

HAROLD FREDERIC:
HIS FICTIVE IMAGINATION AND THE INTELLECTUAL MILIEU

by
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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Jean Marshall Clark, Doctor of Philosophy, 1980

Dissertation directed by: Raymond Thorberg, Associate Professor, English

Harold Frederic reflects in his novels and stories the intellectual milieu of the latter nineteenth century. Most of the major philosophic concerns of the age are present in one way or another in his fiction: metaphysical idealism, Comtian positivism, Darwinism, the Higher Criticism, pragmatism, and, as the power of reason—indeed reason itself—came more and more into distrust, a voluntarism deriving from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. While Frederic tended to synthesize ideas rather than to develop his own systematic philosophy, the psychological penetration of his characters evidences his awareness of such concerns. He is a careful craftsman in the drawing of his fictional personalities, and he often makes explicit note of the inclusion of intellectual elements in their delineations.

Frederic's atypical writing possibly reflects his atypical lack of artistic isolation. His continued journalistic activity as well as his membership in various literary and political clubs might account for his remaining highly responsive to contemporary politics, economics, and religion. His fictional canon reads like a small compendium of the thought of the century's closing decades, tracing its broad diverse movements and

interrelated philosophic strands. His early writing was vitalized by the new currents of thought generated by sociologists and economists in revolt against the social Darwinists, and by new approaches instituted by the Bible exegetes. Included among these were the views most compatible with his own liberalism and his optimistic attitude toward life. Later such hopes as they inspired found themselves weighed in the dramatic balance of his fiction against an unvanquished Darwinism, a spreading skepticism, as well as the darker visions of voluntarism. His final work, while yet bearing witness to an open, inquiring mind, shows a receptiveness to the blending of the spiritual and scientific conceived by American pragmatism.

Frederic's writing, according to Walter Taylor, "anticipates the mingled realism, naturalism, and disillusion of the twentieth century." It is to employ a wrong set of terms, however, to assess him, as Charles Child Walcutt does, as "a kind of naturalist manqué," making implicit comparison thereby with, say, Crane or Dreiser. More to the point is the statement by Austin Briggs that "in the works of no other American novelist does one so fully sense what it was like to be alive in those turbulent years."

To Jerry and Phyl

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The formal culture of the nineteenth century was filled with a wide variety of philosophical thought; it has been critically defined as a time of intellectual turbulence and flux, with much of its intellectualism developing eclectically. The age being replete with the intellectual currents needed for change, Hegel's dialectic, perhaps, best reflects the whole pattern of the intellectual growth of the time. Hegel interpreted the flow of evolution as a continuous movement of opposites that merged and reconciled: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis constituted the solution to all development and reality. The natural flow of both things and thought followed a dialectical progression from unity to diversity to a new genial diversity-in-unity. Opposing systems of philosophical thought were common to the latter part of the century, and many of these polar constructs were directly developed from the social, political, or theological interpretation of a Darwinian materialism, on the one hand, and a Hegelian idealism, on the other. These forces have had inestimable influence on human thought and expression, reacting together in complex ways to form

new intellectual systems. Thus the task of sorting the main strands of continuity within the intellectual life, without distorting its diversity of thought, becomes a particularly hazardous task.

Harold Frederic shared in and recorded the intellectual confusion and excitement that erupted in the closing decades of the century; his philosophies and attitudes were conceptualized amid political ferment, social change, and a booming new industrialism. Never the isolated artist, Frederic's journalism kept him directly in contact with the intellectualism of his age: positivism and metaphysical idealism, the Higher Criticism and a pragmatic system of ethics united in a common concern for moral, social, and political progress; and toward the end of the century, a broad common distrust of the power of reason expressed in voluntarism. Although he tended to synthesize ideas rather than develop his own systematic philosophy, the psychological penetration of his fictional characters and the complexity of his plots reflect more than a superficial grasp of the thought of his time. His writings accurately reflect his intellectual milieu, which constitutes the single most important consistent force in the development of his fictive imagination.

Science was a great contributor to the changing times, influencing the lives of almost everyone with its power to boost material progress, save labor, improve health, and add convenience to life. Apart from its role in the invention of revolutionary new machines such as the steam turbine, the Mergenthaler linotype, the phonograph, the telephone, and the incandescent lamp, and the development of new industrial techniques such as the Bessemer process for making steel, scientific thought, particularly as

expressed in Darwinism, exerted perhaps the greatest influence on the times. The theory of evolution shattered the time-honored belief in man as a rational being endowed with an immortal soul and created in the direct image of God. Instead, man was now relegated to a descendant of the ape and to even lesser forms of life, a species deemed fit to survive only through the process of natural selection. The ramifications of this concept impacted upon almost every aspect of life. Man's stature shrank alarmingly; he, too, was only another animal with the same bestial instincts and drives. No longer were his features fixed in a godly image, but rather were now considered as in a state of constant flux. Man's development ceased to be endowed with divine purpose; the human drama with a beginning and an end had collapsed.

Along with the growing reliance upon science and technology, a continuing struggle for power on the part of the common man must also be included among the diverse and disparate cultural forces which determined the course of events in the last half of the nineteenth century. This particular combination of scientific achievement and proletarian revolution, technology with its abundance of material goods and plethora of social ills, is still considered one of the major distinguishing features of contemporary society. One of the particularly prominent characteristics of the age's rapid growth and sweeping change was the widening gulf between economic classes of people. Relegated to the levels of poverty, an economically disadvantaged class provided the work force for the growing ranks of entrepreneurs, who greatly expanded the already large middle class that was credited with the establishment of the culture's ethical and

moral code. The burgeoning ranks of a new economic aristocracy were expanded by the addition of the "robber barons," who formed a new social stratum which would increasingly take command of the cultural and social scene.

Social Darwinism made application of the new biological concepts to social and human relationships. Although Darwin was a biologist and did not write as a social scientist, the central concept of this theory that competition among individuals and groups of individuals was healthy and beneficial to the development of society was easily adapted to the social and political thought of the day. The struggle among men was construed as economical. Thus, the prestige Darwin enjoyed because of his work in natural history lent credence to the economist's doctrine of laissez-faire and the nineteenth century's liberal acceptance of individual freedom to accomplish all that a man's capabilities permitted. Darwin's theory of evolution was particularly appealing to the middle-class faith in the efficacy of hard work, thrift, intelligence, and self-initiative in opposition to what they considered as indolence, waste, stupidity, and reliance on state welfare.

The theory of natural selection had decreed that random occurrences and blind chance had rendered some organisms more fit to survive than others. Observing in man the existence of what he considered to be the same competitive spirit in the social operation of the survival of the fittest, Herbert Spencer applied this principle to social institutions. He justified his acceptance of this belief on the assumption that social evolution would finally lead to the eventual disappearance of evil and

immorality. Therefore, Victorian society no longer had to regard material success as the result of pious and proper behavior. The business world willingly embraced the tenets of social Darwinism, finding in its "rugged individualism" and fierce competitiveness a rationalization that those companies that survived were stronger and better able to represent the business community as a whole. This principle removed some of the traditional ethical problems that had plagued many of the thoughtful heretofore; the fortunes of a selected few resting on the poverty of millions could be considered natural now, and the standards of behavior fluctuated unhesitatingly according to convenience.

Herbert Spencer set forth the creed accepted by the social Darwinists:

Of man, as of all inferior creatures, the law by conformity to which the species is preserved, is that among adults the individuals best adapted to the conditions of their existence shall prosper most, and the individuals least adapted to the conditions of their existence shall prosper least. . . . Pervading all Nature we may see at work a stern discipline which is often a little cruel that it may be very kind. . . . The ultimate¹ result of shielding men from folly is to fill the world with fools.

However, Spencer did not advocate letting the less competent actually die for lack of food and shelter. It was his contention that the altruistic moral sentiment that impels man toward an individualistic charity was among the greatest achievements of the evolutionary process. Thus the ethically sound, well-to-do individual could be depended upon to voluntarily provide for the destitute, stopping short, however, of deviating from the natural designs of evolution by encouraging the less capable with enough prosperity to be able to propagate their kind.

Positivism, for its part, was easily assimilated into English thought, according to Will Durant, "which took its spirit from a life of industry and trade, and looked up to matters of fact with a certain reverence."² Although other systems had denied the validity of metaphysical solutions and yet others had acclaimed the scientific manner as the only systematic approach to truth, Auguste Comte's positivism was the first distinctively modern attempt to transform philosophy into a synthesis of all the highest generalities of the sciences. Positivism classified the scientific disciplines according to the increasing complexity and generality of their subject matter. From mathematics through astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology, each discipline rested on the results of all the sciences preceding it, sociology forming the apex of the full scientific development. Since the exact knowledge of science had spread from one subject-matter to the next in ascending order, it was natural that the complex phenomena of society should be the last to yield to scientific method. Being concerned for the unity of the emotional and intellectual needs of man, Comte devoted special attention to sociology and ethics, dividing the forms of civilization into militaristic, juristic, and industrial to coincide with the divisions of science. The extraordinary emphasis Comte and Spencer placed on the prestige of science and the progressive faith in man and society, both deeply rooted in nineteenth-century thought, helped attain the broad popular influence of their precepts. The system had immediate appeal to those who linked social reform and intellectual enlightenment, an already accepted holdover from the eighteenth century, and to those who held the empirical sciences in the forefront of knowledge.

As consequence, Mandelbaum thinks its acceptance in intellectual circles was, perhaps, out of proportion to its defense as a viable philosophic system.³

In terms of human achievement, the nineteenth century must be recognized as one of the great centuries in world development. Men were now circumnavigating the globe as a matter of course, and by the end of the century, the frontiers of modern civilization were virtually closed. Nearly all of the world's material resources had become available for exploitation. But while there was a tremendous growth of material goods in the nineteenth century and a great enthusiasm for material progress, it was not to the exclusion of "moral idealism," which held that the clue to the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality existed within natural human experience. This clue was revealed through those traits which distinguished man as a spiritual being. Idealism assumed a monistic concept of the world, seeking the nature of the ultimate reality through entering deeply into the self. The discovery of the ultimate required only natural human experience rather than divine revelation, man's own spiritual nature being the fullest expression of that which was to be taken as basic in reality. The greatest differences among idealist systems lay in their interpretations of what constituted the essential nature of reality.

Hegel considered the periods of harmony in the history of the world as "blank pages," rather than periods of happiness, a dull content unworthy of man. History was made, he felt, only in those periods in which the contradictions of reality were being resolved by growth, like the hesitations of awkwardness and youth passing into the ease and order of maturity. The

dialectical process decreeing change the cardinal principle of life, no condition could be accepted as permanent; in every stage of things, only the "strife of opposites" could resolve contradictions. Therefore, the deepest law of politics was freedom; and the state was, or should have been, Durant notes, freedom organized.⁴ Hegel set forth the absolute state as the completest fulfillment of the Objective Spirit, the total fusion of freedom and morality, which exacted "the highest right over the individual, whose highest duty in turn [was] to be a member of the state."⁵ Final arbitration was delegated to this social aggregate, Hegel placing no limitations to its power and providing no recourse to the individual from its sovereignty.

The neo-Hegelians, however, followed the major aspects of this philosophical system to entirely different political solutions, both liberal and radical. Hegel's doctrine that "the real is rational" exerted a conservative hold: every condition, Durant notes, although destined to disappear, still had the divine right that belonged to it as a necessary stage in evolution. In a sense, therefore, it became brutally true that "whatever is, is right." And as unity was the ultimate goal of development, order was the first requisite of liberty.⁶ Hegel would incline in his later years to the conservative rather than to the radical implications of his thought, but the contradictions in Hegel's philosophy were too deep for peace. Succeeding generations would find his followers split with dialectical fatality into the "Hegelian Right" and the "Hegelian Left." Karl Marx reconstructed Hegel's philosophy to set forth the tenets of socialism. Americans, on the other hand, were moved toward a democratic idealism largely through the efforts

of the neo-Hegelianism associated with Josiah Royce. Vincent P. DeSantis points out that what Hegel meant by freedom was not the same as the traditional American conception. Although the American idealists were generally in accord with the German belief that individuals were parts of a single absolute mind, they, unlike the orthodox Hegelians, were concerned that each separate individual should have an essential place in the whole and be free to make a singular contribution to it.⁷ Donald Zoll notes the dialectical method did not of necessity lead to the type of conservative politics that Hegel might have envisaged. Therefore, he does not find it unusual that various neo-Hegelians, such as Thomas Hill Green and Karl Marx, for example, should have followed major aspects of Hegel's system to political solutions that were both liberal and radical; neither idealism nor the dialectic, of itself, stipulated a closed political order, he states.⁸

For England's Thomas Hill Green, a neo-Hegelian but subjected also to Kantian influence, idealism was liberally conceived with the independent moral participation of the individual making an indispensable contribution to the self-development of the state. Further, Green considered the individual a "social self," having social bonds and attaining his highest satisfaction in social interaction. According to Zoll, "This societal state of freedom of social and moral involvement on the basis of equality" meant "that the state (Green was the first to use the term in England) must rest upon collective will and general acquiescence, not upon force or coercion."⁹ Rejecting the individualist concept of freedom as the absence of restriction, Green advocated a "positive freedom," defining liberty as "a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or

enjoying." Thus, Zoll notes, Green asserted that freedom was both an individual and social condition, its aim to create a state of general good to be shared equally by individuals, rather than to permit unrestricted choice or unlimited prerogative. For Green, the function of government was not to make men moral, but only to provide the opportunity for the growth of moral judgment. Unlike Hegel's equivalent, then, the state for Green became "more an agent for the realization of the general moral welfare than a coercive force for the maintenance of moral properties."¹⁰ But in agreement with Hegel, Green also denied the validity of natural rights, and contended that as long as the state remained a moral expression, the individual could have no recourse against it—any resistance to it would be equivalent to an individual denying his own moral nature, since that nature was social and not exclusively individual.

In his own country, Hegel was also the inspirational source for Karl Marx's leftist interpretation of the dialectic. Marx was a student of Hegel early in his life, and continued his dedication to Hegel throughout his intellectual development, albeit with the disavowal of Hegel's theism. In place of Hegel's Absolute Spirit, as the determining force of history through the *Zeitgeist*, Marx saw economic motives and mass movements as the wellspring of all fundamental change, whether in the realm of things or of ideas. Therefore, Hegel's theories regarding the intellect, ethics, and religion became extraneous for Marx, as Zoll notes, leaving only Hegel's triadic schema and a vague historical determinism. To this extrapolated dialectic, Marx fused "a materialism as complete as his economic reductionism," proclaiming the universe to be matter, and man, a biological

organism with material desires and needs.¹¹ Hegel denounced the new young radical and hid away his earlier essays from which Marx had taken the skepticism and Higher Criticism of his mentor's youth to develop his own philosophy of history as a series of class struggles which would proceed inevitably, according to Hegelian necessity, to socialism. And although Hegel allied himself with the Prussian Government, blessing it as the latest expression of the Absolute, Durant notes that "the imperial professor had hatched the socialistic eggs."¹²

The spirit of reform is considered a central facet of the nineteenth century's intellectualism, with progress and optimism fueling the reformists' efforts. Impetus gathered to move the century toward social and political reconstruction, with the hope of achieving thereby either greater individual or collective satisfaction. The predication of these notions appears to have been based on a growing materialistic psychological premise: all men want things, possibly the same things, and recognizing these wants as a general rule, men considered themselves better off to the extent that they were able to acquire the things they longed for. And by the latter part of the century, a common conviction was expanding that the only means of satisfying these materialistic desires was on a collective or cooperative basis. "A massive synthesis of psychological, economic, and political factors was to shake the Victorian Age," Zoll states, "to reverberate from the Crystal Palace to the Chicago stockyards. . . . the Marxian revolution."¹³

Not all socialist movements, however, were concerned with the violent overthrow of the constitutional status quo. Democratic socialist

movements operated in the mainstream of the existing social order seeking redress through public ownership, through constitutional means, and through the influence of public opinion. Representative of this kind of socialism, derived in part from Marx while disclaiming communism, were the British Fabians. Being both gradualists and democrats, they were as much impressed by John Stuart Mill as they were by Karl Marx. Taking their name from the Roman General Fabius Cunctator, who elusively avoided open battles to ultimately win a decisive victory over stronger forces, the Fabians advocated an evolutionary socialism rather than revolution, and considered the utilitarian aim of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people attainable only by the extensive action of the government in the field of economics. They regarded the state as a social mechanism to be captured and manipulated for the promotion of social welfare, rather than as an instrument of class domination to be violently overthrown. Prominently associated with the movement were the names of Sidney and Beatrice Webb and George Bernard Shaw, who were the Society's outstanding leaders for many years.

Fabian socialism was not primarily concerned with the destruction of capitalism, but rather with "landlordism," rents, and the existence of enormous private estates; this socialist point of view was infused with utilitarianism rather than Marx's dialectical rigidity. Fabians also retained, in opposition to conventional Marxism, their faith in state decentralization and the avoidance of bureaucracy. Zoll considers them to have been generally overoptimistic, "their temper...distinctly and even remotely intellectual rather than popular,"¹⁴ an intellectual elitism similar to the

moralistic voice of the American mugwumps, who were considered the most respectable of this country's reformers. Generally, the mugwumps were "newspapermen, scholars, and intellectuals," DeSantis notes, "earnest men of high ideals and prominent social position," who "lashed out against the spoils system and worked to purify politics through civil service reform."¹⁵ However, since they still had faith in laissez-faire economics, the mugwumps restricted their economic programs to low tariff measures and sound money policies.

The general objections to socialism were powerful enough in the fundamentally democratic nations, such as Great Britain and the United States, to prevent any acceptance of a total socialistic revolution. Instead, socialism came to be regarded as the enemy of progress. With its regimentation of humanity and destruction of individual initiative and enterprise by denying incentive, socialism, it was felt, would create a vast, overall system of state bureaucracy which would ultimately accentuate class distinctions rather than eliminate them. Because the materialistic or mechanistic conception of humanity worked against the natural trend on human emotions, which could never be suppressed for long, it was impossible to accept, as the Marxian socialists had held, that history was determined by economics alone. The opponents of socialism insisted that the encroachment of socialism was by no means inevitable, and that the simplistic arrangement of society into feudal aristocracy, bourgeoisie, and proletariat was inadequate.

Moreover, the extensions of the new scientific approaches of Darwinism and positivism were not limited to the areas of social and

political relationships. The disturbing new ideologies stimulated similar controversies in institutionalized religion as well. The English geologist Charles Lyell's demonstration that the earth was infinitely old, corroborating what the astronomers had already suspected, was culminated in Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859), which, as the exposition of evolution, is still considered one of the most influential books ever written. While Darwin built upon a tradition that might be traced all the way back to Bacon, his more immediate predecessors included Malthus, whose Essay on the Principle of Population set forth the concept of the struggle for existence, and Sir Charles Lyell, whose Principles of Geology expounded the idea of gradual development. Durant notes that evolution was in the air early in the 1850's; Herbert Spencer expressed the idea in his essay on "The Development Hypothesis" in 1852, seven years earlier than Darwin's great work. But with The Origin of Species the old world crashed to pieces, according to the good bishops, because the notion of evolution was no longer a vague notion of higher species evolving somehow from lower ones, "but a detailed and richly documented theory of the actual mode and process of evolution 'by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favored races in the struggle for life'." ¹⁶

Darwin's theory had widespread repercussions on the period's religious institutions, and theologians rose to the challenge in various ways. The advent of historical criticism of the Bible coincided with the method of scientific study, and because science and the historical criticism of the Bible disagreed with widely accepted theological doctrines, the organized churches intensified their efforts to properly control the interpretation of

scientific teachings. However, those historical critics involved in the struggle against various forms of theological doctrine did not consider themselves to be refuting religion. Rather, they considered their campaign against certain theological doctrines as being waged in the interest of religion itself. In his celebrated Belfast address, Tyndall, one of the clearest proponents of materialism in nineteenth-century England, contended that the facts of religious feeling were to him as certain as the facts of physics.

The tradition of criticizing theological doctrines on scientific and historical grounds was an inheritance from eighteenth-century attitudes, particularly as exerted by the influence of pantheism on the opening years of the new century. But Biblical authority was directly challenged by the Higher (or historical) Criticism of the Bible, originating in Germany. In 1835, David Friedrich Strauss published in three volumes his celebrated Das Leben Jesu (translated by George Eliot in 1846), which applied the myth theory to the life of Jesus and denied the historicity of the supernatural elements included in the Gospels. However, Strauss too contended that his criticism of the historical authenticity of the New Testament's account of the life of Jesus was not intended in any way to undermine religious faith in the essential truth of Christianity. In the 1860's the same position was extended in the heresy trials of the seven authors of Essays and Reviews, who heralded the new studies in natural science and Biblical scholarship as reinvigorating faith. They were subsequently condemned in the ecclesiastical court.

In spite of the Biblical exegetes' assertions to the contrary, however, the new historical criticism shook the traditional metaphysical certainties

of a benevolent divine power directly associated with the affairs of man. And regardless of the intent, the new exegesis cut many adrift into a perilous, uncharted sea of skepticism. The idealists sought for a higher unity which would fit the metaphysical view of the times, and they found it in an idealist form of the doctrine of divine immanence. Because mind is necessary to the perception of the dialectical process through its perceiving the unity in difference, Hegel, according to Durant, considered the function of the mind and the end of philosophy to be the discovery of the unity that is always potential in diversity. Thus the task of ethics was to unify character and conduct; the task of politics to unify individuals into a state; the task of religion to reach and find that absolute in which all opposites are finally resolved into unity, "that great sum of being in which matter and mind, subject and object, good and evil, are one."¹⁷ Hegel interpreted the ultimate reality as that which was mediated in all things, but attained its highest expression in the self-conscious objectification achieved within art, religion, and philosophy. Thus, the sphere of the religious was enlarged beyond any confines of orthodoxy and merged not only with philosophy but with the awareness of whatever was taken to be true or beautiful or good. Coinciding with this philosophical thought was a movement to reinterpret Christian doctrine as symbolically rather than literally true. And since religious belief was not confined to a separate compartment of man's nature, the faith in the truth and beauty inherent in the products of any culture made it impossible to restrict authentic religion to the doctrinal teachings of Christianity. Although Christianity might be regarded as the most acceptable form of religious practice, the specific

formulations of Christian theology still had to be interpreted as symbolic rather than literal transcripts of fact. The idealist theory of divine immanence found a general literary and philosophic acceptance; sympathy arose for the varieties of religious experience in all cultures along with a willingness to interpret theological doctrine in symbolic terms.

Based on the supposition that the realm of feeling could lay claim to a higher truth than that arising through the intellect, being prior to and independent of all theological propositions, it could be maintained that the beliefs identified with theology were merely "projections" of the fundamental nature of religious feeling. God could be considered the outward projection of man's inward nature. Strauss and Feuerbach accepted this basic premise, interpreting the historic doctrines of religion as mythical or psychological; God being treated in varying aspects as a being of the understanding, love, or moral law simply corresponded to some basic requirement of human nature. These doctrines could further be construed as the reflections of the cultural knowledge and experience of a particular people at a particular time in the history of the world, and the importance of religion be considered to reside, first, within the realm of immediate feeling and, second, in the results of this feeling. Thus, in the latter view, Mandelbaum states, theological beliefs are not direct projections of feeling; they are inspired by forces outside of religion and are subject to change as these external factors change. Therefore, a change in the state of knowledge would make it possible to reform religious belief, making it no less adequate as an expression of feeling, but more adequate as an expression of what might be held to be true of the world.¹⁸ In this view, it

was possible to believe in progress within the domain of religious belief and to also reform religion to meet the needs and knowledge of succeeding generations.

Strauss and Feuerbach, in Germany, and Comte, in France, all three challenged current Christian orthodoxy and the conceptions of the eighteenth century's natural religion. Although Comte as well as Feuerbach and Strauss considered the feelings associated with traditional forms of religion capable of generating beliefs about the world, they all insisted that any acceptance of these beliefs as statements of fact had to be resisted as erroneous. These universal religious feelings could have direct application for mankind only so long as they resisted any cognitive claims.

Comte distinguished between the theological, fictive mode of thought, which he rejected, and the genuinely religious feeling, which he considered conducive to a good social order. His desire to unite the emotional and intellectual needs of man led him to go beyond the standpoint of the positive sciences with proposals for a Religion of Humanity, which was to be based on science, and was to replace the idea of God by the conception of ideal mankind. Durant notes that Comte spent his old age devising for his "Religion of Humanity an intricate system of priesthood, sacraments, prayers, and discipline," proposing a new calendar "in which the names of pagan deities and medieval saints should be replaced by the heroes of human progress." As a wit would have it, Durant quips, "Comte offered the world all of Catholicism except Christianity."¹⁹ Strauss, also, kept his faith in the value of religious feeling, and accompanied his original criticism of orthodoxy with his acceptance of the

"eternal truth" of what the myths of orthodoxy projected. When he had finally abandoned Christianity, he, like Comte, offered a substitution of a new faith in place of the old. And even Feuerbach, who was possibly more insistent than Comte and Strauss that the doctrines of Christianity were false, still defended religious feeling as that which gives worth to man.

Including the many religious interests connected with a belief in divine immanence, Mandelbaum notes, the nineteenth century cannot be considered an irreligious age. Although there were those who could not take the noetic claims of religion so lightly, and who, if they were unable to compromise with religious orthodoxy, came to a position of agnosticism, such as Darwin, agnosticism was not generally acceptable to the nineteenth century mind, and overt atheism was even less so. More typically, religion was redefined, as in the case of Aldous Huxley (who is credited with coining the word "agnosticism") and Tyndall (who was an avowed materialist), neither of whom made any noetic claims for religion and thus bypassed the issue of agnosticism or of atheism altogether. It was this position, Mandelbaum contends, that provided a modus vivendi between the allegiance felt both toward science and Christian faith, a compromise possible only because religion had antecedently been defined exclusively in terms of feeling.²⁰ Once accepted, science could be held to discover our most certain knowledge, but at the same time, any acknowledgement of the limitation of science, such as that found among critical positivists for instance, gave access through an adjoining door to another domain of existence, in which the endless probings of the intellect had no place. Thus poetry could be interpreted as depicting the truths of feeling; thus, also, the age, which viewed its chief moral problem as the problem of extending

the bounds of sympathetic, altruistic action, could abandon the view that faith in God was either the source or the enemy of the social good, and could instead consider God and the social good as synonymous. And such became the predominant view during the latter part of the century among those who held that the essence of religion was to be found in feeling.

Henry Steele Commager states that "with the decade of the nineties—or roughly from the mid-eighties to the Spanish War—the new America came in as on flood tide,"²¹ the watershed of American history. "Born in 1856," Austin Briggs notes, "Frederic was young enough to be free of the memory of antebellum America that haunted Howells and Twain; in his mid-thirties when the nineties began, he was old enough to be fully aware of just how much was new and different in the modern world then being born." With the exceptions of Stephen Crane and Frank Norris, Briggs contends, no other American novelist can be considered so thoroughly and exclusively representative of the watershed years as Frederic; ". . . in the works of no other American novelist does one so fully sense what it was like to be alive in those turbulent years."²²

Never the isolated artist, Frederic's vocation of journalism and his exuberant social life-style kept him directly in touch with the intellectual currents of the times, which were embodied in his fictive imagination and captured in his writings. Ralph Robert Rogers, in his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, discerned Frederic's relationship to his time and his literary gift as the dialectical process in his own development:

It might be said that in a dialectical sense there were two Harold Frederics, the innocent, uncultivated, romantic one and the experienced, sophisticated, realistic one. Although Frederic may have considered the conflict between his two inner hostile

selves a matter of interest to him-self alone, this same dialectical interplay actually ²³provided the dramatic and intellectual texture for his novels.

If Frederic's youth freed him from the memory of antebellum America that remained a fixed force in the imaginations of Howells and Twain he was nevertheless old enough to be deeply influenced by the neo-Hegelian democratic idealists, unlike his younger contemporary Stephen Crane, and thus the dialectical process Rogers detects in Frederic's work was provided the polar concepts from which to develop. The neo-Hegelian idealism serving as thesis met with the antithesis of European determinism developing in the school of literary naturalism. Thus, Frederic's particular place in the stream of American intellectualism prepared him for a full awareness "of just how much was new and different in the modern world then being born." While his synthesis was never fully achieved, his own desire for some optimistic solution to the colliding forces of thought remained consistent in the pragmatic voice of his minor progressive characters: Abe Beekman in Seth's Brother's Wife, the Soulsbys in The Damnation of Theron Ware, and Louisa Thorpe Dabney in The Market Place.

Considering himself "pretty nearly the original mugwump," Frederic found that his experience in journalism as a young man in his home state of New York brought him into direct contact with the political trends of progressive idealism. As early as 1868, Horatio Seymour's presidential race against General Grant brought the excitement of the political campaign to Utica. When Seymour lost by a surprisingly narrow margin, Utica democrats, including Frederic's family and Frederic himself, Thomas F.

O'Donnell and Hoyt C. Franchere note, were consoled by the fact that Seymour had carried New York State, and remained a hero even in defeat.²⁴ Following a brief sojourn in New England and the Brahmin capital of Boston, Frederic returned to Utica to take up what would be his lifelong career in journalism by becoming a proofreader for the Morning Herald, a Republican paper. Shortly thereafter, he availed himself of the opportunity to proofread for the Utica Daily Observer, a thoroughly Democratic paper, "owned and operated," as O'Donnell and Franchere point out, "by a trio of journalistic and political veterans—DeWitt C. Grove, Elijah Prentiss Bailey, and Theodore Pease Cook. . . . All three were active Democrats." And all three held positions that directly influenced Frederic's own political thought. Grove was a former mayor of Utica and a constant critic of the Republican political boss Senator Roscoe Conkling, who was also from Utica and married to the younger sister of Frederic's political idol Horatio Seymour. Bailey was the son of an active, fighting Abolitionist editor. Cook was "a fiery-penned reformer, a Columbia Law School graduate, who was outraged by the excesses of the Grant administration and a solid backer of New York's Governor Samuel J. Tilden."²⁵ Five years later, the twenty-four-year old Frederic assumed the editorship of the Observer when Cook gave up the post.

A few years later, having outgrown Utica, Frederic accepted the editorship of the Albany Evening Journal, a more influential paper than the Observer. Although the Albany Journal was a Republican paper, it was staunchly anti-Conkling. George E. Fortenberry notes that the paper prospered under Frederic's "vigorous direction, and maintained the respect

earned for it by a succession of distinguished editors, including Thurlow Weed."²⁶ The Republican nomination of Charles J. Folger for governor opened the opportunity for Frederic to launch his own battle against Conkling, and to the dismay of the paper's owners, Frederic maneuvered their conservative publication, by indirection, to the support of the Democratic reform candidate for governor, Grover Cleveland. When the Journal's new editor announced on September 21, 1882, that his paper had bolted the Saratoga ticket supported by Conkling, he pulled dozens of other smaller Republican newspapers along with him. Frederic was in fact instrumental in the election of the then little-known Democratic candidate Grover Cleveland, who was destined to become his new progressive political idol, replacing the waning figures of Seymour and Tilden. Both Grover Cleveland and Deputy State Treasurer Edgar Kelsey Apgar, who had masterminded Cleveland's election, formed lasting friendships with Frederic. Their progressive idealism and devotion to honest politics undoubtedly did the ground work for an interest in the social and political problems that Frederic would continue to grapple with in his writings throughout his life.

Soon thereafter, however, Frederic's open admiration of Cleveland—his editorializing that the new governor was "bigger and better than his party" and his boldly suggesting that Cleveland would make an admirable Democratic candidate for the presidency—brought him into conflict with the new owners of his paper. They were particularly unhappy with his advocacy of civil service reforms and low tariff measures, important planks in the Democratic platform. And before the Democratic

party could convene, just over a year later, to actually carry out Frederic's suggestion to nominate Cleveland as their presidential candidate, Frederic had given up his post with the Journal. Faced with the alternatives of modifying his editorial position or turning in his resignation, he chose the latter and took up his career as the foreign correspondent for the New York Times in London.

Frederic's protracted residence in England provided unlimited opportunities for new intellectual stimulation and a chance to test these new currents of thought gained in the cosmopolitan world capital of London against the more provincial concepts of his American background. Finding an easy acceptance among many of England's literary and political elite, Frederic gained early memberships in several of London's carefully restricted clubs while making a quick study of the country's politics and peerage. His personal letter of introduction from Governor Grover Cleveland, who was shortly thereafter President Grover Cleveland, and the support of his newfound English friend Aaron Watson secured his election to a particularly useful membership, in the Savage Club, in less than eight months after his arrival in London. Frederic's letter to his New York Times editor Charles R. Miller contended for the advantages of this membership, where he could meet and know England's most distinguished contemporary journalists, artists, actors, and "all newsy Bohemia."²⁷ Shortly thereafter he became a member also of the National Liberal Club, through which he continued to exercise his interests in progressive political trends. Frederic's subsequent membership in the Ghouls brought him into contact with such illustrious literary figures as James M. Barrie, Conan Doyle,

Joseph Pennell, W. E. Henley, and Bernard Partridge, the cartoonist for Punch. His colleague Arthur Warren remembered him presiding over both the food and conversation at the club, taking it upon himself to order the menu, and then tyrannizing "over the membership in such a jovial manner that no one complained."²⁸ News and ideas pulsed through the clubs, and Frederic had managed his own placement in the center of the current intellectualism moving across England and the Continent.

