ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: TWIN PILLARS TO THE AXIS OF EVIL: PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY METAPHORS AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1971-2001

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On January 16, 1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that his country would withdraw its forces from the Persian Gulf by 1971. U.S. policymakers interpreted this decision through the lens of the Cold War. They feared that the Gulf—a region whose oil was vital to American defense strategy—was at risk of becoming a "vacuum" and falling under the sway of the Soviet Union. Over the next three decades the United States would steadily assert its dominance in the Persian Gulf, as American policy toward the region evolved in tandem with the language used by presidential administrations to conceptualize and address the challenges they saw in the area.

This study examines the security metaphors (and the ideas and images they conveyed) employed by U.S. presidents to sell their national security vision for the Persian Gulf to the American people. Four presidential metaphors—Twin Pillars, Strategic Consensus, the New

World Order, and Dual Containment—functioned to reconstitute norms of sovereignty and American responsibility for the Gulf. Drawing on the symbolism of the Cold War, these metaphors were used by presidential administrations to progressively articulate a U.S. right of intervention in the region to combat forces perceived to be hostile to U.S. interests. The power of these metaphors derives from the way their logics and symbolism built on each other, collectively constructing interpretive frameworks through which officials, commentators, and reporters made sense of the region and its importance to the United States.

This project is divided into four case studies to examine each metaphor, focusing on the presidencies of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. In each chapter, I outline the development of the metaphor within the administration, analyze the public invocations of the metaphor in presidential discourse, trace expressions of the metaphor and its symbolism in press coverage and foreign policy commentary, and consider criticisms directed at each metaphor. In sketching the constitutive trajectory of each metaphor, I show how the collective picture the presidential administrations painted of the Gulf as a vulnerable and vital region worked to encourage military intervention. These rhetorical developments linked the Cold War to the War on Terror, ultimately setting the stage for George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil" campaign and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

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by

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2021

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For my grandparents, Herb and Betty Price,

whose faith and faithfulness surpass any metaphor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful for the support of many friends, family, mentors, and colleagues without whom I would not have been able to complete this project. Foremost is this project's director and my advisor, Shawn J. Parry-Giles, who has been a steadfast advocate, teacher, and mentor to me during my graduate studies. I am profoundly grateful for your guidance and your willingness to always go the extra mile.

I am thankful for the many contributions of my dissertation committee members to this project and my own academic growth. Trevor Parry-Giles, thank you for helping me think about my own position within the world of academic study and for modeling the kind of engagement with students that sparks intellectual growth and maturity. Carly S. Woods, thank you for your patience, encouragement, and magnanimity during my time at the University of Maryland. I would not be the teacher and researcher that I am today without your influence. Sahar Khamis, thank you for your openness to partnership and collaboration. I am deeply appreciative of the role you have played in my scholarly development and for your confidence in me. Peter Wien, thank you for broadening my intellectual horizons through your helpful comments and insight.

My sincere gratitude extends to all my colleagues at the University of Maryland, from the Oral Communication Program team who helped me grow as an instructor to the library staff who continually amaze me with your resourcefulness. I am especially thankful for my rhetoric cohort: Naette, Skye, Misti, and Alyson. I am so much the richer for having known you and grown alongside you. Your camaraderie over the past five years gave me joy in the midst of personal and professional challenges. Y'all are the best workmates one could ask for.

I am also incredibly grateful for the caring community at Waterfront Church DC. Pastor Zach, I showed up that first Sunday excited to hear some familiar west Texas twang. I left having received more blessings than I can count. Pastor Ed, thank you for your friendship, intellectual encouragement, and time. Your example illuminates how to live as a faithful believer (as well as father and husband) in a demanding age. To Amy, Jacob, Ben, Courtney, Sam, Marissa, James, Chandler, Sarah Hope, Jared, Allison, Rebekah, Rachel, Farnaz, Dan, and the many other friends Sarah and I made at WCDC, you truly embodied God's love to us. We cherish you greatly.

To my parents, Mark and Kayla, thank you for your prayers, your encouragement, and your unwavering belief in my ability to succeed. You taught me the most important lessons. I am indebted to my sister and her family for the messages of encouragement (especially those from Anna Kate and Heidi) while I've been away from Texas. And I am also thankful for the family I gained while at the University of Maryland. Thank you, Jeff, Teri, and Jacob, for welcoming me into the Edison clan with open arms.

Finally, my deepest gratitude is reserved for my wife, Sarah Grace. You are an endless source of inspiration, kindness, and fun. Thank you for your sacrifices and for believing in me. You mean the world to me.

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INTRODUCTION

The Persian Gulf in American Presidential Discourse

On January 16, 1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced before the House of Commons that his country would withdraw its forces based "east of Suez" by the end of 1971. This declaration ended centuries of a British military presence in the Persian Gulf region. Acknowledging the gravity of the moment, he asked his listeners to accept "realistic priorities" so that they may "come to terms with our role in the world. It is not only at home that, these past years, we have been living beyond our means."[1] He then issued his cabinet's conclusion: "We have accordingly decided to accelerate the withdrawal of our forces… to withdraw them by the end of 1971. We have also decided to withdraw our forces from the Persian Gulf by the same date." This was a momentous choice that Wilson made clear: "The broad effect is that, apart from our remaining Dependencies and certain other necessary exceptions, we shall not be maintaining military bases outside Europe and the Mediterranean."[2] The speech comprised, in the words of the U.K. ambassador to the United States, a "watershed" moment in British international affairs.[3] It would occasion a major turning point in American foreign policy and political discourse as well.

Although Wilson's announcement marked the culmination of a slow British retreat across the Middle East, it still represented an about-face from the public posture assumed by his government just a few years prior. In his first month as Prime Minister, for example, Wilson declared, "whatever we may do… we cannot afford to relinquish our world role, our role which, for shorthand purposes, is sometimes called our 'east of Suez' role."[4] Yet a series of challenges had weathered Wilson's resolve. Pan-Arab nationalism, civil war in North Yemen, and terrorist

attacks in Aden increased British military costs across the Arab world.[5] These setbacks occurred alongside the 1967 devaluation of the pound sterling, a crisis that precipitated, according to Duncan Needham, the "most radical overhaul of [British] monetary policy since the Second World War."[6] Together, these difficulties crystallized the "grave financial difficulties" of sustaining a military presence from Bab al-Mandab to Kuwait.[7] Britain's control over the oil-rich Trucial Sheikhdoms, which relied on Whitehall for their defense, further complicated the decision to leave the Persian Gulf.[8]

Wilson's pronouncement ignited worries high and low. Should the government proceed with its plan to "abandon" the Gulf, one British citizen warned, it risked the region degenerating into "a squabbling ground for neighbouring big powers."[9] U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had told Wilson as early as 1964 that the United States "would look with the greatest concern at a diminution of the UK's role, which was of great importance to us."[10] President Lyndon Johnson even called the Prime Minister at the last minute asking him to reconsider the plan to withdraw.[11] Hours after Wilson's message, Rusk's office issued a statement expressing its "regrets" over Britain's course of action.[12] The *New York Times* declared that an "Air of Crisis" had descended on Washington with the British decision punctuating "the complexity and danger of America's military and economic problems across the globe."[13] These anxieties stemmed in part from concerns over the wider strategic ramifications of London's withdrawal. Britain's military outposts in the Gulf comprised part of a "global calculus" that affected the larger world; these installations bore directly on Whitehall's ability to project naval and air power, protect far-flung bases in Hong Kong and Singapore, deter Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean, and support friendly regimes across the Middle East and Africa.[14]

Faced with the rapid reduction in a critical ally's military capability, U.S. strategists scrambled to anticipate what would happen in the post-British Persian Gulf. The CIA published a special memorandum two weeks after Wilson's speech that listed a number of challenges presented by "The New Situation." The intelligence agency forecasted that Arab nationalists hostile to American interests would "see the UK's announcement as a golden opportunity" and that "outbursts are likely to increase" in countries friendly to the United States.[15] The memo's authors voiced skepticism over the ability of Iran or Saudi Arabia to organize a regional security arrangement "either with each other or jointly with local rulers along the Gulf." Overshadowing these concerns was the possibility of Soviet advancements in the region, fears that the country's Cold War nemesis would "be alert to opportunities created by the British withdrawal." In all, the CIA report concluded that the Gulf was likely to become a newly minted theater of the superpower rivalry. Its authors predicted a "tenuous[ness] to the stability in the area," which exacerbated fears that the "opponents" of the United States "will look to the USSR" for support.[16] Other intelligence estimates from 1968-1971 reinforced this assessment. Among other things, they expressed alarm over the risk of a general war breaking out,[17] over the "voluminous publicity" given to Iran and Arab states in Soviet propaganda,[18] and over the Iranian Shah's "complicated" relations with the United States and Arab Gulf monarchies.[19]

These reports reflect the extent to which American strategists used the lens of the Cold War to interpret the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Understood broadly, Cold War realists typically viewed international politics as a zero-sum rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—the democratic-capitalist country versus the communist one and their respective allies.[20] More than a mere rivalry between great powers, many participants saw the Cold War as "a sweeping struggle between two ways of life" that each superpower sought to export

worldwide.[21] For American policymakers, the Cold War offered "a source of coherence, meaning, and appeal" around which they organized the basic guidelines for U.S. foreign affairs.[22] As Martin J. Medhurst notes, this outlook did not emerge fully-formed after World War II, but rather developed into a "Cold War consensus" as Americans debated how to respond best to the postwar global environment.[23] By the late 1960s, the Cold War had long supplied an "all-encompassing rhetorical reality" that defined the international scene for the American people and their political leaders.[24]

The influence of the Cold War can be seen in how frequently the Persian Gulf was described as a "power vacuum" by commentators in the wake of Wilson's January 16, 1968, announcement. The next day, Senate Major Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) said, "I am sorry the British felt they were forced to take this step because I am certain we will be asked to fill the vacuum east of Suez."[25] His language was picked up by the *Washington Star*, which editorialized that the withdrawal "cannot fail to create a vacuum of power and unsettle the military balance in the areas affected—a matter of prime concern to our own country."[26] On January 29, the Voice of America quoted Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow in a broadcast saying that the United States would rely "on the security grouping involving Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to fill the vacuum left by Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf."[27] One *Foreign Affairs* commentator predicted this "vacuum" would inevitably lead to communist expansionism: "The Western withdrawal from the area will be complete with the British departure from the Persian Gulf." This "Middle East vacuum" would be filled by the Soviet Union, Walter Laqueur warned, fulfilling "The Russian drive to the south which began in the eighteenth century."[28]

The vacuum metaphor neatly illustrates how concerns over Middle East sovereignty formed the backdrop of American debates over the Persian Gulf after January 16, 1968. The

language of "vacuum," as Middle East expert James H. Noye records, created an image of the region as a "chronically unstable" part of the world.[29] Within the dualistic frame of the Cold War, instability meant that a region might be ripe for Soviet exploitation or communist infiltration. For example, the 1947 Truman Doctrine address warned that Greece and Turkey were in danger of falling into "political chaos" and insolvency, which would make it impossible for these countries to "build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish."[30] Vacuums, naturally, require resources from elsewhere to stabilize them. According to the zero-sum calculations of U.S. Cold War strategists, regional volatility mandated an American response to make sure the "vacuum" was not filled by Soviet muscle or communist influence.

Vacuums are also inert. As physical phenomena, vacuums do not possess agency; they are rather used by those with the wherewithal to manipulate them usefully. Like a scientist utilizing a low pressure chamber to conduct an experiment, a "power vacuum" might be made to serve the strategic purposes of another nation. By depicting the Persian Gulf region in this manner, U.S. policymakers exhibited what Edward Said calls "American Orientalism," or a tendency to conceptualize the peoples of the Middle East in a distanced, "dehumanized" manner rather than as a "living reality."[31] Only living things can push against the pull of a vacuum. In like manner, this portrayal of the Gulf region presumed the inability of the peoples living there to manage their own political affairs.

Moreover, the use of "vacuum" to describe the Gulf suggested that incipient action of some sort might soon take place there. Presidents have often used the term "vacuum" to lay the groundwork for future actions. Dwight D. Eisenhower, for instance, called for increased education and journalism to prevent the "poisonous propaganda of the Soviets" from pouring in to fill "the vacuum caused by censorship and illiteracy" around the world.[32] In 1972, Richard

Nixon invoked the language of vacuum to make an argument for staying the course in Vietnam, saying, "We would be leaving behind us a global vacuum that could only be filled with chaos and turmoil—a vacuum in which peace and order could not survive."[33] Even if the particular speaker in question stated that they did not want the United States to replace the British in the Persian Gulf, as many did, by labeling the region a "vacuum" their rhetoric worked to generate expectations for political upheaval to occur there all the same.

Lastly, the repeated description of the Persian Gulf region as a "vacuum" illustrates the power of metaphor to imaginatively shape foreign policy discourse. Events that alarmed American intelligence analysts took place across the Arabic-speaking world shortly after Wilson's announcement. Iraqi Ba'athists seized control of Baghdad, the revolutionary People's Democratic Republic of Yemen emerged as a Soviet socialist ally, Muamar Qaddafi took control in Libya, the Soviet Union more than doubled its naval missions to the Arabian Sea, and the United States lost access to massive Wheelus Air Force Base (called by one official a 20-square-mile "little America… on the sparkling shores of the Mediterranean").[34] The "vacuum" metaphor neatly organized all these disparate occurrences into a coherent Cold War narrative: the British withdrew and, as one defense analyst recalled in his memoir, "Moscow wasted no time trying to fill the emerging power vacuum."[35] Because policymakers viewed the Gulf's natural resources as vital assets for the United States and its allies, the perception that the Soviets might gain sway over the region easily led to the conclusion that Washington could not idly stand by. This chain of reasoning was greased by the oft-issued "vacuum" metaphor, exemplifying the extent to which strategic calculations and the language used to express them are inextricably intertwined.

In this project, I examine the metaphors used by American presidents to promote their administrations' defense policies in the Persian Gulf, implicitly responding to the symbolism of

the "vacuum" metaphor to offer inchoate visions of order and security. Namely, I trace the emergence and development of four metaphors in administration discourse and then chart their usages in press coverage of the region. I am specifically interested in unpacking the implicit notions of U.S. responsibility for Persian Gulf security and attendant conceptions of sovereignty implied by these metaphors. As Robert Elliot Mills notes, "sovereignty is rhetorical" because it "is constituted through language and practice in the negotiation of differences between nations."[36] The four metaphors I analyze—Twin Pillars, Strategic Consensus, New World Order, and Dual Containment—advanced, in different ways, an understanding of the Persian Gulf in U.S. political discourse that made space for an American right to defend the region against forces hostile to U.S. interests. In demonstrating how presidential metaphors helped constitute norms of American responsibility for the Persian Gulf's defense, I hope to complicate contemporary accounts of U.S. misadventure in the region by putting on display the contradictions and continuities present in American presidential discourse about the Persian Gulf since the 1970s.

The presidents in this study used the "bully pulpit" to justify their vision(s) of American-Middle East relations. Historically, U.S. foreign policy has been guided by public statements offered by presidents. The presidential act of articulating the nation's international aims goes back to George Washington, who called for "holding a neutral conduct" in European affairs in his first inaugural (1789) and farewell (1796) addresses. Subsequent presidents have voiced their own foreign policy goals while concurrently reflecting the historical, ideological, and linguistic precedents of previous chief executives.[37]

This observation applies to presidential statements about the Middle East during the Cold War. Presidents Harry Truman and Eisenhower both offered rhetorical justifications for the extension of American power in the Arab world during the 1940s and 1950s. They explicitly

framed their eponymous doctrines as reactions to the waning ability of European allies to hold off communist advancements in the region due to their perceived weakness or moral failure.[38] The 1968 British withdrawal from the Gulf presented the successors of Truman and Eisenhower with an analogous situation. These presidents faced the challenge of redefining U.S. security relations with Gulf nations seen as relatively peripheral to American concerns at that time.[39]

Put differently, presidents are politically obliged to offer public justifications of policy to the American people.[40] As part of this "ritual wherein governmental officials represent foreign policy to the people," Phillip Wander notes, presidential administrations provide reasons for their actions abroad.[41] This process involves the repackaging of complex or unpopular foreign policies into terms that seem winsome to the electorate. Metaphors go a long way toward facilitating such repackaging because they structure issues in ways that are more accessible for non-specialist audiences. In such instances, *metaphors can make the unfamiliar familiar*. They "make sense of the unknown" by drawing on "archetypical" and cultural touchstones to frame issues in more palatable ways that pave the path toward persuasion.[42] Metaphors can thus make complicated subjects comprehensible to the general public by furnishing a "basis for comparative judgments."[43] In this manner metaphors provide "a reasoning tool for citizens" and a valuable device for leaders seeking to sway public opinion in their direction.[44]

Metaphors can also go further and filter into the psyche of not only the people but also the presidents and other elites championing their chosen policies. To such ends, metaphors wield constitutive force. As Michael Osborn writes, it is through this process that metaphors invite audiences and rhetors alike "to make creative re-imaginings that may open . . . new vistas of meaning."[45] Even those who wish to minimize metaphorical language in foreign policymaking acknowledge that metaphors "have dominated American thinking about foreign affairs over the

last hundred years." Robert Dallek, one such critic of metaphorical language, laments that metaphors remain "powerful engines of influence on decision-making about vital questions of war and peace."[46]

In this study I examine how U.S. presidents from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton used metaphors to sell their national security vision for the Persian Gulf to the American people, from the heart of the Cold War to the beginning of the War on Terror. The metaphors these presidents coined did not merely adorn their policy decisions for public consumption, although they were issued strategically with persuasion in mind. They also helped define the meanings and contours of U.S. foreign policies that political figures and the press helped popularize. Thus, each metaphor contributed to and drew from a larger social context laden with a history of meaning-making practices, systems of power, and preferred modes of expression for making sense of the region that is called the Middle East.[47]

In other words, these metaphors functioned as "concrete moments of expression" that participated in a broader discursive web of ways that Americans have talked about Iran and the Arabic-speaking world, their fragments, logics, and ideas circulating long after their initial articulation.[48] In order to understand these metaphors' power, it is therefore necessary to trace the main themes of this rhetorical history to help contextualize these metaphoric utterances, while recognizing that any sketch covering such a long time span will be unavoidably partial and incomplete. It to a survey of the multilayered rhetorical contexts that have shaped American perceptions of the Middle East that I now turn. In the process, I highlight several major lines of interest that dominated American public discourse about—and thus representations of—this region prior to the Cold War, which is when our story begins.

Historic Representations of Arabs and Islam in American Public Discourse

Americans' knowledge of lands beyond the nation's borders often comes from mediated representations of some sort or another, including novels, movies, images, speeches, stereotypes, travelogues, news stories, social media, and the internet. The result of this "multivalent tapestry of voices, positions, and perspectives" is that public impressions of other nations are the product "shared political imaginings," which are themselves continually contested and reconstituted.[49] In the case of Arabs and Muslims, public discourse routinely distorts as much as it conveys accurate information. Television shows and films today regularly perpetuate gross caricatures related to oil wealth, terrorism, or sex-related violence.[50] This long history of portraying Arab Muslims as "either belly dancers, billionaires or bombers" in Hollywood taps into even more deep-seated cultural impressions cultivated over centuries. [51] These (mis)representations matter. As Hinds and Windt note, "Government officials and others do not construct a language or rhetoric out of thin air; they inherit it from the past and modify or adapt it to meet current or future concerns."[52] There are several dominant lines of rhetorical interest reappearing throughout American history that bear import for the utterances examined in this study: American exceptionalism and Orientalism, race and religion, and trade and oil.

Exceptionalism and Orientalism

The Puritan settlers of Massachusetts Bay described themselves as a "Chosen People" who, like biblical Israel, were in covenant with God. This "doctrine of exceptionalism" glimmers throughout the settlers' homilies, writings, and other public statements.[53] As John Winthrop declared in his celebrated sermon *A Modell of Christian Charity*, "we shall be as a 'city on a hill.' The eyes of all people are upon us, so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a

story and byword through the world."[54] Winthrop's message (and others like it) generated a kind of "moral energy" meant to sustain a "compelling principle of identity" premised on a collective Congregationalist mission.[55] If, as Samuel Eliot Morrison writes, Winthrop's sermon provides "the clearest statement we have of the principles that guided the leaders of the Bay Colony, and their conception of the sort of commonwealth they were to found," then it is evident that notions of exceptionalism were present in American colonial life from the outset.[56] Key to this exceptionalism was the distinctiveness of the Puritan mission in contrast to what colonial leaders saw as the compromises of other Christians, which they routinely condemned.

Over the decades, Congregationalist leaders reprised the special nature of the Puritan "errand into the wilderness" continually in their rhetoric.[57] Faced with a population growing more religiously diverse, they sought to broaden the appeal of the Puritan way. It was customary to hear them call "for a return to the original covenant, in sermon after sermon," one scholar notes, a pattern marked by practical innovations like the jeremiad, half-way covenant, communal days of fasting, and covenant renewal ceremonies.[58] Puritans also began defining themselves in contrast to Native Americans, French Catholics, and other cultural outsiders rather than other Protestant churches.[59] Examples abound of preachers luridly disparaging these groups of people, as this antithetical rhetoric was less likely to offend nearby Anglican, Baptist, or Quaker hearers. Arabs, Muslims, and Turks fit seamlessly into this rhetorical economy of alterity, and by the late 1600s and 1700s Islam became a convenient "other" against which to project a more generalized Christian colonial identity.[60]

To be sure, few New Englanders held accurate perceptions of Islam. One 1673 sermon juxtaposed "the Doctrine of the Turks and Persians," which relied on "the sword," and true faith, which deemed "it is the glory of a man to pass by an offence."[61] In 1701 prominent preacher

Cotton Mather asserted that no Muslim had ever been to Massachusetts: "we are afar off, in a Land, which never had (that ever I heard of) one Mahometan breathing in it."[62] The "Islam" invoked in these sorts of performances had a purely imaginative function. It operated as the kind of the rhetorical figuration described by Ann Kibbey in *The Interpretation of Material Shapes in Puritanism*. As with Native Americans or French Catholics, New England preachers created a flat "artistic image" of Muslims against which they could marshal popular prejudice via invective.[63] Surviving manuscripts suggest this rhetorical practice was fairly commonplace, since even the religiously nonconformist Roger Williams condemned "the Pope and Mahomet" in the same breath.[64] These frameworks of difference communicated who the colonists *were* (Christian, Puritan) by vividly scorning what they *were not* (Catholic, Muslim).

Colonists' experience with Barbary piracy reinforced these flat portrayals from the pulpit. Five years before the founding of Boston, for instance, North African corsairs abducted 40 ships off the coast of Newfoundland and carried their crews into captivity; in 1673 churches in New York City raised funds to ransom sailors from a similar fate.[65] Sensationalist captivity narratives from such encounters made for popular reading. Volumes such as *Humanity in Algiers: or, the Story of Azem*; the 1655 story of Abraham Browne; Thomas Atwood Digges's *Adventures of Alonso*; and James Riley's *Authentic Narrative* sold millions of copies.[66] Together with English translations of a *Thousand and One Arabian Nights*, this literature dispersed exaggerated and romanticized views of Muslims, Arabs, Islam, and Turks throughout colonial society.[67]

These stereotypical depictions of Arabs and Muslims traded in Orientalism, or "essential motifs of European imaginative geography" in which "the Asiatic world" is portrayed as the Christian world's "great complementary opposite since antiquity."[68] This constellation of motifs—the Orient as dangerous, the Orient as benighted, the Orient as despotic, the Orient as

disorderly, the Orient as exotic, Orient as violent, etc.—operate, according to Said, as "lenses" that "shape the language, perception, and form of the encounter between East and West."[69] These two-dimensional images of the Arab Muslim world operated in tandem with colonists' notions of their own exceptionalism. Indeed, many of these portrayals of Arabs and Muslims as inferior, evil, or otherwise backwards went beyond mere prejudice by working to affirm the colonists' special place and purpose in the world.[70]

This symbiotic relationship between exceptionalism and Orientalism is a recurring theme of American public discourse. Drawn to the mysterious, presses in the newly-independent United States published poems, novels, and captivity narratives about the Arabic-speaking world as well as two biographies of Muhammad and the first U.S. edition of *Arabian Nights*. This "flood" of literature, writes Robert J. Allison, conveyed "an inverted image of the world the Americans were trying to create anew….The Muslim world was a lesson for Americans in what not to do."[71]

U.S. victory in the Tripolitan War reaffirmed this interpretation for many Americans, with North Africa providing a scene in which they had proven their superiority. In the words of a patriotic poet, his fellow citizens had confirmed themselves "a race of beings, of equal spirit to the first of nations."[72] The New York *Morning Chronicle* encouraged readers to feel "the liveliest emotions of joy and pride" now that "the piratical enemy is brought to a sense of his insignificance, and the American flag liberated from the degrading exertions to which it has been so long subject."[73] A Vermont newspaper likewise praised the "honor and potency of the United States" exhibited in the conflict, its year-in-review article reveling, "the terror of her arms is exemplified, and the tyranny of Barbarian pirates humbled."[74] One sailor freed from Barbary captivity extolled his countrymen: "The Republican government of the United States have set an example of humanity to all the governments of the world," having taught the "merciless

barbarians" to view "the character of the Americans… in the most exalted light."[75] The valor, munificence, and power displayed against Muslim pirates served as proof for these writers that the United States was a great, good, and indeed exceptional nation.

American exceptionalist rhetoric and Orientalist depictions inundate nineteenth-century references to the Near and Middle East. The 1821-1829 Greek uprisings against Ottoman rule, to cite one instance, became a cause célèbre in the United States. The *North American Review* called the conflict "a war of the crescent against the cross."[76] The *Augusta Chronicle* disparaged Muslim troops, saying they offered "little resistance," kept "fortifications… in bad condition," and left "a heap of infected ruins" behind them.[77] So-called "Greek Fever" infected figures far and wide. Edward Everall, president of Harvard and a congressman, declared that Greeks and Americans shared a "common interest in Freedom and Virtue."[78] President James Monroe expressed "deep regret" over the "gloomy despotism" afflicting Greeks.[79] Daniel Webster called Greece "civilized," belonging to a "common faith" with Americans, unlike the Muslim Ottomans, who "desolated and ruined cities and villages" and sold Greek women and children into "an accursed slavery."[80] In his 1829 Annual Address, Andrew Jackson called Russia a "steadfast friend," and admitted that while Moscow's invasion of the Ottoman Empire "awakened a lively sympathy for those who were exposed to the desolation of war, we can not but anticipate that the result will prove favorable to the cause of civilization."[81]

Mid-century reports also described the region in Orientalist terms. For example, an 1855 edition of *Harper's* grumbled about "the degraded Arabs" met on a visit to the Holy Land and Mesopotamia.[82] Mark Twain's widely-read travelogue *The Innocents Abroad* was filled with "venomous vignettes" about the local populations of the Levant.[83] "The Emperor of Morocco is a soulless despot," he recounted in one chapter, "and the great officers under him are despots on a

smaller scale."[84] Twain's account frequently topped bestseller lists, instructing thousands of readers in what to think of Middle Eastern Arabs, Persians, Muslims, Jews, and Turks.[85]

Although voyagers to the Arab world expressed varying degrees of national hubris, even accounts intended to reflect positively on their subject tended to presume the region's cultural inferiority to the United States. Case in point, an obituary for the powerful Egyptian Khedive Mohammed Ali began, "It was easier for the Jews to believe good from Nazareth than for us to credit genius in Egypt." Yet, the ensuing sentences voiced one Orientalist motif after another: "in Turkish politics, humanity is only a question of degree," "The leader of sanguinary Albanians and imbruted Egyptians against wild Arab hordes is not likely to be of a delicate stomach," and "Many of the inhabitants [of Syria]… are repulsive in appearance, the dregs of refuse races."[86]

Motifs of exceptionalism and Orientalism found their way into Gilded Age discussions of industrialization and colonialism as well. Russell Conwell's "Acres of Diamonds" speech, which he gave over 6,000 times, opened with the parable of "Al Hafed," a Persian who lost his life in pursuit of riches abroad when there were diamonds buried "under his own wheat fields."[87] Other Americans participated in the "white man's burden" of "civilizing" non-European peoples, such as those who went on the 1888-1889 Spalding world baseball tour. During their time in Egypt, players marveled at the "general shiftlessness" of the Arabs they encountered, whom they called "the most thoroughly antique of all the antiquities of this nineteenth century."[88] Assumptions of Islam's inferiority also took hold in academic institutions across the United States.[89] To cite one example, the inaugural address of the first Parliament of the World's Religions, organized as part of the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition, "expressly disclaimed" the idea that Islam held "equal merit" to Christianity.[90] While these attitudes were mitigated by cosmopolitanism at times, less chauvinistic thinkers still had a habit of distinguishing themselves from "Arabs who

refused to give up their Muslim religion."[91]

Contested notions of exceptionalism accompanied the United States' acquisition of overseas colonies in the Spanish-American War. U.S. imperialists like Senator Albert Beveridge gave speeches exhorting their compatriots to support colonial expansion on the model of Europe. "Fellow-Americans, we are God's chosen people," Beveridge asserted in one speech, "the real career of history's greatest Republic has only just begun." This era, he contended, would witness the spread of U.S. power to every corner of the globe: "There are so many real things to be done—canals to be dug, railways to be laid, forests to be felled, cities to be builded, unviolated fields to be tilled, priceless markets to be won, ships to be launched, peoples to be saved, civilization to be proclaimed and the flag of liberty flung to the eager air of every sea."[92] Beveridge connected imperialism to the premise that Americans were a unique people chosen to spread the virtues of democracy and freedom to the world. As Brandon Inabinet observes, this idea "not only delivered a rhetorically powerful argument for such an expansion project into the Philippines and beyond, but also placed this argument into the larger context of Manifest Destiny—the historic mission of Americans to spread liberty, civilization, and 'God's kingdom on Earth.'"[93] In short, Beveridge averred that exceptionalism demanded imperial conquest.

Not to be outdone, anti-imperialists like William Jennings Bryan attacked colonial aspirations as a perversion of the United States' sacred mission. In his telling, Republicans like Beveridge had abandoned the heritage of American democracy by colonizing Filipinos: "We cannot repudiate the principle of self-government in the Philippines without weakening that principle here."[94] As Elizabeth Gardner points out, "He firmly believed that the American people were exceptional; their history and government, accordingly, stood as a model for other nations to emulate."[95] For Bryan, exceptionalism was grounded in the choices made by the nation's

founders, and the United States risked forsaking that inheritance should it deny democratic self-governance to another people.

These divergent visions of American exceptionalism were mirrored in statements about Arabs and Muslims, which frequently emphasized their ostensive servility, tyranny, or proclivity for violence. Echoing the race-based imperialism of Beveridge, for example, U.S. soldiers in the Philippines deemed the Muslims inhabitants of Mindanao, Jolo, and the Sulu Archipelago "prehistoric" savages and likened the Moro Rebellion to an "Indian" war.[96] General James Harbord, who was sent in 1919 by Woodrow Wilson to report on the Near East, wrote that the region's disposition was "bloodthirsty, unregenerate, and revengeful" due to "the indolent and pleasure-loving Turk" and the "traditional lawlessness of migrating Kurds and Arabs." For that reason, he strongly recommended "a certain force must be kept in hand to supplement the native constabulary…. Such a force will also be necessary for general moral effect. Its mere existence will prevent organized disorder on a scale too large for a peace force to handle."[97]

Others voiced doubts that Muslims were capable of emulating American democracy. When student mobs overthrew the Iranian government in 1906, forcing constitutional reforms, the American ambassador gave a bleak report: "History does not record a single instance of successful constitutional government in a country where the Musselman religion is the state religion."[98] A 1922 news article about the Greco-Turkish War likewise called Muslims "a disagreeable fact of history… the Turk clings to our necks much as the Old Man clung to Sindbad or the leprosy of Naaman clung to Gehazi and his seed."[99] Whatever its form, public discourse habitually portrayed Arabs and Muslims as incapable of constitutional democracy, self-government, or civilizational advancement on the model of the western world.

A panoply of media sources reinforced these Orientalist depictions in the lead up to the

Second World War. In cinema, films like *The Sheikh* (1921), *The Ten Commandments* (1923), *The Thief of Baghdad* (1924), *Ben Hur* (1925), *Beau Geste* (1926), *The King of Kings* (1927), *The Mummy* (1932), *Cleopatra* (1934), and *The Crusades* (1935), propelled stereotypes portraying Arabs as sexually depraved, arbitrarily violent, and culturally primitive.[100] U.S. news coverage of the British mandates in the Middle East sounded similar themes. A 1922 *New York Times* article called Iraq's King Faisal an "Arab Sultan" and the "chief Arab of the kingdom."[101] A special report ten years later called Palestinian youth "an active factor in racial politics… probably the greatest irritant in an already complex situation" and ended on a disparaging note: "As a rule, the Arab youth are as divided among themselves as to methods of political activity as are their elders. But they are in unison on essentials—hatred of the mandatory regime and an unquenching enmity against Zionism."[102] Another *New York Times* report on Jewish-Palestinian clashes blamed "the religious fanaticism of the Arab fellaheen" for the "anti-Jewish agitation constantly on the increase."[103] The violence, it implied, was purely the fault of Arabs.

Other publications amplified these motifs, including *National Geographic*, which during this time became a window into the wider world for millions of American households. In a visit to the newly independent states of Transjordan, Iraq, and the Hashemite Hejaz, the magazine warned, "the tinder is ready wherever the spark may strike" thanks to rampant "resentment of world domination by the white races."[104] A 1927 feature detailed "the fatalistic and irresponsible Arabs" who inhabited the Sinai riding camels and ignoring Western technology.[105] One 1930 photo-essay praised Mussolini's efforts to transform Libya: "New Italy dominates this long derelict land and Italian agriculturalists are teaching new ways to Berber, Arab, and black Sudanese."[106] In 1932, the magazine narrated a journey into the Arabian Desert, informing readers that the land "has been able to guard its mysteries so long against the inquisitive

Westerner… due partly to the physical features of the country and partly to the religious fanaticism of its sparse population."[107] In Douglass Little's assessment, these magazine articles "contrasted the imperial grandeur of ancient Egyptian and medieval Islamic civilizations with the hardscrabble realities of the twentieth century," collectively painting a picture of "Muslim religious fanaticism and anti-Western radicalism" for American audiences.[108]

These Orientalist depictions of Arab Muslims as exotic, uncivilized, or unsophisticated simultaneously implied the inverse about the United States—that it was modern, strong, rational, and innovative. Over and over again, as this brief sketch shows, Orientalism and American exceptionalism reinforced each other as interlocking leitmotifs in U.S. public discourse. Taken together, they supply perhaps the anchor thread structuring American perceptions and interpretations of the Arab Muslim world, including the Persian Gulf, and they would figure greatly into the metaphors crafted by presidents after the Cold War to justify a U.S. presence in the region. These twin themes, however, are far from the only strands in the discursive web of (mis)representation.

Race and Religion

Race and religion are deeply intertwined in the American experience. The Puritan "city on a hill" had African laborers as early as 1624, and John Winthrop himself wrote the 1641 bill to legalize slavery in Massachusetts.[109] By 1698, it was forbidden for them to bear arms, trade, or vote.[110] A similar evolution occurred in Virginia. While the legal status of the African captives brought to Jamestown in 1619 is still a matter of debate among historians, it appears that some had set periods of bondage akin to indentured servants, and a few were granted freedom after embracing Christianity.[111] In 1667 the Virginia Assembly closed this conversion loophole: "It is enacted… that the conferring of baptisme does not alter the condition of the person as to his

bondage or freedom."[112] Although a handful of Africans who had been baptized before arrival in Virginia continued to hold the status of indentured servant, the legislature outlawed this practice in 1682: "any negroes, moors, mulattoes or Indians.. [shall be] slaves to all intents and purposes, any law, usage or custome to the contrary notwithstanding."[113] Because Islam was a key faith in some of the lands from which enslaved persons were taken, a number taken to the colonies were Muslim. Hence, as Amir Hussain states, "There has never been an America without Muslims."[114]

Muslims occupied a tenuous place in the racial hierarchy of the seventeenth century colonies. As enslaved persons imported from Africa, they endured the manifold injustices of slavery. At the same time, enslaved Muslims were often considered above other slaves through a double process Kambiz GhaneaBassiri calls "denegrification" and "reislamization."[115] In a nutshell, the racist observations of white masters led to a system of classification based on skin color, hair texture, and education in which some enslaved Muslims were recategorized as "semicivilized" Moors. "Islam, although considered inferior to Christianity" by most colonists, Nadia Marzouki writes, "seemed more respectable than pagan beliefs and other forms of spirituality."[116] As a result, enslaved Muslims of African origin often occupied a liminal space in the severe racial order of colonial society. Atiya Husain argues that Muslims' social positioning helped "shape the boundaries of blackness and whiteness," which are "religious as well as racial concepts" entangled with one another.[117] As the next few pages show, Arabs and Muslims have been ambiguously codified by American culture throughout the nation's history. This equivocal yet marginal status can be seen clearly in discourses of race and religion.[118]

To start, the career of Ibrahim Abdulrahman illustrates the ambivalences of the "Moor" figure in the early republic. The educated son of a west African ruler, Abdulrahman was captured in 1778 and sold into slavery in Natchez, Mississippi. He rose to become overseer of the

plantation, attracting the attention of a local newspaper. “That Prince … is a Moor, there can be but little doubt,” the editor wrote, “The Prince states explicitly, and with an air of pride, that not a drop of negro blood runs in his veins. He places the negro in scale being infinitely below the Moor.”[119] Abdulrahman was later liberated by President John Quincy Adams, and he leveraged his celebrity (along with rumors that he had converted to Christianity) to raise funds to purchase his family’s freedom.[120] Although Abdulrahman’s life was singular, there are similar examples of enslaved Muslims rising to prominence like Umar Ibn Said and Job Ben Solomon.[121]

Arabs and Muslims also featured in abolitionist arguments in various ways. Samuel Sewall’s famous 1700 tract, *The Selling of Joseph: A Memorial*, compared American slave practices to Barbary slavery: “Methinks, when we are bemoaning the barbarous Usage of our Friends and Kinsfolk in Africa: it might not be unseasonable to enquire whether we are not culpable in forcing the Africans to become Slaves amongst ourselves.”[122] Benjamin Franklin published an essay in the *Federal Gazette* in which he parodied the arguments made in favor of slavery by pretending to quote “Sidi Mehemet Ibrahim, a member of the Divan of Algiers” on the reasons why Christians should not be released from slavery in North Africa.[123] John Jay drew a similar comparison in a court brief, asking, “Is there any difference between the two cases than this, that the American slaves at Algiers were WHITE people, whereas the African slaves at New York were BLACK people?”[124] In the mid-1800s, Charles Sumner wrote a history titled, *White Slavery in the Barbary States* as a means to critique slavery in America.”[125] Abraham Lincoln reportedly owned a copy of Riley’s *Authentic Narrative*, which Gerald McMurty credits for helping instill an anti-slavery attitude in the future president as a youth.[126]

Some abolitionists even wanted to send freed “Moors” to Christianize Africa: “The way is open for evangelizing them through the Arabic language, by means of men who should be

trained for the purpose."[127] GaneaBassiri explains that these appeals reveal how "the existing boundaries between races and religions" could be "temporarily blurred… for commercial and missionary purposes."[128] Another scholar argues that such references to Islam were of "purely strategic" value for abolitionists, since it gave them a rhetorical resource they could use to "score points in polemical arguments about humanity and black culture" with their compatriots.[129]

Point scoring or not, many Americans learned about the Arab world by way of missions. Efforts by American Protestants to evangelize the Middle East slowly grew across the nineteenth century. Working alongside Europeans, American missionaries established permanent stations in the Levant (1823), Turkey (1831), Iran (1835), and Egypt (1854). With Presbyterians and Baptists leading the way, these missionaries translated the Bible into Arabic, founded colleges, started hospitals, and sought converts.[130] While relatively few in number, their efforts had an outsized impact on American perceptions of Arabs and Islam. Through correspondence, newsletters, fundraising updates, and the occasional lecture tour back home, missionaries impressed images of a spiritually, materially, and culturally impoverished Arab world on countless American audiences; they operated, in Joseph Grabill's turn of phrase, as the "communication agents between the United States and the Near East."[131] Indeed, missionaries even appeared in mid-century travelogues. For instance, American explorer William Francis Lynch credited them for teaching his translator to be "a Syrian gentleman" in his retelling of a U.S. Navy mission to chart the Jordan River.[132]

By the 1870s, a small number of Arab immigrants had arrived in the United States. Most of them came from Ottoman Syria, often hoping to work as rural migrants and then return to their homelands.[133] Drawn to the "entrepreneurial Eden" of late nineteenth century America, these migrants were largely Christian Arabs adhering to Maronite, Melkite, or Eastern Orthodox

confessions; they possessed, writes Philip Hitti, "a mercenary sprit" and a "zeal for higher education."[134] Though a drop in the bucket compared to European numbers, roughly 100,000 Arabs immigrated to the United States during this wave of migration, and the Immigration Naturalization Service began categorizing these migrants as "Syrians" (not "Turks") in 1899.[135]

American Islam grew also. In addition to believers of African, Lebanese, and Syrian origin, this time period saw a trickle of Euro-American converts to the Muslim faith. One was Mohammed Alexander Russell Webb, who established a Manhattan-based publishing house to promote Islam in the United States via magazines such as *The Moslem World*.[136] Consequently, Arabs and Muslims in the United States gradually achieved the ability to push back against misrepresentation and challenge prejudicial discourses, even as strong assimilationist pressures pushed these small communities to conform to mainstream culture.[137]

These advances took place in an era characterized by industrialization, urbanization, and diversification of the population, to which Americans responded in a number of ways. One trend was the elevation of a uniform national identity centered on an idealized view of the nation's racial and religious heritage(s). Such discourses tended to conflate "industrial development, commercial capitalism, egalitarian Enlightenment ideals, science, rationality, the white race, and Protestant Christianity to argue for the superiority of Anglo-American, liberal Protestantism."[138] Rhetoric in this vein echoed the ambivalences from earlier treatments of Arabs and Islam. For example, in his 1871 *Ten Great Religions: An Essay in Comparative Theology* Harvard Divinity School professor James Freeman Clarke argued Islam, while a "great" faith which had transcended a single ethnicity, could not provide a "universal" religion in the mold of liberal Protestantism: "Mohammedanism has never sought to make *converts* but only *subjects*, it has not asked for belief, but merely for submission."[139] Islam was depicted as defective Protestantism.

In similar fashion, *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis*, published in 1885 by the General Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance for the United States, announced the inevitable triumph of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism over Islam. "Among the Mohammedans…. The dead crust of fossil faith is being shattered," its author declared. "God is training the Anglo-Saxon race for its mission…. Is there room for reasonable doubt that this race, unless devitalized by alcohol and tobacco, is destined to dispossess many weaker races, assimilate others, and mold the remainder, until, in a very true and important sense, it has Anglo-Saxonized mankind?"[140]

Others were less sanguine, noting that Islam, like Christianity, was a missionary faith. One American scholar called the University of Cairo a "hot-bed of Moslem fanaticism" in a visit to Egypt.[141] Likewise, a South Carolina newspaper voiced alarm that "Arabic influence should convert the large part of the negro populations of Africa to Islam. This fear seems justified by the tremendous gains that the Muslim have made in Northern Arica, in the Sudan, and in the entire central portions." It concluded on a note most of its readers would find distressing: "as Europeans have subdued and opened more and more of the interior of the continent, the Muslims have followed with the conquest of the spirit."[142] These excerpts illustrate the volatility inherent in many Americans' understanding of Muslims and Islam, with portrayals oscillating between race-laden stereotypes of decadent inferiority and frightening images of adversarial rivalry.[143]

These mainstream (mis)representations of Arabs and Muslims were contested by figures like Edward Wilmot Blyden, the "Father of Pan-Africanism." Taking a different track, he argued that Islam had been essential to the growth of modern states in Africa. "Nowhere can one find any community of Negro Christians who are autonomous and independent. Haiti and Libera, the so-called Negro republics, are struggling simply to survive," Blyden wrote in his 1887 study, *Christianity, Islam, and the Negro Race.* "However," he noted, "there are numerous communities

and Negro Mohammedan states in Africa that are autonomous, productive, independent, and dominant."[144] Another example was John H. Smyth, who called for mass emigration to Liberia and Sierra Leone at the 1895 Atlanta Congress on Africa. Recounting the ravages of the "European explorer" and "the Arab man-hunter," he lamented that Americans, "in bringing the Negro here, in making of him, at best, a moral and mental imitation of an original such as he can never be," had "removed him further and further from the land of his fathers." Smyth saw in African Muslims a model for how to develop a Christian, African republic. They had developed "a very high and unique type of Mohammedanism and Arabic training," he said, having "written their own commentaries on the sacred book. They are not controlled by the Arab, the Persian, or the Turk."[145] In the same manner, he dreamed of creating a strong, independent, Christian, African state.

Racial and religious hierarchies also played a role in shaping American attitudes toward Zionism, or the establishment of a Jewish homeland in what was then Ottoman Palestine. Three factors conditioned Americans to support the Zionist project. First, many American Jews supported Zionism. Buffeted by immigration from Europe, Jews comprised 28 percent of New York City's population in 1914, a concentration that dwarfed other Jewish population centers in the western world. Many came to sympathize with Zionism and secular conceptions of Jewish nationalism by way of socialism.[146] Their working-class station prodded key labor organizations such as the American Federation of Labor to support Zionism. In high society, leading Zionists like Rabbi Stephen Wise and Justice Louis Brandeis were well-connected.[147] Moreover, as major politicians like Al Smith, Herbert Lehman, and Franklin Roosevelt made inroads attracting support for the Democrats among New York Jews, they had a corresponding incentive to mute

criticism of Zionism.[148] There was no comparable Arab, much less Palestinian, political mobilization in the United States to offset these influences.[149]

Second, Jews were more likely to be described in terms that Americans found familiar. In rhetorical environments marked by scientific racism, social Darwinism, progressivism, and Americanism, this identification mattered. From the outset, Zionist leaders talked about their aims in Orientalist and colonial language; Theodore Herzl analogized the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine to the building of "a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism."[150] In like fashion, news outlets sometimes produced slanted coverage favoring Jews over Arabs. The *New York Times*, for instance, relied on the Jewish Telegraphic Agency for much of its Palestine reporting, which was run by U.S. Zionist William Spiegelman.[151] Pro-Zionist sentiment appeared in other publications too. One *National Geographic* feature detailed how Jewish settlers had transformed "the land of milk and honey" through their application of "modern inventions [and] modern methods."[152] In the race-inflected rhetorical economy of the early 1900s, Orientalist motifs such as these worked to generate sympathy for Zionism and antipathy for Arabs among media consumers.

Third, Israel has always claimed a special salience in the American imagination. The early colonists strongly identified with the Hebrew Bible, analogizing themselves to biblical Israel.[153] Herman Melville updated this notion in 1850, writing, "we Americans are the peculiar, chosen people—the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world."[154] President Abraham Lincoln echoed him, calling the United States God's "almost chosen people."[155] This trope of "chosen peoplehood" encourages identification with Israel on a base level.[156] The U.S. heritage of Christianity also facilitates support for Zionism. Because of the "special significance" with which nineteenth century and twentieth century American Christians held the Holy Land,

writes Kathleen Christison, "Palestinians were represented, uniquely among Oriental peoples, as aliens in their own land." Subsequently, American travelogues, religion, novels, and news coverage all cultivated the feeling that "the *real* Palestine was not Muslim or Arab but Christian and/or Jewish."[157] All of these factors, from racial hierarchies to Old Testament stories, tilted the deck in favor of Zionism in the United States, even if some American Arabists, anti-imperialists, anti-interventionists, and anti-Semites nevertheless opposed it.

In terms of policy, President Woodrow Wilson was the first to publicly support Zionism. During World War I he formally acceded to the Balfour Declaration, a November 2, 1917 British statement that promised a Jewish right to immigrate and settlement in Palestine.[158] In a letter to Rabbi Wise, Wilson reiterated his support for the Balfour Declaration, writing that he welcomed the opportunity to express "the satisfaction I have felt in the progress of the Zionist movement in the United States."[159] Even as he championed national self-determination in his famous fourteen points, Wilson diluted this principle by supposing that "undeveloped peoples" such as Arabs were not ready for "the full responsibilities of statehood."[160] This belief drew from and reified Orientalist presumptions that Palestinians were less deserving of statehood than Jews. Though Wilson's GOP successors rarely mentioned Palestine or Zionism in their official rhetoric—the only time President Herbert Hoover said the word "Arab" was to denounce "Arab-Jewish hostilities" in Jerusalem that claimed 12 American lives—these Orientalist attitudes solidified over the 1920s.[161] Case in point, a 1929 editorial in the *Los Angeles Times* prophesied that were "the wild Arabs of the desert to open their hearts to moral suasion" then "this savage little war" could be resolved, but "unhappily sweet reasonableness does not seem to be the strongest point of the Bedouin sheik. What he does thoroughly understand… is the song of the bullet and the crash of the high explosive shell."[162]

Franklin Roosevelt also supported Zionism in his public statements as president. On the twentieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, he praised "the vitality and vision of the Jewish pioneers in Palestine" in a letter to Rabbi Wise: "The American people, ever zealous in the cause of human freedom, have watched with sympathetic interest the effort of the Jews to renew in Palestine the ties of their ancient homeland and to reestablish Jewish culture in the place where for centuries it flourished."[163] "I have on numerous occasions… expressed my sympathy in the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine," FDR stated at a different time, "despite the set-backs caused by the disorders there during the last few years, I have been heartened… by the remarkable accomplishments of the Jewish settlers in that country."[164] Regardless of any his anti-Semitic policies, Roosevelt publicly endorsed Zionism. His rhetoric thereby perpetuated motifs of Arab subordination and proclivity for "disorder"—foreshadowing the pervasive fears over "instability" in the decades ahead. While the Arab-Israeli conflict is largely beyond the scope of this study, the anti-Arab emotions and stereotypes generated by this dispute colored American attitudes toward the Middle East then and have into the present day.

As this sampling illustrates, discourses of race and religion operated alongside motifs of Orientalism and exceptionalism to structure American perceptions of Arabs, Muslims, and the Middle East in the leadup to World War II and the Cold War. Racial hierarchies and religious sympathies furnished contexts through which Americans made sense of Arabs and Muslims even while those very hierarchies and sympathies remained contested—not least by Muslims and Arabs themselves. In terms of this study, these themes surfaced especially in U.S. discussions of terrorism and radicalism, and the contradictions embedded in such perceptions of the region were reflected in policymakers' tenuous embrace of local allies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. These

discourses' (mis)representative power was further compounded by historic lines of corporate and governmental interest in the Middle East clustered around the issues of trade and oil.

Trade and Oil

From the United States' founding moment, Americans saw in their country an example for the rest of the world to follow. Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* declared "The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind" and described the American founding as an "Event… the Concern of every Man to whom Nature hath given the Power of feeling."[165] Thomas Jefferson dreamt of an "empire of liberty" that eschewed the *realpolitik* of the European powers."[166] Alexander Hamilton envisioned an American "empire" founded on constitutional government that would be "in many respects the most interesting in the world."[167] In their own way, each of these figures expressed a vision for the United States' role in the world predicated on the power of its democratic example. Arabs and Muslims did not factor much directly in these dreams, but Americans soon learned to take their influence on the world stage into account.

Facing numerous international challenges during his presidency, George Washington clarified in practical terms what democratic exceptionalism meant for U.S. foreign policy. He repeatedly voiced the importance of non-entanglement in foreign conflicts. At the outbreak of war between France and the First Coalition in 1792, he implored citizens to "with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers."[168] In his 1795 Thanksgiving proclamation, he thanked God for "Our exemption hitherto from foreign war" and "an increasing prospect of the continuance of that exemption," which had made possible "the unexampled prosperity of all classes of our citizens."[169] In his farewell address, he stated: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our

commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible."[170] According to Washington, neutrality abroad enabled national unity and commercial prosperity at home.[171]

This policy encouraged growth, as U.S. exports tripled from 1792 to 1796 under Washington's watch.[172] Perhaps for that reason, Washington's rhetoric was echoed by his presidential successors. Both John Adams, who announced his "inflexible determination to maintain peace and inviolable faith with all nations," and Jefferson—"peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none"—overtly embraced neutrality as their core foreign policy principle at inauguration.[173]

These aspirations came under fire in North Africa, where the Barbary states endangered U.S. freedom of trade. Thomas Jefferson reported in 1790 that the Mediterranean received "about one Sixth of the Wheat and Flour exported from the United States. And about one Fourth in Value of their dried and pickled Fish, and some Rice."[174] Barbary piracy endangered the exchange of these commodities. From 1785, when two American ships were captured off the coast of Portugal, to 1815, the year Commodore Stephen Decatur's armada forced the Dey of Algiers to sign a peace treaty, conflict with Muslim corsairs comprised a constant obstacle to seaborne commerce.[175] Military defeat of the Barbary states thereby served as a "pioneering endeavor" that allowed Americans to pursue the prosperity envisioned by Washington without interference in a critical region.[176] President Madison accordingly interpreted the U.S. victory as a triumph that would "afford a reasonable prospect of future security for the valuable portion of our commerce which passes within reach of the Barbary cruisers."[177]

Like these statements, most nineteenth-century presidential references to Arabs, Muslims, or the Middle East were made with trade in mind. Glad at the "protection of our commerce," James Monroe (1820) reported, "Our peace with the powers on the coast of Barbary has been

preserved, but we owe it altogether to the presence of our squadron in the Mediterranean."[178] In 1824, he gave thanks that so much of "the civilized world" was at peace, apart from Turkey and Greece.[179] John Quincy Adams (1828) juxtaposed the "constant exchange of good offices" with Russia and the "geographical distance, religious opinions and maxims of government" of the Ottomans, which stymied "the formation of those bonds of mutual benevolence" characterized by "the benefits of commerce."[180] After securing a trade deal with Istanbul, Andrew Jackson's 1836 Annual Message reported no interruptions to "the good understanding that has long existed with the Barbary Powers" and "the good will which is gradually growing up from our intercourse with… the Ottoman Empire."[181] The next year Martin Van Buren testified that "peace and good will are carefully cultivated" with "the Government of the Ottoman Porte and its dependencies on the coast of the Mediterranean."[182] In an 1845 special message, John Tyler requested that Congress provide diplomatic funds "for the preservation and cultivation of… relations of amity" between the United States and "the Mohammedan States."[183] In the universe of early 1800s presidential discourse, trade formed the primary line of American interest in the Middle East. This constant repetition affirmed and reaffirmed the value of commercial access to the region for U.S. traders, foreshadowing the future importance policymakers would assign to Mideast oil.

American consulates soon dotted the region, reflecting the growth in commercial activity.[184] Smyrna (Izmir) served as a lonely U.S. diplomatic outpost during the republic's early years, and in 1803 its consul begged Secretary of State James Madison to expand the department's footprint in the Ottoman Empire: "The American government is the only one not represented at Constantinople."[185] The situation changed over the course of decades. After much negotiation and several budget increases, the State Department finally opened a U.S. Legation in

Istanbul on September 13, 1831.[186] President Tyler next appointed a consulate to Jaffa in 1844, which was then followed by the dispatch of an "Agent and Consul General" to Cairo in 1849.[187]

These commercial encounters were complemented by the occasional merchant, religious traveler, missionary, and, especially after the Civil War, soldier. Recruited by William Sherman and Thaddeus P. Mott, 50 former Union and Confederate officers trained and served in the Egyptian Khedive's army from 1869 to the late 1870s. These veterans buttressed coastal fortifications, invented new defensive technologies, and led the failed campaign to conquer Ethiopia in 1876.[188] Known for their violence, these American mercenaries frequently brawled with Egyptian officials and with each other; in one notable 1872 incident, the U.S. consul got into a fight with three former rebel soldiers and fled the country in fear for his life.[189]

The Civil War impacted U.S ties to the region in other ways as well. Before the Union blockade, the southern states had supplied roughly 80 percent of Britain's cotton supply, making them "a world-trade superpower." Confederate strategists thought that European demand for "King Cotton" would push them to support the southern cause. They were badly mistaken.[190] Farmers along the Nile had cultivated cotton for several years, and rather than provide succor for the southern states, Britain instead invested in the growth of the Egyptian cotton industry. In the words of the Boston-based *North American Review*, "the barbarism of the South, while destroying itself," would seem "in the providence of God to be working out the regeneration of Egypt."[191]

With the opportunity afforded by the Union blockade of Southern ports, Egyptian exports boomed as the Nile replaced the Mississippi as the world's leading source of cotton. Egyptian production continued to outpace American production after the war's end, helping usher in the Long Depression.[192] These market disruptions were, according to one historian, pivotal in

creating a "new regime" of globalized commodity trade in the late 1800s.[193] That "regime" brought the Middle East into the minds of American farmers and government officials, who bemoaned the competition. As the U.S. Consul-General to Egypt groaned, American agriculture was up against "the magical fecundity of the Nile soil," and "The Egyptian has no dread of frost, and no labor question."[194]

Cotton's importance did not escape presidential notice. During the Civil War, the Lincoln administration encouraged Portugal to cultivate more cotton in its African colonies.[195] Lincoln himself reminded northern audiences that they bore some responsibility for the conflict due to the manner in which they had "unhesitatingly" used cotton before the war.[196] "The high prices resulting for the sudden loss of the American crop," Lincoln's Secretary of the Interior told one Rhode Island audience, "will stimulate the production of the staple in numerous parts of the world…then the Southern monopoly will be gone, and with it will go Southern slavery forever."[197] Andrew Johnson mocked the notion that "the world can't get along without cotton," asserting, "a little experience has proven that cotton is a feeble King without the protection of the United States."[198] After more than three thousand Confederate families resettled in Brazil, which fueled a 373 percent growth in Brazilian cotton exports from 1860 to 1866, Ulysses S. Grant sought to hinder cotton production there and thereby "make slavery unsupportable" across the hemisphere.[199] Chester A. Arthur sought to revitalize American cotton trade, offering several public statements detailing what his administration was doing to streamline transportation. He declared, "increasing our foreign trade and thus relieving the depression under which our industries are now languishing" to be "the gravest of the problems" facing the country.[200] Unlike lower level officials, however, presidents stopped short of publicly commenting on cotton production in Arab lands.

Trade continued to form the main line of U.S. government interest in the Middle East as the 1800s gave way to the 1900s.[201] In the hills of western Pennsylvania, wildcatters discovered a new commodity that they could export to Arab markets: petroleum. During the 1870s U.S. oil was sent to "almost every country of the earth," Ida Tarbell recorded, which included one million gallons to Syria and "about half a million to Egypt."[202] These exports helped fuel the rise of the Standard Oil Company, which by 1890 controlled 88 percent of the U.S. oil market.[203]

The Middle East became an oil producing region—and a site of combined corporate and government interest—soon thereafter. Buoyed by British colonialism in Egypt, Aden, and the Persian Gulf, European oil companies such as Dutch Royal Shell began exploring Mesopotamia for petroleum. They found it in 1908 in Abadan, Persia. A year later, the State Department created the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, which was tasked to assist "with foreign trade relations" in the region.[204] Fearful of the Rockefellers, the Europeans formed "an unofficial cartel" to keep U.S. oil companies out of the Middle East.[205] Standard Oil of New York (Socony) overcame these efforts to secure drilling rights in Palestine, Syria, and Turkey, and it began drilling near Jerusalem in 1913. When Socony returned after World War I, these sites were in land now controlled by Britain, which denied Socony access to its holdings. These and other grievances from American oil companies came up at the Paris (1919) and San Remo (1920) peace conferences, harming U.S. relations with its wartime allies. In 1921, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover started leading a joint campaign alongside the State Department and American oil corporations to secure oil rights for U.S. companies in British-controlled Mesopotamia.[206] After a long and "invariably bitter" slog, an agreement was reached in 1925. In the process, Washington learned how to coordinate with American oil companies to secure the flow of petroleum from the Persian Gulf region.[207]

This loose public-private partnership paved the way for even greater American pursuit of Middle East oil during the interwar years. Standard Oil of California (Socal) obtained oil concessions from Bahrain in 1928, for instance, using a Canadian subsidiary to sidestep British protectorate law. After a British company's rights to Saudi Arabian oil expired in 1927, Socal won a 60-year concession starting in 1933, half of which it sold to Houston-based Texaco. In 1932, Pittsburgh-based Gulf Oil secured rights to Kuwaiti petroleum fields with the help of its principal shareholder and recent ambassador to Great Britain, Andrew Mellon. While the degree of government input varied in each case, the State Department's "occasional assistance" helped open doors at critical moments.[208] By 1941, U.S. multinational oil companies had invested over a billion dollars in Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.[209]

Much could be said about the colonial capitalism or "oil imperialism" at work in these actions.[210] After all, U.S. oil corporations directly partook in the profits from the sale of a natural resource extracted from lands under varying levels of British and French colonial administration. This was noticed at the time; oil companies were decried as "financial imperialists, oil monopolists and international bankers" that had "degraded our State Department" in the 1924 elections.[211] For the purposes of this study, however, it is more interesting to note how the advent of American oil interests in the Arab world introduced new avenues of rhetorical representation. Americans had long talked about Arabs and Muslims by employing Orientalist and exceptionalist motifs or by invoking racial and religious hierarchies. Now, they increasingly spoke about the region as a site of U.S. geopolitical interest due to the immense commercial and strategic value of its oil reserves. The "limited supply" of oil, Franklin Roosevelt explained, manifested "power in [one of] its many forms."[212] This newfound strategic appreciation for the Middle East interacted with perceptions of the region shaped by its centuries of depiction in U.S.

public discourse. For example, an industry-sponsored historian tasked with writing an account of U.S. oil exploration in the Middle East was told to avoid using the commonly-used slur "Coolie" to describe Arab oil laborers. In an obvious reference to an assumed racial hierarchy, he instead compared them to "the Indians of North America."[213]

In addition to the legacies of Orientalism, exceptionalism, race, and religion, political discussions of the Middle East during the interwar years also interacted with longstanding norms of non-entanglement overseas. For example, several factions at the Paris peace conference proposed a U.S. mandate to govern Armenia, Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, or even all of Ottoman Turkey, including delegations from those lands themselves.[214] Woodrow Wilson responded to these entreaties with frank dismissal, as he "could think of nothing the people of the United States would be less inclined to accept than military responsibility in Asia."[215] At the same time, Wilson repeatedly invoked the suffering of "the poor people of Armenia" in his ill-fated League of Nations treaty speaking tour. At stop after stop, he used the example of the "infinitely terrified and infinitely persecuted" Armenians to illustrate why the United States should join the League of Nations, which was charged with ensuring "a promise of safety, a promise of justice" for Armenia.[216] Thus, though he shot down the notion of a formal U.S. mandate territory in the Middle East, Wilson repeatedly argued that Americans had an obligation to protect Armenians. This "Christian people" who were "helpless" before "a Turkish government which thought it the service of God to destroy them," he declared in Kansas City, could "while we sit here and debate, be absolutely destroyed."[217] While Wilson lost, the cause of Armenia retained a strong enough resonance to reappear on the 1924 Democratic Party platform.[218]

Taken as a whole, these words and actions signified a steady revolution in the way American politicians talked about the Middle East. Prior to the twentieth century, presidents

rarely referenced Arabs or Muslims in their public statements outside of the Barbary Wars and general updates on commerce. By contrast, the plight of Middle East Christians (briefly) took center stage in the League of Nations debate. Though rarely in the foreground, the twin issues of oil and trade recurred as themes in press coverage and political discourse. These slow shifts set the stage for the rapid expansion of military, diplomatic, and economic ties during World War II.

The Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf, featured significantly in the American war effort. To facilitate the movement of men and materiel, the U.S. military built a thousand-bed hospital, railroads, warehouses, an airport, and housing for ten thousand men in Cairo.[219] To the east, thousands of American troops were sent to Iran to facilitate the transfer of Lend-Lease materiel to the Soviet front lines, and FDR himself went to Tehran to meet with Churchill and Stalin.[220] Across the water, the administration designated Saudi Arabia a Lend-Lease recipient in February 1943.[221] By the time the president met with Saudi King ibn Saud aboard the *USS Quincy* two years later, the kingdom had received over $100 million in U.S. assistance and nearly that amount in U.S. corporate investment; it had also agreed to house an American airbase at Dhahran.[222] Secretary of State Cordell Hull lauded Saudi oil as "one of the world's great prizes."[223] Indeed, Saudi Arabia—which another official called "probably the richest economic prize in the world"—was the only country to keep receiving Lend-Lease aid after the cessation of hostilities.[224] These actions reflected the assessment of the State Department, which predicted that the United States should be prepared to assume postwar responsibility for "fostering the advancement of Middle East peoples" and "facilitating [their] freedom from external interference and exploitation."[225] The convergence of these actions and words revealed the rapid rise of the Middle East to the forefront of American foreign policy concerns as the Cold War began.

The Cold War, the Persian Gulf, and the Rhetoric of Sovereignty

The Cold War added another discursive layer to how Americans perceived the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East. Following FDR's death, foreign policy decisionmakers faced an uncertain relationship with Moscow.[226] Mistranslations of Stalin's Election-Eve address on February 9, 1946, amplified these anxieties. Stalin's concern that the Soviet Union be ready for "accidents" was translated as a call to prepare for "all possible eventualities," a phrase that amplified U.S. fears that he might launch an offensive war.[227] At this point, State Department official George Kennan provided clarity. He outlined a strategy that would become known as "containment" in his "Long Telegram" cable (1946) and "X Article" in *Foreign Affairs* (1947). Kennan argued that historical and ideological dynamics internal to Russia meant that "there [could] be no permanent *modus vivendi*" with the Soviet Union.[228] "Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world," he therefore argued, should "be contained." Because the Soviet Union was immutably hostile and oriented toward expansion in Kennan's telling—a reality "which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence"—the most prudent strategic option for the United States would be to do what it could to contain communism in the Soviet empire. Because of the Middle East's economic importance and proximity to the Soviet Union, it was naturally assumed that it would comprise one of the "constantly shifting geographical [points]" where the United States would be forced to push back against Soviet influence.[229]

Kennan's framing of U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union was echoed in the classified Clifford-Elsey Report commissioned by Truman. It stated that "peaceful coexistence of communist and capitalist nations" was impossible given the "ultimate" Soviet aim to destroy "capitalist states by communist states."[230] The Clifford-Elsey Report's themes were reiterated in National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), which characterized Soviet leaders as "animated

by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own," rendering conflict "endemic" between the United States and Soviet Union.[231] In purporting to describe the true motivations of Soviet leaders, these security documents furnished a narrative complete with a protagonist (USA), antagonist (Soviet Union), conflict (global Cold War), and motive (Russian expansionism rooted in human nature, historical experience, and communism). Before long, this story assumed the guise of transparent reality among the professional U.S. foreign policy establishment, which then sought to persuade audiences at home and abroad to adopt this view of world politics.[232] Even more importantly, these premises took for granted that the United States would exert tremendous power abroad to tilt the international environment in its favor.

