

RIOTS AS DISASTERS:  
AN EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY OF SELECTED ASPECTS  
OF THE CIVIL DISTURBANCE IN WASHINGTON, D. C., APRIL, 1968

by

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## ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: RIOTS AS DISASTERS: AN EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY  
OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL DISTURBANCE  
IN WASHINGTON, D. C., APRIL, 1968

Richard Guy Sedlack, Doctor of Philosophy, 1973

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Following some of the more recent sociological literature which has been critical of research into riots, the topic of this thesis addresses itself to a hitherto neglected aspect of riots. It is an initial exploratory effort into the ecological dimensions of official statistics, utilizing the relevant temporal and spatial conceptualizations suggested by the sociological disaster literature.

The data sources were the offense and arrest records of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and the fire data on the Daily Communication Log of the District of Columbia Fire Department. The offense and fire data were treated as partial indicators of the situation reported to the police with the arrest data as partial indicators of the response made by the police to the riot. The data were conceptually organized along three dimensions. First, the type of criminal violation was classified into six general categories: crimes against persons, crimes against property, traffic violations, crimes without victims, crimes related to fires, and miscellaneous crimes. For a more detailed analysis, the total crimes falling

into any one of these general categories were subclassified into more detailed subcategories within each general category. Second, the spatial dimension was trichotomized into three locational specifications: the riot areas of major destruction, the corridor areas of sporadic destruction, and the non-riot areas of minimal or no riot destruction. Third, the temporal dimension was dichotomized into the total riot period of organized response and a representative normal time period, so that the latter could serve as a benchmark against which to compare the former.

Two specific questions were posited: what degree of difference existed between the defined riot period and the representative normal time period in terms of crimes and spatial location as reflected by the official statistics and what kinds of differences were evident. Three specific hypotheses were evaluated: (1) the offense and fire data hypothesis which suggested that the degree of association between the offenses reported and the selected riot-normal time period varies directly with the degree of concentrated riot damage, (2) the arrest data hypothesis which suggested that the degree of association between the police's response and the selected riot-normal time period varies directly with the degree of concentrated riot damage, and (3) the comparative hypothesis which suggested that the degree of association between the police's response and the selected riot-normal time period is less than the degree of association between the offenses reported and the selected riot-normal time period.

Utilizing the lambda proportionate reduction in error statistic, the data were inconclusive relative to the first hypothesis and



generally failed to support the second and third hypotheses, although the magnitude of the data indicated that there were some differences. The nature of the differences indicated that the incidence of fires and burglary violations increased substantially, while larceny, false fire alarm reports, and the degree of violence in crimes against persons decreased in the reported offenses during the riot. The police response was dominated by arrests for disorderly conduct and curfew violations with burglary arrests ranking second. While there were decreases in larceny and traffic arrests, the latter were still substantially represented during the riot and no meaningful numbers of arson arrests were made. Further, it was concluded that substantial numbers of offenses reported and arrests made occurred in the non-riot areas.

It was concluded that the disaster literature provided relevant conceptualizations for the analysis of the spatial and temporal dimensions of riots, that further analysis of these dimensions is warranted, and that other dimensions of the disaster approach appear to be useful when applied to riots.

## PREFACE

### Introduction

Presented below is a brief and selected descriptive account of the riot in the District of Columbia, which followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in April of 1968. The purpose of this chapter is first to assist the reader in his recollection of these events and second to partially elucidate the variety of behaviors and actions taken by the people in the Washington metropolitan area. It is hoped that the reader will develop an appreciation for the magnitude, complexity, and variability of the actions which accompany a riot.

The first section is a chronology of events so that the reader will again appreciate the flow of the riot period itself. Most of the events listed here deal with the principal and most visible actors engaged in the riot situation itself: the firemen, the police, the rioters, and the military personnel. In other words, this section focuses on those who started and perpetuated the riot and those whose responsibility was to attempt to control the effects of the riot. The second section is concerned with the less dramatic response made by public agencies, private organizations, religious groups, and involved public citizens--those people who attempted to render aid to the victims of the riot.

### The Chronology

At approximately 6:20 P.M. on April 4th, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr., was shot in Memphis, Tennessee. At 7:30 P.M., WTTG-TV, a local

Washington television station, announced the shooting and reported that King was in serious condition.<sup>1</sup> Dr. King was subsequently pronounced dead at 8:06 P.M.<sup>2</sup> In Washington, the news brought a crowd of several hundred persons to 14th and U Streets, N.W.--an intersection which is one of the major public transportation hubs in the District. At 9:25 P.M., the first window breaking at the Peoples Drug Store next to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference offices at 14th and U Streets, N. W. was heard, and the Washington riot began.<sup>3</sup>

At 12:30 A.M., April 5th, the first fullscale fires were set on 14th Street, although the first fire call was received about an hour and a half earlier. Fire Chief Henry Galotta instituted Plan F, which split the existing fire companies in two, thereby doubling the response capability of the District of Columbia Fire Department, at about 11:00 P.M., April 4th.<sup>4</sup> At 1:20 A.M., April 5th, the police asked and were granted permission to use tear gas on 14th Street.<sup>5</sup> By 3:00 A.M., the last major confrontation on 14th Street was over, and 200 stores had windows broken with looting occurring in 150 of them. Seven fires had occurred and 200 people had been arrested with thirty people injured, including five policemen and one fireman.<sup>6</sup> Dawn saw many policemen on 14th Street, N. W., with this street then quiet.

The police were to be kept on overlapping twelve-hour shifts with the special Civil Disturbance Unit to be activated in force late Friday afternoon.<sup>7</sup>

A riot commission study of twenty-four disorders had indicated that major violence in all those cases had occurred during the night hours, and that, as a general rule, violence at night was followed by lulls during the daytime. However, there had been a few notable exceptions to this pattern. Washington was to be another.<sup>8</sup>

The daylight hours during the morning of April 5th indicated more than the normal number of idlers on the street. The District officials felt that if the school system could operate normally, the chances of a peaceful Friday would be enhanced. Several factors worked against keeping the city's 150,000 pupils in classes. The Washington Teachers Union requested the closing of the schools so that teachers could attend memorial services for Dr. King. Concerned parents wanted their children released, and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee requested closure in memory of Dr. King. Finally, the pupils themselves manifested a more than usual restlessness. Many students walked out of their classes during the morning hours or did not return after the luncheon period.<sup>9</sup> At 1:30 P.M., the school officials, unable to retain the students, dismissed the schools on a staggered basis.<sup>10</sup> By 2:00 P.M. reports of intensive burning and looting were being received from various parts of the District.

Some policemen tried to persuade looters to go home, but the policemen, as a whole, were badly outnumbered and virtually powerless to institute any meaningful response to the situation about them. Looters just ran away from the police, knowing that there was little the police could do.<sup>11</sup>

A well-dressed, matronly-looking woman was one of several who assured newspaperman Maynard that they were not looting.

"Look," she said. "I come here to shop every Friday night. Where else am I to find food? All the stores are closed or looted. It's not that the food is free. It's just that there's not going to be much food around here for a long time."<sup>12</sup>

After they departed, with loaded arms, a man, who had been standing on the sidewalk, watching the spectacle, removed a gasoline-filled cola bottle from under his coat, lighted it, and tossed it through the shattered doorway. It was a perfect hit. . . .



Witnesses said the man had done the same thing at two other stores down the street. They were struck by the fact that he showed no interest in looting, only burning.<sup>13</sup>

These quotations should give the reader some feeling for the variety of behaviors manifested by the rioters themselves. What is interesting here is that the riot participants themselves did not seem to represent any one consistent pattern of riot behavior. Rather different people performed different kinds of actions during the course of the riot.

At 1:00 P.M., the first fire was reported on 7th Street, N. W., and soon thereafter some of the civilian employees at police headquarters and the District Building began to go home. After some minimal harassment from small groups of blacks, the Hecht Company and the Woodward and Lothrop Company--Washington's two largest department stores--decided to close, which led quickly to many smaller businesses closing for the day. Large numbers of customers and employees "flooded" the streets, and the main shopping arteries were soon clogged with automobiles which could hardly move.

All over town, office workers more or less simultaneously reached for their telephones. The heavy volume of calls, coming at the usually busy time before the start of a weekend, swamped the city's exchanges.

Downtown office workers--both federal employees and those on private payrolls--then did what came naturally. They began piling into their automobiles to head for home. The trek, as it picked up momentum, created one of the most massive traffic jams in the city's history.

Deputy Mayor Fletcher asked the Civil Service Commission to stagger the release of the many tens of thousands of typists, clerks, and officials who wanted to go home, but it was too late. Their flight could not be slowed. Just as the schools had failed earlier in their effort to keep pupils in class, the government now was unable to prevent its work force from fleeing the area. The general disorder, to which the released school children were already contributing, spiraled.<sup>14</sup>

The District of Columbia Public Works Department reported that the



evening rush hour traffic started one hour earlier than normal, before the traffic signals could be switched into their rush hour patterns, thereby exacerbating the traffic congestion.<sup>15</sup>

At 12:55 P.M., the situation on the streets was rapidly deteriorating and the police began calling for the District of Columbia National Guard.<sup>16</sup> At 2:48 P.M., the National Guard was placed on standby for weekend duty, and the call ordering them to report to their armories was issued at 3:29 P.M.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, the Cherry Blossom festivities--Washington's first major tourist attraction of the spring--were cancelled, as was all leave for the District of Columbia policemen and firemen. At 4:40 P.M., the first federal troops began moving into the District.<sup>18</sup> At 5:20 P.M., Arlington and Prince Georges Counties sent fire companies into the District to aid the District of Columbia Fire Department.<sup>19</sup>

Under a plan that had been worked out in advance with suburban fire departments, the Washington firemen were also aided by sixty engine companies from the Maryland and Virginia suburbs. Volunteer fire departments came from farther away, one unit driving down from Lebanon, Pennsylvania.<sup>20</sup>

This was the first major deployment of non-District fire fighting equipment since 1927. It was reported that some inner-city residents helped the firemen by holding the fire hoses, bringing them chairs to sit in, coffee, and sandwiches as they labored throughout the night to extinguish the fires.<sup>21</sup> While there reports of harassment of firemen, the Fire Department reported only nine instances during the riot when fire equipment was delayed through interference by crowds of people. Further, while rocks were sometimes thrown, there were no instances of sniping at the firemen, and the total damage to fire equipment was \$10,000--defined by officials as minimal.<sup>22</sup> Deputy Chief Huntington

summarized his feelings toward the burning saying, "In my 36 years, it's never been close to this, and I hope that it never will be again."<sup>23</sup>

At 8:58 P.M., it was reported that the White House and the Capitol were surrounded by machine guns.<sup>24</sup> By midnight, 6600 troops were patrolling the streets of the major riot areas and enforcing a curfew. Thirty-six hours after the initial entrance of federal troops into the District, there were a total of 13,600 federal soldiers and District of Columbia National Guardsmen on duty in Washington.<sup>25</sup>

The appearance of military personnel sharply curtailed the rioting in the major shopping areas. However, the looting and burning continued in some of the areas unprotected by the troops.<sup>26</sup> While the military did not have the authority to make arrests, they were empowered to detain persons until the police arrived, and the latter formally charged those who were apprehended.<sup>27</sup> With the appearance of the military, a rigid policy of enforcement of the curfew restrictions was begun. At 1:20 A.M., Saturday, April 6th, the District Court began processing 1200 arrest cases, and the police cell blocks were reported full at 2:51 A.M.<sup>28</sup> At 6:14 A.M., the Office of Civil Defense monitored a telephone call that Hecht's, Woodward and Lothrop, Jellefs, Raleighs, D. J. Kaufman, Kanns, Lansburghs, and Garfinkles would not open for business.<sup>29</sup> At 9:26 A.M., the District of Columbia Transit Company's buses were reported running but not servicing the burned-out areas, and at 9:50 A.M., all meetings and movies in Washington were cancelled.<sup>30</sup>

And so it went on Saturday with many business establishments closed, others curtailing their services, troops pouring into the District, the peak number of arrests made, and the fire and police departments working to their capacities.



Sunday, April 7th, was relatively calm. Announcements were made that District stores were to be open on Monday until 4:00 P.M., the schools would close at 1:30 P.M., and District and Federal employees would work as usual with the business day ending one and one-half hours earlier than normal.<sup>31</sup> Many of these closing times were selected to conform to the curfew restrictions placed on the area. Monday, April 8th, continued calm, and the schools and many businesses were closed Tuesday, April 9th, in observance of Dr. King's funeral. At 10:20 A.M., the Office of Civil Defense reported that police and fire calls were near normal.<sup>32</sup> District of Columbia Transit announced that their regular schedules would be maintained on Wednesday, April 10th. Finally, at 5:00 P.M., April 12th, after several days of calm, the Office of Civil Defense terminated its monitoring of the communication network.

During the course of the riot twelve people had lost their lives in some riot-connected way. Two whites were reportedly beaten to death by blacks, although only one such death could be definitely linked to the riot. Two blacks were shot and killed by the police. One fifteen year old black youth was accidentally shot when he dashed from a looted store and bumped into the service revolver held by a policeman who had apprehended and was covering a third party.<sup>33</sup> A twenty year old janitor was shot and killed when he turned around quickly with a "shiny object" in his hand.<sup>34</sup> Eight persons died as a result of looting activities. Seven people were trapped in buildings which had been fired with the remaining person being killed when the remnants of a plate glass window crashed down upon him as he was climbing through the shattered window.

Some of the more interesting general statistics reported in the Washington Civil Disorder Survey<sup>35</sup> relative to the privately owned real

properties and business establishments<sup>36</sup> which were damaged during the riot period are briefly mentioned below. A total of 1199 real properties and 1352 business establishments sustained damage during the riot with the total estimated value loss in dollars placed at 57.6 million.<sup>37</sup> These businesses employed prior to the riot a total of 14,593 full-time employees, a figure which decreased by 4916 to a post-riot figure of 9677.<sup>38</sup> The riot was accompanied by a net loss of 2116 people in residential or housing units with a net loss of such units placed at 403.<sup>39</sup> Of all the privately owned properties damaged during the riot, glass breakage was experienced by 89 per cent of the real properties and 94 per cent of the business establishments, and fire damage occurred in 43 per cent of the real properties and 37 per cent of the business establishments. Theft of merchandise occurred in 85 per cent of the business establishments which experienced riot damage. Only eight public buildings were damaged during the riot with all of them being outside the major areas of riot activity and with the value of the damage being minimal.<sup>40</sup> While the dollar value of privately owned real properties which incurred damage or loss was in the millions, this value was but 0.4 per cent of the estimated market value of all taxable properties in the District of Columbia on July 1, 1968.<sup>41</sup> Study of the insurance payments made by the American Insurance Association and other sources of information reveals that the private owners of damaged property and the insuring companies shared about equally the value of the material damaged.<sup>42</sup> Among the reasons given for the rather large proportion of expense shared by the private owners were those owners with the wrong type of coverage or no coverage at all, those who were under-insured, those who had deductibles or coinsurance

penalties, and some policies which paid actual cash value of damaged or lost materials rather than replacement costs.<sup>43</sup> Asked about their future business plans, 49 per cent or 668 owners of damaged business establishments said they would not return to their pre-riot locations. Of these, the owners of 245 businesses said they planned to relocate outside their former neighborhoods, while 423 owners said they planned to either close or sell their businesses.<sup>44</sup>

Robert N. Gold, Assistant Director for Social and Economic Research of the National Capital Planning Commission, presented three basic characteristics of the targets of the riot in his testimony before a Senate subcommittee.

About 95 percent [sic] of the business establishments were in retail trade and services. This means that they had merchandise.

The second point is that a very high proportion, and I believe the figure is close to 90 percent [sic], served primarily neighborhoods. These were not unfamiliar establishments in those neighborhoods.

The third feature which stands out is that the types of damage or loss that occurred with highest frequency was [sic] glass breakage and theft of merchandise.<sup>45</sup>

Further, Edward C. Hromanik, chief of a special task force of the National Capital Planning Commission assigned to prepare urban renewal plans for the civil disturbance areas reported that roughly 50, 25, and 15 per cent of the material damaged or lost in the District of Columbia was suffered on 14th Street, N. W., 7th Street, N. W., and H Street, N. E., respectively.<sup>46</sup>

#### The Response

. . . Members of both races--2,000 in all, including many white suburbanites--volunteered to help. By Saturday, they had operating thirty-eight collection points at suburban churches and forty-two distribution centers at inner-city churches.<sup>47</sup>



As of 12:30 P.M., Thursday, April 11th, the Office of Civil Defense reported that 1,436,750 pounds of food had been distributed and 79,820 people had been provided with three meals a day for a six-day period.<sup>48</sup> Some of the military assisted in the distribution of food, while some commercial stores (such as the Giant and Safeway supermarket chains and the Crusty Pie Bakery), the United States Department of Agriculture, and private individuals donated food, labor, and equipment for the mass distribution of food supplies.<sup>49</sup> The Salvation Army itself dispensed over 250,000 cups of coffee, a thousand gallons of soup, 51,000 sandwiches, 775 dozen doughnuts, 13,000 usable items of clothing, 800 furniture items, a limited amount of rent money, and provided some emergency shelter.<sup>50</sup> The District of Columbia Chapter of the American National Red Cross operated a blood bank (although the need was below normal), distributed 1600 disaster-type comfort kits, operated a canteen for one week, provided motor service for medical personnel, and assisted in the coordination of volunteers.<sup>51</sup> Several agencies set up information centers, such as the Interracial Council for Business Opportunity of Greater Washington,<sup>52</sup> or rumor control centers to quiet rumors and to direct people to the proper places for donations, such as the Montgomery County Commission on Human Relations.<sup>53</sup> The District of Columbia Citizen Information Telephone Answering Service processed approximately 5300 telephone calls between 5:30 P.M., April 6th, and 3:00 P.M., April 9th.<sup>54</sup>

This is not to say that all contingencies were met without confusion and inefficiency. While the District of Columbia Department of Public Welfare had developed a plan to feed and house masses of people in the event of a disorder,

It was impossible to put the Plan into effect on Friday, April 5, 1968, when the disturbance began in Washington.

Communications broke down so that contacting individuals to activate the Disorder Plan was impossible.<sup>55</sup>

On Monday, April 8th, the Office of Civil Defense monitored a call at 10:13 P.M. that some food distribution centers had exhausted their supplies.<sup>56</sup> At 1:40 A.M., April 9th, the Department of Public Welfare needed personnel to assist in handling food at the District of Columbia Village Warehouse.<sup>57</sup> Again, at 12:35 P.M., it was reported that two loading docks and twelve trucks were standing empty as thirty-eight people assigned to the District of Columbia Village Warehouse were all eating at the same time--the essential problem being that of the lack of an expeditor.<sup>58</sup> The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company reported that their unofficial data indicated a sharp increase in telephone calls early Friday afternoon, April 5th, during which the number of calls reached its businest point in the history of the company. There were some breakdowns in equipment, and temporary overloading caused delays in getting a dial tone.<sup>59</sup>

Prior to the April riot, some individuals involved in the District of Columbia judicial system recognized the need for judicial contingency plans in the event of a massive civil disorder. Dr. King's proposed Poor People's March, which was to terminate in Washington, was viewed as a situation which might require an extraordinary effort on the part of the court system. Keven P. Charles of the Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia wrote to Joseph F. Hennessey, the Chairman of the Committee:

. . . Again each of the organizations involved in this march feels it is doing its job and making its plans. Yet we are still like the Hindues driving the elephant. SCLC [the Southern Christian Leadership Conference] hasn't the foggiest idea what the court system is planning, the courts don't have any idea of the extent of the protest, the Justice Department

has no idea of the plans of either the court of [sic] SCLC, and doubtless the same can be said for the legal staffs of the District Government, the Interior Department, and HEW [Health, Education, and Welfare].<sup>60</sup>

Quite simply, plans were being formulated but there was no integration or coordination of the various organizations and agencies involved.

When the riot began, basic policies had not been worked out relative to apprehending or handling large numbers of arrestees. Those involved in the drafting of the curfew regulation decided against listing exceptions, encouraging police officers to exercise their own judgement.<sup>61</sup> When the curfew was placed on the District, there was no consensus regarding the penalty for conviction. On Monday, April 8th, it was decided that a curfew violator would be allowed to post and forfeit a \$25 collateral. But the courts pursued an overnight detention policy, probably because of the rumor that curfew violators, who had been released by the court, were reported to have been seen on the streets returning to the riot areas the same evening as their arrest. Hence, for all practical purposes, the penalty for a curfew violation was \$25 and a night in jail.<sup>62</sup>

The total impression of the investigators is of an absence of guidelines and reliance within the Department on the individual discretion of the officers.

.....  
The interviews of curfew arrestees tended generally to confirm an impression of lack of uniformity in curfew enforcement.

.....  
... Many defendants spent more than one night, or even 24 hours, in custody before they appeared before a judge.<sup>63</sup>

Most of the officers interviewed after the riot reported that they had received no specific instructions regarding looters. Some officers arrested every looter; others only those looters with substantial amounts of merchandise. Following the suggestion of the



United States Attorney's Office, some policemen charged all looters with second degree burglary, as the former's position was to seek the most stringent charge which the typical looting violation will normally support. It was envisioned that when the riots had been concluded, each second degree burglary case would be reviewed for a possible reduction to a lesser charge--usually a misdemeanor--should the lack of evidence suggest difficulty in attaining a conviction on the former charge.<sup>64</sup> Since second degree burglary is a felony charge, there was a substantial increase in paperwork required by the court of the arresting officer. Some police officers felt that it was more important for them to be on the streets rather than filing formal felony charges so they arrested looters for curfew violations, when the latter were in force, or disorderly conduct, when they were not.<sup>65</sup> Finally, some officers only arrested looters when they were apprehended inside business establishments.

But what of the court itself? The District of Columbia Court of General Sessions--the primary judicial organization functioning during the riot--had no detailed emergency plan for processing arrestees. It was placed on a twenty-four hour operating basis, and the only decision made during the riot was the condition of release of the charged offender.<sup>66</sup>

The Bail Reform Act provides that, instead of money bond, the defendant shall ". . . be ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required."<sup>67</sup>

On Friday afternoon, April 5th, most defendants were released on personal bond. However, when the rumor that released defendants were

returning to the rioting areas reached the court, Chief Judge Greene called a meeting of all the judges hearing riot cases and suggested a \$1000 bond in all looting cases unless a responsible person in the court could vouch for the accused. The analysis of statistics, transcripts, and interviews with the judges themselves indicated that there was little uniformity in practice from the bench.<sup>68</sup>

. . . The treatment of defendants varied greatly from judge to judge, from day to day, and between day and night.<sup>69</sup>

Further, the normal initial charging process broke down because officers, being needed on the streets, were not in the court with the persons they had arrested.<sup>70</sup> The District Court's criminal calendar was seriously clogged prior to the disorder, a fact which did not allow a maximal processing of riot period defendants.<sup>71</sup> Finally, simplified arrest forms, which a previous demonstration had shown were needed, had been designed but not yet printed.<sup>72</sup> In sum, the emergency justice system during the riot lacked forethought and planning, detailed instructions and guidelines were absent, and justice was differentially applied by both the police and the court.

### Summary

It is hoped from the foregoing that the reader will come to see the complexity and variability in the events which surround a riot. After perusing the literature on riots, the reader will also realize that many of the dimensions of riots suggested above have not been subjected to systematic analysis by sociologists. While the topic selected for analysis in this thesis can in no way be construed to embrace the totality of the riot in Washington, it does present an initial,



exploratory effort toward a dimension of riots which has to date received little attention by sociologists.

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## CHAPTER I

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

#### Introduction

One of the most visible characteristics of riots is the volume and variety of criminal activity, manifested primarily in the burning and looting of property within the affected riot areas. One of the major concerns, then, for the social system is to try to minimize the effects of the riot. Since the police are the primary agency involved in responding to this aspect of the crisis situation, the study of police activity is a logical and as yet poorly explored aspect of riots.

Three objectives are accomplished in this chapter. First, a brief statement is presented which suggests that the current sociological literature on riots is predominantly concerned with causal analyses at various levels of investigation. Second, it is maintained that some aspects of riots have not received attention by sociologists and that this thesis is an initial step toward the investigation of these neglected aspects. Finally, the objective of this study and the specific questions to be answered are posited.

#### The Major Concern of the Sociological Literature on Riots

The majority of the sociological riot literature is concerned with causal analyses and directed toward the investigation of the

relationship between selected independent and dependent variables. As such, this literature treats a riot or some aspect of a riot as the dependent variable. McPhail argues that much of the recent riot literature has been biased toward causal analyses and that it has failed to recognize both the complexity and the sequential aspects of riots.<sup>1</sup> The position taken in this study is that riots may also be treated *sui generis* or as things in themselves. It is not argued that the factors which cause riots are unimportant, but that riots evidence a complexity and a variety of activities apart from the factors which cause them.

#### Specific Problematic of this Study

The problem under investigation in this study addresses itself to some of the complexities of riots during one of the posited sequential stages of the Washington, D. C. riot of April, 1968. Two of the principal factors in a riot situation become the rioters themselves and their activities, on the one hand, and the control agents and their responses to the actions of the rioters, on the other hand.

The purpose of this study is to present a descriptive, ecological analysis of criminal activity during one specific time stage--the organized response stage--of the Washington riot of April, 1968 and to establish social indicators of the situation reported to the police and the police response to that situation. The organized response stage of a riot is defined as the time during which formal organizations systematically respond to the needs of the affected community. The focus herein is upon the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, as one such formally established agency whose responsibility in part is to stop or minimize the criminal actions of the rioters.

The official statistics of the District of Columbia Fire Department and the police department are used as partial indicators of the criminal activity reported to the police and the response made by the police to that activity. Social indicators are here defined as the major criminal violations which occur and set the riot apart from the non-riot time periods. This objective makes it necessary to contrast the selected riot period statistics against a comparable set of statistics from a non-riot time, which herein are designated, respectively, as the "riot" and "normal" time periods. The ecological variable of space is trichotomized into: (1) the riot areas, where the greatest concentration of riot damage occurred, (2) the corridor areas, where more sporadic riot related damage and destruction occurred, and (3) the non-riot areas, where little or no destruction occurred. The sociological disaster model is used as the source of the relevant conceptualizations of the ecological variables of time and space.

Assumptions. Two major assumptions are made. The first is the rather obvious assumption that activities during riot periods differ from activities during non-riot or normal periods. That differences exist is hardly debatable, but the real question becomes one of the degree of difference between riot and non-riot periods. The second assumption is that the official police and fire department statistics are partial indicators of both the riot and normal time period situations. The police department offense record and the fire department fire record are utilized to describe the situation and are partial indicators of the riot situation in the sense that they reflect only the situation as reported to and officially recorded by these agencies. Obviously, this limitation is more apropos for the police than the fire data. The



arrest record is used to describe the response which the police made and is a partial indicator because it contains what the police themselves officially reported and recorded.

Questions. Two questions are posited for investigation herein. First, what degree of difference in criminal activity existed between the riot period of organized response and a representative normal time period and between differing spatial locations, as reflected by the official police and fire department statistics? The degree of difference is measured by the lambda proportionate reduction in error statistic, in which large values will be interpreted to indicate that differences do exist. Focusing, then, on the organized response stage of the riot and on the riot, corridor, and non-riot spatial areas, the offense, fire, and arrest data will permit a partial assessment of the degree of difference between the riot and the normal period with reference to the situation reported to and the response made by one agency of social control in the Washington community.

Second, what kinds of differences were evident? Once we have measured the degree of difference, we may proceed to the second question concerning the nature of the difference. It is here that indicators will be selected which best describe the riot situation and the police response to that situation. In other words, we will select those specific types of criminal violations from the large number of legally defined criminal statutes which best illustrate the nature of the differences between the riot and non-riot time periods. It is hoped that this analysis will indicate that certain crimes are important ones during riots and that only some crimes change between the two time periods. As such, this study will function in part to simplify some of the data

which is available for the subsequent study of riots.

### Summary

The problematic in this study is two-fold. Using official statistics as reflective of the criminal activity during a riot and the response made to this activity by one agency of social control, we will measure the degree of difference between the riot period of organized response and a representative normal period by category of crime and by spatial zone, describing the nature of these differences, and develop indicators which best summarize these data. As such this study will be a descriptive, ecological assessment of the official police and fire department data and an initial step toward the investigation of the neglected aspects of riots in that it will focus on the variety of criminal activities reported to the police and the responses made by this agency to this criminal activity, emphasizing the differences between riot and normal periods and among various spatial locations within the Washington area.

