An Error-Theory of Consciousness
An Error-Theory of Consciousness
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Date
1998-10-15
Authors
Perlis, Don
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Abstract
I argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence,
hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular,
it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's own
errors. This in turn requires a robust self model as part of its world
model, as well as the capability to come to see that world model as
residing in its belief base (part of its self model), while then
representing the actual world as possibly different, i.e., forming a
new world model. This suggests particular computational mechanisms by which
consciousness occurs, ones that conceivably could be discovered by
neuroscientists, as well as built into artificial systems that may need
such capabilities. Consciousness, then, would not be an epiphenomenon
at all, but rather a key part of the functional architecture of
suitably intelligent agents, hence amenable to study as much as any
other architectural feature.
(Also cross-referenced as UMIACS-TR-94-91)