ABSTRACT

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This dissertation is an exploration of the consequences of elections for those kept out of power. I draw from both the winner-loser gap literature, which explores attitude differences between winners and losers following elections focusing on individual voters as they process electoral results, and the electoral contention literature, which examines the causes and consequences of protests, riots, and violence connected to electoral contests focusing on the elites. My dissertation works to bring these two literatures by examining the factors that create opportunities for attitude and behavioral change for those who are unable to access power in the aftermath of elections. The first two papers use surveys to focus on individuals—their personal identities and their attitudes towards democracy and political contention or violence. The third paper examines the motivations of individual leaders in making public accusations of fraud and the consequences these accusations have on the voters' perception of the legitimacy of elections and the likelihood of electoral contention. Through the ideas explored in these papers, this dissertation provides further context

for differences in attitudes between winners and losers towards democracy and contention, while also cautioning some of the more dire predictions of the consequences of the gap in perceptions and attitudes between winners and losers. Additionally, by examining the ramifications of fraud accusations in the wake of election loss, we can see a better picture of the kinds of motivations that can successfully mobilize those out of power to contention.

ELECTORAL LOSS AND CONTENTION

by

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Kenneth Kraus.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1—Introduction

From the 1970s through the 1990s sixty states transitioned to democracy. This was described by Samuel Huntington as the third wave of democratization. Nearing the end of this wave, in 1989 Francis Fukuyama wrote "The End of History," outlining the theory that liberal democracy was going to be the triumphant form of governance, the end of the historical dialectic.[1] At the time, the Cold War was coming to an end, and the liberal policies of the West seemed to be the answer to the problems created and propagated by fascist regimes. With so much hope for liberal ideas and democratic institutions, there was little doubt that democracy would spread throughout the whole world and peace and freedom would be made accessible to everyone. But since then even Fukuyama has conceded that democratic liberalism is not invulnerable to failure ("Francis Fukuyama On Why Liberal Democracy Is In Trouble," NPR). Specifically, Fukuyama is worried about the disconnect between liberal values, such as the rule of law, and the establishment of democratic practices, like elections. If elections happen without a true system of liberal institutions in place, the promise of liberal democracy cannot be fulfilled.

This dissertation will explore how individuals and parties work with and around democratic institutions through an examination of voter reactions to electoral outcomes in African states. I will discuss how supporters of electoral losers determine their attitudes about democracy following political loss and how different circumstances of loss can lead to very different views on the efficacy and importance

[1] The dialectic of history is a theory traditionally associated with the philosopher Hegel and subsequently the communist thinkers Marx and Engels, in which the history of the world is analyzed as a series of actions and reactions that have driven society throughout history

of democracy and liberalism in practice. To do so, I will be tapping into two growing literatures: the winner-loser gap, which focuses on the relationship between partisanship and loss through attitude measurements of winners and losers concerning various aspects of democracy; and the electoral contention literature, which focuses on when, where, why and how electoral contention arises. Africa is a particularly useful continent for studying this phenomenon because it contains liberal democratic success stories, illiberal democratic facades, and many stages of democracy between these points.

Electoral Losers, Support for Democracy and Contention

Electoral losers' acceptance of electoral results allows states to move forward following elections. In cases where losers challenge the results, there is a potential for political breakdown and instability. For example, in Kenya, following the election on December 27th, 2007, there was widespread violence. The vote was close, and both the incumbent President Kibaki and the opposition candidate Odinga declared victory. Protests were brewing following accusations of voting fraud in the days following the election. President Kibaki was quickly sworn in three days following the election, on December 30th, 2007. Shortly thereafter more protests and violence erupted throughout Kenya. According to a Human Rights Watch report on the election violence, "two months of bloodshed left over 1,000 dead and up to 500,000 internally displaced" (Human Rights Watch 2008). While this is an extreme case of electoral contention as a result of electoral uncertainty, fraud accusation, and loss, it is very illustrative for understanding how the masses can be driven to electoral violence. When the results are uncertain, those who are ultimately deemed the losers accuse the

winners of fraud, and electoral losers become outraged, we can see widespread violence like we saw in Kenya in 2008. This case is helpful for us to better understand the mechanisms that drive people to rethink a commitment to democratic ideals following electoral uncertainty and loss.

This dissertation is motivated by one main question: What happens when people lose elections? This question is immensely important to the study of electoral democracy, because as Riker argues, political losers determine the successfulness of a democracy, because they are the main "instigators of political change" (1983,64). Out of this understanding, a discipline focused on the differences between winners and losers has grown, with research focusing on the gap in attitudes between electoral winners and losers. These studies have found that being counted among the supporters for those leaders that win elections is ideal. You are likely to reap the benefits from your win—even if not materially, emotionally there is a positive boost for those who count themselves among the winners. Losing, however, does not provide these same benefits. Supporters of those politicians that lose elections are less likely to be satisfied with the political system, less likely to trust the government, and less likely to feel like their needs are being met by the government (Anderson et al 2005; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Anderson and Tverdora 2001; Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978; Anderson and Guillery 1997; Kornberg and Clarke 1994; Lambert et al 1986; Rich 2015; Moehler 2009; Esaiasson 2011; Cho and Bratton 2005).

However, these winner-loser gap pieces stop short of explaining the mechanisms that would lead from these negative attitude differences about democracy to losers rejecting democracy through contentious political action and

challenging the system outside of the electoral system. Instead, the electoral violence literature has grown separately from the understandings of the winner-loser gap literature, itemizing circumstances that increase the likelihood of violence without getting into the broader pattern of mechanisms that drive this type of behavior universally when democratic elections are unsuccessful (Hoglund 2009; Burchard 2015; Bekoe 2012; Klopp and Zuern 2007; Sisk 2012; Bekoe and Buchard 2017; Muller 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jabloski 2013; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Chaturvedi 2005; Robinson and Torvik 2009; Collier and Vicente 2012; Wilkinson 2004; Dunning 2011; Fjelde and Hoglund 2016; Straus and Taylor 2012; Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus 2017; Arriola and Johnson 2012; Kuhn 2015; Beaulieu 2014).

This dissertation is meant to bridge the divide between the winner-loser gap literature and the electoral violence literature, a divide that only a handful of studies have touched on (Anderson and Mendes 2006; Sedziaka and Rose 2015; Vazquez Del Mercado 2016). It will focus on the effects of loss on voters' political attitudes and identity activations, how these attitude changes prime non-winners for contentious political behavior, and how losing candidates and party leaders can push their supporters into contention following loss. It accomplishes this through the exploration of the underlying mechanisms that drive the attitude and behavior choices of individuals who are kept out of power following election. How these mechanisms work is dependent on the context in which the loss occurs. In doing so, this dissertation aims to extend works such as Birnir 2007 and Posner 2004, which build our understanding of instrumentalized identities in politics and show how individuals

who are kept out of power (even legitimately through elections) interact with the political system, the party system, and ethnic groupings, in determining their response to their inability to gain power and the resources power provides.

Prior to discussing the specifics of the three papers used to build this argument throughout the dissertation, I will discuss the role of elections in democratic theory, with a focus on the role of elections as a focal point of the distribution of power within a state, to better understand the background for electoral democracy. Then I will cover the developments of the winner-loser gap literature and the electoral contention literatures. Following this, I will discuss my dissertation's unique contributions to the literature and provide an outline of the remaining chapters of the dissertation.

Elections in Democracy

> *-Many forms of government have been tried, and will be tried, in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time. —Winston Churchill, 1947, House of Commons*
>
> *-Surprising as it may sound, a stable democracy required the manifestation of conflict or cleavage so that there will be struggle over ruling positions, challenges to parties in power, and shifts of parties in office; but without consensus—a political system allowing for the peaceful "play" of power, the adherence by the "outs" to decisions made by the "ins" of the rights of the "outs"—there can be no democracy (Lipset, 1960, 21).*

Theoretically, a society free from political contention could exist in a few forms. The Hobbesian Leviathan and the Utopias of More and Marx would create systems in which the question of how to dole out political power is resolved and the political contestation for such power is not required. However, these types of societies

do not and have never existed in the real world; and in all other cases, in transitions to and from the idealized systems of Leviathan and Utopia, who gets what, when, and how, needs to be decided through a form of political contest. In authoritarian systems, this power struggle happens necessarily through violence. In democratic systems, power is sought through elections in a system based on the rule of law. I argue that the stability provided through democracy under an established rule of law makes it a very commonly desired form of government. Diamond (2016) highlights the benefits that democratic regimes can provide:

> "The great promise and redeeming advantage of democracy is its capacity for self-correction, Democracy provides its citizens the freedom to expose and denounce unjust and unwise policies. It gives them the institutional tools to bring about change. It affirms the dignity and worth of the individual, and it at least gives individuals the means to secure their rights" (27).

True democracies require freedom, equality, participation, competition, responsiveness, and rule of law (Diamond 2016). Elections are a particular feature of democracy that touch almost every part of these "required" qualities, but they are not sufficient means to provide true democracy without the underlying principle of the rule of law. In my dissertation, I am focusing on the interactions that voters have with the electoral system.[2] This means that I am not testing specifically for rule of law qualities, but instead focusing on how we can spot the possibilities for electoral contention based on the reaction of supporters of electoral losers to the results.

The results of the research concerning the efficacy of elections in fostering peace and democracy generally have been mixed. Some research argues that elections

[2] Systems that have elections can range from true democracy to competitive authoritarianism; for a review of Competitive Authoritarianism see Levitsky and Way (2010) and for a review of the literature within the context of Africa see Bogaards and Elischer (2015).

can promote democracy by helping states learn democratic principles through the practice of electoral democracy (Lindberg 2006). Butcher and Goldsmith (2016) discuss the role elections can play in the reduction of general political violence, especially in states with high ethnic fractionalization, because elections "reduce incentives for violence" by allowing losers to have more faith in the potential of the future (1392). Harish and Little (2017) on the other hand argue that elections tend to increase violence around the tense electoral period, but generally help to ameliorate political violence during other times. However, others have found that in order for democracy to really take hold, there needs to be a structural build-up of the foundational institutions of democracy before there is a large increase in political participation (Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Bracanti and Snyder 2011). The findings of Collier (2009) and Salehyan and Linebarger (2015) support this idea, finding that elections tend to exacerbate tension and make conflict more likely especially in states with weakly established institutions. In addition to these conflicting findings, a third subset of this literature has found little to no relationship between elections and general political violence (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug 2013; Goldsmith 2015).

Despite the mixed results of the true efficacy of elections seen in the literature, and the general perception of elections as a peaceful way to determine power allocation within states, elections are still, on their face, a struggle for power—and the contestation of political power inherently creates and exacerbates tension. This is true even in cases where this competition takes place in the ballot box rather than the battlefield. Ginsberg and Weissberg (1978) argues that "every election represents a

test and potentially a threat to support for the political regime. Electoral conflicts may strain public acceptance of legal and institutional processes" (34). Elections are a unique phenomenon because in their very nature they are conflictual. Elections encourage people to disagree with each other and throw their support behind different leaders, thus creating a situation in which huge segments of the population are competing and mobilizing against each other. The stakes of political power tend to be high, so why do losers accept the results of elections and move on to prepare for the next opportunity for power?

Przeworski (1991) discusses democracy as a system of "institutionalized uncertainty" over political power. This means that there aren't any guarantees about whether any particular individual or party will win or maintain political power within a state. If no one is guaranteed power, this opens the future for those who are presently out of power: they can have hope they will one day attain power. Institutionalized uncertainty also acts as a constraint on those in power by requiring them to think about the future implications of their actions if they are hoping to maintain power. The uncertainty is institutionalized using free and fair elections, which allow for voters to determine who their leaders should be based on their expectations of whether the candidates for power will be successful (what determines success for each individual voter will be dependent on the preferences—i.e., needs, wants, goals, expectations, etc.—of each particular voter).

The winner-loser gap and electoral fraud literatures have both built on the ideas of institutionalized uncertainty from Przeworski (1991), arguing that voters' perceptions of the legitimacy of elections are influenced by how fair they believe

them to be. For example, within the winner-loser gap literature Moehler and Lindberg (2009) discusses how individuals influence this balance between competing for power and maintaining peace by providing incentives for elites to "play by the rules of the democratic game" by showing support for the institutions of democracy (1148). Other research has shown that if citizens view the electoral process as fair, they are more willing to accept the results of elections, even if it is not their desired outcome (Anderson et al. 2005). However, not all voters within electoral systems believe that this dynamic of "institutionalized uncertainty" is actually working. If voters do not buy that the decision over who will win the contest has not already been decided pre-election, they will not believe that there is real uncertainty about who will be the leader and will not believe in its legitimacy. This idea that electoral fraud—or even just the perception of electoral fraud—can undermine "institutionalized uncertainty" is often explored in the electoral fraud literature. For example, Norris (2013) found that uncertainty is threatened if there is a belief that the results have been influenced through electoral cheating, because fraud would indicate that the outcome was not, in reality, uncertain (Norris 2013). This is related to a wider idea that if the democratic process is seen as illegitimate, there is an increased likelihood of system collapse (Powell 1982; Bermeo 2003).

If people believe there is certainty that they will not win the political contest—because of frequent losses causing them to feel blocked from power, not feeling represented by any party contesting for victory, or because their party leaders are telling them that the other side cheated—it is more likely that these powerless individuals would doubt the political institutions of the state, that they would be more

accepting of others' politically contentious behavior, and that they would be more likely to participate in politically contentious behavior themselves. This dissertation focuses on the mechanisms driving changes in attitude and behavior in response to electoral loss.

The Winner-Loser Gap

The people most in control of the successes and/or failures of democratic systems are the electoral losers, because it is their acceptance of electoral outcomes that maintains peace and allows for the continuation of the democratic process. This situation of seemingly powerless citizens holding the reins of democracy through their acceptance has been studied extensively in a growing literature focusing on "the winner-loser gap" since the late 1990s and early 2000s. By consenting to defeat, electoral losers are accepting the legitimacy of the system, but often their satisfaction with democracy and trust in the government and institutions of the state are reduced (Anderson et al. 2005; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Listhaug 1995; Bowler and Donovan 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Clark and Kornberg 1992; Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978).

Much of the literature on losing elections has looked at survey responses in democracies following elections with an emphasis on the losing respondents' satisfaction with democracy and their level of political trust, as compared to those of the winning respondents (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and Tverdova 2001). Nadaeu and Blais (1993) argues that losers are less likely than

winners to consent to the regime following an election, but that participation in elections enhances the losers' support for elections. Others argue that losers exhibit lower satisfaction with democracy, lower levels of political trust, lower levels of confidence in government responsiveness to citizens, and are less likely to view the new leadership as legitimate (Craig et al. 2006; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Bowler and Donovan 2002).

In addition to simply becoming less satisfied with democracy and the government, other studies have shown that losing elections can also cause changes in individual willingness to continue playing along with the rules of democracy. Esaiasson (2010) argues that losers are likely to react to a loss in a way that "undermines system support" and that "winning and losing elections creates differential incentives for citizens to remain supportive of their political system" (102). He argues that those who accept results voluntarily are those who want to preserve and protect the democratic institutions of the state. However, if the institutions for power allocation are not seen as legitimate, it is unlikely that those who lose power will accept the results. Several studies have examined this relationship, finding that losers are much more likely to discount the electoral integrity of the election (Kerr 2013; Moehler 2009; Cho & Kim 2016; McAllister & White 2015; Rose & Mishler 2009; Cantu & Garcıa-Ponce 2015; Bowler, Brunell, Donovan, & Gronke 2015; Sances & Stewart 2015; Anderson et al. 2005; Birch 2008; Norris 2014; Flesken and Hartl 2018). Other studies have explored how past experiences of winning and losing can alter the attitude differences between winners and losers. Curini, Jou, and Memoli (2011) finds that losers who have had previous

experience of winning consider democratic institutions more legitimate than repeated losers. Anderson and Mendes (2006) finds that losers are more likely to participate in political protest following elections.

The study of the differences in perceptions between winners and losers is particularly important in states that have less well-established democratic systems. Moehler and Lindberg (2009) describes three principal arguments for focusing on the gap between winners and losers, which provide an excellent baseline for our understanding of the importance of this line of inquiry. First, losers have an increased incentive to buck the system that has left them out of power. Second, winners can also show undemocratic preferences in their allowance of elites to act outside the normal bounds of democratic powers. Third, this attitude gap between winners and losers is important because polarization of the population can make working together within the democratic system more difficult.[3]

Moehler (2009) underlines these problems in unstable democracies, arguing that in less-established systems non-elites become uneasy about the political system when they see it as being manipulated by members of the elites. She argues:

> "one would expect losers to assume the worst and conclude that electoral fraud was deliberate and consequential. Additionally, losers might actually witness or be subject to more abuse during campaigns and elections than are winners, especially if the winning party was an incumbent party. As a result, losers may withhold their support not only from elected leaders but also from their political institutions" (347).

[3] For a more detailed discussion of this reasoning see pages 1450-1451 in Moehler and Lindberg 2009.

This assumption of mistrust of institutions is important when investigating reaction to loss in states with a weakly-established rule of law. Several of these studies of winners and losers in developing democracies are specifically focused on the relationship between electoral wins and losses and partisan perceptions of democratic ideals within African states (Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Rich and Holmes 2016). These works are particularly focused on the relationship between winning and/or losing and the perceptions of democracy, because in African states both winners and losers have been seen to show illiberal ideals—winners supporting elite non-democratic behavior, and losers having little faith in the system of democracy altogether (Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009).

In addition to the study of winners vs. losers, a third group of individuals, non-partisans, has historically been left out of studies but is getting more attention in recent studies (Rich 2015, Moehler 2009, Moehler and Lindberg 2009, Rich and Holmes 2016). These non-partisans are important because they can play a significant role in the public's response to electoral results even if they are not supporters of the losing candidates. My dissertation will expand on this research by looking at differences in attitudes of winners, losers and non-partisans, while also examining how the frequency of loss influences attitudes of individuals left out of power for an extended period. Additionally, I will look at how winner-loser partisanship interacts with other identity types, like ethnic identity, to get a better understanding of how losers cope with their losses. To do so, I will build on the works of Chandra 2004, Posner 2004 and Birnir 2007, which discuss the instrumentalization of identity (specifically ethnic identity) in politics.

Electoral Contention

Understanding how the attitudes of winners and losers differ is important, but it is also important to consider the possible consequences of the negative reactions losers have to electoral results. At the most extreme, disputed election results lead to mass violence or civil war, as in cases like Kenya in 2007 or Cote d'Ivoire in 2010. But there are also many cases of lower-level contention and violence seen in electoral democracies throughout the world in response to expected or actual electoral loss. Hoglund (2009) makes the case that electoral violence itself is a specific phenomenon that needs to be studied as its own sub-section of the political violence literature. She argues that the motivation, timing, actors, targets, and types of actions set electoral violence apart from other types of political violence—with her study having a particular emphasis on the idea that electoral violence is undertaken with the intention of influencing or responding to election results. The importance of studying this phenomenon is also underlined by the relative frequency of its occurrence. Studies have found that violence occurs in between 55% and 58% of elections in sub-Saharan African states, with extreme violence occurring in 10% of elections after 1990.[4] The frequency of electoral contention and the uniqueness of the motivations behind it have spawned an extensive electoral contention literature, which examines when, why, and how electoral contention occurs. This section will explore the foundational development of the literature in the early 2000s and the directions it has grown in since then.

[4] Straus and Taylor 2012(study scope: 1990-2008); Burchard 2015 (study scope: 1990-2014)

Following the Cold War, the West attempted to spread democracy and build up liberal democratic institutions. However, this democratic institution building was not always fully implemented or sufficiently safeguarded from abuses of power (Levitsky and Way 2002). These incomplete or unprotected democracies are more susceptible to manipulation by leaders, simply because the mechanisms to stop manipulation are not in place or enforced. With electoral manipulation made easier, there is less hope for the effectiveness of electoral competition as an institution of democracy.

In a strong democratic state, voters will have good information on the level of support each candidate has, quality constraints on the incumbent to prevent electoral meddling, and confidence in a fair electoral fight generally. Even under those conditions mass protests can happen, as was seen in the U.S. following the inauguration of President Trump in January of 2017. While these types of protests are not always outside the law, they are still a very important show of force for those opposed to the leadership. In states with less well-established systems of democracy, electoral contention—such as voter harassment and suppression, threats of violence, protests, rioting, low-level violence, and widespread violence—is more likely.[5] Under these circumstances of incomplete or unprotected democratization, electoral contention can become more likely to be used as a campaign strategy for incumbents[6]

[5] Freedom House scores in 2018: U.S. – 85; sub-Saharan Africa – avg. 42 (range 1-90); African states included in my dissertation – avg. 60 (range 30-83)

[6] For examples see: Mares and Young 2016; Schedler 2002; Austin 1995; Laakso 1999; Klopp and Zuern 2007; Hickman 2009; Boone 2011; Bekoe 2012, Sisk 2012; Bekoe and Buchard 2017; Muller 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jabloski 2013; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014, Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Chaturvedi 2005; Robinson and Torvik 2009; Collier and Vicente 2012; Wilkinson 2004; Dunning 2011; Fjelde and Hoglund 2016; Straus and Taylor 2012; Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus 2017; Arriola and Johnson 2012; Kuhn 2015

and, less frequently, opposition parties (Beaulieu 2014; Straus and Taylor 2012; Klopp and Zuern 2007). However, even though weaknesses in democratic institutions make the use of violence more likely, it does not mean that it is not risky for either the incumbent or the opposition to use violence (Van Ham and Lindberg 2015; Bekoe 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016).

The electoral conflict literature has primarily focused on the logic of incumbent-perpetrated electoral conflict. Incumbents use electoral violence to protect their political power while "maintaining a veneer of democracy" (Sisk 2012). Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus (2017) finds that, in African states, electoral violence is much more likely when incumbents are running for re-election in states with high levels of clientelism[7] (also see Kuhn 2015 and Arriola and Johnson 2012). One of the more researched aspects of electoral violence discusses the relationship between heightened electoral competition and the likelihood of the use of violence by the incumbent (Hoglund 2009; Straus and Taylor 2012). Several studies have noted that pre-election violence often results in reduced turnout (Bratton 2008; Bekoe and Burchard 2017). Interestingly, Robinson and Torvik (2009) finds that, while it is often theorized and assumed that this competition-related electoral violence is aimed at the opposition, the violence is in fact targeting the potential swing voters to reduce turnout and help ensure victory. Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski also wrote several articles expanding this relationship between electoral competition and incumbent use of violence. They discuss the importance of institutional constraints in reducing the

[7] Here, clientelism refers to the practice of political leaders providing goods and services to voters in exchange for political support. For more background on clientelism and its practice in African states see Vicente and Wantchekon 2009; Mares and Young 2016

likelihood of incumbents choosing to engage in contentious behavior prior to elections, how incumbents decide when they are sufficiently threatened, and the consequences incumbents can face due to their use of violence (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, Jablonski 2014, 2018). Opitz, Fjelde, and Hoglund (2013) specifically shows how one particular constraint, the independence of electoral management bodies, can help to constrain incumbent action. Other researchers have investigated how institutional factors influence the likelihood of electoral conflict. For example, Fjelde and Hoglund (2016) argues that majoritarian electoral rules make violence more likely because in winner-take-all systems the stakes of winning are higher.

Other research on electoral contention has incorporated understandings of other illiberal strategies uses by incumbents for election rigging—specifically electoral fraud.[8] While electoral violence is more commonly used by incumbents, challengers can also use electoral contention (most often in the form of protests and riots) to influence the results of the election. Several studies have outlined the relationship between electoral fraud and post-election protest (Magaloni 2010; Beaulieu 2006; Beaulieu 2014; Tucker 2007; Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015; Kuntz and Thompson 2009). While electoral fraud and perceptions of electoral fraud can negatively influence perceptions of democracy (Norris 2014; Frank and Martinez i Coma 2017; Karp, Nai, and Norris 2018), it has also been found that the most common strategy for electoral fraud reduction, international electoral observers, can also make contention more likely. Hyde and Marinov (2014) finds that international observers can increase the likelihood and severity of post-electoral protests by

[8] For more information on electoral fraud literatures see Schedler 2002; Birch 2008; Leqhoucq 2003; Simpser 2013; Birch 2011; Kelley and Kolev 2010; Norris 2014

highlighting when fraud has occurred (Daxecker 2012 finds similar patterns in African elections).

Dissertation Contributions

Both the electoral contention literature and the winner-loser gap literature are important to understanding the dynamic reactions to loss in democratic systems. However, in order to see the big-picture relationship between electoral loss and electoral contention, we need to do more to connect the themes of these literatures. The electoral contention literature focuses most often on the actions of elites, while the winner-loser gap focuses almost entirely on the individual voters. This dissertation works to bridge this gap by examining both the macro and micro levels of action. The first two papers use surveys to focus on individuals and the personal attitudes and preferences of voters. The third paper examines the motivations of leaders and the consequences their public statements have on the perception of the legitimacy of elections.

