ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: DEVELOPMENT AND PRELIMINARY VALIDATION OF THE RELIGIOUS IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT SCALE

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The purpose of this study was to examine the psychometric properties of a new measure of religious identity development, the Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS). The study also explored the relationship among religious identity development, anxiety and dogmatism to determine convergent and discriminant validity for the RIDS. The concurrent validity for the RIDS was determined by exploring the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations. The religious identity measure that was validated in this study was based on a proposed model of religious identity development, the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development.

The participants for the study were 211 students and adults from the Midwest and East coast. They completed the Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS; V. Suthakaran, 2002), the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1960), the State subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, 1983), Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale

(Gorsuch & Venable, 1983), and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).

Exploratory factor analysis supported a six-factor model better than a seven-factor model. Discriminant validity was demonstrated by the negative correlations of the Acceptance status with anxiety and dogmatism, and the negative correlation of the Cognitive-Rationalization status with anxiety. Convergent validity was demonstrated by the positive correlations of the Concrete, Relational and Cognitive –Rationalization statuses with dogmatism, and the positive correlation of the Confusion status with anxiety. Some evidence, albeit modest, was found for concurrent validity, in that the Relational status was positively correlated with extrinsic religious orientation, and the Exploration status was positively correlated with intrinsic religious orientation. The negative correlation of the Cognitive-Rationalization status and the Confusion status with intrinsic religious orientation also provided tentative evidence for concurrent validity. Additional preliminary support for the concurrent validity of the RIDS was provided by examining the relationship of the six statuses with a two-dimensional definition of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation. Finally, results appeared to indicate that the internal consistencies and test-retest reliabilities were adequate, except for the Relational status.

The methodological limitations of the study and implications for counseling psychology were discussed. Suggestions for future research for refinement of methodology were offered.

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by

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Chapter one

Introduction

Psychologists in community agencies, colleges, schools and other settings are increasingly faced with a clientele from a wide range of cultural backgrounds. To meet the demands of this changing environment, new approaches in education and training, research strategies, and direct service delivery are required (Pedersen, 1991). Accordingly, in-service as well as preservice training for counselors seems to include increasing awareness of multicultural concerns. However, despite the increasing stress on multicultural sensitivity in counseling, it appears that a crucial component of culture, religion, is still being largely ignored (Ribak-Rosenthal & Kane, 1999).

Although there is an acceptance that religious values have an overarching influence on a culture, they are often not assessed or considered important from a psychological viewpoint (Spilka, 1987). The prevailing position held by many psychologists, academic and applied, appears to be one of silence towards the issue of religion (Jones, 1994). However, Bergin (1983) acknowledged that quite recently there has been a renewal of psychological interest in religion, and asserted that "religion should be considered more systematically in personality theories and therapeutic interventions" (p. 170). By failing to recognize the influence of religion on an individual, psychologists are overlooking potentially important aspects of an individual's cultural background (Bishop, 1992). There are at least three reasons for counseling psychologists to explore the implications of religion in understanding normal and abnormal development (Worthington, 1989): (a) There is a reluctance on the part of many clients, especially religious clients, to share their religious convictions during secular therapy, because they

fear either being misunderstood or having their religious values changed by counselors who are not explicitly religious; (b) in general, therapists are not as religiously oriented as their clients and in working with religious clients they have difficulty establishing and maintaining trust, difficulty managing client resistance, and difficulty remaining focused on countertransference issues; and (c) many therapists are not adequately informed about religion to be optimally helpful to their religious clients by being more knowledgeable and sophisticated in dealing with religious issues than their clients. The reluctance on the part of many psychologists to embrace religion in their practice or research appears to be because of the doubt that surrounds the issue of religiosity actually promoting psychological well-being (Frenz & Carey, 1989).

Religiosity and psychological well-being

Psychologists, such as Ellis (1980) and Freud (1955) have contended that religiosity has a negative influence on psychological well-being. Ellis (1980) stated that "religiosity in many respects is equivalent to irrational thinking and emotional disturbance...the less religious they are the more emotionally healthy they will be" (p.637). Freud (1955) asserted that "Religion would thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of children, it arose out of the Oedipus Complex, out of the relation to the father" (pp.43-44). In contrast, Bergin (1983) concluded from his meta-analysis that the results "revealed no support for the preconception that religiousness is necessarily correlated with psychopathology" (p.170). Moreover, Bergin (1983) found results from studies that suggested religiosity and psychopathology might actually be negatively correlated. Since psychologists are interested in those aspects of life that promote a sense of psychological well-being,

results from empirical investigations can be quite valuable to settle the debate on the influence of religiosity on psychological well-being (Baker & Gorsuch, 1982).

From a review of the relevant literature, it was evident that empirical findings correlating religiosity and psychological well-being have generally found a positive relationship (Ellison, C. G, 1991; Levin, J. S., 1997; Levin, J. S., Chatters, L. M., & Taylor R. J., 1995; Levin, J. S., Markides, K. S., & Ray, L. A., 1996; Pollner, M., 1989; Witter, R. A., Stock, W. A., Okun, M. A., & Hating, M. J., 1985). Ellison (1998) suggested that religiosity contributes to psychological well-being by promoting healthy behaviors and moderate lifestyles, providing a sense of social integration and support, helping gain a sense of self-worth, and making available another form of coping resource. Furthermore, religiosity has been suggested as potentially contributing to psychological well-being by helping to successfully resolve the crucial issue of ego integrity versus despair (Erikson, 1959). However, results from studies exploring the relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being have been inconclusive and contradictory, as a result of different methods and measures being used to assess religiosity (Bergin, 1983). Therefore, the first challenge in conducting studies exploring religiosity involves greater specificity and precision in defining "religiosity."

Religiosity

Religiosity has been defined as the "scope and intensity of one's religious beliefs, incorporating personal belief in a supreme being, the relationship between personal actions and religious beliefs, and an overall consistency in belief and action" (Gladding, Lewis, & Adkins, 1981). This definition is consistent with Glass and Schoch's (1971) assertion that regarding a person's religiosity or the level of involvement in a religion,

two aspects have to be considered: belief (cognition) and practice (action). Belief relates to the more cognitive and emotional aspects of religion (values, morals, ethical standards etc.). Whereas, practice conveys the behavioral aspects of religion (church attendance, rituals, prayer, watching religious TV, etc.). A third method of defining religiosity has been through the use of the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) that categorizes individuals into two groups: those high on intrinsic religious orientation and those high on extrinsic religious orientation.

Persons high on intrinsic religious orientation are perceived as living the tenets of their religion and those high on extrinsic religious orientation are seen as using religion for social standing and self-serving purposes. Although intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations have proved useful in demonstrating that there are different kinds of religiosity, the concepts are too simple to capture the multidimensionality of religiosity (Bergin, 1983). Furthermore, intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations are discrete types of religiosity that are defined using a typology model that does not attempt to explain the process of religious identity development. Thus, the use of stage/process models to explain religiosity as a process of religious identity development may provide a better method to capture the multidimensionality of the concept of "religiosity." Worthington (1989) has stated that an understanding of the process of religious identity development and maturity throughout the life span could have important consequences for research on religiosity. As suggested by various authors (Erikson, 1968; Fowler, 1981; Rizzuto, 1991), the development of some kind of religious identity is essentially a universal part of the development of any individual.

Religious identity

The cultural environment imposes its religious influence on an individual through the beliefs, customs, and values of the community (Robertson, 1994). As the individual develops, there is a need to formulate some set of beliefs about religion by virtue of the influence of their cultural environment through their community. Therefore, even if the family of origin denies the existence of "God" or religion, the child still has to navigate between the beliefs of the family and the cultural environment to establish his or her own views on religion (Rizzuto, 1991). The fundamental idea behind the concept of religious identity development then is the struggle to find personal meaning in religion (Beit-Hallahmi, 1991). As a result, most individuals go through a process of religious identity development in acquiring a religious identity that is personal and unique. This process of identity development implies that individuals can be at various levels or stages in terms of their religious identity development (religious maturity or immaturity). The assessment of an individual's religious identity development provides an alternate method to categorize and compare an individual's religiosity. A new model of religious identity development, the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V.Suthakaran, 2002), that provides a theoretical basis for the instrument, the Religious Identity Development Scale (V. Suthakaran, 2002), that will be used to assess religiosity in the present study will be presented in a later section. This process model describes the development of religious identity as a progression through seven fluid stages or statuses, that makes it possible to compare and contrast individuals' sense of psychological well-being based on their religious identity statuses. However, to obtain

a precise measurement of the relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being, a more precise definition of psychological well-being is also required.

Psychological well-being

Several concepts have been used to describe the construct of psychological well-being (i.e., personal adjustment, life satisfaction, happiness, self-esteem, depression, anxiety etc.). Although the concepts used to describe psychological well-being are subjective states, they appear to be capturing different aspects (cognitive versus affective) of psychological well-being (George, 1981). For example, the concept of life expectation appears to suggest a cognitive assessment of movement toward favored goals (George, 1979). On the other hand, happiness appears to refer to an affective assessment of subjective life quality (Bradburn, 1969). The distinction made above between cognitive and affective aspects of psychological well-being is supported by a factor analysis performed by Andrews and Withey (1976) on 12 measures of psychological well-being which generated distinct cognitive and affective factors. Therefore, as a means to provide conceptual clarity and precision of measurement, it would be best to include affective and cognitive concepts of psychological well-being to explore its relationship with religiosity.

For the purposes of this study, the affective and cognitive aspects of psychological well-being were assessed by exploring participants' levels of anxiety and dogmatism, respectively. The choice of anxiety as an assessment for psychological well-being was influenced by Arapura's (1972) contention that religious experience and expression emerge from the human experience of self-consciousness which is said to give rise to anxiety. Furthermore, Guntrip (1952) asserted that a sense of secure "faith" is

lacking in many people, which he perceives as the cause for persistent neurotic anxiety. Guntrip (1956) believed that the healing of neurotic anxiety requires a combination of psychotherapy and religion. Accordingly, an individual's overall sense of psychological well-being could be determined by the effective or ineffective management of anxiety (e.g., being dogmatic in one's views and beliefs).

Dogmatism, which is considered to be the cognitive aspect of psychological well-being, was assessed in this study because it provides a means to understand how individuals may choose to manage their anxiety. Rokeach (1960) described dogmatism as "a cognitive network of defenses against anxiety" (p.347). The relationship between anxiety and dogmatism is supported by findings from previous studies that show a positive correlation between anxiety and dogmatism (Anderson, 1962; Hanson & Bush, 1971; Nidorf & Argabrute, 1968; Norman, 1966; Vacchiano, Strauss, & Schiffmann, 1968).

Anxiety

It is generally agreed upon that there is a difference between fear and neurotic anxiety. Fear is generally recognized as being reality based in response to a specific external event or situation. Neurotic anxiety is characterized by inappropriate intensity as well as by lack of an objective or at least identifiable source for the anxiety. Spielberger (1972) regarded anxiety as resulting from indecision, conflict and external control that contribute to cognitive incongruity and an inability to respond. Berger (1979) has shown that religious belief systems are responsible for some of these conflicts, uncertainties, and doubts. Horney (1937) suggested that the religious potential of individuals rested in the

creativity involved in the management of anxiety that results from conflicts, uncertainties, and doubts. The creativity involved in the management of anxiety has been linked to the level of dogmatism of the individual (Rokeach, 1960). Therefore, another variable that could prove useful in the assessment of psychological well-being is the level of dogmatism of an individual.

Dogmatism

The concept of dogmatism was developed by Rokeach (1952) to measure authoritarianism. Rokeach (1960) contended that highly dogmatic individuals are closed-minded and are more threatened than low dogmatic people in synthesizing new beliefs. They are also more likely to base their beliefs on authority figures and are usually intolerant of people who have a different belief system. Moreover, dogmatic individuals are less able to learn new beliefs or change old ones than less dogmatic individuals (Ehrlich & Lee, 1969). Researchers have suggested that dogmatism is related to religiosity (Digenan, 1972; Gilbert, 1972; Raschke, 1973; Seaman, Michel, & Dillehay, 1971). However, the results from these studies have not always indicated a positive relationship between dogmatism and religiosity. The inconclusive and contradictory results from these studies may be as a result of varying and confusing definitions of religiosity and the wide variety of instruments used to measure religiosity and dogmatism (Glass & Schoch, 1971).

Purpose of study

One purpose of the present study was to examine the internal validity of the Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS; V. Suthakaran, 2002). The internal structure of the RIDS was achieved through factor analysis and internal consistency

analyses. The second purpose was to assess the external structure of the RIDS, which was determined through discriminant, convergent, and concurrent validity. To assess the discriminant and convergent validity of the RIDS, the relationship between religious identity development and two aspects of psychological well being (i.e., anxiety and dogmatism) was explored. Concurrent validity of the RIDS was assessed by examining the relationship between the RIDS and the Age-Universal Religious Orientation Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983). Finally, the third purpose of this study was to determine the temporal stability and the construct-irrelevant test variance of the RIDS, by assessing test-retest reliability and social desirability, respectively.

Thus, I have provided a new model for a theoretical understanding of the concept of "religiosity" and made available an accompanying instrument that allows for the efficient and accurate measurement of religiosity. Also, I have expanded the literature that explores the relationship between religion and psychology by investigating how the status of an individual's religious identity might be related to his or her level of psychological well-being (i.e., anxiety and dogmatism). My intent in conducting this study was to hopefully clarify and define the concept of religious identity development, which could provide important insights and knowledge to mental health service providers.

Chapter two

Review of literature

The professional perspective of valuing cultural diversity has been gaining popularity in counseling psychology through a shift from a narrow focus on the individual to a view of self-in-cultural context (Ivey, 1995). By recognizing and affirming the clients' cultural diversity, helping professions put into practice two important values of the profession: (1) the client's right to dignity and self-worth; and (2) the right to self-determination (Sheridan & Bullis, 1992). However, the professional concern for recognizing the clients' cultural diversity traditionally has not been extended to religious issues because religion has been considered as nonscientific and thus a nonessential distracter from the truth (Frame & Williams, 1996). Furthermore, since Freud (1955), many mental health practitioners (Butler, 1990; Pittman, 1990) have perceived religion as an unhealthy form of coping with human problems. In contrast, a few psychologists (Bergin, 1983; Worthington, 1989) have asserted that religious experience should be considered as an important part of multiculturalism and recognized as a critical issue to explore during therapy. Although efforts have been made toward integrating religion in therapy, the application of knowledge in the area of religion has been limited. One reason for the reluctance among psychologists to embrace religion in practice is because of the uncertainty as to whether religion promotes psychological well-being or psychopathology (Frenz & Carey, 1989).

From a review of the literature, it is clear that there are several reasons for the inconclusive research findings reported in studies correlating religiosity and psychological well-being. One reason is because of the varying definitions of religiosity used in different

studies and another reason is because the definition does not fully capture the multidimensionality of religiosity. Furthermore, the definition of psychological well-being itself does not incorporate both the affective and cognitive aspects of the construct. Therefore, an important contribution of the present study was to provide a more accurate method to measure religiosity and to explore the relationship of religiosity to psychological well-being (i.e., anxiety and dogmatism).

The main purpose of this study was to find support for the validity and reliability of a new instrument to measure religious identity development (religiosity) and how this is related to psychological well-being, specifically to levels of anxiety and dogmatism. First, literature on the concept of identity in general, and religious identity in particular, will be reviewed to provide a framework for understanding the process of religious identity development. Next, the process of identity development, specifically the process of religious identity development, will be presented because current conceptualizations of religiosity do not take into consideration the processes involved to fully understand and describe the concept of religiosity. Then, theories and models of religious identity development will be discussed to provide a background for the theoretical understanding of religious identity development. Next, Epstein's Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory will be presented because the rational and experiential systems described within this theory were the basis for the new theory of religious identity development: The Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002), which will be presented in the next section. The new theory was proposed as an alternative means to understand an individual's religiosity by assessing his or her level of religious identity development. Following this section, the theoretical conceptualizations of anxiety

together with the empirical data on the relationship between religiosity and anxiety will be discussed. Finally, literature on dogmatism and the empirical data available on the relationship between dogmatism and religiosity will be reviewed.

Identity

Developmental theories describe the mature personality as one that is able to function effectively in a variety of situations. Having a strong sense of self, knowledge of what one values, and an awareness of ideologies committed to, are attributed to this effective functioning. Erikson (1968) proposed that the formation of identity (ego-identity) has a central personality-organizing function to life. While Erikson's concept of ego-identity indicates the stability and integration of an individual's personality, the concept of identity signifies membership in an externally defined social group and the individual's integration into the group in most of the social-psychological and sociological literature (Beit-Hallahmi, 1991). Thus, the theoretical sources for the understanding of religious identity development are derived from modern psychoanalytic theories (ego-identity) and also from social psychology and sociology (social identity and collective identity).

Ego-identity

Ego-identity is the basic construct that contributes to the understanding of identity (Erikson, 1968). Consistent with the psychoanalytic tradition, the concept of ego-identity emphasizes unconscious processes that are difficult to quantify. The ego-identity, as described by Erikson (1956, 1968) is the stable (or unstable) center of the ego that is achieved (or not) and is not considered a universal attribute of humanity. Thus, ego-identity can belong only to an individual, not to a group and refers to what the individual

means to himself or herself (Beit-Hallahmi, 1991). However, Erikson (1964) did suggest a relationship between the individual achievement of identity and group identity. He stated, " True identity, however, depends on the support with which the young individual receives from the collective sense of identity characterizing the social group significant to him (her): his (her) class, his (her) nation, his (her) culture" (p. 93). As implied by Erikson's (1956) theory, religious beliefs or belonging to a religious group may be an important source of support and resource for an ego-identity system.

Social identity

A level above the basic construct of ego-identity in terms of complexity is social identity (Beit-Hallahmi, 1991). Identity, as defined in the social psychological and sociological literature is viewed as a system of group memberships (McCall & Simmons, 1991). An individual is perceived as belonging to various groups, and each group is represented in the consciousness of the individual as an identity label. Berger (1963) proposed that the identity of an individual is socially bestowed, sustained, and transformed to culminate in a social identity that determines how others view the individual, which in turn could have an impact on how the individual views himself or herself.

Miller (1963) described identity, which he perceived as arising in the course of social interactions, as a three-part structure with a core region labeled self-identity, a peripheral region called public identity, and a region of sub-identities, which are related to social roles. The concepts of identity and sub-identities as described by Miller help describe the relationship between individual personality and social identity. He proposed that the structure and content of three forms of identity are determined by forces external to the individual and are not related to personality dynamics: (a) "public-objective"

identity (identity as perceived by others); (b) "public-subjective" identity (individual's perception of his or her identity as perceived by others), and (c) "self-identity" (the individual's perception of his or her social attachments). Thus, social identity is determined by group dynamics, as the individual's identity is influenced by how others perceive him or her, how he or she thinks others perceive him or her, and how he or she perceives her relationships.

Collective identity

In order for a group to survive, it needs to create a common world-view among its members at least in matters relevant to the group's existence (Beit-Hallahmi, 1991). LaBarre (1972) stated that the main function of the group ethic is simply to maintain the group. Therefore, social demarcations are introduced to stress in-group unity and distinctiveness from other groups. Collective identity describes various group-specific characteristics, such as language, dress, and emblems that are employed to distinguish a group member from "outsiders" (Zerubavel, 1982). As a result of this exclusive behavior, collective identity is expected to manifest itself in the consciousness and behavior (the social-self) of its members (James, 1890). Thus, an individual's collective identity, which developed from membership within a specific group, determines the behavior of individuals in different environments (Beit-Hallahmi, 1991). However, collective identity continues to be reshaped or modified through contact with other groups (Berger & Luckmann, 1971). The reshaping of an individual's collective identity has an impact on the individual's ego-identity and social identity.

Identity and religion

Based on the identity literature discussed above, there appears to be three distinct forms of identity. To fully understand the concept of identity we have to conceptualize it from three separate levels: (a) ego-identity (deepest level), which is privately or unconsciously experienced by the individual; (b) social identity (intermediate level) labels used by the individuals and others to identify himself or herself; and (c) collective identity (peripheral level), which is identity defined by the group in order to distinguish itself from other groups. As suggested by Beit-Hallami (1991), the influence of religion is experienced at each of the three levels of identity described above and in order to fully comprehend the multidimensional nature of religion, we need to understand how religion has an impact on the individual at each of these levels. Our understanding of the influence of religion at each of these three levels of identity as well as the interplay among all three levels helps us to comprehend the concept of religious identity. The concept of religious identity, described using the three levels of identity (ego-identity, social identity, collective identity), is presented below.

Religious identity

Beit-Hallahmi (1991) suggested that for most individuals, religion operates at the social identity level (intermediate level), which implies that religion as an identity operates at the group level and is experienced by an individual as a label. Using the distinction commonly adopted by sociologists and anthropologists, Pi-Sunier and Salzmann (1978) stated that in most cultures and for most human beings religious identity is ascribed, rather than achieved. They elaborated by contending that for most human beings, religious identity is not a matter of real learning or adoption, but a matter of social location. The

implication is that most individuals do not choose a religion; they are simply born into one and they learn their religion in the same way they learned other aspects of their social identity. As a result, in acquiring a social identity, most individuals also acquired a system of beliefs, values, and morals that are tied to their religion. Since religion is part of an individual's social identity, most individuals simply follow the religion they have learned from significant others. The struggle then in the development of one's religious identity is whether or not to find personal meaning in religion by exploring what has been learned passively about religion.

As a means to develop our religious identity and find meaning in religion, Beit-Hallami (1991) suggested that we have to make religion meaningful at the ego-identity level instead of only at the social identity level. Taking this assertion into account, I am proposing that it is in the process of making religion meaningful at the personal level (ego-identity) without alienating ourselves from our community (social identity) that we encounter our struggle in developing our religious identity. Thus, it becomes essential for psychologists to understand the development of identity and sub-identities (i.e., religious identity) that could potentially influence the functioning of their clients and the quality of the therapeutic alliance between clients and therapists. One way of accomplishing this is to examine the process of identity development, specifically religious identity development. Before I present the literature on the processes involved in the development of religious identity, I will lay the foundation by describing the process of identity formation in the next section. Currently, much of the research and theory on the process of identity formation have been based on the identity vs. identity diffusion task described by Erikson (1968) in his psychosocial theory of development.

The process of identity development

Erikson's (1968) theory of development encompasses the entire lifespan and consists of eight stages, each involving a developmental task (crisis) that must be mastered. The resolution of each crisis may be successful or not, and the outcome influences the resolution of future stages. The social nature of his theory implies that the crisis occurs as a result of interaction with another individual or social system. The observation that identity formation that occurs during stage five moves beyond the earlier phases of life (adolescence) suggests the importance of the remaining years of life in the process of identity formation (Parks, 1986).

Erikson (1968) believed that the identity crisis that occurred during adolescence and young adulthood served as a catalyst for identity consciousness. This brings about further differentiation of the self that leads to formation of an identity. Erikson (1968) suggested that the "perception of the self-sameness and continuity of one's existence in time and space and the perception of the fact that others recognize one's sameness and continuity brings about the awareness of a personal identity" (p. 50). Essentially, the individual's task is to connect his or her self-perceptions with the perceptions others have of him or her and to integrate these perceptions with one's aptitudes, career goals, and social opportunities. Finally, the individual aims to express these perceptions in a viable social role to experience a sense of identity achievement. To experience this, an individual has to feel a sense of wholeness, continuity, and congruence. Failure to accomplish this task leads to what Erikson (1968) calls "role confusion," where the individual is unable or unwilling to settle into an identity (Erikson, 1968). Individuals who lack a stable identity (sense of self), respond with constant fluctuations in beliefs and feelings, and have a

diffused amorphous sense of who they are and what they believe. Erikson (1968) described two distinct components of identity, ego-identity and self-identity. Ego-identity includes an individual's commitment to occupational, religious, political, and philosophical life-style values, while self-identity referred to an individual's perception about social-roles (friendship, sex roles, recreational choices, etc). Marcia (1966) operationalized Erikson's theory of identity formation and conceptualized four ways in which an individual could choose to resolve the identity vs. identity diffusion task.

Marcia's (1966) operationalization of Erikson's theoretical statements consists of four ways in which an individual could resolve the identity vs. identity diffusion task: (1) When a person fails to explore alternatives and there is a failure to establish ideological commitments, he or she is said to have a diffused identity; (2) When an individual adopts commitments from others without modifying them for personal fit or if there is a firm commitment without exploration, he or she has a foreclosed identity; (3) Moratorium is the category of identity formation for those who have experienced an identity crisis and are actively exploring, but don't yet have self-defined commitments; and (4) Those individuals who have explored and determined unique ideological commitments are considered identity achieved. Identity is an evolving configuration and thus, at any time a person may fit into one of the four categories. Furthermore, over time the individual' s identity status may change. Along with concern for occupation, political views, and social interaction, Erikson (1968) had suggested a search for faith (religiosity) as a factor that contributes to a change in identity status during the process of identity formation. In the following section, I will explore how the process of identity development as stated by Erikson can be utilized to describe the process of religious identity development.

Religious identity development

Erikson (1968) emphasized the notion that every child is born into a cultural (the family) setting that has a religious strand woven into it. Fowler (1981) made the contention that the religious undertone of a culture begins to affect the child through the actions and belief systems of the parents who are part of the culture. Therefore, even if the family of origin denies the existence of "God" or religion, the child still has to navigate between the beliefs of the family and the culture to establish his or her own views on religion (Rizzuto, 1991). Erikson (1968) had suggested that identity diffusion among adolescents is usually in the areas of occupation and religion. Before we explore the process of religious identity development, we need to understand the endpoint or goal of religious identity development, which has been described as religious maturity (Worthington, 1989). We need to be able to describe what it means to be religiously mature, because only then we can place individuals along a continuum in terms of their religious identity development. The accuracy of the description of the process of religious identity development is dependent upon the validity of the endpoints, religious maturity or immaturity, of religious identity development. In the next section I will explore the construct of religious maturity and religious immaturity.

Religious maturity versus immaturity

Maturity in general has been conceptualized in a variety of ways. Most commonly, it has been thought of as independent ego functioning or as showing competence in socially appropriate behavior (Worthington, 1989). The values implied in this conception of maturity create a conflict between responsibility to the self and responsibility to the community. This conflict is experienced when an individual struggles with making religion

relevant at the individual level by modifying his or her religious beliefs in ways that may be against the religious views of the community. Beit-Hallahmi (1991) suggested that to achieve religious maturity, an individual has to evaluate the relevance of religion at an individual or personal level (ego-identity) separate from the group or community level (social identity). Several psychologists have discussed the concept of religious maturity, and two prominent theories by Gordon Allport and Bernard Spilka will be reviewed in this section.

Gordon Allport

Allport (1950) suggested that both motivation and cognitive structure are required for establishment and evolution of religion in individuals. Certain differences in the quality of motivation and cognitive structure are what differentiated mature from immature religion for Allport. He suggested six specific characteristics that described mature religion: (1) well-differentiated by its increasing complexity exhibited through an openness to criticism that allowed for continual reevaluation and refinement of meaning; (2) dynamic in nature in that the motivation of mature religious experience began in the biological and social drives of the organism but, with maturity, an individual becomes independent of these drives; (3) moral stances taken exhibit consistent morality in dealing with different situations and environments; (4) belief systems are applied to all aspects of life in a comprehensive manner; (5) religion is viewed as an integral component of being and is used to explain all of life in a meaningful way, using the same categories and rules; and (6) belief is fundamentally where many things are held tentatively until confirmed or until a more valid belief is discovered. Allport (1950) proposed two types of motivation

toward religion that exemplified the religiously mature and immature: intrinsic and extrinsic orientations.