Early Cold War in the Persian Gulf as a Conflict over Sovereignty

Disputes over the limits and nature of sovereignty in the Middle East played a critical role in facilitating this reorientation of U.S. foreign policy around the superpower rivalry. As Luke Glanville notes in *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect*, the restoration of national sovereignty lay at the heart of allied war aims in World War II. The Atlantic Charter, for example, announced, "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."[233] Under this conception of sovereignty, states should respect the choices made by other countries so long as they are preserving human rights and respecting the rights of other countries to self-determination. Yet, the idea of sovereignty as self-determination ran into practical problems beyond colonialism. It opened up questions of enforcement, or how to best ensure that the "territorial integrity or political independence" promised each country by the United Nations Charter was actually protected.[234] The answer lay in the "rule of nonintervention," or a nation's entitlement to manage its own affairs.[235] Three episodes illustrate how clashes over the extent and nature of Iran's right to nonintervention set the stage for the

wider Cold War in the Persian Gulf.

First, the limits of Iranian self-rule were clearly demonstrated during World War II. Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran in 1941 to secure Iran's oil fields, create supply routes for Soviet-bound U.S. lend-lease equipment, and end the Shah's diplomatic flirtation with Germany. As part of this arrangement, Soviet troops occupied northern Iran and British troops controlled the country's south.[236] Operation Countenance, as this invasion was called, was the latest in a long line of British and Russian imperialistic encroachments in Central Asia.[237] It exemplifies the extent to which the sovereignty of nations like Iran was subordinated to the "Great Game" between London and Moscow over geopolitical power.

Second, in 1944 a dispute erupted between Soviet and Iranian leaders over the presence of U.S. oil companies in Iran. In retaliation for allowing the Americans access to Iranian oil fields, Soviet intelligence organized massive countrywide protests against the regime in Tehran. The *Chicago Tribune* reported in November that Soviet publications had started "questioning the propriety of American presence in Iran."[238] The crisis did not abate until Iran's oil negotiators resigned and the United States explicitly informed the Kremlin of its support for the Iranian government via a private letter Kennan reportedly hand delivered to the Soviet Foreign Minister.[239] This event led Roosevelt to distrust British and Soviet assurances they would honor Iranian sovereignty after the war despite their formal pledge to respect Iran's independence in accordance with the Atlantic Charter.[240]

A third episode played out in 1946, when Stalin violated his agreement with the United States and Britain to withdraw all Soviet forces from Iran by March 2, 1946. Under the ostensive guise of protecting ethnic minorities, Russian troops remained in Iranian Azerbaijan, effectively annexing these provinces into the Soviet Union.[241] The State Department condemned the

occupation in a missive to Moscow, warning that the violation of Iranian sovereignty contained "many dangerous implications."[242] Addressing the situation indirectly in an April 6 speech, President Truman described the Persian Gulf as "an area which presents grave problems" due to its "vast natural resources." Since the countries of the region "are not strong enough individually or collectively to withstand powerful aggression," he explained, "It is easy to see . . . how the Near and Middle East might become an arena of intense rivalry between outside powers." To rectify this situation, Truman called for increased economic development, promising: "The United States will do its part in helping to bring this about." More immediately, however, he vowed that the United Nations would ensure "the sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle East."[243] Secretary of State James Byrnes followed this performance by loudly sponsoring a U.N. resolution that demanded Soviet troops leave Iran by May 6. They did, confirming to U.S. policymakers that Iran needed support to remain free of Soviet influence. [244]

These incidents underscored the United States' budding rivalry with the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf's centrality to that struggle. They demonstrate how the United States was willing to use its international clout to prevent real or perceived communist gains in the region.[245] And, perhaps most importantly, they reveal the extent to which U.S. policymakers viewed events near the Gulf through the lens of sovereignty. The United States acted decisively to protect a friendly state from what appeared to be outside aggression and subversion. These actions not only marked a distinct shift from the norms of sovereignty on display in Operation Countenance. They also signified the real-world application of the principles first outlined in the Atlantic Charter, as the United States acted to protect Iran's right to non-intervention from Soviet encroachment.[246] In addition to a battle over strategic interests, then, these early Cold War disputes can be seen as a clash over the limits and nature of sovereignty in the Persian Gulf. U.S.

policymakers saw it as their duty, in the words of George Marshall, to "promote peace in the world" by accepting the "vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country."[247] Protecting smaller nations like Iran from the "aggressive forces" of communism was a central component of that duty.[248]

This American impulse to protect the Persian Gulf from communism grew naturally out of the pre-existing ways in which the United States understood the region. Orientalist discourses already presupposed the inability of Middle Easterners to handle democracy; the idea that Iran or its neighbors needed help to fend off communist schemes or the Red Army was hardly a stretch. The Second World War had clearly demonstrated the importance of oil supplies to any kind of effective military structure, much less one engaged in a global campaign to contain communism. And centuries of American exceptionalism, reinforced by religious and racial hierarchies, inclined Americans to think of themselves as, in Truman's turn of phrase, the anti-communist "heroes of democracy."[249] The grand sum of these expressions was an understanding that the United States possessed a special responsibility to make sure the Persian Gulf remained free of Soviet and Communist Party influence/

Supporting the British position in the region provided a practical way for American policymakers to keep the Soviets and communists out. Britain was widely understood to be the main power in the Gulf. But this did not mean that the Truman administration was unwilling to go to war to prevent Soviet or communist breakthrough. "The Near and Middle East is… second only to that of Western Europe" in geopolitical significance, one 1947 CIA report stated. This was due to "its strategic location as a barrier to further Soviet expansion, as an essential link in communications between the West and East, and as a potential base from which power developed elsewhere could be brought to bear on the sources of Soviet power, and in the vital

importance of the oil of the Persian Gulf states to the Western powers." If the United States lost access to Persian Gulf oil, "of which there is real and grave danger," then it "would not only wreck the strategic position of the Western power in the Near and Middle East, but would also have a fatal effect upon… the war potential of the Western powers."[250] Because of these stakes, NSC 136/1 announced that if a communist government took root in Tehran, then the United States would work "to bring about the overthrow of the communist regime."[251]

Critically, this protective impulse was not limited to Iran but can also be seen in how U.S. policymakers talked about other countries in the region. In a February 1947 meeting with congressional leaders, for example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned lawmakers, "Soviet pressure on the [Dardanelles] Straits, on Iran, and on northern Greece" had birthed a situation where "a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration." With rhetorical flourish, he finished his briefing with a potent metaphor: "Like apples in a barrel infected one by rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east."[252]

Concern over the Middle East's ability to maintain its sovereignty in the face of Soviet pressure can also be seen in the Truman Doctrine address. Delivered on March 29, 1947, the policies outlined in this speech committed the United States to send soldiers, military equipment, and millions of aid dollars to Turkey and Greece, drawing both nations into U.S. defense orbit.[253] Although the Truman Doctrine did not directly bolster Persian Gulf defenses, it was made with the wider region in mind. If the Soviets advanced their position in Turkey, according to Acheson, "it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining control over Greece and over the whole Near and Middle East." He prophesied that "when the Soviet Union obtains predominance in an area, American, and, in fact, all Western influences and contacts are gradually eliminated from that area."[254] Hence, the Truman Doctrine was issued

at least in part to preempt the Soviets from dominating the Persian Gulf.[255] With this speech, Truman publicly announced that the United States would work to defend the region from Soviet power. At the same time, he framed this policy as a way to reinforce the British position in the Middle East rather than as a full-on attempt to replace Britain as the region's guardian.[256]

Truman's recognition of Israel complicated his administration's desire to bolster anti-communism across the Arab world, but it makes sense as an outgrowth of pro-Zionist attitudes cultivated over decades of U.S. public discourse. Truman personally made the decision to grant diplomatic recognition to Israel eleven minutes after it declared independence and during its ongoing war with Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians. He did so against the advice of George Marshall, who accurately predicted that this action would infuriate nearly the entire Arab world.[257] Given widespread sympathy for the Zionist cause in the United States, some of the president's advisors felt he was "playing politics" in a campaign year rather than acting out of Cold War motivations.[258] Regardless, American recognition of Israel met severe criticism in the Persian Gulf. A memo composed by the State Department Division of Near Eastern Affairs, for instance, noted in 1946 that "Iraq has shown a great interest and an evident desire to be in the vanguard of the Arab opposition to the Zionists." It warned that American recognition of Israel, "handicaps our efforts to develop friendly and close relations."[259] The U.S. consulate in Jeddah relayed a like message: "Saudi Arabia was at one with other Arab states in opposition [to the] establishment [of a] Jewish state."[260] While U.S. recognition of Israel worked against American policymakers' strategic aims in the region, it also was consistent with an Orientalist-inflected view of the Middle East that saw Muslim states as both inferior to the Jewish settlers in Palestine and incapable of safeguarding their own sovereignty against malevolent forces.

The sovereignty of Persian Gulf countries remained a major concern for Truman later in

his presidency. On June 26, 1950—one day after the start of the Korean War—Truman met with George Elsey. The president pointed his finger toward the Persian Gulf on a map and said, "Here is where they will start trouble if we aren't careful." He firmly believed that "If we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they'll move into Iran and they'll take over the whole Middle East."[261] Statements such as these reveal (1) that the Persian Gulf was now firmly established as a Cold War arena of vital importance for the United States, (2) that American strategists were concerned about how to prevent Soviet or communist incursion in the Gulf, and (3) that U.S. policymakers believed Gulf nations needed American assistance to safeguard their sovereignty against unfriendly aggression.

Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Rhetoric of Sovereignty

Eisenhower and his subordinates similarly framed the Cold War in the Middle East as a challenge to protect the sovereignty of the United States' Persian Gulf allies. During the 1952 campaign, Ike declared there to be "no more strategically important area in the world."[262] After the election, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that it was "high time that the United States government paid more attention to the Near East and South Asia."[263] Attention they did devote to the region: the administration pursued local allies, dispersed economic aid, delivered arms packages, dispatched CIA advisors, greenlit clandestine operations, and went to nuclear alert three times over incidents in the Arab world over the course of Ike's time in office.[264] The Eisenhower administration's basic national security document, NSC 162/2, called for close defense partnerships with "Turkey, Pakistan, and, if possible, Iran" as well as Arab states to "assist in achieving stability in the Middle East."[265] U.S. strategists conceptualized the Cold War challenge in the Gulf as fundamentally a problem of safeguarding the sovereignty of friendly nations there while stopping short of a formal U.S. security commitment, which could

spark a political backlash. In the minds of U.S. policymakers, they needed to make sure that the Gulf remained free from Soviet aggression, communist subversion, or revolutionary activity even while they doubted the Gulf states' ability to remain "free" on their own.[266]

This tendency to view the Persian Gulf through a Cold War lens distorted American perceptions much like earlier depictions of the Arab Muslim world. For example, one member of the Eisenhower administration dreamt up the idea to portray the Saudi monarch as a kind of "Islamic pope"—a clearly ridiculous idea—in an attempt to use religion to rally Muslims against the Soviet Union.[267] The average Saudi, Iraqi, or even Iranian citizen cared much more about anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism than anti-communism. The so-called "Arab Cold War" saw vicious propaganda battles between secular, revolutionary Arab nationalists and traditionalist Arab monarchies. [268] One particularly ferocious poem from Egypt's "Voice of the Arabs" radio program mocked Saudi King Faisal, calling him, "O, Slave of Aramco, stooge of imperialism" and accusing him of tainting the faith: "You have nightly soiled the land of the Prophet, O, Symbol of debauch, baseness, and treachery; You are true corruption, disgrace, and lechery."[269] And, of course, any portrayal of the United States as the Persian Gulf's Cold War sentinel conveniently ignored America's own trespasses in the region, such as the 40 percent stake U.S. oil companies received in Iran after the CIA helped sponsor a coup in August 1953.[270] The rhetoric of Cold War glossed over these underlying realities animating Middle East politics.

Nevertheless, American presidents continued to frame the challenges facing the United States in the Persian Gulf as fundamentally a problem of protecting the region's sovereignty from Soviet aggression. In his response to the Suez Crisis, for example, Eisenhower made the case for "a uniquely *American* responsibility to maintain order and safeguard the Middle East independently of other powers" based on the United States' "prudential and moral

exemplarity."[271] At the same time, Ike's speech focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict and did not assert a right to intervene in the Persian Gulf without coordination with Britain. In the Eisenhower Doctrine speech of January 5, 1957, the president extended a promise of American military support for any Arab leader who requested aid "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism." This policy, Eisenhower declared, would ensure the continuation of the region's "steady evolution toward self-government and independence," and he reaffirmed the United States' dedication to preserving "without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East." In Ike's telling, the United States' role was to "make more evident its willingness to support the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area," not to establish a new imperial system, serve as the military defender of first resort, or permanently station U.S. troops in the region.[272] When a cadre of revolutionary army officers killed the Iraqi prime minister and royal family in a bloody coup on July 15, 1958, Eisenhower dispatched marines to nearby Lebanon to ensure the survival of its government as a way of making good on this promise. [273]

Many other American political leaders doubted the ability of U.S. friends in the region to stave off communist advances on their own. For example, at a 1961 closed-door session of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Hubert Humphrey pessimistically predicted, "I don't care what revolution it is. Somebody is going to get those fellows. They are out. It is just a matter of time." His colleague Frank Church agreed, saying, "I just think it is going to be a miracle if we save the Shah of Iran."[274] To prevent the overselling of weapons to the Shah, the U.S. military mission to Iran instituted the "Twitchell Doctrine," a plan to coordinate the Shah's procurement of U.S.-made weapons with its personnel training program so that Iran could only buy American armaments that Iranian personnel were capable of operating and maintaining.[275]

Still, other congressional figures grumbled that aid to Saudi Arabia should be cut. They accused the kingdom's Arab leaders of being less devoted to anti-communism than anti-Semitism after "6,000 years" of fighting the Jews.[276]

Kennedy echoed Eisenhower's Cold War framing of U.S. responsibility in the Middle East. In the 1960 campaign debate against Nixon, he reminded the electorate that "our enemies… penetrated for the first time into the Middle East" under the previous administration.[277] A year later he declared that "the Middle East… would have collapsed" and "would today be Communist dominated" were it not for U.S. aid.[278] He also warned that Gulf monarchies such as Iran risked provoking a revolution if they did not institute social reforms. In the words of one advisor, JFK was "actively pushing, prodding, and cajoling" the Shah to enact changes from the start.[279] The Shah responded by passing a series of liberal policies dubbed the "White Revolution," which set off demonstrations across Iran.[280] In a public letter to the Shah, Kennedy dismissed these angry protests as "unfortunate attempts to block your reform programs" that would "gradually disappear as your people realize the importance of the measures you are taking to establish social justice and equal opportunity for all Iranians."[281] Overall, Kennedy took the implied U.S. responsibility for protecting Gulf states a step further by pressuring them to pass reforms.

The same themes are visible in JFK's interactions with Saudi Arabia. When King Saud arrived for a state visit, Kennedy called for "ever increasingly intimate relations" and praised the king by saying, "[Americans] know that you have been a vigilant and courageous defender of your country's sovereignty and independence."[282] The president also approved Operation Hard Surface, which sent eight fighters to Riyadh after Saudi territory was bombed by Egyptian warplanes fighting a proxy war in Yemen. [283] In public, Kennedy repeated the same refrain as

Eisenhower, that the United States' role was to assist its friends in the Gulf. For example, in one 1963 speech he remarked, "what happens in the Middle East, and the relationships between Saudi Arabia and Yemen" represented "problems which affect the security of the United States," but "problems which we can deal with in only a limited way."[284] As with Iran, JFK also pushed Saudi Arabia to implement domestic social reforms, suggesting a "civic action program" and other ideas.[285] Saudi leadership responded by banning slavery, reorganizing the religious police, and instituting free healthcare and education for citizens.[286]

President Johnson outlined the issues facing the Persian Gulf similarly. He defended sending troops to Vietnam by analogizing it to Truman's actions in Iran, Greece, and Turkey and Ike's intervention in Lebanon: "wherever we have stood firm aggression has been halted, peace restored and liberty maintain. This was true in Iran, in Greece and Turkey… and in Lebanon."[287] He commended the Shah for the White Revolution reforms. "You have proven your faith and confidence in the Iranian people and your resistance to alien pressures," LBJ wrote in a public letter, "You will be misunderstood and you will be maligned. That is the price of historical movement—the price of progress. But you will also be admired and loved by your people."[288] On a visit to the United States, LBJ praised the Shah's leadership, which "has been a vital factor in keeping Iran free."[289] Johnson approved several arms sales to Iran and extended the U.S. Military Assistance Program to Tehran through 1969.[290] In words reprinted on the front page of the *Washington Post,* Johnson told the Shah, "You are winning progress without violence and bloodshed—a lesson others still have to learn."[291] Johnson touted Iran as a success story, boasting that Tehran "achieved self-support" during his presidency.[292]

He likewise described the United States as a friend who wished to strengthen Saudi Arabia, not serve as the country's protector on the world stage. On a 1966 visit by King Faisal,

LBJ praised the "great strides" made by Saudi Arabia, noting "We Americans are proud to have played a part in Saudi Arabia's development."[293] LBJ also approved a $100 million arms sale during the visit, triggering congressional criticism he was "stoking an arms race in the Middle East."[294] Regardless, the president emphasized that despite the "differences in history, customs, traditions, and geography," between Saudi Arabia and the United States, a set of "common interests" and a "warm friend[ship]" bound the two countries together.[295] He employed similar language during a visit by the Emir of Kuwait, applauding the small country's "mature and responsible role in regional affairs—a role of leadership that is far out of proportion to your size. Kuwait's generosity and leadership are a source of encouragement to all of us who believe that regional cooperation is an important key to world peace." As with his other statements, Johnson asserted that the role of the United States was one of "strengthening" its Persian Gulf allies, not serving as their primary guardian or guarantor of security.[296]

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War briefly imperiled U.S. relations with its Arab friends in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia dispatched a brigade to Jordan to fight the Israelis.[297] Riots broke out at Aramco facilities as Arab workers refused to work for their American bosses.[298] Under pressure from Iraq, Syria, and other Arab countries, Faisal joined an oil embargo against western countries.[299] While this decision did not seriously disrupt U.S. petroleum access, it did impact Britain and played a role in Harold Wilson's decision to withdraw "east of Suez" several months afterward.[300]

In sum, the Persian Gulf was a significant theater of the Cold War for the United States during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. At the same time, these presidents rarely deployed the U.S. military to the region, and when they did so it was in a very limited capacity. For the most part, they treated the Gulf as a "British lake" when it came to

military matters, though they were still involved in the region's political conflicts.[301] Whether plotting coups, providing armaments, protecting investments, or ensuring the flow of oil, these presidential administrations did *not* ignore the Persian Gulf. Publicly, however, they frequently downplayed the degree of U.S. involvement in the region and refrained from issuing a major commitment to the Gulf's defense. Again and again, they characterized their actions in the region as efforts made to bolster Gulf states' ability to fend off revolution, communism, or Soviet aggression. These presidents thereby kept rhetorical and military distance between the United States and the Gulf while still pursuing what they saw as strong U.S. interests in the region.

Like their British counterparts, American policymakers saw the Gulf as a region defined by its natural resources and vulnerability to aggressive powers.[302] In the context of the Cold War, these two attributes presented a dilemma for U.S. strategists. They wished to prevent the region's resources from becoming available to unfriendly nations while also avoiding the direct stationing of U.S. military resources in the Gulf. Defense Secretary McNamara encapsulated this strategic assessment of the Persian Gulf in 1965: "We are in Europe, we are not in Aden, the Persian Gulf, or the Far East. If Britain quits, the United States for political reasons cannot take her place. Britain's contribution to Western defence is far greater in these places than it ever could be in Europe alone."[303] Harold Wilson's 1968 announcement that the British would indeed pull out therefore presented American foreign policymakers with a strategic conundrum—the conundrum that forms the focal point for this study.

Constitutive Rhetoric, Metaphor, and the Presidency

More precisely, this project examines the security metaphors used by presidents to promote their defense policies in the Persian Gulf from 1969 through September 2001. I argue

that these metaphors played a crucial role in redefining the Gulf as an area of U.S. responsibility. Critically, this "responsibility" took many forms, growing from a duty to equip local friends to resist Soviet aggression into a license to police the Gulf and punish wrongdoing in the region. I therefore chart how the different metaphors articulated by presidents and their subordinates advanced impressions of the Gulf that configured the region as an arena of American foreign policy concern. While Twin Pillars, Strategic Consensus, New World Order, and Dual Containment certainly conveyed varying levels of U.S. responsibility for Persian Gulf security, they collectively facilitated a change in how Americans understood the Gulf and their nation's geopolitical role in the region. To assess the imaginative force of these metaphors, I not only examine their utterance in presidential discourse but also their circulation in press coverage and reflection in polling data.

Stated otherwise, this project explores the constitutive force of metaphors used by presidents to articulate their nation's security interest in the Persian Gulf. At root, metaphor's power derives from its ability to impose symbolic order. Metaphors organize perception by privileging the acceptance of some viewpoints and making sense of a world that does not present itself in a "pre-defined" manner.[304] In political discourse, metaphors provide a convenient device for leaders trying to repackage complicated topics for the electorate.[305] For this reason they are practical for politicians enmeshed in the intricacies of foreign affairs, where the thorny problems of unfamiliar places often defy easy resolution and simple policy prescriptions. It can be difficult for presidents to gain public support for foreign policy actions. Metaphors provide a vehicle through which they can make such efforts abroad seem acceptable to the American people.

Within this study, I examine four "metaphors of power" that pictured the Persian Gulf in ways that called for American involvement in the region.[306] Because metaphors like these are

"conducive to the exercise of great power" on an international stage, their recirculation can help naturalize the extension of U.S. military and economic clout in other parts of the world.[307] As Jeremy Moses notes, interventionist foreign policies are "founded upon the claim that sovereignty is a norm that is susceptible to redefinition."[308] During the Cold War, presidents often promoted an active foreign policy agenda by presenting American aims as "utopian objectives completely in harmony" with the electorate's desires and other nations' needs.[309] These metaphors functioned to reconstruct norms of sovereignty in the Persian Gulf by progressively articulating a U.S. right of intervention in that region to defend it from forces hostile to American interests.

Metaphors matter because they inform how we see the world. As they gain common acceptance, metaphors "discipline the imaginative" by constantly refreshing a certain way of thinking about an issue.[310] In so doing, metaphors "tell us not only about the political world as it is, but also as we should like it to be."[311] By examining these metaphors' articulation, composition, and reproduction, one can gain insight into how they exerted constitutive force in American public life. For instance, politicians often describe Central America as the "backyard" of the United States. This label implies a sense of ownership capable of being violated by unwelcome "trespassers." Its constant reiteration reinforces an understanding of that region wherein U.S. intervention seems natural. By tracing the circulation of Twin Pillars, Strategic Consensus, New World Order, and Dual Containment, this study examines the ways in which these metaphors helped form the rhetorical imagination of U.S. foreign policy debates over Gulf security. These metaphors ultimately functioned as shorthand for broader, more complex concepts that guided U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. These metaphors accordingly aided presidents in marshaling public opinion to their side on foreign policy questions.

This study deploys multiple approaches to assess the force of these metaphors. In each chapter, I trace the emergence of each metaphor within the administration. I next analyze the metaphor and its symbolic elements in presidential rhetoric, press coverage, and related political discourse, tracing the metaphor's circulatory path through *Foreign Affairs*, the *New York Times*, and *Reader's Digest*.[312] Such an approach keeps in mind John Oddo's dictum that reporters, experts, and journalists "don't just echo official pronouncements… They *reconstitute* them." This project correspondingly considers criticisms from commentators, activists, and political opponents directed each metaphor across an eclectic range of sources from 1968 to 2001.[313] This approach assumes that members of the press are not a transparent "conduit" for a president's words and outlook, but instead operate as agents who offer "mediated reinterpretations" of the president's rhetoric for public consumption.[314]

Presidential Rhetoric

The subject of this study is presidential rhetoric and press accounts of it. For the purposes of this project, rhetoric encompasses both the practical skills associated with persuasion and the interpretive processes through which we make sense of the material and social worlds we inhabit.[315] As a practical skill, it consists of the "ability to conceptualize and use language and symbols to help achieve specific goals with particular audiences."[316] Rhetoric therefore encompasses not only attempts to persuade an audience, but also an aptitude for devising rhetorical strategies that requires a sensitivity to the language that is core to rhetorical exigencies, rhetorical invention, rhetorical appeals, and rhetorical impact.

Rhetoric might best be conceived as "a natural capacity that all human beings, even presidents, possess."[317] Rhetoric has comprised a tool of presidential leadership since the days of George Washington, who used the medium of public speech to perform the duties of his

office.[318] The realities of democratic politics, news coverage, and mass media oblige chief executives to "'go public' to seek popular support for themselves and their policies."[319] Although individual presidents differ in their use of the bully pulpit, the office is an inherently rhetorical institution because "effective leadership" depends upon the president's "persuasive powers" with Congress, foreign leaders, the press, the electorate, and other government officials.[320]

The presidents in this study appealed to the American people to push their policy agenda in the Gulf. The phenomenon of presidents directing their rhetoric toward the people more so than Congress has come to be known as "the rhetorical presidency." According to Jeffrey K. Tulis, the rhetorical presidency is characterized as an attempt to govern by means of direct appeal—a practice that departs from the constitution's system of checks and balances.[321] Although the origin of the rhetorical presidency is often associated with Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, it also factored significantly in the superpower struggle of the second half of the twentieth century. [322] The Cold War's "needs for unity, speed, and international leadership" fueled the "rise of executive power" in the realm of foreign policy.[323] Buoyed by television, intelligence agencies, and professional speechwriters, Cold War presidents used rhetoric as a weapon in the battle for "heart and minds" abroad and at home.[324] This project adds to our understanding of the rhetorical presidency by exploring the role of metaphor in broader presidential efforts to generate support for their Persian Gulf security strategies.

Presidential Rhetoric as Constitutive Rhetoric

Over time, a president's rhetoric, like all language choices, influences "social constructions of reality."[325] It does so because humans cannot fully access the ideas, arguments, and facts that mediate political interactions independent of the way those ideas, arguments, and facts are expressed.[326] The choice of one symbol over another is not a mere question of

ornamentation—the switch ineludibly alters how audiences comprehend policies and the ideas that undergird them. Rhetoric influences social constructions of reality because the concepts that mediate interpersonal exchange do not exist for an audience independent of the way they are expressed through language and filtered through electronic or print sources generally.[327]

To such ends, words and symbols are engaged in constructing human experience(s) of "reality" by selecting and deflecting details of it.[328] Rhetoric acts as a constitutive force through which rhetors and audiences simultaneously create, modify, accept, alter, and subvert the universe they inhabit.[329] Such sentiments are similar to the ideas offered by Richard Weaver when he states, "We are all of us preachers in private or public capacities. We have no sooner uttered words than we have given impulse to other people to look at the world, or some small part of it, in our way."[330] Rhetorical utterances invite audiences to reimagine the world in ways that carry consequence. Weaver helps us see the constitutive capacities of language, or the ways in which humans use symbols to construct and contest our understandings of the world.[331]

Stephen Heidt describes the constitutive influence of modern presidential speech by comparing it to a molecule. Shortly after any presidential statement, he argues, vested parties such as journalists, political operatives, and administration mouthpieces "almost immediately atomize the address and bond individual elements to already extent molecules of cultural meaning to form new wholes that perform their own unique rhetorical function." Thus, even though audiences rarely encounter presidential rhetoric in its original form as an entire speech, a president's words still make their way across time and space as "fragments… capable of doing rhetorical work."[332] By studying the circulation and recirculation of "textual fragments," critics are able to illuminate how presidential utterances may "shape perceptions of the cultural, political, and material world."[333] Like an unstable molecule, presidential speech fires off

particles of meaning that are reassembled as parts of new textual productions, exerting constitutive force throughout the processes of (re)articulation and (re)circulation.

This study focuses primarily on the processes of textual composition, reproduction, and circulation. As Cara Finnegan states, compositional analysis entails "sophisticated interpretation which emerges from the critic's understanding" of the texts in question. A focus on reproduction involves exploring how the text and its "highly specific context" interact to generate "time-and place-bound meanings." Circulation requires tracing "multiple instances of reproduction," which positions one to "say something about audiences' potential exposure" to the texts in question.[334]

By examining presidential metaphors as a constitutive force, I shed light on the symbolism of each metaphor and its implied picture of American responsibility for the Gulf's protection (composition). In each chapter I also track what James Jasinksi and Jennifer R. Mercieca call "rhetorical exteriors" by reconstructing the metaphor's path through the press (reproduction and circulation). In doing so, my analysis will shed light on the available meanings of these metaphors while also retracing their "constitutive legacy" by charting their evolving usages across diachronic contexts.[335] This critical approach shares much in common with the study of "public address" outlined by Ernest J. Wrage in 1947. He argued that speeches could provide "an index" for assessing the "reach of an idea, its viability within a setting of time and place" on a popular level.[336] Ideas, according to Wrage, possess a "life cycle" in which they are "birthed in the incubator of public discourse," mature as they spread, rule for a period of time, and eventually ebb.[337] This study adopts insights from each of these scholars, starting from the premise that a close examination of these metaphors' circulation provides a way of showing that "rhetoric is a force in history" that "shapes human understanding and action over time."[338]

To be sure, constitutive shifts in meaning can be especially salient in the realm of foreign

affairs.[339] Widely-held impressions of another region of the globe—such as the Persian Gulf—can coalesce into "shared political imaginings," which can in turn limit or expand the horizon of political possibilities.[340] Policymakers are constrained by language as well as material factors. To advance their foreign policy aims, presidents must often redefine of another portion of the world or another actor on the world stage. Woodrow Wilson, for instance, studiously cultivated a view of Germany that stressed its autocratic character, frightening militarism, and bellicose aggression before asking Congress for a declaration of war in 1917.[341] Metaphors provide a valuable device for such presidential projects of conceptual reconstitution in international affairs.

Presidential Metaphor in Foreign Policy

Metaphors function as a pedagogical tool of the presidency by which the chief executive can educate the electorate on international issues. Because most metaphors are easy to understand, they operate as shorthand for broader, more complex concepts that guide U.S. foreign policy. In that sense, metaphors simultaneously explain and justify American actions abroad, enabling presidents to "be active leaders and educators of public opinion" through their rhetoric.[342] They serve a didactic purpose as they allow presidents to "sell" their foreign policies to the people. Like a compelling narrative, the well-crafted metaphor "blots up potential policy objections by strategically framing the meaning of present events."[343] By paying attention to metaphor, we gain insight into how presidential administrations think about foreign policy and how the representational capacities of their language work to advance certain understandings of international affairs.[344]

Metaphor is a difficult term to define. Kenneth Burke classified metaphor in broad terms as "a device for seeing something *in terms of* something else."[345] Metaphors guide how actors interpret and process information by furnishing cross-domain comparisons.[346] Metaphors "reveal

the conceptual universe" in which rhetors operate, Paul Chilton writes, "rearranging the furniture of the mind."[347] Because metaphor comprises "the omnipresent principle of language," according to I.A. Richards, the "pretence to do without metaphor is never more than a bluff waiting to be called."[348] With Richard Gregg, I define metaphor as "a thoroughly rhetorical cognitive process" that "encourages us to adopt some particular perspective" and "culminates in a point of view."[349]

Metaphor offers a fruitful lens for assessing the meaning-making of presidential rhetoric in the Persian Gulf for a few reasons. First, as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson note, *metaphors operate "systematically*."[350] This means that the entirety of a metaphor does not have be uttered for its rhetorical force to be recirculated. One does not need to overtly state "argument is war" in order to convey the metaphor's conceptual content. It can be reproduced by turns of phrase: *attacking* a claim as *indefensible*, preparing a *strategy* to *target* your opponent's *weak spots*, *fortifying* one's case, or *demolishing* and *shooting down* counterarguments. As this illustration shows, metaphors frequently express themselves through what Lakoff and Johnson call "speech formulas" rather than overt invocation.[351] Because metaphors can be easily recirculated as fragments (e.g., "sucked into" a vacuum, "stuck" in a quagmire, "dive" into a topic, "face" a problem), they provide an apt mechanism through which to assess imaginative force.

Consequently, metaphors need not be explicitly stated in order to help shape political discourse. Their symbolism can still exert suasory and imaginative force. For example, President Eisenhower likened South Vietnam to a "domino" that, if it "fell" to communism, would lead to the fall of other nations across Asia.[352] Over two decades later, Ronald Reagan invoked the same metaphor to argue for U.S. intervention in Central America, this time warning Americans "we are the last domino."[353] The "domino" metaphor illustrates how "part of the power of certain metaphors lies not in their explicit repetition but in their reliance on the familiar and that which

goes without being said."[354] Although the word "domino" seldom appears in government documents, related terms saturate Cold War discourse; the United States "supports" or "props up" other nations, lest they "fall" or "be toppled" and set off a "chain reaction." The systematicity of metaphors reveals the conceptual universe of presidential administrations. And to the extent presidential metaphors obtain purchase in public discourse, we can say they have constitutively helped shape American political debate and the foreign policy imaginary.[355]

One way of classifying systematic metaphors is to draw a distinction between "conceptual metaphors," which form the foundation of the cross-domain comparison, and the surface-level "metaphoric expressions" of those basic conceptual metaphors.[356] During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, the Pentagon tried to "decapitate" the Iraqi regime by launching cruise missiles at Saddam Hussein before "punching through" to Baghdad.[357] These surface *expressions* revealed a deep-seated *conceptual metaphor* [war = duel] in which an enemy nation is pictured in bodily terms.[358] Expressions function as "vestiges" of the generative metaphor, according to Robert L. Ivie; they serve as "vehicles" that invoke the logic of the main metaphor even when the "generating term is allowed to operate without being explicitly acknowledged."[359] Indeed, in some instances the original referent might never be recognized on an overt level or might only be intelligible to certain audiences, as is commonplace for those operating clandestinely within repressive regimes.[360] In that sense, composite metaphors can guide the articulation of sub-metaphors and organize their expressions into suasory logics of representation.[361] The New World Order, for example, helped bring together a panoply of metaphors generated by the first Bush administration to promote military action in Iraq.

Second, *metaphors provide warrants for policy*. Metaphoric invocations, whether by direct reference to composite metaphors or by second-order expressions, "constitute powerful

ideological arguments that legitimate some institutions and policies rather than others."[362] For instance, George W. Bush's symbolic decision to declare a *war* on terror versus other metaphoric options available to him (manhunt, crime, trial, etc.) sanctioned a global military campaign rather than a legal procedure or criminal investigation. [363] Metaphors stimulate reasoning chains, transmit tacit appeals to authority, and spur emotional identification in a complicated cognitive interplay that can "reflect and construct political meaning and orient political action."[364]

Because of their ability to link disassociated concepts, metaphors provide powerful tools to advocate for policy. In her analysis of the *frontier of science* metaphor, Leah Ceccarelli argues that this metaphor "carries entailments that force us to think of the subject being discussed as if it were a spatial territory, ripe for exploration and exploitation."[365] In like fashion, foreign policy metaphors characterize the space of American action abroad in ways amenable to generating assent; such policy metaphors, Heidt observes, "reproduce contexts that activate publics toward particular goals." For this reason, he calls for "more case studies elaborating how metaphoric power facilitates assent, authorizes policy, and forecloses contestation."[366]

Well-worn foreign policy metaphors such as "war on terror" or "cold war" train audiences and rhetors alike to think of international situations in familiar ways. As they literalize with rote use and reuse, these metaphoric constructions become "pragmatic fictions" that "restrain the political imagination" of leaders and publics.[367] The metaphors examined in this study, for example, promoted an inchoate sense of U.S. responsibility for Persian Gulf security articulated as a right to defend the region from aggression and subversion. These four metaphors blurred issues of security and sovereignty, thereby working to justify presidential efforts to shore up American power in the Gulf.

Third, *metaphors permeate U.S. foreign policy discourse*. Metaphors, as noted above, are

"indispensable" to the work of educating the public about events overseas.[368] As a metaphor literalizes with use and reuse, its domain of meaning is extended to encompass a progressively wider symbolic horizon until it dominates human experience. In this way, humans' "capacity for metaphor" reflects their "will to power."[369] The Cold War was one such instance in which a specific metaphor, with repeated variation and use, came to dominate a political culture for a sustained period of time.

The Cold War was metaphoric on several levels. The construction "Cold War" itself is a metaphor meant to describe what for Americans was an "ambivalent" state of affairs that "stopped short" of both total war and peace.[370] Political discourse was saturated with what Ivie calls "images of savagery," or metaphoric "vehicles" used to depict the Soviet Union and its allies as mechanistic, violent, and irrational enemies.[371] American leaders deployed metaphors strategically in the global battle for "hearts and minds."[372] Metaphors proved inexorable, from matters of strategy (containment, rollback, flexible response) to situational labels (Iron Curtain, Opening of China, Military-Industrial Complex) to regional assessments (paths, dominoes, vacuums, hotspots, quagmires) to domestic fears (Red Scare, moles, watchdog) and to the superpower rivalry (arms race, card game, playing ball, opposing camps, political crusade).[373]

Lastly, metaphor provides a reasonable starting point for analyzing U.S. Persian Gulf strategy because *Americans have long understood the Middle East in metaphoric terms*.[374] Puritan clergymen frequently compared the colonists' experiences in "the New World" to biblical Israel. They called Massachusetts Bay a new "promised land," compared North America to the Judean wilderness, and likened the Glorious Revolution to the creation of the Davidic monarchy.[375] By 1783, the announcement by the President of Yale that New England was "God's American Israel" was a well-established cultural convention.[376]

Metaphoric views of the Middle East can be found throughout the republic's history. After the Barbary Wars, Thomas Jefferson exulted in the young nation's ability to throw off the "degrading yoke" of Arab piracy.[377] One Civil War veteran in Egypt likened the Nile River Delta to "the Garden of Eden."[378] The term "Middle East" itself, a neologism first coined by Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1902, functions as a spatial metaphor that presumes a European perspective.[379] After Pearl Harbor, an American intelligence officer in Cairo likened the region to an unfastened door and low-hanging fruit: "The Near East is wide open and ripe for plucking."[380] The Suez Crisis was labeled "a passing thunderstorm" in U.S.-U.K. relations.[381] Given these precedents, it is little wonder that presidents turned to metaphor to describe their security policies in the Gulf.

Metaphors such as these have also incorporated elements of Orientalism into a wider persuasive architecture meant to substantiate foreign policy priorities in the public eye.[382] Eisenhower, for instance, told Americans that the Arab-Israeli conflict stemmed not from U.N. Resolution 181, British colonialism, Zionism, or U.S. ties to Israel, but from "animosities born of the ages."[383] This assertion that Middle Easterners acted out of irrational aggression exemplified a broader cultural outlook in which Arabs were seen as the opposite of the modern, scientific, powerful, democratic western world.[384] Although this study focuses on four metaphors spanning the Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton presidencies, it is important to note that these utterances participate in multiple discursive layers of America's encounter with the Middle East.[385] Each chapter illuminates how presidents used metaphor to reimagine U.S. relations in the Persian Gulf, with the Cold War as backdrop and up to September 11, 2001. At the project's close, I show how these security metaphors helped shape how future presidents rhetorically packaged the war on terror for the American people.

This focus on metaphor means that there are many relevant events, movements, figures, and topics that I address only lightly that played a significant role in shaping the modern Middle East. For example, the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the rise of political Islam are only touched on in passing in this study, although both developments instigated dramatic changes in Gulf political affairs. Likewise, the wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors played a monumental role in determining the political order of the Middle East but only receive cursory consideration in in these pages. The same could be said for many other issues, including the rise of U.S. weapons exports to Gulf allies, the founding of Hezbollah and other Shi'a paramilitary groups, the emergence of a clientelist relationship between Egypt and the United States, the internal power struggles of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq, the ebbs and flows of the Iran-Iraq War, and the steady erosion of U.S. corporate control over the Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in Saudi Arabia. Although these and many other worthy topics demand scholarly attention, such attention is simply beyond the scope of this project's aims.

Archives

This study draws heavily on digital and physical archives. Archives help situate textual artifacts in their "historical situation," which can guard against textual criticism that "isolates the text from larger discursive formations and restricts interpretation within the orbit of text's own construction."[386] Various scholars note the importance of archives for "informed" presidential and foreign policy research.[387] I made use of digital archives to complete this project, including documents archived online by the CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, the National Security Archive, the American Presidency Project, and the Department of State Central Files (RG59) with the National Archives and Records Administration. I used material available online through the presidential libraries of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and

Clinton. Additionally, I also used electronic databases of press material made available through the University of Maryland. This enabled me to integrate a range of press sources into my analysis, including outlets read by policy officials (*Foreign Affairs*), news articles frequently reprinted and cited in news outlets across the country (*New York Times*), and popular magazine articles that reached a broad base of more conservative readers during this study's timeframe (*Reader's Digest*).[388] I also used digital copies of physical documents available at the Reagan library in Simi Valley, California, which I captured before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Ample scholarship shows how archives can reveal insights about political leaders' aims, motives, or plans. They can also offer insight into textual composition and development. While archives can be integral to rhetorical scholarship, scholars must also be most aware that archives are not politically or ideologically neutral and they represent an incomplete record of history.[389] They contain logics of access that participate in hierarchies of privilege, organization, and exclusion. For example, Debra Hawhee and Christina J. Olson note that the materials available for scholarly analysis vary across times, locations, and societies, a phenomenon they label "archival incongruity."[390] Archivists may steer scholars toward friendly topics or label a folder or photograph with an unexpected title.[391] Factors such as these, argues Angela Ray, mean that "the archive retains persuasive power."[392] It is clear that presidential libraries and other archives are not "passive receptacles of factual material" but exert suasory influence as they reflect past and present dimensions of American identity, power, and ideology.[393] For the purposes of this project I adopt a conventional definition of "archive" as a collected and organized repository of texts while also noting that this definition implicates issues of agency, identity, and power.[394]

Project Overview and Chapter Previews

The Persian Gulf is located far from U.S. shorelines, and relatively few Americans had visited the area before the 1968 announcement of the British withdrawal. Yet today, the countries of the Gulf feature prominently in the calculations of American diplomats and defense planners. Thousands of U.S. troops are stationed across dozens of military installations located in the Gulf, which serve as a key hub for projecting American military power across Asia.[395] Donald J. Trump's first presidential trip overseas took him not to Europe, Japan, or Latin America, but Saudi Arabia.[396] And the Biden administration has clashed with the oil-exporting states of the Gulf in its first year in office amidst rising gasoline prices, placing U.S. commercial conflicts with Gulf allies on the front pages of the nation's newspapers.[397] This project aims to offer a partial explanation for how this state of affairs came to be, showing how U.S. presidential discourse about the Gulf evolved over the three decades following the British withdrawal. Twin Pillars, Strategic Consensus, the New World Order, and Dual Containment all contributed to a sea-change in how the United States perceives and interacts with this region.

I argue that these metaphors played a central role in how U.S. policymakers responded to the news that the British were leaving the Gulf. Over the course of several decades, the security metaphors (and the ideas and images they conveyed) introduced interpretive frameworks through which officials, commentators, and reporters made sense of the region and its importance to the United States. Critically, American policy toward the Gulf evolved in tandem with the language used by presidential administrations to conceptualize and address the challenges they saw in the area. While each of the metaphors examined in this study served as handy labels used by politicians to promote their chosen policies, these metaphors were not limited to serving as mere "conduits" to express policy. Rather, the logics and symbolism of these metaphors filtered

through the judgments of officials, journalists, and experts, helping mediate their perceptions of the Gulf by joining the "world of political… action" with the "world of political ideas, knowledge, and information."[398] The power of these metaphors derives from the way they helped guide Americans into a revised understanding of the Persian Gulf as a site of U.S. responsibility.

More specifically, I will show the ways that each metaphor revealed the gradual deepening of U.S. involvement in the Middle East, relied on the assumptions of the previous metaphors, and drew extensively from the symbolism of the Cold War that the United States was fighting concurrently through 1989. Across these metaphors, the United States went from propping up Gulf nations to fight on their own (Twin Pillars), to mobilizing allied nations in the coalitional fight after one of the pillars crumbled (Strategic Consensus), to instituting a holistic strategy in the Middle East that established the United States as the hegemon among allied forces (the New World Order), to enacting its hegemonic leadership by containing the perceived threats in the Gulf region (Dual Containment). Each of the metaphors' components was integral to scaffolding the Axis of Evil metaphor that shaped the U.S. War on Terror. While individual remnants of the strategy conveyed by each metaphor have lasted until the present—one "pillar" (Saudi Arabia) remains a U.S. ally today, for instance—the rhetorical legacy of these metaphors appears most powerfully in the persistence of the picture they collectively painted of the region. Taken together, these metaphors depicted the Gulf as a vulnerable and vital area beset by dangers, thereby encouraging Americans to support interventionist policies intended to protect this important region from the hostile forces that sought its subjugation. Failure to manage these dangers, according to the picture painted by these presidential metaphors, would risk imperiling the United States and its allies, further justifying American intervention into this region to fight communism, terrorism, or some other perceived threat; as the younger Bush acknowledged, "Our

strategy is this: We will fight them over there so we do not have to face them in the United States of America."[399] This vision linking Gulf precarity with peril to the homeland has helped guide U.S. policy in the Middle East since the 9/11 attacks and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, supplying a symbolic framework through which to interpret political developments in the Gulf.

The project is divided into four case studies. Each focuses on a prominent metaphor used by presidents to describe their administration's security policy in the Persian Gulf. At the outset of each chapter, I trace the development of the metaphor in presidential planning documents. I next analyze public statements of the president(s) and presidential surrogates about the Persian Gulf, showing how the metaphor offered an implicit vision of regional sovereignty and a U.S. responsibility to respond to perceived threats to the Gulf and access to its oil.[400] Then I examine the metaphor's circulation, including attempts to contest it or its symbolism. I trace expressions of the metaphor in press coverage, foreign policy commentary, and political discourse. In each case study, I consider how the stylistic elements of presidential rhetoric may have helped naturalize logics of intervention in American debates over Gulf defense strategy. The goal is to explore how these presidential metaphors helped constitutively reimagine security relations between the United States and the countries of the Persian Gulf.

Chapter 1 examines the Twin Pillars strategy crafted by the Nixon administration. The policy metaphor responded to the widespread depiction of the Gulf as a "vacuum" in the wake of the British withdrawal. Rather than previous instances where the United States itself responded to fill ostensive vacuums on the world stage, however, this policy designated Iran and Saudi Arabia as "pillars" of security to offset Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf.[401] As part of this strategy, the United States transferred a vast amount of American-made weapons to Iran and Saudi Arabia (as well as technicians to maintain them, advisors to train military personnel in how

to use them, etc.). Under Nixon, U.S. arms sales increased from $1.4 billion in 1971 to over $16 billion in 1975, with Iran counting for over half of that growth.[402] Rhetorically, Twin Pillars was upheld by a constellation of images that conveyed Gulf instability, portrayed Iran and Saudi Arabia as sources of stability, and suggested that the United States had an obligation to strengthen these allies. This characterization lasted even into the presidency of Jimmy Carter, who criticized the Shah for reported human rights abuses but still called him "a friend, a loyal ally, and… a very stabilizing factor" up until the 1979 revolution.[403] A handful of left-wing and Arab-American activists sought to contest the symbolism conveyed by the rhetoric of Twin Pillars by offering alternative schemas through which to understand the region. Carter and the Democrats, however, appropriated the symbolism of Twin Pillars to attack Nixon and Ford; they claimed that the Gulf was indeed an unstable region, but that the main source of instability was these presidents' generous arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia. This situation lasted until the fall of the Shah's regime, at which point Carter issued his eponymous doctrine and declared that the United States would not allow the Persian Gulf to fall under the sway of a hostile power.

Chapter 2 analyzes the Strategic Consensus metaphor of the Reagan administration. A cold warrior to the core, Reagan cast a vision of U.S. freedom and democracy triumphing over Soviet atheistic communism. As part of that vision, his administration depicted the Middle East in a flattened manner; for them, the region was a straightforward theater of the two-sided global superpower competition. Reagan officials portrayed the United States leading its many friends, including Israel, the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, and poorer Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan, in a unified coalition against (in the words of one news report) "Soviet imperialism in the Middle Eastern area."[404] Strategic Consensus, the Reagan administration's chosen metaphor, advanced this simplified picture. As Lawrence Freedman writes, "strategy comes into play where there is

actual or potential conflict, when interests collide and forms of resolution are required."[405] In this instance, Strategic Consensus signaled deeper U.S. regional engagement to control the outcome of events. This metaphor called to mind a world where "consensus" was easy to attain and squabbling among allies over issues like Palestinian rights, intra-Arab rivalries, or political ideology "could, and should, stop" in pursuit of greater aims.[406] While the administration in many ways failed in its attempts to forge a new military accord among allies, the logic of Strategic Consensus set the stage for the rhetorical reinvention of each former pillar. In line with the picture of seamless alignment between the United States and its partners, Saudi Arabia went from being viewed as a teetering autocracy to a more unquestioned ally. Iran was depicted as a frightening enemy that sought to subjugate its neighbors and dominate the flow of oil, echoing the threat to regional security posed by the Soviets in the Strategic Consensus vision. This hostile imagery toward Iran was punctuated by a series of clashes between the U.S. Navy and Iranian forces, culminating in the sinking of half of Iran's navy in Operation Praying Mantis and the accidental downing of Iran Air flight 655.

Chapter 3 examines President George H.W. Bush's rhetoric during the 1990 Gulf crisis, when Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Early in his presidency, Bush had continued the "tilt" toward Iraq initiated during the Reagan administration, seeking to draw Baghdad into U.S. diplomatic orbit. Once Iraq attacked Kuwait, however, Bush and his cabinet resolved that Hussein's conquests could not stand. Although Bush's arguments for military action based on national interests did not generate much public enthusiasm, his metaphors such as *Gulf crisis as test* and *Hussein as criminal* found much more traction. These metaphors were grounded in international law, or the notion that global norms of non-aggression were too important to allow their violation to go unpunished. Bush coined a composite metaphor linking

these sub-metaphors, the New World Order, which appealed to a revitalized American exceptionalism. The New World Order promoted the idea that the United States was needed to provide "peacekeeping" in the region, justifying a massively expanded (and interventionist) role for the United States in the Gulf designed to halt the spread of tyranny, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.[407] Bush thus pioneered a new set of rationales to justify a continued military presence in the Persian Gulf at a key moment when the Soviet Union no longer presented a credible threat to the region. Bush also elected to leave Hussein's regime intact in Baghdad, which his successor (and many commentators) interpreted as a problem in need of resolution.

Finally, Chapter 4 evaluates the Bill Clinton administration's Dual Containment strategy in the Gulf. Emerging out of the Clinton team's strategic assessment, the Dual Containment policy called for isolating Iraq and Iran in the Gulf. Originally articulated by Special Assistant to the President for Middle Eastern Affairs Martin S. Indyk, this strategy called for the "aggressive containment" of Iraq and "active containment" of Iran. In practical terms, this meant that the administration imposed harsh sanctions on each state. It vigorously enforced U.N. sanctions on Iraq, and it worked with Congress to pass and enforce stringent unilateral sanctions on Iran. As part of this strategy, Clinton continually affirmed the image of the United States as the region's guardian and depicted Iraq and Iran as dangers to American interests, U.S. allies, and Middle East peace. While the metaphor itself disappeared from administration discourse, the Cold War logic of containment continued to guide U.S. Gulf policy. Officials affirmed the expansive menu of U.S. regional objectives outlined by the previous administration in the name of enforcing international norms in the Gulf (i.e., punishing Iraq and Iran until they reformed). While relations with Iran improved slightly by the close of Clinton's presidency, he and his team still drew attention to the dangers posed by Tehran, Baghdad, and the related threats of terrorism, Islamist

radicalism, and weapons of mass destruction. They thereby introduced key elements of the interpretive schema that would be used to support the younger Bush's freedom agenda—including the invasion of Iraq—in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

In the conclusion, I review the findings of the overall study. I demonstrate how George W. Bush's Axis of Evil metaphor, which he unveiled in the 2002 State of the Union Address, marked the culmination of the symbolic transformation of the Persian Gulf in American public discourse. Specifically, I trace how the security metaphors examined in this project facilitated the redefinition of the Gulf as a region over which the United States wielded protective influence. These presidents went well beyond strengthening the sovereignty of certain Gulf states (Twin Pillars) to gradually assuming police-power status across the Middle East (Strategic Consensus, New World Order, Dual Containment). The metaphors that these administrations used, I seek to show, provided the building blocks in rationalizing the U.S. empowerment in the Middle East well before the War on Terror. In these ways, the three decades following the British withdrawal announcement helped pave the way for George W. Bush's aggressive, muscular foreign policy.

The steady evolution of presidential rhetoric about the Gulf was routinely questioned by commentators and journalists. These criticisms, however, arguably failed to cohere into a comprehensive "counterframe" capable of reversing the constitutive power of these security metaphors.[408] As a result, the symbolism of these presidential metaphors steadily accumulated. From support (pillars) to mobilization (consensus) to controlling the region (order and containment) against threats, the metaphors examined in this project gradually redefined the Persian Gulf from a region beyond the protective reach of the U.S. military to a cornerstone of American global military power.

Marilyn J. Young attests, "More than anywhere else in the world, the Middle East has confounded presidential administrations and pushed the limits of presidential rhetoric."[409] Commentators today regularly lament the inability of the United States to "redirect" the nation's foreign policy attention away from the region.[410] This project adds to projects of reassessment by revealing the implicit notions of U.S. sovereignty and responsibility for Persian Gulf security that spread through presidential security metaphors leading up to 9/11.

Notes

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[1] *House of Commons Debates*, 5th series, vol. 756, column 1580, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1968/jan/16/public-expenditure#column_1578.

[2] *House of Commons Debates*, 5th series, vol. 756, column 1580, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1968/jan/16/public-expenditure#column_1578.

[3] Sir Patrick Dean, Cable to Foreign Secretary George Brown, Public Records Office, Kew: PREM 13/1999; Jeffrey Pickering, "Politics and 'Black Tuesday,': Shifting Power in the Cabinet and the Decision to Withdraw from East of Suez, November 1967-January 1968," *Twentieth Century British History* 13.2 (2002): 144-145.

[4] *House of Commons Debates*, 5th series, vol. 704, columns 423-4, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1964/dec/16/foreign-affairs#column_423.

[5] For a survey of the British defense reviews that precipitated Wilson's 1968 announcement, see: Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 122-201.

[6] Duncan Needham, *UK Monetary Policy from Devaluation to Thatcher, 1967-1982* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 21.

[7] Helene von Bismarck, *British Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1961-1968: Conceptions of Informal Empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 186-187; Tore Tingvold Peterson, "Crossing the Rubicon? Britain's Withdrawal from the Middle East, 1964-1968: A Bibliographical Review," *International History Review* 22.2 (2000): 328-333.

[8] This political entity is sometimes called the Trucial States or Trucial Confederation (Arabic: الساحل المهادن). It composed a region roughly encompassing modern-day Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Tancred Bradshaw, *The End of Empire in the Gulf: From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 93-94.

[9] Sir Charles Belgrave, "Security in the Gulf," *The Times* (London), January 26, 1968, 9.

[10] Memorandum of conversation, Rusk, McNamara, Gordon Walker, and Healey, December 7, 1964, National Security Files, Country File, Box 214, UK Wilson Visit I 12/7-8/64, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library.

[11] Gregory Gause, "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973," *Review of International Studies* 11.4 (1985): 259.

[12] "U.S. Won't Fill Vacuum," *New York Times*, January 17, 1968, 15.

[13] James Reston, "Washington" An Air of Crisis," *New York Times*, January 26, 1968, 46.

[14] W. Taylor Fain, *American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 7-8.

[15] Special Memorandum: The New Situation in the Persian Gulf, CIA Board of National Estimates, 1 February 1968, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160003-6.pdf, 4, 6.

[16] "The New Situation in the Persian Gulf," 2, 12, 3.

[17] "Quantification of Probability that Certain Threats Will Occur During the Period 1967-1980," April 19, 1968, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79b00972a000100180039-0, 3.

[18] "Trends in Communist Propaganda," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1 April 1970, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030013-8.pdf, 40-44.

[19] Special Memorandum: The Shah's Increasing Assurance," CIA Board of National Estimates, 7 May 1968, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160008-1.pdf, 7-8.

[20] According to Halliday, "the Cold War is defined above all as the dominance of international politics by the Soviet-US competition." This definition makes room for some flexibility, as he notes, since the superpower rivalry did not dominate international politics from 1945-1991 in all places in the world in the same way or to the same extent. Fred Halliday, "The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War," in ed. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 20.

[21] Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, "Introduction," in ed. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 1.

[22] Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, "Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations," in *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 3.

[23] Martin J. Medhurst, "Introduction," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 3-7; Ronald R. Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3.

[24] Hinds and Windt, *The Cold War as Rhetoric*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991), xix.

[25] "Senator Mansfield Is Concerned About Role," *Jackson Sun*, January 17, 1968, 1.

[26] "Britain in Search of a Cure," *Washington Star*, January 17, 1968, A16.

[27] Quoted in Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 237.

[28] Walter Laqueur, "Russia Enters the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 47.2 (1969): 296.

[29] James H. Noye, *The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy* 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 15.

[30] Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-greece-and-turkey-the-truman-doctrine.

[31] Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 291.

[32] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Address at the Dinner of American Newspaper Publishers Association, New York City," April 22, 1954, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-dinner-the-american-newspaper-publishers-association-new-york-city.

[33] Richard M. Nixon, "Radio Address on the American Veteran," October 22, 1972, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-address-the-american-veteran.

[34] Marwan J. Kabalan, "Iran-Iraq-Syria: Shocks and Rivalries in a Triadic Pattern," in *Shocks and Rivalries in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Imad Mansour and William R. Thompson (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2020), 110; Miriam M. Müller, *A Spectre is Haunting Arabia: How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen*, (Frankfurt, Germany: Transcript Verlag, 2015), 245-261; David C. Wills, *The First War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy during the Reagan Administration* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 163; "Intelligence Report: Soviet General Purpose Naval Deployments Outside Home Waters: Characteristics and Trends," June 1973, CIA Electronic Reading Room, 12, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000309797.pdf; Galia Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 68-69; Yahia H. Zoubir, "Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?" *Third World Quarterly* 23.1 (2002): 31-32.

[35] Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, *Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush* (New York: William Morrow, 1993), 23.

[36] Robert Elliot Mills, "The Pirate and the Sovereign: Negative Identification and the Constitutive Rhetoric of the Nation-State," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 17.1 (2014): 113.

[37] George Washington, "Farewell Address," *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897*, Volume I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896), 221; Shawn J. Parry-Giles, "GEORGE W. BUSH, SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS (20 January 2005)," *Voices of Democracy* 3 (2008): 123. Indeed, Cecil V. Crabb notes, "no nation in modern history has relied so heavily upon 'doctrinal' statements and principles in foreign affairs as the United States." Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*: *Their Meaning, Role, and Future* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 2.

[38] Denise Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 4, 10, 50; Randall Fowler, "Lion's Last Roar, Eagle's First Flight: Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 20.1 (2017): 46-50.

[39] Truman and Eisenhower both intervened significantly in Iranian politics; however, neither president publicly acknowledged the extent of their involvement in Iran or the importance American defense planners attributed to Tehran.

[40] Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandates that the president transmit a document titled The National Security Strategy (NSS) to Congress. See "National Security Strategy," Office of the Secretary of Defense," https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Security-Strategy/.

[41] Philip Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70.4 (1984): 339.

[42] Michael Osborn, "Archetypical Metaphor in Rhetoric: The Light-Dark Family," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 53.2 (1967): 115-126; Klaus J. Dodds, "Geopolitics, Experts, and the Making of Foreign Policy," *Area* 25.1 (1993): 72; Francis A. Beer and G. Robert Boynton, "Paths Through the Minefields of Foreign Policy Space: Practical Reasoning in U.S. Senate Discourse about Cambodia," in *Metaphorical World Politics* ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 141-142.

[43] Richard R. Lau and Mark Schlesinger, "Policy Frames, Metaphorical Reasoning, and Support for Public Policies," *Political Psychology* 26.1 (2005): 79.

[44] Lori D. Bougher, "The Case for Metaphor in Political Reasoning and Cognition," *Political Psychology* 33.1 (2012): 145.

[45] Michael Osborn, *Michael Osborn on Metaphor and Style* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2018), 7.

[46] This statement, of course, uses a metaphor (engine) to denounce the spread of metaphoric language. Robert Dallek, "The Tyranny of Metaphor," *Foreign Policy* (November 2010): 85.

[47] Implicit in this project is the premise that, as Crystal writes in *How Language Works*, "When we speak, write, or sign, we are never in total control." David Crystal, *How Language Works: How Babies Babble, Words Change Meaning, and Languages Live or Die* (New York: Overlook Press, 2005), 282.

[48] Kirt H. Wilson, "The Racial Contexts of Public Address: Interpreting Violence During the Reconstruction Era," in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address* ed. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 212.

[49] Stephen J. Hartnett, Lisa Keränen, and Donovan Conley, "Introduction: A Gathering Storm or a New Chapter?" in *Imagining China: Rhetorics of Nationalism in an Age of Globalization* ed. Stephen J. Hartnett, Lisa Keränen, and Donovan Conley (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press 2017), xii. See also: Josue David Cisneros, "(Re)Bordering the Civic Imaginary: Rhetoric, Hybridity, and Citizenship in *La Gran Marcha*," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 97.1 (2011): 42, 26; Jeff D. Bass, "Hearts of Darkness and Hot Zones: The Ideologeme of Imperial Contagion in Recent Accounts of Viral Outbreaks," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84.4 (1998): 445.

[50] Helena Vanhala, *The Depiction of Terrorists in Blockbuster Hollywood Films 1980-2001: An Analytical Study* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011), 290-291; Jack Shaheen, *The TV Arab* (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Press, 1984), 4.

[51] Tom Brook, "Hollywood Stereotypes: Why are Russians the Bad Guys?" *BBC*, November 4, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20141106-why-are-russians-always-bad-guys.

[52] Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., *The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950* (Westport, CT: Prager, 1991), 8.

[53] Andreea Mingiuc, "Key Concepts of Puritanism and the Shaping of the American Cultural Identity," *Philologica Jassyensia* 6 (2010): 213.

[54] John Winthrop, "A Model of Christian Charity," 1630, Hanover Historical Texts Collection, https://history.hanover.edu/texts/winthmod.html.

[55] Stephen Howard Browne, "Errand into Mercy: Rhetoric, Identity, and Community in John Winthrop's 'Modell of Christian Charity,'" in *A Rhetorical History of the United States: Significant Moments in American Public Discourse*, vol. 1, *Rhetoric, Religion, and the Roots of Identity in British Colonial America*, ed. James R. Andrews (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007), 31, 20.

[56] Samuel Eliot Morrison, *Builders of the Bay Colony* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 74.

[57] Non-Puritans outnumbered Puritans in New England by 1703. Perry Miller, *Errand Into the Wilderness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 1; Robert G. Pope, *The Half-Way Covenant: Church Membership in Puritan New England* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), 271–72.

[58] Katrine Dalsgård, "The One All-Black Town Worth the Pain: (African) American Exceptionalism, Historical Narration, and the Critique of Nationhood in Toni Morrison's *Paradise*," *African American Review* 35.2 (2001): 234; Charles E. Hambrick-Stowe, *The Practice of Piety: Puritan Devotional Disciplines in Seventeenth-Century New England* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 247–51.

[59] Bailey locates this exclusionary impulse as a phenomenon spread throughout Puritan society: "Culturally and intellectually, they imagined Native Americans and Africans as something distinct from themselves… things to

be owned." Richard A. Bailey, *Race and Redemption in Puritan New England* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 116.

[60] Randall Fowler, "Puritanism, Islam, and Race in Cotton Mather's *The Glory of Goodness*: An Exercise in Exceptionalism," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 21.4 (2018): 576.

[61] Walter Cradock, *Mount Sion, or, The Priviledge and Practice of the Saints Opened and Applied* (Cambridge, MA: M.F. 1673), 185–86.

[62] Cotton Mather, *American Tears upon the Ruines of the Greek Churches, in Europe and Asia* (Boston, MA: Green and Allen, 1701), 38.

[63] Ann Kibbey, *The Interpretation of Material Shapes in Puritanism: A Study of Rhetoric, Prejudice, and Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3–4; Said, *Orientalism*, 60-63.

[64] Roger Williams, *G. Fox Digg'd Out of His Burrowes, or, An Offer of Disputation* (Boston, MA: John Foster, 1676), 2.

[65] The Regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli enslaved over 1 million Europeans between 1530-1780. The Christian states of the Mediterranean similarly raided Arab and Muslim shipping during this time period. Robert C. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, The Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 23-28; Paul Michel Baepler, "The Barbary Captivity Narrative in American Culture," *Early American Literature* 39.2 (2004): 218; Robert J. Allison, *The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), xiv-xv.

[66] Paul Michel Baepler, *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 44-51.

[67] Robert Irwin, *The Arabian Nights: A Companion* (London: Tauris, 2004), 16.

[68] Said, *Orientalism*, 57-58. These tropes often reflected racist sentiments, as do many of their modern-day echoes.

[69] Said, *Orientalism*, 58.

[70] In Said's words, "Greeks always require barbarians." Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 52.

[71] Allison, *The Crescent Obscured*, xvii.

[72] Joseph Hanson, *The Mussulmen Humbled; or, a Heroic Poem, in Celebration of the Bravery, Displayed by the American Tars, in the Contest with Tripoli* (New York: Southwick and Hardcastle, 1806), 4-5.

[73] "Of Tripoli," *Morning Chronicle*, New York, NY, December 5, 1804, 2.

[74] "Editorial Department," *Vermont Gazette*, Bennington, VT, December 31, 1804, 2.