Through this dissertation I intend to create more connections between these two literatures, but I am also contributing to each, adding some nuance and context to generalized assumptions made. For the winner-loser gap literature, it is common practice to focus on voter reactions to party performance in just one election; but, in practice, parties and their supporters are often involved in iterated electoral contests. I argue that in order to really capture the relationship between political success/failure of the parties that people support and their attitudes, we should look at how these attitudes have been shaped throughout multiple election cycles. My work adds nuance to our understanding of attitude differences between winners and losers and helps to

better contextualize how experiences of winning and losing motivate attitudes towards democracy over time. Additionally, I show that some of the claims of the potential consequences of divergent attitudes between winners and losers found in this literature may be misguided and based on the wrong measures of democracy attitudes.

For the electoral contention literature, my dissertation is adding a better understanding of the motivations of individuals who participate in electoral contention. Most research focuses on the political leaders' motivations and actions, but by tying in the winner-loser gap understandings of individual voters, we can get a better look how the attitudes of voters and leaders interact in their response to electoral results. Additionally, when thinking specifically about the relationship between electoral fraud and post-election contention, most studies focus on officially-reported fraud, but that only captures part of the story. Relying exclusively on officially-reported fraud misses the effects of accusations made by losing candidates.

Paper Outlines

In the first paper, I will explore the relationship between individual connection to national and ethnic identity levels, winner-loser partisanship, and attitudes toward democratic institutions. Past research has shown that higher levels of national self-identification can help to solidify the foundation of democracy within states, but a better understanding of the political determinants of self-identification at the national or ethnic level needs to be established. The paper works to clarify our understanding by bringing together insights from the individually-focused winner-loser gap literature and the group-focused identity-based politics literatures to gain a more

complete understanding of how an individual's connection to national and sub-national identity is influenced by their political connections as well as electoral results. Using both Afrobarometer surveys and an original survey conducted in the summer of 2013 in Ghana during the Supreme Court case concerning the general election of December 2012, I will explore how individual partisanship and political experience influence individual identity, and, in turn, how individual identity influences perception of democratic institutions. I find that individuals who supported parties that lost in the previous election and non-partisans are significantly less likely than electoral winners to identify with their national identity. Importantly, I also find that individuals who identify more with their ethnic identity than the national identity are more likely to distrust the democratic institutions of the state. Individuals who lose don't just feel cut off from power, they feel cut off from the national-level of identity. The results of the paper show the causal pathway between electoral loss and disconnection from the nation and the state.

This disillusionment with the state and democracy that has been found in the winner-loser gap literature is often touted as a potential warning sign for the erosion of democracy. However, not much work has been done to substantiate these claims. The second paper of this dissertation aims to explore whether the gap in attitudes toward democracy between winners and losers does in fact lead losers to be more likely to accept and support the use of violence in politics. Using surveys from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th rounds of the Afrobarometer, I find that political entrenchment and level of support for democracy are the most important factors in individual support for political contention. These results show that not all winners and losers approach

electoral results in the same way and that the winner-loser gap literature may need a shift in focus from satisfaction with democracy to support for democracy to better understand the relationship between electoral results and the likelihood of political contention. Additionally, the mixed results I find in acceptance and willingness to participate in political demonstrations and violence show that there is not a simple relationship between electoral loss and contention—there likely needs to be specific loss-based grievances of corruption, cheating, or repression to actually move losers to action.

In the third paper, I will discuss one of these potential motivations for action in my study of the relationship between accusations of fraud from losing political parties and the likelihood of post-election contention. I chose fraud as the focus of this paper because there is ample evidence that it can influence voter perceptions, but the relationship is not fully explored in the current literature. The distinction between public accusations and officially-reported cases is important because it is commonly argued that voters are following cues from the political leadership of the parties they support to determine their reaction to political events, but in the study of the reaction to fraud only official accounts of fraud are included. This exclusion of accusations of fraud limits our understanding of how political leaders can use accusations of fraud as cues to their supporters for how to perceive the results of the election. To test this relationship, I collected newspaper articles from five months prior to and after 149 elections in 31 African countries, looking for instances of leaders alleging fraud, rejecting electoral results, and claiming victory. This allowed me to test the relationship between public fraud accusations and contention, rather than rely on

officially-reported cases of fraud. I find that accusations of fraud from opposition candidates increase the likelihood of electoral losers perceiving elections to be less free and fair and increase the likelihood of electoral contention. What is particularly interesting is that accusations of fraud seem to be more important than the actual instance of fraud. This suggests that voters are relying on their political leaders to understand how they should feel about the results of an election and that research on the effects of voter fraud should take into consideration what political leaders are alleging when studying how voters react.

The studies discussed in these papers work to create a bridge between the winner-loser gap literature and the electoral contention literature. In doing so, this dissertation provides further context for differences in attitudes between winners and losers towards democracy and contention, while also cautioning some of the more dire predictions of the consequences of the gap in perceptions and attitudes between winners and losers. By evaluating motivations that can drive supporters of losing parties to contention, beyond a base desire for power, we see a more clearly focused picture of the mechanisms driving electoral contention.

Chapter 2: Losing the Nation

Introduction

Studies of democratic governance have shown that democracy is dependent on support from the populace; there needs to be the perception of a government's legitimacy in order for peace to last (Diamond 2016, Przeworski 1991). Without the perception of legitimacy, there is an opening for revolution to establish a different structure of rule (or simply to put a different person or group in power) (Diamond 2016). The key players to focus on in order to identify these openings for revolution within electoral democracies are those individuals who have been shut out of power through political loss (Riker 1983). What determines whether or not these political outsiders continue to play by the rules of democracy? The most important factor support for democracy for those who did not win is the perception of legitimacy of the electoral contests and the rules that govern democracy (Przeworski 1991). These perceptions of legitimacy are dependent on the development of institutional trust, which is in turn influenced by the social cohesiveness of the state (Godefroidt, Langer, and Mueleman 2015; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Mill 1861).

Godefroidt, Langer, and Mueleman (2015) find that higher levels of nationalism help to increase institutional trust. Berg and Hjerm (2010) also find that national identity has a positive effect on institutional trust; however, they also explore the relationship between ethnic identity and national trust, and here they find a negative relationship. These higher levels of institutional trust with higher levels of national identity are likely created through the effect of increased social cohesion that nationalism can bring to new and transitioning democracies (Miguel 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Ahlerup and Hansson 2011; Anderson 1991; 2006; Rose 1985;

Smith 1991; Moore and Kimmerling 1995; Abdelal et al. 2006; Raflowski 2016, Alesina and Reich 2013; Moran 2011; Reeskens and Wright 2014; Huddy 2013; Huddy and Khatib 2007). While research has shown that nationalism is helpful for state-building, especially in post-colonial states, little of the literature discusses the inherent struggle that elections create in achieving this goal of a cohesive national identity. This paper explores the tensions between elections, partisan status (as winners, losers, or non-partisans) and identity, showing how electoral loss can strain individual connections to the national level of identity, which can in turn reduce trust in democratic institutions.

An individual's identity is one of the most fundamentally important aspects of a person. It determines how a person relates to the world by helping to shape his or her worldview (Shils 1975; Berger and Luckman 1967; Geertz 1977). For the purposes of this paper, identity is defined as "the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations to other individuals and collectivities" (Jenkins 1996). While the identities of individuals are fairly stable, every individual within society belongs to several different groups at one time—which groups they connect with the most depends on social and political structures within society. Chandra (2012) categorizes the identity that is most salient at a particular time as the "activated" identity. For example, a person can be a Kenyan, a Luo, a Christian, a Dholuo speaker, etc.; which of these identities an individual feels most strongly describes their identity is considered their "activated" identity. How strongly tied to any particular group an individual feels is very context-dependent. Socially, we can be primed to feel closest to the identity that can bring us the most

success, or the identity that is most represented around us. We can also be drawn to the identity that is generally the most visible—because that is how others will be most readily able to identity us as, especially if that identity can be socially isolating. This paper uses this categorization in understanding the hierarchy of connection to identity any particular individual may feel at any point in time, focusing particularly on ethnic and national levels of identity and how electoral results can influence the strength of the connection to these identities.

Past research exploring nationalism, ethnicity, and elections focuses on the relationships found in the following three themes:

> *(1). Ethnicity and political mobilization (Birnir 2007; Posner 2004),*
>
> *(2). Ethnic groups' levels of political power and national pride (Wimmer 2017; Smith and Kim 2006; Staerklé et al. 2010; Masella 2013; Robinson 2016)*
>
> *(3). Electoral competition and identity (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Michelitch 2015; Whitaker and Giersch 2015; Nakai 2018).*

However, these studies are missing important aspects of the relationship between elections and identity. For the studies that use ethnic groups as their main unit of interest (themes 1 and 2 from above), we miss the individualized party-based reaction to elections—which could be divergent from the reactions of the individual's ethnic group. These studies are somewhat limited in their ability to understand supporters of electoral losers because they are aggregating their information at the ethnic group level and not necessarily on the political level. This assumption of ethnic-based political groupings does not necessarily reflect the reality of the salience of ethnic-based identity politics across sub-Saharan Africa (Horowitz and Klaus 2018) and is therefore too constraining for the scope of this study. In my investigation of the

relationship between political connections and identity activation, this paper uses the winner-loser gap literature framework to study the effects individual partisan support status—winners, losers, and non-partisans—can have on the likelihood of an individual associating with the national identity or with the ethnic identity. For those studies that do focus on the individual (theme 3 from above), most measure the effects of political competition, which is inherently pre-election and therefore we do not see how the results of the election influence identity activation of winners, losers, and non-partisans. By studying the post-election identity activation of winners, losers, and non-partisans we can see that the identity activations made during the pre-election run up can be enduring for losers and non-partisans.

This paper discusses the relationship between political experience and the choice of ethnic or national identity in two steps. First, I examine how the experience of political loss influences personal identity choice for winners, losers and non-partisans in a cross-national study using data collected in 15 African states within the Afrobarometer surveys. I find that individuals who support parties that have lost elections are less likely to identify strongly with the national identity. Individuals who do not support any particular party are even less likely than those who support electoral losers to identify strongly with the national identity. In addition to my focus generally on political losers, I also look to see if the effect that political loss has on ethnic identity activation is compounded through the experience of loss over time by looking at supporters of parties which have been out of power for two elections or more. I do not find any evidence that supporters of parties who are out of power for

any additional time have any additional likelihood of identifying less with the national identity.

Second, I explore how activation of ethnic or national identity influences the level of trust individuals have in democratic institutions. Understanding the rate of national identity activation for individuals who support winners, losers, or no party at all is helpful, but we also need to look beyond this general idea to see what the consequences of these varying strengths of ethnic and national identity are. Are there differences in democracy-related perceptions for individuals who activate lower levels of identity, such as ethnic identity, instead of national identity? I argue that there are differences in democracy perception between individuals who activate their national identity and those who activate their ethnic identity. I test this relationship between lower levels of connection to the national identity and lower confidence in the quality and efficacy of democratic institutions through an original survey of 405 Ghanaian individuals, conducted in June 2013—in the midst of a Supreme Court case over contested electoral results. This survey is particularly useful because it was undertaken post-election and pre-verdict so it is less likely to be influenced by the actual outcome of the election as determined by the court. I find evidence that having a weaker connection to the national identity is connected to a weaker trust in the democratic institutions that are purported to reinforce the legitimacy of the electoral system.

The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. First, I will briefly discuss the extant literature on nationalism and ethnicity in politics and on the winner-loser gap. Following this, I will discuss my main arguments, that activated

identity differences are driven by political experiences and lower levels of national-level activated identities decrease the rates of institutional trust. I will then discuss methodological strategy and data used to test the first argument, for both the relationship between electoral loss and identity choices. Following this I will discuss in detail the results of the statistical tests run. I will then discuss the data and methodology used to test the second argument, relationship between identity choice and institutional trust. Next, I will discuss the results of the second set of statistical tests run. Finally, I will explore the ramifications of the results of this paper for our understanding of the relationship between identity and politics in African states.

Literature Review

Identity and Electoral Politics

> *"A society can function perfectly well if its citizens hold multiple identities, but problems arise when those subnational identities arouse loyalties that override loyalty to the nation as a whole."*
>
> - *Paul Collier 2009*

In the comparative politics literature, these activated identity levels are often represented as identity choices, or hats for individuals to choose between in order to best fight for their interests in society (Posner 2005; 2017; Chandra 2006; 2012; Shayo 2009; Hale 2002; McCauley 2014; 2017; van der Veen and Laitin 2012; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). Many of these studies also argue that the identity activated by a particular individual is influenced by the political structure of the state, with an individual most likely to select the identity expected to produce the highest return in goods and services to the individual. This definition rests on an assumption of the

endogenous nature of identity—meaning that individual identity is not based in primordial truth exogenous to other factors, but instead identity is shaped by political and social forces (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Bisin and Verdier 2000; Greenfield and Eastwood 2007). That is not to say that the underlying identities themselves are not durable or resistant to these societal forces, but rather that the importance of these identities to individuals and groups can be influenced by social and political factors (Hale 2004; Scott 1990).

The two types of potentially activated identities that I will focus on are ethnic identities and national identities. These are not the only two (or sometimes not even the most important two) identity possibilities for individuals, but they do illustrate how people's status as winner or loser shapes their interactions with society differently. There are several different conceptualizations of national identity and ethnic identity within the literature, so it is important to outline the specific meanings of the terms for the project. For the purposes of this paper, ethnic identity is defined in line with Chandra (2012):

> "A subset of categories in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership. But here it is sufficient to note that this subset includes, subject to those restrictions, identity categories based on the region, religion, sect, language family, language, dialect, caste, clan, tribe or nationality of one's parents or ancestors, or one's own physical features" (Chandra 2012, 10).

The national of identity is inclusive of all members of the state, whereas an individual who chooses to identify with his/her ethnic group sees themselves as more closely tied to a smaller group within the state. Thus, the major difference between the two is the exclusivity of the term.

This paper focuses on the activated social identity of individuals following elections because electoral success or failure can determine how a person relates to the society he or she lives in by activating particular identities that coincide with their perceived status. It examines the likelihood that winners, losers, and non-partisans will identify with the national identity or with sub-national ethnic identity. Losers are more likely to see themselves in the out-group of society, at odds with those in power, which can shape their interactions with their society (Charness et al. 2007; Chen and Li 2009). Therefore, examining where individuals believe they fit within the structure of society—i.e., their identity activation choices—reveals underlying motivations for their attitudes and behaviors. For example, Birnir (2007) discusses the potential consequences of exclusion from power, showing that denial of access to power can result in an increased likelihood of violence.

It is also important to take into account other factors that can influence the activation of the national of identity. When looking beyond power-related factors of national identity preference, studies have found individual-level factors (education, competition for employment, income level, religion) and regional or country-level factors (per capita GDP, ethnic diversity) that can influence personal likelihood of identifying with the national identity (Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten 2017; Masella 2013; Robinson 2014; Bannon et al. 2004; Clots-Figueras and Masella 2010; Bisin et al. 2008; Manning and Roy 2009; Constant et al. 2009). Other studies have found mixed results on the relationship between ethnic group size and the likelihood of national identification. Robinson (2014) contends that larger groups would be more likely to identify with the nation. Masella (2013) found that ethnic diversity also

regulates how group size influences national identification, with higher levels of ethnic diversity causing larger groups to be more likely to identify with the nation than smaller groups, and the reverse being true in cases of lower levels of ethnic diversity.

Importance of Ethnicity in Politics in Africa

Numerous studies have explored the role of ethnicity-based motivations for candidate support in developing democracies.[9] Additionally, other work has shown support for the idea that, once in power, leaders show preference for their personal ethnic group or for the regions where their ethnic group is concentrated; and, in turn, that co-ethnics of the leaders are more likely to believe they are being fairly treated by the government (Ahlerup and Isaksson 2015; Burgess et al. 2015; Franck and Rainer 2012; Kramon and Posner 2016).

It is likely that by measuring individuals by ethnic group rather than partisan attachment researchers could be missing important aspects of political identity in Africa. Horowitz and Klaus (2018) also show evidence that ethnic appeals from politicians can backfire and lead to decreased support for politicians. They also argue that there is no real effect in making claims of ethnic-based land insecurity vs. general claims of land insecurity. This argument suggests that the ethnic nature of some political rhetoric is driven by political leadership rather than real group sentiment. By starting from political identity and seeing how individuals self-categorize, we will get

[9] A sample of this vast literature: Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Bates 1983; Chandra 2004; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Ferree 2006; Posner 2005; Butler and Broockman 2011; McClendon 2016; Pande 2003; Birnir 2007; Preuhs 2006; Kasara 2007; Carlson 2015; Ferree 2010; Conroy-Krutz and Moehler 2015; Ichino and Nathan 2013; Posner 2005; Adida 2015; Bratton and Kimenyi 2008; Heath et al. 2015; Horowitz 2016; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Posner 2005; Bratton, Bhavani, and Chen 2012; Horowitz and Long 2016; Dickson and Scheve 2006; Horowitz 1985

a clearer picture of the political effects of exclusion from power, rather than the ethnic group effects so often studied. In these past studies, researchers have found that members of ethnic groups who are in power are more likely to say that they are proud to identify with their nation (Wimmer 2017; Smith and Kim 2006; Staerklé et al. 2010; Masella 2013; Robinson 2016). Green (2018) looks at this relationship between identity and power specifically for the "core" ethnic group[10], finding that when out of power, the core group is more likely to identify at the ethnic level. However, there is no indication whether the individual ethnic group members actually supported the co-ethnic politician whose power they are assumed to support.

While in many African states there is a very strong correlation between ethnicity and political party support, it is important to look at this relationship outside of the lens of ethnic groups. This study examines this relationship between political power and connection to the national identity, but with a shift in focus away from ethnic subgroups to instead focus on individual supporters of political losers and individual non-partisans. Kabiri (2014) argues that using ethnic groups instead of political parties in research concerning African development makes too much of an assumption of the commonality of goals of ethnic groups (Chandra 2006; Keefer 2010). Batty (2011) also underlines this point, arguing that not all members of ethnic groups want the same thing.

I argue that these characterizations of the problems associated with the use ethnic groups in studies of development apply equally, if not more, to studies of the influence of electoral politics. While it is true that co-ethnic representation matters

[10] Core ethnic groups make up the primary or dominant ethnic group of the state, have historically controlled the state, and are the primary model for which the national level of identity is built.

and co-ethnic voting is strong in a great deal of African states, it is also true that if we focus solely on ethnic group behaviors we are potentially missing politically-motivated attitudes and behaviors. For example, Conroy-Krutz (2016) finds that co-ethnic support in politics can be undercut by class-level interests that cross ethnic lines within a state. All of these studies underline the need to move beyond ethnic groups as the go-to sub-grouping of interest in studies of African politics.

> "If ethnic groups are the same as political parties, when studying politics, why not actually use these parties as the variable as opposed to ethnicity. If there is growth past initial heuristics, we will miss it if we are only looking at ethnicity first and foremost as the political unit of Africa" (Kabiri 2014).

I argue that in the study of electoral politics it is more useful to use political parties and their supporters, the official actors within these elections, rather than ethnic groups when examining the effects elections have on individuals. By shifting focus from ethnic groupings to individuals within political groupings, I can hone in more on the direct relationship between political power and nationalism, and we can better understand how political experiences drive individual attitude and behaviors. For this paper, the political grouping that I am using follows the winner-loser gap literature in aggregating political parties to their partisan status—as winners, losers, or non-partisans—because it simplifies the relationship across countries and allows for the understanding to focus on how access to power influenced identity activation.

Winner-Loser Gap and Institutional Trust

Research studying the inherent differences in perceptions of democracy between winners and losers underlines the need for a partisan-based approach to understanding the relationship between different levels of identity activation and support for democracy. Past research has shown that being counted among the

supporters for leaders who win elections is ideal. You are likely to reap the benefits from your win—even if not materially, emotionally there is a positive boost for those who supported the winners (Anderson et al. 2005; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Listhaug 1995; Bowler and Donovan 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Clark and Kornberg 1992; Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978; Rich 2015; Rich and Holmes 2016; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Jou 2009; Fuchs et al 1995; Cho and Bratton 2005; Esaiasson 2010; Curini et al. 2012). Supporters of politicians that lose elections, on the other hand, are less likely to be satisfied with the political system, less likely to trust the government, and less likely to feel like their needs are being met by the government. A third group of individuals, non-partisans, has historically been left out of studies but is getting more attention recently (Rich 2015; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Rich and Holmes 2016). Building on the studies that explore how differences in voter affiliation influence perceptions of democracy and state leadership, scholars have begun to explore this relationship within African states (Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Rich and Holmes 2016). These works are particularly focused on the relationship between winning and/or losing and the perceptions of democracy, finding that both winners and losers can show illiberal ideals—winners supporting elite non-democratic behavior, and losers having little faith in the system of democracy altogether (Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Conroy-Krutz and Nicholas 2015). More research is also focusing on the effects of the experiences of winning and losing over time, finding that winners and losers who have been in their position for longer have bigger gaps in

their satisfaction with democracy and that the effects of winning and losing are robust over time (Chang, Chu, Wu 2014; Dahlberg and Linde 2017). I incorporate these findings by including non-partisans in my study, disaggregating winners and losers based on previous election performance, and adjusting testing that allow for the measurement of likelihood that varies across categories of partisan status.

This paper argues that identity activation is the mechanism driving these differences in perceptions of democracy following elections between winners, losers and non-partisans, particularly as it relates to the development and maintenance of institutional trust. Trust is especially important for democratic governance because the leaders of democracies cannot rely on coercion to the same extent as other, more authoritarian regimes. Wong, Wan, and Hsaio (2011) argue that democratic consolidation in new democracies can be aided by higher levels of institutional trust. Several studies have examined factors that can help to build and maintain institutional trust, finding that institutional trust is related to government performance and the ability for the system to increase or maintain the well-being of society (Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Hutchison and Johnson 2011). Studies have also explored the relationship between more general trust amongst the people living in the state and institutional trust but results of these studies are mixed (Mishler and Rose 2001; Kaase 1999; Christensen and Laegried 2005; Schoon and Cheng 2011; Doring 1992; Newton 2001). Other studies have shown that there is a strong relationship between higher levels of national identity and higher levels of institutional trust (Berg and Hjerm 2010; Godefroidt, Langer, and Mueleman 2015). This paper shows that following a disputed election, in a time of political uncertainty, individuals with

higher levels of national identity activation have a higher level of trust in the institutions of democracy.

Causal Pathway

Mechanism activated by exclusion from power

Posner (2005; 2017) argues that political institutions of a state determine the activation of cleavages within society. He focuses on how electoral structures of political institutions influence the incentives for group mobilization at different levels. This paper extends this idea by arguing that it is not just the political structure of the state that determines identity choices within states, but also the political outcomes (Wimmer 2017; Green 2018). Losers, winners, and non-partisans will identify themselves differently based on how they see themselves relating to the state and other members of society. Eifert, Miguel and Posner (2010) explore the relationship between ethnicity and elections, arguing that ethnicity becomes more salient around competitive elections. However, in almost all these studies on the relationship between politics and identity there is a focus on ethnic groups as the unit of interest. By omitting partisan status as a unit of interest we are missing an instrumental link between politics and identity that cannot be assumed to align perfectly with ethnic identity. This paper extends this investigation of identity and electoral politics by looking past the ethnic groups and focusing on individuals participating in electoral contests as supporters of parties regardless of the party's ethnic ties, examining the differences in identity activation of winners, losers, and non-partisans. The winner-loser gap literature argues that electoral losers feel dissatisfied after losing, which some suggest could be problematic for democracy.

However, more exploration of the mechanisms that relate losing elections to the decay of democratic support should be done. By studying activated identity, we can show an identity-based pathway from electoral loss to individual disillusionment with democracy.

Figure 1 depicts the main structure and flow of the pathway from electoral loss to identity activation, and the general relationship between institutional trust and identity activation levels. I argue that the experience of political loss causes individuals to feel more disconnected from the national identity, which in turn opens a space for these excluded individuals to turn to the activation of sub-national identities like ethnic identity. Because of lower levels of national identity activation, these individuals will also have lower levels of institutional trust, which can be a problem for maintaining democracy.

