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Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences

dc.contributor.authorCarruthers, Peter
dc.date.accessioned2007-03-16T19:20:51Z
dc.date.available2007-03-16T19:20:51Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.citationPeter Carruthers. "Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68 (2004).en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/4342
dc.description.abstractRelying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. Others have thought that we can undermine the credibility of those thought-experiments by allowing that we possess purely recognitional concepts for the properties of our conscious mental states. This paper is concerned to explain, and then to meet, the challenge of showing how purely recognitional concepts are possible if there are no such things as qualia – in the strong sense of intrinsic (non-relational, non-intentional) properties of experience. It argues that an appeal to higher-order experiences is necessary to meet this challenge, and then deploys a novel form of higher-order thought theory to explain how such experiences are generated.en
dc.format.extent119839 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/html
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherInternational Phenomenological Societyen
dc.subjectphenomenal consciousnessen
dc.subjectthought-experimentsen
dc.subjectrecognitional conceptsen
dc.subjectqualiaen
dc.subjecthigher-order thought theoryen
dc.titlePhenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiencesen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Arts & Humanitiesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtPhilosophyen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_us


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