[75] John Foss, *A Journal, of the Captivity and Sufferings of John Foss; several years a prisoner at Algiers: together with some account of the treatment of Christian slaves when sick:--and observations of the manners and customs of the Algerines* (Newburyport, MA: Angier March, 1798), 54-55.

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[78] Quoted in Elaine Thomopoulos, *The History of Greece* (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, 2012), 68. See also Karine V. Walther, *The United States and the Islamic World, 1821-1921* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 33-53.

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[81] Andrew Jackson, "First Annual Message," December 8, 1829, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/first-annual-message-3.

[82] John Stevens Cabot, "The Dead Sea, Sodom, and Gomorrah," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* (January 1855): 187.

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[219] Immerwahr, *How to Hide an Empire*, 215-217.

[220] Ashley Jackson, *Persian Gulf Command: A History of the Second World War in Iran and Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 219-224.

[221] Irvine H. Anderson, "Lend-Lease For Saudi Arabia: A Comment on Alternative Conceptualization," *Diplomatic History* 3.4 (1979): 413.

[222] Bruce Riedel, *Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 4-6, 11-12, 25-26; James Wynbrandt, *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 192-193; Yergin, *The Prize*, 393.

[223] Cordell Hull to Harold Ickes, November 13, 1943, Department of State, *FRUS 1943*, 4: 941.

[224] James Terry Duce Statement, House Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1948, Folder 3461, Box 52, Everette Lee DeGolyer, Sr. Papers, Southern Methodist University DeGolyer Library; Yergin, *The Prize*, 409; J.E. Peterson, *Saudi Arabia Under Ibn Saud: Economic and Financial Foundations of the State* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018). 100-104.; Nathan J. Citino, "Internationalist Oilmen, the Middle East, and the Remaking of American Liberalism,, 1945-1953," *Business History Review* 84.2 (2010): 230-231; Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 562.

[225] "American Economic Policy in the Middle East," May 2, 1945, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*, 8:38; Little, *American Orientalism*, 121.

[226] Frank Costigliola, "After Roosevelt's Death: Dangerous Emotions, Divisive Discourses, and the Abandoned Alliance," *Diplomatic History* 34.1 (2010): 1-23; Ira Chernus, "Eisenhower and the Soviets, 1945-1947: Rhetoric and Policy," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 2.1 (1999): 59-82.

[227] Joseph Stalin, "Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow," February 9, 1946 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950) 19-44; Denise M. Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 17-20.

[228] George Kennan, "Long Telegram," February 22, 1946, *National Security Administration Archive*, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.

[229] George F. Kennan (X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25.4 (1947): 581

[230] Clark Clifford, "American Relations with the Soviet Union" ["Clifford-Elsey Report"], September 24, 1946, Conway Files, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=pdf&documentid=7-1.

[231] "A Report to the National Security Council-NSC 68," April 12, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-04-12&documentid=10-1&pagenumber=1.

[232] In this sense, the Cold War unfolded as "a rhetorical war, a war fought with words, speeches, pamphlets, public information (or disinformation) campaigns, slogans, gestures, symbolic actions, and the like." Martin J. Medhurst, "Introduction," in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* ed. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert Ivie, Philip Wander, Robert Scott (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1997), xiv; Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 183-186.

[233] Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, "The Atlantic Charter," August 14, 1941, *Avalon Project*, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.

[234] United Nations Charter, Article 2, Section 4, *United Nations*, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html.

[235] Luke Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 141.

[236] Robert T. Handy, "Patrick J. Hurley and China, 1944-1945," (M.A. Thesis, Portland State University, 1971), 54-61.

[237] In a foretaste of what was to come, British propaganda at the time succeeded in convincing allied audiences that Germany threatened Iran's sovereignty while failing to persuade audiences in Iran. Mervyn Roberts, "Operation Countenance: The 1941 Invasion of Iran and the Clash of Propaganda Narratives," *Iranian Studies* 52.3-4 (2019): 589-610.

[238] "Red Questions Status of U.S. Troops in Iran," *Chicago Tribune*, November 5, 1944, 19.

[239] Kristen Blake, *The U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945-1962 A Case in the Annals of the Cold War* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2009), 19-20; Alfred J. Rieber, *Stalin and the Struggle for Supremacy in Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 379-380.

[240] Susan Butler, "Introduction," in *My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin*, ed. Susan Butler (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 25.

[241] Blake, *The U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in Iran*, 21-22.

[242] Harry S. Truman, *1946-52: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 94.

[243] Harry S. Truman, "Address in Chicago on Army Day," April 6, 1946, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-chicago-army-day.

[244] George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 7-13; Felix Belair Jr., "Byrnes to Argue Iran Case in UNO; But Says He Will Not Replace Stettinius in the Council—Gromyko Calls on Truman," *New York Times*, March 23, 1946, 1; "Russian Troops Quit Iran, Reports Say: Tabriz Radio Announces 'Last Soldier' Evacuated," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1946, 1; Denise Bostdorff in *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 29.

[245] This approach differed significantly from British thinking about how to prevent communist advances in the region, which involved more political interference in the countries of the Persian Gulf and permanent military deployments to British-administered bases in the region. For an overview, see: Glen Balfour-Paul, "Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 506-509.

[246] Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect*, 151.

[247] George C. Marshall, "The Marshall Plan Speech," June 5, 1947, *George C. Marshall Foundation*, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/marshall-plan-speech-original/.

[248] Although American policymakers did not like European imperialism, they very rarely described it as a violation of national self-determination in the same way they did Soviet actions or communist efforts elsewhere. Harry S. Truman, "Message to the Congress Transmitting Report of U.S. Participation in the United Nations for 1950," July 26, 1951, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-the-congress-transmitting-report-us-participation-the-united-nations-for-1950.

[249] Harry S. Truman, "Address in Chicago Before the Swedish Pioneer Centennial Association," June 4, 1948, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-chicago-before-the-swedish-pioneer-centennial-association.

[250] "Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States," *CIA*, September 26, 1947, CIA Electronic Reading Room, 3-6, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp67-00059a000500060004-6/.

[251] NSC 136/1, November 20, 1952, *FRUS 1952-1954*, *Iran, 1951-1954*, 10:530-533, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d240.

[252] Little, *American Orientalism*, 123; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 219.

[253] Indeed, the Truman Doctrine can be read as the culmination of US-Turkish rapprochement, as Truman had sent the *USS Missouri* to Istanbul in April 1946 to signal American military support for Turkey against the Soviet Union. Şaban H. Çalış, *Turkey's Cold War: Foreign Policy and Western Alignment in the Modern Republic* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 69-81.

[254] Telegram from Acheson to Byrnes (in Paris), August 15, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, 7:840, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v07/pg_840.

[255] Robert Divine argues, the speech represented a "global pledge to resist Communist expansion, whether it took the form of internal subversion or external aggression." Bostdorff concurs with this conclusion, stating that "the Truman Doctrine was the symbolic turning point" that made an interventionist foreign policy possible (as the Korean War would soon demonstrate), a transformation that also enabled a "veer toward imperialism." In J. Michael Hogan's estimation, the Truman Doctrine formally instituted "a peacetime national security establishment… grafted on to the New Deal state, as many conservatives had feared, and yet challenged the New Deal state, as many liberals had warned." Robert A. Divine, *Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History*, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985), 14; Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 146, 148; Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 464.

[256] Randall Fowler, *More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), 20-23, 46-48, 125-126.

[257] Riedel, *Kings and Presidents*, 25-26; Aaron David Miller, *Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1949* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 199-200.

[258] Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship From Truman to Obama* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 17-20; Steven L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 39.

[259] Memorandum (Washington), by Mr. Adrian B. Colquitt of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, February 4, 1946, *FRUS 1946* 7:431, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v07/d431.

[260] Telegram from U.S. Consulate (Jidda), December 15, 1947, *FRUS 1947* 5:931, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d934.

[261] From the papers of George M. Elsey, quoted by Malcolm Byrne, "The Road to Intervention: Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1945-1953" in *Mohammad Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 201. In this book Byrne refers to a document that has now been taken offline by the Truman Library titled "Summary of conversation with President Harry S. Truman regarding intentions of the Chinese communists vis a vis Korea."

[262] Newspaper clipping, "Eisenhower on Middle East," Box 8, Campaign Series, Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

[263] *Department of State Bulletin*, June 15, 1953, 831.

[264] Fred Halliday, "The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War," in ed. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 8-9. Three times: Suez Crisis (1956), Lebanon (1958), Jordan (1958). United States also went to nuclear alert over Turkey (1963), Jordan (1970), Arabi-Israeli War (1973), Afghanistan (1979). See also: John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 174-181; Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 20; Hugh Wilford, *America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 160-161; Zachary Karabell, *Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War 1946-1962* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 70-71.

[265] NSC 162/2, "Basic National Security Policy," October 30, 1953, 21, *Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program*, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf.

[266] Both Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen employed the term "problem of sovereignty" in their work. For Schmitt, the "problem of sovereignty" is a paradox: "the authority of a power depends on whether it is compatible substantively and structurally with the idea that people develop about… the world and their place in the world over time." It therefore has to do with whether an "authority can convince those people living in a society at a particular time" that it is an actual authority and should be respected as the authority. Schmitt calls this reconciliation the correspondence between "historical-political status" and the "general state of consciousness." For Hans Kelsen, the "problem of sovereignty" is the difficulty that exists in reconciling "two different legal orders—that of national and of international law—to each other." In alluding to this term, I reference aspects of each theorists' definition. The United States government faced the problem of legitimating its actions in the Persian Gulf and sought to convince both domestic and foreign audiences that it was appropriate for it to intervene in the region's politics. At the same time, in claiming a right on some level to act as the Persian Gulf's anti-communist guardian, the United States government also made claims about its *national* right to fulfill duties ascribed to the *international* community. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 18, 42-45; Hans Kelsen, "Sovereignty and the International Law," *Georgetown Law Journal* 47.4 (1960): 628-630; Christian Volk, "The Problem of Sovereignty in Globalized Times," *Law, Culture and the Humanities* (2019): 5-7, https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872119828010.

[267] This term originated with Kermit Roosevelt in 1951. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC*, 98; Mark L. Hass, *The Clash of Ideologies: Middle Eastern Politics and American Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 239.

[268] Hedrick Smith, "The Arab Cold War—Naser vs. Faisal," *New York Times*, May 22, 1966, 207; Dore Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: 2003), 74-77.

[269] Translated and quoted in Brown, *Oil, God, and Gold*, 219.

[270] In one 1954 meeting of the National Security Council, administration officials thanked oil executives for "having taken a broadminded and patriotic view" of their role in Iran. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 199th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 27, 1954," *FRUS* 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume 10, Document 465, 1010, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d465. See also: John P. Miglietta, *American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992*: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia (Lanham: Lexington, 2002), 41-42; Andrew Scott Cooper, *The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 25.

[271] Randall Fowler, "Lion's Last Roar, Eagle's First Flight: Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 20.1 (2017): 35, 52.

[272] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East," January 5, 1957, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-the-situation-the-middle-east.

[273] Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, 209-210.; Fowler, *More Than a Doctrine*, 147; Juan Romero, *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: A Revolutionary Quest for Unity and Security* (Lanham, MD: University

Press of America, 2011); Douglas Little, "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 20.1 (1996): 27-54.

[274] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, 13, 2:159-161; James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 136.

[275] Gholam Reza Afkhami, *The Life and Times of the Shah* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 295.

[276] "Senators Oppose U.S. Aid to Saudi Arabia," *Jerusalem Post*, August 13, 1959, 1.

[277] John F. Kennedy, "Excerpts of Remarks by Senator John F. Kennedy, Johnstown, PA," October 15, 1960, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/excerpts-remarks-senator-john-f-kennedy-johnstown-pa.

[278] John F. Kennedy, "Remarks at the Eighth National Conference on International Economic and Social Development," June 16, 1961, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-eighth-national-conference-international-economic-and-social-development.

[279] Kennedy felt a lack of warmth toward Iran, which existed partly because JFK suspected the Shah of smuggling funds to aid Nixon's 1960 presidential campaign. Komer to Bundy, October 20, 1962, Presidential Papers: President's Office Files, Box 119, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. This perception was widespread in U.S. foreign policy circles: Roham Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 23; April R. Summit, "For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran," *Middle East Journal* 589.4 (2004): 564; Daniel C. Williamson, "Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17.3 (2006): 597-615; Ara Sanjian, "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact," *Middle Eastern Studies* 33.2 (1997): 226-66; Bryan R. Gibson, *Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), xvii, 17-18, 25, 30-31; Andrew Scott Cooper, *The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran* (New York: Henry Holt, 2016), 96.

[280] Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah*, 22-23; Kristen Blake, *The U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945-1962: A Case in the Annals of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009), 137; Cooper, *The Oil Kings*, 48-49. For a discussion of the United States' role in instigating the White Revolution, see: Michael Wilcocks, "Agent or Client: Who Instigated the White Revolution of the Shah and the People in Iran, 1963?" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Manchester, 1 August 2016).

[281] Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran (Washington), July 19, 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, 18:297, 646.

[282] John F. Kennedy, "Remarks of Welcome to King Saud of Saudi Arabia at Andrew Air Force Base," February 13, 1962, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-welcome-king-saud-saudi-arabia-andrews-air-force-base; John F. Kennedy, "Toasts of the President and King Saud," February 13, 1962, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/toasts-the-president-and-king-saud.

[283] This was the only deployment of American troops to the Middle East during Kennedy's presidency. Warren Bass, *Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 129-130; Joseph A. Kechichian, *Faysal: Saudi Arabia's King for All Seasons* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2008), 88; Rachel Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Relationship with Saudi Arabia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 87-90; Jesse Ferris, "Egypt's Vietnam," *Foreign Policy*, April 3, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/03/egypts-vietnam-yemen-nasser-sisi/; Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 174-258; Malik Mufi, "The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism," in *The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies* ed. David

W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (New York: Routledge, 2018), 142; Antonio Perra, *Kennedy and the Middle East: The Cold War, Israel and Saudi Arabia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 145.

[284] John F. Kennedy, "Remarks to Student Participants in the White House Seminar in Government," August 27, 1963, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-student-participants-the-white-house-seminar-government.

[285] Memorandum of Conversation [Washington], October 5, 1962, *FRUS 1961-1963* 18:165.

[286] Riedel, *Kings and Presidents*, 40. Alexei Vassiliev, *King Faisal of Saudi Arabia: Personality, Faith and Times* (London: Saqi Books, 2015), 238.

[287] Lyndon B. Johnson, "Special Message to Congress Requesting Additional Appropriations for Military Needs in Viet-Nam," May 4, 1965, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-requesting-additional-appropriations-for-military-needs-viet.

[288] Letter From President Johnson to the Shah of Iran (Washington), January 2, 1964, *FRUS 1964-1968* 22:1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/d1.

[289] Lyndon B. Johnson, "Toasts of the President and the Shah of Iran," June 5, 1964, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/toasts-the-president-and-the-shah-iran-3.

[290] Although these policies facilitated Iran's "graduation" from an aid recipient to a regional security partner, they also planted seeds of unrest in the diplomatic relationship as well as in the streets of Tehran. Stephen McGlinchey, "Lyndon B. Johnson and Arms Credit Sales to Iran 1964-1968," *Middle East Journal* 67.2 (2013): 231; Andrew L. Johns, "The Johnson Administration, the Shah of Iran, and the Changing Pattern of U.S.-Iranian Relations, 1965-1967," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9.2 (2007): 64-94; Cooper, *The Fall of Heaven*, 132-133; Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 223-228.

[291] "LBJ Calls Iran's Progress a Lesson 'Others Have to Learn,'" *Washington Post*, August 23, 1967, A1.

[292] Lyndon B. Johnson, "Message to the Congress Transmitting Annual Report on the Foreign Assistance Program," January 15, 1969, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-the-congress-transmitting-annual-report-the-foreign-assistance-program-1.

[293] Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks of Welcome to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia on the South Lawn of the White House," June 21, 1966, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-welcome-king-faisal-saudi-arabia-the-south-lawn-the-white-house.

[294] Perra, *Kennedy and the Middle East*, 147; Guy Laron, *The Six-Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), 189.

[295] Lyndon B. Johnson, "Toasts of the President and King Faisal," June 21, 1966, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/toasts-the-president-and-king-faisal.

[296] Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks of Welcome at the White House to the Amir of Kuwait," December 11, 1968, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-welcome-the-white-house-the-amir-kuwait.

[297] Samir A. Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 128; Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002), 129.

[298] Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 101.

[299] Kechichian, *Faysal*, 130.

[300] Gibson, *Sold Out?*, 106-109; Edward Longinotti, "Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez: Economic Determinism to Political Choice," *Contemporary British History* 29.3 (2015): 328.

[301] Roham Alvandi, "Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf," *Diplomatic History* 36.2 (2012): 338; Gibson, *Sold Out?*, xv.

[302] von Bismarck, *British Policy in the Persian Gulf*, 215; Parker T. Hart, *Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1998), 28-33, 48-66.

[303] Winston S. (Spencer) Churchill. "Putting National Interests First East of Suez," *The Times* (London), April 21, 1970, 9.

[304] Roya Ghafele, "The Metaphors of Globalization and Trade: An Analysis of the Language Used in the WTO," *Journal of Language and Politics* 3.3 (2004): 447; Michel Foucault, *Les Mots et Les Choses, Une Archéologie des Sciences Humaines* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 93.

[305] Osborn, *Michael Osborn on Metaphor and Style*, 208; Christ'l De Landtsheer and Ilse De Vrij, "Talking about Srebrenica: Dutch Elites and Dutchbat. How Metaphors Change during Crisis," in *Metaphorical World Politics*, ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 171; Robert L. Ivie, "Metaphor and Motive in the Johnson Administration's Vietnam War Rhetoric," in *Texts in Context: Critical Dialogues on Significant Episodes in American Political Rhetoric*, ed. Michael C. Leff and Fred J. Kauffield (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1989), 125-126; Mary E. Stuckey, *The Good Neighbor: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Rhetoric of American Power* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013), 34.

[306] Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer, "Metaphorical Globalization," in *Metaphorical World Politics* ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 194.

[307] Shimko, "The Power of Metaphors," 199, 205.

[308] Moses, *Sovereignty and Responsibility*, 4.

[309] Robert J. McMahon, "'By Helping Others, We Help Ourselves: The Cold War Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 234-235.

[310] Osborn, *Michael Osborn on Metaphor and Style*, 13.

[311] Beer and De Landtsheer, "Metaphors, Politics, and World Politics," 29.

[312] These sources were selected for their differing audiences and reach. They offer the ability to only partially assess the extent to which these metaphors filtered through society. Yet they still provide resources through which to demonstrate the articulation, rearticulation, and circulation. According to Thomas Benson, that limitation is intrinsic to all rhetorical analysis: "We will never, looking back, be able to reconstruct a perfectly complete or impartial understanding of a rhetorical episode, but the attempt to make such a reconstruction can help us recapture something of the particular moment and to understand more fully the experience of living in a rhetorical world." Thomas W. Benson, *Writing JFK: Presidential Rhetoric and the Press in the Bay of Pigs Crisis* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 5.

[313] Oddo, *Intertextuality and the 24-Hour News Cycle*, 16.

[314] Oddo, *Intertextuality and the 24-Hour News Cycle*, 13, 18, 14.

[315] Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer, "Introduction: Metaphors, Politics, and World Politics," in *Metaphorical World Politics* ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 6.

[316] Martin J. Medhurst, "Rhetorical Leadership and the Presidency: A Situational Taxonomy," in *The Values of Presidential Leadership* ed. Terry L. Price and J. Thomas Wren (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 61. On definitions of rhetoric, see: George A. Kennedy, *Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3; George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 4; George A. Kennedy, "A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General Rhetoric," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 25.1 (1991): 1-21.

[317] Martin J. Medhurst, "Was There a Nineteenth-Century Rhetorical Presidency? A Debate Revisited," in *Before the Rhetorical Presidency* ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 3.

[318] Although it is beyond the scope of this project, I side with scholars who argue that rhetoric was "present at the founding" of the presidential office and that the increased rhetorical activity of presidents in the twentieth and twenty-first century marks a difference of degree, not kind, from their nineteenth-century predecessors. The "extent and openness of his rhetorical activities as president pose a major problem for those scholars who argue that there existed a constitutional norm that prohibited pre-twentieth-century presidents from going public through the medium of public speech." Stephen E. Lucas, "Present at the Founding: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective," in *Before the Rhetorical Presidency*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 39. Also: "the idea of 'going public'… was a rhetorical instrument to enhance presidential leadership from the beginning." David Zarefksy, "The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," 31-32.

[319] Vanessa B. Beasley, "The Rhetorical Presidency Meets the Unitary Executive: Implications for Presidential Rhetoric on Public Policy," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 13.1 (2012): 8. See also: J. Michael Hogan, *Woodrow Wilson's Western Tour: Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and the League of Nations* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 27-41; Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security*, 3; Mary E. Stuckey, *Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 1-10; Vanessa B. Beasley, *You, The People: American National Identity in Presidential Rhetoric* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 3-23; Mary E. Stuckey, "Anecdotes and Conversations: The Narrational and Dialogic Styles of Modern Presidential Communication," *Communication Quarterly* 40.1 (1992): 45-55.

[320] Lucas, "George Washington and the Rhetoric of Presidential Leadership," 44.

[321] Jeffrey K. Tulis, "Reflections on the Rhetorical Presidency in American Political Development," in *Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective,* ed. Richard J. Ellis (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998), 211-22. David Zarefsky, among others, notes that rhetoric has always been used by presidents as a form of political power, even if the specific innovations developed in the early twentieth-century mark an expansion of this power: "from the time that political conflict became a fact of life, presidents needed more power and resources than the Constitution offers, and they found in rhetoric the means at least to narrow if not close the gap."Zarefsky, "The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," 24.

[322] For a more in-depth discussion of the inception of the rhetorical presidency, see James W. Cesar, Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette, "The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 11.2 (1981): 158-171; Jeffrey K. Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Mel Laracey, *Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002); Belinda A. Stillion Southard, *Militant Citizenship: Rhetorical Strategies of the National Woman's Party, 1913-1920* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2011).

[323] G. Thomas Goodnight and Kathryn M. Olson, "Shared Power, Foreign Policy, and Haiti, 1994: Public Memories of War and Race," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9.4 (2006): 602.

[324] Jason C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 176; Martin J. Medhurst, "Introduction," in *Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994),

1-2; Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership From FDR to Carter*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 25.

[325] Stuckey, "Jimmy Carter," 294.

[326] Martin J. Medhurst, "Presidential Speechwriting: Ten Myths That Plague Modern Scholarship," in *Presidential Speechwriting: From the New Deal to the Reagan Revolution and Beyond* ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 12.

[327] I agree with Condit, who argues that it is possible "to see facts as both objective and situated—both faithful to material realities and responsive to conditions." Celeste Condit, "How Bad Science Stays That Way: Brain, Sex, Demarcation, and the Status of Truth in the Rhetoric of Science," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 26.4 (1996): 83-85; Denise M. Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 4.

[328] Louis A. Montrose, "Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of culture," in *The New Historicism*, ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York: Routledge, 1989), 16; Kenneth Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action* (Berkeley: CA: University of California Press, 1966), 45.

[329] James Jasinski, "A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward an Understanding of the Discursive (Re)constitution of the "Constitution" in *The Federalist Papers*," in *Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases,* ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 73-78.

[330] Richard M. Weaver, "Language is Sermonic," in *Language is Sermonic: Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric*, ed. Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard Strickland, and Ralph T. Eubanks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 224.

[331] Louis Montrose: "representations of the world in… discourse are engaged in constructing the world, in shaping the modalities of social reality, and in accommodating their writers, performers, readers, and audiences to multiple and shifting subject positions within the world they both constitutive and inhabit." Louis A. Montrose, "Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture," in *The New Historicism* ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York: Routledge, 1989), 16. Instrumental and constitutive approaches to rhetorical effect are not mutually exclusive. See Michael Leff and Ebony A. Utley, "Instrumental and Constitutive Rhetoric in Martin Luther King Jr.'s 'Letter from Birmingham Jail,'" *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 7.1 (2004): 37-52.

[332] Stephen Heidt, "The Presidency as Pastiche: Atomization, Circulation, and Rhetorical Instability," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15.4 (2012): 625; Michael Calvin McGee, "Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture," *Western Journal of Communication* 54.2 (1990): 274-289.

[333] Denise M. Bostdorff,"Public Address Scholarship and the Effects of Rhetoric," *Western Journal of Communication* 84.3 (2020): 359.

[334] While her specific approach concerns the visual images that "shape and frame our experience of public life," Finnegan's framework is also useful for talking about circulation generally. She notes that production involves asking where texts come from, how speakers come to make their speeches, and what the rhetor's purposes might have been. Cara A. Finnegan, "Studying Visual Modes of Public Address: Lewis Hine's Progressive-Era Child Labor Rhetoric," in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address* ed. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 251-255. See also James J. Kimble and Lester C. Olson, "Visual Rhetoric Representing Rosie the Riveter: Myth and Misconception in J. Howard Miller's 'We Can Do It!' Poster," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9.4 (2006): 548.

[335] James Jasinski and Jennifer R. Mercieca, "Analyzing Constitutive Rhetorics: The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and the 'Principles of '98," in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address* ed. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 317- 320.

[336] Ernest J. Wrage, "Public Address: A Study in Social and Intellectual History," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 33.4 (1947): 451-452.

[337] Ronald F. Reid and James F. Klumpp, "Introduction," in *American Public Discourse* Third ed., ed. Ronald F. Reid and James F. Klumpp (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2005), 15.

[338] Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan, "Introduction: The Study of Rhetoric and Public Address," in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address* ed. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 4. On a "broader conception" of public address scholarship, see: David Zarefsky, "The State of the Art in Public Address Scholarship," in *Texts in Context: Critical Dialogues on Significant Episodes in American Political Rhetoric* ed. Michael C. Leff and Fred J. Kauffield (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1989), 304.

[339] Heidarali Masoudi, "Metaphorical Incarnations of the 'Other' and Iranian International Relations Discourses," *European Journal of International Relations* 25.3 (2019): 752; Kathleen J. Turner, *Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 4.

[340] Stephen J. Hartnett, Lisa Keränen, and Donovan Conley, "Introduction: A Gathering Storm or a New Chapter?" in *Imagining China: Rhetorics of Nationalism in an Age of Globalization* ed. Stephen J. Hartnett, Lisa Keränen, and Donovan Conley (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press 2017), xii; Jeff D. Bass, "Hearts of Darkness and Hot Zones: The Ideologeme of Imperial Contagion in Recent Accounts of Viral Outbreaks," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84.4 (1998): 445.

[341] Jason C. Flanagan, "Woodrow Wilson's 'Rhetorical Restructuring'" The Transformation of the American Self and the Construction of the Germany Enemy," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 7.2 (2004): 138.

[342] J. Michael Hogan, George C. Edwards III, Wynton C. Hall, Christine L. Harold, Gerard A. Hauser, Susan Herbst, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Ted J. Smith III, "Report of the National Task Force on the Presidency and Public Opinion," in *The Prospect of Presidential Rhetoric*, ed. James Arnt Aune and Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 296.

[343] G. Thomas Goodnight, "Reagan, Vietnam, and Central America: Public Memory and the Politics of Fragmentation," in *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996),142.

[344] "Because it [metaphor] represents a selection by the speaker, it often provides valuable insights concerning the maker of the metaphor or the audience for whom the metaphor is intended." Osborn, *Michael Osborn on Metaphor and Style*, 10.

[345] Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 503-504; Petr Drulák, "Motion, Container, and Equilibrium: Metaphors in the Discourse about European Integration," *European Journal of International Relations* 12.4 (2006): 499-531. See also Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* London: Routledge, 2013), 27-45; Moses, *Sovereignty and Responsibility*, 40-42

[346] Kai Oppermann and Alexander Spencer, "Thinking Alike? Salience and Metaphor Analysis as Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9.1 (2013): 40; Stella Vosniadou and Andrew Ortony, "Similarity and Analogical Reasoning: A Synthesis," in *Similarity and Analogical Reasoning*, ed. Stella Vosniadou and Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 7; Wayne C. Booth, "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation," *Critical Inquiry* 5.1 (1978): 50; Susang Sontag, *Illness as a Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 93; Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor* (London: Routledge, 1978), 80; Sam Glucksberg, *Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphor to Idiom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3; Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 21; Duncan Snidal, "The Game Theory of International Politics," in *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1986), 29.

[347] Paul Chilton, *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 6, 17; Eva F. Kittay, "Metaphor as Rearranging the Furniture of the Mind: A Reply to Donald Davidson's 'What Metaphors Mean,'" in *From a Metaphorical Point of View: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Cognitive Content of Metaphor* ed. Zdravko Radman (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1995), 73-116.

[348] I.A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 92-94. Richards argues that metaphor goes beyond the level of word signification and implicates cognition. He defines metaphor as "two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase… The traditional theory… made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of *thoughts*, a transaction between contexts." Richard, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 93-94.

[349] Richard B. Gregg, "Embodied Meaning in American Public Discourse during the Cold War," in *Metaphorical World Politics*, ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 60. This project approaches metaphor as a component of rhetorical style rather than adopting a neurocognitive or purely literary perspective. Kövecses provides a cognitive linguistic definition of metaphor: "metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain." The implication of this definition is far-reaching because it is understood that we can only comprehend one conceptual domain in terms of another. Zoltán Kövecses. *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4. See also: Barry Brummett, *A Rhetoric of Style* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), xii; Osborn, *Michael Osborn on Metaphor and Style*, 137-138; George Lakoff, "Mapping the Brain's Metaphor Circuitry: Metaphorical Thought in Everyday Reason," *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 8 (2014): https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00958/full#h3.

[350] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 7, 62-65. Stated otherwise, metaphors can be deployed throughout a text or series of texts in a manner that "create[s] an implied enthymematic structure… a particularly strong form of argumentation." Nigel Haarstad, "Metaphorical Enthymeme: A Rhetorical Criticism of *Barack Obama: Son of Promise, Child of Hope*," *Journal of Communication, Speech & Theatre Association of North Dakota* 23.1 (2010): 58.

[351] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 3-6, 51.

[352] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The President's News Conference," April 7, 1954, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-361.

[353] NBC News, White Paper, *The Castro Connection*, aired in October 1980. Quoted in William M. LeoGrande, "A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador," *International Security* 6.1 (1981): 45.

[354] Keith L. Shimko, "The Power of Metaphors and the Metaphors of Power: The United States in the Cold War and After," in *Metaphorical World Politics*, ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 207.

[355] Chilton, *Security Metaphors*, 17.

[356] George Lakoff, "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor," *Metaphor and Thought* 2 (1993): 208; Arina Greavu, "Metaphors for Brexit in the European Public Discourse," *Journal of Linguistic and Intercultural Education* 11.1 (2018): 109-110. Richards similarly described metaphor as having two parts—the tenor and the vehicle—with the vehicle serving as the object whose attributes are attributed to the tenor. Critically, Richards suggested that metaphors can operate on the basis of dissimilarities between two things as well as by highlighting likenesses between them: "Once we begin 'to examine attentively' interactions which do not work through *resemblances* between tenor and vehicle, but depend upon other relations between them including *disparities*, some of our most prevalent, over-simple, ruling assumptions about metaphors as comparisons are soon exposed. Richards, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 107-108; Eileen Cornell Way, *Knowledge Representation and Metaphor* (Oxford: Intellect, 1991), 5-6.

[357] "Cruise Missiles Target Saddam," *CNN*, March 20, 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/20/sprj.irq.int.main/; "Punching Through to Baghdad," *Economist*, April 3, 2003, https://www.economist.com/news/2003/04/03/punching-through-to-baghdad.

[358] Keith L. Shimko, *The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 50, 61.

[359] Robert L. Ivie, "Metaphor and the Rhetorical Invention of Cold War 'Idealists,'" *Communication Monographs* 54.2 (1987): 167.

[360] Beer and De Landtsheer, "Metaphors, Politics, and World Politics," 11; Philip Wander, "The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory," *Central States Speech Journal* 33.4 (1984): 197-216; Ahmed Gamal Abdel Wahab, "Counter-Orientalism: Retranslating the Invisible Arab,' in Leila Aboulela's *The Translator* and *Lyrics Alley*," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 36.3 (2014): 220-241; Sanjeev Krishan, "Why Xi Jinping is called Winnie the Pooh on Twitter? It's a long story," *Business Today*, June 18, 2020, https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/trends/india-china-border-dispute-twitterati-twitter-xi-jinping-winnie-the-pooh-ladakh-galwan-valley/story/407308.html.

[361] Kine Dørum and Kate Garland, "Efficient Electronic Navigation: A Metaphorical Question?" *Interacting with Computers* 23.2 (2011): 129-136.

[362] Beer and De Landtsheer, "Metaphors, Politics, and World Politics," 14.

[363] Maija Stenvall, "An Actor or an Undefined Threat? The Role of 'Terrorist' in the Discourse of International News Agencies," *Journal of Language and Politics* 2.2 (2003):361-404; Timothy M. Cole, "When Intentions Go Awry: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Rhetoric," *Political Communication* 13.1 (1996): 93-113; Carol K. Winkler, *In The Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 159-181.

[364] Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer, "Foreword," in *Metaphorical World Politics*, ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), x.

[365] Leah Ceccarelli, *On the Frontier of Science: An American Rhetoric of Exploration and Exploitation* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013), 11.

[366] Stephen J. Hedit, "Presidential Rhetoric, Metaphor, and the Emergence of the Democracy Promotion Industry," *Southern Communication Journal* 78.3 (2013): 236.

[367] Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths, and Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007), 27; Robert L. Ivie, "Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor: A Framework for Criticism," in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, Robert L. Scott (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1997), 71-72.

[368] Michael P. Marks, *Metaphors in International Relations Theory* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2-4.

[369] Paul Cantor, "Friedrich Nietzsche: The Use and Abuse of Metaphor," in *Metaphor: Problems and Perspectives*, ed. David S. Miall (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), 71.

[370] Robert L. Scott, "Cold War Rhetoric: Conceptually and Critically," in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 4.

[371] Robert L. Ivie, "Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War," *Communication Monographs* 47.4 (1980): 279-294.

[372] Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1990*, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 146.

[373] Robert L. Ivie, "Metaphor and the Invention of Cold War 'Idealists,'" in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 104-122; Richard M. Fried, "Review: The Iron Curtain in Rhetoric and Reality," *Diplomatic History* 34.1 (2010): 187-191.

[374] Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 13-14; Paul Michel Baepler, "The Barbary Captivity Narrative in American

Culture," *Early American Literature* 39.2 (2004): 218; Robert J. Allison, *The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), xiv-xv.

[375] Douglass Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, 3rd ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 9; Sacvan Bercovitch, *The Puritan Origins of the American Self* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 46; Harry S. Stout, *The New England Soul: Preaching and Religious Culture in Colonial New England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 7, 54-55.

[376] Ezra Stiles, "The United States Elevated to Glory and Honour," May 8, 1783 (New Haven: Thomas & Samuel Green, 1783), 7. See: Conrad Cherry, "Revolution, Constitution, and a New Nation's Destiny," in ed. Conrad Cherry, *God's New Israel: Religious Interpretations of American Destiny* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 63.

[377] Thomas Jefferson to Judge Tyler, March 29, 1805. Taken from: ed. Thomas Jefferson Randolph, *Memoirs, Correspondence, and Private Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Late President of the United States* vol. 3 (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1829), 36.

[378] From a letter by Lt. Col. Charles Iverson Graves. Quoted in William B. Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, *The Blue and the Gray on the Nile* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 150-151.

[379] Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Persian Gulf and International Relations," *National Review* 40.9 (1902): 39; Clayton R. Koppes, "Captain Mahan, General Gordon, and the Origins of the Term 'Middle East,'" *Middle Eastern Studies* 12.1 (1976): 95-98; Charles Carlisle Taylor, *The Life of Admiral Mahan, Naval Philosopher* (New York: George Doran, 1920), 119-122.

[380] William J. Donovan, "Memorandum for President," No. 125, Office of Strategic Services, January 3, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers as President, President's Secretary's File, Box 147, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York; Christopher D. O'Sullivan, *FDR and the End of Empire: The Origins of American Power in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 11.

[381] G.C. Peden, "Suez and Britain's Decline as a World Power," *The Historical Journal* 55.4 (2012): 1082; Christopher John Bartlett, *The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations Since 1945* (London: Addison-Wesley, 1992), 77.

[382] Said, *Orientalism*, 285-296.

[383] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in the Eastern Europe and the Middle East," October 31, 1956, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-and-television-report-the-american-people-the-developments-eastern-europe-and-the.

[384] Said, *Orientalism*, 294; Randall Fowler, "Lion's Last Roar, Eagle's First Flight: Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 20.1 (2017): 48.

[385] Wilson, "The Racial Contexts of Public Address," 212.

[386] David Zarefsky, "The State of the Art in Public Address Scholarship," in *Texts in Context: Critical Dialogues on Significant Episodes in American Political Rhetoric*, ed. Michael C. Leff and Fred J. Kauffield (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1989), 24; Michael C. Leff, "Things Made by Words: Reflections on Textual Criticism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 78.2 (1992): 228.

[387] Shawn J. Parry-Giles, "Archival Research and the Presidency," in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address*, ed. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 159.

[388] Taken together, these sources capture a deliberately varied slice of press publications. Each of these sources addressed a different public, yet each source enjoyed widespread circulation within its target audience. The goal of using these particular sources is to capture a diverse range of opinions and ideological perspectives. In analyzing texts directed toward a wide array of audiences, my aim is to uncover the extent to which the

metaphors in question may have circulated throughout different kinds of press publications. In regard to specific sources: *Foreign Affairs* was chosen over *Foreign Policy* because *Foreign Affairs* enjoyed a wider readership and was more established during the 1970s; *New York Times* enjoyed a greater circulation than other national newspapers during the period in question; and *Reader's Digest* was chosen over *Life* because *Life* changed format twice during the 1970s. *Reader's Digest* also had a conservative editor from 1967 to 2003, which means that it likely reached a different cross-section of audiences than *Foreign Affairs* and the *New York Times*. "Network Evening News Ratings," *Pew Research*, March 13, 2006, https://www.journalism.org/numbers/network-evening-news-ratings/; Karlyn Bowman, "The Decline of the Major Networks," *Forbes*, July 26, 2009, https://www.forbes.com/2009/07/25/media-network-news-audience-opinions-columnists-walter-cronkite.html?sh=2b33913247a5; Joanne Sharp, "Rise and Fall of Reader's Digest," *CNN*, February 20, 2013, https://www.cnn.com/2013/02/20/opinion/sharp-readers-digest/index.html; Jim Bovard, "This *Reader's Digest* Editor Was One Tough, Conservative Cookie," *American Conservative*, August 2, 2019, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/this-readers-digest-editor-was-one-tough-conservative-cookie-bill-schulz/; Dave Shiflett, "My Editor Helped Win the Cold War," *Wall Street Journal*, July 23, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-editor-helped-win-the-cold-war-11563922983; William Bundy, "The History of Foreign Affairs," *Foreign Affairs*, 1994, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/history-foreign-affairs.

[389] Barbara A. Biesecker, "Of Historicity, Rhetoric: The Archive as Scene of Invention," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9.1 (2006): 126-127.

[390] Archival incongruity also occurs as a result of inequities in social power. Olson's work reveals how subaltern indigenous communities in Ecuador were not able to maintain traditional archives due to their "exclusion from equal participation in the republic" and so their cultural artifacts might be better accessed through a focus on *topoi* in the images produced and circulated by these communities. Debra Hawhee and Christina J. Olson, "Pan-Historiography: The Challenges of Writing History Across Time and Space," in *Theorizing Histories of Rhetoric*, ed. Michelle Ballif (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2013), 94-100.

[391] Cara A. Finnegan, "What Is This a Picture Of?: Some Thoughts on Images and Archives," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9.1 (2006): 116-123; Charles E. Morris III, "Archival Queer," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9.1 (2006): 146; E. Cram, "Archival Ambience and Sensory Memory," *Critical Communication/Cultural Studies* 13.2 (2016): 109-129.

[392] Angela G. Ray, "Rhetoric and the Archive," *Review of Communication* 16.1 (2016): 48.

[393] Parry-Giles, "Archival Research and the American Presidency," 164.

[394] Implicit in this definition is the notion that archives are not natural phenomena that spring forth fully formed. Rather, archives are collected and organized by *someone*. Carolyn Steedman points out that state power plays a role in archive formation and that archives operate as places of invention whereby "we" generate historical identification with the dead. Although this project adopts a conventional definition of archive, it is important to note alongside Zaeske and Jedd that if there are "no documents," then there exists less likelihood that histories or accounts will be written about a particular subject matter or group of people. Angela G. Ray, "Rhetoric and the Archive," *Review of Communication* 16.1 (2016): 43-59; Carolyn Steedman, "The Space of Memory: In an Archive," *History of Human Sciences* 11.4 (1998): 65-83; Susan Zaeske and Sarah Jedd, "From Recovering Women's Words to Document Gender Constructs: Archival Research in the Twenty-First Century," in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address* ed. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 184.

[395] Greg Myre, "The U.S. Looks to Support the Afghan Military From 'Over The Horizon,'" *NPR*, May 17, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/05/17/997494815/the-u-s-looks-to-support-the-afghan-military-from-over-the-horizon.

[396] "Trump Arrives in Saudi Arabia in First Foreign Trip," *Al Jazeera*, May 20, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/20/trump-arrives-in-saudi-arabia-in-first-foreign-trip.

[397] Ben Casselman and Clifford Krauss, "Rising Gas Prices Pose Obstacle For Biden's Policies on Economy," *New York Times*, July 7, 2021, A1.

[398] Beer and De Landtsheer "Introduction," 6.

[399] George W. Bush, "Remarks at the American Legion National Convention in Reno, Nevada," August 28, 2007, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-american-legion-national-convention-reno-nevada.

[400] Campbell and Jamieson define the presidency as "an aggregate of people, as a corporate entity." Campbell and Jamieson, *Presidents Creating the Presidency*, 18.

[401] The Soviet Union and Iraq signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on April 9, 1972, which Yetiv argues precipitated Nixon's agreement to provide more weapons to the Shah. Steve A. Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 30-31.

[402] William D. Hartung, *And Weapons for All* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 44; Randall Fowler, "Art of the Arms Deal: Reagan, AWACS, and the Rhetorical Presidency," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 105.3 (2019): 276. Richard F. Grimmett, who authored the 1991 annual report to Congress on conventional weapons transfers, wrote that same year, "For the past 20 to 25 years, the Middle East has been the most significant region of the world for both the size and level of sophisticated of the arms trade." Richard F. Grimmett "The Arms Trade after the War," *Arms Control Today* 21.5 (1991): 21

[403] Jimmy Carter, "Interview with the President Question-and-Answer Session With Bill Moyers of the Public Broadcasting Service," November 13, 1978, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-the-president-question-and-answer-session-with-bill-moyers-the-public.

[404] Bernard Gwertzman, "Haig Says U.S. Seeks Consensus Strategy in the Middle East," March 20, 1981, *New York Times*, A1.

[405] Lawrence A. Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xi.

[406] Martin J. Medhurst, "Why Rhetoric Matters: George H.W. Bush in the White House," in *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 10-11.

[407] Roy Joseph, "The New World Order: President Bush and the Post-Cold War Era," in *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 88.

[408] Robert M. Entman, "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11," *Political Communication* 20 (2003): 418-420.

[409] Marilyn J. Young, "Of Allies and Enemies: Old Wine in New Bottles or New Wine in an Old Jug?" in ed. James Arnt Aune and Martin J. Medhurst, *The Prospect of Presidential Rhetoric* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 172.

[410] Mara Karlin and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "America's Middle East Purgatory: The Case for Doing Less," *Foreign Affairs* 98.1 (2019): 88; James Traub, "Under Biden, the Middle East Would Be Just Another Region," *Foreign Policy*, September 9, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/09/biden-is-planning-change-not-hope-for-the-middle-east/.

CHAPTER ONE

Twin Pillars, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and the Search for Stability

The "vacuum" metaphor swiftly framed the U.S. response to news the British planned to withdraw from the Gulf. In the *Washington Post*, Ali Mehrawi stated, "Iran is preparing to play an important role in filling the power vacuum expected to be left in the Persian Gulf area after the British military withdrawal."[1] In "Persian Gulf Vacuums," the *Christian Science Monitor* warned of "the new Soviet imperialism that will bear the most careful watching, as it expands its influence in the Middle East and the rich oil-bearing regions of the gulf."[2] And an op-ed from Robert Andrews, "Who'll Fill Persian Gulf Vacuum?" read: "Nations, like Nature, abhor a vacuum. Where one appears, there is a rush to fill it… Thus the question of which new conglomerate will acquire majority control of the Persian Gulf is a matter of very present concern."[3] In the zero-sum calculus of the Cold War, a "vacuum" could quickly ignite a crisis.

This vacuum metaphor also saturated internal Nixon administration discussions of the region. The U.S. ambassador in Tehran, Douglas MacArthur II, warned that the Soviets and their allies would face "almost irresistible temptation to subversive activity" in the Gulf "if vacuum develops end of 1971."[4] Another time he cabled the president, "That vacuum is going to be filled. Iran is going to have to play the major part in doing it."[5] Even Kissinger, who shied away from the oft-issued vacuum metaphor—"the problem is less one of filling a vacuum than of dealing with a readjustment of the balance in the area"— still portrayed the Gulf as a region lacking in stability. According to him, the "central problem is that it is easy to recognize the potential for instability in the Gulf and increased Soviet and radical exploitation, but it is difficult

to determine how the U.S. can best help minimize the consequences."[6] Thus, it appears the instability implied by the vacuum metaphor factored into Kissinger's thinking about the Gulf.

While the popularity of the vacuum metaphor marked a noticeable shift in the way U.S. observers described the Gulf, it was far from the first time this metaphor had appeared in American discussions of foreign policy. The emergence of the vacuum metaphor in relation to the post-1968 Gulf is notable for several reasons. To start, this moment marked the first time the vacuum metaphor was applied in such widespread fashion to describe the Middle East during the Vietnam War. The conflict in Southeast Asia revealed not only the constraints of American power, but also the limited public appetite for intervention abroad. This political environment curtailed the logic of the vacuum metaphor. Whereas the "detection" of a regional vacuum in prior chapters of the Cold War had led to the extension of a "stabilizing" U.S. presence, such as in the Truman Doctrine, in this instance the direct insertion of military power was politically impossible. Rather than deploying armed forces, the logic of the vacuum metaphor this time led to the arming of American allies, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, in the hopes that they would be able to calm the supposed power vacuum in their backyard.

Certainly, the vacuum metaphor was not new to U.S. foreign policy. It was commonly invoked in the transition from World War II to the Cold War.[7] But the vacuum metaphor typified a way of talking about the Gulf clustered around images of instability and order that came to dominate policy discussions of the region. Through a constellation of symbols that emphasized Gulf instability, Iranian and Saudi solidity, and the obligation of the United States to support its allies, this way of speaking justified the sale of American-made weapons to Tehran and Riyadh on a vast scale. The symbolism of the vacuum ultimately served as the rhetorical foundation for what would become known as the Twin Pillars policy (the application of the Nixon Doctrine to

Iran and Saudi Arabia). The notion that Twin Pillars was an effective response to the Gulf vacuum permeated not only the internal deliberations of the Nixon administration, but also circulated in the public rhetoric of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. This idea appeared in swaths of press coverage as well, readily surfacing in *Foreign Affairs*, the *New York Times*, and *Reader's Digest*. In this way, Twin Pillars laid the imaginative groundwork for the Carter Doctrine, which relied upon the twin premises of Gulf instability and the United States bearing final responsibility for the Gulf's security. These developments thus opened a path for a formal articulation of a U.S. responsibility to protect the Gulf from hostile forces.

Within this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the vacuum metaphor in U.S. foreign policy. I next show how the Vietnam conflict constrained the policy implications of the metaphor, leading to Twin Pillars. After outlining what the Twin Pillars strategy entailed, I then analyze the symbolic constellation that upheld Twin Pillars and identify these symbolic features in the internal and public rhetoric of the Nixon and Ford administrations. I also trace the circulation of these elements in press coverage of the Gulf. Finally, I show how Democratic Party leaders and grassroots activists sought to contest Twin Pillars before concluding with a consideration of how the Carter Doctrine ultimately rested upon some of the core precepts of Twin Pillars. Such constructions set the stage for the evolution of U.S. Gulf strategy over the ensuing decades.

The Vacuum Metaphor in U.S. Foreign Policy

There is a long history of American leaders invoking the idea of a "vacuum" or instability to justify their course of action in foreign affairs. After General Andrew Jackson seized Pensacola and St. Marks in 1817, for instance, President James Monroe and Secretary of State

John Quincy Adams defended Jackson's invasion by admonishing the Spanish Crown for not keeping order in Florida.[8] Monroe called Amelia Island a hive of "banditti" and "adventurers" whose livelihoods "presumed impunity" on the part of the United States.[9] In his 1846 war message to Congress, President James K. Polk accused Mexicans of perpetrating "grievous wrongs" upon American citizens over "a long period of years." Because these supposed wrongs had gone "unredressed" by the Mexican government, Polk argued, it had proven itself "either unable or unwilling to enforce the execution of such treaties" and thereby failed "to perform one of its plainest duties." In addition to Polk's infamous charge that Mexico had "shed American blood upon the American soil," this accusation that Mexico had allowed the breakdown of order on the Texas frontier thus served as an additional justification for war with Mexico.[10]

President William McKinley made a comparable argument at the outset of the 1898 Spanish-American War. Spain's inability to suppress "insurrections which have occurred in Cuba" for "a period of nearly half a century" had "caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance, and disturbance among our citizens, and… shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people." McKinley thereby claimed that instability in Cuba mandated the "forcible intervention of the United States" to "put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate."[11]

McKinley's successor, Theodore Roosevelt, took this logic a step further. In his 1904 annual message, President Roosevelt asserted the responsibility of "a self-respecting, just, and far-seeing nation" to be prepared "to repel any wrong, and in exceptional cases to take action which in a more advanced stage of international relations come under the head of the exercise of the international police." In this "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, as this statement became

known, Roosevelt outlined a basis for U.S. intervention should Latin American nations experience a breakdown in order. "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the tires of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation," Roosevelt intoned. He therefore wished for "progress in stable and just civilization" so that "all question of interference by this Nation with their affairs would be at an end."[12] Roosevelt dispatched advisors, troops, and administrators across Latin America not because he believed these countries intended harm, but "because he believed that economic and political instability in the region would invite European creditor nations to collect debts by force, which would be detrimental to American hegemony and security."[13] Like previous episodes of American intervention, then, anxieties over instability somewhere else in the world played a crucial role in the extension of U.S. power abroad.[14]

These fears resurfaced at the start of the Cold War. Many Americans saw the postwar landscape as a "power vacuum" after World War II. Ned O'Gorman maintains that this language was "nearly universally" adopted by those in government; according to him, "The metaphor of the 'power vacuum' may have been the single most powerful master metaphor in the discourse of American policy makers in the years 1946-1950."[15] Yet even though policymakers and pundits seemingly agreed that the situation constituted a power vacuum, it was less clear what course of action should follow from this assessment. O'Gorman tracks the contested debate over the meaning of the vacuum, showing how strategists in the Truman administration such as George Kennan and Paul Nitze clashed over their views of the power vacuum and the policy recommendations that stemmed from their divergent understandings of this metaphor. Whereas Kennan "presumed a struggle for power," Nitze "tended to see the postwar power vacuum as… an unwieldy force resulting from the irrevocable collapse of the old system."[16] Both of these

evaluations made their way into Truman administration policies as the Cold War catalyzed U.S. intervention in far-flung corners of the world to fight communism.

Kennan and Nitze were far from the only officials in the opening years of the Cold War to base their foreign policy recommendations on fears of a power vacuum emerging in some part of the world. Truman himself used higher defense budgets to "signal American resolve in an unstable world," writes Michael J. Hogan.[17] Even before the Cold War Dean Acheson had warned about the "tempting adventure" other nations might see in "a military vacuum."[18] C.D. Jackson, the Eisenhower administration's expert on psychological warfare, similarly said, "it does no good to stand still. Somebody is going to move into the vacuum; and if we don't, the enemy will; not only will, but is doing it every day of the week."[19] In one 1957 address, Eisenhower himself declared, "like nature, people and their governments are intolerant of vacuums."[20] He also spoke out against treating the defeated Germans "as sort of a vacuum in both the security world, the economic, and every other, the political world."[21]

While it may be tempting to dismiss the importance of the vacuum metaphor, Londa Schieberger alerts us not to ignore the power metaphors can carry in ostensibly scientific or policy-oriented contexts. As she writes, "Metaphors are not innocent literary devices used to spice up texts. Analogies and metaphors… function to construct as well as describe—they have both a hypothesis-creating and proof-making function."[22] In this case, the vacuum metaphor functioned to underwrite the sustained exercise of American power on the international stage in an "all encompassing" manner.[23]

While the vacuum metaphor emerged as a potent device through which to see the global scene of the early Cold War, it was also invoked to describe specific areas. When Britain said it would leave Palestine in 1948, Truman told reporters, "We could not leave a vacuum on that

situation over there, you understand. When the British pull out, there is no government. These people immediately start killing each other, and there must be some way to keep the peace."[24] The Truman Doctrine provides another example of the vacuum metaphor in use. While the president shied away from formally invoking the notion of a power vacuum in the Truman Doctrine address, his speech held related calls "to restore internal order and security," to uphold "the preservation of order in the Middle East," and to furnish "economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."[25] His proposal was strategically ambiguous about exactly how the United States would fill the supposed vacuum, as Denise Bostdorff points out, but his metaphoric language helped convey a broad "fear of disorder" and "chaos" that underscored the need "to protect… free nations as they currently existed."[26]

Oher public figures, however, did invoke the vacuum metaphor. For example, then-Undersecretary Acheson gave an oral briefing to Secretary George Marshall and Truman that called for the United States to fill the "void" left by the British withdrawal of aid.[27] The Senate concurred that no other source could fill the "vacuum."[28] The *New York Times* editorial board admonished readers to understand "if the vacuums can be filled communism cannot spread."[29] These brief snapshots show how the vacuum metaphor worked to provide rhetorical justification for the Truman Doctrine by advancing images of the eastern Mediterranean as an area that needed U.S. aid to resist Soviet advances.

The metaphor of a power vacuum was utilized to make sense of global affairs well into the Nixon presidency. In a 1971 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, State Department official David E. Mark explained the superpower rivalry almost exclusively through the lens of the vacuum metaphor. "When the collapse came in Europe in 1945 essentially a

vacuum of power was created," he testified: "I believe that power vacuums and particularly such extensive worldwide vacuums as developed in 1945 inevitably attract rival powers to intrude." [30] Mark's explanation shows that he considered "power vacuums" to be an integral part of the Cold War and a transhistorical feature of international politics. Given the preponderance of the metaphor in Cold War discourse and its lasting popularity into the 1970s, it is little wonder that this "master metaphor" was employed to make sense of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, those employing it were simultaneously forced to face the limits of U.S. power and public support for interventionism exposed by the ongoing war in Vietnam.

The Vacuum Metaphor and the Vietnam War

President Nixon's overriding foreign policy priority was to secure, as he put it, "peace with honor in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia."[31] Nixon aide H.R. Haldeman reported his boss as saying, "I'm not going to end up like LBJ, holed up in the White House afraid to show my face on the street. I'm going to end that war. Fast."[32] The 1969 inaugural address seemingly reflected this sentiment. "We are caught in war, wanting peace," Nixon told the nation, "Let us take as our goal: Where peace is unknown, make it welcome; where Peace is fragile, make it strong; where peace is temporary, make it permanent."[33] Nixon's campaign had focused on Southeast Asia and the "promise of peace" as its dominant theme in foreign policy.[34] The Gulf and the anticipated British withdrawal after 1971 took a back seat to that focus.

Rather than directly address the Gulf, Nixon had spoken in general terms about the need for peace and strength during the 1968 presidential contest. This talk sometimes obliquely referenced the Middle East, but rarely in a manner that deviated from Nixon's main rhetorical touchstones. For example, days before the election, Nixon delivered a nationwide radio speech

on American security. “The hard truth is this,” he alerted the electorate, “the present state of our defenses is too close to peril point, and our future prospects are in some respects downright alarming. We have a gravely serious security gap.” Listing off the areas in which Soviet advances had eclipsed the United States—tactical aircraft, nuclear submarines, anti-missile defenses, nuclear naval warheads, ballistic missiles—Nixon promised to “correct these mistakes” and quickly restore “clear-cut military superiority.” Announcing his verdict of the past eight years, Nixon asserted the need for “new leadership so our nation can apply its great power and influence to the building of a stable, international order.” In few areas would this challenge be more difficult, he noted, than in “the Mideast tinderbox.”[35] In Nixon’s formulation, the Middle East—and by extension the Gulf—was part of a broader project of achieving peace, not a separate arena of foreign affairs siloed off from the wider Cold War.

Many commentators agreed with Nixon that the Middle East presented unique challenges within the context of the superpower rivalry. “The situation in the middle east,” counseled the *Chicago Tribune* days after Nixon’s victory, “is a confrontation of the interests and policies of the United States and the Soviet Union.” Nowhere was that challenge clearer than in “the Persian gulf area,” where “the Russians are building up their naval forces.”[36] A Jerusalem-based journalist confirmed the “communist advance in the Middle East,” noting, “Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the minor states on the Persian Gulf are all aware that the Soviets’ real intention is to become a forceful presence in the waters of the Persian Gulf.”[37] And the *Boston Globe* fretted that “Nixon’s search for peace in the dangerous Middle East” was off to a rocky start.[38]

These warnings stemmed from a sense that the Persian Gulf comprised an area of critical importance for the United States. Iran by itself accounted for 33 percent of free world oil and 89 percent of the oil used by the U.S. military in Vietnam. It employed and housed 12,000

Americans in-country.[39] Similarly, by 1968 the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), Saudi Arabia's exclusive oil producer, comprised the "largest single [American] overseas private enterprise," according to one Johnson administration official.[40] American strategists since the days of Truman had argued that U.S. interests in the Gulf were significant enough to risk a war with Moscow in their defense.[41] These economic and strategic perceptions underpinned observers' alarm over the Gulf.

Commentators and the president seemingly agreed that the Middle East (especially the Gulf) presented a challenge that could not be divorced from the wider Cold War. Yet very few figures called for an American presence in the Gulf to stabilize the region. On the face of it, this would seem to be a strange development. After all, during the 1968 campaign Nixon had noted with alarm that "the Soviets have moved a fleet into the Persian Gulf," the "clear-cut moves of a superpower seeking domination." In contrast to the "uncertain and ineffectual" response of President Johnson, Nixon promised to lay down "a hard line" and "impress upon the Soviets the full extent of our determination."[42] Three factors stand out for why the Nixon administration did not seek to fill the "vacuum" created by the British withdrawal from the Gulf.

First, as he took the reins of office, Nixon sought to reorient U.S. foreign policy around the creation of a "stable international equilibrium" that would better account for the ways the international scene had changed since the early days of the Cold War.[43] In National Security (NSC) Advisor Henry A. Kissinger's words, the challenge confronting the incoming administration was one of "relating our commitments to our interests and our obligations to our purposes."[44] This quest for international balance in a multipolar world, or "détente," mandated deescalating tensions with the Soviet Union, downsizing the U.S. effort in Vietnam, and normalizing relations with Communist China; the goal was to respond flexibly so as to "manage"

increases in Soviet power worldwide.[45] Nixon's first priority was to extricate the country from Vietnam and avoid getting U.S. troops drawn in to other regional conflicts. Seeking to refocus on the superpower rivalry, he directed Kissinger not to waste time on so-called Third World countries, "as what happens in those parts of the world is not, in the final analysis, going to have any significant effect on the success of our foreign policy in the foreseeable future."[46] With these preoccupations and priorities, as former U.S. ambassador David A. Korn notes, "The Middle East was not at the top of Richard Nixon's agenda."[47]

Second, Nixon was reticent to get the United States ensnared in a complex region. Despite fears over Soviet advances, the president did not want to get directly involved in "Persian Gulf issues."[48] These "issues" included conflicts driven by Iran's claims on Bahrain, Iraqi-Iranian clashes over the Shaat-al-Arab waterway, Iraq's suppression of Kurdish rebels, and the question of whether the trucial emirates (Qatar, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Fujairah, etc.) would be able to form an independent federation after the British withdrawal.[49] Collectively, Nixon admitted in an interview, these issues had the potential to "explode into a major war."[50] The incoming president understandably sought to avoid placing himself in the middle of such disputes, especially with troops still fighting in Vietnam. This desire was on display when Nixon acquiesced to a declaration by Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran that "outside powers" should "keep out of the Persian Gulf when Britain vacates the zone under the east-of-Suez withdrawal it plans for 1971."[51] Kissinger shared this view, saying in one National Security Council meeting that although "the Persian Gulf is important to U.S. allies and friends," he thought "its potential instability seems relatively unresponsive to U.S. power."[52] As late as 1972, administration figures testified that there existed "no defense or political commitment whatsoever on the part of the United States" to protect small Gulf statelets like Bahrain.[53]

Third, the domestic political environment curtailed Nixon's room for maneuver in foreign policy. Antiwar sentiment erupted across campuses nationwide, highlighting the unpopularity of the conflict in Vietnam.[54] Opposition to the war was also building in the legislature. Senator Mike Mansfield, the leading congressional authority on Vietnam, met regularly with Nixon to discuss foreign policy. Mansfield wrote one of his constituents, "I am doing my best to counsel the President, when I get the opportunity, to do everything in his power to bring this war to a conclusion."[55] Mansfield gave a speech several months after the inauguration, promising the Senate "will join with the President in an effort to end the war in Viet Nam… But we cannot and we will not acquiesce in the indefinite absence of peace."[56] As Gregory A. Olson notes, Mansfield feared that the United States had become a "self-appointed great power protector" of a corrupt regime.[57] Along with other congressional leaders, he pushed Nixon to bring U.S. forces back home. Given this degree of popular and political resistance to the Vietnam War, it made little sense for Nixon to advocate for an expanded American military presence in the Gulf. Indeed, as a sign of this reluctance, the U.S. delegation turned down a British request to take over soon-to-be abandoned military outposts in Bahrain and Oman during a March 1969 meeting between the State Department and the British Foreign Office.[58]

Each of these factors played a role in shaping the Nixon administration's response to the Gulf "vacuum." Rather than repeat the process of expanding U.S. commitments abroad to "fill" the supposed vacuum, as occurred in the Truman Doctrine, Nixon instead pursued an alternative strategy to stabilize the Gulf. In a policy that came to be known as "Twin Pillars," the United States sought to strengthen its regional allies so that they could prevent the growth of Soviet influence in the Gulf. By fortifying its "pillars," Iran and Saudi Arabia, the United States could avoid undertaking a major military commitment to defend the Gulf or stationing troops there.[59]

In practical terms, Twin Pillars entailed massive conventional military arms transfers from the United States to Saudi Arabia and especially Iran, thereby filling the regional "vacuum" left by the British. Unleashed by the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, which encouraged "sales by the United States government to friendly countries having sufficient wealth to maintain and equip their own military forces," the Nixon administration increased U.S. weapons exports from $1.4 billion in 1971 to $16 billion in 1975, roughly half of which went to Iran alone.[60]

This revolution in arms exports built upon precedents established by Woodrow Wilson and FDR. During World War I, American bankers financed the British war effort to the tune of roughly $10 million per day; by 1916 over 40 percent of British military expenditures took place in the United States.[61] Wilson's policy of "armed neutrality" allowed the Allied powers to buy large amounts of American-made war materiel while denying the same opportunity to Berlin due to Wilson's reticence to challenge the Royal Navy's blockade of Germany.[62] Franklin Roosevelt likewise sold massive amounts of weapons to the Allies during World War II. Through the Lend-Lease program, FDR oversaw the transfer of nearly $50.1 billion of war materiel to friendly nations, which amounted to 17 percent of all U.S. war expenditures. Although the vast majority of this aid went to Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, included in this total was $19 million for Saudi Arabia and $5.3 million for Iran.[63] These networks of arms distribution lasted into the Cold War. The Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, and other programs supplied U.S. allies with weapons and other forms of aid into the Cold War.[64] Nixon's weapons sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia marked an increase in tonnage more than a new policy.

Although started by Nixon, the Twin Pillars policy did not formally end until the collapse of the Shah's regime and the Carter Doctrine at the end of the decade. Twin Pillars thus provided an answer to the question posed by the "vacuum" metaphor as to how best to stop unfriendly

forces from "filling" the Gulf. While Nixon did not often mention the Gulf directly in his official rhetoric during his first year in office, he did publicly stress the importance of maintaining peace in the region.[65] In his first presidential press conference, he stated, "I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mideast…. the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid."[66] As the policy designed to keep the Gulf under friendly control, Twin Pillars played a crucial part in Nixon's overall approach to the Middle East as well as the wider Cold War. I now turn to a closer look at how the Twin Pillars policy originated within the Nixon administration.

Filling the Gulf Vacuum: Beginnings of the Twin Pillars Policy

To restate, American policymakers made sense of the British withdrawal by conceptualizing the Gulf as a vacuum. These impressions of volatility carried over into private discussions between the U.S. State Department and U.K. Foreign Office. After a February 1968 meeting, the British embassy in Washington reported "the Americans were worried that political instability would develop when we pulled out and perhaps even before" and that U.S. diplomats "reiterated American concern about the instability of the area, which they thought was being aggravated by Soviet activities in the Middle East as a whole." Yet despite these worries, the report continued, "the Americans had no plans for the Persian Gulf and certainly no intention of setting up any sort of collective defense arrangement." Thus, an alternative strategy would need to be developed in order to address "uncertainty" in the Gulf and "a certain restlessness in the States of the area."[67]

Fears of Soviet expansionism provided the backdrop for these discussions of the Gulf's

supposed instability. Nixon's private communication reveals the degree to which he feared Soviet regional intrusion.[68] "The difference between our goal and the Soviet goal in the Mideast is very simple but fundamental," Nixon said to Secretary of State William P. Rogers, "We want peace. They want the Middle East."[69] In a cable to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Nixon used another metaphor, asserting "we have to take a strong hand against Soviet expansion in the Mideast."[70]

These regional concerns coincided with Nixon's primary foreign policy goal of reducing the U.S. military footprint in Asia and achieving détente.[71] As a Taiwanese newspaper observed, Nixon's aim to prevent "new Vietnams" from happening required offloading more responsibilities on U.S. allies in Asia.[72] This approach quickly became formalized in the "Nixon Doctrine." The president first outlined this policy during an exchange with reporters in Guam on July 25, 1969. He began by reaffirming that the nation would fulfill its treaty commitments. However, he insisted, the United States must also "avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam." With the exception of a threat "involving nuclear weapons," he continued, "the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves." To make this policy work, Nixon pledged that Washington would supply these friendly nations with the requisite military assistance to "meet an internal or an external threat."[73]

Nixon followed up this performance with his "Great Silent Majority" address of November 3, 1969. As millions of demonstrators called on him to end the Vietnam War, Nixon told his audience, "The defense of freedom is everybody's business—not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened."