Figure 1. Causal pathway describing the relationship between electoral loss, identity activation, and institutional trust



After an electoral loss, an individual will need to find a way to reconcile the fact that their chosen candidate did not win, and they will not have access to power or the spoils that power provides (Birnir 2007). We know that electoral losers and non-partisans do not have much trust and confidence in the system or leaders (Anderson et al. 2005; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Anderson and Guillory 1997), and

are likely to expect less from those in charge. This suggests losers will likely also have a lessened connection to the national identity. One of their other, sub-national identities is likely to become more salient, filling the void left by the weakened sense of national identity. For this paper, I use ethnic identity as an example type of sub-national identity that is likely to replace national identity. This leads to the development of my first hypothesis:

H_1: Losers and non-partisans are less likely to activate their national identity

However, this basic relationship only tells us a partial story about the relationship between partisan status and identity activation. In order to get a more nuanced understanding of this relationship I also want to explore if disaggregating winners and losers based on previous electoral experiences tells a different story about the effects of winning or losing on national identity activation. I expect that non-partisans and consistent losers will have the lowest levels of national identity activation because of the relative stability of their absence from power and consistent winners will have the highest rates of national identity activation because of the relative stability of their power. This leads to the development of my second hypothesis and its corollary:

H_{2a}: Non-partisans and consistent losers are less likely to activate their national identity

H_{2b}: Consistent winners are the most likely to activate their national identity

Additionally, I argue that the connection individuals feel to the national identity influences their confidence and trust in the institutions of democracy. This relationship has been well-explored in the literatures of democratization and

nationalism,[11] but my study adds to this by looking at this relationship during a particular period of political instability in which the institutions of democracy are actively being challenged. This leads to my third hypothesis:

> *H_3: In times of political uncertainty, individuals who have a more highly activated national identity are more likely to have higher levels of institutional trust*

Research Design

This section will begin with an overview of the research design, data, and methodology used to test each hypothesis. First, I will discuss the data used to explore the first two hypotheses using a cross-national research deign and results. Second, I will discuss the survey used to explore the third hypothesis, which was conducted in Ghana. Finally, I will present the results of these tests.

Methodology

Cross-National Research Design

The data used to test the first and second hypothesis is from the third, fourth, and fifth rounds of the Afrobarometer. This survey data was collected in 15 countries (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).[12] African countries serve as an appropriate sample because they exhibit cross-national variation in the independent and dependent variables as well as alternative explanations. African states tend to have very high levels of ethnic fractionalization,

[11] For examples see: Miguel 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Ahlerup and Hansson 2011; Anderson 1991; 2006; Rose 1985; Smith 1991; Moore and Kimmerling 1995; Abdelal et al. 2006; Raflowski 2016, Alesina and Reich 2013; Moran 2011; Reeskens and Wright 2014; Huddy 2013; Huddy and Khatib 2007

[12] Afrobarometer Data, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); Rounds 3, 4, 5; 2004-2014, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org

which allows ethnic identity to be a viable alternative to national identity. However, there is also a high level of variation in the political salience of ethnicity for the countries sampled (Posner 2004). This allows me to isolate the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and identity choice from how elections influence the likelihood of self-classification in each of the identity types. Finally, using sub-Saharan Africa as a sample allows for variation in other important variables, such as low development and weak governance systems (Hdr.undp.org 2018; Polity IV Project 2017).

The dependent variable used to test my first hypothesis, most important identity type (*Identity*), is taken from a question from the Afrobarometer asking respondents to choose between being their national identity and being the ethnic identity that they had self-classified themselves as in a previous question:

> "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [ENTER NATIONALITY] and being a _____ [R's Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?"

The options for response were:

> 1). I feel only [respondent's ethnic group]
> 2). I feel more [respondent's ethnic group] than [national level of identity]
> 3). I feel equally [national level of identity] and [respondent's ethnic group]
> 4). I feel more [national level of identity] than [respondent's ethnic group]
> 5). I feel only [national level of identity].

I chose this question as the best representation of activated identity because it explicitly asks the respondent to examine their identity attachments and decide which of these two is more important to them at the time. There are many other identity choices besides ethnicity that could be activated for a particular person at any given time that could show them as less connected to the national level of identity, but

ethnicity is particularly powerful in African states because of its ubiquity in both public and private life in most African states (Ekeh 1975). Below is a table showing the overall averages of identity activation rates for each of the countries included in my study. There are some outliers in a few categories of identity activation for particular countries, but generally, most states follow a similar pattern of identity activation.

Table 1: Country-level average identity activation choices

Country	Only Ethnic	More Ethnic than National	Equally National and Ethnic	More National than Ethnic	Only National
Botswana	8%	6%	52%	4%	30%
Ghana	2%	7%	52%	11%	28%
Lesotho	5%	6%	52%	5%	33%
Malawi	11%	5%	43%	5%	37%
Mali	8%	14%	35%	8%	35%
Namibia	6%	7%	43%	9%	35%
Nigeria	6%	20%	52%	11%	11%
South Africa	3%	9%	25%	11%	53%
Tanzania	2%	3%	18%	8%	69%
Uganda	5%	12%	57%	10%	15%
Zambia	3%	6%	61%	7%	22%
Zimbabwe	7%	7%	37%	12%	36%
Overall	5%	9%	44%	9%	33%

The main independent variables, *Partisan Status*, and *Nuanced Partisan Status* for the tests were based on an Afrobarometer survey question asking which political party, if any, the respondent felt closest to.

"Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that?"

For *Partisan Status,* those who responded as feeling close to the party that won in the elections held the previous year were coded as the winners and those who supported any other political party were coded as losers. If the respondent did not feel any

allegiance to a particular party, they were coded as non-partisans.[13] For the *Nuanced Partisan Status* variable, I combined the results of the most recent election with the election previous to create an indicator variable representing those who won both elections, *consistent winners*, those who came to power through the most recent election, *new winners*, those who lost power in the most recent election, *new losers*, and those who lost both elections, *consistent losers*. I also included a category for those who do not support any party to fully capture the spectrum of this more nuanced partisan status measure. *Nuanced Partisan Status* is a categorical variable because there is not a linear relationship between it and likelihood of national identity activation as can be seen in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Relationship between nuanced partisan status and identity activation

Nuanced Partisan Status	Only Ethnic	More Ethnic	Equally Ethnic and National	More National	Only National
Non-Partisan	6%	10%	44%	9%	31%
Consistent Loser	5%	9%	42%	10%	34%
New Loser	4%	7%	47%	11%	31%
New Winner	4%	7%	45%	10%	35%
Consistent Winner	4%	7%	39%	9%	40%

The parties included in the study were tracked through states over the course of three survey rounds and categorized as winners or losers in each round based on the most recent election held prior to the survey data collection. Importantly, this means that the populations for each survey round only measure those actively supporting the party and that party allegiance could have changed since the time of

[13] It is important to note that this is not a perfect indication of support for a party because there could be some incentive to mislead survey collectors about true partisan choices, but absent individually-identified voting data, it is the best measure available to us (Carlson 2016).

the election. To control for these changes, I have also included a measure, *Time since Last Election*, which should help to control for any adjustments that people could make between the time of the election and the time of the survey collection. I also included a measure for the difference in vote share for the two parties earning the highest vote shares in the previous election. This vote share difference is controlled for to help account for the competitiveness of the previous election, which has been shown to correlate with pre-election identity activation (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010).

Additionally, because I am measuring party groups over several rounds of surveys that were conducted over the course of eight years, it is possible that individuals changed party affiliation over this time. While this is important to note, it should not influence my interpretation of the data because what I am interested in is active supporters. While it would be useful to know which supporters change allegiance and how those individuals differ from those who consistently stay with a particular party, it is outside the scope of this project.[14]

In addition to the independent variable and election-related variables, I also included several control variables both at the institutional and individual level to help isolate the effects of winning and losing on the likelihood of national or ethnic identity activation.

Institution Level Variables

Salience of ethnicity

[14] It is also important to note that this is not a panel study; the individuals surveyed over each round of the Afrobarometer survey are not the same. Therefore, the individuals captured within my measurements should be thought of as average supporters rather than particular individuals.

I controlled for the level of political salience of ethnicity within the states in my sample using Posner's (2004) Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG).[15] This measure is particularly important because I am testing for the importance of national and ethnic identities at the individual level and these identity preferences will be effected by the overall importance of identity in a state. I would expect that in states with higher levels of ethnic salience there would be less difference in the self-classification responses of winners, losers, and non-partisans because each member of the states with higher saliency of ethnicity will be more likely to identify with the ethnic identity.

Political System

I controlled for the type of political system within a state: parliamentary vs. presidential systems. I would expect that in a presidential system, where the leader is directly elected, would create a wider gap between winners, losers, and non-partisans because they are voting for a separate candidate, not just representatives from their district who will in turn elect a leader. Voting directly for a candidate is likely to create a more direct connection to the particular individual than in cases where a voter is simply supporting a party. The data used to categorize the party system was taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2018).

Tenure of Governmental System

I controlled for the tenure of the system of governance for the state. Governmental systems that have been in place for longer are likely to be inherently more stable and trusted by the population of the state because of the extra experiences

[15] I ran additional models using ELF as an alternative measure of ethnic diversity. The results of these models were consistent with those found when using PREG and can be found in the appendix.

of democracy these citizens have had (Lindberg 2009). The data used to measure the tenure of the system of governance was taken from the Database of Political Institutions based on the length of time a government has been deemed democratic or autocratic based on the Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness.[16]

Critical Media Presence

I controlled for the presence of a media that is critical of the ruling party and its leaders. States that have more control over the media have been shown to have wider gaps in democratic satisfaction than states that allow for the media to be critical of their decision-making and actions (Lelkes 2016). To do so I incorporate another V-Dem measure, which gauges the ability and likelihood of the media to criticize the government. If the media outlets within the state have more freedom that suggests a higher level of civil liberty protection, and it also prevents the incumbent from controlling the narrative about the electoral results.

GDP Growth and Freedom House Polity Index

I controlled for GDP growth per capita because the economic development of a state has been found to influence the rates of national identity activation (Bannon et al. 2004; Robinson 2014; Horowitz 2001). I would expect states with higher GDP growth to have higher overall rates of national identity activation than those with lower rates of GDP growth. Additionally, I controlled for the level of democratic development within states through the Freedom House Polity Index which is an average of the freedom house and polity IV democracy scores for states. Controlling for democratization level is important because it has been found to be related to the

[16] The Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness is based on the legality of competitive parties, the existence of national assemblies, and the vote share achieved by the highest party.

level of nationalism within a state (Alherup and Hansson 2011). Both of these measures of development were taken from the V-DEM database.

Individual level variables

Satisfaction with Democracy

I controlled for the satisfaction with democracy individuals report having in their Afrobarometer responses. Controlling for satisfaction with democracy is particularly important because it has been shown to be connected to partisan status (Anderson et al. 2005; Chang, Chu and Wu 2014), and it is also an additional indication of an individual moving away from supporting the political system. I would expect those with a lower level of satisfaction with democracy to be less likely to activate their national identity.

Demographic Variables

I also controlled for three individual-level factors that could have been shown to have an effect on the individual's activated identity. These were age, education, and gender (Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten 2017; Masella 2013; Robinson 2014; Bannon et al. 2004; Clots-Figueras and Masella 2010). I expect younger individuals to be more likely to activate their national level identity along with more educated individuals and women.

Results: Cross-National Testing

In order to test the hypotheses laid out in the previous section, I ran ordered logit models that analyzed the relationship between identity activation and partisan status (Fullerton 2009). Model 1 tests the first hypothesis, which states that winners of electoral contests will have higher rates of national identity activation than either losers or non-partisans. My results from this model (see Table 3) show evidence in support of this

hypothesis, as there is a statistically significant relationship between winning elections and activation of the national identity. Losing elections makes an individual more likely to make ethnicity a more important part of his or her identity, and non-partisans have the lowest likelihood of activating their national identity. This is in line with my theory because winning elections should cause individuals to feel a greater confidence and trust in the government and institutions of the state, which would translate into an increased amount of self-identification at the national level. Further, I expect electoral losers and non-partisans to feel disenchanted with the state and therefore turn to other forms of identity as most important.

Table 3: Ordered Logistic Model: differences in identity activation by winner, loser, non-partisan status

	(1) National Identity Activation b/se	(2) National Identity Activation b/se
Winner	**0.255****	--
	(0.11)	--
Loser	0.090	--
	(0.05)	--
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.014	0.014
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	**0.003***	**0.004****
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**
Gender	**-0.053***	**-0.066****
	(0.02)	**(0.02)**
Education	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time Since Election	**0.007***	**0.007***
	(0.00)	**(0.00)**
PREG	-0.286	-0.247
	(0.75)	(0.76)
Tenure of System	0.008	0.009
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Political System	-0.153	-0.178
	(0.30)	(0.31)
Critical Media	-0.199	-0.232
	(0.33)	(0.35)
GDP Growth	1.506	1.753
	(1.39)	(1.43)
Freedom House Polity Index	0.163	0.176
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Vote Share Difference 1&2	0.010	0.010
	(0.01)	(0.01)

Round 4	0.110	0.113
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Round 5	**0.300***	**0.320***
	(0.15)	**(0.16)**
Consistent Loser	**--**	**0.075***
	--	**(0.04)**
New Loser	--	-0.122
	--	(0.21)
New Winner	--	0.165
	--	(0.14)
Consistent Winner	**--**	**0.293****
	--	**(0.09)**
Cut 1		
Constant	-1.469	-1.454
	(0.88)	(0.91)
Cut 2		
Constant	-0.339	-0.322
	(0.91)	(0.94)
Cut 3		
Constant	1.859*	1.898
	(0.95)	(0.98)
Cut 4		
Constant	2.275*	2.312*
	(0.96)	(1.00)
Observations	56307	52974

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

I also calculated the predicted probabilities for the changes to understand the substantive significance of this difference in the self-classification of identity between electoral winners, losers, and non-partisans. Electoral winners were 4 and 7 percentage points more likely to have a more activated national identity than electoral losers and non-partisans, respectively. Figure 2 displays the trends over each of the five categories of identity activation.

Figure 2: Relationship between partisan status and activated identities.



However, when looking at the predicted probabilities for the likelihood of national identity activation using the more nuanced measure of partisan status, I find that there is a greater variation between groups. Consistent winners are more likely than any other group to activation their national identity with about 50 percent likelihood of activation. New losers are the least likely to activate their national identity with only a 38 percent likelihood of activation. New losers are the least likely to activate their national identity, because they are the individuals who are facing a new understanding of the political power distribution process within their state. Prior to their loss they likely had an appreciation for the system that allowed them to gain

power, but the experience of loss within this same system is likely to be jarring and creates a space for losers to change their perspective on the democratic institutions of the state. Both consistent losers and non-partisans are more likely than new losers to activate their national identity, which suggests that it is not just being out of power that matters, but the newness of the lack of power that really makes the difference for identity activation.

Figure 3: Relationship between nuanced partisan status and activated identities.



Robustness check —Ethnic and Regional Effects

While we do find a difference in activated identity between winners, losers, and non-partisans generally, it is important to take a closer look at a particular state to see what these patterns look like for particular parties over time. For this work, I will use Ghana as a case to explore changes in activated identity over time. Ghana is a good case to explore for two particular reasons: 1). there is evidence of both ethnically- and non-ethnically- motivated voting (Ayee 2001; Kim 2017; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Fridy 2007); and 2). there have been regular exchanges of power as well as political uncertainty. Three of Ghana's ten electoral regions are known as political strongholds for the two major parties: Volta and Northern regions for NDC, Ashanti for NPP (Antwi 2018; Faanu and Graham 2017). These regions are highlighted in Figure 4 below. Despite the vast differences in size, there is not much difference in total population size between the three regions because the Ashanti region is more urbanized than either of the other two regions.

Figure 4: Ghana's ethno-political strongholds and swing regions



Using the Afrobarometer data from Rounds 4-7 for the country of Ghana we can see that there are indeed changes in identity activation for both the NPP and NDC. Overall, we can see that there are some general patterns that apply to these parties equally, but there are definite differences in the degree of these changes for each party over time. The data collection timing for these surveys was as follows:

- Round 4 data was collected in Ghana in 2008
- Round 5 data was collected in Ghana in 2012
- Round 6 data was collected in Ghana in 2015
- Round 7 data was collected in Ghana in 2017

Between rounds 4 and 5, a December 2008 election resulted in John Atta Mills and the NDC winning against the NPP and their new candidate Nana Akufo-Addo. The NPP had previously been in power for 8 years, so this was a relatively significant exchange of power. Between rounds 5 and 6, another election was held in December 2012. John Mahama and the NDC were able to hold onto power, but opposition candidate Nana Akufo-Addo and the NPP contested the election results. Between Round 6 and 7 there was an election in December 2016. The NPP was able to retake power for the first time in 8 years. Over the eight years covered in these Afrobarometer rounds, identity activation for NDC and NPP supporters fluctuated greatly. The differences over time can be seen below in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Differences in activated identities for NPP and NDC in Ghana over time



When looking at overall trends in the identity activation of both the NPP and NDC, despite their competition with each other, the supporters of the NDC and NPP generally adjust their activated identities in tandem with each other over time. However, we do see some deviations from these trends that set the NPP and NDC apart at particular times during this 11-year period.

We can see a surge of national identity activation following the exchange of power in 2008. This was the first exchange of power since the 2000 elections, which had marked the first elections since democracy was restored in Ghana's 4th Republic. As such, this historic change of power likely drove a surge of nationalism as Ghanaians of all parties were able to witness a continuation of the peaceful exchange of power through democratic elections.

However, between 2012 and 2015, we see an increase in both extremes of identity activations, with more NPP supporters turning toward activating their ethnic

identities, though both parties do increase their national identity activation rates. Round 6 is the first time we see any statistically significant difference in the rate of ethnic identity activation, with NPP supporters 5 percentage points more likely to have an activated ethnic identity than NDC supporters. The Supreme Court case over the electoral results of the 2012 election occurred just prior to round 6. It is possible that supporters of the Supreme Court's role in helping to decide the election were more likely to feel a surge of national pride, making them more likely to activate their national identity, while those who saw the electoral results and the Supreme Court ruling as a failure of the democratic process were more likely to activate their ethnic identity.

Finally, between 2015 and 2017, national identity activation levels drastically decreased for both parties after the NPP electoral victory. The ethnic identity activation rates for the NPP decrease by a statistically significant amount 5.6 percentage points—and the same rates for the NDC increase by a statistically significant amount—6.2 percentage points. Following their first loss in eight years, supporters of the NDC became much more likely to activate a lower, more exclusive level of identity than they had in previous years. Unlike the previous measurement following an exchange of power, this trend adds additional support for my hypothesis that electoral losers will be less likely than winners to activate their national identity. It may be that power exchanges matter more after there is a contentious election result, or it could be that the large difference in the margin of victory between the 2008 and 2016 elections (0.4% in 2008 vs. 9.5% in 2016) was responsible for the

differences in national identity activation rates, but clearly supporters of NDC drastically shifted their identity activation following the last election.

In addition to overall trends, I also explored how identity activation shifted over time in some of the sub-regions of the state. I was particularly interested in how the political strongholds of Ghanaian politics would shift their identity activation following wins and losses. The first sub-region I examined was the Ashanti region, which is the political stronghold for the NPP and most often supports candidates of Akan descent. In the Ashanti region between rounds 4 and 5, there is a much larger shift toward national level identity activation by the NDC supporters compared to the NPP supporters, which is likely related to the NDC's rise to power during this time as well. This trend is increased between rounds 5 and 6, during the 2012 election and subsequent Supreme Court deliberations. We observe an increase in both parties' activation rate for ethnic identities, but the increase is larger for the NPP supporters, and the NDC supporters' activation rate for national identity also rises significantly. These identity fluctuations for NPP and NCD in the Ashanti Region can be seen below in Figures 6 and 7.

Figure 6: Identity activation for NDC supporters and NPP supporters between 2008 and 2012 in the Ashanti region of Ghana



Figure 7: Identity activation for NDC supporters and NPP supporters between 2012 and 2015 in the Ashanti region of Ghana



In the NDC's two stronghold regions, the swings toward lower national attachment are significantly smaller for the NPP. The smaller differences in swings from national identity for the NPP supporters living in the NDC stronghold are likely related to the relative differences being out of power within the stronghold of those in power (being NPP in NDC territory) vs. being out of power in the stronghold of those out of power (NPP in NPP territory). The NDC supporter identites shift slightly from the national level between rounds 5 and 6 for the Volta region whereas in the Northern region we see a large increase in national-level identity activation for both parties during this time. This shift was likely a result of the election of John Mahama, who was born in that region. These differences between the identity activations in the Volta and in the Northern regions indicate that the relationship between national identity activation and electoral results is not entirely immune to ethnic and regional ties. The fluctuation of identity activations for NDC supporters and NPP supporters can be seen below in Figures 8-11.

Figures 8, 9, 10, & 11: Identity activation for NDC supporters and NPP supporters between 2008 and 2015 in the Volta and Northern regions of Ghana

Figure 8: Identity activation for NDC supporters and NPP supporters between 2008 and 2012 in the Volta region of Ghana



Figure 9: Identity activation for NDC supporters and NPP supporters between 2012 and 2015 in the Volta region of Ghana



Figure 10: Identity activation for NDC supporters and NPP supporters between 2008 and 2012 in the Northern region of Ghana



Figure 11: Identity activation for NDC supporters and NPP supporters between 2012 and 2015 in the Northern region of Ghana



Survey Research Motivation and Design

The third hypothesis which states, in times of political uncertainty, individuals who have a more highly activated national identity are more likely to have higher levels of institutional trust, was tested using original data collected in June 2013, following the 2012 general election in Ghana and in the midst of the Supreme Court case that determined the results of that election. The events of this election are important to understand the context of the survey, so I will provide a brief background of what transpired before detailing the survey and its implementation procedure.

Ghanaian presidential elections are run in 2 rounds. In presidential elections with three or more candidates, if any candidate earns 50% or more of the first round of the voting, they are declared the winner. If no candidate reaches the 50% threshold, a second round of voting occurs 21 days after the first election (ACE: The Electoral Knowledge Network 2013). The general election on December 7th, 2012 resulted in the incumbent from the NDC, President John Mahama,[17] winning with 50.7%, and

[17] Though at the time of the election Mahama was President, he had only served this role for 5 months following the death of his predecessor John Atta Mills. Mahama had served as the Vice President to Mills for nearly four years prior to Mills' death.

the challenger, Nana Afuko-Addo representing the NPP, losing with only 47.7% of the vote ("Ghana election" 2012). With over 50% of the vote President Mahama was declared the winner; however, these results were challenged via a petition to the Supreme Court of Ghana by the NPP, who argued that the Electoral Commission had tampered with the results ("Ghana election" 2012). The Supreme Court investigated the electoral results for eight months. The challenging candidate lauded the proceedings as a win for democracy in Ghana:

> "This case is seeking to deepen our democracy by strengthening the institutions that are mandated by our constitution to superintend the electoral process," Mr Akufo-Addo said "One, by ensuring that the electoral commission is accountable to the people of Ghana; and two, the Supreme Court is seen by all as the ultimate arbiter of electoral grievances and disputes" ("Ghana election" 2012).

In the end, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NDC confirming Mahama's place as Ghana's president.

The events of this election and the subsequent Supreme Court case provided an ideal test case for studying the relationship between activation of a national identity and institutional trust during a time of political uncertainty. Individuals responding did not know what the ultimate decision would be and this was the first time election results were adjudicated in the Supreme Court of Ghana.

In June 2013, while the Supreme Court was deliberating over the election results, I conducted a survey in Accra, Ghana, asking Ghanaians several questions about their identities, perceptions of ethnic equality in Ghana, perceptions of politically contentious behaviors, and their perception of the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's role in determining the validity of the electoral results. This data was collected in various neighborhoods throughout Accra, with clustered samples to

ensure that a diverse range of individuals from varying socioeconomic backgrounds was surveyed.[18] Survey researchers who spoke several Ghanaian languages as well as English were employed to conduct the survey to ensure that no language barriers would prevent any individual from participating in the survey. Researchers were sent out individually to one neighborhood a day, over the course of two weeks, and collected responses from every fourth dwelling. Ultimately, 400 individuals responded to the survey. This data provides an interesting insight into the perceptions of individuals who are not yet winners or losers, allowing for the study of how different levels of national identity salience can influence perceptions of the democratic state institutions. I will examine how individuals perceive the legitimacy of the Supreme Court in their role as arbiters of the conflicting electoral results.

To test for the third hypothesis (in times of political uncertainty following disputed electoral results, individuals who have a more highly activated national identity are more likely to have higher levels of institutional trust) the dependent variable was based on a survey question asking about the respondent's opinion on the Supreme Court case deciding the electoral results of the 2012 presidential election in Ghana. The question read:

> "Let's talk about the most recent election. Currently, the Supreme Court is deciding the winner of the election. Do you think they should be deciding the winner?"

This question measures institutional trust by asking respondents if they support the Supreme Court's role in deciding the legitimacy of the election. If respondents respond yes, they are indicating that they trust the institutional structure of democracy

[18] The Center for Democratic Development Ghana was indispensable in helping to map locations for survey based on socioeconomic status of the various neighborhoods sampled.

in Ghana. If respondents respond no it is an indication that they are less trusting that the system of legitimacy assurance that the Supreme Court is supposed to provide is reliable.

The main independent variable for this model is actually the same as the dependent variable from the previous models. The data is based on the self-identification of individuals based on a question asking individuals to choose between their national and ethnic identities:

> "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ghanaian and being a _____ [R's Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?"

