Consciousness: Explaining the Phenomena

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dc.contributor.authorCarruthers, Peter
dc.date.accessioned2007-03-23T20:30:50Z
dc.date.available2007-03-23T20:30:50Z
dc.date.issued2001
dc.description.abstractCan phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical and/or intentional states and processes, on the one hand, and phenomenal consciousness, on the other. I reply that, since we have purely recognitional concepts of experience, there is indeed a sort of gap at the level of concepts; but this need not mean that the properties picked out by those concepts are inexplicable. I show how dispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theory can reductively explain the subjective feel of experience by deploying a form of ‘consumer semantics’. First-order perceptual contents become transformed, acquiring a dimension of subjectivity, by virtue to their availability to a mind-reading (HOT generating) consumer system.en
dc.format.extent117778 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/html
dc.identifier.citationPeter Carruthers. Consciousness: Explaining the Phenomena. In D.Walsh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/4351
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Arts & Humanitiesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtPhilosophyen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_us
dc.rights.licenseCopyright Cambridge University Press - http://www.cambridge.org/us/0521003733en
dc.subjectphenomenal consciousnessen
dc.subjectreductive natural explanationen
dc.subjectexplanatory gapen
dc.subjectdispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theoryen
dc.subjectconsumer semanticsen
dc.subjectFirst-order perceptual contentsen
dc.subjectsubjectivityen
dc.titleConsciousness: Explaining the Phenomenaen
dc.typeBook chapteren

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