Agricultural & Resource Economics

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2014 Changes for Organic Crop Insurance
(2014-02) Goeringer, L. Paul; Lynch, Lori
2014 Farm Bill Dairy Provisions
(2014-08) Connelly, Steve
Provides an overview of the risk management options that will be available for dairy producers under the 2014 Farm Bill
2014 Farm Bill Educational Tools
(2014-08) Connelly, Steve
This presentation gives an overview of the producer tools that will be available to aid in the decision making process.
2014 Farm Bill Makes Changes to the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program
(2015-09) Goeringer, Paul; Leathers, Howard
The Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) was established in 1994 and administered by USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA). NAP is a risk management tool for those producers growing crops not currently covered by a crop insurance product. The 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized NAP and made some dramatic changes to the program. NAP now offers coverage from the 50-percent level to the 65-percent level with producers able to buy-up coverage in 5-percent increments at up to 100 percent of the established market price. Prior to the 2014 Farm Bill, NAP had only allowed coverage at the 50-percent level and 55 percent of the established market price of the crop.
2014 Farm Bill Training
(2014-08) Wevodau, Bob
This presentation was presented under by the 2014 Farm Bill Workshops across MD. This presentation provides an overview of the commodity programs in the new bill.
2014 Legal Services Directory
(2014-04) Agricultural Law Section, Maryland State Bar Association
2016 USDA Crop Insurance Update
(2016-09-13) Alston, Michael
2019 Market Facilitation Program Available to Assist Producers Trade Disputes
(2019-08-04) Millet-Williams, Nerice; Goeringer, Paul
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) established the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) under Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act in 2018. This section authorizes CCC to assist in the disposition of surplus commodities and to increase the domestic consumption of agricultural commodities by expanding or aiding in the expansion of domestic markets or by developing or aiding in the development of new and additional markets, marketing facilities and uses for such commodities. MFP provides direct payments to producers of specific products impacted by foreign tariffs. This program has been updated for 2019 to continue to assist growers impacted by trade disputes.
Adoption of Household Stormwater Best Management Practices
(2014-02) Newburn, David A.; Alberini, Anna; Rockler, Amanda; Karp, Alison
The Agricultural Act of 2014
(2014-11) Turner, George
Provides an overview of the final regulations for commodity and dairy programs in new farm bill.
Agricultural BMPs and Cost-Sharing
(2014-12-16) Fleming, Patrick; Newburn, David A.
This presentation was delivered at the 2014 Policy and Outlook Conference. The focus is on the impact of cost-sharing and the adoption of BMPs in Maryland.
Agricultural Conflict Resolution Service
(2014-06-18) Johnson, Mae
Mae Johnson's presentation from June 18th, 2014 covering an overview of the ACReS program in Maryland for the MSBA's section on Agricultural Law
AGRICULTURAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION SERVICE (ACReS)
(2015-02) Johnson, Mae
Presentation delivered by Mae Johnson of Maryland Department of Agriculture during the 2015 Ag Lease Workshops.
Agricultural Law Education Initiative Brochure
(2014-06) Agriculture Law Education, Initiative
Agricultural Law Education Working Group March 2014 Quarterly Update •
(2014-03) Pons, William
Agricultural Leasing in Maryland
(2013-07-11) Goeringer, Paul
Maryland farmers understand the importance of leases in their operations. From land to equipment, Maryland farmers use varying forms of agreements in their business operations. With the leasing of land, leases for a period of less than one year can be oral and there is no requirement the lease be in writing. Even if the lease can be oral, the landlord and tenant should still consider putting the lease in writing to provide both with a written record of the terms agreed to. Any lease longer than one year will be required to be in writing and signed by the parties involved. The tenant will be the one to request a renewal and a landlord can never force a tenant to renew a lease. Termination will depend on either the termination process in the lease or when the lease is silent on termination on state law which requires either the landlord or tenant to give at least 6 months’ notice of the desire to terminate the lease. Unless specified in the lease, a landlord retains no right to reenter the property or to allow new tenants to enter the property to begin preparing fields for planting before the current lease terminates. The landlord can specifically request the right to reenter in the lease. Other issues to consider when negotiating a lease are how to split repair costs, which party will be responsible for noxious weed control, and when the tenant will be required to purchase crop insurance or how crop insurance costs will be split, depending on the type of lease the parties have. This publication will provide an overview of some issues to be considered by both landlords and tenants when negotiating lease agreements.
