

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: POPULAR BACKLASH TO LANGUAGE
ASSIMILATION REGIMES

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Do assimilationist restrictions on a minority language lead to greater national unity or a more rebellious minority population? Under what conditions might short-term backlash to language assimilation evolve into greater national unity in the long term? While much of the literature on ethnic politics implicitly treats language simply as an identifying feature of ethnic groups, this dissertation contends that salient language identities and grievances can serve as a source of meaningful division. I examine when and why the costs of pursuing linguistic homogeneity exceed its practical benefits. Just as minority individuals must conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether they should acquire or have their children acquire the dominant language of a host state, so too must governments consider the likelihood that an assimilation program will succeed or fail. I highlight an interaction between three key mechanisms that lead to a distortion of political leaders' cost-benefit analysis when deciding on the nature of their desired language assimilation program. This distortion leads host states

governed by the dominant language group to systematically overestimate the willingness of minority individuals to assimilate voluntarily and underestimate the likely level of subsequent backlash to severe language restrictions. From this theoretical framework, I argue that more severe language restrictions increase minority backlash, and that the intensity of this backlash is influenced by the presence of exclusionary political and economic policies targeting the minority group.

To this end, I conduct five comparative historical case studies on the language assimilation programs imposed on the South Tyroleans in Italy, Amazigh in Algeria, Azerbaijanis in Iran, Mayans in Mexico, and the Anglophones in Cameroon. The overall findings show that the use of more severe language restrictions and exclusionary political and economic policies are very likely to result in intense backlash responses. More often than not, this elevated backlash response will inflict considerable long-term damage to a state's national unity.

POPULAR BACKLASH TO LANGUAGE ASSIMILATION REGIMES

by

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Preface

On Friday, September 29th, 2017, I flew from Lyon to Barcelona for my first weekend trip as a new student in Europe. Two days later, the autonomous region of Catalonia voted in an independence referendum. I sat next to a camera operator in *Plaça de Catalunya* and watched as Carles Puigdemont, the President of the Government of Catalonia, addressed his supporters virtually through a giant projector screen. I would have understood nothing if not for the fact that I happened to be standing next to a Dutch child—fluent in Dutch, English, Spanish, and Catalan—providing me with real-time translations.

As we were waiting for the results to be announced, I could not help but think about the strangeness of the event. Since 1979, Catalonia has enjoyed a significant degree of regional autonomy, complete with its own empowered police force, parliament, and president. As an informal observer, it appeared that demonstrators' grievances primarily revolved around 1) an imbalance between national taxes paid and received and 2) the continued ubiquity of the Spanish language—particularly in Barcelona—alongside Catalan in a bilingual framework.

These grievances were, on the surface, seemingly minimal compared to what one might expect from an independence movement in some other part of the world. Indeed, prior history played an important role in the demands of Catalans in 2017. For example, in 1842, the Regent of Spain and General Baldomero Espartero infamously stated “For the good of Spain, Barcelona must be bombarded once every fifty years.” While the rate of Spanish bombardment of Barcelona has been less frequent than once every fifty years, Espartero's statement serves as a fair indicator of the views held by many Castilian Spanish monarchs toward their fractious Catalan minority since the early 17th century.

I came to Catalonia as an observer, but the experience left me with more questions than answers. I was aware of Spanish attempts to assimilate minority groups during Francoist rule. I was also aware that these attempts failed, as evidenced by Catalonia's achievement of autonomy just four years after Franco's death. Were all language assimilation programs doomed to failure? I wanted to find out.

I would like to specially thank my advisor, Dr. John McCauley. When I began my doctoral studies, I anticipated studying identity and African politics. As my research focus shifted away from these initial interests, I maintained Dr. McCauley as my advisor. His encouragement, positivity, and dedication in providing me with detailed and insightful comments on my drafts and advice throughout my graduate journey were among the best things I could have asked for in a mentor.

Finally, I would like to thank *Caitlyn* for more than words can convey.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Political leaders often have a heightened sense of responsibility for the success and stability of their state. Key to that success and stability is the perceived need to establish or maintain a common language for the sake of national unity, as evidenced by widespread government efforts over time to standardize national languages or eradicate other languages that might create conflicting loyalties. From the perspective of such political leaders, concerns over national unity and the administrative costs of linguistic pluralism incentivize the pursuit of linguistic assimilation over pluralism. At the same time, leaders likely understand that language restrictions can elicit strong reactions from minority groups in the short term.

Is there a ‘correct’ way to assimilate a minority group? Under what conditions, if any, does short-term backlash to language assimilation give way to greater national unity in the long term? What explains variations in the type and intensity of popular responses to such language restrictions? Contrary to the expectations of governments that employ restrictive, assimilationist language policies, I argue that more severe restrictions on language will increase minority backlash to assimilation. I further argue that the extent to which language restrictions impact the intensity of popular backlash is mediated by the degree to which the targeted minority group is subject to exclusionary political and economic policies. In other words, minority backlash to language restrictions increases when a minority is excluded from equal political and economic participation in society.

Language restrictions and minority exclusion affect backlash through interactions between the mechanisms of *coercion resentment*, *status injustice*, and *cultural egoism*. Specifically, coercive measures taken to achieve a particular desired outcome are likely to produce significantly more coercion resentment, increasing the possibility of an undesirable backlash effect. In the context of political and economic exclusion, marginalized minority groups experience status injustice when they are denied the

recognition of their equal worth and right to participate in society's decision-making processes. High levels of cultural egoism among political leaders of the dominant group distort their perceptions of how severe and exclusionary an imposed language assimilation regime is in reality. This distortion in the cost-benefit analysis causes political leaders to overestimate the willingness of minorities to voluntarily assimilate and underestimate the subsequent levels of popular backlash such minorities will create. I conduct comparative historical analyses on five geographically diverse cases of language assimilation programs in order to investigate the effects of language restrictions and exclusionary political and economic policies on popular backlash.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the social science literature on the determinants of minority assimilation and the key factors involved in the formation of state language policies. Here, I discuss why governments are uniquely incentivized to pursue strategies of linguistic assimilation over pluralism. In Chapter 3, I define key concepts and mechanisms and present my classification of the four categories of language assimilation regimes. In Chapter 4, I present the research design, where I elaborate a new Language Restriction Severity Index (LRSI) and discuss the qualitative case study selection approach. The remaining chapters of the dissertation delve into the five 'most ideal' case studies that resulted from this process: South Tyroleans in Italy (1921-1972), Amazigh in Algeria (1962-2015), Azerbaijanis in Iran (1923-2023), Mayans in Mexico (1921-2023), and Anglophones in Cameroon (1961-2017). The findings support the hypothesized relationship between the severity of language restrictions and the level of minority exclusion on popular backlash and national unity.

In addition to elaborating the LRSI, my dissertation makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, while much of the literature on ethnic politics implicitly treats language simply as an identifying feature of ethnic groups, this dissertation makes theoretical advances by problematizing language as a source of meaningful division, furthering research on the unique impact of language on politics. Second, I demonstrate that variations in the severity of language restrictions and exclusivity

of minority political and economic participation greatly affect the intensity and nature of subsequent minority backlash. In doing so, I find that aggressive forms of assimilation both fail to assimilate minorities at a faster rate and catalyze minority nationalisms to such an extent that subsequent extreme backlash responses nullify any potential long-term gains in national unity. Finally, each of the five case studies examined in this dissertation serves as the most comprehensive and transparent source of information on the evolution of language restrictions and exclusionary policies imposed by each host state on their respective targeted minorities. These findings contribute to a small but growing literature on the practical costs and benefits of pursuing nation-building projects using cultural assimilation policies.

Chapter 2: Literature

2.1 *Determinants of Minority Assimilation*

Any minority group in a given host state subjected to assimilationist pressures must conduct a rational cost-benefit analysis to determine the potential material and immaterial costs and benefits of voluntarily assimilating. The literature on nationalism, economics, and sociological integration proposes a variety of explanations for why minorities choose to assimilate.

The first and most prominent factors contributing to minority assimilation choices are the economic incentives that drive individual decisions to acquire or have their children acquire the dominant language. In some explanations, an individual's calculations about whether to adopt the dominant language are primarily determined by the economic returns of assimilation (Glazer & Moynihan, 1970; Laitin, 1993; Lazear, 1995; Adida, 2014). For example, minorities may consider their lifetime wages if they acquire the language widely used in the labor market, public life, and politics (Lazear, 1995; Laitin, 1998). According to Alba and Nee (2003), assimilation acts as an adaptive strategy for many minority communities and immigrant groups in particular. By aligning themselves closer to the dominant culture, these communities believe they can access better job opportunities, superior educational resources, and an improved quality of life. Over time, these economic advantages become deeply intertwined with cultural practices, making assimilation a holistic process rather than a compartmentalized one. Economic incentives are also reflected in other variables that affect the assimilability of minority languages, such as the density of road networks in a region (Bromham et al., 2022). As noted by Lazear (1995) and Adida (2014), the degree of economic competition between minority and dominant-group traders and the degree of commercial dependence on the dominant group are additional factors that shift economic incentives to assimilate.

Economic incentives are further influenced by the relative size and geographic concentration of the minority group, as smaller groups derive more significant economic benefits from assimilation than larger, more concentrated groups who can avoid engaging in economic activity with outside groups to a greater extent. The prominence of relative group size and concentration is particularly evident in scenarios of immigrant assimilation. Additionally, the study of immigrant populations has been instrumental in proposing various theories related to assimilation processes. First among these was the “straight-line” theory of assimilation introduced by Warner and Srole (1945), which suggests that assimilation is a secular, linear path where minority groups eventually adopt the culture, norms, and values of the dominant society over generations. Over time, numerous challenges to straight-line assimilation were made. One of the most significant critiques came from Portes and Zhou (1993), who introduced the concept of “segmented assimilation.” They argued that assimilation outcomes vary based on socioeconomic context and could result in different integration patterns. For some groups, upward mobility might occur, while for others, assimilation might align more with marginalized subcultures.

Gans (1974), while initially helping popularize straight-line assimilation, later challenged it by introducing the concept of “symbolic ethnicity,” which described how immigrant minorities of European descent would identify with their ethnic heritage even after three or more generations (Gans, 1979). While they would adopt the mainstream American culture in their everyday lives and maintain distance from the immigrant community’s cultural practices, they would still engage in symbolic activities that connected them to their ethnic roots. The idea of symbolic ethnicity can also be seen indirectly in the findings of Basch et al. (1994), who similarly challenge straight-line assimilation by showing how many immigrants maintain strong ties with their homelands. Gans (1992) also echoed the findings of Portes and Zhou (1993) by showing that not all groups have equal opportunities to increase their socioeconomic standing, leading to variability in assimilation outcomes

among different groups. Finally, Alba and Nee (1997) added an important nuance to our understanding of assimilation, asserting that assimilation is not simply minorities adapting to the dominant culture but rather a mutual process wherein the dominant culture evolves due to the influence of integrating minority groups.

For all its flaws, the straight-line theory of assimilation is broadly correct in that minority (immigrant) groups generally tend to assimilate over time. Indeed, when the focus of assimilation is narrowed down to the linguistic component, the linguistic assimilation of minority groups seems inevitable. In the United States, various studies have shown how native languages of immigrant groups tend to disappear after just three generations, with the second generation being bilingual in its upbringing and the third retaining only limited knowledge of their grandparents' native language (Waters & Jiménez, 2005; Rumbaut et al., 2006; Portes & Rumbaut, 2014).

For minorities in general, other factors that increase or decrease the speed of assimilation include the nature of preexisting intergroup relations between the minority and dominant group, the presence of salient religious differences, lexical distance, and the presence of bordering transnational ethnic kin.¹ High levels of hostility between the minority and dominant groups can hinder voluntary assimilation by the minority group (Laitin, 1998; Bisin et al., 2011; Herath, 2015). Laitin's (1998) seminal study of Russian-speaking populations in post-Soviet states indicates that heightened animosity toward a minority group decreases minority interest in voluntarily assimilating due to a potential loss of dignity. Similarly, Bisin et al. (2011) demonstrate in the European context that perceived hostility or discrimination in labor markets negatively affects immigrants' economic assimilation, suggesting a strong link between external hostility and the retention of ethnic identity as a form of defense or resistance. Drawing from the postwar Sri Lankan context, Herath (2015)

¹ Linguistic (lexical) distance is defined here simply as a measure of the difference between two languages based on the comparison of their vocabularies. Two languages that significantly differ in grammar, phonetics, syntax, writing system, etc., will have a respectively high level of linguistic distance from each other.

underscored this dynamic, illustrating that hostile linguistic policies, such as the imposition of Sinhala as the sole official language, marginalized the Tamil-speaking minority. Such policies fueled resistance to voluntary assimilation, as adopting the dominant language and culture could be interpreted as succumbing to a history of oppression.

Salient religious differences are also cited as a barrier to assimilation, particularly in South Asia (Schiffman, 1996; DeVotta, 2004). Religious identities are generally the most powerful bases for political mobilization outside of ethnolinguistic identities. When neither an ethnic, linguistic, nor religious identity crosses the minority and dominant groups, it becomes difficult for political mobilization to engage both groups simultaneously, increasing future minority resistance to assimilation. Using the case of Sri Lanka, DeVotta (2004) shows how the lack of a crosscutting religious identity significantly weakened the desire for Tamils to linguistically assimilate, particularly because religious differences were layered with linguistic and political tensions. Research has shown that greater linguistic distances between an immigrant's native language and the learned language result in lower proficiency in the learned language within a given time frame (Chiswick & Miller, 2004). Thus, greater linguistic distances are necessarily linked to cost-benefit considerations concerning an individual's decision to assimilate linguistically.

2.2 State Language Policy Formation

The field of language policy and planning (LPP) is, at its core, concerned with the deliberate efforts to influence the behavior of others concerning the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes. The terms 'language planning' and 'language policy' are often used interchangeably, and many definitions of each can be found in the LPP literature. Fundamentally, language policy refers to governmental, institutional, or organizational bodies' official decisions, guidelines, or stances regarding the use, status, and function of languages in various societal domains,

such as education, media, courts, public administration, and public spaces. A language policy can be explicit, codified in official documents, laws, or regulations, or it can be implicit, manifesting through unwritten practices, attitudes, and societal norms. Essentially, language policy provides the framework or the ‘why’ behind language-related decisions.

Language planning pertains to the systematic and proactive efforts and strategies governments employ to change a language or its use. These efforts can be directed toward the structure of the language (corpus planning), its status in society (status planning), or its teaching and learning (acquisition planning) (Ager, 2001). Language planning is the practical execution or the “how” that arises from the broader directives set by language policy.

2.2.1 *Assimilation and Pluralism*

The reality of national language policy choice creates certain perennial pressures on governments to adopt assimilation over pluralism.² Brubaker (2013) highlights two key points about language as a form of cultural difference. First, language is “a pervasive, inescapable medium of social interaction” that influences one’s culture, religion, social relationships, status, and often ethnic group (Brubaker, 2013, p. 16). Second, minority languages tend to lack institutionalization and self-reproducibility. Thus, linguistic pluralism requires significant financial and legal support in the form of education, rights, and protections that only the state can provide (Gellner, 1983; Brubaker, 2013, p. 16). However, due to reasons stemming from nationalism and administrative efficiency, governments are highly and uniquely disincentivized from pursuing policies that would strengthen linguistic pluralism.

² Linguistic pluralism refers to a situation where multiple languages coexist within a society or state and are recognized and adequately supported. This definition emphasizes the acceptance and promotion of linguistic diversity within the framework of official policies.

The importance and pervasiveness of language generate social and economic pressures on minority groups³ to assimilate into the dominant language within a given polity. Differential informal treatment in markets, bureaucratic processes, and private relationships frequently result from language use, leading to segregated social networks and unequal access to the resources that flow from them (Brubaker, 2015). These pressures weaken the self-reproducibility of minority languages, as each new generation is more incentivized to educate their children in the dominant language. Indeed, Zorlu and Hartog (2018) remind us that proficiency in a host country's language can create a strong foothold for immigrants to integrate into the host society and explore more social and economic opportunities.

Moreover, contemporary states are more involved in citizens' daily lives, taking over broad responsibilities in education, local dispute arbitration, welfare, and public sector employment. The expanding role and presence of the government in society created an initial utilitarian incentive to elevate one or two languages to increase administrative efficiency. This dynamic inevitably challenges true linguistic pluralism, as it requires the state to invest significantly in minority language schools, translators, bureaucrats, public signage, and media. Additionally, Liu (2015, p.15) points out that such power-sharing language regimes wherein multiple languages are recognized and protected come with substantial time and monetary efficiency costs due to the necessity of translating communications alone. Gazzola (2014, p. 101) further outlines some of the secondary and tertiary costs of linguistic pluralism, which come in the form of reduced productivity from employees due to working in a foreign language, and delays, errors, and misunderstandings caused by mistranslations, and the time and opportunity costs accrued by individuals in learning a second or third language. Given the considerable direct and indirect costs of these investments, it may become prohibitively expensive for governments to operate in more than one or two official languages. Nonetheless, the survival of minority languages

³ Minority groups are defined here as an ethnic group (on a linguistic, religious, racial, or ideological basis) that is subordinate to the majority or dominant group within a given polity. As such, minority status relates to power or status, rather than population.

is often dependent on the state providing such resources to counteract the decay in the vitality of minority languages resulting from natural language shifts.⁴

Nationalist sentiments held by political leaders further incentivize strategies of assimilation. Political leaders, and particularly founders, often have a heightened sense of responsibility for the success and stability of their state beyond what we should expect from the general dominant-group public (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Bucken-Knapp, 2003; Erdem, 2017; Choi, 2021). Key to that success and stability is the perceived need to establish or maintain a common language for the sake of national unity, as evidenced by widespread government efforts over time to standardize national languages or eradicate other languages that might create conflicting loyalties.

Language has also served as the basis of or strongly informed all nationalisms from the late 18th century onwards (Anderson, 2006). As the primary agents of transformative change within the state, political leaders often regard linguistic diversity as tantamount to national disunity, leading them to pursue assimilationist language policies. Survey research consistently shows that of the major national identity attributes, most people view language as the most critical component of national belonging, above birthplace, religion, customs, and traditions (Stokes, 2017; Tosun, 2020). A common, mutually intelligible language is arguably the most potent tool that political entrepreneurs or governments can exploit to convince speakers of a language of their shared origins and solidarity. Darden and Mylonas (2016) show evidence of this effect, arguing that mass schooling has proven to be the most effective tool for governments to generate national cohesion, instill lasting loyalties, and motivate extreme personal sacrifices in linguistically-defined groups.

⁴ Dorian (1982, p. 44) defines language shift as “the gradual displacement of one language by another in the lives of the community members. This occurs most typically where there is a sharp difference in prestige and in levels of official support for the two (or more) languages concerned.”

2.2.2 *Motivations of Language Regimes*

The decisions and strategies developed by LPP extend beyond theoretical discussions and significantly influence the socio-political landscapes of countries. Historical events like wars and other political changes frequently prompt alterations in language policies and planning as leaders utilize language as a tool to strengthen authority, foster nationalism, and carve out unique identities. Following his unexpected and decisive victory over the French army at the Battle of Agincourt (1415) during the Hundred Years' War and following years of failure and military defeat, King Henry V of England (1413-1422) sought to reinforce early English nationalism. Henry V achieved this by promoting the use of English in administration in an attempt to differentiate England from its historical suzerain in France as well as to bolster support among the English government, merchant class, and public for the Lancastrian usurpation of the English throne initiated by his father, King Henry IV (1399-1413) (Fisher, 1996).

Before the reign of Henry V, official communication in the English bureaucracy and royal court was conducted primarily in Latin and French. Between his second return to France in 1417 and his death in 1422, Henry used English in all correspondence with the government and citizens of England, most of whom already primarily spoke English. Successive English monarchs further helped reinforce this trend (Richardson, 1980; Fisher, 1996). What Henry realized at the time, and around three centuries earlier than the rest of Europe, was the potential power of language as a unifying force for a national identity.

Outside of Lancastrian England, nationalist motivations behind language policy remained effectively nonexistent until the conception of the idea of the nation-state. Language policy decisions made by leaders until the late 18th century were almost invariably motivated by concerns over administrative efficiency. The French state under Francis I (1515-1547) saw significant progress toward centralizing power away from the church and into the French administration. Perhaps the

most notable piece of legislation from this period is the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts (1539), which sought to replace Latin with French in all official and legal documents. Similarly, the difficulties of administering a multilingual empire pushed Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II (1765-1790) to establish German as the sole official language of administration within Habsburg holdings, much to the chagrin of Hungary and Transylvania.

More than simply a tool to improve administrative efficiency, the use of classical Chinese (*wenyan*) in the Qing Dynasty (1636-1912) ensured that the edicts of imperial officials in Beijing would be interpretable by subordinates throughout the empire. The phonetic flexibility of Chinese characters meant that anyone versed in classical Chinese could understand it when written down, regardless of whether the reader pronounced the characters using Beijing Mandarin, Wu, Min, or Yue Chinese.

The period following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty saw intense debate around the future of the Chinese language. China had a severe illiteracy problem, and scholars both inside and outside of China viewed the complexity of classical Chinese with its lack of a phonetic alphabet or syllabary as the primary obstacle (Griffiths, 2021). Previously, achieving literacy in Chinese required an understanding of the pronunciation and meaning of countless characters and mastery of the specific sequence of brush strokes required to write them, all learned through years of rote memorization. As such, the basis of the Chinese Communist Party's early literacy program during the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) based itself on the Latinized New Script (*Latinxua Sin Wenz*)—a romanization scheme that sought to eventually replace traditional Chinese characters with the Latin alphabet.

While *Latinxua* was met with criticisms over its relative inadequacy for writing in regional languages, nationalism proved to be the decisive nail in the coffin of attempts to give Chinese a phonetic alphabet (DeFrancis, 1984). Chen Guofu, a senior KMT leader, was one of several high-ranking politicians who viewed any departure from characters as a prelude to the collapse of China and warned that China must have a unified written language in order to remain united (DeFrancis,

1950). With victory in the civil war close at hand, *Latinxua Sin Wenz* and the broader Latinization movement in China was curtailed in 1944 as communist leaders shied away from testing the assertion of linguists that its national adoption would not lead to national disunity (Norman, 1988; Griffiths, 2021). Heeding the complaints of supporters of the traditional writing system wanting to preserve the use of characters while pushing for greater literacy, *Pinyin*—a less radical successor romanization system for teaching Mandarin Chinese—was adopted by the Chinese Communist Party in 1958 (Griffiths, 2021). With this, plans for future phonetic alphabets were abandoned, and *Putonghua*—Standard Mandarin Chinese based on the Beijing dialect—became the sole official language of China.

The nationalist motivations for state support of an official monolingual language policy came to China relatively late, as significant parts of Western Europe achieved high literacy rates by the late 18th century. As national borders hardened around religious and ethnic identities, attention turned to linguistic homogenization to promote national unity. The French Revolution (1789-1799) brought with it a surge of nationalism emphasizing a shared national identity, culture, and territory. The revolutionaries aimed to break away from the feudal past, where local lords and regional divisions wielded significant power, and create a centralized, unified French state in its place. While pre-revolutionary French monarchs were largely ambivalent toward the languages spoken by their subjects, revolutionaries viewed designating French as the sole official language as one means to achieve this end. According to Hobsbawm (1990, pp. 80-81), citing Henri Grégoire (1794), only around 12-13% of the French population spoke Parisian (Standard) French as their native language on the eve of the revolution.

To implement this linguistic shift, the French government took several steps. Grégoire's report on the necessity and means to annihilate the patois⁵ and to universalize the use of the French language⁶

⁵ Defined as “uneducated or provincial speech.”

⁶ Original French: *Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d'anéantir les patois et d'universaliser l'usage de la langue française.*

was a seminal work that argued for linguistic assimilation. The government passed various laws and decrees requiring the use of French in legal proceedings, public education, and official documentation. Teachers were also dispatched in later years to rural and linguistically diverse areas to teach French.

A related motivation for fostering a linguistically unified polity in a revolutionary state is to spread revolutionary ideals. When an individual adopts a new language, they become exposed to all the cultural influences that dominate the discourse in that language. To a revolutionary French government, this can accelerate adoption of revolutionary ideals. To a revolutionary Communist party, this can spread an understanding of Marxism-Leninism in Russia or Maoism in China. To a modern democratic nation-state, this may lead to more widespread adoption of the state's social and political values, including beliefs on human rights, democracy, religion, marriage, and justice (Pew Research Center, 2004).

Thus, the effort to make French the sole official language of France was deeply tied to the revolutionary and later Napoleonic aspirations for a strong, united, and centralized French state. Nationalism and the desire for national unity were at the core of this effort, aiming to eradicate regional divisions and create a cohesive French identity. While minor concessions were given to some of France's regional languages in the 20th century, successive French Republic governments continued reinforcing the state's focus on linguistic homogeneity. As of 2012, over 93% of the French population⁷ speaks Standard French as their native language (Eurobarometer, 2012).

A similar example can be seen in Prussian governance over its Polish territories throughout the 19th century. The official Germanization of the Polish provinces began as early as 1819 with the gradual replacement of Polish with German in schools and public administration (Zdrada, 2005). Severe language restrictions did not begin until the imposition of Otto von Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* (culture struggle) immediately after the unification of Germany in 1871. As the first Chancellor of the

⁷ Refers to the metropolitan French population, or the area of France geographically located in Europe.

German Empire, Bismarck was eager to consolidate the young nation-state, and one of the ways he sought to do this was through linguistic unity. German officials were keenly aware of awakening Polish nationalism as the key driver behind Poles' increasing demands for independence and regarded the Polish language and culture as potential threats to the state's cohesion. Of the various policies employed in this effort, none were as significant as the requirement of German-language instruction in schools. By suppressing the Polish language and culture, German authorities hoped to erode the foundations upon which Polish nationalism could thrive.

While the language policies of revolutionary France and imperial Germany were some of the first instances of nationalism and national unity being a clear-cut motivation behind assimilationist minority language restrictions, the desire for greater administrative efficiency was often equally important. Indeed, every modern state employing an assimilationist language regime is broadly motivated by the two general considerations of national unity and administrative efficiency. The motivations behind the particular set of language policies used in the above examples can best be understood by viewing the formation of language policy first as a strategic response to a country's politically relevant linguistic heterogeneity (Liu, 2015). Countries with high linguistic heterogeneity are likely to incur a relatively more significant amount of minority backlash to language regimes wherein only the dominant group's language is recognized (Liu, 2015). Likewise, countries with low linguistic heterogeneity will likely incur a relatively lower amount of minority backlash to such power-concentrating language regimes (Liu, 2015).

A state's choice of language policy is thus a political and institutional choice rooted in cost-benefit analysis, similar to minority groups deciding whether to assimilate. This approach recognizes that while there are practical advantages for the state in achieving linguistic homogeneity, significant and varying costs exist in trying to achieve this homogeneity (Mylonas, 2012; Liu, 2015; Ozkan, 2023). Such a perspective helps explain why not all states employ severe language restrictions, as seen in

France and Germany. For example, the apartheid South African government prior to 1974 pursued a uniquely prohibitive language regime wherein education in Afrikaans was reserved for White South Africans as part of the state's system of institutionalized racial segregation (Moore, 2015). Similarly, some post-colonial African governments opted to use the language of their colonial suzerain as the language of state business for reasons rooted partly in administrative efficiency, partly in desires to avoid ethnic conflict, and partly in efforts to preserve the power of the elite, as was seen in the cases of apartheid South Africa and Qing China. Sometimes, states choose to pursue official multilingualism, wherein linguistic diversity is either tolerated—as seen in the Ottoman Empire, where there existed a high degree of linguistic heterogeneity—or promoted, as it is in French Canada. The motivations for official multilingualism can sometimes be traced to concerns for national unity through minimizing unrest. In other cases, a lack of state funds discourages states from attempting assimilation, even though official multilingualism comes with its own significant costs. These multilingual or accommodative motivations were most common within multiethnic empires where a high degree of ethnic, linguistic, or religious heterogeneity led to a lack of a homogenizing imperative.

For example, concerns among leaders regarding the assimilability of a particular minority group due to an outsized risk of rebellion, overall country linguistic heterogeneity, insufficient state funds, dilution of elite power, saliency of a minority nationalism, lack of crosscutting cleavages, lexical distance, influence of neighboring kin, differences in customs, weak state capacity, or hostile prior intergroup relations all heighten the relative costs of attempting to assimilate a minority group. In other words, the cost of assimilation “depends on the particular attributes of the non-core [minority] group that differentiate it from the core [dominant] group” (Mylonas, 2012, p. 23). Governments thus rarely consider only their desire for greater national unity and potential savings from a more efficient bureaucracy in formulating their language regimes. As Mylonas (2012, p. 23) notes, “the cost-benefit analysis of a nation-builder has to take into account the strategic and security costs of failing to pursue

the appropriate policy toward a non-core [minority] group as well. A failure to properly evaluate the costs of assimilation can lead to national unity or security becoming more compromised than it would have otherwise been under a policy of accommodation.

The core responsibility of a head of state is to maintain control over the territory within its political borders. The primary obstacles to this objective come from external threats (e.g., interstate war, conflict spillover, foreign espionage) and internal threats (e.g., secession, intrastate war, coup d'état, extremism). Linguistic heterogeneity, as well as religious and ethnic heterogeneity, is often viewed by states insecure about their territorial control as a threat to national unity and, by extension, national security. Consequently, such states will often target sources of heterogeneity to reinforce or reassert control. Among the diverse strategies states employ to achieve homogenization—including assimilation, expulsion, and extermination—this dissertation primarily concentrates on assimilation. Where states do not view any of these options as acceptable or feasible, the maintenance of exclusion or its reinforcement through apartheid will be the default, with an acceptance of continued threats to national unity and security.

There is extensive literature that seeks to explain why various governments choose to accommodate, assimilate, expel, or exterminate various groups. The most comprehensive of these explanations comes from Mylonas' (2012) discussion on how domestic and international factors influence government decisions in dealing with problematic minority groups.⁸ Specifically, Mylonas (2012) argues that the presence and relative power of external actors (i.e., states and international organizations) supporting a non-core [minority] group, as well as a state's foreign policy goals, heavily

⁸ Mylonas' (2012) definition of exclusion notably differs from the definition offered here. As will be discussed later, my definition of exclusion policies does not necessarily include indicators present in Mylonas' (2012, p. 22) definition, such as "population exchange, deportation, internal displacement, pogroms, or even mass killing," in addition to segregation. Similarly, the goal of assimilation policies according to Mylonas (2012, p. 22) is "to secure the loyalty of an individual or a community by "conquering" their belief system and ensuring their obedience to the national state," with the implicit assumption in these policies being the superiority of the dominant group's culture. As will be discussed later, this conception of assimilation is situated at a more extreme level than the one offered here.

influence the decision of states to pursue strategies of accommodation, assimilation, or exclusion. States adopt different strategies toward minority groups depending on whether they perceive these groups as having ties to foreign powers that may be allies, enemies, or neutral parties. Per Mylonas (2012, p. 11), assimilation is the likely outcome if the host state favors the international status quo and the minority group is supported by enemy states (e.g., Poles in imperial Germany), while accommodation is more likely for a minority group supported by an allied state or unsupported by any external actor. Nonetheless, there is currently no scholarly consensus regarding the relative importance of numerous demographic, historical, and international factors in shaping a state's decision to pursue a strategy of accommodation, assimilation, expulsion, or extermination. For these same reasons, the relative importance of various factors that influence the choice of governments to adopt severe language restrictions in pursuit of assimilation is even less clear.

While I have discussed the motivations informing states' choice of language policy and how they create recurring pressures pushing governments toward policies of assimilation over pluralism,⁹ the focus of this dissertation is not on these specific causes or motivations. Rather, the primary aim is to shed light on how a given assimilation program, once employed, interacts with the prevalence of minority exclusion to impact the degree of popular backlash against the state.¹⁰

However, reconciling theories that explain states' formulation of language policies with real-world observations regarding the varying effectiveness of assimilative language policies presents a significant puzzle. If a state's choice of language regime is a rational political and institutional choice rooted in cost-benefit analysis, it must carefully evaluate the costs of imposing various language regimes on a minority group. However, none of the theories discussed thus far can explain why

⁹ The definition of pluralism included here aligns with the definition of "accommodation" provided by Mylonas (2012, p. 22) as "situations where the 'differences' of a non-core [minority] group are more or less respected and institutions that regulate and perpetuate these differences are put in place."

¹⁰ For literature discussing the specific factors involved in influencing state language policy choices, see Esman (1992), Ager (2001), Spolsky (2004), Wright (2006), May (2008), Liu (2015, 2017), and Ozkan (2023).

assimilationist language regimes sometimes fail to achieve their intended goals. In other words, why do states sometimes choose incorrect minority language policies?

In order to answer this question and fill this gap in the literature, I must first move away from the tendency among ethnic politics scholarship to view language as simply an identifying feature of ethnic groups and ethnic conflict as the result of relative demographic strength. By doing so, I am able to consider how the unique features of language that distinguish it from other aspects of ethnic identities can lead to particular political outcomes (McCauley, 2017). Building on this perspective, I then develop an argument on how cultural egoism warps host states' perception of the costs and benefits of assimilation. I further argue that the severity of language restrictions and the exclusion of minority groups from political and economic participation influence the level of popular backlash that will occur against a host state. Then, I test these arguments using a series of empirical tests and in-depth case studies in Chapters 5-9.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.1 *Assumptions and Scope Conditions*

The selection of language policies by the state is, to a significant extent, endogenous to the character and history of the relationship between the minority group and the state, which in turn directly affects the level of backlash that can be expected from any language regime. I assume that a state's decision to pursue a policy of minority exclusion or inclusion or impose severe or moderate language restrictions is the natural result of the interaction of many historical and demographic variables. Such variables include but are not limited to the foreign policy goals of the host state; overall country linguistic heterogeneity; the saliency of another identity cleavage; prior hostile intergroup relations; the relative and absolute sizes of the dominant and minority groups; the presence, power, and political goals of neighboring minority ethnic kin; relative regional wealth; the presence of natural resources; political regime type; and lexical differences between the dominant and minority languages.

This assumption and recognition of the endogeneity problem implicitly concedes that this study will be unable to account for the various ways in which the severity of language restrictions or minority exclusion may impact the likelihood that a given assimilationist language regime will succeed. This dissertation aims to study how language assimilation regimes with varying levels of language restriction severity and minority exclusion produce unintended backlash consequences for the host state.¹¹

Nonetheless, the endogeneity problem does create implications for the interpretability and generalizability of my findings, as it is almost certain that the variables influencing a government's

¹¹ Per Mylonas (2012, p. 23), a “host state” is defined here as “the elites governing the national state in the name of the ‘core group’—the members of the ruling political organization that has the military and administrative capacity to enforce its decisions within the borders of a state.”

decision to pursue a particular language regime affect the type and degree of backlash we might expect from it. To this end, I employ controls and case selection criteria to help moderate these concerns. However, due to the difficulty of accurately accounting for these variables, these measures are insufficient to allow for more than a limited amount of generalizability to other cases. The presented results are also heavily contextualized on a per-case basis. The goal of the case studies in Chapters 5-9 is to reveal a pattern of language restrictions and minority exclusion leading to adverse outcomes for the state. While several case selection conditions are applied in Chapter 4 to help standardize the cases in the case pool, unique circumstances that lead to a different outcome in one case may not necessarily be present in another. As such, I contextualize the conclusions drawn from the experience of any given case in its respective historical, demographic, and situational context.

I also make no assumptions on the relative importance of language restrictions or minority exclusion in producing the observed outcomes. The relative importance of either variable will become more apparent with the discussion and comparison of cases demonstrating a high level of one variable and a low level of the other. These cases will help illustrate the mechanisms by which either variable helps produce a particular outcome. While there exists a potential divergence of interests between organizations making demands represented in the data and individual group members, I must further assume that the demands of organizations or parties generally represent those of the average individual group member. Finally, I assume that a government employing exclusionary policies toward a minority group is still motivated by assimilation only if it simultaneously employs assimilationist policies.

The scope of this analysis includes immigrant, indigenous, and historical national minority groups. Kymlicka (1995) makes an important and relevant distinction between ‘immigrant groups’ and ‘national (indigenous and historical) minorities.’ While immigrant groups are those who voluntarily move from one country to another, national minorities are groups that find themselves incorporated into larger states, often due to historical processes like colonization or annexation. This difference

leads Kymlicka (1995) to argue that national minorities have a legitimate claim to some form of self-determination—a notable form of potential minority backlash.¹² I recognize that immigrant groups both have an inherently weaker claim to self-determination and very rarely—if ever—demand it.

However, it needs to be made clear from existing literature to what extent immigrant groups avoid making demands for self-determination due to reasons rooted in a relative lack of claim legitimacy or due to characteristically low levels of group geographical concentration and group size. If the lack of claim legitimacy is, in fact, almost entirely responsible for the lack of self-determination demands coming from immigrant groups, it would be appropriate to exclude immigrant groups from the analysis as it could distort the relationships between my hypothesized factors and their impact on minority backlash. However, because no study has demonstrated this to date, immigrant groups are retained in the analysis.

3.2 *Language Restriction Severity*

The first of the two variables along which language assimilation regimes¹³ vary is language restriction severity. Specifically, language restriction severity indicates the degree to which a targeted minority group's language has its use restricted in state administration, education, media, and public spaces. I define a *language restriction* as any formal or informal¹⁴ law or rule that effectively restricts the use of a language or otherwise limits the language rights of a minority group.

¹² This dissertation uses the definition of a self-determination group or movement presented by K.G. Cunningham (2014) as a group of people who share a collective identity and advocate for what they believe to be their legitimate right to self-rule.

¹³ Defined as the set of formal and informal laws or rules enacted by a state to limit, suppress, or eliminate the use and propagation of specific languages with the intent of promoting a dominant language. The formal policies that constitute a language assimilation regime are not required to be accompanied by an explicitly stated assimilationist motive.

¹⁴ Individual policies need not be official. As Menken (2008) and Schiffman (1996) point out, language policy at the official 'overt' level may be at odds with real-world grassroots unofficial 'covert' policy. Ager (2001) shows how de jure policies can be mostly aspirational or symbolic, and unrepresentative of reality.

The specific criteria used to measure language restriction severity will be discussed further in Chapter 4. For now, it is worth simply discussing the common language restrictions states tend to use when pursuing a language assimilation regime. The possible policies available to a state include but are not limited to partial restrictions or outright bans on minority language use in administrative/official documentation; communication of government officials; judicial proceedings; law enforcement activities; various professions (e.g., armed forces, universities, courts, internal security services, and government bureaucracies); naming people, places, or businesses; public signage; primary through higher education; public speech inside and outside of the home; print and electronic media (e.g., TV, radio, internet, film, newspapers, magazines, and books); and health services.

Severe language restrictions are those that mandate tight restrictions or outright bans on the use of a language in various societal spheres. For example, the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) data set codes the Kurdish minority in Iran as having their language use “sharply restricted” between 1980 and 2006 due to a ban on the use of Kurdish in schools, workplaces, press and publications, and the naming of children (Birnir et al., 2018). Another example of a severe language restriction can be seen in the case of Russians in Ukraine, when Ukraine banned the use of Russian on TV and other broadcasting media in 2004, despite constitutional protections for Russian and other minority languages.

Moderate language restrictions generally do not prohibit the use of a language in a given space but instead, opt to employ more subtle partial restrictions. In such cases, the state may fund dominant-language media outlets but provide no funding for their minority-language counterparts. Similarly, the state may require knowledge of the dominant language for employment in the public sector within a minority-dominated region but not require its use in internal communications or external communications with the public. One example of a partial restriction arises from the 1945 law on

education in Italian South Tyrol, which imposed bilingual education requirements on only the German-speaking population, which dominated the region.

3.3 *Minority Exclusion*

I argue that in addition to language restriction severity, the level of *minority exclusion* significantly influences the expected level of minority backlash from a language assimilation regime. I define minority exclusion as the degree to which a minority group is excluded from services provided by the state, positions of power in public or private sectors, or participation in political society, government, and economic opportunities relative to other groups in the host state *and for reasons outside of language proficiency requirements*. I include this last qualifying statement to help separate the effects of the two key explanatory variables of language restriction severity and minority exclusion, as most language restrictions are inherently exclusionary to varying degrees.

In addition to finding that cultural restrictions increase feelings of national loyalty amongst a minority group in civic nationalist contexts, Tosun (2020) finds that language restrictions are likely instead to provoke resentment and resistance in ethnic nationalist contexts. Tosun (2020, p. 98) defines ethnic nationalism “as one in which a sense of national community is based on the true or perceived sharing of blood and ancestry, or the true or perceived sharing of culture, language, customs, or memories linked to an ethnolinguistic group,” and civic nationalism per Keating (1996, pp. 5-6) “as one in which a sense of national community is linked to shared political values, or shared culture, language, customs, or memories that are not linked to a single ethnolinguistic group, and in which ‘anyone can join the nation irrespective of birth or ethnic origins.’” While Tosun (2020) argues against assigning any normative values to either category, she nonetheless agrees that the nature of ethnic nationalism is fundamentally more ascriptive and exclusionary relative to civic nationalism, where membership is more closely tied to particular values and practices. Indeed, Tosun (2020, p. 38) further

asserts that “the resentment derived from cultural oppression in a nation with exclusive membership rules will outweigh any positive effects of strong acculturation induced by policies.” In other words, states characterized as practicing exclusionary or ethnic nationalism are more likely to see their cultural assimilation policies fail to produce the desired increases in national identification.

Ozkan (2023), classifying language regimes as regimes of promotion, toleration, or exclusion, finds that employing severe language restrictions is about as likely to provoke violent ethnic conflict as the use of promotion-oriented language regimes. Importantly, Ozkan (2023, p. 81) defines an exclusionary language regime as “precluding the minority language from use in public affairs by private persons and the state” and operationalizes it simply as “the lack of any [substantively] legally guaranteed use of a minority language in a language policy area.”

The definition and conceptualization of an exclusionary language regime used by Ozkan (2023) differs notably from the one presented here. First, the definition of minority exclusion presented here captures the overall level of exclusion a targeted minority group experiences outside of language proficiency requirements that effectively exclude minorities. Under Ozkan’s (2023) conceptualization of exclusion, a scenario whereby the state excludes a linguistic minority on a religious or explicitly ethnic basis would not be considered when classifying a regime as exclusionary. Furthermore, I do not directly consider the lack of legal guarantees for using a minority language when measuring the level of minority exclusion for each case. This is due to the existence of ‘neglectful’ language regimes, wherein a state shows relative ambivalence toward a minority group and their potential assimilation. Mainly out of neglect, rather than a motivated desire to include or exclude a minority group, the state does not impose any severe restrictions on the minority language.

One such example can be seen in the case of the various indigenous groups of Colombia throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. For most of Colombia’s post-independence history, indigenous groups were largely neglected due to and as the result of weak state capacity in indigenous

territories. Indigenous languages had no legal protections, though there was little demand for any given minimal state-group interactions. It was not until the codification of Article 10 in the 1991 Colombian constitution that the language policy of Colombia toward its indigenous groups became more inclusive, allowing minority languages to be official in their respective territories.

The specific criteria used to measure minority exclusion is discussed further in Chapter 4. For now, it is worth briefly discussing the policies states use when excluding a minority from political or economic participation. Some examples of policies that politically exclude minorities include but are not limited to restrictions on minority group representation in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; governorships in the minority region(s); high-ranking bureaucratic positions; the military; the internal security apparatus; disenfranchisement in national elections; imposing non-linguistic barriers to citizenship; revocations of autonomy; forced internal displacement; the excessive use of violence or deadly force by security forces; and the destruction of physical symbols of a minority's identity.

Some examples of the policies used by states to economically exclude a minority group include but are not limited to land confiscation, forced property evictions, preferential economic treatment of non-minority individuals within the minority group's majority region, effectively explicit prohibitions on minority employment in various professions, lack of provision of certain state services in comparison with other regions of comparable economic power (e.g., sanitation, electricity, water, road maintenance, medical services), relative budget allocation discrepancies, travel restrictions, and forced labor.

Generally speaking, minority groups experiencing a high degree of minority exclusion will see a greater number of more exclusionary policies imposed on them. As such, some policies of minority exclusion are more exclusionary than others. For example, if two minority groups hold 1% of the seats in the legislature in a given host state due to formal or informal laws or practices, regardless of the

type of political regime, the policy will be considered more exclusionary for the minority group that constitutes a greater proportion of the total host state population, all else equal. Likewise, policies of forced internal displacement, systematic land or property confiscations, forced labor, and revocations of autonomy are, for instance, considered more exclusionary than relatively moderate discrepancies in political representation in various branches of government or the provision of certain state services. However, each case is unique and likely to feature policies of minority exclusion that are more or less exclusionary than those featured in this abridged discussion on policies of minority exclusion.

3.4 *Classification of Language Assimilation Regimes*

As highlighted in the literature, host states undertaking nation-building projects experience perennial pressures that incentivize them to pursue strategies of linguistic assimilation over pluralism due to concerns regarding national unity and administrative efficiency. I argue that states may choose from four general strategies or *language assimilation regimes* on the negative side of the spectrum of language rights. Before discussing these, it is worth first briefly discussing the strategies on the positive side of the spectrum of language rights.

The first typology of language rights regimes, as identified by Kloss (1977), distinguishes between promotion-oriented and toleration-oriented language rights. Promotion-oriented rights involve active efforts by the state to encourage the use of a minority language through its official use in public institutions, such as in education, government communications, public signage, and the media. This approach validates the minority language and enhances its prestige and viability for use in public life. Toleration-oriented rights are characterized by a laissez-faire attitude of the state toward private language choices, allowing linguistic minorities to use their language in personal and communal settings without significant state interference. In other areas of rights, a policy of non-interference hardly qualifies as a positive right. However, given the perennial pressures for governments to choose

assimilation over pluralism, a policy of non-interference may help preserve the linguistic diversity and cultural identity of minority groups.


Further expanding this framework, scholars such as Kymlicka and Patten (2003), Patten (2009), and more recently Gazzola et al. (2023) and Gavin et al. (2024), recognize a third class of language rights most commonly referred to as ‘accommodation’ rights. Accommodation rights involve making specific accommodations for linguistic minorities in public institutions to ensure their access to essential public goods and services in their language. Such accommodations may include providing translation services in courts, bilingual education options, or offering government documents in multiple languages. Such accommodations lie somewhere at the midpoint between promotion and toleration-oriented language rights, as states implicitly do not interfere with the private language choices of individuals but stop short of making broad concessions in education, administration, public use, and media.

Each of these classes of rights—promotion, toleration, and accommodation—uniquely contributes to the empowerment of linguistic minorities. Promotion-oriented rights actively elevate a minority language to a status closer to that of the dominant language, fostering a sense of collective equality and recognition. Toleration-oriented rights protect the private use of minority languages to maintain cultural and linguistic diversity. Accommodation rights bridge the gap between minority communities and state institutions, enhancing accessibility and inclusivity.

The four language assimilation regimes presented here are ‘negative’ in that a key motivation of the state in all four categories is assumed to be assimilatory. While the particular nature of any language regime is unique to a certain extent, I argue that the character of language assimilation regimes is generally governed by two main variables: the severity of language restrictions and the degree of political and economic exclusion imposed on the minority group. It is the combination of these two categories that determines the classification of the various categories of language

assimilation regimes, and it is the prevalence of each in the lived experiences of a minority group that is the primary determinant of the type and scale of minority backlash against the state. Language assimilation regimes defined by a high level of language restriction severity and minority exclusion are classified as Exclusionary Assimilation regimes. Language assimilation regimes defined by a low level of language restriction severity and minority exclusion are classified as Inclusive Assimilation regimes. Hybrid Assimilation regimes are those that have low minority exclusion and high language restriction severity. In contrast, Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes have a high level of minority exclusion and low level of language restriction severity. Figure 1 below summarizes these categories according to their determined levels of language restriction severity and minority exclusion.

Figure 1: Case Categorizations



3.4.1 *Exclusionary Assimilation*

States that pursue assimilation using severe language restrictions toward an excluded minority are considered to be employing an Exclusionary Assimilation regime. These states' choice of more over less severe language restrictions may be a product of a prior adversarial relationship between the dominant and minority group(s), concerns over national security, a wave of nationalist sentiments among the dominant group population, or something else (Horowitz, 1985; Van Evera, 1994; Kaufman, 2001; Straus, 2006). For states employing such severe and exclusionary language regimes, concerns regarding national unity likely come second to concerns over maintaining the dominance of the dominant group.

In cases where the dominant group genuinely desires and holds a strong belief in the eventual assimilation and inclusion of the minority into the national identity, Exclusionary Assimilation regimes also seek to maintain the dominance of their group among the ethnic groups included in the national identity. Consequently, the language restrictions imposed on a targeted minority group in such states are expected to be severe. At the same time, minorities attempting to assimilate will find that genuine inclusion into the national identity is impossible due to the high level of non-linguistic minority exclusion they experience. As Tosun (2020, p. 207) asks in her case study on assimilation in Turkey, "Will a Kurd who sheds all signs of their minority ethnicity actually become an equal member of the nation?" For minorities living under an Exclusionary Assimilation regime, it is unlikely.

Unfortunately, it is often the case that exclusionary states, for any of the reasons mentioned above, might abandon or sideline assimilation using severe language restrictions in favor of expulsion to resolve their minority problem. The case of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria demonstrates how a state can begin with aggressive assimilation toward a minority group before transitioning to forced deportation in 1989 as part of the "Revival Process." As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the case of German-speakers in Italian South Tyrol shows how fascism, along with concerns over national

security, can lead a state to aggressively assimilate a minority group while also attempting—and later abandoning after limited success—a form of voluntary expulsion.

3.4.2 *Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation*

Language regimes that systematically exclude the targeted minority group from political and economic participation while simultaneously employing moderate language restrictions are categorized as Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes. Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes are, in some respects, an anomaly. In practice, exclusionary states with a distinct linguistic majority rarely choose to employ moderate instead of severe or no deliberate language restrictions. In Chapter 4, I discuss the case selection criteria for the case studies in Chapters 5-9. Of the handful of potential cases in the AMAR data set with a high level of minority exclusion and evidence of deliberate but moderate language restrictions, only the case of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon satisfied all case selection criteria.

As the definition of exclusion used in this dissertation does not include exclusionary policies that result from language proficiency requirements, states which systematically exclude minorities from political and economic participation will likely continue to do so even if the targeted minority group entirely assimilates into the dominant language. Understanding that leader attitudes toward the continued presence of a deliberately excluded minority group within their borders will be apprehensive, if not hostile, states can be expected to attempt to resolve their minority problem through either assimilation, expulsion, or extermination. As such, the incentives driving the urgency of assimilation progress in an Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime should be comparable to those in an Exclusionary Assimilation regime, with the key difference being that in an Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime, minority exclusion is not paired with the expected severity of language restrictions. Furthermore, Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes have a higher chance

of failure relative to Hybrid Assimilation regimes due to the effect of exclusionary policies amplifying grievances toward relatively moderate language restrictions.

3.4.3 *Hybrid Assimilation*

States which do not exclude the targeted minority from political and economic participation but impose severe language restrictions are categorized as Hybrid Assimilation regimes. In contrast to exclusionary regimes, governments employing a Hybrid Assimilation regime typically neither have a hostile relationship with the targeted minority group nor view them as a significant national security threat. Thus, they do not systematically exclude the minority from political and economic participation. Unlike Inclusive Assimilation regimes, the political leadership of a Hybrid Assimilation regime likely views the progress of an assimilation program as more urgent or essential relative to other national issues. Accordingly, such leaders are comparatively more willing to undertake measures to accelerate assimilation by imposing more severe language restrictions.

Prevailing attitudes among the dominant group are likely to view the eventual assimilation of the targeted minority group into the dominant language and national identity as desirable. While a host state employing a Hybrid Assimilation regime allows the prospect of genuine inclusion into the national identity to be a real possibility for an assimilated minority individual, assimilatory policies are comparably aggressive and unforgiving as those in an Exclusionary Assimilation regime.

3.4.4 *Inclusive Assimilation*

Inclusive Assimilation regimes do not exclude minorities from political and economic participation and employ moderate language restrictions. Host states employing such regimes do not view the targeted minority group as a significant threat to national security, and there is often a neutral or even amicable relationship between the minority and the dominant groups. The leaders of host states employing an Inclusive Assimilation regime are comparably sensitive to concerns over national

unity rooted in linguistic diversity as leaders pursuing other types of language assimilation regimes. However, they may view the progress of an assimilation program as less urgent or important than other national issues. Such leaders are accordingly less willing to undertake measures to accelerate assimilation by introducing more severe restrictions, opting instead for enforcing moderate language restrictions.

While the eventual goal of these states is linguistic assimilation, an essential feature of an Inclusive Assimilation regime as defined here is the state provision of bilingual services. Among these, the provision of bilingual or minority-language primary school education serves as the most important indicator of an Inclusive Assimilation regime. In an Inclusive Assimilation regime, prospects for genuine inclusion into the national identity are also more open compared to minorities living under exclusionary regimes. The dominant group likely wants minorities to use the dominant language to become true nationals like themselves and provides the minority group with the tools and resources to do so.

3.4.5 *Political and Language Regime Type*

I posit that the nature of language assimilation regimes strongly disincentivizes democratic political parties from imposing language restrictions. In democratic political regimes with competitive elections, opposition parties have the option of rolling back language restrictions on a minority group if doing so will help earn their support in upcoming elections.¹⁵ From the perspective of the ruling party, antagonizing an enfranchised minority group through language restrictions is likely to do more harm than benefit for their party. This is particularly true when a competitive opposition party signals support for the minority group or when the enfranchised minority group has a large population.

¹⁵ For a related theory on how competitive elections helped women gain the right to vote around the world, see Teele (2018).

The particular relationship between political and language regime type should be most apparent in Hybrid Assimilation regimes. In democratic states, Hybrid Assimilation regimes are more unstable in the long term compared to all other language assimilation regime types, as inclusion in political participation allows the targeted minority group to more effectively apply political and electoral pressure to ease restrictions. Thus, democracies are only likely to be represented in the potential pool of Inclusive Assimilation regimes and perhaps only temporarily in the Hybrid Assimilation regime category.

3.5 *Popular Backlash*

3.5.1 *Coercion Resentment*

The first mechanism by which minority groups targeted for assimilation resist and create popular backlash is coercion resentment, which Schøyen (2021, p. 273) defines generally as “the response of increasing behavior that coercion intends to reduce.” Coercion resentment, however, is not specific to the experience of assimilation. Whether an assimilationist language, religious, or broadly cultural regime succeeds or fails depends on the extent to which the coercion resentment mechanism can translate applied restrictions into resistance and the ability of the state to weaken this resistance. The concept of coercion resentment, or terms similar to it, has been known to influence political and social outcomes for at least two decades in social sciences scholarship. However, the concept is primarily known for its consequences; the backlash or backfire effects. Indeed, Schøyen (2021) notes that applying state coercion to encourage minority assimilation can cause a backlash effect, wherein the non-state (minority) group experiences increased mobilization and socialization to the non-state identity. Primarily through the coercion resentment mechanism, I argue that more severe language restrictions will lead to more undesirable popular backlash outcomes for the state.

To political science scholarship, these effects often appear in studies related to polling and political misperceptions (Jasperson & Fan, 2002; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Wood & Porter, 2019; Nyhan, 2021) or societal exclusion and indignation (Allardt, 1979; Calvet, 1998; DeVotta, 2004; Fouka, 2016; Medeiros, 2017; Fukuyama, 2018; Petersen, 2020). Relatedly, ample political science research considers backlash to repression. However, Davenport (2007) notes that research on the impacts and causal directionality of repression on dissent (i.e., coercion on backlash) is inconclusive.

Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue that effective public policies are often best accomplished using “nudges,” which seek to lightly encourage or discourage a specific public behavior rather than strictly enforce or ban it. The corollary to this argument is that public policies that use “pushes”—more forceful guidance—will be less effective. In other words, more coercive measures taken to achieve a particular desired outcome are likely to produce significantly more coercion resentment, increasing the possibility of an undesirable backlash effect. Other similar literature focuses on how coercion or repression may lead to the formation of oppositional identities, wherein minorities subject to state coercion increase their identification with the minority culture (Battu et al., 2007; Battu & Zenou, 2010; Bisin et al., 2011). Increased minority group identification may lead to outcomes ranging from higher rates of homogamy (Bisin & Verdier, 2000, 2001) to protest or rebellion (Schøyen, 2017, 2021).

Given the known effects of coercion resentment, one might expect that language assimilation regimes are more likely to generate backlash rather than unity. Existing research provides some evidence supporting this possibility. For example, Carvalho (2013) finds that bans on veiling among Muslim women lead to increases in religiosity, while compulsory veiling leads to decreases in religiosity. While some evidence suggests a unifying tendency behind policy restrictions in a religious context (Abdelgadir & Fouka, 2020; Tosun, 2020), the evidence is mixed. Beyond a limited number of studies examining language and its effects on conflict and national belonging within the political

science literature (Bormann et al., 2017; Laitin, 2000; Medeiros, 2017), few studies in political science consider the effects of language restrictions.¹⁶

Studies that specifically look at language restrictions and assimilation are less common, with mixed results on the consequences of such policies. For example, Fouka (2016) finds that bans on German-language education in the United States after World War I not only failed to integrate German immigrants but served to reverse trends within the German minority toward cultural assimilation and national identification. Meanwhile, Ersanilli and Koopmans (2011) find that the use of language restrictions generally succeeds in assimilating immigrant groups. Specifically, they find that in France, where assimilationist pressures are high, Turkish immigrants have largely linguistically assimilated and display higher levels of national identification. Medeiros (2017) finds that as minority groups' language usage and status reach sufficiently low levels, ethnic conflicts involving such minority groups become more intense. This finding implies that a weakening of a minority group's language usage and status is often the result of language restrictions, natural language shifts, or a combination of both. In addition to finding that cultural restrictions increase feelings of national loyalty amongst a minority group in civic nationalist contexts, Tosun (2020) finds that language restrictions are likely instead to provoke resentment and resistance in ethnic nationalist contexts.

Overall, the literature presents mixed evidence on the effectiveness of linguistic and cultural restrictions on political outcomes relating to acculturation, national identification, and political protest. This study aims to add clarity to the debate by analyzing the link between language restrictions and minority backlash through the lens of coercion resentment.

¹⁶ Laitin (2000) and Bormann et al. (2017) are the only two major studies in political science to seriously contend that language conflict operates fundamentally differently than conflict centralized on a different ethnic identity cleavage: religion. Specifically, Laitin (2000) finds that greater levels of language difference between the minority and majority are associated with lower levels of violence, and higher levels of language grievance are associated with increased political protest but decreased rebellion. Bormann et al. (2017) find that intrastate violent conflict is more likely within linguistic dyads compared to religious dyads. Laitin (2000) uses language differences and grievances rather than language restrictions as independent variables, while Bormann et al. (2017) use language differences rather than language restrictions as their independent variable.

3.5.2 *Status Injustice*

Understanding that all language restrictions are inherently exclusionary to varying degrees, the second key mechanism—linking minority exclusion and, by extension, the severity of language restrictions to popular backlash outcomes—can be found in the literature on the politics of dignity. Fraser (2000) argues that recognition is a fundamental aspect of justice and that denying political and economic participation to minority groups leads to a profound sense of injustice and indignity among the marginalized minority. This denial of dignity, fueled by systemic exclusion, creates fertile ground for the emergence of minority backlash against the state and assimilation. In the context of political and economic exclusion, marginalized minority groups are denied the recognition of their equal worth and right to participate in society's decision-making processes. Consequently, they experience what Fraser (2000) terms “status injustice,” which encompasses the denial of equal status and participation in the public sphere. This denial of recognition and status intensifies the sense of indignity and injustice among marginalized groups, compelling them to seek legislative redress or engage in acts of resistance and backlash. Expanding on this framework, Chakrabarti (2020) finds that the level of status inequality (injustice) mediates the policy preferences of politically and economically marginalized groups. When there exists a high level of status injustice, concerns over recognition become more important than redistributive economic policies.

Furthermore, the politics of dignity also directly affect a minority's response to non-exclusionary language regimes. As noted by Liu (2015, p. 12), when a language is recognized, its speakers are empowered (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 32-42). Likewise, where a language goes unrecognized, its speakers are disempowered compared to speakers of the official or dominant language(s). This disempowerment results from status injustice that has real-world effects on a minority's ability to participate meaningfully in political and economic life.

Social psychology offers valuable insights into the mechanisms through which language restrictions or minority exclusion give rise to backlash. The concept of social identity theory, as developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979), underscores the importance of group identity in shaping individuals' attitudes and behaviors. When minority groups experience or perceive systemic exclusion or [linguistic] discrimination, the minority becomes alienated from the national identity (Adida et al., 2016). Furthermore, the saliency of a minority social identity is often heightened as a reaction to such treatment, and minority group individuals may develop a stronger sense of group cohesion and solidarity in response to exclusion or discrimination. This heightened group identity can serve as a catalyst for collective action and resistance against the state and the institutions responsible for their exclusion. This dynamic parallels the formation of oppositional identities discussed previously (Bisin & Verdier, 2000; Bisin & Verdier, 2001; Battu et al., 2007; Battu & Zenou, 2010; Bisin et al., 2011; Schøyen, 2017, 2021).

Similarly, a wealth of literature has focused on the role of perceived discrimination in shaping individuals' attitudes and behaviors (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Pearson et al., 2009). Perceived discrimination, which is often a consequence of systemic exclusion, can lead to feelings of anger, resentment, and mistrust toward the dominant majority or the state. These negative emotions can further motivate minority groups to push back against their exclusion and demand justice and equal participation in political and economic life.

Albert Hirschman's (1970) concept of “voice” and “exit” also offers a valuable framework for understanding how minority groups respond to political and economic exclusion. According to Hirschman (1970), individuals faced with dissatisfaction in an organization or system have two primary options: voice, which involves expressing their discontent and seeking change within the system, and exit, which entails leaving the system altogether. When minority groups are systematically excluded from political and economic participation, their ability to exercise voice is severely restricted. This

limitation forces them to consider alternative strategies, such as exit, which can manifest as social or political disengagement or more radical forms of resistance in the context of societal exclusion.

Indeed, many studies have found that politically excluded minorities are more likely to engage in ethno-nationalist civil conflict relative to minorities included in political participation and the central state (Wimmer, 2002; Petersen, 2002; Cederman et al., 2010). Here, the concept of relative deprivation is instrumental in understanding the relationship between minority exclusion and backlash. Relative deprivation theory, as formulated by Gurr (1970), suggests that individuals or groups are more likely to engage in protest and resistance when they perceive a discrepancy between their expectations and actual outcomes. In the context of minority exclusion, marginalized groups often harbor expectations of equality and fair treatment in society. When these expectations are systematically thwarted by exclusionary policies and practices, a sense of relative deprivation emerges, driving individuals and communities to protest and demand redress.

Noting criticisms of endogeneity arising from how governments' decisions to exclude or include may be informed in part by their expectation of conflict, Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) use an identification strategy to estimate the exogenous effect of political inclusiveness on conflict. Confirming previous studies, they find that among states colonized by France or the United Kingdom, groups included in political participation and the central state at the time of independence were significantly less likely to engage in rebellion. As a whole, this literature makes it clear that excluding and discriminating against minority groups increases the likelihood of backlash from the minority against the state.

3.5.3 *Cultural Egoism*

If a host state's choice of a language assimilation regime is one borne of a cost-benefit analysis that considers the risks of choosing the wrong strategy, why do language or broader cultural

assimilation regimes sometimes fail to achieve their goals? I argue that host states considering a strategy of assimilation will consistently overestimate the willingness of minority groups to voluntarily assimilate and underestimate the likelihood and level of minority popular backlash to assimilationist policies. This miscalculation is driven by the mechanism of cultural egoism, defined here as the belief that one's own culture or cultural practices are superior to those of other groups. Cultural egoism is driven partly by a group's language being officialized and thus recognized as being prestigious (Liu, 2015).

Host states dominated by a distinct (ethno)linguistic or religious group will see their political leadership possess a relatively high level of cultural egoism compared to other groups in the host state. The tendency of dominant groups to overestimate the likelihood of voluntary assimilation and underestimate potential backlash results from the interaction between cultural egoism and the two key backlash mechanisms of coercion resentment and status injustice. Due to its corresponding perceptions of cultural superiority, dominant groups underestimate the importance of appropriate recognition and status to minority identities, and the extent to which state coercion and status injustice might produce a backlash effect against the state. This interaction leads host states to routinely underestimate how severe and exclusionary an imposed language assimilation regime is in reality. In autocratic political contexts, this interaction can also result in a disproportionate application of violent repression in response to dissent and a greater reluctance to grant concessions.

Such perceptions may also lead host states to overvalue homogeneity and undervalue the benefits of cultural diversity, leading to a skewed perception of the practical benefits of minority assimilation. Thus, the belief in the inherent superiority of the dominant culture will lead to a more aggressive and less accommodating language assimilation regime. The first case study included in this dissertation on the case of South Tyroleans in Italy is a prime example of this effect, as the arrival of

the hyper-nationalist Fascist regime heralded the imposition of some of the most extreme language restrictions examined in this study.

3.5.4 *Popular Backlash Options*

Overall, governments pursue linguistic assimilation primarily due to the high administrative costs of true linguistic pluralism and its expected and desired positive impact on national unity. Political leaders likely anticipate some amount of coercion resentment backlash in the short term in response to a language assimilation regime. However, popular backlash can occur in numerous forms, and a minority group looking to reject national unity has the option to do so using less extreme methods, such as legislative redress or nonviolent protest. When subjected to a given language assimilation regime, minority groups generally have a handful of response options, some of which may be employed simultaneously by one or multiple minority organizations. These response options generally progress in intensity, with the least extreme options coming in the form of acceptance, national de-identification, legislative redress, electoral boycott, and nonviolent protest, followed by the more extreme options of violent protest, (non)violent self-determination, sabotage, terrorism, and armed civil conflict.

From the literature on exclusion, we know that when compared to minorities who are included in political participation, excluded minorities will more readily disregard less extreme options as a consequence of their curtailed “voice,” putting them at a greater risk of rebellion. However, little attention to date has been paid to how different levels of language restriction severity produce different political outcomes. One example comes from Piazza (2012), who uses the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database’s political, economic, linguistic, and religious discrimination variables to find that the occurrence of terrorist attacks is most closely associated with higher levels of minority economic

discrimination—and to a lesser degree political discrimination—rather than linguistic or religious discrimination.

I argue that due to the same set of incentives that push host states led by a dominant group to impose language restrictions in the first place, the most likely expression of resistance from a minority group subject to severe language restrictions comes in the form of demands for self-determination.¹⁷ Due to its importance and pervasiveness in everyday life, the centrality of language to a group's identity and nationalism applies equally to both majority and minority groups. While nationalist incentives push host states to restrict minority languages, minority groups will likely experience heightened levels of linguistic nationalism in response to restrictions. This effect is due to the perception that the foundation of the minority group-defined nation is threatened by the majority's linguistic or cultural dominance (Inglehart & Woodward, 1967; DeVotta, 2004). As a result, the minority is more likely to interpret language restrictions as symbolizing exclusion from the national identity rather than inclusion within it.

The state's administrative disincentives against linguistic pluralism also apply inversely to minority groups in their decision to prefer self-determination over alternative options, including unity. Within a given state, the reproducibility of all spoken languages operates in a roughly zero-sum game, with the size of the national language retention pie roughly increasing in scale to the average number of languages spoken by an individual. When one or two official languages are designated, the resulting increase in reproducibility of the official language(s) will invariably come at the expense of the reproducibility of all other languages. Even where the decision to designate one language as the sole official language is made purely for reasons of administrative efficiency, as was the case in the late 18th-century Austro-Hungarian Empire, such a decision necessarily perpetuates a sense of inequality

¹⁷ In this section, I argue that self-determination is a relatively likely minority response to language restrictions. However, this is not an outcome I test in the following chapters.

(Liu, 2015) and inspires suspicions of ethnic or linguistic favoritism amongst minority groups (Anderson, 2006).

The weakly reproducible nature of minority languages is at the root of all administrative-adjacent disincentives to pursue linguistic pluralism. As the linguistic vitality of minority languages declines, they require increasing levels of investment in minority language programs in order to survive. However, as necessary investments into minority languages become more expensive over time, states become increasingly disinclined to provide them. This imbalance of (dis)incentives is not lost on the minority group, and in formulating their response to language restrictions, any solution must attempt to address this dynamic in the long term.

Because these investments and their costs to the state increase only with the addition of more than one official language, the most evident solution to language restrictions from the perspective of the minority group is self-determination in the form of either territorial autonomy, independent statehood, or unification with a neighboring kin state. Because language reproducibility is weak, self-determination seems to resolve many, if not all, language-related grievances of the minority group. This is why Mowbray (2012) advocates for the right to self-determination for linguistic minorities, citing the inherent guarantees of language security that self-determination offers. The new autonomous or independent territory would be unburdened by administrative expenses relating to the additional cost of providing public services in education, bureaucracy, media, administration, or commerce for the formerly dominant language group. Revoking restrictions through achieving self-determination and designating the minority language as the official language of the autonomous territory or independent state would also help reverse trends of language shift (Fishman, 1991) and remove entry barriers to the labor force. Indeed, language-related concessions, or greater territorial autonomy for the stated purpose of promoting the use of a minority language, often comprise at least

part of the demands of many self-determination movements.¹⁸ For example, MP Ruba Ghazal of the independentist party Québec Solidaire noted that “We cannot count on Ottawa to protect our official and common language in Quebec... The best way to ensure the full vitality of French is to achieve independence” (Côté, 2023).

However, self-determination as a solution is neither cheap nor very likely to succeed. Gaining future concessions or promises from the state might initially seem to be the relatively more efficient and desired outcome from the perspective of both the state and the minority group. Here, it is the inability of the government to credibly commit to the unilateral upholding of minority languages that makes the more radical option of self-determination the most likely expression of resistance.¹⁹ It is costly for a group to mobilize in defense of any policy, including protections for their language. In response to group protests and threats in opposition to language restrictions, the government may make promises or grant some limited concessions on language rights, such as making the minority language official within the region where it is spoken. However, assuming the government is controlled by leaders and legislators belonging to the dominant linguistic group, they will remain incentivized to eventually assimilate minority languages. It is thus unlikely that the minority group will be satisfied with such a resolution, as both the state and minority group understand that the state still faces strong incentives to revoke any future promises or concessions on language protections. Consequently, minority leaders are likely to leverage protests to move past what they may view as the

¹⁸ For example, in his *Global Reference of Separatist Movements*, Beary (2011) details the four primary motivating factors behind any secessionist movement being either the *control of natural resources, religion, historical political borders, and language or ethnicity*. Of the 59 cases examined, *language or ethnicity* play a key motivating role in 51.

¹⁹ Credible commitment issues have most prominently been cited in the literature as barriers to the resolution of intrastate conflict, increasing their duration and decreasing the probability of a sustained peace (Walter, 1997; D.E. Cunningham, 2011). This paper also assumes that self-determination movements can be violent.

less costly but more long-term fragile and insufficient option of legislative redress in favor of the more costly but more robust option of self-determination.²⁰

Referencing other previously discussed literature, Piazza (2012) informs my expectation that in cases where the targeted minority group is disproportionately excluded from economic participation, the occurrence of terrorism and sabotage will be more likely. Similarly, Tosun's (2020) findings on ethnic nationalisms further lead me to expect that language assimilation regimes with high levels of minority exclusion will result in minority de-identification with the national (state) identity. I further anticipate that minority groups subjected to severe language restrictions will make greater calls for self-determination compared to groups subjected to moderate language restrictions. It is also likely that groups subjected to relatively less minority exclusion will display a weaker tendency to demand self-determination, in addition to all other forms of backlash. However, these three expectations are not tested in the following chapters. Rather, I focus on overall backlash outcomes as a consequence of language restrictions and minority exclusion.

In summary, coercion resentment is the primary driver of popular backlash caused by language restrictions, with more severe restrictions incurring more coercion resentment. Due to the unique nature of linguistic identities and language grievances, the consequent backlash is uniquely likely to take the form of demands for self-determination. The second mechanism of status injustice serves as the primary driver of popular backlash caused by exclusionary political and economic policies toward a minority group. However, status injustice also drives backlash caused by language restrictions, particularly when the targeted minority group is also broadly excluded. These mechanisms do not overlap to produce an observed level of backlash against the state but instead function additively.

²⁰ Non-secessionist rebellion for control of the state also appears as an alternative option, though this option may be easily viewed as simultaneously more costly and implausible than self-determination or legislative redress, and excessive if done in pursuit of minority language protections.

For example, a language assimilation regime that imposes a low level of minority exclusion and severe language restrictions (i.e., Hybrid Assimilation) will incur less backlash compared to language assimilation regimes that impose both a high level of minority exclusion and severe language restrictions (i.e., Exclusionary Assimilation). Likewise, a Hybrid Assimilation or Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime will produce weaker popular backlash compared to an Inclusive Assimilation regime. Finally, in formulating a host state's language policy, the mechanism of cultural egoism leads political leaders to consistently overestimate the willingness of minority groups to voluntarily assimilate and underestimate the likelihood and level of popular backlash to assimilationist policies from minority groups.

In order to fill the gap in our current understanding of the effects of language restrictions of varying degrees of severity, I test the link between language restriction severity and demands for self-determination in Chapter 4 using data from the AMAR data set. In Chapter 5, I discuss how varying levels of language restriction severity paired with varying levels of minority exclusion produce different forms and intensity levels of popular backlash and consequences for the state. Due to the known effects of minority exclusion on the probability of violent conflict, I consider a more expanded set of options for minority resistance in the qualitative case studies in Chapters 6-10.

3.6 *Hypotheses*

This dissertation contends that language regimes employing severe language restrictions will often provoke significant backlash, with the degree of backlash intensifying when restrictions are paired with minority political and economic exclusion. I argue that host states pursuing minority assimilation will consistently overestimate the willingness of minority groups to assimilate voluntarily and underestimate the likelihood and severity of minority backlash to language restrictions due to the mechanism of cultural egoism. Such backlash to severe language restrictions—a response to the

perceived threat to a minority's cultural identity and autonomy—tends to intensify when minority groups face exclusion from meaningful political and economic participation. Specifically, exclusionary policies reinforce perceptions of marginalization and discrimination, leading to heightened resistance against imposed language restrictions. In order to examine how varying degrees of language restrictions and minority exclusion interact to shape the nature and intensity of backlash against state assimilation efforts, I formulate the following central hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: More severe and exclusionary language assimilation regimes will result in greater minority backlash.


