Philosophy Theses and Dissertations

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The Distinction in the Tractatus Between Saying and Showing
(1970) Harward, Donald W.; Perkins, Moreland; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md)
The distinction between saying and showing is fundamental to Wittgenstein's attempt in the Tractatus to explain the communication of significant propositions, the function of non-significant assertions, and the general relationships between thought, language and reality. In fact, the saying and showing distinctions provide the key to an interpretation of the philosophies of logic and language in the Tractatus. The distinction has not been thoroughly investigated in the Wittgensteinian literature. When it has been discussed, it has not been analyzed rigorously; nor, I think, has it been analyzed correctly. It is quite remarkable that a distinction so important to the Tractatus has been given such brief treatment. I critically construct the positions of the six leading commentators on the Tractatus doctrines of saying and showing early in the dissertation. The commentators are: Pitcher, Black, Stenius, Favrholdt, Schwyzer and Shwayder. Arguments are presented to demonstrate the inadequacies of each of their intepretations. By paying attention to just how Wittgenstein uses various "show" and "say" terms or expressions in the Tractatus, and by exploring what follows from those uses, an appropriate interpretation is found. In Chapters Three and Four, I structure this interpretation and I indicate how it avoids the criticisms and errors attributed to the other commentaries. The last chapter buttresses my interpretation of what Wittgenstein is doing in, and with, the doctrines of showing and saying in the Tractatus by presenting supporting evidence from the pre-Tractatus manuscripts.
INTERNALIST AND EXTERNALIST THEORIES: THE DIVERSITY OF REASONS FOR ACTING
(1990) Paul, Linda Marie; Slote, Michael; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md)
Although common-sense moral theories tend to hold that everyone has reason to act morally, Bernard Williams argues in "Internal and External Reasons" that an agent has no reason to act if the act in question fails to Promote any desire or project of hers. Williams considers this a logical property of reasons for acting and refers to this position as "internalism." After critically examining Williams' specific arguments, I use a heterogeneous group of arguments to show that internalism oversimplifies the logic of reasons. There are various ways in which reasons can be attributed to an agent without first examining her motives or Projects: (1) some ways of undertaking obligations give rise to reasons for acting due to rational requirements on consistency of intention; (2) Thomas Nagel's arguments that prudential reasons are best described in terms of the agent's metaphysical conception of herself allow us to attribute reasons for acting to an agent without checking her desires first; and (3) John McDowell's account of agents ''perceiving" reasons explains how an agent's conception of the facts will give rise to a reason and a motive for acting. It also appears that internalism's appeal relies in part on our prejudices in favor of self-interest theories of rationality and our tendency to view agents as more separate and independent than they actually are. As a result, internalism suffers from too narrow a value focus. The emphasis on a shared form of life that originates in the Wittgensteinian notion of a practice allows us to attribute reasons for acting to agents without considering their individual projects in each case and better suits the process of judging and understanding reasons for acting than a view which focuses as heavily on the individual as internalism does. Finally, because agents are sometimes perverse, reasons themselves do not always motivate and motivation cannot logically be part of having a reason. In conclusion, reasons for acting are significantly more diverse than internalism allows and the theory should therefore be rejected.
A Moral Contractualist Defense of Political Obligation
(2003-11-24) Lefkowitz, David B.; Galston, William A.; Philosophy
Is there a moral duty to obey the law? Or more precisely, do citizens of any modern state have a general duty to acknowledge its authority to determine for them, for action guiding purposes, whether certain kinds of conduct are morally permissible, required, or forbidden? Moral contractualism, I contend, entails that citizens of a liberal democratic state do have such a duty. Treating others morally often requires agents to act collectively. But even agents who accept the moral necessity of collective action will sometimes disagree over the specification of the ends to be achieved, and the means for doing so. I argue that a liberal democratic state (and only such a state) can justifiably claim the authority to resolve such disagreements, which it does mainly by enacting and applying laws. Obedience to democratic laws expresses respect for others' autonomy. In defending these claims, particular attention is paid to the problem posed by disagreement over the design of democratic decision procedures, conflicts between democratically enacted laws and individual rights, and conflicts of rights. Civil disobedience, conscientious objection, and over-inclusive laws are also addressed.