Frederic's journalism assignments also broadened his first-hand experiences with cultural environments totally unlike anything he had known in America. The cholera epidemic he covered personally in southern France and posted as "Down Among the Dead Men" not only enhanced his stature as a journalist, winning him international acclaim, but also gave him the opportunity to compare the living conditions of America's and Europe's poor. O'Donnell and Franchere contend: "As a reporter, he had learned to face the hard realities of squalor in the Mohawk Valley; but what he saw in Toulon and Arles surpassed what even the most morbid American mind might conceive."²⁹ Further, the extent of Frederic's duties as the Times correspondent were expanded. In addition to his weekly London cable, Fortenberry notes, Frederic's editor insisted that he further collect the news from other agents in other capitals of Europe. Frederic made up dispatches in London which could then be published by the Times with various European datelines to "create the impression that the continent was populated with Times correspondents."³⁰ In subsequent years, his Times assignments would take him to the Continent several times: to Germany to collect enough information to do a fairly comprehensive biographical study

of William II, which he titled The Young Emperor, and to Russia to report on a Jewish pogrom then being carried out there, the articles for which were collected and published as The New Exodus.³¹

But while Frederic's life became increasingly complex and his character changed and matured, he yet remained the good-natured exuberant Yankee, possessed of an immense curiosity. His biographers feel he did not mellow, but rather, became "more insistently individualistic . . . completely sincere and honest and always intolerant of sham."³² He was noted as being insatiably inquisitive, appearing to have an almost photographic memory for details and a great store of universal knowledge. Nor was his considerable understanding of the British aristocracy just gleaned from Burke's Peerage, his information being current and in depth. Aaron Watson considered the extent of that knowledge nothing short of amazing; seemingly "no citizen of the United States could have possessed a more incongruous accomplishment"; but then Watson felt, "it no doubt greatly increased his value to the New York Times."³³ Clement Shorter maintained Frederic had a "grip on the whole political situation in England the like of which probably was possessed by not half a dozen men, apart from the official wire-pullers." He, too, considered the grasp Frederic had of facts astonishing.³⁴

Like Frederic's political and social interests that developed early and continued throughout his lifetime, Frederic's religious interests also developed during his formative years and continued to his death. When Frederic was five years old, his maternal grandmother Ramsdell moved into the new household his mother had established with his stepfather in the

DeMott home. With her, O'Donnell and Franchere note, she brought not only the fascinating stories of the Revolutionary War, learned during her own childhood, but her accounts of Biblical customs and various aspects of Methodist history as well. The nominal Presbyterian affiliations of his mother and stepfather were lost to the greater excitement of Grandmother Ramsdell's Methodism, and Frederic was reared in that Protestant discipline, placing his membership with the Corn Hill Church soon thereafter. Frederic's biographers note the propriety of the decision, since the Frederics as well as the Ramsdells had been active Methodists in that same church for decades.³⁵ On the other hand, Fortenberry points out, although he was reared in the discipline of the Methodist Church, he was also "filled with a spirit of libertarian radicalism by his mother; his heroes were Kossuth, Garibaldi, and the patriots of the American Revolution."³⁶

And Frederic's early career in journalism on the Utica Daily Observer not only broadened his political acquaintances, it also broadened his contact with religious leaders and thought. Father Edward A. Terry, the recently assigned Irish priest to Utica's St. John's parish, which served the city's largest Irish-Catholic population, opened new channels of thought for the young newspaperman. O'Donnell and Franchere note that just as Seymour had influenced Frederic's attitude toward political history, so did the eloquent Father Terry influence his attitude toward religion — "not by trying to entice him to Catholicism," they state, "but by calmly opening for him new paths to intellectual excitement of which Frederic had never dreamed."³⁷ His friendship with the priest was continued in correspondence and renewed with periodic visits after Father Terry was transferred from St. John's and Frederic had moved to England.

Following the London assignment, which greatly expanded his cultural and political contacts, Frederic still retained a vigorous interest in religious thought and social practice. The Czar considered The New Exodus so offensive that he permanently barred the author from his country, which did little to hinder Frederic professionally since he had made arrangements for news to be secretly sent to him in cipher from informants inside Russia. The articles did, however, alert this country to the miserable conditions of the Russian Jews. His interest in Catholic theology also continued, his Times dispatches serving as a forum for that interest as he made arrangements for the coverage of Catholic news as a regular feature of his dispatches. Frederic mentioned the value of this feature in several of his letters to Miller in the New York office of the Times, pointing out once, that Gill, the editor of the "biggest of American Catholic Magazines," had just praised the Times as "the only American paper which had fair Irish news."³⁸ Included also is a complaint about the careless editing of his copy covering the Catholic news, which he found particularly vexatious, not only because he had tried to make the Catholic news a feature but also because he had "a great number of Catholic friends, both in and out of the priesthood," who were following his reportage with personal interest. This following, he felt, "ought to be of service to the paper."³⁹ A year later, Frederic still seemed convinced of the news value of the Catholic materials. A letter from J. C. Millage, in Paris, to Frederic indicates that Frederic had requested Millage to write some articles on the Catholic Church in America. Millage notes that what Frederic wanted was "spicy stuff with a flavour of reverence about it," something in the style of some

Anglo-Roman sketches Millage had once published which he felt had set the English Catholic Bishops, clergy, laity, and all going.⁴⁰ Millage's interpretation of Frederic's request reflects a general tone, similar in attitude, to that which Frederic used to develop his fictional Father Forbes in his best-known novel, The Damnation of Theron Ware.

When Frederic lay stricken with a fatal stroke in 1898, he gave up his traditional medical treatment to undergo the unorthodox spiritual treatment of the Christian Scientists, which was instigated by Kate Lyon, the mistress of his second household in London. But regardless of the instigator of the treatment, Frederic apparently harbored some latent hope that a measure of this new spiritual force might somehow help restore his failing physical health. And, indeed, Kate Lyon wrote in a letter to the practitioner, Mrs. Mills, that Frederic did believe that Christian Science would help him, and that he did want the treatment.⁴¹ However, his final acceptance of the unorthodox practice was credited as the direct cause of his premature death; and although they were subsequently acquitted, both Kate Lyon and Mrs. Mills were formally charged and brought to trial for manslaughter.

Frederic's astonishing memory and grasp of the facts ultimately served him for far greater purposes than just the implementation of his journalistic dispatches to the Times. The political background he garnered during his early years with his journalism assignment on the Utica and Albany papers, his experiences with the New York Times, his memberships in the London Clubs, and his travels on the Continent all formed a working center for his creative fictive imagination; his reading supplied the rest.

Frederic's political contacts with the reforming spirit of the mugwumps was balanced by his contempt for the machine politics of Roscoe Conkling. The opposing philosophies of William Graham Sumner's What Social Classes Owe to Each Other, an interpretation of social Darwinism as natural law, and Lester Frank Ward's attack on the prevailing tenets of laissez-faire economics in his Dynamic Sociology, an appeal for government intervention in corporate business affairs, both published in 1883, formed the dramatic tension for Frederic's early writings set in Western New York State. Later his experience with the religious individualism encompassed in Methodism, which had been well suited to the individualistic liberalism of the eighteenth century, was used as the center for the dramatic tension of opposing developments of the Higher Criticism—the European historical analysis of Comte and Renan set against the American Social Gospel and a pragmatic faith in moral ethics.

The earlier intellectual thought of the last half of the nineteenth century had shared a common belief in a reasonable future for mankind. Whether the voice was that of materialism, positivism, or idealism, it held the same conviction of the inevitability of man's being inexorably drawn toward some progressive goal or development that was infinitely more to be desired than the state in which he presently found himself. Whether the results were to be intellectual, moral, or economic, there was a progressive urgency to move mankind to its accomplishment. The darker side of the century's intellectualism did not flower until doubts about the perfectibility of the common man crept in, and by the end of the century the skepticism growing out of the historical criticism of the Bible and the concepts of the

irrational will of man set forth in voluntaristic thought engulfed the progressive hopes for the reform of man's social, political, and religious institutions.

Frederic's interest in the Higher Criticism is reflected with the inclusion of Renan's Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse among the books that greatly stir his fictional minister, the young Reverend Mr. Theron Ware. And Celia Madden reveals Frederic's acquaintance with the new darker philosophies of the will with her allusion to Schopenhauer's metaphor of not having the water without the jug to hold it in. Schopenhauer's disparagement of the mentality of the duel provided a satirical base against which to set the expansive laissez-faire economics expounded by the social-Darwinists coupled with the dark will to power expounded by Nietzsche, that Frederic utilizes in the characterization of Joel Stormont Thorpe in his last novel, The Market Place. Toward the end of the century, many of the extreme anti-rationalists turned against democracy, which had kept its wavering faith that the ordinary man was capable of correcting his erroneous traditions, habits, and prejudices to make logical, disinterested decisions concerning the development of the institutions that would enable all men to live more vitally and happily. However, once the position was seriously entertained that men were naturally irrational creatures, the notions of democracy had to be drastically revised or rejected altogether. Crane Brinton considers the extreme anti-rationalist as best exemplified in the political thought of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche's followers, becoming numerous throughout the West in the last decades of the century, felt that he advocated a new spiritual aristocracy,

made-up of "overmen" destined to rise above the materialism and national patriotism of the middle classes. Nietzsche's opponents were just as sure that he was only another of the preachers of Nordic superiority.⁴² But regardless of the position that was taken, Nietzsche was clearly an enemy of democracy, which he held in scorn second only to its offspring, socialism, which he viewed as a system allowing the weak to unjustly rule the strong. Nietzsche waged an all-out attack against what he considered to be the fundamental position and values associated with the inheritance of the Enlightenment: the natural goodness and reasonableness of ordinary men, the beneficent workings of a free market, the invisible control of laissez-faire economics, and much of conventional liberalism.

By the close of the century, liberal thinkers throughout the West were beset with an urgency to revise their attitudes. The pragmatism of William James, Brinton contends, must clearly be classified as one of the philosophies of the will. For although James built on the philosophical constructs of the idealists, accepting the traditional values of a moral world, Brinton notes that James's reality was conceived as neither fixed nor certain.⁴³ However, American pragmatism expounded a more benign will than extreme anti-rationalism. C. Wright Mills contends that James's "philosophy of experience" embraced and mediated between three widely held systems: "experimentalism," "voluntarism," and "experientialism" or the sensationalist "intuitive theory of reality." In its looking into the future for tests of meaning, Mills states, pragmatism involved voluntarism, holding that the believing exceeds the immediate and already known.⁴⁴ Voluntarism, according to R. B. Perry, would justify the believing, which he

considered to exceed "the limits of experimental verification and must, insofar as this is the case, proceed on moral grounds."⁴⁵ Thus, Mills contends, for James "the real locus of pragmatic testing" must be considered in a "personal and moral sphere." In "The Will to Believe," James addressed himself to those "academic audiences," who, having been nurtured in science, found themselves succumbing to a "paralysis of their native capacity for faith." James offered the prescription:

In this age of toleration, no scientist will ever try actively to interfere with our religious faith, provided we enjoy it quietly with our friends and do not make a public nuisance of it in the market-place. But it is just on this matter of the market-place that I think the utility of such essays as mine may turn. If religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the active faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in life, are the experimental tests by which they are verified, and the only means by which their truth or falsehood can be wrought out. The truest scientific hypothesis is that which, as we say, "works" best; and it can be no otherwise with religious hypotheses.⁴⁶

Heavily indebted to the Romantic movement, anti-rationalism constituted a rejection of the eighteenth-century's faith in the natural reasonableness of the ordinary human being; on the positive side, however, the anti-rationalist was convinced that if man could accept his true nature as a human being, and the radical limitation of his reasoning processes, to which much of his experience never penetrated at all, he could live a richer, fuller life than any ever planned for him by a rationalist. The moderate anti-rationalist, therefore, was content to retain as much of the eighteenth century's belief in human rationality as possible. Brinton considers this to be a general "attitude of modern psychology from Freud and William James on." This psychology attempted to aid human reason, he points out, by making the difficulties under which it must work apparent:

reason was hindered by man's instincts, or drives—by the limitation of man's biological inheritance of animality, emphasized by the evolutionists, and by man's sociological inheritance of custom and tradition, emphasized by the historians.⁴⁷

Frederic was not sympathetically impressed with his contemporary novelist Henry James, who was also residing in England at the time—Frederic unkindly remarking that James was "an effeminate old donkey who lives with a herd of other donkeys around him and insists on being treated as if he were the Pope."⁴⁸ But remaining close to the progressive American attitude of the time, he wrote for and about the same public temperament that would readily accept the more optimistic statement of the will contained in American pragmatism, which was formulated by Henry's brother William James. Following the interjection of the darker forces of the will into the later nineteenth-century thought, the intellectualism of the period was penetrated with a dynamic historical and evolutionary cast, that not even the "tough-minded" could totally ignore. Following Hegel, the idealist might still hold to an unchanging, perfect world of the absolute beyond the flux and shift of this world of the senses; but he also came to an acceptance that this imperfect world was being drawn toward that other perfect world by ways he could only imperfectly understand. And on the obverse side, the realist of the nineteenth-century could no longer believe that his reason was sufficient to reveal the neat, static, mathematical formula for the good life. He too came to accept the thesis that everything changed and grew, and that even what was constructed on the basis of human plans must take account of

nature's mysterious patterns of growth. Frederic's exuberant good nature was never to be entirely quelled by the pessimistic determinism he encountered in Europe. O'Donnell and Franchere note that while Frederic's friend and confidant, Stephen Crane, must be conceded as having had "the greater artistry," "Frederic had the greater warmth and human understanding." Having a "vast hunger for life," he lived "it joyously and to the full."⁴⁹ Frederic's optimistic vision of life, his progressive social, political, and religious hopes for mankind were an integral part of his fictive imagination. As he grew older, his progressive hopes for politics and religion were weighed in the dramatic balance of Darwinian determinism and the skepticism of the Higher Criticism along with the still darker irrational visions of voluntarism. The obvious champions of progressive, democratic idealism—Reuben Tracy, Richard Ansdell, and John Fairchild—prevalent in the early writings Frederic set in his fictional district of New York State, are replaced in his later work by the good-intentioned, but generally ineffectual, social planners characterized in Gloria Mundi and by the heavily satirized finaglers of the world's stock exchange characterized in The Market Place. But throughout his canon, in the careful delineation of his common-sense characters from the early Abe Beekman in Seth's Brother's Wife through the Soulsbys in The Damnation of Theron Ware to Louisa Thorpe Dabney in The Market Place, the optimistic, pragmatic voice of hope and expectation still rings clear.

NOTES

¹In Crane Brinton and others, Modern Civilization, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967), p.571.

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³Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought (Baltimore, 1971), p.12.

⁴Durant, p.324.

⁵G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. by T. M. Knox (New York, 1942), Sects. 257-58.

⁶Durant, p.324.

⁷Louis B. Wright and others, The Democratic Experience, Rev. ed. (Glenview, Illinois, 1968), p.285.

⁸Donald Atwell Zoll, Reason and Rebellion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963), pp.242-43.

⁹Zoll, p.245.

¹⁰Zoll, pp.245-46.

¹¹Zoll, p.274.

¹²Durant, p.325.

¹³Zoll, p.269.

¹⁴Zoll, p.292.

¹⁵Wright, p.267.

¹⁶Durant, p.385.

¹⁷Durant, pp.322-23.

¹⁸Mandelbaum, p.33.

¹⁹Durant, p.383.

²⁰Mandelbaum, p.35-36.

²¹Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880's (New Haven, 1950), p.44.

²²Austin Briggs, Jr., The Novels of Harold Frederic (Ithaca, New York, 1969), pp.202-3.

²³In Briggs, p.14.

²⁴Thomas F. O'Donnell and Hoyt C. Franchere, Harold Frederic (New York, 1961), pp.26-27.

²⁵O'Donnell and Franchere, pp.36-37.

²⁶Harold Frederic, The Correspondence of Harold Frederic, The Harold Frederic Edition, eds. George E. Fortenberry and others, (Fort Worth, Texas, 1977), I, 8.

²⁷Harold Frederic Papers in the Manuscript Division, New York Public Library.

²⁸In O'Donnell and Franchere, p.61.

²⁹O'Donnell and Franchere, p.52.

³⁰Fortenberry, p.23.

³¹O'Donnell and Franchere, p.63.

³²O'Donnell and Franchere, pp.59-60.

³³In O'Donnell and Franchere, p.61.

³⁴In O'Donnell and Franchere, p.61.

³⁵O'Donnell and Franchere, pp.24-25.

³⁶Fortenberry, p.7.

³⁷O'Donnell and Franchere, p.43.

³⁸The Harold Frederic Papers, New York Public Library.

³⁹The Harold Frederic Papers, New York Public Library.

⁴⁰The Harold Frederic Papers, New York Public Library.

⁴¹In Fortenberry, p.484.

⁴²Brinton, p.591.

⁴³Brinton, p.589.

⁴⁴C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York, 1966), p.255.

⁴⁵In Mills, p.255.

⁴⁶In Mills, p.256.

⁴⁷Brinton, p.590.

⁴⁸In O'Donnell and Franchere, p.155.

⁴⁹O'Donnell and Franchere, p.163.

CHAPTER II

Positivism and Determinism

One of the knotty problems confronting the social and political critic of the nineteenth century exists in the attempt to synthesize the era's diverse philosophical thought and in the analysis of the effect differing concepts exerted in the shaping of the intellectual milieu. Maurice Mandelbaum reduces this diversity to a consideration of just two dominant strands, metaphysical idealism and positivism, each of which he feels possesses a relatively high degree of continuity and a tendency to deal with similar problems, even though from opposed points-of-view.¹ Convinced that the world had radically changed over the centuries, positivism contended that nothing, not even the knowledge of God, was revealed completely, remaining immutable. Darwin's studies tended to support the positivist assertion that the history of the world was the history of progress, without need of supernatural intervention either at its inception or during its development through the ages. And as idealism would enlist individualistic democrats as well as more socially conscious pragmatists,

the materialism and determinism of Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin were to inspire both the individualistic social Darwinists and the later collectivist reform Darwinists.

Opposed to the dualistic interpretation of mind and body, the positivists rejected metaphysics because it presupposed a belief that principles of explanation could be projected which were more basic than those which derived from observation. Although the positivists acknowledged that theological and metaphysical questions were common to mankind, they considered any attempt to pass from the realm of phenomena to a more ultimate reality as meaningless, regardless of the deeply rooted impulse to do so. This school of thought emphasized scientific achievement and considered the adequacy of knowledge greater as it approached the systems of explanation already accepted by the most advanced sciences, those confined to the data of experience and excluding a priori or metaphysical preconceptions. Only on the basis of discovery, they felt, through the observation of repeated and reliable uniformities within experience, could future events be anticipated and past events explained. The positivist, in contrast to the idealist who accepted basic reality as spiritual, rejected any appeal to immanent forces or transcendent entities, accepting reality only as it was evidenced in the physical or material. For him, the explanation of a phenomenon was accomplished by subsuming it under one or more laws of which it was an instance, a manifestation of an authenticated description of observed experiential correlations which had occurred in the past.

Its first formulation was to be identified with Auguste Comte, marking a distinctively new movement in the history of thought. Although

other systems had previously rejected the belief that metaphysical questions were capable of solution and still others had acclaimed the scientific manner as that with which truth was being progressively attained, systematic positivism was the first modern attempt to transform philosophy into a synthesis of the sciences. "For Comte, Spencer, and others of the school, the task of philosophy became 'the organization into a harmonious Doctrine of all the highest generalities of Science'; its method was to examine the empirical results attained by all sciences, seeking out the most general laws in each, and bringing these laws together into an integrated pattern of knowledge which was more general than that attainable by any single science," Mandelbaum states.² And, he contends, this conception of philosophy was new, whatever its inconsistencies, and its adherents convinced that the whole of the future belonged to it.

Both Comte and Spencer emphasized the prestige of science and the progressive development of man and society, ideas deeply rooted in nineteenth-century thought. According to Comte, society was an organism, his motto for positivism being order and progress:

Order is the condition of all Progress; Progress is always the object of Order. Or, to penetrate the question still more deeply, Progress may be regarded simply as the development of Order; for the order of nature necessarily contains within itself the germ of all possible progress. The rational view of human affairs is to look on all₃ their changes, not as new Creations, but as New Evolutions.

To those who tended to link intellectual enlightenment and social reform, a heritage of the eighteenth century, and who also accepted the empirical sciences as the forefront of knowledge, the Comtean system had tremendous appeal.⁴

It was Rousseau's conception of a sovereign people, according to Oscar Cargill, which made possible this new science of human behavior. Although the sciences of ethics, politics, and civil law had seemed adequate before, with The Social Contract setting forth the exercise of the general will as moral and healthful, implying the existence of a natural law which this will, unless subverted, regularly obeyed, it could only be a matter of time, Cargill holds, before a science of sociology should follow Rousseau's book. Although Comte declared decisively that positivism rejected the metaphysical doctrine of the Sovereignty of the People, he did not conceive of his teaching as merely a philosophical system. He saw it as "an instrument of social renovation" as well, applicable to the work of moral and mental reorganization which was to constitute the second phase of the great Western revolution.⁵ This concept of fixed laws ruling human destinies and molding human institutions was to inspire generations of philosophers to search for and formulate such laws, and other generations of bemused sovereigns to require their subjects' conformity to them. According to Henry Steele Commager, "It animated visionaries like Condorcet and Godwin and Jefferson and enlightened statesmen like Struensee and Joseph II and Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford, and even seduced tyrants like Frederick and Catherine the Great temporarily from military to civil adventures."⁶ For a century the greatest minds sought for the Law in the realms of government, jurisprudence, political economy, history, and of what came to be identified with Comte as sociology.

Comte's first gift to the world of thought, given before either his concept of polity or the Religion of Humanity, was a theory of a general evolvement of the human intellect based on a fundamental law to which its

progress was invariably subjected. Comte decreed that the intellectual system of man developed and passed through three successive phases: the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive or Scientific. This theory of human intelligence, which glorified the scientific attitude as the highest development of the mind, implied that there had been stages at which supernatural or abstract reasons alone were adequate as explanations of phenomena in man's thinking. Since the scientific phase was produced from an evolution of the two earlier, and less competent, phases of the mind, the growth of the intellect was not determined by individual effort, but rather by natural law. Intelligence was conceived as an organism. Harold Frederic exemplified the product of that development in his experimental scientist appearing in The Damnation of Theron Ware. Dr. Ledsmar is as much a product of the inevitable laws of natural growth and selection as his species of monoecious and dioecious flowers, with which he is testing the probabilities for or against the theory that hermaphroditism in plants is a late by-product of earlier forms. The doctor's mind operates at the positivist or scientific level as he explains a phenomenon by subsuming it under one or more of the laws of which it is an instance, without any appeal to immanent forces or transcendent entities. Humble-bees do not interest the doctor, as they do the Reverend Mr. Ware, because of their honey, but rather because they may divulge whether it is a law or merely the old-fogy "conservatism of the individual" that explains why some bees bore holes through the bases of flowers to save the labor of climbing in and out of the flowers, while others never utilize such holes.⁷

A combination of factors, it is considered, led to this new interpretation of science. For one thing, the scientists, themselves, were

convinced that investigation had to be liberated from metaphysical preconceptions; and a positivist interpretation could be supported in the interest of advancing science. Further, the development of the evolutionary theory encouraged a pragmatic interpretation of the human mind, and that interpretation was applied to scientific thought itself. Darwin's theory came to be accepted as proof that all aspects of living creatures must have an adaptive function in the struggle for survival. This assumption came to be applied not only to the evolutionary development of bodily structures but to the evolutionary development of human impulses and intelligence as well. Once the measure of the development of man's intelligence was accepted as its usefulness in satisfying needs, it was only a short step to the further claim that science was to be regarded as a form of adaptation. Comte's successive theological, metaphysical, and scientific phases followed in the same basic line.

Darwin's evolution found a ready acceptance among the rugged individualists who had found sanction for free competition and government nonintervention in the laissez-faire economic theories of Adam Smith and the English classical school. In his The Descent of Man, Darwin noted that with savages, the weak in body or mind were soon eliminated and that those remaining commonly exhibited a vigorous state of health.

We civilized men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of everyone to the last moment. . . . Thus the weak members of civilized societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man.

Social Darwinism added scientific support to further enhance the theory's acceptance among many belonging to the nineteenth century's upper social strata. The English philosopher Herbert Spencer advocated the preeminence of the individual over society and of science over religion. In his First Principles (1862) he contended that a fundamental law of matter, which he termed the law of the persistence of force, decreed that nothing homogenous could remain as such if it were acted upon. Any external force must affect parts of it differently, thus causing difference and variety to develop. Further, any force that continued to act on what was homogenous must bring about an increasing variety. In Spencer's view, this law of the multiplication of effects was the clue to the understanding of all development, cosmic as well as biological. He saw an unknown and unknowable absolute force continuously operating on the material world to produce "variety, coherence, integration, specialization, and individuation."⁹ He applied this same evolutionary scheme to human societies, considering them to have evolved from undifferentiated hordes, by the means of increasing division of labor, into more complex civilizations. Primitive men, according to Spencer, were not only physically smaller, they were also less intelligent and more emotional than their civilized counterparts; their religion, he felt, developed from a belief in ghost souls appearing in dreams. Thus Spencer theorized that worship was originally a form of ancestor deification with civilized religions being basically elaborate variations on this primitive theme.

Echoing the same principles, Frederic's Dr. Ledsmar expounds on the intellectual condition of mankind. Religion, he theorizes in the manner of

Spencer, is especially calculated to attract women since they remain "as superstitious to-day, down in the marrow of their bones, as they were ten thousand years ago." Even the intelligent ones, he contends, "are still secretly afraid of omens, and respect auguries." It is they who make up "the constituency to which an institution based on mysteries, miracles, and the supernatural" would generally and naturally appeal. Women, not being a metaphysical people, have difficulty in following abstractions, requiring their dogmas and religious sentiments to be embodied in a man. Dr. Ledsmar contends that while a woman is not learned enough to understand why she desires to see the priest surrounded by flower pots and candles and smelling of musk, she nevertheless can intuitively feel "in his presence a sort of backwash of the old pagan sensuality and lascivious mysticism which enveloped the priesthood in Greek and Roman days" (pp.324-31). In his tabulation of "woman" included in his notes for The Damnation of Theron Ware, Frederic clarifies the scientist's position with the observation that "Ledsmar hates them all as enemies of real knowledge, real peace of mind, real anything."¹⁰

Boys, according to Ledsmar, traverse in their early development the latent evolutionary stages of the race. They have terrifying dreams of monsters and animals:

... they pass through the lust for digging caves, building fires, sleeping out in the woods, hunting with bows and arrows, — all remote ancestral impulses; they play games with stones, marbles, and so on at regular stated periods of the year which they instinctively know, just as they were played in the Bronze Age, and heaven only knows how much earlier.

However, while the boy goes through all these evolutionary stages, leaving them completely behind, the girl, he conjectured, is totally different. More

precocious, at an age when her slower brother was still stumbling along somewhere in the Neolithic period, she progresses to a kind of medieval stage, the age of faith, which is peculiarly her own, and Comte's most primitive stage in his intellectual system of development. Once there, she remains there, however, while the boy passes her. If he was a philosopher (which Dr. Ledsmar seems to consider Father Forbes to be rather than a theologian), he left her in the dark ages, where the scientist felt she belonged. If he happened to be a fool (as Dr. Ledsmar considers Theron to have revealed himself with his questions concerning the relationship between Celia Madden and Father Forbes), he stopped and hung around in her vicinity (pp.325-35).

Even Dr. Ledsmar's serpent-worship studies support his intellectual theories. He had turned from the study of law (one of the disciplines Cargill judged as adequate before Rousseau's conception of a sovereign people made possible the new science of human behavior) to his scientific philosophy after throwing a pretzel to a monkey in a German beer hall. When the monkey screamed with fright, he interpreted the behavior as the animal's inherent fear of snakes, which the pretzel resembled, even though the monkey had never seen one (p.328). The implication is that women, and Celia Madden in particular, are on an evolutionary plane similar to the monkey's. The theory would explain the Biblical prototype in Genesis, since it was Eve who was beguiled by the serpent, and women as consequence continue in perpetual fear of the snake. Darwin's The Descent of Man was incorporated into the positivist system, and a picture painted by the new scholars of Natural History was set up "to mock the old picture of Creation which the Churches implicitly upheld."¹¹ Their contempt is obviously

shared by Dr. Ledsmar. The extent of the difference in the intellectual development of Theron Ware and Dr. Ledsmar is illustrated by the minister's inability to understand the scientist at all, as "Theron did not feel sure that he had understood the point of the anecdote" of the monkey and the pretzel (p.328).

While Spencer compared animal organisms and human societies, seeing in both a regulative system, a sustaining system, and distributing system, he considered their great difference to be a consciousness relating to the whole. While the animal organism had a relating consciousness, he considered society as a whole to be mindless. Individualism became the key word. In his industrial society, coercion and regimentation were to be minimized; the order achieved was to be carefully adjusted to the needs of all, rather than being planned by anyone. Spencer's ideas had special appeal for successful businessmen, since they found not only justification for free competition in them, but an assurance that they were evolution's finest product as well. Andrew Carnegie explained his first reaction to reading Spencer to be as a light coming "as in a flood and all was clear." Not only did he rid himself of theology and the supernatural, he felt he "had found the truth of evolution."¹² John D. Rockefeller, however, apparently saw no dichotomy between evolution and theology. Instead, he related to his Sunday school class that he considered the growth of a large business merely the survival of the fittest. The American Beauty rose, he explained, could be produced in the splendor and fragrance which bring cheer to its beholder only by sacrificing the early buds which grew up around it. Therefore, he did not consider this same practice an evil tendency in business; it was "merely the working-out of a law of nature and

a law of God."¹³ The theory of evolution was accepted as proof that those who survived were the fittest. Spencer had published his idea of the evolution of biological species before the views of Charles Darwin were known, first attributing the cause of evolution to the inheritance of acquired abilities, while Darwin and Wallace attributed it to the theory of natural selection. Later, however, Spencer accepted the theory of natural selection as one of the causes of biological evolution and himself coined the phrase "survival of the fittest."¹⁴

Competitive struggle was accepted as the means by which a society would inevitably be evolved, where men would enjoy "the greatest perfection and the most complete happiness." In this unremitting strife, the weak fell by the wayside while the strong continued onward.¹⁵ Any governmental interference to alter this situation could only impede progress. Translated into economic and social terms, Darwinism simply brought science to the support of predatory capitalism. Spencer was much in vogue in this country in the 1870's and 80's, and it is estimated that his theories considerably helped the new American industrialism.

Frederic reflected this attitude in many of his fictional characters, taken perhaps as much from the business sector at large as from the works of the English philosopher. In The Lawton Girl, his second contemporary novel set in his fictional district of New York State, he dramatizes two different reform attitudes in reaction to the prevalent forces of social Darwinism. Schuyler Tenney, the hardware merchant who, along with Peter Wendover, owns the Thessaly Manufacturing Company, attached to the Minster iron-works, echoes the tenets of social Darwinism operating at

their most predatory level. Dishonesty was wrong and foolish, Tenney admonishes the young attorney Horace Boyce, getting a man disgraced and in jail; but a smart man could "get money in a good many ways without giving anybody a chance to call him dishonest."¹⁶ Encouraging Horace to join their forces, he assures him that he would not be bound to do anything of a shady character. Everything is to be "as straight as a die," nothing but a simple business transaction. When Horace responds that "taking some of the Minster money away" had a "queer sound," Tenney assuages his concern with the assurance that "all business consists in getting other people's money." Inquiring where Horace supposed Steve Minster got his millions, the hardware merchant insists that every dollar passed through some other fellow's pocket before it reached his, the only difference being that when it got into Minster's pocket it stuck there. Everybody was looking out to get rich, he contends; "and when a man succeeds, it only means that somebody else has got poor." That was only plain common-sense (p.233)! The hardware merchant proposes, broadly, only what everybody else proposes:

To get for himself what somebody else has got. That's human nature. It's every kind of nature, down to the little chickens just hatched who start to chase the chap with the worm in his mouth before they've fairly got their tails out of the shell (p.225).

However, when Judge Peter Wendover speaks for the pair, he is not so concerned with a commercial veneer. The "survival of the fittest" is portrayed at the bestial level in the judge. Having first informed Horace Boyce that they have no compunction against wringing his neck and throwing him on the dungheap as they would a dead rat, he then breaks the young lawyer's composure by pointing out that there was a "penitentiary job

in this thing for somebody" (pp.368-69). He clarifies his generalization with the assurance that the courts and newspapers would regard Boyce as the "one chiefly responsible" since they had money and he did not. Boyce is revolted by their "naked selfishness and brutality," and cowers under the "disheartening fact that these men would not hesitate for an instant to sacrifice him—that they did not like him, and would not lift a finger to help him unless it was necessary for their own salvation" (p.371). These same predatory traits are cited in the characterization of Philip Cross in Frederic's preceding historical novel In The Valley, which is set against the background of the American Revolution. Philip is the arrogant, aristocratic descendant of the Mohawk Valley's first ruling baronet, Sir William Johnson, and the natural antagonist to the champion of democracy Douw Mauverensen, who is the narrator and protagonist of the romance. Douw and Philip ultimately meet on opposing sides of the Battle of Oriskany, which ends in a democratic victory for the simpler Dutch settlers over their oppressive neighbors, the aristocratic English landed-gentry. Frederic describes the animated glow in Philip's eyes, noting that the varnish of civilization was seen to melt away from his surface, leaving only "the historic fierce, blood-letting islander, true son of the men who for thirty years murdered one another by tens of thousands all over England, nominally for a York or a Lancaster, but truly from the utter wantonness of the butcher's instinct." During the same period the Dutch ancestors of Douw Mauverensen were "discovering oil painting and perfecting the noble craft of printing with types,"¹⁷ activities more nearly in line with Spencer's peaceful industrial stage of development.

Nor were Frederic's fictional directors of the Thessaly Manufacturing Company, depicted in The Lawton Girl, entirely fictional exaggeration; he had ample suggestion for the pair from the American business scene about him. Vincent P. DeSantis's profile of the industrialists of the latter part of the nineteenth century reveals that the majority were native white and Anglo-Saxon of New England descent, coming primarily from lower- or middle-class families, with little or no formal education. They were usually Protestants, strict denominationalists and outwardly pious men, as Frederic portrays Schuyler Tenney, who "lived above-board," defying "anybody to so much as whisper a word" about his character (p.226). It is hardly unexpected irony that Tenney is shown to be engaged at the same time in inveigling the Minster iron-works into financial ruin by fraudulently involving Mrs. Minster, the widow of the company's founder, in a four-hundred-thousand-dollar debt for machinery patents that she already owned (p.369). DeSantis notes that many of the industrialists had experience in bookkeeping, which again is reflected in Schuyler Tenney. He takes a tabular statement from his pocket-book which Horace had made of the Minster property, and observes that it is a very pretty table which "no bookkeeper could have done . . . better." Though he knows it by heart, he wants it there in sight as the lawyer proceeds (pp.224-25). While the industrialists nearly all displayed a strong craving for riches, a fact that perhaps did not set them apart from other Americans, very few, it has been noted, had a taste for high living.¹⁸ When Tenney visits Horace at his quarters in the General's house he refuses a drink, stating his total abstinence from alcoholic beverages. He looks about the room with

interest and curiosity; it is his first opportunity to study a young gentleman of fashion and culture in the intimacy of his private apartments. Examining the bric-a-brac on the walls and mantles and hefting a bronze trifle or two on the table, and making a comprehensive survey of the furniture and hangings, he comments that it looks like "a ninety-nine-cent store, for all the world" (p.223).

DeSantis notes the early industrialists' aspirations, resourcefulness, and ability; while at times they may have been ruthless and dishonest, he doubts they were any more so than many other of their contemporary Americans. Living at a time when the highest goal was to acquire wealth, they demonstrated that one's position in society was indeed determined by the amount of money he had amassed. In their day they were known as the Captains of Industry and praised for their part in the economic growth of modern America. The late Stephen Minster, "one of the cleverest and most daring of all the strong men" whom Thessaly had produced, was typical of the first enterprising industrialists. His opening of the iron fields at Juno and his building of the smelting-works on the outskirts of Thessaly had altered everything. He had lifted the village at once into the prominence of a manufacturing site (p.146). However, times changed, and few of the industrialists continued to be guided by the morality and ethics that had prevailed in business before the Civil War.