Allport (1950) suggested two qualities of religious behavior that are broadly applicable to religious identity development. Extrinsic religious orientation or immature religion tends to be identified with minimal involvement of the self, with rigidity of doctrinal beliefs, with socially conservative views, and with a high degree of inability to tolerate ambiguity in beliefs or practices. Extrinsic religious orientation is very consistent with the religious identity of an individual who has not explored the value and place of religion in his or her life. An individual with an extrinsic or immature religious orientation can be described as operating from the early levels or stages of religious identity development. By contrast, intrinsic religious orientation or mature religion is characterized by intensive involvement and self-commitment, a flexible and liberal social outlook, and an ability to tolerate and effectively utilize ambiguity. An individual with an intrinsic religious orientation is consistent with someone who has explored the value and meaning of religion in his or her life, and is now able to utilize religion to help achieve and live his or her full potential. Such an individual could be said to be operating from the higher levels of religious identity development. Evidence from research using the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), which contains two subscales measuring intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation, indicated the existence of different religious orientations (Richards, 1991; Watson, Morris, and Hood, 1989). These findings on the validity of the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations demonstrated that individuals do vary in their orientation toward religion, which provided support for assessing the religious identity development of individuals. However, Allport's theory has

its limitations in terms of placing too much stress on the cognitive qualities of individuals and not enough importance on affect in determining their religious maturity.

Bernard Spilka

Another theory that might provide us with a framework for understanding religious identity development is Allen and Spilka's (1967) theory on mature and immature religion. Focusing primarily on cognitive qualities, Allen and Spilka (1967) suggested that mature and immature religion could be differentiated on the basis of five cognitive elements: content (i.e., the way in which an individual conceptualizes a topic area); clarity (i.e., the precision and coherence of belief reflected in the ability to perceive meaning and implications clearly); complexity (i.e., the number of categories of religiousness the individual uses and the degree of differentiation among aspects of religion) ; flexibility (i.e., the willingness to accommodate the ideas, attitudes or beliefs of others); importance (i.e., the strength of religious belief in the everyday functioning of the individual). Each of the five cognitive elements above can provide us with an avenue for understanding the development of religious identity from a cognitive perspective. Below are presented the descriptions of each of these cognitive categories as they relate to religious maturity.

Religiously mature individuals are those who have explored their religious identity and tend to be more advanced in their religious identity development (Beit-Hallahmi, 1991). The advantage to being religiously mature is that these individuals conduct their lives in ways that enhance their being as well as the being of others. Therefore, the religiously mature are comfortable with abstract principles and relational expressions (Allen & Spilka, 1967). Furthermore, their speech tends to be clear and exact in meaning, and are orderly in their conceptualizations and expression. Additionally, the thoughts of

religiously mature individuals tend to be complex with a large number of categories and multiple ideas, which brings about openness to diversity and a willingness to consider ideas, beliefs and opinions not consistent with their own. Finally, for religiously mature individuals, religious belief and principle is incorporated as a meaningful part of daily activities, often serving as a template for self-evaluation.

In contrast, religiously immature individuals who have not explored their religious identity or who have superficially explored their religious identity tend to think in concrete and specific ways, and speak with vagueness, often offering routine or rule-bound answers. Furthermore, they are often characterized by limited and overgeneralized thoughts and ideas. Additionally, there is often an attempt to screen out or distort different ideas and practices. Finally, the religiously immature individuals could possibly consider religion important but it is never a central focus of their lives whereby there is more willingness to compromise religious beliefs and principles. By assessing individuals on the five cognitive elements above and comparing their thoughts to the endpoints of religious maturity, Allen and Spilka's (1967) theory provides us with a method to estimate an individual's religious identity development. However, a significant limitation of this theory is that it only takes into account the cognitive elements of the individual. The affective state as well as the behavior of the individual is not considered in determining their religious maturity.

Although Allport and Spilka provide extensive descriptions of religious maturity and immaturity, both of their theories are typologies that propose discrete religious types rather than stage/process theories. Thus, the theories of Allport and Spilka do not give explanations as to how individuals achieve their religious types or what prompts them to

go through transitions in their religious maturity. However, various theories have been put forth that directly address the development of religious identity (Alter, 1985; Fowler, 1981; Groeschel, 1983; Jung, 1958; Wilbur, 1981). These theories (i.e., Fowler's Faith Development theory) provide theoretical explanations for why one stage of religious identity might be expressed rather than another stage. They also provide explanations as to what facilitates the development of religious identity at one stage as opposed to another stage.

Theories and models of religious identity development

Theories of religious identity development have been derived from general theories of human development. Piaget's theory of cognitive development (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) has been utilized by some theorists as the basis for their theories of religious identity development (see Ballard, 1988; Fleck, Ballard & Reilly, 1988; Steele, 1986). Kohlberg's (1969) theory on moral development has also been used to support theories of religious identity development (see Fowler, 1981; Steele, 1986). Erikson's (1963) theory of psychosocial development provides another support for some aspects of the development of religious identity (Steele, 1986; Whitehead & Whitehead, 1979). The specific application of the developmental theories stated above to religious identity development has little empirical support (Worthington, 1989). However, other theories addressing the issue of religious identity development have combined several developmental theories to explain the process of religious identity development. One such theory is James Fowler's (1981) Development of Faith Theory. It is also the most widely known and the most comprehensive theory of religious identity development. Fowler's theory is briefly summarized below.

Development of faith: James Fowler

Fowler's (1981) Development of Faith Theory is based on the earlier work of Piaget and Kohlberg in cognitive and moral development, respectively (Lownsdale, 1997). Fowler's (1981) broad theory of spiritual development rests on his premise that faith is founded on several features and dimensions common to all humans: the awareness of death; the necessity of making life-defining choices under uncertain conditions and; the dual experiencing of a tangible world in which we live together with the occasional experiencing of another world that is reached through imaginings and intuition that remains mysterious with promise. Fowler (1981) suggested that we spend our time on earth becoming, defining our identity through our relationships with individuals and communities. These relationships, lived in the context of the uncertainty of our lives, establish our meaning of live. The uncertainty that we experience compels us to define a portion of our meaning of life on faith. Development of faith occurs through ordered stages representing successively complex ways of construing meaning in life. In its current conceptualization, there are seven stages to Fowler's theory of faith development and is related both to age and to social environment.

The initial stage is called Primal Faith and begins at birth. This stage, Stage 0, similar to Erikson's basic trust vs. basic mistrust, involves attachment and the reliability of the parent in satisfying the needs of the infant. These are the first experiences of an infant with superordinate power, wisdom and with dependence.

At about age two, important changes occur to the child that initiate the Intuitive-Projective Stage of faith. Language, locomotion, and imagination expand the child's ways of knowing. There is the first glimmer of awakening to the mystery of death.

At about the time the child starts school, Stage 2, the stage of Mythic-Literal Faith begins. This stage is correlated in time with Piaget's concrete operational thinking. The child depends less on feeling and imagination in constructing a framework for meaning. The child is able to recognize others' perspectives as different from his or her own and develops a concept of fairness based on reciprocity. Faith is supported by the structure of "stress, rules, and implicit values of the family's community of meanings" (p. 55). Occasionally, adults remain at this stage although it is more commonly found in adolescents.

Synthetic Conventional Faith (Stage 3) emerges for most by early adolescence. The young person's cognitive development allows for thought beyond the simple manipulations of concrete objects. They may now be able to consider hypothetical possibilities as well as abstract concepts. With this cognitive development comes the ability to see oneself from another's perspective. There is an increased interest in the internal aspects of development both for oneself and for others. The formation of one's identity during this stage is determined through a compromise between personal choices and the need to please others (i.e., peers). Faith at this stage involves a structure of personal meaning that is supported mainly by aspects of the external world most valued. Finally, this stage is also characterized by the acceptance of authority that concurs with one's own views.

With Stage 4, Individualistic-Reflective Faith, the process of individuation accelerates and views supported by authority are critically examined. The person at this stage makes decisions based on personal values and understanding. In order to successfully transition beyond this stage, beliefs and values have to be organized

systematically. Finally, in this stage, meaning of life becomes personalized and behavior becomes more consistent and congruent within the context of that meaning.

Stage 5, Conjunctive Faith, involves the integration and resolution of apparent opposites in self, others, societies and God. Although there is an increasingly consistent set of values that define meaning, and an increasing openness to all kinds of experience, the self also becomes increasingly aware of conflicts that are not easily resolved. This new awareness, usually at age 35 and beyond, increases an individual's sense of humility, which brings about an increased tolerance of others.

Fowler's Stage 6, Universalizing Faith, is characterized by two tendencies. The first is called decentration from self and involves an increasing inclusiveness of the perspectives of others in a widening radius of social consideration. With this awareness of others' perspectives comes an increased understanding of the experiential world of others. Increased understanding leads to the second tendency of this stage, an increased ability for compassion and caring. In this stage, previous values related to power, status, or wealth become de-emphasized, and is replaced with an increasing appreciation of God and others. Finally, one experiences an "emptying of self" that is often described as a detachment or disinterestedness in the things of this world.

Fowler's paradigm of faith development has attracted the attention of religious educators and practitioners who see in it a framework for understanding the processes of religious growth and development more clearly. Furthermore, Fowler's theory also has stimulated a fair amount of research (Wulff, 1991). This research will be described next.

Empirical support for Fowler's theory

Das and Harries (1996) found partial support for Fowler's theory of faith development among 32 college students. They hypothesized that most of the college students (ages 18-20), as implied in Fowler's theory, would be at stage four. The subjects responded by writing short descriptive answers to two questions, (a) "What does it mean to be religious?" and (b) "Do you regard yourself as religious?" As predicted, most of the students were found to be at stage four. However, when the distribution of stages were assessed in terms of sex, significantly more men appeared to have reached stage four of faith development than women.

Shulik (1988) also found partial support for Fowlers's theory of faith development among older adults. Forty participants (20 men and 20 women) were interviewed using the Fowler interview protocol, which is a semi-clinical technique. The first few questions are highly objective, focusing upon demographic material (e.g., familial, residential, educational, and career histories). Thereafter, the focus moves gradually toward more subjective questions (e.g., questions about influences and experiences which have been most significant in the subject's life). Participants were also administered an ego development questionnaire (Loevinger, 1976) and the Kohlberg moral judgment interview. Depression was assessed through the basic projective techniques (the Rorschach and the Thematic Apperception tests). Participants who had achieved more mature levels of faith development were found to also have achieved a more mature level of moral and ego development. However, the findings suggested, unexpectedly, that participants who had achieved intermediate stages of faith development were much less likely to be depressed than participants whose developmental stages were low or high.

Although Fowler's (1981) theory has been used extensively in studying the development of religious identity, the theory appears to have serious limitations in describing the development of religious identity. These will be described in the next section.

Limitations in Fowler's theory

Fowler's six stages of faith represent phases of cognitive development. However, by emphasizing cognition, Fowler's theory ignores the influence of affect in religious identity development. Furthermore, the Fowler interview does not assess any expression of feelings in terms of how an individual tries to resolve his or her struggles with religious identity development. The interview produces a merely fragmentary cognitive profile of the person. Another limitation of Fowler's theory is similar to that of Kohlberg's theory in which the community is seen as a hindrance to healthy development (Johnson, 1996). By ignoring or minimizing the positive influence of community on development, Fowler 's theory reinforces the strong individualism that underlies the thought and life of modern Western culture (Parks, 1992). Finally, Fowler's theory does appear to make a moralistic judgment on what is considered maturity by implying that humans should be on a journey from thoughtless, dependent, tradition-bound rationality to reflective, independent, and free-thinking rationality.

In an attempt to improve our understanding of religious identity development and also to rectify the inherent inadequacies of current theories, I am proposing a new theory of religious identity development as part of the current study. The new theory, unlike the current theories of religious identity development, which place too much emphasis on cognition and individualism, will take into consideration the positive influences of affect and community in the development of religious identity. Furthermore, the new theory will

be a stage/status model that explains the processes of religious identity development. Most importantly, the stage/status of religious identity development can be assessed through the use of a quantitative instrument, the Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS; V. Suthakaran, 2002) that was constructed based on the premise of this theory. The basic premise of this new theory of religious identity development hinges on the proposition that resolving the place of religion in one's life is accomplished through the interaction of faith and reason.

Faith and reason in religious identity development

Faith, as defined by Kierkegaard (1946), is belief that is held with psychological certainty. Kierkegaard added that faith in some key respects is paradoxical or contrary to reason. From this perspective, the concept of faith alludes to what one feels, experiences or imagines. In contrast, reason is seen as the use of intellect to attain truth and also to guide our actions. Reason, from this perspective, refers to our cognitive or rational abilities. Faith and reason imply two fundamental ways of knowing, an emotional way and an intellectual way. This distinction is widely assumed to have important consequences for understanding information processing in general (Epstein, 1994). In attempting to formulate a new theory of religious identity development, I propose that the resolution of the role of religion in our lives involves information processing that occurs through the interaction of faith and reason. An interesting theory that addresses these two components of information processing is Epstein's (1998) Cognitive-Experiential-Self-Theory (CEST), which addresses the experiential system (faith) and the rational system (reason) as means to create our self-theories or reality (hierarchical conceptual systems). The proposed new theory of religious identity development is based upon Epstein's (1998)

Cognitive-Experiential-Self-Theory (CEST), and both the experiential system and the rational system is used to describe the process of religious identity development which is proposed as the interaction between faith (experiential system) and reason (rational system). A brief summary of Epstein's theory is presented below to better understand the religious identity development theory that follows.

Epstein's Theory: Cognitive-Experiential-Self-Theory

Epstein's (1998) Cognitive-Experiential-Self-Theory is a global theory of personality, which proposes that people process information by two parallel interactive systems: an experiential and a rational system. The experiential system, according to Epstein, has a very long history and operates in an almost similar way in humans and animals. At lower levels of operation, it is a crude system that automatically, rapidly, effortlessly, and efficiently processes information. At higher levels, particularly in interaction with the rational system, it is a source of intuitive wisdom and creativity. In contrast, the rational system is a deliberative, effortful, abstract system that operates primarily in the medium of language and has a very brief evolutionary history. It is capable of very high levels of abstraction and long-term delay of gratification. However, it is a very inefficient system for responding to everyday events. A comparison of the operating principles of the experiential and rational cognitive systems are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Comparison of the Experiential and Rational Systems

	Experiential System	Rational System
1.	Holistic	Analytic
2.	Automatic, effortless	Intentional, effortful
3.	Affective: pleasure-pain oriented (what feels good)	Logical: Reason oriented (what is sensible)
4.	Associationistic connections	Logical connections
5.	Behavior mediated by "vibes" from past events	Behavior mediated by conscious appraisal of events
6.	Encodes reality in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives	
7.	More rapid processing: oriented toward immediate action	
8.	Slower and more resistant to change: changes with repetitive or intense experience	
9.	More crudely differentiated: broad generalization gradient, stereotypical thinking	
10.	More crudely integrated-dissociative, emotional complexes; Context-specific processing	
11.	Experienced passively and preconsciously: we believe we are seized by our emotions	
12.	Self-evidently valid: "experiencing is believing"	

Table 1: continued

Comparison of the Experiential and Rational Systems

6. Encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, and numbers
7. Slower processing: capacity for long-delayed action
8. Changes more rapidly and easily: changes with strength of argument and new evidence
9. More highly differentiated
10. More highly integrated: context-general principles
11. Experienced actively and consciously: we believe we are in control of our conscious thoughts
12. Requires justification via logic and evidence

A critical assumption made in CEST is that all behavior is the product of the joint operation of the experiential and rational systems. The relative influence of the systems is determined by individual differences in styles of thinking, degree of emotional involvement, and particular situational variables. However, in most situations, the automatic processing of the experiential system is dominant over the rational system because it is less effortful and more efficient.

Furthermore, according to CEST, as opposed to most theories of personality, four fundamental needs are described as being equally important: (a) need to maximize pleasure and minimize pain; (b) need to maintain a relatively stable, coherent conceptual system; (c) need to maintain favorable relationships with others; and (d) need to overcome feelings of inferiority and enhance self-esteem. Behavior is assumed to be determined by the interaction of the four basic needs through several interesting principles.

The first principle suggests that behavior can be viewed as a compromise among the four needs. The second principle is that the needs serve as checks and balances against each other. When one need is fulfilled at the expense of others, the need to fulfill the others increases. It is suggested by Epstein (1998) that a source of maladaptive behavior occurs when a particular need becomes so important that fulfillment of the other needs is sacrificed. The third principle suggests that good adjustment is fostered by fulfillment of the four needs in a synergistic and harmonious manner and poor adjustment by fulfilling the needs in a conflictual manner, in which satisfying one need interferes with fulfilling the others. The fourth principle proposes that well-being is associated with a fulfillment orientation (i.e., satisfying the basic needs) and disturbance is associated with a defensive orientation (i.e., maintaining a narrow view of the world).

Empirical support for Epstein's theory

Research on Epstein's CEST has produced findings that are consistent with formulations within the theory (Denes-Raj, 1994). Epstein et al. (1992) found evidence for the existence of two different modes of information processing, experiential and rational. Participants were asked to respond from three perspectives to vignettes with arbitrary outcomes: how they believed most people would react in everyday life; how they, themselves, would react; and how a completely logical person would react. The first two perspectives above were considered to be under the jurisdiction of the experiential system, and responses from the third perspective were considered to be primarily under the jurisdiction of the rational system. By presenting the logical perspective first in half the cases and last in the other half, they found that automatic processing in the experiential system can influence subsequent processing in the rational system.

In another study conducted on 649 patrons of a cafeteria, Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) found further evidence for the existence of two processing systems. They used an experimental paradigm in which participants had been shown to regard certain outcomes as more likely than others despite their objective probabilities being identical. Using CEST to interpret their findings, they found that people made systematically biased choices that made no sense from a rational perspective, but conformed to the principles of the experiential system.

A new theory or religious identity development, the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development, was formulated based on Epstein's theory. The basic premise of this theory is that the development of religious identity is a product of the joint operation of the experiential and rational systems. Religious identity is posited to progress

along seven ego statuses and represent successively complex means of organizing religious identity. The new theory is presented below.

Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development

The motivation and inspiration for the formulation of this new model came from Helms' (1990) model of racial identity development. In her model of racial identity development, Helms (1990) described the process of how an individual comes to terms with his or her race. Helms (1990) posited in her theory that the developmental issue for Whites pertained to the abandonment of entitlement, whereas the challenge for people of color was in surmounting internalized racism. Logically, several of the concepts Helms (1990) had used to describe the process of racial identity development served well in delineating a new model of religious identity development. For example, Helms (1990) used the concept of "statuses" to explain how it is possible to confront and manage increasingly more complex racial issues. She defined statuses as the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral processes that reflect a person's perception of pertinent information in his or her interpersonal environments. Additionally, she posited that statuses allowed a person to manage racial (religious) issues at an increasingly complex level according to the number of different statuses that are available to the individual. Helms (1990) also postulated that the statuses developed sequentially, but in terms of which status is expressed is dependent upon the accessibility and the level of dominance of a particular status. Dominance, as defined by Helms (1995) is the status that is most often utilized to deal with the person's reactions to racial (religious) material, whereas accessibility refers to the availability of a particular status to the individual in terms of utilizing it when reacting to racial (religious) materials. For a status to become accessible, it has to mature.

The maturation process is usually triggered by a need, as a result of not being able to successfully cope with racial (religious) materials in his or her environment. The strength of a particular status (dominance) is dependent upon the effectiveness of the status in contributing to effective coping. The seven statuses of the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development are briefly described below.

1. Concrete status is characterized by the processing of religious issues almost exclusively through the experiential system. Reality as it pertains to religion is encoded in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives. Aspects of religion that "feel" good and fit into a stereotypical thinking pattern are adhered to passively. Religion is often viewed from a dualistic and egocentric perspective, where there is only one "right" religion (theirs) and every other religion is "wrong." They exude a sense of deep religious devoutness by the way they practice their religion (e.g., going to a place of worship very often, practicing many rituals associated with their religion). However, their devoutness usually does not translate into others areas of their lives, as their fundamental belief about religion is as a tool to ease some of their anxieties. They often behave in rigid and uncompromising ways, and they are likely to be very consumed about having their needs met. The rational system is never or seldom engaged to process religious issues. If their view on religion is questioned, they are likely to react in a defensive self-righteous attitude, as they have not developed the capacities for independent judgment. Unbeknownst to them, the views and opinions of authorities and significant others have a major influence on how they perceive religion. However, they are quick to deny this when this is pointed out to them, as they are truly convinced that they have independent thoughts and views about their religion. As long as the individual stays closely tied to

authority figures, he or she can present a picture of feeling good about themselves. The individuals in this status can be aptly described as "unconscious conformists."

2. Relational status involves the experiencing of religion more actively and consciously. However, the rational system is still dominated by the experiential system in processing issues related to religion. There may be a growing tendency to do what is logical at this stage of religious identity development. However, logic may be limited to what is sensible to others about religion. Thus, religion is defined in terms of its influence on interpersonal relationships, especially with parents and significant others. The need to maintain favorable relationships with others was ignored in the first status, because there was a greater need to maximize pleasure and maintain a stable and coherent system. In this status, individuals become aware of the possibility of being rewarded for following the opinions and ideas of authorities and significant others. Therefore, they make a conscious effort to adhere to the views and beliefs about religion as defined and portrayed by significant others. To do this effectively, they usually take the initiative to learn just enough about their religion to exhibit aspects of their religion that are considered highly religious. However, unlike the individuals in the Concrete status, these individuals are not only aware of the fact that their religious views are being defined by others, they also welcome this influence in the hopes of being rewarded for "acting appropriately." Therefore, the individuals in this status can be accurately described as the "conscious conformists."

3. Confusion status involves the period when individuals feel anxious thinking about religion. The anxiety is a result of emotional experiences that are so discrepant with previous views of religion that they cannot be assimilated. There may be a sense of

disorganization and doubt pervading their thoughts on religion. There could also be feelings of anger and frustration associated with a sense of betrayal by significant others who had "duped" them about the grandness or uniqueness of their religion compared to all other religions. The anger and frustration might also be related to the realization that they had allowed others to define religion for them. Thus, the people whom they were interested in impressing in the Relational status with their pious acts, now become the people whom they "rebel" against by flaunting their misuse of and disrespect for religion. These individuals usually do not make an attempt to guise their strong feelings against religion to deceive others into thinking that they are very religious. As a result of a sense of turmoil, individuals at this stage of religious identity development are forced to attend to the rational system, which has so far been dominated by the experiential system. For the very first time, the individuals may be interested in looking for justification via logic, and evidence for what they believe about religion. They may also question their understanding of the concept of religion, but they susually choose to do nothing about it. The only escape from anxiety for these individuals is by transitioning into the next status or transitioning back to the relational status.

4.Cognitive-rationalization status is characterized by the appraisal of events and data related to religion only through the rational system. Individuals at this status of religious identity are likely to be alienated from their experiential system. As a result, their interpretation of religion is highly intellectualized. Any aspect of religion that do not make logical sense and that cannot be encoded in abstract symbols, words, or numbers is rejected. As a result, individuals at this status are likely to be rigid and uncompromising on their views about religion and may choose not to associate with others who are not

like-minded. The rigidity in values and beliefs about religion is a form of defense mechanism that was erected to guard against the high level of anxiety they experienced in the previous (Confusion) status. Thus, they may not appear as anxious as the individuals in the Confusion status, although their anxiety is readily aroused when discussing about religious topics. Not surprisingly, they are very unlikely to practice any form of religion, although they may be very familiar with the tenets of some or many religions. They may describe religion as nothing more than a good topic for an intellectual exercise. The mechanism that allows them to move to the next status is that unlike the experiential system, the rational system, which defines their way of being, changes more rapidly and easily through the use of cogent arguments and new evidence. Thus, if sufficient dissonance appears within their rational system, it might be enough to challenge their coherent conceptual system to a point where they may utilize the experiential system to process through the dissonance. If they are successful in reducing the dissonance as a result of utilizing the experiential system, which was predominantly ignored in this status, they may be tempted to utilize the experiential system in other situations where it becomes clear that the rational system is not going to be effective to reduce dissonance or anxiety. These individuals are now ready to transition to the fifth status.

5. Exploration status is characterized by the reengagement of the experiential system to reduce the anxiety that was present in the previous status (Cognitive-Rationalization) as a result of the dissonance within the rational system. However, the rational system is still dominant in processing religious issues in this status. Individuals in this status of religious identity have the self-sufficiency to engage in an independent search for the meaning of religion. They do not choose to undertake this exploration to impress

others or merely as a hobby. There is a concerted and serious attempt to get to the true meaning and essence of religion. A search for the personal meaning of religion is conducted through an effortful and logical manner, mediated by a conscious appraisal of events and data. They may feel anxious in exploring their religious identity, but the need to suppress this anxiety is not as strong or important as in the previous statuses. The availability of the experiential status provides them with a means to process their anxieties and not to erect defense mechanisms to safeguard against them. Furthermore, there is willingness and an excitement to learn about alternative views and beliefs about religion. Therefore, individuals in this status may read books on religion, attend religious events, or talk to a religious advisor to learn more about their religion. The individuals may also be curious about other religions. However, they still do rely on their religion as a guidepost to help focus their search for alternative ways of perceiving religion.

6. Acceptance status involves further reintegration of the experiential system in processing religious information. There is a realization that in order to fully comprehend and appreciate religion, there needs to be an appreciation for both the experiential (faith) and rational (reason) systems. At this status, individuals are comfortable with their religion, because they have resolved the place of religion in their lives through the experiential and rational systems. They do not feel a need to invest psychological energy in defense mechanisms. Rather, the individuals choose to explore, face challenges and frustrations, and incorporate new and conflicting alternatives when it comes to dealing with religious issues. There is a sincere acceptance and appreciation for other religions and this is evident in their willingness to practice aspects of other religions. Individuals in this status are very religiously devout, but their perceptions are not narrowly defined by

the tenets of their religion, as they are very comfortable in taking into consideration different and conflicting systems of beliefs. The defining characteristic of these individuals is that they practice religion in a way that is beneficial to them and to others.

7. Integration status is characterized by further realization that religion provides an avenue to communicate with the experiential system in order to provide a satisfactory way of understanding the world. The fact that there have been few societies, if any, throughout recorded history that have not developed some form of religion, implies that all religions share something in common through their attempts at communicating with the experiential system (Epstein, 1998). However, it has to be asserted that in order to fully comprehend and experience religion in this status, the experiential and the rational systems have to be in complete balance. At this status, individuals have the capacity to transcend the bounds of their religion. They do not find it necessary to stay within the parameters of their religion to be considered religious. They practice religion in a way that their thoughts, actions, and behaviors are always congruent with each other.

As postulated by Erikson (1968), the failure to achieve an identity results in "identity confusion." The anxiety generated by this sense of confusion often leads individuals to develop a kind of pseudo-identity through an identification with other individuals or groups in an attempt to experience a sense of identity achievement. This anxiety resulting from indecision, conflict and external control contribute to cognitive incongruity and an inability to respond (Spielberger, 1972). The religious potential of individuals is said to rest in the creativity involved in the management of anxiety that results from conflicts, uncertainties, and doubts Horney (1937). In the next section, I will

provide an overview of the literature on anxiety and in the following section, I will provide a theoretical relationship between anxiety and religiosity.

Anxiety

It is generally agreed upon that there is a difference between fear and neurotic anxiety. Fear is generally recognized as being reality based in response to a specific external event or situation. Neurotic anxiety is characterized by inappropriate intensity as well as by lack of an objective or, at least identifiable source for the anxiety. Although there are various definitions of anxiety, interpretations from the psychodynamic, existential, and eclectic perspective were considered for this study. Anxiety from a psychodynamic perspective was considered important because Freud's interpretation of anxiety has left an impression on the definition of anxiety in the field of counseling psychology. Furthermore, psychodynamic theory can help us understand how people choose to deal intrapsychically with anxiety that is provoked by processing religious issues. An existential perspective of anxiety appeared valuable, because much of religion, as suggested by Tillich (1952), is associated with answering existential questions that provoke anxiety. Finally, anxiety was also defined from an eclectic perspective, because the instrument that was used to assess anxiety, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, was formulated from an eclectic perspective by Spielberger (1972).

