School of Public Policy

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Protecting Our Military Space Systems
(Center for National Policy Press, 1988) Fetter, Steve
Over the last 25 years the United States has become increasingly dependent on space-based systems to support its military forces, and this trend is likely to continue for some time. Satellite systems have become an integral part of nuclear deterrence by providing strategic warning of an attack, tactical warning of missile launches, reliable communications between command authorities and nuclear forces, and nuclear explosion detection. Satellites also aid in conventional war-fighting by providing accurate reconnaissance, intelligence, weather, and navigation information.
Using Tags to Monitor Numerical Limits in Arms Control Agreements
(The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1989) Fetter, Steve; Garwin, Thomas
The treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) has sanctified the “zero option.” It has long been understood that it is easier to verify a complete ban on a weapon system than it is to verify a numerical limit. A complete prohibition is easier to verify because a single sighting of a banned weapon would constitute clear evidence of a violation. Moreover, a complete ban would eliminate training, testing, and repair activities that could serve as a cover for clandestine weapon deployments or could support a sudden breakout from a treaty. Although a total ban may be the best option from the standpoint of verification, this is not realistic for many weapon system. In the past, numerical limits could be verified adequately because the weapon systems in question—missile silos, bombers, and ballistic-missile submarines— were hard to conceal from national technical means (NTM) of verification (primarily reconnaissance and electronic intelligence satellites). Unfortunately, changes in technology and in the strategic environment are giving rise to new weapons whose deployment will be difficult to verify using current techniques. Mobile land-based ballistic missiles, for example, are gaining increased prominence in the strategic forces of both sides, primarily because they are less vulnerable to preemptive destruction than immobile silo-based missiles. But mobile missiles are much more difficult to count since they are designed to move around the countryside and are often hidden from view. Limits on nuclear cruise missiles would also be difficult to verify using NTM because they are small and because the conventional- and nuclear-armed versions are nearly indistinguishable. In addition, the INF Treaty is giving new impetus to the search for cooperative restrictions on the military confrontation in Central Europe, where numerical limits have been hard to agree on in part because of verification difficulties.
Long-term Radioactive Waste from Fusion Reactors: Part II
(Elsevier, 1990) Fetter, Steve; Cheng, E. T.; Mann, F. M.
In Part I we calculated 10 CFR 61 "Class-C" specific activity limits for all long-lived radionuclides with atomic number less than 88 (Ra). These calculations were based on the whole-body dose. We also estimated the production of these radionuclides from all naturally occurring elements with atomic numbers less than 84 (Po) in the first wall of a typical fusion reactor, and thereby derived concentration limits for these elements in first-wall materials, if the first wall is to be suitable for Class-C disposal. In Part II we use the "effective dose equivalent" (EDE), which is a much better indication of the risk from radiation exposure than the whole-body dose, to calculate specific activity limits for all long-lived radionuclides up to Cm-248. In addition, we have estimated the production of long-lived actinides and fission products from possible thorium and uranium impurities in first-wall structures. This completes our study of long-lived radionuclides that are produced from all elements that occur in the earth's crust at average concentrations greater than one part per trillion.
The Effects of Nuclear Detonations and Nuclear War
(Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990) Fetter, Steve
Nuclear war conjures up images of mass destruction and mutilation that few are willing to contemplate in detail. This chapter reviews the effects of nuclear explosions and describes the damage that might result from various types of nuclear strikes.
Tags
(Westview Press, The Perseus Books Group, 1990) Fetter, Steve; Garwin, Thomas
An agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) may place numerical and geographical limits on more than 140,000 treaty-limited items (TLIs)1 in 21 countries. Monitoring limits on such huge numbers of TLIs would be extremely difficult, as well as expensive and intrusive, with human inspectors alone. This chapter examines a promising way to effectively monitor limits while reducing cost and intrusiveness: the tagging of TLIs. The use of tags transforms a numerical limit into a ban on untagged items. The result is that many of the verification advantages of a complete ban can be retained for a numerical limit. Tagging works by certifying that every TLI observed is one of those permitted under a numerical limit. A tagging system would involve the manufacture of a number of tags equal to the number of TLI, which would then be affixed to an essential part of each allowed TLI. If even one untagged TLI were ever seen—during on-site inspections (OSI), by national technical means (NTM), or even by nationals of the inspected party loyal to the treaty regime—then there would be prima facie evidence of a treaty violation. If properly designed, tags could also identify a TLI as belonging to a particular nation or as normally deployed in a particular region, which would make it easier to verify CFE sub-limits on national and regional deployments.
