

ABSTRACT

Title: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
A CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN
SENEGAL

Bjorn Harald Nordtveit, Doctor of Philosophy, 2005

Directed By: Prof. Steven J. Klees, Department of Education Policy and
Leadership, University of Maryland

The World Bank and other international institutions often promote market-based solutions for implementation of public services. This research examines the set-up, implementation, and results of public-private partnerships and outsourcing, using a World-Bank funded literacy project for women in Senegal as a case study. The case is analyzed from a critical and welfare economics perspective, as well as from a neoliberal view, and shows how the analytical approach conditions the understanding of the project.

The World Bank implements much of its development projects in the belief that the market is more cost-effective than government implementation. In this case, literacy education was not funded by the World Bank until the Senegalese state had formulated a project that fit the Bank's neoliberal policy vision. The requirement of private

implementation strategies was a way to impose market-based solutions that in the end proved to be unreasonable and ineffective.

Analysis of enrollment, success and drop-out rates shows that the project enrolled approximately 180,000 learners, of which only about 44,000 learned to write and read. The literacy courses offered very cheap and very ineffective schooling (whereas the state-implemented primary school system offered much more expensive but also a somewhat more effective education). Literacy education offered in Senegal therefore appears to be poor education for the poorest of the citizens. The literacy providers offered low-quality literacy learning because they wanted to make money from the service delivery, and therefore cut costs. The government and the World Bank failed to correct these negative aspects of the public-private partnership system.

The outsourcing affected civil society in Senegal. The project created and structured civil society by helping to establish women's associations in the villages. However, outsourcing also had a negative effect, since provider associations increasingly became businesses that were dependent on politicians, and corrupt practices multiplied. In order to improve literacy education in Senegal, it is necessary to acknowledge the inability of the market to solve literacy problems on its own, and to adopt a more balanced distribution of responsibilities between the public and the private sectors.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES:
A CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN SENEGAL

By

Bjorn Harald Nordtveit

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2005

Advisory Committee:
Professor Steven J. Klees
Professor Herman Daly
Professor Jing Lin
Professor Carol Anne Spreen
Professor Clifford Zinnes

© Copyright
Bjorn Harald Nordtveit
2005

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank Professor Steven J. Klees, my adviser, for his insight and invaluable guidance during the research and drafting stages of the dissertation. Thanks are also due to my advisory committee, Professor Herman Daly, Professor Jing Lin, Professor Carol Anne Spreen and Professor Clifford Zinnes, all of whom contributed helpful advice and critiqued the study in the course of its preparation.

I am very grateful to Mr. Amadou Wade Diagne for his useful comments and help during the drafting of the dissertation. I would also like to express my gratitude to the staff of the DAEB and the PCU, and particularly to its directors, Mr. Alassane Ndiaye and Ms. Bineta Sall, who were extremely helpful during my fieldwork. Special thanks are also due to Mr. Mamadou Ndoeye, former Minister of Education in Senegal, Mr. Madefall Gueye, other consultants, World Bank staff members, UNESCO staff members, PAPF project participants, provider associations' staff members, and many other people who contributed to the dissertation and helped me with logistics during fieldwork, in addition to participating in interviews and providing comments during the drafting stage.

Special thanks are due to Ms. Ruth Teitelbaum, for her help with the editing of the document. Also, I would like to thank my parents and my sister for their ongoing support to my endeavors.

Bjorn Harald Nordtveit

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	ii
Table of Contents.....	iii
List of Tables.....	viii
List of Figures and Illustrations.....	x
Acronyms.....	xi
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
1.1: General Overview.....	1
1.2: Theoretical Issues.....	3
1.3: Senegal: Background Information.....	7
A) Historic Context.....	7
B) Geography, Human and Social Contexts.....	10
1.4: Education and Literacy Context in Senegal.....	13
1.5: Direction of the Study.....	17
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework.....	20
2.1: Overview of Recent Economic Development Theories and Policies.....	22
A) The Washington Consensus.....	23
B) Welfare and Institutional Economic theories.....	33
C) Critical Views.....	39
2.2: Globalization.....	43
A) Definition of Globalization.....	44
B) Globalization and Privatization: The Case of Education.....	48
2.3: Civil Society.....	51
A) Definitions.....	52
B) Civil society, Development, and Neoliberalism.....	56
2.4: Literacy Education.....	59
A) Functionalist and Human Capital Views.....	60
B) The Socio-Cultural and Critical Views.....	63
2.5: Gender Issues.....	66
A) From “Women in Development” to “Gender and Development”.....	66
B) Gender and Education.....	71
2.6: Research Questions.....	74
Chapter 3: Research Methodology.....	76
3.1: Research Design.....	76
3.2: Foci of the Case Study.....	77
3.3: The Methods of the Case Study.....	79
A) Document Analysis.....	80
B) Analysis of Survey Data and Statistics.....	80
3.4: Field Work.....	83
A) Research Design.....	83
B) Sample.....	84

C) Issues of Entry, Personal Biography, and Ethics	87
D) Data Collection Procedures	90
E) Data Analysis Procedures	91
F) Validity Controls	92
Chapter 4: The Case Study – Outsourcing Policy and the Women’s Literacy	
Project	95
4.1: Creation of the Outsourcing/Partnership Policy	95
A) Before Kolda.....	96
B) The Colloquium in Kolda	101
C) After Kolda	104
4.2: Creation of the PAPF.....	107
A) A Brief Overview: PAPF Management and Procedures	107
B) The Pilot Phase	113
C) Main Phase of the PAPF.....	116
4.3: Characteristics of the PAPF.....	121
A) General Features of the Subprojects	122
B) Characteristics of the Learners.....	124
4.4: Reasons for the World Bank’s Involvement in the Sector.....	125
A) The Rationale for Creation of a Partnership Model.....	125
B) The Criteria for Selection of Providers.....	131
Chapter 5: The Stakeholders of the Partnership	137
5.1: The Local Stakeholders in Literacy Courses	138
A) The Participants	140
B) The Women’s Association and the Literacy Management committee	146
C) An Intermediate Category: the Relais.....	150
D) Evolution of the Perception and Role of the Participant Category.....	152
5.2: The Providers.....	154
A) Types of Providers.....	155
B) Responsibilities of Providers	160
C) The Provider’s Operation.....	165
D) Evolution of Roles and Responsibilities of Providers	169
5.3: The Providers Association (CNOAS).....	173
A) Intended role of CNOAS	174
B) “Real” Functions of CNOAS	176
5.4: The Contract-Managing Agency (AGETIP).....	179
5.5: The Government	182
A) Central Level (DAEB, PCU, and the Cabinet).....	183
B) Regional and Department Levels (RRA and RDA).....	188
Chapter 6: Subproject Selection and Implementation Processes.....	193
6.1: The Selection Processes.....	193
A) Phase 1: Information to Providers	195
B) Phase 2: Preparation of Subproject Proposal	196
C) Phase 3: Control and Preselection.....	200

D) Phase 4: Selection	202
E) Phase 5: Approval	204
6.2: Contractual and Financial Processes.....	207
6.3: Decentralization of Project Management	209
6.4: Monitoring and Evaluation Processes.....	213
A) Monitoring of Subprojects by the State Agencies	214
B) Financial Monitoring by the Contract-Managing Agency.....	218
C) Course Monitoring and Evaluation by the Providers.....	219
D) Sector Studies	220
Chapter 7: Implementation and Design Flaws of the Outsourcing Processes ...	222
7.1: Reported Activities Versus Fictional Activities	223
7.2: Critique of the Processes.....	226
A) Critique of the Selection Method.....	227
B) Critique of the Decentralization of the Project Administration	230
C) Critique of the Monitoring and Evaluation System	233
7.3: Critique of the Stakeholder Interactions	237
A) State Versus Civil Society	237
B) The Participants in Literacy Courses	240
7.4: Critique of the World Bank's Involvement in the Project.....	245
A) World Bank Follow-up and Monitoring of Projects.....	245
B) Overall World Bank Involvement: an Evolution Theory of Development Policies (Survival of the Project that Fits the World Bank).....	247
Chapter 8: Costs.....	254
8.1: How Much, How Many	254
A) Enrollment Data Versus Costs.....	254
B) Dropout Rates	258
C) Success Rates	260
8.2: Real Costs	264
8.3 Calculation of a Unit Cost (Per Learner)	265
A) Government Costs	265
B) Participant's Direct Costs	269
C) Participants' Opportunity Costs.....	270
8.4: Use of the Funds	274
A) Providers' Use of Funds	274
B) The Government's Use of Funds	277
8.5: Government costs Analysis	278
A) Comparison of Literacy Education Costs with Primary Education.....	278
B) Factors Leading to Wastage.....	281
8.6: Private Cost Analysis.....	284
A) Direct Costs	284
B) Opportunity Costs	287
Chapter 9: Literacy Outcome of the Courses.....	292
9.1: Literacy and Post Literacy Aim of the Courses and Outcomes.....	292

A) Definitions of Literacy.....	293
B) Literacy Learning Achievements.....	299
C) Duration of the Courses.....	307
D) Age and Learning.....	309
9.2: Quality of the Courses.....	311
A) Textbooks.....	312
B) The Literacy Teaching Methods.....	314
C) Reading and Activities Center.....	322
9.3: Language Aspects of the Learning.....	328
A) Why Were Classes Taught in Local Languages?.....	328
B) Local Languages: the Learners Point of View.....	331
Chapter 10: Gender and Civil Society Impact.....	337
10.1: The Course's Impact on Gender Power Relationships.....	337
A) Why was the Project Targeted at Women?.....	338
B) Gender Relations in the Set-up of the Course.....	343
C) Power Relationships in the Class.....	345
D) Learning Content.....	347
E) Impact on Girls' Schooling.....	351
10.2: Gender and Civil Society.....	353
A) The Relais and the Course Management Committee.....	354
B) The Local Women's Associations.....	357
C) The Provider Associations.....	360
Chapter 11: Development Impact.....	366
11.1: The Concept of Development.....	366
A) Providers and Participants' Concept of Development.....	366
B) The Senegalese Government's Concept of Development.....	370
C) The World Bank's Vision of Development.....	373
11.2: Economic Impact.....	375
A) The Ability to Calculate.....	376
B) Income-generating Activities.....	378
C) Need for Credit.....	382
11.3: Impact on Health.....	385
A) Hygiene.....	386
B) Awareness Raising Activities and Vaccination.....	388
11.4: Negative Development Impact of the Project.....	389
A) Learning and Course-specific Issues.....	390
B) Process-specific Issues.....	393
11.5: Literacy as Poor Education for Poor Citizens.....	398
A) Lack of Literate Environment in Local Languages.....	399
B) The Problems of Standardization.....	401
C) The Issues of Quality.....	402
Chapter 12: Conclusion.....	406
12.1: Review of the Research Questions.....	406

A) What are the New Roles of Global Organizations, Government Institutions and Civil Society in Service Delivery?.....	406
B) What are the Economic and Political Rationales for Outsourcing of Literacy?.....	410
C) What are the Design and Implementation Strengths and Weaknesses?	412
D) What were the Results and Impact of Outsourced Literacy Education?	418
12.2: Truth and (Un)Certainty	424
12.3: A Personal View on Outsourcing	430
Appendices.....	437
List of source documents	438
List of interviewees (in Senegal)	440
Coding model.....	442
Providers' fees	443
Payments to the project account from the World Bank	444
CPI adjusted participants' payments.....	445
Bibliography	446

List of Tables

Table 3.1: Interview sample: categories of interviewees in Senegal	85
Table 4.1: Subproject proposals for literacy training per year, number of selected proposals, and enrollment	118
Table 4.2: Types of literacy courses offered and number of enrollees	119
Table 4.3: Characteristics of the subprojects	123
Table 4.4: Ethnicity of learners.....	124
Table 6.1: Different types and characteristics of providers	158
Table 8.1: Participation figures for PAPF.....	257
Table 8.2: Success rates for PAPF in 1997 and 2000	261
Table 8.3: Success rates of PAPF (integrated course, 1999)	262
Table 8.4: Success rates based on official data and longitudinal data	263
Table 8.5: Consumer price index	265
Table 8.6: Average unit costs (public).....	266
Table 8.7: Provider fee (real prices)	267
Table 8.8a: Public unit costs for the non-integrated subprojects (1999 fee)	268
Table 8.8b: Public unit costs for the integrated subprojects (1999 fee).....	268
Table 8.9: Learner's contribution to the project in cash	269
Table 8.10: Direct costs (participants to provider)	270
Table 8.11: Opportunity costs (total private loss).....	271
Table 8.12: Total private costs (direct and opportunity costs).....	273
Table 8.13: Total societal unit costs	273
Table 9.1: Reading achievements of the PAPF	304
Table 9.2: Literacy rates for people having attended school or other literacy courses at enrollment of literacy course	306
Table 9.3: Performance in well- and under-equipped learning centers	313
Table 9.4: Literacy teacher training	320
Table 9.5: Quality of literacy centers.....	323
Table 9.6: Reasons given for choice of language	334

Table 12.1: Project design strengths and weaknesses.....	414
Table 12.2: Project implementation strengths and weaknesses	416
Table 12.3: Effects of outsourcing methods and of literacy courses	420
Table 12.4: Case study findings and the debate raised in the dissertation.....	426
Table 12.5a: Neoliberal views on the outsourcing debate	430
Table 12.5b: Critical views on the outsourcing debate.....	431

List of Figures and Illustrations

Picture 1.1: Participants in a literacy course.....	3
Figure 1.2: Map of Africa’s colonies.....	8
Figure 1.3: Map of Senegal’s administrative divisions	11
Figure 1.4: Selection, financing and implementation of a subproject	16
Figure 4.1: Selection and implementation procedures for a subproject.....	111
Figure 5.1: A village’s associative structure.....	139
Picture 5.2: A rural Learning and Activities’ Center.....	142
Figure 5.3: Provider association personnel.....	167
Figure 5.4: Administrative structure for literacy management in Senegal	182
Figure 6.1: The selection process.....	194
Figure 6.2: Decentralization of the PAPF.....	212
Figure 8.1: The Knowledge Bank.....	250
Figure 9.1: Previous schooling of literacy course participants	305
Picture 9.2: Textbooks and course materials	312
Picture 9.3: A literacy center	315
Picture 9.4: The teacher explained the lessons of that day to the learners.....	316
Picture 9.5: The teacher wrote up that day’s lessons	316
Picture 9.6: New learners arrived throughout the learning session	317
Picture 9.7: The learners watched the teacher write the lessons on the blackboard. .	317
Picture 9.8: The teacher asked a student to read the text.....	318
Picture 9.9: The learners lost concentration.....	318
Picture 9.10: Literacy center in bad shape	323
Picture 9.11: Interior of low-quality literacy center.....	324
Picture 9.12: Learning and Activities’ Center: the library.....	326
Picture 11.1: Urban micro gardens in Dakar	380
Picture 11.2: Books and exercises were related to basic skills.....	400

Acronyms

<p>AOF (<i>Afrique Occidentale Française</i>): French West Africa</p> <p>AGETIP (<i>Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Public</i>): Contract managing, or “outsourcing” agency</p> <p>ASCRA Accumulating Savings and Credit Association</p> <p>C Cohort (of enrollees)</p> <p>CAL (<i>Centre d’Animation et Lecture</i>) Learning and Activities’ Center</p> <p>CDF Comprehensive Development Framework</p> <p>CFAF (Francs of the <i>Communauté Financière d’Afrique</i>). Currency used in 12 former French-ruled countries in West Africa (including Senegal). Also known under the acronym XOF</p> <p>CIDA Canadian International Development Agency</p> <p>CNES Citizens’ Network on Essential Services: Association working on policies of service delivery (www.servicesforall.org)</p> <p>CNOAS (<i>Coordination Nationale des Opérateurs en Alphabétisation du Sénégal</i>) : Providers’ Association</p> <p>CPI Consumer Price Index</p> <p>DAEB (<i>Direction de l’Alphabétisation et de l’Education de Base</i>): Department for Literacy and</p>	<p>Basic Education at the Ministry of Education</p> <p>DALN (<i>Direction de l’Alphabétisation et des Langues Nationales</i>): Department for Literacy and Local languages (formerly DAEB)</p> <p>EFA Education For All</p> <p>EAI Education Alternatives Inc. (an EMO, now known as Tesseract Group)</p> <p>EMO Education Management Organization</p> <p>GAD Gender and Development</p> <p>GCE Global Campaign for Education: alliance of associations active in education (www.campaignforeducation.org)</p> <p>GDP Gross Domestic Product</p> <p>GER Gross enrollment ratio (often used for education statistics)</p> <p>GIE (<i>Groupement d’Intérêt Economique</i>): Local for-profit association</p> <p>GTZ (<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i>) German Technical Cooperation for Development</p> <p>IA (<i>Inspection de l’Académie</i>): Regional Chief Education Office</p> <p>ICR Implementation Completion Report (the World Bank’s project completion report)</p>
--	---

IDA	International Development Association (it is the part of the World Bank that provide interest-free loans and some grants for to the world's poorest countries)	PDEF	<i>(Programme Décennal de l'Education et de la Formation)</i> : 10-years program for education in Senegal
IDEN	<i>(Inspection Départementale de l'Education Nationale)</i> : Department Education Office	PDEF-NF	Non-formal literacy education component in PDEF
IFC	International Finance Corporation	PM	Procedures Manual
IGA	Income Generating Activities	PPP	Public-private Partnership
IMF	International Monetary Fund	PRSP	Government Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (sponsored by The World Bank)
IS	Impact study (of four main literacy projects in Senegal)	PRSC	Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit
LCD	Less Developed Countries (Senegal is classified among the LCDs but not among the LLCDs)	RDA	<i>(Responsable Départementale de l'Alphabétisation)</i> : Department Responsible for Literacy
LLDC	Least Developed Countries (the poorest of the LDCs)	ROSCA	Rotating Savings and Credit Association
LS	Longitudinal study (of PAPF)	RRA	<i>(Responsable Régional de l'Alphabétisation)</i> : Regional Responsible for Literacy
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation	SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
MDG	Millennium Development Goals	SAL	Structural Adjustment Loan
NGO	Non-governmental Organization	SAR	(World Bank) Staff Appraisal Report (equivalent to a UN Project Document)
PAPA	<i>(Projet d'Appui au Plan d'Action)</i> : Action Plan Support Project (Literacy project financed by CIDA)	SDR	Special Drawing Rights: The World Bank's lending currency also known under the acronym XDR
PAPF	<i>(Projet d'Alphabétisation Priorité Femmes)</i> : Literacy project prioritizing women (financed by an IDA grant)	UN	United Nations
PCR	Primary Completion Rate	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (www.unesco.org)
PCU	Project Coordination Unit	UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund (www.unicef.org)

UNIFEM United Nations
Development Fund for Women
(www.unifem.org)

WDR World Development Report (a
yearly World Bank publication)

WID Women in Development

XDR See SDR

XOF See CFAF

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1: General Overview

The World Bank and other international institutions have promoted market-based solutions for implementation of public services, because these private implementation methods are said to be more effective than state implementation of services. For this reason, public-private partnership and outsourcing have increasingly been used to transfer the responsibility of work that was previously done by the state to businesses and civil society organizations. The stated rationale for outsourcing public funds is that private providers are said to be more cost-effective than the state, and that outsourcing leads to the same or superior quality as compared to state-run services. It is in most cases difficult to verify empirically these assumptions, as the constant debate on the delineation between the roles of the public and private sectors has shown. The increasing use of private service providers is in many cases based on ideology, rather than proof of a superior cost-effectiveness ratio of the private sector.

It is clear that the change of provision processes from government to the private sector, whether justified by evidence of better performance or not, is linked to global policy changes. Policies favoring market solutions to delivery of social services are increasingly employed in most countries. These policies also affect the nature of the state and civil society in each country.

This research examines the set-up, implementation, and results of public-private partnerships, using a literacy project for women in Senegal as a case study. It analyzes how globalization and privatization policies influenced service provision in Senegal, and how these changes in turn influenced local people's conception of the state and civil society. The case studied is the "Women's Literacy Project," a World Bank-funded project that the Senegalese government outsourced to local development associations and organizations between 1996 and 2001. The project aimed to strengthen existing civil society organizations and also to stimulate growth of new associations for the provision of literacy courses. At the local level, the literacy project was designed to teach literacy (see picture 1.1), and also to improve the participants' organizational capacities i.e., building local capacity to manage women's associations.

The selection of provider organizations was done through outsourcing, consisting of a yearly bidding process that selected the best literacy course proposals for financing. The method went under the names of "partnership" (*le partenariat*), or "to make do" method (*faire-faire*). It is under this last name, *faire-faire*, that it has become known in Senegal and the West African subregion. By using *faire-faire* or public-private partnerships, the project contributed to changing the role of the state and civil society organizations in the

conception and delivery of literacy services in Senegal: the government became the policy-making and evaluation agent; civil society became the implementing agent.

Picture 1.1: Participants in a literacy course



During a period of five years, through this particular project, about 200,000 people were enrolled in local-language literacy courses. These courses were managed through the set-up of over 300 small provider projects (henceforth called “subprojects” to distinguish them from the PAF project).

1.2: Theoretical Issues

The theoretical part of the dissertation seeks to establish the connection between globalization, economic theory, and domestic policy in terms of service delivery. The interest in outsourcing and public-private partnerships for educational service delivery is

relatively new of date. Most public spending before the economic downturn and inflation problems of the 1970s was based on government execution through civil servants' involvement, except sometimes for peripheral services such as school-related transportation or canteen services. The modern foundations of the theoretical framework for government spending were laid out by John Maynard Keynes, who, in his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936), recommended higher government spending to stimulate economic activity. Most politicians were heavily influenced by Keynes' theories on government intervention and spending, if not by his moral principles that considered economic accumulation per se as something undesirable.¹

A sharp change from Keynes' ideas of a welfare state came in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Thatcher and Reagan funded their economic policies on Friedrich Hayeks' economic thought and focused on individual liberty and the restriction of government. These policies were dubbed Thatcherism and Reagonomics, and later became widely known as neoliberalism or market fundamentalism. Social services were in this conjuncture still a part of the government's responsibilities, insomuch as they did not infringe on the overreaching rule of individual freedom. However, the tax cuts of the 1980s reduced governments' possibilities to finance social services, which were increasingly regulated through market processes.

¹ Keynes was occupied by the moral and religious decay which he believed that capitalism brought about: "Now we doubt whether the business man is leading us to a destination far better than our present place. Regarded as a means he is tolerable; regarded as an end he is not so satisfactory [...] to me it seems clearer every day that the moral problem of our age is concerned with the love of money [...] with the universal striving after individual economic security as the prime object of endeavour" Keynes, 1963, p. 307)

Outsourcing is an increasingly used market-based delivery method. The term “public-private partnerships” has been employed to design a certain type of outsourcing, in which the public and private sectors join for the purpose of delivering a project or a service traditionally provided by the public sector. Public-private partnerships can be created using different legal or contractual forms. The International Finance Corporation’s Edinvest group, which has as its objective “Facilitating Investment in the Global Education Market” (<http://www.ifc.org/edinvest/>), defined public-private partnerships in the following terms:

“1. PPPs [public-private partnerships] are risk-sharing relationships that are firmly grounded on a determined ambition between the public and non-public (including voluntary and private) sectors to achieve a preferred public policy outcome.

2. A PPP usually takes the form of a long term and flexible relationship that is underpinned by a contract for the delivery of a publicly funded service” (Edinvest PPP toolkit, not dated).

In Senegal, the partnership approach was designed to establish a risk-sharing relationship, along the lines of the above definition. The government outsourced funds to private providers, and established yearly contracts for delivery of literacy education. The word partnership [*partenariat*] is used in Senegal, rather than “outsource” (the terms *sous-traiter* or *commanditer* are rarely used, these words can be translated as “subcontracting” and “financing of”). In the following analysis, “outsourcing” is used to define the action of subcontracting private associations to set up literacy courses. The term “public-private

partnerships” is used to characterize the relationship between the public and the private stances. The word “partnership” is problematic because it is questionable whether the public and private sectors can share common goals and risks in a situation where the public sector is subcontracting the private sector to do a job. The notion of “risk” is another problematic term. The highest economic risk may in this case be taken by the consumers (the participants), since failure of delivery will ultimately be most harmful to them. The literature review in chapter 2, and subsequent analysis draw on sources related to this form of service delivery, and try to establish whether the partnership in Senegal can be understood as a goal and risk- sharing relationship.

From an institutional economics’ point of view, the effectiveness of the partnership depends on the ability of the “principal,” or the economic sponsor (such as the World Bank, or the state), to control the actions of the “agent,” or the provider. The success of an outsourced service therefore depends on the ability of the principal to monitor the results of the service. Decisions about whether a service should be outsourced should be based on the possibilities of monitoring the outcomes of the service. The effective sharing of risks must therefore be evaluated (if the service cannot be monitored by the principal, the consumer will incur all the risks). In such a framework for analysis, the partnership must be evaluated from both its design and its implementation:

- A flawed design, especially in terms of monitoring and evaluation processes, would almost surely lead to implementation problems;
- Even a good design for outsourcing may lead to flawed implementation. Such implementation flaws may indicate that the service is not suitable for outsourcing.

In the following chapters, processes, costs, and results of the partnership model in Senegal are analyzed from their design and implementation angles. A critical analysis of outsourcing-based partnerships evaluates their overall effects on society, and thereby defines its suitability for delivery of services. Particularly, questions of how public-private partnerships address the unjust distribution of power and riches in the society are essential for the analysis. The analysis of public-private partnership for delivery of literacy services requires three levels of examination: (i) analysis of the design characteristics of outsourcing-based partnerships; (ii) analysis of implementation; and (iii) discussion to what extent literacy is fit for outsourcing based on the service delivery's overall impact on society.


1.3: Senegal: Background Information

In order to set the stage for the case study, this section presents the historic, geographical, and social contexts of Senegal.

A) Historic Context

The political map of Senegal is largely a colonial construct (see figure 1.2 below). The Jolof Empire in the 16th century represented a more coherent ethnic and geographic entity, stretching out between the rivers of the Gambia and the Senegal.

Figure 1.2: Map of Africa's Colonies



(Source: Atlas of Africa, 2000, p. 31)

Gradually, however, the Empire disintegrated into smaller entities. Inter-ethnic distrust contributed to even more partition when the slave traders began using prior ethnic distinctions as a tool for the trade. In the beginning of the 19th Century, the French did not have a strong presence in Senegal (the slave trade was mainly set up from Gorée Island outside Dakar). The English were firmly established on the Gambia River. French politics changed in 1850, when the expansion towards the interior began during the ‘the scramble for Africa’, which ended by the turn of the century (Pakenham, 1991). Dakar was made capital of French West Africa (*Afrique Occidentale Française*, or AOF) in the beginning of the 20th Century (Manning, 1998). The French domination lasted until 1960, when the Senegalese parliament proclaimed the country’s independence. In 1982,

Senegal and The Gambia joined in the Senegambian Federation, which was dissolved in 1989.

The first colonial (French) school was established in Saint Louis in 1817, by Dard, who tried to set up an African education system, built on the Wolof language. To do that, Dard learnt Wolof, and transcribed it using Latin letters. He also established a dictionary and grammar (Prinz, 1996). The set-up of a genuine African schooling system failed: after Dard's attempt, the project of making an African school system was abandoned. Schools that were set up used French, and literacy education in local languages was almost non-existent.

During most of the 19th century the school system in Senegal was managed by religious groups, particularly catholic missionaries. At the end of the century the French government gradually took over the school system: by 1900, 85% of the school population was in public schools (White, 1996). The school system was inadequate (in 1900, only 70 schools had been established in French West Africa), and aimed at educating a limited number of Africans to be employed as lower-level civil servants to help in the administration of the colony. Schooling appeared as something foreign, with its objective to train civil servants (Sylla, 1993). The colonial perception of schooling has continued to this day and has contributed to a low enrollment of girls. The curriculum is highly theoretical and offers little relevant learning for rural people's improved livelihoods. It is rather designed for civil service positions that are held mostly by urban men.

B) Geography, Human and Social Contexts

Senegal is situated in West Africa, with borders to Mauritania in the North, Mali in the East, and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau in the South. The small country, The Gambia, is situated inside Senegal, on the Gambia River delta. Senegal counted 9.8 million inhabitants in 2001, which corresponds to a population density of 48 persons per km² (Senegalese Government, 2003²). The population is concentrated in and around the capital city Dakar (25% of the population), and in the center region of the country (35% of the population). The east of the country is less populated. Overall, the urban population represents 41% of the total population (Senegalese Government, 2003); the country is thus fairly urbanized as compared to other African countries. Over 90% of the population is Muslim; less than 5% is Christian. It is a fairly young population; 58% is less than 20 years old, and the population growth is estimated at 2.8% (Senegalese Government, 2003).

Senegal is administratively divided into eleven regions (*régions*), each of which is subdivided into 3 departments (*départements*). Each of the departments are subdivided into districts (*arrondissements*) which are again subdivided into rural communities (*communautés rurales*), grouping a certain number of villages (see figure 1.3 below).

² See www.gouv.sn

Figure 1.3: Map of Senegal's administrative divisions*



(Source: Atlas du Sénégal, 2000, p. 68)

*A 2002 administrative change (reflected in Government Decree No. 2002-172), created a new region, dividing the Saint-Louis region into two regions: Saint-Louis and Matam. This latter, formerly a department in Saint-Louis, was subdivided into three new departments. This change is not reflected in recent Senegalese maps.

The regional and department levels are the most important administrative levels for education and literacy management. At the regional level, the Chief Education Office (*Inspection de l'Académie* – the IA) has one civil servant in charge of literacy issues; this is the Regional Responsible for Literacy (*Responsable Régional de l'Alphabétisation* – the RRA). In addition to the regional chief education office (which is a permanent administrative structure), there is also a selected body of advisers in education, the Regional Education Council Board. At the department level, the Education Office (the IDEN: *Inspection Départementale de l'Education Nationale*) has one civil servant in

charge of literacy, who is the Department Responsible for Literacy (*Responsable Departementale de l'Alphabétisation* – the RDA).

At the village level, the head of the village (*chef du village*) is the traditional leader of the community (although his role is more based on traditional prestige than on administrative duties). A community development committee and various other committees (youth and women associations, etc.) complement the village structure. Most women belong to the village's Women's Association. In most villages there are also one or several women's for-profit associations or GIEs (*Groupement d'Intérêt Economique*). These GIEs often have legal registration documents and associate women that are involved in the same economic activity, such as production of peanut oil or production and sale of vegetables. Frequently women belong to associations and groups (including finance networks), in order to obtain some financial independence from their husband. This is particularly important because the Senegalese society accepts polygamy, and the women in the household may be in competition for obtaining the husband's attention and for funds for food to feed their children. In such cases, women's affiliation with local financial networks and associations has both a financial role and a social one (Abdoulay Kane, 2001). These local financial networks are frequently known under the name of "tontines".³

³ The functioning of these market and social financial networks ("tontines") can be compared to that of a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA) or of an Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCRA): "In the ROSCAs, the lump sum available at the end of each [savings] period is given in whole or in part to one of the participants, most often chosen by lot. In the ASCRAs, by contrast, an accumulation phase precedes the rotation among members of reimbursable credit with interest. The fund can also be loaned to non-members, on the condition of repayment, at a higher interest rate. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE).

Senegal's population predominantly belongs to Black African ethnic groups. Nearly half of the population belongs to the Wolof group. The three ethnic groups of Wolof, Pulaar, and Sereer comprise about 82% of the population (Diouf, 1994). The less represented ethnic groups are Joola and Manding. They represent about 10% of the population, and other, smaller groups represents 8% of the population (Diouf, 1994). The impact of the Wolof culture is important; linguistics have estimated that about 80% of the Senegalese population speak Wolof as first or second language (Diop, 1996).

1.4: Education and Literacy Context in Senegal

After independence in 1960, Senegal had a very low literacy rate estimated at 34% by Camara & Sow (2003). The education reforms of 1971 and 1981 aimed at moving Senegalese education from a colony-inspired system toward a genuine national education system, and at the same time to boost enrollment and achievement. However, the public school system faced several problems, particularly in terms of its planning of education expansion. The government relied on day-to-day planning, without having any systematic approach to eradicate illiteracy: "it does seem as if, faced with a truly endless array of problems, the public authorities decided back in 1988 to give up the idea of forward planning. To all intents and purposes they adopted a new credo: to let problems

At the end of the fixed period, the members may decide to share equally the entire fund and the accumulated profits." [For market tontines] "the main objective is to obtain low-cost credit" (Abdoulay Kane, 2001, p. 299). These definitions fail to take into account the relationship between actors: "For the most part, these are exclusively female organizations, found in residential neighborhoods, in workplaces or among immigrants from the same village. In such associations, members know one other and are expected to attend meetings at which contributions and pay-outs are made. Absent and late members pay fines into a contingency fund that covers missing contributions on distribution day. In this type of tontine, social aspects, such as meetings, educational discussions and mutual aid, are as important as the money that circulates" (Abdoulay Kane, 2001, p. 301).

come as they may, and to cope with or adjust to them as far as momentarily possible, one day at a time” (Sylla, 1993, p. 371).

In absence of planning and as a result of flawed implementation, global donors, and particularly the World Bank, became very influential in Senegal. Some teachers in Senegal were less than enchanted with reforms proposed by the World Bank, and suggested re-baptizing the national education system as The World Bank School System: “the World Bank has taken over the bulk of funding for educational projects. Confronted with a staggering array of urgent problems while World Bank intervention increases steadily, the State stands open to suspicions that as far as the educational system is concerned, it has abdicated its sovereign responsibilities, and given up the planned management of educational investments and programmes. Some teachers, accusing the state of dereliction of duty, have taken to quipping that henceforth the system should be called the World Bank School System” (Sylla, 1993, p. 370). At present, planning and achievement problems continue, both for primary and for non-formal literacy education.

Currently, about half of the present Senegalese population has attended school, and is by government standards considered as literate (Senegalese Government, 2003). However, most pupils attend too few years of schooling to become functionally literate. The World Bank estimates the average years of schooling of adults at 2.6 years (2000 data) and estimates the illiteracy rate at 63% (in 2000) as opposed to 39% in Sub-Saharan Africa, or 38% in low-income countries (Edstats, 2003).⁴ These data situate the literacy rate in

⁴ See <http://www1.worldbank.org/education/edstats/>

Senegal among the lowest in the world. There is a significant gender gap in both formal school enrollment and attainment; 42% of young women in the 15 – 25 years age group are literate against 60% of young men (Edstats, 2003, using 2000 data). To correct the gender disparities, the government has attempted to set up literacy programs in local languages that are specifically targeted at women.

In 1968, a law officially recognized the existence and use of local languages; most literacy courses subsequently used them as language of instruction (Prinz, 1996).


Literacy training was an official priority in the years after independence, and no institution took charge of literacy as a particular mandate. In 1971, the Department for Vocational Training at the Secretariat for Youth and Sports was given responsibility for literacy. In the next fifteen years the responsibilities for literacy fluctuated between institutions – and the main responsibility of the sector was to coordinate different NGO programs in the field. It was not before 1986 that the Department for Literacy and Basic Education (DAEB) was created. The department had the following main tasks:

- To establish strategies to eliminate illiteracy;
- To train literacy teachers;
- To control and coordinate all literacy actions in Senegal;
- To promote local languages;
- To conceive and realize (i.e., publish and distribute) all necessary material to do the above;
- To provide basic skills education necessary for the population to participate in the development process of the country. (Prinz, 1996, p. 65).

Various literacy programs were implemented in the 1970s-1990, mainly by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, the scale of these interventions was limited, and the impact was therefore low on the overall illiteracy rate (Diouf, 2001).

Then in the 1990s a new implementation strategy was tested out, based on public-private partnerships through outsourcing, or *faire-faire*. The approach was based on an outsourcing model, in which civil society associations were subcontracted to deliver services (see figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4: Selection, financing and implementation of a subproject



The providers (i.e., diverse types of civil society associations) submitted a project proposal (often called “subproject,” or *sous-projet* in French) to a control and selection committee which selected the best proposals for financing. The selected subprojects were financed by various international agencies. The Women’s Literacy Project (or

Projet d'Alphabétisation Priorité Femme: PAPF), covering half of Senegal, was financed through an International Development Association (IDA) loan (IDA is the part of the World Bank that provide interest-free loans to the world's poorest countries). The Canadian International Development Association (CIDA) financed another program, *Projet d'Appui au Plan d'Action (PAPA)* or "Action Plan Support Project," which covered the other half of the country, using similar partnership/outsourcing approaches for implementation.

The outsourcing/partnership approach was set up during a policy colloquium in Kolda in 1993, which had as its objective to define a ten-year policy framework for literacy in Senegal. Representatives from civil society and several donor groups were present at Kolda, and would later support this strategy as funding or implementing agencies.

1.5: Direction of the Study

The dissertation makes use of a case study methodology to analyze the public-private partnership policy used in Senegal, and its application through a particular initiative, the Women's Literacy Project (PAPF). It is necessary to clearly distinguish between the policy plan and the project: The 10-year Government literacy policy plan was based on outsourcing/ partnership strategies, and was supported by four main projects (financed by various donors). These projects contributed to a reported enrollment of over one million people during a ten-year period (from 1993 to 2003). The World Bank sponsored the PAPF project, which was one of the four projects supporting the 10-year literacy policy. This project was implemented during a five year period between 1996 and 2001, and is

the subject of this dissertation's case study. The PAPF enrolled an estimated 200,000 people (of which about 87% were women) into literacy courses.

It is important to analyze to what extent the implementation method, i.e., the outsourcing/partnership method, contributed to – or limited – the impact of the literacy courses. All chapters will try to distinguish between literacy-related impact on the participants, and consequences that were due to the partnership.

The first three chapters of the dissertation give the background information needed for the analysis, such as the case-related literature, as well as a theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing the case. Chapters 4 through 7 explore the processes of the partnership model and their evolution through a ten-year period, from 1993 to 2003. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the outsourcing/partnership policy as it was defined in 1993, and how it was applied by the PAPF in the period of 1996-2001.

Each stakeholder of the PAPF is described in Chapter 5. The main stakeholders include the World Bank, various government institutions, the providers, and the learners.

Chapter 6 explains how the selection of providers functioned, and how the monitoring and evaluation processes were supposed to work. Particularly, the problems of decentralization are analyzed, and the difficulties of a decentralized monitoring and evaluation system. Chapter 7 discusses the project processes' design and implementation flaws, and provides an overall evaluation of the outsourcing system.

Chapter 8 explores cost-related issues of the project. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the cost of creating and structuring civil society to deliver and receive literacy

projects, and to determine the level of wastage (the word wastage is used to describe cost incurred by drop-out and non-success in the courses). To better understand these issues, the chapter analyzes the different costs factors involved in project set-up and implementation. Then the costs of literacy education are compared with those of primary education.⁵ The impact of the project is measured in chapters 9 through 11. These chapters investigate the possibilities for significant social change through the influence of civil society organizations and literacy services. Chapter 9 in particular analyzes the literacy results of the courses, and chapter 10 examines how gender roles and civil society were influenced by the project and implementation processes. Finally, in chapter 11, the stakeholders' expectations of the project is examined, and compared to the development outcomes of the project. This chapter also provides a critique of the project's development impact.

As noted above, the first chapters of the dissertation give the background information, such as the case-related literature and a theoretical framework, for analyzing the case. In order to examine the results of the project, it is of particular interest to analyze theories related to outsourcing, globalization, gender issues, and literacy. The next chapter provides the theoretical framework for these issues.

⁵ It is underscored that such comparison does not claim that literacy education should be substituted by primary education (or vice versa), based by arguments of superior cost-effectiveness of one approach or the other. It is recognized that primary and literacy education have different goals, and are necessarily supplementary approaches. The objective of this chapter is to provide cost comparisons of different delivery methods based on Senegalese prices, and to evaluate whether the costs of the literacy course were reasonable.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

We are constantly told that we are living in a global world. Images fill the television screen that underscore this point: we see terror from the Middle East, poverty from Africa, economic development in the far East. An array of stereotypes fills our minds. We often think of our world as filled with new phenomena; new terrorism, new disasters, new poverty. Rarely, do we look at the background of problems and their historic evolution; rarely do we consider the relationships between one and the other.

One reason that we categorize each phenomenon under its own label, and hardly ever consider them from other perspectives, is that we are used to doing so, from early schooling and onwards. The disciplines we study are labeled and classified; politics, economics, education, history, sociology, anthropology. If connections are found between the disciplines, then new disciplines even more narrow than the former ones are born, hence economics of education, sociology of education, and so on. It is difficult to understand an issue by putting it into a scientific box, labeled according to the discipline we feel the most appropriate: “The phenomena dealt with in these separate boxes are so

closely intermeshed that each presumes the other, each affects the other, each is incomprehensible without taking into account the other boxes” (Wallerstein, 2004).

The previous chapter introduced a literacy project in a developing country that received funding from the World Bank. This project can be studied from boxes, looking at its financing, its partnership processes, its gender aspects, or its literacy impact. But what to do if the financing influences the processes and the processes in turn influence the gender aspects of the project, which again influence the literacy impact? Then we have a problem with our labels and our science boxes. This case study makes an effort to go beyond boxes, and to show how different aspects of the project influence each other. To do that, this chapter draws on various disciplines, chiefly economics, education, anthropology, and sociology.

In particular, this chapter examines the interaction between economics, globalization and civil society, and their impact on the project. A working definition of civil society that draws on African theorists and concepts will be introduced. This chapter will further analyze gender concepts, and will study how gender and literacy are interrelated with economics, globalization and civil society.

This literature review and the following analysis distinguish between neoliberal views and welfare economics approaches. The latter is defined as liberal and socially oriented welfare theories (and has recently inspired “Third-Way” welfare theories, especially in the Tony Blair administration). The neoliberal approaches include various schools of thought that usually advocate for market-based solutions and a minimization of

government services. Both welfare and neoliberal views generally advocate for preservation of the existing social hierarchy, and would not find it necessary to radically change power relationships in society. A third set of theories explored in this dissertation, is labeled critical views. In the literature, these views are also often known under the name of “emancipatory”. The emancipatory, or critical paradigm, combines different theoretical standpoints, and includes critical theorists, action researchers (i.e., using Freirean action research), Marxists, feminists, and other groups occupied with power relationships in the society (Mertens, 1998). The power relations questioned can be based on gender, ethnic, cultural or social status. Many of these critical views emerged as a result of “dissatisfaction with the dominant research paradigms and practices and because of a realization that much of sociological and psychological theory had been developed from the White able-bodied male perspective and based on the study of male subjects” (Mertens, 1998, p. 15). Most critical views are social theories that explain causes of oppression, evaluate current social practices, and advocate social transformation through the change of power relations in the society.

2.1: Overview of Recent Economic Development Theories and Policies

The economic theories and policies discussed below must be seen in relationship with what has been called “development”. This word acquired a special significance in the 1940s, when President Harry Truman in his famous inauguration speech defined most of the world as underdeveloped, and proposed that all nations were supposed to move along the same path as the United States, and to aspire to the same goals of development

(Sachs, 1999). At this time, development efforts concentrated on increasing levels of agricultural and industrial production as well as exploitation of natural resources (mining, forestry, etc.), which, it was believed, would lead to economic growth. It was not before the early 1970s that leading donor agencies began focusing on rural development, and then, in rapid succession during the 1970s and 1980s, began developing specific programs to address poverty, basic needs, education, women, etc. (Sachs, 1999). The overreaching purpose of most funding agencies' programs, however, never shifted from the focus on economic growth as a path to development. Most project proposals were evaluated by their contribution to economic growth, and in this way, most funded project had economic growth as their ultimate goal.⁶ Using this goal as a starting point for analysis, the following sections seek to explain the growth-based paradigm from the following angles: (i) neoliberal; (ii) welfare economics; and (iii) critical views.

A) The Washington Consensus

As noted in the introduction (section 1.2), Thatcher and Reagan founded their economic policies on Friedrich Hayeks' economic theory, which focused on individual liberty and the restriction of government. These policies later became widely known as neoliberalism or market fundamentalism. Many international agencies (including the

⁶ The World Bank-sponsored Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for Senegal is a particularly clearly formulated example of how World Bank's conceive the linkages between poverty, development, and economic growth: "Different statistical studies point to a very strong relationship between the national per capita income and the poverty indicators, whether monetary or non-monetary. A recent (2000) World Bank study covering 80 countries has moreover shown that on average the incomes of the poorest 20 percent of the populations have increased at the same rate as that of the economy as a whole. In Senegal, the analyses made of the determinants of poverty clearly demonstrate the importance of the 'insufficient income' factor and amply justify promotion of wealth creation in a sound and stable macroeconomic framework being considered the primary pillar of the [poverty reduction] strategy, with the aim of favoring the emergence and strengthening of productive employment for the poor" (PRSP, 2002, p. 22).

World Bank and IMF) used this economic theory as a foundation of their development theories. These agencies would consider the governments in developing countries as obstacles for economic growth, and promote policies aimed at liberalizing markets and reducing the scope of the public sector: “[U.S. Treasury] pushed market fundamentalism on the rest of the world, both directly and through the IMF” (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 229). In the development context, a version of the neoliberal agenda became known as the “Washington Consensus,” a term first used in 1989 by a World Bank economist, John Williamson in an attempt to “distill which of the policy initiatives that had emanated from Washington during the years of conservative ideology that had won inclusion in the intellectual mainstream rather than being cast aside once Ronald Reagan was no longer on the public scene” (Wilhelmson, 2000, p. 254). The Washington Consensus was largely based on the standard market model, a core element of neoclassical economic theory (Todaro & Smith, 2002).⁷

⁷ Elliot Sclar offers a non-technical and concise overview of the market model: “The standard market model envisions a world of markets, each of which is composed of a large number of unrelated buyers and sellers. Each is assumed to be pursuing his or her own gain independent of the others. All are sufficiently small relative to the size of the market to ensure that any individual actions have little or no appreciable impact on the price, quantity, or quality of the product, which are shaped by the aggregation of individual decisions made by the larger market. From the perspective of individual buyers or sellers, these market conditions are viewed as uncontrollable givens on which they base individual decisions to buy, sell, or leave the market. There are no appreciable impediments to the entrance or exit of any buyer or seller from the market in question. Hence, no concentration of market power can accrue because of such barriers. All buyers and sellers are assumed to share equally all relevant knowledge (or ignorance) about the key factors determining product quality and prices in the market. Thus, the aggregate key market characteristics of price, quantity, and quality change only through the concentrated action of the equally informed participants. The quality of goods traded in such a market is assumed to be sufficiently uniform and known so that buyers need merely to seek out the lowest priced sellers. On the production side, the pressure of many sellers vying for the dollars of the most buyers leads sellers to discipline their production costs as low as possible. Sellers seek to keep their individual production costs low to achieve maximum gain, regardless of the ups and down of market price. It is assumed that every producer is aware of and has access to all the technical possibilities for producing the goods in question and that each chooses the less costly means to do so. If all these questions hold, the market is said to be competitive. [...] (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE).

The Washington Consensus promoted economic growth through a series of deregulation and privatization activities. It can be summarized in ten points, including (i) fiscal discipline; (ii) financial liberalization; (iii) tax reform – including cutting marginal taxes; (iv) unified and competitive exchange rates; (v) secure propriety rights; (vi) deregulation; (vii) trade liberalization; (viii) privatization; (ix) elimination of barriers to direct foreign investment; and (x) redirection of public expenditure towards health, education, and infrastructure;⁸ (Todaro & Smith, 2002). In this model, the privatization of social services was considered as a highly effective way of improving delivery. In implementing these policies, however, it was found that some had adverse effects on others, i.e., deregulation and privatization led to less public expenditure for health and education (Stromquist, 1999).

The Washington Consensus had as fundamental idea that unhindered market exchanges would be the driving force of economic growth: “It involved minimizing the role of government, through privatizing state-owned enterprises and eliminating government regulations and interventions in the economy. Government had a responsibility for macrostability, but that meant getting the inflation rate down, not getting the unemployment rate down” (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 230). The Washington Consensus policies used, among other instruments, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and structural

It is a world in which knowledge, technology, product, prices, and costs are all givens. Hence, the profit-maximizing position for each producer and the satisfaction-maximizing position for each consumer become highly predictable” (Sclar, 2001, p. 6-7).

⁸ In practice, health and education suffered from the implementation of the Washington Consensus, since government spending was severely cut. Although public expenditure to some extent was redirected to health, education and infrastructure, the funds available were in most cases not sufficient to continue a needed development of healthcare and education.

adjustment loans (SALs), to impose certain pro-market conditions on the borrowing countries. The structural adjustment loans were “designed to foster structural adjustment in the LDCs by supporting measures to remove excessive governmental controls, getting factor and product prices to reflect scarcity values, and promoting market competition” (Todaro & Smith, 2002, p. 810). The SAPs were explicitly designed to bring about a recession, arguably (from a neoliberal viewpoint) a necessary first step to bring economic stability and then economic growth (MacEwan, 1999). In the 1980s, the SAPs were severely criticized from many institutions, including International Agencies. UNICEF, for example, proposed a “SAP with a human face.” The criticism was endorsed within the IMF and the World Bank, and milder versions of the SAPs were proposed (Stiglitz, 2003).

The Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile in April 1998 further recognized the existence of market failure and the need for government intervention in certain sectors (some authors have called the outcome of this conference “The Santiago Consensus,” or the “Post-Washington Consensus”). The main points in the Santiago Consensus were only superficially different from the Washington Consensus, and included the following ideas “1. Development must be market-based, but there are large market failures that cannot be ignored. 2. Government should not be in the business of direct production, as a general rule. 3. But, there is a broad, eclectic role for government in [...] public health [,] education and training” (Todaro & Smith, 2002, p. 704).

The lending instruments to implement the new policies are known under the name of poverty reduction strategies that are to be coordinated within a comprehensive

development framework (CDF). The development frameworks are conceptualized in country-specific poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and backed financially by poverty reduction strategy credits (PRSCs). The PRSPs aimed to reorganize development assistance by improving donor coordination, and reducing the fragmentation of donor efforts. This would lead towards broader government-formulated policy frameworks and implementation mechanisms. Sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) emerged during the 1990s, with mainly the same aim as PRSPs (Land & Hauck, 2003). Whereas PRSPs covered a number of sectors (education, health, agriculture, etc.) in an effort to make a coordinated poverty reduction plan involving all these sectors, the SWAPs only covered one sector (e.g., the education sector, or the health sector).

In many aspects, however, the new consensus and the new instruments for policy implementation are only other versions of the Washington Consensus and the SAP policies, inasmuch as they still promote market-based solutions and at the same time use the basic model of economic growth as a condition for development. Both consensuses are based on the belief that privatization and public-private partnerships are more effective than the government. Hence, the private sector needs to do what it is believed that the state cannot do effectively: “The result so far has been a SAP in SWAPs clothing. PRSPs churn out the same failed neoliberal policies of the eighties and nineties. What the Bank and the Fund continue to advocate is more openness to trade and foreign investment; less protection of domestic industry; laws that encourage "flexible" labor markets (i.e., weaken unions and employment safeguards); more emphasis on exports; macroeconomic stability; no new taxes; and small government through privatization,

greater efficiency, and contained social sector budgets, but with some attention to protecting the poor--i.e., SAPs with a human face” (Klees, 2001).

State ownership and public delivery of services, it is often argued by neoliberals, cannot be done effectively for a number of reasons. Many politicians direct services towards their supporters. It is therefore rare that services reach the disadvantaged population strata, because these strata do not typically have any political influence. These arguments are usually held by proponents of public choice theory. Also, many neoliberals would argue that government services are corrupt, and that privatization, outsourcing and partnerships may have an effect of bypassing corrupt civil servants (Harper, 2000).

However, the effects of corruption on service provision are ambiguous, since a corrupt government is not only less able to effectively run publicly-delivered services, but is also less able to privatize or contract and regulate the private sector in the public interest. The pro-privatization argument states that the prevalence of corruption strengthens the case for private ownership, since it is easier to fight corruption in private companies and NGOs than to fight corruption inside state firms and agencies. Also, once an activity is privatized or outsourced, it is argued that the government control over it weakens, and so do the possibilities for corruption (Shleifer, 1998). A number of other arguments strive to prove that private provision is more effective than state provision, because it is based on competition between providers. The providers can be held accountable for their actions, while it is argued that it is difficult for the government to be held accountable for its own actions.

Usually, privatization was done through “the act of transferring publicly owned property rights to private owners” (Kasper & Streit, 1998, p. 303). Privatization took other forms when a large part of the prior state functions had been privatized, and there was still a growing discontent with the effects of Washington Consensus policies and the SAPs (Stiglitz, 2003; IMF, 2004). In view of the “Santiago consensus” governments and funding agencies, especially the World Bank and IMF, have been increasingly turning to public contracting of private providers to carry out projects and services. Privatization policies are now increasingly being implemented through the set-up of public-private partnerships: “by the late 1990s privatization was losing much of its earlier momentum [...] It was at this time that PPPs began to emerge significantly [...] as an alternative where there had been obstacles to privatization. After a modest start, a wave of PPPs is now beginning to sweep the world” (IMF, 2004, p. 4).

Outsourcing and partnership methods can be understood as methods of privatization that are built on cooperation between the public and the private sectors. The private sector includes, in most definitions, both businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), these latter being part of what is commonly called civil society. Private-Public Partnership in education is described by the International Finance Corporation as a “partnership between the public and private sector for the purpose of delivering a project or a service [...]. PPPs [public-private partnerships] come in a variety of different legal or contractual forms, but at the heart of every successful project is the concept that better value for money can be achieved through the exploitation of private sector competencies and the allocation of risk to the party best able to manage it” (Edinvest, non dated).

There is no standard definition for the legal framework of a public-private partnership. According to the IMF, the difference between partnership and contracting out is that in partnerships, the private sector designs the project or service type (instead of implementing a government-designed project or service), and shares some of the risk.⁹ Hence, in a typical partnership the government specifies and provides funding for the services it wants the private sector to deliver, and then “the private partner designs and builds a dedicated asset for that purpose, finances its construction, and subsequently operates the asset and provides the services deriving from it. This contrasts with traditional public investment where the government contracts with the private sector to build an asset but the design and financing is provided by the government” (IMF, 2004, p. 7).

According to their proponents, public-private partnerships are employed for three main reasons: (i) the government wishes to concentrate on certain key sectors, and uses private providers for other sectors where the private sector has a comparative advantage and where risk can be shared; (ii) in a number of countries public social services are inefficient and run-down due to lack of human and material resources, and therefore it is believed that instead of re-equipping government services, private providers can make possible a more effective implementation; and (iii) many donors view private provider-implemented programs as less corrupt than traditional public delivery (Harper, 2000). In

⁹ The risks taken by the private sector may include the research and design of a proposal that may not necessarily be funded, and may also be related to the results of the project: if the results are poor, the provider may be asked to bear a larger part of the costs of the unsatisfactory project. Within the neoliberal view, the risk taken by the consumer is not discussed, since it is argued that the consumer can vote with “his or her feet” and not “buy into” the service offered. In this conjuncture, education is not seen as a *right* or as something necessary for society; it is rather considered as a product or merchandise.

all three cases, according to a pro-partnership view, the use of private providers to implement services aims to improve the cost-effectiveness ratios without sacrificing equity. The stated objective is that through outsourcing programs, one will achieve a quicker pace of implementation, higher disbursement rates, and larger impact than traditional, government-executed programs.

It is often underscored that one key solution to avoid corruption problems and cost-cutting practices in partnership programs is to make providers accountable towards clients (or receivers of services). Typically, government providers are accountable towards policy-making institutions (e.g., teachers are accountable towards local or central education offices). This is what the World Bank's Development Report (WDR) for 2004 calls the "long route of accountability". In state-implemented services, it is argued, information about flawed implementation needs to reach the government, and then the government needs to channel the information to the provider agency. In many cases, such negative sanctions will be taken too late to have any corrective influence on the service delivery (or such correction will be difficult to implement, since the implementing institution is the same as the policy-making and control institution). This is why the 2004 WDR report suggests using a "short route of accountability" in which the provider is directly accountable to the recipients of services: "For the services considered here—such as health, education, water, electricity, and sanitation – there is no direct accountability of the provider to the consumer. Why not? For various good reasons, society has decided that the service will be provided not through a market transaction but through the government taking responsibility [...] That is, through the "long route" of

accountability – by clients as citizens influencing policymakers, and policymakers influencing providers. When the relationships along this long route break down, service delivery fails (absentee teachers, leaking water pipes) and human development outcomes are poor. [...] Given the weaknesses in the long route of accountability, service outcomes improved by strengthening the short route – by increasing the client’s power over providers” (WDR, 2003, p. 6). The WDR report further cites voucher schemes, public-private partnerships and other privatization means as examples of the short route of accountability.

Even strong advocates for partnerships, however, agree that the use of outsourcing in an attempt to reduce costs and enhance efficiency may lead to flawed results. For example, schools might substitute short teacher training seminars for more expensive teacher training courses. In such situations, cost-cutting incentives may lead to inefficient outcomes: “ironically, the government sometimes becomes the efficient producer precisely because its employees are not motivated to find ways of holding costs down” (Shleifer, 1998, p. 11). According to the pro-privatization model, under-provision of quality can be addressed through (i) making it possible for consumers to switch suppliers; (ii) reputation-building among providers; and (iii) where competition is weak, consumer choice is ineffective, and where reputational mechanisms are also weak, one can make use of non profit organizations as providers. Some theorists hold that the use of non profit organizations as providers has the advantage that their surplus in most cases is used to improve lives of the organization’s employees, and even to increase quality of delivery when the organization is socially motivated (Schleifer, 1998).

In neoclassical economic theories, the validity of these aims are relative to the accuracy of assumptions regarding (i) the ease of seller access to the market and (ii) the ready and inexpensive availability of relevant contract information: “the first assumption speaks directly to the existence of sustainable competition, and the second pertains to the ability to obtain low-cost and effective contract enforcement. To the extent that these conditions hold, contracting in a market-oriented society can typically be expected to be more efficient and more effective than the work done by public employees” (Sclar, 2001, p. 9). For most public-private partnerships, the second assumption of access to information has proven to be the most difficult to implement. Asymmetric information problems, in which the government does not know how the provider performs, have in many cases made it necessary to set up costly (and often flawed) monitoring and evaluation systems to ensure contract compliance, or have resulted in ineffective and unregulated service implementation.

B) Welfare and Institutional Economic theories

Most criticism of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus can be divided into two main groups, (i) welfare and institutional economic theories, which come from a neoclassical economic framework, but seek to prove that the neoliberal models do not take sufficiently into account questions of market failure and equity, and (ii) critical theories that challenge the Washington Consensus’s failure to address unequal distribution of wealth in society, in addition to challenging the notion of growth-based development. This section explores criticism of neoliberalism by welfare and institutional economic theories, and the next section proposes criticism of neoliberalism

from a critical point of view. Most criticism of the Washington Consensus that is based on neoclassical economics does not reject or question the notion of growth-based development. Rather than support a privatization model to stimulate growth, however, the critics offer their own efficiency arguments, which often support public allocation of resources and state implementation of services (Wolff, 1999).

In new institutional economics, transaction costs are defined as the “costs of running an economic system or a social system. They consist of fixed transaction costs (e.g., the specific investments made in setting up institutional arrangements), and variable transaction costs (e.g. the outlays that depend on the number or volume of transactions). Examples of variable transaction costs include: search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, supervisory and enforcement costs” (Furubotn & Richter, 2003, p. 496). The variable transactions costs can be particularly heavy when using outsourcing, because of the costs of ensuring contract compliance. The field of institutional economics further deals with such issues as privatization, decentralization, and corruption; it “connects the rationality concerns of transaction-cost economics with the formal and informal rules that social institutions impose on the behavior of individuals and organizations, creates a more robust but less specific context in which to evaluate contractual and organizational behavior” (Scar, 2001, p. 100). Within this framework, for example, there is no certainty that using private associations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to implement services will reduce corruption or enhance effectiveness: “It is often stated that privatization or NGOization would reduce corruption but this is seldom rigorously evaluated. Private providers and NGOs can also siphon off

or waste funds and perform poorly in terms of service delivery” (Azfar & Zinnes, 2003, p. 16).

According to institutional economics, the issue of bounded rationality is a main problem with outsourcing. Bounded rationality relates to situations when people do not take the action that would maximize results, because they do not have complete access to information of what is feasible (Kasper & Streit, 1998). For example, in the case of outsourcing, it entails that the actors’ (civil servants, providers, service recipients...) access to and processing of information is costly; each actor has a limited ability to store and utilize information; and the use of information of each actor may be distorted by beliefs and personal preferences (Furubotn & Richter, 2003). Such problems may lead to selection of low-quality providers, and of distortions of the implementation of the outsourcing/ partnership processes, because of design and implementation flaws.

Institutional economics recognizes three main ways in which people can be induced to make an effort in the interest of others: “(a) they make the effort to benefit others out of love, solidarity, or other variants of altruism; (b) they are coerced by someone who threatens them with the use of force (command); (c) they act out of their own free will, but are motivated out of enlightened self-interest because they can expect a sufficient reward. What they do for others is then the side-effect of their selfishness” (Kasper & Streit, 1998, p. 61). It is argued that the last type of motivation works best in large societies (Kasper & Streit, 1998). Use of selfish motivation together with bounded rationality, entails that each actor evaluates and chooses the implementation type that is likely to maximize his or her reward based on his or her flawed information and limited

cognition. The ability of understanding the actors' behavior is therefore a requirement to improve delivery systems. Each actor's behavior may be linked to the perceived cultural and religious rewards of the behavior, or to its cash value. In deciding whether or not to outsource (and in designing outsourcing mechanisms), one must therefore not only understand the possible economic gain of an action, but also strive to obtain a deeper understanding of each actor's motivation.

A further problem with partnerships from this perspective is the principal-agent problem, which arises when agents (or providers) act on behalf of public institutions (called principals), and when the agents have better knowledge about the operation than the principals. This is called asymmetric information (Furubotn & Richter, 2003). It is likely that agents act in their own interests and induce shrinking and other opportunistic types of behavior. The word "moral hazard" is used to describe situations "where self-interested individuals are tempted to violate general standards of honesty and reliability, and circumstances allow them to get away with it" (Kasper & Streit, 1998, p. 67). Moral hazard is a common problem in partnership models, since such partnerships are based on the principle of common interests (i.e., shared interests by both the state and the private sector to deliver a public good). In reality, the provider rarely shares the goal of the principal, but acts out of self interest. The state therefore has to set up costly control procedures to correct the problem of asymmetric information. This issue of control and information questions the regulatory function of the state: is the state capable of regulating implementation of social services by the private sector; is it willing to do so, and at what cost? These questions challenge the neoclassical economics' assumptions of

free transaction costs, freely available information, and rational actors. Seen from an institutional economics angle, it can be assumed that there is a case for outsourcing if these problems can be dealt with.

From a welfare economics perspective, the issue of equity of provision is usually addressed. Keynes is considered as one of the main theorist on welfare economics. In the face of the depression, he offered a theory to combat unemployment and stimulate growth through raising the level of government spending. After Keynes, different schools of “modern Keynesians” have offered theories as to how the government can deal with market failures of both micro- and macroeconomic nature in a market economy (Canterbery, 2001). At a macro level, the modern Keynesians propose, among other strategies, to use deficit spending and to increase government services. Such a strategy, it is argued, would combat unemployment and create greater equity. The greater equity would in turn increase aggregate consumer demand and spending, which is a condition for economic growth: “Insufficient aggregate demand in the short run, which would be aggravated by the weak consumer spending that would be associated with a high degree of inequality and a consequently high savings rate (following the classical assumption), would inhibit investment and thereby reduce long-run economic growth. Greater equality, however, would tend to spur stronger consumer demands, reduce the severity of short-run instability, thus encourage investment and long-run growth” (MacEwan, 1999, p. 90). This argument is based on Keynes’s theory that insufficient aggregate demand generates recessions, which are bad for long-term economic growth. If economic growth is indeed the solution to development, there are several ways to achieve it: (i) use of

government deficits to stimulate demand; (ii) expansion of export markets; and/or (iii) greater equality, which would arguably “stimulate aggregate demand through a higher level of consumer spending” (MacEwan, 1999, p. 90).

Keynesian prescriptions for economic growth are in exact opposition of the structural adjustment programs. The SAPs, we have seen, argued for stabilization through minimizing government. Arguably, Keynesian ideas of creating greater aggregate demand through greater equity and more government spending would result in more pro-poor policies than the Washington Consensus.

At a micro level, welfare economics are focusing on an equitable distribution of services and effectiveness through economies of scale. From this perspective, several problems may result from partnership-delivered services. If the participants are choosing the service they see most fit for them, these services would meet only individual objectives, while neglecting public needs: “the sum of the individual interests may not produce the best outcome because markets may have failures of various kinds” (WDR, 2003, p. 53).

Also, a market-based system may lack enforcements to ensure an equitable distribution of the services, which most societies have as a collective objective. The Washington Consensus (and to a somewhat lesser degree, the Santiago Consensus) did not advocate any strong agenda for combating poverty: “there is no mention of shared growth, the central need to focus on eliminating absolute poverty to achieve development in any meaningful sense, or of reducing inequality, as central needs in themselves as well as instruments of economic growth. Driving the several components of the [Washington]

consensus was the conviction that government was more likely to make things worse than better. There also was the view that poverty would be taken care of by growth and was not a major obstacle in itself to growth and development” (Todaro & Smith, 2002, p. 702).

Both institutional economics and welfare economics criticize the neoliberal model’s fundamental reliance on market mechanisms. They also tend to criticize neoliberal economics for its neglect of market imperfections and equity. Some of this criticism is taken up by neoliberal and conservative institutional economists, who will generally propose other pro-market solutions to counter problems due to market failure (e.g., set up market-based monitoring and evaluation systems to control implementation). These economists may criticize outsourcing programs; yet often find market solutions preferable to government solutions. In other words, they find market imperfections more easily repaired than government failure. Therefore, a large part of the economics-based criticism of the Washington Consensus and market fundamentalist approaches addresses design and implementation flaws of outsourcing and partnership, rather than inherent flaws of such mechanisms.

C) Critical Views

The critical views question the inherent flaws in the Washington Consensus. Critical views have their origin in a number of schools of thought that critique structures of capitalism, neocolonialism, patriarchy, racism, etc. They question some of the basic assumptions of the postwar development theories, including the following assertions: (i)

some countries are developed; some are underdeveloped; (ii) development is a series of stages towards a society which mirrors Western societies; (iii) the advancement through these stages of development is based on economic growth. Schumpeter used the word “vision” to characterize such basic assumptions. Critical views have advocated for a paradigm shift, in which one questions the basic assumptions (or vision) of development: “One might say that vision is the pattern or shape of the reality in question that the right hemisphere of the brain abstracts from experience, and then sends to the left hemisphere for analysis. Whatever is omitted from the preanalytic vision cannot be recaptured by subsequent analysis. Correcting the vision requires a new preanalytic cognitive act, not further analysis of the old vision” (Daly & Farley, 2004, p. 23).

Critical views, through questioning the basic assumptions of development, propose changes to the vision held by various neoliberal economic viewpoints. It would be useless, according to this view, to discuss the partnership/outsourcing issue in terms of design and implementation flaws, or in terms of cost-effectiveness: “the debate over Neoliberalism has thus most often been about which particular effects are to be identified and counted in tallying cost-benefit ratios. The debaters rarely challenge the logic of all such counting. The Neoliberals select and measure their subset of costs and benefits to reach their conclusion about, say, private vs. state property. The devotees of the latter, critics of Neoliberalism, select, measure and compare their subset of consequences to reach the opposite conclusion. Neither side challenges the presumptions of such comparisons – namely, that a set of conditions can be traced a single cause within the complex social totality and that all or most social effects of an economic event can be

known and measured to yield efficiency conclusions” (Wolff, 1999, p. 74). Most critical views argue that the vision must shift from the question of how to obtain economic growth, towards questioning how to obtain a more just society.

A core problem for the critical schools is the question of power and wealth distribution. It is argued that the Washington Consensus recognizes, implicitly, that power relations in the society are ‘just’ and that the poor will become less poor by the development of the economy as a whole (Todaro & Smith, 2002). According to critical views, economic growth is mainly profiting the rich, and thus having a double disadvantage of exacerbating income differences and at the same time firmly maintaining the unjust power balance in society. The critique of the Washington Consensus is based on three main issues:

- (i) The Washington Consensus is based on an erroneous basic assumption that economic growth is the core instrument of development erroneous;
- (ii) The Washington Consensus is based on an erroneous assumption that economic growth is contributing to reducing poverty through the improvement of the economy as a whole;
- (iii) The Washington Consensus is based on a biased ideology that precludes policy choice (since for neoliberals, the policy choice is already made; government is ineffective and private sector is effective).

Critical analysis of World Bank and IMF strategy documents argues that their action plans are ideologically biased, insomuch as their judgment of the government delivery is already established. Their pre-established vision implies that government service providers cannot be reformed, and that diverse forms of privatization and outsourcing are the best alternatives (Kessler, 2004).

Most critical views propose to address these issues through different measures to correct the distribution of wealth and adjust the power balance to give equal voice to the vulnerable in society. Hence, policy choices should respond to power and distribution criteria, not to criteria of economic growth. In analyzing the outsourcing/ partnership versus government delivery options from a critical view, the decisive criteria would therefore be related to social justice, and not only be based on questions of cost effectiveness.¹⁰

In 1987 the term “sustainable development” was introduced into the development discourse by the Brundtland report.¹¹ The work on this report started in 1983, when the United Nations appointed an international commission to propose strategies to improve human well-being in the short term without threatening the local and global environment in the long term. Sustainable development especially favored ecologically sound growth: “transition towards greater sustainability would require a more holistic approach to development, entailing inter-generational equity as well as harmonization of economic

¹⁰ Most critical views would also challenge the specification and meaning of cost-effectiveness analysis.

¹¹ The Commission was chaired by the then Norwegian prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, hence the name.

growth with other human needs and aspirations” (Mehmet, 1999, p. 133). In the 1990s, the notion of sustainability was adopted by most international development agencies, and even largely incorporated into the neoliberal discourse. A critical version of the sustainability concept contends that (i) economic growth cannot continue without limits because there is an ecological boundary for growth; (ii) economic growth is not distributed equitably in society; (iii) therefore, instead of promoting unsustainable economic growth, development should be striving to promote a qualitative change towards an improved and more equitable society. In this view, development can no longer be understood as a theory of stages in which countries are progressing towards a Western-inspired “civilization”. On the contrary, development must be understood as a redistribution of existing wealth within the society and improvement of production processes, to create a more just society, in which the equity and justice concerns are of an inter-generational nature.

2.2: Globalization

The debate on globalization is in many regards parallel to the one on privatization. According to a neoliberal point of view, the notion of globalization is equivalent to a market-based driving force that helps improve the worldwide economic system. Many critics take the opposite stance and argue that globalization, insomuch as it is a pro-market agenda, is a force that needs to be challenged and redirected.

The understanding of globalization is widely contested. Most theories of globalization are based on its economic aspects; the cultural aspects are often seen as derivatives from

economic and technical changes: “all the other dimensions of globalization – ecology, culture, politics, civil society – [...are placed] under the sway of the world market system” (Beck, 2000, p. 9). Globalization is largely understood as the creation of a global market, and one way it can be understood, is in its opposition to the term internationalization, which can be used to define relations that are based on separate national entities.¹² Hence, internationalization signifies “increasing importance of relations between nations: international trade, international treaties, alliances, protocols, and so on. The basic unit of community and policy remains the nation, even as relations among nations, and among individuals in different nations, become increasingly necessary and important” (Daly & Farley, 2004, p. 317). This section discusses the economic aspects of globalization and (i) addresses its definitions; and (ii) gives an example of how globalization can be seen as a neoliberal force in the delivery of education.