Many of the rising industrialists, having been of military age during the war, took advantage of the legislation which permitted them to hire a substitute or to pay a set sum of money in lieu of military service, as Frederic depicted in his Civil War story, The Deserter. Elisha Teachout,

whose very name is an ironic implication of his out-spoken self-conception of respectability, is bent with rheumatism and his hairless, palid face is shrunken and wrinkled, but he is not old. Rather than sell their unproductive farm to Teachout, the Whipples borrow money from him to pay the taxes on it; by July of 1863 they owe "something over three hundred dollars in accrued interest upon the mortgages he held." To prevent foreclosure and eviction, "Mose Whipple went to the war as Teachout's substitute,"¹⁹ with the agreement that Mose's father should be provided with basic necessities. Old Asa Whipple is certain there is "no other such an all-fired pesky mean name for a man in the dictionary as 'desarter'" (p.68), preferring that he "starved a hundred times over" than allow Mose to do this sort of thing (p.63). Elisha, however, is little bothered by moral scruples, and permits Asa nearly to die as consequence of his repudiation of their agreement.

In the same year James Mellon, son of the founder of the aluminum fortune, requested permission of his father to enlist. The elder Thomas Mellon assured him that those who were able to pay for substitutes did so with no discredit attached. It was not so much the danger he objected to, it was the disease and idleness and vicious habits. Mose voices similar complaints to his father: his pay stopped through the efforts of a German officer, so that Mose never got more than about ten shillings out of his thirteen dollars, and this owed twice over before he gets it; a furlough that does not materialize even after "extra good behavior" and a lieutenant's encouragement that it could be handled; and the idleness of winter quarters around Brandy station without any fighting (pp.69-72). The very pride that

Asa takes in his family's record of service in the Revolution and the War of 1812, which includes his brother's death at Sackett's Harbor "before he 'come of age" (pp.65-6), is exactly what Mellon deprecated. Mellon had hoped for an heir who would be a smart, intelligent businessman, "not such a goose as to be seduced from his duty by the declamations of buncombed speeches."²⁰ The war provided opportunities for making money that were new to the American experience. War contracts demanded production regardless of quality, making possible great fortunes and gigantic frauds. Some of the more notorious included Vanderbilt's production of leaky ships for the government and Morgan's purchase of government-discarded carbines which were sold back to the Army at exorbitant profits. Though both men were later exposed, neither of them was punished.²¹

With the growing power of the trusts, the gulf between management and labor widened and alliances between corporations and politicians proliferated. With court decisions commonly in favor of the private property in the hands of the industrialists, the working class was easily exploited. In The Lawton Girl, Wendover even controls the representatives of organized labor, the "two speech-making fellows who were there from the Amalgamated Confederation of Labor." Rather than these representatives being directed by their labor organization, they take orders from Wendover, even to the acceptance of his instructions to keep their hands off the French-Canadian work crews, whom the rolling-mill people plan to import into Thessaly following the shutdown of the furnaces and lockout of the local employees (p.374). Because the French-Canadian work crews can be hired for lower wages, their presence will effectively destroy any unionized resistance on the part of the Thessaly labor force.

And while Mrs. Minster protests that it is perfectly useless for women to try to understand business matters, their only recourse being in the advice of men in whom they had perfect confidence, she exhibits a simple faith in the power of trusts to "put up prices." She, therefore, signs an agreement to include the Minster iron-works in the proposed combination of "all the iron manufacturers of Pennsylvania and Ohio and New York—called the Amalgamated Pig-Iron Trust," contending that it stood to reason that prices would go up "because trusts limit production." The Captains of Industry of Stephen Minster's time had become the post-Civil War Robber Barons who were guided by the most ruthless principles of social Darwinism. The competitiveness of the small business units of antebellum American industry was checked by trade agreements, associations, and pools to limit competition. But because these devices depended upon voluntary cooperation without court enforcement, industrial trusts were created to provide more efficient control over the individual policies within a single industry. Ownership remained with a single company, but management was consolidated in a single board of directors. The most noted figure in the trust movement was John D. Rockefeller, who formed the Standard Oil Company in 1879, establishing the trust pattern in the United States. More similar to Frederic's fictional Pig-Iron Trust, however, were Andrew Carnegie's enterprises, which Carnegie began by buying out five or six steel companies during the depression of the seventies. Later he bought out and took into his business Henry Clay Frick, who already had control of most of the coke ovens around Pittsburgh; together they created a vertical combine of coal fields, coke ovens, limestone deposits, iron mines, ore ships, and railroads. In 1892, two years after the publication of

The Lawton Girl, the Carnegie Steel Company was formed at a capitalization of \$25 million, controlling all its sources of supply and producing one fourth of all the unfinished steel in the United States. Like those of most of the corporation leaders of this era, Carnegie's labor policy included long hours, low wages, and hostility to trade unions.²²

However, a persistent problem expanded on the industrial scene in the later decades of the nineteenth century. The very industrialists who prided themselves in their rugged individualism increasingly sued for and won government support for their business enterprises. In The Lawton Girl, Horace Boyce complains to Tenney about the prohibitive tariffs that necessitate his leaving behind most of the furniture and hangings he had acquired for his London rooms in Jermyn Street. He notes that this "damned tariff of yours—or ours—makes it cost too much to bring decent things over here." The protective tariff—beginning with the Morrill Tariff of 1861 and expanded by the McKinley bill of 1890, the Wilson-Gorman law of 1894, and the Dingley Tariff of 1897—was particularly beneficial to American manufacturers, permitting them to charge premium prices without fear of foreign competition. The American consumer, of course, was by contrast handicapped since there were no sweeping investigations of business practice, no legislation to protect labor or consumers, and no effective regulatory commissions or laws. American businessmen professed a commitment to the laissez-faire economic theory set forth by the English economist Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations. In reality, however, "the protective tariff violated the laissez-faire economic doctrine, for it was a form of government intervention in the economy on behalf of American

manufacturers."²³ In The Lawton Girl, Horace's slip in consigning the tariff to Tenney is indicative of their respective positions. Since Horace is not yet accepted to the privileged rank of belonging to either the Minster iron-works or the Thessaly Manufacturing Company, it is, indeed, not "Horace's" tariff. The tariffs were important to and sought by business. Mr. Tenney quickly responds to his associate's complaint: "Protection to American industry, my boy. . . . We couldn't get on a fortnight without it" (pp.223-24). Reformers began to voice the opinion that those opposing state interference were the ones who most frequently and successfully invoked it.²⁴

William Graham Sumner, one of America's most influential disciples of Spencer, incurred the wrath of the social Darwinist businessmen when he remained true to his concept of individualism by denouncing the protective tariff as violating genuine individualism. He considered the whole system of government inspectors as corrupting to free institutions because it consisted "in relieving negligent people of the consequences of their negligence and so leaving them to continue negligent without correction."²⁵ It was largely under the influence of Spencer that Sumner concluded that if the principle of the survival of the fittest were rejected, we would have to be prepared to accept the survival of the unfittest. He considered the first as the necessary condition of liberty and civilization, the second as resulting in equality and anti-civilization: "The former carries society forward and favors all its best members, the latter carries society downward and favors all its worst members."²⁶

The problem of humanitarian behavior on the part of the businessman in the relief of distress without violating the tenets of social Darwinism

with any form of aid that might undermine self-reliance was offered some solution by Andrew Carnegie in The Gospel of Wealth (1889). While Carnegie upheld the idea of the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, he also set forth the maxim that the man who died rich, died disgraced. Though he steadfastly denounced the idea of support to a needy individual, he held that a man of wealth was duty bound to establish a trust for surplus funds at his death to be administered to yield the greatest value to the community. Such projects as public libraries, improvement of education, or the promotion of world peace might be supported.

Frederic's Mrs. Desideria Minster is perhaps his clearest exemplification of industrialist respectability. She attends the Episcopal Church regularly, a denomination the author's notes make clear was a symbol for acceptable prestigious social behavior devoid of any spiritual excesses;²⁷ and "she neither professed nor felt any particular devotion to religious ideals or tenets." She gives of her substance generously, though not profusely, "to all properly organized and certified charities, but did not look about for or often recognize when they came in her way, subjects for private benefaction" (p.59). Her religious concept of charity closely follows the prescriptions of Prof. C. W. Hargitt, Ph.D., published in The Christian Advocate and kept among Frederic's papers, which proclaimed, "The parasite is a pauper." Some wholesome lessons on administrative charity might be taken from the corollaries of evolution, he suggested, the application of that somewhat drastic principle "the survival of the fittest" perhaps pointing the way toward a sounder system of social ethics than certain systems then in vogue:

And if these principles obtain in the physical world, is it strange that they should find application in the higher realm of mind or spirit? If the spiritual man turns pauper by shrinking from the stern demands of a higher obligation, is it strange that he shall forfeit the capacity for such high responsibility? It seems to me that under such a view of the case the story of the "talents" takes on a new meaning; and the seeming harshness of the sentence upon the "wicked and slothful servant" resolves into the plainest commonplace of natural law.²⁸

Clearly, however, something had gone awry with the ideal outcome of social Darwinism. Mrs. Desideria Minster's position could no longer be maintained on the legalities of ownership. Frederic creates her as incapable of understanding the intricacies of the new business era and insensitive to the character of those about her. Reuben Tracy considers her perhaps "the most difficult and dangerous element in the whole problem" (p.331). It is incredible to him that any woman in her senses could have done what she seems to have done. She listens uncritically to the advice of Judge Wendover because they knew each other as children, simply refusing to entertain any other suggestions, including those of her daughters, Kate and Ethel. Never having been prepared for a role in the business world and having no innate curiosity about the iron works, she is helpless, her lack of character judgment making her a perfect prey to the voraciousness of Schuyler Tenney and Peter Wendover. Without the intervention of her daughters, the business and the Minster fortune would have been lost, her legal ownership having proved useless against the wiles of the unscrupulous directors of the Thessaly Manufacturing Company. And in this aspect Frederic's fiction tends toward a corroboration of Thorstein Veblen's assessment of millionaires who take possession of the wealth produced by the skill and labor of other people, rather than being responsible, themselves, for the creation of any industrial technology.²⁹

In all of Tenney's and Wendover's business ventures, the same devouring procedure is followed. As the name of The Amalgamated Pig-Iron Trust suggests, its owners "hog" everything with which they come in contact. Tenney's hardware establishment had borne another name on the sign over its portals before the War, that of "Sylvanus Boyce." A year or two after the War, "Boyce & Co." appeared there. During the panic of 1873, it underwent a transformation to "Boyce and Tenney." And then the name of Boyce had disappeared altogether, and the original owner, the dignified General, had dwindled into a position "somewhere between the head bookkeeper and the shipping-clerks" (pp.116-17). When Tenney and Wendover went into the poorly managed little rolling-mill and nail-works at Cadmus financed by "some silly people" and managed by "a sort of half-crazy inventor fellow," apparently the person whose genius invented the nail machine, it too became their exclusive property. Tenney explains that he would not exactly say that the former owners and manager were put out, but after a while they just did not seem to be able to stay in, and they just "kind o' faded away like" (p.228). Operating in the same manner and at the same time as other trusts throughout the country, Tenney and Wendover found this little rolling-mill and nail works at Cadmus off the main line of transportation, but "business was fair enough." They made "a straight ten per cent" because it was managed carefully. By moving the whole concern to Thessaly, however, and connecting it with the iron works, Tenney foresaw that they could save forty-five thousand dollars in the matter of freight alone, and Wendover's previous acquaintance with Mrs. Minster assured the success of the venture. The Thessaly Manufacturing Company was grafted to the larger Minster iron works on paper, but no increase in

production accrued. On Wendover's recommendation, the manufacturing company was stocked with one hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars of the Minsters' cash, and seventy-five thousand dollars of Tenney's and Wendover's. The plant, machinery, business, "good-will and so on" were counted for one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, to stock the Thessaly Manufacturing Company at four hundred thousand dollars, with Tenney and Wendover holding the controlling interest, two hundred and twenty-five shares to the Minsters' one hundred and seventy-five shares (pp.228-29).

Tenney and Wendover had already greatly improved their business position without any additional production on their part, but the scheme proceeds apace. Presumably to acquire a nail machine imperative to the Thessaly Manufacturing Company's survival, they must have four hundred thousand additional dollars, with which, ostensibly, they will be able to control the whole United States market. And since Mrs. Minster will not mortgage the business by endorsing their notes in accordance with a death-bed promise exacted by her late husband, Wendover suggests, instead, that she issue four hundred thousand dollars in bonds on the iron works, about one-third of its value. With Horace's recommendation, Wendover is sure she will consent to that, and there is still no increased production. While the interest on the bonds is projected to cost her twenty-four thousand dollars a year, she will still supposedly profit from the deal because for the first time it will make her share in the manufacturing company a real property instead of a paper asset, which has been obviously worthless. Wendover then suggests she become part of the big pig-iron trust that is currently being formed, which he contends will return twice the amount of

interest in half the time; of course, they will be cutting production now to realize a greater profit. Wendover does not explain, however, why he would advise her to become part of a trust which will be shutting down the Minster furnaces in order to force the price of iron up, for which the Minsters will be compensated, but which will engender a financial burden for Wendover's and Tenney's manufacturing company as the primary buyer of the Minster pig iron.

When Horace inquired of Wendover why he should lend his encouragement to the scheme, Wendover answers him bluntly, because he could "make a pot of money by it." His advice to Horace is to hitch on when he sees a big thing like this travelling his way because "that's the way fortunes are made" (pp.252-54). It is no longer the producers whose efforts make a tangible difference to the well-being of a community, the Stephen Minsters who afforded employment to thousands and good investments to scores, who are prospering. It is now the paper speculators who are taking possession of the wealth accrued by industry; it is they who are amassing fortunes, with no tangible benefit to the society at large. And this constitutes the major target for the progressive political, social, economical, even theological, reform movements of the time. Frederic's major theme is concerned with this struggle between the social Darwinists, exemplified by Tenney and Wendover, the apprentice robber baron and the experienced robber baron,³⁰ and the reform Darwinists, exemplified by Jessica Lawton and supported by Reuben Tracy, Tracy functioning somewhere between the philosophies of the reform Darwinists and the neo-Hegelian idealists.

Without Kate's direct intervention, Mrs. Minster would have been devoured in the social Darwinist unrestricted struggle of the financial fittest. Wendover intended to despoil the estate. If legal investigation could have been delayed until after New Year, Mrs. Minsters' interest would have become due and could not have been paid. Some mob violence was to be instigated to drive her "out of town, and out of the iron business too." And while there is much to be admired in Kate's character, yet her business acumen is not much greater than that indicated by her mother's summation that it was perfectly useless for "women to try and understand these things."

All of Stephen Minster's energy was concentrated in his eldest child, Kate, whose wealth and social position also make her the town's most sought-after maiden. Reflecting the natural selection of biological evolution, the deceased son was described as a light-headed weakling, the other daughter, Ethel, as fragile and physically delicate, while Kate was strong, physically vigorous, and proudly confident of her position, her ability, and the value of her plans and actions (pp.156-57). She is astute enough to recognize that women are often their own worst enemies, wondering why they should be "so brutal to each other," and out-spoken enough to chastise her friend Tabitha for her prejudice against Jessica Lawton. She exacts a promise from Tabitha neither to mention her new tenant's name nor to discuss her within hearing of anyone until Jessica has had a chance to rehabilitate herself. She reflects, thereby, her responsiveness to the new thought of the social scientists concerning the importance of the environment in the development of moral behavior. Acknowledging

the fact that she and Tabitha had both had good homes and fathers who could afford them protection against the world, she is not at all sure they would not have been crushed and overwhelmed if they had been in the thick of the battle, instead of being able to watch it from a private box. Kate's most admirable quality is probably her inquisitive, open mind. Although her own plans are not well defined, in spite of her "confidence in them," she is pliant enough to be inspired by the social undertakings of others. Jessica and Reuben are able to enlist her help with a sitting room for the factory-girls of the village. While Tabitha is offended by the thought of Reuben Tracy making a call on Jessica, Kate compares herself unfavorably with the rich London girl of Walter Besant's socialist novel All Sorts and Conditions of Men, who originated the idea of the "People's Palace of East London's mighty hive of millions." She, Kate, had had to have a similar humanitarian project "hammered into her head" by others (p.208). But once naming the project the Girl's Resting House and dropping by to give Jessica a reasonably comprehensive plan and a considerable sum of money to carry out the plan, Kate is diverted by Horace Boyce's attention to her, after which she avoids both Jessica and the project (p.305).

However, she instinctively recognizes the shallowness of Horace Boyce in his manner of sneering at Americans who had not been to Europe, his condescending air with Kate because he had seen things she had only read about, his patronizing of the railway car—the heating-apparatus, the conductor, the black porter, and all the rest. He looks precisely like all the other young men in New York at that time, "with their coats buttoned in just such a way, and their gloves of just such a shade, and a scarf of just

such a shape with the same kind of pin in it, and their hats laid sidewise in the rack" so that it could be observed that "they had a London maker's brand inside" (pp.65-66). And while Kate also recognizes the good character of Reuben Tracy, she disdains his offer of professional services following the sacrifice of his partnership with Boyce, and remains, through Boyce, at the mercy of Tenney and Wendover. Sulking in a jealous pique because she feels he is more anxious to help the Lawton girl than herself, she explains to her sister Ethel that she would prefer to be helped first and let the reasons come afterward. "Whether the distressed maiden falls into the water or into debt, the principle is precisely the same," she asserts, and she wants a chivalrous hero when she cries for assistance. Admittedly, she might respect Tracy for his ethical concern in respect to his partner's representation of the Minsters' legal affairs; but then one also respected "John Knox, and Increase Mather, and St. Simon what's-his-name on top of the pillar—all the disagreeable people, in fact." It was not, however, respect, Kate Minster felt, that made the world go round. Kate, like Celia Madden in The Damnation of Theron Ware, who appealed for the Reverend Mr. Ware's intercession in the struggle for control of the priest against the scientist, wants emotional commitment. In The Damnation of Theron Ware it was not the young minister's mind that was needed; rather than arguments Celia wanted "sympathies, sensibilities, emotional bonds," and she had already assessed Theron's love "of poetry, of ideals, of generous, unselfish impulses." He could see the human, warm-blooded side of things, and that to Celia was what was really valuable (pp.149-50).

As previously noted, Dr. Ledsmar's position concerning Celia Madden in particular, and women in general, is one of disdain, hating "them all as

enemies of real knowledge" because of their arrested emotional stage in evolutionary development, which closely parallels Comte's lowest theological plane. Frederic's same notation on "Woman" clarified his own feelings about this subject. His premise being that "intellectual superiority in men" went to pieces before "woman's beauty and air of purity, goodness," he notes that Ledsmar regarded this concept of woman's goodness "strictly as illusion." Frederic's own thoughts indicate, to the contrary, that these attributes, when confronted, "seem to be best things there are," evidencing no disparagement in his notation that "women preserved the childhood of the race."³¹

Expressing sentiments similar to Celia's, Kate in The Lawton Girl petulantly contends that there is such a thing as caring "too much for respect, and too little for warmth of feeling, and generous impulses, and—so on." While Tracy agonizes over honorable relationships with his partner, Kate points out to her sister that the latter "would have gone into anything headlong, asking no questions, raising no objections," if she had so much as lifted her finger, never giving Tracy a thought. Apparently realizing her own irrational judgment, Kate directs her comments to the firelight, being conscious of not wanting to meet her sister's glance. However, Kate still adds that she finds the man without scruples more interesting than the man with them (pp.285-87). William James would voice the same dilemma for the turn-of-the-century mind in general, which might well have been directed specifically to Kate:

You want a system that will combine both things, the scientific loyalty to facts and willingness to take account of them, the spirit of adaptation and accommodation, in short, but also the old confidence in human values and resultant

spontaneity, whether of the religious or of the romantic type. And this is then your dilemma, you find the two parts of your quaesitum hopelessly separated. You find empiricism with inhumanism and irreligion; or else you find a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out all definite touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows.³²

James, of course, would come to offer pragmatism as the answer that could satisfy both kinds of demand.³³ Kate, however, without the representation of Reuben Tracy, would have found both her and Ethel's interests dissipated along with their obstinate and implacable mother's. For while Horace Boyce may have been more interesting than Reuben Tracy, he was also more acquisitive. If he could not indirectly control the Minster millions through marriage, he would control them directly by fraudulently wresting the business from their hands into the control of the Amalgamated Pig-iron Trust, and swindling hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Minster iron works through the Thessaly Manufacturing Company. Ultimately, the whole scheme is revealed, entailing Boyce's recommendation to Mrs. Minster to borrow four hundred thousand dollars for the purchase of certain machinery patents that she already owned, patents included with the plant and business at the time of the original stock merger accompanying the Manufacturing Company's move from Cadmus.

The fate of the Minster women suggests that the robber barons were functioning in closer conformity in both intelligence and virtue to Spencer's military society than to the hoped-for industrial era. Spencer considered the fundamental sociological classification to be the demarcation between military societies, in which co-operation was secured by force, and industrial societies, in which co-operation was voluntary and spontaneous.

Spencer's concept of "industrial" designated societies chiefly concerned with producing for their members' needs by peaceful, voluntary cooperation, rather than just "technologically developed." He conceived of military societies being ruled by chiefs who maintained their power by force and superstition, suppressing the status of women, and maintaining a static hierarchical organization.³⁴

More developed in complexity of character than any of the Minster women, it is Frederic's Lawton girl who provides the common-sense, practical approach to reform with an incongruous twist, a technique which becomes a characteristic of Frederic's work. Like Abe Beekman in Seth's Brother's Wife, an unlikely honest political boss, and the Soulsbys in The Damnation of Theron Ware, unlikely good and compassionate debt-raisers, Jessica Lawton is a virtuous fallen woman. She has been reared in the most rudimentary family structure, among grasping, limited siblings and parents who are exemplary of the most extreme naturalism. But the Lawton girl has still developed a moral character, with the help of her old school teacher Reuben Tracy and a new-found friend in Tecumseh, Anne Warren Fairchild, who had taught at the Burfield School before her marriage to Seth Fairchild.

Jessica's courage is obvious in her resolve to come back to Thessaly, not only to suffer the shame of her illegitimate child and expiate her sin like Nathaniel Hawthorne's Hester Prynne, but also to extend positive help for other creative and sensitive girls like herself who had no family provision to develop their potentials. Wearing the "scarlet letter" of shame as a warning to young impressionable girls, however, will not suffice at the close of the nineteenth century. It now requires positive action against the

social consequences brought about by the growing classes of the wealthy and the destitute and the shrinking class of independent American entrepreneurs.

It was Anne Fairchild who had suggested the original plan of a working girl's social club to Jessica. Her plan was based on the new philosophy of progress by involving the people who were to be rehabilitated actually in a project of rehabilitation rather than simply pointing out their sins from a safe and proper distance and then presenting a master plan for them to follow step by step toward predetermined goals in which they had no input, and in most instances no interest nor desire to achieve success. Operating on a master plan with predetermined goals is one of the major reasons for the failure of Emanuel Torr's class-structured community in Gloria Mundi. In this later novel of ideas, set in contemporary England, Frederic explores English nobility and planned societies. Since Emanuel deplores the lives of idleness led by most noblemen, he devotes his own life to the direction of a social scheme he calls the "System." In the role of the benevolent despot, he socially experiments with the lives of the inhabitants of the six controlled villages of Somerset without direction or input from any of those inhabitants who were directly affected by the experimentation. And in spite of Emanuel's emotional and monetary commitment to Somerset's success, the lack of involvement by his community's participants destroys the anticipated accomplishments of his social venture. Frederic's spokesperson, the fiercely independent commoner Frances Bailey, whom the young heir to the Torr Dukedom, Christian Tower, finally wins and makes his duchess, debunks the whole

scheme. The Torr estate, she reminds Christian, was stolen from the birthright of the masses, human beings whom the Torrs, and by inference the entire aristocratic class, have used as animals. Jessica Lawton, conversely, has contact with the prospective members of her social club and can provide an acceptable model to emulate, one that is meaningful to their experience.

Jane Addams, the daughter of a Sunday School-teaching, mill-owning state Senator, born in a small town, and an Illinois Quaker, opened the social settlement called Hull House in Chicago in 1889. And she was to note: "During those first years on Halsted Street nothing was more painfully clear than the fact that pliable human nature is relentlessly pressed upon by its physical environment."³⁵ C. Wright Mills notes that while the more individualistic John Dewey did not explicitly share this deterministic perspective, he did serve as a trustee at Hull House, remaining a "warm friend" and a "regular visitor." In The Lawton Girl, Tracy's sympathy with Jessica's Girl's Resting House, perhaps, is akin to Dewey's continued interest in Hull House, predicated on the theory that the dependence of classes on each other was reciprocal, and that as the social relation was essentially a reciprocal relation, it gave a form of expression that had peculiar value.³⁶ Tracy's reform club, in its turn, is closer in precept to Dewey's and James's neo-Hegelian individualism, to be more fully discussed in the following chapter, than to the more socialistic settlement-house schemes. Nevertheless a sensitivity to the current abuses of the social Darwinists forced many of the reforming voices into some agreement concerning the need for social legislation. Jane Dewey could

construe Miss Addams' view of the settlement as a manner "of learning how to live together" regardless of economic and social position, of learning especially that democracy was a way of life, "the truly moral and human way of life, not a political institutional device."³⁷ And Tracy could present Jessica's proposal to Kate Minster, finally winning her sympathy and financial support for the project, if not her active participation in it.

Frederic's continued interest in social clubs for working girls is attested to in an article in The Soho Club & Home & Girls' Club Union Magazine, published a year or so after The Lawton Girl and preserved among his papers in the Library of Congress. A writer signed only E. M. A. B. recounts her own early work with these clubs beginning in 1873. There being no clubs for girls in those days, and boarding schools and compulsory education existing then only in their infancy, she tried to meet the wants of all, with "classes for reading and writing, needlework classes for those who wished to learn how to make their own garments, while someone read aloud an amusing book." There was also a lending library. The writer found the girls "warm-hearted and most constant" when once their affections were won, and she considered one of her greatest happinesses to have been her gift of "help and sympathy as one woman should always be able to give to another."³⁸ Frederic's conception of Jessica's Girl's Resting House was similar both in attitude and format. Tabitha's initial negative response to Jessica's tenancy was based on her fear for her own reputation; she did not mind having to have the house pulled down, but she was horrified by the thought that it might be made "a rendezvous for all the tag-rag and bob-tail in town." Kate's mind at least remains open to the common-sense of

helping people in their own way, rather than insisting that they accept someone else's way, which she senses is really no help at all; yet she listens only in "an absent-minded manner" when the matter of financing the project is raised by Tabitha. It takes Tracy's enthusiasm to fire a glow of zeal, resulting in Kate's pledge to finance the entire project rather than just insuring Tracy's proposed subscription (pp.200-06). However, in the spring, Jessica is puzzled that the deep enthusiasm Kate Minster showed at the outset of the plan has generated no further interest beyond her initial planning and financing. As the scheme takes tangible form, "some score of work-girls availed themselves of its privileges," with "less friction and more substantial success than Jessica had dared to expect" (p.306).

Positioned between the social Darwinists and the progressive reformers, both of whom are anxious to bring him into their respective camps, is the attractive, impressionable young Horace Boyce, who is indicative, perhaps, of Frederic's concept of the state of contemporary young American manhood. Both sides consider Boyce's good looks and manners, his cultural experience, and his legal knowledge as assets to their causes. Tenney and Wendover could foresee his acceptance as the replacement for Mr. Clarke, the previous Minster attorney who had died unexpectedly in Florida. Tenney makes it his business to take stock of Horace as soon as he comes back to Thessaly to start his practice of law, and is favorably impressed when he "offered on his own hook to lie to Tracy" about his proposed trip to Florida to confer with Mr. Clarke concerning the Minsters' legal affairs (p.140). Reuben Tracy is particularly hopeful that the young Boyce's European experience with social planning

will be a tangible asset to his reform club plans. He is favorably impressed when Horace impulsively gives Ben Lawton a couple of turkeys from General Boyce's pile at Dave Rantell's turkey shoot, convinced that it is the little things that show the character of a man. Horace Boyce, at this point, is not deeply impressed by the philosophies of either position. His naturalistic impulses existing basically in the Darwinian instincts of sex, fear, and hunger, he is primarily concerned with achieving the power necessary for the comforts he feels capable of wresting from his particular physical and social environment. Tracy's appeal for Boyce's reforming support reaches only his concept of prestigious deportment; Horace would have apparently enjoyed being considered a public-spirited citizen. When Tracy explains the role he expects of him in their new partnership, Horace walks down the village street in "a maze of proud and pleasant reflections upon his own admirable qualities." He fancies himself "a public-spirited reformer, whose life was to be consecrated to noble deeds" (p.114). However, Horace has just revealed to Tracy how shallow his conception of reform is. His travels in Europe, which Tracy had hoped would be of such importance to the other proposed members for their new reform club, have given Horace only the new perspective to see, "the prevalence of tobacco juice" upon his return to his native village. The things Horace sees as important to their provincial people include such concerns as the improvement of the cuisine of the American country hotels, which to him compare so unfavorably to the rural inns along the English country side. Then the country roads could be improved by not permitting the farmer to work out his road tax "by going out and ploughing up the highway." And

there should be porters to carry one's luggage at railway stations, and the substitution of light beers and thin, wholesome wines for whiskey. Those ugly flat-topped wooden houses, with tin eaves troughs, he considers to be an abomination to the sight and an obstacle to the growth of civilized people. A penal law might also be enacted against "those beastly sulphur matches with black heads." Here Tracy stops him with a chuckle, and points out that while those things comprise "the graces of life," he himself is concerned with the matters of reform. Still, he is convinced that Boyce's character is right; the partnership is agreed upon, to begin the approaching first of December (pp.112-13).

Horace prides himself as being both intellectually and morally superior to Tenney. He is amused by Tenney's failure to understand an allusion to Richard Brinsley Sheridan. He permits himself "a shadowy smile, emphasized by a subdued little sniff," in response to Tenney's assurance that there is no question of dishonesty about his proposal to fraudulently take control of the Minster fortune. When Tenney explains that he proposes "to get for himself what somebody else has got," Horace quips, using his familiar name for the first time, "you ought to write a book, Schuyler, 'Tenney on Dynamic Sociology'" (p.225). O'Donnell and Franchere note that the title is either irony or error, since "dynamic sociology" was Ward's terminology for his own theories as contrasted to Sumner's social Darwinism. Boyce's smugness and use of Tenney's given name strongly suggest irony on Frederic's part, the entire episode of Tenney's meeting with Boyce being ironic in tone. Boyce is a "dandy" who takes pride in his attractiveness to others. He "flatters" himself, after his

first conversation with the Minsters on the train, that he had discoursed with debonair charm upon his experiences in Europe, "a large number of which could with propriety be described in polite conversation, rather cleverly, skirting delicate points with neatness, and bringing in effective little descriptions and humorous characterizations in quite a natural way" (pp.28-29). He recounts his assets to Tracy as a lawyer and partner in his law firm as including his father's social connections, his study in Europe, and his new acquaintance with the Minsters (p.41).

And Horace is attractive, on the surface. He does get a partnership with Reuben Tracy, he does become the Minster lawyer and wins their social acceptance, and he considers himself entirely capable of holding Tenney and Wendover at bay, to act against them or with them according to the development of his fortunes with Miss Kate Minster. He is yet too callow to realize that his veneer is quickly penetrated, not only by Kate, but even by those to whom he considers himself the most superior. Lacking any firm entrenchment in ethical standards, he is an easy prey to the amoral, if not immoral, social Darwinists Tenney and Wendover.

Tenney's display of ignorance with his ascription of Boyce's allusion to Richard Brinsley Sheridan as to General Phil Sheridan, deceptively encourages the inexperienced young lawyer to enter into Tenney's and Wendover's fraudulent scheme (p.118). At this point, Horace defends Tracy to Tenney, apparently with conviction, as "one of the best fellows alive," and insists he will not enter into any enterprise with the hardware merchant that cannot be shared with his partner. However, Tenney exacts Boyce's promise of secrecy within minutes after his pronouncement to the

contrary. As the uncouth hardware merchant reads Boyce's desire to become the Minsters' legal adviser, the "strange depths in Mr. Tenney's eyes which had been dimly apparent at the outset, and then had been for a long time veiled . . . were now once more discernible."

Once comprehending Boyce's desire to become more closely associated with the Minster ladies and their fortune, Tenney reverses the roles of superiority and takes complete mastery of the situation from the patronizing, but ambitious, young lawyer. Horace will then watch Tenney examine severally all the papers in the Minster box, in spite of the irregularity, because he is contemplating the prospect, through Tenney's and Wendover's intercession, of becoming Mrs. Minster's representative to the Thessaly Manufacturing Company at a salary of five thousand dollars a year (pp.231-33). From this point in the narrative, Horace Boyce slips increasingly deeper into the Wendover, Tenney scheme until both his morals and his legal status are compromised.

However, Frederic's impressionable young lawyer is not conceived in the same avaricious vein as Wendover and Tenney, who as spokesmen for social Darwinism are presumably beyond any useful role in the reformed community. On the positive side of Boyce's character is the fact that he did not know, until Jessica's death scene, about the child she had borne him (p.467), and his ambitions include "honor" as well as "wealth and fame" (p.138). Since the society in which he lived all too often equated honor with wealth and fame, it is not surprising that Horace should also become confused in making this distinction. Though he felt Tenney's help might be of assistance at the outset, Horace does not consider him any more

indispensable than Tracy. He is simply attempting to climb the social scale, naively expecting to stay unencumbered. Frederic admits, in auctorial voice, that, "to do him justice, he had once or twice dwelt momentarily on the plan of simply defying Tenney and doing his duty by the Minsters." However, his complicated predicament contrived by Tenney and Wendover convinces him that the days of martyrdom are long since past, the present calling for one to be smarter than his neighbor. "Turning the other cheek," he feels can no longer suffice under these new circumstances. Thus, Horace concludes he must now accept the rule of eating others, if he is to save himself from being devoured (p.237). Frederic's characterizations strongly suggest that at least some of the fault is society's, with its broad acceptance of social Darwinist thought.

The declarations of the American Economic Association, founded in 1885 by a group of scholars, many of whom had been trained in German Universities, that the state was "an agency whose positive assistance is one of the indispensable conditions of human progress," and that the doctrine of laissez-faire was unsafe in politics and unsound in morals,³⁹ was clearly applicable to Horace Boyce. The talents of the young, even the educated and appealing, are obviously being drained off in superfluous, if not immoral and illegal, endeavors. Horace is the product of the attitudes within the village that make Tracy "sick at heart," including "the greed for money . . . the indifference to real education . . . the narrowness and mental squalor" of the lives of people all about him (p.113). There is every reason that Tracy's reform movement should have impinged upon Boyce's development as a part of the social order of Thessaly. The new academic

economists of the 1880's, including such leaders of revolt as Richard T. Ely of Johns Hopkins, Simon Nelson Patten of Pennsylvania, John R. Commons of Wisconsin, and Wesley C. Mitchell of Columbia, differed in the principles of their economic programs; as the reform politicians and theologians did. They were in agreement, however, in their dissent from the classical belief in absolute economic laws which were to be accepted as valid for all societies. They insisted that society, which was in constant flux, had to be examined in terms of process and growth, their historical approach to the study of economic realities convincing them that there were great disparities between what actually happened and what, according to classical economics, was supposed to have happened.⁴⁰

While Horace Boyce may not have had many redeeming graces, Frederic apparently still had hope for the misshapen Horaces being created by social Darwinism. Access to the Minsters' papers covering the transfer of the right of the nail machine, which Tenney and Wendover arranged to have passed on to Horace as the Minsters' legal representative, is the only reason for Horace's inclusion in Tenney's and Wendover's plans from the outset. The judge is fully aware that it only seems that Horace has induced the swindle, but he counts on the courts and newspapers to regard Boyce as "the one chiefly responsible" (p.371), making it mandatory first to prosecute the more appealing young lawyer if the conniving judge and hardware merchant are ever to be brought to trial at all. The Minsters do not want their young acquaintance prosecuted. Kate defends him to Tracy, arguing that he is credulous, "weak, foolish, vain—what ever you like"; but that it was Wendover and Tenney who had "led him into the thing." She is

still convinced that he did not set out to plunder them, contending that, "others deceived him, and still more he deceived himself" (p.454).