The concern of this study, then, is with some of the ecological dimensions of riots as suggested by the sociological disaster literature and with the development of indicators of riots utilizing official statistics. It is maintained that this thesis is an initial exploratory investigation into one part of the neglected aspects of riots. The social indicators which are developed will be useful to the further study of riots in two ways. First, they will direct attention toward only those criminal offenses and arrest responses which are paramount to riots, thereby simplifying the mass of available official data. Second, these indicators of riots may be used in the subsequent study of

riots in other communities, as they are data which are collected by all police jurisdictions and classified in a consistent manner as suggested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's manual for the uniform reporting of crime.<sup>2</sup>



## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

#### Introduction

The first section of this chapter begins with a brief discussion of the major current conceptualizations used to organize the study of riots. It is shown that the predominant concern of this literature is with the causal relationships between selected independent and dependent variables, with the latter being the riot or some aspect of the riot itself. The second section reviews the recent literature which has been explicitly or implicitly critical of the bulk of the riot literature. The critical literature maintains either that the empirical support for the hypotheses suggested by these perspectives is somewhat deficient or that other aspects of riots have been neglected by the emphasis on causal relationships. It is shown how the problem treated in this thesis is a response in the direction of study suggested by this critical literature. The third section begins with a brief overview of the disaster literature and then focuses specifically upon those aspects of the disaster perspective which relate to the ecological dimensions of time and space.

#### Major Current Conceptualizations in the Study of Riots

The deprivational approach is one major theoretical perspective and involves some variant of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.<sup>1</sup> Here, a perceived unfair distribution of rewards is seen as the cause of violence. Some recent studies have focused on variables which

intervene between the initial state of frustration and the final outcome of aggression.<sup>2</sup> Other studies focus on some variation of the frustration-aggression theme, such as absolute deprivation,<sup>3</sup> relative deprivation,<sup>4</sup> and the revolution of rising expectations.<sup>5</sup>

Another major set of theoretical approaches to riots reflect the inability of some groups to identify with some of the normative patterns of the existing social system or the inability of some agencies to restore these norms. Among the studies oriented toward this theme of community disorganization or lack of integration are those which posit political alienation,<sup>6</sup> low status,<sup>7</sup> criminalistic tendencies,<sup>8</sup> and the criminal riff-raff theory<sup>9</sup> as independent variables which cause riots or specify who participates in riots.

The third major theoretical perspective currently utilized in the interpretation of riots is the group conflict theme. Some sociologists argue that riots are mechanisms of political and economic protest,<sup>10</sup> while others perceive a more generic relationship of conflict between blacks and whites.<sup>11</sup>

In all of these studies independent variables are selected as factors which cause riots or specify which individuals or social groups are likely to participate in riots. Therefore, the riot itself or some aspect of rioting is treated as the dependent variable. In other words, none of these studies addresses itself to the reaction of the community to riots.

#### Recent Critical Assessments of the Previous Riot Literature

Some of the recent literature on riots has been critical of the above mentioned conceptual orientations. Two types of criticisms have

been explicitly presented: first, those which suggest that the degree of support offered in substantiation of the hypotheses presented in the earlier research has been too minimal to warrant acceptance of these hypotheses and, second, those which suggest that the previous studies have neglected aspects of riots and have oversimplified other aspects of riots.

Spilerman has examined a number of perspectives which offer a variety of independent variables used to explain the location of riots.<sup>12</sup> Among the independent variables associated with the incidence of riots which were assessed in this research were: (1) high social disorganization, (2) absolute deprivation as indicated by the black population's material conditions of life, (3) relative deprivation where blacks compare their situation with that of whites, (4) the rising level of expectations, where blacks perceive the gap between what they expect and what they have really attained, (5) political alienation caused by existing political structures which are unresponsive to the needs of the black population, (6) the negative reinforcement thesis, which posits that any disorder decreases the likelihood of subsequent disorders, (7) the positive reinforcement thesis, which maintains that any disorder increases the likelihood of subsequent disorders by leaving some sort of polarizing residue, (8) the geographic contagion hypothesis, which argues that riots are directly related to proximity, and (9) that riots are random events in the sense that all communities have an equal disorder-proneness.

Spilerman's research generated either no support or at best minimal support for all of these independent "causal" variables when used to explain the incidence of riots. Two variables, the number of blacks



in the community and the dummy variable of region dichotomized into South and non-South, were the best indicators of the location of disorders. He writes:

Yet, the crucial point is not that non-white population is so important for explaining the distribution of disorders--the number of Negroes would appear to be a basic resource for Negro uprisings--but that, after the effect of this conceptually prior variable has been removed, the other community characteristics account for so little.

. . . . .  
The conclusion from this analysis is that the racial disturbances of the 1960's were not responses to conditions in the local community. Disorder-prone cities do differ from their less traumatized neighbors in many significant respects.

. . . . .  
However, these conditions have little to do with a community being prone to disorder, and are instead the incidental characteristics of cities with large Negro populations.<sup>13</sup>

Spilerman concludes:

. . . I would argue that although different communities are not equally prone to racial disturbance, the susceptibility of an individual Negro to participating in a disorder does not depend upon the structural characteristics of the community in which he resides.<sup>14</sup>

After presenting a general version of the "deprivation-frustration-aggression" hypothesis, McPhail analyzes the adequacy of the data presented in support of this thesis in recent journal articles.<sup>15</sup> He concludes that while the majority of the independent variables associated with riot participation in these previous studies are statistically significant and consistent with the direction originally hypothesized, the magnitudes of the associations are overwhelmingly low. He writes:

In view of these results concerning individual riot participation, and the results of Spilerman (1970) and others concerning the occurrence of riots, there is considerable reason for rejecting the sociological and popular cliché

that absolute or relative deprivation and the ensuing frustration or discontent or despair is the root cause of rebellion.<sup>16</sup>

The impact of these recent studies by Spilerman and McPhail is to question the validity of the interpretations which have recently dominated the sociological literature on riots. What these researchers are suggesting is that the studies analyzed have been too quick to accept empirical support and/or that they have overinterpreted the data to some degree. In sum, these authors argue that some rethinking is necessary on the subject of the causes of riots as our dominant interpretations are without any firm empirical support.

This critical posture also moves into a second direction, suggesting implicitly or explicitly that some aspects of riots have been either neglected by sociologists or subjected to oversimplification.

Cohen writes:

. . . the dominant bias in American sociology has been toward formulating theory in terms of variables that describe initial states, on the one hand, and outcomes, on the other, rather than in terms of processes whereby acts and complex structures of actions are built, elaborated, and transformed.<sup>17</sup>

Grimshaw maintains that:

There are more complicated dimensions to this issue [riots] than to any other I have examined in my role as a sociologist.<sup>18</sup>

Rainwater remarks:

Riots are difficult to control precisely because of this voluntary division of labor among the participants. Because their many different sorts of activities require different sorts of responses, the riot becomes a highly complex event that can be brought under control only by a mass show of force.<sup>19</sup>

Finally, Quarantelli and Dynes state:

On the contrary, if we have learned anything from our studies of these situations, it is that the behaviors



and participants involved are far more heterogeneous than is implied in a statement that "violence" broke out in this ghetto or that the Negroes in a particular community "rioted." Sniping and looting, arson and vandalism and other behaviors are not the same kinds of acts; different participants take part in these activities, the action takes place at different locations and at different time periods of the disturbances.<sup>20</sup>

McPhail argues that many recent studies focus on the dependent variable of riot participation operationally measured by arrestee status, the respondent's reported participation status, the respondent's witness of others' behaviors, and/or some combination of the above.<sup>21</sup> While these operational definitions vary, McPhail believes they all have the common characteristic that they fail to sample the respondent's behavior content through the time duration of the riot.<sup>22</sup> In other words, he feels that any one individual may quite likely be engaged in rioting, non-rioting, and counter-rioting activities at different times throughout the duration of the riot itself and that the recent literature has failed to adequately deal with this possibility. He writes:

Rather, he [a rioter] is likely to be intermittently engaged in a wide range of routine and "illegal" activities during the course of his presence in the area of the disorder. Unfortunately, measures of civil disorder participation have failed to recognize, record, and attempt to account for this differentiation in behaviors through space and across time. Perhaps, unwittingly, participation in civil disorder has been conceptualized as a monolithic phenomenon and measured accordingly.<sup>23</sup>

McPhail concludes this article with an alternative focus, suggesting several major questions for study.<sup>24</sup> Among these is the question which refers to ". . . the variety of individual and joined performances in which people engage during the course of the disorder."<sup>25</sup> Finally, McPhail concludes:

Civil disorders are complex and differentiated phenomena. Attempts to account for their occurrence and individual participation therein have failed to



acknowledge this complexity, theoretically and operationally.<sup>26</sup>

Most of the above sociologists suggest that more attention be placed upon the variety of behavior which occurs during civil disorders. McPhail argues for a conceptualization of this variety which encompasses the temporal and spatial dimensions of the riot. This thesis is an initial step toward the investigation of this complexity as suggested by the riot literature itself. In view of these specific suggestions as well as the lack of conclusive empirical evidence which is supportive of the previously investigated hypotheses, it seems quite justifiable to begin to move in the direction suggested by McPhail and others.

#### The Disaster Literature

The sociological disaster literature appeared principally during the middle 1950's and early 1960's. Among the variety of dimensions of disasters studied have been the definition of disasters,<sup>27</sup> the classification of disasters,<sup>28</sup> disasters roles,<sup>29</sup> panic theory,<sup>30</sup> convergence behavior,<sup>31</sup> disaster communication networks,<sup>32</sup> various methodological issues related to disaster research,<sup>33</sup> and types of organized behavior in disaster.<sup>34</sup> Since the spatial and temporal classifications provide in part the relevant categorizations used in this thesis, it is to these that we now turn.

The temporal dimension. Most descriptive studies of disasters have reported and organized the data in terms of the variables of time and space. Killian writes:

Functional time-phases and spatial zones have been identified in most disaster studies and these concepts prove highly useful in ordering the data.<sup>35</sup>

Killian suggests four chronological time phases.<sup>36</sup> First, the warning period is the time during which information is available concerning the probable danger of the approaching disaster. Second, there is the period of impact, during which the destructive agent is affecting the community. Third is the period of emergency, when there is a relatively unorganized response to the disaster made by the affected population. During this period, rescue operations, first aid, and emergency medical care are offered to the victims of the impact period. Finally, there is the period of recovery during which the long term activities designed to restore the system to a functioning entity are carried forth.

Fritz presents a partial listing of time sequences, which are quite similar to those mentioned above, but he adds the initial period of preparation for disaster.<sup>37</sup> This period is only evident in those communities which have experienced frequent exposure to disasters, and it refers to the preparations made by the community in anticipation of future disaster experiences. For example, it is likely that most mining communities experience this initial time phase and during it develop a fatalistic attitude relative to the incidence of a disaster, as the possibility of cave-ins and explosions becomes something one lives with in the performance of this occupational role. Fritz also subdivides Killian's period of warning into, first, the period of disaster warning in which information is received concerning the probability of a disaster, and second, the period of threat in which the probable danger is perceived as an actual danger which has not yet affected the community but whose effect is inevitable.<sup>38</sup> For example, the period of warning would begin with the issuance of a statement by the mass



media concerning the possibility of, say, a tornado. The period of threat begins when the warned community perceives that the tornado is not only a possibility but also sees it as definitely going to strike them.

Barton suggests a further subdivision of Killian's period of emergency into the period of relatively unorganized response during which survivors search for their own family members and administer aid in a somewhat haphazard fashion and the period of organized social response where formal organizations specifically trained for emergency relief operations are activated and present in the stricken community.<sup>39</sup> The former refers to a comparatively short period of time during which emergency assistance is rendered on a one to one individual basis as opposed to the longer latter period during which formal organizations more systematically provide relief functions.

In sum, the above sources suggest the total range of possible chronological time phases in disasters: (1) the period of preparation--which is only present when the defined community has experienced frequent exposure to disasters; (2) the period of warning--during which information is received that a disaster might occur; (3) the period of threat--during which the possibility of danger is seen as actual danger, an actual danger that has not yet affected the community but is going to affect the community; (4) the period of impact--when the destructive agent is actually at work in the community; (5) the period of relatively unorganized response--during which surviving individuals randomly provide aid to casualties; (6) the period of organized response--during which formal organizations more systematically and fully provide aid; and (7) the period of recovery--which begins when the



crisis situation is defined as over and the restoration of the community begins.

When investigating any one disaster situation, one might find that some of these time phases are missing or that some of them are truncated or elongated in comparison with the amount of time devoted to these phases in other disaster investigations. Other variables affect the likelihood of the occurrence of some of these phases. For example, the nature of the stress agent can affect both the period of warning and the period of threat. In the past the weather bureau had neither the resources nor the sophistication to spot tornado dangers, hence there was no period of warning. Further, if the destructive agent is an explosion in a chemical factory, it is quite likely that its suddenness would eliminate both the periods of warning and threat. Again, in the case of a tornado, the impact period is likely to be no more than a matter of minutes, while this same period in the case of a flood might take several days. Further, in the former the periods of relatively unorganized and organized response will be likely to follow the conclusion of the impact period, while in the latter unorganized and organized response will quite likely overlap with the impact period. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of the seven previously mentioned time phases is not equally likely as one moves from one specific disaster to another. Nor will the amount of time encompassed by any one specific phase be congruent as you move to the same time phase in another disaster situation. Finally, some phases may be fairly distinct from others or they may overlap with others depending upon the specific nature of the disaster agent.

The temporal sequence discussed above suggests that the community

affected by a disaster moves through a number of qualitatively different stages which are ordered and which call forth different kinds of responses during the various stages. It is argued here that some of these temporal stages are useful to an analysis of civil disorders and that when so applied to the time dimension in riots, a certain pattern seems applicable. If the period of preparation exists, it is likely that it will only be present in those communities which have experienced riots or similar massive demonstrations in the past. There is evidence that some segments of the Washington community had initiated preparatory measures prior to the April, 1968 riot, for example, the implementation of a simplified arrest form by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department<sup>40</sup> and contingency planning for future scheduled demonstrations by several community organizations.<sup>41</sup>

The periods of warning and of threat seem to have little applicability to civil disorders. For the sake of argument here, let us assume that the independent variables mentioned briefly in the beginning of this chapter as the causes of riots are in truth causal factors. It is logical to assume, for example, that relative deprivation characterizes all of the communities in the United States. But all communities in this country have not experienced civil disorders, and therefore we must conclude that these conditions are too generalized to indicate any kind of warning period. Some sociologists argue that riots are preceded by amongst other variables a "precipitating event."<sup>42</sup> But quite often this precipitating factor is of such a nature that it can be interpreted as such only in retrospect after the impact period has started. In other words, the "precipitating event" is often a quite common event, such as a raid on an after-hours social club



which began the Detroit riot of 1967,<sup>43</sup> the rumored beating by police of an arrested cab driver which led to the Newark riot of 1967,<sup>44</sup> or the arrest of a black man for a traffic violation in Watts in 1965.<sup>45</sup> These common, everyday events which only rarely result in riots can hardly be used as indicators of the period of threat, which posits that the danger is imminent. While hindsight might indeed indicate underlying causal variables and precipitating events, these latter factors are hardly sufficient as indicators of the outbreak of a riot in a given place and at a given moment in time.

The period of impact and the periods of unorganized response and organized response overlap in the case of riots. The rioters themselves become the disaster agent and are operative at the same time that the formal and informal agencies both within and without the affected community are responding to the riot. Finally, the period of recovery begins when the crisis is defined as over. There will be a qualitatively different type of response between the periods of unorganized and organized response, on the one hand, and the period of recovery, on the other. In the former, the community is directing its response to the immediate conditions created by the disaster agent, conditions which create immediate dangers and hazards to the affected population. In the latter period, these dangers have subsided, and the reconstruction and restoration of the community begins.

In this thesis, we will concentrate on the time phase of organized response as a whole, which overlaps with the period of impact.

The spatial dimension. A second major dimension involves the spatial characteristics of the disaster situation. Killian<sup>46</sup> and Wallace<sup>47</sup> posit identical concentric zonal schemas. The total impact



zone is the innermost and the area where the danger and destruction caused by the disaster agent is the greatest. Second, the fringe impact zone is the area where destruction occurs but is somewhat mollified when compared to the total impact zone. Third, the filter zone is the area where personnel and material goods flowing into and out of the impact zones meet. Fourth, the organized community aid zone is the area wherein the local resources are marshalled. Finally, there is the extra-community aid zone where personnel and materials come to the stricken area from places not normally perceived to have any real or direct vested interest in the disaster-stricken area.

Of all the conceptual dimensions of the disaster approach, the spatial dimension is the one most in need of an operational definition, empirical testing, and subsequent revision. As with Burgess' classic ideal typical concentric zonal scheme of spatial distribution and growth, which emerged from the empirical efforts of the Chicago human ecological perspective in urban sociology, the spatial zones in the disaster model are idealized constructions which have rarely been used in the empirical investigations of disasters. The obvious difficulties here are the methodological ones of operationalizing definitions of these zones. Probably, one of the reasons for the limited usage of the spatial dimension is that students of disaster have tended to restrict their research questions so that the notion of space became at best a minor consideration in these past studies.

Since the dimension of space has not been a major focus of research into disasters, this aspect of the literature provides minimal suggestions for the study of riots. As riot behavior is not randomly or evenly distributed throughout the affected community, the idea that

zones exist seems a useful conceptualization for organizing the data. Since the focus of this thesis is upon one agency of social control, since that agency is legally restricted to activity within its politically defined jurisdiction, and since the police are more oriented toward minimizing and/or preventing the immediate hazards created by rioters, some of the possible disaster zones have minimal utility for this specific problematic. But the total and fringe impact zones are quite useful here. The total impact zone would contain the geographic area of greatest concentrated riot damage, while the fringe impact zone would contain an area of lesser damage concentration. The remaining area within the District of Columbia would, in terms of damage, have to be defined as unaffected.

#### Summary and Specific Hypotheses

McPhail and others have argued that the current literature has oversimplified the study of riots. McPhail specifically suggests concentration of research effort upon the complexity and variability of riot behavior organized through time and across space. This thesis presents an initial exploratory effort into the ecological dimensions of time and space, suggesting that the disaster literature provides a useful conceptualization of these variables. Specifically investigated are the police and fire data for the organized response time period of the riot which are compared to similar police and fire data during a non-riot time period across the dimension of space, conceptualized as riot, corridor, and non-riot areas.

Dynes distinguishes four basic types of organizations which are active in the period of organized response during a disaster.<sup>48</sup> One



of these he identifies as the established type of agency, which has an already existing structure and which is called upon to perform regular tasks. He writes:

Even during a major community emergency these organizations attempt to adhere to regular activities as much as possible.

.....  
If a police or fire department is forced to engage in some search and rescue, there is an effort to revert back as quickly as possible to the regular work of maintaining security or fighting fires. Whether intended or not, such restriction of activity helps prevent disaster demands on Type I groups from exceeding organizational capabilities.

.....  
Whatever the reason, Type I organizations attempt to restrict themselves to traditional tasks even in an emergency and tend to use only their own personnel or almost identical personnel from similar groups elsewhere.<sup>49</sup>

Therefore, it might be supposed that there will be a lesser degree of association between the normal and riot time periods in the arrest data than in the reported offense and fire data. Further, it may be posited that the degree of association will increase in both data sources as one moves from the non-riot areas to the corridor areas to the riot areas.

Three specific hypotheses are evaluated. First, the degree of association between the offenses reported and the selected riot-normal time period varies directly with the degree of concentrated riot damage. Remembering that the police offense record contains reported crimes which are classified and recorded by the police and that the fire data contains all the fires reported to the fire department, it is suggested that when the offenses and fires during the riot period studied are compared to the offenses and fires during a non-riot time period, the association between them will increase as one moves from the non-riot



spatial areas to the corridor spatial areas to the riot spatial areas. In other words, the degree of divergence between the riot data and the non-riot data will increase the closer one gets spatially to the areas of maximum destruction.

Second, the degree of association between the police's response and the selected riot-normal time period varies directly with the degree of concentrated riot damage. Remembering that the police arrest record reflects in part the responses made by this agency, it is suggested that there will be a greater divergence in the responses during the riot period studied when compared to a comparable non-riot time period the closer one gets to a spatial area of maximum destruction.

Finally, the degree of association between the police's response and the selected riot-normal time period is less than the degree of association between the offenses reported and the selected riot-normal time period. In other words, when the associations in offenses and fires as reported are compared to the associations in arrests as reactions made by the police, we would expect greater association in the former than the latter.

More simply, it is suggested, first, that the situation reported to the police and fire departments during the riot time period studied will not only be different when compared to a comparable non-riot time period but also evidence an increasingly greater divergence or greater degree of association as one moves along the dimension of space from those areas not being burned and looted to those areas where the burning and looting are most severe. Second, it is suggested that the police response during the riot time period studied will not only be different when compared to a comparable non-riot time period but also

evidence an increasingly greater divergence or greater degree of association as one moves along the dimension of space from an unaffected area to an area most severely affected by rioters. And thirdly, when we compare the situation reported to the police and fire departments against the responses made by the police, the greater divergence will be found in the offense and fire data rather than the arrest data.

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES

#### Introduction

The first section of this chapter describes the nature of the fire, offense, and arrest records and discusses the validity problems concomitant with the use of official statistics. The second section deals with the need for a simplification of the raw data and posits a classification of the police data into socially more meaningful categories. Further, the operational definitions of the riot period of organized response and a comparable normal time period are presented as well as the operationalization of the spatial dimension into the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas. The third section describes the tabular presentation of the data in terms of the categories and the descriptive statistics utilized and concludes with a comparison between the traditional statistic of chi-square and lambda as well as the categories used in the interpretation of the selected lambda statistic. Finally, a summary section will emphasize that there are a number of crucial methodological questions which must be answered before the degree and type of differences can be assessed.

#### The Data

The fire, offense, and arrest records. The empirical data herein analyzed comes from three sources: (1) the daily alarm log of the Communication Section of the District of Columbia Fire Department, which records all reported fire alarms by time of day in minutes and



location by street address; (2) the offense record of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, which records all the substantiated and formally filed complaints of violations by hour of the day, location of the crime committed by street address, and type of violation committed;<sup>1</sup> and (3) the arrest record of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, which reports all arrests made by hour of the day, location by street address, and type of violation committed.

Since the District of Columbia Fire Department data do not formally specify and only seldom informally indicate the nature of the request for assistance, it is not possible to differentiate real fires, false fire alarms, or ambulance calls on this record. While such a distinction might be interesting, it is hardly crucial in this analysis, since the fire department must respond to any call, be it one for a real fire or a false alarm. Hence, the information contained in this record indicates the total activity reported to the fire department and to which the fire department was obliged to respond. These data will be used as an indicator of the incidence of fires as reported to the fire department.

The offense record contains the total number of complaints recorded by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, for which there is substantial evidence that a violation has actually been committed.<sup>2</sup> While the origin of the report is unknown, it will be filtered through the police department's perception and recorded on this record in a legally defined criminal category. For example, if someone broke into a home while the residents were away and the ensuing report to the police claimed that a robbery had occurred, the police

would classify this crime as a burglary to conform to the legal definition of the violation rather than as a robbery which the victim has self-reported. These data reflect only what has been reported to the police and must be considered a partial indicator of the situation to which the police were obliged to respond.

The arrest record summarizes the total number of apprehensions and chargings made by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, exclusive of non-moving traffic violations. Parking violations, for example, do not appear on this record. These data must similarly be interpreted as a partial indicator of the police's response as they do not contain response for assistance which are unrelated to criminal activities. Further, they contain only those apprehensions which result in formally filed charges. Finally, if an individual is apprehended and charged with multiple violations, he will be classified once and only once in the most serious category from amongst the multiple charges. Therefore, the arrest record corresponds to the total number of people arrested and charged, not to the total number of violations perpetrated.<sup>3</sup>

Two general points remain to be made with reference to the interpretation of the data. First, an arrest reported does not necessarily coincide with an offense reported. In other words, it is not possible to determine which arrests match up with which offense, if, indeed, they match at all. Second, both the offense and arrest records report data by hours of the day. The police classify any violation in any specific hour if it occurs 30 minutes prior to or after the specified hour. For example, a classification of 1:00 A.M. would contain all those violations reported between 12:31 A.M. and 1:30 A.M. Hence,



data recorded for any one day will not contain the first 30 minutes of that day and will contain the first 30 minutes of the subsequent day. For reasons of comparability, the fire data, which is reported in the time units of minutes, has been so adjusted as to correspond to the police department's time classification.

Validity problems with official statistics. Numerous investigators have remarked about the difficulties surrounding the analysis of official crime statistics.<sup>4</sup> First, since many crimes are not discovered or discovered but not reported, crime statistics hardly reflect the total criminal activity in any locality. Second, while what crimes are reported are often interpreted as an index of the "true crime rate," the relationship between this index and the true crime rate is not constant but subject to variation. Third, differential interpretations of any specific violation among differing jurisdictions as well as differing interpretations through time in any one jurisdiction make comparisons quite difficult. Fourth, since crime statistics are often compiled for administrative purposes, they are often biased by political and budgetary considerations. Fifth, some crimes, for example, white collar crimes, are not routinely compiled. Sixth, quite often nebulous definitions, as in the case of juvenile delinquency, further compound interpretations of these data. Finally, some social characteristics of the offenders themselves lead to differential treatment by the regulatory authorities. For example, the possibility of actually being arraigned for a violation is inversely related to the offender's social class position.

Are these criticisms of paramount importance to this study? The first four criticisms have in common that they are most relevant when



a study encompasses a considerable time element. The data utilized in this thesis covers a total time period of fifteen contiguous days, and the effects of changes through time must therefore be considered as minimal. While the first criticism is applicable, the problematic in this study is not the true crime rate but the degree and nature of the differences in what is reported. We are willing to grant that bias exists, but we argue further that the bias should be operative equally on the police statistics for the time period covered with the exception of the effects of the riot itself, which is the principle concern herein. Of course, differential interpretations of the law between political jurisdictions is irrelevant here. The fifth and sixth criticisms are also irrelevant, because the white collar crimes are compiled by the police in Washington, and juvenile data are not a part of these data. The final criticism is relevant, but again, because of the short span of time investigated, the data should be equally biased.

The above, then, leads to a methodological assumption of extreme importance. While we do assume some bias in these data, we further assume a homogeneous distortion from the true values. This makes the normal time period an absolute necessity as a benchmark to compare the riot period against, because the comparative differences between these two time periods should then reflect the real differences.

While the above criticisms are relevant to official criminal statistics, Kitsuse and Cicourel present a number of criticisms relative to any official statistics.<sup>5</sup> Quoting Merton, these authors write:

There is little in the history of how statistical series on the incidence of juvenile delinquency came to be collected that shows them to be the result of efforts to identify either the sources or the contexts of juvenile delinquency. These are social bookkeeping data. And it would be a happy coincidence if some of them

turned out to be in a form relevant for research.

From the sociological standpoint, 'juvenile delinquency' and what it encompasses is a form of deviant behavior for which the epidemiological data, as it were, may not be at hand. You may have to go out and collect your own appropriately organized data rather than to take those which are ready-made by governmental agencies.<sup>6</sup>

Kitsuse and Cicourel interpret Merton to mean that quite often official statistics are not in a form which is suitable for sociological research.<sup>7</sup> It may be argued that while the police data utilized in this thesis are classified into legally defined categories, these categories are quite amenable to reformulization into socially meaningful units of analysis. The very detailed classification of location, time, and type of violation, while too cumbersome for sociological analysis, is manipulatable into more general categories.

The authors continue:

Merton also argues against the use of official statistics on quite different grounds. He states that such data are "unreliable" because "successive layers of error intervene between the actual event and the recorded event, between the actual rates of deviant behavior and the records of deviant behavior." In this statement, the argument is that the statistics are unreliable because some individuals who manifest deviant behavior are apprehended, classified and duly recorded while others are not.<sup>8</sup>

And,

From this point of view, deviant behavior is behavior which is organizationally defined, processed, and treated as "strange," "abnormal," "theft," "delinquent," etc., by the personnel in the social system which has produced the rate.<sup>9</sup>

The argument here is that often the incidence of "deviant behavior" is defined as such by the personnel within the agency performing the classification. In a word, these statistics tell the researcher more about the people making the classification than the people being



classified. Since the focus of this study is upon the police as one agency of social control, then this particular criticism is irrelevant in the present context.

But there are a number of positive aspects to the use of official data. One of the basic factors which delineates riot situations from normal situations is the general breakdown or change in the normative structure of the social system. Looting and burning of property and the imposition of emergency measures are frequently found during civil disturbances. This is not to say that riots necessarily generate anomic behavior, only that they establish a normative pattern which differs from a normal time period. Hence, as investigators of riots, we are in part interested in what kinds of behavior are manifested during riots and what kinds of responses are made to this behavior. Further, since part of the behavior manifested in riots is in violation of the law, the police may be assumed to be the one formal agency most familiar with this aspect of the riot and the one agency interested enough to collect such data. Apart from the validity of police statistics, the offense and arrest records provide the best single source of information available concerning crime during a civil disturbance.

Amongst the available data on riots are a variety of reports by various agencies within the community. While various agencies within the District of Columbia provide information, these reports all have in common a lack of systematic presentation. For example, the District of Columbia Department of Public Health surveyed the total casualties, total admissions, and total deaths reported by eleven hospital facilities in Washington.<sup>10</sup> While this information is reported on a day to day basis for the five days from April 8th through April 12th, the



first three full days of the riot, April 5th through April 7th, are collapsed into one tabular presentation. On the other hand, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department data are very systematic. The units of reportage are consistent and small so that meaningful combinations of time periods or violations can be easily accomplished.