The response options were the same as the Afrobarometer survey:

1). I feel only [respondent's ethnic group],
2). I feel more [respondent's ethnic group] than Ghanaian
3). I feel equally Ghanaian and [respondent's ethnic group]
4). I feel more Ghanaian than [respondent's ethnic group]
5). I feel only Ghanaian

The control variables used for these models asked a bit more about how individuals viewed their group in comparison to other groups on the matters of health care, political influence, and general economic status. These are important to control for because they may increase an individual's likelihood to identify on the sub-state level if they believe they receive less support from the state (Carlson 2016). Additionally, I controlled for the level of trust respondents have for other Ghanaians generally (Robinson 2016). This will help to control for how connected individuals feel to other members of their community. I also controlled for the respondents' willingness to accept the use of violence in politics. I argue this will help to control for general acceptance and approval of democratic institutions in determining winners

and losers in the political system. Finally, I controlled for demographic variables including age, personal economic status, and education; these features can influence the likelihood of identifying with ethnic or national level identities (Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten 2017; Masella 2013; Robinson 2014; Bannon et al. 2004; Clots-Figueras and Masella 2010).

Results: Ghana 2012-13 Supreme Court Proceedings on the 2012 Presidential Election

The results of Model 3 support my second hypothesis, that individuals who identify more strongly with the national identity are more likely to support the legitimacy of the democratic institutions used to resolve disputes over electoral results. The only other statistically significant variable was the overall trust respondents felt they had in other Ghanaians. This result aligns with my theory that a stronger connection to others within a political community helps to create stronger salience for that identity politically. If you can trust more people generally, you are more likely to identify with a wider scope of people, like a national identity would require you to do.

Table 4: Logistic Model 3—differences in support for Supreme Court by identity activation

	(3) Support Court's Role b/se
National-Level Identity Activation	0.343*
	(0.16)
Support for Political Violence	-0.099
	(0.18)
Trust Ghanaians	-0.677*
	(0.29)
Relative Healthcare Group	0.118
	(0.39)
Relative Political Power Group	-0.457
	(0.29)
Relative Economic Status Group	0.592

	(0.39)
Personal Economic Status	-0.251*
	(0.11)
Age	-0.001
	(0.01)
Education Level	0.085
	(0.05)
Constant	0.737
	(0.76)
Observations	315

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As shown here, those who have an activated national identity are 25 percentage points more likely to support the Supreme Court's rule in deciding elections than those who have an activated ethnic identity. Furthermore, those with an activated national identity are 10 percentage points more likely to support the Supreme Court's role in deciding elections than those with equally activated national and ethnic level identities. The full trend can be seen below in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Graph of the predicted probability of support for the role of the Supreme Court of Ghana in determining the legitimacy of the December 2012 general election in Ghana



This gap in support between individuals with different activated identity levels shows that there is a substantively different rate of trust in institutions' ability to maintain and preserve democracy. Understanding these differences in the context of

activated identity can help us better understand the underlying mechanism that causes electoral losers and non-partisans to be less likely to feel satisfied with democracy, trust their governments, and support the institutions of the state. These feelings of disconnection from the government are rooted in the differences in identity activation for losers and non-partisans as compared to winners. Losers and non-partisans do not feel as much a part of the nation as winners do, and this dearth of connection is directly related to being shut out of political power through electoral loss.

Discussion/Conclusion

While past research on the connections between identity activation and politics in Africa has focused almost entirely on the build up to electoral contests, this research expands this study of politics and identity to cover the post-election fallout for losers and non-partisans shut out of power. (Posner 2004; 2017; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Michelitch 2015; Whitaker and Giersch 2015; Nakai 2018). In doing so this study builds on a growing literature exploring the relationship between power and nationalism (Wimmer 2017; Smith and Kim 2006; Staerklé et al. 2010; Masella 2013; Robinson 2016). However, my work deviates from the existing literature on power and nationalism. I study this relationship between power and identity activation by looking specifically at individual political party affiliation instead of ethnic group affiliation, which most previous studies choose to use as their unit of interest. This change of focus from ethnic groups to political groups allows me to explore how individuals experience political loss through elections regardless of the salience of ethnicity in state politics. By limiting a study to only ethnic groups, we

risk missing important developments in alternative voting patterns (Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Fridy 2007; Carlson 2016).

The results of this study show a relationship between an individual's partisan status and their identity activation choices. Supporters of electoral losers and non-partisans are more likely to activate their ethnic identity, and supporters of electoral winners are more likely to activate their national identity. I also found that fresh loss drives supporters of parties that have newly lost power to activate ethnic identity over national identity at a rate higher than any other group. Future research could delve more deeply into this relationship by using panel data that follows individual party supporters to see if these differences hold over time at the individual level in the same way that they appear to hold at the partisan level. The evidence I found from the two biggest Ghanaian political parties did indicate some support for increases in ethnic identity activation following prolonged loss, other evidence showed that exchanges of power between parties can help to increase the overall level of national identity activation over time.

I also found evidence that, during the Supreme Court case on the disputed Ghanaian election of 2012, lower levels of national identity activation decreased the likelihood that individuals would support the role of the Supreme Court in deciding the case. The negative relationship between sub-national identity activation and support for the Supreme Court indicates that lower levels of national identity could decrease the overall level of institutional trust in a state during times of political uncertainty. This could suggest that building national identities could help strengthen democratic institutions and, in turn, foster stability in new and developing

democracies; however, potentially complicating this is the possibility that stability is a necessary prerequisite for a national identity to develop. More research must be done to further explore the true nature of this relationship.

Appendix

Descriptive statistics

Individual Level Data					
Variable	**Count**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Min**	**Max**
Age	71286	36.39	14.62	18.00	110.00
Education	64473	3.79	1.59	1.00	9.00
Gender	72118	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Satisfaction with Democracy	68701	2.50	1.11	1.00	4.00
Round 3	72106	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Round 4	72118	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Round 5	72107	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00
Country, Round Level Data					
Variable	**Count**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Min**	**Max**
Time Since Last Election	48	30.22	17.76	3.42	67.73
Tenure of System	48	11.90	6.89	1.00	27.00
Vote Share Difference Party 1&2	48	35.16	20.48	1.95	76.20
Freedom House Polity Index	48	6.16	2.10	1.92	9.33
GDP Growth	48	0.02	0.07	-0.17	0.26
Critical Media	48	2.31	0.47	2.00	3.00
Country Level Data					
Variable	**Count**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Min**	**Max**
PREG	16	0.39	0.25	0.00	0.71
System	16	0.19	0.40	0.00	1.00
ELF	16	0.59	0.27	0.00	0.93

Supplemental Regression Table: Ordered Logistic Models: differences in identity activation by partisan status with alternative ethnic salience measure

	(1) National Identity Activation b/se	(2) National Identity Activation b/se
Partisan Status	0.145***	--
	(0.04)	--
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.013	0.013

	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	**0.003***	**0.003***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	**-0.054***	**-0.068****
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.02)	(0.02)
ELF	-0.440	-0.442
	(0.50)	(0.50)
Time Since Election	**0.006***	**0.007***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tenure of System	0.008	0.009
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Political System	-0.105	-0.148
	(0.28)	(0.29)
Critical Media	-0.131	-0.153
	(0.34)	(0.37)
GDP Growth	1.540	1.789
	(1.35)	(1.38)
Freedom House Polity Index	0.145	0.157
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Vote Share Difference 1&2	0.009	0.009
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Round 4	0.110	0.109
	(0.14)	(0.13)
Round 5	**0.301***	**0.323***
	(0.14)	(0.15)
Non-Partisan	--	0.000
	--	(Baseline)
Consistent Loser	**--**	**0.074***
	--	(0.03)
New Loser	--	-0.127
	--	(0.21)
New Winner	--	0.151
	--	(0.13)
Consistent Winner	**--**	**0.331*****
	--	(0.08)
cut1		
Constant	-1.617	-1.606
	(0.85)	(0.88)
cut2		
Constant	-0.488	-0.474
	(0.88)	(0.90)
cut3		
Constant	1.713	1.748
	(0.91)	(0.94)

cut4		
Constant	2.130*	2.163*
	(0.92)	(0.95)
Observations	56307	52974

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Difference of proportion tests for NDC and NPP over rounds 4–7 of the Afrobarometer

	Ethnic		**Equal**		**National**	
	Z-score	P-Value	Z-score	P-Value	Z-score	P-Value
Difference R4 & R5: NDC	2.91	0.00	3.44	0.00	-8.39	0.00
Difference R4 & R5: NPP	-2.96	0.00	-3.69	0.00	5.44	0.00
Difference R5 & R6: NDC	2.63	0.01	1.85	0.06	-3.41	0.00
Difference R5 & R6: NPP	4.68	0.00	2.04	0.04	-4.55	0.00
Difference R6 & R7: NDC	2.63	0.01	-6.02	0.00	4.41	0.00
Difference R6 & R7: NPP	4.68	0.00	-7.89	0.00	6.16	0.00

Descriptive Variables Accra, Ghana Survey

Variable	**Count**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Min**	**Max**
Support Court's Role	364	0.74	0.44	0	1
National-Level Identity Activation	402	2.44	0.98	0	5
Support for Political Violence	368	0.58	0.79	0	2
Trust Ghanaians	406	0.29	0.45	0	1
Relative Healthcare Group	418	0.84	0.37	0	1
Relative Political Power Group	418	0.29	0.45	0	1
Relative Economic Status Group	418	0.19	0.39	0	1
Personal Economic Status	409	2.98	1.28	1	5
Age	416	33.21	14.95	18	72
Education Level	416	8.27	10.45	0	12

Chapter 3—Finding an Outlet:

Introduction

Since the third wave of democracy in the 1970s, elections have become the norm for both democratic and, more recently, autocratic states (Huntington 1991; Diamond 2016; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2015). Elections are considered essential for stability in democratic systems because they allow for a peaceful exchange of power, and they also benefit states with authoritarian regimes by enforcing accountability (Diamond 2016; Miller 2015). While elections present a unique opportunity for peaceful contestation for political power, they inherently produce contention between two groups vying for power (Butcher and Goldsmith 2016; Salehyan and Linebarger 2015). Ginsberg and Weissberg (1978) argue that "every election represents a test and potentially a threat to support for the political regime. Electoral conflicts may strain public acceptance of legal and institutional processes" (34).

Elections create friction because they can change the entire political system simply by allowing for a change in leadership. Different parties run states differently and dole out benefits to supporters, so voters will react differently to the results depending on whether the party they support won the election or not (Riker 1983; Anderson et al. 2005). Birnir (2007) finds that, for ethnically-based parties, prolonged exclusion from power can result in an increased likelihood of contention. The winner-loser gap literature has been built around these understandings of the potential consequences of not having access to political power. These studies generally find that losers have a lower satisfaction with democracy, have less trust in the government, and are less likely to feel their participation in politics matters

(Anderson et al. 2005; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Listhaug 1995; Bowler and Donovan 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Clark and Kornberg 1992; Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978; Rich 2015; Rich and Holmes 2016; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Jou 2009; Cho and Bratton 2005; Esaiasson 2010; Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2011; Chang, Chu, and Wu 2014; Davis and Hitt 2017; Davis 2014; Howell and Justwan 2013; Delgado 2016; Dalhberg and Linde 2017; Han and Chang 2016; Lelkes 2016). However, very few of these studies have explored the difference between winners' and losers' attitudes about willingness to participate in contention (Anderson and Mendes 2006; Van-Dusky-Allen 2017). Moreover, only a few, more recent, studies have explored how individuals who don't support any party are similar to or different from winners and losers in their attitudes toward democracy (Rich 2015; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Rich and Holmes 2016; Rich and Tracee 2018).

While these works find a myriad of differences in democracy satisfaction and perception between winners, losers, and non-partisans, they often fail to connect these differences to real indicators of potential threat to democracy. In this paper, I seek to expand on these limited understandings with new insight into the different attitudes winners, losers, and non-partisans have concerning contentious political behaviors. This paper shows how supporting winners, losers, or no parties (non-partisans) influences individual attitudes towards three different measurements of contentious political behavior: (i) acceptance of violence in politics, (ii) willingness to participate in political demonstrations or protests, and (iii) willingness to participate in political

violence. In contrast to what the winner-loser gap often claims, I find that winners and losers actually have similar likelihoods in acceptance and willingness to participate in contention. The group that is least likely to show interest in political contention and violence is actually the non-partisans. These results suggest that engagement in party politics plays a role in increasing tensions on both sides by increasing investment in the results of elections.

I also explore these relationships with a disaggregated measure of partisan support to allow for differences between those who are new to winning and losing and those who have been in their position of winner or loser for a longer time period. Generally speaking, when thinking about how people react to losing elections, we think about winners and losers as a simple comparison between two groups. This is the same way we think about all grievances—i.e., the haves vs. the have nots. However, this is not how these groups exist in reality. Not every loser has had the same experience of losing, nor have all winners had the same history of winning. Knowing this, we need to look at how circumstances of loss affect people's attitudes and behaviors. The results of these tests show mixed likelihoods over the three measures of perception of contention and violence, with new losers being the most willing to accept the necessity of violence, consistent winners being the most likely to want to participate in political demonstrations and consistent losers being the most likely to showing willingness to perpetrate political violence.

However, while these findings that winners and losers are similar in their willingness to accept and participate in contention show that some of the concerns of the winner-loser gap may be overstated, the most important difference from the works

of the winner-loser gap relates to the measure this literature often uses as a proxy for the likelihood of future contention. I find that for both sets of testing with the aggregated and disaggregated measures of partisan status when looking at the likelihood of acceptance and willingness to participate in political violence the factor with the biggest influence was actually the individual's level of support for democracy. This finding that support for democracy matters more for the likelihood of acceptance of and willingness to participate in contention suggests that the winner-loser gap may be missing the point when using alternative democracy perception measures to quantify the risk of losers rejecting the results of an election.

The following sections of the paper will outline the structure and logic of the relationship between partisan support and the acceptance of political contention throughout four sections. The first section will discuss theories of political contention and violence from the social movement and electoral violence literatures as well as the understandings of partisan-based differences in democracy perceptions from winner-loser gap literature. The second section will consider the different possible reactions to losing elections and how the circumstance of loss can influence the likelihood of these reactions. The third section will outline the research design and methodology of the hypotheses tests, as well as the results of those tests. The fourth and final section will be a discussion of these results.

Literature Review

This section starts with a discussion about the inherent tensions created and highlighted by electoral competition. Following this discussion, I will review ideas

from the social movements literature[19] to discuss how elections can provide openings for contentious political behavior. In doing so, I will outline how elections are both an essential element of the stability of democracy and the cause of its fragility, because of the political change that can occur. I will then discuss the themes of the growing electoral contention literature as they relate to the likelihood of incumbents (winners) and challengers (losers) engagement in electoral violence. Finally, I will discuss how the winner-loser gap literature explores the relationship between individuals' partisan status and their views of democracy generally.

Elections and contention in Democracy

Elections are an essential feature of democracy because they allow for the citizens of the state to choose the leadership (Diamond 2016). However, the presence of elections does not determine whether or not a state is democratic; those who lose elections need have some degree of hope for future electoral wins. Przeworksi (1991) argues that in order for members of a state to buy into elections as a viable means of power alteration, there needs to be uncertainty over who will ultimately win elections. Without uncertainty, those out of power have no reason to believe that democracy will be beneficial to them, and therefore have no reason to accept their loss. Repeated elections help to create "institutionalized uncertainty," allowing voters to develop trust in the system by experiencing electoral results that are not pre-determined (Lindberg 2009; Lupu and Reidl 2012).

[19] It is important to note that while there is a growing literature on linkages between parties and social movements, this paper does not touch on this relationship (see Hutter, Kriesi, and Lorenzini 2018 for an overview of this topic). It focuses on the opportunity structures elections create for electoral and political contention to occur.

While repeated elections are a recipe for "institutionalized uncertainty," specific elections are discrete events of uncertainty that heighten tensions between those vying for power from different political camps (Ginsburg and Weisman 1978, Lupu and Riedl 2012). This tension creates an opportunity for social movements to mobilize. McAdams, Tilly and Tarrow (2001) describe how opportunity for contention can arise from uncertainty in the political environment (97).[20] Before any movement grows into an actual force for contention, it needs to instill in potential fighters/demonstrators confidence in the movement's tactical abilities of the movement and significant buy-in to the effort from the potential fighters/demonstrators (McAdam 1982). With this in mind, we can see that even in situations where there is potential for political contention to arise, there also needs to be significant support for this action. Through measuring the acceptance of the necessity of political violence and individual willingness to participate in contentious or violent acts we can better understand whether or not electoral results can cause a groundswell of support for contention.

Within the democratization literature, there is some debate over the effect that elections can have on the likelihood of political violence. Butcher and Goldsmith (2016) argue that elections can help to ameliorate tensions based on social structures like ethnicity by creating a hope for future power. Harish and Little (2017) find that elections do create an opening for contention around the election, but also help to decrease the likelihood of political violence at other times. While these studies

[20] See also Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Kriesei et al 1995; Jenkins 1995; Tarrow 1996; Tarrow 2013; Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Tilly et al. 2019; Kitschelt 1993; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2010; Snow et al. 2018 etc.

provide some evidence for the usefulness of elections, most scholars believe it is best to build the institutional foundations of democracy before elections are held (Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Bracanti and Snyder 2011; Collier 2009; Salehyan and Linebarger 2015).

There is an extensive (and fast-growing) literature building on this understanding of elections as potential drivers of contention and violence. Most of these studies focus on incumbent incentives for pre-election violence (Mares and Young 2016; Schedler 2002; Austin 1995; Laakso 1999; Klopp and Zuern 2007; Hickman 2009; Boone 2011; Bekoe 2012, Sisk 2012; Bekoe and Buchard 2017; Muller 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014, Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Chaturvedi 2005; Robinson and Torvik 2009; Collier and Vicente 2012; Wilkinson 2004; Dunning 2011; Fjelde and Hoglund 2016; Straus and Taylor 2012; Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus 2017; Arriola and Johnson 2012; Kuhn 2015), but a growing sub-section is exploring the rarer events of contentious political behavior from the opposition parties (Beaulieu 2014; Straus and Taylor 2012; Klopp and Zuern 2007). This paper focuses on how exclusion from power can stoke the flames of anti-democratic sentiment and cause losers and non-partisans to increasingly accept political violence and be willing to participate in contentious behaviors. By measuring the effect partisan status can have on individuals' attitudes toward demonstration, protest, and violence, we can better understand how electoral loss distances people from the practice of democracy in ways beyond a mere decreased satisfaction with the system and a lower trust in the government.

While this paper is not discussing actual organization and mobilization to contention, it is discussing an important step in the direction of mobilization. By gaining a better understanding of how loss relates to an individual's willingness to participate in demonstrations or protests and to their attitudes about political violence, we also gain insight into the foundations of mobilization to political contention—but through this paper I show that other factors must also be present for this mobilization to be actualized.

The Winner-Loser Gap

Since the 1990s, literature on the winner-loser gap has focused on electoral loss as a priming condition for these potential post-election contentious events (Anderson et al. 2005; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Listhaug 1995; Bowler and Donovan 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Clark and Kornberg 1992; Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978; Rich 2015; Rich and Holmes 2016; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Jou 2009; Cho and Bratton 2005; Esaiasson 2010; Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2011; Chang, Chu, and Wu 2014; Davis and Hitt 2017; Davis 2014; Howell and Justwan 2013; Delgado 2016; Dalhberg and Linde 2017; Han and Chang 2016; Lelkes 2016). Most of these studies focus on individual party supporters' perceptions of democracy through survey research following elections. There are two main categories of study within the winner-loser gap literature: (1). studies on the differences in attitudes between winners and losers, and (2). studies on the factors that can widen this winner-loser gap. This paper aims to build on the literature that identifies areas of attitude divergence between winners and losers in the

aftermath of elections, and it will also use findings from the sub-section of winner-loser gap literature that identifies factors that can affect the magnitude of these differences, which will allow us to control for outside factors that could muddy the results.

A common conclusion in the subsection of the winner-loser gap literature that focuses on attitude differences is that losers view democracy more negatively than winners, across several indicators of democratic support. Losers have been found to trust the political system and its leaders less (Listhaug 1995; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Holmberg 1999; Lühiste 2006; Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug 2007; Craig et al. 2006; Esaiasson 2011; Moehler 2009; Moehler & Lindberg 2009; Nadeau & Blais 1993; Jou 2009), feel less satisfied with democracy (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Anderson et al. 2005; Craig et al. 2006; Anderson and Tvedora 2001; Anderson and Guillery 1997; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Rich 2015; Rich and Holmes 2016), be more likely to believe that voting does not matter Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Bowler and Donovan 2002; Davis 2014; Davis and Hitt 2016; Karp and Banducci 2007), show greater support for political reforms (Jou 2009), and be less likely to perceive the system as legitimate (Moehler 2009). More recent studies have also included non-partisans, individuals who do not support a party and thus cannot be classified as winners or losers. These studies find that non-partisans fall somewhere between winners and losers in their perceptions of democracy (Rich 2015; Moehler 2009; Moehler and Lindberg 2009; Rich and Holmes 2016; Rich and Tracee 2018).

While the literature consistently finds similar differences in attitudes between winners and losers, studies have identified several factors that deepen these differences. Of these factors, the one that most studies focus on is the electoral system of the state (Anderson et al 2005; Singh et al 2012; Banducci and Karp 2003; Birch 2008; Rich and Tracee 2018; Bowler and Donovan 2002; Cho and Bratton 2005; Davis 2014; Anderson & Guillory 1997; Anderson & Mendes 2005; Chang, Chu, & Wu 2014; Conroy-Krutz & Kerr 2015; Davis & Hitt 2016; Holmberg 1999; Lijphart 1999; Singh 2014). Winners and losers in majoritarian systems have a much higher difference in perceptions of democracy than winners and losers in consensual systems.[21] The difference between winners and losers is smaller in proportional or consensual systems because it is much less likely for a party representing only a minority of people to come to power (Lijphart 1999). Other studies have identified a number of other factors that can influence the differences in democracy perception between winners and losers: the ideological proximity of voters to the winning party (Curini et al. 2012; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Delgado 2016); the political experiences of the losers (Anderson et al. 2005; Chang et al. 2014; Delgado 2016); the level of economic inequality in a state (Han and Chang 2015); the quality of the democratic institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003); the occurrence of electoral turnover (Moehler and Lindberg 2009); the winner's margin of victory (Howell and Justwan 2013); and the differences in media representation of political parties in a state (Lelkes 2016).

[21] Majoritarian electoral systems are winner-take-all political systems in which the candidate gaining the most votes is rewarded all of the power. Consensual systems on the other hand dole out power based on proportional vote totals. For more detailed discussion of the differences see Lijphart 1999.

However, these winner-loser gap studies stop short of explaining the mechanisms that push losers from simply having negative attitudes about democracy to fully rejecting democracy by challenging the system outside of the elections and engaging in contentious political action. Unlike most of the previous works I will not just be using the democracy perception measures commonly used by winner-loser gap scholars such as satisfaction with democracy, support for democracy, trust in government, or political efficacy as proxies to indicate discontent with the political system. Instead, I will use respondents' opinions on political violence and willingness to participate in contentious political behaviors. By using these perceptions of political contention and violence I am measuring the potential for contentious political behaviors more accurately. Additionally, I find that support for democracy has a stronger correlation with likelihood of support for contention than satisfaction with democracy, trust in government, or political efficacy.

Effects of loss

An individual may have much to gain or lose as a result of an election. Elections create winners and losers, with winners holding political power and losers shut out of power positions. Winners decide how goods and services are allocated within states, and it is likely that those decisions will disproportionally benefit the winners' supporters.[22] These high stakes may likely affect an individual's response to loss. We often expect individuals to respond rationally to an event, but studies have shown that some circumstances—including high stakes—increase the likelihood of individuals responding "irrationally" (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). A "rational"

[22] This has been found to be a particularly strong political force in Africa see: Lindberg 2003; van de Walle 2003; Wantchekon 2003; Posner 2007; Mares and Young 2016

response to loss would likely be a change in the party or candidate that an individual chooses to support.

However, evidence from the winner-loser gap literature shows that individuals may respond by changing their perception of democracy or even going so far as participating in political contention (Anderson and Mendes 2006). These drastic steps of democracy rejection and contention are irrational because contentious political action is risky behavior, that could result in punishment for those participating (Tarrow 1994, Tilly 1978, Lichbach 1995). By acknowledging that humans at times bypass "rational" behavior, choosing instead to engage in risky behavior, we can get a better understanding of the reality of electoral loss and the circumstances that increase the likelihood of an individual, motivated by a lack of power, to reject democracy and participate in political contention. However, even though people who are out of power have the option to change their perspective and participate in contention, it does not mean that it is their only, or even most likely option. This paper aims to explore how perception of democracy influences willingness to support and participate in political contention as well as how this willingness varies among winners, losers, and non-partisans.

