Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland

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Adaptive Agent Modelling in a Policy Context
(2004-12-16) Gulden, Tim; CISSM
This dissertation examines the utility of adaptive agent modeling (also referred to as agent-based modeling or individual based modeling) as a tool in public policy research. It uses the adaptive agent technique to produce useful results in three diverse areas. It demonstrates that the adaptive agent framework can be used to extend traditional models of comparative advantage in international trade, showing that the presence of increasing returns to scale in some industries shifts the basis of comparative advantage arguments, making room for industrial policy and the regulation of trade. Next, the dissertation demonstrates that the size distribution of cities within nations, generally thought to approximate the "Zipf" distribution, can be reproduced using a simple agent-based model. This model produces insights into the evolution of the distribution as well as departures from it especially in France and Russia. This understanding of urban dynamics has implications for easing the structural transition of the Russian economy and for designing policies to reduce the size of megacities in the developing world. The dissertation goes on to examine individual level data from the Guatemalan civil war from an adaptive agent modeling perspective. It finds several novel patterns in the data which may serve as benchmarks for adaptive agent modeling efforts and suggests avenues by which existing conflict models might be brought into closer accord with the data. The dissertation concludes that adaptive agent modeling is useful in a policy context because it allows quantitative work to be done while relaxing some of the unrealistic assumptions which are often required to gain analytical traction using traditional methods. The method is found to be particularly useful in situations where path dependence, heterogeneity of actors, bounded rationality, and imperfect information are significant features of the system under examination. The individual based nature of the method is also found to be well suited to assessing distributional impacts of changes in process or policy.
Americans on WMD Proliferation
(2004-04-15) Kull, Steven; Ramsay, Clay; Subias, Stefan; Lewis (aka Fehsenfeld), Evan; CISSM
Americans on WMD Proliferation
(2004-04-15) Kull, Steven; Ramsay, Clay; Subias, Stefan; Lewis (aka Fehsenfeld), Evan
A PIPA/Knowledge Network Poll dated April 2004
Anticipating Climate Mitigation: The Role of Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs)
(2014-07) Steinbruner, John
Global warming is likely to force assertive redirection of global energy markets in order to achieve a prudent standard of mitigation; the resulting process of energy transformation will fundamentally alter prevailing policies and institutional relationships. Efficiency gains and renewable technologies—wind, solar, and biomass—will presumably make substantial contributions, as will carbon sequestration to some extent. But at the moment it seems quite apparent that global mitigation cannot be achieved without a very substantial expansion of nuclear power generation. While current light water reactor technology will likely play a role, this paper argues that smaller modular reactors (SMRs) of innovative design, with innovative institutional arrangements, could contribute to meeting energy demands in a more safe and secure manner. Though many SMR designs are currently being developed, it is doubtful that any of them will be brought to the point of serial production by their current developers under currently projected market conditions. Completed prototype development would almost certainly have to be a public sector initiative undertaken in support of eventual mitigation. This paper explores the potential of developing international structures whereby multiple states and entities could develop several SMR prototypes and serial manufacturing hubs. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor development process could prove to be a useful analogue to the arrangements necessary to support such large-scale SMR development and deployment.
Are the Better Educated Less Likely to Support Militancy and Terrorism? Women Are
(2012-08) Afzal, Madiha
I use 2009 public opinion survey data from Pakistan to show that the relationship between education and support for terrorism varies by gender. Specifically: 1) as women become more educated, they are less likely to support militancy relative to similarly educated men, whereas uneducated women are more likely to support militancy relative to uneducated men, controlling for religiosity, demographics, region, and terrorist events in the district; 2) the effect of women’s education is driven by the years of schooling immediately preceding and following high school; 3) educated women have more negative views of the United States and are more likely to support terror attacks against the U.S. relative to educated men, and uneducated women have more positive views of the United States relative to uneducated men. I discuss possible omitted factors which could explain the results, and use the Altonji Elder Taber test to show that a causal explanation is plausible.
The Argument for Oversight
(2006-02-18) Steinbruner, John; CISSM
The fundamental problem of managing biotechnology arises from two circumstances. First, it is evident that the momentum of discovery in molecular biology in particular is simultaneously enabling therapeutic and destructive applications of extraordinary potential consequence. But, second, no one is able to judge with assurance the exact character or extent of those consequences. That situation is likely to require competent but independent oversight of those areas of research that inherently pose extreme danger. An outline of an appropriate oversight arrangement will be presented.