A) Definition of Globalization

The Washington Consensus favored development strategies are based on deregulation, trade liberalization, cutting of government spending, privatization, elimination of barriers to direct foreign investment, and financial liberalization. This agenda grew because of Reagan and Thatcher’s policies in the early 1980s, which also supported the integration of national economies into a global market-based economy, a tendency that has

¹² The economic interpretation of globalization is only one of its many aspects: others include civil society issues, social movements, international organizations, as well as globalization in terms of identity and culture. One much-debated theme is whether the spreading of a US-dominated culture must be understood as hegemonic or if on the contrary globalization is allowing for other voices to emerge and compete with the US-inspired: see for example Appadurai (1996) and Tomlinson (1991).

increasingly become known as “globalization”. The notion of integration of national economies into a global economy suggests to some that national economies are being disintegrated (Daly & Farley, 2004). Furthering this view, some would say that the global economic system is no longer based on autonomous national economies but on a “consolidated global marketplace for production, distribution and consumption” (Korsgaard, 1997, p. 15).

Arguably, globalization as disintegration of national economies into a world economy may lead to significant changes in politics and other areas of national decision-making, which would henceforth be dominated by the world market. Globalization in this context may be understood as “the view that the world market eliminates or supplants political action – that is, the ideology of rule by the world market, the ideology of neoliberalism” (Beck, 2000, p. 9).

The role of information and the pace of financial exchange in this system are important. It can be argued that the new economy is so different from anything precedent, that in fact it is replacing the very fundamentals of the nation-state. Hence, the new economy may be understood as “an information or postindustrial economy characterized by the global and instantaneous movement of unprecedented amounts of finance and information-based capital that makes the old nation-state economies, and therefore the nation-state itself, irrelevant” (Holst, 2002, p. 52). The emergence of globalization can be seen in stages from internalization towards increased global interchanges: The Bretton Woods institutions were created to facilitate international trade and investment after the Second World War; the oil crisis in 1973 made offshore markets expand rapidly; the policies of

Reagan and Thatcher further accelerated global market integration, as did the collapse of the Soviet empire in the early 1990s (Soros, 2002).

The interpretation of globalization as a new phenomena, driven by significant and qualitative change in market relations can be challenged, since the capitalist system is based on a world economy from the 17th century and onwards (Wallerstein, 1997; Pieterse, 2004). Also, the majority of exchanges and a large part of production are still taking place among Northern countries, and there has been no significant change in production modalities. By challenging the idea of significant changes in market relations, the notion of globalization of world markets can be negated on three grounds: (i) capitalism has always been global; (ii) there has been no welfare state compromise between labor and capital, and no qualitative change in the interaction between them; and (iii) production cannot be moved easily between the North and the South – the majority of production is still carried out in the North (Holst, 2002).

Instead of accepting globalization as new and global market integration, it can be seen as a way that the state structures and manages the functioning of the market. In light of this view, globalization can be considered as a neoliberal policy, or “specific politic choices (not inevitabilities) made by those with the power to use the nation-state as an instrument to maintain or enhance profitability” (Holst, 2002, p. 54). According to this reading, globalization is not seen as an inevitable evolution towards a weakened state, but a deliberate policy choice that aims to accumulate and concentrate political and economic power. This view would argue that globalization leads to changes in the nature of the state, insomuch as the state is less a representative organ for its constituency and instead

is a strong representative of international corporations: “in the 1990s, nation-states have been transformed from sovereign subjects into strategic actors, playing their interests, and the interests they are supposed to represent, in a global system of inter-action, in a condition of systematically shared sovereignty. They marshal considerable influence, but they barely hold power by themselves, in isolation from supranational macro-forces and subnational micro-processes” (Castells, 1997, p. 307). One can speak about privatization of the state, since the new modes of governing are blurring the distinction between public and private, between economy and politics, and between legal and illegal (Hibou, 1999).

In understanding globalization as a deliberate policy choice, it may be argued that globalization therefore corresponds less to a weakening of state power than to personal and often secret negotiations and arrangements between members of the political-economic elite (Hibou, 1999). The state is thus experiencing contradictory pressures from the local and the global. It still needs to have a façade of listening to its constituencies, whereas its policies are in reality dictated by multinational companies: “the more states emphasize communalism, the less effective they become as co-agents of a global system of shared power. The more they triumph in the planetary scene, in close partnership with agents of globalization, the less they represent their national constituencies” (Castells, 1997, p. 308). Arguably, such neoliberal globalization policies may undercut the democratic functioning of society (MacEwan, 1999).

From most welfare economics and critical viewpoints, whether one considers globalization as an inevitable evolution of the modern society or as a deliberate policy choice; the winners of globalization are the advantaged, and the losers are the populations

as a whole, and especially the poor populations: “it is clear to almost everyone that something has gone horribly wrong [...] globalization has not succeeded in reducing poverty, neither has it succeeded in ensuring stability [...] the West has driven the globalization agenda, ensuring that it garners a disproportionate share of the benefits, at the expense of the developing world” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 4-7).

B) Globalization and Privatization: The Case of Education

Many welfare and critical views contend that globalization enables governments to carry out a social policy that has corporate growth as its goal, and not welfare (Herz, 2001). It is argued that in the 1960s and 1970s many countries’ policies gradually shifted from the coupling of Keynesianism and internationalization toward neoliberalism and globalization: “The globalization of economies makes it more difficult to sustain regulation models based on the welfare-state and Keynesian policies which have underpinned economic policies since World War II, especially in Western Europe. Keynesianism was premised on the idea that national economies were real. The acceleration in globalization since the mid 1970s has nevertheless caused a loss of effectiveness of national policies in the sphere of welfare” (Korsgaard, 1997, p. 19).

As a result of a shift in local and global policies, responsibilities for implementing social services have increasingly been transferred from the state to businesses and civil society organizations. In the U.S., using effectiveness arguments, large corporations such as Edison or Tesseract have taken over parts of the public school system that are deemed to

be inefficient (Fitz & Beers, 2001). Although these takeovers represent only a very small fraction of the public education system, it has created an increasingly explored precedent.

Critical observers claim that many of these takeovers are leading to a wider gap between the rich and the poor, and that they put disadvantaged people particularly at a risk (Apple, 2001). Several of the takeovers were subject to severe criticism because the new for-profit education management organizations cut costs by using unethical methods. This is particularly the case of the former group “Education Alternatives Inc.” (EAI), which is now known as Tesseract Group. This company is, together with Edison, one of the largest EMOs (Education Management Organizations). The General Accounting Office (1996) showed that EAI “claimed they could reduce costs within the schools they managed by thirty percent [...] EAI implemented these cost savings through cutting personnel, increasing class size and cutting special education classes to help fund operation expenses. [...] Contracts with EAI were terminated after failing to raise levels of student achievement sufficiently, failure to reduce costs, denial of special education programs and misrepresentation of test score results” (Fitz & Beers, 2001, p. 21).

Whereas such a mismanagement situation probably is not widespread, some critics would make a case of the similarities between EAI’s policies and structural adjustment policies: Both cut costs by reducing personnel, increasing class size and cutting classes that were not deemed to be cost-effective.

The debate on privatization of education has been particularly heated in the USA, and each privatization method (vouchers, EMOs, outsourcing, public-private partnerships...) has been the subject of a number of studies. The research methods and conclusions from

each side (pro- and anti privatization) have been questioned, and the political linkage (and thus the basic assumptions, or preanalytic vision) of certain authors has been said to color research outcomes: “these [privatization] reforms have not been notable for their grounding in research findings. Indeed, when research has been used, it has often either served as a rhetoric of justification for preconceived beliefs about the supposed efficacy of the market or regimes of tight accountability or they have been based – as in the case of Chubb and Moe’s much publicized work on privatization – on quite flawed research” (Apple, 2001, p. 412).

Internationally, the privatization policies have not been grounded on a more rigorous research approach. Particularly, IMF used very contested SAP-packages in many countries, which contributed to the reduction of public spending on education: “In financial terms, most governments are under pressure to reduce the growth of public spending on education and also to find other sources of funding for the expected expansion of their education systems” (Carnoy, 2000, p. 44).

Neoliberal policies have been criticized not only for affecting the delivery and quality of education, but also for affecting its substance. It is contended that education has become economy-centered, instead of child-centered. The Norwegian education researcher Alfred Telhaug analyzed the education systems in a number of countries, “and identified a common tendency which prevailed during the 1980s. Although Japan, China, Germany, Great Britain, the USA, Russia and the Scandinavian countries are extremely different regarding history, culture and political systems, there is, according to Telhaug, a common tendency to shift from ‘child-centered’ to ‘economy-centered’ motivation.

When new school planning is formulated, ideas about social justice and personal development are exchanged for concepts from management discourse such as competition, quality and productivity” (Korsgaard, 1997, p. 19). In order to make education more market-oriented, there is also a movement to establish standardized curricula and standardized tests that are calibrated to the new economic needs: “In educational terms, the quality of national education systems is increasingly being compared internationally. This has placed increased emphasis on math and science curricula, standards, testing, and on meeting the standards by changing the way education is delivered” (Carnoy, 2000, p. 44). Globalization can therefore be said to have an impact both on the delivery processes of education (which are now more market-based) and on the content of education (which is now more economy-centered). The Freirian model of education as critical dialogue has increasingly been considered as threatening and regressive by education policy-makers (Apple, 2001).

2.3: Civil Society

Civil society has become a new partner to the government for delivery of education and other social services. Civil society has not always been considered a partner to the government; in many cases civil society represents the “people” against an oppressive government, e.g., in Lech Walesa’s *Solidarity* movement in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s. Currently, instead of being a representative of local communities and local interests groups, civil society is increasingly being used as an implementing agent for the government’s work. In this context, it is important to define (i) what is civil society (as

compared to private businesses or trade unions); (ii) what is the role of civil society; and (iii) what is the debate between the critical, liberal and neoliberal paradigms on civil society?

A) Definitions

The word “civil society” is known since the ancient Greeks and has led to countless debates on its definition and purpose. The term has often been used to characterize civic associations. In most definitions, these associations gather for a purpose that is not exclusively linked to economic purposes, nor to the government. Hence, it is often defined as a set of organized activities that are independent of the state and economic interests, as a “sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication” (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. ix). This was not the idea of the Greeks: civil society was first mentioned by Aristotle in terms of *politike koinonia* (political society). The Aristotelian definition of civil society did not allow for distinction between state and society; the “*politike koinonia* was a unique collectivity, a unified organization with a single set of goals that were derivable from the common *ethos*” (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. 85). This tradition entered the tradition of political philosophy and civil society thus became the designation of the state-civil-society unity until the beginning of the 18th Century, when Montesquieu sought to differentiate between “government” and “society”. He contended that political law regulates the relationship of governors and governed, whereas civil law regulates the relationship between members of society to one another. Therefore

government should be separate from civil society. The Scottish Enlightenment furthered the notion of civil society as an entity that was separate from the state. Civil society was claimed to be the appropriate entity to manage relations among “civilized gentlemen,” whereas the state functions should be limited. Also, for the Scottish Enlightenment, religious notions that had previously been inherently linked to notions of civil society became less evident. It was assumed that citizens associate voluntarily with courtesy, trust, reliability and concern; in different organizations including social networks, learned and professional societies, firms and markets (the Scottish Enlightenment did not include military, aristocratic, or sectarian groups in its definition of civil society). Hence the economic role of civil society in the Scottish Enlightenment’s philosophy is pre-eminent: “For those of the Scottish Enlightenment, civil society is principally the unification of individuals by market exchange” (Holst, 2002, p. 60).

Hegel and Marx were the two theorists who laid the fundamentals for today’s debates on civil society. Hegel had an idealistic notion in which civil society is the realm of the individual; the aggregate of the individual culminates in the idea of the state. Marx did not view civil society idealistically (as did Hegel), but as humans who live and experience it (Holst, 2002). Also, Marx furthered the Aristotelian concept of integrated civil and political society, and defined civil society as political construct and as an ideologically charged notion, insomuch as it is impossible to separate civil society from the state. In the twentieth century, Gramsci developed Hegel and Marx’s theories on civil society. Gramsci, building on a definition of civil society that includes the family and political culture, considers that civil society is a conservative defense of the existing

society's power structure, and whose function is the social integration of capitalist domination (Cohen & Arato, 1992).

Alexis de Tocqueville largely separated from Marx's definition, and explained the success of the US democracy by the existence of civil society organizations.

Tocqueville's associations included voluntary associations, newspapers, civic institutions, and local government in his definition of civil society, but excluded all large organizations that did not have face-to-face relations between their members. Civil society is, according to de Tocqueville, necessary for the democracy, since it relieves the state burden, checks the state's power, distributes information, and initiates people into public life: "The associations of civil society in Tocqueville's theory prepare private individuals for the exercise of public power, a task that the literary public sphere is, on its own, incapable of performing. At the same time, these associations preserve the connection of citizens to the prepolitical social networks that serve as their background." (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. 230). Putnam, based on Tocqueville's philosophy, defined the notion of social capital as an aspect of civil society inasmuch as "official membership in formal organizations is [...] a facet of social capital" (Putnam, 2000, p. 49). A networking society, it is argued, functions better than a society with no networks. The level of "connectivity" of the society is usually measured by the number of people registered in civil society associations and the number of such associations (Krishna, 2002).

These definitions of civil society are very western-oriented and do not accurately apply to non-western contexts. In Africa, for example, the notion of family is subordinate to the

notion of “clan”, and all clans have a clear economic *raison d’être* (Lachenmann, 1994).

One may argue whether or not a clan is civil society. Likewise, women’s organizations are often publicly registered as “Economic Interest Groups,” with a clear for-profit mandate. It can be debated whether these associations belong to civil society.

Furthermore, the current expansion of associations in Africa is not in many cases generated through forms of self-constitution and self-mobilization, but is on the contrary often constituted through assistance from government-financed programs (Thiané, 1996). Again, one can argue whether such associations, whose main purpose is to capture finance from the state, should be included in the definition of civil society.

Overall, a multitude of associations that are less known to western societies belong to daily life in Africa, e.g., “in West Africa the following types of movements can be distinguished: - movements linked to cultural institutions, such as secret societies, prophets, diviners, sorcery, etc., - religious revival movements and sects, Islamic fundamentalist movements, – new ethnic movements, - cultural, youth, and development associations, social movements” (Lachenmann, 1994, p. 70). Based on the above, associations in Africa can be roughly divided into three groups; such as (i) traditional mutual help groups (i.e., womens’ village associations, economic networks called “tontines”, etc.); (ii) religious groups; and (iii) new, development-related associations which have as aim to capture external capital for the purpose of setting up development activities (these groups are most often for-profit). In this dissertation, civil society in Africa is considered as a sphere of social interactions that are linked to political and economic interests, and composed above all of the sphere of associations, especially

voluntary associations such as traditional grassroots organizations, faith-based groups, and development-related associations.

B) Civil society, Development, and Neoliberalism

Citizens' connections to associations, Putnam argued, have both private advantages and societal advantages, insomuch as there are positive externalities to the society in connectivity (Putnam, 2000). Neoclassical economists further maintain that social capital lowers crime and amplifies mutual trust, thereby leading to economic growth. It is argued that a society with many civic associations and many people adhering to such associations (i.e., with a "strong" civil society) has a high social capital, which leads to a more inclusive democracy and to economic growth: "How many civic organizations exist in any given setting and how effectively these organizations perform will have a close bearing not only upon rates of economic growth, but also on levels of communal harmony and patterns of political participation. Governments and development agencies are being urged, therefore, to "invest" resources in building stocks social capital" (Krishna, 2002, p. 3). This view of social capital, drawing on Putnam's theories, is particularly attractive for neoliberals who are skeptical to the government (Harriss 1997).¹³

¹³ Not only neoliberals attacked the state: In the 1970s, disillusioned workers and intellectuals began questioning a state that was perceived as cruel and inefficient: In Eastern Europe, first in Poland, civil society was reinvented as a conceptual weapon to challenge the state. The anti-authoritarian movements in the East and the South "felt that civil society expressed their aspirations for freedom as citizens, their right to a voice and to representation. These were not their only objectives. Social and economic inequalities remained a major, if not the major, concern in the South" (Howell & Pearce, 2002, p. 15).

Civil society was at first not an item on the neoliberal agenda, which preferred to speak in terms of individuals. As Margaret Thatcher said in a famous interview with the magazine *Woman's Own* (1987); "you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first" (Thatcher, 2002, p. 426). During Bill Clinton and Tony Blair's governments, the search for an alternative way in-between capitalism and socialism became the topic of Anthony Giddens's (1999) influential Third Way. As adviser to Tony Blair, Giddens was defining a so-called socially responsible capitalism where "civil society is an intermediary sphere serving to complement rather than to replace the state" and "offers a third route to welfare provision, which is neither private nor state" (Howell and Pearce, 2001, p. 67). From the 1980s, the World Bank and other development agencies began to use civil society organizations in the implementation of its social programs. Recently partnership with civil society has become a new buzzword in the debate on democracy and development, and is now largely being adopted into the neoliberal discourse. In the 1990s, World Bank theorists such as Stiglitz, partially due to influence by Putnam, turned towards analysis of civil society's role in development (Todaro, 1996). From a development perspective, Putnam's theories could be used to argue that increasing the stock of social capital would be realized through strengthening civil society, and that the increased stock of social capital would have both economic and political results. In the end of the 1990s, especially through the influence of Stiglitz and Wolfensohn, the World Bank began to actively advocate policies that resulted in the creation of civil society.

From the donors' side, the idea of an accountable and democratic state that could foster economic development progressively gained ground. Criticisms from different viewpoints contended that state reform programs, including various forms of structural adjustment, had not gained conclusive results, and lacked political and popular support. To overcome these problems, donors turned gradually towards civil society "which by the late 1980s had already been constructed as a benign arena in contrast to the malign state. Housed within civil society was a potential agency in the form of NGOs and, later, other non-state groups [...] Civil society assistance could encourage external pressure on states for reform" (Howell & Pearce, 2002, p. 41). The role of NGOs and civil society thus became the preservation of a good state; or "system maintenance, in other words, the creation or strengthening of the democratic institutions that protect the rule of law, legitimate peaceful oppositions, and the expression of dissent in acceptable ways." (Howell & Pearce, 2002, p. 59). From a critical perspective, such a restricted vision limits civil society's role to a safeguard against the excesses of the government, one that preserves negative liberty by defending the individual against the mass.

In this climate of strengthening civil society as a tool to create accountable states, together with the recognition of market imperfection, NGOs were gradually conceived as alternative deliverers of social services and welfare. In the 1990s, development programs not only began using civil society organizations, but also set up programs that aimed to strengthen, or even to create civil society. By the year 2000, key financial development institutions, especially the World Bank under the leadership of Wolfensohn, began perceiving civil society as a main partner in the development business.

2.4: Literacy Education

The definition of literacy has been the object of much debate. Historically, it was possible to make a distinction between those who attended school, and those who had not; schooling was generally seen as synonymous with literacy since most enrolled students attained a literacy level (Wagner *et al*, 1999). However, by the end of the century, the number of people who had attended only a few years of schooling augmented considerably, and it was therefore questionable from which level of education one should consider them literate. The increase of enrollment in primary education contributed to making a much more variegated landscape of literacy skills, where the traditional dichotomy between schooled and unschooled did not reflect the population's literacy level, nor did it account for its abilities in various basic skills. Literacy training was in this context an ambiguous term, since it could be used to define formal basic education as well as non-formal training, and included all level of technical and basic skills levels. Instead of literacy training, the term non-formal education (NFE) became widely used in the 1970s. At that point, non-formal education was defined as “any organized, systematic, educational activity carried on outside the framework of the formal system to provide selected types of learning to particular subgroups of the population, adults as well as children” (Coombs & Ahmed, 1974, p. 8). Using this definition, all literacy programs come under the NFE umbrella, except (formal) primary education and self-study and/or informal family instruction. Self-study methods and also non-institutionalized family learning settings are frequently labeled informal education.

Primary non-formal education programs increasingly gained interest from the early 1970s as a way of addressing the problem of out-of-school and unschooled children and youth. In this dissertation, “literacy education” is understood as non-formal basic education for out-of school and unschooled youth and adults. The term “literacy education” is used to designate this category of education. Literacy through basic formal education (primary education) or informal education will not be covered here. The following sections discuss how literacy education can be analyzed from functionalist and human capital views, and from critical views.

A) Functionalist and Human Capital Views

Most theoreticians oppose functionalist views and socio-cultural views of literacy. Under a functionalist view, a person’s degree of literacy is not considered as dependent on the local context but as a pre-defined and measurable quality (Wagner et al, 1999). Using this viewpoint, one can define literacy as reading ‘automatism’ (e.g., reading faster than 1 word per second, so that reading becomes automatic).¹⁴

From the perspective of neoclassical economics, the reasons for implementing non-formal basic education are drawing on human capital theory and intimately linked to a discussion of efficiency and equity. Education policy-makers have often preferred investment in primary education instead of investing in literacy education. This preference often rests on assumptions of budget constraint and belief that primary

¹⁴ In a review of cognitive research for developing countries, a World Bank publication notes that literacy training for adults is often inefficient because the recipients of training cannot read at the end of the course, or in some cases that he or she cannot read fast enough to make the reading skill useful (Abadzi, 2003a).

education is more cost-effective than other types of education. Proponents of literacy education have suggested that literacy is a necessary complement to formal education, and should not be shunned because the perceived return of investment will be longer for young people, as compared to literacy education which is typically offered to youth and adults. Also, since most adult literacy education programs cover the age group of 15 – 45 years old, with a usual average age at about 20 years, it can be argued that literacy education is also likely to generate a long stream of return to investment.

Recent developments in the calculation of returns for education have tried to take into account effects of education that are not directly linked to direct income gains, especially effects on health. Such effects can in some cases be monetized. Mostly, cost-benefit research on non-monetary effects has concentrated on issues such as (1) consumer behavior; (2) health; (3) family life; and, to a lesser extent, on (4) asset management and (5) migration (Cohn & Geske, 1990). Recent research on literacy education has found evidence of impact on the following areas:

- Literate mothers support children’s education;
- Empowerment;
- More effective communication (oral as well as written);
- Improved family health;
- More productive livelihoods (Lauglo, 2001, p. 16).

These areas of impact are complementing earlier research, which depicted literacy education as a means to “(1) provide education to those for whom schooling is not a realistic alternative; (2) make new skills and attitudes available to the rural poor; (3)

circumvent cultural obstacles that prevent some people from utilizing school effectively; (4) use scarce educational resources more efficiently; and (5) modify the schooling system itself” (Papagiannis & Bock, 1983, p. 8). One of the few quantitative studies of monetary and non-monetary benefits on non-formal education has been done on literacy in Ghana, based on data from the Living Standard Measurement Study 1998/99 (Valerio, 2003). This study revealed little monetary benefits and mixed results regarding non-monetary benefits from the program. Primary school attendance for children in Ghana was one of the areas that were most clearly positively correlated with the parents’ literacy level: “Overall, the attendance rate is lower, irrespective of the child’s age, among children whose parents are not literate” (Valerio, 2003, p. 97). This finding is consistent with earlier studies (Lauglo, 2001; PIRLS, 2003).

Literacy may not primarily be seen as a means to obtain increased cash income, but rather as a way to stimulate political and social participation (World Development Report, 2001). Also, its effects on awareness-raising is claimed to be important. Hence, “education and training for youths is not only an economic imperative. In many countries young people’s dissatisfaction and disillusionment with their prospects for education and work threaten social cohesion and stability. Reaching this age group through formal and non-formal education is also vital to the targeted intervention in such areas as HIV/AIDS and reproductive health education and programs to raise awareness of civic rights and responsibilities” (World Bank, 2001, p. 14).

In addition to the above, literacy education can be seen as a way to restore equity and fairness for young people. Particularly, it may provide a second chance to learn for young

illiterate girls and women, who have often not had the opportunity to go to primary school for socio-cultural and economic reasons (e.g., girls who are needed at home frequently do not attend primary schooling, and some ethnic groups infrequently send their girls to school). The importance of literacy courses to serve these vulnerable groups is emphasized by other studies, e.g., in Ghana: “Literacy programs are achieving their intended objective and reaching their targeted population. Literacy interventions should not be abandoned in favor of formal education programs only; such an action could potentially marginalize even further the most educationally and economically impoverished and vulnerable population group” (Valerio, 2003; p. 200).

B) The Socio-Cultural and Critical Views

The socio-cultural views allow no fixed definition of literacy since they see literacy as culture dependent. Literacy thus becomes “a cultural construction that has meaning only in a specific cultural context. [...] To be viewed as literate, individuals must be able to manipulate culturally meaningful symbols and must be able to do so in a culturally appropriate manner” (Ferdman, 1999, p. 97). The socio-cultural view denies the measurability of literacy against fixed standards. Such a way of defining literacy rejects standard literacy projects and programs, and also rejects using standard testing: “there has been a tendency to compare or contrast all out-of-school educative activities in terms of their content and pedagogic methods. This has led to the misplaced belief that it is possible to borrow innovative ideas about education from Cuba’s parallel system [...] what distinguishes nonformal education in different societies [...] differences in the

intervention theories that underlie such programs and the contextual realities within which these models are implemented” (Papagiannis and Bock, 1983, p. 13).

From a critical perspective, literacy’s contribution to replicating existing social power relationships must be assessed. Literacy from such perspective can be understood as the degree to which a person possesses the skills that are valued by the dominant group (Ferdman, 1999). Therefore, literacy can be used as a strategy to “displace blame for prior political and technical failures onto the poor; reinforce social myths about people’s degree of control of their own fate; lead to person-centered treatment rather than institutional or system treatment in order to understand poverty; encourage and justify continued study of the poor rather than the rich” (Papagiannis & Bock, 1983, p. 10). It can be further argued that literacy education does not in most cases give the learners the formal certification necessary to gain access to good jobs. In this way, literacy becomes a way of containing social discontent by giving vulnerable people a poor education. At the same time, literacy education may replicate and maintain existing power relations in society: “If nonformal education programs are successful in producing more competent, satisfied farmers and fishers, they are likely to effectively defuse legitimate social discontent, and inhibit the development of concerted demand for social and economic restructuring. Instead of providing an alternative channel for upward socioeconomic mobility, nonformal education may rigidly maintain existing channels” (Papagiannis & Bock, 1983, p. 11-12).

However, also from a critical point of view, literacy education can be seen as a means for emancipation of the poor. Many states in transition to a socialist regime have used

literacy education to change the power relationships between people. This has been the case in the former Soviet Union, China, Mongolia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and other countries. Mass literacy campaigns, historically, were favored by socialist states that used mass mobilization. Some of the more famous campaigns took place in USSR (1919-1939), Vietnam (1945-1977), China (1950s-1980s), Cuba (1961), Burma (1960s-1980s), Brazil (1967-1980), Tanzania (1971-1981), and Zimbabwe (1983-) (Wagner *et al.* 1999).

In Cuba, for example, 1961 was designated as the ‘Year of Education and more than 250,000 men, women, schoolboys and schoolgirls were mobilized over a nine-month period into a teaching force to eradicate illiteracy on the island. They were transported all over the island and supplied with more than 3 million books and more than 100,000 paraffin lamps (Carnoy & Samoff, 1990). The literacy campaign brought the revolution to the most physically isolated areas of Cuba, and also brought the urban, educated population groups into contact with the rural poor and illiterate: “The campaign was therefore a means to connect elements in Cuban society that had been successfully separated by conditioned capitalist development. Bringing urban youth to the countryside through the educational system became a dominant theme in education from 1961 on, and the breakdown of barriers between urban and rural areas (both in production/distribution and in values) has been an integral part of the Cuban development process (Carnoy & Samoff, 1990, p. 176 -177).

One of the most influential scholars about literacy education as an emancipatory tool has been the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (1921 – 1997). His theories contend that education should be based on conversation and dialogue instead of curricula. The

dialogue should involve respect, and people working with one another instead of the teacher lecturing the illiterate (Gerhardt, 1994). Furthermore, education should be informed action, not neutral. It is impossible for educators to be neutral, hence they should have a clear political mandate, which would be linked to values of social justice (Freire, 2001). In this way, education should have as aim to develop consciousness about the possibility of transforming reality. This process is called “conscientization” from the Portuguese word *conscientização* (Freire, 2001). Freire’s concept of literacy education as a tool to promote freedom for the oppressed and social justice stands in stark opposition to the neoliberal views reviewed above.

2.5: Gender Issues

Questions of power relations are also underlying the gender aspects of service delivery. Gender-related issues can be studied both in their relationship to human capital (this approach is frequently used by neoclassical economics) and from a power and oppression perspective (this approach is often used by critical theory). This section discusses the notions of women in development (WID) and gender and development (GAD), as well as gender and globalization from both perspectives.

A) From “Women in Development” to “Gender and Development”

The debate on women’s role in development is of recent origin. The post-war discourse focused on increased production and development of resources. In this context, women were only considered as passive recipients of welfare policies (Heward & Bunwaree,

1999). This changed in 1970 with a pioneering study by the Danish economist Ester Boserup, which showed how introduction of cash cropping in Africa created gender segmentation because the new cropping techniques were aimed at men, whereas women were responsible for subsistence farming (Boserup, 1989). This study was followed by a great number of studies from 1978 and onwards on women's role in development. These studies were partly stimulated by a 1975 conference in New Mexico City, in which the UN inaugurated the Women's Decade. A United Nations organization, United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), was created in 1976 as a result of the conference. UNIFEM has as its core mandate to strengthen the capacity and leadership of women's organizations and networks and to test and build a knowledge base of innovative approaches to women's empowerment and gender mainstreaming. A Mid-Decade Conference took place in Copenhagen in 1980. UNIFEM prepared the conference by collection of worldwide statistical information on women's living conditions. These initiatives proclaimed that women were active contributors to development, and important to economic growth. In doing so, they claimed that investment in women was economically cost-effective, and would lead to development. In short "it focused on what women did for development, rather than what it did for them" (Heward & Bunwaree, 1999 p. 1). The effort to make women key actors in development efforts was labeled "Women in Development" or WID.

The development community responded to the arguments of economic efficiency of investing in women-related activities, and many WID projects were created, especially in the domain of income-generating activities. Generally, these projects were aimed at

women exclusively. They were later criticized inasmuch as they often added to the already heavy workload of women, and also tended to classify women as inferior or “vulnerable”.

The notion of “gender and development” (GAD) gained momentum in the 1980’s, criticizing WID for its focus on “Women’s development [...] as a logistical problem, rather than something requiring a fundamental reassessment of gender relations and ideology” (Marchand & Parpart, 1995, p. 13). In other words, the WID movement focused on approaches that arguably would increase women’s effectiveness at work through policies focusing on health, education and training. Proponents of the GAD movement insisted that development work should be based on a critical analysis of the relationship between gender and society, and promoted a fundamental social transformation of patriarchal power structures. GAD sees gender as a social construct: “the concept of gender makes it possible to distinguish the biologically founded, sexual differences between women and men from the culturally determined differences between the roles given to or undertaken by women and men respectively in a given society. The first are unchangeable, like a destiny. The latter are workable and may be changed by political and opinion-shaping influences. The concept of Women in Development is concrete and may lead to marginalizing women as a particular species with inherited handicaps. The concept of Gender in Development is abstract and opens up for the realization of women’s productive potentials in development” (Østergaard, 1999, p. 7). In this context, the GAD movement addresses the inequity of women representation in administrative bodies in development countries. Women are often excluded from

political arenas in which decisions about development are made. GAD's challenge of traditional patriarchal power structures (albeit rarely of the goals of modernization and Westernization of the development world) has made the approach less attractive for mainstream development and donor agencies, such as the World Bank (Marchand & Parpart, 1995).

According to GAD theories, the place of women in the community is linked to a female sphere and female activities that are distinct from the men's sphere. These activities and relationships need to be analyzed, both as they relate to development activities, and also how they are affected by them. However, it is argued that women and development must not be seen as a united, single "issue". It is important to stress the heterogeneity of women and their interests, which lead to heterogeneity in their relations to development (Heward & Bunwaree, 1999). Hence, "women are never simply women; they are daughters, widows, married mothers of small children, unwed mothers, wives of migrant labourers, mothers-in-law. The authority, autonomy, responsibility, obligations and workload they have in the families vary accordingly. And so does their ability to participate in a [development] project and the way they are affected by it. Thus we cannot simply ask how a project has affected women's roles in the family; we must ask how family roles affect their potential participation in the project" (Østergaard, 1999, p. 9). Gender and development theorists stress the importance of analyzing these relationships in all development projects so as to create projects that are "gender-sensitive", thus not adding to the already wide gap between men and women's relative positions in society, if not improving them.

The GAD movement rarely criticized the Western model of development as it was rooted in the very same Western concepts. Other feminist movements developed at the same time as GAD, offering a different vision of women and development. Development Alternatives With Women for a New Era (DAWN) was one such movement, which began in 1984, and set up networks of women scholars and activists from developing countries, who engaged in feminist research and were committed to economic and gender justice, and democracy. DAWN scholars did not only critique development at a micro level (proposing “gender projects,” etc.), but were interested in the macro level, proposing alternative paths to development as compared to Western modernization views: “DAWN's first global analysis provided a strong critique of the dominant economic model. DAWN's theme of Alternative Economic Frameworks, which provided the focus for the network's continuing work on the economic growth model until 1995, was renamed Political Economy of Globalisation in 1996. Under this theme, DAWN monitors and analyzes the systematic processes of economic globalisation and trade liberalisation and their impact on poor women of the South, working closely with other global development networks for greater accountability and radical restructuring of institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations system and (from 1999) the World Trade Organisation” (www.dawn.org, 2005).

The economic dimension of women and men’s work was traditionally a pattern in which men were employed in waged jobs and women worked in unpaid household and subsistence work. The movements that are referred to as neoliberalism and globalization had a double impact on women’s lives: (i) in many cases they changed the traditional

patterns of family income, in which the men were responsible for cash income; and (ii) they changed women's access to services, especially through the changes brought about by World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs (SAPs). The first point is demonstrated by the globalization of the labor market: "as the process of expansion of capitalism continued, capital proved gender-blind and the cheap, efficient labour of women was found to be preferable to that of men" (Afshar & Barrientos, 1999, p. 4). The second point, introduction of structural adjustment programs, is characterized by changes in service delivery that, it is argued, have negatively affected women (Stromquist, 1999). The debate on how globalization affects women and development in many cases is parallel to the debate on globalization and neoliberalism. The critical view contends that many state-based actions are still necessary to improve women's access to basic services, and that privatization and de-regulation negatively affect women.

B) Gender and Education

Access to education can be considered within a neoclassical economic framework as an investment that has the potential to lift individuals out of poverty through their increased returns in the labor market. This is the human capital version of education, heavily emphasized by such institutions as the World Bank. The social return on investment, it is claimed, is higher for girls and women than for boys and men. Education for girls and women will improve productivity, cash income, and lead to positive externalities in terms of consumer behavior, health, family planning and, to a lesser extent, on asset management and migration (Cohn & Geske, 1990). Based on this, "societies may also want more investments in women, because of the greater social returns (external benefits)

accruing from women's human capital compared to men's" (Schultz, 1995, p. 15). The World Bank and other institutions have noted a gender gap in education, and have been launching specific programs targeted at girls' enrollment in primary education.

Women's (and men's) education can also be considered as a human right.¹⁵ Such a stance has been taken by UNICEF agencies and many NGOs, and would lead to an analysis of education in terms of equitable access to education regardless of the returns on investment-analysis. Many agencies claim that the efforts of the World Bank and other agencies in this regard are not sufficient to achieve the international goals set for gender and education, i.e., according to the Millennium Development Goals and the Dakar Declaration on Education for All, to ensure gender equity in primary and secondary education by 2005; and at all education levels by 2015.¹⁶ UNESCO statistics show that the gap between male and female enrollment has been reduced between 1990 and 2000, but that there are still great inequalities between male and female enrollment and achievement, especially in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Washington Consensus and structural adjustment programs (SAPs), have been criticized because of the effects they have had on women, especially in regard to the state's withdrawal from

¹⁵ See, for example, Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), available at: http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_c_educ.htm

¹⁶ "7. We hereby collectively commit ourselves to the attainment of the following goals: [...] (ii) ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality; [...] (v) eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality" (<http://www.unesco.org/education/efa>).

the provision of many services. From a social welfare perspective, it is contended that these policies have brought many of women's economic and political gains to a standstill.

From a welfare and WID perspective, it is also contended that the curricula need to be reformulated, especially for literacy education, to fit women's needs. It is contended that the state's involvement in compensation for opportunity costs in education is necessary. Income-generating activities and basic skills classes, it is argued from this point of view, should be included as a part of the curriculum: "1. Strategies to improve girls' education in Africa need to work on the provision of basic fuel and water infrastructures for the household. [...] 2. There is a need to redefine the educational requirements of women and girls. Educational programmes aimed at adult women should go beyond literacy programmes to include knowledge of soil fertility, water use, animal husbandry, forest products use, food storage, nutrition, health and marketing. [...] 3 To accomplish gender objectives the collection and use of social statistics will have to be improved [...] 4. Financial assistance should be targeted to low-income women and should be available for low-level economic activities, including micro-credit capacity" (Stromquist, 1999, p. 28-29).

From a critical perspective, it has been argued that these measures do little to address prevailing patriarchal gender ideologies (Marchand & Parpart, 1995). If women have the same access to education as men, it is argued, they will still be channeled into women's roles and women's work. Equity in access to education *per se* does little to dismantle barriers to women's development that are due to existing power structures.

2.6: Research Questions

The previous sections have shown how globalization, current development theories, and theories of the new roles of civil society are interconnected and interdependent, and how they influence literacy and gender policies. The implementation of the Washington Consensus policies, particularly through structural adjustment programs have led to new institutional arrangements in which the private sector and civil society are seen as preferable for implementation of social services instead of the state, which is often perceived as an inefficient and corrupt.

By analyzing a World Bank initiative in Senegal, which made use of civil society for provision of literacy education, this research will examine the following issues:

1. What are the new roles of global institutions (such as the World Bank), government institutions, and civil society organizations in delivery of social services?
2. What are the economic and political rationales for making use of outsourcing to deliver social services?
3. What are the design and implementation strengths and weaknesses that may be encountered in using partnership approaches?
4. What are the outcomes and impact of outsourced literacy education services?
5. Is large-scale delivery of a social service, such as literacy, advisable through outsourcing and what are the consequences for society?

These issues will be examined through investigation of the existing theoretical documentation on the subject matter, combined with analysis of documents and quantitative data related to the Senegalese Women's Literacy Project, as well as data

collected during fieldwork. The next chapter describes these sources and the methods used to study them.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

This dissertation examines a literacy project, using a case study research. Case study is contingent on the triangulation of information from multiple sources of evidence, in which “the evidence may include direct observations, interviews, documents, archival files, and actual artifacts” (Yin, 1997, p. 76). In this research, the main evidence comes from case-related documents, surveys and statistics, as well as fieldwork.

This chapter first explains how case study research is used in this dissertation, the conceptual framework for analysis, and which boundaries, or foci, have been used to define the case. Then the research and analysis methods are discussed.

3.1: Research Design

Case study is in this research conceived as a method contingent on three criteria (i) the use of triangulation for establishing validity; (ii) richness of data available on the case; and (iii) the need for multiple-case studies (which can be made within a single-case study) to generalize patterns (Yin, 1997). These three conditions are present for research related to the Women’s Literacy Project (PAPF). Various sources of information can be triangulated to establish validity. These sources are (a) project evaluation information

(including data from a longitudinal study); (b) fieldwork data; and (c) policy and project documents reporting on implementation progress. Also, there is a sufficient richness of data available (the robustness of the data will be discussed below), and patterns can be established by comparing each provider's subproject (or 'small cases') within the case, and even by comparing individual learning experiences within each subproject.

A case study can also be defined as an object. By using this definition, a case study should be delimited by boundaries encapsulating the case (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1995). As it will be further elaborated below, the Women's Literacy Project is defined by such boundaries.

The outcome of the analysis is presented as a detailed description of the different facets of the case, from which patterns and generalizations are sought (Cresswell, 1998). The results from data collection and analysis have been verified through formal member checks with key informants in Senegal (Guba & Lincoln, 1982). An in-depth description of these methods is provided below.

3.2: Foci of the Case Study

A case study can be conceived both as a method and as the study of a bounded system; hence, it can be described as a "thing, a single entity, a unit around which there are boundaries. I can 'fence in' what I am going to study" (Merriam, 1998, p. 27). The study of the Women's Literacy Project in Senegal has been considered as a study with defined boundaries, and a specific focus. It is both a study of a policy (of

outsourcing/partnerships) and the application of the policy (the Women's Literacy Project).

The focus of the study is in part artificial inasmuch as it is difficult to think about any policy and program that is self-contained and does not belong to a sequence of historic events. However, the establishment of a focus is useful for clarifying the extent of the study and its limits. As historic focus, a colloquium in Kolda (Senegal) in September 1993 defined a ten-year literacy plan for Senegal from 1995 to 2005, and a policy for implementation of literacy. The policy was based on public-private partnerships and the use of outsourcing as financial mechanisms for funding of literacy subprojects. World Bank representatives were present at the colloquium, and the first discussions on what later became the Senegal Women's Literacy Project took place at that setting. The case study therefore begins in Kolda in September 1993, and the application of the policy began in 1995 (pilot phase of the PAF project) and in 1996 (main phase).

In September 2003, ten years after Kolda, a new colloquium took place, this time in Thies, which is one of the political power centers of Senegal. This event had as its objective to define the new policy orientations for literacy in the country for the period 2003 – 2012. The main focus on the dissertation will be on the outsourcing/partnership policy during a ten-year period between 1993 and 2003, and the Women's Literacy Project as an application of the policy between 1996 and 2001. Whereas the policy was applied nationwide, the PAF was geographically limited to five provinces in Senegal; Dakar, Diourbel, Fatick, Kolda, and Louga (see map in figure 1.3).

The actors in the case belong to four main categories: (i) International agents, especially the World Bank; (ii) Senegalese institutions, especially the Ministry of Education's Department of Literacy (DAEB); (iii) parastatal organizations such as the contract-managing agency (AGETIP), and (iv) civil society, comprising the provider organizations and the participants, organized for the most part in local grassroots associations.

The case now has boundaries, in the form of a limited time horizon, a limited number of actors, operating in a limited geographical zone. The end limits (2003) are more arbitrary than the beginning limits (1993), since World Bank financing for literacy continues under another program, using largely the same implementation modalities and covering the same geographic zones. Similarly, the present policy orientations are built on the partnership policy defined in 1993.

3.3: The Methods of the Case Study

The research has been grounded in the review and analysis of different economic literature, as well as writings on the role and functions of civil society, NGOs and the state. Also documents on development and globalization have been reviewed, and the connection of all of these issues to education policy and practice has been analyzed. A combination of research methods has been used to further explore the case, including document analysis, fieldwork, as well as examination of survey data and statistics. These research methods are described below.

A) Document Analysis

The case related documents include the procedures manual for subproject financing, the project document from the World Bank (known under the acronym of SAR; Staff Appraisal Report), various evaluation documents, and the project coordination unit's newspaper, *Partage*, of which the 21 issues that were published since the project's initiation in 1996 until 2003 are used.

Of particular interest is the project's procedures manual, which gives an overview of the internal functioning of the program, and especially the procedures to obtain financing. The procedures manual in use between 2000-2002 has been used for this analysis. Also, different source documents (including various evaluation reports) have been analyzed from the different conceptual viewpoints discussed in the literature review (see Annex 1 for a list of source documents). To ensure validity, the analysis has considered the history of the documents, the authorship of the documents and subsequent editions, the intended use of the document, the sources of documentation and possible biases of the document (Merriam, 1995).

B) Analysis of Survey Data and Statistics

The analysis of survey data and statistics has made use of descriptive statistical analysis for the most part, which aimed to provide an overview of the different outcomes of the project and the costs involved. The statistical and survey data available on the women's literacy program include the following:

- Statistics from the DAEB and the World Bank (on yearly course enrollment, evaluation, and success);
- Statistics from the project coordination unit (PCU) based on reports from providers;
- Survey data from an impact study undertaken by the DAEB (a draft 1st phase progress report has been used);
- Data from a longitudinal study (three progress reports are available).

Statistical data from the DAEB, PCU and the World Bank are at times conflicting, since three agencies are involved in collection of statistics and use different collection and reporting methods. The statistics cover enrollment data (number of enrollees, their gender, and in some cases, their ages, and educational background) and some data on learning outcomes. The data do not usually take into account the characteristics of new participants who replace participants dropping out from the course, so it is difficult to compare enrollment statistics with final-test results. The statistical evidence from the project is therefore at best only providing a very partial image of the project.

An impact study started in 2003, and is expected to be finished in 2006. The impact study analyzes the impact of literacy classes as implemented by four main literacy projects in Senegal on a sample of learners.¹⁷ An unpublished draft report is available at this point, and contains data on enrollment characteristics of the learners in terms of literacy, education, health, and household income (the acronym “IS” is used to refer to the draft report of the impact study’s first phase, written in 2004). The survey sample is

¹⁷ The impact study covers the following main projects: PAPA (Canadian-funded program based on outsourcing), PDEF/NF (the World Bank-funded continuation of the Women’s Literacy Program), PAIS (Government program based on outsourcing), and a Rural Poverty Alleviation Program (Integrated rural development program with a literacy component).

1000 participants (representing and providing data on 1000 households) in the experiment group and 500 participants/households in the control group. The sampling is weighed according to the projects' size and characteristics. Accordingly, 300 people are interviewed from the PDEF-NF project. Although the time-line of the impact evaluation is outside the boundaries of the case study (the Women's Literacy Project ended in 2001, and World Bank financing continues through PDEF-NF), the first progress report has provided important data on enrollment characteristics of learners.

A longitudinal study started in 2000, and investigated the subprojects of 20 providers, which included information about the outcomes of 60 literacy classes, with a total of 1500 participants. The initial interviews took place before the start of the course, which was labeled "T0". Subsequent interviews were undertaken 6 and 24 months after the courses had begun, and were labeled "T1.1" and "T1.2" respectively (the abbreviations of LS for longitudinal study, as well as T0, T1.1, and T1.2, are used henceforth in this dissertation). References to the three different reports of the longitudinal study are made as follows: (LS-T0, 2001); (LS-T1, 2002); (LS-T1.2, 2003), and should not be confounded with the impact study, which is referred to as follows: (IS, 2004).

The longitudinal study examines the characteristics of the learners, the providers, the facilitators, the supervisors, and the administrative staff members. The study is most concerned with the actual literacy learning and does not investigate the socio-economic characteristics of the participants. The data only contain indirect information on enrollment and dropout (i.e., it is stated that the reduction in sample population was largely due to dropout). The total number of learners covered was 1516 in T0, 1151 in

T1, and 737 in T1.2. The data includes information about the learners' knowledge to reading, math, and basic skills (including health and income-generating skills).

All quantitative data (i.e., all surveys and statistics) from the project have been used with extreme caution, and interpretations have been done by triangulating results with results from the qualitative research. This is particularly important since Senegal institutions, and the DAEB in particular, have little experience in gathering statistical information. Analysis of statistical materials alone leads to inconclusive indications about the functioning of the project.

3.4: Field Work

The main part of the field work was done in January and February 2004. This section presents the research design, sample, and methods used to collect and analyze data.

A) Research Design

The aim of the fieldwork was to describe and analyze the Women's Literacy Project from a participant's perspective, in terms of project processes, goals, and impact. It was based on personal on-site interviews and group discussions. Key informants with special knowledge of the project were consulted. The interviews were based on unstructured and semi-structured questionnaires, which partially drew on feminist critical methods for substance and data collection methods (see section D below). Since the fieldwork focused mainly on only one aspect of the participant's lives, i.e., their interaction with the literacy project and the outcomes thereof; a compressed ethnographic research design

was used, using two cognitive elicitation methods: (i) individual and group interviews with representative samples of learners; and (ii) unstructured and semi structured interviews with key informants having special expertise in the topics of literacy. A compressed ethnographic study is a modified ethnography that accommodates to shortened time lines and multiple sites; it requires that the researcher is already familiar with the field setting (Schensul, *et al* 1999, vol. 1).

The fieldwork data enable a “thick description” of the Women’s Literacy Project. Thick description is the term for emic interpretations Clifford Geertz popularized in 1973 (Stake, 1995). Emic approaches “seek to understand the meaning of people’s lives, as they themselves define them” (Schensul, *et al*, 1999, vol. 6, p. 10). To establish a thick description, many of the interviews have been constructed as a small story about the participant (or a small case study within the overall study of the literacy project). This approach has been drawing on narrative inquiry methods, which are using the accounts of single individuals to develop a picture of the issues that are being investigated (Schensul, Schensul & LeCompte, 1999, vol. 1). The research strives to give the project stakeholders a voice, and the use of quotations from the interviews is the preferred method used throughout the document, instead of simply describing what the stakeholders said.

B) Sample

The aim of the sampling was to allow for different stories which would give a broad understanding of the project. Hence it was deemed “useful to try to select cases which

are typical or representative of other cases [...] Case study research is not sampling research” (Stake, 1995, p. 4). In all, 52 interviews were conducted, transcribed and coded.¹⁸ The interviewees, as well as focus groups and classroom participants can be divided into the following three broad categories: (i) civil servants, (ii) consultants and staff of provider associations; and (iii) learners (see table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Interview sample: categories of interviewees in Senegal

Category	Number of people
Civil Servants (excluding consultants that have been former civil servants)	14
Civil Society (including consultants and 10 former civil servants)	23
Learners	14
Parastatal	1

As noted above, the sample size is intended to give as broad knowledge as possible of the case. Sampling was therefore stratified, trying to cover all categories involved in the project. The characteristics of the sampled population are as follows: of the civil servants, all, excepted one (7%) were male. Overall, 57% of the civil servants were based in urban areas, 43% were in rural areas. At least 43% of the interviewees from the civil society were former civil servants. Most of them were based in rural areas (57%), and most were male (74%). All interviewees were Senegalese, from mixed ethnic

¹⁸ Mertens (1998) suggests using a sample size of 30-50 interviews in ethnographic research. This number was found to be on the low side, since so many different categories of people, both from civil society and civil service, are involved in this particular case.

backgrounds, except one provider staff who was American. As for the learners, most (57%) were living in urban areas, and only one (7%) was male. Two of the learners functioned as relais (14%). The average age of the interviewed learners was 36 years old (which is older than the project's average learner age), and at least 21% of the learners held positions in the local women's association. The interviews were completed by discussions with current learners during classroom visits. A complete list of the interviewees is annexed (see Annex 2).

The interviews were conducted in three different provinces (out of five involved in the project), including Dakar, Diourbel, and Louga (see map, figure 1.3). The choice of interviewees was based on representative samples of learners, chosen from three different learning centers.

To gain a more accurate image of the project, the field visits were not announced in advance. During most visits the interviews were undertaken with the help of a translator (who translated into Wolof, Pulaar or Serreer, depending on the area). Most visits took place in the afternoon, at a time of the day when it was usual for literacy classes to gather. When the field visit did not coincide with a literacy class session, available participants were interviewed. If the class session took place on arrival, the class was often interrupted, and discussion took place, either with individual participants, or with the participant group as a whole.¹⁹ The interviews and discussions within each site were therefore in many cases be based on sampling of "any group readily accessible to the

¹⁹ Some disruption of the class was inevitable when outside visitors arrived to the village.

researcher that reasonably might be assumed to possess characteristics relevant to the study” (Schensul, *et al*, 1999, vol. 2, p. 233). This approach is recommended in ethnographic and case research: “If we can, we need to pick cases which are easy to get to and hospitable to our inquiry, perhaps for which a prospective informant can be identified” (Stake, 1995, p. 4).

Different provider staff members and consultants were used as key informants. The selection of key informants was based on purposeful sampling, i.e., representative providers were selected, based on (i) ethnicity; (ii) results (e.g., staff from provider associations with particularly good and particularly bad results were selected for interviewing); and (iii) rural/urban providers. The sampling was made to obtain the largest possible information base for understanding the project. At ministry level, interviews were undertaken with the key informants, including the Director of the Ministry of Education’s Department of Literacy (DAEB), the Head of Evaluation Section at DAEB, and with independent consultants who had been involved in the project’s design and evaluation. In addition to the people interviewed during the fieldwork, World Bank and UNESCO staff members were also interviewed and consulted at various stages of the drafting of the dissertation.

C) Issues of Entry, Personal Biography, and Ethics

The use of various techniques for data collection and analysis must take into account the features of the researcher (Stake, 1995). My ethnic, cultural and gender background is different from the background of most participants in the Women’s Literacy Project in

Senegal. Also, I have had prior exposure to the project as a consultant for the World Bank. In total, I have been working (part-time) for five years on issues related to the Women's Literacy Project. My involvement with the project included the organization of and participation in various workshops (on monitoring & evaluation processes, outsourcing, etc.), and involvement in different evaluation activities (including participation in the research for the project's Implementation Completion Report, and set-up of the Impact Study). Also, I have written two documents for the World Bank on the project: *Managing Public-private Partnerships: Lessons from Literacy Education in Senegal* (2004), and *When Governments gets Creative: Adult Literacy in Senegal* (2004). My previous exposure to the project could not be changed (or set aside) during the fieldwork for this dissertation: "researchers do not step outside their ordinary lives when they observe and interpret and write up the workings of a case" (Stake, 1995, p. 134). Instead of considering my past involvement in the project as an obstacles, I found that it gave me certain advantages, including easy access to key project stakeholders: "the way the case and the researchers interact is presumed unique and not necessarily reproducible for other cases and researchers. The quality and utility of the research is not based on its reproducibility but on whether or not the meanings generated, by the researcher or the reader, are valued. [...] Each researcher's style and curiosity will be unique in some ways" (Stake, 1995, p. 134). The aim of the research was not to find one truth that could be replicated by someone else undertaking the same research, but to find meaning based on various stories and events that I was able to study due to my unique experience.

The freedom of speech in Senegal makes it possible for any literacy participant to state his or her opinion without any risks for retaliation from the government's side, even if this latter is directly criticized²⁰. Many of the interviewees were still illiterate, even if they were at the end of the course – or if they had attended both primary schooling and literacy course(s). This fact was not seen as a shame, and readily shared with me.

Likewise, the fact of being poor or having difficulties was not seen as factors of shame that should be hidden. On the contrary, most local people in Senegal deemed that such factors should be explained to the officials and to the researcher.

Most interviewed people found anonymity undesirable. A visit from the capital, from the outside, was seen as a rare way of obtaining a voice, of declaring one's meaning about something. Many people therefore insisted on giving the interviewer their name and contact information. Most interviewees were willing – and even enthusiastic – about being interviewed. In the dissertation, for clarity reasons, only the function of the interviewee has been displayed, i.e., current learner, chief of village, provider staff, etc. Statements by the former Minister of Education, and the current head of the Ministry of Education's Department of Literacy (DAEB), since they provide information of a particular importance to my research, have in some cases been – with their consent – attributed to them.

²⁰ As an example of open criticism of the government is the best-seller *Wade, un Opposant au Pouvoir, L'Alternance Piégée* (Coulibaly, 1999). [*Wade, an Opponent in Power: The Trapped Alternation*].

D) Data Collection Procedures

The interviews made use of three recording methods: audiotaping (using digital minidisks), videotaping/ photography, and taking written notes.²¹ The interviews (regardless of whether or not written notes were taken), were recorded on digital minidisks with high storing capacities. This enabled the possibility to check accuracy of the written notes after the interview was conducted. Some literacy sites were videotaped and photographed, to facilitate description and analysis of the classroom setting.

The data collection procedures were built on the principles of feminist research, including the following: “- Conduct sequential interviews in an interactive, dialogical manner that entails self-disclosure on the part of the researcher and fosters a sense of collaboration. - Conduct group interviews that provide potential for deeper probing and reciprocally educative encounters. - Negotiate meanings of results with participants in the study. - Strive to address issues of false consciousness and conceptual determinism. - Be self-reflective about what researchers experience when they conduct research” (Cresswell, 1998, 83-84). Self-reflective notes were recorded in a field journal, which was consulted throughout the drafting of the dissertation. Also, notes and recordings were subject to in-the-field analysis, and enabled consequent fine-tuning of interview questions.

²¹ Most case study researchers recommend using written notes, because of the time-consuming transcription of audiotaping (Stake, 1995).

E) Data Analysis Procedures

After recording, the field notes and recordings were transcribed. All interviews were fully transcribed. Some transcriptions were done directly from French into English, and in some cases when the data could not easily be understood, they were transcribed into French before translated into English.

The data were coded by assigning a “shorthand designation to various aspects of [the] data”. (Merriam, 1998, p. 164). The coding scheme identified themes that illustrated information relevant to the research question. Coding and subsequent analysis was done through the use of qualitative software NVIVO. The choice to use NVIVO was done after the data collection²². There are two types of coding. The main coding model was created by reading the interviews and classifying the information provided (see illustration of model in Annex 3).

This first model divided the interview information into four main nodes, describing the interviewees answers on (i) the subproject processes, including selection, monitoring & evaluation, and decentralization; (ii) the literacy education impact as experienced by the interviewee in different domains such as health, gender relationships, literacy; (iii) the costs involved in the set-up of the subproject, including direct and opportunity costs, and cost of the subproject model as a whole. For each category, there is a node for critique,

²² Merriam recommends choosing such software after the fieldwork. If it is chosen prior to data collection and coding, the “software tools will shape a researcher’s choice of methods; those easy to do on the computer will be chosen over those difficult to do. They may impose a certain set of procedures, a chronology, or an undesirable rigidity of approach. They may blur the lines between quantitative and qualitative in an unacceptable manner” (Merriam, 1998, p. 173).

e.g., stakeholders critique of selection processes, or their critique of impact on literacy, or again their critique on the cost model. A fourth (iv) category codes background information of the project. The chapters of the dissertation follow this coding model, i.e., the dissertation's first chapters describe the background and the processes of the Women's Literacy Project; then a chapter analyses the project costs, and the last chapters describe the project's impact.

A second coding system (in addition to the four main nodes and their node "children" shown in Annex 3) was superimposed, which more directly related to the research questions. This additional coding system divided the interviews according to information gathered on development theory, gender, civil society, and outsourcing.

F) Validity Controls

Data from different interviews and from different sources (including data from secondary sources) have been triangulated to search for consistency. Different methods of triangulation were used to check the following aspects of the data: (i) consistency of the data, (ii) the consistency of the source information; and (iii) the consistency of analysis methods and researcher approach (Stake, 1995).

Also, all interview data were checked for consistency with: (i) data from other interviews with similar interviewees; (ii) data from interviews with key informants; (iii) when possible, data from similar interviews made by a different interviewer; (iv) data from other sources, using other collection methods (documents and quantitative data). The triangulation depended on the certainty of the data; uncontested data needed little effort

of triangulation, whereas dubious and contested data, especially those critical key interpretations “need[ed] extra effort toward confirmation” (Stake, 1995, p. 112).

The study also used member checks to verify whether the data were accurate. Member checks verified “with the respondent groups the constructions that are developing as a result of data collected and analyzed” (Mertens, 1998, p. 182). Such member checks are, according to many theorists on case research among the most important criteria in establishing credibility of the research. After interviews, informal member checks were used through summarizing key data, and probing if it accurately reflected the interviewee’s position. Also, interview information was discussed with key informant after the interview had taken place.

Finally, the study was subject to peer debriefing, consisting of making colleagues “comment on the findings as they emerge” (Merriam, 1995, p. 204). The peer debriefing had as objective “to keep the inquirer honest, to provide him or her with the opportunity to test his or her growing insights against those of uninvolved peers, to receive advice about methodological steps in the emergent design, to leave an audit trail [...], and to discharge personal feelings, anxieties, and stressed which might otherwise affect the inquiry adversely” (Guba & Lincoln, 1982). Various people helped for member checks and peer debriefing, including (i) Senegalese key informants; (ii) faculty at the University of Maryland; and (iii) World Bank staff members. The opinions expressed in this dissertation are mine, and in no way represent those of anyone else.

Exploring the project through the voices of the stakeholders has been seen as the key of understanding the various facets of the case. The next chapter will give basic information about the case and explain how it was created, using the boundaries defined above and the voices of stakeholders as guides.

Chapter 4: The Case Study – Outsourcing Policy and the Women’s Literacy Project

This chapter explores the evolution of the case study, starting from 1993, when a colloquium in Kolda decided to make use of outsourcing/ partnership to conduct literacy courses. To better understand the policy and the Women’s Literacy Project (PAPF), this chapter first describes the background of the outsourcing/partnership policy. Then it explains how the project was created; and discusses reasons for World Bank financing of literacy education in Senegal. The analysis in this chapter enables a better understanding of the Women’s Literacy Project. It also helps us to understand the impact of globalization on development, and in particular, the processes through which the World Bank and other international institutions can assert influence on individual countries’ internal policies.

4.1: Creation of the Outsourcing/Partnership Policy

The literacy sector in Senegal did not have any specific policy before the 1990s. For the examination of the outsourcing/partnership policy, it is useful to distinguish three phases of literacy delivery in Senegal: (i) 1960-1993: Independence of Senegal to the literacy

policy colloquium in Kolda; (ii) 1993-1995: Policy colloquium in Kolda and construction of tools for setting up outsourcing projects; (iii) 1995 till present: Implementation of the main literacy projects.

A) Before Kolda

The colloquium in Kolda in October 1993 marked in many ways the beginning of a literacy policy in Senegal. Before that, literacy programs were implemented by civil society organizations, and did not receive much attention from the state's side. In the 1970s and 1980s, some small-scale civil society associations and NGO projects, as well as some larger enterprises, such as the National Association for Development of Textiles (SODEFITEX), were involved in literacy education. The small-scale civil society associations mainly provided literacy courses in local languages for cultural, religious and altruism reasons. The larger enterprises needed literate workers and therefore organized literacy classes for their own staff members.²³

²³ As opposed to many other countries, Senegal had few literacy programs or campaigns in the 1960s to 1970s. Pape M. Gueye traces the evolution of literacy programs in Senegal in the following terms: "Literacy programs in Senegal go back to the colonial period and were continued in an improvised and disorganized manner up until 1970. It is not until 1971, with the creation of the Department of Literacy, that they began to be systematized. [...] But only recently, at the beginning of the '90's, their development was given a jolt, after the World Conference at Jomtien, with the creation of a Ministry in charge of Literacy and Promotion of national languages" (Kuper & Valiente-Catter, 2001, p. 51).

During the fieldwork for this dissertation, an interviewee traced the evolution of the sector as follows:

"In 1971 the Department of literacy was created, and likewise, in 1971 the Senegalese state promulgated its first law organizing the education system. Therefore, 1971 is a key date. Before that, we had literacy classes in Senegal, but other [non-governmental] institutions and organizations managed them. In 1971, the Department of Literacy was created, but the service was attached to the Ministry of Youth. Afterwards, the service was transferred to the Ministry of Human Promotion. The change showed an [increasing] awareness of [the importance of] human resource building, first in liaison with youth - and then as a necessity for rural areas. The literacy function was later transferred to the direction of vocational training - and coexisted with secondary vocational training [*formation moyenne pratique*]. [The policy of the government was to] promote work-related training for its population. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

The institutional history of literacy education in Senegal began in 1971, when a Department of Literacy was created and attached to the Ministry of Youth. Literacy became a service of the Ministry of Education only in 1985-86, but did not receive much attention before it obtained international donors' funding in the 1990s. The civil servants interviewed during the field work for this dissertation underlined the importance of civil society associations (and especially of language associations) in the implementation of literacy courses before the 1990s. The concept of civil society in this context principally consisted of language and culture associations, promoting certain ethnic groups, such as for example Wolof, Pulaar or Joola. These associations, and the lessons in local languages, were seen as a reaction to the dominance of French in primary school. Also, some international NGOs and development societies set up literacy classes. A DAEB civil servant described the preeminence of the civil society in implementing literacy in the following terms:

“Literacy has traditionally been an important issue for civil society; we have language associations, association for the defense of Pulaar, organizations for the renaissance of the Joola culture, the Manding culture, Soninke associations... these associations were the pioneers that established the base of our literacy programs. All by themselves, they began providing literacy. The Senegalese state took up their work in 1971 and 1972 when a Department of Literacy was created. These associations were the first to provide literacy classes, because local languages were at

In 1985-86, literacy became a part of the Ministry of Education. The literacy programs, as compared to today's programs, were very small, localized in the region of Fatick and in certain other regions with programs that were set up by large development societies such as SODEVA and SODEFITEX. These programs were 'functional' in the narrow sense of the term [i.e., they responded to the needs of the development societies]" (Consultant, former civil servant).

that point a cultural issue, related to [in confrontation with] French. Afterwards, NGOs, which had the possibility to obtain external or state financing, became interested in literacy and in local languages. These organizations included TOSTAN and Plan International, which followed the movement created by the language and cultural organizations. In this context, the ministry encouraged civil society to organize so as to take charge of literacy courses” (Civil servant).

Before the 1990s, the state’s encouragement to civil society to conduct literacy classes was literally reduced to acknowledging the existence of courses. Overall, the government’s interest in the sector was low, and little public funding was available. One interviewee (a former civil servant) stated that the DAEB

“... had no policy, no financing, ...there was nothing” (Consultant, former civil servant).

In 1990 the government became preoccupied with the low literacy rate of the population, which was seen as an obstacle to development. The impulse to make literacy a priority was closely linked to the World Conference on Basic Education for All in Jomtien. The policy orientations of the government were based on five key events, including Jomtien: “The literacy policy of the government was registered within the framework of the conclusions of the General States of Education and of Formation (GSEF), of the recommendations of the National Conference of Educational Reform and of the Formation (NCERF), of the World Conference on Basic Education for All of Jomtien, of the law of Orientation Number 91-22 of February 16, 1991, and of the conclusions of the Colloquium of Kolda, of September 1993.” (Kuper & Valiente-Catter, 2001, p. 51).

In 1990, a delegated minister position was created to deal with illiteracy. The system of creating a delegate minister post was in Senegal a means for the government to deal with specific issues or problems that the country faced.²⁴ A census in 1988 (finding that 69% of the Senegalese population was illiterate) and Jomtien in 1990 compelled the different national conferences to recognize that illiteracy was a problem. To deal with it, the delegate minister obtained funding for a project called “1000 classes.” The project ‘1000-classes’ was the first large literacy initiative of the Senegalese state. Since literacy in Senegal already was the prerogative of the civil society associations, the project built on a strategy of cooperation between the state and civil society. A large part of the project’s administration was decentralized and transferred to the education offices at the department level, which funded local associations to implement literacy classes. One interviewee called this method an embryonic faire-faire model, and described it in the following term:

“The DAEB was responsible in 1991 for the operation ‘1000 classes’ funded by the Government at a level of 100 million FCFA. The DAEB used the “faire-faire” at an embryonic stage to implement the program. At the inspection level, it was noted which associations implemented literacy

²⁴ A former civil servant defined the role of the delegated minister as follows:

“When the government saw that [literacy was under-prioritized], it was decided that it was important [to develop] the sector. ‘In order to stimulate it, [the Government said,] I will create an exceptional structure to push the sector,’ and it sought a Delegated Minister, which is not a full minister, who had as his function to stimulate and develop the sector. When the sector is developed, it will be reintegrated [back into the MOE]. This is what a Delegated Minister is for; when a sub-sector has any specific problems, and when there is political will [to address these problems], a secretariat of state [*secretariat d’état*] is created, or a delegated minister is nominated. The first one [delegate minister] was Aminata Tall in 1990. This was at the time of the project ‘1000 classes’. [...] After she [Aminata Tall] left the post in 1991, the position was canceled.” (*Consultant, former civil servant*).

projects. These associations were given financial support. There were no procedures, manual or selection process; it was a direct support of some associations. This was the first version of the 1000-classes program. [...] The project was under the political supervision of the Cabinet [of the Ministry of Education], but it was implemented by the DAEB” (Consultant, former civil servant).

The project was not backed by any policy initiative that promoted outsourcing and partnership methods. It lacked a procedural manual that regulated its functioning, (e.g., its selection and financing methods were not clearly defined), and was therefore vulnerable to embezzlement and to the promotion of (personal) political agenda of government authorities, both at central and local levels. One interviewee stated,

“I encountered the program 1000 classes at Ziguinchor. It didn’t work; it didn’t work at all!” (Consultant, former civil servant).

Consultants interviewed were negative about the 1000-classes project, which they described as ‘inefficient’. No comprehensive written evaluation was made on the outcomes of the project. The model, arguably because it was not based on proper outsourcing mechanisms (and thus led to embezzlement), was quickly abandoned. A second public attempt to set up literacy courses succeeded the first, in which the *embryonic faire-faire model* was abandoned in favor of a more direct state intervention. This time, the department authorities recruited the literacy teachers directly, without

using civil society associations as intermediaries. The project later adopted the name of PAIS (Intensive Literacy Program of Senegal), and is implemented till this day.²⁵

B) The Colloquium in Kolda

In 1993, a new political party came to power in Senegal. The new government re-created the function of delegated minister for literacy issues, and an enthusiastic leader of a civil society association, Mamadou Ndoye, was appointed minister of literacy. All the interviewees underlined the political importance of this appointment:

“[...] there was political will led by a minister who was a visionary, but also one with field experience. When Mamadou [Ndoye] was appointed, he was supported by the President of the Republic, who had a vision for the sector” (Former civil servant).

One of the first actions of Mamadou Ndoye was to convene a colloquium, which took place in Kolda and therefore got the name “the Colloquium in Kolda.” This colloquium is constantly referred to in literacy-related policy documents in Senegal. Most interviewees, both from civil and state sectors, mentioned the colloquium as an important stage in defining the partnership model and for building a policy for the literacy sector.

Written policy information almost always makes reference to Kolda as a starting point for

²⁵ The PAIS model is, similarly to the first phase of the 1000-classes program, using civil society associations to set up local literacy classes. Many of the basic problems of the 1000-classes project, however, re-emerged in the PAIS. Its subproject selection procedures are still lacking – and there is still (September 2004) no comprehensive evaluation of its results. The impact study (2004) found that some of the financed activities of the project appeared not to have taken place, due to embezzlement.

the Senegalese partnership approach. All future partners of the big literacy projects, including the World Bank and other donors, were present at Kolda.²⁶

The Kolda colloquium made it possible to define the partnership approach, which was to be used as a strategy for implementation of literacy ever since.²⁷ Instead of the government's direct intervention in the recruitment and training of literacy teachers, the policy was building on an idea that had appeared in the first phase of the 1000-classes project, where the state financed civil society to conduct literacy classes. The goal of the partnership approach as it was defined in Kolda, was both qualitative and quantitative: Senegal's literacy courses needed to improve their quality, and at the same time the civil society organizations needed to develop their capacity of enrolling more learners. The central orientations of the government policy were as follows:

- “Perceptibly reduce the illiteracy of the female population principally in the age group from 9 to 39 years, with the object of guaranteeing an immediate impact upon social, economic and educational indicators.
- Reduce the disparities between regions, on one hand, and between urban and rural zones, on the other.

²⁶ One interviewee described the Colloquium in the following terms: “When Mamadou N’Doye took up the function as Minister, his first action was to convene a colloquium on the subject of Women and Literacy in Kolda. The main objective of the colloquium was to discuss the policies of literacy education that were used in Senegal. It was reckoned that the sector never had had a proper literacy policy and an action plan. [...] Essentially, literacy was reduced to a few development projects and associations promoting local languages that were active in the literacy sector. The Kolda colloquium made a first outline of a literacy policy” (*Consultant, former civil servant*).

²⁷ A new policy seminar, which took place in Thies in September 2003, reaffirmed the decisions of Kolda, and stated that there were no alternatives to the partnership strategy, and that this strategy will be used to eliminate illiteracy in Senegal over the next ten years.

- Favor functional literacy and the development of alternative models of basic education through utilization of local languages with the objective of improving the performance of literacy programs.
- Promote a learned setting in local languages in order to guarantee the permanent utilization and development of what has been learned.
- Create a policy of ‘do to do’ [sic] which will support the organizations or institutions in the area (the NGOs, Associations, Groups and Societes) to carry out functional literacy programs.
- Coordinate interventions of financing institutions in order that they be oriented toward the same objectives and sign on to the government plan of action.” (Gueye, 2001, p. 53).