Loss Aversion

Individuals who have been in a position of power or are currently holding a position of power are likely to view the use of violence differently than those trying to attain power. This can be explained by a psychological phenomenon called loss aversion. Loss aversion is a part of Tversky and Kahenman's prospect theory, a behavioral economic theory of decision-making which takes into account human

miscalculation of true odds, which are distorted by individual expectations and misperceptions (Kaneman and Tverskry 1979). Loss aversion is the theory that individuals will take more risk to keep something they already have than they would take to gain that same thing if they did not already possess it.

In the context of this paper, the behavioral risk of interest is political contention (Tucker 2007; Beaulieu 2014; Kuran 1995). For those who already have power, loss aversion will drive them to take more risks to maintain that power than those without power will take to attain it. The drive to maintain power could cause those in power or those who have just lost power to be more willing to accept and perpetrate violence, which is always risky, against those who stand in the way. These differences in risk acceptance help us understand the process of mobilization to contention. Electoral violence research highlights the different motivation levels for contention between those in power and those out of power, finding that incumbents who are trying to hold on to power are the most likely perpetrators of election-related violence (Mares and Young 2016; Schedler 2002; Austin 1995; Laakso 1999; Klopp and Zuern 2007; Hickman 2009; Boone 2011; Bekoe 2012, Sisk 2012; Bekoe and Buchard 2017; Muller 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jabloski 2013; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014, Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Chaturvedi 2005; Robinson and Torvik 2009; Collier and Vicente 2012; Wilkinson 2004; Dunning 2011; Fjelde and Hoglund 2016; Straus and Taylor 2012; Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus 2017; Arriola and Johnson 2012; Kuhn 2015). Groups that have never been in power, on the other hand, are much less likely to undertake risky action because they are not in danger of losing power.

Understanding the difference in risk acceptance likelihoods between those who have experienced power and those who have not, I argue that, while several factors influence how individuals respond to their chosen political party gaining or losing power the most influential factor is likely to be their past political experiences. In past research, winners and losers are often treated as monolithic groups, but thinking of all winners as the same or all losers as the same in their experiences misses important nuance in how individuals experience winning and losing. For example, supporters of losers who had been in a position of power prior to this election are unlikely to respond in exactly the same way as losers who have been kept out of power for some time. Similarly, supporters of winners who have consistently been in power are not likely to respond to their win in the same way as winners who have newly won power. And individuals who have no access to power because they have no connection to any particular party are not likely to respond to an electoral result in the same way as winners or losers, since they are not as invested in the electoral contest. The fact that different groups of people who all have little or no power in a political system (i.e. new losers, consistent losers, and non-partisans) react differently to electoral results suggests that disaggregating a voting populace based on political experience creates a more accurate image of potential contentious actors. Without understanding these nuances we may misunderstand the patterns we see in reaction to electoral wins or losses because we are conflating all those in power or all those out of power as having had the same experience of winning or losing.

Causal Pathway

Based on the established observations that they are more dissatisfied with democracy than their victorious counterparts, I posit that we should see that supporters of electoral losers are more accepting of contentious political behaviors like demonstrations and political violence than supporters of electoral winners. If supporters of losers do not believe that democracy is satisfactory or that their elected leaders can be trusted, it follows that they would want to go outside the political system through these contentious acts to get a different result. These feelings are likely to be exacerbated if their negative feelings about democracy and their political leaders are compounded with a sense that the political system is unfairly stacked against them because of fraud. This leads to my first three hypotheses:

Table 5: Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3

H_1	Losers are more likely to accept the use of violence in politics than winners and non-partisans
H_2	Losers are more likely to be willing to participate in demonstrations or protests than winners and non-partisans
H_3	Losers are more likely to be willing to participate in political violence than winners and non-partisans

I argue that it is important to distinguish between different types of losers: those who had previously never won, those who had previously never lost, and those who have both won and lost. This will allow for a more nuanced understanding of the experience of loss. Losing suddenly after having only experienced being in power might be jarring to individuals. On the other hand, individuals who have only experienced repeated loss may become disillusioned with the system that never comes through for them. If we only focus on the differences between supporters of winners and supporters of losers within their larger groups, we only see how these

groups compare to each other and are missing nuance in differences in perceptions within groups of winners or losers. Individuals do not just look to others to see how they are situated in society, they also rely on their personal past experience to inform their perceptions of their current status.

Table 6: Types of Losers

Types of Losers
Those who had previously never won
Those who had previously never lost
Those who have both won and lost

Elections serve as a breaking point at which people can re-evaluate how they are doing. Thus, by focusing on elections in this paper, I can better understand how individuals self-compare between their status before and after elections to decide how they should react to the results. I argue that perceptions should be measured in a way that allows for individual self-comparison because individuals are more likely to understand how the loss changes their own lives than how it affects other groups, groups that they might have no interaction with. In this understanding, a change in power status following an election can trigger a change in the attitudes of individuals because, as we understand from loss aversion, losing power can spark a higher acceptance of risk to regain what has been lost. The abruptness of the power loss incentivizes individuals to be more accepting of riskier behavior, which could lead them to be more supportive of the use of violence in politics. This leads to my fourth hypothesis that new losers would be the most likely to support the use of violence in politics

But those who have been in power also know that democracy can work for them as they were put into a position of power through democracy at some point,

whereas consistent losers may be more primed to action than new losers because they have had more repeated loss experiences to reiterate that democracy is not working for them (Birnir 2007). I expect that consistent losers are more likely to report willingness to participate in contentious or violent political behaviors. This leads to my fifth and sixth hypotheses that consistent losers will be more likely to show willingness to participate in political contention or violence.

Table 7: Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6

H_4	New Losers will be more likely to accept the use of violence in politics than any other group
H_5	Consistent Losers will be more likely to show willingness to participate in demonstrations or protests than any other group
H_6	Consistent Losers will be more likely to show willingness to participate in political violence than any other group

Methodology

In order to test the validity of my hypotheses, I used data from 3 rounds of the Afrobarometer survey (round 3—2004-2005, round 4—2008-2009, and round 5—2013-2014) from 15 African states: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.[23] Using three rounds of the same survey allows me to explore the phenomena over time in a way that a single snapshot of time that a single survey round would not be able to show. The Afrobarometer project conducts surveys on individuals' attitudes on democracy and economy across several African states.

[23] Afrobarometer Data, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); Rounds 3, 4, 5; 2004-2014, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org
These countries were chosen because they appear in all 3 rounds of the Afrobarometer used in the study. Mali also appears in all three rounds, but for the majority of the timespan in which the data was collected, the president was an independent candidate not affiliated with a political party, making it too difficult to compare winners and losers based on the system of winner and loser identification used in the study.

African countries are an appropriate sample because they exhibit cross-national variation in the independent and dependent variables as well as alternative explanations. African states have variant records of political power exchange, with some states having regular changes to those in power and other states with entrenched leadership that has not faced serious challenges in several years. Additionally, the occurrence of political contention and violence varies greatly among the states included in my sample (ACLED). Finally, using sub-Saharan Africa as a sample allows for variation in other important variables, such as low development and weak governance systems (Hdr.undp.org 2018; Polity IV Project 2017).

This study employs three questions for three dependent variables to measure different types of attitudes about contention. The first two dependent variables, *Willing to Protest* and *Willing to Use Violence*, come from a series of questions that ask respondents if they have participated in specific activities within the past year, or if they would if they had the chance to. The two behaviors this paper uses in its tests ask if the respondent has or would be willing to: "Attend[ed] a demonstration or protest march," and "Use[d] force of violence for a political cause." The following were the available responses

1). No, would never do this
2). No, but would do if had the chance
3). Yes, once or twice
4). Yes, several times
5). Yes, often

These responses aggregated into a dummy variable, with response one being coded as no and responses 2-5 being coded as yes. This allows for the measure to represent overall willingness to act contentiously or violently, as the most important aspect of

the response is not whether an individual has participated in demonstrations or violence already, but rather what they would be willing to do.[24] While the question asking about participation in demonstrations was asked in all three rounds of the Afrobarometer analyzed in this paper, the question asking about participation in political violence was only asked in the Round 5 Afrobarometer questionnaire, so the respondents are limited to those surveyed in Round 5. About 40 percent of respondents reported their willingness to engage in political demonstration and a much lower 11 percent reported that they would be willing to engage in political violence.

Table 8: Rates of willingness to participate in political demonstration across countries included in my sample

Country	Willingness to Participate in Political Demonstrations	
	Not Willing	Willing
Botswana	51%	49%
Ghana	77%	23%
Kenya	63%	37%
Lesotho	56%	44%
Madagascar	77%	23%
Malawi	60%	40%
Mozambique	55%	45%
Namibia	44%	56%
Nigeria	64%	36%
Senegal	46%	54%
South Africa	55%	45%
Tanzania	54%	46%
Uganda	64%	36%
Zambia	61%	39%
Zimbabwe	70%	30%

Table 9: Rates of willingness to participate in political violence across countries included in my sample

Country	Willingness to Participate in Political Violence	
	Not Willing	Willing
Botswana	95%	5%
Ghana	94%	6%
Kenya	92%	8%
Lesotho	88%	12%
Madagascar	92%	8%
Malawi	93%	7%
Mozambique	79%	21%
Namibia	83%	17%
Nigeria	89%	11%
Senegal	91%	9%
South Africa	85%	15%
Tanzania	89%	11%
Uganda	82%	18%
Zambia	94%	6%
Zimbabwe	94%	6%

[24] I also ran these models coding only 3-5 those who reported actual participation, excluding those only willing to act, and the results were very similar to the models using both those willing and those who have previously participated. The predicted probability results of these models can be found in the appendix.

The third dependent variable, *Violence Necessary*, is based on another question that asks individuals about their overall attitudes toward the use of violence in politics, without asking about their willingness to engage in such contention or violence themselves:

> *"Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2.*
>
> *Statement 1: The use of violence is never justified in [Ghanaian] politics today.*
>
> *Statement 2: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause."*

About 19 percent of respondents reported that they believed that violence is sometimes necessary in politics. This question was not asked in Round 4 of the Afrobarometer survey, so only Rounds 3 and 5 are considered in the analysis using this variable.

Table 10: Rates of willingness to accept the necessity of political violence across countries included in my sample

Country	Is violence ever necessary in politics?	
	Never Necessary	Sometimes Necessary
Botswana	91%	9%
Ghana	88%	12%
Kenya	84%	16%
Lesotho	87%	13%
Madagascar	80%	20%
Malawi	82%	18%
Mozambique	80%	20%
Namibia	64%	36%
Nigeria	76%	24%
Senegal	89%	11%
South Africa	77%	23%
Tanzania	79%	21%
Uganda	74%	26%
Zambia	82%	18%
Zimbabwe	89%	11%

The first independent variable, *Partisan Status*, was determined based on responses to two Afrobarometer questions asking if respondents feel close to any particular political party, and if yes, which party that was. If respondents reported not feeling close to a political party they were coded as non-partisans. If respondents reported feeling close to a political party they were coded as winners and losers based on the results of the most recent election in the state.[25] I then coded a second independent variable, *Nuanced Partisan Status,* which disaggregated the winners and losers into sub-categories that accounted for their performance in the previous election as well. Research has shown that the number of times a party has won or lost can influence satisfaction with democracy (Chang, Chu, and Wu 2014; Conroy-Krutz & Kerr 2015; Davis & Hitt 2016; VanDusky-Allen 2017). If a party had won the two most recent elections they were categorized as a "consistent winner." If they had only won the most recent election the party was categorized as a "new winner." This disaggregation process was repeated for the electoral losers, with parties who had lost the two most recent elections categorized as "consistent losers" and those who had only lost the previous election as "new losers." I did not disaggregate the non-partisans.[26] This variable is not as evenly distributed as the original categorization of winners and losers because exchanges of power are not always guaranteed through elections. Supporters of new losers are a particularly small group of individuals found

[25] In presidential systems, the winning candidate's party was deemed the "winner" and all other parties were deemed losers. In parliamentary systems the party winning the most seats was deemed the "winner" and all other parties were deemed the losers.

[26] Note: because these surveys were administered to separate individuals across survey rounds, the individuals identifying as "close" to a particular party may change between data collection. With this in mind, we should think of the individual supporting any party as the average supporter of that party at that particular time and not as the same individuals supporting that party across the years.

in the sample collected via the survey. This is likely caused by erosion of party support as a result of continued political loss.

Next I used two variables identified by the winner-loser gap literature as indicators that democracy could be vulnerable to challenge, *Satisfaction with Democracy* and *Support for Democracy*, to see which most correlates with actual support for violence and willingness to participate in contention behaviors. Evidence shows that satisfaction for democracy is not actually measuring support for democracy and in my data, as there is a very low level of correlation between the two measures. Linde and Ekman (2003) suggest that satisfaction with democracy is an imperfect measure of actual support for democracy, but instead an indicator of support for how it is currently functioning. Conroy-Krutz and Kerr (2015) particularly find that electoral loss does not cause support for democracy to change, so it is important that we revisit some of these winner-loser differences to ensure we are actually capturing what we are purporting to be capturing. The relationship between satisfaction with democracy and support from democracy can be seen below in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Relationship between Support for Democracy and Satisfaction with Democracy



These two variables were taken from responses to the same three Afrobarometer rounds. The first variable, *Satisfaction with Democracy*, was taken from the question "Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country?" The responses were coded as follows:

1). Not at all satisfied
2). Not very satisfied
3). Fairly satisfied
4). Very satisfied

Support for Democracy was taken from the question asking respondents to identify the statement that was closest to their opinion from the following list of statements:

1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.

As can be seen in the figures below, no particular level of satisfaction with democracy is distinct from any of the other levels in terms of the effect it has on an individual's willingness to participate in demonstrations or political violence. There is also little correlation between satisfaction with democracy and belief in the necessity of the use of violence in politics. However, an individual's level of support for democracy does correlate strongly with their willingness to participate in contention or violence, as well as with the belief that violence is sometimes necessary in politics.[27]

Figure 14: Differences in willingness to participate in political demonstrations over different levels of satisfaction with democracy



Figure 15: Differences in willingness to participate in political demonstrations over different levels of support for democracy



[27] Neither Satisfaction with Democracy nor Support for Democracy is correlated with Partisan Status figures showing these relationships can be found in the appendix

Figure 16: Differences in willingness to participate in political violence over different levels of satisfaction with democracy



Figure 17: Differences in willingness to participate in political violence over different levels of support for democracy



Figure 18: Differences in willingness to accept political violence over different levels of satisfaction with democracy



Figure 19: Differences in willingness to accept political violence over different levels of support for democracy



This relationship between individual support for democracy and individual perception of the three political contention variables measured in this paper is weakest for an individual's likelihood to participate in political demonstration. This is likely related to the social and legal acceptance of protests and demonstrations in democratic governance. As they are nonviolent forms of political contention, protests and demonstrations are often legal in democratic states.

Preliminary analysis of the relationship between the partisan status of an individual, their support for democracy, and the likelihood they would support contention shows evidence that partisan status and level of support for democracy are related to an individual's willingness to participate in protests and violence as well as their belief that violence can sometimes be necessary in politics.

This data suggests a wide variation between non-partisans, winners and losers in their likelihood to report acceptance of the necessity of violence in politics. Winners who believe that non-democracy is sometimes preferable are the most likely to believe that violence can be necessary. However, opinions on the necessity of violence differ more greatly between individuals with different levels of support for democracy than between individuals of varying partisan status. These relationships

can be seen below in Figure 8. This suggests that beliefs about the legitimacy of using violence are not strongly affected by whom an individual supports politically and are unlikely to be changed following the results of an election. Changes in this attitude about the general legitimacy of violence in politics likely require more than just standard loss.

Figure 20: Differences in the willingness to accept political violence over partisan status and level of support for democracy



Winners who believe that non-democracy is sometimes preferable to democracy are also the most likely to report their willingness to participate in protest; they are about 13 percentage points more likely to do so than non-partisans who also sometimes prefer non-democracies. This echoes the findings of Moehler (2009) which finds that winners can tend to have an illiberal view of politics once they are in power. The difference between winners and losers in this regard is a bit smaller, but winners are still 4 percentage points more likely to report their willingness to protest than losers. These relationships can be seen in Figure 21 below.

Figure 21: Differences in the willingness to participate in political contention over partisan status and level of support for democracy



Measurements of an individual's willingness to participate in violence show the greatest differences both between partisans and non-partisans and among the three measured levels of support for democracy. Respondents who believe that non-democracy can be preferable to democracy are the more likely to report their willingness to participate in political violence than those who believe democracy is always preferable and those who believe that the system of government doesn't matter. Within this category, winners are the most likely to report their willingness to participate in political violence, though they are only 3 percentage points more likely to do so than losers. Winners and losers are between 11 and 8 percent more likely than non-partisans to report their willingness to participate in political violence. These relationships can be seen in Figure 22 below.

Figure 22: Differences in the willingness to participate in political violence over partisan status and level of support for democracy



The evidence shows a relationship between an individual's partisan status—supporting a winner, supporting a loser or non-partisanship—and their willingness to accept and participate in contentious political behaviors. These results contradict the understandings of the potential consequences of losing according to the winner-loser gap literature and show a need to go beyond just comparing attitude differences of winners and losers to really understand the potential for democratic breakdown following loss. The results found in this analysis show mixed evidence for my first three hypotheses, which can be seen be seen below in Table 11.

Table 11: Results of preliminary tests of hypotheses 1-3

H_1	Losers are more likely to accept the use of violence in politics than winners and non-partisans	Mixed Evidence
H_2	Losers are more likely to be willing to participate in demonstrations or protests than winners and non-partisans	Mixed Evidence
H_3	Losers are more likely to be willing to participate in political violence than winners and non-partisans	Mixed Evidence

While losers are more likely to show acceptance of and willingness to participate in political demonstrations and violence, winners are actually just as likely and even

slightly more likely as loser to do so. These results suggest that partisanship is more important to willingness to act than connection to any particular winner or loser. But we must also look at this relationship with a disaggregated measure of partisan status to allow for different circumstances of wins or losses that could influence perceptions of contention. To do so, I will re-run this preliminary analysis substituting use the *Nuanced Partisan Status* variable for the simpler *Partisan Status*.

However, as we saw with the aggregate measure of partisan status, there is no clear relationship between disaggregated partisan status and the likelihood of believing that violence can be necessary in politics. While consistent winners are the most likely to report believing that violence is sometimes necessary, the differences between all other categories are not very large. These relationships can be seen below in Figure 23.

Figure 23: Differences in the willingness to accept the necessity of political violence over disaggregated partisan status and level of support for democracy



Among individuals who believe non-democracy is sometimes preferable, *Consistent Winners* and *Consistent Losers* are the most likely to report their willingness to participate in political demonstration. Consistent winners are 21 percentage points more likely than new winners and consistent losers are 17 percentage points more likely than new losers to report their willingness to protest. The relational differences can be seen below in Figure 24.

Figure 24: Differences in the willingness to participate in political contention over disaggregated partisan status and level of support for democracy



Those individuals who have been in their current power position (either as winners or as losers) for 2 or more elections are also more likely to report willingness to engage in political violence than their "recent" counterparts, with consistent winners twice as likely as new winners to report willingness to engage in political violence. These relationships can be seen in Figure 25 below.

Figure 25: Differences in the willingness to participate in political violence over disaggregated partisan status and level of support for democracy



This evidence shows a relationship between an individual's disaggregated partisan status and their willingness to accept and participate in contentious political behaviors. The results found in this analysis show no evidence for my fourth hypothesis and mixed evidence for my final two hypotheses. While consistent losers are more likely to show willingness to accept and participate in political demonstrations and violence, consistent winners are actually just as likely and even slightly more likely as loser to do so. These results suggest that entrenched partisanship is more important to willingness to act than status as a winner or a loser.

Table 12: Results of preliminary tests of hypotheses 4-6

H_4	New Losers will be more likely to accept the use of violence in politics than any other group	No Evidence

H_5	Consistent Losers will be more likely to show willingness to participate in demonstrations or protests than any other group	Mixed Evidence
H_6	Consistent Losers will be more likely to show willingness to participate in political violence than any other group	Mixed Evidence

Although the results from the preliminary analysis show some mixed support for my hypotheses, additional analysis is required to ensure that these relationships stand when accounting for other factors that have been shown to influence winners' and losers' perceptions. To conduct this additional analysis I ran a series of logit regressions with standard errors clustered at the country level using *Willing to Protest, Willing to use Violence, and Violence Necessary* as the dependent variables. Within each of these three models I used *Nuanced Partisan Status* along with *Support for Democracy* as the main independent variables. I expect that *Consistent Winners* and *Consistent Losers* will be the most likely to report their willingness to participate in contentious political behaviors, especially if they report believing that non-democracy can sometimes be preferable to democracy.

I also included several control variables at both the individual and country level. At the individual level, I included controls for the respondent's age, gender, and education. These three demographic variables have been found to influence the likelihood an individual would engage in contentious political behaviors (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and Mendes 2005; Dalton et al. 2010; VanDusky-Allen 2017). I expect that younger, male individuals will be more likely to be willing to engage in political contention. For education, I expect that more educated individuals

may be more willing to participate in demonstration behaviors while less educated individuals would be more willing to participate in violence.

Salience of ethnicity

I controlled for the level of political salience of ethnicity within the states in my sample using Posner's (2004) Political Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG). This measure is particularly important because states with higher levels of ethnic salience have been found to have a higher likelihood of political contention (Butcher and Goldsmith 2016). I would expect that in states with higher levels of ethnic salience there would an increased willingness to participate in contentious political behaviors for winners, losers, and non-partisans.

Electoral System

I controlled for the type of electoral system a state has using data from the Database of Political Institutions (Scartascini, Cruz, and Keefer 2018). The structure of the electoral system has been shown to greatly affect the magnitude of the difference between winners' and losers' perceptions of democracy, with majoritarian states having a much wider gap than proportional systems (Anderson et al 2005; Singh et al 2012; Banducci and Karp 2003; Birch 2008; Rich and Tracee 2018; Bowler and Donovan 2002; Cho and Bratton 2005; Davis 2014; Anderson & Guillory 1997; Anderson & Mendes 2005; Chang, Chu, & Wu 2014; Conroy-Krutz & Kerr 2015; Davis & Hitt 2016; Holmberg 1999; Lijphart 1999; Singh 2014).

Difference in Vote Share between the First and Second Place Parties

I also included a measure of the difference in vote share for the first and second place parties to control for the competitiveness of the election. Lower electoral competition

rates have been found to influence the losers' perceptions of democracy (Howell and Justwan 2013).

Time since Last Election

I controlled for the number of days since the previous election that each survey was collected. There is some evidence that, over time, the difference in winners' and losers' perceptions of democracy can decrease over time, which must be accounted for (Davis and Hitt 2016). However, there is also evidence that these differences in perception can be long-lasting (Dahlberg and Linde 2017).

Tenure of Governmental System

I controlled for the tenure of the system of governance for the state. Governmental systems that have been in place for longer are likely to be more stable and more trusted by the population of the state because their citizens have more experiences of democracy (Lindberg 2009). I used data from the Database of Political Institutions to measure the tenure of each system of governance; this data is based on the length of time a government has been deemed democratic or autocratic, using the Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness to identify systems as democratic or autocratic.[28]

Critical Media Presence

I also included a measure to control for the presence of a critical media. States that give the ruling party more control over the media have been shown to have wider gaps in democratic satisfaction between winners and losers than states that allow for the media to be critical of their decision-making and actions (Lelkes 2016). To do so I

[28] The Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness is based on the legality of competitive parties, the existence of national assemblies, and the vote share achieved by the highest party.

incorporate a V-Dem measure that gauges the ability and likelihood of the media to criticize the government. More freedom for media outlets within a state suggests a higher level of civil liberty protection within that state, and it also prevents an incumbent from controlling the narrative about the electoral results.

GDP Growth and Democratization Level

I controlled for GDP growth per capita because the economic development of a state has been found to influence the rates of contention (Collier 2009). I would expect states with lower GDP growth to have higher overall rates of political contention. Additionally, I controlled for the level of democratic development within states through the Freedom House Polity Index, which is an average of the freedom house and polity IV democracy scores for states. Democratization level has been found to relate to the level of political contention within a state (Coppedge et al. 2019). Both of these measures of development were taken from the V-Dem database.

Results

The results from the logistic models can be found in Table 13. The two main independent variables, *Partisan Status* and *Support for Democracy*, were operationalized using indicator variables so the coefficients for each category represent the differences between each category within a nominal variable and the base categories identified. For *Partisan Status*, the base category was *Non-Partisan*. In every model the supporters of losers are statistically significantly more likely to be willing to participate in contention and violence or believe in the necessity of violence. In both of the models that measure willingness to participate in contention and violence, models 2 and 3, the supporters of winners are also statistically

significantly more likely to report willingness. For *Support for Democracy*, the base category is "For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have." In the two models that explicitly ask about acceptance of and willingness to participate in violence, models 1 and 3, those who believe democracy is always preferable are statistically significantly less likely to report their acceptance of and willingness to participate in violence than those who believe the type of system doesn't matter. For those who believe that non-democracy can sometimes be preferable, they were statistically significantly more likely to report their willingness to participate in contention or violence in the two models that asked about willingness to participate, models 2 and 3.