The Argument for Oversight: Developments in the US
(2006-05-13) Steinbruner, John; CISSM
Arms Control as Uncertainty Management
(2018-04-23) Nelson, Amy
For decades or longer, policy-makers have sought to use arms control to reduce the uncertainty endemic to the international security environment. Because uncertainty is pervasive in these situations, however, practitioners themselves are naturally vulnerable to its effects. This paper seeks to help policy-makers optimize arms control outcomes by providing improved theory and best practices for goal-setting and strategy selection using the judicious application of decision theoretic concepts. The paper first lays out a suitable role for decision theory in the study and analysis of arms control, arguing that “uncertainty” is a more appropriate concept for description and analysis here than is “risk.” Prior approaches that rely on “risk” have tended to drive the search for arms control best practices, but “risk” requires the use of probability estimates that are frequently not available or not a good indicator of potential outcomes. Second, the paper argues that decision-makers are vulnerable to the effects of missing information and the uncertainty it causes in the run-up to and during arms control negotiations. Consequently, they are subject to biases and resort to the use of security-specific heuristics, including worst-case scenario thinking, limited-theater-of-war thinking, and low-dimension (or non-complex) thinking when setting goals and employing strategies for negotiating arms control agreements. The paper discusses the origins of this uncertainty and the strategies that states could employ as a result of these security-specific heuristics, arguing that they can best be grouped into two types—risk reduction versus uncertainty management. Finally, the paper makes recommendations for optimizing outcomes—for getting efficient negotiations that result in robust, durable agreements, capable of managing uncertainty about security, despite the effects of missing information.
Arms Control Policy and the National Security Council
(2000-03-23) Daalder, Ivo; Destler, I.M.; CISSM
During the cold war, arms control policy was a focal point in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The progress of negotiations was closely tracked by observers both within and outside of successive administrations, and the outcome of such negotiations frequently proved to be a harbinger of the entire superpower relationship. Thus the process for making policy was crucial. Since arms control, almost uniquely among national security issues, involves both the expertise and equities of all the key national security agencies including the Departments of State and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Staff, and the Intelligence Community the National Security Council has long played a central role in coordinating policy making and implementation. This process has often worked well defining the central issues, and helping to forge interagency consensus on policy directions. But it has also broken down on occasion either because the issue proved to be too difficult or contentious or because some players decided to ignore the interagency process altogether. To shed light on this variation, the National Security Council Project convened a roundtable panel on March 23, 2000, to explore the ways NSC"s in different administrations worked to coordinate U.S. policy on arms control. Participants in this roundtable represented a broad range of experiences across administrations, from Eisenhower to Clinton. Participants were asked to respond to a set of questions (Appendix A) to draw upon their understanding of how the decision making processes on arms control worked in relation to the National Security Council. This is the sixth in a series of roundtables held by the NSC Project, which is cosponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies at the Maryland School of Public Affairs and the Foreign Policy Studies program of the Brookings Institution. Transcripts of four previous roundtables on the Nixon NSC, on the role of the NSC in international economic policymaking, on the Bush NSC, and on the role of the national security adviser have already been published and are available on the Brookings website at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/ projects/nsc.htm. Two additional transcripts on the NSC and U.S. policy toward China and on the Clinton administration NSC will be published in the near future. These seminars have been conducted for their own independent value. They also provided useful insight for "A New NSC for a New Administration," a policy brief published by the Brookings Institution in November 2000 (also available on the Brookings website at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nsc.htm) and a book to be published in 2001. We are grateful to the participants for coming and talking with candor and insight. We are also particularly grateful to Karla Nieting for her help in organizing the roundtable, editing the transcript, and working with the participants in bringing this edited version of the proceedings to publication. Responsibility for any remaining errors rests with us. I.M. "Mac" Destler is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Ivo Daalder is a Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Arms Race in Space? U.S. Air Force Quietly Focuses on Space Control
(2003-09-01) Hitchens, Theresa; Lewis, Jeffrey; CISSM
While the U.S. Congress was debating the defense budget this summer, Air Force officials were downplaying their efforts to develop small, orbiting weapons to disrupt or destroy enemy satellites. In a June 24 meeting with reporters at the Pentagon, Peter Teets, Air Force undersecretary, denied the Air Force was working on radio-frequency or laser jamming microsatellites. A June 30 article in Space News quoted an Air Force spokesman as saying that the service had "dropped" work on such satellites because the "technology was deemed too immature." Both statements are true, in a narrow sense. Efforts to build attack satellites are currently taking a back seat to ground-based technologies that disrupt enemy space assets and protect our own - what the Air Force calls "space control" and "counterspace operations." But the shift in research priorities does not mean the Air Force has given up plans to put these weapons in space. The service's "Strategic Master Plan for FY 04 and Beyond" makes it abundantly clear that officials intend to deploy a variety of space weapons eventually. The Master Plan calls for development of "defensive and offensive counterspace" capabilities during the next two decades that will produce "active on-orbit protection" and "space-based counterspace" systems between 2016 and 2028. And despite its acknowledgement that the technology is not yet ready, the Air Force continues to pursue the development of microsatellite weapons. The service's 2004 budget request gives a program called Advanced Spacecraft Technology $14.4 million to develop and test a microsatellite "to demonstrate ... operations around a non-cooperative resident space object." The program also contains $14.8 million to "develop microsatellite (10-100 kilogram) technologies ... [that] could enable applications such as space protection, [and] counterspace capabilities." These efforts are part of several microsatellite technology programs, including the Experimental Satellite Series (XSS). Launched Jan. 29, the 28-kilogram XSS-10 successfully demonstrated its ability to move closely around another object to take images. The contract to build its successor, XSS-11, and its more specific sensor payload already has been awarded.
Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat
(2005-12-01) Leitenberg, Milton; CISSM
This is an expanded version of a paper prepared for an international conference "Meeting the Challenges of Bioterrorism: Assessing the Threat and Designing Biodefense Strategies"
Assessing the Iran Deal
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-09-01) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, Clay
On July 14, 2015, after two years of negotiations, the United States, the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and Iran announced they had reached agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program. On July 20 the Security Council endorsed the agreement unanimously. Under terms agreed between the U.S. Congress and the White House, Congress has until September 17th to disapprove the JCPOA if it wants to prevent President Obama from suspending U.S. nuclear sanctions after Iran fulfills its nuclear commitments. Thus an intense debate is underway. Advocates on both sides have been making their appeals to the American public at a volume, and with a forcefulness, seen in foreign policy issues only a few times a decade. After the initial rollout of the agreement—a phase in which the White House essentially held the floor—critics of the agreement have been widely heard, both in and out of Congress. Media polls have been sporadic and inconsistent. In polls that offer respondents the opportunity to say that they do not have enough information to say, approximately half take it. In this case, the minority opposing the deal tends to outweigh those favoring it. In some polls that give respondents minimal information about the basic outlines of the deal, majorities have approved of it. Apparently Americans have low levels of information and their responses are affected by minimal inputs. Citizen Cabinet surveys are not meant to simply be another poll. Rather the goal is to find out what a representative panel of registered voters recommends when they are given a briefing and hear arguments for and against the key options. The process they go through is called a ‘policymaking simulation,’ in that the goal is to put the respondent into the shoes of a policymaker. The content of the simulation is vetted with Congressional staffers and other experts to assure accuracy and balance. Earlier Citizen Cabinet surveys on the Iran deal focused on the central debate at the time as to whether the US should make a deal based on allowing Iran limited uranium enrichment with intrusive inspections or if it should seek to ramp up economic sanctions in an effort to get Iran to give up its enrichment program entirely. Arguments for both options were found convincing but in the end, in February, 61% in a national Citizen Cabinet recommended in favor of making the deal. In June Citizen Cabinet surveys in three states (Oklahoma, Maryland, and Virginia) went through the same process but with more detail about the draft agreement. In all states seven in ten recommended the deal over ramping up sanctions. In the current Citizen Cabinet survey the simulation focused much more deeply on the terms of the deal, especially the terms that have been highly criticized by Members of Congress. Panelists were first briefed on the origins of the international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program and the main issues during the negotiations and given a detailed summary of the agreement’s main features. Then panelists evaluated a series of critiques—some general, some quite specific—prominent in the Congressional debate, and assessed a rebuttal offered for each. Panelists then assessed proposals for three alternative courses of action that have been proposed, evaluating arguments for and against each and also assessing each one’s chances of success. Finally panelists were asked what they would recommend to their member of Congress—to approve the deal, or disapprove of it, and, if the latter, what alternative course to take.
Autonomous Proximity: A Coming Collision in Orbit?
(2004-12-01) Lewis, Jeffrey; CISSM
As satellites become smaller and smarter, they will become increasingly capable of sophisticated operations in orbit. One class of operations "autonomous proximity operations" would allow satellites to inspect other satellites, diagnose malfunctions and provide on-orbit servicing. Such satellites could also provide sophisticated surveillance in space and would make excellent anti-satellite weapons. The rapid development of satellites capable of conducting close maneuvers to one another, in-orbit, may increase tension "suggesting that now may be the time to consider "rules of the road" for such operations. The Defense Technology Area Plan (2000) called for "the development of micro-satellite vehicles with significant capability" including the ability to "conduct missions such as diagnostic inspection of malfunctioning satellites through autonomous guidance, rendezvous, and even docking techniques."1 These missions "generally referred to as autonomous proximity operations"are being pursued by NASA, DARPA and the Air Force, each of which intends to launch demonstrators in coming years Jeffrey Lewis is a Graduate Research Fellow at the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland.