IDENTIFICATION AND AUTONOMY: A MEDITATION ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HARRY FRANKFURT
(2004-04-22) Chandler, Teresa Marie; Martin, Raymond; Philosophy
Harry Frankfurt offers an account of freedom as "autonomy" in which identification plays a central role. Identification is supposed to be a process or psychic configuration by which attitudes desires in particular become or count in some sense as one's own. When we are propelled to action by desires with which we "identify," we're acting autonomously. On Frankfurt's view, whenever we act, a desire is involved, but sometimes the desire that moves us is one by which we do not want to be moved, a desire from which we are alienated with which we fail to identify. Paradigm examples are addictions and compulsions. When moved by one of these "alien" desires, we lack autonomy. Frankfurt's account of autonomy, then, rests on a basic distinction. Of the desires that move us to action "effective desires" only some will be desires with which we identify. The main claim of this dissertation is that Frankfurt needs to maintain this distinction, but in the end, doesn't. There are two basic problems. First, as Frankfurt develops his conception of identification, it shifts, and as it shifts, it becomes broader, so much so that it no longer marks the narrow internality. Second, neither of Frankfurt's alternatives wholeheartedness, caring clearly functions to mark out a narrow internality, either. In the case of caring, Frankfurt gives an account that's dispositional that is made out in terms of effective desire, so that in the end caring is not clearly distinguishable from having an effective desire from simply being moved to action. In the case of wholeheartedness, Frankfurt introduces the concept as a way of understanding identification and therefore as a criterion of narrow internality, but he defines wholeheartedness in a way that presupposes a criterion of narrow internality. Given the shifting conception of identification and the problems with wholeheartedness and caring, we are unable to distinguish between effective desires and desires that are truly an agent's own, and therefore, are left with an account of autonomy that remains unclear.
Artistic and Ethical Values in the Experience of Narratives
(2004-05-10) Giovannelli, Alessandro; Levinson, Jerrold; Philosophy
The ethical criticism of art has received increasing attention in contemporary aesthetics, especially with respect to the evaluation of narratives. The most prominent philosophical defenses of this art-critical practice concentrate on the notion of response, specifically on the emotional responses a narrative requires for it to be correctly apprehended and appreciated. I first investigate the mechanisms of emotional participation in narratives (Chapters 1-2); then, I address the question of the legitimacy of the ethical criticism of narratives and advance an argument in support of such a practice (Chapters 3-7). Chapter 1 analyzes different modes of emotional participation in narratives, distinguishing between: emotional inference, affective mimicry, empathy, sympathy, and concern. Chapter 2 first critically discusses Noël Carroll's objections to identificationism and to an empathy-based account of character participation, and then analyzes the sorts of imaginative activities involved in narrative engagement, by investigating the distinctions introduced by Richard Wollheim between central and acentral imagining, and iconic and non-iconic imagination. Chapter 3 offers a taxonomy of the possible views on the relationship between the ethical and the artistic values of a narrative, distinguishing between reductionist and non-reductionist views, and sorting the latter ones into autonomism and moralism, radical and moderate. Chapter 4 analyzes the ethical assessment of narratives for (i) their consequences on their perceivers and (ii) the means of their production, and indicates the evaluation in terms of (iii) the ethical perspective a narrative embodies as the kind of ethical evaluation on which an argument for the ethical criticism of narratives ought to concentrate. Chapter 5 critically assesses the accounts of "imaginative resistance" to fiction offered by Kendall Walton, Richard Moran, and Tamar Gendler, and concludes that none of them is adequate to ground an argument for the ethical criticism of narratives. Chapter 6 looks at Carroll's argument for moderate moralism and Berys Gaut's "merited-response" argument for "ethicism," and finds both arguments wanting. Chapter 7 proposes a version of moralism grounded in the notion of a narrative's ethical perspective, and defended on the grounds of narratives' commitments to provide a realistic (or "fitting") representation of reality.
