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Assessing Motives for Russian Federation Use and Non-use of Force: An Approach to Improve the Strategic Planning and Policy of the United States

dc.contributor.advisorGallagher, Nancy W.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHickey, Christopher Johnen_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-04T06:36:48Z
dc.date.available2022-02-04T06:36:48Z
dc.date.issued2021en_US
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.13016/rvkf-ejnw
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/28444
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this dissertation is to inform scholarship and improve U.S. policy and strategy to prevent the Russian Federation from using military force against U.S. interests. It does this by exploring and answering the question, what explains the Russian Federation’s choices on the use of military force? The dissertation developed and demonstrated an approach to translating policy debates into sufficiently rigorous sets of competing explanations of strategic behavior for expectations about future behavior under various conditions to be stated and tested. The explanations developed and tested used motives derived from The Rational Theory of International Politics by Glaser and The Logic of Political Survival by Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow. Systematic analysis of competing explanations attempted to find incongruence between the expectations if a motive was a plausible explanation and the behaviors actually observed since 1991. This dissertation found that the Russian Federation’s choices on the use of military force are explainable by the balancing of three motives. These choices have prioritized first the motive of the president’s political survival, then Russia’s self-protection/security motive, and then Russia’s domination/greed motive. This suggests that the Russian Federation calculates risks when making these choices differently than currently assumed. The most important risks influencing these decisions are those related to the future of the Russian president’s political winning coalition. These findings allow the U.S. to take a game theory-informed approach to strategic planning that seeks to prevent the use of military force against U.S. interests at a lower level of costs and risks than the current approach. The United States should develop a strategy to foster three somewhat contradictory calculations simultaneously. The U.S. strategy needs to communicate that the negative consequences of using force would outweigh whatever potential benefit might tempt the domination/greed motive. At the same time, the strategy needs to communicate that if Russia acts with restraint, then Russian self-protection/security motive concerns will be addressed cooperatively. Most importantly, the strategy needs to influence the Russian president’s calculations about whether using or not using force against U.S. interests would be better for personal political survival.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleAssessing Motives for Russian Federation Use and Non-use of Force: An Approach to Improve the Strategic Planning and Policy of the United Statesen_US
dc.typeDissertationen_US
dc.contributor.publisherDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_US
dc.contributor.publisherUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentPublic Policyen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledInternational relationsen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledPublic policyen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledMilitary studiesen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolleddesign thinkingen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledmilitary force and poweren_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledmilitary strategyen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledNATOen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledRussian Federationen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledstrategic planningen_US


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