While a field observer may attain a qualitative impression which cannot be gleaned from quantitative secondary analysis, the latter does provide the investigator with quantification. A perusal of the riot literature indicates that riot situations are very definitely qualitatively different from non-riot periods. Again, we mention the incidence of looting and burning as obvious differences. But very little of the literature indicates any quantification of these behaviors. As an instance of collective behavior and as an instance of, at best, differing normative patterns, it is understandable why quantified data are difficult to obtain. For this very reason, then, police statistics are valuable. After the researcher has distinguished qualitative differences between riots and non-riots, it becomes necessary to specify how much of a change is manifested from one situation to the other.

Finally, systematic and quantified data are absolutely crucial for the fourth characteristic of police data--comparability. One of the major purposes of this study is to quantitatively describe the differences in officially conceived criminal activity between a riot period and a non-riot or normal period. One can only make comparisons in differing time periods from actual data if the data are quantified and if they are reported in a constant fashion. That the data are quantified is obvious, but what about consistency of classification? The police

classification is based on the legal definitions of criminal violations as stated in the District of Columbia Code and is, therefore, irrelevant to the particular characteristics of the social situation.<sup>11</sup> The preceding statement must be modified somewhat when a new ordinance is enacted specifically for the existing situation, as was done during the riot. A curfew was placed on Washington during the riot period and as such there was no provision in the classificatory schema for this violation. Therefore, all arrests for curfew violations were placed in the disorderly conduct category. Further, there is no ordinance against looting. The criminal code contains laws against burglary and against rioting as an offense. Therefore, all looters arrested and all looting offenses reported to the police were classified as burglaries. With the exceptions noted above, all other violations were classified in the same categories prior to and during the riot.<sup>12</sup>

In short, the police and fire data maximize quantification, systematization, and comparability within the limits specified by the substantive concerns of this research. Of the existing sources of data, these are the best. This is a very important consideration. Riots contain elements of deviant as well as collective behavior, which exacerbates the validity problem. The issue essentially is a very simple one: either we use these data recognizing their limitations or we do not research these aspects of riot situations.

#### Conceptualizing the Data: A Problem in Simplification

The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department identifies any violation with a four digit code. For example, first degree murder is identified with the number 0101. Since every legally differentiatable

crime is designated with its own code number, the total number of codes is 497,<sup>13</sup> which obviously creates a need for some kind of simplification of these data. This information can be generalized into any one of thirty more general categories. For example, first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, and homicide are all placed in the more general category of homicide or the 0100 series of codes. Again, robbery with no weapon (0300), robbery with a weapon (0310), and attempted robbery (0301) are all placed in the general category of robbery or the 0300 series of codes.

The most specific reportage of violations herein is presented in terms of the thirty-three more general categories.<sup>14</sup> In the analysis of a civil disturbance, it is important to know how many aggravated assaults occurred and relatively immaterial from a social point of view as to the particular material object used in such an assault. There is one exception to the above statement. Because of the high incidence of fires and burning during the riot, false fire alarms (code 2649) have been separated from the general 2600 series of "other" violations. Table 1 indicates the general codes and the substantive violations.

Classification of the police and fire data. Figure 1 presents a more socially meaningful categorization of the data, conceptualized into six general categories: (1) crimes against persons, (2) crimes against property, (3) traffic violations, (4) crimes without victims, (5) crimes related to fires, and (6) miscellaneous crimes. Crimes against persons are those violations which result in direct physical harm to a victim.<sup>15</sup> Crimes against property involve no such personal injury or threat of personal injury to one's physical being. Traffic violations have been placed in a separate category because of the very



large volume of these violations. Crimes without victims are here used to indicate violations which involve the offender and which rarely, if ever, entail a victim directly. One might argue that the chronic alcoholic, who is continually on the police blotter for drunkenness, is performing behavior which is injurious to the welfare of his family. While this notion is readily accepted here, one may argue further that alcoholism does not involve the same kind of direct contact with a victim as would a homicide or assault. Nor does the alcoholic transgress directly upon some victim's property as in larceny or auto theft. Crimes without victims, then, in this research refer to those violations in which the offender performs behavior unrelated to property or to persons who are unwillingly involved in the violation.

Arson and false fire alarms obviously belong in the fire-related crime category, but how can the incidence of fires reported to the fire department be so placed? While reporting instances of fire can not be conceived as criminality, such reports do generate actions on the part of the fire department in much the same way that the police must respond to a call for assistance. It is for this reason, coupled with the obvious substantive similarity, that the fire statistics are placed in this category.

Finally, the remaining violations are lumped together in the miscellaneous category for the simple reason that these violations are irrelevant or appear to be irrelevant to riot behavior. Since the looting of liquor stores is so prevalent in

most civil disturbances, one might question why liquor law violations have been classified in this category. Since the liquor laws involve the regulation of the manufacture, distribution, sale, and taxation of alcoholic beverages, these violations are pertinent to those individuals whose business interests are found in the area of alcohol rather than those individuals who avail themselves of the product.

In sum, at this point, the 497 specific criminal violations have been reduced to thirty-three generalized headings and classified into one of six mutually exclusive general categories, as reported in Figure 1. It will be necessary to look within each one of these six general categories for a more detailed descriptive analysis. But some of these general categories contain a relatively large number of generalized headings. For example, the general category of crimes against persons contains eight headings and the miscellaneous category contains ten headings. Therefore, a further simplification of these generalized headings within the six general categories would be useful, and it is to this that we now turn.

Crimes against persons seem to fall naturally into a trichotomy: (1) crimes which carry a future potential for violence, (2) crimes which carry an actual threat of violence, and (3) crimes in which violence or force is really exercised. First, weapons violations, which involve possession, sale to a minor, and unlawful sale, are placed in the subcategory of future potential for violence, because they involve a material object which could be used against a person but which at the time of the charge there is no evidence that it has been so used. Therefore, weapons violations connote possession of an object which could lead to the second and third subcategories of crimes against

persons. Second, robbery has been placed in the actual threat of violence subcategory, because it involves theft accompanied by violence or imposing fear of violence in the relationship between the offender and the victim.<sup>16</sup> From the definition just given, robbery might have been placed in the third subcategory of really exercised violence. It has been kept separate, because it is not possible in the data to distinguish those robberies involving threat of violence from those involving real violence. Also, it would logically appear that the main purpose of a robbery is to secure the victim's property, while the violations classified in the real violence exercised category involve only personal bodily harm. But this consideration implies that robberies should be classified as crimes against property since they involve theft. As such, a robbery could be placed in either category. It is retained in the crimes against persons division because of the assumed greater concern or priority with physical harm than with the loss of property. Third, homicide, rape, aggravated assault, other assaults, sex offenses, and offenses against the family and children are placed in the actual force exercised subcategory for obvious reasons. Parenthetically, all sex offenses involve some real sexual action and most all family and child offenses involve behavior which produces directly or indirectly physical trauma.

The general category of crimes against property has not been collapsed, because these crimes are all substantively different from one another with the obvious exception that they involve property violations. Burglary-house breaking involves unauthorized entrance and actual or intended theft. Larceny entails only theft and is separated from auto theft, which involves theft of a motor vehicle. If some



item on or within a motor vehicle is stolen, this crime would be classified as a larceny. Therefore, auto theft refers only to the actual unauthorized use of the motor vehicle itself. Stolen property applies basically to possession of pilfered goods. For example, if one individual removed an article by shop lifting, he would be charged with larceny. If the stolen article was given to a second person, who was not involved in the action of taking the article, this second person would be charged with receiving stolen property. Finally, vandalism entails primarily destruction of another's property. Again, all the crimes against property involve no real or threatened physical harm to the owner of the property.

The third general category of traffic violations has been collapsed into two subcategories of moving and equipment violations. The traffic series (3300 codes) and the other traffic series (3500 codes) are synonymous and separated in the police statistics only because the number of possible moving violations exceed 100. Intoxicated driving is placed with traffic and other traffic violations because, first, it is a moving violation, and second, because of the minimal number of arrests in this category, this violation is proportionately rather unimportant. Equipment violations are placed in a second separate subcategory, because these deal with mechanical malfunctions of the automobile rather than human errors in the operation of a motor vehicle. Again, recall that non-moving violations (for example, illegal parking) are not considered important enough to be included in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department statistics. In fact, while police officers write parking tickets, the police department's responsibility ends with the issuance of the violation.

Within the general category of crimes without victims, prostitution, narcotics violations, and gambling offenses are generally ones which are not logically related to riot situations and have been placed in the non-riot related subcategory. This logical assumption seems to be supported by the data which indicate a fairly constant number of these violations between the normal and the riot periods studied. Drunkenness is placed in a separate category because of the very high incidence of liquor store looting. Finally, since the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department classification contains no curfew violation category at the time of the 1968 riots, all curfew violations were placed in the disorderly conduct category. Since curfew violations are peculiar to civil disturbances, the disorderly conduct category is treated separately. It could be strongly argued that one should separate the curfew violations from the normal disorderly conduct violations. Table 2 indicates the unofficial police statistics for these violations. Under the assumption that curfew violations were classified as disorderly conduct violations, the reader will note that these statistics are all possibilities with the exception of April 8th and April 9th. On both of these days, there were purportedly more arrests for curfew violations than reported disorderly conducts. Since it is not possible to verify which source is inaccurate, we assume the official statistics to be more representative than the unofficial ones.<sup>17</sup>

The general category of crimes related to fires has not been collapsed, because the violations within this category are obviously different. Finally, the miscellaneous general category contains all the remaining crimes. It may be argued that since fraud, forgery, and embezzlement involve theft, these violations are best treated as crimes



against property. They have been placed in the subcategory of fraud, because they are thefts which suggest a more intellectual or mental manipulation when compared to larceny and burglary. In other words, these thefts are ones which do not admit force or violence as does a robbery. Nor do they admit breaking and entering as does burglary-house breaking. Further, larceny in general is treated as qualitatively different from these violations.

Larceny-theft is the unlawful taking or stealing of property or articles of value without the use of force or violence or fraud. . . . In the Uniform Crime Reporting Program this crime category does not include embezzlement, "con" games, forgery, and worthless checks.<sup>18</sup>

For reasons cited earlier, liquor laws are included in this category. Other arrests, vagrancy, and suspicion were grouped because of their similar number in the normal as well as the riot period and because of their irrelevance to any of the other miscellaneous categories and identified with the label "varied." Finally, all the "unknown" violations were grouped together. These latter violations appear to be basically miscoding errors in the data processing process within the police department itself.

In sum, the thirty-three generalized headings have been further collapsed and grouped into six general categories, as indicated in Figure 2. This figure indicates the substantive criminal categorizations which are to be used in the interpretation of this aspect of the data.

Definition of the riot period of organized response and a comparable normative time period. As we argued in the preceding chapter, the time phases of unorganized response and organized response begin after the impact time period has started. It will be necessary to present a



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brief chronology of the beginning of the impact stage of the Washington riot so that we may select an appropriate beginning of the period of organized response.

At approximately 6:20 P.M. on April 4th, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr., was shot in Memphis, Tennessee. At 7:30 P.M., WTTG-TV, a local Washington television station announced the shooting and reported that King was in serious condition.<sup>19</sup> Dr. King was subsequently pronounced dead at 8:06 P.M.<sup>20</sup> In Washington, the news brought a crowd of several hundred persons to 14th and U Streets, N. W.--an intersection which is one of the major public transportation hubs in the District of Columbia. At 9:25 P.M., the first window breaking at the Peoples Drug Store next to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference offices at 14th and U Streets, N. W., was heard, and the Washington riot began.<sup>21</sup> At 12:30 A.M., April 5th, the first full scale fires were set on 14th Street, although the first fire call was received about an hour and a half earlier. Fire Chief Henry Galotta instituted Plan F, which split the existing fire companies in two, thereby doubling the response capability of the District of Columbia Fire Department at about 11:00 P.M., April 4th.<sup>22</sup> At 1:20 A.M., April 5th, the police asked and were granted permission to use tear gas on 14th Street.<sup>23</sup> By 3:00 A.M., the last major confrontation on 14th Street was over, and 200 stores had windows broken with looting occurring in 150 of them. Seven fires had occurred and 200 people had been arrested with thirty people injured, including five policemen and one fireman.<sup>24</sup>

While the first indicators of the beginning of the impact period were at 9:25 P.M., the fire department did not switch to Plan F until approximately 11:00 P.M., and the police department did not begin to



implement riot control procedures until 1:20 A.M., April 5th, when permission was granted for the use of tear gas. With the fire department activating its preplanned civil disturbance routine about one hour before midnight and the police department beginning to use tear gas a little over one hour after midnight, the riot period of organized response is operationally defined as beginning on the day following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and ending on the beginning of the day following the lifting of the curfew against the free movement of persons within the District of Columbia. It is clear that the lifting of the curfew indicated to the public officials of the District of Columbia that the immediate danger of the impact period had past. In terms of time, then, the riot period of organized response is operationally designated as beginning at 12:01 A.M., April 5th and ending at 12:00 P.M., April 12th. Hence, this time period covers eight full days.

Once the organized response time period has been defined, one must make a variety of decisions relative to a comparable normal time period. While the annual report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is concerned only with a limited number of variables in its analysis of crime, this report indicates monthly fluctuations in selected crimes.<sup>25</sup> Statistics are also presented indicating variations in the number of slain police officers by day of the week<sup>26</sup> and by hour of the day.<sup>27</sup> The annual report of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department shows variations in offenses reported to the police by month,<sup>28</sup> by day of the week,<sup>29</sup> and by hour of the day.<sup>30</sup> Similar fluctuations occur with arrest data.<sup>31</sup>

The incidence of major crimes was greatest on weekends. . . . The peak was on Saturday, declining Sunday through Tuesday, and beginning to climb toward the Saturday peak.



Generally, the daily incidence of serious crime was highest during the hours from 8 P.M. to midnight, when approximately 70 percent [sic] of the daily offenses were cleared by the police . . .<sup>32</sup>

Comparisons of crime statistics for differing time periods require careful attention to congruity of time of the year, day of the week, and hour of the day. Because of seasonal fluctuations in crime statistics, one must select a comparable time period very close to the selected riot period. The seven days prior to the selected riot period have been designated as the normal time period, because this period minimizes seasonal fluctuations, differing interpretations of law enforcement through time, and possible changes in law enforcement subsequent to the riot which might have resulted from the civil disturbance. Hence it was possible to compare congruent days and hours of the day, holding as constant as possible seasonal factors.

One further assumption of significance was made. Since the selected riot period covered eight days, beginning on a Friday, this time span contains data for two Fridays (April 5th and April 12th). Therefore, the comparable normal time period must also contain eight days of data. The first Friday of the selected riot period (April 5th) has been compared with Friday, March 29th or the day seven days previous. If the second Friday during the riot was compared to the day one week earlier comparisons would be between one day at the beginning of the selected riot period and another day at the end of that same period. Therefore, the second riot Friday was compared to Friday, March 29th. In other words, the normal time period has been operationally defined as March 29th through April 4th with the first day of this period enumerated twice to compose a normal time period of eight days. If the normal time period had been defined as eight chronological days prior to

the selected riot period, comparisons would have been between different days of the week. If the second Friday of the riot period was compared to the second Friday prior to the period of organized response, there would have been a time differential of three intervening weeks. Neither one of these alternatives appeared logical in view of the known fluctuations in crime statistics.

Definition of the riot, corridor, and non-riot spatial areas. A second major concern of this thesis is a geographic analysis of the distribution of crime between the two defined time periods. The National Capital Planning Commission and the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency made field surveys of the structural damage and classified this damage into three categories: (1) slight damage: 0-10 per cent; (2) substantial damage: 11-50 per cent; and (3) extensive damage: over 50 per cent.<sup>33</sup> Since these estimates dealt only with building condition or structural damage, it has been assumed that even in the 0-10 per cent category of window breaking and entering, there was probably rather heavy looting of inventories within the structures. Further, this report contains block maps of the major riot areas in which each structure is color coded into one of the three damage categories noted above. Therefore, the reader is able to determine specifically the spatial distribution of structural damage for each of the major riot areas. One further source presents a complete map of Washington with the incidences of structural damage identically treated.<sup>34</sup>

Both reports agree that the major riot areas were 14th Street, N. W.; 7th Street, N. W.; and H Street, N. E. Since the 8th Street, S. E. riot damage was similarly concentrated (although not as great in



dollar value), this researcher has interpreted this area as a fourth major area of destruction. All four of these areas have been collapsed into what is herein conceptually defined as the "riot areas." A perusal of the damage maps indicates other areas of lesser concentration of damage along several major transportation routes within the District of Columbia: Rhode Island Avenue, N. W. and N. E.; Benning Road, N. E. and S. E.; and Good Hope Road, S. E. These areas of sporadic damage have been collapsed into what is conceptually defined as the "corridor areas." All the remaining areas within the politically defined area of the District of Columbia have been conceptually defined as outside the areas of riot activity and identified as "non-riot areas."

The four riot areas and the three corridor areas were operationally defined by including two blocks of space as one moves through the specific blocks and streets of damaged areas as defined by the structural damage reports. A radius of two blocks was selected, because it was assumed that the general area of confusion, smoke, tear gas, and other riot characteristics could have been sensorily perceived by any person within that area. While this delineation seems somewhat arbitrary, and is, it also appears fairly logical. This is to say that the physical characteristics of a civil disturbance can not be assumed to end thirty feet from the center line of the major road of activity. But at the same time, these characteristics can not extend indefinitely into space.

Given these operational boundaries, all streets and their block numbers were established using a street address map of Washington, D. C.<sup>35</sup> Each offense, arrest, and fire report was locationally



classified and collapsed into one of the above mentioned three spatial categories.<sup>36</sup>

### Statistical Analysis of the Data

Tabular presentation of the data. Each table contains three dimensions. First, the time dimension has been dichotomized into the "riot" period of organized response and the "normal" period of a comparable span of time. Second, the substantive category of criminal violation contains either the six general categories, as noted in Figure 1, or the collapsed subcategories within any one of these six general categories, as noted in Figure 2. Finally, the spatial dimension, trichotomized into riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, is held constant within any one table. Each table reports three types of descriptive summary statistical data: (1) the frequency of items falling into each cell, (2) the percentage of the number of items in a specific cell computed from the total number of items contained within the specified time period, and (3) the percentage change from the normal to the riot time period.

The tables are presented for analysis according to the following guidelines. The offense and fire data appear first, followed by the arrest data. The offense and fire data are ordered by presenting these data for the riot, corridor, and non-riot spatial areas, respectively. Finally, these data are ordered further by presenting the six general categories first and following with the more detailed collapsed subcategorizations. The arrest data is presented according to the same guidelines as posited for the offense and fire data.

The lambda statistic. The chi-square statistical test may be

used to test differences between two or more independent distributions under the null hypothesis of no differences. Should a "statistically significant" result occur, the null hypothesis would be rejected, and one would fail to reject the alternative hypothesis of difference. While the chi-square test would be the traditional choice for a contingency table analysis where the data are reported at the nominal level of measurement, the symmetrical, proportionate reduction in error measure of lambda has been selected. Hays remarks:

When the value of chi square turns out significant one can say with confidence that the attributes A and B are not independent. Nevertheless, the significance level alone tells almost nothing about the strength of the association. . . . Statistical relations so small as to be almost nonexistent can show up as highly significant chi square results, and this is especially likely to occur when sample size is large. . . . The lambda indices do, however, suggest just how much the relationship found implies about real predictions, and how much one attribute actually does tell us about the other. Such indices are a most important corrective to the experimenter's tendency to confuse statistical significance with the importance of results for actual prediction. Virtually any statistical relation will show up as highly significant given a sufficient sample size, but it takes a relation of considerable strength to enhance our ability to predict in real, uncontrolled, situations.<sup>37</sup>

Chi square's descriptive interpretation, then, is limited to one of association and neglects the strength or degree of association present. It is also very much influenced by the size of the sample and also by the number of expected frequencies per cell.<sup>38</sup> Finally, and probably most important of all, is the tendency to interchange statistical significance with substantive significance. Hays continues:

On the other hand, chi-square tests are always approximate, and the evidence at hand suggests that the goodness of the approximation varies with a number of factors, not all of which can be taken into account in a simple rule of thumb.<sup>39</sup>



Blalock remarks:

A number of other measures of association which can be used with contingency tables have been presented by Goodman and Kruskal. Most of these measures, only one of which will be discussed in this text, involve what have been referred to as probabilistic interpretations. Since they have an intuitive meaning enabling one to interpret values intermediate between zero and one, these measures would seem to be superior to those based on chi square.<sup>40</sup>

For these and other reasons, chi-square has been disregarded in favor of lambda. Hays continues:

One of the oldest problems in descriptive statistics is that of indexing the strength of statistical association between qualitative attributes.

. . . . .  
As we have seen, most of our notions of the strength of a statistical association rest on the concept of the variance of a random variable. . . . However, when the independent and dependent variables are each categorical in nature, the variance per se is not defined. Something else must be used in specifying how knowledge of the A category to which an observation belongs increases our ability to predict the B category.

Three somewhat different approaches to this problem will be discussed here. The first rests directly on the notion of statistical independence between two attributes, defined as  $p(A_j, B_k) = p(A_j) p(B_k)$ . In this approach, the strength of association is basically in terms of the difference the extent to which the probability of a joint occurrence differs from the probability that would be true if the attributes A and B were independent. . . .

Another and much more recent approach deals with predictive association. Association between categorical attributes is indexed by the reduction in the probability of error in prediction afforded by knowing the status of the individual on one of the attributes. This way of defining association makes intuitive good sense, but is not as directly tied to tests of association as the first approach.<sup>41</sup>

The proportionate reduction in error measures, then, may be used in tests of association. Since the value of a PRE measure falls somewhere between zero and one, it facilitates interpretation. A value close to one may be interpreted as evidencing a strong association



between the variables, while a value close to zero would suggest a weak association. While the lower limit of chi-square is zero, it contains a variable upper limit, and this latter characteristic makes the interpretation of the chi-square statistic difficult, especially when one considers the variety of factors which may alter this statistic. Hays continues:

Finally, in some contexts it may be desirable to have a symmetric measure of the power to predict, where neither A nor B is specially designated as the thing predicted from or known first. Rather, we act as though sometimes the A and sometimes the B information is given beforehand.<sup>42</sup>

While most PRE measures assume the direction of prediction, lambda itself does not. Since the basic concern of this research is to test the hypothesis of association between normal and riot periods in terms of criminal violations, the direction of the prediction is unimportant. In other words, it is herein immaterial whether the violation is used to predict the time period or the time period is used to predict the violation. Should this be our desire, the former may be assessed using lambda b and the latter using lambda a. Since the value of lambda falls between lambda a and lambda b, lambda itself is a more conservative measure of both lambda a and lambda b. If one is not sure what his directional assessment should be, then the symmetric measure is the better one. This is to say that for consistency's sake, lambda has been chosen rather than fluctuating back and forth between lambda a and lambda b.

Hays concludes:

In the light of its somewhat complicated statistical character, a significant Pearson chi-square test may mean next to nothing, but an apparent predictive relationship in the data is usually worth looking into.<sup>43</sup>

In sum, if the lambda measures indicate a predictive relationship, a small value can be interpreted as a minimal reduction in one's error prediction, with the knowledge of how any one variable is distributed. Therefore, a small value indicates little association or a minimal amount of difference.

Finally, any of the lambda measures are useful in contingency tabular analysis because of the leniency of the assumptions underlying a proper meaningful interpretation of the statistic.<sup>44</sup> One must have two "polytomies" or classifications, in which there is no underlying continua or natural ordering of interest. In the case of lambda, as opposed to lambda a and lambda b, one does not have to assume asymmetry or that one classification precedes the other causally, chronologically, or in any other way. While it may be argued that some of the collapsed tabular presentations show ordinal properties (for example, the crimes against persons category), other's do not. Given the nature of the data collected and the interpretation desired in the analysis of these data, lambda seems the most appropriate statistic.

One final topic remains relative to lambda--its utilization within this study. If lambda is used as a measure of the association between the riot period of organized response and a comparable normal time span, it is necessary to specify certain ranges in the lambda values for interpretive purposes, and four such ordinal ranges are posited: (1) minimal association (the computed lambda value falls between 0.0000 and 0.1000), (2) weak association (the computed lambda value falls between 0.1001 and 0.2000), (3) moderate association (the computed lambda value falls between 0.2001 and 0.5000), and (4) strong

association (the computed lambda value falls between 0.5001 and 1.0000). While such an ordinal categorization of the lambda values is an arbitrary one, it is governed by one very important property of this statistic. Lambda is a weak measure of association. This means two things relative to its interpretation. First, a relatively low lambda value indicates more association in the data than a similarly low value in a more powerful measure of association. And second, because of this first consideration, the categorizations of possible lambda values have been divided more toward the zero end of the continuum rather than being equally spaced throughout the entire possible range of this statistic.

To summarize the statistical analysis of the data, the lambda values will be used to evaluate the degree of association between the selected normal and riot time periods and as such are restricted to the evaluation of the hypotheses presented in the preceding chapter. The descriptive statistics are used to indicate the nature of the differences in the criminal violations, thereby facilitating the selection of the indicators.

### Summary

There are a number of crucial methodological questions with which we have dealt in this chapter and which must be answered before the degree and type of differences between the normal and riot time periods selected for analysis can be assessed, apart from the obvious questions relative to the ecological variables of time and space. First, what data will be used? As indicated above, the data must be continuously collected so that the normal time period prior to the



riot can be used as a benchmark or control against which to compare the riot data. Second, are these data recorded in a form which is socially meaningful? While the violations are reported in a form which best corresponds to the legal definitions of crimes, these categories may be easily simplified into many fewer socially meaningful categories. The additional data dimensions of time and location are sufficiently precise that, again, meaningful simplifications are possible. Third and finally, are these data valid? While these data are, surely, not without some bias, they are utilized because in view of the other requirements (the nature of the questions asked, the focus on the police department, the need for continuously collected data, which can be manipulated into meaningful categories), they are the most valid data of that which is available. As instances of collective behavior, riots are atypical situations, and the student of these occurrences can not expect the same degree of sophistication in data collection which we have come to expect under normal circumstances.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE RESULTS

#### Introduction

In this chapter the results of the data analysis are presented and discussed. There are four major sections which encompass the discussion of (1) the offense and fire data, (2) the arrest data, (3) a comparison of the offense and fire data with the arrest data, and (4) a brief summary indicating those violations which are indicative of riots. Each of these first three major sections is subdivided into five parts which include the discussion, respectively, of (1) the riot area data, (2) the corridor area data, (3) the non-riot area data, (4) the comparison of the three spatial areas, and (5) the evaluation of the relevant hypothesis. Further, within any one of the spatial areas discussed, the tabular presentations are ordered beginning with the classification by general category, as indicated in Figure 1, and then proceeding to the collapsed subclassifications of the data, as indicated in Figure 2. The particular data are analyzed by type of violation and by time period in terms of both number and percentage of the specific category of violation to the total number of violations within the specified time period. Finally, each spatial subsection concludes with a listing of the major findings of that section.

The analysis of the first three subsections of the spatial variable is descriptive, showing which criminal categories change

and which do not as well as the magnitude of the change between the two selected time periods. Also, the violations which dominate and the magnitude of the dominance are noted, with emphasis placed on the changes within each spatial area. Finally, the fourth subsection deals with the comparative differences among the spatial areas.

#### The Offense and Fire Data

Before the analysis of the offense and fire data is presented, the reader is referred to Table 50, which reports the total number of offenses reported by day and by location for both the defined normal and riot time periods. The last column of this table refers to those offenses for which no locational data appeared on the police offense record. During the normal time period, 291 of 1566 offenses or 18.6 per cent of all offenses recorded by the police did not contain locational data. During the riot period selected, 345 of 1689 offenses or 20.4 per cent did not present any locational data. While the normal and riot percentages of offenses reported of "unknown location" were very constant, these percentages do indicate that approximately one-fifth of the offenses were lost in the analysis of the locational variable.<sup>1</sup> Two points need to be made here. First, the consistency of the percentage of items missing locational information between the normal and the riot time periods suggests that the police handling of reported offenses was not appreciably affected by the riot. Second, since one-fifth of the items lack addresses, it is impossible to say which items fall into which category of the locational variable. Quite simply, one-fifth of the offense data had to be treated in the locational analysis as if it never happened.



The offense and fire data for the riot areas. The tables analyzed in this section represent the summation of the offenses reported within the riot areas of 14th Street, N. W.; 7th Street, N. W.; H Street, N. E.; and the small cluster in S. E. Washington. In other words, this section analyzes the offense data by category of violation and by time period for only the riot areas themselves.

Table 3 shows the riot area reported offenses by general category and by time period. The lambda value of 0.1288 indicates weak association between the riot and normal time periods. Since there were no reports of traffic violations made to the police and since the number of reports in the general categories of crimes without victims and of miscellaneous crimes were quite low, these subcategorizations are not discussed. Crimes against persons decreased in absolute number during the riot and manifested a proportional decrease of 19.2 per cent. Crimes against property, while increasing in number, decreased proportionately by 11.8 per cent. The fire-related category was the only one which manifested a proportionate increase during the riot. While crimes against property represented somewhat less than one-half of the offenses reported during the normal time with crimes against persons and fires respectively accounting for one-fourth of the offenses reported, the fire-related category dominated the riot time by accounting for almost 6 out of every 10 offenses reported. During the riot, reported crimes against persons accounted for less than 10 per cent and crimes against property decreased to slightly over 30 per cent. While the riot areas were the locations of massive riot destruction, the general public reported primarily instances of fire.

