Logic for a lifetime
Abstract
There has been an explosion of formal work in commonsense
reasoning in the past fifteen years, but almost no significant connection
with work in building commonsense reasoning systems (cognitive or
otherwise). We explore the reasons, and especially the ideal formal
assumption of omniscience, reviewing and extending arguments that this is
irreparably out of line with the needs of any real reasoning agent. On the
other hand, this exploration reveals some desiderata that might still be
given useful formal treatment, but with a somewhat altered set of aims
from what has motivated most formal work. The discussion is motivated by
several examples of commonsense reasoning, involving change of belief in
addition to the more usual arguments concerning resource limitations. Key
to the entire discussion is the notion that real reasoners do not usually
have the luxury of isolated problems with well-defined beginnings and
endings, but rather must deal with evolving and ongoing problems and
situations.
(Also cross-referenced as UMIACS-TR-94-62)