Jessica chooses to renew her friendship with Horace despite the social stigma of the birth of her child. She has not revealed the father of her illegitimate son even though Horace Boyce has deserted her and has thwarted her efforts to gain even minimal acceptance in the village. Kate admits to Tracy that it was Horace's slander of Jessica that kept her from following the progress of *The Girl's Resting House* (p.388).

Morally, Jessica's and Horace's plot lines intersect, she gaining in dignity like Hawthorne's Hester Prynne while he undergoes moral and social degradation. However, no public scaffold scene is to redeem Horace Boyce in a final self-revelation of his cowardly character, as Hawthorne contrived for his Puritan minister, Arthur Dimmesdale. When Jessica confronts Horace near the end of their story, she has gained mastery of herself, finding that she is now "perfectly independent of this or any other man." She finds him "worn and unhappy," looking "years older than he had any chronological right to look," with "heavy lines of anxiety on his face, and his blonde hair . . . powdered thick with silver." When he bursts out vehemently, under the incentive of her sympathy, that he is coming to believe that every man is a scoundrel, and every woman a fool, she counters that there was a long time she thought the same thing. But now she wants him to know that she is no longer angry with him, having learned a host of bitter lessons since they had been young together. Horace finds the mere contact with someone who liked him for himself a refreshing novelty, and has to admit that dear old Jess was "the best of the lot . . . a damned decent sort of girl—considering everything" (pp.412-16).

O'Donnell and Franchere consider Jessica's death scene in the final chapter as remarkable for its use of interior monologue and a curious mixture of pre-Freudian symbolism, even if it is only a gratuitous addition to the finished story. Frederic was later to feel that she did not deserve to die at all, and considered it false and cowardly on his part to make her die.⁴¹ Quite possibly, however, his lapse was more attributable to his interest in drama and to the demands of morality of the American theater than to cowardice. His lasting interest in the dramatic form was made manifest in his rewriting of several of his novels into dramatic scenarios as well as his attempt to write several original plays. Jessica's death scene included the melodramatic elements of passion and pathos popular at the time and fulfilled the general requirements of the American stage pertaining to the fallen woman.⁴² Jessica's ultimate sacrifice of her life, of course, is an attempt to save Horace from disgrace, but more importantly, the progressive social planner entrusts the care of her beloved "young Horace" to him, with the stipulation only that he never "let him lie—ever—to any girl." And Horace's promise to do so bodes hope yet for his responsible manhood, bringing the novel to a close on the optimistic note that Horace Boyce, still functioning as a free moral agent, will consciously choose a responsible role in his community.

Charles Child Walcutt considers Frederic weak in planning unified plots, and states that even had Frederic possessed plotting ability he would still have to be considered too closely "attached to the notion of ethical responsibility ever to see his characters as completely the creatures of external forces."⁴³ Therefore, in spite of the trace of determinism

Frederic shows "by the way in which he transforms rural 'setting' into an active force that changes, fundamentally, the people who come under its influence,"⁴⁴ Walcutt feels that he cannot be considered entirely a naturalistic novelist. In contrast to Oscar Cargill, who noted Frederic's "discipleship" to the French historical naturalists, Erckmann-Chatrian,⁴⁵ Walcutt sees no evidence of Frederic's concern with science or heredity in any way comparable to that of the French naturalists,⁴⁶ contending instead that Frederic was just too "inept in the architecture of his novels . . . to make any operation of determinism" control the patterns of his stories.⁴⁷

However, the social critic Clarence R. Decker points out that the realistic revolt in England was less violent than that on the Continent, and as the Victorians were only mildly or indirectly involved in proselytizing literary reform: "Realism, and later Naturalism, affected Victorian life and letters much as the radical social changes modified her economic and political patterns." There was no sudden eruption, he contends, only reforms, whether peaceful or not, which came with little of the furor aroused in France or Germany, the Victorians absorbing by a kind of osmosis the new spirit.⁴⁸

If Frederic's fiction is considered in the same social framework, then his indignation at rural wickedness, combined with that faith in the common man which seemed to have flourished as long as there were frontiers open, might be no more an indication of his ineptness, which Walcutt contends prevented him from "achieving the scientific detachment and the dispassionate comprehension of social pressures . . . essential to naturalism,"⁴⁹ than it is an expression of his conception of a reportorial

"truth to nature" as he saw it reflected in the social structure about him. This conception Howells praised from the "Editor's Study" in Harper's, considering the newest and best things in Seth's Brother's Wife to be the dramatic studies of local politics and politicians. These were rendered, he felt, as they were found in the field of actualities, and as the newspapers, from which Frederic seemed to have gotten his training for literature, knew them.⁵⁰ Edwin Cady notes Frederic's having been "Howell's grateful scholar" as well as his "grateful ally," the friendship continuing throughout Frederic's life. In a letter to Howells the same year of his death, Frederic stated that he would "belong to any hose-company or target-shoot" with Howells "and be happy."⁵¹

V. L. Parrington considered the problem confronting American liberalism to be centered on the problem of the subjection of property to social justice, with the intellectuals immersing themselves in European collectivistic philosophies—in Marxism, Fabianism, Syndicalism, and Guild Socialism—sweeping away the last shreds of political and social romanticism. Considering the doctrine of economic determinism as revealing the significance of the industrial revolution, he noted that with the acceptance of the "principle of economic determinism, liberalism still clung to its older democratic teleology, convinced that somehow economic determinism would turn out to be a fairy godmother to the proletariat and that from the imperious drift of industrial expansion must eventually issue social justice." Armed with this faith, liberalism threw itself into "the work of cleaning the Augean stables," with its resultant reward, however, remaining elusively for the achievements of President Wilson's first

administration.⁵² Frederic's work, reflecting a concern very similar to this combination of idealism and economic determinism, might well have been accorded a more lengthy discussion in the body of his study than the limited comments, confined to Seth's Brother's Wife, relegating the novel to a bitter, defeatist account of the flight from country to town.⁵³

Frederic's themes reflect an early sensitivity to the social effects of the flagrant abuses of the industrial trusts which were to prompt later economists, seconding Ward's assault on social Darwinism, to assert that each individual personality was shaped by social institutions which were themselves amenable to social control. By 1907, Allsworth Ross would contend that in the new industrial society, morality required the impersonal corporation to accept full responsibility for its anti-social acts,⁵⁴ a message similar to what Frederic foreshadowed by 1889 in The Lawton Girl. Larzer Ziff, in fact, was so impressed by Frederic's "fictionalized social studies" that he conjectures that had Frederic escaped a premature death (a death Ziff rushes to even greater prematurity by having him die at thirty-two), he would increasingly have concerned himself with explicit political problems. Ziff contends that should he have survived into the next decade—that of Progressivism—"he might very well have turned from fiction altogether."⁵⁵

The dichotomy enveloping much of the Frederic criticism concerning his optimistic or pessimistic point-of-view, his idealism or determinism, appears to be a critical problem incurred with the hindsight of the twentieth century, the increasing concern with the critical separation of the various streams of philosophical thought, and more particularly the

diverse strands of idealism and positivism. This distinction between a scientific and an idealistic interpretation was made by only a few philosophers in Frederic's own time, the idea of progress as it actually existed in the nineteenth-century mind consisting generally of a loose interweaving of both strands into a comprehensive notion of progressive development. Jerome Hamilton Buckley noted that, like Henry George, most Victorian social thinkers were content to accept the inevitability of gradualness as they strove to advance the proposals they had adopted. While European Marxists worked out deductively in the light of a romantic idealism what they viewed as the perfect state, the scholarly Fabians followed the inductive method to slow but certain change for a future of unknown possibilities. The British "socialists," operating on various intellectual levels, succeeded over the years in subtly reshaping a large part of the nation's industrial economy. Yet their "radical" thought barely touched the creative imagination of the late Victorian artist, other than in a few novels like Walter Besant's All Sorts and Conditions of Men (1882) and Bernard Shaw's Unsocial Socialist (1883).⁵⁶ Frederic, too, was interested in such writings and reflected their concerns in his own fiction.

Viewed in the context of this social analysis of his milieu, the melange of determinism and individualism Frederic displays in his works need not necessarily stigmatize him a confused writer any more than it might justify his grasp, if not his total philosophical understanding, of the intricacies existing in the tensions between the progressive social projections of both the collectivists and the individualists. Regardless, any study of Frederic's fictive canon must consider the theme of individualism

as fully as determinism. His sympathetic portrayal of the more individualistic Reuben Tracy suggests a broader philosophical and intellectual approach to progressive reform than a singular focus on economic and social determinism. Other of Frederic's novels deal more directly with the opposing dominant strand of nineteenth-century intellectual thought, that of metaphysical idealism, particularly as it was incorporated into democratic individualism.

NOTES

¹Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought (Baltimore, 1971), p.5.

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³In Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1968), p.9.

⁴Mandelbaum, p.12.

⁵Cargill, p.9.

⁶Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880's (New Haven, 1963), p.199.

⁷Harold Frederic, The Damnation of Theron Ware, in The Major Works of Harold Frederic (New York, 1969), I, 329-30.

⁸Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (London, 1901), pp.205-6.

⁹"Spencer, Herbert," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1972), XXI, 1-3.

¹⁰Notes for The Damnation of Theron Ware, The Harold Frederic Papers, Library of Congress.

¹¹Robert Langbaum, ed., The Victorian Age, 2nd ed. (Greenwich, Connecticut, 1967), p.72.

¹²In Louis B. Wright and others, The Democratic Experience, Rev. ed. (Glenview, Illinois, 1968), p.250.

¹³In Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, Rev. ed. (Boston, 1955), p.48.

¹⁴Herbert Spencer, Principles of Biology, I, 444, in "Spencer, Herbert," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1972), XXI, 2.

¹⁵Herbert Spencer, Social Statics (New York, 1954), pp.288-9.

¹⁶Harold Frederic, The Lawton Girl, in The Major Works of Harold Frederic (New York, 1969), IV, 227.

¹⁷Harold Frederic, In the Valley, in The Major Works of Harold Frederic (New York, 1969), IV, 237.

¹⁸Wright, p.249.

¹⁹Harold Frederic, The Deserter, in The Major Works of Harold Frederic (New York, 1969), II, 47-8.

²⁰Wright, p.249.

²¹Wright, p.249.

²²Wright, p.252.

²³Wright, p.246

²⁴Wright, p.283.

²⁵Wright, p.282.

²⁶William Graham Sumner, Essays, eds. A. G. Keller and M. R. Davie (New Haven, 1934), II, 56, 95.

²⁷In his notes, various characters were indicated as Methodists, Presbyterians, or Episcopalians, and then apparently as they took definitive shape in his mind some of the denominations were marked out and changed, Episcopalians designating the highest social scale. In his notes for the unpublished short story, "Cordelia and the Moon," for example, the parish choir was changed from Catholic to Methodist, and then Cordelia's narrow-minded Uncle was relegated to the expelled faction of free-Methodists. —"Notes for 'Cordelia and the Moon'," The Harold Frederic Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁸"Clippings for The Damnation of Theron Ware," The Harold Frederic Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁹Wright, p.284.

³⁰Thomas F. O'Donnell and Hoyt C. Franchere, Harold Frederic (New York, 1961), p.92.

³¹"Notes for The Damnation of Theron Ware," The Harold Frederic Papers.

³²In C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York, 1966), p.20.

³³Mills, p.33.

³⁴Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, in "Spencer, Herbert," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1972), XXI, 2.

³⁵Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House, with Autobiographical Notes (New York, 1910), p.196.

³⁶Addams, p.91.

³⁷Addams, p.29.

³⁸"Printed Matter," The Harold Frederic Papers.

³⁹Wright, p.283.

⁴⁰Wright, p.283.

⁴¹O'Donnell and Franchere, p.95.

⁴²Frederic's contemporary, the dramatist Bronson Howard, who founded the American Dramatists Club in 1891 and was later to be considered the "Dean of American Drama," voiced attitudes which were to hold sway among the dramatists long after the novelists were experimenting not only with realism but the more extreme forms of naturalism as well. Drama critics William Coyle and Harvey G. Damaser consider Howard's innocent, wholesome, outspoken heroines somewhat similar to those of William Dean Howells and Henry James, as well as his concern with contrasts between the Old World and New World cultures and the rise of the businessman to a dominant position in American life. But while his conviction that America needed plays that lauded virtue and denounced vice won him the praise of Theodore Roosevelt, it limited his art to an antiseptic realism. In an address made at Harvard in 1886, he contended: "The wife who has once taken the step from purity to impurity can never reinstate herself in the world of art on this side of the grave; and so an audience looks with complacent tears on the death of an erring woman."—William Coyle and Harvey G. Damaser, eds., Six Early American Plays: 1798-1890 (Columbus, Ohio, 1968), p.205.

⁴³Charles Child Walcutt, "Harold Frederic and American Naturalism," American Literature, 11 (March 1939-January 1940), 17.

⁴⁴Walcutt, p.15.

⁴⁵Cargill, pp.414-15.

⁴⁶Walcutt, p.14.

⁴⁷Walcutt, p.22.

⁴⁸Clarence R. Decker, The Victorian Conscience (New York, 1952), p.18.

⁴⁹Walcutt, p.22.

⁵⁰"Editor's Study," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, 81 (October 1890), 801.

⁵¹Edwin H. Cady, The Realist at War (Syracuse, 1958), p.212.

⁵²Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (New York, 1930), III, 412.

⁵³Parrington, III, 288.

⁵⁴Wright, p.283.

⁵⁵Larzer Ziff, The American 1890s: Life and Times of a Lost Generation (New York, 1966), p.217.

⁵⁶Jerome Hamilton Buckley, The Victorian Temper (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969), p.209.

CHAPTER III

DEMOCRATIC IDEALISM

American political life in the last half of the nineteenth century has been critically censured as consistently low in moral and intellectual tone, when political patronage virtually corrupted the very fabric of the country. Politicians, it has been contended, were a group of spoilsmen who served the business community as they were themselves served by business. American historian Vincent P. DeSantis conjectures that this political lethargy was due, in part, to changing economic conditions colliding with outmoded economic philosophies. Far-reaching economic changes generated by the industrial revolution following the Civil War necessitated extensive social re-adjustments, he contends, and economic upheavals arising from recurrent industrial crises and depressions called for innovative governmental action. But since American opinion still adhered to the conviction that government should "let well enough alone," both political parties ignored these new issues, or else revived old ones. Problems concerned with the new economic order were seldom aired in the political arena unless a third party became sufficiently powerful to force it there.¹

Operating yet in harmony with the dominant economic philosophy of the times, laissez-faire, the acceptable role of government was noninterference in the management of business or in personal affairs other than the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property. Nor was resistance to social legislation confined exclusively to a coalition between politicians and businessmen. Prominent educators, editors, clergymen, and economists also defended the doctrine of business enterprise free of governmental control as the surest promotion of economic progress which rewarded each according to his talents and efforts, a secular attitude not difficult to integrate with the Calvinism of the first settlers.

However, if the processes of government were stagnated at the last quarter of the century, intellectualism was alive and vital; creative thinkers of the eighties and nineties have been counted among the most prominent in the history of American ideas. Harold Frederic's journalism and fiction were nourished by these new currents of thought generated by the sociologists and economists who were in revolt against the rugged individualism and fatalism of the social Darwinists. American businessmen had rigorously applied the highly respected concepts of Herbert Spencer to free enterprise, justifying their own financial achievements as the full flower of evolution. As the century moved to an end, new minds saw the necessity for a synthesis between the older, more traditional tenets of individualism and the new concepts of social responsibility for all individuals. The economic shifts resulting from the exhaustion of the open frontier and the vast growth of monopolies marked by ruthless competition and control of prominent politicians impelled the spokesmen for divergent types of radicalism, who were yet in agreement on the ineffectiveness of

the unorganized individual approach in reform, to accept some measure of collective action and the expansion of legislative control over private interests.

In part, this reforming zeal is attributable to the proponents of neo-Hegelianism, who were active and influential both in this country and Great Britain in the last two decades of the century, among them Josiah Royce and William T. Harris. Royce disagreed with European commentators who found American civilization engulfed in a wave of materialism, countering that idealism and materialism had effected an even balance in the national life. William T. Harris created a broad platform for the propagation of the new social thought with his establishment and editorship of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, the first American periodical dealing entirely with philosophical matter. A great many essays and lectures, rather than lengthy treatises, tended to enhance his prestige in his own time; and Hegelianism provided an optimistic philosophy from which a democratic idealism could be formed to suit the American mind. As literary critic Merle Curti notes, Hegelianism, without relinquishing the individualistic ideals of self-help and self-activity, still held forth the concept of the individual being lifted to a higher plane of self-realization with its endowment of a noble and immortal destiny. At the same time the individual was still subordinated to the existing social institutions with the insistence that the true, spiritual self could be realized only by the adjustment of the individual to the divinely-established existing social institutions. Thus, Harris was able to provide "cogent arguments for regarding the individual and the solidarity of society as one and the same"; for the individual, he contended, could "realize himself only through the

family, school, church, and state."² But while the neo-Hegelians accepted the German belief that individuals were parts of a single absolute mind, they, unlike the orthodox Hegelians, interpreted each individual as a separate part of this whole and as such capable of making an independent, singular contribution to it. From the 1870's to the close of the century, according to DeSantis, German idealism, particularly as expressed by Hegel, was the most important new influence in the American democratic experience. The idealist, following Hegel, could yet believe that beyond the continuous change of the world of the senses there was still an unchanging, perfect, and absolute world, toward which this imperfect world was inexorably being drawn by a rational will.

With the advent of the reform Darwinists in the 1880's, particularly Lester Frank Ward, who contended that man was capable of using his intelligence to both plan and direct his future, the American scene was set for an expanding role by its political and social institutions in the welfare of the lives of its citizens. Credited with Spencer and Comte as the founders of modern sociology, Ward was profoundly influenced by the doctrine of evolution, as was William Graham Sumner, professor of sociology and political economy at Yale, and Spencer's most authoritative disciple. Yet Ward interpreted evolution not as a blind, mechanistic, trial and error process but rather as a cosmic force in which the resolute efforts of men's minds were capable of performing a decisive function. Thus he advocated an education in which the scientific spirit and method were given priority, and encouraged the utilization of government as a vital and forceful instrumentality to any economic and social change beneficial to the achievement of man's highest possibilities. In contrast to the social

Darwinists, who contended that social relations were the end result of natural processes, in which neither physical nor social phenomena were subject to human control, the reform Darwinists insisted that all the practical benefits of science were directly attributable to man's control of natural forces. Because Ward could see "no natural harmony between natural law and human advantage," he felt that the prevailing laissez-faire economic system did not necessarily signify the advancement of human progress, and advocated, instead, not only social planning but state management as well. Like Sumner who had incurred the wrath of the social Darwinist businessmen by attacking the protective tariff as a violation of genuine individualism, Ward noted that "Those who dismiss state interference are the ones who most frequently and successfully invoke it."³

With greater emphasis on the Hegelian concept of the "civil" society than the neo-Hegelians were inclined to give it, the new order of American economists, many of whom had studied in German universities before founding the American Economic Association in 1885, insisted that the state was an agency whose position was one of the "indispensable conditions of human progress" and that the doctrine of laissez-faire was "unsafe in politics and unsound in morals."⁴ Contrary to Spencer's notion that society was composed of separate individuals, all operating independently of one another, the reform voice called for a new perspective, and asserted that each individual personality could be moved and shaped by social institutions which in turn were themselves amenable to social regulation. In harmony with the Hegelian dialectic, they insisted that the continuously changing society had to be examined in terms of process and growth. "Using the historical approach to study economic realities, they discovered that there

were great differences between what actually happened and what, according to classical economics, was supposed to have happened."⁵

However, Americans were not easily dissuaded from their individualistic attitude, which was democratic and equalitarian, albeit perceived only in social and political terms. In the American tradition, economics had consistently expressed itself in inequality; but since economic success continued to be optimistically expected, there was little envy for any who had already achieved it. So in spite of the creative minds active in the social sciences, individualism continued to flourish in the area of politics. Merle Curti conjectures that in depth political reform was resisted primarily because no serious external threat forced American nationals into sacrifices of some of their most cherished liberties in the interest of mutual protection. Thus new ideas remained for the most part in the speculative stage up until the First World War, coming into fruition only in the middle years of the twentieth century. Neither Ward nor other social critics, Curti notes, exerted any real influence on even the liberal politicians of the age, whether they designated themselves Populists, Insurgents, or Progressives. On the whole, the reform elements devoted their energies to the immediate problems of governmental supervision of business and the conservation of the nation's resources.⁶

Frederic's life-long concern with political reform was in evidence throughout his reportorial and fictional efforts. He staunchly supported Grover Cleveland, first for Governor of New York and later for president of the United States, and became a familiar of Edgar Kelsey Apgar, the Deputy State Treasurer who organized Cleveland's campaigns. His journalistic career brought him directly into contact with both the

American political scene, as reflected in his developmental work on Utica's Herald and Observer and Albany's Evening Journal, as well as the British and Continental problems of state, as correspondent for the New York Times. Frederic also fictionally explored various forms of political thought. Democratic idealism, in particular, was a prominent theme in his earlier American fiction: Seth's Brother's Wife and The Lawton Girl, as well as the historical writings concerned with the Revolution and the Civil War.

In The Lawton Girl, published in 1890, Frederic broadly explored theoretic reform, not only reform Darwinism, as exemplified in Jessica Lawton's Girl's Resting House, but also democratic idealism, as expressed in Reuben Tracy's civic service club. Frederic's thematic development is particularly sensitive to the economic forces of social Darwinism as they impacted on the quality of American community life. Reuben Tracy, one of Frederic's most sympathetic fictional characters if possibly not among the most memorable, sets forth the neo-Hegelian thought of the time. His character, like that of Seth Fairchild in Seth's Brother's Wife and the better known Reverend Mr. Theron Ware in The Damnation of Theron Ware, was first developed in the writing Frederic set in his fictional district of New York State. Larzer Ziff notes Frederic's "fiction of the commonplace," contending that he surpassed Howells "in rendering a sense of communal density. Not until Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha County," he feels, "did American literature have a region so fully and intimately explored as Frederic's fictionalization of his native area."⁷

By nature, Tracy is both a teacher and a reformer: "the man could never contemplate injustices, great or small, without longing to set them

right."⁸ He first taught school in Thessaly, his students having included Jessica Lawton in her formative years; but then his interests turned to law. Originally he studied by himself, and then later he studied at Tecumseh with Richard Ansdell, the progressive politician who inspired Seth Fairchild in his formative years as a journalist; and finally, he studied for a year at Columbia Law School in New York. He was successful enough there to have had "fair prospect of remaining," but Tracy could not like New York. Its size prohibited any chance of his personal development there, and his political ambitions did not extend to any public office or interest beyond his own village (p.108). Tracy's longing for the improvement of his own villagers reflects a philosophy similar to that of the neo-Hegelian Josiah Royce, who adapted Hegel's monism to the American scene. Although Royce accepted Hegel's tenet that all minds are related to the single mind as a whole, he conceived of the absolute as endowing the individual with a moral will which could be independently realized through the community. Each individual then, while a necessary part of the absolute, could still make a unique contribution to the whole.⁹ Tracy's notion is to single out a small community and make a systematic attempt to improve its intelligence, its good taste, its general public attitude toward its own public affairs. He is sure one could "fairly count on at least some results, going at it in that way." Like the neo-Hegelians he is convinced that the public mind can be moved and upgraded, coming finally to "a calm, high level of intelligence about the management of such affairs as the people have in common." Reform rhetoric, he contends, "is trite commonplace," to be read in "any newspaper any day," effecting nothing because no particular person is addressed (pp.108-11). Royce believed the individual's salvation

lay in loyalty to a cause —"to some cause to which the community, through which he could alone realize his moral independence, professed allegiance." It is not surprising, therefore, Merle Curti contends, that Royce extolled the cause of regionalism that had already found acceptance in both political movements and the local color school of literature.¹⁰

Tracy points out that politics should embrace in its meaning "all the ways by which the general good is served, and nothing else." And disdaining the tenets of social Darwinism, he notes that politics had come to mean "first of all the individual good, and quite often the sacrifice of everything else" (p.109). It had become all too easy for a man to attach importance to the personal honor and the profit. Tracy's proposed reform club was conceived as an instrument for community development, a means of changing the attitudes of the village that made him sick at heart: "greed for money, the drunkenness, the indifference to real education, the neglect of health, the immodesty and commonness of the young folks' thought and intercourse, the narrowness and mental squalor" (p.113). The fact that Horace Boyce felt it was like that everywhere is no comfort to Tracy, for he was convinced that his townsmen should be infinitely better by comparison, and he was certain that they had it in them to be better.

In his analysis of the effects of individualism in America, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that the free institutions of the citizenry coupled with their active exercise of political rights, reminded every citizen that he lived in society, and impressed upon him that it was the duty of men as well as in the interest of men to be useful to their fellow creatures. "Men attend to the interests of the public, first by necessity, afterwards by choice; what was intentional becomes an instinct, and by dint of working

for the good of one's fellow citizens, the habit and the taste for serving them are at length acquired."¹¹ All that is missing in Thessaly, Tracy feels, is the someone to be concerned about the others, "to organize public feeling for its own improvement"; and that is what he dreams of trying to do (pp.113-14). The fundamental principle on which the proposed club should be established, according to Tracy, is that it is to have "nothing to do with anything outside Thessaly and the district roundabout"; he wants the members to establish the habit of minding their own immediate business. He charges the newspapers with teaching the people to attend to what was going on in New York and Chicago and London and Paris, every place except their own, which he considers a great evil. As for Tracy, he feels they had become like "a gossiping woman who spends all her time in learning what her neighbors are doing, and lets the fire go out at home." Nevertheless, he wants to believe that this could "be altered a good deal," if only the club set to work at it (p.111).

Thessaly's club was both conceived and founded on democratic principles. Neo-Hegelianism lent itself particularly to the older, traditional forces of individualistic democracy which were becoming overwhelmed by the aggregates of mass power, not only in the forms of the corporate trust but in the national state as well. Although Tracy wants to effect change, the change is not to be dictated; and even Horace Boyce's arrangement of his own presidency does not distress him. He thinks perhaps Boyce might be the best man for the office since he has had the opportunity to study these things in Europe, including "the cooperative institutes in the English industrial towns." Tracy wants to believe that Boyce will put his soul into insuring the success of the citizens' venture (p.152).

Although Hegel's conception of the ideal state was a form of monarchy—limited, however, by parliamentary government, trial by jury, and toleration for dissenters—his insistence on a synthesis of universal individual claims made his philosophy malleable to the democratic idealism of the British and American neo-Hegelians. In his proposal of the "universal" class, Hegel set forth a concept of a dedicated "meritocracy," with a generally middle-class character, comprised of the members of the executive and the state officials. In this large and stable social stratum, Hegel contended, would be found the "educated intelligence and the consciousness of right of the mass of people."¹² It was particularly this middle-class emphasis that appealed to the American interpretation. As Tracy talks to the men who assembled outside the Minster home at the instigation of Judge Wendover, he admonishes them to "beware of men who preach the theory that because you are puddlers or moulders or firemen, therefore you are different from the rest of your fellow-citizens." Although the American lawyer had attained social prominence and, according to Henry Steele Commager, "throughout the nineteenth century dominated the legislature of even the farming states,"¹³ at a time when his British counterpart was only a minor clerk, Tracy resents the idea that because he was a lawyer and one of his fellow-citizens, for example, was a blacksmith, they were to be considered as members of different classes. He would have liked for everyone to resent it, thus obliterating what he considers an abominable word, "classes," from the English language as spoken in America (p.444). By the 1890's, this was considered virtually accomplished. The War and Reconstruction in the South, the eclipse of Beacon Street and Gramercy Park by new fashionable suburbs like

Brookline and Tuxedo Park, brought to a close the only indigenous aristocracies America had known, and the assurance of the triumph of the middle class. This move toward social uniformity tended to direct class antipathies to economic rather than social considerations.¹⁴

Frederic's concern with this same democratic theme was more explicitly developed in his historical romance In The Valley, set against the background of the American Revolution in the Mohawk Valley. The aristocratic pretensions of the Irish Johnsons and Butlers based on the old British aristocracy propel them into a class war against their simpler, democratic neighbors of Dutch-German extraction, with whom the protagonist Douw Mauverensen sides in spite of his regard for his Scotch-Irish aristocratic benefactor Mr. Stewart. Frederic depicts the Battle of Oriskany as a class struggle between the Tory aristocracy led by the Johnsons and Butlers and the middle-class farmer and merchant patriots under the command of Nicholas Herkimer.

In keeping with Hegel's concept of qualitative Nation-Spirits, Frederic depicts a decaying social class structure superimposed on the American scene. "The Nation," Hegel contended, "lived the same kind of life as the individual when passing from maturity to old age—in the enjoyment of itself—in the satisfaction of being exactly what it desired and was able to attain."¹⁵ Like persons, nations too grew strong and virile or became weak and decadent, international life serving as the acid test of national wills.

It was the decadent spell of Europe that made it possible "to burn a slave to death by legal process" there in the Valley, and it was "still within the power of careless, greedy noblemen in London, who did not know the

Mohawk from the Mississippi, to sign away great patents of land, robbing honest settlers of their all." But Douw felt even as a boy that "the spell of America" was certainly to come, which should bring a remedy to all these things: "One could see wherein the age of Pitt differed from and advanced upon the age of Colbert, on this new continent, and could as in prophecy dream of the age of Jefferson yet to come" (pp.61-62). To illustrate his principle of class-structured social decadence more concretely, Frederic makes a connection between thick ankles, trousers, and democratic Whigs as opposed to the old-world trimmings of the well-turned calves belonging to the dying aristocratic Tories. After the peace, when the Whigs became masters of their own country, forming a culminating synthesis in a singular expression of ethnic and cultural determinations along democratic lines, Douw was to find it still largely a matter of lower limbs: "The faction which stood nearest Old-World ideas and monarchial tastes are said to have had great delight in the symmetry of Mr. Adams's underpinning, so daintily displayed in satin and silk. And when the plainer majority finally triumphed with the induction of Mr. Jefferson... was it not truly a victory of republican trousers," he queries, "—a popular decree that henceforth all men should be equal as to legs?"¹⁶

But neither Douw nor Tracy, in the The Lawton Girl, is suggesting a "classless society" in the sense of communal ownership. Tracy admonishes the men gathered outside the Minster home that because this was a free country, they were all the more bound to respect one another's rights. In America, Tracy contends, there was no place for a mob, nor even the "thought of a riot." The strength of the country lay in the idea of being one's own policeman—one's own soldiery (p.444). The notion of meeting

was admirable, and had Tracy not availed himself of the opportunity to speak to them there, he would have called a meeting "in a more convenient place" to talk the matter over with them (pp.441-42). But the notion of forming a crowd outside the Minster home "was not American," as well as being "an unsatisfactory and uncivil way of going at the thing" (p.444). On economic and political questions, William James was ordinarily counted among the classic liberals; commenting on the Chicago anarchists, he too felt they were bound to be foreigners, since "no native American would act like that."¹⁷ The auctorial voice considers Tracy's courageous stand for democratic principles as the foundation of his later political eminence, but Tracy would credit his success to "the better sense of his auditors," who "from the outset, wanted him to succeed," because his sincerity impressed "a very decent and bright-witted lot of men" (pp.445-46).

While Frederic did not envision a socialistic state for Tracy's ideal village, he did deal concretely with the disruptive forces of capitalistic expansion, particularly the proliferation of the trusts. The late Stephen Minster is described in positive terms as "one of the cleverest and most daring of all the strong men whom the section had produced," but it is a combination of actions that account for his daring and cleverness. It is not only that he had recognized the "choicest combination of ores to be found in the whole North," and that he had had the force to get the necessary capital "to erect and operate the works," but also that he had afforded "employment to thousands and good investments to scores" that accounts for the colossal fortune amassed for the founder and heirs of the Minster iron-works. The important aspect of the industry is that "during all the dozen or more years of their existence they had never once been out of

blast." Even in the "seasons of extreme depression in the market" that idled Pennsylvania, St. Louis, and Chicago, "these chimneys . . . had never ceased for a day to hurl their black clouds into the face of the sky" (pp.23-24). Although Stephen Minster has avoided the "public-spirited bequests" expected in the wills of such wealthy men, in accordance with the social Darwinist Andrew Carnegie's The Gospel of Wealth, Stephen Minster is still a "Captain of Industry" rather than a "Robber Baron." Frederic's tone indicates no undue concern with the lack of charitable bequests; however, his fictive imagination does reflect a deep concern with the responsible usage of private enterprise. Thessaly is doomed without the Minster iron works in operation and calamity stalks the village with the closing of the furnaces "for the first time since the place had begun its manufacturing career." Like a group of mourners, the idled workers "instinctively hung about the deserted works." In a scene similar to the wasteland imagery which would recur in much of the creative work of the twentieth century, Frederic depicts their dismal plight: "the tall, smokeless chimneys, the locked gates, the grimy windows—through which the huge dark forms of the motionless machines showed dimly, like the fossils of extinct monsters in a museum—the dreary stretches of cinder heaps and blackened waste which surrounded the silent buildings—all these had a cruel kind of fascination for the dispossessed toilers" (pp.352-53).

Commager notes that one of the enduring aspects of the American character was its willingness to accept hardship with fortitude, in part because the American believed that fortitude, "together with industry, shrewdness, and a little luck," was certain to be rewarded in the end. "He preached the gospel of hard work and regarded shiftlessness as a vice more

pernicious than immorality."¹⁸ For these artisans of Thessaly, "employment, regular and well requited, had become a matter of course"; they "lacked experience in enforced idleness," and unlike the ancient Hebrews in bondage, they did not know "the trick of making bricks without straw." Frederic reflects that, "Even on ordinary holidays the American workman, bitten as he is with the eager habitude of labor, more often than not some time during the day finds himself close to the place where at other times he is employed" (p.352).

But while American workmen needed occupation, Frederic does not credit large organized labor unions with any valid solutions to the industrial problem. At the outset of the lockout, it is noted, "one of the State officers of a labor association had visited Thessaly," promising a hastily convened meeting of the idled workers generous assistance from the central organization. With that, he departs, leaving two or three subordinate officials of the body, who profess to be preparing detailed reports upon which their chiefs might take considered action while they spend money with a "metropolitan freedom" at the various bars. Their large stock of encouraging stories concerning the ways "bloated capitalists had been beaten and humbled and brought down to their knees elsewhere in the country" win them popularity with the great bulk of the workers, but just how their particular fight is to be waged is never mentioned. When the financial aid began to arrive, then there would be time to discuss that (pp.354-55). What Frederic does advocate is interaction on the part of a living community.