Justifying Bioethical Case Decisions: Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-Level Moral Principles
(2005-04-14) Kader, Nancy Stowe; Lichtenberg, Judith; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Bioethics is a practical enterprise intended to produce morally acceptable solutions to clinical case problems. Although answers can be derived from deductivist or principle-driven methods of deliberation, these solutions may be too abstract to be accepted as appropriate to the circumstances, clinically effective, or suitable to those stakeholders affected by the decision. Furthermore, it has proven difficult to identify the best moral principle to apply to each case, because of the variation in detail and nuance impacting each situation. In this dissertation, I exemplify the difficulty in practical bioethics deliberations by presenting in detail the activities of a practicing ethics committee, working at the clinical level of private medical practice in the field of assisted reproductive medicine. In descriptions of over forty cases, I show the difficulty this committee faced in solving routine cases and even more when attempting to solve the novel cases that arise with some frequency in this unique field. This research leads me to recommend a more procedural approach, based on the process of reflective equilibrium described by John Rawls, but supplemented by the contractualist version put forth by T. M. Scanlon. In this deliberative process, a wide variety of factors are considered: moral theory, particular details, paradigm cases, information from policy boards or professional organizations, diverse points of view, and public input. From this style of reasoning, useful mid-level principles can emerge, providing justification for bioethical solutions and encouraging consensus, which can also play a legitimizing role in decision-making. I conclude that this inclusive kind of deliberation is more likely to occur at the level of the professional organization or the national commission, where broad diversity in participation and information, as well as public input, can take place. Decisions or principles achieved from this wider level of discourse will be more legitimate and can then be used to guide ethics committee members functioning at the private level.
Pieces of Music: The Ontology of Classical, Rock, and Jazz Music
(2005-06-21) Kania, Andrew; Levinson, Jerrold; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
I investigate the nature of, and relationships between, works, performances, and recordings in the Western musical traditions of classical, rock, and jazz music. I begin in chapter one by defending the study of musical ontology against a recent attack by Aaron Ridley. This leads into a discussion of the appropriate methodology for investigating the ontology of art, and the reasons for doing musical ontology, particularly in a comparative way. In chapter two I review and reject several theories of what a classical musical work is. I defend the view that such a work is an abstract object - a type of performance - against several objections, most notably that abstract objects cannot be created, while musical works are. In chapter three I argue that classical recordings, as they are typically made, are correctly conceived of as giving access to performances of the works they purport to be of, despite the fact that they are not records of any single performance event in the studio. Before tackling rock and jazz, in chapter four I investigate the concept of a work of art in general, arguing that there are two necessary conditions an art object must meet to be a work: (1) it must be of a kind that is a primary focus of critical attention in a given art form or tradition, and (2) it must be a persisting object. I argue further that (i) there is no need to subsume all art under the work concept, and that (ii) drawing a distinction between works and other art objects need not lead to valuing the former over the latter. In chapter five, I argue that the work of art in rock music is a track for playback, constructed in the studio. Tracks usually manifest songs, which can be performed live. A cover version is a track (successfully) intended to manifest the same song as some other track. In chapter six, I discuss various proposals for the ontology of jazz. I argue that in jazz there are no works, only performances.
Reason for Rescue: An Essay on Beneficence
(2005-07-01) James, Scott; Morris, Christopher W; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Duties of beneficence are not well understood. Peter Singer has argued that the scope of beneficence should not be restricted to those who are, in some sense, near us. According to Singer, refusing to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts is just as wrong as refusing to rescue a child drowning before you. Most people do not seem convinced by Singer's arguments, yet no one in my view has offered a plausible justification for restricting the scope of beneficence that doesn't produce counterintuitive results elsewhere. I offer a defense of this restricted scope by introducing the notion of unique dependence, a notion that is both intuitively attractive and theoretically grounded. Roughly, someone is uniquely dependent on you when you are the only individual in a position to provide assistance. Why unique dependence deserves the importance ascribed to it is further explained by the following considerations. First, when someone is uniquely dependent on you, you are in control of her situation. But this control cannot be exchanged for a reduction of suffering elsewhere without treating the value of this person as interchangeable with the value of others. But treating a person's value in such a way does not reflect our beliefs about the dignity and autonomy of persons. Second, the relation of unique dependence entails that one's beneficiary is determinate. The reason this is important becomes clear once we accept the plausible (Scanlonian) idea that moral justification depends on what determinate individuals could or could not reasonably accept, not on the aggregative wishes of the whole. Thus when you refuse to make the sorts of contributions to humanitarian relief efforts that Singer and others demand, there is no determinate individual who can claim that had you made the effort to save her life, she would almost assuredly be alive. Addressing distant suffering is, and ought to be, the work of collective bodies, particularly those bodies that set policy. Your individual obligations are to those bodies. When you refuse to contribute, you are responsible for not making an effort to reduce suffering, but you are not responsible for any determinate deaths.