The policy was thus centered on the core role of civil society, and was defined in the following terms by the director of the government’s Department of Literacy (DAEB):

“The partnership in literacy is a relationship of different actors which has as its aim to maximize the efficiency of [literacy] programs, both on qualitative and quantitative levels. The quantitative levels are important for us, and partnerships as used in faire-faire have enabled a large number of participants to be enrolled in literacy courses. It would have been unthinkable to enroll such a large number of people in the courses without the partnership with civil society. As for quality, I think that the partnership has helped us to create a body of providers that are specialized in literacy. Previously, program managers in literacy were exclusively functions reserved for the administration; now the civil society is involved and has taken over these functions. There is therefore a larger population of qualified people in the sector. Some have become real experts on the subjects.” (Civil servant).

The colloquium of Kolda, and its outcomes in terms of a policy documents and work plan interested several donors. The implementation modality, built on the principle of civil society partnerships corresponded to World Bank policies within a Washington Consensus framework.²⁸

C) After Kolda

The period after 1993 can be divided into two periods with different institutional characteristics:

1993-1998: During this period Mamadou Ndoye ensured institutional stability; the partnership approach was created (1993-95) and consolidated through the action of CIDA and World Bank-funded projects (1995-98). During the fieldwork, all the former civil servants interviewed agreed in highlighting this period as a “golden age”:

“Between 1993 and 1998 it was fantastic [...] there was a good collaboration [complicité] between actors to get things going, hence my use of the word ‘team’.” (Consultant, former civil servant).

1998 till present: In 1998, Mamadou Ndoye left his post. The large projects continued to be implemented under the supervision of independent project coordination units (PCUs) that were set up during the Mamadou Ndoye period.²⁹ These coordination units should in principle keep the projects safe from political turbulence, i.e., shifting priorities and

²⁸ As noted in section 2.1, some would call it a *post*-Washington consensus framework. In the 1990s the World Bank increasingly used civil society organizations for implementing services instead of outsourcing these services to private businesses.

²⁹ In this text, the acronym PCU henceforth refers explicitly to the project coordination unit of the World Bank-financed Women’s Literacy Project (PAPF).

change of staff members in the Delegate Minister's cabinet and the Department of Literacy and Basic Education (DAEB). However, most interviewees³⁰ agree that there was deterioration in the partnership policies from the moment Mamadou Ndoeye left his post. This deterioration was due to three factors: (i) the civil servants in key positions did not last for a long time in their posts; (ii) the recruitment of staff in key positions responded to political requirements, not to technical ones; and (iii) the institutional entities themselves were not stable – the delegate Ministry was constantly cancelled, recreated, and reorganized.³¹ Also, the DAEB changed; its staff members were frequently reassigned, and it sometimes had responsibility for the promotion of local languages (sometimes this responsibility was given to a separate department). In such circumstances, institutional memory was quickly erased:

“With Madefall Gueye [as head of DAEB], we saw a very interesting development but he was dismissed in 1998 because the Minister who came at that point was not of the same political background. Somebody else was put there, and this person was dismissed as well. This was Serigne. After him was Alassane. The sector has had problems since Made[fall Gueye].

³⁰ Except some interviewees with current key positions in the public sector.

³¹ One interviewee described the constant political changes in the following terms: “The Delegate Minister was responsible for literacy until 1995, when the position was widened and included Basic Education as a whole. Mamadou Ndoeye was therefore responsible for primary education from 1995 to 1998. This position was in use until 2001, because when Mamadou Ndoeye left in July 1998, Mambonama Sall replaced him from 1998 to March 2000. Between May 2000 and October 2002, Becama Diop had two positions: he was delegate Minister during one year, and then [full] Minister of a Ministry of Literacy, Technical Training, and Local languages. Then the Ministry re-became a delegate Ministry with the current Georges Tendeng. [...] DAEB was always there, either with responsibilities for Local languages or without responsibilities for Local languages. A Department to Promote Local Languages was created, then canceled, and then recreated. Today we come back to the former formula, a Department of Literacy and Promotion of Local languages. When [the government] wanted to particularly promote local languages, a direction of local languages was created. Today, with the new government, we have only one department; for literacy and local languages. This also is institutional instability. (*Interview Consultant, former civil servant*).

You see how the political dimension is very important; I remind you that between 1993 and 1998 we had only one Minister, who had a vision and a plan, and who began implementing this plan; it was Mamadou N'Doye. Between 1998 and 2003 we have had three other Ministers; and with each of them a change in the director of the cabinet and the technical divisions: The institutional memory is fleeing away [fout le camp]. There is no continuation; the new people have to learn [everything anew]. Ask any of the counselors [in DAEB] what we are discussing about now; it would be Chinese for them. The instability, political, institutional and staff-wise, has very precise effects” (Consultant, former civil servant).

The political instability affected the outsourcing/partnership approach and the literacy projects in several ways. Political considerations instead of technical ones were used to select providers in the projects (see section 7.2). Also, a flawed decentralization was initiated, which has been criticized both from local levels and from the providers' side (see section 6.3). Schedules were no longer kept, the procedures manual no longer used. One interviewee stated,

“Today, there are many problems - I think these problems are so important that they can destroy the faire-faire system” (Consultant, former civil servant).

This statement, and other similar criticisms of the political evolution of the partnership approach, also reflects back to the approach itself. Particularly, the current problems clearly expose the need to address the question explored earlier (see section 2.1 and 2.6): Are public-private partnerships and outsourcing only feasible when the political system is stable? Is outsourcing advisable to as a method to implement literacy education? These issues will be further explored in chapter 7.

4.2: Creation of the PAPF

The creation of the Women's Literacy Project was directly linked to the colloquium in Kolda. Three donors, including two bilateral institutions (i.e., the Canadians through Canadian International Development Aid (CIDA) and the Germans through German Technical Cooperation for Development (GTZ)) and the World Bank, were willing to provide assistance to the sector. The first donor to become interested was CIDA, which developed the PAPA (Action Plan Support Project). The second was the Bank-funded PAPF (Women's Literacy Project), which was developed quicker than the PAPA and was therefore launched ahead of it.

The set-up phase of the PAPF project can be divided into three main stages, including (i) identification of a project strategy and creation of project management tools; (ii) conducting a pilot project; and (iii) experimentation with the management tools and the literacy models used. The first phase was intimately linked to the Kolda colloquium, the pilot phase was set up and implemented in 1993-1995; and the 'main' phase of the PAPF project was implemented in 1996-2001.

A) A Brief Overview: PAPF Management and Procedures

The PAPF project originated from the development of the partnership approach, and from the policy goals decided upon in Kolda, which planned to reduce illiteracy in the country by 5% per year. The use of civil society associations for implementation of subprojects, a strategy that had had been experimented with little success in the 1000-classes project

three years before, was reintroduced. The strategy was formalized and theorized at this time:

“If we trace the history of the project, we have to begin with the Kolda colloquium in 1993, in which all actors in the field were represented: government agents, technical and financial partners, the communities, the providers; all the segments of the society were present at Kolda. The colloquium defined a policy and an action plan over 10 years, from 1993 to 2002, which was used by PAPF. It had as objective to reduce the illiteracy rate by 5% per year. A priority was accorded to women, because we needed to correct disparities between sexes and between rural and urban areas. We saw at that point that there was an 82% illiteracy rate in Senegal, and 72% of it concerned women.³² At that point the PAPF and the PAPA and the other projects financed by the Germans [...] were created. PAPF had as aim to experiment with a new strategy of implementation that was called faire-faire. This is a particularity of the project - to experiment with a new approach. The strategy of faire-faire had as aim - for the first time in Senegal - to work with civil society. The government made public funds available for civil society to implement the courses at grassroots level” (Civil servant).

According to the interviewees and to the World Bank project document (SAR, 1996) the Bank was interested because of three main factors in the strategy: (i) priority was accorded to women; (ii) civil society was involved in the implementation of the courses; and (iii) the project would use a transparent method of transfer of funds, involving civil society. A former civil servant described World Bank’s interest in the following terms:

³² There is some uncertainty about these data. The World Bank’s project document notes that in 1995, “the majority (80%) of young rural Senegalese women aged 15-39, [...] are illiterate [...]. Comparable rates for their urban counterparts and men average between 40% and 45%, respectively” (SAR, 1996).

“Some time after the drafting of a policy and action document [based on the results of the Kolda colloquium], the Minister received a delegation from the World Bank that was exploring literacy and vocational training. This mission was particularly interested in the fact that priority was accorded to women. It also liked the fact that the strategy chosen was based on partnership and the involvement of other actors [i.e., civil society] in the conception and provision of literacy programs. [...] The question of clarity in the implementation process was important, both for the Minister and for the Bank. Finally, the involvement of civil society was important; but it was at first not known how this should be done, and which mechanism should be used” (Consultant, former civil servant).

Both CIDA and the World Bank provided technical assistance to define the management tools for the public-private partnership strategy.³³ The government and the World Bank decided to use AGETIP [*Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Publique*], a parastatal contract-managing agency that was set up as an NGO, to manage the contracts with the providers. AGETIP was chosen because it had prior contract-management experience from infrastructure projects financed by the World Bank.³⁴ After selection of a contract-management agency, the procedures for selection of providers were established. Many of the selection mechanisms were based on AGETIP’s procedures for

³³ An interviewee explained, “they [CIDA and World Bank] were therefore facilitators, and they were structures that encouraged the approach by mobilizing important resources to finance it. Also, they provided human resources to assist the planning phase during the whole formulation and set-up phase. Maybe we couldn’t have achieved all of this ourselves.” (*Consultant, former civil servant*).


³⁴ An interviewee explained, “The Bank then stated its interest [to finance] a literacy project with priority for women, involving civil society in a transparent program. How should this be done exactly? At that point, it was necessary to invent the process, and the “faire-faire” strategy was thought about and theorized by the Ministry, of course with Bank support. It was necessary to look at the problems of transfer of funds and decide which organization was most capable of rapidly managing and transferring funds. After an initial assessment, it was concluded that only AGETIP did such transfers, in the building sector. One questioned whether AGETIP could not play that same role in the social domain, for literacy, because there were no alternatives.” (*Consultant, former civil servant*).

selecting firms to carry out infrastructure work (see figure 4.1 below for selection and implementation procedures). These procedures were modified to be used in the literacy sector.³⁵ The outsourcing procedures were set up in the following way (see Figure 4.1 below): The provider requested financing through a bid written as a subproject proposal. The proposal would typically propose the set-up of 10 to 20 learning centers, each of which were to enroll about 30 participants. In total, each provider enrolled between 300 and 600 persons, for which they received financing of US \$22,500 to \$45,000 (the financing was based on a fixed unit price of approximately US \$75 per enrollee; see chapter 8 for a detailed cost analysis).

The subproject proposals were checked for accuracy at local level by government staff. They were then sent to a selection committee that provided a technical analysis of all proposals and decided which ones should be financed. The composition of the selection committee included literacy staff from the government as well as representatives from the providers. The proposals approved for financing were then sent to a contract managing, or “outsourcing” agency (AGETIP) which established contracts, paid the providers, and managed and verified the contracts. After obtaining the first installment of the funds, the providers began implementing the subproject.

³⁵ An interviewee explained, “The procedures manual was made by using the same approach that AGETIP used in the mechanisms of financing [infrastructure], together with [technical] criteria from the DAEB to select a good provider and to implement a good literacy program. Someone from AGETIP was selected to develop the mechanisms of financing, and I myself was involved in developing the criteria of selection [of a provider]. Three commissions were set up with representatives from AGETIP, the providers, the Ministry of Finance, and all the other stakeholders. A meeting was held on the first procedures manual, to define the mechanisms [of selection and financing]. It was the mechanisms of [infrastructure] building guiding the financial arrangements, but at each step we defined how and who should be doing each operation so as to establish the responsibilities of each actor in the process. Our understanding of the literacy sector guided the set-up of the procedures” (*Consultant, former civil servant*).

Figure 4.1: Selection and implementation procedures for a subproject



During implementation, the providers were responsible for follow-up and monitoring on a regular basis, the government was responsible for overall technical supervision, and the contract-managing agency was responsible for financial supervision. In addition, a providers' organization (CNOAS) was created to represent the providers' interests, and to help in case of conflict between any of the providers and other parties. In addition to the

above, the project employed a Project Coordination Unit (PCU), which was responsible for day-to-day management of the project. The PCU was set up as a part of the ministry, and reported directly to the cabinet of the delegate minister (i.e., it did not report to the Department of Literacy). Civil servants staffed the PCU, and the World Bank paid for administrative (secretarial) support and equipment.

In addition to setting up the project management structures and procedures, the project also needed to delineate responsibilities and to create a capacity building plan for each actor.

The building of capacity was seen as a priority, since the literacy sector had limited human capacities.³⁶ Also, the selection procedures needed to be written into a procedures manual. The procedures manual was to define the duties of each actor and explained the exact procedures the provider had to follow to obtain funds. It was intended to be a tool for the providers when they made the subproject proposal. In most cases, the World Bank and the government consulted civil society on the management set-up indicated in the procedures manual; the project procedures were therefore established in partnership between actors.³⁷

³⁶ One interviewee said, “We also needed to strengthen the capacity of the providers and also of the Ministry, especially in the field of monitoring and evaluation of the programs. In faire-faire, all actors must play their role, the government for impulsion-orientation, the providers for implementation. The contract-managing agency, AGETIP, needed to take care of financial issues - signing contracts, transferring funds and following-up on the disbursements. We, a little coordination and management unit, needed to take care of the overall management of the PAPP” (*Civil servant*).

³⁷ One interviewee said, “All the procedures were elaborated together with the civil society, and there was a manual that told how PAPP should be implemented. The creation of the procedures manual took nearly one year.” (*Interview Civil servant*).

B) The Pilot Phase

The pilot phase of the PAPP created and tested out the tools of the outsourcing method through experimentation. Also, the project experimented with the literacy courses themselves, so as to find the most cost-effective course type. In this context, the partnership approach was considered as a particularly interesting method to experiment with different methods of literacy teaching, since each provider would have, in theory, a different approach to literacy.

*“The Minister at that time [Mamadou Ndoye] told us to go ahead, make errors, correct the errors, and at least we will have learned something.”
(Consultant, former civil servant).*

Another interviewee (the first Director of the PCU) stated that:

“He [Mamadou Ndoye] asked me to innovate; he told me that I could fail and he would cover me. I was free to test out anything since I had strong political support of somebody who was interested in results.” (Consultant, former civil servant).

Another interviewee (current director of PCU) said that:

“The aim of PAPP was to experiment with this [partnership] approach. This was interesting, because we had to experiment with everything; it was necessary to change all the methods that we previously had used. We all came from the formal schooling system, and were used to order this or that. Now we had to work in partnership with others and to give them public funds. The first difficulty of PAPP was to determine how to work with these partners. How to work with civil society? In order to figure that out, we cooperated with civil society to set up the project and in particular, to write

the procedures manual. [...] The second issue was to define the nature of the courses that should be taught. We decided to implement functional literacy courses. Also, we decided to set up experimental programs in post-literacy. In addition, we decided to support production of newspapers and books. This was to experiment with different actions, so as to make the program efficient. We tried to find the constituents of a good literacy program through this experimentation.” (Civil servant).

The pilot phase of the project took place after selecting the institutional modalities for project set-up (i.e., decision to use AGETIP as contract-managing agency and to use the new-created PCU as a coordination unit) after deciding on the procedures. The pilot project covered four regions and roughly half of the country³⁸ (the region of Dakar was later added to Kolda, Louga, Diourbel and Fatick, which were the four first implementation regions).

During the pilot phase, 22 providers were selected.³⁹ They enrolled a first cohort of learners. Each selection of subprojects and subsequent enrollment were called a

³⁸ The CIDA-sponsored PAPA project covered the other half of the country. The PAPA project also used the public-private partnership approach.

³⁹ The pilot phase was characterized by the use of two provider organizations that had as an additional role to provide training for the other providers. The use of such relay-providers [*opérateur relais*], as they were called, did not work well during the pilot phase, because of conflict of interests – on the one hand, these relay-providers needed to secure their own interest (and funding) and at the other hand they were supposed to represent other providers’ interest. However, according to at least one interviewee, the function of the relay-provider was abandoned too quickly. This interviewee, former head of the PCU, thought it should have been experimented more:

“The project was first implemented in 4 regions, Kolda, Louga, Diourbel and Tambac [Tambacounda]. We started with a pilot project involving 22 providers. We also had two relay-providers: in each region, a big provider with real capabilities in financial, technical and material matters was given the responsibilities of informing and training the other providers. Plan International, a well-known international NGO, and some other NGOs were selected to become such relay-providers. The first phase went very well. However, we found that there was a certain competition between the relay-providers and the other providers. When we evaluated the program, we stopped the system of relay-providers” (*Civil servant*).

“generation” (*une génération*) or a cohort; the first enrollment corresponded to cohort one, and we are currently, in 2004, at cohort eight. Each year (with a few exceptions) a new cohort of learners was enrolled.

The pilot phase was evaluated before the courses of the first cohort had ended. The evaluation therefore could not report on the actual learning of the participants, but only on the procedural and financial aspects of the project. The World Bank was at that time interested in a technical evaluation of the process– to check whether the use of a partnership approach was feasible. The World Bank, at that time, found that the mechanisms of the project were adequate:

“[...] it was convened with the Bank to test the approach with 24 providers in four of the regions of the country. This was the pilot phase of the program, implemented in June 1995, and an evaluation took place in December of the same year. At that point the process was evaluated; because we had made the procedures manual; the providers were informed and had written the requests, the subprojects to be financed had been selected, and the programs had started. The Bank visited the field to see how the activities were going. And in the field, the courses were there, as well as the learners and the facilitators...” (Consultant, former civil servant).

After the adjustments of some procedural aspects, such as the suspension of the relay-provider function (see footnote on previous page), the main phase of the PAPF began in 1996. The project obtained a World Bank financing of \$12.6 million over a period of 5 years (1996-2001).

C) Main Phase of the PAF

The PAF literacy project had as its aim to provide literacy courses to women, to correct the large disparities between female and male literacy in the country. This was done through implementation of many small subprojects; each implemented by a provider.

The word subproject is used in the case study to describe a coherent set of interventions by a provider in a locality or a zone, and typically consists of ten to twenty literacy courses in a corresponding number of villages.

The division of the country between donors was worked out in consultative meetings, and the World Bank's project document notes that "IDA financing would support literacy and post-literacy subprojects in the regions of Diourbel, Louga, Kolda, Fatick, and in suburban areas of Dakar to reach about 135,000 adults (75% women) over the five-year period 1996-2001 -- or about 75% of the total required to meet the Government's targets for those regions. [...] The proposed project would also strengthen the capacity of providers in program development and delivery, and the capacity of Government, providers and AGETIP in program monitoring, supervision, evaluation and coordination" (SAR, 1996, p. 10).

The quantitative enrollment goals were achieved – and even surpassed, according to statistics from AGETIP and the PCU. According to these sources, about 200,000 people (87% women) enrolled in literacy training in the local languages of Wolof, Pulaar, Sereer, Joola, Mandinka, and Sonike (ICR, 2004). According to the same sources, most capacity building and publication goals of the project were fully achieved. The results of

the project included procurement and publishing of many literacy booklets in local languages. The project also supported five quarterly newspapers (one in each region covered by the project), which were publicized in local languages. Because of this perceived effectiveness, the PAPF continues to this day, but is financed through the World Bank's education sector program in Senegal (the acronym PDEF-NF is used to describe the literacy education part of the sector program).⁴⁰

As for literacy classes, in all, 312 literacy subprojects were financed, out of 960 requests (see table 4.1 below). The Senegalese Government had previously had problems to implement World Bank projects (SAR, 1996). Civil society's capacity to enroll a higher volume of people in literacy courses than expected was considered as a sign of effectiveness of the outsourcing approach used.

⁴⁰ For estimations of enrollment numbers, see section 8.1. PCU staff explained the project achievements in the following terms:

“At the quantitative level, we needed to train 135,000 people, 75% of whom were women. At the end of the project, our statistics showed that we had trained about 168,000 people, of whom 80% were women. The quantitative goals were over-achieved, at 120% [of the planned enrollment]. Each of the 4 regions was supposed to train 25,000 people, and Dakar was supposed to train 35,000 people, for a global number of 135,000 people trained. The planning of enrollment was very easy; 25,000 and 35,000 for five years made 5,000 each year in each province, and 7,000 in Dakar. As for the integrated program, the project financing made it possible to experiment and enroll 9,000 people for the test phase. For the 6th cohort, we enrolled about 10,500 people in the integrated program with PAPF financing. An additional 25,000 people were enrolled with the new credit from PDEF-NF, for a total of 35,190 learners [for the 6th cohort]. As for quantitative results, we obtained and exceeded the goals. As for publishing of books, the planning was to publish 60 titles per year; 10 titles for each of the 6 languages in which we implemented literacy courses at that time. We achieved this goal at nearly 60%. This can be explained by the difficulties of procedures, but also by the fact that there was hegemony of the Pulaar and Wolof languages, which were better prepared for publishing. Languages like Joola and Soninke were languages used in regions where we did rarely intervene, and where another large project intervened [PAPA].

Since this other project also had a component for publication, this other project took care of the needs in Joola and Soninke. Nevertheless, we succeeded at 60% to implement what we had as a goal. What is more important is that we supported the establishment of a policy for publishing in local languages. Today, the sector is guided by an editing and publishing policy, and we have supported that policy both technically and financially. Also, to strengthen the literate environment, we set up a newspaper in each of the provinces. These are written in local languages. However, due to different problems, only one of these newspapers is issued regularly today; it is the newspaper of Dakar” (*Civil servant*).

Table 4.1: Subproject proposals for literacy training per year, number of selected proposals, and enrollment

Cohorts and years	Subproject proposals		Selected proposals	
	Quantity	Enrollees	Quantity	Enrollees
C1: 1995 – 97	77	23,100	22	6,911
C2: 1996 – 98	135	58,736	54	28,831
C3: 1997 – 99	155	90,181	58	29,985
C4: 1998–2000	189	109,711	68	27,257
C5: 1999-2001	368	181,406	95	65,409
C5: Integrated	36	21,600	15	9,799
Total	960	484,734	312	168,182*
C6: Integrated				10,190**

Source: Government contribution to ICR, December 2001.

*The numbers are reproduced as they appear in the government report (there are some adding errors; e.g., the total should be 168,192).

**The PAPF ended in 2001, when Cohort 5 was financed. However, some project funds were left to partially finance Cohort 6 (i.e., 10,190 enrollees were financed by the PAPF; the remaining enrollees were financed by PDEF-NF).

The PAPF financed three types of literacy approaches (see table 4.2 on the following page):

- Type 1: the “non-integrated” approach (which was the main implementation type for PAPF);
- Type 2: post-literacy training (which was always combined with non-integrated literacy training); and
- Type 3: the “integrated” approach.

Table 4.2: Types of literacy courses offered and number of enrollees

Type 1: Literacy course	Type 2: Post-Literacy course
Total number of learners: 158,393	Total number of learners: 13,133

Type 3: Integrated Literacy course
Total number of learners: 31,790

The “non-integrated” approach corresponds to functional literacy training emphasizing literacy (i.e., to learn to write, read, and perform basic mathematical operations) and some basic skills, especially related to hygiene and health.

The post-literacy training was offered to a reduced number of learners that completed the (non-integrated) literacy course. In total, 13,133 persons attended post literacy courses (ICR, 2001). It had as aim to offer income-generating related training that helped the participants to sustain the literacy skills they had learned in the literacy course, and at the same time helped them to learn new skills.

The integrated approach began in 1999 and is discussed throughout the dissertation. It corresponds to a “mature” project approach, which integrates literacy and post-literacy actions. The procedures manual corresponding to this period is dated 2000-2002. One interviewee explained,

“PAPF had as objective to be an experimentation and innovation program, each [implementation phase] we conducted action- research and tried to improve the quality of the program. The integrated approach emerged as a result of these different evaluations” (Civil servant).

The dropout rate of the subprojects (for all three approaches) was seemingly low (see description in section 8.1), and was estimated at 15% by the government and the World Bank (ICR, 2004).

Subprojects using the integrated approach trained the participants in literacy, and basic skills, as well as organizing income-generating activities. In addition, some selected participants received training in management and administration. This latter training was designed to strengthen the functioning of the local women's association. In areas where such organizations did not exist, the providers helped the local women create an association. Two persons (or, sometimes, one person) in each implementation site, called the *relais*, or the "relay" person (henceforth called the *relais*), received specific training to continue literacy training for local participants after the subproject financing had ceased, thus, in theory, ensuring that the learning activities in the village were sustainable. The *relais* was a volunteer living at the implementation site, who did not receive any other incentives from the subproject than specific training sessions on management and adult pedagogy, organized by the provider).

The main phase of PAPF had both experimental and quantitative goals. At the experimental level, it was supposed to further test out the partnership method and also to improve the literacy programs:

"After the pilot phase, we went to the extension phase, with cohort 2, 3, 4 etc. and at the same time we experimented with post-literacy courses. Each time, we capitalized on the lessons learned from [project activities, such

as:] the publication of newspapers, publication of books, post-literacy activities, and it led us to change the program” (Civil servant).

The achievements of the quantitative goals of the project were important. The PAPF, in view of its seemingly impressive quantitative results, was considered as a very successful project, both by the World Bank and by the Senegalese government. When the project ended, literacy financing by the World Bank continued through support by the education sector plan (known under the acronym of PDEF) from 2001 and onwards. The PAPF project therefore has a continuation within the PDEF, known under the acronym of PDEF-NF (Non-formal component in Senegalese Education Sector plan). Also, the World Bank has promoted the use of partnership approaches in other countries, both for implementation of literacy and for delivery of other social services. The partnership approaches have been so important for the World Bank that it devoted a large part of its 2004 World Development Report to the issue. Other materials, such as a “toolkit” for public-private partnerships in education published by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), have been developed to promote the strategy worldwide.

4.3: Characteristics of the PAPF

As noted above, the PAPF financed three types of literacy activities. The non-integrated literacy courses were in some cases (only about 8%) followed by post-literacy classes. The integrated type of literacy course, which consisted of literacy activities combined with post literacy and income-generating activities, proved so popular that the PDEF-NF financed only integrated literacy subprojects, from 2000 and onwards.

A) General Features of the Subprojects

Information on how to formulate a subproject, on the selection of the subproject, and on requirements of the providers, was defined in the procedures manual, which was the legal instrument of the Women's Literacy Project. The procedures manual required that each provider, in cooperation with villagers, prepare a literacy subproject proposal. In the case of the Women's Literacy Project, the private providers were paid to do the following work:

- In discussion with villagers, establish a subproject, or a service delivery program for literacy education;
 - Recruit, pay, provide initial training and in-service training of staff;
 - Upgrade or construct literacy centers (known as Learning and Activities' Centers) this was a required feature of subprojects using the integrated approach
 - Procure equipment;
 - Implement the subproject (for the integrated approach subprojects, the training offered included post literacy and income generating activities, as well as training of the local women's association's leaders)
 - Monitor and evaluate the progress of service implementation
- (Source: MDP, 2000).

The basic characteristics of the subprojects are shown in table 4.3 on the following page.

The providers set up literacy courses that were characterized by their main focus on women's literacy. The courses were not free; each participant had to pay 2,500 CFAP to the provider to participate. Each provider implemented one subproject; it was very infrequent that a provider implemented several subprojects (it often happened, however,

that a provider “finished” a subproject from an earlier cohort while starting a new cohort).

Table 4.3: Characteristics of the subprojects

	Non integrated course	Integrated course
Number of enrollees per subproject	300-600	(preferred)* 600
Number of courses per subproject	10-20	(preferred) 20
Number of enrollees per course	30	30
Percentage of women	>75% (required) 87% (actual)	>75% (required) 87% (actual)
Age of participants	15-39 (required)	15-39 (required)
Participant cost (paid to provider)	2,500 CFAF**	2,500 CFAF
Provider fee per participant (paid by government to provider)	27,500 CFAF	36,000 CFAF
Duration of the course	450 hours	450 hours
Construction of a learning center	No***	Yes (required)
Training of a <i>relais</i>	No***	Yes (required)
Income-generation activities	No****	Yes (required)

*For the integrated course type, providers were requested to prepare requests that covered 600 learners (per subproject). However, in a few cases, they proposed smaller subprojects or they received financing covering less than 20 courses/600 learners.

** US \$1 = CFAF 580 (average 2003 costs).

***A few providers constructed a learning center and/or trained *relais* in the non-integrated course. This was not a requirement (it did not figure in the contract between the contract-managing agency and the provider), and the provider did not receive financing to do it. In the integrated course, however, these actions were funded and the provider was required to implement them.

****In the non-integrated project, the provider would usually teach about specific subjects that could lead to income. For example, many providers taught about dyeing and/or soap making. The difference with the integrated project was that henceforth the providers were required to provide such teaching, and they received some funding for it.

The courses were of 450 hours’ duration. The participants could decide on how they wanted these hours to be used. In most cases, the participants decided to attend the

course two to three times a week, for about 3 hours each time. The weekly time schedule would be between eight and eleven hours, which would make the course last for ten to fourteen months. Most often, the participants wished to go to class during afternoons, before dark. Most classes were therefore held between 3 PM and 6 PM during three afternoons per week. For the integrated project, it was generally assumed that the *relais* (a participant that had received special training as a substitute literacy teacher) would take over the literacy course after 10 months of implementation.

B) Characteristics of the Learners

The learners were from both urban and rural areas, and belonged to different socio-cultural, ethnic, and religious background (see table 4.4). Generally, their ethnicity represented the ethnic structure of the five regions in which the project was implemented.

Table 4.4: Ethnicity of learners

Ethnic group	Ethnic division of population in Senegal	Percentage of learners (all literacy programs)	PAPF classes (based on language of teacher)
Wolof	44%	51%	57%
Pulaar	23%	28%	24%
Serrer	15%	12%	11%
Manding	5%	7%	5%
Soninke	2%	3%	0%

The learners could choose the language of instruction and timetable for the classes. In some cases, non-Wolof groups chose to learn Wolof, since this language is also used by other ethnic groups, and is by many considered to be a national language.

The participants belonged to the poorest segment of the Senegalese population (although there are grounds to believe that the poorest of the poor could not afford to participate because of the opportunity costs and the required direct fees; see section 8.6) The Senegal Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2002) sets the poverty threshold at an income of 143,080 CFAF per year for adults, and estimates that the percentage of households below the poverty threshold is about 53.9%. The impact study shows that of the learners, 83.5% had a family income of less than 300,000 CFAF per year. There are therefore grounds to believe that most of the participants in the literacy courses had an average income situated at or below the poverty threshold of 143,043 CFAF.

4.4: Reasons for the World Bank's Involvement in the Sector

The World Bank's involvement in the literacy sector was conditional on the use of public-private partnerships (SAR, 1996). To understand the World Bank's influence in the establishment of partnership, this section analyzes (a) the rationale for the creation of a partnership model and (b) how the criteria of selection of providers were created.

A) The Rationale for Creation of a Partnership Model

The World Bank did not consider that use of direct implementation of literacy by the government was a viable option. Generally this comes from the World Bank's neoliberal

position. Specifically, the World Bank believed that the government had to concentrate on the primary education sector. Since the state did not have enough resources to create a proper primary school system; how could one expect it to take up non-formal education for youth and adults in addition to the formal education?

The PAPF project document describes the World Bank's position as follows:

- The World Bank thought that the experience of mass literacy campaigns and functional literacy programs popularized by UNESCO during the 1960s and 1970s were unsuccessful;
- Governments in Africa already have great difficulty organizing and delivering primary education. The World Bank therefore thought that support for literacy programs would risk distracting the government from fulfilling this obligation;
- Literacy programs did not, according to the World Bank, require significant investment, and such programs were difficult for the government to provide because they were usually small-scale operations that need to be responsive to needs of diverse groups;
- The Bank had little experience with literacy programs.

The first statement above, on UNESCO literacy campaigns, is a contested opinion, reflecting the World Bank's own belief about the low rates of return to literacy education for adults. The second statement (about governments' need to focus on primary education) is a policy judgment by the World Bank. The third statement appears to indicate two reasons for not financing non-formal education: (i) since literacy programs did not require significant investment, they were not interesting for the World Bank; and (ii) they are difficult for the government to implement anyway. The fourth point

indicates that the World Bank did not know much about literacy programs (which is probably true, since the World Bank does not have any section or work position specializing in literacy education). The World Bank's position (at least the two first points) was clearly understood by the Senegalese counterpart. One of the members of the Senegalese negotiation team noted that:

[...] prior programs that were implemented through UNESCO and other agencies' support had not been sufficiently convincing in terms of outcomes and effectiveness as well as economic and cultural impact on the society. [...] These arguments were important for the World Bank because at that point the international community was skeptical to the need for financing literacy programs at all. Many thought that it would be better to invest in primary education, because the enrollment rate [for primary] was at that point [only] about 50%" (Consultant, former civil servant).

In view of its priorities to finance primary education, the World Bank was unwilling to accept that the government used resources (especially human resources) to conduct literacy courses. Many civil servants in the Senegalese government agreed that the government should concentrate on primary schooling and not get involved in literacy provision:

"Could we have used another way 15 years ago? Could we have given everything to the state? No. No, we asked the state to school the children. And the state is supervising children's schooling; these children are obliged to go to school. A state that is not capable of schooling one child out of two; now you ask that state to provide literacy courses for millions and millions of illiterate people; it doesn't work. Also, the state is not organized to do that. At the inspection level, you have one person in charge of

literacy. During the 1000-classes project, this person was supposed to control and follow up on the implementation. Many fake classes were 'set up', and no monitoring followed. The state was not capable of controlling the sector" (Consultant, former civil servant).

The World Bank's position was very similar to the one expressed by the government. It is possible that the government, knowing the World Bank's and other donors' reticence to finance non-formal basic education, eliminated other possibilities and focused on the implementation modality that had the largest chance to succeed. Many interviews underline that one main outcome of the partnership approach was to receive increased financing.

A DAEB official noted that

"[...] this strategy has resulted in increased financing from donors. Before 1993 we never received financing at over 500 million [FCFA]; currently, the amounts are measured in billions. Hence, two main results of the strategy are (i) improved quality of programs and (ii) increased financing from external partners [...]. (Civil servant).

The use of outsourcing/partnerships was based two concurrent actions: external pressure and internal acceptance. The World Bank and other international donors, influenced by the Washington Consensus, promoted use of private associations for service delivery. The internal explanation for using this approach was that local associations existed, and they had already set up literacy courses by themselves.

Based on the two reasons, one external, one internal, the obvious implementation model would be to use civil society associations as providers:⁴¹

“There was a large potential for literacy actors; we didn’t invent these actors. We found that they were already doing literacy activities. The “faire-faire” did not invent them. The “faire-faire” said: I have found actors that are implementing small literacy programs with maybe an insufficient quality level. I will support these programs, make them bigger and make them high-quality programs.” (Consultant, former civil servant).

The World Bank’s project document explicitly mentioned its concerns about what is called a specter: “the specter of the government using primary education resources for literacy financing,” (SAR, 1996, p. 7). From the beginning of negotiations between the World Bank and the government about a possible literacy project, the discussion centered on the definition of the outsourcing approach, and on clarifying the state and the providers’ respective roles.⁴² The World Bank’s conditions had the potential to have a major influence on the development of the whole literacy sector in the country, since World Bank assistance often also includes financing of the establishment of policies that orient the government’s and other donors’ actions. As seen in section 4.1, the partnership

⁴¹ However, as we will see in section B), it was not the World Bank’s initial intention to use local associations as providers. The World Bank had as intention to use a few, large organizations for implementation; these would be organizations with international reputation. The local civil society associations were accepted for service delivery because of Senegalese pressure on the World Bank.

⁴² The World Bank’s project document explicitly mentioned the conditionality of the project: “Since 1991, the Senegalese authorities have persistently requested IDA support for a literacy program. However, for all the above reasons, particularly the specter of the government using primary education resources for literacy financing, the Bank was reluctant to move ahead. Additional concerns included the limited experience of the MCALN [Delegated Ministry of Literacy and Local languages] in the area of literacy, and that increased government involvement in the sub-sector would turn towards program delivery and regulation of private providers. Therefore, at the outset, IDA-Government discussions on this proposed project centered on defining the meaning of its faire-faire strategy, the appropriate roles for Government and literacy providers, and on an experimental approach to expand literacy programs” (SAR, 1996, p. 7-8).

approach became the approach used in Senegal for the four literacy projects that were financed by the key donors.⁴³

However, the World Bank's preferences for a particular model were not enough to create the policy. In policy formulation, confluence of favorable factors has often been called a "policy window" of opportunity, which often opens "because of change in the political stream" such as a change in the government (Kingdon, 1995, p. 168). Another important factor for policy formulation is the existence of a "policy entrepreneur" who can join the different streams of problems, policy and politics, and push the creation of policy (Kingdon, 1995). An interviewee in Senegal notes four reasons for its establishment, including (i) political leadership from Mamadou Ndoeye who became the "policy entrepreneur" in this case; (ii) refocus of the World Bank on social issues in view of criticism against adjustment policies; (iii) the existence of civil society associations in Senegal that were already operating in the field, and (iv) existence in key positions, of individuals in the World Bank and in Senegal who were favorable to literacy. We should add to this list the Jomtien conference, which seems to have made the Senegalese government more responsive to literacy.

The World Bank was not the sole decision maker for Senegalese policy formulation. As the economic sponsor, it had a large role in orienting the policy. However, it needed internal support and leadership from the Senegalese government. The choice and definition of the partnership model was open for discussion, and some discrepancies

⁴³ Some international NGOs still implemented their own projects, using own funds, without receiving funds from the World Bank – or without outsourcing their work to other associations.

between the World Bank's view and the Senegalese view could be seen already in the policy's conception phase.

B) The Criteria for Selection of Providers

It was not taken for granted that the partnership model that became known as *faire-faire* was to be used. In the beginning, the World Bank disagreed to use many small providers. It was thought that these providers did not have the necessary competency to implement quality literacy programs. The World Bank therefore suggested subcontracting with a few, large associations, which had an international reputation. These associations, it was believed, would set up high-quality literacy courses.

According to the outsourcing/partnership model discussed in section 2.1, under-provision of quality can be addressed through making it possible to switch suppliers, reputation among providers, and use of non profit organizations as providers (Schelifer, 1998). The model proposed by the World Bank would make it easier to monitor the associations (since there were few providers to monitor). If any of the providers were delivering low-quality projects, they could be replaced. Since the selection of these providers would be based on reputation, it was believed that this reputation would have made it necessary to implement high-quality courses.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ From a neoliberal perspective, the main flaw of the World Bank-proposed design was that it may not have included a sufficient accountability of the providers towards the consumers (i.e., the learners). It is often underscored that one key solution to avoid corruption problems and cost-cutting practices in partnership programs is to make providers accountable towards clients (or receivers of services).

The delegate minister in Senegal (Mamadou Ndoye), however, did not agree to using a few, international providers for implementation of literacy services. He had been responsible for local NGO in Senegal, and wanted to develop the local civil society milieu. Therefore, he insisted on using many small, local associations to conduct literacy classes. This use of small-scale associations, instead of using a few big providers, may well be the most original aspect of the partnership approach in Senegal, and is probably a reason for the apparent dynamism of the project.⁴⁵ The former Director of PCU was at that time involved in the negotiations with the Bank. He notes that:

“[...] we began having a number of difficulties with the Bank. The Bank wanted us to subcontract with a few big providers, which were internationally and nationally well known, and which had a large implementation capacity. Very few organizations fulfilled these criteria. The Ministry thought that it was necessary to make the criteria wider. Also, the use of national associations was supported since the big international organizations had networks that made it possible for them to find other resources. Small associations, for example those defending languages such as the Pulaar, or other small organizations, were implementing small programs because they did not have access to any financing networks. If they were not given access to financing, they would not have the possibility of entering into such networks by themselves.” (Consultant, former civil servant).

⁴⁵ The use of many small providers has some drawbacks insomuch as monitoring and evaluation of many providers is more difficult than monitoring and evaluation of a few. Also, the reputation mechanisms (for selection of high-quality providers and replacement of low-quality providers) needed to be build from scratch. As we shall see in section 7.2, such reputation-selective mechanisms were never established in Senegal, and decreased the results of the courses.

The World Bank agreed to finance a pilot project testing out the Senegalese approach of using many small providers. Use of relay-providers that had an international (good) reputation, such as Plan International, can be understood as a compromise between the Senegalese and the World Bank approaches. When the pilot project appeared to have succeeded, the main project was financed. Since the relay provider system posed some problems, it was abandoned.

World Bank staff members, however, were still hesitant about the capacity of the providers to conduct literacy courses in the beginning of the main implementation phase. The project document for the PAPF noted, “although literacy providers show significant interest in the program, capacity is widely believed to be weak among small providers” (SAR, 1996, p. 18). Despite this reticence the ‘Senegalese’ version of the model was adapted. It is now widely believed (in Senegal) that the model is genuinely Senegalese, and that the Senegalese government invented it without any pressure from the outside.

“In the field of education, [the faire-faire is] a Senegalese innovation. We were pioneers, and the other ministries followed the partnership approach after the Ministry of Education. We wanted it to be more than a technique; we wanted it to be a philosophical approach [deontodologie] - and we also wanted it to be an ethical approach” (Consultant, former civil servant)..

Mamdou Ndoeye, who many people consider as the ‘father’ of the approach, stated,

“it was evident for me that a partnership between the state and NGOs, and larger, between the state and civil society is necessary. This has nothing to do with the World Bank. It is true that the World Bank helped us from a technical and professional point of view, especially with the procedures

manual. The basic policy orientation, however, was ours, and had nothing to do with the ideas of the World Bank” (Former civil servant).

When looking at the World Bank’s project document, it appears that the World Bank influenced the basic policy orientation, and that the Senegalese state adopted it to their circumstances. A further point of inquiry is the reasons for appointing Mamadou Ndoye as delegated Minister. His background from civil society must have been the ideal choice if the government wished to promote partnership approaches. As Ndoye himself indicates,

“I used to work for the Teachers’ Union, which promoted the idea that the government should include all the stakeholders in any policy decisions. [...] When I left the teachers’ union in 1990, [...] I started a project of volunteers for education, in which we financed youth who would like to become volunteers and teach in community schools. In this context, I could see how civil society organizations could develop education. Therefore, at the time I was asked to become Minister I was [...] a part of the NGO milieu. It was evident for me that a partnership between the state and NGOs, and larger, between the state and civil society, is necessary.” (Former civil servant).

The choice of the partnership model may therefore be read in two ways; one is that international agencies indirectly (by refusing to finance any other program than those based on partnership approaches) exerted pressure on the government to choose the model, and the second is the internal (Senegalese) adaptation of the model to local circumstances.

In conclusion, there were differences in opinion on how to set up the outsourcing model. The World Bank wished to use a few large associations whereas the Senegalese government wanted to base its literacy provision on the subcontracting on many small grassroots associations. The World Bank agreed to fund the Senegalese version of the literacy policy (i.e., using many small associations) inasmuch as it used market mechanisms for the selection of providers.

The choice to use many small associations for literacy delivery was based on a historic precedent. Civil society associations in Senegal were more involved in literacy delivery than public organizations before the 1990s. These organizations principally consisted of language and culture associations, promoting certain local languages, such as for example Wolof, Pulaar or Joola. Later, some international NGOs and development societies set up literacy classes. In the 1990s the government became preoccupied with the low literacy rate of the population, which was seen as an obstacle to development, and tested out various approaches for state-sponsored literacy education.

A colloquium in Kolda defined the partnership approach, which was to be used as a strategy for implementation of literacy. Instead of the government's direct intervention in the recruitment and training of literacy teachers, the policy was based on outsourcing literacy provision to civil society associations which were to expand their activities in literacy. The goals of the partnership policies were both qualitative and quantitative: Senegal's literacy courses needed to improve their quality, and at the same time the civil society organizations needed to develop their capacity of enrolling more learners. The outsourcing processes used by the PAPF were apparently sufficiently transparent (despite

some design and implementation flaws) and functioned well during a period with political stability in Senegal. When there was a government change in 1998, followed by increasing turnover of directors in the Department of Literacy, the outsourcing processes lost stability and led to increasing implementation flaws (the process flaws of the outsourcing system are further explored in chapters 6 and 7).

The literacy policy of the government had a clear quantitative mandate. The literacy courses purported to enroll young women in the 15-39 years age group, and to reduce the illiteracy rate by 5% per year. Although the average age of the learners in PAPF was 21 years, many enrollees were younger than 15 years of age, and some were older than 39 years. One has the impression that the enrollment of learners was more important than the outcome of the learning; hence there was a special focus on the outsourcing mechanisms, as opposed to the pedagogic aspect of the courses. However, the pedagogic aspects were not neglected, and resulted in the change toward an integrated project model in 1999. This model integrated literacy and income-generating activities. It had a stronger focus on local development issues, instead of concentrating only on literacy.

To further analyze the outsourcing/partnership model and the courses, it is necessary to present the “partners” or the agents of the policy, such as the participants, the providers, and the government institutions involved in the selection, monitoring and policy formulating processes. This is the objective of the next chapter.

Chapter 5: The Stakeholders of the Partnership

This chapter describes stakeholders of the partnership, which include (i) the local participants who wanted to learn how to write and read in local languages; (ii) civil society associations that conducted literacy courses; (iii) the providers' association; (iv) the parastatal agency that was responsible for managing contracts and transferring funds to the providers; (v) government institutions that ensured policy direction, monitoring and evaluation; and (vi) project-specific institutions such as the selection committee, the approbation committee and the Project coordination Unit (PCU); and (vii) an external financial organization: The World Bank.

After describing the stakeholders and their role within the PAPF, the chapter analyzes how the role of each of these stakeholders evolved as a result of the partnership. As noted in chapter 4, the partnership was partially a result of requirements by the World Bank. Also referred to above is the notion that international influence and/or pressure on internal policies is a phenomenon of globalization. This chapter examines the evolution of the participant category, the civil society organizations, and the government within a framework of global financing and global pressure.

The roles of the stakeholders are described in the way they pertain to the integrated approach (as reflected in the procedures manual for 2000-2002). The integrated approach was characterized by decentralization, and involved the participants more directly in the course management. It may be described as a mature approach evolving from earlier experimentation.


5.1: The Local Stakeholders in Literacy Courses

In rural areas, the literacy courses were implemented in small villages. If it was implemented in an urban area, the community receiving services belonged to an administrative subdivision called “*quartier*” or neighborhood. The village or neighborhoods’ associative structures are illustrated below (figure 5.1). Different committees were responsible for organizing different aspects of the community life. Of these, the women’s committee is significant, since it was directly linked to the literacy course. The majority of the women in the course, if not all, belonged to the women’s association, but not all women in the association enrolled in the course (in most cases, they were too many). The course participants created another committee, responsible for the management of the course.

The provider association usually contacted the head of the identified village to obtain authorization to conduct a literacy course in the village. The provider association interacted with the women association, which decided who (in the association) should attend classes. Also, the provider association set up a subproject proposal in coordination with the local women’s association. If the subproject obtained PAPF financing, a

management committee was set up. If there were no women's association in the village (which was very rare), the provider would help to create it.

Figure 5.1: A village's associative structure



Based on the above, the principal local stakeholders of the PAPF may be divided into three categories:

- The learners;
- The chief of the village; the elders; the village development committee (these people were outside of the project management, but were involved in the decision to establish the course);
- The literacy management committee; the women's association, the *relais* (these categories were directly involved in day-to-day course management).

The literacy management committee was generally not the same as the management committee for the women's association, and the participants of the literacy course were not necessarily the same as for the women's association:

“Often there are 50 members or more in the association, and they have to choose 30 if we open one CAL [learning and activities' center]. If the village is really large, we often open two CALs. The 30 learners are chosen by their age. They should be at least 15 years old, and I even prefer that they are older than 15, because the 15-years old girls are most often not married” (Private provider staff).

The categories involved in project management (participants, women's association literacy management committee, and the *relais*) will be discussed below.

A) The Participants

The procedures manual described the “target” participants in these terms: They were “illiterate population groups living in the target areas of program implementation (especially women and girls). These groups should preferably be organized” (PM 2000, p. 9). Normally, at least 75% of the participants should be women in the 15-39 years age group,⁴⁶ and there should be thirty participants per class (or course). Sometimes, a few people who were outside the women's association asked to participate in the course (these “outside” people were sometimes men). The providers obtained the same fee for enrollees that were outside the “target” age (or who were men). A subproject proposal in

⁴⁶ The colloquium in Kolda decided to make a priority of women's enrollment, and the “target” age was set to 9-39 years. Since specific basic non-formal community education programs (*Education Communautaire de Base*) were set up for the 9-15 years age group, the adult literacy classes focused on the 15-39 years age group.

which there was a majority of learners that did not conform to PAPF requirements, would not receive financing. The World Bank's project completion report stated that most of the enrollees corresponded to the criteria (ICR, 2004).⁴⁷

The decision to participate was made on several criteria; the participant must be willing to pay the 2500FCFA (or approximately US \$4) fee to participate (or pay the fee in-kind), and the participant must be of the right age. The providers were often unwilling to enroll many unmarried participants, since young women in the 15-18 years group were likely to marry during the course period. When they married, women nearly always had to move to their husbands' family house. This house may or may not have been in the same community as that of the literacy course. Due to the move and also to other cultural factors, newly wed women often stopped attending the literacy course. This affected the provider association's statistics negatively, and the literacy teacher had to bring in 'substitute learners' – or had less than 30 learners in the class (according to field interviews and observations, the provider most often opted for enrolling new learners).

The providers tried to enroll married women in the 25-30 years group; these were considered the most persevering attendees. Quantitative data from the project confirms that most enrollees were indeed between 25-30 years old. The PAPF longitudinal study shows that 86% of 1516 learners were between 15-39 years; this was the target age for learner enrollment (EL-T0, 2001). As for the impact study, the mean age of the sample of 1000 learners was 28.5 years (IS, 2004). According to the project completion report, 87%

⁴⁷ The PAPF enrolled 191,500 individuals, of which 87% were women, according to the ICR (2004).

of the enrolled learners were women (ICR, 2004); this corresponds roughly to the numbers of the impact study's sample (89.6% of total enrollment, all projects confounded, was of female learners). Of these, a large majority (77%) was married (IS, 2004).

Each participant group received some financing to help construct a Learning and Activities' Center [*Centre d'Animation et Lecture (CAL)*].⁴⁸ See picture 5.2 for an illustration of a CAL.

Picture 5.2: A rural Learning and Activities' Center



⁴⁸ In the earlier stages of the project, the construction of a CAL was not required. In the integrated project, however, the construction of a CAL became necessary. One interviewee defined the center in the following way: “The center is a reading center, but it is also a resource center. Anyone in the village can come to the center and read books in the library, where one can find reading materials in both national and other languages [i.e., French]. There are both reading materials for children and Koran-related books for religious people in the village” (*Civil servant*).

The center should in principle not only cater for the learners, but also function as a library and a resource center for all villagers. The learning and reading centers were partially financed by the subproject (the subproject paid some materials; the community sponsored the rest of the materials and built the center). The provider brought books to the center (the subproject financing included a budget for CAL books and learning materials):

“Lately, we have been intervening in 1,200 villages; in all these villages there is now a beginning of a library. It is mandatory to set up these libraries, because they are financed through the subprojects [i.e., they are part of the fixed unit price].” (Civil servant).

This center was in most case the place where the literacy teacher conducted classes for the participants. This place was also meant to be a meeting and learning place for other villagers. It was thus aimed at both participants and indirect beneficiaries. During the interviews with people in the village, they characterized their relationship with the center and with the course in different ways. Here is a sample of short vignettes, describing some of the people that had some connection with the literacy course:

A chief of the village described the project in these terms:

“I have four wives and 22 children. All my wives have attended literacy class; I have seen nothing but benefits from it.” (Villager).

One of his wives belonged to the Manding ethnic group; she had attended French school and could read and write perfectly [in French]. Her husband was Wolof. She said:

“I attend the literacy classes to be able to speak better Wolof - because then I can help my children better. Besides - Wolof is the national language.”

(Current learner).

During an interview with a woman participating in literacy classes, her son came by. He was attending the University of Dakar preparing a State BTS (*Brevet de Technicien Supérieur* - a vocational training certificate taken after the age of 18), and would soon become a computer analyst and programmer. He said:

“My mom can write her name now and she is telephoning by herself. That helps to keep her occupied. At home, when we are watching the Africa Football [soccer] Cup, she now knows who scored.” (Villager).

His mother said that she would like to know literacy “completely” before she began to learn computer sciences from her son: she would like to use a computer for the management of the GIE (for-profit association) for which she is a president.

A male learner said:

“I am 46 years and I am a farmer. I want to go to the course because I want to learn more. I have learned the Arab language, but am especially motivated to learn my local language. I want to be able to read the road signs when I am traveling - now I can read the names of the villages. The course has helped me to become more aware of things - and also to have a better relationship with the other villagers. Every day after the classes I revise the lesson, because I don't want to forget it. I don't have any problems with the course; it is working well. I think that people should be more aware of the importance of literacy - even if one is 55 years of age, it is important to go to the course.” (Current learner).

One village elder said:

“We had never had literacy classes [here] before. The literacy classes made it possible to resolve problems in the community, whereas the French school is a door towards other perspectives. Literacy is enough to develop the localities; in fact, literacy is much more advantageous for the village than the French school. Besides, the literacy classes open possibilities for all, whereas French schooling is only for children of low age. This is my own opinion.” (Current learner).

Common for these people, is that they are all experiencing some effects of the course, either indirectly since a family member is attending class, or they are participating in the class themselves. Chapter 9-11 further discuss why people are attending class.

The participants had a certain number of tasks when they were attending the course.

These tasks are described in the following way in the procedures’ manual:

- Their “policy role” was to “choose which type of functional skills they would like to learn; identify the beneficiaries (i.e., the community chooses the beneficiaries);⁴⁹ organize community participation (management committee)”;
- Their administrative role was to “set up a management committee; sign agreement with the provider; the management committee keeps class register”;
- Their financial role was to “participate financially through cash payment or in-kind”;
- Their technical role was to “choose the course dates, the place for the training, and the language of instruction; identify and propose [literacy] instructor(s) to the provider; identify and mobilize resource persons to teach functional skills;

⁴⁹ Most often the Women’s Association facilitates this choice.

participate in internal and external evaluations on the impact of the program” (Procedures Manual, 2000, p. 8).

During interviews, most often the participants indicated that they had been consulted on these above issues, except for identifying and proposing a literacy teacher to the provider; and identifying and mobilizing resource persons to teach functional skills. Most often the provider carried out these functions.

B) The Women’s Association and the Literacy Management committee

Many associations were created as a result of the literacy courses in the villages. This “associative movement” was complex, and included the following possible structures (see figure 5.1: A village’s associative structure):

- A course management committee that was set up by the provider to manage the literacy course;
- A women’s association or a “feminine promotion group” (GPF: *Groupement de Promotion Féminine*); these latter were women’s associations that had been officially registered;
- A women’s association for savings and mutual aid (*tontine*) – or a financial network for micro-credit (these networks or tontines were not necessarily local)
- A for-profit women’s association (GIE: *Groupement d’Intérêt Economique*).
- The following section describes the aforementioned main variations of the village associations below, and chapter 10 further discusses the impact that the project’s structuring movements had on social relations.

The provider association helped create a management committee for the literacy course for purposes such as keeping the class registry and organizing the community’s

participation for construction of learning and activities' center. A few courses had more than one literacy course management committee, e.g., one course site visited had two management committees, one for monitoring of literacy activities and one for monitoring course-related income generating activities.⁵⁰ The separation of the management functions of the women's association and the literacy course management committee was sometimes not very clear, since in many cases the same women participated in the women's association and in the literacy course. It was unusual to find a village without a women's association – in most cases at least an informal associative movement existed (in some rare cases where no women's association existed, the providers helped creating it). Most associations gathered all the women in the village to consult on different issues related to daily life in the village (e.g., water fetching, problem solving, support to sick or to pregnant women). The women's association had an important social function in the village and most women participated in it. The association, in most cases, did not have any educative objective. Participation was not based on ethnic criteria, but on age: usually all the women in working age belonged to an association:

“Most often, there are many women in the association. In a big village, there can be 100 women in the association. In a small village, there can be

⁵⁰ The management committees were in one case described in the following terms: “In each course, we select two committees, one for the management and monitoring of learning activities [i.e., literacy; writing, reading, math, etc.] and one for the IGA. Sometimes the course members want to do different IGAs, and they divide in two groups. Then there is competition; each of the groups wants to be best! In the course, the learners assign a mature woman, or someone who is known for being honest, to the responsibilities in the management committee for the class-work. These people will tell anybody who is not concentrated during the class to stop talking, or would give a 100 or 150 FCFA fine to those coming too late for the class. Also, the management committee is monitoring payments for IGA and reimbursement of loans. There are usually three members of the management committee, and they are receiving a special training. After we have trained the *relais* [see section C below for a definition of *relais*], we will train them; it is what we call the leader's training. There are three functions in the management committee, president, treasurer, secretary; they are the same functions as in the women's association” (*Private provider staff*).

15 - 20 - 30 women in the association. The associations are not defined by ethnic criteria. I can go to another village and marry a person belonging to another ethnic group. Then I will join the women's association at that site. It will help them. If a woman in the association gets a child, every other woman will give her a piece of soap. With that soap you can clean clothes until the child is getting big or you can sell it. Or they give you clothes or they give each 1000 FCFA; that makes 100,000 FCFA. So each woman coming to the village, be it Bambara, Peul or from Dakar, will integrate into the women's association, because there are advantages [in doing so]. The associations therefore include all the women from 15 to 50 years. These are the women who work. Those who do not participate are very few, sometimes they are very poor, or sometimes they have a very jealous husband" (Private provider staff).

Also, the association had an economic role, which was based on mutual aid between women (see also section 11.2 on the project's economic role). In this regard, the women's associations were a product of a particular socio-cultural and religious context that favored distinct female and male spaces (Kane, 2001). Women were confined to the private or family spheres (i.e., the household and the farmland); men were in the public spheres (the mosque, and other public meeting places such as the café). Women therefore had a social need of a forum for discussion and sharing of information. These aspects were more important than financial aspects of mutual aid and financial networking. The financial aspects of the associations, however, should not be underestimated. Many women's associations therefore functioned as (or they were connected to) "tontines" or female financial associations. In addition to the mutual aid function described above, tontines often made it possible for women to access credit and

also to save money: “Most women who participate in neighborhood tontines draw their contributions from the household budget, funds given to them by their husbands. Women, therefore, have a vested interest in keeping their husbands out of the tontines, where they would learn about female accumulation strategies. This is especially important in polygamous families, where each wife attempts to draw maximum advantage from the family budget for the needs of her children” (Abdoulay Kane, 2001, p. 305). Literacy providers sometimes created and managed tontine-like financial networks. During each “cohort” of literacy course provision, the provider could attach between 10 and 20 new associations to the network (depending on the size of the subproject, which most often varied between 10 and 20 courses, with 300-600 learners enrolled for each ‘cohort’). Most women’s associations were eager to connect to these networks since it was difficult to obtain credit within the villages. According to the Impact Study, 43% of the sampled learners were connected to similar credit organizations (IS, 2004, p. 65).

One role of the provider was to assist the local Women’s Associations to obtain a ‘legal status’ or a legal registration document, which is an official document stating its existence (such document would enable the association to obtain loans or financial aid from various donors – see the section on project impact). Also, the providers’ role was to strengthen the Women’s Association through various management training.

Some villages had more than one Women’s Associations in the village. In many cases there were one or several women’s for-profit associations or GIEs (*Groupement d’Intérêt Economique*). These GIEs often had legal registration documents and associated women that were involved in the same economic activity, such as production of peanut oil or

production and sale of vegetables. In many cases a local GIE requested the provider association for a literacy course. In the interaction with the community, this specific GIE played the role of the Women's Association (see figure 5.1 above). Also, in cases where the provider association proposed its services to the village, the head of the village often connected the provider staff with the most structured women's association in the village, which was sometimes a GIE. For the provider, it was often easier to work with such (structured) groups. In cases where the Women's Associations were unstructured, the women in the literacy course often formed a GIE by themselves (in such case the provider would help them to obtain a legal registration document).

In the impact study on average rural communities had 1.15 women's associations (*Groupement de Promotion Féminine – GPF*) in areas with literacy course, against 1.05 women's associations in communities without literacy course. As for GIEs; the communities with literacy course had 0.64 GIEs in areas with literacy course, against 0.35 GIEs per community in areas without literacy course (Impact Study, 2004, p. 38). According to the Impact Study, 44% of the sampled learners belonged to a Women's Association (GPF); 39% to other type of association; and 10% belonged to a GIE (Impact Study, 2004, p. 65).

C) An Intermediate Category: the Relais

In this dissertation, the French word *relais* is used, which designates a “relay person” who is supposed to continue learning activities in the community when the provider-implemented course has finished. The *relais* appeared with the integrated project, and is a

function given to one or two enrollees in the literacy course. The *relais* would organize learning activities in the learning and activities center when the course had finished. In this way, the *relais* took over the functions of the literacy teacher, who left the village when the course was over. The learning activities taking place in the learning and activities center that were organized by the *relais* would promote sustainability of the literacy skills learned during the course, and create a continuous learning system in the villages:

“The [use of a] relais is a part of the measures taken to ensure sustainability; it is one person from the community who can be a participant in the literacy class or a person who has already been made literate, and who has been selected according to criteria of availability and of knowledge of writing and reading, as well as the capacities of organization of activities. Generally there are two relais who are selected to continue each class’s learning activities after the provider has left. The relais are offered an initial training of one month from the provider, which is followed by a system of hands-on [in-class] training [tutorat] by the facilitator, which starts about six months after the beginning of the classes. The relais are taught how to organize a class, how to plan lessons, etc. Then, after twelve months of training by the provider, the relais are taking over the conduct of the class. The provider-paid literacy teacher is accompanying the relais for another six months, upon which he or she [the teacher] leaves the village. The relais remain in the village, and are now responsible for local training activities” (Civil servant).

During the field visits, it was found that the *relais* function had been set up in most villages, and *relais* participants had been recruited. In most cases, the other participants chose two or more people to become *relais*; the provider then trained them. They were

not paid, which created problems for the sustainability of the learning activities in the CAL. In most cases such learning activities were discontinued shortly after the provider left the village.

D) Evolution of the Perception and Role of the Participant Category

They are not animals.

(Private provider staff).

In this dissertation, the word ‘participants’ is used to designate the local population that enrolls in literacy courses. The vocabulary in Senegal changed over time; in the beginning of PAPP one spoke about ‘beneficiaries’. One provider pointed out during an interview that the participants “are not animals:” a terminology that shows the perceived superiority of the provider. At present one evolves towards designating the participants as ‘clients,’ a business term that was not a traditional term in Senegal, but appeared as a part of the neoliberal discourse. The former director of PCU pointed out that:

“Until now we haven’t sufficiently taken into account the communities that are involved; and we have always called them ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘targets’. In the last procedures manual we speak about ‘client’, because when we speak about clients, we indicate a possibility of [their] choice and search for quality in the provision. A client does not buy just anything [n’importe quoi] but knows what he or she wants. When it does not fit the client’s needs, he or she can say ‘stop!’” (Civil servant).

The evolution of the participants’ name also reflects their increasing involvement in the design and organization of the courses. In the beginning, the project offered literacy classes to *participants*, which were mostly local women. As seen above, the project

evolved towards provision of literacy classes to *participants organized in a women's association* (or in a for profit-association such as a GIE – *Groupement d'Interet Economique*). The project gradually focused on associations instead of individuals, and had as objective to strengthen these associations (in areas where they did not exist, the provider would help to create them and assist to obtain a legal status). During the interviews, one had often the impression that illiterate people could be found anywhere and that they were only tools for the provider to obtain a living:

“Participants can be found in any case. If there are too many providers somewhere, one changes location. I have always operated in the same location - which always has illiterate people to instruct. The only thing I have noticed is that the mean age has shifted downwards; now there are 5-6% of learners that are in the age group of 12-15 years.” (Private provider staff).

Initially, the government tried to make the participants a full-fledged ‘partner’ in the partnership approach, but it did not succeed.⁵¹

⁵¹ One former civil servant noted, “The problems with faire-faire can be found at several levels. The faire-faire is a partnership process, which is linking the state and civil society. But it is important that the third actor, the population, should be more involved. There is a communication problem; the population should know that the literacy programs are not a gift from heaven; a random generosity. No, literacy is their own business. It should be as if they were clients - with their own resources. We should make it such that the partnership really has three poles; the state, civil society, and beneficiaries. The offer [of literacy classes] should not be an external offer, but should engage the participants in a more direct way” (*Consultant, former civil servant*).

5.2: The Providers

The providers – or civil society – were at the heart of the partnership approach:

“Faire-faire is a modality of partnership between the state and the civil society to implement literacy, in which the state is in charge of resource mobilization. The state then entrusts civil society at grassroots level with the funds. In addition to resource mobilization, the state is in charge of follow-up and evaluation. Faire-faire is [thus] a partnership between the population and civil society, in which the state is in charge of resource mobilization and also of follow-up and monitoring. The civil society has experience with the field and is in charge of implementing the subprojects in coordination with the beneficiaries identified at grassroots’ level.”
(Consultant, former civil servant).

In most interviews, the word civil society was used synonymously with private providers. In the project’s procedures’ manual, most civil society associations were considered to be potential providers. Civil society was distinct from the local population:

“In fact, what I call civil society includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and different associations. [...] The current dilemma [for the literacy sector] is that we are in a three-pronged partnership: [first] there is the population. [Then] there is civil society, which sometimes represents the population [...]. More often, however, [civil society] is a structure which supplies a service, and which has certain skills that can be transferred to the population. This [supply situation of the provider] is not very representative of the population.” *(Consultant, former civil servant).*

Many other interviewees explained people’s understanding of the composition of civil society and the definition of the word very similarly to the quotation above, i.e., that civil

society was a group with technical capabilities that could be used by the state. It was not, however, conceived as groups that were representing the local population. By being distanced from the local population – and by its closeness to the state’s affairs, the notion of civil society in Senegal distinguished itself from our definition of civil society as a sphere of social interactions that are linked to political and economic interests, composed above all of the sphere of associations and especially voluntary associations (see section 2.3).

A) Types of Providers

One can make a legal distinction between for-profit providers (GIE: *Groupement d’Intérêt Economique*), and larger non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The NGOs and other non-profit organizations (e.g., religious associations, GPFs) were registered by the Ministry of Interior. The for-profit associations (GIEs) were registered by the Department of Justice. Most GIE personnel interviewed desired that their organization would become an NGO, since the NGO status was more prestigious. Also, since it was considered as a non-profit organization, an NGO could in certain circumstances obtain easier access to funding than GIEs. Other differences between these two categories were blurred, though, since in many cases the aim of the NGO or GIE was to capture enough funding to pay its members decent salaries and to purchase equipment⁵² (such as a car, computers, etc.).

⁵² Such equipment has a triple function; it facilitates the provider associations’ communication means both for private and work-related purposes; it increases the prestige of the provider; and because of these two reasons, it facilitates access to more resources for the provider.

Other than the NGO and GIEs, there were also religious associations and language associations that offered literacy courses. In some cases the provider association was working in a partnership with a church or a religious structure. In some cases, the provider association was Muslim and the associated Church was Christian:

“There is a division between the [Christian protestant] church and the literacy classes. External Muslim consultants organized themselves [into a GIE] to provide literacy classes and they [the Muslim-run GIE] associated with the [Christian] church. The cultural center attached to the church is secular” (Private provider staff).

Another provider staff explained that the provider association was composed of two groups, one business group and one non-profit group:

“The [Association Name] was created in 1989, obtained its legal status in 1990 and became an NGO in 1993. The association has two parts: one non-profit part which is implementing a PAPF subproject, and one for-profit part, which is, among other activities, running the only hostel in town. It is also running joinery, as well as making peanut oil for export to Belgium. The objective of the for-profit activities is to make the association financially autonomous. The NGO part of the association has one administrator, one coordinator, a driver and a watchman to guard the offices. It intervenes in six villages through PLCP financing [mainly for credit and microfinance], and in ten villages through PAPF financing. The group is a member of CNOAS [the provider association]; and the director of the group is the local secretary of CNOAS” (Private provider staff).

The aforementioned interview shows how the provider function can be multiple; providers were not necessarily specialized in literacy, but became specialized when funding was available. The interviewees made a distinction between local and “professional” providers.⁵³ The professional providers sometimes got the slightly pejorative name of “economic” provider (*opérateur économique*), which designated a provider with a core aim to earn money. In many cases, however, the local providers were as much profit-oriented as the ones coming from urban areas.

The types can thus be differentiated in a number of ways – and many combinations were possible, as it is shown in table 6.1 below. The table is not exhaustive; it only shows usual combinations of implementation scale, legal status, type and aim of providers in the PAPF project.

⁵³ One interviewee explained the differences between providers in the following way: “There are several types of providers however; one type is a local development agent at the village level (*promoteur villageois*), which is stimulating activities in its own community. Such agent has specific competencies, and maybe has specific goals for its own village’s development. It is therefore a provider, because it has capacity for literacy training, it is situated in the village and aims to promote its village. I think we need to differentiate this provider-type from a ‘professional’ provider that comes from Dakar and has as only goal to assist the village in any specific training program. We have to continue reflection about these issues because the local development agent is situated in the village and will continue its activities [beyond subproject financing], and in the use of such agent, there is a possibility for sustainability of activities. Such agent will accompany the village in the whole development process, whereas the other type comes to provide a specific service” (*Civil servant*). Another interviewee focused on the “economic” aspect of the providers: “Many providers, all they want, is money. Among 6 local providers, 4 are “economic” ones. In most cases, over half of the providers are mostly occupied with money. When we go to the field and see the CALs, we notice that everything is in a bad state” (*Civil servant*).

Table 6.1: Different types and characteristics of providers

Implementation scale	Legal status	Type of provider	Aim of provider
International	NGO	Professional, most often with own funding to implement other activities	Proselytism, local development, sometimes own profit
National, regional, department, locality	NGO, GIE	Professional or local; may have funding from other projects for development work	Local development, own profit, sometimes political
Regional, department, locality	GIE	Local provision, most often organizations created some time ago to fight against the prevalence of French	Promotion of langue and culture, own profit, sometimes political
Department, locality	GIE	Local provision, organizations created recently because funding is available	Local development, own profit

During field visits in Senegal, each discussion with a provider showed a unique story.

Some ‘typical’ stories are sketched below:

“The GIE was created in 1993 - through a general assembly. In the beginning we did not conduct literacy classes - we were partners in an initiative to produce milk. In the villages, we noted that the low literacy rate was a problem” (Private provider staff).

“The [religious association name] has, in addition to the literacy classes, also computer classes, English classes, and classes for pupils who have failed the primary school exam” (Private provider staff).

“The GIE currently has 40 centers under implementation (20 for the experimental program, 20 for the 6th cohort). In addition we have four Community Basic Education Schools.⁵⁴ We continue to monitor the local associations’ IGA [income-generating activities] after the subproject stops” (Private provider staff).

“This GIE association is a group of young people who wish to work for the development of their communities. They set up an association, and would like to obtain status as an NGO” (Private provider staff).

“Our organization has nationwide activities; this is the headquarters. We have two other [administrative] centers and other activities than literacy: we provide different types of classes to young women and also organize other social activities” (Private provider staff).

The longitudinal study analyzed the profile of a limited number of providers. Out of a total of fifteen providers studied, nearly half (47%) were GIEs, 40% were associations, and only 13% were NGOs (EL-T0, 2001). The impact study, found somewhat similar proportions: 52% of the courses studied were conducted by GIEs, 25% by associations, 12% by NGOs and 12% by other types of providers (IS, 2004).

Local for-profit associations (GIE: *Groupement d’Intérêt Economique*) thus implemented the majority of the courses, associations (including language and culture-oriented associations) implemented a large part– and NGOs and other associations (e.g., religious organizations) implemented a relatively small part of the courses. Most GIEs and language and culture-oriented associations were providers in their region, if not department, of

⁵⁴ *Ecole Communautaire de Base* (ECB): Non-formal education schools for children in the 9-15 age group who do not attend formal school (financed by CIDA).

origin. This use of locally based providers corresponded to the aim of the project. Some Dakar-based providers (GIEs and NGOs) were providing courses countrywide.

