Government & Politics Theses and Dissertations
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/2775
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Item The Oil Blessing? Hydrocarbons’ Effects on Maritime Boundary Formation(2023) O'Brien, Patrick L; Huth, Paul H; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Do natural resources help states resolve contentious maritime boundary issues? Literature on maritime boundaries suggests that states often sign maritime boundary agreements to acquire offshore hydrocarbons, yet there are also ample examples when resources have been the reason why states dispute maritime zones. To explain this apparent contradiction, an oil effect is posited that is conditional on states’ pre-existing claims. When maritime neighbors do not have overlapping maritime claims, the onset of oil interests in bordering maritime space make states more likely to sign delimitation agreements to achieve the legal certainty necessary to extract the oil. However, among states engaged in a maritime dispute prior to the onset of hydrocarbon interests, a different industry risk calculus, increased audience costs, and institutional challenges in reducing extant claims all mean that the same effect should not be observable. Meanwhile, the increased issue salience born from the oil interest should also make states more likely to pursue peaceful settlement attempts through other agreements related to their maritime zones, like establishing a joint development zone or pursuing third party conflict management. A dataset of maritime boundaries was improved upon to test this theory on 447 pairs of maritime neighbors from 1946 to 2016. Regression analyses confirm that a nearby oil discovery makes delimitation agreements more likely only among dyads without a prior existing dispute. Closer examination of 27 joint development zone agreements and 38 agreements to pursue binding third-party dispute settlement suggest that the order of events also plays a key role. Indeed, states engaged in a new dispute prompted by hydrocarbon interests are the most likely to sign all three agreement types—delimitation, joint development zone, and judicial settlement. In a comparative case study using U.S. maritime boundaries, oil interests are shown to have hastened delimitation agreements between the United States and Mexico, whereas oil interests made dispute resolution more difficult in U.S.-Canada maritime boundary areas. After resorting to and enduring the ordeal of a World Court case to achieve one partial settlement, Ottawa and Washington had little appetite to address remaining disputes. The implications of these findings for the world’s remaining undelimited boundaries are then discussed, focusing on East Asia.Item Words that Matter: Three Essays on Multilateral Opposition to War(2022) Kim, Hyunki; Huth, Paul; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)My dissertation titled “Words that Matter: Three Essays on Multilateral Opposition to War” advances our understanding of how the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) constrains state behavior through the use of verbal condemnation. The UNSC has an array of tools to manage violent conflicts, including condemnations, economic sanctions, and military actions. Existing scholarship largely discounts verbal condemnations as ineffective because they are not backed up by coercive actions that impose tangible costs. Empirical patterns and anecdotal illustrations, however, suggest contrary findings – that verbal condemnations can constrain state behavior under certain conditions. I address this gap by examining how variation across UNSC condemnations impacts the crisis-actors’ decision to escalate. I argue that variation in legal invocation and rhetorical severity sends important signals to the targeted state that can change the expected costs of war and, ultimately, prevent escalation. I further examine the determinants of rhetorical variation across UNSC condemnations through the lens of power-sharing and power-politics within the UN. I find that the permanent members influence the contents of the resolution, but the Council President shapes the UN’s agenda. My theoretical expectations and findings are validated by an empirical analysis of international crisis-actors from 1946 to 2017 with the original coding of legality and severity in the UNSC resolutions. This dissertation project improves our understanding of the UN’s role in conflict management, especially through condemnations. The findings suggest that rhetorical tools can be just as effective, and that the UN’s multilateral efforts can mitigate interstate conflicts in world politics by invoking international law and designing impactful messages.Item Recontracting Global Governance(2020) Lugg, Andrew David; Allee, Todd; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation introduces an original theory explaining how international organizations (IOs) evolve in response to changing member dynamics. I argue that member states create new subsidiary IOs, which I call linked international organizations (LIOs), in order to “recontract” their cooperation. Three features of LIOs incentivize their creation: 1) they are easy to create, 2) they have flexible design features, and 3) they insulate the original IO from destabilizing reform. I evaluate my theory using a multi-method approach. First, I analyze original data on nearly 1,200 LIOs created since World War