Psychodynamic perspective of anxiety

Freud's ideas about anxiety originated from his belief that all of us are born with certain impulses or drives. His initial explanation of anxiety was based upon these impulses and he viewed anxiety as resulting from repressed libido or sexual energy, which could not be expressed appropriately. Freud further concluded that there was a qualitative

difference between anxiety experienced by a neurotic and a normal person. He differentiated between realistic anxiety and infantile (neurotic) anxiety. He described realistic anxiety as "something very rational and intelligible...that it is a perception of an external danger, that is, of an injury which is expected or foreseen" (1963, pp.393-394). In contrast, neurotic anxiety was described as resulting not from a real external danger, but from libidinal energy that had been repressed. However, Freud later revised his theory by implicating the ego rather than the id as the source of anxiety.

Freud's (1926) revised version of anxiety postulated that repression was caused by anxiety through the defensive function of the ego. He suggested that the ego responds to a perception of danger by producing the experience of anxiety. The birth trauma was seen by Freud as the fundamental cause for all subsequent "traumatic situations" which evoke anxiety. Primary anxiety occurred whenever there was a feeling of helplessness as a result of overwhelming experiences that were comparable to anxiety experienced at birth. Freud added that with maturity, the ego learns to anticipate dangerous or traumatic situations that evoke anxiety. The ego then, when it's forced to acknowledge its weakness, produces another form of anxiety called "signal anxiety." Signal anxiety can be conceptualized as a mechanism to alert the ego of an impending threat to its equilibrium. Ultimately, the function of "signal-anxiety" is to insure against the experiencing of primary anxiety through the ego's establishment of defense mechanisms (e.g., repression, suppression, intellectualization, etc.). Freud limited his explanation of anxiety to intrapsychic processes. However, interpersonal psychoanalysts, such as Harry Sullivan, incorporated cultural and social factors to explain anxiety.

Sullivan's (1956) theory of "interpersonal induction of anxiety" implied that the experience of anxiety has an interpersonal origin. Sullivan asserted that the anxiety infant's feel when they experience disappointment in their caretakers is the source of every experience of neurotic anxiety in the future. He postulated that infants develop a sense of "self" to protect themselves from experiences that create anxiety. The wholeness and integration of the "self" which was described by Sullivan as "the content of consciousness at all times when one is thoroughly comfortable about one's self-respect" (p. 216), can be threatened with disintegration when one's sense of self-respect is threatened. Sullivan perceived this threat of disintegration as the primary source of anxiety. For the "self" to protect itself, it limits its awareness to experiences that provide a positive response and it deflects negative responses that threaten its sense of wholeness. Therefore, anxiety as explained by Sullivan is a warning that the "self" is feeling overwhelmed. By examining the defenses employed to protect the "self" from disintegration when an individual feels anxious can provide an understanding of how anxiety impacts the psychological well-being of the individual.

Existential perspective of anxiety

Tillich (1952) suggested that most of our anxiety has its cause in finding meaning to our lives, which is directly related to our religiosity. Thus, existential anxiety, more than any other form of anxiety, is important in the understanding of religiosity. Kierkegaard (1946) viewed anxiety or "dread" as a natural part of living and not as something negative that has to be resolved or dealt with psychologically. He stated that anxiety is an outgrowth of an existential dilemma that we all experience as beings who have the awareness to make infinite choices, but also knowing that our capability to

exercise those choices is limited by our finite physical body. Kierkegaard also asserted that we can choose not to be aware of this dilemma and thus, avoid experiencing anxiety. However, by choosing not to experience anxiety through the use of defense mechanisms, we are only denying our true nature by constricting our ability to fully experience our thoughts and feelings. Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, anxiety is a positive aspect of our being that should be embraced, as it propels us forward to explore and attain our full potential. By ignoring or avoiding anxiety, we are essentially choosing to lead limited lives. Another important existentialist whose views on anxiety will be described below is Paul Tillich.

Paul Tillich (1952) defined anxiety as "a state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing" (p.35). Tillich described three forms of anxiety that resulted from three features of nonbeing. The first, "ontic nonbeing" is anxiety related to mortality and a person's need to affirm his or her existence. This kind of anxiety was described as being ever-present, as there is no way to escape the realities of our existence. The second feature of nonbeing is related to the need to affirm one's morality, which is related to how ethically one has lived his or her life. This feature of nonbeing produces anxiety over guilt, shame, and condemnation as a result of questioning one's moral principles and ethics. The third feature of nonbeing, which is the most relevant to the current study, is affirming one's spirituality, which is related to the anxiety that we might lead meaningless lives. Tillich asserted that to escape this anxiety we need to turn our attention to spirituality, which he perceived as the only means to provide meaning to our lives. He also stated that too often individuals resort to have their doubts dispelled by relying on answers provided by authoritative voices because they do not choose to deal with their doubts and seek a

sense of meaning to their lives. Tillich warned that finding a sense of meaning by relying upon authoritative voices is tantamount to losing a sense of individuality. Although anxiety is caused by three different features of nonbeing, Tillich argued that they are interrelated.

In view of the pervasiveness of anxiety in our lives related to our awareness of possible nonbeing, Tillich suggested that we have to have courage to experience anxiety and confront life. He described "neurotic" anxiety as being the result of not having the courage to confront the anxiety over nonbeing. He then warned that anxiety is existential in nature and as a result will always be present. Tiilich asserted that because of the existential nature of anxiety, psychological perspectives can only help us understand anxiety, but not with coping effectively with anxiety.

Eclectic perspective of anxiety

An eclectic perspective of anxiety provides us a better opportunity to describe the complex nature of anxiety by including views from different personality theories. Utilizing Cattell's factor analytic approach to anxiety as a foundation, Charles Spielberger (1972) put forth an eclectic view of anxiety that incorporated ideas from behaviorists, cognitive theorists, and psychodynamic theorists. Spielberger's model of anxiety distinguished between two forms of anxiety: (1) A-State, a transitory feeling of unpleasantness, tension and apprehension with activation of the autonomic nervous system; and (2) and A-Trait, a stable personality trait of the individual that describes an individual's proneness to anxiety. Spielberger contended that trait anxiety does not have behavioral manifestations and so, it has to be inferred from observing the pattern of responses to A-State anxiety. Spielberger did clarify that trait anxiety and state anxiety are distinct, but related constructs.

Anxiety, as stated by Spielberger (1972), is a response that is perceived as threatening or dangerous by an individual. Spielberger asserted that the distinction between high A-Trait individuals and low A-Trait individuals is that high A-Trait individuals tend to be more threatened than low A-Trait individuals in situations where their self-esteem might be threatened. Consequently, high A-Trait individuals are likely to experience state anxiety with greater intensity and more often than do low A-Trait individuals. Spilberger hypothesized that individuals who were unduly criticized by their parents and who developed self-deprecating attitudes are the ones who have high A-Trait anxiety. The individuals with high A-Trait anxiety or the ones who often experience S-Trait anxiety are the individuals who are most likely to develop defense mechanisms. Defense mechanisms (i.e., intellectualization, repression, denial, etc.) are enacted to reduce or avoid state anxiety.

In summary, anxiety in general appears to be a signal of an impending threat to our being. The use of defense mechanisms as suggested by psychodynamic theorists is one method to cope with anxiety. However, as suggested by existential theorists, the most effective way to deal with anxiety is not to defend against it, but to perceive it as a natural part of living that drives us forward to achieve our full potential. Existentialists like Tillich (1952) have suggested that religion can also alleviate anxiety by providing meaning in our lives. Therefore, in the next section, I will explore the theoretical relationship between religiosity and anxiety.

Theoretical relationship between religiosity and anxiety

Guntrip's (1956) asserted that "...the persistence of deep-seated mental pain or neurotic anxiety shows that the individual feels...all the time seriously menaced at the very

center of his (her) psychic life" (p.144). The neurotic anxiety that Guntrip mentions may be the signal that Sullivan (1956) alluded to as a warning that unpleasant aspects of the "Self" are becoming conscious. Understanding this phenomenon from the perspective of Paul Tillich (1952), the unpleasant aspects of the "Self" could be perceived as being related to the three forms of nonbeing that arouses anxiety. Tillich asserted that the only way to escape anxiety is to turn to religion, as it had the capacity to provide meaning to our lives. By combining Spielberger's (1972) idea on anxiety with Guntrip's assertion about religiosity and anxiety, we could speculate that the difference in proneness to experiencing states of anxiety is a function of the ability of one's ego to tolerate religious questions within one's life. Maybe those who have a greater tolerance for handling religious issues are those who have a lesser degree of proneness to experiencing anxiety. In contrast, those with a greater need to block out religious issues might have a higher degree of proneness to experiencing anxiety.

For Guntrip (1956), healing neurotic anxiety requires a combination of psychotherapy and religiosity. He asserted that neither approach alone is sufficient for healing neurotic anxiety. He warned religious people not to use religion as a "cover for ignorance and a fear of facing facts"(p. 130), and he warned the "scientifically and medically minded" not to limit their healing to that of the body and the psyche, but to also include the religious. He believed that the real future contribution of psychotherapy would be in achieving a "...psychodynamic understanding of man as a person, whose significant and real life is on what we may broadly call the spiritual plane of the achievement of personal reality and the sustaining of interpersonal relations" (p.130). In the following

section, I will review the empirical work that has been conducted to explore the relationship between religiosity and anxiety.

Empirical evidence for the relationship between religiosity and anxiety

Limited amount of research has been conducted to explore the relationship between religiosity and anxiety. Researchers investigating the relationship between religiosity and anxiety had defined religiosity in terms of religious beliefs by assessing the values and thoughts of participants regarding religion (Cooley & Hutton, 1965; Heintzelman & Fehr, 1976). Other researchers had chosen to define religiosity by measuring the religious practice (i.e., church attendance, frequency of prayers, reading religious materials, religious conversion, etc.) of participants (Maltby 1998; Rappaport 1978; Spellman, Baskett, and Byrne, 1971; Williams and Cole, 1968). A few others had defined religiosity by measuring both the religious belief and practice of participants (Glass, 1971; Glass and Schoch, 1971; Koenig, Ford, George, Blazer, & Meador 1993; Koenig, George, Blazer, Pritchett, & Meador,1993; Wilson & Miller, 1968).

The results from most of these studies found a negative relationship between religiosity and anxiety (Cooley & Hutton, 1965; Glass, 1971; Glass & Schoch, 1971; Koenig, Ford, George, Blazer, & Meador, 1993; Maltby, 1998; Rappaport, 1978). However, several studies did not find a significant relationship between religiosity and anxiety (Heintzelman & Fehr, 1976; Koenig, George, Blazer, Pritchett, & Meador,1993; Spellman, Baskett, and Byrne, 1971; Williams & Cole, 1968). Only one study found a positive relationship between religiosity and anxiety (Wilson & Miller, 1968). The contradictory and inconclusive findings from these studies could have been contributed by the lack of uniformity in the definition of religion.

As suggested by Koenig et.al., (1993), the measures used to assess religiosity from the perspective of a person's belief or practice might have limited the ability to capture the full essence of religiosity. Believing in a religion or practicing a religion is not synonymous with religiosity because religiosity (level of involvement in and meaning of one's religion) can only be understood by investigating the true motive for the belief or practice of religion. Thus, the validity of the findings above which had defined religiosity in terms of religious belief or practice is unclear. However, a promising set of variables, intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation, that were introduced by Allport, have been extensively used to assess religiosity. Bergin (1983) asserted that these variables provide an adequate starting point for measuring religiosity. In the following section, a review of studies that explored the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation with anxiety is presented.

Intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation and anxiety

Sturgeon and Hamley (1979) explored the relationship between religious orientation (intrinsic or extrinsic) among 148 students from a Protestant Church related college. They were given the Existential Anxiety Scale, Spielbrger's Trait and State Anxiety Scale, the Inventory of Religious Belief, the Religious Orientation Scale, and Rotter's Internal-External Locus of Control Scale. One hundred forty four students were split into two groups based on their scores on the Religious Orientation Scale. Results indicated that the intrinsic group had significantly less trait anxiety, existential anxiety and had more internal locus of control. There was no significant difference between the groups on state anxiety. The authors suggested that a lack of difference on state anxiety would be expected, because a stress condition was not present during testing. Finally,

they concluded that a person who lives consistent with his or her beliefs should be less anxious, more self-assured and secure.

Another study that explored the relationship between anxiety and religious orientation was conducted by Baker and Gorsuch (1982). Subjects for this study consisted of 52 subjects from a religious wilderness camping organization in Southern California. They were given the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), the IPAT Anxiety Scale (Cattell & Scheier, 1960) together with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory to measure their trait anxiety. Results indicated that intrinsic religious orientation was negatively correlated to extrinsic religious orientation. Trait anxiety, lack of self sentiment, ego weakness, and paranoia were negatively correlated with intrinsic religious orientation, but positively correlated with extrinsic religious orientation. Guilt proneness and frustration tension were both not significantly related with religious orientation. The authors concluded from their findings that being committed intrinsically to a religion does bring peace.

Frenz and Carey (1989) examined the relationship between religious orientation (intrinsic-extrinsic) and trait anxiety. The subjects for this study were 175 undergraduates from a private university in New York. They were given the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Scale (Feagin, 1964), which is a modification of the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) that allows for a fourfold scoring system (intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminate, and nonreligious). The Trait subscale from the State-Trait Anxiety Scale was also administered to the subjects. The data were analyzed using all the subjects and a subset of the sample that consisted of only Christian students. The four-fold scoring system for religious orientation yielded 12 subjects who were intrinsic, 46 who were extrinsic, 43

indiscriminate, and 21 nonreligious subjects. Results showed that the four religious groups and the two genders did not significantly differ on trait anxiety. Chi-square analysis conducted on the Christian (n=101) subset of the sample which consisted of 9 intrinsic, 21 extrinsic, 28 indiscriminate, and 11 nonreligious subjects indicated that there were no differences in religious orientation on the basis of sex. Analysis of variance showed no main effects for religious orientation, sex, or their interaction. Contrary to findings from previous research employing religious orientation, the present study did not find any significant relationship between religious orientation and trait anxiety. The authors suggested that the reason for the discrepancy could be due to the heterogeneity of the sample when compared to previous studies that have mainly used homogeneously religious samples. The authors also suggested that subjects recruited from religious institutions as most previous studies have done, might have had a tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner by overemphasizing their intrinsic religiosity and underemphasizing any traits or symptoms that might be interpreted as signs of poor psychological adjustment. The socially desirable response of these subjects might have had an impact on the outcome of previous studies that showed a negative correlation between intrinsic religious orientation and trait anxiety.

Bergin, Masters, and Richards (1987) conducted a study among 119 Mormon college students attending psychology courses and 32 former missionaries attending a religious course at Brigham Young University to investigate the relations between religiosity and several personality variables (anxiety, self-control, irrational beliefs, depression, and personality traits measured by the CPI). Subjects in this study were administered the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), the CPI, Taylor

Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS; Taylor, 1953), and Rosenbaum's Self-Control Schedule (SCS; Rosenbaum, 1980). The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and Jones' (1997) standardized measure of Ellis's Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) were administered only to the former missionaries. Two separate analyses were conducted, one involving students attending the psychology courses and the other comprised of students attending the religious course former missionaries). Results indicated that the intrinsics' scores on religiosity tended to correlate positively with personality scores and the extrinsics' scores were negatively related to personality scores. Furthermore, higher intrinsic scores were associated with lower anxiety and better self-control. They also found that being intrinsically religious was positively related to self-control, freedom from self-doubt, minimization of worries, alert disposition, and tolerance. They also found intrinsic religious orientation to be positively associated with such positive traits as sociability, responsibility, social maturity, accepting personal responsibility, and intellectual efficiency. The authors concluded from their findings that significant religious involvement (intrinsic) could result in positive and healthy functioning. They argued that the findings from this study did not indicate any support for Ellis' hypothesis that religiosity is associated with irrational beliefs.

Baker and Gorsuch (1985) investigated the relationship between anxiety and the frustration of religious values (intrinsic or extrinsic). Participants for this study consisted of 98 members of Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Congregational churches from the Mid-West and California. The subjects' religious orientation was assessed using the Age-Universal Religious Orientation Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983). The subjects were administered a total of four conditions: intrinsic/high frustration, intrinsic/low frustration,

extrinsic/high frustration, extrinsic/low frustration. For each of these four conditions a vignette was designed employing values taken from the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967). After the vignettes were presented to the subjects, the State subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was administered. In order to test the extent of their cognitive assimilations as it relates to their religious thinking, a series of theological statements were presented to the subjects. These statements were designed to contradict the values espoused in the Religious Orientation Scale. The results supported the hypothesis that frustration of religious values among intrinsics produced an increase in state anxiety in a high frustration situation compared to a low frustration situation. The hypothesis that frustration of religious values would produce anxiety in religious people was supported in this study. The second hypothesis that unassimilated cognitions in religious thinking is related to higher anxiety among religious persons when placed in conflictual religious situations was also supported. The investigators concluded that the support found for the second hypothesis suggested that a person with an intrinsic religious orientation finds the values of the other orientation (extrinsic) to be important and vice versa.

In summary, the findings from most of the studies reviewed above which examined the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation with anxiety appear to suggest that individuals who are intrinsic in their religious orientation tend be less anxious than individuals who are extrinsic in their religious orientation. Only one of the studies reviewed above did not find a significant relationship between religious orientation and anxiety (Frenz & Carey, 1989). Based on the empirical findings above, there is support for the theoretical assumption made in the earlier section that resolving one's religious

issues and becoming religiously mature may bring about less anxiety in the individual. Conversely, the theoretical assumption also implies that if the individual chooses not to struggle with religious issues to promote growth in his or her religious maturity, he or she could experience more anxiety. An effective means to relieve this anxiety is by choosing to associate with other individuals who hold the same religious beliefs and ideas, being rigid in thought and action, and relying on the words of authorities or as Rokeach (1960) had defined it, by being dogmatic. Dogmatism, which has been shown to be positively related to anxiety (Glass, 1971; Glass & Schoch, 1971), was described by Rokeach (1960) as a cognitive network of defenses against anxiety. Therefore, the concept of dogmatism was included in this study to assess its relationship with religious identity, as the inclusion of dogmatism as a variable allowed for a cognitive aspect of psychological well-being to be also assessed. Previous studies assessing the relationship between psychological well-being and religiosity have generally not assessed the affective (anxiety) and cognitive (dogmatism) aspects of psychological well-being simultaneously. In the next section, I will provide an overview of the literature on dogmatism and in the following section I will provide a theoretical relationship between dogmatism and religiosity.

Dogmatism

The concept of dogmatism was put forth by Rokeach (1956) as a generalized theory of authoritarianism to distinguish it from the "authoritarian personality" as measured by the California F Scale. Rokeach contended that the F Scale did not fully capture the full spectrum of authoritarianism, as it was originally developed to measure fascism, which is synonymous with right-wing ideology. Rokeach asserted that an accurate assessment of authoritarianism should measure equally well the two poles of

ideological content: left-wing and right-wing. Rokeach's assertion was supported in a factor analysis of items of the F(Fascism) and D(Dogmatism) Scales by Kerlinger and Rokeach (1966) who noted a "common core" of authoritarianism underlying both scales. When a second-order factor analysis was conducted, two scales were factorially discriminated with the DS (dogmatism scale) representing authoritarianism independent of ideological content (left-wing or right-wing). The results from the factor analysis was further incentive for Rokeach to attempt defining dogmatism as a means of measuring authoritarianism independent of ideological content (left-wing or right-wing). Eventually, he defined dogmatism as "a relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, organized around a central set of beliefs about authority, which in turn, provides a framework for patterns of intolerance and qualified tolerance toward others" (Rokeach, McGiveny & Denny, 1955, p.87). In summary, the concept of dogmatism is portrayed by a closed cognitive system, general authoritarianism, and general intolerance (Rokeach, 1956). As a means to increase the validity and improve the measurement of the construct, dogmatism was described in terms of its structure, content and function (Rokeach & Restle, 1960).

Rokeach and Restle (1960) described the structure of dogmatism as consisting of a cognitive system that is divided into two interdependent systems: belief and disbelief. Disbelief systems were further divided into several disbelief subsystems. Rokeach stated that the disbelief system was organized along a central-intermediate-peripheral dimension. The individual's believes about the world as a friendly or threatening place resided in the central region. The intermediate region, which holds the formal beliefs, determines the perception of absolute authority and how it influences the judgment of other individuals.

Finally, the peripheral region, which holds the structure of beliefs and disbeliefs, determines how beliefs and disbeliefs originate from authorities and whether subsystems are in communication with each other (Rokeach & Restle, 1960). The structure of the central-intermediate-peripheral regions determines the content of one's beliefs about the world and how those beliefs manifest themselves.

The content of the belief-disbelief system mainly determines the quality of belief towards authority. The more closed the belief-disbelief system, the more will authorities determine whether one accepts or rejects others. Therefore, people are accepted or rejected based on the congruence of their beliefs with that of the authorities. This lack of tolerance towards others is usually revealed through opinionated and judgmental ideas. Finally, the structure and content of the central-intermediate-peripheral regions determine the function of one's beliefs about the world.

The function of the belief-disbelief system is to enable the individual to feel safe from external threats. Thus, the most important function of a closed system is to defend against threatening aspects of reality. The ability to defend one's egocentric attitudes and reject the attitudes of others is rationalized and justified thought a cognitive framework that is provided by a closed belief-disbelief system. The more dogmatic the belief-disbelief system, the more rigid will be the cognitive framework. As a result of constructing a rigid cognitive framework to protect himself or herself from threatening encounters, a dogmatic person is less likely to be open to creative and novel ideas (Rokeach & Restle, 1960). Consequently, the ability to form new cognitive, perceptual, and ideological belief systems is inhibited by the rigidity of the cognitive framework. However, rigidity and dogmatism are not synonymous, and rigidity does not necessarily lead to dogmatism (Rokeach, 1955).

Rigidity is different from dogmatism, in that, rigidity communicates the degree of separation among the components of a belief-disbelief system. The more rigid an individual, the less likelihood there is of the different components of his or her belief-disbelief system communicating with each other. This has an influence on how one approaches and solves problems, as well as how one learns new tasks. Consequently, rigidity is characterized by the tendency to make simplified judgments, denying contradictions and being very uncomfortable experiencing incongruities and dissonances. Dogmatism shares the characteristics of rigidity, as it also refers to a closed belief-disbelief system. However, dogmatism has an element that it does not share with rigidity, which is the rejection of ideas and beliefs that is perceived as a threat to the closed system.

In summary, the concept of dogmatism refers to a relatively closed belief-disbelief system, which has a high degree of isolation among components within and between those systems (Rokeach, 1956). The more closed the system, the more likelihood there is for an individual to rely upon inappropriate or irrelevant internal cues or external cues from authorities to validate their beliefs. This results in rigidity, which limits one's openness to new and novel ideas, feelings, and experiences. Furthermore, the anxiety that results from a rigid way of being creates a high need for structure and an intolerance for ambiguity (di Maria & di Nuovo, 1983). Finally, a dogmatic individual will associate with other individuals who hold the same beliefs and ideas, and reject those with ideas and beliefs that appear to be incongruent with his or her belief-disbelief system (Rokeach, 1960). Rokeach also asserted that a dogmatic individual would most likely discriminate others based upon their beliefs as opposed to other social characteristics.

Theoretical relationship between dogmatism and religiosity

Religiosity has been suggested as a system of beliefs held as important and fundamental in defining the nature of things (Meredith, 1968). Ellis (1986) had contended that devout individuals who define their beliefs through religion are emotionally unstable and have an extreme disregard for the rights of others. Furthermore, Rest (1983) suggested that an individual's religious beliefs interfere with his or her sense of justice when he or she is contemplating a moral course of action. The authors above and others like them appear to be suggesting that belief in religion encourages dogmatism.

Dogmatism, as defined by Rokeach (1960), includes closed-mindedness, intolerance of people who have differing belief systems, and acceptance of "truth" as defined by an authority figure. Rokeach suggested that these characteristics are exhibited by dogmatic individuals because they are threatened by the process of synthesizing new beliefs. If it is true that religious individuals are dogmatic, there is a paradox inherent in this relationship because most religious teachings encourage compassion, concern, caring, and concern for others. Therefore, the manner in which religious tenets and doctrines are translated into religious beliefs, and not religion per se, may be at the root of dogmatic thinking. Religiosity, defined as the degree to which an individual practices his or her religion, does have a strong potential to promote dogmatism. As suggested by Fowler (1981), "faith" determines the quality of one's cognitive system. Therefore, our religious maturity or religious identity status could have profound influence in the way we think and generate meaning in the world. McNeel and Thorsen (1985) suggested that an in-depth understanding of the reasons for dogmatic behavior might be made possible by exploring theories that describe human development. They contended that different stages of

development might have varying impacts on the dogmatism of individuals. Thus, the Religious Identity Development Model that is described in this study can be valuable in our understanding of the relationship between religious identity development and dogmatism. In the following section, I will review the empirical work that has been conducted to explore the relationship between dogmatism and religiosity.

Empirical evidence for the relationship between religiosity and dogmatism

A limited amount of research has been conducted to examine the relationship between religiosity and dogmatism. Researchers investigating the relationship between religiosity and dogmatism have defined religiosity in terms of religious belief (Glass, 1971; Glass & Schoch, 1971; Hunter, Harris, & Trusty, 1998; Parker, 1990; Rappaport, 1978; Swindell & L'Abate), practice (Kilpatrick & Sutker, 1970), and a combination of belief and practice (McNeel & Thorsen, 1985).

The results from all of these studies, except for one (Hunter, Harris, Trusty, 1998), showed a low correlation between religiosity and dogmatism. Similar to studies that had explored the relationship between anxiety and dogmatism, the measures used to assess religiosity were from the perspective of a person's belief or practice. Religiosity defined in this manner has a limited ability to capture the multidimensionality of religiosity (Bergin, 1983), as it does not consider the process of religious development. Thus the validity of the findings above which had defined religiosity in terms of religious belief or practice is unclear. However, three studies had explored the relationship of religiosity with anxiety and dogmatism. A review of the three studies will be presented in the following section, due to their relevance to the present study.

Rappaport (1978) explored the relationship between shifts in religious identification (to a different or no religious affiliation) with anxiety and dogmatism. The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale and the Trait Anxiety Scale from the State-Trait Anxiety Scale were utilized to group 169 female college students into four groups of 15 subjects each: high dogmatism/high anxiety; high dogmatism/low anxiety; low dogmatism/high anxiety; and low dogmatism/low anxiety. A chi-square test performed showed that subjects who had switched to a different religious affiliation were more likely to be in the low dogmatic/high anxiety group. Those who changed to no religious affiliation were found to be mainly within the high dogmatic/low anxiety group. The author postulated that a high level of anxiety appeared to increase the likelihood of changing to a different religious affiliation, provided the subjects were open to other religions. He further suggested that those who are highly anxious and highly dogmatic may tend to deal defensively with anxiety by holding firmly to their beliefs, whereas those who are highly anxious and low on being dogmatic may be more susceptible to other beliefs as a means to cope with their anxiety. Finally, the author concluded that the high dogmatic/low anxiety group probably did not need religion to deal with their anxiety because they were low on trait anxiety and their dogmatic nature (opinionated and closed-minded) made them more prone to reject religion and abandon their religious affiliation.