As previously stated, I make no assumptions regarding the relative importance of minority exclusion and language restriction severity on the outcome of popular backlash. Thus, I further expect that the overall level of popular backlash will be comparable between regimes with a low level of exclusion and a high level of severity (Hybrid Assimilation) and regimes with a high level of exclusion and a low level of severity (Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation). I further expect both Hybrid Assimilation and Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime types to produce a lower level of overall popular backlash compared to Exclusionary Assimilation regimes. In the case of Hybrid Assimilation regimes, backlash will primarily be the consequence of a triggered coercion resentment response, whereas in the case of Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes, backlash will largely be the consequence of status injustice.

Corollary 1: The overall level of backlash produced by Exclusionary Assimilation regimes will be greater compared to Hybrid Assimilation and Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes.

Finally, my hypothesis further implies that language assimilation regimes that do not exclude the targeted minority group and opt for less severe language restrictions (Inclusive Assimilation) will not trigger the coercion resentment and status injustice backlash mechanisms, resulting in less overall backlash to Inclusive Assimilation regimes compared to all other language regime types. Hypothesis 1 and corollaries 1 and 2 are tested in a series of case studies in Chapters 5-9. A summary of the central theory and expected backlash outcomes tested in Chapters 5-9 is included in Figure 2 below. The categories of Hybrid Assimilation and Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation are necessarily more ambiguous, leading to my expectation of a moderate level of backlash for each.

Corollary 2: Less severe and exclusionary language regimes (Inclusive Assimilation) will lead to less popular backlash relative to all other language regime types employing more severe or more exclusionary policies and restrictions.

Figure 2: Expected Backlash Outcomes



The literature on minority exclusion is unanimous in its findings on the positive relationship between exclusionary policies and popular backlash. The literature on the relationship between varying levels of language restriction severity and popular backlash is more ambiguous. The key insight drawn from the above hypothesis and corollaries is the relationship between the severity of language restrictions and the level of minority exclusion on popular backlash outcomes. The theoretical framework outlined here provides insights into why, for example, Castilian Spanish so successfully spread throughout Iberia without significant backlash but ultimately faced heavy backlash in Catalonia and the Basque Country in Francoist Spain.

The theoretical framework presented here further demonstrates the importance of the interaction between minority exclusion and language restrictions. For instance, the 1976 Soweto uprising was the single largest uprising against apartheid rule in South African history. The immediate trigger of the uprising was the imposition of dominant-language (Afrikaans) schooling requirements on an already highly excluded group. However, it is unlikely that a similar language restriction on a non-excluded minority group would produce a backlash event of comparable intensity. This dissertation seeks to explain the extent to which the success or failure of a language assimilation regime is dependent on varying levels of minority exclusion and the severity of language restrictions.

Chapter 4: Comparative Historical Analysis of Language Assimilation Regimes

Is there a ‘correct’ way to assimilate a minority group? Can a contemporary state reasonably expect a positive net return from pursuing assimilation in the long term? If so, under what conditions? In addition to the argued influences of the severity of language restrictions and the degree of minority exclusion, any answer to this question must, at a minimum, be mindful of the unique historical contexts that, through path dependency, can lead to the failure of assimilation in one country and success in another. Such a perspective requires searching beyond currently available data sets and extending the temporal scope of analysis into the long term.

4.1 *Case Selection Criteria*

As previously discussed, I assume that a state’s decision to pursue a policy of minority exclusion or inclusion or impose severe or moderate language restrictions is the natural result of the interaction of many historical and demographic variables. Indeed, it is likely that the factors that lead a host state to marginalize a minority group and restrict their language usage would further lead the host state to expect a more substantial backlash response than a different non-excluded and non-restricted minority group. However, I must specify several case selection criteria to maintain a reasonable degree of consistency and comparability of popular backlash outcomes across case studies.

First, the government must be at least partially motivated by assimilation. A government that attempts genocide against a minority group is de facto uninterested in assimilation. Where the picture becomes less clear is in potential cases where non-violent ethnic cleansing or voluntary deportation is employed in conjunction with severe language restrictions. In such cases, the government is still considered to be partially motivated by assimilation, even if exclusion is the primary motive. This criterion specifically stipulates that there must be no instances of violent ethnic cleansing throughout the time period under review. It aims to exclude cases where government-led efforts to forcibly deport

or exterminate a minority group could skew an accurate evaluation of backlash outcomes. Additionally, the criterion anticipates using the minority group's various popular backlash options as leverage to negotiate concessions from the state. In instances of violent ethnic cleansing, most forms of backlash outside of rebellion for control of the state in unique circumstances are rendered implausible due to the demonstrated unwillingness of the government to compromise, even under theoretical contexts of maximum pressure from the minority group.

Second, the targeted linguistic minority must contain a minimum absolute population size of 100,000 speakers at the time of the first policy implementation. Third, the minority group must be geographically concentrated. I include these two criteria to filter out cases where a reasonably practical minority backlash effort is rendered implausible or excessively difficult. Geographic concentration and group size are widely acknowledged as among the most important characteristics for any minority group to effectively further political mobilization or form an oppositional identity in response to exclusion or language restrictions (Edwards, 1984; Horowitz, 1997; Toft, 2003; Goddard, 2006; Sambanis & Milanovic, 2011; K.G. Cunningham, 2014; McCauley, 2014). The necessity of spatial concentration is largely due to the increased level of group cohesion that spatial concentration confers. Increased group cohesion results in the development of a stronger unique identity and greater facility in overcoming collective action problems, leading to both greater group capability and claim legitimacy, both of which fuel political mobilization for potential backlash responses. Furthermore, having a geographical referent in mind with defined political boundaries is essential to the formation of a group identity.

While likely not as impactful as group concentration, (relative) group population size is widely recognized in the literature for its effects on political mobilization and political violence. The minimum absolute population size threshold for when minority political mobilization is deemed exceedingly difficult is not precisely known. However, it is commonly conceptualized as a proportion of the total

host country population. This threshold may be significantly higher when the host state of the minority group has a very large population without a federal form of government. For example, a minority group with a geographically concentrated population size of 2 million would usually constitute a politically significant proportion of the total country population. In China, the minority Korean population of roughly 2 million constitutes a politically insignificant 0.14% of the total population. My decision to set the minimum population threshold at 100,000 was a somewhat arbitrary but conservative decision to allow for potential cases where a small minority group is able to effectively mobilize in opposition to government policy.²¹ I raise the minimum absolute population requirement to 1 million for immigrant group cases due to differences in the ways immigrant and non-immigrant (indigenous and historical national minorities) groups internalize linguistic culture.²² However, none of the cases which passed all other case selection criteria featured an immigrant minority.

Fourth, the dominant language of the group in control of the host state must be spoken by a majority (51%) of the country's population by the start of a case period. I include this criterion to provide greater assurance that the character of the dominant national identity around which oppositional identities are formed is itself uncontested. General observations made in the literature on nationalism speak to the necessity of having a single dominant group define the rules required for membership in the nation beyond basic citizenship requirements. More importantly, the dominant

²¹ More specifically, I set the threshold of 100,000 in response to the high prevalence of groups with a population size between 100,000-999,999. Of the 122 groups included in the initial case study pool, only four groups were removed due to possessing a population total of less than 100,000. Furthermore, all four groups additionally had a low amount of available and relevant research material to use for a sufficiently in-depth case study. By comparison, many of the groups with a population size of 100,000 to 500,000 or 1 million possessed sufficient amounts of available and relevant research material to use. I set this threshold at 100,000 rather than 500,000+ to avoid unnecessarily eliminating viable cases from the case pool.

²² Specifically, immigrant groups who immigrate to a new country often expect that their language will not be protected (or assaulted) and so are significantly less likely than non-immigrant groups to interpret a lack of state support for minority-language primary education as a restriction (Kymlicka, 1995; Schiffman, 1996). This becomes important in case selection since all cases must demonstrate at least some level of perceived language restrictions. Since the expectation of government support for a minority language roughly correlates to the absolute or relative size of the minority group, raising the minimum absolute population requirement for immigrant groups is necessary to filter out cases where the weight of restrictions via a lack of state support is significantly less perceptible to an immigrant group.

group must be responsible for setting policies for minority assimilation. In cases where a linguistic minority rules the state and imposes language restrictions on a linguistic majority, it is unclear to what extent the resulting backlash would exceed that of a scenario whereby a linguistic majority imposes language restrictions. This is due to the presence of two groups claiming the right to set the national language(s): the ruling linguistic minority and the ruled linguistic majority.

Fifth, there must not be any simultaneous state-led programs of religious assimilation or deliberate government efforts to exclude a minority group based on religious differences. I include this criterion to provide a greater degree of confidence that observed backlash effects are not due in part to the activation of a distinct religious identity. Salient religious identities are widely acknowledged to be potent drivers of political mobilization to an equal or greater degree than activated (ethno)linguistic identities in various contexts (Birnie & Şatana, 2022, 2023). Eliminating cases with religious assimilation or exclusion thus allows for a more consistent interpretation of backlash outcomes arising from generalized minority exclusion or language restrictions.

Sixth, there must not have been a violent conflict between the targeted minority and dominant groups within the first decade before or after the imposition of the initial language policies. I include this criterion to filter out cases where the outcome of backlash is disproportionately affected by unobserved variables relating to hostile prior intergroup relations. Seventh, a minimum of 50 years must pass between the imposition of the first language restrictions to the present. Thus, if a language assimilation regime began in 1973, the case would meet this criterion due to the passage of 50 years (2023-50). I include this criterion to ensure that a reasonable amount of time has passed to allow for inherently lagged backlash effects to become apparent. Furthermore, the high point in the severity of language restrictions must have occurred within the first half of the case period.

The transnational spillover effects of nearby active separatist kin groups on the desire of a minority group to rebel, demand self-determination, or demand greater cultural rights have been well documented. Darden and Mylonas (2016) also show that government decisions to enforce linguistic homogeneity through mass schooling are partially motivated by external threats, including threats to support separatist groups, connecting the prevalence of separatist kin to the decision to impose language restrictions. In order to control for transnational spillover effects, I exclude cases where the targeted minority group has bordering transnational linguistic kin in armed rebellion against their respective host state(s). Finally, cases with greater availability of relevant and reliable source material are prioritized, as well as cases where the initial levels of minority exclusion and language restriction severity are stable over longer periods of time. A summary of the case selection criteria can be seen in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Summary of Case Selection Criteria

1. Government must be motivated by assimilation (no programs of violent ethnic cleansing).
2. Minimum absolute minority group population of 100,000 for non-immigrant groups.²³
3. Minority group must be geographically concentrated.
4. Dominant language of the host state must be spoken by a majority (51%) of the population.
5. No simultaneous state-led programs of religious assimilation or exclusion.
6. No violent minority-dominant intergroup conflicts 10 years before or after the imposition of the first language restrictions.
7. Minimum 50 years from imposition of the first policies to present.²⁴
8. No bordering transnational linguistic kin in armed rebellion against their host state(s).
9. Prioritization of cases with greater availability and reliability of source material.
10. Prioritization of cases where initial levels of minority exclusion and language restriction severity are stable over longer periods of time.

One issue with the present case selection strategy is the lack of any comprehensive and centralized source to use as a case pool. The source that meets this need to the greatest extent is the

²³ Adjusted to 1 million minimum for immigrant groups.

²⁴ The most severe language restrictions must occur within the first half of the case period.

All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) data set. AMAR contains relevant data for language restrictions, political discrimination, and group concentration for 349 unique ethnic groups across 5,368 observations. However, while the temporal scope for AMAR data extends as far back as 1940, observations with data on the two key independent variables of language restrictions and minority exclusion²⁵ only extend as far back as 1980. Still, only 12% of all observations come from 1980-1989, with the remaining 88% covering 1990-2006. Due to the maximum starting year for the imposition of language restrictions set in 1973, the crucial first years of imposed language restrictions are concealed across all cases.

Regardless, as the most comprehensive source to serve as a case pool, the initial case pool will consist of all unique ethnic groups and host country dyads with an AMAR language restriction score of 1 or greater, with a score of 1 indicating that minority language activity is restricted by informal social practice. Of the 349 unique groups, 122 reported at least one occurrence of a language restriction score of 1 or greater. While the first years of imposed language restrictions are concealed across all cases, all cases with a language restriction score of 1 or greater in AMAR are provisionally measured for their language restriction scores across all likely case-years. For example, the first case study examined here is that of the German-speaking minority in Italian South Tyrol. This case registered a language restriction score of 1 in AMAR in 1990 but was later found during subsequent measurement to be much higher in previous years not included in AMAR's temporal scope.

Additionally, AMAR's base inclusion of 1,202 unique ethnic groups necessarily overlooks historically restricted or excluded minorities due to AMAR's sampling of minorities 'at risk' between 1980 and 2006. For example, the severe language restrictions and political and economic exclusion imposed by West Pakistan on the population of East Pakistan are hidden from the AMAR data. East

²⁵ Minority exclusion through AMAR's political and economic discrimination indices.

Pakistan's experience of severe language restrictions and exclusion led to the eventual war for and independence of Bangladesh in 1971—nine years before the effective start date of AMAR observations. In order to avoid unnecessarily selecting on the dependent variable and keep the selection of cases as systematic as possible, I chose not to include potential historical cases not included in AMAR.

Furthermore, AMAR's native language restriction variable cannot differentiate between cases featuring non-severe language restrictions. Cases where the government does not impose explicit language restrictions while simultaneously providing inadequate or nonexistent protections for minority languages are coded in AMAR similarly at the lowest level of language restriction (0 in AMAR) to cases where governments offer substantial protections and rights for minority languages. Per the case selection criteria, an absence of explicit language restrictions combined with effectively withholding public goods and service provisions from a minority group due to language proficiency requirements may constitute a language restriction. Such a case would qualify for inclusion into the case pool. Furthermore, ignoring cases coded in AMAR at the lowest level of language restriction would also obscure potential cases in the Inclusive Assimilation category, as even governments that provide basic minority language services and bilingual primary education can still be fundamentally motivated by assimilation and seek to pursue it using less restrictive policies in other areas of public life. Finally, I removed minority groups recorded in AMAR as "Indigenous Peoples of (country)" from consideration due to uncertain group specificity, as well as cases from countries in the former Yugoslavia due to the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars in 1991 requiring an early endpoint in the case period.

4.1.1 Case Filtering

Case filtering begins with systematically removing cases where the host state is too young (gaining independence after 1973) or does not meet the minimum absolute population size and geographic concentration criteria.²⁶ The remaining case criteria must be filtered through a brief review of each case study candidate supplemented by relevant AMAR data when temporally applicable. The criteria evaluated in this process filter out all cases that do not fulfill the criteria regarding the lack of a dominant-language population majority, recent history of violent ethnic cleansing,²⁷ religious assimilation or exclusion,²⁸ recent violent minority-dominant group conflicts, the approximate year of the first qualifying language restrictions, and the presence of bordering transnational linguistic kin groups in armed rebellion. The starting year for a case study defaults to the year of the host country's independence, with exceptions for cases where a transformational regime change or a significant change in political structure or territorial borders results in a shift in language policy.

The final two prioritization criteria regarding the availability and reliability of source material and the stability of minority exclusion and language restriction severity levels are subjectively determined after each case study candidate's brief review. Of the initial 122 case study candidates, 20 passed the eight non-prioritization criteria. Of these, 11 were removed from further consideration due to their low availability and reliability of potential source material or high variability in initial language restriction severity levels. Based on the brief review of each case study candidate, I place them in

²⁶ The informing data on geographic concentration is derived from AMAR (GROUPCON), with passing cases scoring a 1 or greater (the minority group cannot be widely dispersed). The 1973 maximum start year effectively eliminates all former Soviet Socialist Republics excluding Russia, as well as a number of former colonies.

²⁷ The informing data on violent ethnic cleansing is partially parsed from AMAR's repression of group civilian population variable (REPGENCIV), with cases recording a score of 5 being eliminated (violent coercion, killing - systematic killings, ethnic cleansing, reprisal killings). The violent ethnic cleansing criterion is then manually applied to the remaining cases through brief case searches, using the description of ethnic cleansing given by the United Nations S/1994/674 as "...to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas."

²⁸ Religious restrictions score of 2 (religious activity somewhat restricted) or greater per AMAR's CULPO1 variable.

provisional categories according to their suspected minority exclusion and language restriction severity levels.

Table 2 below details the nine cases that fulfilled all of the case selection criteria, along with their provisional categorizations and geographical regions. If multiple cases are placed in the same provisional category with the same host country or group and time period, only the case with more available relevant and reliable research material qualifies for consideration. The cases in the full case pool are included in the Appendix, along with the unmet criterion that prompted the removal of various cases from the final case list.

Table 2: Provisional Case Categorizations

Case	Region	Provisional Category
Corsicans in France	Western Europe	Hybrid
South Tyroleans in Italy	Western Europe	Exclusionary
Sardinians in Italy	Western Europe	Exclusionary
Zapotecs in Mexico	Latin America	Inclusive
Mayans in Mexico	Latin America	Inclusive
Azerbaijanis in Iran	Middle East	Exclusionary
Amazigh (Berbers) in Algeria	North Africa	Hybrid
Amazigh (Berbers) in Morocco	North Africa	Hybrid
Anglophones in Cameroon	Sub-Saharan Africa	Incidental Exclusionary

Among the cases that fulfilled all the case selection criteria, this occurred with the cases of the South Tyroleans and Sardinians in Italy (Exclusionary, 1921-2023), the Zapotecs and Mayans in Mexico (Inclusive, 1921-2023), and the Amazigh (Berbers) in Algeria and Morocco (Hybrid, 1962/1956-2023). Due to the greater availability of research material, the cases of South Tyroleans in Italy, the Mayans in Mexico, and the Amazigh (Berbers) in Algeria were selected for study in their respective language assimilation regime categories. As such, the cases of the Sardinians in Italy, the Zapotecs in Mexico, and the Amazigh (Berbers) in Morocco were removed from consideration.


The cases of the South Tyroleans in Italy, Amazigh (Berbers) in Algeria, Mayans in Mexico, and Anglophones in Cameroon all ultimately matched their provisional categories. These four cases were fortunately split equally among the four language assimilation regime categories, with the case of the Amazigh (Berbers) in Algeria occupying one of the two possible Hybrid Assimilation regime slots. The case of the Azerbaijanis in Iran was provisionally categorized as Exclusionary Assimilation. However, after the case study was completed, this case was ultimately categorized as Hybrid

Assimilation, occupying the second possible slot for this category.²⁹ This was done before the case of the Corsicans in France could begin, leading to the latter's removal from further consideration in order to maintain a reasonable balance in case representation across the four categories.

The final case list and their ultimate categorizations after the case study analyses are seen in Figure 3 below. While the case of the Corsicans in France was unfortunately removed from consideration, it is fortunate that two cases of Hybrid Assimilation could be included. Of these four categories, the category of Hybrid Assimilation is the most theoretically important due to its relative ability to isolate the effects of language restrictions from minority exclusion. If severe language restrictions could achieve its desired assimilation outcomes while minimizing popular backlash through minority inclusion in political and economic participation, such a finding would have significant implications for future assimilation programs.

²⁹ The case of the Azerbaijanis in Iran also scored slightly higher in the availability of research material compared to the case of the Corsicans in France.

Figure 3: Finalized Cases by Category



4.2 Research Design

4.2.1 Measurement of Language Restriction Severity

Similar to the framework used in determining minority exclusion scores and categorizations, I place the scoring and categorization of language restriction severity in the framework of an original index. In examining the effect of nationalism type on the likelihood of success of various cultural assimilation policies in Europe, Tosun (2020) created the Language Restrictions Index (LRI). Tosun (2020) distinguishes between five categories of language restrictions: official, education, media, public, and names. More recently, Ozkan's (2023) Minority Language Policy Dataset (MLPD) provides examples of language restrictions over four categories: legal status, media, education, and public services. Finally, Gavin et al. (2024) created the Language Freedom Index (LFI), including three categories on civil rights and representation; education and health care; and media, culture, and

religion.³⁰ The coding scheme I present here includes four categories of language restrictions: administration, public, education, and media.

The coding methods used by Tosun (2020), Ozkan (2023), and Gavin et al. (2024) are considerably distinct from one another. Ozkan's (2023) approach to scoring involves scoring each category according to whether or not a minority language speaker can access the services or rights within the category and the degree to which the minority language can be used effectively in those contexts. Ozkan (2023) combines these two parts into a summary variable to produce a score for each category, then sums all category scores to produce an overall summary variable whose score determines the classification of the language regime. Tosun (2020) differs in her approach by first scoring all indicators within each category according to whether each policy indicator was not at all restricted, partially restricted, or totally banned. Tosun (2020) then gives each category a score corresponding to the highest level of restriction found in any of the included policy indicators. For example, if the only restriction found in the official category was a total ban on the use of a minority language in judicial proceedings, the official category is accordingly given the maximum category score of 2, indicating the presence of a total ban within the category. The five category scores are summed to produce a country LRI score along a discrete ten-point scale, with higher scores indicating the presence of more restrictions in a given country-year observation. Gavin et al.'s (2024) LFI scores variables according to a three-point scale (-1, 0, 1) ranging from active suppression of language rights or services to total or near-total language freedom.

³⁰ Another notable index proposal comes from Gazzola et al. (2023) in their Index of Linguistic Justice. This index is currently only theoretical and is not accompanied by a sample data set or any real-world examples where the index was applied. While the authors set aside questions or indicators on education and media, their theoretical focus on the categories of law and order, administration, and essential public services is commendable. However, the data required to properly code for this index is significantly more granular than those proposed by Tosun (2020), Ozkan (2023), or Gavin et al. (2024), making any real use of this index implausible in the context of a historical analysis.

Despite these differences, these indices share a few similarities. All three indices first aggregate scores within each category before summing the average scores in each category to arrive at a final score or classification. Due to the notoriously poor quality and coverage of data on language use and language policies, coding for the policy indicators for each of the three indices is restricted to three-point scales, with the sole exception of a single language status indicator in Ozkan's (2023) MLPD. The index I propose here uses a four-point scale for several reasons. First, Ozkan (2023) and Gavin et al. (2024), in their respective focuses on overall language policy and language freedoms, identify instances where governments might implement policies of promotion by making an active effort to bolster the vitality of a minority language at its own financial expense. However, both indices overlook what Tosun (2020) identifies through her focus on language restrictions as a crucial distinction in the severity of language restrictions. Per the LRI, a ban on the use of a minority language is more impactful on assimilation outcomes than the use of partial restrictions—an important nuance missed by Ozkan (2023) and Gavin et al. (2024). Therefore, the Language Restriction Severity Index (LRSI) used here builds on Gavin et al.'s (2024) category coding scheme of using a three-point scale with negative and positive scores but extends this scale to a fourth point (-2, -1, 0, 1) to include the distinction between partial language restrictions and total language bans. With several minor exceptions, a score of -2 indicates an outright ban on the associated indicator, while a score of 1 indicates the presence of a promotion policy on the associated indicator.

In scoring all categories and indicators, I apply the following conceptual guidelines: The government is expected to support the dominant group's language in meeting a score of 1. For a minority group, a score of 1 in any of the indicators or categories shows that the host state is helping extend that same provision to the minority-language group in a manner that is both costly for the government and generally unexpected from an archetype of the tolerant nation-state. The archetype of the tolerant nation-state is a state that is motivated by both national unity and national stability. The

archetype of the tolerant nation-state fundamentally prefers a linguistically unified polity but is unwilling to risk triggering severe backlash that severe language restrictions might produce or spend significant resources to achieve national stability via linguistic pluralism. A score of 0 indicates that government support for the minority language is somewhat costly but expected from an archetype of the tolerant nation-state. A score of -1 indicates that the government is failing or refusing to meet its expected obligations to a minority language speaker as a citizen of the country in part due to deliberate policies or informal strategies intended to assimilate the minority language group. A score of -2 indicates that the government is employing severe language restrictions through the use of bans in an attempt to aggressively assimilate the minority group by erasing the cornerstone of their minority identity.

Once codes are assigned to all indicators within a given category, category scores are then calculated by averaging all indicator scores *for which sufficient and relevant evidence is found*. For example, if case research cannot produce any evidence describing language policy toward a minority group for the judiciary indicator under the administration category, the judiciary indicator is assigned the non-score of *No Evidence (NE)*. In order to avoid a situation whereby a case with scores of -2 for all indicators within a given category is scored the same as a case with several non-scores of *No Evidence* and only one score of -2, indicators with *No Evidence* in a given case-year observation will count as half of a category for the purposes of averaging category scores.³¹ For example, if a case scores -2 for three of the four indicators under the administration category, and a non-score of *No Evidence* under the fourth indicator, the administration category score for that case-year will be $((-2*3)/3.5) = -1.71$. After determining the average category scores for a given case-year, the LRSI score for that case-year will be:

³¹ Non-scores of *No Evidence* are also given to instances where severe restrictions on all parts of a country's dominant and minority-language media landscape precludes any positive or negative score.

$$LRSI_C = \left(\frac{A_C}{A_I}\right) + \left(\frac{P_C}{P_I}\right) + \left(\frac{E_C}{E_I}\right) + \left(\frac{M_C}{M_I}\right)$$

with C indicating a case-year for a unique group, A , P , E , and M indicating the aggregate indicator scores for the administration, public, education, and media categories, respectively, and I indicating the number of indicators within the specified (with indicators scored as *No Evidence* counting as 0.5 indicators). With four categories, the range of possible LRSI scores extends from -8 to +4.

If the last known policy or event informing an indicator score has an assumed or implied end date, scores for that indicator past that point in time are recorded as *No Evidence*. Some categories and indicators may have policies that begin earlier than others. Using the case of the Amazigh (Berbers) in Algeria as an example, several language restrictions under the education and media categories began in 1962, but the first restrictions under the administration category began in 1968. If case research does not strongly imply a previous state of affairs that might inform the prior scores in the first years of a case study (e.g., 1962 - 1968 for indicators under the administration category in the Amazigh case), these indicator-year scores are recorded as *No Evidence*. As another example, the first significant policy under the higher education indicator of the education category was the closure of the Berber department and cancellation of the last Berber course at the University of Algiers in 1973. The wording of this recorded policy and the context behind it imply that there were other Berber courses available elsewhere in the country that were closed down before 1973. As such, the higher education indicator receives an inferred score of 0 between 1962 and 1972 and a score of -1 from 1973 onwards, or until another restriction alters it.

In the early coding years, some indicators—particularly those under the public category—are more susceptible to immediate interpretation with relatively little context. For example, the first explicit language restrictions on public signage in the case of the Amazigh in Algeria began in 1973/1974. However, due to the nature and ubiquity of public signage, it is reasonable to assume that

the prior state of affairs in Amazigh regions was that the Amazigh language(s) was at least regionally prevalent in public signage.

Generally, a severely restricted minority language will be effectively or explicitly banned on average in around three categories. A minority language with relatively moderate restrictions will typically be partially restricted in around two or three of these categories. Specifically, case-years with an LRSI score between -3 and 0 are categorized as having moderate language restrictions. They are further categorized as an Inclusive Assimilation or Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime, depending on their corresponding level of minority exclusion. Cases with an aggregate LRSI score between -8 and -3.01 are categorized as having severe language restrictions. They are further categorized as either an Exclusionary Assimilation or Hybrid Assimilation regime, depending on their corresponding level of minority exclusion. No case-years across the five cases examined here demonstrated an LRSI score above 0, though several scattered indicator scores did register scores of 1.³²

I consult various sources in the construction and coding of the LRSI. In addition to various country-specific reports, encyclopedias, media sources, and historical texts, other commonly referenced sources include Jacques Leclerc's *L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde* online database (Leclerc, 2024), LexisNexis, the 7th (1969), 10th (1984), 13th (1996), 15th (2005), 22nd (2019), and 25th (2022) editions of *Ethnologue* (Eberhard et al., 2022), the *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations* (Minahan, 2002), as well as the extensive coding notes of the SDM (Sambanis et al., 2018) and AMAR (Birbir et al., 2018) data sets.

³² Individual indicator scores of +1 are included so as to allow greater nuance in cases where promotion policies in one category can offset, to a certain extent, language restrictions in another.

Table 3: Language Restriction Severity Index (LRSI)³³

Administration

Documentation — “Whether the government/bureaucracies provide documentation in the language”

- Always (1)
- Sometimes/When Requested (0)
- Rarely or Never (-1)
- Banned (-2)

External Communications — “Whether the use of the minority language is permitted for citizen communications with a government bureaucracy”

- Always (1)
- Sometimes/When Requested (0)
- Rarely or Never (-1)
- Banned (-2)

Judiciary — “Whether law enforcement, court documentation, and court proceedings are conducted in the language”

- Always (1)
- Regionally (0)
- Prohibited, with translation services (-1)
- Prohibited, without translation services (-2)

Employment — “Whether knowledge or use of the dominant language is required for employment in certain professions” (bureaucratic positions, medical doctors, universities, regional law enforcement, or other private sector positions)³⁴

- Not Required (1)
- Dominant Language Knowledge (0)
- Dominant Language Use (-1)³⁵
- Minority Language Banned (-2)

Public

Naming — “The extent to which the names of people or places can be legally recorded in the language”

- Unrestricted (1)
- Somewhat/Alphabetically Restricted (0)
- Tightly Restricted (-1)
- Banned (-2)³⁶

Signage — “Whether signposts, billboards, or other public writing is available in the language”³⁷

- Widely (1)

³³ Non-scores of *No Evidence* are not shown, but still apply for all indicators.

³⁴ Requirements regarding mandatory language use for internal communications within a bureaucracy apply here.

³⁵ Includes discrimination toward users of the minority language in lower-level public sector hiring practices as a result of the unequal enforcement of language proficiency hiring requirements.

³⁶ Includes changing existing names of people or places.

³⁷ Includes television or radio advertising, street names, publicly displayed names of private businesses, seals, stamps, and inscriptions on protest banners. Does not include television or radio advertising.

- Regionally (0)³⁸
- Dominant Language Required (-1)
- Banned (-2)

Public Speech — “The extent to which various forms of public speech are permitted in the language”³⁹

- Unrestricted (0)
- Partially Restricted (-1)
- Tightly Restricted (-2)

Education

Primary — “Whether primary education instruction is available in the language”⁴⁰

- Widely (1)
- Regionally (0)
- Rarely (-1)⁴¹
- Never or Banned (-2)

Secondary — “Whether secondary education instruction is available in the language”

- Widely (1)
- Regionally (0)
- Rarely (-1)⁴²
- Never or Banned (-2)

Higher — “Whether higher education instruction is available in the language”

- Widely (1)
- Regionally (0)
- Rarely (-1)⁴³
- Never or Banned (-2)

Media

Broadcasting — “The availability of television, radio, or internet broadcasts in the language”⁴⁴

- Publicly Provided, Unrestricted (1)

³⁸ Includes the required use of the dominant language alongside the minority language as bilingual signage.

³⁹ Score of 1 not applicable. Includes use in political campaigns and elections, government building, public speeches, outside of the home, mail correspondence, religious ceremonies, and in live theatrical or cultural performances.

⁴⁰ Restrictions on language use in preschool contexts are included in the primary indicator.

⁴¹ Including instructional use exclusively in literature or foreign language courses, or if there is a one-sided bilingual instruction requirement imposed on the minority group.

⁴² Including instructional use exclusively in literature or foreign language courses, or if there is a one-sided bilingual instruction requirement imposed on the minority group.

⁴³ Including instructional use exclusively in literature or foreign language courses, or if there is a one-sided bilingual instruction requirement imposed on the minority group.

⁴⁴ Public media sources receive the majority of their funding from the state. Private media are sources that receive the majority of their funding from private capital. Non-scores of *No Evidence* in for this indicator additionally apply to situations where *all* of the following are true: 1) There are no broadcast stations in the minority language; 2) broadcasts in the minority language are not publicly provided; 3) private broadcasting in the minority language is unrestricted. This does not apply to the publications indicator due to the relatively higher entry barriers of broadcasting compared to publishing.

- Publicly Provided, Moderate Bilingual Requirements (0)⁴⁵
- Tight Restrictions (-1)⁴⁶
- Banned (-2)

Publications — “The availability of print media sources in the language, including online publications”⁴⁷

- Publicly Provided, Unrestricted (1)
- Privately Unrestricted (0)⁴⁸
- Tightly Restricted (-1)⁴⁹
- Banned (-2)

4.2.2 *Measurement of Minority Exclusion*

In determining whether and to what extent a state is systematically excluding the targeted minority group from political and economic participation, I reference various sources, including historical texts, policy and media reports, and other secondary sources. I examine the evidence derived from these sources using the framework of the two discrimination indices formulated by AMAR. The political and economic discrimination indices are latent variables ranging from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating no discrimination and 4 indicating severe discrimination through formal exclusion and/or recurring repression to substantially restrict the group’s political/economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.

Each index refers to several other AMAR variables on minority discrimination and other unique pieces of evidence. Three of these are binary variables on group representation in politics:

⁴⁵ Moderate bilingual requirements are those that do not require the dominant language to be broadcast for a longer period of time than the minority language, provided that the broadcast station’s primary audience is users of the minority language.

⁴⁶ Includes restrictions on content (relative to other groups in the country) and time, or an unequally applied bilingual requirement to broadcast in the dominant language for a longer period of time than the minority language, provided that the broadcast station’s primary audience are users of the minority language.

⁴⁷ Public media sources receive the majority of their funding from the state. Private media are sources that receive the majority of their funding from private capital.

⁴⁸ Includes the general unavailability of minority-language publications, provided there are no formal or informal restrictions on public or private publications.

⁴⁹ Includes tight restrictions on content (relative to other groups in the country) or an unequally applied bilingual requirement to include the dominant language in a publication which has for its primary audience the users of a minority language. Applies to both public and private publications.

group representation in the legislative branch of central government, group representation in the executive branch of central government, and guaranteed group representation in the central government. Two additional grievance-related variables in AMAR are indirectly considered when constructing each index: political and economic grievances.⁵⁰ Table 23 in the Appendix details the basic coding rules surrounding each variable. While political or economic grievances do not necessarily indicate the presence of systemic political or economic discrimination, they do strongly imply some level of actual discrimination.

Since the degree of exclusion suffered by a minority group cannot be determined solely by the limited conditions of expressed grievances and group representation in branches of government, I reference various other indicators to determine a minority exclusion score for a given case. The effective time period in which AMAR includes sufficient data for a majority of its groups—at least for those among the original MAR sample—extends only to around 1980-2006. Due to the significantly wider temporal scope of this dissertation and the need to take a more comprehensive view of the numerous ways a state can effectively exclude a minority group, I include all of the discussed AMAR variables as several of many more possible exclusionary policies.

For political discrimination, this includes but is not limited to restrictions on minority group representation in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; governorships in the minority

⁵⁰ The political grievances variable indicates the highest level of political grievance reported. A political grievance or economic grievance score of 0 indicates the expression of no political grievances, while a score of 1 indicates the expression of political grievances focused on ending discrimination or creating or strengthening remedial policies. Since scores of 2 and 3 in the original AMAR grievance variables concern demands for self-determination, these are mostly considered in the measurement of popular backlash.

While not explicitly stated in the AMAR codebook, the three group representation variables (group representation in the legislative branch, group representation in the executive branch, and guaranteed group representation in the central government), as well as the two grievance variables (highest level of political grievance and economic grievance), inform the codes given for the political and economic discrimination indices. Referencing the various coding decisions in the MAR 2004-2006 coding notes and sources shows how pieces of evidence relating to group representation and expressed grievances from minority group leaders appear as justifications for coding decisions for the political and economic discrimination indices.

region(s); high-ranking bureaucratic positions;⁵¹ the military; the internal security apparatus;⁵² minority disenfranchisement in national elections; imposing non-linguistic barriers to citizenship; revocations of autonomy; forced internal displacement; and the *relatively* excessive use of violence or deadly force by security forces. The destruction or removal of physical symbols (e.g., monuments, museums, pilgrimage sites) of a minority's identity are also considered to contribute to political discrimination as they are also consequences of a minority group's inability to block such actions through political pressure. For each of these indicators, it must be determined that the government's actions were at least plausibly deliberate and effectively excluded the targeted minority by comparison with other groups.

For economic discrimination, this includes but is not limited to land confiscation, forced property evictions, preferential economic treatment of non-minority individuals within the minority group's majority region, relative urban unemployment rates, effectively explicit prohibitions on minority employment in various professions,⁵³ lack of provision of certain state services in comparison with other subnational regions of comparable economic power (e.g., sanitation, electricity, water, road maintenance, medical services), relative budget allocation discrepancies, travel restrictions, and forced labor. Notably excluded from the list of economic exclusion indicators are measures of relative poverty and prosperity, such as regional GDP per capita, life expectancy rates, literacy rates, and absolute national or rural unemployment due to the outsized influence of historical factors which are (often) largely outside the control of the central government's deliberate and contemporary policy choices.

⁵¹ If there are *explicit* prohibitions on minority group representation in *lower-level bureaucratic positions* either at the national or subnational level, it is viewed as evidence of economic exclusion. If there are no explicit prohibitions—replaced instead with formal or informal language proficiency requirements—it is viewed as a language restriction.

⁵² Due to the nature of internal security apparatuses and the military, the underrepresentation of a minority group in either institution due to deliberate policy is coded as a policy of political exclusion, regardless of whether language proficiency requirements are the immediate or most obvious cause of minority underrepresentation.

⁵³ Excluding the military. These are rare in the public sector. In most instances where a minority language group is broadly excluded from public sector positions, a formal or informal language proficiency requirement is used to justify minority exclusion.

When disparities between the minority and dominant or other groups along these generally excluded indicators are largely due to deliberate government policy, they are included as evidence of minority exclusion. Furthermore, the prevalence of severe ethnic or intercommunal tensions is not considered as evidence to inform a score for minority exclusion.

In cases where ambiguities or contradictions arise, I rely on the most reputable source providing the most detailed evidence. As much as possible, I reference verifying sources to support less detailed or unpublished sources. I use the evidence gathered to create a historical timeline detailing the imposition of and changes in exclusionary policies in each country. Due to both a lack of consensus on the relative importance of any number of the aforementioned exclusionary policies in contributing to a minority individual's belief that they are excluded, as well as a lack of formal and specific coding rules for both discrimination indices in AMAR, minority exclusion scores for a given case-year are subjectively decided and justified, with more obviously malicious and deliberate policies leading to a higher minority exclusion score. Minority exclusion scores are based on the same scoring regime formulated by AMAR for the political and economic discrimination indices. As such, the scores for minority exclusion range between 0-4.⁵⁴ The coding rules for AMAR's discrimination indices—and, by extension, the coding rules for minority exclusion—are detailed in Table 23 in the Appendix.

For example, if the overall weight of evidence concerning the level of exclusion imposed on a minority group for a given case-year reflects “significant (poverty and)⁵⁵ under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination,” the case will receive a minority exclusion score of 3. The evidence cited in support of a case's minority exclusion scores and

⁵⁴ Due to the requirement that the host states must be employing some form of language restrictions on a minority and that language restrictions in reality are never totally separated from related discrimination, the effective theoretical range for minority exclusion scores extends from 1 to 4.

⁵⁵ For the economic discrimination index.

categorization are discussed in the relevant case study section. Cases with a score of 3 or 4 in the first half of a case period are likely to result in a minority being classified as excluded (high exclusion), while a case with a score of 1 or 2 in the first half of a case period is more likely to result in a minority being classified as not excluded (low exclusion).⁵⁶

4.2.3 *Measurement of Popular Backlash*

Language, deeply embedded in numerous aspects of political disagreements, presents challenges in isolating it as an explanatory variable or identifying it as a causal factor. Measuring popular backlash requires a more qualitative approach than the framework used to code for language restriction severity. For example, violent protests in a state with weak state capacity (e.g., Colombia) are more easily done than in a state with very high state capacity and advanced surveillance tools (e.g., China). As such, the weight and significance of the occurrence of the same event (violent protest) changes depending on each case's unique historical, demographic, political, economic, and social contexts. Furthermore, the severity of various backlash events can vary widely, similarly depending on a wide range of variables. Each case study section discusses the extent to which any case-specific influence affects the interpretation of various backlash events. Some examples of popular backlash options that may come as a result of minority exclusion or language restrictions include:

- Acceptance (Assimilation)
- National De-Identification
- Legislative Redress
- Electoral Boycott
- (Non)Violent Protest
- (Non)Violent Self-Determination
- Sabotage [material targets]
- Terrorism [human targets]
- Armed Civil Conflict (Secessionist or Non-Secessionist)

⁵⁶ When the determined political and economic discrimination index scores vary by one point, the higher score is used as the overall minority exclusion score. If the index scores vary by two points, the average is used as the overall minority exclusion score. In the discussion at the end of each case study, only the overall minority exclusion score is presented.

Each case study section will provide evidence connecting state policies of minority exclusion and language restrictions to popular backlash outcomes through process tracing (Collier, 2011; Bennett & Checkel, 2015). Using process tracing techniques, I consult various source materials, including policy and media reports, official documents, primary and secondary historical texts, diaries and (auto)biographies of political leaders, speeches, interviews, and online data sets and articles. I use these sources to map out the key events, decisions, and actors involved in the process on a detailed timeline, from the initial policies of minority exclusion or language restrictions to the outcome of popular backlash. I discuss all evidence and outcomes in a case's social, political, and economic context, considering alternative explanations for a given backlash event. Based on the weight and context of the evidence, I then make a reasoned judgment about the extent to which various observed backlash events were the result of grievances caused by minority exclusion or language restrictions. All backlash events must be motivated at least in part to language-related grievances. The sum of popular backlash events is classified as either *minimal backlash*, *moderate backlash*, or *severe backlash* per Figure 2 in Chapter 3.

4.2.4 *Measurement of Success and Failure*

Finally, I make a reasoned judgment on the relative success or failure of each host state's language assimilation regime. Each case's language assimilation regime type corresponds to an expected level of backlash I expect to observe as a result of language grievances. After comparing the observed level of backlash to the level of backlash anticipated by my theoretical framework, I then include any additional available information regarding the observed progress toward the assimilation of a targeted minority. If no such information is available, I consider other factors including but not limited to the observed level of backlash, the degree to which the observed backlash does or does not

exceed the anticipated level of backlash, and the attitudes of the minority group at the beginning and end of the case period.

Afterwards, I evaluate and justify each case as either a *failure*, *moderate failure*, *moderate success*, or *success*. The degree to which a given backlash event is informed by language-related grievances also informs the extent to which the same event contributes to a case's overall classification as a success or failure.⁵⁷ I define *success* as an increase in national unity due to the effective and efficient assimilation of a targeted minority group into the dominant language and culture. I define *failure* as a decrease in national unity due to the ineffective and inefficient assimilation of a targeted minority group into the dominant language and culture. Efficacy is primarily determined by the extent to which language restrictions facilitate the linguistic assimilation of a targeted minority group. Efficiency is primarily determined by the extent to which the state is able to keep the financial and backlash costs of assimilation to a minimum.


Since all backlash events must be partially motivated by language-related grievances, Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes are fundamentally biased toward failure. Minority groups in such cases are expected to primarily resist the more extreme exclusionary policies, but the addition of moderate language restrictions opens the way for language differences to serve as a more salient basis for minority political mobilization and identity. When this happens, I expect backlash events to be primarily motivated by exclusion but only partially motivated by language restrictions.

Many of the important pieces of evidence (e.g., precise language use data, size of self-determination movements, likely trajectory of future morale) that could speak most to the success or

⁵⁷ As a coding rule, the initial formation of a self-determination organization or movement is included as a popular backlash event. Subsequent minor protest events organized by said group are not included as separate entries, though they may be mentioned in the notes section accompanying the entry marking the formation of the responsible organization. Major protests centrally concerned with language-related grievances and acts of sabotage or terrorism organized by a previously recorded self-determination organization are exempt from this rule and are recorded as separate entries.

failure of a given language assimilation regime are present in some cases and absent in others. As such, the evaluation of this measure is done using informed reasoned alone, based on the available evidence and the definitions of success and failure above. The expectations detailed in Figure 4 below are based on the theoretical framework presented in this dissertation but should not be considered as formal hypotheses or corollaries.

Figure 4: Expected Success and Failure Outcomes



Chapter 5: South Tyroleans in Italy

Tragedy to Triumph

<i>Case Summary</i>	
Language Regime Type	Exclusionary Assimilation
Group	South Tyroleans (German-speakers)
Host State	Italy
Time Period	1921 - 1972
Hypothesized Backlash	Severe Backlash
Observed Backlash	Severe Backlash
Outcome	Failure

The case of the German-speaking minority in Italian South Tyrol is consistent with my theory on the relationship between the severity of language restrictions and level of minority exclusion on popular backlash.⁵⁸ Between 1923 and 1940, the inhabitants of the newly annexed region of South Tyrol experienced severe language restrictions and a high degree of exclusion from political and economic participation. After the conclusion of World War II, language restrictions were reduced in severity, though the population faced arguably even greater levels of economic exclusion.

My theoretical framework anticipates a high level of popular backlash to result from the extreme language restrictions present during the Fascist period and the high degree of minority exclusion imposed from the early 1920s to 1972. I further anticipate the formation of a robust self-

⁵⁸ For the purposes of this case study, the term “South Tyrolean(s)” refers to the German-speaking population of Italian South Tyrol unless stated otherwise. Likewise, “German-speaker” and “South Tyrolean(s)” are considered as equivalent terms unless stated otherwise. The ethnic and linguistic composition of South Tyrol, and in particular the regional capital of Bozen (Bolzano), began to change during and after World War II.

determination movement. The case evidence also supports Piazza's (2012) theory, as South Tyroleans reacted to political and economic exclusion with an extended bombing campaign.

Beginning in 1956 and with the support of a newly independent Austrian state, South Tyroleans began to inflict heavy backlash costs on the Italian state through mass protests and an extended bombing campaign that did not definitively end until 1988. Ultimately, the Italianization program of the Fascist era and the majorification strategy pursued by the postwar Italian state ended in failure in 1972. With the passage of the second autonomy statute in 1972 and the full implementation of the included measures by 1992, the South Tyrolean minority was able to extract a stunning amount of self-determination concessions from the Italian state. South Tyroleans have since used their autonomy to transform the region from one of Italy's poorest at the time of annexation to its most prosperous today, with nearly all of the province's tax income retained in the local government coffers.

Today, implied bilingualism rates in South Tyrol are high—the only apparent success, albeit unclear, of the Italian state in assimilating South Tyroleans. However, the bilingualism policies that led to this result were implemented as part of the 1972 autonomy statute and largely as a reaction to the failure of the severe language restrictions previously imposed. Despite achieving comprehensive autonomy in 1972, separatist parties in the South Tyrolean legislature continue to receive significant support from the German-speaking population. I conclude that the Exclusionary Assimilation regime imposed on South Tyroleans by the Italian state constitutes a failure.

5.1 *Background*

South Tyrol (German: *Südtirol*, Italian: *Alto Adige*) is a mountainous region situated south of the Brenner Pass separating present-day Austria from Italy. The total population of South Tyrol in 1921 was 257,000, increasing to 505,000 by 2011 (Gobbi & Maffei, 2021, p. 8). As of 2011, 62.3% of

South Tyroleans were native German-speakers, while 23.4% and 4.1% were native Italian and Ladin-speakers, respectively (Gobbi & Maffei, 2021, p. 19).⁵⁹ The Treaty of London (1915) stipulated that South Tyrol and Trento be taken from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and given to the Kingdom of Italy after World War I as a reward for switching allegiances to the Triple Alliance. The prewar province of Tyrol had been a part of Austria for over five centuries and was almost entirely German-speaking.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the province was split in two across the Brenner Pass, with the southern half given to Italy. The Italian rationale for wanting South Tyrol was to create a defensible military chokepoint in the Brenner Pass to create a frontier against rising militant pan-Germanism.

What followed was the systematic subjugation and erasure of South Tyrolean “Germanness” by Italian Fascists. Upon Italy’s annexation of South Tyrol in 1919, it seemed that ascendant Italian Fascism might not intrude on the South Tyrolean way of life. The administration of the new Italian region of Venetia Tridentina, which included South Tyrol, was entrusted to Luigi Credaro, a member of parliament, a professor at the University of Rome, and a liberal who was well-versed in Germanic culture (Toscano, 1975). This appointment came as reassurance to South Tyroleans, who were worried about their potential marginalization. In a letter to Prime Minister Francesco Nitti (1919-1920), Credaro writes, “...if we want to give our new Germanic fellow-citizens and the world at large proof of our justice, equity, sincerity and moderation, we must take all the wishes of the people of the Alto Adige into careful consideration...” (Toscano, 1975, p. 17). Immediately before annexation, the first Italian military governor of South Tyrol promised in 1918 that “The German-speaking parishes will be allowed German elementary schools, and all private and confessional schools already in being will

⁵⁹ Ladins are a small minority linguistic group in Italy that primarily resides in small pockets in South Tyrol and Trentino in Italy. As of 2011, there are 20,000 Ladin-speakers in Italy (Gobbi & Maffei, 2021, p. 15).

⁶⁰ At the conclusion of World War I. As a result of Napoleon’s campaigns in Italy and the interethnic conflicts occurring in Austrian Tyrol, Austria induced around half of the Italian population of Bozen (Italian: *Bolzano*), the capital city of South Tyrol, to leave between 1860 and 1913 (Toscano, 1975).

be allowed [the] freedom to retain the German language as the language of instruction” (Kunz, 1927, p. 503).

Days before Credaro was handed administrative powers over South Tyrol, an Italian nationalist named Ettore Tolomei (1865-1952) was appointed Commissioner for Language and Culture in the Alto Adige. Immediately after Credaro’s appointment, Tolomei resigned from his post in recognition of the disparity in views between Credaro and himself. When Tolomei later returned to prominence in South Tyrol, he would not be constrained by forces of moderation.

Between November 1919 and March 1920, representatives from the Alto Adige submitted increasingly comprehensive demands for autonomy to Prime Minister Nitti that approximated a confederal arrangement (Toscano, 1975). The extreme nature of the March 1920 proposal heralded an end to relative Italian noninterference in South Tyrol and heavily influenced the attitudes of the successive governments of Giovanni Giolitti (1920-1921), Ivanoe Bonomi (1921-1922), Luigi Facta (1922), and Benito Mussolini (1922-1943). At the King’s speech in parliament in 1921, the remarks regarding the question of South Tyrolean autonomy were either more cautious than before or outwardly hostile. Mussolini—then a member of the Chamber of Deputies—made remarks condemning South Tyrolean autonomy and further demanded Credaro’s dismissal (Mussolini, 1956).

The state of Italian politics prior to 1922 can only be described as political anarchy, marked by a rapid succession of governments, paralyzing general strikes, economic turmoil, widespread social unrest, and an inability to establish a stable and effective government. The frequent changes in government, coupled with the growing disillusionment with the parliamentary system, created a fertile ground for extremist ideologies. At this point, the South Tyrolean political leadership’s central mistake was to mistake the Italian government’s moderate attitude after annexation for weakness. Indeed, South Tyrolean political leaders before 1921 were able to extract a surprising number of autonomy concessions in education, political representation, administration, and the press.

Less than two years after annexation, the prospect of further concessions abruptly ended on April 24, 1921. In an event known today as “Bloody Sunday,” Italian Fascists from other regions traveled to Bolzano to attack South Tyroleans attending the Bozen Fair, leaving one dead and fifty injured (Lechner, 2005). The military subsequently intervened to escort the Fascists safely to the train station. Two of the perpetrators were later arrested at the request of Prime Minister Giolitti, only to be released less than a week later, owing to threats made by Mussolini for their release (Steininger, 2003; Lechner, 2005). As the South Tyrolean population tried to process what had just occurred, Mussolini clarified, “...If the Germans have to be beaten and stomped to bring them to reason, then so be it, we’re ready” (Reut-Nicolussi, 1928, p. 84).

The first language restriction came in August 1921 in the *Lex Corbino*, which required Italian parents to send their children to Italian-language schools. Initially framed as a measure to protect the Italian minority in South Tyrol, the law quickly became a tool for assimilation (Rautz, 2014). Monolingual Italian commissions were responsible for determining which families were Italian and often designated German-speaking families as Italian if they possessed Italian or Italian-sounding names. From March to October 1922, Italian Fascists took control of all of Italy except for South Tyrol, Sardinia, and pockets of the south. Fascists occupied Bozen’s city hall on October 2. On October 5, a Fascist squad attacked Credaro and forced him to resign his position to allow for Fascist administration of the region (Steininger, 2003; Rautz, 2014).

Prior to Tolomei’s appointment and resignation as Commissioner for Language and Culture in the Alto Adige in 1919, Tolomei was the central actor most responsible for formulating what would become the post-1922 Italianization program in South Tyrol. Particularly through his work in the magazine *Archivio per l’Alto Adige* he founded in 1904, he created the Italian conception of the Alto Adige. In 1923, an Italian newspaper described Tolomei’s work as the following: “He created Alto Adige. He created it in its current geographical conception; he forced it upon the historical

consciousness of the nation through thirty years of work in that field” (Steininger, 2003, p. 18). Specifically, Tolomei reshaped the Italian perception of the ‘true’ ethnographic conditions of South Tyrol, created authoritative reinterpretations of the spread of Germanness in South Tyrol under Austrian rule, Italianized German city names, and formulated the Italianization program for South Tyrol (Framke, 1987).⁶¹ In April 1923, village names in South Tyrol were Italianized based on Tolomei’s first handbook (Framke, 1987; Steininger, 2003). In July 1923, Tolomei gave a speech at the Bozen Municipal Theater to make public his *32 provvedimenti per l’Alto Adige* (32 measures for South Tyrol) for the assimilation and Italianization of South Tyrol. According to Steininger (2003, pp. 19-20), these included the following proposals:

1. The unification of Alto Adige and Trentino to form a single province with Trient as its capital.
2. The appointment of Italian communal secretaries.
3. Revision of the (citizenship) options and closure of the Brenner border to all persons to whom Italian citizenship had not been conferred.
4. Provisions to make it more difficult for Germans and Austrians to get entry visas and permission for temporary residence.
5. Provisions to prevent immigration by Germans.
6. Revision of the 1921 census.
7. Mandating Italian as the language of official government business.
8. The dismissal of German bureaucrats or their transfer to other provinces.
9. Disbanding the German Association.
10. Disbanding all mountaineering clubs that were not affiliated with the Italian Alpine Association and transfer of their mountain huts to the Italian Alpine Association.
11. Banning the name “South Tyrol” and “German South Tyrol”.
12. Shutting down *Der Tiroler*, the daily newspaper published in Bozen.
13. Italianization of German place names.
14. Italianization of public signs and inscriptions.
15. Italianization of street signs.
16. Italianization of German family names.
17. Removal of the monument to Walther von der Vogelweide from Walther Square in Bozen.
18. Increasing carabinieri (police) strength while also eliminating German units.
19. Measures to facilitate the purchase of land and immigration by Italians.
20. Measures to encourage foreign countries to maintain a policy of non-involvement in South Tyrol.
21. Elimination of German banks and establishment of an Italian mortgage bank.

⁶¹ For an expansive discussion refuting Tolomei’s reinterpretation of the spread of Germanness in South Tyrol, see Stolz (1934).

22. Construction of customs offices in Sterzing and Toblach.
23. Generous subsidies for the Italian language and culture.
24. Construction of Italian kindergartens and elementary schools.
25. Construction of Italian intermediate schools.
26. Thorough investigation of university degrees earned abroad.
27. Expansion of the *Istituto di Storia per l'Alto Adige* (Institute of History for South Tyrol).
28. Revision of the geographical dimensions of the Bishopric of Brixen and strict surveillance of the activities of the clergy.
29. Use of Italian in civil and criminal court proceedings.
30. State control of the Bolzano Chamber of Commerce and the agricultural associations (corporazioni).
31. An extensive railroad infrastructure construction program in order to facilitate the Italianization of Alto Adige (Milan-Mals, Veltlin-Brenner, Agordo-Brien rail projects)
32. Increase troop strength in Alto Adige.

Between 1923 and 1939—with the most active phase occurring before 1930—almost all of these measures were carried out in South Tyrol, albeit with minor variations. Some measures, such as control of the press, administrative appointments, and others, were generally implemented throughout Italy in accordance with the Fascist political and economic changes of the time. The following discussion of the implementation of language restrictions and minority exclusion in South Tyrol is primarily informed by four comprehensive studies of the South Tyrol issue by Antony Alcock (1970, 2000), Mario Toscano (1975), Rolf Steininger (2003), and Georg Grote (2012).

5.2 Initial Policies

Beginning in late 1922, the government erected formal entry barriers for non-Italian speakers seeking employment in the public sector. Bureaucrats in local and provincial administration, municipal councils, and post offices were dismissed if they lacked sufficient proficiency in Italian. By April 1923, Italian place names had already been changed according to Tolomei's first handbook. In August 1923, the use of the word "Tyrol" and all its derivatives was banned, with violators subject to up to a month in prison or a fine of 20-200 lire (1923-1931) or 2,000 lire (1931 to 1946) (Steininger, 2003, p. 21).

Daily newspapers and publications, including *Der Landsmann*, *Bozner Nachrichten*, *Volksbote*, and *Meraner Zeitung*, were subject to pre-publication censorship from January 1925 onwards (Steininger,

2003). *Der Tiroler* was renamed to *Der Landsmann* (The Compatriot) and was forced to shut down in October 1925. *Der Landsmann* was shuttered due to two violations of the Place Name Decree. Other publications soon followed *Der Landsmann* for similar violations, including *Brixner Chronik* and *Bozner Nachrichten* (Steininger, 2003). In early 1926, all remaining German-language newspapers and magazines were shut down, including the *Volksbote*, the *Volksblatt*, *Meraner Zeitung*, and the *Burggräfler* (Alcock, 2000; Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012). In their place, the Fascists created the *Alpenzeitung* (Alpine Newspaper) in March 1926, followed by the official newspaper of the Fascist Party of South Tyrol *La Provincia di Bolzano* in April 1927 (Steininger, 2003). In 1926, *Der Landsmann* reopened as *Dolomiten*, and *Volksbote* was revived. However, both were strictly mandated to adhere to a pro-regime editorial policy (Steininger, 2003).⁶²

Even before the announcement of Tolomei's program, communications with the South Tyrol prefecture were required to be conducted exclusively in Italian starting in November 1922 (Alcock, 1970; Alcock, 2000; Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012). In October 1923, the exclusive use of Italian for administrative communications became mandatory at all levels of local, provincial, and federal government (Alcock, 1970; Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012). Later that same month, street signs and other public signs and notices were required to be written exclusively in Italian. Letters and postcards with a German address or writing were not delivered, and private businesses had to remove all publicly visible traces of German (Steininger, 2003). In September 1925, the government mandated the exclusive use of Italian in civil and criminal proceedings and general administrative communications of the courts (Alcock, 1970; Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012). German-speaking South Tyroleans were

⁶² According to the Language Restrictions Severity Index coding rules discussed in Chapter 5, restrictions can only be considered as such if applied disproportionately to the targeted minority group. In the case of newspaper and media restrictions in Fascist Italy, the state's tight grip on the free press in South Tyrol mirrored Fascist policy throughout Italy. Since the Italian state provided alternative state-run German-language newspapers in *Alpenzeitung* and *La Provincia di Bolzano*, these media restrictions are not included.

often forced to give false testimony, and attorneys caught speaking in German were given an extreme fine of 5,000 lire (Steininger, 2003).

The *Lex Gentile* of October 1923 was written to apply to all of Italy. However, it effectively served as the most comprehensive attempt to eradicate the German language from South Tyrol. Indeed, by February 1928, Italian was the only language of instruction in 760 classes in South Tyrol, while German was only permitted as supplementary instruction in 30 classes (Steininger, 2003). Immediately after coming into effect, a significant number of German primary and secondary schools closed down, and monolingual German teachers were dismissed *en masse*. The German Teachers College in Bozen was closed in 1924, and kindergartens were required to use Italian exclusively beginning in May 1924 (Alcock, 1970; Gruber, 1974; Framke, 1987). Finally, university degrees from Austria or Germany were invalidated unless the degree holder spent at least one year of study at an Italian university (Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012). A January 1925 law provided for the establishment of private schools, though German-speaking teachers were required to take Italian language examinations. Many failed these exams and became ineligible to teach at private schools. Regardless, textbooks and classroom space for these private institutions had to be authorized by the Trentino School Board. In South Tyrol, such authorizations were seldom made; when made, they were further subject to arbitrary revocation (Steininger, 2003). The language restrictions imposed by the *Lex Gentile* largely remained in place until 1940, when Italian authorities officially permitted schools to provide normal German-language instruction.⁶³

Somewhat connected to the Fascist regime's desire to control the activities of the clergy, religious instruction was required to be given exclusively in Italian beginning in 1926, leading to mass resignations of South Tyrolean priests (Steininger, 2003). In 1928, the Vatican gave approval for

⁶³ Alcock (1970, p. 53) states that German was allowed to be taught again in 1934 but only as a foreign language in primary schools.

parishes to provide private religious instruction in German, though this was kept under strict internal surveillance and was not officially permitted (Alcock, 1970; Steininger, 2003). As part of the Lateran Treaty in February 1929, the government made a minor concession to allow two German-language seminaries to continue teaching.

In September 1927, public libraries were required to hold the exact same number of German and Italian books, while kiosks and cafes were similarly required to provide an equal amount of Italian and German magazines and newspapers (Steininger, 2003). Another seemingly cruel restriction was made in November 1927, when the prefect of Bozen banned all future gravestone inscriptions in German (Steininger, 2003). In 1928, Italy banned German and Austrian radio broadcasts and established Radio Bolzano to “provide Fascist propaganda and help the assimilation process” (Alcock, 1970; Alcock, 2000, p. 167). Furthermore, South Tyroleans whose names were derived from Latin or Italian—with the criteria determined by Tolomei—were required to adopt their ‘original’ (Italian or Latin) name (Alcock, 1970). South Tyrolean parents were also forbidden from giving their children names that ‘offended Italian sentiment’ (Alcock, 1970, p. 37).

Among the 32 measures implemented by Tolomei, many led to the political and economic exclusion of South Tyroleans. The first exclusionary measures began around when the South Tyrolean Alpine Association was dissolved in September 1923, along with all of its local affiliates, and was forced to transfer all of its assets, including 77 mountain huts, to the Club Alpino Italiano (Steininger, 2003, p. 23). From May 1925 onwards, the right of communities to appoint their own community secretary was revoked (Steininger, 2003). In 1926, state-appointed mayors (*Podestà*) replaced freely elected mayors (Grote, 2012). While these appointment revocations applied to all of Italy as part of the Fascist program, it was not until the introduction of later autonomy packages that the government began to appoint mayors with a working knowledge of German to South Tyrol.

One other tool for Italianization was through the operations of the *Ente di Rinascita Agraria per le Tre Venezie* (ERA). Founded in 1921, the purpose of the ERA was to take over South Tyrolean farms that failed during the Great Depression to acquire as much land as possible for later redistribution to immigrating Italians (Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012). Royal Decree No. 2525 of 1928 formally invalidated the Austrian Civil Law Code in South Tyrol. This decree indirectly but automatically nullified the Tyrolean Farm Rule, which prevented the subdivision of farms and mandated unitary inheritance. With the nullification of the Tyrolean Farm Rule, the ERA began the state takeover of South Tyrolean farms. However, the ERA saw limited success in its mission. By 1931, it had taken over just 61 farms, increasing to 350 by 1939 (Steininger, 2003).

Similarly, most South Tyrolean communities had a local *Raiffeisenkasse*, which extended credit to agricultural organizations, farmers, and co-ops. The headquarters for all 136 *Raiffeisenkasse* was located at the Agricultural Central Bank in Bozen. In October 1926, Fascists forcefully took over the administration of the bank and led the institution to shut down one year later due to insolvency (Steininger, 2003). The takeover and closure of the *Raiffeisenkasse* in South Tyrol served as a prelude to the Fascist program of bank concentration throughout Italy. South Tyrol specifically saw the merger and state control of the savings banks in Bozen, Meran, and Bruneck (Steininger, 2003). This process would not begin to reverse itself until 1935.⁶⁴

The period between 1923 and 1935 saw the most significant attempt by Italian authorities to erase or rewrite the historical dimension of German identity in South Tyrol. Starting in 1923, Tolomei began the long process of Italianizing the Bozen Museum (Steininger, 2003). In July 1928, construction of the Fascist Bozen Victory Monument was completed, taking the place of the demolished Austrian *Kaiserjäger* World War I monument (Alcock, 1970; Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012). In 1933, the Laurin

⁶⁴ Bank concentration is not included as a policy of minority exclusion due to its application throughout Italy in accordance with Fascist policy at the time.

Fountain was destroyed by persons unknown, and the Walther von der Vogelweide monument was relocated to a secluded park two years later (Steininger, 2003).

The most powerful tool used by the state to exclude German-speaking South Tyroleans was the creation of the Bozen Industrial Zone. Frustrated with the seemingly slow pace of assimilation, Mussolini gave directives to major industries in Lombardy and Piedmont in February 1935 to construct new manufacturing plants in Bozen (Alcock, 2000; Steininger, 2003). In order to make the mountainous terrain of South Tyrol more attractive for industrialists, Mussolini granted preferential tax treatment and fee exemptions in May 1935 to workers in the industrial zone (Steininger, 2003). In 1936, railroad transportation rates for freight deliveries to and from Bozen were reduced (Steininger, 2003). From 1937 to 1939, subsidized housing units were offered to migrating Italian workers near the industrial zone (Steininger, 2003). Furthermore, 50,000 fruit trees owned by South Tyrolean farmers were bulldozed to make space for construction (Steininger, 2003).

The first factories in the Bozen Industrial Zone began to open between 1937 and 1939. These operated as subsidiary plants of larger Italian corporations and included a fiber board works (Feltrinelli-Masonite Corp.), aluminum works (Montecatini Corp.), magnesium works (Società Italiana per il Magnesio), steel works (Falck Group), and an automobile body plant (Lancia Group) (Steininger, 2003). By 1947, around 19,000 Italians were employed throughout the industrial zone, up from zero in 1936 (Steininger, 2003).

5.3 *Popular Backlash and Later Policies*

To say that Tolomei and the architects of the Italianization program in South Tyrol expected assimilation to come easily would be an overstatement. As early as 1914, Tolomei's discussions and memos preparing for an eventual annexation of South Tyrol hinted that relocating the German-speaking population might become necessary (Framke, 1987; Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012).

Nonetheless, Italian authorities were becoming increasingly aware that South Tyroleans were actively resisting assimilation. In education, South Tyroleans resisted through the operation of “catacomb schools.” After the passage of the *Lex Gentile*, the chief editor of *Volksbote*, Michael Gamper, published the first call for clandestine schooling in November 1924 (Steininger, 2003). The first classes began in late 1925 and did not escape the detection of Italian authorities. As early as November 1925, the Prefect of Bozen referred to the catacomb schools as tantamount to a resistance organization (Steininger, 2003). One year later, Italian authorities began their efforts to dismantle these schools, conducting searches of private residences, deportations, interrogations, imprisonment, and confiscating German-language school books (Alcock, 1970). Attempts to dismantle German catacomb schools continued until German was allowed as a permissible language of instruction in 1940 (Alcock, 1970; Steininger, 2003).

In other areas of Italianization, South Tyrolean reactions remained hostile. In this context, National Socialism began to radicalize politics in South Tyrol. In 1926, the government outlawed the German Association in South Tyrol. As a result, the various operational youth groups reorganized and merged in 1927-1928 to become the *Gau-Jugend-Rat* (GJR). The GJR later produced many of the leaders of the dominant Nazi organization in South Tyrol, the *Völkischer Kampfring Südtirols* (VKS), founded in 1933, the same year Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. As Italian Fascists observed the relative failure of their efforts to make Italians out of Germans, they simultaneously witnessed the increasing support for pan-German National Socialism among South Tyroleans and the broader Germanic world. By 1934, the Italian strategy of Italianization began to shift from assimilation to majorification. Majorification entailed the mass migration of Italians from other regions of Italy—primarily from the poorer South—into South Tyrol. The Bozen Industrial Zone was the most impactful tool used by the Italian state in their majorification strategy.

The reunification of the Saarland with Germany in January 1935 was particularly impactful in South Tyrol, as South Tyroleans pinned greater hopes for their rescue on German irredentism.⁶⁵ The March 1938 *Anschluss* (German annexation of Austria) greatly raised the hopes of South Tyroleans for unification under the German Reich. The day before the *Anschluss*, Hitler promised Mussolini to leave the German-Italian border at the Brenner Pass unchanged. The reaction of Mussolini and South Tyrolean Nazis was one of skepticism. Both parties viewed news of Hitler's promise as a potential strategic maneuver designed to maintain Italian support for Germany in the face of hostile powers in France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Sensing Tyrolean and Italian skepticism over his promise, Hitler traveled to Rome in May 1938 to once again assert that it was his "unshakeable will and his mandate to the German people to look upon the Alpine border established by nature as forever inviolable" (Steininger, 2003, p. 49). Still, Tyrolean Nazis remained cautiously optimistic, while Italian Fascists remained wary. The clearest sign to both of Hitler's commitment to Mussolini came in 1939.⁶⁶

The first preparatory talks for what would become known as the South Tyrol Option Agreement, or "The Option," began in March 1938. As previously mentioned, Tolomei anticipated in his early writings that Italian strategy may be required to shift from assimilation to resettlement. In one instance, Tolomei and Adriano Colocci-Vespucchi argued in 1914 that Italy had the right "to resettle the German contaminants that dominate the region of the Alto Adige today to the almost

⁶⁵ Frustrated with late war reparation payments due to them after World War I, France and the United Kingdom occupied the Saarland in 1920 under a League of Nations mandate. The Saarland was a heavily industrialized and coal-rich region along the Franco-German border.

⁶⁶ It should be noted that the events occurring in South Tyrol from 1939 to 1945 were not particularly important to either Hitler or Mussolini. In two biographies of Mussolini, written by Smith (1983) and Bosworth (2002), the topic of the Alto Adige/South Tyrol appears only a handful of times and only in passing and in relation to other events. In Mussolini's autobiography, written in 1928 by Richard Washburn Child (Mussolini, 1928), South Tyrol (specifically Bolzano) is only mentioned once and in the context of the preparations for Mussolini's March on Rome. In the personal diaries of Mussolini's son-in-law and Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano (1936-1943), the issue of South Tyrol is extensively discussed only in the 1939 entries, though largely without any indication as to whether Mussolini held any strong feelings on resettlement or Italianization (Ciano, 1945). In Corvaja's (2001, p. 5) book on the relationship and secret meetings between Hitler and Mussolini, the only mention of South Tyrol comes from a quote from an Italian bureaucrat in 1922: "Regarding Alto Adige, they [the Germans] declare that it is an Italian internal problem, and they are confident in Italy's liberal traditions to allow the German language heritage to remain unhampered."

complete exclusion of others, and to kick them back beyond the Brenner where they belong” (Steininger, 2003, p. 51). Perhaps surprisingly, however, the idea of resettling all German-speaking South Tyroleans as a solution to the South Tyrol issue was first advanced by German Nazi leaders (Toscano, 1975). It appears that the Italians initially sought only to resettle active irredentist and pro-Nazi groups, as well as former Austrians who had opted to retain Austrian citizenship per the 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (Alcock, 1970; Toscano, 1975).

Germany and Italy ultimately agreed that the South Tyrol issue could be resolved through resettlement. However, there were smaller disagreements regarding which groups of South Tyroleans to prioritize for resettlement, compensation for assets left behind, and payments for Italian guest workers in Germany. Hitler tasked *Reichsführer-SS* Heinrich Himmler with managing the South Tyrol resettlement program, who decided by May 1939 to go forward with resettlement. One month earlier, a VKS delegation traveled to Munich to receive clarification of the German position on the South Tyrol situation. While it is unclear whether the delegation was aware of the preparatory talks for resettlement, they were nonetheless informed by *Reichsleiter* Martin Bormann that Hitler decided the resolution of the situation in favor of resettlement (Steurer, 1980).

In June 1939, several months before the planned German invasion of Poland, Germany and Italy reached an agreement in Berlin on the resettlement of German-speaking South Tyroleans. It was decided that resettlement should take place in three stages. The first stage, set to be carried out throughout 1940, called for the forceful resettlement of dissidents, politically problematic Reich Germans, and former Austrians in particular. The second stage, set to be carried out throughout 1941, included the resettlement of the *Volksdeutsche* (German-speaking Italian citizens) working as laborers. The final stage involved the resettlement of land-owning *Volksdeutsche*. Just one month later, in July 1939, all Germans in the Italian civil service were dismissed, and a further language restriction was put

in place for tobacco stores and newspaper stands, forbidding owners from using German to converse with their customers (Steininger, 2003).

The agreement was announced in October 1939 and stipulated for a referendum to take place on December 31, 1939, to offer South Tyroleans the option of remaining in Italy or emigrating to the German Reich. All *Volksdeutsche* who opted for Germany had to depart South Tyrol by December 31, 1942. Emigrating to the German Reich was understood by South Tyroleans to involve resettlement not in neighboring Austria or Bavaria but in newly conquered lands in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland. However, this destination would constantly change during the course of the war, with rumored destinations changing from Poland to Alsace-Lorraine to Burgundy to Crimea.

Meanwhile, the implications of opting for Italy were confounded by rumors of forced resettlement outside of South Tyrol. The Prefect of Bozen, Giuseppe Mastromattei, likely started a rumor—intended to prepare South Tyroleans for the prospect of resettlement—wherein Italy would not allow any German-speakers to remain in South Tyrol but rather forcibly resettle them in southern Italy.⁶⁷ This rumor proved to be highly influential in the eventual outcome of the Option referendum,⁶⁸ to the extent that Italian authorities feared the economic implications of a heavily depopulated South Tyrol. In reality, Mastromattei and the Nazi German Consul General Milan, Otto Bene, signed a new agreement in November 1939 that affirmed that those who opted for Italy would not be deported outside of Italy and enjoy the full rights of Italian citizenship. While this agreement did not preclude resettlement to southern Italy, Mussolini assured a South Tyrolean delegation in May 1940 that those who opted for Italy would be allowed to remain in South Tyrol (Steininger, 2003).

