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dc.contributor.authorCalvo, Guillermo A.
dc.date.accessioned2007-01-18T19:51:24Z
dc.date.available2007-01-18T19:51:24Z
dc.date.issued1999-05-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/4036
dc.descriptionA rough version of these notes was presented at the AEA 1999 New York Meetings, and at the Winter Camp in International Finance, organized by the Center for International Economics (University of Maryland) and the Faculty of Economics (Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia) in Cartagena, Colombia, January 7-11, 1999.en
dc.description.abstractThe paper examines the case in which the capital market is populated by informed and uninformed investors. The uninformed try to extract information from informed investors’ trades. This opens up the possibility that if informed investors are forced to sell emerging market securities to meet margin calls, for example, this action may be misread by the uninformed investors as signaling low returns in emerging markets. The paper presents a simple model in which this type of Wall Street confusion may result in a collapse in emerging markets’ output.en
dc.format.extent94503 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.subjectemerging marketsen
dc.subjectinformed investorsen
dc.titleContagion in Emerging Markets: When Wall Street is a carrieren
dc.typePresentationen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtEconomics Departmenten_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_us


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