Balancing Belligerents or Feeding the Beast: Transforming Conflict Traps
(2018-02-26) Hayden, Nancy
Even as the threat of international conflict between great powers re-emerges, violent civil conflict remains one of the greatest threats to human security and global stability. Persistent conflicts – those that have been active for twenty years or more – resulted in 65 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide at the end of 2017. This record high is an increase of 20 percent from the previous year. In Africa alone, more than 35 such conflicts continue to pose the utmost challenge for conflict resolution despite investments of over a trillion dollars in peacebuilding and foreign aid by the international community. The spread of extremist threats through conflicts across the Middle East and Africa—e.g., Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo–demonstrate that ignoring these conflicts is not an option. Creating the right balance and coordination among security assistance, military peace operations, humanitarian relief aid, and long-term peacebuilding remains an elusive goal. Are these intervention failures due to unsuitable policies and practices, to the fundamental intractability of the conflicts, or some combination of both? This question is the subject of many academic and policy studies. However, most studies of when, where, and how to intervene are limited in perspective, and fail to assess the combined effects of different types of interventions on human security over time. Practitioners and policy makers recognize that lifting social and political systems out of the “conflict trap” requires a systems approach. Such an approach holistically considers the nature and context of the conflict, in conjunction with the scope, timing, and dynamic interactions among different modes and types of interventions. Using twenty-five years of comparative data on persistent conflicts in Africa, supplemented by a case study of Somalia, this brief presents a scalable systems framework to (1) examine the relationship between conflict persistence and factors associated with conflict contexts, peacekeeping and aid interventions, and (2) identify the underlying principles and practices for those conflict interventions most likely to result in conflict transformation that increases human security, and those most likely to sustain conflict.
Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat
(Center for International & Security Studies, 2017-01-02) Pollack, Joshua
Some of the most enduring disagreements in the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) concern ballistic missile defenses (BMD). At the same time that South Korea has expanded its conventional offensive missile program, it has declined American proposals for a regionally integrated BMD architecture, insisting on developing its own national system in parallel to the defenses operated by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). American appeals for interoperability between U.S. and ROK systems have been received cautiously, as were proposals to enhance its own BMD in Korea by introducing the Terminal HighAltitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Peninsula for several years. A desire for expanded autonomy in national security appears to underpin Seoul’s attitudes on BMD. Rather than rely passively on American protection against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, South Korea’s military leaders have focused on developing precision-strike capabilities to intimidate Pyongyang, and resisted simply accepting an American BMD umbrella. Even more than they desire greater independence from their American patron-ally, South Koreans are suspicious of entanglements with Japan, their former colonial master, whose own defensive systems are already integrated with the American regional BMD architecture. This outlook encourages the pursuit of independent defense capabilities and discourages institutionalizing trilateral security arrangements.
The Basic Problem: Dual-Use Research
(2006-05-13) Nixdorff, Kathryn; CISSM
Biological Threat Reduction: Opportunities and Obstacles
(2005-05-20) Harris, Elisa D.; CISSM
Ms. Harrington addressed the risk of biological proliferation in Russia and Eurasia. She outlined five sources of risk for biological proliferation: expertise, facilities, materials, unstable sociopolitical environments, and the proximity of the region to the Middle East. Regarding expertise, the thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians involved in bioresearch and development possess skills that could contribute to biological weapons programs. Dozens of research, production and design facilities still remain throughout the former Soviet Union, posing a proliferation risk. Information on the extent and location of biological materials remains sparse, even within the Russian government. Dangerous pathogen collections exist at many of these sites. Efforts have been made to locate these materials and to take initial actions to safeguard them in order to prevent illicit transfer. The unstable sociopolitical and economic environment in the region, exemplified by the current unrest in Uzbekistan, pose a danger to the security of biological institutes and materials. Finally, the facilities" proximity to the Middle East make them particularly tempting targets for biological materials theft by terrorist groups. Several unsuccessful incidents of nuclear materials transfer have been discovered, and biological materials could follow the same trafficking networks. The U.S. has been engaged with key bioinstitutes in the region since 1994, and expanded that involvement in 1997. Several U.S. government agencies oversee programs focused on responding to the biological proliferation threat including the Departments of State, Defense, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency. In 2001, the White House review of biothreat reduction programs encouraged the expansion of these programs. Internationally, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union are all funding projects and activities related to reducing the biological threat. In particular, Canada has made a major contribution under the G-8 Global Partnership. Among non-governmental organizations, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Civilian Research and Development Foundation have implemented projects and encouraged dialogue that has sensitized policymakers and the public to the importance of the biological threat. In addition, the International Science and Technology Center now devotes 40% of their budget to funding biological institutes and research. On the Russian side, increased attention to the problem has resulted in competitive grant programs for bioresearchers in order to absorb their expertise and discourage proliferation. Elisa D. Harris is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland.
Biological Weapons Arms Control
(1996-05-01) Leitenberg, Milton; CISSM
Biosafety and Dual-Use Scientific Research
(2006-12-08) Fernandez, Roberto J.; CISSM
Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms: Mexican Experience
(2006-12-08) Soberon, Mario; CISSM

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