Of the providers evaluated by the longitudinal study, 53% were working only in literacy, 20% were also involved in microfinance/credit activities, 13% was involved in for-profit shop keeping and 13% were involved in health-related activities and programs (EL-T0, 2001). The majority (67%) of the providers studied had less than 7 years of experience; 20% had only 1-3 years of prior experience. The NGOs, generally, had more experience than the GIEs and the associations. The GIEs had the shortest experience (EL-T0, 2001).

B) Responsibilities of Providers

The providers had a set of responsibilities, described in the procedures manual. The principal occupation of providers was to obtain financing for the subprojects and then to implement them. The subproject design and implementation work of providers were thus both of a political and a technical nature, and included the following:

- Identify beneficiaries and if necessary, support their association;
- Conduct [a] feasibility study using participatory methods;
- Set up a request for financing of the subproject;
- Improve, if necessary, the request according to recommendations from the selection committee;
- Implement the subproject in conformity with the contract;
- Coordinate with other development projects implemented in the same locality. (PM, 2000)

An interview with a project staff member is cited at some length below because it gives a good overview of how these functions were perceived within the provider association (the selection and implementation processes are further analyzed in chapter 6).

Selection of a village for provision of literacy education:

“We take any village. Sometimes, when a village has had a course, other villages [which have seen the course take place] come to ask us for a class. I don’t want to glorify us, but given the quality of our provider, we have currently 40 villages that have asked us to participate in our subprojects. So, if a village has a class, other [neighboring] classes approach us to ask to participate. We have hardly ever found villages that refuse to attend. In the beginning, there were some villages that said ‘yes’ and when we came to sign the agreement with them, there were problems. These villages, we know, are lazy and do not want to work. Few villages are like that; all our villages work well - we are lucky.”

Participatory needs assessment in the village (necessary to make the subproject proposal):

“To do the assessment, we have to go to the field. We need to write documents, photocopy this and photocopy that, use gasoline. We, the supervisors, everyone, are tired. And if the request for funds is not selected, we, and the provider, lose, physically and financially. If we tell a village that we are trying to set up a school [literacy center] in their village, we come back to sign the agreements when we have obtained the financing. If we don’t obtain financing, we also return to say that we didn’t obtain financing, and that we are going to submit the request elsewhere. So if we get the funds, we come back, and if we don’t have the funds, we come back too. And if another provider takes care of that village, it is good - we go elsewhere.”

Choice of learning language and program; choice of class schedule:

“In our subproject, it was the participants who chose the hours to conduct the course, and the days. During the pre-assessment, we go from one village to another, asking which days they prefer to attend classes. Some say Monday; others say Wednesday. We have 4 days with 3 hrs per week, or we have 3 days if the participants wish to attend 4 hrs of courses at once. In all, it is 12 hrs per week. Some want to work in the mornings, others prefer the evening; they have to decide - because they are adults and it is very difficult to make them satisfied.”

Before the course started, the provider sent a literacy teacher to the village. The course could then begin:

“We had to begin in March because of the wrestling ceremonies and family ceremonies. The Wolofs give their daughters to be wed during the dry season; they are afraid [of doing it in] the rainy season. Weddings are big ceremonies; one has to go from a village to another with many people. This has prevented us from starting early. We began in March and then we visited the villages in June to say that the course should continue [during rainy season] even if they needed to reduce the number of classes.”

Choice of a *relais* (who would be trained to conduct post-literacy learning activities in the village after the course had ended):

“In the beginning, if we find someone who has attended the old functional program, and we know that he can write some Serreer or Wolof, we choose him immediately as relais. If there is no one, we let the class go on for 3 months, and try to find someone who can read and write among the population, someone who is liked by the villagers. It should also be someone who works well and is not lazy, who therefore can help the

provider. Therefore, there are relais that are chosen immediately, and there are relais that are chosen after 3 months.”

Class size; dropouts:

“In each course, there are 30 people. In the beginning there are classes that we report as 30, but they really have 32. The dropout rate is very low, but we have waiting lists for people to attend classes. There are not waiting lists in all the villages, but in some villages there are up to 45 women waiting for training. My provider said that maybe we are going to ask for another course there in another request. But the women’s association says that they want to learn now, so they all come to listen. We have needed to use the school since we needed a larger space. We can’t help it. At the end of the course, there are at a maximum of 5 dropouts, but they are not real dropouts. They are people who lose their husband and need to respect the mourning period, or they move from the village or they get married, or are sick. The real dropouts are 2 people maximum. In some courses there are no dropouts at all.”

Construction of learning and activities’ centers (CAL):

“The PAF has said that we need to construct a center. The head of the village gives us 6 square meters [sic] of land and the women, together with the women’s association, look for means to construct the center.⁵⁵ If the association has enough money, they will look for cement to construct it, else it is constructed of straw. My provider gave 5 bags of cement to each literacy center. Some of the villages have already finished the center now,

⁵⁵ It is assumed that the interviewee meant 6x6 meters, since 6m² would be too small for constructing a literacy center. The size of 6x6 meters (approximately 18 x 18 feet) corresponds roughly to the size of the village learning and activities centers observed during the field visits. The learning and activities center had three functions: (i) literacy classes were conducted there; (ii) other learning activities, most often organized by the provider or by the *relais*, took place there; and (iii) the center was used as a village library (the providers were supposed to equip the centers with books and learning materials).

but a few are slacking behind. Our next monitoring trip will be to check up on this. The places where they don't construct are where the primary schools let them use the primary school classrooms."

Strengthening of the women's association:

"The women's associations include only a part of the women in the village. Participation is based on age: the association's members are 40-30-15 years old women. If we have a course with only 15-year old girls, there will be a problem since they will leave the course to go to their husbands. The girls marry very early here. The courses with many young people have the highest dropout rate. Sometimes we are lucky to get them replaced. The women's associations need to get their legal status. If they don't have a legal status, we help them to obtain it. The legal status is like a birth certificate for the association."

Coordination with a financial network:

"We have set up a network with "Action Plus" - which is a big NGO and a financial network. The president of this NGO has worked with my provider. He has said that each of our classes that is involved in IGA can come and make a loan. They lend between 100.000 and 500.000 FCFA [to the participants] in the course - it is the participants who decide how much they want to borrow. If the course participants estimate that 200,000 is what they can reimburse, or 300,000, or 100,000, they ask for it. Right now there are two relais who have asked for financing. They have asked for about 400,000 each. They are doing marsh farming and also make milk products. There are others who do agro-forest work, or other activities - there are many activities."

The provider is a member of the providers' association (CNOAS):

“My president is secretary of CNOAS. I hope that [his function in CNOAS] will help create relations with other associations.” (All quotations above are from the same interview, Private provider staff).

The above interview gives a fairly comprehensive view of the responsibilities of a normal provider, from project set-up through implementation. In addition, the provider was supposed to involve external resource people to teach specific classes on skills (e.g., hygiene, vaccination, and cattle raising). Also, the provider was involved in the final evaluation of the class learning. This evaluation was conducted in cooperation with local and central education authorities.

Finally, the providers had to participate in policy discussions with government agencies, especially by participating in the CNEA (National Committee to Eliminate Illiteracy). The political role of the providers was therefore conceived as an obligation— and it was involving them directly in policy work. This policy role, however, was often negligible (neither reports nor interviews emphasize the provider’s policy role – in most policy documents it was underscored only that civil society had been consulted).

C) The Provider’s Operation

First, the word provider is somewhat misleading, since it is often used to designate both the person in charge of the association and the association itself. Legal documents often distinguished between *l’opérateur* which was the provider association and the *personne morale* [lit. “morally responsible”] which was the person responsible for the subproject. In addition, it was frequent to have a “coordinator” who was the daily leader for the

subproject (whereas the *personne morale* is most often the daily leader of the provider association as a whole).⁵⁶

The procedure's manual enumerated the people necessary to conduct a subproject as follows: the subproject needed (i) a coordinator with prior experience in management; (ii) one or several supervisors,⁵⁷ preferably with prior experience as literacy teachers; (iii) competent literacy teachers; and (iv) an account manager with prior training in bookkeeping. The literacy teacher (who was called "facilitator") conducted literacy classes in the villages. The supervisors were most often based at the provider's office, and were following up on the classes. The supervisors were reporting to the coordinator, who in turn reported to the director of the provider association (*personne morale*).⁵⁸

The illustration on next page (see figure 5.3) shows the providers' personnel. In the most simple cases, in which the provider association was entirely dependent on PAPF financing for its existence, there would be a manager (*personne morale*), who would be in contact with three to four persons to set up the subproject proposal: these people may


⁵⁶ In cases where the provider association is small and dependent on PAPF financing, the same person often holds the *personne morale* and the coordinator function.

⁵⁷ In general, the provider association had one supervisor for each ten literacy courses it implemented; the procedures manual required this.

⁵⁸ One coordinator explained the functioning of the supervisor and coordinator functions as follows: "The supervisor visits the courses to get information (statistics) and he helps the teacher to conduct classes. He follows up on the classes, and evaluates the learning. He is reporting about all this to me [coordinator]. Except from my own supervision missions, it is from the supervisor that I know that this or that course or teacher have some problems. From the information of the supervisor, I know the attendance, the hours of class, and the number of classes that we have conducted. Every month I'm going to the course sites myself except for the rainy season. When the roads are wet and the cars are in bad shape it is difficult to use the car. Every time we go to the field we rent a car; my provider knows where to rent them - he rents a car and then we go to the sites. Sometimes it takes more than a week to visit all the classes. Each of the supervisors has a motorcycle - and we give them vouchers for gasoline" (*Private provider staff*).

have included the future coordinator (if the manager did not assume both roles); one or two supervisors, and an accountant.

Figure 5.3: Provider association personnel



Then, if the subproject proposal was accepted, between 10 and 20 literacy teachers would be recruited, depending on how many villages (or project sites) were chosen for financing. Sometimes, if the PAPF (or other projects) had a large budget and therefore financed an unusual large number of courses during a particular time in a particular area, it became difficult to find competent literacy teachers.

“It is also difficult to find good teachers. The teachers know the providers and the projects; they choose the best [providers]. They follow the law of demand; when there are a lot of subprojects financed, it is difficult to find good teachers.” (Private provider staff).

The background of the literacy teachers varied; in some cases interviewed providers indicated that they had been using young unemployed people. Some of the providers used former *relais*, and some used former learners: “Many *relais* have become literacy

teachers,” told a provider. The impact study indicated that about 62% PAPF literacy teachers were women. This number was quite similar between PAPF and other literacy projects in Senegal; all studied projects had 66% female literacy teachers (IS, 2004).⁵⁹ The average age of the literacy teachers analyzed by the impact study in the PAPF was of 31 years, with an average of 4,9 years of prior experience (IS, 2004).⁶⁰ The coordinators and head of provider associations (*personne morale*) were in many cases retired teachers, or former civil servants. The vignettes below show a sample of backgrounds for the provider management:

“I came from Dakar, when I finished the University, they asked me what I should do, and I said “anything”; I want to work. I don’t beg, I don’t drink, I want to work. I found an old refrigerator and I sold ice. [Before that] I was at the University for two years, and I have two years of training in computer sciences. Then I worked in the villages to help with vaccination, and I helped with development. I like local languages; I have learned it well. I have many family members in the neighboring villages, so I don’t have any problems. I do a lot of different things; I like that. One has to believe! one has to believe in development” (Private provider staff).

“I was a school teacher - and I was at the head of a club of teachers. This club was a part of a network which made a proposal for the 3rd cohort. At that point I retired - and from the 4th cohort and onwards I proposed subprojects with my own NGO” (Private provider staff).

⁵⁹ In the longitudinal study’s sample of literacy teachers, 60% were women (EL-T0, 2001).

⁶⁰ This number is nearly identical to the number of average provider experience found by the longitudinal study, where about half of the provider associations had between 4 and 6 years of experience (EL-T0, 2001).

“I am a retired teacher. I set up an association in 1999 which began to focus on literacy activities. We implemented a 10- course subproject for the 5th cohort, 12 courses for the 6th cohort, and 12 courses for the 7th cohort. We also implement ECBs for PAPA” (Private provider staff).

The competence of the provider personnel varied. As noted above, the background of the provider staff was often linked to education (the education background of provider staff was a criteria for selection of the subproject); in most cases this experience was linked to primary education. Likewise, the literacy teachers had in many cases a formal education background. The exposure of most provider personnel to pedagogic methods for adults was therefore limited (see section on courses and impact for more information on this issue).

D) Evolution of Roles and Responsibilities of Providers

The evolution of the provider role in Senegal was marked by an important increase in the number of provider associations. In 1995, there were less than fifty associations that were involved in literacy; in 2002 there were several hundred:

“As for the providers I did a study and noted that in 1994 there were exactly 94 providers that offered literacy courses. There were 41 NGOs, 43 associations, as well as development projects and [local] development organizations (sociétés de développement)” (Consultant, former civil servant).

There were several reasons for this multiplication of provider associations. First of all, the World Bank itself did not restrain financing in any way; the SAR indicated that “with respect to the Operator [provider]: (i) the operator exists as a legal entity, with proven

capacity and experience to implement the subproject; (ii) competent technical, administrative and accounting staff is available, otherwise a proposal for staff training/upgrading must be included; and (iii) the necessary equipment and materials to implement the subproject are available” (SAR, 1996, Annex 4, p. 1). No specific criteria for experience in the field were required from the World Bank’s side. As noted in section 4.3, the World Bank’s initial idea was to make the access to financing so restricted that only a few larger providers with international reputation could access it. Without doubt as a compromise to Senegalese wishes, the World Bank deliberately did not make any strict selection criteria. The policy of opening up financing to what the Senegalese called “emerging providers” was therefore instituted from the beginning, and led to a multiplication of providers. The PCU indicates three reasons for this multiplication:

1. Associations involved in different activities (sports, promotion of local languages and cultures, women’s groups, churches and religious associations, etc.) became interested in literacy because of the outsourcing program.
2. Some provider associations divided, i.e., some staff members left the association to create a new provider association. This was the most important factor to explain the phenomenon of the quick multiplication of provider associations.
3. Some former participants in literacy classes organized themselves, and became providers on their own. (*Source: Interview, Civil servant*).

The PAPF had from its very beginning a strategy of developing and strengthening small and medium-sized provider associations. The size of the financing ‘packages’ did not

appeal to very large business-oriented organizations. Besides, the overhead ‘package’ may have been too low to make international NGOs break even:⁶¹

“The big NGOs which are capable of finding their own financing, continue to do so; many organizations have never asked the Bank for financing; never. The [local] development societies continue to do their literacy programs on their own budget. The problem is [was] the small or the medium-sized associations that implemented small-size projects. Their work did not have any effect on the literacy level of the country. Here it must be understood that one of the objectives of the program was to increase the capacity of the providers to fight against illiteracy. One of the goals of the project was to increase the numbers of providers by at least 20%. When the program began, we saw that many associations had literacy as an objective of their intervention, but they didn’t do anything. With available financing, maybe they would begin implementing literacy activities. Or maybe new organizations would emerge, because there were conditions for that to happen...” (Consultant, former civil servant).

Through its emphasis on stimulating the emergence of new providers, the project thus contributed to the creation of civil society associations. Many interviewees doubted that this civil society representative of the population; in most cases they saw it as an association that was created out from market forces. There was a market for literacy (in the villages); there was financial availability from the state; hence, many people created an association to provide literacy.

⁶¹ See section 8.4 on project financing. The maximum size of a subproject was limited to 20 literacy centers (each with a maximum of 30 participants), which corresponds to 600 learners. The financing was set at about \$75 per learner; each subproject “package” was therefore at most \$45,000 (for a project implementation duration of up to 18 months). This financing may be too low for International NGOs and associations with high overhead costs.

The literacy courses also had the creation of civil society in mind – since one main goal of the project was to strengthen the villagers’ associations. Even on the first page of the procedures manual, this function was described at length: “The integrated character of the intervention is based on the following four principles: 1. Strengthening of the beneficiaries’ associations. 2. Development of endogenous human resources (associations, leaders, members and the *relais*); [...] 4. Making the beneficiaries’ association autonomous through income-generating activities...” (PM, 2000, p. 3). The PAPP therefore boosted the creation of civil society by two actions: it generated new providers through its use of outsourcing; and the courses themselves had as aim to create and strengthen civil society in the villages. The question of financial *raison d’être*, however, both for the providers and the associations created in the villages, make one hesitate to use the word civil society. This word was nevertheless frequently used by interviewees in Senegal to describe the providers.

Many providers were financially dependent on PAPP; when financing ceased, the provider association shrunk to its *personne morale*. Likewise, in many cases, the GIEs that were created in the villages as a result of the literacy course, in many cases ceased to exist when the subproject ceased its intervention. The civil society created was in many cases not sustainable, since it was merely a reply to external financial factors, initiated by the World Bank and other donors.

One can inquire whether the associative movement in Senegal should merely be understood as a market function that was responsive to available financing. The interviews with former learners pointed out the contrary, i.e., they said they were

involved in functioning GIEs. Also – many provider NGOs and GIEs that did not receive financing from PAPF sought other ways of receiving financing. Some NGOs conducted for-profit activities to become financially sustainable, and most providers sought other financial resources than PAPF. Also, some associations that started by focusing only on financing of literacy became active in other development activities.

By referring to these examples of associations that were created and are functioning as a result of the PAPF, it seems that civil society created by market forces, is not necessarily a “false” civil society. Some associations are trying very hard to help local communities and to transcend existing power relations between people and institutions. However, it seems that a stage of activation of the “latent” or “emerging” civil society is necessary to make this externally funded civil society (i) more responsive to local social needs and thereby more representative of the local population; and (ii) less dependent of World Bank financing (see also section 10.2).

5.3: The Providers Association (CNOAS)

The providers’ association – CNOAS – (*Coordination Nationale des Opérateurs en Alphabétisation au Sénégal*) was, as its name indicates, an association that was representing the providers in literacy: “In July 1995, providers organized a professional association (CNOA) to strengthen their professional capacity and to represent them in discussions with the MCALN [Minister delegated for literacy and local languages].” (SAR, 1996, p. 13). From 1995, the providers’ association participated in all major meetings among the stakeholders as a representative of the providers. Another

organization, the CONGAT (National Coordination of Senegalese NGOs) had similar functions as CNOAS, but represented the NGO sector in Senegal as a whole. In most cases where literacy is concerned, CNOAS was involved, not CONGAT.

The providers in literacy that were members of CNOAS⁶² selected its management body and its local representatives. All the staff members of CNOAS were providers (except for office support personnel), and the office facilities and equipment of the association were normally those of the provider selected to be responsible for CNOAS at that time. The functions in the CNOAS were not salaried (except for the office support, which was paid by the projects, especially by the CIDA funded PAPA).

This section discusses the intended and the real functions of CNOAS.

A) Intended role of CNOAS

Originally, it was foreseen that CNOAS should have an important role in the PAPF. The function of the relay provider was transferred to CNOAS in the main project (1996-2001): “The main changes proposed were: (i) replace the *opérateur relais* strategy with technical support provided by the CNOA and the decentralized structures of the MCALN” (SAR, 1996, p. 13). A large budget was set aside for training of the providers, which should have been organized by CNOAS. The association’s financial means were therefore important. The PAPF project document notes: “To strengthen provider

⁶² Most providers but not all were members of CNOAS. There were no requirements, and as we shall see below, few benefits, of becoming a member.

capacity, the project would provide support in three areas. First it would finance 9000 person days of training and workshops provided by the CNOA.” (SAR, 1996, p. 12).

In addition, it was hoped that CNOAS could help set forth ethical guidelines for the providers, and oversee the evolution of the sector (i.e., many interviews mentioned their hopes that CNOAS could make recommendations and organize training sessions that could contribute to a healthy evolution of the provider sector). The CONGAT and the CNOAS were originally intended to strengthen the civil society associations’ role to check the government’s power, and thus create a more sound democracy. Many people hoped that the CNOAS as an organization could not only check the government’s power, but also have a role as “stabilizer” against problems of political instability. According to Mamadou Ndoeye, the then minister delegate of education:

“We wanted to come to a situation where the government has not all the power, and where the CNOAS is a partner. In that way, the providers would create a third party alongside the government. We also wanted that this strong providers’ organization could supervise what is happening at the grassroots level, because the state cannot supervise everything. The organization should be capable of giving a yearly account of what is happening, to take notice of and correct problems, as well as to register and fight against any deviation from the original intentions of the program”
(Civil servant).

This function of CNOAS controlling the state was discussed in the theory chapter: The role of civil society, according to neoliberal thought, became a preservation of a good state; or “system maintenance, in other words, the creation or strengthening of the democratic institutions that protect the rule of law, legitimate peaceful oppositions, and

the expression of dissent in acceptable ways.” (Howell & Pearce, 2002, p. 59). In such system, CNOAS would act as a representative for civil society organization to check the excesses of the government. As we shall see below, it is difficult to put into practice the rhetoric of this idea. In the case of Senegal, CNOAS never came to play this role.

B) “Real” Functions of CNOAS

Consider these vignettes:

“We are members of CNOAS. I don’t see any reason for the CNOAS to exist; they have done nothing for me. I have never been invited to a meeting” (Private provider staff).

“I’m not a member of CNOAS. I have never received any information about CNOAS, there are no regular meetings to which I have been invited. CNOAS has never assisted me with anything. If CNOAS were active, the organization could have defended providers’ interests, which are the same as the population’s interests” (Private provider staff).

“I am a member of CNOAS, which is a consultation body. The CNOAS is useful for training providers. Every time a new program is begun (i.e., a new cohort) the PAPF [i.e., the PCU] and the CNOAS hold an orientation meeting. For the 6th cohort, CNOAS sent a trainer to train the supervisors in adult education pedagogy and cultural issues” (Private provider staff).

“We are members of CNOAS [silence for a while; then laughter]. They gave us a diploma for being the best provider in Louga during the Literacy Day” (Private provider staff).

CNOAS is disseminating information on new projects, and updates of the procedures manual” (Private provider staff).

As we cannot escape noticing from the various quotations above, most provider personnel felt that CNOAS had a very marginal role. The main work of CNOAS, during the PAPF implementation, was to represent the providers during selection sessions (i.e., its staff members participated as observers in the selection of subprojects). Thereby the CNOAS was supposedly a guarantee for a transparent selection. One can even question this representation, since the observers from CNOAS were providers themselves, and were therefore personally interested in the outcome of the selection. Except for this representation during selection, the role of CNOAS was not very visible: the number of training sessions it offered for its members was very limited, and its political role was merely symbolic.

The failure of CNOAS may be linked to the failure of having professional staff members, who could be working full-time on the representation of providers. If full-time literacy providers are staff members, it may lead to two problems: (i) the providers would be more occupied by promoting their own associations than representing the providers' association; and (ii) by representing their own operations, they may corrupt the transparency of the selection and reduce the political potential of the association. It can also be argued that the failure of CNOAS is rather linked to the wrong leadership – not to the wrong set-up.⁶³ Obviously, any restructuring of CNOAS so as to make it perform its

⁶³ Mamadou Ndoeye said that, “unfortunately, the CNOAS did not have the needed leadership. You spoke about the lack of salaries [reference is made to (Nordtveit, 2004)] but I don’t think that this is the main problem. Unfortunately the leadership failed to become the contra-power [to the state] of which we spoke earlier, it did not have the capacity of noting what is happening in the field and to make it become a public debate, and thus to ensure transparency and objectivity in selection and other [aspects of the program]. We even gave them a budget for strengthening their capacities [in that direction]. In the agreements with Canada, we had even foreseen a budget to pay permanent staff to give the organization more strength. However, CNOAS lacked leadership [to perform its intended role]. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE).

intended role, would depend on one's reading of the problem. Mamadou Ndoye is proposing to use CNOAS with its current structural set-up, and, if it is not possible, use CONGAT. Another option would be to restructure CNOAS –to make its staff members independent from the project's financing. Such restructuring would make it stronger politically. However one interprets the need to change the CNOAS, the interesting fact is linked to its *intended* role as a counter power to the government. Top government leaders considered it as a tool to guarantee stability in the sector – and control its evolution. The role of the CNOAS both intended to capture the role of civil society as seen in the theoretical part (to become a counter-power to the state) and that of an auto-control of the civil society sector at the same time. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to ensure such double control function, since it would have made the organization as an independent institution altogether, existing in an institutional vacuum in between providers and the state. As noted above, these roles remain purely theoretical; the CNOAS was not capable of performing its role, neither at a project-related scale (the training of the providers was not performed) nor on a larger scale; the CNOAS never represented a counter-power to the Government or was a control agent for the provider sector.

The CONGAT, on the other hand, is making public statements and is mobilizing civil society to push the government in certain directions. CNOAS has not been able to do any of it; and has therefore been unable to be a guaranty against political instability (*Former civil servant*).

5.4: The Contract-Managing Agency (AGETIP)

AGETIP was originally set up by the Senegalese government with USAID and World Bank assistance to facilitate subcontracting for infrastructure work. It was created in 1989 and was governed by a Board of Directors consisting of a Director from the private sector, representatives of the National Council of Employers of Senegal, the Union of Construction and Public Works Workers, and the Association of Mayors of Senegal. The agency's operations were governed by a procedural manual that was part of the Government of Senegal-AGETIP agreement establishing the Agency in 1989 (SAR, 1996).

AGETIP was the main, if not the only, institution in Senegal that was involved with contract management in Senegal. It was decided to make use of this agency to take care of (i) contracting, transfer of funds, and contract management with providers; and (ii) project-related procurement of materials.

The contractual set-up of the PAPF was made through a credit agreement with the Government of Senegal, and with a separate agreement with the AGETIP. Such separate agreement conferred a large autonomy to AGETIP. The World Bank had prior experience with this type of set-up in Senegal. The World Bank made use of AGETIP since its creation for outsourcing of infrastructure work: "Since 1989, AGETIP has been involved in the management of several IDA financed projects, most notably two Public Works and Employment Projects, the Community Nutrition Project, and the classroom construction component of the Second Human Resources Development Project. [...] A

large number of small contracts, and weak financial and managerial capacities of small enterprises in need of timely payments are main features of the projects” (SAR, 1996, p. 9). The characteristics of the small enterprises were similar to the characteristics of the civil society associations, i.e., they had weak financial and managerial capacities.

The projects managed by AGETIP apparently worked well – for a price of 5% overhead costs: “AGETIP has successfully carried out these projects and has developed a competence for efficient management of a large number of small contracts, effective monitoring, and rapid payments while keeping administrative costs at or below 5% of program costs” (SAR, 1996, p. 9). PAPF also paid 5% of program cost (i.e., 5% of the cost of contracts) for AGETIP contract-management services. Two controllers and office support personnel were hired to work with the PAPF. AGETIP explains the work performed in the following terms:

“I am head of the literacy project at AGETIP, and am therefore responsible for everything concerning the subsector of literacy within the AGETIP. This includes the budget, transmittal of all the non-objections to the Bank, and also I produce trimestrial reports for the Bank and for the Ministry. We also do everything related to monitoring of providers and transfer of payment, as well as closing of ended contracts. Often we are associated with meetings between partners at the Ministry of Education. We are also, through PAPF management, in charge of everything related to procurement, including gasoline, and computer equipment. The AGETIP is directly linked to the director-general [of the MOE] so we are accountable towards the DG and we are acting in his name, for example in the approval committee which is proposing the decree of approval of the selected providers for signing by the Minister (this is done when the selection is

finished). Then we are setting up the contracts and we also manage these contracts. We are quite autonomous and things work well” (Contract-managing agency staff).

The work was indeed performed well, except for the functions of monitoring and evaluation – which will be further discussed in chapter 6.4. For now, it is only important to point out that the transfer of funds and the set up of contracts, as well as procurement, was most often timely, and quick. The project completion report for PAPF rated AGETIP’s work as ‘Marginally Satisfactory’: “AGETIP did well in managing credit special account and ensuring timely disbursements, but it did not do well in supervision and monitoring of the contracts” (ICR, 2004, p. 16). Through the use of AGETIP, the government’s financial functions and some of its technical roles were bypassed. By using AGETIP, the private implementation system was extended to the financial services of the project. Not only was the local service delivery private, but also the contract managing and financial structures were private.


The World Bank’s use of AGETIP, both for infrastructure work and also in the social sector, was increasing over time: “social sector Ministries also became interested in using AGETIP’s management experience. Since 1994, the Ministry of Health has used AGETIP in the preparation and execution of the Community Nutrition Project. Due to its demonstrated expertise with transparent and efficient procedures for the evaluation of subprojects and the management of numerous subproject contracts, in 1995, the MCALN involved AGETIP in the preparation of the Implementation Manual for the proposed [PAPF] project and in the management of its experimental phase. AGETIP’s

performance thus far has been effective, efficient and professional. In April 1995, AGETIP's convention with the Government of Senegal was modified to allow it to offer this assistance to support the delivery of basic public services in nutrition, health, education and literacy” (SAR, 1996, p. 9).

5.5: The Government

Senegal is divided into eleven regions and thirty-three departments (each region is divided into three departments). At both regional and department level, there is a bureau (“inspectorate”) of education in which an education officer is in charge of literacy. At the central level is the delegate Minister for literacy and local languages. The delegate minister has at his charge a cabinet, which is responsible for political issues linked to literacy and local languages. The minister’s technical arm is the DAEB – the Department of Literacy and Basic Education (see figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4: Administrative structure for literacy management in Senegal



The delegate minister followed up on the PAPF through his cabinet, which was responsible for the policy aspects of the project. As noted above, during the main project phase, PCU reported to the Cabinet of the delegate minister (which in turn reported to the delegate minister), and the DAEB had some responsibilities for monitoring and evaluation. At the end of the project, all project responsibilities were transferred from the Cabinet to the DAEB. This section first analyzes the DAEB's shifting role and then the decentralized bureaus of DAEB.

A) Central Level (DAEB, PCU, and the Cabinet)

The DAEB was a fairly large central administration unit for literacy education in Senegal. Its staff size is reportedly about 50, which are divided into units of local languages, curriculum and production, administration, and monitoring and evaluation. The department has currently an extensive role in project administration. According to the director of DAEB:

"I have been director of the DAEB for two years now. DAEB is responsible, theoretically, for PAPF. We plan the execution of this project, as well as taking care of project monitoring and evaluation. We indicate how many people should be enrolled every year, and we follow up on the project through our decentralized services" (Civil servant).

In 1993, the DAEB was extremely skeptical to the use of the approach, and wished to maintain central control over the local implementation of literacy classes. This opposition led to some changes within the agency; the civil servants that were negative to the approach were changed. The opposition to the approach also led to the omission of

DAEB in certain functions, since the delegate minister, knowing that the DAEB was negative to the approach, instead used his cabinet to perform technical work:

“There was resistance [against faire-faire]; some people did not manage to adapt and these people have left [...] Today, the staff members [of DAEB] are not against faire-faire, but they are against the fact that there has been a lot of negligence amongst the providers. Also, there has been confusion about the roles of the Cabinet and the DAEB; often the Cabinet members, such as I, were sent to perform technical work. However, it was the DAEB’s role to perform technical work; the Cabinet’s role was political. There was never any exclusion of DAEB; however, problems of misunderstanding and resistance continue to exist” (Consultant, former civil servant).

The cabinet was supposed to have a political role to establish project proposals and to negotiate with the World Bank. The cabinet’s technical work may have been perceived as a threat for the DAEB.⁶⁴

The PCU was at first attached to the Delegate Minister’s Cabinet (in a similar way as the DAEB), and then it merged with the DAEB in 2004. It is now supposed to be a part of the DAEB. It was a small and flexible unit, with four core staff members (who were civil

⁶⁴ One former civil servant described the situation in the following way: ⁶⁴ “In 1993, the capacities of DAEB were extremely low in terms of human resources. There were some teachers or mediators who were very good on such issues as transcription [of local languages] and training of trainers. But they were not competent in political issues, in the set-up of programs and structures of monitoring and evaluation. These functions did not exist in the DAEB. The Minister asked often the DAEB to establish projects, but they did not have the capacity [of doing it]. That is why he [the Minister] set up a technical support group, in which I functioned as the coordinator. We did not even have a legal status [*existence juridique*], but we were a group that worked for everyone in the sector, including DAEB. In this context, we were asked to establish projects and to undertake studies. When we began discussing with the Bank, the DAEB was present, we were there, and representatives from the Minister. The DAEB felt that it was invaded; there was a minister-delegate, the technical support group, the cabinet... In this context the DAEB felt threatened in its prerogatives, and did not understand that the sector was changing” (Consultant, former civil servant).

servants). According to the World Bank project evaluation, the PCU functioned in a satisfactory manner (as opposed to the DAEB, which was rated “marginally satisfactory”): “The PCU was proactive in managing the project and showed preparedness to assist the Ministry in taking policy and administrative decisions. [...] During the project life, the PCU did a good job at the technical level, working with communities, IA and IDEN and literacy providers, providing training to providers and supervising their activities” (ICR, 2004, p. 16).

During the PAF implementation, the DAEB was gradually integrated into project implementation; it was increasingly made responsible for the project until it took over the entire project management in 2004. At the same time, in 1995, a director of DAEB who was very negative to the approach was transferred to the formal sector, and a pro-partnership person was named director instead. These changes apparently improved the coordination between the DAEB and the delegate minister. However, the increased responsibilities did not concur with increased capacities, despite a large component of capacity building in the PAF aimed at the DAEB (capacity building of both material and human resources):

“The PAF provided technical and capacity building assistance to the DAEB. [...] The DAEB today is not against faire-faire; slowly its staff members realized that they had their function and responsibilities within the new system. They perform these functions with difficulty; no one is satisfied with DAEB’s work. The providers say DAEB staff members come too late [for evaluation exercises], because they do not have enough resources.

They never had the experience to manage a program of the size [of current literacy funding confounded], nor did they have the human resources or the organizational structure for doing it. It is not sure that they have it, even today” (Consultant, former civil servant).

The increase in work responsibilities of the DAEB led to a situation that the partnership initially was created to avoid: a heavy state structure performed low-quality services for a high price. Most non-state interviewees agreed that the DAEB did not perform its role well; most non-state interviewees say that this low-level performance was due to the political instability (frequent changes of key staff members). DAEB interviewees, however, said that low performance was due to lack of resources. The World Bank’s project completion report rated the government’s performance as “marginally satisfactory”, indicating, “the DAEB did not take all the requisite means to address problems raised by project implementation. [...] DAEB’s poor performance is partly explained by the turnover in its personnel. In December 1999, a new DAEB’s Director was designated, but shortly replaced in April 2000 (presidential elections) by decisions of the new Minister. These circumstances weakened the institutional stability needed to adequately follow the project” (ICR, 2004, p. 15).

Most local people did not see any role for the central government at all, except for the coordination of projects and the “setting up of a plan.” Nobody really knew what this plan consisted of, anyway. However, it was “felt” that the government was “maybe doing something” that was important. Consider these statements:

“The provider is in-between the financial sponsor and the population. The state has a lesser role than the financial sponsor. The silent partner is the

World Bank. Maybe the state participates, but it is the World Bank that prevails. The state's role is, through the intervention of the IDEN, to ensure that the project works well” (Private provider staff).

“The government's advisory role is important to prevent the subprojects from changing direction. Also, the government must ensure that [all] the work is coordinated, and that all contribute for the success [of the overall policy goals]. We are not at liberty to do what we want but need to follow a plan” (Private provider staff).

“Maybe the DAEB is doing something positive that I don't know about” (Private provider staff).

“There is a role for the government, because everything that is going on in a territory is related to the government. The government allows the World Bank, through AGETIP, to finance PAPF. So the government is doing lots of things” (Private provider staff).

The above and many other similar statements show prevalent feelings among the providers; the state had a monitoring and evaluation function at decentralized level; also the state was coordinating with the World Bank so that the providers could do their work. The important partner was the World Bank; the state was doing some intermediate monitoring work, which may or may not be important. In many cases, the government was seen as a nuisance:

“Some days it is like the state's role is to get as much as they can as middlemen: The World Bank is funding, the [provider name] is implementing: what else is there for the state then to “cash in.” Some [government] people who do not take the project seriously are seeing the evaluations as a means of getting something [for writing a good evaluation]” (Private provider staff).

Many interviewees noted that the role of the state had diminished. Central state institutions became less important – and the local level (provider, IDEN, population) and the global level (the World Bank) became more important. According to the interviewees, this change was due to three factors: (i) the decentralization approach that was supported by the World Bank; (ii) the lack of political stability made the central government less credible; (iii) the partnership approach itself changed the role of the central state institutions, which became less involved in hands-on involvement in project activities.

B) Regional and Department Levels (RRA and RDA)

The decentralized education management system was extremely light (see table 5.3 above). At the regional level, the Chief Education Office (*Inspection de l'Académie* – the IA) had only one civil servant in charge of literacy issues; this was the Regional Responsible for Literacy (*Responsable Régional de l'Alphabétisation* – the RRA). Similarly, at the department level, the Education Office (the IDEN) had only one civil servant in charge of literacy, the Department Responsible for Literacy (*Responsable Departementale de l'Alphabétisation* – the RDA). The RRA and the RDA were not independent in the management of literacy issues in the region and the department, since they were accountable to the principal education officer. The principal education officer was evaluated against his or her performance in formal education and not to performance in literacy education. The literacy service was therefore often under prioritized:

“From a historical point of view, there has been a cohabitation of the person in charge of literacy; at department and regional levels we call them responsible of literacy (RDA and RRA), but in fact it is the inspector [of education] himself who is in charge of literacy. [...] Since the inspector considers literacy as a secondary task - and since he has no particular training or knowledge on the issue - literacy is never prioritized. The staff members who were put in charge of literacy do not always have an appropriate background. With the explosion of literacy today, it happens that literacy classes are more important [in certain localities] than formal schooling. And the institutional set-up hasn't changed! [The person working on literacy, RDA or RRA] is still a person who does not have access to resources; and they are used to [monitoring] formal schooling activities. The inspector is evaluated on his performance in the field of formal schooling, and he is therefore giving priority to the formal school system. The literacy sector therefore lacks both material and human resources” (Civil servant).

The RRA and RDA's were often former teachers with little experience in literacy.⁶⁵

They received motorbikes for following up on PAPF issues, but they often underlined that the distances made it impossible for them to perform proper project monitoring.

Most often they visited the project sites by using the provider's car. Such a situation did not facilitate an independent monitoring of the subprojects. The RRA did not have any particular role in the monitoring and evaluation system of the project. The regional level, however, became responsible for the selection of providers. This function was

⁶⁵ A former civil servant said, “At present, the RDA is most often a former teacher. This person is often marginalized within the inspection, because the priority is given to primary education, and very little attention is given to non-formal education.” (*Consultant, former civil servant*).

transferred to the regional level as a part of the decentralization following the 1997 administrative reorganization.

The RDA was based in the department education office and was directly in charge of all literacy activities in the area. He or she ensured that the information in the requests for funds was correct and sent it to the pre-selection committee, which was situated at the regional level (for an overview about the change in the selection system, see section 6.1 below).

In conclusion, this chapter has described the stakeholders of the partnership, which included the following main categories:

- Local participants, 87% of which were women, most were in the 15-39 years and were associated in a women's association;
- *Relais* persons, which were participants that received special training (by the provider) to take over literacy classes after the subproject was over;
- Provider organizations, of which most were grassroots for-profit associations;
- The providers' association, CNOAS, which was supposed to represent the interest of the providers in negotiations with the state, and to train provider personnel. In reality, the provider association did not function well;
- Decentralized government offices at regional and department levels. The decentralization of the project gave these administrative bureaus main responsibilities in the selection and monitoring/evaluation of the project. They were not prepared to take over these tasks;
- The department of literacy (DAEB) was the central government institution responsible for policy-formulation, as well as monitoring and evaluation of the project. These tasks were not effectively done;

- The PCU was a small, flexible unit set up by the government to ensure day-to-day supervision of the PAPF project. This unit performed very well and was a main reason that the outsourcing strategy worked at all. Its responsibilities, however, were gradually transferred to the DAEB (and subsequently were neglected or not well implemented);
- The contract-managing agency, AGETIP, which performed well in establishing contracts with the providers, and in transferring funds for subproject implementation in a timely manner. The agency, however, did not perform well in its financial monitoring duties.

The local participants who wanted to learn how to write and read in local languages were mainly women, and organized in women's associations. The providers were mainly civil society grassroots associations, which interacted with local women to define and set-up the course. The interaction between learners and providers, especially in the integrated course, can be characterized as a relationship between women's associations and the providers' associations, as opposed to interaction between provider associations and individuals. One can argue that this had a positive effect inasmuch as it strengthened civil society locally.

The providers were organized in an association that was supposed to represent the providers in their relationships with the government. Also the provider association was supposed to train the providers and to monitor the sector as a whole (e.g., by preventing providers from behaving unethically). The provider association did not fulfill these expectations. At best it was present during selection procedures and supposedly ensured transparency and fairness in the selection process. One reason for the malfunctioning of the association may have been that its senior management consisted of directors of

provider associations. It was difficult for these directors to take a distance from their daily work and to represent the provider group as a whole.

All the government institutions involved in project delivery experienced to some extent institutional and organizational failures that reduced the effectiveness of the outsourcing approach: At decentralized levels, for example, the education offices did not have the human and technical means to do the work requested from them. The central institutions, especially the DAEB, were not effective in program management.

The PAPF selection and implementation procedures functioned relatively well because of the strong performance of a project coordination unit (PCU), which ensured day-to-day leadership of the project. The use of a private contract-management agency (AGETIP) ensured rapid set-up procedures of contracts, and rapid transfer of funds. The agency had an incentive to perform these operations well, since it was paid on a pro-rata basis (equivalent to 5% of the contract value). It did not have an incentive, however, to stop payments to unethical providers or to providers who did not perform well. Hence, the financial monitoring of the providers was not well done. In order to understand how these monitoring and evaluation processes functioned, as well as other processes, it is necessary to look at the implementation set-up as a whole. This will be the objective of the next chapter.

Chapter 6: Subproject Selection and Implementation Processes

This chapter explores the selection methods and financing of providers during the integrated project (using the procedures manual 2000-2002 as a reference). The description of selection and monitoring procedures is the subject of the first two sections of the chapter. The procedures were subsequently decentralized, and the decentralized procedures will be the subject of the last part of the chapter.

6.1: The Selection Processes


The procedures manual explained the selection procedures to be followed. It defined twelve stages of the subproject cycle;⁶⁶ beginning with information to the providers and ending with the closing of the subproject (these stages will be further explained below).

⁶⁶ These twelve stages identified by the procedures manual are as follows:

1. Information to providers about the project
2. Preparation of a subproject proposal by the provider
3. Submission of the request for financing of the subproject (and control of requests by the Department of Literacy authorities)
4. Preselection by regional preselection committees
5. Transmission to PCU
6. Reception and transmission to the selection committee
7. Technical analysis by the selection committee
8. Approval of the selection committee's decision by the approval committee
9. Contracting of the providers to implement the subproject
10. Implementation of the subproject by the provider
11. Evaluation of the subproject
12. Closing of the subproject

The main phases of the selection process are identified in the schema below (the stages of the procedures manual are simplified in the schema below):

Figure 6.1: The selection process



A) Phase 1: Information to Providers

The PCU, the decentralized education offices, and the DAEB were responsible for informing the providers about each new cohort of literacy subprojects. Normally this was a yearly procedure, so most providers were waiting for this information. Given that no provider complained about the transmission of information, it appears that transmission of information was successful.

At the same time as providing information about the project, the department's education offices (RDA) also made available information about priority zones in which the literacy projects were to be implemented. In most cases, requests for funding of subprojects outside these zones were refused. The providers were aware of this fact and usually obtained information about the priority zones before preparing the proposal. During the field visits, some providers complained about the geographical situation of priority zones. They received requests for literacy courses from populations outside these zones, and felt it was 'unjust' to refuse any village outside of the zone that was eager to start a course. Sometimes the rigidity of the selection of priority zones also reflected disagreement between providers and the local authorities:

“As for the 8th cohort, representatives from several villages came to the [provider's] president to request literacy courses. The [provider] agreed to it, and conducted the preliminary studies in the village. [During preselection, the request for financing was refused, since many of these villages were not on the list of priority areas for literacy that year]. The CNOAS opposed the change of zones - and some of the providers who haven't obtained any financing this year, also opposed it. The IDEN said

that he was going to wipe out all the bigheads, and that the provider was a bighead” (Private provider staff).

It is uncertain whether the local authorities would have accepted this request if the provider had not been categorized as a bighead [*grosse tête*]; these problems, however, were more linked to personal problems than to lack of information.

The transmission of information was done concurrently with the distribution of the procedures manual. The procedures manual was normally distributed through the local education offices, and explained the steps for setting up a subproject proposal.

B) Phase 2: Preparation of Subproject Proposal

The preparation of a subproject proposal was most often done as follows:

1. Identification of villages within the target zone based on (i) ease of access; and (ii) willingness of the population to participate;
2. Discussion with chief of village, with elders, with the person responsible for the local women’s association;
3. Discussion with the whole village and with the women in particular;
4. During discussions, the population decided on the language of instruction and on the basic skills learning program;
5. Signing of an agreement with the population (most often the document was signed by the chief of the women’s association);
6. Drafting of the subproject proposal and a budget based on the models in the procedures manual.

The villages were most often chosen on a convenience basis, i.e., they were chosen based on criteria of access. Hence, villages that were close to the road were often receiving a subproject more easily than the villages that were more remote. Also, many villages, having noticed that a neighboring village received a literacy subproject, requested a similar subproject from the provider.

A few villages did not wish to receive a subproject; the providers most often left them alone. Refusal to participate did not happen frequently, and it was often linked to a prior experience with a bad provider. Sometimes the refusing village was situated in a zone that had not been exposed to literacy courses previously, and that considered them as a threat to cultural or religious practices:

“Often the head of the village does not want to have any project. This happens when we are in zones that are not used to schools. Sometimes other providers have not kept their promises. During the pre-assessment some providers promise this or that, and then they do not keep the promises. Then the population becomes discouraged. There are at maximum two or three villages that refuse [over 20]. Sometimes, the neighboring village accepts. Then after a while the village that refused, will come and ask for the project. I always withdraw from the village straight away, when the local population refuses the literacy program. Then I wait until they come back to me and ask for it. This usually happens for the next cohort of programs [when the refusing village has seen a neighboring village benefiting from the subproject].” (Private provider staff).

After decisions about the villages were included in the request, the preparation of a proposal began with a participatory assessment of the village. The procedures manual

states, “Knowledge about the locality and local demand for literacy implies that the provider has undertaken an in-depth participative study and needs assessment of the proposed implementation site. The methods and the results should be clearly indicated in the request for funding, with precise information about the target zones and the indirect and direct beneficiaries of the program.” (PM, 2000, p. 13). However, the in-depth assessment was most often reduced to a discussion with the stakeholders about their problems and desires:

“We go to the [priority] zones and make an assessment. We go as a team and spend one or two weeks in the field. First we need to inform the population about what we are doing; when they understand it, they are favorable towards you. We identify all their training needs, health, nutrition, etc. The team is composed of five persons. Sometimes I join them. First I go to the village alone, to tell that the team will come. I go to the head of the village; I greet him. Then I tell him that we have a literacy program and I try to explain it to him. I stop at the first village on the road in the priority zones. Sometimes the rural development agent also helps us; he can further direct us within the priority zone. Sometimes the women’s association has a management committee; this facilitates the process. In that case, the team speaks with them before meeting the whole village. The team is composed by the supervisors and by some literacy teachers”
(Private provider staff).

The villagers thus defined parts of the learning program together with the provider. In theory, the predetermined part corresponded to the 300 contact hours on literacy skills (reading, writing, math); the variable part, for which the villagers decided the program, corresponded to 150 hours. This variable learning program was to be based on the needs

assessment, and was supposed to take into account four issues: (i) the learners' daily occupation (e.g., a fishing village would rarely be interested in cattle raising and vice versa); (ii) the learners' problems (e.g., malaria prone areas were sometimes interested in gaining more knowledge about malaria); (iii) the learners' wishes in terms of learning activities (which in some cases was unrelated to their problems and to their daily activities, e.g., they sometimes decided to learn to dye clothes or to make soaps even if this was not directly linked to their main occupations or problems); and (iv) the providers' capabilities and the governments' objectives. The provider could not convert the literacy program into for example a cattle-raising program – this was not the intention of the financing. In many cases, however, the provider helped the women's association to seek assistance from other organizations to perform such work that the provider association could not do within the literacy course financing:

“I tell about my objectives, and I ask them to tell about their problems. If I cannot resolve the problems, I tell them at once. For example, I cannot make a fodder, but I can help them and tell them whom they should contact to get more information about it” (Private provider staff).

The assessment was included in the subproject request, often in the form of a table indicating in very synthetic terms the site and the problems of the population. A typical request of the integrated project – well advanced from relatively 'thin' documents from the earlier period, included the following four sections:⁶⁷

- Legal and general information about the provider (resources, personnel, etc.);

⁶⁷ The information is based on analysis of a number of requests covering the period from 1997 – 2002.

- Information about the localities and the participants to be involved in the courses (based on the needs assessment);
- Learning program and teaching methods; these was based on the needs assessment;
- Information about the provider’s management, follow-up and monitoring of the course.

In addition, annexes included a detailed budget and other information about the course.

C) Phase 3: Control and Preselection

The department education office (IDEN) made sure that the provider (i) had received clearance for implementing literacy projects in the concerned department; (ii) that the information in the request was correct (this was verified through on-site inspections); and (iii) that the implementation zones corresponded to the priority zones for literacy education. The procedures manual required that the department education office performed an on-site inspection of at least 20% of the sites to control that the information in the requests was correct. The interviews explained that such on-site inspection was rarely done; the stated reason was the lack of capacity of the IDEN (lack of car, lack of gasoline; see section 5.1). Despite this lack of on-site control, the department education officer provided a “technical note”⁶⁸ on the request, which was sent to the regional chief education office.

⁶⁸ An example of a technical note: “1. On the provider: The provider is established in the department since 1996 with excellent results both at field level and in its relation with the local education structures. 2. On the intervention zone: The [provider has targeted] a priority zone with a strong request for education. 3. On the accuracy of the assessment [*étude du milieu*]: The assessment has in general been well conducted with participation of the beneficiaries. General opinion: Reliable provider which is well equipped to undertake a literacy subproject of this size.” Source: PCU Archives; provider’s request dated November 2001.

The preselection committee at the regional level then analyzed the requests. This preselection committee was composed of representatives from different regional bodies, including the regional education council, the regional chief officer of education (IA), and the office for community development services. These bodies were in charge of regional administration. Some of them were selected through local elections (such as members of the regional education council); some bodies were permanent (such as the regional chief officer of education (IA) who was a part of the permanent administrative structure). The preselection committee thus included a mixture of members, both from selected and permanent administrative structures. The committee also allowed observers from the provider's union (CNOAS) to participate in the proceedings. The person that represented this latter did not have voting power, but had the right to include comments in the minutes from the preselection deliberation.

Decentralization of project management started in 1999 (following a general administrative restructuring that took place in 1997). The regional preselection was a first step in decentralizing the full selection procedure to department and regional levels.⁶⁹ Since the preselection committee at first did not have much experience in literacy projects, a member of the PCU assisted in the preselection. His or her function was to facilitate any procedural questions that came up during the proceedings.

The preselection committee evaluated the capacity of the provider (i.e., it determined whether the provider association was competent to run a subproject) and also evaluated

⁶⁹ In the beginning of the project, the department and regional levels were hardly involved in subproject selection, monitoring and evaluation at all. These functions are fully decentralized at this time.

the association's apparent knowledge of the local area. As seen above, the subproject proposal was supposed to include information about (i) the provider; (ii) the locality; (iii) the learning program; and (iv) the subproject management. The preselection committee was responsible for evaluating the two first parts of the request (information about the provider and about the locality). Any request that did not fulfill a minimum set of requirements was rejected.

D) Phase 4: Selection

The pre-selected requests were sent to Dakar for selection. The selection committee, which was also called the "technical analysis committee," was composed of one representative from the delegate ministry for Basic Education and Literacy, one from the Ministry of Family, Social Action and National Solidarity, one from the contract-managing agency (AGETIP) and two members without voting rights, one from the PCU and one from the providers' association (CNOAS).

The committee analyzed the requests through the use of an evaluation sheet. In order to be eligible, the proposal needed to score at least 60% of the maximum points possible, as follows:

Legal and general information about the provider (maximum score: 50 points);

Provider's knowledge about the localities and the participants to be involved in the courses (maximum score: 40 points);

Proposed learning program and teaching methods (maximum score: 50 points);

Proposed management, budget, follow-up and monitoring of the course (maximum score: 40 points);

Proposed institutional development of the provider and the participant's organization (maximum score: 10 points);

In order to be eligible, as noted above, it was necessary to score 60%, or 114 points out of a maximum score of 190 points. The two first criteria having already been subject for preselection, the selection committee concentrated on the last three criteria, which consisted of (i) a learning program; (ii) management and budget of the course; and (iii) institutional development. This latter point referred to a part of the budget that could be allocated to activities or purchases that would strengthen the organizations of the participants and of the provider (the institutional development part of the budget should not exceed 10% of the total budget). Such institutional development budget could be used to purchase a means of transport (car or motorbike) or a computer, or any other item or training, either for the provider association or for the learners. It was a part of the project strategy to develop civil society in Senegal. Any subproject proposal that contained minor errors, for example in the budget set-up, could be sent back to the provider for correction. Then the committee would consider the corrected version of the proposal for financing.

Each proposal received a score and was hierarchically ranked during selection. The highest ranked projects usually obtained funding and those ranked under 60% of the maximum score usually did not (except if the funding was exceptionally high that year).

The aim of this approach was to fund the best projects:

“The civil society is making requests that are analyzed, and then approved by an approbation committee. This is a set-up that makes it possible to fund the best civil society subprojects” (Interview Civil servant).

E) Phase 5: Approval

After selection, the subprojects were sent to the approbation committee, which was composed of the directors of the following institutions: the DAEB, the community development department in the Ministry of Family, Social Action and National Solidarity, and AGETIP. This high-level committee had as its goal to check that the selection procedures had been respected. The committee also processed any appeals for re-evaluation of rejected proposals. Finally, it checked that the number of classes selected corresponded to available financing from the World Bank.

After the approval committee approved the financing, the DAEB prepared a decree for signature by the delegate Minister. After the government had made a public announcement about the selected providers, the rejected providers had five days to submit an appeal to the approbation committee.

Usually, the providers' proposals were either accepted or rejected. In some cases, however, the providers were selected to implement a part of the subproject. This situation sometimes happened when the overall project financing did not match the number of courses selected. In case of partial financing, or in case of rejection, all interviewed providers stated that they informed the concerned communities about the rejection. Most providers stated that in case of rejection they tried to obtain some other

financing to conduct the course. Some providers even tried to implement the literacy course by their own means:

“Once I didn’t get the financing for a class that was very eager to have a literacy course. We have a contract linking us to them. [...] The head of the village signs this protocol. If we don’t receive the financing, we come to explain to them that we haven’t received the financing, and we can’t help them at the level of PAPF. We try to make a reduced formula - and implement some literacy activities - until the next financing. This happened once - when I received financing for 15 centers out of 20. I don’t understand how this happened. I was able to finance two centers by myself, and the population helped with the financing of the remaining three. Also, last time, I did not receive financing for the 20th class, which was very motivated and had constructed a center for literacy activities” (Private provider staff).

The rejection of a subproject proposal did inflict some financial losses on the providers. Such losses can be considered as a part of the risk-sharing features of a partnership. From a neoliberal view, one can argue that these losses had as function to ensure that the quality of implementation was improved. The risk was real; of 960 proposals, only 312 obtained financing (see table 4.1), and there was no mechanism in the PAPF to reimburse the pre-assessment or any other work undertaken to prepare the subproject proposal:

“If we are not selected after having done the pre-assessment, we lose. To do the assessment, we have to go to the field. We need to write documents, photocopy this and photocopy that, use gasoline. We, the supervisors, everyone, are tired. And if the request for funds is not selected, we, and the provider, lose, physically and financially. If we tell a village that we are trying to set up a school [literacy center] in their village, we come back to

sign the agreements when we have obtained the financing. If we don't obtain financing, we also return to say that we didn't obtain financing, and that we are going to submit the request elsewhere. So if we get the funds, we come back, and if we don't have the funds, we come back too. And if another provider takes care of that village, it is good - we go elsewhere” (Private provider staff).

The participants did not have any large financial loss if the subproject was rejected (their costs would be limited to some hours of lost opportunity cost). Also, sometimes, knowing that providers did not always obtain financing, they signed agreements with several providers, to be on the sure side of receiving a literacy course. Since there were no mechanisms to prevent such double implementation, it therefore happened that more than one provider was selected to implement a course in the same village. The procedures manual did not suggest a solution for the case of double financing. In practice, one of the following did happen: (i) one provider went elsewhere (in principle the first provider to the site had a priority to the site); or (ii) if there were enough illiterate people at that site, two courses took place simultaneously.

Likewise, there was no mechanism to check in which sites literacy courses had been implemented previously, and it often happened that courses were implemented in the same sites as in prior years. This phenomenon was frequently encountered with the integrated project, since many previous learners wished to gain access to the additional features of the integrated project (such as the income-generating activities proposed by the integrated project):

“There is no control over which sites have been touched previously, so we’re often implementing courses in the same places as we have before. This is especially a problem for the integrated program, in which many former participants enrolled [i.e., participants from earlier cohort’s courses]” (Civil servant).

6.2: Contractual and Financial Processes

Four additional phases of a subproject life were indicated in the procedures manual, relating to the financial and evaluative mechanisms of the subproject. These phases included (i) contracting of the provider; (ii) implementation of the subproject; (iii) evaluation of the subproject; and (iv) closing of the subproject. To recapitulate, a successful subproject proposal would go through the following phases:

- Information was given to the provider;
- The provider did an on-site assessment and prepared the request;⁷⁰
- The local (department) education authorities certified that the provider was welcome to work in the department, and that the selected areas for implementation corresponded to priority areas;
- Regional authorities pre-selected the proposal based on the two first criteria for selection (provider capacity and knowledge to local area);
- The selection committee selected the proposal based on the last three criteria for selection (course program and methods, management of the subproject, and the plan for institutional development);
- The approbation committee checked that the procedures manual had been used for selection and that financing was available;

⁷⁰ The preparation of the needs assessment and the request was sometimes contracted out to a consultant or an agency specialized in preparing such requests.

- The contract-managing agency signed a contract with the provider and transferred a first amount of financing, to cover the subproject start-up;
- The provider set up the subproject (technical monitoring was performed by the DAEB, financial monitoring by the contract-managing agency);
- The PCU and DAEB evaluated the project;
- The contract-managing agency closed the project.

This schema was followed in most cases (documents and interviews did not suggest any variation). After selection, the contracting of the provider was followed by an immediate transfer of a first installment of funds into a special account that the provider had opened for the subproject. This first amount (and subsequent amounts) varied according to the number of courses for which the provider had received financing. The fee for each learner was invariable.

After having received the first installment, the provider began the project activities. The second installment was made after the provider submitted a report that included: (i) an activity report for the first four months of implementation; (ii) a financial report supported by receipts for all project-related purchases; and (iii) a request for payment of the second installment. This second payment was not contingent on the on-site verification of implementation. The third installment, however, was contingent on the on-site inspection of implementation progress (a similar documentation as for the second installment was required for the third and all subsequent payments). As we shall see later, such on-site inspection was not often undertaken. In reality, the third and subsequent installments were paid upon submission of similar documentation as was required for the second installment.

When the provider had received the first installment, the participants were remobilized and informed about the outcome of the selection. The provider would check that each locality's course management committee was functioning, and proceeded with collecting the participants' financial contribution to the course (it was set at 2,500 FCFA per person, or about US\$4). The provider would then recruit the subproject personnel (supervisors and literacy teachers) and train the personnel. Also, before beginning the course implementation, the provider ensured that each course location had a reading and activities' center or at least a location where classes could be held. Finally, the provider needed to purchase the necessary booklets and instruction materials for the course.

The provider then implemented the course as it had been planned by the subproject document. The provider used three internal reporting systems to monitor implementation progress: (i) attendance records kept by the instructor; (ii) the supervisor's reporting book; (iii) the financial manager's register. In addition, the provider submitted implementation reports to the contract-managing agency and PCU every four months of project implementation. After the subproject had been implemented, DAEB and the decentralized education offices evaluated its outcome. Then the subproject was closed by the contract-management agency.

6.3: Decentralization of Project Management

PAPF was a centrally executed project until 1999, when it began to decentralize the project functions linked to selection and to monitoring and evaluation. As noted above, there were two parallel systems of school management in Senegal; on the one hand the

administrative system of education inspectors; the department inspectorate and the regional inspector of education or chief education officer. On the other hand were the ‘*collectivités locales*’; the elected bodies. The rural councils at regional level were of particular importance in this context.

This decentralization of project activities was parallel to the decentralization of other functions that had been centrally executed in Senegal, and which had been initiated in 1996 and 1997, when “the presidents of rural councils were made accountable to their constituencies, and the regional governments were established to develop and carry out regional development policy” (Todaro & Smith, 2003, p. 715). During a workshop on decentralization in Bougainvillées on 1-3 September 1999, it was noted that the local administration felt excluded because of the centralized implementation of the project. Besides, there was a lack of interaction between the providers and the local authorities. The PCU noted that local authorities had little information about the value of literacy. A series of measures to strengthen the capacity of the local level bodies, and to involve them more in the project management was therefore proposed at the workshop in Bougainvillées, and adopted by the project’s mid-term evaluation (in 1999):


“The project was centralized, and in 1996 the state was decentralizing and conferring new roles to the locally elected bodies [collectivités locales]. There was a transfer of responsibilities to the decentralized level, and the management of literacy was one of the activities transferred to that level. We made studies as to how to decentralize project responsibilities, and where the decentralization is most clear, is the example of selection of providers. A central selection committee that was set up by the Minister

selected the providers. We noted that since the local levels did not have the skills to perform the selection, we had to decentralize progressively. The first years we performed a 2-phase selection process; the decentralized level at the department level did the pre-selection, then a national committee made a selection on the remaining criteria of selection.⁷¹ Finally, an approbation committee approved the results of the selection committee. The next year we decentralized the selection of providers fully, and the department level did a pre-selection, the regional level did the selection, and the approbation at the national level. All this was made possible through a very important component of the project, which was aimed at capacity building. In capacity building, we not only had a strengthening of material means - which was needed - but we also strengthened the capacities of all the actors” (Civil servant).

The project execution can therefore be seen in three phases, going from a centrally executed project to a decentralized one, as shown in figure 6.2 below. The partnership approach studied in this thesis is the one described by Model 2 in figure 6.3. The somehow complicated selection methods can be explained by the fact that this model was seen as an intermediate model (see interview quotation above), and that the fully decentralized model (3) corresponded to the revised objective of the project. One problem with the decentralization was that financial resources and the management thereof never were decentralized. Also, the project never foresaw the provision of transport means and other resources to decentralized levels (except for the provision of motorbikes to the RRAs and the RDAs).

⁷¹ This is the method that was described in the procedures manual for 2000-2003, and that has been explained above.

Figure 6.2: Decentralization of the PAF



Decentralized level lacked the necessary human and material resources to play its role in the project. Besides, the IDEN had as its main work objective to manage formal education. Hence, the primary sector was prioritized, even in areas where the literacy education was as important as the formal sector:

“In fact it is the inspector [IDEN] himself who is responsible for literacy. [...] Since the inspector considers literacy as a secondary task - and since he has no particular training or knowledge on the issue - literacy is never prioritized. The staff members who are put in charge of literacy [RDA or RRA] do not always have an appropriate background. With the explosion of literacy today, it happens that literacy classes are more important [in certain localities] than formal schooling. And the institutional set-up hasn’t

changed! [The person working on literacy, RDA or RRA] is still a person who does not have access to resources; and they are used to [monitoring] formal schooling activities. The inspector is evaluated on his performance in the field of formal schooling, and he is therefore giving priority to the formal school system. The literacy sector therefore lacks both material and human resources. The projects have given the decentralized administration levels motorbikes and gasoline. The inspector sometimes confiscates these transport means. The RDA or RRA has not always the right profile to do the job. Since the zone they are covering is very large, they cannot humanly follow-up on the activities in his zone. The role of those responsible for literacy should be reconsidered; literacy needs to be a full service under the control of the inspector, and the profile of the staff members [RDA and RRA] must be better studied” (Consultant, former civil servant).

6.4: Monitoring and Evaluation Processes

Since it was a pilot project, there were many monitoring and evaluation activities foreseen for the PAPF. The monitoring and evaluation had at least three functions:

- At the local level, evaluate each provider subproject, to ensure that the provider association delivered what it had been paid for delivering;
- At the project level, ensure that the requirements for the courses corresponded to the needs of the learners and that the financing was adequate;
- At a national level, ensure that the project processes (selection, financing...) contributed to a harmonious development of the sector.

The actors involved in the monitoring and evaluation activities were the same as we have already met: The PCU, the DAEB and its decentralized agents (whom evaluated the

subprojects); the contract-managing agency (which monitored the financial aspects of each subproject), and the providers' association, CNOAS (which was supposed to monitor the provider sector as a whole). Also, the World Bank was involved in the monitoring of the project, through regular field visits and coordination meetings.

In all, one can identify six monitoring and evaluation functions, including (a) monitoring of the subprojects by the state agencies (including assessment of the learning outcomes); (b) financial monitoring by the contract-managing agencies; (c) monitoring and evaluation of the courses by the implementing provider; (d) sector studies on various aspects of the impact of the project and (e) monitoring of the project as a whole by the World Bank (this monitoring function will be further discussed in chapter 7.4). In addition, several interviewees stated that it was the intention of the project that a sector monitoring by the providers' association (CNOAS) should take place, although this was not explicitly stated in the project document. In any case, CNOAS never performed any monitoring activity. The different monitoring and evaluation activities are further described below.

A) Monitoring of Subprojects by the State Agencies

There were three state agencies involved in the monitoring of the subprojects; (i) the (i) PCU; (ii) the DAEB, and (iii) its decentralized bureaus (especially the IDEN and RDA). The PCU was involved in day-to-day management of the project and did many monitoring visits to control that the subprojects had started and that their implementation progress was satisfying.

The DAEB and its decentralized bureaus were supposed to verify whether the people who had attended classes had become literate, and, generally, probe the content of the learning that had taken place. One problem with DAEB's monitoring and evaluation activities was that comparatively little time was used for actual monitoring; most of the time was used to generate reports – and to perform unscheduled work. At times, one had the impression that the staff members were functioning on an ad-hoc basis, with little planning of the activities, and little effective monitoring of the project. The implementation-completion report of the project stated that the DAEB “experienced significant difficulties in accomplishing [their] task,” and especially underlined the failure of the DAEB to set up a capable monitoring and evaluation system (ICR, 2004, p. 15).

In analyzing a typical day for the monitoring and evaluation division in the DAEB, one finds that very little substantive work was actually performed – except for report writing:

“For the head of division of monitoring and evaluation, the day begins with a look at the mail. Then there is usually a brief meeting with the director - and then a review of the work of the division members. Most of the work is related to the provincial bureaus and the reports they have submitted. There are often problems in the reports. We need to review these reports and send comments on them [i.e., send comments back to the provinces]. Currently we're working on the drafting of the reports for PAPA on ECB and functional literacy centers. During 2003, we made four reports: for PAPF on the experimental [integrated] program; T2 – the longitudinal studies; and two reports for PAPA. This is very satisfactory; a few years ago we had very little capacity [and could not have made so many reports].”

Sometimes we have to do unscheduled activities, for example, recently we had to make a report for ADEA on faire-faire. Such unplanned activities do usually not take much time - maybe they take 20% of our [total] time”
(Civil servant).

At a provincial level, the report writing was as important a task as at the central level.

The local level and in particular, the Department (IDEN), stated that they did not have the means for monitoring and evaluation – and that the central level in Dakar was incapable of performing a good monitoring of the project.

Consider these statements made by local officials:

“It is not from Dakar that one can perform an efficient monitoring and evaluation! The reality that I am living is that the RDA is given about 2-300 liters of gasoline per year. It comes late. He is then asked to monitor 200-300 courses with my car. Dakar [understands that he cannot monitor all the classes] and asks him to monitor a representative selection of the classes. In reality, he visits a few classes, and also waits for the evaluation mission from Dakar” (Civil servant).

“The problem of the project is linked to the lack of means for follow-up and monitoring. The means are confiscated by Dakar. We need to certify the statements of the providers [in the request for funds]; we don’t have the means to do it” (Civil servant).

“We don’t have the means for follow-up and monitoring. We don’t have the logistics means. We receive some money for gasoline and fax paper; we don’t have the means of visiting the providers in the field. We can’t do anything else than the administrative work” (Civil servant).

“I have about 300 centers to supervise, so I can’t visit all of them. I cover about half of these centers. Since I only have a motorbike to travel with, it is difficult to visit the remote centers. I haven’t visited any centers at all for 2 or 3 months now” (Civil servant).

A large part of the day-to-day monitoring of the projects, as noted by the above interviews, was reduced to desktop monitoring and report writing. The only monitoring that seems to have been done with some regularity was the end of subproject test submitted by the DAEB in coordination with the local offices.

The PCU considered the lack of monitoring as the single most important problem in the project:

“There should be more reflection on the monitoring of the projects - this is the element that doesn’t work - or else it is the strategy as a whole that does not function [i.e., the strategy does not function if monitoring cannot be effectively implemented]” (Civil servant).

“We have asked the IDEN to control all the sites, but they haven’t done it. There is no follow-up from DAEB. Maybe there exist 5 - 10 % of fictitious sites. In some of the zones, there is about a hundred km between sites, and the RDAs say that really they can’t inspect the sites; they don’t have any means [of transport]. In the providers’ reports from these zones, all seem very well. However, it looks too perfect; one cannot have the same perfect situation in all the sites - it is not normal” (Civil servant).

The evaluations that were undertaken were characterized by the lack of action on their conclusions; no action was taken on reports of embezzlement and/or substandard results of the courses. The implementation completion report of the project stated, “sanctions

and incentives for providers based on their performance were rarely undertaken” (ICR, 2004, p. 15). At worst, an installment of project financing was withheld for a short period – during which the provider was supposed to reorganize the course:

“Negative sanctions do not exist. We need to integrate them in the procedures manual; when people get involved, they need to know the rules. We need to have not only sanctions, but also a system to analyze bad management, and with rigorous sanctions” (Consultant, former civil servant).

Also, there was no evaluation of the learner’s skills at entry, so the provider association could enroll only literate people in the courses, if so it wished. Project studies indicate that a large part of the enrollees were literate at entry (see section 8.1).⁷²

B) Financial Monitoring by the Contract-Managing Agency

The contract-managing agency (AGETIP) was supposed to make on-site visits to verify that the providers were on track in the implementation of the subproject. It was supposed to make this on-site visit before transferring the third installment of the subproject funds.

In the beginning of the project, when the PAPF still had relatively few providers enrolled in the project, the contract-managing agency assigned only two full-time professional staff members to the project. They were already at that time too few to inspect a significant sample of the subprojects; and when the project expanded, the financial

⁷² One former civil servant wished that “The education development plan should orient the providers in the recruitment [of illiterate people] and the follow-up and monitoring should ensure that the bias [of enrolling literate people] should be avoided”. (*Consultant, former civil servant*).

monitoring came close to a standstill. The implementation completion report of the project stated that the AGETIP supervision's "frequency deteriorated over time as the number of subprojects increased [...] The fifth cohort required the monitoring of over 1,030 classes. It became evident that AGETIP's capacity with only two supervisors was insufficient to carry out the supervision work correctly. However, the supervision model remained unchanged for the remainder of the project" (ICR, 2004, p. 17).

C) Course Monitoring and Evaluation by the Providers

The most important monitoring and evaluation of the courses was performed by the provider organization itself. To this effect, it had two staff types particularly in charge of following up of the courses: the coordinator of the courses and the supervisor(s). The supervisors visited the courses to obtain information about the progress of the learning, and reported to the coordinator.

A coordinator explains these monitoring functions in the following terms:

"The supervisor visits the courses to get information (statistics) and he helps the teacher to conduct classes. He follows up on the classes, and evaluates the learning. He is reporting about all this to me. Except from my own supervision missions, it is from the supervisor that I know that this or that course or teacher have some problems. From the information of the supervisor, I know the attendance, the hours of class, and the number of classes that we have conducted. Every month I'm going to the course sites myself except for the rainy season" (Private provider staff).