⁶⁷ This rumor was echoed by General Consul Otto Bene, who informed German expatriates in Meran in late July 1939 that Italy might deport all South Tyroleans to the South who did not opt for German resettlement (Steininger, 2003).

⁶⁸ Per Steininger (2003).

Ultimately, 77% to 81% of eligible South Tyroleans opted for Germany, losing Italian citizenship upon signing their vote, while only 19% to 23% opted for Italy (Alcock, 1970, p. 57).⁶⁹

In order to carry out the resettlement program, a German immigration bureaucracy (*Amtliche deutsche Ein- und Rückwandererstelle*) (ADERST) and a working group for those opting for Germany (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Optanten*) were set up in Bozen to organize and carry out emigration to Germany. ADERST came to represent a quasi-parallel German administration. Their presence allowed some of the severe language restrictions on the use of German to be partially lifted, particularly for those who opted for Germany. The most important of these lifted restrictions was the resumption of German-language schooling in 1940, albeit with course content centered on Nazi ideology.

The reason why the case of South Tyrol was not excluded from the case pool on account of a possibly forced resettlement program is due to the fact that the execution of the resettlement plans did not materialize as anticipated. Only around 70,000 (Grote, 2012; Toscano, 1975) to 75,000 (Steininger, 2003) of those who opted for Germany left Italy by the end of the war, effectively without the use of force by Italian authorities. Much of the delay was caused by the aforementioned indecision on the destination, difficulties securing lodging, and appraising the assets of emigrating South Tyroleans. Of the 70,000-75,000 who left, around 20,000⁷⁰ (Steininger, 2003) returned to South Tyrol after the war. The Option became a failed resettlement program that ultimately did not rise to the scale or level of brutality of a forced deportation program.

In July 1943, Mussolini lost a vote of no confidence from the Grand Council of Fascism and was placed under arrest. On September 8, 1943, the Allied powers and Italy signed an armistice. Two days later, Hitler ordered the creation of two zones of operation in Italy, one of which (the

⁶⁹ The figures reported on the results of the Option require interpretation. Other sources provide point estimates on the percentage of those who opted for Germany at between 69.3% (Steininger, 2003; Toscano, 1975) and 86% (Grote, 2012). However, Alcock (1970, pp. 55-59) discusses how such point estimates drawing from official reports are misleading or inaccurate.

⁷⁰ Grote (2012, p. 69) estimates this figure to be between 20-25,000.

Alpenvorland) included and led to the occupation of most of South Tyrol. *Gauleiter* Franz Hofer, the supreme German commissioner for the *Alpenvorland*, immediately began implementing policies aimed at merging South Tyrol and the former Austrian North Tyrol into a single administrative unit (Toscano, 1975). Hofer failed in this goal largely due to Hitler's commitment to Mussolini and his newly established Republic of Salò.

Nonetheless, Hofer began reversing most of the severe language restrictions in South Tyrol almost immediately after taking control. German and Italian were granted equal status as the official languages of administration. German was once again permitted to be spoken everywhere in public, German text and names were allowed to be posted on public signage alongside Italian, the children of 'stayers' were permitted to attend German schools, and the *Podestà* were replaced with local mayors (Toscano, 1975; Steininger, 2003).

Despite designating Italian as a co-official language, language restrictions and exclusionary policies were imposed on Italians living in German-occupied South Tyrol. All Italian-language daily newspapers were effectively banned, all radio broadcasts were permitted to be in German only, and the Fascist party was outlawed (Steininger, 2003). German occupation of South Tyrol definitively ended by May 1945 with Germany's defeat in World War II. Immediately after the Allied victory in Europe, the Austrians and Italians pleaded their respective cases for control over South Tyrol to the Allied powers. After much deliberation, control over South Tyrol was, in short, conclusively given back to Italy by the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers in May 1946. This decision was bitterly received in Vienna, who proceeded to set their sights on a less ambitious target: autonomy for South Tyrol.

Fearing Austria's possible reorientation toward the Soviet Union and the poisoned relationship Italy and Austria would have if Italy continued its Italianization program, the British began advancing autonomy as a possible solution to the South Tyrol problem. On September 5, 1946, Italian Prime

Minister Alcide De Gasperi and Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber met in Paris to sign the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement. The agreement entailed several important changes to the governance of South Tyrol. The full text of the relevant clauses in the agreement is as follows (Alcock, 2000, pp. 9-10):

- 1) German speaking inhabitants of the Bolzano [Bozen] Province and of the neighbouring bilingual townships of the Trento Province will be assured a complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants...
In accordance with legislation enacted or awaiting enactment the said German-speaking citizens will be granted in particular:
 - a) elementary and secondary teaching in the mother-tongue;
 - b) purification [purification] of the German and Italian languages in public offices and official documents, as well as bilingual topographical naming;
 - c) the right to re-establish German family names which were italianised in recent years;
 - d) equality of rights as regards the entering upon public offices with a view to reaching a more appropriate proportion of employment between the two ethnical groups.
- 2) The populations of the above-mentioned zones will be granted the exercise of autonomous and executive regional power. The frame within which the said provisions of autonomy will apply, will be drafted in consultation also with local representative German-speaking elements.
- 3) The Italian Government, with the aim of establishing good neighbourhood relationships between Austria and Italy, pledges itself, in consultation with the Austrian government, and within one year from the signing of the present Treaty:
 - a) to revise in a spirit of equity and broadmindedness the question of the options for citizenship resulting from the 1939 Hitler-Mussolini agreement;
 - b) to find an agreement for the mutual recognition of the validity of certain degrees and university diplomas.

The Gruber-De Gasperi agreement was implemented in South Tyrol by Constitutional Law No. 5 of February 1948, in what is known as the first autonomy statute. While various sources differ on the extent to which the 1948 autonomy statute failed South Tyroleans, all are in agreement that the accord failed in that it neither gave South Tyroleans adequate control over their own cultural affairs nor substantively reduced their exclusion (Alcock, 1970; Toscano, 1975; Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012; Rautz, 2014).

The first autonomy statute called for several relevant changes. The first and most impactful change was the merger of the Trentino and Alto Adige/South Tyrol provinces into a single “special” autonomous region named Trentino-Alto Adige. The new province also came with its own elected

legislative assembly and governing council, with limited authority to make decisions in the areas of culture, education, local transportation, and public works. Further measures intended to preserve German culture were also included. The 1948 autonomy statute also included provisions for recognizing Italian and German as official languages in Trentino-Alto Adige. Public offices were required to use both languages in documentation and communications, with similar bilingual requirements extending to courts and schools. The statute also featured measures aimed at promoting economic development in the region in an attempt to address concerns of economic neglect toward South Tyroleans. Finally, the statute also included a proportionality principle intended to ensure that public employment and resources were proportionally distributed among Italian, German, and Ladin speakers.

In practice, however, the 1948 statute more closely resembled a form of pseudo-autonomy that would soon see the diminished concessions included in it reversed. First, a significant gap existed between the degree of power promised to the regional legislative assembly and governing council and the degree of power they wielded in reality. Furthermore, merging the Italian-dominated and more populous Trentino with the German-dominated but less populous South Tyrol resulted in the significant dilution of potential South Tyrolean political power. While this new level of political power represented an improvement on the total political exclusion South Tyroleans experienced under the Fascist regime, they remained relatively excluded since further ambitions for South Tyrolean autonomy were consistently curtailed by Italian voters and leaders in Trentino working with directives set by Rome.

For example, in the fall semester of 1948, Italian schools were to open in Bozen with instruction in German for several subjects. The *Dolomiten* newspaper protested this seemingly innocuous development due to the continued power former Fascists wielded in the government and the perception among South Tyroleans that the government would soon attempt to reinstate the

Italianization program. Indeed, in April 1954, Rome rejected a constitutionally compliant kindergarten schooling law passed by the South Tyrolean provincial legislature based on non-compliance with past Fascist policy (Steininger, 2003). Regarding the status of Italian and German in Trentino-Alto Adige, the Italian government initially continued to favor Italian in all three areas, with severe language restrictions soon to follow. The promised economic development to offset the neglect and discrimination of the German-speaking population also transformed into further economic development projects expressly in favor of Italian-speakers. The proportionality principle was never truly implemented.

The 1950s witnessed the passage of a number of laws that strengthened the legal status of Italian at the expense of German to an extent comparable to the language restrictions of the Fascist era. In March 1952, Rome revoked preferential hiring privileges in effect since 1948 for low-level public service positions for South Tyrolean World War II veterans in favor of Italian-speaking immigrants (Grote, 2012). In July 1952, Italian again became the sole permissible language for internal correspondence in government offices and school administrations (Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012). In 1953, the government reintroduced a Fascist-era military law that banned private houses from being within a certain distance from military installations and the Brenner border (Grote, 2012). This act served as a pretext for confiscating South Tyrolean property for state purposes. The ERA further had its confiscation authority—suspended since 1948—reinstated in March 1955 (Grote, 2012). In February 1955, Italian citizens (i.e., South Tyroleans) were again prohibited from using foreign names when engaging with the Italian state at any level (Grote, 2012). After 1955, certain aspects of the 1948 autonomy statute were implemented. In 1960, a private Teacher Training College was established in South Tyrol—the first of its kind since the closure of the German Teachers College in Bozen in 1924 (Alcock, 2000). Article 3(b) of the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement concerning the recognition of diplomas acquired abroad was largely resolved in 1955 (Alcock, 2000).

In February 1958, representatives from the South Tyrolean People's Party (SVP) proposed legislation in the Italian parliament, which maintained that the 1948 autonomy statute had “not put autonomy into operation” in actual practice (Steininger, 2003, p. 116). In April 1955 and October 1957, Rome respectively earmarked 2 and 2.5 billion lire for public housing construction reserved for Italian immigrants. It was the Italian policy of Italian immigration, paired with the state's preferential employment and housing programs in favor of Italian-speakers, that resulted in much discontent and emigration of German-speaking South Tyroleans. Sepp Mitterhofer, one of the prominent militants involved in the later bombings in South Tyrol, cited the economic exclusion and ethnic supplantation of German-speakers for his shift from normal politics to violent resistance (Grote, 2012). The October 1957 residential construction program triggered a large protest at Sigmundskron Castle that focused its grievances on the housing program and the lack of representation of German-speaking bureaucrats in public sector positions in South Tyrol.⁷¹

In the context of the renewed push for Italianization and majorification in the 1950s, South Tyrolean militants,⁷² mostly associated with the South Tyrolean Liberation Committee (BAS), carried out a series of bombings between 1956 and 1969. The BAS itself was fundamentally motivated by the goal of self-determination for South Tyrol. The largest bombing event, known today as the *Feuernacht* (Night of Fire), began at the Sacred Heart of Jesus Festival in June 1961. Throughout South Tyrol, the BAS attacked 92 high-tension pylons and destroyed 37, cutting off power to industrial plants in Northern Italy, including the Bozen Industrial Zone (Alcock, 2000; Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012). At the same time, the BAS distributed flyers calling for self-determination for South Tyrol. The Night of

⁷¹ At the time of the Sigmundskron rally, only 7.1% of German-speaking South Tyroleans held public service positions compared to 52% of Italian speakers (Steininger, 2003, p. 116).

⁷² The term used for those who carried out the bombings depends on the point of view of the observer. Steininger (2003) makes a point to label the perpetrators of the bombings between 1956 and 1961 as non-terrorists, and the perpetrators of the 1962-1969 bombings as terrorists. Grote (2012) offers a slightly more nuanced presentation of the bombings of the second phase, highlighting strategic divisions within the BAS movement responsible for organizing the attacks. This dissertation uses the term “militant(s)” to refer to both groups.

Fire immediately triggered a military response from Rome. Twenty-five thousand soldiers and police were deployed in South Tyrol, and searches of private homes were carried out daily in search of the perpetrators of the *Feuernacht* bombings (Grote, 2012). During these searches, there were reports of harsh interrogation methods and torture by the Italian police. Out of ten accused, two Italian *carabinieri* were later found guilty of mistreating prisoners and the deaths of two South Tyroleans in their custody (Steininger, 2003; Grote, 2012).

It is worth also briefly discussing the trial of the accused perpetrators of the *Feuernacht* bombings. Between December 1963 and June 1964, 94 South Tyrolean defendants were put on trial. Four were sentenced to 20+ years in prison, eight were given 10 to 20-year sentences, 35 were given 4 to 10-year sentences, and 27 were found not guilty or were granted amnesty (Steininger, 2003, p. 127). An additional 46 South Tyroleans were released from prison, with 22 remaining in custody. Notably, the judge rejected the state attorney's charge of offense against the unity of the state and offense against the constitution, which carried a maximum life sentence. Many of the convicted were also later granted early release. Both the SVP and Vienna applauded these relatively light sentences as a token of goodwill. Two additional major BAS attacks occurred after the *Feuernacht* bombings. In September 1966, the BAS bombed a station of the Italian financial police in Malga Sasso near the Brenner Pass, killing three guards and injuring four more (Alcock, 1970; UmbriaSud, 2016). In June 1967, BAS militants killed four Italian *carabinieri* using an improvised explosive device in an ambush in Cima Vallona near the Austrian border (Alcock, 1970; The Post Internazionale, 2018).

Upon signing the State Treaty in 1955, Austria became an independent state capable of managing its own foreign affairs and acting as a more powerful backer for South Tyrolean interests. Vienna's efforts to persuade Rome to scale back its restrictions first came to a head in 1960, when Austria was able to internationalize the South Tyrol issue by placing it on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. As the political atmosphere in South Tyrol intensified, Italy appointed eleven

Italians and eight South Tyroleans to an independent commission in 1961, tasked with examining the South Tyrol issue and presenting possible solutions to the government. In April 1964, the commission presented its report to Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. The contents of the report came to be known as the “package,” and included 137 measures to serve as the foundation for the first *substantive* autonomy statute for South Tyrol.

Negotiations with the Italian government over the content and implementation of the measures included in the package continued until the SVP officially approved it in November 1969. Attacks after the SVP’s approval of the package were less radical in their methods and scope, and typically targeted symbols of Fascism. Notable targets during this period included the ossuary in Burgeis (March 1978), the Victory Monument in Bozen (September 1978), and Tolomei’s grave (March 1979) (Grote, 2012). These attacks also led to retaliation by Italian militants targeting symbols of German identity, including the apartment of SVP Chairman Silvius Magnago (July 1978), the Andreas Hofer memorial in Meran (October 1979), and cable cars in South Tyrol (December 1979) (Grote, 2012).

The implications of the measures for real autonomy, unlike the first autonomy statute of 1948, were extensive and effectively entailed the end of the South Tyrol question. The package was approved through Constitutional Law No. 1 of November 1971 and took effect in January 1972.⁷³ The first and most important change was in provincial and regional power. The Trentino-Alto Adige region continued to exist as a weakened administrative unit while both provinces were given legislative autonomy over their provincial territories. The province of South Tyrol itself was renamed as the Autonomous Province of Bolzano.⁷⁴

⁷³ For a deeper discussion of the contents and implementation of the 1972 autonomy package, see Woodcock (1992).

⁷⁴ This name conformed with the Italian standard of naming provinces over their capital cities. However, the Italian name “Bolzano” was used over the German “Bozen” preferred by South Tyroleans.

The operations calendar for the package specified that all 137 measures be implemented by January 1974. While most measures were in effect by the January 1974 deadline, the package was not fully implemented until January 1992. Of the measures that were implemented by the 1974 deadline, the most important involved transferring various areas of authority from the region (Trentino-Alto Adige) to the two Autonomous Provinces of Bolzano and Trento. Each province was given far-reaching authority in various areas, including but not limited to sewage systems and public works, water supply, hunting and fishing, parks, communication and transportation systems, social and public services and hiring, the tourism and hospitality industries, agriculture and forestry, construction of schools, public welfare, hydraulic engineering, libraries, museums, and preservation of nature. South Tyrol was further given control over subsidized residential construction, definitively halting Italian majorification in South Tyrol.

South Tyrol was also given near-total control over its education and language policy. Kindergarten, primary, and secondary instruction was required to be provided in the native language of the student and teacher. However, an additional condition aimed at making the entirety of the province bilingual was attached: instruction in the secondary language (German for native Italian speakers, Italian for native German speakers) was made mandatory in South Tyrol in primary and secondary schooling. Another bilingualism exception was made in the administrative sphere: German and Italian admission into the civil service required a certificate of bilingualism (*Patentino*), indicating a working knowledge of both Italian and German.⁷⁵

At a special SVP convention in May 1992, 83% of the delegates voted in favor of a resolution declaring an end to the dispute between South Tyrol and the Italian government. In June 1992, the Italian and Austrian ambassadors to the United Nations gave Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-

⁷⁵ Per the *Proporz* Decree of November 1976. Did not apply to hiring in the railroad sector until November 1990.

Ghali the “Notification of the Termination of Conflict,” signifying the formal end of the dispute between Austria and Italy over the South Tyrol problem and ending Austria’s claim on the territory. With self-rule in the political, economic, and cultural arenas secured, South Tyroleans were relieved of the language restrictions and political and economic exclusion policies they suffered under Italian rule since 1919.

Table 4 below details the major policies that effectively excluded the South Tyrolean minority from political and economic participation in roughly chronological order.⁷⁶ Table 5 below similarly details the timeline of various language restrictions imposed on German according to category and indicator. Finally, a list of the various relevant popular backlash events is included in Table 6.⁷⁷ An asterisk (*) on any date indicates that the associated month or year is inferred due to a relative lack of specificity or coverage in the source material. Due to South Tyrol’s acquisition of near-total self-government as part of the 1972 autonomy statute, the present analysis ends in 1972.

⁷⁶ The following policies are excluded from Table 4 due their consistency with Fascist policy as applied throughout Italy at the time: the concentration of savings banks, the invalidation of the Austrian Civil Law Code, and the dissolution of *Deutscher Verband*, the unofficial predecessor party to the SVP.

⁷⁷ Press restrictions are not included as restrictions due to their application throughout Italy in accordance with Fascist policy toward the media.

Table 4: South Tyrolean Exclusion in Italy

Exclusionary Policy	Time Period	Notes
Italianization of the Bozen Museum	1923 - 1943*	Known today as the Bolzano/Bozen Municipal Museum. Progress was slow, and likely reversed to a considerable extent after 1943.
Dissolution and transfer of assets of the South Tyrolean Alpine Association	Sep. 1923	Constitutes economic exclusion via expropriation without compensation.
Declaration of South Tyrol as a fortified border region	May 1924 - Sep. 1926	Required that all new construction and architecture be approved by the military. Gave the military the power to order the demolition of any structure and annul any sales contract or lease in South Tyrol (Steininger, 2003). Continued by the declaration of South Tyrol as a militarized region (see entry below).
Revocation of right to appoint community secretary	May 1925 - Jan. 1972	Reinstated per the 1972 autonomy statute.
Banning of the German Association and other German associations	1926 - 1940	
Transfer of mayoral posts to the <i>Podestà</i>	1926 - Sep. 1943	Implemented throughout Italy but particularly malicious in South Tyrol. Ended with the armistice between the Allied powers and Italy.
Declaration of South Tyrol as a militarized region	Sep. 1926 - Sep. 1943* 1953 - Jan. 1972*	Unsure exactly what this entailed that wasn't included in the May 1924 declaration. Unclear when the first phase of this policy ended, but it must have occurred at or before the armistice between Italy and the Allied powers in September 1943. Parts of this declaration were reinstated in 1953. It is also unclear when the second phase ended. Ended per the 1972 autonomy statute.
Fascist takeover and closure of the South Tyrol <i>Raiffeisenkasse</i>	Oct. 1926 - 1927	The later bank concentration policy is not included as a policy of minority exclusion due to its application throughout Italy in accordance with Fascist policy at the time.
Demolition of the Austrian <i>Kaiserjäger</i> WWI monument and construction of the Bozen Victory Monument	Jul. 1926 - Present	Construction of the Bozen Victory Monument was completed in July 1928. Inscription glorifying Mussolini removed in 1945. Target of South Tyrolean separatist attacks in 1970s, leading to its closure to the public. Reopened in 2014 as a historical exhibit.
Operations of the <i>Ente di Rinascita Agraria per le Tre Venezie</i> (ERA)	1931 - 1948 Mar. 1955 - Apr. 1972	Founded in 1921, effectively began operations in 1931. Ended in 1948, reactivation of expropriation authority in March 1955. The <i>Brennerbad</i> real estate complex was confiscated that same month. Dissolved per the 1972 autonomy statute.
Destruction of the Laurin Fountain in Bozen	1933	Perpetrated by unknown persons but rhetorically supported by Tolomei and other Fascists at the time. Reconstructed in the 1980s to Ladin disapproval (Heinzle, 1999; Steininger, 2003).
Preferential tax treatment and subsidized housing for Italian workers immigrating to South Tyrol	May 1935 - Jan. 1972*	Housing subsidies for Italian workers began starting in 1937. Definitively ended with the implementation of the 1972 autonomy statute.
Relocation of the Walther von der Vogelweide monument	Aug. 1935 - 1981	Returned to its original location in Walther Square in 1981.
Importation/immigration of Italian workers for the Bozen Industrial Zone	1937 - Jan. 1972*	The number of Italians working in the Bozen Industrial Zone rose from 0 in 1936 to around 19,000 by 1947. 50,000 fruit trees owned

		by South Tyrolean farmers bulldozed for IZ construction. Continued until the 1972 autonomy statute.
Dismissal of all German-speakers in the civil service	Jul. 1939 - 1948	Major policy, and one of the rare instances of an employment restriction being categorized as a minority exclusion policy per the LRSI coding guidelines discussed in Chapter 4.
The South Tyrol Option Agreement - Citizenship stripped for those who opted for Germany	Dec. 1939 - 1952	Major policy. All South Tyroleans who opted for German in 1939 had their Italian citizenship formally reinstated in 1952.
Merger of Trentino and Alto Adige into autonomous region	1948 - Jan. 1972	Part of the first autonomy statute. Effectively a policy of political exclusion due to the resulting dilution of German voting power in the regional legislative bodies. Trentino-Alto Adige continues to the present day, albeit in a highly weakened state after Jan. 1972.
Revocation of preferential hiring in low-level public service jobs for South Tyrolean WWII veterans	Mar. 1952 - Jan. 1972*	In favor of Italian-speaking immigrants. Ended per the 1972 autonomy statute.
Required military approval for transfers of real property in 37 South Tyrolean communities.	1953 - Jan. 1972*	Fascist-era exclusionary policy, suspended since 1947. Ended per the 1972 autonomy statute.

Table 5: South Tyrolean (German) Language Restrictions in Italy

Language Restriction	Subcategory	Time Period	Notes
Formal entry barriers for non-Italian speakers seeking employment in the public sector	Administration (Employment) (Documentation)	1922 - 1946	Beginning in late 1922 and strictly enforced. Includes local and provincial administration, municipal councils, post offices, and schools. Italian proficiency requirements were also applied to existing public sector workers. Indirectly and negatively affected the availability of German-language official documentation in South Tyrol.
Exclusive use of Italian in communications with the prefecture	Administration (ExComm)	Nov. 1922 - Oct. 1923	Overridden by the October 1923 requirements on the use of Italian in communications with the state.
Exclusive use of Italian in all local, provincial, and federal government communications (internal and external, including in official documentation)	Administration (ExComm) (Employment) (Documentation)	Oct. 1923 - Sep. 1943	The term ‘exclusive’ isn’t specifically used in the source text (Steininger, 2003, p. 23), but is strongly implied. Inferred end date set at the armistice between the Allied powers and Italy in September 1943.
Exclusive use of Italian in civil and criminal proceedings and all court communications	Administration (Judiciary)	Sep. 1925 - Sep. 1943	Including discussions among attorneys, who could face a fine of 5,000 lire for speaking German (Steininger, 2003, p. 24). South Tyroleans who could not speak Italian were excluded from jury lists (Alcock, 2000, p. 165).
Poor availability of German-language translators in court proceedings	Administration (Judiciary)	Sep. 1943 - 1984*	Steininger (2003, p. 138) notes that, until at least 1984, courts lacked much of the basic infrastructure to maintain a minimum level of bilingualism. No evidence that non-Italian languages were <i>banned</i> from court proceedings between September 1943 and 1984. However, individuals had to cover the cost of an interpreter during court proceedings.
No provisions for translators for interactions between Italian police and German-speakers	Administration (Judiciary)	Sep. 1943 - 1984*	Not directly stated, though this problem was noted by Steininger (2003) with a resolution achieved sometime in the early 1980s. The ethnic proportion aspect of the <i>Proporz</i> Decree of 1976 did not apply to the Ministry of Defence and Italy’s various police forces (Alcock, 2000).

Informal entry barriers for non-Italian speakers seeking employment in the public sector	Administration (Employment)	1947 - 1974	Even after 1946, the Italian state continued to give Italians preference in hiring. At the time of the Sigmundskron rally, only 7.1% of German-speaking South Tyroleans held public service positions compared to 52% of Italian speakers (Steininger, 2003, p. 116). Remedial policy to address the severe and long-lasting distortions in the labor market in the form of hard quotas for Italian speakers arrived in 1974 (Belmonte & Di Lillo, 2021).
Required use of Italian in internal correspondence in government offices and school administration.	Administration (Employment)	Jul. 1952 - Jan. 1972*	Inferred end date set at the approval of the 1972 autonomy statute. Unclear as to whether this affected the availability of German-language official documentation.
[1] Forced adoption of Italianized names when engaging with the Italian state, including at the local level	Administration (ExComm)	Feb. 1955 - Jan. 1972*	Grote (2012) records the imposition of this restriction beginning in Feb. 1955. Alcock (2000) notes that in the 1970s, officially changing person names back to German was made cost-free and expedited. Implied end date set at the approval of the 1972 autonomy statute. Not explicitly included in the 1972 autonomy statute but must have ended by 1974. Counts as a joint administration-external communications and public-naming restriction. Relatively minor impact as an administration-external communications restriction.
Changing of German place names	Public (Naming)	Apr. 1923 - Sep. 1943 Sep. 1943 - Present	Many of Tolomei's Italianized place names were maintained even after the 1972 autonomy statute. Thus, a second, comparatively minor phase is included.
Banning of "Tyrol" and its derivatives	Public (Naming)	Aug. 1923 - Sep. 1943	Included as a separate entry to emphasize the significance of this restriction.
Exclusive use of Italian in street signs and other public signage and notices, including private businesses	Public (Signage)	Oct. 1923 - Sep. 1943*	Per the <i>Lex Gentile</i> . Inferred end date set at the armistice between the Allied powers and Italy in September 1943.
Banning of future gravestone inscriptions in German	Public (Signage)	Nov. 1927 - Sep. 1943*	Inferred end date set at the armistice between the Allied powers and Italy in September 1943.
Forced de-Germanization (Italianization) of given names (new and existing)	Public (Naming)	1928 - 1946*	Alcock (2000) mentions that South Tyroleans were allowed to give their children German language names shortly after the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement was reached. Thus, the inferred end date is set at 1946.
Prohibition of use of German in public (tobacco shops and newspaper stands)	Public (Public Speech)	Jul. 1939 - 1940	Unclear what the end date is, but I assume that this restriction was lifted in 1940 under the quasi-governance of ADERST. Otherwise, this restriction must have been lifted by September 1943.
[2] Forced adoption of Italianized names when engaging with the Italian state, including at the local level	Public (Naming)	Feb. 1955 - Jan. 1972*	See previous entry above. This restriction alone would be insufficient for an LRSI score of -1 during this period. Combined with the maintenance of Tolomei's Italianized place names until the 1972 autonomy statute, these two policies warrant a score of -1 for the naming indicator for the period extending from 1955 to 1972.
Requirements for 'Italian' parents to send their children to Italian-language primary and secondary schools	Education (Primary) (Secondary)	Apr. 1921 - Oct. 1923	Per the <i>Lex Corbino</i> . Constitutes a restriction because many monolingual German-speaking parents were forced to send their children to Italian schools based on semi-arbitrary rulings. Overridden by the <i>Lex Gentile</i> in Oct. 1923.

Exclusive use of Italian in primary and secondary education	Education (Primary) (Secondary)	Oct. 1923 - 1934 (Primary) Oct. 1923 - 1940 (Secondary)	Per the <i>Lex Gentile</i> . German-language primary and secondary instruction permitted 1940. In primary schools, German was allowed to be taught as a foreign language starting in 1934.
Rare availability of German-language primary education	Education (Primary)	1934 - 1940	German was allowed to be taught again in 1934 but only as a foreign language in primary schools. Normal German-language primary and secondary instruction was permitted 1940.
Mass dismissal of German teachers	Education (Primary) (Secondary)	Oct. 1923 - 1940	Per the <i>Lex Gentile</i> . German-language instruction permitted in 1940.
Closure of German Teachers College in Bozen	Education (Primary) (Secondary)	1924 - 1960	Per the <i>Lex Gentile</i> . A private Teacher Training College was opened in South Tyrol in 1960 (Grote, 2012).
Monolingual Italian language mandate for kindergartens	Education (Primary)	May 1924 - 1940	Per the <i>Lex Gentile</i> .
Invalidation of German and Austrian university degrees without one year of study at an Italian university	Education (Higher)	1924 - 1955	Per the <i>Lex Gentile</i> . Largely resolved by 1955. Since there were no German-language higher education institutions in South Tyrol throughout the case period, many South Tyroleans sought higher education in neighboring Germany and Austria. Consequently, the invalidation of university degrees from Germany and Austria serves as a particularly severe language restriction.
State surveillance and testing for private German teachers	Education (Primary) (Secondary)	Jan. 1925 - 1940	Private German teachers were required to take an Italian language exam, most of whom failed. Private German teachers had to report their activities to the Italian village teacher (Steininger, 2003). May have ended in either 1940 or 1943.
Abolition of German-language religious instruction	Education (Primary)	1926 - 1940	Minor concessions were made in 1929, and religious instruction in German was conducted in private from 1928 onwards. Likely only affected primary education.
Bilingual Italian-German primary and secondary education in South Tyrol (German-speakers only)	Education (Primary) (Secondary)	1945 - 1973	In the 1945 law on education. Affirmed in the 1948 autonomy statute. Obligatory for German schools to teach Italian, not obligatory for Italian schools to teach German. Bilingualism for both language groups was implemented in earnest in 1973 per Article 19 of the 1972 autonomy statute.
Bilingual reading material requirements for public libraries, kiosks, and cafes in South Tyrol	Media (Publications)	Sep. 1927 - Sep. 1943*	Minor restriction due to the low Italian speaker population in Bozen/South Tyrol at the time of the policy's imposition.
Prohibition of German (and Austrian) radio broadcasts	Media (Broadcasting)	1928 - 1936*	It is likely that German radio broadcasts were not advocating self-determination, unlike smuggled Austrian broadcasts—the suppression of which would have been consistent with overall Fascist policy at the time. Unclear exactly when this restriction ended. Banned German-language radio broadcasts were replaced by Radio Bolzano. Since Italians were not subjected to bans on international radio broadcasts, this constitutes a restriction, albeit relatively minor. Since Nazi newspapers were allowed into circulation in South Tyrol in 1936, I assume that German radio broadcasts were also allowed at the same time (Alcock, 2000).

Poor availability of German-language radio broadcasts	Media (Broadcasting)	May 1946* - Oct. 1960	The exact extent of this restriction is unclear, but seemingly relatively minor. Solderer (n.d.) and Alcock (2000) record an increase in German-language broadcasts on the Bozen station of <i>Radio Televisione Italiana</i> to 8h 35m (M-F) and to 10h 55m on Sundays in October 1960. While previous broadcast time permissions are not stated, this implies that the availability of German-language radio broadcasts was insufficient prior to October 1960. Inferred start date set at the resumption of Italian sovereignty in South Tyrol in May 1946. In coding the LRSI scores for this case, the lack of specificity in this restriction does not allow for a score below 0 or <i>No Evidence</i> .
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Table 6: South Tyrolean Backlash Events⁷⁸

Backlash Event	Time Period	Notes
Operations of the “catacomb schools”	Jul. 1925 - 1940	Resistance in the form of illegal, underground German-language schooling with smuggled educational materials.
Formation of the South Tyrolean People’s Party (SVP)	May 1945 - Present	Informally preceded by <i>Deutscher Verband</i> . Advocated for and acquired self-determination for South Tyrol. Founded in May 1945 per Alcock (1970, p. 81).
Formation of the South Tyrolean Liberation Committee (BAS)	1956 - Dec. 1967*	Advocated for self-determination through violent resistance. Steininger (2003, p. 123) states that the BAS was founded in 1956 with the September bombings (see below). Alcock (1970, p. 318) states that the BAS was founded in 1957 as a splinter group of the SVP. While both are close, I take Steininger’s (2003) estimate due to his attribution of the responsibility of the September 1956 bombings to the BAS. End date set at the last known BAS attack (Cima Vallona ambush, July 1967).
September 1956 bombings	Sep. 1956	Minor bombing events. Targeted the Fort Otto Huber army base and a railroad overpass near Siebeneich. Perpetrated by BAS militants.
Bozen/Brixen railway bombings	Jan. 1957	Perpetrated by BAS militants.
Sigmundskron rally	Nov. 1957	35,000 involved. Mostly focused on the housing program and social welfare issues and disparities, but also motivated by language restrictions in public sector hiring.
First bombing of the <i>Alpini</i> monument	Feb. 1959	Perpetrated by BAS militants.
Bombings of the ‘Aluminium Duce’ monument and Tolomei’s former home	Jan. 1961	Perpetrated by BAS militants.
Bombing of eight apartment blocks	Mar. 1961	Perpetrated by BAS militants.
April 1961 bombings	Apr. 1961	Major bombing event. Targets included the Italian Bar Ferari in Tramin, an Italian settlement in Sarntal, the station of the financial police in Schlanders, the Montecatini plant in Marling. Perpetrated by BAS militants.
<i>Feuernacht</i> bombings	Jun. 1961	Major bombing event. Perpetrated by BAS militants.

⁷⁸ This is a shortened list. For a full list of bombings and attacks in South Tyrol, see Belmonte (2019).

July 1961 bombings	Jul. 1961	July 10-13, per Alcock (2000, p. 379). Perpetrated by BAS militants.
Malga Sasso bombing	Sep. 1966	Major bombing event; 3 dead, 4 injured. Perpetrated by BAS militants.
Demolition of the <i>Alpini</i> monument	Dec. 1966	Major bombing event. Perpetrated by BAS militants.
Cima Vallona ambush	Jun. 1967	Major bombing event; 4 dead. Perpetrated by BAS militants.
Post-1969 bombings	Mar. 1978 - Dec. 1979	Minor bombing events, per Grote (2012). More small-scale attacks took place until 1988, as recorded by Belmonte (2019). Unlikely that these were perpetrated by BAS militants.
Passage and implementation of the Second Autonomy Statute	Jan. 1972 /Jan. 1992 - Present	Decisive backlash event. South Tyroleans granted near-total control over provincial government. Exceptions in bilingual administration and education are mandated or maintained.

5.4 Discussion

5.4.1 Minority Exclusion

The South Tyrolean experience of economic discrimination between 1926 and 1943 was extreme. Like the southern regions of Italy, South Tyrol was a relatively poor province at the time of annexation. The Italian state often expropriated the properties and farms of South Tyroleans to make room for Italian military installations, factories, or immigrant Italian farmers. The operations of the ERA from 1931 to 1948, paired with the nullification of the Farm Rule in 1928 and the Fascist takeover and closure of the South Tyrol *Raiffeisenkasse* in 1926, allowed the Italian state to place deliberate pressure on South Tyrolean farmers to sell their farms to the state, which were later distributed to immigrant Italian workers.

The Italian state's strategic shift toward majorification from 1935 onwards sought to Italianize South Tyrol through the immigration of Italians from the poorer southern regions of Italy. Positions as workers in newly constructed factories, farms, and the public sector were reserved exclusively for Italian-speakers in an attempt to transfer the relative economic power and resources of the German-speaking minority to Italian-speaking immigrants. Moreover, legislation mandating preferential hiring

for low-level public service jobs for returning South Tyrolean World War II veterans was revoked in 1952 as the Italian state returned to Italianization and majorification.

The immigration policy set by Rome and the preferential economic treatment of Italian-speakers in South Tyrol continued largely uninterrupted from 1937 to 1972. The fact that hard quotas on the proportion of Italians working in the public sector would have to be introduced in 1974 to address long-lasting labor market distortions indicates the extent to which South Tyroleans were deliberately excluded from economic participation. The ban on using non-Italian languages in communications within and between government bureaucracies, as well as in citizen communications with government bureaucracies, could be framed as a policy intended to incentivize a more rapid adoption of Italian. However, the practical consequences of these restrictions, when paired with the strategy of Italian majorification from 1937 onwards, were to severely exclude South Tyroleans from public sector employment and access to most state services. Indeed, outside of the Option, the relative unemployment experienced by South Tyroleans in their own region was the most impactful driver of South Tyrolean emigration prior to 1972.

However, it is further clear that while the Italian government may have imposed exclusionary economic policies toward the German-speaking population, the immigrant Italian-speaking population arriving from the poorer southern regions of Italy was ultimately unable to achieve a comparable and sustained level of group prosperity. Indeed, one of the primary drivers of Italian backlash against the removal of Fascist-era preferential hiring policies that benefited the Italian-speaking population in South Tyrol was the fact that the German-speaking population continued to dominate the province's core industries of tourism and agriculture (Steininger, 2003; Belmonte & Di Lillo, 2021).

Due to the German-speaking population making up less than 1% of the total population of Italy at any point during the case period, the absence of any German-speaking South Tyroleans in the

executive branch is not necessarily indicative of political discrimination. Due to the highly unique structure of the lower house of the Italian Parliament during Fascist rule (1928-1939, 1939-1943),⁷⁹ the total absence of South Tyrolean representation in that institution does not constitute a clear sign of targeted political exclusion. In the postwar period, South Tyroleans in the Italian Parliament were represented approximately in proportion to their group population size. Simultaneously, other forms of political discrimination toward South Tyroleans remained only slightly dampened from 1946 until the implementation of the 1972 autonomy statute. However, the transfer of mayoral posts to the *Podestà*, the relatively more widespread dissolution of German associations in South Tyrol, the destruction or removal of many symbols of German identity, and the absence of any symbolic or substantive remedial policies serve as clear indicators of the policy of targeted and severe political exclusion toward the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol.

During the Fascist period, the transfer of mayoral posts to the *Podestà*, the relatively more widespread dissolution of German associations and institutions in South Tyrol, the destruction or removal of many symbols of German identity, and the absence of any symbolic or substantive remedial policies serve as clear indicators and examples of the Italian state's policy of politically excluding South Tyroleans. However, the Option agreement represented the clearest signal to South Tyroleans that the Italian state viewed them as little more than an obstacle to national unity. Stripping Italian citizenship from those who opted for Germany was an immensely exclusionary policy. The significance of this act of exclusion was exacerbated by the Italian government's significant delay in reinstating citizenship, especially after it was evident by 1943 that the Option would not be realized.

While it is unclear whether South Tyroleans were explicitly barred from working in the internal security service (Organization for Vigilance and Repression of Anti-Fascism, OVRA) during the

⁷⁹ In 1939, the lower house transformed from the Chamber of Deputies into the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations.


Fascist period, one could easily assume as much considering the ongoing transfer of political and public sector positions in South Tyrol away from German-speakers in favor of Italian Fascists. After 1943, the merger of the provinces of Trentino and South Tyrol into the autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige as part of the 1948 autonomy statute effectively disenfranchised South Tyroleans, who were repeatedly rebuffed by the more populated and Italian-dominated province of Trentino. Taking into account the prevalence of exclusionary policies and the specificity, context, and relative importance of the evidence cited here, the case of the South Tyrolean minority in Italy receives a minority exclusion score of 4 (high), indicating “exclusion/repression policy.”⁸⁰

5.4.2 *Language Restriction Severity*

The case of the South Tyrolean minority in Italy is categorized as having severe language restrictions per the Language Restriction Severity Index (LRSI) scoring regime discussed in Chapter 4. Figure 5 below details the evolution of the severity of language restrictions from 1921 to 1972, excluding the period from 1944 to 1946 due to significant enforcement ambiguities arising from the aftermath of World War II. Due to South Tyrol’s acquisition of near-total self-government as part of the second autonomy statute, the end date for coding the LRSI score for this case is set at 1972. The Appendix provides a more detailed breakdown of yearly indicator scores for each category.

⁸⁰ The political discrimination index definition for “exclusion/repression policy” is “Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group’s political participation by comparison with other groups (Note: This does not include repression during group rebellion. It does include patterned repression against group members when the group is not openly resisting state authority.).” The economic discrimination index definition for “exclusion/repression policy” is “Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.”

Figure 5: LRSI Timeline - South Tyroleans in Italy (1921 - 1972)



Based on these results, we can identify two distinct phases of Italian language policy toward the South Tyrolean minority. The first phase extends begins in 1921 and ends with Italy's defeat in World War II in 1943. Within this phase, increasingly severe language restrictions were rapidly implemented within the first several years of the case period. In 1927, the severity of language restrictions plateaued at an LRSI score of -6.33, reaching its peak of -7 in 1939. During this phase, the use of German in all parts of public administration and education was banned outright. Language restrictions under the public category were very severe, though South Tyroleans remained more or less free to speak their language in public spaces.⁸¹

In the postwar period, language restrictions were lifted to moderate levels, though some important restrictions remained. The judiciary remained thoroughly Italianized up to the implementation of the 1972 autonomy statute, while relatively moderate restrictions remained on the use of German in public sector hiring, primary and secondary education, and in naming people and

⁸¹ With the exception of a brief ban on the use of German at newspaper stands and tobacco shops in 1939.

places. Based on the determined scores for minority exclusion and language restriction severity, the case of the South Tyrolean minority in Italy is classified as an Exclusionary Assimilation regime.

5.4.3 *Popular Backlash*

The diminished “voice” of the South Tyrolean minority found alternative avenues of resistance through covert schooling, mass protests, acts of sabotage and terrorism, and an exceptionally successful self-determination movement. In the first 35 years after annexation, the only significant act of resistance came in the form of the catacomb schools operating from 1925 to 1940. The success of Nazi propaganda in increasing support for pan-German National Socialism in South Tyrol directly led to the Italian strategic shift toward majorification in the mid-1930s. Understood in the context of the coercion resentment and status injustice mechanisms, it is more likely than not that highly repressive Italianization policies were a significant driver of South Tyrolean support for Nazi Germany, leading to high levels of national de-identification with Italy. However, when considering the apparent popularity of pan-German irredentism in Austria immediately prior to the *Anschluß*, it is difficult to discern to what extent Austrian support for irredentism differed in the repressed German-speaker population in South Tyrol compared to the dominant German-speaker population in Austria.⁸² Likewise, the significant cultural egoism at the core of the national identity of Fascist Italy certainly influenced the severe nature of the Fascist regime’s language restrictions on German.⁸³ This too, however, cannot be disentangled from the fact that the external threat posed by bordering pan-German nationalism likely further incentivized the use of severe language restrictions (Darden & Mylonas, 2016).

⁸² On the Austrian side, Hitler’s decision to occupy Austria immediately before the referendum led to its effective cancellation, obscuring any definitive measure of Austrian support for irredentism. There was never any poll on support for irredentism in South Tyrol.

⁸³ Italian cultural egoism is most readily apparent in the Fascist Italian state’s enthusiastic adoption of Tolomei’s historical revisionist writings on South Tyrol.

Popular backlash in South Tyrol turned to sabotage with the September 1956 bombings. Belmonte (2019) records 337 attacks between 1956-1988, with the major bombings and attacks taking place in April 1961, June 1961, September 1966, December 1966, and June 1967. These attacks were perpetrated by the BAS, with the stated goal of South Tyrolean self-determination. As previously discussed, Sepp Mitterhofer—a prominent BAS militant—cited the economic exclusion and ethnic supplantation of German-speaking South Tyroleans for his shift from normal politics to violent resistance (Grote, 2012). Indeed, these events support Piazza's (2012) finding that the occurrence of terrorist attacks is most closely associated with higher levels of minority economic discrimination.⁸⁴ Similarly, the massive Sigmundskron Rally in November 1957 was triggered by news of a new residential construction program for Italian immigrants. The rally primarily focused on issues relating to the exclusion of South Tyroleans from public sector employment on a linguistic basis, exclusion from housing subsidies, broader welfare disparities, and Trentino's opposition to South Tyrolean legislative initiatives.

The BAS was established in 1956 because of the perceived weakness of the SVP in their negotiations with the Italian government. Economic policies facilitating Italian majorification, rather than language restrictions, were likely responsible for this split. However, two key facts must be observed in determining the extent to which language restrictions generated popular backlash. First, the nature of Italian majorification is unique compared to other indicators of minority exclusion. Majorification threatened minority erasure through supplantation in a more immediate and demonstrably effective manner relative to severe language restrictions or other exclusionary policies. Second, the relative level of minority exclusion experienced by South Tyroleans after the Fascist period remained high until the implementation of the 1972 autonomy statute, while the severity of language

⁸⁴ The frequent use of bombings as a tool of violent resistance was likely aided by the fact that many returning South Tyrolean World War II veterans gained knowledge of bombmaking during the war. In another scenario wherein a sizable proportion of the repressed minority population were not war veterans, violent resistance may have taken another form.

restrictions from 1943 onwards dropped to moderate levels.⁸⁵ The decade preceding the significant increase in popular backlash events beginning in 1956 coincides with a period of moderate language restriction severity and high minority exclusion. Thus, I can only conclude that the bombing campaigns and protests from 1956 to 1972 were *primarily* motivated by the threat posed by ethnic supplantation through Italian majorification and South Tyrolean exclusion.

Ample anecdotal evidence from the Fascist period strongly implies that South Tyroleans strongly resented their group's restricted language freedoms and political and economic exclusion. The fact that 77% to 81% of all eligible South Tyroleans opted for Germany reveals the extent to which German speakers felt hopeless in their situation. The Sigmundskron rally—the largest protest event in the history of South Tyrol—was at least partially focused on the exclusion of German-speakers from public sector employment through language proficiency requirements.

However, since the 1920s saw the formulation of a formal policy of exclusion along with severe language restrictions, what explains the lack of popular backlash events prior to 1956? As with all totalitarian regimes, the Fascist period (1922-1943) imposed severe press restrictions that helped obscure news of protest actions from spreading within and outside South Tyrol. Furthermore, the presence of a repressive internal security service (OVRA) served to squash and deter simmering dissent. Most important, however, was the impact of German National Socialism. Given their alignment with Germany's irredentist ambitions and witnessing the reunification of Saarland with Germany in 1935, alongside the annexation of the Czech Sudetenland and Austria in 1938, South Tyroleans likely viewed their clearest route to liberation through diplomatic intervention or annexation by Germany. This route changed in 1939 with the unambiguous message of the Option, sent by both Germany and Italy: if South Tyroleans wanted freedom, emigration to Germany was their only choice.

⁸⁵ The average yearly LRSI score between 1947 and 1972 increased to -2.03.

This message was maintained until 1946 when the Allied powers definitively handed control of South Tyrol back to Italy. The false hope for self-determination set by the Gruber-De Gasperi agreement likely strung along South Tyroleans for the first couple of years after 1948, given that the Italian government only clearly signaled its true intentions for the postwar period through several new restrictions starting in 1952.

The signing of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 allowed Austria to once again take its role as the leading and most powerful advocate for South Tyrolean interests. Thus, the only periods of time prior to 1956 when South Tyroleans could not reasonably pin hopes for their salvation on external intervention or an abrupt reversal in Italian minority policy were the short windows between 1921-1933, 1946-1947, and 1952-1954. However, only in 1946-1947 and 1952-1954 were South Tyroleans free from a totalitarian Italian state and without reasonable hope of a tolerant minority policy in Italy. Thus, while the popular backlash events of 1956 onwards were primarily concerned with the political and economic exclusion imposed on South Tyroleans, it is very likely that the experience of extreme language restrictions suffered during the Fascist period contributed to self-determination sentiments or discontent in the postwar period.

The role of Austria was also a key distinguishing feature of this case. Shortly after Austria and Italy declared an end to their dispute over South Tyrol in June 1992, Italy withdrew its veto on Austria's admission into the European Union. Unlike some other cases of minority assimilation discussed in this dissertation, the SVP found a powerful and persistent ally in Austria. Through diplomatic pressure, Austria successfully brought the South Tyrol issue to the international stage. Prior to its annexation by Germany, Austria helped smuggle German-language educational material and banned media publications and broadcasts into South Tyrol. After signing the Austrian State Treaty, it unofficially permitted North Tyrolean militant groups in Austria to coordinate with the SVP and BAS in South Tyrol during the bombing campaigns. After 1961, Austria unofficially provided safe harbor to North

Tyroleans directly participating in the bombings while simultaneously condemning the attacks. Indeed, the breakdown in diplomatic talks between Vienna and Rome in early 1961 led to 1961 becoming the most active year in the South Tyrol bombing campaign.

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, South Tyrolean and Austrian political leaders worked together to pressure Italy to grant autonomy to South Tyrol. In November 1971, these efforts culminated in the passage of the second autonomy statute through Constitutional Law No. 1. Considering the profound scope and scale of autonomy given to South Tyrol, this event serves as a decisive backlash event. Total victory for a self-determination movement is a historically rare occurrence, requiring significant and sustained popular support. From its founding until the passage of the second autonomy statute, the SVP championed the cause of self-determination while being the dominant political party in South Tyrol. In Chapter 7 on the case of the Azerbaijani minority in Iran, I discuss how numerous self-determination organizations were established, only to fade to relative obscurity due in large part to a lack of Azerbaijani support. This landmark event illustrates the rare convergence of political will and popular support necessary to achieve such extensive autonomy, distinguishing South Tyrol's experience from most other historical and contemporary self-determination efforts. While South Tyrol gained its freedom, Italy effectively lost its control over the province, aside from military installations near the Brenner Pass.

5.5 Conclusion

As described by Alcock (2000), the case of South Tyrol is one of tragedy to triumph. The years after Italy's annexation of South Tyrol saw its German-speaking minority population subjected to extreme language restrictions and extensive policies of political and economic exclusion. In search of liberation, South Tyroleans placed their hopes in pan-Germanism as championed by Nazi Germany, whose leaders uncharacteristically cared little for them in return. The Option left an indelible stain on

South Tyrol's history and deeply divided South Tyrolean communities between those who voted to remain with Italy and those who voted to emigrate to Germany. Pushed by the Allied powers in the aftermath of World War II and seemingly understanding their failures to assimilate the South Tyrolean minority, Italy appeared to be open to granting autonomy to South Tyrol. Efforts made primarily by Austrian and South Tyrolean leaders culminated in the Gruber-De Gasperi agreement in 1948.

Throughout the 1950s, Italy reversed course and reintroduced many of the exclusionary policies that defined the Fascist-era Italianization and majorification programs in South Tyrol. Organized bombing campaigns by South Tyrolean militants began against the backdrop of renewed Italianization and majorification and only ended around when the SVP approved the second autonomy statute. The 1972 autonomy statute was the product of decades of negotiations between the SVP, Austria, and Italy. Although the full implementation of all 137 measures was not achieved until 1992, it granted South Tyrol a stunning amount of authority to rule itself in almost every political, cultural, and economic arena.

Despite acquiring greater political autonomy in 1972, autonomist and separatist parties continue to receive support in South Tyrol's provincial legislature (*Südtiroler Landtag*). In the 2023 provincial elections, parties promoting greater autonomy, independence, or irredentism controlled 20 out of 35 seats in the provincial legislature. The SVP claimed 13 seats and continues to campaign for greater economic autonomy as part of its platform. In recent decades, other self-determination parties have become more prominent. The independence-oriented *Die Freiheitlichen* (dF) party claimed two seats, while the irredentism-oriented *Süd-Tiroler Freiheit* (STF) claimed four seats. Like the SVP, *Lega* campaigned on federalism and autonomy for South Tyrol, claiming one seat.


In any case, the two most influential factors used to determine the outcome of this case are the success of the self-determination movement and the degree of language loss or assimilation from the minority group. The high degree of autonomy South Tyrol achieved in 1972 and maintained in

the half a century since is widely viewed as a model for minority protection and self-rule (Rautz, 2014). With their newfound autonomy, South Tyroleans have, as of 2019, transformed their once-poor province into the richest Italian province in terms of regional income per capita. In the more than 50 years since the passage of the Second Autonomy Statute, the South Tyrolean minority in Italy has become one of—if not *the* best—protected linguistic minorities in the world. If states pursue assimilationist language regimes in order to achieve a greater level of national unity, then the achievement of true self-rule by South Tyrol in 1972 can only indicate the near-total failure of Italianization.

Viewed solely through the lens of increased rates of bilingualism, Italy's assimilationist efforts were somewhat successful. However, Italy's shift to encourage bilingualism in South Tyrol as part of the 1972 autonomy statute resulted from the failure of the previous Exclusionary Assimilation regime. Between 1921 and 2011, the proportion of German-speakers in South Tyrol declined from 75.9% to 62.3% (Gobbi & Maffei, 2021, p. 8). The exact extent to which this result was driven by South Tyrolean emigration as part of the Option or by Italian immigration is unknown. However, data from the 1921 Austrian census and 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011 Italian censuses shed light on the effect of language restrictions in South Tyrol. Figure 6 below details the changes in the linguistic composition of South Tyrol between 1921 and 2011 using data from the Provincial Statistics Institute of South Tyrol (Gobbi & Maffei, 2021). Austria collected the 1921 census data, while Italy was responsible for the 1961 through 2011 censuses.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Italy either did not collect language data in their 1931, 1936, and 1951 censuses, or this data is not available to the public. The census of 1941 was cancelled due to World War II. In order to access the full census data for these years, one must visit the state archive for each province in person.

Figure 6: Linguistic Composition of South Tyrol



The data reveals a noticeably slow rate growth of the German-speaking population and a significant increase in the Italian-speaking population between 1921 and 1961. In the 40-year period between 1921 and 1961, the German-speaking population grew by 20.4%, indicating a compound annual growth rate of 0.47%.⁸⁷ During the same 40-year period, the Italian-speaking population grew by 474.2%, indicating a compound annual growth rate of 4%. Such a dramatic increase in a group's population can only be attributed to a mass immigration policy. Given the decrease in the absolute number of Italian-speakers over the 50-year period between 1961 and 2011, it is reasonable to assume that up around 100,000 Italian-speakers immigrated from southern Italy to South Tyrol as part of Rome's majorification strategy. In the face of severe language restrictions employed from 1923 to 1943, the number of German-speakers in South Tyrol in the 40-year period between 1921 and 1961

⁸⁷ The Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) equation is as follows: $CAGR = ((P_E / P_S)^{(1/n)} - 1) * 100$, wherein P_E represents the ending population, P_S indicates the starting population, and n equals the number of years.

In the 50-year period between 1961 and 2011, the German-speaking population of South Tyrol increased by 35.2%, indicating a 0.6% compound annual growth rate.

increased by 20.4%. However, the overall proportion of German-speakers fell from 75.9% to 62.2%. The Italian-speaking population increased from 10.6% in 1921 to 34.3% in 1961.

Importantly, the number of Italian-speakers in South Tyrol decreased in absolute terms, from 138,000 in 1971 to 118,000 in 2011. Given the overall increase in the number of German-speakers during the same period, this discrepancy in growth rates indicates a failure on the part of the Italian state to make Italians out of Germans. Considering the additional fact that the Ladin-speaking population also grew by 48.8% between 1961 and 2011, this indicates that it may have been the South Tyroleans who made Germans out of Italians. Based on these conclusions and the evidence provided in this case study, and in particular consideration of the success of the South Tyrolean self-determination movement and the demonstrated failure of the Italian state to assimilate the minority German-speaking population, I determine that the Exclusive Assimilation regime employed by Italy on the South Tyrolean minority constitutes a failure.

Chapter 6: Amazigh in Algeria

March of Folly

<i>Case Summary</i>	
Language Regime Type	Hybrid Assimilation
Group	Amazigh (Berbers)
Host State	Algeria
Time Period	1962 - 2015
Hypothesized Backlash	Moderate Backlash
Observed Backlash	Severe Backlash
Outcome	Moderate Failure

The case of the Amazigh minority in Algeria is somewhat consistent with my theory on the relationship between the severity of language restrictions and the level of minority exclusion on popular backlash. From 1976 to 1990, the government's Arabization program employed severe language restrictions to force Amazigh to speak classical Arabic and abandon their use of the Amazigh language (Tamazight) and French. From 1991 to 2004, the government imposed even more severe language restrictions but was limited by a lack of enforcement owing to intense resistance and backlash in Kabylia and the outbreak of the Algerian Civil War. Since 2008, the government has made significant concessions on Amazigh language freedoms and officialized Tamazight in 2016. Throughout most of the case period, the Amazigh largely enjoyed similar political freedoms and a relatively equal level of economic prosperity and participation as the majority Arab population.

My theoretical framework anticipates a moderate amount of popular backlash resulting from the combination of severe language restrictions without significant minority exclusion. Given the presence of severe language restrictions, I anticipate the emergence of a robust self-determination

movement. This expectation was met in 2001 through the formation of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK), which escalated its demands from autonomy to independence in 2013. Several massive protest movements and popular backlash events concerned with Amazigh cultural and language rights posed significant challenges to the Algerian state, particularly in 1980, 1994-1995, 1998, and 2001-2002. Unlike the case of German-speakers in South Tyrol, the Algerian government has not conceded territorial autonomy to Kabylia or other Amazigh regions.

The Arabization program could have arguably been categorized as an outright failure by 1992 due to the significant role it played in the outbreak of the Algerian Civil War, in addition to the major riots of 1980 and 1988. However, the civil war was not directly related to Tamazight language grievances but instead to the adverse religious effects of Arabization on the religious Arab population. Even so, the Arabization program became a moderate failure with the officialization of Tamazight in 2016, coming after three additional major protest events, the formation of a self-determination movement, and in consideration of the observed failure to erase the use of Tamazight and French from Algerian public life and institutions.

6.1 Background

The Amazigh (Berbers)⁸⁸ of Algeria consists of several related ethnic sub-groups. In descending order from most populous to least, these groups are the Kabyles, Chaouis, Mozabites, Tuaregs, and Chenouis. Kabylia (Kabyles) is the most populous and politically relevant Amazigh

⁸⁸ The English term “Berber” is derived from the Arabic term “*barbar*,” which was in turn derived from the Greek term “*barbaroi*,” or barbarian. Today, the term “Berber” is largely viewed as a pejorative exonym term by contemporary North Africans. Instead, most Berbers today self-identify with the endonym “*Amazigh*,” or free people. While I prefer to use the single term of “*Amazigh*” throughout the entirety of this case study, the term “Berber” better fits into certain historical discussions regarding the group. For example, when discussing the closure of the Berber chair at the University of Algiers, it would be more accurate to use the term “Berber” rather than “*Amazigh*.” While “Berber” is more commonly understood and not viewed in a pejorative manner in the English-speaking world, I will default to the term “*Amazigh*” when the term “Berber” is not required for historically accurate terminology. Furthermore, I take the ethnic terms “*Amazigh*” and “*Imaghiẓen*” to be synonymous in the context of this case study.

region and is the focal point of Amazigh dissent in Algeria. The discussion in this case study refers to these groups together as Berbers or Amazigh since the Amazigh sub-groups do not seem to advocate for cultural or linguistic rights or self-determination separately from each other (Sambanis et al., 2018).⁸⁹ When discussing Kabyle demands or grievances, these should be understood as implicitly extending to all other Amazigh groups outside of Kabylia. Furthermore, the terms “Tamazight,” “Amazigh,” and “Berber(-ophone)” are all understood by the Algerian government and Amazigh as synonyms for the language(s) of the Algerian Amazigh.

During the French conquest of Algeria in the mid-19th century, French colonial authorities sought to propagate what is now known as the “Kabyle Myth.” The Kabyle Myth elaborated a set of real and supposed differences between the Kabyle and Arab populations of Algeria and portrayed the Kabyles as the racially superior group. This was done based on the belief that the Kabyles, unlike the Arabs, could possibly be assimilated into French culture, as well as to divide Arabs and Amazigh. According to Viscount Caix de St. Aymour, “Arabs cannot be transformed while Kabyles can be assimilated [to the French]. Arabs are lazy, soft, slow... The Berber is hard-working, enterprising and practical... and basically not very religious” (Ageron, 1968, p. 276). During the colonial era, Kabylia was the sole region in Algeria to experience significant Western acculturation, primarily due to the colonial government’s focus on French-language schooling (Fois, 2016).

Between 1881 and 1915, French colonial authorities further attempted to suppress the use of Arabic and give preference to Kabyles in economic participation (Lazreg, 1983). Arabs were deliberately excluded from public sector employment and colonial administration, while lucrative positions were given to Kabyles (Quandt, 1972; Lazreg, 1983). This preference helped the Kabyles achieve relatively high group representation in public administration, commerce, and industry before

⁸⁹ With the recent exception of the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia (Nationalia, 2016).

and after the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) (Quandt, 1972; Lazreg, 1983). However, this preference did not prevent Berbers from opposing France during the war or initiating periodic revolts against French colonial rule.

During the Algerian War, Amazigh leaders were promised autonomy upon independence, but this promise was rescinded in 1963 (Minahan, 2002; Sambanis et al., 2018). The immediate consequence was that the Amazigh-dominated Socialist Forces Front (FFS) split from the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) and launched a rebellion from 1963 to 1964 for control of the central government. This rebellion failed, leading to the deaths of 400 FFS fighters and the arrest of its leader, Hocine Aït Ahmed (Monbeig, 1992).

Meanwhile, the leaders of the FLN turned to implementing their revolutionary policies after their victory over France in late 1962. As is often the case with newly formed or independent states, the leaders of the FLN turned to assimilation over pluralism in an attempt to consolidate power and demonstrate internal cohesion and unity with other newly independent North African states. The Algerian state and nation-building project attempted to combine revolutionary socialist ideology with Arab-Islamic nationalism (Malley, 1996). The 1963 Algerian constitution solidified this agenda, with Article 3 stating the revolutionary motto, Article 4 affirming Islam as the state religion, and Article 5 affirming Arabic as the only national and official language of Algeria. The use of Arabic in the Koran and the centrality of Islam to Algerian nationalism deeply influenced the Algerian government's decision to provide official status to Arabic alone. For the Amazigh, this entailed the loss of not only their promised autonomy but also their language and culture.

6.2 Initial Policies⁹⁰

The initial set of Arabization policies implemented under President Ahmed Ben Bella (1963-1965) were relatively tame compared to the policies of his successors, Houari Boumédiène (1965-1978) and Chadli Bendjedid (1979-1992). In 1962, the national education board abolished the Berber chair at the University of Algiers (Aïtel, 2013).⁹¹ Arabic⁹² was introduced into the primary and secondary education curriculum, with instruction initially at seven hours per week in 1962, increasing to ten hours by 1964 (Benrabah, 2004). In September 1964, instruction in the first year of primary school was given entirely in classical Arabic (Nakla, 2021). Arabic-language teachers were recruited from other Arab countries—particularly Egypt—to teach monolingual Arabic classes at the primary and secondary levels (Aïtel, 2013). In recounting his educational experience at this time, Professor Hend Sadi (Sadi, 2010, p. 23) recalls his teachers’ attempts to “Arabize” their pupils: “In high school, the Arabic teachers, most of them ‘Baathists’ or ‘Muslim Brothers,’ carried out their mission with zeal. They set out to Arabize us... as a result, we had to learn to love the Arabic language, which we were to make our own, but also to abandon Kabyle, a worthless ‘dialect,’ and deny Berber identity, a concept ‘created by colonialism’ according to our teachers...”⁹³

In 1962, the Algerian government imposed extremely tight restrictions on Amazigh-language publishing. It was not until 1989 that Amazigh-language publishing began its cautious return with the help of newly established cultural associations and private publishers (Chaker, 2001). Chaker (2001)

⁹⁰ For the discussion of language-related laws, decrees, and ordinances related to this case, Jacques Leclerc’s *L’aménagement linguistique dans le monde* was central to compiling a more complete catalog of relevant language laws and restrictions for this case (Leclerc, 2023). If a specific article, provision, or clause is mentioned when discussing the text of a law, decree, etc., Leclerc (2023) is the source unless stated otherwise. Leclerc is cited specifically when narrative information in *L’aménagement linguistique dans le monde* is used.

⁹¹ Gandon (1978, p. 23) puts this date at 1965. Both dates are included in Table 9.

⁹² For the purposes of this case discussion, I use the term “Arabic” in reference to literary or classical Arabic rather than dialectal (Algerian) Arabic unless stated otherwise.

⁹³ Translated from French. Many of the recruited teachers from Egypt were members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Benrabah, 2004). Slackman (2008) reports that Algerian officials did not realize this at the time. However, these denials may be the result of Algeria’s reckoning with religious extremism during the Algerian Civil War.

further recounts two attempts by the FFS and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) to create an Amazigh-language newspaper, each of which published only a few issues before disappearing for unknown reasons.⁹⁴

In 1965, Houari Boumédiène ousted President Ahmed Ben Bella in a military coup and accelerated the Arabization program. The Algerian government chose to elevate classical Arabic as the state language despite its limited use among Algerians, including the elite. Most of the population communicated in dialectal Arabic, French, or Tamazight in their everyday lives (Aïtel, 2013). As television broadcasts Arabized, Hadjarab (2000) notes how many politicians spoke in broken classical Arabic rather than defaulting to their more comfortable dialectal Arabic.

Arabization sought not only to eradicate the use of French, Tamazight, and local dialects of Arabic but also to erase references to Algeria's pre-Islamic history. Starting in 1966, the educational content of secondary schooling was Arabized, teaching history solely in classical Arabic and excluding all pre-Islamic history (Benrabah, 2004). Algeria also introduced a new semantic orientation in naming places. The initial goal was to strip place names of their French or Berber connotations if the original names were based on a local, cultural, or historical referent (Gandon, 1978). These place names were later replaced with new names conveying politically aligned connotations (Gandon, 1978). Gandon (1978) provides many examples of Arabization in naming public places, streets, businesses, and signage. Using two examples of the semantic transformation of French place names in Oran: a garage was renamed from "garage du Pont-Saint-Charles" (Saint-Charles-Bridge garage) to "garage du Pont" (Bridge garage), and a café was renamed from "café de Mohand" (Mohand's cafe) to simply "café" (Gandon, 1978, pp. 16-17).⁹⁵ In Kabylia, these name changes also served to erase traces of Amazigh identity. For instance, "goums" (the name of the Numidian mercenaries who fought with Hannibal)

⁹⁴ While government interference is likely, Chaker (2001) discusses the logistical difficulties plaguing Amazigh-language publishing from independence until 1998.

⁹⁵ Mohand was a Kabyle poet, and the Pont-Saint-Charles refers to the christian Saint Charles.

was replaced by the name of an Arab sheikh, and the symbol of a martyr of the Algerian War replaced that of the Numidian King Massinissa (Gandon, 1978, p. 17).

Similar to the 1963 rebellion led by the ethnic Kabyle Aït Ahmed, Amazigh dissent within the cabinet and army increased after Boumédiène—an Arab—seized power in 1965 (Chin et al., 2022). In December 1967, Colonel Tahar Zbiri led a failed coup attempt against President Boumédiène. The goal of the coup attempt was to alter the ethnic balance of power within the FLN and restore the socialist revolution, with Zbiri representing the Chaouis (Amazigh) people and the more radical leftist faction of the party and Boumédiène representing the moderate faction (Chin et al., 2022). Due to the failure of the coup attempt, Boumédiène purged the Amazigh (Chaouis and Kabyle) political and military elite from power (Quandt, 1972; Chin et al., 2022). Immediately prior to the coup attempt, the exclusive Revolutionary Council included five Amazigh members. Boumédiène purged Amazigh influence here as well, leaving only one Amazigh member on the Revolutionary Council (Quandt, 1972).

In the wake of the coup attempt, Boumédiène issued an ordinance in April 1968 requiring that all civil servants possess a working knowledge of classical Arabic so that it could be used throughout public administration within three years. After January 1971, only candidates proficient in Arabic would be allowed to work as government officials. Broadcast media was also targeted for Arabization. Upon Algeria's independence, three main radio stations were designated to broadcast in Arabic (Channel 1), Tamazight (Channel 2), and French (Channel 3) (Aïtel, 2013). Starting in 1970, Tamazight radio broadcasting from Channel 2 was subjected to content censorship and had its hourly volume and transmission strength continually reduced until 1976, when a high school uprising prevented its total abolition (Gandon, 1978; Ferhat, 1983; Aïtel, 2013).⁹⁶ In the same year Channel 2 was targeted

⁹⁶ Since 1976, Channel 2 had its broadcast time and content permissions restored and further included non-Kabylarian dialects in some of Channel 2's programs (Chaker, 2001). In 1980, Channel 2 broadcast Tamazight programs for 12

for Arabization, live sports reports from stadiums were mandated to broadcast exclusively in Arabic through the radio (Ouerdane, 1990). Establishing private radio and television stations was not an option under autocratic one-party FLN rule.

In February 1970, the government passed an ordinance mandating that children's first names "sound Algerian." While this ordinance was certainly intended to phase out French first names, it was unclear at that point to what extent traditional Amazigh first names were considered Algerian-sounding.⁹⁷ At the same time, the government mandated the use of Arabic in court documentation while allowing another language to be shown alongside it. However, Ouerdane (1990) notes that the translation services for court proceedings provided since 1966 were refused starting in 1970. In 1980, the judiciary was further Arabized through the hiring of monolingual Arabic-speaking law graduates (Benrabah, 2013). In 1973, the government mandated the Arabization of national seals. In April 1974, Arabic was mandated for use or display in all commercial advertising, though foreign languages could appear alongside Arabic in a smaller font.

Starting in 1971, Arabization accelerated at the primary and secondary levels of education. French was banned outright, and the study of the Koran and Islamic law was made compulsory (Slackman, 2008). At the higher education level, the sole Berber course at the University of Algiers was canceled in 1973 (Aïtel, 2013). This restriction is particularly notable because it was taught by Mouloud Mammeri, a popular and accomplished Kabyle scholar and novelist who would later become a key figure in future Amazigh uprisings. Mammeri was particularly effective at instilling an Amazigh identity into his students. Mohand-Ouamar Oussalem, one of the leaders of the 1980 Berber Spring, emphasized the importance of Mammeri's course in helping young Berbers learn about their history and culture (Ouerdane, 1990). In April 1976, Boumédiène extended Arabization to preparatory

hours a day while retaining state funding (Tabory & Tabory, 1987). At the same time Channel 2 had its broadcasts degraded, Channel 3 was also subjected to similar degradations.

⁹⁷ Due to the ambiguity of this restriction, this ordinance is considered as a minor/partial restriction for the Amazigh.

education (kindergarten, nursery schools, infant classes), requiring lessons to be conducted exclusively in Arabic. At the same time, two decrees in April 1976 effectively prohibited the operation of private schools.⁹⁸ This rule applied to all but Algeria's elite, who often sent their children to a few private schools that provided monolingual French or bilingual French-Arabic education (Benrabah, 2013).

In a dramatic escalation of Arabization efforts, the Circular of July 1976 imposed the most severe language restrictions since independence. It specified the total and exclusive Arabization of the environment, with all inscriptions publicly visible to be shown exclusively in Arabic (Abu-Haidar, 2000; Kruse, 2013). Specifically, it required that all public notices, street and place names, names of businesses, advertisements, and even license plates (formerly in French) be shown exclusively in Arabic.⁹⁹ Parents were prohibited from giving their children traditionally sounding French or Amazigh (Tamazight) names (Abu-Haidar, 2000; Mostari, 2003). This further meant that the Tifinagh script—the official alphabet of Tamazight and other Amazigh languages—was strictly banned. While this ban most directly affected naming conventions and public administration, it also effectively restricted the use of Tamazight in printed media and further imposed strict bans on wearing clothing and receiving magazines or record sleeves featuring Tifinagh characters (Gandon, 1978). The *Fichier Berbère* periodical published by French missionaries covering Amazigh culture and history was also immediately suspended (Mostari, 2003). Punishments for violating this ban often included prison sentences and extended to instances where people were arrested simply for owning Amazigh documentation (Aïtel, 2013).

The language restrictions imposed on the Amazigh up to this point were accompanied by a complicated policy of minority exclusion. Under French rule, Kabylia was given preference for

⁹⁸ Per Decree No. 76-66 and No. 76-67 of April 16, 1976. Private schools were once again formally permitted to operate with the enactment of Executive Decree No. 04-90 in March 2004.

⁹⁹ Mostari (2003) describes how in a single night in October following the imposition of the Circular of July 1976, all transcription panels in Algiers were changed to be in Arabic.

economic development, which allowed the Kabyles to enter the post-independence period with a strong presence in commerce and economic participation. Almost immediately after independence, the government targeted Kabylia for economic and educational development. Despite the ethnic dimension of the 1967 coup attempt and Boumédiène's subsequent purging of the Amazigh elite from political and military positions of power, Boumédiène designated some \$100 million in government credits toward agricultural and industrial development in Kabylia between 1967 and 1970 (Quandt, 1972, p. 301). These developments gave the Boumédiène regime a decent amount of popularity among Kabyles, as further evidenced by the relatively strong support Kabyles gave to the FLN in the May 1969 elections (Quandt, 1972).

Against the backdrop of Kabylia's relatively strong economic position, the Amazigh were excluded in other ways. From 1962 to 1989, the government effectively banned Amazigh cultural associations through government certification requirements and severe restrictions on their activities (Chaker, 2001).¹⁰⁰ Despite constitutional protections for associations specified in the 1963 and 1976 constitutions, all existing Amazigh cultural associations were forced underground to operate unofficially (Chaker, 2001). While the Algerian crackdown on Amazigh cultural associations could be viewed in the context of the broader Arabization program, it is more likely that the Algerian government sought to prevent the centralization of any oppositional political power—particularly amongst the Amazigh—originating from a cultural association. Thus, this policy is coded in Table 7 as an exclusionary policy.¹⁰¹ However, Amazigh support for the Boumédiène regime would not last. The severe language restrictions stipulated in the Circular of July 1976 would combine with the

¹⁰⁰ Per Act 89-11 of July 1989 on political associations.

