Theses and Dissertations from UMD
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New submissions to the thesis/dissertation collections are added automatically as they are received from the Graduate School. Currently, the Graduate School deposits all theses and dissertations from a given semester after the official graduation date. This means that there may be up to a 4 month delay in the appearance of a give thesis/dissertation in DRUM
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Item Assessing Motives for Russian Federation Use and Non-use of Force: An Approach to Improve the Strategic Planning and Policy of the United States(2021) Hickey, Christopher John; Gallagher, Nancy W.; Public Policy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)The purpose of this dissertation is to inform scholarship and improve U.S. policy and strategy to prevent the Russian Federation from using military force against U.S. interests. It does this by exploring and answering the question, what explains the Russian Federation’s choices on the use of military force? The dissertation developed and demonstrated an approach to translating policy debates into sufficiently rigorous sets of competing explanations of strategic behavior for expectations about future behavior under various conditions to be stated and tested. The explanations developed and tested used motives derived from The Rational Theory of International Politics by Glaser and The Logic of Political Survival by Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow. Systematic analysis of competing explanations attempted to find incongruence between the expectations if a motive was a plausible explanation and the behaviors actually observed since 1991. This dissertation found that the Russian Federation’s choices on the use of military force are explainable by the balancing of three motives. These choices have prioritized first the motive of the president’s political survival, then Russia’s self-protection/security motive, and then Russia’s domination/greed motive. This suggests that the Russian Federation calculates risks when making these choices differently than currently assumed. The most important risks influencing these decisions are those related to the future of the Russian president’s political winning coalition. These findings allow the U.S. to take a game theory-informed approach to strategic planning that seeks to prevent the use of military force against U.S. interests at a lower level of costs and risks than the current approach. The United States should develop a strategy to foster three somewhat contradictory calculations simultaneously. The U.S. strategy needs to communicate that the negative consequences of using force would outweigh whatever potential benefit might tempt the domination/greed motive. At the same time, the strategy needs to communicate that if Russia acts with restraint, then Russian self-protection/security motive concerns will be addressed cooperatively. Most importantly, the strategy needs to influence the Russian president’s calculations about whether using or not using force against U.S. interests would be better for personal political survival.Item Turkish Security Policymaking on Nuclear Issues: Conceptualizing Advanced Cooperative Security Strategies(2016) Goren, Nilsu; Gallagher, Nancy W.; Public Policy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Turkey is a non-nuclear member of a nuclear alliance in a region where nuclear proliferation is of particular concern. As the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member that has a border with the Middle East, Turkish officials argue that Turkey cannot solely rely on NATO guarantees in addressing the regional security challenges. However, Turkey has not been able to formulate a security policy that reconciles its quest for independence, its NATO membership, the bilateral relationship with the United States, and regional engagement in the Middle East. This dissertation assesses the strategic implications of Turkey’s perceptions of the U.S./NATO nuclear and conventional deterrence on nuclear issues. It explores three case studies by the process tracing of Turkish policymakers’ nuclear-related decisions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, national air and missile defense, and Iran’s nuclear program. The study finds that the principles of Turkish security policymaking do not incorporate a fundamentally different reasoning on nuclear issues than conventional deterrence. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems do not have a defining role in Turkish security and defense strategy. The decisions are mainly guided by non-nuclear considerations such as Alliance politics, modernization of the domestic defense industry, and regional influence. The dissertation argues that Turkey could formulate more effective and less risky security policies on nuclear issues by emphasizing the cooperative security approaches within the NATO Alliance over confrontational measures. The findings of this dissertation reveal that a major transformation of Turkish security policymaking is required to end the crisis of confidence with NATO, redefinition of the strategic partnership with the US, and a more cautious approach toward the Middle East. The dissertation argues that Turkey should promote proactive measures to reduce, contain, and counter risks before they develop into real threats, as well as contribute to developing consensual confidence-building measures to reduce uncertainty.Item REVERSAL OF POLICY: THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE, AND THE ARMING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 1946-1955(2012) Goldberg, Sheldon Aaron; Herf, Jeffrey; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Between 1946 and 1950, the U.S. State Department repeatedly expressed its determination to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized and offered pledges regarding the extended presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe. At the same time, and initially unbeknownst to the State Department, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were