Table 4 shows the collapsed category of crimes against persons for the riot area locations. The lambda value of 0.1818 indicates a weak association between the riot and normal time periods. The reader is reminded that Table 3 indicates an overall increase in offenses reported during the riot, while crimes against persons decreased proportionately and in absolute number from about one-quarter during the normal time to less than 10 per cent during the riot time. Within this category and within the four zones of maximum destruction, reported crimes involving potential threat of physical harm greatly increased proportionately from a normal of 3.1 per cent to a riot percentage of 30.9. Crimes involving an actual threat to one's physical well-being decreased proportionately from a normal percentage of 62.9 to a riot percentage of 25.5. Finally, crimes resulting in real physical harm increased proportionately by 9.6 per cent, although they decreased in absolute number during the riot period. While the reported crimes involving actual personal injury proportionately increased during the riot, a check of the absolute numbers in Table 4 suggests that the increase is really due to the fewer number of crimes reported during the riot period in this general category.

Table 5 indicates crimes against property within the riot areas, and the lambda value of 0.1468 displays a weak association in the data. Proportionately, auto theft, vandalism, and stolen property remained fairly constant between the normal and riot time periods. Reported larceny violations dropped from a normal proportionate percentage of 38.4 to a riot percentage of 6.0. Finally, burglary-house breaking proportionately increased from 40.9 per cent during the normal time to 73.6 per cent during the riot. Further, burglary-house



breaking and larceny were proportionately the same during the normal time period, but the former not only increased in number during the riot time but also clearly dominated the entire category of crimes against property. The decrease in larceny violations indicates that the thefts occurred when the businesses were closed.

Table 7 reports the fire-related items reported within the four major destruction zones. The lambda value of 0.0164 indicates minimal association in the data. In both the normal and riot time periods, the reporting of the incidence of fire virtually monopolized this category. Fires accounted proportionately for 85.9 per cent during the normal period and 96.2 per cent during the riot period. The riot period showed a proportionate decrease in false fire alarms of 10.8 per cent, but the absolute numbers indicate that this decrease was really a function of the tremendous riot increase in the number of fires reported within the riot areas. Clearly, arson was not a factor in the public reportage during the riot. Again, Table 3 shows the domination of fires during the riot with a percentage of 25.1 for the normal time and a large increase to 58.8 per cent during the riot time.

The following summary statements are descriptive of the major findings relative to the offenses and fires reported within the defined riot areas of 14th Street, N. W.; 7th Street, N. W.; H Street, N. E.; and the small riot area in S. E. Washington.

1. Within the riot areas themselves during the normal time period, the general public reported primarily crimes against property, with lesser proportionate reportage of crimes against persons and fire-related items. (Table 3)

2. Within the riot areas themselves during the riot time period,



fire-related items dominated the offense record with property violations ranking a distant second and crimes against persons ranking a minimal third. (Table 3)

3. While reportage of crimes involving actual physical harm increased slightly, reported crimes threatening harm decreased proportionately and reported crimes carrying a potential for harm increased proportionately. (Table 4)

4. During the riot time period, reported instances of fires and burglary-house breaking accounted proportionately for 56.6 and 24.2 per cent of all recorded offenses within the riot areas. (Tables 3, 5, and 7)

The offense and fire data for the corridor areas. The tables analyzed in this section reflect the summation of the offenses reported along the major lines of transportation (Rhode Island Avenue, Benning Road, and Good Hope Road) where some sporadic riot destruction occurred within the District of Columbia.

Table 9 indicates the violations by general category and by time for the corridor areas of sporadic destruction. The lambda value of 0.0532 indicates minimal association within the data. Traffic violations, crimes without victims, and miscellaneous crimes together totaled but eleven offenses for both time periods and are not discussed further. Crimes against persons proportionately decreased by 13.5 per cent from a normal percentage of 23.1 to a riot percentage of 9.6. Crimes against property and fire-related items increased during the riot somewhat in number but remained proportionately constant between the normal and riot times, respectively accounting for approximately 30 per cent and 50 per cent of all the offenses reported during the

riot. In those areas which experienced some riot damage, public reporting of total criminality differed very little between the normal and the riot time periods. Fire-related items again dominated both the normal and riot periods proportionately accounting for about one-half of the offense data. As in the riot areas, reported crimes against persons decreased during the riot period in the corridor areas.

Table 10 reports the corridor area offenses by time for crimes against persons. The lambda value of 0.3095 indicates moderate association in the data. Since the total numbers are small, very careful interpretations of the percentages are necessary. Perhaps it is safest to say merely that reported crimes involving actual personal injury remained fairly constant, while crimes involving a threat of bodily harm (robbery) decreased during the riot and crimes involving a future potential for personal harm (weapons) increased.

Table 11 reports the corridor area crimes against property, and the lambda value of 0.1233 indicates weak association between the normal and riot time periods. While the total numbers for the normal and riot periods were again small, Table 11 clearly shows that burglary-house breaking was most reported during both time periods. The total number of offenses rose from a normal figure of 38 to a riot figure of 52, while vandalism and auto theft remained constant and larceny decreased during the riot period somewhat. No stolen property violations were reported during either time period.

Table 13 reports fire-related items within the corridor areas, and the lambda value of 0.1684 shows weak association between the normal and riot periods. The incidence of fire dominated both the normal and riot periods as evidenced by the percentages of 70.8 and

87.4, respectively within this category. False fire alarms decreased markedly during the riot by 25.8 per cent to a riot low of 3.4 per cent. Arson reports increased from a zero number during the normal time period to eight during the riot.

The following summary statements are descriptive of the major findings in the corridor area offense and fire data.

1. Public reportage of riot period offenses within the corridor areas remained reasonably constant when compared to the normal time period data. (Table 9)
2. Reported fire-related items and crimes against property remained proportionately constant between both time periods, respectively accounting for approximately 30 and 50 per cent of all reported corridor area offenses. (Table 9)
3. The incidence of fires and burglary-house breaking dominated the riot period offense data in the corridor areas. (Tables 11 and 13)
4. Within the corridor areas during the riot period, reported crimes involving bodily injury remained constant, while the remaining crimes against persons evidenced a movement toward less personal violence. (Table 10)

The offense and fire data for the non-riot areas. In this section the offenses reported for non-riot area locations are analyzed. A non-riot area is defined, again, as any area within the District of Columbia which does not fall within two city blocks of the four major streets of massive riot destruction or within two city blocks of the three major lines of transportation which experienced sporadic riot damage. In other words, the non-riot areas contain the statistical



summation of all the offenses which have not been classified as riot area, corridor area, or for which the location data was miscoded or absent from the offense record.

Table 15 reports the non-riot area offenses by general category and by time period. The lambda value of 0.0419 indicates minimal association between the normal and riot periods. Miscellaneous crimes, traffic violations, and crimes without victims were proportionately low in both time periods, reasonably constant between the normal and riot times, and will not be further discussed. Crimes against property showed little fluctuation between the normal and riot times, but these violations accounted for almost 40 per cent of all the offenses reported during either time period. Crimes against persons dropped proportionately by 6.1 per cent during the riot changing from a normal percentage of 15.1 to a riot percentage of 9.0. The only general category to experience a riot increase was the fire-related items, which increased by 9.9 per cent from a normal percentage of 43.1 to a riot percentage of 53.0. Again, fires dominated the offenses reported during the riot with crimes against persons not only proportionately decreasing but also decreasing in absolute number. If one looks at the riot and normal totals, public reporting of crimes as a whole outside the riot and corridor areas remained constant. In sum, over 80 per cent of all offenses reported and recorded by the police in the non-riot areas dealt with crimes against property and fire-related reports in both the normal and riot time periods, with the fire category receiving some ascendancy during the riot time.

Table 16 focuses on non-riot area reported offenses relative to crimes against persons. The lambda value of 0.1575 indicates weak

association between the normal and riot periods. The only category to increase during the riot in absolute number was the potential threat category or the weapons violations. Violations which result in actual bodily harm proportionately decreased slightly by 5.3 per cent although there was a marked reduction in absolute number during the riot. Also evidencing both a large reduction in number and proportion was the threat of bodily harm category during the riot. While reported robberies accounted for about 60 per cent of all crimes against persons during the normal time period, this percentage dropped to about 30 per cent during the riot. Weapons violations increased from a normal percentage of less than 3 per cent to a riot percentage of about 35 per cent. Again, the data clearly indicate a movement toward less real personal violence reported during the riot period.

Table 17 reports non-riot area crimes against property offenses where minimal association exists between the normal and riot time periods as indicated by the lambda value of 0.0970. While the total number of offenses reported during the normal and riot periods was fairly constant, burglary-house breaking reports increased by 18.8 per cent from a normal period percentage of 37.4 to a riot period percentage of 56.2. Larceny violations decreased during the riot by almost the same amount changing from a normal percentage of 35.1 to a riot percentage of 15.2. Auto thefts, stolen property, and vandalism remained proportionately constant between both time periods with auto theft accounting for about one-fifth of all the offenses reported in the crimes against property category. Again, looting which was classified as burglary dominated the riot period

proportionately accounting for over one-half of all non-riot area offenses within this general category and was the only violation to manifest an increase in absolute number.

Table 19 shows fire-related items for the non-riot area and the lambda value of 0.0213 shows minimal association between the riot and normal periods. Again, Table 15 indicates that the fire-related items accounted for 43.1 per cent of all non-riot area reported offenses during the normal period and for 53.0 per cent of all non-riot area offenses reported during the riot period. Fires represented the most numerous category within the offense data in the non-riot areas during both time periods. Table 19 shows that fires reported to the Fire Department dominated the fire-related category, accounting for 86.0 per cent of the normal period offenses and 89.6 per cent of the riot period offenses. The proportional distribution of fires reported remained constant, although the absolute number increased during the riot period. False fire alarm reports decreased during the riot, while arson reports increased, although the latter were proportionately minimal during either time period.

The following summarizes the major results of this section.

1. In the non-riot areas, the total number of offenses reported to the police were relatively constant between the two time periods. (Table 15)
2. During the riot period in the non-riot areas, fires dominated the reported offenses accounting for about one-half of all reports with burglary-house breaking accounting for about one-fifth of the total offenses, each showing some increase over the normal time period. (Tables 15, 17 and 19)



3. Within the non-riot areas during the riot period, reported crimes involving bodily injury remained constant, while the remaining crimes against persons evidenced a movement toward less personal violence. (Table 16)

Comparison of the offense and fire data for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas. When Tables 3, 9, and 15 are compared, a number of interesting points are evident in the general categorization of the offenses by time and by location. Traffic violations in all three locational areas accounted for not one single offense reported in either time period. Miscellaneous crimes and crimes without victims were minimal proportionately and in absolute number in the offense data of all three locational areas during both time periods. The riot and the corridor areas evidenced an equal public concern with crimes against persons during the normal time period, as these offenses accounted for about one-quarter of all the offenses reported. However, in the non-riot areas crimes against persons reported during the normal time period accounted for only 15.1 per cent of all the offenses. During the riot period, reporting of crimes against persons dropped in all three locational areas to a relatively constant proportion of all the offenses. Further, as one moves from the riot to the corridor to the non-riot areas, the riot time period demonstrated a steady proportionate decrease of 19.2 per cent, 13.5 per cent, and 6.1 per cent, respectively, in reported crimes against persons. It would seem, then, that the riot effectuated a decrease in reported crimes against persons no matter which particular locational area is studied.

Directing attention to crimes against property, the data in Tables 3, 9, and 15 become a little more difficult to interpret. If

one looks at the corridor area proportions for the normal and riot periods and then at the non-riot area proportions for both time periods, the data clearly indicates little change between both time periods, although the non-riot area proportions were slightly higher. The riot areas, however, demonstrated a marked proportionate decrease of 11.8 per cent from a high during the normal time period of 44.7 per cent to a low of 32.9 per cent during the riot. Interestingly, within the riot areas themselves, where property damage was at a comparative maximum, the proportion of crimes against property reported to the police was almost at its lowest value, although the absolute number of these offenses increased somewhat. Not only was the proportion of crimes against property reported the greatest in the riot areas during the normal time period when compared to the corridor and non-riot areas, but also the greatest proportionate reduction in crimes against property reported during the riot occurred in the riot areas.

The fire data represented proportionately the major category of public concern during the riot period in all three locational areas. Fire-related items accounted for almost 6 out of 10 offenses reported during the riot within the riot areas and slightly over 5 out of every 10 offenses reported during the riot within the corridor and non-riot areas. While this would be a logical supposition for any riot period, the normal time period indicated proportions of 25.1 per cent, 48.5 per cent, and 43.1 per cent for fire-related items within the riot areas, the corridor areas, and the non-riot areas, respectively. In other words, while there were increases in the absolute number of offenses reported in this category in all of the locational areas, the corridor areas remained relatively constant with the non-riot areas experiencing

about a 10 per cent increase and the riot areas experiencing about a 33 per cent increase. One would expect a great increase in reports of fire within the riot areas, which the data supports. Interestingly though, fires increased in the non-riot areas as well, although this latter increase was not as dramatic in magnitude. Equally curious was the relatively constant figure during both time periods in the corridor areas of sporadic destruction. To put it another way, fires dramatically increased in the riot areas but also were quite in evidence in the non-riot areas as well, while remaining constant in the corridor areas.

Finally, if one looks at the total numbers of offenses reported during the normal and riot periods in each of the three locational areas, it was obvious that the greatest increase during the riot occurred in the riot areas with some increase in the corridor areas and a relatively constant figure in the non-riot areas.

Tables 4, 10, and 16 report the offenses for crimes against persons for the three locational areas. We may assume that crimes against persons demand sufficient public attention that changes in the social situation will affect this category of criminality as a whole to a lesser degree than the other general categories. Remember, however, in terms of absolute numbers reported crimes against persons decreased during the riot in all three locational areas. If we look within the categories of these tables in terms of the absolute numbers, crimes involving actual bodily harm and crimes involving a threat of bodily harm decreased during the riot, with the latter showing very dramatic proportional decreases of 37.4 per cent, 58.3 per cent, and 27.8 per cent for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas respectively.<sup>2</sup> Only



the potential threat of bodily harm category (weapons violations) evidenced an increasing number during the riot period. Comparatively, reported crimes involving actual bodily injury remained proportionately the most consistent category between the normal and riot periods in all three locational areas. Since the absolute numbers in these tables are relatively small, the percentages are somewhat misleading. Perhaps after a perusal of the absolute numbers, it is safest to say that the riot caused a diminution in the level of violence in reported crimes against persons. The riot seems to have been accompanied by less real or actual personal harm than found in the normal period. Further, reported crimes suggesting a future potential for personal violence increased, indicating a greater public concern with the less violent end of the continuum of violence against persons. These conclusions are applicable to all three locational areas.

Tables 5, 11, and 17 specify offenses related to crimes against property for the three major locational areas. Looking at the riot and normal time period totals in these three tables, it may be concluded, obviously, that the riot period was accompanied by a large increase within the riot areas, a moderate increase within the corridor areas, and a relatively constant number in the non-riot areas of reported crimes against property. Reported auto thefts, stolen property violations, and vandalism remained reasonably constant in all three locational areas between the normal and riot periods. Of the three crimes, the incidence of auto theft appeared most prevalent with vandalism and stolen property comparatively and respectively ranking a poor second and third. What is interesting here is that the offense data do not indicate any real public reporting of stolen property or

vandalism in any of the three locational areas during the riot period.

The normal time period reports of larceny violations proportionately accounted for roughly one third of all offenses in this general category in all three locational areas. Not only did the absolute numbers decrease during the riot in all three areas, but also the proportionate distribution of reported larcenies decreased to 6.0 per cent, 11.5 per cent, and 15.2 per cent for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. When many businesses were closed, the possibilities for larceny violations were severely restricted. That we may make this supposition is further reinforced by the data in Table 47, which reports offenses by specific category and by date during the riot period itself. April 5th was a Friday, the first full day of rioting, and businesses began the day in a somewhat normal fashion. The number of reported larcenies on this day was 36 from a riot period total of 146. April 6th and 7th were weekend days at the peak of the riot period with April 9th being the day of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s funeral, on which many businesses closed. During these four days, reported larceny violations totaled but 28 out of 146. The last three days of the riot, April 10th through April 12th, manifested an increase of 82 reported larceny violations, when the peak of the riot impact period was over.

Burglary-house breaking is legally defined as a theft accompanied by breaking and entering or by unauthorized presence. With many businesses closed or restricting their hours of commerce during the riot, one would expect this category of crimes against property to increase. Tables 5, 11, and 17 show that during the riot period, burglary accounted for 73.6 per cent, 75.0 per cent, and 56.2 per cent of all reported offenses against property in the riot, corridor, and non-riot



areas, respectively. These facts are what one would logically suppose during any riot period. It is interesting to note that in terms of the absolute numbers of burglaries for which locational information is available, the total riot period increase in reported burglaries was 251 of which 111 occurred outside the riot or corridor areas. Put another way, of the total number of 581 reported burglaries during the riot for which locational information is available, 358 or well over half of these burglaries were not in the riot or corridor areas. These statistics must be tempered with the fact that an additional 98 burglaries were reported during the riot period for which there is no locational data. However, if we assume that all of these 98 additional violations occurred in the riot and/or corridor areas, then a total of 321 burglary violations occurred in areas which experienced heavy or moderate riot period damage, while 358 violations occurred elsewhere in Washington. The conclusion must be reached that looting was fairly prevalent outside the riot and corridor areas. In other words, looting was not as localized in the ghetto areas of major destruction and the corridor areas of lesser destruction as one might suppose.

Tables 7, 13, and 19 report the fire-related offenses for the three locational areas. Looking first at the totals of the absolute numbers in the normal and riot time periods, the riot period showed an increase in the number of items reported in all three locational areas. However, only the riot areas themselves experienced a dramatic increase, while the corridor and non-riot areas increases were comparatively modest. False fire alarms decreased during the riot in all three locational areas to a proportionately minimal amount in the riot and corridor areas and to a proportionately modest level in the non-riot



areas. Further, while the number of arson reports increased during the riot in all three locational areas, proportionately these offenses accounted for minimal amounts during both times periods. During the normal time period, reported fires accounted for 85.9 per cent, 70.8 per cent, and 86.0 per cent of all fire-related offenses reported in the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. During the riot time period, these proportions increased to 96.2 per cent, 87.4 per cent, and 89.6 per cent within the riot, corridor, and non-riot locations, respectively. Put in other terms, the absolute number of fires reported in the riot areas during the riot period was over five times the normal time period number. In the corridor areas, the number of fires reported during the riot was slightly over one and one-half times the normal time period number, and the non-riot areas experienced an increase in reported fires during the riot of less than one and one-half times the normal number. That the incidence of fires dominated the offenses reported during the riot situation is obvious from these data and from the proportional figures presented in Tables 3, 9, and 15. And as one moves from the areas of comparatively maximum destruction to the areas of comparatively minimum destruction, the riot period experience with increasing numbers of fires diminished. All of the above is to be expected. What is not expected was the number of fires reported during the riot in the non-riot areas (Table 52). During the normal period, the non-riot areas accounted for slightly over 80 per cent of all fires reported in the District of Columbia. While this percentage decreased during the riot period, the non-riot areas still accounted for slightly over 60 per cent of all reported fires. We may conclude, then, that while the major areas of destruction showed dramatic riot

period increases in the incidence of fires, the non-riot areas experienced a high incidence of fires themselves during the riot period.

The following summary statements highlight the major findings of the analysis in this section.

1. Reported traffic violations, crimes without victims, and miscellaneous crimes were minimal in proportion during both time periods in all three locational areas. (Tables 3, 9, and 15)
2. The riot period studied was characterized by decreases in reported crimes against persons in all three spatial areas with the decreases varying directly with the concentration of riot damage and a concomitant diminution in the reported level of violence. (Tables 3, 4, 9, 11, 15, and 16)
3. Reported fire-related items proportionately dominated the offense data in both time periods and all locational areas with the exception of the riot area normal time period with maximum reportage of the incidence of fires and minimal reporting of arsonist activity, as well as a reduction in riot period reported false fire alarms in all three locational areas. (Tables 3, 7, 9, 13, 15, and 19)
4. When the three locational areas were compared, the greatest proportion of reported crimes against property during the normal time period and the smallest proportion of reported crimes against property during the riot time period both occurred within the riot areas themselves. (Tables 3, 9, and 15)
5. The degree of increase in absolute number of offenses reported between both time periods varied directly with the



concentration of riot damage. (Tables 3, 9, and 15)

6. During the riot time period, reported larceny violations decreased and reported burglary offenses increased in all three locational areas, while auto theft, stolen property, and vandalism remained proportionately relatively constant. (Tables 5, 11, and 17)

7. While reported burglaries and incidences of fire dominated the offense data in all three locational areas, the majority of the reported offenses in these two categories occurred in the non-riot areas. (Tables 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, and 52)

Evaluation of the offense data hypothesis. Before the analysis of the lambda values is presented, we must digress somewhat to put these data into some more reasonable context. One of the assumptions which guided the selection and definition of the spatial categories was the idea that the situation reported to the police and the response made by the police would both be affected by proximity to the areas of major riot damage. After making such an assumption, it would appear logical to posit a number of ideas. First, since the defined riot areas are those areas of maximum concentration of riot activity, one would expect the police to concentrate a majority of their resources within these areas. Second, since the damage surveys indicated some sporadic destruction in the defined corridor areas, one would expect some secondary concentration of police effort within these spatial areas. Finally, since the non-riot areas experienced comparatively little riot damage, then police arrests would be minimal in these areas compared to the riot and corridor areas. Quite simply, it seems logical to suppose that police response would indicate the greatest number of riot period



arrests within the riot areas with fewer arrests in the corridor areas and with very little attention paid to the non-riot areas. It was further assumed that the offense and fire data reported to and recorded by the police would follow a similar pattern.

While such a series of assumptions appear logical, they must be tempered somewhat by one additional factor. A check of the map defining the major riot areas and the corridor areas will definitely indicate that the geographic area encompassed by both of these spatial areas is quite small when compared to the remaining areas classified as non-riot.<sup>3</sup> Therefore when the reader looks at the absolute numbers in the three spatial categories, he might very well expect to see a larger number of offenses and fires, on the one hand, and of arrests, on the other hand, in the non-riot areas than the assumptions presented above might suggest. That such is true, the data will support.

Yet, the real curiosity in the offense and fire data exists in the corridor areas. If one looks at the total numbers of normal and riot time period offenses and fires reported in the corridor areas when compared to the same data in the riot and non-riot areas, it is obvious that the corridor area data are quite small in number. For example, Tables 3, 9, and 15 contain the total number of offenses and fires reported for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. During the normal time period, the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas accounted for, respectively, 16.6 per cent, 6.1 per cent, and 77.4 per cent of all the reported offense data for which locational information is available. During the riot period, this riot area proportion increased to 28.3 per cent and the non-riot area proportion decreased to 65.5 per cent, as one might logically expect. But curiously, the

corridor area proportion remained constant increasing during the riot period by only 0.1 per cent. This is to say that in the areas of some sporadic destruction during the riot period, reportage of fires and offenses proportionately did not change when compared to the other spatial areas.

Further, if one focuses on the collapsed subcategorizations within the corridor spatial areas (Tables 10 through 14), two characteristics of the corridor area data become obvious. First, some subclassifications evidenced very small numbers of items. For example, the crimes against persons subcategory contained only 16 offenses reported during the riot period, the miscellaneous crimes subcategory contained but one item for both time periods, and there was not one offense recorded in the traffic subcategory during either time period. Second, some of the subclassifications not only contain minimal numbers of offenses reported but also indicate that all or most of the items reported clustered within one cell of the table. For example, the subcategory of crimes without victims contains all 10 items in the riot period non-riot related cell. In view of these considerations, the analysis of the lambda values for the corridor area data are not particularly meaningful and are not discussed in relation to the posited hypothesis.

To summarize the above, it is suggested that a variety of factors make any meaningful interpretation of lambda difficult in the corridor area data. However, this does not dismiss the very interesting question of why the numbers of offenses reported in the corridor areas are so small. It merely means that the lambda statistic will not assist us toward an answer to this question.

Table 21 reports the lambda values for the offense data by general



category and collapsed subcategory and by spatial area. It has been hypothesized that the degree of association between the offenses reported and the selected riot-normal time period varies directly with the degree of concentrated riot damage. In other words, it is suggested that the closer one moves toward the major riot areas, the higher the lambda value will be, indicating an increasing degree of association.

The calculated lambda values for the general categorization and the subclassification of crimes against property indicate increasing association as one moves from the areas of least damage concentration to the areas of greatest damage concentration. These data indicate that the hypothesis as stated should fail to be rejected. However, the lambda values for crimes against persons and fire-related items evidence a relatively constant degree of association as one moves from the riot to the non-riot areas. Finally, the collapsed subclassifications of traffic violations, crimes without victims, and miscellaneous crimes contained so few items that the evaluation of the lambda values for any spatial area would be misleading. In view of the minimal degree of change from one locational area to another for some offense categories, it must be concluded that the data warrants neither a rejection of nor a failure to reject the above hypothesis. Rather, the data appear inconclusive.

However, it is interesting to note that with the exception of the corridor area crimes against persons, all the other lambda values fall in the minimal to weak range of association, indicating not only that there were few differences in reported offenses between the defined organized response period of the riot and a representative normal time



period but also that what differences exist are of a rather small magnitude. This is to say that given the modal marginal category on any one variable, the knowledge of the modal marginal category on the other variable does not sufficiently reduce the error in one's prediction of the distribution of the data.

In sum, while the data do not indicate clear support or denial of the hypothesis, they do indicate a very small degree of difference in riot period reportage of violations when compared to a normal time period.

#### The Arrest Data

Before the analysis of the arrest data is presented, it is necessary to digress into the issue of those arrests for which no locational information appeared on the official arrest record. The reader is referred to Table 51, which reports the total number of arrests by locational area and by date for both the normal and riot periods. The column identified as "location unknown" reflects the number of arrests for which no locational information appeared on the arrest record. The column identified as "miscoded" reports the arrests for which the location, while specified, was uninterpretable due to supposed miscoding or key-punch errors. In terms of the analysis in this thesis, it does not matter whether the locational information is deficient because it is missing or inaccurate. Rather, both categories are combined as the total number of arrests which must be disregarded in the locational analysis. Hence, during the normal time period, 522 of 3387 arrests (15.4 per cent) had to be dropped from the locational analysis. During the riot period, 1805 of 7308 arrests (24.7 per cent) had to be dropped.

It appears that the riot period arrest data were characterized by an increase in the number of items for which locational information was missing or inaccurate. Again, there is no way to assign in any meaningful fashion these arrests to one or another of the locational areas. Quite simply, they have been deleted.

The arrest data for the riot areas. In this section the arrests are analyzed for the four major riot areas by time period. The reader is reminded that the arrest data are a partial indicator of the responses made by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department to the normal and riot periods.

Table 22 shows the arrests made by general category and by time period for the riot areas. The lambda value of 0.1584 indicates weak association. Arrests for miscellaneous crimes, violations related to fires, and crimes against persons were minimal in absolute number and proportion during both the normal and riot time periods and will not be discussed further. Traffic violations during the normal time period accounted for slightly less than one out of every two arrests made in the riot areas. However, during the riot period traffic citations dropped drastically from a normal high of 47.1 per cent to a riot percentage of 5.1. Put another way, during the riot police arrests increased almost four times while traffic arrests decreased by almost two-thirds. Crimes without victims claimed the next greatest proportion of arrests during the normal time period with 35.5 per cent, and they radically increased during the riot to proportionately 74.7 per cent. Arrests for crimes against property increased during the riot period proportionately to 17.6 per cent from the normal time period percentage of 8.3. Finally, in terms of absolute numbers, the police

arrests greatly increased in the riot areas during the riot period.

Table 23 shows the riot area arrests for crimes against persons. The lambda value of 0.2459 indicates moderate association between the normal and riot time periods. The percentages here must be interpreted with great care, since the absolute numbers are so very small. The reader should remember that as a whole, this category of arrests decreased during the riot proportionately to a minimal percentage of less than 2 per cent of all arrests made (Table 22). Perhaps, we should say that arrests for crimes involving actual bodily harm and for crimes threatening bodily harm (robbery) remained relatively constant during both time periods. There was a slight increase in number (from 4 to 18) in the arrests made for weapons violations or crimes involving a future potential for bodily harm. On the whole, however, police response to crimes against persons within the riot areas remained relatively constant during both time periods.