It is community involvement that Reuben Tracy advocates as the purpose of his citizens' reform club. At its inception, the idea of creating

machinery for municipal improvement had been the primary thrust. And when the abrupt stoppage of the two largest works in the section troubled the village, Tracy considers alleviating some of that anxiety more important than "the adoption of all modern facilities for making themselves comfortable in their new club-house." Tracy admonishes the membership: "If the club meant anything, it must mean an organization to help these poor people who were suddenly, through no fault of their own, deprived of incomes and employment. That was something vital, pressing, urgent; easy-chairs and billiard tables could wait, but the unemployed artisans of Thessaly and their families could not." Tracy expects the same dedication from the professional members of their club as Hegel expounded for his middle-class executive and state officials who were to comprise "the educated intelligence and the consciousness of right of the mass of people." John Fairchild, of course, shares this sense of urgency to assist the men of Thessaly then out of work, and the democratic body prevails over its first elected president, Horace Boyce, and newer member, Schuyler Tenney. When Boyce stepped down, leaving the chair, he led his small following out. Among them were Tenney and the Reverend Dr. Turner, and five or six others, all supporters of the social Darwinist moneyed interest.

Despite Boyce's abdication, however, Tracy still feels no compulsion to preside over Thessaly's group of professional and business men. That was to fall to John Fairchild, who appoints a committee with Tracy as its head to study what could be done for the idled workers of the community (pp.358-60). While Hegel conceived of his "universal" class being controlled by "the institutions of sovereignty operating from above and the rights of corporations from below"—to prevent "this class from occupying the

position of an exclusive aristocracy and using their education and skill wilfully or despotically"¹⁹—in Thessaly, the democratic process, inspired by individual leaders from the immediate community, is sufficient to surmount any obstacle threatening to the villagers' well being. The rational will could still prevail because Tracy is committed to the responsible community bond between workers and owners, in harmony with Hegel's system of the mutual dependence of labor and wealth. As the legal representative of the two young Minster women, Tracy could assure the disgruntled workers that the furnaces were to be promptly opened. And further, Tracy gives them his word that, no man belonging to Thessaly should be "crowded out by a newcomer." Strike-breaking techniques, used and defended by the rising industrial trusts as laissez-faire standards of private property rights, were not to be tolerated. French Canadians would not be used, Tracy announces, to operate the iron-works in order to force the workers to accept lower wages for their labor.

Nor were the Minster women to blame for the present dilemma. Having been misled and deceived by agents outside of the community interest, whom they mistakenly trusted, the women had taken a series of steps which they were later to deplore, but had not known how to correct. Tracy then worked "toward undoing the mischief" from which both they and the townspeople generally were suffering. It is imperative to both that the furnaces be opened, and Tracy reiterates the Minster women's shock at "the proposal to bring outside workmen into the town to undersell and drive away their own neighbors and fellow-townsmen." A part of the community spirit, these women are not outsiders; they belong to Thessaly and are as fond of the village as any of its other citizens. And, "for their own sake as

well as that of Stephen Minster's memory," they deserve the respect and acceptance of the villagers (pp.442-43).

Although Hegel defended a delineated class system, contrary to democratic principles, which he considered a logical extension from a system of wants,²⁰ in America this became largely a matter of financial differentiation. Tracy, like W. T. Harris, apparently saw no conflict between the values of capitalism and those of the mind and spirit, envisioning, instead, that the masses, under capitalism, were destined to enjoy competence and security as well as leisure time for the cultivation of "the good life." Hegelianism served to reconcile the dichotomy between the material and practical and the intellectual and the spiritual.²¹ Following the exposition of Tenney's and Wendover's fraudulent scheme, Tracy assures Mrs. Minster that "no real loss will result from this whole imbroglio," and in fact a net gain might even be shown since her big loan must legally give her control of the Thessaly Manufacturing Company. Tenney and Wendover have played recklessly, stacking their majority interest in that concern to win the whole Minster property in the game. They having lost their gamble, Tracy does not object to the proceeds being picked up by the Minster iron-works (pp.451-52).

Hegel's concept of the organic inner being of the state was based on the premise that freedom, both individual and universal, consisted in the obedience to reason, in the resolute discharge of either legal or moral duties to the family or to the civil society.²² Tracy is impelled by the spirit of the civil society to get the iron production going again for the good of the community. But with the good of the community chiefly in view, there seems to be no restriction on the acquisition of wealth by those

"daring strong men" who have the foresight and capability to take command when the situation calls for it.

In The Lawton Girl, Tracy's honorable, disinterested actions win him the hand of Kate Minster, Thessaly's most attractive and wealthy maiden, in marriage. Wealth, in fact, was often Frederic's heroes' reward for valiant behavior. Like Carlyle, who extolled heroic leaders, and Hegel who approved of strong men, Frederic, too appreciated the individual leader. It is noted that Tracy likes an old collection of Carlyle's earlier essays "better, perhaps, than any other member of his library family." Profoundly influenced by the metaphysical speculations of the Germans, Carlyle conceived of the process of history as a gradual realization of ideals, "in the philosophic sense, a progressive unfolding of the capabilities of humanity." His assurance of a brighter day following the current darkness rested explicitly on his faith in "the progress of man towards higher and nobler developments of whatever is highest and noblest in him."²³ Horace, however, makes a mental note that Tracy was still inspired by "Carlyle after everybody else had ceased reading him" (pp.101-02).

Not as radical as his contemporary academic rebel Thorstein Veblen, who denounced what he termed the "kept classes" and disparaged the social Darwinists' conception that the wealthy leisure class was the most biologically fit and the inevitable product of natural selection, Frederic still envisioned responsible owners of private property who remained secure in position and prestige. His fictional Minsters from The Lawton Girl, and Maddens, from The Damnation of Theron Ware, are still functional in the financial organization of the life of the community in contrast to Veblen's "kept classes," whom Veblen contended were not only not responsible for

the creation of the industrial technology but also had taken possession of the wealth produced by the skill and labor of others. Nor does Frederic advocate a socialistic organization to handle the business affairs of the community's industry, as does Edward Bellamy in Looking Backward, published in 1888. Bellamy, having long been troubled by the suffering and poverty of industrial America, depicted a Golden Age following the nationalization of the great trusts and the substitution of scientific methods of an organized and unified industrial system for the wasteful programs of the current competitive plan with its conflicting and mutually destructive undertakings.²⁴

However, aware of Bellamy's and other reforming voices in democratic government as his membership in the National Liberal Club indicates, Frederic reflects a concern with the social problems connected with the growing system of trusts. Bellamy's book appealed to a wide public interest, and knowing that in America the term "socialism" was often equated with "anarchism" and "communism," both of which were repugnant to Americans, Bellamy termed his system "nationalism." A whole network of "Nationalist" clubs were formed to advocate the new ideas. "Nationalist" magazines calling for public ownership of railroads and utilities, civil service reform, and government aid to education, served to quicken the support of the American public at least to general reform directed toward the control of utilities and trusts and the support of education, if not toward a wide-spread acceptance of socialist utopian schemes. Frederic was more critical of the proliferation of trusts, as depicted in the financial finagling of Tenney and Wendover, than of productive private ownership. But implicit in his work is the admonition

that private ownership must be administered with an awareness of the interdependence of the various economic strata of the community.

While The Lawton Girl explores social planning in some depth with Tracy's Reform Club and Jessica's more socially deterministic club for the factory girls, similar in concept to the Hull House experiments in Chicago opened by Jane Addams in 1889, Frederic's individualism is never submerged in a collectivist state. Particularly sensitive to the forces acting on his own time, Frederic reflects the influence of Lester Frank Ward's challenge to the prophet of individualism, William Graham Sumner, to abandon laissez-faire and establish the social service state—a state willing to undertake social experimentation to provide a part of the necessary data for social planning. And yet Frederic's reforms, like those of the other liberal politicians and thinkers of his age, were primarily concerned with battles to achieve governmental supervision of business and the conservation of the nation's resources. Ralph H. Gabriel notes that the new horizons suggested by the social pioneers such as Ward coupled with the actual achievements of the reforming statesmen, "bred such hopes for the future as to make it difficult for Marxian socialism to establish itself as a significant force in American life." Equally important to the defense against Marxian influence was the tradition of individualism carrying on in an expanding economy. This tradition tended to channel in America what the author of Das Kapital had determined as the inevitable class struggle, into increased individual efforts on "the part of the natural leaders of the proletariat to escape from the class to which they were born and to achieve the dignity and power inherent in management."²⁵ Frederic's fictive political and economic leader Reuben Tracy exemplifies that traditional individualism.

Like T. H. Green, who was still influenced by Kant as well as Hegel, Tracy affirms that the free moral participation of the individual is indispensable to the self-development of the state. Yet the individual is conceived as a "social self," possessing social bonds and attaining his greatest satisfaction only in social interaction, which Green interpreted as both moral equality among men and the acceptance of freedom within the society for individualized moral opportunity. Thus, the state is dependent upon the collective will and general acquiescence rather than force and coercion.²⁶

In keeping with the spirit of democratic idealism, perhaps the single most important influence for change during the time, various reform movements stirred across the American social and political scene. Among the most respectable of the political reforming voices were the mugwumps, as they were designated by their opponents, the term first being used in 1884 to describe the independent Republicans who refused to support James G. Blaine's presidential candidacy. C. Wright Mills contends the term generally designated an independent in politics. According to Vincent DeSantis, they were primarily intellectual, "earnest men of high ideals and prominent social position, of conservative economic views, and usually of Republican background."²⁷ Foremost among them were such figures as George William Curtis, editor of Harper's Weekly; E. L. Godkin, editor of the Nation; Carl Schurz; William Cullen Bryant; Whitelaw Reid; and Samuel Bowles. The spoils system became their primary target and their strongest efforts were directed toward the purification of politics through civil service reform. However, since they were still proponents of laissez-faire, their economic programs were concerned only with tariff reform and sound

money. Speaking in moralistic terms rather than economic ones, their appeal was largely to the educated; it is contended that they seldom identified themselves with the interests of the masses.²⁸

Frederic's journalistic career would suggest an awareness of these intellectual reformers, and his editorial support of political candidates provides evidence of an active concern in this movement. His interest in Carl Schurz is documented by a single page, torn from a large volume, preserved among his papers in the Library of Congress. A short biographical sketch recounts the highlights of Mr. Schurz's journalistic career and his political efforts. Among his many liberal stands is included his 1884 leadership in the "Independent" movement in the presidential campaign, "opposing the election of James G. Blaine and advocating that of Grover Cleveland."²⁹

Schurz's stand for Cleveland's presidential candidacy is remarkably similar to Frederic's own earlier support for Cleveland's New York gubernatorial race in 1882. Although a staunch democrat, Frederic had accepted the editorship of the Albany Journal, which was a Republican publication, yet idealistic enough to be anti-Conkling. The largest patronage office in the federal service was the New York Customhouse under the control of the notorious political boss Senator Roscoe Conkling and long considered a prime example of the spoils system at its worst. One of President Hayes' most remembered reform moves was the appointment of a commission headed by John Jay, grandson of the first Chief Justice, to investigate the Customhouse. When Senator Conkling's followers, Collector of the Port Chester A. Arthur and naval officer Alonzo B. Cornell, neglected to correct the corruption reported by the commission, Hayes

removed them, and named new personnel to their positions. Although the Senate originally refused to confirm the nominations because of Conkling's influence, Hayes persisted and was victorious in one of the first struggles against the spoils system. Frederic's own battle against the notorious New York senator was launched with his editorial in the Journal announcing that his paper had bolted the Saratoga ticket supported by Conkling, which brought dozens of local Republican papers into the same fold to assure the defeat of Folger, Cleveland's Republican opponent.³⁰

The mugwumps' particular stand against the spoils system, while narrow by twentieth-century standards, is more understandable in the context of the time. Tammany Hall in New York City provided one of the most notorious examples of a municipal machine. In operation since the eighteenth century, it controlled both the Democratic party and the local government. William Marcy Tweed, supported by his followers, ran Tammany Hall and plundered the city. The spoils going to the Tweed Ring have been estimated at from \$45,000,000 to \$100,000,000. While citizens protested that they could not make a stand against the machine's boss, since he totally controlled and corrupted every aspect of the government, editorials in the New York Times and the cartoons of Thomas Nast in Harper's Weekly exposing the corruption of the Tweed Ring finally aroused the general public to decisive action. Tweed reportedly commented that while his followers could not read, they could "look at the damn pictures."³¹ When an offer of a million dollars to George Jones, owner of the New York Times, to silence his paper, and another half million to Nast to facilitate his study of art in Europe, was refused, a citizens' committee led by Samuel J. Tilden and Charles O'Connor set forth an investigation that

succeeded by the end of 1872 in removing every member of the Ring from office. Tweed himself died in jail. In 1875, the young Frederic went to work as a proofreader on the Democratic Utica Observer, which was owned and operated by three journalistic and political veterans: DeWitt C. Grove, Elijah Prentiss Bailey, and Theodore Pease Cook. Cook, the youngest of the three, was a graduate of Columbia Law School, and a "fiery-penned reformer" whose "hopes for the future of America were solidly pinned on New York's Governor Samuel J. Tilden, whose presidential campaign biography he was planning to write."³²

When William Curtis and Carl Schurz, among other reform mugwumps, bolted the Republican party in 1884 to throw their support to the Democratic presidential nominee Grover Cleveland, because they considered the Republican candidate Blaine inimical to good government, they became instrumental to the Democratic win. Cleveland's margin of victory was so narrow that the pivotal state of New York was carried by only slightly more than a thousand votes. Faced then with the difficult commission of appeasing both the mugwumps as well as the spoilsmen of his own party, who had been removed from federal patronage for twenty-four years, Cleveland first stood firm against the political bosses on appointments and was acclaimed by the reformers. But when he was challenged by revolt within the party, he capitulated to the spoilsmen and replaced Republicans with "honest Democrats." In response, Carl Schurz declared, "Your attempt to please both reformers and spoilsmen has failed"; this signaled Cleveland's break with the reformers.³³

Frederic, however, was not so easily disillusioned. His personal friendship with Cleveland continued even following his move to England as

London correspondent for the New York Times. Frederic's aversion to politics displayed in a flat rejection of Grover Cleveland's appeal for his entry into government, on the ground that "the political game was a dirty one," was recalled in a letter written by Mrs. Eliot Keen.³⁴ However, his idealistic enthusiasm is readily apparent in a letter addressed to Cleveland following the latter's election in 1884. He realized, he felt, for the first time the "stalwart pride," as of the ancient Roman citizenship, "which the Clays and Bentons and Jacksons of past generations felt in their birthright of a whole continent, and which [they] of a punier growth, smarting under foreign criticism, aping foreign customs, seeking in the race for dishonored wealth to win class distinction and the idleness of the aristocrat in older countries, had almost completely lost." He hated these tendencies, which he considered modern, in the American people, feeling the aims and end for which Americans worked, "the gods before which they did fetish worship," were "trivial and selfish and unworthy." It might be said, he confessed, that previously he had felt "more indignation at, than pride in," his country and his countrymen. Reflecting his own chagrin at being dismissed from the editorship of the influential Republican Journal in Albany, due in part, perhaps, to his quiet support of the then Governor Cleveland, Frederic refers to his own attempt to set things right with the attendant result of having been "broken on the wheel for it."³⁵

Much of the American political spirit of the time, as well as Frederic's own experience, is reflected in the congressional race depicted in Seth's Brother's Wife, published in 1887. As the mugwumps had supported Cleveland, John and Seth Fairchild support the reform candidate, Richard Ansdell, against the New York City machine candidate, their

brother Albert Fairchild. Reminiscent of the already out-dated Adams' concept of democratic government, the aristocratic pretensions of Aunt Sabrina Fairchild are fanned into action in the person of her nephew Albert.

It was the aristocracy of the well-born gentlemen that concerned Adams, sharply set off from the mass of "simple men, the laborers, husbandmen, mechanics, and merchants in general, who pursue their occupations and industry without any knowledge in liberal arts or sciences, or in anything but their own trades or pursuits."³⁶ His distinguishing marks for this aristocracy were that it be "educated, well-born, and wealthy." Albert Fairchild, born and reared when the farm was still prosperous, becomes the first "University man of his family"; and at considerable expense, he is "secured a place with one of the greatest legal firms in New York City," becoming a successful lawyer with a handsome income who has married wealth as well.³⁷ Albert can disdain the opinions of his Aunt and Dearborn County, patronizingly indicating his lack of concern about being less esteemed as a New York lawyer than he was as a boy "when he had a pony" and the family had been accorded the baronial nomenclature of "Seth Fairchild O'Dearborn" (p.55). But Aunt Sabrina snares him with a comment concerning his taking political office. While he could turn down Sabrina's plea to take the farm, "to make it a rich gentleman's home again! to put the Fairchilds up once more where her father left 'em" (p.54), he can not resist the added inducement of "be a country gentleman, 'n'—'n'—a Congressman!" (p.57). Aunt Sabrina simply combines, perhaps instinctively, property and government, a refrain, slightly altered, Albert would later echo to Seth. With his extensive connections as a lawyer in New York, it is all settled that he is to be on a committee which will be worthwhile. And

then with his grandfather's name back of him, he feels there is no telling where he may not climb; for "a name that has figured in the blue book as ours has is a tremendous power." He notes that while the Republic may deride heredity, he still finds "the public believes in it" (p.220). However, Albert's campaign strategy will eventually turn to extortionate demands for the editorial support of the Chronicle, threatening the paper's demise with the support of a rival paper in Tecumseh if Editor Workman should give him the slightest reason for complaint (p.226), and then to outright bribery in an attempt to buy the support of political boss Abe Beekman's organization and thereby gain the party's congressional nomination (p.227).

Albert Fairchild has at his disposal the political means available to the machine. It had to be admitted that everywhere the struggle in the Thirty-sixth District was regarded as a sample conflict, as embodying in itself the features of the larger issue between the machine and the people. "Albert Fairchild had identified himself so thoroughly with the party organization, and had played so prominent a part in the scandals which provoked the revolt, that his cause was distinctly that of the politicians" (p.200). He makes himself known personally to his county constituents by spreading his purchase of stock to cover most of the farms in a twenty-mile radius. He and Milton got "a cow from this man, a colt from another, a pig here, and a bull there"—driving perhaps two hundred miles to collect the various animals (p.150). Tyre is disposed to favor his "portly, black-clad figure" and his "professional capacity for oratory" to their own "brusque, self-contained Abe Beekman" (p.262-63). But those "affable, taking ways" Albert "used to such purpose" are professional, for use before the bar, in back rooms wheeling and dealing, on auspicious occasions, but never for

popular appeal. Albert threatens to stump the district, but for Albert that means "Tecumseh, at the biggest meeting money and organization can get together" (p.228). He has no platform and no program of reforms to present to the populace at large.

In an appeal to Albert to financially assist their talented younger brother until he can establish himself professionally as a journalist, John insists that Seth is already worthy of an editorial position on a city newspaper. His assumption is based on an article Seth has written on Civil Service Reform, this topic becoming a major campaign issue for the mugwump support of Cleveland. John has printed the article in the Banner, and it was then picked up by the big papers from Boston to Chicago. Albert's patronizing attitude toward the Banner turns to outright amusement as he chuckles to the indignant John: "What a delightful commentary on Civil Service Reform your words make. The best article on that doctrine is written by a youngster who has never left the farm, who doesn't know the difference between a Custom House and a letter-box on a lamp-post!" (p.69). However, when the machine cannot guarantee his nomination before the delegates convene, Albert counters with New York money in an attempt to put Abe Beekman in his pocket and to secure Seth and the Chronicle's delivery of an editorial endorsement at the opportune moment in the campaign. Like Boss Tweed, Albert has come to the realization of the power of a free press.

In an impassioned response to Albert's demand for loyalty, Seth tells his brother that their views of politics are totally different. Seth is convinced that Albert's wing of the party is "scandalous, corrupting, and ruinous," and that if the rule of the machine is not checked, and "the drift

of public acquiescence in debased processes of government is not stopped, it will soon be too late to save even the form of their institutions from the dry rot of venality" (pp.224-25).

Albert's political opponent, a political dark horse, is Richard Ansdell. While Abe Beekman, the local political boss, is not concerned about reformers, because "these reform spirits don't winter well" (p.274), Ansdell is a zealot concerning public duty, a "talker," nervous and eager, in contradistinction to Albert with his professional oratory and "affable ways."

In appearance, Frederic's fictional Ansdell is certainly more reminiscent of Edgar Apgar than of Grover Cleveland. His description as "small, thin-faced, clean-shaven, dark of skin and hair, with full, clear eyes, that by their calmness of expression curiously modified the idea of nervousness which his actions, and mode of speech gave forth," hardly recalls the moustached, balding, portly Cleveland whose portrait is familiar to the rudimentary student of American history. Apgar, on the other hand, was remembered by Moses Coit Tyler as a fiery, intense little man, whose "weight was ordinarily about one hundred pounds."³⁸ The characteristics of Frederic's political reformer, however, seem more closely related to Cleveland. During Cleveland's term as Governor of New York, Frederic was editor of the Republican Journal; and like John Fairchild who did not bolt the ticket, he did not openly endorse Cleveland; he only withheld his support of Cleveland's opponent and afterward remained noticeably uncritical of a Democratic administration. According to Cleveland's biographer, Allan Nevins, "Frederic often dropped into the Governor's office, and gradually developed an enthusiastic admiration for Cleveland."

And in turn, "Frederic's wit and cultivation appealed to Cleveland as a welcome change from the shoals of politicians. . . . Versatile, light-hearted, full of ideas, [Frederic's] talk diverted the Governor, while his editorials were among the few which Cleveland read."³⁹

Robert Woodward notes the suggestions of both Grover Cleveland and Edgar Apgar in Ansdell's characterization. Like Cleveland, he was a reform candidate, a lawyer, and bachelor; but his "tearful, tremulous eagerness," his "enthusiastic interest," and his earnest "convictions" were more indicative of Apgar, who held the same view of the role of the public man that Seymour and Cleveland held.⁴⁰ Abe Ravitz' article on the "Venerable Copperhead" first explored Frederic's admiration for New York's Governor Horatio Seymour, an esteem Ravitz considered "verging on romanticized hero worship rather than on usual mature admiration."⁴¹ However, as Woodward notes, Frederic was devoted to the same political ideals. Cleveland's 1884 campaign slogan was "Public office, a public trust." Apgar for his part devoted his life to honest politics. "Both echoed the ideals of Horatio Seymour—and of Harold Frederic." Woodward contends that, "If the ethic of Seymour is reflected in Seth's Brother's Wife, it is principally because Frederic saw in Cleveland and Apgar two individuals who also regarded integrity and duty as the only defensible ideals of the men in public service."⁴²

Historians have noted Cleveland's revelation of a personality of contrasting characteristics. An indefatigable worker, his public image was stern, stolid, and dignified. He sought relaxation, on the other hand, with a close group of friends with whom he drank and bantered in the saloons and beer gardens of Buffalo. And similarly, Ansdell has much in both his

theories and practice which would not have commended itself to the moral status of his age. Further, he attempts no defense, "being incredulous as to the right of criticism upon personal predilection." And he has a "flaming wrath, a consuming, intolerant contempt, for men who were unable to distinguish between private tastes and public duty" (p.188).

Cleveland's campaign for the presidency is remembered as one of the bitterest in U. S. history, memorable chiefly for its mudslinging. Partisans cited Cleveland's avoidance of the draft in 1863, by taking advantage of the commutation provision of the law by means of a hired substitute, as an indication of pro-Southern sentiments. Even Frederic fictionally disparaged the commutation provision, in The Deserter. The appealing, young Mose Whipple is forced into service as Asa Teachout's substitute to prevent Asa's foreclosure on the three-hundred-dollar mortgage he holds on the Whipple property.⁴³ Moreover, an unsavory incident from Cleveland's private life involving an illegitimate child, the responsibility for whom he accepted, was publicly exposed. Seth's brother, John Fairchild, feels that one of Ansdell's greatest assets was the fact that he was a man of the world, "who has sown more wild oats than would fill Albert's new bins" (p.164). And one mugwump suggested as a solution to the public accusations of the 1884 campaign that since Blaine seemed to have led an impeccable private life but a culpable public one (Democrats had publicized the "Mulligan letters" as evidence that Blaine as Speaker of the House had been guilty of unethical conduct in connection with land-grant railroads), and Cleveland just the reverse, that "we should elect Mr. Cleveland to the public office he is so admirably qualified to fill and remand Mr. Blaine to the private life which he is so eminently fitted to adorn."⁴⁴

After berating Seth for his behavior in Tecumseh, particularly settling down in a Dutch beer saloon, making associates out of the commonest people in town, and having for his "particular chum that rattle-headed loafer Tom Watts" (p.162), John admits that he would not have his younger brother spend all his time at the Young Men's Christian Association. But he does not want him to continue emulating unworthy models; Seth has served his time and taken his diploma in dissipation (p.164). John expects Ansdell to inspire his younger brother now and put him on the other track, and accordingly he expects Seth to improve himself with good reading and the choice of associates among men who are his superiors and from whom he can learn.

Exemplifying the neo-Hegelian concept of each individual being able to act independently to make a contribution to the whole, Ansdell's fanaticism is put to "magnificent uses." Politicians who "vaunted their conventional superiority to him" are swept along toward "nobler purposes than their own small souls could ever have conceived, in the current of feeling which his devotion had created" (pp.188-89). John prescribes Ansdell to Seth as a doctor would some medicine (p.174); with his passion for educating and ability to force these convictions upon those of whom he was fond, Ansdell gains "perfect ascendancy" over his young charge. Seth finds "himself hating one line of public action, and all its votaries, vividly," and "thrilling with violent enthusiasm for another line, and its exponents—such an enthusiasm as exiled men tremble under when they hear the national air of their native land" (p.189).

In the minds of the practical politicians who assemble in Tyre, the contest for the nomination of a congressman is considered a duel between

the professional county and state political machines, involving Abe Beekman and Albert Fairchild. The third candidate, Richard Ansdell, supported by nearly all the Adams delegation, is of no interest to them. He is a reformer, absenting himself from the political maneuvers at Tyre. A county boss with a machine who proposed doing something definite with that apparatus, whether it was "to build up himself or crush somebody else, was natural and comprehensible; but a man who set himself up as a candidate, without the backing of any recognized political forces, who came supported by delegates elected in a public and lawless manner without reference to the wishes of leaders, and who pretended that his sole mission in politics was to help purify it—who could make head or tail out of that?" (p.263). And yet, the lawyer, student, teacher, reformer, inspirer, devotee to public duty, wins his party's ticket at Tyre and is sent to Washington as New York's congressman, his nomination directly attributable to Abe Beekman, Jay County's "brusque, self-contained, dogmatic" political boss. O'Donnell and Franchere credit much of the inspiration for Beekman, one of Frederic's more interesting characters, to Edgar Kelsey Apgar, whose "fiery intensity . . . coupled with his complete dedication to honesty in the democratic party both amused and inspired Frederic." And they note that much of what he learned from Apgar appeared later in Seth's Brother's Wife not only in the idealistic-reformer Richard Ansdell but also in the honest political boss, Abe Beekman.⁴⁵ Considering the derogatory remarks recurring throughout the novel concerning political machines, one might have anticipated the final scenes of the novel pitting arch-villain, political-boss Beekman against arch-victor, political-statesman Ansdell; for one of the memorable aspects of the last quarter of nineteenth-century

politics in America was its political bosses. Many of them were United States senators, controlling powerful state machines and rewarding their constituents with lucrative public offices. Among the more notorious Republicans were Senators Roscoe Conkling and James G. Blaine of New York, Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, and John A. Logan of Illinois; among the Democrats, Arthur P. Gorman of Maryland.⁴⁶

However, reflecting a further development in American intellectual thought, Frederic gives his grass-roots boss politician a more interesting role. The taciturn Beekman might disparage reformers and rule with an iron hand, "remorselessly crushing all signs of rivalry" (pp.270-71); of a certainty, he is aware of and uses the spoils system. He concludes that if he was to have had any dealings at all with Albert Fairchild, he would have had a written agreement turning over to him all the appointments of Dearborn's men on the district Committee, reserving half the postmasters in Dearborn and Adams counties along with all those in his own county, Jay, for his naming. In particular, Beekman would have appointed his brother-in-law, as an informant, to the Thessaly post office in Albert's own county, in order that he might have been kept apprised of Albert's dealings. Beekman knows that in his own county he has nothing to fear from Albert; it is the power Albert would have had in Congress to cripple his control in the district that concerns him (p.274). And after all, Abe says, "It's the duty of every man to provide for his own family" (p.275).

This sense of expediency and opportunism, generally feared as the excesses of pragmatism, is probably the basis for Charles C. Walcutt's critical analysis of Jay's political boss. The crowning example of Frederic's ethical bias, he contends, is displayed when the complicated gambit of local

politics, involved by the death of Albert and the wickedness of several county delegates, "is played through into a checkmate of evil by the eleventh-hour conversion of the most corrupt and powerful of political bosses into a tower—or, to carry out the figure a castle—of righteousness." Walcutt feels that the spirit of this conversion, indeed, seems to endow Beekman with those very homely American virtues which Frederic has elsewhere been denying to those who lived in rural America or were workers of the soil. "To such a degree," he contends, "may the exigencies of plot disrupt an author's underlying convictions,"⁴⁷ convictions (even if imperfectly executed) Walcutt considers to be deterministic.

However, Abe Beekman's characterization is possibly more of a developmental continuum than a conversion. Beekman exemplifies the pragmatic conviction that the individual need not be defeated, either by nature, his fellowman, or himself, reflecting William James's emphasis on the individual as an adjusting mechanism rather than a formation of his environment. Frederic notes of his political creation that, "Withal, he was a kindly man to those who deserved well of him, an upright citizen according to his lights, and a profound believer in his party." He is a shrewd judge of character with an "almost supernatural faculty of organizing information, and getting at the motives of men" (p.271), which was no small accomplishment to the liberal intellectual. James considered the social value of a college education to be its advantage in the discrimination of "a good man when you see him."⁴⁸ Abe's primary reason for withholding his support from Albert's nomination is his initial reaction to Albert's choice of Milton Squires as his agent and confidant (p.271). Abe dislikes treachery, even against his political adversary:

Here Fairchild has took you off a dunghill, where all yer hull humly, sore-eyed, misrubble fam'ly belong, 'n' made a man of yeh, trusted his affairs to yeh, clothed yeh, fed yeh, yes, 'n' let yeh fatten yerself on the profits of his farm—and naou yeh turn 'raound 'n' offer to sell him aout. By gum! I was right. Fairchild hain't got no sense! 'N' you, yeh skunk, git aout! Don't yeh walk on the same side of the street with me, or I'll swat the hull top of yer head off! (p.276).

And when Beekman, suspecting that the democratic apparatus had been tampered with, rises on the floor of the convention to withdraw his own nomination and throw the support of Jay County to Richard Ansdell, he states that, although he has not spoken to Ansdell, he is convinced of his honesty. The Boss "ain't lived all this while 'thaout learnin' to read somethin' of a man's natur' in his face," and he's convinced that Richard Ansdell is honest and "straight-aout" (p.281).

Further, he considers one of Albert's big mistakes to have been his attitude that politics was all money. While Abe could not have been bought, even if he were poorer than "Job's turkey," he would have been receptive to an "arrangement" for Albert's congressional bid if Albert had simply confronted him at the beginning of his campaign (pp.272-73). Not a rich man himself, Abe understands needs more basic than money to those about him. One of his staunchest supporters is loyal to him because the boss provided the means of a proper burial for his child, more than a decade ago (p.276). Abe Beekman is rural, but he is also moral, portraying self-sufficiency and practical good sense based on experience, the revered national characteristics that would make Americans receptive to the new pragmatic philosophy then taking form and direction in the thought and writings of William James and John Dewey.

The role of "culture," for Dewey, in the mode of problem solving was to define itself as the "utilization of the realities of a corporate

civilization to validate and embody the distinctive moral element" in the American version of individualism:

Equality and freedom expressed not merely externally and politically but through personal participation in the development of a shared culture. "Culture" here stands as "community" within which the "distinctive moral element" can live.

John Dewey, like other progressive reformers, was inspired by Hegelian thought. As early as 1887, he wrote, "In social feeling we merge our private life in the wider life of the community, and in doing so, immensely transcend self and realize our being in its widest way."⁵⁰

Operating on political experience and in the best practical interests of his community and his constituents, the Jay County boss manipulates the order of the delegates in order to take control of a drifting trend that could have been detrimental to both his own and his county's well being before Albert Fairchild's death was revealed. While he is not then fully aware of the machinations, Milton Squires' offer to sell the nomination to him has been enough to spur Beekman into action. Before Dearborn County could make a move on the floor of the convention to sell out their man or make a combination which would be advantageous to them with the next congressman, leaving "Jay aout in the cold," the wily, experienced boss rises to withdraw his name. When the point of order is raised that Beekman speaking as an Adams County delegate does not have the right to withdraw a Jay County man's name, the boss acquiesces. However, before relinquishing his position, in a move similar to Frederic's own editorial announcement that he was bolting the Saratoga ticket in order to bring other local papers along with the Albany Evening Journal and thus help elect Cleveland as governor of New York, Beekman advises the delegation

that Jay County would be voting for Mr. Richard Ansdell. Even without the intervening news of Fairchild's death, Beekman has blocked any startling proposal which might have been made by Dearborn County before Jay could take the floor in its conventional alphabetical sequence of presentation.

In a letter to Dr. Samuel Delano, just after the turn of the century, William James was to lament that "our American people used to be supposed to have a certain hard-headed shrewdness." That loss might be typified by the old Abe Beekmans, and it was a loss James regretted, as he observed that nowadays Americans "seemed smitten with utter silliness," their professional principles becoming meaningless to them as any phrase or sensational excitement seemed to captivate them.⁵¹ Intellectually, American critic C. Wright Mills notes, James leaned upon The Nation. A frequent visitor at the Jameses from 1875-81, Godkin assumed the role of his political gadfly because Godkin's stance was the closest to James' own convictions. Conservative and intellectual, James, too, by nature was a mugwump.⁵²

Unlike Seth's journalist colleague Mortimer Samboye, who is induced by Albert's bribe to act against his convictions by withholding his endorsement of Richard Ansdell, Abe Beekman is in politics because he likes it; it is "meat 'n' drink" to him, giving him "solid, substantial comfort" (p.273). Reflecting Frederic's assessment of Apgar's political philosophy, published in Moses Coit Tyler's memorial volume following Apgar's death, and in harmony with Hegel's concept of a dedicated, professional civil service, Abe Beekman is also "proud of being a politician," a single minded servant to society.⁵³ Obviously a machine politician, yet a staunch supporter of the democratic system, he is perhaps the most eloquent of its

defenders. His faith in the general honesty of the grass-roots political organizations is less wavering than Seth's impassioned defense of the American press.