The president promised that he was "Vietnamizing the search for peace," which entailed "the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable."[74]

In theory, the Nixon Doctrine placed a greater responsibility on South Vietnam to provide for its own defense. In practice, this policy meant withdrawing U.S. troops and replacing them with American-made weapons to be wielded by allied soldiers.[75] Though originally offered in reference to Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine was soon applied to other security partners such as Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Zaire, and, most of all, Iran.[76]

A powerful Iran, Nixon decided, would help "foreclose Soviet opportunities" in the Gulf.[77] Unlike the Johnson administration, which according to Roham Alvandi had generally followed Britain's lead in "balancing" among Gulf allies, Nixon had fewer qualms when it came to arming the Shah, whom he called "decisive, confident, strong, kind, thoughtful."[78] Although they had met during Nixon's time as vice president, the two men bonded during a 1967 trip Nixon took to Tehran; as the Shah later recalled, the men found that they strongly agreed on "geo-political principles."[79] Upon his return, Nixon praised Iran's "strong monarchy," and he acknowledged that while Iran was not "a representative democracy by Western standards," that "their system has worked for them."[80] Once Nixon was elected, the Shah appealed to him to sell Iran more weaponry so that it could police the Gulf. He told administration officials that "the Soviet Union wanted to penetrate the Persian Gulf area" and that he would, if given the military equipment, strive to deter any "foolish aggressor" from upsetting the regional order.[81] Building up Iranian power—the central component of the Twin Pillars policy—served as the answer to the problem of how to fill the ostensible power vacuum in the Gulf.

A June 1970 report illustrates this reasoning in action. Developed out of National

Security Council discussions over how to fill the anticipated "void" left by the British in the Gulf, the paper outlined different solutions for the "problem."[82] As it stated, "The Persian Gulf is a region of potential instability—vulnerable regimes, regional conflicts, and rivalries between outside powers—which is potentially exploitable by Arab radicals and by the Soviet Union." Because the region would "no longer enjoy… formal British protection or tutelage," the paper found, it was "virtually certain that the USSR will seek to increase its presence in the Gulf after the British leave," which was "likely" to take the form of developing "a stake in the Gulf's oil." This diagnosis conveyed a narrative premised upon images of disorder. In the paper's telling, the Gulf was losing British protection, which created "potential instability" characterized by "vulnerable" states capable of being exploited by "outside powers" such as the Soviet Union. Consequently, it recommended the United States work to prevent instability from taking hold, which it could do if it "lends its encouragement and support and deters Soviet involvement."[83]

The paper enumerated several possible policy responses, the discussion of which stressed the importance of stability. It listed three policy options to be "impracticable": (1) assuming "the UK role of 'protector' ourselves," (2) sponsoring "a regional security pact," and (3) backing Saudi Arabia as the U.S. "chosen instrument" in the Gulf.[84] The report identified a combination of designating Iran a "chosen instrument" and "[f]ostering Saudi-Iranian cooperation" as the only "feasible or desirable alternative." As the report concluded, these two countries "common power may be sufficient to maintain regional stability," though "Saudi stability is less reliable than Iran's."[85] In each step of this reasoning process, the paper's authors repeatedly elevated "stability" to be the primary criterion for evaluating regional actors as well as possible U.S. defense policies, implicitly responding to impressions of an unstable, unpredictable, or vulnerable region.

On November 7, 1970, Nixon formalized U.S. Gulf strategy in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 92. Titled "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," this two-page policy directive streamlined the approval process for "all significant requests for military assistance" from Gulf states.[86] It also approved a "general strategy" to guide American conduct in the region consisting of "promoting cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia as the desirable basis for maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf while recognizing a preponderance of Iranian power." This formal statement of the Twin Pillars policy codified the picture painted by the vacuum metaphor; it assumed that the region was beset by instability, then identified Riyadh and Tehran as agents with the "local responsibility for maintaining stability" in the Gulf.[87] Additionally, by formally articulating an American obligation to facilitate the rise of Iranian and Saudi power in the region, NSDM 92 conveyed a vision of Persian Gulf sovereignty in which it was the United States' task to underwrite the region's security through indirect means.

Ensuing intelligence reports and diplomatic messages reflected this understanding of the United States' critical role supporting its "pillars" in the Gulf. In a meeting held to discuss "the geopolitical aspects of the Gulf situation, including the Soviet capability to cause trouble," U.S. and British diplomats agreed that "Iran by itself cannot guarantee stability on the Arab side of the Gulf. For this Saudi cooperation is essential."[88] The U.S. ambassador in Riyadh, while acknowledging the House of Saud's "deep emotional involvement" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, concluded that the "Saudi regime, whatever its weaknesses and peculiarities, does have the power to play a useful role in supporting Gulf stability."[89] Acknowledging the revamped U.S. role in the region, a national intelligence estimate predicted that while the "Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf" could "prove troublesome for the US," that no matter the state of Saudi-Iranian relations "the states of the Gulf will almost certainly seek to involve the US more

directly in their problems."[90] Indeed, at the close of 1971 Rogers recounted how the State Department had relied on "close consultation" with U.S. allies to navigate "the difficult transitional period in the Gulf" the previous year.[91] These statements illuminate how the Twin Pillars policy cast the United States as the ultimate source of Gulf security.

At the outset, policymakers justified the Twin Pillars policy by referencing images of Gulf instability such as the vacuum metaphor. Nixon, Kissinger, Rogers, and other administration figures encouraged a security-centric view of the Gulf oriented around such symbols of instability and order. This symbolic constellation subsequently provided a rhetorical justification for the transfer of arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia. I now turn to a closer analysis of these various symbols that underpropped Twin Pillars.

The Rhetoric of Twin Pillars: Instability, Order, and American Power

Oil and realism guided Nixon's approach to the Gulf. American strategists since the World War II had noted the strategic importance of Middle Eastern oil. In an August 1945 memo about Saudi Arabia, for example, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal told the State Department, "oil and all of its by-products are the foundation of the ability to fight a modern war."[92] In 1957, President Eisenhower told an advisor, "should a crisis arise threatening to cut the Western world off from Mid East oil, we would *have* to use force."[93] Months into Nixon's presidency the United States became a net importer of oil, much coming from Persian Gulf sources. Oil eventually spelled disaster during the 1973 Arab oil embargo, creating an energy crisis that lasted into the Carter era.[94]

Nixon was also motivated by realism, or a view of international affairs premised on the continual struggle among nation-states to increase "national interest defined in terms of power,"

which includes access to key resources such as oil. In this theory of politics, nations "rank each other according to their power, which is measured primarily in terms of material and especially military capabilities."[95] An unduly focus on issues such as democracy promotion or human rights, in Kissinger's calculations, meant risking "geopolitical disintegration" by using "our moral convictions to escape reality."[96] Operating from this vantage, Nixon and Kissinger sought to grow the power of Cold War allies, which required increasing their military and economic strength.[97] Both a "realist" view of power and a focus on superpower rivalry fueled their foreign policy course of action, including the decisions they made about the Gulf and the oil it produced.[98]

Rhetorically, Nixon and his officials' discussions of the Gulf contained three main features. First, reflecting the vacuum metaphor, they described the Gulf as a region beset by political instability. Second, in line with the Twin Pillar policy, they identified Iran and Saudi Arabia as sources of regional order whose job was to prevent Soviet, communist, or radical advances. Third, these discussions assumed that it was the United States' job to make sure Iran (and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia) was equipped for this mission, rendering Washington the ultimate source of regional order. The Twin Pillars policy grew out of this symbolism organized around interlocking images of instability and order in Persian Gulf policy debates. All three elements of this symbolism continued into internal Ford and Carter administration discussions and circulated in the press.

Put differently, Nixon administration officials consistently interpreted Gulf challenges through the lens of *stability*. They therefore emphasized the need to equip their "pillars" to uphold that stability and assumed the United States' role was to underwrite Saudi and Iranian efforts to that end. The repeated association of the Persian Gulf with instability interacted with

deliberative discussions of U.S. policy in the region, tacitly framing the problem for American strategists as one of establishing *order*.

Pillars, understandably, evoke impressions of order. As Michael Osborn writes, vertical spatial metaphors "can carry a more positive meaning, can imply that the building erected upon principles… can endure to serve and save the country. Especially relevant are 'pillars or 'columns,' which often represent the constructive significance of such principles or the solutions based upon them."[99] Thus, the correspondence of the language of instability and order on display in Nixon administration discourse about the Persian Gulf formed a mutually reinforcing bond that encouraged the "building up" of regional allies, which was accomplished through arms transfers à la the Nixon Doctrine. This language was even adopted by critics of U.S. Gulf policy in some instances, as one article in *Economic and Political Weekly* questioned the wisdom of relying on "the main props" of Saudi Arabia and Iran to create "a stable base" in the region.[100]

Consequently, even though the actual phrase "Twin Pillars" was not often used by policymakers during the 1970s, the logic and symbolism of Twin Pillars still saturated the internal debates and public rhetoric of the Nixon administration. According to Brandon Friedman, the "Twin Pillars" label was popularized after Richard Haas published a chapter in *The Security of the Persian Gulf* titled "Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Twin Pillars in Revolutionary Times" in 1981.[101] However, the cluster of symbols constituent of the Twin Pillars—images of stability, security, and order versus chaos, communism, vulnerability, and instability—very much characterized the rhetoric of Nixon and his subordinates when it came to the Gulf.[102] Their utterances created an interpretive field through which they introduced, deliberated, and arrived at decisions for Gulf defense.[103] Three main elements of Twin Pillars rhetoric exerted suasory force as they circulated not only in internal debates but also in public statements and press coverage.

Element #1: Images of Instability

The first element of Twin Pillars symbolism was a pervasive, constant framing of Persian Gulf politics through the lens of stability. This portrayal expressed itself through metaphors that emphasized the potential instability of the region, such as "vacuum." For example, the U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia sounded alarms in a cable sent November 2, 1970. Starting from the premise "radical political forces inevitably created wherever British are driven out," it offered a clear policy prescription for the Gulf: "From viewpoint of US interests the more unity in the Gulf the better. Fragmentation provides greater opportunities for subversive elements to infiltrate individual entities and for sudden coups." [104] A 1977 CIA report produced for Carter echoed this depiction. Because "peace and stability" proved an "evident disadvantage to the USSR," the report predicted that Moscow would seek to "[unsettle] regional conditions" and "encourage domestic unrest and instability in all the principal Arab states and Iran, knowing that there can be no successful effort to regain lost ground while the present Arab leaders and the Shah remain in power." [105] These reports exemplify how foreign policy professionals tended to frame U.S. challenges in the Gulf as a constant fight against the forces of instability.

In addition to depicting the region as potentially unstable, policymakers also frequently described U.S. aims in the Gulf in terms of upholding stability and order. Weeks into Nixon's first term, for example, the State Department Country Director for the Arabian Peninsula gave a positive analysis, saying, "I am very optimistic about the stability of the situation in the Gulf."[106] In Nixon's diagnosis, the Gulf's "primary need is for elements of stability in the area—economic and political stability yes, but primarily… there must be military stability and military strength."[107] In his 1971 foreign policy report Nixon stated, "The changing relationships in the Persian Gulf necessarily raise new issues for American policy. How do we best encourage and

assist constructive forces in the area to build a regional system of stable relationships?"[108] This order-inflected rhetoric reappeared the following year. "Local tensions in the Middle East periodically threaten to break into open conflict," he warned, as "the stability of new political entities and structures remains to be consolidated." The search for a "durable formula" for peace continued, the president noted, with "subversive movements, some aided and supported from outside" threatening "[s]table and moderate governments."[109] In similar fashion, Ford ordered a review of U.S. policy in February 1976 with an analytical focus on "The prospects for stability and moderation in key Persian Gulf nations."[110]

Images of the Persian Gulf as an unstable region circulated in the press no less than in presidential and administration rhetoric. These representations accentuated the Gulf's ostensible vulnerability to, in Walter Lacquer's words, a "Russian drive to the south" or "drift toward anarchy."[111] In *Foreign Affairs*, for example, future Prime Minister Edward Heath credited "British power" for its "strikingly successful" ability to restore "the stability of the area" during various crises.[112] Other writers depicted the Gulf as a "fragile" region populated "by inherently unstable governments" and administered "by uncertain and unpredictable rules."[113] Indeed, while some essays questioned the rhetorical fixation on themes of order—as John Franklin Campbell asked, "What do 'progress' and 'stability' really mean?"—many others tended to describe geopolitical problems in terms of instability or balance, especially in regards to the Gulf. [114]

The *New York Times* also provided a platform for long-form articles that depicted the Gulf as a disordered or otherwise fraught region. "If today's trend of events continues much longer a new set of ruins… is bound to feature this landscape," wrote one 1969 article, warning of a "dry rot" that "is spreading, a malady which threatens to erode existing social and political structure while offering nothing in their stead."[115] Lacquer promoted his Cold War-centric view

of Gulf politics in several multipage *New York Times* opinion features as well; in his 1973 article announcing the end of détente, for instance, he cautioned, "The Persian Gulf is now the most explosive area in the world."[116]

Another way press outlets circulated images of instability was by indulging in various Orientalist tropes that suggested Middle Easterners were erratic, naïve, or overly emotional. For instance, Nahum Goldmann wrote, "One of the characteristics of the Arabs is their tendency to move quickly and radically from one emotional position to another."[117] Another time he counseled, "The Arab peoples are characterized by an unusual capability of ignoring or discarding realities," which made it difficult to translate Israel's 1967 victory to regional "stability and peace."[118] Other *Foreign Affairs* essays also propagated Orientalist stereotypes. Fouad Ajami: "vision and reality do not often converge in this [Arab] world."[119] Don Peretz claimed "mystique and slogans full of emotional overtones" characterized "modern Arab politics."[120] By the same token, a *Reader's Digest* feature called militant Arabs "shadowy" figures who threatened "the political stability of the Middle East… one more source of crises and upheavals in a region that already has had too many of them."[121]

Concerns over oil politics also contributed to the characterization of the Gulf as an unstable region. For example, a 1970 *New York Times* article on the Trucial States opened by telling readers, "At issue is the stability of a developing region, rich in oil but plagued by political problems," and relayed an unnamed diplomat's uncomplimentary assessment: "It's a real rat's nest… It's impossible to say whether we'll get a federation of nine or eight or seven, or anything at all."[122] Another article published eleven days prior had also described Iran as "the dominant political and military power in the strategic Persian Gulf once Britain has withdrawn."[123]

Foreign Affairs authors also wrote frequently on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Gulf oil politics. The Soviets would "almost inevitably" try to "fortify nationalistic groups hostile to the West" in order to "undermine" the "constructive role of Western oil companies" in the "unstable" Gulf warned Walter Levy.[124] Several articles worried over the "exponential" growth of Gulf economies and noted that OPEC's negotiating style made "stable new institutional ties… far more difficult" to create between Gulf and U.S. companies.[125] Some essays wondered how Arabs, buoyed by the belief "that oil will turn the tables on Israel," might change "the nature of the game in the Middle East," "seriously endanger" the region's "delicate, painstakingly maintained balance," or create "new and potentially unstable—and destabilizing" organizations for the liberation of Palestine.[126] Others spoke to the challenge of "maintaining a stable and abundant supply of oil at reasonable prices," with one author warning "This Time the Wolf is Here," since the "growth of radical anti-Americanism" in oil-producing states could "drive all Arabs into the Communist camp" and "bring disaster" on U.S. allies.[127]

These concerns over the stability of American oil supplies appeared in several *Reader's Digest* articles as well. Carl Thomas Rowan's essay covering the effects of the oil embargo branded OPEC's actions "the poor nations' economic uprising" that led to "chaotic economic warfare."[128] In July 1973 William E. Griffith told readers "by 1980 the politically unstable Arab world will be supplying an estimated one fourth to one half of all the oil used in this country."[129] These articles were complemented by jokes linking Arab stereotypes with oil; the October 1975 issue, for instance, reprinted an attempt at humor from the *National Enquirer*: "Gas-station attendant to Arab sheik motorist: 'I don't know how to tell you this, sir—you need oil.'"[130]

Each of these examples illustrated a broader trend in press coverage to portray the Gulf as

an unstable region. By articulating worries over political anarchy, radicalism, oil disruptions, or supposed Arab unreliability, these sources encouraged an understanding of the Gulf that highlighted its potential political instability. In doing so, these press outlets circulated the symbolic foundation of Twin Pillars, even as the means through which they conveyed impressions of Gulf instability varied considerably.

Element #2: Iran + Saudi Arabia = Stability

The second symbolic element of Twin Pillars was an identification of Iran and Saudi Arabia as sources of regional order. This elevation of the "pillars" into symbols of security took several forms. For example, Kissinger described Saudi Arabia in pillar-like terms during a round of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations in 1975; it had "stood alone" against price hikes in OPEC and occupied the "center of the stage" as the foremost U.S. Arab ally in the Gulf.[131] While Nixon sometimes clashed with the Saudis, he still publicly credited Riyadh for standing against "radical elements that presently seem to be on the ascendancy in various countries in the Mideast."[132] He affirmed the "very generous" House of Saud's "record of unbroken friendship with the United States."[133] He equated a strong Riyadh with regional peace, declaring, "If Saudi Arabia is strong and secure, as it will be, we will enhance the prospects for peace and stability throughout the Middle East and, in turn, throughout the world."[134] The Nixon administration reliably praised Saudi Arabia as a source of order despite their diplomatic quarrels.

Nixon was much more unabashedly positive about Iran. Behind the scenes Nixon once gushed, "I'm stronger than a horseradish for him [the Shah]."[135] He was no less effusive in public. When the Shah visited in October 1969, Nixon's toast likened him to a pillar: "today Iran stands as one of the strongest, the proudest among all the nations of the world… today we honor a nation a people with whom we are proud to stand as friends and allies."[136] Upon the Shah's

departure, the president thanked him for "talks which have been most constructive" and called Iran "a bridge between the East and the West."[137] Following a meeting with the Shah in 1972, Nixon affirmed that "His Imperial Majesty agreed that the security and stability of the Persian Gulf is of vital importance," and Nixon thanked Iran for buttressing "the stability of the region."[138] Another time Nixon labeled Iran a "new strong, vital nation" that "plays such an important role [in] an area that could cause very grave problems," elevating "the fact that he [the Shah] believes so strongly in the kind of peace that can survive, a peace not based on weakness, but a peace based on strength, not the strength of arrogance, but the strength of competence, confidence, ability, magnanimity."[139] During another visit by the Shah, Nixon greeted him: "What gives us a great deal of heart, those of us all over the world who are interested in peace, is that you have always stood for, and stand for now, a policy of contributing to the forces of peace and stability rather than the forces of war and destruction."[140] Time and time again Nixon venerated the Shah in his public rhetoric.

In his 1973 foreign policy report, the president continued to portray Saudi Arabia and Iran as sources of regional order. In fact, he uttered the word "stable" six times in reference to the Twin Pillars. "Two of the largest Gulf states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, have undertaken greater responsibility for helping enhance the area's stability," he declared. Even more, they had not allowed their rivalry to "undermine their perceived common interest in unity and stability."[141]

Other figures in the Nixon and Ford administrations also made the case that Iran and Saudi Arabia represented forces of regional order. During his 1971 Middle East tour, Secretary Rogers explicitly connected the Twin Pillars policy with the idea of Iran and Saudi Arabia as stabilizing forces. In a security meeting, he elaborated on the tenets enshrined in NSDM 92: "We believe it is proper that, following the British action, the states of the region should exercise

primary responsibility for security in the gulf." "We will therefore continue to encourage close cooperation between Iran and its Arab neighbors of the gulf," he maintained, so that they could "preserve peace and stability."[142] When he arrived in Saudi Arabia, Rogers announced that the "major purpose" of his visit was "to advance the cause of peace and stability in the area." Echoing Nixon's calls for a "durable peace," Rogers described "Saudi statesmanship" as an anchor for Gulf stability: "Saudi Arabia has a key role to play in assuring that the area of the Arabian Peninsula evolves in a constructive and orderly fashion."[143]

Assistant Secretary Sisco likewise testified that while the Gulf "is of major strategic and economic interest to us," the administration believed the region's states "are capable of meeting the challenges of independence and… cooperation among themselves."[144] The next year Sisco repeated this point before the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia: "One of the principal U.S. policies in the gulf… has been to encourage friendly states in the area to assume increasing responsibility for collective security in the region. In the gulf, this has been shared primarily by Iran and Saudi Arabia."[145] Rogers himself reported, "On the whole, there has been an orderly and stabilizing evolution of the situation in the important Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf area. Most of the states of that region, with our encouragement and support, are themselves assuming increasing responsibilities for their development and security."[146] A 1975 CIA report similarly argued that Iran's deployment of U.S.-equipped troops to "suppress a leftist rebellion" in Oman had illustrated a broader "willingness to aid Gulf sheikhdoms threatened by leftists" and shore up "the security situation in the Persian Gulf."[147] By praising Tehran and Riyadh as sources of stability in a perilous region, these officials complemented Nixon's characterization of these allies and echoed his view that they could calm whatever political storms arose in the Gulf.

Although President Ford devoted the bulk of his attention to domestic issues, his public

rhetoric still reaffirmed the notion that Saudi Arabia and Iran were sources of order in the Gulf. Ford honored the passing of King Faisal, for example, by commending the monarch's immense "stature" that had "earned the respect of the entire world."[148] Another time he mentioned that the United States had "been quite generous to a number of Arab nations" who now possessed "more sophisticated weapons" and "a better military capability."[149] During another address Ford defended the Shah's U.S. arms purchases on the basis that Iran was one of the "key countries" restraining the power of "radical Arabs" and "Soviet arms."[150] Ford's rhetoric was far from unvaryingly positive, to be sure. He also complained about "the cartel-manipulated, inflated prices of foreign oil" set by "Arabs and other oil-producing nations."[151] All told, however, when Ford spoke about the Persian Gulf his rhetoric evinced the basic formula laid down by Nixon—that Iran and Saudi Arabia were sources of regional stability whom the United States should support—and he occasionally tendered vertical metaphors (stature) and images of disorder (radical Arabs) in service to those elements of Twin Pillars symbolism.

Perhaps more importantly, Ford also facilitated a dramatic deepening of business ties with the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, as a way of countering public disapproval of his economic policy.[152] U.S. arms exports to Riyadh skyrocketed under Ford, offsetting the trade deficit created by Saudi oil imports; in the words of the State Department, this system allowed "moderate Arab leaders" to "look to military assistance from the United States as a buttress to their moderation and as a means of protecting themselves against more radical forces in the area."[153] These policies had major ramifications. For one, the Saudi break with OPEC in December 1976, which the Ford administration encouraged, led to 40 percent inflation and a 50 percent drop in industrial production in Iran.[154] It also catalyzed business partnerships between certain U.S. industries and Saudi Arabia. As one anonymous businessman confided to

Newsweek, "They're going to fuel our industry and keep our economy afloat. I say make the place the goddam 51st state."[155]

This element of Twin Pillars symbolism—the elevation of Iran and Saudi Arabia as symbols of security—circulated widely in the press. *Foreign Affairs* essays called Iran a "foothold" of U.S. influence and "the major strategic power in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean."[156] Similarly, a *Reader's Digest* writer exulted in Riyadh's largesse: "he who pays the fiddler is beginning to call the tune in the Middle East. The Tune could hardly be more harmonious to American hears… the Saudis are both staunchly pro-American and strongly anticommunist."[157] By the same token, the *New York Times* crowned King Faisal "a pillar of Islamic conservatism" who "has long been considered its [the United States] stanch ally against Communism and radical nationalism in the Middle East." These titles circulated abundantly in American newspapers after Faisal's assassination in 1975.[158]

In addition to its normal coverage, which detailed the ebbs and flows of U.S. Gulf diplomacy and the rise of Iranian military power, the *New York Times* also hosted several full-page ads by the Iranian or Saudi governments. Weeks after the British withdraw, the Iranian embassy sponsored a vivid ad; emblazoned with the title, "IRAN (Persia) and the Persian Gulf," the advert had maps assuring readers that since the days of Alexander the Great the waterway was known as the *Persian* Gulf and charts illustrating the importance of Gulf oil for the "Western World."[159] Another full page ad in 1975 proclaimed in all caps: "IRAN: MAJOR POWER IN ASIA."[160] On the passing of the late King Faisal, the Saudi Ministry of Information paid for a full-page ad reiterating Riyadh's pledge to "the saving of the Arabs and Islamic Jerusalem from Zionism" and friendliness "to all nations and countries that believe in God and the principles of justice and righteousness."[161] These ads augmented news coverage of the Gulf

that stressed its instability, suggesting that Iranian and Saudi leaders consciously aimed to cultivate images of their nations as steadfast, stable friends of the United States.

The Shah in particular received ample hagiographic coverage in American news media. Arnold Hottinger credited "the old tradition of Shah-dom" for achieving in Iran "a certain economic success and a still precarious stability."[162] A plethora of *Reader's Digest* features enthused over the Shah. One article bore the self-explanatory title "Iran: Keystone of the Middle East."[163] A different exposé titled "Superman of the New Iran" hailed Tehran's "Practical Potentate." The "new anti-communist bulwark, blocking Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf," as the article called him, "influences the well-being of people everywhere." His "iron-willed ruthlessness" had built Iran into "the new military colossus of the oil lanes" armed with the "awesome firepower" purchased from the United States. As it concluded, the article asked, "Is there really a need for the United States to try to turn Iran into a Middle East superpower friendly to the West?" It answered in no uncertain terms: "'Yes.' One need only note that under the sands and seas of these Gulf countries lie 60 percent of all the world's known oil reserves… the Shah made it clear to me that he intends to build up whatever military force is necessary to keep that gateway open and safeguard the flow of oil from the Gulf 'to any free country.'"[164] Such effusive writing parroted Nixon at his friendliest with the Shah.

Element #3: U.S. Responsibility to Strengthen Iran and Saudi Arabia

Finally, American responsibility to facilitate the buildup of Iranian and Saudi power to stabilize the Gulf comprised the third symbolic feature of Twin Pillars. In an address before the World Affairs Council of Los Angeles, for example, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson credited the "structures of defense and world order that we joined in erecting" for keeping Iran free from "Communist threats and initiatives."[165] In a Congressional testimony, Assistant

Secretary Sisco issued a panoply of metaphors to describe U.S. Gulf policy. He promised to "exhaust all avenues" in attempts to dissipate the "clouds of suspicion and distrust" troubling Arab-American relations since "the United States has a decisive role to play in helping bring stability and durable peace."[166] Another time the ambassador to the United Nations thanked "the peoples of the gulf" for their "readiness" to promote "tranquility, stability, and friendliness in the area" during negotiations over the future of the Arab Gulf statelets.[167]

This notion that the United States should play a supporting role in achieving Gulf stability flooded internal Nixon administration discussions of the region. In a cable to Washington, the U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia noted that while it was not feasible for the United States to assume the "principal burden" of the Gulf's defense and political organization in the manner of Britain, Washington could "nudge Saudis to play more helpful role" and find ways of "encouraging Iran… for defending region against the very subversion and radicalization which GOI [Government of Iran] fears most."[168] In a memo to the president, Kissinger wrote that "Saudi-Iranian cooperation" could provide "the mainstay of a stable regional system," but "A Saudi-Iranian confrontation would increase instability." He summarized American Gulf strategy to be one of "promoting regional responsibility for stability." In his telling, U.S. actions—"inject Western methods," spark "political and economic evolution," build a "most constructive" American "presence"—were absolutely necessary to stabilize such a volatile region, even as he disavowed the notion that Washington should directly defend or station troops in the Gulf.[169]

After Nixon left office, Kissinger continued to stress the importance of a U.S. commitment to Gulf security in his public rhetoric. For example, he habitually called the House of Saud "our oldest friend in the Arab world."[170] In a callback to Nixon, Kissinger stated, "We have helped to sow the seeds of peace in the Middle East" by "strengthening our commitment" to

U.S. allies' security.[171] He also delivered speeches defending his approach to Gulf policy. Describing the Gulf as an area of "strategic importance" whose "energy on which much of the world depends," Kissinger warned that "outside powers" wished to "involve themselves in its conflicts" in a manner that "competitively" detracted from American influence. For that reason, the United States stood on guard against "radicalism in the area" that was "putting greater pressures on America's friends… and heightening all the tensions and dangers." In his telling, the Ford administration "sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis" by growing "allied cohesion and strength."[172] Kissinger's words, in sum, painted a picture of the Gulf in which U.S.-backed allies held Soviet-and-communist-backed radicalism at bay.

Kissinger linked American security, allied strength, and Gulf stability more fully in a May 1976 address in Baltimore. "Without our commitment there can be no security," Kissinger declared, "Upheavals in key areas—such as the Middle East—menace our friends and allies, jeopardize our prosperity, and raise the risk of global confrontation." He continued, integrating motifs of order into his argument: "History taught us that our own tranquility depends on global stability. From Waterloo to Sarajevo, America benefitted from the stability of a world balance of power which maintained global security and prevented international war. That responsibility now rests, in large measure, with us." Thus, he concluded, "The United States will keep its friends and allies strong enough to defend themselves with our support…. We must vigilantly protect our own security, and that of our allies and friends."[173] In the picture painted by Kissinger, the Twin Pillars policy would fall apart without an American commitment to strengthening its Gulf allies. This notion circulated intelligence reports on the Gulf well into the Carter administration. One 1977 CIA report, for instance, called Iran and Saudi Arabia "the Soviets' most powerful and

effective opponents in the Middle East" whose strength, crucially, derived from their U.S.-facilitated "rapid military buildup."[174]

Press outlets also circulated this third symbolic element of Twin Pillars. The idea that the United States carried a special responsibility to facilitate the rise of Iranian and Saudi power often found expression through coverage that framed Gulf politics through the dualistic lens of the Cold War. Writing in a 1972 edition of *Foreign Affairs,* Zbigniew Brzezinski told readers that "the Soviet Union has pierced southward," abetted by U.S. "passivity" in the region.[175] Other writers said the United States needed to "maintain balance" with arms transfers to achieve "a stable equilibrium" in the Gulf and thus avoid tempting Moscow "to use its forces in unstable and conflicted parts of the world."[176] The pursuit of "central balance," argued Stanley Hoffman, constituted a mistake in the Middle East, where the Soviets "behave as if any retreat, voluntary or not, of the United States and its allies… constitutes an invitation."[177] For these writers, Cold War realities meant that the United States should urgently act to prevent a Soviet breakthrough in the Gulf.

This premise was overtly laid out numerous times. In *Foreign Affairs,* David Holden argued that London's withdrawal had "opened the door to what could be a major, and possibly painful, reconstruction of the Middle Eastern map." The Gulf, David Holden argued in "The Persian Gulf after the British Raj," "might become an area of persistent unrest" in which "uncertainties and tensions" between rivals "must release throughout the region" or "could erupt and be exploited by the Soviet Union, imperiling Western oil interests." Thus, he argued, the United States should "consider the threats of disorder."[178]

Other essays issued similar warnings. Fears over "imminent Soviet mastery" and "Soviet domination of the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean" was overblown, argued another

writer, but "the future peace and security of the region" still "requires a firmness and a specificity of policy which the United States has not previously shown."[179] The "precarious" British Gulf withdrawal could increase Soviet "diplomatic, strategic, and economic leverage," disagreed a different author.[180] *Foreign Affairs* writers fell back on the familiar language of Soviet pressure in their attempts to relate events in the wider world to the Gulf. After Nixon's impeachment, "the Kremlin felt itself able to push somewhat harder," stated one author; another argued that the 1973 war had fortified the Soviet position in the Arab world: "With an entrenched position in four or five 'radical' countries and with influence radiating through them the other Arab countries, the Russians seemed in a position to reduce the American position in the Middle East."[181]

Multiple *Reader's Digest* articles sounded fears over Soviet intrusion in the Gulf as well.[182] In "Zero Hour for the Middle East," William Gareth of MIT forewarned, "For centuries the tsars dreamed of expanding their influence into that part of the world; until 1955 however, such dreams came to nothing. Today, by contrast, Russia is the most influential foreign power in many Arab states." Noting Moscow had already secured rights to Iraqi oil fields, Gareth indicated that this was a problem Washington must solve, since "Now that Britain is withdrawing from the Middle East, the United States will soon be the sole Western power that maintains a presence in the area."[183]

The *New York Times*, for its part, also frequently framed news accounts of the Gulf through the lens of the Cold War. During the 1976 presidential race, the newspaper contextualized "Egypt's open break with the Soviet Union" by reminding readers that "Iraq and Syria, which are both armed by Moscow, are the Russians' two main pillars in the Middle East."[184] In another article, the paper cited a Congressional study on "the 'twin-pillar' policy that

presumed cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia" to safeguard U.S. interests in the Gulf.[185] These articles overtly invoked the "pillar" metaphor to describe U.S. and Soviet client states in the Middle East, and by doing so they neatly portrayed the region in terms of a two-sided showdown. Within the logic of this depiction, it made sense for the United States to do all it could to strengthen its allies.

Criticisms of Twin Pillars: Complication and Contestation

Nixon came to authorize more and more weapons sales to Iran over the course of his presidency, especially following the rapid rise in oil prices that followed the 1973 oil embargo. In 1975 he issued the "blank check" order to provide Iran with "all available sophisticated weapons short of the atomic bomb."[186] A 1976 congressional report found that Nixon and Kissinger had agreed "to sell Iran virtually any conventional weapons it wanted and so instructed the bureaucracy."[187] Having jettisoned the Eisenhower-era Twitchell Doctrine that limited arm transfers to Iran, under Nixon the Shah's military spending accounted for no less than 25 percent of the Iranian national budget.[188] These arrangements led to U.S.-Iranian partnership in other areas as well, such as the combined Iranian and CIA operation to arm Kurdish insurgents in Iraq that ran from 1972 until the Algiers Accords in 1975. [189] They also resulted in thousands of advisors living in-country, fueling anti-American sentiment among everyday Iran citizens in the leadup to 1979.[190]

The Nixon Doctrine also transformed U.S. relations with its other "pillar," Saudi Arabia. The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars overshadowed U.S.-Saudi relations during much of Nixon's time in the White House, as King Faisal lobbied for a "more balanced" approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[191] Faisal even pressured U.S. oil executives to ask the Nixon

administration to help end the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem.[192] Nevertheless, from 1970 and 1972 American arms sales to Saudi Arabia grew from $15.8 million to $312.4 million, an increase of nearly 2,000 percent.[193] In 1975 the value of U.S. military sales agreements with Riyadh jumped again to $5 billion; an anonymous military officer stationed in Saudi Arabia told the *New York Times*, "I do not know of anything that is nonnuclear that we would not give the Saudis."[194]

To be sure, Washington's ties to Riyadh experienced significant turmoil during Nixon's time in office. After an initial delay, Nixon sent "everything that can fly" to resupply the Israeli Defense Forces during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.[195] The Arab oil embargo issued in response doubled U.S. unemployment.[196] During the embargo pundits grumbled about seizing oil fields; the administration argued internally over whether a military "occupation" of some sort would ameliorate the situation.[197] The resentment went both ways. When Nixon visited Jeddah, King Faisal scolded him: "Mr. President, the injustice and aggression which were wrought upon the Arabs of Palestine are unprecedented in history… there will never be a real and lasting peace in the area unless Jerusalem is returned to Arab sovereignty."[198] Worries over the U.S. energy supply underlay much of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations' efforts in the Gulf, as by 1977 the United States imported over half its oil supply, with 40 percent from the Gulf.[199]

This friction should not obscure the wider picture, however. On the whole, Nixon's time in office set in motion much closer U.S.-Saudi ties. He became the first president to ever set foot on Saudi soil in 1974. That same year, Saudi Arabia invested $5 billion in the United States, about a fifth of its entire annual oil revenue; by 1976 that figure had reached $60 billion.[200]

Lest this overview paint too rosy a picture, the Twin Pillars policy was far from a harmonious, successful triumvirate. Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House Subcommittee on the

Near East and South Asia, admitted "one of our primary challenges in the Persian Gulf will be to avoid any confrontation between our two close friends."[201] Saudi Arabia and Iran did not see eye to eye on a number of issues, including drilling rights, Israel, and Iran's annexation of Abu Musa and other Gulf islands. Both countries undermined each other in the international oil market. Iran did not participate in the 1973 embargo, and Saudi Arabia broke with an Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) plan to raise prices in 1977, supercharging Tehran's fiscal difficulties. Many scholars argue that the large amounts of U.S. arms imported into Iran contributed to the economic crises Iran faced in the late 1970s, which played a role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.[202] RAND Corporation analyst David Ronfeldt issued a blistering critique of Twin Pillars in a 1978 report, accusing the United States of having created a "superclient" in Iran that had gained "reverse leverage" by virtue of excessive U.S. investment in the country.[203]

Given these assessments, it is perhaps unsurprising that Twin Pillars experienced a political backlash in the United States. The rife circulation of Twin Pillars in press coverage, presidential rhetoric, and internal administration discussions suggests that this constellation of symbols exerted substantial imaginative force in the minds of strategists, policymakers, and journalists. Yet at the same time, it would be a mistake to assume the logic of Twin Pillars was universally adopted or understood the same across audiences.[204]

Sometimes these deviations from Twin Pillars simply took the form of a different metaphor. Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow, for example, went on Voice of America three days after Wilson's 1968 announcement and told hearers that the Gulf had "some very strong, and quite active and stable countries," including "Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, [and] Saudi Arabia." Deploying the metaphor of an atom, he then suggested that these countries could "be a nucleus around which such security arrangements could hopefully be built."[205] Rostow's comparison of

these security partners to the "nucleus" of an atom conveyed a different conceptual picture of the Gulf than the vacuum metaphor, as it conceded a degree of volatility in relationships among the pro-U.S. Gulf countries.

Indeed, the vacuum metaphor itself came under fire in some quarters. A 1968 editorial from the *Washington Post* pointed out the interventionist, Cold War logic hardwired in the description of the Gulf as a vacuum. "A political situation in which neither the United State nor Soviet Union is dominant is sometimes called a 'vacuum,"' the article read. "This provides a ready-made rationale for the intervention of one or the other great power. Yet there is something gratuitous as well. For it downgrades an alternative way of organizing power, by the local people themselves."[206]

Other writers warned that a deeper investment in the Gulf could require a larger U.S. commitment to the region than previously thought. Two 1974 essays in *Foreign Affairs* called for the United States to take "The Hard Road to World Order" while doing its best to steer clear of overcommitment, or the duty to uphold "the structure of peace everywhere."[207] Another author forewarned that the Nixon Doctrine, rather than "buy" influence, could entangle the United States in the Gulf and thereby "herald the beginnings of a major military commitment by the United States to the defense of other countries."[208]

Thus, while many members of the press reinforced the logic of Twin Pillars by recirculating its symbolic elements, other members of the press complicated the images of the Gulf put forward by Nixon, Ford, and their subordinates. For example, oil rather than stability served as the main lens for most *New York Times* coverage of the Gulf. Nearly 72 percent (1,758 out of 2,447) of articles referencing the Gulf mentioned oil in some capacity; the figure was only 9.7 percent for "stability."[209] This statistic does not necessarily mean images of instability were

drowned out by oil, but it does complicate any straightforward line of rhetorical influence running directly from the administration into media coverage. Beyond the press, several other political actors advanced major criticisms of Twin Pillars. Three of these lines of criticism were offered by Ted Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, and Arab American activists.

Appropriating Twin Pillars: Ted Kennedy

In contrast to Nixon and Ford, many Democrats attacked the increased scale of U.S. arms sales to Gulf countries as the 1970s wore on. Tellingly, many of these attacks also invoked the fear of Gulf instability to make their arguments. In the lead up to his own presidential run in 1980, Senator Ted Kennedy's October 1975 article in *Foreign Affairs*, "The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control?," exemplifies this line of critique. Claiming that Washington did not possess "a coherent Persian Gulf policy," Kennedy began: "For two decades following the Second World War, U.S. policy toward the Gulf was reasonably straightforward… support for Iran, building a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia, and encouraging Britain to remain involved in the Gulf itself."[210] The "unquestioned acceptance" of these "holdover policies," he continued, "has been to draw the United States—and other nations close to us—more and more deeply into the security situation of the Gulf, as the sale of arms has increased dramatically." The huge quantity of weapons imported from the United States, he said, "contains built-in risks of increased political tensions or even conflict, by accident or design." But, Kennedy testified, "When I traveled to the Persian Gulf last May, I found only a nascent understanding of these risks."[211] In his telling, "efforts to promote cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia in regional security, as the pillar of our position in the Gulf, hardly square with levels or types of arms sales that could help bring the two into conflict with one another."[212]

Kennedy's arguments offered a clear break with the Nixon Doctrine and Twin Pillars.

The senator condemned the levels of U.S. arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia as dangerous and imprudent. As he put it, "It is clear that selling billions of dollars worth of arms each year is a significant offset for our oil account with these nations. But just as clearly the price is not worth it, if we are only buying an increased risk of tensions, instability, and even conflict."[213] Kennedy condemned Twin Pillars in no uncertain terms.

Yet Kennedy's language is as striking as his argument. Instead of challenge the depiction of the Gulf as unstable, Kennedy simply relabeled arms transfers as a source of regional instability. His rhetoric inverted the status of weapons sales; rather than serve as a stabilizing force, they were themselves jeopardizing the Gulf's political order. Kennedy thus appropriated the symbols used over and over again by Nixon and Ford to justify the Twin Pillars policy in their public statements to condemn the policies these presidents had pursued in the Gulf. Altogether, the senator innovatively used images drawn from Twin Pillars symbolism to argue against the arms transfers endemic to the Twin Pillars strategy. This rhetorical tactic signaled the widespread adoption of the language of instability to conceptualize Gulf politics even as Kennedy sought to contest the specific policies enacted by Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford to address that supposed Gulf instability.

The basic story told by Kennedy gained traction among foreign policy analysts as time went on. Several commentators lamented the fact that "American decision-makers chose to place their bets on Iran," a "refuge" and "island of political stability" that had, until 1978, weathered "the storms of revolutionary change." In an inversion of Twin Pillars symbolism, James A. Bill noted, "Whatever sturdy consistency has obtained in Iran up to now seems to have been shaken—possibly for good."[214]

R.K. Ramazani's 1979 essay in *Foreign Affairs*, "Security in the Persian Gulf," similarly

followed Kennedy's line of reasoning. "Iran was perceived as having ensured Gulf security before the outbreak of its recent revolution," Ramazani recounted, "Although American rhetoric spoke of pursuing a 'twin-pillar policy,' the United States itself actually relied primarily on Iran to perform the role of the 'policeman' for the Gulf region." This was, in his telling, because "Iran was willing to undertake the burden of responsibility for Gulf security" while the "second pillar," Saudi Arabia, "was unwilling to undertake such a role." In locating blame for Iran's downfall, Ramazani identified the Nixon Doctrine as the culprit. Because "indiscriminate arms supplies can contribute more to destabilization than stabilization of the region," he concluded, "Iran will no longer act in any sense as a pillar of American policy in the Persian Gulf."[215] Like Kennedy, Ramazani conceptualized Iran in binary terms: it *was* stable, but *now* it was unstable thanks to indiscriminate arms transfers. He appropriated the symbolism of Twin Pillars, merely reversing its polarity to argue that arms sales had made Iran unstable, not strong.

Incorporating Idealism: Jimmy Carter

Jimmy Carter also denounced the Twin Pillars policy. During the 1976 campaign, he made this case by combining moral appeals with language suggesting Ford's policies had weakened the nation. In a 1975 interview, for example, he described arms exports in economic terms of instability and imbalance: "I think that our country is best served by minimizing as much as possible our dependence on military exports for stabilizing our economy and balancing the trade relationships. And in every instance, as President, I would minimize those sales."[216] He paired this rhetoric with the assertion that Iran was now "strong and self-sufficient," undermining Ford's stance that yet more conventional weapons transfers were needed to further fortify the Shah.[217] Another time he said that because of Ford's absence of moral leadership, "the country drifts" and "our foreign policy the last few years has been amoral in nature. There has been no

constancy. There has been no commitment… We all want trade, but I see no reason why we should sell $7 ½ billion worth of arms to Saudi Arabia in this year alone." These choices, according to Carter, had "brought great damage to our country."[218] Like Kennedy, Carter also deployed payment metaphors in reference to the Gulf. For example, Carter claimed that Ford had weakened the country due to his administration's "selfish" and "shortsighted" arms sales, saying that they "will be repaid by terrorism, hatred and political violence."[219]

In making these arguments, Carter appropriated each symbolic element of Twin Pillars. Like his Democratic rival, he claimed that the region was unstable because of too many arms exports. He depicted Iran as a source of regional order and strength—and so it did not need any more U.S. conventional weapons transfers. And he argued that U.S. attempts to strengthen its Gulf allies had actually weakened the country by squandering America's moral authority and making it commercially dependent on arms exports. As he bluntly put it, the "unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability."[220]

In contrast to Nixon's realism, Carter's foreign policy was defined by his commitment to idealism.[221] As Guerrero observes, Carter believed the United States had to recognize its limits, come to terms with the fact that it could not solve all the world's problems, and thus embrace cooperation on the global stage. A key aspect of this strategy was to "improve the reputation and moral standing of America in the world," even at the cost of short-term setbacks.[222] Carter's ideals therefore played a major role in his attempt to "unite the nation around the idea of restoring America's moral authority."[223] This project put him on a collision course with the dualistic Cold War logic underpinning Twin Pillars. This idealism informed Carter's attacks on Ford's foreign policy.

As the campaign drew to a close, Carter's rhetoric pounded descriptions of U.S. arms

export policy in the Gulf as a sign of moral laxity and national weakness. During the debate with Ford on October 6, for instance, Carter argued, "When this Republican administration came into office, we were shipping about $1 billion worth of arms overseas; now $10 to $12 billion worth of arms overseas to countries that quite often use these weapons to fight each other." The "disturbing" quantity of weapons comprised "a deviation from idealism" as well as "a deviation from a commitment to our major ally in the Middle East, which is Israel." Carter concluded his answer by insisting "it's not just a matter of idealism. It's a matter of being tough. It's a matter of being strong. It's a matter of being consistent."[224] Hence, Carter returned to the language of order (stability, balance, strength, tough) as well as morality (idealism, commitment) to attack Ford's Gulf policy, which Carter depicted as a source of national weakness (drift, selfish, dependence, damage).[225] These elements supported the broader emphasis on human rights and American exceptionalism in Carter's foreign policy rhetoric.[226]

Although Carter sought to transform U.S. foreign affairs, in many respects he never outran the shadow of Twin Pillars.[227] For example, he appropriated the vacuum metaphor describe his overall approach to the Middle East. As he said, "there has been a vacuum in international affairs" that could be filled only with "the absolute truth…I want us to tell the Saudi Arabians and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Lebanese and the Jordanians and the Israelis the same thing."[228] Like Ford, Carter overcame substantial opposition to pass an arms package to Saudi Arabia and followed it up by saying the arms transfer "adds a degree of stability and morality" to U.S. Gulf policy.[229]

Rhetorically, Carter continued to speak about the Gulf in terms of stability, praised Saudi Arabia and Iran as steadying forces, and even described the U.S. role in the Gulf as one of strengthening these allies. In a major address at Wake Forest University, Carter declared, "We

have important historical responsibilities to enhance peace… in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf." Yet "permanent peace and stability" required that "the primary responsibility for preserving peace and military stability rests with the countries of the region. But we shall continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent threats to their interests and to ours."[230] Even though Carter had volatile relations with the Shah, in public he still credited the monarch with "maintaining order in a very difficult period" and moving his country "toward democratic principles and social liberalization." In turns of phrase that echoed Nixon and Ford, Carter asserted, "Iran has been a stabilizing factor around the Persian Gulf. This stability is valuable in the region. It's valuable in the surrounding territory, reaching certainly as far as Israel and the Mediterranean, and it's important for world peace. Iran has been very helpful to us."[231] And in infamous turns of phrase months before the Islamic Revolution began, Carter commended the Shah as "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world" and proclaimed, "our military alliance remains unshakeable."[232]

Obviously, the Islamic Revolution altered the way Carter spoke about Iran and the Gulf. But in the meantime, it is worth noting how closely Carter's rhetoric hewed to Twin Pillars symbolism despite his emphasis on human rights and morality in foreign policy. Carter repeatedly avowed his "total, unequivocal, and firmly fixed" commitment to Israel's security.[233] Even as he sought (somewhat unsuccessfully) to reduce U.S. arms exports, Carter depicted the Gulf as an unstable region, praised the stability of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and stated that it was a U.S. responsibility to strengthen these allies.

That Carter's public rhetoric rearticulated each symbolic element of Twin Pillars speaks to the pervasive power of this interpretive schema. Carter made his case against his predecessors' policies by adopting their language to argue that arms exports on the Nixon Doctrine's scale

detracted from Gulf stability and, therefore, U.S. global defense. These rhetorical choices illustrate the imaginative force of Twin Pillars, which framed U.S. policymaking in the Gulf in terms of tradeoffs between order and instability even after the policy of selling arms Iran and Saudi Arabia became politically unfashionable and an electoral liability.

Creating Rhetorical Alternatives: Diplomats, Activists, & Academics

Other voices besides Democratic presidential aspirants sought to complicate mainstream portrayals of Arabs, Muslims, and the Gulf circulating across the U.S. government as well as in the press. In a 1976 *Washington Post* feature on Muslim diplomats in the U.S. capital, for instance, United Arab Emirates ambassador Sa'id Ahmad Al-Ghubash pushed back against Orientalist stereotypes of his country: "Cartoons picture us Arabs as looking very smug, one hand on the gas pump ready to turn it off as the need strikes us." "You think we are rich," he continued, "Before 1970, we practically gave our oil away. We are building a country from the ground up." The Kuwaiti ambassador likewise complained about U.S. pressure on his country in the same article, stating, "The British never interfered in our internal affairs this way."[234]

Grassroots efforts also sought to challenge dominant understandings of the Middle East and Persian Gulf in the United States. After the 1967 war, civil rights attorney and activist Abdeen Jabara joined with Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and others to establish the Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG) to help counteract negative representations of Arabs in scholarship and public arenas.[235] This group helped organize a wide array of Arab Americans (a term that does not capture the transnationally diverse array of persons involved) into a political force within wider constellations of left-wing coalitions. As Pamela E. Pennock notes in *The Rise of the Arab American Left*, the 1960s and 1970s saw the growth of "a cross-generational Arab American identity increasingly geared toward political activism," specifically organized around

the issues of Palestinian independence, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, and anti-racist ideologies as well as a general commitment to left-wing political stances.[236] These groups sought to offer rhetorical alternatives to the dominant stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims in U.S. public discourse, challenging infantilizing or Orientalist stereotypes.

For instance, a common theme of AAUG convention speeches was to link left-wing guerilla or resistance movements and the plight of the Palestinians. "Though more of our activities have been concerned naturally with attaining equality for the Arab Americans and Arabs in general, we have actively supported the just struggle of other groups to attain equality in systems where they are oppressed," Abu-Lughod declared in his presidential address at the 1969 convention. He continued: "we stand united with the gallant fighters of Vietnam and with all other groups valiantly struggling… we have perceived the inextricable link which the [Palestinian] Revolution has with other wars of national liberation, particularly but not exclusively in the Third World."[237] While the Gulf did not attract as much attention as Palestine, it is clear that Arab Americans in groups such as AAUG sought to contest negative portrayals of Arabs, Iranians, Muslims, and the Middle East circulating in presidential and press accounts of the region.

These efforts to completely reframe Middle East and Gulf politics sometimes bore fruit in mainstream publications. For example, Kenyan-born Ali A. Mazrui argued for an entirely different approach to Arab and African politics in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* during the heyday of arms exports to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Rather than viewing the Gulf through the lens of the Cold War, Mazrui contended that Arab oil-producing states could cultivate "broad solidarity with Africa as a single foundation." In so doing they could establish "a single international subsystem" across the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, thereby creating "new forms of

alignment" that broke free from the dualistic alliance politics of the Cold War.[238] Mazrui's article unveils a rich undercurrent of conceptual frameworks lurking beneath mainstream discussions of Gulf politics. Yet in many respects, these alternative paradigms struggled to totally overcome the imaginative influence of Twin Pillars or more mainstream critiques of Nixon and Ford.[239]

Conclusion: The Carter Doctrine

Despite the best efforts of diplomats, academics, and Arab activists, the rhetorical alternatives they generated did not displace the dominant image of the Gulf as an unstable region in Carter's presidential rhetoric. As the Shah's situation deteriorated, Carter told journalists, "We primarily want an absence of violence and bloodshed, and stability."[240] He said, "peace and stability in the Middle East and the Gulf area" were vital for a "better future" and "the well-being of the peoples of the region as well as the world as a whole."[241] When the Shah fell, Carter told Americans, "Obviously, what has occurred could not have been predicted. And for 30 years, our country has had a relationship with a fairly stable government there. The changes took place very rapidly. So far as I know, no one on Earth predicted them."[242] His rhetoric continually framed the Gulf through the lens of stability to the point where there was little else to talk about.

Above all, the view of the Persian Gulf as a region in need of stabilization and protection came through most clearly in the Carter Doctrine. Delivered on January 23, 1980, as part of the State of the Union, the president issued his eponymous doctrine a year after the Shah departed Iran and a month after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In his words, Soviet actions constituted a "new threat to security in the Persian Gulf" that demanded a response from "all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability." He declared that the United States would not shy from "[m]eeting this challenge" in

"the vital oil-producing area of the Persian Gulf region." And so, Carter unequivocally proclaimed, "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[243]

With this sentence, Carter dispelled any doubts about what nation actually served as the guarantor of Gulf security. Twelve years and a week after Prime Minister Wilson announced the British would withdraw from the Gulf, Carter asserted that the United States would serve as its unabashed protector. That Carter was met with public approval rather than political backlash testifies not only to the importance Gulf oil held for the United States, but also the constitutive work performed by the Twin Pillars metaphor over the course of the 1970s to make such a grand extension of American power seem natural and appropriate.[244]

Twin Pillars as a policy represented an outgrowth of a metaphorical and pervasive view of the Persian Gulf that emphasized the region's political instability in the wake of the British withdrawal. Robert L. Ivie writes that "generative or guiding metaphors become progressively less figurative over time and are taken increasingly more literally as a given perspective or frame of reference develops into… orientation."[245] U.S. strategists' fixation on stability, with its attendant language of vacuum, upholding order, military strength, and suppressing forces of subversion, depicted the Gulf through interlocking images of instability and order. More than the Twin Pillars metaphor itself, it was this rhetorical constellation that literalized over time to reinforce American perceptions of the Persian Gulf as a region in need of stabilization. This powerful rhetorical current outlasted the actual Twin Pillars policy, as even critics of arms sales to Gulf allies deployed elements of Twin Pillars symbolism to argue for their preferred

policies.[246] When the primary "pillar" of stability collapsed with the Iranian Revolution, this event was interpreted as an exigence demanding an American reaction. That response came in the form of the Carter Doctrine, which asserted that the United States itself would fill the new "vacuum" formed by the collapse of the Shah's regime. Rarely, as this chapter has shown, did American defense planners believe that Gulf states should or could defend their sovereignty (which was perceived to be under threat from "Soviet imperialism") on their own.

This chapter has shown how images of instability such as the vacuum metaphor were used by Nixon administration officials and the press to describe the Persian Gulf. Unlike earlier episodes where the vacuum metaphor had been invoked, such as after World War II or the leadup to the Truman Doctrine, this time the logic of the metaphor was curtailed by U.S. unwillingness to intervene and the ongoing conflict in Southeast Asia. As a result, Nixon approved NSDM 92, which authorized large-scale conventional weapons sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia on the basis that these "pillars" would serve U.S. interests by maintaining stability in the Gulf. In this manner Nixon and Ford sought to strengthen these allies' ability to mount "an effective indigenous defense" against hostile forces.[247] Traces of this way of speaking about the Gulf continued into the Carter era.

Viewed through the lens of sovereignty, it seems clear that Twin Pillars promoted a view of the Persian Gulf predicated on the need for an outside power to serve as a regional security guarantor. Jeremy Moses writes that questions of sovereignty "will always return to a question of power; that is, who is *capable* of taking responsibility?"[248] During the 1970s, American policymakers answered that question not by assuming the role vacated by Britain of regional hegemon, but rather by arrogating to themselves the task of equipping Iran and Saudi Arabia to assume the responsibility for imposing and sustaining a U.S.-friendly order in the Gulf. In this

way, their policies and words encouraged an understanding of the Persian Gulf in which the United States served as the ultimate source and backstop of regional security. When this strategy unraveled in the streets of Tehran, Carter responded by removing the middlemen and claiming for the United States the right to protect the Gulf from forces hostile to American interests. Exactly what responsibilities flowed from this right and how this new regional order would function were questions to be worked out by his successor.

Notes

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[6] "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon," October 22, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92.

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[15] Ned O'Gorman, "The Logic and Rhetoric of Power: George F. Kennan, Paul H. Nitze, and Planning for the Cold War," in *World War II and the Cold War: The Rhetoric of Hearts and Minds: A Rhetorical History of the United States, Vol. 8*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2018), 259, 293.

[16] O'Gorman, "The Logic and Rhetoric of Power," 294.

[17] Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 102. On the subject of defense spending, Hogan cites Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 205, 209, 223.

[18] Randall Bennett Woods and Howard Jones, *Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 18.

[19] "Princeton Metting on Political Warfare," May 10-11, 1952, summary compiled by Lewis Galantiere of Radio Free Europe, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library; Ned O'Gorman, *Spirits of the Cold War: Contesting Worldviews in the Classical Age of American Security Strategy* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2012), 153.

[20] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Address to the 1957 Governors' Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia," June 24, 1957, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-1957-governors-conference-williamsburg-virginia.

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[22] Londa Schieberger, *Has Feminism Changed Science?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 147.

[23] Lynne Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., *The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991), 2.

[24] Harry S. Truman, "The President's News Conference," March 25, 1948, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-344.

[25] Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947, American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-greece-and-turkey-the-truman-doctrine.

[26] Denise M. Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2008), 130.

[27] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, Vol. 2 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), 100; 93-102.

[28] Arthur Vandenberg, "Assistance to Greece and Turkey: Report," April 3, 1947, U.S. Congressional Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine: Historical Series* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 219.

[29] "Beyond the Truman Doctrine," *New York Times*, May 25, 1947, E8.

[30] David E. Mark, "The Cold War: Origins and Developments: The Cold War and Current Policies," June 7, 1971, U.S. Congressional House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings 1971, Vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 58.

[31] Richard M. Nixon, "Address to the Nation Announcing Conclusion of an Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," January 23, 1973, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-announcing-conclusion-agreement-ending-the-war-and-restoring-peace.

[32] Richard Nixon, *RN*, 366.

[33] Richard M. Nixon, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1969, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-1.

[34] Shirley Anne Warshaw, *The Domestic Presidency: Policy Making in the White House* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 26.

[35] Richard M. Nixon, "Remarks on the CBS Radio Network: 'The Security Gap,'" October 24, 1968, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-cbs-radio-network-the-security-gap.

[36] Chesly Manly, "Soviet Plan to Rule Seas Hits Mideast," *Chicago Tribune*, November 1968, 1-2.

[37] I. Bar-Moshe, "The Gulf on Guard Against Egypt, Russia," *Jerusalem Post*, November 22, 1968, A3.

[38] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Nixon Suffers his first Middle East Casualty," *Boston Globe*, December 27, 1968, 7.

[39] Andrew Scott Cooper, *The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 19.

[40] "Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson," June 18, 1966, *FRUS 1964-1968* 21:278, 1; Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), 25.

[41] NSC 136/1 stated that in the event of a Soviet or communist takeover of Iran, the U.S. goal would be "if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist regime" and to assess whether the United States would go to war with the Soviet Union. NSC 136/1, November 20, 1952, Office of the Historian, https://history..state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d240.

[42] Richard Nixon, "Remarks to the B'nai B'rith Convention in Washington, D.C.: 'The Cradle of Civilization Must Not Be Its Grave,'" September 8, 1968, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-bnai-brith-convention-washington-dc-the-cradle-civilization-must-not-be-its.

[43] Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1.

[44]Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," in *Agenda for the Nation*, ed. Kermit Gordon (New York: Doubleday, 1969), 611.

[45] Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1990*, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 258-266; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategic of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 272-287.

[46] Nixon to Hlademan, Ehrlichmann, and Kissinger, March 2, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 1:61.

[47] David A. Korn, "US-Soviet Negotiations of 1969 and the Rogers Plan," *Middle East Journal* 44.1 (1990): 38.

[48] W. Taylor Fain, *American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 187-188.

[49] Indeed, earlier that year Tehran and Riyadh had nearly come to blows after Iran had seized a Saudi oil rig to protest Arab drilling in the Gulf . Keynoush Banafsheh, *Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 95.

[50] Richard M. Nixon, "President Nixon's News Conference of February 6, 1969, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 60 (Jan – June 1969), 159.

[51] "Around the World," *Washington Post*, December 28, 1968, A4.

[52] "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon," October 22, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92.

[53] U. Alexis Johnson, "Department Discusses Agreements on Azores and Bahrain Facilities," February 1, 1972, *Department of State Bulletin*, 66:282.

[54] Gregory A. Olson, George N. Dionisopoulos, and Steven R. Goldzwig, "The Rhetorical Antecedents to Vietnam, 1945-1965," in *World War II and the Cold War: The Rhetoric of Hearts and Minds: A Rhetorical History of the United States, Vol. 8*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2018), 343.

[55] Mansfield, letter to Mr. and Mrs. Joe Petrich, July 9, 1969, Mansfield Papers, Mansfield Library, Series XIII: Senate: Foreign Relations, 1953-1977, 82, #3.

[56] Mansfield, Statement to the Annual Democratic Congressional Dinner, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1969, 2, Mansfield Papers, Mansfield Library, Series XII: Senate: Miscellaneous, 1953-1977.

[57] Gregory A. Olson, *Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 209.

[58] "Memorandum of Conversation" (in Washington), March 11, 1969, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 24:238.

[59] Haim Shemesh, *Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 33; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), 410-411.

[60] The Foreign Military Sales Act," October 22, 1968, *Office of Law Revision Counsel: United States Law Code*, http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/90/629.pdf; William D. Hartung, *And Weapons For All* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 44. As Richard F. Grimmett, who authored that year's annual report to Congress on conventional weapons transfers, wrote in 1991, "For the past 20 to 25 years, the Middle East has been the most significant region of the world for both the size and level of sophisticated of the arms trade." Richard F. Grimmett "The Arms Trade After the War," *Arms Control Today* 21. 5 (1991): 21.

[61] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 404; Kathleen Burk, *Britain, America, and the Sinews of War, 1914-1918* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 5.

[62] Whereas prior to the war the share of U.S. exports going to Allied countries was roughly 63 percent, this figure rose to 80 percent during the war. Benjamin O. Fordham, "Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American Intervention in World War I," *International Organization* 61.2 (2007): 277-310.

[63] As noted in the previous chapter, Saudi Arabia received even more economic aid and private investment alongside this military aid. William H. McNeil, *America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict 1941 – 1946* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), 778.

[64] Randall Fowler, "Art of the Arms Deal: Reagan, AWACS, and the Rhetorical Presidency," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 105.3 (2019): 274-275.

[65] In his memoir, Nixon stated that he and Kissinger had "more than enough on our plate with Vietnam, SALT, the Soviets, Japan and Europe" and that the Middle East deserved more focused attention, which is why they delegated it to the State Department during his first year in office. Nixon, *RN*, 477.

[66] Richard M. Nixon, "President's News Conference of January 27," *Department of State Bulletin*, February 17, 1969, 142-143.

[67] "A.B. Urwick to M.S. Weir, Confidential 10/37, 15 February 1968," FCO 8/36, Arabian Gulf Digital Archive, https://www.agda.ae/en/catalogue/tna/fco/8/36.

[68] Another factor lurking in the background was the issue of Soviet intrusion into the Arab-Israeli conflict. Two National Security Council (NSC) meetings in February 1969 were devoted to responding to a Soviet offer to negotiate a peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Craig Daigle, *Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 23-25.

[69] Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 477.

[70] Quoted in Richard Reeves, *President Nixon: Alone in the White House* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 43.

[71] For a discussion of stability and the Cold War strategy of détente, see: Kjell Goldmann, "Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Détente as a Problem of Stabilization," *World Politics* 34.2 (1982): 230-266.

[72] "United Daily News – Nixon's Asian policy," *Taiwan Review*, September 1, 1969, https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=4&post=6048.

[73] Richard Nixon, "Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen," July 25, 1969, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/informal-remarks-guam-with-newsmen.

[74] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *The Great Silent Majority: Nixon's 1969 Speech on Vietnamization* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 34-35; Richard Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam," November 3, 1969, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-the-war-vietnam.

[75] Senator Mansfield played a significant role in reinforcing this interpretation of the Nixon Doctrine. As Gregory A. Olson reveals in an interview with Francis R. Valeo, who served as an aide to Mansfield, the senator "pushed [the Nixon Doctrine] to make sure it stayed in and hammered in because as he interpreted it, the Doctrine implies a reduction of U.S. involvement in Asia. He continued to interpret it that way whether Nixon meant it that way or not." Olson, *Mansfield and Vietnam*, 210.

[76] Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine*, 135-150; David F. Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships: 1965-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 72-111.

[77] Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 116; George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 116; Shemesh, *Soviet-*

Iraqi Relations, 22-33. Kissinger admitted that in 1969 that he was not well-versed in Gulf politics: "I did not know how Saudi-Iranian relations worked, my priority was to get the Soviets out of the Middle East." Interview with Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, New York, June 3, 1997, in Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, *Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition, 1968-1971* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 65.

[78] Handwritten notes by Richard M. Nixon, Wilderness Years, Series 2, Far East and Middle East Trips 1967, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA; Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah*, 35; Cooper, *Oil Kings*, 27-30.

[79] Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, (London: M. Joseph, 1980), 143.

