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dc.contributor.authorCarruthers, Peter
dc.date.accessioned2007-03-16T16:45:48Z
dc.date.available2007-03-16T16:45:48Z
dc.date.issued1999-12
dc.identifier.citationPeter Carruthers. "Sympathy and Subjectivity," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 77, No. 4 December 1999 , p. 465 - 482.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/4340
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological.en
dc.format.extent107139 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/html
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherTaylor and Francis Groupen
dc.subjectsympathyen
dc.subjectsubjectivityen
dc.subjectconsciousnessen
dc.subjectmental-stateen
dc.subjectagencyen
dc.subjectdesireen
dc.titleSympathy and Subjectivityen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Arts & Humanitiesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtPhilosophyen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_us
dc.rights.licenseTaylor and Francis Group, Australasian Journal of Philosophy: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/00048402.aspen


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