Concepts: Taking Psychological Explanation Seriously
(2005-07-26) Rives, Bradley; Rey, Georges; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
What do we need a theory of concepts for? Two answers to this 'meta-level' question about concepts figure prominently in the recent philosophical literature, namely, that concepts are needed primarily for the purposes of psychological explanation, and that concepts are needed primarily for the purposes of normative epistemology. I argue that the psychological perspective leads to what I call 'Judgment Pragmatism', which is a version of conceptual/inferential role semantics according to which concepts are not constitutively tied to rationality and knowledge. I begin in Chapter 1 by distinguishing two uses of the term 'concept' found in the literature, and laying out some constraints on any adequate theory of concepts. In Chapter 2, I articulate the two meta-level approaches under consideration, and explain how the work of Jerry Fodor and Christopher Peacocke is representative of the psychological and epistemological perspectives, respectively. I also show that the meta-level question is distinct from the object-level question of whether Fodor's Informational Atomism or Peacocke's 'Concept Pragmatism' is correct. In Chapter 3, I distinguish two versions of Concept Pragmatism: Judgment Pragmatism, which individuates concepts in terms of mere judgment, and Knowledge Pragmatism, which individuates some concepts in terms of knowledge. I argue against Peacocke's claim that the former leads to the latter, and show that the perspective of psychological explanation provides us with reasons to resist Knowledge Pragmatism. I then consider, in Chapter 4, one of Peacocke's arguments for Judgment Pragmatism, and articulate the Quinean Challenge it faces. In Chapter 5, I argue that Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction are inadequate, and that Concept Pragmatism is not vulnerable to Fodor's empirical case against the analytic. I then make the empirical case for Judgment Pragmatism, in Chapter 6, by defending the view that positing the analytic/synthetic distinction is a piece of explanatory psychology. In Chapter 7, I consider the dialectical role of Frege cases, and argue that adopting the psychological perspective allows us to stake out a middle ground between Fodor's 'syntactic' treatment and Peacocke's claim that concepts are constitutively tied to reasons and rationality. Chapter 8 offers some concluding thoughts.
The Very Idea of Hispanic Identity
(2005-08-03) Idler, Jose Enrique; Morris, Christopher W; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Hispanics, and similar ethnic groups, are socially and politically recognized in American society because belonging to such groups is often thought to be central to members' identities. But is "Hispanicity" central to members' identities? What is the significance of being a Hispanic? My general thesis is that contrary to the common assumption of governmental agencies, advocacy groups, policy-makers, and American society in general, belonging to the Hispanic group is not currently central to its members' identities. I develop my thesis in two parts. In chapters two through four, I address philosophical questions about membership and groups. I argue that the sort of membership that is central to group members' identities is basic. Basic membership consists of traits that are essential to someone's self-understanding, making such a person a member of a particular group. Groups in which membership is basic generally satisfy three conditions: relevant identification, differentiation, and intrinsic identification. In chapters five through seven, I then turn to Hispanic identity. I argue that given the national identities of Hispanics, membership in the Hispanic group is generally not basic. Hispanic membership is an epiphenomenon of national membership, and thus the latter is basic whereas the former is not. I also point out that Hispanic membership could be a tipping phenomenon. A process of Hispanic people-making, in which the American state plays a key role, could turn Hispanic membership into a basic one. By way of conclusion, I discuss some possible implications of Hispanic identity for American national unity and for U.S.-Latin American relations.