Table 24 indicates arrests for crimes against property in the riot areas, and the lambda value of 0.2909 indicates a moderate degree of association in the data. Auto theft arrests were minimal during both time periods, while vandalism arrests remained proportionately constant accounting for a normal percentage of 7.9 and a riot percentage of 6.3. Stolen property arrests during the riot period proportionately increased from a normal percentage of 0.0 to a riot percentage of 7.0. If one looks at the absolute numbers, the police arrested 40 persons for stolen property and vandalism during the riot period. This is to say that the police did not utilize these categories of criminality to any degree within the riot areas. During the normal time period, larceny arrests dominated proportionately crimes against property accounting for 60.5



per cent, although the numbers were small. During the riot period, larceny arrests all but evaporated accounting for only 1.0 per cent, proportionately. Burglary-house breaking proportionately accounted for 28.9 per cent of the normal period arrests and dramatically increased to 85.0 per cent during the riot period within the riot areas.

Table 25 indicates traffic citations within the riot areas, and the lambda value of 0.0000 indicates minimal association in the data. The absolute numbers indicate that police concern with any kind of traffic violation decreased within the riot areas during the riot period. However, we may logically surmise that the opportunity for police arrests in this category would be radically reduced by the quite severe limitations placed on vehicular movement by the riot situation itself. What is surprising here is that the police made any arrests at all during the riot period within the riot areas themselves for traffic violations. Further, the proportionate distributions of moving and non-moving violations between the normal and riot time periods were the same, which indicates that the riot did not appreciably change the police response to different kinds of traffic violations.

Table 26 reports arrests for crimes without victims within the riot areas, and the lambda value of 0.1703 indicates weak association in the data. Arrests for non-riot related crimes (prostitution and vice, narcotics and drugs, and gambling) proportionately decreased from a normal percentage of 6.7 to a riot percentage of 0.5. While the number of arrests for drunkenness during the riot period increased somewhat within the riot areas, this category was proportionately decreased by 56.9 per cent by the tremendous increase in "disorderly conduct" arrests. The reader will recall from an earlier discussion that curfew

restrictions were placed on, among other things, personal movement during selected hours of the riot period days. Arrests for curfew violations were classified as disorderly conducts with no real possibility of practically separating these two violations from the arrest record. During the normal time period, disorderly conduct arrests accounted for about one out of every four arrests made within the category of crimes without victims. During the riot period, disorderly conduct (plus curfew violations) accounted for nine out of every ten arrests. Further, in terms of absolute numbers, within the riot areas this category increased from 43 arrests in the normal period to 1144 arrests in the riot period.

The following descriptive statements highlight the major findings relative to the arrest data for the riot areas.

1. During the normal time period traffic arrests (principally moving violations) dominated the arrest data in the riot areas, while crimes without victims (principally disorderly conduct and curfew violations) dominated the riot time period in these areas. (Tables 22, 25, and 26)
2. The riot period indicated no appreciable change in the riot areas in arrests for crimes against persons, crimes related to fires, and miscellaneous crimes. (Table 22)
3. Within the riot areas in the crimes against property category, the normal time period was dominated by arrests for larceny violations, while the riot period was dominated by burglary-house breaking arrests. (Table 24)
4. No arrests were made during either time period within the riot areas for arson or reporting a false fire alarm. (Table 27)

The arrest data for the corridor areas. In this section the arrest data for the areas of sporadic riot destruction along the major lines of transportation are analyzed by time period and type of violation.

Table 29 reports the arrest data by general category and by time period. The lambda value of 0.2274 indicates moderate association amongst the data. Arrests for crimes against persons, crimes related to fires, and miscellaneous crimes were minimal in terms of absolute numbers and proportions during both time periods within the corridor areas. Arrests for crimes against property increased proportionately by 16.5 per cent from a normal percentage of 1.1 to a riot percentage of 17.6. More dramatically, arrests in this category increased in absolute numbers from one during the normal time period to eighty-two during the riot period. Traffic arrests decreased proportionately from 71.6 per cent during the normal time period to 9.0 per cent during the riot period. Arrests for crimes without victims increased during the riot from a normal percentage of 18.2 to a riot percentage of 70.1. All of these percentages must be interpreted carefully because of the comparatively small total number of arrests during the normal time period. In other words, the number of arrests for crimes against property very greatly increased during the riot, but the percentage distribution is moderated by the tremendous increase in arrests for crimes without victims. Finally, traffic arrests dominated the normal time period accounting for seven out of every ten arrests in the corridor areas. During the riot period, arrests for crimes without victims accounted for seven out of every ten arrests with property violations accounting for somewhat less than one out of every five arrests. Finally, in terms of absolute numbers the corridor area arrests increased quite



substantially during the riot period.

Table 31 indicates arrests within the corridor areas for crimes against property by time period. The lambda value of 0.0000 indicates minimal association between the normal and riot periods. Strangely enough, there was only one arrest during the normal time period for any crime against property. The only category to appreciably increase during the riot period was burglary-house breaking.

Table 32 reports arrests in the corridor areas for traffic violations by time period, and the lambda value of 0.0000 indicates minimal association within the data. There was no measurable distinction between the proportions of arrests for different types of traffic violations between the normal and riot periods. In terms of absolute numbers the total number of arrests for traffic decreased during the riot period by approximately one-third.

Table 33 reports corridor area arrests for crimes without victims by time period, and the lambda value of 0.0455 indicates minimal association in the data. Arrests for non-riot related crimes were nonexistent during either time period. Because of the very few number of arrests in the corridor areas during the normal time period, the distributional percentages are somewhat misleading. Suffice it to say that during the riot period, there was a very large increase in the number of disorderly conduct (and curfew) arrests with a slight increase in the number of arrests for drunkenness. Clearly, disorderly conducts dominated the arrests during the riot period within the corridor areas.

The following statements are indicative of the major findings of the analysis of the arrest data in the corridor areas.

1. Within the corridor areas the normal time period arrest data was dominated by traffic citations, while the riot time period arrest data was dominated by crimes without victims, predominantly disorderly conduct and curfew arrests. (Tables 29, 32, and 33)
2. During the riot time period arrests for burglary-house breaking dominated the crimes against property general category and evidenced a large increase when compared to the normal time period within the corridor areas. (Table 31)

The arrest data for the non-riot areas. Analyzed within this section are the arrest data for all those remaining areas within the District of Columbia which do not fall into the defined riot areas (14th Street, N. W.; 7th Street, N. W.; H Street, N. E.; or SE Washington) or into the defined corridor areas (Benning Road, Good Hope Road, or Rhode Island Avenue).

Table 36 reports the non-riot area arrests by general category and by time period. The lambda value of 0.4595 indicates moderate association in the data. Since this lambda value is the highest attained in the data analysis, we may conclude that the police response within the non-riot areas was least consistent between the riot and normal time periods. Arrests for crimes against persons, fire-related crimes, and miscellaneous crimes were not only minimal but also relatively constant during both time periods. Arrests for crimes against property increased proportionately during the riot period by 10.9 per cent from a normal percentage of 4.2 to a riot percentage of 15.1. Also important here is a greater than quadrupling of the number of these arrests during the riot period. Traffic citations clearly dominated the arrests in the non-riot areas during the normal time period, as they

proportionately accounted for 69.5 per cent of all the arrests made. However, during the riot period, traffic citations dropped to 15.2 per cent. Arrests for crimes without victims dominated the riot period, accounting proportionately for 63.9 per cent of all the arrests made in the non-riot areas. This was a proportionate increase of 46.7 per cent from a percentage of 17.2 during the normal time period. Finally, if one looks at the total number of arrests for both time periods, he will see that there was a substantial increase during the riot period from a normal total of 2656 to a riot total of 3328. Apparently, the police were quite active outside of the riot and corridor areas during the riot period.

Table 37 shows the non-riot area arrests for crimes against persons by time period. The lambda value of 0.2203 indicates moderate association within the data. It is interesting to note that in terms of total numbers, the police made fewer arrests during the riot for crimes classified in this category than they normally did. Further, arrests for crimes which really result in personal injury decreased proportionately from a normal percentage of 61.0 to a riot percentage of 33.6. Also, the absolute number of arrests in this subcategory halved during the riot. The number and proportion of arrests for crimes threatening bodily injury remained constant, while arrests for crimes with a future potential for bodily harm increased proportionately by 28.0 per cent from a normal percentage of 26.0 to a riot percentage of 54.0. Clearly, arrests for crimes involving personal injury dominated the normal time period, while arrests for crimes involving potential future bodily harm dominated the riot period within the general category of crimes against persons. Therefore, we may conclude that the riot was



accompanied by a real reduction in the level of personal violence within the non-riot areas.

Table 38 reports non-riot area arrests for crimes against property by time period, and the lambda value of 0.0923 indicates minimal association. The proportionate distribution between the normal and riot time periods should be very carefully interpreted because of the relatively small total number of arrests made in this general category during the normal time period. Proportionately, burglary-house breaking and larceny equally dominated the normal period within the non-riot areas, respectively accounting for 36.6 per cent and 34.8 per cent of the total arrests made. During the riot period, however, burglary clearly dominated the arrest data, accounting for 82.5 per cent of all the arrests for crimes against property. While arrests for auto theft and stolen property increased during the riot when compared to the normal period, these increases were proportionately dwarfed by the tremendous increase in burglary arrests.

Table 39 reflects the non-riot area arrests for traffic violations, and the lambda value of 0.0000 indicates minimal association in the data. In terms of absolute numbers, the riot caused a tremendous diminution in traffic citations which fell from a normal total of 1846 to a riot total of 505. However, the riot did not affect the proportionate distribution of the two basic types of traffic violations.

Table 40 reports the non-riot area arrests for crimes without victims by time period. The lambda value of 0.2318 indicates moderate association in the data. The reader will remember that arrests in the general category of crimes without victims accounted for slightly more than 6 out of every 10 arrests made during the riot period in the

non-riot areas and slightly less than 2 out of every 10 during the normal period (Table 36). Non-riot related arrests (prostitution and vice, narcotics and drugs, and gambling) were minimal in number and proportion during both time periods. Drunkenness proportionately accounted for 71.3 per cent of the arrests during the normal time period and decreased during the riot to 11.5 per cent. Disorderly conduct arrests proportionately increased dramatically from a normal percentage of 24.3 to a riot percentage of 87.8. That this increase was meaningful is reinforced by the absolute numbers which show that disorderly conduct accounted for 111 normal time period arrests and 1867 riot time period arrests.

The following summary statements highlight the major findings of this section.

1. Within the non-riot areas, the normal time period was dominated by arrests for traffic violations, while the riot time period was dominated by arrests for crimes without victims, predominantly curfew and disorderly conduct violations. (Tables 36 and 40)
2. The increase in the number of arrests in the non-riot areas during the riot period indicates that the police were quite active outside the defined riot and corridor spatial areas. (Table 36)
3. In the non-riot areas during the riot time period, the arrest data indicate a reduction in the level of personal violence, as well as a decrease in larceny arrests and an increase in burglary-house breaking arrests. (Tables 37 and 38)

Comparison of the arrest data for the riot, corridor, and non-riot

areas. Tables 22, 29, and 36 report the arrests by general category and by time period for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. Comparatively, arrests for crimes against persons and for miscellaneous crimes represented minimal numbers and proportions during both time periods in all three locational areas, although both categories showed slight proportionate reductions during the riot period. Arrests for arson and reporting a false fire alarm totaled but three during both time periods in all three locational areas. Arrests for crimes against property increased proportionately and in absolute numbers during the riot period in all three locational areas, accounting for normal percentages of 8.3, 1.1, and 4.2 which increased to 17.6, 17.6, and 15.1 during the riot period in the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. What is interesting here is that arrests in this category were fairly constantly distributed proportionately throughout the three locational areas during the riot period itself.

Traffic citations accounted proportionately for 47.1 per cent, 71.6 per cent, and 69.5 per cent of all arrests made in the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively, during the normal time period. Further, these violations dominated the arrest data in the normal time period, accounting for 2317 of 3783 or 61.2 per cent of the total arrests made (Table 48). The normal period traffic citations were proportionately the same in the corridor and non-riot areas, accounting for approximately 7 out of every 10 arrests while slightly less than 5 out of every 10 arrests fell into this category during the normal time period within the riot areas. During the riot period traffic citations were proportionately reduced to 5.1 per cent, 9.0 per cent, and 15.2 per cent within the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas,



respectively. It appears that as one moves from the geographic areas of greatest concentration of riot property damage to the areas of least concentration of property damage, the proportion of arrests for traffic violations increased, indicating that traffic citations varied inversely with the concentration of property damage during the riot period. It should be noted, however, that in all three locational areas, the numbers of traffic citations during the riot period were dramatically curtailed when compared to the normal time period. But even though the riot was accompanied by a radical reduction in traffic citations, these arrests still accounted for 712 of a total of 7308 (or 9.7 per cent) of the arrests made. Only burglary-house breaking (937) and disorderly conduct (4501) accounted for a greater volume of arrests during the riot period (Table 49).

Finally, arrests for crimes without victims accounted proportionately for 35.5 per cent, 18.2 per cent, and 17.2 per cent of all the arrests made during the normal time period within the riot, corridor, and non-riot locational areas. During the riot period, these arrests dramatically increased in number and proportion to 74.7 per cent, 70.1 per cent, and 63.9 per cent within the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. Clearly, this general category of crimes dominated the arrest data during the riot period in all three locational areas. Further, there were slight proportionate decreases in this category of arrests as one moves from the areas of greatest concentration of the riot damage to the areas of lesser concentrated damage.

Tables 23, 30, and 37 report arrests for crimes against persons by time period for the three locational areas. Since the absolute numbers in all three tabular presentations are small, the percentages

must be interpreted cautiously. Perhaps the safest conclusion here is that the level of violence against persons decreased during the riot period in all three locational areas. Further, while Tables 22, 29, and 36 show proportionate decreases in arrests for the general category of crimes against persons, we may argue that these decreases were a function of the increases during the riot period in some of the other general categories, for the total number of arrests for crimes against persons in all three locational areas during the normal and the riot period were 151 and 156, respectively.

Tables 24, 31, and 38 report arrests for crimes against property by time period for the three locational areas. Interpretations are again complicated by the very small numbers, particularly in Table 31, which represents the corridor area. Perhaps we should reiterate here that the corridor areas evidenced only one arrest for burglary within this entire category of crimes against property during the normal time period. While this number increased to 82 during the riot period, only 10 arrests in the corridor areas were attributed to non-burglary categories. Both the categories of stolen property and auto theft were proportionately minimal during either time period. In terms of numbers of arrests, vandalism increased somewhat in the riot areas and remained constant in the corridor and non-riot areas during the riot period. However, the riot period proportions of vandalism arrests were low in all three locational areas. It was only in the non-riot areas during the normal time period that vandalism arrests were fairly abundant, accounting for almost 1 out of every 5 arrests within the crimes against property category. Larceny arrests showed dramatic proportionate decreases in the riot and non-riot areas during the riot period. However,

these percentage decreases really overstate the reduction of arrests for larceny if one peruses the absolute numbers in these two tables. Perhaps, we may conclude here that when the percentages for stolen property, vandalism, auto theft, and larceny are assessed with an eye on the total numbers from which the percentages were derived, these arrests either remained relatively constant or were minimal in number during the normal and riot periods, especially when compared to the burglary-house breaking arrests. Obviously and not surprisingly, burglary arrests dominated the riot period both in number and proportion, accounting for proportionately 85.0 per cent, 87.8 per cent, and 82.5 per cent of all the arrests made in this general category for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. The increase in number of burglary arrests during the riot period in all three locational areas was substantial from a normal period total of 53 to a riot period total of 743. Interestingly, if the burglary arrests within the riot and corridor areas are combined (328), it is surprising to find that a significantly larger number of arrests (415) were made in the non-riot areas during the riot period itself. Perhaps, we may conclude, from this distribution of the burglary arrests during the riot period, that looting activity was not as concentrated as one might initially suppose. Several factors complicate the meaningful interpretation of the burglary arrests: (1) the United States Attorney's Office decision to charge all looters with burglary with the intention of possibly reducing this charge to a lesser one as more evidence was gathered in each "burglary" case; (2) the self perception of some police officers' social role during the riot as being needed on the streets rather than filing formal felony charges in the court system, which resulted



in some looters being charged with a misdemeanor such as curfew or disorderly conduct which required less paperwork; and (3) the differential arresting practice applied to looters by some police officers who, when interviewed after the riot, claimed that they received no specific directions for handling looters and followed an individualized definition of the situation.<sup>4</sup> Quite simply, these three complicating factors represent contradictory attitudinal perspectives on the part of those persons responsible for maintaining or trying to maintain order. On the one hand, the United States Attorney's Office advocated a very stringent stance toward looters, while, on the other hand, some members of the police force defined their roles less stringently. Finally, some officers were unclear about their duties with regard to looting and reacted in a variety of possible ways. Unfortunately, it was not possible to estimate or to determine how many police officers adopted the second or third posture, because the sample from which the above information was obtained was at best a judgemental, non-probability one. Suffice it to say that the response by the police to looting behavior during the riot period was surrounded by a certain amount of official confusion.

Tables 25, 32, and 39 report the arrests for traffic violations by time period for the three locational areas. The most obvious fact in these data was that the riot was accompanied by a considerable reduction in traffic citations as a whole in the riot, corridor, and non-riot locational areas. Secondly, when the two different types of traffic violations are compared, there were no meaningful proportional changes in any of the locational areas, no meaningful changes between time periods, and no meaningful changes between subcategories. Quite

simply, the riot did not influence traffic citations at all with the exception of reducing their number. What was surprising in these data was the fact that during the riot period (given the supposed volume of looting and arson), the police still responded with 712 traffic citations, which accounted for 9.7 per cent of all the arrests made (Table 49).

Tables 26, 33, and 40 report arrests for crimes without victims by time period for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas. Non-riot related arrests within this category were minimal both in number and proportion in all three locational areas. Arrests for drunkenness dominated this category during the normal time period, accounting proportionately for 66.9 per cent, 56.2 per cent, and 71.3 per cent of all arrests made within the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively, although the corridor area proportion is misleading due to the small numbers involved. During the riot period, arrests for disorderly conduct dominated proportionately this category, accounting for 89.5 per cent, 94.2 per cent, and 87.8 per cent of the totals for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. These statistics are all the more meaningful when one considers that within the three locational areas there were a total of 635 arrests for crimes without victims during the normal period and that this category increased during the riot to a total of 3731 arrests. Again, this tremendous increase was probably due to the imposition of the curfew restrictions which, once filed, were classified as disorderly conducts.

One very interesting point needs to be made. If we compute the percentage of riot disorderly conduct arrests in the non-riot areas from the base figure of the total number of riot disorderly conduct

arrests for which locational information is specified, we will find that 56.3 per cent of the disorderly conduct arrests during the riot period were not made in the areas of concentrated or sporadic riot damage. If we compute the percentage of riot period arrests for all crimes without victims in the non-riot areas using the total number of arrests in this category for which locational information is specified as the base figure, we will find that 57.0 per cent of the arrests for crimes without victims during the riot period were not made in the areas of concentrated or sporadic riot damage. Further, Tables 22, 29, and 36 report collectively 5503 arrests made during the riot period for which locational information is available with 3328 arrests (or 60.5 per cent) having been made outside the riot and corridor areas. Finally, if 3328 arrests (Table 36) were made in the non-riot areas from a grand riot total of 7308 arrests (Table 49), the non-riot areas accounted for a minimum of 45.5 per cent of the total arrests. While the above must appear somewhat redundant, it is equally obvious that the police responded to a tremendous amount of activity during the riot period which was not within an area of concentrated or sporadic physical destruction--no matter how one computes the percentage figure for the non-riot areas.

There were two possible violations related to fires--reporting a false fire alarm and arson. During the normal time period, there were no arrests in any of the three locational areas for either arson or false fire alarms. During the riot period 7 total arson arrests were made (Table 49) with only 3 specifying locational information and all of these three arrests were made in the non-riot areas.

The following summary statements indicate the major findings of



the comparative analysis of the arrest data.

1. While traffic citations dominated the arrest data in all three locational areas during the normal time period, crimes without victims, primarily curfew and disorderly conduct violations, dominated the riot period arrest data with arrests for crimes against property, principally burglary violations, ranking a poor second, in all three locational areas. (Tables 22, 24, 26, 29, 31, 33, 36, 38, and 40)
2. The riot time period arrests for crimes against persons indicated a reduction in the degree of violence in crimes which result in personal harm. (Tables 23, 30, and 37)
3. The looting activity was not as localized as one might suppose during the riot time period selected for study. (Tables 22, 29, 36, and 38)
4. While the number of traffic citations issued during the riot period dropped considerably in all three locational areas, traffic citations still accounted for approximately about one out of every ten arrests made, although the number of citations varied indirectly with the degree of concentrated damage. (Tables 22, 25, 29, 32, 36, and 39)
5. The police did not or could not respond to the increase in fires during the riot time period with any appreciable number of arrests for arson. (Tables 22, 27, 29, 34, 36, 41, and 49)

Evaluation of the arrest data hypothesis. Before the analysis of the arrest data lambda values is presented, we must again digress to a consideration of the corridor area, which we have earlier argued is

reset with interpretative difficulties. Tables 22, 29, and 36 indicate the total number of arrests for which locational data is available for the riot, corridor, and non-riot spatial areas, respectively. During the normal time period, the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas accounted for, respectively, 14.3 per cent, 2.7 per cent, and 82.9 per cent of all the arrests. During the riot time period, the riot area arrests increased by 16.8 per cent to a percentage of 31.1, the corridor area arrests increased by 5.7 per cent to a percentage of 8.4, and the non-riot areas decreased by 22.4 per cent to a percentage of 60.5. Unlike the offense and fire data for the corridor areas, the arrest data proportional changes in these areas follow the pattern which was logically assumed in an earlier section of this chapter.<sup>5</sup> However, with the exception of the general categorization, all of the collapsed subcategories of the corridor area arrest data report minimal numbers of items and/or the items are primarily found in one cell. Further, the general categories of fire-related crimes and miscellaneous crimes evidenced very few items in all three locational areas. For the reasons discussed earlier, the lambda values for the collapsed subcategories in the corridor areas and the lambda values for fire-related and miscellaneous crimes will not be discussed.

Tables 43 reports the lambda values for the arrest data by general category and collapsed subcategory and by spatial area. It has been hypothesized that the degree of association between the police's response and the selected riot-normal time period varies directly with the degree of concentrated riot damage. This is to say that the closer one moves toward the major areas of destruction, the higher the lambda value will be, indicating an increasing degree of association.

The calculated lambda values for the general categorization indicate decreasing association in the arrest data as one moves from the non-riot areas of least concentrated damage to the corridor areas of sporadic damage to the riot areas of major concentrated damage, thus failing to support the hypothesis. Also note that the degree of association decreases as evidenced by a reduction in error of 46.0 per cent for the non-riot areas, 22.7 per cent for the corridor areas, and 15.8 per cent for the riot areas. Further, the collapsed subcategory of crimes without victims indicates lambda values which do not support the hypothesis with a reduction in error of 28.2 per cent for the non-riot areas and 17.0 per cent for the riot areas.

We have remarked earlier that the riot period studied did not affect the traffic citations to any appreciable degree, saving the reduction in their number, and the lambda values surely indicate this. Similarly, the lambda values indicate an approximately equivalent degree of association in the arrest data for the crimes against persons subcategory between the riot and the non-riot areas.

The subcategory of crimes against property is supportive of the hypothesis as the riot areas evidenced a 29.1 per cent reduction in error, while the non-riot areas evidenced but a 9.2 per cent reduction. Further, the absolute numbers in Tables 24 and 38 are surely not minimal as suggested earlier in the discussions of the corridor area lambda values. This subcategory is the only one which seems to clearly support the hypothesis.

Finally, if one looks at the magnitude of the lambda values discussed, there is a moderate degree of association in one-half of the lambdas, while two lambda values evidenced weak association and the



remaining four lambdas show minimal association, although three of these latter four values are applicable to traffic citations.

While there is not an absolutely clear pattern, with the exception of the subcategory of crimes against property, the remaining lambda values discussed do not support the arrest data hypothesis if we further disregard the traffic citation lambdas.

#### Comparison of the Offense and Fire Data with the Arrest Data

In this section the offense and arrest data are compared by locational area. The reader is reminded that the offense data are assumed to be a partial indicator of the normal and riot situation. The arrest data are assumed to be a partial indicator of the response made by the police to the situation. Further, the reader is reminded that some offenses and arrests did not specify locational information on their respective records, and therefore, these cases had to be eliminated from the locational analysis.

Tables 3, 9, and 15 report the offense data by general category and by time period for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. Tables 22, 29, and 36 report the arrests made by general category and by time period for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. Both the offenses and arrests for miscellaneous crimes were minimal in number and proportion in both time periods in all of the three locational areas. The offense and arrest data classified in the general category of "fires" is difficult to compare, because the former reflects in part calls made to the fire department for assistance as well as reported fire-related criminal activity. The comparison of items related to fire will be postponed until we focus

specifically upon the subcategories within this general classification. The offense data relative to crimes without victims was all but non-existent in both time periods and all locational areas. Arrests for crimes without victims dominated all three locational areas during the riot and were proportionately large in all three areas during the normal period. There was not one traffic offense reported to and recorded by the police in any locational area during both time periods, while traffic citations clearly dominated the normal time period and represented 11.5 per cent of all the riot period arrests for which locational information was available. Obviously, the general public did not report victimless crime or traffic violations during either time period, while the police response to traffic dominated the normal time period with a substantial number of arrests for crimes without victims, and arrests for the former and the latter exchanged positions during the riot period in all three locational areas. Put another way, while traffic and crimes without victims accounted for proportionately 0.5 per cent, 0.0 per cent, and 0.7 per cent of the offenses reported during the normal time period in the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively, these two general categories during the normal time period accounted proportionately for 82.6 per cent, 89.8 per cent, and 86.7 per cent of all the arrests made in the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. While these two categories proportionately represented 0.7 per cent, 6.0 per cent, and 0.5 per cent of all offenses reported during the riot period in the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively, they represented proportionately 79.8 per cent, 79.1 per cent, and 79.1 per cent of all the arrests made during the riot time

period in the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. Offenses related to crimes against property remained constant proportionately in the corridor and non-riot areas between the normal and riot time periods, while they decreased in the riot areas. Arrests for crimes against property increased in all locational areas proportionately during the riot period.

Finally, the data clearly indicate that both the offenses and arrests for crimes against persons proportionately decreased during the riot period. While the proportions for crimes against persons from the arrest data were very small during the normal time period in all three locational areas, they proportionately decreased to almost minute percentages during the riot period. In the normal time period, the offenses reporting crimes against persons accounted for 1 out of every 4 in the riot and corridor areas, with the non-riot areas accounting for but 15.1 per cent of the total. During the riot period, these offenses not only decreased in proportion to less than 1 out of every 10 offenses but also decreased in absolute number.

Tables 4, 10, and 16 report the offense data relative to the subcategories of crimes against persons for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. Tables 23, 30, and 37 report the arrest data for the same variables. Since the percentages of these tables were derived from absolute numbers which were very small, perhaps the better interpretative procedure would be to comment on the numbers themselves. In all three locational areas the total offenses reported diminished during the riot period, while the arrests remained fairly constant, if minimal, in number. Within the subcategories, the offense data indicate that the general public reported fewer crimes involving actual



personal injury--i.e., homicides, rapes, aggravated assaults, etc.--and fewer crimes involving a threat of bodily harm--i.e., robberies--during the riot period in all three locational areas. Further, the arrests made for these two subcategories either remained constant or decreased in all three areas during the riot. On the other hand, both the offenses and arrests for weapons violations--crimes which involved a future potential for personal violence--increased in number in all three locational areas during the riot period. Along with the proportionate reduction in arrests and offenses during the riot in crimes against persons, as noted in the preceding paragraph, we may add that on the continuum of potential to actualized personal violence, the riot time period was accompanied by a reduction in actual harm and an increase in potential bodily harm.

Tables 5, 11, and 17 report offenses related to property for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively, while Tables 24, 31, and 38 report arrests for the same variables. For the most part, the offenses and arrests between the normal and riot periods for vandalism, stolen property, and auto theft, were reasonably constant and proportionately minimal when compared to the other types of crimes against property, although there were small increases in absolute numbers for the latter two during the riot period within the riot and non-riot areas within the arrest data. With the exception of a minimal increase in arrests within the corridor areas, the riot time period was accompanied by a rather large reduction of offenses reported and arrests made for larcenies. Just as dramatic were the riot time period increases in offenses and arrests for burglary in all three locational areas. Finally, the data reveal that there was a large number of

offenses reported and arrests made outside the corridor and riot areas of concentrated riot period destruction.

Tables 6, 12, and 18 report the offenses for crimes without victims for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. Tables 26, 33, and 40 report the arrests made for crimes without victims for the same variables. That the notation "crimes without victims" is appropriate is obvious from the offense data which indicate that the general public did not report these crimes in any meaningful numbers during either time period. Further, there was a tremendous increase in number and in proportion of disorderly conduct (also curfew) arrests during the riot in all three locational areas.

Tables 7, 13, and 19 report fire-related offenses for the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas, respectively. Tables 27, 34, and 41 report arrests for fire-related crimes by the same variables. Arrests for reporting false fire alarms and arson were negligible during both time periods in all three locational areas. The offense data contains a "fire" classification which incorporated the calls reporting the incidence of fires to the fire department within the offense data. Obviously, a call for assistance does not reflect a crime committed. But these calls not only dominated this subcategory but also all the offense data during the riot period, and when compared against reports of false fire alarms and arson, which were minimal, indicate that the public was more concerned with the incidence of fire than with the cause of the fire, assuming that a large number of riot fires were deliberately set--a not unreasonable assumption.