II. Statistical tests show that changes in the membership environment at existing IOs – including the addition of new members, changes in the distribution of power, and shifts in member preferences – leads to LIO creation. Second, I examine LIO creation at the United Nations (UN) using historical analysis, quantitative text analysis, and case studies of the Decolonization Committee, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Finally, I investigate the creation of LIOs at the World Bank, including case studies of the International Development Association (IDA) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). My dissertation proposes a major rethinking of reform and evolution at IOs. The creation of LIOs provides states a means to resolve internal disagreements and updates IOs so that they are more reflective of their diverse memberships. This helps maintain (and even expand) cooperation in an increasingly multipolar world.Item ANOTHER EMPTY PROMISE? STATES’ COMMITMENT TO THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT(2018) Chang, Hyo Joon; Kastner, Scott L.; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) was established in 2002 to facilitate implementation of the Convention against Torture. Due to its regular visitations and national preventive mechanisms (NPMs), as well as increasing ratifications, the OPCAT has been regarded as a paradigm shift in the human rights arena. This dissertation study attempts to discover if states’ commitment to the OPCAT is a sign of increased commitment to human rights or another empty promise. Empirical analyses of states’ ratification of and compliance with the OPCAT provide evidence questioning the high expectations surrounding the treaty’s ratification. First of all, the treaty terms of the OPCAT do not incur as high costs of commitment as expected. Human rights-violating countries have not been deterred from ratifying the treaty, indicating that they are not particularly concerned with potential costs of international and domestic monitoring. Neither has states’ commitment to the OPCAT functioned as a costly signaling. The cost-based theories are further challenged by empirical findings for regional clustering of commitment. Moreover, states’ compliant behavior suggests that the treaty ratification does not guarantee compliance. Regarding the NPMs, about one-third of states parties have not complied with their obligation to designate or establish NPMs. Although most states parties have allowed the international monitoring body unhindered access to places of detention, institutional loopholes in the OPCAT permit states parties to offset the negative consequences of the international visiting program. About the half of states parties have not requested their reports by the international monitoring body to be publicly released, nor have they responded to their reports. The case of the Philippines illustrates that states’ selective compliance or non-compliance with the OPCAT could undermine its effectiveness in preventing states’ practice of torture. Overall, the treaty’s innovative measures make states’ commitment to the OPCAT more than another empty promise. However, ratification is not automatic proof of states’ increased commitment to human rights. Therefore, the international community is strongly recommended to develop effective strategies encouraging states parties to implement the OPCAT rather than simply praise its increasing membership.Item In the Court of World Opinion: International Law on the Use of Force and Crisis Escalation(2012) Appel, Benjamin; Huth, Paul; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)In this dissertation, I examine how international law on the use of force influences the behavior of leaders in international crises. I argue that leaders are less likely to escalate militarily in international crises when the Charter of the United Nations and related legal principles prohibit the use of force compared to when international law allows for the right of self-defense. I argue that international law can constrain crisis actors from employing the large-scale use of force by facilitating the dynamics of reciprocity in crisis-bargaining. Crisis actors who act in accordance with international law can expect to receive greater international support, while actors that violate the law can expect to obtain less support. International law therefore promotes the peaceful resolution of international crises because actors with the support of third parties can credibly signal their intent to employ the use of force in self-defense and deter their adversaries from engaging in the aggressive and illegal use of force in the first place. I find strong support for my theoretical argument using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Using an original dataset on international law on the use of force in international crises from 1946-2005, I find that leaders are less likely to escalate militarily when international law prohibits the use of force than when they have a right to use force. I also find that intergovernmental organizations are more likely to support leaders who have the right to use force, providing support for the underlying causal mechanism in my argument. Finally, I present a case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis and find that international law contributed to President Kennedy's decision to implement the blockade, instead of employing air strikes against Cuba.