[80] Address by Richard M. Nixon to the Bohemian Club, San Francisco, July 29, 1967, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 1:2.

[81] Memorandum of Conversation [Shah to Kissinger], April 1, 1969, *FRUS 1969-1976*, E-4:6.

[82] Friedman, *The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf*, 2.

[83] "Persian Gulf: Analytical Summary of IG [Interdepartmental Group] Response to NSSM 66," June 4, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. According to the State Department Record (RG 59), this paper was initially drafted at the end of 1969; see "Memorandum From Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," December 31, 1969, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-156, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 66.

[84] Italics in original. Orientalist tropes appear in private cables discussing the Saudi leadership, possibly contributing to this assessment of Riyadh's military and political capabilities. Secretary of State Rogers conveyed his British counterpart's assessment of Saudi leadership in a State Department cable on July 12, 1970, stating that "the hopeless incompetence of the Arabs" was getting in the way of British plans for withdraw. Rogers continued: "This was particularly true with the Saudis. Faisal was getting old and was inclined to do things without telling his subordinates; furthermore, he did not have people around him capable of giving good advice." "Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers [in London] to the Department of State," July 12, 1970, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970-1973, ORG 7 S.

[85] Italics removed from original. "Persian Gulf: Analytical Summary of IG [Interdepartmental Group] Response to NSSM 66."

[86] The United States naval contingent codenamed Middle East Force was established in 1947 and was based at Jufair on Bahrain Island. Gary Sick, "The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment," in *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*, 4th edition, ed. David W. Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 316.

[87] NSDM 92, November 7, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Vox 1248, Saunders Files, NSSM 66-NSDM92-Persian Gulf.

[88] "Memorandum of Conversation," January 13, 1971, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, POL 7 UK/POL 33 PERSIAN GULF.

[89] "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State," March 3, 1971, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. II.

[90] National Intelligence Estimate 30-1-71, April 1, 1971, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf.

[91] Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, December 16, 1971, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, DEF 1 NEAR E.

[92] Forrestal stood by this commitment when his plan to build a pipeline in Saudi Arabia using much-needed steel came under domestic criticism. James Forrestal, "Memorandum for the Secretary of State. Subject: Saudi Arabia," August 1, 1945, Folder 36-1-30, Forrestal Files, General Record of the Department of the Navy, RG 80; Walter Millis, ed. *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 323.

[93] Eisenhower to Dillon Anderson, July 30, 1957, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Burton I. Kaufman, "Mideast Multinational Oil, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Antitrust: The 1950s," *Journal of American History* 63.4 (1977): 937-959.

[94] Meg Jacobs, "America's Never-Ending Oil Consumption," May 15, 2016, *Atlantic*, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/american-oil-consumption/482532/.

[95] Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, "Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations," in *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, ed. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 3.

[96] Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 211; Henry A. Kissinger, *For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1981), 286-287.

[97] Robert Hariman, "Henry Kissinger: Realism's Rational Actor," in *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, ed. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 38-39, 46.

[98] The nature of Nixon's realism is of course a debated topic. For a recently-published alternative account, see: Joseph S. Nye, *Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 89-94.

[99] Osborn, *Michael Osborn on Metaphor and Style*, 281.

[100] "Vacuum Fillers in Conflict," *Economic and Political Weekly*, February 17, 1968, 314-315.

[101] This chapter also works to qualify Brandon Friedman's claim that "'Twin Pillars' was not a term that was used by U.S. or British officials during this period," because I demonstrate that several policymakers did in fact use this language to describe the Persian Gulf even though this descriptor was not widespread. In particular, Kennedy's 1975 essay and Ramazani's 1979 essay in *Foreign Affairs* both formally employ this language to outright label U.S. Gulf policy. Brandon Friedman, *The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1971* (New York: Springer, 2020), 2.

[102] As Burke writes, "the work of every writer [rhetor] contains a set of implicit equations. He uses 'associational clusters.' And you may, by examining his work, find 'what goes with what' in these clusters—what kinds of acts and images and personalities and situations go with his notions of heroism, villainy, consolation, despair, etc." Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 20.

[103] Robert L. Ivie, "Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor: A Framework for Criticism," in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 72.

[104] "Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State," November 2, 1970, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-1973, POL 19 FAA.

[105] "Soviet Role in the Middle East," June 1977, CIA Electronic Reading Room, 3, 12, 14, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79b00457a000100040001-8.

[106] William D. Brewer, "Yesterday and Tomorrow in the Persian Gulf," *Middle East Journal* 23.2 (1969): 158.

[107] Richard Nixon, "Remarks by President Nixon at Dromoland Castle, Newmarket-on-Fergus," October 4, 1970, *Department of State Bulletin*, 63:604.

[108] Richard Nixon, "Second Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy," February 25, 1971, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/second-annual-report-the-congress-united-states-foreign-policy.

[109] Richard Nixon, "Third Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy," February 9, 1972, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/third-annual-report-the-congress-united-states-foreign-policy.

[110] National Security Study Memorandum 238, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," February 13, 1976, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-153-3-25-1.pdf.

[111] Walter Lacquer, "Russia Enters the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 47.2 (1969): 307, 296-308.

[112] Edward Heath, "Realism in British Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 48.1 (1969): 49.

[113] Sorenson, "Most-Favored-Nation," 280; Levy, "World Oil," 692; Safran, "The War and the Future of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," 221-222.

[114] John Franklin Campbell, "'What is to be Done?': Gigantism in Washington," *Foreign Affairs* 49.1 (1970): 85. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, authored a 1970 article that dwelled at length on "The stability of the division of Europe" and the "potential instability" that could erupt from "accelerating political change" on the continent. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America and Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 49.1 (1970): 12. See also: Nahum Goldmann, "The Future of Israel," *Foreign Affairs* 48.3 (1970): 443-459; Don Peretz, "Arab Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom?" *Foreign Affairs* 48.2 (1970): 322-333; John C. Campbell, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 49.1 (1970): 51-69; T.B. Millar, "Soviet Policies South and East of Suez," *Foreign Affairs* 49.1 (1970): 70-80.

[115] C.L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: The Dry Rot," *New York Times*, October 17, 1969, 46.

[116] Walter Lacquer, "Détente: What's left of it?" *New York Times*, December 16, 1973, 27, 293.

[117] Nahum Goldmann, "The Psychology of Middle East Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 54.1 (1975): 123

[118] Goldmann, "The Future of Israel," 446-447.

[119]Fouad Ajami, "Between Cairo and Damascus: The Arab World and the New Stalemate," *Foreign Affairs* 54.3 (1976): 445.

[120] Peretz, "Arab Palestine," 332.

[121] David Reed, "Fedayeen: Israel's Fanatic Foe," *Reader's Digest* (October 1970): 168, 173.

[122] John M. Lee, "Unity Eludes Nine Persian Gulf Sheikdoms," *New York Times*, November 29, 1970, 2.

[123] John M. Lee, "Iran Moves to Assume Major Role in the Persian Gulf," *New York Times*, November 18, 1970, 2.

[124] Walter J. Levy, "Oil Power," *Foreign Affairs* 49.4 (1970): 664, 660.

[125] Thomas O. Enders, "OPEC and the Industrial Countries: The Next Ten Years," *Foreign Affairs* 53.4 (1975): 625, 628; see also Maurice J. Williams, "The Aid Programs of the OPEC Countries," *Foreign Affairs* 54.2 (1976): 308-324.

[126] Richard H. Ullman, "After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles," *Foreign Affairs* 53.2 (1975): 287, 296; Eric Rouleau, "The Palestinian Quest," *Foreign Affairs* 53.2 (1975): 269-270.

[127] Jahangir Amuzegar, "The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play," *Foreign Affairs* 51.4 (1973): 689; James E. Akins, "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here," *Foreign Affairs* 51.3 (1973): 467.

[128] Rowan, "The War that OPEC Started," 153-154, 156.

[129] It also predicted—in July 1973—that in the event of another war, "Arab nations would probably then retaliate against us, as Israel's patron, by shutting off or cutting down our oil supplies… This could be a crippling blow to our economy." Griffith, "Crisis in Middle East Oil," 101.

[130] "Cartoon Quips," *Reader's Digest* (October 1975): 82.

[131] Telegram from Secretary of State Kissinger [in Jidda] to President Ford," March 9, 1975, March 7-22, 1975 – Kissinger's Trip – Vol I. (5), Box 3, National Security Advisor: Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974-76, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[132] Richard Nixon, "The President's News Conference," September 5, 1973, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-89.

[133] Richard Nixon, "Remarks Following a Meeting With Arab Foreign Ministers," October 17, 1973, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-following-meeting-with-arab-foreign-ministers; Richard Nixon, "Remarks of the President and King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabi at a State Dinner in Jidda," June 14, 1974, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-president-and-king-faisal-ibn-abdul-aziz-saudi-arabia-state-dinner-jidda,

[134] Richard Nixon, "Remarks at the Conclusion of Discussions With King Faisal of Saudi Arabia," June 15, 1974, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-conclusion-discussions-with-king-faisal-saudi-arabia.

[135] "U.S. Department of State, Conversation Among President Nixon, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, and General Alexander Haig, Washington, April 8, 1971," *FRUS 1969-1976* E-4:122.

[136] Richard Nixon, "Toasts of the President and the Shah of Iran," October 21, 1969, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/toasts-the-president-and-the-shah-iran-1.

[137] Richard Nixon, "Remarks on the Departure of the Shah of Iran," October 23, 1969, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-departure-the-shah-iran.

[138] Richard Nixon, "Joint Communique, Following Discussions With the Shah of Iran," May 31, 1972, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/joint-communiqu-following-discussions-with-the-shah-iran.

[139] Richard Nixon, "Toasts of the President and the Shah of Iran at a Dinner at the Iranian Embassy," July 25, 1973, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/toasts-the-president-and-the-shah-iran-dinner-the-iranian-embassy.

[140] Richard Nixon, "Remarks of Welcome to His Imperial Majesty, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran," July 24, 1973, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fourth-annual-report-the-congress-united-states-foreign-policy.

[141] Richard Nixon, "Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy," May 3. 1973, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fourth-annual-report-the-congress-united-states-foreign-policy.

[142] William P. Rogers, "Statement Before CENTO Ministerial Meeting, April 30," April 30, 1971, *Department of State Bulletin,* 65:692.

[143] William P. Rogers, "Visit to Saudi Arabia: Arrival Statement, Riyadh, May 1," May 8, 1971, *Department of State Bulletin,* 65:694.

[144] Joseph M. Sisco, "Assistance to Near Eastern and South Asian Nations," March 20, 1972, *Department of State Bulletin,* 66:607.

[145] Joseph J. Sisco, "department Discusses the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf Area," July2, 1973, *Department of State Bulletin (Jul-Dec),* 69:32.

[146] William P. Rogers, "Secretary Rogers Discusses Six Concerns of American Foreign Policy," May 21, 1973, *Department of State Bulletin,* 68:635

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CHAPTER TWO

Strategic Consensus and the Reagan Administration

In August 1978, the CIA told President Carter, "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a prerevolutionary state."[1] By November, the U.S. Ambassador to Iran dispatched a cable warning that the erstwhile "pillar" was wobbly: "the authority of the Shah has considerably shrunk. His support among the general public has become almost invisible… we need to think the unthinkable at this time."[2] On January 16, 1979, the "unthinkable" indeed occurred: The Shah left Iran. Eight months later, an Iranian mob of students stormed the U.S. embassy, took 66 Americans captive, and demanded "the criminal Shah" be repatriated to face trial under the new revolutionary regime in Tehran.[3]

Iran's descent into revolution shocked observers across the world, not least those watching from the United States. The plight of the hostages absorbed an inordinate amount of American attention; millions wrote letters, expressed outrage, and adorned their houses with yellow ribbons meant to signal solidarity with the captives.[4] The yellow ribbon, in the words of the *Washington Post*, gave form to the nation's "Irage" at Iran, achieving "mass visibility" as a symbol of Americans' anger at their country's perceived ineptitude on the global stage.[5] As Peter Feuerherd notes, the crisis coincided with a "transformation" in journalism that witnessed the massive growth of TV evening news audiences, satellite feeds, and more video coverage. Catalyzed by these developments, the Iran hostage crisis filled virtually every forum of public conversation as Americans tuned in daily for the latest plot twists and turns in their fellow citizens' captivity.[6]

Ted Koppel and the ABC news program *Nightline* typified this constant stream of reporting. Each night over the course of the 444 day hostage crisis, Koppel announced exactly how many days had passed since the U.S. embassy had been seized, creating the impression of "an entire nation held hostage."[7] On CBS, Walter Cronkite likewise closed each nightly news broadcast with a reminder of the number of days that had passed with the hostages in captivity.[8] This "nightly spectacle," according to media scholar Melani McAlister, became one of the most covered news stories in TV history.[9] Print media was little different; the *Washington Post*, for example, averaged three stories on Iran per day.[10]

The unending drama of the Iran hostage crisis harmed Carter politically.[11] While Carter enjoyed a spike in approval in the early days of the crisis, by October 1980, even articles that endorsed his reelection acknowledged his "failures" on Iran.[12] Carter's diary entry on the eve of the election testified to how press coverage of the hostage crisis undermined his bid for a second term: "[We were] getting some very disturbing public opinion poll results, showing massive slippage as people realized the hostages were not coming home. The anniversary date of their having been captured absolutely filled the news media…. This apparently opened up a flood of related concerns among the people that we were impotent."[13] The next day Carter lost the presidency.

Ronald Reagan was among the chorus of Carter critics. After a failed bid to unseat Ford for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976, Reagan gave speeches, wrote weekly columns, and provided radio commentary on current events, often using these venues to attack the former peanut farmer on defense and foreign policy.[14] While Reagan refrained from outright blaming Carter for the hostages being taken, he still obliquely criticized the president's handling of the crisis on the 1980 campaign trail.[15] To wit, he accused Carter of trying to make a "political

issue" out of the hostage situation in an attempt to garner sympathy.[16] Unlike the current administration, which was "surprised repeatedly," Reagan promised to "be prepared with contingency plans for future Irans."[17] On the stump he said, "I don't understand why 52 Americans have been held hostage for almost a year now."[18] Richard V. Allen, Reagan's future National Security Advisor, warned that Carter might "tilt" toward Iran by illicitly giving Tehran weapons in exchange for the hostages' return.[19] These attacks hammered home the message that Carter was, in Reagan's words, "totally oblivious" to national threats coming from overseas.[20]

After he won the presidency, Reagan entered office seeking to cast a fresh vision for international affairs.[21] In place of what he described as Carter's "litany of despair," Reagan sought to instill a more confident national attitude through a more active foreign policy posture.[22] Reagan's vision reflected public opinion. According to a *New York Times*/CBS poll, voters ranked the nation's foreign policy failures as the second largest issue of the campaign, and nearly twice as many Americans saw Reagan as a "strong leader" compared to Carter.[23] Reagan's 1981 inaugural address reflected this desire for renewal. Building on his campaign's call for a "crusade" against communism, Reagan rededicated the United States to the cause of liberty, declaring, "We will again be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom."[24] If, as John Lewis Gaddis writes, "Reagan's decisive victory was a mandate to reverse course and reassert American strength," then this path correction entailed a reinvigorated focus on the Cold War, anti-communism, and the rhetoric of freedom.[25]

Given his overarching focus on the Cold War, it makes sense that Reagan interpreted events occurring in the Middle East through the prism of the superpower rivalry. Reagan often saw Soviet mischief behind the series of crises that had erupted over the course of Carter's presidency. Salafi-Jihadist militants seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca; Ayatollah Khomeini

and the Revolutionary Council took total control of Iran; Syrian involvement intensified the Lebanese Civil War; the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan; and Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Iran, setting off a horribly bloody eight-year war.[26] Collectively, said one commentator, these conflicts presented "awesome problems for the Middle East and for American policy in the region."[27]

In the face of these challenges, the administration promulgated a new metaphor that organized all these disparate events into Reagan's Cold War narrative: *Strategic Consensus*. At root, the metaphor painted an image of the Middle East in which all the United States' allies were collectively engaged in the project of offsetting Soviet power and communist influence. This portrait of a consensus in the region implied that all Middle East allies shared the Reagan administration's view that the Soviet Union was the primary threat to their safety. It also suggested that these allies—rich and poor, republics and monarchies, Arabs and Israelis—should and would cooperate on security issues, with Washington playing a leading role.[28] Strategic Consensus, as with Twin Pillars, thereby advanced a view of the Middle East and Persian Gulf as a territory under Soviet threat. Yet Strategic Consensus moved beyond Twin Pillars by portraying allied countries in the region as dependent upon the U.S. government for leadership in defending against Soviet aggression. Strategic Consensus, in sum, painted a simplified picture by asserting that all these various allies shared a common threat perception and identical political goals.

Beyond a commitment to collaborate in fighting communism, however, it was unclear what exactly this strategy entailed. This lack of conceptual clarity opened the metaphor to criticism. Fred H. Lawson acerbically stated that Strategic Consensus meant "to promote US military sales to as many Middle Eastern governments as possible."[29] John Campbell criticized

Strategic Consensus for its lack of nuance. The administration's efforts, he predicted, would run into the hard reality that these "various nations… had very little or no consensus with each other."[30] Because of its ambiguity, it is perhaps unsurprising that Strategic Consensus failed to generate a transregional accord to fight communism, create a new anti-Soviet alliance, or bridge deep divides among allies.

Yet Strategic Consensus matters rhetorically, for the flattened image it projected helped shape Reagan's public interpretation of events in the Gulf over the course of his presidency.[31] The metaphor set in motion three specific trajectories. First, it encouraged Reagan officials to integrate U.S. Gulf strategy more closely with Saudi Arabia. These actions moved away from the clientelist relationship of Twin Pillars and kickstarted a much more extensive (and often covert) security partnership that met with mixed public approval. Second, the flat representation of Gulf politics stemming from Strategic Consensus supplied the Reagan administration with a ready-made formula for constructing threats to the Gulf. When the administration began to view Iran as an equal or greater danger to the flow of Gulf oil than the Soviet Union in 1984, Reagan shifted to describing Khomeini's regime in the same way he had talked about Moscow earlier in his tenure. Third, these images of Iran as an enemy circulated widely in press coverage, thus encouraging aggressive U.S. naval intervention in the Iran-Iraq War. The Iran-Contra scandal harmed Reagan not only due to its shock value, but also because it directly cut against these images conveyed by Strategic Consensus. Although this scandal revealed the administration's duplicity, it did not reverse negative U.S. attitudes toward Iran or prevent military escalation between the two nations late in Reagan's presidency. In the end, Strategic Consensus worked to collapse distinctions—distinctions between U.S. and Saudi aims, between the danger posed by

Soviet and Iranian aggression, and between Gulf security and American oil interests—in a manner that facilitated a more direct form of U.S. intervention in regional politics.

This chapter proceeds in several phases. First, I situate Reagan's utterances about the Gulf in the context of his larger foreign policy themes and rhetorical career. Next, I sketch the emergence of Strategic Consensus in the early Reagan administration and the initial diplomatic failure to sell it to American allies in the Middle East. Then, I more closely examine how the Strategic Consensus metaphor helped lay the groundwork for the rhetorical transformation of both Saudi Arabia and Iran in Reagan's public rhetoric. Finally, I discuss the Iran-Contra scandal and outline other lines of criticism levied at the administration's Gulf policy before I offer concluding thoughts on how these events reshaped views of U.S. responsibility in the Gulf.

Reagan: Communicator, Conservative, Cold Warrior

As Reagan stepped into office, many of his supporters held high hopes for what his presidency could accomplish. Hedrick Smith, for example, wrote that the president-elect was taking office at "a fascinating and quite remarkable moment in American political history," with the chance to "lead a political revolution" and rescue the nation from its "crippling sensation" of "national humiliation" rooted in Vietnam.[32] One of the reasons for this optimism was Reagan's giftedness as a communicator. Reagan's warm, "common sense" style had been honed over his decades as a film actor, TV host, radio newscaster, and politician.[33] For critics like Robert Dallek, Reagan's expertise in "symbolic politics" masked a lack of policy substance.[34] For Reagan's supporters like White House speechwriter Ken Katchigian, Reagan was winsome and relatable, possessing a "sense of theater" that enabled him to appeal beyond his conservative base.[35] After Barry Goldwater's presidential run, Reagan emerged on the national stage as the

"hottest new product on the Republican horizon."[36] His gifted storytelling and speaking ability eased his rise and earned him the moniker, "The Great Communicator."

Reagan also had a long track record of opposing communism. He often shared stories of how his eyes were opened to communist infiltration during his acting days in Hollywood.[37] As early as 1947 he cooperated with the FBI by tipping off investigators to specific actors who seemed to "follow the Communist Party line."[38] In 1961 he told the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, "Wars end in victory or defeat. One of the foremost authorities on communism in the world today has said we have ten years. Not ten years to make up our minds, but ten years to win or lose—by 1970 the world will be all slave or free."[39] He decried "lawless communism" in a 1967 address as Governor of California before the University of Southern California Law School: "Communism by definition is a government of men not of laws. It is the very antithesis of what our founding fathers had in mind when they laboriously and carefully designed our Constitution."[40] He opposed the 1975 Russian Grain Agreement, which sold over six million tons of U.S.-produced grain to Moscow, on the basis that the sale helped "a Godless tyranny maintain its hold on millions of helpless people."[41] In 1979 Reagan condemned Carter's normalization of ties with the People's Republic of China, warning "the nations of the world have seen us cold bloodedly betray a friend [Taiwan] for political expediency."[42] His anti-communism, like his oratorical aptitude, was well-established as he entered the nation's highest office.

Both of these characteristics—Reagan's rhetorical prowess and anti-communist sentiments—played a substantial role in how he conducted U.S. foreign policy. His foreign policy approach contained three main principles. First, he believed that the Soviet Union comprised the most powerful totalitarian regime in the world, rejecting God and denying its

people their legitimate rights. In line with a realist view of power politics, it was therefore the most dangerous source of evil in the world. Second, he supported a strong defense policy that entailed higher Pentagon spending but was ultimately meant to send the message that Moscow could not militarily win the Cold War. Third, Reagan, like his predecessors, saw the Cold War as, ultimately, a war of words. On one side stood democratic liberalism, which included a faith in the founders' vision and a belief that the American experiment was divinely blessed. On the other stood atheistic communism. He believed that since democracy reflected universal human drives for religious faith and freedom, it would win in the end. Reagan displayed "remarkable continuity" in adhering to these principles.[43]

These motifs permeated Reagan's foreign policy rhetoric. As a candidate, Reagan attacked Carter throughout the 1980 presidential race for his supposed weakness toward the Soviet Union. For example, Reagan assailed Carter for conducting "a foreign policy bordering on appeasement" and criticized the president for endangering "our national security—our credibility—and damaging American purposes by sending timid and even contradictory signals to the Soviet Union."[44] In place of Carter's foreign policy, Reagan promised to achieve "peace through strength."[45] As he said in the October 28 debate, "we cannot shirk our responsibility as the leader of the Free World, because we're the only one that can do that… America has never gotten in a war because we were too strong."[46] In his nomination acceptance speech, he declared that the United States' global mission was to safeguard the cause of freedom against its enemies: "the United States has an obligation to its citizens and to the people of the world never to let those who would destroy freedom dictate the future course of human life on this planet."[47] In Reagan's formulation, military strength and a dedication to freedom went hand-in-hand.

Reagan skillfully propagated this message over the course of his first term. "Tough rhetoric" alongside "an offer of diplomatic engagement" formed the heart of the Reagan administration's Soviet strategy, as one of his speechwriters later recalled.[48] These themes shone through in two specific speeches that captured, according to Reagan advisor Edwin Meese, the administration's "view of communism, the Soviet system, and the required free world response."[49] The first speech was Reagan's 1982 address before the British Parliament. Assuming the guise of a truth-teller, he declared, "If history teaches anything it teaches self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly." Reagan then called on his hearers to join "the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people."[50]

The other speech, Reagan's address to the National Association of Evangelicals in 1983, framed the superpower rivalry in overtly moral terms. He urged his audience to resist temptations "to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil." The Cold War, Reagan declared, was more than a military challenge; it was "a test of moral will and faith."[51] These speeches in Reagan's first term depicted the Cold War as a comprehensive struggle and hammered home the message that the United States had a responsibility to extend democratic liberties to those oppressed by Soviet communism.[52]

These themes continued into Reagan's second term. At the Brandenburg Gate, for instance, he followed his memorable appeal to Soviet leadership—"Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!"—with an exhortation to build allied power: "To be sure, we in the West must resist

Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength." Reagan asserted that the free world was able to build such defenses due to its principles. "In the 1950's, Khrushchev predicted: 'We will bury you,"' he recalled, "But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history… Even today, the Soviet Union cannot feed itself." Thus, he concluded, "Freedom leads to prosperity.… Freedom is the victor."[53] Reagan, in sum, preached the gospel of freedom and anti-communism throughout his presidency.[54]

Guided by this vision, the Reagan administration pursued an active foreign policy agenda. The president's images and metaphors, such as the "march of freedom" or "city on a hill," eased the path for efforts meant to combat communist power worldwide.[55] From U.S. rearmament to military interventions to supporting anti-communist guerrillas, Reagan pursued a muscular foreign policy meant to combat communist forces from Afghanistan to the Caribbean.[56] His sweeping rhetoric organized these policies into a potent narrative about democracy, freedom, and the United States triumphing over communism, atheism, and the Soviet Union.[57] Though China, North Vietnam, and other communist states still very much factored into the administration's strategic calculus, on a rhetorical level, Reagan tended to fixate on Moscow.[58] While communism everywhere was a problem, he wrote in a letter to a friend, "Russia is still enemy number one."[59]

Reagan's rhetoric applied this Soviet-centric, Cold War rhetorical template to the Middle East no less than other regions of the world. In the campaign Reagan repeatedly praised Israel as a valuable ally in the struggle against communism. He feared that the ongoing conflict in Lebanon might strengthen Soviet client states such as Syria or Iraq. And he thundered against the dangers posed by terrorists, often depicting them as being in cahoots with communists if not

communists themselves. After entering office, Reagan and his subordinates propagated a new metaphor to frame the Middle East as part of the larger battle between democracy and communism: Strategic Consensus.[60]

Creating a Consensus: Haig and the Early Reagan Administration

Besides promises to do "whatever we can do to promote peace," Reagan did not frequently get into the specifics of his Middle East policy during the 1980 campaign.[61] As his administration got underway, Reagan's team began articulating a new regional strategy centered on developing "consensus." Secretary of State Alexander Haig was the main spokesperson for this idea. He drew on stark images of Gulf instability to advance this new strategic plan. During his Senate confirmation hearing, for instance, Haig painted a dire picture: "At the head of the Persian Gulf, war between Iraq and Iran threatens the very lifeblood of many national economies. Iran itself, once a major force for regional stability, lurches from demonstration to demonstration, in a state of near anarchy." To address this chaotic state of affairs, he testified, "Our urgent task is to re-establish an effective foreign policy consensus."[62] This task entailed not only getting everyone in the administration on the same page, but also crafting agreement among U.S. Middle East allies on geostrategic questions. His aim was therefore to "form a consensus."[63] Haig's first order of business, consequently, was to gauge "the attitudes and sensitivities of the nations in the region" as the new administration built on the steps Carter had taken to ensure U.S. interests were protected in the Gulf.[64]

In other words, the administration hoped to foster a "regional consensus" that the Soviet Union was the primary military threat to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf. As Keith Krause records, the administration aimed to increase military cooperation among its diverse cast of

Middle East allies, believing that this process would "create converging perceptions of security interests" among those allies.[65] In an interview, Haig described administration Gulf policy as an attempt at "synchronization," or harmonizing the objectives of the United States and its allies so that they dealt with challenges "in tandem and in parallel and with coherence, one with the other."[66] The goal, as one report said, was to cultivate a "concept of the region as a single strategic entity."[67] In its grandest form, as an unnamed Egyptian official disclosed, Strategic Consensus would facilitate the creation of an "anti-Soviet military bloc" encompassing the entire Middle East.[68] In this way Strategic Consensus also reflected the assumptions of the Cold War, as the administration responded to the collapse of the Shah's regime by attempting to assemble a coalition of allied states to offset the influence of the Soviet Union in the region.

In portraying U.S. Gulf strategy in this way, Haig drew on a long history of American leaders depicting the nation's international aims in ways that glossed over divergences among allies. In his address asking Congress for a declaration of war against Germany, for example, Woodrow Wilson described the Great War as a conflict pitting "the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world… against selfish and autocratic power." In Wilson's telling, the war was about the conflict between democracy and autocracy. On one side stood "a league of honor, a partnership of opinion" that even included Tsarist Russia; as Wilson said, "Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart." America would join this "partnership of democratic nations" so that the "menace" of "Prussian autocracy" could not endanger "the ultimate peace of the world."[69] By flattening the complex conflict into a simple tale about democracy versus autocracy, Wilson advanced a more attractive rationale for war.

Similar examples abound. In his 1944 State of the Union address, FDR portrayed World War II in equally straightforward terms: "We have joined with like-minded people in order to defend ourselves in a world that has been gravely threatened with gangster rule."[70] At the start of the Korean War, Truman declared that "the free nations had learned the lesson of history," and they now joined together in "united and resolute action to put down lawless aggression."[71] When Eisenhower dispatched marines to Lebanon, he described the country as nascent democracy: "Lebanon has been a prosperous peaceful country, thriving on trade largely with the West. A little over a year ago there were general elections, held in an atmosphere of total calm." The United States therefore had an obligation to protect "tiny Lebanon" against "indirect aggression from without."[72] Lyndon Johnson pledged his full support for South Vietnam's "brave struggle for freedom… against the forces of enslavement, brutality, and material misery."[73] In each of these circumstances, the nature, values, and objectives of U.S. allies were portrayed in a simplified manner that papered over real, sometimes fundamental differences.

The Strategic Consensus metaphor performed this same function for the Reagan administration in the Middle East. It repackaged a complicated set of interrelated regional challenges into a more forthright Cold War project of aiding allies in their (ostensibly) shared fight against communism. Like the examples listed above, Strategic Consensus glossed over the serious differences among U.S. allies to put forward an image of these countries working alongside the United States in pursuit of a common aim. In this instance, that aim was to develop a coordinated defense against Soviet military power.

The diplomatic effort to realize Strategic Consensus got underway in the leadup to Haig's Middle East tour in April 1981. Days before his departure, Haig told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the administration wished to develop a "consensus of strategic

concerns" in the region; this policy, he said, would respond to "a greater sense of concern about the behavior of Soviet imperialism in the Middle Eastern area." As the *New York Times* reported on its front page, Haig's proposal would involve "some kind of unofficial and nonspecific arrangement to counter Soviet influence in the region."[74]

On his trip, Haig tried to sell Strategic Consensus in the face of hard skepticism from his Arab counterparts. In Egypt, Haig asserted "strategic consensus" did not mean putting "the peacekeeping process in a lower priority," but, as he put it, "The goal is to use the common concerns on strategic matters as a catalyst toward progress."[75] Haig spun his meeting in Jordan as best he could after King Hussein refused his proposals, saying they had "an essential convergence of views" on "strategic and regional matters."[76] In Saudi Arabia, Haig found the royal family shared his concern over Soviet aggression, but they completely rejected the idea of cooperating with Israel; rather, they blamed "Israeli intransigence" for the high degree of "turmoil and upheaval in the region."[77] Arab media voiced disdain for Haig's overtures.[78] One Kuwaiti newspaper even saw in Haig's visit a conspiracy, suggesting it was part of a Pentagon plot "prepared by military experts for invading the Arab oil fields."[79] Rather than generate agreement to coordinate a renewed fight against communism, Haig's trip did little more than reaffirm that America's Arab allies cared far more about the threat Israel posed to their security than the Soviet Union.

While Haig returned somewhat "battered" from these interactions, he remained committed to the Strategic Consensus idea.[80] Along with Reagan, Haig insisted that "illegal interventionisms by the Soviet Union" and Soviet "proxies and surrogates" were still the main driver of conflict and instability in the region.[81] He likewise told reporters that he met a "positive mood and attitude" when he shared Reagan's plan "to confront Soviet imperialism in the

region." The administration thus publicly reaffirmed its goal of creating and maintaining a "strategic consensus against the Soviets in the Middle East."[82]

Hence, while Haig's tour was something of a flop, the idea of cultivating some sort of regional accord continued to shape administration rhetoric.[83] "When I went to the Middle East in April-May, you will recall my talking about a strategic consensus," Haig told a reporter in late 1981, "Whether that's the right terminology for the phenomenon is less important than the fact that there is such a consensus."[84] During the administration's push to sell the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia that fall, Regan said that Riyadh was "as concerned about the threat to the Middle East by the Soviet Union, as, I think, we are."[85] State Department spokesman Dean Fischer asserted that the deal was part of the vision to build an inclusive "strategic consensus" that would include both Tel Aviv and Riyadh.[86] Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger likewise told the Senate that the deal "will promote our efforts to create a strategic consensus in the Southwest Asia region."[87] Asserting the "strategic importance of the Persian Gulf area," Reagan informed reporters he would find, "new and dramatic ways to protect and solidify the security and peace of the Middle East," telling them, "The Soviet Union continues its aggression, and the dynamics of the Persian Gulf are precarious."[88]

Although it was not entirely evident what "consensus" entailed in each of these instances, Reagan officials kept repeating it as the central label for the administration's overall approach to the Middle East. These public references faded after George P. Shultz replaced Haig as secretary of state in July 1982, however, and the term ceased to be used as a catch-all label for the administration's Middle East policy soon afterward. Yet while the label itself may have fallen out of favor, the Strategic Consensus metaphor laid the groundwork for the administration's Gulf

strategy as its flattened, Cold War-centric image involving the region's actors continued to inform Reagan's rhetoric and policy.

The Rhetoric of Strategic Consensus: American Leadership in the Gulf

As a metaphor, Strategic Consensus offers significant insight into the Reagan administration's thinking about the Gulf. As Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer write, "Metaphors tell us not only about the political world as it is, but also as we should like it to be."[89] In this instance, Strategic Consensus reveals an administration that wished to refract regional politics through a Cold War lens, thereby making sense of the many crises of the Carter years by reinterpreting them as part of the larger struggle against the Soviet Union.[90] Strategic Consensus offered an image of the Middle East where U.S. interests and those of its allies perfectly overlapped and they all worked together to fight Moscow. In this vein the metaphor provided what Lakoff and Johnson call "orientation," or a sense of policy direction for Reagan and his subordinates to follow in the Gulf.[91]

The logic of the Strategic Consensus metaphor contained three interrelated parts. First, it positioned the Middle East, especially the Gulf, as a geopolitical battleground.[92] The region's energy resources were being targeted by an aggressive power, hence the necessity of an organized area defense. Haig cast the Soviet Union in this role. Strategic Consensus thus borrowed from images of Soviet "savagery," Twin Pillars symbolism, and Reagan's other foreign policy utterances to assert that Moscow presented a danger to the Gulf's security.[93] However, the metaphor was not *necessarily* anti-communist, as other states could presumably seek to dominate the Gulf's oil reserves as well. In line with the Carter Doctrine, the logic of

Strategic Consensus thereby dictated a U.S.-led response to would-be regional "hegemons" seeking control over Gulf oil.[94]

Second, Strategic Consensus painted a binary view of regional politics. At the heart of Haig's plan was the notion that all the nation's Middle East allies—Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and maybe other Gulf sheikdoms—should coordinate with Washington and each other to offset the Soviet threat to Gulf oil. This proposal depended on a view of world politics in which the superpower rivalry trumped all other foreign policy considerations.[95] It therefore relied on an understanding of the international scene in which the Cold War took absolute primacy.[96] On a symbolic level, this aspect of Strategic Consensus was supported by rhetoric that depicted allies as sharing a non-contentious, businesslike agreement with the United States and each other on matters of global strategy, regional defense, and the supposed Soviet threat to the Gulf.

Third, Strategic Consensus presumed U.S. leadership of Middle East defense. After the collapse of the Shah, Carter dispatched Defense Secretary Harold Brown to visit the Middle East. Upon his return, Brown announced that the free flow of Gulf oil was "clearly part of our vital interests" which the United States would defend "with whatever means are appropriate, including military force where necessary."[97] To that end, Carter approved the creation of a "rapid deployment force," enabling the U.S. military to intervene quickly in the case of a Gulf crisis.[98] Strategic Consensus represented the next step of this thinking—that it was the United States' role to actively coordinate Gulf defense. And indeed, Reagan expanded the rapid deployment force into U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1983.[99] Strategic Consensus attended these developments insofar as it conveyed a vision of Gulf security in which the United States played the leading role in marshalling allies toward a coordinated, collective defense. In this manner, Strategic Consensus built on the symbolic foundation of American responsibility laid by Twin

Pillars and the Carter Doctrine, taking the notion of a U.S. obligation to defend its friends in the Gulf from aggression a step further by developing military strategies in which American troops would play a leading role in fighting off Soviet, communist, or otherwise hostile enemy forces.

Critically, the binary picture painted by Strategic Consensus—Soviet communism versus the United States and its allies—superimposed a Cold War frame on Gulf politics. Under the dualistic logic of this depiction, any threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf was presumed to be a pro-Soviet move (and vice versa). Since Strategic Consensus conflated fighting the Cold War with safeguarding U.S. interests, especially the flow of Gulf oil to allied markets, the metaphor thus facilitated the redefinition and expansion of U.S. efforts to protect its oil access in the name of fighting Soviet aggression. The Strategic Consensus metaphor thereby encouraged U.S. military intervention in the Gulf by framing the region through the zero-sum lens of the Cold War.

While administration figures did not spell out each step in this thinking formally, the logic of Strategic Consensus continued to permeate their internal discussions of Gulf security. For example, on June 14, 1982, the National Security Council Planning Group (NSPG) sent a memo to Reagan outlining U.S. strategy with the Arab states of the Gulf. While it did not invoke Strategic Consensus outright, the document called for a strategy designed to "exploit opportunities to strengthen our strategic posture in the region and weaken Soviet influence, while enhancing the perception of key regional states that cooperation with us serves their national interests."[100] In like fashion, the NSPG meeting of November 7, 1983, offered a summary of U.S. objectives in the Gulf. At the top of the list was "[k]ey should be to protect our friends," alongside the aim of preventing Gulf states from being tempted to "turn to Soviets" out of an "accommodationist streak." The paper's main policy proposal had to do with how, not whether, the United States should coordinate Gulf defense; the question was "that of our posture in the

event of hostilities and our willingness to predeploy forces that can help to deter and effectively cope with new violence."[101] These reports illustrate how offsetting hostile influence, aligning allies with U.S. interests, and enhancing American military posture in the region all went together as a cohesive strategy in the minds of Reagan administration officials.

These ideas also appeared in Reagan's public statements during his first years as president. As mentioned above, appeals to Strategic Consensus played a large role in the administration's successful legislative battle to sell the AWACS defense system to Saudi Arabia in the fall of 1981.[102] They resurfaced in a March 1983 presidential address on national security. Reagan warned of Soviet "bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen, near the Persian Gulf oil fields… Some people may still ask: Would the Soviets ever use their formidable military power? Well, again, can we afford to believe they won't?" In response to this perceived threat, Reagan declared, "we're building a real capability to assist our friends in the vitally important Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region."[103] By portraying the Soviets as an imperialistic menace to Gulf oil and the United States as its leading defender in concert with local friends, Reagan's rhetoric reiterated the images of Strategic Consensus even though the actual phrase did not cross his lips.

The logic of Strategic Consensus played a key role in facilitating a much closer security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. This partnership was reflected in administration actions and rhetoric that portrayed Saudi Arabia and the United States as seamlessly aligned in their regional goals. Strategic Consensus also supplied a familiar rhetorical formula administration officials could apply to Iran once they started to see Khomeini's regime as a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf (especially oil) on par with Moscow. I now turn to show how these changing perceptions of each former "pillar" spread through administration discussions, Reagan's public rhetoric, and press coverage.

Saudi Arabia: From Unstable Autocracy to Unquestioned Ally

Perhaps the most significant development that sprang from Strategic Consensus was the deepening of U.S.-Saudi ties under Reagan. This integration led to cooperation across a number of issues, ranging from keeping the Gulf free for oil tankers to arming "freedom fighters" in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and elsewhere. To justify this closer relationship, Reagan had to confront fears that Saudi Arabia was a danger to Israel and/or an unstable ally like Iran under the Shah. Although press coverage of Saudi Arabia was nowhere near as uniformly positive as Reagan's rhetoric, the image of Riyadh fighting communism and the Soviet Union alongside America circulated widely.

While the United States and Saudi Arabia had friendly ties going back to FDR, their relationship matured into a *bona fide* security partnership under Reagan. The Saudis, as Weinberger recalled in an interview, were given a "very high priority" in U.S. defense planning: "We worried about Soviet domination. We needed firm friends in the region."[104] The administration acted accordingly. It passed the AWACS deal in 1981 despite a fierce effort by pro-Israel groups to defeat the sale.[105] Saudi Arabia, in turn, financed "all sorts of operations all over the world" undertaken by the Reagan administration to fight Soviet influence.[106] To cite but one example, in Afghanistan the Saudis matched U.S. financial aid used to arm anti-Soviet guerrilla groups to the tune of half a billion dollars.[107] "If you knew what we were really doing for America," Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan once said to an American journalist, "you wouldn't just give us AWACS, you would give us nuclear weapons."[108] Although the Iran-Contra scandal and Saudi Arabia's clandestine deal to acquire East Wind missiles from China chilled ties near the end of Reagan's time in office, his eight years in the White House indisputably upgraded the two countries' partnership to new heights.[109]

Such a dramatic deepening of U.S.-Saudi ties would not have seemed likely to many Americans at the start of the Reagan presidency. Still shaken by the revolution in Iran, a 1980 poll found that 43 percent of Americans believed it was "almost certain or somewhat likely" that enemies of the United States would take over Saudi Arabia in the near future.[110] Concerns over Saudi stability spilled onto the pages of the nation's newspapers. During the debate over the AWACS sale, for instance, a single issue of the *Los Angeles Times* had three reader letters weigh in on the deal. None expected the sale to pass, even though, as the third stated, Riyadh was "grievously underprotected."[111]

Reagan's response to these fears led him to issue the "Reagan Corollary" to the Carter Doctrine. On October 1, Reagan was asked, "when the Shah fell, the United States lost much top secret military equipment in Iran… [can you guarantee that the AWACS system] will not compromise American security or would not fall into the wrong hands?" He responded: "I wasn't here then. And Iran—I have to say that Saudi Arabia, we will not permit to be an Iran."[112] When pressed later in the news conference, he reiterated his pledge to keeping the oil flowing and preserving the stability of the "most important" OPEC nation. "There is no way," Reagan said, "no way that we could stand by and see that [Saudi Arabia] taken over by anyone that would shut off that oil."[113] The next day the *New York Times* plastered across the top of its front page, "Reagan Says U.S. Would Bar a Takeover in Saudi Arabia that Imperiled Flow of Oil: Rules Out 'An Iran.'"[114]

Two days later, William Safire penned a *New York Times* column titled, "The Reagan Corollary." The former Nixon speechwriter contended that the president's statements constituted "the Reagan Corollary to the Carter Doctrine," which meant "the U.S. has guaranteed both the territorial integrity and the internal stability of Saudi Arabia."[115] While Reagan did not formally

accept this designation in public, he and his subordinates continued to emphasize, as State Department official Robert H. Pelletreau said, that "the unrestricted flow of oil from the gulf is vital… Our commitment to freedom of commerce and navigation in the international waters of the gulf is firm."[116] Th administration thus tacitly accepted Safire's description of a "corollary."

Contained in these statements, writes Bruce R. Kuniholm, was an understanding that Washington would not allow the Saudi regime to collapse. Unfolding alongside Haig's Strategic Consensus campaign, these statements thus gave policy form to the image of cooperation and U.S. leadership advanced by the metaphor. In addition to a presidential restatement that the United States would fight to protect its access to Gulf oil, the Reagan Corollary positioned Saudi Arabia to become the new "cornerstone" of U.S. Gulf policy months into Reagan's presidency and supplied a demonstration of the young administration's intent to assume a more direct hand in coordinating Gulf security.[117]

The centrality of Saudi Arabia to defense planners was reflected in administration discussions and decisions. In 1983, Shultz briefed Reagan on the "strategically important relationship," for example, telling him, "Saudi Arabia has worked very hard for our common objectives."[118] When it appeared Iran could capture Basra and conquer southern Iraq—something U.S. officials saw as an "Armageddon" type event—Reagan's national security advisor told him he should expect the Saudis "to turn to us for protection."[119] Reagan responded by fulfilling Saudi requests to share geospatial intelligence with Iraq and by approving National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 139 that highlighted "the leading role of Saudi Arabia" in formulating a response to the Iran-Iraq War.[120] Reagan invoked his emergency powers to transfer defensive systems to Saudi Arabia after its shipping had been attacked in 1984.[121] This pro-Saudi language continued in Reagan's second term. The briefing material prepared for Vice President

Bush's 1986 visit to the kingdom, for instance, stressed Riyadh's role in "stabilizing the strategic defense of the Arabian Gulf," and Bush promised that Washington would defend their "common security objectives." [122] In sum, the kingdom stood at the heart of U.S. Gulf strategy.[123]

Saudi Arabia's importance to American strategists carried over into the world of espionage. After Reagan issued NSDD 166, which instructed the CIA to try to force a "complete Soviet withdrawal" from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia boosted its public and private support for Afghan resistance groups.[124] Riyadh served as an intermediary with other Arab regimes and funded Iraq's war against Iran. The Saudis also gave upwards of $500 million a year to prop up Sudan, which opposed Soviet-friendly regimes in Libya and Ethiopia, and gave money to U.S.-backed causes in Yemen, Angola, Lebanon, and Nicaragua.[125] According to news correspondent Martin Sieff, Reagan's tenure "was the golden age of the special relationship" with Saudi Arabia.[126] This "golden age" was the direct outworking of the logic of Strategic Consensus, as the two nations directed one covert operation after another against left-wing and Soviet-backed forces across the globe on top of their cooperation on matters of military security in the Gulf.

In his public speeches, Reagan executed two rhetorical maneuvers that echoed the positive view of Saudi Arabia inside the administration. First, building on the Strategic Consensus metaphor, he continually described the desert kingdom as a country aligned with U.S. interests. The two countries enjoyed, he said, "more than a half-century of warm, constructive, and mutually beneficial relations."[127] In the wake of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, Reagan credited Saudi Arabia for having "a very definite hand" in negotiating a "first step" toward peace.[128] On another occasion he argued that the rapprochement between the two countries represented a broader alliance between "the Islamic world and the Western democracies," and he

thus called for "a more powerful recognition of the common interests shared by these two significant world forces."[129]

These utterances carried the whiff of Twin Pillars at times, as Reagan ascribed Saudi power to keeping the Soviets at bay. In 1987, for instance, Reagan affirmed that Saudi military abilities "are directly related to the protection of our long-term interests in the Persian Gulf." Lest his point be lost, he stated in no uncertain terms, "Saudi Arabia is our staunchest ally in the Gulf in resisting the Soviet efforts to establish a presence in the Middle East."[130] Yet these words painted a slightly different picture than Twin Pillars. For Reagan, Saudi Arabia was not expected to stand on its own; rather, it complemented U.S. leadership on everything from peacekeeping to counter-terrorism to containment.[131] The image in Reagan's rhetoric was one of partnership that grew out of the Strategic Consensus campaign from the start of Reagan's time in the White House.

His view was not universally shared among other foreign policy figures. This included many members of Congress who suspected that a strong Saudi Arabia might someday threaten Israel. Thus, Reagan's second maneuver was to continually assert that Saudi Arabia contributed not only to U.S. security but also to the safety of Israel. In late 1981, he argued, "the greatest security for the United States and the greatest security for Israel rests with the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia."[132] On multiple occasions he praised Riyadh for being "willing to arrive at peace agreements with Israel."[133] And he commonly described American relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel in collective terms, such as when he said the two countries helped the United States advance "the twin causes of peace and freedom" in the Middle East.[134] These kinds of statements imitated the Strategic Consensus metaphor insofar as they papered over Saudi-

Israeli divisions and suggested that all three countries harmoniously cooperated in pursuit of identical goals.

Press coverage of Saudi Arabia during the Reagan years yielded a mixed verdict. On one hand, many media outlets recirculated the administration's image of Saudi Arabia as a supportive partner in the Cold War and the Gulf. This press depiction of U.S.-Saudi alignment was particularly evident in descriptions of Fahd, who became king in June 1982. As far back as 1979, Fahd had been described as "a rather firm member of the 'pro-American' school" within the Saudi royal family.[135] Upon his coronation, *New York Times* coverage hailed him as "the leading figure in a progressive, modernizing faction within the tradition-minded monarchy," as having "pro-Western attitudes and preferences," and as an "Ally of [the] West."[136] It frequently cited experts who portrayed Fahd as fully on board with Reagan's foreign policy agenda such as William B. Quandt, who said, "It takes King Fahd about 10 seconds to write a check." The newspaper also regularly quoted unnamed sources who described Fahd in similar terms, including one former diplomat: "They have been terrific in lots of places. Any time we needed them to pay for something, we always turned to the Saudis."[137] Fahd's intent on matters of Cold War and Gulf security were rarely questioned by U.S. press outlets.

This was a comparison the president encouraged. Like himself, Reagan claimed, King Fahd found "radical elements" in the region "unacceptable."[138] For his part, Fahd voiced similar notes as Reagan when it came to Iran. The king said he would only restore relations with the Tehran "if it abandoned its criminal manner."[139] If Strategic Consensus advanced an image of the United States and its allies as fully aligned, this was a picture Fahd and his fellow royals did much to reaffirm.

Indeed, press coverage frequently emphasized how Washington relied on the Saudis to coordinate diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. This trend appeared regularly in *New York Times* articles. The paper reported how the administration "leaned heavily on the Saudis" to restore the United States' image after the Lebanon debacle; it also noted when Riyadh put "pressure on Baghdad" to end the Iran-Iraq War at U.S. and U.N urging.[140] Robert Neumann added to these assessments, praising Saudi Arabia's "discreet and indirect" efforts to mollify its "radical neighbors" such as Syria.[141] In line with this thinking, foreign policy analysts such as Ian Lustick credited the Saudis for being "fundamentally willing to join Egypt in pursuit of a peace agreement" with Israel.[142]

Press coverage depicted Saudi Arabia as fully aligned with the United States in other ways as well.[143] Dankwart A. Rustow called Saudi Arabia the leader of the Arab world's "pro-Western forces."[144] Michael Sterner warned the world, "the defense system worked out between themselves [the Saudis] and the United States is indeed operationally effective."[145] In his analysis of Soviet foreign policy, Evan Luard said that Moscow had an interest in improving relations with Riyadh as a means to "maintaining a fruitful superpower relationship" with the United States.[146] Mazher Hameed argued that Saudi actions, such as "efforts to deter Iranian attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf," had "demonstrated the wisdom of Washington's decisions to coordinate Gulf security with Saudi Arabia and build up Saudi defensive strength."[147] A *Reader's Digest* article published after the 1986 Challenger explosion even thanked providence that Sultan bin Salman, a Saudi royal, "fortunately" went unharmed on his NASA flight the year prior.[148]

Reader's Digest in particular voiced strong support for the Saudis, which is perhaps not a surprise given the magazine's strong anti-communist tone. Articles praised Riyadh for its efforts

to combat Soviet influence, coordinate with other Arab countries, and negotiate with Israel. For example, a feature on Jordan's King Hussein mentioned how he partnered with the Saudis "along the Gulf to maintain stability in the region and help thwart Soviet designs on Middle East oil."[149] Sounding similar notes as Reagan, another article lauded the "inherent anti-communist, anti-Soviet feeling" felt in Riyadh.[150] And a remarkable feature, coauthored by Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, called on Reagan to work with Saudi Arabia "in the background" to "snatch peace from the cauldron that has been the Middle East."[151] These articles relied on an implicit view of Riyadh as an unalloyed U.S. ally whose interests were virtually indistinguishable from those of the United States. They thereby rearticulated, at least on a tacit level, the same image of Saudi Arabia conveyed by the Strategic Consensus metaphor.

On the other hand, not all reporting was so positive. While a wide swath of press coverage recirculated the image of the countries in lockstep on strategic issues, numerous commentators still questioned Saudi Arabia's actual fighting capability.[152] For example, foreign policy experts such as Joseph Sisco, now working in private industry, voiced skepticism that Saudi leaders would prove reliable in a crisis. According to him, "normal Saudi diffidence" would likely prevent the Saudis from being able to sway Gulf events in a major way.[153] In similar fashion, *New York Times* news coverage frequently stressed the lack of Saudi military preparedness; as one report stated, the kingdom's armed forces were not capable of effectively executing "countermeasures" in the event of a Saudi or Iranian military confrontation.[154] A steady stream of stories questioned Riyadh's ability to fight alongside the United States should the situation demand it.[155] A *Times* report in 1984 noted that Saudi leaders had "failed to make progress" in developing collective defense plans with their Arab neighbors, the result being "if

Iran should strike at the Gulf states' oil installations, only the United States could effectively come to their aid."[156]

Other commentators denounced the nature of the Saudi regime, arguing that the absolute monarchy was unlikely to prove an obstacle for U.S. enemies in the region. Walter Levy, for instance, expressly blamed "the antiquated nature" of the Saudi government for exacerbating the "structural threats that are confronting world oil operations."[157] Christopher Van Hollen bluntly termed Saudi Arabia "an extraordinarily weak state."[158] James A. Bill asserted the House of Saud was "under great pressure at home from Populist Islam."[159] William Griffith combined fears of a "predatory" Soviet Union with concerns over the royal family's longevity: "[Like Iran], Saudi Arabia's rulers are also under the fundamentalist gun."[160] Taken together, these various analyses collectively downgraded Saudi Arabia's reliability and directly questioned the Reagan administration's picture of the Gulf kingdom as a credible defense partner.

Even among the handful of foreign policy commentators who sympathized with the administration's Gulf strategy, few believed that Saudi Arabia posed a credible block to Soviet military power. For example, Smith Hempstone warned, "Saudi Arabia is both our greatest asset and our most pressing problem; if we lose it, we lose the basis of the Western industrial world."[161] Like many other commentators, Hempstone argued that building a Gulf security framework around Riyadh might prove precarious. Along with news coverage highlighting Saudi military unpreparedness, this line of analysis portrayed Saudi Arabia less as an ally to be counted upon in a critical moment and more as a prize to be defended from the depredations of America's rivals around the world.

In sum, press coverage of Saudi Arabia was far more complicated than the administration's image of the desert kingdom. However, many of the critiques directed at the

U.S.-Saudi partnership attacked Saudi Arabia's military ineptitude and the wisdom of relying on Riyadh in a crisis. This means that negative coverage did not primarily contest the image of U.S.-Saudi alignment found in Strategic Consensus and Reagan's rhetoric. The debate over Saudi Arabia centered on Saudi effectiveness, not Saudi cooperation.

It seems fair, therefore, to conclude that these criticisms did not outweigh the substantial swath of press coverage that did propagate the picture painted by Reagan of the United States and Saudi Arabia fighting side-to-side against terrorism, communism, and "radical" forces across the Middle East. By depicting Saudi Arabia and especially Fahd as acting in concert with the administration, these sources amplified Reagan's portrayal of the kingdom as a virtual extension of American power in the Gulf. Bolstered by the efforts of D.C.-based political lobbyists such as Frederick Dutton and Michael Deaver, these depictions helped improve the kingdom's reputation in the United States.[162] By 1988, only 12 percent of Americans thought Washington should weaken ties with Riyadh.[163] More Americans believed Saudi Arabia was "doing more to bring peace to the Middle East" than Israel.[164] And a clear majority of Americans considered Saudi Arabia an ally or close friend and supported sending troops to protect it if it faced invasion.[165]

These changes in public perception represent a major rhetorical legacy of Strategic Consensus. Notwithstanding the damages wrought by the Iran-Contra scandal and Saudi Arabia's secret purchase of Chinese missiles in 1987, American ties with Saudi Arabia deepened considerably under Reagan. On a rhetorical level, these changes were marked by fresh depictions of Saudi Arabia as the United States' main ally in the Gulf that was helping offset Soviet, Iranian, and radical influence in the region. Press coverage recirculated this image of Saudi Arabia even as analysts argued over Riyadh's reliability and military effectiveness. As an

outgrowth of Strategic Consensus, this rhetorical reinvention of the Saudi regime was matched only by that of its Gulf rival, Iran.

Iran: An American Enemy

While Iran did not fit neatly within the picture painted by Strategic Consensus, the metaphor also helped shape how the Reagan administration interpreted the revolutionary state's actions. It was a tale of two terms. During the first four years of the Reagan era, the president described Iran in criminal language, drawing on metaphors of misconduct to depict the revolutionary regime as a violator of international law. The image of Iran as a miscreant fit well with Haig's initial Strategic Consensus campaign, which viewed the Soviet Union as the primary source of regional disorder. By the second Reagan term, however, the administration had come to view Iran as a major threat to U.S. Gulf oil access, and it shifted from the rhetoric of criminality to that of enemyship. Drawing overt equivalences between the menace posed by Iran and the Soviet Union in the Gulf, Reagan borrowed from language he used earlier to describe communists to vilify the regime in Tehran. In the picture conveyed by Reagan's rhetoric, Iran sought to impose its tyrannical rule on the entire Gulf while cutting off the flow of needed oil to the free world as an outgrowth of its anti-American hatred. This image found purchase in press coverage, which maligned the revolutionary Islamic republic. In the process, these outlets also circulated Reagan's equivalence between Persian Gulf security and U.S. oil access.

As neither a U.S. ally nor communist state, Tehran did not feature prominently in the administration's early efforts to rally regional allies against the Soviet Union. Instead, Reagan used the language of criminality to describe Iran in his public utterances. He told reporters that Iran should "have a government that would abide by international law" if it wished for better relations with the United States; when asked if he would permit oil companies to return there, he

questioned whether Iran could even enforce its own laws: "we don't think their safety can be guaranteed there."[166] Reagan highlighted Iran's delinquency again when the hostages returned, saying that it should "be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."[167] In a statement honoring the freed hostages, he contrasted their "dignity, determination, and quiet courage" with the "abuse of their captors."[168] This "heroism," he said, was something "the Iranians did not understand."[169]

To reinforce this characterization, Reagan commonly accused Iran of committing acts of terrorism. He did so in the 1980 campaign: "In Iran, terrorism has been elevated to the level of national policy."[170] Weeks into his presidency, Reagan thanked Margaret Thatcher "for British efforts to bring the American prisoners home from Iran," in the next breath announcing, "together we will work to continue to confront the scourge of international terrorism."[171] Indeed, Reagan invoked the threat of "international terrorism" rather often in reference to Iran.[172] For example, in a 1982 address Reagan called for "a political settlement in the Iran-Iraq conflict," then immediately exhorted hearers to continue the "fight against international terrorism."[173] Other times Reagan referenced "the threat which international terrorism presents to the free world" and the dire peril "terrorism and intimidation" in the Middle East posed for "our national security and economic well-being."[174] These utterances obliquely implied Iranian misconduct at the same time Reagan portrayed the Middle East as a "perilous" and endangered region.

Reagan's references to Iran as a criminal state worked to isolate Tehran. As Bryan J. McCann writes, "Criminality is not a static site of meaning but highly contingent… rhetorics of law and order inscribe markers of fear." Those markers, in turn, function "to justify their [criminals] surveillance and confinement." By invoking fears associated with Khomeini's regime—terrorism, lawlessness, and the hostage crisis—Reagan's utterances helped justify a

policy of isolating Iran, portraying it as a rogue, felonious state.[175] Policing—not military confrontation—was the logic of this rhetoric of criminality.

Since Khomeini was hardly a communist, this rhetorical formula offered a way for Reagan to make sense of Iran within the Strategic Consensus framework.[176] As an outlaw state, Iran was ruled by a "fanatical theocracy" beyond the pale of both normal international conduct and the typical rules of the Cold War.[177] Shultz labeled Tehran a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984.[178] By 1985 Reagan had identified Iran as the origin of a "whole pattern of terrorist assaults in recent years." This pattern, he argued, epitomized how the revolutionary state relied on "intimidation, terror, and outright acts of war" to seek its "totalitarian" aims. Invoking the imagery of frontier justice, Reagan then concluded that the United States should treat Iran like it did all such "squalid criminals," "outlaw states," and "lawbreakers." Like a cop, he promised to act "with the full weight of the law" to "deal legally with lawlessness."[179] By summoning the metaphor of a sheriff-outlaw duel, Reagan's depiction of U.S.-Iranian relations portrayed the Khomeini regime as a menace to, but not necessarily a usurper of, the Gulf order.[180] This image preserved the message of Strategic Consensus that the Soviets comprised the main threat.

Several press outlets echoed the president's characterization of Iran. A *Reader's Digest* account of the revolution lamented how "Khomeini and the radical clerics" were able to "impose their almost fundamentalist concept of an Islamic state upon the country," defeating the "moderates and liberals" who "envisioned a pluralistic society with government essentially on democratic, Western lines." Its conclusion could have come from a Reagan campaign speech: "The United States should be seen turning away from criminals, not trying to deal with them."[181] Elaine Sciolino likened "the atmosphere of terror" in Tehran to the French Revolution in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*; the regime, in her 1983 estimation, "will remain Islamic, repressive

and revolutionary."[182] Shahram Chubin similarly claimed that Iran used "official terrorism" to facilitate "the export of the revolution" into neighboring countries.[183] In his obituary for "Receding Peace Prospects," Larry L. Fabian enumerated "threats to conservative Arab states emanating from Iran." These "Iran-backed groups," he said, fomented "instability" and had been identified as the "perpetrators of the recent terrorism" inflicting the Gulf region.[184] A letter to the *New York Times* decried "inhumane and lawless" Iran's "senseless savagery."[185] Each of these depictions was consistent with Reagan's rhetoric of criminality insofar as they fixated on the Iranian regime's threat to its neighbors and atrocities against its own people. By rearticulating the criminal image of Iran—a terrorist backer, but not the primary Gulf adversary or a true danger to American oil access—they amplified Reagan's portrayal of Khomeini's Tehran.

This assessment of Iran began to change near the end of Reagan's first term as the administration started to modify its internal evaluation of the situation in the Gulf. A May 1984 NSC report reveals this shift in thinking. Titled, "Politically Sensitive Approach to Enhanced Military Cooperation with the Key Gulf Arabs," the paper first reiterated the administration's "illusive goal" of organizing "a truly multilateral effort to defend Western access to the Gulf." The report then enumerated the various threats facing the Gulf. "Although the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is a constant reminder of the larger 'menace,'" it stated, "the stalemate and attrition warfare in Afghanistan have made that less immediate and less poignant." Consequently, the paper argued, a new danger had emerged on par with the Soviet Union: "Iran and its peculiar brand of Islamic fundamentalism has become the most immediate threat to the moderate Arabs."[186] By formally arguing that Iran represented a more direct security threat to American allies in the Gulf than the Soviet Union, this report captured a broader shift away from the strict fixation on Moscow originally promoted by the Strategic Consensus metaphor.

Reagan had long called the revolutionary regime in Iran a danger, characterizing it as a lawless, malevolent actor on the world stage. He had denounced the "barbaric persecution" of the Bahai faithful in Iran; he regularly said that Tehran was a place where "international law and common decency were mocked."[187] But whereas it was common for Reagan to criticize Iran in his public utterances, at no time prior to this reassessment did the president say Tehran was as dangerous as Moscow to U.S. interests and allies in the Gulf.

The change in the administration's thinking shone most clearly in Weinberger's June 1987 report to Congress on Gulf security. The 28-page document was intended to address legislative fears that Reagan had made "an open-ended unilateral American commitment to defend all non-belligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf." As the report detailed, the free world was "heavily dependent on oil," which meant "our vital national interests are at stake in the Gulf." Although Moscow was still likely to try to "manipulate the movement of Persian Gulf oil," Weinberger's summary continued, "the threat of Iranian hegemony over the Gulf" presented an equal hazard to the "free flow of oil."[188]

This language marked an evolution from the picture of the Gulf painted by Haig and Strategic Consensus. Like Haig, Weinberger distilled an image of the Persian Gulf as under terrific threat from an imperialistic aspirant to regional dominance. Unlike Haig, Weinberger identified Iran, not the Soviet Union, as this dangerous foe. This portrayal of Iran as an equal if not greater threat than the Soviets thus grew out of the original image put forth by the Reagan administration during Haig's initial push for Strategic Consensus.

The body of the report went into more detail on the Iranian threat to the Gulf. It restated what had been U.S. policy throughout the Cold War: "Since the Gulf is a region of vital economic importance… we have a strategic interest in ensuring that it does not come under the

domination or hegemony of a power hostile to the United States." This language echoed the Carter Doctrine, which had stated that any "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America."[189] However, Weinberger deviated from these previous U.S. statements by singling out Iran, not just Moscow, as one such potential enemy that could dominate the Gulf. As the report cautioned, there existed "an historic Iranian penchant for hegemony over the Gulf," and Tehran still claimed "predominate responsibility for security in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf as a whole." Should Iran achieve regional dominance, Defense Secretary Weinberger concluded, the result "would be disastrous."[190] The strongly implied message was that the United States needed to take greater measures to stop Iran.

The magnitude of this development can be seen in how the report described Gulf domination by Moscow or Tehran as equally menacing possibilities. Either "Soviet or Iranian hegemony in the Gulf," it stated, would represent a serious "strategic setback." The report portrayed U.S. efforts to combat Iranian and Soviet influence as equivalent, reassuring readers, "we have the ability to blunt both Soviet and Iranian threats to our interests."[191] While these sentences might not seem significant, they heralded a larger breakthrough in the way policymakers discussed Gulf security. For the first time since the beginning of the Cold War, U.S. defense planners talked about a country other than the Soviet Union as a hostile power that might be able to dominate the Gulf and its oil.

On a rhetorical level, this shift in thinking was characterized by a transition from the language of criminality to the language of enemyship. Paul Achter notes that "enemy-making" is a rhetorical process that involves "the active and ongoing construction of an enemy who must be vanquished."[192] By constructing enemies via rhetorical processes of naming, estrangement, and

escalation, as Jeremy Engels observes in *Enemyship*, rulers can "bolster their authority and manufacture consent."[193] The construction of enemy others thereby functions to generate unanimity by rallying the polity against terrible and dangerous foes. In the context of foreign policy, the language of enemyship provides rhetorical cover for leaders to prosecute aggressive policies against those identified as enemies of the nation.[194] By drifting into the language of enemyship to describe Iran, the administration set the stage for greater American military action against Iran in the Gulf. In so doing, it applied the same formula used to depict the Soviet Union under Strategic Consensus to Iran, drawing on prior images of hegemonic danger to characterize Tehran much as it had deployed the rhetoric of enemyship to depict the Soviets and communism.