¹⁰¹ At the same time, the Algerian government also banned all political associations. However, this was a national policy associated with the FLN's one-party control over Algeria and is thus not included as a policy of minority exclusion. In 1989, the democratization of the Algerian political system led to increased support for Amazigh-associated political parties, as well as a larger increase in support for more powerful Arab-Islamist parties.

opening of a new university in Kabylia to produce the largest Amazigh demonstration of resistance since independence.

6.3 *Popular Backlash and Later Policies*

Prior to the Circular of July 1976, Amazigh discontent with Arabization was apparent to Algerian government officials. Whether the goodwill accrued by the Boumédiène regime during the 1967-1970 development program dropped precipitously or whether this goodwill put a temporary façade over Amazigh language grievances, discontent began to boil over. In 1974, the FLN organized “*la fête des cerises*” (cherry festival) in the Kabyle town of Larba Nat Iraten. According to Aïtel (2013) and Bessaoud (2000), the event attracted over 5,000 Kabyle attendees who anticipated performances by Kabyle artists, only to be presented with Arabic-speaking performers. The ensuing riot led to clashes with the Algerian gendarmerie, resulting in injuries to 50 spectators and the deaths of several gendarmes.

At the Algerian Cup Soccer Championship on June 19, 1977, the Kabyle team Jeunesse Sportive de Kabylie (JSK) was set to play against NA Hussein Dey in Algiers. Ninety percent of the approximately 80,000 spectators in attendance were Kabyle, imbuing the match with particularly high symbolic significance for the Amazigh identity. Boumédiène also attended and was received with anti-Boumédiène boos and chants (Aïtel, 2013). Spectators unfurled banners displaying anti-regime, pro-democracy, and pro-Amazigh language and culture slogans (Ouerdane, 1990). Boumédiène was forced to leave through an underground passageway after the Kabyle team won, while spectators marched to the center of Algiers to celebrate and protest with banners written in the banned Tifinagh script (Aïtel, 2013).

The incidents at Larba Nat Iraten in 1974 and Algiers in 1977 served as preludes to the explosion of Amazigh dissent in 1980. In 1978, the University of Tizi-Ouzou (CUTO) was established

in Tizi Ouzou, Kabylia. According to Aïtel (2013), the new university was meant to relieve the overcrowded University of Algiers. Accordingly, the student population of CUTO consisted of students primarily from Kabylia. Ongoing strikes in support of teaching Berber courses at the University of Algiers immediately spread to CUTO in 1977 (Ouerdane, 1990). On March 10, 1980, Mouloud Mammeri arrived at the University of Tizi-Ouzou to give a lecture on his collection of ancient Berber poems (*Poèmes Kabyles anciens*). Fearing a risk to public order, the Algerian governor of Tizi Ouzou ordered Algerian authorities to block Mammeri's access to the University, and in doing so, triggered the Berber Spring (Ouerdane, 1990; Chaker, 2001; Aïtel, 2013; Benrabah, 2013; Kruse, 2013).

Given Mammeri's standing in the Amazigh community, the decision to cancel Mammeri's lecture was broadly perceived as an affront to Amazigh identity and rights, igniting long-standing grievances toward Arabization within the Amazigh community. The next day, students organized demonstrations in Tizi Ouzou, Algiers, and Bougie (Béjaïa), demanding an end to the suppression of the Amazigh language and culture and calling for greater democratic rights. From March 11 to April 20, strikes and demonstrations in Kabylia spread from the university to occupy nearby hospitals and factories, with a total general strike throughout Kabylia occurring on April 16 (Ouerdane, 1990). On April 20, the police stormed the occupied buildings in Bougie and Tizi Ouzou, resulting in hundreds of arrests (Aïtel, 2013). Two months later, most of those arrested during the Berber Spring demonstrations were released. The Berber Spring transformed Amazigh culture and demands into the first social movement to make a dent in the monolithic nature of Algerian politics since independence. The first consequence of this newfound social movement was a general strike at the University of Bab Ezzouar near Algiers in May 1980 in support of Amazigh language rights (Ouerdane, 1990). Given the central role of CUTO in the events of the Berber Spring, one of the key demands of the Berber

movement was to establish a Berber department at CUTO. In January 1990, this demand was met through the creation of the Amazigh (Berber) Language and Culture Department.¹⁰²

The FLN faced its greatest challenge to date in the 1988 October Riots. The immediate causes of the riots were high unemployment rates—primarily among the youth—and falling oil prices rather than language grievances. The riots started in Algiers and focused on the demonstrators' contempt for one-party rule by the FLN. Nonetheless, the demonstrations forced President Benjedid to open Algeria to multiparty democracy. Political associations nationwide were legalized. On the Amazigh side, the RCD was founded in 1989, and the FFS was legalized in 1990. On the Arab-Islamic side, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was founded in 1989.

Amazigh cultural associations were once again allowed to operate. By July 1989, 154 cultural associations were registered in Kabylia alone, and the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) held its first meeting in Tizi Ouzou (Chaker, 2001). The MCB can be credited with organizing several large demonstrations in support of the Amazigh language and culture. The two most notable MCB demonstrations include the January 1990 general strikes in Kabylia and the seven-month general school boycott in Kaylia between 1994 and 1995 (Chaker, 2001; Maddy-Weitzman, 2019; “Language Policy,” 2020). The school boycott resulted in the symbolic recognition of Tamazight as a national language and *Amazighité* (Amazigh-ness) “as an integral component of Algerian national identity along with Islam and *Arabité* (Arab-ness),” as well as a pledge to introduce Tamazight classes in schools (Minahan, 2002; Maddy-Weitzman, 2019, p. 318). In practice, this concession allowed for little more than creating “Berber courses in several schools” (Chaker, 2001, p. 8).

The Algerian general public's distaste for the FLN revealed itself through the immense popularity of the FIS during the 1990 local elections, winning nearly double the votes cast compared

¹⁰² The University of Tizi-Ouzou was later renamed to the Mouloud Mammeri University of Tizi-Ouzou.

to the FLN (Iratni & Tahi, 1991). The election was boycotted by the FFS, leaving only the RCD to secure the Amazigh vote. To this end, the RCD won 87 out of 1541 municipal council seats, all in Kabylia (Iratni & Tahi, 1991). The RCD further won the single but important provincial assembly in Tizi Ouzou. Benrabah (2013) and Chaker (2001) discuss how this result gave Kabylia a degree of unofficial linguistic autonomy. The RCD began to impose a multilingual agenda, introducing Tamazight alongside French and Arabic on public signage, the names of businesses, and street names, as well as reinforcing the status of Tamazight in higher education institutions (i.e., the University of Tizi-Ouzou).¹⁰³

If the ideological foundation of the FLN was based on Islamist and Arab nationalist principles, the FIS platform promised a more fundamentalist governance of Algeria while also adhering to Arab nationalism. In particular, the FIS pushed for imposing sharia law and intensifying the Arabization program. Likely considering the immense success and political pressure exerted by the FIS after the 1990 local elections, Benjedid passed the infamous Law No. 91-05 on January 16, 1991. Until this point, the FLN-led Arabization program specified a relatively more gradual approach to Arabization, requiring the use of Arabic in almost all parts of the environment but allowing for the use of foreign languages in certain contexts. Coming into effect on July 5, 1991, Law No. 91-05 included the most radical and comprehensive language restrictions imposed in post-independence Algerian history with the objective of definitively eradicating the use of French and Tamazight in Algeria.¹⁰⁴

Law No. 91-05 unambiguously called for the total and exclusive Arabization of all parts of Algerian society. While reaffirming the ban on non-Arabic (Tifinagh) characters, the law also banned the use of languages and characters other than Arabic in official documentation; internal and external administrative communications; domestic and international communications from public

¹⁰³ Per Benrabah (2013), the order of presentation began with Arabic, followed by Tamazight and French.

¹⁰⁴ The specific date of July 5, 1991 is provided by Mostari (2003, p. 36).

administrations, institutions, and private companies; the operations of private and public companies; the administration and proceedings of the court; seals; the naming of people and places (streets and towns); all public signage or inscriptions (businesses, institutions, advertising); medical reports and orders; public statements, speeches, and conferences; television broadcasts; and primary, secondary, and higher education. The law further made using Arabic a prerequisite for employment in public administration and private businesses. The punishments for violating any provision mandated in Law No. 91-05 ranged from a fine of 1,000 Algerian Dinars (\$54 USD in 1991) to 100,000 Algerian Dinars (\$5,405 USD in 1991) or the closure of repeat offending businesses.

Fortunately, Law No. 91-05 was not fully implemented—at least not immediately following its passage—due to the outbreak of the Algerian Civil War (1992-2002). In the December 1991 parliamentary elections, the FIS swept the first round of voting, winning 300 out of 599 contested seats (Chin et al., 2022). Fearing an FIS takeover, the military forced Benjedid to resign in order to suspend the second round of voting set to take place in January 1992. Under the leadership of Mohamed Boudiaf (1992), the new military regime declared the FIS unconstitutional, disbanded the party, and froze the implementation of Law No. 91-05, reasoning that the regime lacked the time and resources to implement such an expansive policy (“Language Policy,” 2020; Chin et al., 2022). However, Boudiaf was soon succeeded by Ali Kafi (1992-1994), who enacted Decree No. 92-02 in July 1992, which slightly extended the timeline for Arabization set out in Law No. 91-05. At the same time, Kafi also enacted Decree No. 92-303, reaffirming the provisions in Law No. 91-05. In December 1996, Liamine Zéroual (1994-1999) enacted Ordinance No. 96-30, unfreezing and making minor amendments to Law No. 91-05, as well as repealing its provision on the exclusive use of Arabic in higher education. In April 1999, the government tried once more to push for Arabization in higher education, requiring the use of Arabic in graduate theses and dissertations.

In June 1998, the famed Kabyle singer Lounès Matoub was assassinated by Islamic fundamentalists (Whitney, 1998). Matoub was outspoken in his criticism of Arabization and his support for the Amazigh language and culture. Specifically, Matoub criticized Law No. 91-05, which was due to come into effect in July 1998—just ten days after his assassination. Matoub’s assassination triggered a week of violent anti-Zéroual and anti-fundamentalist riots, culminating in the widespread destruction of Arabic-language public signage and inscriptions across several Amazigh cities and towns. Nonetheless, the amended Law No. 91-05 was reimposed in July, as the government remained seemingly committed to pushing forward with total Arabization.

In March 1997, Amazigh political parties were subjected to a new ordinance requiring the use of Arabic in party operations and prohibiting the use of a linguistic or regional (or religious) identity as the basis of any party’s formation. This ordinance was intended to target both Amazigh separatism and Islamic fundamentalism and is coded as a policy of minority exclusion in Table 7.

Running as an independent with the support of Algeria’s political elite, Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999-2019) won the April 1999 presidential election. An orator fluent in dialectical Arabic French, Bouteflika purposefully violated Law No. 91-05 through his public use of French and dialectical Arabic in speeches. Bouteflika was by now aware of the state’s failure to Arabize the Amazigh and Francophone populations as well as the adverse effect Arabization was having on the popularity of Islamic fundamentalism. Bouteflika initially recognized the cultural pluralism in Algerian society and actively sought to depoliticize the language issue (Benrabah, 2013). Abu-Haidar (2000) notes that Bouteflika’s initial concern seemed to be the eradication of illiteracy. Bouteflika likely viewed certain aspects of the country’s Arabization program as a failure in Arabizing the Amazigh population, improving literacy rates, and radicalizing the youth toward Islamic fundamentalism.

Two years later in April 2001, a Kabyle youth was arrested and later died while in the custody of Algerian police. Importantly, the youth’s name was Massinissa Guermah—a name banned by the

Circular of July 1976.¹⁰⁵ Authorities initially claimed that the youth's name was not Massinissa but later relented. The almost year-long anti-government demonstrations that ensued focused on Amazigh grievances toward government policies of Arabization and the marginalization of the Amazigh population (Volpi, 2013). Known today as the Black Spring, these protests resulted in the deaths of more than a hundred demonstrators as well as thousands more injured or arrested in Kabylia, in addition to the widespread destruction of government offices and other symbols of Arabization (Volpi, 2013; Maddy-Weitzman, 2019). The Black Spring led to the recognition of Tamazight as a national language in April 2002 as a symbolic gesture and the removal of the Algerian gendarmerie in Kabylia.¹⁰⁶ Chaker (2001) notes how the idea of autonomy or independence among Kabyle youth grew in popularity after the 1998 riots following Matoub's assassination and at the start of the Black Spring. Thus, this minor concession did not end the nascent formation of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK) in June 2001.¹⁰⁷

As a result of Tamazight's recognition as a national language, Ordinance No. 03-09 of August 2003 modified an earlier ordinance (No. 76-35 of April 1976) on the organization of education and training. Specifically, two clauses were added to allow state resources to be used for teaching Tamazight. However, the wording of these clauses importantly does not formally commit the state to promoting Tamazight in education. Despite its symbolism, the recognition of Tamazight as a national language was a turning point for language conflict in Algeria. Private schools were formally legalized in March 2004, and the Ministry of Education introduced French as a mandatory foreign language in

¹⁰⁵ Massinissa is a name that predates Islam and originates from King Massinissa (206 BC-148 BC), the legendary Berber King of Numidia that fought on the Carthaginian and Roman sides of the Second Punic War (218 BC-201 BC).

¹⁰⁶ National languages do not require the same level of state support as official languages. A national language typically symbolizes the identity of a nation by reflecting its culture and heritage. An official language is designated by law for use in government proceedings, legal matters, and public administration. A country can have multiple official or national languages but only official languages are typically required to be sufficiently used in the operations of a state.

¹⁰⁷ The MAK changed its name to the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia in October 2013 (UNHCR, 2017).

the second year of primary education for public and private schools in September (Benrabah, 2013). Shortly thereafter, the government backtracked with an ordinance in August 2005 mandating (affirming) the use of Arabic in all public and private instruction while allowing for French and Tamazight to be taught as foreign languages (Bassiouny, 2009).

Many of the severe language restrictions included in Law No. 91-05 were never explicitly repealed, but Bouteflika's ascension to the presidency in 1999 resulted in a relaxation in the enforcement of the law's provisions—at least in public speech—and specifically in regards to French. At the same time, Bouteflika maintained his support for a more subdued version of Arabization. In 2005, Bouteflika stated, “No country in the world has two official languages, and this will never be the case in Algeria, where the only official language... is Arabic... This does not prevent us from learning the Amazigh language...” (“Language Policy,” 2020).¹⁰⁸ In June 2007, the government established two language institutions tasked with promoting and standardizing Tamazight: the High Council for the Amazigh Language and the Amazigh Language Academy.¹⁰⁹ However, the first substantial language concession arrived in January 2008 with Law No. 08-04 formally allowing for the instructional use of Tamazight outside of foreign language classes.¹¹⁰

Given Bouteflika's stance on Arabization, it is worth discussing the enforcement of language restrictions up to this point. Benrabah (2013) and Chaker's (2001) discussions of the on-the-ground linguistic reality in Kabylia after the 1990 elections suggest that Kabylia had some level of linguistic autonomy that was uninterrupted by Law No. 91-05 even after its reimposition in 1998. Despite the provisions in Law No. 91-05 requiring the exclusive use of Arabic in private business signage, Mostari

¹⁰⁸ Original French: “*Il n’y a aucun pays au monde possédant deux langues officielles et ce ne sera jamais le cas en Algérie où la seule langue officielle, consacrée par la Constitution, est l’arabe. [...] Ceci ne nous empêche pas d’apprendre la langue amazighe avec toutes ses variantes et dialectes.*”

¹⁰⁹ See Sambanis et al. (2018) “Self-Determination Movements (SDM) Dataset — Coding Notes II.”

¹¹⁰ However, Tamazight instruction faced significant difficulties in the immediate years after Law No. 08-04, as discussed by Benrabah (2013).

(2003) notes that many private businesses continued to prefer and show French or dialectical Arabic in their signs rather than Arabic. Benrabah (2013, p. 75) further mentions that “In recent years, most commercial signs have been in Berber or French.” At the same time, criticism toward Law No. 91-05 by Matoub and other Amazigh activists was likely rooted in some level of belief that the government would enforce its provisions in Amazigh regions.

Further contributing to this ambiguity is the capriciousness of Algerian language policy over time. The most obvious example of this is evidenced in the sudden escalation of Arabization under President Benjedid in 1991, its suspension later that year under Boudiaf, its alteration in 1996 under President Zéroual, and its lack of enforcement under President Bouteflika despite the formal continuation of nearly all the provisions in the amended version of Law No. 91-05. Elsewhere, language policies imposed in one year were often escalated or repealed several years later. Other informal restrictions, such as the denial of translation services in courts after 1970, were never formally codified.

It is also important to note that the FLN and FIS both considered the primary target of Arabization to be the presence of French and Western influences. Arabic-Amazigh bilingualism did not grate the Algerian political elite as much as Arabic-French bilingualism, even though most of the political elite were proficient in both Arabic and French. Given the experience of all but the most recent Algerian heads of state in fighting for independence from France, this much is understandable.¹¹¹ Nonetheless, Arabization extended to the predominantly secular Amazigh populations since the FLN leadership, even prior to independence, viewed the Amazigh with a significant degree of suspicion over potential secessionist aspirations (Kruse, 2013).

¹¹¹ President Abdelmadjid Tebboune (2019-Present) did not participate in the Algerian War.

Given the state language policy in Algeria after the June 1990 local elections, I conclude that the provisions included in Law No. 91-05 were intended to apply to Tamazight, but certain provisions were never enforced after 1998 due to the severe resistance shown in Amazigh regions as evidenced in the 1994-1995 general school boycott in Kabylia, the 1998 Matoub riots, and the Black Spring protests. It is also likely that as a result of Boudiaf's decision to freeze Law No. 91-05 in December 1991 and the government's preoccupation with fighting in the Algerian Civil War, the RCD's multilingualism agenda in Kabylia was allowed to continue uninterrupted.¹¹²

Under President Bouteflika, who once stated that Algeria would never have two official languages, Tamazight was recognized as a national and official language through a constitutional resolution in February 2016. To this end, Article 4 of the Algerian constitution further called for the establishment of an Algerian Academy of the Amazigh Language tasked with standardizing and promoting Tamazight in order to facilitate its integration as an official language. Notably, Article 3 of the Algerian constitution states that Arabic is the national and official language and that "Arabic shall remain the official language of the State." The lack of a similar clause in Article 4 regarding Tamazight implies that at least in the administrative operations of the state outside of Amazigh regions, Arabic effectively remains the only official language. Despite the officialization of Tamazight, Amazigh activist organizations have criticized the amendment on various grounds, such as the lack of equal status between Tamazight and Arabic or a continued lack of the right to vote on true self-determination (Nationalia, 2016; Blidi, 2020). Overall, the sentiment among the Amazigh population reflects an attitude of distrust toward the Algerian government, viewing the amendment as a distraction or a fragile concession that could be violated by a government that has shown itself to be both consistently hostile to true linguistic equality and willing to amend the constitution for the

¹¹² In coding the timeline of language restrictions in Algeria, the ban on the use of Tifinagh and several other provisions within Law No. 91-05 are coded as ending in June 1990.

regime's political purposes.¹¹³ Since 2016, the MAK has organized demonstrations for independence or a Kabyle state federated with Algeria. Meanwhile, the RCD and FFS continue to push for greater linguistic rights for Tamazight. In 2017, Kestler-D'Amours (2017) reported that the Algerian government continues to refuse funding used to help implement Tamazight in official settings and for Tamazight education.

Table 7 below details the major policies that effectively excluded the Amazigh minority from political and economic participation in roughly chronological order. Table 8 below similarly details the timeline of various language restrictions imposed on Tamazight according to category and indicator. Finally, a list of the various relevant popular backlash events is included in Table 9. An asterisk (*) on any date indicates that the associated month or year is inferred due to a relative lack of specificity or coverage in the source material.

¹¹³ In reference to the removal of presidential term limits in 2008 under President Bouteflika.

Table 7: Amazigh Exclusion in Algeria

Exclusionary Policy	Time Period	Notes
Effective prohibition of Amazigh cultural (and political) associations	1962 - Jul. 1989	This effectively excluded the Amazigh politically, as it primarily served to prevent the concentration of political power among Amazigh groups. Repealed by Law No. 89-11.
Purge of Amazigh political and military elite	Dec. 1967 - 1976	Initiated by Boumédiène after a failed coup attempt by Col. Tahar Zbiri. Boumédiène later reintroduced five Amazigh into the Revolutionary Council in 1976, per Kashani-Sabet (1996). The body was also dissolved in the same year.
De-Kabyzization of the army	1980	Unknown end date. Began after the 1980 Berber Spring, caused by fears within Algerian leadership of potential Amazigh insubordination. Mostly targeted Kabyle officers.
Linguistic restrictions on political parties	Mar. 1997 - Feb. 2016*	Per Articles 4 and 5 of Ordinance No. 97-09. Repeals Law No. 89-11. Requires the use of Arabic in party operations, and forbids the basis of a party's formation on religious, linguistic, gender, corporatist, or regionalist basis. Uncertain end date, but assumed repealed with the February 2016 constitutional amendment recognizing Tamazight as an official language.

Table 8: Amazigh Language Restrictions in Algeria

Language Restriction	Subcategory	Time Period	Notes
Required knowledge of Arabic for civil servants	Administration (Employment)	Apr. 1968 - Jul. 1991	Per Article 1 of Ordinance No. 68-92. Amends Article 25 of Ordinance No. 66-133. Not applicable to candidates for public employment who do not originally have Algerian nationality. Repealed and made more restrictive by Law No. 91-05.
Required use of Arabic in court documentation (and proceedings)	Administration (Judiciary)	Feb. 1970 - Jul. 1991	Per Article 37 of Civil Code of February 19, 1970. The documentation part is not a particularly significant restriction on other languages, since this is mostly typical of states. Made more restrictive by Law No. 91-05. However, Ouerdane (1990) notes that the translation services provided in proceedings since June 1966 per Article 55 of Ordinance No. 66-154 were informally refused starting in 1970. This implies that proceedings were unofficially required to be in Arabic. Unclear when translation services were reinstated.
[1] Ban on the use of the Amazigh alphabet (Tifinagh)	Administration (Documentation)	Jul. 1976 - Jun. 1990*	Includes a ban on owning Amazigh documentation, wearing clothing or receiving magazines and record sleeves featuring Tifinagh characters. Punishments for violating this often came as prison sentences (Aïtel, 2013). Gandon (1978) is not clear on exactly when this ban began, but hints at a date sometime around 1977. This would roughly correspond with the effective ban on non-Arabic characters for public inscriptions enacted by Articles 3 and 4 of the Circular of July 1976. Reaffirmed by Articles 3 and 39 of Law No. 91-05, but was likely unenforced after the 1990 local elections. Tamazight is more commonly written using the Latin script, which was restricted but not formally banned.
Arabization of the judiciary	Administration (Judiciary)	1980 - Present	Through the hiring of monolingual Arabic-speaking law graduates. May have ended with the recognition of Tamazight as a national and official language in February 2016.

Exclusive (<i>Required</i>) use of Arabic in public administration, official documentation, internal administrative communications, and companies	Administration (Documentation) (Employment)	Jul. 1991 - Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - Feb. 2016*	Per Articles 4, 5, 6, and 29 of Law No. 91-05. Frozen by Boudiaf in December 1991 and unfrozen per Ordinance No. 96-30 in December 1996, taking effect July 1998. Likely relaxed during the Bouteflika administration, but in reality was likely never enforced as an exclusive measure in Kabylia or elsewhere in Algeria, as the use of French continued to persist internally in bureaucracies. It is likely that the use of Arabic was instead effectively required, while also allowing for other languages to be used unofficially. However, Souag (2020, p. 405) notes that “official documents are rarely, if ever, provided in Berber.” Likely ended by implication with the recognition of Tamazight as an official language in February 2016.
Exclusive use of Arabic in the administration and proceedings of the courts	Administration (Judiciary)	Jul. 1991 - Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - Feb. 2016*	Per Article 7 of Law No. 91-05. Frozen by Boudiaf in December 1991 and unfrozen per Ordinance No. 96-30 in December 1996, taking effect July 1998. Per “Language Policy” (2020), nearly all law courts were Arabized by 2008. Bolstered by Law No. 08-09 of February 25, 2008. No translation services have been provided since 1970, and it is unclear whether RCD governance in Kabylia after the 1990 local elections changed this. Likely ended by implication with the recognition of Tamazight as an official language in February 2016.
Required proficiency/use of Arabic as prerequisite for employment and professional competitions in public administration <i>and</i> private businesses	Administration (Employment)	Jul. 1991 - Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - n/a (Never Enforced)*	Per Article 8 of Law No. 91-05. Frozen by Boudiaf in December 1991 and unfrozen per Ordinance No. 96-30 in December 1996, taking effect July 1998. Likely relaxed during the Bouteflika administration but was likely never enforced in Kabylia after the 1990 local elections.
Exclusive (<i>Required</i>) use of Arabic in domestic external communications from public administrations, institutions, and companies	Administration (ExComm)	Jul. 1991 - Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - Feb. 2016*	Per Article 11 and 16 of Law No. 91-05. Frozen by Boudiaf in December 1991 and unfrozen per Ordinance No. 96-30 in December 1996, taking effect July 1998. Likely relaxed during the Bouteflika administration, but in reality was likely never enforced as an exclusive measure in Kabylia or elsewhere in Algeria, as the use of French continues to persist internally in bureaucracies. It is likely that the use of Arabic was instead effectively required, while also allowing for other languages to be used. However, Souag (2020, p. 405) notes that “there is no generalized right to communicate with the government in Berber.” Likely ended by implication with the recognition of Tamazight as an official language in February 2016.
Exclusive use of Arabic in international external communications from public administrations, institutions, and companies	Administration (ExComm.)	Jul. 1991- Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - Feb. 2016*	Per Article 12 of Law No. 91-05. Minor amendment per Article 3 of Ordinance No. 96-30 relating to the language used in international treaties and conventions. Insufficiently clear if RCD governance after the 1990 local elections led to this provision’s lack of enforcement. Likely ended by implication with the recognition of Tamazight as an official language in February 2016.
Required use of Arabic in medical reports, analyses, and orders	Administration (Documentation)	Jul. 1991 - Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - Feb. 2016*	Per Article 38 of Law No. 91-05. Exceptions made for use of foreign languages in medical and pharmaceutical sciences. Frozen by Boudiaf in December 1991 and unfrozen per Ordinance No. 96-30 in December 1996, taking effect July 1998. Insufficiently clear if RCD governance after the 1990 local elections led to this provision’s lack of enforcement. Likely relaxed during the Bouteflika administration, and likely ended by implication with the recognition of Tamazight as an official language in February 2016.
Semantic transformations of French and Amazigh place names	Public (Naming)	1965* - Jun. 1990*	Gandon (1978) is not clear as to when these changes began or whether these changes were reversed at the time of his writing in 1978. Implied start date set at 1965 to coincide with the start of increased Arabization efforts by the Boumédiène regime, as

			implied by Aïtel (2013). Article 20 of Law No. 91-05 in Jan. 1991 references these changes. Amplified with the imposition of the Circular of July 1976 (Mostari, 2003). Likely ended with RCD governance in Kabylia after the 1990 local elections.
First names of children must sound Algerian	Public (Naming)	Feb. 1970 - Jul. 1976	Per Article 64 of Ordinance No. 70-20, though “it may be different for children born to parents belonging to a non-Muslim faith.” Most Amazigh are Muslim, thus this counts as a full, albeit relatively light, language restriction. Minor restriction, made more restrictive by the Circular of July 1976.
Arabization of national seals	Public (Signage)	Oct. 1973 - Jul. 1991	Per Ordinance No. 73-55. Repealed by Law No. 91-05.
Required use of Arabic in commercial advertising	Public (Signage)	Apr. 1974 - Jul. 1991	Per Article 1 of Decree No. 74-70. Exclusive use of Arabic mandated per Law No. 91-05. Other languages are allowed to be shown as translations, but the advertisement must be expressed in Arabic. Likely unchanged by RCD governance in Kabylia.
Prohibition of traditionally sounding Amazigh (or French) first names for children	Public (Naming)	Jul. 1976 - Apr. 2002*	Per the Circular of July 1976. Specifically targeted traditional names predating Islam. Likely unchanged by RCD governance in Kabylia. Inferred end date set at the second recognition of Tamazight as a national language in April 2002.
[2] Ban on the use of the Amazigh alphabet (Tifinagh)	Public (Naming) (Signage)	Jul. 1976 - Jun. 1990*	See previous entry above.
Exclusive Arabization of public inscriptions (public administrations and businesses)	Public (Signage)	Jul. 1976 - Jun. 1990*	Per Articles 3 and 4 of the Circular of July 1976. Applies to internal and external signs of public administrations and businesses. Replaced by Law No. 91-05 in January 1991, but was likely never enforced in Kabylia after the 1990 local elections.
Required use of Arabic in all forms of public signage	Public (Signage)	Mar. 1981 - Jul. 1991 Jul. 1991 - Jan. 2008*	Per Decree No. 81-36. Repealed and made more exclusive by Law No. 91-05. Per Benrabah (2013) and Chaker (2001), this practice was continued (as required, not exclusively) in Kabylia after the 1990 local elections, but likely stopped applying to private businesses somewhere between 2002 to 2013. Inferred end date set around the halfway point to coincide with the de-Arabization of schools in 2008.
Exclusive use of Arabic in all forms of public signage (including advertising and private businesses)	Public (Signage)	Jul. 1991 - Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - n/a (Never Enforced)*	Per Articles 19 and 20 of Law No. 91-05. Foreign languages may be used in parallel with Arabic in exceptional cases and after prior authorization. Frozen by Boudiaf in December 1991 and unfrozen per Ordinance No. 96-30 in December 1996, taking effect July 1998. Likely never enforced in Kabylia after the 1990 local elections.
Exclusive use of Arabic in seals, stamps, official signs specific to institutions, public administrations, and all companies	Public (Signage)	Jul. 1991- Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - n/a (Never Enforced)*	Per Article 10 of Law No. 91-05. Frozen by Boudiaf in December 1991 and unfrozen per Ordinance No. 96-30 in December 1996, taking effect July 1998. Likely never enforced in Kabylia after the 1990 local elections.
[1] Exclusive use of Arabic in all statements, speeches, conferences, and television broadcasts	Public (Public Speech)	Jul. 1991 - Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - Apr. 1999* (Never Enforced)	Per Article 18 of Law No. 91-05. Minor amendment per Article 4 of Ordinance No. 96-30. Relaxed during the Bouteflika administration, to the extent that this restriction likely ended at the start of Bouteflika’s presidency.
Abolition of the Berber chair at the University of Algiers	Education (Higher)	1962	Aïtel (2013) places this date at 1962, while Gandon (1978) places this date at 1965. For coding purposes, this is recorded as occurring in 1962.

Arabization of primary and secondary education	Education (Primary) (Secondary)	1962 - Aug. 2005	Instruction in Arabic for 7 hours per week in 1962, increasing to 10 hours in 1964. Instruction in the first year of primary school education given entirely in Arabic in September 1964 (Nakla, 2021). Primary and most secondary schools were Arabized by 1974 (Abu-Haidar, 2000). Arabic was the sole language of instruction at the primary and secondary levels of education starting in 1989 (Gherzouli, 2019). General education was made mandatory per Decree No. 76-66 in April 1976. Repealed by Law No. 08-04 of January 2008. Separate entry below to indicate the period during which Tamazight was only allowed to be used as the language of instruction in foreign language courses.
Arabization of school curriculum	Education (Primary) (Secondary)	1966/1971 - 2002*	Introduced at a single grade level for history starting in 1966. In 1971, French was banned and students were required to study the Koran and Islamic law. Applies to primary education from 1966, and secondary education after 1971. Inferred end date set some time in 2002 to coincide with the government's attempts to revise the religious curriculum in schools after the Algerian Civil War.
Closure of the Berber department and the cancellation of last Berber course at the University of Algiers	Education (Higher)	1973 - Jan. 1990	The Amazigh (Berber) Language and Culture Department was established at the University of Tizi-Ouzou in January 1990. A second Berber department was established in Bougie in October 1991.
Exclusive use of Arabic in preparatory education	Education (Primary)	Apr. 1976 - Jan. 2008	Per Articles 22 and 25 of Ordinance No. 76-35. Preparatory education includes kindergarten, nursery schools, and infant classes. Repeated in Article 11 of Decree No. 76-70 of April 1976. Repealed by Law No. 08-04 of January 2008.
Exclusive use of Arabic at higher education institutions and institutes	Education (Higher)	Sep. 1991 - Dec. 1991 (Never Enforced)	Per Article 37 of Law No. 91-05. To take effect from the first academic year 1991/1992 "and will continue until total and definitive arabization by July 5, 1997 at the latest." Frozen by Boudiaf in December 1991 and repealed per Article 7 of Ordinance No. 96-30. Never truly implemented.
Required use of Arabic in theses and dissertations	Education (Higher)	Apr. 1999 - Jan. 2008*	Per Article 44 and Sections 45 and 59 of Law No. 99-05. Inferred end date set at January 2008 to coincide with the de-Arabization of primary and secondary schools.
Restriction of Tamazight instruction to foreign language courses	Education (Primary) (Secondary)	Aug. 2005 - Jan. 2008	Continuation of the entry "Arabization of primary and secondary education." Restrictions on the use of Tamazight in schools were slightly relaxed in August 2003 with the enactment of Ordinance No. 03-09, amending Ordinance No. 75-35 of April 1976. Instruction in Tamazight was allowed in foreign language classes per Article 8 of Ordinance No. 05-07 of August 2005. Repealed by Law No. 08-04 of January 2008.
Tight restrictions on publishing in Tamazight	Media (Publications)	1962 - Jul. 1989	In 1989, Tamazight publishing began to return with the help of cultural associations and private publishers (Chaker, 2001).
Reduction of Amazigh-language radio broadcasting (Channel 2)	Media (Broadcasting)	1970 - 1976*	Gradual process until 1976. By 1980, Amazigh-language broadcasts ran for 12 hours per day. Inferred end date set at 1976.
Exclusive use of Arabic for live sports reports via radio	Media (Broadcasting)	1970 - 1976*	Unclear end date. Assumed end date set at 1976 to coincide with the lifting of Channel 2's broadcasting restrictions.
[3] Ban on the use of the Amazigh alphabet (Tifinagh)	Media (Publications)	Jul. 1976* - Jun. 1990*	See previous entry above.
Required use of Arabic (as spoken, translated in subtitles, or	Media (Broadcasting)	Jul. 1991 - Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - Feb. 2016*	Per Article 17 of Law No. 91-05. Frozen by Boudiaf in December 1991 and unfrozen per Ordinance No. 96-30 in December 1996,

dubbed) in cinematographic and/or televisual films, as well as cultural and scientific programs			taking effect July 1998. Likely relaxed during the Bouteflika administration, and likely ended by implication with the recognition of Tamazight as an official language in February 2016. All TV programs during this period were run by the Ministry of Information and Communication.
[2] Exclusive use of Arabic in all statements, speeches, conferences, and television broadcasts	Media (Broadcasting)	Jul. 1991 - Dec. 1991 Jul. 1998 - Apr. 1999 (Never Enforced)*	Per Article 18 of Law No. 91-05. Minor amendment per Article 4 of Ordinance No. 96-30. Definitely relaxed during the Bouteflika administration, to the extent that this restriction likely ended at the start of Bouteflika's presidency.

Table 9: Amazigh Backlash Events¹¹⁴

Backlash Event	Time Period	Notes
La fête des cerises (cherry festival) riot	1974	In Larba Nat Iraten. 50 wounded and three killed (Ouerdane, 1990).
Algerian Cup Soccer Championship incident	Jun. 1977	Boumédiène booed, protests/celebrations going from the <i>5th of July Stadium</i> to the center of Algiers displaying banners featuring the banned Tifinagh script.
1977-1979 academic strikes	1977-1979	Three major strikes were held at the University of Algiers and Tizi-Ouzou in support of introducing Berber classes.
Berber Spring	Mar. 1980 - Apr. 1980	Major backlash event. Demonstrations/riots for cultural and linguistic autonomy. Violently suppressed by the Algerian government. Sambanis et al. (2018) estimated 32 dead.
University of Bab Ezzouar general strike	May 1980	From May 19 to May 24. Done in support of Berber language freedoms. Violently suppressed with 30 injured.
1990 Pro-Amazigh language and culture demonstrations	Jan. 1990	Organized by the MCB. Most significant demonstration held in Algiers on January 25. Intended to show support for Amazigh language and culture.
Algerian Civil War	Jan. 1992 - Feb. 2002	The consequences of Arabization played a significant role in the outbreak of the Algerian Civil War, <i>though it was unrelated to Amazigh language restrictions or related grievances</i> .
General school boycott in Kabylia ("satchels strike")	Sep. 1994 - Apr. 1995	Major backlash event. Organized by the MCB. Act of large-scale civil disobedience in favor of Amazigh language and culture, as well as the inclusion of Tamazight in education. Resulted in the symbolic alteration of the Algerian constitution to recognize Amazigh culture in November 1996 and the creation of the High Commission for Amazighness in 1995. Starting and ending months per Benrabah (2013).
1998 Matoub riots	Jun. 1998 - Jul. 1998	Major backlash event. Week-long riots triggered by the assassination of Lounès Matoub.
Black Spring	Apr. 2001 - Apr. 2002	Major backlash event. Widespread destruction of government offices and symbols of Arabization, 126 dead (BTI, 2022), thousands more injured or arrested. Resulted in the symbolic recognition of Tamazight as a national language.

¹¹⁴ The following events are not included due to the lack of any discernible language-related goals or motivations: the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) rebellion (Sep. 1963 - Oct. 1964), the coup attempt by Colonel Tahar Zbiri (Dec. 1967), the 1988 October Riots (Oct. 1988), the Arab Spring (Dec. 2010 - Jan. 2012), and the Hirak Movement (Feb. 2019 - Apr. 2021).

Formation of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK)	Jun. 2001 - Present	Since its creation, the MAK has escalated its demands for either an independent state or a Kabyle state federated with Algeria. The MAK organized at least one large protest for Amazigh language institutionalization and self-determination in April 2015 (see entry below).
Major protest for Amazigh language institutionalization and self-determination	Apr. 2015	Major protest organized by the MAK, per Nationalia (2015).
Tamazight recognized as a national and official language	Feb. 2016 - Present	Per Article 4 of the 2016 Algerian constitution. Significant concession, though the Algerian government has resisted implementing this or providing funding.

6.4 *Discussion*

6.4.1 *Minority Exclusion*

From 1962 to 1989, the Algerian government subjected the Amazigh population to a relatively low level of political and economic exclusion. During French colonial rule, the Kabyle population, in particular, enjoyed a somewhat privileged economic position compared to the Arabs. While the French colonial preference for Kabyles over Arabs did not prevent Kabyles from rebelling against French rule, the Kabyles entered into post-independence Algerian society with a secure economic position and enjoyed similar lifestyles to Arabs in Algiers and elsewhere.

Upon independence, promises of autonomy and equality given to Amazigh leaders were revoked as the FLN attempted to cultivate an Algerian national identity based on Islam as the state religion and Arabic as the sole official language. As a generally secular and French and Tamazight-speaking population, the FLN immediately began to view the Amazigh with distrust, fearing potential secessionist aspirations. This distrust was first embodied through the effective prohibition of Amazigh cultural associations from 1962 to 1989. While the desire to dismantle potential roadblocks to Arabization certainly factored into this decision, it was also done to prevent the concentration of Amazigh political power in an electoral autocracy ruled by an Arab-dominated FLN.

Nine years after the arrival of multiparty democracy in Algeria, political parties were banned from using a linguistic, religious, gender, corporatist, or regionalist identity or cause as the basis of a

party's formation. The government further required the use of Arabic in all party operations. After Col. Zbiri's coup attempt failed to depose President Boumédiène in 1967, Boumédiène purged many Amazigh elites from the military, the FLN, and other political bodies. In the decade after the coup attempt, many Amazigh were reintroduced back into political positions inside the FLN and the military. This policy was reversed once again after the Berber Spring in 1980, resulting in another purge of Amazigh officers from the military due to fears of potential Amazigh insubordination (Ouerdane, 1990).

Despite the immediate and relatively limited repercussions of the coup attempt and the Berber Spring, the Amazigh largely enjoyed similar political freedoms and a relatively equal level of economic prosperity and participation compared to Algeria's Arabs. According to the U.S. Department of State (2015), the Amazigh population actively and freely participates in the political process and "represents more than one-third of government officials." Christiani (2014) also finds that the Amazigh "are well integrated in the social, political and economic structure of the country." In 2019, the government recognized the Amazigh New Year as a national holiday, and according to the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) 2022 country report for Algeria, "Algerians increasingly embrace the Berber heritage and identity." Despite the real and symbolic concessions over the past decade, many Amazigh continue to feel marginalized by the government. For example, during the 2019-2021 Hirak Movement demonstrations to oust President Bouteflika, the government made a failed attempt at dividing the movement's coherence by targeting the Amazigh flag and spreading insulting rumors about Kabyles (BTI, 2022).

Overall, the Algerian political leadership pursued a strategy of Arabization with severe language restrictions while not simultaneously excluding Amazigh from political and economic participation. Taking into account the prevalence of exclusionary policies and the specificity, context, and relative importance of the evidence cited here, the case of the Amazigh minority in Algeria receives


a minority exclusion score of 1 (low) throughout the entire case period, indicating “neglect/remedial policies.”¹¹⁵

6.4.2 *Language Restriction Severity*

The case of the Amazigh in Algeria is categorized as having severe language restrictions per the Language Restriction Severity Index (LRSI) scoring regime discussed in Chapter 4. Figure 7 below details the evolution of the severity of language restrictions from 1962 to 2015, excluding the period from 1992 to 1997 due to significant enforcement ambiguities arising from the Algerian Civil War. The extent to which the 2016 recognition of Tamazight as a national and official language has led to any tangible changes in language freedoms remains unclear but is expected to improve. Thus, the end date for coding the LRSI score for this case is set at 2015. The Appendix provides a more detailed breakdown of yearly indicator scores for each category.

¹¹⁵ The political discrimination index definition for “neglect/remedial policies” is “Substantial (poverty and) under-representation in political office and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect or improve the group’s political status.” The economic discrimination index definition for “neglect/remedial policies” is “Significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group’s material well-being.”

Figure 7: LRSI Timeline - Amazigh in Algeria (1962 – 2015)



Based on these results, we can identify several important phases of Algerian language policy toward the Amazigh. The first phase extends from 1962 to 1969 and covers the period when the Amazigh were subjected to low severity language restrictions as the Algerian state gradually accelerated the Arabization of primary and secondary education and imposed semantic transformations of Amazigh place names. Civil servants were required to understand Arabic, and Amazigh-language publications were tightly restricted. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is -0.71 .

The second phase (1970-1975) begins with the diminishment in the strength and content permissions of Tamazight radio broadcasts, while radio broadcasts for live sports reports from stadiums were required to be exclusively in Arabic. Courts began to require the use of Arabic in documentation while translation services for court proceedings provided since 1966 were discontinued. National seals were Arabized, and the use of Arabic was required in commercial advertising. By 1974, primary schools and most secondary schools were Arabized. The closure of the Berber Department at the University of Algiers and the cancellation of the last and highly influential

Berber course taught by Mouloud Mammeri in 1973 signaled the Algerian state's shift to further accelerate Amazigh assimilation. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is -2.95.

The third phase (1976-1990) marks the start of very severe language restrictions, starting with those imposed by the Circular of July 1976. The Amazigh script (Tifinagh) was explicitly banned, semantic transformations of Amazigh and French place names became more transformative, and Amazigh parents were prohibited from giving their children traditionally sounding Amazigh first names. Public inscriptions of public administrations and companies were changed to be exclusively in Arabic in 1976, and all forms of public signage were required to show Arabic—though not exclusively—in 1981. In 1976, the government required the exclusive use of Arabic in preparatory education, and the primary and secondary levels of education were fully Arabized in both the language of instruction and course content by 1989. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is -4.67.

The start of the fourth phase (1991, 1998-2007)¹¹⁶ is marked by two events: the RCD victory in Tizi Ouzou in the June 1990 local elections and the imposition of Law No. 91-05 in July 1991. Law No. 91-05 entailed the total and exclusive Arabization of essentially all of Algerian society. The law made only slight headway into implementing its provisions before it was derailed by the outbreak of the Algerian Civil War one year later. In 1998, President Zéroual reimposed Law No. 91-05 with minor amendments. While the arrival of the Bouteflika presidency did result in some relaxations in the enforcement of certain provisions of Law No. 91-05 in Amazigh regions, the Algerian state overall remained committed to pursuing Arabization where it could. Fortunately for Kabylia, RCD governance of the province since the 1990 local elections allowed for a degree of unofficial linguistic autonomy in some spheres that was uninterrupted by Law No. 91-05. However, it is likely that certain provisions concerning the required or exclusive use of Arabic in TV media, films, signage of public

¹¹⁶ Not including the years 1992-1997 due to the Algerian Civil War.

administration, bureaucratic communications and documentation, and in court administration and proceedings were enforced after July 1998. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is -3.75.

The most notable change to occur during the fifth and final phase (2008-2015) was the effective de-Arabization of primary and secondary education brought into force by Law No. 08-04 in January 2008. While a 2005 ordinance allowed for Tamazight to be taught as a foreign language, the 2008 law formally allowed for general educational instruction in Tamazight. In February 2016, Tamazight was recognized as a national and official language. While it is unclear regarding the extent to which this concession has resulted in a more than symbolic change in Amazigh language freedoms, it is likely that as Tamazight becomes more standardized, it will become more integrated into the public administration, education, and media landscape of Amazigh regions. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is -1.75. Based on the determined scores for minority exclusion and language restriction severity, the case of the Amazigh in Algeria is classified as a Hybrid Assimilation regime.

Table 10: Phases of Arabization Summary

	Time Period	Average Yearly LRSI Score
Phase 1	1962 - 1969	-0.71
Phase 2	1970 - 1975	-2.95
Phase 3	1976 - 1990	-4.67
Phase 4	1991, 1998 - 2007	-3.75
Phase 5	2008 - 2015	-1.75

6.4.3 Popular Backlash

The first hint of Amazigh backlash against the Algerian state came immediately after independence with Hocine Ait Ahmed's FFS rebellion in Kabylia (1963-1964). However, Ait Ahmed launched the rebellion intending to take control over the central state and was indifferent to the

nascent Arabization program. Moreover, the broader Amazigh population was largely indifferent to the rebellion's success, viewing it as a conflict between the FLN's political elite. Similarly, the goal of Colonel Tahar Zbiri's coup attempt against President Boumédiène in 1967 was to strengthen the leftist faction within the FLN rather than to stop the nascent Arabization program.

Tracking the timeline of popular backlash events with the severity of language restrictions over time reveals a confirming pattern. As seen in Table 11 below, the most severe backlash events occurred when language restrictions were most severe. With the exception of the Algerian Civil War, each backlash event in Table 11 can be directly and unambiguously linked to language-related grievances. Recall that the range of possible LRSI scores extends from -8 to +4, with scores below -3 resulting in a severe language restriction severity classification. One detail to note concerning Phase 4 is that while the more extreme provisions in Law No. 91-05 were never truly enforced, the prospect that they could be in the future almost certainly influenced the responses of Amazigh activists during this period.

Table 11: Joint Escalation of Backlash and Language Restriction Severity

	Avg. Yearly LRSI Score	Popular Backlash Events
Phase 1 <i>1962 - 1969</i>	-0.71	● None
Phase 2 <i>1970 - 1975</i>	-2.95	● La fête des cerises riot (1974)
Phase 3 <i>1976 - 1990</i>	-4.67	● Algerian Cup soccer championship incident (1977) ● Three major academic strikes (1977 - 1979) ● Berber Spring (1980) ● University of Bab Ezzouar general strike (1980) ● Pro-Amazigh demonstrations (1990)
Phase 4 <i>1991, 1998 - 2007</i>	-3.75	● Kabylia general school boycott (1994 - 1995) ● Matoub riots (1998) ● Black Spring (2001 - 2002) ● Formation of MAK (2001)

		● <i>Algerian Civil War (1992 - 2002)</i>¹¹⁷
Phase 5 <i>2008 - 2015</i>	-1.75	● Self-determination demonstrations (2015) ● Officialization of Tamazight (2016)

In its pursuit of Arabization, the Algerian government paid a significant price in popular backlash. To what extent did this pursuit succeed in assimilating the Amazigh and strengthening national unity? Estimates on the number of Tamazight speakers in any North African country—including Algeria—are unreliable and highly contested. While no precise estimates on the level of multilingualism (Amazigh, French, dialectical Arabic, classical Arabic) exist in regard to the Algerian Amazigh population, Minahan (2002) notes that most Kabyles are trilingual, and Abu-Haidar (2000) states that monolingualism is practically non-existent in Algeria. Benrabah's (2013) 2004 study also reveals a significant prevalence of Arabic-French bilingualism among Algerian youth. As in the case of South Tyrol, Souag (2020) finds that bilingualism is highly asymmetrical in Algeria, with many Amazigh learning dialectical and classical Arabic and few Arabs learning Tamazight.

The maintenance of Tamazight in Algeria and elsewhere is exercised through informal norms requiring the use of Tamazight within the family and village (Souag, 2020). However, Algeria's introduction of mass mandatory education in Arabic shifted these norms, as parents are more incentivized to speak to their children in Arabic to complement their education (Souag, 2020). Amazigh in urban settings outside of Kabylia primarily address each other in either French or Arabic but rarely in Tamazight (Tigziri, 2008). For example, Ait Habbouche (2013, p. 79) finds that 54% of Kabyles living in the Arab-majority city of Oran in western Algeria spoke Arabic with their siblings. Overall, the current social health and linguistic vitality of Tamazight in Algeria is poor. It is unclear as to what extent the officialization of Tamazight in 2016 has or will improve this situation, as programs

¹¹⁷ Mostly unrelated to Amazigh language grievances, but significantly caused by the Arabization program.

to revitalize Tamazight are still in their early stages. More Amazigh today are proficient in classical Arabic than were at the start of Arabization, and this has likely come at the expense of Tamazight.

While Algeria likely found some success in forcing the Amazigh to acquire classical Arabic, it has uniquely failed in Arabizing public administration. In parental decisions regarding which language they should speak to increase their child's economic and life outcomes, French continues to out-compete Arabic. Upon Algeria's independence, French was the language of the bureaucracy. This situation has only somewhat changed in the more than half a century since, despite repeated attempts to require the use of Arabic in internal and external bureaucratic communications and documentation. Mostari (2003), reflecting on 41 years of Arabization, notes that only the Ministries of Education, Justice, and Defense have been Arabized.

Outside of these ministries, Mostari (2003) claims that French remains strongly present in Algerian public administration, as evidenced by the maintenance of Arabic-French bilingualism in official documentation and internal and external bureaucratic communications. Writing some years later, Bossut (2016) and Souag (2020) affirm this view, finding that proficiency in French remains a crucial career skill for many young Amazigh due to its continued use within many companies and the Algerian bureaucracy. Additionally, Benrabah's (2013) survey of Algerian youth¹¹⁸ in May 2004 reveals striking attitudes on language status. In choosing between the options of dialectical Arabic, classical Arabic, French, and Berber, a majority of respondents stated that French was the most modern language (82.1%), the language of science and technology (85.7%), the language that allows openness to the world (91.5%), and their preferred language for learning and studying (55.3%). A further 44.4% responded that French was the language they liked the most.

¹¹⁸ Algerian youth in general, not specifically Amazigh youth.

This case study focuses mainly on the use of Tamazight in Algeria; however, acknowledging the role of French is crucial due to the nature of Arabization and its widespread use across Amazigh regions and throughout Algeria as a whole. French was and continues to be perceived across Algerian society as the more useful, economically advantageous, and prestigious language over Tamazight and classical and dialectal Arabic, even among the Amazigh. As noted by Dorian (1982), a language's prestige and economic utility are critical to understanding language shift and, by extension, the likelihood that a targeted linguistic minority will assimilate voluntarily.

The first mistake made by Algerian leaders in pursuing Arabization was their choice of promoted language. By seeking to replace French, dialectal Arabic, and Tamazight with classical Arabic, Arabization effectively asked bilingual Francophones in Algeria and Kabylia to replace their use of a highly prestigious language (French) with a relatively less prestigious and unfamiliar alternative in classical Arabic. For those Amazigh who have yet to learn either French or classical Arabic as their second language, French remains the more advantageous option. To the state, this deficit in linguistic prestige and economic utility alone likely made pursuing Arabization a more challenging task. Furthermore, the lexical differences between Tamazight and classical Arabic made acquiring classical Arabic more difficult for Tamazight speakers compared to Arabs, whose native language is dialectal Arabic (Tabory & Tabory, 1987).

Given Algerian perceptions of linguistic prestige, it is unsurprising that among the various spheres of public life where the Algerian state sought to impose Arabic, the attempt to Arabize higher education in Amazigh regions found little success and extreme resistance. Article 7 of Law No. 96-30 extended the deadline for the complete Arabization of higher education institutions to July 2000. Since this deadline, only the humanities have been Arabized. French remains the partial language of instruction in the social sciences, journalism, law, and the primary language of instruction in all other subject areas, including the natural sciences, medicine, and engineering (Chaker, 2001; Gherzouli,

2019). Furthermore, Arabization was somewhat resisted in higher education in regard to Tamazight, considering the government's concession of Berber Departments at the Universities of Tizi-Ouzou (1990) and Bougie (1991).

The relatively high prestige and economic utility of the French language in particular in relation to classical Arabic likely led to some amount of discontent. However, it was the promotion of a language fundamentally linked to Islam and Arab nationalism in conjunction with the repression of their own native Tamazight language and denial of their ethnic Amazigh identity that likely led to the greatest feelings of status injustice. Likewise, heightened cultural egoism among the post-independence political leadership greatly incentivized their promotion of Arab-Islamic nationalism and the exclusive officialization of classical Arabic. Such cultural egoism, paired with significant feelings of coercion resentment and status injustice amongst the Amazigh minority, likely intensified Amazigh backlash to assimilation.

These backlash mechanisms allowed Arabization to inflict unexpectedly severe popular backlash costs on the Algerian state. The employment of severe language restrictions outweighed the 'carrot' of minority non-exclusion in political and economic participation. As language restrictions increased in severity, so did popular backlash. Since all of the backlash events listed in Table 9 were directly caused by Arabization policies, I argue that all of these could have been avoided through either the acceptance of linguistic pluralism or the use of less severe language restrictions spread out over a longer time period. By pursuing Arabization on an ambitiously accelerated timeline, the potential cost savings from a more linguistically homogeneous population were arguably surpassed simply by costs associated with quelling repeated riots and mass demonstrations, as well as an expensive, rushed, and initially inept attempt at rapidly Arabizing primary and secondary education in the 1960s. Moreover, the idea of Amazigh self-determination has transformed from a taboo to an increasingly popular demand from activists as an oppositional Amazigh national identity took root. Thus, my expectation

of the formation of a self-determination movement is met by the creation and activities of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK), though to a lesser extent than might be expected in another political and historical context.

Relatedly, the Algerian government's use of foreign Arabic-language teachers affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood resulted in ideological shifts among Algerian youth. Just as language planning was used to further revolutionary ideals in the French First Republic, language planning in Algeria also doubled as identity planning. In forging an anti-western and anti-French national identity centered on Islam and Arab nationalism, Algeria banned French and required students to study the Koran and Islamic law in primary and secondary schooling in 1971. Reflecting on the legacy of the Arabization of the school curriculum, Slackman (2008) quotes Khaoula Taleb Ibrahim, a professor of education at the University of Algiers, stating, "We say that Algeria's schools have trained monsters... It is not to that extent, but the schools have contributed to that problem." Benrabah (2004, p. 72) argues that the Arabization of the school system "produced a whole generation of school-leavers and students who value religious beliefs and Islam more than the Arabic language." Chaker (2001) shares this view and asserts that the Arabization of education laid the foundation for Algerian Islamism. As a result of the Arabization of the school system, Algerians who went through schooling between 1966 and 2005 are significantly more religious than their parents. More broadly, Arabization resulted in the greater Islamization of Algerian society (Benrabah, 2004).

It was in this context of increasing Islamism—and the continued economic downturn that triggered the October 1988 riots—that the FIS dominated the 1991 parliamentary election, triggering the Algerian Civil War. Amazigh regions were largely spared from violence during the Civil War, preferring neither the FLN nor the FIS. However, the relatively secular Amazigh were particularly hostile toward the FIS for the party's violent fundamentalist beliefs and platform of further accelerating Arabization beyond what Law No. 91-05 specified. In the aftermath of the Algerian Civil

War and recognizing the link between the Arabization of the school system and violent fundamentalism, the government reintroduced French in schools, removed the most zealous religious teachers from schools, and deemphasized the religious curriculum. Several years later, Tamazight was first allowed as a foreign language, then as a language of instruction. Thus, not only did Arabization lead to severe unrest in Amazigh regions, but also significantly contributed to the outbreak of a civil war. Overall, the case of the Amazigh minority in Algeria demonstrates a severe level of backlash against the state.

6.5 *Conclusion*

In 1949, the Algerian nationalist movement faced an internal conflict over recognizing Berber cultural and linguistic identity, known as the “Berberist crisis.” Advocates for Berber recognition clashed with those advocating for an Arab-Islamic identity, leading to divisions within the movement. This disagreement culminated in purges and arrests of Berber advocates from the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, an early predecessor to the FLN (Fois, 2016). This failure to recognize the cultural pluralism within Algeria and the FLN’s subsequent adoption of an Arab-Islamic national identity necessitated a series of mistakes in the state’s approach to managing linguistic diversity. By closely linking Islam with classical Arabic—an intuitive but not necessary connection for nation-building—the Algerian state attempted to impose a new language of relatively lower prestige and economic utility in comparison to French on an already highly multilingual population.

The explicit rejection of Amazigh culture and identity in 1949 necessarily led to suspicions of Amazigh separatist sentiments in the Arab-dominated post-independence government. Meanwhile, the scars of the Algerian War motivated the aggressive erasure of all aspects of French influence in Algeria. In pursuing Arabization, the Algerian government made the same mistake as the Fascists in Italy of imposing too many severe language restrictions too quickly. Arabization also led to

bureaucratic inefficiency, poor educational outcomes as Amazigh students were forced to learn classical Arabic as their third or fourth language, and significantly contributed to the outbreak of civil war. Furthermore, French continues to maintain a place of prominence in Algerian society. French remains the language of much of the bureaucracy and business landscape, while much of the Algerian elite send their children to be educated in French or bilingual Arabic-French private schools.

The linguistic tensions left over from the Algerian Civil War, pitting Arabophones against Francophones and Berberophones and secularists against fundamentalists, has left Algeria a legacy of continued linguistic conflict and national division. Despite the apparent lack of progress since 2016 in implementing genuine linguistic pluralism vis-à-vis Tamazight, Amazigh resistance to Arabization has ultimately led to what was denied to them in 1949—a begrudging recognition of Amazigh culture as a part of the Algerian identity, and the officialization of Tamazight. Unfortunately for the state, neither Algerian Islamism nor the Amazigh self-determination movement is likely to disappear soon. As noted by Cristiani (2014), tension in Kabylia is “far from being dissipated.” Based on these conclusions and the evidence provided in this case study, I determine that the Hybrid Assimilation regime employed by Algeria on the Amazigh minority constitutes a moderate failure.

Chapter 7: Azerbaijanis in Iran

Split-Screen Nationalism

<i>Case Summary</i>	
Language Regime Type	Hybrid Assimilation
Group	Azerbaijanis
Host State	Iran
Time Period	1923 - 2023
Hypothesized Backlash	Moderate Backlash
Observed Backlash	Moderate Backlash
Outcome	Moderate Success

The case of the Iranian Azerbaijani¹¹⁹ minority in Iran is consistent with my theory on the relationship between the severity of language restrictions and the level of minority exclusion on popular backlash. Between 1923-1941 and 1947-1997, the Pahlavi and clerical governments imposed very severe language restrictions to force Iranian Azerbaijanis to assimilate into the dominant Persian language and culture group. Between 1945 and 1946, Azerbaijan effectively seceded from Iran owing to substantial grievances relating to Pahlavi-era language restrictions and economic decline. Since the start of President Mohammad Khatami's term in office (1997-2005), Iran has slightly relaxed language restrictions, though the present level of language restrictions on Azerbaijani remains severe.

In the 1990s, the increasing economic and cultural influence of Turkey and the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan from the Soviet Union led to a nationalist revival in Azerbaijan. Since

¹¹⁹ In the context of this case study, the use of the geographic term "Azerbaijan" refers to Iranian Azerbaijan rather than the independent Republic of Azerbaijan situated across the Araxes (Aras) River in north-western Iran. Similarly, this case study uses the group term "Azerbaijanis" to refer to the inhabitants of Iranian Azerbaijan unless stated otherwise. Finally, the terms "Azeri(-language)," "Azerbaijani," "Azeri," "Azeri Turkish," and "South Azerbaijani" are understood for the purposes of this case study to be synonymous and in reference to the language of Iranian Azerbaijanis. This case study discussion will largely default to the terms "Azeri" and "Azerbaijani."

then, greater numbers of Azerbaijanis have demanded more linguistic and democratic rights from the government. However, such demands are unlikely to be granted by the ruling autocratic clerical regime in Tehran. Throughout the entire case period, Azerbaijanis largely enjoyed and continue to enjoy relatively similar political freedoms and a slightly lower level of economic prosperity compared to the majority Persian population. Azerbaijanis are also the most included minority group in the Iranian political, business, and religious elite by a significant margin, but relatively less included compared to the dominant Persian population when considering the population size of each group.

The Hybrid Assimilation regime imposed on Azerbaijanis was and generally continues to be moderately successful. As of 2019, only around 68% of the ethnic Azeri population in Iran speaks Azerbaijani. Tehran's choice of elevating the relatively more prestigious Persian language as the sole official language of Iran and the fact that Azerbaijanis largely adhere to Shi'a Islam facilitated the moderate success of assimilation efforts.¹²⁰ Similarly, the historical and religious affinity of Azerbaijanis toward Iran, in addition to their relative inclusion in Iranian society, significantly contributes to the lower desire of Azerbaijanis to secede from Iran and the ability of the government to contain popular backlash. As expected from my theoretical framework, the severe level of language restrictions resulted in the formation of numerous self-determination or secessionist organizations since 1994, though most of these organizations are unknown to the Azerbaijani public. Nonetheless, the proliferation of self-determination organizations and massive protests in 2006 and 2015 serve as evidence of a growing level of dissatisfaction with assimilation and clerical rule.

7.1 *Background*

Azerbaijanis are a Turkic people residing south of the Caucasus Mountains and southwest of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijanis in Iran largely reside in the provinces of East and West Azerbaijan,

¹²⁰ Persian was the literary language of prestige in Iran from around 1500 onwards.

Zanjan, Ardabil, and Hamadan. In 2019, they comprised the largest minority group in Iran, making up roughly 16.7 million (20.1%) of the total Iranian population of 82.9 million (UNDESA, 2019; Eberhard et al., 2022).¹²¹ Of the 16.7 ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran, 11.3 million speak Azerbaijani (Azeri) (Eberhard et al., 2022). Azerbaijani is an Altaic Turkic language and is split into two main dialects: North Azerbaijani—primarily spoken in the present-day independent Republic of Azerbaijan—and South Azerbaijani, primarily spoken in Iranian Azerbaijan (Eberhard et al., 2022). Both dialects are mutually intelligible (Eberhard et al., 2022). The dominant language group in Iran is Persian (Farsi), of which there are 52.5 million native (L1) speakers in Iran as of 2019 (Eberhard et al., 2022).

In January 1921, Reza Khan was given command of the Persian Cossack Brigade by British General Edmund Ironside (Ghani, 2001). Soon after, Reza Khan used this force to occupy Tehran and dissolve the previous government of the Qajar Dynasty and install a new cabinet with Seyyed Zia as Prime Minister and himself as Minister of War (Ghani, 2001). In October 1923, Reza Khan was appointed as Prime Minister. Two years later, Iran's National Consultative Assembly (Majles) declared Reza Khan to be the Shah of Iran, formally ending the rule of the Qajar Dynasty (1789-1925) over Iran.

During the Qajar era, the Azerbaijani-dominated city of Tabriz was Iran's most active and prosperous trade center, primarily mediating commercial activity between Europe and the rest of Iran. Tabriz was also a politically influential city, hosting many consulates outside of Tehran and serving as the site of the Qajar Crown Prince's court (Atabaki, 2005). Importantly, the Qajar Dynasty used Turkish rather than Persian as the language of the court, while Persian was the literary language in regions of Iran where it was spoken (Shaffer, 2002, p. 27). Due to the city's advantageous position,

¹²¹ The true ethnic populations inside Iran are difficult to measure, as the last time data on ethnicity was gathered was in the 1976 Iranian census, which put the population proportion of Persians at 51% and Azeris at 25% (Ghanea & Hass, 2011). However, Ghanea and Hass (2011) note that the Pahlavi regime may have altered these figures for ideological reasons.

Tabriz became a center for progressive thinking in the region, producing many of the leaders of Iran's constitutional movement between 1905 and 1911. Azerbaijanis were also disproportionately more represented in Iran's representatives and foreign student population abroad (Taqizadeh, 1960).

Similar to his contemporary Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938), the ideological pillars of Reza Shah Pahlavi's (1925-1941) rule were defined by (Iranian) nationalism, secularism, modernization, centralization, and cultural assimilation. Turkey and Iran under Atatürk and Reza Shah Pahlavi maintained noticeably cordial diplomatic relations, a large part of which can be attributed to their amicable personal relationship. Both leaders strongly adhered to their beliefs on nation-building. In 1931, Atatürk was quoted in a now infamous speech as stating, "A person who says he belongs to the Turkish nation should in the first place and under all circumstances speak Turkish. It is not possible to believe a person's claims that he belongs to the Turkish nation and to Turkish culture if he does not speak Turkish" (Kieser, 2006, p. 44).

The late 19th and early 20th centuries, many countries adhered to the belief that modernization and nation-building would spare their country from foreign occupation, colonization, and poverty. Thus, the common ideological discourse in Iran during the 1920s was the danger of ethnolinguistic diversity to the national unity of Iran (Swietochowski, 1995). Thus, the ideological leaning of Reza Shah Pahlavi was largely consistent with the contemporary beliefs of the postwar Iranian intelligentsia and Turkey in particular, as well as those of Europe and Japan more generally. The autocratic character of Iranian nation-building was perhaps influenced by Iran's experience of being occupied by Russia between 1909 and 1918 (Atabaki, 2005).

In the several decades preceding Reza Shah Pahlavi's (1925-1941) overthrow of Qajar rule, the Iranian state exercised weak control over its periphery, which informally allowed much of the periphery to operate under *de facto* autonomy. Modernization and state centralization in Iran entailed the revocation of many regions' informal autonomy, including the northern Azerbaijani regions. Thus,

the early years of Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule were spent crushing a series of rebellions from Azerbaijanis,¹²² Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, Baluchis, Lurs, and the Shahseven tribesmen (Swietochowski, 1995; Karakuş, 2021).

7.2 *Initial Policies*

Under Pahlavi rule, the state employed a harsh approach toward Persianizing Azerbaijanis and other minority ethnolinguistic groups. From the perspective of the Persian-dominated Pahlavi state, Azerbaijanis, in particular, appeared to pose the biggest domestic threat to Iran's territorial integrity and national unity. I should note that these fears were not entirely unwarranted. Azerbaijanis are Iran's largest and linguistically distinct minority group, and one with transnational bordering kin in (Soviet) Azerbaijan, and to a lesser degree, in Turkey.¹²³ Furthermore, Azerbaijanis were viewed by the Pahlavi (and later Islamic Republic) regime as democratic agitators. In the chaos that followed the Russian withdrawal from Azerbaijan during World War I, Mohammad Khiyabani launched an uprising from Tabriz in April 1920, calling for liberal and democratic reforms.¹²⁴ The Qajar army suppressed this

¹²² Referring to Major Abu'l Qasim Lahuto Khan's revolt from Tabriz in February 1922. This was a short-lived mutiny largely sparked by a lack of pay to the local gendarmerie (Swietochowski, 1995).

¹²³ In 1923, the Turkish Hearth organized a conference in Istanbul on the question of Azerbaijan. At the conference, the pan-Turkist Roshani Beg condemned Iran for its repressive policies toward Azerbaijanis and called for the unification of Azerbaijan with the recently founded Republic of Turkey (Atabaki, 1993).

¹²⁴ Sources seem to disagree on the circumstances surrounding Khiyabani's uprising. All sources agree that the democratic uprising began in April 1920 but disagree on subsequent events. Atabaki (2005, pp. 33-34) states that Khiyabani was "also committed [to] preserving the country's territorial integrity and to the establishment of [an] Iranian nation-state, rather than to independent or even autonomous rule in Azerbaijan. In this area, his political demands did not go beyond seeking a fair distribution of executive powers between the central government and local authorities throughout Iran."

On the other hand, Shaffer (2002) states that Khiyabani did threaten to secede from Iran if his demands were not met but that Khiyabani initially seemed committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of Iran. Shaffer (2002, p. 48) also notes that "When the Shah rejected their demands, Khiyabani proceeded to take over and govern the whole province of Azerbaijan, establishing the autonomous government of Azadistan in April 1920." Souleimanov et al. (2013, p. 73) claim that "In July 1920, separatists [Khiyabani] declared part of southern Azerbaijan an independent territory called 'Azadistan'... 'Within less than three months, the Persian army regained control of the unrecognized territory.'" This claim would place the end of the uprising in September 1920. Ahmadoghlu (2019, pp. 7-8) states that Khiyabani named the new province "Azadistan" in April and, on June 23, 1920, "announced the establishment of the National Government of Azadistan." Ahmadoghlu (2019) cites Khiyabani through an inaccessible Persian-language source but does provide a relatively more detailed description of the Khiyabani uprising compared to other sources cited here.

uprising in September 1920. The brief uprising did, however, make a lasting impression on Reza Khan. In order to formulate a strong national and unified Persian identity, the Pahlavi regime placed particular emphasis on assimilating Azerbaijanis. To this end, the government employed severe language restrictions.

As with the South Tyroleans in Italy and the Amazigh in Algeria, the Pahlavi regime promoted a revisionist historical narrative that rejected the foundations of Azerbaijani ethnolinguistic identity. Azerbaijanis were taught that they were actually Turkified Iranians. In a pamphlet titled “The Azari Language” (*Zaban-i Azari ya zaban-i bastani Azarbaijan*), the prominent Azerbaijani intellectual Ahmad Kasravi claimed that Azerbaijanis and other Turkic-language speakers in Iran were originally Persian-speakers who were forced to adopt Turkic languages beginning in the 11th¹²⁵ century (Swietochowski, 1995; Shaffer, 2002).¹²⁶ In his later book “Eighteen Years of History in Azerbaijan” (*Tarikh-i Hijdah Saleh-i Azarbaijan*), Kasravi (1967) argued that linguistic heterogeneity and tribal loyalties were to blame for Iran’s backwardness. This revisionist narrative also had racist undertones, as Azerbaijanis were also viewed as the descendants of culturally inferior marauding Turkish nomadic tribes that regularly swept through the Iranian Plateau prior to the rise of gunpowder empires (Souleimanov, 2010).¹²⁷ Similar to Ettore Tolomei and his publication *Archivio per l’Alto Adige*, the magazine *Ayandeh* was edited by the influential nationalist thinker Mahmud Afshar. In early 1925, Afshar wrote an editorial stating:

“Achieving national unity means that the Persian language must be established throughout the whole country, that regional differences in clothing, customs and such like must disappear...

From these sources, one can see disagreement on whether Kheyabani ever claimed independence or autonomy and disagreement on the month when “Azadistan”—as a “national government,” “independent territory,” or “autonomous government”—was declared. I accept the version of events as described by Ahmadoghlu (2019) due to the author’s more granular description of events.

¹²⁵ Shaffer (2002) mentions the 10th century but is referring to the alleged Turkification of the Caucasus region after the invasions of the Seljuk Turks in the mid-late 11th century.

¹²⁶ Rahimli (2003) recounts one instance where a state official used the occasion of a funeral ceremony to lecture attending Azerbaijanis on their ‘true’ Persian ethnic roots.

¹²⁷ Prior to the 1990s, children of mixed Azerbaijani-Persian parents commonly claimed Persian nationality. Similar to the Amazigh in Algeria living outside of Amazigh regions, Azerbaijani families living outside of Azerbaijan taught their children Persian and avoided speaking Azeri in public to avoid ridicule (Souleimanov et al., 2013).

Kurds, Lors, Qashqais, Arabs, Turks, Turkmen, etc., shall not differ from one another by wearing different clothes or by speaking different languages... unless national unity is achieved in Iran... there will always be the possibility that our political independence and geographical integrity will be endangered... Thousands of low-priced attractive books and treatises in the Persian language must be distributed throughout the country, especially in Azerbaijan and Khuzistan... Certain Persian-speaking tribes could be sent to regions where a foreign language is spoken and be settled there, while the tribes of that region, who speak a foreign language, could be transferred and settled in Persian-speaking areas. Geographical names in foreign languages or any souvenirs of the marauding and raids of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane should be replaced by Persian names. The country should be divided from an administrative point of view if the goal of national unity is to be achieved.” (Atabaki, 1993, pp. 56-57).