When Beekman joins Ansdell and the Sheriff at the Fairchild homestead to solve the mystery of Albert's untimely death, he is reluctant to reveal to outsiders that Albert had intended to bribe him. He did not know if he would confide this to Seth if his paper "wa'n't so dum fond o'pitchin'" into him "fer a boss 'n' a machine man ez yeh call it, 'n' that kine o' thing." And Seth's brother was just as wrong as Seth's paper:

They tell me ther air' some country caounties in th' State where money makes th' mare gao. But Jay ain't one of 'em. Yer brother wanted to git into Congress. Ther was nao chance fer him in New York City. He come up here 'n' he worked things pooty fine, I'm baoun' to say, but he slipped up on me. Bribes may dew in yer big cities, but they won't go daown in Jay (p.383).

Social and political critics have tended toward a severe assessment of regional politics, particularly those of the cities. Andrew D. White in an article in The Forum in 1890 commented that "with very few exceptions, the city governments of the United States are the worst in Christendom—the most expensive, the most inefficient, and the most corrupt."⁵⁴ But, on a more optimistic note, concerning political bribery, Beekman reiterates, "I don't b'lieve they's ez much of it done anywhere ez folks think, nuther" (p.383).

Beekman's sovereignty is Jay County. Although he becomes a congressional candidate, he put his name "before the convention jest to hold [his] caounty together" (p.275). And while New York State was big enough for him, succeeding years would take him to Washington "to look around and get an idea of things." Although he would by then be an elderly

man and obviously provincial, Dent surmising from his extremely droll comments that it was the first time he had ever been so far away from home, he was "often very clever, too." Nor did the boss's regionalism make him any less responsive to the national interests, a result that is in keeping with Hegelian thought. It was Royce's contention that in fact the necessary training for the larger loyalties to the nation and to humanity itself was to be found in loyalty to one's section or province.⁵⁵ Beekman's encounter with "some foolish and exceptional" Southern Congressman who had referred to "your Government" and "your laws" instead of "our" had "made him a great stalwart again—for the time-being" (p.403), in spite of the success of the Ansdell experiment.

It was Hegel's contention that the state was the embodiment of concrete freedom and that only in this concrete fashion could personal individuality and its particular interests, as found in the family and civic community, have their fullest development. In this concrete freedom, too, the rights of personal individuality were provided adequate recognition, for these interests and rights passed partially of their own accord into the larger interest of the universal. Partially, also, individuals recognized by their own knowledge and will the universal as their own substantive spirit, and strove toward it as their own end. "Hence, neither is the universal completed without the assistance of the particular interest, knowledge, and will, nor on the other hand do individuals, as private persons, live merely for their own special concern."⁵⁶ C. Wright Mills credits Hegel for the derivation of Dewey's concept of sociality.⁵⁷ Noting Dewey's stress on the value of "interdependence," Mills states that he would have the character of this interdependence of a Gemeinschaft order, that is "shared" and of

the "common interest." And while Dewey never stated it that way, Mills interprets Dewey's emphasis upon the social as "participation," and "communication" as an invitation to reinstitute that type of sociality that is Jeffersonian and rural.⁵⁸

Isabel, Seth's brother's wife, points out to Seth that the nineteenth century was an age of cities, noting that there might have been a time when the poet "could live in . . . daily communion with Nature and not starve his mind and dwarf his soul," but that it was not their century (p.33). To this Seth counters with what seems a refrain from Frederic's letter to Cleveland concerning the "stalwart pride" of "the Clays and Bentons and Jacksons" that "Webster was a farm boy, and so was Lincoln and Garfield and Jackson—almost all our great men" (p.34).

Beekman comes to admire Ansdell, and ultimately considers his election as a successful "experiment"; but he is still not ready to accept the "habit of thinking that all bolters are saints and all straight-party men devils" (p.403). The concept of experiment as it is manifested in social-political contexts blends with Dewey's thought, and Mills notes that it was not irrelevant that Jefferson referred to the American Government as an "experiment," fitting in the orientation, Mills contends, which sees the good society organized communally, and in a way that is unmistakably rural. Jefferson advocated a simple, frugal, agricultural structure of the colonies. It was those who labored on the earth that he saw as God's chosen people. "Corruption of morals in the mass of the cultivators," he insisted, "is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example."⁵⁹ Not unaware that this type of community was being lost in the growing financial complexity, Dewey would note the difference between a society

in the sense of an association and a community well after the turn of the century. "Economic forces have immensely widened the scope of associational activities," he contended, "but it has done so largely at the expense of the intimacy and directness of communal group interests and activities."⁶⁰

The neo-Hegelian influence of Josiah Royce's work has been connected with the later muckrakers and "a growing army of urban citizens who were spurred to action by a sense of social responsibility."⁶¹ And it has been contended that it was no accident that pragmatism finally developed in the Progressive Era,⁶² affirming flux as the ultimate cosmic reality, and distilling from change a philosophy for America. Frederic explored that same progression of thought in the relationship between his reformer Ansdell and his political boss Beekman, a correlative and yet divergent association which would reappear in much of his writing. While Charles S. Peirce and William James both repudiated the metaphysics of Royce, "yet Peirce had described himself as an 'idealist' in his early life, and even James had experienced the Hegelian influence to some extent." This was also true of James's successor John Dewey, "who began life as a Hegelian and, despite his antipathy to absolutes, retained certain Hegelian features in his thought, particularly the tendency to ignore abstractions and a reserved attitude toward the claims of formal logicians."⁶³ Perceptive to the trends of his time, if not the full philosophic implications, Frederic's idealistic reformer is not all good, any more than his political boss is all bad; both affirm the pragmatic tenet of experience as the test of truth. If the neo-Hegelians and pragmatists are viewed in the sequential development of progressive thought, rather than as developers of philosophical

systems based on opposing precepts of monism and dualism, Abe Beekman and Richard Ansdell then become logical extensions of liberal American intellectualism rather than representative antagonistic forces.

Mills contends that while James's philosophical thinking came into focus with the publication of his Pragmatism in 1907, his collected thought embraced ideas which he had been working out for thirty years. Ralph Perry traced the inception of the pragmatic doctrine to notes and marginal annotations made by James as early as 1873, five years before James's crediting the term to Charles Peirce's 1878 article.⁶⁴ James's philosophical thought is traced by Mills to a drive for mediation, a desire to retain and intellectually "exploit various phases of his poly-sided experience." Back of James's technical solution on a technical sphere, Mills feels, "lay a sensitivity to many publics and thinkers":

It is precisely at the hands of an individual, who, by virtue of his cosmopolitan mobility and sensitivity to a variety of persons, representing different views, focusing on diverse perspectives, that the category of "instrumentality" or "purpose" could arise and be given control status.⁶⁵

Critical evaluations of Frederic's writing include a rather equal balance of praise for his insight into the social dilemmas of his own time as well as their projection into the industrial twentieth century and censure for his lack of systematized solutions. These differing critical opinions reflect, perhaps, a similar response to a variety of philosophical ideas on Frederic's part to that of James, with whom Frederic shared similar political sympathies. Frederic's conceptions of political and social reform, projected in his progressive protagonists, also suggest a "drive for mediation" and an attempt to "exploit various phases of a poly-sided experience."

Whether or not Frederic was concerned with a systematized and formal philosophical statement, his novels, particularly the earlier American ones set in Western New York State, are remarkably consistent in their reflection of the prevailing philosophical thought of his time, underlying his much-praised realistic characterizations. Possibly the critical diversity inherent in Frederic's fiction is not so much his "adherence to the old plot lines of fallen women, conventional villains, and idealistic young heroes," resulting in novels in which "amplitude of context is betrayed by the irrelevance of the action," as Larzer Ziff charges,⁶⁶ as it is a matter of Frederic's underlying statement of democratic idealism functioning in context with a variety of views "focusing on diverse perspectives" that beset the industrial world at the turn of the century.

Whether, as Ziff contends, Frederic would have concerned himself more and more with explicit political problems had he escaped a premature death, perhaps abandoning fiction altogether if he had survived into the next decade—that of Progressivism,⁶⁷ is, of course, a matter of conjecture. Had Frederic lived longer, into the Progressive Era, it might also be conjectured that the fully developed and systematized pragmatism of James and Dewey, by that time, might have provided the unity for which he was searching in his variation of progressive protagonists: the neo-Hegelian, individualistic Reuben Tracy; the democratic idealists Seth Fairchild and Douw Mauverensen; the reform Darwinist Jessica Lawton; the pragmatic Abe Beekman.

Although the relation of Ansdell's idealism and Beekman's pragmatism is often a source of dissent among Frederic's critics, particularly the interpretation of Beekman as both corrupter and protector, Frederic's

idealistic reformer and his political boss could team up to win the election without violating the integrity of either because they both still functioned in a milieu regarded as moral and rational. But while agreement on a moral order provides cohesion, the idealist's concept of the absolute is unacceptable to the pragmatist; and the surface unity is troubled by the underlying differences in attitude concerning monism and dualism. Although, then, their line of development has continuity and unity, pragmatism became a new and prominent type of reaction against idealism. Those who had, up to that time, extolled the supremacy of the ethical interest and the necessities of the practical life insisted that faith had both the right and the ability to answer, in its own practical way, the concepts which were considered to be unanswerable on the basis of knowledge. They acclaimed the necessity of faith as a replacement for reasoned knowledge. The new contention of pragmatism, however, was "that knowledge itself depended on practical considerations, that the intellect always and inevitably worked in subordination to the will and its purposes, that all knowledge was utilitarian, and that the criterion of truth was not conformity to reality, but its instrumental value, the results which followed from its acceptance."⁶⁸ And while James might still be convinced of the moral life, his pragmatic approach tore down the barriers to that absolute. As the critic James Seth perceptively notes, there was a breakdown in the concept of the absolute in the sequential thought of the British neo-Hegelians, F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green. Bradley moved away from the positions of the earlier English idealists in his dissent from the doctrine of the ultimateness of morality. Green saw the inevitable correlate of the moral as well as the intellectual life with God, for it followed to him that

"there must be eternally such a subject which is all that the self-conscious subject, as developed in time, has the possibility of becoming; in which the idea of the human spirit, or all that it has in itself to become, is completely realized. . . . He is a being in whom we exist; with whom we are in principle one; with whom the human spirit is identical, in the sense that He is all which the human spirit is capable of becoming."⁶⁹ For Bradley this was only appearance, not reality. The radical vice of all goodness, he felt, could be seen in the irreconcilable dualism of the ethical ideals of self-realization and self-sacrifice. Since it was the essential nature of the self, Bradley contended, "as finite, equally to assert and, at the same time, to pass beyond itself," the objects of self-sacrifice and of self-advancement were its, also equally. Thus, this inconsistency of goodness, its "self-contradiction in principle," proved that goodness was neither absolute nor ultimate, but was rather only "one side, one partial aspect, of the nature of things." But since in the Absolute no appearance was lost, the good was still considered a main and essential factor in the universe. By accepting its transmutation, the good both realized its own destiny and yet survived in the result. Error and evil were facts, and certainly there were degrees of each, and whether anything was better or worse did make a difference to the Absolute. However, there was nothing that finally could be real, exactly as it appeared, because evil and good could only be relative factors, never ultimate.⁷⁰

Thus the philosophic scene was set for the advent of pragmatism. Originating in America, the movement is associated with William James and John Dewey. James, whose gift of style and reputation as a psychologist did much to popularize the theory, dedicated his Will to

Believe (1897) to Peirce, to whose article entitled "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," appearing in the Popular Science Monthly for January 1878, he attributed the origin of the name and the theory. Although James's interest was in the "value" of ideas "for concrete life," which for him was the moral life of the individual,⁷¹ he would come equally to abjure absolute monism and absolute pluralism. For him, the world was one just so far as its parts hung together by any definite connection, and many just so far as any definite connection failed to obtain,⁷² leaving everyone in a common-sense world, in which things were partly joined and partly disjointed.⁷³ But neither could a philosophy of common sense be considered true, for there were also philosophy and science, and they competed. Man, according to James, must simply mediate between them. "Common sense is better for one sphere of life, science for another, philosophic criticism for a third; but whether either be true absolutely," Heaven only knew.⁷⁴ Because of the breakdown in absolute values with the consequent possibilities for the justification of expediency and opportunism, many Americans, however democratic and individualistic, rejected the new philosophical thought. Merle Curti contends that James himself would have admitted those possibilities but that he would have insisted "that the risks and chances so characteristic of his philosophy are necessary unless life is to be so restricted and ordered that the joy of individual living is lost altogether."⁷⁵

Like the generally conservative and intellectual James, who apparently looked upon politics as an arena of personal struggles, and felt that its strongest force was human scheming, Frederic saw the political world as one in which the schemers seemed capable of capturing every organized effort set up against them.⁷⁶ Albert Fairchild stoops to bribery,

Milton Squires commits murder for Albert's New York political-machine money and then attempts to extract a bribe from Beekman, Mortimer Samboye accepts a bribe to withhold an editorial endorsement, and even John Fairchild is stopped from bolting the ticket by financial restraints. However, on the positive side, Frederic demonstrated what James and other mugwumps believed, "that the part of critical intelligence might offset their lack of heat by their greater steadiness."⁷⁷ And reformers like Richard Ansdell could still win elections supported by a reform press, and Seth could still develop in a rational world inspired by individual, moral leaders; Richard Ansdell and Reuben Tracy could still function effectively as idealists despite the growing encroachment of industry and the civil state.

It was characteristic of the reform movements of the time to have little in common with each other; thus divided and mutually suspicious, their influence on the overall political scene was greatly diminished. Once Cleveland was elected, he faced the task by trying to appease both the mugwumps and the spoilsmen of his own party, both of whom had supported his candidacy. His attempt to withhold federal patronage yielded by the end of his presidency to the replacement of almost two-thirds of the 120,000 Republican federal officeholders by "competent Democrats." This cost him the mugwump support. But to his credit as a reformer, the civil service classified list was increased to 27,380, which was almost double the number at the time he took office. He was also the first president to veto one of the scandalous pension racket bills that congressmen had been passing for constituents whose claims had been rejected by the Pension Office. He compelled railroad, lumber, and cattle companies to give up

millions of acres of public land which they had fraudulently occupied; and he signed, although reluctantly, the Interstate Commerce Act.⁷⁸

The spirit of reform was not yet sufficiently developed to support an active governmental role in the business and social affairs of Americans. And while Frederic's novel Seth's Brother's Wife ends on an optimistic note concerning the development of the American democratic process, his theme, like that of the mugwumps and the developing pragmatists, is moralistic, concerned with public duty and individual commitment to the democratic ideal rather than a specific reform program or utopian scheme. His sympathy with Seth's practical education at a business level that made social and financial success available to him with the proper moral and vocational motivation, makes no demands for sweeping reform legislation or social changes.

It has been noted that James was not blind to the implications of social planning. While he might condone inequities in wealth, he also had to admit that when the individual was involved in a struggle in which the odds were too great, that rather than the human spirit being tested, it might well be broken instead. Like Dewey, James too sensed that the society of the future was destined to become more socialistic, but he still endeavored to demonstrate that "the traditional American values of self-help, initiative, competition, and the zest for living" could also survive. According to Curti, "This was the synthesis of the old and the new that James offered his fellow countrymen."⁷⁹ Frederic's protagonists are an early manifestation of the trend toward that philosophical accommodation.

American politics may have indeed suffered a certain remoteness from public opinion during the greater part of the last half of the century,

the public desire for an accommodation of the industrial age with the ideals of economic democracy exerting a certain complacency with a public which was slow to express its resentment or to demand specific regulatory control against the excesses of big business.⁸⁰ The political machinery, however, was still responsive to individual impact on affairs of state and an honest, free press available for the exposition of political corruption. Frederic's experience in journalism, reflected in Seth and John Fairchild, was similar to that of turn-of-the-century muckrakers, who were also advocates of liberal reform. However, at a time when the muckrakers had reached a peak, James would reaffirm his contention that the only motive which "socialistic literature" reckoned with was "the fear of poverty if one is lazy."⁸¹ And Frederic, like many of his age, still had reason to hope that an informed electorate with the democratic means of the ballot could effect reform under the individualistic leadership of such reform leaders as Grover Cleveland and Edgar Apgar.

In The Lawton Girl, the village overcomes the economic despotism of the kind considered to be inherent in the belief of the social Darwinists that the social order was fixed by laws of nature precisely analogous to those of the physical order; in In the Valley, it destroys the threat of class tyranny; and in Seth's Brother's Wife, it triumphs over political corruption. And in all three victories, as O'Donnell and Franchere note, the achievement was under the leadership of men who were themselves able and intelligent products of the region.⁸² Similar to James, whose functional conception of the mind as an instrument of adjustment enabled him to reconcile such "deterministic" forces as heredity and biology with resolution and effort, even with "free will" itself if properly defined,

Frederic's progressive, democratic protagonists demonstrate a belief in the individual's ability to achieve self-realization despite the stifling encroachment of the environmental forces of rural America's society, politics, and economics.

NOTES

- ¹Louis B. Wright, and others, The Democratic Experience, Rev. ed. (Glenview, Illinois, 1968), p.263.
- ²In Robert E. Spiller and others, Literary History of the United States, 3rd ed. Rev. (New York, 1973), pp.972-73.
- ³In Wright, p.283.
- ⁴Wright, p.283.
- ⁵Wright, p.283.
- ⁶Spiller, pp.749-50.
- ⁷Larzer Ziff, The American 1890's: Life and Times of a Lost Generation (New York, 1966), p.209
- ⁸Harold Frederic, The Lawton Girl, in The Major Works of Harold Frederic (New York, 1969), IV, 265.
- ⁹Spiller, p.973.
- ¹⁰Spiller, p.973.
- ¹¹Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York, 1945), p.112.
- ¹²G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. by T. M. Knox (New York, 1942), sect. 296.
- ¹³Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880's (New Haven & London, 1963), p.20.
- ¹⁴Commager, p.46.
- ¹⁵G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. by J. Sibree (New York, 1956), p.436.
- ¹⁶Harold Frederic, In The Valley, in The Major Works of Harold Frederic (New York, 1969), IV, 61-2, 80.
- ¹⁷C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America, ed., Irving Louis Horowitz (New York, 1966), p.273.
- ¹⁸Commager, pp.6-7.
- ¹⁹Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, sect. 296.

²⁰Donald Atwell Zoll, Reason and Rebellion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963), p.239.

²¹Spiller, p.972.

²²Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, sect. 260.

²³Walter E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind (New Haven and London, 1968), p.29.

²⁴Wright, p.284.

²⁵Spiller, p.950.

²⁶Zoll, p.245.

²⁷Wright, p.267.

²⁸Wright, p.267.

²⁹The Harold Frederic Papers, Library of Congress.

³⁰Thomas F. O'Donnell and Hoyt C. Franchere, Harold Frederic (New York, 1961), p.45.

³¹In Wright, p.267.

³²O'Donnell and Franchere, p.36.

³³Wright, p.271.

³⁴In O'Donnell and Franchere, pp.50-1.

³⁵In O'Donnell and Franchere, p.49.

³⁶From John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, quoted in John Herman Randall, Jr., The Making of the Modern Mind, Rev. ed. (Boston, 1968), p.349.

³⁷Harold Frederic, Seth's Brother's Wife, in The Major Works of Harold Frederic (New York, 1969), I, 16.

³⁸O'Donnell and Franchere, p.48.

³⁹O'Donnell and Franchere, p.48.

⁴⁰Robert H. Woodward, "The Political Background of Harold Frederic's Novel Seth's Brother's Wife," New York History, 43 (July 1962), 242-43.

⁴¹Abe C. Ravitz, "Harold Frederic's Venerable Copperhead," New York History, 41 (January 1960), 37.

- ⁴²Woodward, p.248.
- ⁴³Harold Frederic, The Deserter, in The Major Works of Harold Frederic (New York, 1969) II, 47-8.
- ⁴⁴Wright, p.271.
- ⁴⁵O'Donnell and Franchere, p.48.
- ⁴⁶Wright, p.266.
- ⁴⁷Charles Child Walcutt, "Harold Frederic and American Naturalism," American Literature, 11 (March 1939-January 1940), 18.
- ⁴⁸Mills, p.269.
- ⁴⁹From Individualism Old and New, quoted in Mills, p.434.
- ⁵⁰In Mills, p.443.
- ⁵¹In Mills, p.264.
- ⁵²Mills, pp.217, 262, 269.
- ⁵³From In Memoriam Edgar Kelsey Apgar, quoted in Woodward, p.243.
- ⁵⁴In Wright, p.266.
- ⁵⁵Spiller, pp.973-74.
- ⁵⁶Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, sect. 260.
- ⁵⁷Mills, p.443.
- ⁵⁸Mills, p.444.
- ⁵⁹From Thomas Jefferson, Works, quoted in Randall, p.356.
- ⁶⁰From Freedom and Culture, quoted in Mills, p.435.
- ⁶¹Spiller, p.946.
- ⁶²Spiller, p.952.
- ⁶³"Neo-Hegelianism," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1972), XVI, 213.
- ⁶⁴Mills, pp.224-25.
- ⁶⁵Mills, p.228.

- ⁶⁶Ziff, p.211.
- ⁶⁷Ziff, p.217.
- ⁶⁸James Seth, English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy (New York, 1912), p.363.
- ⁶⁹From Prolegomena to Ethics, Sect. 187, in Seth, p.349.
- ⁷⁰Seth, pp.356-57.
- ⁷¹Mills, p.240.
- ⁷²William James, Pragmatism (New York, 1907), p.156.
- ⁷³James, p.161.
- ⁷⁴James, p.190.
- ⁷⁵Spiller, p.985.
- ⁷⁶Mills, p.262.
- ⁷⁷Mills, p.262.
- ⁷⁸Wright, p.271.
- ⁷⁹Spiller, pp.984-85.
- ⁸⁰Wright, p.241.
- ⁸¹From Memories and Studies, quoted in Mills, p.273.
- ⁸²O'Donnell and Franchere, p.96.

CHAPTER IV

The Higher Criticism

The greatest impact on nineteenth-century thought was undoubtedly made by the new fields of study in the social sciences. Darwinism and positivism not only affected attitudes and approaches concerning social and political issues, these disturbing new ideologies stimulated similar controversies in institutionalized religion as well. As a result of the cross currents in theological thought, the church retained its commanding position among the century's cultural institutions, and continued as one of its most vital and interesting forums for intellectual exchange.

The religious ferment among England's intellectual elite produced such imposing figures as John Henry Newman, one of the leaders of the Oxford Movement, who retained his independent views concerning religion even following his conversion to Roman Catholicism; Matthew Arnold, a celebrated cultural and literary critic who also seriously studied the Bible, repudiating its literal interpretation and applying Darwin's theory of evolution to Christianity; and Thomas Carlyle, a Puritan moralist who scathingly denounced the mechanization and loss of spirituality in his time

and country. On the Continent, geological studies of the earth's age and Darwin's theory of evolution caused Ernest Renan and Ludwig Feuerbach to challenge the traditionally accepted literal interpretation of the Bible's Old and New Testaments. They imposed the same careful critical scrutiny utilized in other areas of literary criticism to the scriptures, subjecting even Jesus of Nazareth to the same historical analysis applied to other political or social leaders, thus de-emphasizing the consideration of his divinity during his mortal life. As a result, the concern with religion's supernatural aspects lessened while a corresponding interest expanded in its ethical and social implications. Evil was increasingly projected from the individual soul into the environment, and then attacked by religious thinkers who encouraged social reforms to cure the problems of urban poverty and the growing tensions between employers and laborers resulting from the expansion of large-scale industry. The American social structure, as well as those of other industrialized nations of the West, were profoundly moved by these new intellectual currents.

The Damnation of Theron Ware, critically acclaimed as Frederic's most important work, is probably his most carefully constructed novel, also. Copious notes and an abundance of newspaper clippings preserved among his papers at the Library of Congress attest to the deliberate care and thought that went into this work. Underlying the critically acclaimed realistic characterizations used to chronicle a year in the life of a Western New York State fundamentalist Methodist minister, is a carefully constructed narrative of the initiation into manhood of a turn-of-the-century American Adam, or perhaps a contemporary Everyman. The image of the American Adam, according to R.W.B. Lewis, was "crowded with

illusion . . . vulnerable in the extreme."¹ Austin Briggs contends that the debate between, in Lewis's terms, "the party of the Past and the party of the Future" never ceased within Harold Frederic, expressing itself in a continuing conflict between "his innocent younger self and his experienced older self. That the debate between the two selves did not reach conclusion," he feels, "is borne out forcibly in The Damnation of Theron Ware."²

Frederic's fictional minister was born into a society with a solid social acceptance of sectarian Christianity; and Theron Ware accepted the standards of that institutionalized religion without any soul-searching anguish or deep conviction. Until he was exposed to the current influences of archeology, art, and science, his accepted lifestyle seemed adequate. However, his innocence is weighed in the hands of the humanistic Catholic priest, Father Forbes; the Darwinian scientist, Dr. Ledsmar; and the emotional artist, Celia Madden; and of course, innocence proves inadequate to withstand so great a temptation.

Frederic invites consideration of Theron as nineteenth-century Adam early in the novel with the reverse symbolism of the garden at the parsonage in Octavius. Although it is a bright May day with green elms and robins which promise the purification of spring, the garden has not been spaded; as if in anticipation of twentieth-century waste land imagery Frederic describes a landscape of "muddy earth," strewn with "last year's cabbage-stumps" and the general litter of dead roots and vegetation. The door of the "tenantless chicken-coop hung wide open," flanked by "a great heap of ashes and cinders, soaked into grimy hardness by the recent spring rains"; other details include an "ancient chopping-block," bits and pieces of

"broken barrels and packing-boxes," and "a nameless debris of tin cans, clam-shells, and general rubbish."³ Although Theron's wife Alice is rejuvenated by the replanted garden, it is blackened and destroyed at the end of the season as Theron pursues, alone, his journey into illumination.

Yet Frederic's serpent is more complex. Levi Gorringer supplies the flowers, at a large personal expense, for Alice's garden, and candidly admits the Methodist church still owes him a girl. Sister Soulsby feels some of "the wisdom of the serpent" is needed "to serve the cause." Dr. Ledsmar studies snakes in his laboratory to further understand the process of evolution, deciding to classify Theron among the reptiles as he recognizes the symbolic characteristics of the slimy lizard in the minister's innuendoes. A discovery that the priest and Celia are both leaving for New York on the same day "twists and twines" in Theron's mind. But the young minister's greatest temptation is his desire for knowledge, knowledge which he will use in a drive for worldly polish and charm, physical gratification, and prestige—in short, the temptation of modern naturalistic thought.

Theron is caught in a spiritual dilemma—was he a good man damned by God, an evil being who had deceived only himself with his appearance of goodness, or just an animal gone mad and relegated to the dung heap? Theron's fundamentalist doctrines are burned away with his descent into and deliverance from his emotional hell. His humane spiritual mentor Sister Soulsby assures him it is for the best, and the reader must ponder whether Theron's loss of innocence indeed marks his damnation—or illumination, indicating a new reverence for humanity on his part and the setting of new directions for spiritual achievement. Frederic's twice-titled novel, Illumination for the British publication, The Damnation for the

American, may have been an indication of the tangles suggested in his fictional minister's religious dilemma, reflecting the theological "snarls" of the time.

An informed citizenry was an inherently important concern of both the political and religious circles of the country and the time. Theron's thirst for knowledge was not uncommon to the American experience, or for that matter the Methodist movement. Because of the mass desire for knowledge and understanding, touring lecture programs motivated by idealistic as well as monetary goals became common. One of the most successful of these ventures, destined to become a prototypic institution for the period, was the Chautauqua movement, founded in Frederic's home state in 1874 by Lewis Miller, an Ohio businessman, and John H. Vincent, a onetime circuit-riding Methodist minister. First organized as a two-week summer course for a few Sunday school teachers at Lake Chautauqua, the lectures on the Bible and Palestinian geography expanded into four-year study courses in history, literature, science, art, and music for middle-class Americans "who had had too little book-learning in the rude schoolhouses and poor libraries of their youth."⁴ The experience was so enjoyable, however, that within a few years it attracted thousands who came from all parts of the country. During the period of its greatest popularity, such eminent figures as the historians John Fiske and Herbert B. Adams, the economist Richard T. Ely, and the psychologist G. Stanley Hall lectured to open-air audiences on a wide variety of subjects. Even James H. Garfield appeared on the Chautauqua podium. Although William James felt appalled before these "earnest and helpless minds," according to Dixon Wecter, his Harvard colleague Herbert Palmer considered "the colony of summer tents

and tabernacles as the expression of a folk impulse, idealistic, hopeful, bizarre, but vital, comparable to the Crusades or the Greek mysteries."⁵

The appeal and popularity of the Chautauqua lecture movement encouraged numerous imitators, until by 1900 about two hundred such series were in existence throughout the country. Literary and scientific reading circles were organized as a national society, and their offerings expanded with a varied fare of music, humor, and inspirational lectures.⁶

Theron's first sense of an expanding growth of his "tree of strength and knowledge" is stirred when he learns to "exchange merry quip and whimsical suggestion" with Alice (p.30); but his greatest desire is learning.

He covets the knowledge of modern intellectualism, a desire in accord with the temper of the times. According to its founder, the Reverend Mr. Vincent, the Chautauqua cultural program was formulated to provide a college outlook for those who had not had the opportunity for a higher formal education.⁷ One of the most important outcomes of the movement was to popularize information that had previously been the exclusive property of the experts. Wecter notes that "the gospel according to Chautauqua proclaimed that study was no longer drudgery, but radiant opportunity; that education did not end when a boy went to work or a girl got married, but persisted forever."⁸

Much of the "snarl" concerning Frederic's theme centers on the interpretation of Theron Ware as a condemned and expelled nineteenth-century Adam or a repentant and redeemed Everyman. Throughout the novel, Frederic's imagery of light indicates his protagonist's belief in his illumination, as he steps out of his Eden of ignorance and innocence into the intellectual world of modernistic thought embodied in Dr. Ledsmar, Father Forbes, and Celia Madden.

When Alice and Theron settled in Octavius, Theron recalls that even the most doleful and trying hour of his bitter experience in Tyre had not depressed him like the bitter humiliation of seeing his wife sitting beneath the pulpit, "shorn by despotic order of the adornments natural to her pretty head," by the order of the irascible trustees Pierce and Winch to remove the flowers from her bonnet. Looking back on their past experiences in Tyre and the humiliation their indebtedness had caused, he persuades himself that he had been able to bear it all with a light and cheerful heart, "simply because Alice had been one with him in every thought and emotion." Like the first pair in the garden, they had "walked that difficult path together" in "absolute unity of mind and soul." He pronounces his life an "intolerable curse if Alice were to cease sharing it with him in every conceivable phase" (pp.56-68), and considers himself "enriched and humanized by daily communion with the most worshipful of womankind" (p.30).

As he contemplates the book he intends to write to alleviate their financial straits, Theron is convinced that the hand of Providence supplied the subject of Abraham, who like Adam had left the confines of the familiar to begin life anew; his "book was to be blessed from its very inception" (p.60). But his reverie is broken as he is drawn to follow a group of people congregating at MacEvoy's house, where he meets Celia Madden and Father Forbes. Greatly stirred by the priest's performance in administering the rites of extreme unction, the young minister is suddenly aware and ashamed of his ignorance. As Adam's knowledge had made him aware of his nakedness, the author notes that "perhaps it was the sight of these half-filled shelves which started this day's great revolution in Theron's opinions of himself":

He had never thought much before about owning books. He had been too poor to buy many, and the conditions of canvassing about among one's parishioners which the thrifty Book Concern imposes upon those who would have without buying, had always repelled him. Now, suddenly, as he moved along the two shelves, he felt ashamed at their beggarly showing (p.92).

And Abraham as the son revolting against his idolatrous father, the image maker, with his ensuing exodus from the unholy city of Ur along with the nomadic little deistic family group all shining with a poetic light and the halo of sanctification (p.60)—this Abraham has now been altered in conception. The historical analysis of Father Forbes portrays him instead as an untutored, unwashed "Abram the Chaldean," followed by a barbarous band "filled with animal lusts and ferocities, struggling by violence and foul chicanery to secure a foothold in a country which did not belong to them,—all rude tramps and robbers of the uncivilized plain" (p.93). The fact that Abraham was a Chaldean and not a Jew struck Theron with peculiar force, since he had vaguely supposed that there had been Jews from the beginning, or at least from the flood. Father Forbes's historical analysis of the Old Testament, an aspect of the Higher Criticism, reveals to Theron a staggering truth, that "he was an extremely ignorant and rudely untrained young man, whose pretensions to intellectual authority among any educated people would be laughed at with deserved contempt." Following the first shock of his discovery, however, he develops a pleasurable sense of the importance of the revelation. Heretofore he had been drifting in conceited blindness, but ignorance could be remedied. Like Milton's Eve, who could still contemplate a new paradise following the expulsion from Eden, Theron envisions his mind cultivated "till it should blossom like a garden." As he mentally measures himself against the more conspicuous of his colleagues in the Methodist Conference, he feels his

innate superiority. They were also ignorant, but unlike himself, who had tasted the fruit of knowledge, they were doomed by a "native incapacity" to finish their lives without ever realizing they were ignorant. He takes pride that his case is obviously better, since he sees bright promise in the very fact that he has discovered his shortcomings (p.91).

At various times Theron attributes his beginning another life to his three new associates. He confides to Father Forbes that he will never forget that death-bed, where he first met the priest. He dates from "that experience a whole new life" (p.356). In a reverie induced by the drawling hymns of his own congregation, he recalls the music he heard Celia play at the Catholic church a month before and the atmosphere in the sitting room at the parish house with Father Forbes and Dr. Ledsmar. On the emotional moment, he arrives at an intuitive conclusion:

Nothing was clearer to his mind than the conclusion itself,—that his meeting with the priest and the doctor was the turning-point in his career. They had lifted him bodily out of the slough of ignorance, of contact with low minds and sordid, narrow things, and put him on solid ground (p.197).

When Theron makes his last visit to the priest's sitting room, he states with deluded pride that he has marked a "tremendous revolution" in his thoughts, his beliefs, his whole mind, and his character since his first visit there. He credits his indebtedness for this enormous change, which he considers "splendidly satisfactory," to the priest (p.412). Father Forbes, too, recognizes a changed Theron; however, he is not so "splendidly satisfied" with this new young man. After he excuses himself on the pretense of making a "sick call," the urbane priest settles comfortably into his slippers and loose old soutane, alone, to enjoy his "coffee and fine champagne." Henceforth, he will not be "invariably at home when the Rev. Mr. Ware does [him] the honor to call" (p.421).