Also, the *relais* was supposed to have some supervisory and monitoring role when the provider ceased activities in the villages. However, most interviewees said that such monitoring did not take place. Also, during the interviews, most providers complained that the subproject financing did not allow for a prolonged follow-up of the subprojects, and that the short timeframe of implementation hindered a sustainable learning to take place i.e., it hindered the people's ability to become literate and to remain literate (literacy issues are further discussed in section 9.1).

D) Sector Studies

The DAEB was responsible for realizing sector studies, including longitudinal and impact studies, as well as cost-effectiveness studies of the subprojects. The aim was to fine-tune the outsourcing tools (and in particular to improve the selection procedures), as well as finding a course model that was cost-effective. In 2000 a longitudinal study was initiated. This study aimed to track the impact of the literacy courses. Its methodology was inadequate (see section 3.3 for information about the methodological problems with the longitudinal study and the statistics generated by the DAEB).

In conclusion, this chapter has given an overview of how the different procedures of the project worked. The most important administrative procedures were the selection of the subprojects, and then the follow up of the implementation (through different monitoring and evaluation mechanisms). Local government institutions had an important role in project processes, especially when the project administration was increasingly

decentralized. The decentralized education institutions lacked the necessary human and material resources to play its assigned role in project monitoring.

Most project administrative processes did not function as they were designed. Also, the flawed decentralization of the project led to problems in the selection and implementation of subprojects. The study of these design and implementation flaws will be the objective of the next chapter.

Chapter 7: Implementation and Design Flaws of the Outsourcing Processes

Most interviewees agreed on the basic data of project set-up and implementation. They agreed that there were problems with the project processes, in particular the monitoring and evaluation, and the decentralization of the project. Despite largely homogenous interview and document information about the project data, it is not to be said that this information is not critical. On the contrary, many interviewees and documents make a severe critique of the project and outsourcing processes. The criticism of the project will be examined in this chapter.

There were several types of critique in the interviews and project-related documents. A few people looked at the overall project set up – and discussed whether it was appropriate to use outsourcing for implementation of literacy. Some interviewees discussed the World Bank's involvement in the sector and provided a critical reading thereof. The following sections further discuss these matters and are organized as follows: (i) reported and fictional project activities; (ii) process flaws; (iii) the interaction between stakeholders; and (iv) the World Bank's interaction with the project.

7.1: Reported Activities Versus Fictional Activities

In view of the lacking monitoring and evaluation processes of the project, and in view of the flawed data, it can be argued that the achievements of the project (i.e., enrollment of about 200,000 learners) are largely fictional and do not reflect the reality of the project. Despite this possibility, it is here argued that the basic facts (as reported by AGETIP, DAEB and the PCU) about this project are true, based on the following:

- During a comprehensive survey of the literacy sector in Senegal involving 100 subprojects, the interviewers found very few fictitious sites, none of which related to the PAPF project;⁷³
- No interview, no report, and no newspaper statement, even those being very critical of the project and of the partnership model, ever stated that the project or its subparts were fictitious;⁷⁴
- Independent AGETIP, DAEB, and PCU data collection reported similar findings (although the exact data differed). The data were largely consistent with evaluations and findings during field visits made by the World Bank, external agencies, and independent consultants.
- One can therefore be reasonably sure that the project exists, and that it had an enrollment of nearly 200,000 people over a five-year period (the exact number of enrollees is discussed in section 8.1).

The most negative statements of the project were related to the learning of the participants. In terms of processes, the critique of the project was mostly based on the economic incentives of the providers, as well as the lack of monitoring and evaluation,

⁷³ All fictitious sites encountered belonged to the government's intensive literacy project (PAIS), which has its background in the 1000-course project of the early 1990s.

⁷⁴ Some interviewees, however, said that they believed there were a limited number of fictitious course sites.

which apparently led to misbehavior by certain providers, corruption, and the implementation of some fictitious sites. Therefore, if one considers the most negative statements of the interviews to be true, here are some of the more unsettling aspects of the project:

“Many providers, all they want, is money. Among 6 local providers, 4 are ‘economic’ ones. In most cases, over half of the providers are mostly occupied with money. When we go to the field and see the CALs, we notice that everything is in a bad state” (Civil servant).

“[The] problem is the non-application of the procedures manual, both for positive and negative sanctions” (Civil servant).

“There is a bias in the selection procedure, since it allows for civil servants to become providers (under another name). They try to gain money through providing literacy programs” (Civil servant).

“Every three months the provider comes with his fictitious report - I am disgusted by it. I have barely enough to survive and he [the provider] makes 2-3 million. It is exceptional that the IDEN refuses a report [i.e., refuse to validate it]. In most cases, the provider is too strong and can get around the IDEN. Or he gives 300,000 - or even a million - to the children of the IDEN. For the Tabaski [mutton feast to celebrate Abraham’s sacrifice], they give a sheep. A lot of providers are staff members of DAEB or they are RDA or RRA, but they don’t use their own name” (Civil servant).

The critique is often not only linked to the PAPF project, but to the public sector in Senegal as a whole. The public sector is often characterized as slow and inefficient, and to a certain extent, corrupt:⁷⁵

“If there is anything that characterizes Senegal, it is the impossibility of innovating something, and experimenting it, because of the [political] instability. It is also in the mentality of how the system functions: it is not democratic; the structures on which the system is founded are not democratic. The person who directs anything, needs to be of the same group as those in power. If not one is fragile, and if one does anything wrong, one’s head is going to be chopped off.”⁷⁶ One does not look to innovate anything but to keep one’s place” (Consultant, former civil servant).

According to proponents of outsourcing, one main reason for outsourcing is to bypass government bureaucracy. Interviews conducted in Senegal and reports from the project’s implementation point contend that this is not the case: The government is a main actor in

⁷⁵ It can often be exasperating to work with the government of Senegal: slowness and bureaucratic methods are customary. Operations involving hard cash (e.g., photocopying, transport, etc.) are slow to be implemented, since hard cash is, in a system of scarcity, infinitely more valuable than time. There is also a certain cultural conception of time that is different from the West.

One interviewee said, “The reality of the functioning of the system, and not only for literacy, is that people decide to meet at, say 9 a.m., and then arrive at noon. Sometimes there are many cultural factors behind this [behavior]. I’m not excusing them; it is important to come on time and respect timing. If one does not respect the time, there is loss [of time] and less efficiency. From a cultural and anthropological point of view, time has not always been linear; time is divided into slots. When one says “morning” it is from 8 am to noon; there is an early morning and a late morning. Even the religion, and especially the prayer time, is a time-slot and even a space. It is a different moment and a different space; it is another sphere separated from the issues of administration and of work, which are fixed. If we want to be efficient, time management should be a part of our performance indicators” (Consultant, former civil servant).

⁷⁶ This is figuratively speaking; criticizing the government openly can lead to the lack of promotion for a civil servant, or in extreme cases separation from the job. Physical punishment for open disagreement with the government policies is rare.

the partnership approach: thus the PAPF is not bypassing the bureaucracy; it is simply changing the rules under which the bureaucracy applies.

In conclusion, the project does exist; it has had an impact through the enrollment of a large number of people, but the processes of the project are flawed. It must be noted that the World Bank's project completion report deplores the institutional instability of the sector and the failure of some of its processes, but does not mention any problems of fictitious sites or corruption. Evidence from interview information from several sources (civil servants, consultant, and private provider staff) indicates that the dysfunctional processes have led to (i) corruption and (ii) emergence of economic providers who are mainly interested in the economic advantages any such project can offer them. These problems must be compared to the previous situation in the literacy sector, to evaluate whether or not the project only has continued a tradition of corruption or whether the partnership approach has initiated a whole new dynamism of embezzlement that is detrimental for the country.

7.2: Critique of the Processes

According to the interviewees, the role of the money dominated literacy subprojects – and many stakeholders found that social and/or altruist aspects of the project were lacking:

“In principle, the faire-faire approach is acceptable, but in reality there is a problem linked to the financing and the quality of the classes. People feel that there is much money linked to the approach from World Bank, CIDA,

etc. The state tries to recapture some of that money; after all, faire-faire is the application of the government's policy. The state, then, is conceiving the program; the private sector is executing the program. This is a problem, because there is no social anchorage of the program. The administration is disconnected from the social level, and the procedures are so complicated that they can hardly be realized”⁷⁷ (Consultant, former civil servant).

In neoclassical economics, financial gains are viewed as a major motivation for behavior in humans, who “act out of their own free will, but are motivated out of enlightened self-interest because they can expect a sufficient reward. What they do for others is then the side-effect of their selfishness” (Kasper & Streit, 1998, p. 61). The PAPF project, it was felt by most stakeholders, was centered on the action of such self-interest. Several flawed processes, in the selection as well as in the monitoring and evaluation of the subprojects, made corruption and embezzlement possible. These problems are further discussed in the sections below.

A) Critique of the Selection Method

One main problem with the selection method is that it was linked to a very technical treatment of a project document. In some cases, the providers did not even create this document by themselves, but subcontracted it to a consultant or to another association. In other words, a very bad provider could make a very good proposal (or subcontract with a consultant to make a very good proposal). Since the selection committees' members

⁷⁷ The notion of complicated procedures was not often encountered in interviews. On the contrary, many people underlined the usefulness of the procedures manual, which explained in detail the procedures of the selection of the project.

were bound to make an evaluation of this proposal, the selection procedures did not always lead to the selection of the best providers because only the proposal document was evaluated, and not the provider's past performance. In this way, one of the main arguments for outsourcing civil services, namely that it led to competition and thereby to better quality of projects, was partly bypassed: the partnership in Senegal, by the selection technique, merely led to competition in the write-up of a project proposal. The improvement in proposal writing was notable, but it was not always complemented with a corresponding improvement in the courses implemented.

A second problem with the selection was the lack of verification of the subproject's statements: The selection committee did not check whether (i) two or more providers were involved in the same village; (ii) civil servants were providers, using a front name; (iii) the provider requested financing for several subproject, using different front names:

“There is a bias in the selection procedure, since it allows for civil servants to become providers (under another name). They try to gain money through providing literacy programs. Some providers complain about the selection procedure; they are right in complaining about it. Many of the members of the selection committees don't know the project well enough to select good providers” (Civil servant).

“Also, there is often a problem with the staff members of the provider. A provider can make a request using the names of the same staff members in two different departments. Sometimes the provider requests several projects, but uses a front man for a second project. Sometimes there are fictitious centers; when we did the impact study, we saw that some of the sites had been “taken” by another provider, and that the second provider

who had obtained financing for the site did not inform anybody about this situation” (Civil servant).

Again, these problems decreased the effectiveness of the approach. There were no statistics on the number of villages in which there had been double financing. The sites where double financing occurred often had easy access to the road. Outsourcing has often been criticized by its lack of equity – since providers concentrate on the zones where it is most easy to implement courses. In principle, the local authorities in Senegal defined priority zones that offset some of the effect of this selection bias from the providers’ side. However, it was still difficult to prevent the providers from selecting the areas that were most easily accessible within the priority zones:

“If the provider looks for economical gain, he will implement the course in the zone that is the most advantageous. The inspector needs to orient the providers in their choice of intervention zone. The development plan of education should define the priority zones. Each of the actors needs to play his or her role, but it is normal that each looks for the easiness for the most gain. The remote areas need to be prioritized, else it is the villages that are easy to access and the suburban areas around the cities that will be targeted. It is the role of the state to impulse the providers in the right direction, and the pre-assessment should be a tool to push the provider in the right direction” (Consultant, former civil servant).

The selection problems may have resulted in offsetting the perceived advantages of partnership approaches. The subproject proposals were set up in such way that they would generate an economic profit. Instead of competition among providers to make the best subprojects, there was competition to make the nicest proposal.

B) Critique of the Decentralization of the Project Administration

As seen in section 6.3, the decentralization of the PAF project's administration followed the general decentralization process of the government that was initiated in 1996.

According to the interviewees, there were three problems with the decentralization process; (i) the local agents did not have the required skills to perform the work; (ii) the local education offices were prioritizing work in the formal sector, and (iii) the lack of control of local education officers made it possible for the latter to engage in unethical behavior.

Most interviewees in the DAEB and PCU said that there was a lack of competency at the decentralized level to perform the two major tasks that were decentralized: monitoring and evaluation and the selection of the providers. These problems were generally attributed to the lack of project funds to train local stakeholders and to provide them with the necessary resources:

“There are many problems linked to the decentralization of project activities. First, there is a problem of competency and [lack of] human resources. Then there is a problem of lacking equipment, such as computers and transport” (Civil servant).

The second problem was linked to the institutional set-up of the sector, which rewarded the local education authorities for the work they performed on the formal schools, but which did not include responsibilities for literacy. In other words, the decentralization was done through the assignment of new duties to the local levels. These local levels did not receive the means to perform these new activities, no new staff members were

assigned to the field, and the institutional set-up was not changed to allow the local authorities to use more time to follow up on literacy programs. As one inspector of education pointed out:

“In my department, I have 300 formal schools, and I have also schools at the intermediate level [lower secondary]. The Ministry has given me a car and gasoline to monitor these schools. If I am given the responsibility for 200-300 literacy classes in my department, you can understand the problem that it gives me. Sometimes I am given some liters of gasoline and told that [the follow-up on] literacy is your role since you are the IDEN! I am an official - and I can't do it. They evaluate me, not on literacy classes, but on the functioning and results of primary school classes. This is our problem with literacy classes; and not only a problem linked with PAPF” (Civil servant).

The decentralization was done as a desktop exercise, without taking into account the institutional, human resource and material needs that were necessary to make the decentralization process successful. As a result, the mechanisms of selection and monitoring and evaluations were open to unethical behavior:

“Decentralization is a good idea. But it is necessary to really decentralize; at this point one only has the impression that problems are transferred to a lower level. Then local small bosses [des petits chefs] who try to make a profit are born” (Consultant).

The unethical behavior could be done in many ways, some of which have been discussed above: (i) local education staff could establish an association and request funds for implementing a subproject; (ii) the evaluating officer (most often the local inspector or

the RDA) could refuse to sign an evaluation sheet before receiving a “gift” from the provider; and (iii) they could refuse authorization for implementation for a provider association which did not pay its dues to the local authorities:

“Then there is the problem that all of the actors know each other. The IDEN can tell any of the providers that he needs 200,000 or 300,000 FCFA and the provider will have to pay it straight away. After that the IDEN will give a good evaluation of the subproject. The IDEN in [Department Name] has not done correct work; now the providers do what they want” (Civil servant).

In many cases, the situation led to a duel between the provider and the local authorities. Some providers were strong enough to bypass the local authorities. A Western provider association that has been implementing courses for a while stated:

“Some days it is like the state’s role is to get as much as they can as middlemen: The World Bank is funding, the [provider name] is implementing: what else is there for the state then to ‘cash in’? Some [government] people who do not take the project seriously are seeing the evaluations as a means of getting something [for writing a good evaluation]” (Private provider staff).

So far this provider had obtained good results, and avoided paying any ‘tribute’ to the local authorities. However, according to interviews, in many areas ‘good providers’ had had to pay local authorities. Such payment in turn reduced the quality of the course, so it is a downward spiraling system that is further reducing the effectiveness of the

partnership approach. In some areas, ‘bad’ providers choose to pay off the local authorities, to reduce subproject costs and to enhance personal gain.⁷⁸

C) Critique of the Monitoring and Evaluation System

The DAEB tried to set up a minimum monitoring system, not to coerce the providers to set up courses, but to avoid a moral hazard problem in which the government did not know the providers and the quality of the providers’ work:

⁷⁸ A game theory matrix can show the relationship between the provider and the local authorities: If both engage in unethical behavior, both “wins” (as we shall see later, the risk factor is low for cheating, even in a repeated game):

	Provider: Ethical behavior	Provider: Unethical behavior
Authorities: Ethical behavior	(1) Low financial gain for both; low risk for both	(2) Low financial gain for authorities, high financial gain for provider, some risk for provider
Authorities: Unethical behavior	(3) High financial gain for authorities, no financial gain for provider; risk for both	(4) Somewhat high financial gain for both; low risk for both

This game, which is a repeated game, is stable at two points: (1) When both the authorities and the providers are ethical, there is a low profit for both, and no risk. This point is stable. (2) If the provider engages in unethical behavior, there is some risk that the payments for the course would be stopped, and that the provider would not obtain any future financing, since the (ethical) local authorities would try to prevent the provider from obtaining more funds. The risk for negative sanctions, however, is almost negligible. This point is not stable; it would prompt the provider to do a better job, or to bribe the local authorities to make them close their eyes to faulty implementation. (3) If the local authorities engage in unethical behavior, there is a low risk that some administrative action is taken against them. This point is not stable, however, since the providers cannot, in most cases, both pay-off authorities and also implement a high-quality course. (4) If both the provider and the authorities engage in unethical behavior, there is a higher return for both than in (1). This point is stable, since there is low risk for both. This matrix shows how the outsourcing system as it is set up in Senegal may actually *encourage* corruption: the reward is higher in for both provider and authorities in point (4), and the risk is low. Besides, points (2) and (3) are most likely to tip towards point (4), in which there is a higher reward for both. If one out of many (ethical) providers engages in unethical behavior, there is a chance that the local authorities will accept the bribe. In such case, the local authorities may also expect similar bribes from other providers (i.e., the situation would evolve to point 3), which is likely to result with both providers and authorities engaging in unethical behavior. The matrix, both for individual providers and especially for a system with many providers and one local civil servant, is slanted towards point (4).

“We should avoid excessive control [of the providers]. I think that an easy follow-up and monitoring procedure is better than performing an in-depth monitoring of everything that the providers do. [...] Not an inquisitive [fouillante] monitoring, but a light follow-up to gain understanding about what is going on” (Civil servant).

The monitoring and evaluation, however, was not sufficient to avoid a principal-agent problem, where the provider (the agent) short-changes the state (the principal) because of the lack of knowledge of the latter of what is going on in the field. The local learners were the losing “partners” in this system.

The problems of lacking monitoring were due to three problems, (i) lack of materials (lack of equipment and transport means for monitoring and evaluation); (ii) lack of human resources and (iii) lack of structural coercive (punitive) mechanisms (lack of feedback mechanisms to penalize unethical behavior).⁷⁹ Because of these problems, there was not any monitoring and evaluation system that could help preventing abuses and embezzlement. From the top and downwards, the monitoring and evaluation system was deficient. The DAEB received support, both in training and material resources, to strengthen their monitoring and evaluation capacities. Despite this support, it was not capable of ensuring a correct level of monitoring:

“All the [concerned DAEB] agents received training in statistics from a specialized agency. Secondly, a training plan was established for all DAEB staff members, with study tours, on-the-job training, etc. Then their intervention possibilities were strengthened; three vehicles were procured

⁷⁹ Inversely, there was also a lack of positive sanctions given to well-performing courses. The project mechanisms, thus, did not punish unethical behavior and they did not encourage outstanding behavior.

for them, each with place for nine passengers; which made possible simultaneous travel of 27 persons. All necessary gasoline was provided, each month. A budget to undertake activities was made. We asked them to do two things: follow-up on the projects and evaluate them in time: You have the human resources, you have the equipment needed, you have the logistical and financial resources to do it. And it was never well done. That is a problem” (Consultant, former civil servant).

Also, even if the local and central authorities had performed a correct monitoring and evaluation system, as we have seen above, there were no mechanisms for negative sanctions of unethical behavior. The PCU, in certain subprojects, did temporarily suspend payment of a subproject that had visible implementation problems. Such occurrence, however, was infrequent, and in most cases embezzlement practices did not have any consequence whatsoever for the provider. The PCU tried at an early stage to make public lists of the results of each provider, and classified the providers according to results. The publication of such list would by itself be a motivating factor to perform well, and would have contributed to building a reputational mechanism that could have contributed to an improved quality of implementation (see section 2.1). Unfortunately, these lists were abandoned. The project completion report noted, “AGETIP and the PCU were able to gather data that allowed the classification of providers according to their performance. These classifications were published in 1997 and 1998 in the project’s newspaper and generated enthusiastic reactions among the providers and the communities. Having performance classifications published was an unusually good practice for the time. Unfortunately, it was not sustained due to political pressure” (ICR, 2004, p. 9). At a political level, it was therefore not desirable to distinguish between

high and low quality providers. The same reluctance to make negative assessments about certain providers may have been reflected in project evaluations. Due to these political factors, a provider that had implemented an unsatisfactory project would be eligible for new financing:

“Among the providers selected for the PAF, we know that some are useless. They know that in the PAF project, they’ll never be prosecuted for embezzlement. Some of the providers collect the textbooks they have given to the participants; in that way they “earn” 600 (participants) x 800 FCFA (price for the textbooks) [= 480,000 FCFA] on the next subproject [these books are budgeted for in the budget proposal they submit to PAF]. Sometimes the provider can even collect the library books that were given to the participants as well” (Civil servant).

The monitoring and evaluation were then performed in a vacuum; the objective was to generate reports and not to create sound feedback mechanisms that could lead to negative sanctions for dishonesty. The faulty monitoring and evaluation also prevented the project from obtaining good baseline data about performance and course quality, and it made it difficult to gain knowledge about the outcomes of the courses. Many people involved in the project think that the problems with a lacking monitoring and evaluation system are so important that they can destroy all the (possible) advantages with the partnership approach:

“Today, there are many problems - I think these problems are so important that they can destroy the faire-faire system. It is necessary to emphasize that if there are provider faults [malfeasance] today, they come from the

lack of follow-up, especially from the state” (Consultant, former civil servant).

7.3: Critique of the Stakeholder Interactions

The WDR (2004) distinguishes between two types of accountability: the “long route” of accountability, in which government implementation agents are accountable towards other government institutions, and the “short route”, which makes private providers accountable towards the receivers of the services – the learners (WDR, 2004). As seen above, the method adopted in Senegal was supposedly the short route, since the providers negotiated the services directly with the villagers. However, the set-up had all of the perceived inconveniences of the long route, and moreover it was a dysfunctional long route where the state did not play its monitoring and evaluation role. The learners could still “vote with their feet” and stop attending courses that were badly implemented. There is some evidence that this happened in certain cases where the subprojects had a much higher drop-out rate than the average. In such cases the population was at disadvantage, since the government in most cases failed to take appropriate action to prevent repetition of such occurrence.

A) State Versus Civil Society

As noted in chapter 4.1, the literacy sector was characterized by some stability during Mamadou Ndoeye’s period, and then it was marked by political instability that led to an inefficient management of activities:

“All is managed on a day-to-day basis; there is no overview of what is going to happen tomorrow. The civil servants have no idea what they are supposed to do the next day...” (Consultant, former civil servant).

There are two different opinions about the state’s inefficiency. One idea is that the state is too strong and that the civil society must become a counter balance to the state (see section 2.3). This is the position of Mamadou Ndoye, who thinks that a sound and strong civil society will check any mismanagement from the state’s side, and contribute to a sound democratic system. Also, according to Mamadou Ndoye, any ‘brain drain’ from the public to the private sector is positive, since it strengthens the civil society:⁸⁰

“[...] if we as public sector can export “brains” to the private sector, it is excellent! The civil society is weak in our country; the government is not weak. In the relationship between the government and civil society, it is the civil society part that needs strengthening. I think it is an excellent process if civil society can be reinforced by the most capable of the civil servants. Then the government can play their role, which is to recruit and train new civil servants to perform the needed state work. I think it is very positive that civil society is reinforced in this way, because it will lead to development” (Consultant, former civil servant).

Many civil servants, however, stated that the civil society associations had become too strong, and that they had more means than the state, thus becoming threatening to the state in many ways. These civil servants maintained that the state lacked resources to perform a proper monitoring of the sector:

⁸⁰ Many of the civil servants who were knowledgeable about the partnership approach and participated in its conception phase, left to become private consultants. Also, many civil servants in various domains left to become private providers.

“Some of the providers are very good - but we should police the financial management and make sure that the spent money corresponds to the allocation [it would improve the system]. We lack authority - we lack means. The partnership has become laissez-faire instead of faire-faire; I’m not OK with this kind of partnership! Many IDEN staff members are present [at the field], they ‘function’ as we say, but they lack the authority to perform their work. If we say that a subproject should be stopped, they [the government] need to stop it! We need to be a police; what is it to be police? It is to give the government back its role to supervise the projects. [Faire-faire] doesn’t work if the providers have more means than the government, and that is what happens now” (Civil servant).

The providers’ staff members – as the partnership structure was set up – were prone to opportunistic behavior. The PAPF had a positive impact on the creation and strengthening of civil society through training provided for civil society staff members (see section 10.2). After being trained, however, many provider staff members would create their own association to access funding. It can be argued that the positive impact was partially offset by a negative impact of division and thereby weakening of the associations. One interviewee said,

“When the provider invests in training for its staff members, the next year the staff members create another association. In this way the program is undermining the provider associations” (Consultant, former civil servant).

These many weak associations could have a greater impact as a counter-power to the state if they had been organized in a strong providers’ association or union. The CNOAS providers’ association, however, could not facilitate the creation of a strong civil society, nor was it capable of representing any counter-power to the state:

“What we tried to realize with faire-faire has not been fully achieved. We wanted to come to a situation where the government has not all the power, and where the CNOAS is a partner. In that way, the providers would create a third party alongside the government. We also wanted this strong providers’ organization to supervise what is happening at the grassroots level, because the state cannot supervise everything. The organization should be capable of giving a yearly account of what is happening, to take notice of and correct problems, as well as to register and fight against any deviation from the original intentions of the program. Unfortunately, the CNOAS did not have the needed leadership” (Consultant, former civil servant).

Since both the CNOAS and the providers proved unable to become a counter power to the state, the situation evolved towards an uneasy collaboration in which the government and civil society acted as individual opportunists – in which both state agents and providers could access extra funds if they bend the system a little. The processes, as they were set up, allowed for such individualistic behavior.

B) The Participants in Literacy Courses

The participants in the literacy courses are at the losing end of the failing mechanisms. As seen above, the outsourcing approach as it was designed in Senegal, used a ‘long route’ of accountability; in which the providers were accountable towards the state and not towards the villagers. This situation was inconvenient for the recipients of services, since they had little possibilities of pressure on the providers (the lacking monitoring and evaluation of the course exacerbated the situation). Mamadou Ndoeye acknowledged that this imbalance between the providers and the beneficiaries had not been considered

during the set-up of the partnership system and suggested that some – if not all – of the funds should have been transferred directly to the communities. In this way, the providers would have been directly responsible towards the participants (i.e., using the short route of accountability):

“We considered this problem [of disequilibrium between providers and participants] after implementation, when we saw the relations between communities and the NGOs. The relationship is imbalanced [...] we should not give all the funds to the provider; one part of the funds should go to the communities. In this way, maybe the NGOs would be more accountable towards the communities. [NGOs] lack accountability towards the communities. In this context, the example of Latin America, where the budget was sent directly to the communities, is particularly useful. The NGOs [in Latin America] performed the work, but it was the communities that paid for the services. If the service was not well done – and a definition thereof needed to be included in the contract – the communities would refuse to pay. This aspect lacked in Senegal; we should have changed the financing to give more funds directly to the communities” (Consultant, former civil servant).

The problem of accountability was exacerbated by the identification of participating villages, which was organized by the providers (within the priority zones defined by the government). Since the role of selecting the participating villages was given to the providers, they could dictate the principles of their involvement towards the villagers.⁸¹

⁸¹ Some villages, if they had the opportunity, tried to counterbalance this power disequilibrium through signing contracts with several providers. As we have seen in the chapter on processes, such actions, while they may have strengthened the communities' position vis-à-vis the provider, created process difficulties within the outsourcing system.

In some places, the providers even created fictitious sites, or they reported that they had implemented a course in a village, without actually doing it:

“we need to change the position of the provider towards the community, and to organize the demand ourselves. This will reduce the problem of fictitious sites” (Consultant, former civil servant).

“The role of the provider is to find local communities, organize them and find demand at the local level. Therefore, the provider organized the demand. We have followed up on these subprojects and found that often they had problems with the communities. Frequently, providers wrote to us and asked to change site because another provider had set up a course in the same site. Sometimes there were several providers on a single site; this was a problem. Second problem, there were what we call imaginary [fictitious] sites, which were identified in the project proposal, but when we controlled for them, there was no such place. In that case, the provider needed to choose another site. How can we learn from this? The government should gain knowledge about the real demand from the local sites” (Civil servant).

Many interviews have outlined how this organization of demand could be done; most suggested that the state should identify the communities where literacy courses should be implemented, and then the providers could bid on performing the work.⁸²

⁸² One interviewee suggested, “The best policy would maybe be to empower the rural council at grassroots level to follow up on literacy activities, and to organize the demand. Then they [grassroots level communities] could forward requests of subprojects to department level, which could again forward it to the regional level. The local administration could for example identify villages that would like to organize literacy activities, and then forward this request to the department.” (Civil servant). Another interviewee said, “The government should learn what is the real demand for literacy classes: how many women how many men, what are the characteristics of this group, how many of these people are physically challenged, and which professional category do they belong to. We should know this by village, by rural community, by department, by region, etc. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE).

After the providers had identified the localities in which they wished to implement the literacy course, they undertook a “participatory needs assessment.” Since the providers were uncertain about obtaining financing (and thus being reimbursed for this investment), the pre-assessment was often done in a hurry, without any real consultation of the villagers at all:

“There are no funds to perform a good pre-assessment. It is often undertaken in a hurry, with some reference to PRA methods. The pre-assessment is in most cases not a living process, but already a failure from the start. It prevents the course from evolving. Literacy for adults should be adapted to the different events of [adult] life; and not be adapted to a standardized [theoretical] person which does not exist in real life”
(Consultant).

If the government establishes such knowledge, it is a first stage. Then we would have a clear image of what we need to do, and then we could make a good plan for the elimination of illiteracy. The second stage would be to look at who is capable of resolving the needs identified, expressed by this demand, e.g., once the demand has been defined and organized, we need to link the community [in which we had identified the needs] with the entity that can reply to the needs raised by the community. At this moment the provider can be drawn in, because the provider has the capacity to respond to needs at the village level. Therefore, the innovations that we bring are that the community has been prepared and sensitized to literacy and that it wants to be literate. The village therefore knows its own needs, and the provider can work from that and establish additional needs identification, which can in this case distinguish the specific needs for training in the community. There has already been needs identification at the local level, but the provider undertakes a specific evaluation about training needs. Therefore the community will be linked with the provider that corresponds to their needs, and the provider will make a technical and financial offer of services. The contact is between the provider and the villagers; and the contract will be with the project or with a fund. In this way the provider becomes a *prestataire de services*, i.e., a provider who is paid upon satisfaction of the community. This is very different from what we are doing now, because we do not know where is the demand. We just tell them where the priority zones are, and they go out and select the villages. In the future we will know the village needs, and what the local population convenes with e.g., GROCEF, and the plan for this or that other village. The village management committee will spend funds for participation of its own community in the particular training program that has been chosen. Therefore, the role of the provider will be a support role, and the provider is paid directly for its services. This is for a type of provider that comes and gives a technical and financial offer.” (Civil servant).

The World Bank and the Gambian government are currently (2004) setting up a partnership approach in which the providers are directly accountable to the participants.

“Prior to setting up any course, I consulted the local population myself. I organized meetings with potential learners and we discussed the course. We need to understand each other before implementing the program: they are not animals. I made the request myself, using the procedures manual as guide” (Private provider staff).

The set-up of the subprojects was in most cases based on mutual understanding between providers and community members about the course; and not on a genuine participatory assessment. The providers explained what they could offer, and the community then accepted it (in which case they got the provider’s version of a course), or they refused it; in which case the provider went elsewhere and the community did not receive anything. Such methods of identifying a course led to a disconnection between the providers and the population. The provider was not representative of the population (it was only a supplier of something) and, since there was little or no ownership at the villager’s side, there was a disjunction between provider and courses – and the villagers:

“Some providers [through faire-faire] have concretized their ideas in a positive way - having good relations with the grassroots level. Most others set up subprojects that are theoretically perfect, but which have no particular adherence from the population. In addition, the lack of regularity mixed with a course content that is not particularly useful, make the participants forget everything afterwards” (Consultant).

“The problem is that we give funding for literacy to providers who have other goals than literacy and local development [i.e., their goals are purely economic]” (Civil servant).

“Until now, in all these literacy programs, the participants have not been really involved. It was people that were mobilized, sensitized, and enrolled

in the course, but they were not involved as actors in the program” (Civil servant).

7.4: Critique of the World Bank’s Involvement in the Project

This section discusses two issues: (i) how the World Bank followed up on project implementation (once the project had been agreed upon); and (ii) the impact of the World Bank’s involvement on the literacy sector.

A) World Bank Follow-up and Monitoring of Projects

The problem of the political instability in the government was coupled with rotation of World Bank’s staff members assigned to follow-up on the project. The World Bank itself rates its own performance in the project as “satisfactory”: “despite the turnover of TTLs [task-team leaders in charge of the project] (the project had three TTLs), the Bank team was able to ensure continuity and coherence in its dialogue with the Senegalese counterparts” (ICR, 2004, p. 14).

The interviewed civil servants and former civil servants in Senegal underlined that the World Bank had provided thorough follow-up in the beginning of the project (during the conception of the partnership strategy). After an initial phase of strong involvement, the Senegalese had the impression that the World Bank lost interest: new staff members were made responsible for the project, and they had less time to follow-up on the project. Also, authorization for spending (“non-objections”) that the World Bank, were slow to be processed. These problems slowed down the project’s effectiveness:

“Also, sometimes there are bottlenecks that slow procedures down. For example, it seems that non-objections from the Bank are very slow to be processed. It is necessary to make efforts [to improve the system]. In my time [i.e., when I was the director of the DAEB] the financial sponsor was at the head of the program, and monitored its implementation. Sometimes it appeared like the financial sponsor was more engaged in the project than the civil servants. Maybe it is linked to a problem of staff change [in the World Bank and CIDA]. The staff of the financial sponsor have had problems [in following-up on the project], the civil servants have had problems; there has been no sustainability [of lessons learned]. There has been political instability or the instability of staff members, so many institutional changes and reorganizations. A lot of information and lessons learned have been lost” (Consultant, former civil servant).

“Some of the financial sponsor’s staff members seem to be arbitrarily assigned to the job. I think it is necessary to follow-up on these issues; here, an architect is responsible for education, and there, an administrator is taking the place. These people are not at all competent [to follow-up on education programs]! Also, sometimes they are involved in many things at the same time, so they cannot go in depth on any question” (Consultant, former civil servant).

“We also felt this instability at the level of the Bank, where there were many different task managers. The understanding of the task managers was not the same, and it did not coincide with the understanding of the first task manager, who was present at the conception phase. These changes and this instability slowed the progress of the project.” (Consultant, former civil servant).

In addition to the processes of the World Bank’s follow-up of the project, one can also question its role in the conception of the project strategy.

***B) Overall World Bank Involvement: an Evolution Theory of Development Policies
(Survival of the Project that Fits the World Bank)***

The World Bank's involvement in the project's conception phase was more active than the subsequent follow-up. Section 4.3 discussed how the World Bank agreed to finance the literacy project. The financing was contingent on the set-up of a partnership strategy that did not take resources from the primary education sector. Another way of conceiving this, is to relate it to a 'survival of the fittest' or evolution theory: the World Bank and any other donors, will, of course, fund the 'fittest' project, i.e., the project most likely to succeed. Invariably, this would be the project that would comply with the donor's policies at the moment. In the current development theory climate, such project would need to have a low risk for failure and a high potential for a good return on investment. The evolution of the sector has increasingly prioritized use of the private sector in implementation. As seen in section 2.3, the theorists at the World Bank, (especially Stiglitz), partially due to influence by Putnam, turned towards analysis of civil society's role in development (Todaro, 1996).

As seen in section 2.1, the new World Bank discourse has been criticized for changing rhetoric and keeping the same objectives as before. Outsourcing towards civil society can be considered as a form of privatization: "partnering with NGOs began in the 1980s as a direct result of the ideological shift in the U.S. and the U.K. to neoliberal policies that emphasized a diminished role for the public sector. Working with NGOs instead of governments became a part of the de-legitimization of the government" (Klees, 2001, p. 1). The World Bank did not agree to fund literacy services until the state had formulated

a 'fit' project within the World Bank paradigm, i.e., a literacy project that outsourced funding to private providers and that did not make use of human resources within the state structure (which were to be reserved for the areas that the World Bank had defined as priority areas, i.e., primary education). According to the World Bank's project document, the Senegalese government had repeatedly asked for support for a literacy project (SAR, 1996). Funding, however, was contingent on the use of outsourcing.

Was then the use of outsourcing and partnership approaches inevitable for the Senegalese government? Would the World Bank categorically have refused to fund a literacy project that was state implemented? To respond to this question, it is interesting to compare Senegal with Ghana, where, during roughly the same period, a large mass-literacy project was initiated, which was directly implemented by the Government and financed by the World Bank. This fact seems to contradict the World Bank's own statement (in the SAR) that it did not wish to finance state-run projects that draw resources from the primary school sector to the non-formal sector. However, it must be noted that (i) the Ghana project did in most cases not use primary school resources for implementing literacy; it mainly used literate people from the private sector who functioned as voluntary teachers; (ii) the World Bank team in Ghana was not the same as in Senegal; (iii) the civil society context in Ghana and Senegal were not similar. These aspects point to the fact that ideology was not all: the World Bank was open to other approaches for literacy than the public-private partnership approach.


If one considers the survival of the fittest theory, it must be noted that Senegal and Ghana were among the first literacy projects financed by the World Bank in the 1990s. The

Senegal model fit the World Bank's theories and thereby became an international reference; nobody speaks about 'the Ghana model' in West Africa. The partnership model was most fit to the neoliberal paradigm and became the model that was later used in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger, The Gambia, and is currently being propagated elsewhere.

If a new model comes up that is more fit to the World Bank's policy view than the current partnership model, it is quite possible that slowly, as in evolution theory, such model will take over and outmaneuver other models used (partnership methods may thus be eliminated in their own turn, for example by social-funds types of financing, which seems to be increasingly popular in the World Bank today).

The World Bank has the stated ambition to become a 'Knowledge Bank' and promotes best practice projects. Hence, the creation of a "Knowledge Sharing Program" which captures and organizes "knowledge and experiences" and makes it available to World Bank staff and clients. Located in the World Bank's Institute, this program's role "is to help advance the vision, first articulated by James Wolfensohn, of a knowledge Bank" (www.worldbank.org/ks/team, 2004). This is one of several knowledge sharing systems of the World Bank. The World Bank itself depicts its new knowledge sharing system in the following way:

Figure 8.1: The Knowledge Bank



Source: Bruno Laporte, 2003, see www.worldbank.org/ks/team

As seen in Senegal, the World Bank’s financial weight is so great that it can contribute to changing the implementation strategy for a whole sector. The impact of such financial and knowledge assistance is therefore high. What if the World Bank is wrong in certain areas? As noted in the World Bank’s own project document for PAPF, it has little experience in literacy education. It therefore seems strange that it was so sure about the effectiveness of implementing literacy services by using an outsourcing model. What, for example, if the private-implementation model undermines the quality of services? How can one know that it is the ‘right’ model? The World Bank seems to ground its decisions on its preanalytic visions about the supremacy of the private sector (see section 2.1).

The World Bank explicitly mentions the UNESCO programs and mass literacy campaigns as an example of ‘unfit’ policies: “it is supported by the experience of mass

literacy campaigns and functional literacy programs popularized by UNESCO during the 1960s and 1970s which, by and large, were unsuccessful. Although literacy programs have continued to develop and expand, they still have not recovered from the bad reputation acquired from this time.” (SAR, 1996, Annex 2, p. 1). This statement seems to be an example of the World Bank’s knowledge “vision”. It is unclear on which experience the World Bank bases its evaluation on the literacy campaigns in these countries. On a larger scale one must ask the question of whether it is good or bad that the World Bank has such supra-national power to influence local policies.

In conclusion, in this chapter we have seen how the project was led by the World Bank, and how the processes of the project can be criticized from both a design and an implementation angle. The design of the project was characterized by over-confidence in market mechanisms, and the main design flaws were as follows:

- Failure to take into account past performance of the providers during selection (accompanied by failure to build reputational mechanisms encouraging providers to perform well);
- Failure to design a correct decentralization of the project led to asymmetric information problems between the central and local administration levels, and virtually unlimited possibilities for corruption during both selection and evaluation;
- Failure to address skewed power relationships between provider and learners. The project is provider-driven, and not driven by authentic grassroots’ demand – if the provider is performing badly, the participants have no way of changing the provider association (their only option is to “vote with their feet” and leave the course);

- Failure to address asymmetric information at all levels. This failure is linked to a failure of recognizing the importance of a high-quality government involvement to lead and monitor the sector. The project design worked well when the government was stable and led by capable managers, but it deteriorated when the initial project administrative personnel was affected elsewhere;

Many implementation flaws were directly or indirectly derived from design flaws. The main implementation problems that occurred were as follows:

- Failure of the DAEB to implement the evaluation activities it received financing for;
- Failure of the contract-managing agency (AGETIP) to perform the financial monitoring activities it had received financing to do;
- Failure to address providers' unethical behavior, and to impose negative sanctions for low performance and/or embezzlement;
- Failure of the providers association (CNOAS) and lack of involvement of other institutions to steer the evolution of the civil society associations, and to prevent them from becoming "economic" providers;
- Failure of the World Bank and the government to address project flaws (both implementation and design flaws).

Since the outsourcing/partnership was considered an experimental approach, the government and the World Bank's failure to repair problems must be characterized as the most significant flaw of the project. Since the project tested out outsourcing/ partnership approaches, it is normal that both implementation and design flaws existed (see section 4.2). The failure of addressing these failures leads to a broader question about the government's regulatory function. In the literacy sector, the Senegalese government seemed neither capable nor willing to regulate the private sector. The resulting

ineffective processes of the project lowered the results of the literacy courses. This, in turn, led to wastage. The objective of the next chapter is to estimate the costs of the project, and the costs of the wastage.

Chapter 8: Costs

This chapter analyzes the costs of the literacy project. It is divided into six sections, the first discussing how much money was spent, for how many enrollees. Then, the real costs of the project will be calculated; to define a unit cost per learner. The providers' and the government's use of funds is subsequently discussed, and followed by a cost comparison between primary education and literacy education. Finally, the costs for participants (in terms of direct and opportunity costs) are discussed. All costs are in nominal US\$ or CFAF, unless otherwise specified.

8.1: How Much, How Many

The aim of this section is to evaluate how many learners enrolled in literacy courses, how many dropped out, and how many became literate.

A) Enrollment Data Versus Costs

Different project documents give different enrollment data for the PAPF project. The World Bank's project implementation report states the number of enrolled beneficiaries

as 191,577 (on p. 7 and 23 for example). The same report, on page 19, observes that the PAPF enrolled 203,599 learners in 6 cohorts (ICR, 2004). The government's implementation report states that 168,182 people were trained (p. 5), and adds that "with a drop-out rate of 15%, it is therefore 193,409 learners that were enrolled" (MOE, 2001, p. 7). In this calculation, the dropouts were added to the number of people having completed the course (hereinafter "completers") instead of deducting the number of dropouts from the number of enrollees. The latter would seem a more regular approach to calculating enrollment and dropout rates.

The documentation tells that the enrollment numbers were between 191,500 – 203,000 enrollees and that 15% of the enrollees dropped out.⁸³ In addition to these learners, the project also financed post-literacy activities for 13,133 people in the non-integrated program (literacy and post-literacy activities were combined in the integrated program). In this dissertation, two scenarios are considered: one uses the official estimate of enrollment of 203,599 learners (ICR, 2004, p. 19). The second uses enrollment data based on World Bank disbursement reports on provider fees, and on the government's project report on project participants (178,382 people). The reason for the use of the latter scenario is as follows:

⁸³ PCU personnel stated the following in an interview:

"At the quantitative level, we needed to train 135,000 people, 75% of whom were women. At the end of the project, our statistics showed that we had trained about 168,000 people, of whom 80% were women. The quantitative goals were over-achieved, at 120% [of the planned enrollment]. Each of the 4 regions was supposed to train 25,000 people, and Dakar was supposed to train 35,000 people, for a global number of 135,000 people trained. The planning of enrollment was very easy; 25,000 and 35,000 for five years made 5,000 each year in each province, and 7,000 in Dakar. As for the integrated program, the project financing made it possible to experiment and enroll not only 9,000 people for the test phase, but also, for the 6th cohort, to enroll about 10,500 people in the integrated program. The project financing of 25,000 people was then completed with an additional credit from PDEF-NF, for a total of 35,190 learners" (Civil servant).

The maximum fee given by the project to the provider per learner is set at 27,500 CFAF for the non-integrated program, 27,500 for the post-literacy program, and 37,000 CFAF for the integrated program.⁸⁴ The total fee paid by the government to the providers, using the enrollment numbers above, should represent approximately 6.03 billion CFAF.⁸⁵ Data from the World Bank, however, shows that authorizations for payment of provider services were approximately 5.22 billion CFAF (see overview of payments in Annex 4 and 5). There are two possibilities to explain this discrepancy: either (i) the fees requested by, and paid to providers were much lower than the maximum provider fee; or (ii) the enrollment numbers are erroneous.

PCU's newspaper, *Partage no 7* (June 1998), gave an overview of all of the subproject proposals in literacy and post-literacy education. The average cost of literacy project provision was very close to 30,000 CFAF (this cost included the learners' contribution of 2,500 CFAF). These numbers are consistent with costs given in a cost report on literacy (Fall, 1999). Analysis of post-literacy courses and courses using the integrated project leads to similar findings: the requests and subsequent payments to providers for literacy provision were very close to the maximum fee (reference: *Partage no 7*; various subproject proposals). The provider fees were hardly ever below 4% of the maximum allowed, and could not explain the 13% discrepancy between the World Bank disbursement numbers and the fee calculated by using official enrollment data. The

⁸⁴ These numbers represent the fee given to the provider by the state. In addition, each participant contributed with 2,500 CFAF to the course (this fee was given to the provider). See section 8.3 for a discussion of private costs.

⁸⁵ The total fee would correspond to 27,500CFAF x approximately 180,000 learners enrolled for the non-integrated project + 37,000CFAF x 20,000 learners enrolled in the integrated project + 27,500 CFAF x 13,000 learners enrolled in post-literacy programs.

number of enrollees, therefore, must have been about 13% lower than the official number reported by the Government and the World Bank.

In estimating a more realistic number of enrolled people, it is helpful to use the government report of trained people (in which the dropout⁸⁶ rate had been calculated as an *added* 15%). By considering the government numbers as *enrollees* instead of considering them as *completers*, one obtains a total fee of 5.10 billion CFAF for the providers, which is more consistent with the World Bank disbursement numbers (see table 8.1 below).

Table 8.1: Participation figures for PAPF

Cohort (C) and year*	Learners	Fee	Total (in thousands)
C1: 1995-1997	6,911	27,500	190,053
C2: 1996-1998	28,831	27,500	792,853
C3: 1997-1999	29,985	27,500	824,588
C4: 1998-2000	27,257	27,500	749,568
C5: 1999-2001	65,409	27,500	1,798,748
Integrated (C5)	9,799	37,000	362,563
C6 Integrated: 2000	10,190	37,000	377,030
Total	178,382**		5,095,401

Source: Government's completion report, 2001

*The post-literacy estimates have here been included in the numbers for G1-G3. The Government completion report states that "In all, the beneficiaries of the literacy program, post-literacy program, and the integrated program were of 168,182 people." (MOE, 2001).

**The total number of enrollees C1 – C5 + Post literacy was given at 168,182 in the government report, as a sum of the above cohorts. However, there is an adding error in the government's report; the numbers add up to 168,192 which is the number used above. In addition, the number of enrollees from Cohort 6 that was financed by the PAPF is added, bringing the total number of learners to 178,382.

⁸⁶ "Dropouts" are enrolled participants who do not complete the course.

Based on the above, two scenarios are considered: (i) one uses an official estimate of enrollment of 203,599 learners (ICR, 2004, p. 19); and (ii) the second uses the enrollment data calculated above (178,382 people). The latter, corrected numbers, correspond to the government's report on project participants. However, instead of considering the number of participants as completers, this second scenario considers them as enrollees.

B) Dropout Rates

In calculating project costs, it is necessary to estimate the number of enrollees who do not complete the course. These are considered as “dropouts”. In the case of PAPP, higher dropout is likely to lead to more wastage, since the provider fee was based on the number of enrollees, not of completers. Again, due to the frailty of data on project performance, this dissertation will make use of two scenarios. The official project reports from the government and the World Bank state that the dropout number represented 15% of the enrollees. A second scenario will use numbers from the longitudinal studies, and estimates the total number of dropouts to be 34% of the enrollees. The reasons for using this latter scenario are given below.

The official number is based on provider reports (which again, are based on the literacy teachers and supervisors' reports). The literacy teacher had an incentive to make dropout numbers as low as possible, since he or she may be offered future employment depending on the positive results of the literacy course. Likewise, the provider association had an incentive to report good results, to show that the outcome of the subcontracting had been

successful. The incentives to “improve” results therefore suggest that the 15% may be a too low estimate of dropouts.

In calculating a corrected number of dropouts, there are two data sets that may be used: (i) the government’s yearly evaluation of the completers; or (ii) the longitudinal studies. The longitudinal data sets have many weaknesses (for example, the number of dropouts are not explicitly evaluated, but must be inferred through estimation of numbers of interviewees). The yearly DAEB evaluations, on the other hand, have some inherent flaws that would lead to an over-estimate of the dropout numbers.⁸⁷

In calculating corrected dropout numbers, for the reasons stated above, the dissertation made use of the longitudinal studies, which evaluated 60 sites, in which 1,800 learners were reportedly enrolled. In all, 1516 learners (84%) were present for the evaluation at the beginning of the course (LS-T0, 2001). The remaining 16% may have been absent that day for various reasons. After 6 months, the number evaluated was 1151 “because of a relatively high dropout rate (dropouts and closing of learning centers) and because of absences during the evaluation mission” (LS-T1, 2002, p. 9). If the number of absentees was 16% (i.e., the same as during the first mission), the number of dropouts would be

⁸⁷ Every year, the Department of Literacy (DAEB) evaluated the outcome of the courses. The number of people that were evaluated was much lower than the number of reported enrollees. Often, less than half of the enrollees were evaluated. For example, *Partage no 16* (Mars, 2000) classified the providers according to their results. The evaluation covered 2,895 learners in 181 sites (third cohort). This corresponds to an average of 16 persons per site. The required number of enrollees per site corresponds to 30 learners. Based on these numbers, the dropout rate would have been 47%. The yearly evaluation reports from the Department of Literacy, however, may not be a good indicator of the number of dropouts. Interviews have indicated that the evaluations did not coincide with the end of the subproject (sometimes, the evaluation team arrived in the rainy season, and could therefore evaluate only a few learners). Statistics on evaluated learners from the DAEB (measured against enrollment numbers) would therefore exacerbate the number of dropouts.

about 460 people (26%).⁸⁸ To this latter number an additional 8% is added, representing an estimated number of regular absentees that is considered as effective dropouts, bringing the total number of dropout rate to 34%.⁸⁹

Hence, in the official scenario (i.e., using the government documents), dropout rates are set at 15%, and none of the absentees are considered as a dropout. The second scenario, in which half of the absentees are hypothetically considered as effective dropouts, estimates the dropout rate to 34%.

C) Success Rates

The success rates pose the same quality problem as the enrollment and dropout rates. Again, it is necessary to use two scenarios, one using the official data from the World Bank's completion report, which sets the success rate at an average of 50%, i.e., 50% of the completers learned to read, write, and solve simple math problems (ICR, 2004). A second scenario, based on the outcome of the longitudinal studies, estimates the success

⁸⁸ Use of the numbers of the third evaluation, 24 months after the program had started, to calculate the dropout rate would have been inappropriate. This evaluation only covered 737 learners (LS-T1-2, 2003). The reason for the reduction in numbers of interviewees is not given. It is unlikely that 737 (41%) represented the number of people having finished the course, because it is difficult to re-mobilize learners for a test some time after the project has ended. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to use the numbers of the second evaluation for calculation of a corrected number of dropout.

⁸⁹ It is likely that some of the attendees who were regularly absent could be considered as dropouts. The distinction between these two categories, absentees and dropouts, is not clear. If the 16% of absentees are representing the whole participant category, and that no person is significantly more absent than another, there is no reason to classify any absentee as an effective dropout. Such homogeneous absenteeism (thus representing 16% of the class frequentation of any given participant), is not likely, however. It is more likely that some of the absentees are much more absent than the others, and that these former should be considered as effective dropouts. This dissertation has hypothetically estimated that 50% of the absentees are "regular" absentees and should be considered as dropouts.

rate (reading, writing, math and basic skills learned) at 34%. The reason for using this latter scenario is explained below:

Official reports did not take into account the literacy rates at enrollment (and calculation of project success thus implicitly estimated that all enrollees were illiterate). Using the output-based success rates and yearly DAEN evaluations, Government and World Bank reports estimate that the average success rate was 50%, and that it improved over time. Specific success rates, on which the cumulative 50% was based, indicated rates varying between 6% and 75%, as shown in table 8.2:

Table 8.2: Success rates for PAPF in 1997 and 2000

	1997	2000
Reading	57%	75%
Writing	28%	63%
Problem-solving	6%	44%

(Government completion report, 2001)

The longitudinal report (LS-T1-2, 2003) states that 52% of the evaluated people (enrolled in integrated subprojects in cohort 5, in 1999) acquired the target reading skills, 39% learned to write, and 23% learned problem-solving (functional math), and 73% acquired the targeted functional skills (see table 8.3, column “Literate after completion”):

Table 8.3: Success rates of PAF (integrated course, 1999)

	Literate at enrollment	Literate after completion	Success
Reading	17%	52%	35%
Writing	13%	39%	26%
Problem-solving	3%	23%	20%
Functional skills	5%	73%	68%
Average	10%	47%	37%

(Source: LS-T0 and LS-T1.2)

Some of the attendees were literate at the time they enrolled and would therefore, naturally, be literate at the end of the project. These cannot be counted as “success cases.” The longitudinal study finds that 17% of the learners already knew how to read at the onset of the program, 13% could write, 3% knew how to solve mathematical problems, and 5% had a sufficient knowledge of functional skills (see table 8.2 above, column “Literate at enrollment”). Using these numbers, the average success rate (compounded on the literate-after-completion numbers minus the literate-at-enrollment numbers) comes to 34%. Hence, the use of two scenarios to calculate success rates; one based on the official results of 50%, and one based on the longitudinal study, using the rate of 37.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ As noted in section 3.3 these data are not robust. Here it is assumed that the dropout was equal among literate and illiterate enrollees. There are no indications whether or not this was the case in the project data. Also, the longitudinal data included success rates on functional skills learning (which prior official data did not include). These rates are included in the calculation of the success rates (for the integrated approach) because they corresponded to the objectives of the project. The aim of these calculations is to get a credible rate to be used as basis for calculating success.

In summary, the cost analysis will use two scenarios. One will be based on official numbers, with 203,599 enrollees, 15% of dropout and 50% of non-success. The second scenario will be based on corrected enrollment, dropout and success rates, based on World Bank payment data and the Senegalese government’s longitudinal study. This latter, corrected, scenario corresponds to 178,382 enrollees, 34% dropout, and 63% of non-success. The outcomes of the two scenarios in terms of successful learners are displayed in Table 8.4 below.

Table 8.4: Success rates based on official data and longitudinal data

	Official numbers	Corrected numbers
Enrollees	203,599	178,382
Completers	173,059	117,732
Successful	86,529	43,561

Different readings of the project’s data thus provide very different numbers of success. In terms of official numbers, the results of the project would be substantially better than calculations based on an analysis of payments from the World Bank and success numbers from the longitudinal study.

8.2: Real Costs

This section discusses two issues to be taken into account for costs discussions (i) the conversion rates between Special Drawing Rights⁹¹, US \$, and CFAF⁹², as well as (ii) the inflation rates in Senegal.

The provider fee was fixed to 27,500 CFAF per enrollee in the non-integrated course and in post-literacy courses, and 37,000 CFAF for the integrated course. The fee in US\$ varied according to the parity between US\$ and CFAF, and the buying power of the fee varied according to the Senegalese consumer price index. The conversion rate used in the World Bank's project document was US\$1 = 500 CFAF (SAR, 1996). The conversion rates that will be used to calculate costs in the following section will be based on average 2003 costs as calculated by the World Bank (*average nominal official local currency unit*), US\$1 = 580 CFAF. The adjustment of prices into real costs is made by using Senegal's consumer price index (CPI): In calculating the project's real costs, the yearly costs are first adjusted to real 2003 values using the CPI index in table 8.5, and then converted into US \$, using the average exchange rate between US\$ and CFAF in

⁹¹ The World Bank's financing is not calculated in US\$, but in Standard Drawing Rights (SDR, also abbreviated XDR) which is based on a compound of currencies to offset large variations in the US dollar. The SDR conversion rate at the project conception in 1996 was at SDR1 = US\$1.45. Hence, the fixed credit amount from the World Bank to Senegal is SDR 8.7 millions, which was at that time the equivalent of US\$12.6 million.

⁹² The XOF, or CFA Franc (CFAF) is the common currency of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. The central bank of the Union is the Central Bank of West African States. Fourteen countries are members of the Franc zone, including Senegal: "The CFA Franc was created on December 26, 1945, the day when France ratified the Bretton Woods agreement and made its first declaration of parity to the IMF" (www.bceao.int). It is linked to the French Franc, with the parity of 1 XOF = 0.01 FF.

2003 (\$1 = 580 CFAF).⁹³ This enables us to understand project costs in real 2003 values, and to compare the costs of literacy education with primary education initiatives.

Table 8.5: Consumer price index

	2003	2002	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996
Cost*	100	102.3	105.3	106.0	106.9	108.1	110.1	113.1

*2003 is used as reference year. (Source: IMF data, <http://www.imf.org/external/country/SEN/index.htm>)

8.3 Calculation of a Unit Cost (Per Learner)

This section calculates the PAPF's unit cost per learner for providing literacy. The cost calculations are divided into two parts; a public cost, and a private cost. The private cost can again be subdivided into two parts, including the fee paid by the learners to the provider, as well as opportunity costs.

A) Government Costs

The government costs of the PAPF can be divided into two categories; (i) the fee paid to the providers; and (ii) the government and contract-managing agency costs.⁹⁴ To calculate a complete unit cost per enrollee, it is necessary to add the government and contract-management costs to the provider costs. In real terms and using the average

⁹³ The IMF is using 1987 as the year of reference (hence the CPI index for 1987 = 100). The dissertation will use 2003 as the year of reference (2003 = CPI index 100). This enables us to analyze costs as if the project was implemented in 2003, with 2003 prices.

⁹⁴ Only the "Senegalese" costs are discussed here. The costs of the loan (from IDA/World Bank to Senegal) are not included, since the loan is cross-subsidized by loans given to mid-income countries. These "global" cost aspects are not discussed in this dissertation, since they are outside the scope of the subject. In this regard, the costs for seminars and training, etc., given to Senegal as a part of trust funds, and somehow linked to the project are also omitted from discussion (these grants would represent less than 1% of the total project budget).

conversion rate of 2003, these costs would represent a World Bank cost of US \$13.71 million (see Annex 5).⁹⁵ In discounting the costs that were not fully depreciated over the life time of the project,⁹⁶ and by adding the government costs,⁹⁷ the total government costs would represent \$13.91 million. In dividing \$13.91 million on the number of enrollees, completers and successful completers, the average costs per enrollee would be as follows:

Table 8.6: Average unit costs (public)

Real 2003 cost (US \$)	Official enrollment data	Corrected enrollment data
Cost per enrollee	\$68	\$78
Cost per completer	\$80	\$118
Cost per successful completer	\$161	\$319

⁹⁵ According to the World Bank's data, 32 transfers to the project were made. The payments were in US\$ and CFAF. All payments have been converted into CFAF, CPI-adjusted, and converted back into 2003 US\$ (see Annex 3). The total amount of the World Bank financing was US\$13,707,674 (real costs). The costs of approximately US\$13.71 million would therefore be the cost of the project if we were to implement everything with 2003 prices and with the average 2003 conversion rate of US\$ and CFAF.

⁹⁶ Costs that were not fully depreciated over the lifetime of the project have been subtracted. This project, since it employed providers to implement activities, was notoriously low on infrastructure costs. However, it did allow purchase of some equipment such as cars and motorbikes. Category 1 "goods," in the ICR (2004) overview of expenditure included some items such as cars and computers that were not fully depreciated over the project period. At the time of the field work in Senegal, three cars still functioned, and some motorbikes. These transport means, however, needed increasing attention and repair. The total World Bank cost of the project (real 2003 costs minus approximately \$58,000 in non-depreciated costs based on the market value of 4 used cars and 10 used motorbikes), would be approximately US\$13,650,000 in real terms.

⁹⁷ In addition to the World Bank costs, the Government contributed to the government costs of the project (by paying salaries and by purchasing some goods). The completion report has estimated that the state contributed approximately US\$240,000 million to the project. If we consider the government's costs to be distributed evenly over the time period covering 1996 – 2001, it would correspond to about US\$40,000 per year, or US\$260,000 in approximate real cost. The total (public) costs of the project would therefore correspond to US\$13.91 million.

The average unit costs in the table above do not distinguish between non-integrated and integrated subprojects. As seen in section 4.3, the costs of the integrated approach were higher than the non-integrated project: the providers' (maximum) fee per enrollee was 27,500 CFAF for the former and 37,000 CFAF for the latter. The year 1999 offered two programs, one non-integrated and one integrated, hence there were two cost possibilities for that year. Before 1999, all the projects were non-integrated, and after 1999, all the subprojects became integrated. Table 8.7 below shows what the different unit fees to providers would represent in buying power in 2003:

Table 8.7: Provider fee (real prices)

Year	2003 CFAF	2003 US \$
1996	31,102	53.60
1997	30,278	52.20
1998	29,728	51.30
1999	29,398	50.70
Integrated:	39,553	68.30
2000	39,294	67.70
2001	38,961	67.20
2002	37,851	65.30
2003	37,000	63.80

The fee to the provider thus varied in real terms each year. The real (2003) costs of all payments to providers are US \$9,61 million (see calculations in Annex 6).

The public cost without provider fee is US \$4,30 million. The provider's fee in 1999 (per enrollee) corresponded to (real) \$50.70 for the non-integrated program and (real) \$68.30

for the integrated program. Hypothetically, if one estimates that the same, average government and contract-managing costs are valid for both integrated and non-integrated courses, the unit costs for each approach would be as follows:

Table 8.8a: Public unit costs for the non-integrated subprojects (1999 fee)

Real 2003 cost (US \$)	Official enrollment data	Corrected enrollment data
Cost per enrollee	\$72	\$75
Cost per completer	\$85	\$113
Cost per successful completer	\$169	\$306

Table 8.8b: Public unit costs for the integrated subprojects (1999 fee)

Real 2003 cost (US \$)	Official enrollment data	Corrected enrollment data
Cost per enrollee	\$89	\$92
Cost per completer	\$105	\$140
Cost per successful completer	\$210	\$378

In conclusion, we have calculated an average public unit cost that showed that the project costs were approximately \$78 per enrollee in literacy courses, \$118 per completer, or \$319 per successful completer (see table 8.7). The costs for the non-integrated project were a bit lower, and for the integrated project they were a bit higher (see tables 8.8a and 8.8.b above).

B) Participant's Direct Costs

The learners contributed to the project with a fixed cost of 2,500 CFAF per person.⁹⁸

This was most often paid to the provider and was a part of the implementation budget of the provider.⁹⁹ In real terms the direct costs represented the following amounts:

Table 8.9: Learner's contribution to the project in cash

	Fee	Real fee	US\$2003
1996	2,500	2,828	4.88
1997	2,500	2,752	4.74
1998	2,500	2,703	4.66
1999	2,500	2,673	4.60
2000	2,500	2,650	4.57
2001	2,500	2,633	4.54
2002	2,500	2,558	4.41
2003	2,500	2,500	4.31

In multiplying these costs with the number of learners per cohort (see table 8.1 for number of enrollees per cohort), the total fee of the participants adds up to (real) US \$825,460 or an average direct cost of \$4.63 per learner. This would represent the total direct fees shown in table 8.10 below:

⁹⁸ Costs for construction of a learning center were not included in the calculation of the direct or opportunity cost, since such centers were only used during the integrated project, and the subproject sponsored some of the building costs for such centers (in the rare cases it was built). Often, a private-owned building that had excess capacity was used as learning center. The lease value of such building would be almost nil.

⁹⁹ Many interviewees indicated that the fees were sometimes paid in-kind. In such case, the in-kind fee was supposed to be equivalent of cash contribution. The aforementioned numbers are therefore used to represent all unit fee payments, whether paid in-kind or in cash.

Table 8.10: Direct costs (participants to provider)

Real 2003 cost (US \$)	Official enrollment data	Corrected enrollment data
Cost per enrollee	\$4.63	\$4.63
Cost per completer	\$5.44	\$7.02
Cost per successful completer	\$10.88	\$18.96

The provider would thus collect a total of \$4.63 per enrollee, which would correspond to about \$7 per completer or about \$19 per successful learner (corrected data; see table 8.10 above).

C) Participants' Opportunity Costs

The opportunity costs correspond to the cost of foregone opportunities of the learners, which would in most cases correspond to the income potential the learners could have had during the course's duration. It is estimated that the foregone opportunities represent the following costs (see table 8.11):

Table 8.11: Opportunity costs (total private loss)

Real 2003 cost (US \$)	Official enrollment data	Corrected enrollment data
Cost per enrollee	\$38.70	\$38.70
Cost per completer*	\$40.60	\$44.10
Cost per successful completer	\$81.10	\$119.20

* The opportunity cost per completers is calculated by adding the opportunity cost of \$38.70 for the completers and 25% of the full opportunity cost of the non-completers (representing \$10.50), and dividing this amount by the number of completers.

These rates are estimated as follows: Since the course time corresponded to 450 hours, or 56.25 workdays (assuming 8 hour work days), this number is used to represent the days of lost earnings incurred by the learners.¹⁰⁰ It corresponded to approximately 2 work months (counting 28 days of work per month – and thus allowing for 2 free days per month for social functions).¹⁰¹

The impact study does not provide a precise figure about the participants' income. In 83.5% of the cases, it was below 300,000 CFAF per year. Also, 23% of the learners indicated that they had “savings,” and about 50% had “jewels” (IS, 2004). Senegalese women often place a large value in having some jewels which is an indicator for social

¹⁰⁰ Homework time is not included in this calculation, since homework was not done during work hours (if it was ever done), with a minimum loss of productivity.

¹⁰¹ It can be argued that the course was conducted in non-core working time, since the participants could select the most convenient time for attending the course. However, most of the implementation villages did not have electricity; most courses were therefore held during daylight time, which must be supposed to be during normal working hours. Also, evidence from interviews point to the fact that dropout was mainly due to opportunity costs. Therefore, opportunity cost calculations are based on the equivalent of 2 months of income.

standing. The 50% not having any jewels would belong to the poorest segment of the society. The joint World Bank – IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2002) sets the poverty threshold at an income of 143,080 CFAF per year for adults. It estimates that the percentage of households below the poverty threshold is about 53.9%. The number of people living below the threshold of poverty varies between 72% and 88% in rural zones, and between 44% and 59% in urban areas (PRSP, 2002, p. 23). Since the indicators from the impact study shows that about half the population had enough savings to invest in jewelry, it is estimated that the participants in the literacy courses had an average income situated at the poverty threshold of 143,043 CFAF yearly, or 146,476 CFAF in 2003. This would correspond to an opportunity cost of 24,412 CFAF per person, or in 2003 US \$, the equivalent of \$42,1.

These costs would be lower for people dropping out of the course, and people not attending it frequently. One reason for the low success rates may be the lack of sustained attendance in the course. Since we lack data on the exact moment when the participants drop out from the course, in this dissertation it is estimated that they drop out over the first half of the course at an evenly distributed rate. The opportunity costs for dropouts would therefore correspond to 25% of the full rate (or \$10.50). The remaining 8% of absenteeism is discounted from the opportunity costs of the basic opportunity cost for the attendants (bringing the cost per person down to \$38.70), since the learners would not bear opportunity costs on days when they were absent. The calculation does not distinguish between opportunity costs for successful attendees and non-successful attendees (see table 8.10).

The private costs structure (unit costs) is shown in table 8.12, and includes both direct and opportunity costs:

Table 8.12: Total private costs (direct and opportunity costs)

Real 2003 cost (US \$)	Official enrollment data	Corrected enrollment data
Cost per enrollee	\$43.30	\$43.30
Cost per completer	\$46.00	\$51.10
Cost per successful completer	\$92.00	\$138.20

The full societal unit cost can now be calculated, by adding the total government costs (see table 8.6) with the total private costs (see table 8.12). The total societal costs correspond to the following unit rates (table 8.13):

Table 8.13: Total societal unit costs

Real 2003 cost (US \$)	Official enrollment data	Corrected enrollment data
Cost per enrollee	\$111	\$121
Cost per completer	\$126	\$169
Cost per successful completer	\$253	\$457

The above societal unit costs (table 8.13) are average for the project duration, and would be somewhat lower for the non-integrated subprojects and higher for the integrated subprojects. In comparing the unit costs for the non-integrated and integrated approaches with the average unit costs (see table 8.6, 8.8a, and 8.8b), one can estimate that the

societal unit costs per successful completer is US \$444 for courses using the non-integrated approach and \$516 for the integrated approach (corrected numbers).

8.4: Use of the Funds

We have seen that about 70% of the World Bank support went directly to the providers. The first section will discuss how the providers used these funds. The second section will discuss how the government and contract-managing company (AGETIP) used the remaining 30% of the funds.

A) Providers' Use of Funds

The providers were supposed to set up a budget that corresponded to the beneficiaries' needs. A model budget was shown in the annexes of the procedure manual, to ensure that the providers did not forget any essential components, such as textbooks or pedagogical materials. The budget for each component was decided by the provider association. The flexibility for each individual provider in the set-up of the subproject budget led to large differences between subprojects. A 1999 study of 55 subproject budgets found that the unit fee requested was "very close" to the maximum allowed, i.e., 30,000 CFAF per enrollee, with 27,500 CFAF paid by the PAPF and 2,500 CFAF paid by the learners (Fall, 1999).

Most provider associations asked for the maximum fee they could obtain for literacy provision and the unit costs for all the subprojects were therefore largely the same (the only variation in unit costs, as noted in section 8.3, was between subprojects using the

integrated and non-integrated approach). However, each provider association used the funds differently. Fall (1999) gives an example of three budgets, in which budget (a) used 6,158 CFAF for learning materials per learner, budget (b) used 4,371 CFAF and budget (c) used 7,646 CFAF. The learning situation in case (a), (b), and (c) is not likely to have been the same, since the participants in subproject (c) received much better quality or more study materials. The salaries were also widely different between subprojects, especially for the subproject coordinators. Fall (1999) noted a range from 15,000 CFAF to 120,000 CFAF per month in this category.¹⁰² The length of recruitment of coordinators also varied, from 10 months to 16 months.

For supervisors, the fee varied between 40,000 – 80,000 CFAF, and for financial managers it varied between 15,000 – 75,000 CFAF. The length of the employment of the supervisors (per subproject) also varied (usually the supervisors were recruited for the same duration as the coordinator). The salaries of the literacy teachers were more homogenous, and varied between 25,000 – 33,000 CFAF, usually for a 10-month period (Fall, 1999).¹⁰³ The literacy teacher salaries were enough to sustain a family, and

¹⁰² The first salary (15,000) would represent an income at the poverty limit – and would indicate that the coordinator had some other means of income. The maximum income would represent about 6 times more than the GDP per capita.

¹⁰³ Also, costs for equipment and learning materials were uneven between proposals. Fall (1999) gives a list of equipment and learning materials where prices ranged widely, e.g., between 25 and 125 CFAF per pen; between 40 and 175 CFAF per writing book; and between 100 and 300 CFAF per slate. This variation may have been due to market differences between urban centers and remote rural areas; it may also have been due to differences in quality of the items. In some cases the price variation might also have been due to corrupt behavior from providers' staff members who agreed to pay a high cost for products and received kickbacks in return. The price of the goods purchased by the subproject was therefore in many cases not subject to normal market conditions, but was biased due to difficult access in remote areas or corruption.