While the Pahlavi regime never attempted to suppress Azerbaijani customs or clothing, it did ultimately pursue the spirit of Afshar’s proposals. The Pahlavi regime started with the education system by replacing the traditional religious schools with modern primary schools and “increased their number from 440 in 1922 to 2,401 in 1942” (Atabaki, 1993, p. 58). The number of students enrolled in primary and secondary schools rose similarly. In 1923, Reza Khan—likely in his capacity as Prime Minister—issued a directive that mandated the use of Persian in all official written documents (Yenisey, 2009; Ahmadoghlu, 2019). The directive further mandated the exclusive use of Persian as the language of instruction at all levels of education, effectively banning the use of local languages in Azeri, Kurdish, and Arab schools (Shaffer, 2002; Yenisey, 2009; Souleimanov, 2010; Souleimanov et al., 2013; Heidari, 2023).¹²⁸ Shaffer (2002) describes how some Azerbaijani teachers were forced to teach lessons in broken Persian to students who then responded in broken Persian. Some teachers were also beaten or fined for using Azeri in their classrooms (Shaffer, 2002), and students were fined, beaten, or purposefully isolated as punishment for using Azeri during breaks (Rahimli, 2003; Yenisey, 2009). Heidari (2023) further discusses the extent to which school administrators were allowed to use

¹²⁸ Atabaki (1993, p. 58) notes that by 1930, Arabic was completely removed from the primary school curriculum.

force to spread and promote Persian. The use of non-Persian languages was also banned in court proceedings, likely in 1923 (Jannatoglu, 2016; Ahmadoghlu, 2019).¹²⁹

Beginning in 1926, all government-appointed state officers and high-ranking bureaucrats in Azerbaijan were Persian-speakers (Mustafayev, 1998). Azerbaijanis proficient in Persian were only allowed to hold subordinate positions (Mustafayev, 1998).¹³⁰ In 1934, the regime banned all Azeri-language books, and the government further tried to confiscate all existing Azeri-language books in circulation with a particular emphasis on schools (Swietochowski, 1995; Ahmadoghlu, 2019).¹³¹ In the same year, the government mandated the use of Persian in all mail correspondence (Mustafayev, 1998), banned the use of Azeri in theatrical performances and religious ceremonies (Swietochowski, 1995; Werner, 2014),¹³² and closed the oldest theater in Tabriz “based on its perceived deviation from Persian norms and standards” (Heidari, 2023, p. 84). The government further closed many other minority-language newspapers, magazines, and journals (Shaffer, 2002; Atabaki, 2005; Souleimanov, 2010; Heidari, 2023). As noted by Shaffer (2002), the ban on minority-language books and publications

¹²⁹ Ahmadoghlu (2019, p. 9) mentions that the ban on the use of Azeri in courts occurred during “The two decades of [Reza Shah] Pahlavi rule, which lasted from 1921 to 1941.” However, it is unlikely that this ban was imposed before Reza Shah Pahlavi became Prime Minister in 1923.

¹³⁰ The coding for this policy is split between language restriction severity and minority exclusion. The prohibition on the employment of minority individuals for high-ranking bureaucratic positions is considered a policy of minority exclusion (political), while the requirement of proficiency in Persian for subordinate bureaucratic positions is considered a language restriction (Administration, Employment).

¹³¹ Swietochowski (1995, p. 122) mentions that the ban on the use of Azeri on school premises was introduced “in the 1930s.” Due to the more precise dates offered by Ahmadoghlu (2019) and Yenisey (2009), the language restriction on schools is coded as beginning in 1923. Swietochowski (1995) further mentions a ban on the use of Azeri in theatrical performances, religious ceremonies, and the publication of books “in the 1930s.” Given that this statement includes “...and the publication of books,” this likely is connected to Ahmadoghlu’s (2019) statement that the ban on the use of Azeri in the publication of books took effect in 1934. Thus, I align the bans on the use of Azeri in the publication of books, theatrical performances, and religious ceremonies. The inferred start date for the ban on the use of Azeri in theatrical performances and religious ceremonies is set in 1934.

¹³² Werner (2014, p. 216) mentions how this led to a “paradoxical situation in that Azeri operettas were translated into Persian in order to be performed in the Azeri environment of Tabriz in the 1930s.” Werner (2014, p. 219) further notes that despite the exclusive use of Persian in promotional announcements for theater performances and the government’s attempts to ban performances in non-Persian languages, “we can well assume that a majority of the actual dramas and operettas were not performed in Persian, but in Azeri Turkish.” This clarification serves to somewhat nullify this language restriction in the LRSI coding for this case. This was most likely a result of the overall lack of Persian-speaking performers at the time.

was most impactful on the Azerbaijani community, who were more urbanized and owned more publications and media institutions in comparison with other minority ethnic groups in Iran. Consistent with Afshar's proposal, Iranian officials also changed existing Azeri place names to be shown in Persian and effectively banned Azerbaijani parents from giving their children non-Persian first names (Shaffer, 2002; Rudaw, 2014; Ahmadoghlu, 2019; Mirshekari & Ketilate, 2020; Hussein, 2022; Chalabi, 2023; Heidari, 2023).

During the Qajar period and throughout most of Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule, Iran was divided into the four provinces (*iyalat*) of Fars, Khorasan, Kerman-Sistan, and Azerbaijan (Atabaki, 2005). In late 1937, this too was changed when the government divided the Azerbaijan region into two provinces (East and West Azerbaijan), with some traditional Azerbaijani areas incorporated into neighboring provinces where Azerbaijanis would constitute a minority (Swietochowski, 1995; Shaffer, 2002). As a result of centralization policies, investments in economic development were focused primarily in the central provinces in and around Tehran. Between 1928 and 1930, the government also ended economic, cultural, and educational ties, as well as transborder migratory rights with the Soviet Union and Soviet Azerbaijan (Atabaki, 1993). This decision prevented many Azerbaijanis from traveling to Baku in Soviet Azerbaijan for seasonal work (Shaffer, 2005) and massively reduced the amount of trade coming through Azerbaijan. The centralization program also heavily discriminated against Azerbaijan and the broader periphery, as the provinces collected far more tax revenues than they received back from Tehran. Swietochowski (1995, p. 123) mentions one particular instance where, despite having a population only three times the size of West Azerbaijan, Tehran received a budget allocation twenty times greater. Such was the extent of Azerbaijan's economic regression that Azerbaijan contributed only 1.1% of Iran's total industrial output between 1940 and 1941 (Rahimli, 2003, p. 26).

The economic regression of the Azerbaijani provinces was likely a consequence of the centralization policies imposed throughout the country and some amount of deliberate discrimination. The government made a deliberate choice to cut off Azerbaijanis from their ethnic kin in Soviet Azerbaijan and encourage economic immigration to Tehran or elsewhere in Iran to accelerate assimilation (Shaffer, 2002).¹³³ Echoing this sentiment, Katouzian (1981) argues that the use of cultural repression, economic exclusion, and social discrimination were deliberately employed by the Pahlavi regime in order to facilitate assimilation and possibly also as punishment for Azerbaijanis' participation in the Khiyabani uprising in 1920. Thus, by the end of Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign, the Azerbaijan region regressed from relative prosperity to poverty (Ahmadoghlu, 2019). These acts served as the first instances of political and economic exclusion against the Azerbaijani minority, as they effectively limited Azerbaijani political control and severely limited economic opportunities for Azerbaijanis living in their own region.

7.3 *Popular Backlash and Later Policies*

In August 1941, the British Empire and the Soviet Union launched a joint invasion of Iran.¹³⁴ The six-day invasion resulted in, among other things, Reza Shah Pahlavi's forced abdication and exile in favor of his son, Crown Prince Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The aftermath of the Anglo-

¹³³ Citing Wilber (1975), Swietochowski (1995) mentions that the severance of economic, cultural, and educational ties came as a result of the 1930 espionage scandal between Iran and the Soviet Union. A Soviet diplomat revealed an extensive spy network of Iranian officials, as well as Moscow's intention to separate the Azerbaijani and Kurdish regions from Iran. Swietochowski (1995) implies that this was the impetus behind the Pahlavi regime's decision to subdivide the Azerbaijani region. One could argue that there are plausible arguments that the economic regression of Azerbaijan was simply the result of the perceived necessity to prevent Soviet agitation and the ongoing centralization program. I take the view that the regime's tolerance of social discrimination toward Azerbaijanis and severance of educational ties with Soviet Azerbaijan point to these policies being at least partially motivated by a desire to economically deprive the Azerbaijani minority in order to accelerate assimilation and reduce the political and economic influence of Tabriz.

¹³⁴ The Allied invasion of Iran occurred due to a combination of suspicions of pro-German sympathies from Reza Shah Pahlavi, fears that Iranian oil fields would fall under German control, and a desire to secure the Persian Corridor route through which American material support via the Lend-Lease Act could reach Allied powers. As Farrokh (2011, p. 268) notes, Iran's turn to seek German assistance in its industrial drive was at least in part due to their rejection by the United States and wariness of cooperating with the British or Russians.

Soviet invasion of Iran exposed the public's previously suppressed but deep-seated resentment toward state centralization. With the authoritarian grip of Reza Shah Pahlavi relaxed, a period of intense sociopolitical instability began. Concealed religious tensions between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, Jews, Zoroastrians, Bahá'í, and Christians during Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign boiled over during the Anglo-Soviet occupation. At the same time, the British consul warned that an Allied withdrawal from Iran would lead to an eruption in religious, class, and ethnolinguistic violence.¹³⁵ Ethnolinguistic tensions were particularly palpable in the Azerbaijani, Arab, and Kurdish regions—groups that experienced severe language restrictions under Reza Shah Pahlavi since the 1920s. As noted by Abrahamian (1982, p. 175), speaking in reference to the Kurdish and Arab regions, “The Iranian authorities had to make long detours to avoid the numerous small independent republics that had appeared since August 1941.”

In Azerbaijan, intense language grievances led to the establishment of the largest of the newly declared independent republics. The Soviet invasion route through Azerbaijan triggered an exodus of Iranian authorities from Azerbaijan. The provincial commission that filled this new power vacuum immediately “refused to recognize the central government, demanded the right to use Azeri in schools, and raised a volunteer militia from the *Muhajirin* (immigrants)—some 5,000 Turkish-speaking Iranians...” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 175). The Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan also brought a renewal of contacts between Iranian and Soviet Azerbaijan, while the Soviets dismantled many border installations separating them (Spector, 1959). The Soviets further placed primarily Azeri-speaking troops in Iranian Azerbaijan and helped produce many Azeri-language publications and broadcasts once banned by the Pahlavi regime. These publications, likely by direction from Baku and Moscow, often told of the shared ethnic roots of Iranian and Soviet Azerbaijanis and encouraged ideas of ethnic

¹³⁵ For specific examples of religious and ethnolinguistic tensions and conflict during the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, see Abrahamian (1982, p. 174).

difference between Azerbaijanis and Persians, but initially discouraged separatist sentiments (Shaffer, 2002; Abrahamian, 1982). One newspaper based in Tabriz wrote, “What is the cause of Azerbaijan’s misfortune? The main cause is the lack of unity within the nation of Azerbaijan. Others have been able to manipulate and exploit us because of our internal unity... We will gain our rights only when we put aside these differences and unite against our exploiters in Tehran... Our main aim, however, is to protect the democratic right of the people to use their mother language... Azerbaijanis are not and have never been Persian-speakers” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 176).

Overall, the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan led to a temporary relaxation in almost all of the Pahlavi regime’s policies of minority exclusion and language restrictions, save for the education and public signage restrictions that remained due to a lack of Azeri-speaking teachers or funds to replace them immediately. In addition to having the freedom to print their own publications and make radio broadcasts in Azeri, Azerbaijanis were also de facto permitted to speak their language in public, the provincial bureaucracies, schools, and most other parts of Azerbaijani society. The newfound political and cultural freedoms given to Azerbaijanis during this brief period led to the consolidation of an oppositional Azerbaijani identity in Azerbaijan.¹³⁶

Determined to secure oil concessions from Iran, Joseph Stalin ordered the creation of a separatist movement in Azerbaijan and placed Mir Bagirov—the leader of Soviet Azerbaijan—in charge of the operation (Ahmadoghlu, 2019). On July 6, 1945, the Soviet Politburo issued a decree to Bagirov titled “Measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces in Northern Iran” (Wilson Center, 2011). To this end, the decree ordered the creation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (*Firqeh Dimokrat Azurbayjan*, ADP) under the leadership of Ja’far

¹³⁶ This phenomenon was particular but not exclusive to Azerbaijan. Prior to the Anglo-Soviet invasion, there were only 12 newspapers and periodicals in Iran. By 1947, this number grew to 580 (Atabaki, 1993, p. 65). Similarly, 21 new political parties—including the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party—appeared in the same period (Atabaki, 1993, p. 65).

Pishevari.¹³⁷ The decree further called for the establishment of equal cultural rights, the publication and distribution of several magazines and newspapers, small arms supplies for Azerbaijani separatist combatants, as well as the development of further separatist movements in the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan, and Khorasan (Wilson Center, 2011).

In October 1945, the ADP seized control of Azerbaijan under the protection of Soviet troops and established the Provincial Government of Azerbaijan (Shaffer, 2002). After Tehran rejected Pishevari's demands for full autonomy for Azerbaijan, the National Majles (parliament) of Azerbaijan declared the establishment of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan in December 1945 (Ahmadoghlu, 2019). Within its first several months in power, the ADP launched numerous successful reforms in an attempt to boost popular support for autonomy. Some of these reforms included universal female suffrage, land redistribution to peasants,¹³⁸ the establishment of new public transit systems, and industrial policies to restart factory production. The ADP also enacted many popular cultural policies, including the officialization of Azerbaijani; the establishment of the University of Tabriz; the construction of primary schools, secondary schools, libraries, national museums, and theaters; the establishment of new Azeri-language radio stations; and sponsored Azeri-language musicals and plays (Ghods, 1989; Swietochowski, 1995; Ahmadoghlu, 2019).¹³⁹ At the start of the school year in September 1946, all schools began using Azeri as the language of instruction (Swietochowski, 1995). Going further, one bill passed by the autonomous Azerbaijani parliament banned the use of non-Azeri languages in education, trade, and public administration (Atabaki, 1993).

The successes of ADP governance in Azerbaijan initially gave the party broad popular support. However, Pishevari's increasingly confrontational stance toward Tehran led to rumors of secession

¹³⁷ The next month, the entirety of the Azerbaijani provincial branch of the Soviet-supported Tudeh Party in Iran immediately defected to join the ADP (Emami-Yeganeh, 1984; Shaffer, 2002).

¹³⁸ Of the non-cultural reforms, the land reform was the most significant. Atabaki (1993, p. 150) notes that "a total of 380,000 hectares of land was designated to be given free of charge to new peasant owners."

¹³⁹ Per Ghods (1989, p. 547), the government "built eighty-two high schools and 325 elementary schools."

despite the ADP's constant declarations of its commitment to remaining part of Iran (Swietochowski, 1995).¹⁴⁰ The possibility of secession was fraught with fears over possible Soviet annexation and oppression, particularly among those Azerbaijanis who relied on commercial ties with Tehran for their livelihoods, as well as the Shi'a clergy, who viewed secession as a threat to the unity of Shi'a Islam (Ahmadoghlu, 2019). In September 1945, the ADP abolished the Iranian national anthem and designed a new flag for the Autonomous Republic (Emami-Yeganeh, 1984). Paired with an economy now weakened by the severance of economic and trade ties with Tehran and the introduction of the draft for potential armed resistance, popular support for the ADP began to decline in mid-late 1946 (Ahmadoghlu, 2019).

More consequential was the Soviet withdrawal from Azerbaijan. As early as April 1946, the Soviet Union began pulling its support for the ADP as it negotiated oil concessions with Tehran. With waning Soviet support, ideological differences between the communist and Azerbaijani nationalist factions within the ADP began to tear the party apart (Ahmadoghlu, 2019). In May 1946, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Azerbaijan after securing conditional oil concessions from Tehran. In December 1946, the Iranian army entered Azerbaijan, and the ADP immediately overruled Pishvari and ordered the provisional forces to surrender.¹⁴¹ The ADP's terms of surrender were short, but emphasized the importance they placed on the language issue. The demands included the right of Azerbaijanis to educate their children in Azerbaijani and the retention of a portion of tax revenues collected in the province (Shaffer, 2002). Not only were these terms not honored, but the Iranian army's occupation of Azerbaijan led to many casualties and a mass exodus of Azerbaijanis to Soviet

¹⁴⁰ Atabaki (1993) and Shaffer (2002) provide evidence that Pishvari threatened to secede if Tehran did not grant full autonomy to Azerbaijan.

¹⁴¹ For more detailed discussions on why Azerbaijani resistance failed so spectacularly and why the Soviets failed to provide expected aid to the province in the event of an Iranian entry into Azerbaijan, see Hasanli (2006, pp. 377-381) and Atabaki (1993, pp. 175-184).

Azerbaijan (Abrahamian, 1982; Emami-Yeganeh, 1984; Atabaki, 1993; Swietochowski, 1995; Atabaki, 2000; Shaffer, 2002; Atabaki, 2005; Ahmadoghlu, 2019).¹⁴²

Restrictions were immediately reimposed. According to Hasanli (2006, p. 376), “Textbooks and manuals published by the [ADP] national government were piled and burnt. Teaching in Azeri was prohibited. The Azerbaijan University [University of Tabriz], National Theatre, Philharmonic Society, and museums were closed. Monuments to Sattarkhan, Baghirkhan, and Khiyabani were destroyed.¹⁴³ Press in Azeri was prohibited. The newspapers *Ariya* and *Tabriz* advanced “irrefutable arguments” that no Azerbaijani nation had ever existed.” Swietochowski (1995, p. 170) adds that “...Azeri radio programs were halted, Persian again was declared the only official language.” Determined to force Persianization, the government announced plans to rebuild and open the schools, libraries, and university (Swietochowski, 1995). However, the government did not have the resources to re-Persianize Azerbaijan in the immediate years following the collapse of the autonomous republic. By the end of 1949, Tehran newspapers reported that classes in the state schools in Azerbaijan still used Azeri as the language of instruction (Swietochowski, 1995).

After the ADP declared autonomy in December 1945, most politicians in Tehran condemned the move—comments that were not publicized in the Azerbaijani press (Atabaki, 1993). As a member of parliament (Majles) in 1945, Mohammad Mossadegh was an unimpeachable Iranian nationalist who deviated from the indignant attitude of politicians in Tehran in admitting that Azerbaijan had legitimate grounds for grievance (Atabaki, 1993; Swietochowski, 1995).¹⁴⁴ During the premiership of Mohammad Mossadegh (1951-1953), some of the political and language restrictions were relaxed

¹⁴² Estimates on the number of dead range enormously, from between 330-30,000 dead. A further 10,000-15,000 fled to Soviet Azerbaijan (Abrahamian, 1982; Atabaki, 1993; Shaffer, 2002; Hasanli, 2006).

¹⁴³ Sattarkhan and Baghirkhan were important figures in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. Unlike the closure of the Azerbaijani museums, the destruction of these monuments is not coded as an act of political exclusion since they do not represent “physical symbols of a minority’s identity.”

¹⁴⁴ Mossadegh spoke Azerbaijani and served as the Governor of Azerbaijan in 1922.

throughout Iran. This largely impacted Azerbaijani cultural associations in and around Tehran and allowed for a limited amount of Azeri-language literary activity to take place. Unfortunately, Mossadegh's premiership was cut short by a joint US-British-Pahlavi coup d'état in August 1953. After Mossadegh's ouster, the Azerbaijani newspapers and publications permitted under his premiership were once again banned by order of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (Shaffer, 2002).

In the decade after the coup, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi consolidated power, placed the coup leaders in key political positions, and received technical assistance from the United States and Israel to establish a secret police force (*Sazman-i Ittila'at va Amniyat-i Keshvar*, SAVAK) (Abrahamian, 1982). With a strengthened crown, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi effectively outlawed all other political parties and introduced constitutional amendments that strengthened his political power vis-à-vis the Majles (Abrahamian, 1982). Mohammad Reza Pahlavi also continued his father's program of Persian nationalism, secularism, modernization, centralization, and cultural assimilation. During this time, Iran experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization without any serious challenges to Pahlavi rule, due in part to the repressive operations of the SAVAK.

As a result of the continued migration of Azerbaijanis from the north and into the center, Azerbaijanis came to form large communities in Tehran and many of Iran's major cities. In Tehran, the Azerbaijani population even surpassed the Azerbaijani population in Tabriz (Atabaki, 2005). As during the premiership of Mossadegh, the ban on Azeri-language publishing in the late 1940s and early 1950s was, as noted by Swietochowski (1995, p. 171), "neither airtight nor uninterrupted, particularly in poetry and folk literature," with several Azeri-language publications spreading and being republished in Turkey and Soviet Azerbaijan. Following years of unpopular economic and land reforms, the Pahlavi regime faced major popular protests in June 1963, spearheaded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the opposition National Front party.

During the 1960s and 1970s, modernizing economic reforms and programs were implemented, and industrialization accelerated. The oil boom beginning in 1956 and peaking in the mid-1970s caused the national income to increase sharply. While the spoils of the oil boom were largely redirected toward industries in the Persian center, some of this newfound prosperity did spread to Azerbaijan and the broader periphery.¹⁴⁵ Aghajanian (1983, p. 218) presents data from a 1973 Iranian government report showing that 21% of Persian families living in the center were at a poverty level of consumption compared to 32% and 35% of families in East and West Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Aghajanian (1983, pp. 216-217) uses the 1966 and 1976 Iranian census reports to show changes in literacy rates and availability of housing with electricity and piped water between 1966 and 1976 (SCI, 1966, 1976).

From 1966 to 1976, the literacy rate among Persians in the central provinces increased (49.6% → 66.1%), along with literacy rates in East Azerbaijan (20.5% → 36.3%) (Aghajanian, 1983).¹⁴⁶ During the same period, the Persian center saw an increase in the proportion of houses with electricity (55.7% → 80.7) and an increase in the proportion of houses with piped water (68.7% → 74.9%) (Aghajanian, 1983). Meanwhile, East Azerbaijani households saw similar increases in electrification (16.6% → 36%) and access to piped water (7.4% → 25.6%). The improvements in West Azerbaijan in electrification (13% → 28.9%) and piped water (7.1% → 24.3%) mirrored those in East Azerbaijan. Finally, Abrahamian (1982, p. 449) mentions that “the percentage of children in school was 74 percent in Tehran, but as low as 44 percent in West Azerbaijan... Tehran had one doctor for every 974 people...

¹⁴⁵ Shaffer (2002) and Swietochowski (1995) differ on the extent to which Azerbaijanis shared in the oil boom revenues. Per Shaffer (2002, p. 70), “the ethnic minorities in the provinces gained little from the overall improvement of the Iranian economy that came with the oil boom.” Per Swietochowski (1995, p. 179), “With some limitations, Azerbaijan shared in the unprecedented prosperity of the Iranian oil boom...”

¹⁴⁶ For a more detailed discussion of the impact of the Iranian Literacy Corps and its use as a tool of Persianization, see Sabahi (2001).

one nurse per 1,820 people... East Azerbaijan had one doctor per 5,589... one nurse per 12,712 people.”

These figures serve as inconclusive pieces of evidence of the Pahlavi regime’s policy of exclusion toward the Azerbaijani minority. From one perspective, such dramatic increases in literacy and economic well-being may be indicative of the central state allowing the periphery to share in the benefits of the oil boom. In another, these indicators reveal the economic deprivation of the periphery prior to the oil boom. Importantly, the first Iranian census was conducted in 1956 and contained only demographic data (age, sex, population, location). Other data on access to health, education, electricity, piped water, etc., are largely absent prior to 1960. On the one hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that the Azerbaijan region should have been more prosperous, at least in the half-century prior to the 1920s. However, the lack of relevant older socioeconomic data prevents the use of any of these particular points as evidence of minority exclusion.¹⁴⁷

In any case, the oil boom led to an unquestionably large and highly visible increase in class inequality. Paired with perceptions of growing ethnic inequality among minority groups on the periphery, popular resentment toward the Pahlavi regime steadily increased throughout the 1970s. Perhaps as a measure to ease Azerbaijani resentments, the Pahlavi regime conceded to a few of their demands for local language use in the 1970s. Specifically, the regime granted permission for the publication of a few Azeri-language books and the use of Azeri in some lectures at the University of Tabriz (Swietochowski, 1995; Shaffer, 2002).

In spite of these minimal concessions, Tabriz became the second city after Qom to launch a major protest as part of the nascent Iranian Revolution (Jan. 1978 - Feb. 1979).¹⁴⁸ Following the

¹⁴⁷ Previously discussed evidence regarding centralization policies and budget allocation discrepancies may be used as evidence of minority exclusion. It should also be noted that other minorities—particularly the Baluchis—fared significantly worse than Azerbaijanis.

¹⁴⁸ As language-related motivations or grievances were not central to the Iranian Revolution, neither this event nor the Iranian Revolution are considered as popular backlash events.

revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1979-1989) returned from exile to become the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran in February 1979. Despite the importance of Azerbaijani participation in the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Azerbaijan almost immediately revolted against the new clerical regime.

In the first days after the revolution, the clerical regime lifted or relaxed several restrictions or bans on the use of Azeri. Azeri-language newspapers, books, and cultural and literary organizations began proliferating throughout Azerbaijan and Tehran (Swietochowski, 1995). In February 1979, a new Azeri political party was founded as the Muslim People's Islamic Republic Party (*Khalq*) with the endorsement of Ayatollah Mohammad Shari'atmadari and called for Azerbaijani autonomy and a reduction in the political power of the clergy (Swietochowski, 1995). Shari'atmadari was also the driving force behind the successful boycott of the December 1979 constitutional referendum in Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, and Kurdistan (Swietochowski, 1995).¹⁴⁹ The referendum passed with 99.5% of voters in approval and an abstention rate of 80% (Swietochowski, 1995). Following the ratification of the new constitution, Ayatollah Khomeini addressed concerns from ethnic minorities on the periphery: "These people should not be called minorities, because this term assumes that there is a difference between these brothers. In Islam, such a difference has no place at all... It is very probable that such problems have been created by those who do not wish the Muslim countries to be united... Their plan is to destroy Islam and Islamic philosophy" (Elling, 2012).

Several days after the referendum, an attack on Shari'atmadari's house in Qom triggered a rebellion in Tabriz. Shari'atmadari's followers seized government buildings and the national (radio and television) broadcasting station in Tabriz. From there, they broadcasted their demands for a rather minimal level of political autonomy and the abolition of censorship in the local media (Randal, 1979;

¹⁴⁹ Since the boycott was largely motivated by concerns over clerical involvement in politics and the draconian punishments employed by revolutionaries, this event is not recorded as a popular backlash event.

Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, 2022).¹⁵⁰ Government forces recaptured the station several days later, and violent rival protests and clashes between Khomeini and Shari'atmadari supporters continued until mid-January. The suppression of Shari'atmadari's rebellion resulted in at least 17 executions by the state and 41 deaths during the unrest in Tabriz, in addition to the closure of numerous Azeri-language publications in Azerbaijan under the guise of countering pan-Turkist and pro-Soviet agitation (Swietochowski, 1995; Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, 2022). In April 1982, Khomeini stripped Shari'atmadari of his honorific title and placed him under house arrest without medical treatment (Shaffer, 2000).¹⁵¹ In response, his supporters rioted in Tabriz in April 1982 (Schahgaldian & Barkhordarian, 1987).

Since Pishevari's rebellion in 1945-1946, Azerbaijani demands for greater autonomy have been linked to demands for more language freedoms. The central grievance behind Shari'atmadari's rebellion was the intrusion of clerics into political life and the draconian punishments used by the revolutionary clerical regime. Although Shari'atmadari and *Khalq* included limited demands for Azerbaijani political autonomy, language grievances are not mentioned as key motivations or demands. After the referendum, many Azerbaijanis came to the dawning realization that the clerical regime did not intend to end the Pahlavi regime's Persianization policies. This realization likely contributed to Azerbaijani unrest and increased support for the rival Ayatollah Shari'atmadari.¹⁵²

In the months after the rebellion, Article 15 of the new constitution guaranteeing the right of ethnic minorities to use their language in publications and education was reinterpreted to mean that Azerbaijani could only be used in literature classes or classes teaching the Azerbaijani language itself

¹⁵⁰ The implication behind this demand is for the end of restrictions on the language used in media (Azeri) and the more extreme content restrictions imposed since the revolution.

¹⁵¹ Shari'atmadari was 76 years old in 1982.

¹⁵² As such, this event is considered as indirectly motivated by language grievances in evaluating the level of popular backlash in this case study.

(Swietochowski, 1995).¹⁵³ Instruction in all other subjects was to be given exclusively in Persian. However, the scope and intensity of Persianization efforts in post-1979 Iran were reduced relative to the Pahlavi era. Combined with the shift of Iranian national identity to one centered on Shi'a Islam rather than Persian, Azeri nationalist unrest largely disappeared until the 1990s.¹⁵⁴ Despite promising to re-evaluate the Pahlavi subdivision of Azerbaijani provinces (Swietochowski, 1995) and grant minorities a greater amount of cultural and administrative autonomy (Karakuş, 2021), the new clerical regime instead further subdivided Azerbaijan and continued the Pahlavi regime's cultural assimilation program, albeit less severely. In 1993, Ardabil detached from East Azerbaijan ("Provinces of Iran," 2016). In 1996, the province of Qazvin was formed from parts of Zanjan province ("Provinces of Iran," 2016). In these new provinces, Souleimanov (2010, p. 79) states that Tehran "continued to almost exclusively put Persians into office as leaders there."¹⁵⁵

The 1990s witnessed a sharp increase in Azerbaijani popular backlash against the state. In October 1991, the dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in the establishment of an independent Azerbaijani state (Republic of Azerbaijan) north of the Araxes River. At the same time, the growing economic and cultural influence of Turkey resulted in increased economic links between Iranian Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as the spread of illegal Turkish satellite broadcasts into Azerbaijani households.¹⁵⁶ Combined with increasing disapproval of the theocratic clerical regime, more

¹⁵³ The revised Article 15 of the 1979 Iranian constitution states "The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as textbooks, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed *in addition to* Persian."

¹⁵⁴ Souleimanov et al. (2013) mention increased social discrimination toward Azerbaijanis near the end of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), but do not provide many examples.

¹⁵⁵ The Pahlavi practice of putting Persian-speaking leaders in Azerbaijani provinces was continued by the post-1979 government. One of the autonomist demands of the Shari'atmadari rebellion was the right for Azerbaijanis to appoint their own local governors.

¹⁵⁶ Per Souleimanov and Kraus (2017), the use of satellite receivers to watch Turkish or [Republic of Azerbaijan] Azerbaijani television is technically illegal but tentatively tolerated by Tehran to avoid inflaming Azerbaijani grievances. As evidence of the effect of Turkish broadcasting in Azerbaijan, Alikhan (2008) finds that since the early 2000s, there has been a significant increase in the use of Anatolian Turkish-isms in the Azerbaijani language.

Azerbaijanis distanced themselves from a national identification tied to the Iranian state and the national Shi'a religious identity (Souleimanov et al., 2013). Much like the 1979 revolution redefined Iranian nationalism from a primarily Persian cultural and linguistic identity to one centered on Shi'a Islam, the weakening of Azerbaijani alignment with the theocratic regime spurred a renewed identification with the ethnic identities that characterized the *ancien régime*. As a result, demands for more cultural rights and even autonomy or secession resurfaced in a significant manner for the first time since Pishevari's 1945-1946 rebellion.

In 1994, Piruz Dilanchi founded the separatist South Azerbaijan National Liberation Movement (CAMAH). CAMAH's stated goals are to acquire political (democratic), economic, and cultural autonomy for Azerbaijan while remaining within the Iranian state.¹⁵⁷ One year later, former Turkish linguistics professor Mahmudali Çehregani founded the irredentist South Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement (GAMOH) (Souleimanov & Kraus, 2017). In 1996, Çehregani registered as a candidate in the 1996 Iranian legislative election, campaigning on issues of cultural and linguistic discrimination against Azeri. Çehregani won in the first round of voting but was then arrested and disqualified from the second-round ballot by the electoral commission in Tabriz, likely on orders from Tehran (Human Rights Watch, 1997; Çehregani, 2013).¹⁵⁸ This act triggered demonstrations in Tabriz in support of Çehregani, which involved up to 40,000 participants (Human Rights Watch, 1997). In early 1999, Çehregani was appointed as the head of the CAMAH Central Committee (CAMAH, 2002). In December 1999, the government once more arrested Çehregani to prevent him from registering as a candidate in the upcoming legislative elections in February 2000 (Amnesty International, 2000). Tried

¹⁵⁷ In the case of liberation through diplomatic talks. In the case of liberation through armed rebellion, CAMAH calls for secession from Iran (CAMAH, n.d.-a).

¹⁵⁸ Çehregani's Turkish linguistics course was closed by orders from Tehran sometime 1996 (Souleimanov & Kraus, 2017). This event is included as a language restriction under the Education - Higher category and indicator.

by a Revolutionary Court “on charges including smuggling shampoo,” Çehregani spent six months in prison, where he was tortured (Amnesty International, 2000; Souleimanov & Kraus, 2017).

Dilanchi was similarly barred from registering as a candidate in the February 2000 legislative elections (Piruz Dilanchi, n.d.). In December 2002, Dilanchi was covertly kidnapped and kept in prison until pressure from the Azeri media resulted in his transfer to house arrest (Piruz Dilanchi, n.d.). In January 2002, Çehregani was removed from his position as the head of the CAMAH Central Committee in January 2002 due to strategic disagreements with Dilanchi (CAMAH, 2002). Keen to keep its founders away from prison, the Azerbaijan National Resistance Organization (AMDT) was founded by persons unknown in March 2006 (Diranish, 2007). Similar to CAMAH, GAMOH, and Pishevari’s ADP, the AMDT is an Azeri nationalist separatist organization that advocates for democracy, cultural and language rights, and independence for Azerbaijan. These organizations, including other less well-known organizations founded after the early 1990s, are largely run by Azerbaijanis in exile.¹⁵⁹ Other than GAMOH, Azerbaijanis are largely unfamiliar with the various organizations competing to be the representatives of Azerbaijani interests abroad (Souleimanov & Kraus, 2017). Souleimanov and Kraus (2017) further find that the effect of these organizations on Azerbaijani sentiment inside Iranian cities has been minimal.

The reformist President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) came into office conscious of rising regionalism in Azerbaijan and other provinces with ethnic minorities. During his election campaign, Khatami distributed election materials in Azerbaijani and Kurdish—a violation of informal norms on the use of non-Persian languages in electioneering (Shaffer, 2000). Khatami further promised voters that Articles 15 and 19 of the constitution would be reinterpreted to uphold minority language rights (Shaffer, 2002).¹⁶⁰ Promises that subtly appealed to ethnic identities helped candidates

¹⁵⁹ These additional organizations are listed in Table 14 below.

¹⁶⁰ Per Baharan (2010), Khatami approved the teaching of the Kurdish language and literature at the University of Kurdistan some time before 2005. However, the issue was abandoned after Ahmadinejad came into office in 2005.

aligned with Khatami achieve a sweeping victory in the 1999 Iranian local elections. Under Khatami's administration, local television stations and mosques were permitted to use Azeri in addition to Persian, and relaxed some of the restrictions on Azeri-language newspapers and periodicals (Grebennikov, 2013). However, the victory of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) in the 2005 presidential election led to a reversal of Khatami's cultural and political reforms. Peuch (2006) quotes Touraj Atabaki's appraisal of Ahmadinejad's first year in office: "What Khatami did was to try to bring more local people into the political establishment. Governors, mayors, and local officers were elected or appointed from [amongst] various ethnic groups and that was a trend that started some eight years ago. But now... those officials who were appointed [over] the past eight years [are being] replaced with people... who have links with the [Persian-dominated] Revolutionary Guard."

The most significant single backlash event in the post-1990 period began with a cartoon drawn by Mana Neyestani and published in the state-run newspaper *Iran* on May 12, 2006. The cartoon depicts a boy sitting across the table from a cockroach, saying several words that mean "cockroach" in Persian. The cockroach responds by asking "What?" in Azerbaijani ("Namana?") (Collin, 2006).¹⁶¹ Souleimanov and Kraus (2017) discuss how a significant aspect of humor in Iran comes in the form of insulting jokes about other ethnic groups or regions. By virtue of their status as the largest minority group in Iran, jokes about Azerbaijanis appear to be more common (Souleimanov & Kraus, 2017). Likely as a result of greater ethnic self-confidence owing to the influence of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey, Shaffer (2000) notes that throughout the 1990s, Azerbaijanis began to react more negatively to jokes about their ethnicity or language.

¹⁶¹ In an interview with the *Los Angeles Times*, Neyestani stated "The image and the use of the word created so much misunderstanding... Those who criticized the cartoon took it out of its context and made it look as if the cockroach was speaking Azeri. They interpreted it as an insult against the Azeri people ... That was never my intention at all" (Miranda, 2015).

Regardless, Azerbaijanis understandably equated the cartoon as comparing Azerbaijanis to cockroaches and held demonstrations in Tabriz and Tehran that quickly spread to other major Azerbaijani cities.¹⁶² While the protesters' demands for the cartoonist to be punished were quickly met,¹⁶³ demands quickly turned to larger cultural and language issues. Demonstrators called for the right to use Azeri in schools and an end to "Persian chauvinism" (Souleimanov, 2010; Ghanea & Hass, 2011; Souleimanov et al., 2013), as well as recognition of Azeri as an official language (Ghanea & Hass, 2011), the right to use Azeri in a free press and media (Ghanea & Hass, 2011), and the establishment of an Azeri-language TV channel (Peuch, 2006). In late May, protests turned into riots as the local Azerbaijani police and militia refused to suppress the demonstrations (Souleimanov et al., 2013). Cities were paralyzed as government buildings, banks, and television stations were burned down (Collin, 2006), and at least four demonstrators were killed in Naqadeh, West Azerbaijan (Baharan, 2010).¹⁶⁴ Ahead of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's (1989-Present) address to the Majles, security forces suppressed an attempt by protesters to enter the Majles (Peuch, 2006). Since the events of May through June 2006, many Azerbaijani students continue to boycott the schools at the start of every school year and hold demonstrations to demand their right to be educated in their native language (Baharan, 2010; Jannatoglu, 2016).¹⁶⁵

Similar to how the Algerian government's restrictions on any politicized expression of Amazigh identity resulted in political and cultural grievances being expressed in sports arenas, so too

¹⁶² More recently, Azerbaijanis staged mass protests in several cities in the Azerbaijan region in November 2015 against a children's TV episode that "ridiculed the accents of Azeris and included offensive jokes" (BBC, 2015).

¹⁶³ Neyestani and the editor-in-chief of *Iran* (Mehrdad Ghasemfar) were dismissed, *Iran* was temporarily shut down, and Neyestani was imprisoned in the notorious Evin Prison for three months (Souleimanov et al., 2013; Miranda, 2015). Neyestani fled to France after his release.

¹⁶⁴ According to official Iranian sources. GAMOH estimated at least 20 dead (Peuch, 2006). Due to the Iranian government's strict control over information coming out of Iranian Azerbaijan, the true number of deaths and injuries to result from the demonstrations is unknown but likely high. Collin (2006) mentions that at least five were killed, according to reports from the cities of Ardabil, Naqadeh, and Meshkin Shahr.

¹⁶⁵ The first boycott took place in September 2006, where more than 15 Azerbaijanis were arrested (Amnesty International, 2006; Jannatoglu, 2016).

was the case in Iran. Specifically, Azerbaijanis turned to the Tabriz-based Tractor Sazi Football Club (TSFC) as an outlet for expressing political and cultural grievances and nationalist sentiments. Souleimanov and Kraus (2017) mention that as Azerbaijani fans accompany TSFC to its matches, they shout slogans relating to their demands for the right to use Azerbaijani in schools or their distinctiveness from Persians. When TSFC plays against their traditional Tehran-based rivals Esteghlal and Persepolis, Azerbaijani and Persian fans often shout racist slurs at each other, sometimes leading to violent clashes.¹⁶⁶ Similar to how the victory of JSK over NA Hussein Dey in June 1977 in Algeria led to an outbreak of celebrations that transformed into political protests, the victory of TSFC over Esteghlal in September 2011 led to similar celebrations turned political protests in Tabriz, which were similarly suppressed by the police (Souleimanov & Kraus, 2017).

Since 2005, Tehran has made no practical or legislative improvements or concessions to Iran's linguistic and cultural status quo. Despite President Hassan Rouhani's (2013-2021) promises leading up to the 2013 presidential election, all restrictions in place upon the beginning of his presidency have remained in place up to the present day (Souleimanov & Kraus, 2017).¹⁶⁷

Table 12 below details the major policies that effectively excluded the Azerbaijani minority from political and economic life in roughly chronological order. Table 13 below similarly details the timeline of various language restrictions imposed on Azerbaijanis according to category. Finally, a list of the various relevant popular backlash events is included in Table 14. An asterisk (*) on any date indicates that the associated month or year is inferred due to a relative lack of specificity or coverage in the source material.

¹⁶⁶ Souleimanov and Kraus (2017, p. 81) further mention that during such violent clashes (e.g., July 27, 2010: TSFC v. Persepolis) the police often side with Persian fans, disproportionately arresting Azerbaijani fans.

¹⁶⁷ Including throughout Ebrahim Raisi's presidency (2021-2024).

Table 12: Azerbaijani Exclusion in Iran

Exclusionary Policy	Time Period	Notes
Economic discrimination in development investments for Azerbaijani regions	1925* - Feb. 1979*	None of the sources offer specific dates or years for when this began. Implied start year set at 1925 to coincide with the formal start of Pahlavi rule. Insufficient publicly available provincial-level data to determine if or when this ended. However, economic investments in Iranian industries and economic discrimination against Azerbaijanis likely decreased significantly after the 1979 revolution. Very severe between 1925 and 1941.
Appointment of non-Azerbaijani Persian speakers to high-ranking bureaucratic and political positions and as state officers in Azerbaijan	1926 - Aug. 1941 May 1946 - Aug. 1997 Aug. 2005 - Present	Per Ahmadoglu (2019), this implicitly includes governorships. Paused during the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. Souleimanov (2010) mentions that in the early 1990s, Tehran “broke up the province of Azerbaijan into several provinces and continued to almost exclusively put Persians into office as leaders there.” Practice reversed during Khatami’s presidency, then reimposed with Ahmedinejad’s presidency, though not to the original level of exclusion.
Severance of economic ties and migratory rights between Iran/Iranian Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union/Soviet Azerbaijan	1928* - Aug. 1941	Start year is set at 1928 to coincide with the partial severance of economic ties between the Soviet Union and Iran/Azerbaijan. Effectively ended with the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. Economic ties between Iran and the Soviet Union were weak in the postwar years, but strengthened considerably in 1962 (Atabaki, 1993, p. 168).
First subdivision of Azerbaijani administrative regions	1937 - Present	
Closure of Azerbaijani national museums	Dec. 1946	Closed after Iranian occupation. Unclear if or when these unnamed museums reopened.
Exclusion from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)	May 1979 - Present	Starting date set at the establishment of the IRGC in May 1979. Can only be taken as weak piece of evidence in favor of minority exclusion due to the lack of anything more than vague observations of the IRGC being predominantly Persian.
Second subdivision of Azerbaijani administrative regions	1993 - Present	Souleimanov (2010) mentions that in the early 1990s, Tehran “ <i>broke up the province of Azerbaijan into several provinces</i> , and continued to almost exclusively put Persians into office as leaders there.” ¹⁶⁸

Table 13: Azerbaijani Language Restrictions in Iran

Language Restriction	Subcategory	Time Period	Notes
Exclusive use of Persian in courts and court proceedings, no translation services	Administration (Judicial)	1923* - Aug. 1941* Dec. 1946* - Present	Ahmadoghlu (2019, p. 9) mentions that the ban on the use of Azerbaijani in courts occurred during “The two decades of [Reza Shah] Pahlavi rule, which lasted from 1921 to 1941.” However, it is unlikely that this ban was imposed before Reza Shah Pahlavi became Prime Minister in 1923. Thus, the start date of 1923 is inferred. Likely paused during the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. Ahmadoghlu (2019, p. 11) quotes <i>Vartik</i> magazine in its first publication after the 1979 Iranian Revolution as saying “... even speaking in the mother tongue in courts <u>was</u> prohibited.” However, Jannatoglu (2016, p. 10) mentions “Azerbaijani Turks in Iran... cannot provide court testimony in their native Azeri—though these rights are enshrined in Iran’s constitution.” In an

¹⁶⁸ This is a slight misstatement. Reza Shah Pahlavi subdivided the single Azerbaijan state (*iyalat*) into several provinces (*ostan*) in 1937-1938. The Azerbaijan region was further divided in 1993 and 1996.

			interview with a Tehran-based lawyer, Newman (2023) asked “There are multiple languages spoken in Iran besides Farsi. Are all court proceedings in Farsi?” to which the lawyer responded “All proceedings are in Farsi. People in Iran may speak Turkish or Arabic, but in court, everything is filed in Farsi.” Using these three statements and considering the reinterpretation and disregard for Article 15 of the Islamic Republic’s constitution on native language education rights, I assume that the clerical regime initially allowed for the use of non-Persian languages but backtracked some time before the publication of Jannatoglu’s (2016) article. Due to lack of further information, I continue the second phase from Dec. 1946 to the present. No sources hint at the provision of translation services. Since the use of Persian in courts seems to be an exclusive measure, I must assume that translation services were not provided.
Required use of Persian in all official written documents	Administration (Documentation)	1923 - Aug. 1941* Dec. 1946* - Present	First phase likely ended with the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. The approval of the ADP program by the National Majles of Azerbaijan in December 1945 is another possible first phase end date, as it included the use of Azerbaijani in schools and government offices. However, this was likely just a formality. Restrictions likely reimposed after Iranian occupation and continued after the 1979 revolution. The wording of this piece of evidence in Ahmadoghlu (2019, p. 10) allows this restriction to be interpreted as requiring the use of Persian or requiring the <i>exclusive</i> use of Persian. No information on whether documentation in Azeri was provided sometimes, when requested, rarely, or never. To be conservative coding this policy, I assume that Azeri-language documentation was provided sometimes or when requested.
Required knowledge of Persian for employment in subordinate bureaucratic positions in Azerbaijan	Administration (Employment)	1926 - Aug. 1941* Dec. 1946* - Feb. 1979*	Per Ahmadoghlu (2019, p. 10), “...subordinate positions were open to Azerbaijanis only if they knew Persian.” First phase likely ended with the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan, as many high-level Persian bureaucrats fled Azerbaijan for Tehran. The ADP’s takeover of the provincial government solidified this, at least between Dec. 1945 and Dec. 1946. It is unlikely given the other concurrent language restrictions that bureaucratic positions in Azerbaijan did not at least require knowledge of Persian during Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rule. Requirements on the use or knowledge of Persian for employment become insufficiently clear to justify extending this policy past 1979. With the passage of the Gozinesh law in 1985, all Iranians who seek employment in public administration or wish to pursue higher education must pass an assessment of their loyalty and ideological commitment to Shi’a Islam and the Islamic Republic (Ghanea & Hass, 2011). Since Azerbaijanis largely adhere to Shi’a Islam and no other mention of Persian-language requirements are mentioned after 1979, the end date for the second phase is set at ending with the 1979 revolution.
Required use of Persian in external bureaucratic communications	Administration (ExComm)	1927* - Aug. 1941* Dec. 1946* - Present	Heidari (2023, p. 84) mentions “Persian was the only academic <i>and official communication</i> tool” and “...by de facto criminalizing ethnic and local languages, all public services were offered only in the official language.” However, no start or end dates are provided for this, nor is this evidence supported elsewhere, though Heidari (2023) very vaguely hints at a start date around 1927.¹⁶⁹ Due to the other concurrent administrative restrictions not explicitly requiring the exclusive use of Persian in official documentation and bureaucratic hiring, this policy is coded as a tight restriction rather than a ban. In the context of the External Communications indicator, this translates into Azerbaijani rarely or never being used for citizen communications with a government bureaucracy. Likely paused during the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan and reimposed afterwards, continuing into the present day.

¹⁶⁹ Heidari (2023) generally serves as a largely accurate but overly vague source, perhaps in part due to mistranslations in translating the author’s original article from Turkish into English.

Effective ban prohibiting giving children non-Persian first names	Public (Naming)	1925 - Present	Starting date set at 1925 per Article 20 of the 1925 Registration Code (Mirshekari & Ketilate, 2020). While this policy could have ended during the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan, parents had to register their children's approved names with the government after the ADP rebellion was crushed. This effectively means that this policy was not paused during this time. Babek Chalabi—the leader of ANRO—clearly asserts that this is an ongoing issue (Rudaw, 2014; Chalabi, 2023). While Chalabi's position as the leader of a separatist group in Azerbaijan gives reason to doubt this claim, it is further supported by Hussein (2022) in the Voice of America, as well as Mirshekari and Ketilate (2020). This policy was transformed sometime in the 1980s to pressure Persian <i>and</i> ethnic minority parents to give their children more Islamic-sounding names (Hussein, 2022). However, this later transformation regarding Persian names was done through social pressure rather than law, unlike the situation for traditional Azerbaijani names.
Changing of Azerbaijani place and street names	Public (Naming) (Signage)	1934* - Dec. 1945* Dec. 1946* - Present	Sources unclear on start or end dates. Ahmadoghlu (2019) hints at a state date for the first phase sometime around 1934. Regarding governance under the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, Ahmadoghlu (2019, p. 19) mentions "...and the region returned to using the original Azerbaijani street names and place names." It is inferred that this was done sometime around December 1945. Restrictions likely reimposed immediately after Iranian occupation.
Ban on the use of non-Persian names for businesses and organizations	Public (Signage)	1934* - Dec. 1945* Dec. 1946* - Present	Unclear when this policy began, as it isn't mentioned in any other sources other than Chalabi (2023). Since Chalabi's other assertions in Rudaw (2014) and Chalabi (2023) could be verified, this policy is accepted. Inferred time period set to mirror that of the changing of Azerbaijani place and street names.
Tight restrictions on the use of Azerbaijani in theatrical performances & closure of the National Theatre	Public (Public Speech)	1934* - Aug. 1941* Dec. 1946 - Feb. 1979*	Formally a ban. However, this was relatively unenforced, and most of the plays and performances that did take place were in Azerbaijani (Werner, 2014). The number of plays were significantly cut down due to the lack of Persian-speaking performers in Azerbaijan. Paused during the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. Restrictions reimposed after Iranian occupation through the closure of the National Theatre. Unclear end date for second phase. To be conservative in coding for language restrictions, the end date for the second phase is set at the 1979 revolution.
Ban on the use of Azerbaijani in religious ceremonies and mosques	Public (Public Speech)	1934 - Aug. 1941* Dec. 1946 - Aug. 1997	Paused during the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. Reimposed after Iranian occupation and continued after the revolution. Second phase ended with Khatami's presidency (Grebennikov, 2013). Unclear if reimposed afterwards.
Required use of Persian in mail correspondence	Public (Public Speech)	1934 - Aug. 1941*	Likely ended with the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. Unclear whether this was continued or ended after the reimposition of Iranian rule over Azerbaijan in 1946.

Exclusive use of Persian as the language of instruction at all levels of education, including a ban on the teaching of local languages as a subject	Education (Primary) (Secondary) (Higher)	Oct. 1923* - Jan. 1946 Dec.* 1949 - Dec. 1979 (Primary) Oct. 1923* - Sep. 1946 Dec.* 1949 - Dec. 1979 (Secondary) Oct. 1923* - Sep. 1946 Dec.* 1949 - 1975 (Higher)	Punitively enforced at all levels of education. Yenisey (2009) and Ahmadoghlu (2019) do not specify the starting month for the first phases. However, the month of October is inferred to coincide with Reza Khan's appointment as Prime Minister. First phase may have ended with the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan, though Swietochowski (1995, p. 151) mentions that by January 1946, Azerbaijani was already the language of instruction in many primary schools. The ADP also announced that beginning with the new school year in September 1946, all schools would use Azerbaijani as the language of instruction. These two statements imply that for primary schools, the first phase of this restriction definitively ended by Jan. 1946, while the restrictions on secondary and higher education definitively ended in Sep. 1946. However, it is also likely that education was "rarely" available in Azerbaijani between Aug. 1941 and Sep. 1946 (Jan. 1946 for Primary). Restrictions formally reimposed after Iranian occupation, but due to a lack of resources and teachers, this effectively applied only after late 1949, per Swietochowski (1995, p. 170). Thus, the inferred start month for the second phase is set at December. Per Shaffer (2002, p. 71), some lectures were allowed to be given in Azerbaijani at the University of Tabriz in "the 1970s." Swietochowski (1995, p. 172) mentions that this occurred by 1975. The second phase for the Primary and Higher indicators ended with the passage of the 1979 Iranian constitution.
Confiscation of existing Azeri-language books from schools	Education (Primary) (Secondary) (Higher)	1934	The confiscation of books from schools (and elsewhere) in 1934 serves as a singular language restriction in the context of schools.
Closure of the University of Tabriz	Education (Higher)	Dec. 1946 - 1947	Closed after Iranian occupation. The University of Tabriz likely reopened in 1947, per the university's website (University of Tabriz, 2018). At the time, the University of Tabriz was the only university in Azerbaijan.
Tight restrictions on the use of Azerbaijani in education	Education (Primary) (Secondary) (Higher)	Dec. 1979* - Present (Primary) (Secondary) 1975 - Present (Higher)	Beginning with the reinterpretation of Article 15 of the 1979 Iranian constitution to restrict the use of Azeri to only literature and language classes. For lack of a specific month, the ratification of the constitution in Dec. 1979 is used as the inferred starting month. Per Shaffer (2002, p. 71), some lectures were allowed to be given in Azerbaijani at the University of Tabriz in "the 1970s." Swietochowski (1995, p. 172) mentions that this occurred by 1975. Tight restrictions remain overall in higher education.
Closure of Dr. Mahmudali Çehregani's Turkish linguistics course	Education (Higher)	1995*	Supplementary evidence for language restrictions in higher education. Occurred sometime before and near the 1996 election. Inferred date set at 1995.
Ban on Azeri-language and TV and radio broadcasting	Media (Broadcasting)	1928* - Aug. 1941 Dec. 1946 - Feb. 1979	Independent private TV and radio outlets were heavily restricted since the start of Reza Shah Pahlavi's premiership in 1923, though it is unclear exactly when the government began to target minority or Azeri-language media specifically. Paused during the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. Some starting date for the first phase between 1923 and 1934 is most likely. Inferred date set halfway between this range in 1928.
Ban on Azeri-language books and other publications (excluding newspapers and periodicals), confiscation of existing Azeri-language books	Media (Publications)	1934 - Aug. 1941 Dec. 1946 - Apr. 1951 Aug. 1953 - 1975*	Paused during the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. Restrictions reimposed after Iranian occupation. Ban relaxed into tight restrictions during Mossadegh's premiership. Per Shaffer (2002, p. 71), some books in Azerbaijani were allowed to be published in "the 1970s." The inferred ending year for the third phase of the Publications indicator set at 1975. Per the prior entry "Confiscation of existing Azeri-language books from schools," Iranian efforts in this regard specifically—but not exclusively—targeted schools for book confiscation.

Ban on Azeri-language newspapers and periodicals	Media (Publications)	1934 - Aug. 1941 Dec. 1946 - 1978 Dec. 1979 - Aug. 1997	Per Swietochowski (1995, p. 171), this lasted until 1978, with a pause during the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. Per Randal (1979), the government banned newspapers and pamphlets published in Azerbaijan without government approval due to Shari'atmadari's rebellion in December 1979. This ban likely continued until Khatami's presidency, starting in Aug. 1997.
Restrictions on Azeri-language books and other publications (excluding newspapers and periodicals)	Media (Publications)	Apr. 1951 - Aug. 1953 1975* - Present	Shaffer (2002, p. 64) mentions the brief liberalization of Azeri literature and publications under Mossadegh, though this was narrow in scope and overall resembled tight restrictions rather than a ban. Thus, the first phase is set to coincide with Mossadegh's premiership. Per Shaffer (2002, p. 71), some books in Azerbaijani were allowed to be published in "the 1970s." The inferred starting year for the second phase is set at 1975. One minor concession was made in 1991 with Iranian authorities allowing the publication of the Azeri-language <i>Yol</i> magazine (Shaffer, 2000, p. 461). Due to the popularity of this magazine, it was quickly shut down only two years later.
Restrictions on Azeri-language and TV and radio broadcasting	Media (Broadcasting)	Feb. 1979 - Aug. 1997 Aug. 2005 - Present	The ban on Azeri-language TV and radio broadcasting informally transitioned into tight restrictions after the 1979 revolution. Broadcasting restrictions significantly relaxed during Khatami's presidency, but were reimposed afterwards (Grebennikov, 2013). Souleimanov (2010) and Souleimanov et al. (2013) point to such tight restrictions continuing at least until 2013, but argue that they constitute an effective ban on Azeri-language TV broadcasting. However, the creation of propagandized state-owned Azeri-language TV and radio outlets in the post-revolution period point to this policy better indicating the presence of tight restrictions rather than an outright or effective ban. ¹⁷⁰ Per Souleimanov et al. (2013), Azerbaijani was allowed to be broadcast on TV for only a few hours per day after the revolution, which was nonetheless an improvement from the Pahlavi era. Furthermore, after the 1979 revolution, Azerbaijanis began using illegal satellite receivers to receive Turkish television broadcasts. However, this law was not enforced by Iranian authorities out of fear of further inflaming Azeri grievances. These tight restrictions have continued at least since 2016, per Jannatolu (2019, p. 9).
Tight restrictions on Azeri-language newspapers and periodicals	Media (Publications)	Aug. 1997 - Present	Restrictions were partially lifted during Khatami's presidency (Aug. 1997-Aug. 2005). However, Azeri-language newspapers and periodicals still faced overall tight restrictions during Khatami's presidency. Unclear if the previous ban was reimposed with Ahmedinejad's presidency starting in Aug. 2005, but it is clear that Azerbaijani newspapers continue to face language and content restrictions. Thus, this policy is coded as continuing into the present.

Table 14: Azerbaijani Backlash Events

Backlash Event	Time Period	Notes
Secession of Iranian Azerbaijan	Dec. 1945 - Dec. 1946	While the ADP was significantly supported by the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union relied on motivated activists and separatists in Azerbaijan and gave them a more or less free hand in pursuing their own agenda.

¹⁷⁰ Peuch (2006) mentions that one of the demands of protesters during the 2006 Cartoon protests was the establishment of an Azeri-language TV station. This implies that none had previously existed. Private ownership of TV stations is forbidden in Iran. While there exist three Iranian state-owned TV channels broadcasting in Azeri (Sahar TV, Sabalan TV, Azerbaijan TV), all broadcast in multiple languages, including Persian and Azeri. It is unclear how many hours per day these stations broadcast Azeri-language programs. However, the implication from Peuch (2006), Shaffer (2000, pp. 461-462), and Souleimanov et al. (2013, p. 72) is that Azeri-language programs were broadcast only for a few hours per day, heavily propagandized, and often not spoken by native Azerbaijani speakers. Per the BBC (2010), Sahar TV's programs "regularly contain criticism of Azeri policy," and largely serve as a propaganda outlet for the Iranian government. This evaluation of Sahar TV is supported by Souleimanov et al. (2013).

Ayatollah Shari'atmadari's rebellion	Dec. 1979 - Jan. 1980	Taking place from December 5, 1979 to January 1980. Between 2-4 killed and 6-30 wounded on December 6 (Abdollah Boroumand Center, 2022). An additional 5 dead and 26 wounded on December 9, but casualties after this point are unclear (Randal, 1979). Indirectly and partially motivated by language grievances.
Tabriz protest in support of Ayatollah Shari'atmadari	Apr. 1982	Minor relative to the larger demonstrations from Dec. 1979 to Jan. 1980.
Formation of the South Azerbaijan National Liberation Movement (CAMAHA)	1994 - Present	Informally founded in 1991, though activity began in an organized manner under Dilanchi in 1994 (CAMAHA, n.d.-b). Active. Advocates for ethnolinguistic emancipation and potentially independence.
Formation of the Southern Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement (GAMOH)	1995 - Present	Advocates for irredentism with the Republic of Azerbaijan. Closely linked to language grievances. According to Souleimanov and Kraus (2017), GAMOH is the most well-known of Azerbaijan's separatist groups. Both Souleimanov and Kraus (2017) and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (2010) mention 1995 as the starting date. However, Çehregani (2013) <i>seems</i> to put this date at 1996. Since the Çehregani (2013) source is crudely translated, I default to the 1995 starting year. Souleimanov and Kraus (2017, p. 37) also mention that GAMOH "has become a paralyzed group of local enthusiasts rather than a political movement."
Formation of the South Azerbaijan National Revival Organization (SANRO)	1995	Unclear if this group is still active. Appears in Souleimanov and Kraus (2017), but the group currently entirely lacks an online presence. Advocates for ethnolinguistic emancipation. Five SANRO members were convicted of creating an illegal organization and sentenced to eight years in prison in 2013.
Tabriz protest in support of Dr. Mahmudali Çehregani	May 1996	Involving up to 40,000 demonstrators. Suppressed with 600 arrested (Human Rights Watch, 1997).
Formation of the South Azerbaijan Independence Party (GAIP)	2006 - Present	Active. Consult their website at: (https://gaip.biz/en/home/). Advocates for ethnolinguistic emancipation.
Formation of the Azerbaijan National Resistance Organization (AMDT)	Mar. 2006 - Present	Active. Advocates for ethnolinguistic emancipation.
2006 Cartoon protests	May 2006 - Jun. 2006	Per Souleimanov et al. (2013), the protests ended in June. Demands quickly shifted from punishing the authors of the cartoon to broader demands for language rights.
2010 Tabriz TSFC protest	2010	Per Souleimanov and Kraus (2017), "an estimated two to three thousand people protested in Tabriz to demand the right to receive education in Azerbaijani and condemned what they called, "discrimination against the Azerbaijani Turks in Iran"... The demonstration appeared to have been organized by fans of the Tabriz soccer team Tractor Sazi."
Formation of the Southern Azerbaijan Student Movement (AZOH)	2011 - Present	Active. Consult their website at: (https://www.azoh.net/). Advocates for ethnolinguistic emancipation.
2011 Tabriz TSFC protest	Sep. 2011	The referenced political demands were almost certainly demands for political or ethnolinguistic autonomy, though I cannot find any other source for this. As a result, this is considered a relatively minor event.
Formation of the South Azerbaijan National Liberation Front (SANLF)	2012	Unclear if this group is still active. Appears in Souleimanov and Kraus (2017), but the group currently lacks an online presence. Advocates for ethnolinguistic emancipation.
Azerbaijani protest of anti-Azeri TV show	Nov. 2015	Per the BBC (2015), this protest was forcefully suppressed with "many arrests."

7.4 *Discussion*

7.4.1 *Minority Exclusion*

The level of exclusion faced by the Azerbaijani minority is a puzzle. Ample evidence illustrates how the Iranian state under Reza Shah Pahlavi levied exclusionary economic policies against Azerbaijan. Further evidence presented by Aghajanian (1983) and Abrahamian (1982) illustrates the persistence of severe underdevelopment in Azerbaijan compared to Tehran through the 1960s and 1970s. The Azerbaijani language and culture are often ridiculed in state-run media outlets, and Azerbaijani fans are disproportionately arrested during violent skirmishes at ethnically charged soccer matches. Numerous restrictions on the Azerbaijani language remain in place, and high-ranking bureaucratic positions (e.g., governorships) in Azerbaijan continue to be informally reserved for those fluent in Persian.

On the other hand, the evidence also points to the willingness of the Iranian state and Persian majority to completely accept an ethnic Azeri who has assimilated into the dominant Persian language group as a true and equal member of the nation. Since the beginning of Pahlavi rule, Iran has offered its minorities a realistic and attainable chance at gaining entry into the Iranian elite, provided that the minority individual assimilates. Per Shaffer (2002, p. 76), “Tehran discriminated against non-Persian groups, but rarely against individual non-Persians who accepted the Persian language and culture.” Discussing Reza Shah Pahlavi’s approach to modernizing the Iranian state, Atabaki (2005, p. 33) states that “Every citizen regardless of his/her ethnic origin enjoyed the right of personal achievement in the newly established administration, as long as he/she appreciated the state definition of Iran as a modern integrated nation-state.”

Almost all other writings on the relationship between Azerbaijanis and the Iranian state and the Persian majority describe the Azerbaijani minority as well-integrated and well-represented in the

Iranian political elite throughout Qajar, Pahlavi, and clerical rule. According to Higgins (1984, p. 59), Azerbaijanis are included as “representatives at all levels of political, military, and intellectual hierarchies, as well as the religious hierarchy,” and that “Azerbaijanis have been relatively well integrated into the national system (and on a roughly equal basis with Persians).” Per Souleimanov et al. (2013, p. 73), “By no means negligible are the numbers of Azerbaijanis serving as high state officials, clerics, army commanders, important figures in the economy, and representatives of the intellectual elite... the country’s supreme religious leader, Ali Khamenei; the opposition leader and reformist candidate in last year’s [2009] presidential election, Mir-Hossein Mousavi... and the former Minister of the Interior and Minister of Social Security Sadeq Mahsouli.”¹⁷¹

Souleimanov et al. (2013) further argue that Azerbaijanis face no discrimination in the armed forces, though Persians dominate the general staff and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).¹⁷² Atabaki (1993, p. 183) states that Azerbaijanis before and after the start of Pahlavi rule “often managed to attain the highest ranks in Iran’s military and administrative apparatus.” This statement implies that Azeris were excluded to an unknown degree from the IRGC upon its establishment in May 1979. It is also important to note that since the revolution, the two key decision-makers in Iran are the Supreme Leader and the Command/Joint Staff of the IRGC, with the IRGC wielding powers that one would normally expect from the executive or legislative branches of government (Dagher, 2020). Thus, exclusion from the IRGC serves as significant evidence of minority exclusion. However, since anything more than vague observations of Azeri exclusion from the IRGC

¹⁷¹ Souleimanov et al. (2013) used the same sentence “the opposition leader...” in Souleimanov (2010), hence the misstatement of “last year’s presidential election.”

¹⁷² Baharan (2010, p. 15) notes that in 2010, “... sources allege that some military personnel have been expelled from the armed forces for taking part in Azeri Turkic cultural activities or celebrations in recent years. Firooz Yousefi, a non-commissioned officer, was said to have been expelled from the Army for pan-Turkism in March 2010 and later detained in June.” This occurrence reflects the hostility of the Iranian state and Persian majority specifically toward Azerbaijanis involved in nationalist movements.

are forthcoming, this policy can only be considered as weak evidence of minority exclusion in this context.

Despite these claims of Azerbaijani representation in the Iranian elite, few are supported by surveys or quantitative data, largely due to the lack of relevant data before 1956 and tight information controls employed by the clerical regime from 1979 onwards. Given these limitations, the survey conducted in the late 1960s by Zonis (1971) is singular in this regard. Zonis (1971, p. 136) finds that during the late 1960s, 54.1% of Iran's political elite were born in the city of Tehran, despite only 5.1% of all Iranians being born there. Azerbaijanis were the only linguistically distinct non-Persian group to constitute a significant portion of Iran's political elite. Still, only 6.7% of the political elite were Azerbaijani, despite 16.3% of all Iranians being born there. Despite this fact, Zonis (1971, p. 59) describes the Azerbaijanis as a "well-integrated linguistic minority." In contrast, Swietochowski (1995, p. 170) states that "Restrictions on the use of Azeri did not extend to the exclusion of natives of Azerbaijan from the Iranian political elite, in which they had held prominent and, in past centuries, sometimes dominant positions. Nonetheless, under the Pahlavis their numbers declined to a level disproportionately lower than their share in Iran's population."

While the Iranian state de-emphasized the Persian aspect of Iranian identity in favor of Shi'a Islam in 1979, the Pahlavi offer of social mobility and national belonging in exchange for assimilation has more or less remained in place during clerical rule. Souleimanov et al.'s (2013, p. 73) mention of the ethnic Azeri background of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is telling in this regard, as "Ayatollah Khamenei very seldom speaks Azerbaijani Turkish in public, and he refers to himself as an 'Iranian from Mashhad'." Azerbaijanis in the Iranian elite are further "regarded by ordinary Iranian Azerbaijanis as Persianized, and therefore as not being of their own kind" (Souleimanov et al., 2013, p. 73). One reason for the co-ethnic rejection of 'Persianized' Azerbaijanis may be rooted in advocacy for assimilation during Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule. As pointed out by Shaffer (2002), most of the

Azerbaijanis advocating for Persianization spent most of their time and received their education outside of Azerbaijan, while those who spent most of their time in Azerbaijan tended to emphasize their Azerbaijani identity.

If the results from the Zonis (1971) survey can be extrapolated to the present, Azerbaijanis are still likely insufficiently represented in the political, economic, and religious elite compared to Persians when considering their population size as a proportion of the total Iranian population. However, there is reason to suspect that the representation of Azerbaijanis in the Iranian elite may have increased after the 1979 revolution. Since the revolution, the central pillar of Iranian national identity shifted from belonging to the Persian language and culture group to Shi'a Islam. By virtue of largely adhering to Shi'a Islam, Azerbaijanis found their social and political status particularly strengthened relative to other religious minorities in Iran (i.e., Sunni Arabs, Sunni and Sufi Kurds, Bahá'ís, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians).

However, representation of a minority group in the political, economic, and religious elite alone is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for classifying a minority as not excluded from meaningful political and economic participation. As previously discussed, Azerbaijani national identity was significantly reinforced in the 1990s by the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the growing economic and cultural influence of Turkey. Shaffer (2002, p. 222) notes that during this time, "Azerbaijanis in Iran expressed indignation over their low social status, which contrasts with their self-image based on their marked political and economic success in Iran." As an indicator of the split-screen exclusion-inclusion reality of Azerbaijanis in Iran, Grebennikov (2013, p. 10) notes that "By the beginning of the 1990s, Iranian Azeris had woven themselves into every facet of Iranian life, dominating the business elite of the nation and even holding high positions of power."

It is also worth further discussing the motivations behind economic discrimination toward Azerbaijanis during Pahlavi rule. Reza Shah Pahlavi's decision to pursue centralization was borne of a

genuine desire to transform the Iranian state and economy rather than to punish the periphery. Moreover, the Pahlavi belief in the efficacy of centralization and modernization was genuine as well. In the first days of the Anglo-Soviet Invasion in 1941, Farrokh (2011, p. 278) notes Reza Shah Pahlavi's controversial order "that no bridges, roads, or railways were to be demolished" throughout the entire country. Had key infrastructure been demolished early on, Iranian resistance could have been maintained for months (Farrokh, 2011, p. 281). Reza Shah Pahlavi almost certainly knew the consequences of not sacrificing his achievements in infrastructure and modernization, but he did so anyway.¹⁷³ I interpret this key decision as evidence of Reza Shah Pahlavi's genuine desire to see his economic development achievements not be erased. The fact that the no-demolition order applied to all parts of Iran indicates that Reza Shah Pahlavi placed at least somewhat equal value on individual infrastructure achievements in the center and periphery—including in Azerbaijan.

Katouzian (1981) cites the severe economic regression of Azerbaijan during the first several decades of Pahlavi rule as evidence that Reza Shah Pahlavi may have specifically targeted Azerbaijan as punishment for Khiyabani's rebellion. However, I argue that given the Pahlavi's willingness to accept assimilated Azerbaijanis as true and equal members of the nation and the overall economic regression experienced by the entirety of Iran's periphery during the first several decades of centralization, it is more likely that Azerbaijan's economic regression was more the result of the indirect consequences of centralization rather than a deliberate or formal practice of social exclusion. However, this is not to say that there was absolutely no practice of social exclusion by Persians. There was, though to a lesser extent compared to the cases in Italy and Cameroon, but less than Mexico and Algeria.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ One important piece of context to note is that several other minor powers in World War II did not employ scorched-earth tactics in their own territory. Examples include Denmark, Luxembourg, and Belgium—only the latter of which resisted for more than one day.

¹⁷⁴ The cases of Mexico and Cameroon are discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, respectively.

Compared to all other minority groups in Iran, Azerbaijanis have historically been and continue to be the most well-represented and included minority group throughout society, as well as in the upper echelons of the Iranian political, business, and religious elite. Compared to Persians, non-assimilated Azerbaijanis, in particular, were relatively excluded during the early to mid-20th century but still more included compared to all other minority groups. Considering the prevalence of exclusionary policies and the specificity, context, and relative importance of the evidence cited here, the case of the Azerbaijani minority in Iran receives a minority exclusion score of 2 (low) throughout the entire case period, indicating “neglect/no remedial policies.”¹⁷⁵

7.4.2 *Language Restriction Severity*

The case of the Azerbaijanis in Iran is categorized as having severe language restrictions per the Language Restriction Severity Index (LRSI) scoring regime discussed in Chapter 4.¹⁷⁶ Figure 8

¹⁷⁵ The political discrimination index definition for “neglect/no remedial policies” is “substantial under-representation due to historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No evidence of protective or remedial policies.” The economic discrimination index definition for “neglect/no remedial policies” is “significant poverty and under-representation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group's material wellbeing.”


¹⁷⁶ Newspaper restrictions are recorded in this case, unlike the case of South Tyroleans in Italy. Unlike in Fascist Italy, the newspapers of the Persian majority in the Persian language were not shut down in near-equal proportions, and the Iranian state made little attempt at substituting closed Azeri-language newspapers with Azeri-language newspapers that were more politically aligned. While many newspapers in Iran were closed since the start of autocratic Pahlavi rule, minority-language newspapers were disproportionately closed due to their use of non-Persian languages.

One major language restriction was omitted due to a lack of sufficient evidence. Souleimanov et al. (2013, p. 72) mention that during Pahlavi rule, “the use of a Turkic language in public was completely banned.” However, Souleimanov et al. (2013, p. 74) later mention that since the mid-1990s, it is no longer socially unacceptable to speak Azerbaijani Turkish in public, unlike in the past. This second statement somewhat contradicts their previous statement of a total ban on speaking Azerbaijani in public spaces. Chalabi (2023) also states, “...The government has restricted the use of non-Persian languages in the public sphere, including in the media” and “...This has resulted in denying the right to celebrate cultural events and preventing speaking their language in public spaces.”