The reader will recall that there was not one offense reported to the police relating to a traffic violation during either time period

in any of the three locational areas. Obviously, crimes relating to traffic, if reported, were not recorded by the police. Tables 25, 32, and 39 report the arrests made for moving and equipment violations for both time periods and the three locational areas, respectively. These tables have been analyzed elsewhere and need not be reiterated here. Suffice it to say that compared with the offense data, traffic violations dominated the police's response during the normal time period, while the riot reduced their numbers and proportions greatly. However, the riot did not change the proportional distribution of the subcategories and considering the riot situation, traffic citations were remarkably high.

The following summary, descriptive statements present the major findings of this section.

1. Traffic violations and crimes without victims are infrequently reported during both time periods in all three locational areas, while these categories dominate the arrest data in all three locational areas during the normal time period. (Tables 3, 9, 15, 22, 29, and 36)
2. During the riot time period, arrests for crimes without victims clearly dominate the police's response, with arrests for crimes against property ranking a substantial second. (Tables 22, 29, and 36)
3. In the general category of crimes against persons, the offenses reported decreased in all three locational areas during the riot period, while the arrests made remained reasonably constant, although minimal in number and proportion. (Tables 3, 9, 15, 22, 29, and 36)



4. Both offenses reported and arrests made for crimes resulting in actual bodily injury and for threatening bodily injury decreased during the riot time period with one exception--the corridor area arrests, which were constant and minimal in number--while both the offenses reported and arrests made for crimes with a future potential for bodily injury increased somewhat. (Tables 4, 10, 16, 23, 30, and 37)
5. In the crimes against property category, larceny offenses and arrests decreased and burglary-house breaking offenses and arrests increased during the riot time period, while auto theft, stolen property, and vandalism remained comparatively constant. (Tables 5, 11, 17, 24, 31, and 38)
6. In the crimes without victims subcategory, the offenses reported in all three locational areas were minimal during both time periods, while arrests for drunkenness dominated the normal time period and disorderly conduct (curfew) arrests increased in number and proportion tremendously during the riot period, dominating the arrest data in all three locational areas. (Tables 6, 12, 18, 26, 33, and 40)
7. Reports of fires dominated the offense data in the crimes related to fires category during both time periods in all three locational areas, while false fire alarm reports decreased during the riot period and arrests made for crimes related to fires were minimal in number and proportion during both time periods in all locational areas. (Tables 7, 13, 19, 27, 34, and 41)
8. Rather large numbers of offenses reported and arrests made

during the riot time period occurred in the non-riot area locations. (Tables 3, 9, 15, 22, 29, and 36)

Evaluation of the comparative hypothesis. It was hypothesized that the degree of association between the police's response and the selected riot-normal time period is less than the degree of association between the offenses reported and the selected riot-normal time period. In other words, when the degree of association between the arrest data in the two time periods is compared to the degree of association between the offense data in the two time periods, it is expected that the former would evidence smaller lambda values than the latter.

Again, for the reasons cited earlier in the evaluations of the offense data hypothesis and the arrest data hypothesis, certain lambda values have been disregarded. But an additional problem occurs in the analysis of the final hypothesis. Some general categories in the offense data contained minimal numbers, while the corresponding categories in the arrest data contained substantial numbers of cases. For example, the offense data for crimes without victims contained but 38 reports (Tables 3, 9, and 15), while the arrest data for this same category contained 4366 cases (Tables 22, 29, and 36). A quite similar pattern may be noted in the traffic data where the offenses reported and recorded total not one single item, and the arrest data totaled 2760 cases (Tables 22, 29, and 36). Further, one general category in the offense data contained a great number of items, while the corresponding arrest data category contained minimal numbers of items. The offenses reported and the incidences of fires called into the fire department totaled 2360 items (Tables 3, 9, and 15), while the arrests made for fire-related crimes were but 3 (Tables 22, 29, and 36). Since

a comparison between two lambda values, where one of them has been calculated on a minimal number of cases, would not be meaningful, comparisons between the arrests and offense lambdas for traffic violations, crimes without victims, and fire-related items are not made. Similarly, as noted previously, the general category of miscellaneous crimes contained minimal numbers in both the offense and arrest data, and comparisons are not made. In other words, for the reasons cited above and for reasons of comparability, the evaluation of the comparative hypothesis will rest solely upon the lambda values for the general classification and the collapsed subcategories of crimes against persons and crimes against property, disregarding the corridor area lambda values in these two subcategories.

Of the seven sets of lambda values, only one--the non-riot area crimes against property subcategory--minimally supported the stated hypothesis. In the general category in all three locational areas, the arrest lambda values were greater than the offense lambda values. Further the riot and non-riot area crimes against persons subcategory evidenced greater arrest lambda values than offense lambda values, which also characterized the riot area crimes against property subcategory.

Therefore, with one exception, where comparability is possible, it may be concluded that the police's response was less consistent between the riot period of organized response and a representative normal time period than the general public's reportage of criminal activity between these two time periods. Put another way, the offense lambdas displayed three minimal (0.0000 - 0.1000) and four weak (0.1001 - 0.2000) associational values, while the arrest lambdas displayed one minimal, one weak, and five moderate (0.2001 - 0.5000) associational values.



However, the lambda values in both Tables 21 and 43 indicate that there were differences in both the arrest and offense data between the two time periods selected for study. Rather, the degree of difference was greater amongst the arrest data than amongst the offense data.

### Summary

The final objective in this chapter is to simplify the official police statistics by eliminating those categories and types of crimes which seemed unaffected by the riot itself. Further, those violations or categories which increased or decreased substantially during the riot period are noted. While it is certainly conceded that the offense and arrest data presented in this chapter do not reflect, respectively, the true crime rate and the complete response of the police to the offense data, we can make two points. First, the offense data must be that which is reported to the police which the latter filtered through their perceptual screen and recorded on the official offense record. As such, these data do represent inputs into the police system, granting that these inputs are manipulated by the collecting agency. Second, the arrest data represent those formally filed apprehensions which the police officially made in response to the riot situation. If one is interested, as we are, with the police response to one time period during the total span of the riot, then such data are important, when compared to a non-riot time period, in indicating the nature of the police response.

The entire general category of miscellaneous crimes may be eliminated from further consideration, since both the offenses reported and arrests made during either time period totaled less than 5 per cent

of the total items.

In the crimes against persons category, the riot time period was accompanied by increases in both offenses reported and arrests made for weapons violations. While the proportions are minimal because of the tremendous increases in the numbers of violations in other categories, the weapons offenses reported increased by 70 items and the arrests made by 50 items. Further, robbery offenses dropped substantially by 167, while the arrests made remained constant and minimal in number. Finally, crimes involving actual bodily harm--homicides, rapes, assaults, sex crimes, and crimes against family and children--dropped substantially on both the offense and arrest records by 59 and 41, respectively. These data indicate that the degree of violence involved in reported offenses and arrests made for crimes against persons decreased during the riot time period.

Focusing on the crimes against property category, burglary-house breaking offenses and arrests experienced substantial increases of 251 violations and 690 violations, respectively, during the riot time period. Larceny offenses and arrests during the riot decreased, while the remaining violations--auto theft, stolen property, and vandalism--remained reasonably and comparatively constant.

Since there were very few offenses reported during both time periods for crimes without victims and traffic, we will focus only upon the arrest data for these categories. Traffic arrests decreased tremendously during the riot from a normal total number of 2125 to a riot period total number of 635. Just as dramatic were the increases in disorderly conduct (and curfew) arrests from a normal time period number of 161 to a riot period number of 3318. Arrests for drunkenness

remained comparatively constant, accounting for 443 normal period arrests and 392 riot period arrests.

The arson offenses reported to the police increased during the riot by only 28 to a total of 30, while the false fire alarm offenses decreased by 38 from a normal time period total of 133. The incidences of fires dominated the offense data accounting for 759 reports during the normal time period and 1341 reports during the riot time period. There were very few arson arrests and no arrests for reporting a false fire alarm.

In summary, the offense data indicate that public reportage during the riot period was dominated by reports of fires with increases in crimes involving a future potential for personal bodily injury and burglary-house breaking. Substantial decreases in reported offenses for crimes involving actual personal harm and actual threat of harm, larceny, and reported false fire alarms also occurred. Interestingly, arson reports were minimal in number. Obviously, the official input to the police stressed fires, weapons violations, and burglary offenses, with no apparent concern relative to the causes of the fires.

The arrest data indicate that the police responded with massive use of disorderly conduct violations (curfew) and somewhat less use of burglary-house breaking. Further, even though there was a considerable decrease in traffic citations, the police still issued 635 tickets in this general category. Finally, assuming an increase in arson during the riot--a not unreasonable assumption--, the police were unable to respond to this activity with similar charges.



## CHAPTER V

### THE CONCLUSIONS

#### Introduction

This final chapter is divided into three sections. First, a brief summary of the major results of the foregoing is presented. Second, further research objectives are suggested, dealing with a more refined analysis of the ecological dimensions of time and space. Using some of the descriptive findings in the previous chapter, a number of inferred propositions are also presented as possible explanations of these results. In addition, some of the seemingly logical contradictions in the data will be mentioned for further analysis. Third, the methodological and theoretical implications of the foregoing are presented.

#### Major Results of this Study

The substantive problematic investigated herein is an ecological analysis of a portion of a riot utilizing official statistics as indicators of the inputs to and responses made by the police as a formal agency of social control. The time period investigated was conceptualized as the period of organized response, as suggested by the disaster literature, and the data during this time period was compared to a representative normal time period, the latter providing the benchmark against which to measure the nature and degree of the change in police department activity during the riot time period selected for study.

The spatial dimension was conceptualized as a trichotomy--the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas--, as also suggested by the disaster literature. Two basic questions were posited: (1) what degree of difference existed between the defined riot and normal time periods and (2) what kinds of differences were evident? The three hypotheses posited were applicable to the first question, while the indicators of riots focus attention on the nature of the differences, as well as simplifying the rather voluminous amount of official data available for analysis.

Relative to the hypotheses investigated, the basic assumption was that the closer one gets spatially to an area of maximum riot activity, the greater the degree of association in both the offense and fire data between the two time periods, on the one hand, and the arrest data between the two time periods, on the other hand. More specifically, it was hypothesized that the degree of association in the offenses and fires reported between the riot and normal time periods would decrease as one moved from the non-riot areas of minimal destruction to the corridor areas of sporadic destruction to the riot areas of major destruction. While the general categorization and the subcategorization of crimes against property indicate increasing association, the degree of change was relatively small.<sup>1</sup> Further, the additional collapsed subcategories of fire-related items and crimes against persons evidenced comparatively constant degrees of association. Since the data displayed no clear pattern, it was adjudged that these data did not clearly suggest that the offense and fire data hypothesis should be rejected or not be rejected. It was concluded, however, that on the basis of the associational values themselves, the offense and fire data

did manifest rather small degrees of differences between the two time periods in all three locational areas.

Second, the arrest data hypothesis posits that the degree of association between the normal time period arrests and the riot time period arrests would increase as one moved from the riot to the corridor to the non-riot areas. After disregarding the associational values which were calculated on minimal numbers of arrests, the remaining values did not support this hypothesis with the exception of the subcategory of crimes against property.

Third, it was hypothesized that the association between the normal and riot time periods within the arrest data would be less than the association between the normal and riot time periods within the offense and fire data. After eliminating lambda values calculated from minimal numbers of items and maintaining comparability wherever possible, of the seven sets of spatial categories investigated, six sets of arrest and of offense and fire lambda values did not support the stated hypothesis with contradictory evidence only in the non-riot area crimes against property subcategory.

However, if one looks solely at the magnitude of the lambda values in Tables 21 and 43, it is obvious that there were differences in both the arrest and the offense and fire data between the normal and riot time periods studied, although the degree of difference was greater for the former than the latter. This indicates that the riot was accompanied by a different type of response by the police, and the nature of that response became the second basic problematic.

The police data were simplified by suggesting that only some types of violations dramatically increased or decreased or proportionately



contributed greatly to the input to the police or their response during the riot. First, the offense data during the riot time period studied was dominated by reports of the incidence of fires, although little concern was apparent relative to the nature of the causal agent in these fire reports. Burglary-house breaking--the police department classification of looting--was also reported in substantial numbers. The offense record showed substantial decreases in larceny and false fire alarm reports during the riot period. Within the collapsed subcategory of crimes against persons, those involving actual personal harm (i.e., homicides) and those which actually threatened harm (robberies) decreased substantially during the riot, while weapons violations increased substantially. It must be concluded that the reported level of personal violence decreased during the riot. Strangely, while the absolute numbers of reported stolen property violations decreased and the absolute numbers of reported vandalism increased during the riot period studied, these changes were minimal, hence relatively constant.

Second, the arrest data was dominated during the riot period by arrests for disorderly conduct and curfew violations with burglary-house breaking clearly ranking second. While traffic citations decreased substantially, they still accounted for a rather large number of arrests during the riot. Substantial decreases in arrests also occurred during the riot for larcenies, while neither stolen property nor vandalism arrests changed substantially when compared to burglary arrests. Further, the police did not respond to the burning during the riot with any substantial amount of arson arrests. As with the offense data, arrests for crimes against persons showed a decrease in the level of personal violence.

Finally, when one compares the offense and fire data with the arrest data during either time period, it becomes obvious that public reportage of crimes without victims and traffic violations were quite minimally represented, while the police responded principally with these categories of crime.

#### Suggested Further Research

The spatial variable. We have noted earlier that it seems logical to expect the greatest number of offenses reported and arrests made during the riot period of organized response to have occurred within the major areas of riot damage. Conversely, one would suppose that the least number of offenses reported and arrests made would have occurred within the non-riot areas of least destruction, with the corridor areas of some destruction falling somewhere between the extremes of the defined riot and non-riot areas.

Table 44 reports the total offenses by locational area and by time period for all those data for which locational information was available. The riot areas accounted for 16.6 per cent proportionately of all the normal period offenses and for an increase of 11.7 per cent during the riot time period to a percentage of 28.3. While the offenses reported during both time periods in the corridor areas remained proportionately constant, the non-riot areas proportionately accounted for 77.4 per cent and 65.5 per cent of all the offenses during the normal and riot periods, respectively. The same pattern is fairly well replicated in Table 45, which reports the total arrests made by locational area and by time period, again for all those items specifying locational information. The riot areas proportionately accounted for 14.3 per

cent of the normal period arrests, which increased by 16.8 per cent during the riot to 31.1 per cent. Further, the non-riot areas accounted proportionately for 82.9 per cent of the normal period arrests, which decreased by 22.4 per cent during the riot to 60.5 per cent. The corridor areas experienced small proportionate values in arrests during the riot period with a normal percentage of 2.7 and a riot percentage of 8.4.

Three points need to be made about these data. First, as stated before but shown quite clearly in these tabular presentations, the riot activity, while proportionately increasing in the riot locational areas and proportionately decreasing in the non-riot areas, was nonetheless substantial in the latter. Second, while the proportionate changes between the normal and riot time periods are in the directions deemed logical, they are quite minimal in degree. In other words, the non-riot areas accounted for well over 50 per cent of all the offenses and fires reported and arrests made during both time periods. Third, it seems rather strange that the proportions within the corridor areas were as small as they were.

There are two possible implications resulting from the locational analysis. The first is the substantive one which declares that the riot activity was more dispersed than one might logically imagine. The second, which will concern us here, is a methodological one and is most surely interrelated to the first. Perhaps, the riot and corridor areas were too rigidly defined within the present analysis. The assumption was to enclose the areas of major and sporadic destruction, as defined in a report by the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency and the National Capital Planning Commission, in the center of a two-block



radius of geographic space, thereby generating the riot and corridor areas. This is to say that the defined riot and corridor areas geographically encompass a very small area when compared to the non-riot areas (see Appendix D). The absolute numbers in Tables 44 and 45 suggest this possibility. But with so great a proportion of offenses reported and arrests made falling outside these locational areas, it is suggested that the locational specification be subjected to a more detailed future analysis. For example, it would be interesting to know whether or not the majority of the non-riot area offenses and arrests fell within, say, five blocks of the defined riot and corridor spatial areas or whether or not they were randomly distributed throughout the non-riot areas. What would be necessary here is a computerized mapping program which could sort the data items into very small geographic units--i.e., two-block square areas--, into the normal and riot time period, into the offense or arrest category, and into the specific criminal category.

In defense of the defined locational areas, it would be difficult to refute the assertion that the major destruction to property occurred in areas other than those surveyed by the two above mentioned District of Columbia agencies. Further, while fires, for example, were reported in the non-riot areas, these fires might represent burning waste cans and brush fires rather than the major conflagrations which were evident within the riot areas. Unfortunately, as with burglaries and other crimes, the seriousness of any specific fire cannot be determined from the available data sources. In sum, there seems no logical reason to discount the defined locational areas analyzed above, although a word of caution and a suggestion for future investigations seem appropriate.

Given that a more detailed investigation of the locational variable would be basically supportive of the locational assumptions made, thereby justifying the operational definitions of space utilized in this study, a number of interesting questions appear. For example, as indicated by the official records, does there appear to be qualitatively different kinds of police responses amongst the four major areas of riot destruction? Since the southern portion of the 14th Street riot area was very close to the central business district and several major federal governmental installations and since the H Street riot area was primarily a neighborhood commercial center for the surrounding ghetto population, the police might have pursued qualitatively different kinds of responses. Further, while it was not a focus of the present research, the arrest data alone contains, where known, the home address of the individual arrestee. It would be interesting to compare the distance between the home address and the place of apprehension for each arrestee under the hypothesis that the people arrested during the riot were residents of the neighborhood. The results of this kind of analysis would be particularly interesting for crimes against property and crimes without victims and relatively meaningless for traffic citations, so some selectivity would have to be exercised in deciding which crimes to include in such an analysis.

The temporal variable. In the original formulation of this research, the idea of a day by day analysis in which the first riot day would be compared with its representative normal day and which would also incorporate the general and collapsed subcategories of the offense and fire data and the arrest data by the three locational areas was entertained. It doesn't take a plethora of imagination to realize that

such an analysis would generate a very large and cumbersome number of tables and for this reason it was discounted. However, as was mentioned in an earlier chapter, too often studies of riots tend to dichotomize or otherwise oversimplify the data. For example, it has been argued that studies which characterize the general public as falling into one or the other category of "rioters" and "non-rioters" approaches the subject matter in a naive manner. Therefore, the author would be remiss if some suggestion of a more detailed analysis of the time variable was not included.

With the data simplifications suggested, a more detailed investigation of the temporal dimension is possible. It is suggested that the next topic for specific analysis be the nature of the distribution of the offense and fire data and of the arrest data by hours of the day throughout the defined eight day organized response period of the riot. One would expect variable quantities of offenses reported and arrests made from day to day and from hour to hour throughout any day. Assuming that these data partially reflect the inputs to and reactions made by the police, a tentative analysis indicates that the riot in Washington during April of 1968 did not follow the pattern of riots in other major metropolitan communities during the decade of the 1960's.<sup>2</sup> The activity reported to the police and the response made by the police seem to have occurred primarily during the daylight hours.

By pursuing these units in the temporal dimension, we may be able to determine not only the fluctuations in police activity but also develop a feeling for the peak of the riot activity. That these fluctuations occur is indisputable, but movement toward a descriptive riot curve of response activity by the police would perhaps be possible.



Further, it would be interesting to subdivide the riot areas into their component parts of 14th Street, 7th Street, H Street, and SE Washington. While these areas are generally recognized as the areas of major riot-related destruction, we do not know if these areas simultaneously experienced riot activity or if they were more or less four independent riot zones which coincidentally happened to be contained within the same political jurisdiction. Also of interest would be the distribution of specific offenses and arrests by days and by hours of the day. For example, one might hypothesize that the traffic citations issued by the police occurred primarily during the non-curfew hours of the day and after the riot activity peak toward the end of the defined organized response time period. Also, if the majority of disorderly conduct classifications appeared during the curfew hours, we might hypothesize that these arrests were primarily responses to the newly enacted curfew restrictions against personal movement.

Inferred propositions for further testing. If one looks closely at the numbers and proportions of some criminal categories, a number of seemingly logical contradictions appear in the data. It is to some of these that we now direct attention.

As noted in the preceding chapter, a number of factors make the interpretation of the burglary statistics difficult. We have argued that the upper echelons within the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department in conjunction with the United States Attorney's Office decided to charge all looters with burglary--a felony charge and a serious one in terms of penalty--with the idea of reducing the charge if clear evidence was not available to anticipate the probability of conviction. However, a rather poorly performed ex post factum study

by the District of Columbia Committee on the Administration of Justice under Emergency Conditions indicated that some police officers self-reported that their instructions for handling looters were unclear and that they used their own discretion relative to looting activity or that some police officers defined their social role during the riot as one of being needed on the streets rather than within the court buildings filing formal felony charges. Rather, the latter group of officers minimized their off the street time by charging looters with disorderly conduct or curfew violations, which are misdemeanors and necessitate much less paperwork than felony charges. Further, data collected by the Washington Civil Disorder Survey indicated a total of 1352 business establishments and 1199 real properties<sup>3</sup> were damaged during the riot.<sup>4</sup> Let us further assume that all the arrests made by the police during the riot period of organized response for burglary (937), larceny (42), stolen property (85), vandalism (51), and arson (7)--a total of 1122 arrests--occurred in response to real properties and businesses damaged.<sup>5</sup> If we make the further rather unrealistic assumption that there was only one person performing only one of the legally defined criminal activities per real property damaged--the smaller of the figures for damaged properties and businesses--, then we must conclude that the police did not respond to crimes against property with a maximum utilization of charges for these crimes. Put quite simply, the official statistics indicate that the rather stringent policy suggested by the United States Attorney's Office and the upper echelons of the police department was not pursued by the police officers on the streets.

Further, if one looks at the disorderly conduct arrests, which also include curfew violations, the police charged 4501 persons with

these crimes during the riot period of organized response. When one compares the crimes against property subcategory arrests and arson arrests with the disorderly conduct arrests, it becomes even more obvious that the police officer on the street was not adhering to the officially defined policy.

A number of qualifications must be placed on this interpretation, however. The reader will remember that in the event that some one person was arrested for multiple violations, he was classified once and only once for the most serious crime from all the alleged infractions. Hence, if a person was arrested for burglary and assault with a deadly weapon, that person might very well have been lost in the above statistics to the more serious criminal category of assaults during the classification process within the police department's data processing division. Second, the reader will also recall that the arrest record does not contain juvenile offenders, who might have been quite active in the looting and burning of the commercial property damaged during the riot. Third, the police might have made a number of informal and unofficial responses to criminal activities during the riot. And fourth, there could very well have been too much riot activity for the police to make any kind of response to the majority of these activities.

While it is necessary to probe more deeply into the above mentioned factors for more conclusive evidence, the discrepancies in the data noted above do suggest the tentative hypothesis that the police officers on the streets during the Washington riot of April, 1968 pursued a response policy of removal of the causal riot agents rather than of attempting to punish such offenders. In other words, the data suggest a massive use of restrained force designed to remove rioters



from the scene of the riot by the simplest and most efficient legal means possible--disorderly conduct and curfew violations.

Given that this was the orientation of most of the police officers, then a more difficult question becomes the reason for this arrest posture. Did the police perceive a majority of the rioters as basically law abiding individuals, who happened to be caught up in the "spirit" or contagion of a riot situation? Or did they really feel that the priority should be placed on their function in the streets which generated a reluctance to file more time consuming felony charges? Or, perhaps, they felt it easier to gain a conviction for curfew violations than for some more serious charge. The reader will recall from the preface that the military personnel aided the police by holding offenders until the police arrived, while the latter filed any formal charges deemed appropriate. Since the rules for evidence leading to conviction for criminal charges in the court system are quite rigid, then perhaps policemen charged the misdemeanor of curfew, because one would only have to prove that the defendant was out on the street at a forbidden time of the day.

Let us now focus upon the police arrests for disorderly conduct (curfew), burglary-house breaking, traffic related violations (which include moving violations, non-moving violations, and intoxicated driving), and drunkenness, irrespective of whether or not locational information was available (Tables 48 and 49), since these criminal categories ranked from one to four in number of arrests made during the riot period of organized response. When compared to a representative normal time period, burglary and disorderly conduct arrests increased substantially, and traffic citations decreased substantially,

while arrests for drunkenness remained comparatively constant in number, although they halved proportionately. Interestingly, if we add the total number of arrests made within these four categories, the riot period accounted for 91.8 per cent and the normal period accounted for 84.6 per cent of all the arrests made in these respective time periods. We must conclude that the police made quite consistent responses between the two time periods studied for these violations as a whole. Granting that some categories increased and some decreased during the riot, the point remains that the police response during either time period concentrated upon these four categories.

A number of subpoints are interesting also. Even though traffic citations decreased from a normal time period number of 2317 to a riot time period number of 712, the latter figure was still large enough to rank third during the riot period behind disorderly conduct (curfew) and burglary arrests. In a time when public attention was directed toward the more visible riot indicators of looting and burning, the police still continued to make substantial numbers of traffic related arrests. To a lesser degree the same may be said of the arrests for drunkenness. Second, the reader will note that public reportage of crimes for disorderly conduct and curfew, traffic violations, and drunkenness were obviously minimal in number during both time periods (Tables 46 and 47), while these categories accounted for 3124 normal time period arrests and 5770 riot time period arrests (Tables 48 and 49). Not only did the police response seem to be reasonably consistent during both time periods, but also it seemed directed toward those categories of criminality which presumably failed to excite the public to the degree that they were reported to the police. These data lend

further support to Dynes contention, as noted earlier, that the police are most comfortable in their traditional role behaviors.

It would be interesting to know if the majority of the traffic citations occurred at times when the daily fluctuations in other riot arrests were low. We might hypothesize that traffic citations were issued when the burglary and disorderly conduct arrests were minimal. Or, perhaps, they were made toward the end of the period of organized response, after the peak time of riot-related activity. Does the volume of traffic citations indicate a police policy related to the generation of revenue for the municipality? Further, are arrests for drunkenness so prevalent because they represent a relatively easy mechanism by which the police officer attains his monthly arrest quota? These particular criminal violations are interesting, because they do not seem to elicit much concern from the general public.<sup>6</sup>

As noted in the review of the literature chapter, many sociological studies posit some variant of the basic frustration-aggression theme as the cause of riots. If, as some argue, the fire and police departments are indicative of the white power structure's quasi-military occupation of the black ghetto areas, it would seem as if false fire alarms would increase if for no other reason than the pure harassment of these departments. Since the vast majority of fire box alarms are false, the police monitor the fire department's alarm communication center and automatically respond to the scene of a fire box alarm on the assumption that it will be false.<sup>7</sup> It would appear logically that false fire alarm reports would increase during a riot, but, as noted before, they decreased in all three of the locational areas studied.

Did the general public curtail the reporting of their normal rates



of false fire alarms, because they perceived the incidence of fire as potentially harmful? Or, perhaps, a normal number of false fire alarms were reported, but because of the tremendous number of fires during the riot, the fire department was almost assured of finding a real fire close enough to the fire box from which the call originated that the call was not recorded as false by the police. Maybe, because of the increased volume of reports made to the police plus the increased street activity, the police were not able to respond to fire box alarms in their normal fashion.

#### Methodological and Theoretical Implications of this Study

The preceding has established a number of major descriptive points concerning riots. First, riots are complex and variable phenomena. They are complex in that many different types of behaviors are performed throughout the duration of a riot. Not only are there the causal factors which lead to riots, but also there are the responses made by persons and agencies within and without the affected community. Riots are variable in the sense that the actions performed are not evenly distributed throughout the time span encompassed by the riot. In other words, riots evidence peak times of activity followed by depressions in activity. Second, it has been argued that the majority of the sociological literature dealing with riots has been concerned with the independent causal variables which lead to the dependent variable of the incidence of riots or some aspect of riots, neglecting other aspects of riots which have passed virtually unstudied. Third, it was noted that many previous research studies oversimplified the conceptualization of the objects of the research in these studies.

It is maintained specifically in this thesis that the ecological dimensions of space and time, suggested by the disaster literature, provide a meaningful and useful interpretative schema for the analysis of official statistics as partial indicators of the degree of difference and of the nature of the differences in the response behavior of one agency of social control to the activity of rioters themselves. The disaster literature suggests that qualitatively different behaviors are to be expected as one moves through the various sequential time periods and the various spatial zones. Specifically, we have focused upon one time period--the organized response period--and upon three locational areas--the riot, corridor, and non-riot areas. While the descriptive findings reported in the results chapter are relevant to the nature and degree of the police response, we have argued further in this final chapter that the analysis of these findings suggest a number of seemingly interesting and relevant inferred propositions which are hypothesized as indicative of other aspects of police behavior and the behavior of persons who are not police officers. In other words, two major substantive contributions are made herein. First, we have partially described the nature and degree of difference in the police's response between the period of organized response and a representative normal time period, and second, we have maintained that the official statistics, while not providing conclusive evidence, do suggest relevant substantive directions for future analysis.