Table 13: Primary Logistic Model Differences in Attitudes about Political Contention and Violence by Partisan Status

	(1) Violence Necessary b/se	(2) Willingness to Participate in Demonstration b/se	(3) Willingness to Participate in Violence b/se
Loser	0.222***	0.276***	0.440***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Winner	-0.017	0.322***	0.328***
	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Sometimes Non-Democracy Preferable	0.012	0.225*	0.563**
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.20)
Democracy is Preferable	-0.464***	-0.026	-0.359**
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Age	-0.006**	-0.014***	-0.008***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.125**	-0.292***	-0.265***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	0.007	0.070***	-0.043**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PREG	0.521	0.265	-0.399
	(0.87)	(0.51)	(0.29)
Time Since Election	-0.015*	-0.007	-0.014***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tenure of System	0.008	-0.016	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pluralty	-0.869	-0.232	-1.413***
	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.21)
Critical Media	0.003	-0.294*	-0.031

	(0.27)	(0.13)	(0.15)
GDP Growth	-3.191	0.275	-0.158
	(2.11)	(2.17)	(0.90)
Freedom House Polity Index	-0.028	0.102	-0.220***
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.05)
Vote Share Difference 1& 2	-0.003	0.007	-0.012*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Weights	0.016	0.242**	-0.005
	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Constant	0.168	-0.308	2.022**
	(1.71)	(1.10)	(0.76)
Observations	23932	40498	24499

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

While these relationships can be shown to have statistical significance using logistic models, it is also important to understand what the substantive effects of the different categories of *Partisan Status* and *Support for Democracy* have on the likelihood of acceptance of violence and individual willingness to participate in contention or violence. To better understand substantive significance, I conducted predicted probabilities testing to evaluate the differences in likelihood of acceptance and willingness to participate. Figures 26, 27, and 28 show the results of these tests.

The predicted probabilities for model 1, which analyzes the likelihood an individual would believe that violence can be necessary in politics, show that losers are the most likely to support this idea, which shows evidence supporting my first hypothesis. These results are slightly different from the results found in the preliminary analysis highlighting the importance of the additional controls in understanding the true effect of partisan status on the acceptance of contention. However, the difference between losers and winners and non-partisans in their acceptance of the use of violence in politics is only by 3-4 percentage points. This small difference suggests that winning, losing, and feeling disconnected from political parties do not influence beliefs about the use of violence very significantly, especially

when compared to the difference an individual's support for democracy can have on the same issue. The biggest difference shown in these predicted probabilities is found in the level of support for democracy. This can be seen in looking at the differences between those who believe democracy is always preferable and those that do not, with a 7-8 percentage point difference between the two.

Figure 26: Predicted Probabilities of the likelihood that an individual will be willing to accept the necessity of political violence over partisan status and level of support for democracy



The predicted probabilities for the second model can be seen in Figure 27 below. The results of the predicted probability test show that differences in likelihood of willingness to participate in political demonstration are slightly more pronounced between winners, losers, and non-partisans. However, the most significant difference is not between winners and losers, but between either winners and losers and non-partisans—that is, between partisans and non-partisans. Winners and losers collectively are about 7 percentage points more likely than non-partisans to report their willingness to participate. This suggests that engagement with political parties is

indicative of a willingness to actively participate in politics of many forms, whereas non-partisanship indicates a lack of interest in politics more generally. These results suggest that my second hypothesis, which states: Losers are more likely to be willing to participate in demonstrations or protests than winners and non-partisans, was only partially correct.

Figure 27: Predicted Probabilities of the likelihood that an individual will be willing to participate in political contention over partisan status and level of support for democracy



In testing the predicted probabilities for the third model, we see a similar relationship between willingness to participate in political violence and partisan status. These results can be found in Figure 28. Winners and losers are 5-7 percentage more likely than non-partisans to report their willingness, with losers being slightly more inclined to participate. However, as with belief in the necessity of violence, the stronger influence on the likelihood of an individual's willingness to participate in violence is their level of support for democracy, with those preferring democracy being about half as likely to report willingness to engage in political violence as those

who believe non-democracy is sometimes preferable. These results show minimal support for my third hypothesis, but the evidence is not strong.

Figure 28: Predicted Probabilities of the likelihood that an individual will be willing to participate in political violence over partisan status and level of support for democracy



Table 14: Evidence from predicted probabilities tests of hypotheses 1-3

H_1	Losers are more likely to accept the use of violence in politics than winners and non-partisans	Weak Evidence
H_2	Losers are more likely to be willing to participate in demonstrations or protests than winners and non-partisans	Partially Supported
H_3	Losers are more likely to be willing to participate in political violence than winners and non-partisans	Weak Evidence

While simple division of individuals into winners, losers, and non-partisans shows slight differences in attitudes concerning political contention and violence, I also included models using a more complex division of winners and losers: disaggregation based on their past political performance. I ran three more models with the same variables, with this new measure of partisanship as my main independent variable. The results from these models can be seen below in Table 16.

As with the previous models, the *Nuanced Partisan Status* variable was run as indicator variable, which creates a categorical test of the nominal variable using the non-partisan group as the base. In each model, consistent losers are statistically significantly more likely to accept violence or show willingness to participate in political contention or violence than non-partisans. Consistent winners are also statistically significantly more likely to show willingness to participate in protests or political violence (models 2 and 3). Interestingly the results for new losers show a greater belief in the necessity of violence and willingness to participate in violence than non-partisans, but they are less likely to show willingness to participate in political demonstrations. The results of model 4 shows some evidence in support of my fourth hypothesis that new losers will be the most likely to believe that violence can be necessary in politics, while models 5 and 6 give some evidence to support the arguments in my fifth and sixth hypotheses that consistent losers are most likely to show willingness to participate in contentious or violent political behavior.

Table 15: Results of testing for hypotheses 4-6

H_4	New Losers will be more likely to accept the use of violence in politics than any other group	Supported
H_5	Consistent Losers will be more likely to show willingness to participate in demonstrations or protests than any other group	Supported
H_6	Consistent Losers will be more likely to show willingness to participate in political violence than any other group	Supported

Table 16: Secondary Logistic Model Differences in Attitudes about Political Contention and Violence by Nuanced Partisan Status

	(4) Violence Necessary b/se	(5) Willingness to Participate in Demonstration b/se	(6) Willingness to Participate in Violence b/se
Consistent Loser	0.203***	0.172*	0.443***
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)

New Loser	0.336*	-0.515**	0.438***
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.10)
New Winner	0.089	-0.179	0.103
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Consistent Winner	-0.036	0.453***	0.391***
	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Sometimes Non-Democracy Preferable	0.014	0.206	0.561**
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.20)
Democracy is Preferable	-0.465***	-0.038	-0.362**
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Age	-0.006**	-0.014***	-0.009***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.123**	-0.294***	-0.268***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	0.009	0.062***	-0.043**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PREG	0.473	0.402	-0.419
	(0.90)	(0.45)	(0.27)
Time Since Election	-0.015*	-0.006	-0.014***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tenure of System	0.007	-0.013	0.005
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pluralty	-0.906	-0.045	-1.385***
	(0.47)	(0.26)	(0.22)
Critical Media	0.022	-0.283*	-0.062
	(0.27)	(0.11)	(0.13)
GDP Growth	-3.269	0.425	-0.001
	(2.13)	(1.81)	(0.91)
Freedom House Polity Index	-0.041	0.156*	-0.211***
	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Vote Share Difference 1&2	-0.003	0.006	-0.013**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Weights	0.018	0.233**	-0.003
	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Constant	0.271	-0.903	2.048**
	(1.77)	(0.93)	(0.78)
Observations	23932	37068	24499

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

While these comparisons to non-partisans give some insight into the overall relationships between disaggregated partisanship status and the willingness to accept or participate in contention and violence, we need to use predicted probabilities to show the full comparison in likelihood between categories of disaggregated partisan status. Figures 29, 30, and 31 show the results of these predicted probabilities tests run on models 4, 5, and 6.

The predicted probabilities for the fourth model show that new losers are the most likely to believe that violence can be necessary in politics; however, the differences between categories are not very substantial. This provides only weak evidence for my fourth hypothesis; the gaps between supporters of democracy and those who believe that non-democracy is sometimes preferable or that the type of system does not matter are much larger. These results again highlight that an individual's level of support for democracy is the main influence on their acceptance of violence, not their partisan status.

Figure 29: Predicted Probabilities of the likelihood that an individual will be willing to accept the necessity of political violence over disaggregated partisan status and level of support for democracy



The predicted probabilities for the fifth model can be seen in Figure 30 below. The results show pronounced differences in the likelihood of willingness to participate in political demonstration between those who have consistently been in their position of

power (whether in power or out of power) and those who are newly winners or losers. Consistent winners are 14.6 percentage points more likely than new winners to show willingness to participate in demonstrations, and consistent losers are 14.7 percentage points more likely to show willingness to demonstrate than new losers. Consistent winners are the most likely to show willingness to participate in demonstrations, regardless of levels of support for democracy. This suggests that entrenchment in political power status fosters a willingness to actively participate in politics of many forms, including those outside democratic institutions, whereas those who have recently experienced an adjustment to their power status are less likely to deviate from democratic institutions. These results offer only partial support for my fifth hypothesis.

Figure 30: Predicted Probabilities of the likelihood that an individual will be willing to participate in political contention over disaggregated partisan status and level of support for democracy



Predicted probabilities tests for the sixth model show a limited relationship between disaggregated partisan status and likelihood of willingness to participate in political violence. These results can be found in Figure 31. Consistent winners, consistent losers, and new losers all have about the same likelihood of willingness to participate in violence, while new winners and non-partisans are both about 5-6 percentage points less likely to show this willingness. As with the aggregate models, the real difference in willingness to participate in violence is between individuals with differing levels of support for democracy. Individuals who believe non-democracy is sometimes preferable are twice as likely to show willingness to participate in violence as those who believe democracy is always preferable and fifty percent more likely than those who believe the type of system doesn't matter. These results show enough evidence to reject my sixth hypothesis.

Table 17: Evidence from predicted probabilities tests of hypotheses 4-5

H_4	New Losers will be more likely to accept the use of violence in politics than any other group	Weak Evidence
H_5	Consistent Losers will be more likely to show willingness to participate in demonstrations or protests than any other group	Partial Support
H_6	Consistent Losers will be more likely to show willingness to participate in political violence than any other group	Reject

Figure 31: Predicted Probabilities of the likelihood that an individual will be willing to participate in political violence over partisan status and level of support for democracy



Only two of the control variables were significant in all six models: *Age* and *Gender*. These results suggest that younger people and men are more likely to accept the use of violence and show willingness to participate in contention (VanDusky-Allen 2017). Education level was only significant in the four models testing an individual's likelihood to report willingness to participate in contention or violence. The *Time since the Previous Election* variable was negatively significant in both of the models discussing the use of violence, models 1, 3, 4, and 6, which suggests that attitudes encouraging violence dissipate over time. Two other measures that have been found to influence the attitude gap between winners and losers were only significant in two models: *Critical Media* in models 2 and 5 and *Plurality* in model 3 and 6. More work should be done to assess the effects of these variables on the magnitude of the difference between winners, losers, and non-partisans.

Discussion/Conclusion

While past research on the ramifications for electoral loss suggests that electoral losers are ripe for political contention and pose potential threats to the stability of democracy, the results of this study show that these warnings are likely overstated. While winners and losers do have different perspectives on the quality of the results that democracy can bring, there must be other factors involved in order for losers or winners to actually turn away from democracy and towards contentious political behaviors. My results show that political power entrenchment can drive individuals to greater willingness to participate in contention, but in most cases, the strongest indicator of support for violence is an individual's level of support for democracy. With this in mind, the winner-loser gap literature should turn its focus from measurements of satisfaction with democracy and feelings of political efficacy to a more direct measure of democracy support levels.

For instance, it may be that more corrupt governments or more repressive governments create environments that make political contention more likely. These types of systems, in which losers are not sure of their future competitiveness in elections, would create an incentive for contention that does not exist in states with political uncertainty adequately institutionalized. What need to be better explored are factors that can entrench power and lessen the citizenry's support for democracy, the latter of which this paper has shown to increase willingness to accept the use of and participate in contention and violence.

Additionally, my findings that winners and losers are both more likely than non-partisans to show willingness to accept and participate in contention and violence suggests that the distinction between partisans and non-partisans may be more

significant in this regard than that between winners and losers. This echoes past research from Moehler (2009), which finds that winners can also have illiberal ideas in the wake of elections. Both her study and my study were conducted in African states, so it is possible that comparing winners and losers in developing democracies to winners and losers in places with more established institutions of democracy may be misguided. More work should be done to clarify the relationship between partisanship status and the likelihood of challenges to democracies across political systems with different levels of institutional strength.

Appendix

Descriptive statistics

Individual Level Data					
Variable	**Count**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Min**	**Max**
Age	71286	36.39	14.62	18.00	110.00
Education	64473	3.79	1.59	1.00	9.00
Gender	72118	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Satisfaction with Democracy	68701	2.50	1.11	1.00	4.00
Support for Democracy	47306	1.65	0.68	0.00	2.00
Round 3	72106	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Round 4	72118	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Round 5	72107	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00
Country, Round Level Data					
Variable	**Count**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Min**	**Max**
Time Since Last Election	48	30.22	17.76	3.42	67.73
Tenure of System	48	11.90	6.89	1.00	27.00
Vote Share Difference Party 1&2	48	35.16	20.48	1.95	76.20
Freedom House Polity Index	48	6.16	2.10	1.92	9.33
GDP Growth	48	0.02	0.07	-0.17	0.26
Critical Media	48	2.31	0.47	2.00	3.00
Country Level Data					
Variable	**Count**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Min**	**Max**
PREG	16	0.39	0.25	0.00	0.71
Plurality	16	0.82	0.40	0.00	1.00

Relationships between partisan status and measures of democracy





Predicted Probability results of models using participation in contention or violence variables coding only individuals who reported previous participation as willing.


Poitical Demonstration Participation Levels of Individuals of Varying Partisan Status as conditioned by Level of Support for Democracy
Winner
Loser
No Party
12.83%
17.44%
14.27%
10.82%
14.84%
12.06%
7.29%
10.16%
8.17%
0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00% 16.00% 18.00% 20.00%
Democracy is preferable
Non-democracy can be preferable
It doesn't matter


Poitical Violence Participation Levels of Individuals of Varying Partisan Status as conditioned by Level of Support for Democracy
Winner
Loser
No Party
2.88%
10.45%
5.94%
2.92%
10.58%
6.02%
1.46%
5.58%
3.08%
0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00%
Democracy is preferable
Non-democracy can be preferable
It doesn't matter

Multi-level Logistic Model Differences in Perception of Contentious Politics by Partisan Status

	(7) Violence Necessary b/se	(8) Willingness to Participate in Demonstration b/se	(9) Willingness to Participate in Violence b/se
Loser	0.180***	0.279***	0.423***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Winner	-0.010	0.273***	0.314***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Sometimes Non-Democracy Preferable	0.064	0.155***	0.571***
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Democracy is Preferable	-0.371***	-0.105**	-0.342***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Age	-0.006***	-0.014***	-0.008***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.113**	-0.311***	-0.259***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Education	0.030*	0.060***	-0.032*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PREG	0.222	0.771	-0.456
	(0.71)	(0.62)	(0.31)
Time Since Election	-0.012	0.001	-0.014***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tenure of System	0.000	-0.048***	0.003
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pluralty	-1.024	-0.024	-1.365***
	(0.64)	(0.35)	(0.27)
Critical Media	0.169	-0.325	0.092
	(0.41)	(0.32)	(0.18)
GDP Growth	-3.461	3.482***	-0.230
	(2.32)	(0.37)	(1.00)
Freedom House Polity Index	-0.051	0.111	-0.211***
	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Vote Share Difference 1&2	-0.003	0.006***	-0.010
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Weights	-0.058	0.256***	0.036
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Constant	0.083	-0.463	1.473
	(2.14)	(0.86)	(0.93)
lns1_1_1			
Constant	-0.856***	-0.689***	-1.811***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.25)
Observations	23932	40498	24499

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Multi-level Logistic Model Differences in Political Contention Perceptions by Nuanced Partisan Status

	(10) Violence Necessary b/se	(11) Willingness to Participate in Demonstration b/se	(12) Willingness to Participate in Violence b/se
Consistent Loser	0.169***	0.173***	0.437***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)
New Loser	0.243*	-0.229**	0.302*
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.15)
New Winner	0.187*	-0.036	0.117
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Consistent Winner	-0.078	0.356***	0.378***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Sometimes Non-Democracy Preferable	0.068	0.141**	0.568***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Democracy is Preferable	-0.368***	-0.115**	-0.344***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Age	-0.006***	-0.014***	-0.008***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.111**	-0.308***	-0.261***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Education	0.030*	0.059***	-0.032*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PREG	0.189	0.671	-0.453
	(0.72)	(0.56)	(0.31)
Time Since Election	-0.012	0.005***	-0.013***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tenure of System	-0.002	-0.030***	0.004
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pluralty	-1.063	0.087	-1.321***
	(0.64)	(0.31)	(0.28)
Critical Media	0.209	-0.323	0.052
	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.18)
GDP Growth	-3.605	3.541***	-0.029
	(2.33)	(0.39)	(1.01)
Freedom House Polity Index	-0.065	0.116	-0.197**
	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Vote Share Difference 1&2	-0.002	0.007***	-0.011
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Weights	-0.057	0.242***	0.035
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Constant	0.134	-0.934	1.443
	(2.15)	(0.79)	(0.94)
lns1_1_1			
Constant	-0.851***	-0.806***	-1.801***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.26)
Observations	23932	37068	24499

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Chapter 4—It wasn't me: How electoral losers attempt to explain away their failures

Introduction

In the wake of the third wave of democracy that followed the Cold War, African states have been holding elections and building democracy to varying degrees of success. Support for electoral democracy is often promoted with the promise of a better life for the average person (Diamond 2016). Within democratic institutions, elections have been a particular focal point as a potential source of peace (Lindberg 2006; Butcher and Goldsmith 2016; Cheibub and Hayes 2017) while at the same time being a potential catalyst for political violence (Ginsberg and Weisberg 1978; Harish and Little 2017; Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Bracanti and Snyder 2011; Collier 2009; Salehyan and Linebarger 2015). In the continent of Africa, it is estimated that around 55% of elections result in some level of violence (Straus and Taylor 2012; Burchard 2015). Knowing that elections are meant to be a peaceful competition for power that so often can result in violence, we are left with a central question: what causes electoral protests, rioting, and violence following elections?

The root of most major arguments about the causes of electoral conflict is the idea that weak democratic institutions create opportunities for conflict by enabling incumbents to bend the system in order to prevent their loss. This can happen in a few ways. First, and most discussed in the research, incumbents can use violence to maintain power. Incumbent-perpetrated electoral violence can occur before the election happens, through voter harassment and intimidation, or by using force to maintain power after they have already lost (Mares and Young 2011; Schedler 2002; Austin 1995; Laakso 1999; Klopp and Zuern 2007; Hickman 2009; Boone 2011;

Bekoe 2012; Sisk 2012; Bekoe and Burchard 2017; Mueller 2012, Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jabloski 2013; Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jabloski 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jabloski 2016; Chaturvedi 2005; Robinson and Torvik 2009; Collier and Vicente 2012; Dunning 2011; Fjelde and Hoglund 2016; Straus and Taylor 2012; Taylor Pevehouse, and Straus 2013; Arriola and Johnson 2012; Kuhn 2015). Second, incumbents can incite contention by perpetrating voter fraud, which can cause the losing parties, who feel cheated out of a chance to win, to turn to conflict as a means of gaining power/enforcing will/voicing desires, as they recognize they can never achieve these ends via the democratic contest (Norris 2013; Beaulieu 2014; Straus and Taylor 2012; Klopp and Zuern 2007; Tucker 2007).

This paper will focus primarily on the second path to electoral contention, exploring how electoral fraud influences perceptions of electoral integrity and the likelihood of contention. To do so I explore a particular factor that has been overlooked in previous studies: how losing candidates speak through the media to their supporters about the fairness of the election. Much of the current literature on fraud focuses on finding the actual level of fraud that was perpetrated during the election (Magaloni 2010; Beaulieu 2006; Beaulieu 2014; Tucker 2007; Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015; Kuntz and Thompson 2009). However, there is a growing movement in the literature pushing for a better understanding of fraud through perception of fraud as seen by the voters themselves (Norris 2014; Norris 2013; Frank and Martinez i Coma 2017; Karp, Nai, and Norris 2018). I am building on these works that focus on fraud perception to shed light on the role that losing political

candidates have in shaping voters' perception of fraud; and, ultimately increases in the likelihood of post-election contention.

I argue that the political leaders who lose elections will attempt to hold onto power (either within their party for challengers or within the state for incumbents) through shifting blame from themselves following loss. Losing candidates will make the case to their supporters that they were all cheated out of victory by the winner through the use of electoral fraud. When the supporters of losers hear this message, they react differently than they would otherwise—they have less faith that the election was free and fair, and the likelihood of electoral contention increases. While previous studies have shown that the occurrence of electoral fraud can increase the likelihood of voters perceiving and election to be unfair and can increase the likelihood of contention, there have been doubts about the importance of the accusations of fraud made by losing candidates having a similar effect (Chernykh 2014).

To test the relationships between fraud accusation and voter perception of fraud as well as fraud accusation and the occurrence of electoral contention, data was collected from newspaper articles that cover the losing party's reaction to electoral results in 31 African countries over the span of 18 years, in which 149 elections took place. Using individual-level survey data from the fifth round of the Afrobarometer, I find that accusations of fraud increase the likelihood of individuals believing that the previous election was not free and fairly contested. I also find that when losing candidates argue that the election they just lost was rigged, that the winner had perpetrated electoral fraud, there is an increase in the likelihood of protests or riots

occurring. This increase due to fraud accusation is bigger than that due to measured fraud, meaning that the accusations likely have a greater influence on the likelihood of electoral contention than the actual measurable occurrence of fraud. However, these contentious behaviors are limited, I do not find that accusations of fraud increase the likelihood of post-election violence.

Past research has suggested that the mere perception of fraud could influence the likelihood of contention, and this research helps to explore a mechanism—accusation of fraud by losers—that could drive a perception of fraud when there is little direct evidence (Norris 2014). Previous studies of the effects of electoral fraud have overlooked accusations of fraud, which is powerful force in shaping perceptions of electoral integrity and contention behaviors following electoral loss. This paper shows that individuals are influenced by mere accusations of fraud and more work needs to be done to include elite rhetoric on the legitimacy of democracy and the institutions that support it to better understand how their supporters are likely to perceive these important features. This is not to say that electoral fraud is just a boogeyman that electoral losers use to maintain their supporters and continue their political lives—electoral fraud is a genuine problem in weak democracies and occurred in at least 30% of the elections in African states—but rather, that the opposition can use accusations of fraud to convince their followers that the loss was not the losing candidate or party's fault, which may help the loser to maintain a role in future electoral contests. The results of this paper show that accusations of fraud, which occur in 75% of elections in the African states included in my study, can lead

to the previous election being perceived as less free and fair and makes electoral contention, if not electoral violence, more likely.

The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. First, I will briefly discuss the extant literature on electoral fraud, as well as its relationship with electoral contention. Following this, I will discuss my main argument concerning the motivations of losing political candidates and their supporters. I will then discuss the data and methodological strategy used to test this argument, both for the relationship between accusations of fraud and perceptions of electoral legitimacy, and for the relationship between accusations of fraud and electoral contention. Following this I will discuss in detail the results of the statistical tests run and explore the ramifications of the study for elections in African states.

Literature Review

While there is much debate on the effectiveness of elections as democracy-building mechanisms (Lindberg 2006), it is generally agreed upon that the perception of electoral legitimacy is an essential part of a functioning democracy (Diamond 2016). Przeworski (1991) argues that elections help democracy to function by "institutionalizing uncertainty"—establishing an iterated game in which the outcome is continually unknown until after the vote occurs. The combination of having a recurring contest with an uncertain outcome and a defined expectation about when the next contest will occur helps to engender hope for those who do not win the contest; they know they will have another opportunity to gain political power in the next election, in a predetermined amount of time. These iterated electoral contests, when legitimate, help to reinforce democratic institutions and promote political stability

(Fearon 2011; Lindberg 2006; Goldsmith 2015). However, when there is a higher degree of certainty about who the winner will be (due to fraud), voters' perceptions of an election's legitimacy diminish (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002). Therefore, it follows that a breakdown in uncertainty can lead to a situation in which those out of power no longer trust elections to provide a fair chance to gain power and thus turn to violence instead to contest power. Norris, Frank, and Martinez i Coma (2015) makes this case arguing that the occurrence of electoral contention "reflects a fundamental disagreement about the legitimacy of the contest" (Norris, Frank, Martinez i Coma 2015, 2). If doubt in the legitimacy of an electoral contest is the cause of electoral contention, the next question to ask is: what factors cause people to doubt the legitimacy of elections?