Identifying and Eliminating the Problem with Einstein's Cosmological Constant
(2005-11-16) Myers, Zac D; Bub, Jeffrey; Mattingly, James; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
The cosmological constant, lambda, was first introduced into Einstein's field equations in the early 20th century. It was introduced as a quantity of outward-pushing energy in space that would counteract the contracting force of gravity thereby keeping the universe in a balanced and static state. Einstein willingly removed it once the universe was observed to be dynamic rather than static. However, as the decades have gone by, lambda has maintained its supporters and has continually been reintroduced to solve problems in cosmology. Presently, there is good reason to believe that lambda or something like it is indeed present in our universe. In the 1960s, in an effort to provide a physical basis for lamda, particle physicists turned to quantum vacuum energy and have since estimated a value for lamdba to be significantly greater than its observationally constrained value. This discrepancy has come to be known as the cosmological constant problem. Any effort to resolve the inconsistency must also account for the various observations we attribute to lambda, such as cosmic inflation and cosmic acceleration. To date, there are two basic approaches to resolving the cosmological constant problem that we may call the Identity approach and the Eliminativist approach. The Identity approach entails that vacuum energy is responsible for all the relevant observations and the problem is to be solved by some cancellation mechanism within the internal components of the vacuum. The Eliminativist approach explicitly rejects the reality and cosmological efficacy of vacuum energy, seeks alternative explanations for the observations and eliminates the cosmological constant problem by eliminating the cosmological constant. The benefit of having a crisis between these two views at this particular stage in cosmology's history is that they can be tested against each other in an experimental situation. Whatever the outcome of the experiments, we will be clearer about the work needed to resolve the cosmological constant problem once and for all.
Bee-ing There: The Systematicity of Honeybee Navigation Supports a Classical Theory of Honeybee Cognition
(2006-04-27) Tetzlaff, Michael James; Rey, Georges; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
The Classical theory of cognition proposes that there are cognitive processes that are computations defined over syntactically specified representations, "sentences" in a language of thought, for which the representational-constituency relation is concatenative. The main rival to Classicism is(Nonimplementational, or Radical, Distributed) Connectionism. It proposes that cognitive processes are computations defined over syntactically simple, distributed representions, for which the constituency relation is nonconcatenative. I argue that Connectionism, unlike Classicism, fails to provide an adequate theoretical framework for explaining systematically related cognitive capacities and that this is due to its necessary reliance on nonconcatenative constituency. There appears to be an interesting divergence of attitude among philosophers of psychology and cognitive scientists regarding Classicism's language of thought hypothesis. On one extreme, there are those who argue that only humans are likely to possess a language of thought (or that we at least have no evi- dence to the contrary). On the other extreme, there are those who argue that distinctively human thinking is not likely to be explicable in terms of a language of thought. They point to features of human cognition which they claim strongly support the hypothesis that human cognitive-state transition functions are computationally intractable. This implicitly suggests that the cognitive processes of simpler, nonhuman minds might be computationally tractable and thus amenable to Classical computational explanation. I review much of the recent literature on honeybee navigation. I argue that many capacities of honeybees to acquire various sorts of navigational information do in fact exhibit systematicity. That conclusion, together with the correctness of the view that Classicism provides a better theoretical framework than does Connectionism for explaining the systematicity of the relevant cognitive capacities, gives one reason in support of the claim that sophisticated navigators like honeybees have a kind of language of thought. At the very least, it provides one reason in support of the claim that the constituency relation for the mental representations of such navigators is concatenative, not nonconcatenative.
An Investigation into Popular Art
(2006-06-01) Derksen, Craig; Levinson, Jerrold; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
While Popular Art surrounds us, there have been few scholarly investigations of it. One reason for this is that accounts of Popular Art have not facilitated such investigations into Popular Art. I characterize a work as Popular Art based on the relationships that it bears to the influences that make up Popular Culture and other things that are associated with Popular Culture. By classifying the work according to the relationships that it bears to Popular Culture, my account provides us with a context of interpretation for the work. In doing so, I follow David Novitz and his traditional account of Popular Art whereby Popular Art is defined by its association with a certain tradition, namely the tradition of Popular Culture, but I do not follow his rejection of the role of formal traits since the fact that a distinction has a social source does not entail that the distinction has a social criterion as Novitz argues. I also follow Noel Carroll in attributing a central role to the accessibility of the work, but I associate that accessibility with a particular audience rather than general accessibility since the constitution of the audience is more important that the size of the audience. I do not follow Carroll in his attempt to treat accessibility as a necessary and sufficient condition for such a classification since it is important for the classification of a work as Popular Art to follow changes in Popular Culture and a Culture must be defined in terms of connection to the previous stages of the culture.