To suggest guidelines for cost calculations, Fall (1999) set up an indicative budget, representing the costs of 20 centers, or 600 learners. He suggested a unit price of 31,342 CFAF per learner, based on the calculations of all costs compounded. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE).

represented about twice the poverty limit. This cost was probably uniform because it was the only personnel cost where the market cost was likely to be prevalent. Often the providers' staff members were linked to each other through family or other relationships, in which case needs-based salaries could supersede market-based salaries. For the

A seminar on costs took place in August 1999, and was reported on in *Partage no 14* (January 2000). The outcome of this seminar was to propose a budget for 20 centers (or 600 learners), with a unit cost of 36,874 CFAF. This unit cost would eventually become the basis of the integrated approach, in which the unit fee for the provider was 37,000 CFAF + 2,500 CFAF (contribution to the costs per learner).

The subproject budget included the following categories:

Staff salaries (including literacy teacher's fee): This is the most important cost component. *Partage no 14* (2000) estimates it at 35% of total costs, of which 77% would be literacy teachers' fee (i.e., literacy teachers' salaries would represent 27% of a subproject's total costs). Diagne & Sall (2001) estimates it at 35% of total costs of a generic subproject, whereas Fall (1999) gives examples in which the human resources cost vary between 34% and 60% of total costs.

Training of staff (including literacy teachers): *Partage no 14* (2000) estimates this cost component at 8% of total costs of a generic subproject. Diagne and Sall estimate it at 11% of total costs, whereas Fall's examples varies from 6% to 14% of total cost. The training of literacy teachers is most important in all cases.

Learning materials (for beneficiaries and pedagogic materials for literacy teachers): *Partage no 14* and Diagne & Sall estimates this cost component at 24% of total costs of a generic subproject, whereas Fall's examples varies from 19% to 24% of total cost. This component showed less variation than other components, probably because the PAPF required that the beneficiaries receive a certain number of booklets.

Follow-up & Evaluation: *Partage no 14* and Diagne & Sall estimates the cost of follow-up at 10% of total costs of a generic subproject (mostly transport cost), and at 1% for evaluation. Fall's examples vary from less than 1% to 5% of total cost.

Overhead: *Partage no 14* and Diagne & Sall estimates the overhead cost at 2% of total costs, whereas Fall's examples vary between 2 – 3% of total costs.

Institutional assistance: *Partage no 14* and Diagne & Sall estimates the overhead cost at 8% of total costs. In the examples of Fall, the costs vary between 8% - 12%, mostly for motorcycles, writing machines and furniture.

For the integrated approach, a budget for "sustainability" [*perennisation*] was added, including training of *relais*, library books, newspaper subscription, etc. This component represented 5 – 7% of the total costs of subprojects in requests from 2000 – 2002.¹⁰³ In addition to the "sustainability cost" paid by the provider, the beneficiaries also participated in equipping the reading center. In one case they were paying a "motivation cost" to the *relais*.

The institutional assistance budget changed in the requests for subprojects using the integrated approach; it still helped the provider to buy needed equipment ranging from motorbikes to computers, but it also helped strengthen income-generating skills activities for the learners and leadership training for the leaders of the women's association and/or the management committee. The part of institutional support was about 8 – 10% in studies requests using the integrated approach, with 30 – 50 % of the institutional support going to the providers, and the rest to the learners.

provider organizations' staff members, literacy provision could therefore generate a lucrative income.

The director (*personne morale*) of the provider association did not have any budgeted income (unless the director was also the subproject coordinator). The World Bank's project evaluation report estimates, however, that the provider associations (which would most often mean the director of the association) "'earns' on average 4,492 CFAF per learner" (ICR, 2004, p. 19). This corresponds to about 8% of the overall provider fees (integrated process), and would constitute a very lucrative earning in Senegal. These salaries and the 8% "earning" described above, with the exception of literacy teacher salaries, were not competitive and market-adjusted. Not surprisingly, many new associations were created with service delivery business in mind, and there was a high level of competition to write good subproject proposals.

B) The Government's Use of Funds

There were three distinct entities using the part of the funds that were not going to the providers: (i) the contract-managing agency, AGETIP, received a fee from the World Bank loan corresponding to 5% of the amount of contracts made with the providers; (ii) the PCU received financing for rental of offices and operating costs; and (iii) the Minister of Literacy's Cabinet and personnel as well as the Department of Literacy's personnel received training and equipment. As seen in section 8.3, the real costs of these three categories represented (real) US \$4.30 million, or about 30% of the total costs of the project. The contract managing agency's total fees represented about US \$500,000 (for

keeping two people in work for a duration of five years). These amounts are quite important in view of Senegal's average income levels.

8.5: Government costs Analysis

This section discusses how expensive the PAPF project was, by comparing it with other literacy initiatives, and by discussing factors that could lead to wastage. The costs used for comparisons are based on the corrected numbers for average unit costs. As noted in section 8.3, the (corrected) average public cost for an enrollee was \$78, the costs for a completer would represent \$118, and the costs for a successful completer \$319 (see table 8.6). The section aims to discuss whether or not the outsourcing method leads to lower costs as compared to government provision of literacy services. The comparison does not claim that literacy education should be substituted by primary education (or vice versa), based by arguments of superior cost-effectiveness of one approach or the other. Primary and literacy education have different goals, and are supplementary approaches. The objective of this chapter is to provide cost comparisons of different delivery methods based on Senegalese prices, and to evaluate whether the costs of the literacy course were reasonable.

A) Comparison of Literacy Education Costs with Primary Education

The cost comparisons between literacy and primary education show that literacy courses in Senegal are slightly less costly than primary education. The cost to produce one

successful completer in literacy education (\$319) is equivalent to about 4.5 years of primary education

Four years of primary education is not enough to make one person literate: The World Bank findings show that children who leave school before completing primary schooling do not, in most cases, become literate: “a growing body of research suggests that completion of at least five to six years of schooling is a critical threshold for sustainable mastery of basic competencies, such as literacy and basic numeracy. Literacy surveys conducted in African countries and elsewhere indicate that a high share of the adults who have completed less than five or six years of primary schooling remain functionally illiterate and innumerate for the rest of their lives” (Bruns, Mingat Rakatomalala, 2003, p. 23).

World Bank studies found very little literacy impact of three or less years of primary schooling and noted: “Especially striking in the data is the very limited impact on lifelong literacy from as many as three years of schooling” (Bruns, Mingat Rakatomalala, 2003, p. 24). Studies conducted in Togo and Niger both found literacy rates lower than 20% in students who had completed 3 years of schooling. The cohort survival rate in Senegal, according to UNESCO statistics, is 72% at fourth grade, and the repetition rate is 14%.¹⁰⁴

The outcomes of the PAPF in terms of literacy show an average success rate of 35% in reading and 26% in writing (see table 8.3). This rate compares to 4 years of primary schooling. The cohort survival rate is slightly higher for primary education than for

¹⁰⁴ UNESCO, statistics for 2000-01, see www.uis.unesco.org

literacy education (there is an estimated 28% dropout at fourth grade against an estimated dropout of 34% for literacy education). Based on these numbers, one can compare the outcome of PAPF literacy education with four years of primary education (measured on literacy criteria and dropout).

Senegal's unit costs for primary education are, according to World Bank estimations, about 14.2% of per capita GDP in 2000 (Bruns, Mingat Rakatomalala, 2003, p. 131). With a GDP per capita at US \$464 in 2000, this corresponds to a unit price of \$66 in 2000, or \$71 in 2003¹⁰⁵. The cost for one year of primary education is therefore slightly less expensive than the average enrollment cost of one person in literacy education (US \$71 against \$78). The cost to produce one successful completer in literacy education is equivalent to 4.5 years of primary education.

When we compare the costs of literacy education with primary education in Senegal, we must bear in mind that Senegal is characterized by extremely low effectiveness in primary education output. The literacy education costs per successful completer may be much lower than the cost of a completer at fourth grade, but it still represents a “disastrous combination” of high unit costs and poor efficiency (Bruns, Mingat Rakatomalala, 2003, p. 52).

¹⁰⁵ \$71 represents the 2003 CPI-adjusted number of \$66 in 2000.

The literacy course cannot, therefore, be called effective because of the above comparison with primary education.¹⁰⁶

B) Factors Leading to Wastage

A cost-related problem with the PAPP was related to the relative liberty given to the providers in the set-up of budgets. The providers in most cases adopted the budget that would generate the most income for them with the least amount of risk,¹⁰⁷ and not the budget that would be most cost-effective, or that would be most desired by the participants. The participants were outside the cost loop, and had little or no say in how the provider used the funds (see section 7.3). There was a general lack of accountability for the funds; the providers had in most cases all rights in the implementation of the subproject.

The Department of Literacy and the contract management agency (AGETIP) managed the funds in two different ways. The management style of these two institutions illustrated typical problems linked to the use of private or public implementation agents respectively. The contract-management company was efficient in doing the core of their

¹⁰⁶ The World Bank has defined boundary parameters for two groups of the “most extreme of the ‘unsuccessful’ countries based on gross enrollment (GER) and primary completion (PCR) rates (Bruns, Mingat Rakatomalala, 2003). This “Group 3” corresponded to “high inefficiency countries: GER above 70%; PCR below 50%.” Senegal, with a GER of 69.5%, fell barely outside this definition. However, since its PCR was at only 41%, some of the “group 3” definition applies to Senegal: “Group 3 countries are painfully far from EFA goals by any definition. [...] Accordingly, the stylized characterization of Group 3 is low primary coverage deriving from a disastrous combination of low spending, high unit costs driven by extremely high teacher salaries, and relatively poor efficiency” (Bruns, Mingat Rakatomalala, 2003, p. 52). The teacher salaries in Senegal are 4.9 times higher than per capita GDP, as opposed to an average of 3.7 for 55 low-income countries (Bruns, Mingat Rakatomalala, 2003).

¹⁰⁷ The budget can therefore be seen as equilibrium between the maximum income the provider association can give itself and its perception of risk in a repeated game.

operations, i.e., to establish contracts and transfer funds. The agency was paid on a pro-rata basis, so the more it paid out, the more it would earn. Such incentive may have improved the pace of the payments – but it did not strengthen AGETIP’s monitoring of the providers’ use of the funds. The agency tried to cut costs and their monitoring of the contracts was generally flawed (see section 6.4). It can be argued that the problem was partially due to the fee type for AGETIP, which represented a percentage (5%) of the total contract amount with the providers. The agency therefore had a financial incentive to make more contracts and more payments. However, it would be negatively rewarded (in financial terms), for carrying out a strict monitoring and evaluation schedule, and by stopping payments to dishonest providers. If, during monitoring, the contract-managing agency found that a provider had embezzled funds, the agency would have to stop payments to the provider, representing loss of income of 5% of the outstanding amount to be paid. Also, agency personnel would lose time (and thus inflict costs on the agency) in trying to resolve the conflict.

As opposed to the outsourcing agency, the government did not try to cut costs. It appears that on the contrary that it wanted to increase costs. Most of the interviewees from the private sector who had been prior civil servants, pointed to the fact that the government, and especially the Department of Literacy, wasted money. According to these interviews, the training did not go to the right people; the appointment of people to different positions was based on political maneuvering instead of technical capabilities, and there was generally a lack of commitment to the technical work of the Department of Literacy (DAEB). The main work of the DAEB seems to be linked to report-generating,

political networking, and efforts to obtain some financial advantage. A former minister of education said in an interview that the DAEB was not given the opportunity to reposition themselves within the outsourcing structure:

“There is a repositioning of [institutional] structures through the faire-faire. We explained the restructuring of roles to the partners, but we did not give them the means of repositioning themselves. DAEB previously worked on the textbooks, organized training sessions, etc. and when we told them that this is no longer your role, they were lost” (Civil servant).

According to the aforementioned quotation, it may seem that the Department of Literacy somehow became less effective as a result of the outsourcing policy. However, according to other interviewees, it was not efficient even before the outsourcing policy. The PAPF did little to correct inefficiency problems within the government. As we have seen in section 4.3, the project outsourced funds because of the lack of belief in capacity of the government (e.g., the project document referred to the “specter” of government involvement in literacy) – it was therefore not aimed at improving the functioning of the government. In order to bypass government bottlenecks, especially those of the Department of Literacy, PAPF created an independent institution – the project coordination unit (PCU).

Ironically, the PCU was a government agency, and its main agents were civil servants. One could therefore suspect that the same shortcomings were visible in the PCU as in the Department of Literacy. However, the PCU started from a “clean slate,” and became everything that the Department of Literacy was not: a small, efficient, and dynamic

organization, which, as widely recognized (in World Bank documents and from interviewees), was the driving government institution in the project.¹⁰⁸

8.6: Private Cost Analysis

As seen in section 8.3, the participants paid fees for attending the courses, both in terms of a direct cost of 2,500 CFAF and through incurring opportunity costs. The impact of these costs on the project's enrollment and success rates are discussed below.

A) Direct Costs

In comparing the private costs, it is clear that the opportunity costs were much higher than the direct costs. The opportunity cost was the basis of an argument for having the participant paying a fee. It was argued that someone who could not afford the opportunity costs would be likely to drop out of the course. Therefore, by charging fees, the providers would separate out those who were not likely to be able to afford the opportunity cost. Such fee, it was argued, would also separate out those who were not interested enough (in literacy) to pay the direct costs, and who might have dropped out of the course at a later stage anyway, to avoid the opportunity costs.

Most interviewees said that all people, even the poorest, could pay the direct fee, whereas it was recognized that for many the opportunity costs would be a significant barrier:

¹⁰⁸ The establishment of coordination units, however, is against current World Bank policy. The policy of the World Bank now aims at creating the right conditions within the government for implementation of large-scale programs (financed by the World Bank *and* its financial partners). Therefore, the PCU has been integrated back into the government Department of Literacy (effective in 2004). According to many interviewees from the private sector, the effectiveness of the project execution declined sharply after the PCU integrated the Department of Literacy.

“I am from a poor background myself, and I know the poverty and even extreme poverty in Senegal. I have spoken to poor women and I state clearly that in Senegal, one can use a [large] amount of money to celebrate a birth or a wedding, even in the most disadvantaged milieus. I think that there is a minimum of motivation that one needs in order to learn. To the person who says that he or she cannot use 2500 FCFA to become literate, I say that he or she doesn’t have the minimum of motivation to learn. I know that even in the poorest areas of Senegal, one can mobilize 2500 FCFA. For me, this money does not constitute a real participation in the program, because it represents a negligible part of the costs, but it constitutes a proof of the participants’ interest in the course. We could eliminate this fee, since it is such a small part of the overall cost. [...] It is like the cost of a newspaper; if it is free, people do not read it, and if it cost something, then the person who buys it will read it” (Civil servant).

Most interviewees agreed with the above quotation. The same issue is explained in the vignette below, taken from a village where the participants did not want to pay the direct costs, and where the management committee found a way of dealing with it:

“We have problems with the financing and payments. Every participant should pay 2,500 FCFA to complete what the sponsor, the Bank, has given. In the beginning, during the pre-assessment, we explained all about this, and they were in agreement to pay it [the requested amount]. We said that we were coming with materials and that they needed to pay their contribution before December. At that point, they didn’t want to pay. Some said it was difficult this year, some said other things. And with these problems, they said that they didn’t want to attend class any more, although they had already registered. I went to the course sites and I told them:

'Really, you're slowing us down. You haven't been able to put aside 2,500 FCFA during the last five months, and at the same time you have been participating in all these wrestling ceremonies! You do what you want - all the women do what they want during the ceremonies - you put on the clothes you want during these ceremonies, so if you don't want to pay the contribution, it is that you don't want to attend the course! You don't have confidence in what we are doing - or maybe it's just that you don't want to attend.'

[After discussion with the participants, the problem was arranged in the following way:] In every class, every week the participants gave 200 or 150 FCFA to the management committee for the participation - and after a couple of months we could go and collect the money. With this process we got the funds" (Private provider staff).

These examples from the project show that in the general opinion, it was considered as normal that the learners paid something for the education received. The providers and civil servants often said that those who did not pay were lazy or lacked interest. Direct payment was therefore seen as a safeguard to obtain the "right learners." The direct fee was therefore not considered as a further barrier that was added to the opportunity costs incurred by attending literacy classes. On the contrary, providers and civil servants (and even some learners) considered the fee as proof of commitment to the course.

It was up to the community members, through payment of the fee, to show interest for the education provided, and to "merit" the education. The responsibility for education was therefore placed on the individual and the community. No longer had the state any responsibility in enrolling people; education (and thereby a promise of poverty alleviation) was the responsibility of each individual. The conception of education as a

human right was abandoned in favor of the conception of education as the responsibility of individuals (see section 2.2 on globalization and education).

B) Opportunity Costs

Some participants could not afford the opportunity costs involved in attending the classes. They were extremely poor and had to work to feed their families. Many likely did not enroll for these reasons. Some of the enrollees (estimated at 8-16% of the total number) would not drop out from the course, but their attendance would be irregular (see section 8.1).

A civil servant said:

“The problems I most often see in the centers are related to participants’ difficulties that are part of daily life: heavy work makes it so that not all participants can attend classes. [...] Poverty makes it necessary to go to Dakar or elsewhere to get help” (Civil servant).

A learner who had dropped out from the course said:

“The problem I have had during the course was the enormous workload I had at home. Except for that, I didn’t have many problems during the course. I would have liked to continue in the project, but have too much work at home with the children” (Former learner).

A director of a provider organization said:

“The only problem we have is low attendance. There are moments when people cannot come, because of poverty. The women need to find something to eat. We try to connect the women to financial networks, but it

is still difficult, especially last year when it did not rain enough” (Private provider staff).

A coordinator of a subproject said:

“Really, these women are tired. Some have more than 40 minutes to walk to fetch water. Some rise very early every morning to fetch water, and can use at least three hours only to fetch water. Then they need to prepare the meals and then they need to go to literacy classes. It’s not easy!” (Private provider staff).

The problems mentioned above (which are part of the opportunity costs incurred through attending the course) are not seen as issues in which the state has any role. Here, the providers and civil servants do not consider individual non-attendance of the project as laziness or lack of interest. In the interviews one has often the impression that these problems are inevitabilities, fate, and not linked to any problem of skewed distribution of wealth.

In interviews, poverty problems were never connected to distribution inequalities in the society or to any issue in which the state can play a positive role. Nor are the providers seen (by the interviewees) as a poverty-solving factor at a political level.¹⁰⁹ From these interviews one has the impression that only the individual’s own work can help in getting access to services, to markets, and in enabling them to get out of poverty.

The community may have supported the literacy courses because they had different measures for a successful outcome than the government’s Department of Literacy. The

¹⁰⁹ Some interviewees mention the women’s associations and financial networks sometimes as positive factors for income. These networks also in many cases have a social safety net function.

participating communities were not likely to have supported the high opportunity costs of the subproject if the successful outcome was only 37% (see table 8.3). According to the longitudinal study, 46% of the interviewees expected from the project an “improvement of the income of the community,” whereas 35% expected that the project should “strengthen solidarity and mutual help in the community.” Only 28% of the interviewees in the longitudinal study had as their first expectation that the project would reduce illiteracy (LS-T00, 2001, p. 32). Whereas the project was not very successful in reducing the illiteracy rate, it may have been more successful in the domains where the community expected it to be successful, i.e., in the improvement of income through classes about income-generating activities: Only 5% of the learners had the required IGA skills upon entering the project, and 73% had the required skills after the subproject had ended (see table 8.3). This represents a success rate of at least 68%, which would make attendance very worthwhile from the learners’ point of view. The question of project success is thus dependent on the point of view from which one evaluates the project. In most cases, the learners were willing to pay the direct and opportunity costs involved in the project because they saw that it was worthwhile based on their criteria of success.

In conclusion, there are indications that the participants attended the course because they considered it as an income-generating development project instead of a literacy project alone. The longitudinal study showed that the outcome of the literacy classes was meager, whereas the outcome of the basic skills learning was good (see table 8.3).

The cost analysis used two scenarios. One was based on official numbers, with 203,599 enrollees, 15% of dropout and 50% of non-success. The second scenario was based on

corrected enrollment, dropout and success rates, based on data on World Bank's payments to providers and also on the Senegalese government's longitudinal study. This latter, corrected, scenario corresponds to 178,382 enrollees, 34% dropout, and 63% of non-success. With the official data, it was estimated that 42% of the enrollees finished the course and learned to read and write, and also learned some basic skills. The total societal unit cost of the program would be \$253, representing 58% of wastage. In the corrected scenario, it was estimated that 24% of the enrollees finished the course, learned reading, writing, and income-generating and basic skills. The total societal unit cost of the program would be \$457 (including opportunity costs), representing 76% of wastage.

Considered from a literacy point of view only, the public cost of one successful course completer would correspond to the cost of 4.5 years of primary schooling. However, the primary school system in Senegal is notorious for its levels of wastage (it is considered among the most ineffective education systems in the world). Whereas literacy education fares slightly better than primary education in terms of costs and effectiveness, the levels of wastage are still tremendous: less than one of four learners who attend the literacy course would actually learn to read and write. One of the reasons for this is that the literacy course is of such a short duration that the learners do not have time to learn well. Another reason is that the quality of teaching is very poor. Many learners cope with this by attending several literacy courses (which would lead to even higher wastage and higher societal costs for literacy learning).

In order to understand, on the one hand, the impact of the governments' investment in literacy courses, and on the other hand, why the participants invest in them by paying

direct fees and incurring high opportunity costs, it is necessary to analyze the overall impact of the project. Such analysis must look at both literacy and other impacts of the PAPP. This will be the objective of the next chapters.

Chapter 9: Literacy Outcome of the Courses

In order to evaluate the literacy outcomes of the courses, this chapter will examine the following elements: the aims of the project in terms of literacy and post-literacy; the literacy and post-literacy outcomes of the subprojects as measured against these aims; individual comparisons in between providers to determine to which extent the quality of implementation depends on the provider, and finally, the cultural aims of the courses, especially the use of local languages in the instruction.

9.1: Literacy and Post Literacy Aim of the Courses and Outcomes

The PAPF-financed courses had as stated primary goal to make people literate: “The IDA financed project would support literacy and post-Literacy sub-projects [...] to reach about 135,000 adults (75% women) over five years (1996-2001) – or about 75% of the total required to meet the Government’s targets for those regions – to lower the illiteracy rate from a combined average of 50% to 35%” (SAR, 1996, p. 10). As seen in section 2.41, there are several ways of defining literacy. To understand the PAPF’s working definition of literacy, this section first discusses the definition of literacy as it was understood in the PAPF project and in Senegal generally. Then it investigates what the

participants achieved in terms of learning. Finally, it looks at how the course duration and the learner's age affected the course outcome.

A) Definitions of Literacy

As noted above, the PAPF project had as its aim to support the government's literacy campaign in five out of ten regions in Senegal. However, the objective was not to make the people literate in a vacuum, as had been the case with other literacy projects aiming at making the participants master reading and writing skills in a stand-alone exercise:

“Other programs offer what is sometimes referred to as comprehensive, or basic, education. Such programs are longer in duration, provide a range of important information of interest to beneficiaries, and develop critical thinking and problem solving skill, at times with the goal of making participants leaders in the communities or for women's empowerment. In the context of this project the following definition of literacy programs is understood: to provide participants with a usable level of reading, writing and math skills, teach a range of important information, cultivate critical thinking and problem solving skills, and bring participants to a level where they can retain their skill and improve it over time” (SAR, Annex 2, p. 1). The objective of the courses was thus to provide a set of skills that gave the learners tools to perform their daily tasks in a better way:

“I believe there has been a qualitative change in the implementation of literacy courses because the dynamics [of literacy courses] have evolved together with the politics of our country. After 40 years, literacy has acquired more institutional weight, and we have understood the impact that

literacy has on the promotion of citizens and its impact on development. Literacy has produced a silent revolution. The local population can [now] have leaders with access to documentation; they have gained confidence [in themselves], and organize themselves efficiently; they defend their interests” (Consultant, former civil servant).

“The government-implemented programs had as a basic idea to provide reading and writing skills to the population. In the faire-faire system, questions of what to read, what to write, and what are the objectives with these skills become more important as the skills acquisition per se. The faire-faire system gives a purpose to the acquired skill. The novelty of faire-faire is that it makes it possible for the beneficiaries to say that this is our context, these are our needs, and these are the problems that the literacy course can help us resolve. The learning program is built on discussions with the beneficiaries on these needs. The interest of the system is that it motivates the learners, because they learn for a purpose and can use what they learn instantaneously. This motivation is improving learning and also the pedagogical effectiveness of learning. The previous [state-run] system was close to the primary school system, and taught the learners in the same manner as if they were children” (Consultant, former civil servant).

The above two quotations show that the faire-faire system was supposed to adapt the learning to the participants’ needs, and thus positioned the project within a socio-cultural understanding of literacy. However, as seen in the previous section, the format of the curriculum was fairly rigid. About 300 out of the 450 contact hours were normally related to acquiring the “instrumental skills” (reading, writing and basic math were called “instrumental skills”) in a traditional way¹¹⁰. Not one of the literacy course teachers and

¹¹⁰ All the literacy teachers observed during fieldwork used traditional primary school methods; the teacher read, the learners repeated it aloud.

very few providers indicated that they had been using specific methods for adult learning, e.g., participative learning methods such as group work, peer tuition, etc. which are frequently recommended for adult learning (Abadzi, 2003).

In the PAPP, providers were expected to use socio-cultural criteria indicated in the procedures manual, to propose a literacy program that was intimately linked to the life and needs of the learners. The use of a needs-based curriculum was promoted: the learning program was considered appropriate if “it clearly responds to the requests of the population as revealed in the needs assessment” (PM, 2000, p. 14).

As noted above, these socio-cultural criteria were rarely applied. The learning program, especially the required 300 contact hours for learning instrumental skills (reading, writing, math), was often decided arbitrarily (e.g., based on the cost of learning materials) – and/or was based on a ‘standard’ program that the provider was familiar with. In many cases neither functionalist nor socio-cultural definitions were applicable to the aims of the learning program, since the course functioned wholly on an ad-hoc (leaning) basis.¹¹¹ The longitudinal study indicates that at the beginning of the classes, only 38% of the course sample had a goals-based curriculum indicating the planned learning progress over the implementation period; half of the courses did not even have a schedule indicating the subject for each lesson (LS-T0, 2001). Interview evidence suggests that the courses that had a goals-based curriculum adapted the goals to the learners’ needs. Interviewed

¹¹¹ I.e., the goal of many courses course was neither to give the learners a pre-determined literacy level, nor to give them a locally defined literacy level; rather, the courses gave literacy classes without defining a set of learning objectives.

provider staff generally indicated that they adapted the learning and made it as responsive as they could to the local socio-cultural context.

In practice, socio-cultural adaptations allowed by the procedures manual and found in the subproject proposals somewhat clashed with other, functionalist, requirements of the project. These latter were especially linked to the monitoring-evaluation of the provider. As seen in section 6.1, the procedures manual required that the provider put in writing (in the needs assessment and subproject proposal) the learning schedule. This latter should be based on the needs of the learners. The selection committee then evaluated whether this particular learning program was appropriate for that particular group. The contract was based on the subproject proposal, and theoretically, the monitoring and evaluation from the authorities should have been based on the fulfillment of the contractual engagement of the provider. There should therefore not have been any conflict between functional and socio-cultural aspects of the program, since theoretically, all aspects of the program were based on a cultural-specific view of literacy.

However, international evaluation requirements and national political pressure, among other factors, made it necessary to find a standard definition and measure of literacy. The tests submitted by the DAEB to measure learning achievements at the end of the course were standardized, and theoretically, were not supposed to take into account local and socio-cultural elements. In reality, each evaluator (most often they were from department education offices) had his or her own style and tended to be less strict in areas where the population had had less prior exposure to writing. The standardization of tests consisted in having a similar approach to it, i.e., the evaluators asked the participants (a) to read a

text; (b) to write a sentence; and (c) to solve a problem (most often the problem was related to some income generating or market-related activity, which needed the knowledge of simple math to be solved). It was well known, however, that some ethnic groups did not have the same attitudes for and needs of literacy. The learning pace in these groups was consequently different than that of other groups.¹¹² During evaluations, education officers declared that among specific groups, the ability to read, albeit very hesitantly and slowly, was most often enough to make the person literate. In some cases the sole ability to write one's name and the name of the village was considered sufficient writing skills. If the evaluator found that the learning achievements were low in a particular area, the provider would explain that the participants had learning difficulties, because of their traditions and culture. An local education officer noted during an evaluation session that,

"I'm declaring them literate because I don't want to discourage them"
(Civil servant).

In this case, people who could not correctly write their own name were considered literate. Not surprisingly, the results of the problem-solving exercise (which required more analytical literacy skills) were consistently worse than the reading and writing results (which could more easily be adapted to the evaluators' appreciation of each case). The problem solving results improved from 6% success in 1997 to 20% (longitudinal

¹¹² This was, for example the case of the Peul ethnic group, which often lived in remote areas, and therefore had less access to written materials. One provider noted: "I am very proud of the results we have had in Peul villages, because these villages are difficult to access, and they have many problems. After we have spent some years among them, they have become very enthusiastic about the project" (Private provider staff).

studies, 1999) and a reported 44% success rate in 2000¹¹³ (see table 8.2 and 8.3). It is difficult, however, to appreciate whether the improvements noted in the test results were due to an improved pedagogic approach, changes in evaluation methodology, or more widespread corruption.

In summary, the final evaluation was supposedly functionalistic. In reality, each evaluator adapted it to his or her own liking. There is also some evidence that it was common for providers to pay the evaluator some money to obtain a positive evaluation. The results of the evaluations were therefore fairly arbitrary, and could not be used to impose negative or positive sanctions on the providers.

In many countries, tests are seen as the culminating event. In many such cases, the pedagogy and learning program are adapted to fit the final exams. This was not the case in Senegal. The final test took in many cases place a long time after the course had finished, and with a small sample of the learners (see section 8.1). The tests had very little effect on the pedagogy, on project processes (e.g., imposing negative and positive sanctions on providers), and were at best a simple control that some learning activities actually had taken place in the communities. The testing system therefore valued processes over delivery, i.e., the testing processes (and subsequent reporting) were assigned importance, but these processes were not oriented towards an improved delivery quality. In the learning context of Senegal, it would have been difficult and maybe not advisable to implement a more strict standardized (functionalist) testing system. A site-

¹¹³ See also section 3.3 on project data flaws.

adapted evaluation system (instead of standardized tests) based on the socio-cultural literacy goals of the subprojects (as defined in the subproject proposal) could have made a better assessment of the providers' performance than a standardized test. It would have been of importance, though, that the testing system was result-oriented and that it could have an impact on delivery.

B) Literacy Learning Achievements

The interviews and studies of the PAPF indicated that the learning achievement of the courses was low. Most interviewees who were enrolled (in 2003) or who were close to completion of the course said that they had learned to write their name and to use the telephone during the 450-hours coursework. Some interviewees made references to places where "bad providers" (*des mauvais opérateurs*) had been implementing courses that were so flawed that the local population was skeptical to literacy afterwards. These providers had apparently promised to set up various development-related activities in the villages, but had subsequently failed to set up activities that were deemed satisfactory. Indications from interviews and statistics showed that this situation was not frequent in the PAPF project.¹¹⁴ Some women, despite having learned many other things, cited the ability to telephone as a major outcome of the course. "Advanced" learners who had achieved mastery of reading and writing generally stated that they have been using the newly acquired literacy skills to write poems and letters.

¹¹⁴ None of the interviews indicated that this had been the case in a PAPF project. In the Impact Study, a few cites, representing less than 5% of the overall sample, (and all belonging to the government-financed and outsourced program) reported that the learning activities were not implemented at all, resulting in skepticism of the local population to future programs.

Helen Abadzi, who has been involved in evaluation of World Bank literacy programs, noted that “the outcome of literacy programs are still modest” and that “reading must become automatic, fast, effortless and accurate in order to be useful” (Abadzi, 2003, p.

1). In Senegal the reading skills obtained were rarely fluent – and in the rare cases where the participants could read fluently and effortlessly, they had previously been to school or attended other literacy courses. During the interviews and field observations, however, very few people thought that the courses should make the participants literate at a pre-determined, universal level (e.g., automatic reading; see section 2.4). Most learners thought that the courses should be adapted to local socio-cultural circumstances and provide a literacy level that corresponded to the learners needs.

Civil society associations and civil servants shared this opinion. The following is the text of a letter, which was sent from a former learner to the director of a provider association, and which clearly underlines the positive factors of becoming literate (even if the reading and writing skills were flawed):

“I hope that you are with good health; I pray to God that all is well in your life and with your family. Thank you for your intervention in the village; before you came we were in the darkness, and you made us see light. We could not write or read or make telephone calls. Currently, we can write without anybody knowing what we write. Previously, we could not hide anything. Now we can telephone without anybody knowing to whom we are speaking. God alone can pay you, may He bless you.”¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Letter, former learner to private provider staff – translated from local languages by Private provider staff – translation controlled by Civil servant/PCU.

Seen from a socio-cultural view, the letter underlines that the literacy course helped satisfy a very basic need of the learner for privacy (e.g., to telephone without assistance); and to put thoughts into words for oneself (as a financial or other type of reminder, or for the pleasure of it). The learners did usually not make explicit their learning needs in literacy to the provider. Sometimes some vague expression of needs was made during interviews, e.g., to be able to write letters, poems, and to be able to function better in the marketplace. The providers referred to the needs and results of training in the same terms:

“The learners write poems to show to the coordinator. They also write to each other - and keep financial books. Some use a calculator” (Private provider staff).

“The director of the women’s association was also a beneficiary; she had never been to school. At this point, the literacy course has been going on for a couple of months. ‘Now I know how to write my name and I know how to telephone,’ she said” (From the Field Journal).

“During the course, the women learn to write, read, and how to solve problems. Many of the participants write to me or to each other. They write if they need something - they give the letter to their children to give to me” (Private provider staff).

The first skills acquired (and in many cases the *only* skills acquired) were on how to use the telephone, writing small notes, and/or keeping small business notes (who owns who, how much). Considering the definitions of literacy (chapter 4.1 and in the above section 9.1.a), these skills were hardly sufficient to characterize the learner as “literate” if defined

within a functionalist view; yet they gave the learners important tools that enabled them to function better in the local society.

Within a socio-cultural view, it could be argued that participants acquired some literacy skills needed for their daily life. Many interviewees indicated that this level of achievement was not sufficient for them and that they would like to attend another course (some of the participants had already attended other courses), and they pointed out that the course's duration was too short. This can partially be explained by the poverty context of the participants: people living in need often express a need for more of everything. The need is not always expressed according to the most desirable product or service, but according to the circumstantial situation and the likelihood for a positive result. In this case, when interviewed about the literacy program, there was a sense of needing more literacy and skills learning. In many cases, however, the request went beyond the want of "more" of something – many learners had concrete needs that the literacy course had not satisfied, e.g., learning specific basic skills (especially income-generating related skills), as well as learning to read a newspaper and write a letter. One must conclude that using a socio-cultural literacy definition based on local needs, one would find the results of most courses very modest in terms of literacy achievements. The way that most participants coped with this – as we shall see below – was to attend several literacy courses.

The longitudinal study divided reading achievements of the PAPF learners into three categories:¹¹⁶

Level 1: can read an easy text on their daily life;

Level 2: can decipher words;

Level 3: cannot read a word or a letter;

With these definitions, the study obtained the following outcomes of the course: At entry, most participants (74%) were illiterates and only 17% were literate (according to the definition of literacy given above – which does not require fluent and effortless reading). Roughly half (53.7%) of the illiterate people learned at least to decipher words; the remaining 46.2% still could not read a word (or a letter) at the end of the course (see table 9.1). For writing achievements, the numbers are lower than for the reading.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ In addition to learning how to read, the participants also learned math-based problem solving (to be able to function better at the marketplace), small shop-keeping, and income-generating activities such as soap-making and agriculture-related activities. These learning activities are discussed in chapter 11. In this section, reading skills are used as a proxy for literacy learning.

¹¹⁷ As for writing; the following definitions of learner achievements were used:

Level 1: can write a simple statement that makes sense and that respects the basic syntax and orthographic rules of the language;

Level 2: can write words;

Level 3: cannot write a word.

Only 38.7% of the participant sample was at level 1 at the end of the course. 73.6% of the learners were at level 2 (combined with level 1);¹¹⁷ and 26.5% were at level 3; they could not write a word at the end of the course (LS-T1-2, 2003, p. 21). At enrollment, 13% were at level 1 (they could write a simple statement) and 51% could not write a word (EL-T0, 2001, p. 42). We note the same order of achievements is found by the longitudinal study in writing skills as in reading skills; roughly half of the participants learned at least to write words – the remaining half could still not write a word at the end of the course.

Table 9.1: Reading achievements of the PAPF

	Level 1: Literate	Level 2 Intermediate	Level 3 Illiterate
Literacy level at enrollment	17%	7%	74%
6 months after start of program	36%	16%	48%
24 months after start of program	52%	14%	34%

(Source: LS-T0, LS-T1.1 and LS-T1.2)

The longitudinal study indicated that the results were better for providers with more than six years of previous experience in education. Providers with less experience had worse results. Some of the variability was probably also due to each locality's socio-cultural understanding of literacy and the consequent adaptation of the subprojects. The variability due to socio-cultural understanding of literacy is less however, than variability in the quality of provision (LS-T1.2). A difference in the degree to which the environment was literate was especially noted in between urban and rural areas. The reported progress in reading skills between enrollment and the end of the course was 14.8% for urban zones and 35.4% for urban zones.¹¹⁸


The impact study's statistics on enrollment were fairly similar to those in the longitudinal study – but gave a more graduated breakdown of the skills. The countrywide characteristics of new learners were as follows (in 1993): 14% could read “fluently”; 13% could read “hesitantly”; 7% could read “word by word”; 25% could read letters and syllables; whereas 41% could not read at all (Impact Study, 2004, p. 70). As for writing

¹¹⁸ I.e., the percentage of people that was literate at the end of the course minus the percentage of people that was already literate in the beginning of the course.

skills, 12% could write “correctly”; 17% could write words; 24% could write letters and syllables; whereas 47% could not write at all (IS, 2004, p. 70). The enrolled learners had learned these skills through different learning establishments; 23% of the total number of enrollees had been to French schooling; 36% had been to Arabic school, and 53% had been to a former literacy class Reference: IS, 2004, p. 69).¹¹⁹ Only 30% of sample of learners enrolled nationwide had not attended any form of schooling (literacy course, Arabic schooling, French primary school) before (IS, 2004, p. 45). For the PAPF, 35% had not attended school before (see figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1: Previous schooling of literacy course participants

Source: IS, 2004



¹¹⁹ A first version of the impact study found that 32% of the enrollees had been to non-formal primary schooling [*Ecole Communautaire de Base – ECB*]; this number, however, was retracted later since it cannot correspond with the reality. Senegal has a limited number of ECBs. See also section of statistical validity in chapter II.3.

The literacy level of participants who had been to prior school establishments was low.

A reading test¹²⁰ submitted by the Impact Study obtained the following results:

Table 9.2: Literacy rates for people having attended school or other literacy courses at enrollment of literacy course

	Literate	Intermediate	Illiterate
Participants having been to primary school (average attendance: 5 years)	10%	81%	9%
Participants having been to Arabic school (average attendance: 3 years)	3%	70%	27%
Participants having been to a previous literacy class (1-2 years)	3%	70%	27%

The statistics also showed that the illiterate participants having been to French school had only attended school for an average of 4 years; those having a correct reading level, had attended school for an average of 6 years. This is consistent with international findings on literacy in Africa (Bruns, Mingat & Ratakomala, 2003).¹²¹

¹²⁰ The test was submitted in the local language of the participants (i.e., the language taught in the literacy class). For some students (especially those having studied only Arabic), this may have lowered the results. A fully literate person in French, however, would be able to read the simple text in local languages used for this reading test.

¹²¹ The Progress in International Literacy Study (PIRLS) investigated reading achievements in the fourth grade for level in 35 countries. Most children were literate by that level. Morocco, the only African country participating in the study, however, obtained much lower scores at fourth grade than the average. Since the education situation in Senegal generally is worse than in Morocco, it is to be expected that the scores of 4th graders would be even lower in Senegal, and that students will not often be literate at fourth grade. Recent World Bank publications on Africa confirmed this: “A high share of the adults who have completed less than five or six years of primary schooling remain functionally illiterate for their rest of their lives” (Bruns, Mingat & Ratakomala, 2003).

C) Duration of the Courses

The procedures manual required that the literacy courses should provide at least 450 contact hours of instruction over a period not exceeding 24 months (PM, 2000). The usual duration for a course was 18 months, with the *relais* taking over literacy activities the teaching after approximately ten months. However, as has been noted in section 5.1, the *relais* often stopped organizing activities a short time after the subproject had ended. The teacher did not remain in the village for eighteen months (the procedures manual suggested paying the literacy teacher for ten months); most often he or she was recruited for a period of ten months; the relay took over afterwards. The supervisor (there was usually one supervisor per ten classes) followed up on the course for more extended period of time:

“Normally, the teacher is in the village during 10 months, and the supervisor is following up on the project for 18 months [i.e., following up on course activities conducted by the relais]” (Private provider staff).

The learning impact of the project was often impeded by the lacking involvement of the *relais*. According to evidence from interviews, other obstacles that may have contributed to make the courses less effective included:

PAPF suggestion (and later, requirement) of implementing the course during the rainy period;¹²²

Lacking monitoring of the courses disposed some providers to close the project early, before the required course implementation period had ended;

Cultural events of the local population made it impossible to implement the courses during certain periods.

The interviews frequently mentioned the aforementioned impediments to the learning achievements:

“Normally the programs should last 18 months, but it is infrequent that a provider conducts the program until it is finished. When they notice that the follow-up is not really done, they close the classes. During the rainy season, they do not conduct classes for at least two months” (Civil servant).

“[...]in the end of July, beginning August, [the course] really didn't work, because of the rain. Those who want to attend the classes usually are prevented to do it by their agricultural work. The teacher came, and he found 15 people dispersed everywhere; they complained that the weeds would take over the field. They tried to conduct classes, but the objectives of PAPF were not at all satisfied. I have to tell the truth! So in the end of July and in August we conducted fewer classes, and the goals of PAPF were not at all reached. It is better to conduct classes in the dry season but since they say we must do it in the contract with PAPF, we have to work with these difficulties. [...] Do you know Taysie? It's a great Senegalese wrestler. Every village organizes a wrestling ceremony that lasts between 3 days and a week. [...]. Every village close to a Sereer village organizes a

¹²² Many, if not most, providers did not implement courses during the rainy period, because the participants were busy with agricultural work at that time. Many interviews indicated that some activities were taking place with a limited number of learners. The *relais* often organized review sessions during the rainy period.

wrestling program. This is making us lose time. We began in March - but we had done the teacher training in January. We had to begin in March because of the wrestling ceremonies and [because of the] family ceremonies. The Wolof give their daughters to be wed during the dry season; they are afraid [of doing it in] the rainy season. Weddings are big ceremonies; one has to go from a village to another with many people. This has prevented us from starting early. We began in March and then we visited the villages in June to say that the course should continue [during rainy season] even if they needed to reduce the number of classes” (Private provider staff).

Many learners regretted not having more time to learn and complained that the course period was too short:

“I don’t think that the duration of the course is sufficient. The end of the course may stop the learning cycle - I don’t want it to stop” (Current learner).

This was also the sentiment of many providers, who suggested that the financing should make it possible for them at least to hire the supervisors over an extended period – so that they could follow up on literacy activities organized by the *relais* in the villages.

D) Age and Learning

The PAPF aimed at enrolling young women at the age of 15-39 years. This age corresponded to the government’s target age for literacy enrollment. From a human capital view, younger enrollees have a longer time of productive work ahead of them; it may therefore appear more cost effective to enroll young people in the courses.

However, in the PAPF, the providers preferred enrolling women that were well above

fifteen years of age.¹²³ The providers did not wish to enroll younger girls because they normally married between the age of 15 – 18 years. They would often leave the course when they married.¹²⁴ Most providers mentioned this problem of dropout by young girls in marrying age:

“If we have a course with only 15-year old girls, there will be a problem since they will leave the course to go to their husbands. The girls marry very early here. The courses with many young people have the highest dropout rate” (Private provider staff).

“They should be at least 15 years old, and I even prefer that they are older than 15, because the 15-years old girls are most often not married. They will be asked for marriage during the course and sometimes leave the village. The married women are more stable [they will not leave the course]. If we only take young people, we will end up without participants, because they will all get married during the time of the course! The marriage age is 15-16 years old, and there are some who marry before that age as well; especially the Peul marry early” (Private provider staff).

Many providers had a relatively high mean age of enrollment. This was partially linked to the structure of the course; since the local women’s associations were involved in the set-up of the course, many of its senior members became interested in attending it. Also,

¹²³ Some providers accepted to enroll very young boys and girls – one provider noted, “5-6% of learners [...] are in the age group of 12-15 years”. The provider got the same fee for enrolling people outside the targeted age group (15-39 years old) as for people in this age group. This was against the procedures manual and general PAF requirements. In many cases, however, especially in villages without primary schooling (or where the girls needed to stay home from primary schooling for family, cultural, or religious reasons) it was accepted that the provider enrolled young girls or boys that had fallen outside the formal school system.

¹²⁴ The girls often moved or became pregnant rapidly after getting married, and would therefore stop attending literacy classes.

some men who were older than the mean enrollment age became interested in it; they frequently had occupations or interests that encouraged literacy.

During field observation, it was noted that many of the classroom settings were very dark (see pictures 9.3-9.9). Many students complained about lack of light (most centers did not have electricity). The dim light in most centers add to the eyesight problems, the latter being a phenomena that is seldom addressed by use of correcting eyeglasses in the rural areas of Senegal. Also, the combination of age and presbyopia is positively correlated, and most adults have some eyesight problems and need correcting lenses (which are not readily available in most rural communities). These problems almost certainly contributed to lower the learning achievements – especially for the older students.

9.2: Quality of the Courses

In the former section, we noted that the learning outcomes in terms of literacy achievements were modest. The longitudinal study noted that the differences in achievements were provider- and locality dependent; it also suggested that the providers implemented courses of varying quality. In this section, different indicators of quality that are likely to have influenced the course outcome will be discussed, such as textbook provision, the literacy teacher's background, and the functioning of the reading and activities' center.

A) Textbooks

The DAEB had the role of regularly updating repertoires of acceptable learning materials – and of evaluating the appropriateness of new materials (Procedures Manual, 2000). In principle, a CIDA-financed resource center (based in Dakar) had to collect learning materials used in the courses. In that way, the providers could consult the different materials used in the courses. In that way, the providers could consult the different materials and suggest the most appropriate to the communities for use in the course. In reality, most providers imposed learning materials on the communities; often the selection was based on convenience and price criteria. Many used standardized DAEB productions as learning materials (see picture 9.2).

Picture 9.2: Textbooks and course materials



Many providers also made their own materials and often encouraged course participants or *relais* to produce local newspapers. Unfortunately, there is no overview of the number and type of productions that were made. A consultant working on literacy recently began studying the materials that were used by the providers:

“I have started a study of pedagogical material. There are a lot of different materials; much of it is very interesting. However, it is not known, neither by the state, nor by the other providers. It is important to capitalize on these lessons learned, and also to gain knowledge about materials produced [by other providers]. We need to set up resource centers and to analyze the different subprojects” (Consultant).

According to the longitudinal study, centers with more pedagogical materials were getting better results: “as for individual [learning] materials, the learners in centers with better materials have better performances with a 37% [success rate] against 26%. For the centers that have student registers [*documents andragogiques*]; the analysis of the results shows that if these latter are well kept, it influences the performances positively [...] It is the same for the existence of a yearly plan, monthly repartitions [of the learning program], and material written in local languages” (LS-T1-2, 2003, p. 18). In general, better equipped centers performed about 40% better than under equipped centers (see table 9.3):

Table 9.3: Performance in well- and under-equipped learning centers*

Success rates in centers that are:**	Individual learning materials	Collective learning materials	Documents in local languages
Well equipped	37%	37%	36%
Under equipped	26%	27%	26%

Source: LS-T1-2, 2003, p. 18

* The calculation of these numbers is imprecise, and difficult to compare to overall success rates such as those in Tables 8.2 and 8.3.

** The ability to read is used as proxy for success.

It is likely that well equipped centers belonged to more qualified providers, which generally, implemented a better subproject. In most cases, the material stayed in the villages after the course ended. The provision of learning materials, both to the individual learner – and to the whole community as a part of the learning and activities center (see section D below) – was part of the PAPF strategy to create a literate environment. Unfortunately, some of the providers collected the textbooks that they had given to the villagers, and used them for the next cohort of learners:

“Some of the providers collect the textbooks they have given to the participants; in that way they “earn” 600 [participants] times 800 FCFA [price for the textbooks] on the next subproject. Sometimes the providers even collect the library books that were given to the participants” (Civil servant).

These books were accounted for in the budget proposal approved by the selection committee, and any such attempt to save money would be embezzlement.¹²⁵

B) The Literacy Teaching Methods

The literacy teachers in Senegal were called “facilitators” (*facilitateurs*). They were not considered with the same respect as formal schoolteachers, and in most cases their background did not include any teacher training or experience, let alone adult teacher training. Generally, their background experience in education was that of (their own) lower secondary education, and their methods would thus be dependent of the methods used in primary education. During the fieldwork period, some class learning settings

¹²⁵The amount “earned” by this type of embezzlement would be 480,000 FCFA (for a subproject with 600 learners). This corresponded to roughly \$960 (conversion rate: US\$1 = 500 FCFA).

were videotaped. A typical learning session is transcribed below (the visit was unannounced to a rural village chosen randomly; the visit took place in the rainy season – when only a limited number of learners usually would come to class sessions):

Picture 9.3: A literacy center



The literacy center was made according to PAPF standards for a learning and activities center, i.e., it was made with cement, and the roofing and door were made of aluminum sheets. Learners were arriving (with learning materials under their arm and/or balancing on their head); some of the learners had obviously “dressed up” for the occasion.¹²⁶ The literacy teacher – a man in his thirties – was arriving by bicycle – he had his teaching materials on the back of the bicycle.

¹²⁶ The videotaping began immediately after arrival to the village, so the participants did not have time to dress up. Class attendance was obviously seen as a social event; hence the nice clothing. The teacher’s behavior may have been modified by the videotaping.

Picture 9.4: The teacher explained the lessons of that day to the learners



The teacher was standing in front of the blackboard; the window shutters were open to let in light (there was no electricity in the village). The windows did not have any glass – and one cannot fail to notice how dark the classroom is.

Picture 9.5: The teacher wrote up that day's lessons



The lesson was a repetition lesson to practice reading some letters that had already been taught (lessons taught during the rainy season were often repetition sessions, since many of the learners could attend class). Many of the participants brought their youngest child to class, and the classroom was therefore never silent.

Picture 9.6: New learners arrived throughout the learning session



At this point there were 12 learners in the class and 3 children. The learners arrived during the whole session. In some classes the women's association and/or the class management committee imposed a fine for latecomers; this was not the case here. At the end of the class session there were about 20 learners in the classroom.

Picture 9.7: The learners watched the teacher write the lessons on the blackboard.



The teacher wrote three sentences on the blackboard. These sentences were the writing and reading lessons for that day.

Picture 9.8: The teacher asked a student to read the text



The teacher gave a ruler to a learner; she used it to follow the text as she read. The reading was hesitant and slow; the other learners were listening. The teacher corrected her when she could not read the text – and at times he corrected the sentences he wrote at the blackboard (he discovered that he had written something erroneously). After this woman had read the text, another woman read the text... and then another one. It was the same text on the blackboard all the time, and since the women became more and more familiar with it, they could “read” it more and more fluently.

Picture 9.9: The learners lost concentration



The learners became less and less concentrated and the children became more and more impatient. Some children were fed during the course.

The remaining time of this particular class was used to read and repeat the sentences on the blackboard.¹²⁷ The method was derived from primary school practices, and is not considered very effective for learning to write and read. Moreover, the class lacked any supporting pedagogical materials.¹²⁸ The practice of making one person after the other read, made the other learners lose time. Other field observations from Senegal found very similar class settings. A World Bank study notes (about a literacy class observed in Senegal): “on the board, there is a story about their [the learners’] daily lives, and the women take turns reading the text. The text is short, and after a few repetitions, the next reader recites it by heart. While one learner reads, the rest are inactive, fiddling with the items on their desks or looking out the window...” (Abadzi, 2003, p. 64).¹²⁹

The procedures manual requires that the literacy teacher should be “competent” and that they should be “development agents from the same background [as the learners] who are willing to do the job, motivated and trained for their assignment” (PM, 2000, p. 12).

¹²⁷ The class time may have been somewhat shortened by our presence. The teacher may have asked the participants to write the lesson on their [little individual blackboard?] or involved in some other exercises if we were not present. We were told, however, that this was the method and the content of that day’s lesson.

¹²⁸ The learners had not been given any books at all by the provider; and we did not get an explanation about why supporting materials, financed by the PAPF, had not been supplied.

¹²⁹ A key informant (during memberships checks) read the above description, looked at the pictures, and noted that, “the course seems to have a normal size and learner population. Often, one finds literacy teachers who teach poorly, like in this case. The situation seems convincing. However, the literacy classes are not supposed to take place like this!” (Consultant, former civil servant).

However, many interviews pointed out that the profile of the teachers did not always correspond to the profile required by the procedures manual:

“I doubt we can have a high-quality course if the literacy teacher is not sufficiently trained. We need to define the profile of the literacy teacher. The procedures manual has defined a certain profile, but the reality shows that it is not always this profile we find in the classroom” (Civil servant).

The PAPF project required that the providers trained the literacy teachers. This training, however, was in most cases too short to make them good literacy teachers. In most cases it did not last for more than one month: the longitudinal study noted that the average training duration for literacy teachers was 19 days, and that it varied between 10 days for the provider that offered the shortest teacher training period, to 31 days for the provider that offered the longest. The variance of the duration of the teacher training sessions was large between providers (see Table 9.4).

Table 9.4: Literacy teacher training

Teacher training duration:	Providers*
10 – 19 Days	36%
20 – 31 Days	64%

Source: LS-T0, 2001, p. 20

* N = 11 providers (44 literacy teachers).

Since the providers were responsible of organizing the training, they often used local teacher trainers with little experience. The PCU recognized that the training of the teachers was a problem:

“There should be a common initial training for all the teachers, so as to ensure that at least they know how to transcribe local languages correctly, and also that they know how to teach adults. This is a problem; the pedagogical methods of the literacy teachers [is a problem]” (Civil servant).

Several seminars were conducted to raise awareness among provider staff on the importance of training the trainers (and other provider personnel) adequately. The project’s newspaper, *Partage*, several times provided suggestions about how to improve the training (see for example *Partage no 19*, May 2001). However, the success rates from the longitudinal study did not give evidence of better outcomes over the time (see chapter 9 on costs and success rates). One possible explanation is that the teacher training did not sufficiently insist on individual learning methods, peer tutoring, and group work, which are increasingly being acknowledged as methods that can improve the learning, especially to increase reading speed and accuracy (Abadzi, 2003).

The literacy teacher training was an area in which the public-private partnership method clearly was at a disadvantage as compared to a public literacy-teacher training program. A government-certified course would likely be more cost-effective than the PAPF provider-individual training sessions, since government implementation may have been capable of making economies of scale. It would also ensure that the literacy teachers received instruction in adult education pedagogy, instead of receiving an ad-hoc learning program from the least costly teacher trainer in the area. The literacy courses offer a poor education, because the subprojects do not invest sufficiently in the teacher training, learning materials and school centers. Illiteracy needs to be addressed by more

comprehensive and planned activities, such as, for example, longer and better literacy teacher training. Each provider is currently offering courses of various quality ranging from 10 to 31 days. The prior education of literacy teachers does not reach upper secondary school level (Lycée) for 80% of the literacy teachers (LS-T0, 2001). Comparatively, the teacher training for primary schooling takes three years, and represents a completed upper secondary school level.¹³⁰ It follows that the literacy education methods were likely to be copied from what the literacy teachers had experienced in primary and lower secondary school. It often resulted in poor quality teaching methods that were not adapted to adolescent and adult learning context.

C) Reading and Activities Center

The learning situation seen in pictures 9.3-9.9 represents learning conditions in dim light. Except for the low quality of lighting, this learning center is, comparatively, of good quality. Many centers were too crowded, and had benches and other equipment of very low quality. The longitudinal studies (LS-T0, 2001) found that 61% centers were in bad shape at program start, and offered unsatisfactory learning conditions (see pictures 9.10 – 9.11), with inadequate and provisional buildings, lacking materials, low security (for theft), and sometimes disturbed by noise pollution (see table 9.5 below).

¹³⁰ Training of “elementary school teachers is offered by Ecoles normales, which provide three-year programmes at the upper secondary level. Completion of the three-year programme leads to the Baccalauréat or the Brevet Supérieur de Fin d'Études Normales or the Certificat d'Aptitude Pédagogique (CAP). The curricula of the Ecoles normales is very similar to the Lycées, the major exception being that about three periods per week are devoted to pedagogical training in the écoles normales” (Loyola Marymount University, 2003)

Table 9.5: Quality of literacy centers

Quality of center	Centers*
Good quality	12%
Acceptable quality	27%
Low quality	61%

Source: LS-T0, 2001, p. 22

* N = 60 literacy centers.

In the integrated project, the providers were asked to assist the villagers to construct a village reading and activities center (these activities were partly financed by the PAPF, and partly financed by fee work contributions from the community members).

Picture 9.10: Literacy center in bad shape



Picture 9.11: Interior of low-quality literacy center



The aim of these centers was to promote a literate and enabling environment in the village – and to sustain learning activities (with the help of the *relais*) beyond the subprojects’ duration:

“The first measure of sustainability is the reading center in the village. The center is a reading center and a resource center. Anyone in the village can come to the center and read books in the library, where one can find reading materials in both national and other languages [i.e., French]. There are both reading materials for children and Koran-related books for religious people in the village. The second measure of sustainability is the organization of participants, and the [third measure] is the library. At the center of all this, is the relais” (Civil servant).

The library most often consisted of a book box (sometimes in wood) – that was given to (or made by) the course participants. Most often (when the course’s was ongoing), this box was stored in the learning and activities’ center; the *relais* (or some other person in

the course management committee) stored it at home if the center could not be locked or if it was not waterproofed. When classes were taking place, the books were regularly exposed on shelves (see picture 9.12). Often, the providers organized community activities related to the book box:

“As for the libraries, we group people, not only beneficiaries, but also all others who want to come. The teacher reads the text, and asks questions about the text afterwards. There are readings from health books or other books; the session is made to interest external people about the subproject. They read fairy tales, and also books on how to transform produce, etc. Also, I have invented something; I have bought the Koran to make the older villagers interested so they would come and consult the libraries we set up in the villages. The books are written in Arab with Arabic letters. All the other books, except the Koran, are in Wolof or Serreer. Sometimes we give them French books too, but only the teachers and other villagers can read those books. At times schoolchildren come to the literacy center to read books” (Private provider staff).

These activities did not always prove to be enough to create a literate environment in the villages. Often, the providers’ sustained intervention was necessary to make the book box and library system work. Sometimes, it was even necessary to tie the use of the library to other incentives.

Picture 9.12: Learning and Activities' Center: the library



Some providers were visibly discouraged about the participants' disinterest in using the library to improve their knowledge:

“One of my predecessors here said that [setting up] the library is the best form of development. It is a base of resources; now it is up to the people to make use of them. [However, it is not that easy:] We also have an adolescent health program in which we need to motivate the participants financially. The values of the learning should be enough, but it needs to be tied to something else to gain people’s interest. It is easy to be cynical about this” (Private provider staff).

In many other cases, the library disintegrated after the provider left the community.

Sometimes the learners divided the books between themselves, and sometimes the book box was standing unused and exposed to wind and rain. During several field observation sessions, books were found to be in very poor shape because they were not used. In this context, it must be underlined that Senegal’s rural areas still are of an oral tradition, and

the written word had neither the weight nor the respect that it has in a literate environment. The understanding of literacy and the use of literacy in the villages have less significance than in a literate society. Also, since all important documents (road signs, official information, instructions manuals, etc.) are in French, the literacy courses in local languages have less instrumental value than literacy in French (see section 9.3 on language of instruction).

Many of the reading and activities' centers were given or lent to the providers for the duration of the course, partly to satisfy PAPP requirements. When the subproject ceased, the building went back to its original usage (often buildings used for storage of food staples were seen as appropriate for conducting literacy courses, since they were often constructed of cement). As for the library books, in many cases they were lost. When I asked her what had become of the books, one former learner dryly noted,

“The subproject is finished since one year. When the teachers left, the books in the library were divided in between participants” (Former learner).

UNESCO staff members confirmed the problems observed in the libraries:

“During field visits, we have found that all the libraries were in bad shape” (UNESCO-Dakar).

In other cases, the villagers built a center that was too frail to last through the heavy rains of the rainy season, and the center itself disintegrated (see above pictures 9.10 and 9.11 showing centers that were not likely to withstand the next rainy season).

The difference between PAF theoretical requirements and the reality therefore showed a disjuncture between the theory of the PCU regarding learning methods and outcomes, and the application in the villages. On one hand, some aspects of the PCU literacy model were coherent and very advanced; however the application of the model was lacking. Some of these application problems were due to the lack of understanding of adult literacy approaches by the provider's personnel. The use of cost-cutting practices and the PAF low financing of teacher training contributed to low quality literacy training in low-quality centers. On the other hand, aspects of the PCU model may have been based on flawed assumptions on the utility of literacy in local languages.

9.3: Language Aspects of the Learning

The classes were taught in local languages.¹³¹ The main language, taught in most formal schools, was French. The teaching of local languages was a conscious choice of the PAF, and this section first looks at the policy reasons for teaching local languages. Then it discusses the learners' motivation and thoughts about learning a local language as opposed to French. This enables us to examine the impact of the policy on the literacy environment in Senegal.

A) Why Were Classes Taught in Local Languages?

The interviewees had different opinions on the policy of conducting classes in local languages. Some considered the local language policy as an urban movement, driven by

¹³¹ In French, often the word national languages [*langues nationales*] was used to designate local languages; such designation implies national ownership of the language, as opposed to French, a foreign language.

intellectuals. Such movement, they considered, had little relevance to the needs of the participants, since most written documents were in French:

“The New Big Thing is Local languages: Wolof and Pulaar are challenging French and each other. Maybe intellectuals drive the movement: A famous writer, Bobacar Diop, just published a novel in Wolof” (Private provider staff).

“People learn to read and write, but it doesn’t change anything for them. Local languages are not promoted at an institutional level; the town council papers, the postal services, newspapers, other information [are in French]. Local languages don’t respond to peoples’ needs. Often the beneficiaries want to learn in French. [...] The learning [in local languages] ‘doesn’t take’” (Consultant).

Other interviewees saw the language policy as a gender issue; local languages are good enough for women – whereas the boys need to learn French (see section 10.1 on gender issues).

The teaching of literacy classes in local languages, however, was not specific for the PAPP, or of the partnership method. Most literacy classes in Senegal were taught in local languages, even before 1993 (the only exceptions were some specific courses implemented at the demand of companies that needed workers who were literate in French). The development philosophy used by the state in the 1990s was based on the following assumptions on literacy:

- The literacy skills did not aim at creating the capacity for the learners to get a government job but to function better in society;

- The literacy classes did not have as their aim to reintegrate the learners into formal schooling (such reintegration happened in rare cases, especially for ECB students);
- It was easier for the students to learn in local languages; pedagogical research supports the notion that people learn to read and write much faster when they learn it in their own language (Lauglo, 2001);
- Local languages appealed to the feeling of ethnic belonging to people.

For these reasons, most of the courses were implemented in local languages, even when the learners wished to learn French. Mamadou Ndoeye, and several other civil servants, noted that the literacy learning was seen primarily as a tool for improving the daily lives of the participants (in giving them access to written information):

“Many people asked why we teach in local languages, since someone cannot get a job after having learned a local language. Most people think that the use of the school is to obtain a paid job. We had to explain that if we want to achieve development, development is first of all the capacity of the population to be aware of a number of essential question, e.g., how one can take care of one’s own health, and that of the family and the community, through the knowledge to prevention and hygiene, as well as nutrition” (Former civil servant).

Literacy was not seen as an objective in itself, but as a tool for development. This tool would be useful only if needed development-related information was available in local languages. The project therefore had a large production component; it was supposed to publish 60 titles per year (10 for each of the languages in which the PAPF conducted

literacy classes at that time). Also, the project was to publish newspapers in local languages. The project succeeded in implementing a large part of these measures (ICR, 2004). However, as seen in section 9.2 above, it was difficult to “convert” an oral society into a literate society by giving them access to these books. Nevertheless, in some cases, the courses succeeded. Some interviews pointed out that in such cases, the newly literate people were even more conscious about the fact of being literate than those who were exposed to writing from their childhood:

“When we are conducting meetings and seminars, I am always surprised at seeing women who have attended a literacy course coming with a notebook and taking notes. This is quite unique in an oral society. Also, I see that these women are more conscious about using their writing skills than those who have been exposed to writing from their childhood. The people having attended literacy courses are more aware of the difference between written and oral society” (Civil servant).

B) Local Languages: the Learners Point of View

During field observation, several different positions on the language issue from the learner’s side were found:

- Quite a few people were literate in French but would like to know Wolof transcription.
- Quite a few were illiterate and would like to learn French.
- Quite a few were semi-literate in French and wanted to learn better Pulaar and Wolof.

The push to learn local languages may become stronger as these languages obtain more popularity (currently, there is a push for local languages among the intelligentsia in Dakar).

Among the people interviewed, some had forgotten to read and write (they had only attended a few years of primary education in French); they considered it was easier to learn in local languages. Several interviewees could not write correctly in French - and said they wanted to learn Wolof, because then “they could write what they wanted.” The reasons for learning local languages were in many cases based on the learners’ negative assumptions about their ability to learn to write and read in French. The learners were not always aware of the limited use of literacy in local languages, and stated that they primarily wanted to be able to telephone and to calculate (as noted in section 9.1, this was also the result of most courses). The local languages would be a better means for learning these limited skills than French, which would require prior knowledge to the French language before become literate in it.

Consider these quotes:

“We’re not learning much in the French school. We have to learn in Wolof to be able to read and write, to telephone, and to calculate... Previously we couldn’t do [all this], but in Wolof, we can” (Current learner).

Local languages were linked to the national culture; French was not:

“I am 38 years old; I have been to literacy program for two years. My most important activity is to go to the course, and I’m also doing agricultural work. I prefer to attend class all the time, and give that the priority. My

motivation is to help the village to develop. There are two aspects of this development; promotion of local languages and economic development. I love my country and my village, and it is important to learn my language. We need to attend the program. Use of the local language is a major motivation to go to the course - because it is linked to our culture. The program has helped raise awareness - and also I can write everything now. [...] I have attended 4 years of primary schooling before coming to literacy class. I left the school to get married” (Current learner).

Local languages can be used as a base to learning other languages:

“I want to learn French after having learned Wolof”. (Current learner).

Wolof was the “real” local language:

“The village is Serreer, but the people speak Wolof. Many of the children do not speak Serreer, since most parents use Wolof at home. The teacher is a Wolof, who also speaks Serreer. For this course, the participants chose to learn in Wolof” (Provider staff).

French may enable village people to emigrate:

“They want to learn French now - some even want to learn English. The reason for this is that they want to travel abroad. They wish to learn until they can emigrate to Spain, Switzerland or the USA” (Provider staff).

French made people go away; local languages made them stay home and develop their villages:

“The literacy classes made it possible to resolve problems in the community, whereas the French school is a door towards other perspectives. Literacy is enough to develop the localities; in fact, literacy is

much more advantageous for the village than the French school. Besides, the literacy classes open possibilities for all, whereas French schooling is only for children of low age. This is my own opinion” (Elder of the village).

The most usual reasons were as shown in the table below:

Table 9.6: Reasons given for choice of language

	Illiterate people	Literate people in French
Reasons to learn French (or English):	Wish to travel or emigrate Job purposes	Some wish to improve their knowledge to French
Reasons to learn local languages:	Easier than French The only thing available Use local languages as a base to learn French or English Cultural reasons, e.g., marriage	They can't learn to write French correctly; it is easier with local languages; Cultural reasons, e.g., marriage

As one can see from the quotations and the table 9.6, there were many reasons, both for wanting to learn in local languages, and to learn in French. In addition to the ones mentioned above, some people wanted to learn a local language different from their own, for cultural purposes (e.g., they were married to someone from a different ethnic background and wanted to learn his or her language).

In conclusion, this chapter has shown that many people came to the courses because they were interested in learning their local language better. Some ethnic groups did not have the same needs of literacy; their learning was consequently at a different pace and of a

different nature than that of other groups. The subprojects were in principle supposed to adapt the learning to these different local needs. The curricula, however, especially the required 300 hours for learning instrumental skills (reading, writing, math), was for the most part not making use of adult learning methods that were adapted to such local requirements. In most cases the learning program was decided according to arbitrary criteria (e.g., on the price of textbooks), or it was based on a 'standard' program that the provider was familiar with. The learners had different aspirations about the course, but most feel that the education they received by attending the course was insufficient.

The first skills acquired and in many cases the only skills acquired were on how to use the telephone, and writing small notes. Seen from a socio-cultural view, the literacy course helped satisfy a very basic need of the learner for privacy (e.g., to telephone without assistance); and to put thoughts into words for oneself (as a financial or other type of reminder, or for the pleasure of it). These skills were hardly sufficient to characterize the learner as "literate" if defined within a functionalist view; yet they gave the learners some tools that enabled them to function better in the local society.

Most of the participants had attended prior literacy education, either through Arabic school, literacy course, or primary schooling. Their literacy level, however, was generally low and in most cases they were still considered functional illiterates. The low level of learning in the literacy courses, and the low level of prior knowledge mastered by those who had been to prior schooling, demonstrate to which extent the education system in Senegal is lacking in quality.

One of the reasons for the lack of quality in literacy education is that the profile of the literacy teachers did not correspond to the profile required by the procedures manual. Their training was in most cases too short to make them good literacy teachers. Another quality issue was linked to the lack of a literate environment in the villages. The providers were supposed to train a *relais*, build literacy centers, and set up village libraries. These activities were not sufficient to create a literate environment in the villages. In most cases the villagers did not use the books; and in some cases the library books were distributed among learners or taken back by the provider. The *relais* did not continue to teach in the literacy center since he or she did not receive any remuneration for performing this job. The learning and activities centers were rarely used for learning and activities. They most often disintegrated through the impact of time, or were converted to other uses.

Despite lacking quality in the courses, the learners were enthusiastic about participating in them. For many, the literacy function of the classes was less a priority as compared with other social and economic functions of the subproject. The next chapter will explore these other functions of the courses.

Chapter 10: Gender and Civil Society Impact

This chapter analyzes how the project contributed to change the role and perception of women in the family and in society. Changes that may be attributed to the literacy course are can be seen at several levels: the courses changed the participants by giving them access to knowledge. The project also helped the women to organize themselves in legally recognized associations.

The first section of this chapter will discuss whether the knowledge the women gained replicated existing power relationships between genders, or whether the courses had a potential to promote women's emancipation. The following section will discuss the project's objective to create civil society in the villages through the strengthening of women's associations, and the impact this had on women's roles in the villages. This section will also consider issues of civil society generally.

10.1: The Course's Impact on Gender Power Relationships

This section explores the background of the project, particularly the question of why the project focused on women. It will then examine the participants' own evaluation of the course – and will compare it to that of their spouses. The third section will evaluate the

power relationships in the class itself, particularly between the teacher and the students. The final section will consider the learning content of the courses and the impact generated by the learning content.

A) Why was the Project Targeted at Women?