making plans to arm Germany in response to the growing Soviet threat to Western Europe. In September 1950, in reaction to the communist invasion of South Korea that had prompted fears the same would happen in Germany, the United States decided to arm the Federal Republic of Germany. Although coupled with a pledge to increase the number of U.S. troops in Europe, the U.S. decision resulted in a number of unintended consequences including a Congressional challenge to Presidential power, opposition by and discord among U.S. Allies, loss of control over the rearmament process, and the establishment of a new set of relations with its erstwhile enemy. While the actual outcome of that 1950 decision was positive, i.e., the arming of the Federal Republic of Germany was approved, the creation of a national German army was not what official U.S. policy had intended.Item Creating Deterrence for Limited War: The U.S. Army and the Defense of West Germany, 1953-1982(2006-04-06) Trauschweizer, Ingo; Sumida, Jon T.; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation addresses the role of the U.S. Army as an instrument of national and alliance strategy in the era of the Cold War. The army was confronted with the fundamental question of its utility in the nuclear age. This dissertation argues that after the Korean War army leaders pursued a consistent policy to create a force that could deter limited, i.e., conventional and tactical-nuclear war in Central Europe. This policy resulted in a three-decade long transition process, as the army had to respond to influences ranging from the Soviet threat to inter-service rivalry, budgetary concerns, rapidly evolving technology, and military and political developments in Europe and Asia. The transition process occurred in three stages. First, army leaders redefined the mission of their institution from war-fighting to the deterrence of war. Then, the structure of combat divisions was altered to reflect the requirements of nuclear as well as conventional battlefields. Finally, and only after the Vietnam War, doctrine was introduced that combined specific objectives in Central Europe, modern divisional structure, weapons technology, and newly defined principles of operational art in a coherent system of air and land warfare. At the heart of the dissertation rests the question of strategic decision-making and the impact of military institutions. But it also addresses NATO's military and political capabilities and considers the effect of nuclear weapons on land warfare and the deterrence of war. Moreover, it is a study of civil-military relations in the United States. Finally, it offers a fresh view of the Vietnam War by placing both the periphery and center of the Cold War in the context of potentially devastating nuclear war. Scholarship of the Cold War to date has emphasized the effects of nuclear deterrence and neglected the contribution of ground forces to the prevention of war. This dissertation is based on archival research in Europe and the United States, including the archives of NATO and the German military, the U.S. National Archives, the National Security Archive, several presidential libraries, and other major repositories of manuscripts of diplomats, military officers, and political leaders.Item TOWARD A THEORY OF JUST COMMUNICATION: A CASE STUDY OF NATO, MULTINATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT(2005-07-27) Van Dyke, Mark A.; Grunig, James E.; Communication; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation used a qualitative, case study to explore how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) applied strategic public relations management during peace operations in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 to 1996. The purpose of this research was to propose a model of ethical communication that extended the excellence theory in public relations and contributed to a global public relations theory. This proposed model relies on an ethical framework for moral reasoning that helps justify public relations decisions. The model incorporates interdisciplinary concepts drawn from the situational theory of publics, the excellence theory, an activist theory of communication, a moral theory of just war, and game theory. Fourteen long interviews, four elite interviews, and three focus group interviews explained how NATO applied principles of the excellence theory and global theory in public relations, how organizational culture and conflict influenced NATO communication management, and how NATO leaders made communication decisions. It had been assumed that NATO's political-military, authoritarian nature would lead the alliance to reject symmetrical communication and to adopt asymmetrical communication strategies. The study found that NATO mixed symmetrical communication - and other principles of the excellence theory and global public relations - with asymmetrical strategies like coercion to manage conflict. The study also identified a constellation of divided cultures among NATO's 26 member nations that influenced alliance public relations. Furthermore, senior NATO leaders relied heavily on intuitive knowledge when making decisions, leaving communication choices vulnerable to ethical relativism. In conclusion, this study has significant implications for theory and practice. The integrated, coercive-collaborative model of ethical communication developed through this study offers normative and positive value for managing asymmetrical conflict situations in which one or more parties demonstrate no willingness to cooperate. This model retains the value of excellence in public relations, which produces strategic, long-term, symmetrical relationships. Demonstrating how symmetrical outcomes can be achieved through ethical application of short-term coercive as well as collaborative communication tactics represents a major leap forward for the excellence theory. Practical implications of this study extend to any organization that relies on communication to manage conflict, build strategic relationships, and reduce costs - especially in a global, multinational context.