Reagan himself deployed tropes of enemyship to depict Iran numerous times in his second term. A common tactic he used was to portray Iran as an aggressor trying to conquer or subjugate the region. He accused Iran of "expansionism."[195] Tehran "has so far proved unresponsive in the face of all efforts to encourage reason and restraint in its war policy." He asserted another time: "It has also persisted in its efforts to subvert its neighbors."[196] The "intransigent" state was "occupying Iraqi territory and trying to take more."[197] Iran's terrorism endangered "the stability and security of the Gulf States," the president said, and he promised "to find ways to end this scourge once and for all."[198] "We're going to do what has to be done to keep the Persian Gulf open," he told reporters, "No country there has a right to close it off and take it for itself."[199] These depictions, like his denunciations of Iran's mining operations or attacks on "nonbelligerent shipping," all conveyed the simple message that Iran was a regional aggressor seeking to subjugate its neighbors and potentially cut off the free world's supply of oil.[200] In asserting that the United States would not allow this outcome, Reagan essentially claimed an American right of intervention to protect Gulf oil and other Gulf nations from Iran. In the

process, Reagan charged Iran with the sins—imperialism, aggression, hostility, duplicity, and irrationality—that he typically reserved for communist nations.

Indeed, Reagan's depictions of Iran commonly echoed the language he used to describe the Soviet Union or communism. Like Moscow, Reagan said, Iran could "pose a direct threat to U.S. strategic interests in the region."[201] Similar to a communist regime, he said, Iran "continues to suppress fundamental freedoms."[202] Much as he decried the tenets of communism, Reagan condemned the Iranian regime's "untampered faith" that led to "the hellish deaths of 14-year-old boys—small hands still wrapped around machine guns."[203] Trading in mythic language, Reagan literally described Iran as a global villain; when addressing how "there was a threat from Iran of closing the Persian Gulf," he professed, "the villain in the piece really is Iran." [204] Time and again he depicted Iran as an enemy in similar language as his Cold War condemnations of Moscow, borrowing on longstanding images of a Soviet threat to characterize Khomeini's regime in Tehran. In fact, he acknowledged Soviet-Iranian threat equivalence explicitly in a 1987 address. "Our economies and our people" would be "the captives of oil-producing regimes in the Middle East," he warned, "if Iran and the Soviet Union were able to impose their will upon the friendly Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and Iran was allowed to block the free passage of neutral shipping."[205] By identifying both nations as coequal Gulf enemies in the same breath, Reagan encouraged his audiences to see them in an equivalent way.

This process of redefining Iran as an enemy had lasting rhetorical significance. According to Murray Edelman, enemies are defined by inherent characteristics, whereas adversaries are defined by the political situation. "Enemies," Edelman writes, "are characterized by an inherent trait or set of traits that marks them as evil, immoral, warped, pathological and therefore a continuing threat regardless of what course they pursue."[206] By elevating Iran to the

status of *enemy*, not merely a temporary adversary, Reagan helped establish a rhetorical formula for understanding the Islamic republic that would last well beyond his time in the White House. As Jamie Warner affirms, "Adversaries are spatially and temporally defined by the context of the particular situation; an enemy is forever."[207]

To be sure, this move to describe Iran as an enemy was accompanied by multiple hostile engagements between the two countries. These clashes built on earlier actions taken by the administration in the Iran-Iraq War. After it had begun to share geospatial intelligence with Iraq in 1982, for example, the administration launched Operation Staunch, a global effort to halt conventional arms sales to Iran, in 1983.[208] Responding to attacks on neutral shipping, U.S. ships began escorting oil tankers through the Gulf in 1984. From 1984 to 1986, Iranian torpedoes and mines damaged 67 oil tankers, which significantly increased global gas prices and maritime insurance rates.[209] Reagan reacted by ordering the U.S. Navy to conduct more minesweeping, escort missions, reflagging operations, and retaliatory strikes. These efforts culminated on April 18, 1988, when U.S. warships sank over half of Iran's navy in Operation Praying Mantis; days later Reagan followed up this action by commanding the navy to use military force to defend neutral ships from Iran.[210] Then, on July 3, the "trigger-happy" *USS Vincennes* shot down Iran Air 655, a civilian plane carrying almost 300 passengers.[211] Reagan attributed this "tragic accident" to the ongoing Iran-Iraq war, which he blamed Iran for continuing.[212]

All these episodes, according to Judith Yaphe, signified an ever-increasing deployment of military resources to realize the American vision of "a stable and secure regional environment" in the Gulf that ensured "international access to the region's oil and gas resources." [213] Far from the days when American policymakers viewed the Gulf as a "British Lake," under Reagan the United States was a forceful, leading, and deeply felt presence in the region. Operation Praying

Mantis still ranks as the largest U.S. naval battle since World War II.[214] Reagan's portrayal of Iran as an enemy was therefore not simply a matter of words; his language functioned to legitimate actual military warfare against Khomeini's regime. In this regard, Reagan's characterization of Iran as an enemy of the United States and a danger to Gulf security prompted a pivotal step toward the United States not only articulating a responsibility to protect the Gulf, but also asserting the right of military intervention to exercise that responsibility as it saw fit.

Building on the administration's rhetoric, many foreign policy commentators recirculated the enemy image of Iran. Numerous analysts and press outlets adopted the administration's framing of the former U.S. ally. The "theocrats and their flock" had created "a revolutionary state with cunning to match its ferocity," said Fouad Ajami; Iran was animated by an "ideological crusade, the principle of revolutionary intervention," which it intended to "forcefully spread" across the Middle East.[215] Tehran not only sought "to impose its revolutionary vision on Iraq," wrote Mark A. Heller, but sought to export it throughout "the rest of the Islamic world."[216] James A. Bill similarly argued Iran was "attempting to fly the banner of Populist Islam" worldwide.[217] The *New York Times* magazine published a multipage exposé titled: "Iran: Five Years of Fanaticism."[218] David Segal likened Iran to the Kaiser's Germany in its "high-stakes" naval confrontation with the United States.[219] Gary Sick stated that if Iran succeeded in its quest "to be recognized as the dominant power of the region," it would use "heavy-handed tactics" to impose its rule on its neighbors, creating a new energy "superpower of the Persian Gulf."[220] Critically, each of these commentators represented Iran not only as an enemy, but as a foe specifically seeking to dominate its neighbors and imperil U.S. access to oil.

News coverage also tended to depict Iran in this manner, especially during Reagan's second term. A steady stream of sensational *Reader's Digest* accounts of Iranian fanaticism or

terrorism complemented administration accounts, telling stories of hijackers, terrorists, and Iranian boy soldiers "as young as ten or twelve" in lurid detail.[221] A *New York Times* editorial called for Reagan to continue "containing Iranian radicalism" without getting into an all-out war against "Iranian frenzy."[222] The paper published op-eds warning about Iranian terrorism's "dangerous metamorphosis" from "technological clods relying on fanaticism to skilled tacticians."[223] It also recirculated Arab claims that Iran was "an expansionist regime" with a "hegemonic tendency, this obsession with fundamentalism to the exclusion of all other thoughts and trends."[224] By contrast, when the *Times* quoted Iranian sources it tended to emphasize their anti-American threats. For instance, a March 1987 report read, "The Speaker of Iran's Parliament said today that Americans around the world would be in danger if the United States launched an attack in the Persian Gulf."[225] Even if some articles painted a somewhat less threatening picture of Iran, these press outlets still portrayed the state as a U.S. enemy in their coverage. They thereby circulated the enemy image of Iran advanced in administration rhetoric.

These depictions achieved popular salience. Iran was not widely seen as the main target of the Carter Doctrine when the president announced it in early 1980. To wit, one Harris opinion poll found that Americans supported the application of the doctrine 75 to 18 percent "if the Russians try to take over the Persian Gulf." [226] Whether those same attitudes would translate to Iran was a different question. Reagan's habitual portrayal of Iran as a dangerous foe built upon the ill will generated by the hostage crisis and eased this project of persuasion. By mid-1988, over 90 percent of Americans believed Iran was an enemy of the United States.[227] As Gary S. Sick, a Carter advisor on national security, noted, "in 1980, the Soviet Union was viewed as the principal threat to American interests in the Persian Gulf… I can't believe anybody would make that assertion today."[228] Instead it was Iran that loomed large in the minds of policymakers,

spurring them to authorize naval warfare. By the end of Reagan's tenure, Mafinezam and Mehrabi write, terms like "'Islamic Revolution' worked their way into the lexicon of international relations across the globe."[229] This transformation of Iran in the public eye, first sparked by the hostage crisis then intensified by the rhetoric of enemyship, military intervention, and Iran's own belligerent actions, comprises a major legacy of Reagan's Gulf strategy.

Iran-Contra and Criticisms of Strategic Consensus

Reagan's depictions of the Gulf did not go uncontested, as the administration's approach to the region's security came under fire from different quarters. During Haig's tenure as secretary of state, for instance, a prominent line of criticism was to critique the administration's fixation on the Soviets to the exclusion of other threats to Gulf security. Senator Ted Kennedy's 1982 *New York Times* op-ed illustrates this kind of argument. "It is not enough to guard against Soviet machinations," he reproached the administration. "Other dangers having little do with Moscow also confront the region," he said, listing issues ranging from "the stress of industrial modernization" to "the export of terrorism and revolutionary extremism." The lack of frameworks to address such problems, he concluded, demonstrated the absence of a "sensible foreign policy" in the region.[230] These criticisms resurfaced during the 1984 campaign. Stanley Hoffman, for instance, blasted Reagan that June for having "strained our relationship with our Arab friends" through his "consecutive and contradictory policies [that] have all failed."[231] Both of these figures illustrate how politicians and analysts challenged the administration's Soviet-centric approach to the Gulf contained in Strategic Consensus.

Other arguments directed against the administration's Gulf policy had to do with unilateralism and executive power. In *Foreign Policy,* Arthur Schlesinger Jr. attacked Reagan's

choice to intervene in the Iran-Iraq War by protecting oil tankers. "This was a decision taken without consultation with America's allies and with only sketchy notification to Congress," Schlesinger wrote. "The reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers—again no consultation with allies—goes far to… drawing us into the war against Iran."[232] By concentrating his criticism on the methods used by the administration to counter Iran, his arguments took for granted the administration's enemy image of the Islamic republic.

News coverage could also frame Reagan's Gulf strategy negatively. For example, a *Boston Globe* article noted that Reagan failed to convince U.S. allies in Europe to help protect Gulf oil shipments, even though 60 percent of their oil came from the region compared to only four percent of U.S. oil.[233] Other articles highlighted division over military tactics in the Gulf. For example, one May 1987 *New York Times* story opened: "Despite advice from naval commanders in the Persian Gulf that relatively small frigates are ideal for escorting merchant vessels, the Pentagon is likely to send larger, more sophisticated cruisers."[234] Similarly, an article that July drew attention to Republican infighting about Gulf policy, with GOP members of the House of Representatives alleging the administration had altered the "ground rules" for classified briefings.[235] Like Schlesinger's analysis, this kind of coverage that painted the administration in poor light often focused on the details of Gulf policymaking rather than overtly address the view of Iran as an enemy, the administration's partnership with the Saudis, or the equation of oil access with Gulf security, these shifts in language were all set in motion by Strategic Consensus.

Ironically, the event that generated by far the largest amount of opprobrium for the administration—the Iran-Contra scandal—serves as a testament to the overall success of Reagan's rhetorical transformation of Saudi Arabia and Iran. After the administration was caught selling weapons to Iran, press criticism arrived from far and wide. Not only did the scandal

saturate news coverage and commentary—*Foreign Affairs*, for example, dedicated a standalone chronology in its year-in-review issue to detail every aspect of the scandal—conservative outlets also criticized Reagan.[236] Even *Reader's Digest*, which voiced support for Reagan throughout his presidency on Saudi Arabia, terrorism, Iran, and arms sales, deviated from its friendly reporting to offer mixed verdicts on the affair.[237] The scandal, according to a *Foreign Affairs* editorial, raised "broader questions about the formulation and conduct of the Iran policy by the Reagan Administration… and the outlook for a weakened presidency."[238] In the words of a veteran CIA official, "it turned into this huge media circus… a juicy scandal that you could read about in the checkout line of your local supermarket."[239] The U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad admitted, "Iran-Contra put us in a bizarre position."[240] The affair, in short, painted the administration in a terrible light by uncovering its dishonesty and foolishness in selling arms to Iran.

The fact that the scandal generated such a media firestorm also reveals the extent to which most Americans had come to understand Iran as the nation's enemy in the Gulf. Iran-Contra was so damaging partly because it ran counter to everything Reagan had said about the Gulf in his public rhetoric. The administration could rebut or at least address policy critiques; when told escorting tankers in the Gulf was risky, for instance, Weinberger responded, "the risks of not doing it, I think, are higher."[241] But the revelation that the administration had sold weapons to Iran cut directly against the picture of the Gulf Reagan painted with his rhetoric. Notwithstanding the president's pained claims that "it was not my intent to do business with Khomeini, to trade weapons for hostages," the scandal clearly undermined his depiction of Iran as an enemy of the United States and the closeness he had cultivated with the Saudis.[242] By the president's own admission, the deal "runs counter to my own beliefs, to administration policy, and to the original strategy we had in mind… it was a mistake."[243] Observers were left with one

of two conclusions. Either the Reagan administration had lied about Iran being an enemy, or it had dealt weapons to a nation it described as a threat to the flow of Gulf oil and, by extension, U.S. national security. That Reagan chose to admit a lapse in judgment rather than argue that Iran was not quite so bad is thereby instructive, for it shows how salient the image of Iran as an American enemy was in the eyes of the administration.

In brief, the flattened images of the Gulf advanced by Strategic Consensus set in motion the Reagan administration's attempts to shift U.S. opinion on Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular. These efforts, in turn, laid the rhetorical groundwork for American military intervention in the Iran-Iraq War, which solidified the picture of U.S. direct responsibility for Gulf security. While stopping short of all-out conflict, these naval operations set important precedents by following through on the Carter Doctrine's central premise: that the United States would militarily enforce its commitment to keep the oil flowing as it saw fit. This decision marked another step in the haphazard march of the United States to filling the role vacated by the British in 1971. By promoting the importance of Saudi Arabia, constructing a new non-communist enemy in Iran, and centralizing the role of the U.S. government in military operations in the Gulf, Reagan set the stage for the next phase of regional intervention under his immediate successor.

Conclusion: America at the Center of Gulf Security

At the outset of the Reagan presidency, the Persian Gulf's importance to U.S. strategists stemmed from its oil and the impression that it may become a flashpoint in the superpower conflict. Even before Reagan entered the White House, a member of Carter's NSC staff argued that in the "East-West competition, the largest strategic stakes and the most fragile situation was in Iran and the Persian Gulf area."[244] Some policymakers went as far as to insinuate that the

Soviet Union was "somehow" behind the fall of the Shah.[245] These fears fit well with the Reagan administration's determination to win the Cold War. In the Middle East, the Strategic Consensus metaphor served as a vehicle through which Reagan could reframe his administration's efforts in the region in terms of combating communist influence and Soviet aggression in his administration's efforts to ensure U.S. access to Gulf oil and block the Soviets from it.

While Secretary of State Haig fell short in his attempts to build consensus about the supposed Soviet threat to the Middle East, the rhetoric of Strategic Consensus set the stage for greater American involvement in Gulf security. The image of the United States and its allies working in common carried over into Reagan's portrayals of the U.S.-Saudi partnership, and though many commentators questioned the wisdom of this relationship, few disagreed with Reagan that the kingdom comprised America's closest and most vital Gulf ally. Similarly, the picture of a region under dire threat contained in the Strategic Consensus metaphor saturated administration thinking and Reagan's public references to the Gulf; time and again administration figures equated regional security with oil access. However, this impression of an imperiled Persian Gulf increasingly came to be associated with the threat from Tehran rather than Moscow over the course of Reagan's tenure.

These developments reached their climax in 1988, as the U.S. military and Iran exchanged blows over oil shipping in the Gulf. By the time the Iran-Iraq War ended, the U.S. Navy had shot down a civilian airliner, disabled Iranian oil platforms, and destroyed the bulk of Iran's navy. These actions marked a stark contrast from the administration's early days of proclaiming that the Soviet Union lurked behind all the Middle East's ills. Whereas Reagan had started out arguing that the Persian Gulf was simply part of the wider Cold War, by 1988 his team was effectively making the case that conditions unique to the Gulf—the threat Iran

allegedly posed to the free flow of oil—mandated military operations be undertaken for reasons more disconnected from the Cold War. Ironically, Reagan fulfilled the Carter Doctrine's pledge that the United States would prevent a hostile power from seizing control of the Gulf not by targeting the Soviets, but by authorizing air and naval strikes against the nation's former Gulf ally. His rhetoric thus depicted the Gulf as a region that may veer dangerously out of order absent U.S. effort, affirming an implicit vision of sovereignty in which the United States played the key role of ensuring the Persian Gulf's stability and security through direct, military means.

In the end, Strategic Consensus kickstarted three developments. First, it built up Saudi Arabia as the chief American ally in the Gulf whose protection was vital to U.S. security. Second, it created a rhetorical template for a country other than the Soviet Union to be considered an American enemy in the Gulf; this enemy schema was then firmly affixed to Iran. And third, its image of the Gulf under dire threat encouraged the use of military force to respond to perceived risks to oil access. The metaphor thereby conveyed an understanding of Gulf sovereignty in which the United States played the role of regional "hegemon" itself, capable and willing to deploy force to make sure things went its way. Reagan thereby set crucial precedents for the even greater American military intervention in the Persian Gulf that would occur under his vice president—Desert Storm.

Notes

[1] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 438.

[2] William Sullivan, U.S. Embassy Tehran, Cable to State Department, "Thinking the Unthinkable," November 9, 1978, NSA, http://dev.nsarchive.gwu.edu.946elmp01.blackmesh.com/dc.html?doc=5734181-National-Security-Archive-Doc-07-U-S-Embassy.

[3] Communique quoted and translated by Mark Bowden, *Guest of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America's War With Militant Islam* (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2006), 70. See also: Javier Gil Guerrero, *The Carter Administration and the Fall of Iran's Pahlavi Dynasty: US-Iran Relations on the Brink of the 1979 Revolution* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 133-193.

[4] David Farber, *Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter With Radical Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 1-2.

[5] Roger Stahl, "Why We 'Support the Troops': Rhetorical Evolutions," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 12.4 (2009): 544; Gerald E. Parsons, "How the Yellow Ribbon Became a National Folk Symbol," *Folklife Center News* 13.3 (1991): 9-11; Barbara Parker, "Coping: With 'Irage,'" *Washington Post*, December 10, 1979, B5.

[6] Farber, *Taken Hostage*, 2; Peter Feuerherd, "How the Iran Hostage Crisis Changed International Journalism," *JSTOR Daily*, November 4, 2017, https://daily.jstor.org/how-the-iran-hostage-crisis-changed-international-journalism/.

[7] Monica L. Cosica, "The Fateful Fifty-Two: How American Media Sensationalized the Iran Hostage Crisis," *E-International Relations*, August 20, 2016, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/08/20/the-fateful-52-how-the-american-media-sensationalized-the-iran-hostage-crisis/; "'Nightline' Archive: America Held Hostage," *ABC News*, December 1, 1979, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/iran-crisis-america-held-hostage-9049607.

[8] Cronkite closed each show by saying, "And that is how it was on January _____, the ___ day of the hostages' captivity." Robert J. Donovan and Ray Scherer, *Unsilent Revolution: Television News and American Public Life, 1948-1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 146. For an example, see: Dave W, "CBS Evening News November 12-14, 1979," YouTube Video, 0:14-19, March 31, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uvX25IG4tvY.

[9] Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 198.

[10] Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan, *Over the Wire And On TV" CBS and UPI in Campaign '80* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983), 185. *Reader's Digest* also devoted significant space to a complication of responses to the hostages' return in its April 1981 issue.

[11] Denise Bostdorff argues that Carter's idealism led to "perceived passivity during the hostage crisis" because, she writes, "He insisted that policies not only must achieve pragmatic results, but also must be consistent with his definition of the nation's moral character. Herein lay the strength of Jimmy Carter, the man, and the weakness of Jimmy Carter as a presidential rhetor." Denise M. Bostdorff, "Idealism Held Hostage: Jimmy Carter's Rhetoric on the Crisis in Iran," *Communication Studies* 43.1 (1992): 14-15.

[12] As the Baltimore Sun stated, "He did little to save the shah of Iran, then blundered into the hostage crisis." "Carter: A Better Choice," *Baltimore Sun*, October 26, 1980, K4. A number of polls in late 1979 and early 1980 showed widespread public approval for Carter's handling of the situation in Iran. Michael Coakley, "Since Iran, It's Been a Whole New Jimmy Carter," *Chicago Tribune*, March 3, 1980, 1; Godfrey Sperling, Jr., "Carter's Re-Election Bid—Now Tied to Iran, Inflation," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 4, 1979, 1.

[13] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 568.

[14] In a September 1977 radio broadcast, for instance, Reagan accused Carter of trying to "muzzle" the Pentagon. Ronald Reagan, "The Military," September 27, 1977, in *Reagan in His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision For America*, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, Martin Anderson (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 69. According to H.W. Brands, Reagan's radio broadcasts "were overwhelmingly negative." H.W. Brands, *Reagan: The Life* (New York: Doubleday, 2015), 211.

[15] For example, in a major foreign policy address Reagan crossed out the following paragraph in a draft sent to him: "Until the tragic and disgraceful events in Iran, the Carter Administration used to boast that it knew how to improve our relations with the countries of the Third World. But in fact, we have courted these countries with a campaign of meekness, apologies and concessions. This has only provoked our enemies to become more extreme. But our friends have been taught the bitter lesson by the present Administration that the more they support the United States, the more likely they will be treated badly by us." Ronald Reagan, "'State of the Union' Speech, March 13, 1980, in *Reagan in His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision For America*, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, Martin Anderson (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 474. This "gag order" on Iran was part of a deliberate campaign strategy. As Bill Casey wrote to Reagan two days before voting day, "I believe he [Carter] will be widely perceived as having engaged in a desperate last attempt to manipulate the hostages again for political benefit and to have once more bungled it. If this analysis is correct, we should say very little and leave it that way." Casey to Reagan and Meese, November 2, 1980, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *The "October Surprise" Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 234.

[16] Steve Neal, "Campaign '80: Carter Exploiting Hostages, Reagan Says," *Chicago Tribune*, October 23, 1980, 10.

[17] Reagan, "'State of the Union' Speech," 477.

[18] Fourteen of the hostages were released soon after being taken. Robert Shogan, "Carter Makes Offer to Iran on Hostages," *Los Angeles Times*, October 21, 1980, B1.

[19] Daniel Southerland, "Reagan Camp on Persian Gulf Policy: Carter Can't Back Up Commitment," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 29, 1980, 4.

[20] Ronald Reagan, "Peace: Restoring the Margin of Safety," August 18, 1980, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Simi Valley, California, (RRPL), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/peace-restoring-margin-safety.

[21] Some scholars argue that there is evidence that Reagan administration worked out a deal with Khomeini's regime in Tehran over the release of the hostages. Since this issue is beyond the purview of this study, I do not raise it.

[22] Ronald Reagan, "Labor Day Speech at Liberty State Park, Jersey City, New Jersey," September 1, 1980, RRPL, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/9-1-80; Mary E. Stuckey, *Getting Into the Game: The Pre-Presidential Rhetoric of Ronald Reagan* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989), 74.

[23]Adam Clymer, "The Collapse of a Coalition," *New York Times*, November 5, 1980. A1; Patricia Heidotting Conley, *Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National Agenda* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 97.

[24] Ronald Reagan, "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Detroit," July 17, 1980, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-republican-national-convention-detroit; Ronald Reagan, "Inaugural Address," The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, January 20, 1981, RRPL, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/inaugural-address-january-20-1981.

[25] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 349.

[26] Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2; Randall Fowler, "Reagan and Israel: Heroic Democracy in the Holy Land," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 23.3 (2020): 465-466; Yaroslav Trofimov, *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam's Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al-Qaeda* (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 246-250; Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 103-107. On

the use of Salafi-Jihadism, see: Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 8-17.

[27] William B. Quandt, "The Middle East Crises," *Foreign Affairs* 58.3 (1979): 541.

[28] George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 213.

[29] Fred H. Lawson, "The Reagan Administration in the Middle East," *Middle East Report* 128 (November/December 1984), https://merip.org/1984/12/the-reagan-administration-in-the-middle-east/.

[30] John C. Campbell, "The Middle East: A House of Containment Built on Shifting Sands," *Foreign Affairs* 60.3 (1981): 597.

[31] For more on Reagan's strategy and rhetoric in other areas of the Middle East, see: Carol Winkler, "Parallels in Preemptive War: Reagan on Libya; Bush 43 on Iraq," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 10.2 (2007): 303-333; David S. Birdsell, "Ronald Reagan on Lebanon and Grenada: Flexibility and Interpretation in the Application of Kenneth Burke's Pentad," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73.3 (1987): 267-279.

[32] Hedrick Smith, "Introduction: A Historic Opportunity," in ed. Hedrick Smith, Adam Clymer, Leonard Silk, Robert Lindsey, and Richard Burt, *Reagan the Man, the President* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1980), 1-2.

[33] Robert L. Ivie, "Speaking 'Common Sense' About the Soviet Threat: Reagan's Rhetorical Stance," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 48.4 (1984): 39.

[34] Robert Dallek, *Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 74, 78, 64.

[35] Quoted in Robert Schlesinger, *White House Ghosts: Presidents And Their Speechwriters From FDR to George W. Bush* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 315.

[36] Stewart Alsop, "The Good Guy," *Saturday Evening Post*, November 20, 1965, 18; Kurt W. Ritter, "Ronald Reagan and 'The Speech': The Rhetoric of Public Relations Politics," *Western Speech* 32.1 (1968): 50-58; Paul Fessler, "Ronald Reagan, Address to the National Association of Evangelicals ('Evil Empire Speech') (8 March 1983)," *Voices of Democracy* 2 (2007): 28-29; Mary E. Stuckey, *Playing the Game: The Presidential Rhetoric of Ronald Reagan* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1990), 96-97.

[37] Mary Beth Brown, *The Faith of Ronald Reagan* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2011), 91-92.

[38] Brands, *Reagan*, 97.

[39] Quoted in Joseph M. Siracusa and Aiden Warren, *Presidential Doctrines: U.S. National Security From George Washington to Barack Obama* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 144-145.

[40] Ronald Reagan, "Speech by Governor Ronald Reagan before the University of Southern California Law Day Luncheon, Los Angeles," April 29, 1967, RRPL, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/04291967a.

[41] Ronald Reagan, "The Russian Wheat Deal," October 1975, in ed. Kiron K. Skinner, et. al, *Ronald Reagan In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision For America* (New York: Touchstone, 2001), 30-31.

[42] Ronald Reagan, "Taiwan II," January 1979, in ed. Kiron K. Skinner, et. al, *Ronald Reagan In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision For America* (New York: Touchstone, 2001), 46.

[43] Rowland and Jones explain unpack what Reagan meant by these terms. In short, they argue that Regan saw democracy, faith, capitalism, and liberalism as compatible parts of an all-encompassing worldview in competition with a similarly all-encompassing worldview advanced by the Soviet Union. Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones, "Reagan and the Evil Empire," in *World War II and the Cold War: The Rhetoric of Hearts and Minds*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2018), 417. See also: Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones, *Reagan at Westminster: Foreshadowing the End of the Cold War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010); Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones, "Reagan's Farewell Address: Redefining the American Dream," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 20.4 (2017): 640, 647-649, 652-655; Robert C. Rowland, "Reagan's Strategy for the Cold War and the Evil Empire Address," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 19.3 (2016): 427-464; Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones, "Redefining the Proper Role of Government: Ultimate Definition in Reagan's First Inaugural," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 18.4 (2015): 697-700, 706; Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones, "Reagan at the Brandenburg Gate: Moral Clarity Tempered by Pragmatism," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9.1 (2006); 21-50; James Graham Wilson, "Ronald Reagan's Engagement and the Cold War," in *Reagan and the World: Leadership and National Security, 1981-1989*, ed. Bradley Lynn Coleman and Kyle Longley (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 11-29; Eliot A. Cohen, "Ronald Reagan and American Defense," in *Reagan's Legacy in a World* Transformed, ed. Jeffrey L. Chidester and Paul Kengor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 124-135; G. Thomas Goodnight, "Ronald Reagan's Re-formulation of the Rhetoric of War: Analysis of the 'Zero Option,' 'Evil Empire,' and 'Star Wars' Addresses," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 72.4 (1988): 390-414.

[44] Ronald Reagan, quoted in Lou Cannon, "Reagan's Foreign Policy: Scrap 'Weakness, Illusion,' Stress Military Strength," *Washington Post*, February 16, 1980, A3.

[45] Sara A. Mehltretter Drury, "Defining National Security as Peace Through Strength: Ronald Reagan's Visionary Rhetoric of Renewal in the 1980 Presidential Campaign," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 51.3 (2014): 87-102.

[46] Ronald Reagan, "Presidential Debate in Cleveland," October 28, 1980, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-debate-cleveland.

[47] Ronald Reagan, "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Detroit," July 17, 1980, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-republican-national-convention-detroit.

[48] Martin J. Medhurst, "Writing Speeches for Ronald Reagan: An Interview with Tony Dolan," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 1.2 (1998): 247.

[49] Edwin Meese III, *With Reagan: The Inside Story* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 164.

[50] Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Members of the British Parliament," June 8, 1982, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-members-the-british-parliament.

[51] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida," March 8, 1983, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-annual-convention-the-national-association-evangelicals-orlando-florida.

[52] Allison M. Prasch, "Ronald Reagan, 'Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-Day,' Pointe Du Hoc, France (6 June 1984) and Ronald Reagan, 'Remarks at a United States-France Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-Day,' Omaha Beach, Colleville Sur Mer, France (6 June 1984)," *Voices of Democracy* 2015): 22.

[53] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin," June 12, 1987, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-east-west-relations-the-brandenburg-gate-west-berlin.

[54] Travis J. Cram, for example, argues that Reagan's 1987 and 1988 National Security Strategy documents reveal a "both/and" perspective that wedded forceful, principled rhetoric with a pragmatic approach to negotiations. Travis J. Cram, "'Peace, Yes, but World Freedom as Well': Principle, Pragmatism, and the End of the Cold War," *Western Journal of Communication* 79.3 (2015): 367-368.

[55] Paul Kengor, "Reagan's 'March of Freedom' in a Changing World," in *Reagan's Legacy in a World Transformed*, ed. Jeffrey L. Chidester and Paul Kengor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 78-90; Stephen J. Heidt, "Presidential Rhetoric, Metaphor, and the Emergence of the Democracy Promotion Industry," *Southern Communication Journal* 78.3 (2013): 237.

[56] The policy of supporting militant groups fighting communist regimes was labeled the "Reagan Doctrine" by Charles Krauthammer in 1985. This policy was pursued to varying levels of intensity and success. Charles Krauthammer, "The Reagan Doctrine," *Time*, April 1, 1985, 54; James M. Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 1-39.

[57] Ronald R. Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 25-26, 99; Paul D. Erickson, *Reagan Speaks: The Making on an American Myth* (New York: New York University Press, 1985), 5.

[58] Reagan was also a longtime support of Taiwan, and after Nixon's visit to China told a friend, "Personally, I think the Red Chinese are a bunch of murdering bums. I think the President probably believes the same; but in the big chess game going on, where Russia is still head man on the other side, we need a little elbow room." Reagan letter to Lorraine and Elwood Wagner, August 3, 1971, Young America's Foundation Collection, Santa Barbara, CA.

[59] Letter quoted in Helene Von Damm, *Sincerely, Ronald Reagan* (Ottawa, IL: Green Hill Publishers, 1976), 75. See also: Peter Schweizer, *Reagan's War: The Epic Story of His Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 67; Paul Kengor, *The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism* (Los Angeles: Regan Books, 2006), 46.

[60] Haim Shemesh, *Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 172-173. The administration was concerned with the civil war in Lebanon expanding to include more involvement from Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria, and other regional actors. Reagan responded by dispatching negotiator Philip Habib. For an example of Reagan's public discussions of Habib's mission, see: Ronald Reagan, "The President's News Conference," June 16, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-993.

[61] Ronald Reagan, "The President-Elect's News Conference in Los Angeles," November 6, 1980, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-president-elects-news-conference-los-angeles.

[62] "Major Points From Appearance by Haig Before Senate Committee," *New York Times*, January 10, 1981, 9.

[63] Haig's testimony contained the caveat that Gulf oil remained so vital that the United States "must be prepared to act even unilaterally." His attempts to generate consensus should therefore not be viewed as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine or the importance of Gulf oil in U.S. strategy more generally.

[64] John Maclean, "Prepare to Defend Persian Gulf, Haig Urges," *Chicago Tribune*, January 13, 1981, 2.

[65] Keith Krause, "Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships," *International Studies Quarterly* 35.3 (1991): 328.

[66] Al Haig, "News Conference With British Press," February 24, 1981, in *Department of State Bulletin* 81, no. 2049 (April 1981): 19.

[67] Henry Trewhitt, "Haig Leaves for Middle East Today," *Baltimore Sun*, April 3, 1981, A2.

[68] Judith Wyer, "The 'Strategic Consensus' Attempt," *Executive Intelligence Review* 8.34 (September 1, 1981), 35.

[69] Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Join Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany," April 2, 1917, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-joint-session-congress-requesting-declaration-war-against-germany.

[70] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "State of the Union Message to Congress," January 11, 1944, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/state-the-union-message-congress.

[71] Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress Reporting on the Situation in Korea," July 19, 1950, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-reporting-the-situation-korea.

[72] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Statement by the President Following the Landing of United State Marines at Beirut," July 15, 1958, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-following-the-landing-united-states-marines-beirut.

[73] Lyndon B. Johnson, "New Year's Message to the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council in South Viet-Nam," January 1, 1964, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/new-years-message-the-chairman-the-military-revolutionary-council-south-viet-nam.

[74] Bernard Gwertzman, "Haig Says U.S. Seeks Consensus Strategy in the Middle East," *New York Times*, March 20, 1981, A1.

[75] Bernard Gwertzman, "Haig Opens Tour With Cairo Talks, Pledges Efforts for a Mideast Peace," *New York Times*, April 5, 1981, 16.

[76] "Israel Causes Unrest, Jordanians Tell Haig," *Chicago Tribune*, April 8, 1981, 9.

[77] Karen Elliott House, "Haig's Mission in Middle East Runs Into Snags," *Wall Street Journal*, April 8, 1981, 2.

[78] A Bahraini paper said that Haig's proposal was "bound to fail." Manama, *Akharbar Al-Khalij* (Arabic), March 4, 1981, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service – Middle East & Africa*, 81-044, March 6, 1981.

[79] Kuwait, *As-Siayah* (Arabic), November 13, 1979, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service – Middle East & Africa*, 79-226, November 21, 1979.

[80] Don Oberdorfer, "A Battered Haig Leaving on Trip to Mideast," *Washington Post*, April 3, 1981, A20.

[81] Oswald Johnston, "Haig Softened Anti-Soviet Rhetoric in Mideast," *Los Angeles Times*, April 11, 1981, A20.

[82] Oswald Johnston, "Haig Sees Mideast Policy on New Track," *Los Angeles Times*, April 9, 1981, B9.

[83] Egypt, having signed a peace agreement with Israel during the Carter administration, eagerly embraced the strategic consensus concept under Anwar Sadat. John Yemma," Egypt's Position in US 'Strategic Consensus' for Middle East," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 14, 1981, 12. The idea also caught on with some commentators, such as Paul Nitze, who argued that the Soviet Union was likely "to use its power in the Persian Gulf area in a manner inimical to West European interests" by realizing the supposed "Russian ambition to have direct access to the Gulf [that] goes back some 200 years." Paul H. Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* 29.1 (1980): 88.

[84] "Excerpts From Interview With Haig on Mideast," *New York Times*, September 6, 1981, 16.

[85] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Working Luncheon With Out-of-Town Editors," October 16, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-working-luncheon-with-out-town-editors.

[86] Oswald Johnston, "Haig Assures Saudis on New Ties With Israel," *Los Angeles Times*, September 13, 1981, A1.

[87] Charles Mohr, "Senate Panel Is Told Deal Would Promote Strategic Consensus," *New York Times*, September 29, 1981, A1.

[88] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With a Group of Out-of-Town Editors," October 5, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-with-group-out-town-editors; Ronald Reagan, "Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of Japan at the State Dinner," May 7, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/toasts-the-president-and-prime-minister-zenko-suzuki-japan-the-state-dinner.

[89] Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer, "Metaphors, Politics, and World Politics," in *Metaphorical World Politics*, ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 29.

[90] This understanding of the region was supported by a handful of commentators. J.C. Hurewitz argued, for example, "The East-West dimension—the Soviet threat and superpower competition—remains a central feature of the Middle East." J.C. Hurewitz, "The Middle East: A Year of Turmoil," *Foreign Affairs* 59.3 (1980): 541.

[91] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 14.

[92] In that regard Strategic Consensus bore resemblance to the Eisenhower Doctrine, which asserted that "Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East" and announced a U.S. determination to "defend the territorial integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed aggression." Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East," January 5, 1957, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-the-situation-the-middle-east.

[93] Robert L. Ivie, "Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War," *Communication Monographs* 47.4 (1980): 279-294. The idea that the Soviet Union comprised the chief threat to Middle Eastern security also found many adherents in Congress. Fred Halliday, "The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War," in *The Cold War and the Middle East*, ed. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 11.

[94] This idea of a Soviet threat came under criticism by many foreign policy analysts. Karen Dawisha, for example, argued that Moscow's unpopularity in the region meant it was a "Superpower in Eclipse" as far as Gulf politics were concerned. Karen Dawisha, "The U.S.S.R. in the Middle East: Superpower in Eclipse?" *Foreign Affairs* 61.2 (1982): 438.

[95] In this respect, Strategic Consensus reflected Reagan's commitment to what he described as "realism, strength, and dialog" as the main principles of his foreign policy. "Realism," according to Reagan, "means we must start with a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad." Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations," January 16, 1984, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-and-other-countries-united-states-soviet-relations. See also: William D. Anderson and Sterling J. Kernek, "How 'Realistic' Is Reagan's Diplomacy?" *Political Science Quarterly* 100.3 (2985): 389-405.

[96] According to Halliday, this assessment was a "delusion" driven "by belief in a single, all-encompassing logic." He instead argues for a "differential, partial interrelationship of the Cold War with the Middle East" centered on

decolonization, arms sales, state development, alliance networks, and the "over-globalization of Middle Eastern politics." Halliday, "The Middle East and the Great Powers," 12-17, 11.

[97] Richard Halloran, "2 Aides Say U.S. Will Defend Oil Interests in Mideast," *New York Times*, February 26, 1979, A12.

[98] Acharya argues that it was the collapse of the Shah's regime, not the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that precipitated the creation of the rapid deployment force: Amitav Acharya, *U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf: Origins and Evolution Under the Carter and Reagan Administrations* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 52-53.

[99] Acharya, *U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf*, 67-68.

[100] William P. Clark to Reagan, NSPG Meeting on Middle East Policy, June 14, 1982, NSPG 0039 14 Jun 1982 [Lebanon], Box 1, Executive Secretariat, NSPG, RRPL.

[101] Iran-Iraq NSPG, November 7, 1983, NSPG 0076 07 Nov 1983 (2/2), Box 2, Executive Secretariat NSPG, RRPL.

[102] Randall Fowler, "Art of the Arms Deal: Reagan, AWACS, and the Rhetorical Presidency," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 105.3 (2019): 273-296.

[103] Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security," March 23, 1983, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-defense-and-national-security.

[104] Interview with Rachel Bronson. Rachel Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership With Saudi Arabia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 162.

[105] Nicholas Laham, *Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of America's Competing Interests in the Middle East* (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 3-11.

[106] Quote from Ambassador Robert G. Neumann. "Saudis Secretly Funding Contras, U.S. Sources Say—'Kickback' from AWACS Sale Funneled to Nicaraguan Rebels, Other Anti-Leftists," *San Francisco Examiner*, July 27, 1986, 1.

[107] Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 173; Bruce Riedel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2014), 76, 83.

[108] Edward J. Epstein, "The Well-Greased 'Special Relationship,'" *Manhattan Inc.*, October 1, 1987, quoted in Jonathan Marshall, "Saudi Arabia and the Reagan Doctrine," *Middle East Report* 155 (1988): 14.

[109] Bruce Riedel, *Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States Since FDR* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 93-97.

[110] Only 12 percent responded "not likely at all." Cambridge Reports/Research International. Cambridge Reports National Omnibus Survey, April, 1980 [survey question]. USCAMREP.80APR.R056. Cambridge Reports/Research International [producer]. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Nov-12-2019. It is also possible to see evidence of the Iran-Saudi comparison at work in internal Reagan administration documents. A report compiled in February 1981 for the Department of Energy on Saudi Arabia began, "Saudi Arabia has been undergoing an explosive modernization without abandoning traditional institutions. Yet the system works. It is very different from Iran under the Shah." Saudi Arabia (Volume 1): A Report Submitted to the Department of Energy, i, February 15, 1981, Saudi Arabia, 1/01 I (1), Box 12, Crisis Management Center, NSC: Records, 1981-85, RRPL.

[111] "Letters to the Times," *Los Angeles Times*, May 11, 1981, C4.

[112] Reagan said something similar in his memoirs, writing "To put it simply, I didn't want Saudi Arabia to become another Iran." Ronald W. Reagan, *An American Life: The Autobiography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 41.

[113] Ronald Reagan, "The President's News Conference," October 1, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-991.

[114] Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Says U.S. Would Bar a Takeover in Saudi Arabia that Imperiled Flow of Oil: Rules Out 'An Iran,'" *New York Times*, October 2, 1981, A1.

[115] William Safire, "The Reagan Corollary," *New York Times*, October 4, 1981, E19.

[116] Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, September 26, 1983, State Department, *Current Documents, 1983*, #278. Quoted in Michael A. Palmer, *On Course to Desert Storm: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1992), 109.

[117] Bruce R. Kuniholm, "The Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Corollary, and Prospects for United States Policy in Southwest Asia," *International Journal* 41.2 (1986): 345.

[118] George P. Shulz to Reagan, Our Strategy in Lebanon and the Middle East, October 13, 1983, NSPG 00032 14 Oct 1983 [Middle East], Box 2, Executive Secretariat NSPG, RRPL.

[119] William P. Clark to Reagan, Memo for the President, July 1982, NSA. James G. Blight, Janet M. Lang, Hussein Banai, Malcolm Byrne, and John Tirman, *Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 306-307.

[120] National Security Decision Directive 139: Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War, April 5, 1984, NSA; Riedel, *Kings and Presidents*, 89.

[121] National Security Decision Directive 141: Responding to Escalation in the Iran-Iraq War, Mary 25, 1984, NSA.

[122] Foreign Relations, The Visit of Vice President Bush to the Persian Gulf, April 3-12, 1986 [Briefing Book – Shirin Tahir-Khezi Copy] (1), Box 17, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate: NSC: Records, RRPL; Milton Viorst, "Iraq at War," *Foreign Affairs* 65.2 (1986): 362.

[123] They also relied on Saudi help in the Gulf. For example, when an oil tanker being escorted by the U.S. navy hit an Iranian mine in July 1987, the administration depended on Saudi Arabia to sweep the area for additional mines. NSPG Meeting Minutes, July 24, 1987, NSPG 0159 24 Jul 1987, Box 5, Executive Secretariat NSPG, RRPL.

[124] National Security Decision Directive 166: U.S. Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan, March 27, 1985, NSA, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-166.pdf.

[125] Saudi Arabia also gave Iraq roughly $1 billion per year during its war against Iran. Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 180.

[126] Martin Sieff, "Sand in Our Eyes," *The National Interest* (Summer 2004): 94.

[127] Ronald Reagan, "Statement on the Death of King Khalid of Saudi Arabia," June 13, 1982, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-death-king-khalid-saudi-arabia.

[128] Ronald Raegan, "Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on the Cease-fire in Lebanon," September 25, 1983, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/question-and-answer-session-with-reporters-the-cease-fire-lebanon.

[129] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for King Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia," February 11, 1985, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-welcoming-ceremony-for-king-fahd-bin-abd-al-aziz-al-saud-saudi-arabia.

[130] Ronald Reagan, "Statement on the Proposed United States Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia," June 11, 1987, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-proposed-united-states-arms-sale-saudi-arabia.

[131] Reagan's cabinet members reinforced these depictions of Saudi Arabia. During a February 1982 trip to Saudi Arabia, for instance, Weinberger told foreign reporters that he was there to "add to our mutual security." National Security Council Message Center: SECDEF Visit To Saudi Arabia: SECDEF Arrival Comments, AT: Saudi Arabia (2/6/1982 – 2/9/1982), Box 10, Robert H. Lilac Files, RRPL.

[132] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters Upon Returning From the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development in Cane fin, Mexico," October 24, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-with-reporters-upon-returning-from-the.

[133] Ronald Reagan, "Interview With Representatives of Independent Radio Networks," January 26, 1985, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-representatives-independent-radio-networks; Ronald Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters Following Senate Approval of the Sale of AWACS and Other Air Defense Equipment to Saudi Arabia," October 28, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-with-reporters-following-senate-approval-the-sale; Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 520.

[134] Ronald Reagan, "Radio Address to the Nation on Foreign Policy," October 17, 1987, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-address-the-nation-foreign-policy-2.

[135] Don N. De Marino, "Letter: Royal Factionalism and Saudi Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 58.1 (1979): 183.

[136] Peter Kihss, "Saudis' King: Ally of West: Fahd," *New York Times*, June 16, 1982, A6.

[137] Steven V. Roberts, "Prop for U.S. Policy: Secret Saudi Funds," *New York Times*, June 21, 1987, 1.

[138] Ronald Reagan, "Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on the Situation in the Middle East," April 10, 1983, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/question-and-answer-session-with-reporters-the-situation-the-middle-east.

[139] Alan Cowell, "Gulf Arabs Seek Better Iran Ties," *New York Times*, October 17, 1988, A1.

[140] Flora Lewis, "The Gulf Powderkeg," *New York Times*, September 30, 1983, A31; Paul Lews, "Saudis Are Said to Step Up Pressure on Iraq to Reach a Cease-Fire," *New York Times*, July 30, 1988, 4.

[141] Robert G. Neumann, "Assad and the Future of the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 62.2 (1983): 248.

[142] Ian S. Lustick, "Israeli Politics and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 61.2 (1982): 379.

[143] *New York Times* coverage could be skeptical of Saudi integrity and honesty on certain issues. An editorial titled "The Price of Saudi Money," for instance, criticized the Reagan administration in the midst of the Iran-Contra scandal. As it stated, "What's unwise and unacceptable is to turn to Saudi Arabia—or any other country—for secret funds." "The Price of Saudi Money," *New York Times*, August 3, 1987, A16.

[144] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Realignments in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 63.3 (1984): 600.

[145] Michael Sterner, "The Iran-Iraq War," *Foreign Affairs* 63.1 (1984): 136.

[146] Evan Luard, "Superpowers and Regional Conflicts," *Foreign Affairs* 64.5 (1986): 1019; Galia Golan, "Gorbachev's Middle East Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 66.1 (1987): 48.

[147] Mazher Hameed, "A Reagan-Fahd Agenda," *New York Times,* February 7, 1985, A27.

[148] Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger: Reflections on a Tragedy," *Reader's Digest* (May 1986): 85.

[149] David Reed, "Jordan's Indestructible King Hussein," *Reader's Digest* (August 1981): 150.

[150] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "America and Israel—A Troubled Partnership," *Reader's Digest* (January 1982): 59.

[151] Jimmy Carter and Gerald R. Ford, "A Time for Courage in the Middle East," *Reader's Digest* (February 1983): 54.

[152] When Reagan's attempt to sell missiles to the Saudis failed in May 1986, the reasons cited for congressional opposition were not that they believed that the Saudis were not U.S. allies. Rather, they argued (1) "that the Saudis were unreliable partners in the search for a Middle East peace plan" and (2) "that the American weapons could well wind up in the hands of terrorists." These two lines of reasoning illustrate how U.S. experiences with Israel and Iran shaped perceptions of Saudi Arabia. Steven V. Roberts, "Senate Rejects Saudi Arms Sale, 73-22," *New York Times,* May 7, 1986, A3.

[153] Joseph J. Sisco, "Middle East; Progress or Lost Opportunity?" *Foreign Affairs* 61.3 (1982): 617.

[154] Drew Middleton, "Gulf War: A Shift From Air to Land," *New York Times*, May 28, 1984, 4.

[155] Safire wrote a particularly critical take on this situation in May 1984: "The spectacle of a superpower pleading with Arab potentates for the use of bases from which to defend Arab oil is repugnant to even the most avid interventionists." William Safire, "The Isoventionists," *New York Times*, May 28, 1984, 19. See also: Richard Halloran, "New Soviet Afghan Bases Seen as Peril to Gulf," *New York Times*, November 14, 1982, 21; Thomas Mcnaugher, "Persian Gulf: Tasks for the U.S. and Its Allies," *New York Times*, February 16, 1983, A30; Richard Halloran, "Poised for the Persian Gulf: A Makeshift U.S. Command Prepares to Fight, With Borrowed Forces and Borrowed Bases, To Defend the Oil Lifelines of the Middle East," *New York Times*, April 1, 1984, SM38; S. Fred Singer, "Against Sending Troops To the Gulf," *New York Times*, May 7, 1984, A23.

[156] Judith Miller, "Sidelines Are Hard to Find in the Gulf," *New York Times*, June 3, 1984, E1.

[157] Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West," *Foreign Affairs* 58.5 (1980): 1007.

[158] Christopher Van Hollen, "Don't Engulf the Gulf," *Foreign Affairs* 59.5 (1981): 1069.

[159] James A. Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," *Foreign Affairs* 63.1 (1984): 125.

[160] William E. Griffith, "Countdown in the Middle East," *Reader's Digest* (February 1982): 122, 123.

[161] Smith Hempstone, "Can We Protect Persian Gulf Oil?" *Reader's Digest* (November 1981): 96, 93.

[162] Anthony Cave Brown, *Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 328-329; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Washington's Shameful Revolving Door," *Reader's Digest* (May 1987): 121.

[163] American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Congress Poll: April 1988, Question 42, USMARTIL.88AJC.R08B, Marttila & Kiley, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1988).

[164] 15 percent versus 14 percent. Anti-Defamation League, Anti-Defamation League Poll: January 1988, Question 5, USPENN.88MIDE.R05, Penn & Schoen Associates, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1988).

[165] Americans Talk Security Project, National Security Survey 12, Question 37, USMOR Public Opinion Research, 1988); American Jewish Congress, American.ATS12.R35, Market Opinion Research, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Jewish Congress Poll: April 1988, Question 21, USMARTIL.88AJC.R04F, Marttila & Kiley, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1988).

[166] Ronald Reagan, "The President's News Conference," January 29, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-992.

[167] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for the Freed American Hostages," January 27, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-welcoming-ceremony-for-the-freed-american-hostages.

[168] Ronald Reagan, "Statement Honoring the Freed American Hostages," April 13, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-honoring-the-freed-american-hostages.

[169] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at a White House Luncheon for Representatives of the Hispanic Community," September 16, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-white-house-luncheon-for-representatives-the-hispanic-community.

[170] Ronald Reagan, "Televised Address by Governor Ronald Reagan 'A Strategy for peace in the '80s,'" October 19, 1980, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/televised-address-governor-ronald-reagan-strategy-for-peace-the-80s.

[171] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom," February 26, 1981, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-welcoming-ceremony-for-prime-minister-margaret-thatcher-the-united-kingdom.

[172] Terrorism was, of course, a live issue in the 1980s, as during Reagan's presidency over 5,000 terrorist attacks took place worldwide, thirty-five percent of which originated in the Middle East. Carol K. Winkler, *In The Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 65.

[173] Ronald Reagan, "Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Versailles Economic Summit Conference in France," June 6, 1982, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-issued-the-conclusion-the-versailles-economic-summit-conference-france.

[174] Ronald Reagan, "Joint Statement Following Meetings in Rome With President Alessandro Pertini and Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini of Italy," June 7, 1982 American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/joint-statement-following-meetings-rome-with-president-alessandro-pertini-and-prime; Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada," October 27, 1983, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-events-lebanon-and-grenada.

[175] Bryan J. McCann, *The Mark of Criminality: Rhetoric, Race, and Gangsta Rap in the War-on-Crime Era* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2017), 3.

[176] This portrayal was somewhat in tension with Reagan's "terrorist narrative" that identified the Soviet Union and its client states as the source of all global terrorism. Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism*, 78-82.

[177] Christopher C. Joyner, "In Search of an Anti-Terrorism Policy: Lessons from the Reagan Era," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 11.1 (1988): 40.

[178] Winkler, *In The Name of Terrorism*, 80-81.

[179] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association," July 8, 1985, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-annual-convention-the-american-bar-association.

[180] Elaine Sciolino cited unnamed Pentagon officials who said, "U.S. military planning there [the Gulf] is focused almost exclusively on the fear that the Soviets might someday invoke the Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty of 1921." Iran denounced the treaty; however, this fixation reveals the extent to which Reagan's depiction of the Soviet Union as the primary threat reflected internal administration planning. Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's Durable Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 61.4 (1983): 918.

[181] Barbara Rosen, Barry Rosen, and George Feifer, "The Destined Hour," *Reader's Digest* (July 1982): 186, 195.

[182] Sciolino, "Iran's Durable Revolution," 897, 920.

[183] Shahram Chubin, "The Soviet Union and Iran," *Foreign Affairs* 61.4 (1983): 925.

[184] Larry L. Fabian, "The Middle East: War Dangers and Receding Peace Prospects," *Foreign Affairs* 62.3 (1983): 637, 652.

[185] Siamek Hassanzadeh, "Letter to the Editor," *New York Times*, March 29, 1985, A34.

[186] Philip A. Dur to John M. Poindexter, Politically Sensitive Approach to Enhanced Military Cooperation with the Key Gulf Arabs, May 18, 1984, Persian Gulf 1984, RAC Box 14, Near East and South Asia Affairs, Directorate, NSC Records, RRPL.

[187] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks on Signing the Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights Day and Week Proclamation," December 9, 1983, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-signing-the-bill-rights-day-and-human-rights-day-and-week-proclamation; Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at a Dinner Marking the 10th Anniversary of the Heritage Foundation," October 8, 1983, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-dinner-marking-the-loth-anniversary-the-heritage-foundation.

[188] Caspar W. Weinberger, "A Report to the Congress: Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf," i, Persian Gulf 1987 (06/15/1987), RAC Box 14, Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs, Directorate, NSC Records, RRPL.

[189] Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress," January 23, 1980, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-state-the-union-address-delivered-before-joint-session-the-congress.

[190] Weinberger, "A Report to the Congress," 2, 8, 23.

[191] Weinberger, "A Report to the Congress," 3.

[192] Paul Achter, "Rhetoric and the Permanent War," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 102.1 (2016): 81.

[193] Jeremy Engels, *Enemyship: Democracy and Counter-Revolution in the Early Republic* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), 213.

[194] See: Randall Fowler, "'Caliphate' Against the Crown: Martyrdom, Heresy, and the Rhetoric of Enemyship in the Kingdom of Jordan," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 21.1 (2018): 122-126; Mahboub Hashem, "Bullying and Labelling as Communication Tools of Control and Domination," *Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research* 8.2 (2015): 118; Robert L. Ivie and Oscar Giner, "Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37.4 (2007): 580-598.

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CHAPTER THREE

George H.W. Bush and the New World Order

On the evening of August 1, 1990, President George H.W. Bush was pulled out of a heat massage and told dire news: Iraq had just invaded Kuwait.[1] The army of Saddam Hussein, the man *U.S. News & World Report* labeled "The Most Dangerous Man in the World" two months prior, seized control of the small Gulf emirate in hours.[2] Its tanks now rested less than a mile from the Saudi border. As Bush contemplated his options the next day, NSC Middle East expert Richard Haas warned his boss of the example Hussein's actions could set. "I am aware as you are of just how costly and risky such a conflict would prove to be," he stated, as he tallied the perceived tradeoffs involved in an American military intervention. But he also recognized the "terrible precedent" that "accepting this new status quo" would set for the "emerging 'post-Cold War' era."[3] Haas's thinking proved decisive. Bush ultimately appealed to what he called the "New World Order," a hazy international vision organized around American leadership and the rule of law to justify liberating Kuwait from Iraqi rule.

Bush was an unlikely candidate to make such a case. In contrast to Reagan, Bush entered the White House with little appetite for the rhetorical dimensions of presidential leadership. According to one of his speechwriters, Bush deemed many public aspects of the presidency to be "phony baloney, inauthentic, unpresidential."[4] If Reagan functioned as "an ideological architect," said Fred Barnes in the *New Republic*, Bush was "a bricklayer."[5] A White House aide once called Bush's presidency an "anti-rhetorical operation."[6] Bush himself admitted that he struggled with "the vision thing," as he pejoratively put it, and his administration intentionally hired entry-level speechwriters rather than attempt to retain Reagan speechwriters at their current pay.[7]

Indeed, Bush launched his 1988 campaign by pithily downplaying his own eloquence: "I'm not much for the airy and abstract… I am not a mystic, and I do not yearn to lead a crusade."[8] Bush instead aspired to be a "qualified and competent leader," one of his leading biographers explains, "not a visionary or an ideologue."[9]

In one of history's ironies, it fell to the "anti-rhetorical" Bush to articulate a fresh course for American foreign policy at a time when the Cold War could no longer provide direction. Whereas Reagan entered office in the heat of the superpower competition, Bush encountered a Soviet empire on the brink of collapse. The Berlin Wall fell months into his presidency; the Soviet Union itself dissolved by the close of 1991. As Soviet premier Gorbachev remarked to Bush at the December 1989 Malta summit, "The world is leaving one epoch, the 'Cold War,' and entering a new one."[10]

Shying away from grand pronouncements, Bush preferred to describe the United States' global role in idealist bromides of doing right, upholding order, and defending democracy.[11] "America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high moral principle," Bush said in his Inaugural Address, "our strength is a force for good."[12] This anodyne image of the United States as a model world citizen marked a shift from Reagan, who according to Robert Tucker, pursued "the promotion of freedom even at the risk of greater disorder" through clandestine interventions in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, and elsewhere.[13] Bush's foreign policy, by contrast, was steeped in a studious commitment to multilateral problem-solving, internationalist sentiment, and upholding the rule of law. For him, the United States should serve as a paragon of good behavior. "This is a time for America to reach out and take the lead, not merely react," he exhorted citizens a week into his presidency. Bush called for unabashed U.S. global leadership: "As the freest and the fairest and the most powerful democracy on the face of the earth, we must continue to shine

as a beacon of liberty, beacon of justice, for all the people of the world."[14] The *New World Order* emerged out of this image of leadership abroad, applying Bush's framework to the Gulf crisis set off by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in the late summer of 1990.

Internationalist rhetoric filled Bush's public response to the crisis from its earliest moments, as he depicted Iraq's actions as a violation of the peaceful order.[15] While he also emphasized the importance of protecting allies, U.S. jobs, and oil access, Bush and his team pivoted to almost exclusively making their case for war through appeals centered on a vision of a law-based, American-led global system as the autumn progressed; they framed the crisis as a test for the global community as to whether it would join the United States in upholding international law. The New World Order served as a composite metaphor for this way of speaking about the nation's new role in the post-Cold War world. In an immediate sense, it worked. Bush was able to rally a 39-nation coalition against Iraq, crushing Hussein's army in a massive military rout. Operation Desert Storm, the military offensive to evict Iraq from Kuwait, achieved victory in 100 hours of combat. As one observer put it, the U.S. Army was able "to bring Iraq to its knees by flattening it with overwhelming military force."[16] Bush's approval rating surged to 89 percent, the highest ever recorded for a president to that point.[17] The New World Order was seemingly validated. However, for its critics, Bush's New World Order represented a revived American imperialism. According to Edward Said, the metaphor enjoined a "continuing war" against forces that resisted the reordering of world politics in accordance with liberal democratic capitalism.[18] Even more, Desert Storm did not save Bush from electoral defeat in 1992.

My aim in this chapter is to examine the metaphors Bush deployed to makes his case for intervention and the images of Iraq, the Gulf, and the United States that these metaphors propagated. I argue that Bush's New World Order metaphor relied upon two sub-metaphors,

Gulf crisis as test and *Hussein as criminal*, to portray the United States as an "international peacekeeper" whose presence was required to keep order in the Gulf after the Cold War.[19] In the image painted by these metaphors, Saddam stood for all the things the new era was against; he was despotic, tyrannical, militaristic, cruel, and isolated. By defeating Hussein, the United States demonstrated the viability of the American-led global system championed in Bush's rhetoric. Critically, this vision demanded even more from the United States in the Gulf than before. According to Bush, it was now an American responsibility to not merely offset communism but also root out tyranny, fight terrorism, expand democracy, and stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf. As Bush put it on the 1992 campaign trail, Desert Storm was a "test case" to forewarn the "renegade rulers, outlaw regimes, [and] madmen" who might be tempted to threaten the post-Cold War peace in the Gulf and elsewhere.[20]

Although the New World Order may not have caught on with commentators, the logics conveyed by Bush's sub-metaphors circulated widely in press coverage of the Gulf war. Multiple outlets depicted Hussein as a criminal akin to Adolf Hitler and the conflict as a test to establish the norms of the post-Cold War order, which together constructed a compelling picture of a crisis that merited American military intervention. In circulating the dominant images associated with Bush's metaphors, the press not only amplified the president's internationalist case for war. They also reinforced his picture of the Gulf as a region over which the United States possessed an almost unlimited right of intervention, thereby situating the United States as the final arbiter of the limits and nature of Gulf sovereignty. Unlike Twin Pillars and Strategic Consensus, which each depicted the Gulf as a region endangered by Soviet communism, Bush's metaphors went beyond these defensive visions by positing an active, reformist role for the United States in the Gulf. Specifically, Bush's New World Order framed it as the job of the United States to promote

freedom and democracy by opposing rogue states, buttressing allies, and stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. By pivoting away from the Soviet threat, Bush's words authorized a continued—even expanded—role for the U.S. military in the Gulf after the Cold War. According to the interventionist logic of his metaphors, the United States was responsible for ensuring that tyrants and terrorists coming from the Persian Gulf did not threaten the tranquility of the post-Soviet international order, thereby justifying a hegemonic U.S. presence in the Gulf.

To make this case, I begin by first outlining the policy context in which the Gulf crisis occurred, including the Reagan and Bush administrations' "tilt" toward Iraq. I next examine Bush's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, showing how the administration quickly determined that Hussein's conquests must be reversed. In making the public case for intervention, Bush's arguments initially concentrated on pragmatic concerns, such as oil and jobs, before shifting to a focus on internationalism; that is, Bush stressed the value of global norms and multilateralism over purely U.S. interests in the Gulf to justify liberating Kuwait. I then analyze the New World Order, showing how this metaphor appeared as a way for Bush to condense the internationalist case for liberating Kuwait in his public rhetoric while drawing on notions of American exceptionalism and global leadership deeply rooted in the Cold War. The ensuing section analyzes press reception and circulation of Bush's metaphors, showing how the test and criminal sub-metaphors found more success than the New World Order metaphor among journalists and commentators. Finally, I survey efforts to contest Bush's rhetoric. While anti-imperialists and Arab-Americans attempted to disrupt the picture painted by Bush's metaphors, their efforts were limited in part because Bush's political opponents aimed to appropriate his metaphors rather than directly challenge them. I conclude by showing how these developments laid the groundwork for the presidential administration of Bill Clinton.

Policy Context: American Attitudes Toward Iraq

Public attitudes toward Iraq were largely negative for most Americans in the years leading up to the Gulf crisis. These adverse views of Iraq hearkened back to the 1958 coup against its British-appointed monarch.[21] The CIA feared that the new Iraqi regime's friendliness with Moscow might "establish the USSR in the heart of the Middle East."[22] This fear seemingly was realized when the Soviet Union began sending military equipment to Baghdad in late 1958, authorized large-scale arms transfers in 1967, and signed a treaty of friendship with Iraq in 1972 that codified the "broad and substantive cooperation" between the two allies.[23] According to Carl Forsberg these actions nurtured an adversarial relationship between Washington and Baghdad, which periodically clashed over issues related to Israel, the Kurds, and the Cold War.[24]

Successive presidential administrations adopted different strategies to Iraq. Sometimes they tried to lure Baghdad out of Soviet orbit, such as when Lyndon Johnson invited five Iraqi generals to the White House. Other times presidents sought to weaken Iraq, such as when Nixon supported an insurgency in the northern Kurdish part of the country.[25] This ambivalence set the stage for the Bush presidency, as the administration sought to cultivate closer ties with Iraq while the U.S. public remained deeply skeptical of Saddam's regime.[26]

Press coverage played a major role in cultivating these negative attitudes toward Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s, as reporters depicted Iraq as a close Soviet ally in the Cold War. In 1969, for instance, William Dorsey of the *Baltimore Sun* called Baghdad's relationship with Moscow "perhaps the only element of stability" in Iraqi politics.[27] When Iraq nationalized western oil assets in 1972, the front page of the *New York Times* cited Soviet press accounts calling the event a "great victory for the Arab peoples."[28] Months later, Paul Wohl wrote in the *Christian Science Monitor* that Iraq "seems to be becoming Moscow's candidate to take Egypt's place as Russia's

main military and power base in the Middle East."[29] When Soviet leaders delivered advanced missiles to Iraq in 1975, *Washington Post* reporter Jim Hoagland warned of "a new escalation of the arms race in the Persian Gulf" that was marked by "groups of Soviet military technicians" setting up shop across Iraq.[30] These examples illustrate how mainstream press outlets reflexively portrayed Iraq as a Soviet client state during the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford years.[31]

This characterization of Iraq slowly began to shift during Carter's time in office. As he remarked in a speech directed toward the State Department, Iraq counted among the "potential adversaries and some past adversaries with whom we want to have better relationships."[32] He wished to "aggressively challenge, in a peaceful way, of course, the Soviet Union and others for influence" in Baghdad.[33] Journalists likewise modified their tone. For example, a 1978 *Baltimore Sun* report stated, "Iraq appears to be readjusting its foreign relations to assure its independence from the Soviet Union."[34] Marvine Howe of the *New York Times* similarly reported that Iraq was "edging away" from the Soviet Union and its leaders held "no particular hostility toward the United States."[35] Hence, while a majority of Americans still viewed Iraq as a national adversary, these statements reveal a softening of attitudes at the level of policy discussion.[36]

By the early 1980s, a few commentators openly called for better ties between Washington and Baghdad. Claudia Wright exemplifies this trend. Conceding that some policymakers still viewed Hussein as one of the "wild men" of the Middle East, Wright claimed that Saddam's volatility actually offered a path for reestablishing U.S.-Iraqi relations.[37] Because Hussein found security in being "the least knowable, the most unpredictable, and the most difficult for Western (or Soviet) intelligence services to penetrate," Wright argued, this meant that Iraq's foreign policy "can accommodate considerable flexibility and compromise." American diplomats should seize upon that flexibility, she concluded, as an opening to "find a formula" for rapprochement.[38]

Several commentators agreed with Wright. John Borawski, for one, suggested the United States should exploit the gap between Baghdad's public stances and private desires. "Although Iraq… denounces suggested U.S. security schemes for the region, *privately* the Iraqis are not opposed to indirect U.S. military assistance." In fact, he argued, Baghdad "would probably tacitly condone an intensified U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf."[39] In short, this argument held that Iraqi strength should motivate the United States to draw closer to it, a reflection of new assessments taking place among foreign policy specialists in the late 1970s and 80s.

