Accounting & Information Assurance
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Item The Spillover Effect of Environmental Disclosures: Evidence from Customers' Net-zero Pledges(2024) Castillo, Juan; Hann, Rebecca; Business and Management: Accounting & Information Assurance; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This paper investigates the real impact of customers’ voluntary environmental disclosures, specifically, Net-Zero Pledges (NZPs), on the direct greenhouse gas emissions of their suppliers. NZPs represent a growing trend in corporate disclosure, where companies commit to reducing carbon emissions to a minimum level by a specified date, with any remaining emissions being offset by carbon removal actions. Using firms’ connections along the supply chain and a staggered difference-in-differences design, this study provides evidence that suppliers significantly reduce their direct emissions following customers’ NZPs. This effect is more pronounced for NZPs made by customers with greater bargaining power, while suppliers’ reactions are stronger when they have higher carbon intensity and better environmental performance. Furthermore, NZPs of higher quality elicit a stronger response, especially when they limit the use of carbon offsets, set interim targets, and establish public reporting mechanisms. The evidence suggests that this reduction in emissions is achieved by suppliers’ investments in green technologies and innovation, as well as improvements in environmental policies in the years following customers’ NZPs. While these modifications do not seem to change firms’ profitability, they are associated with increased business output and capital investments, though at the expense of additional debt. These findings suggest that customers’ voluntary environmental disclosures can trigger positive spillover effects in upstream suppliers’ real operations, even in the absence of mandatory regulations.Item Non-Investor Stakeholders and Earnings Benchmarks(2017) Wei, Sijing; Kimbrough, Michael D.; Business and Management: Accounting & Information Assurance; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)ABSTRACT A firm has numerous non-investor stakeholders, such as customers, employees, and potential business partners, who provide needed monetary and nonmonetary support to the firm. In Essay One, I provide empirical evidence on the previously untested theoretical prediction that these stakeholders’ views of a firm depend on its ability to meet relevant earnings benchmarks. Using published and proprietary reputation scores to capture stakeholder perceptions, I find in both levels and changes analyses that non-investor stakeholder perceptions are positively associated with a firm’s ability to beat relevant earnings benchmarks and that the relevant earnings benchmark for each stakeholder group varies based on the nature of its claim. Specifically, customer perceptions are positively associated with a firm’s ability to meet the profit benchmark. Potential business partner perceptions are positively associated with a firm’s ability to meet both the analyst forecast benchmark and the earnings growth benchmark. Employee perceptions are positively associated with a firm’s ability to meet the earnings growth benchmark. These findings highlight broader uses of and broader audiences for accounting information than previously documented. In Essay Two, I examine whether and how firms consider their non-investor stakeholders when prioritizing which earnings benchmarks to meet or beat. Using a sample of publicly traded firms from 1990 to 2015, I identify which non-investor stakeholder group (i.e. consumers, employees, or potential business partners) is most critical to a firm based on a stakeholder dependency score, which measures the extent to which a firm relies on a particular stakeholder group. I find that, regardless of which non-investor stakeholder group is most critical to the firm, firms beat the analyst forecast benchmark several times more frequently than they beat other benchmarks. Because the analyst forecast is the most important benchmark to the capital market, this finding indicates that managers place greater weight on investors’ preferences than on the preferences of their non-investor stakeholders when deciding which earnings benchmarks to meet or beat. Thus, capital market pressure appears to dominate the pressure from non-investor stakeholders. However, I also find that consumer-focused (employee-focused) firms meet or beat the profit benchmark (the increase benchmark) more often than non-consumer-focused firms (non-employee-focused firms) when the profit benchmark (the increase benchmark) is the most difficult to beat or when pre-managed earnings falls short of the associated benchmark. These results indicate that firms are more likely to meet or beat the specific earnings benchmark that is most relevant to a particular non-investor stakeholder group when that non-investor stakeholder group is most critical to the firm. These findings contribute to a better understanding of how managers incorporate non-investor stakeholders’ preferences in their decisions about which earnings benchmarks to meet or beat.Item THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC EQUITY OWNERSHIP ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT THROUGH THE MANIPULATION OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES(2011) Kim, Yura; KIMBROUGH, MICHAEL D; Business and Management: Accounting & Information Assurance; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This paper examines whether public equity firms and private equity firms with public debt exhibit different degrees of real earnings management, defined as the manipulation of operational activities in order to influence reported earnings. Public equity firms face intense capital market scrutiny that their private equity counterparts do not. Therefore, this study's comparison of the two types of firms provides insight on the impact of capital market pressure on real earnings management behaviors. The impact of capital market pressure is not clear ex ante. On the one hand, the scrutiny associated with the public equity markets may play a disciplining role that leads firms to refrain from activities that distort reported earnings. On the other hand, the penalties faced by public equity firms that fail to meet earnings benchmarks may put additional pressure on top managers to report positive and improved earnings and hence, may lead to greater distortion of reported earnings through the manipulation of operational activities. Consistent with the latter possibility, I find that public equity firms are more likely than private equity firms to opportunistically alter normal operations to improve earnings by cutting R&D spending, by pushing sales through discounts and promotions, and by lowering costs of sales through overproduction. I find no difference in abnormal discretionary expenses between public equity and private equity firms. Although private equity firms with public debt do not face the same capital market pressure that public equity firms face, they are not immune from incentives to engage in real earnings management. Specifically, I find that private equity firms with public debt engage in a greater degree of real earnings management as their debt moves closer to default. Given that debt claims become more like equity claims as a firm's debt moves closer to default, this finding suggests that public debtholders exert similar pressure to public equity holders when their claims become more equity-like. Moreover, private equity firms with public debt that do engage in real earnings management appear to emphasize the zero earnings benchmark, consistent with prior research, suggesting that this benchmark is of primary importance to creditors. In addition, I assess the performance implications of capital market-induced real earnings management, by examining its association with one-year ahead industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA). I find that public equity firms that just meet earnings benchmarks while altering real operating activities suffer from lower future industry-adjusted ROA than private equity firms that just meet earnings benchmarks while altering real operating activities. The finding for the public equity firms validates concerns that operating decisions made in response to capital market pressure may negatively impact future firm performance. On the other hand, the results for private equity firms indicate that alterations of operating activities made in the absence of capital market pressure are more likely to be strategically sound.