The wording of Chalabi's (2023) statements could instead be interpreted as meaning that the Azerbaijani language was restricted in various public spheres, such as at cultural events and in the media—both of which are mentioned in other listed sources. Given the gravity of an enforced ban on the use of Azerbaijani in general public speech outside of the home, this should have been discussed in more detail or at least mentioned in some of the other sources. The fact that it was not mentioned suggests that the first statement made by Souleimanov et al. (2013, p. 72) was likely an exaggeration and that the statements made by Chalabi (2023) are general statements about the use of Azerbaijani in various public spheres rather than its general use outside of the home.

below details the evolution of the severity of language restrictions from 1923 to 2023. The Appendix provides a more detailed breakdown of yearly indicator scores for each category.

Figure 8: LRSI Timeline - Azerbaijanis in Iran (1923 – 2023)



Based on these results, we can identify several important phases of Iranian language policy toward Azerbaijanis. The first phase extends from 1923 to 1933 and covers the first half of Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule. During this time, Reza Shah Pahlavi imposed severe restrictions on the use of Azeri in education and TV and radio broadcasts and banned the use of non-Persian languages in courts and court proceedings and non-Persian names for children. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is *-4.65*. The second phase (1934-1941) begins with the imposition of various new restrictions, largely as a part of the 1934 directive. The use of Azeri was effectively banned in all publications, and the Pahlavi regime imposed further restrictions on Azeri-language cultural and religious activities. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is *-6.75*.

The brief third phase (1942-1946) was triggered by the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran and the subsequent Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan. Most language restrictions were de facto lifted as Iranian authorities fled Azerbaijan. However, some language restrictions likely remained on naming children,

public signage, and education due to the sticky nature of such restrictions. The scoring for this phase should also be taken with a grain of salt, as many of the starting and ending dates for these restrictions were never formalized and required heavy use of inductive reasoning to determine. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is -2.07. Phase four (1947-1978) follows the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and begins with the suppression of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan secessionist state and the reimposition of nearly all of the language restrictions imposed by his father. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is -6.55.

The fifth phase (1979-1997) marks the start of clerical rule as the new government sought to formulate an Iranian national identity centered on Shi'a Islam over the Persian culture and language. Despite this, many of the language restrictions on Azerbaijani were only somewhat relaxed rather than lifted entirely. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is -5.23. The sixth and final phase (1998-2023) begins with Mohammad Khatami's victory in the 1997 presidential election. From August 1997 to August 2005, some of the restrictions on the use of Azerbaijani in various forms of public speech and the media were lifted or relaxed. However, the start of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency in August 2005 saw some of these policies reversed, although likely not to the levels seen before Khatami's presidency. The yearly average LRSI score for this phase is -3.93. Based on the determined scores for minority exclusion and language restriction severity, the case of the Azerbaijani minority in Iran is classified as a Hybrid Assimilation regime.

Table 15: Phases of Persianization Summary

	Time Period	Average Yearly LRSI Score
Phase 1	1923 - 1933	-4.65
Phase 2	1934 - 1941	-6.75
Phase 3	1942 - 1946	-2.07
Phase 4	1947 - 1978	-6.55

Phase 5	1979 - 1997	-5.23
Phase 6	1998 - 2023	-3.93

7.4.3 Popular Backlash

While both the cases of the Amazigh in Algeria and the Azerbaijanis in Iran are classified as Hybrid Assimilation regimes, the case of the Azerbaijanis shows no discernable pattern of tightening restrictions leading to an uptick in popular backlash. Apart from the 1945-1946 rebellion, the most severe backlash events that were centrally concerned with Azeri language rights mostly occurred after 1994. With the further exception of Ayatollah Shari'atmadari's uprising in 1979-1980, all listed backlash events were centrally concerned with Azerbaijani language freedoms.

Table 16: Joint Escalation of Backlash and Language Restriction Severity

	Avg. Yearly LRSI Score	Popular Backlash Events
Phase 1 <i>1923 - 1933</i>	-4.65	• None
Phase 2 <i>1934 - 1941</i>	-6.75	• None
Phase 3 <i>1942 - 1946</i>	-2.07	• Secession of Iranian Azerbaijan (1945-1946)
Phase 4 <i>1947 - 1978</i>	-6.55	• None
Phase 5 <i>1979 - 1997</i>	-5.23	• <i>Ayatollah Shari'atmadari's rebellion (1979-1980)</i>¹⁷⁷ ◦ Tabriz protest in support of Shari'atmadari (1982) • Formation of CAMAH (1994) • Formation of GAMOH (1995) • Formation of SANRO (1995) • Tabriz protest in support of Çehregani (1996)

¹⁷⁷ Largely motivated by concerns of clerical involvement in politics and the draconian punishments used by revolutionaries. Language issues were not central to Shari'atmadari's rebellion, though they likely significantly factored into Azeri demands for greater political autonomy for Azerbaijan.

Phase 6 <i>1998 - 2023</i>	-3.93	● Formation of GAIP (2006) ● Formation of AMDT (2006) ● Cartoon protests (2006) ● Tabriz TSFC protest (2010) ● Tabriz TSFC protest (2011) ● Formation of AZOH (2011) ● Formation of SANLF (2012) ● Azerbaijani protest of anti-Azeri TV show (2015)
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However, many of these events require further scrutiny if used to determine the overall success or failure of Iranian language assimilation policy toward the Azerbaijani minority. In most cases, the secession of a minority group region for a full year would constitute an immense failure on the part of an assimilation regime to reduce popular backlash against the state. Similarly, the formation of seven self-determination organizations in the span of 18 years would represent potential failure in the future if such organizations gain sufficient popular support. Despite these events and continued severe language restrictions, Azerbaijanis today and throughout the entire case period showed little support for secession.

Indeed, it was the fears sparked by Pishevari's statements alluding to permanent secession that significantly contributed to the failure and collapse of the 1945-1946 rebellion.¹⁷⁸ Azerbaijani clerics feared that secession would fragment Shi'a Islam and Azeri traders and businessmen feared the prospect of isolation from the Iranian market. At the same time, most of the Azerbaijani public feared possible annexation by the Soviet Union and being cut off from their historical homeland state of Iran.

The rising influence of Turkey and the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan from the Soviet Union in the 1990s was responsible for an increase in Azerbaijani nationalism and sensitivity

¹⁷⁸ Importantly, the ADP movement was one created by Soviet decree. While it provided substantial support and protection for the 1945-1946 rebellion, it relied on highly motivated Azerbaijani activists to implement its agenda and garner public support. The fact that Azerbaijan did not independently and organically rebel after the Soviet occupation serves as further evidence of Azerbaijani attachment to Iran and the muted impact of this backlash event on the success or failure of the Iranian assimilationist regime.

toward Tehran's assimilation program. Despite rising nationalism and the proliferation of separatist groups in Azerbaijan during this time, none except GAMOH are generally known, let alone broadly supported. Per Souleimanov and Kraus (2017, p. 39), "Most of Iran's Azerbaijanis, however, are not affected by any of the [GAMOH] movement's activities and do not perceive it as a platform for a real solution to their problems or desires for autonomy, actual independence, or unification with the Azerbaijani Republic or Turkey." Higgins (1984, p. 59) further notes that "... no separatist movements occurred during the relatively free era of the early 1950s and that Azerbaijani garrisons were staffed with local officers and men during the later Pahlavi era are also considered evidence of the lack of separatist sentiment." In contrast to the cases in Italy and Cameroon, the Iranian government's decision to include Azerbaijanis in local military and security positions serves as evidence of the Iranian political leadership's relatively assured belief in the loyalty of the minority.

Since the Safavid Empire (1501-1736), Azerbaijanis were included in or dominated a religiously Shi'a and culturally Persian or Turko-Persian state with borders that more or less extended from the Caucasus and Zagros mountains in the northwest and west, the Kopet Dag mountain range to the north, and the eastern edge of the Iranian plateau. As noted by Souleimanov (2010, p. 77), "Until the second half of the nineteenth century, the Turkic language was the language of the military, and for centuries Turkic had been the language of the court." Unlike South Tyroleans in Italy or the Amazigh in Algeria, Azerbaijanis have a deep historical and religious attachment to the Iranian state. While the first two decades of Pahlavi rule led to the formulation of an Azerbaijani identity in opposition to Persian nationalism, it is the unanimous view of the sources referenced in this case study that Azerbaijanis generally do not consider their own national identity as separate from Iran. It is largely thanks to this historical and religious attachment that Azerbaijanis generally keep their demands restricted to the improvement of language rights, democracy, and minor improvements to political autonomy.

While historical and religious affinity proved highly effective at softening Azerbaijani feelings of coercion resentment arising from severe language restrictions, the intensity of the coercion resentment response was itself likely softened by the relative inclusion of Azerbaijanis in political and economic participation. In the context of another host state lacking the historical connectedness between the dominant and minority group, it is likely that the severe language restrictions resulting from cultural egoism during the Pahlavi era would have produced a severe backlash response. Nonetheless, the case of Azerbaijanis in Iran demonstrates a moderate level of backlash against the state.

7.5 Conclusion

For the imposition of a Hybrid Assimilation throughout the span of a century, what benefits have the Iranian state gained? According to Eberhard et al. (2022), there are 11.3 million users of (South) Azerbaijani in Iran as of 2019. Eberhard et al. (2022) further estimate an ethnic Azeri population of 16.7 million as of 2019. While using Ethnologue estimates of language users comes with many caveats,¹⁷⁹ the estimate of 16.7 million ethnic Azeris living in Iran is situated at the lower end compared to other highly variable estimates.¹⁸⁰ Using this more conservative estimate of the ethnic Azeri population and considering the fact that great numbers of Azerbaijanis moved from Azerbaijan to Tehran during the 1960s and 1970s, only 68% of the ethnic Azeri population in Iran speaks Azerbaijani today.¹⁸¹ Since anecdotal evidence from the linguistic environment of pre-Pahlavi Azerbaijan portrays a people that were largely monolingual in Azerbaijani, it is reasonable to assume

¹⁷⁹ See Paolillo and Das (2006), Moore et al. (2010), and Cornwell (2019).

¹⁸⁰ Jannatoglu (2016): 25 million, Shaffer (2002): 20 million, Grebennikov (2013): 25 million, Ahmad (2022): 15 million, Souleimanov and Kraus (2017) and Souleimanov et al. (2013): between 12-22 million, Abrahamian (1982): 21% of 1956 total population. Ghanea and Hass (2011) note that “The Federal Division of the US Library of Congress has its own estimates, published in 2008, putting Persians at 65 per cent, Azeris at 16 per cent.” As of 2008, that would amount to 11.7 million Azerbaijanis.

¹⁸¹ According to Shaffer (2002), Azerbaijanis who moved to Tehran were quickly assimilated and often married ethnically Persian spouses.

that an estimate of 11.3 million users of (South) Azerbaijani in Iran indicates a substantial but not critical decline in the vitality of the Azeri language in Iran.

In discussing the linguistic environment in Azerbaijan as of 2010, Souleimanov (2010, p. 80) states, “While two decades ago most Azerbaijanis preferred to speak Persian even in the streets of Azerbaijani-dominated Tabriz, Azerbaijani Turkish has now become commonplace, displacing Persian in most of the predominantly Azerbaijani areas of northwestern Iran. Ordinary Azerbaijanis in Tehran and elsewhere do not hesitate to speak in their native tongue...” Indeed, there have been more demonstrations for language rights in Azerbaijan since the nationalist revival in the 1990s. These demonstrations persist despite often being violently suppressed, with its activists arrested and subjected to torture (Amnesty International, 2019).

Particularly during Pahlavi rule, Tehran succeeded in instilling the message that Persian was the more prestigious and developed language, and that the acquisition of Persian would open many economic opportunities to minorities who chose to assimilate. It is most likely that the pursuit of Persianization was initially successful, as Azerbaijani parents sent their children to Persian-language schools and consumed Persian-language books, newspapers, radio, and television programs. The spread of Turkish-language TV programs from abroad and the overall nationalist revival of the 1990s provided Azerbaijanis with enough ethnic pride to become comfortable speaking their language in public and make more forceful demands for language rights. Unfortunately, a language will always remain endangered when excluded from education, particularly at the primary and secondary levels.

Overall, the Iranian state throughout Pahlavi and clerical rule over the last century has managed to contain widespread Azerbaijani backlash against the state. Notwithstanding the 1945-1946 rebellion, the inclusion of assimilated Azerbaijanis throughout society as well as Azerbaijani religious and historical affinity with Iran dampened any serious threats to Iranian territorial integrity and national unity. Azerbaijanis will likely continue to eschew separatist aspirations and maintain or

perhaps amplify demands and demonstrations for language rights or democracy. Azerbaijani rebellions in 1920, 1945, and to a lesser extent in 1979 included demands for democratic rights, political autonomy, and language rights. As discussed in Chapter 3, Hybrid Assimilation regimes are inherently unstable in the long term in democratic political systems. Accordingly, Azerbaijani activists and organizations largely and appropriately view democratization as a promising pathway to restoring their language freedoms. Unfortunately, such demands are unlikely to be granted in the foreseeable future by the ruling clerical regime. Meanwhile, the relatively moderate language restrictions in place since 1998 will likely continue to slowly assimilate Azerbaijanis into the Persian language and culture despite increased Azeri nationalism. Based on these conclusions and the evidence provided in this case study, I determine that the Hybrid Assimilation regime employed by Iran on the Azerbaijani minority constitutes a moderate success.

Chapter 8: Mayans in Mexico

Paradigm Shift

<i>Case Summary</i>	
Language Regime Type	Inclusive Assimilation
Group	Mayans
Host State	Mexico
Time Period	1921 - 2023
Hypothesized Backlash	Minimal Backlash
Observed Backlash	Minimal Backlash
Outcome	Success

The case of the Mayan minority in Mexico is consistent with my theory on the relationship between the severity of language restrictions and the level of minority exclusion on popular backlash. Throughout the entire case period, the Mexican government imposed moderate restrictions on the Mayan and broader Indigenous languages to assimilate them into Mexican culture and society. Between 1921 to the late 1950s, the dominant paradigm of Indigenous education in Mexico emphasized the use of the direct method¹⁸² of language teaching, wherein Indigenous students were taught literacy exclusively in Spanish using the curriculum of Spanish-language schools throughout Mexico. By 1978, the bilingual method¹⁸³ had definitively prevailed over the direct method. Since then, the goal of Mexican Indigenous education policy has more or less remained the same up to the present day in the form of an informal compromise between the two. That is, teachers use Indigenous

¹⁸² The direct method of language teaching focuses on immersive learning, where instruction is given entirely in the target language, avoiding translations and encouraging direct association between meaning and expression.

¹⁸³ The core principle of the bilingual method is that learning how to read and write first in one's native language will greatly facilitate learning how to read and write in a foreign language.

languages to communicate effectively with their students, while normal instruction is provided mostly in Spanish.

In 1994, Mayan rebels seized several towns in Chiapas primarily in protest of neoliberal economic policies, land rights, and single-party rule in Mexico. While the rebellion ultimately failed to extract any of its core economic or political concessions from the government, several notable cultural concessions resulted from negotiations between the Zapatista rebels and the government in the early 2000s. Since around 2010, the Mexican government has made significant strides in providing substantive public services for speakers of Mayan and Indigenous languages. Throughout the entire case period, Mayans were included in political and economic participation, barring the exclusionary economic effects that necessarily resulted from the revocation of agrarian reform in 1992. Regardless, the relative isolation and historical poverty of Indigenous regions and the economic weakness of the Mexican state upon the conclusion of the Mexican Revolution added to the historically discriminatory colonial legacy of Indigenous exclusion. As a result, Mayans and other Indigenous groups in Mexico continue to show relatively poor economic and health outcomes compared to other groups.

The Inclusive Assimilation regime imposed on Mayans was and generally continues to be successful. The relatively high prestige of the Spanish language and greater economic opportunities for those who acquired it were almost certainly the driving force motivating Indigenous assimilation. Despite recent programs to revitalize Mayan and other Indigenous languages in Mexico, the vitality of Mayan languages appears to be in terminal decline. Between 1940 and 2020, the percentage of the state populations of Yucatán, Chiapas, Campeche, and Quintana Roo that speak an Indigenous (Mayan) language declined considerably, particularly in the Yucatán peninsula. Between 1940 and 2020, the combined populations of Yucatán, Campeche, and Quintana Roo increased from 527,000 to 5.1 million. During the same period, the number of Mayan-language users in these states increased from 234,000 to only 775,000. At the same time, the Mexican strategy of not imposing widespread

public restrictions on the use of Indigenous languages was crucial to minimizing backlash against the relatively moderate policy of assimilation through bilingual education. For example, no demands for self-determination or greater language freedoms were made by any group claiming to represent Mayans throughout the entire case period.

8.1 *Background*

The Maya people of Mexico are largely the descendants of the peoples of the Maya Civilization that dominated the Yucatán peninsula and the highlands of central Mexico for most of the period from antiquity to the Spanish conquest of the Maya in 1697. Today, the Maya people are concentrated in the largest numbers in Guatemala, Mexico, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The languages spoken by the Maya people are part of the larger family of Mayan languages. Of these languages, Maya (Yucatec “Maya”) is the most widely used Mayan language and is largely concentrated in the Yucatán peninsula. According to the 2020 Mexican census, there are approximately 775,000 Maya users in Mexico (INEGI, 2020). Tzotzil, Tzeltal, and Ch’ol are descended from the Ch’olan–Tzeltalan branch and are all more or less mutually intelligible. Its speakers are largely concentrated in the state of Chiapas, where there are a combined 1,394,000 people aged three and over who speak Maya, Tzotzil, Tzeltal, and Ch’ol as of 2020 (INEGI, 2020).¹⁸⁴ This case study focuses on these four language groups in the states of Yucatán, Chiapas, Campeche, and Quintana Roo. Given that Mayan languages are spoken by the overwhelming majority (>90%) of Indigenous people in each of these states, the terms “Indigenous” and “Mayan” are considered synonymous in the context of those states. Comparable to the importance of Steininger’s (2003) history of the South Tyrol conflict, this case study leans heavily on

¹⁸⁴ Tzotzil: 550,274; Tzeltal: 589,144; Ch’ol: 254,715.

Shirley Brice Heath's (1972) history of the evolution of language policy in Mexico as the primary and often only source for much of the period between 1921 and 1970.¹⁸⁵

The Indigenous populations of Mexico have been subject to assimilationist language policies at varying degrees of severity over the last five centuries. Charles V of Spain (1516-1566) and Philip IV of Spain (1621-1665) both issued decrees in 1550 and 1634, respectively, ordering colonial and religious authorities in New Spain (present-day Mexico) to teach the Indigenous population Spanish (Heath, 1972). Charles II of Spain (1665-1700) later became impatient with the colonial authorities' failure to implement Philip IV's orders (Heath, 1972). In 1686, Charles II issued a further decree ordering the teaching of Spanish to the Indigenous population. In contrast to previous decrees, this came with a warning to state and church officials against disobedience and further required progress reports on the Castilianization of the Indigenous population (Heath, 1972). Colonial and religious authorities in New Spain, for the first time, voiced their concerns regarding the severe impracticalities of such a request. Despite this, Charles II issued another decree in 1691 with specific plans for establishing schools in rural Indigenous villages. Ultimately, the Castilianization¹⁸⁶ efforts made by the Spanish Crown up to this point failed due to a lack of incentive on the part of colonial and religious authorities in New Spain to impose them or for Indigenous populations in New Spain to learn Spanish.¹⁸⁷

In the next century, Charles III of Spain (1759-1788) issued a royal decree in 1770 ordering all authorities in all Spanish colonies to promote the teaching of Spanish and to eliminate Indigenous languages (Heath, 1972; De León, 2016, p. 3). Like Philip V of Spain's (1700-1724) decision to ban Catalan from all forms of official use and of Charles V, Philip IV, and Charles II before him in regard

¹⁸⁵ In this chapter, I hope to provide a 50-year update to the state of affairs in Mexican language policy.

¹⁸⁶ Castilianization refers to the process by which a people (or place) adopt aspects of Castilian culture and language. Castilian (Standard Spanish) is the dialect of Spanish spoken in Castile on the Iberian Peninsula.

¹⁸⁷ Hamel (2008a) attributes the failure of the Spanish Crown to assimilate the Indigenous population to the existence of a feudal order which segregated Spaniards from the Indigenous population.

to Indigenous languages in the Americas, the goal of the 1770 decree was to make administration more efficient. This effort was somewhat more successful than those of previous Spanish monarchs but still beset with a severe lack of progress overall (Heath, 1972).

By the time of Mexico's independence from Spain in 1821, the prevailing beliefs on nation-building in Mexico mirrored those of the Western world more generally. Specifically, linguistic heterogeneity (i.e., Indigenous languages) was seen as an unnecessary cost to administrative functions, a hindrance to economic development, and a barrier to true national unity (Cifuentes, 1992). The Mexican approach to solving this issue was first elaborated in 1857 by Ignacio Ramírez, the governor of the state of Mexico and the head of the Ministry of Justice, Public Instruction, and Development under President Benito Juárez (1858-1872), an Indigenous Zapotec (Heath, 1972). Like his contemporaries, Ramírez believed that Spanish should be promoted throughout Mexico, including in Indigenous regions. Unlike his contemporaries, Ramírez believed that the languages and cultures of the Indigenous population should be included in the Mexican national identity and that literacy in Indigenous languages could be used to communicate and record Indigenous histories. Ramírez further argued in favor of the bilingual method—that Indigenous languages should be used to teach Indigenous peoples how to read and write first before introducing Spanish as a second language.

However, the first 90 years of Mexican independence were characterized by severe political instability and general neglect toward Indigenous regions and populations, concluding with the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911) and the start of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920).¹⁸⁸ The Díaz period saw Mexico experience significant modernization and economic growth alongside harsh political repression and increasing economic inequality between the rich and the poor. Díaz's rule had a deeply negative impact on Indigenous populations, as his policies led to the expropriation and

¹⁸⁸ The first Emperor of Mexico Agustín de Iturbide (1822-1823) was overthrown by Santa Anna in 1823. Texas seceded from Mexico in 1836, and Mexico further lost its northern territories as a result of its defeat in the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) per the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848).

exploitation of Indigenous lands for development projects. This, in turn, led to the displacement and marginalization of many Indigenous communities (Powell, 1968; Rus et al., 2003).

One relevant development occurred during the Díaz period. The Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, Joaquín Baranda (1882-1901), launched a program to improve primary school education. According to Heath (1972, p. 72), this program was enacted through three steps. First, a national school to train teachers was established. Second, a compulsory elementary school system was established in the Federal District (Mexico City). Third, the states would be included in national debates over education policy. The first step was satisfied in 1887 with the establishment of the Normal School (*Escuela Normal para Profesores de Instrucción Primaria*). The second step was satisfied in 1888 with the passage of the Law of Compulsory Instruction. The third step was achieved in 1889 at the First Congress of Instruction. Due to Mexico's federal structure, Baranda was limited in his ability to extend the program to the states. However, Baranda hoped that the establishment of the Normal School and compulsory primary education in the Federal District would serve as a model to the states.

The First Congress of Instruction importantly resulted in the institutional rejection of the racial and intellectual inferiority of the Indigenous peoples. With the rejection of racist arguments toward the Indigenous peoples, a new Mexican national identity centered on the fusion between Spanish and Indigenous cultures began to develop (Powell, 1968).¹⁸⁹ Outside of Baranda's program, however, Díaz never effectively carried out the proposals made by Mexican educators and intellectuals for Indigenous education. Primary schools in rural indigenous regions were established but suffered severe shortages of teachers and school buildings resulting from a chronic lack of funding from the central and state governments (Powell, 1968; Heath, 1972).

¹⁸⁹ As discussed in Powell (1968), racist sentiments toward the Indigenous population remained well after the 1889 Congress of Instruction.

In 1910, the linguist and former Supreme Court Justice Francisco Belmar founded the Mexican Indianist Society (Heath, 1972; Schulze, 2018). The two primary goals of the society were toward the “knowledge and study of the Indian tongues in a purely linguistic sense” and “the extension of the use of Castilian among the Indigenous” (Heath, 1972, p. 76). The society effectively sought to promote the use of Spanish as a second language among Indigenous groups while allowing them to maintain the use of their native Indigenous language. Opposition from the Díaz government to the society’s goals was largely concerned with what a lack of linguistic homogeneity based on the Spanish language would entail for Mexican national unity. The writer, historian, and later Secretary of Public Education, Justo Sierra (1905-1911), stated that “The polyglot state of our country is an obstacle to the extension of our culture and the full formation of the conscience of our fatherland... Thus [Castilianization] will bring about the unification of national speech, the essential force behind social unification” (Heath, 1972, pp. 77-78).

Despite Sierra’s statements on the necessity of Castilianization, Indigenous languages were still being used for instruction in state-sponsored preparatory schools. Sierra’s rationale for this apparent inconsistency is rooted in the assimilationist utility of the bilingual method first elaborated by Ramírez in 1857: “To teach the Indigenous idioms [languages] to the teachers of the Indians has for us the prime objective of destroying them, of teaching to all the Castilian language, and of thus overcoming this formidable barrier to the unification of the Mexican people” (Heath, 1972, p. 78). Still, bilingual education and schools in rural and Indigenous regions remained broadly neglected by the Díaz government.

Between 1821 and 1920, Indigenous languages were broadly excluded from use in public administration and elsewhere. If an Indigenous citizen wanted to access any public service, they had to do so exclusively in Spanish (Leclerc, 2023). However, the Mexican state during this period was relatively poor and effectively absent in Indigenous regions. This lack of state involvement allowed

Indigenous languages to continue perpetuating until the conclusion of the Mexican Revolution in 1920. This state of affairs began to change as widespread dissatisfaction among the Mexican public and intellectual class with the Díaz government culminated in the jailing of the main opposition candidate in the 1910 Mexican general election, Francisco Madero. The decades following the start of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) saw numerous debates on the efficacy of the direct and bilingual methods of language teaching.

8.2 *Initial Policies*¹⁹⁰

The first serious federal attempt to assimilate the Indigenous population came in 1911 with the passage of the Law of Rudimentary Instruction under the influence of Gregorio Torres Quintero (Heath, 1972). This Law permitted the federal government to establish preparatory schools in rural and Indigenous areas to teach Spanish literacy using the direct method. It should be noted that Quintero's belief in the direct method was not primarily rooted in evidence-based studies but rather in his belief that Indigenous languages "are a persistent and serious obstacle to civilization and to the formation of the national soul" (Heath, 1972, p. 83). In passing the Law of Rudimentary Instruction, the Mexican state retreated from its adherence to the bilingual method practiced under Sierra. However, the application of this Law was hindered by an overall lack of funding and a lack of constitutional authority over the more numerous state schools. According to Heath (1972, p. 85), "By 1914... the federal government had been able to provide only 300 schools for the eleven million illiterates of the nation."

¹⁹⁰ For the discussion of language-related laws, decrees, and ordinances related to this case, Jacques Leclerc's *L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde* was central to compiling a more complete catalog of relevant language laws and restrictions for this case (Leclerc, 2023). If a specific article or provision is mentioned when discussing the text of a law, decree, etc., Leclerc (2023) is the source unless stated otherwise. Leclerc is cited specifically when narrative information *L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde* is cited.

Conscious of the obstacle that limited federal authority over state schools had on the implementation of any national education and language policy, members of the Constitutional Convention of 1917 lobbied to give the federal government control over state schools. While Articles 3 and 31 of the new 1917 constitution respectively provided for free primary education and made attendance compulsory for students under 15 years of age, the responsibility for rural education remained with state leaders who “...most frequently feared they had much to lose if the Indians were educated and learned to speak Spanish” (Heath, 1972, p. 85).

With the conclusion of the revolution in 1920 and after the ascension of Álvaro Obregón (1920-1924) to the presidency, the 1917 constitution was amended in 1921 to give the federal government near-total control over all of Mexico’s schools and educational institutions and further amended Article 3 to include the provision of mandatory preparatory, primary, and secondary education.¹⁹¹ In 1921, Obregón appointed José Vasconcelos as the first Secretary of Public Education in post-revolutionary Mexico, tasked with organizing a new and empowered Ministry of Public Education. The powers of the Ministry of Public Education included the ability to establish, organize, and maintain schools, libraries, and educational and fine arts institutions throughout Mexico (Heath, 1972, p. 87).¹⁹²

The goals of Obregón and Vasconcelos were twofold: to increase the literacy rate nationwide and to assimilate the rural and Indigenous population into Mexican society and the Spanish language in order to strengthen national unity (Scott et al., 2018). Vasconcelos further opposed an earlier effort by the anthropologist Manuel Gamio working under President Venustiano Carranza (1917-1920) to linguistically assimilate the Indigenous population through the direct method of language teaching

¹⁹¹ In determining the formal starting year for a case study, exceptions are made for cases where a transformational regime change results in a significant shift in language policy. Mexico is one instance of this, where the conclusion of the Mexican Revolution coincided with the amendment of the constitution in 1921 to transfer control of Mexico’s educational institutions to the federal government. As such, 1921 is coded as the start date for this case study.

¹⁹² With the partial exception of universities, which were later granted relative administrative autonomy.

using culturally specific approaches in different Indigenous regions. Rather, Vasconcelos initiated a program whereby rural villages constructed their own local schoolhouses and received a language teacher provided by the federal government (Heath, 1972).¹⁹³ Like Quintero and Gamio before him, Vasconcelos' "incorporation" approach relied on the direct method of language teaching. While Vasconcelos' efforts at assimilating the Indigenous population ultimately failed, he did succeed in improving the literacy rate, establishing numerous rural schools, and building many public libraries.¹⁹⁴

In 1925, Moisés Sáenz began working as Undersecretary of Public Education to expand Vasconcelos' "incorporation" program of language education. Between 1914 and 1930, the number of federal rural schools increased from 300 to 3,594 (Heath, 1972, p. 91). In all of these, Spanish was the sole language of instruction across all primary grade levels. The use of any Indigenous language among teachers or pupils was highly discouraged but not punitively enforced. The widespread belief among Mexican officials and educators in the promise of the direct method remained generally uncontested between the passage of the Law of Rudimentary Instruction in 1911 and the early 1930s. By the late 1920s, the failure of the "incorporation" approach championed by Vasconcelos to assimilate the Indigenous population was becoming increasingly clear to policymakers. The causes attributed to the failure of incorporation often included arguments that the Indigenous peoples were of lower intelligence or incapable of civilization (Heath, 1972).

In 1926, the Secretary of Public Education, José Manuel Puig Casauranc, under President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928),¹⁹⁵ launched an experimental project that proved that the Indigenous

¹⁹³ Per Heath (1972), this program primarily operated in rural areas where the Indigenous population was already bilingual, and largely neglected monolingual Indigenous rural areas.

¹⁹⁴ By the end of the revolution in 1920, Mexico had an illiteracy rate of 80% and only 39 public libraries (Krauze, 2011, p. 47). By the end of Vasconcelos' term as Secretary of Education, there existed 1,916 libraries in Mexico (Krauze, 2011, p. 47), which likely contributed to bringing down the illiteracy rate to 59.3% by 1930 (INEGI, 1930).

¹⁹⁵ Founded in 1929 by President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928), the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated the Mexican state without interruption until 2000. Throughout this period, the state and party apparatus became increasingly intertwined to the point that they may be considered synonymous until the PRI's defeat in the 2000 Mexican general election.

people were not only capable of ‘Mexicanizing’¹⁹⁶ but eager to do so under the right circumstances (Heath, 1972).¹⁹⁷ In 1933, the lessons of this experiment were applied in the new Centers of Indigenous Education (Heath, 1972). Intended to serve as supplements for education in rural schools, these boarding schools sought to socialize students to Mexican society with teachers who knew their students’ language(s). Starting with the tenure of Secretary of Public Education Narciso Bassols in 1934, teachers at these boarding schools were instructed to provide all their lessons in Spanish while allowing the use of Indigenous languages among students and in student-teacher interactions.

Slowly, educators and policymakers were warming to this quasi-bilingual modification of the direct method. Critical to this process was the belief in the superiority of the “integration” approach over the “incorporation” approach. Unlike the incorporation approach, the integration approach emphasized the positive contribution that Indigenous cultures brought to the Mexican national identity. The integration approach both recognized the utility of using Indigenous languages to teach literacy and made changes to the curriculum to reflect the needs and demands of a student’s life in their rural village. However, the educational paradigm in Mexico remained consistent with the direct method, particularly in rural schools. Still, language learning outcomes were hindered by an overall lack of incentive for Indigenous students to continue learning or retain their knowledge of Spanish due to the relative linguistic isolation of rural Indigenous villages, as well as a severe lack of teachers who were proficient in both Spanish and Indigenous languages.

In the early 1930s, a partnership between Sáenz and the missionary-linguist William Townsend further shifted the dominant educational paradigm toward the bilingual method. As a missionary in Guatemala, Townsend developed an alphabet for the Indigenous Kaqchikel language (SIL International, 2024). After teaching literacy in Kaqchikel, Townsend began teaching children literacy

¹⁹⁶ Defined as adopting the Spanish language and non-Indigenous Mexican culture and customs.

¹⁹⁷ For further discussion on the “house of the Indian student” experimental program, see Heath (1972, pp. 94-95).

in Spanish. Tasked with creating scripts for the various Indigenous groups of Mexico, Townsend further established the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) in 1934 (SIL International, n.d.).¹⁹⁸ In 1936, Townsend's work received direct support from President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940).¹⁹⁹

Beginning in the 1930s, discourse around Indigenous policy in education and other spheres shifted toward "indigenism." Coinciding with the term of President Cárdenas, the indigenist movement was characterized by efforts to reconcile the image of Mexico as a modern nation-state with its Indigenous roots by promoting Indigenous languages, customs, and traditions as part of a unified Mexican national identity. Under the indigenist education project, literacy in Indigenous languages continued to be viewed as a pathway to Spanish-language literacy as a second language.

In 1939, the First Assembly of Philologists and Linguists concluded that the direct method as applied to Indigenous populations in Mexico was an overall failure and endorsed the bilingual method (Heath, 1972). The Assembly also led to the formation of the Council of Indigenous Languages. The Council's recommendations led to the passage of the Law for the Elimination of Illiteracy in August 1944 (Heath, 1972, p. 127). Beginning in early 1945, the anti-illiteracy campaign relied on the publication of bilingual teaching and reading materials provided for under Article 14 of the August 1944 law (Heath, 1972).²⁰⁰ The National Indigenous Institute (INI) was founded in 1948 with the goal of Indigenous assimilation through bilingual education and the development of Indigenous regions (De León, 2016).

¹⁹⁸ The Summer Institute of Linguistics is the institution responsible for the creation of *Ethnologue*, the world's most comprehensive catalog of languages.

¹⁹⁹ Building on Townsend's work, Morris Swadesh led the Tarascan Project in Mexico from 1939 to 1941, and used it to develop a bilingual education program, and trained Indigenous teachers in a newly elaborated alphabet and grammar for the P'urhepecha language (De León, 2016).

²⁰⁰ As part of this campaign, a special task force was created to train fifty bilingual teachers and prepare bilingual education materials for, among several other groups, the Maya of the Yucatán peninsula (Heath, 1972). The task force was ultimately unsuccessful for the Maya program.

At the time, the multitude of programs to educate and teach literacy to the Indigenous population were largely uncoordinated between each other and the federal government. As a result, the overall shift toward bilingual education within these programs was not reflected in the rural federal schools. From 1911 to the early 1960s, teachers in rural schools largely continued to teach Spanish using the direct method (Heath, 1972). Heath (1972, p. 143) attributes the resistance of rural teachers to adopting the bilingual method to “linguistic chauvinism, insufficient training in linguistics, inadequate knowledge of an Indian tongue, and in many cases, a sincere belief that literacy in the Indigenous tongues kept the Indians locked in isolation.” Curiously, the bilingual method faced some resistance from several Indigenous groups who objected to the idea that they needed to learn how to read and write in their own language before having the opportunity to learn Spanish (Heath, 1972). However, most Indigenous groups ultimately favored the bilingual method due to its utility in learning Spanish. Nearly two decades after the bilingual method received legislative approval in the 1944 Law for the Elimination of Illiteracy, the Ministry of Public Education—responsible for the oversight of rural federal schools—endorsed the bilingual method in 1963 (Heath, 1972).

While it is unclear when the majority of Mayan students began attending federal schools where the use of Spanish was mandatory, Weber’s (1967) ethnographic study of Maya speakers in the village of Pustunich in Yucatán provides a glimpse into Mayan attitudes toward Spanish-language education during this time. Unlike most other villages in Yucatán at that time, Pustunich was recently connected to the largely Spanish-speaking state capital of Merida through a paved road. According to Weber (1967, p. 16), “A federal school, where the use of Maya is prohibited, has existed in Pustunich for over sixty years.”²⁰¹ At this federal rural school, the use of Maya in the classroom was prohibited, though

²⁰¹ This indicates that the federal school in Pustunich was established in 1905, which predates the establishment of the federal rural school system in 1921 by 16 years. Per Heath (1972, p. 91), there were 300 federal rural schools in 1914. The first federal rural schools were established by the 1911 Law of Rudimentary Instruction. Either the estimate of 1905 is inaccurate, Heath (1972) is incorrect in her estimate, or the village of Pustunich was an extremely early recipient of a federal rural school.

enforcement was relatively relaxed (Weber, 1967). According to Weber (1967), local incentives for parents to teach their children Spanish over Maya were borne not from pressures from the federal rural school but on the relative connectedness of Pustunich to Merida and the relative prestige and economic opportunity afforded to those who learned Spanish.

Between 1970 and 1974, Aguirre Beltrán served as the Sub-Secretary of Culture under President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) (De León, 2016). During this time, Beltrán developed and implemented bilingual and bicultural Indigenous education programs (De León, 2016). Modiano's (1973) research in the Tzeltal and Tzotzil regions of Chiapas during this period revealed that Indigenous-language literacy was effective at later teaching Spanish-language literacy.²⁰² However, just as the dominant paradigm in education policy began to shift toward true bilingualism, it also refocused on assimilationist goals. In 1977, the former Secretary of Public Education and Governor of Oaxaca, Victor Bravo Ahuja, published a method of assimilating the Indigenous population using Spanish-language L2 education as a transitional step (Bravo Ahuja, 1977; De León, 2016).

During the administration of President José López Portillo (1976-1982), the General Department of Indigenous Education (DGEI) was created in 1978 for the purpose of centralizing and coordinating Indigenous bilingual primary education throughout Mexico. However, the curriculum in Indigenous schools was the same as in primary schools throughout the rest of Mexico, with both Indigenous and Spanish-language schools using the same mandatory Spanish-language textbooks and syllabi (Hamel, 2008b; De Korne, 2021). The primary difference between the two during this time was the fact that most of the teachers in the Indigenous schools were themselves Indigenous and spoke the local language as their native language (Hamel, 2008b). This allowed Indigenous school teachers

²⁰² Interestingly, Modiano's (1973) finding found a more receptive audience in the United States, where it had a significant impact on advocacy for native-language instruction (Francis & Reyhner, 2002).

to use the local language to communicate effectively with their students and translate meaning during normal instruction in Spanish.

Outside of Indigenous education policy, there were no language laws or informal policies restricting the use of Indigenous languages in the naming of people or places, most forms of public signage, public speech, or print media. However, Indigenous groups—including Mayans—were affected by a relative lack of access to public services due in part to the lack of state presence in Indigenous (Mayan) regions and the lack of bureaucrats proficient in Indigenous (Mayan) languages. According to Leclerc (2023), federal government services have only been offered in Spanish as of 2011, and “Only a few municipalities can communicate orally with Indigenous people.”²⁰³ At the same time, Leclerc (2023) argues that this policy of linguistic denial was the result of “the political and economic weakness of the Mexican state [which] prevented the transformation of the way of life of these [Indigenous] populations, so that the Indigenous people continued to live in relative isolation...”

Like the United States, Mexico does not have an official language. Like the United States, federal laws explicitly concerning language use are rare, and often restricted to the minimally intrusive spheres of consumer product information, pharmaceutical information, aviation, financial disclosures, and the naturalization process. Most countries require the use of their official or effectively dominant language in courts, and Mexico is no exception to this. Articles 15, 18, 124 bis, 128, and 154 of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure of August 1934 detail exceptions made for Indigenous languages in courts and court proceedings, including provisions for bilingual judges and translators. Per Article 271 of the 1943 Federal Code of Civil Procedures,²⁰⁴ “Judicial proceedings and promotions must be written in Spanish... The proceedings dictated in trials in which one or both parties are Indigenous,

²⁰³ While it is unclear which municipalities in particular Leclerc (2023) is referring to, anecdotal evidence suggests that most Mayan regions lacked access to most public services.

²⁰⁴ Amended in December 2002.

who do not know how to read Spanish, the court must translate them into their language...” Articles 107, 108, and 180 of the aforementioned law further detail provisions for bilingual interpreters during court proceedings.

Contract law similarly requires the exclusive use of Spanish. Per Article 73 ter of the Federal Consumer Protection Act of December 1992, contracts for real estate transactions must “be written in the Spanish language, without prejudice to the fact that it can be expressed in another language.” Per Article 85, adhesion contracts “shall be drafted in the Spanish language...” Articles 9 and 18 of the Federal Law on Responsibilities of Public Servants of December 1982 provide translation services for Indigenous citizens who file a complaint against a civil servant. Articles 54, 67, and 113 of the General Health Law of February 1984 provide for bilingual or translation services for Indigenous individuals seeking healthcare services.

Despite numerous legal provisions for translation services, Minorities at Risk (2006) cite a now inaccessible 2004 report from the Human Rights Commission as stating, “Mayans were often abused by local authorities and were put into court systems with few if any translators for their languages.” Following the specific wording of the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Mexico between 1999 and 2022 reveals a discernible trend (U.S. Department of State, 2024). Between 1999 and 2013, the provision of translation services for Indigenous defendants as required by Law was “generally not done.” In 2014, translation services were “often not available.” From 2015 to 2022, translation services were “not always available.”

Given the international dominance of the English language, Mexico places relatively more strict requirements on language use in consumer products. Per Article 34 of the Federal Consumer Protection Act of December 1992, “The data displayed on the products or their labels, containers and

packaging and the respective advertising,²⁰⁵ both of national manufacture and of foreign origin, will be expressed in Spanish...” For products manufactured in Mexico, the use of any language other than Spanish is totally prohibited.²⁰⁶ For products manufactured abroad, Spanish letters must appear larger than the other language(s).²⁰⁷ Per Article 18 of the Regulations of the General Health Law on Health Control of Advertising of 1974, advertisements cannot use any language other than Spanish, with possible exceptions for brand names.²⁰⁸

Concern over the influence of English and the United States additionally led to the creation of the Commission for the Defense of the Spanish Language in August 1981 under President José López Portillo (1976-1982) (Lara, 1993; Leclerc, 2023). The Commission was tasked with maintaining the purity of the Spanish language (i.e., excising Anglicisms) and promoting the use of Spanish in Mexico’s borders by coordinating activities between the federal government and the private sector (Lara, 1993; Leclerc, 2023). The Commission’s actions affected language use in legislation, radio and television broadcasting, publishing, education, “language,” tourist services, and municipal action (Lara, 1993, p. 150). The Commission was abolished less than two years after its creation by the new administration of President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) (Leclerc, 2023).

According to Article 75 of the Federal Law on Radio and Television of January 1960, “Broadcasting stations must use the national language... The Ministry of the Interior may authorize,

²⁰⁵ This aspect of Article 34 is recorded in Table 18 as a restriction under the public signage indicator under the media category.

²⁰⁶ Applies to (prohibits) the use of foreign languages in trademarks for products, per Article 123 of the Law on Inventions and Trademarks of February 1976. Per Article 124, this does not apply to products exclusively manufactured for export.

²⁰⁷ Unlike the prohibition of non-Spanish languages on products manufactured in Mexico, the requirement for more prominent Spanish lettering for products manufactured abroad is not considered a language restriction, since this is the default position for most countries in the world. For example, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA) passed in the United States in 1967 requires that English text in bilingual consumer products be at least equally prominent and visible as those of other languages.

²⁰⁸ This applies to tobacco products in particular, as Article 44 of the Regulations of the General Law for Tobacco Control of 2009 mandate the exclusive use of Spanish in advertising for tobacco products.

in special cases, the use of other languages, provided that a Spanish version is subsequently made...’’²⁰⁹

In the context of the Mayan languages examined here, broadcasts in Mayan languages were initially sporadic, limited, very local, without dedicated federal funding, and effectively limited to radio broadcasting. It was not until 1982 that the first dedicated Mayan-Spanish radio stations with sufficient federal funding appeared.²¹⁰ Currently, there are six radio stations that broadcast in Maya, Tzotzil, Tzeltal, and Ch’ol in the states of Yucatán, Chiapas, Campeche, and Quintana Roo: *La Voz de los Mayas* (est. 1982: Maya, Spanish), *La Voz de los Chontales* (est. 1982-1989, 2020: Ch’ol, Spanish),²¹¹ *La Voz de la Frontera Sur* (est. 1987: Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Spanish), *La Voz del Corazón de la Selva* (est. 1995: Maya, Ch’ol, Spanish), *La Voz de los Vientos* (est. 1997: Tzotzil, Spanish), and *La Voz del Gran Pueblo* (est. 1999: Maya, Spanish) (Ecos Indígenas, n.d.).²¹²

In the earlier decades of the 20th century, Mayans and the broader Indigenous population faced significant political and economic exclusion largely due to the isolation of Indigenous language communities, the lack of civil servants proficient in Indigenous languages, and a general lack of proficiency in Spanish within Indigenous communities which could be used to communicate with Mexican bureaucracies. While this situation improved throughout the mid-to late-20th century, it was not until the amendment of Article 4 of the Mexican constitution on December 7, 1990, that the Mexican government formally recognized the existence of Indigenous groups: “The Mexican nation has a pluricultural composition which is based originally on its Indian peoples. The Law will protect

²⁰⁹ This law was substantially altered in 2006 to be more supportive of Indigenous-language broadcasting. Indigenous-language broadcasting was further bolstered after the Federal Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law of July 2014 was amended in May 2016 to guarantee access to multimedia services in all national languages, including indigenous ones.

²¹⁰ The parent organization of Mayan-language radio stations is the National Institute of Indigenous Peoples, which manages the various Indigenous radio stations throughout Mexico through the Indigenous Cultural Broadcasting System.

²¹¹ *La Voz de los Chontales* was closed in 1989 and reestablished in 2020.

²¹² Several of these stations also broadcast in other Indigenous languages, including some small Maya languages not discussed here.

and promote the development of their languages, cultures, usages, customs, resources, and specific forms of social organization...” (Minorities at Risk, 2006; Hamel, 2008b, p. 307). As with the case of the Amazigh in Algeria, this constitutional recognition was a symbolic step forward furthering Indigenous rights, but was “lukewarm and ambiguous” (De La Peña, 2006, p. 287) and ultimately served as a “cosmetic arrangement rather than amounting to full recognition of the Indigenous reality” (Tresierra, 1995, p. 202). Unlike the case of the Amazigh in Algeria, the Mexican government’s recognition of the contribution of Indigenous cultures to the national identity was not done in response to a major uprising.²¹³

8.3 *Popular Backlash and Later Policies*

Despite the recent symbolic recognition of Indigenous peoples, the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) revoked agrarian reform through the amendment of Article 27 of the constitution in January 1992. This allowed the Mexican government to privatize the traditional *ejido* communal farmland system previously dominated by Indigenous communities in an attempt to modernize the Mexican economy (Austin, 1994) and enter into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Rus et al., 2003).²¹⁴ Due to the size of the *ejido* system, the amendment of Article 27 has been likened to the passage of the Dawes Act of 1887 in the United States (Austin, 1994).

In April 1992, 3,000 mostly Mayan protesters demonstrated in Ocosingo, Chiapas, to protest the new amendment and NAFTA (Benjamin, 2000, p. 442). In October 1992, 10,000 Mayans protested the Mexican government’s treatment of Indigenous groups in San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, by toppling a monument to the city’s founder—conquistador Diego de Mazariegos

²¹³ This was almost certainly easier for the Mexican government to do relative to the Algerian government simply due to the fact that most Mexicans by the 1990s could claim some amount of Indigenous heritage.

²¹⁴ The rationale behind Mexico’s decision to join NAFTA and amend Article 27 is discussed in Section 8.4.1.

(Benjamin, 2000; Collins, 2010).²¹⁵ The protest was not organized directly in response to Article 27 or NAFTA but was instead coordinated to occur on the 500th anniversary of Columbus' arrival in the New World. However, the mood was likely charged with grievances related to Article 27 and NAFTA. These demonstrations were to be the precursor to an even larger expression of popular backlash fifteen months later.

On the eve of Mexico's accession to NAFTA, the Mexican Congress passed the General Law of Indigenous Education of 1993, which had as its goal the maintenance of students' Indigenous identities and languages. As a result, introductory primary education textbooks were published for each of Mexico's 40 most-used Indigenous languages (De León, 2016, p. 7). Specifically, the program set out by the 1993 law sought to promote the use of Indigenous languages as the language of normal instruction, while Spanish would be taught separately as a second language. This program ultimately failed in its objective due to resistance from both Indigenous communities and teachers (Hamel, 2008b).

On January 1, 1994—the same day NAFTA was set to come into effect—the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) seized control of the towns of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Ocosingo, Altamirano, and Las Margaritas, and further released 230 Indigenous prisoners, most of whom were jailed over land disputes (Collins, 2010, p. 778). The EZLN rebels were made up of predominantly Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Ch'ol, and Tojolabal²¹⁶ Mayans from Chiapas (Terborg et al., 2006). Within twelve days, the army had recaptured the cities and forced the EZLN into the Lacandon Jungle, from where the conflict transformed into a prolonged but low-intensity guerilla war (Terborg et al., 2006).²¹⁷

²¹⁵ The statue was erected in March 1978. At the time, the statue of Diego de Mazariegos was the only statue of a conquistador in Mexico, and one of only two in all of Latin America (Benjamin, 2000, p. 444).

²¹⁶ The Tojolabal people are a Mayan Indigenous group that reside in Chiapas. They are not directly included in this discussion and later analysis due to the small (<100,000) size of their language group.

²¹⁷ The leader of the EZLN, Subcomandante Marcos, later attributed the October 1992 protest as the beginning of the Zapatista war against the Mexican state (Benjamin, 2000).

Between 1994 and 2005, the EZLN elaborated their demands and motivations in six declarations. The First Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle (1993)²¹⁸ demanded the prosecution of soldiers involved in the repression of Indigenous citizens, an end to the “robbery of [Indigenous] natural resources,” and further mentions their struggle for “work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace” (Radio Zapatista, 2005). The EZLN also strongly opposed duty-free imports of agricultural products from the United States and Canada in the belief that such imports would impoverish Indigenous farmers (Hewitt & Cheetham, 2000, p. 329).

The second declaration (1994) largely followed the theme of the first but featured a greater focus on democratization and an end to single-party rule in Mexico (Radio Zapatista, 2005).²¹⁹ The third (1995), fourth (1996), and fifth (1998) declarations largely repeat the themes of the first two (Radio Zapatista, 2005). In 2001, the EZLN announced that it would transition to a more peaceful form of politics and withdrew its fighters from roadblocks in Chiapas (Collins, 2010). The Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle (2005) was made five years after the victory of Vicente Fox in the 2000 Mexican general election ended single-party rule in Mexico, and four years after the strategic transition of the EZLN. It is only in this final declaration that the topic of language appears, but only once and in an anti-neoliberal economic context.²²⁰ Demands for autonomy were made in the third, fifth, and sixth declarations. Given the lack of any discernible language-related demands or motivations made or held by the EZLN during their most active period in the 1990s, the 1994 Zapatista rebellion and the protests of April and October 1992 are not considered popular backlash

²¹⁸ Made on December 31, 1993—one day before the EZLN attack.

²¹⁹ See Magaloni (2006) for further discussion on single-party rule in Mexico.

²²⁰ “Then neoliberal globalization, capitalism, destroys what exists in these countries, it destroys their culture, *their language*, their economic system, their political system, and it also destroys the ways in which those who live in that country relate to each other” (Radio Zapatista, 2005). According to Trejo (2002, p. 5), “Neither the peasant Indigenous movement nor the EZLN originally espoused an ethnic discourse and only strategically raised the ethnic banner after economic and political options for the advancement of a peasant-based programme had been cancelled.”

events for the purposes of this case study. Similarly, the numerous large protests that occurred from 1994 to 1998 are also not included due to their connection with the Zapatista rebellion and lack of expressed language grievances or motivations. In any case, the Zapatista rebellion would have a profound effect on language policy in Mexico.

By 2000, the most active phase of the Chiapas conflict subsided while the government and the EZLN continued in negotiations. While the central demand of the EZLN at the time was for economic and political autonomy, the government only offered minor cultural concessions and initiatives (De León, 2001). In 2001, Article 4 of the constitution—which was amended to formally recognize the existence of the Indigenous population in 1990—was moved in place of Article 2 and amended to be more symbolically inclusive.²²¹ In the same year, the Coordination in Intercultural Bilingual Education (CGEIB) was created within the Ministry of Public Education to implement bilingual and intercultural education. This effort also failed to gain widespread support, as by 2006, “practically none of the proposals or even the new debates had reached the classrooms” (Hamel, 2008a, p. 319).

In March 2003, the General Law on the Linguistic Rights of Indigenous Peoples (LGDLPI) was passed under the administration of President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2003). Of particular importance are Articles 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11. Per Article 11 of LGDLPI, Indigenous peoples were guaranteed access to compulsory bilingual primary education while the state promoted multilingualism in secondary and higher education. Article 4 recognizes most Indigenous languages as national languages, and Article 6 commits the state to “allocate a percentage of the time available in the mass media under concession... for the broadcasting of programs in the

²²¹ Per the amended Article 2 of the Mexican constitution: “The nation is multicultural, based originally on its Indigenous peoples, described as descendants of those inhabiting the country before colonization and that preserve their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, or some of them.” This amendment is not included as a remedial policy related to minority exclusion due to its purely symbolic nature.

various national languages...” Articles 7 and 10 allow speakers of Indigenous languages to access bureaucratic documentation and public services and use their language in court proceedings.²²² Article 9 states “It is the right of all Mexicans to communicate in the language they speak, without restrictions in the public or private sphere, orally or in writing, in all their social, economic, political, cultural, religious and any other activities.” In the previously discussed Exclusionary and Hybrid Assimilation cases, this would constitute a powerful though symbolic concession. However, Article 9 had no practical effect on the situation of linguistic minorities in Mexico, as there were previously no such restrictions in place.

By 2005, there were around 55,000 Indigenous teachers for 1.2 million Indigenous primary school students (Hamel, 2008a, p. 315). Despite this, Hamel (2008a, p. 315) concludes that “most observers would agree that the Indigenous school system does on the whole not contribute to maintaining and fostering Indigenous languages.” Hamel (2008a, p. 317) attributes this failure in large part to the formation of a national teacher’s union in 1980, which “... acts objectively as a language movement in favor of Spanish and linguistic assimilation.” The reasons behind the critical attitude of Indigenous teachers toward federal directives to promote Indigenous languages are explained by Patthey-Chavez (1993, p. 207): “... many bilingual teachers themselves resent federal policies... They are required to apply what to them are impractical abstractions with little or no support while at the same time working under appalling conditions... What is more, they are asked to undo several decades’ worth of teaching. After having convinced their communities that teaching Spanish is the most advantageous educational course for their children, they now have to counteract the effects of the integrative policy... and the local community may actively oppose it.” Local Indigenous opposition to Indigenous-language primary instruction itself stems from the perception among many that

²²² The provision of court proceedings in one’s Indigenous language was also formalized three months earlier in a December 2002 law (Minorities at Risk, 2006).

proficiency in Spanish will guarantee their children a better future. In this regard, they can point to the fact that during most of the case period, the secondary and higher education curricula were taught exclusively in Spanish (Patthey-Chavez, 1993).²²³

There have never been any public universities in Mexico where normal instruction is given in any Mayan language. This began to change somewhat in December 2004 with the establishment of the Intercultural University of Chiapas (Unich) (Muñoz & Villar, 2009, p. 246).²²⁴ Unich primarily provides courses on Mayan language and culture, though normal instruction appears to be given in Spanish. In October 2006,²²⁵ the Mayan Intercultural University of Quintana Roo (UIMQRoo) was founded to teach “...degrees in Language and Culture, Production Systems Engineering, and Alternative Tourism,” though normal instruction also appears to be given in Spanish (Muñoz & Villar, 2009, p. 251).

In July 2014, the Federal Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law was passed under the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2014). Under its original wording, Article 230 was interpreted to mean that broadcasts were required to be in the “national language” (singular, i.e., Spanish). In May 2016, a Supreme Court case ruled that since Indigenous languages were recognized as national languages in the LGDLPI, broadcast stations were allowed to “use any of the national languages,” which included Indigenous languages (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2016; Mioli & Higuera, 2016).

In September 2019, the General Education Law (LGE) was passed under the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024) (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2021). The Articles concerning Indigenous education went further than any previous law had gone in committing

²²³ By 1956, “few [Indigenous] areas provided education beyond the fourth grade” (Heath, 1972, p. 147). This state of affairs seems to have continued up to Patthey-Chavez’ writing in 1993.

²²⁴ Began operating in August 2005. In the 2008-2009 academic cycle, 1,172 students attended Unich.

²²⁵ Began operating in August 2007. In the 2008-2009 academic cycle, around 400 students attended UIMQRoo.

the state to providing substantial funding toward Indigenous-language education. However, the Supreme Court invalidated all relevant articles (Articles 56, 57, and 58) in June 2021—less than two years after the Law’s passage (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2021).²²⁶

According to the case selection criteria discussed in Chapter 4, this case is intended to cover the speakers of Mayan languages in Mexico with a language group size of at least 100,000. The qualifying language groups consist of Maya, Tzotzil, Tzeltal, and Ch’ol. However, the discussion thus far has generally focused on Indigenous groups throughout Mexico as a whole since almost all education policy after 1921 was intended to apply equally to all Indigenous groups. Given this chapter’s narrow focus on Mayan languages, my discussion largely concerns the experience of Tzotzil, Tzeltal, and Ch’ol speakers in Chiapas. While this is due to the importance of the 1994 Zapatista rebellion and its effects on Indigenous policy in Mexico, it is worth mentioning why the Maya speakers of the Yucatán are mentioned less frequently in the historical literature.

In 1930, Yucatán was the only state where the majority of primary education teachers provided instruction in the local Indigenous (Maya) language (Heath, 1972). Heath (1972) argues that the Yucatán experience of using local languages in education helped contribute to the state’s relatively low illiteracy rate among Mayan students. When the newly established Ministry of Public Education monopolized its control over existing school systems and established new federal schools in the 1920s and 1930s, Yucatán was seemingly less affected by this in comparison to other states. For example, Scott et al. (2018) highlight Yucatán as an example of a state where the government historically had little influence and where many primary schools provided instruction in the local Indigenous (Maya) language.

²²⁶ Obrador was almost certainly genuinely motivated to provide Indigenous-language education, given his previous position as Director of the Institute of Indigenous Peoples in Tabasco.

In the following section, I show that all Indigenous languages in Mexico—Maya included—have experienced a precipitous drop in linguistic vitality. In response, the Yucatán state Congress approved a law in December 2019 that mandated Mayan language instruction in primary and secondary schools (Copeland, 2019). As with seemingly every Law passed in Mexico attempting to achieve a similar outcome, implementation has been impeded by a lack of teachers proficient in Spanish and Maya. Guerrettaz et al. (2020) attributes the decline in the linguistic vitality of Maya specifically to a lack of teachers proficient in Maya.

From 1978 to the present day, the model of Indigenous education has remained more or less the same. That is, Indigenous languages are used by teachers to communicate effectively with their students while normal instruction is provided mostly in Spanish. In that sense, the Indigenous education policy of the late 20th and early 21st century effectively mimics the assimilationist utility of the bilingual method elaborated by Justo Sierra.

Table 17 below details the major policies that effectively excluded the Mayan minority from political and economic life in roughly chronological order. Table 18 below similarly details the timeline of various language restrictions imposed on Mayans according to category. This case featured no popular backlash events in response to language-related grievances. An asterisk (*) on any date indicates that the associated month or year is inferred due to a relative lack of specificity or coverage in the source material.

Table 17: Mayan Exclusion in Mexico

Exclusionary Policy	Time Period	Notes
Acteal massacre	Dec. 1997	45 Tzotzils dead, perpetrated by the state-affiliated paramilitary group Máscara Roja (or Paz y Justicia) in Acteal, Chiapas allegedly in retaliation for the victims' verbal support of the EZLN (Trejo, 2002, p. 11).

Table 18: Mayan Language Restrictions in Mexico

Language Restriction	Subcategory	Time Period	Notes
Required use of Spanish in citizen communications with state and federal bureaucracies	Administration (ExComm) (Employment)	1921 - 2011	The criticisms concerning the provision of bilingual translation services for legal matters likely extend to the translation provisions for health services as stipulated by Articles 54, 67, and 113 of the General Health Law of February 1984. While I code translation services for legal matters as being mostly unavailable until 2014, Leclerc (2023) finds that federal government services have only been offered in Spanish as of 2011, while few Indigenous municipalities can communicate with Indigenous-language speakers. Since the ability of citizens to communicate with local and federal bureaucracies in a minority language typically precedes the ability of local and federal bureaucracies to provide documentation in a minority language, it is likely that documentation was rarely provided in Indigenous languages at least until around 2011. However, there is no direct evidence of this, so the documentation indicator is coded as “no evidence” throughout the entire case period. Unlike the documentation indicator, the lack of bureaucrats capable of communicating with Indigenous people more directly points to an informal policy of requiring use of the dominant (Spanish) language in hiring for public sector positions.
Required use of Spanish in courts and court proceedings, without translation services	Administration (Judiciary)	1921 - 2014	Minorities at Risk (2006) and numerous reports from the U.S. Department of State criticized the implementation of bilingual translation services for legal matters as stipulated in Article 271 of the 1943 (amended in December 2002) Federal Code of Civil Procedures, as well as Articles 15, 18, 124 bis, 128 and 154 of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure of August 1934. These criticisms implicitly extend to Articles 9 and 18 of the Federal Law on Responsibilities of Public Servants of December 1982. I conclude based on the previously discussed wording provided by reports from the Department of State between 1999 to 2022 that translation services for Indigenous languages were insufficiently provided as to be categorized as unavailable until 2014.
Required use of Spanish in legal documentation	Administration (Judiciary)	1921 - Dec. 1992	The informal state of affairs prior to the Federal Consumer Protection Act of December 1992 was that all legal documentation for contracts were written in Spanish. This act serves as a substantial amendment, as the original law was previously passed in 1975. Per Article 73 ter, contracts for real estate transactions must “be written in the Spanish language, without prejudice to the fact that it can be expressed in another language.” However, Article 85 states that adhesion contracts “shall be drafted in the Spanish language...” Considered a relatively minor restriction under the judiciary indicator. Articles 9 and 18 of the Federal Law on Responsibilities of Public Servants of December 1982 ostensibly provides translation services for Indigenous citizens who file a complaint against a civil servant. As mentioned above, this was likely insufficiently implemented due to budgetary constraints.
Required use of Spanish in consumer products and consumer product advertising	Public (Signage)	1974 - Present	Per the Federal Consumer Protection Act of December 1992. Per Article 34, “The data displayed on the products or their labels, containers and packaging <i>and the respective advertising</i> , both of national manufacture and of foreign origin, will be expressed in Spanish...” Applies to trademarks per Article 123 of the Law on Inventions and Trademarks of February 1976. Per Article 18 of the Regulations of the General Health Law on Health Control of Advertising of 1974, advertisements cannot use any language other than Spanish, with possible exceptions for brand names. Mayan languages were likely not used in consumer products and advertising prior to the February 1974 law to begin with. Considered a minor restriction by comparison with the similar restriction on non-Arabic languages in the Amazigh case due to significant differences in the proportion of the minority group proficient in the dominant language.

Rare availability of primary education in Mayan languages	Education (Primary)	1921 - 2009	By 1956, “few [Indigenous] areas provided education beyond the fourth grade” (Heath, 1972, p. 147). This state of affairs seems to have continued up to Patthey-Chavez’ writing in 1993 (Patthey-Chavez, 1993). Guerrettaz et al. (2020) discuss an intercultural bilingual education program in Yucatán in which 1,600 teachers provided instruction in Mayan in primary and secondary schools. This program began in September 2010 (Guerrettaz et al., 2020, p. 4). However, they find that in order to effectively combat the decline of Mayan languages, more Mayan-speaking teachers are needed. Unlike primary education, this seems to be the first instance of Mayan languages being systematically and continuously used in secondary education. Even after the consolidation of primary schools by the Ministry of Public Education in 1930, primary education teachers in Yucatán continued to provide instruction in Maya. However, there were few schools in Mayan areas in general, and likely less so in Chiapas, Quintana Roo, and Campeche. Primary education is thus considered as being “rarely” available until 2010, while secondary education is considered as being “never” available until 2010.
Unavailability of secondary education in Mayan languages	Education (Secondary)	1921 - 2009	(See above)
Rare availability of secondary education in Mayan languages	Education (Secondary)	2010 - Present	(See above) Excluding Articles 56-58 of the General Education Law of September 2019, since I could not locate any information verifying that any concrete measures were taken to implement its provisions before its invalidation by the Supreme Court.
Unavailability of higher education in Mayan languages	Education (Higher)	1921 - Aug. 2005	Shifts to “rare availability” with the start of the operations of the Intercultural University of Chiapas (Unich) in August 2005. In October 2006, the Mayan Intercultural University of Quintana Roo (UIMQRoo) was founded and began operations in August 2007. However, both universities appear to have very small student populations.
Rare availability of higher education in Mayan languages	Education (Higher)	Aug. 2005 - Present	(See above)
Near-exclusive use of Spanish in radio broadcasts	Media (Broadcasting)	Jan. 1960 - 1981	Per Article 75 of the Federal Law on Radio and Television of January 1960, effectively all radio broadcasts had to be in Spanish. Mayan languages lacked consistent access to radio broadcasts in their languages until the establishment of <i>La Voz de los Mayas</i> and <i>La Voz de los Chontales</i> in 1982. From 1982 to May 2016, Mayan access to radio broadcasts is coded as publicly restricted due to moderate bilingual broadcast time requirements. From May 2016 onwards, Mayan access to radio broadcasts is considered publicly provided without restrictions.
Required use of Spanish in Mayan radio broadcasts	Media (Broadcasting)	1982 - May 2016	(See above)

8.4 Discussion

8.4.1 Minority Exclusion

Several potentially prominent incidents of minority exclusion are excluded here. In response to Mayan organization against landowners, the Guardias Blancas tortured and killed hundreds of

Mayans in Chiapas between 1982 and 1988 (Minorities at Risk, 2006). The Mexican government's use of paramilitary groups such as the Guardias Blancas from 1968 onwards did not specifically target Mayans. Rather, the government targeted various leftist social movements and organizations, which happened to align with the goals of Mayan activist groups (Moreno, 2011). Therefore, this event is not considered a policy of minority exclusion. Furthermore, incidents of state-based violence against the Indigenous population in Chiapas during the most active phase of the Zapatista rebellion (1994-1998) are not included due to the confounding influence of violent rebellion.²²⁷

Trejo (2002, p. 14) records the frequency of economic, political, and ethnic demands made by Mayans in Chiapas from 1975 to 2000. From 1975 to 1980, political demands (anti-government, repression, corruption) declined from 100% of all demands to around 50%, with economic demands (land reform, anti-poverty, agricultural programs) rising an equal amount.²²⁸ The proportion of ethnic demands (recognition, affirmative action, autonomy) briefly spiked at around 5% in 1983 before dropping to zero by 1986. After its peak of 50% of all demands in 1980, the relative frequency of economic demands from 1980 to 2000 declined to its lowest point at around 5% in 1998. This decrease was largely due to the federal and local governments launching land reform programs in response to the 1994 Zapatista rebellion. Likewise, the frequency of political demands reached its highest point in the post-1980 period in 1988, with around 90% of all demands being political in nature. After remaining near zero between 1975 and 1990, the frequency of ethnic demands sharply increased between 1995 and 1997, achieving its peak of around 45% in 1997 before falling back to around 18% by 2000.

²²⁷ With the sole exception of the 1997 Acteal massacre, which is discussed below. Per the coding notes associated with Sambanis et al.'s (2018) SDM data set, "Following the end of the [Chiapas] rebellion, there was continued repression and some low-level violence between government troops and separatist guerillas in the region until 1998."

²²⁸ This finding is somewhat contradicted by Benjamin (2000, p. 426), who writes that at the 1974 Indigenous Congress in San Cristóbal de las Casas, the greatest complaint among the Mayans of Chiapas was "...the insufficiency of good land. That was the primary cause of their hunger, misery, and exploitation."

Of the economic demands examined by Trejo (2002, p. 14), 77% involved petitions for land reform. In the post-1980 period, economic demands reached their peak in 1994 due to the Zapatista rebellion. Ethnic demands mostly involved local or regional autonomy (70%) and requests for constitutional recognition (30%). With the amendment of Article 4 of the constitution in 2000 recognizing Indigenous groups, ethnic demands occupied a smaller share of Mayan demands. Political demands somewhat overlap with ethnic demands in that like demands for local or regional autonomy, 30% of all political demands involved the democratization of municipal power. The majority of political demands (60%) involved an end to repression by police forces and the military, as well as the release of political prisoners. While the 2001 constitutional amendments gave Indigenous communities the right to elect their own local authorities or representatives, only Quintana Roo and Oaxaca have enacted laws formalizing this as of 2004 (U.S. Department of State, 2004).

According to Jung (2003, p. 433), Mayan claims include demands for “bilingual education, the right to local and regional autonomy, and to communal land...” Sambanis et al. (2018) further cite this same statement in coding the nature of demands for Mayans in Mexico, though the demand for bilingual education only appears in the first paragraph of Jung (2003) and without any specific accompanying example later on. It is tempting to interpret this demand for bilingual education as a demand for the right to use or learn in one’s native language. However, it is more likely that Jung’s (2003) assertion of Mayan demands for bilingual education more closely mirrors the brief demand made by the EZLN for some form of basic education. In 1990, the illiteracy rate for the Indigenous population of Chiapas (54%) was double that of Chiapas’ more urbanized mestizos (21.6%) (INEGI, 1990; Trejo, 2002). Chiapas is also the state with the highest illiteracy rate. In 1990, 30% of the

population in Chiapas was illiterate (INEGI, 1990). By 2020, the illiteracy rate in Chiapas had dropped to 13.7%, while the national average fell to 4.7% (INEGI, 2020).²²⁹

The illiteracy rate of Mayans in Chiapas is more closely linked to the region's historical poverty rather than attempts made by the *post-revolutionary* government to impoverish it. According to Rus et al. (2003, p. 2), Chiapas before 1890 was “a closed, largely stagnant backwater.” However, as the Díaz government expropriated and sold Indigenous holdings to foreigners for agricultural production, Chiapas emerged as Mexico's most profitable agricultural region (Rus et al., 2003). These profits were made largely at the expense of dispossessed Mayans. During this time and for much of the early 20th century, Chiapas and other rural Indigenous parts of Yucatán, Quintana Roo, and Campeche were highly rural and isolated highland regions where the state had little to no involvement in the affairs of its Indigenous residents. Federal and state initiatives to provide education to isolated Indigenous communities have, among Mayans and other Indigenous communities throughout the entire case period, been beset by the poverty of rural schools and the towns and villages that are supposed to support them, as well as budgetary constraints resulting in federal teachers receiving minimal salaries from the federal government. Rus et al. (2003, p. 7) further note that “Before the 1970s, there were practically no urban Indians in Chiapas. By the second half of the 1990s, there were approximately 120 thousand speakers of Maya languages settled on the outskirts of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Ocosingo, and Palenque.”

I conclude that the Mexican government did not deliberately exclude the Mayan minority from economic participation. This conclusion is based on the nuances surrounding the government's decision to revoke agrarian reform and join NAFTA, the severe federal budgetary constraints that hindered the efforts of nearly every post-revolutionary Mexican government to effectively implement

²²⁹ Among the population aged 15 and older. The illiteracy rates for Yucatán (6%), Quintana Roo (3%), and Campeche (5.9%) were significantly lower compared to Chiapas (13.7%) and the heavily Indigenous states of Guerrero (12.5%) and Oaxaca (11.8%) (INEGI, 2020).

public and education policy, as well as the historically impoverished position of Chiapas, but also of Yucatán, Quintana Roo, and Campeche to a lesser extent.

It is generally unclear as to whether or to what extent the federal and local governments disproportionately repressed or excluded Mayans relative to other groups. In the Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (1994), the EZLN condemned the use of “specialized personnel and modern equipment of repression” (Radio Zapatista, 2005). However, in the Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (1995), it becomes clear that the referenced repression primarily concerns “The economic, political, social and repressive program of neoliberalism” (Radio Zapatista, 2005).

The temporal scope of data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) is limited to January 2018 through April 2024 as of this writing. The results that can be extracted are also limited. Of the 308 incidents of state violence against civilians between January 2018 and April 2024, 32 (10.4%) occurred in the states of Yucatán, Chiapas, Campeche, and Quintana Roo (ACLED, 2024). Of the 123 fatalities that resulted from all 308 incidents, seven (5.7%) occurred in these four states (ACLED, 2024). Per the 2020 Mexican census, these four states comprise 8.5% of the total population of Mexico (INEGI, 2020).²³⁰ While none of the 32 incidents mention the ethnicity or Indigenous status of the victim(s), eight were perpetrated against journalists. Even if this temporally limited data is used to catalog the frequency of the use of excessive force or abuses of power, it does not appear that Mayan regions were disproportionately targeted for violent repression for the period between January 2018 and April 2024. Protest events involving Mayans during this period were also overwhelmingly concerned with insecurity due to rising gang and drug violence in their regions (ACLED, 2024).

²³⁰ Despite constituting 7.4% of the total population, 9.7% of these incidents occurred in Mexico City.