One of the first studies conducted that had included both religious belief and practice was by Glass and Schoch (1971). They studied 495 college women who were enrolled in a private college in the South to explore the impact of religiosity in terms of belief and practice on personality characteristics (anxiety and dogmatism). There were 64 Catholic students and 20 or more students from each of five Protestant denominations

(Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Episcopal). The Inventory of Religious Belief (Brown & Lowe, 1951) was used to measure religious belief. Religious practice was measured using the Survey of Religious Practice (Ligon, 1965). The Self Analysis Form (Cattell & Scheier, 1963), a 40-item instrument was used to measure free floating, manifest anxiety. The Rokeach Dogmatic Scale (1960) was used to measure dogmatism. A negative correlation was found between religious belief and religious practice with anxiety. However, a positive correlation was found between religious belief and dogmatism. In summary, the authors concluded that the results showed that participants who scored low on religious belief and practice were more anxious and less dogmatic than participants who scored high. The authors proposed that insecurity might be the original basis for adopting a religious orientation, and that the subsequent belief in and practice of religion may be responsible for reducing anxiety and increasing dogmatism. It was also suggested by the authors, that the participants who were high in religious practice could have been less anxious mainly because of general social skills in interacting with others and not because of their high religious practice.

A very similar study to the one described above was conducted by Glass (1971) to explore the possibility that denominational differences might have an impact on religiosity (belief and practice), and personality characteristics (anxiety and dogmatism). He studied 431 college women enrolled in a private college in the South. A liberal-conservative scale (Brown & Lowe, 1951) was used to measure religious belief. Religious practice was measured using the modified Ligon (1965) scale. Free floating and manifest type anxiety, was measured employing the Self Analysis Form (Cattell & Scheier, 1963). Dogmatism was measured using the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (1960). T-tests were conducted

between various combinations of the denominational groups. The Baptist group was found to be significantly higher on the belief and practice scale than any of the other denominations. The author observed that with the exception of Episcopal students, there appears to be a trend for denominational groups with lower beliefs and practice (i.e., Lutheran) to be more anxious and less dogmatic than students from denominational groups with higher beliefs and practice (i.e., Baptist). The author suggested that students might be less anxious and more dogmatic if they regularly followed practices (religious) that are rooted in internalized values. He concluded that further research is necessary to determine if a healthy and secure personality is associated with a liberal or non-traditional approach to religion.

Overall Summary of Literature Review

Some of the major themes identified in this literature review suggest that individuals who have an intrinsic religious orientation are less anxious than individuals with an extrinsic religious orientation (Sturgeaon & Hamley, 1979; Baker & Gorsuch, 1982). Furthermore, individuals who are more religious in their belief or practice appear to be less anxious than those who are less religious in their belief and practice (Cooley & Hutton, 1965; Koenig, et. al., 1993). The literature also suggests that the religious individuals are more dogmatic than nonreligious individuals (McNeel & Thorsen, 1985; Parker, 1990).

Three studies had examined the relationship of religiosity with anxiety and dogmatism. The pattern of relationship of religiosity with low anxiety and high dogmatism for religious individuals supports the hypothesis for the fourth status (Cognitive-Rationalization) of the Religious Identity Development Model. More

specifically, the hypothesis stated that individuals who are in the Cognitive-Rationalization status are likely to have low anxiety and high dogmatism. Individuals who were assessed as less religious were less dogmatic and more anxious, which is consistent with what is hypothesized for individuals in status three (Confusion) of the Religious Identity Development model. More specifically, the hypothesis stated that individuals in the Confusion status are likely to have high anxiety and low dogmatism. Taken together, the empirical findings and information discussed in the literature review suggest that the level of religiosity does have an impact on the affective (anxiety) and cognitive (dogmatism) aspects of psychological well-being. Therefore, religious and nonreligious individuals may have personality characteristics that are significantly different from each other to warrant attention during counseling or therapy. However, the dynamics underlying the relationship of religiosity to anxiety and dogmatism appear to merit further investigation, as the findings on the relationship is still inconclusive

First, as the literature underscores, most of the empirical research has been conducted using religious belief and practice to define religiosity (Glass, 1971; Koenig, et al, 1993; Maltby, 1998). Although, several studies have been conducted using Allport's (1967) intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation (Frenz & Carey, 1989; Bergin, et al, 1987), this is still an inadequate measure to assess the multidimensionality of religiosity. Intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations are typologies that describe the structure and not the process of religiosity. Thus, these studies need to be replicated by including a measurement, such as the Religious Identity Development Scale, to assess religious identity as a process.

Second, only three studies had looked at the affective (anxiety) and cognitive (dogmatic) aspects of psychological well-being together (Glass, 1971; Glass & Schoch, 1971; Rappaport, 1978) in studying religiosity. Thus, more studies are needed to examine how the affective and cognitive aspects are correlated to better understand the relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being.

Finally, although the body of religiosity literature described earlier is helpful, in examining the relationship of religiosity with psychological well-being, a limitation is that much of it is at least 10 years old (Glass, 1971, Rappaport, 1978; Wilson & Miller, 1968). The recent increase in interest in religious issues as reported by Worthington (1989), warrants conducting more recent studies.

Chapter three

Statement of the problem

In an effort to address some of the limitations described in the literature review, one goal of the present study was to examine the psychometric properties of a new instrument to assess religious identity development. As suggested by Worthington (1989), the construct of religiosity can be more accurately assessed by understanding and evaluating the process and not just the typology of religious maturity. Therefore, as an important contribution to the literature on religiosity, I have developed a process model that describes the development of religious identity in terms of stages or statuses. To test this model, a new instrument, the Religious Identity Development Scale (V. Suthakaran, 2002) was constructed to quantitatively assess the religious identity status of an individual.

The main goal of the present study was to further examine the psychometrics of the Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS) that was initially examined in a small pilot study (V. Suthakarn & Helms, unpublished manuscript). The psychometric qualities of the RIDS were further analyzed in this study by determining its reliability and validity using a sample of undergraduates and adults.

As a first step, exploratory factor analyses were conducted on items for each of the seven subscales of the RIDS to determine the relevant items for each of the subscales. Next, coefficient alphas were assessed for each factor. A high internal consistency for each of the factors shows that an adequate degree of consistency and stability are present in each of the subscales (statuses) of the measure. An instrument with a high reliability is less likely to be susceptible to random measurement error (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).

Although good reliability is necessary, it does not assure good validity. In terms of validity, the focus was in determining the convergent, discriminant, and concurrent validity of the RIDS

Convergent and discriminat validity

Convergent validity measures the relationship between two variables that are theoretically related to each other (Heppner, et al., 1998). In contrast, discriminant validity assesses the degree of independence between two variables that are not theoretically related with each other. Findings from previous studies have shown anxiety and dogmatism to be related to religiosity, although the direction of the relationship of both the constructs with religiosity was inconclusive. Thus, in this study, anxiety and dogmatism, which appear to explore the experiential (anxiety) and rational (dogmatism) aspects of psychological well-being, were studied together to explore their relationship with religiosity. The positive correlations and negative correlations of anxiety and dogmatism with specific statuses of religious identity provided evidence for convergent validity and discriminant validity, respectively. As another method to assess the validity of the instrument, the concurrent validity of the RIDS was also measured.

Concurrent validity

Concurrent validity assesses the degree to which two highly correlated constructs (e.g., religiosity versus religious orientation) are related. The concurrent validity of the RIDS was assessed by comparing the RIDS with the Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983). The religious orientation scale measures the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation of an individual and these variables have been widely used to assess religiosity in previous studies (Worthington, 1989). The intrinsic subscale

of the Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale was expected to be positively correlated to the more advanced statuses of religious identity (i.e., Exploration, Acceptance, and Integration). Conversely, the extrinsic subscale of the Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale was expected to be positively correlated with the less advanced statuses (i.e., Relational and Confusion).

In light of these goals, the following hypotheses were investigated in this study. Hypothesis 1 referred to the internal consistency of the religious identity statuses (subscales).

Hypothesis 1: Status 1 through status 7 will demonstrate an acceptable level of internal consistency. Chronbach's alpha for each of the seven statuses (factors) will be above .65, which meets the minimum requirement for the reliability of a scale (Nunnally, 1978).

Hypothesis 2 refers to the distinctiveness (reliability) of the religious identity statuses (subscales). The moderate correlations among the statuses will provide evidence that they are distinct constructs.

Hypothesis 2: The factor solution will include the seven statuses (subscales) that will be moderately inter-correlated with a correlation coefficient of less than .50 between any two statuses.

Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d examine the relationship of the religious identity statuses with anxiety and dogmatism. The positive and negative correlations of scores on anxiety and dogmatism with scores on specified religious identity statuses will demonstrate the convergent and discriminant validity of the RIDS.

Hypothesis 3a: Scores in status 1 (Concrete) and status 2 (Relational) will be

positively correlated with dogmatism and anxiety. More specifically, individuals who understand religion predominantly through faith (experiential system) will exhibit higher levels of anxiety and dogmatism.

As defined in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002), individuals in statuses 1 and 2 tend to conform to the (non)religious views of significant others around them. In general, they have a religious identity that is similar to Allport's (1967) extrinsic religious orientation, which he defined as using religion for utilitarian or self-centered needs. Empirical findings from previous studies do suggest that individuals with an extrinsic religious orientation exhibit a high level of anxiety (Baker & Gorsuch, 1982; Bergin, Masters, & Richards, 1987; Sturgeon & Hamley, 1979). Furthermore, as a result of not having engaged their rational system (reason), individuals in statuses 1 and 2 are generally dogmatic, because they are uncomfortable with religious views and ideas that are new and different. They are threatened by new beliefs and values, which contribute to their high anxiety levels, because they have not reasoned through their religious beliefs and values. Therefore, individuals in statuses 1 and 2 will exhibit a high level of dogmatism to help them cope with religious issues that are anxiety provoking.

Hypothesis 3b: Scores in status 3 (Confusion) will have a positive correlation with anxiety and a negative correlation with dogmatism. More specifically, individuals who are confused about religious issues will show high levels of anxiety but will not show corresponding levels of dogmatism.

As suggested in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002), individuals begin to engage their reasoning capacity

(rational system) to think about alternative belief systems. To allow themselves to consider the possibility of having alternative beliefs and values, there has to be a corresponding decrease in their dogmatic ways of perceiving values and beliefs. Thus, a significant decrease in their level of dogmatism is an indication that they have moved into the Confusion status (status 3). However, their anxiety level increases, because the relaxation of their dogmatic beliefs and views does not provide them with a tool (defense mechanism) anymore to repress their anxiety. The anxiety for individuals in this status has its origin in the realization or acknowledgment that their religious values and beliefs are but one among many. Empirical evidence does indicate that individuals who go through a religious conversion (religious to nonreligious or nonreligious to religious) experience a high level of anxiety (Spellman, Baskett, & Byrne, 1970). The high level of anxiety experienced could have been as a result of the confusion that accompanied the conversion process.

Hypothesis 3c: Scores in status 4 (Cognitive-Rationalization) will have a positive correlation with dogmatism and a negative correlation with anxiety. More specifically, individuals who fully depend upon reason (rational system) and neglect faith (experiential system) in processing their religious issues will exhibit high levels of dogmatism but will not exhibit corresponding levels of anxiety.

As suggested by Spellman (1959), when a religious convert realizes that his or her anxiety remains high after the conversion process, he or she is most likely to find new solutions to decrease his or her anxiety. The transition from status 2 (Relational) to status 3 (Confusion) in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002) is analogous to a conversion process, because new

and alternative religious beliefs and values are considered for the first time. Thus, the high anxiety that is provoked in the Confusion status demands resolution and one way to cope is by fully engaging the rational system (reason) and relinquishing the experiential system (faith) by utilizing dogmatic arguments and rationalizations as a defense against anxiety. The utilization of rationalization and intellectualization as defense mechanisms to temper the anxiety that is provoked when processing religious issues is the hallmark of the fourth status (Cognitive-Rationalization). The defense mechanism employed is generally effective in suppressing anxiety around religious issues, but it is enacted at the cost of being dogmatic in processing religious issues. Therefore, individuals in status 4 (Cognitive –Rationalization) have low anxiety and high dogmatism levels.

Hypothesis 3d: Scores in status 5 (Exploration), status 6 (Acceptance) and status 7 (Integration) will be correlated negatively with anxiety and dogmatism. More specifically, individuals who process religious issues through faith (experiential system) and reason (rational system) will not exhibit high levels of anxiety or dogmatism.

As defined in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002), individuals in statuses five, six, and seven explore religious issues utilizing faith (experiential system) and reason (rational system). In general, they have a religious identity that is similar to Allport's (1967) intrinsic religious orientation, which he defined as using religion as a guide for mature and meaningful living. These individuals strive to balance their individual needs with the needs of the community and attempt to live their lives with tolerance, patience, ethics, and morality. Empirical findings form previous studies suggest that intrinsic religious orientation is negatively related to anxiety, rigidity, prejudice, and intolerance (Bergin, Masters, and Richards,

1987; Sturgeon & Hamley, 1979). As opposed to the individuals in the previous statuses, individuals in these three statuses do not try to defend against anxiety by resorting to repression, suppression, or rationalization, because they are comfortable in engaging their experiential system (faith) when the rational system (reason) does not appear to help them cope with anxiety provoking religious issues. They choose to deal with anxiety in a healthy and immediate manner. Therefore, individuals in statuses five, six, and seven are also low in dogmatism because they do not choose to resort to rigid, intolerant and pathological ways of coping with anxiety.

Hypothesis 4a and 4b examine the relationship between religious identity status and religious orientation (intrinsic and extrinsic). The concurrent validity of the RIDS will be determined by the positive correlation of the intrinsic and extrinsic scales with specified statuses of the RIDS.

Hypothesis 4a: Status 1 (Concrete) and status 2 (Relational) will predict extrinsic religious orientation. More specifically, individuals with less well-developed religious identities will use religion for superficial, self-centered, and immediate needs (extrinsic religious orientation).

As defined in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002), individuals in statuses one and two are similar, as their conceptualization and understanding of religious issues are from a faith perspective. This implies that they predominantly operate from the experiential system and have not effectively engaged the rational system to think through the deeper meaning and contributions of religion. Therefore, individuals in statuses one and two are limited in their view of religion and tend to use religion for utilitarian purposes. Findings from

previous empirical studies suggest that individuals who utilize religion for superficial reasons tend to be more prejudiced, less tolerant, and less mentally and physically healthy than those who find deeper meaning in religion (Allport & Ross, 1967; Baker & Gorsuch, 1982; Bergin, Stinchfield, Gaskin, Masters, & Sullivan, 1988).

Hypothesis 4b: Status 5 (Exploration), status 6 (Acceptance), and status 7 (Tolerance) will predict intrinsic religious orientation. More specifically, individuals with well-developed religious identities will internalize their religious beliefs and values that guide their thoughts and actions, regardless of external consequences (intrinsic religious orientation).

Individuals in statuses five, six, and seven, as defined in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002) are similar, in that they have fully engaged their rational system together with their experiential system. This suggests that these individuals rely on their faith and reason to understand and find meaning in religion. Therefore, individuals in statuses five, six, and seven are not limited in their view of religion and are able to incorporate their religious beliefs and values in their everyday lives. Empirical findings from previous studies do suggest that individuals who pursue religion for its own sake and attempt to live their religion are more healthy mentally and physically, tolerant, less prejudiced than those who do not (Allport & Ross, 1967, Bergin, Masters, & Richards, 1987; Donahue, 1985).

Hypothesis 5 refers to the influence of social desirability on responses to the RIDS. Assessment of the correlation between a desire to respond in a socially desirable manner and religious identity status can be used to assess construct-irrelevant test variance.

Hypothesis 5: Status 1 through status 7 will not be correlated with social desirability.

The potential for the responses in any self-report measure to be influenced by social desirability always exists. The biases that result from responding to items in ways that are deemed to be socially desirable contribute to measurement error that reduces the validity of the instrument. Therefore, the lack of a significant correlation between scores on the RIDS and scores on social desirability provides further evidence for the validity of the instrument.

Chapter four

Method

Participants

The need to recruit participants for a heterogeneous sample and also because of the anticipated difficulties in getting participants to share their views regarding a sensitive topic (religion) resulted in a broad approach being utilized to recruit participants for this study. The subject pool consisted of 127 students from a community college in the Midwest, 51 students from a community college in the East coast, 17 staff members from a Counseling Center at a large public university in the East coast, and 16 staff members from a post office in the Midwest. Research participants were 211 adults and students who were at least 18 years old. Of this sample, 98 (46.4%) were male and 113 (53.6%) were female. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 77 with a mean age of 24.7 (SD =10.8). The majority of the sample was White/European American (68.7%, n = 145). Other racial groups consisted of Black/African American (14.2%, n = 30), Hispanic American/Latino/Latina (5.2%, n = 11), Asian/Pacific Islander (5.7%, n = 12), Native American (.5%, n = 1), and other (5.7%, n = 12). A description of the religious preference of the sample is presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Religious preference

	n	%
Christianity	163	77.3
No religion/agnostic/atheist	18	8.5
Islam	6	2.8
Buddhism	2	0.9
Judaism	1	0.5
Hinduism	1	0.5
Sikhism	1	0.5
Did not respond to item	19	9.0

Note. N = 211

Among the Christians, 52 (31.9%) were Catholic, and 70 (42.9%) were Protestant. Forty-one (25.2%) of the Christian participants did not specify whether they were Catholics or Protestants. The denominational affiliation of the Protestants is presented in Table 3.

Table 3

Denominational affiliation (Protestant subsample)

	n	%
Baptist	15	21.4
Non-denominational	12	17.1
Methodist	10	14.3
Pentecostal	5	7.1
Episcopalian	4	5.7
Unitarian	3	4.3
Lutheran	3	4.3
Presbyterian	2	2.9
Seventh Adventist	2	2.9
Evangelical	1	1.4
Jehovah's Witness	1	1.4
Mormon	1	1.4

Note. Percentage reported is from the total number of participants who reported being Protestants (n=70).

The participants were asked to specify the most common religion within their community and 164 (77.7%) said that Christianity was the most common religion, followed by Judaism (2.8%, n = 6), and Islam (.9%, n = 2). Thirty-seven participants (17.5%) did not respond to this item. Among the Christians, 66 (40.5%) reported Catholicism as the most common religion in their community and 35 (21.5%) reported Protestantism as the most common religion within their community. Sixty-two (38.0%) participants who were Christians did not specify whether Catholicism or Protestantism was the most common religion within their community. Participants were asked to specify the importance of religion in their lives as a means to guide their thoughts and actions. The largest group consisted of those who said that religion was important (31.8%, n = 67), followed by those who said that religion was very important (25.1%, n = 53). In contrast, 19 (9.0%) said that religion was not very important, followed by those who said that religion was not important (8.5%, n = 18). Forty nine (23.2%) of the participants responded neutral to the question and 5 (2.4%) did not respond to this item. Most of the participants said that they had not attended any kind of religious school (71.6%, n = 51), but a substantial number shared that they had attended some type of religious school (28.0%, n = 59). The personal income reported is presented in Table 4 and the parents' income is reported in Table 5.

Table 4

Reported personal income (annual)

	n	%
Less than $10,000	65	30.8
$10,001 to $20,000	37	17.5
$20,001 to $30,000	18	8.5
$30,001 to $40,000	16	17.6
$40,001 to $50,000	8	3.8
$50,001 to $60,000	5	2.5
$60,001 to $70,000	3	1.4
$90,001 to $100,000	1	0.5
More than $100,000	1	0.5
Did not report income	57	27.0

Note. N = 211

Table 5

Parents' income (annual)

	n	%
$10,001 to $20,000	4	1.9
$20,001 to $30,000	14	6.6
$30,001 to $40,000	12	5.7
$40,0001 to $50,000	18	8.5
$50,001 to $60,000	13	6.2
$60,001 to $70,000	12	5.7
$70,001 to $80,000	18	8.5
$80,001 to $90,000	4	1.9
$90,001 to $100,000	4	1.9
$100,001 to $200,000	13	6.2
More than $200,001	6	2.8
Did not respond or did not know	91	43.1

Note. N = 211

Almost half the participants reported that they were freshmen (49.3%, n = 104), followed by those who were sophomores (18.5%, n = 39), juniors (9.0%, n = 19), and seniors (5.2 %, n = 11). Six (2.8%) of the participants reported that they were graduate students and 20 (9.5%) reported other. Twelve (5.7%) did not respond to this item. Finally, the participants were asked about the highest academic degree that they had earned and most of them (67.3%, n = 142) shared that it was a high school degree. This was followed by those with an Associates degree (6.6%, n = 14), Master's (4.7%, n = 10), Bachelor's (3.3%, n = 7), and Doctorate (.9%, n = 2). Nine (4.3%) participants reported not having a degree and 27 (12.8%) did not respond to this item.

Measures

The following measures were used in this study: (a) a demographic questionnaire; (b) Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS; V. Suthakaran, 2002); (c) Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1960); and (d) State subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, 1983); (e) Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983); and (f) the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).

Demographic questionnaire. Demographic information of the participants was collected using a demographic questionnaire designed by the author for this study (See Appendix A). The participants were asked to provide the following information about themselves: (a) gender; (b) age; (c) race; (d) their religion; (e) their mother's religion; (f) their father's religion (g) most common religion within their community; (h) importance of religion to them; (i) if they attended religious school; (j) their income;

(k) their parents' income; (l) year in school; (m) college major of job title; and (n) highest academic degree.

Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS, V. Suthakaraan, 2002). This 23-item self-report instrument was developed in the present study to measure the religious identity status of an individual based on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The RIDS in its present form has six subscales that measure values and "attitudes" that correspond to the first six statuses in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002). The score for the RIDS is determined by calculating the mean score for each status, as there are different number of items in each status. Therefore, scores are determined and available for all six statuses of the RIDS. As suggested by Helms (1990), because identities (religiosity) are attitudes, it is more meaningful to determine "the amount of attitudes associated with each stage" (p.36). In other words, to accurately assess individuals' religious identity status, one needs to examine their profiles across all the statuses rather than to look at individual status scores. This perspective implies that regression models in which each type of "attitude" is taken into account for an individual, might offer more sensitive techniques for measuring the relationship between religious identity and other personality constructs (Parham & Helms, 1985). The results of a pilot test for the RIDS are presented below.

The RIDS is a modification of an earlier instrument known as the Religious Identity Scale (RIS; V. Suthakaran & Helms, unpublished manuscript) (See Appendix B) that was pilot tested to assess its preliminary reliability and validity on a group of 124 college students. For the pilot study, a total of 84 items was written by the researchers, based on the description of each of the seven statuses on the Experiential/Rational Model

of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002). Each of the seven statuses of the RIS was represented by 10 to 15 items. The proposed items were shown to faculty members and graduate students who were asked to provide feedback about the RIS, and to suggest alternative ways to reword or restructure unclearly worded items. The items for the measure were finalized based on the responses offered by the faculty and students. A total of seven items were eliminated from the original scale because they were poorly worded and were very vague in their meaning. The revised version of the RIS that was tested in the pilot study included 77 items: 11 in status one (concrete); 10 in status two (relational); 11 in status three (confusion); 13 in status 4 (exploration); 10 in status five (cognitive-rationalization); 10 in status 6 (tolerance); and 12 in status 7 (integration). Respondents indicated on a 5-point Likert scale the degree to which they agreed with the statements (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Since specific items were written for each of the seven statuses, principal component analyses with an orthogonal rotation (Varimax) were conducted for each of the seven subscales. Seven separate factor analyses were conducted because the main reason for conducting the pilot study was to determine the type of items that best represented a particular status, so that similar items could be added in a future study. Items that loaded highly (factor loading of more than .40) on the first component of the rotated component matrix for each of the seven subscales were retained to represent the respective subscales (status). The final version of the RIS had a total of 40 items with the following items and alpha levels in each of the seven subscales: 6 items in Concrete (.83), 4 items in Relational (.75), 7 items in Confusion (.81), 10 items in Cognitive-Rationalization (.89), 5 items in Exploration (.76), 4 items in Acceptance (.68), and 4 items in Integration (.65). For the purpose of

concurrent validity, the seven subscales of the RIDS were used to predict intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation assessed through the Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983). As hypothesized, a simultaneous multiple regression analysis showed that the intrinsic religious orientation (mature religiosity) was predicted by the more advanced statuses: Exploration (status 5) and Acceptance (status 6). In addition, the extrinsic religious orientation (immature religion) was only predicted by the less advanced Relational (status 2) status. The results from the regression provided preliminary support for the validity of the Religious Identity Scale. For the present study, more items were added to the RIS, after deleting poor items, to assess its reliability and validity. The 23-item Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS) (See appendix J) is the psychometrically validated version of the Religious Identity Scale (RIS). The scale development for the RIDS in the present study is presented in the procedures section.

Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (RDS). The dogmatism level of the participants was assessed using the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1960) (See Appendix C). This scale specifically assesses the ability of participants to accept and independently evaluate social, political, and economic information based on how open their belief systems are to processing beliefs and values that might be different from theirs. The RDS is a 40-item, 7-point Likert scale instrument where the scores can range from 40 to 250, with a higher score representing a higher level of dogmatism. To standardize the number of points in this scale with the others scales used in this study, a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) was used for this measure. Internal consistency reliabilities assessed from six groups of college students yielded a coefficient of .78 (Rokeach, 1960). Furthermore, reliability coefficients ranging from .68 to .93 were also

obtained for three groups of residents of a Veterans Administration Domiciliary. A six-month test-retest reliability coefficient of .71 and a 1-month test-retest reliability coefficient of .84 were also reported. Internal consistency for the present study as measured by Cronbach's alpha was .86.

State subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (STAI). The state anxiety of the participants was measured using the State subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, 1983) (See Appendix D). The STAI is comprised of two separate self-report scales for measuring state (S) and trait (T) anxiety. However, only the State subscale of the STAI was used in this study, as the goal in using the STAI was to assess the anxiety level of participants at the moment they were filling out the questionnaires. The S-Anxiety subscale consists of 20 statements with a 5-point Likert scale to evaluate the anxiety level of participants in the moment. A rating of five indicates the presence of a high level of anxiety for ten of the 20 items, and an absence of anxiety on the remaining ten items. Ten of the 20 statements were reverse coded in the present study, so that a higher score would indicate a higher level of anxiety for all 20 items. The possible range of scores varies from 20 to 80 with higher scores representing more anxiety. Reliability and validity for the instrument has been established through numerous studies. The overall median internal consistency reliability alpha coefficient for the S-Anxiety subscale is .92. Evidence of construct validity were demonstrated in previous research with working adults, college students, high school students, and military recruits. In addition, evidence of concurrent validity has been established in correlation with the IPAT Anxiety Scale (Cattell & Scheier, 1960) and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1953). Correlations were relatively high ranging from .73 to .85. The internal

consistency for the S-Anxiety subscale for the present study as measured by Cronbach's alpha was .95.

Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale. The Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983) (See Appendix E) was selected as a concurrent measure for the RIDS. The Age Universal Scale is derived from the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) and uses simplified language to measure intrinsic and extrinsic orientation toward religion. The Age Universal Scale consists of 19 items with eight items measuring intrinsic religious orientation and 11 items measuring extrinsic religious orientation. The items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale with (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly disagree).

The Age Universal Scale has demonstrated adequate psychometric properties to support its use in religious identity research. Analyses of the Age Universal Scale for 230 college students revealed alpha coefficients of .75 for the extrinsic subscale and .68 for the intrinsic subscale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983). The correlation between the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales was -.28. These values compare favorably with alpha coefficients on the Allport-Ross scales of .70 for the extrinsic subscale and .73 for the intrinsic subscale.

Evidence of the scale's validity has also been demonstrated. Intrinsic religious orientation almost always correlates positively with measures of mental health, whereas extrinsic religious orientation correlates negatively with mental health measures (Bergin, 1991; Ventis, 1995). Furthermore, from a meta-analysis conducted by Trimble (1996) on 15 studies that included 2,229 participants, intrinsic religious orientation was found to be

correlated with altruism, yielding a mean correlation of .27. Extrinsic religious orientation was found to correlate negatively with altruism (r = -.18), as aggregated from 12 studies with 1,094 participants. The internal consistency for the Intrinsic Scale in the present study as measured by Cronbach's alpha was .88 and for the Extrinsic Scale was .66. The correlation between the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Scales was found to be not significant (r = .09).

