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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4353

Title: Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought
Authors: Carruthers, Peter
Type: Book chapter
Keywords: conscious experience
conscious propositional thought
conscious thinking
conscious thought
Issue Date: 2006
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press
Citation: Peter Carruthers, Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought, in Consciousness and Self-Reference, Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, Eds., Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2006.
Abstract: Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types? And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of self-reference? In pursuing these questions I shall also explore the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning conscious thinking, one that would leave the reality of conscious experience untouched. In the end, I shall argue that while there might be no such thing as conscious judging or conscious wanting, there is (or may well be) such a thing as conscious generic thinking.
Required Publisher Statement: MIT Press: http://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262112949/
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4353
Appears in Collections:Philosophy Research Works

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