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Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents

dc.contributor.authorCramton, Peter
dc.contributor.authorKwerel, Evan
dc.contributor.authorWilliams, John
dc.identifier.citation"Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," (with Evan Kwerel and John Williams) Journal of Law and Economics, 41, 647-675, October 1998.
dc.description.abstractChanges in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values but good public information about the cost of relocating the incumbent. We examine the experience of broadband PCS entrants in relocating microwave incumbents. We conclude with some remarks on how these ideas might be applied to digital television spectrum.en
dc.format.extent77641 bytes
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dc.subjectradio spectrum allocationsen
dc.subjectradio regulationsen
dc.subjectFederal Communications Commission
dc.titleEfficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbentsen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtEconomics Departmenten_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_us
dc.rights.licenseCopyright 1998 by Journal of Law and Economics.

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