Economics Research Works

Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/9

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Start date: 1991End date: 1999

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 30
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    A Brief Guide to C and C++ for Fortran or Basic Programmers
    (1999) Almon, Clopper
    This paper introduces C and C++ programming for learners who already have some experience in another language such as Fortran or Basic. It explains basic syntax, dynamic space allocation, structures, classes, constructors and destructors, and overloading of operators. All concepts are illustrated with working programs.
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    The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation
    (Edward Elgar, 1999) Cramton, Paul A.
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    The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages
    (MIT Press, 1999) Cramton, Peter; Gunderson, Morley; Tracy, Joseph
    Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January 1967 to March 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, general contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and employers better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to significantly higher negotiation costs and redistribution of quasi-rents from employers to unions.
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    Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Practice
    (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1991) Dees, J. Gregory; Cramton, Peter
    From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. When grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about one’s settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases it is condoned, even admired as shrewd bargaining. Because of the difficulty in verifying someone’s settlement preferences, it is hard to establish a basis for trusting the revelations of the other party, especially in competitive negotiations with relative strangers.
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    Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics
    (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1993) Cramton, Peter; Dees, J. Gregory
    In a competitive and morally imperfect world, business people are often faced with serious ethical challenges. Harboring suspicions about the ethics of others, many feel justified in engaging in less-than-ideal conduct to protect their own interests. The most sophisticated moral arguments are unlikely to counteract this behavior. We believe that this morally defensive behavior is responsible, in large part, for much undesirable deception in negotiation. Drawing on recent work in the literature of negotiations, we present some practical guidance on how negotiators might build trust, establish common interests, and secure credibility for their statements thereby promoting honesty. We also point out the types of social and institutional arrangements, many of which have become commonplace, that work to promote credibility, trust, and honesty in business dealings. Our approach is offered not only as a specific response to the problem of deception in negotiation, but as one model of how research in business ethics might offer constructive advice to practitioners.
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    Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction
    (Blackwell, 1995) Cramton, Peter
    The Federal Communications Commission held its first auction of radio spectrum at the Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction in July 1994. The simultaneous multiple-round auction, which lasted five days, was an ascending bid auction in which all licenses were offered simultaneously. This paper describes the auction rules and how bidders prepared for the auction. The full history of bidding is presented. Several questions for auction theory are discussed. In the end, the government collected $617 million for ten licenses. The auction was viewed by all as a huge success—an excellent example of bringing economic theory to bear on practical problems of allocating scarce resources.
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    Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
    (Blackwell, 1997) Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter; McAfee, R. Preston; McMillan, John
    We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest-losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.
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    Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets
    (Elsevier Science, 1997-12) Cameron, Lisa J.; Cramton, Peter; Wilson, Robert
    In most states, ratepayers will compensate utilities for their stranded costs. As a result, these costs must be measured as accurately as possible, in a manner that is easily understood by all concerned parties. We describe the options for measuring stranded costs and argue that a simultaneous ascending auction is the best approach.
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    The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes
    (University of Chicago Press, 1994) Cramton, Peter; Tracy, Joseph S.
    We present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations, in which the union decides between two threats: the union can strike or continue to work under the expired contract. The model makes predictions about the level of dispute activity and the form the disputes take. Strike incidence increases as the strike threat becomes more attractive, because of low unemployment or a real wage drop during the prior contract. We test these predictions by estimating logistic models of dispute incidence and dispute composition for U.S. labor contract negotiations from 1970 to 1989. We find empirical support for the model's key predictions, but these associations are weaker after 1981.
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    Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats
    (University of Chicago Press, 1994) Cramton, Peter; Tracy, Joseph S.
    We study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm's willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time. Strike payoffs change over time as replacement workers are hired, as strikers find temporary jobs, and as inventories or strike funds run out. We find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary. If dispute costs increase in the long-run, then dispute durations are longer, settlement rates are lower, and wages decline more slowly during the short-run (and may even increase). The settlement wage is largely determined from the long-run threat, rather than the short-run threat.