Thermodynamics, Reversibility and Jaynes' Approach to Statistical Mechanics
(2006-07-25) Parker, Daniel; Bub, Jeffrey; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
This dissertation contests David Albert's recent arguments that the proposition that the universe began in a particularly low entropy state (the "past hypothesis") is necessary and sufficient to ground the thermodynamic asymmetry against the reversibility objection, which states that the entropy of thermodynamic systems was previously larger than it is now. In turn, it argues that this undermines Albert's suggestion that the past hypothesis can underwrite other temporal asymmetries such as those of records and causation. This thesis thus concerns the broader philosophical problem of understanding the interrelationships among the various temporal asymmetries that we find in the world, such as those of thermodynamic phenomena, causation, human agency and inference. The position argued for is that the thermodynamic asymmetry is nothing more than an inferential asymmetry, reflecting a distinction between the inferences made towards the past and the future. As such, it cannot be used to derive a genuine physical asymmetry. At most, an inferential asymmetry can provide evidence for an asymmetry not itself forthcoming from the formalism of statistical mechanics. The approach offered here utilises an epistemic, information-theoretic interpretation of thermodynamics applied to individual "branch" systems in order to ground irreversible thermodynamic behaviour (Branch systems are thermodynamic systems quasi-isolated from their environments for short periods of time). I argue that such an interpretation solves the reversibility objection by treating thermodynamics as part of a more general theory of statistical inference supported by information theory and developed in the context of thermodynamics by E.T. Jaynes. It is maintained that by using an epistemic interpretation of probability (where the probabilities reflect one's knowledge about a thermodynamic system rather than a property of the system itself), the reversibility objection can be disarmed by severing the link between the actual history of a thermodynamic system and its statistical mechanical description. Further, novel and independent arguments to ground the veracity of records in the face of the reversibility objection are developed. Additionally, it is argued that the information-theoretic approach offered here provides a clearer picture of the reduction of the thermodynamic entropy to its statistical mechanical basis than other extant proposals.
Memorable Moments: A Philosophy of Poetry
(2006-08-07) Ribeiro, Anna Christina Soy; Levinson, Jerrold; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
In my dissertation I give a philosophical account of poetry from an analytic perspective--one that is also informed by studies in linguistic communication (pragmatics) and cognitive psychology, and that takes into account the many varieties of poetic traditions around the world. In chapter one I argue that philosophically rigorous study of poetry is long overdue, and that it should focus not on what poetry has in common with the other literary arts, but rather on what is distinct to it. In chapter two I give a cross-cultural history of poetry, showing the many types of features that are typical of the art form. From this history it emerges that beneath the variety of poetic traditions all over the globe lies a remarkably consistent set of features--the use of recurrence patterns. In chapter three I argue for an intentional-historical formalist definition of poetry according to which a poem is either (1) a verbal art object relationally or intrinsically intended to belong in the poetic tradition, or (2) a verbal art object intrinsically intended to involve use of repetition schemes (naïve poetry-making). In my fourth chapter I investigate the psychological reasons for poetry to have begun as and remained an art that relies on repetition devices, focusing on two non-literate groups: the illiterate trovadores of Northeastern Brazil, and pre-literate children. Both cases suggest an innate predisposition to attend to and produce linguistic recurrence structures of various, sometimes highly intricate, sorts. In my fifth chapter I consider the Relevance theory claim in pragmatics that, as a rule, repetition incurs extra linguistic processing effort, and that this must be outweighed by an increase in contextual effects, given the assumption of relevance. I argue that although this picture of poetic understanding is largely correct, repetition can also be seen as a cognitive facilitator, helping us draw connections that might have gone unnoticed without it. I conclude by exploring the contributions my approach to poetry may offer to other topics in aesthetics and philosophy art, such as aesthetic experience, aesthetic properties, and theories of interpretation.
