College of Behavioral & Social Sciences
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The collections in this community comprise faculty research works, as well as graduate theses and dissertations..
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Item To Whisper in the King's Ear: Economists in Pahlavi and Islamic Iran(2013) Sadr, Ehsanee Ian; Haufler, Virginia A.; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Who whispers in the King's ear, for how long, and to what effect? The primary hypothesis guiding this study is that economists gain influence when the international resources they can deliver are valued and desired by the country's political leadership; and economists lose influence when those resources are not valued or desired. Alternate hypotheses that consider the role of increasing complexity in international economic relations, epistemic communities, emulation, and economists' political activity are also considered. These hypotheses are evaluated through a study of the experiences of economists in Iran under both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic regime. Results indicate support for the primary hypothesis that economists are desired for their ability to signal competence and gain the trust of the international financial and donor communities. Surprisingly, especially in the Islamic Republic, epistemic communities of economists are also found to have been very successful in using moments of political or economic crisis to influence the worldview and economic policy preferences of political leaders.Item THREE ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY(2010) Miller, Sebastian Jose; Drazen, Allan; Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation explores three different relevant questions in political economy. Chapter 1 is devoted to understanding why populist-outsider candidates get elected, and what conditions may favor/hinder their electability. The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff also are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into office. Chapter 2 in turn explores the role of the middle class in moderating political outcome in a framework where money and votes play two distinctive roles in the election process. In this chapter, a three-class model of heterogeneous agents is developed in which groups affect policy outcomes through their voting behavior and contributions to political campaigns, and where income inequality can lead to extreme policy outcomes. Increasing the size of the middle class reduces the likelihood of extreme policy outcomes, as does a richer middle class. This result highlights the importance of a large and strong middle class for political stability. Finally Chapter 3 looks at the question of why inequality has remained persistently high in Chile despite its success in reducing poverty and achieving high growth for two decades while having a mostly pro-poor structure of public expenditures. We show that the key factors explaining this persistent inequality have been a low level of fiscal expenditures caused by low tax revenues that have not permitted enough public investment in human capital and R&D.Item ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES(2009) Hennessey, Jessica Lynne; Wallis, John J; Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This thesis focuses on the changing relationship between state and local governments. I explore state-level constitutional changes in the 19th and early 20th century with respect to the governance and organization of municipalities. The rich heterogeneity across state constitutions gives us an opportunity to understand the underlying political and economic forces at work, using a fiscal federalism and political economy framework. There are parallels between state-level constitutional changes regarding private corporations and the less well understood changes instituted for public corporations such as municipalities. The adoption of municipal general legislation stemmed from similar problems of special interests and political maneuvering under special legislation. In some states, general legislation protected municipalities from unwanted abuse by state-level politics, and provided a uniform structure under which all local governments could operate and easily gain access to the corporate form. However, as in the case of private corporations, the one-size-fits-all rubric of general legislation was often not amenable to all municipalities. Some states implemented a Pareto-improving solution, which is to have general legislation available for those well served by it, and to give municipalities the flexibility to self-select and independently charter themselves. The resolution to grant home rule to municipalities retained the political security afforded by general legislation and provided the freedom of organization to those who needed it most. The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 documents the history of the relationship between states and their municipalities. The chapter also discusses the various problems states had in maintaining the original setup of passing special laws for municipalities. Chapter 3 evaluates the changing economic and political conditions which may influence a state's choice of how to structure the state-municipal relationship. Chapter 4 looks at one institutional change, the adoption of home rule. By using a unique municipal-level dataset, I empirically investigate why certain states may have adopted this institution. Chapter 5 considers another form of local government, the school district. The patterns seen in the state-municipal relationship are mirrored in the state-school district relationship.Item Essays on Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries(2009) Ilzetzki, Ethan; Drazen, Allan; Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Several empirical studies have found that government expenditures are procyclical in developing countries, unlike the countercyclical expenditures observed in high-income countries. This dissertation attempts to explain this phenomenon and to refine this empirical observation. It contains two essays. The first provides a dynamic political economy theory of the phenomenon of procyclical fiscal policy. In the model, governments provide public insurance to uninsured households, and time-consistent redistributive policies are countercyclical. The introduction of a political friction, in which alternating governments disagree on the desired redistributive policy, can lead to procyclical transfer policies. In numerical simulations, the model successfully captures the cyclicality of government expenditures, tax revenues, and deficits observed in the data for both high-income and developing countries. Simulations also allow a quantitative comparison with other common explanations for fiscal procyclicality. Without the political friction, borrowing constraints and differences in macroeconomic volatility cannot account for the differences in fiscal policy across countries in this setting. The second chapter addresses potential endogeneity problems in the measurement of the fiscal stance. We build a novel quarterly dataset for 49 countries covering the period 1960-2006 and subject the data to a battery of econometric tests: instrumental variables, simultaneous equations, and time-series methods. We find that (i) fiscal policy is indeed procyclical in developing countries and (ii) fiscal policy is also expansionary, lending empirical support to the notion that "when it rains, it pours."