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS) (Short Form-C). The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Reynaolds, 1982) (See Appendix F) was utilized to assess if the participants were responding to items in a socially desirable manner to obtain the approval of others.

The full scale consists of 33 items and uses a true/false response format. The SDS has been widely used to measure if participants are responding in a socially desirable manner in studies that utilize self-report measures. Several abbreviated forms of the SDS were shown to have similar levels of reliability as the full scale SDS (Reynolds, 1982). These short forms provide a more efficient method of assessing social desirability by shortening the time it takes to complete the form. Factor analysis with a factor loading criterion of .40 was used to develop these short forms. The scores on these short forms were correlated with the full SDS scale and the Edwards Social Desirability Scale (1957) to determine the convergent validity of these forms. The Short Form-C (Reynolds, 1982), which was found to have the highest correlation (.93) with the full scale SDS, was the short form that was used in this study. To ensure that the scoring format for the SDS was similar to the other measures, the items were assessed using a 5-point Likert scale. Eight of the items were reverse scored, so that a higher score would indicate a higher

level of social desirability. The SDS (Short Form-C) has been found to have an acceptable level of reliability (.76) and is positively correlated with the Edwards Social Desirability Scale (1957; r = .41). The internal consistency for the SDS in the present study as measured using Cronbach's alpha was .67.

Procedure

Scale Development Procedures

In generating items for the Religious Identity Development Scale (V. Suthakaran, 2002), 77 items from the original Religious Identity Scale (RIS; V. Suthakaran &Helms, unpublished manuscript) were used. However, based on the results of the pilot study, which was described in the Measures section, the Acceptance status (status 6) and the Integration status (status 7) were found to have the lowest alpha levels, which indicated low internal consistency. Therefore, to improve the internal consistency of these two statuses, some old items were removed and new items were added.

Additional items were written by the author and revised by a team of two people (the author and a staff psychologist) to reflect the Acceptance and the Integration statuses, based on the theoretical conceptualization of these two statuses in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development. A total of 25 new items, 12 for the Acceptance status and 13 for the Integration status, were written for the present study. These 25 new items together with 22 old items (10 Acceptance items and 12 Integration items) from the RIS, were evaluated for their content validity by two counseling psychologists and two graduate students in counseling psychology. Individuals associated with the field of counseling psychology were used to rate the items, because the RIDS was constructed to be used primarily in counseling research and

practice. Therefore, the items selected for the RIDS were expected to be pertinent to the field of counseling. The four raters, who were familiarized to the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002), assessed clarity in terms of how the items were worded and also determined how well the items represented their respective statuses. Items that reflected at least a 75% agreement (3 of the 4 raters agreed) were retained and changes were made based on feedback received from the raters. A total of 8 old items and 4 new items were discarded, which left a total of 15 items for the Acceptance status and 20 items for the Integration status. The revised Religious Identity Scale (V. Suthakaran & Helms, unpublished manuscript), which is now know as the Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS: V. Suthakaran, 2002) was used in this study and consisted of 90 items: 11 items in Concrete; 10 items in Relational; 11 items in Confusion; 11 items in Cognitive-Rationalization; 12 items in Exploration; 15 items in Acceptance; and 20 items in Integration.

Data Collection Procedures

A majority of the participants for this study were recruited by soliciting for student participation in two introductory classes at a community college. A community college was chosen for data collection, because of the possibility of eliciting participation from a heterogeneous pool of non-traditional students. After seeking the permission of two instructors to recruit students from their classes, research packets were given to the instructors who volunteered to distribute the packets during their class period. The participants received course credit for participation in this research project and it was also an opportunity for them to learn about the research process. The students completed the

questionnaires that were handed to them by their instructor during class and returned the survey packets to their instructor when they were done.

Participants were recruited from a second community college during an orientation session for new students. An assistant dean of the community college was contacted by the researcher and the assistant dean agreed to allow the researcher to distribute the survey packets during the orientation session for new students. The students had the opportunity to fill out the questionnaires while they were waiting to see staff at the admissions office to help them with their registration process. When they had completed the questionnaires, they returned the packets either directly to the researcher or to the front desk at the admissions office. Some of the students had also opted to return the packets to the dean.

To collect data from a more adult population, survey packets were also distributed among staff and graduate students at a University Counseling Center. The Assistant Director of the Counseling Center was contacted by the researcher and he agreed to distribute the survey packets among staff and graduate students. The Assistant Director explained the purpose of the study and handed survey packets to staff and graduate students at the Counseling Center. Staff and graduate students who chose to complete the questionnaires returned the survey packets directly to the Assistant Director who then mailed the packets to the researcher.

Survey packets were also distributed among staff at a United States Post Office. A staff member at the postal office was contacted by a colleague of the researcher to ask for permission to distribute survey packets at the postal office. The colleague explained the purpose of the study to the staff member and she gave the researcher permission as well

as agreed to distribute and collect the survey packets. The staff member distributed the survey packets to all members of the postal office and they were instructed to return the completed survey packets to the staff member. The staff member then handed over the completed survey packets to the colleague who then gave them to the researcher.

Participants who volunteered for this study were asked to read the cover letter which thanked participants for participating in the study and explained that the goal of the study was to better understand identity development (See Appendix G for a copy of the cover letter). The cover letter also asked the participants to read the consent form carefully and to sign it if they agreed to participate in the study (See Appendix H for a copy of the consent form). In addition, the cover letter informed the participants that their responses would be kept confidential and that they were not to write their names on any of the questionnaires. Furthermore, it informed the respondents that they would be given a debriefing statement after they had completed the questionnaires (See Appendix I for a copy of the debriefing statement). The cover letter provided my name and phone number should any participant have future questions about the study.

The participants were then reminded to fill out the informed consent forms indicating that all information about them would be kept confidential and anonymous, and that they could withdraw at any time without penalty. Participants were than given a packet of questionnaires which included a cover letter, a consent form, a demographic form, the Religious Identity Development Scale, the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, the Anxiety subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Scale, the Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale, and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. The order of the

questionnaires in the packets were randomized to prevent any order bias. It should be noted, however, that the cover letter, consent form, and demographic questionnaire was always placed first, second, and third, respectively in the packet. Finally, the participants were instructed to complete all items, enclose the completed instruments in the envelope provided and return it to the person who had distributed the packet to them.

A total of 400 survey packets were distributed and 216 packets were returned for a return rate of 54%. Two surveys had to be discarded because a majority of the items were not completed and four more were not included because they were received after the survey data had been analyzed. A total of 211 completed surveys were eventually used in the data analysis.

Test-Retest Procedures

The participants at the community college in the Midwest who took the test during their class period were given an opportunity to complete the survey packet a second time. The retest procedure was conducted with these participants because of the convenience in distributing the survey packets for a second time, and also because of the possibility of yielding a high return rate of completed questionnaires. As an incentive, the participants were informed by their instructors that they could gain extra research credits by choosing to complete the questionnaires for a second time. A total of 130 survey packets were distributed in two separate classes two weeks after the initial testing. The participants completed the questionnaires in class and returned them to their respective instructors. Of these, 93 completed and returned the survey packet, yielding a return rate of 72%. It was determined that only 65 of the survey packets were usable, as 28 measures were found to be invalid for a variety of reasons: (1) the participants did not

indicate a completion date for the second measure; (2) participants did not put down identifying data (last four numbers of social security number or their initials), which did not allow for the test and retest questionnaires to be matched; (3) evidence of response bias (e.g., responded to all the items in the RIDS with three's); or (3) there was no first measure to compare to the second measure. The results and the demographic data for the test-retest analysis will be provided in chapter 5.

Proposed Analyses

Hypothesis 1: The value of Crronbach's alpha will be above .65 for each of the seven statuses of the RIDS. The internal consistency of each subscale will be evaluated by computing Cronbach's alpha to determine that each subscale (status) has an alpha of .65 or above.

Hypothesis 2: The factors (statuses) will be moderately inter-correlated with a correlation coefficient of less than .50 between any two factors. This hypothesis will be tested by first examining the item-total score correlation of all the items within each of the seven statuses. Items with low correlation with the mean score of all items in a particular status ($r < .50$) will be discarded from future analyses. Next, to reduce the number of items in each of the statuses, seven separate exploratory factor analyses (principal axis) with a Varimax rotation will be conducted on items for each of the seven statuses. Items that load highly on the first factor of the rotated component matrix will be retained to represent the respective status (subscale). However, items will then be further evaluated for inclusion based on the following criteria: (a) factor loadings that exceeded .40 (Floyd & Widaman, 1995); (b) at least three items per factor (Comrey, 1988); (c) elimination of items loading significantly (i.e., .40 and above) on more than one factor;

(d) elimination of items that did not contribute to a significant increase in the α level; and (e) conceptual similarity to other high loading items in a factor. The intent in conducting seven separate factor analyses, one each for the seven statuses, was to reduce the number of items in each of the statuses and to retain the best items for each of the statuses for a final factor analysis with all the items from the seven statuses of the Religious Identity Development Scale. Next, the remaining items from all seven statuses will be subjected to an exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring with direct oblimin oblique rotation. The purpose of this factor analysis will be to identify a seven-factor model that was congruent with the theorized Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002). An a priori criterion extraction method, requesting a seven-factor solution will be used in this analysis, as the model has seven statuses.

Finally, in order to ensure that each of the status is distinct, a correlation matrix will be calculated to examine the correlation between statuses. The correlation between any two statuses will be expected to be less than .50. The low correlation will indicate that the correlation occurred through chance and that each of the statuses is measuring a unique construct.

Hypothesis 3a: Scores in status 1 (Concrete) and status 2 (Relational) will predict scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, 1983) and the scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1960).

Hypothesis 3b: Scores in status 3 (Confusion) will predict scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, 1983), but will not predict scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1960).

Hypothesis 3c: Scores in status 4 (Cognitive-Rationalization) will predict scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1960), but will not predict scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, 1983).

Hypothesis 3d: Scores in status 5 (Exploration), status 6 (Acceptance), and status 7 (Integration) will not predict scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, 1983) and the scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1960).

Hypotheses 3a through 3d will be tested conducting two simultaneous regression analyses, which will be conducted separately to predict anxiety and dogmatism. The predictor variables for these two regression analyses will be the seven statuses of the RIDS.

Hypothesis 4a: Scores on status 1 (Concrete) and status 2 (Relational) of the RIDS will predict the scores on the extrinsic religious orientation subscale of the Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983). This hypothesis will be tested by performing a simultaneous multiple regression analysis with status 1 through 7 as predictor variables for extrinsic religious orientation. Also, the standardized beta weights, the significance levels and the direction of prediction for each predictor variable will be examined to determine the significant predictors of extrinsic religious orientation.

Hypothesis 4b: Scores on status 5 (Exploration) and status 6 (Acceptance), and status 7 (Integration) of the RIDS will predict the scores on the intrinsic religious orientation subscale of the Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983). This hypothesis will be tested by performing a simultaneous multiple regression analysis with status 1 through 7 as predictor variables for intrinsic religious orientation. Also, the standardized beta weights, the significance levels, and direction of prediction

for each predictor variable will be explored to determine the significant predictors of intrinsic religious orientation.

Hypothesis 5: Scores on status 1 through 7 and the total score of the RIDS will not be significantly correlated with the scores on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). This hypothesis will be tested by correlating participants' scores on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Short Form-C) with scores on each of the seven statuses and the total score of the RIDS. Correlations will be calculated to determine the significance of the relationship between the seven statuses and the total score on the RIDS with scores on the social desirability scale at an alpha level of .05.

Chapter five

Results

The purpose of the present study was to construct and empirically validate the Religious Identity Development Scale (V. Suthakaran, 2002). All items for this religious measure were derived theoretically based on a new model of religious identity development that is composed of seven interrelated statuses. Initially, as part of increasing the reliability of this new measure, an item analysis was conducted through item-total score correlation and factor analyses to reduce the number of items in each status.

Item Analyses

Item analyses were conducted on the original 90 items by examining the correlation of each item with the mean score of its representative status. The items with low item-total correlations within each of the seven statuses were deleted as an initial attempt to reduce the length of the measure and also to retain the better items within each of the seven statuses. As suggested by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), an item-total correlation of .30 was appropriate as a criteria for deleting items. However, as most items had high item-total correlations within each of the seven statuses, a more stringent criteria ($r = .50$) was used to delete items from each of the statuses. Analyses of item-total correlations for items in status one (Concrete) resulted in three items being removed. A total of 17 items with item-total correlations ranging from .50 to .75 were retained for further analysis. For the second status (Relational), analyses of item-total correlations resulted in one item being removed, and six items with item-total correlations ranging from .55 to .66 being retained. One item was removed from the third status (Confusion),

which resulted in ten items with item-correlations ranging from .52 to .80 being retained. Item-total correlations for the fourth status (Cognitive-Rationalization) indicated that one item had to be deleted, which resulted in 11 items with item-total correlations ranging from .61 to .78 being retained. Analyses of item-total correlation for the fifth status (Exploration) resulted in two items being deleted, and ten items with an item-total correlations ranging form .51 to .65 being retained. For the sixth status (Acceptance), analyses of item-total correlations indicated that 10 items had to be deleted, which resulted in 8 items with item-total correlations ranging from .51 to .67 being retained for further analysis. The item-total correlations for the seventh status (Integration) were generally lower than for the other statuses. Lower item-total correlations were expected, as the Integration status is the most abstract of all the statuses, and thus, more difficult to quantify. As a result, the criterion for item deletion was lowered for this status from an item-total correlation of .50 to .40. Only one item (r = .29) was deleted from this status, which resulted in nine items ranging in item-total correlations from .41 to .55 being retained. As a result of the item-total correlation analyses, the total number of items was reduced from 90 to 71. To further reduce the number of items, exploratory factor analyses were conducted for each of the seven statuses.

Exploratory Factor Analyses

As suggested by Clark and Watson (1995), factor analysis is merely a tool that provides information, not answers or solutions. As this was a preliminary exploratory investigation of a new instrument, the main purpose of utilizing factor analysis in this study was to inform the author of the types of items that loaded onto each of the seven statuses, so that better items could be added in future studies. Moreover, Stevens (1996)

said that as a general rule, one has to aim to have at least five cases per variable (item) for a factor analysis, although the more acceptable range is ten to one. He warned that a low ratio of cases to variables (items) could contribute to "overfitting" the data and to lack of generalizability. Stevens suggested that to increase the ratio of cases to variables (items), the researcher could select the most parsimonious set of variables (items), by employing conceptual and practical considerations. Therefore, separate factor analyses were conducted to select the most representative items, statistically and conceptually, from each of the seven statuses to increase the cases-per-item ratio.

Seven separate exploratory principal-axis factor analyses, with an orthogonal Varimax rotation and a Kaiser-Guttman criterion of eigenvalue greater than 1.00 were used to further reduce items in each of the seven statuses. Five criteria were used to allow for the selection of items from the first factor (factor with the highest variance) to represent a particular status (subscale): (a) factor loadings that exceeded .40 (Floyd & Widaman, 1995); (b) at least three items per factor (Comrey, 1988); (c) elimination of items loading significantly (i.e., .40 and above) on more than one factor; (d) elimination of items that did not contribute to a significant increase in the α level; and (e) conceptual similarity to other high loading items in a factor. Results of factor analyses for each of the statuses are provided next.

Factor analysis of the Concrete status

The principal-axis factor analysis yielded a Meyer-Olkin Index of .92, indicating that the 17 items were sufficiently correlated to justify a factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996, suggested that the index should be greater than .60). The factor analysis revealed four factors with eigenvalues > 1.0 (7.00, 1.30, 1.07, 1.02), accounting for 61%

of the variance (See Table 6). Because factor one had the highest eigenvalue = 7.00, which accounted for 41% of the variance, four items that met the criteria for retention in this factor were selected to represent the Concrete status. An additional fifth item, (item 57) that had a factor loading of >.40 on two factors, which violated the retention criteria, was included with the other four items, as it had the second highest loading for factor one (.62) and its loading on the second factor was relatively low (.41). Furthermore, inclusion of this item increased the coefficient α for the Concrete status from .73 to .80. Thus, a total of five items were selected to represent the Concrete status.

Table 6

Factor Loadings for Principal-Axis factor Analysis of the Concrete status

Items	Factors			
	1	2	3	4
RELID1	.39	.50	.42	.20
RELID8	.28	.54	.36	-.04
RELID15	**.64**	.33	.20	.04
RELID22	**.55**	.10	.27	.22
RELID36	.55	.50	.24	.05
RELID37	**.62**	.28	.18	.16
RELID43	.23	.31	.36	.01
RELID50	.14	.49	.52	.15
RELID57	**.62**	.41	.23	.11
RELID63	.35	.60	.10	.35
RELID64	.32	.55	.22	.06
RELID71	.13	.22	.74	.15
RELID76	**.42**	.29	.55	.22
RELID80	.57	.33	.01	.46
RELID81	.17	.10	.19	.70
RELID83	.22	.47	.29	.13
RELID86	.20	.51	.11	.32

Note. N=211. Data in bold represent the items that were selected to represent the Concrete status.

Factor analysis of the Relational status

The principal-axis factor analysis yielded a Meyer-Olkin Index of .78, indicating that the six items were sufficiently correlated to justify a factor analysis. The factor analysis revealed one factor with eigenvalue > 1.0 (2.46), accounting for 41% of the variance (See Table 7). Because all the items loaded onto one factor, five items that met the criteria for retention in this factor were selected to represent the Relational status. A sixth item (item 16), which met the criteria for retention, was not included with the other items, as it had a factor loading (.43) that was relatively lower than the other items. Furthermore, inclusion of this item did not evidence much improvement in the internal consistency of the factor, as there was only a minimal increase in the α coefficient (from .70 to .71). Thus, five items were selected to represent the Relational status.

Table 7

Factor Loadings for Principal-Axis factor Analysis of the Relational status

Items	Factor
	1
RELID2	**.54**
RELID16	.43
RELID30	**.60**
RELID44	**.59**
RELID51	**.58**
RELID58	**.50**

Note. N=211. Data in bold represent the items that were selected to represent the Relational status.

Factor analysis of the Confusion status

The principal-axis factor analysis yielded a Meyer-Olkin Index of .87, indicating that the 10 items were sufficiently correlated to justify a factor analysis. The factor analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues > 1.0 (4.38, 1.27), accounting for 57% of the variance (See Table 8). Because factor one had the highest eigenvalue = 4.38, which accounted for 44% of the variance, three items that met the criteria for retention in this factor were selected to represent the Confusion status. An additional fourth item, (item 52) that had a factor loading of >.40 on two factors, which violated the retention criteria, was included with the other three items, as it had the third highest loading for factor one (.64) and the inclusion of this item increased the coefficient α for the Confusion status from .67 to .75. Thus, four items were retained to represent the Confusion status.

Table 8

Factor Loadings for Principal-Axis factor Analysis of the Confusion status

Items	Factors	
	1	2
RELID3	.55	.50
RELID10	.54	.46
RELID24	.03	.61
RELID31	.22	.71
RELID38	**.72**	.09
RELID45	.36	.27
RELID52	**.64**	.49
RELID59	**.40**	.39
RELID66	**.67**	.08
RELID77	.28	.65

Note. N=211. Data in bold represent the items that were selected to represent the Concrete status.

Factor analysis of the Cognitive-rationalization status

The principal-axis factor analysis yielded a Meyer-Olkin Index of .93, indicating that the 11 items were sufficiently correlated to justify a factor analysis. The factor analysis revealed one factor with eigenvalue > 1.0 (5.614), accounting for 51% of the variance (See Table 9). All 11 items met the criteria for retention, but only the items with factor loadings > .70 were selected to represent the Cognitive-Rationalization status. The decision was made to retain five items with factor loadings >.70, as the main purpose of conducting the seven separate factor analyses was to reduce the number of items in each status. Thus, five items were selected to represent the Cognitive-Rationalization status.

Table 9

Factor Loadings for Principal-Axis factor Analysis of the Cognitive-Rationalization status

Items	Factor
	1
RELID5	.60
RELID12	.57
RELID17	.60
RELID19	.77
RELID26	.77
RELID33	.65
RELID47	.65
RELID54	.57
RELID61	.77
RELID68	**.78**
RELID72	**.70**

Note. N=211. Data in bold represent the items that were selected to represent the Concrete status.

Factor analysis of the Exploration status

The principal-axis factor analysis yielded a Meyer-Olkin Index of .81, indicating that the 10 items were sufficiently correlated to justify a factor analysis. The factor analysis revealed three factors with eigenvalues > 1.0 (3.42, 1.35, 1.15), accounting for 59% of the variance (See Table 10). Because factor one had the highest eigenvalue = 3.42, which accounted for 34% of the variance, three items that met the criteria for retention in this factor were selected to represent the Exploration status. An additional fourth item, (item 67) that had a factor loading of >.40 on two factors, which violated the retention criteria, was included with the other three items, as it had a relatively high factor loading (.45) compared to the other items in the factor and the inclusion of this item increased the coefficient α for the Exploration status from .61 to .67. Thus, four items were selected to represent the Exploration status.

Table 10

Factor Loadings for Principal-Axis factor Analysis of the Exploration status

Items	Factors		
	1	2	3
RELID4	.09	.72	.11
RELID11	.40	.20	.48
RELID25	.38	.51	-.01
RELID32	**.63**	-.03	.21
RELID39	**.51**	.20	.32
RELID53	.03	.51	.22
RELID62	**.52**	.19	.07
RELID67	**.45**	.44	.13
RELID73	.04	.24	.68
RELID75	.31	.01	.59

Note. N=211. Data in bold represent the items that were selected to represent the Exploration status.

Factor analysis of the Acceptance status

The principal-axis factor analysis yielded a Meyer-Olkin Index of .82, indicating that the eight items were sufficiently correlated to justify a factor analysis. The factor analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues > 1.0 (3.31, 1.16), accounting for 56% of the variance (See Table 11). Because factor one had the highest eigenvalue = 3.31, which accounted for 41% of the variance, five items that met the criteria for retention in this factor were selected to represent the Acceptance status.

Table 11

Factor Loadings for Principal-Axis factor Analysis of the Acceptance status

Items	Factors	
	1	2
RELID6	**.59**	.19
RELID20	.21	.60
RELID27	.19	.78
RELID56	**.46**	.20
RELID78	.32	.60
RELID79	**.53**	.25
RELID82	**.59**	.13
RELID85	**.69**	.24

Note. N=211. Data in bold represent the items that were selected to represent the Acceptance status.

Factor analysis of the Integration status

The principal-axis factor analysis yielded a Meyer-Olkin Index of .68, indicating that the nine items were sufficiently correlated to justify a factor analysis. The factor analysis revealed three factors with eigenvalues > 1.0 (2.33, 1.34, 1.06), accounting for 52% of the variance (See Table 12). Because factor one had the highest eigenvalue = 2.33, which accounted for 26% of the variance, three items that met the criteria for retention in this factor were selected to represent the Integration status.

Table 12

Factor Loadings for Principal-Axis factor Analysis of the Integration status

Items	Factors		
	1	2	3
RELID7	.09	.07	.62
RELID21	-.04	.41	.30
RELID28	.22	.66	.12
RELID35	.36	.35	.05
RELID42	.36	.06	.10
RELID49	**.50**	.14	.21
RELID87	.10	.13	.32
RELID88	**.67**	-.01	.13
RELID89	**.47**	.20	-.21

Note. N=211. Data in bold represent the items that were selected to represent the Integration status.

Factor Analysis of the Religious Identity Development Scale

Analyses of item-total correlations and factor analyses, yielded 31 items that were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring with direct oblimin oblique rotation. The cases-per-item ratio was significantly increased (7 to 1) as a result of selecting a parsimonious set of items for a final factor analysis with all the items. The purpose of this factor analysis was to identify a seven-factor solution that was congruent with the theorized Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development (V. Suthakaran, 2002). An a priori criterion extraction method, requesting a seven-factor solution was used in this analysis, as the theoretical model has seven statuses. As an additional benefit of conducting the initial seven factor analyses, the parsimonious set of items with items loading highly on at least one of the statuses, improved the chances of extracting a seven-factor solution. The principal-axis factor analysis yielded a Meyer-Olkin Index of .84, indicating that the 31 items were sufficiently correlated to justify a factor analysis. A seven-factor solution was obtained that accounted for 62% of the variance, with factor one accounting for the largest proportion of the variance (22%). The seven-factor solution was found to be not statistically or conceptually sound. From a conceptual or theoretical perspective, the negative valence for the items with the highest factor loadings in factors one, six and seven indicated that the seven-factor solution did not maintain the theoretical integrity of the religious identity model, as the factor loadings for all the representative items were expected to be positive. The seven-factor solution was also not statistically sound, as factor six only had two items with significant loadings. In order to maintain the conceptual and statistical integrity of this model, the three items from the Integration

status were deleted from the analysis, because the only status that failed to emerge in the seven-factor solution was the Integration status (status 7). To find a cleaner factor structure, a six-factor solution was extracted, after deleting the three items that represented the Integration status.

The principal-axis factor analysis yielded a Meyer-Olkin Index of .84, indicating that the 28 items were sufficiently correlated to justify a factor analysis. The cases-to-item ratio in this analysis was eight to one, which was in the more acceptable range. An a priori criterion extraction method, requesting a six-factor solution was used in this analysis, as the three items from the Integration status were deleted from the factor analysis. Thus, the religious identity model is being assessed as a six-status model, without the inclusion of the Integration status, in this analysis. The six-factor solution accounted for 60% of the variance (See Table 13). The six factors that emerged had at least three items loading onto each factor, and the valence of the highest factor loadings for each of the factors were positive. All of the items loaded as predicted onto their respective factors (statuses), except for two items (item 58, item 66), which did not load as predicted. Three other items, (item 6, item 30, item 37), did not load onto any factors. The six-factor solution was not only statistically sound, but also maintained the theoretical integrity of a six-status model better than the seven-factor solution maintained the theoretical integrity of a seven-status model. Therefore, on the basis of the interpretability of the factor-solutions, the six-factor solution was deemed more appropriate.

Factor one had an eigenvalue of 6.53, which accounted for 23% of the variance. Examination of the items indicated that six items met the retention criteria and except for

one item (item 66), they were clearly items that belonged in the Cognitive-Rationalization status (status 4). Item 66 was found to be not conceptually similar to the other items and thus, only five items were assigned to this factor. Factor two had an eigenvalue of 3.2, which accounted for 11% of the variance. Examination of the items indicated that four items met the retention criteria and that they belonged in the Acceptance status (status 6). Factor three had an eigenvalue of 2.48, which accounted for 9% of the variance. Examination of the items indicated that five items met the retention criteria, and except for one item (item 58), they clearly belonged in the Concrete status (status 1). Item 58 was found to be not conceptually similar to the other items and thus, only four items were assigned to this factor. Factor four had an eigenvalue of 2.00, which accounted for 7% of the variance. Examination of the items indicated that three items met the retention criteria and that they belonged in the Relational status (status 2). Factor five had an eigenvalue of 1.58, which accounted for 6% of the variance. Examination of the items indicated that three items met the retention criteria and that the items belonged in the Confusion status (status 5). Factor six had an eigenvalue of 1.02, which accounted for 4% of the variance. Examination of the items indicated that four items met the retention criteria and that they belonged in the Exploration status (status 5).