Beyond Political Neutrality: Towards A Complex Theory of Rights in the Modern Democratic State
(2006-10-23) Mason, Chataquoa Nicole; McIntosh, Wayne; Williams, Linda F; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
As of late, women, racial and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and other similarly situated groups have begun to make right-claims that once again test liberal notions of neutrality and raise significant questions concerning whether or not full equality and autonomy is possible in modern democracies. This study focuses on the impact of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other markers of difference on the realization of rights in the modern democratic state. This dissertation uses three case studies, which separately and together demonstrate attempts to realize full freedom and autonomy through practices of direct democracy, the California Referendum Initiative; appeal to the courts, the issue of Gay Marriage; and the creation of public policies and landmark legislation, the Violence Against Women Act. The findings of my research suggest that at all levels of government, race, class, gender, sexual orientation and other markers of difference shape the realization of rights in the modern democratic state. In this study, I extend the insights offered by critical race scholars by proffering a complex theory of rights that is able to account for the impact of identity and culture to the realization of rights and rights-claims made by individuals and groups in the public sphere. Employing a complex theory of rights, the findings of this study confirm that there are a variety of factors that influence the realization of rights in the modern democratic state. Chief among them are: (1) A notion of the good operating in society that is connected to deeply entrenched societal values and norms and that privileges the dominant culture; (2) the structures and institutions that govern society are enmeshed in race, class, sexuality, and ethnic hierarchies; (3) the accumulated advantages gained through historic practices of exclusion, conquest, and enslavement; (4) the representation of the dominant group and subjugated groups in the public sphere through texts, the media, and discourse; and (5) whether or not individuals or groups are recognized as bearers of rights under the law.
Rwanda and the Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention
(2007-04-25) Kassner, Joshua James; Morris, Christopher W; Morris, Christopher W; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
In 1994, nearly one million Men, women, and children were slaughtered because of their ethnicity. The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide has caused many to question the international community's choice not to intervene. I use the Rwandan genocide as a means of discussing international morality and the role of morality in international relations. The first half of my project focuses on humanitarian intervention as an issue of global ethics. I argue that the international community, as a collection of duty-bearing states, had a moral obligation to intervene in Rwanda. To defend this proposition I must first establish the conceptual possibility of global ethics. In that vein, I begin by arguing against various skeptical arguments made by communitarians, relativists, and political realists. Having made the conceptual room for global ethics, I then develop a weak moral principle in support of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention by identifying the set of conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that such an obligation exists. I next explain how states can and why they on occasion do bear that obligation. Lastly, I argue that the Rwandan genocide fulfilled such conditions; as a consequence, not only was intervention permissible, it was obligatory. The second half of my project is concerned with the role moral demands should play in the practical deliberations of states. Many international relations scholars contend that questions of intervention are largely determined by the right of nonintervention which precludes other states from considering reasons for action that would require intervention. Against such scholars I argue that the role the right of nonintervention played in the practical deliberations of states during the Rwandan genocide was, and remains, unjustified. In the alternative, I argue that we ought to adopt a rebuttable presumption in favor of nonintervention. Such a rule would serve the same goals as the right of nonintervention, but without the unjustified preclusion of moral reasons for action. I conclude that the presumption of nonintervention would have been rebutted during the Rwandan genocide, and that the international community ought to have intervened.
Empowerment and International Development
(2007-08-27) Keleher, Loretta Wills; Lichtenberg, Judith; Crocker, David A; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
International development theorists and practitioners agree that human empowerment is a necessary part of good development. This agreement is encouraging because attention and resources are being directed towards the important goal of empowering the oppressed. It is problematic because the agreement is relatively superficial and masks some deep and important disagreements about the goals and means of development theory, policy, and practice. Chapters One and Two compare the dominant economic growth approach to development with the capability approach, a relatively new alternative. I determine that the capability approach offers a more complete and therefore, superior concept of empowerment. Chapter Three considers Thomas Pogge's argument for the conclusion that the praise and attention the capability approach receives cannot be justified. I explain that Pogge's argument is based on a misunderstanding of crucial aspects of the capability approach, including the important role of empowerment. Chapters Four and Five provide detailed consideration of the role of empowerment within both Amartya Sen's and Martha Nussbaum's versions of the capability approach. I conclude that although neither scholar consistently uses the term empowerment, the concept of empowerment - both as agency and as capability-set expansion - plays a robust role on both versions of the approach. Moreover, I make the controversial suggestion that many of the differences between Sen and Nussbaum are more a matter of style than substance. Chapter Six considers the concern that Sen does not do enough to engage the role of institutionalized power in generating inequalities that prevent individuals from being empowered. I conclude that despite valuable contributions, Sen fails to provide a complete account of empowerment issues. However, this is not a fatal flaw. Considering both Sen's contributions, and the fact that the approach is well suited to accommodate a more complete understanding of institutionalized power and of empowerment for development (for example, Naila Kabeer's Social Relations Approach), it is clear that Sen and the capability approach have offered valuable steps towards a complete concept of empowerment.
