Economics Research Works
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/9
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Item Path Curves and Plant Buds: an Introduction to the Work of Lawrence Edwards(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1979-07) Almon, ClopperLawrence Edwards has shown that many flowering plants have buds with an outline in the form of a path curve, the curve that a point follows under repeated projective transformation of the plane into itself. Edwards, however, did not give a formula for these curves nor did he fit the curves by the standard method of least squares. This paper gives an elementary exposition of the method used by Edwards, shows its relation to projective geometry, and then uses homogeneous coordinates, linear differential equations and characteristic values and vectors of a matrix to derive the formula for path curves. This formula is then used to fit path curves by least squares to data provided by Edwards for the buds of 150 plants. Most buds are fit very closely.Item Scientific Programming with Borland C++ Builder and Codegear's Turbo C++(2008) Almon, ClopperThis tutorial explains the use of Borland C++ Builder and Codegear Turbo C++ for writing Graphical User Interfaces for Windows for scientific, number-crunching applications. Drawing graphs and making help files are explained with examples.Item A Brief Guide to C and C++ for Fortran or Basic Programmers(1999) Almon, ClopperThis paper introduces C and C++ programming for learners who already have some experience in another language such as Fortran or Basic. It explains basic syntax, dynamic space allocation, structures, classes, constructors and destructors, and overloading of operators. All concepts are illustrated with working programs.Item Unions, Bargaining and Strikes(Edward Elgar, 2002-08-25) Cramton, Peter; Tracy, JosephItem The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation(Edward Elgar, 1999) Cramton, Paul A.Item Nonrandom Mixing Models of HIV Transmission(Springer-Verlag, 1989) Kaplan, Edward H.; Cramton, Peter; Paltiel, A. DavidModels of HIV transmission and the AIDS epidemic generally assume random mixing among those infected with HIV and those who are not. For sexually transmitted HIV, this implies that individuals select sex partners without regard to attributes such as familiarity, attractiveness, or risk of infection. This paper formulates a model for examining the impact of nonrandom mixing on HIV transmission. We present threshold conditions that determine when HIV epidemics can occur within the framework of this model. Nonrandom mixing is introduced by assuming that sexually active individuals select sex partners to minimize the risk of infection. In addition to variability in risky sex rates, some versions of our model allow for error (or noise) in information exchanged between prospective partners. We investigate several models including random partner selection (or proportionate mixing), segregation of the population by risky sex rates, a probabilistic combination of segregation and random selection induced by imperfect information (or preferred mixing), and a model of costly search with perfect information. We develop examples which show that nonrandom mixing can lead to epidemics that are more severe or less severe than random mixing. For reasonable parameter choices describing the AIDS epidemic, however, the results suggest that random mixing models overstate the number of HIV infections that will occur.Item Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions(Springer-Verlag, 2000-05) Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse A.The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We examine solutions to mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions.Item Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing(Springer-Verlag, 2004-04) Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, PeterWe generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders’ reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.Item Auctioning Many Divisible Goods(MIT Press, 2004) Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, PeterWe study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder’s decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them.Item The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages(MIT Press, 1999) Cramton, Peter; Gunderson, Morley; Tracy, JosephUsing Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January 1967 to March 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, general contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and employers better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to significantly higher negotiation costs and redistribution of quasi-rents from employers to unions.