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Recent Submissions

  • Suffering without Subjectivity 

    Carruthers, Peter (Springer Netherlands, 2004-11)
    This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness − in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (‘Phenomenal’ consciousness is the property ...
  • Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory 

    Carruthers, Peter (Springer Netherlands, 2007)
    This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense of ‘possible’) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many ...
  • Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought 

    Carruthers, Peter (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2006)
    Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, ...
  • Moderately Massive Modularity 

    Carruthers, Peter (Cambridge University Press, 2003)
    This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind’s structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the ...
  • Consciousness: Explaining the Phenomena 

    Carruthers, Peter (Cambridge University Press, 2001)
    Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical and/or intentional states and processes, on the one hand, and ...

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