Even more than do the doctor and the priest, Celia entices Theron, "like fascinated bird and python" (p.142), into the quest for illumination, her imagery consistently related to light. Theron first catches sight of her framed in the "sunlit street doorway" at MacEvoy's death scene. From the pastorate, across the narrow alley, Theron observes Celia's resemblance to the image of the "woman's head" with "a halo about it, engirdling rich, flowing waves of reddish hair, the lights in which glowed like flame" where he could vaguely trace it in the stained glass window of the church, illuminated by a dim light within (p.118). Following his physical collapse at the opening service of the debt-raising revival, at which he witnesses Alice and Levi Gorringer kneel among the "mourners" (p.234), he misses the assemblage of his own flock for the first time and hurries straight to the pastorate. Once more he finds Celia framed in the light of the window, making "a flitting effect of diaphanous shadow between him and the light which streamed from the casement" (p.275). Accepting the fact that he has come there in the hope of encountering Celia Madden, he finds the truth simplicity itself. Acting in accord with Schopenhauer's universal law of love, he realizes now that "he was only obeying the universal law of nature,—the law which prompts the pallid spindling sprout of the potato in the cellar to strive feebly toward the light" (p.276). He is convinced that "fate walked abroad [that] summer night," for the street door of the pastorate opened; and "in the flood of illumination which spread suddenly forth over the steps and sidewalk, Theron saw again the tall form, with the indefinitely light-hued flowing garments and the wide straw hat" (p.277). Celia leads him up the stairway of the Madden's palatial mansion, like a moth drawn to the flame of the candle she uses to guide his way to her

inner sanctum, "concealed behind a curtain," from which the servants are barred like the sacristy of the church. Once in the chambers, the darkness reveals little to his eye: "His gaze helplessly followed Celia and her candle about as she busied herself in the work of illumination" (p.284).

Her seductive concert of Chopin's music is a "revelation" to Theron. The following morning he feels it apparent that both "he and the world had changed over night." His metamorphosis accomplished, he stands forth in a "new skin," with altered perceptions "upon what seemed in every way a fresh existence" (p.303). Celia's music becomes a "palpable barrier between him and all that he had known and felt and done before. That was his new birth,—that marvellous night with the piano" (p.307). Indeed, when Theron thinks about it, his old state of mind seems quite incredible to him, and he can find no word for his new state "short of illumination" (p.324).

The problem with the Reverend Mr. Theron Ware's illumination, however, is that it is a conceit, a strained metaphor from the fanciful mind of the newborn poet. Theron's greatest charm is his innocence and his artlessness; it was for that, that "people had prized him—above the average" (p.29). Abram Beekman, Tyre's tough political boss, whom we met earlier in Seth's Brother's Wife, had assumed a "fatherly" interest in the Wares, eliminating their burden of debt and enabling them to begin anew at Octavius (p.36). It is to Theron that Levi Gorringer reveals that he had taken original probationary membership in the Methodist Church only to please a girl who was devoted to religion and church work. Although he would not have told his story to any of the church's other ministers, he felt at the first time he saw this new minister that he was different. "In a pulpit or out of it," what Mr. Gorringer likes in a human being is that "he

should be human" (pp.183-85). Sister Soulsby expected Theron to mix up more worldly gumption with his Renan, but maybe she likes him all the better for not having it —"for being so delightfully fresh" (p.236). As Celia delivers the coup-de-grace, divesting Theron of his last shred of pretension at her hotel in New York, she informs him that she and Father Forbes, and Dr. Ledsmar, had liked him because he was "unsophisticated and delightfully fresh and natural."

You impressed us an an innocent, simple, genuine young character, full of mother's milk. It was like the smell of early spring in the country to come in contact with you. Your honesty of nature, your sincerity in that absurd religion of yours, your general naivete of mental and spiritual get-up, all pleased us a great deal. We thought you were going to be a real acquisition (p.478).

Celia explains their attraction as a mistake in judgment, because they had taken it for granted he would stay innocent, which was in turn a rather naive expectation on their part, it seems, since they all set out at once to educate him. Possibly, like the original story of the fall, the seduction was all the more attractive because of the innocence. Regardless, the end results are the same; once they have ruined him, they accuse their young acquisition of having become a bore, the cardinal sin to the three sophisticates.

Theron, like Adam as the first man, and later as Everyman, must face anew the temptations inherent in his own contemporary society. The limited confines of his sectarian world could not indefinitely prevent his coming into contact with the intellectual currents of his day, and left him ill equipped to cope with them when he did. Theron's narrow religious training causes a defensive recoil as Father Forbes casually comments that scores of centuries would reveal a whole "receding series of types of the

Christ-myth of ours." Sitting upright at the fall of these words, Theron flings a swift, startled look about the room — "the instinctive glance of a man unexpectedly confronted with peril, and casting desperately about for means of defence and escape."

For the instant his mind was aflame with this vivid impression, — that he was among sinister enemies, at the mercy of criminals. He half rose under the impelling stress of this feeling, with the sweat standing on his brow, and his jaw dropped in a scared and bewildered stare (p.111).

But then, quite suddenly the sense of shock is gone; taking a long breath and another sip of coffee, he finds himself reflecting almost pleasurably upon the charm of this contact with really educated people. It requires an effort to smile and show these men of the world how much at ease he is, but he makes it bravely, and hopes he is succeeding. A month later, he could bring the crowded impressions of that first evening at the pastorate forth, across his brain — "no longer confusing and distorted, but in orderly and intelligible sequence."

Their earlier effect had been one of frightened fascination. Now he looked them over calmly as they lifted themselves, one by one, and found himself not shrinking at all, or evading anything, but dwelling upon each in turn as a natural and welcome part of the most important experience of his life (p.197).

He is now receptive and eager to acquire the knowledge possessed by the dazzling trio, thus to gain access to that exclusive, and privileged, domain of the initiated. It is a world that entices him with all the privileges that have been heretofore denied him: living graciously without the mundane problems of salaries and budgets, luxuriating in the beauty of the fine arts, and enjoying the license afforded to the prestigious. This new world beckons to him; he has only to be vigorous enough to take possession of it.

Nor is it unusual that Theron should anticipate sharing freely in wealth and prestige and yet retain his place in the pulpit. American ministers took sides on the same issues that divided the thought of the sociologists and politicians of the period. Carnegie's gospel of wealth was closely intertwined with the doctrinal concept of the stewardship of time, money, and talent that provided the moral core of Protestant theology. The current principles of economics were easily translated into laws of "God's providential ordering of society." Henry Ward Beecher and Phillips Brooks embraced the gospel of wealth with a fervent devotion, although Russell Conwell, with his lecture on "Acres of Diamonds (. . . in one's own backyard) and his exhortation that everyone has a 'duty to get rich'—was its most eloquent clerical spokesman."⁹ For every layman whose conscience was aroused by an advocate of the Social Gospel, according to historians William H. Harbaugh and Arthur S. Link, probably a thousand others were inspired by the existing theological and social order espoused by the Reverend Mr. Conwell's exhortation to get rich, since "to make money honestly [was] to preach the gospel."¹⁰ His Acres of Diamonds, delivered some six thousand times, set forth a religion of success, old as Cotton Mather, but then flourishing anew with renewed vigor. Its exalted practitioner in fiction was Horatio Alger, a timid and neurotic Unitarian clergyman, according to Dixon Wecter, whose more than a hundred novels based on "pluck and luck" mirrored "a naive hopefulness, a passion for self-improvement, characteristic of the times." Wecter notes that "their blend of morality with riches can be found in scores of nonfiction books throughout this period, all pointing the way to wealth and happiness."¹¹

However, Theron is not particularly drawn to the philosophical materialism represented by Dr. Ledsmar, his sensibilities not being attuned to the view that no entities exist independently of matter. And Dr. Ledsmar seems to have almost an instinctive aversion to the minister. With their first meeting at the pastorate, Theron's naive rejoinder to the priest's comment concerning the universality of the Christ-myth, that he preserved an open mind in an attempt to maintain his faith that the more he could know Christ, the nearer he should "approach the Throne," brought the scientist to his feet with an immediate apology for the necessity of making his departure. The priest enjoys their new acquisition, however; and with a "soft half-smile and purring tones," he assures his friend he has plenty of time, thus forcing the two into an attempt at further conversation until Celia's music relieves them (p.116).

Although the genuineness of the unorthodox religious practice of the Soulsbys interests and attracts Dr. Ledsmar, Theron's first visit to the doctor's house ruptures any pretense of civility on Ledsmar's part toward the minister. It becomes apparent that they do not speak the same language. The doctor's book on serpent-worship interests Theron, but the only copies still extant as a serious study are in German, the English edition having been exhausted by the collectors who bought it for its supposed obscenity (p.328), which Dr. Ledsmar deduces almost immediately would have been the extent of Theron's understanding of his book. He groans with anger and pain only a few minutes later in response to Theron's inquiry concerning the relationship between Celia and the priest (p.335). Theron's greatest admiration for the doctor comes with the discovery of his garden, which "seemed old-fashioned and natural and delightfully free from

pretence." For a moment he is sure that Celia was mistaken in her indictment of the doctor as a man with "no poetry in his soul." However, the doctor explains that his horticultural interests lie in testing "the probabilities for or against Darwin's theory that hermaphroditism in plants is a late by-product of these earlier forms." Theron's understanding of bees encompasses the monetary value of the honey; the doctor's interest is in the discovery of a law of behavior and his payment in recognition, such as the achievement of "a half-column in the 'Encyclopedia Britannica'" (pp.329-31).

The scientist can experiment with impunity on his Chinese houseboy because his testing is in accord with his materialist belief "that there is an independently existing world; that human beings, like all other objects, are material entities; that the human mind does not exist as an entity distinct from the human body, and that there is no God (nor any other non-human being) whose mode of existence is not that of material entities."¹² The dualistic aspect of the minister's traditional Christian theology, however, making a sharp distinction between the spiritual and the material, brings Theron's sentiments into vehement accord with Celia's. "The doctor was a beast," his experiments "offended and repelled him" (p.332). The minister responds with moral indignation, but the scientist makes no distinction between the flowers, the bees, or the human being: all are studied objectively, valued alike for what they might reveal concerning physical laws. Theron is repulsed by what he considers immoral; Ledsmar, however, is amoral. The doctor points out that although he views all the churches "impartially from the outside," his preferential judgment of Catholicism is based solely on the logic of the church functioning for sinners (p.115).

Thus, the gulf between these two is too distinct for the doctor's theories to present any serious temptation to Theron.

Darwin's theory of evolution, however, had widespread repercussions on the religious thought of the times, the rise of the historical criticism of the Bible coinciding with the new methods of scientific thought. Although the more traditionally oriented ministers moved into combat against the new Biblical studies, even Tyndall, one of the strongest proponents of materialism in nineteenth-century England, stated in his Belfast address that "the facts of religious feeling are to me as certain as the facts of physics." Further, he contended that in spite of the fact that many religions, past and present, were "grotesque in relation to scientific culture" and "mischievous if permitted to intrude on the religion of knowledge," yet they were "forms of a force . . . capable of being guided to noble issues in the region of emotion, . . . its proper and elevated sphere." In the same connection, he admitted that "without moral force to whip it into action, the achievements of the intellect would be poor indeed."¹³ Thus, Dr. Ledsmar's science and Father Forbes's Higher Criticism of the Bible provide a common interest for the two intellectuals. Celia asserts that it makes her sick to hear them talk about "mankind being merely a fortuitous product of fermentation" (p.151).

The young minister's initial reaction to Dr. Ledsmar, when they first met at the pastorate, is aversion. His unseasoned innocence is threatened by the doctor's "extravagant and incendiary talk," and he finds himself ritualistically "stepping over the seams in the flagstone sidewalk as he had done as a boy." His dominant sensation, once he has departed from the priest's sitting room, is one of deep relief; he feels himself affected "by the

weariness and half-nausea following a mental intoxication. . . . One thing was certain,—he would never be caught up at that house beyond the race-course, with its reptiles and its Chinaman" (pp.124-25). When his initial resolve is broken, and he does visit the doctor at his own home, it is Dr. Ledsmar, feigning a painful right shoulder in order to rid himself of the minister's company, who lets him out without a departing touch of the hands and an invitation to come again. Searching from one of his tanks to another, he draws forth "a long, slim, yellowish-green lizard, with a coiling, sinuous tail and a pointed, evil head," which he renames the "Rev. Theron Ware" (pp.336-35).

But pondering whether he should ever go to the pastorate again, Theron decides "not to quite definitely answer that in the negative," as yet (p.125). The priest does interest Theron. His position is in accord with the young minister's own ambition. The prestige of the pulpit orator held forth an appeal to him early in his career that has not been diminished with time or disappointment. Even the serious-minded, introspective young Emerson catalogued an inherited love for "the strains of eloquence" as the main reason for his early choice of the ministry, basing his expectations for a successful career in public preaching on it. And when he subsequently resigned from his pulpit, he turned to the broader public symposium with his skills of oratory to teach his transcendental gospel. And all the bitter experiences at Tyre have not destroyed Theron's dreams of success and distinction. Once his debts were settled by Abe Beekman, his efforts could once more be turned to the principles which underlay the art of pulpit oratory. He set to work with resolute purpose to master all the adorning tricks, practicing effects with "an alert ear, and calculation in every tone.

An ambition, at once embittered and tearfully solicitous, possessed him" (p.35). Dr. Ledsmar points out to Theron that Father Forbes no longer preaches because not more than fifteen of his parishioners would understand him if he did, and at least a dozen of them would complain to the Bishop about his heterodoxy. Nobody wants him to preach, and he has reached an age, the scientist feels, where personal vanity no longer tempts him to do so:

What is wanted of him is that he should be the paternal, ceremonial, authoritative head and centre of his flock, adviser, monitor, overseer, elder brother, friend, patron, seigneur,—whatever you like,—everything except a bore.

Thus, he points out to Theron, one could see how "diametrically opposed this Catholic point of view" was to the Protestant (p.114).

Theron recognizes that his religious aversion to Catholicism and national aversion to the Irish have been formed by the "lowering, ape-like faces from Nast's and Keppler's cartoons," which reflected a national predisposition for alarm with their "gibbets for dynamiters and Molly Maguires" and "black-robed, tonsured men, with leering satanic masks, making a bonfire of the Bible in the public schools" (pp.76-77). Winthrop Hudson doubts that more than a small minority of the American populace shared the conviction of "the radical nativist fringe" that large-scale Catholic immigration was a perpetrated plot to undermine the free institutions of America. But he notes that "there were many who feared that the tenets and spirit of Roman Catholicism were antithetical to religious and political liberty."¹⁴ And they were not entirely without reason. The 1885 encyclical letter Immortale Dei by Pope Leo XIII "explicitly affirmed the right of the papacy to judge when the affairs of the

civil order must yield to the superior authority of the Roman Church."¹⁵ But having been present at the last rites of the dying MacEvoy, Theron now feels the Irish, with all of their faults, must at least have a poetic strain; else they would not have clung so tenaciously to these curious and ancient forms (p.77). "But most of all he was moved by the rich, novel sound of the Latin as the priest rolled it forth . . . with its soft continental vowels and liquid r's" (p.67). He finds the ritualistic forms of the Church to be profoundly interesting—ancient ceremonies, according to the priest, that were probably Persian in origin like the baptismal form (p.71).

It is Dr. Ledsmar who places the first incendiary texts at Theron's disposal, which stir the minister's growing interest in the historical criticism implanted earlier by the comments of the priest. Theron first hides the half-dozen volumes beneath a pile of old "Sunday-School Advocates" and church magazines. Ostensibly, he is hiding them from Alice; since he feels the necessity of covering them so they will escape her observation. However, three of the four volumes dealing with Chaldean antiquity were published under religious auspices; and as for the two volumes of Renan, he realizes the name would be meaningless to Alice. Apparently Theron's own innocence suggests the concealment of the volumes, which had "come to him in a neat parcel" (p.188), much like the "plain, brown wrapper" so appealing to the young.

It is Renan's Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse, published in 1883, which particularly enthralls Theron at the moment, "entitled in the translation, 'Recollections of my Youth!'" Renan had been working on his memoirs since 1876, reconstructing his life to show that he was predestined to become a Prêtre manqué; yet the failed priest feels that his wager on

the hidden God has "paid off" in terms of happiness. For Renan, the history of Jewish messianism bore witness to man's capacity for faith, even when the odds were against him. By initiating a revival of his own faith, he could at least hope that, though Judaism would disappear, the dreams of its prophets would be eventuated in some distant future, so that without the necessity of a compensatory heaven, justice would actually exist on earth. The minister follows inattentively the introductory sketches and essays, which dealt with what he considers a "somewhat preposterous Breton racial type"; but after some perusal of the materials he becomes aware of the connected story in all of it. He reads parts of it again and again, to make sure that he has thoroughly penetrated the "husk of French habits of thought and Catholic methods in which the kernel was wrapped." Then he discerns the narrative of a devout young man, prepared from his earliest boyhood for the sacred office, and desiring passionately nothing more than to be worthy of it, finally coming to the declaration, with infinite pain to himself and anguish to those dearest to him, that he could no longer believe at all in revealed religion (p.189). "This gentle, tender, lovable book, which had as much piety in it as any devotional book he had ever read, and yet, unlike all devotional books, put its foot firmly upon everything which could not be proved in human reason to be true," he contemplates, must be only one of thousands known to Father Forbes and Dr. Ledsmar. The prospect that he, too, was on his way to know these books "wooed him" and "thrilled him, with the wistful and delicate eagerness of a young lover." Theron could not yet look squarely at "the fact that the priest and the doctor were not religious men, and that this book which had so impressed and stirred him was nothing more than Renan's recital of how he, too, ceased to be a

religious man." It did, though, take the shape of a vague premise that there were many kinds of religions, which past and dead races had multiplied literally into the thousands, and that each had its central support of truth somewhere for the good men who were in it; "... to call one of these divine and condemn all the others was a part fit only for untutored bigots." He is greatly impressed that Renan could repudiate Catholicism and yet write in his old age with the deepest filial affection for Mother Church, just as Father Forbes could talk coolly about the "Christ-myth" without ceasing to be a priest, "apparently an active and devoted priest" (pp.197-98).

Renan had reluctantly left the Church in 1845 when his belief that the Church's teachings were incompatible with the findings of historical criticism involved him in a crisis of faith. His quasi-Christian belief was sustained by a hidden God, revealed to him, he felt, both by Pascal's writings and by experience. Father Forbes avoids a similar crisis in part, perhaps, by his intellectual selectivity and his withdrawal from the pulpit; but in large part, he avoids ecclesiastic censure for his exegesis because Modernism had not yet come to the fore in Catholic theology. For, like Renan, Father Forbes is more interested in historical criticism than in religious dogma. And, although various other early scholars like Ernest Renan espoused the cause of Biblical criticism, it was not until the close of the nineteenth century that the most vigorous discussion of the historical-critical method of exegesis developed in the Roman Catholic Church, provoked by the rise of Modernism. Influenced, in part, by liberal Protestant thought, the Modernists set forth the concept that evolution had been a force throughout the history of Biblical religion because the writers

of both the Old and New Testament were conditioned by the times in which they lived. Shortly thereafter, however, the implications of this radical position were to clash with the official dogma of the church, and Modernism as a "synthesis of all heresies" would be condemned in the encyclical Pascendi Gregis and the decree Lamentabili, both to be issued by Pope Pius X in 1907.¹⁶ But for the time being, Theron concludes that there must be an intellectual world, "a world of culture and grace, of lofty thoughts and the inspiring communion of real knowledge," where creeds were minimized and men questioned, not "Is your soul saved?" but "Is your mind well furnished?" Theron is so eager to give his allegiance to this enticing new world that he does not stop to fully "reflect upon what it was he was abandoning" (pp.198-99).

The Jewish philosopher Spinoza was one of the earliest "thinkers of the Enlightenment" to reopen the question of the interpretation of the Bible by casting doubt upon the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and by interpreting the Bible according to the rational and historical principles appropriate to the exegesis of other books. Contrary to fundamentalist traditions which interpreted the scriptures literally as the direct word of God made manifest through infallible inspiration, Spinoza felt meaning could be questioned and explicated. The critical-historical method of exegesis became particularly prominent among German professors of theology. It is German scholarship that Father Forbes credits for the renewed interest in the Irish, for example, and he hopes that this scholarship will turn its attention to the matter of Irish mythology. Noting that the legends and traditions of his people are far more ancient than those of any other nation west of Athens, he dates the Irish myth of the

Milesian invasion to the time of Solomon's Temple, and other independent Irish myths to the fall of the Tower of Babel. He equates the Druids' tree-worship with that of the Chaldeans, "—those pagan groves . . . which the Jews were always being punished for building" (p.109). Reflecting Frederic's interest in the new Biblical exegesis, Father Forbes admonishes Theron in paternalistic tones not to take their friend Abraham too literally, since modern research had quite wiped him out of existence as an individual. He goes on to explain to his young guest that the word "Abram" is merely an eponym, meaning "exalted father," and further, that practically all the names in the Genesis chronologies are eponymous. Rather than a person, Abram is a tribe, a sept, a clan, as "Heber is simply the throwing back into allegorical substance, so to speak, of the Hebrews, Heth of the Hittites; Asshur of Assyria" (p.107).

Then as pentateuchal criticism had labored to isolate the several sources of the Books of Moses, the study of the Synoptic Gospels attempted to chart the literary history of the New Testament and thus to find "the essence of Christianity" by isolating the authentic facts about the life and teaching of Jesus. Two works in the nineteenth century were especially influential in their rejection of orthodox Christology. The first, Das Leben Jesu, by David Friedrich Strauss, was published in 1835, the second, Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse, by Ernest Renan, was published in 1863. Strauss was more concerned with the growth of Christian ideas, which he called myths, about Jesus, as the basis for the portrait presented in the Gospels; while Renan's study accounted for the career of Jesus by a study of his inner psychological life in relation to his environment. Based on the Enlightenment contention that the sources for the life of Jesus were to be

studied in the same manner as other sources, the works they constructed on the bases of such sources were a type of modern biography. This exegesis, Mandelbaum notes, implied that Jesus was human like other men, but with a heightened awareness of the presence and power of God. It contended that the dogma of the Church had misinterpreted this awareness, making it a metaphysical statement that Jesus was the Son of God, and had thus distorted the original simplicity of his message.¹⁷

In part, this stress on humanizing the life of Christ, according to the ecclesiastical historian Jaroslav Jan Pelican, developed from a general concern with the problem of history inherent in nineteenth-century scholarship. Through the influence of Kant's moral theories, many theological scholars had moved independently in this direction in their considerations of what was lasting about the teachings of Jesus; through the influence of Hegel's historical theories, many had changed in their manner of relating the original message of Jesus to the Christian interpretations of that message by later generations of Christians. Then too, the ideas of evolution and of natural causality associated with the science of the nineteenth century must be considered among the influences, Pelikan feels, because of the naturalistic explanations of the Biblical miracles. Regardless of the source, however, there was a growing inclination to demonstrate the dependence of ancient Christology upon non-Christian sources for its concepts and terminology, and to reinforce the claim that Christianity had to get back from the Christ of dogma to the "essence of Christianity" in the teaching of Jesus about the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man.¹⁸ Among the consequences was the extension of religious ties backward temporally to pre-Judaic history and outward geographically beyond Judeo-Christian cultures.

There is nothing new, Father Forbes contends, agreeing with the historical Biblical critics; everything is built on the ruins of something else. "Just as the material earth is made up of countless billions of dead men's bones, so the mental world is alive with the ghosts of dead men's thoughts and beliefs, the wraiths of dead races' faiths and imaginings" (p.110). Father Forbes, like other Modernists, is willing to subject the inspiration of the Gospels to the same critical scrutiny. Finding the names of those dead-and-gone things particularly pertinacious, he notes that the modern name Marmaduke, for example, is thousands of years older than Adam, who sets the outer limits of Jewish chronological antiquity. Tracing the name to the ancient Chaldean Meridug, or Merodach, he instructs Theron that he was the young god who interceded between his angry, omnipotent father Ea and his humble, unhappy earth mother Damkina. Then staggering the unsuspecting minister, much as Strauss stunned the orthodox religious world, the priest quietly notes the myth's added interest as the original prototype of the Christian "divine intermediary" idea. And he is confident that still other scores of receding centuries would reveal a whole series of "this Christ-myth of ours" (pp.110-11).

Strauss's mythical interpretation of the historic doctrines of religion was similar to and influenced by Feuerbach's psychological explanation, Mandelbaum holds, which maintained the position that all the beliefs identified with theology were merely "projections" of the fundamental nature of religious feeling. Both Strauss and Feuerbach passed from Hegelianism to a form of naturalism. After two years in Berlin under Hegel, Feuerbach went to Erlangen in 1828 to study natural science. His first published work in 1830 attacked personal immortality, advocating

instead the Spinozistic immortality of reabsorption in nature. Later he attempted to humanize theology with Das Wesen des Christentums, in which he stated that man is to himself his own object of thought, God being the outward projection of man's inward nature. In the true or anthropological essence of religion, man treats God in the various aspects of "being of the understanding," "a moral being or law," or as "love"; and these aspects, Feuerbach contended, correspond to some basic need of human nature.¹⁹

Father Forbes advocates a similar doctrine. Although the Methodists might do more personal soul searching than their Catholic brethren, Father Forbes insists that it is the "fear of hell" that governs them both: "Where religions are concerned, the human race are still very like savages in a dangerous wood in the dark, telling one another ghost stories around a camp fire" (pp.356-57). Further, the priest insists that the idea that humanity progresses is utterly baseless fiction. The savage's natural impression is that the world he perceives was made for him, that the rest of the universe is subordinate to him and his world, and then he conceives all the spirits and demons and gods as occupying themselves exclusively with him and his affairs. That psychological need, the priest maintains, was the basis of every pagan religion; and the Christian, sharing the same need, has the same basis for his religion, "simply because it is the foundation of human nature," not because it in anyway offers anything new or unique. Because that foundation is enduring and unchanging, he continues, God being the outward projection of man's inward nature, some kind of religious superstructure will always be constructed upon it (p.36).

According to Feuerbach, it was the false or theological essence of religion which regarded God as having a separate existence and led to a

belief in revelation and the sacraments.²⁰ Reflecting a similar attitude, even though he is unwilling to do away with religious materialism altogether, Father Forbes minimizes dogma, noting that "when people have grown tired of their absurd and fruitless wrangling over texts and creeds which, humanly speaking, are all barbaric nonsense, they will come back to repose pleasantly under the Catholic roof." It was not that Catholicism had any claim to theological truth or superiority, according to the priest, but rather that its church could offer a "restful house where things are taken for granted" —a place where one is "no more expected to express doubts about the Immaculate Conception" than to ask "the lady whom you take down to dinner how old she is" (pp.361-62).

Another facet of the Feuerbach-Strauss position which maintained that all the beliefs identifiable with theology are merely "projections" of the fundamental nature of religious feeling, according to Mandelbaum, was that these historic doctrines of religion could be further viewed as the reflections of the knowledge and experiences of certain peoples at certain times in the world's history. The importance of religion, then, could be construed, first, within the realm of immediate feeling and, second, in the fruits which this feeling bore. In contrast to the alternate view, which regarded the content of religious belief as error if it was interpreted as being anything more than a projection of individual and social feeling, the latter view did not accept theological beliefs as necessarily the direct projections of feeling. Rather, these beliefs could arise from sources outside of religion and thus be subject to modification as external factors changed. This broader view was less hostile to organized religion, because the content of religious belief could be construed as a reflection of the

state of knowledge and experience of those who held the belief. Insofar as there was any change in the state of knowledge it was possible to reform religious belief, to make it no less adequate as an expression of feeling, but more adequate as an expression of what was known to be true of the world. Thus, in the latter view, one could believe in progress within the domain of religious belief, and one could seek to reform religion to meet the needs and knowledge of succeeding generations.²¹ This second view-point more closely approximates Father Forbes's projections for the development of Irish Catholicism in this country. While he views human nature as static, he denies the Reverend Mr. Ware's contention that the Catholic creed is rigid, having no elasticity or room for compromise. Quite to the contrary, the priest declaims, "The Church is always compromising . . . only it does it so slowly that no one man lives long enough to quite catch it at the trick." The Church's great secret, he contends, is that it does not debate with skeptics. Regardless of the point that is made against it, the Church simply says these things are sacred mysteries which may be accepted for salvation, or rejected to damnation (p.361). Father Forbes assures Theron that intelligent men have very little influence on the development of religion, but Catholicism impresses him as an intelligent and rational church for the expression of man's religious needs, an expression capable of meeting the changing needs and knowledge of the succeeding generations of Irish Americans, and Americans in general.

O'Donnell and Franchere have noted the influence of Father Terry on Frederic's fictional Father Forbes. Having attended an evening service at St. Johns as early as 1880, Frederic wrote in the following day's Observer:

Father Terry's address explaining the service was replete with information touching the origin of the Christian Church, which

he traced from the Pagan inceptions through the first adoption by the early church as a means of drawing the people into the true fold by humoring their habits and customs, until they were finally transformed into devout ceremonies, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Christianity.²²

Father Forbes's "archetypes," "Christ-myths," and "relative truths" echo Father Terry's "address," but Father Forbes further reflects the general thought of progressive American Catholicism, which continued to interest Frederic throughout his lifetime.²³ Voicing the general tenets of "Americanism" advocated by such liberal American prelates as Carroll, Ireland, Keane, and Gibbons, Father Forbes is confident that the "lager-drinking Irishman" in a few generations will be a new type of humanity, a more polished Hibernian who is to ameliorate and soften the social roughness of the American Church. It was the prelate Ireland's contention that "an honest ballot and social decorum" would do more for "God's glory and the salvation of souls than midnight flagellations or Compestellan pilgrimages." Protestants, he taught, were not to be considered as implacable enemies, but as "brothers to be brought back to the fold,"²⁴ an admonition similar to Father Forbes's that Americans would be attracted to this evolving Irish-American culture as expressed in its church. Americans were to be inevitably attracted toward it; ultimately, it would "embrace them all, and be modified by them, and in turn influence their development," till there emerged "a new nation and a new national church, each representative of the other" (p.362). Theron ventures jokingly to inquire if all this is to be accomplished with lager beer, which his clerical acquaintance has just expounded as the most important aspect of this revolutionary Keltic change. Responding in a tone that Theron finds difficult to interpret just how much is serious and how much is jest, Father Forbes projects the lager-drinking Irishman, "the Kelt at his best," coming

to dominate America, "to become the American" (p.359). At the centenary celebration in 1889 of Baltimore's establishment as a diocese, Gibbons re-emphasized Carroll's Americanist theme, "that the clergy and people—no matter from what country they spring—should be thoroughly identified with the land in which their lot was cast."²⁵ Ireland stated even more emphatically that a person unwilling to be assimilated did not deserve to be admitted to the country and "should in simple consistency betake his foreign soul to foreign shores, and crouch in misery and subjection beneath tyranny's sceptre."²⁶ Gibbons, whom Hudson notes had been encouraged "to assume the role of spokesman and unofficial primate of the church by exploiting the precedence he derived from being the archbishop of Baltimore and the only American cardinal,"²⁷ found the Constitution admirably fitted "to the growth and expansion of the Catholic religion," and the Catholic religion admirably adaptable "to the genius of the Constitution."²⁸ And Father Forbes could foresee the Irish-American church—"with the Italian element thrown out of it, and its Pope living, say, in Baltimore or Georgetown"—evolving to become the "Church of America" (p.359).

Advocating a religious body so liberally structured, in fact, as to reflect Comte's proposal that the organization of the Catholic Church, devoid of its supernaturalism, might well provide an acceptable structural model for the new positivist society, Father Forbes proclaims in an entirely serious mood that the Church must be retained. If it did not exist, he feels, it would be necessary to invent it. One of Comte's cardinal tenets had been that any desirable and permanent social improvement had to be preceded by an appropriate moral transformation, and Father Forbes feels the church

is imperative as a "police force," needed, "so to speak, as a fire insurance." He claims that "it provides the most even temperature and pure atmosphere for the growth of young children." Comte was concerned for a "religion of humanity," his structure more closely resembling a system of social ethics than a church; and Comtism not only encouraged reform in liberal Christian circles but also stimulated the rise of secular religious movements such as Humanism.

Comte's priesthood was to be comprised of secular sociologists, responsible for working out the details of the new social order given by Comte, himself, as the supreme social planner. They were to preach the positivist gospel, give advice and counsel, control education and public morality, and arbitrate disputes. Frederic's priest can foresee a new spiritual head for his American church without concern for heresy, on his part, and stresses its functional design: "it furnishes the best obtainable social machinery for marrying off one's daughters, getting to know the right people, patching up quarrels, and so on." It is Father Forbes's contention that the priesthood actually earn their salaries as the agents for these "valuable social arrangements," their theology serving only as a "sort of intellectual diversion." While there are priests who get excited about the theological aspect of their positions, he notes, those who understand what it all amounts to, take their duties more quietly, and "make the best of it." Father Forbes declares himself one of the enlightened, and graciously indicates his acceptance of the Reverend Mr. Ware among their intellectual company (pp.362-63).

In Gloria Mundi, Frederic includes an extremely flexible Anglican priesthood, similar in concept to the evolved Catholic Church in America

envisioned by Father Forbes, in Emanuel Torr's mediaeval social experiment. The young curates comprise "among themselves a kind of guild or confraternity," being addressed as "Father William, or Father Alfred," and wearing habits of "a somewhat outlandish fashion." An "irreducible minimum of dogmatic theology" has been agreed upon, as well as an "artistic elaboration of the ritual." Their active lives are "consecrated to good works." While a central chapter house has been provided for the enjoyment of their own society, each curate is directly responsible for "the moral and intellectual health" of one of the six villages of the Somerset System. And, although Emanuel's remarkable group remains unmarried because of their own natural predilections, Emanuel would have insisted upon celibacy otherwise, because he considers the task of finding the unique sort of women suited for this difficult work to be impossible.

Historian Harry E. Barnes states that John Stuart Mill and others of Comte's rationalistic admirers were astonished when "Comte's conception of the ideal positivist society was revealed in his System of Positive Polity as a religious utopia." Barnes thinks, however, that Comte's earlier writings foreshadowed this spiritual framework: "His 1826 volume, Considerations of the Spiritual Power, indicated that he believed that the organization of the Catholic Church, divorced from its supernaturalism, might well provide an ideal structural and symbolic model for the new positivist society." Although Comte himself was to be the supreme social planner of his new social system, Barnes notes, based on the worship of the Great Being, "namely, humanity past, present and future," he realized his original concepts "would require detailed guidance and interpretation, constant exhortation, and continuity." Comte envisioned these

responsibilities lodged in a "priesthood with headquarters in Paris." However, as reflected in Emanuel Torr's Village System curates, the priesthood was to be comprised of secular sociologists who would "preach the positivist gospel, give advice and counsel, control education and public morality, and arbitrate disputes," while being devoid of any material power with which to enforce their decisions and recommendations.²⁹ Taking a position like Comte's, himself, summing up the philosopher's Religion of Humanity, Emanuel Torr explains to his cousin Christian that his curates are "wholly his invention," and that their constant and capable oversight has contributed much to the success of his experiment:

... what they do is wonderful. They have made a study of all the different temperaments and natures among the people. They know just how to smooth away possible friction here, to encourage dormant energy there, to keep the whole thing tight and clean and sound. They specially watch the development of the children, and make careful notes of their qualities and capacities (p.227).

However, while Comte advocated a universal education, stressing positivist principles, as the cornerstone of his new social order, Emanuel assures Christian that never was there "grosser nonsense talked in this world" than "universal education." Instead, his curates, like the mediaeval monks, are to have full power to "decide which are to be fully educated, and which are to be taught only to read and do sums" (p.227). When the feudal monks were operating with an honest spirit, Emanuel contends, "it mattered nothing whether these children belonged to the lord of the manor or the poorest peasant." The monks of a locality simply "picked out the children whose minds would repay cultivation, and they taught these as much as it was useful for them to know" (p.228). While Emanuel admits that the mediaeval system had lacked uniformity and "eventually failed to work

altogether," he still feels that "its principle, its spirit, was the right one." And, he is convinced that they can achieve real progress now only by turning back to that spirit to make another start with "the light of experience to guide [them] this time" (p.229).