Data on state violence against Mayans before 2018 is largely concerned with the conflict between the EZLN and the Mexican government. The most notorious incident associated with this conflict occurred in December 1997 when the government-affiliated paramilitary group *Máscara Roja* killed 45 Tzotzils in Acteal, Chiapas (Trejo, 2002, p. 11).²³¹ The massacre was allegedly carried out in retaliation for the victims' verbal support of the EZLN (Trejo, 2002, p. 11). Collins (2010, p. 782) notes that while the paramilitary group was fostered by the PRI, the Mexican government "moved swiftly and aggressively to punish the perpetrators of the massacre, arresting 40 individuals, including the mayor of Acteal..." According to Tresierra (1995, p. 204), "from 1982 to 1989 a total of 870 assassinations were committed in rural Mexico."²³² Tresierra (1995, p. 204) argues that "Most of the violence is directed against Indians. Most occurred in the states with the largest Indigenous populations: Oaxaca, Chiapas, Puebla, Hidalgo, Veracruz, Guerrero, and México, which together account for 81 percent of the country's total Indigenous population; however, security [police] forces killed several persons during the year."²³³

In 2004, the U.S. Department of State (2004) found that "There were no politically motivated killings by the government or its agents," but noted that there were "sporadic outbursts of politically motivated violence... particularly in the southern states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca." The U.S. Department of State (2004) further cited an investigation conducted by Amnesty International in June 2004 in which they expressed concern over the continued presence of the army in Indigenous

²³¹ Collins (2010, p. 782) mentions the same details of the Acteal massacre, but attributes responsibility to a different paramilitary group—*Paz y Justicia*.

²³² Tresierra (1995) cites an unlocatable source for this statistic. Thus, Tresierra (1995) is cited instead.

²³³ Without access to the originally cited source (see above footnote), this statement comes with a few caveats. According to the Consejo Nacional de Población (2018), these states had the following intentional homicide rate (per 10,000 residents) in 1997: Oaxaca (21.91), Chiapas (34.73), Puebla (14.46), Hidalgo (15.36), Veracruz (10.13), Guerrero (39.93), and México (24.99). The national average was 17.35 per 10,000 residents. Tresierra (1995) does not provide evidence that Indigenous people were overrepresented as victims of assassination and does not explain subnational variations in intentional homicide rates. As such, I cannot cite this statement as evidence of minority exclusion. However, this could be addressed if the originally cited source is consulted. In any case, multiple sources including the U.S. Department of State (2004) do attest to the almost casual willingness of landed interests to assassinate Indigenous leaders during this period when they felt threatened by Indigenous demands.

communities. According to AMAR, the Mayans in Mexico experienced no systematic repression by the Mexican government between 2004 and 2006 (Birbir et al., 2018).²³⁴

There are neither any reliable statistics on minority participation in the central government nor any quotas that guarantee representation of Indigenous groups in the Mexican legislative or executive branches. There have also never been any laws or formal or informal rules that effectively limited the political participation of Indigenous groups in Mexico. Based on the distinct lack of evidence of any formal or significantly impactful informal restrictions on the political or economic participation of Mayans, the Mayans of Mexico are classified as not excluded throughout the entire case period.

Taking into account the prevalence of exclusionary policies and the specificity, context, and relative importance of the evidence cited here, the case of the Mayan minority in Mexico receives a minority exclusion score of 1 (low) throughout the entire case period, indicating “neglect/remedial policies.”²³⁵ This evaluation differs from that of AMAR due to this dissertation’s stricter requirements regarding which potential policies or incidents of minority exclusion may be included. AMAR categorizes the Mayans in Mexico as “demographically marginalized by a history of social exclusion, land struggles, poor health conditions, and periodic natural disasters” from 1980 to 2006 (Minorities at Risk, 2006; Birbir et al., 2018).²³⁶

²³⁴ It is worth reiterating that for the purposes of this dissertation, state-based violence, torture, or assassinations of minority activists *in particular* are not considered an incident or pattern of minority exclusion. However, state-based violence against the broader civilian population is considered evidence of minority political exclusion.


²³⁵ The political discrimination index definition for “neglect/remedial policies” is “Substantial under-representation in political office and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect or improve the group’s political status.” The economic discrimination index definition for “neglect/remedial policies” is “Significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group’s material well-being.”

²³⁶ AMAR: ECDIS = 3 (1980-2006), POLDIS = 3 (1980-2006).

8.4.2 Language Restriction Severity

The case of the Mayan minority in Mexico is categorized as having moderate language restrictions per the Language Restriction Severity Index (LRSI) scoring regime discussed in Chapter 4. Due to the confounding influence of the Zapatista rebellion's most active phase between 1994 and 1998, these years are excluded from the analysis. Figure 9 below details the evolution of the severity of language restrictions from 1921 to 2023. The Appendix provides a more detailed breakdown of yearly indicator scores for each category. At no point did the Mexican government impose severe language restrictions on the Mayan minority. However, the years between 1960 and 1981 featured borderline severe language restrictions (LRSI = -2.98) due to the imposition of Spanish-language requirements on radio broadcasting.

Figure 9: LRSI Timeline - Mayans in Mexico (1921 - 2023)



Despite the plethora of symbolic cultural concessions that resulted from the negotiations between the EZLN and the Mexican government, none of these had any immediate material impact on the severity of language restrictions on Mayan languages. By 2010, the various government

programs to provide public services and education in Indigenous languages throughout Mexico began to have a substantive impact on improving Indigenous language rights. By 2016, the LRSI score for Mayans in Mexico increased to -0.12 as the public and media categories maintained net positive scores among their respective indicators. Today, the administrative category maintains a marginally net negative score of -0.29 due to the inadequate availability of Indigenous translators for court proceedings. The education category since 2010 received a net score of -0.67 due to the general lack of secondary and higher education options that provide normal instruction in Mayan languages. However, this remains a substantial improvement upon the period between 1921 and 2009, when there existed very few—if any—options for primary, secondary, and higher education in Mayan languages. Based on the determined scores for minority exclusion and language restriction severity, the case of the Mayan minority in Mexico is classified as an Inclusive Assimilation regime.

8.4.3 *Popular Backlash*

The most immediate and direct cause of the 1994 Zapatista rebellion was the amendment of Article 27 and Mexican accession to NAFTA. One of the requirements for a possible policy or incident to be considered as one of minority exclusion is that the targeted minority group be relatively and deliberately more excluded by comparison with other groups in the host state. Thus, it is worth briefly discussing the scope and intention behind Mexico's decision to amend Article 27. In the 1930s, President Cárdenas formalized the *ejido* system as a way to empower peasant farmers and Indigenous groups throughout Mexico. While the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other Western European states began to shift to neoliberal economic policies in the 1970s and 1980s, Mexico and many other Latin American countries began their shift to neoliberalism in the 1990s.

The importance and intractability of the issue of agrarian reform is the outcome of the perennial struggle over land rights between Indigenous groups and modern Latin American states.

Like most Indigenous groups in Latin America, the Mayans of Mexico viewed land as not only a resource but as an integral part of their cultural and sometimes spiritual identity. Much like almost every modern Latin American state from the late 19th century onwards, the Mexican government viewed the *ejido* system as a barrier to increasing agricultural productivity, attracting foreign investment, and integrating into the global economy.

Tresierra (1995) discusses the two key facts that motivated Mexico to join NAFTA and amend Article 27. First, Mexico during the 1990s was a net importer of agricultural goods (Tresierra, 1995). Second, 40% of all lands suitable for agriculture were controlled by the 28,000 *ejidos* in the country, which were on average 40% less productive than similar privately owned lands (Wilson & Thompson, 1993; Tresierra, 1995). If there is one national policy consideration that is common to most states in the world that might supersede national unity, it is economic growth. Indeed, increasing economic growth itself is often viewed as a means to reducing public dissent and increasing political legitimacy. The inverse of this relationship is a lesson learned by the Mexican state during the 1976 Peso crisis and 1982 debt crisis. By revoking agrarian reform, the Mexican government continued the historical pattern of prioritizing state and economic interests that necessarily come at the expense of Indigenous populations. Crucially, this historical pattern is not unique to Mexico, as many governments in Latin America view the exploitation of their country's natural resources as their only escape from poverty (Baluarte, 2004).

When trying to establish true motivations without access to the personal diaries and thoughts of influential decision-makers, it may be possible to determine whether other countries would behave similarly given similar circumstances. Throughout the 20th century, every modern state in the Americas with significant (>10%) Indigenous populations has consistently chosen economic development over Indigenous land rights when forced to choose between the two (e.g., Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, and Panama). Beyond Latin America, similar conflicts over Indigenous land rights

and economic development continue to occur throughout parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the United States, Canada, and Australia (Bravo, 1997).

Given these considerations, I must conclude that the Mexican government did not deliberately seek to economically exclude Mayans or other Indigenous groups by amending Article 27. Rather, the exclusionary economic effects of Article 27 for Mayans and other Indigenous groups were an unfortunate consequence of the higher priority states almost invariably give to economic development. At the same time, the effect of the amendment of Article 27 and Mexican accession to NAFTA led to the disproportionate exclusion of Indigenous groups from economic participation. The Mayans necessarily suffered from this more than most other Indigenous groups in Mexico due to their relatively higher population and spatial concentration. For this reason, it is likely that for many Mayans disadvantaged by Article 27 and Mexican accession to NAFTA, these government actions were perceived as deliberately exclusionary.

Two other possible popular backlash events are not included as popular backlash events. Sambanis et al. (2018) mention that “The first evidence for separatist activity among Mayans in Mexico we found is in 1987, when the Indigenous Organization of the Highlands (ORIACH) was founded in Chiapas, where the majority of Mexican Mayans are located.”²³⁷ Similarly, Trejo (2002, p. 15) notes that “In 25 years of active collective dissent, Chiapas’s Indigenous organizations have only made one demand for secession (the PRIstas of San Juan Chamula).” I was not able to find sufficiently detailed information regarding the demands, grievances, or history of ORIACH. While I was not able to locate the demand for secession made by the PRIstas of San Juan Chamula, the contemporary discussions regarding social conflict in San Juan Chamula entirely concern religious differences between adherents to Catholicism and Evangelical Christianity.

²³⁷ See Sambanis et al. (2018) “Self-Determination Movements (SDM) Dataset — Coding Notes I.”

The lack of Mayan backlash to assimilation can be explained through the lens of the three backlash mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3. Due to the weak capacity of the Mexican state to enforce anything other than moderate language restrictions in education, the Mayans largely did not experience significant feelings of coercion or resentment. At the same time, weak state capacity and low Mayan literacy rates forced the post-revolutionary Mexican political leadership to temper the scope and intensity of their desired language restrictions while also increasing the willingness of Mayans to learn Spanish voluntarily. As such, the practical effect of cultural egoism was largely muted in this case. Moreover, the relatively low prestige and weak economic utility of the Mayan languages in comparison with Spanish further limited potential Mayan sentiments of coercion, resentment, and status injustice. Overall, the case of the Mayan minority in Mexico demonstrates a minimal level of backlash against the state.

8.5 *Conclusion*

For many decades, there has been a strong desire among many Mayan communities to maintain the use of their native language in the public sphere. On its surface, this effort was aided by perpetual budgetary constraints for government programs working toward bilingual Spanish-Mayan or monolingual Spanish education, the early creation of a Latin script for Mayan languages, the proliferation of literature in Mayan languages, greater recognition of Indigenous groups, and the officialization of Mayan languages. Despite the Mexican government's imposition of Spanish in Indigenous schools, neither the EZLN nor any other notable Mayan advocacy group has made any significant and consistent demands for greater Mayan language freedoms. As the pendulum of educational language policy swung from the direct and bilingual method throughout most of the 20th century, Mayan and broader Indigenous demands remained primarily centered on land rights and anti-poverty programs and later shifted to corruption, Indigenous recognition, and local autonomy. In the

21st century, Mayan grievances once again shifted to political grievances concerning rising violent crime rates associated with the drug war.

Writing in 1993, Patthey-Chavez (1993, p. 210) concludes their evaluation of late-20th-century developments in Mexican education and language policy on a somewhat optimistic note by stating, “Only time will tell how successful Indigenous groups will ultimately be in maintaining and reviving their languages...” Similarly, Heath (1972, p. 190) predicted that “bilingualism—the acquisition of Spanish for special functions and the maintenance of Indian tongues for in-group identification—will be the policy of the future in many Indian regions.” Despite the aforementioned factors working in favor of Indigenous-language maintenance, in addition to more recent attempts to revitalize Mayan languages through the education system, it does not appear that Mayan languages have achieved a state of stable diglossia.²³⁸ Overall, the vitality of Mayan and other Indigenous languages in Mexico appears to be in terminal decline.

Figure 10 below displays the total populations of Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Campeche, and Chiapas from 1921 to 2020. Figure 11 displays the percentage of those state populations that spoke some Indigenous language from 1940 to 2020.²³⁹ Figure 12 shows the total number of users of Maya, Tzotzil, Tzeltal, and Ch’ol from 1921 to 2020. Finally, Figure 13 shows the prevalence of monolingualism among the population that can speak an Indigenous language in each state from 1940 to 2020. Since Mayans constitute the overwhelming majority (>90%) of speakers of Indigenous languages in all four states, the terms Mayan and Indigenous should be viewed as largely synonymous in this context. All data is sourced from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) census reports of 1921, 1940, 1960, 1980, 2000, and 2020.

²³⁸ A “stable diglossia” describes a situation in which two distinct language or language varieties are used by a single language community but in different contexts and for different functions consistently over a long period of time.

²³⁹ The census reports from 1921, 1940, 1960, 1980, and 2000 provide estimates (or enough data to calculate a reasonably accurate estimate) for the relevant variables for the population aged five and older. The 2020 census report includes relevant data for the population aged 3 and older.

The 1940 and 1960 Mexican censuses do not directly provide the absolute number of users of various Indigenous languages. Instead, only the total number of monolinguals for each Indigenous language and the percentage of each state's population that speaks an Indigenous language are provided. However, enough information is included to make a fairly accurate estimate of the total number of speakers of each language. For every given language (L), I first divide each state's (S) number of monolinguals by the total number of monolinguals for that language, resulting in each state's proportion of all a given language's monolinguals (S_M^L). I then multiplied this by the product of the state's populated aged five and older (S_{P5}^L) and the proportion of that population that speaks any Indigenous language (S_I^L). This formula assumes that the proportion of a state's population aged five and older that speaks any Indigenous language is equal to that of the specified language and that there is only one Indigenous language spoken in each state. This is the case for Yucatán, Campeche, and Quintana Roo, as Maya is effectively the only Indigenous language to have notable numbers of monolinguals in all three states.²⁴⁰ In Chiapas, there are six Indigenous languages with sizable monolingual populations, including Tzeltal, Tzotzil, and Ch'ol. To account for this, I further multiply this product with each language's proportion of all monolinguals within a given state (S_U^L).

$$\text{Language Users Estimate} = (S_M^L * (S_{P5}^L * S_I^L)) * (S_U^L)$$

²⁴⁰ For example, there were only a total of 26 non-Maya monolinguals in Yucatán in 1940.

Figure 10: Mexican State Populations




Figure 11: Indigenous-language Users




Figure 12: Mayan-language Users





Figure 13: Monolingual Indigenous-language Users



Taken together, these tables reveal that despite an absolute increase in the number of users of Mayan languages in Mexico, the absolute growth of Mayan languages is outpaced by state population growth. Furthermore, Figures 11 and 13 show that the vitality of Mayan languages in each state has substantially decreased since the Mexican Revolution. Weber (1967, pp. 17-18), citing Redfield (1950, p. 139), raises justified concerns over the accuracy of language figures presented in the census reports of 1930 through 1960. Specifically, reporting biases possibly led to “inflated figures for bilingualism in Yucatán villages, and perhaps for all of Mexico.” These concerns over the accuracy of earlier census reports are further echoed by Patthey-Chavez (1993, p. 211).

Noting these concerns over validity, the overall results of Figures 9.4 and 9.6 nonetheless paint a grim picture of the future survival of Mayan languages. In 1940, nearly three-fourths (73.9%) of the Yucatán population spoke an Indigenous language, with 37% of the Indigenous-language speaking population being monolingual. In 1940, the national average for the percentage of the population who spoke an Indigenous language was 14.8%, of whom 49.7% were monolingual. By 2020, only 23.7% of the Yucatán population spoke an Indigenous language, with the monolingual population dropping to 4.5%. The trendlines of Quintana Roo and Campeche followed similar paths, with the rate of monolingualism in each between 1940 and 2020 falling from around 43% to 3.6% and 43% to 2.7%, respectively.

By contrast, Chiapas maintained a healthier level of Mayan-language vitality throughout the entire case period. In 1940, 32.9% of the population of Chiapas spoke an Indigenous language. By 2000, this figure dropped to 24.6% but increased to 28.2% in 2020. Between 2000 and 2020, the proportion of the state populations of Yucatán, Quintana Roo, and Campeche that spoke an Indigenous language dropped by 36%, 49%, and 33%, respectively. Moreover, the rate of

monolingualism among users of an Indigenous language in Chiapas remains relatively high, falling from 64.5% in 1940 to 27.2% in 2020.²⁴¹

Ultimately, Mayan languages represent an increasingly smaller portion of Mexico's linguistic composition. When Mexican independence from Spain was achieved in 1821, Indigenous peoples constituted two-thirds of the population (Cifuentes, 1992). As of 2020, only 6.1% of the population of Mexico speaks an Indigenous language. Of this, Mayan-language speakers accounted for 29.5% of all speakers of Indigenous languages in Mexico.²⁴² The 2020 Mexican census also included an expanded questionnaire that included a question on Indigenous self-identification for the first time. Among each state's population aged three and older that does *not* speak an Indigenous language, many self-identify as Indigenous. In Yucatán, 56.1% of the population that does not speak an Indigenous language self-identified as Indigenous.²⁴³ As a whole, 65.2% of the total population of Yucatán self-identified as Indigenous, while only 23.7% spoke an Indigenous language.

Assuming that ethnic self-identification is stickier than linguistic identification, these figures more or less indicate that 63.6% of the Yucatán population identifying as Indigenous today have lost knowledge of their heritage language. Similar patterns can be seen in Quintana Roo and Campeche, where around 64.8% and 78% of the populations of Quintana Roo and Campeche, respectively, that self-identify as Indigenous today have lost knowledge of their heritage language. In Chiapas, only 23.4% of the population that self-identifies as Indigenous today have lost knowledge of their heritage language. Moreover, ethnic self-identification is not eternal, and present estimates of the proportion of a state's population that is ethnically Indigenous are almost certainly far lower than true estimates from one or two centuries earlier at the end of the Mexican Revolution (1921) or Mexican

²⁴¹ Despite an increase in the proportion of the population of Chiapas that spoke an Indigenous language between 2000 and 2020, the rate of monolingualism decreased from 36.6% in 2000 to 27.2% in 2020.

²⁴² Maya: 10.5%; Tzeltal: 8%; Tzotzil: 7.5%; Ch'ol: 3.5%

²⁴³ Excluding "not specified" responses.

independence from Spain (1821). At the very least, present estimates are unable to account for population changes due to migration over the last two centuries.

From the perspective of the Mexican state, their program of Inclusive Assimilation did not lead to any widespread discontent or backlash against the state. The relatively high prestige of the Spanish language and greater economic opportunities for those who acquired it were almost certainly the driving force behind Indigenous assimilation. At the same time, the Mexican strategy of not imposing widespread public restrictions on the use of Indigenous languages was crucial to minimizing backlash against the relatively moderate policy of assimilation through bilingual education.

It should be noted that under different circumstances, the Mexican government may have followed the path of Algeria or Iran.²⁴⁴ In the early and middle decades of the 21st century, numerous debates were held regarding the merits of the direct and bilingual methods toward bringing the Indigenous population into the fold of Mexican culture and society. As it became increasingly clear over time that this goal was predicated on the Indigenous population first becoming literate and that the bilingual method was the fastest method of achieving this, the bilingual method became firmly adopted in the Mexican education sphere. If Mexico began its case period as Algeria or Iran did with an already largely literate minority population, one could imagine that the options of more severe language restrictions on other spheres of public, political, economic, or religious life would have been available for exploitation by a post-revolutionary state predictably obsessed with national unity. Instead, the Mexican state was forced to take a more moderate approach. In doing so, they made immense ‘progress’ in assimilating Indigenous languages at the price of minimal backlash. Based on these conclusions and the evidence provided in this case study, I determine that the Inclusive Assimilation regime employed by Mexico on the Mayan minority constitutes a success.

²⁴⁴ In Section 10.2, I discuss the role of path dependency in determining the outcomes of each case study.

Chapter 9: Anglophones in Cameroon

Faux Bilingualism

<i>Case Summary</i>	
Language Regime Type	Incidental Exclusionary
Group	Anglophones (Westerners)
Host State	Cameroon
Start Year	1961 - 2017
Hypothesized Backlash	Moderate Backlash
Observed Backlash	Severe Backlash
Outcome	Failure

The case of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon is somewhat inconsistent with my theory on the relationship between the severity of language restrictions and the level of minority exclusion on popular backlash. Throughout the case period, the Francophone Cameroonian government informally imposed moderate restrictions on English while systematically excluding Anglophones from political and economic participation. At the 1961 Foumban constitutional conference, the Francophone government committed its original sin by breaking its promise to Anglophone leaders that the post-independence unified state would have meaningful federalist provisions. Importantly, the government allowed both French and English to be institutionalized as co-official languages.

The decision to pursue official bilingualism alongside centralization and territorial integration as strategies for fostering greater national unity was an incidental one—the consequence of committing to official bilingualism early without a true understanding of its costs and only later developing an assimilationist motive. Centralization and territorial integration serve to undermine regional institutions that uphold official bilingualism. Without the prospect of using autonomous

regional institutions to maintain the vitality of the junior official language or the ability for the minority to enact change through the ballot box, official bilingualism erodes through neglect or moderate language restrictions to the detriment of intergroup relations. While it is plausible that these two strategies could have been pursued in the context of a legally enforced and detailed language policy, this was not the case in Cameroon. Cameroon's lack of a coherent language policy and a lack of willingness to commit sufficient resources to uphold vaguely defined official bilingualism served as an early sign of future failure. The already bleak prospects for official bilingualism combined with single-party autocratic rule, the systematic exclusion of Anglophones, and a casual willingness to use lethal force to suppress dissent in a state with relatively weak state capacity led to the outbreak of armed civil conflict with the Anglophone minority in 2017.

The Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime imposed on Anglophones was and continues to be a failure in all respects. The Cameroonian government not only demonstrably failed to promote bilingualism within its population or convert Anglophones into Francophones but further antagonized a sizable minority group that had only a colonial linguistic identity separating them from the rest of Cameroonian society. Following the 2016-2017 Cameroonian protests, the country's numerous self-determination and secessionist organizations declared an insurgency for Anglophone independence. Nearly seven years later, much of the North-West and South-West Anglophone regions remain under separatist control while the government refuses to consider any meaningful political, economic, or linguistic concessions.

9.1 *Background*

The Anglophones of Cameroon are an English-language minority language group that primarily resides in the present-day North-West (*Nord-Ouest*) and South-West (*Sud-Ouest*) regions. Cameroon is the second most linguistically diverse country in Africa, excluding second languages, with

a linguistic diversity index score of 0.945 (Eberhard et al., 2022).²⁴⁵ The dominant language in Cameroon is French, though estimates of the number or proportion of French and English speakers in Cameroon vary widely. According to the official website for the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, 19.8% of Cameroonians live in the two Anglophone regions as of 2023, though the same source states that 70% and 30% of Cameroonians are Francophone and Anglophone, respectively (PRC, 2023). Francoscope (2023) estimates that 41% of Cameroonians speak French as a first or second language. Using data from the 2005 Cameroonian census, Translators Without Borders (2021) estimates that 56% of Cameroonians speak French as a first or second language, compared to 23% with English.²⁴⁶ Meanwhile, only 11.6% of Cameroonians are literate in both French and English. The overwhelming majority of Cameroonians are bilingual, speaking their indigenous heritage language as well as either French, English, or Cameroonian Pidgin English as a second or third language.²⁴⁷ Due to various changes to the internal administrative structure in Cameroon throughout the case period, the terms “West Cameroon,” “Anglophone Cameroon/regions,” and “North-West and South-West provinces/regions” all refer to the geographical region where Anglophone Cameroonians predominantly reside.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ The Greenberg (Language) Diversity Index measures the probability that any two randomly selected people in a given country speak a different first language, with a score of 1 indicating total linguistic diversity and a score of 0 indicating total linguistic homogeneity. While the overwhelming majority of Cameroonians speak French, English, or Cameroonian Pidgin English, it is usually as a second or third language.

²⁴⁶ For the purposes of this case study, I will default to the English-speaker estimate of 23% of the total population provided by Translators Without Borders (2021).

²⁴⁷ While this case study examines the Anglophone-Francophone majority-minority divide in Cameroon, it should be noted that the Cameroonian government’s treatment of indigenous African and pidgin languages has been far less kind relative to their treatment of English. For example, Ndille (2016, p. 24) mentions that in 1966 in Dschang, “government authorities seized books, typewriters, duplicators and other materials from an indigenous language school established by chief Djoumesi.” Later programs set up in the late 19th and early 20th century to research indigenous Cameroonian languages are all relatively minor and inconsequential.

²⁴⁸ Per Decree No. 2008/376 of November 2008, all “provinces” were renamed to “regions,” keeping all else equal (Leclerc, 2024). For the sake of simplicity, I refer to subnational political units in Cameroon from 1961 to 1972 as “states,” and from 1972 onwards as “regions” rather than as “provinces.”

In 1884, the German Empire established a protectorate colony (*Schutzgebiet Kamerun*) in Cameroon (Köster, 2014). In 1891, the Governor of Kamerun, Eugen von Zimmerer, began implementing a policy of Germanization on the native population for the purposes of training native Cameroonians colonial officials (Köster, 2014). This policy was first expanded in 1897 by Governor Jesko von Puttkamer, who mandated the exclusive use of German in missionary schools (Leclerc, 2024). In 1910, Governor Theodor Seitz again expanded the Germanization program by mandating the exclusive use of German for all school subjects (Köster, 2014). However, these policies failed due in part to a relative lack of German-language colonial schools and a lack of cooperation from missionary teachers who preferred teaching in the indigenous languages (Leclerc, 2024).

Upon the conclusion of World War I, Germany ceded control over Cameroon to France and Great Britain, with Great Britain administering the *Southern Cameroons* and *Northern Cameroons* regions effectively as a colony informally tied to the neighboring British colony in Nigeria. Between October 1920 and December 1924, the exclusive use of French was mandated in all schools²⁴⁹ in French Cameroon and prohibited the use of local languages to communicate with students (Köster, 2014; Ndille, 2016; Leclerc, 2024).²⁵⁰ In the British Cameroons, the practice of indirect rule ultimately favored the maintenance of native languages, while English was taught as a subject in the few colonial schools that existed (Lee & Schultz, 2012; Köster, 2014).²⁵¹ Under pressure from the United Nations to relax its strict language education policy, France allowed native languages to be taught as a subject in 1949 (Leclerc, 2024). As in the case of the Mayans in Mexico, few Cameroonians took the

²⁴⁹ This mandate extended to both private schools and missionary schools and was more strictly enforced compared to prior German attempts.

²⁵⁰ Per Leclerc (2024), this policy was elaborated in three decrees issued on October 1, 1920, December 20, 1920, and December 26, 1924.

²⁵¹ French colonial authorities' more hands-on (direct rule) approach toward Cameroonian education is evident when discussing the relative availability of education in British and French Cameroon. In Anglophone Cameroon, public high schools were only built after independence (Simo Bobda, 2004). Meanwhile, in Francophone Cameroon, public high schools were available in the 1950s (Simo Bobda, 2004).

opportunity to learn literacy in their local languages and continued to prefer learning French (Leclerc, 2024).²⁵²

By 1959, nationalist movements in Cameroon advocating the unification of the French-speaking and English-speaking parts of Cameroon succeeded in achieving their demands. On January 1, 1960, the French-speaking portion of Cameroon was granted independence from France as the “Republic of Cameroon.” Due in part to the split Christian-Muslim demographics of the British Cameroons, the British Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons were each given a choice via referendum between unification with either of the newly independent states of Nigeria or Cameroon.²⁵³ The referendum was held on February 11, 1961, and saw the Muslim-majority Northern Cameroons join Nigeria and the Christian-majority Southern Cameroons join Cameroon.

Given the predominance of English in Nigeria and French in Cameroon, the decision of the Southern Cameroons to unify with Cameroon over Nigeria seems to be a puzzling choice in hindsight. Ultimately, it was their negative perception of British colonial rule in comparison with their perception of French colonial rule across the border (Konings, 2005; Leclerc, 2024) paired with a promise from the Republic of Cameroon not to revoke the proposed federal structure that tipped the scales in the Southern Cameroons in favor of Cameroonian unification. On October 1, 1961, the Republic of Cameroon annexed the British Southern Cameroons, thereby transforming the nominal Republic of Cameroon into the Federal Republic of Cameroon under President Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-1982). At the same time, French and English were designated as official languages.

²⁵² For further discussion on the language policies in Cameroon under German, French, and British colonial rule, see Tabi-Manga (2000).

²⁵³ The option of independence was taken off the referendum by the decision of the United Nations.

9.2 *Initial Policies*

The idea of transforming Cameroon into a federal state upon unification was championed by John Ngu Foncha, the leader of the main pro-independence political party in the Southern Cameroons during British colonial rule (Stark, 1976). Foncha's position throughout the late 1950s and up to the May 1961 referendum was to push for a relatively decentralized federal system, while Ahidjo and the Francophone Cameroonian elite sought a unitary state (Stark, 1976). In any case, Ahidjo was not legally required to accept federalism at all "since the Southern Cameroons was obliged to form the Republic [of Cameroon] in any event. This situation was not clear in the Southern Cameroons" (Stark, 1976, p. 430). After the referendum, Ahidjo was pressured by various Francophone organizations to push for a more centralized form of federalism. At the Foumban Constitutional Conference in July 1961, Ahidjo received a Southern Cameroons (Anglophone) delegation ostensibly to negotiate the details of federalism that were to be finalized at the conference (Stark, 1976). However, it became clear to the Southern Cameroons delegation that they could only make suggestions concerning the proposed federal structure but otherwise had no real bargaining power.

Consequently, the federal state envisioned by Foncha and the Southern Cameroons delegation mutated into a largely unitary state with minor federal provisions.²⁵⁴ There were only two states in the

²⁵⁴ There is disagreement among the sources concerning the true degree of agency and leverage held by the Anglophone delegation at Foumban. Ngoh (1999) argues that much of the blame for the substantial loss of autonomy that befell West Cameroon after the Foumban conference can be placed on the incompetence of the Anglophone delegation. Ngoh (1999, p. 168) states that "In their political short-sightedness and naiveté, they approved articles in the constitution which gave the federal government and president certain powers which fundamentally reduced the influence and authority of the West Cameroon government." Ngoh (1999, p. 168) cites Articles 5 and 6 of the constitution which gave the federal government powers over issues such as "the internal and external security of the Federated States; information services and radio; territorial boundaries of the Federated States and the organization of services pertaining to these matters." Ngoh (1999) raises other valid points on the lack of political will or incompetence of the West Cameroon government to challenge Ahidjo at various points between the conclusion of the Foumban conference and the abolition of federalism in 1972.

On the other hand, Stark (1976, p. 431) criticizes the Anglophone delegation for their lack of preparation but also states that "It was made clear that the president would accept suggestions but that he and his delegation would be the final arbiters of what would be accepted. The 'Westerners' gave their 'observations' on Ahidjo's proposals back to Ahidjo who accepted those he wished to and ignored those he did not." Achankeng (2015) echoes this assessment, arguing that the Anglophone delegation was inadequately prepared for the negotiations, but adds that the Francophone delegation

new Federal Republic of Cameroon: East Cameroon—encompassing the former French colonial region—and West Cameroon—encompassing the former British colonial region. Crucially, the proposal of a bicameral national legislature was rejected “on the grounds of cost and efficiency,” thereby removing one of the primary means of preserving regional interests (Stark, 1976, p. 431). Furthermore, the president would be elected by popular vote rather than through an electoral college,²⁵⁵ West Cameroon lost state control over incomes from import and export duties, and an earlier proposal for a quota of cabinet ministers from the various regions of Cameroon was rejected (Stark, 1976).

Within the same month of establishing the Federal Republic of Cameroon, Ahidjo enacted Decree No. 61-15. This decree established six administrative regions in Cameroon. West Cameroon constituted its own administrative region, while five administration regions were created in East Cameroon.²⁵⁶ Each administrative region was led by a Federal Inspector of Administration who was “responsible for representing the Federal government in ‘all acts of civil life and in judicial matters,’ to ‘supervise the enforcement of federal laws and regulations,’ to ‘maintain order according to the laws and regulations in force,’ having at their disposal the police force and gendarmerie, and federal

had no intention of compromising with the Anglophones. In contrast to Ngoh (1999), Ndi (2014a) takes a more sympathetic view toward the Anglophone predicament, placing the overwhelming majority of the blame for the failure of the Anglophone delegation to extract any meaningful concessions on the Francophone delegation. Both Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003) and Ngoh (1999) place particular blame on Foncha for withholding critical information from his delegates, negotiating privately with Ahidjo, and withholding the outcome of their secret negotiations from the Anglophone delegation.

All sources mentioned appear to be extensively researched using non-conflicting original primary sources. However, given the lack of consensus in the historical literature on the relative responsibility for the marginalization of the Anglophone minority, I adopt the default perspective when examining most cases of state majority-minority relations outside of conflict negotiations. That is, I attribute the majority of the responsibility for the marginalization of the Anglophone minority to the party that held decisive advantages in both political power and bargaining leverage at the time—the Francophone majority. That said, Ngoh’s (1999) more critical view of the Anglophone delegation does highlight the real possibility that the over half-a-century-long path leading from Fomuban to the 2017 Anglophone Crisis could have at least been mitigated by a more aggressive or less naïve Anglophone delegation.

²⁵⁵ This stance was supported by the Southern Cameroons delegation at the Fomuban Constitutional Conference in the belief of the delegates that the office of the presidency would be a largely ceremonial role (Ngoh, 1999).

²⁵⁶ Per Decree No. 61-15, West Cameroon was both a state and administrative region. East Cameroon was one state with five administrative regions.

services” (Stark, 1976, p. 432). In practice, the Federal Inspector of West Cameroon held powers that rivaled, if not exceeded, those of the Prime Minister of West Cameroon (Stark, 1976; Ngoh, 1999).²⁵⁷ The Federal Inspector of West Cameroon headed all federal departments and gendarmerie and army units in West Cameroon (Ngoh, 1999). Furthermore, all of the Federal Inspectors in West Cameroon were Francophones, and no Anglophone ever held the position of Federal Inspector of Administration anywhere between 1961 and 1972 (Ngoh, 1999). The West Cameroon government correctly interpreted the decree as an attempt to curtail the political power of West Cameroon and as a signal of the inequality in status between the Anglophone West and Francophone East.

In response to Decree No. 61-15, the West Cameroon government sent a top secret memo to Ahidjo expressing many complaints concerning marginalization, non-respect of the ‘equality of status’ between the states, the administrative reorganization of the territory, the powers of the Federal Inspector, lack of consultation with West Cameroonians even in decisions that affected West Cameroon, abuses of power by the national gendarmerie, the weak powers and humiliation of the [Anglophone] Vice President, and the absence of Anglophones in Ahidjo’s cabinet (Ngoh, 1999, pp. 169-170). The lack of consultation with the West Cameroon government and lack of Anglophone cabinet members, in particular, led the West Cameroon government to make special note of the “widespread feeling among the [West Cameroon] public that although they voted for unification, what they are getting is absorption and domination” (Ngoh, 1999, p. 170).

Ahidjo did not address any of these grievances. Additionally, Ahidjo enacted Decree No. 62-442 in December 1963, giving the Federal Inspector control over the police, in addition to the gendarmerie and local military units (Ngoh, 1999). Control over local security forces—particularly the gendarmerie—was a particularly strong concern for the West Cameroon government. Since the

²⁵⁷ John Ngu Foncha held the position of Prime Minister of West Cameroon from 1961 to 1965.

establishment of the Federal Republic, the gendarmes of West Cameroon became notorious for their excessive brutality, arrogance, and use of arbitrary beatings, extortions, arrests, rape, and torture (Ngoh, 1999). Recruitment exams for the army include only a French language section, forcing a bilingual requirement only on English (and Pidgin English) speakers (Ndezenyuy, 2006). More consequentially, this practice was most likely used in recruitment exams for the gendarmerie, leading to Francophones being highly overrepresented in the gendarmerie of West Cameroon (Ngoh, 1999). Additionally, the new decree gave the federal government the authority to make all decisions concerning “appointments, promotions, demotions, and transfers of senior [military/gendarmerie] divisional and divisional officers” in West Cameroon (Ngoh, 1999, p. 170).

In October 1966, the newspaper *Cameroon Mirror* of Kumba published an article that suggested redrawing the internal borders of Cameroon so that the Francophone administrative regions would incorporate the Anglophone administrative regions as a minority (Stark, 1976). The Prime Minister of West Cameroon, Augustine Jua (1965-1968), responded to the article by emphasizing the importance of maintaining federalism (Stark, 1976). Ahidjo criticized Jua’s perceived attempt to solidify regional and linguistic identities in Cameroon and pointed out that “the peoples of West Cameroon massively voted [in 1961] in favor of reunification and not for federalism...” Ahidjo further downplayed the importance of maintaining federalism since there were examples of unitary states that practiced official bilingualism (Stark, 1976, p. 437). Ngoh (1999, p. 181) argues that the absence of any significant objections to this statement among the people and politicians of West Cameroon serves as an “unmistaken indication [of] the marginalization and ‘second class status’ of Anglophones...”

In January 1968, Ahidjo replaced Jua with Salomon Tandeng Muna (1968-1972) as Prime Minister of West Cameroon despite having no constitutional or legal right to do so (Bayart, 1978). In a press conference at the Garoua Congress of the Cameroon National Union in March 1969, Ahidjo was asked directly about the future of federalism, to which he responded with a vague and ambivalent

statement (Stark, 1976). Furthermore, Muna was nominated to replace Foncha as Vice President ahead of the 1970 presidential election.²⁵⁸ By this point, Stark (1976) argues that support among West Cameroon politicians for whatever little remained of their original federalism agreement with Ahidjo was lost. In 1971, Ahidjo replaced the original proponent for official bilingualism from his cabinet, Dr. Bernard Fonlon (Stark, 1976). Stark (1976, p. 439) reports that by 1971, “education in neither East nor West Cameroon was bilingual. Several bilingual grammar schools were set up in the West, but it was bilingualism for West Cameroon alone. Anglophones in the Ministry of Education were losing their strength; the bilingual journal *Revue Camerounaise de Pédagogie* was no longer published after 1967.”

At a surprise meeting of the Political Bureau in early May 1972, Ahidjo announced the formal end of federalism in Cameroon. On May 20, 1972, a constitutional referendum was held on replacing the federal system with a French-style unitary system of government, in addition to increasing the powers of the office of the president. The act of using a constitutional referendum to change the constitution was itself unconstitutional (Mukong, 1990). With a reported turnout rate of 98.2%, the proposed amendments passed with a reported 99.99% voting in favor, marking the beginning of the United Republic of Cameroon and the formal revocation of autonomy for Anglophone Cameroon (African Elections Database, 2012).

It is worth noting that from the unification of West and East Cameroon in 1961 until the demise of federalism in 1972, the overwhelming majority of the Francophone elite actively pressured Ahidjo to abolish federalism (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Per Ndi (2014b), concrete plans were underway as early as July 1964 to convert Cameroon into a unitary state. In contrast, the “vast majority of articulate Anglophones” viewed the abolition of federalism as a serious threat to their regional interests and cultural identity (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, pp. 66-67). According to Ndi (2014b),

²⁵⁸ During his tenure as Vice President, Muna “closely collaborated with Ahidjo in dismantling the federal institutions” (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, p. 71). Foncha served as the Vice President of Cameroon from 1961 to 1970 and concurrently as Prime Minister of West Cameroon from 1961 to 1965.

there was a relatively moderate backlash against the referendum from West Cameroon politicians, though this soon subsided.

Soon after the new constitution came into effect, the government redrew the internal borders of the territorial administration. East Cameroon was divided into five provinces. West Cameroon was divided into the new North-West (*Nord-Ouest*) and South-West (*Sud-Ouest*) regions, with their respective capitals in Bamenda and Buea. Unlike the case of Azerbaijanis in Iran, these borders were drawn largely without any motivation to reduce the political power of Anglophones. Furthermore, Stark (1976, p. 441) argues that the decision to divide West Cameroon was a “delayed response... which had first raised its head in the period of British administration.”²⁵⁹ Regardless of whether Ahidjo and the Francophone elite knew it at the time, the division of Anglophone Cameroon later led to competition between the North-West and South-West Anglophone political elite for favor in Ahidjo's hegemonic party. This competition served to discourage complaints from either about perceived Francophone domination (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).

Even before the abolition of federalism in 1972, the bulk of grievances expressed by the Anglophone political elite centered on their exclusion from decision-making bodies and key government and party positions.²⁶⁰ According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003, p. 67) and Fon (2019, p. 60), Anglophones are excluded from posts in higher-status ministries (Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, National Education, Territorial Administration, Economy, and Finance) and are instead appointed to positions in lower-status ministries (Ministries of Transport and Mines) that have

²⁵⁹ Thus, this policy is not considered as one of minority exclusion for the purposes of this case study.

²⁶⁰ Throughout the 1960s, Ahidjo worked to ensure that his party (*Union Camérounaise* [1958-1966], transforming into the *Union Nationale Camerounaise* [1966-1985]) dominated Cameroonian politics in both the Anglophone and Francophone regions. In 1985, the *Union Nationale Camerounaise* was transformed under Paul Biya into the *Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais* (RDPC) [1985-Present]. Throughout the entire case period, Cameroon functioned as a single-party authoritarian state.

become stigmatized as “Anglophone ministries.” Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003) further note that Anglophones are rarely represented in important leadership (director) roles in the broader civil service.

In contrast with the underrepresentation of Anglophones in leadership positions in the bureaucracy, Anglophones are overrepresented in the premiership due to elite cooptation. Beginning with the abolition of federalism in 1972 and the reinstatement of the premiership in 1975, the first four prime ministers of Cameroon were Francophones (1975-1984, 1991-1992), cumulatively accounting for 11 years of the post-1975 premiership.²⁶¹ Since 1992, five Anglophones have held the premiership consecutively up to the present day, cumulatively accounting for 33 years of the post-1975 premiership.²⁶² As will be discussed later, it is worth noting that the string of Anglophone premierships began in 1992, when brief political liberalization led to the near-defeat of Biya’s party by an Anglophone opposition party in the 1992 presidential election.²⁶³ In 2019, Prime Minister Ngute announced the composition of his 31-member cabinet, which included only two Anglophones (Shaban, 2019b). Both Anglophones were appointed to important positions as Minister for Territorial Administration (Paul Atanga Nji) and Minister of Secondary Education (Pauline Nalova Lyonga) (Shaban, 2019b).

Outside of the political elite, Anglophone Cameroonians complained of exclusion from employment opportunities in the public sector²⁶⁴ and a relative lack of public service provisions. These complaints grew increasingly loud throughout the next several decades. Citing an October 1974 article

²⁶¹ Francophone Prime Ministers: Paul Biya (1975-1982), Bello Bouba Maigari (1982-1983), Luc Ayang (1983-1984), Sadou Hayatou (1991-1992). The office of prime minister was abolished between 1984-1991.

²⁶² Anglophone Prime Ministers: Simon Achidi Achu (1992-1996), Peter Mafany Musonge (1996-2004), Ephraïm Inoni (2004-2009), Philémon Yang (2009-2019), Joseph Ngute (2019-Present).

²⁶³ While it is difficult to determine the extent to which the Biya regime co-opted Anglophone Prime Ministers, all Anglophone Prime Ministers except for Joseph Ngute (2019-Present) have spoken out against the political movements and opposition parties in the Anglophone regions. Due to single-party rule in Cameroon, it is almost certain that Biya placed co-opted Anglophones in the Premiership as a symbolic display of unity between Francophones and Anglophones, while allowing Anglophones to be excluded throughout most of the government. The cooptation of the Anglophone elite was part of the strategies used by the Biya government to deconstruct the Anglophone identity from the 1990s onwards (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, pp. 108-138).

²⁶⁴ Per the LRSI coding regime discussed in Chapter 5, this is considered a language restriction in Table 20 below.

in the *Cameroon Tribute* newspaper, Stark (1976, p. 439) states, “In the bureaucracy, government circulars and directives were not always translated into English, and if translated were months late appearing.” The inadequate availability and accuracy of official documentation in English relative to French has persisted until at least 2013 (Stark, 1976; Echu, 2004; Fouda, 2013).

From 1961 to around 1966, the West Cameroon government incurred a substantial budget deficit owing to various overlapping national economic reforms and a significant worldwide decline in demand for export crops. To meet their financial obligations, the West Cameroon government relied on subsidies from the federal government, which accounted for 60% of their budget in 1966 (Ngoh, 1999, p. 179).²⁶⁵ Outside of this relatively minor evidence favoring minority economic inclusion, most evidence points to a pattern of social, political, and economic exclusion toward the Anglophone minority.

For example, Dupraz (2019) uses a border discontinuity analysis of 1976 and 2005 census microdata to study differential colonial legacies between the former British and French colonies in Cameroon.²⁶⁶ Dupraz (2019) finds evidence that after independence, the Francophone government in Cameroon built more primary schools in the Francophone region to the neglect of the Anglophone regions. The relatively lower proportion of primary schools per student in Cameroon did not equalize until 1995. The proportion of secondary schools per student remained roughly equal until around 2000, when the availability of secondary schooling in the Anglophone regions fell significantly.²⁶⁷ Using data from the 2004 Demographic and Health Survey of Cameroon, Lee and Schultz (2012)

²⁶⁵ The Federal government also subsidized 20% of the budget for East Cameroon in 1966. Taken together, this serves as relatively minor evidence against Anglophone minority exclusion concerning potential budget allocation discrepancies.

²⁶⁶ To read more about border discontinuity analysis—particularly in the African context—see McCauley and Posner (2015).

²⁶⁷ Dupraz (2019) finds that Cameroonian men born in the (former) British Cameroons between 1920 and 1950, and 1970 onwards, had at least one more year of schooling relative to their counterparts born in the (former) French Cameroon. However, this is attributed to pedagogical differences in the Francophone schooling system that more frequently results in grade repetition for students.

show that *rural* households in the former British Cameroons are relatively more wealthy and have slightly better access to piped water due to the relative British vs. French colonial legacy. This finding did not hold for Anglophone households in urban areas, which fared worse than urban and suburban areas in the Francophone regions.

Youmbi and Banini (2023) use data from Afrobarometer's Round 6 survey in Cameroon in 2015 to propose an infrastructure indicator index. Across the ten regions of Cameroon, the North-West and South-West Anglophone regions are tied for the lowest infrastructure index score at 0.66. In contrast, the Centre-Yaoundé, Littoral, and South regions score the highest, with scores of 0.94, 0.88, and 0.88, respectively (Youmbi & Banini, 2023). Cameroonians in certain less developed Francophone regions (i.e., the East, Far North, North, and Adamawa regions) have also complained about the underrepresentation of their ethnic groups in government and neglect in development projects (U.S. Department of State, 2004). However, the existence of a group that is more disadvantaged or excluded compared to the targeted minority group does not disqualify policies of potential economic exclusion as long as the other group is not the dominant group, and the policies are employed with suspected exclusionary intent.

Citing health reasons, Ahidjo resigned from the presidency in November 1982. Two days later, Ahidjo was constitutionally succeeded by then-Prime Minister Paul Biya (1975-1982). As with any transfer of power away from a repressive leader as viewed by the Anglophone minority, many hoped that Biya would alleviate their marginalization. These hopes were raised during President Biya's (1982-Present) first visit to the Anglophone regions, where he addressed Anglophone citizens in English and promised to immediately address some of the core grievances of the Anglophone population concerning poor infrastructure and the centralization of the Cameroonian state (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). However, Biya's contempt for Anglophone grievances soon became apparent, as he refused to implement any of his stated promises and "would stubbornly insist on speaking French

not only to his Anglophone collaborators but even to visiting English-speaking foreign dignitaries” (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, p. 69).

In September 1983, President Biya ordered the Minister of National Education to modify the Anglophone baccalaureate (General Certificate of Education, GCE) by including French as a mandatory subject (Tabi-Manga, 1994; Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, 2004).²⁶⁸ Since all of the universities and professional and technical institutes in Cameroon at the time were based on the French system and provided instruction exclusively in French, the order was supposedly made to help Anglophone students transition from their Anglophone primary and secondary educations to the almost exclusively Francophone higher education system (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).

Seven higher education institutions in Cameroon currently offer normal instruction in English. Three of these are public institutions, two of which include the University of Buea (est. 1992) and the University of Bamenda (est. 2010). The four private institutions include the Baika University Institute of Buea (est. 1998), the Catholic University of Cameroon (est. 2010), Saint Monica University (est. 2012), and the Hibmat Institute University of Buea (est. 2015). Between 1962 and the establishment of the University of Buea in 1992, the only feasible option for Anglophones to acquire higher education was to attend the officially bilingual University of Yaoundé (est. 1962). During this period, the University of Yaoundé was a primarily Francophone institution that offered little assistance to Anglophone students who “took two or three years longer to get degrees than their Francophone counterparts” (Stark, 1976, p. 439). In 1993, the University of Yaoundé was split into two parts (University of Yaoundé I and II). Echu (2004) notes that at the time of their writing, only 20% of lectures between the two universities were given in English. Despite “the promotion of bilingualism”

²⁶⁸ Upon successful completion of the Anglophone baccalaureate, students are awarded the General Certificate of Education, Ordinary Level (GCE-OL). Possession of the GCE indicates that the student has completed high school or secondary education and is eligible to pursue higher education. French is optional for those pursuing the General Certificate of Education - Advanced Level (Tabi-Manga, 1994).

being highlighted as one of the fundamental objectives of higher education per Articles 5 and 6 of Law No. 005 of April 2001, universities in the Anglophone and Francophone regions provide normal instruction almost exclusively in English or French, respectively (Leclerc, 2024).

In response to the modification of the Anglophone GCE, Anglophone students at the University of Yaoundé staged a boycott of classes and held demonstrations in November 1983, demanding the establishment of universities and institutes based on the English schooling system and language (Nyamnjoh, 1996; Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Anglophone students complained of the relative lack of English-language instruction at the officially bilingual university and the dismissal of Dr. Bisong, one of the few professors to offer English-language courses. Simultaneous solidarity protests in some Anglophone urban centers were violently suppressed (Nyamnjoh, 1996).²⁶⁹ In 1989, the government again attempted to modify the GCE but failed in the face of significant Anglophone opposition and demonstrations (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). In October 1993, after an almost three-year struggle with the government, the Teachers' Association of Cameroon forced the government to establish a semi-autonomous GCE board to administer examinations in the Anglophone regions (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). However, this minor victory did not last, as the government eventually forced the Francophone system into the GCE in March 1997 (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).

Just several months after the 1983 GCE crisis, Biya changed the name of the country from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon unilaterally and without consultation with Anglophone political leaders (Ngoh, 1987; Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). The name "Republic of Cameroon" was previously and briefly held by Francophone Cameroon before unification with Anglophone Cameroon.²⁷⁰ Anglophones rightfully interpreted this unilateral decision as an attempt to deny or erase their cultural identity. The Anglophone reaction was one of near-universal

²⁶⁹ The launch of the book detailing this claim (Nyamnjoh, 1996) was banned by the Biya regime right before publication (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).

²⁷⁰ Per Law No. 84-1 of February 1984 (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003; Leclerc, 2024).

condemnation. In March 1985, the Anglophone president of the Cameroon Bar Association, Fon Gorji Dinka, wrote a memo to President Biya declaring the Biya government as unconstitutional and thus lacking a constitutional basis to rule the Anglophone regions (Ngoh, 1987; Mukong, 1990; Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Dinka further made the first call for independence for the Anglophone regions under the name “Republic of Ambazonia” (Mukong, 1990).

Starting in late 1986, Cameroon fell into an economic crisis that lasted until the mid-1990s. The immediate cause of the crisis was a steep decline in the price of oil, cocoa, coffee, and rubber, in addition to a slide in the value of the dollar against the CFA franc (Jua, 1991). Two years prior, Biya allegedly uncovered a plot led by former President Ahidjo to oust him. Biya subsequently purged alleged co-conspirators in the political elite (Lewis, 1984). As the country’s deteriorating economic situation overlapped with the political crisis in both parts of Cameroon, the government increased its use of violent repression to crush dissent (Takougang & Krieger, 1998).

9.3 *Popular Backlash and Later Policies*

Competition between the North-West and South-West Anglophone elite (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003) paired with a pervasive system of ethno-regional patronage (Jua, 1991) and violent repression (Takougang & Krieger, 1998) during the Ahidjo and Biya regimes served to silence Anglophone grievances. However, these grievances were never directly addressed, and Anglophone hopes that the new Biya administration would ease their marginalization were quickly shattered. As the latest attempts for legislative redress to reduce Anglophone marginalization or restore federalism failed to produce any change, Anglophone demands grew progressively more extreme.

On May 26, 1990, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) was founded in Bamenda under the leadership of chairman John Fru Ndi, with a platform centered squarely on demands for political liberalization. The rally to launch the SDF was peaceful but was violently suppressed by security forces,

leading to the deaths of seven people.²⁷¹ Still experiencing economic deterioration and related demonstrations nationwide resulting from the 1986 economic crisis, the Biya regime yielded to some of the SDF's demands. Law No. 90-56 was passed in December 1990, which allowed for multiparty politics for the first time in post-1961 Cameroonian history (Rutinwa, 2001). Law No. 90-56 further granted relatively greater freedoms for associations and the media (Rutinwa, 2001).

On the same day as the launch of the SDF, Anglophone students at the University of Yaoundé organized a simultaneous solidarity demonstration, where gendarmes “harassed and brutalized the students, looted their property and arrested about three hundred of them” (Konings, 2002, p. 8).²⁷² Tensions remained high on campus following the suppression of this protest. Meanwhile, the quality of education received at the university continued to deteriorate due to the ongoing economic crisis. In one particularly relevant complaint lodged by the students, “English private law students protested about discrimination, bitterly lamenting that some of their courses were in French while French private law students had no courses at all in English.” In interpreting the following discussion on the series of paralyzing demonstrations at the University of Yaoundé, it should be noted that the demonstrations were organized primarily by the Anglophone student minority on campus from 1990 to the end of the demonstrations in 1996. Language grievances and political grievances served as the initial basis of the protests. Later, student demands expanded to include grievances related to the generally poor quality of education received, exploitation of students by faculty members, brutality of the gendarmes and other government-affiliated militias, revocation of scholarship payments, and forced tuition payments.

Soon after the advent of political liberalization, these tensions came to a head starting on April 2, 1991, as students demonstrated in support of the joint demand made by the country's new

²⁷¹ Human Rights Watch (1991), Nyamnjoh (2011) and Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003) report seven dead. Hopkins-Hayakawa (2011) reports between 4 and 12 dead.

²⁷² Unless stated otherwise, all claims in the following discussion on student protests at the University of Yaoundé between 1990 and 1996 are summarized from the detailed timeline of events presented by Konings (2002).

opposition parties for a “sovereign national conference and an unconditional general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles.” This protest was largely peaceful and was dispersed without incident by gendarmes.²⁷³ The students resumed their protest the next day, burning vehicles and smashing the windows of the university’s chancellery. This protest was met with extreme brutality by the gendarmes. Between April 10 and April 15, around 300 students were arrested at a demonstration on campus (Hopkins-Hayakawa, 2011). Following a student mass rally on May 4, 1991,²⁷⁴ a student organizing meeting two days later was again met with extreme brutality at the hands of gendarmes and other pro-government groups.²⁷⁵ The government finally made some concessions in late May, including the creation of two new universities, one of which would provide normal instruction in English. Student demonstrations subsequently died down. The government fulfilled its promise of an Anglophone university by establishing the University of Buea in 1992.

On December 12, 1991, students protested against the delay in scholarship payments. Following the dispersal of the protests, a renewed boycott of classes was called for. On January 20, 1992, gendarmes again violently dispersed a student meeting, “again brutalizing and raping students, looting their property and arresting over 35 of them.” Similar protests were staged on May 6, 1992, and May 8, 1992, the former of which was also violently suppressed. After several similar protests in April and May 1993, the next wave of student protests began three years later. Violent and nonviolent student demonstrations or clashes between students, gendarmes, and university authorities occurred in 1996 on May 6, May 7, May 8, May 14, May 21, June 3, and June 12.²⁷⁶

²⁷³ Per Konings (2002, p. 9), the gendarmes were reinforced with new troops, and “... [sprayed] tear gas over students in excessive quantities, looting their rooms, raping some of the girls and torturing anyone arrested.”

²⁷⁴ The student rally at the university sports complex attracted around 25,000 students.

²⁷⁵ In addition to the gendarmes, “The Self-Defense group, the Beti militia and the Beti inhabitants of the nearby quarters also attacked fleeing students. Soldiers again invaded students’ residences... looting property, raping girls and arresting any student caught up in the violence. Reportedly, 218 students were arrested but there were contradictory reports about the number of deaths, disappearances, and injuries.”

²⁷⁶ In a meeting on May 6, 1996, between student representatives and the Chancellor of the university, Dominique Obounou Akong, Akong “threatened to kill any student caught destroying university property.” The students held him

From April 1991 to January 1992, the SDF and other allied opposition parties²⁷⁷ organized a prolonged civil disobedience demonstration (Operation Ghost Town) wherein the normal functions of every city in Cameroon (businesses, ports, transportation services) were shut down during the weekdays (Hopkins-Hayakawa, 2011).²⁷⁸ The public was also asked to “immobilize the economy by staying indoors, blocking streets, refusing to pay taxes and bills, and boycotting markets and offices” (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, p. 78).²⁷⁹ Between April 10 and April 15, eight pro-democracy demonstrators were killed by security forces (Human Rights Watch, 1992; Hopkins-Hayakawa, 2011).

With relatively greater political and civil liberties, the SDF began to recruit from outside the Anglophone regions. The SDF quickly started taking the character of a national rather than regional Anglophone party. In doing so, “The party proved to be so successful in its recruitment efforts in Francophone Cameroon... that Francophones soon outnumbered Anglophones in the originally Anglophone party” (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, p. 79). With a significant Francophone membership, the SDF distanced itself from pressure exerted by other Anglophone organizations and associations to include a return to federalism in their platform.

In the 1992 presidential election, Biya (RPDC) won with 40% of the national vote, followed by Fru Ndi (SDF) with 36% (African Elections Database, 2012). The SDF, the United States,

hostage in his office until they were cleared out by gendarmes. On May 7, 1996, gendarmes violently suppressed another student protest. The next day, students marched and burned down a lecture hall. On May 14, 1996, students “were arrested and severely beaten by the [gendarmes].” On May 21, students disrupted the examinations of the Advanced Teachers’ Training College, resulting in several arrests. Immediately prior to this, students burned down another lecture hall, beat a captured military captain, and smashed the windows of cars belonging to university authorities. On June 3, students clashed with gendarmes and the Self-Defense group. On June 12, students marched on campus in protest of the dismissal of their leaders from the university. In the following days, around 300 students were arrested.

²⁷⁷ The SDF, along with the National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) and the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), formed an alliance named the National Coordination Committee of Opposition Parties (NCCOP).

²⁷⁸ Per Hopkins-Hayakawa (2011), “The NCCOP’s main goal was to paralyze the national economy and cut off support for the civil servants of the government. The NCCOP wanted to end the reign of Biya, and to establish democratic procedures for subsequent elections. The NCCOP’s primary public demand was for a sovereign national conference of all constituent parties. The main issue at this conference would be rules and procedures for the upcoming local and national elections, as well as addressing Biya’s abuse of the political system.”

²⁷⁹ Due to the changing character of the SDF and lack of any linguistic motivation or demand, Operation Ghost Town is not coded as a backlash event.

Germany, and the European Union declared the election results fraudulent, and violent protests spread throughout the Anglophone North-West province in protest of Fru Ndi's stolen victory (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Addressing the general societal discontent with his rule, Biya announced the organization of a national forum on constitutional reform, set to take place between late April and June 1993 (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). In response, the first All-Anglophone Conference (AAC) was organized in Buea and scheduled to take place ahead of the national forum "for the purpose of adopting a common Anglophone stand on constitutional reform" (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, p. 84). On April 3, 1993, the AAC issued the "Buea Declaration."²⁸⁰ The Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) took a leading role in organizing the conference.²⁸¹

The Buea Declaration begins by listing a litany of Anglophone grievances against the Ahidjo and Biya regimes. To the best of my knowledge, the numerous allegations of language restrictions and Anglophone exclusion are largely supported or not explicitly contested by the various authors cited in this case study. The verified allegations are included in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 below.²⁸² Some of the notable grievances could not be verified through external sources. The Buea Declaration ends with four specific declarations that focus on the unconstitutional and illegal nature of the 1972 referendum to abolish the federal system and the Anglophone desire to restore the federal constitution and government. The AAC was also tasked with drafting a federal constitution to present at the national forum. The AAC proposed a loose form of federation that shared many similarities with the American

²⁸⁰ See Jumbam (2021) for the full text of the 1993 Buea Declaration.

²⁸¹ CAM was founded in 1980 (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000, p. 59).

²⁸² Including but not limited to: The abolition of the West Cameroon House of Chiefs (Chem-Langhee, 1983, p. 653; Ngoh, 1987, p. 352); the dissolution of democratic electoral institutions in the Anglophone regions (Ndi, 2014b); exclusion of Anglophones from leadership positions in important state ministries (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003; Fon, 2019); the abolition of law-making institutions with which the distinct Anglophone use of English Common Law can be amended or reformed (Tebug, 2006); near-total exclusion of Anglophones from jobs in oil-related public corporations, all of which are located in the Anglophone regions (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003); neglect of road maintenance for critical roads in the Anglophone regions (Minorities at Risk, 2006; Youmbi & Banini, 2023); exclusion of Anglophones from lower-level bureaucratic leadership positions (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003; Leclerc, 2024); exclusive use of French in television films and (entertainment) programs, even for films and programs originally made in English (Nyamnjoh, 2011, p. 36).

federal system. The technical committee refused to consider the Anglophone draft constitution at the national forum.

Between December 1990 and June 1993, most prominent Anglophone organizations advocated for a return to federalism, with the exception of the outlawed Free West Cameroon Movement (FWCM) and the Ambazonia Movement (AM) (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). The persistent refusal of the Francophone government to discuss or consider the constitutional proposals led to CAM—at the time the most influential Anglophone organization outside of the SDF—progressively adopting a nonviolent secessionist position. The CAM proposals for a peaceful and negotiated separation of the former states of West and East Cameroon were discussed at the second All-Anglophone Conference in Bamenda between April 29 and May 1, 1994 (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Furthermore, the AAC's Anglophone Standing Committee was renamed to the Anglophone Council. Shortly after the conference, the Anglophone Council was again renamed to the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC).

For the next several years, the SCNC took on a leading role in advocating for Anglophone autonomy. Specifically, the primary goal of the SCNC was to secure autonomy for the territory and people of the former British Southern Cameroons under a federal political structure (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).²⁸³ On January 18, 1996, the new constitution was put into effect per Law No. 96-6, amending the constitution of June 2, 1972.²⁸⁴ None of the Anglophone demands for a return to

²⁸³ Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003, p. 91) cite a SCNC press release printed in the *Cameroon Post* (Aug. 16-23, 1994) stating that “the change of name makes it clear that the struggle led by the former AAC is neither of an essentially linguistic character nor in defense of an alien colonial culture, as has often been alleged, in bad faith, by some misguided critics of the AAC.” This statement serves as evidence that the goals of the SCNC were, as expected, in part but not wholly motivated by language-related grievances.

²⁸⁴ Between December 15 and December 22, 1994, a Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reform met to give non-binding advice to Biya on constitutional reform. The Committee was chaired by the Anglophone Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu. Among the 58 invited members, 44 were Francophones belonging to Biya's party or parties allied with it. The remaining 14 members were Anglophones, none of whom were nominated by the SCNC. Half of the original 14 Anglophone members withdrew from the conference before its conclusion in protest (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003, p. 91).

federalism were included, though an insignificant degree of political devolution was given (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Similar to the Mexican government providing only minor symbolic cultural concessions in the face of the major political and economic demands of Mayans, the Cameroonian government provided only one minor symbolic language concession in the new constitution.²⁸⁵

Despite the abolition of the federal system, Cameroon maintained official bilingualism with French and English as the two official languages. At a minimum, official bilingualism requires a state to translate all official texts, decrees, laws, and other forms of government documentation into both of the official languages. Public services such as education, healthcare, and public safety must also be accessible to speakers of either official language nationwide. In education, students of both language groups must be required to learn both languages as part of their curriculum. Furthermore, individuals must be allowed to attend court proceedings in either official language, and legislative proceedings must be conducted and published in both languages. Finally, public signage, official government websites, and government communications must be bilingual or provided in either of the two official languages where a given language group predominantly resides.²⁸⁶

Given these requirements, Cameroon's policy of official bilingualism has failed the Anglophone population. The language restrictions imposed on the Anglophone minority in Cameroon are rarely specified in decrees or legislation. Instead, they are largely the consequence of the Francophone government's gross neglect of the use or provision of English-language services in

²⁸⁵ Section 3 of Article 1 of the new constitution emphasized the official and equal status of both French and English, and further stated that "The state shall guarantee the promotion of bilingualism throughout the country. It shall endeavor to protect and promote national languages" (Ndille, 2016, p. 24).

²⁸⁶ A very basic requirement of bilingualism is that both languages be shown in consumer product information and related contracts. This requirement was only met in Cameroon through Article 21 of Law No. 90-31 of August 1990, which requires companies to provide notices in French and English stating product details (Leclerc, 2024). This was expanded to include bilingual provisions in consumer product and contract information in Decree No. 2011-1521-PM of June 2011 (Leclerc, 2024).

administration, public services, and education. This neglect results from an informal but deliberate policy designed to facilitate assimilation (Ayafor, 2005).

While the Francophone government espoused rhetoric asserting the importance of a bilingual populace, no clearly defined bilingual goals or objectives were ever elaborated, let alone codified. From the perspective of the Francophone government, official bilingualism extends only to its use in government institutions, transactions in private businesses, and the provision of a limited number of bilingual schools and non-school language teaching centers (Ayafor, 2005). As such, official bilingualism remained a vague political rather than linguistic goal.

Soon after unification, the Ahidjo regime did make minor overtures to Anglophone language rights, notwithstanding the inclusion of official bilingualism in the constitution. In 1962, the first secondary education institution in the Anglophone region opened as the *Lycée Bilingue de Bué* (bilingual grammar highschool in Buea) (Ayafor, 2005). At its opening, Ahidjo stated, “By bilingualism we mean the practical usage of our two official languages, English and French, throughout the national territory” (Ayafor, 2005, p. 127). In 1965, the *collège bilingue d’application* (bilingual middle school) was established in Yaoundé (Tabi-Manga, 2000). At the inauguration of a new public bilingual high school in Yaoundé in 1977, Ahidjo stated, “The ideal goal to be attained in our schools will be to produce citizens capable of using the two languages to perfection, even to produce in French or in English, according to their choice, literary and scientific works of quality” (Ayafor, 2005, p. 127). This aspirational statement stands in contrast with the sentiments of government workers—the overwhelming majority of whom define *bilingualism* as the “Coexistence of French & English as official languages.”²⁸⁷ Despite the relatively greater aspirations of the Francophone government relative to its population, even the low expectations of official bilingualism in Cameroon have not been met.

²⁸⁷ Per Ayafor (2005, p. 130). The survey was conducted in 2002 and found that an overwhelming majority (82.2%) of Francophone and Anglophone government workers defined bilingualism as the “Coexistence of French & English as

As France built relatively more primary and secondary schools in the 1950s, Francophone Cameroon entered the post-independence period with a greater availability of French-language education. Since independence, the government has built more primary and secondary schools throughout all parts of Cameroon. Students in both linguistic regions are guaranteed to receive instruction²⁸⁸ in either English or French, but not both. Official bilingualism should attempt to cultivate bilingualism at the individual level first and foremost through teaching both languages in primary or secondary education in all linguistic regions. In Cameroon, primary and secondary education is split into two subsystems: one English and one French, each operating in their respective linguistic regions.²⁸⁹ Articles 16 and 17 of Law No. 98-004 of April 1998 state the organization of each subsystem (Leclerc, 2024). While this law was formally codified in 1998, it was informally in place since 1961.

Teaching French to Anglophone Cameroonians began as part of a 1977 Franco-Cameroonian project named “Operation Bilingualism” (Tabi-Manga, 1994, p. 224) aimed at expanding French-language education in Anglophone primary schools. For schools in the Francophone regions, English is not a compulsory subject. The same cannot be said of primary education in the Anglophone regions, where students must spend a half hour everyday learning French (Tabi-Manga, 1994).²⁹⁰ In the

official languages.” Only 4.6% of respondents defined bilingualism as “Perfect mastery of French & English by all Cameroonians.”

²⁸⁸ Per Article 7 of Law No. 98-004 of April 1998, “The State guarantees equal opportunities of access to education to all without discrimination based on sex, political, philosophical and religious opinions, social, cultural, linguistic or geographical origin” (Leclerc, 2024).

²⁸⁹ Per Article 15 of Law No. 98-004 of April 1998, “The education system is organized into two subsystems, one English-speaking, the other French-speaking, which reaffirm the national option of biculturalism... The above-mentioned educational subsystems coexist while each retaining its specificity in evaluation methods and certifications” (Leclerc, 2024).

²⁹⁰ Since 1980 and until at least 1994, students in primary school in the Francophone regions dedicated much of their schooling time to learning French. Per Tabi-Manga (1994, p. 241), students from the Francophone region spend on average 15 out of 30 weekly schooling hours learning French throughout the five years of primary school. The allocation of such a large amount of time dedicated to French lessons is due to the fact that many children first come into contact with French in primary school and thus do not speak it. This is expected to change as later generations that speak French as their native language pass their language on to their children.

Francophone region, students generally are surrounded by Francophones and a saturated French-language environment, diminishing the incentives for students to maintain their knowledge of English (Leclerc, 2024). Furthermore, considering the government's tendency to prefer Francophones or bilinguals in public sector hiring, students in the Anglophone regions are exposed to a relatively more bilingual environment with stronger pressures to learn French (Tabi-Manga, 1994).

According to Article 2 of Ordinance No. 72-11 of August 1972, "The publication of legislative or regulatory acts takes place in the Official Journal of the Republic... It is carried out in English and French" (Leclerc, 2024). Similarly, Article 3 of the 1996 constitution states, "Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic in English and French." According to Tabi-Manga (2000), Members of Parliament speak in either French or English, assisted by a simultaneous translation system in the legislative chamber that has been in place since 1961. However, certain laws are only promulgated in French due to translation delays, making some laws only available in English for up to two weeks after promulgation. Furthermore, the government's use of inexperienced translators often results in translation errors (in English), causing laws to be withdrawn for rectification.

The right to have a trial in either French or English is guaranteed by the Cameroonian constitution due to the official status of each.²⁹¹ As stated by Leclerc (2024), lawyers and judges in the Francophone regions typically speak only French. In contrast, lawyers and judges in the Anglophone regions will default to Cameroonian Pidgin English²⁹² if the defendant does not speak Standard English. In determining the extent to which these linguistic courtroom rights are practiced in reality, the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices is a valuable resource from 1999 onwards (U.S. Department of State, 2024). Notwithstanding the significant corruption and

²⁹¹ For national (indigenous) languages, translation services are provided per Law No. 2005-007 of July 2005 (Leclerc, 2024).

²⁹² Cameroonian Pidgin English is viewed as a lingua franca in Cameroon, particularly in the Anglophone regions where relatively fewer individuals are fluent in Standard English (Simo Bobda, 2004).

staffing issues in the Cameroonian justice system, there appears to be no systematic denial of an individual's right to be understood and speak at proceedings in their chosen official language.

Per Circular No. 001-CAB-PM of August 1991, Prime Minister Sadou Hayatou elaborated certain measures to make the Cameroonian administration more bilingual (Leclerc, 2024). These include the right for Cameroonian citizens to access public services and speak to bureaucrats in French or English; the right to work in English or French without discrimination in hiring; the provision of bilingual documentation for public services and government or bureaucratic communications; the use of both official languages in international treaties; and publication of laws and judicial decisions in both languages “as soon as possible” (Leclerc, 2024). The dissemination of this circular should not have been necessary, given that the official status of English makes the promulgation of any laws specifying which languages should be used in public administration redundant. The fact that the Prime Minister felt the need to issue this circular reflects Cameroon's lack of true bilingualism and the significant Anglophone backlash against the government starting in the early 1990s.

Despite this and the fact that bilingualism is one of the hiring criteria for civil servants, few bilinguals are present in national ministries and bureaucracies in Yaoundé, where many Anglophones live and work (Leclerc, 2024). In the administration of the North-West and South-West Anglophone regions, monolingual English speakers are disadvantaged in advancing their careers.²⁹³ Moreover, there is evidence that Anglophones are relatively excluded from lower-level public sector positions, likely due to the unequal enforcement of language proficiency requirements between French and English (Minorities at Risk, 2006; Atabong, 2016; U.S. Department of State, 2024). The exclusion or marginalization of Anglophones is particularly apparent in the public media and army (Nsom, 2005a, 2005b; Ndezenyuy, 2006).

²⁹³ Leclerc (2024) states that in the regional civil service and police force, “...if they do not know French... it will be impossible for them to continue their career after a few years of service... Anglophones cannot use services in their language across the country, while Francophones can do so in the English-speaking part.”

Cameroon also has a public and private press, both of which are largely bilingual (Tabi-Manga, 2000). The print media landscape was and largely continues to be dominated by a single state-run newspaper: the *Cameroon Tribune* (est. 1974) (Gallagher, 1991). The *Cameroon Tribune* is published daily in French but only weekly in English (AllAfrica, n.d.). As expected in authoritarian regimes, both the public and private press are subject to editorial restrictions regarding criticism of the government and popular protests. The state-owned Cameroon Radio Television (CRTV) channel is the only television or radio broadcaster that is fully licensed and officially recognized by the Cameroonian government, though a small number of privately owned radio stations exist (U.S. Department of State, 2004).