There can be several explanations for prioritizing women through this project. First, there is the government's stated reason for implementing the literacy courses, namely, to establish equity in literacy in the country. Second, there is the World Bank's stated argument for involving women in the course, to create civil society, promote equity and gain higher returns on investment by prioritizing women in literacy education. Third, according to the critical point of view, the project can be seen as a means to reproduce existing social relationships.

From the critical point of view, the project maintains existing power relationships in the society by giving women an education that maintained their existing role in society, instead of providing a channel for upward socioeconomic mobility (Papagiannis & Bock, 1983). The use of local languages seems to support this point of view: as was noted by Mamadou Ndoeye,

*“One cannot get a job after having learned a local language” (Civil
Servant)*

The aim of the project was not to give women the skills necessary for obtaining jobs that required French; the aim was to give them the skills to improve families' and communities' living conditions. This could best be done, it was thought, through the

education of women, which would have a larger impact on families' and communities' well-being than the education of men. The needs of women, as seen in a women-in-development perspective (i.e., "how can women help promote development"; see section 2.5 on WID and GAD), were thus linked to the idea of providing a minimum of skills to women, to make them more effective in their households (e.g., teach them how to obtain vaccination and schooling for their children, how to improve household hygiene). Some of the interviewees pointed out that the learning of local languages without the possibility of converting them into French at a later stage was useless – and that such learning was imposed by government policy.

“There are no newspapers and no literature in local languages; it is not useful to learn them. Local languages are learned because they are politically correct” (UNESCO staff).

“There is a big government push for local languages, especially for girls' education. Boys seem to continue learning French. In this way the girls obtain 'literate' status, but not in the official language [French]. The same effort should be given to girls as to boys to get them into [formal] schooling and to keep them there” (Private provider staff).

The official view differed from the above. Senegal had a very high rate of illiteracy, particularly among women. This was mainly linked to cultural and religious reasons; many families did not see the necessity of educating girls. The government's efforts therefore prioritized girls and women – both in literacy courses and in primary school enrollment:

“[...]some of the sites actually refuse to have a primary school. This is due to cultural and religious reasons. Also, most of the villages do not think that education of girls is important” (Civil servant).

“PAPF is prioritizing women. The other projects also prioritize women. This is because the government has opted for a policy of correcting disparities between the genders. PAPF has as objective to enroll 75% of women among its participants, whereas PAPA and some other projects have 65% as target figure for women’s enrollment.¹³² The programs also prioritize women for the positions of supervisor and instructor” (Civil servant).

The use of local languages for literacy courses, seen from this point of view, was due to several reasons. Traditionally, literacy courses had been taught in local languages; it was therefore natural to continue as before. Also, literacy was seen as a tool to obtain information to improve the participants’ daily lives. Finally, the literacy courses were aimed at areas of high illiteracy, where most participants could not speak French. Teaching French literacy in such milieu would have required a long time – both to familiarize the learners with French, and then to train them in writing and reading this foreign language. Many of the enrollees would simply not have had the time to learn both French and literacy at the same time; the opportunity costs would have been too high. Besides, research has proved that people learn better in their own language (Lauglo, 2001); it made sense to focus on local languages to teach literacy and then eventually teach French after the participants had learned how to read and write.¹³³ There

¹³² Statistics showed that about 87% of the learners were women (SAR, 2004).

¹³³ The use of local languages to teach literacy skills as a base for the official language is now being experimented in primary schooling in many, if not most African countries included Senegal.

is a disjunction between the policy and the reality, insomuch as the country lacks a literate environment in local languages (as noted above, all important official documents and most other types of information are in French). Besides, the training of girls and young women in local languages (through literacy training) and boys in French (through primary education) replicate current gender differences and constitute a barrier for women to access work in control and administrative positions. The current increase in girls' enrollment and girls' higher attainment in primary education help correct this situation, whereas the literacy training does not help modify such gender barriers.

The World Bank was occupied by the gender disparities in the country, but considered that local languages would be a better choice for the literacy learners. The project document noted that the PAPF project was complementing pro-women efforts in the primary school sector; these latter were not great enough to offset the gender disparities.¹³⁴ In addition, the World Bank was occupied by the ratio between cost and benefits of a literacy program. A program targeted at women would be more cost effective than a project targeted at men, since it was thought that it would improve the health of the family and of the community, and also increase girls' enrollment in formal

¹³⁴ The World Bank's project document notes, "widespread illiteracy among women is directly related to a historical under-provision of primary education, to financial, cultural, and social constraints that limit girls' school enrollment, and limited education opportunities for teens or adults who missed the opportunity to attend formal school. To expand access to primary education, IDA, the KfW, France and Japan are supporting a five-year program [...] to increase girls' enrollment. This effort alone, however, will be insufficient to significantly lower illiteracy among young women for at least another cohort. Projections suggest that even assuming the objectives for primary education are attained, in the year 2015, still about 45% of teens and young women (aged 15-39) would be literate, and even less in rural areas. The proposed project complements [...] the efforts to expand basic education by supporting the expansion of literacy programs for teenage girls and young women who dropped out, missed the opportunity to attend, or are not yet reached by formal schooling" (SAR, 1996, p. 10).

schooling.¹³⁵ The World Bank's project document also compared the cost effectiveness of literacy education as opposed to primary education: the former is said to be more cost effective (see section 8.5).¹³⁶ The comparison is flawed since it is widely recognized that one cannot substitute primary education with literacy classes. In this case, literacy was considered as a low-cost support for people having fallen outside the formal school system. This was recognized by the World Bank and the Senegalese government, and the main education efforts in the country were therefore directed at the primary education sector.

As opposed to literacy as a tool for emancipation (such as the action-oriented literacy approaches advocate by Freire), this project had the following characteristics: (i) it was socially and politically not threatening because it only offered local-language learning for illiterate people, with a special focus on women; (ii) it was internationally and nationally

¹³⁵ The World Bank's project document notes, "although not supported by empirical analyses, literacy providers in Senegal also contend that school enrollment, particularly for girls, has increased significantly in the villages where programs are operating. An analysis from Senegal of available household surveys (Sadio 1994) also confirms many of the social benefits cited above. It shows that children of illiterate mothers are 50% more likely to die in childhood; illiterate women want 1.8 more children on the same income as literate mothers; and literate mothers are about 50% more likely to send their daughters to school, *ceteris paribus*. With these assumptions, below we estimate the reduction in disease burden, infant mortality and fertility, and the increase in girls' primary school enrollment that could be expected from the Government's literacy program. Table I shows the estimated impact of the program on reducing the disease burden and compares the cost effectiveness of the literacy intervention with the most cost-effective health intervention -- a minimum essential package of clinical services" (SAR, 1996, Annex 2, p. 3).

¹³⁶ "Cost Effectiveness Relative to Primary Education: II. Evidence suggests that schooling requires a much higher level of resources per student than do literacy programs for the same literacy outcomes. In Senegal, over 1,500 hours of instruction in language and mathematics are required to achieve a fourth grade education, i.e. the level assumed to be required to acquire a level of skill sufficient to use and retain over time. This excludes the number of hours invested in students who repeat and those who drop-out before fourth grade. For adults, 200-300 hours of instruction are generally assumed to be needed to acquire an equivalent level of skills mainly because adults acquire the skills with considerably less time on task. Due to the comparatively long duration of primary school, and because teachers' salaries (excluding benefits) are more than triple the earnings of literacy instructors, the cost of producing a graduate from an adult literacy program is significantly less than the investment required to obtain a fourth grade completer" (SAR, 1996, Annex 2, p. 4).

well accepted because it corrected gender disparities; and (iii) it was considered to have high social returns, so the World Bank could invest in it. Moreover, since it transferred new responsibilities to women (e.g., looking after families' and communities' health and hygiene); the project implicitly transferred more work to women.

B) Gender Relations in the Set-up of the Course

The set-up of literacy classes in a village was not automatic. Many communities, for cultural reasons, were hostile to letting women participate in a literacy project. Often, only one or a few villages in a locality accepted the set-up of a literacy project. However, when the other villages saw the results of the literacy project, they also wished to participate. During the integrated phase of the PAPF (from the year 2000 and onwards), the literacy projects were well known and accepted in rural and urban areas (most of the villages that had been hostile to the project changed their mind about it) :

“[During the set-up of courses,] sometimes we meet the women and men separately. When meeting with men, we listen to their problems, but we also try to convince them [about the literacy course]. In the beginning [i.e., several years ago, during the first cohorts], the men were hostile to allowing women to attend the literacy course. Now they are no longer hostile to it” (Private provider staff).

Still some people refused to allow their wives to attend the courses. This was both because of gender issues (the existence of a “jealous” husband) and because of other reasons.¹³⁷ The importance of men’s willingness to let their wives participate was clear from most interviews. One village had particularly good results – and we were informed that:

“The men have supported the women - sometimes some of the women were even pushed [by their husband] to go to class” (Private provider staff).

An elder of the village had been very supportive of the course, which had obtained very interesting results in terms of income-generating activities (by setting up rural micro gardens). He informed us:

“I have four wives and 22 children. All the women have attended literacy class; I have seen nothing but benefits from it” (Villager).

In general, the men’s support was necessary for a course to be set up in any given community. If the men, and especially the elders of the community, were against the course, it was rarely if ever set up.

As time went by, there was a change in the local concept of the literacy course since the providers met less and less resistance to the courses in the villages. It is unclear whether this increasing acceptance was due to a changing view of gender relationships in the

¹³⁷ A curious example of resistance to a course occurred in a village where the villagers had two competing chiefs. One of the chiefs accepted the course; the other refused it. The supporters of one chief let their wives go to the course; the others did not: “The other women in the village [those married to men who were against the literacy course] are sorry not to participate. Their husbands refused to let them join when the course was set up in the village; the reasons for this were mainly political” (Current learner-*relais*). Still, this story shows that male acceptance of the course was necessary before women could enroll.

village – or if the men simply recognized that the literacy course was not threatening and that it did not challenge their supremacy.

C) Power Relationships in the Class

The class structures in the literacy courses were very hierarchal, with the teacher in a dominant position (see pictures 9.3-9.9). Although a majority of the literacy teachers were women,¹³⁸ the course set-up very much emphasized the dominant role of the teacher. The teaching of instrumental activities (reading, writing, math), which represented the majority of the coursework, underlined traditional structures in the society, without letting much space open for group work and peer tutoring. Most of the literacy class consisted in mechanical repetition of what the teacher said, instead of engage in group discussions and group work. Therefore, the courses' teaching methods did in most cases not encourage any questioning of the established gender roles in the society.

During the implementation of the course, men's participation and support were seen as desirable and necessary. In most cases, men were not too interested in the course, because it taught "female" things (especially for the teaching of basic skills and income-generating activities). Nevertheless, the men needed to be involved in the construction of the literacy center, and – generally – in supporting the women's attendance in the course:

¹³⁸ In the sample of the longitudinal studies 60% of the PAPF literacy teachers were women (LS-T0, 2001); in the sample of the impact study 62% PAPF teachers were women against 66% of women teachers in literacy projects nationwide (Impact Study, 2004).

“I first come to see the head of the village, who was accompanied by three men representing the main families of the village. Then the men retired from the process, because it was about ‘female activities,’ such as shop keeping and dyeing. However, the men helped them [the women] to construct a literacy center” (Private provider staff).

Some providers asked men to participate in the course management committee. In most cases, the men were not selected to have any dominant role in the committee, but nevertheless represented the male “power” to get certain things done:

“I ask [the villagers] to include one man in each committee, so that he can help the women to organize activities. For the construction of the CAL, I associate the Chief of the village. It is necessary to associate with the men. The men will do nothing if we don’t associate with them. The man is not the head of the management committee; most often he is the assistant to the secretary” (Private provider staff).

The existing patriarchal power relations were replicated through the teaching methods and course set up. However, the set-up of course management committees to some extent promoted women’s role in society, since the committee members were given specific training. Even when the committees had male members, as in the example above, the women held the leadership positions in the committee. The women holding these leadership functions would receive particular leadership training (see section 10.2). In this way – although the courses in many ways had a traditional hierarchical set-up, they also strengthened female leadership roles through the creation and training of the management committee.

D) Learning Content

The teaching of the courses could strengthen women's roles in the communities, in at least four ways:¹³⁹ (i) the courses could teach about women's rights during civics classes; (ii) the classes could indirectly strengthen the women's role in the society by giving them access to information and teaching new capabilities; (iii) the frequent meeting in the literacy classes could have a social role that strengthened the women's cohesion and relationship in the village; and (iv) the courses could improve girls' enrollment and attendance in primary schooling. These issues will be discussed below.

Although the PAPF leadership recommended teaching civics classes, such classes were not seen as a priority by most provider associations.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, certain providers took the matter of civics seriously. Some taught about voting rights, and some taught about other gender-related issues. According to some civil servants, a rise in voting participation was largely an impact of the literacy classes:

“At an organizational level, literacy helps set up better organizational structures [in the villages] - and provides instruction on rights and obligations of citizens. The literacy programs have led to an important increase in voting during the last 10 years” (Civil servant).

Some providers actively encouraged women to vote:

¹³⁹ All four were observed during fieldwork, and made reference to during the interviews.

¹⁴⁰ Most training sessions for provider personnel focused on procedural aspects of the project. The project's newspaper, *Partage*, also focused on procedures; comparatively little space was given to the learning content of the classes. No reference to gender issues or to civics is found in *Partage*.

“As for civics, our traditions and culture as Serreer are particularly studied. Also, we provide some information about civil law: what is the nation, the republic, how does the administrative structure function, rural taxes, etc. The participants are encouraged to vote in elections” (Private provider staff).

However, most providers stated that they were afraid that such instruction would be too political. Politics were a difficult topic in Senegal and could easily lead to important problems. It would, for example, be difficult if the husband and wife voted for different parties. Voting preferences had been known to create many problems both between individuals and in-between different fractions in the communities, even in remote rural areas. A director of a provider association told:

“I have seen families destroyed by politics. When a couple votes for different parties, there can be serious problems. Literacy can help to improve this [situation]. However, politics belong to one domain; literacy to another. In one village, we had two heads of village, one for each political tendency. We had to open two literacy classes, one for each camp. The formal school was opened under one head of village, and the children of people belonging to the other political tendency would not attend the classes. I had to intervene, and ask the village chiefs to dissociate between education and politics” (Private provider staff).

The statement that politics belong to one domain, literacy to another, shows that the literacy education in Senegal had as specific aim to promote economic growth, and did not question the status quo of the society. It is difficult to be neutral in setting up courses, and self-proclaimed neutrality often hides an agenda: “In the context of history, culture, and politics, I register events not so as to adapt myself to them but so as to change them,

in the physical world itself. I am not impotent. [...] For this reason I do not accept (because it is not possible) the ingenuous or strategically neutral position often claimed by people in education [...] No one can be in the world, with the world, and with others and maintain a posture of neutrality. I cannot be in the world decontextualized, simply observing life” (Freire, 2001, p. 73). As if explicitly disagreeing with Freire, another provider staff stated that:

“As for civics in the curriculum; I think it is a bit dangerous since the providers are often politically connected. I have tried to remain as neutral as I could in my classes. Many of the learners belong to other political orientations [than mine]” (Private provider staff).

Another director of a provider association said that the women in the locality were not registered to vote – and that he was not going to take up this subject with them:

“The women are not registered to vote - and the teachers have not been discussing this issue with them” (Private provider staff).

Most providers instead concentrated on giving general information about Senegal; some ventured to give courses in civil rights, and how to obtain administrative papers (identity papers, birth certificates, marriage licenses, etc.):

“As for civics, some paralegal specialists have provided training for the 7th cohort on rights in marriage, divorce, civil status, rights of renting, heritage laws, etc. These sessions are intended for women, and also help them with such issues as obtaining a national ID card and how to declare children’s’ births - this is necessary for subsequent enrollment to primary school (Private provider staff).

“Some of the participants are getting marriage licenses, even after having being married for 30 years! Also, we teach the women how to obtain children’s birth certificates; now they are pushing their husbands to obtain birth certificates!” (Private provider staff).

Teaching on civics’ issues to strengthen the women’s position was not frequently encountered in the courses; these were still too sensitive topics for most rural areas. However, the women’s position in the village was in many cases improved only by attending the course. The new capabilities, to write, read, and calculate in themselves strengthened the women’s role.

One participant said:

“I think that the immediate effect of the program is that I have a better vision of things; the program has raised awareness, which has made me manage my actions in a better way. In addition to the instrumental knowledge, such as knowing to write my name - which I have known for a long time now - I can also write letters. I can write what I want, and have written to people outside the association” (Current learner).

The learning of the instrumental knowledge not only enabled the women to look after their own accounts, but also to communicate (through telephone and letters) with people outside the village. Their position would be further changed in the cases when the course helped them to undertake income-generating activities (the impact of income-generating activities initiated under the project will be further discussed in section 10.2 below):

“The status of women in the village, in particular, has changed and they are now managing their own funds. They produce soap and tomatoes” (Private provider staff).

Another outcome of the courses was social, and related to the women's inter-relationship within the village. The learners often used the course to discuss problems in the village, and to finding common solutions to these problems. Many interviews pointed to the course's role to solve internal strife:

“The village is more united by the literacy course, and there are less incidents between people” (Current learner).

“The literacy classes made it possible to resolve problems in the community, whereas the French school is a door towards other perspectives” (Villager, whose family members participated in literacy courses).

“The village is much more closely-knit and united than before” (Private provider staff).

The results of the courses cannot be seen in terms of political engagement, or a radical change in civic behavior. The literacy and leadership training had as main goal to stimulate economic growth and thus reduce poverty. The indirect effect of the courses, however, had a positive effect on women's situation in the villages, inasmuch as they had gained more autonomy and skills (e.g., autonomy to telephone / write notes, skills to function better and more autonomously in the marketplace).

E) Impact on Girls' Schooling

There are reasons to believe that the literacy course's content strengthened primary school enrollment in the concerned communities, especially for girls. The World Bank's project document especially underlined that the improvement of girls' education was an

important rationale for the project: “The program is estimated to result in a 23% increase in girl's [primary school] enrollment” (SAR, 1996, p. 5); and “all other things being equal (income, geographic location, ethnicity, etc.), literate mothers are about 50% more likely to send their daughters to school than illiterate mothers” (SAR, 1996, p. 10). The likelihood of literate mothers to send their girls to primary school structures could have several reasons: on the one hand it was a self-selecting mechanism since the mothers who were interested in literacy often wanted her children also to have an opportunity to learn. In addition, the literacy course was supposed to promote children's education issues and especially focus on the necessity to send girls to school. A third reason would have been that some providers taught the participants how to obtain birth certificates; such birth certificates were necessary to enroll children in the formal schools. Finally, the course set-up included a reading and activities center, which in many cases also interested children of school age, both boys and girls:

“The center is a reading center, but it is also a resource center. Anyone in the village can come to the center and read books in the library, where one can find reading materials in both national and other languages [i.e., French]. There are both reading materials for children and Koran-related books for religious people in the village” (Civil servant).

In conclusion, the course selection processes and set-up did not challenge the power relationship between men and women in the local communities. These processes, however, enabled leadership training for some women in the village, thereby strengthening their role in the local society. Also, the learning in itself, both for instrumental skills and for income-generating activities, helped advance the women's

social standing. The learning and literacy education structures (such as the learning and activities' center) aimed at improving children's enrollment, and especially girls' enrollment, into formal schooling. Finally, the social function of the course helped women solve internal problems in the village.

10.2: Gender and Civil Society

As seen in section 4.2, the project had as its objective to create and strengthen civil society associations at a local level, through the strengthening of the women's associations, and by obtaining a legal status for these associations. A second way in which the project contributed to creating civil society was through the strengthening of provider associations. Both of these functions had an impact on women's lives in Senegal, since the former helped strengthening local associations, and the latter made it possible for women's associations to become providers in their own right.

Some women created and led their own provider associations, and the project encouraged all providers to recruit women and women staff members and literacy teachers; this also strengthened women's positions in local life. Most provider associations were new for-profit providers (52%) or cultural and language associations (25%), and it is probable that some of the for-profit associations (GIE) were former groups of literacy recipients (IS, 2004). The longitudinal studies noted that 20% of the studied providers were headed by women; all of these were new GIEs (LS-T0, 2001). Women were also involved in other project-related leadership functions; as seen in section 5.1, each provider association involved women in the courses' management committees and some local women were

asked to function as a *relais*. The following section will first examine the course management committees and *relais* functions, then the local women's associations – and finally the provider associations.

A) The Relais and the Course Management Committee

The management committee (set up from the beginning of the course) supervised the course locally – and subsequently also the *relais* was involved in the running of literacy activities. As seen in Section 6.1, the *relais* were selected in the beginning or during the course's implementation – and received special training by the provider. Specific training helped *relais* to improve their literacy knowledge and administration skills, and also, in some circumstances, it assisted them in gaining access to credit.¹⁴¹ The training often led to the subsequent recruitment of the *relais* as a literacy teacher in a next cohort of subprojects (several of the literacy teachers interviewed during the field work confirmed that they had been former *relais* – and the PCU confirmed that this was a normal phenomenon).

The *relais* position – even if it did not as intended ensure ongoing literacy activities in the village after the course had ended – was therefore the stepping-stone for one or two persons in each community; in many cases it enabled them to continue a development-related activity (many *relais* were recruited as staff for other providers or development projects). Since the *relais* were almost exclusively women, this new function (which was

¹⁴¹ Several of the provider associations' staff members said in interviewees that the *relais* had received (personal) access to credit as a compensation for the free work they provided in organizing learning activities in the literacy center.

apparently created by the PAPF) led to an opening for women in leading positions for community development.

This strengthening of women's positions was also noticeable for members of the course management committee, who received specific training from the provider. The course management committees usually had a president, a secretary, and a treasurer. In most cases the training, called "leadership training," was targeted at these three functions (president, a secretary, and treasurer). The work of the management committee could also give them useful experience in supervision and finance. Usually, the members of the committee were involved in general course monitoring, and also in financial matters related to the course fees and income generating activities:

"The management committees are monitoring the learning and the income generating activities, and they are not chosen among the members of the women's association but among the participants in the literacy course. [...] These people [members of the management committee] will tell anybody who is not concentrating during the class to stop talking, or would give a 100 or 150 FCFA fine to those coming too late for the class. Also, the management committee is monitoring payments for IGA and reimbursement of loans. There are usually three members of the management committee, and they receive a special training. After we have trained the relais, we will train them; it is what we call the leaders' training. There are three functions in the management committee, president, treasurer, secretary; they are the same functions as in the women's association" (Private provider).

The collective nature of the management committee's work led to a different development of the committee than of the *relais*. The management committee was

strengthened through management training given by the provider. Often the training of the management committee led to the structuring of the class itself as a for-profit association, i.e., the class set up a GIE which was different from the local women's association. This GIE would most often continue collective work on the income-generating activities that they had learned during the course (see section 5.1).

As noted above, the management committee had financial responsibilities, since it was responsible for the payment of the financial contributions of the participants [2,500FCFA or about \$4 from each participant] – and it was also sometimes responsible for the use of these funds:¹⁴²

“A [course] management committee is elected, and they are put in charge of the construction of the literacy center. The participants contribute with 2,500 FCFA per person, which is managed by the management committee and most often used to purchase materials for the learning center” (Private provider staff).

In many cases, the management committee was responsible for purchasing materials for the course's income generating activities (IGA), and for other activities generated as a part of the course. This could ultimately, as have been seen above, lead the class to establish a for-profit association (GIE) with the literacy course participants as members:

“This is a part of Senegal where there is a lot of fishing. Prior to the course, we had to use an intermediate person to go to the market and buy fishing materials for us. We lost a lot of money in doing that. Now, we can

¹⁴² In many cases, the management committee also turned the money over to the provider, e.g., one supervisor told that “in every class; every week the participants gave 200 or 150 FCFA to the management committee - and after a couple of months we could go and collect the money,” (Private provider staff).

buy it ourselves; it is the management committee that is doing it” (Private provider staff).

All these experiences led to some enfranchisement of women’s position in the communities; for example, women increasingly emerged in leadership positions in provider associations. The PAPF thus helped generate women’s leadership capabilities within the village, both by training *relais* and by creating course management committees. It is possible that these functions had a greater social and economic impact than the literacy training itself.

B) The Local Women’s Associations

The local women’s associations were in some cases structured, and in other cases they were loosely knit associations. The provider had, in the integrated approach, an obligation to help obtaining a judicial recognition of the association:

“Previously, the association did not have legal status and had no structure. It was rather conducted as separate meetings between women than it was association” (Private provider staff).

Women’s associations were not a new thing in Senegal, but built on an ancient socio-religious distinction between men and women. They were often linked to financial networks (*tontines*) and had regular meetings. In analyzing Senegalese financial networks, Kane notes, “Senegalese society has been profoundly shaped by the legacy of patrilineal social structures and the Muslim religion, which assigns women primacy in the domestic sphere and men the dominant role in the public sphere. [...] The female-run associations represent, above all, socially acceptable spaces where women may freely

join together, without male interference, to resolve common problems” (Abdoulay Kane, 2001, p. 304).

The participation in such structure by itself – was a first step in women’s struggle for an improved condition. It may contribute to help them to achieve more financial autonomy, and also encouraged travel, participation in meetings, in training sessions, etc.:

“We are sometimes asked to come to see the provider in Louga. Also, when I go to Louga to buy dyes, I also pass by the provider to say hello. Often the provider is organizing meetings at the end of the month - where we discuss the subprojects. The last such meeting took place two months ago. We spoke about issues concerning dyeing, raising cattle, and also on the [revolving] funds” (Former learner/relais).

“The associations [...] include all the women from 50 to 15 years. These are the women who work. Those who do not participate are very few, sometimes they are very poor, or sometimes they have a very jealous husband. When you tell him that you need to go to Fatick and get funding for the association, or go to training sessions, or meet with the provider, he [the husband] refuses it. [...] When you are in the association, sometimes you need to stop the work and go to the class and sometimes you have to participate financially. Some people don’t or can’t do it. The associations have meetings; a treasurer a secretary and a president. Sometimes they need to speak with the members on financial or other issues, so the women need to stop working and meet together. There are women who cannot do it, and there are also husbands who don’t like it. Some husbands are also very naive and think that their wives will be too intellectual when they attend the association’s meetings” (Private provider staff).

These associations had both financial and social value, and led to increasing social capital (especially since it contributed to the creation of trust in-between its members).¹⁴³ Also, since the movement involved women, it strengthened their position in the communities – and may have helped to change power relationships between men and women.

As seen above, the local women's associations obtained a legal status as a result of the provider's intervention; this was one of the aims of the project. This legal status was frequently obtained at great costs for its members, since evidence from interviews shows that local administrative structures in most cases requested special fees¹⁴⁴ to establish the legal documents for the new associations. Even though the legal documents of the association were expensive and required payment of \$2 - \$5 per member (in addition to the fee for the course), it enabled the women's association to negotiate development activities directly with funding agencies, international and national ones:¹⁴⁵

“The legal status makes it possible for the association to open a bank account, obtain a loan, and to work directly with financial sponsors. In the 1980s, most members of different associations did not understand the advantages of obtaining a legal status” (Private provider staff).

¹⁴³ Many interviewees underlined the reduction of internal dispute as a result of the set-up of women's associations.

¹⁴⁴ In many cases the civil servants in Senegal require two payments for work: one is his or her salary for the job he or she is supposed to do; the second payment is the “encouragement” necessary to make him or her actually do it. This system has made it difficult for the World Bank to implement certain activities, since it has a very strict policy of not paying extra salaries to government officials. Many other international organizations and NGOs, however, do not have such strict policies, and pay the government officials for providing support to “their” projects. To obtain a legal status, the government “stamp” to register the association costs 2,000 FCFA (about US\$4); in addition the Clerks Office generally requested an additional payment of 25 - 75,000 (US\$50 – 150) for writing a notice of the status of the association and for “doing the paperwork”.

¹⁴⁵ For comparison, the poverty limit was set at an income of \$253 per year. See section 8.3.

This enfranchisement of the women's associations helped strengthen the status of women both at local and national levels. Since the associations with formal registration papers were free to engage in direct communications with funding agencies such as international NGOs, they could in theory bypass government bottlenecks and work directly with these associations. Funding agencies, however, were less free to subcontract directly with the women's associations – since the government officials in many cases wanted to control the processing of funds and the implementation of the activity. Such control may have constituted an inhibiting factor for local development, especially in cases where decentralization efforts transferred unchecked power to local administration units.

The women's associations, by obtaining legal status, were free to submit proposals for implementing literacy courses (or implementing other social services that were formerly carried out by the state). Many associations thus became literacy providers on their own right. The longitudinal and impact studies do not give an indication as for the number of local women's associations that became providers. Field work and interviews do not give any statistically valid information. It was frequent, however, to meet either women's association that had become providers, or former relais that had become literacy teachers or obtained some other development-related work in the village.

C) The Provider Associations

As seen above, the creation of women's associations had as its main focus to discuss women's issues (and to solve women-related problems). Different PAF actions (training sessions, seminars, etc.) also had as aim to build the capacity of provider staff.

With the emergence of officially recognized women's associations, these associations increasingly gained access to funding. The longitudinal study found that 20% of provider associations were led by women (i.e., they had female directors and coordinators). Of these, all but one had less than three years of experience, signifying that they were relatively new associations. As for financial managers of provider staff, 37% were women. Only 9%, however, of the sampled supervisors were women.¹⁴⁶ The percentage of female literacy teachers, however, showed that 60% of the sampled teachers were women (LS-T0, 2001). We have seen in chapter 4.3 that one initial idea of the project was to use local associations for implementation of subprojects and thereby strengthen local civil society. The emergence of local women's associations as providers particularly fit this vision.

All provider association staff received project training. The PCU was the main agent responsible for training provider staff, and conducted specific training sessions for coordinators, supervisors, and financial managers. Financial management training provided by AGETIP complemented training of this latter category (the financial training specifically aimed at instructing provider staff in accounting procedures required by the AGETIP to manage a subproject). The project thus helped the providers both with human resource building and also with the acquisition of materials that enabled the providers to function better:

¹⁴⁶ This may be due to the fact that the supervisors were frequently required to travel. They were most often given a motorbike, and regularly visited all the course sites to monitor what was going on. Such positions, due to security reasons and due to the tradition, were often deemed "unfit" for women.

“We have also organized training sessions for each of the providers involved in the project. Hence, the coordinator, the supervisors and the financial manager of each provider have received training. In addition, in the subproject proposal, the providers include a training plan for their personnel. This training is paid by the project financing, i.e., it is included in the global budget for the subproject [which is financed by the PAPF]. In addition, we are providing institutional support for the providers, which is making it possible for them to purchase a motorbike or a car or a boat - according to their needs. It is also enabling them to purchase office materials. Many providers have a computer, which is purchased through the institutional support given by the PAPF” (Civil servant).

As has been seen above, a large part of the training sessions aimed at provider staff members, involved women staff. The partnership approach’s boosting of the development of civil society organizations was therefore likely to promote increasing female participation in national civil society associations – and thereby strengthening women’s position in the society as a whole. The project both improved women’s basic knowledge (literacy, skills...) at an individual level and was instrumental in creating a civil society that is aware of women’s issues and that is also increasingly being run by women. The result was an emerging and gradual consciousness of development issues at local level:

“The literacy programs in themselves have been important in shaping a consciousness of citizenship, and a sentiment of belonging to the country. After attending literacy classes, participants enroll their children in school. They look for an education for their children. They also ask for local health offices, because they would like to ensure that their children are healthy. In the courses, they have discussed about education, they have discussed about

health, and they have discussed about the environment. Not all these questions are understood at the same time, but they make people gradually aware of their place in the society” (Civil servant).

However, the women’s role was seen as a support for economic growth, and not as a target for empowerment. As noted in section 2.5, the courses rather “focused on what women did for development, rather than what is did for them” (Heward & Bunwaree, 1999 p. 1). The core achievements of the PAPF in helping development reach women, was maybe not so much the courses’ training, but rather, the organizational impact of the courses:

“The organization of the participants is at the core [le socle] of the program; or the strengthening of the organizational capacities of the participants is a core activity of the program, because when the association has a structure, a life, an action plan, then something sustainable can be built” (Civil servant).

In conclusion, this chapter analyzed how the project contributed to a changed role and perception of women in the family and in society. Many communities, for cultural reasons, were in the beginning hostile to letting their women participate in a literacy project. As time went by, there was a change in the local concept of the literacy course and the providers met less and less resistance to the courses. It is unclear whether this increasing acceptance was due to a changing view of gender relationships in the village – or if men simply recognized that the literacy course was not threatening and that it did not challenge their supremacy.

The course had an effect on women's issues both through the literacy training and also through training of local women in leadership and management. The local course management committee was set up by the participants, and its members (all of whom were women) received particular leadership training by the provider. Often the training of the management committee led to the structuring of the class itself as a for-profit association (GIE). This GIE would most often continue collective income-generating activities that had been learned during the course, but the association would also in certain cases become literacy providers in their own right. Additionally, specific training helped *relais* to improve their literacy knowledge and administration skills. The training often led to the subsequent recruitment of the *relais* as a literacy teacher in a next cohort of subprojects.

The classes in some rare cases supported women's rights through teaching about them during civics classes. Most often however, the classes indirectly strengthened the women's role in the society (to various degrees) by giving women access to information and teaching them new competencies. Also, and more importantly, the frequent meeting of women during literacy classes had a social role that strengthened the women's solidarity and relationship in the village.

The government's reason for implementing the literacy courses with a special focus on women was to establish gender equity in literacy in the country. According to a critical point of view, however, this can be disputed and the project can be seen as a means to maintain existing social relationships by giving poor women a poor education. However, generally, the impact of the project seems to go beyond the maintenance of existing

gender relationships, because of the aforementioned (and government-required) leadership training that was to take place as an obligatory part of the subprojects. This training had as its specific objective to train leaders of women associations and the management committee to take a more active part in guiding local development. The next chapter will further explore how these associations have understood and guided local development.

Chapter 11: Development Impact

The first part of the chapter investigates perspectives of development of the Senegalese participants – and compares it with the perspective of the World Bank. The second part analyzes the project’s impact on participants’ income, and the third part studies the courses’ impact on community health and hygiene.

11.1: The Concept of Development

The concept of development varied according to the type of interviewees. In this section, we will consider the point of view of the participants, the providers, the Senegalese government, and the World Bank.

A) Providers and Participants’ Concept of Development

Most providers and participants linked development to an improvement of their daily lives. Often development was associated with an increased income. Many of the practical activities that the community viewed as steps towards development were offered as practical IGA lessons connected to the literacy course:

“The reason that I come to the classes is that they have helped trigger a development process. Development - that’s first of all knowledge and tools

for conducting economic activities, such as micro-gardening, commercial activities (small shop keeping), dyeing, etc.” (Current learner).

Since the providers and the learners were involved in the literacy course, it also felt natural for them to link development and literacy. Most concepts of literacy were relatively simple, and the participants related literacy to an improved life through having a higher income:

“Development is seen as an individual’s progress from a state “a” to a state “b” in which he or she is better off socially, economically, and culturally” (Private provider staff).

“Development is that the needs of the population and the individuals can be satisfied. It is achieved through education: knowledge of how to cultivate, how to write, how to find a solution to one’s problems. It is to earn money from our activities and to be able to save a bit for the future” (Private provider staff).

The connection between literacy and development was not clearly seen; most people thought that “literacy was the key to development” but did not know why. Many of the providers did not have a clear concept about the integration between literacy and development activities required by the PAPF, and often offered two sets of classes (or activities); one set of traditional literacy classes, and separate income-generating activities.

The connection between literacy and development was sometimes seen in the literate persons’ greater possibility of communication, which could lead to an improved connection between funding agencies (e.g., international NGOs) and the communities.

Contact between funding agencies and communities would of course be difficult without having someone literate in the village.¹⁴⁷ One provider explained how literacy could help promote the villages' development in the short term:

“Literacy is a big step ahead towards development for the village. In one [project] village where the people had no knowledge [prior to the course], the women organized an association functioning like a “mutuelle” (a Mutual Social Benefits Society). They wrote a letter to Plan International to request assistance to improve sanitation in the village” (Private provider staff).

Some providers had a more long-term view of the benefits of the literacy course, and saw it as a part of a knowledge base needed for a better life. These providers often strived to integrate development and literacy activities in the subprojects, rather than seeing the subproject as a 300-hours literacy course with a separate 150-hours “activities” part. Such courses often introduced ideas about environmental effects of the development process. Principles of justice, just distribution of resources, and of liberty and citizenship were taught:

“Development is to promote humans. For me, development has no sense except if it makes human individuals better off. People’s autonomy and liberty in all domains are also part of development - as a step towards confidence between people - and peaceful cohabitation. Human resources need to be competent and purposeful; those are the two essential qualities that must arm the citizens in their daily concerns and problems. Literacy projects must be centered on these issues. The content of literacy classes

¹⁴⁷ Also, (written) legal registration papers were a prerequisite to work directly with funding agencies.

should be centered on functional skills, on all the needs and concerns of the target participants. In addition to the functionality of the program; the literacy course must also make the participants have a life that is much more in harmony with the environment” (Private provider staff).

“I see development as bringing people together in order to build capacity and make life more livable. It is to help people help themselves, and to seek a more just distribution of resources, without destroying the environment. [...]

One of my predecessors here said that [setting up] the library is the best form of development. It is a base of resources; now it is up to the people to make use of them” (Private provider staff).

Many providers with a more pondered view of literacy and development services had a long experience (sometimes through former work with development projects, or through international experience and exposure). The opinions of these providers were almost identical of civil servants’ definitions of development. They expressed less concern about the short-term income, and were more concern about the long-term effect of development. Sometimes one had the impression that these providers were remote from the populations’ daily needs, and had a somewhat idealized view of development (this can be partly explained by the fact that many directors of provider associations were physically absent from the field, and they had supervisors and coordinators who oversaw the actual work).

B) The Senegalese Government's Concept of Development

The notion of development generated a long discussion during the establishment of the PAPF project. The discussion was at that point intimately linked with the question of local languages, since literacy in French meant that it would be possible for the participants to get a paid job, and thereby a higher salary. This, maintained Mamadou Ndoye, was not necessarily the objective of development:

“We discussed this question recurrently in the context of faire-faire. Many people asked ‘why should we teach in local languages, since someone cannot get a job after having learned a local language?’. Most people think that the aim of education is to obtain a paid job. We had to explain that if we want to achieve development, development is first of all the capacity of the population to be aware of a number of essential questions, e.g., how one can take care of one’s own health, and that of the family and the community, through the knowledge to prevention and hygiene, as well as nutrition. That is development. Understanding that destroying the natural environment has severe consequences for today and tomorrow, and knowledge to preserve it; that is development. Use traditional production methods as a basis for evolving towards modern production methods; that is development. Knowledge of the citizens’ rights, and demand that the local authorities respect those rights; that is development. Knowledge in order to organize the community to collectively take charge of school-related and health-related issues, so as to improve the well-being of people; that is development” (Civil servant).

Short-term financial gains were not included in the above-mentioned definition of development. Economic gains were the single top priority of the local participants and of most providers that lived close to the participating communities (for example, short-term

economic gain was often promoted by the women's associations that had become providers).¹⁴⁸ These people lived a harsh daily life, and were preoccupied with getting enough food to feed the family at least once a day. High-level officials, on the other hand, had a less immediate view of development – and needed to plan on a long-term basis for other people.

In the beginning, the PAPF project was set up very much according to Mamadou Ndoye's definition of literacy, to provide a package of basic knowledge to the community. This skills package changed when the project management more and more realized that the population requested some income-generating activities as a part of the course, to cope with the issue of income. The understanding of development, according to the current leader of the Department of Literacy (Alassane Ndiaye) is much more based on the popular concept of development as short-term economic improvements accompanied by longer-term development effects:

“I define development as an improvement of the life of the community. There are several elements that should be taken into account; first there is the access to health services for the community. Then there is the set-up of income-generating activities, access to clean water and to food. To obtain development - we must set up means to realize this, using small projects that can initiate and catalyze such processes. The actions need to be based on a prior needs assessment in the area. It is necessary to build everything on the needs of the grassroots level, and not depart from the needs of the base. The project must not be ‘parachuted’ from the top down” (Civil servant).

¹⁴⁸ The longitudinal study found that 46% of the communities involved in the program were interested in improvement of the income, whereas only 28% expected a higher literacy rate in the community.

Mamadou Ndoye's environmental concerns and the emphasis on citizen rights were less prioritized. The subprojects became more focused on income-generating activities:

“We saw that we needed something else to retain the learners in the classes, because the attendance was not good. We had to improve the courses to interest the local associations and illiterate people. So we set up income generating learning programs, which taught the learners a craft, such as sewing, micro-gardening, or dyeing. Such activities are generating funds for the local associations, which is of interest for them” (Private provider staff).

“Even if there were government programs today, they would have been focused on IGA since government policy is making a priority of this issue” (Private provider staff).

The integrated approach, which became the main implementation modality after 1999, according to the interviewees, was much “better” than other approaches, because it included learning about income-generating skills. One participant who had attended a prior “non-integrated” course also enrolled in an integrated course, because she wanted to learn income-generating skills. It may appear that the learning of income-generating skills are more important than environment and civics education, since the marginal utility of food is higher than that of knowledge about the environment and about one's rights. However, one can also argue that the marginal utility of food is decreased if the environment is destroyed, or if one is living in a lawless society.¹⁴⁹ The need of finding

¹⁴⁹ This argument can be used to criticize projects with a short-term development vision which does not take into account possible long-term depletion of natural resources: “We may argue that for rich people with a low MU [marginal utility] for goods in general, the relative importance for N [natural funds] is high, but that for the poor, the MU of goods still outweighs the MU of N. That may be the case in certain circumstances, and it is certainly what institutions like the World Bank consider realistic. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE).

solutions that fulfill both short-term needs and a long-term development vision was partially achieved in the integrated project, where income-generating activities were coupled with learning that could promote more long-term development (e.g., a few providers offered courses in civics, and in women's rights).

C) The World Bank's Vision of Development

The World Bank and other international organization's stated views of development are reflected in the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which include eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, improving education and ensuring gender equity, and safeguarding the environment (see section 2.1). The World Bank's World Development Report for 2004 stated that the means of obtaining these goals is based on (i) economic growth (which in itself often is reducing natural resources) and (ii) resource transfers from developed to developing countries.¹⁵⁰ The transfer of funds must be accompanied by reforms in service delivery – to make the services reach all people, including the poor. Since government methods for service delivery often are failing, one should consider alternative delivery methods. The first alternative delivery method mentioned, is contracting out of services “to the private sector, to NGOs, and even to other public agencies” (WDR, 2004, p. 5). The World Bank's vision of development is therefore

But it need not be. Even food bought by the poor has low marginal utility if the poor are being choked by poisonous air and fried by UV radiation” (Daly & Farley, 2004, p. 154). A similar argument may be used to argue for civics education as a part of the project.

We also note that in Senegal, natural resources are frail; the desertification increase through use of firewood. Senegal's northern part lies in the Sahelian zone and has less than 500 mm of annual rainfall (see also Atlas of Africa, 2000, p. 154).

¹⁵⁰ The WDR 2004 cites estimates of these resource transfers at the level of US\$40 to \$60 billion a year. (WDR, 2004, p. 3).

intimately linked to the delivery process. As noted above, these are more often than not linked to private or civil society delivery of services. In this context, the MDG 8 promotes market access.¹⁵¹

This connection between market processes and development goals was reflected in the PAPF project document which, as seen in chapter 4, stated that the financing was conditional on the use of outsourcing since the World Bank was particularly concerned by “the specter of Government becoming more involved in providing literacy programs” (SAR, 1996, p. 7). The project objectives stated in the project document reflected how the process was a part of outcome; the main objective of the project was therefore not only to lower illiteracy but to “to pilot a strategy which supports non-governmental literacy providers to expand their programs with the aim of lowering the illiteracy [...] Other objectives include: (i) ensuring the sustainability of literacy skills, and (ii) strengthening the capacity of the private sector to deliver effective programs, and the capacity of the public sector to monitor, evaluate and coordinate sector investments” (SAR, 1996, p. 10). Pro-market reforms were therefore an integral part of the project, and a main outcome of the activities to be implemented. The PAPF completion report praises the original project document’s consistency with Senegal’s poverty reduction goals, which is emphasizing “wealth creation through economic reforms and private sector development” (ICR, 2004, p. 3).¹⁵² Concerns related to an environment-conscious

¹⁵¹ The Millennium Development Goal 8 states: “Develop a global partnership for development: Raise official development assistance. Expand market access.” (WDR, 2004, p. 2).

¹⁵² The PAPF’s completion report underlined that the initial project goals were well aligned with the World Bank’s strategy for Senegal: (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE).

development – or to changes in the proportional distribution of wealth were absent – as were references to voting behavior and civic participation.

11.2: Economic Impact

The economic impact of the course may be examined at several levels. The organization of women in for-profit organizations (GIEs) in many cases improved the production of goods and agricultural products in the communities – and the set-up of course management committees also in some cases had a positive impact on earnings.

In addition to the economic impact the organization of the learners could have, the courses also were likely to generate an economic impact through three means: (a) the participants learned to calculate; (b) the participants learned income-generating activities; and (c) the participants sometimes obtained access to credit. The economic impact of these three means will be discussed in the sections below.

“The Project Development Objectives (PDO) [of the PAPF] were clear and relevant because:

- (a) *They are well aligned with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS).* The CAS (March 2003) supports the Government’s PRSP [Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, established with assistance of the World Bank], focusing on the following axes: (i) wealth creation for economic growth and capacity building, and (ii) development of social services for more equity. The project promoted equal access of women to educational opportunities.
- (b) *They are consistent with the current Government objectives.* The project’s objective links closely to the Government’s current objectives to the sector as defined in the PRSP and PDEF [the Government’s education program, which is supported by the World Bank]. The PRSP (June 2002) has three fundamental pillars: (i) wealth creation through economic reforms and private sector development; (ii) capacity building and development of basic social services; and (iii) improving living conditions of vulnerable groups.”

(ICR, 2004, p. 2-3).

A) The Ability to Calculate

In Senegal, economic life (and also, very often, social life) is connected to market activity. The market is situated in a community area where local shopkeepers are selling articles (such as cloth, clothes, soap, beauty products and a variety of other products); and where local farmers come to sell their produce. The market activities concern both men and women – and characterized as a privileged commercial place for women. Some small-scale retail businesses (with very low profit margins) are also operated out from the homes of the vendors (Riss, 1989).

One interview in a rural area indicated that illiterate women in that particular area of Senegal did not participate in the market activities since they did not know numbers. Commercial activities in Senegal revolve around bargaining, and knowledge of numbers, prices and basic calculation is necessary to participate in any market activity. The first impact of learning how to calculate also an important social enfranchisement of women; they were now able to participate in market activities:

“Previously, they did not go to the market; now they know how to manage their money” (Private provider staff).

In other areas the course participants (even illiterate) would know how to engage in commercial activities. However, after attending the course, they stated that they knew how to make a profit:

“We didn’t notice that many women practiced commercial activities before [literacy courses became widespread]; now they are doing it much more.

[...] For example; when importing cloth from Mali, they now know how to calculate the price per square meter, they know the transport costs - and then know how much to charge for it to make a profit” (Civil servant).

Former and current learners told that the bookkeeping lessons of the course had helped them to calculate profits. In many cases, they had lost money because they had sold their products at a loss, without knowing how to calculate earnings. A former learner told:

“We did not know how to manage funds - now we know [i.e., how to calculate expenses and profits]. Before, we bought like this, sold like that without knowing whether or not we had made any profit. Now we know how to study the market, that is, how to sell higher than we bought” (Former learner).

In chapter 9, the literacy outcomes of the project were discussed. The chapter concluded with the statement that the literacy outcomes (in terms of instrumental skills, i.e., reading and writing) of the project were very modest. Some interviews indicated, however, that even the modest skills they had learned had improved their daily lives. Many learners’ literacy requirements (seen from a socio-cultural or needs-based literacy definition) were low, because the environment was poor and illiterate. In such an environment even the most basic literacy skills would help the learners to overcome barriers in the market. One older learner told:

“Today, I know how to decipher words. I can also calculate prices for my shop, and see whether I have a profit or lose money when I sell things. Maybe I can’t understand all that is taught since I am so old. However, what I have learnt has helped me a lot” (Current learner).

During field observation it was clear that although limited, the literacy skills obtained fulfilled an important function for most of the learners:

The curriculum has been improved as compared to earlier literacy courses; there are more books in the learning center, and the providers conduct classes in small shop keeping. The learners in one class showed me a writing book in which it was indicated who had borrowed money, how much they had borrowed and how much they had reimbursed” (from the Field Journal).

B) Income-generating Activities

Classes in income-generating activities accompanied the literacy-skill learning sessions. As seen in section 5.1, the participants were to choose the income-generating activities; and the provider would then help organize courses on the subject chosen by the participants. In practice, the provider could not support complicated activities that required an important investment (the PAPF allowed only a limited amount of money to be used for income-generating activities); hence, only low-cost activities were chosen. Sometimes the providers draw in experts to give classes on these activities;¹⁵³ sometimes they used their own personnel to do it.

“The participants choose their IGA; sometimes they want to raise ox, but we usually don’t do that because it is expensive. Most often we do chicken farming, shop keeping, and dyeing. The women choose these activities

¹⁵³ The providers often asked local civil servants to give these lessons. The use of local civil servants had the additional advantage of giving the provider goodwill at the local administration offices. Such goodwill was important for receiving a good evaluation at the projects’ end – and it was also important for future selection of subproject proposals. Having a good connection meant that the probability for receiving new financial support was higher.

themselves. We can't choose for them; if we had chosen activities that they have never done, it wouldn't work. We help them improve their knowledge, so that they can perform better. For raising chicken for example, we ask a specialist to come and give classes. Often the expert comes from the relevant administrative structure. Also, we call in experts to train the literacy teachers" (Private provider staff).

The activities often concentrated on local production activities, such as fishing, farming, and raising chicken. In addition to these locality-specific activities, there were also activities of a more general nature that were not specific to the learners' local production activities. These activities included soap production, dyeing of clothes, knitting, and sewing. In addition, many women kept stands in the local markets or had permanent shops, and therefore wanted to learn more about shop keeping:

"They had chosen to focus on shop keeping, dyeing and oil extraction for the skills activities in the course. The provider helped them with training in dyeing and soap making – the supervisor of the provider was an expert in soap making [and gave lessons on the subject]" (Private provider staff).

"Generation V and VI learned to make conserves out of fruit - and they continue to this day" (Private provider staff).

Some learners and providers used a lot of originality in defining activities and in making them work. One provider in the suburbs of Dakar found that the cost of vegetables was very high in that area of the city. The provider helped the learners to set up urban micro gardens to produce fresh vegetables (see picture 11.1).

Picture 11.1: Urban micro gardens in Dakar



The concept of micro gardens proved very popular; so the local women’s association taught other women’s associations about it, and also set up a network of micro-gardening associations:

“In the literacy course, they organized cultivation of micro-gardens in urban centers, providing the participants with vegetables (both for personal consumption and for possible sale). A federation of GIEs tried to teach other associations about micro-gardening” (Private provider staff).

Another provider made a network that connected the course villages, and organized exchange visits in between the learners, so that they could compare what they had learnt with each other:

“We have exchanges between the villages; every center shows another what they have done in dyeing” (Private provider staff).

The same provider association also set up prizes for the best outcome of the classes. PAPP’s financing of providers using the integrated approach included funds for income-generating activities. Not all providers were equally engaged in such income-generating activities. In many villages, the only provider intervention in income generating skill teaching, was that the provider gave the local women’s association the money (in cash) that the PAPP had earmarked for income-generating activities, and told the association members to use these funds for income-generating activities (in practice, they could use it to whatever they wanted). Interviews indicated that in such situations the participants distributed the funds among themselves, and used them for setting up their own activities, often with a meager outcome. One *relais* told that,

*“The provider gave some classes in management, and gave each course 45,000 FCFA, which was distributed among the learners [about 1,500FCFA per person] to buy small products to sell, such as soap, spices, etc. We set a day for repayment. All the products were sold for 60,000FCFA, for which we bought new products. Each learner chose to focus on the products that had had most successful sales” (Current learner/relais).*¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ In US\$, the provider gave each course about \$90, which was distributed among the learners at a rate of \$3 per person. All the products were sold for \$120. This profit must have been low in view of the opportunity costs involved in the activity. Also, the learning outcome must have been low, since the provider did not accompany them through the organization of the shopkeeping activities.

The outcome of the buying and selling activities generated a surplus that was reinvested. Nevertheless, this surplus was not high enough to make a big difference in the participants' life— and it was not the objective of the course to fund such activities.

In most cases the provider used the funding to train the participants in income-generating activities – and then helped them to obtain credit to invest in these activities. Such training and facilitation corresponded to the PAPF objective – and it was often successfully implemented (according to the longitudinal studies, 73% of the learners did achieve mastery of the functional skills they had decided to learn).

C) Need for Credit

The providers' role was to train participants in income-generating activities – and to connect them to financial networks. The communities' need for credit seemed large; each village that had been connected to financial networks (rural credit) were positive about it, and eager to borrow more money.¹⁵⁵ The credit was shared either between all the course participants, or it functioned as a revolving fund, lending money to individuals over a limited time period (most often ranging from 3 to 6 months). The *relais* in many cases had a priority in borrowing funds (as a compensation for services rendered). In some cases the *relais* seemed to monopolize the access to credit:

¹⁵⁵ In some cases, when they were connected to a network that could only lend them a small amount of money, they were less enthusiastic. In such cases the women's association normally used the funding as a revolving fund – and gave all the money to one or two individuals in the association. In some cases, however, the women's association opted to give all a share – in which case the women complained that the amount was so low that there was “more work than profit in investing it”.

“We have set up a network with “Action Plus” - which is a big NGO and a financial network. The president of this NGO has worked with my provider. He has said that each of our classes that are involved in IGA can come and make a loan. They give from 100 - 500.000¹⁵⁶ per course - it is the participants who decide how much they want to borrow. If the course participants estimate that 200,000 is what they can reimburse, or 300,000, or 100,000, they ask for it. Right now there are two relais who have asked for financing. They have asked for about 400,000 each. They are doing marsh farming and also make milk products. There are others who do agro-forest work, or other activities - there are many activities” (Private provider staff).

Since most of these credit schemes were linked to small financial networks – often led by private rural credit provider organizations – or by individuals, the fee for the loan was very high. The FCFA was marked by a high degree of stability during the project period since it was linked to French Francs, and then to the Euro. Despite this stability, the usual interest rate was at 10% per 6 months, or 20% per year:

“A group of relais comes together twice a month. They can borrow 500,000 FCFA¹⁵⁷ each from the GIE for 6 months, with an interest rate of 10% for the 6 months” (Private provider staff).

With a good investment, the women could outperform the heavy cost of the credit. Especially, during interviews, investment in real estate was said to be profitable, since prices soared, especially in and around urban centers. The risk of investment, nevertheless, seemed high (especially in view of the high interest rates). Despite the

¹⁵⁶ Corresponding to US\$200 - \$1,000 per course.

¹⁵⁷ About US\$1,000.

seemingly high risk, none of the interviews indicated that there had been any default in payment – or any other problems linked to the credit. Non-payment would have made the defaulting person a social outcast since it would negatively affect the credit rating of the whole community and/or bar possibilities for credit for the whole community.

The linkages to financial networks were not a PAPF invention, and the World Bank project document did not indicate anything about micro-credit. The use of financial networks, often called *tontine* in French – dated back to pre-colonial times (Abdoulay Kane, 2001). These networks were informal financing system that existed side-by-side with the informal economic sector. They were rooted in mutual gifts system (see section 5.1). The PAPF project thus built on use of traditional financing methods, since access to credit in the formal financial system was difficult, if not impossible: “Senegalese banks systematically deny credit to the vast majority of citizens. Two deterrent factors are at work here: on the one hand, credit-granting conditions make the poorer social classes ineligible for loans and, on the other, complex banking procedures alienate a population with an illiteracy rate of more than 70 per cent” (Kane, 2001, p. 308).

Women had at least three problem in obtaining credit: (i) illiteracy made it difficult for many women to understand banking procedures; (ii) culturally and economically, women were dependent on men, at least in the formal and public arena (under which the “official” banks would be categorized); and (iii) male dominance and gender discrimination were visible in property rights; property was therefore often registered in the husband’s name. Women therefore often lacked means to establish loan collateral. As seen above, the PAPF responded to these problems by (i) increasing female literacy

rate (although not in French, the language used by the banking system), and (ii) connecting women to informal financial networks.

11.3: Impact on Health

The World Bank's project document emphasized the importance of the project's proposed impact on health: "An analysis from Senegal of available household surveys (Sadio 1994) [...] shows that children of illiterate mothers are 50% more likely to die in childhood; illiterate women want 1.8 more children on the same income as literate mothers [...] *ceteris paribus*" (SAR, Annex 2, p. 3). The project document continued to project the benefits of the PAPF as follows: "The GOS's literacy program is estimated to reduce the burden of disease by 10-14% at a cost of US\$2.0 per capita, saving an estimated 8.5 (disability adjusted) life years [...], the equivalent of about 170,000 child deaths" (SAR, Annex 2, p. 3).

There was no data or information gathering to check whether the aforementioned reduction of disease was achieved. The courses' impact on health, however, was noticed at several practical levels. As we have seen, the courses strengthened civil society. The local women's association or the course management committee often began work to improve the cleanliness of the village. Also, the courses themselves had an information-providing function, and thereby raised awareness on certain sicknesses, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and diarrhea. Finally, the courses were supposed to link the participants to local health services, especially to obtain vaccination for the children. These issues will be discussed in the sections below.

A) Hygiene

The courses helped promote a higher standard of hygiene in the villages through the classes – but also through the village associations (especially the women’s association and the course management committee). The promotion of hygiene was also in many cases coupled with a better consciousness of preserving the environment.¹⁵⁸ In many communities, the course management committee performed cleanliness checks on the houses of the participants, and imposed fines on unkempt houses. In some cases they set up subcommittees to perform this work; these latter in some cases functioned like a “hygiene police” of the village. Although not one interviewee mentioned this as a negative factor, it may nevertheless have had a disturbing effect on some people’s lives. The committee responsible for hygiene set up official cleaning days – during which the whole community took part in cleaning activities:

“The association is performing a cleanliness check in the village every Thursday; they are checking that each house, and the common spaces in between houses, are clean” (Current learner/relais).

“Also, each Saturday we organize cleaning sessions in the village. These sessions stopped since the [onset of the] dry season, but we will start again after the Tabaski feast” (Current learner).

The providers often supported the “hygiene movement” of the village; in some villages they helped set up hygiene subcommittees and in other villages they gave prizes for the cleanliest village or the best-kept learning and activities’ center.

¹⁵⁸ Many activities were beneficial both for the environment and local hygiene. Such activities included reforestation – which was undertaken through subproject support in 46.6% of the sampled sites in the longitudinal study (LS – T1-2, 2003, p. 48).

“In each village we have helped to set up subcommittees to help [...] promote hygiene and health. The follow up is continuous; once every two months we visit them; once every three months they come here” (Private provider staff).¹⁵⁹

“We are giving out prizes for the cleanest CAL, and prizes for the least absenteeism from classes” (Private provider staff).

Many providers also saw hygiene as a prime goal of the teaching; the learning about this issue was considered a priority. Teaching about hygiene and health-related issues were often integrated with the income-generating skills classes – or held as separate classes, sometimes with the intervention of local health officers:

“I have been helping with development actions for the last 15 years. We can’t develop a village without hygiene; hygiene is the most important problem today. The villages are often situated far away from health services, roads and water sources” (Private provider staff).

Example of integration of hygiene and income-generating activities:

“To make bissac juice, they lacked knowledge about how to take basic hygienic precautions; now they know [how to make bissac juice in a sanitary way]. Also, now cattle are being vaccinated. All these examples show benefits derived from literacy” (Civil servant).

The longitudinal studies note that hygiene committees had been set up by the end of the course in 60% of the sampled sites; whereas 65% of sites had initiated environment protection actions (the nature of these latter was not specified). Roughly half of the sites

¹⁵⁹ This subproject had finished, yet the provider still was in contact with the villagers. The frequency and type of contact described by the provider was later (and independently) confirmed by community members during a field visit.

had organized cleaning operations (e.g., cleaning days) in the village and in 15% of the villages, the project had had as effect the construction of latrines in the village (LS – T1.2, 2003, p. 48).

B) Awareness Raising Activities and Vaccination

During interviews the providers personnel emphasized the importance of awareness raising activities, especially to make the participants aware of problems related to child raising and vaccination, basic hygiene, HIV/AIDS-related issues, as well as malaria and diarrhea. These two latter are among the most important causes of death in Senegal.

“I can’t attend classes regularly. Anyway, I have learned about management, and have about hygiene, health and HIV/AIDS” (Current learner).

“The development of a country is done through education. One must teach a person to take care of him or herself. Instead of distributing fish, we need to teach them how to fish. [In order to achieve development] there is a need for health care too. Health and education are complementary. Besides, health education is provided through literacy classes” (Private provider staff).

The awareness raising included both preventive activities (especially through information about HIV/AIDS and about vaccination) and information about treatment (especially for diarrhea and malaria). Also, information about local health services – and how to get in touch with them – was included in most course “packages”. The longitudinal studies note that 6 months after the start of the course “in the case of prevention of child diseases, it was noted that 8.62% of the participants go more frequently to public health service

providers [...]; also they respect better the vaccination schedule for the children and they have a better pre-natal follow up [...] Globally, 58.60% of the learners have learned about [*se sont appropriés*] individual and collective hygiene rules that they apply to improve their health and to protect their environment. [These activities include] especially the construction of individual latrines and the set-up of draining actions” (LS – T1-1, 2002, p. 16). These findings were confirmed by the field observation and interviews. Most interviewees insisted that they had “learned about health;” some said that they had actually applied the learning during daily life.

“The results from the literacy course include prenatal follow-up on pregnancies [which was not done before the literacy course] and regular follow-up on the children’s vaccination” (Private provider staff).

“After attending literacy classes, participants enroll their children in school. They look for an education for their children. They also ask for local health offices, because they would like to ensure that their children are healthy. In the courses, they have spoken about education, they have spoken about health, they have spoken about the environment. Not all these questions are understood at the same time, but they make people gradually aware of their place in the society” (Civil servant).

11.4: Negative Development Impact of the Project

One problem discussed earlier include the possible exclusion the poorest women from participating (the combined direct and opportunity costs would prove too high for them to participate); or the project may have added to their workload even if they had the possibility to participate. A further set of impact-related problems was linked to the

public-private partnership model used in Senegal, in which the providers often had an all-important role. These issues will be discussed below.

A) Learning and Course-specific Issues

The project-specific negative impacts were linked to the participation requirements of women, their increased work burden as a part of the course, and the possible exclusion of the poorest. None of these risks were evaluated by the World Bank's project document (which has a section on "benefits and risks").¹⁶⁰

Participation has been characterized as "a new tyranny,"¹⁶¹ because the use of participative methods has become a quasi-obligation for many development organizations in their project establishment processes. The use of participatory assessment is in many cases done in ways that are manipulative and can in certain situations harm the people that are supposed to be "empowered" (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). As we have seen, the providers were supposed to make a participatory assessment in the communities, so as to propose a literacy program that corresponded to the learners' needs. As noted by several interviewees, this assessment was undertaken because it was required (in some cases it did not even take place) – and it did not adapt the learning style to the local areas. A consultant who had been involved in different evaluations of the literacy courses, noted,

¹⁶⁰ In fact, the World Bank staff's view on impact issues was not very critical, since they were more interested in process issues (e.g., the disbursement of the project was seen as an important indicator of success). A former civil servant noted, "Also the financial partner [i.e., the World Bank] should have a role; currently, they [the World Bank staff] are proud when a woman can read, but they don't even know how she learned it. They take a photo of her and are pleased" (*Consultant, former civil servant*).

¹⁶¹ The expression is taken from Cooke, B. & Kothari, U., eds. (2001): *Participation – the new tyranny*, in which the authors critiqued the new emphasis the World Bank and other institutions put on participative approaches, and the way that these are implemented.

“[...] the teaching remains very theoretical and not very functional because the relationship between the service provider and the beneficiaries is not a partnership relation. The needs and concerns of the participants are not taken into account by the provider, because the provider group comes from the exterior and has maybe not the time to make a pre-assessment, and is much more concerned about the satisfaction of the funding agency than of the beneficiaries” (Consultant).

One problem with the assessment was its hierarchical nature. One civil servant noted that the population “respect[s] the NGOs and provider associations because they think that these organizations have money to fix their problems.” In other words, the pre-assessment was not done between equals (the community needed to “please” the provider, so they could obtain funds). Also, since the provider association was perceived as a potential funding agent of village development activities, the provider staff would not interact with the target population for the project, i.e., poor women. The leaders of the community would in most cases be interacting with the provider, and would not give the poorest of the community members a voice. As seen in chapter 6.1, the provider staff first contacted the leaders of the village; then they interacted with the women’s association. It was therefore likely that the needs assessment first took into account the views of the leaders, and then the most prominent women in the women’s association. The course from its conception did not directly include the poor, but was formed to the providers’ and the village chiefs’ view of the local needs. Instead of challenging existing power structures in the village, most subprojects were therefore likely to reinforce the existing structure, and even to worsen the inequalities at local level. Besides, the poorest

women did not participate in women's associations because they did not have the time (see also section 8.3 on opportunity costs):

“The problems I most often see in the centers are related to participants' difficulties that are part of daily life: heavy workloads make it so not all participants can attend classes” (Private provider staff).

The literacy course had thus the double effect for these women of excluding them from the social networking that the project helped initiate, and also excluding them from taking part in the learning. The PAPF may therefore have generated a negative effect of the poorest village women by contributing to their further exclusion from the communities' social life.

Course participation imposed some obligations on the community; we have seen in chapter 11.3 how hygiene committees imposed checks on individuals, and how the women were supposed to participate in different forms of community activities that they might or might not have wished to involve in (such compulsory participation is an example of how participation can be conceived as a new “tyranny”). One interviewed participant said she felt obliged to take part in the revolving fund scheme initiated by the project although it had only generated negative economic effects for her:

“The revolving funds are to be reimbursed over 4 or 6 months, with an interest of 500 per 5000 over six months [i.e., 10% over 6 months or 20% p. a.]. The women generally divide the funds. [...] The amount is far too low; I cannot use it to do anything. It is only about 15,000 per person [...] I need 50 or 100,000FCFA. With that I can buy clothes to dye them and resell them, or an ox or something else. I sometimes take the 15,000 and

keep them and then reimburse them - I am feeling obligated to take them, because the money is shared between all the members. Once I bought some cattle with the money, but the loan did not suffice to feed it” (Current learner/relais).

The PAPF project had a negative effect in some of the villages insomuch as it created social obligations for some participants and contributed to further social exclusion for some of the most vulnerable population groups. These problems were not inherently linked to the use of public-private partnerships, and could have been found in government-implemented projects too (e.g., public schooling in Senegal displays some of these effects). It is possible, however, that such partnerships exacerbated the effect of such exclusion mechanisms because of the lack of controlling mechanisms to prevent them. On the other hand, the partnership mechanisms could build in control mechanisms to prevent the aforementioned situation. In some cases, the interviewees also said that the women’s association (which in many cases functioned like a social safety net) had helped them to pay the entrance fee to the classes. To which extent the women’s association facilitated their further participation in the course (and the opportunity costs they incurred) is uncertain.

B) Process-specific Issues

The process-specific negative impact of the project was linked to the use of the public-private partnership approach. As seen in section 5.5, the role of the state changed through the use of partnership approaches – and so has the role and nature of civil society. There were surely some positive effects of the changes, but there were also

negative ones, at government level, at the providers' level, and among the participants.

An analysis of negative effects at each of these three levels will follow below.

At the state level, the partnership approaches may have led to corruption. Such development would also have been possible under a government-executed project, but as seen in section 7.2, it was the very partnership mechanisms in the PAPF project that led to corruption. To prevent corruption and other management problems, the PAPF had a significant budget (US\$ 3.1 million)¹⁶² set aside for "Project Management and Capacity Building in Program Delivery, Management, and Evaluation" (SAR, 1996, p. 12).

However, capacity building of government's staff did not have the intended effect, and many interviewees (especially providers and former civil servants) referred to government performance in negative terms:

"All the [concerned DAEB] agents received training in statistics from a specialized agency. Secondly, a training plan was established for all DAEB staff members, with study tours, on-the-job training, etc. [...] A budget to undertake activities was made. We asked them to do two things: follow-up on the projects and evaluate them in time: You have the human resources, you have the equipment needed, you have the logistical and financial resources to do it. And it was never well done" (Consultant, former civil servant).

In addition to improving the public sector, the project had also as its aim to mobilize and create civil society – but one has to inquire what kind of civil society was created?

According to many interviewees, it was often a civil society that had as its only aim to

¹⁶² These funds were to be used to improve management performances of both government structures and providers.

generate an economic profit, hence the designation of “economic providers” [*opérateurs économiques*]. The project, which by its very mechanisms made embezzlement possible (see section 7.2), encouraged civil society to take part in a scheme where the providers paid civil servants for a positive evaluation of their (often low-quality) courses, in which the main losers were the beneficiaries. Project evaluations and interviews, however, indicate that in most cases such scheming did not take place. Most of the providers probably tried to maximize their economic gain from the project, and, as seen in section 8.4, such gain could be quite lucrative and still be in a gray area that would not be considered as corruption. The threat of not being re-selected (even if this in many cases was not a real threat), was enough to make most providers deliver the required activities.

In promoting ‘economic’ providers, the project was effective in creating a civil society structure that was oriented towards self-promotion and self-profits (such associations corresponded more to private businesses than to civil society, as it is defined in section 2.3). In an interview with a World Bank official on this issue, it was noted that “there is nothing wrong with this [i.e., creation of economically oriented providers] as long as they are delivering the goods.” From the point of view of neoclassical economics, the development of such civil society associations would be advantageous, inasmuch as they generated profits, created jobs, and at the same time worked for the development of the community.

However, one must not forget that the stated role for civil society in Senegal, was to present a counter-power to the state, checking its excesses and promoting democracy. In this regard, the former Minister of Literacy, Mamadou Ndoeye, said:

“We count on the emerging civil society to defend our democratic rights, the right of education for all, the protection of our freedom, the protection of a transparent political system, and the pressure for government accountability” (Civil servant).

Clearly, these were not the characteristics of the civil society that was created as an effect of the PAPF project. If any civil society association had as mandate to preserve and promote these rights, the PAPF project may have contributed to change these objectives, because the partnership approach was based on a model of shared interests between the government and civil society. The government’s interest was to make people literate. Even if the provider associations did not share this primary goal, but became increasingly dependent on the government financing, this focus on funding in itself marked a change in attitude: the main objective of the association was no longer to preserve rights, but to obtain more money. In any case, none of the provider staff members interviewed stated that they had anything to do with the defense of democratic rights, the right of education for all, the protection of freedom, the protection of a transparent political system, and the pressure for government accountability. On the contrary, they saw their role as to coordinate activities with the government. In practice this often led to corruption of both the state and civil society.

Also it must be underlined that even the civil society role described in the quotation above was a role of control and democracy system maintenance; it was not a role that would promote changes of power relationships in the society. However, as Mamadou Ndoye himself pointed out during the interview, the civil society created in Senegal has not been able even to perform the job of system maintenance, no more than it has been a

political instrument for social change. The funding and partnership structures co-opted the civil society in a politico-economic sphere; the providers became dependent on their money. The politicians, on the other hand, needed the support of their civil society “subjects”. The selection process, as seen in section 7.2 thus increasingly became a political process to obtain civil society support.

The project’s impact on civil society must be said to have a large quantitative impact since many new associations were created. However, the civil society associations created were in most cases dependent on government funding, they had an economic objective, and they would often cease to function when state funding ceased. The project changed the *raison d’être* of civil society from a social goal to an economic one.

The dynamics in between the communities and providers reflected the fact that communities experienced the providers as “outsiders.” Literacy was often created as an activity outside the daily life of the learners; it was perceived as a result of the interaction between the head of the village, the head of the women’s association and the provider.