The Hazard from Plutonium Dispersal by Nuclear-warhead Accidents
(Taylor & Francis, 1990) Fetter, Steve; Frank, von Hippel
Nuclear weapons are carefully designed to have an extremely low probability of exploding accidentally with an appreciable yield—even if they are involved in a high-speed crash, struck by a bullet or consumed in a fire. The principal concern when nuclear warheads are involved in such accidents is the possible dispersal of plutonium into the environment. In particular, an explosion could disperse a significant fraction of the plutonium in a warhead as particles of respirable size.
Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should be Done?
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1991) Fetter, Steve
Iraqi missile attacks against cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia have focused attention on the continuing proliferation of ballistic missile technology throughout the third world. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 25 countries have acquired or are trying to acquire ballistic missiles, either through purchase or indigenous production. All but a few are developing countries, and the list encompasses some of the most volatile regions of the world. The greatest concentration is in the Middle East, where nine nations have missile programs. Missiles have also spread to other hot spots, including India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, Brazil and Argentina, Taiwan, and South Africa.
Verifying the Authenticity of Nuclear Warheads Without Revealing Sensitive Design Information
(1991-12) Fetter, Steve; Cochran, Thomas B.
Verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads will require reconciling two conflicting objectives: the desire of the monitoring party to insure that the objects slated for dismantlement are bona fide warheads of the declared type, and the desire of the monitored party to protect sensitive information about the design of the warhead. A possible solution would involve visiting a deployment site on short notice and randomly selecting a given number of warheads for dismantlement. The warheads would then be placed in tagged, sealed containers for transport to the dismantlement facility, where the integrity of the tags and seals would be verified. If the number of warheads to be dismantled is a small fraction of the entire inventory, then the monitoring party would be reasonably sure that the warheads are genuine, for the only way the monitored party could defeat the scheme would be to deploy large numbers of fake warheads. Still, the process of on-site tagging and sealing for each warhead is tedious, and the monitored party would have no assurance that all the warheads were genuine, since the monitored party could easily replace 10 or 20 percent of the warheads slated for dismantlement with decoys. A much better solution would involve gathering only a small sample of warheads during an initial random on-site inspection and establishing a unique “fingerprint” or signature for this warhead type.
Why Were Scud Casualties So Low?
(Nature Publishing Group, 1993-01-28) Fetter, Steve; Lewis, George N.; Gronlund, Lisbeth
Patriot missiles were returned to the Gulf last week. But they were not the reason for the unexpectedly low casualty rate when Saddam attacked Israel with Scud missiles in 1991. Iraq fired more than 80 modified Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. These attacks caused 31 deaths, numerous injuries, and substantial property damage. With the exception of the Scud that hit a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and killed 28 U.S. soldiers, however, the number of deaths and serious injuries caused by each Scud appear to be much lower than one would have expected based on the results of previous ballistic missile attacks. The relatively low casualty rate has been cited by several analysts as evidence of the success of the Patriot missile defense system. Others have argued that the same casualty data suggests that the Patriot may not have been very successful.
Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War
(Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993-03) Fetter, Steve; Lewis, George N.; Gronlund, Lisbeth
The proliferation of ballistic missiles has in recent years become a major international security concern. This increased concern is in part due to the highly visible role played by Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. However, it is also due to the widespread -- but incorrect -- perception that even conventionally-armed ballistic missiles are tremendously destructive. This perception that ballistic missiles are inherently weapons of great destructive capability may have played a key role in the politics of the Gulf War. Iraq fired more than 80 modified Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, causing 31 deaths, numerous injuries, and substantial property damage. However, with the exception of the Scud that hit a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and killed 28 U.S. soldiers, the number of casualties caused by these Scuds was much lower than was generally anticipated.