Fraud, Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, and Electoral Contention

For the purposes of this paper, I will be using the definition of electoral fraud established by Lehoucq (2003): "clandestine efforts to shape election results." Under this definition, use of violence to influence electoral results constitutes a form of electoral fraud.[29] As previously discussed, the perception of electoral legitimacy is most often damaged by the actions of winners who perpetrate electoral fraud prior to or during the election (Egorav and Sonin 2014; Little 2012; Rozenas 2012; Simpser 2013; Rundlett and Svolik 2016). That is not to say that challengers do not ever engage in electoral contention or fraud, but it is much more difficult for them to do so, as challengers are not in the same position of power within the state as

[29] For more working definitions of electoral fraud see: Schedler 2002; Mozaffar 2002; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Hartlyn and McCoy 2006; Kelley and Kolev 2010; Birch 2011; Schedler 2013; Simpser 2013; Norris 2014; Gehlbach et al. 2015; Van Ham and Lindberg 2015

incumbents. The most common fraud or electoral contention behavior we see from challengers is post-election contention in the form of protests, riots, or violence.[30] Whether or not this challenger-driven post-election contention occurs is often dependent on the challenger's reaction to electoral results—if they perceive the election to have been legitimate or not (Daxecker 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; Hyde and Marinov 2014; Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015; Tucker 2007; Fearon 2011; Rozanas 2012; Kuntz and Thompson 2009). Therefore, this post-election violence is still dependent on the behavior (or perception of the behavior) of the incumbent.

Studies have shown that official observations of electoral fraud have wide-reaching effects that undermine the integrity of democracy. Fraud decreases voters' participation in elections (Simper 2013; Birch 2010), because it causes voters to believe they have a lower level of political efficacy (Elklit and Reynolds 2002; McAllister and White 2011). Official observations of electoral fraud also make voters less satisfied with democracy (Norris 2014; McAllister and White 2015) and it makes voters less likely to trust their representatives (Rose and Mishler 2009). In addition to lower confidence and trust in the system, general support for protest is increased with fraud (Chaisty and Whiefield 2013), and this support for electoral protest is stronger for losers than winners (Sedziaka and Rose 2015).

[30] Though Collier and Vicente 2012 also argue that challengers could turn to terrorism, most arguments about opposition electoral contention are about post-election protests see Beaulieu 2014; Brancati 2016; Tucker 2007; Fearon 2011; Daxecker 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; Hyde and Marinov 2014; Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015; Tucker 2007; Fearon 2011; Rozanas 2012; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Svolik and Chernykh 2012; Bell and Chernykh 2018

Beyond official fraud observations, even the perception of voter fraud can have wide-ranging effects on democracy (Birch 2010; Norris 2014; Bratton 1998; Alemika 2007; Carreras and Irepoglu 2013; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Bowler and Karp 2004). Perceptions are particularly important because they are likely to translate into action: people do not necessarily rely on facts to determine their behavioral choices—what matters more is what they believe to be true (Bratton 2013; Karp, Nai, and Norris 2018). It is this reliance on perception for behavioral and attitude choices that motivates this paper's focus on how leaders' words can influence voters' perceptions of electoral integrity. This focus on the perception of fraud is especially important as it is extremely difficult to measure and observe fraud—it can happen anywhere within a country, at any time during an electoral process (Hyde and O'Mahony 2010; Simpser and Donno 2012; Beaulieu and Hyde 2009). Klaas (2013) confirms this difficulty, finding that there are a good number of elections that were deemed "free and fair" by the international community that were in reality not. Additionally, I argue that perception of fraud can also spur changes in attitudes and beliefs of supporters of the losing candidate.

Building off this focus on the effects of actual and perceived fraud, more recent research has turned to the sources of individuals' perceptions of fraud, asking: how do individuals form their perception of whether or not fraud occurred or influenced the election? Several different sources of information have been found to shape how citizens perceive electoral integrity: personal experiences (Birch 2008; McAllister and White 2011; Shah 2015; Schedler 1999; Kerr 2013; Hall, Monson and Patterson 2009; Kerr 2018), international observer reports of fraud or no fraud (Hyde

2011; Little 2015; Daxecker 2012; Hyde and Marinov 2014; Svolik and Chernylh 2012), public records of fraud like those supplied by the news media (Karp, Nai, and Norris 2018; Herron 2010; Sjoberg 2014; Birch 2011, Schedler 2013; Coffé 2016), integrity and independence of electoral management bodies (Kerr and Lurhmann 2017; Kerr 2013; Birch 2008; Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo 2008; Pastor 1999; Lehoucq 2003; Debrah, Ansante and Gyimah-Boadi 2010; Elklit and Reynolds 2002; Rosas 2010), and partisanship (Wellman et al. 2018; Robertson 2017; Ansolabeher and Persily 2008; Flesken and Hartl 2018; Kerr 2013; Moehler 2009; McAllister and White 2015; Rose and Mishler 2009; Cantu and Garcia-Ponce 2015; Bowler et al. 2015; Sances and Stewart 2015; Anderson et al. 2005; Birch 2008; Norris 2014; Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn 2008; Anderson et al. 2005; Kerr 2013; Bratton 2013)[31].

This paper is particularly interested in investigating not only how partisanship influences fraud perception, which in turn creates a higher potential for contention, but also how this can be strengthened by the losing candidates' use of the media to spread accusations of fraud. By using losing political leaders' words about fraud in news media following electoral results, I am able to draw out the mechanism that contributes to the differences and changes of perception for those who listen. The next section will build on this by exploring the motivations of party leaders to make accusations of fraud (regardless of the actual occurrence of fraud).

Party reaction to losses

Political parties are only viable so long as they can maintain their supporting base, whether by keeping their current supporters happy or by gaining new

[31]However, Fortin-Rittberger, Harfst and Dingler (2017) finds that the partisan effect on perception of electoral integrity is less strong when there is an observed occurrence of electoral fraud.

supporters. Parties challenging for political power, however, require growth in supporters if they hope to gain power in the future. What actions these out-of-power parties take to grow their numbers, and the tradeoffs they face in doing so, are discussed at length in studies about the developed world (Somer-Topcu 2009; Schumacher et al. 2015; So 2018; Vis and Kersbergen 2007; Andrews and Jackman 2008). Studies of less-developed democratic countries often discuss the choices of parties in a different light. Instead of assuming party leaders will accept the results and move forward, adjusting their platforms in an attempt to keep current supporters or gain new ones, studies of weaker democratic states often focus on whether electoral results are accepted or not (Bell and Chernykh 2018; Brancati 2016; Chernykh 2014; Estrada and Poire 2007; Fearon 2011; Harvey and Mukherjee 2015; Hickman 2011; Hyde and Marinov 2014; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Lago and Martinez i Coma 2016; Lankina and Skovoroda 2017; Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015; Beaulieu 2014; Smyth, Sobolev and Soboleva 2013; Tucker 2007; VanDusky-Allen 2017).

Chernykh (2014) outlines the options that losers have following the announcement of electoral results: 1) accept electoral results and move forward to compete in future elections; 2) reject results via legal means; and 3) reject results via protests and/or violence. However, this list of options leaves out a very important, relatively low-cost option for losing political leaders: public accusation of electoral fraud. Chernykh (2014) does mention this as a factor, but she does not believe that verbal accusations of fraud are as impactful as legal or contentious rejections of the election. This paper, on the other hand, provides compelling evidence that verbal

accusations of fraud—given to the public via the media—do have a significant impact on citizens' perceptions of electoral integrity, as well as on the likelihood of electoral contention.

Causal Pathway

Building on the understandings established by prior literatures, I assume that electoral fraud threatens the integrity of democracy by lowering voter confidence and trust and by making electoral contention more likely (Norris, Frank, Martinez i Coma 2015; Tucker 2007; Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015; Norris 2014). I argue that a losing political candidate's reaction to electoral results is particularly important for our understanding of their supporters' reactions to those electoral results.

The pathway of election reaction can be seen as follows: 1) the election results are collected and announced; 2) the losing candidate and winning candidate react to the results; 3) simultaneously, voters form perceptions of the freeness and fairness of the election; and 4) voter perception is translated into peaceful acceptance, protests, riots, or violence. This pathway can be seen below in Figure 32.

Figure 32: Pathway from election results to the likelihood of electoral contention



I argue that voters listen to accusations of fraud from electoral leaders. If this argument is correct, when fraud is accused we will see a decrease in the number of individuals who believe that the prior election was free and fair, as well as an increased likelihood of electoral contention following elections. By focusing on these fraud accusations made in the media, I am better able to measure two aspects of factors found to contribute to voter perception of electoral integrity: partisanship and media effects.

H_1: Accusations of fraud will decrease the likelihood that voters perceive an election to be free and fair

Connecting the rhetoric of political losers as reported in the media to perceptions of electoral integrity only tells part of the story of the impact that these words can have on the electoral aftermath. I argue that, in addition to altering voters' perceptions of electoral integrity, fraud accusations also serve as a catalyst for post-election contention. Through accusations of cheating, the losing political candidate sets voters up to feel like they have been robbed of the political power that they do not have (and in many cases never had), which in turn makes those voters more likely to engage in protests or riots. However, I am not arguing that these fraud accusations by the losing candidates will necessarily lead to an increased likelihood of post-election violence perpetrated by the opposition. Organized violence requires more coordination between elites and their supporters and is a much higher risk action than more sporadic forms of contention like protests and riots. These arguments lead to the following two hypotheses:

H_{2a}: Accusations of fraud will increase the likelihood of post-election opposition protests and riots

H_{2b}: Accusations of fraud will not increase the likelihood of post-election opposition violence

If these arguments are true, then it serves to show that much more attention needs to be paid to the rhetoric of candidates before, during, and after elections. Past research, focusing on institutional structures, general partisan ties, and general media effects, can only tell us so much about the general effects of these factors on voters. But the content of the political discussion surrounding these mechanisms for political

information dissemination is essential to understanding how and why these mechanisms matter.

Data and Measurements

Using multivariate logistic models, I test the hypotheses about the effects of fraud accusations on citizens' perceptions of the freeness and fairness of elections and on the likelihood of post-electoral contention. The data used in the analysis for this paper is based on original data collection as well as several well-established sources of data concerning individual characteristics and beliefs, events surrounding electoral results, and democratic institutions. This article focuses on African elections for several reasons. Most sub-Saharan African states attained independence at roughly the same time period but saw varying levels of success in developing democratic states in the nearly 60 years since the original independence movements. These similarities help to mitigate differences in potential for stabilization that could be seen if we looked at a group of states with more variance in the timeframe of self-rule. Despite differences in development of democratic institutions, every country in my sample does run elections as the primary means of deciding political power and has done so since the late 1980s or early 90s. While the occurrence of elections does not in and of itself create guarantee democracy, it at least provides a common structure in which power is distributed, which allows for a better understanding of how accusations of cheating can cause individuals to have questions about the legitimacy of the elections. Despite the shared electoral forms across the African states in this study, there is still a good amount of variation in the details of democratic institutions,

such as the timing and structure of the elections, which allows for other factors to be controlled.

The following section of the paper describes the variables included in the analysis. First, it discusses the variables used in testing my first hypothesis: fraud accusations influence voter perception of fraud. Second, it discusses the results of the tests run to explore my first hypothesis. Third, it discusses the variables used to test my second hypothesis: fraud accusations increase the likelihood of electoral contention. Fourth, it discusses the results of the tests for my second hypothesis.

VOTER PERCEPTION OF FRAUD

In investigating the role of fraud accusation on voter perception of electoral integrity, I use a more limited scope of countries and elections within my fraud accusation data. I do so in order to accommodate the limited spread of the Afrobarometer throughout Africa. This portion of the data analysis was conducted using 10 countries that were included in the fifth round of Afrobarometer surveys: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

Dependent Variables: VOTER PERCEPTION OF FRAUD

The dependent variable used to measure perceptions of electoral integrity is taken from the fifth round of the Afrobarometer, Question 28:

"How would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last election?"

I selected this particular question because it focuses on a general sense of electoral integrity, rather than on any one type of electoral fraud that the voter may believe to have happened. The question offered several choices for respondents to choose from: 1) completely free and fair; 2) free and fair, but with minor problems; 3) free and fair,

with major problems; and 4) not free and fair. These responses were coded as a binary variable, collapsing responses 1 and 2 into one value and responses 3 and 4 into another value, to more clearly separate those who believe that fraud was widespread and pervasive from those who believe it was a small issue or not a problem at all. Using the Afrobarometer surveys, we can see that there is a fair amount of variation across countries' general perceptions of the freeness and fairness of the previous election.

Table 18: Self-reported perceptions of freeness and fairness of previous elections over countries included in the sample

Perceptions of Electoral Integrity by State		
	Not Free and Fair	**Free and fair**
Botswana	6.36%	93.64%
Lesotho	12.87%	87.13%
Malawi	23.43%	76.57%
Mali	32.21%	67.79%
Namibia	17.14%	82.86%
Nigeria	27.33%	72.67%
South Africa	19.77%	80.23%
Tanzania	14.00%	86.00%
Uganda	32.00%	68.00%
Zambia	11.07%	88.93%

Independent Variable: Accusation of Fraud

Most work studying the effects of electoral fraud uses either officially-reported fraud or voter perception of fraud as the independent variable. Limiting the measurement of fraud to official reports ignores a significant amount of election-related information that could influence the reactions that voters will have to the results. On the other hand, limiting the measurements of fraud to the perception of voters does not tell us enough about the sources of information that voters use to shape their opinions about the legitimacy of the electoral process.

In order to resolve the issue of missed information, I collected the media responses of parties following their electoral losses. These responses act as our source for direct claims of fraud from losing political candidates. Using this information, I am better able to examine the effect of the losing political candidates' depiction of electoral events on their supporters' reactions and behaviors. To collect this data I search for newspaper articles related to 149 elections in 33 African states[32] over 20 years.

To gather observations of fraud accusations, I used newspaper articles reporting political losers' accusations of fraud, from 5 months before and 5 months after an election.[33] I used data from Factiva and Lexis Nexus, cross-checking some events with the Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD). The media sources for Africa collated by these databases are primarily international news outlets like BBC, Reuters, and Agence France-Presse, however, there are also some local news and radio transcripts that feature election information. To identify instances of fraud, I performed searches on each individual election looking for common phrases of accusation: fraud, unfair, boycott, reject, rigged, harassment, voter intimidation, riot, protest, unrest, violence, demonstrations. In cases where the candidate, one of his close allies or a member of the party accused any form of electoral fraud, the election was coded as having an accusation of fraud. Using the wide-variety of search terms allowed for the collection of a wide breadth of data on each election, but it is possible

[32] Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

[33] 5 months is an arbitrary cut off period, but any period chosen would have been at least partially arbitrary. Most accusations were made shortly after electoral results were announced.

that instances of fraud accusation, electoral rejection, claims of victory, or electoral contention were missed. To help mitigate potential mistakes, each election was coded by myself and my research assistant and any discrepancies in the information collected was further explored through cross-checking. Even so, it is possible that accusations of fraud were made that were not reported by the media. In these cases, the data is simply missing from the dataset, though, it is likely that these missing accounts of electoral fraud accusations would also be less likely to reach supporters if it is not widely reported in the media.

Fraud accusations were made in 75% of the elections included in my study. The use of newspaper articles with actual rhetoric of fraud accusation from electoral losers is particularly important because it provides new insight into the idea that the mere perception of fraud could influence voter attitudes and behavior. Several studies have shown that individuals' beliefs about the occurrence of fraud are influenced not only by personal experience, but by partisanship as well (Wellman et al. 2018; Flesken and Hartl 2018; Robertson 2017; Cho and Kim 2016; McAllister and White 2015; Cantu and Garcia-Ponce 2015; Bowler et al. 2015; Sances and Stewart 2015; Norris 2014; Bratton 2013; Kerr 2013; Moehler 2009; Rose and Mishler 2009; Birch 2008; Ansolabeher and Persily 2008; Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn 2008; Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson et al. 2005). As a number of studies have shown, supporters of parties listen to their leaders and act on the information their leaders give them, so in our consideration of the effects of fraud, we cannot discount the importance of knowing what leaders are saying about it (Popkin 1994; Bean and Mughan 1989;

Bisgaard and Slothuus 2018; Colombo and Kriesi 2017; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Bullock 2011, Leeper and Slothuus 2014).

Independent Variable—Individual Partisanship

Which party, if any, an individual supports has been shown to matter a great deal in their perception of electoral integrity (Conroy-Krutz and Kerr 2015). In testing the relationship between accusations of electoral fraud and voter perception of electoral integrity, an additional independent variable is included: *Individual Partisanship*. I drew observations of individual partisanship from a combination of survey questions from the fifth round of the Afrobarometer, specifically Question 89 parts A and B, which ask:

"Do you feel close to any particular political party?" and "Which party is that?"

Those who responded as feeling close to the party that won in the elections held the previous year were coded as the winners (31%), those who supported any other political party were coded as losers (25%), and those who responded that they did not feel close to any political party were coded as non-partisans (44%). I expect that winners will be the least likely to believe that an election was not free or fair, while losers and non-partisans will be more likely to believe that any election was not free or fair. The difference between winners (those in power) and losers and non-partisans (those out of power) is likely to be increased when an accusation of electoral fraud is made by the opposition candidate.

Figure 33: Relationship between Individual Partisanship and Perception of Electoral Integrity



Control Variables: VOTER PERCEPTION OF FRAUD

In order to control for other variables that could influence the perceptions of electoral integrity, I have added several variables that measure relevant aspects of elections and democratic institutions within states. First, I included a measurement for official report of fraud (*Actual Fraud)*. This measurement of fraud is drawn from the Varieties of Democracy database, which uses expert surveys to measure various aspects of democratic governance. This particular variable is based on an expert survey question that asked:

> "Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?"

Including a second measurement of observed fraud helps to parse out whether the effect of fraud accusation is connected to or independent from the occurrence of

observed electoral fraud. This variable indicates that fraud was detected by outside sources, and the fraud that was detected influenced the results of the election. The variable is coded with three levels of fraud occurrence based on country expert reviews of electoral fraud for each independent election.[34] The three levels are: no fraud that affected the outcome of the election, unclear or ambiguous as to whether the fraud was consequential to the outcome, extensive fraud—enough to swing the results of the election. The percentage of elections categorized as each of these level of fraud categories can be found in Figure 34 below.

Figure 34: Breakdown of the level of fraud for elections included in the study



In elections where the experts detected little to no fraud there was still an accusation of fraud in 76% of elections. These rates of accusations only increase in cases of an

[34] These three levels were collapsed from five more specific levels 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed, and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority); 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority); 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above); 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities, but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above); 4: Yes. There was some amount or human error and logistical restrictions, but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

ambiguous fraud determination by the experts (83%) as well as cases that in which experts deemed fraud to have occurred (95%). The relationship between the expert evaluation of the actual occurrence of fraud and the occurrence of a fraud accusation by the losing party can be seen below in Figure 35. In all cases, the percentage of cases in which fraud is accused is relatively high, but the likelihood of accusation increases with observed indications of fraud as indicated by the expert evaluations.

Figure 35: Relationship between expert evaluation of fraud and accusations of fraud



As the survey data is not collected in conjunction with the previous election, I have included a variable that measures how many months prior to the survey administration the last election occurred (*Time Since Last Election*). This helps to account for any diminishment or growth in election-related feelings of resentment or positivity—allowing for a better comparison across surveys regardless of the timeframe. A second temporal variable accounting for the tenure of the electoral system (*Tenure of Election System*) was also included. Longer-established democratic systems are likely to be more stable; systems that have gone through more iterations of the electoral process have been shown to have stronger democratic institutions (Lindberg 2006). The final election-level variable I have controlled for is the

difference in vote share (*Difference in Vote Share*) between the two best-performing political parties. Including this vote share variable helps to account for the competitiveness of the electoral contest. The level of competition is important as it helps to indicate freeness and fairness, level of turnout, and stability (Giebler, Banducci, and Kritzinger 2017).

Additionally, I include several measures of individual demographic characteristics to control for other individual-level factors that could influence perception. These were drawn from the Afrobarometer survey responses and include: *Age*, *Gender*, *Education*, and respondent's self-reported economic status (*Personal Economic Status*).

Results-VOTER PERCEPTION OF FRAUD

My first hypothesis states that accusations of electoral fraud will cause voters, especially those who are not supporters of the electoral winner, to be more skeptical about the integrity of the election. The following section will outline the results of the multivariate logistic regressions run to test the veracity of this hypothesis.

VOTER PERCEPTION OF FRAUD

The first hypothesis concerns the relationship between fraud accusations and voter perception of electoral integrity. I first ran a multivariate logistic regression using just the measure for just the observed occurrence of fraud and excluding the variable indicating whether fraud was accused by the loser of the election. In this model the relationship between the occurrence of actual fraud and the likelihood of an individual perceiving the election as not free or fair is strongly significant. However, when this model is re-run including the variable measuring accusation of fraud, I find

that there is a statistically significant relationship between accusations of fraud by a losing political candidate and the perception of the election as less free and fair. Additionally, I find that partisanship, economic status, the difference in vote share garnered by the winner and losers, and the tenure of the political system all also influence the perception of the electoral integrity.

For my main variable of interest, the occurrence of an accusation of fraud from a losing political candidate during the election, I find a strong negative relationship—in cases where fraud is accused, there is a strong likelihood that individuals within the state will perceive the election as less free and fair than they would if no fraud accusation was made. Interestingly, when the occurrence of an accusation of fraud is accounted for, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between official reports of fraud and these same perceptions of electoral integrity. These results suggest that voters are paying more attention to what the losing candidates are saying about their experiences than to outsider reports of electoral integrity. The results of these two models can be found below in Table 19.

The relationship between partisanship and the perceptions of electoral integrity is well studied, and these results support the conclusions that those studies have drawn (Wellman et al. 2018; Robertson 2017; Ansolabeher and Persily 2008; Flesken and Hartl 2018; Kerr 2013; Moehler 2009; Cho and Kim 2016; McAllister and White 2015; Rose and Mishler 2009; Cantu and Garcia-Ponce 2015; Bowler et al. 2015; Sances and Stewart 2015; Anderson et al. 2005; Birch 2008; Norris 2014; Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn 2008; Anderson et al. 2005; Kerr 2013; Bratton 2013). Those who support winners are most likely to believe the election was free and fair,

with losers and non-partisans having a less rosy picture of the electoral process. I find that the more secure someone feels in their economic status, the more likely they are to perceive the election as free and fair. The relationship between self-reported economic status and electoral integrity perception is expected as, generally, more secure people are likely to believe that the current system is working when compared to those who see themselves as doing poorly.

For variables related to the election and electoral system itself, I find that both the difference in vote share between the winning party and first losing party and the length of the electoral tenure have an effect on voters' perceptions of electoral integrity. These results show that larger gaps in vote share between the winner and loser cause voters to view the election as less free and fair. This suggests that low levels of electoral competition cause voters to have less faith in the process overall. Interestingly, I find a negative relationship between the tenure of the political system and the perception of electoral integrity. This suggests that voters are indeed learning in elections, but perhaps they are learning that the system is not functioning as they expected, rather than learning that democracy works for them. I find a weak relationship between gender and the perception of electoral integrity, with women being slightly more trusting of the electoral process than men. I do not find a significant relationship between age or education and the perception of electoral integrity.

Table 19: Primary Ordered Logistic Model Differences in Perception of Electoral Integrity by Partisan Status and Fraud Accusation

	(1) Likelihood of perceiving last election as free and fair b/se	(2) Likelihood of perceiving last election as free and fair b/se
Winner	0.826***	0.823***
	(0.11)	(0.05)
Loser	-0.234	-0.196
	(0.13)	(0.12)
Accusation of Fraud		-0.546***
		(0.08)
Actual Fraud	-0.456**	-0.234
	(0.16)	(0.12)
Age	0.004	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.010	-0.015
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Personal Economic Status	0.150***	0.147***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender	0.201**	0.186*
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Difference in Vote Share	-0.005	-0.010***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
System Tenure	-0.043***	-0.048***
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Time Since Last Election	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Constant	1.654***	2.354***
	(0.35)	(0.33)
Observations	13915	13915

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

However, using a logistic model only tells us so much about what these effects look like in real terms. To know what these likelihoods really mean, we need to measure the substantive significance through predicted probabilities. The results of

the predicted probabilities test show that the effect of fraud accusation on perception of electoral integrity is strongest for those individuals who say they do not support any particular political party and those who support losers, with smaller effects for the supporters of winners. However, these results do suggest that fraud accusations from losing political candidates do influence every type of voter, which underlines the importance of the study of these effects. The results of the predicted probabilities can be seen below in Figure 36.