Entanglement and Information in Algebraic Quantum Theories
(2008) Valente, Giovanni; Bub, Jeffrey; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
The algebraic approach to physical theories provides a general framework encompassing both classical and quantum mechanics. Accordingly, by looking at the behaviour of the relevant algebras of observables one can investigate structural and conceptual differences between the theories. Interesting foundational questions can be formulated algebraically and their answers are then given in a mathematically compelling way. My dissertation focuses on some philosophical issues concerning entanglement and quantum information as they arise in the algebraic approach. The se two concepts are connected in that one can exploit the non-local character of quantum theory to construct protocols of information theory which are not realized in the classical world. I first introduce the basic concepts of the algebraic formalism by reviewing von Neumann's work on the mathematical foundations of quantum theories. After presenting the reasons why von Neumann abandoned the standard Hilbert space formulation in favour of the algebraic approach, I show how his axiomatic program remained a mathematical "utopia" in mathematical physics. The Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics is grounded in information-theoretical considerations. I take on some specific problems concerning the extension of Bayesian statistical inference in infinite dimensional Hilbert space. I demonstrate that the failure of a stability condition, formulated as a rationality constraint for classical Bayesian conditional probabilities, does not undermine the Bayesian interpretation of quantum probabilities. I then provide a solution to the problem of Bayesian noncommutative statistical inference in general probability spaces. Furthermore, I propose a derivation of the a priori probability state in quantum mechanics from symmetry considerations. Finally, Algebraic Quantum Field Theory offers a rigorous axiomatization of quantum field theory, namely the synthesis of quantum mechanics and special relativity. In such a framework one can raise the question of whether or not quantum correlations are made stronger by adding relativistic constraints. I argue that entanglement is more robust in the relativistic context than in ordinary quantum theory. In particular, I show how to generalize the claim that entanglement across space-like separated regions of Minkowski spacetime would persist, no matter how one acts locally.
Diversity, Modesty, Liberty: An Essay on State Neutrality
(2008) Baltzly, Vaughn Bryan; Galston, William A; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Human beings have long disagreed about the best way to live. Of what significance is this fact for politics? In this dissertation, I argue that it is of the utmost significance, and that substantial theoretical conclusions follow from our decision to take it seriously. Arguing that few accounts of politics have given due consideration to the fact of persistent disagreement, among reasonable and well-intentioned individuals, as to what gives life meaning and value, I articulate what I hope to be the most defensible account of a politics that accommodates this fact. Citing a variety of possible inferences we might make in response to this `fact of diversity', I defend a humble assessment of our cognitive abilities in this regard as the most charitable inference on offer. Formulated from the perspective of those who would claim the right to exercise political power and authority, this epistemically-humble response to the fact of diversity issues in a principled refusal to endorse any particular account of the Good Life as authoritative for public purposes. The state manifests this principled refusal by adopting an attitude of `maximum feasible accommodation' with respect to its citizens' pursuits of their diverse conceptions of life's meaning and value. Such an attitude needs to be fleshed out in terms of policy, however, so in the final chapters I articulate and defend, as the best practical expression of a stance of maximum accommodation, a principle that restricts the use of the state's coercive power to only those measures needed to protect citizens' `expressive liberty' - that is, their right to live lives that express their cherished notions of life's meaning and value, free from coercive interference.

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