Agricultural Outlook and Policy Conference Agendas: 2014-2017, 2019
(2022-11) Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PRODUCTION IN THE PRESENCE OF RISK AND INCOMPLETE FINANCIAL MARKETS
(2017) Voica, Daniel Constantin; Chambers, Robert G; Agricultural and Resource Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Economic interventions are rarely free of debate, hence it should come as no surprise that governmental agricultural policies are usually surrounded in controversy. A topic of debate in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is how to maintain the fragile balance between two opposite objectives: the need of governments to protect their farmers and the need for a subsidy system which does not distort farmers’ production decisions. Lump-sum transfers to farmers are commonly believed to affect the production choices of farmers in the presence of risk and uncertainty. Chapter 1 shows that if farmers have off-farm investment and employment opportunities, production decisions are decoupled from lump-sum subsidies in the presence of risk and uncertainty. The results are reconciled with existing results by showing that previously identified production adjustments are portfolio adjustments. Chapter 2 contributes to the debate surrounding agricultural policy support for farmers and the potential distortionary effects of area payments. Area payments can affect production decisions via land allocation. I show theoretically how the timing of these payments can weaken the link between area payments and production. The theoretical predictions are supported by the empirical findings. Chapter 3 explores the trade-off between health and food consumption, and the effectiveness of health interventions such as taxing unhealthy foods. Rational agents maximize utility over health and consumption of healthy and unhealthy foods, while health is a function of discretionary and non discretionary calories and nutrients. Calories are not available for purchase in the market, thus their pricing is derived via a ``household'' production technology used to convert healthy and unhealthy foods into health outcomes. Additionally, consumers face a physiological constraint, a minimum calorie intake, which has further implications in terms of reducing potential health benefits associated with governmental interventions, such as taxing high-calorie foods. The future budget available to consumers depends on the consumption of discretionary calories. The theoretical model is calibrated using financial and consumption data reflecting farmworkers's food consumption in the US.
Agriculture, Environmental Incentive Payments, and Water Quality in the Chesapeake Bay
(2016) Fleming, Patrick; Lichtenberg, Erik; Newburn, David; Agricultural and Resource Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Nonpoint sources (NPS) pollution from agriculture is the leading source of water quality impairment in U.S. rivers and streams, and a major contributor to lakes, wetlands, estuaries and coastal waters (U.S. EPA 2016). Using data from a survey of farmers in Maryland, this dissertation examines the effects of a cost sharing policy designed to encourage adoption of conservation practices that reduce NPS pollution in the Chesapeake Bay watershed. This watershed is the site of the largest Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) implemented to date, making it an important setting in the U.S. for water quality policy. I study two main questions related to the reduction of NPS pollution from agriculture. First, I examine the issue of additionality of cost sharing payments by estimating the direct effect of cover crop cost sharing on the acres of cover crops, and the indirect effect of cover crop cost sharing on the acres of two other practices: conservation tillage and contour/strip cropping. A two-stage simultaneous equation approach is used to correct for voluntary self-selection into cost sharing programs and account for substitution effects among conservation practices. Quasi-random Halton sequences are employed to solve the system of equations for conservation practice acreage and to minimize the computational burden involved. By considering patterns of agronomic complementarity or substitution among conservation practices (Blum et al., 1997; USDA SARE, 2012), this analysis estimates water quality impacts of the crowding-in or crowding-out of private investment in conservation due to public incentive payments. Second, I connect the econometric behavioral results with model parameters from the EPA’s Chesapeake Bay Program to conduct a policy simulation on water quality effects. I expand the econometric model to also consider the potential loss of vegetative cover due to cropland incentive payments, or slippage (Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez, 2011). Econometric results are linked with the Chesapeake Bay Program watershed model to estimate the change in abatement levels and costs for nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment under various behavioral scenarios. Finally, I use inverse sampling weights to derive statewide abatement quantities and costs for each of these pollutants, comparing these with TMDL targets for agriculture in Maryland.
An analysis of regulatory decisions on food-use pesticides under the Food Quality and Protection Act
(2012) Newcomb, Elisabeth Jo; Cropper, Maureen L; Agricultural and Resource Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
To ensure the safety of older pesticides used in the United States, the EPA required the reregistration of pesticide uses which were first introduced before 1984. Using a dataset of reregistration outcomes for 2722 pesticide uses applied to food crops, I analyze the extent to which these decisions were determined by chronic health risks, pesticide expenditures, and other factors. I find that the dietary health risks associated with pesticides are had greater influence on actions to reduce dietary and occupational exposures than on pesticide cancellations. High population dietary risks are associated with higher rates of pesticide cancellations, though these results are insignificant. There is evidence that the EPA was more responsive to child and infant dietary risks: values above the EPA's threshold of concern were more than 10% more likely to be cancelled than those that were not (significant at the 10% level). The effects of cancer risks on EPA actions are more ambiguous, though this may be due to data limitations. The less safe pesticides are for handlers, the more often they are cancelled, but pesticide safety has a more significant correlation with reentry intervals. A one percent decrease in the safety of a pesticide to handlers predicts a reduction in reentry interval of 1.6 days (significant at the 5% level). Expenditures on individual pesticides have a strong relationship with pesticide reregistration, with an additional half million dollars in expenditures predicting a 2% increase in the probability of reregistration (significant at the 1% level). Expenditures are not so correlated with reentry intervals or changes in pesticide tolerances. After accounting for dietary risk and pesticide expenditures, Monsanto and Dow were most likely to have uses reregistered. Though there was some concern that small crops with low pesticide expenditures would suffer extra cancellations, small crop uses were no more likely to be cancelled than large crop uses. Mentions of individual pesticides in the media had no apparent relationship with the outcome of reregistration decisions.

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