Government & Politics Theses and Dissertations
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/2775
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Item A Better Place to Be: Republicanism as an Alternative to the Authoritarianism-Democracy Dichotomy(2016) Binetti, Christopher; Alford, Charles F; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: A BETTER PLACE TO BE: REPUBLICANISM AS AN ALTENATIVE TO THE AUTHORITARIANISM-DEMOCRACY DICHOTOMY Christopher Ronald Binetti, Doctor of Philosophy, and 2016 Dissertation directed by: Dr. Charled Frederick Alford, Department of Government and Politics In this dissertation, I argue that in modern or ancient regimes, the simple dichotomy between democracies and autocracies/dictatorships is both factually wrong and problematic for policy purposes. It is factually wrong because regimes between the two opposite regime types exist and it is problematic because the either/or dichotomy leads to extreme thinking in terms of nation-building in places like Afghanistan. In planning for Afghanistan, the argument is that either we can quickly nation-build it into a liberal democracy or else we must leave it in the hands of a despotic dictator. This is a false choice created by both a faulty categorization of regime types and most importantly, a failure to understand history. History shows us that the republic is a regime type that defies the authoritarian-democracy dichotomy. A republic by my definition is a non-dominating regime, characterized by a (relative) lack of domination by any one interest group or actor, mostly non-violent competition for power among various interest groups/factions, the ability of factions/interest groups/individual actors to continue to legitimately play the political game even after electoral or issue-area defeat and some measure of effectiveness. Thus, a republic is a system of government that has institutions, laws, norms, attitudes, and beliefs that minimize the violation of the rule of law and monopolization of power by one individual or group as much as possible. These norms, laws, attitudes, and beliefs ae essential to the republican system in that they make those institutions that check and balance power work. My four cases are Assyria, Persia, Venice and Florence. Assyria and Persia are ancient regimes, the first was a republic and then became the frightening opposite of a republic, while the latter was a good republic for a long time, but had effectiveness issues towards the end. Venice is a classical example of a medieval or early modern republic, which was very inspirational to Madison and others in building republican America. Florence is the example of a medieval republic that fell to despotism, as immortalized by Machiavelli’s writings. In all of these examples, I test certain alternative hypotheses as well as my own.Item Electoral Systems and Representation: the Effects of District Magnitude(2013) Taylor, Jeffrey Alan; Herrnson, Paul S.; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)District magnitude (the number of representatives elected from a district) influences the strategies legislators adopt to build and maintain electoral security. In comparison to single member districts (SMDs), representatives in multimember districts (MMDs) compete for votes alongside a large set of candidates, and often share a party affiliation with other candidates competing for one of many available seats in the same district. This project sheds new light on the effects of district magnitude on the political careers of elected representatives and the nature of representation provided by a legislature. Utilizing a unique data set of campaign and legislative behavior in conjunction with personal interviews of current state legislators in four states, I find that those elected in MMDs build and maintain electoral support differently from those in SMDs. Specifically, I find that district magnitude influences the way candidates interact on the campaign trail, attention to local governments and organized interests, the degree to which representatives specialize, and the balance of power in the legislative chamber. The results have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between electoral systems and democratic representation, and suggest that many long-standing assumptions regarding the influence of district magnitude on elite political behavior may be in need of revision.Item Representation in State Legislatures: Searching for Responsiveness in an Age of Polarization(2006-04-24) Bigelow, Nathan S.; Herrnson, Paul S; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)The purpose of this dissertation is to assess the degree to which state legislators are responsive to their various constituencies. The guiding research questions are: 1) Under what circumstances are state legislators most responsive to their districts, parties, and interest group supporters? 2) What drives certain legislators to take extreme issue positions? And 3) What explains and what are the consequences of state legislative polarization? I propose a theory of conditional responsiveness that specifies circumstances (issue type, electoral competition and legislative professionalism) under which responsiveness is most likely to occur. I systematically test my hypotheses using an original data set that includes information on over 4,000 state legislators and their districts in 30 different states. I find legislators to be most responsive to constituents on high salience social issues. On lower salience economic issues, state representatives are much more responsive to their interest group supporters. In addition, I find members from electorally safe districts to be most responsive to their districts as safe members are more likely to reflect their district's demographic and political homogeneity. Legislative professionalism if found to enhance responsiveness. This discovery supports the view of many scholars who saw the professionalization of state legislatures in the latter half of the 20th century as a healthy development. Across the country, I find a good deal of ideological extremism among state legislators. This legislative extremism, when aggregated, results in chamber level polarization. This polarization cuts into the productivity of the legislatures, making stalemate a more common legislative outcome. Policy responsiveness occurring in state legislatures is a reassuring finding; responsiveness, however, is conditional. Certain conditions influence the degree to which constituency opinion really matters. Perhaps the most important condition is the level of public interest on a given policy issue - when people care, legislators respond. This observation has practical implications for our democratic system of government. Representatives, without an informed or caring citizenry, can get away with straying from the wishes or needs of their constituents. As such, a necessary component of representative democracy must be an informed and vigilant citizenry.