A Step-by-step Approach to a Global Fissile Materials Cutoff
(Arms Control Today, 1995-10) Fetter, Steve; von Hippel, Frank
Despite its centrality to the future of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, progress toward a fissile cutoff has lost momentum. To regain momentum, and to capture many of the security benefits of a cutoff as soon as possible, groups and countries advocating nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament should press the nuclear-weapon and threshold states to commit themselves publicly to a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons. Fissile materials—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—are the fundamental ingredients of all nuclear weapons. They are also the most difficult and expensive part of a nuclear weapon to produce. A global, verified ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives is therefore an essential part of any comprehensive nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. A cutoff would limit the size of potential nuclear arsenals. It would make reductions irreversible if fissile material were transferred from dismantled weapons and other unsafeguarded stocks to nonweapons use or disposal under international safeguards. A cutoff would also strengthen the nonproliferation regime by opening up nuclear facilities in all states to international inspection.
Climate Change and the Transformation of World Energy Supply
(MacArthur Foundation Program on International Peace and Security, 1998-02) Fetter, Steve
In December, world attention turned to Kyoto, Japan, where parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiated a protocol to reduce the greenhouse-gas emissions of the industrialized countries by 5 percent over the next ten to fifteen years. The agreement was attacked from both sides, with environmental groups claiming that deeper reductions are urgently needed, and opponents claiming that reductions are unnecessary and would curtail economic growth. Both groups are wrong. Immediate, deep reductions are neither necessary nor politically possible. We must, however, begin today to prepare for the inevitable reductions that lie ahead. Most especially, we must lay the foundation for a global transition, beginning in the next ten to twenty years, away from traditional fossil fuels.
Verifying Nuclear Disarmament
(Westview Press, The Perseus Books Group, 1998-03) Fetter, Steve
Commentators differ on whether nuclear disarmament would be desirable, but many argue that disarmament is impractical because it could not be verified. Three reasons are often offered for such pessimism. First, nuclear weapons are small and difficult to detect, and one could not be sure that a few weapons had not been hidden away. Second, nuclear weapons are so destructive that a mere handful would confer enormous military and political advantages over non-nuclear adversaries. Finally, nuclear know-how cannot be eliminated, and any nation that had dismantled its nuclear weapons would be capable of quickly assembling a new arsenal from scratch or using civilian nuclear materials. Because of the difficulty of verifying that other states had eliminated all their weapons and providing adequate warning of their rearming, it is argued, states would not agree to disarm in the first place.
Future Directions in Nuclear Arms Control and Verification
(International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP), 1998-04) Fetter, Steve
To date, nuclear arms control has focused on restricting the number and capabilities of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles— intercontinental missiles and bombers. In the future, it will become increasingly important to combine these measures with restrictions on nuclear warhead and fissile-material stockpiles and on the operation and targeting of nuclear forces. Restrictions on nuclear warheads, materials, operations, and targeting would not only help improve stability, but would also help reduce the risk of accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous use of nuclear weapons. A major challenge is verifying compliance with such restrictions. This paper outlines the technical possibilities for verifying limits on stockpiles of warheads and fissile materials, on the dismantling of nuclear warheads and the disposition of fissile materials, and on the launch-readiness of nuclear forces in the hope of stimulating further research on these topics.
A Comprehensive Transparency Regime for Warheads and Fissile Materials
(Arms Control Today, 1999-01) Fetter, Steve
U.S. Russian efforts to limit nuclear forces largely have ignored their most fearsome components—the nuclear warheads. Arms control agreements have instead focused on limiting the number of deployed delivery vehicles and their launchers: ballistic missiles and their associated silos, mobile launchers or submarines; and long range bombers. START II limits the number of warheads that can be mounted on delivery vehicles, but is silent on non-deployed warheads. Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin announced in 1991 that certain tactical warheads would be withdrawn and dismantled, but these initiatives were not legally binding and neither side could confirm that the promised reductions actually took place.