Since the arrival of television broadcasting in Cameroon in 1985, all CRTV television stations broadcast programs in both official languages (Tabi-Manga, 2000). Similar to the print media landscape, anti-government or pro-SDF coverage is prohibited on CRTV broadcasts, and radio and television broadcasts are supposed to be bilingual. As alleged in the 1993 Buea Declaration, there exists an uneven division in the time allotments for entertainment programs in French and English, in favor of French. However, Anchimbe (2005) shows that as of 2002, English-language and bilingual CRTV programs on average represented 18.5% and 19.1% of CRTV weekly airtime, respectively, while French-language programs take up 51.2% of weekly CRTV airtime on average.²⁹⁴ Given that Anglophones and Francophones respectively constitute 23% and 56% of the Cameroonian population, I do not consider this discrepancy significant enough to include as a language restriction in Table 20 below.

Similarly, films originally produced in English are only aired on CRTV broadcasts after being translated into French (Nyamnjoh, 2011). The CRTV Poste National is the largest public radio station in Cameroon and broadcasts programs throughout the country in French (60%) and English (40%)

²⁹⁴ Per Anchimbe (2005, p. 42), 28.7% and 6.7% of Monday-Wednesday CRTV airtime was dedicated to English-language and bilingual programming, respectively. Thursday-Sunday CRTV airtime is more dedicated to bilingual programming (27.6%), with the difference largely taken from English-language programming (11.7%).

(Leclerc, 2024). However, English is overrepresented when considering the total airtime of English and French radio broadcasts across all CRTV radio stations (Anchimbe, 2005).²⁹⁵ Public signage displaying the names of government ministries or bureaucracies is bilingual, as are other forms of public signage and notices.²⁹⁶ Language use rules in the media and public signage do not extend to private advertising.

From the passage of the 1996 constitution onwards, the Anglophone movement—at that point led by the SCNC—struggled with a general loss of momentum. Inside the SCNC, a split emerged between those who favored a negotiated separation from Cameroon and those who favored secession through armed rebellion (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). In particular, the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) opted for armed rebellion. The SCYL severed relations with the SCNC in November 1996 and attacked military and civil establishments in the North-West region in March 1997, killing three gendarmes (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). The Biya government’s response to this attack was one of disproportionate repression. The government “ruthlessly killed, tortured, raped and arrested several local men and women, forcing even more to go into exile... It seized the opportunity to clamp down on the SDF and SCNC... A considerable number of SCNC members were arrested and imprisoned...” (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). In response, the SDF purged many Anglophone separatists from the party, while the SCNC, SCARM (formerly CAM), AM, and SCYL formed an alliance to work toward secession (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).

In December 1999, Justice Ebong—a leading SCNC member—and several collaborators seized the CRTV station in Buea and declared the independence of the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Ebong was arrested, but this first declaration of

²⁹⁵ This is likely due to the greater amount of time allocated to indigenous language programming from radio stations in the Francophone regions (Anchimbe, 2005, pp. 46-48).

²⁹⁶ In 2021 in Yaoundé, for instance, one could find bilingual signage on banners hung across major roads encouraging citizens to get vaccinated against Covid-19.

Anglophone independence represented a portent of future civil conflict. In the years between Ebong's declaration of independence and the outbreak of civil conflict in 2017, tensions progressively increased between various Anglophone organizations and the government. The SDF contested fraudulent elections in 2004, 2011, and 2018, while the SCNC and affiliated secessionist groups petitioned international actors for support.

The immediate trigger of the Anglophone Crisis (2017-Present) was the passage of a minor new law regarding business transactions (Essomba & Searcey, 2017). It is common for laws written in French and passed in Yaoundé to experience delays before being translated into English. Concerns regarding the delays and poor quality of translations of laws promulgated in French have been expressed by Anglophone lawyers and judges practicing English Common Law since at least January 2006 (Tebug, 2006). However, similar concerns were also raised in the 1993 Buea Declaration. Nonetheless, the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC)—an association of lawyers and teachers—staged a sit-in protest in Bamenda on October 11, 2016 (International Crisis Group, 2017). The initial demands of the protest were for the government to restore the Common Law system and to stop appointing Francophone judges, often unfamiliar with English Common Law and with a poor command of English, to judicial posts in the Anglophone regions (International Crisis Group, 2017; Essomba & Searcey, 2017). Soon, teachers began voicing concerns over the appointment of Francophone teachers with poor English skills to schools in the Anglophone regions (Essomba & Searcey, 2017). The protest spread to Yaoundé, Buea, and other towns in the Anglophone regions. As the protest continued into November and December, the scope of demands escalated while deadly clashes between protesters and security forces broke out in Bamenda (Gigova, 2016; Essomba & Searcey, 2017).

In responding to the developing protests in his New Year message speech, President Biya stated, “Any claim, no matter how relevant, loses its legitimacy once it jeopardizes, even slightly, the

building of national unity” (Biya, 2017). On January 13, 2017, riots in Bamenda triggered by police abuses and rumors severed ongoing negotiations between CACSC and the government. Four days later, the government outlawed CACSC and arrested its president and secretary general (Essomba & Searcey, 2017).²⁹⁷ Rather than die down, the protests escalated into a repeat of the 1991-1992 Ghost Town protest, while the government imposed an extended internet blackout (Essomba & Searcey, 2017).

By March 2017, the Biya government made concessions, which included: “creating a National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism; creating new benches for Common Law at the Supreme Court and new departments at the National School of Administration and Magistracy; recruiting Anglophone magistrates and 1,000 bilingual teachers; and turning the internet back on after a 92-day cut” (International Crisis Group, 2017). However, the concessions were seen as too little too late, and the largest mass demonstration in support of independence broke out throughout the Anglophone regions on September 22, 2017 (Deutsche Welle, 2017). On October 1, 2017, an alliance of the major Anglophone secessionist groups declared independence for the state of “Ambazonia” (Shaban, 2019a).²⁹⁸

In April 2018, former Anglophone Prime Minister Peter Mafany Musonge (1996-2004) appeared at a town hall-like event in the Anglophone region (AB News & Infotainment, 2018).²⁹⁹ The residents who were shown speaking at the event unequivocally blamed the government’s

²⁹⁷ Per Essomba and Searcey (2017), the president of CACSC was Nkongho Felix Agbor-Balla. The secretary-general of CACSC was Fontem Neba. At their trial, Andzongo (2017) reports: “More than a dozen English-speaking defense lawyers wore the elaborate British-style wigs in the French-speaking court, while government lawyers went bare-headed. The Anglophone lawyers waited patiently for the translation of the proceedings but the quality was so poor that they asked for the interpreter to stop, a Reuters witness said.”

²⁹⁸ CACSC, previously an advocate for a federalist solution, changed its goal from the restoration of federalism to secession on February 16, 2017 (CrisisWatch, 2024).

²⁹⁹ Precise location is unknown but is likely somewhere in or near Buea. The fact that this video captured individual Anglophones’ grievances in the environment of a town hall speaking to a former Anglophone Prime Minister indicates that the grievances expressed were most likely genuine or intended to influence the opinions of outside observers. However, this does not necessarily mean that the stated allegations are true. Rather, they validate several of the coding decisions made in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 below.

marginalization of Anglophones for the outbreak of the crisis. One resident particularly described the various ways the Anglophone population has been excluded:

“... that the language of the military, the language of the police force, is *French* [emphasis original]. If you go to the police college in Mutengene [near Buea] you will hardly see them talking—it is not that there are not Anglophones there—the Anglophones there are obliged to have a mastery of French before they can get any headway. I work as a customs [unintelligible] at the seaport of Douala [near Buea]. If you go there, the language is French, and we have lots of Anglophones who are working there! But it seems as if you can’t speak French, you can’t find your food. I am appealing to this wonderful commission—that the head of state has cleared it³⁰⁰—that this issue of translating documents should not only be in theory but in practice, and we should see it coming from the top!” Another resident added, “Your Excellency, we need *total* [emphasis original] decentralization. We need autonomous states so that we can have a world... to see as far as the wronging of our region is concerned” (AB News & Infotainment, 2018).³⁰¹

The Anglophone Crisis (insurgency) in Cameroon was the consequence of decades of marginalization and assimilation efforts by the Francophone government. The radicalization of Anglophone groups is the direct consequence of persistent efforts on the part of the Francophone government to deny the existence of an “Anglophone problem,” disregard expressed grievances, co-opt Anglophone elites, intimidate legitimate opposition, and violently repress any opposition or demonstrations in support of Anglophone goals. Promises of decentralization made by the Biya government between 1990 and 2016 were repeatedly broken as the government cited financial difficulties for the lack of progress (International Crisis Group, 2023). The Anglophone population is now thoroughly embedded in an oppositional national identity based primarily on the French-English linguistic divide. Today, many Anglophones view only a return to federalism or secession as desirable outcomes to the ongoing crisis. From the start of the Anglophone Crisis in October 2017 to March 2023, hundreds of thousands of Cameroonians from the Anglophone regions have been displaced,

³⁰⁰ Likely in reference to a supposed concession regarding the documentation translation issue.

³⁰¹ Unfortunately, Musonge’s response after the event was unintelligible due to background noise.

and at least 6,000 have died (International Crisis Group, 2023). Furthermore, 80% of schools in the North-West and South-West Anglophone regions have closed as of June 2019 as a result of the deteriorating security situation (UN News, 2019).

In 2019, the government granted the North-West and South-West Anglophone regions' Special Status' (International Crisis Group, 2023). In principle, Special Status is meant to give the Anglophone regions greater autonomy by allowing them to create regional *assemblies* with more powers compared to the Francophone regional *councils* (International Crisis Group, 2023). In this sense, they are nominally akin to special regional autonomy arrangements in Italy, China, and Spain, for instance. Unlike the robust autonomy provided today to South Tyrol or Valle d'Aosta in Italy or Basque Country or Catalonia in Spain, the autonomy given to the Anglophone regions more closely mimics that of the inland autonomous regions of China.³⁰² In other words, the Anglophone regional assemblies "... remain weak and under the thumb of governors appointed in the capital Yaoundé... They show little inclination to serve as a platform for discussing the educational, judicial, and linguistic issues that go to the heart of Anglophone identity" (International Crisis Group, 2023). The decision to grant Special Status to the Anglophone regions was made without consultation with Anglophone leaders or separatists (International Crisis Group, 2023). Furthermore, Yaoundé undermined the legitimacy of the regional assemblies by filling them "... with government proxies and giving veto power over their decisions to the centrally appointed governors" (International Crisis Group, 2023). Since their creation, the Anglophone regional assemblies "have played no role in the formation of policy in education and other matters that underpin Anglophone identity issues" (International Crisis Group, 2023).

³⁰² Xinjiang, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, and Inner Mongolia.

While granting Special Status to the Anglophone regions was an important legal step toward decentralization, it did little to bring a resolution to the crisis. As of this writing in mid-2024, the conflict is at an impasse, and international efforts to bring the Biya government and separatists to the negotiating table have all failed. These failures appear to be primarily due to the Biya government's refusal to grant substantive concessions.³⁰³ There is also little indication that the 91-year-old President Biya is willing to loosen his grip on Cameroonian politics.³⁰⁴ Since the 2018 presidential election, Biya has redoubled efforts to repress all opposition parties ahead of the 2025 presidential election (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

Table 19 below details the major policies that effectively excluded the Anglophone minority from political and economic life in roughly chronological order. Table 20 below similarly details the timeline of various language restrictions imposed on Anglophones according to category and indicator. Finally, a list of the various relevant popular backlash events is included in Table 21. An asterisk (*) on any date indicates that the associated month or year is inferred due to a relative lack of specificity or coverage in the source material. Due to the effects of the Anglophone Crisis, the present analysis ends on October 1, 2017—the day marking the start of armed rebellion.

Table 19: Anglophone Exclusion in Cameroon

Exclusionary Policy	Time Period	Notes
Revocation of federalist provisions in the 1961 constitution	Jul. 1961	An effective revocation of unimplemented but promised autonomy, per the events at the Foumban constitutional conference in July 1961. Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration.
Dissolution of the West Cameroon Electricity Corporation, the Cameroon Bank, the West Cameroon Development Agency, and the West Cameroon Produce Marketing Board	Oct. 1961	Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration and supported by Mukong (1990) and Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003, p. 182).

³⁰³ Human rights groups have accused both separatist groups and the government of human rights abuses. However, it appears that the abuses of the government significantly exceed those of the separatists (O'Grady & Lee, 2019).

³⁰⁴ Despite his tightening grip on the podium during his televised speeches in recent years.

Underrepresentation of Anglophones in Ahidjo's cabinet	Oct. 1961 - 1971*	Between October 1961 to around the abolition of federalism in 1972, the only Anglophone in Ahidjo's 16-member federal ministerial cabinet was the Vice President, John Ngu Foncha (Ngoh, 1999). However, the powers of the Vice President were severely curtailed with the passage of Decree No. 61-15. Ngoh (1999, p. 173) cites a currently inaccessible source that states that this situation only changed ten years later, when West Cameroon held 3 out of 22 ministerial cabinet positions. While holding 3 out of 22 ministerial positions does violate the "equality of status" promised to West Cameroon as part of the Federal Republic, this proportion does somewhat reflect the relative population size of the Anglophone regions.
Establishment of administrative regions and the appointment of exclusively Francophone Federal Inspectors of Administration in West Cameroon	Oct. 1961 - May 1972	Applicable only during the federal period. Per Decree No. 61-15. Significantly reduced the political power of West Cameroon and excluded Anglophones from the highest office in West Cameroon (Federal Inspector of Administration). Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration.
General exclusion of the West Cameroon government from decisions that directly affect West Cameroon	Oct. 1961 - May 1972	Applicable only during the federal period. Appears to arise from norms of social exclusion held by the Francophone political elite toward the Anglophone minority. Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration.
Overrepresentation of Francophones in the gendarmerie of West Cameroon, and their use of excessive brutality in civilian repression	Oct. 1961* - Present	The dominance of Francophones in the West Cameroon gendarmerie is further hinted at in Ngoh (1999, p. 171): "... it is probable that Ndoko (the Acting Senior District Officer for Mamfe Division) did not want to offend the Inspector of Administration given that <i>it would have been an indictment of Francophone gendarmes in general</i> . Stories of arbitrary arrests, detentions, beatings and all sorts of extortions by the gendarmes were rife in West Cameroon." Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration. Occurring as of April 2018 per News & Infotainment (2018), and likely continues into the present.
Relative neglect of infrastructure and other development programs in the Anglophone regions	Oct. 1961* - Present	Allegation included in the 1993 Buea Declaration. Supported by International Crisis Group (2017), Youmbi and Banini (2023), and Minorities at Risk (2006): "Additionally, while English-speaking Cameroon provides much of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Cameroon, it gets minimal returns in infrastructural and other developmental investment (ECDIS06 = 3)." Continues into the present day. Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration.
Relative lack of access to public services	Oct. 1961* - Present*	In part due to the government's tendency of placing Francophones in bureaucratic positions in the Anglophone regions. Inferred from numerous sources, including but not limited to: Stark (1976), Ngoh (1999), Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003), and Lee and Schultz (2012). Exact start and end dates are unknown, though this was likely an issue from independence up to the present day.
Exclusion of Anglophones from the army	Oct. 1961* - Present*	Intentional. Extended at least up to April 2018, per (AB News & Infotainment, 2018). No sign or reason to believe this has stopped.
Replacement of Foncha with Muna as Prime Minister of West Cameroon and Vice President of Cameroon, and weakening of the powers of the Prime Minister and Vice President under Muna	Jan. 1968 - May 1972	Applicable only to the federal period, though Anglophone Prime Ministers in the post-1972 period were marginalized relative to their Francophone predecessors. Muna replaced Foncha as Prime Minister of West Cameroon in 1968, and as Vice President of Cameroon in 1970. Effectively politically excluded Anglophones. Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration.
Formal revocation of federalism (autonomy)	May 1972	While the formal revocation of federalism occurred in May 1972, the key pillars of federalism were degraded beginning even before the 1961 British Cameroons referendum. From the unification of Cameroon in October 1961 to the formal revocation of federalism in May 1972, the highly centralized form of federalism degraded to a form of federalism that was purely symbolic. This entry includes: the abolition of the West Cameroon House of Chiefs (Chem-Langhee, 1983, p. 653; Ngoh, 1987, p. 352); the dissolution of democratic electoral institutions in the Anglophone regions; the forced dissolution of Anglophone local government and community development systems; the abolition of law-making institutions with which the distinct

		Anglophone use of English Common Law can be amended or reformed; and the erosion of the independence of the judiciary in the Anglophone regions.
General exclusion of Anglophones from higher-level bureaucratic and ministerial positions	May 1972 - Present	Excluding the premiership, as previously discussed. Continues into the present day, according to Fon (2019) and International Crisis Group (2017). Inclusive of the co-optation of Anglophone Prime Ministers. Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration.
Exploitation of oil resources in the Anglophone regions	May 1981 - 2015*	Oil was discovered off the coast of the South-West region in 1967, and the main oil refinery in Limbe, South-West region was inaugurated in May 1981. Oil revenues were sent directly to the federal government, though a combination of mismanagement, corruption, and the general tendency of the Francophone government to prioritize the Francophone region for economic development meant that Anglophones were disproportionately excluded from oil wealth. The end date is set to coincide with the collapse in Cameroonian oil rents as a % of GDP in 2015. Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration.
Near-total exclusion of Anglophones from jobs in the oil refinery near Limbe, South-West region	May 1981 - 2015*	Addendum to the above entry on exploitation of oil resources. Per Ngho (1987), the state-owned National Refinery Corporation (SONARA) held a monopoly on oil production in Cameroon. The main refinery in Limbe, South-West region was inaugurated in May 1981. End date set to match the entry above. Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration and further supported by Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003).
Change in country name from the “United Republic of Cameroon” to the “Republic of Cameroon”	Feb. 1984	Minor symbolic exclusionary policy. Since the new name was the name of Francophone Cameroon prior to unification with Anglophone Cameroon, Anglophones rightfully interpreted this unilateral decision as an attempt to deny or erase their cultural identity.

Table 20: Anglophone Language Restrictions in Cameroon

Language Restriction	Subcategory	Time Period	Notes
Exclusion of Anglophones from lower-level public sector positions	Administration (Employment)	Oct. 1961* - Present	Due in part to the government’s use of French-language civil service entry examinations, which are often crudely translated into English as pointed out by Minorities at Risk (2006) and Atabong (2016). No evidence that this has been addressed since 2016. Noted in the 2004-2009 U.S. Department of State reports on human rights practices for Cameroon (U.S. Department of State, 2024). Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration.
Inadequate availability and accuracy of official documentation in English	Administration (Documentation)	May 1972* - Present	Despite the cited source (<i>Cameroon Tribute</i> , in Stark (1976)) for this grievance being written in October 1974, is it highly unlikely that English-language documentation was noticeably better between 1972 and 1974. Due to relative self-government in the Anglophone regions between October 1961 and May 1972, these years are excluded as I assume that the West Cameroon government provided English or bilingual English-French official documentation. The relative lack of English-language official documentation in the Anglophone regions has extended until at least 2013, per Fouda (2013). However, Fon (2019) cites Fouda (2013) as evidence that this has continued into at least 2019. No further evidence that this restriction has been addressed since. Further validated per AB News & Infotainment (2018).
Rare availability of higher education in English	Education (Higher)	Oct. 1961 - 1992	Beginning with unification and ending with the establishment of the University of Buea in 1992. Mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration.
Rare availability of	Education	Oct. 1961 - 1995	Dupraz (2019) records this as beginning in 1960. Since October 1961 is

primary education in English	(Primary)		the start date for this case, October 1961 is set as the starting date for this restriction. Per Dupraz (2019), the imbalance of Francophone and Anglophone primary schools was corrected by 1995.
Modification of the Anglophone baccalaureate (GCE)	Education (Secondary)	Sep. 1983 - Dec. 1983* Mar. 1997 - Present	Per Ngoh (1987), the initial reform was suspended in 1983 after student protests, likely in December. Had only minor informal effects on the time spent learning French in secondary schools.
Rare availability of secondary education in English	Education (Secondary)	2000 - Present*	First secondary education institution opened in 1962 as the bilingual grammar school in Buea. In September 2006, the government shut down 12 middle schools said to be operating illegally (Pefok, 2006). Most of these schools provided English or bilingual instruction, and disproportionately affected Anglophone students. However, this was not necessarily the cause of the decrease in the availability of secondary education in the Anglophone regions since 2000 as evidenced in Dupraz (2019).
Exclusive use of French in films in theaters and television	Media (Broadcasting)	1963 - Present*	Per the Buea Declaration of April 1993, “After reunification, all cinema theaters in Victoria, Buea, Kumba and Bamenda and other Anglophone towns were compelled to show only French-language films” and “Television films and programmes originally made in English are shown in Cameroon only after they have been translated into French, and only in their French version.” The latter allegation is directly supported by Nyamnjoh (2011), implying support for the former allegation. The Cameroonian film industry began screenings in 1963, and the last three theaters in Cameroon closed in 2009 (Coulon, 2011). Still, there is no evidence today this issue has been addressed in the context of television films.
Relatively less access to English-language newspapers	Media (Publications)	1974 - Present*	The state-run <i>Cameroon Tribune</i> (est. 1974) is the largest newspaper in Cameroon and publishes daily in French but weekly in English. Likely continues to the present day.
Required use of French in television programs ³⁰⁵	Media (Broadcasting)	1985 - Present*	“Programs” refers to entertainment programs, not news broadcasts. Per the Buea Declaration of April 1993, “Television films and programmes originally made in English are shown in Cameroon only after they have been translated into French, and only in their French version.” This allegation is directly supported by Nyamnjoh (2011). CRTV began broadcasting in 1985 and became fully operational in 1986. Last evidence by Nyamnjoh (2011), but likely continues into the present day. However, given CRTV’s continuous practice of airing English-language programs (Anchimbe, 2005), I interpret this restriction as minor one requiring the non-exclusive use of French in television programs.

³⁰⁵ In the Appendix, I provide the yearly scores for each LRSI indicator for this case. While films are included in the broadcasting indicator, the indicator more strongly prioritizes language restrictions on television, radio, and the internet. Given the relatively minor nature of the effective language restrictions on the use of English in television and the relative overrepresentation of English in radio, the broadcasting indicator receives a score of 0 throughout the case period.

Table 21: Anglophone Backlash Events³⁰⁶

Backlash Event	Time Period	Notes
Formation of the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM)	1980	Established in 1980. Took a leading role in organizing the 1993 AAC. Soon after became an advocate for secession after none of its demands were met but flip-flopped between secession and a return to federalism throughout the 1990s.
University of Yaoundé student demonstrations	Nov. 1983	Lasted eleven days, beginning on November 19, 1983. Expressed grievances relating to the modification of the GCE and the lack of English-language courses at the officially bilingual University of Yaoundé and elsewhere.
First threat of Anglophone secession	Mar. 1985	Very minor backlash event. Made in response to the change in the name of the country from the “United Republic of Cameroon” to the “Republic of Cameroon.”
Formation of the Ambazonia Movement (AM)	1990*	Advocates for secession, but not very influential. Date of establishment is not precisely known but had to occur between 1990 and 1993. Most likely date set at 1990, per Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003).
Formation of the Social Democratic Front (SDF)	May 1990	At the rally to launch the SDF, seven people were killed by security forces. Demands of the SDF centered on political liberalization but were certainly catalyzed by general political-linguistic grievances against perceived Francophone domination. Later transformed into a broad national party inclusive of Anglophones and Francophones.
1990-1996 University of Yaoundé protests	May 1990 - Jun. 1996	Major backlash event. Dates of major events: May 26, 1990; April 2-3, 1991; April 10-15, 1991; April 20, 1991; May 6, 1991; May 12, 1991; January 20, 1992; May 6, 1992; May 8, 1992; April 24-25, 1993; May 3, 1993; May 6-8, 1996; May 14, 1996; May 21, 1996; June 3, 1996; June 12, 1996.
Formation of the Free West Cameroon Movement (FWCM)	1991*	Founded in 1991, per Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003).
Buea Declaration	Apr. 1993	Major backlash event. Categorized as a backlash event due to the linguistic character of some of the listed grievances.
Formation of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC)	May 1994	Advocates for secession. Formed out of the Anglophone Standing Committee. Implied start date set at the conclusion of the second All-Anglophone Conference in Bamenda.
Formation of the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL)	May 1995	Advocates for secession through armed rebellion. Orchestrated the attack of March 1997, killing three gendarmes.
First declaration of independence	Dec. 1999	According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003, p. 105), “Justice Frederick Alobwede Ebong, an SCNC activist with close ties to the SCYL, took over the [CRTV] station in Buea on 30 December 1999, proclaiming the restoration of the independence of the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons (FRSC).”

³⁰⁶ Due to the inseparable nature of political, economic, and linguistic grievances in Anglophone demands, all Anglophone secessionist movements are considered to be motivated, at least in part, by language grievances. In addition to the popular backlash events here, numerous protests have occurred throughout the case period, particularly after the political liberalization reforms in 1990. With the exception of the student protests at the University of Yaoundé between 1990 and 1996, these protests were typically conducted in support of the goals of one or more of the various self-determination organizations operating in the Anglophone regions since 1990. The foundational motivations of all Anglophone self-determination organizations are a mix of political, economic, and linguistic grievances. These protests were often violently suppressed, often resulting in deaths. In accordance with the rule stated under Section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4, such protests organized by a self-determination organization are not included as separate entries of popular backlash.

Formation of the first Anglophone alliance	Jun. 2001	Month of June inferred per Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003). Alliance formed between the SCNC, AM, SCARM (formerly CAM), and SCYL.
Formation of the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC)	2013	Advocates for secession. Founded in 2013 by Ayaba Cho Lucas (International Crisis Group, 2019).
Formation of the Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia (IG)	Jun. 2017	Advocates for secession. Founded in June 2017 per International Crisis Group (2019).
2016-2017 Cameroonian protests	Oct. 2016 - Oct. 2017	Major backlash event. Prelude to the Anglophone Crisis, encompassing boycott actions, mass demonstrations, strikes, etc. Major demonstrations, often violent and deadly, occurred on October 11, 2016; November 8, 2016; November 21, 2016; November 28, 2016; December 8, 2016; January 13-17, 2017; September 22, 2017; February 27, 2017; October 1-2, 2017.
Anglophone Crisis	Oct. 2017 - Present	Decisive backlash event. Ongoing insurgency with deadlocked negotiations. Over 6,000 dead with hundreds of thousands displaced.

9.4 Discussion

9.4.1 Minority Exclusion

Since the unification of Cameroon in 1961, the Anglophone minority has suffered significant political and economic exclusion as a result of the deliberate policies of the Francophone governments of Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya. The original sin behind the 2017 Anglophone Crisis lies in the broken guarantee made to Anglophone leaders prior to the 1961 referendum that the state the former British Southern Cameroons would be unifying with would have a federal political structure. The false negotiations at the Foumban Constitutional Conference effectively revoked nearly every critical provision necessary to uphold any true federal system.

The Ahidjo and Biya regimes excluded Anglophones from top leadership positions in the cabinet, ministries, regional governments, and armed and security forces. During the federal period, the Francophone government consistently left West Cameroon leaders out of discussions and decisions that directly affected West Cameroon. The powers of the Vice President of Cameroon and Prime Minister of West Cameroon—positions held simultaneously by an Anglophone after unification—were severely curtailed. Controversially, Ahidjo created the office of the Federal

Inspector of Administration, which in practice held powers that surpassed those of the Prime Minister of West Cameroon. Moreover, no Anglophones were ever appointed to this post in either Francophone East Cameroon or Anglophone West Cameroon. The Francophone government also controlled the security forces of West Cameroon, excluded Anglophones from the local gendarmerie, and allowed or overlooked its use of excessive brutality in repressing West Cameroonians. The Francophone government's tendency to exclude Anglophones from the security forces extended to the military, where entrance exams were written only in French.

In regard to economic exclusion, the government heavily prioritized development and infrastructure projects in the Francophone regions while neglecting the Anglophone regions. Likewise, the Anglophone regions lacked access to public services compared to the Francophone regions. When oil was discovered off the coast of the Anglophone South-West region, the government excluded Anglophones from jobs at the SONARA oil refinery. Rents from oil production were redirected to the federal government's coffers, though little of it has made its way back to the Anglophone regions in the form of development projects.

When Ahidjo announced the end of federalism in 1972, it marked the end of a process begun in the mid-1960s by Francophone leaders who actively pressured Ahidjo to transform Cameroon into a unitary state against the wishes of Anglophone leaders. Simultaneously, many local governing bodies were dissolved, including Anglophone electoral institutions that were relatively more democratic in comparison with their Francophone counterparts. When President Biya announced a change in the country's name in 1984 from the "United Republic of Cameroon" to the "Republic of Cameroon," it signaled to the Anglophone population the unambiguous assimilationist intent of the Francophone government.

Anglophones continue to be excluded or marginalized in the public sector and top leadership positions, brutalized by predominantly Francophone security forces, lack access to public services,


and are neglected in the allocation of development funds. Cameroonian politics is dominated by a single-party authoritarian regime that neither guarantees the representation of Anglophones in government nor gives English-speaking political parties any real chance at gaining power. Considering the prevalence of exclusionary policies and the specificity, context, and relative importance of the evidence cited here, the case of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon receives a minority exclusion score of 3 (high) throughout the entire case period, indicating “social exclusion/neutral policy.”³⁰⁷

9.4.2 *Language Restriction Severity*

The case of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon is categorized as having moderate language restrictions per the Language Restriction Severity Index (LRSI) scoring regime discussed in Chapter 4. Due to the confounding effects of the Anglophone Crisis, the case study time period ends in 2017. Figure 14 below details the evolution of the severity of language restrictions from 1961 to 2017. The Appendix provides a more detailed breakdown of yearly indicator scores for each category.

³⁰⁷ The political discrimination index definition for “social exclusion/neutral policy” is “Substantial under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory social practices.” The economic discrimination index definition for “social exclusion/neutral policy” is “Significant poverty and under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.”

Figure 14: LRSI Timeline - Anglophones in Cameroon (1961 - 2017)



Despite the government's observed assimilationist motivations and use of policies that effectively excluded Anglophones from political and economic participation, at no point during the case period did the Cameroonian government impose severe language restrictions on the Anglophone minority. It is widely agreed upon that official bilingualism was applied in a deeply unequal manner between Francophones and Anglophones. Fortunately, the officialization of both English and French in 1961 erected significant legal barriers that protected Anglophones against potential future government attempts to impose severe language restrictions on English.

While the Anglophones face language restrictions in their access to official documentation and employment opportunities, they face no significant language restrictions in the judiciary or in communicating with government bureaucracies located in the Anglophone regions. In the media, Anglophones only face significant language restrictions in their access to English-language daily newspapers. Prior to 1992, there was little opportunity for Anglophones to pursue higher education in English. Until 1995, Anglophone students lacked access to English-language primary education

relative to their Francophone counterparts. From 2000 onwards, English-language secondary education has become relatively less accessible for Anglophones.

The LRSI scores for the Anglophone minority made only minor shifts throughout the case period, with an overall average LRSI score of -1. Based on the determined scores for minority exclusion and language restriction severity, the case of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon is classified as an Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime.

9.4.3 *Popular Backlash*

From unification until late 1990, popular Anglophone backlash to language restrictions was relatively muted, with three relatively minor backlash events occurring in 1980, November 1983, and March 1985. According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003), the relative lack of protests against perceived Francophone domination prior to 1990 was the product of competition between elites from the North-West and South-West regions for Ahidjo's favor in the single-party state. This dynamic, in addition to the broader practice of co-opting the Anglophone political elite, helps explain the absence of significant Anglophone protests in the first several decades after unification (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Beginning with the formation of the Social Democratic Front in May 1990 and the brief advent of political liberalization in December 1990, the new and numerous Anglophone associations and organizations began discussing their grievances. These grievances mostly pertained to political and economic exclusion or marginalization but also included numerous language grievances despite the maintenance of official bilingualism in the constitution.

The theoretical framework presented in this dissertation allows for but does not directly anticipate the emergence of self-determination movements in this case. Nonetheless, increasingly radical self-determination organizations were established in 1980, 1991, 1994, 1995, 2001, 2013, and 2017. Due to the uniquely linguistic nature of the majority-minority identity divide, strong perceptions

of minority exclusion likely amplified feelings of linguistic marginalization, and vice versa. Based on the evidence and sources cited in this case, there appears to be an entrenched pattern of social exclusion on the part of the Francophone elite toward the Anglophone minority. Inevitably, this has been translated as linguistic repression by Anglophones.

Between May 1990 and June 1996, a series of nonviolent and violent student demonstrations paralyzed the University of Yaoundé. These protests were organized primarily by the Anglophone student minority population and focused on the lack of English-language courses, the poor quality of education received, and late scholarship payments. As the Francophone gendarmerie and local Beti militias violently and often lethally suppressed student protests, later protests demanded an end to the brutality of the security forces.

In 1993, Anglophone leaders gathered in Buea to discuss proposals for the upcoming constitutional forum as part of the first All-Anglophone Conference. The resulting Buea Declaration lists many grievances concerning restrictions on the use of English and Anglophone political and economic exclusion. Moreover, none of the proposals made by the first or second All-Anglophone Conferences were included in the 1996 constitution. If there had ever been a critical juncture where meaningful concessions could have prevented the onset of the Anglophone Crisis in 2017, it would have been in the aftermath of the first All-Anglophone Conference. Until 1993, Anglophone organizations were split between those who advocated for federalist restoration and those who advocated for peaceful or violent secession. Faced with a central government determined not to restore any meaningful aspect of federalism, the major Anglophone organizations radicalized their goals in favor of a negotiated and peaceful separation of the two Cameroons. By the mid-2010s, many of these organizations embraced the idea that their marginalization could only be rectified through violent secessionist conflict.

Thus, the outbreak of mass protests throughout the Anglophone regions in October 2016 and the subsequent outbreak of the Anglophone Crisis in October 2017 were the result of language restrictions and longstanding government policies of political and economic minority exclusion (Ayafor, 2005). While these policies were largely informal or the result of gross negligence, they were deliberate insofar that for the policies or events listed in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 above, the Cameroonian government had no justifiable reason for systematically excluding Anglophones or restricting the use of English in various spheres. Almost seven years after the start of the Anglophone Crisis, the conflict remains at a stalemate while the Biya regime refuses to consider any meaningful political, economic, or linguistic concessions.

The intensity of Anglophone backlash can be further understood when considering the three backlash mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3. Ahidjo and Biya did not display major signs of pure cultural egoism, likely as a result of Ahidjo's ascension to the presidency as a pro-France politician. The moderate severity of language restrictions on English was also unlikely responsible for significant feelings of coercion resentment. Rather, the co-official status of French and English—both of relatively equal and overall high prestige and economic utility at the domestic and international level—bestowed certain expectations among the Anglophone population regarding bilingual equality in the political and economic spheres. By repeatedly violating these expectations, a profound sense of status injustice developed within the nascent oppositional Anglophone national identity. As such, status injustice served as the prime motivation behind the initial set of Anglophone grievances. The tendency of the Cameroonian government to almost immediately resort to violence to suppress any form of dissent—without possessing sufficient state capacity to deter dissent through surveillance—served as the most direct catalyst for increased feelings of coercion resentment among the Anglophone population. Overall, the case of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon demonstrates a severe level of backlash against the state.

9.5 *Conclusion*

As discussed in Chapter 3, the existence of Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes is an anomaly. Theoretically, governments with an assimilationist motive that impose policies that severely restrict the political and economic participation of a minority group should also attempt to eradicate the aspect(s) of a minority identity that separates the minority from the dominant culture. In many cases, this comes in the form of highly visible but mutable language differences. Unlike several other post-independence African states, Ahidjo chose to perpetuate the use of French as an official language in Cameroon. Given Cameroon's highly diverse linguistic context, this was understandably done in order to avoid future language-related conflicts caused by elevating one ethnic group's language above all others (Liu, 2015). If the intent behind this decision was to avoid conflict, the decision to officialize English alongside French was rational, albeit effectively non-negotiable for West Cameroon. Viewed in one light, this case is an anomaly because the Francophone government developed an assimilationist motive after unification, perhaps due their lack of understanding at the time as to what true official bilingualism would require from the state and its people. Problematically for the Francophone government, the early officialization of English and French prevented the imposition of most possible severe language restrictions seen in prior cases.

The failure of the Cameroonian nation-building project can also be attributed to the government's use of two contradictory methods of achieving national unity. Official bilingualism can, if done correctly, be used to temper minority grievances and cultivate national unity in the long term. Centralization and territorial integration can also plausibly be used to cultivate national unity by removing regional barriers that to a certain extent divide national interests. However, employing both official bilingualism and centralization and territorial integration are incompatible strategies to achieving a more unified nation, particularly when employed in an autocratic political context. Centralization and territorial integration serve to undermine regional institutions that uphold official

bilingualism. Without the prospect of using autonomous regional institutions to maintain the use and vitality of the junior official language or the ability to enact change through the ballot box, official bilingualism can be eroded as it was through neglect or moderate language restrictions to the detriment of intergroup relations.

The Cameroonian government's attempts to assimilate the Anglophone minority were also likely hindered by the international prestige of the English language. Unlike the cases discussed in previous chapters, both the dominant and minority languages are highly prestigious in the context of this case, with French retaining high domestic prestige and English retaining high international prestige. This dynamic was even mentioned in the 1993 Buea Declaration: "In spite of the officially bilingual character of Cameroon, and in spite of its wide international spread and high international standing, English is treated as a secondary language in Cameroon..." (Jumbam, 2021).

Most Anglophone Cameroonians learn their indigenous heritage language as their first language before learning Standard English and Cameroonian Pidgin English as their second and/or third language(s).³⁰⁸ In pressuring the Anglophone minority to adopt the French language, the Cameroonian government was effectively asking the Anglophone population to learn their third or fourth language. As such, official bilingualism in Cameroon has failed despite the low bar set for it. As previously mentioned, Translators Without Borders (2021) estimates that only 11.6% of Cameroonians are literate in both French and English as of 2005. As one common saying in Cameroon goes, "*C'est le Cameroun qui est bilingue, pas les Camerounais*" (Cameroon is bilingual, not Cameroonians) (Nsom, 2015).

Konings and Nyamnjoh (1997, p. 229) conclude their analysis of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon with an ominous prediction: "The Government's continued denial of any 'Anglophone

³⁰⁸ This is beginning to change, as Cameroonian parents choose to teach or speak with their children in French or English as opposed to their indigenous heritage language (Ndille, 2016).

problem' in Cameroon, and its determination to defend the unitary state by all available means, including repression, could lead to an escalation of Anglophone demands past a point of no return.” Twenty years later, this prediction came to fruition with the outbreak of the Anglophone Crisis. Moreover, the concessions required from the Francophone government to quell the insurgency and prevent any future conflict with the Anglophone minority are likely to be more substantial than a return to the highly centralized form of federalism in place at the time of unification. Based on these conclusions and the evidence provided in this case study, I determine that the Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime employed by Cameroon on the Anglophone minority constitutes a failure.

Chapter 10: Conclusions

Is there a ‘correct’ way to assimilate a minority group? Under what conditions, if any, does short-term backlash to language assimilation give way to greater national unity in the long term? What explains variations in the type and intensity of popular responses to such language restrictions? In this dissertation, I investigated language assimilation regimes from the perspectives and priorities of political leaders driven by nationalist motivations to foster national unity. To such leaders, concerns over adverse educational or mental health outcomes in the minority group often come second to the greater priority of national unification. However, even this priority is mediated by considerations of administrative efficiency, the potential for destabilizing backlash, and the added long-term costs of true linguistic pluralism. Contrary to the expectations of governments that employ restrictive, assimilationist language policies, I argue and find that more severe restrictions on language will increase minority backlash to language assimilation regimes. I further find that minority backlash to language restrictions increases when a minority is excluded from meaningful political and economic participation in society.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the current literature regarding the efficacy of language assimilation regimes and elaborate the reasoning behind many states’ decisions to pursue assimilation over pluralism. Key to this reasoning is an evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of pursuing minority assimilation. If a state’s choice of language regime is a rational political and institutional choice rooted in cost-benefit analysis, political leaders of host states must carefully evaluate the costs of imposing various language regimes on a minority group. Yet, there exists an apparent disconnect between the supposed rationality of states’ language policy choices and the often-ineffective nature of language assimilation regimes in practice.

In Chapter 3, I present a new classification of the four categories of language assimilation regimes based on a combination of their demonstrated levels of language restriction severity and

minority exclusion. I further theorized on the mechanisms of popular backlash that I argue cause host states to overestimate the willingness of minorities to voluntarily assimilate, underestimate the likely level of subsequent backlash. I argued that the resulting distortion in the cost-benefit analysis in the minds of political leaders leads them to overestimate the willingness of minority groups to voluntarily assimilate and underestimate the probable level of resulting backlash to assimilation. In Chapter 4, I discuss my qualitative case selection criteria and process. I further elaborated a new Language Restrictions Severity Index (LRSI) in addition to measurement guidelines for minority exclusion, popular backlash, and success and failure.

The overall case study findings reveal several key insights. Most importantly, I show that the belief held by political leaders that short-term minority backlash will give way to long-term gains in national unity is strongly refuted by the case evidence. More often than not, severe language restrictions trigger the creation of an oppositional minority identity that places greater value on minority-language retention. This minority emphasis on language maintenance as a form of resistance is not something that commonly features as a consequence in pre-1900 historical examples of language assimilation regimes. Combined with more extreme forms of backlash, it is likely that the animosities generated by aggressive language assimilation programs in the 20th century will continue to persist for many decades after such language restrictions are repealed. Thus, the use of severe and exclusionary language assimilation regimes in the pursuit of national unity will more likely lead to national unity or security becoming more compromised than it would have otherwise been under a policy of accommodation.

For those leaders who choose the path of assimilation, under what conditions is success most likely?³⁰⁹ I propose seven core recommendations. As previously discussed, the prevalence of

³⁰⁹ Success is defined in Section 4.2.4 in Chapter 4.


endogeneity between language assimilation regimes and their respective outcomes fundamentally limits the generalizability of my interpretations of the case study findings.

1. If language restrictions must be applied, make such restrictions moderate in severity.
2. Do not exclude minorities from political and economic participation.
3. Focus on and sufficiently fund bilingual education programs.
4. Ensure that the promoted language is of greater economic utility and prestige compared to the targeted minority language.
5. Avoid restrictions that are particularly undignifying (e.g., Naming, Public Speech).
6. Exercise restraint in the use of violence to suppress language-related protests.
7. Do the above while having a national identity not defined by exclusive ethnic membership rules.

10.1 Summary of Case Study Findings

Figure 15 below details the summary of findings for the five case studies examined in this dissertation.³¹⁰ Of these five, three matched the level of backlash anticipated by my theoretical framework (South Tyroleans, Azerbaijanis, Mayans). The two remaining cases exceeded their expected backlash levels by one degree (Amazigh, Anglophones). All five cases matched their expected success and failure outcomes.

Figure 15: Summary of Case Study Findings



³¹⁰ Per Figure 15, EB = Expected Backlash, EO = Expected Outcome, OB = Observed Backlash, OO = Observed Outcome.

The comparative historical analysis of case studies conducted in Chapters 5-9 overall support the central hypothesis and corollary 2 discussed in Chapter 3. Per corollary 1, I argue that the overall level of backlash produced by Exclusionary Assimilation regimes will be greater compared to Hybrid Assimilation and Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes. This corollary was unsupported due to the cases of the Amazigh in Algeria and the Anglophones in Cameroon having severe backlash outcomes. The case of the Mayans in Mexico supported corollary 2. Hypothesis 1 is supported by the overall findings from the case studies.

Table 22: Summary of Theoretical Outcomes

Hypothesis/Corollary	Outcome
<i>Hypothesis 1:</i> More severe and exclusionary language assimilation regimes will result in greater minority backlash.	Supported (Chapters 5-9)
<i>Corollary 1:</i> The overall level of backlash produced by Exclusionary Assimilation regimes will be greater compared to Hybrid Assimilation and Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regimes.	Unsupported (Chapters 5-7 & 9)
<i>Corollary 2:</i> Less severe and exclusionary language regimes (Inclusive Assimilation) will lead to less popular backlash relative to all other language regime types employing more severe or more exclusionary policies and restrictions.	Supported (Chapter 8)

In this chapter, I discuss my findings while reviewing the undertheorized variables and path-dependent processes that helped determine each case's (mis)alignment with my theoretical expectations. According to Figure , the cases of the Amazigh in Algeria and the Anglophones in Cameroon deviated from my theoretical expectations. In both cases, the observed level of popular backlash exceeded the expected level of backlash by one degree (Moderate Backlash → Severe Backlash). Despite these observed deviations, all five cases aligned with the subjective evaluations of overall success and failure. As expected, the Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime, as represented by the case of the Anglophones in Cameroon, resulted in failure. A significant part of this outcome can be attributed to the inherently linguistic nature of Cameroonian identity politics, which

interacts with the requirement that recorded backlash events be at least partially motivated by language-related grievances. Cameroon ultimately made little to no progress in assimilating the Anglophone minority while amplifying language-related grievances through highly exclusionary political and economic policies.

The Hybrid Assimilation regime cases in Iran and Algeria also differed in their observed backlash and success or failure outcomes, with the Hybrid Assimilation regime in Iran resulting in moderate success. The moderate success of the case of the Azerbaijanis in Iran was aided by Iranian Azerbaijanis' historical and religious affinity with the Iranian nation. The inclusion of Azerbaijanis in the dominant and politically salient religious identity—particularly from 1979 onwards—further facilitated the moderate success of Iran's Hybrid Assimilation regime. More than the dominant groups featured in the cases of Italy, Algeria, Cameroon, and Mexico to a lesser extent, the dominant Persian-speaking majority demonstrated the greatest willingness to fully accept assimilated Azerbaijanis as true and equal members of the Iranian nation.³¹¹

The openness of national membership rules in Iran stands in contrast to the case of the Amazigh in Algeria, where the Hybrid Assimilation regime employed there resulted in moderate failure. Algeria's emphasis on Arab-Islamic nationalism led the government to explicitly reject acknowledging the Amazigh culture and identity, though without excluding them from political and economic participation. Unlike in the Mayan case, Algeria only begrudgingly acknowledged the Amazigh identity after numerous massive and extended protest events. In contrast to the Persian-speakers in Iran, Algerian Arabs overall did not similarly view assimilated Amazigh as truly equal members of the Algerian nation. I posit that, per Tosun (2020), the exclusivity of Arab nationalism played a significant role in causing subsequent Amazigh backlash to be unexpectedly severe. However,

³¹¹ The relationship between the inclusivity of a national identity and the backlash produced by assimilation regimes is elaborated by Tosun (2020), who anticipates that states with more inclusive national membership rules will find more success in assimilating minority languages. The findings in this dissertation broadly support Tosun's (2020) argument.

the Algerian government made other consequential mistakes while advancing its Arabization program, which likely contributed to the severe Amazigh backlash response.

Finally, my expectations regarding the relationship between political and language regime type were largely confirmed by the case evidence. Both host states categorized as a Hybrid Assimilation regime (Algeria and Iran) were autocratic for the entirety of their case periods. The only instances of sustained democratic transitions were observed in the cases of Mexico and Italy. In Italy, South Tyroleans were enfranchised after World War II. Unfortunately, their small population size likely delayed the lifting of their language restrictions. Meanwhile, Mexico's transition to democracy in 2000 preceded a sharp decrease in the severity of Mayan language restrictions. It is further telling that many of the initial demands made by the Amazigh, Azerbaijanis, and Anglophones focused primarily on political liberalization as an indirect route to lift restrictions.

10.2 *Path Dependency*

In Chapter 3, I discussed the endogeneity problem at the core of this dissertation. As a result, the case study results are limited in their generalizability—particularly in potential cases that violate any number of the case study criteria. Nonetheless, the recognition and acceptance of this issue while continuing the qualitative analyses is important because it allows one to identify the pathways that lead from the imposition of language restrictions to the longer-term change in backlash and national unity.

The case of the Mayans in Mexico serves as clear evidence of the endogenous nature of the selection of language assimilation regimes and their eventual outcomes. In Chapter 8, I discussed how the Mexican government operated in a historical and demographic context that heavily favored the selection and later success of their Inclusive Assimilation regime. Perhaps most importantly, the Spanish language was significantly more prestigious and economically advantageous than the Mayan languages. Largely due to this discrepancy in linguistic prestige and economic utility, most Mayans

preferred to have their children gain literacy in Spanish, even if they were illiterate in their mother tongue.

Mayans were perhaps more willing to assimilate in part due to the Mexican government's relatively narrow focus on education policy. However, this focus on education policy was itself the consequence of two key path-dependent factors. First, the Mexican state before and throughout most of the case study period had an insufficient amount of state capacity to implement and enforce hypothetically severe restrictions. Second, most Mayans in the first half of the case study period were entirely illiterate. Thus, aspects of certain potential language restrictions (e.g., documentation, print media, employment, secondary and higher education) did not apply until Mayans became literate. Moreover, because teaching literacy first in Spanish proved far more difficult than teaching literacy in Mayan before Spanish, the Mexican government progressively adopted a more patient and restrained attitude toward Mayan assimilation. Because of this, Mayans experienced little language-related coercion throughout most of the case period, limiting their coercion resentment response. Furthermore, Mexico and other states during the mid-20th century were likely unaware of the full extent to which natural language shift would begin to assimilate minority languages in the late 20th and early 21st centuries without ever having to rely on overt language restrictions (Wilford, 2007). The unique historical context of Mexico pushed its government to pursue an Inclusive Assimilation regime. In doing so, it found considerable success in assimilating Mayans into the dominant Spanish language while limiting subsequent backlash.

Path-dependent processes did not only affect the trajectory of the Mayan experience. Early on in each case study, most governments made certain decisions that led them to their respective marches of folly. In the case of the Amazigh in Algeria, the FLN's decision to formulate a post-independence national identity around Arab-Islamic nationalism was itself informed by background historical events. Extreme animosity toward France after the Algerian War of Independence led the FLN to eschew the

decision made by other post-independence sub-Saharan states to maintain official use of the colonial language. The officialization of classical Arabic, with its religious connections to Islam through the Koran, seemed like the obvious choice for the nationalist Arab regime. Unfortunately, few Amazigh and Algerians spoke classical Arabic. To the relatively secular Amazigh, the Arabic language was both linguistically foreign and less economically lucrative compared to French and Tamazight. To a significant extent, this discrepancy and the added religious component of classical Arabic eventually led to the outbreak of the Algerian Civil War, the maintenance of French as the dominant language of the bureaucracy, and Algeria's failure to assimilate the Amazigh.

In Iran, Reza Khan lived in an intellectual environment that broadly emphasized the importance of national unity, ethnolinguistic homogeneity, centralization, and modernization. The pillars of Pahlavi rule from 1925 to 1979 were characterized along these values, in addition to autocratic values concerning executive power. This historical trajectory set Iran on a collision course with its largest minority group: Azerbaijanis. The near millennia-old and largely amicable historical relationship between Azerbaijanis and the Iranian state simultaneously fueled Azerbaijani indignation toward Persianization while discouraging separatist sentiments. For most of the Algerian case study period, demands for autonomy and self-determination were seen as taboo due the recency of the Algerian War of Independence. While this taboo has only recently begun to dissipate in Algeria, it remains solid in Iran. Thus, it appears that such historical affinities, particularly when paired with a shared and salient religious identity with the dominant group, can significantly discourage the more extreme forms of popular backlash.

In South Tyrol, it was the rise of pan-German nationalism that fueled Fascist Italy's fear of subversion from German-speakers. Given the specific configuration and prevailing ideologies defining central European politics at the time, Italy's imposition of an Exclusive Assimilation regime seems inevitable in hindsight. More than the other cases discussed here, it appears as if the fluctuations in

the fortunes of the South Tyrolean minority were primarily decided by seismic events and decisions made by other states and international actors that were out of their control. The South Tyrolean case featured another undertheorized variable that likely contributed to the case's alignment with my theoretical expectations: powerful allies. The South Tyrolean minority had a powerful and persistent ally in Austria. Austria crucially helped South Tyroleans circumvent certain language restrictions at the height of Italianization and helped internationalize the South Tyrol issue. It is likely that without Austria's support, South Tyrol would not have achieved anything resembling the far-reaching autonomy concessions it acquired in 1972. At the same time, South Tyroleans' option of looking to Germany or Austria for salvation throughout most of the case period likely led to naturally suppressed expressions of popular backlash against Italianization.

In Cameroon, the colossal failure of the government's Incidental Exclusionary Assimilation regime also finds its roots in key decisions made after independence. The decision to rescind critical autonomy provisions while also granting English official status alongside French can be easily identified as the most historically immediate and influential decision that led to the outbreak of the Anglophone Crisis. However, even these decisions were themselves the consequence of path-dependent historical processes. France's decision to surrender control of Cameroon to Ahidjo rather than socialist revolutionaries led to Cameroonian politics becoming more receptive to centralizing pressures from its former colonial overlord. Meanwhile, the Anglophone requirement of official status for English was almost certainly a non-negotiable condition for the amicable annexation of the Anglophone region. Once a language is made official at the national level, it is completely unprecedented for a host state to revoke such status during peacetime.³¹² With the institutionalization

³¹² Provided that the hypothetically revoked official language is spoken as the primary language by a specific minority group(s). In India, the official status of English was supposed to be revoked in 1965. This prospect sparked protests from ethnic groups in Southern India who did not speak Hindi—the other official language—but did not speak English as their primary language. As a result, the official status of English was maintained. After the 2014 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine, the administration of President Petro Poroshenko revoked the semi-official status of Russian in various

of English, The Cameroonian state promised Anglophones a level of inclusion that they either could not or would not deliver on. It was the conflicting paths of centralization and official bilingualism that, alongside the entrenchment of single-party rule, connected the decisions made at Foumban to the outbreak of armed civil conflict in 2017.

This is not to say that the creation, composition, process, and outcomes of language assimilation regimes are entirely predetermined.³¹³ At key points in each case, opportunities arose where the state could have prevented a later backlash effect or adverse outcome but did not. This discussion on the role of path dependency in the fate of language assimilation regimes is intended to recognize the inherent endogeneity between the choice of language assimilation regime and backlash outcomes. Still, the unique evidence and historical paths taken in each case illustrate the mechanics that catalyze popular backlash to assimilation. In doing so, I hope to have shown that present-day political leaders employing severe language restrictions can lift such restrictions before their country suffers long-term damage to its national unity.

10.3 *Future Research*

In conducting my case studies, I quickly recognized the difficulty in scoring a unique piece of case evidence into a limited number of possible scores under a limited number of indicators. In most countries' contexts, the translation of words from a decree or piece of legislation into real-world enforcement is not seamless. The perceived and actual effect of a newly enacted language restriction must be filtered through the influence of state capacity and numerous other historical factors. Nor is

regions. However, Russian was never official at the national level. The closest any example comes to revoking a widely used official language during peacetime can be seen in the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867. Per the terms of the agreement, the official status of German was revoked in newly sovereign Hungarian territories but not in Austria proper. From Hungary's perspective, however, the *Ausgleich* was only possible due to Austria's weakness after its defeat in the Austro-Prussian War (1866).

³¹³ While I do not personally believe in free will, I assume that individual and group decisions and their outcomes are probabilistic.

it seamless to accurately code a given policy. More than any attempt thus far, the Language Restrictions Severity Index I present here offers a higher degree of transparency and granularity in its coding process. If a standard language policy index is ever going to be widely adopted by other scholars, it must be highly specific in the coding rules for every score for every indicator.

For example, if a government mandates that movies and films must be translated into the official language, one must note the difference in status injustice effects between understanding something (subtitle translations) vs. understanding nothing (subtitle and spoken dialogue translations) when watching a movie or film. Other considerations may alter scoring: What if the film was produced abroad? What about televised vs. in-person theater performances? Is the minority language allowed to be spoken at all in either situation? Such considerations can change the entire indicator and category classification of a given restriction (e.g., Media restriction into a Public restriction). Moreover, a standard language policy index would significantly benefit from an additional variable to account for differences in enforcement. Do the authorities make any exceptions for the theater? How active are underground language-related activities?

One of the key factors that emerged as a potentially significant catalyst for minority backlash is the differential in the prestige between the dominant and minority languages. There is currently no standardized measure of linguistic prestige, though this is largely due to the inherent difficulty in operationalizing such a measure. While domestic economic utility is likely the primary determinant of linguistic prestige, additional variables should be considered. These include but are not limited to international economic utility, linguistic intellectualization, the relative balance between the number of first-language and second-language speakers, and the group size and socioeconomic status of its native speakers. Unfortunately, the notoriously poor quality of cross-national language data—particularly historical data and for theoretically low-prestige languages—may limit the feasibility of

such efforts. Regardless, the practical operationalization and creation of such a measure would help in determining the impact of relative language prestige on assimilation outcomes.

Appendix

Disqualified Case Studies

<i>Legend - Reason for Removal</i>	
CTY = Country Too Young (post-1973)	FYM = 50-Year Minimum
LTP = Low Total Population	WGS = Weak Group Specificity (<i>"Indigenous Peoples"</i>)
DGC = Dispersed Geographic Concentration	YUG = Former Yugoslavia
NDL = No Dominant Language Group	VCC = Violent Civil Conflict
VEC = Violent Ethnic Cleansing	LCI = Low Case Information
RAE = Religious Assimilation/Exclusion	STB = High Instability of Initial LRS/ME Scores

Potential Case	Failed Criterion ³¹⁴
Abkhazians in Georgia	CTY
Albanians in Macedonia	CTY
Amazonian Indians in Brazil	LCI
Antillean Blacks in Costa Rica	LCI
Arabs in Iran	RAE
Armenians in Azerbaijan	CTY
Baluchis in Iran	RAE
Basques in France	LCI
Berbers in Tunisia	LCI
Black Karibs (Garifuna) in Honduras	LCI
Bodos in India	NDL
Bosniaks in Bosnia	YUG
Buryat in Russia	RAE
Chechens in Russia	VEC

³¹⁴ This column lists just one of the criteria that the associated case failed to fulfill. Each case may have been unable to meet other unmentioned criteria. Cases listed in bolded letters are those that passed all criteria but were sidelined due to their relatively insufficient availability and reliability of source material or instability in initial minority exclusion or language restriction severity scores.

Chinese in Cambodia	VEC
Chinese in Indonesia	RAE
Chinese in Malaysia	DGC
Christians in Iran	RAE
Crimean Russians in Ukraine	CTY
Crimean Tatars in Ukraine	CTY
Dayaks in Malaysia	RAE
Europeans in Namibia	CTY
Europeans in South Africa	DGC
Filipinos in Japan	LCI
French Canadians in Canada	DGC
Gagauz in Moldova	CTY
Garo in Bangladesh	LCI
Germans in Kazakhstan	CTY
Greeks in Albania	RAE
Haitian Blacks in Dominican Republic	DGC
Hispanics in USA	FYM
Hui Muslims in China	DGC
Hungarians in Romania	STB
Hungarians in Slovakia	FYM
Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka	RAE
Indigenous Highland Ppls. in Bolivia	WGS
Indigenous Highland Ppls. in Ecuador	WGS
Indigenous Highland Ppls. in Peru	WGS
Indigenous Ppls. in Argentina	WGS
Indigenous Ppls. in Chile	WGS
Indigenous Ppls. in Colombia	WGS
Indigenous Ppls. in Panama	WGS
Indigenous Ppls. in Paraguay	WGS
Indigenous Ppls. in Guatemala	WGS

Kachins in Burma	RAE
Kalenjin in Kenya	LCI
Karens in Burma	RAE
Kewri in Mauritania	LCI
Kgalagadi in Botswana	LCI
Kirata in Nepal	RAE
Koreans in Japan	LTP
Kurds in Iran	RAE
Kurds in Turkey	VEC
Lezgins in Azerbaijan	CTY
Lhotshampas in Bhutan	RAE
Lowland Indigenous Ppls. in Bolivia	WGS
Lowland Indigenous Ppls. in Ecuador	WGS
Lowland Indigenous Ppls. in Peru	WGS
Malay-Muslims in Thailand	LCI
Mongolians in China	RAE
Mons in Burma	VCC
Muslims in Greece	LTP
Ndebele in Zimbabwe	CTY
Northern Hill Tribes in Thailand	LCI
Oromo in Ethiopia	NDL
Other Indigenous Ppls. in Mexico	WGS
Poles in Belarus	CTY
Poles in Lithuania	CTY
Rohingya (Arakanese) in Burma	VEC
Roma in Bulgaria	DGC
Roma in Czech Republic	DGC
Roma in France	DGC
Roma in Macedonia	CTY
Roma in Slovakia	DGC
Russians in Azerbaijan	CTY

Russians in Estonia	CTY
Russians in Kazakhstan	CTY
Russians in Kyrgyzstan	CTY
Russians in Latvia	CTY
Russians in Turkmenistan	CTY
Russians in Turkmenistan	CTY
Russians in Ukraine	CTY
Russians in Uzbekistan	CTY
San Bushmen in Botswana	LTP
San Bushmen in Namibia	CTY
Santals in Bangladesh	LCI
Scheduled Tribes of East India in India	NDL
Seraiki in Pakistan	LCI
Serbs in Bosnia	YUG
Serbs in Croatia	YUG
Serbs in Macedonia	YUG
Shans in Burma	VEC
Sinhdis in Pakistan	RAE
Slavs in Moldova	CTY
Southerners in Chad	LCI
Southerners in Sudan	RAE
Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka	RAE
Taiwanese in Taiwan	DGC
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	CTY
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	CTY
Tatars in Russia	RAE
Tibetans in China	RAE
Tuareg in Mali	NDL
Tuareg in Niger	LCI
Turkmen in China	LTP
Turkmen in Iran	RAE

Turks in Bulgaria	RAE
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan	CTY
Uzbeks in Tajikistan	CTY
Vietnamese in Cambodia	DGC
Zomis in Burma	RAE

Table 23: Relevant AMAR Variable Code Descriptions

AMAR Variable	Range	Indicates	Code Descriptions				
<i>Political Discrimination Index</i> (POLDIS)	0-4	Highest level of political discrimination	0 = No discrimination	1 = Neglect/remedial policies Substantial under-representation in political office and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect or improve the group's political status.	2 = Neglect/no remedial policies Substantial under-representation due to historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No evidence of protective or remedial public policies.	3 = Social exclusion/neutral policy Substantial under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory social practices.	4 = Exclusion/repressive policy Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group's political participation by comparison with other groups. (Note: This does not include repression during group rebellion. It does include patterned repression against group members when the group is not openly resisting state authority.)
<i>Economic Discrimination Index</i> (ECDIS)	0-4	Highest level of economic discrimination	0 = No discrimination	1 = Neglect/remedial policies Significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group's material well-being.	2 = Neglect/no remedial policies Significant poverty and under-representation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group's material well-being.	3 = Social exclusion/neutral policy Significant poverty and under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.	4 = Exclusion/repressive policy Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group's economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.
<i>Representation in Legislative Branch</i> (LEGISREP)	0-1	Group representation in the legislative branch of government	0 = No	1 = Yes Representation may be through individual group members who belong to non-ethnically based parties or by representation through ethnically based parties.			
<i>Representation in Executive Branch</i> (EXECREP)	0-1	Group representation in the executive branch of government	0 = No	1 = Yes Representation may be through individual group members who belong to non-ethnically based parties or by representation through ethnically based parties.			
<i>Representation in Central Government</i> (GUARREP)	0-1	Guaranteed group representation in central government	0 = No	1 = Yes Guaranteed positions in the central government (e.g., appointed positions in cabinet, appointed positions in legislature, guaranteed elected positions in legislature, etc.).			
<i>Political Grievances</i> (POLGR)	0-3	Highest level of political grievance	0 = No political grievances expressed	1 = Political grievances focused on ending discrimination or creating or strengthening remedial policies.	2 = Political grievances focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status.	3 = Political grievances focused on creating separate state for group or revanchist change in borders (union with kindred required revanchist change in borders).	
<i>Political Grievances Modified</i> (POLGRM)	0-1	Highest level of political grievance	0 = No political grievances expressed	1 = Political grievances focused on ending discrimination or creating or strengthening remedial policies.			
<i>Economic Grievances</i> (ECGR)	0-3	Highest level of economic grievance	0 = No economic grievances expressed	1 = Economic grievances focused on ending discrimination.		2 = Economic grievances focused on creating or strengthening remedial policies.	

LRSI Score Tabulation — South Tyroleans in Italy

Year	Doc	ExCom	Jud	Empl	ADMIN	Nam	Sig	Sph	PUBLIC	Prim	Sec	High	EDU	Broad	Pubicat	MEDIA	LRSI
1921	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	-0.67	NE	NE	NE	-0.67
1922	-1	-1	NE	-1	-0.86	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	-0.67	NE	NE	NE	-1.52
1923	-2	-2	NE	-2	-1.71	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	0	-1.33	NE	NE	NE	-4.38
1924	-2	-2	NE	-2	-1.71	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	NE	NE	-5.05
1925	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	NE	NE	-5.33
1926	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	NE	NE	-5.33
1927	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1	-1	-6.33
1928	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-6.33
1929	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-6.33
1930	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-6.33
1931	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-6.33
1932	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-6.33
1933	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-6.33
1934	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-6.33
1935	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-6.33
1936	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-6.33
1937	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1	-1	-6.33
1938	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1	-1	-6.33
1939	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1	-1	-7
1940	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	0	0	-2	-0.67	NE	-1	-1	-5
1941	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	0	0	-2	-0.67	NE	-1	-1	-5
1942	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	0	0	-2	-0.67	NE	-1	-1	-5
1943	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	-1.33	0	0	-2	-0.67	NE	-1	-1	-5
1944	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1945	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1946	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1947	NE	NE	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.33

1948	NE	NE	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.33
1949	NE	NE	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.33
1950	NE	NE	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.33
1951	NE	NE	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.33
1952	NE	NE	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.33
1953	NE	NE	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.33
1954	NE	NE	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.33
1955	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	-2	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.52
1956	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1957	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1958	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1959	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1960	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1961	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1962	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1963	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1964	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1965	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1966	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1967	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1968	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1969	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1970	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1971	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86
1972	NE	0	-2	-1	-0.86	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.86

LRSI Score Tabulation — Amazigh in Algeria

Year	Doc	ExCom	Jud	Empl	ADMIN	Nam	Sig	Sph	PUBLIC	Prim	Sec	High	EDU	Broad	Pubicat	MEDIA	LRSI
1962	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	-1	0	0
1963	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	-1	0	0
1964	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	-0.66	1	-1	0	-0.66
1965	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.66	1	-1	0	-1
1966	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.66	1	-1	0	-1
1967	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.66	1	-1	0	-1
1968	NE	NE	NE	0	0	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.66	1	-1	0	-1
1969	NE	NE	NE	0	0	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.66	1	-1	0	-1
1970	0	NE	-2	0	-0.57	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.66	-1	-1	-1	-2.56
1971	0	NE	-2	0	-0.57	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.66	-1	-1	-1	-2.56
1972	0	NE	-2	0	-0.57	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	0	-0.66	-1	-1	-1	-2.56
1973	0	NE	-2	0	-0.57	-1	0	0	-0.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-2.9
1974	0	NE	-2	0	-0.57	-1	0	0	-0.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	-1	-1	-1	-3.56
1975	0	NE	-2	0	-0.57	-1	0	0	-0.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	-1	-1	-1	-3.56
1976	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	-1	-2	-1.5	-5.63
1977	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1978	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1979	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1980	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1981	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1982	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1983	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1984	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1985	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1986	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1987	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1988	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63
1989	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	-1	-1.66	1	-2	-0.5	-4.63

1990	-2	NE	-2	0	-1.14	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-2	-2	0	-1.33	1	-2	-0.5	-4.3
1991	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	-2	-1	0	-1	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	0	-0.5	-4.08
1992	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1993	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1994	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1995	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1996	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1997	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1998	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	-2	-1	0	-1	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	0	-0.5	-4.08
1999	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	-2	-1	0	-1	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	0	-0.5	-4.08
2000	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	-2	-1	0	-1	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	0	-0.5	-4.08
2001	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	-2	-1	0	-1	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	0	-0.5	-4.08
2002	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	-2	-1	0	-1	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	0	-0.5	-4.08
2003	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	-1	0	-0.4	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	0	-0.5	-3.48
2004	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	-1	0	-0.4	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	0	-0.5	-3.48
2005	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	-1	0	-0.4	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	0	-0.5	-3.48
2006	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	-1	0	-0.4	-2	-1	0	-1	-1	0	-0.5	-3.15
2007	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	-1	0	-0.4	-2	-1	0	-1	-1	0	-0.5	-3.15
2008	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-0.5	-1.75
2009	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-0.5	-1.75
2010	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-0.5	-1.75
2011	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-0.5	-1.75
2012	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-0.5	-1.75
2013	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-0.5	-1.75
2014	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-0.5	-1.75
2015	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1.25	NE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-0.5	-1.75

LRSI Score Tabulation — Azerbaijanis in Iran

Year	Doc	ExCom	Jud	Empl	ADMIN	Nam	Sig	Sph	PUBLIC	Prim	Sec	High	EDU	Broad	Pubicat	MEDIA	LRSI
1923	0	NE	-2	NE	-0.67	0	0	0	0	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4
1924	0	NE	-2	NE	-0.67	0	0	0	0	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4
1925	0	NE	-2	NE	-0.67	-2	0	0	-0.67	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4.67
1926	0	NE	-2	0	-0.57	-2	0	0		-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4.57
1927	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	0	0		-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4.75
1928	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	0	0		-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4.75
1929	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	0	0	-0.67	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4.75
1930	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	0	0	-0.67	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4.75
1931	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	0	0	-0.67	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4.75
1932	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	0	0	-0.67	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-4.75
1933	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	0	-2	-1.33	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	NE	-1.33	-5.41
1934	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-6.75
1935	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-6.75
1936	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-6.75
1937	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-6.75
1938	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-6.75
1939	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-6.75
1940	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-6.75
1941	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-6.75
1942	0	0	0	0	0	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	-2.33
1943	0	0	0	0	0	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	-2.33
1944	0	0	0	0	0	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	-2.33
1945	0	0	0	0	0	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	-2.33
1946	0	0	0	0	0	-2	1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	0	0	0	-1
1947	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	0	-2	-0.67	-2	-2	-2	-5.42
1948	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	0	0	0	-2	-2	-2	-4.75
1949	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	0	0	0	0	-2	-2	-2	-4.75
1950	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-6.75

[illegible]

2013	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2014	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2015	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2016	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2017	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2018	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2019	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2020	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2021	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2022	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08
2023	0	-1	-2	0	-0.75	-2	-2	0	-1.33	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4.08

LRSI Score Tabulation — Mayans in Mexico

Year	Doc	ExCom	Jud	Empl	ADMIN	Nam	Sig	Sph	PUBLIC	Prim	Sec	High	EDU	Broad	Pubicat	MEDIA	LRSI
1921	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1922	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1923	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1924	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1925	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1926	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1927	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1928	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1929	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1930	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1931	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1932	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1933	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1934	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1935	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1936	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1937	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1938	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1939	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1940	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1941	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1942	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1943	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1944	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1945	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1946	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48
1947	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	NE	0	0	-2.48

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1979	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	-1	0	-0.5	-2.98
1980	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	-1	0	-0.5	-2.98
1981	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	-1	0	-0.5	-2.98
1982	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1983	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1984	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1985	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1986	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1987	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1988	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1989	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1990	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1991	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1992	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1993	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
1994	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1995	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1996	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1997	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1998	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1999	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
2000	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
2001	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
2002	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
2003	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
2004	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
2005	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-2	-1.67	0	0	0	-2.48
2006	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-1	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.14
2007	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-1	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.14
2008	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-1	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.14
2009	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	-1	-2	-1	-1.33	0	0	0	-2.14

2010	NE	-1	-2	-1	-1.14	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	0	0	0	-1.48
2011	NE	0	-2	0	-0.57	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	0	0	0	-0.90
2012	NE	0	-2	0	-0.57	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	0	0	0	-0.90
2013	NE	0	-2	0	-0.57	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	0	0	0	-0.90
2014	NE	0	-2	0	-0.57	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	0	0	0	-0.90
2015	NE	0	-1	0	-0.29	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	0	0	0	-0.62
2016	NE	0	-1	0	-0.29	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	1	0	0.5	-0.12
2017	NE	0	-1	0	-0.29	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	1	0	0.5	-0.12
2018	NE	0	-1	0	-0.29	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	1	0	0.5	-0.12
2019	NE	0	-1	0	-0.29	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	1	0	0.5	-0.12
2020	NE	0	-1	0	-0.29	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	1	0	0.5	-0.12
2021	NE	0	-1	0	-0.29	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	1	0	0.5	-0.12
2022	NE	0	-1	0	-0.29	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	1	0	0.5	-0.12
2023	NE	0	-1	0	-0.29	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	-1	-0.67	1	0	0.5	-0.12

LRSI Score Tabulation — Anglophones in Cameroon

Year	Doc	ExCom	Jud	Empl	ADMIN	Nam	Sig	Sph	PUBLIC	Prim	Sec	High	EDU	Broad	Pubicat	MEDIA	LRSI
1961	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	NE	NE	NE	-0.58
1962	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	NE	NE	NE	-0.58
1963	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.58
1964	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.58
1965	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.58
1966	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.58
1967	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.58
1968	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.58
1969	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.58
1970	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.58
1971	0	0	0	-1	-0.25	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.58
1972	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.83
1973	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	NE	0	-0.83
1974	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1975	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1976	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1977	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1978	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1979	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1980	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1981	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1982	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1983	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1984	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1985	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1986	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1987	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33

1988	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1989	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1990	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1991	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	-1	-0.67	0	-1	-0.50	-1.33
1992	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
1993	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
1994	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
1995	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	-1	0	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
1996	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-0.50	-0.67
1997	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-0.50	-0.67
1998	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-0.50	-0.67
1999	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-0.50	-0.67
2000	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2001	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2002	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2003	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2004	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2005	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2006	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2007	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2008	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2009	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2010	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2011	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2012	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2013	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2014	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2015	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2016	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1
2017	-1	0	0	-1	-0.50	1	0	0	0.33	0	-1	0	-0.33	0	-1	-0.50	-1

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Chapter 6

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