The Iran-Iraq War provided an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to implement these ideas. To harm Iran and "counter Soviet influence," Reagan ordered the deepening of U.S.-Iraqi relations in NSDD 99.[40] The United States began selling more arms to Iraq, sharing satellite photos of Iranian troop positions, and teaching Iraqi army officers how to exploit the geospatial data being transferred. According to the CIA officer tasked with sharing the intelligence, the Iraqis "drooled" over the information provided.[41] Beyond the battlefield, the administration extended a loan for an oil pipeline and gave needed agricultural aid to Baghdad.[42] In November 1984 the two countries restored formal diplomatic ties, which Reagan hailed as a major "step forward" in the relationship.[43] By 1986, in the words of a retired Pentagon official, the United States was fighting a "secret war, with the U.S. on the side of Iraq, against Iran, on a daily basis."[44] Collectively, these actions were labeled by commentators as a "tilt" toward Iraq.[45]

Some officials hoped that the "tilt" could lead to an eventual alliance. Richard Murphy, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, gave voice to such thinking in a September 1988 memo. "The US-Iraqi relationship is important to our long-term political and economic objectives in the Gulf and beyond," he wrote. "Iraq emerges from the war as a major economic and military power. Its oil reserves are second to those of Saudi Arabia. It is

a disciplined, purposeful, and ruthless regime, led by a dictator who is feared and respected by his own people and others."[46] By describing Iraq as a powerful country and calling on officials to avoid "Iraq-bashing," Murphy's memo captured a prevalent belief in Washington that Baghdad comprised a lesser evil than Iran, warranted U.S. aid, and offered a possible ally in the future.[47]

In line with this thinking, the Bush administration wished to draw closer to Iraq and thereby coax better behavior from Saddam. A January 1989 State Department report stated, "the lessons of war may have changed Iraq from a radical state challenging the system to a more responsible, status-quo state working within the system, and promoting stability in the region." President Bush, the report concluded, would have "to decide whether to treat Iraq as a distasteful dictatorship to be shunned where possible, or to recognize Iraq's present and potential power in the region and accord it relatively high priority. We strongly urge the latter view." [48] Likewise, a National Intelligence Estimate from the CIA concluded that a "war weary Iraq" would prove to be "reluctant to engage in foreign military adventures given the imperatives of post-war reconstruction."[49] These reports show how voices inside the administration desired to continue the Reagan-era rapprochement with Iraq.

Bush and his team made this case publicly at several points. Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly, for example, gave a favorable portrait of Iraq before Congress. He testified how "we developed a dialogue with Iraqi leaders on issues" that had already borne "modest" fruit on human rights, terrorism, and chemical weapons. Measures taken to discipline Iraq, he warned, would be not only be politically counterproductive but also economically harm "the American farmer and the American exporter."[50] The president said much the same. When confronted with allegations of Iraq's chemical and nuclear programs at a press conference, Bush said, "I don't want to give credence to the fact that Iraq is in the process of building nuclear weapons. I cannot

confirm that. And so, I don't want to go beyond that."[51] On October 2, 1989, he approved National Security Directive 26, which instructed officials to devise "economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and increase our influence with Iraq," since closer relations "would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability."[52] A few months later he removed financial and trade sanctions placed on Baghdad, and by July 1990, the United States was importing more than a quarter of all the petroleum Iraq produced.[53] These statements and actions conveyed the Bush administration's aspirations to convert Iraq into a Gulf ally.[54]

Strategists' interest in U.S.-Iraqi collaboration, however, did not displace public skepticism toward Hussein's regime. Deep-seated aversion to Iraq continued to surface among the press, legislature, and electorate. In *Foreign Affairs*, for example, Geoffrey Kemp wrote "it would be unwise to read too many lessons" into the wartime partnership between the United States and Iraq.[55] Others expressed outrage at Hussein's treatment of the Kurdish minority in the country's north. After he unleashed chemical weapons on them to crush unrest in 1988, reporters leveled charges of a Holocaust-like genocide.[56] In Congress, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) thundered that "overwhelming majorities" of lawmakers would find a way to punish Iraq for its abuses, and he co-sponsored the bipartisan Prevention of Genocide Act against administration wishes.[57] In March 1989, a White House reporter called Iraq a "tiny, sometimes warlike nation" that was "seriously engaged in a program to build nuclear warheads and missiles."[58] Similarly, a May 1990 poll found 77 percent of Americans had an adverse opinion of Iraq, with a near majority having a "very unfavorable" view of the country.[59] Iraq's poor reputation thus persisted into the 1990s despite the countries' limited cooperation and Bush's desire for better relations.

Baghdad's poor public image stemmed from a variety of sources. According to Matthew Frakes, the Bush era was characterized by concerns over terrorism, rogue states, and weapons of

mass destruction; each issue implicated Iraq in some way.[60] Reporters rushed to condemn Hussein after he declared that his chemical weapons would "eat up half of Israel if it tries to do anything against Iraq."[61] Iraq was caught in early 1990 trying to import experimental artillery equipment as well as components for producing nuclear weapons.[62] Although Iran and Libya claimed more headlines, many journalists still counted Iraq among the "'bad actor' nations."[63] A flow of reports, including Samir al-Khalil's *Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam's Iraq*, also provided in-depth accounts of the regime's penchant for cruelty, corruption, and despotism, including the execution of British journalist Farzad Bazoft on fabricated charges of espionage.[64] Stories touching on these issues primed U.S. audiences to view Iraq as a threat to U.S. interests. In fact, Bush himself even came under criticism for, as one *Washington Post* article said, "trying hard to tone down the image of Iraq's tempestuous President Saddam Hussein."[65]

This kind of coverage helps explain the immediate condemnation Iraq met in the United States after the invasion of Kuwait. Culminating with Hussein's "Most Dangerous Man in the World" headline in the aforementioned June 4 edition of *U.S. News & World Report*, press criticism and public skepticism of Iraq persisted well into Bush's White House tenure despite his administration's attempts to build on the "tilt" toward Baghdad. Saddam's threats against Israel, abuse of chemical weapons, and autocratic excesses exacerbated pre-existing animosities. When Iraq attacked Kuwait, these commonly held attitudes filtered how many Americans viewed the invasion. This situation thereby presented Bush with a delicate balancing act, as he aimed to navigate a rhetorical course between his previous support for Hussein's regime, the need to protect U.S. oil interests in the Gulf, the risk of a major war, diplomatic relations with other countries, and Americans' widespread antipathy for Saddam Hussein.

The Crisis Begins: Bush, Pragmatism, Internationalism, and Metaphor

Bush's distinctive pragmatism stamped his administration's initial response to the crisis. After the CIA showed him satellite photos on July 28 verifying an Iraqi military buildup on the Kuwaiti border, Bush messaged Hussein in "a spirit of candor and friendship" to ask him not to attack.[66] The Bush team sought to deescalate the crisis domestically and globally; it lobbied against congressional sanctions against Iraq and delayed going before the United Nations until Secretary of State Baker returned from a trip to Siberia.[67] Publicly, Bush asserted his intent to find a "peaceful solution" to the situation.[68] In calculating fashion, the Bush administration first reacted to the invasion by trying to keep all options open.

Behind closed doors, however, Bush resolved in a matter of hours that it could not permit Iraq's conquests to stand, even at the cost of military engagement. Jon Meacham's *Destiny and Power* offers a behind-the-scenes look at administration's deliberations. According to Meacham, CIA Director Webster argued that allowing Iraq annex Kuwait would put Hussein "in an inequitable position, since he would control the second-and-third largest proven oil reserves with the fourth-largest army in the world." Defense Secretary Cheney then carried this thinking a step further: "No non-military option is likely to produce any positive result." Bush evidently agreed. When he met British Prime Minister Thatcher, who asked him to do "everything possible" to reverse Saddam's gains, he concurred: "The status quo is intolerable."[69] By the time he met with the Saudi ambassador, Bush's biggest concern was "trying to stiffen the spine" of U.S. Middle East allies.[70] Shortly thereafter Bush ordered the launch of Operation Desert Shield, dispatching 400,000 troops to Saudi Arabia with the objective of deterring any further Iraqi attacks.[71]

The administration's pragmatism extended to its public response to the crisis. Echoing the arguments made by Reagan during the Iran-Iraq War, Bush and his team stressed the

economic importance of U.S. oil interests in the Gulf. For example, Bush told Americans that Iraq's actions could restrict "access to energy resources that are key, not just to the functioning of this country but to the entire world." As he warned, "Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of that one man, Saddam Hussein."[72] As it became clear Baghdad had no intention to withdraw, the administration detailed the possible economic effects of the Iraqi occupation. Secretary of State James Baker in particular championed this line of argument. He described the crisis as a quandary for the United States and its allies, telling citizens that Hussein's army now imperiled the "economic lifeline" of the free world. He made sure to frame the crisis in a more quotidian light. "And to bring it down to the average American citizen, let me say that means jobs," he told hearers. "If you want to sum it up in one word, it's jobs… the control of one nation, one dictator if you will, of the West's economic lifeline will result in the loss of jobs on the part of American citizens."[73] By emphasizing the threat Iraq's invasion posed to citizens' livelihoods, Bush and Baker made a practical case that Hussein's actions endangered the United States and could therefore lead to war.

These arguments revisited many points the prior administration had made to justify U.S. intervention on the side of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. In that situation, Reagan claimed that Iranian domination of the Persian Gulf would call into question the "free flow of oil" essential to the United States and U.S. allies. Bush tried to make a similar case by arguing that Iraq's conquest of Kuwait would enable it to rule the region through intimidation; he made it a point to mention that on August 5, the day Hussein promised to leave Kuwait, the dictator instead massed his tanks on the Saudi border.[74] Bush, like Reagan, told the country that vital American interests would be harmed if an unfriendly local power came to totally control the Gulf and its oil.

Unlike Reagan, however, Bush's pragmatic case for intervention met severe criticism from both sides of the political aisle. Journalists voiced consternation that the United States would enter a war over mere job numbers. Thomas Friedman, for example, highlighted the "apparent" weakness of the idea that the "primary reason the United States must confront Iraq is to save American jobs." The "eroding support" for the Bush administration's stance, Friedman predicted, "if not stemmed, is going to nullify its entire gulf strategy."[75] Friedman's right-of-center colleague William Safire similarly blasted the "cynical" administration for advancing such a "dismaying rationale" for war.[76] Even ex-Reagan officials undermined the pragmatic case for intervention, as one former economic advisor pilloried the Bush team's predictions of economic ruin.[77] These criticisms were mirrored in public opinion. A CBS poll discovered that Americans rejected the "jobs" rationale for war by a two-to-one margin and found it less convincing than other reasons to employ military force against Iraq.[78] As Denise Bostdorff recounts, this poor reception spurred Bush officials to abandon arguments based on "purely pragmatic concerns."[79]

Faced with such strong public disapproval, the administration recalibrated its rhetorical strategy to earn approval for intervention. One tactic the president employed to overcome resistance to his Gulf policy was issuing metaphors. This turn to metaphor has attracted scholarly notice; as Curry Jansen and Don Sabo observe, "during the Persian Gulf War… metaphors and synecdoches gained wide currency in several institutional contexts."[80] The Bush team and its allies invoked a variety of metaphors to make the case for intervention. Acquiescing to annexation was to prefer the "rule of the jungle" over the "rule of law"; there was "no erosion" in the coalition's determination to liberate Kuwait; the president and Hussein were like "coaches preparing for the Super Bowl"; Patriot missiles stuck to Iraqi scud missiles "like Velcro"; the Bush administration's pre-crisis courtship of Iraq was one of several "fumbles" in U.S. foreign

policy; and while "[t]he Soviet bear may be extinct," the "lone wolf" of Hussein still lurked in the woods.[81] Inventive codenames for military operations—Desert Shield and Desert Storm—underscored this gravitation toward metaphors. Bush especially was given to tying metaphors to the internationalist principles that would justify military intervention in the Gulf.

To be sure, Bush's internationalism ran deep and was visible from the start of the crisis.[82] He was careful to work under the mantle of the United Nations. He limited U.S. policy to that which was permitted by U.N. resolutions. And he stressed that the demand for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait was a collective order made by the entire world, not an ultimatum from the United States alone.[83] Just as he elected to pursue a multilateral military strategy with allies to evict Iraq from Kuwait, Bush leaned on internationalist appeals about global norms, international law, and U.S. leadership abroad once the pragmatic argument about jobs and oil fell short.[84] This shift in rhetoric did not necessarily mark a change in Bush's assessment of American interests in the Gulf, but it did represented a focused emphasis in how the administration aimed to sell its aim to evict Iraq from Kuwait to audiences at home and abroad.

For example, Bush frequently assumed the guise of speaking for the entire globe in relation to Iraq. He spoke of "what the world is demanding of Saddam Hussein" rather than U.S. objectives, and he characterized Iraq's actions as "a blow against the rule of law" that "strengthens the forces of chaos and lawlessness that, ultimately, if unchecked, threatens us all."[85] By focusing on the danger to "us all," Bush subtly deemphasized U.S. interests in the region such as jobs or oil access in favor of depicting Iraq's actions as a threat to the global system. As he put it at a September 6 fundraising event, "Nothing strikes with greater force at the very heart of the international order than the act of naked aggression perpetrated by Saddam

Hussein of Iraq."[86] According to Bush, the nation needed to act in the Gulf for reasons of global importance, not just U.S. economic health or national interests.

Bush hammered this message in the months after the invasion. In an August press conference, he said, "this is not a matter between Iraq and the United States of America; it is between Iraq and the entire world community, Arab and non-Arab alike. All the nations of the world lined up to oppose aggression."[87] In a September address to GOP donors, Bush lamented the "tidal wave of tragedy" unleashed by "Saddam's illegal act… [and] inhumanity," finding hope in the extensive denunciation of Iraq: "Never before has the world community been so united—never, anyway, since World War II."[88] During his October speech at the United Nations, Bush called for a coalition "that transcends the Cold War" to "act now" against "terrible despots" like Hussein. [89] The president consistently portrayed Iraq's conquests as a violation of the world order that all nations condemned, a barefaced crime that demanded restitution.

Bush's argument echoed prior presidents who appealed to international principles to justify military intervention abroad. Woodrow Wilson, for example, called on his fellow citizens to "deliver the free peoples of the world from… the ruthless master of the German people" and thereby bring about a "covenanted peace" in which war would be abolished.[90] When Lebanon seemed threatened by Arab nationalists, Dwight Eisenhower sent troops to Beirut. According to Ike, this act displayed how "we strive for a world in which nations, be they great or be they small, can preserve their independence."[91] Like Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson argued that South Vietnam must be protected in order to ensure freedom and self-determination for all nations; he drew an equivalence between the security of the United States and the maintenance of world order (i.e. the continued independence of South Vietnam against Communist aggression).[92] As LBJ's Secretary of State Dean Rusk said, "We can be safe only to the extent that our total

environment is safe."[93] As in these previous episodes, Bush equated American security with a totally safe international environment. This in turn provided a strong moral reason to warrant military intervention overseas.[94] As he proclaimed in an October address in New Mexico, "What is at stake is far more than a matter of economics or oil. What is at stake is the principle at the very heart of international order and whether aggression pays or whether aggression is punished…. I am determined that aggression will not stand."[95]

Saddam as Criminal and Crisis as Trial: Bush's Sub-Metaphors

Two metaphors lay at the heart of Bush's internationalist case for intervention in the Gulf. First, he constantly described *Hussein as a criminal*, which framed the crisis as a matter of enforcing the law. He called the Iraqi regime a collection of "outlaws, international outlaws and renegades."[96] He called Saddam an "illegitimate authority" who should restore "Kuwaiti leaders to their rightful place."[97] Hussein's conduct, Bush said, "violates every norm of international law" and was in "direct contravention" of the U.N. charter and global customs.[98] Over and over, as Rachel Martin Harlow observes, "Bush was careful to remind his audience that Hussein was in essence a lawbreaker." [99] While Saddam did much to earn this moniker, it is also worth noting that this depiction participated in the long U.S. history of portraying Arab Muslims as menacing.

One of Bush's favorite ways to promote this view of Hussein was to compare the Arab dictator to Adolf Hitler. "If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression," Bush lectured, likening Saddam to a Nazi. "Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930's, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors."[100] Bush accused him of doing things "that even Adolf Hitler didn't do."[101] Bush repeatedly cited the "Nayirah" testimony, in which the Kuwaiti ambassador's daughter (falsely) told the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Council that she had just fled Kuwait after personally witnessing

Iraqi soldiers burn down neighborhoods, torture innocent civilians, and murder babies in hospitals. Bush later embellished her story by describing how "Saddam the invader" ordered a litany of atrocities: "Mass hangings. Babies pulled from incubators and scattered liked firewood across the floor. Kids shot for failing to display the photos of Saddam."[102] These horrifying images painted Hussein as a vicious tyrant and fueled public outrage at the occupation. By interpreting Hussein's actions through the lens of international law and describing him as an evildoer akin to Hitler, Bush communicated the message that Iraq must be stopped for the sake of all nations.[103] This metaphor (Saddam = criminal) thus reinforced Bush's case that the crisis was primarily a matter of international sentiment, rules, and norms being violated.

This metaphor also depicted the United States as an agent of law enforcement, a sheriff assembling deputies to handle an outlaw. Bush's image of the nation assuming the role of Gulf law enforcement echoed prior episodes where American presidents claimed the responsibility to police a region of critical importance to the United States. Theodore Roosevelt's "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine again offers a precedent for this tactic by which presidents arrogate the power to police faraway regions. If, Roosevelt proclaimed, "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which result in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society" should occur anywhere in the Western hemisphere, then the United States may be forced, "however reluctantly," to "exercise [an] international police power." For Roosevelt, the United States possessed the responsibility to ensure that "barbarism" and "tyrannous terror" did not break out in its corner of the world; it was the duty of "a self-respecting, just, and far-seeing nation" to not only avoid wrongdoing itself but also "not to sink into helplessness before the powers of evil."[104] Like TR, Bush claimed an American responsibility to go beyond serving as a beacon of

democracy and use its military power to protect Kuwait against Iraqi wrongdoing and tyranny. The criminal metaphor condensed this logic into a powerful moral appeal.

Second, Bush depicted the *Gulf crisis as a test* for the global community. He repeatedly described the crisis as a kind of trial to determine whether the conflict-free geopolitical landscape emerging from the Cold War could endure; this portrayal appealed to international as well as domestic audiences. At stake in the Gulf crisis, Bush stressed, was nothing less than civilization itself: "Iraq's invasion was more than a military attack on tiny Kuwait; it was a ruthless assault on the very essence of international order and civilized ideals."[105] According to him, the crisis raised the question of whether the "civilized" world, led by the United States, would rise to the challenge of protecting the international norms on which all countries depended. Iraq's attack was therefore a test of American and allied resolve to protect the peace.[106]

Bush's test metaphor represented a change in the way U.S. leaders articulated the norms of international sovereignty as well. As Luke Glanville notes, during the Cold War most states "enjoyed an almost absolute right of nonintervention."[107] The international community did not often countenance interference in the internal affairs of an individual country, as this would be a seen as gross violation of said country's sovereignty. Stated otherwise, the diplomatic realities of the Cold War did not allow for a coalition of states to intervene in the affairs of another country with the blessing of the United Nations.[108] However, as Glanville contends, after the Cold War the principle of non-interference gave way to a new understanding of national sovereignty premised on sovereign states' accountability to the international community to protect the people under their rule. This conception of sovereignty as the "responsibility to protect" eventually came to be applied in the 1990s and 2000s as a justification for U.N-blessed interventions in Somalia, Kosovo, and Libya. Bush's test metaphor, by framing the Gulf crisis as the

responsibility of the international community to resolve, marked an initial step toward this revised view of sovereignty and U.S. responsibility on the world stage.[109]

The test metaphor also had deep roots in Bush's rhetoric. A key component of his foreign policy was to spread the "almost universal" values of freedom and democracy to the far corners of the world.[110] From his earliest days in the White House, Bush cast a vision of the United States joining with other countries to serve as a force for good in the world. In a 1989 interview with Tokyo reporters, Bush said, "The scope of America's vision is global, and we will continue to shoulder the obligations that belong to a global power."[111] At the fortieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Bush ascribed the flowering of "security and peace" across Europe to the readiness of NATO countries to jointly defend "freedom, true democracy, human rights, and the rule of law."[112] Bush continually described American foreign policy in internationalist terms, stressing the United States' obligations to other nations: "the world trusts us with power, and the world is right. They trust us to be fair. They trust us to be on the side of decency. They trust us to do what's right."[113] For Bush, the United States held its position of global leadership as a kind of trust given to it by other countries.

Iraq, by forcibly annexing Kuwait, represented an overt threat to this vision. As Bush insisted many times, Iraq's "brutal aggression" could not be allowed to stand because such tolerance would imperil the fragile system emerging from the Cold War.[114] His August 3 message to Congress laid out these charges in direct, lawyerlike prose. Iraq had invaded Kuwait, "which clearly constitutes an act of aggression and a flagrant violation of international law." So brazen was this offense, he warned, that it comprised a real danger to the world order itself: "It threatens the entire structure of peaceful relations among nations in this critical region." Consequently, he concluded, Iraq's occupation of Kuwait "constitutes an unusual and

extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States."[115] Bush's address oscillated between seeing the threat globally and domestically; Hussein's shameless lawbreaking imperiled both the world order and the leading place of the United States in that order. At stake, he insisted time and time again, was the future of the international system. Bush's message served as an appeal to U.S. allies and citizens alike to rally against aggression and reverse Iraq's ill-gotten gains. His repetition of the Gulf crisis = test metaphor consequently bolstered his case for intervention by asserting that the peaceful nature of the post-Cold War order depended on a positive outcome to the situation in the Gulf.

As the crisis wore on, Bush's internationalist appeals and metaphors gave way to a composite metaphor that linked these ideas all together. The *New World Order* labeled the crisis as a chance to realize a new foundation for geopolitics, organizing the host of metaphors being promulgated into a nebulous comparison of the situation in the Gulf to a utopian dream of peace and prosperity. Shifting the debate away from jobs and oil, the New World Order metaphor inundated Bush's public rhetoric; it portrayed the ongoing crisis as a challenge between the old rules of aggression and conquest versus the post-Cold War dream of a world without major conflicts. And at the heart of this dream was a vision of benevolent American hegemony in the Gulf and beyond.[116] I now turn to trace the emergence of this metaphor in Bush's rhetoric.

The Emergence of the New World Order: A Composite Metaphor

The New World Order metaphor was one Bush seemingly stumbled upon weeks into the Gulf crisis. He had first employed the phrase during a session with reporters on February 28, 1990, well before the Gulf crisis began.[117] Reflecting on the "Revolution of '89," Bush suggested "the day of the dictator is over," setting in motion "a new world order."[118] Perhaps remembering

that moment, Bush next mentioned New World Order in an August 30 press conference, weeks after the Iraqi invasion. After fielding a question about how he might seek to shape "the post-postwar shape of the world" after the crisis, Bush replied with an answer that refocused on Kuwait while hinting at more: "As I look at the countries that are chipping in here now, I think we have a chance at a new world order… But we have to be sure that what's been undertaken so far is successful before we can move to that other agenda, it seems to me."[119]

This "chance at a new world order" attracted the attention of several journalists, including Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta.[120] Writing in the September 9, 1990, edition of the *Washington Post*, they bemoaned that "the message the American public has heard is that our men and women are risking their lives to keep the supply of oil flowing." "While oil is important," they continued, "it pales, in our view, before something else that hangs in the balance of this crisis." Taking up Bush's turn of phrase, they identified a much more compelling rationale for intervention: the "opportunity to create a new world order" that would safeguard "world stability and security." They concluded their op-ed by calling on Bush to develop a full-fledged multilateral vision that would direct American and global conduct beyond this crisis.[121]

Bush answered this call in a September 11 address. Declaring that the creation of "a new world order" now comprised a major objective of his Gulf strategy, he explained what he aimed for: "a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace." Leaning on idealistic generalities, Bush described a peaceful and prosperous order "struggling to be born," a world "where the strong respect the weak" and "nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice." Having offered a few glimpses of this inchoate vision, he next underscored the precarity of this dream: "A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace." Bush then connected New World

Order with the test metaphor, assuring hearers that the Gulf crisis supplied a way to demonstrate the nation's commitment to the hopeful vision he proclaimed. "The test we face is great, and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our mettle." Should the nation permit Iraq to "swallow" Kuwait, Bush said, it would provide "a signal to actual and potential despots around the world" that the United States and the world had failed the trial of "credibility and reliability."

By defining the New World Order in this way, Bush drew heavily on the logics of his other internationalist metaphors. Specifically, *Hussein as criminal* and *Gulf crisis as test* furnished the intellectual content for Bush's New World Order. His vision entailed a global order in which "actual and potential despots" were deterred by how forcefully the United States and its allies responded to Iraq's violent annexation of Kuwait, opening the way toward a more prosperous and peaceful future after the Cold War. The *New World Order* served as a composite metaphor that condensed these logics into a single symbol. Hsu and Boling describe composite metaphors as "navigational aids" that function as "a main metaphor as the basis of understanding [for] subsequent metaphors." A composite metaphor "establishes the context for the auxiliary metaphor."[122] In this manner, the New World Order worked to direct the Bush administration's other metaphorical appeals by providing an overarching context in which to understand them. [123] It served as a catch-all phrase that combined and concentrated the power of Bush's auxiliary metaphors. It gave audiences a rhetorical roadmap for interpreting Bush officials' arguments.

According to Bush, the New World Order also entailed an ongoing concern for Gulf stability and security. "Our interest, our involvement in the Gulf is not transitory," he said. "It predated Saddam Hussein's aggression and will survive it. Long after our troops come home… there will be a lasting role for the United States assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf."

Beyond deterring aggression, this "lasting role" would be to "help our friends in their own self-defense" as well as "to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile, and above all, nuclear technologies." With this list of objectives buried in the middle of his address, Bush radically expanded the scope of U.S. foreign policy aims in the Gulf. He recast Reagan's call to protect the flow of oil from Iran into a positive vision of the United States energetically using its power to change Gulf politics for the better. According to the president, the American presence in the Gulf would increase, not decrease, after the Cold War, since the United States needed to extirpate weapons and technologies incompatible with the New World Order. The metaphor thus also offered a capacious redefinition of U.S. Gulf aims in the soon to be post-Soviet era.[124]

While he mentioned oil in the address—"We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless"—Iraq's ill-gotten oil gains appeared only in one of speech's 31 paragraphs.[125] In place of oil, the speech traded in plentiful images of the United States acting as the Gulf's designated guardian in cooperation with and on behalf of the global community; as with Twin Pillars and Strategic Consensus, Bush propagated images of the United States as the ultimate backstop for Gulf security. The president suggested that by freeing Kuwait, the United States could live up to this idealized picture and usher in a new age of worldwide harmony.

On a tactical level, New World Order papered over more pragmatic concerns like jobs and oil in an attempt to redefine the crisis as an issue of international principle.[126] Several polls from August 1990 showed that the American public, while broadly supportive of Bush himself, were deeply divided as to what the nation should do to resolve the Gulf crisis.[127] The New World Order provided a potent tool for Bush to mold attitudes and gain favor for his Gulf policies.[128] The composite metaphor compressed Bush's internationalist argument for intervention into a potent moral appeal; it conveyed the simple idea that the war was about ideals, not oil—ideals

that the world shared, that Hussein had violated, and that it fell to the United States and its allies to defend. Although this vision was light on actual policy, it adeptly repackaged the Bush's case for war into an easily repeated metaphor that also hinted at U.S. aspirations to steer the global environment toward a rule-based, American-led order.[129]

The Rhetoric of New World Order: Exceptionalism and Orientalism

As the autumn of 1990 wore on, the Bush administration's efforts to roll back Hussein's gains took two forms. On one front, the administration aggressively lobbied to gain U.N. authorization for intervention. These attempts led to U.N. Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677, and 678, the last of which empowered member states to use "all necessary means" to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait if they had not left by January 15.[130] Crucially, Moscow voted in favor of these efforts, joining the coalition against its former client state.[131]

On the public opinion front, Bush invoked the New World Order in constant attempts to generate political support for reversing Iraq's conquests. His September 24 press briefing illustrates how this process unfolded. Addressing an Arab-American audience, Bush argued that his Gulf policy "is not about religion, nor is it about greed or culture or imperialist ambitions…. It is about our vital national security interests and ensuring peace and stability in the world…. It is about principle." When asked about Palestinian rights, Bush again asserted that the Gulf crisis was about "the sovereignty of nations," downplaying the pragmatic, oil-based reasons for intervention in favor of an appeal to the rule of law. Ending the exchange, Bush called on his hearers to support the "new world order," the beginnings of which could be seen in how "more than 20 countries have answered the call for help from the Gulf nations to provide defensive

assistance against Iraq."[132] The New World Order thereby offered an efficient way for Bush to make the case for intervention as well as sidestep attempts by critics to link the Gulf crisis with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

Bush certainly invoked the metaphor often. On a visit to Saudi Arabia, Bush declared, "we can't hope to achieve our vision of a new world order, the safer and better world for all our kids, if the economic destiny of the world can be threatened by a vicious dictator."[133] In a November 23 press conference in Cairo, Bush described the New World Order as an opportunity for "a world in which all nations, big or small, have a right to live in peace and dignity."[134] In these instances and many others, the New World Order functioned as rhetorical shorthand—a handy label—Bush could invoke to reframe the conflict with Iraq as an issue of international principle rather than U.S. national interests.

Yet even as it foregrounded the value of international norms, the metaphor also relied upon a reinvigorated sense of American exceptionalism.[135] After all, the New World Order fused Bush's internationalist emphasis on the rule of law with a military, muscular conception of U.S. global leadership. By deploying its "overwhelming" power to defend Gulf allies and liberate Kuwait, the United States under Bush realized a form of exceptionalism premised on the nation exercising a unique mode of leadership to uphold internationalist norms of conduct with the blessing of the United Nations.[136] In leading the world's forces against a tyrant, Bush's United States fulfilled its exceptional mission as the global champion and set the stage for a glorious liberal democratic future.

Several scholars have identified American exceptionalism as the key ingredient in the vision of Bush's New World Order. Through the metaphor, Donald Pease notes, Bush redefined the doctrine of American exceptionalism to mean that the nation possessed a "moral imperative

to fight a Just War." Because Hussein's aggression was "historically incommensurate with the New World Order," this offered a justification for Bush to go to war to liberate Kuwait.[137] Roy Joseph likewise writes that, for Bush, "[d]efeating Saddam was a necessary prelude to realizing the New World Order. [138] This redefined notion of American exceptionalism required a perpetual vigilance not against communism, as during the Cold War, but against tyranny and aggression worldwide. Critically, this new understanding of the United States' global mission implied the need for an ongoing U.S. presence in the Gulf at the exact moment when the previous rationale for engagement there—fears of a Soviet or communist takeover—had evaporated.

In propounding this internationalist version of exceptionalism, however, Bush's rhetoric also resurrected its longstanding corresponding motif: Orientalism. As mentioned in the introduction, the area today called the Middle East has served as a place used by Americans to understand themselves throughout their nation's history. Enlightenment thinkers in the American colonies, for instance, often contrasted their preferred modes of political organization with the "despotism" supposedly found in Arab or Muslim lands.[139] The "Orient" thereby supplied an imaginative resource Americans employed to make sense of their own place in the world. Defining Middle Easterners as benighted or backward eased the path toward Americans marking themselves as an exceptional people.

One of the most common Orientalist motifs deployed in this vein was to depict Arabs or Muslims as lacking agency (i.e., being passive recipients of western influence in some fashion). According to Edward Said, the imperial subjugation of the Orient to Europe enabled "[t]he scientist, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier" to interact with the region and its peoples as objects rather than equals.[140] To be clear, Jews, Muslims, Arabs, Eastern Christians, Iranians, and others have been far from "passive receptacles" of western influence in the modern

era; however, it is also vital to note that Americans have a long history of approaching the Middle East as a place where they could bring their sociopolitical, spiritual, or scholarly ambitions to bear.[141] Historical moments where Americans interposed themselves in Arab or Muslims lands have played an important role in upholding this Orientalist motif of Middle Easterners lacking agency, with the region furnishing a context in which Americans could realize their aspirations.

There are many examples of this dynamic. During the Barbary Wars, U.S. sailors believed themselves to be proving the young nation's martial prowess by displaying in the ports of North Africa that the nascent democratic republic was a force to be respected. In the 1800s American missionaries set out to evangelize the Levant, thereby fulfilling the Great Commission by Christianizing its native inhabitants. U.S. anthropologists and other scholars visited the Middle East with blessing of European colonial regimes, seeking to refine academic theories by studying the peoples under their rule.[142] During the early twentieth century, American oilmen set out to strike black gold in Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Iran and thereby transform the Middle East into a commercial energy storehouse for the developed nations of Europe and North America. In the Cold War, U.S. strategists imagined the Middle East as a critical theater in the global competition with communism, dispatching soldiers, advisors, and contractors to wreak massive transformations across the region; they aimed to offset Soviet influence by doing everything from selling state-of-the-art weapons to “coup proofing” friendly rulers and electrifying remote villages.[143]

In each of these moments, Americans interacted with those living in the Middle East in such a way as to portray them as either beneficiaries of American benevolence (salvation from communism, damnation, or destitution) or as objects used to demonstrate U.S. power and

superiority (via military defeat, scholarly examination, or technological contrast). These depictions played a key role in reifying the Orientalist motif that Middle Easterners lacked agency compared to their western counterparts. Bush's rhetoric of New World Order reiterated this motif, as his internationalist vision portrayed Gulf allies as fortunate recipients of U.S. protection and Hussein's Iraq as an aberrant wrongdoer whose retreat from Kuwait would illustrate to other potential tyrants that Washington would not tolerate brazen aggression in the post-Cold War era.

Edward Said explains the Orientalist nature of the New World Order metaphor in *Culture and Imperialism*. As he argues, the New World Order conveyed a "structure of feeling" characterized by "redolent self-congratulation," "unconcealed triumphalism," and the "grave proclamations of responsibilities" on the part of the United States. For Americans, he contends, the metaphor boiled down to a sentiment along the lines of "we are number one, we are bound to lead, we stand for freedom and order." For Arabs and other Middle Easterners, however, Said asserts that New World Order represented the "illusion of benevolence when deployed in an imperial setting."[144] In other words, the New World Order gave moral sanction to the deeply felt exercise of American power in the Persian Gulf—which Said argues comprises a form of empire.

In any case, Bush advanced a view of international politics in which the United States overtly served as the sheriff over Gulf affairs, rallying deputies to take out an outlaw. This image adapted a Cold War commonplace—the picture of the United States as freedom's champion—and applied it to the Gulf crisis, positioning the United States as the leader of a coalition of states against tyrannical aggression. As Timothy Cole notes, the Gulf crisis brought into sharper focus the foundational premise of Bush's worldwide vision: "the United States is the only superpower with the power and moral responsibility to solve international problems."[145] Therefore, by

violating the international order, Saddam necessarily had defied the American-led system at the center of Bush's foreign policy vision and practice. Given the leading role Bush saw the United States playing in the global scene, the challenge posed by Saddam to the New World Order represented an act the United States could not ignore. Bush seized the opportunity to claim an international mandate for the United States to punish Saddam. In the process Bush equally asserted an American right to police the Gulf and arbitrate Gulf conflicts, establishing the United States as the dominant power in the region.

To sum up, Bush's New World Order metaphor portrayed the United States leading the planet into a fresh dawn, an era in which the rest of the globe would benefit from American-led multilateralism and unquestioned U.S. military supremacy. This vision drew heavily on American exceptionalism, as Bush proclaimed that only the United States could offer the kind of leadership called for by the New World Order. Consequently, Iraq's conquest of Kuwait demanded a U.S. response because it would equip Hussein to "finance further aggression, terror, and blackmail" as well as imperil the emerging New World Order. "At stake is not simply some distant country called Kuwait. At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit," Bush declared, asserting the historic nature of the conflict: "At this critical moment in history, at a time the cold war is fading into the past, we cannot fail."[146] Bush's case for war rested on the need to send a signal to the rest of the world that Hussein's conduct would not be tolerated. According to Bush, Iraq's inevitable defeat against the combined might of the U.S. military and its allies served as an object lesson to future would-be aggressors who might be tempted to disturb the peace imposed through the New World Order. This message was not only Orientalist insofar as it portrayed the crisis as a chance to flex American muscle and teach Hussein a lesson, but also in how it positioned the United States as the ultimate arbiter of disputes over Gulf sovereignty and as the

instrument through which the global community would resolve regional conflicts.[147] Iraq, in other words, could not redraw the map without (American) permission.

Critical to Bush's argument, then, were three interlocking images. First, he cast the United States as the embodiment of the international community's will; in his words, "What we seek is the same as what the international community seeks."[148] Second, he portrayed the Gulf crisis as fundamentally an issue of principle, not American national interests. As he declared in an address for coalition partners, "Iraq's action was more than an attack on one nation—it is an assault on us all, on the international order we all share."[149] And third, Bush represented the crisis as a chance to use U.S. power to correct the mistakes of a wayward Iraq, thereby establishing a template for handling conflicts in the global system emerging from the Cold War. In a pair of mid-February speeches, Bush described the war as an appeal to the Iraqi people to "rejoin the family of peace-loving nations." All countries were welcome if they obeyed the rules: "We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Our differences are with that brutal dictator in Baghdad."[150]

The New World Order condensed these images into a single symbol. For instance, the president told college students that Iraq's occupation "violates every principle of human decency" in the days before combat began. He charged: "If we do not follow the dictates of our inner moral compass and stand up for human life, then his lawlessness will threaten the peace and democracy of the emerging new world order we now see: this long dreamed-of vision we've all worked toward for so long."[151] A similar instance arose when King Hussein of Jordan criticized U.S. actions, accusing the military coalition of exceeding its U.N. mandate. While he did not invoke the metaphor explicitly, its logic formed Bush's reply: "I think they've [Jordanians] made a mistake to align themselves so closely with Saddam Hussein against the rest

of the world."[152] In Bush's vision, every nation should align itself with the New World Order—with its attendant premises of U.S. international leadership—or risk finding itself in opposition against the entire globe for having violated the unspoken rules of sovereignty in the new era.

In short, Bush's New World Order drastically revised the rationale and scope of the American presence in the Gulf. His rhetoric throughout the crisis relied on a constellation of images organized around the New World Order metaphor, which conveyed an Orientalist view of the Gulf by depicting it as a region in need of perpetual U.S. protection and the Gulf crisis as an object lesson for any would-be threats to the global order. In accordance with this vision, Bush called for an expanded U.S. role in the Gulf. Rather than offsetting Soviet influence or hostile forces, the reasons prior presidents gave for an American presence in the region, Bush defined U.S. aims to include "efforts to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction" and to make clear "that there is no place for lawless aggression in the Persian Gulf and in this new world order that we seek to create."[153] This reasoning relied on Bush's other metaphors, *Gulf crisis as test* and *Hussein as criminal*, to depict the situation as a trial run for U.S. leadership in a post-Cold War world. Bush's rhetoric suggested that the glimmering future portrayed in his New World Order vision might forever be lost if America failed to uphold order in the Gulf. For this reason, Bush professed, "we *had* to free Kuwait from Saddam Hussein."[154] This was a duty for the exceptional nation, a duty that, critically, had no limiting principle or expiration date.

The Press, the Administration, and the New World Order

The Bush administration's interactions with the press during the Gulf crisis have attracted significant attention from media scholars for a variety of reasons. It was the first U.S. ground war to occur in an era of cable and satellite television.[155] The conflict served as a "defining moment"

for CNN, as news organizations around the world carried the 24-hour news channel's live coverage in the initial hours of the crisis.[156] Censorship and government manipulation of news were also major features of the war; as Haas admitted, "It (television) really became at times our chief tool—and I don't mean this in a cynical way—for selling our policy."[157] Military officers went to great efforts to provide correspondents with material even as they also worked to control the flow of information, limit reporters' mobility, and promote their own narratives about the war through media outlets.[158] As Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said, "The press gave the American people the best war coverage they ever had."[159] Due to the hypermediated nature of the conflict, with reporters embedding themselves with combat groups, infrared nighttime bombing runs, and a constant stream of updates from the battlefield, many Americans experienced the "Nintendo war" with a sense of immediacy that was lacking in previous conflicts.[160] In fact, a 1998 poll found that the war was the second most vividly remembered historical event for American adults after the Kennedy assassination.[161] As a result, it seems difficult to overstate the constitutive significance of the Gulf War in shaping Americans' views of the Persian Gulf and the U.S. role in the region.[162]

Press outlets' circulation of the administration's arguments, images, and metaphors painted a complicated picture. On one hand, most press outlets adopted the administration's chosen language when discussing the Gulf crisis. For example, dozens of *New York Times* articles from August 1 to December 31 mentioned Bush's call for a New World Order and, like the administration, tied the metaphor to the outcome of the crisis. The newspaper regularly quoted Bush officials' invocation of the metaphor. The *Times* cited Baker, who said, "It would be a terrible mistake in terms of establishing a new world order… If we began by working out deals that would permit unprovoked aggression to pay." Another time it quoted Baker's assertion

that "a new world order… would operate on a different principle entirely [than aggression]."[163] The paper even charted how foreign leaders had begun adopting the New World Order in their own descriptions of the crisis, such as when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze called Iraq's occupation "an act of terrorism that has been perpetrated against the emerging new world order" in an address to the U.N. General Assembly.[164] Indeed, media scholars Stig Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen contend that the coverage found in most U.S. press outlets differed little from administration messaging.[165] One correspondent even compared coverage of the war to a Nazi propaganda operation.[166] In any case, it seems safe to say that the administration's preferred language, arguments, and metaphors appeared in the press quite often.

However, to assume a straight line of influence from the government to the press would be an oversimplification. Bush was at first hesitant to move against Iraq, in stark contrast with the levels of congressional and press outrage over the invasion. In similar fashion, there was a gap between the administration and commentators over the New World Order. In a five week span in the pages of the *New York Times* alone, A.M. Rosenthal dismissed the New World Order as a " fairy tale" and "hypocrisy"; John B. Judis relayed analysts' takes that it was "bunkum" and "prattle"; Senator Jim Sasser (D-TN) accused the administration of getting "stiffed" by Germany, Japan, and Saudi Arabia in its pursuit of the New World Order; and James Reston warned that it was distracting the administration from deficits, political disarray in Moscow, and the terrifying peril of a desert war.[167] Each of these writers (along with many others) disputed the rosy picture painted by Bush's New World Order metaphor. Numerous news articles also relayed right-wing or progressive displeasure with Bush's vision. Randall Rothenberg, for instance, quoted Pat Buchanan asking, "when you start talking about intervening for a new world order,

we stare at that and say, 'What are we doing in this house?'"[168] Repetition of the administration's chosen language did not automatically translate to approving coverage.

Like press reporters, foreign policy commentators articulated a range of opinions on the New World Order. Some, such as Robert Hormats, argued Americans should be more focused on budgetary concerns than utopian visions; as he cautioned, the conflict "was the first U.S. military operation in this century that America felt unable to pay for by itself."[169] Others like Theodore H. Moran focused on the "looming prospect of energy crises" stemming from the United States' perpetual dependence on Persian Gulf oil, which would render New World Order moot.[170] Graham Fuller contended that New World Order would translate to "political chaos in Moscow," asking, "The new world order was fine, but to what place did it relegate the Soviet Union?"[171] Given New World Order's rhetorical flexibility—Bush invoked it as a catch-all term for U.S. aims—it is unsurprising that foreign policy commentators questioned it from several directions. Most *Foreign Affairs* writers dismissed the New World Order as an infeasible prospect insofar as it meant a durable, multilateral system of global problem-solving akin to the coalition assembled to fight Hussein. Alvin Z. Rubinstein spoke for many when he predicted Bush's vision "may well prove to be unworkable" due to domestic pressures, international economic competition, and the political complexities of the dawning era.[172]

These examples comport with other scholars' analysis of press reporting of the war. In their study of how U.S. media outlets adopted the administration's arguments, Kempf, Reimann, and Luostarinen found that "editorials were slightly more critical to the New World Order than were the news items." However, criticism was "seldom" found (in either editorials or regular coverage) of Bush's specific claim that the crisis was occurring in a "historical moment." In other words, while editorial and op-ed writers expressed more skepticism of Bush's Gulf strategy

than the news in general, virtually all journalistic accounts affirmed that the crisis was unfolding at a critical juncture and would shape the post-Cold War world. Thus, although many in the press debated the merits and nature of Bush's New World Order, there was widespread agreement over the logic of its main underlying metaphor: the *Gulf crisis as test*. [173]

A similar story can be found in regard to *Hussein as criminal*. While this metaphor did not appear in every news item, it comprised a major theme in coverage. *Reader's Digest* articles such as "Defenseless Against Missile Terror" (October 1990) and "Nailing the Iraqi A-Bomb" (November 1990) emphasized Hussein's penchant for targeting civilians and pursuing chemical or nuclear weapons.[174] Severely negative descriptors ("tyrant," "dictator," "criminal," "rogue," "evil") appeared in over ten percent of *New York Times* items about Hussein from August 1 to the start of Desert Storm, and an additional six percent mentioned Hitler outright.[175] This did not include belligerent op-eds such as the one authored by Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R – NY), which warned *Times* readers, "with every passing hour, Mr. Hussein rounds up more innocent Americans… We must act decisively against Iraq before we are presented with the unacceptable moral choice of tolerating his naked aggression in Kuwait or facing a protracted hostage crisis."[176] Other outlets such as *Reader's Digest* encouraged the Nazi comparison by telling how "Saddam's blitzkrieg" gave way to "wholesale plundering," the indiscriminate rape of defenseless women, and "brutally capricious" executions.[177] Beyond these publications, the impression of Hussein as a war criminal was fueled by reporters' rampant circulation of the Nayirah testimony, Voice of America propaganda, and other accounts of the "Rape of Kuwait."[178] Taken as a whole, these developments indicate Bush and his subordinates were by and large successful at enlisting the press in their attempts to paint Hussein as a criminal and make war seem like an "inevitability"[179]

While the Hitler analogy was much less likely to be invoked by professional foreign policy commentators, it still appeared in a handful of *Foreign Affairs* articles. For instance, Barry Rubin argued, "Aggressors thrive on appeasement," a lesson "learned… at tremendous cost from the Munich agreement of 1938." Rubin made the case that Munich "should also apply to U.S. policy toward Iraq's ambitions."[180] By analogizing Kuwait to the Sudetenland, he openly endorsed the Hitler comparison. The circulation and rearticulation of these images seemingly worked to persuade Americans that military intervention was necessary. By January 1991 over 57 percent of Americans believed that the United States should be willing to use force against Iraq, over twenty points higher than those who thought that sanctions should be given more time to work.[181] As Winkler observes, these figures signified a jump from previous months, which suggests that the circulation of these images was effective in growing public support for intervention.[182]

Media circulation of these metaphors—*Hussein as criminal* and *Gulf crisis as test*—intensified after Desert Storm began. Nearly one fifth of *New York Times* articles about Hussein referenced the criminal metaphor from January 15 to March 3, the date Iraq accepted U.N. ceasefire terms.[183] Many press outlets embraced and at times defended the Hitler analogy. *Newsweek*, for instance, chided those who "dismissed George Bush's comparisons between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler."[184] And even if the analogy or language of criminality went unmentioned, the metaphor's logic was present in manifold media portrayals of Hussein that deployed a "negative enemy-image" in other ways.[185] In the end, one poll found that 61 percent of Americans agreed with the statement "Saddam Hussein is like Adolf Hitler of Germany in the 1930s and it is important to stop him."[186]

Similarly, many foreign policy commentators implicitly assumed the logic of *Gulf crisis as test* in their discussions of how the war would shape the nascent post-Cold War order. Like Bush, dozens of analyses framed the war as a new beginning or an event that would lay a new foundation for geopolitics in the absence of superpower competition. *Foreign Affairs* articles like James E. Akins' "The New Arabia," Martin Indyk's "Watershed in the Middle East," Peter W. Rodman's "Middle East Diplomacy after the Gulf War," and Carl E. Vuono's "Desert Storm and the Future of Conventional Forces" posited that the war offered a fresh start in some fashion, a new beginning that marked (in Vuono's words) the start of "a truly revolutionary era."[187] These essays reiterated the reasoning at work in the *Gulf crisis as test* metaphor by linking the geopolitical landscape of the world after the Cold War to the outcome of the crisis.

Even writers attacking administration policy relied on these underlying metaphors to make their case. Rachel Flick's *Reader's Digest* article "How We Appeased a Tyrant" exemplifies this trend. In her piece Flick chronicled how U.S. officials "slept at the switch" as Hussein armed Iraq in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War. "American and European greed and gullibility," she chastised, blinded them to "the chasm of hatred that separated the Iraqi dictator from the West." The verdict was clear: "We closed our eyes because some businesses wanted to make money and because Saddam was a useful tool against Iran." As Flick concluded, "Saddam is a Frankenstein monster that the West created."[188] Flick's article illustrates how commentators frequently invoked one metaphor propagated by Bush in the leadup to war (Saddam = criminal) to criticize his administration's policies such as the continued tilt toward Iraq or slow response to the Iraqi military buildup in July 1990. Such stories thereby recirculated the prominent images conveyed by Bush's metaphors even as they attacked Bush's actual Gulf policy.

In sum, Bush's chosen metaphors so central to his case for intervention met mixed reviews in the press. Reporters and analysts did not fully accept his central composite metaphor, the *New World Order*. It faced criticism in the press and skepticism from the foreign policy establishment. Yet the underlying metaphors upon which the New World Order depended, *Gulf crisis as test* and *Hussein as criminal*, had the opposite fate. They were widely adopted by press outlets, foreign policy analysts, and administration critics; even if these writers did not recirculate Bush's language verbatim, the logics of these metaphors saturated media discussions of the war. The images of the Gulf conveyed by these metaphors thereby did much to shape Americans' understanding of the region, the crisis, and their nation's ongoing mission in the Gulf after the Cold War.

Evidence for the constitutive power of these metaphors abounds in polling data. Only 34 percent of Americans thought the region was more stable after the war ended, and a whopping 40 percent disagreed that the world's access to Gulf oil was now more secure.[189] They were far more fearful of Iraqi cruelty than any other aspect of the war.[190] Nearly one third supported keeping troops in the region for at least another two years, with only 16 percent wanting them out within six months.[191] These attitudes make sense if these audiences believed Hussein—who remained in power—truly was a modern-day Hitler. Likewise, 80 percent of Americans thought Bush did the right thing by sending troops to the Gulf, which comports with a belief that the Gulf crisis represented a test in a historic moment that would determine the shape of the post-Cold War world.[192] Based on these findings, it seems evident that Bush's metaphors exerted substantial constitutive force on American imaginations even while the New World Order metaphor met mixed reception. But notwithstanding the president's approval ratings, several groups sought to complicate and contest the picture painted by Bush's rhetoric.

Contesting the New World Order: Three Lines of Criticism

Bush's New World Order metaphor elicited a wide range of responses, including conspiracy theories about a one world government administered by the United Nations. Within more mainstream discourse, however, three major lines of opprobrium emerged to challenge Bush's framing of the Gulf war. First, a broad coalition of groups attacked the administration's policies as a new form of U.S. imperialism. Arab-Americans like Said turned to magazine and newspaper pages to register their discontent, calling attention to how the administration was "occluding the role of the United States and its allies in the formation of the crisis."[193] Black civic and religious leaders likewise called for an end to hostilities to save lives and safeguard federal spending on domestic programs.[194] Left-wing activists joined alongside these efforts and accused the administration, as Michael Mann would later write, of promoting "a unilateralist and militarist vision of how to overcome world disorder."[195] While these groups were able to organize anti-war demonstrations across the country, few protests attracted Vietnam-era levels of attention or turnout. Case in point, a January protest at Lafayette Park next to the White House only drew about 200 participants.[196] Still, this coalition denounced the war as an imperialist exercise and made its voice heard in certain places.[197] These groups helped shape local interpretations of the conflict even though they did little to derail Operation Desert Storm.

A second, related strand of resistance to Bush's framing of the crisis came in the form of journalism exposing the depth of the administration's courtship of Iraq before Desert Shield. Books such as Alan Friedman's, *Spider's Web: The Secret History of how the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*, and Kenneth R. Timmerman's, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq*, set out to reveal how Bush officials circumvented legislative oversight and misled the

public to continue the "tilt" started under Reagan. While this line of criticism was present in some press commentary prior to Desert Storm, it reached new audiences with the publication of these books in 1992 and became a campaign vulnerability against Clinton.[198] Unlike the anti-imperialist case against Bush, these arguments did not seek to disrupt images of Hussein as a criminal but rather relied upon dire impressions of the Iraqi dictator for their persuasive power. Their focus was instead on pointing out the degree to which Bush officials "believed that they could ignore the rapacity and unpredictability of Saddam's Iraq" and thus engaged in "self-deception."[199] To the extent they addressed the New World Order, these sorts of accounts tended to dismiss the metaphor as an exercise in craven rhetorical posturing.[200]

Bush's political opponents built on this reasoning to attack the president. Democrats challenged the administration's portrayal of the Gulf crisis in a third way by arguing that Bush was an unfit leader to realize the New World Order. They sought to appropriate, not contest, the images at work in Bush's metaphors. This strategy was apparent even before the war was over. In the official party response to the 1991 State of the Union address, Senator George Mitchell (D-ME) stated, "For 10 years, U.S. policy favored Iraq. We can't repeat that kind of mistake." He then cast a vision for a post-war world along the lines of Bush's New World Order without using that sequence of words. "Out of the tragedy of war, we seek a world where the force of law is more powerful than the force of arms. We seek a world where justice and human rights are respected everywhere," Mitchell proclaimed. He then elaborated: "We cannot oppose repression in one place and overlook it in another…. The President says he seeks a new world order. We ask him to join us in putting our own house in order."[201] Democrats aimed to seize Bush's idealist and internationalist mantle rather than try to overturn the force of his metaphors.

This approach continued into the 1992 presidential race. Like Mitchell, Clinton attacked Bush by leaning into the image of Hussein as a criminal. “I am angered by the Administration’s appeasement of Saddam Hussein,” Clinton declared. He continued: “President Bush showered Government-backed grain credits and high technology on a regime that had used poison gas on its own people”[202] This argument aimed to disrupt Bush’s rosy portrayal of the Gulf war by highlighting the president’s own contributions to the crisis, thereby demonstrating that he was not qualified to enact the post-Cold War vision he had outlined. While effective, this case did not contest the dominant images and logics conveyed by the *Gulf crisis as test* or *Hussein as criminal* metaphors but instead aimed to capture their moral force and redirect their outrage toward Bush. That Democrats found it more advantageous to appropriate these metaphors than oppose them speaks to their formative constitutive power and evident acceptance by American voters.

Conclusion: The Pivotal Legacy of the New World Order

From U.S.-Soviet cooperation to government-press relations, the Gulf war revolutionized many arenas of American politics. It equally marked a watershed moment in the way Americans perceived the Persian Gulf. Although Reagan oversaw large-scale naval clashes with Iran and justified these actions through the rhetoric of enemyship, these arguments did not generate the kind of support Bush required to sanction a ground war against Saddam’s armies. To build approval for his confrontational Gulf policy, he deployed various metaphors: *Hussein as criminal* and *Gulf crisis as test* that propped up the *New World Order*. These metaphors painted a picture of the crisis as a historic moment that would determine the future of the post-Cold War era, with the Hitler-esque Saddam Hussein facing the combined might of an American-led

coalition dedicated to enforcing the rule of international law. These images, which drew upon deep-seated notions of Orientalism, internationalism, idealism, and American exceptionalism, found widespread purchase in the press even as countless journalists and commentators questioned the meaning and viability of Bush's New World Order.

Running roughshod over Arab-American and anti-imperialist resistance, Bush's metaphors exerted great constitutive force among U.S. audiences and informed how they understood their country's role in the Gulf. Before Bush, U.S. troops had never fought a war in the Persian Gulf and had not engaged in major ground operation since Vietnam. After Desert Storm, Americans not only supported Bush's decision to go to war by a margin of 80 percent, but a majority even wanted to resume the war against Saddam if he failed to fully comply with the U.N. ceasefire agreement.[203] That a large swath of Americans felt this way at the moment the Soviet Union was collapsing speaks to the imaginative power wielded by Bush's rhetoric. Building on prior symbolism, his rhetoric defined the Gulf as a site of instability and danger, a region in need of policing and ongoing efforts to root out potential threats. After Bush's 1992 defeat, it fell to Clinton to translate these desires into a new Gulf strategy for a radically changed world.

Bush's rhetoric was important for several reasons. Perhaps most notably, he developed an alternative rationale for U.S. military intervention in the Gulf than his predecessor. Whereas Reagan had argued that oil and national interests were the factors driving U.S. intervention in the Iran-Iraq War, such pragmatic arguments did not work as effectively for Bush. Bush instead offered principled, idealist rationales for liberating Kuwait. In doing so, Bush echoed the many precedents of presidents arguing for intervention on internationalists grounds, from Wilson in the Great War to Eisenhower in Lebanon to Johnson in Vietnam.[204] Bush's contribution was

thus to pioneer the application of internationalist principles—the rule of international law and U.S. leadership of multilateral institutions—to support intervention specifically in the Gulf. Yet, as his critics alleged, these metaphors put a benevolent face on the pursuit of an imperialist end—unfettered access to Gulf oil. Bush thus established a rhetorical formula, an argument field, that could be redeployed alongside more candidly pragmatic rationales by his successors to generate political support for interventionary policies in the Persian Gulf and beyond.

Metaphors played a critical role in Bush's internationalist case for intervention.[205] The *Gulf crisis as test* metaphor structured discussions of the stakes of the crisis from its earliest days. At its core, this metaphor linked the outcome of the Gulf crisis with the shape of the emerging post-Cold War order.[206] According to the metaphor's logic, peacefulness of the post-Cold War world depended on keeping order in the Gulf. It thereby furnished a strong warrant for liberating Kuwait—so that a strong norm against military aggression would characterize the new international environment. Even critics of the New World Order metaphor such as Joseph Nye adopted the test metaphor in their analysis. In his *Foreign Affairs* essay titled, "What New World Order?," Nye blasted Bush for having "thought and acted like Nixon, but borrowed the rhetoric of Wilson and Carter." But even Nye still accepted the link between the Gulf crisis and the character of the world order after the Cold War. As he wrote, "Had there been no response to Iraq's aggression and violation of its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty, the post-Cold War order would be far more dangerous."[207] The test metaphor spread far and wide.

Similarly, by portraying Saddam as a villain on par with Hitler, Bush's *Hussein as criminal* metaphor pictured the Gulf as a distressed Europe laying vulnerable before an evil would-be conqueror. It likewise suggested an image of the United States as the world's sheriff, rounding up a posse of allies to join the U.N.-blessed coalition to crush Iraq and rescue innocent

Kuwait from Hussein's ravaging clutches. In a manner akin to Theodore Roosevelt's assertion of an American right to police Latin America, the metaphor reinforced nebulous notions of U.S. guardianship over the Gulf by depicting the United States as the region's ultimate source of law and order—an impression Bush translated into policy by sending hundreds of thousands of troops into Saudi Arabia as he waited for U.N. authorization to send forces into Kuwait. This portrait of the situation was fueled by many in the media as press outlets circulated wild stories of Saddam's excesses, which sometimes exaggerated accounts of Iraqi abuses in Kuwait.[208]

These metaphors entailed a much broader U.S. mission in the Gulf than previous presidents had assumed. Far from merely opposing Soviet or Communist inroads in the Gulf, the United States under Bush was now committed to preventing rogue states from upsetting regional stability, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and advancing liberal democratic values across the region. As Bush stressed in his March 6 victory speech to Congress, each of these aims "requires special vigilance…. And I guarantee you: No one will work harder for a stable peace in the region than we will."[209] Consequently, these metaphors helped facilitate a continued American presence in the Gulf and redefinition of its purpose there at a critical juncture when the threat of Soviet communism ceased to exist altogether. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, these metaphors provided a way for policymakers to maintain the perpetual investment of U.S. resources in a region no longer at risk of falling under Moscow's sway.

Yet the images conveyed by these metaphors left certain issues unresolved. If the Gulf's stability was linked to the intoxicating promise of a world after the Cold War, then Hussein's grip on power in Baghdad represented a possible danger not only to his neighbors but also to the peaceful order outside the Gulf—to say nothing of the threat posed by the Iranian regime's

terrorism and radicalism, at least in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. Bush's rhetoric portrayed the Gulf as a region out of step with the rest of the world; this meant a "special vigilance" was required to prevent its problems from spilling over and spoiling the post-Cold War moment of triumph. Given that Democrats sought to appropriate, not contest, the dominant images at work in this discourse, their victory at the 1992 ballot box seemingly did little to disarm the power of this picture. Clinton thus faced the apparent problem of how to bracket the two "rogue states" of the Gulf, Iraq and Iran, from the rest of the world. He turned to a familiar metaphor to do so: containment.

Notes

[1] Jon Meacham, *Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush* (New York: Random House, 2015), 420-421.

[2] "The Most Dangerous Man in the World," *U.S. News & World Report* (June 4, 1990), cover page.

[3] Richard N. Haas, *War of Necessity: War of Choice* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 62.

[4] Martin J. Medhurst interview with Curt Smith, tape recording, College Station, Texas, January 27, 2000. Quoted in Martin J. Medhurst, "Why Rhetoric Matters: George H.W. Bush in the White House," in *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 3.

[5] Fred Barnes, "Mr. Popularity," *New Republic* 202.2-3 (1990), 12.

[6] Charles Kolb, *White House Daze: The Unmaking of Domestic Policy in the Bush Years* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 3.

[7] Medhurst, "Why Rhetoric Matters," 5-7.

[8] Quoted in David Hoffman, "Bush Becomes Pragmatic Champion of the Reagan Revolution," *Washington Post*, March 4, 1988, A12.

[9] David Mervin, *George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 33.

[10] Quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff, "The US Role in Winding Down the Cold War, 1980-1990," in *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation*, ed. Olav Njølstad (New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 149-162.

[11] In his careful style, Bush reminded hearers that "we have some differences" with the Soviets even as he promised "to help be a catalyst for real change." George Bush, " The President-Elect's News Conference in Washington, DC," December 6, 1988, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-president-elects-news-conference-washington-dc. Bush retained a confrontational tone—"on the other side of the

rusting Iron Curtain, their vision failed"—before it became apparent that Soviet troops would indeed leave Eastern Europe, allow German reunification, and dissolve the Warsaw Pact. George Bush, "Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany," May 31, 1989, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-citizens-mainz-federal-republic-germany; William Forrest Harlow, "And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Bush's Rhetoric of Silence during German Reunification," in *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 40-51.

[12] George Bush, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1989, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address.

[13] Robert W. Tucker, "Origins of the New World Order," in *The Gulf Crisis and Its Global Aftermath*, ed. Gad Barzilai, Aharon Klieman, and Gil Shidlo (New York: Routledge, 1993), 165.

[14] George Bush, "Remarks at the Swearing-in Ceremony for James A. Baker III as Secretary of State," January 27, 1989, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-swearing-ceremony-for-james-baker-iii-secretary-state.

[15] By internationalist, I mean what Henry R. Nau calls the "liberal internationalist tradition, America's leadership of world affairs through international institutions like the League of Nations and United Nations." Bush (and later Clinton) sought to exercise American leadership *through* international institutions, which entailed a multilateral approach to problem-solving in the Gulf while still deploying U.S. military forces to secure U.S. interests. Under this schema, a realist approach to foreign policy stresses the use of force "to ensure national security." Henry R. Nau, *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 1-2, 31-35, 67-68. See also endnote 204 and 205.

[16] Jack R. Payton, "Bush and U.S.: World's Top Cops," *St. Petersburg Times*, August 1, 1991, 3A.

[17] RJ Reinhart, "George H.W. Bush in Retrospective," *Gallup*, December 1, 2018, https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/234971/george-bush-retrospective.aspx.

[18] Edward Said, "Peace and the Middle East," *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 16.1 (1992): 5, 18.

[19] George Bush, "Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf Crisis," January 9, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/open-letter-college-students-the-persian-gulf-crisis.

[20] George Bush, "Remarks to the American Legion National Convention in Chicago, Illinois," August 25, 1992, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-american-legion-national-convention-chicago-illinois.

[21] Daniel C. Williamson, "Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17.3 (2006): 597-615; Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 215; Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, 204.

[22] "Special National Intelligence Estimate," *FRUS 1958-1960* 12, 161, 382-387, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d161.

[23] Francis Fukuyama, "The Soviet Union and Iraq Since 1968," RAND Corporation, July 1980, v, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2007/N1524.pdf.

[24] Carl Forsberg, "Iraq, the United States, and the Long Shadow of the Cold War," *Cold War History* 19.4 (2019): 458.

