College of Behavioral & Social Sciences

Permanent URI for this communityhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/8

The collections in this community comprise faculty research works, as well as graduate theses and dissertations..

Browse

Filters

1999 - 199912000 - 20061

Settings

Subject: search.filters.subject.electricity

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM
    (Elsevier Science, 1999-04) Cameron, Lisa; Cramton, Peter
    Several regions of the U.S. have sought to restructure the electric power industry by separating the potentially competitive generation sector from the natural monopoly functions of electricity transmission and distribution. Under this restructuring scheme, a central authority, which we will refer to as the independent system operator (ISO), is given control over both the transmission system and the spot market for electricity. The ISO’s role in managing the spot market is relatively uncontroversial. This is because the spot market takes place in real time and requires continuous physical adjustments to electricity supply and demand subject to complex constraints, such as the need to maintain voltage and frequency within tight bands. Although the ISO’s role in managing the spot market is generally accepted, its role in scheduling and pricing generators prior to actual dispatch was hotly debated during the development of California’s market and remains a contentious issue.1 Like other restructured electricity markets, the California market requires generators to be scheduled for operation on a day-ahead basis and allows for adjustments in these day-ahead schedules up to an hour ahead of actual dispatch. However, the California ISO has a minimal role in this scheduling process; almost all scheduling is carried out by a number of competing scheduling coordinators, referred to as SCs. In contrast, the ISO in the Pennsylvania New Jersey Maryland market (PJM) schedules all generators that do not elect to schedule themselves. This paper discusses the California and PJM approaches to shed light on the controversy over the ISO’s role in pre-dispatch phases of the market. Section I describes the California market while Section II briefly reviews PJM. Section III outlines the costs and benefits associated with limiting the ISO’s role in the scheduling phases of the market. Section IV summarizes recent experience in California and PJM and offers conclusions.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    The Economics of Nuclear Power
    (2006-11-28) Horst, Ronald L; Rust, John; Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
    We extend economic analysis of the nuclear power industry by developing and employing three tools. They are 1) compilation and unification of operating and accounting data sets for plants and sites, 2) an abstract industry model with major economic agents and features, and 3) a model of nuclear power plant operators. We build a matched data set to combine dissimilar but mutually dependent bodies of information. We match detailed information on the activities and conditions of individual plants to slightly more aggregated financial data. Others have exploited the data separately, but we extend the sets and pool available data sets. The data reveal dramatic changes in the industry over the past thirty years. The 1980s proved unprofitable for the industry. This is evident both in the cost data and in the operator activity data. Productivity then improved dramatically while cost growth stabilized to the point of industry profitability. Relative electricity prices may be rising after nearly two decades of decline. Such demand side trends, together with supply side improvements, suggest a healthy industry. Our microeconomic model of nuclear power plant operators employs a forward-looking component to capture the information set available to decision makers and to model the decision-making process. Our model includes features often overlooked elsewhere, including electricity price equations and liability. Failure to account for changes in electricity price trends perhaps misled earlier scholars, and they attributed to other causes the effects on profits of changing price structures. The model includes potential losses resulting from catastrophic nuclear accidents. Applications include historical simulations and forecasts. Nuclear power involves risk, and accident costs are borne both by plant owners and the public. Authorities regulate the industry and balance conflicting desires for economic gain and safety. We construct an extensible model with regulators, plant operators, insurance companies, and consumers. The model possesses key attributes of the industry seldom found in combination elsewhere. We then add additional details to make the model truer to reality. The work extends and corrects existing literature on the definition, effects, and magnitudes of implicit subsidies resulting from liability limits.