Climate Change and the Transformation of World Energy Supply
(Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 1999-05) Fetter, Steve
In December 1997, world attention turned to Kyoto, Japan, where parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) negotiated a protocol to reduce the greenhouse-gas emissions of the industrialized countries by 5 percent below 1990 levels over the next ten to fifteen years. The agreement has been attacked from both sides. Environmental groups assert that much deeper reductions are urgently needed. Opponents claim that the proposed reductions are either unnecessary or premature, would curtail economic growth, or would be unfair or ineffective without similar commitments by developing countries. Both groups overstate the importance of near-term reductions in emissions. The modest reductions called for by the Kyoto agreement are a sensible first step, but only if they are part of a larger and longer-term strategy. Indeed, near-term reductions can be counterproductive if they are not implemented in a manner that is consistent with a long-term strategy to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations. The centerpiece of any long-term strategy to limit climate change is a transformation in world energy supply, in which traditional fossil fuels are replaced by energy sources that do not emit carbon dioxide. This transformation must begin in earnest in the next 10 to 20 years, and must be largely complete by 2050. Today, however, all carbon-free energy sources have serious economic, technological, or environmental drawbacks. If economically competitive and environmentally attractive substitutes are not widely available in the first half of the next century, it will be impossible to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at acceptable levels.
The Future of Nuclear Arms Control
(American Physical Society, 1999-10) Fetter, Steve
It’s a great privilege for me to be invited to join this very distinguished panel. As you can tell from the color of my hair, I represent the next generation of physicists involved in public policy. Rather than talk about the history of physics in national defense, I’ll talk about the future—in particular, the future of nuclear arms control.
Decarbonizing the Global Energy System
(2000) Fetter, Steve
To stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at an equivalent doubling, CO2 emissions must be limited to 5 PgC y–1 in 2050, compared to 8 PgC y–1 today. This will require the decarbonization of world energy supply, in which fossil fuels, which today account for 85% of energy supply, are replaced by carbon-free sources. Only five sources are capable of supplying a substantial fraction of the required carbon-free supply: biomass, fission, solar, wind, and decarbonized fossil fuels. Other sources are either too limited, too expensive, or too unproven to make a substantial contribution by 2050. Each of the major alternatives has significant economic, technical, or environmental handicaps. Biomass can supply affordable portable fuels, but would require vast areas of land, in competition with agriculture and natural ecosystems. Fission is a mature technology, but suffers from public-acceptance problems related to the risks of accidents, waste disposal, and proliferation. Solar is environmentally benign but expensive and would require massive storage or transmission. Wind is economically competitive at windy sites, but attractive sites are limited. Fossil fuels are cheap and abundant, but the cost of CO2 capture and disposal may be high and the environmental impacts unknown.
Alternatives to NMD
(Lawyers Alliance for World Security, 2000) Fetter, Steve; Mendelsohn, Jack
In Chapter VI, Steve Fetter and Jack Mendelsohn outline Alternatives to NMD. There exists an effective alternative to NMD for dealing with the potential ballistic missile threat: strengthening the interlocking and complementary barriers to proliferation created by deterrence, arms control (including transparency measures), economic incentives, cooperative programs, export controls, preemption and civil defense.
Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System
(Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program, 2000-04) Fetter, Steve; Sessler, Andrew M.; Cornwall, John M.; Dietz, Bob; Frankel, Sherman; Garwin, Richard L.; Gottfried, Kurt; Gronlund, Lisbeth; Lewis, George N.; Postol, Theodore A.; Wright, David C.
The National Missile Defense system under development by the United States would be ineffective against even limited ballistic missile attacks from emerging missile states. Moreover, its deployment would increase nuclear dangers from Russia and China, and impede cooperation by these countries in international efforts to control the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States should reconsider its options for countering the threats posed by long-range ballistic missiles and shelve the current NMD plans as unworkable and counterproductive.

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