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Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

dc.contributor.authorCramton, Peter
dc.contributor.authorSchwartz, Jesse A.
dc.identifier.citation"Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," (with Jesse Schwartz) Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, 1:1,, 2002.
dc.description.abstractThis paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This "code bidding" occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids and code bids in the DEF-?block PCS spectrum auction. We and that only a small fraction of the bidders commonly used retaliating bids and code bids. These bidders won more than 40% of the spectrum for sale and paid significantly less for their overall winnings.en
dc.format.extent373327 bytes
dc.publisherThe Berkley Electronic Press
dc.subjectspectrum licensesen
dc.subjectcollusive biddingen
dc.subjectFederal Communications Commission
dc.subjectcode bidding
dc.titleCollusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctionsen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtEconomics Departmenten_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_us
dc.rights.licenseThe Berkley Electronic Press copyright 2002.

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