Table 13

Factor Loadings for Principal-Axis factor Analysis of the Religious Identity Development Scale

Items	Factors					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
RELID15	-.13	-.27	**.55**	.11	-.02	.16
RELID22	-.04	.08	**.61**	.07	-.13	.01
RELID37*	-.10	-.33	.32	.34	-.17	.33
RELID57	-.09	-.23	**.59**	.10	-.04	.12
RELID76	.07	-.04	**.63**	-.06	.06	.02
RELID2	-.05	.03	-.06	**.67**	.01	-.05
RELID30*	-.32	-.02	.22	.33	-.09	-.19
RELID44	.08	.12	.20	**.48**	.13	-.18
RELID51	-.08	-.06	.27	**.44**	-.02	.11
RELID58**	-.01	.12	.58	.14	-.04	-.07
RELID19	**.81**	.13	.13	.05	-.04	-.00
RELID26	**.85**	.05	.02	.07	-.11	-.05
RELID61	**.74**	.02	.01	-.06	.08	-.13
RELID68	**.82**	-.20	-.09	-.05	-.02	.18
RELID72	**.60**	-.09	-.08	-.09	.23	.04
RELID32	.14	.18	-.01	-.09	-.09	**.48**
RELID39	-.04	.02	.03	.03	-.02	**.60**
RELID62	.04	.06	-.00	-.10	-.03	**.60**

Table 13: continued

Factor Loadings for Principal-Axis factor Analysis of the Religious Identity Development Scale

Items	Factors					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
RELID67	-.09	.18	.24	-.04	.22	**.47**
RELID6*	-.01	.32	-.33	.29	.06	.36
RELID56	.18	**.40**	-.02	.01	.07	.19
RELID79	-.17	**.60**	.06	-.13	.04	.14
RELID82	.06	**.56**	-.03	.20	-.04	-.11
RELID85	.07	**.59**	-.14	.08	-.00	.18
RELID38	.32	.05	-.08	-.09	**.52**	-.22
RELID52	.08	.09	.14	-.01	**.75**	-.04
RELID59	-.12	-.08	-.09	.11	**.67**	.04
RELID66**	.46	-.01	-.19	-.08	.38	.14

Note. N=211. Data in bold represent the items that had significant loadings on a factor and was also conceptually meaningful.

* Item did not load onto any factor

** Item was not conceptually similar to the other items

Internal consistency and Intercorrelation among Statuses

The internal consistency of the six statuses was examined by calculating the Cronbach's α for each of the statuses. Cronbach's α for the six statuses of the Religious Identity Development Scale are presented in Table 14. In order to determine that the six statuses were distinct from each other, the intercorrelations among the six statuses were examined through a Pearson correlation. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 15.

Table 14

Cronbach's α for the six statuses of the RIDS

Status	α
Concrete	.76
Relational	.60
Confusion	.70
Cognitive-Rationalization	.87
Exploration	.67
Acceptance	.68

Note. N = 211

Hypothesis 1: The hypothesis that the value of Cronbach's α will be above .65 for each of the statuses of the Religious Identity development Scale was supported, except for the Relational status (α = .60). Cronbach's α for the six statuses ranged from .60 to .87

Hypothesis 2: The hypothesis that the statuses will be moderately intercorrelated with a correlation coefficient of less than .50 between any two statuses was supported. The correlation between statuses ranged from -.04 to .41.

Convergent and Discriminant Validity

To determine the convergent and discriminant validity for the 23-item Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS), analyses in the form of two separate simultaneous multiple regressions were conducted to explore the relationship of religious identity development with anxiety and dogmatism. Parham and Helms (1981) suggested that we have to be careful not to ignore the variance associated with the different types of attitudes (religious identities) that an individual might hold simultaneously. They further proposed that an efficient use of "religious" attitudes might be to consider them as different types of attitudes that an individual might possess simultaneously. Therefore, what differentiates individuals in their "religious attitude" is the strength of each type of "religious attitude" within them. Parham and Helms (1981) recommended the use of regression models in which each type of attitude is taken into account for each individual to investigate the relationship between attitudes (e.g., religious identity statuses) and other personality variables. Taking this suggestion into account, the results from the regression analyses, which took the variance of all six statuses into account in predicting for dogmatism and anxiety, provided a more sensitive method for verifying the

hypotheses than bivariate correlational analyses. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are shown in Table 15. Results of the simultaneous regression between the six statuses of the RIDS as the predictor variables and anxiety as the criterion variable showed that a significant relationship existed between religious identity development and anxiety, $F(6, 204) = 3.48$, $p<.01$, $R = .31$, and $R^2 = .10$, as presented in Table 16. The results of the simultaneous regression between the six statuses of the RIDS as the predictor variables and dogmatism as the criterion variable showed that a significant relationship existed between religious identity development and extrinsic religious orientation, $F(6, 204) = 10.26$, $p<.001$, $R = .48$, and $R^2 = .23$, as presented in Table 17.

Hypothesis 3a: The hypothesis that the scores on the Concrete and Relational statuses will predict scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism scale and on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale was partially supported. The simultaneous multiple regression analyses with dogmatism as the criterion variable and the six statuses of the RIDS as the predictor variables showed that the Concrete ($\beta = .34$, $t(1, 204) = 4.68$, $p < .001$) and the Relational ($\beta = .18$, $t(1, 204) = 2.70$, $p < .01$) status significantly predicted scores on dogmatism. However, results from the simultaneous multiple regression analysis with anxiety as the criterion variable and the six statuses of the Religious Identity Development model as the predictor variables showed that the Concrete ($\beta = -.08$, $t(1, 204) = -1.03$, $p = .30$) and Relational ($\beta = .10$, $t(1, 204) = 1.36$, $p = .18$) statuses did not predict scores on anxiety.

Hypothesis 3b: The hypothesis that the scores on the Confusion status will not predict scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism scale, but will predict scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale was supported. Simultaneous multiple regression analyses with

dogmatism as the criterion variable and the six statuses of the RIDS as the predictor variables showed that the Confusion status, $\beta = .10$, $t(1, 204) = 1.53$, $p = .13$, did not predict scores on dogmatism. However, simultaneous multiple regression analysis with anxiety as the criterion variable and the six statuses of the Religious Identity Development Model as the predictor variables showed that the Confusion status $\beta = .27$, $t(1, 204) = 3.62$, $p < .00$, significantly predicted scores on anxiety.

Hypothesis 3c: The hypothesis that the scores on the Cognitive-Rationalization status will predict scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism scale, but will not predict scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale was supported. Simultaneous multiple regression analyses with dogmatism as the criterion variable and the six statuses of the RIDS as the predictor variables showed that the Cognitive-Rationalization status, $\beta = .26$, $t(1, 204) = 3.73$, $p < .01$, significantly predicted scores on dogmatism. Simultaneous multiple regression analysis with anxiety as the criterion variable and the six statuses of the RIDS as the predictor variables showed that the Cognitive-Rationalization status, $\beta = -.15$, $t(1, 204) = -1.99$, $p < .05$, did predict scores on anxiety. However, the negative beta weight indicated that the Cognitive-Rationalization status was negatively correlated with anxiety, which is consistent with the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3d: As the Integration status (status 7) was not included in the analysis of this hypothesis, the relationship of the Integration status with anxiety and dogmatism will not be reported here. The hypothesis that the scores on the Exploration and Acceptance statuses will not predict scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism scale and on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale was supported. Simultaneous multiple regression analysis with dogmatism as the criterion variable and the six statuses of the RIDS as the predictor

variables showed that the Exploration status ($\beta = -.08$, $t(1, 204) = -1.15$, $p = .25$) did not predict scores on dogmatism. The Acceptance status ($\beta = -.15$, $t(1, 204) = -2.03$, $p < .05$) significantly predicted scores on dogmatism, but the negative beta weight indicated that the Acceptance status and dogmatism were negatively correlated, which is consistent with the hypothesis. The simultaneous multiple regression analysis with anxiety as the criterion variable and the six statuses of the Religious Identity Development model as the predictor variables showed that the Exploration status ($\beta = .07$, $t(1, 204) = .91$, $p = .37$) did not predict scores on anxiety. The Acceptance status ($\beta = -.20$, $t(1, 204) = -2.50$, $p < .01$) significantly predicted scores on anxiety, but the negative beta weights indicated that the Acceptance status was negatively correlated with anxiety, which is consistent with the hypothesis.

Table 15

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of RIDS subscales with Anxiety and Dogmatism

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	M	SD
1. Concrete	-						2.60	.83
2. Relational	.36*	-					2.35	.77
3. Confusion	-.25*	-.07	-				2.75	.89
4. Cognitive	-.32*	-.24*	.37*	-			2.10	.84
5. Exploration	.06	-.05	-.03	.04	-		3.03	.76
6. Acceptance	-.24*	.04	.16	.16	.41*	-	2.53	.73
7. Anxiety	-.01	.08	.19**	-.07	-.04	-.13*	2.80	.76
8. Dogmatism	.33**	.24**	.08	.12	-.12	-.19**	2.77	.40

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$

Note. N = 211

Table 16

Simultaneous Regression Analysis of religious Identity Development Statuses and Anxiety

Variable	B	SE B	β	t	p
Concrete	-1.48	1.43	-.08	-1.03	.30
Relational	2.00	1.47	.10	1.36	.18
Confusion	4.51	1.25	.27	3.62	.00
Cognitive	-2.72	1.37	-.15	-1.99	.05
Exploration	1.37	1.51	.07	.91	.37
Acceptance	-4.11	1.64	-.20	-2.50	.01

$R = .31, R^2 = .09, p < .01$

Note. N = 211

Table 17

Simultaneous Regression Analysis of Religious Identity Development Statuses and Dogmatism

Variable	B	SE B	β	t	p
Concrete	6.50	1.39	.34	4.68	.00
Relational	3.83	1.42	.18	2.70	.01
Confusion	1.85	1.21	.10	1.53	.13
Cognitive	4.95	1.33	.26	3.73	.00
Exploration	-1.68	1.47	-.08	-1.15	.25
Acceptance	-3.23	1.59	-.15	-2.03	.04

$R = .49$, $R^2 = .23$, $p < .001$,

Note. N = 211

Concurrent Validity

Hypothesis 4a: The predictor variables for the first analysis were the six statuses of the RIDS and the criterion variable was extrinsic religious orientation. As shown in Table 18, a significant relationship existed between religious identity development and extrinsic religious orientation, $F(6, 204) = 13.06$, $p<.001$, $R = .53$, and $R^2 = .30$. Examination of beta weights indicated that the hypothesis was partially supported in that the Relational status, $\beta = .37$, $t(1, 204) = 5.58$, $p < .001$ yielded significant beta weights in predicting extrinsic religious orientation among the six statuses. The Confusion, $\beta = .30$, $t(1, 204) = 4.61$, $p < .001$, and Acceptance, $\beta = .19$, $t(1, 204) = 2.78$, $p < .01$, statuses also predicted extrinsic religious orientation. However, the Concrete status, $\beta = -.03$, $t(1,204) = -.48$, $p = .63$, did not support the hypothesis that it will also predict extrinsic religious orientation. Zero order correlations between the six statuses and extrinsic religious orientation are shown in Table 19.

Table 18

Simultaneous Regression Analysis of religious Identity Development Statuses and Extrinsic Religious Orientation

Variable	B	SE B	β	t	p
Concrete	-.02	.04	-.03	-.48	.63
Relational	.25	.04	.37	5.58	.00
Confusion	-.17	.04	.30	4.61	.00
Cognitive-Rationalization	.04	.04	-.07	-.98	.33
Exploration	.03	.05	.05	.74	.46
Acceptance	.14	.05	.19	2.78	.01

$R = .53$, $R^2 = .28$, $p < .001$

Note. N = 211

Hypothesis 4b: The predictor variables for the second analysis were the six statuses of the RIDS and the criterion variable was intrinsic religious orientation. As shown in Table 19, a significant relationship existed between religious identity development and intrinsic religious orientation, $F(6, 204) = 67.03$, $p<.001$, $R = .82$, and $R^2 = .66$. Examination of beta weights indicated that the hypothesis was partially supported in that the Exploration status, $\beta = .171$, $t(1, 204) = 3.73$, $p < .001$ yielded significant beta weights in predicting intrinsic religious orientation among the six statuses. The Confusion, $\beta = -.28$, $t(1, 204) = -6.17$, $p < .001$, and Cognitive-Rationalization, $\beta = -.36$, $t(1,204)$, $p <.001$, statuses also predicted intrinsic religious orientation, but the negative valence of the beta weights indicated that the two statuses were negatively correlated with intrinsic religious orientation, which was consistent with the hypothesis. The Concrete, $\beta = .39$, $t(1, 204) = 8.21$, $p < .001$, and Relational, $\beta = .11$, $t(1, 204) = 2.32$, $p < .05$ statuses also predicted intrinsic religious orientation, however, this was found to be inconsistent with the hypothesis. Finally, the results did not support the hypothesis that the Acceptance status, $\beta = -.06$, $t(1,204) = 1.23$, $p =.22$ will also predict for intrinsic religious orientation. Zero order correlations between the six statuses and intrinsic religious orientation are shown in Table 20.

Table 19

Simultaneous Regression Analysis of religious Identity Development Statuses and Intrinsic Religious Orientation

Variable	B	SE B	β	t	p
Concrete	.40	.05	.39	8.21	.00
Relational	.12	.05	.11	2.32	.02
Confusion	-.26	.04	-.28	-6.17	.00
Cognitive-Rationalization	-.40	.05	-.36	-7.89	.00
Exploration	.19	.05	.17	3.73	.00
Acceptance	.07	.06	.06	1.23	.22

$R = .82$, $R^2 = .66$, $p < .001$

Note. N = 211

Table 20

Intercorrelations Between Religious Identity Statuses and Religious Orientation Scale

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	M	SD
1. Concrete	-						2.60	.83
2. Relational	.36**	-					2.35	.77
3. Confusion	-.25**	-.07	-				2.75	.89
4. Cognitive	-.32**	-.24**	.38**	-			2.10	.84
5. Exploration	.06	-.05	-.03	.04	-		3.03	.76
6. Acceptance	-.24**	.04	.16*	.16*	.41**	-	2.53	.73
7. Extrinsic	.00	.36**	.29**	.00	.10	.28**	2.58	.51
8. Intrinsic	.61**	.35**	-.51**	-.60**	.21**	-.06	3.17	.85

* $p < .05$ **$p < .01$

Note. N = 211

Additional analysis

Additional analysis was conducted to verify the proposed relationships between the statuses of the RIDS and religious orientation conceptualized two-dimensionally. The results from the proposed regression analyses using a unidimensional conceptualization of religious orientation did not produce conclusive results. By utilizing a unidimensional conceptualization of the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations, it was implied that the extrinsic and intrinsic orientations are orthogonal variables within an individual. However, by conceptualizing religious orientation two-dimensionally, the underlying assumption is that both the intrinsic and extrinsic orientations are correlated in varying degrees among different individuals. The implication is that an individual has to be evaluated for his or her religious orientation with the assumption that he or she has both an intrinsic religious orientation and an extrinsic religious orientation. Differences between individuals is determined by evaluating if they subscribe equally high or low to both the orientations, or if they subscribe significantly higher to one orientation than the other. Therefore, a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted with religious orientation, conceptualized two-dimensionally (low intrinsic/low extrinsic, high intrinsic/high extrinsic, low intrinsic/high extrinsic, high intrinsic/low extrinsic) as the independent variable and the six statuses of the RIDS as the dependent variables.

The sample for this analysis was selected among those with extreme scores on both the intrinsic and extrinsic scales to form four experimental groups: low intrinsic/low extrinsic, high intrinsic/high extrinsic, low intrinsic/high extrinsic, high intrinsic/low extrinsic. Participants with scores in the upper third of the intrinsic and extrinsic scales were designated as high intrinsic and high extrinsic, respectively. Participants with scores

in the lower third of the intrinsic and extrinsic scales were designated as low intrinsic and low extrinsic, respectively. The cut-off scores for the high intrinsic and the low intrinsic were above 29 and below 22, respectively. The cut-off score for the high extrinsic and the low extrinsic were above 31 and below 26, respectively. A total of 87 participants were selected for this analysis with 24 in the low intrinsic/low extrinsic, 18 in the high intrinsic/high extrinsic, 19 in the low intrinsic/high extrinsic, and 26 in the high intrinsic/low extrinsic.

A significant multivariate main effect was yielded for religious orientation, Wilks' $\lambda = .17$, $F(6, 78) = 10.53$, $p < .001$. Table 21 presents the means and standard deviations on the six religious identity statues within each religious orientation group. Inspection of univariate effects indicated that five of the six statuses were significantly effected by religious orientation: Concrete, $F(3, 83) = 28.77$, $p < .001$; Relational, $F(3, 83) = 13.29$, $p < .001$; Confusion, $F(3,83) = 18.47$, $p < .001$; Cognitive-Rationalization, $F(3,83) = 18.64$, $p < .001$; and Acceptance, $F(3, 83) = 3.41$, $p < .05$.

Examination of univariate tests' mean scores indicated that for the Concrete status, individuals who were in the high intrinsic/low extrinsic group ($M = 3.50$, $SD = .80$) had significantly higher mean scores than the low intrinsic/low extrinsic group ($M = 1.88$, $SD = .76$), the high intrinsic/high extrinsic group ($M = 2.97$, $SD = .55$), and the low intrinsic/high extrinsic group ($M = 2.26$, $SD = .35$). For the Relational status, individuals in the high intrinsic/high extrinsic group ($M = 3.04$, $SD = .64$) had significantly higher mean scores than the low intrinsic/low extrinsic group ($M = 1.65$, $SD = .63$), the low intrinsic/high extrinsic group ($M = 2.26$, $SD = .73$), and the high intrinsic/low extrinsic group ($M = 2.26$, $SD = .78$). In terms of the Confusion status,

individuals in the low intrinsic/high extrinsic group (M = 3.57, SD = .89) had significantly higher mean scores than the low intrinsic/low extrinsic group (M = 3.04, SD = .70), the high intrinsic/high extrinsic group (M = 2.43, SD = .90), and the high intrinsic/low extrinsic group (M = 1.87, SD = .79). For the Cognitive-Rationalization status, individuals in the low intrinsic/low extrinsic group (M = 2.87, SD = .97) had significantly higher means than the high intrinsic/high extrinsic group (M = 1.88, SD = .51), the low intrinsic/high extrinsic group (M = 2.45, SD = .57) and the high intrinsic/low extrinsic group (M = 1.35, SD = .78). For the Acceptance status, individuals who were in the high intrinsic/high extrinsic group (M = 2.78, SD = .66) had significantly higher mean scores than the high intrinsic/low extrinsic group (M = 2.10, SD = .80), but their scores were not significantly different than the low intrinsic/low extrinsic group (M = 2.58, SD = .85), and the low intrinsic/high extrinsic group (M = 2.10, SD = .55).

Table 21

Means and Standard Deviations of Religious Identity Statuses Within Each Religious Orientation Group

	Religious Orientation							
	Low I/Low E		High I/High E		Low I/High E		High I/Low E	
Religious Identity	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Concrete	1.88	.76	2.97	.55	2.26	.35	3.50	.80
Relational	1.65	.63	3.04	.64	2.26	.73	2.26	.78
Confusion	3.04	.70	2.43	.90	3.58	.89	1.87	.79
Cognitive	2.87	.97	1.88	.51	2.45	.57	1.45	.78
Explore	2.91	1.09	3.36	.68	2.66	.54	2.96	.80
Acceptance	2.58	.85	2.78	.66	2.47	.55	2.10	.80

Note. N = 87. I = Intrinsic, E = Extrinsic

Construct-Irrelevant Test variance

Validity for the RIDS was also determined by examining the construct-irrelevant test variance. This was assessed by correlating the total score from the Religious Identity Development Scale with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Reynolds, 1982). Intercorrelations between the RIDS statuses and the Marlowe-Crowne are shown in Table 22.

Hypothesis 5: Theoretically, the Religious Identity Development Scale should not be significantly correlated to the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Hypothesis five was partially supported, as the total score for the RIDS ($r = -.10$, $p > .05$) was not significantly correlated with social desirability, but significant negative correlations were found between the Confusion ($r = .23$, $p < .01$) and Cognitive-Rationalization ($r = .14$, $p < .05$) statuses with social desirability.

Table 22

Pearson Correlation Coefficients between the RIDS an its subscales with Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale.

Variable	Marlowe-Crowne
Concrete	.02
Relational	.01
Confusion	-.23**
Cognitive	-.14*
Exploration	.04
Acceptance	.08
RIDS (Total score)	-.10

*p < .05 **p < .01

Note. N = 211

Test-Retest Reliability

The stability of the RIDS was investigated over a two week period. The stability of the RIDS is another test of construct validity (Messick, 1989). Data from sixty-five retest packets were used in the analysis. Of the 65 participants who completed the survey, 34 (52.3%) were female and 31 (47.7%) were male. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 40 with a mean age of 21.6 (SD = 4.14). The majority of the participants were White or European American (90.7%, n = 59), followed by Black or African American (3.1%, n = 2), Hispanic American/Latino/Latina (3.1%, n = 2), and other (3.1%, n = 2).

Most of the participants were Christians (80%, n = 52), followed by atheists and agnostics (13.8%, n = 9) and Jewish (1.5%, n = 1). Among the Christians, 16 (24.6%) were Catholics, and 21 (32.3%) were Protestants. Thirty-seven (56.9%) participants did not specify whether they were Catholics or Protestants. Christianity was reported as the most common religion within their community by 54 (83.1%) the participants. The rest of the participants (16.9%, n =11) did not respond to this item. Among the Christians, 26 (40.0%) reported Catholicism as the most common religion within their community and 11 (16.9%) reported Protestantism as the most common religion. Twenty-eight (43.1%) participants did not respond to this item. Many of the participants (30.8%, n = 20) reported religion as being important to them, followed by ten (15.4%) participants who reported that their religion was very important to them. In contrast, eight (12.3%) participants reported that religion was not important to them and another eight (12.3%) reported that religion was not very important to them. Sixteen (24.6%) participants responded neutral to the item and three (4.6%) did not respond to the item. Most of the

participants reported not having attended any kind of religious school (70.8%, n = 46) and 19 (29.2%) reported having attended some kind of religious school.

The largest group of participants reported an income of less than $10,000 (35.4%, n = 23). This was followed by those reporting an income of $10,001 to $20,000 (32.3%, n = 21), $20,001 to $30,000 (6.2%, n = 4), $30,001 to $40,000 (3.1%, n = 2), $40,001 to $50,000 (1.5%, n = 1), and $50,001 to $60,000 (1.5%, n = 1). Thirteen participants (20.0%) did not report their income. In terms of their parents' income, some of them (21%, n = 32.3) chose not to respond or did not know their parents' income. Many of the participants' parents had an income between $40,001 and $50,000 (13.8%, n = 9). This was followed by six (9.2%) participants each with parents' income of $20,001 to $30,000 and $60,001 to $70,000. The next largest group had 5 (7.7%) participants with a parents' income of $70,001 to $80,000. Next, two groups of four (6.2%) participants each, had a parents' income of $30,001 to $40,000 and a parents' income of more than $100,000. The next group had three (4.6%) participants with a parents' income between $50,001 and $60,000. The next three groups had similar number of participants, two (3.1%) each, with parents' income of less than $10,000, income between $80,001 and $90,000 and an income of more than $200,001. Finally, one participant (1.5%) reported a parents' income of between $150,001 and $200,000.

Most of the participants reported that they were freshmen (61.5%, n = 40) at college, followed by those who were sophomores (27.7%, n = 18), juniors (9.2%, n = 6), and seniors (1.5%, n = 1). Finally, most of the participants reported that their highest academic degree was a high school diploma (81.5%, n = 53). They were followed by

those with an Associates degree (3.1%, $\underline{n} = 2$). Two (3.1%, $\underline{n} = 2$) participants reported that they did not have a degree and eight (12.3%) did not respond to the item.

The stability of the RIDS was evaluated by examining the correlation between the test and retest scores using Pearson correlation coefficients. The stability of the RIDS and its subscales were found to be adequate over a 2 week period, except for the Relational status ($\underline{r} = .61$, $\underline{p} < .01$). The test-retest correlation coefficients are presented in Table 23.

The correlation between the state-anxiety level of the participants during the test and the retest sessions was also examined, because the responses of the participants to the RIDS, especially to items in the Relational status (status 2) which had a low correlation coefficient could have been influenced by a significant difference in the level of state-anxiety of the participants. The significance level of the correlation was found to be not significant ($\underline{r} = .02$, $\underline{p} = .90$), which indicated that the state-anxiety levels of the participants during the test ($M = 56.31$) and retest ($M = 59.97$) sessions were significantly different.

Table 23

Test-Retest Estimates of the RIDS and its Statuses

Status	Correlation Coefficient
Concrete	.76*
Relational	.61*
Confusion	.80*
Cognitive-Rationalization	.81*
Exploration	.74*
Acceptance	.72*
RIDS Total Score	.74*

*$p < .01$

Note. N = 211

Chapter six

Discussion

Although efforts have been made toward integrating exploration of religious beliefs in psychotherapy, there is still a lack of a systematic consideration of religious constructs in conceptualizing personality theories and therapeutic interventions (Bergin, 1983). As posited by Bergin (1983), the assessment of religiosity using existing religiosity measures is too simple to capture the multidimensionality of a person's religiosity. Religiosity, in most instances, is defined using a typology model to describe discrete types of religiosity by ignoring the processes involved in explaining the development of these discrete types (Worthington, 1989). It was suggested by Hill (1997), that a process model might provide accessibility to an individual's religious attitude (status) at a given moment, which could have important implications for measuring religious experience (religious identity).

The main purpose of the present study was to conceptualize a new process model of religiosity (Experiential /Rational Model of Religious Identity Development) and to investigate the psychometric properties of an instrument (Religious Identity Development Scale; RIDS) that was developed to measure religiosity as conceptualized in the model. The development of this instrument might enable many academicians, clinicians, and researchers to explore how the overt emotional, interpersonal, experiential, and motivational styles of individuals might relate to their "religiosity." Specifically, the model and the RIDS might promote better psychotherapy relationship by providing a means to conceptualize and assess clients' and therapists' attitudes toward religion. This in turn, could provide an opportunity for a systematic analysis of the dynamics between

clients and therapists when dealing with religious issues in psychotherapy, so that better interventions could be provided.

Below is a discussion of the outcome of the hypotheses tested to analyze the psychometric properties of the RIDS. Results will be discussed in four sections. The first section will discuss psychometric properties of the RIDS. The second section will examine the methodological limitations of this study. The next section will discuss the implications for counseling. Finally, the fourth section will explore directions for future research.

Reliability and Validity of the RIDS

Factor Analysis

The psychometric validation of the RIDS was initiated through an item-total score correlation and then a principal axis factor analysis with a Varimax rotation for each of the seven statuses to obtain a parsimonious set of items. Finally, a principal axis factor analysis with an oblique rotation was conducted on all the items. To maintain the integrity of the model, an a priori extraction method was used, as seven factors were expected to emerge to represent seven statuses in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development. The seven-factor solution was deemed a poor fit for the data, as the Integration status (status seven) did not emerge as a separate factor in the analysis.

The integration status (status 7) is the most abstract among the seven statuses of the Experiential /Rational Model of Religious Identity Development, as it is not only the most difficult to achieve, but also the most challenging to explore for most people. A good example of an individual who might consistently operate from this status would be

someone like "Buddha," who is assumed, from the perspective of this model, to have found total balance in the processing of information through the experiential and rational systems. The Integration status was included in the model, mainly to present a complete model by describing the experiences of someone like "Buddha." However, as evident from the results of this study, such an abstract status could be difficult to quantify. The low internal consistency (α = .54) and variance (SD = .73) of the Integration status suggested that perhaps the items were a poor assessment of this status or that there was not enough variance in the sample for there to adequately assess the Integration status, respectively. As a result, the Integration items were removed from a second factor analysis to improve the fit of the factor-solution to the data. The six-factor solution that emerged was a better fit to the data, and it was found to be statistically and theoretically sound. The net result of the factor analysis was a 23-item, six factor instrument. Results from the current study offered preliminary support for the reliability and validity of the RIDS.

Reliability Analysis

Internal consistency estimates using Cronbach's alpha, as posited in the first hypothesis, was above .65 for each of the statuses of the RIDS, except for the Relational status (α = .60). The correlation, between any two factors, as speculated in the second hypothesis, was less than .50. These results suggested that the items for most of the factors were intercorrelated adequately, and that the factors were distinct.

