Theses and Dissertations from UMD
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Item An East and West Debate on Human Rights(2011) Chan, Benedict Shing Bun; Morris, Christopher W.; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)In an East and West debate on human rights, scholars from different cultures disagree on whether all civil and political rights are human rights. While they generally agree that basic civil rights such as rights against torture and slavery (i.e., physical security rights) are human rights, some of them argue that traditional political rights in the West such as freedom of speech and political participation (i.e., liberal rights) are not human rights. Some scholars, such as Daniel A. Bell, argue that liberal rights are not human rights because liberal rights conflict with some East Asian cultures. In this dissertation, I argue that both physical security rights and liberal rights are human rights, and explain the relationship between these rights and East Asian cultures. First, I argue that if liberal rights are not human rights because they conflict with some East Asian cultures, then physical security rights are also not human rights because physical security rights also conflict with some East Asian cultures. Next, I discuss the idea from Daniel Bell and Michael Walzer that physical security rights are human rights because they are minimal values. Based on their idea, I explain what minimal values are, and why it is possible to develop some maximal theories of physical security rights in East Asian cultures. I argue that since physical security rights are minimal values, they are still human rights even they conflict with some East Asian cultures. I then argue that liberal rights, similar to physical security rights, are also minimal values, and it is possible to develop some maximal theories of them in East Asian cultures. Therefore, similar to physical security rights, liberal rights are also human rights even they also conflict with some East Asian cultures. I also discuss other human rights debates, especially the debates between Daniel Bell and other philosophers. Charles Taylor argues for an overlapping consensus approach on human rights; Jack Donnelly argues for a Western liberalist approach on human rights. I explain the relationship between these approaches and my arguments, and how my arguments can help them to reply to the challenges from Daniel Bell.Item ARISTOTLE'S TREATMENT OF THE SOCRATIC PARADOX IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS(2009) McBrayer, Gregory A.; Butterworth, Charles E.; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation seeks to understand one of the most perplexing statements uttered by the Platonic Socrates, the so-called Socratic Paradox that no one voluntarily does wrong. In such dialogues as the Gorgias and the Protagoras, Socrates famously, or infamously, declared that all wrongdoing is a result of ignorance and is therefore not culpable. While the beginning point for this investigation is Socrates, this dissertation turns for the most part to Aristotle as the first and foremost commentator on the Platonic dialogues, guided by the belief that Aristotle can aid in the discovery of what Socrates' outlandish assertion means. In Books III and VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle takes up the questions on which the Socratic Paradox touches, submitting the so-called paradox to scrutiny in Book VII. While much research has focused on the Socratic Paradox, the contribution of this work is to exploit the intellectual genius Aristotle has brought to bear on this question. Turning to Aristotle will allow us to gain greater clarity into this central tenet of Socratic Political Philosophy.Item Rwanda and the Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention(2007-04-25) Kassner, Joshua James; Morris, Christopher W; Morris, Christopher W; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)In 1994, nearly one million Men, women, and children were slaughtered because of their ethnicity. The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide has caused many to question the international community's choice not to intervene. I use the Rwandan genocide as a means of discussing international morality and the role of morality in international relations. The first half of my project focuses on humanitarian intervention as an issue of global ethics. I argue that the international community, as a collection of duty-bearing states, had a moral obligation to intervene in Rwanda. To defend this proposition I must first establish the conceptual possibility of global ethics. In that vein, I begin by arguing against various skeptical arguments made by communitarians, relativists, and political realists. Having made the conceptual room for global ethics, I then develop a weak moral principle in support of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention by identifying the set of conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that such an obligation exists. I next explain how states can and why they on occasion do bear that obligation. Lastly, I argue that the Rwandan genocide fulfilled such conditions; as a consequence, not only was intervention permissible, it was obligatory. The second half of my project is concerned with the role moral demands should play in the practical deliberations of states. Many international relations scholars contend that questions of intervention are largely determined by the right of nonintervention which precludes other states from considering reasons for action that would require intervention. Against such scholars I argue that the role the right of nonintervention played in the practical deliberations of states during the Rwandan genocide was, and remains, unjustified. In the alternative, I argue that we ought to adopt a rebuttable presumption in favor of nonintervention. Such a rule would serve the same goals as the right of nonintervention, but without the unjustified preclusion of moral reasons for action. I conclude that the presumption of nonintervention would have been rebutted during the Rwandan genocide, and that the international community ought to have intervened.