Figure 36: Predicted Probabilities of the likelihood of perceiving an election to be free and fair over the partisanship



The evidence suggesting that even the supporters of winners can be influenced is particularly interesting. However, as it has been found in previous work that winners can tend to be more accepting of illiberal practices of the leaders they support, this may not mean any diminished support for the leaders who are being accused (Moehler 2009).

Robustness checks

In addition to these tests, I also ran a series of models that included some other variables that have been found to influence perceptions of electoral integrity. First, I included a variable measuring the degree of independence given to the electoral management body. This variable represents the level of constraints leaders face in their abilities to manipulate elections as electoral management bodies tend to be the entities in charge of maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. I do find that this independence of electoral management bodies is significant, but it is not as influential as accusations of fraud made by a losing candidate. This suggests again that the reports from political losers are very accessible to voters, which allows for a greater impact. It is likely that the average voter does not know very much about the degree of independence of the electoral management body, so the impact it can have on their opinions is limited.

I have also controlled for the freedom of the media within the various states included in my sample. To do so I incorporate another V-Dem measure, which gauges the ability and likelihood of the media to criticize the government. If the media outlets within the state have more freedom that suggests a higher level of civil liberty protection, and it also prevents the incumbent from controlling the narrative about the electoral results. This variable is not significant, and it does not change the results I find for partisanship effects. Interestingly, the relationship between critical media and the perception of freeness and fairness is negative, meaning that voters are more likely to believe that the election is free and fair if the media does not regularly criticize the government. However, including this variable does increase the differences between the perception of electoral integrity from when fraud is accused

and when it is not. When this variable is included in the model, voters perceive the election as free and fair at a higher rate than in the previous model. This is true for all three subsections of partisanship. The results of these models can be found below in Table 20.

Table 20: Secondary Logistic Models Differences in Perception of Electoral Integrity by Partisan Status and Fraud Accusations with extra control variables

	(1) Likelihood of perceiving last election as free and fair b/se	(2) Likelihood of perceiving last election as free and fair b/se	(3) Likelihood of perceiving last election as free and fair b/se
Winner	0.778***	0.751***	0.738***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Loser	-0.227	-0.260	-0.272*
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Accusation of Fraud	-0.506***	-0.773***	-0.721***
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Actual Fraud	-0.107	-0.119	-0.075
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.011	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Personal Economic Status	0.150***	0.157***	0.157***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender	0.190*	0.194*	0.195*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Difference in Vote Share	-0.010***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
System Tenure	-0.042***	-0.047***	-0.044***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time Since Last Election	-0.006	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Independent Electoral	0.233		0.109
Commission	(0.12)		(0.07)
Critical Media		-0.267***	-0.230***
		(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	1.576*	3.035***	2.571***
	(0.62)	(0.34)	(0.38)
Observations	13915	13915	13915

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

LIKELIHOOD OF CONTENTION

In testing my second hypothesis, Accusations of fraud will increase the likelihood of post-election opposition protests and riots, I use a compiled dataset which contains information from 120 elections which took place in 33 African countries over 20 years. This data contains variables which measure electoral contention, fraud accusation, official fraud events, and several other control variables.

Dependent Variables—LIKELIHOOD OF CONTENTION

The main dependent variable, occurrence of protest or rioting following the election (*Post-Election Protest or Riot*), is drawn from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012). NELDA extensively outlines several election-level variables throughout the world, including whether there were protests and/or riots related to the previous election.[35] Using protests and riots as the outcome of interest is particularly useful for understanding the losing party's supporters' reaction to unfavorable electoral results. It is likely that most losing parties do not have enough weapons, resources, or political will to engage in electoral violence; which makes the reactions of protest or rioting more likely as a response if they want to make their voice heard. Protests and riots occurred following 19.6% of the elections in my sample.

However, I did not want to exclude other cases of more escalated levels of violence if there was a relationship between fraud accusation cases of electoral violence. Thus, I also used a secondary dependent variable, drawn from the African Electoral Violence Database (AVED), for when the opposition engages in electoral

[35] The NELDA dataset is coded using scholarly studies of countries, Oxford election handbooks, historical news archives and other sources

violence (Straus and Taylor 2012). The opposition engaged in election violence in 9.4% of elections in my sample, making it a fairly rare event. I do not believe that post-election violence will be significantly correlated with accusation of electoral fraud.

Independent Variable—LIKELIHOOD OF CONTENTION

The main independent variable for these tests is the same independent variable used in the testing of the previous hypothesis: *Accusation of Fraud.*

Control Variables—LIKELIHOOD OF CONTENTION

Two control variables included in the model used to test the first hypothesis are also included in my analysis of the second hypothesis: *Actual Fraud* and *Difference in Vote Share*. In addition to these two repeated controls, I also controlled for the level of democracy within states (*Level of Democracy*) by using a variable that combines normalized democracy scores from Freedom House and Polity2 from the Varieties of Democracy database. This will help to account for variance in institutional strength across states (Lehoucq 2003). Additionally, I accounted for the stability of party systems within states (*Party System Stability*) as determined by expert surveys from the Varieties of Democracy database. This will help account for how the stability of party systems could constrain the leaders' ability to shirk blame for loss (Randell and Svasand 2002). I also controlled for whether this was the country's first election since democratization (*First Election*). Several studies have shown that the practice of elections helps to stabilize democracy because it teaches members of the state and elites how democratic power distribution functions, and as elections happen, states learn how to maintain it (Lindberg 2006). However, other studies argue that if the learning process does not show a fair and legitimate power

distribution process from elections, the democracy can be challenged (Fearon 2011). Additionally, I controlled for the political relevance of ethnic groups (*PREG*) to help account for any increase in the likelihood of contention that could be related to ethnic differences (Posner 2004).[36] Finally, I accounted for the past year's GDP growth within states (*GDP Growth*). This will help to account for economic factors that can influence contentious political behavior (Horowitz 2001).

I also ran models with controls for whether the election was boycotted (*Opposition Boycotted Election*) and whether or not the opposition accepted the results of the election (*Opposition Accepted Election Results*). These two cases of opposition electoral reaction are also potential signals to the voters that the opposition has been cheated in some way in an election process. Adding these variables in, will help to pinpoint the type of messaging that has the most influence on voter reaction to electoral results. These are also important because they are alternative measures of party and candidate reaction to the electoral proceedings. If a challenger chooses to not participate in an election because they believe it will be unfair or will put their supporters into a dangerous position (if they are worried about violent retaliation or harassment from the incumbent supporters) through electoral boycotts or if following the election an opposition candidate officially reject the electoral results, the candidate or party is signaling an even stronger message to their supporters that the results are unfair. By escalating from simple fraud accusations to rejection of the

[36]I chose PREG over other measures because it is an expert-assessed measure of the importance of the ethnic diversity found in most African states. It is important to include not just the presence of ethnic difference, but also its influence on politics to get a clear picture of the real effect of politicized ethnic difference on the likelihood of political contention.

electoral process either before (boycotting) or after (rejecting the results), the candidate or party is in turn escalating the potential response from their supporters.

Results—LIKELIHOOD OF CONTENTION

The second hypothesis, that accusations of fraud from losing political candidates will increase the likelihood of post-electoral contention. The following section will outline the results of the multivariate logistic regressions run to test the veracity of this hypothesis.

LIKELIHOOD OF CONTENTION

First, I ran three models without instances of fraud accusation, to show that when fraud accusation is excluded, the occurrence of *Actual Fraud* is statistically significant in two of the three models. Interestingly when one of the measures of loser reaction to the electoral results—whether or not they accept the final results of the election—is included the relationship between the observed occurrence of fraud and the likelihood of protests and riots is no longer significant. These results suggest evidence for my hypothesis that it is not just the occurrence of fraud that matters, we also need to take into account the actions of the losing party once the electoral results are announced. The results of these models can be seen in Table 21 below.

Table 21: Primary Logistic Models Differences in Likelihood of Protest based on Occurrence of Fraud

	(1) Post-Election Protests or Riots b/se	(2) Post-Election Protests or Riots b/se	(3) Post-Election Protests or Riots b/se
Actual Fraud	-0.908*	-0.927*	-1.052
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.67)
Difference in Vote Share	-0.015	-0.014	-0.015
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gain in Opp. Vote Share	0.168	0.158	0.178
	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.54)

Party Stability	-0.431	-0.491	-0.598
	(1.82)	(1.94)	(1.91)
Presence of Election Monitors	0.805	0.800	0.780
	(0.67)	(0.68)	(0.70)
Freedom House Polity Score	0.161	0.161	0.145
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)
GDP Growth Past Year	-0.024	-0.024	-0.023
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
First Election	-0.440	-0.394	-0.396
	(0.88)	(0.91)	(0.89)
PREG	-0.144	-0.165	-0.241
	(1.32)	(1.33)	(1.29)
Election Boycott Opp.		-0.195	
		(0.75)	
Electoral Results Accepted			0.156
			(0.37)
Constant	-1.232	-1.165	-1.235
	(1.35)	(1.42)	(1.36)
Observations	120	120	120

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Following these results, I re-ran these three models including a measure which accounts for accusations of fraud in addition to the actual fraud variable. In the first of these three models, I found neither variable to be significant. However, in the second two models, which included controls for electoral boycotts and official rejection of electoral results we see that only *Accusation of Fraud* becomes significant.

The results show that there is a statistically significant relationship, showing that the likelihood of protests and riots happening after an election is increased when there has been as accusation of fraud. Additionally, in my tests I find that this is the only statistically significant variable, with all other variables—the official report of fraud, the difference in vote share, the political relevance of ethnicity, the stability of the party system, the level of democracy, the previous year's GDP growth, and whether or not this is the first election since democratization—found as not having a statistically significant relationship with the occurrence of protests or riots following elections.

Interestingly, there is not a statistically significant relationship between the actual electoral integrity (as indicated in official reports) and the likelihood of contention. This suggests that the communication of fraud from the political elites is a very important factor in whether or not individuals are spurred to action. This does not mean necessarily that the goal of politicians accusing fraud is to incubate contention, but it is often a result of their accusations of cheating.

Table 22: Primary Logistic Models Differences in Likelihood of Protest based on Accusation of Fraud

	(1) Post-Election Protests or Riots b/se	(2) Post-Election Protests or Riots b/se	(3) Post-Election Protests or Riots b/se
Accusation of Fraud	1.995	2.015*	2.063*
	(1.02)	(1.02)	(1.05)
Actual Fraud	-0.753	-0.778	-0.974
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.64)
Difference in Vote Share	-0.016	-0.015	-0.016
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Gain in Opp. Vote Share	0.354	0.344	0.382
	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.53)
Party Stability	-1.472	-1.568	-1.816
	(1.76)	(1.90)	(1.87)
Presence of Election Monitors	0.926	0.921	0.908
	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.70)
Freedom House Polity Score	0.150	0.150	0.127
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)
GDP Growth Past Year	-0.051	-0.052	-0.052
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
First Election	-0.627	-0.571	-0.566
	(0.91)	(0.91)	(0.90)
PREG	-0.152	-0.177	-0.274
	(1.33)	(1.35)	(1.29)
Election Boycott Opp.		-0.293	
		(0.71)	
Electoral Results Accepted			0.250
			(0.37)
Constant	-2.742	-2.666	-2.828
	(1.96)	(1.99)	(2.03)
Observations	120	120	120

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

However, because it is difficult to directly ascertain the actual effects in logistic models, it is important that we also look at the predicted probabilities of the model to understand the substantive significance of the relationship. The results of this test can be found below in Figure 37. The result shows that the occurrence of contention is 19 percentage points more likely when fraud has been accused. Clearly, there is a strong relationship between elite accusations of fraud and the likelihood of electoral contention.

Figure 37: Predicted Probabilities of the occurrence of protests or riots as conditioned by accusation of electoral fraud



Robustness checks

While my initial tests show a strong relationship between accusations of electoral fraud and the occurrence of protests or riots, I do not necessarily believe that this relationship extends to more organized and violent instances of electoral contention. Protests and riots as less structured contentious behaviors are more likely to develop sporadically requiring less encouragement and support from elites to occur

(Burchard 2015). With higher levels of escalation in these contention behaviors, like coordinated violence perpetrated by the opposition party, there needs to be more of an effort made by elites to create buy in from their supporters (McAdam 1982). This increase in buy-in requirement is directly related to the increase in riskiness of the contention—coordinated violence is riskier to engage in than protests or riots. Opposition parties are unlikely to have the support they would need to protect their supporters from repression crackdowns from the state leadership and, therefore, a low-cost behavior like accusing the winner of fraud is unlikely to spur many opposition supporters to action without harder evidence of the potential for success in creating change through violence.

In order to test whether or not accusations of fraud maintain their significance in escalated electoral violence, I also ran an additional test with a new dependent variable—opposition engagement in post-election violence. In running this multivariate logistic model I did not find a statistically significant relationship between post-election violence and accusations of fraud. This suggests that the degree of post-election contention that could be prompted by accusations of fraud by the losing political candidate is mostly limited to protest and riot behaviors. The results of this model can be seen below in Table 23.

Table 23: Secondary Logistic Models Differences in Likelihood of Post-election Violence by the Opposition based on Occurrence of Fraud and Accusation of Fraud

	(7) Opposition Engagement in Post-Election Violence b/se
Accusation of Fraud	-0.489
	(0.80)
Actual Fraud	-1.329
	(1.03)

Difference in Vote Share	-0.037
	(0.02)
Gain in Opp. Vote Share	-0.016
	(0.71)
Party Stability	3.010
	(2.66)
Presence of Election Monitors	-0.650
	(1.12)
Freedom House Polity Score	0.323
	(0.25)
GDP Growth Past Year	-0.023
	(0.07)
First Election	0.914
	(1.44)
PREG	-3.535*
	(1.53)
Electoral Results Accepted	-0.348
	(0.58)
Constant	0.282
	(1.71)
Observations	120

$^{*}\ p < 0.05,\ ^{**}\ p < 0.01,\ ^{***}\ p < 0.001$

However, these results finding non-significance for the relationship between accusations of electoral fraud and post-election violence perpetrated by the opposition makes sense for two reasons: 1) post-election violence engagement by the opposition is very rare, it is unlikely to be triggered by a simple accusation of fraud by the losing candidate, 2) participation in violence is likely to be riskier than participation in protests or riots—this is not to say that participation in protests and riots is without risk, but the use of violence against the government is likely to prompt larger response than mere protests.

Conclusion

Despite the research that has shown that individual voters are influenced by the politicians they support (Popkin 1995), no previous research on the relationship between perceptions of electoral integrity and fraud have explored how losing

candidates' accusations of fraud can influence voter perceptions. In looking at fraud accusations specifically, my paper contributes a great deal to our understandings of voter reaction to elections. First, my paper accounts for a very important aspect of reaction to elections that most work measuring the reaction of losers to loss fail to account for—accusations of fraud from losing candidates. These accusations are important to account for because they are relatively low cost, but at the same time have a high potential for influencing voters—if they can convince voters to stick with them despite their loss, they can continue to play the political game. By using the words of failed candidates directly, we can know what types of messages that they were giving to the voters through the press following their loss. This use of real-world rhetoric allows for a more nuanced understanding of how leaders attempt to connect with voters over their loss and explain away their failure to win. Using Afrobarometer surveys, data from the V-Dem, AVED, and NELDA datasets I have been able to test the effects of these fraud accusations on both voter perceptions of elections as well as the likelihood of post-election contention.

The results from this paper show a clear relationship between accusations of fraud from losing political candidates and the subsequent reactions of voters to the results. The evidence suggests that fraud accusations change voters' perceptions of electoral integrity—making voters less likely to view an election as "free and fair"—and the same fraud accusations also increase the likelihood of post-election protests and rioting. What is particularly interesting is how much more this seems to matter than the actual instance of fraud. This suggests that voters are relying heavily on their political leaders to understand how they should feel about the results of the election.

But this does not necessarily extend to more extreme measures elites can take to denounce the legitimacy of the election—such as legal rejection of the results, boycotting the election, or attempting to coordinate more extreme forms of electoral contention involving violence.

This paper only touched on the very basic relationship between accusations of fraud from electoral losers and their effect on contention. Future research could delve more deeply into this relationship by looking at how this relationship changes from election to election within states—whether there is a compounding effect, or if the accusations and rejections lose their influence over repeated experience. I was limited to the analysis of elections from 31 African countries, but this study could potentially be expanded to all developing democracies.

Appendix

Multi-level model tests of Hypothesis 1
Relationship between Fraud Accusation and Perception of Electoral Integrity

	Dependent variable:	
	Perception of Electoral Integrity	
	(Random Intercept)	(Random Effects)
Partisanship	0.324***	0.278***
	(0.029)	(0.066)
Fraud Accusation	-0.721***	-0.717***
	(0.108)	(0.129)
Official Report of Fraud	-0.075	-0.212
	(0.083)	(0.131)
Electoral Management Body Independence	0.109	0.099
	(0.108)	(0.141)
Media Freedom	-0.230***	-0.229*
	(0.082)	(0.123)
Age	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Self-Reported Economic Status	0.157***	0.153***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Gender	0.195***	0.192***
	(0.045)	(0.045)
Tenure of Electoral System	-0.044***	-0.043***
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Difference in Vote Share 1st and 2nd	-0.011***	-0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Time Since Last Election	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	2.571***	2.682***
	(0.524)	(0.584)
Observations	13,915	13,915
Log Likelihood	-6,402.268	-6,396.832
Akaike Inf. Crit.	12,832.540	12,825.660
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	12,938.110	12,946.320

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Multi-level model tests of Hypothesis 2

Relationship between Likelihood of Post-Election Contention and Accusation of Fraud

	Dependent variable:		
	Perception of Electoral Integrity		
	(Random Intercept)	(Random Intercept)	(Random Intercept)
Fraud Accused	2.150*	2.132*	2.032*
	(1.203)	(1.221)	(1.201)
Opposition Boycott	-0.194		
	(0.807)		
Opposition Accept Results		-0.260	
		(0.389)	
Vote Share Difference	-0.021*	-0.021*	-0.020*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Official Fraud Report	-0.115	-0.096	0.177
	(0.707)	(0.694)	(0.829)
Party System Stability	-2.065	-1.936	-1.583
	(2.768)	(2.395)	(2.741)
Level of Democracy	-0.038	-0.031	0.011
	(0.180)	(0.168)	(0.187)
Past Year Growth	-0.051	-0.050	-0.049
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.063)
First	-0.842	-0.859	-0.896
	(0.898)	(0.895)	(0.899)
PREG	0.147	0.169	0.247
	(1.461)	(1.431)	(1.470)
Constant	-1.343	-1.446	-1.358
	(2.042)	(1.860)	(2.032)
Observations	121	121	121
Log Likelihood	-54.811	-54.842	-54.610
Akaike Inf. Crit.	131.623	129.684	131.221
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	162.377	157.642	161.974

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Chapter 5—Conclusion

Dissertation Summary

This dissertation explored the consequences of elections for those shut out of power. In doing so, I worked to bridge the divide between the winner-loser gap literature and the electoral contention literature. By studying how individuals of varying partisan status—winners, losers, and non-partisans—respond to electoral results and rhetoric of the party leaders following electoral loss, we can better understand the underlying motivations for political contention. The work presented in these papers shows that an inability to access power can cause individuals to feel less connected to the state, but it also shows that more than just an electoral loss is required to motivate an individual to be willing to participate in or support post-electoral contention. There needs to be a catalyst, like an accusation of fraud, to really motivate action. However, from these findings it is difficult to say how to reduce the disconnection that losers and non-partisans feel from the state or how to reduce the likelihood of electoral contention.

In Chapter 2, I explored one of the underlying mechanisms that drives differences in perceptions of democracy between winners, losers, and non-partisans—individual connection to the national and ethnic levels of identity. Through my focus on identity, elections and partisan status, I can see how electoral results influence the connection that individuals of differing partisan status feel toward the national and ethnic levels of identity. I find that losers and non-partisans, individuals that do not have access to power, are less likely to feel connected to the national level of identity, and that losers who had previously been in power feel the least connection to the

national identity. In exploring the consequences of this disconnection from the national identity, I find that those who are less connected to the national level of identity are more likely to mistrust the institutions of democracy. These findings show a distinct connection between identity and electoral results that has not been previously studied and provide a clear mechanism for understanding the differences in beliefs about democracy held by winners, losers, and non-partisans.

Chapter 3 builds on this work by investigating the warnings often given by the winner-loser gap literature about the consequences of these attitude differences between winners and losers concerning democracy. To do so, I examined the relationship between winners, losers, and non-partisans and the likelihood of their willingness to accept and participate in political contention and violence. Additionally, I evaluated the relationship between individual willingness to accept and participate in political contention and violence and several measures of attitudes toward democracy. The results of these tests show that it is not winner or loser status that is most related to the likelihood of willingness to accept and participate in contention, but rather entrenched partisanship that matters most, with winners and losers both being more likely that non-partisans to report this willingness. These results are surprising given the emphasis on losers' attitudes as the potential threat to democracy often found in the literature. I also find that the most often-used measure of attitudes toward democracy, satisfaction with democracy, is not very well correlated to willingness to accept or participate in political contention. This suggests that the winner-loser gap literatures should shift their commonly used measure for democracy attitude, satisfaction with democracy, toward an alternative measure of

democracy attitude, support for democracy, which was found to be significantly related to an individual's willingness to accept and participate in political contention. Additionally, this paper shows that there is not a uniform response to electoral results from all winners, losers, and non-partisans, so we need to explore other motivations beyond an electoral loss to incentivize contentious behavior in the wake of political loss.

Chapter 4 works to build toward a better understanding of the motivations for action following electoral loss, studying accusations of fraud as a potential motivator for contentious political action following an electoral loss. Fraud generally is a well-studied cause of electoral contention, but past work has been limited by focusing only on officially reported instances of fraud. In incorporating the actual accusations of fraud made by the losing political candidates and parties, I can study how voters are influenced by the rhetoric of the losing political candidates and parties. I find that these accusations are influential to voters' perceptions of the freeness and fairness of the election, and that accusations of fraud create a higher likelihood of the occurrence of post-election protests and riots. These results are particularly interesting because I find that accusations of fraud are actually more influential than official reports of fraud in driving both public perception of the election and electoral contention, however, this relationship between accusations of fraud and contention does not extend to post-election violence. The results of this study show that political leaders, even those who have recently lost an election, hold a great deal of power in shaping voters' understandings of the electoral process and in motivating voters to action.

Each of these papers contributes to a fuller understanding of the path from exclusion from political power to the potential for political contention. These studies create connections between the winner-loser gap and the electoral contention literatures' understandings of the potential for electoral contention by exploring both the individual-level voter responses to loss as well as the bigger picture consequences of elite rhetoric about the fairness of their political loss. They provide context for the differences between winners, losers, and non-partisans, while also granting a new understanding of the actual potential for political contention that these differences in attitudes between winners, loser and non-partisans cause. Additionally, they show the influence that political leaders can have in motivating voters to action, which helps to highlight how catalyst for action, such as an accusation of electoral fraud, can encourage voters to engage in political contention.

Future Research

These papers are just the tip of the iceberg in our understandings of the causes of the differences in attitudes between winners, losers and non-partisans and motivations to political contention. Future work can take this as a starting point to delve into the psychological forces driving these differences and motivations. Given that the research conducted in this dissertation was entirely observational, there is a huge opportunity for future research to expand on these ideas and explore these psychological forces through experimental research. I was limited in my ability to test the mechanisms which underlay the motivations for differences in attitudes and behaviors because I was unable to isolate these mechanisms. Particularly, I would be interested in testing two mechanisms at work in determining individual responses to

electoral loss: cognitive consistency and an element of the prospect theory called loss aversion. Anderson et al. (2005) discuss these as potential drivers for the gap in attitudes between electoral winners and losers, but more work needs to be done to evaluate how these factors influence change in political losers. An understanding of the effects of these mechanisms would provide for a clear cause for the changes in attitudes that we see between winners, losers, and non-partisans.

Additionally, future research could broaden our understandings of the theories posed in this dissertation by expanding beyond the scope of sub-Saharan Africa. It is possible that the phenomena I find in this work are only applicable to this region, but it seems likely that these understandings could apply to regions with similarly developed democratic institutions. It would also be interesting to see how these patterns are augmented in states with more established and entrenched democratic institutions. While political contention is less likely in well-established democracies, it may be true that losers and non-partisans are still less likely that winners to identify at the national level. It would also be interesting to see if partisans still have a higher likelihood than non-partisans of being willing to accept and participate in political contention and violence. These further inquiries at different strengths of democracies may inform our understandings of the best way to measure entrenchment of democracy by allowing us to see which groups of people are most invested in maintaining peace within the system.

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