“The literacy course can make a real impact on the society, if one has not constructed it as an action that is outside the [daily] life of the learners. The learning must be instrumental, and it is necessary to integrate activities. In such context, literacy is the key for a social transformation. Literacy is inescapable [to achieve social transformation]; it is a trigger”
(Consultant).

The learning, and especially the learning of instrumental literacy skills, such as reading and writing was most often set up by the providers as an action that was outside learners’

daily life. It followed that literacy learning was often not sustainable, and that it was not of a nature that could achieve social transformation, or any change in power relationships in the society.

The project had taken several measures to ensure ownership. It required the set-up of a learning and activities center, it required training of a *relais*, and it required that the providers equip a library in the learning and activities center. However, in many cases, these activities were not effective, since they were considered as extraneous to the village's social life. One elder villager told the following story (which was not unique):

“I built the literacy center myself. Now it has become a center for telephone services [i.e., form where one can make telephone calls; most people in Senegal still do not own a telephone]. They had a library, but now the books have deteriorated. This is the women's problem; they never kept the books clean and safely stored. I always said to the women that they needed to take care of the books. At this point, the books are everywhere; the library disintegrated - the books are everywhere. Half of them are rotten; [...they] were distributed among the beneficiaries” (Villager).

11.5: Literacy as Poor Education for Poor Citizens

Literacy has been critiqued for being a way to provide poor education to poor citizens. Such education may have as outcome to contain social discontent, and at the same time replicate existing power relationships in society. We will look at how this could be the case in the PAF project. There are a few indicators that the project did not promote

social mobility: (a) there was a lack of a literate environment in local languages; (b) the courses were fairly standardized; and (c) in general the courses lacked in quality.

A) Lack of Literate Environment in Local Languages

As seen in section 9.3, the courses were taught in local languages, and did not propose any transition to French. The project management stated that the project aimed to create a literate environment in local languages. Some books in local languages were given to the reading and activities' center. However – all administrative documents, all road signs, and all documentary information (on medication, vaccines, agricultural products, banking information, notice on use of equipment, etc.) were in French. All official journals and all legal documents were in French. Only learning books specifically targeted at illiterates and newly-literates were available in local languages, on such issues as how to prevent HIV/AIDS and other sicknesses, as well as instruction books on chicken raising and other agricultural activities (see picture 11.2). Some popular fairy tales and religious books were also available. In many cases, these books were only transcribed into Wolof. Most of them were targeted at making poor people understand basic hygiene and health-related issues.

Picture 11.2: Books and exercises were related to basic skills



Most interviewees saw the literacy education as “sufficient” for a certain level of the population. Some people see this education in local languages as a springboard towards other “destinations”:

“Is literacy a poor education for the poorest citizens? Basic education is not the same in different places in Senegal; it certainly adapts to the locality. There is a knowledge base that is needed; this base varies according to countries, zones, and localities. The essential is that one can identify, from local circumstances, the basic knowledge that the population needs to acquire to have a better life, so that they can live in a decent way. This is the philosophy of faire-faire. Since the civil society and the providers are already among the beneficiaries, they are more likely to understand the problems of the population, and can find adequate solutions [to these problems] together with the population. The best way of making someone react to his or her problems is to make him or her aware of these problems. It is necessary that the language of communication is appropriate. Crises in development are also crises in communication: the

base of literacy is to become aware [awareness raising]. Is literacy then alienating because it is about the most basic knowledge? For me, I don't see basic awareness as alienation - I see it as a springboard! One needs a bit of everything in a country; one needs an elite but also a local population which is aware. We cannot finance university programs for many millions when a large part of our population is still illiterate" (Consultant, former civil servant).

B) The Problems of Standardization

The courses had all the same basic characteristics, even if the learner groups were very different and lived in different geographic locations. The costs and basic requirements of each subproject were the same; a unit cost per enrollee was used to calculate the fee given to the providers. Most providers therefore used the same type of low-cost programs, which ensured a certain standardization of the courses. The cost limited the course materials and type – and most providers tried to cut costs as much as possible. The costs were even reflected in the use of languages; some providers refused to implement classes in other languages than Wolof and Serreer, the two most common languages, for cost reasons:

"I have been asked to conduct classes in other languages, but have always refused to do it. For each language, I need to train teachers. I need to use Wolof trainers of trainers for the teachers in Wolof classes, and idem for Pulaar, etc. Also, I need one supervisor for each language. The funds are the same even if I have more languages. And allowing for more languages would be costly" (Private provider staff).

In many cases such cost considerations led to the establishment of a standardized, low-cost program:

“People know that the lack of skills to read and write is a barrier for them. They would like for literacy to change their lives. Many of them want to learn, and many even take initiatives by themselves. However [the providers] do not try to take their wishes into account, but try to “sell” a pre-established program. There is no real discussion and “responsibilization” of the population. They say yes [to the program] - then the classes are empty - and the activities are stereotyped. The needs of the financial sponsor, DAEB, and others take precedence [over appropriate actions in the villages]. There is no space for participants to change things significantly [in the course]; everything is standardized” (Consultant).

The standardization of literacy programs and the cost considerations of the providers in many cases led to implementation of low-quality courses.¹⁶³

C) The Issues of Quality

As seen in section 9.1, the courses had quality problems. The literacy teacher training was of particular low quality and contributed to classroom structures and use of learning methods that were not, in most cases, appropriate. Also, the duration of the course was in many cases criticized for being too short. This was largely due to the set-up of the government policy, which every year targeted to enroll a certain of people. The targeted

¹⁶³ Some providers, however, used a significant proportion of the budget for literacy materials: see discussion in section 8.4 on the providers' use of funds.

numbers were followed to the letter – the quantitative objectives were thus taking precedence over quality:¹⁶⁴

“There is an important effort to reach a large number of people, especially women, by literacy courses. However, similarly to primary schooling, literacy courses have a big quality problem. The programs are satisfactory at a quantitative level, but have qualitative problems as for their utility. The courses seem to touch ‘real’ illiterates, but they are not useful. [...] The participants don’t attend regularly - and nothing or very little is learned during post-literacy classes. The learning ‘doesn’t take’” (Consultant).

“There are often problems in the [literacy] training, for example the literacy teachers are not competent” (Civil servant).

The emphasis on quantity – and similarly – the lack of quality made it difficult if not impossible for participants to (re-)access primary schooling after having completed a literacy course. Likewise, the courses did not give the participants any certification. The question of equivalency between literacy classes and formal schooling was not addressed – or if addressed, it was not recognized. The current administration, during an interview, recognized this problem – and a senior official in the Ministry of Education stated the need to give a formal recognition to the courses:

“[...] the masses we had to educate in terms of quantity were more important than criteria of quality. This is a reality that we had to work with, and it needs to be corrected in the future. We have also seen that some of our former participants have continued to learn through their own

¹⁶⁴ For example, in 2004 the Senegalese Government decided to cut the unit fee to the providers by nearly 50%, since World Bank financing did not cover the projected number of people to be enrolled. This decision, which risked compromising the courses’ quality, was a clear sign as to how the government prioritizes quantity above quality.

effort. This is not frequent - but it indicates that there are other ways to follow. During our recent policy seminar, we had a group working on inter sector coordination. More and more we perceive that we need to increase the relations between formal and non-formal education. This is especially necessary if we want to give a value and a certificate for the literacy training. More and more we are asked about the value of our training” (Civil servant).

In conclusion, many providers implemented courses that were short and in many cases lacking in terms of quality. These courses were not recognized as a valid education by any institution. It can be argued that the courses only aimed at providing poor citizens with a minimum level of basic knowledge, and to improve the country’s literacy rates.

In other words, many literacy courses became a second-hand education for those considered as second-class citizens. Its basic aims were to assist local development. Therefore, it did not offer literacy in French, which would have made it possible for the participants to obtain employment, and thereby a higher salary.

In addition to providing literacy classes in local languages, the project also focused on basic skills income-generating activities. It thus tried to find solutions to fulfill both short-term income needs at a local level and a long-term development vision based on concepts of economic growth. The economic impact of the course may be examined at several levels. The organization of women in for-profit organizations (GIEs) in many cases improved the production of goods and agricultural products in the communities – and the set-up of course management committees also in some cases had a positive impact on earnings. The literacy courses also generated a positive economic impact for

individual participants through teaching them how to calculate, how to set-up income-generating activities. The course also in many cases helped the participants obtain access to credit.

The courses had a further impact on local health. This was achieved partially through the improved hygiene of the village as a result of the subprojects' organizing cleaning committees and village cleaning days. Also, the courses had an information-providing function, and raised awareness on certain sicknesses, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and diarrhea. Finally, many courses connected the participants with local health services, especially to obtain vaccination for the children.

Most of these development actions had a positive effect on the local communities. It remains to be discussed, however, to which extent these actions, obtained through a literacy project, did enough to change local circumstances significantly. The project may have had as its main function to provide a minimum of services to prevent social discontent. The overall outcome and significance of the project will be evaluated in the next chapter.

Chapter 12: Conclusion

In this final chapter, we return to the research questions and examine them in light of the findings of the study. The first section reviews the first four research questions, and the second section explores the fifth research question, namely whether large-scale delivery of a service such as literacy, is advisable through outsourcing. In the last part, my views on partnership/outsourcing methods are given.

12.1: Review of the Research Questions

The first four research questions are related to (i) the new roles of global institutions (such as the World Bank), the local government institutions, and civil society organizations in delivery of social services; (ii) economic and political rationales for making use of outsourcing to deliver social services; (iii) the design and implementation strengths and weaknesses of partnership approaches; and (iv) the outcomes and impact of outsourced literacy education services. These questions will be discussed below.

A) What are the New Roles of Global Organizations, Government Institutions and Civil Society in Service Delivery?

This case study has examined the roles of the following institutions and associations:

- The World Bank
- The Ministry of Education's Department of Literacy
- The decentralized education institutions
- Civil society associations and the providers' association (CNOAS)
- The project coordination unit (PCU) and the contract-management agency (AGETIP)
- Women's associations and for-profit groups
- *Relais*
- Learners (i.e., participants in literacy courses)

The theory chapter set forth the argument that the World Bank and other international agencies are promoting pro-market policies in developing countries. These policies are often known under the label of the Washington Consensus. Senegal adopted a set of policies in 1993 that reflected pro-market solutions, namely outsourcing, to deliver literacy education. Chapter 4 analyzed the background of the set-up of the literacy policy, as well as the background of the PAPF project. The analysis of each actor's contribution to the Senegalese policy shows how international pro-market pressure worked in this case.

The choice to use many small civil society associations for literacy delivery was based on a historic precedent in Senegal. Local civil society associations were more involved in literacy delivery than public organizations before the 1990s. The government therefore had a double incentive to use the civil society associations: (i) some were already there, ready to implement literacy courses; and (ii) the World Bank and other donors agreed to fund projects that used market mechanisms for the selection of providers.

The World Bank was not dictating the Senegalese government's policies, but clearly influenced them. International organizations and the World Bank's contribution functioned to some extent according to a theory of survival of the fittest policy (section 7.4). The World Bank would not, according to the PAPF project document (SAR, 1996), have agreed to fund literacy services until the state had formulated a "fit" project that outsourced funding to private providers and that did not make use of civil servants for implementation of literacy services.

The economic importance of the donor's aid makes such pressure extremely effective. As noted above, the pressure is not directed to improve the type of programs rendered (i.e., the quality of literacy courses), but is connected to policy-making aspects for delivery of services: "The conditions that donors attach to their aid programmes go far beyond any legitimate measures to ensure that aid money is used efficiently for its stated purposes" (Action Aid, 2004). The evolution of the education sector in Senegal in the 1980s and 1990s was marked by a repositioning of forces; a relative weakening of the government position in policy definition, and the relative strengthening of global institutions. The intensification of the World Bank's influence in Senegal's education system, as seen in chapter 1, made some teachers suggest that the Senegalese education should henceforth be called "the World Bank School System" (Sylla, 1993).

In addition to this repositioning of forces, the partnership/outsourcing system was also characterized by the emergence of new actors: In the villages, *relais* persons were participants that received special training by the provider to take over literacy classes after the subproject was over (section 5.1). Also, provider organizations multiplied, most

of which were grassroots for-profit associations. A providers' association (CNOAS) was created, which was supposed to represent the interests of the providers in negotiations with the state, and to train provider personnel. And finally, a project coordination unit (PCU) was created to manage the PAPF project.

At the local level, the participants in literacy courses were mostly women, and organized in women's associations. As described in chapter 10, the interaction between learners and providers, especially in the integrated course, can be characterized as a relationship between women's associations and the providers' associations, as opposed to an interaction between provider associations and individuals. This relationship between providers and local women's associations gave the participants a stronger voice than if they had not been organized, and contributed to create civil society (see section 10.2).

In view of the above, one can conclude that the outsourcing policy changed the role and relative influence of civil society and of the government. The government's position was weakened inasmuch as it had less choice in defining implementation policies in the 1990s than before, whereas the World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral institutions had more influence. The outsourcing system changed the nature of civil society associations, which became government-dependent businesses. The outsourcing policy and the PAPF project contributed to the creation of more provider associations, more women's associations and also contributed to the emergence of new institutions and functions (e.g., CNOAS and *relais* persons), as well as new roles and actors in civil society organizations (sections 5.1 and 5.2).

B) What are the Economic and Political Rationales for Outsourcing of Literacy?

In many cases the given economic rationales were the same as the political rationales for justifying the outsourcing policy. Proponents of the policy said it boosted both the quantity and quality of literacy service education in comparison to a (hypothetical) literacy program offered by the government. The quantitative increase of literacy course enrollment was real, and could be explained by the availability of more funding from international agencies. There was a strong political rationale for using outsourcing since many donor agencies' financing was contingent on using private firms for implementation. The avoidance of heavy upfront investment in infrastructure and set-up costs for a quantitative expansion of literacy was seen as an economic rationale: the outsourcing could build on an existing structure of civil society providers and thereby reduce the investment costs.

Chapter 4 noted that the aim of outsourcing was to improve the quality of the literacy courses, and at the same time to increase the capacity of enrolling more learners. It was argued that private provision of services represented a better quality and a higher quantity of literacy than the state could deliver. The rationale of using outsourcing was thereby based on the belief that the market was more cost-effective. Chapter 8 analyzed the results of the project in relation to its costs. The cost analysis used two scenarios, one based on official numbers, stating that over a 5-year period, more than 200,000 people enrolled in literacy courses through the PAPF project, about 87,000 of whom learned to read and write. The second scenario was based on corrected data according to the World Bank's payments to providers and also on the Senegalese government's longitudinal

study. It estimated that the project enrolled approximately 180,000 learners, only about 44,000 of whom learned to write and read. The second scenario is believed to represent a truer version of actual project results, and would represent a cost of \$457 per successful learner (includes opportunity cost). This number represents 76% wastage (through drop-out, non-success in the final test, or the learners were literate before they enrolled). The cost to the government (not including private costs) of one successful course completer (\$378) would correspond to the cost of 4.5 years of primary schooling.¹⁶⁵

The primary school system in Senegal is notorious for its levels of wastage and is considered among the most ineffective education systems in the world (section 8.5). The “production” of one literate person was less expensive through the literacy course than in primary education since 4.5 years of primary education is not enough to produce one literate person. However, literacy education had even higher wastage than the primary school, insomuch as less than one of four learners who attended the literacy course actually learned to read and write. The high level of wastage also affected the learners, who would drop out of the course without having learned to read and to write or who would complete it without feeling that they had acquired the necessary skills to improve their life (section 9.1 and 9.2). The opportunity and direct costs were relatively high, and the participants therefore shared a large part of the risk in investing in literacy education.

In conclusion, the literacy courses offered very cheap and very ineffective schooling (whereas the primary school system offered much more expensive but also more effective

¹⁶⁵ It must be underlined that the comparison between literacy education and primary education is made for cost purposes only; one type of education cannot substitute for another – they are complementary.

education). Literacy education offered by PAPF therefore appears to be poor education for the poorest of the citizens. The costs per literate person do not seem unreasonable if considered separately from the statistics of wastage. The percentage of dropout and non-successes however, is so large that it places the supposed market advantages into serious doubt. One can conclude that the economic and political rationales were not sufficiently based on Senegalese realities, but were largely based on a pre-established vision about the market's higher efficiency than the government.

C) What are the Design and Implementation Strengths and Weaknesses?

The third research question examined design and implementation strengths and weaknesses that were encountered in the Women's Literacy Project. The essential administrative procedures of the project included the selection of providers, as well as the follow-up and evaluation of the implementation. Many of these functions were decentralized to local government institutions, between 1998 and 2000. The project design's strengths and weaknesses were described in chapter 7. Design flaws were encountered in the following project aspects:

- Subproject/provider selection processes
- Monitoring and evaluation, including financial monitoring
- Institutional set-up
- Decentralization
- Course implementation

The selection procedures were clearly laid out in the procedures manual, but had a design flaw insomuch as they failed to take into account past performance of the providers

during selection. Hence, a very poor provider could obtain financing by making a very good subproject proposal (see table 12.1). If the provider performed badly, the participants had no way of changing the provider association (their only option was to “vote with their feet” and leave the course). The provider association therefore had a monopoly on literacy activities in the village.

Monitoring and evaluation of the project was also malfunctioning, partly because of design flaws. Although the project had designed a monitoring and evaluation system that would address asymmetric information problems, the design failed to take into account incentives and disincentives of government agents to perform the work. Similar problems were encountered in the project’s management: the project administration worked well when the government was stable and led by capable managers, but it deteriorated when the initial project administrative staff members were affected elsewhere.

As seen in chapter 5, the use of a private contract-management agency ensured rapid set-up procedures of contracts, and rapid transfer of funds. The agency had an incentive to perform these operations well, since it was paid on a pro-rata basis (equivalent to 5% of the contract value). It did not have an incentive, however, to stop payments to unethical providers or to providers who did not perform well (if the contract-management agency stopped paying a provider, it stopped receiving 5% of the financing as well). This was one of the reasons for the poor financial monitoring of the subprojects.

Table 12.1: Project design strengths and weaknesses

Design category	Strengths	Weaknesses
Selection	Transparent selection procedures Good information-sharing system (Procedures Manual)	Not based on provider's past performance
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)	Good monitoring and evaluation design	The design did not take into account the capacities of local institutions to perform the work No system to impose negative sanctions for bad performance
Contract management	Straightforward system; no bottlenecks	No incentive to perform financial monitoring Inflexible unit cost design
Institutional set-up	Creation of a PCU to ensure day-to-day project management Creation of a providers' association	Creation of a supplementary institution (PCU) instead of fixing the existing one (DAEB)
Decentralization		Lack of decentralization design
Participants and providers	Providers' deal with local women's associations	Project driven by provider, not by local demand
Courses	Integrated courses are more adapted to local needs	No clear connection between policy goal (literacy) and course objectives (basic skills?)

The institutional design of outsourcing and project management was described in Chapter 5. The set-up of a PCU ensured a highly competent management of the project. However, it did little to address problems (e.g., poor management skills, and lack of planning) within the Department of Literacy. The design and set-up of the providers'

association (CNOAS) also had some flaws since all of its senior managers were directors of their own associations. They were therefore less involved in the management of the CNOAS than of their own provider association.

Section 6.3 described how the project failed to decentralize the project well. The ad-hoc decentralization led to virtually unlimited possibilities for corruption (at decentralized education management levels) during both selection and evaluation. The project was provider-driven, and not driven by grassroots' demand, mainly because the providers had important financial incentives to set up courses. This was both positive and negative. It was negative insomuch as the demand for literacy was not based on community demand but on the providers' persuasion of the villagers to accept the program. The subprojects were therefore not "owned" by the participants. However, such provider exhortation to implement literacy was also positive, since the providers publicized for literacy in the villages, and did everything they could to stimulate local interest for literacy. It can be discussed, however, to which extent the courses (especially those using the integrated approach) corresponded to the literacy policy of the government. Whereas the policy aimed at a quantitative increase of literacy, the project obtained better results in non-literacy related aspects of the training, e.g., in income-generating activities and basic skills education (section 8.1). Many of the implementation strengths and weaknesses were directly or indirectly derived from the design of the project. Implementation flaws were found in the following aspects of the project (see table 12.2):

- Selection
- Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

- Contract management
- Institutions
- Decentralization
- Participants and providers
- Courses

Table 12.2: Project implementation strengths and weaknesses

Processes and institutions	Strengths	Weaknesses
Selection	Rules were followed	Political biases in some cases The best providers or proposals not always selected
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)	PCU performed some of the needed M&E	Asymmetric information problems at all levels not solved
Contract management	Quick, timely contracting and transfer of funds	Lack of financial monitoring
Institutions	PCU performed well (day-to-day management, supervision)	The provider's association did not perform well Lack of follow-up and correction of problems
Decentralization		Asymmetric information problems led to corruption
Participants and providers	Participants helped design courses, decided on language, class time...	Civil society changed into "economic providers" Literacy not achieved for most participants
Courses	Courses well received, and helped to develop income-generating skills Leadership training for <i>relais</i> and management committee	Literacy teachers were not well trained, resulted in low quality Literate environment not well established, failure of <i>relais</i> to continue courses; learning center & books not used

In most cases the rules explained in the procedures manual were followed during selection (section 6.1). In some cases, the selection was unfair because of political involvement (i.e., political pressure to select certain providers). Partially due to this implementation bias, the best providers or proposals were not always selected.

The lack of literacy-related monitoring was accompanied by a general lack of financial monitoring (section 6.4). The project management ensured quick and timely contracting and transfer of funds, but did not implement the planned financial monitoring activities. The implementation of the subprojects was of mixed quality. In most course sites, the participants helped design courses, particularly by deciding on language of instruction and class time. Despite high attrition and nominal gains in literacy, the courses were nevertheless well received by the community. One reason for the favorable reception was that they helped develop the learners' income-generating skills.

The leadership training for the *relais* and the management committees helped build local capacity for management of development activities. However, the literacy teachers were not well trained. Their low-quality training exacerbated the result of the literacy training (whereas the results of income generating skills training were quite good). Overall, the providers failed in establishing a literate environment in most communities. The training and learning materials that were used, as well as the training of *relais* and establishment of a library, did not have the intended effects. Mostly, this was due to the low quality of the teaching, which did not make literacy a priority in the village.

The failure to create a literate environment was largely due to implementation flaws, including a low-quality literacy teacher training. Theoretically, the integrated courses had many positive features (*relais*, learning and activities center, etc.), but in most cases these functions and the project-created infrastructure did not last after the provider association ceased its subproject implementation, i.e., most activities were not sustainable (see table 12.2 above).

The existence of implementation and design flaws was not surprising. As noted in chapter 4, the project was testing out outsourcing/partnership processes and was therefore considered an experimental project. It is normal that both implementation and design flaws existed (see section 4.2). In such circumstances, the government and the World Bank's failure to repair problems that were visible early in the project's implementation phase must be characterized as the most significant flaw of the project. As this study illustrates, the project design was already based on flawed premises, and could not have been adjusted without a major redesign of implementation modalities. Making this case from a critical perspective, the study illustrates how the World Bank's failure to address project flaws was primarily due to its flawed basic beliefs and values around efficiency and privatization.

D) What were the Results and Impact of Outsourced Literacy Education?

In looking at results, it is necessary to try to distinguish between the results of outsourcing and the results of the literacy courses *per se*. This is complex, since as this

study shows the outsourcing policy is likely to have affected the quality of the courses (see table 12.3).

The outsourcing/partnership policies are likely to have boosted the possibility for large-scale implementation. This was partially due to the willingness of international agencies to fund courses based on outsourcing. Therefore, the use of outsourcing increased the number of literacy courses offered. However, it was the literacy courses that made people literate, not the outsourcing mechanisms. It can be argued that the use of outsourcing mechanisms with small, local providers made it possible to adapt the curriculum to local contexts, and this adaptation in turn improved results. As noted in section 6.1, the subprojects were in principle adapted to the culture and local circumstances of different local needs. The curricula, however, especially the required 300 hours for learning instrumental skills (reading, writing, math), were rarely making use of adult learning methods that were adapted to such local requirements. In most cases the learning program was decided according to arbitrary criteria (e.g., on the price of textbooks), or it was based on a 'standard' program that the provider was familiar with. The learners had different aspirations about the course. Although most community members and learners were grateful for the course and positive about it, they also felt that the education they received by attending the course was insufficient. In other words, the literacy content of an outsourced program (i.e., to be fairly standardized and not very innovative) could be criticized for having the same flaws as the proponents of outsourcing criticize state programs for having. For many learners, the literacy function

of the classes was less a priority as compared with other social and economic functions of the subproject.

Table 12.3: Effects of outsourcing methods and of literacy courses

Effects on:	Effect of outsourcing policy:	Effect of literacy course:
Literacy teacher training	Low quality since providers implemented low quality teacher training courses	Many new literacy teachers were recruited and trained
Literacy training	Decreased quality, partially because many providers tried to cut corners; Heightened quantity because of more funding	Over 40,000 people learned to read and write in local languages (of over 170,000 enrolled)
Income generation and basic skills learning	Course content was adapted to local needs and interests	Effective learning of basic skills (including health) and income generating skills took place
Gender	Subprojects were more easily accepted by men because they were set up by providers in cooperation with communities, and therefore not threatening	The learning helped narrow the gender gap in literacy. Various training strengthened women's positions in the local community
Leadership training	Training was flexible, adapted to local needs. The civil society associations conducting the training had experience in how to manage associations	Many local associations (especially GIEs) were created. Managers were trained Women's position locally was strengthened
Sustainability of activities	The literacy activities were provider-driven. There was a lack of local ownership	Literacy acquisition was in many cases frail. The creation of a literate and enabling environment did not often take place
Civil society	Associations became businesses, partnership created alliances with government instead of alliances between local people	The capacity of these associations to implement literacy courses is likely to have been strengthened through experience

As the above table illustrates, some of the reasons for the lack of quality in literacy education are directly linked to the use of outsourcing. Most providers cut costs on the literacy teachers' training, for example. The training was rarely long enough and of sufficient quality to make them good teachers. Another quality/outsourcing issue was linked to the lack of a literate environment in the villages. The providers were supposed to train a *relais*, build literacy centers, and set up village libraries. In some cases, the providers and villagers did a poor job of constructing and/or maintaining the center, which was reduced to shambles fairly soon after the project had ended (see pictures 9.10 and 9.11). Also, since control mechanisms were lacking, the library books were often distributed among learners or taken back by the provider. All these issues are linked to the fundamental problems of the providers' cutting back on costs to save money.

The results of lessons on income-generating activities were better than lessons on literacy (see table 8.3). For skills and income-generating activities, the providers were able to adapt courses to the local situation in a way that may have been difficult for the government. The first skills the learners acquired included how to use the telephone, and writing small notes. Chapter 10 described how the project contributed to a changed perception of literacy in communities that had initially been skeptical if not outright hostile to women's education. This was both a result of the literacy training and of the outsourcing method. Many men were initially very hostile to allowing women to participate in a literacy project. As time went by, the providers (and their programs) became more known and met less and less resistance to the courses. It is unclear whether this increasing acceptance was due to changing gender relationships in the village, or if

the literacy courses and the providers were accepted because they were not found to be threatening to the established gender relationships.

The literacy course had an effect on women through training of local women in leadership and management. The training of the management committee could lead to the structuring of the class as a for-profit association (GIE). This GIE would continue collective income-generating activities that had been learned during the course, but would also in certain cases become literacy providers in their own right. Additionally, specific training helped the *relais* to improve their knowledge and administration skills. The training often led to the subsequent recruitment of the *relais* as a literacy teacher in a next cohort of subprojects. The classes in some rare cases supported women's rights through civics classes dealing with women's right to vote, for example. Most often however, the classes indirectly strengthened the women's role in the society by giving women access to information and teaching new competencies. Also, and more importantly, the frequent meeting of women during literacy classes had a social role that strengthened the women's solidarity and relationship in the village. The project saw the women's role as a means to support the family and local economic growth, and thus firmly established the project within a WID perspective (section 2.5). The courses thus focused on what women could do for the family and the community, rather than focusing on how literacy skills could improve women's situation in society.

In chapter 11 we saw how the economic impact of the course can be examined at several levels. The organization of women in for-profit organizations (GIEs) improved the production of goods and agricultural products in the communities. The literacy courses

also generated a positive economic impact for individual participants through lessons on how to calculate and how to set-up income-generating activities. The course also in many cases helped the participants obtain access to credit.

Additionally, the courses had a positive impact on local health. This was achieved partially through the improved hygiene of the village as a result of the subprojects' organizing cleaning committees and village cleaning days. On the other hand, the courses had an information-providing function through awareness raising on HIV/AIDS, malaria and diarrhea. Many courses also connected the participants with local health services, especially to obtain vaccination for the children.

These development actions had a positive effect on the local communities. It is unclear to which extent these actions were strengthened or weakened through the use of an outsourcing approach. Generally speaking, outsourcing decreased the quality of learning through the use of cost-cutting practices, but it also strengthened the learning (especially on basic skills and income-generation activities) through offering courses that were more relevant to the local communities.

According to a critical point of view, the project, like other similar efforts, can be seen as a means to replicate existing social relationships by giving poor women a poor education, and by offering the lowest possible social service package for rural poor communities.

Also, the project is likely to have added to women's workload instead of reducing it.

However, the impact of the project goes beyond the simple maintenance of existing gender relationships, because of the government-required leadership training that was to

take place as an obligatory part of the subprojects. This training had as its specific objective to train leaders of women associations and the management committee to take a more central part in guiding local development. Arguably, it could lead to some change in the existing gender power balance.

The basic aims of the courses were to assist local development, based on a vision of development through economic growth. Therefore, it did not offer literacy in French, which would have made it possible for the participants to obtain employment, and thereby a higher salary.¹⁶⁶ The project sought mainly to find solutions to fulfill short-term income needs at the local level. Its visions for the future were all built on the belief that economic growth will lead to development.

12.2: Truth and (Un)Certainty

To what extent can one establish a “true story” concerning the outcomes about this case study? All the quantitative project data are flawed. Analysis of the quantitative achievements of the project therefore varies according to estimation and interpretation of the numbers. In the analysis, the “official” number of successful outcomes is nearly twice of the corrected number of successes.¹⁶⁷ Both estimations are based on project data released by the World Bank and the Senegalese government. The corrected estimate may

¹⁶⁶ This is not an endorsement for literacy in French. The opinion of this author is that all courses in primary, lower secondary and literacy should be in local languages. It is necessary to build a literate milieu in local languages – and to make it possible for people who are literate in local languages to access employment requiring literacy. The local language/French barrier should not constitute a barrier, like it is now.

¹⁶⁷ Official data states that 86,529 people learned to read and write during the course, whereas corrected numbers indicate that only 43,561 learned it. See section 8.1.

be set even lower, if one, for example, evaluates the results according to literacy achievements alone. How can one interpret the effectiveness of the project based on such differences in numbers?

The different project information and analysis can be usefully classified in categories of (i) widely held opinions supported by findings and analysis in this case study; (ii) new, and/or possibly controversial findings; and (iii) interpretations that depend on the paradigm from which one reads the case (this latter will be discussed in section 12.3). Even “widely held opinions” are not universal (and may not seem self-evident to any people who will argue, for example, that for cultural and religious reasons, education should not be provided to girls). This section discusses the more controversial findings of the case study, and the next section summarizes the debate for and against privatization through the use of outsourcing (see table 12.4 below for an overview of widely held opinions, controversial issues, and the privatization debate). This case study has taken as an assumption that although literacy education is not an alternative to primary education, it is a valuable method to address the needs of illiterate youth and adults. This assumption is widely supported by literature from various sources, ranging from neoliberal to critical (the methods as well as the substance which should be used to provide literacy courses, of course, are widely debated). One can continue to raise the following arguments:

- The integrated approach was an improvement of the “non-integrated approach” notwithstanding its failures to boost literacy achievements;
- The design flaws of the program led to, or exacerbated implementation flaws;

- The public-private partnership policy was more an outsourcing policy than a genuine partnership since most providers did not share risks and the same goals as the government;
- The providers' use of local language were perceived as less threatening to the communities than the "French school" (i.e., the primary school).

The study of PAPF indicated that literacy actions "integrated" with other development activities were more popular than the "non-integrated" approach. The quantitative data from the project are so frail that it is impossible to say whether the literacy outcome was better for the integrated approach. If anything, they seemed slightly worse (see tables 8.2 and 8.3). Interviews and reports from the project, however, pointed out that the "integrated approach" was more effective than literacy alone because it stimulated interest for literacy through courses on income generating activities.

The market-based approach and influence on the project failed to prevent or bypass corruption and ineffectiveness. The analysis of this case has demonstrated that outsourcing cannot be successful without a well-functioning state system. It was essential for the PAPF to address state weaknesses at the same time as it began building civil society's capacity for implementing social services. Many of the flaws could have been repaired through a better project design and better implementation control (see section 7.2). The World Bank, through the PAPF, however, did not sufficiently build government capacity for addressing such problems.

Table 12.4: Case study findings and the debate raised in the dissertation

Issues	Widely held opinions	New findings & possibly controversial issues	The debate
Development and literacy	<p>Basic education should be given to all people in society</p> <p>It is important to involve women in education, to decrease gender inequalities</p> <p>The delivery mode has an impact on services; hence the question of whether or not to outsource is important</p>	<p>Literacy is not an alternative to primary education</p> <p>Literacy programs should be set up to help those who fall out from primary education</p> <p>Literacy is an important part of development, and literacy actions should be “integrated” with other development activities</p>	<p>Main development questions that should be addressed are/are not questions about social justice</p> <p>The aim of development is/is not to make a more just society</p> <p>The aim of development is/is not to achieve better economic performance</p>
Global influence	International agencies influence local policies	The World Bank imposes market-based solutions	The influence of the WB is/is not beneficial
Implementation and design issues	<p>Use of outsourcing increased access to services</p> <p>The implementation of the project had many process-linked flaws</p> <p>These flaws lowered the project’s impact</p>	<p>Design was flawed, but the flaws can be repaired</p> <p>The design and implementation flaws considerably lowered the impact of the project</p> <p>Outsourcing cannot be successful without a well functioning state system</p>	<p>Use of outsourcing improved/worsened service quality</p> <p>Use of outsourcing improved/worsened implementation effectiveness</p>
Cost	Use of outsourcing led to more funding from international funding agencies	The literacy programs in Senegal were cheaper than basic education, and much less effective	Use of outsourcing was more/less cost-effective than government implementation
Stakeholders	<p>Providers did an uneven job</p> <p>The involved state agencies and contract management agency did an uneven job</p> <p>The providers’ association (CNOAS) did not function well</p>	<p>The providers association can be improved and can help improve delivery results</p> <p>Civil society can help improve poor people’s condition</p> <p>The project did not help improve government performance</p>	<p>Outsourcing made the learners more/less involved in project design and implementation</p> <p>The project created and strengthened civil society</p> <p>The project did/did not maintain unjust power and resource distribution in society</p>
Project outcomes	<p>The project changed roles of civil society and state</p> <p>The courses taught people how to read and write, basic health skills and other community-relevant issues</p>	<p>The project changed people’s conception of state and civil society</p> <p>Literacy outcomes were not as important as other outcomes</p>	<p>Outcomes in term of literacy and skills learning were good/bad</p> <p>The project did/did not build/strengthen civil society; it made/did not make civil society corrupt</p>

If government capacity for addressing asymmetric information problems could be developed, in addition to creating better methods to ensure that a good training for providers' staff members (including literacy teachers) takes place, there may be arguments in favor of using public-private partnerships approaches built on outsourcing. The PAPF project has shown that civil society associations can be used to help deliver social services; it has also shown the inconsistent quality of service delivery of these associations. The market methods used in the project were clearly flawed, since it did not ensure that the best subproject proposals were selected. The selection was based on criteria that did not sufficiently take into account the providers' prior performance (i.e., a poor provider could write a good subproject proposal and obtain funding), and the selection was further biased by political pressure. Use of outsourcing necessitated correction of these flaws, to ensure that the quality of delivery was more uniform, and of better quality.

The outsourcing method used in Senegal was in most cases reduced to a contractual relationship between the state and the providers, instead of becoming a partnership in which the partners had a common goal. As noted in section 1.2, public-private partnership in education is according to the International Finance Corporation (IFC) based on three principles: (i) it is a risk-sharing relationship; (ii) the public and non-public (including voluntary and private) sectors have a common goal; and (iii) the partnership is underpinned by a contract for the delivery of a publicly funded service. Outsourcing approaches would be strengthened to the extent that they can be built on a genuine partnership, not only on a contract. Such partnership could be built if the civil

society and the state shared risks and had a common goal, which was rarely the case in the PAPF. The state and the participants bore most of the risks in this case, and the goal of most provider associations was to earn money. Therefore, the word “partnership” in the Senegalese case is almost synonymous with the word “outsourcing”. The main difference with outsourcing would be that in the Senegalese partnership, the providers defined the subprojects themselves (in cooperation with the learners); and they participated in policy decisions taken by the delegate minister and/or by the DAEB. There are therefore grounds to employ the word partnership even if the policy was reduced to a contractual relationship in which the partners did not share a common goal.

As it was implemented, the project changed people’s notion about the roles of the state and civil society. Previously, the state was considered a direct provider of education services, mainly through primary schools – which were called “the French school” (*l’école française*) by most interviewees. Increasingly, particularly in the late 1990s, civil society began to establish local-language classes open to illiterate adolescents and adults. In the opinion of rural people, the literacy courses (*alphabétisation*) became education that was closer to the local reality, as opposed to *l’école française*, a foreign-influenced primary school. Literacy classes were therefore less threatening to local customs and religious beliefs. Likewise, the implementation was made through a certain negotiation between providers and the community (instead of being implemented in a top-down way). The local population therefore felt at ease with the PAPF approach.

The overall implementation decision to be made when setting up a literacy program or other services would be (i) to fix the market flaws through building of government

capacity in correcting these flaws, and to use outsourcing because it is more easily adapted to a local context than government programs; or (ii) to reform the government and then to create a flexible government approach that is not market-based. The decision on which implementation system to pick, is based on the theoretical framework used to analyze development and literacy education.

12.3: A Personal View on Outsourcing

In evaluating whether or not to outsource, it is useful to look at advantages and disadvantages from both neoliberal economics point of view, and from the critical view (see tables 12.5a and 12.5b below).

Table 12.5a: Neoliberal views on the outsourcing debate

	State delivery	Partnerships/Outsourcing
Benefits	<p>Can be less costly through economies of scale</p> <p>Easier to mobilize volunteers to become literacy teachers</p> <p>Monitoring and control are inherent to the implementation structure, and are less difficult to set up</p>	<p>Does not need long time to set up delivery structure</p> <p>Fast delivery of services; flexibility</p> <p>Client-oriented approach; grassroots participation in all stages of subproject formulation implementation</p> <p>Adapted to local needs; programs in local languages; helps create demand</p> <p>The approach builds civil society</p>
Disadvantages	<p>It takes a long time & is costly to set up administrative structures for public delivery</p> <p>Public transfer of funds is often slow and cumbersome; it is likely to delay activities</p> <p>Programs tend to be nation-wide, uniform, and less client-oriented</p> <p>May lead to conflict of interests in evaluation, and delivery is prone to corruption</p>	<p>Sometimes the unit cost of private delivery is more costly, and there are heavy transaction fees</p> <p>The approach does not work unless there are possibilities for monitoring the providers' actions</p> <p>Providers tend to become very profit-oriented and to try to cut costs</p> <p>Subprojects finish when financing ceases (there is little sustainability)</p>

From a critical point of view, the same table could be as follows:

Table 12.5b: Critical views on the outsourcing debate

	State delivery	Partnerships/Outsourcing
Benefits	<p>Is more equitable, since there is no incentive to deliver only to “easy” locations and population groups</p> <p>The system is not profit-oriented, and is therefore of better quality</p>	<p>The subprojects can more easily be adapted to local circumstances</p> <p>Civil society represents local communities, and can be a factor to promote a more just society</p>
Disadvantages	<p>The state is controlled by the dominant class, race, and gender. It is unlikely that these people will promote programs that challenge their own hegemony in society (and for that reason, there is a need for civil society associations that can represent grassroots associations and become a counter-power and controlling instance to the state)</p>	<p>Existence of market failures (information problems, providers act as monopolies in the villages, etc.)</p> <p>Outsourcing may pervert civil society associations and make them become clients of politicians, and dependent on financing</p> <p>Outsourcing may exacerbate corruption problems at all levels, and promote a money-driven, unsound society without rules</p> <p>Civil society allies with the government instead of representing a counter-power to the state</p>

The neoliberal economics’ point of view would look at pace and quality for delivery, and problems of asymmetric information. In a broader perspective, one must consider whether a state can regulate private sector implementation – and whether it is willing to do it. Table 12.5a and 12.5b show how the question of outsourcing can be approached from both views in the Senegalese case.

Outsourcing in Senegal had a double effect: on the one hand it affected the service delivered; on the other hand the delivery method itself affected the civil society and the state. One must evaluate the effects of both, before deciding whether to outsource or not.

For the service delivery, two important negative factors were linked to the monitoring and evaluation problems and the effect of cost-cutting practices. One positive feature of outsourcing was the possibility of adapting the courses to the local situation. The “cost-cutting factor” was of particular importance for the literacy learning (e.g., the literacy teachers did not obtain enough training, and often the textbooks were chosen by cost criteria), but may have had less effect for income-generating activities (the learners were more apt to control the providers’ contribution to this field, and it was possible to find local “experts” on specific subjects, e.g., soap making, dyeing, etc.). The “flexibility factor” had therefore little positive impact on the literacy training, but it improved the income-generating activities considerably. I would argue that there is a case for outsourcing training on income generating activities, whereas there is a case for not outsourcing literacy training.

As was illustrated, many of the flaws of the project could have been corrected through redesign of the outsourcing processes. Even if the state took over parts of the literacy education, such redesign would have made sense from a welfare economics view and from certain critical perspectives, if civil society was to be involved (even partly) in service delivery. The redesign could include the following measures:

- (i) To prevent provider-driven activities with low community participation (and to prevent asymmetric power relationships), the following actions could be taken:
 - To involve the communities in the control of the funds (e.g., make them responsible for payments to the providers upon delivery of satisfactory services rendered);

- The selection processes could be redesigned. Target communities should be pre-identified and providers should compete for obtaining funds for implementing literacy courses in those communities. Representatives from the concerned communities should be involved in the selection process;

(ii) The following actions could be taken to avoid government bottlenecks,:

- Avoid giving the government “packages” of funds that it can use almost indiscriminately. Build the capacity of the government through careful analysis and correction of the institutional set-up (of the government), so as to eliminate bottlenecks;
- Use a project coordination unit (PCU) to manage project implementation. Although current World Bank policies try to fix government flaws and thus use government institutions to monitor projects, this case shows that in some institutions the government bottlenecks cannot easily be fixed. The use of a small flexible project coordination unit will in such cases improve results;

(iii) To improve provider performance, the following actions should be taken:

- Set up a system for imposing negative and positive fines.¹⁶⁸ The provider association (CNOAS) could do this job. The CNOAS should be improved through the creation of an independent (and full-time) association management committee, the members of which must not manage literacy activities on their own (to avoid conflict of interests);
- The selection committee should take into account providers’ previous performance. A list classifying the providers of literacy classes according to their results should be

¹⁶⁸ Such system will transfer some risks to the providers. Most risks are currently borne by the learners.

re-initiated¹⁶⁹ and the providers with the lowest results should be automatically excluded from the next selection;

- The decentralization processes should be fully redesigned, as should the monitoring and evaluation processes, which implementation experience has shown are flawed. A full institutional redesign must be undertaken in view of improving the government's handling of literacy. During the redesign period, the PCU should handle project implementation issues (and should steer the selection processes);

(iv) To avoid “creaming off” (i.e., that providers only choose the areas that are easy to access) and to avoid lower implementation quality in remote areas with high transport costs, the following action should be taken:

- The unit cost system should be redesigned. Three types of fees should be established (one fee for implementation of courses in urban areas, where transport and thereby supervision and equipment costs are low; one fee for easy-to access rural areas; and one fee for remote rural areas). Pre-identified villages should be chosen and divided into cost zones.

From a pro-market economic view, it is likely that the above adjustment of project design will correct most of the implementation flaws, and will boost the project's effectiveness.

Yet, my assumption is that the flaws of the project, in not addressing problems of social justice and equitable distribution of services, are so important that they cannot be fixed through a simple redesign of processes (see table 12.4). I would argue that, in addition to the aforementioned redesign of processes, the core delivery system of the project must be changed. One possibility to benefit both from state guaranteed quality and civil society's flexibility, would be that the government paid literacy teachers to teach literacy, and the

¹⁶⁹ This was done for the courses implemented in 1997/98 and 1998/99. The results were published in the project's newspaper, *Partage*, no. 8 and no. 16.

course attendees gradually obtain control over funds that could be used to involve civil society associations in specialized training.

The literacy classes should make a priority of enrolling and fostering competencies for the poorest and most vulnerable in society (for whom one should be ready to compensate the loss of opportunity costs for attending). In order to ally the groups of the poorest with civil society, civil society could be subcontracted by these groups to perform certain jobs associated with literacy training (especially related to income-generating activities). Any payments of civil society for delivery should be done through the requests of learners, and certification that the job is (well) done. Civil society must be recreated as a part of the Senegalese state, and instead of being an economic “partner” to the government, it must represent a counter-power to political society. It must become the “hegemonic” aspect of the state balancing the coercive aspect (Host, 2002). The idea of these changes would be to terminate a contracting system that is maintaining a false “economic” civil society, and to “activate” the “real” civil society and promote social justice. The providers association (in the style of a reorganized CNOAS) would have an important role in monitoring the evolution of the sector, and in preventing misuse of the system.

The curriculum of the literacy courses should be reformulated to include classes on social rights and civics, as well as management and other subjects (in the style of the integrated approach of PAPP). The teaching style should be changed, and be informed by a state-monitored literacy teacher training. The new training system (for illiterates) should be centered on group work and peer tutoring. The education (both the classes provided by state-paid teachers, and those given by civil society) should, as much as possible, be

based on conversation and dialogue. The dialogue should involve respect, and people working with one another instead of the teacher lecturing the illiterate. It should develop local consciousness about the possibility of informed action for a more just society, along the lines of Freire's "conscientization" (Freire, 2001). The emphasis of such redesign of literacy education, must be its reinstatement as a human right, instead of considering it as a market commodity.

Appendices

List of source documents

Banque Mondiale. (1996). *Rapport no 15517-SE : Rapport d'Evaluation – République du Sénégal ; Projet d'Appui à l'Alphabétisation Priorité Femmes*. AFTHD [World Bank Project Appraisal].

Cabinet du MDCEBL. (1999). *Évaluation du Processus de Développement du Projet d'Alphabétisation « Priorité Femmes » dans le Cadre de la Revue à Mi-Parcours*. [Project Mid-term Evaluation].

Cabinet du MDCEBL. (2003). *Projet de Politique Générale et de Plan d'Action pour l'Alphabétisation et la Promotion des Langues Nationales 2003-2012*. BACDI. [10-year policy plan for literacy].

Camara & Sow (2003). *Coût et financement de l'Alphabétisation au Sénégal*. [Cost analysis of Literacy in Senegal].

DAEB. (2001). *Rapport d'Evaluation des Sous Projets de Post Alphabétisation*. PAPF – DAEB. [Evaluation report of Post-literacy Subprojects].

DAEB/PAPF. (non dated). *Rapport de Synthèse de l'Evaluation*. [Summary of Evaluation].

DAEB, *Longitudinal study, 3 reports*: LS-T0 (2001), LS-T1 (2002), and LS-T1.2 (2003) .

MOE/DAEB/PAPF. (2000). *Manuel de Procédures pour l'Expérimentation des Programmes Intégrés d'Education des Adultes, 2000-2002*. Dakar : Groupe SIFNI.

DAEB. (2004). *Etude d'Impact* (draft report).

Diagne, A. (2000). *La Stratégie du Faire-faire en Education*. BELOYSIA, Banque Mondiale. [The 'Faire-faire' strategy in Education].

Fall, A. (1999). *Mission d'Analyse des Coûts des Sous Projets d'Alphabétisation en Langues Nationales*. Rapport Provisoire, PAPF [Cost Analysis report].

MOE. (non dated). *Cadre de Référence Pour l'Alphabétisation*.

MOE. (2001). *Contribution du Gouvernement au Rapport d'Achevement du Projet d'Appui a l'Alphabétisation fonctionnelle « Priorité Femmes »*. Dakar : PAPF.

PAPF. 1996 – 2001: *Partage: Bulletin de Liaison no 1 – 23*. Dakar, distributed by PCU/PAPF.

PCU. (2003). *Guide Pour la Conception et la Mise en Œuvre du Programme Intégré de Formation des Adultes*. Dakar : PAPF/PCU.

Providers' requests for financing: Different GIEs, NGOs and religious associations' requests from 1996 - 2001.

World Bank. (1995). *Senegal, an assessment of living conditions. Report No. 12517-SE*. Africa Region: World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank. (1996). *Staff Appraisal Report. Report No. 15517-SE*. World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank. (2002). *Senegal, Poverty reduction strategy paper. Report No. 25127 SE*. IMF/World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank. (2004). *Implementation Completion Report. Report No. 27339 SE*. World Bank, Washington DC.

Annex 2:


List of interviewees (in Senegal)

Category	Function	Urban /Rural	Gender	Age
Parastatal	Head of literacy initiatives, AGETIP	Urban	M	
Civil Servants	Minister of Education	Urban	M	
	Director of DAEB (now DAELN)	Urban	M	
	Head monitoring and evaluation unit, DAEB	Urban	M	
	Director, PCU	Urban	M	
	Vice Director, PCU (took over Director function in 2004)	Urban	F	
	Financial assistant, PCU	Urban	M	
	IDEN	Urban	M	
	IDEN	Rural	M	
	RRA	Rural	M	
	RDA, former teacher	Rural	M	
	RDA	Rural	M	
	RDA	Rural	M	
	RDA	Rural	M	
RDA	Rural	M		
Civil Society	Head of ADEA (Association for Development of Education in Africa), former World Bank staff member, former Minister of Education in Senegal	Urban	M	
	Consultant, former Director PCU and Civil Servant	Urban	M	
	Consultant, published history of literacy in Senegal	Urban	M	
	Consultant (former Director of DAEB)	Urban	M	
	Provider (American)	Urban	M	
	Provider (current teacher – somebody else is coordinator of the group)	Rural	F	
	Provider (former high-level civil servant)	Rural	M	
	Provider (retired teacher, and high-level civil servant)	Urban	M	
	Provider (retired school teacher)	Rural	M	
	Provider (former civil servant)	Urban	M	
	Provider (former civil servant)	Rural	F	
	Provider	Rural	F	
	Provider	Rural	M	
Provider	Rural	M		

	Provider	Rural	M	
	Provider	Urban	M	
	Coordinator (retired formal school teacher & Civil Servant)	Rural	M	
	Coordinator	Rural	F	
	Supervisor	Rural	M	
	Literacy teacher (earlier relais)	Urban	F	
	Literacy teacher	Rural	F	21
	Head Village	Urban	M	
	Head of Village (“Ancien du Village”)	Rural	M	
Learners	Relais (Treasurer of Women’s Association)	Rural	F	
	Relais	Rural	F	
	Former student, President of Women’s Association	Rural	F	
	Former student, Treasurer of Women’s Association	Rural	F	
	Shopkeeper (former student)	Urban	F	38
	Shopkeeper (former student)	Urban	F	40
	Shopkeeper (former student)	Urban	F	20
	Shopkeeper (former student)	Urban	F	22
	Specialized in dyeing (former student)	Urban	F	29
	Tailor (former student)	Urban	F	37
	Current student, President of Women’s Association	Rural	F	“>50”
	Current student, farming/family	Rural	F	
	Current student, farmer	Rural	F	38
	Current student, farmer	Rural	M	46

In addition to the above, World Bank staff members in Washington DC were interviewed, as well as UNESCO staff members in Paris and Dakar.

Coding model



Annex 4:

Providers' fees*

Ref.	Ccy	Amount	Value date	CPI adjusted	US\$2003
2	XOF	181,964,852	11-Mar-97	200,343,302	345,419
3	XOF	200,997,944	10-Jun-97	221,298,736	381,550
4	XOF	153,273,753	13-Aug-97	168,754,402	290,956
5	XOF	25,050,145	8-Oct-97	27,580,210	47,552
7	XOF	204,312,084	4-Dec-97	224,947,604	387,841
9	XOF	420,404,710	1-Apr-98	454,457,492	783,547
10	XOF	239,542,785	14-Sep-98	258,945,751	446,458
11	XOF	86,220,970	17-Nov-98	93,204,869	160,698
12	XOF	433,746,186	27-Jan-99	463,674,673	799,439
14	XOF	241,389,683	17-May-99	258,045,571	444,906
15	XOF	243,190,728	20-Oct-99	259,970,888	448,226
17	XOF	80,417,549	15-Feb-00	85,242,602	146,970
19	XOF	815,870,867	19-May-00	864,823,119	1,491,074
21	XOF	598,781,326	21-Sep-00	634,708,206	1,094,324
22	XOF	211,849,930	27-Dec-00	224,560,926	387,174
23	XOF	297,235,220	22-May-01	312,988,687	539,636
24	XOF	86,342,545	10-Jul-01	90,918,700	156,756
25	XOF	114,371,187	31-Aug-01	120,432,860	207,643
26	XOF	312,872,409	11-Dec-01	329,454,647	568,025
27	XOF	31,223,316	15-Feb-02	31,941,452	55,071
28	XOF	55,733,366	11-Jun-02	57,015,233	98,302
29	XOF	79,536,822	18-Oct-02	81,366,169	140,286
30	XOF	58,721,250	31-Oct-02	60,071,839	103,572
31	XOF	25,215,417	10-Mar-03	25,215,417	43,475
32	XOF	23,849,266	28-Mar-03	23,849,266	41,119
	XOF	850,059	17-Jul-03	850,059	1,466
Total costs		5,222,964,369		5,574,662,678	9,611,487

* In comparing payment ref. 19, 20, 21, and 26 of Annex 1 with the payments in Annex 3, it would appear that the transfers under component 2 were higher than the total payments. This is due to the existence of a special account (in Senegal), on which the government could draw for specific payments. If the government requested a non-objection and subsequent payment for an activity, the World Bank could (a) transfer the funds; or (b) authorize the payment from the special account. The last payment (32) for category payments, for example, was made exclusively upon drawing from the special account; hence it does not figure in the table in Annex 3.

Annex 5:

Payments to the project account from the World Bank

Ref.	Ccy	Amount	Value date	XOF equivalent	CPI adjusted	US\$2003
PPF	USD	514,331.16	6-Sep-96	261,768,844	296,060,563	510,449
PPF	USD	1,837.06	6-Sep-96	934,941	1,057,418	1,823
1	XOF	250,000,000	4-Dec-96	250,000,000	282,750,000	487,500
2	XOF	199,353,987	11-Mar-97	199,353,987	219,488,740	378,429
3	XOF	218,025,096	10-Jun-97	218,025,096	240,045,631	413,872
4	XOF	194,675,013	13-Aug-97	194,675,013	214,337,189	369,547
5	XOF	128,106,696	8-Oct-97	128,106,696	141,045,472	243,182
6	XOF	73,200,000	17-Nov-97	73,200,000	80,593,200	138,954
7	XOF	226,028,518	4-Dec-97	226,028,518	248,857,398	429,064
8	XOF	250,000,000	11-Dec-97	250,000,000	275,250,000	474,569
9	XOF	496,968,165	1-Apr-98	496,968,165	537,222,586	926,246
10	XOF	290,323,809	14-Sep-98	290,323,809	313,840,038	541,104
11	XOF	140,356,505	17-Nov-98	140,356,505	151,725,382	261,595
12	XOF	447,269,870	27-Jan-99	447,269,870	478,131,491	824,365
14	XOF	316,113,094	17-May-99	316,113,094	337,924,897	582,629
15	XOF	360,663,653	20-Oct-99	360,663,653	385,549,445	664,740
16	XOF	160,800,000	2-Feb-00	160,800,000	170,448,000	293,876
17	XOF	200,260,979	15-Feb-00	200,260,979	212,276,638	365,994
18	XOF	500,000,000	2-Mar-00	500,000,000	530,000,000	913,793
19	XOF	718,129,127	19-May-00	718,129,127	761,216,875	1,312,443
20	XOF	80,400,000	12-Oct-00	80,400,000	85,224,000	146,938
21	XOF	505,816,423	21-Sep-00	505,816,423	536,165,408	924,423
22	XOF	190,876,255	27-Dec-00	190,876,255	202,328,830	348,843
23	XOF	369,077,609	22-May-01	369,077,609	377,566,394	650,977
24	XOF	144,041,203	10-Jul-01	144,041,203	147,354,151	254,059
25	XOF	205,369,592	31-Aug-01	205,369,592	210,093,093	362,229
26	XOF	227,792,409	11-Dec-01	227,792,409	233,031,634	401,779
28	XOF	141,987,617	11-Jun-02	141,987,617	145,253,332	250,437
29	XOF	57,580,304	18-Oct-02	57,580,304	58,904,651	101,560
30	XOF	74,983,661	31-Oct-02	74,983,661	76,708,285	132,256
Total				7,430,903,370	7,950,450,742	13,707,674

Annex 5:

CPI adjusted participants' payments

	Enrollees	Unit fee	Total
G1: 1996	6,911	5.39	37,250
G2: 1997	28,831	5.25	151,363
G3: 1998	29,985	5.15	154,423
G4: 1999	27,257	5.10	139,011
G5: 2000	65,409	5.05	330,315
G5: 2000 (Integrated)	9,799	5.05	49,485
G6: 2001 (Integrated)	10,190	5.02	51,154
Total	178,382		913,001

Bibliography

Abadzi, H. (2003). *Improving adult literacy outcomes: lessons from cognitive research for developing countries*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Abadzi, H. (2003). *Teaching adults to read better and faster: results from an experiment in Burkina Faso*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Afshar, H., & Barrientos S. (1999). *Women, globalization and fragmentation in the developing world*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire New York: Macmillan; St.Martin's Press.p.

Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization*. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.

Apple, M. W. (2001). Comparing Neoliberal Projects and Inequality in Education. *Comparative education*, no. 37 (4), pp. 409-423.

Atlas of Africa. (2000). UNESCO/Jaguar Ed..

Azfar, O., & Zinnes, C. (2003). *Success By Design: The Science of Self-Evaluating Projects*. NIE-Based Toolkit for USAID Applications, IRIS-USAID.

Beck, U. (2000). *What is globalization?*, Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Beneria, L. (2003). *Gender, development, and globalization: economics as if all people mattered*. New York: Routledge.

- Bhola, H.S. "Literacy Campaigns: A Policy." In Wagner, D.A., Venezky, R.L. & Street, B.V. (1999). *Literacy: an international handbook*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Boserup, E. (New ed. 1989). *Woman's role in economic development*. London: Earthscan.
- Canterbery, R. (2001). *A brief history of economics: artful approaches to the dismal science*. Singapore: World Scientific.
- Carnoy, "Globalization and Educational Reform." In Stromquist, N.P. & Monkman, K. (2000). *Globalization and education: integration and contestation across cultures*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Carnoy, M. & Samoff, J. (1990). *Education and social transition in the Third World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Castells, M. (1997). *The power of identity*. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
- Cohen, J.L. & Arato, A. (1992). *Civil society and political theory*. Studies in contemporary German social thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Cohn, E. & Geske, T.G. (1990). *The economics of education*. 3rd ed., Oxford, England; New York: Pergamon Press.
- Cooke, B. & Kothari, U., eds. (2001): *Participation – the new tyranny*. London: Zed Books.
- Coombs, p. H., et Ahmed, M. (1974). *Attacking rural poverty; how nonformal education can help*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Coulibaly, A.L. (2003). *Wade, un opposant au pouvoir: l'alternance piégée?*, Dakar, Sénégal: Editions sentinelles.
- Creswell, J.W. (1998). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five traditions*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

- Daly, H.E. & Farley, J.C. (2004). *Ecological economics: principles and applications*. Washington: Island Press.
- Diop, M.C., ed. (1993). *Senegal: Essays in Statecraft*. Oxford : CODRESIA
- Diop, A. B. (1996). "Croyance religieuses traditionnelles et Islam Chez les Wolof." *In Peuples du Senegal*. Sepia.
- Diouf, A.M., & Nachtman, Y. (2001). *L'Education Non Formelle Au Sénégal: Description, Evaluation et Perspectives*. Paris : UNESCO Editions.
- Diouf, M. (1994). *Sénégal, les ethnies et la nation*. Genève, Paris: UNRISD; Editions L'Harmattan.
- Edinvest. (Non dated, CD-Rom). *Public-private Partnership Toolkit*. International Finance Corporation.
- Ferdmann, B. "Ethnic and minority issues in literacy." *In* Wagner, D.A., Venezky, R.L. & Street, B.V. (1999). *Literacy: an international handbook*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Fitz, J. & Beers, B. (2002). "Educational Management Organisations and the privatization of education in the US and the UK." *In Comparative Education*, 38,2, May.
- Freire, p. (2001). *Pedagogy of Freedom: Ethics, Democracy, and Civic Courage*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Giddens, A. (1999). *The third way: the renewal of social democracy*. Malden, Mass.: Polity Press.
- Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1982). *Effective evaluation. 1st ed.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

- Gueye, p. M. "Reflections on the Advantages and the Practical Use of National Languages in Adult Literacy in Senegal." *In* Kuper & Veliente-Catter. 1999. *Educación de los adultos en África y Latinoamérica. Experiencias interculturales en un encuentro multicultural*. GTZ.
- Harper, M. (2000). *Public Services through Private Enterprise: Micro-Privatisation for Improved Delivery*. Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Harriss, J. (1997). "Missing link or analytically missing?: the concept of social capital." *In* *Journal of International Development*, vol. 9 no. 7, 919-937.
- Harvey, D. (1989). *The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change*. Oxford [England]; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
- Hertz, N. (2001). *The silent takeover: global capitalism and the death of democracy*. New York: Free Press.
- Heward, C. & Bunwaree, S.S. (1999). *Gender, education, and development: beyond access to empowerment*. London; New York: Zed Books.
- Hibou, B. (1999). *La Privatisation des Etats*. Paris: Karthala.
- Holst, J.D. (2001). *Social movements, civil society, and radical adult education. Critical studies in education and culture series*. Westport, Conn.: Bergin & Garvey.
- Howell, J. & Pearce, J. (2001). *Civil society & development: a critical exploration*. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers.
- IMF/Fiscal Affairs Dept. (2004). *Public-Private Partnerships*.
- Jacob, J.-P., & Lavigne Delville p. (1994). *Les associations paysannes en Afrique: organisation et dynamiques*. Marseille, Association euro-africaine pour l'anthropologie du changement social et du développement. Paris : Karthala.

Kane A. "Financial Arrangements Across Borders: Women's Predominant Participation in Popular Finance, from Thilogne to Paris. A Senegalese Case Study." In Lemire, B., Pearson R. & Campbell, G. (eds). (2001). *Women and Credit*. Berg/Oxford, New York 2001.

Kasper, W. & Streit, M.E. (1998). *Institutional economics: social order and public policy*. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.

Kessler, T., (2004). *Who's Taking Risks: How the World Bank pushes private infrastructure -- and finds resistance in some surprising places*. CNES (Citizens' Network on Essential Services). www.servicesforall.org.

Keynes, J. M. (1963). *Essays in persuasion*. New York: Norton.

Keynes, J. M. (1965). *The general theory of employment, interest, and money*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

King, A.D. (1997). *Culture, globalization, and the world-system: contemporary conditions for the representation of identity*. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.

Kingdon, J. W. (1995). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*. 2nd Edition. University of Michigan: Longman.

Korsgaard, O. "On Globalization". In Walters, S. & Manicom, L. (1996). *Gender in popular education: methods for empowerment*. Bellville, South Africa: Zed Books.

Krishna, A. (2002). *Active social capital: tracing the roots of development and democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Klees, S. (2001). "Sector Wide Approaches in Education: Coordination or Chaos? World Bank Development Policy: A SAP in SWAPs Clothing." *Current Issues in Comparative Education* [Online], volume 3 (no. 2). Available at: <http://www.tc.columbia.edu/cice/vol3nr2/al152.htm>

- Klees, S. (2002). *The implications of the World Bank's private sector development strategy for education: increasing inequality and inefficiency*. University of Maryland: Draft version.
- Kuper & Veliente-Catter. 1999. *Educación de los adultos en África y Latinoamérica. Experiencias interculturales en un encuentro multicultural*. GTZ.
- Lachenmann, Jacob, J.-P., & Lavigne Delville p. (1994). *Les associations paysannes en Afrique: organisation et dynamiques*. Marseille, Association euro-africaine pour l'anthropologie du changement social et du développement. Paris : Karthala.
- Land, T. & V. Hauck. (2003). *Building Coherence between sector reforms and decentralisation: do SWAPs provide the missing link?* (ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 49). Maastricht : European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM).
- Laporte, B. (2003). *The Knowledge Bank*. The World Bank: www.worldbank.org/ks/team
- Lauglo, J. (2001). *Engaging With Adults: The Case for Increased Support to Adult Basic Education in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Africa Region Human Development Working Paper Series: World Bank.
- LeCompte, M.D. & Schensul, J.J. (1999). *Designing & conducting ethnographic research. The ethnographer's toolkit; v. 1*. Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press.
- LeCompte, M.D. and Schensul, J.J. (1999). *Analyzing & interpreting ethnographic data. Ethnographer's toolkit; v. 5*. Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press.
- Loyola Marymount University. (2003). *Senegal Education System*. www.lmu.edu/global/wwcu/background/sn.rtf
- MacEwan, A. (1999). *Neoliberalism or democracy? Economic strategy, markets, and alternatives for the 21st century*. London: Zed Books.

Manning, p. (1998). *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1995*. Cambridge University Press.

Mehmet, O. (1999). *Westernizing the Third World: The Eurocentricity of Economic Development Theories*. New York: Routledge.

Merriam, S.B. (1998) *Qualitative research and case study applications in education*. 2nd ed., San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Mertens, D.M. (1998). *Research and evaluation in education and psychology: integrating diversity with quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods*. 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Nederveen p. J. (2004). *Globalization or empire?*, New York: Routledge.

Nordtveit, B. H. (2004). *Managing Public-private Partnerships: Lessons from Literacy Education in Senegal* (2004). Africa Region Human Development Working Paper Series – No. 72. Washington DC: World Bank.

Nordtveit, B. H. (2004). *When Governments gets Creative: Adult Literacy in Senegal* (2004). Education Notes. Washington DC: World Bank.

Okech, A. & Carr-Hill R.A. (2001). *Adult literacy programs in Uganda*. Africa Region human development series. Washington: World Bank.

Oxenham, J., Diallo, A. H., Katahoire, A. R., Petkova-Mwangi, A., & Sall, O. (2002). *Skills and Literacy Training for Better Livelihoods : A Review of Approaches and Experience*. Africa Region Human Development Working Paper Series: World Bank.

Østergaard, L. article in Heward, C. & Bunwaree, S.S. (1999). *Gender, education, and development: beyond access to empowerment*. London; New York: Zed Books.

- Østergaard, L. and Commission of the European Communities Directorate-General Development. (1992). *Gender and development: a practical guide*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Pakenham, T. (1991). *The scramble for Africa, 1876-1912*. 1st US ed. New York: Random House.
- Papagiannis, G.J. & Bock, J.C. (1983). *Nonformal education and national development: a critical assessment of policy, research, and practice*. The Praeger special studies series in comparative education, New York, NY: Praeger.
- Peuples du Senegal*. (1996). Sepia.
- Pirls 2001 international report: IEA's study of reading literacy achievement in primary school in 35 countries*. (2003). Chestnut Hill, MA: International Study Center.
- Printz, M. (1996). *L'Alphabétisation au Sénégal*. L'Harmattan.
- Putnam, R.D. (2000). *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Riss, M.D. (1989). *Femmes Africaines en Milieu Rural*. L'Harmattan.
- Sall, M. (2000). *Atlas du Sénégal*. Paris: Les Editions J.A.
- Sachs, W. (2001). *Planet dialectics: explorations in environment and development*. London: Zed Books.
- Schleifer, A. (1998). State Versus Private Ownership. NBER Working Paper Series. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w6665>
- Schensul, S.L., Schensul, J.J., & LeCompte M.D., (1999). *Essential ethnographic methods: observations, interviews, and questionnaires. Ethnographer's toolkit; v. 2*. Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press.

Schensul, J.J. (1999). *Enhanced ethnographic methods: audiovisual techniques, focused group interviews, and elicitation techniques. The ethnographer's toolkit; v. 3.* Walnut Creek, Calif.: Altamira Press.

Schensul, J.J. (1999). *Mapping social networks, spatial data & hidden populations. The ethnographer's toolkit; v. 4.* Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press.

Schensul, J.J. (1999). *Using ethnographic data interventions, public programming and public policy. Ethnographer's toolkit; v. 7.* Walnut Creek, Calif.: Altamira Press.

Schultz, T.P. (1995). *Investment in women's human capital.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sciar, E. (2000). *You don't always get what you pay for: The Economics of Privatization.* Cornell.

Senegal, Government. *Official site of the Government.* www.gouv.sn.

Soros, G. (2002). *George Soros on globalization. 1st ed.* New York: PublicAffairs.

Stake, R.E. (1995). *The art of case study research.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Stiglitz, J.E. (2002). *Globalization and its discontents. 1st ed.* New York: W. W. Norton.

Stiglitz, J.E. (2003). *The roaring nineties: a new history of the world's most prosperous decade. 1st ed.* New York: W.W. Norton.

Stromquist, N.P. & Monkman, K. (2000). *Globalization and education: integration and contestation across cultures.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Stufflebeam, D.L., Madaus, G.F., & Kellaghan, T. (2000). *Evaluation models: viewpoints on educational and human services evaluation. 2nd ed.* Evaluation in education and human services. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

- Sylla A. "Reform Options for the Educational System." In Diop, M.C., ed. (1993). *Senegal: Essays in Statecraft*. Oxford : CODRESIA.
- Thatcher, M. (2002). *Statecraft: strategies for a changing world. 1st ed.* New York, NY: HarperCollins.
- Thiané, A. (1996). *Les ONG, Une Panacé... ?* Saint-Louis, Senegal: Xamail Editions.
- Todaro, M.P. & Smith, S.C. (2003). *Economic development. 8th ed.* The Addison-Wesley series in economics., Boston: Addison Wesley.
- Tomlinson, J. (1991). *Cultural imperialism: a critical introduction*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Valerio, A. (2003). *Estimating the Economic Benefits of Adult Literacy Programs: The Case of Ghana*. PhD Dissertation, Columbia University.
- UNESCO. (2005). *EFA Global Monitoring Report: The Quality Imperative*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Wagner, D.A., Venezky, R.L. & Street, B.V. (1999). *Literacy: an international handbook*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (2004). *World Systems Analysis*. Duke University Press.
- Wallerstein, I. "The National and the Universal: Can There Be Such a Thing as World Culture?" In King, A.D. (1997). *Culture, globalization, and the world-system: contemporary conditions for the representation of identity*. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- Walters, S. (1997). *Globalization, adult education and training: impacts and issues. Global perspectives on adult education and training*. London, UK; New York: Zed Books.

- Walters, S. & Manicom, L. (1996). *Gender in popular education: methods for empowerment*. Bellville, South Africa: Zed Books.
- White, B. E. (1996). "Talk About School: Education and the Colonial Project in French and British Africa." *Comparative Education* 32, no. 1, March 1996, 11-12.
- Willhelmson, (2000). The Washington Consensus. Washington: World Bank www.worldbank.org
- Wolff, R. D. "Limiting the state versus expanding it: a criticism of this debate". In Vlachou, A. (1999). *Contemporary Economic Theory: Radical Critiques of Neoliberalism*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.
- World Bank. (2001). *A chance to learn: knowledge and finance for education in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington DC: Africa Region Human Development Series.
- World Bank. (2003). *Edstats*. <http://www1.worldbank.org/education/edstats/>
- World Bank. (2003). *Making Services Work for Poor People*. World Development Report, 2004. World Bank/Oxford University Press.
- Yin, R.K. (1994). *Case study research: design and methods*. 2nd ed. Applied social research methods series; v. 5., Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.