Security Analysis of a Distributed Common Secret Generation Procedure

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dc.contributor.advisorBaras, John S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorR. Poovendranen_US
dc.contributor.authorBaras, John S.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentISRen_US
dc.contributor.departmentCSHCNen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-23T10:08:11Z
dc.date.available2007-05-23T10:08:11Z
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.description.abstractIn a distributed scheme allowing any number of members to compute a commonsecret without revealing individual secret was proposed. We present asecurity weakness of this protocol. In doing so, we show that any twomembers can collude and obtain the secret contributed by middle memberin generating the common secret.<p><i>Journal of Cryptology</i>en_US
dc.format.extent212918 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/6073
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesISR; TR 1999-34en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCSHCN; TR 1999-16en_US
dc.subjectuser collusionen_US
dc.subjectGlobal Communication Systemsen_US
dc.titleSecurity Analysis of a Distributed Common Secret Generation Procedureen_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US

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