The reader might well ask why the police response to the riot has been the focus of attention. It is argued that the police are the one major social control agency most likely to become involved in any riot and are therefore one of the principal components in the community's

response to the conditions created by riots. Further, while the analysis of police statistics is accompanied by a number of confounding factors, as noted in the third chapter, these data are important data for a number of reasons. First, they are quantified data. While riots have been extensively studied, most of the available data has been qualitative, and the more comprehensive studies have been essentially attempts to recreate the chronology of riots in the style of Ten Blocks from the White House or Rivers of Blood, Years of Darkness. We know that riots are accompanied by increases in arrests, but the utilization of official police statistics makes it possible to incorporate additional variables--such as time and location--into the analysis of this aspect of a riot situation. Second, police data are continuously collected, which allows the researcher to compare the riot data against non-riot data as done in this thesis. While other sources of riot data are extremely interesting, they often lack continuity of collection which makes the establishment of a benchmark impossible. Third, and perhaps most important, police statistics are available for any riot anywhere in the nation. The uniform crime reporting program used by police jurisdictions allows the researcher to compare the responses of the Washington police force to the responses of other police forces in other political jurisdictions. It is argued here that with the data simplifications and indicators suggested in this thesis and with the spatial and temporal organizing conceptualizations from the disaster model, comparative studies in police response to riots can be done between metropolitan areas. Although the interpretations must be carefully considered because of potential official biases, the availability, continuity, and comparability of these quantitative data



sources should not be underestimated--a point which requires major emphasis. In the area of collective behavior, where data rarely possesses the characteristics deemed most desirable by researchers, police statistics are an important source of systematically presented information.

In sum, it may be argued that the analysis of police statistics provide us with information which we did not know previously. This is to say that we can state when and where all different types of officially recorded criminality occurred. While many of the descriptive findings might appear as an exercise in the painful elaboration of the obvious, some findings appear unusual, for example the quantity of arrests made outside the areas of major and minor riot destruction, and therefore warrant further investigation.

Methodologically, there are a number of problems which require a certain amount of difficult rethinking. Since the disaster model dimensions have not been applied to the analysis of riots, the operational definitions of the time periods and the spatial zones are made more difficult. One can not utilize the operational definitions in other disaster studies because the nature of the "disaster"--in this case a riot--has not been so studied. Further, while the data are quantified, when one compares one criminal category to another criminal category, one can only assume a nominal level of measurement. With the substantive problem of association, the number of statistical measures available which can incorporate nominal data are minimal. Lambda was selected as the best, for reasons cited earlier, but one must realize that this statistic is a weak measure of association. This means that the lambda measure will underestimate the amount of true association in the data. Also it is argued that small numbers in any table will generate a lambda

value which, if interpreted, is without substantial meaning. Yet, more positively, we can say the data do permit the utilization of some statistical procedures which generate an additional level of information which has been hitherto unavailable to many students of riots.

In the review of the literature chapter, allusions were made to some of the other dimensions of the sociological disaster literature. While these dimensions have not been the specific focus of this thesis, we would like to argue that they appear to be relevant to the analysis of riots. Most definitions of disaster emphasize a cessation in the normal functioning of a social system--a disruption which is infrequent enough that this disruption and the reaction it engenders have not become incorporated into the normative structure of that system and which usually requires some measure of extra-community assistance before the social system can return to a state of normalcy. Students of disasters see these phenomena as events which happen and which then necessitate some kind of action on the part of the community. Therefore, the disaster literature concentrates attention upon the social system's response to the effects created by the disaster agent. More specifically, it directs attention toward the variety of actors and agencies which perform some kind of response to the disaster situation.

It is argued here that the disaster conceptualization is potentially valuable to the sociological student of riots, because it focuses attention on a variety of structures in the community which have hitherto been neglected, such as the agencies which provide "relief" functions for the victims of the riot, and which are operative during a riot. This means that the disaster approach incorporates into one systematic analysis seemingly disparate elements of the social system and moves

closer to a more sophisticated multivariate conceptualization of the situation. In other words, the disaster literature is not in contradiction with the previously mentioned causal interpretations of riots. Rather, it is supplemental to these conceptions in that it organizes one's perception of riots toward the nature of the reaction of the affected social system. This is a point which requires major emphasis.

In sum, because of the neglected aspects of riots as well as the complexity and variability of riots, a movement toward the conceptualization of riots as disasters would be useful and meaningful. Therefore, a more comprehensive view of riots may be attained by combining the disaster literature conceptualizations with the more well established causal interpretations already in the present riot literature. It is argued here that this approach to riots is a potentially fruitful direction for further research. It is further argued that this thesis is an initial exploratory effort in such a direction.



**APPENDIX A**

**NOTES**

Notes to the Preface

1. See Office of Civil Defense, Government of the District of Columbia, Operation Bandaid One: April 4 - April 12, 1968, p. 1.
2. See ibid., p. 3.
3. See Ben W. Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House: Anatomy of the Washington Riots of 1968 (New York, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 19.
4. See ibid., p. 27.
5. See Office of Civil Defense, Operation Bandaid One, p. 9.
6. See Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, p. 29.
7. See ibid., p. 41.
8. Ibid.
9. See ibid., pp. 46f.
10. See Government of the District of Columbia, Report on Civil Disturbances in Washington, D. C. April, 1968, Section on schools.
11. See Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, p. 55.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 81.
14. Ibid., pp. 71f.
15. See Government of the District of Columbia, Report on Civil Disturbances, Section on sanitation.
16. See Office of Civil Defense, Operation Bandaid One, p. 17.
17. See ibid., pp. 18f.
18. See Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, p. 88.
19. See Office of Civil Defense, Operation Bandaid One, p. 20.
20. See Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, p. 85.
21. See ibid., p. 86.

22. See R. D. Heinl, Jr., "Washington's Three Days of Burning," Fire Engineering (July, 1968), p. 40.

23. Ibid., p. 39.

24. See Office of Civil Defense, Operation Bandaid One, p. 26.

25. See Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, p. 89.

26. See ibid., p. 104.

27. See ibid., p. 96.

28. See Office of Civil Defense, Operation Bandaid One, pp. 28f.

29. See ibid., p. 30.

30. See ibid., p. 33.

31. See ibid., pp. 58f.

32. See ibid., p. 83.

33. See Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, pp. 83f.

34. See ibid., p. 84.

35. See U. S. Senate, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation of the Committee on Government Operations, Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders--Part 17 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 3174-3205.

36. See footnote number three in Chapter V for the distinction between real property and business establishment.

37. See U. S. Senate, Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, p. 3176.

38. See ibid., p. 3178.

39. See ibid., pp. 3178f.

40. See ibid., p. 3177.

41. See ibid.

42. See ibid., p. 3191.

43. See ibid.

44. See ibid., p. 3183.

45. Ibid., p. 3207.



46. See ibid., p. 3126.
47. See Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, p. 212.
48. See Office of Civil Defense, Operation Bandaid One, p. 102.
49. See Government of the District of Columbia, Report on Civil Disturbances, Section on the Department of Public Welfare.
50. See Joel T. Broyhill, "Praise of the Salvation Army in Washington, D. C. During the Recent Rioting Disorders," Congressional Record (Vol. 114, No. 87), Item E4471.
51. See National Red Cross, Red Cross News, Special issue on the activities of the first week of the riot.
52. See Interracial Council for Business Opportunity of Greater Washington, Report dated May 10, 1968 and an accompanying letter dated August 12, 1968.
53. See personal communique to Howard Gabennesch from Bertram L. Keys, Jr., Executive Secretary of the Montgomery County Commission on Human Relations dated July 23, 1968.
54. See Government of the District of Columbia, Report on Civil Disturbances, Section on Citizen Information Answering Service.
55. Ibid., Section on Department of Public Welfare.
56. See Office of Civil Defense, Operation Bandaid One, p. 79.
57. See ibid., p. 81.
58. See ibid., p. 85.
59. See personal communique to Howard Gabennesch from the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company dated August 7, 1968.
60. Letter of April 1, 1968, from Keven P. Charles of the Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia to Joseph F. Hennessey, Chairman of the Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia.
61. See William A. Dobrovir, Justice in Time of Crisis: A Staff Report to the District of Columbia Committee on the Administration of Justice Under Emergency Conditions (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 6.
62. See ibid., p. 7.
63. Ibid., pp. 10f.
64. See ibid., p. 15.

65. See ibid., p. 14.
66. See ibid., p. 16.
67. See ibid., p. 19.
68. See ibid., p. 21 et passim.
69. Ibid., p. 30.
70. See ibid., pp. 13f.
71. See ibid., p. 87.
72. See Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, p. 11.

#### Notes to Chapter I

1. See Clark McPhail, "Civil Disorder Participation: A Critical Examination of Recent Research," American Sociological Review, 36 (December, 1971), pp. 1058-73.

2. U. S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports--1970 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970).

#### Notes to Chapter II

1. See John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears, Frustration and Aggression (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1939).

2. See Leonard Berkowitz, "The Study of Urban Violence: Some Implications of Laboratory Studies of Frustration and Aggression," Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community, ed. Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1968), pp. 39-49. See also Ted Gurr, "Urban Disorder: Perspectives from the Comparative Study of Civil Strife," Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community, pp. 51-67.

3. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 61-72.

4. See James A. Geschwender and Benjamin D. Singer, "Deprivation and the Detroit Riot," Social Problems, 17 (Spring, 1970), pp. 457-63.

5. See Claude Brown, Manchild in the Promised Land (New York, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 7f.

6. See Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, "Racial Disturbances as Collective Behavior," Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community, pp. 121-30. See also Jeffery M. Paige, "Political Orientation and Riot Participation," American Sociological Review, 36 (October, 1971), pp. 810-20.

7. See Irving A. Spergel, "Youth Gangs and Urban Riots," Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community, pp. 143-56.

8. See Gustave LeBon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (New York, New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1960). See also Jules J. Wanderer, "1967 Riots: A Test of the Congruity of Events," Social Problems, 16 (Fall, 1968), pp. 193-98.

9. See Robert M. Fogelson, "White on Black: A Critique of the McCone Commission Report on the Los Angeles Riots," Political Science Quarterly, LXXXII (September, 1967), 337-67. See also Tom Parmenter, "Breakdown of Law and Order: A Firsthand Account in the Words of Detroit's Ghetto Dwellers," Trans-action, 4 (September, 1967), pp. 13-22. For critiques of this position, see also E. L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, "Property Norms and Looting: Their Patterns in Community Crises," Phylon, 31 (Summer, 1970), pp. 168-72. And Anthony Oberschall, "The Los Angeles Riot of August 1965," Social Problems, 15 (Winter, 1967), pp. 322-41. And David O. Sears and John B. McConahay, "Participation in the Los Angeles Riot," Social Problems, 17 (Summer, 1969), pp. 3-20. And Robert Blauner, "Whitewash Over Watts," Trans-action, 3 (March-April, 1966), pp. 3-9, 54.

10. See Lee Rainwater, "Open Letter on White Justice and the Riots," Trans-action, 4 (September, 1967), pp. 22-32. And Irving Louis Horowitz, "Comment: Black Sociology," Trans-action, 4 (September, 1967), pp. 7f.

11. See Marilyn Gittell and Sherman Krupp, "A Model of Discriminations and Tensions," Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community, pp. 69-83. See also James H. Laue, "Power, Conflict, and Social Change," Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community, pp. 85-96.

12. See Seymour Spilerman, "The Causes of Racial Disturbances: A Comparison of Alternative Explanations," American Sociological Review, 35 (August, 1970), pp. 627-49.

13. Ibid., p. 645.

14. Ibid.

15. See Clark McPhail, "Civil Disorder Participation: A Critical Examination of Recent Research," American Sociological Review, 36 (December, 1971), pp. 1058-73.

16. Ibid., p. 1064.



17. Albert K. Cohen, "The Sociology of the Deviant Act: Anomie Theory and Beyond," American Sociological Review, 30 (February, 1965) p. 9.

18. Allen D. Grimshaw, "Three Views of Urban Violence: Civil Disturbance, Racial Revolt, Class Assault," Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community, p. 117.

19. Lee Rainwater, "Open Letter on White Justice and the Riots," Trans-action, p. 26.

20. E. L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, "Property Norms and Looting: Their Patterns in Community Crises," Phylon, p. 182.

21. See Clark McPhail, "Civil Disorder Participation: A Critical Examination of Recent Research," pp. 1059f.

22. See ibid., p. 1068.

23. Ibid., pp. 1068f.

24. See ibid., pp. 1070f.

25. Ibid., p. 1071.

26. Ibid., p. 1070.

27. See Nicholas J. Demerath and Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Introduction to Human Adaptation to Disaster," Human Organization, 16 (Summer, 1957), pp. 1f; Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 39; Hoyt Lemons, "Physical Characteristics of Disasters: Historical and Statistical Review," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 309 (January, 1957), p. 2; Charles E. Fritz, "Disaster," Contemporary Social Problems, ed. Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet (New York, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), p. 655; Charles E. Fritz, "Disasters," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, ed. David L. Sills (New York, New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), 202-207; Lewis M. Killian, An Introduction to Methodological Problems of Field Studies in Disasters, Committee on Disaster Studies Report, No. 8 (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences--National Research Council, 1956), pp. 1f; James D. Thompson and Robert W. Hawkes, "Disaster, Community Organization, and Administrative Process," Man and Society in Disaster, ed. George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman (New York, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962), p. 268; Gideon Sjöberg, "Disasters and Social Change," Man and Society in Disaster, p. 357; Dwight W. Chapman, "Dimensions of Models in Disaster Behavior," Man and Society in Disaster, p. 319; Ira H. Cisin with Walter B. Clark, "The Methodological Challenge of Disaster Research," Man and Society in Disaster, p. 30; and Aleta Brownlee, "Disaster and Disaster Relief," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 5, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), 161.

28. See Charles E. Fritz, "Disasters," Contemporary Social Problems, p. 656; and Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations, pp. 40f.
29. See Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations, p. 67; and Charles E. Fritz, "Disaster," Contemporary Social Problems, pp. 677f.
30. See E. L. Quarantelli, "The Nature and Conditions of Panic," The American Journal of Sociology, LX (November, 1954), 267-75; Charles E. Fritz, "Disasters Compared in Six American Communities," Human Organization, 16 (Summer, 1957), pp. 6-9; and Charles E. Fritz and Harry B. Williams, "The Human Being in Disasters: A Research Perspective," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 309 (January, 1957), p. 45.
31. See Charles E. Fritz and J. H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem of Social Control, Committee on Disaster Studies Report, No. 9 (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences--National Research Council, 1957).
32. See Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations, pp. 163-79.
33. See Lewis M. Killian, An Introduction to Methodological Problems of Field Studies in Disasters, pp. 5f; and Anthony F. C. Wallace, Human Behavior in Extreme Situations: A Survey of the Literature and Suggestions for Further Research. Committee on Disaster Studies Report, No. 1 (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences--National Research Council, 1956).
34. See Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1970).
35. Lewis M. Killian, An Introduction to Methodological Problems of Field Studies in Disasters, p. 2.
36. See ibid., p. 3.
37. See Charles E. Fritz, "Disasters," Contemporary Social Problems, pp. 658-63.
38. See ibid., p. 657.
39. See Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations, p. 49.
40. See Ben W. Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House: Anatomy of the Washington Riots of 1968 (New York, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 11.

41. See unpublished letter of April 1, 1968, from Keven P. Charles of the Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia to Joseph F. Hennessey, Chairman of the Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia.

42. See, for example, Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, New York: The Free Press, 1962).

43. See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 47.

44. See ibid., p. 33.

45. See Robert Conot, Rivers of Blood, Years of Darkness (New York, New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1967), pp. 7ff.

46. See Lewis M. Killian, An Introduction to Methodological Problems of Field Studies in Disasters, p. 3.

47. See Anthony F. C. Wallace, Human Behavior in Extreme Situations: A Survey of the Literature and Suggestions for Further Research, pp. 18f.

48. See Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1970), pp. 136-49.

49. Ibid., p. 141.

### Notes to Chapter III

1. Each of these three records contains additional variables which are not mentioned here as they have not been utilized in this analysis.

2. Very infrequently, one finds an "unfounded" classification on this record. For example, in fiscal year 1968, 1383 of the 59,380 offenses or 2.3 per cent were false or baseless reports. See Annual Report of the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C., Fiscal Year: 1968, p. 20. Even in these cases, the police respond until they find the report false.

3. This information was presented by Sgt. Fralin of the Data Processing Division of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, who was the chief programmer working on the offense record at the time the data were secured by the author.



4. See Donald R. Cressey, "Crime," Contemporary Social Problems, 2nd edition, ed. Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet (New York, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), pp. 141-45. This section relies heavily upon this article.

5. See John I. Kitsuse and Aaron V. Cicourel, "A Note on the Uses of Official Statistics," Social Problems, 11 (Fall, 1963), pp. 131-39.

6. Ibid., p. 133.

7. See ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 135.

10. See Report on Civil Disturbances in Washington, D. C. April, 1968, Section on health.

11. See District of Columbia Code: Annotated, 1967 Edition (Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

12. This information was presented by Sgt. Fralin and Mrs. Taylor of the Data Processing Division of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, who, respectively, were the chief programmers of the offense and arrest records at the time these records were secured by the author.

13. See Codes of Offenses prepared by the Office of Crime Analysis.

14. In the previous paragraph, only 30 general categories were indicated. The discrepancy is a minor point and explained on page 39.

15. The reason for placing robbery in this category will be discussed in the succeeding pages of this chapter.

16. See District of Columbia Code: Annotated, 1967 Edition (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967) Vol. II, Title 22, Chap. 29, Section 22-2901, 1189.

17. The latter was a single typewritten sheet of paper with no title and some of the typed figures were scratched out and replaced by hand written data. While the summary statistics reported for the normal and riot periods wash out this discrepancy, it is herein noted for the reader's evaluation.

18. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Crime in the United States," Uniform Crime Reports--1970 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 21.

19. See Office of Civil Defense, Government of the District of Columbia, Operation Bandid One: April 4 - April 12, 1968, p. 1.

20. See ibid., p. 3.
21. See Ben W. Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House: Anatomy of the Washington Riots of 1968, p. 19.
22. See ibid., p. 27.
23. See Office of Civil Defense, Operation Bandaid One, p. 9.
24. See Ben W. Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House: Anatomy of the Washington Riots of 1968, p. 29.
25. See J. Edgar Hoover, "Crime in the United States," Uniform Crime Reports--1970, pp. 26f.
26. See ibid., pp. 48f.
27. See ibid., p. 50.
28. See Annual Report of the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C., 1968, p. 25.
29. See ibid., p. 27.
30. See ibid., pp. 28-31.
31. See ibid., pp. 42-5.
32. Elmer Hubert Johnson, Crime, Correction, and Society, Revised Edition (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 45.
33. See National Capital Planning Commission, Civil Disturbances in Washington, D. C. April 4-8, 1968: A Preliminary Damage Report, May, 1968, p. 5.
34. See Report on Civil Disturbances in Washington, D. C. April, 1968.
35. See the Street Address Map of Washington, D. C. by Robert E. LaRue which is for sale from the above mentioned at P. O. Box 182, Silver Spring, Maryland 20907. These maps are used by the Washington Metropolitan real estate brokers and similar maps are available for Montgomery County and Prince George's County.

36. We must digress to indicate and explain the major difficulties with the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department official statistics with respect to the locational data. Very few of the items on the offense record are without locational specification. But this is not true of the arrest data. While some of the locational omissions are due to the arrest addresses simply not being reported, a certain number of "locations" had to be classified as "miscoded," since the addresses reported could not possibly be where they were listed.

For example, the arrest data employs a ten digit numerical code for the location of the arrest. The first digit indicates the quadrant of Washington: NW, NE, SE, or SW. The last digit indicates location at an intersection, location within the block, location unknown, or out of town location. If the final digit indicates an intersection, the remaining eight digits refer to two streets. If the final digit indicates a locality within the block, the first four digits of the remaining eight identify the street and the second four digits identify the house number on that street. One of the possible miscoding errors would be a locality designation indicating an intersection and two streets which run parallel to one another. Since this researcher can not presume which part of the ten digit code was in error, any error, even the slightest difficulty in interpretation, was classified as miscoded and subsequently dropped.

37. William L. Hays, Statistics for Psychologists (New York, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 610.

38. See ibid., pp. 596f.

39. Ibid., p. 613.

40. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 232.

41. William L. Hays, Statistics for Psychologists, p. 603.

42. Ibid., p. 610.

43. Ibid., p. 614.

44. See Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 49 (December, 1954), pp. 735-45.

#### Notes to Chapter IV

1. While a systematic analysis of the items possessing no locational information is still to be performed, a hurried spot check indicated no serious pattern in the data. In other words, some lost items were serious crimes, while other lost items were less heinous violations.



2. Remember that the total number of offenses reported for crimes against persons within the corridor areas was very small. Hence, the 58.4 per cent proportional reduction must be interpreted with caution.

3. See appendix D.

4. See William A. Dobrovir, Justice in Time of Crisis: A Staff Report to the District of Columbia Committee on the Administration of Justice Under Emergency Conditions (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 9 and 14.

5. See the earlier section of this chapter which discusses the offense and fire data hypothesis.

#### Notes to Chapter V

1. The reader is reminded that for the reasons cited in the results chapter, some lambda values were disregarded in the analysis of this and the two subsequent hypotheses.

2. This analysis was done by the author but is not reported herein in detail, because, first, it is not part of the defined problematic, and second, it was done with less methodological rigor and less detail.

3. "Real property" is legally defined as ". . . land, and generally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land." See Henry Campbell Black, M.A., Black's Law Dictionary: Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern, Revised Fourth Edition (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1968), p. 1383. See also definition of "fixture," *ibid.*, p. 766. According to Black, the term "business" has no definite or precise legal meaning (see *ibid.*, p. 248). Therefore, a certain degree of assumption is necessary here. For the purposes of the survey, it would appear that real property referred to the land, building, parking lot, sidewalk, and similar kinds of materials which are the property of the lessor in a lessor-lessee relationship. Business establishment referred to the inventories (merchandise) and movable appurtenances (cash registers, display counters, for example) which the businessman (lessee) uses for his economic livelihood apart from the building itself. Such a distinction, however, would not be legally as distinct as assumed above.

4. See "Summary of Purposes, Methodology and Limitations, and Major Findings of the Washington Civil Disorder Survey," Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders--Part 17, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Government Operations United States Senate, May 27 and 28, 1969 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 3174-95.

5. See Table 49.

6. Some of these ideas were suggested to this researcher by a former member of the Baltimore City police force.

7. From personal communication with Capt. Miller of the Operations Research and Planning Division of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department.

APPENDIX B

TABLES

Table 1. The General Code<sup>1</sup> and Description of that Code for Arrests and Offenses Recorded by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department.

Code	Category	Code	Category
0100	Homicide	1800	Narcotics and Drugs
0200	Rape	1900	Gambling
0300	Robbery	2000	Family and Children
0400	Aggravated Assault	2100	Intoxicated Driving
0500	Burglary-House Breaking	2200	Liquor Laws
0600	Larceny <sup>2</sup>	2300	Drunkenness
0700	Auto Theft	2400	Disorderly Conduct <sup>3</sup>
0800	Other Assaults	2500	Vagrancy
0900	Arson	2600	Other
1000	Forgery and Counterfeiting	2700	Suspicion
1100	Fraud	3300	Traffic <sup>4</sup>
1200	Embezzlement	3500	Other Traffic <sup>4</sup>
1300	Stolen Property	3800	Equipment Violations <sup>5</sup>
1400	Vandalism	3000	Unknown <sup>6</sup>
1500	Weapons	3100	Unknown <sup>6</sup>
1600	Prostitution and Vice	3400	Unknown <sup>6</sup>
1700	Sex Offenses	2649	False Fire Alarm <sup>7</sup>

1. While it is irrelevant to this research, the reader should note that these codes represent the adoption of a standardized identification system of crime classification for the United States as a whole. This system of reporting crimes will greatly facilitate comparative criminological research among different law enforcement jurisdictions. See J. Edgar Hoover, Director, "Crime in the United States," Uniform Crime Reports—1970 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 61f.
2. This category also includes thefts from a motor vehicle.
3. During the riot, curfew violations were categorized as disorderly conduct violations by the police.
4. Two series of codes are necessary here for the large number of moving violations. Note also that no non-moving violations appear in this information.
5. These are violations of malfunctioning appurtenances relative to motor vehicles; i. e., break failure, no turn signal.
6. The arrest record indicates the codes 3000, 3100, and 3400. Since there are only three cases of codes 3000 and 3100, these might very well be coding errors. However, there were 73 arrests for code 3400, which has been classified as unknown, since no such code appears in the police system of classification.
7. The only specific code used in the riot analysis herein is 2649. The number of false fire alarms has been subtracted from the remaining violations in the 2600 series.



Table 2. Number of Disorderly Conduct<sup>1</sup> and Curfew Violations<sup>2</sup> During the April, 1968, Riot in Washington, D. C. by Date.

Date	Disorderly Conduct	Curfew
April 5	483	253
6	1232	1116
7	1132	1024
8	712	781
9	468	470
10	177	165
11	209	164
12 <sup>3</sup>	88	76

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.
2. Data from an unpublished informal handout of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, no date.
3. Curfew against free movement of civilian personnel was lifted on April 12th, 1968. Regulations governing the sale of alcoholic beverages and firearms, however, were still in effect.

Table 3. Percentage of Offenses by General Category and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

General Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Persons	26.4 (97)	7.2 (55)	-19.2	152
Property	44.7 (164)	32.9 (250)	-11.8	414
Traffic	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Crimes Without Victims	0.5 (2)	0.7 (5)	0.2	7
Fires <sup>2</sup>	25.1 (92)	58.8 (447)	33.7	539
Miscellaneous	3.3 (12)	0.4 (3)	-2.9	15
Total	100.0 (367)	100.0 (760)		1127

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

2. Data from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log.

Lambda = 0.1288

Table 4. Percentage of Offenses by Collapsed Category of Crimes  
Against Persons and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Potential Threat of Bodily Harm	3.1 (3)	30.9 (17)	27.8	20
Threat of Bodily Harm	62.9 (61)	25.5 (14)	-37.4	75
Actual Bodily Harm	34.0 (33)	43.6 (24)	9.6	57
Total	100.0 (97)	100.0 (55)		152

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department  
Offense Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.1818



Table 5. Percentage of Offenses by Category of Crimes Against Property and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Burglary-House Breaking	40.9 (67)	73.6 (184)	32.7	251
Larceny	38.4 (63)	6.0 (15)	-32.4	78
Auto Theft	16.5 (27)	12.8 (32)	-3.7	59
Stolen Property	0.6 (1)	5.2 (13)	4.6	14
Vandalism	3.7 (6)	2.4 (6)	-1.3	12
Total	100.1 (164)	100.0 (250)		414

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.1468

Table 6. Percentage of Offenses by Collapsed Category of Crimes  
Without Victims and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Non-Riot Related	100.0 (2)	100.0 (5)	----	7
Drunkenness	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Disorderly Conduct and Curfew <sup>2</sup>	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Total	100.0 (2)	100.0 (5)		7

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department  
Offense Record, 1968.