The position to which Kathleen Torr, in Gloria Mundi, is relegated in the development of Somerset also reflects Comte's cult of sentimental womanhood. Lord Julius and Emanuel both take a dim view of women in general. Even more like Schopenhauer, perhaps, than Comte, they consider women as a group apart, inherently inferior, both intellectually and morally, to men. Although the women in his system keep Emanuel constantly disconcerted, rather than charging them with "evil natures," he considers their shared problem to be "one of brains." He notes with chagrin: "Let a soldier in a red coat come along, for example—an utterly ignorant and vulgar clown from heaven knows what gutter or pigsty—and we have girls here who would secretly value his knowledge of the world, and his advice upon things in general, above mine!" (p.232). Kathleen notes that Emanuel "proceeded upon the theory that the sex is a unit, for philosophical purposes at least," and that he is sure he ought to be able "to get at the rules which govern its actions." Emanuel systematically classifies the common psychological trait of women as "furtiveness," seeing a "trained facial capacity for concealment" and considering it "their commonest accomplishment" (p.233).

Christian points out, however, to Julius and Emanuel (names easily equated with Jehovah and his son Jesus—who would be called Emanuel), that they both venerate Kathleen and the late Lady Julius, who might be considered corporately as contemporary counterparts of the mediaeval

veneration of the Virgin Mary. They were held, Christian noted, in the same esteem as "one's favorite saints." Comte also developed a mystic cult of sentimental womanhood, stimulated, it is conjectured, by his romantic episode with Clotilde de Vaux in 1845, and her subsequent death the following year. As a result, he delegated the maintenance of private morality to women, who were to be instilled with dignity, discipline, and austerity through the "monogamous family, indissoluble marriage and perpetual widowhood." They were to be excluded entirely, however, from public or political life even though they were to be extended special educational advantages.³⁰ Rumor had it that Lady Julius was among "the most highly cultivated women of her time, and that the most illustrious scientists and thinkers would quit the society of kings to travel post-haste across Europe at her bidding" (p.181). In reality, the author notes, she was neither "deeply learned" nor "notably advanced or unconventional." She simply put her vast financial resources completely at the disposal of her husband Lord Julius, "every penny of her fortune" having been transferred, at her insistence, to him many years before her death (pp.181-82). And, it was she, one of Spinoza's direct descendants, who had completely transformed the "indolent young attache" she had married into the powerful, social reforming thinker, who came to bear no resemblance to the Torrs, his decadent, noble English family. Lord Julius considers the transformation wrought by his wife "supernatural," as "unaccountable as magic" (pp.183-84).

Kathleen, however, who is also devoted to the work of her husband, Emanuel, realizes neither Lady Julius nor Emanuel has ever understood the full potential of women. And the more progressive Kathleen has since

come to believe that their generalizations concerning women are wrong, perceiving that what has been considered inherent differences between men and women are, in fact, only matters of physical circumstance. She now believes that those differences are acquired: "If a woman is brought up like a man, and circumstanced precisely like a man, and knows nothing of any conventions save those which control a man—why, then you can't tell the difference between her opinions and actions and those of her brother" (p.248). And, contrary to Christian's contention that her particular work with the women in the villages at Somerset is changing all that, she points out that what she does for Emanuel proceeds only on orthodox lines. She is developing them only in the way of usefulness, material usefulness, "spinning, weaving, sewing, dairy and poultry work, and above all things good cooking." There has been no effort, she adds, "to take women away from the work they have always been doing, but only to make them do it better" (pp.248-49). And, when Emanuel's social venture finally fails, Kathleen realizes much of the problem lay in this misunderstanding, and underutilization, of women.

Although, in The Damnation of Theron Ware, Dr. Ledsmar is certainly no convert to Comte's cult of sentimental womanhood, he does concur in crediting women with the perpetuation of religious sentiment, contending that the entire priestly profession would have long since perished from the memory of mankind had it not been for them. While he views the girl as more precocious than her male counterpart in childhood, flying ahead to a kind of mediaeval stage while her slower brother is still stumbling along somewhere in a neolithic period, he contends that "having got there, she stays there; she dies there." The boy, then, passes her, and goes on, "if he

is a philosopher [like Father Forbes], and lets her remain in the dark ages, where she belongs." However, "if he happens to be a fool [like this young minister], which is customary, he stops and hangs around in her vicinity" (pp.324-25). Just as Father Forbes explains the religious structure as a basic adjunct of human nature, Dr. Ledsmar attaches it to the particular basic nature of women. What is regarded as religion, he feels, is especially calculated to attract women: "They remain as superstitious to-day, down in the marrow of their bones, as they were ten thousand years ago," and "even the cleverest of them are secretly afraid of omens, and respect auguries." Thus, they make a natural constituency to which an "institution based on mysteries, miracles, and the supernatural generally, would naturally appeal." Then, too, he feels, the personality of the priest must be considered. Women, not being a metaphysical people, do not easily follow abstractions. Therefore, according to Dr. Ledsmar, "they want their dogmas and religious sentiments embodied in a man, just as they do their romantic fancies." The reason the institution of celibacy was forced upon the early Christian Church, according to the doctor's interpretation of Jerome, was the scandal caused by rich Roman ladies loading bishops and handsome priests with fabulous gifts, "until the passion for currying favor with women of wealth, and marrying them or wheedling their fortunes from them, debauched the whole priesthood." In his opinion, no matter what laws a sect might enact, the woman's attitude toward the priest remains intact. Although she is not learned enough to have knowledge of it, "she intuitively feels in his presence a sort of backwash of the old pagan sensuality and lascivious mysticism which enveloped the priesthood in Greek and Roman days" (pp.326-27).

Celia is an obvious exception to his generalization concerning women's lack of learning, but she echoes his assessment of the priest's attraction for women when she admonishes Theron to think of Father Forbes's sacrifice — "to never know what love means, to forswear his manhood, to live a forlorn, celibate life." She assures Theron he has no idea "how sadly that appeals to a woman" (p.373). Theron, too, is fascinated by this enigma of the attitude toward the celibate. He finds it strange that this "soft-voiced, portly creature in a gown, with his white, fat hands and his feline suavity of manner, should produce such a commanding and unique effect of virility." He assumes that this is a part of the great sex mystery which historically surrounded the figure of the celibate priest. "Women had always been prostrating themselves before it," and Theron tries to imagine himself in the priest's place, looking down on these worshipping female forms. He realizes that he, too, is emotionally drawn to the priest, having "a quaint sensation of feeling as a romantic woman must feel in the presence of a specially impressive masculine personality" (p.417).

It was Comte's contention that the evolution of human thought and knowledge passed through three main stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific. A major imperative of his positivist program was to place the study of society in the third or scientific stage, which he attempted on a grand scale. He came to the realization, however, that it would be a slow process; as Father Forbes reflects, the theological and metaphysical vestiges inevitably cling longest in the realm of social science. Frederic's fictional trio in The Damnation of Theron Ware generally personify Comte's three stages in the evolution of human thought:

Dr. Ledsmar representing the objective voice of science; Father Forbes, the philosophic voice of metaphysics; and Celia the emotive voice of theology. Father Forbes realizes his middle position in the little game of power play the trio enjoy. In spite of Dr. Ledsmar's description of Celia as a "mad ass . . . bundle of egotism, ignorance, and red-headed lewdness" (p.333) and her abhorrence of him as "a beast" (p.146) as well as of his "heartless, bloodless science" (p.149), the priest understands their animosity not to be in any way alarming. Accepting his own middle position, like Renan, as mediator between science and faith, he points out to Theron that:

These two good friends of mine have much enjoyment out of the idea that they are fighting for the mastery over my poor unstable character. It has grown to be a habit with them, and a hobby as well, and they pursue it with tireless zest. There are not many intellectual diversions open to us here, and they make the most of this one. It amuses them, and it is not without its charms for me, in my capacity as an interested observer. It is a part of the game that they should pretend to themselves that they detest each other. In reality, I fancy they like each other very much (pp.419-20).

Frederic's trio also present a microcosm of the basic attitudes directly affecting the religious thought at the turn of the century. Of the three, it is Celia's idealism and love of beauty that most appeal to Theron. Citing Mary and Jesus, Isis and Horus, Mahamie and Buddha, Olympias and Alexander and even Perictione and Plato, she notes that almost every religion has its Immaculate Conception, which she interprets as man's natural inclination to worship the maternal idea. The deepest of all our instincts, she feels, is the love of woman, who is at once daughter, wife, and mother. The priest idealizes Celia as an Irish Madonna. Unique in genetic form, she impresses him as a sort of atavistic idealization of the

old Kelt at his finest. Interpreting the Irish as a strange mixture of elementary early peoples, isolated to work out "their own racial amalgam" with its large inheritance of Eastern mysticism, he sees the Ireland of two thousand years ago incarnated in Celia. They are a people of impossible contradictions, at once the most devout and the most pagan; and in his "mind's eye," he sees Celia the "fair young ancestral mother of them all" (pp.416-17). And, Theron recalls, after having lain on his arm beside Celia that he had experienced the sensation of having been a boy again, "a good, pure-minded, fond little child," and she was the mother that he idolized (p.385). Although she remains a nominal Catholic, Celia explains the religious form serves only as "the jug" into which she pours the things she likes; her theology is Greek (p.152). She takes much more stock in Plato than Peter, and like Matthew Arnold, she distinguishes only Greek and Jew, considering "all other division and classifications, such as by race or language or nationality" as pure foolishness. Arnold, it might be noted, distinguished a "Keltic" strain in his own sensibility, attributed to the Cornish extraction of his mother, Mary (nee Penrose).³¹

Celia's antagonist, Dr. Ledsmar, also makes a distinction between Greek and Jew in his accolade of those "marvellous old Jews" who, though never more than a handful, were able to impose the rule of their ideas and their gods for fifteen hundred years because their most fundamental laws forbade sculptures or pictures. At the same time, he notes, the Egyptians, Assyrians, and other Semites were "running to artistic riot"; and while the museums of the world are filled with statues from the Nile and carvings from the palaces of Sargon and Assurbanipal, the artistic remains of the Jews of that same period could be put in "a child's wheelbarrow." Because

they had both the sense and the strength to suppress art, they survived the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Moors. According to Dr. Ledsmar's inflexible laws of materialism, in contrast to Celia's religion of beauty and art, all artistic peoples perish. Based on that premise, he now sees the decline of his revered ancient race because the present generation of European Jews is producing young painters, sculptors, and actors, just as for the past century they had been producing talented composers and musicians (p.122).

It is Celia's religious mission to restore the "art and poetry and the love of beauty, and the gentle, spiritual, soulful life" to the church; and it is only the Greeks, she insists, who had that. The Christians might have had it, too, except for those early leaders they call "the Fathers," who were devoted to dirt and ugliness and the thought of hell-fire. She notes that Jesus had valued women, since they had been prominent in the earlier stages of the development of the church. And that, according to Celia, was the very essence of the Greek spirit, which breathed "sweetness and grace" (in phrasing similar to Arnold's "sweetness and light") into Christianity at its inception, which twenty generations of "cranks and savages like Paul and Jerome and Tertullian could not extinguish." But, the very man, Cyril, who killed Hypatia, beginning, in Celia's estimation, the dark ages, unwittingly secured the church's acceptance of the adoration of the Virgin in order to please the Egyptians. To that idea, Celia credits the survival of the Greek spirit, a spirit she sees destined to rule the world. "It was only epileptic Jews," she contends, "who could imagine a religion without sex in it" (pp.383-84). Thus, the statuary in the sanctum of her inner chambers are unified in the theme of the Madonna rather than religious dogma.

As Celia attempts an alliance between herself and Theron in order to exert pressure against the scientist's influence over the priest, she intuitively feels the minister to be a man of sensitivity. She tests her assessment of his temperament and tastes by inquiring, "Are you fond of pictures, statuary, the beautiful things of the world? Do great works of art, the big achievements of the big artists, appeal to you, stir you up?" (p.147). She promises to heal the minister's "bruised and wounded nerves," as his "doctor," with Chopin; as for Theron, "for a shrinking moment the flesh was weak" (p.279).

"Culture," for Matthew Arnold, connoted the qualities of an open-minded intelligence. He insisted, as George H. Ford notes, that both the Bible as "a great work of literature like the Odyssey," and the Church of England, as "a great national institution like Parliament," had to be preserved. Not because they were credible, "but because both, when properly understood, were agents of what he called 'culture'—they contributed to making mankind more civilized," providing "a full awareness of man's past and a capacity to enjoy the best works of art, literature, history, and philosophy that have come down to us from that past."³² The basic function of criticism, Arnold contended, was the "disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world. . . ."³³ "As a way of viewing life in all its aspects, including the social, political and religious," culture represented for Arnold, "the most effective way of curing the ills of a sick society." It was his "principal prescription," Ford adds.³⁴

Once admitted to Celia's inner sanctum, Theron finds himself in a miniature temple with "flat upright wooden columns, terminating high

above in simple capitals." Between two apertures on the fourth side of the apartment, "rose against the wall what Theron took at first glance to be an altar," with a shelf-like projection below which supported what "seemed a massive, carved casket," but revealed the keyboard of a piano when Celia opened it. Whistler's color scheme to compliment her red hair completes Celia's representation of the meaning of "being a Greek" (pp.287-88). "There was a nation," she contends, "where all the people were artists, where everybody was an intellectual aristocrat" (p.289). In Culture and Anarchy, Arnold classified the industrialized English society into three categories: the Barbarians—the aristocracy, high spirited, serene, and distinguished, but isolated from ideas; the Philistines—the middle class, dissenting, energetic, and moral, but devoid of "sweetness and light"; and the Populace—the masses, raw and blind. The most important element now to be considered in this social division, Arnold felt, was the Philistines. Their having become the most influential section of society, their strength was the country's strength, but their crudeness was also the country's crudeness. Therefore, his prescription was to educate and humanize the Philistines; their excessive Hebraism could only be remedied with a full measure of Hellenism.³⁵ Celia commences Theron's Hellenizing.

As she begins the Fourth Prelude, Theron "surrendered his senses," settled in "a recumbent posture," feeling that "there ceased to be any such thing as nudity." The music spoke to him "as with a human voice." The "wooing sense of roses and moonlight, of perfumed, white skins, alluring languorous eyes," enveloped him. Then she swept him from the "dark, scented, starlit garden" into the sanctity of the cathedral. Throughout the episode of Theron's conversion, Frederic entwines the imagery of the sexual

act with the seductive quality of Celia's performance. With the suggestions of the music's "choral power and authority . . . Theron sat abruptly up, then was drawn resistlessly to his feet." As she played the funeral march from the Second Sonata, "he sank down upon the divan again." His "heart beat furiously" as he listened to the "weird, mediaeval processional, with its wild, clashing chords"; there was a "propelling motion in the thing—a sense of being borne bodily along," as he breathed hard and "rocked himself to and fro." Then Celia stopped. Commenting that the "Hellenizing" was moving along successfully, she disappears through the curtains. When she returns, her hair is loose, and she is robed now in shapeless, clinging fabric, "lustrous and creamy and exquisitely soft . . . her head inclined gently, gravely, toward him," with the posture of the armless Venus. The Third Ballade seems to have "incoherent and impulsive words" which appeal to him "in strenuous argument and persuasion." He strains after their meaning "with a passionate desire." In the moment's silence, "Theron listened for what he felt must be the audible thumping of his heart." As she begins the Sixteenth Mazurka, she plays with her eyes closed, as if enraptured, and "he fancied her beholding visions as she wrought the music,—visions full of barbaric color and romantic forms," and then he feels that "he too could see these visions,—as if he gazed at them through her eyes." As the two merge to become one for the moment, Celia stops. "It can't be the end," Theron gasps; and suggesting a climactic response, he has trouble breathing. "A sharp, blinding spasm of giddiness closed upon and shook him." He tottered under it, gasped, patted his chest with his hand, noting that he was afraid his "heart had gone wrong" (pp.289-98). Celia assures him that it is only Chopin, who first excites, then sends to sleep; and she

anticipates that Theron will sleep well that night. She pours him Benedictine for communion, her cigarette smoke serves for incense, and Theron is both physically seduced, at least in a manner of speaking, and spiritually converted. He eagerly makes his confession: "I want to be a Greek myself . . . I want to get as close to you—to your ideal, that is, as I can . . . you and the music have decided me. . . . Only you must help me; you must tell me how to begin." After the minister leaves, the surrogate priestess holds out her flowing skirts with both hands, executing "a swinging pirouette in front of the gravely beautiful statue of the armless woman" (pp.301-02).

Austin Briggs notes the similarity of Celia's costume to the Bohemian attire of Stephen Crane's wife Cora, which was regularly worn at their home in England.³⁶ As Lillian Gilkes recorded Sanford Bennett's description of Cora's at-home costume, it consisted of Greek sandals and "a species of blouse and skirt—'a weird kind of wrapper' . . . which she made herself and which was probably an adaptation to long-skirt requirements of the classical Greek chiton, with long sleeves added to lend a touch of the medieval."³⁷ While Celia's interpretation of the emotional artistry of Chopin and Whistler might lack the restraint and balance generally attributed to the classical, Theron's conversion to Celia's concept of being Greek is nevertheless accomplished. That "marvellous night with the piano" was his "new birth":

Yes; the former country lout, the narrow zealot, the untutored slave groping about in the dark after silly superstitions, cringing at the scowl of mean Pierces and Winches, was dead. There was an end of him, and good riddance. In his place there had been born a Poet,—he spelled the word out now unabashed,—a child of light, a lover of beauty and sweet sounds, a recognizable brother to Renan and Chopin—and Celia! (p.308).

Following his emotional religious experience, Theron erroneously considers himself one now of the intimate group, Celia's convert and follower. However, membership is not that easily obtained. The doctor closes his door to Theron first, following Theron's inquiry about the personal relationship between Celia and the priest (p.336). The priest excludes him from "communion" at the pastorate, partaking of his "fine champagne" alone, when Theron presumes membership in the group (p.420). Celia abandons her neophyte at the picnic on the Fourth of July when she sees him turn from maternal worship to cringing fear at the prospect of being discovered alone with her (p.387). However, still filled with self-delusion, Theron follows her to New York, convinced that her way of life is yet open to him. When he finally confronts Celia in New York, at her hotel, he prostrates himself before her. No other man in all the world, he declares, can yield himself so absolutely to the woman he worships as he can. Using the language of Ruth from the Old Testament, he confesses his unworthiness, but asserts that no one else could idolize and reverence her as he does:

Whither thou goest, I will go, and where thou lodgest I will lodge; thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God; where thou diest, will I die, and there will I be buried. The Lord do so to me, and more also, if aught but death part thee and me! (p.475).

Frederic's direct treatment of human sexuality was a bold literary innovation, disturbing to the reading public of his time and indicative of his early response to the new influences of naturalism. And Theron was, of course, physically attracted to Celia. However, Frederic's fictional minister was, perhaps, as much attracted to the theological thought represented in his temptress's characterization as he was to her seductive

physical appeal. With St. Paul and Protestantism, Literature and Dogma, God and the Bible, and Last Essays on Church and Religion, all published in the seventies, Arnold is considered to have founded Anglican Modernism. His attitude is summed up in the preface to God and the Bible: "At the present moment two things about the Christian religion must surely be clear to anybody with eyes in his head. One is that men cannot do without it; the other, that they cannot do with it as it is."³⁸ Certain that much in popular religion was "touched with the finger of death," and no less certain of the hopelessness of man without it, he sought to discover for religion a basis of scientific fact, according to Basil Willey, which even the modern positivist spirit could accept.³⁹ In an age of crumbling creeds, he conceived that mankind would increasingly turn to poetry for an interpretation of life, for sustenance and consolation.⁴⁰ Celia declaims her paganism and yet retains Catholicism as its symbolism, which is pleasant to her. That Catholic religion is her "jug," but she puts into that form the things she likes, things that were there thousands of years ago, before "the Jews threw them out." She is convinced that the "art and poetry and love of beauty, and the gentle, spiritual, soulful life" can be restored: the spirit of the Greeks stifled in Christianity by the early church Fathers (p.383).

When Theron asks Celia to explicate her Greek idea, she offers almost indifferently that it means lots of things, "absolute freedom from moral bugbears, for one thing. The recognition that beauty is the only thing in life that is worth while. The courage to kick out of one's life everything that isn't worth while; and so on" (p.300)—an echo of Arnold's early lectures On the Study of Celtic Literature, in which without much knowledge of either his subject or anthropology, Willey feels, he used "the

'Celtic' strain as a symbol of that which rejects the despotism of the commonplace and the utilitarian."⁴¹ And it is precisely in this capacity that Theron fails his recently confessed madonna at the picnic. Celia lives a liberated life in accordance with her spiritual convictions. Theron's reverence for her gospel of trampling the generally accepted views underfoot—such as the prohibition of "young married Methodist ministers" sitting out "alone in the woods with red-headed Irish girls" (p.379)—turns abruptly to cringing panic with the thought that Levi Gorringe's office boy might reveal their presence in the woods together and ruin him (p.387).

According to the concept that religious feeling could be construed as a natural capacity which made legitimate demands for satisfaction and found justification in the fruits it bore, knowledge alone was not sufficient for man; and Celia, as Father Forbes has pointed out, battles Dr. Ledsmar for mastery over the priest's metaphysics. In his preference for Celia's convictions, Theron depicts the general predilection of his century. For, according to Mandelbaum, Comte, Strauss, and Feuerbach did not come to dominate nineteenth-century religious thought. Rather what came to exert the greater influence was a less radical interpretation of the relation between religious feeling and religious belief. The attitude that religious feeling was a natural capacity, demanding satisfaction and justifying itself according to the results, was connected with German Romantic and idealist philosophers of religion who espoused a belief in divine immanence and denied that the object of religious worship transcends the world. Instead, for them the object of religious feeling was to be found within the totality of nature, of which man is a part.⁴² It was this religious conception, according to Mandelbaum, which characterized such liberal theologians as

Francis Newman, most if not all of the authors of Essays and Reviews, and such literary figures as Carlyle, Matthew Arnold, and Tennyson.⁴³ Celia opposes the religious assessments of Father Forbes that the human race turns to religion in fear of death, like savages telling one another ghost stories in a dark woods around a campfire. "What nonsense!" she declares. It was only with the advent of the miserable Jeromes and Augustines and Cyrils, when the abominations of the meanness and cruelty of the Jewish Old Testament were introduced to stamp out the sane and lovely Greek elements in the Church, "that Christians became the poor, whining, cowardly egotists they are, troubling about their tin-pot souls, and scaring themselves in their churches by skulls and crossbones" (pp.357-58).

For those who held that the object of religious worship did not reside outside the world, but at its heart, the theory of evolution posed no insurmountable obstacles. For some, it was possible to identify true religion with the veneration of that immanent power which was at work in nature, evolving higher forms of existence, bringing mankind out of crudity, ignorance, and selfishness into altruism, knowledge, and culture, and creating a climate of opinion in which the boundaries of what was recognized as religion became greatly enlarged. Theron's self-deception convinced him that he was gaining that knowledge and culture; Celia's theology, perhaps, even provided some semblance of altruism to him. His exposure to Celia and the priest destroys the narrow confines of his education and experience. Celia's artistry at the organ and piano expands his appreciation of music, a fascination so great that he had earlier "specifically prayed against it as a temptation" (p.78). The many volumes of the priest's library (p.105) contrast with his own inadequate "threescore

books which constituted his printed possessions" (p.92). However, betrayed by Celia's kiss, he interprets her act as an invitation to his complete surrender. The memory of the kiss abides with him, and like Aaron's rod, swallows up all competing thoughts, making Theron's brain its slave (p.389). Like Milton's Eve who pays pagan homage to the forbidden tree, Theron bares his head to the full moon on a Sunday night, where "the impulse to kneel, there in the pure, tender moonlight" was restrained only by some formless reservation. But he looks up at the "broad luminous face of the satellite," and blasphemously murmurs: "You are our God. . . . Hers and mine!" (p.390). Theron then deludes himself that Celia's momentary anger with him before the kiss had been provoked by his lack of "faith in her protection." In his momentary fright, he had lost sight of the fact that, should he be exposed, "she would naturally feel that she had been the cause of his martyrdom." As he walked "into the woods with her,—'the further the better' had been her own words." Certainly, "her own warm heart would tell her, on the instant, how he had been sacrificed for her sake, and would bring her, eager and devoted, to his succor" (p.394).

His encounter with Levi Gorringer at this point convinces him that his own independence has been secured. Rather than coming to the realization of his own hypocrisy, with his suspicions concerning the relationship between Gorringer and Alice, he finds it "good to be on his legs, and alone." The charm of his own companionship encourages his conclusion that he can no longer "sacrifice himself to a notion of duty to these low-minded and coarse-natured villagers," and he no longer feels any "doubt about his moral right . . . to wash his hands of the miserable combination of hypocrisy and hysterics which they called their spiritual life" (pp.409-10).

It is for Michael Madden, "as sweet and holy a character," according to Father Forbes, "as it is possible for any one to think of" (p.414), to reveal to Theron his dangerous shortcomings. Dying, and without guile, Michael can speak with candor about the change that has taken place in the young minister; and he first lays bare Theron's deceit. "Those Protestants, and others too, mind you," he admonishes the visiting minister, "who profess and preach good deeds, and themselves do bad deeds,—they will never be saved." The young man instinctively saw good in Theron's face when he came to Octavius. It drew even him to the back of the Methodist church to hear Theron preach, and it was comforting to Michael that Theron's face was a "pleasure and a help for those in suffering and trouble to look at." The very sight of it encouraged the belief in pure thoughts and merciful deeds. And, regardless of the opinions of the theological scholars, Michael can not credit it that God intends damnation for such a man as Theron or others like him. Within six months, however, that face had changed. Michael notices the great difference, all of a sudden, on the day of the picnic. If it appeared to him like "the face of a saint before," it seems "more like the face of a barkeeper now!"

Theron tells the afflicted Michael that his quarrel is with the air of Octavius, which Theron, for his own part, finds to agree wonderfully with him, making him "fat as a seal." Forcing a little deprecatory laugh, Theron hopes he is not paying for it with any wholesale deterioration inside. In fact, Theron assures Michael, he feels himself "an infinitely better and broader and stronger man" than he was when he first came there. To which Michael replies: "You are entirely deceived about yourself." It was a great misfortune, Michael feels, that Theron did not keep among his own people.

He sees that Theron did not have the proper understanding of what his tempters' sayings and doings really meant. Because of the power of the true church, Michael feels, they can say and do things without any harm; while those same things bode destruction for Theron because he is walking alone (pp.438-42).

Michael is worried about the social implications of the relationship between his sister and the minister, as Theodore was also embarrassed by the freedom of his sister's relationship with Father Forbes; but in his "primitive humanity," Michael sets forth the crux of Theron's damnation—or illumination. Frederic structures his novel with two lines of character development in the central character of his minister, intersecting the developing lines on the day of the Fourth of July picnic; Theron's overt quest for knowledge ascends at the same time his self-awareness ironically descends. Michael's "power of the true church" might be more broadly interpreted as catholicity or the European tradition. As Father Forbes points out, sectarians are more prone to examine their souls, like children who pull up the bulbs they have planted to see if they have roots yet; while his people are more satisfied to leave their roots alone, "once they have been planted, so to speak, by baptism" (pp.356-57). The traditions give support, and the roots are taken for granted. The turmoil of modern thought is not too shaking to those protected by authority, Father Forbes feels, noting that the whole "question of private judgment versus authority is No-Man's-Land for us" (pp.108-09). So rather than preach, he serves as "the paternal, ceremonial, authoritative head and center of his flock" (p.114). Dr. Ledsmar is grounded in scientific studies in which "three or four hundred years" are needed to prove a single theory (p.330), and Celia

puts the art and culture of thousands of years ago into her "Catholic religion jug" (p.383). None of them has to walk alone as Michael understands the minister must, since he is unable to "jog along between the rails" like the street-car horse Father Forbes uses as the simile for his Catholic clergy (p.413).

Frederic's novel is not complete with the separation of the lines of the Reverend Mr. Ware's character development, and the intellectualism of the doctor, priest, and artist presents only the divisive factors in the minister's initiation. Each was amused by his intellectual development but repelled by the accompanying anguish of spirit. Celia irrevocably pronounces his exile from their company with her assessment of the value of their acquisition: "It is all in a single word, Mr. Ware . . . we find that you are a bore" (p.477). All his attempts to ingratiate himself with them—his ridicule of his church and his wife, his comprehension of George Sands's domestic arrangement—only "opened their eyes." While Celia could appreciate Theron's feeling of expanding and growing in all directions, she advises him that what he took for improvement was degeneration (p.479). When Father Forbes encounters the completely distressed young minister in New York, he no longer has any interest in him; the priest's only concern is with the machinery necessary to get Celia's wayward brother Theodore out of his serious scrape. He has brought his old friend, General Brady, who "knows all the parties concerned, and . . . can set things right if anybody can."

Father Forbes, unlike Celia who gives vent to a full range of emotions and responds on a more personal level to those around her, is still too controlled to deal directly with Theron. On the minister's first visit to the

pastorate, the priest had made it clear that he did not consider it "everybody's" business to know things. After all, he contended, the earth was no less round in the days when people supposed it to be flat than it is now. So, the truth remains the truth, even though a charter might be given to "ten hundred thousand separate numskulls to examine it by the light of their private judgment, and report that it is as many different varieties of something else" (p.108). Contrary to the thrust of the Chautauqua movement which asserted knowledge was no longer to be considered as a "closed preserve or class monopoly, but lay open to squatters' rights by Everyman,"⁴⁴ Father Forbes feels no obligation as a part of the intellectually elite to share his concept of the "truth." The imperious priest does not preach to his parishioners because he does not consider them capable of understanding him, and he feels no compunction to move them toward his level. Nor can he be bothered with Theron in New York.

Dr. Ledsmar, Father Forbes, and Celia Madden had been amused, at first, by Theron. His honest nature, his "sincerity in that absurd religion," his "general naivete of mental and spiritual get-up" pleased them, and made them think he was going to be a "real acquisition":

We liked you, as I have said, because you were unsophisticated and delightfully fresh and natural. Somehow we took it for granted you would stay so. But that is just what you didn't do,—just what you hadn't the sense to try to do (p.478).

Theron's mistake was in "presuming upon the friendship" which he felt had been extended to him, and which Celia admits was "mistakenly extended" to him. Now, in New York, Frederic's protagonist does appear to be damned, and like Adam expelled from the paradise of innocence. His insular, sectarian Methodism had not provided sufficient grounding to

sustain him against the inundation of nineteenth-century religious thought. He seems undone, both spiritually, as his old faith is destroyed, and morally. However, the journey is not complete; and for those nurtured in a democratic climate, with an appreciation of the individual, such ending would hardly be satisfactory. Although he has not yet become a man capable of functioning within his society, Theron only misunderstands who his real mentors are. The new concepts of intellectual authoritarianism were appealing to his sensitive character, but they were deceptive and destructive to the democratic experience.

Theron's actual new birth, to be more fully discussed in the following chapter, is effected only through the guidance of his real mentors, the Soulsbys, and even more specifically, through the tutelage of Sister Soulsby who embodies the Higher Criticism as it developed in America. The closing chapters of Frederic's novel suggest the possibility, at least, of the completion of the redemptive cycle, with Theron better depicting, perhaps, an American nineteenth-century Everyman.

NOTES

- ¹R. W. B. Lewis, The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy, and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1955), p.I.
- ²Austin Briggs, Jr., The Novels of Harold Frederic (Ithaca, New York, 1969), pp.111-12.
- ³Harold Frederic, The Damnation of Theron Ware, in The Major Works of Harold Frederic (New York, 1969), I, 22-23.
- ⁴Robert E. Spiller and others, Literary History of the United States, 3rd ed. rev. (New York, 1973), p.799.
- ⁵Spiller, pp.798-99.
- ⁶Louis B. Wright and others, The Democratic Experience, Rev. ed. (Glenview, Illinois, 1968), p.292.
- ⁷Wright, p.292.
- ⁸Spiller, p.799.
- ⁹Winthrop S. Hudson, Religion in America, 2nd ed. (New York, 1973), p.305.
- ¹⁰In Wright, p.346.
- ¹¹Spiller, p.801.
- ¹²Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man and Reason: A Study in 19th-Century Thought (Baltimore, 1971), p.22.
- ¹³In Mandelbaum, p.29.
- ¹⁴Hudson, p.244.
- ¹⁵Hudson, p.244.
- ¹⁶"Exegesis and Hermeneutics," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1972), VIII, 953.
- ¹⁷Mandelbaum, p.30.
- ¹⁸"The Debate Over Christology in Modern Christian Thought," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1972), XII, 1027.
- ¹⁹"Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1972), IX, 222.

- ²⁰"Feuerbach," Britannica, IX, 222.
- ²¹Mandelbaum, p.33.
- ²²In Thomas F. O'Donnell and Hoyt C. Franchere, Harold Frederic (New York, 1961), p.44.
- ²³The liberal Father Terry and Frederic remained in touch long after both had moved from Utica. When Frederic returned to the United States in May 1886, President Cleveland canceled a cabinet meeting to entertain Frederic and his friend Father Terry, whom Frederic had brought along. The Reverend John F. Lowery, priest, orator, writer, and poet, a native of Utica and a clergyman in the Albany Diocese, was another of the many acquaintances in the Catholic hierarchy with whom Frederic remained in contact. Father Lowery hunted Frederic up at the Savage when he came to tour England and the Continent in 1890. —Harold Frederic, The Correspondence of Harold Frederic, The Harold Frederic Edition, eds. George E. Fortenberry and others, (Fort Worth, Texas, 1977) I, 23, 253.
- ²⁴In Hudson, p.253.
- ²⁵In Hudson, p.252.
- ²⁶In Hudson, p.252.
- ²⁷Hudson, p.255.
- ²⁸In Hudson, p.253.
- ²⁹"Comte, Auguste," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1972), VI, 250.
- ³⁰"Comte," Britannica, VI, 250-51.
- ³¹"Arnold, Matthew," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1972), II, 467.
- ³²M. H. Abrams, ed., The Norton Anthology of English Literature, 3rd ed. (New York, 1974), II, 1333.
- ³³Matthew Arnold, "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," in Abrams, II, 1399.
- ³⁴Abrams, II, 1333.
- ³⁵"Arnold," Britannica, II, 468.
- ³⁶Briggs, p.124.
- ³⁷Lillian Gilkes, Cora Crane (Bloomington, Ind., 1960), p.123.

- ³⁸In "Arnold," Britannica, II, 469.
- ³⁹"Arnold," Britannica, II, 469.
- ⁴⁰"Arnold," Britannica, II, 468.
- ⁴¹"Arnold," Britannica, II, 468.
- ⁴²Mandelbaum, p.34.
- ⁴³Mandelbaum, p.35.
- ⁴⁴Spiller, p.799.