How Consumers Respond to Product Certification and the Value of Energy Information

dc.contributor.authorHoude, Sébastien
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-17T23:36:57Z
dc.date.available2017-11-17T23:36:57Z
dc.date.issued2017-08
dc.description.abstractI study how consumers respond to competing pieces of information that differ in their degree of complexity and informativeness. In particular, I study the choice of refrigerators in the U.S., where a mandatory disclosure labeling program provides detailed information about energy cost, and a certification labeling program provides a simple binary-star rating related to energy use. I find that the coarse certification may help some consumers to pay attention to energy information, but for others, it may crowd out efforts to process more accurate, but complex, energy information. The effect of the certification on overall energy use is thus ambiguous.en_US
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.13016/M2ZC7RW11
dc.identifier.citationHoude, Sébastien. 2017. Moral Hazard and the Energy Efficiency Gap: Theory and Evidence. University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Working Papers, WP 17-08.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/20217
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Agriculture & Natural Resources
dc.relation.isAvailableAtAgricultural & Resource Economics
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Maryland
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, MD)
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUMD AREC Working Papers;WP 17-08
dc.subjectquality disclosure, certification, attention allocation, demand estimationen_US
dc.titleHow Consumers Respond to Product Certification and the Value of Energy Informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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