Kippen, Hunter MichaelAdvanced cryptography that goes beyond what is currently deployed to service our basic internet infrastructure is continuing to see widespread adoption. The enhanced functionality achieved by these schemes frequently yields an increase in complexity. Solely considering the asymptotic security of the underlying computational assumptions is often insufficient to realize practical and secure instantiations.In these cases, determining the risk of any particular deployment involves analyzing the concrete security (the exact length of time it would take to break the encryption) as well as quantifying how concrete security can degrade over time due to any exploitable information leakage. In this dissertation, we examine two such cryptographic primitives where assessing concrete security is paramount. First, we consider the cryptanalysis of lattice problems (used as the basis for current standard quantum resistant cryptosystems). We develop a novel side-channel attack on the FrodoKEM key encapsulation mechanism as submitted to the NIST Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. Our attack involves poisoning the FrodoKEM Key Generation (KeyGen) process using a security exploit in DRAM known as “Rowhammer”. Additionally, we revisit the security of the lattice problem known as Learning with Errors (LWE) in the presence of information leakage. We further enhance the robustness of prior methodology by viewing side information from a geometric perspective. Our approach provides the rigorous promise that, as hints are integrated, the correct solution is a (unique) lattice point contained in an ellipsoidal search space. Second, we study the concrete security of interactive signature schemes (used as part of many Privacy Enhancing Technologies). To this end, we complete a new analysis of the performance of Wagner’s k-list algorithm [CRYPTO ‘02], which has found significant utility in computing forgeries on several interactive signature schemes that implicitly rely on the hardness of the ROS problem formulated by Schnorr [ICICS ‘01].enDissertationComputer scienceComputer engineeringAlgorithmsCryptanalysisCryptographyLatticesSecurityWagner's Algorithm