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ESSAYS IN (I) STRATEGIC ORDERING WITH ENDOGENOUS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN SUPPLY CHAIN (II) STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF NEW PRODUCT INNOVATION AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENT
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This dissertation discusses two research problems. First topic is strategic information management in supply chain, and second topic is analytical modeling approach in productivity dilemma. The first two chapters of dissertation discuss the impact of information asymmetry and competition on vertical contractual relationships, and risk neutral firms' strategic ordering decisions with minimal assumptions. Modern business environment caused by competition and information asymmetry plagues most firms across industries, often leading to suboptimal outcomes. Given the lead times in planning capacity, suppliers prefer earlier orders from their downstream partners (retailers). Much attention has been given in the literature to Advance Purchase Discount (APD), where the supplier lowers the wholesale price to entice the retailers to order early. In this dissertation, we suggest another avenue of early purchase model considering more realistic ways - competition between downstream retailers and information flows (from information acquisition to dissemination) in supply chain. We show that with one retailer having "better" market demand information on uncertain demand than the other, the supplier can induce earlier ordering from the better-informed retailer without any reduction in the wholesale price, or creating rationing risk. In addition, we investigate firm's information investment decisions corresponding to the timing of the orders. We extend the model with different information structures of firms such as imperfect and evolving information. In reality, firms can have more accurate market information near the selling season by acquiring it from more diverse resources. Consistent with practice, we explorer firm's equilibrium outcomes of endogenous sequencing game with this setting. The third chapter of dissertation is in the trade-off between production efficiency and new product innovation. A firm's ability to compete over time has been rooted not only in improved efficiency, but also in its ability to be simultaneously innovative (Abernathy (1978)). This trade-off between efficiency and innovation has long been discussed in the business context, but limited analytical research has been done using the `extreme value theory' (Dahan & Mendelson (2001)) to investigate this issue. Our model considers important exogenous innovation factors such as innovation characteristics (Benner & Tushman (2003)) and degree of competition, which has yielded the following theoretical results and practical implications. First, we highlight new product characteristics. If R&D projects are paradigm-shifting innovations, there is a stronger adverse effect between efficiency and innovation than incremental innovation. Second, competition results in underinvestment effort in innovation performance for the firms. For example, in the symmetric firms' competition, the optimal size of R&D projects decreased, as competition increases. On the other hand, firms are more likely to focus on process improvement activities.