The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages

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dc.contributor.authorCramton, Peter
dc.contributor.authorGunderson, Morley
dc.contributor.authorTracy, Joseph
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-31T15:00:11Z
dc.date.available2007-08-31T15:00:11Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.description.abstractUsing Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January 1967 to March 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, general contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and employers better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to significantly higher negotiation costs and redistribution of quasi-rents from employers to unions.en
dc.format.extent119515 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citation"The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages," (with Morley Gunderson and Joseph S. Tracy) Review of Economics and Statistics, 81:3, 475-487, 1999.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/7114
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherMIT Pressen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtEconomicsen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, MD)en_us
dc.subjectCanadaen
dc.subjectstrike costsen
dc.subjectreplacement workersen
dc.subjectconciliation policiesen
dc.titleThe Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wagesen
dc.typeArticleen

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