Although the internal consistency of the statuses supported the hypothesis for this study, Clark and Watson (1995) recommended that scale developers should strive for a coefficient alpha of at least .80 for their scales. They suggested that a revision of a new

scale or subscale should be undertaken by writing additional items to increase reliability to an acceptable level if the alpha level was below this mark. Therefore, by adding items to five of the six statuses, which had coefficient alphas less than .80, the internal consistency of these statuses might be improved and result in a better assessment of each of the statuses.

Convergent and Discriminant Validity

Evidence of convergent and discriminant validity was provided by significant positive or negative correlations between specific statuses of the RIDS with dogmatism and anxiety. Discussion of these correlations are provided below.

As posited in hypothesis 3a, the Concrete (status 1) and Relational (status 2) statuses predicted dogmatism, which provided support for convergent validity. However, the hypothesis that both the statuses would also predict anxiety was not supported. The results appeared to suggest that individuals, who scored high on their Concrete or Relational status, might experience high levels of dogmatism, but not necessarily high levels of anxiety.

Individuals who operate from the Concrete and Relational statuses are seen as highly conforming to those who are in authority and to those who are significant to them from the perspective of the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development. Their tendency to conform, whether unconsciously (Concrete) or consciously (Relational), is congruent with Rokeach's (1960) description of a highly dogmatic person as someone who bases his or her beliefs on authority figures and is usually intolerant of people who have a different belief system. The individuals in the Concrete and Relational statues were hypothesized to have higher levels of anxiety and

dogmatism to differentiate them from the individuals in the Cognitive-Rationalization status (status 4) who were expected to have higher levels of dogmatism and lower levels of anxiety. However, the results of the regression appeared to suggest that the individuals in the Concrete and Relational statuses might share the same levels of anxiety and dogmatism as hypothesized for the individuals in the Cognitive-Rationalization status, in that individuals scoring high in any one of these three statuses might experience high levels of dogmatism, but not necessarily high levels of anxiety. Rokeach (1960) described dogmatism as "a cognitive network of defenses against anxiety" (p.347). He also suggested that there could be a correlation between the creativity involved in managing anxiety and the level of dogmatism. Based on the results of the present study, it appeared that individuals in the Concrete and Relational statuses were probably utilizing "creative" ways to manage their anxiety. An effective way to reduce or avoid anxiety, as suggested by Spielberger (1972), is to develop effective defense mechanisms (i.e., intellectualization, repression, denial, etc.). The defense mechanism that is probably most effective for individuals in the Concrete and Relational statuses who have not experienced the overwhelming anxiety that follows the transition to the third status (Confusion status) is repression. Repression is defined as a major defense mechanism in which distressing or anxious thoughts are prevented from conscious expression (Corsini & Wedding, 1989). These individuals' dogmatic stance on religious issues might be the "creative" means deployed to prevent anxiety from becoming conscious, which probably explains the significant prediction for dogmatism, but not for state-anxiety by the Concrete and Relational statuses.

The convergent validity for the RIDS was also supported by the significant prediction of anxiety by the Confusion status (Status 3), as posited in hypothesis 3b. The hypothesis that the Confusion status will not predict dogmatism was also supported. Thus, an individual who is highly confused about religion would probably experience high levels of anxiety, but not necessarily high levels of dogmatism. As suggested by Ehrlich and Lee (1969), individuals who are higher in dogmatism are less able to learn new beliefs or change old beliefs. A study conducted by Rappaport (1979) showed that individuals with higher levels of dogmatism became more anxious when integrating new beliefs into their belief systems than individuals with low levels of dogmatism. Therefore, the higher levels of anxiety and lower levels of dogmatism associated with the Confusion status, might be a consequence of trying to synthesize new beliefs while still trying to hold on to old dogmatic beliefs. This is consistent with the description of a person who is high on the Confusion status as someone who is beginning to engage their reasoning capacity (rational system) and pondering alternative beliefs and values. However, as suggested in the model and the results of the present study, the level of willingness to consider alternative beliefs and values, by lowering one's dogmatism has a positive correlation with his or her level of anxiety. Consequently, for the new beliefs and values to be truly integrated, the individual has to gradually relinquish his or her dogmatic ways of thinking.

The convergent validity of the RIDS was again supported by the significant prediction of dogmatism by the Cognitive-Rationalization status (Status 4), as proposed in hypothesis 3c. The hypothesis that the Cognitive-Rationalization status would be negatively correlated with anxiety was supported in the regression analysis, and was

evidence of discriminant validity for the RIDS. The results appeared to indicate that individuals who processed religion in a highly cognitive and rational manner had higher levels of dogmatism and lower levels of anxiety. Therefore, the individuals in the Cognitive-Rationalization status were almost similar to individuals in the Concrete and Relational statuses, who had positive correlations with dogmatism, but not with anxiety. Dogmatism has been described as "nothing more than the total network of psychoanalytic defense mechanisms organized together to form a cognitive system designed to shield a vulnerable mind" (Rokeach & Restle, 1960, p.70). Thus, the high level of dogmatism among individuals who score high in the Cognitive-Rationalization status could be a form of defense mechanism that is utilized to keep their anxiety level low. However, there could be a qualitative difference in the way individuals in the Cognitive-Rationalization status utilize dogmatism to manage their anxiety compared to those in the Concrete and Relational statuses. Study conducted by Spellman, Baskett, and Byrne (1971) showed that high anxiety levels increased the likelihood of change to a different religious affiliation or to no religious affiliation. The Confusion status was shown to be positively correlated with anxiety, which means that an individual who is highly confused probably has to move from the Confusion status to a less anxiety-provoking status to reduce his or her anxiety. By choosing to move to the Cognitive-Rationalization status, the individual is essentially attempting to reduce his or her anxiety by taking on a dogmatic attitude toward religious issues. Thus, in contrast to the individuals in the Concrete and Relational statuses who repressed their anxiety, the individuals in the Cognitive-Rationalization status probably "creatively" manage their anxiety by suppressing them through intellectualization and rationalization. Thus, individuals in the cognitive-

rationalization status essentially attempt to explain away anxiety that they are experiencing consciously into the unconscious (suppression), as opposed to preventing anxiety to surface to the conscious from the unconscious (repression).

The discriminant validity for the RIDS was again supported by a lack of prediction of dogmatism by the Exploration status and a negative prediction of dogmatism by the Acceptance (status 6) status, as proposed in hypothesis 3d. Moreover, the lack of prediction of anxiety by the Exploration status and the negative prediction of anxiety by the Acceptance status, provided further evidence for the discriminant validity of the RIDS. The results were found to be very consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of these statuses, as the individuals who are high in their Exploration and Acceptance statuses are not expected to experience high levels of anxiety or dogmatism. Allen and Spilka (1967) asserted that the advantage to being religiously mature is that it provides an avenue to enhance one's being, as well as the well-being of others. He also said that the religiously mature tend to have complex thoughts with multiple ideas, which brings about an openness to diversity and a willingness to accept beliefs not consistent with his or her own. Allen and Spilka's (1967) assertion are well supported by empirical findings which have shown that individuals who are considered religiously mature are less likely to be anxious, rigid, intolerant, and prejudiced (Bergin, Masters, & Richads, 1987; Sturgeon & Hamley (1979). The findings from the present study appear to be consistent with findings from previous studies, in that individuals who operate from more mature religious identity statuses, exhibit lower levels of anxiety and dogmatism, which has been shown to contribute to their well-being (Pfeifer & Waelty, 1995)

Concurrent validity

Evidence for concurrent validity was provided by comparing the scores on the RIDS with scores on the Intrinsic and Extrinsic subscales of the Age-Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983). The scores were compared by regressing the six statuses of the RIDS on two separate simultaneous regression analyses with extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientations as the criterion variables.

Regression analyses showed that three statuses (Relational, Confusion, Acceptance) positively predicted extrinsic religious orientation and three statuses (Concrete, Relational, Exploration) positively predicted intrinsic religious orientation. The intrinsic religious orientation was also predicted by the Confusion and Cognitive-Rationalization statuses, but the correlations were negative. The results from the regressions suggested that the concurrent validity of the RIDS was questionable, as the results did not indicate the hypothesized pattern in the religious orientation of individuals as they progressed along in their religious identity development. The inconclusive results also suggested that there was a possibility that a unidimensional conceptualization of the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations might not have been very effective for the purposes of this study. Therefore, a decision was made by the researcher to explore the relationship between religious orientation that had been conceptualized two-dimensionally and the six statuses of the RIDS. A new pattern of relationship between religious orientation and the six statuses of the RIDS was proposed and a MANOVA was conducted as an additional analysis to validate the new propositions. Before I discuss the findings from the regressions and the MANOVA, I will provide information on the four possible variations of the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations, the imprecision

that exists in defining and assessing intrinsic religious orientation, and the concept of fundamental attribution error, as these issues were not addressed in the literature review. We will first explore the four possible variations of the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations.

An explanation of a two-dimensional conceptualization of the intrinsic and extrinsic orientations was put forth by Allport and Ross (1967) when they noted in their study that the extrinsic and intrinsic scales were not correlated. The new conceptualization produced four religious orientations: (a) intrinsic (high intrinsic and low extrinsic); (b) extrinsic (high extrinsic and low intrinsic); (c) indiscriminately proreligious (high intrinsic and high extrinsic); and (d) indiscriminately nonreligious (low extrinsic and low intrinsic). The indiscriminately proreligious, who were shown to be high on both the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations, were suggested by Allport and Ross (1967) as being religiously devout, but likely predisposed to dogmatic and discriminatory attitudes. In contrast, they suggested that the indiscriminately nonreligious were unlikely to be uncommitted to organized religion. Next, we will examine the imprecision in the definition and assessment of intrinsic religious orientation.

Doubts regarding the usefulness of the intrinsic religious orientation as defined by Allport and Ross (1967) still exist after years of research employing the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations (Donahue, 1985; Kahoe, 1974; Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990). Gorsuch (1984) asserted that the lack of clarity of the orientation stems from combining belief, behavior and motivation to define this construct, and that this combination gives uncertain interpretations. Batson (1997) suggested that the intrinsic

scale might no be sensitive enough to measure "true" intrinsic orientation. He suggested that the scale was actually measuring what people thought they "should be" according to their religion and not how they were in reality. Therefore, there might be wide discrepancies between what people say is true of them on the intrinsic scale rather than how they actually live their lives (Batson, 1997). Finally, we explore the concept of attribution error as it pertains to intrinsic religious orientation.

Gorsuch (1984) suggested that a person might not be aware that his or her religious behavior is extrinsically based (using religion for self-centered and relational needs). When he or she is assessed using a self-report, his or her views on religion could indicate intrinsic religious orientation (living one's religious faith for the sake of the faith itself). Gorsuch (1984) asserted that in this situation, by attributing the intrinsic religious orientation of this person to a personal source rather than an environmental source, we are committing a fundamental attribution error. Gorsuch (1984) concluded that the motivation for religious behavior could be explained by different ways, especially since intrinsic religious orientation is imprecisely defined.

As predicted in hypothesis 4a, the Relational status did predict extrinsic religious orientation, but it also predicted intrinsic religious orientation. In variance to the hypothesis, the Concrete status did not predict extrinsic religious orientation, but did predict intrinsic religious orientation.

Individuals who operate from within the Relational status were described as "conscious conformists" from the perspective of the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development. They conform in ways that are maximally beneficial to them. These individuals could be expected to respond to the intrinsic and extrinsic

questions by endorsing both the intrinsic and extrinsic items, because they do in actuality endorse both of these orientations. Basically, these individuals' willingness to take on an intrinsic religious orientation is to be perceived as such (as they are very aware of the qualities that would describe one as religious), and their true religious orientation which is extrinsic in nature (using religion for self-centered needs) could contribute to them responding high on both orientations. Therefore, these individuals' religious orientation corresponded with that of the "indiscriminately proreligious" who were shown to be high on both the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations by Allport and Ross (1967). They were viewed by Allport and Ross (1967) as being religiously devout, but also as being predisposed to dogmatic and discriminatory attitudes. A fundamental attribution error (Gorsuch, 1984) is very much a factor to be taken into consideration with these individuals, as they are likely to highly endorse intrinsic items, because their true motivation for doing so is to look "religious" to others, as they are fully aware of the expectations of others. This assumption appeared to be supported by the MANOVA, which showed that individuals who scored equally high on their intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations were significantly higher than the other there groups (high intrinsic/low extrinsic, low intrinsic/high extrinsic, low intrinsic/low extrinsic) on the Relational status. Thus, the findings in this study provided tentative support for the assumption that individuals high on their Relational status possibly endorse intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations, equally.

The concrete status predicted intrinsic religious orientation but not extrinsic religious orientation, which was the opposite of what was predicted. In this situation, we again have to take into account the possibility of a fundamental attribution error

(Gorsuch, 1984). The individuals in the Concrete status are described as the "unconscious conformists" who are very fundamental in their views about religion, in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development. Thus, these individuals are simplistic in their view of religion and are unaware of how much the environment (i.e., significant others) may have an impact on their religious identity. When asked, they would categorically deny external influences in the way they perceive and practice their religion. As suggested by Batson (1997), the intrinsic scale probably measures what individuals think they ought to be, especially if they are still not aware of or are not willing to admit the influence of others upon them. Therefore, the individuals in the Concrete status, who are aware of what it means to be intrinsically religious and think they are so, would most likely endorse items on the intrinsic scale, but not the items on the extrinsic scale. A fundamental attribution error may be committed when these individuals are assigned as intrinsically oriented, when they are really extrinsically oriented (Gorsuch, 1984). Again, the finding from the MANOVA appeared to support this assumption, as the individuals who scored high on their intrinsic orientation and low on their extrinsic orientation had significantly higher scores than the other three groups (low intrinsic/low extrinsic, low intrinsic/high extrinsic, high intrinsic/high extrinsic) on the Concrete status. Thus, the finding in this study provided preliminary support for the assumption that the individuals in the Concrete status would perceive themselves as being high on intrinsic religious orientation and low on extrinsic religious orientation, because of their lack of awareness of and their unwillingness to admit to the influences of others, which are truly behind their religious motivations.

As predicted in hypothesis 4b, the Exploration status did predict intrinsic religious orientation, and not extrinsic religious orientation. In variance to the hypothesis, the Acceptance status did not predict intrinsic religious orientation, but did predict extrinsic religious orientation.

Individuals in the Exploration status, from the perspective of the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development are beginning to live their lives using the religion that they were born into as a guidepost to explore alternative ways of being. Thus, these individuals would be considered to have an intrinsic religious orientation (high intrinsic and low extrinsic) (Allport & Ross, 1967). Compared to the individuals in the previous statuses, these individuals are more aware of their motivations for being religious and their motivations are not intended to impress or manipulate others. Their only motivation is to have a more unified and complex religious identity that relates to more of the reality of who they truly are (Venable, 1982). Thus, the finding from the regression analysis that the Exploration status predicted for intrinsic religious orientation, but not for extrinsic religious orientation is consistent with the assumption that the individuals in the Exploration status would be consistent in motivation, behavior and thought in adhering to an intrinsic religious orientation.

The Acceptance status predicted extrinsic religious orientation, but did not predict intrinsic religious orientation, which was in variance with the hypothesis. As defined in the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development, the individuals in the Acceptance status have reached a level of religious identity development where they can now select aspects of their own religion and borrow certain aspects from other religions to practice. Their own religion, which was central in defining their way of being in the

Exploration status, is now replaced by a complex amalgamation of beliefs and values from various sources, including other religions. Most importantly, these individuals are comfortable and apt at effectively synthesizing and practicing, sometimes conflicting beliefs and values. As suggested by Gorsuch (1984), the only motivation for the highly religious to maintain an intrinsic religious orientation is to have a more unified and complex belief system that relates to more of reality. From this perspective, if we were to examine some of the items from the extrinsic scale (e.g., It doesn't matter much what I believe, so long as I am good; Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in my life), it is quite possible for individuals high in their Acceptance status to highly endorse these extrinsic items, as religion per se, especially their own religion, is not the sole criterion used to make decisions. Furthermore, there is also a possibility that they might not highly endorse some of the intrinsic items (e.g., My whole approach to life is based on my religion; I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs; My whole approach to life is based on my religion), because some of these items could be perceived as too restrictive and rigid from their complex and multidimensional perspective. Therefore, the individuals from the Acceptance status could be expected to score equally high on the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation scales, because the individuals high on the Acceptance status are likely to equally endorse or not endorse the intrinsic and extrinsic items. The finding from the MANOVA provided partial support for this assumption, as the individuals who scored high on their intrinsic and extrinsic orientations had higher scores than the other three groups (low intrinsic/low extrinsic, low intrinsic/high extrinsic, high intrinsic/low extrinsic) on the Acceptance status. However, their scores were significantly different only from the high

intrinsic/low extrinsic group. The findings suggested, that the utility of the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientation scale to accurately assess religiosity among those with a high religious identity status (Acceptance status) is not very certain, as they could possibly endorse items from both orientations.

The Cognitive-Rationalization status, which was not part of the hypotheses, predicted extrinsic religious orientation, but did predict intrinsic religious orientation. However, the prediction of intrinsic religious orientation had a negative correlation, which indicated that scoring high on the Cognitive-Rationalization status would correspond to scoring low on intrinsic religious orientation. From the perspective of the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development, the individuals in the Cognitive-Rationalization status were described as the least likely to practice religion in any form (intrinsic or extrinsic), because of their highly intellectualized interpretation of religion, which does not lend itself well to being guided by religious tenets. They could aptly be described as the indiscriminately nonreligious (low on intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations) (Allport & Ross, 1967). The finding from the MANOVA provided tentative support for this assumption, as the individuals who scored low on their intrinsic and extrinsic orientations had significantly higher scores than the other three groups (high intrinsic/high extrinsic, low intrinsic/high extrinsic, high intrinsic/low extrinsic) on the Cognitive-Rationalization status. Thus, the finding in this study appeared to be consistent with the assumption that the individuals in the Cognitive-Rationalization status would be low on their intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations (indiscriminately nonreligious).

Another status that was not part of the hypotheses was the Confusion status. The Confusion status predicted extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientations. However, the

prediction of intrinsic religious orientation was negatively correlated. From the perspective of the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development, the individuals in the Confusion status are most likely to experience feelings of anger and frustration toward religion, as a result of feeling deceived about the grandness and uniqueness of their religion. As a result, the confused individuals might show disdain and rebel toward their own religion by using religion in strictly self-centered and utilitarian ways for their own benefit, without regard for anybody else. Unlike, the individuals in the Relational status who also use religion for self-centered needs, the individuals in the Confused status do not care if they are perceived as religious by others and might even act in ways to show that they do not have an intrinsic religious orientation. Thus, one does not have to be concerned about fundamental attribution error (Gorsuch, 1984) with these individuals, because they do not make any attempts to disguise their extrinsic religious motivation by falsely exhibiting intrinsic beliefs or behaviors. Again, the finding from the MANOVA provided tentative support for this assumption, as the individuals who scored high on their extrinsic orientation and low on their intrinsic orientation had significantly higher scores than the other three groups (low intrinsic/low extrinsic, high intrinsic/high extrinsic, high intrinsic/low extrinsic) on the Confused status. The finding in this study seemed to be consistent with the assumption that individuals who are highly confused about religion would be high on their extrinsic religious orientation and low on their intrinsic religious orientation.

The concurrent validity of the RIDS was partially supported by results from the regression analyses. However, the results from the MANOVA, which assessed the relationship between religious identity development and religious orientation

conceptualized as a two-dimensional construct, provided better support, albeit preliminary, for the concurrent validity of the RIDS. As the results of this study appeared to suggest, the accurate assessment of the six statuses in the RIDS can only be achieved through the right combination (high/low) of the intrinsic and extrinsic scales. The results also appeared to suggest that one has to be cautious in interpreting the results from the Religious Orientation Scale, as the utility of this instrument appears to be limited by fundamental attribution error. Overall, the concurrent validity of the RIDS appeared to have preliminary support if fundamental attribution error was taken into consideration in interpreting the results from the Religious Orientation Scale. Thus, an instrument that assessed multi levels of religiosity would be a better parallel instrument to assess the concurrent validity of the RIDS in the future.

Construct-Irrelevant Test Variance and Test-Retest Validity

Analyses conducted to assess construct-irrelevant test variance by examining the relationship between religious identity development and social desirability showed that the Confusion status and the Cognitive-Rationalization status were negatively correlated with social desirability. Thus, a higher score in either of these two statuses would indicate a tendency to respond in a socially undesirable manner. This finding provided further support for the discriminant validity of the RIDS, because from the perspective of the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development, the individuals who score high in the Confusion and Cognitive-Rationalization statuses are likely to respond in ways that oppose a positive view on issues relating to religion. These individuals are generally angry and frustrated when dealing with religious issues, as a result of feeling deceived by people whom they trusted and respected about the "specialness" and

"uniqueness" of their religion and how their "God" would not let anything bad happen to them. One possible way for individuals in these two statuses to "rebel" against religion and the people who espoused the religion to them is by responding in socially undesirable ways on religious issues. Thus, the more confused and rational individuals are about their religion, the more likely they are to respond in socially undesirable ways when dealing with religious issues.

The test-retest correlation coefficients were found to be adequate for all the statuses, except for the Relational status ($r = .61$, $p < .01$). The Relational status was also found to have the lowest coefficient alpha ($\alpha = .60$) among all the six statuses. Thus, the Relational scale, which has only three items with low intercorrelations, could be a poor measure of the Relational status. On the other hand, Helms (1990) suggested that it is difficult to measure a phenomenon consistently if the phenomenon itself is not consistent. She added that the difficulty in quantifying a phenomenon might be related to the dynamic changeable nature of these (religious) attitudes. As the scores on the RIDS are expected to be influenced by one's state-anxiety, the correlation between the state-anxiety during the test and the retest was assessed. The correlation was found to be not significant, which indicated that the anxiety levels during the test and the retest were significantly different. Therefore, the low correlation coefficient for the Relational status could have been influenced by the differing state-anxiety levels of the participants, which showed that the Relational status could be easily influenced by one's environment and psychological well-being (anxiety), which is consistent with the description of this status.

In conclusion, the low correlation coefficient of the Relational status in the RIDS could be contributed to poor items with low intercorrelations, or it could be that this

status is difficult to measure, because the phenomenon underlying the construct is not consistent.

Summary of Reliability and Validity

Overall, the psychometric properties of the Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS) appear to have preliminary support. The RIDS was found to have adequate internal consistency for all of its statuses, except for the Relational status ($\alpha = .60$). The low correlations among the statuses indicated that the statuses were measuring distinct constructs. The RIDS also appeared to have support for convergent and discriminant validity. Some evidence was found for concurrent validity, albeit modest, for the RIDS from the results of the regression analyses. However, results from the MANOVA, which explored the relationship between religious identity statuses and religious orientation conceptualized as a two-dimensional construct (high intrinsic/high extrinsic, low intrinsic/high extrinsic, high intrinsic/low extrinsic, low intrinsic/low extrinsic) provided preliminary concurrent validity for the RIDS. Finally, the test-retest reliability (temporal stability) for the RIDS and its subscales were shown to be adequate, except for the Relational status.

Methodological Limitations

The findings from this study might have been limited by a number of methodological issues. As this was an initial validation study of a new instrument based on a new theory, additional research is needed to confirm the findings of this study. Thus, the findings must be interpreted with caution.

The measures that were utilized in this study had a self-report format and thus, it was not possible to make objective observations of the participants' actual behaviors,

attitudes, and perceptions to assess if they were responding in a biased manner. As a result, the validity and reliability of the data collected in this study, which is about a sensitive topic (religion), is limited by the subjectivity of the participants.

The lack of standardization in how the measures were completed by the participants is another limitation of this study and could have contributed to response bias among some clients. Specifically, the participants who were not in one of the community colleges were allowed to complete the measures in a packet on their own time and to return it when they had completed the questionnaires. The validity of their responses is limited by the possibility that they might have had input from others in responding to the items or might have been distracted by external factors. As a result of this lack of standardization, data collected from participants from especially the Relational status might have been compromised, as they are the ones who are most likely to be influenced by the views and opinions of others. There is also a possibility that some of them, especially the participants in the Confusion and Cognitive-Rationalization statuses, might have decided to not complete and return their questionnaires, as they are the ones most likely to be negatively affected by having to deal with anything religious. Thus, there could have been a bias (e.g., number of participants in each status of the sample not being representative of the population) in the data collected from the post office and the Counseling Center, since these participants completed the data on their own. The researcher had to resort to relaxing the criteria for data completion, because of the difficulty involved in getting participants to fill out questionnaires that surveyed their responses to a sensitive issue, religion.

Several characteristics of the sample used in this study might limit the generalizability of the results to other populations and also limit its validity. Although the sample for this study was relatively heterogeneous, the participants were mostly White Christians, who stated a moderate or strong preference for religion. These two characteristics of the sample, Christianity and an appreciable preference for religion, possibility limited the heterogeneity of the sample on two very important aspects relevant to this study, as the RIDS was meant to be used for people from all religions and all levels of preference for religion. Furthermore, the use of a convenience sample for the test-retest, students at a Midwest community college, probably limited the generalizability of the findings to other populations. Thus, the temporal reliability of the RIDS as it pertains to groups other than White young adults from the Midwest is still uncertain.

The Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development was initially proposed as a seven-status model, but because of a poor fit of the data to a seven-factor solution, the decision was made to delete items from the seventh status (Integration), because a six-factor solution was found to be a better fit to the data. Only three Integration items with very low internal consistency ($\alpha = .54$) were included for this status in the final factor analysis, which indicated that the representative items were not highly intercorrelated. Several of the statuses in this scale had alpha levels lower than .70, which were probably contributed by the statuses being represented by fewer than five items. Thus, the internal consistency of some of the statuses on the RIDS ($\alpha < .80$) were probably attenuated by the small number of items that represented them. More importantly, the results from the principal axis analysis with an oblique rotation using

items from the seven separate factor analyses has to be interpreted with caution, because the analysis was done on the same sample that was used for the initial seven factor analyses (one each for the seven statuses). Ideally, a different sample should have been used to obtain the seven-factor structure for the 31 items from the initial seven factor analyses, but the unavailability of a different sample did not allow for this. Therefore, the validity and reliability findings from this study, which was meant to be exploratory in nature, have to be interpreted tentatively and cautiously.

Finally, a valid parallel instrument that effectively assessed religious identity development was not included in this study to support the concurrent validity of the RIDS. The Age-Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic Religious Orientation Scale was not a very appropriate parallel instrument for the RIDS, as it appeared to lack construct validity. The meaning of scoring high or low on the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations was not very clear, as the assignment of individual as either intrinsic or extrinsic using the scores from the religious orientation scale appeared to be influenced by fundamental attribution error (Gorsuch, 1983). Thus, individuals who assume, but who are not really intrinsic in their religious orientation, could actually score high on the intrinsic scale. Although concurrent validity for the RIDS appeared to be supported by conceptualizing religious orientation as a two-dimensional construct, we have to be tentative with the results from the MANOVA, as a small sample was used for the analysis. Only one religious measure was included for concurrent validity purposes in this study, because adding another religious measure would have meant further increasing the time it took to complete all the items.

Implications for Counseling

Despite the limitations stated above, there are some important implications of this research. Although the concept of religiosity has been studied widely, there has been a lack of emphasis placed in understanding the process involved in conceptualizing religiosity in counseling (Worthington, 1989). However, this situation is changing rapidly, as there is a realization that values, especially religious values, must be dealt with more systematically if therapeutic change is to be lasting (Bergin, 1991). Individuals' values are basically tied to many of the same values that underlie practices and beliefs espoused in their religious environments, as was shown by Jensen and Bergin (1988) in a national survey of mental health care workers. Therefore, when value-related problems are encountered in therapy, both the client's values and the therapist's values may need to be examined to make therapy more effective (Bergin & Payne, 1993). By choosing to ignore religious constructs and experiences in therapy, therapists could potentially misjudge, misinterpret, misunderstand, or mismanage important aspects of clients' lives that could have significant impact on adjustment and growth. This issue might be especially relevant in pastoral counseling settings where therapists might have to routinely deal with clients who place religion at the forefront of therapy. It then becomes very important for the therapists to evaluate the "religiosity" of their clients from the onset to better serve the needs of their clients. An objective instrument, such as the RIDS, could prove effective to quickly and easily evaluate the religious "attitudes" of their clients. Thus, this study contributed to the understanding of clients' values, especially their religious values, by providing a means to describe, assess, and understand clients' religious identity development.

The Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development that is proposed in this study goes beyond the current literature by explaining the process of religious identity development from not only a cognitive (intellectual) perspective, but also from an experiential (emotional) perspective. The model provides a means to understand the value pattern, as well as the dilemmas typical of clients at various statuses of religious identity development. As a means to objectively assess the religious identity of clients using this model, the scores from the 23-item Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS) provide a profile of scores on six religious identity statuses to efficiently assess the religious maturity of the clients. The availability of this new model and instrument has implications, both in research and counseling.

In terms of research, the RIDS provides a rare objective tool to assess the religiosity of a client using a process model. The instruments that are used widely to assess religiosity or religious maturity (e.g., the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religious Orientation Scale) are based on a typology model that do not explain the process involved in achieving a certain level of religious maturity. Therefore, the scores from the RIDS have the potential to provide a profile of the client according to his or her level of maturity in each of the six statuses. It is hoped that the RIDS will provide a helpful research tool for counseling psychology researchers, as there is especially a need to better understand how the religiosity of clients and therapists influences the therapeutic relationship and how the process of religious identity development impacts the psychological well-being of clients (Worthington, 1989). Finally, the religious model and instrument from this study also has important implications for counselors.

The Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development and the RIDS can help therapists become more culturally competent through increased awareness and knowledge about the process of religious identity development and the degree to which their clients fall within a particular profile of religious identity development. In planning culturally (religiously) sensitive counseling interventions, therapists will need to assess their clients' level of religious maturity to understand their adherence to religious behaviors and attitudes (Butman, 1990). As most of the current religious scales typically ignore the process of religious identity development when assessing individuals' religiosity (Worthington, 1989), the RIDS, with continued validation studies, has a potential to serve as an assessment tool to better assess the religious identity of clients and therapists to treat psychological factors associated with this complex phenomenon.

Individuals (clients and therapists) at different statuses of religious identity probably enter counseling relationships with different attitudinal and behavioral predispositions. The manner in which these individuals choose to exhibit these predispositions are probably influenced by the religion, the religious identity and perceived religious identity of the other person with whom a counseling relationship is sought. Thus, by using the RIDS to assess the religious identity of therapists and clients, therapists can be better aware of and account for the similarities or differences in their religious identities with their clients. Ideally, the hope is for the therapist to move the client toward a more complex and healthier religious identity status. However, if the therapist shares the same religious identity status with the client or is actually at a lower status than the client, to the extent that that religious issues are important in the counseling process, counseling is likely to be terminated because the therapist would

probably not be able to process religious issues at the level of sophistication as the client. To reduce the chances of premature terminations, the RIDS could prove useful in predicting the quality of the counseling relationship, as well as the possible outcome, so that a client could be matched with a therapist who would be effective for him or her.

Directions for Future Research

Because this was a preliminary examination of a new instrument, further study is required to confirm the validity of this instrument. As suggested by Clark and Watson (1995), a series of investigations is required to determine the construct validity of a new instrument, such as the Religious Identity Development Scale (RIDS).

Future research should focus on gathering data other than through self-report measures to reduce the defensive-related distortions that probably impinged upon the responses of participants to a sensitive topic, such as religion. A simple means to reduce distortions if self-report is the only means to gather data is to standardize data collection in future research. Also, participants should be encouraged to complete the questionnaires where the researcher could observe the participants to reduce contamination of responses from consultation with others or other distractions.

As conceptualized by Campbell and Fiske (1959), a multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) design could prove useful in evaluating the construct validity of this new instrument. In this design, two or more traits are measured by two or more methods, and the resulting correlation matrix can be analyzed using factor analysis to determine the presence of convergent and discriminant validity. Thus, observational methods could be used to supplement self-report measures to improve the validity and reliability of results. Also, a behavior-based measure could be included to assess the congruence or

incongruence between religious attitudes and behavior. To further validate the reliability of the responses, the religious attitude of participants as perceived by significant others could also be assessed. As another method to establish the validity of the RIDS, the six statuses measured by the Religious Identity Development Scale could be assessed using a paper-and-pencil instrument and an alternative qualitative method. A positive correlation in the scores between these two methods would support the convergent validity of the RIDS, while correlations among the six statuses that were significantly different from 1.0 would support the discriminant validity (i.e., distinctiveness of the statuses) of the RIDS. For the purpose of conducting a qualitative study, Malony's (1988) Religious Status Interview (RSI) could prove useful. The RSI is a 32-question structured interview designed to assess Christian maturity. Fowler's (1981), Faith Development Interview Guide could also prove useful as a qualitative method to explore religious identity development. This rather open-ended interview consists of four sections that evaluate various aspects of a person's religious and secular life. By utilizing a qualitative method to assess the validity of the RIDS, it would also be possible to refine the items in the RIDS by incorporating feedback and analyzing data from the interviews.

As the majority of the participants in this sample were White Christians, future studies should be conducted using samples from different populations. An attempt should also be made to collect data from a large sample to facilitate the use of confirmatory procedures, such as structural equation modeling (Bentler, 1990), to compare models from different samples to validate the six-factor solution of the RIDS. Furthermore, structural equation modeling provides guidelines for "model trimming" which allows for the modification of proposed factor structures (Floyd & Widaman,

1995). Thus, confirmatory procedures are effective for revising and refining new instruments like the RIDS, by increasing or decreasing the number of subscales to improve the validity and reliability of the scale in general.

Because of a poor fit of the seven-factor structure to the data, the Integration status was removed from the RIDS. Research in the future should consider revising and refining items for the seventh status for inclusion in future analysis. The seventh status (Integration) is a very abstract status that is theorized to be the realm of operation of someone like Buddha or Jesus. Thus, very few individuals are even expected to explore this status let alone operate from it. However, for the RIDS to be a complimentary scale to the Experiential/Rational Model of Religious Identity Development, which proposes seven distinct statuses, an attempt should be made to include items to measure the seventh status (Integration). Additionally, as a means to improve the alpha levels of the other six statuses, additional items should be included in future validation studies to increase the alpha level of each status to at least .80, as suggested by Clark and Watson (1995). As the next step in improving the validity of the RIDS, confirmatory factor analysis has to be conducted by comparing the fit of the model from this sample with the fit of the same model from a different sample. A significant fit of the models would provide strong construct validity for the RIDS.

Finally, measures other than Allport's (1964) Intrinsic-Extrinsic Religious Orientation Scale should be included to measure religiosity. Religiosity measures, such as the Faith Development Scale (Leak, Loucks, & Bowlin, 1999), should be considered for inclusion to provide support for the concurrent validity of the RIDS. The Faith Development Scale (FDS) was conceptualized as an attempt to provide more objectivity

to Fowler's (1981), Faith Development Interview Guide. The FDS provided preliminary validity for the assessment of faith development as theorized by Fowler (1981) in his theory of Faith Development. In addition, future studies should explore the relationship of religious identity development with mental health variables by using objective personality assessments such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) or a subjective personality instrument like the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). The use of a wide range of assessments and research methods to explore the relationship between mental health constructs and religious identity development would provide strong reliability and validity for the RIDS to be used in the field of counseling psychology.

The empirical investigation of religious identity development or religious maturity is still at a very preliminary stage. The present study provided an objective method to measure an individual's religious identity and explored its relationship anxiety and dogmatism. Because this is only the preliminary validation of the RIDS, further research is needed to confirm the validity and reliability of this new instrument. It is my hope that the development of a psychometrically sound instrument to measure the religious identity development of clients would facilitate the understanding and assessment of this complex phenomenon, and promote the evaluation and discussion of religious issues in counseling.

Appendix A

Demographic Questionnaire

We are interested in gathering a little information about your background. Your responses to the following questions will be held in strict confidence. Please print your answers clearly.

1. Sex: _____ (1) Male _____ (2) Female

2. Age: _____

3. Which of the following comes closest to describing your race or ethnic group? (Check as many as possible).

_____ (1) Black or African American
_____ (2) Hispanic American/Latino/Latina
_____ (3) White or European American
_____ (4) Asian/Pacific Islander
_____ (5) Native American
_____ (6) Other _____ (please specify)

13 Your religion: _____

14 Your mother's religion: _____

15 Your father's religion: _____

16 The most common religion within your community: _____

17 How important is religion (defined as a major teaching with its own theology) in your life as a means to guide your thoughts and actions? (circle a number)

1	2	3	4	5
Not Very Important	Not Important	Neutral	Important	Very Important

9. Did you attend religious school: _____Yes _____No

10. Your income: _$_____

11. Your parents' income: __$_____

12. Year in school:
_____ (1) Freshman _____ (2) Sophomore _____ (3) Junior
_____ (4) Senior _____ (5) Graduate student _____ (6) Other (please specify)

13 Your college major or job title: _____

14 Highest academic degree earned: _____

Appendix B

INSTRUCTIONS: The following questions are designed to examine religious attitudes and behavior. Please indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with the following statements (circle the appropriate number).

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

1.	I believe that my religion should be good enough for everybody else	1 2 3 4 5
2.	When it comes to dealing with religious issues, I am guided by my parents' advice.	1 2 3 4 5
3.	I am confused about what my religion means to me.	1 2 3 4 5
4.	Sometimes I feel I should explore more in depth what religion means to me.	1 2 3 4 5
5.	I have fun finding faults in religious teachings.	1 2 3 4 5
6.	I learn about other religions to include certain aspects of their teachings in my prayer.	1 2 3 4 5
7.	My experience of religion is through a sense of "oneness" with every living being.	1 2 3 4 5
8.	I believe that people who practice a different religion than I do are living in sin.	1 2 3 4 5
9.	The people who attend my place of worship have a big influence on my religious beliefs.	1 2 3 4 5
10.	I am uncertain about the teachings of my own religion.	1 2 3 4 5
11.	I have considered enrolling in a class to learn more about religions.	1 2 3 4 5
12.	Although I think a lot about religion, I do not feel comfortable practicing it.	1 2 3 4 5
13.	I would get married to someone of a different religion.	1 2 3 4 5

	Strongly Disagree 1	Disagree 2	Neutral 3	Agree 4	Strongly Agree 5
14. I define my religion as the composition of all religions or no religion at all.					1 2 3 4 5
15. If I had the opportunity, I would try to convert others to my religion.					1 2 3 4 5
16. I will be okay if I follow the teachings of my religion in the same way as my friends and family do.					1 2 3 4 5
17. I don't know why religion is so important to some people.					1 2 3 4 5
18. I think it would help me if I could talk to a religious advisor.					1 2 3 4 5
19. I am too intelligent to follow the teachings of any religion.					1 2 3 4 5
20. I would be supportive of my children's decision to convert to another religion.					1 2 3 4 5
21. I have had religious experiences (e.g., enlightenment) that I cannot hope to share with anyone else.					1 2 3 4 5
22. If people from other religions were exposed to my religion, they would definitely start practicing it.					1 2 3 4 5
23. It is not my place to question the teachings of my religion.					1 2 3 4 5
24. I think I should have a better understanding of the concept of religion.					1 2 3 4 5
25. I am trying to define what religion means to me.					1 2 3 4 5
26. Religion is not for people like me who can think for themselves.					1 2 3 4 5
27. I think other religions are just as valuable as mine.					1 2 3 4 5
28. I have performed acts that could be interpreted as religious miracles.					1 2 3 4 5
29. I believe that an enlightened person would come around to practicing my religion.					1 2 3 4 5
30. I have complete faith and trust in my religious leaders.					1 2 3 4 5
31. Sometimes I know what my religion means and sometimes I don't.					1 2 3 4 5

	Strongly Disagree 1	Disagree 2	Neutral 3	Agree 4	Strongly Agree 5
32. I find myself reading about various religions.					1 2 3 4 5
33. When I am faced with a dilemma, I believe I should rely on my intellect and not on any religious beliefs to come up with a solution.					1 2 3 4 5
34. I believe I have to come to terms with the religion I was born into.					1 2 3 4 5
35. I practice religion by giving up all desires and needs.					1 2 3 4 5
36. I believe that my religion is the one true religion.					1 2 3 4 5
37. I would feel lost if I did not have the teachings of my religion to follow.					1 2 3 4 5
38. I am not sure I am a religious person.					1 2 3 4 5
39. I try to get an understanding of religions by talking to others about their religions.					1 2 3 4 5
40. Religious people seem to have the least understanding about the true meaning of religion.					1 2 3 4 5
41. I am left with a sense of awe and wonderment when I think of the teachings of any religion.					1 2 3 4 5
42. I do not have any selfish intention in the way I practice my religion.					1 2 3 4 5
43. This would be a much more peaceful world if everyone believed in one religion.					1 2 3 4 5
44. My motto is, "if my religion was good enough for my parents, it is definitely good enough for me."					1 2 3 4 5
45. Nobody has told me about what role religion should play in my life.					1 2 3 4 5
46. I have attended religious ceremonies to satisfy my curiosity.					1 2 3 4 5
47. I am very familiar with the teachings of many religions, although, I do not really believe in religion.					1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

48. My acceptance of other religions has grown as a result of a better understanding my religion	1 2 3 4 5
49. Every act I perform in the name of religion helps others to better themselves.	1 2 3 4 5
50. There must be something wrong with people who practice religions other than mine.	1 2 3 4 5
51. Being religious is part of being a good citizen.	1 2 3 4 5
52. When it comes to religion I feel lost.	1 2 3 4 5
53. In order for religion to have meaning in my life, I should know more about it.	1 2 3 4 5
54. No religion offers me the flexibility I need to deal with the complexities of the new century.	1 2 3 4 5
55. I feel I understand my religion better as a result of having learned about other religions	1 2 3 4 5
56. It is important for me that my children use the teachings of as many religions as possible in terms of shaping their belief and value systems.	1 2 3 4 5
57. I believe that God's true words are only found within the scriptures of my religion.	1 2 3 4 5
58. I feel respected by my significant others because I am just as religious as they are.	1 2 3 4 5
59. I may not value religion as much as I am supposed to.	1 2 3 4 5
60. Trying to understand my religion takes a lot of my time.	1 2 3 4 5
61. Religion does not have anything to offer to me.	1 2 3 4 5
62. I would feel uncomfortable not knowing the teachings and contributions of other religions.	1 2 3 4 5

	Strongly Disagree 1	Disagree 2	Neutral 3	Agree 4	Strongly Agree 5
63. I believe that it is not healthy to practice the beliefs, values and rituals of more than one religion.	1	2	3	4	5
64. Other religions do not seem to have the same insights that are offered by my religion.	1	2	3	4	5
65. If everyone made an attempt to follow the most common religion in their community, it might foster closer ties among the people.	1	2	3	4	5
66. I often have doubts about religion	1	2	3	4	5
67. I think I need to learn about the relationship of my religion to other religions.	1	2	3	4	5
68. Being religious would ultimately hurt me than help me.	1	2	3	4	5
69. I believe it is important to understand the impact that the religion we were born into have on our lives.	1	2	3	4	5
70. I do not understand why anybody would complicate their lives by trying to include the teachings of a religion other than their own.	1	2	3	4	5
71. I think religions other than mine are strange or bizarre.	1	2	3	4	5
72. I wonder if religions are really good for people.	1	2	3	4	5
73. I attend religious events, so I can learn more about my religion.	1	2	3	4	5
74. I have practiced or followed the teachings of another religion.	1	2	3	4	5
75. When I have doubts about religion, I seek more information.	1	2	3	4	5
76. I would not consider myself religious if I practiced more than one religion.	1	2	3	4	5
77. I sometimes feel that I need help in figuring out where religion fits in my life.	1	2	3	4	5
78. I have great respect for other religions.	1	2	3	4	5

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

79. I would feel comfortable attending daily prayer services at a place of worship that was of a different religion than mine. 1 2 3 4 5

80. It is important for me to strictly adhere to the teachings of my own religion. 1 2 3 4 5

81. It is best that I practice the religion that I was born into. 1 2 3 4 5

82. I often include prayers from another religion during my time of worship. 1 2 3 4 5

83. Some religions are just better than other religions. 1 2 3 4 5

84. "God," "Allah," "Jesus," "Buddha," or "Krishna" are all the same to me. 1 2 3 4 5

85. I try to use the teachings of as many religions as possible to provide structure in my life. 1 2 3 4 5

86. I believe that the teachings of different religions are meant to be kept separate and distinct. 1 2 3 4 5

87. I can comfortably call myself a "Christian," "Hindu," "Moslem," or "Buddhist," "Jewish," because I do not discriminate among religions. 1 2 3 4 5

88. The way I lead my life represents everything good about any religion. 1 2 3 4 5

89. I understand perfectly the meaning of religion in my life. 1 2 3 4 5

90. I believe every religion promotes peace and harmony in its own way. 1 2 3 4 5

Appendix C

Instructions: Please circle the response which best describes your reactions to each of the statements below.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common. 1 2 3 4 5
2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent. 1 2 3 4 5
3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups. 1 2 3 4 5
4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas that he/she believes in than with ideas he/she opposes. 1 2 3 4 5
5. Man/woman on his/her own is a helpless and miserable creature. 1 2 3 4 5
6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonely place. 1 2 3 4 5
7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. 1 2 3 4 5
8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems. 1 2 3 4 5
9. It is only natural for a person to be fearful of the future. 1 2 3 4 5
10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in. 1 2 3 4 5
11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop. 1 2 3 4 5
12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I'm being understood. 1 2 3 4 5
13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what others are saying. 1 2 3 4 5
14. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward. 1 2 3 4 5
15. While I don't even like to admit it to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great person, like Einstein, Beethoven, or Shakespeare. 1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important. 1 2 3 4 5

17. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world. 1 2 3 4 5

18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a hand full of really great thinkers. 1 2 3 4 5

19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for. 1 2 3 4 5

20. A woman or man who does not believe in one great cause has not really lived. 1 2 3 4 5

21. It is only when a person devotes himself/herself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful. 1 2 3 4 5

22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct. 1 2 3 4 5

23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person. 1 2 3 4 5

24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. 1 2 3 4 5

25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently form the way that we do. 1 2 3 4 5

26. In times like these a person must be pretty selfish if she/he considers her/his own happiness. 1 2 3 4 5

27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe the same thing he/she does. 1 2 3 4 5

28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp. 1 2 3 4 5

29. A group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long. 1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

30. There are two kinds of people in the world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth. 1 2 3 4 5

31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit she's/he's wrong. 1 2 3 4 5

32. A person who thinks primarily of his/her own happiness is beneath contempt. 1 2 3 4 5

33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on. 1 2 3 4 5

34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what is going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted. 1 2 3 4 5

35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects. 1 2 3 4 5

36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own. 1 2 3 4 5

37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts. 1 2 3 4 5

38. If a man or woman is to accomplish his or her mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all." 1 2 3 4 5

39. Unfortunately a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on. 1 2 3 4 5

40. Most people just don't know what's good for them. 1 2 3 4 5

Appendix D

DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Important: For each of the following items, read each statement and then circle the corresponding response to indicate how you feel right now, that is at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. I feel calm.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I feel secure.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I am tense.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I feel strained.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I feel at ease.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I feel upset.	1	2	3	4	5
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes.	1	2	3	4	5
8. I feel satisfied.	1	2	3	4	5
9. I feel frightened.	1	2	3	4	5
10. I feel comfortable.	1	2	3	4	5
11. I feel self-confident.	1	2	3	4	5
12. I feel nervous.	1	2	3	4	5
13. I am jittery.	1	2	3	4	5
14. I feel indecisive.	1	2	3	4	5
15. I am relaxed.	1	2	3	4	5

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
16. I feel content.	1	2	3	4	5
17. I am worried.	1	2	3	4	5
18. I feel confused.	1	2	3	4	5
19. I feel steady.	1	2	3	4	5
20. I feel pleasant.	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix E

INSTRUCTIONS: The following questions are designed to examine religious attitudes and behavior. Please indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with the following statements (circle the appropriate number).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	NEUTRAL	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

1.	I enjoy reading about my religion.	1 2 3 4 5
2.	I go to an institution of worship (e.g., church, temple, mosque) because it helps me make friends.	1 2 3 4 5
3.	It doesn't much matter what I believe, so long as I am good.	1 2 3 4 5
4.	Sometimes I have to ignore my religious beliefs because of what people might think of me	1 2 3 4 5
5.	It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer.	1 2 3 4 5
6.	I have often had a strong sense of a spiritual being's presence.	1 2 3 4 5
7.	I pray mainly to gain relief and protection.	1 2 3 4 5
8.	I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs.	1 2 3 4 5
9.	What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow.	1 2 3 4 5
10.	My religion is important because it answers many questions about the meaning of life	1 2 3 4 5
11.	I would rather join a religious study group than a social group organized by my institution of worship.	1 2 3 4 5
12.	Prayer is for peace and happiness.	1 2 3 4 5
13.	Although I am religious, I don't let it affect my life.	1 2 3 4 5
14.	I go to an institution of worship mostly to spend time with my friends.	1 2 3 4 5
15.	My whole approach to life is based on my religion.	1 2 3 4 5

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	NEUTRAL	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

16. I go to an institution of worship mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there. 1 2 3 4 5

17. I pray mainly because I have been taught to pray. 1 2 3 4 5

18. Prayers I say when I am alone are as important to me as those I say in an institution of worship. 1 2 3 4 5

19. Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in my life. 1 2 3 4 5

Appendix F

Listed below are a number or statements concerning attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide to what extent you agree or disagree with each statement as it pertains to you personally.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 1 2 3 4 5

2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 1 2 3 4 5

3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability. 1 2 3 4 5

4. There have been times where I felt like rebelling against people in authority even if I know they were right. 1 2 3 4 5

5. No matter whom I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. 1 2 3 4 5

6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 1 2 3 4 5

7. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 1 2 3 4 5

8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 1 2 3 4 5

9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 1 2 3 4 5

10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 1 2 3 4 5

11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 1 2 3 4 5

12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 1 2 3 4 5

13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. 1 2 3 4 5

Appendix G

General Instructions to Participants

Dear Student:

We are conducting research on religious identity development. The present study is aimed at evaluating a measure to test its effectiveness in assessing religious identity development. Our goal is to better understand the process of religious identity development so that we can develop better counseling techniques for individuals like yourself. Your participation will aid us in that goal and will be greatly appreciated.

This study involves the following three steps: (a) completing an informed consent form; (b) filling out a demographic sheet, a religious identity scale, an intrinsic-extrinsic religious scale, an anxiety scale, a dogmatism scale, and a social desirability scale, and (c) receiving a debriefing session. You will be requested to retake the measures after a 2-week interval. We ask that you be as honest and candid in your answers as possible; your responses will remain strictly confidential.

Thank you very much for considering taking part in our project. If you have any questions or concerns about your participation in this study, please feel free to contact me at (219)631-4357.

Sincerely,

V. Suthakaran

Ph.D. candidate,

Counseling Psychology Program

University of Maryland, College Park

Appendix H

Consent Form

Project title: Religious Identity Development.

Statement of willingness to participate: I am willing to participate in a research activity being conducted by V.Suthakaran and Dr. Mary Ann Hoffman at the Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park.

Purpose of research activity: This project is designed to examine religious identity development.

Procedures: Students will be asked to complete questionnaires concerning their demographic and personality characteristics, and their religious identity development. They will also be given an opportunity to return in 2 weeks to complete the religious identity measure a second time.

Confidentiality: Confidentiality will be protected in the following ways: First, the consent form, containing students' names and identification numbers, will be separated from the research questionnaire, and stored separately by the Principal Investigator (PI). Second, the research questionnaire will contain, as the only identifier, a subject number assigned by the PI. Third, all research materials will be maintained under secure conditions by the PI. Only the PI and the supervisor will have access to consent forms and research questionnaires. Fourth, data from this project will only be reported in aggregate form to protect the identity of individual subjects.

Risk/benefit statement: There are no known risks to my participation in this research. I understand that the research is not designed to help me personally, but to understand religious identity development so that better counseling techniques can be developed.

Freedom to ask questions without penalty: I understand that I am free to ask questions about the study without penalty.

Freedom to withdraw participation: I understand that I am free to withdraw from participation in the study at any time without penalty.

Freedom to withdraw data at end of debriefing: I understand that I am free to withdraw my data after the debriefing session without penalty.

Instructions for contacting Chair of the Human Subjects Committee: If I have questions about the rights of research participants, I understand that I may contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee through Toni Bretton, Biology-Psychology 0129, (301)-405-5878.

Name, address, and phone number of Principal Investigator: V. Suthakaran, Counseling Center, University of Notre Dame, (219) 631-4357.

Signed: _____ Please print name: _____

Date: _____

Approval period of the project:

Appendix I

Debriefing Statement

Thank you for participating in this study. Your responses will be critical in helping Dr. Hoffman and I to better understand the process of religious identity development and how it is related to psychological well-being. Our ultimate goals are (a) to formulate a theory of religious identity development and (b) to use this theory as a basis to refine counseling techniques.

The findings of this study will not be available for some time. However, if you would like information about what we eventually learn from this study, please feel free to contact V. Suthakaran, the Principal Investigator, toward the end of the year (2002). His address and phone number are listed on the copy of the informed consent form you have received.

Thank you again for participating. I greatly appreciate your responses and time.

Appendix J

INSTRUCTIONS: The following questions are designed to examine religious attitudes and behavior. Please indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with the following statements (circle the appropriate number).

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

2. When it comes to dealing with religious issues, I am guided by my parents' advice. Relational 1 2 3 4 5

15. If I had the opportunity, I would try to convert others to my religion. Concrete 1 2 3 4 5

19. I am too intelligent to follow the teachings of any religion. Cognitive 1 2 3 4 5

22. If people from other religions were exposed to my religion, they would definitely start practicing it. Concrete 1 2 3 4 5

26. Religion is not for people like me who can think for themselves. Cognitive 1 2 3 4 5

32. I find myself reading about various religions. Exploration 1 2 3 4 5

38. I am not sure I am a religious person. Confusion 1 2 3 4 5

39. I try to get an understanding of religion by talking to others about their religions. Exploration 1 2 3 4 5

44. My motto is, "if my religion was good enough for my parents, it is definitely good enough for me." Relational 1 2 3 4 5

51. Being religious is part of being a good citizen. Relational 1 2 3 4 5

52. When it comes to religion I feel lost. Confusion 1 2 3 4 5

56. It is important for me that my children use the teachings of as many religions as possible in terms of shaping their belief and value systems. Acceptance 1 2 3 4 5

57. I believe that God's true words are only found within the scriptures of my religion. Concrete 1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

61. Religion does not have anything to offer to me. Cognitive 1 2 3 4 5

62. I would feel uncomfortable not knowing the teachings and contributions of other religions. Exploration 1 2 3 4 5

67. I think I need to learn about the relationship of my religion to other religions. Exploration 1 2 3 4 5

68. Being religious would ultimately hurt me than help me. Cognitive 1 2 3 4 5

72. I wonder if religions are really good for people. Cognitive 1 2 3 4 5

76. I would not consider myself religious if I practiced more than one religion Concrete. 1 2 3 4 5

79. I would feel comfortable attending daily prayer services at a place of worship that was of a different religion than mine. Acceptance 1 2 3 4 5

82. I often include prayers from another religion during my time of worship. Acceptance 1 2 3 4 5

85. I try to use the teachings of as many religions as possible to provide structure in my life. Acceptance 1 2 3 4 5

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