2. Riot time period will contain curfew offenses classified as dis-  
orderly conduct violations by the police.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 7. Percentage of Offenses by Category of Crimes Related to Fire and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
False Fire Alarm	13.0 (12)	2.2 (10)	-10.8	22
Fires <sup>2</sup>	85.9 (79)	96.2 (430)	10.3	509
Arson	1.1 (1)	1.6 (7)	0.5	8
Total	100.0 (92)	100.0 (447)		539

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

2. Data from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0164



Table 8. Percentage of Offenses by Collapsed Category of Miscellaneous Crimes and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Fraud	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Liquor Laws	50.0 (6)	---- (0)	-50.0	6
Varied	50.0 (6)	100.0 (3)	50.0	9
Unknown	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Total	100.0 (12)	100.0 (3)		15

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 9. Percentage of Offenses by General Category and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

General Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Persons	23.1 (31)	9.6 (16)	-13.5	47
Property	28.4 (38)	31.3 (52)	2.9	90
Traffic	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Crimes Without Victims	---- (0)	6.0 (10)	6.0	10
Fires <sup>2</sup>	48.5 (65)	52.4 (87)	3.9	152
Miscellaneous	---- (0)	0.6 (1)	0.6	1
Total	100.0 (134)	99.9 (166)		300

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

2. Data from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0532

Table 10. Percentage of Offenses by Collapsed Category of Crimes Against Persons and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Potential Threat of Bodily Harm	6.5 (2)	50.0 (8)	43.5	10
Threat of Bodily Harm	64.5 (20)	6.2 (1)	-58.3	21
Actual Bodily Harm	29.0 (9)	43.8 (7)	14.8	16
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (16)		47

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

$\Lambda = 0.3095$



Table 11. Percentage of Offenses by Category of Crimes Against Property and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Burglary-House Breaking	42.1 (16)	75.0 (39)	32.9	55
Larceny	28.9 (11)	11.5 (6)	-17.4	17
Auto Theft	15.8 (6)	7.7 (4)	-8.1	10
Stolen Property	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Vandalism	13.2 (5)	5.8 (3)	-7.4	8
Total	100.0 (38)	100.0 (52)		90

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.1233

Table 12. Percentage of Offenses by Collapsed Category of Crimes Without Victims and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Non-Riot Related	---- (0)	100.0 (10)	100.0	10
Drunkenness	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Disorderly Conduct and Curfew <sup>2</sup>	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Total	---- (0)	100.0 (10)		10

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

2. Riot time period will contain curfew offenses classified as disorderly conduct violations by the police.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 13. Percentage of Offenses by Category of Crimes Related to Fire and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
False Fire Alarm	29.2 (19)	3.4 (3)	-25.8	22
Fires <sup>2</sup>	70.8 (46)	87.4 (76)	16.6	122
Arson	---- (0)	9.2 (8)	9.2	8
Total	100.0 (65)	100.0 (87)		152

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

2. Data from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log, 1968.

Lambda = 0.1684



Table 14. Percentage of Offenses by Collapsed Category of Miscellaneous Crimes and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Fraud	---- (0)	100.0 (1)	100.0	1
Liquor Laws	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Varied	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Unknown	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Total	---- (0)	100.0 (1)		1

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 15. Percentage of Offenses by General Category and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

General Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Persons	15.1 (258)	9.0 (159)	-6.1	417
Property	38.6 (661)	36.2 (637)	-2.4	1298
Traffic	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Crimes Without Victims	0.7 (12)	0.5 (9)	-0.2	21
Fires <sup>2</sup>	43.1 (737)	53.0 (932)	9.9	1669
Miscellaneous	2.5 (43)	1.3 (22)	-1.2	65
Total	100.0 (1711)	100.0 (1759)		3470

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

2. Data from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0419

Table 16. Percentage of Offenses by Collapsed Category of Crimes Against Persons and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Potential Threat of Bodily Harm	2.7 (7)	35.8 (57)	33.1	64
Threat of Bodily Harm	57.4 (148)	29.6 (47)	-27.8	195
Actual Bodily Harm	39.9 (103)	34.6 (55)	-5.3	158
Total	100.0 (258)	100.0 (159)		417

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

$\Lambda = 0.1575$

Table 17. Percentage of Offenses by Category of Crimes Against Property and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Burglary-House Breaking	37.4 (247)	56.2 (358)	18.8	605
Larceny	35.1 (232)	15.2 (97)	-19.9	329
Auto Theft	21.3 (141)	21.0 (134)	-0.3	275
Stolen Property	0.2 (1)	3.0 (19)	2.8	20
Vandalism	6.1 (40)	4.6 (29)	-1.5	69
Total	100.1 (661)	100.0 (637)		1298

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0970.



Table 18. Percentage of Offenses by Collapsed Category of Crimes Without Victims and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Non-Riot Related	100.0 (12)	100.0 (9)	----	21
Drunkenness	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Disorderly Conduct and Curfew <sup>2</sup>	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Total	100.0 (12)	100.0 (9)		21

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

2. Riot time period will contain curfew offenses classified as disorderly conduct violations by the police.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 19. Percentage of Offenses by Category of Crimes Related to Fire and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
False Fire Alarm	13.8 (102)	8.8 (82)	-5.0	184
Fires <sup>2</sup>	86.0 (634)	89.6 (835)	3.6	1469
Arson	0.1 (1)	1.6 (15)	1.5	16
Total	99.9 (737)	100.0 (932)		1669

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

2. Data from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0213

Table 20. Percentage of Offenses by Collapsed Category of Miscellaneous Crimes and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Fraud	27.9 (12)	54.5 (12)	26.6	24
Liquor Laws	23.3 (10)	18.2 (4)	-5.1	14
Varied	48.8 (21)	27.3 (6)	-21.5	27
Unknown	----- (0)	----- (0)	-----	---
Total	100.0 (43)	100.0 (22)		65

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.1000

Table 21. Lambda Values for the Offense Data by General Category and Collapsed Subcategory and by Spatial Area.

Category/Spatial Area	Riot	Corridor	Non-Riot
General	0.1288	0.0532	0.0419
Crimes Against Persons	0.1818	0.3095	0.1575
Crimes Against Property	0.1468	0.1233	0.0970
Traffic Violations <sup>1</sup>	-----	-----	-----
Crimes Without Victims <sup>2</sup>	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Fire-Related Items	0.0164	0.1684	0.0213
Miscellaneous Crimes <sup>2</sup>	0.0000	0.0000	0.1000

1. No violations reported in this category in any spatial area during either time period.

2. Small numbers of violations reported in this category.



Table 22. Percentage of Arrests by General Category of Violation and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

General Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Persons	5.4 (25)	1.9 (33)	-3.5	58
Property	8.3 (38)	17.6 (301)	9.3	339
Traffic	47.1 (216)	5.1 (88)	-42.0	304
Crimes Without Victims	35.5 (163)	74.7 (1278)	39.2	1441
Fires	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Miscellaneous	3.7 (17)	0.6 (10)	-3.1	27
Total	100.0 (459)	99.9 (1710)		2169

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.1584

Table 23. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Crimes  
Against Persons and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Potential Threat of Bodily Harm	16.0 (4)	54.5 (18)	38.5	22
Threat of Bodily Harm	32.0 (8)	18.2 (6)	-13.8	14
Actual Bodily Harm	52.0 (13)	27.3 (9)	-24.7	22
Total	100.0 (25)	100.0 (33)		58

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department  
Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.2459

Table 24. Percentage of Arrests by Category of Crimes Against Property and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Burglary-House Breaking	28.9 (11)	85.0 (256)	56.1	267
Larceny	60.5 (23)	1.0 (3)	-59.5	26
Auto Theft	2.6 (1)	0.7 (2)	-1.9	3
Stolen Property	---- (0)	7.0 (21)	7.0	21
Vandalism	7.9 (3)	6.3 (19)	-1.6	22
Total	99.9 (38)	100.0 (301)		339

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.2909

Table 25. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Traffic Violations and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Moving Violations	93.5 (202)	94.3 (83)	0.8	285
Equipment Violations	6.5 (14)	5.7 (5)	-0.8	19
Total	100.0 (216)	100.0 (88)		304

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

$\Lambda = 0.0000$



Table 26. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Crimes Without Victims and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Non-Riot Related	6.7 (11)	0.5 (6)	-6.2	17
Drunkenness	66.9 (109)	10.0 (128)	-56.9	237
Disorderly Conduct and Curfew <sup>2</sup>	26.4 (43)	89.5 (1144)	63.1	1187
Total	100.0 (163)	100.0 (1278)		1441

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

2. Riot time period will contain curfew arrests classified as disorderly conduct violations by the police.

$\Lambda = 0.1703$

Table 27. Percentage of Arrests by Category of Crimes Related to Fire and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
False Fire Alarm	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Arson	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Total	---- (0)	---- (0)		---

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 28. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Miscellaneous Crimes and by Time Period for Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Fraud	5.9 (1)	---- (0)	-5.9	1
Liquor Laws	29.4 (5)	10.0 (1)	-19.4	6
Varied	35.3 (6)	70.0 (7)	34.7	13
Unknown	29.4 (5)	20.0 (2)	-9.4	7
Total	100.0 (17)	100.0 (10)		27

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0417

Table 29. Percentage of Arrests by General Category of Violation and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

General Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Persons	3.4 (3)	2.2 (10)	-1.2	13
Property	1.1 (1)	17.6 (82)	16.5	83
Traffic	71.6 (63)	9.0 (42)	-62.6	105
Crimes Without Victims	18.2 (16)	70.1 (326)	51.9	342
Fires	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Miscellaneous	5.7 (5)	1.1 (5)	-4.6	10
Total	100.0 (88)	100.0 (465)		553

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.2274



Table 30. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Crimes Against Persons and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Potential Threat of Bodily Harm	---- (0)	70.0 (7)	70.0	7
Threat of Bodily Harm	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Actual Bodily Harm	100.0 (3)	30.0 (3)	-70.0	6
Total	100.0 (3)	100.0 (10)		13

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.3333

Table 31. Percentage of Arrests by Category of Crimes Against Property and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Burglary-House Breaking	100.0 (1)	87.8 (72)	-12.2	73
Larceny	---- (0)	6.1 (5)	6.1	5
Auto Theft	---- (0)	3.7 (3)	3.7	3
Stolen Property	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Vandalism	---- (0)	2.4 (2)	2.4	2
Total	100.0 (1)	100.0 (82)		83

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 32. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Traffic Violations and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Moving Violations	96.8 (61)	97.6 (41)	0.8	102
Equipment Violations	3.2 (2)	2.4 (1)	-0.8	3
Total	100.0 (63)	100.0 (42)		105

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 33. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Crimes Without Victims and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Non-Riot Related	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Drunkenness	56.2 (9)	5.8 (19)	-50.4	28
Disorderly Conduct and Curfew <sup>2</sup>	43.8 (7)	94.2 (307)	50.4	314
Total	100.0 (16)	100.0 (326)		342

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

2. Riot time period will contain curfew arrests classified as disorderly conduct violations by the police.

Lambda = 0.0455



Table 34. Percentage of Arrests by Category of Crimes Related to Fires and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
False Fire Alarm	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Arson	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Total	---- (0)	---- (0)		---

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 35. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Miscellaneous Crimes and by Time Period for Corridor Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Fraud	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Liquor Laws	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Varied	100.0 (5)	60.0 (3)	-40.0	8
Unknown	---- (0)	40.0 (2)	40.0	2
Total	100.0 (5)	100.0 (5)		10

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.2857

Table 36. Percentage of Arrests by General Category of Violation and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

General Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Persons	4.6 (123)	3.4 (113)	-1.2	236
Property	4.2 (112)	15.1 (503)	10.9	615
Traffic	69.5 (1846)	15.2 (505)	-54.3	2351
Crimes Without Victims	17.2 (456)	63.9 (2127)	46.7	2583
Fires	---- (0)	0.1 (3)	0.1	3
Miscellaneous	4.5 (119)	2.3 (77)	-2.2	196
Total	100.0 (2656)	100.0 (3328)		5984

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.4595

Table 37. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Crimes Against Persons and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Potential Threat of Bodily Harm	26.0 (32)	54.0 (61)	28.0	93
Threat of Bodily Harm	13.0 (16)	12.4 (14)	-0.6	30
Actual Bodily Harm	61.0 (75)	33.6 (38)	-27.4	113
Total	100.0 (123)	100.0 (113)		236

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

$\Lambda = 0.2203$



Table 38. Percentage of Arrests by Category of Crimes Against Property and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Burglary-House Breaking	36.6 (41)	82.5 (415)	45.9	456
Larceny	34.8 (39)	3.2 (16)	-31.6	55
Auto Theft	10.7 (12)	5.0 (25)	-5.7	37
Stolen Property	---- (0)	5.8 (29)	5.8	29
Vandalism	17.9 (20)	3.6 (18)	-14.3	38
Total	100.0 (112)	100.1 (503)		615

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0923

Table 39. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Traffic Violations and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Moving Violations	95.6 (1765)	93.7 (473)	-1.9	2238
Equipment Violations	4.4 (81)	6.3 (32)	1.9	113
Total	100.0 (1846)	100.0 (505)		2351

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 40. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Crimes Without Victims and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Non-Riot Related	4.4 (20)	0.7 (15)	-3.7	35
Drunkenness	71.3 (325)	11.5 (245)	-59.8	570
Disorderly Conduct and Curfew <sup>2</sup>	24.3 (111)	87.8 (1867)	63.5	1978
Total	100.0 (456)	100.0 (2127)		2583

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

2. Riot time period will contain curfew arrests classified as disorderly conduct violations by the police.

Lambda = 0.2818

Table 41. Percentage of Arrests by Category of Crimes Related to Fires and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
False Fire Alarm	---- (0)	---- (0)	----	---
Arson	---- (0)	100.0 (3)	100.0	3
Total	---- (0)	100.0 (3)		3

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0000



Table 42. Percentage of Arrests by Collapsed Category of Miscellaneous Crimes and by Time Period for Non-Riot Area Locations.<sup>1</sup>

Collapsed Category/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Fraud	6.7 (8)	1.3 (1)	-5.4	9
Liquor Laws	3.4 (4)	3.9 (3)	0.5	7
Varied	65.5 (78)	61.0 (47)	-4.5	125
Unknown	24.4 (29)	33.8 (26)	9.4	55
Total	100.0 (119)	100.0 (77)		196

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 43. Lambda Values for the Arrest Data by General Category and Collapsed Subcategory and by Spatial Area.

Category/Spatial Area	Riot	Corridor	Non-Riot
General	0.1584	0.2274	0.4595
Crimes Against Persons	0.2459	0.3333	0.2203
Crimes Against Property	0.2909	0.0000	0.0923
Traffic Violations	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Crimes Without Victims	0.1703	0.0455	0.2818
Fire-Related Crimes <sup>1</sup>	-----	-----	-----
Miscellaneous Crimes	0.0417	0.2857	0.0000

1. The only three items in this entire category were arrests made in the non-riot areas during the riot period.

Table 44. Percentage of Offenses Reported to the Police<sup>1</sup> by Time Period and by Locational Area.<sup>2</sup>

Area/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Riot Areas	16.6 (367)	28.3 (760)	11.7	1127
Corridor Areas	6.1 (134)	6.2 (166)	0.1	300
Non-Riot Areas	77.4 (1711)	65.5 (1759)	-11.9	3470
Total	100.1 (2212)	100.0 (2685)		4897

1. Part of these counts were taken from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log, 1968.

2. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968 and contains only those items for which locational information was available.

Lambda = 0.0000

Table 45. Percentage of Arrests Made by the Police by Time Period and by Locational Area.<sup>1</sup>

Area/Time	Per Cent Normal	Per Cent Riot	% Riot - % Normal	Total Number
Riot Areas	14.3 (459)	31.1 (1710)	16.8	2169
Corridor Areas	2.7 (88)	8.4 (465)	5.7	553
Non-Riot Areas	82.9 (2656)	60.5 (3328)	-22.4	5984
Total	99.9 (3203)	100.0 (5503)		8706

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968 and contains only those items for which locational information was available.

Lambda = 0.0000



Table 46. Total Number of Offenses by Category of Violation and by Date for the Normal Time Period.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Date	3-29	3-30	3-31	4-1	4-2	4-3	4-4	3-29	Total
Homicide	1	1			1	1		1	5
Rape		1	3	2	1		1		8
Robbery	32	48	23	33	29	32	41	32	270
Aggravated Assault	14	15	15	12	3	13	8	14	94
Burglary-House Breaking	47	44	40	53	40	58	68	47	397
Larceny	59	61	31	54	33	40	47	59	384
Auto Theft	25	34	25	14	18	24	36	25	201
Other Assaults	6	14	7	7	3	6	10	6	59
Arson		1					1		2
Forgery et al				1			1		2
Fraud	1	1	1			1	2	1	7
Embezzlement					3				3
Stolen Property		1				1	1		3
Vandalism	5	8	16	6	9	3	12	5	64
Weapons	3		2	2		4	2	3	16
Prostitution and Vice									
Sex Offenses	3				1	2	1	3	10
Narcotics and Drugs		4		1			4		9
Gambling	1		1	4			6	1	13
Family and Children									
Intoxicated Driving					1				1
Liquor Laws	2		10				2	2	16
Drunkenness									
Disorderly Conduct									
Vagrancy				2	1				3
Other <sup>2</sup>	1	4	1	10	3	6	3	1	29
Suspicion							5		5
Traffic									
Other Traffic									
Equipment Violations									
False Fire Alarm	26	33	26	22	17	14	27	26	191
Fires <sup>3</sup>	106	138	100	79	92	59	79	106	759
Total (without fires)	226	270	201	223	163	205	278	226	1792
Total (with fires)	332	408	301	302	255	264	357	332	2551

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.
2. This category contains all offenses classified by the police as "other" with the exception of "false fire alarm" which has been treated separately.
3. Data from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log, 1968.

Table 47. Total Number of Offenses by Category of Violation and by Date for the Riot Time Period.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Date	4-5	4-6	4-7	4-8	4-9	4-10	4-11	4-12	Total
Homicide	5	2		2		1			10
Rape			1	1			3		5
Robbery	32	13	3	3	2	3	9	11	76
Aggravated Assault	5	12	6	9	5		7	5	49
Burglary-House Breaking	367	138	40	24	21	35	21	33	679
Larceny	36	7	4	7	10	21	15	46	146
Auto Theft	74	32	22	11	19	24	28	26	236
Other Assaults	14	6	4	5	3	3	9	3	47
Arson	12	10	3			4	1	2	32
Forgery et al	1	2	1						4
Fraud	2					1	8	1	12
Embezzlement	1								1
Stolen Property	20	14	4		3			4	45
Vandalism	24	1	7	4	4	3	2	5	50
Weapons	16	30	21	10	5	9	1	7	99
Prostitution and Vice							1		1
Sex Offenses							2	1	3
Narcotics and Drugs	1	3	3	4	10	2	1		24
Gambling			1						1
Family and Children									
Intoxicated Driving									
Liquor Laws				1	1			2	4
Drunkenness									
Disorderly Conduct <sup>2</sup>									
Vagrancy									
Other <sup>3</sup>	3	1	1	2	1	1	3		12
Suspicion	7					6		1	14
Traffic									
Other Traffic									
Equipment Violations									
False Fire Alarm	9	2	5	25	21	21	27	29	139
Fires <sup>4</sup>	194	352	197	121	117	123	114	123	1341
Total (without fires)	629	273	126	108	105	134	138	176	1689
Total (with fires)	823	625	323	229	222	257	252	299	3030

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

2. Also includes curfew violations classified as disorderly conducts.

3. This category contains all offenses classified by the police as "Other" with the exception of "false fire alarms" which have been treated separately.

4. Data from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log, 1968.

Table 48. Total Number of Arrests by Category of Violation and by Date for the Normal Time Period.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Date	3-29	3-30	3-31	4-1	4-2	4-3	4-4	3-29	Total
Homicide		1		1	1				3
Rape		1	2	2	4				9
Robbery	2	7	3	2	3	5	4	2	28
Aggravated Assault	3	5	6	10	10	18	5	3	60
Burglary-House Breaking	3	9	8	12	7	17	17	3	76
Larceny	6	14	3	13	9	29	8	6	88
Auto Theft		1	4	1	1	3	7		17
Other Assaults	6	6	3	5	9	1	6	6	42
Arson									
Forgery et al	1			1			1	1	4
Fraud	1		1	6	1		1	1	11
Embezzlement					1	1			2
Stolen Property	1			1		2		1	5
Vandalism	2	5	5	4	6	3	5	2	32
Weapons	6	3	4	9	4	8	7	6	47
Prostitution and Vice									
Sex Offenses	1	1					1	1	4
Narcotics and Drugs		9	1	1		6	9		26
Gambling	4				2	3	7	4	20
Family and Children					1				1
Intoxicated Driving		5	2	1	1	1	1		11
Liquor Laws	3	9	7	2			3	3	27
Drunkenness	64	122	72	64	77	61	73	64	597
Disorderly Conduct	31	38	20	19	16	8	47	31	210
Vagrancy					2	1			3
Other <sup>2</sup>	12	5	10	16	11	10	25	12	101
Suspicion				1	4	5	6		16
Traffic	205	222	189	234	305	219	191	205	1770
Other Traffic	26	23	28	86	92	70	74	26	425
Equipment Violations	15	15	12	13	12	10	19	15	111
False Fire Alarm									
Unknown	4	4	5		2	4	14	4	37
Total	396	505	385	504	581	485	531	396	3783

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

2. This category contains all offenses classified by the police as "Other" with the exception of "false fire alarm" which has been treated separately.

Table 49. Total Number of Arrests by Category of Violation and by Date for the Riot Time Period.<sup>1</sup>

Category/Date	4-5	4-6	4-7	4-8	4-9	4-10	4-11	4-12	Total
Homicide									3
Rape									8
Robbery		1			1		1		3
Aggravated Assault	1								26
Burglary-House Breaking	9	2	1	5	4	2	1	3	28
Larceny	5	4	3	5	3	4	2	2	937
Auto Theft	444	282	85	23	14	26	26	37	42
Other Assaults	14	7	1	3	2	5	7	3	41
Arson	1	6	2	4	3	3	8	14	30
Forgery et al	12	1		2	2	2	6	5	7
Fraud		3	1				2	1	
Embezzlement				3				3	6
Stolen Property				1					1
Vandalism	35	32	6	1	4	2	1	4	85
Weapons	22	3	6	3	8	2	1	6	51
Prostitution and Vice	16	32	25	11	11	12	8	4	119
Sex Offenses								1	1
Narcotics and Drugs									
Gambling	2	5	2	1	8	3	1		22
Family and Children			1						1
Intoxicated Driving	1		1						2
Liquor Laws		1					1		2
Drunkenness			2	1	1				4
Disorderly Conduct <sup>2</sup>	46	83	84	54	41	74	74	101	557
Vagrancy	483	1232	1132	712	468	177	209	88	4501
Other <sup>3</sup>				3			2		5
Suspicion	13	10	3	8	6	12	13	8	73
Traffic		2		1	1	1	1	3	9
Other Traffic	40	52	45	88	34	57	99	153	568
Equipment Violations	4	15	13	23	11	14	8	13	101
False Fire Alarm	2	9	1	5	2	1	8	13	41
Unknown									
Total	1	4	5	8	6	13	37		
	1151	1782	1415	964	624	406	488	478	7308

ata from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department  
 Arrest Record, 1968.  
 is category will contain arrests for curfew violations classi-  
 fied as disorderly conduct violations by the police.  
 s category contains all offenses classified by the police as  
 "Other" with the exception of "false fire alarm" which has been  
 treated separately.



Table 50. Total Number of Offenses by Date and by Location.<sup>1</sup>

Date	Non-Riot Area	Corridor Area	Riot Area 14th	Riot Area 7th	Riot Area H	Riot Area SE	Location Unknown	Total
3-29	143	11	7	8	6	3	48	226
3-30	156	17	21	14	12	1	49	270
3-31	117	8	14	13	8	--	41	201
4-1	124	10	16	9	5	2	57	223
4-2	111	5	10	3	7	1	26	163
4-3	133	15	15	12	10	1	19	205
4-4	150	11	36	15	12	3	51	278
Total	934	77	119	74	60	11	291	1566
4-5	310	41	58	49	45	13	113	629
4-6	152	21	13	12	20	5	50	273
4-7	66	7	6	4	4	1	38	126
4-8	74	7	5	5	5	1	11	108
4-9	58	3	9	4	3	--	28	105
4-10	75	5	11	5	3	1	34	134
4-11	85	4	8	9	7	2	23	138
4-12	104	2	11	6	5	--	48	176
Total	924	90	121	94	92	23	345	1689

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Offense Record, 1968.

Table 51. Total Number of Arrests by Date and by Location.<sup>1</sup>

Date	Non-Riot Area	Corridor Area	Riot Area 14th	Riot Area 7th	Riot Area H	Riot Area SE	Mis-coded	Location Unknown	Total
3-29	272	9	21	23	11	2	19	39	396
3-30	320	11	31	24	18	--	32	69	505
3-31	233	10	33	22	19	--	26	42	385
4-1	383	13	17	15	6	1	28	41	504
4-2	447	7	18	28	7	1	29	44	581
4-3	354	14	21	22	6	--	17	51	485
4-4	375	15	23	24	9	--	11	74	531
Total	2384	79	164	158	76	4	162	360	3387
4-5	486	120	133	74	60	3	21	254	1151
4-6	838	160	144	107	105	3	13	412	1782
4-7	614	60	116	146	62	1	20	396	1415
4-8	424	45	142	97	48	1	16	191	964
4-9	292	34	95	33	34	--	9	127	624
4-10	174	12	43	18	17	1	6	135	406
4-11	222	18	31	67	36	--	16	98	488
4-12	278	16	41	26	26	--	7	84	478
Total	3328	465	745	568	388	9	108	1697	7308

1. Data from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Arrest Record, 1968.

Table 52. Total Number of Fires by Date and by Location.<sup>1</sup>

Date	Non-Riot Area	Corridor Area	Riot Area 14th	Riot Area 7th	Riot Area H	Riot Area SE	Total
3-29	93	5	5	1	2	--	106
3-30	108	14	3	8	5	--	138
3-31	88	2	3	3	3	1	100
4-1	65	5	5	2	2	--	79
4-2	84	5	2	--	1	--	92
4-3	43	9	4	1	2	--	59
4-4	60	1	10	4	3	1	79
Total	541	41	32	19	18	2	653
4-5	89	8	47	30	18	2	194
4-6	187	30	49	52	30	4	352
4-7	120	9	18	34	15	1	197
4-8	84	3	13	18	2	1	121
4-9	91	5	6	8	5	2	117
4-10	92	8	6	9	7	1	123
4-11	80	8	1	17	6	2	114
4-12	92	5	8	14	3	1	123
Total	835	76	148	182	86	14	1341

1. Data from the District of Columbia Fire Department daily alarm log, 1968.

APPENDIX C

FIGURES



Figure 1. First General Classification of Arrests and Offenses,  
Indicating the Code and the Description of the Code.

I. Crimes Against Persons:

- |                              |                               |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Homicide (0100)           | 5. Other Assaults (0800)      |
| 2. Rape (0200)               | 6. Weapons (1500)             |
| 3. Robbery (0300)            | 7. Sex Offenses (1700)        |
| 4. Aggravated Assault (0400) | 8. Family and Children (2000) |

II. Crimes Against Property:

- |                                   |                           |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Burglary-House Breaking (0500) | 4. Stolen Property (1300) |
| 2. Larceny (0600)                 | 5. Vandalism (1400)       |
| 3. Auto Theft (0700)              |                           |

III. Traffic Violations:

- |                               |                                |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Intoxicated Driving (2100) | 3. Other Traffic (3500)        |
| 2. Traffic (3300)             | 4. Equipment Violations (3800) |

IV. Crimes Without Victims:<sup>1</sup>

- |                                 |                                |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Prostitution and Vice (1600) | 4. Drunkenness (2300)          |
| 2. Narcotics and Drugs (1800)   | 5. Disorderly Conduct (2400)   |
| 3. Gambling (1900)              | 6. Curfew Violations (no code) |

V. Crimes Related to Fires:

- |                            |                                 |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Arson (0900)            | 3. Number of Fires <sup>2</sup> |
| 2. False Fire Alarm (2649) |                                 |

VI. Miscellaneous Crimes:

- |                                    |                              |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Forgery & Counterfeiting (1000) | 6. Other (2600) <sup>3</sup> |
| 2. Fraud (1100)                    | 7. Suspicion (2700)          |
| 3. Embezzlement (1200)             | 8. Unknown (3000)            |
| 4. Liquor Laws (2200)              | 9. Unknown (3100)            |
| 5. Vagrancy (2500)                 | 10. Unknown (3400)           |

1. Curfew violations obviously only occurred during the riot period and then they were treated as disorderly conducts for the purposes of classification by the police. It is not possible to separate the curfew violations from the more general disorderly conduct category.
2. The incidences of fire were only used in the offense categorization and reflect the District of Columbia Fire Department data.
3. False fire alarms, which are treated above, have been eliminated from this category.

Figure 2. First General Classification of Arrests and Offenses  
Indicating the Subcategories and the Codes and Their  
Description.

I. Crimes Against Persons:

1. Potential Threat of Bodily Harm: Weapons (1500)
2. Threat of Bodily Harm: Robbery (0300)
3. Actual Bodily Harm: Homicide (0100), Rape (0200), Aggravated Assault (0400), Other Assaults (0800), Sex Offenses (1700), and Family and Children (2000)

II. Crimes Against Property (no subcategorization): Burglary-House Breaking (0500), Larceny (0600), Auto Theft (0700), Stolen Property (1300), and Vandalism (1400)

III. Traffic Violations:

1. Moving Violations: Intoxicated Driving (2100), Traffic (3300), and Other Traffic (3500)
2. Equipment Violations: Equipment Violations (3800)

IV. Crimes Without Victims:

1. Non-Riot Related: Prostitution and Vice (1600), Narcotics and Drugs (1800), and Gambling (1900)
2. Drunkenness: Drunkenness (2300)
3. Disorderly Conduct and Curfew: Disorderly Conduct (2400) and Curfew (no code)

V. Crimes Related to Fires (no subcategorization): Arson (0900), False Fire Alarm (2649), and number of fires reported to the District of Columbia Fire Department (no code)


VI. Miscellaneous Crimes:

1. Fraud: Forgery and Counterfeiting (1000), Fraud (1100), and Embezzlement (1200)
2. Liquor Laws: Liquor Laws (2200)
3. Varied: Vagrancy (2500), Other (2600), and Suspicion (2700)
4. Unknown: Unknown (3000), Unknown (3100), and Unknown (3400)

APPENDIX D

MAPS

Map 1 : Indicating the Riot, Corridor, and Non-Riot Areas.<sup>1</sup>



1. Reproduced from panels 5 and 6 of a map entitled "Washington Metropolitan Area" which was prepared for the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments : Transportation Planning Board by the Air Survey Corporation, Reston, Virginia in 1968.



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