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dc.contributor.authorPerlis, Donen_US
dc.date.accessioned2004-05-31T22:25:16Z
dc.date.available2004-05-31T22:25:16Z
dc.date.created1994-03en_US
dc.date.issued1998-10-15en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/619
dc.description.abstractSome implications of the view that mind is a suitably complex kind of process are investigated in various contexts. The underlying theme is that the behavior of complex systems cannot be adequately judged by that of simple systems. I first present a personal exploration of the mechanistic account of mind in terms of non-technical considerations; then I present and criticize some ideas of Kripke, Nagel, and Jackson that challenge the mechanistic view. Next I turn to a brief synopsis of some of Dennett's recent ideas. Finally I offer some critical comments on Dennett's views and suggest possible modifications. (Also cross-referenced as UMIACS-TR-94-25)en_US
dc.format.extent177257 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/postscript
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUM Computer Science Department; CS-TR-3232en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUMIACS; UMIACS-TR-94-25en_US
dc.titleConsciousness and complexity: the cognitive questen_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtTech Reports in Computer Science and Engineeringen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUMIACS Technical Reportsen_US


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