[25] Oles M. Smolansky and Bettie M. Smolansky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 144-155; Bryan R. Gibson, *Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), xvii-xviii, 143-174.

[26] David Campbell observes how U.S. policymakers immediately interpreted Iraq's actions as a threat. "For many, this was obvious," he writes, "Even though it was not the United States which had been invaded, this deed was regarded as a fact which could be observed and a danger which could be understood." Because peril "is not an objective condition," Campbell continues, the process of assessing risk and identifying threats is a "necessarily interpretive" act. Consequently, he argues, Iraq's "unproblematic status" as a national danger in the eyes of Bush officials demands explanation—especially since the United States had supported Iraq in the war against Iran a mere two years prior in 1988. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 1-2.

[27] William H. Dorsey, "With Its Survival at Stake, Arab Nation Found Stability with the Soviets' Aid," *Baltimore Sun*, August 31, 1969, K2.

[28] Theodore Shabad, "Soviet Calls Iraq's Seizure of Oil Holdings a 'Victory,'" *New York Times*, June 3, 1972, 1.

[29] Paul Wohl, "New Soviet Strategy in the Middle East," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 2, 1972, 1.

[30] Jim Hoagland, "Soviets Send Iraq Advanced Missiles," *Washington Post*, February 1, 1975, A1.

[31] For more examples, see: John K. Cooley, "Iraq Coup Leaders Lay Aref Ouster to Israeli War," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 18, 1968, 1-2; John K. Cooley, "Leadership Shuffle in Iraq Signals New Internal Ferment," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 2, 1971, 14.

[32] Jimmy Carter, "Department of State – Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Department Employees," February 24, 1977, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/department-state-remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-with-department-employees.

[33] Jimmy Carter, "Interview With the Magazine Publishers Association – Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Members of the Association," June 10, 1977, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-the-magazine-publishers-association-remarks-and-question-and-answer-session. Carter also repeatedly observed, as he put it, "The Soviets are shipping massive quantities of weapons into the Middle Eastern area," including to Iraq. Jimmy Carter, "The President's News Conference," February 17, 1978, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-1013.

[34] Douglas Watson, "Soviet Ties Altered: Strong-Willed Iraq Asserts Its Independence," *Baltimore Sun*, July 29, 1978, A1.

[35] Marvine Howe, "Iraq Edging Away From Soviet And Restoring Links With West," *New York Times*, February 3, 1980, 12.

[36] A poll conducted in July 1980 found that 56 percent of Americans considered Iraq either "unfriendly" or an "enemy" of the United States (29 percent answered "not sure"); Iraq was the fourth most common answer after the Soviet Union, Iran, and Communist China to the question "which of the countries on this list do you feel could be a threat to the security and the well-being of the United States?" World Jewish Congress, World Jewish Congress Poll: July 1980, Questions 7 and 16, USHARRIS.80ME-G.R04B, Louis Harris & Associates, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1980), Dataset, DOI: {doi}.

[37] Wright quoted John C. Campbell, "The Middle East: The Burdens of Empire," *Foreign Affairs* 57.3 (1978): 619.

[38] Claudia Wright, "Iraq: New Power in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 58.2 (1979): 257-258, 275, 277.

[39] John Borawski, "Letter: Rapprochement With Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 58.4 (1980): 968.

[40] State Department Memorandum, "Letter to Secretary Weinberger on U.S.-Iraqi Relations and Advanced Technology Exports to Iraq," April 29, 1985; National Security Decision Directive 99: "United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia," July 12, 1983, NSA, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-99.pdf; Bruce W. Jentleson, *With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994),47, 257.

[41] Thomas Twetten, quoted in *Becoming Enemies*, 115.

[42] Jentleson, *With Friends Like These*, 33, 42-67; Joost R. Hiltermman, *A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 42-44; Friedman, *Spider's Web*, 29.

[43] Ronald Reagan, "Interview With Representatives of the Washington Times," November 27, 1984, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-representatives-the-washington-times.

[44] Lieutenant Colonel Roger Charles interview with Alan Friedman. Alan Friedman, *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq* (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 40.

[45] For contemporaneous examples of this label in use, see: David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," *Foreign Affairs* 66.5 (1988): 950, 962; Milton Viorst, "Iraq at War," *Foreign Affairs* 65.2 (1986): 361.

[46] Richard W. Murphy, "U.S. Policy Toward Iraq and CW: Use," September 19, 1988, NSA.

[47] Joseph Kay and Alex Lefebvre, "The Diplomacy of Imperialism: Iraq and US Foreign Policy," April 2, 2004, World Socialist Web Site, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2004/04/irq9-a02.html.

[48] Department of State, "Guidelines for U.S.-Iraq Policy," January 20, 1989, NSA.

[49] "Iraq: Foreign Policy of a Major Regional Power," National Intelligence Estimate, November 1989, CIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP94T00766R000300180003-7.pdf.

[50] "Testimony of Assistant Secretary John H. Kelly Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Sub-Committee on Europe and the Near East," April 26, 1990, in *Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives One Hundred First Congress Second Session* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 2-8.

[51] Bush, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session."

[52] National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, 2, NSA.

[53] Friedman, *Spider's Web*, 157, 163.

[54] Fredman, "Shoring Up Iraq," 533.

[55] Geoffrey Kemp, "Middle East Opportunities," *Foreign Affairs* 68.1 (1988/1989): 150.

[56] William Safire, "Stop the Iraqi Murder of the Kurds," *New York Times*, September 5, 1988, A21.

[57] Claiborne Pell's proposal to sanction Iraq over its use of chemical weapons was defeated by senior members of the House of Representatives working with Reagan. David B. Ottaway, "Israel Uneasy over Word of Syria-Soviet Arms Deal; Long-Range Bomber Reportedly Involved," *Washington Post*, October 25, 1989, A24; Zach Fredman, "Shoring Up Iraq, 1983 to 1990: Washington and the Chemical Weapons Controversy," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 23.3 (2012): 544-547.

[58] Journalist unnamed. "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a White House Luncheon for Journalists," March 41, 1989, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-white-house-luncheon-for-journalists.

[59] 43 percent responded with a "very unfavorable" answer and 34 percent with "unfavorable." 12 percent responded "don't know." Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press, Times Mirror Poll # 1990-PS0590: Spring 1990 Political Update, Question 30, USPSRA.90TM2A.R200K, Princeton Survey Research Associates, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1990).

[60] Matthew Frakes, "Reagan, Rogue States, and the Problem of Terrorism," September 17, 2020, Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/reagan-rogue-states-and-problem-terrorism.

[61] "Iraq Threatens Chemical Warfare if Israelis Launch Another Attack," *Chicago Tribune*, April 3, 1990, D5; Alan Cowell, "Iraq Chief, Boasting of Poison Gas, Warns of Disaster if Israelis Strike," *New York Times*, April 3, 1990, A1; Ben Lynfield, "Iraq": From Autonomy to Chemical Weapons," *Jerusalem Post*, May 16, 1990, 7; Daniel Williams and Nick B. Williams, Jr., "Mideast Edges Into Balance of Terror Mode," *Los Angeles Times*, April 4, 1990, A1.

[62] Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 373.

[63] Rushworth Kidder, "Why World Terrorism is on the Rise," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 13, 1989, 13; "The Terrorism Racket," *Boston Globe*, November 15, 1989, 20.

[64] Samir al-Khalil, *Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam's Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990). This book was originally published by the University of California Press. Additionally, newspapers drew attention to Saddam's other abuses, such as the hanging of British-based journalist Farzad Bazoft on March 15, 1990 for supposedly being an Israeli spy. Roger Owen, "A Deathly Silence, to Cover What?" *Los Angeles Times*, March 25, 1990, M7.

[65] Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "A Kinder, Gentler Thug in Iraq?" *Washington Post*, May 3, 1990, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1990/05/03/a-kinder-gentler-thug-in-iraq/15850eeb-d117-4e33-827a-02bc698a9f61/.

[66] Douglas Franz, "Bush Policy Toward Iraq Emerging as Possible Achilles Heel," *Los Angeles Times*, October 13, 1992, A5; Mark Perry, *Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA* (New York: William Morrow, 1992), 354.

[67] Mark Matthews, "Agonist's Bush's Wishes, House and Senate Adopt Different Curbs on Iraq Trade," *Baltimore Sun*, July 28, 1990, 2A; Friedman, *Spider's Web*, 169.

[68] George Bush, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Aspen, Colorado, Following a Meeting With Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom," August 2, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-with-reporters-aspen-colorado-following-meeting.

[69] Meacham accessed non-digitized materials residing at the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas, such as Bush's presidential diary. I hope to make a visit to the library in the future to refine this portion of the analysis. Jon Meacham, *Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George H.W. Bush* (New York: Random House, 2015), 426-429. See also Azriel Bermant, *Margaret Thatcher and the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 206.

[70] Offering a glimpse into these exchanges, the White House released a press statement disclosing Bush's demand for "immediate and unconditional withdrawal" in his conversations with Arab leaders. George Bush, "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the President's Telephone Conversation With King Fahd bin `Abd al-`Aziz Al Sa`ud of Saudi Arabia," August 2, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-press-secretary-fitzwater-the-presidents-telephone-conversation-with-king-fahd.

[71] Bostdorff notes that this decision was made "without seeking congressional permission or invoking the War Powers Resolution," which she calls an "unprecedented action." Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis*, 233. See also Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 108-116.

[72] George Bush, "Remarks to Department of Defense Employees," August 15, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-department-defense-employees.

[73] Quoted in David Hoffman, "Baker Calls Iraqi Threat To 'Economic Lifeline,'" *Washington Post*, November 14, 1990, A25.

[74] "On August 5th, Saddam Hussein announced that he was pulling his forces out of Kuwait. And at the very moment, there was a picture of a truck with some lonely Iraqi soldier smiling and waving as the truck went north. Saddam Hussein's armor went south to the Saudi Arabi border, threatening yet another member of the United Nations, another member of the Arab League." George Bush, "Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Mashpee, Massachusetts," November 1, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-republican-campaign-rally-mashpee-massachusetts.

[75] Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Jobs at Stake in Gulf, Baker Says," *New York Times*, November 14, 1990, A14.

[76] William Safire, "Not Oil Nor Jobs," *New York Times*, November 19, 1990, A19.

[77] "The annual cost to the U.S. economy of doing nothing in the Gulf would be less than half of 1 percent of gross national product." David R. Henderson, quoted in Richard Harwood, "War—or Folly—in the Gulf?" *Washington Post*, September 2, 1990, B6.

[78] 62 percent said "protect the source of much of the world's oil" was "not good enough" compared to 31 percent who said it was a good enough reason. Andrea K. Grove, *Political Leadership in Foreign Policy: Manipulating Support Across Borders* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 62-63.

[79] Denise M. Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 216.

[80] Sue Curry Jansen and Don Sabo, "The Sport/War Metaphor: Hegemonic Masculinity, the Persian Gulf War, and the New World Order," *Sociology of Sport Journal* 11.1 (1994): 3; Dale A. Herbeck, "Sports Metaphors and Public Policy: The Football Theme in Desert Storm Discourse," in *Metaphorical World Politics* ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 124-127; Douglass Kellner, *The Persian Gulf TV War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 56; Gordon R. Mitchell, *Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2000), 121-126.

[81] Bush, "Remarks to Department of Defense Employees"; Bush, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Kennebunkport"; Bush, "Remarks to the American Legion National Convention in Chicago"; Colman McCarthy, "The Terrible Toll of a Gulf War," *Washington Post*, January 13, 1991, F2; David Evans, "Gulf War Victory Mega-parade: It's Too Much, Too Soon," *Chicago Tribune*, June 7, 1991, 25; Kevin Phillips, "The Vietnam Syndrome; Why Is Bush Hurting if There Is No War?" *Los Angeles Times*, November 25, 1990, M1.

[82] For the purposes of this chapter, I define internationalism to mean a belief in transnational cooperation in global problem-solving. N.D. Adora, *Political Science for Civil Services Main Examination* (New York City: McGraw-Hill, 2013), 2. On a brief overview of the varying definitions of internationalism, see: Warren F. Kuehl, "Concepts of Internationalism in History," *Peace & Change* 11.2 (1986): 1-10; Fred Halliday, "Three Concepts of Internationalism," *International Affairs* 64.2 (1988): 187-198; Colin Dueck, "Hegemony on the Cheap: Liberal Internationalism from Wilson to Bush," *World Policy Journal* 20.4 (2003): 1-11; Henry R. Nau, *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

[83] George Bush, Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," August 5, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-exchange-with-reporters-the-iraqi-invasion-kuwait-0.

[84]On Bush earning the moniker "the internationalist president," see: Tony Walker, "George H.W. Bush: The Internationalist President," *The Interpreter*, December 1, 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/george-h-w-bush-internationalist-president.

[85] George Bush, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Kennebunkport, Maine, Following a Meeting With Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada," August 27, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-with-reporters-kennebunkport-maine-following;

[86] George Bush, "Remarks at a Fundraising Barbecue for Representative Bill Grant in Tallahassee, Florida," September 6, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-fundraising-barbecue-for-representative-bill-grant-tallahassee-florida.

[87] George Bush, "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis," August 22, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-the-persian-gulf-crisis-3.

[88] George Bush, "Remarks at a Republican Party Fundraising Luncheon in Denver, Colorado," September 18, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-republican-party-fundraising-luncheon-denver-colorado.

[89] George Bush, "Address Before the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York," October 1, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-the-45th-session-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-new-york.

[90] Secretary of State Robert Lansing, "Letter of Reply to the Pope," August 27, 1917, American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-reply-the-pope.

[91] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Statement by the President following the Landing of United States Marines at Beirut," July 15, 1958, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-following-the-landing-united-states-marines-beirut.

[92] As he put it, "Communist domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself." Lyndon B. Johnson, "The President's News Conference," July 28, 1965, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-1038.

[93] Dean Rusk, "America's Goal—A Community of Free Nations," February 22, 1962. Reprinted in Dean Rusk, *America's Goal—A Community of Free Nations: Dean Rusk Secretary of State* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, 1962), 2.

[94] Tucker, "Origins of the New World Order," 164-170.

[95] George Bush, "Remarks to a Fundraising Luncheon for New Mexico Gubernatorial Candidate Frank Bond," October 25, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-fundraising-luncheon-for-new-mexico-gubernatorial-candidate-frank-bond.

[96] Bush, Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," August 5.

[97] Bush, "Remarks and Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion," August 2; Bush, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Aspen."

[98] George Bush, "Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," August 3, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-exchange-with-reporters-the-iraqi-invasion-kuwait; George Bush, "The President's News Conference," September 21, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-22.

[99] Rachel Martin Harlow, "Agency and Agent in George Bush's Gulf War Rhetoric," in *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 65.

[100] George Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia," August 8, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-announcing-the-deployment-united-states-armed-forces-saudi-arabia.

[101] George Bush, "Remarks at a Republican Party Fundraising Breakfast in Burlington, Massachusetts," November 1, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-republican-party-fundraising-breakfast-burlington-massachusetts.

[102] "Nayirah Kuwaiti Girl Tesimony," *YouTube*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LmfVs3WaE9Y; George Bush, "Remarks to United States Army Troops Near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia," November 22, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-united-states-army-troops-near-dhahran-saudi-arabia. On the incubator story and Nayirah testimony, see: John Oddo, *The Discourse of Propaganda: Case Studies from the Persian Gulf War and the War on Terror* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2018), 57-101. William James Willis, *The Media Effect: How the News Influences Politics and Government* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 3; Douglas Walton, "Appeal to Pity: A Case Study of the *Argumentum Ad Misericordiam*," *Argumentation* 9.4 (1995): 769-784; Arthur E. Rowse, "How to Build Support For War," *Columbia Journalism Review* 31.3 (1992): 28-29; Giles Fowler and Fred Fedler, "A Farewell to Truth: Lies, Rumors and Propaganda as Press Goes to War," *Florida Communication Journal* 22.1 (1994): 22-24, 32.

[103] Mary E. Stuckey, "Competing Foreign Policy Visions: Rhetorical Hybrids After the Cold War," *Western Journal of Communication* 59.2 (1995): 220; Robert L. Ivie, "Tragic Fear in the Rhetorical Republic: American Hubris and the Demonization of Saddam Hussein," Presentation at the Ninth Annual Alta Conference on Argumentation, Alta, Utah, 1995.

[104] Theodore Roosevelt, "Fourth Annal Message," December 6, 1904, American Presidency Project, Fourth Annual Message | The American Presidency Project (ucsb.edu).

[105] George Bush, "Remarks at the Annual Conference of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Baltimore, Maryland," August 20, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-annual-conference-the-veterans-foreign-wars-baltimore-maryland.

[106] Statements such as these marked a departure from the arguments used by Reagan in the Iran-Iraq War, as Bush foregrounded international norms in the United States' response rather than U.S. oil or political interests in the Gulf. In that respect Bush echoed Eisenhower, who argued that U.S. intervention in Lebanon was necessary not because "tiny" Lebanon itself was necessarily important but to protect the global order writ large. As Bush biographer Jon Meacham writes, "Saddam Hussein had challenged Bush's universe, a post-Cold War world of order and balance, and the president was not interested in allowing a dictator to destroy a unique historical moment." Meacham, *Destiny and Power*, 432.

[107] Luke Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 159.

[108] The Korean conflict might arguably constitute another instance where a coalition of states intervened in a war with the blessing of the United Nations, but that situation was different for a number of reasons, including the fact that neither South Korea or North Korea were U.N. member states. See: Paul M. Edwards, *United Nations Participants in the Korean War: The Contributions of 45 Member Countries* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2013), 27-57.

[109] Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect*, 171-172, 178-189.

[110] Bush often described American-style political and economic freedoms as universal human values. Full quote: "And now, in the 1980's, human aspirations for basic political and economic freedoms have become almost universal." George Bush, "Remarks to the National Assembly in Seoul," February 27, 1989, American

Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-national-assembly-seoul; George Bush, "Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony in Massachusetts," May 21, 1989, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-boston-university-commencement-ceremony-massachusetts.

[111] As part of this vision, Bush called on allies like Japan to "contribute to global peace and prosperity" alongside the United States. George Bush, "Written Responses to Questions Submitted by the Kyodo News Service of Japan," February 16, 1989, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/written-responses-questions-submitted-the-kyodo-news-service-japan.

[112] George Bush, "Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty," April 4, 1989, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-ceremony-commemorating-the-40th-anniversary-the-north-atlantic-treaty.

[113] George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 1992, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-0.

[114] George Bush, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Trade Legislation," September 17, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-textile-apparel-and-footwear-trade-legislation.

[115] George Bush, "Message to the Congress on the Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to Iraq," August 3, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-the-congress-the-declaration-national-emergency-with-respect-iraq.

[116] Jackson Haynes, "Arms and the New World Order," *Washington Post*, September 7, 1990, A2.

[117] Gorbachev had used the metaphor "New World Order" first, during a December 7, 1988, address at the United nations General Assembly. Bush officials employed the term with journalists prior to the Gulf crisis to describe the post-Cold War vision the administration wished to bring about. Michael Dobbs, "Soviet Leader Speaks of Hope, Meets With Reagan and Bush," *Washington Post*, December 8, 1988, A1; Dan Balz, "Bush, Kohl: International Odd Couple: New World Order Bonds Two Dissimilar Leaders," *Washington Post*, July 12, 1990, A8; Thomas J. McNulty, "Summit May Unveil New Order," *Chicago Tribune*, September 9, 1990, D1.

[118] George Bush, "Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Gubernatorial Candidate Pete Wilson in San Francisco, California," February 28, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-fundraising-dinner-for-gubernatorial-candidate-pete-wilson-san-francisco.

[119] George Bush, "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis," August 30, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-the-persian-gulf-crisis-0.

[120] Other commentators such as John Hughes and Frank Gaffney Jr. responded to Bush's invocation of a New World Order as well, suggesting that the metaphor carried significant salience among observers. John Hughes, "A New Kind of Summit," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 5, 1990, 19; Frank L. Gaffney, Jr., "Moscow's Cynical Agenda," *Los Angeles Times*, September 3, 1990, B5.

[121] Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "Bush's Big Chance," *Washington Post*, September 9, 1990, D7.

[122] Y.C. Hsu and E. Boling, "An Approach for Designing Composite Metaphors for User Interfaces," *Behaviour & Information Technology* 26.3 (2007): 209, 211.

[123] Composite metaphors, as Eileen Cornell Way writes, the "kind of category shifting and concept merging that…provides us with a way of moving from known ideas and familiar concepts to new and unknown ones." Eileen Cornell Way, *Knowledge Representation and Metaphor* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 2,8.

[124] According to Jeffrey A. Engel, Bush's foreign policy was centered on the "notion of American power as the guarantor of [a] stability [that] extended far beyond Europe." Jeffrey A. Engel, "A Better World… but Don't Get Carried Away," *Diplomatic History* 34.1 (2010): 33. See also: Arnon Gutfeld and Clinton R. Zumbrunnen, "From Nickel Grass to Desert Storm: The Transformations of US Intervention Capabilities in the Middle East," *Middle Eastern Studies* 49.4 (2013): 623-644.

[125] George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit," September 11, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-persian-gulf-crisis-and-the-federal-budget.

[126] In these ways the New World Order metaphor epitomized how, according to William G. Hyland, "the realism of geopolitics is giving way to the idealism" of the post-Cold War. William G. Hyland, "America's New Course," *Foreign Affairs* 69.2 (1990): 7.

[127] One Gallup survey conducted August 30 to September 2 offered 18 different policy options and asked participants to select which ones they supported. No policy garnered more than 9 percent support. The same poll also found that 74 percent of Americans supported Bush's handling of the Gulf crisis. Gallup Organization, Gallup News Service Survey: U.S. Troops in the Persian Gulf/ Press Coverage of the Kuwaiti Situation, Question 3 and Question 4, USGALLUP.122004.R03, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1990).

[128] Indeed, a September poll taken after Bush's speech showed supermajorities of Americans approved of Bush and the decision to protect Saudi Arabia. However, only a slight majority (56 percent) believed the United States should use military force to evict Iraq from Kuwait if economic sanctions failed, and Americans favored a continuation of sanctions over attacking Iraq by more than a three-to-one margin (59 percent to 19 percent). Time Magazine/Cable News Network (CNN), Yankelovich/Time Magazine/CNN Poll: Middle East/Budget Deficit Reduction, Questions 11 and 14, USYANKCS.092090.R07, Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1990); Gallup Organization, Gallup News Service Survey: Time Management/The Middle East, Questions 5, 6, and 23, USGALLUP.922018.R03, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1990).

[129] As Roy Joseph points out, "there was no programmatic development of this idea beyond the construction of the Gulf War coalition." Roy Joseph, "The New World Order: President Bush and the Post-Cold War Era," in *The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush,* ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 98.

[130] Thomas L. Friedman, "Mideast Tensions," *New York Times*, December 2, 1990, 1.

[131] Cuba opposed Resolution 678 alongside Yemen, and China abstained from the vote. For more background on Communist states and Resolution 678, see Juan M. Del Aguila, "A Retrospective Analysis of Cuba's Role During the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991," *Cuban Studies* 26.1 (1996): 97-120.

[132] Bush, "Remarks at a Question-and-Answer Session," September 24.

[133] Bush, "Remarks to United States Army Troops Near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia," November 22, 1990.

[134] George Bush, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters Following Discussions With President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak in Cairo, Egypt," November 23, 1990, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-question-and-answer-session-with-reporters-following-discussions-with.

[135] As Trevor B. McCrisken writes, "Given the depth of criticism that Bush lacked vision, it is perhaps surprising to find that many of his speeches did in fact contain familiar rhetorical references to the special nature of the United States." Trevor B. McCrisken, *American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: US Foreign Policy Since 1974* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 132.

[136] Karen A. Mingst, "The Bush Doctrine and Multilateral Institutions," in *American Foreign Policy in a Globalized World*, ed. David P. Forsythe, Patrice C. McMahon, and Andrew Wedeman (New York: Routledge, 2006), 124.

[137] Donald E. Pease, *The New American Exceptionalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 64, 66.

[138] Joseph, "The New World Order," 95.

[139] In a letter that is likely to have been written by Benjamin Franklin, the pseudonymous Pacificus attacked the notion of absolute rule of the monarch: "Examine every Form of Government at this Day subsisting on the Face of the Globe, from the absolute Despotism of the Grand Sultan to the Democratic Government of the City of Geneva, and it will be found that the Exertion of Power in those Hands with whom it is lodged, however unconstitutional, is always justified." Pacificus, "Pax Quaeritur Bello," January 23, 1766, Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-13-02-0019. On the claim that Franklin is the likely author, see: *Benjamin Franklin's Letters to the Press 1758-1775*, ed. Verner W. Crane (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1950), 54-57; *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* vol. 13, ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 54-58.

[140] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 7.

[141] Susannah Heschel and Umar Ryad, "Introduction," in *The Muslim Reception of European Orientalism: Reversing the Gaze* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 4.

[142] Dale F. Eickelman, *The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach*, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 5.

[143] Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power* (New York: Free Press, 2009), 179-181, 244; 130-134, G. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances: Fiscal Year 1980* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 513; Hugh Wilford, *America's Great Game* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 148-152, 191-192.

[144] Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), xvii

[145] Timothy M. Cole, "When Intentions Go Awry: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Rhetoric," *Political Communication* 13.1 (1996): 96.

[146] George Bush, "Radio Address to the Nation on the Persian Gulf Crisis," January 5, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-address-the-nation-the-persian-gulf-crisis.

[147] Again, as Glanville notes, this framework marked a break from the dominant discourses surrounding national sovereignty premised on each state's right to non-intervention and heralded the early outworking of a new discourse premised on the international community's responsibility to protect defenseless populations in the face of mass atrocity (such as the Iraqi Kurds). Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect*, 181-183.

[148] George Bush, "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict," January 18, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-the-persian-gulf-conflict-0.

[149] George Bush, "Message to Allied Nations on the Persian Gulf Crisis," January 8, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-allied-nations-the-persian-gulf-crisis.

[150] George Bush, "Remarks to Raytheon Missile Systems Plant Employees in Andover, Massachusetts," February 21, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-raytheon-missile-systems-plant-employees-andover-massachusetts; George Bush, "Remarks to the American Association for the Advancement of Science," February 15, 1991, American Presidency Project," https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-american-association-for-the-advancement-science.

[151] George Bush, "Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf Crisis," January 9, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/open-letter-college-students-the-persian-gulf-crisis.

[152] George Bush, "Exchange With Reporters Aboard Air Force One on the Persian Gulf Conflict," February 6, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/exchange-with-reporters-aboard-air-force-one-the-persian-gulf-conflict.

[153] George Bush, "Remarks to Community Members at Fort Stewart, Georgia," February 1, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-community-members-fort-stewart-georgia; George Bush, "White House Statement on Weapons of Mass Destruction," March 7, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/white-house-statement-weapons-mass-destruction.

[154] Emphasis added. George Bush, "Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region," March 2, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-address-united-states-armed-forces-stationed-the-persian-gulf-region.

[155] Stewart Purvis, "The Media and the Gulf War," *RSA Journal* 139.5423 (1991): 735-744.

[156] Ingrid Formanek, "Operation Desert Storm: 25 Years On," CNN, January 19, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/19/middleeast/operation-desert-storm-25-years-later/index.html.

[157] Timothy J. McNulty, "In Gulf War, TV Was Both Friend, Foe," *Chicago Tribune*, December 23, 1991, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1991-12-23-9104250154-story.html.

[158] Heikki Luostarinen and Rune Ottosen, "The Media Gulf War and its Aftermath," in *Journalism and the New World Order* vol. 1, ed. Stig A. Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen (Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom, 2000), 35; John R. MacArthur, *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the 1991 Gulf War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); *The Media and the Gulf War*, ed. Hedrick Smith (Santa Ana, CA: Seven Locks Press, 1992); Oddo, *The Discourse of Propaganda*, 40-56; *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf—A Global Perspective*, ed. Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, and Herbert I. Schiller (New York: Routledge, 1992); Douglass Kellner, "The Persian Gulf TV War Revisited," in *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*, ed. Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer (New York: Routledge, 2004), 136-154.

[159] Pete Williams, "View From the Pentagon," *Washington Post*, March 17, 1991, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/03/17/view-from-the-pentagon/ef620cec-c4d9-40d1-93a8-f91db8468d3e/; see also Rian Dundon, "Operation Desert Storm Was a Practice Run in Press Manipulation," *Timeline*, March 1, 2018, https://timeline.com/photos-gulf-war-cnn-effect-press-manipulation-66680a20cf42. For two examples of glowing coverage, see: C.D.B. Bryan, "Desert Norm," *Reader's Digest* (June 1991): 104-108; Malcolm McConnell, "Rescue in Iraq!" *Reader's Digest* (June 1991): 75-82.

[160] James McBride, *War, Battering, and Other Sports: The Gulf Between American Men and Women* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995), 36; Benjamin Wooley, *Virtual Worlds* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 193.

[161] History Channel, History Channel Poll: March 1998, Question 1, USROPER.98MRHC.R01, Roper Starch Worldwide, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1998).

[162] Jean Baudrillard famously advanced the provocative claim that the Gulf War never happened, since the experience of the Gulf War for most audiences around the world was constructed by media representation. While I agree with Gordon Mitchell in that Baudrillard's claim is too western-centric and ontologically sloppy for me to assent to it, the general observation that the war was constructed for most Americans through their interaction with press outlets, which then powerfully shaped their opinion of the conflict and related policies, is one with which I agree. Jean Baudrillard, "La Guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu," *Liberaton*, March 29, 1991; Jean Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, trans. Paul Patton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

[163] Thomas L. Friedman, "Mideast Tensions; Senators Demand Role in Approving Any Move on Iraq," *New York Times,* October 18, 1990, A1; "Standoff in the Gulf," *New York Times,* December 6, 1990, A16.

[164] Paul Lewis, "Confrontation in the Gulf," *New York Times,* September 26, 1990, A1; Francis X. Clines, "Confrontation in the Gulf," *New York Times,* October 4, 1990, A14; Joel Brinkley, "Confrontation in the Gulf: Jordanians Meet Frustration in Search for 'Arab Solution,'" *New York Times,* September 21, 1990, A1.

[165] Although it is beyond the purview of this project, it is also interesting to note that they find "this one-dimensional propaganda image" conveyed by the U.S. government was adopted to varying degrees in many European countries. As they write, "The more the country's security has been based on close cooperation with the USA, primarily within NATO, the more the media will promote active support for the US Gulf War policy in both national and local media." Stig A. Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen, "Summary and Conclusion: Globalization and the Gulf Conflict 1990-2000: Challenges for War Journalism in the New World Order," in *Journalism and the New World Order* vol. 1, ed. Stig A. Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen (Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom, 2000), 258, 257.

[166] "Spin Control Through Censorship: The Pentagon Manages the News," *Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR),* April 1, 1991, https://fair.org/extra/spin-control-through-censorship/.

[167] A.M. Rosenthal, "The New World Order," *New York Times*, October 23, 1190, A23; A.M. Rosenthal, "On My Mind: More Arabian Tales," *New York Times*, October 26, 1990, A35; John B. Judis, "George Bush, Meet Woodrow Wilson," *New York Times,* November 20, 1990, A21, A1; James Reston, "It's Still Wiser to Jaw Than to War," *New York Times,* November 30, 1990, A33.

[168] Randall Rothenberg, "Confrontation in the Gulf; Thunder on the Right," *New York Times,* September 6, 1990, A21.

[169] Robert D. Hormats, "The Roots of American Power," *Foreign Affairs* 70.3 (1991): 133.

[170] Theodore H. Moran, "International Economics and National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 69.5 (1990): 83.

[171] Graham E. Fuller, "Moscow and the Gulf War," *Foreign Affairs* 70.3 (1991): 64, 73.

[172] As he continued: "Still, let it not be written of George Bush's attempt to establish a new system of security in the gulf that it was found difficult and hence not tried." Alvin Z. Rubenstein, "New World Order or Hollow Victory?" *Foreign Affairs* 70.4 (1991): 65.

[173] Wilhelm Kempf, Michael Reimann, and Heikki Luostarinen, "New World Order Rhetoric in US and European Media," in *Journalism and the New World Order* vol. 1, ed. Stig A. Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen (Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom, 2000), 134.

[174] San Diego Magazine, "American Sting: Nailing the Iraqi A-Bomb," *Reader's Digest* (November 1990): 79.Ralph Kenney Bennet, "Defenseless Against Missile Terror," *Reader's Digest* (October 1990): 112.

[175] Out of 1,939 articles from August 1, 1990, to January 15, 1991, 115 also mentioned Hitler and 198 mentioned tyrant, dictator, criminal, rogue, or evil without referencing Hitler. Search conducted using ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times with Index.

[176] Alfonse D'Amato, "Yes Hussein Must Be Ousted," August 24, 1990, A29.

[177] Ralph Kinney Bennett and Rachel Flick, "The Rape of Kuwait: Why War Came," *Reader's Digest* (April 1991): 84, 87.

[178] Laurien Alexandre, "Voicing the Gulf: The Voice of America Constructs the Gulf War," in *Journalism and the New World Order* vol. 1, ed. Stig A. Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen (Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom, 2000), 87. For an example of how harrowing stories about Iraq's conquest of Kuwait circulated in U.S. media, thereby disseminating images of Iraqi brutality making war seem more palatable, see: the *Reader's Digest* complication "Escape From Kuwait." "Escape From Kuwait," *Reader's Digest* (December 1990): 100-104.

[179] Douglass Kellner, *The Persian Gulf TV War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 59, 57.

[180] Barry Rubin, "Reshaping the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 69.3 (1990): 144-145.

[181] *Gallup Poll Monthly*, 304 (January 1991): 2; Carol K. Winkler, "Transforming Individuals and Collectives in 'The New World Order': Implications for Enemy Construction and Response," in *Argument in Controversy: Proceedings of the Seventh SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation*, ed. Donn W. Parson (Alta, UT: University of Utah Press, 1991), 124.

[182] Winkler, "Transforming Individuals and Collectives in 'The New World Order,'" 123-125.

[183] 152 articles out of 885, or 17.1 percent. Search conducted using ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times with Index.

[184] "His 'Kampf,'" *Newsweek*, March 3, 1991, https://www.newsweek.com/his-kampf-201340.

[185] Stig. A. Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen, "Studying the Media Gulf War," in *Journalism and the New World Order* vol. 1, ed. Stig A. Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen (Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom, 2000), 24.

[186] Philip Smith, *Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 106.

[187] Carl E. Vuono, "Desert Storm and the Future of Conventional Forces," *Foreign Affairs* 70.2 (1991): 68; Martin Indyk, "Watershed in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 71.1 (1991), 70-93; Peter W. Rodman, "Middle East Diplomacy after the Gulf War," *Foreign Affairs* 70.2 (1991): 1-18; James E. Akins, "The New Arabia," *Foreign Affairs* 70.3 (1991): 36-49.

[188] Rachel Flick, "How We Appeased a Tyrant," *Reader's Digest* (January 1991): 39-44.

[189] Gallup Organization, Gallup News Service Poll: July Omnibus, Wave 3, Question 33, USGALLUP.073191.R09F, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1991); Gallup Organization, Gallup News Service Poll: July Omnibus, Wave 3, Question 31, USGALLUP.073191.R09D, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1991).

[190] 34 percent answered "cruelty of war," and the second-highest answer was "fear of Iraqi dictatorship" at 18 percent. Asahi Shimbun, 91JUN1: PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT, OPINION SURVEY YEARBOOK, 1992, Question 18, 31115765.00017, Asahi Shimbun, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1991).

[191] Gallup Organization, Gallup News Service Poll: July Omnibus, Wave 3, Question 34, USGALLUP.073191.R10, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1991).

[192] Americans Talk Issues Foundation, Americans Talk Issues Foundation Poll: National Security Survey 16, Question 37, USMS.ATS16.R36, Greenberg-Lake: The Analysis Group, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1991).

[193] As Said wrote in March 1991, "Yet at bottom this is a personalised struggle between, on the one hand, a Third World dictator of a kind the US has long dealt with, whose rule it has encouraged, whose favours it has long enjoyed, and, on the other, the president of a country which has taken on the mantle of empire inherited from Britain and France and is determined to remain in the Middle East for reasons of oil and of geo-strategic and political advantage." Edward Said, "Edward Said, an American and an Arab, writes on the eve of the Iraqi-Soviet peace talks," *London Review of Books* 13.5, March 7, 1991, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v13/n05/edward-said/edward-said-an-american-and-an-arab-writes-on-the-eve-of-the-iraqi-soviet-peace-talks. Said gave other interviews and lectures as well. See: Barbara Harlow, "The Intellectuals and the War: An Interview with Edward Said," *Middle East Report* 171 (July/August 1991), https://merip.org/1991/07/the-intellectuals-and-the-war/.; Josh Getlin, "Edward Said: Moderate Voice for the Mideast," *Los Angeles Times*, February 3, 1991, OCE1; Josh

Getlin, "Forever and Exile," *Los Angeles Times*, February 3, 1991, E1; Edward Said, "Peace and the Middle East," *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 16.1 (1992): 5-19.

[194] Sam Fulwood III, "Black Activists Urge Bush to Declare Cease-Fire," *Los Angeles Times*, February 16, 1991, VCA3.

[195] Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (London: Verso, 2003), 2.

[196] Paul Taylor, "Pro-and Anti-War Feeling Expressed Across Nation," *Washington Post*, January 18, 1991, A23. An earlier protest in October had between 250 and 500 participants. Laurie Goodstein, "7 Who Refuse to Serve lead Anti-War March," *Washington Post*, October 21, 1990, A28.

[197] Several California protests showed up in headlines and led to arrests, for instance. Scott Harris, "Anti-War Protests Widen by Students," *Los Angeles Times*, January 18, 1991, SDA17; Terry Spencer, "High Schoolers Demonstrate Anti-War Sentiments," *Les Angeles Times*, November 22, 1990; Jay Matthews, "Antiwar Fervor From Those Who Went," *Washington Post*, January 12, 1991, A8; Edwin Chen, "Thousands Join War Protests Across U.S.," *Los Angeles Times*, October 21, 1990, A10A.

[198] Thomas Omestead, "Why Bush Lost," *Foreign Policy* 89.4 (1992): 70.

[199] P. Edward Haley, "It Wasn't My Fault: Or, Why Saddam Surprised the Bush Administration and Invaded Kuwait," in *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Meena Bose and Rosanna Perotti (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 94-95.

[200] To the extent New World Order represented a multilateral, peaceful system of resolving international disputes, wrote Moeller, then "the United States is thus definitely a part of the problem." Bjorn Moeller, "The United States and the 'New World Order,'" *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 11.1-2 (1998): 102.For an alternative account that defends Bush, see: Daniel R. Heimbach, "The Bush Just War Doctrine: Genesis and Application of the President's Moral Leadership in the Persian Gulf War," in *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H.W. Bush*, ed. Meena Bose and Rosanna Perotti (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 442-450.

[201] George Mitchell, "Democratic Party Response to President Bush's 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,'" January 29, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/democratic-party-response-president-bushs-address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-0.

[202] William J. Clinton, "Excerpts of Remarks in Milwaukee," October 2, 1992, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/excerpts-remarks-milwaukee.

[203] 70 percent thought the United States should bomb Iraq if Washington believed Iraq was trying to make a nuclear bomb in secret. ABC News, ABC News Poll: Omnibus - July, 1991, Question 17 and 18, USABC.435.R028, Chilton Research Services, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1991); Americans Talk Issues Foundation, Americans Talk Issues Foundation Poll: National Security Survey 16, Question 17, USMS.ATS16.R17, Greenberg-Lake: The Analysis Group, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1991).

[204] In *Why Wilson Matters: The Origins of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today*, Tony Smith Jr. writes that Wilson's liberal internationalism entailed a long list of commitments: "dedication to the promotion of human rights and democratic government abroad, its trust in the general prosperity that an open, integrated international economic system could bring the world, its commitment to multilateral institutions to promote international peace, [and] its claims that America is 'exceptional' because its power serves out country's national security and democratic institutions by promoting peace." Bush certainly fell short of the full sweep of these aims. However, his rhetoric voiced a clear commitment to the importance of unimpeded trade (free flow of oil), the peacefulness of American exceptionalism, and multilateral institutions as instruments of peace. It is in this sense that I label Bush's appeals "internationalist." Tony Smith Jr., *Why Wilson Matters: The Origins of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2018), 1.

[205] As Steven Hurst writes, this "internationalist world view" translated to an attempt on the part of the United States to keep the peace "through international institutions wherever possible, and with the objective of strengthening those institutions and the norms they enforced. This did not imply an unwillingness to use force, but it did mean a commitment to act multilaterally, and with the imprimatur of the UN, whenever possible." Steven Hurst, *The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War* (Edinburgh, U.K.: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 116.

[206] Different forms of this metaphor saturated Soviet discourse about the Gulf crisis as well, as both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze called for "the new world order" and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in their own ways. Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations at the End of the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), 435.

[207] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs* 71.2 (1992): 84, 96.

[208] MacArthur, *Second Front*, xxiv, 58-59, 71, 171, 240, 247.

[209] George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict," March 6, 1991, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-cessation-the-persian-gulf-conflict.

CHAPTER FOUR

Clinton and Dual Containment

Bill Clinton heralded a new era in international relations as he assumed the presidency. "The cold war is won," he told the American people after his electoral victory.[1] In place of enmity toward Moscow, Clinton vowed "to do everything I can to support democratic and economic reform there."[2] He likewise announced "a new chapter in United States policy toward China," granting most-favored-nation trade status toward America's other major communist rival during the Cold War.[3] From South Africa to Saigon, Clinton's tenure was characterized by U.S. diplomatic breakthroughs. Outside ethnically-motivated bloodletting in places like Rwanda and Yugoslavia, he presided over a mostly peaceful era in global affairs. After decades of being locked in the two-sided superpower conflict, the United States now found itself, in the words of political analyst Stephen M. Walt, "in a position of unprecedented preponderance" on the world stage.[4] So sharp was this transition that the *New York Times* and *Foreign Affairs* held unofficial competitions to name this new "unipolar" era of geopolitics.[5] Many Americans concurred with Clinton's triumphalist assessment: "Soviet communism has collapsed and our values—freedom democracy, individual rights, free enterprise—they have triumphed all around the world."[6]

There was, however, one noticeable exception to this rule: pro-American values had most certainly not triumphed across the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Republic of Iran, according to Clinton, existed outside "the family of nations," an internationalist metaphor he like to use to cast a familial image of U.S. global leadership.[7] When terrorists bombed the World Trade Center in New York scarcely a month after his inauguration, news reports and Clinton himself voiced suspicions that Iran may have been behind the attack, and an editorial in the *Los Angeles Times*

warned readers that a host of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations "draw their inspiration from the religious-revolutionary zeal of Iran."[8] This antagonism toward Iran expressed itself in numerous policy decisions, such as when the Clinton administration pressured American oil companies and Azerbaijan to avoid routing lucrative pipelines through Iranian territory.[9] And as Clinton's "family of nations" metaphor would suggest, this antagonism toward Tehran fit within an internationalist approach to foreign affairs that emphasized American-led multilateralism.[10]

Iraq found itself on the outside of the "family" as well. After Desert Storm, the United Nations had taken the unprecedented step of declaring a "no-fly zone" across swaths of northern and southern Iraq to prevent Hussein from committing further atrocities against minority Kurds and Shiites. Clinton stridently supported this mission to provide "air cover" for these vulnerable groups and rejected anything resembling "appeasement" for Baghdad.[11] Under Clinton, the United States would become the leading enforcer of U.N. sanctions on Iraq.[12] Indeed, Clinton went so far as to publicly disavow even the possibility of restored relations so long as Hussein remained in power. Two months into his presidency, he told CBS News, "I cannot conceive of the United States ever having any kind of normal relationship with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussein is there."[13] The administration even took the extreme step of calling for regime change in Baghdad and funding covert efforts to overthrow Saddam.[14]

These attitudes toward Iran and Iraq served as the rhetorical foundation for Clinton's Gulf strategy. In a policy the administration labeled *Dual Containment*, the United States sought to marginalize Iraq and Iran through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, economic measures, and, at least in the case of Iraq, military strikes. By excluding these two countries from Gulf power structures, the thinking went, the United States could prevent another military crisis, ensure the flow of oil out of the Gulf, and maintain a favorable status quo for its allies in the region.

Drawing on Cold War symbolism and building on prior presidential depictions of these countries as rogue states, Clinton's Gulf strategy rested on a symbolic understanding of Iraq and Iran as threats that must be kept in check through the application of U.S. economic and military power in the region. While Clinton had little appetite for overthrowing the governments of these nations through military force, he asserted the need for vigilance to make sure they did not endanger U.S. interests in the Middle East. These interests included the defense of allies, the flow of oil, and the continuation of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Administration rhetoric portrayed Iraq and Iran as threats that must be suppressed, underpinning this Gulf strategy. As Secretary of State Madeline Albright liked to say, the goal was to keep "Saddam Hussein in his box."[15]

On an imaginative level, Dual Containment marked the culmination of the Gulf's transformation in political discourse. We can see the shift from a region beyond the scope of American security commitments (under Nixon) to one the United States had a responsibility to not only protect (under Reagan) but also police (under Bush).[16] Dual Containment, in short, implied a long-term U.S. commitment to isolate Iran and Iraq. Twin Pillars had situated the United States as the regional backstop. Strategic Consensus set the United States at the center of regional defense. The New World Order expanded the American mission in the Gulf beyond anti-communism. And Dual Containment, in turn, signified the next step in this evolution by asserting an open-ended U.S. commitment to preserving a pro-American Gulf order. Like the original strategy of containment directed at the Soviet Union in the early stages of the Cold War, Clinton's Dual Containment strategy entailed an indefinite commitment to restrain the unfriendly regimes in Iraq and Iran with U.S. muscle. Unlike Bush, who rallied the nation to war, Clinton's strategy called for the sustained exercise of American police power over the Persian Gulf. By building on the internationalist vision conveyed by the New World Order, Dual Containment

offered a powerful rationale for an enduring U.S. military presence in the region wholly separate from Cold War concerns. As Zbigniew Brzezinski declared, the Gulf was now "unambiguously an American sphere of influence."[17] As the Clinton era wore on, it became ever clearer that the United States was the dominant power in the region and was in the region to stay.

Moreover, Clinton's rhetoric of Dual Containment, though contested, laid the groundwork for the foreign policy vision of his successor in important ways. Clinton contributed to George W. Bush's War on Terror and invasion of Iraq in three specific ways. To start, Clinton confirmed the expansive American role in the Gulf outlined by his predecessor. He increased the U.S. military presence in the region and affirmed the image of the United States as the Gulf's guardian, all after the Soviet collapse had opened a possible exit ramp from the region. Clinton also cast a preventative, negative vision of perpetual containment as the linchpin of his strategy, which set the stage for Bush to offer a positive vision of democracy promotion and regime change in the Gulf. And Clinton's fixation on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and "Islamic fundamentalism," set crucial rhetorical precedents, paving the way for the War on Terror in the wake of 9/11. These lines of continuity suggest that Bush's misadventures in the Gulf and his "freedom agenda" grew in part from the rhetorical seeds planted before him.

This chapter unfolds in several stages. First, I trace the emergence of the Dual Containment policy in the Clinton administration, outlining the context, deliberation, and initial articulation of the new Gulf strategy. Next, I sketch the prominent features of the rhetoric of Dual Containment, showing that even when the name of the strategy itself fell out of fashion, the major images and logics underpinning it still proliferated in administration rhetoric and circulated in press coverage, despite some attempts to contest them. I then conclude by sketching lines of rhetorical continuation vis-à-vis the Gulf from Clinton to the younger Bush in detail.

The Beginnings of Dual Containment: Context, Deliberation, and Articulation

Clinton devoted a considerable amount of his foreign policy attention to the Middle East, building on two specific accomplishments of the elder Bush administration. First, Clinton continued the push for a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Following up on the 1991 Madrid Conference, Clinton presided over the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat; his administration, according to its internal historian, would end up investing "vast amounts of time and resources" to assist the two parties in implementing the agreement over the course of his presidency.[18] Second, Clinton built on the Bush administration's efforts to create formal security agreements with the smaller states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As General Joseph Hoar told the House Committee on Armed Services in March 1992, the Gulf crisis had created a "turning point" that "opened the door to increased politico-military cooperation throughout the region."[19] The U.S.-Bahrain Defense Cooperation Agreement was reached in October 1991; by 1994, the United States had concluded defense pacts with Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates as well.[20]

These policies were an extension of Clinton's campaign rhetoric. Throughout the 1992 race he assured voters that one of his highest priorities was "keeping the Middle East peace process on track and doing whatever I can to make sure there is no break in continuity [with Bush administration policy]."[21] By strengthening ties to smaller Arab Gulf states and focusing on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the Clinton administration hoped to, in the words of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, be a "full partner" in instituting peace across the region.[22] Yet this vision was clouded by the potential threat posed by unfriendly regimes in Iraq and Iran. Secretary Christopher's first trip abroad therefore took him to the Middle East not only to

encourage peace talks, but also to assure Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf allies that the administration would support them against any kind of Iranian and Iraqi aggression.[23]

Iran and Iraq loomed large in the minds of foreign policy analysts as Clinton began his stint in the White House. James Schlesinger warned that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and ballistic weapons technology was going to be difficult for the United States to stem because "suppliers" like Iraq and Iran would find ways around whatever sanctions might be put in place. Therefore, he argued, the only way "to preclude the spread of such capabilities… is direct intervention."[24] Beyond weapons destruction, these two countries were also singled out for their penchant for sponsoring terrorism. As reported by the State Department in April 1993, Hussein had already begun rebuilding the "international terrorist infrastructure" destroyed in Desert Storm, and Tehran represented no less of a danger, as the report succinctly testified: "The Iranian regime has practiced state terrorism since it took power in 1979; it is currently the deadliest state sponsor and has achieved a worldwide reach."[25] Many in the administration shared these fears. Likening the two states, Clinton's CIA Director argued that Iran's buildup was "ominously analogous to Iraq's action in the 1980s—and could pose a grave threat to regional stability."[26]

Hawkish commentators such as Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson highlighted the "Growing Iranian Threat" in particular. Noting Iran's "bellicose" foreign policy, they cautioned that it represented a danger to the peaceful, friendly Gulf order that had taken shape after Desert Storm. "Iranian moderates advocate an aggressive brand of Persian nationalism that is likely to cause troubles in the years ahead," they warned. "Looking at the world through the combined filters of fundamentalist Islam and a resurgent Persian nationalism, they aspire to a sphere of influence that includes Iraq, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf."[27] Whereas Iraq's expansionist desires were self-evident after Desert Storm, articles such

as this one performed important rhetorical work as Clinton entered office by ascribing similarly belligerent motives to Iran. Pipes and Clawson illustrate an association that was being made by many Americans. A poll from March 1993 specifically asked if "the existence of threats from countries like Iran and Iraq" meant that defense spending should remain high despite "further democratic reform in Russia."[28] Fifty-nine percent answered yes, meaning that a majority of Americans saw Iran and Iraq as serious enough threats to merit a larger national defense budget.

These combative attitudes translated to many policies designed to hamper Iraq and Iran. After Desert Storm, for instance, the United Nations passed Resolutions 687, 688, and 707. These measures imposed severe sanctions on Iraq for its repression of minorities, obstruction of weapons inspectors, and its weapons programs. Until Iraq complied, these economic sanctions would remain.[29] Although mediation efforts were attempted, such as the U.N.-sponsored "oil-for-food" program, Hussein rejected such overtures.[30] By August 1991 the Iraqi earnings had dropped 90 percent and its inflation rate reached 2,000 percent from a year prior.[31] Beyond sanctions, U.S. intelligence agencies prosecuted covert actions and supported opposition groups meant to weaken Hussein's regime. From the end of Desert Storm to late 1994, the United States spent over $100 million on coup attempts and military insurrections in Iraq.[32] These efforts gave form to the forceful U.S. policing role outlined by Bush in his New World Order rhetoric.

While Iran was not subject to similar U.N. restraints, American lawmakers imposed restrictions of their own. Case in point, the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992, cosponsored by Senators John McCain (R–AZ) and Al Gore (D-TN), made it illegal to "transfer of goods or technology to Iraq or Iran" that might "contribute to that country's acquisition of chemical, biological, nuclear, or advanced conventional weapons."[33] The effect of this legislation was to suspend almost all technology transfers and chill trade with Iran wholesale.[34] A transitional

national security document created by the outgoing Bush administration reemphasized the importance of economic and technical sanctions. It warned that "the proliferation of advanced weaponry represents a dear, present, and widespread danger." U.S. Gulf policy demanded "arms control and regional stability."[35] In sum, the Clinton team inherited a defense establishment fully committed to efforts that would sideline Iraq and Iran in the Gulf, building on prior interventions in the Gulf. The new administration's Dual Containment strategy grew out of this context.

Policy Deliberation: "Aggressive" and "Active" Containment

A few early hints suggested that Clinton's regional security policy would specifically target Iraq and Iran. For example, during a press briefing on March 15, 1991, Martin Indyk, Special Assistant to the President for Middle Eastern Affairs, told reporters that Clinton was concerned about "the regional threat… with a special focus on Iran and Iran." As Indyk continued, "Iraq's WMD capabilities" as well as "Iran's intentions" demanded that the administration "focus on the longer-term security threat."[36] Indyk, who would also serve as NSC senior director for the Middle East and South Asia, U.S. ambassador to Israel, and assistant secretary of state for the Middle East and Near Eastern Affairs, became one of the main architects of Dual Containment.[37] As a close foreign policy advisor to the president, he had discussed the basic idea for nearly a year of simultaneously containing Iran and Iraq while pushing for an Arab-Israeli settlement.[38]

Conceptually, "containment" lent itself to a relatively seamless transition from a Cold War mindset to a new era without the overarching Soviet threat. As the *Los Angeles Times* argued, "As U.S. intelligence services reorient themselves away from a primary focus on the Soviet Union, priority must be given to increasing scrutiny of those Third World countries, mainly in the Middle East, that are most likely to engage in aggressive actions, including

terrorism."[39] Dual Containment adopted this disposition, transferring Cold War ways of thinking about U.S. foreign policy and applying them to Iraq and Iran.

Behind the scenes, Dual Containment policy arose as a complement to Clinton's goal of achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. According to Indyk, Clinton wanted to make sure that Iraq and Iran would not jeopardize the U.S.-led Arab-Israeli peace process.[40] Rejecting alternative strategies such as playing Iran and Iraq off against each other in a regional balancing act, Clinton authorized his national security team to develop policy options for dealing with these two Gulf powers.[41]

For Iraq, three options emerged out of this discussion group: engage Hussein diplomatically, try to overthrow his regime, or contain Iraq with sanctions and force as needed.[42] As the deliberations migrated higher into the administration, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell coined memorable body metaphors to conceptualize the problem posed by Iraq. Powell argued Hussein was like a "toothache," a pain that recurs from time to time with which one can live, or he was like a "kidney stone," an excruciating hurt that will eventually pass.[43] Adopting the logic of these metaphors, the National Security Council landed on a policy of "aggressive containment" in which Washington would steadily apply internal and external pressure on the Iraqi regime until, as with the Soviet Union, it collapsed under its own weight.[44]

Iran, by contrast, confronted policymakers with more limited options. Given the dearth of U.S. intelligence assets in the country and the absence of U.N. sanctions against Iran, the committee devised three possible policies: offer positive incentives to induce Iran to moderate, impose unilateral sanctions and isolation, or forcibly change the regime via military action. With little hope for moderation and even less desire to go to war, Clinton settled on a policy of unilateral sanctions dubbed "active containment."[45] Under this "hard line" policy, the United

States blocked loans to Iran by international financial organizations, pressured friends and allies across the globe to avoid commercial ties with Iran, worked to isolate Iran at international forums, and tried to curtail Iran's ballistic and nuclear weapons programs however possible.[46]

These strategies of containment fit nicely within the Clinton administration's global defense strategy. Recognizing the unique opportunity afforded by the Soviet Union's collapse, Clinton argued that the United States should not withdraw from the world but should instead seek to increase the spread of liberal democratic capitalism. This approach was framed as "a policy of enlargement, to enlarge the circle of democracies and market economies around the world."[47] "Enlargement," a strategy meant to replace the overarching goal of Soviet containment, was thus upheld by replicating containment on a smaller scale in the Gulf.[48] By isolating Iraq and Iran, the reasoning went, the United States could prevent these "backlash states" from impeding the spread of the American way of life worldwide.[49]

Although "aggressive containment" and "active containment" were different in the minds of administration strategists, the two policies swiftly became conflated. Days before the policies were publicly announced Indyk discussed the strategy with Elaine Sciolino, who was the chief diplomatic correspondent for the *New York Times*. Based on her interview with Indyk, Sciolino said it sounded like the administration was planning a policy of "parallel containment." Indyk attributed this conversation to the name ultimately used for the strategy. He chose the name "dual containment" since "parallel containment" elided the disparate aims (regime change versus isolation) and means (U.N. resolutions, unilateral sanctions) being employed by the United States to contain Iraq and Iran respectively. The "dual containment" phrase made its way into a speech written by Indyk and his subordinate Bruce Riedel for Lake, who was to share the policy publicly at a symposium hosted by the Washington Institute on Near East Policy. When Lake

and his lieutenant Sandy Berger were both unavailable, the task fell to Indyk to announce the Clinton administration's new Persian Gulf strategy to the world. [50]

Announcing Dual Containment: A New Middle East Strategy

Delivered on May 18, 1993, Indyk's address began by identifying U.S. aims in the Middle East. He quickly conveyed the scale of Clinton's regional ambitions by listing the administration's various objectives: promoting "the interests of American business abroad" to achieving "real and comprehensive peace" to stemming "the flow of weapons of mass destruction" to pursuing other "democracy-oriented" goals. Far from shrinking away from Bush's expansive vision, the new administration embraced the wide-ranging U.S. mission in the Middle East outlined by its predecessor. As Indyk put it, "the 'vision thing' was very clear to this president before he came into office." His purpose over the remainder of the speech was to lay out Clinton's strategy for realizing the many objectives associated with this enlarged American role in the region.[51]

Four symbolic elements of the speech guided Indyk's introduction of the Dual Containment policy. First, he described the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf in terms of duty. "We are tasked with greater regional responsibilities," Indyk stated, deploying passive voice to elide exactly who had "tasked" the United States with such a chore. This rhetorical maneuver allowed him to depict America's status as "the unchallenged dominant power in the region" as a mere happenstance, not the logical outworking of prior interventions and intentional alliance-building efforts. Throughout the speech Indyk portrayed the United States as a modern-day Cincinnatus responding to cries for leadership; as he put it, "For the first time since the 1950s… all sides now look to Washington to exert its influence." By depicting the United States

as a reluctant regional hegemon, Indyk defined the administration's Middle East strategy in terms of duty and responsibility, building on the guardianship images of previous presidents.

This picture came through most clearly in Indyk's invocation of the "vacuum" metaphor halfway through the speech. Expressing thanks that the Soviet Union's disintegration represented the "collapse of the radical, rejectionist front in the Middle East," he warned that the United States must nevertheless remain watchful. As he declared, "nature—especially Middle East nature—abhors a vacuum. With one set of troublemakers down, another set has emerged to take its place…. with the potential of destabilizing the region." By combining the vacuum metaphor with the specter of a "destabilized" Gulf, Indyk summoned frightening phantasmagorias of a "volatile region" hearkening back to the days of Lyndon Johnson. Given the presumed dangers of a Middle East in chaos, the logic of the metaphor dictated that the United States should step in to maintain order as "the dominant power in the region, uniquely capable of influencing the course of events." U.S. policy was first and foremost guided by a sense of responsibility.

Second, Indyk's speech imposed a dualistic lens through which to understand Middle East politics. In turns of phrase redolent of the Cold War, Indyk cast the area as "finely balanced between two alternative futures." The future would be pacific and prosperous, characterized by "peaceful coexistence, regional economic development, arms control agreements, and growing democratization," or it would be dominated by "extremists, cloaked in religious [Iranian] or nationalist [Iraqi] garb." With this stark portrayal of two sharply different futures, Indyk symbolically elevated the stakes of the situation and justified the Clinton administration's Dual Containment policy on the basis that it was necessary to prevent extremism. Mary Stuckey writes that "dualism has the effect of legitimating leadership, stifling debate, and forestalling compromise by dividing the world into two opposing camps representing good and evil."[52]

Rather than a rivalry with communism, he crafted a convenient dualism pitting "extremists" against the presumably rational United States. The elasticity of this image was enough to lump Iraq and Iran into the same morally repugnant camp that opposed Clinton's peaceful vision.

Third, Indyk recast U.S. Middle East strategy as a regional rather than a global affair. As he told hearers, "[T]he United States no longer needs to view the region through a competitive global prism." The Cold War contest for allies and resources was over. Yet Indyk framed this development as a new sort of challenge, as "the absence of superpower competition also brings in its wake less influence over the policies of regional powers." Thus, his depiction of the region as a separate arena of U.S. foreign policy interest did not translate to a call for less American involvement in Middle Eastern politics. Rather, Indyk asserted that "we can no longer deal with the region in compartments." So long as the United States had an interest in the flow of oil and Israeli security, it would need to acknowledge how "turmoil in one part of the region can have a dramatic impact on events elsewhere. No longer could a war be waged for eight years… while the rest of the region went about business as usual."[53] In other words, while the Middle East was no longer a small theater in the global superpower competition, U.S. interests such as oil and Israel meant the United States still needed to develop "a coherent regional strategy" that acknowledged how events in the Gulf might impact the Clinton administration's dreams of achieving a peace settlement. Symbolically, troubles in the Gulf could no longer be isolated from the wider region or U.S. ambitions across the Middle East. The Gulf demanded American attention on its own terms, not thanks to a global competition.

Indyk then unveiled the Clinton administration's new Middle East strategy crafted to address these problems: *Dual Containment*. "A short-hand way of encapsulating the Clinton administration strategy is thus," he proclaimed, "'dual containment' of Iraq and Iran in the east;

promotion of Arab-Israeli peace in the west."[54] Indyk portrayed the Dual Containment policy as an organic response to the realities of intraregional "interdependence," as it would enable the United States to prevent Iran, Iraq, and their proxies from interfering with the peace process. The practical effect of this depiction was to underscore that Iran and Iraq represented a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf (oil and allies) as well as to Israel and a peace deal.

Fourth, Indyk conflated the threats posed by Iraq and Iran. Throughout the address he described the two states as a unit: "threats posed by Iraq and Iran in the east," "the current Iraqi and Iranian regimes are both hostile to U.S. interests," we must "counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes," etc. This basic tactic worked to meld each country into a coalesced, amplified threat in the minds of audiences. It functioned to tar the Iranian regime with the misdeeds of Hussein and vice versa.

Several rhetorical devices helped conflate Iraq and Iran. For example, Indyk invoked the criminality metaphor to describe Iraq; it was "a criminal regime, beyond the pale of international society and, in our judgment, irredeemable." He then asserted that it was only a matter of time until Tehran possessed a similar rap sheet. "Iran does not yet face the kind of international regime that has been imposed on Iraq," Indyk admitted. But he attributed this situation to "the fact that Iran's threatening intentions for the moment outstrip its capabilities." Hence both nations, in the world of administration rhetoric, were symbolically coded as criminal states.[55]

Beyond metaphors of criminality, Indyk's language schematically portrayed Iran and Iraq in parallel fashion despite the policy distinctions between "active" and "aggressive" containment. As Paul Chilton notes, containment discourse during the Cold War was "closely bound up with the cognitive schema of the container."[56] As in the Cold War, Indyk described U.S. policy as an

attempt to "fence in" each nation and thereby prevent Tehran or Baghdad from contaminating the Middle East with his destabilizing activity.[57] The container image lay at the root of this strategy.

For example, he described how the advent of "the missile age in the Middle East" meant that "Riyadh and Tel Aviv can find themselves under simultaneous Iraqi attack." Consequently, containing Iraq—keeping Saddam "in his box"—through the rigorous enforcement of U.N. sanctions offered the best way to ensure that the government of Iraq "will not be in a position to threaten its neighbors or to suppress its people with impunity." Iraqi military aggression was conceptualized as a radiating danger that must be suppressed through energetic counterforce. Hence, the enthusiastic enforcement of harsh sanctions offered the means to contain Iraq.

Indyk employed analogous language in reference to Iran. He accused the "fundamentalist regime" of supporting terrorist movements across the Middle East. According to him, "It is the foremost sponsor of terrorism and assassination across the globe," as many "religious extremists have found succor" from Tehran. Beyond terrorism, he warned, Iran also tried to destabilize U.S. friends across the region: "Iran is fishing in troubled waters across the Arab world, actively seeking to subvert friendly governments." And, most portentously, he alleged that Iran "is seeking a weapons of mass destruction capability including clandestine nuclear weapons."[58] Taken altogether, Indyk painted the picture of a dangerous regime bent on upending the Middle East through violence. Containment, in this telling, was the only plausible American response.

The net sum of all these elements was to advance a set of interlocking images geared toward justifying the Dual Containment policy. The promise of an Arab-Israeli settlement hinged on suppressing Iraq and Iran. Since the job of Middle East leadership had fallen to the United States, it was therefore an American duty to ensure that this peaceful future be realized rather than the "extremist" alternative. The policies of aggressive and active containment provided the

means through which to ensure that each hostile state remained in its container, so to speak, and did not upend the regional order. These impressions built on previous presidential depictions of the Gulf. The Nixon administration's metaphors of instability, the Reagan administration's portrayal of Iran as a "hegemonic" enemy, and the Bush administration's picture of American responsibility to police the region all supplied the symbolic foundation for Dual Containment.

Viewed through the lens of sovereignty, Dual Containment instantiated the revised view of Gulf sovereignty articulated by Bush to gain support for Desert Storm. The New World Order metaphor justified a wide-ranging U.S. mission in the Gulf—stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction, stopping terrorism, and rooting out tyranny—by constituting an American right to enforce international norms of conduct upon the individual "rogue" states in the Gulf. In other words, Bush claimed a right to abrogate the Westphalian sovereignty of Iraq, understood as the right to exclusive juridical authority over its own territory, on the basis that the United States held a legal authority bestowed by the international community that superseded Iraq's right to non-intervention.[59] Instead of break with this formulation, the Clinton administration continually reconstituted the right of the United States to police the conduct of Gulf states by repeatedly claiming an international mandate to take punitive actions against Iraq and Iran.

Dual Containment from 1993-1994: Reception, Rearticulation, and Criticism

Initial responses to the speech adopted these symbolic elements, especially the conflation of Iraq and Iran. A news article in the *New York Times* glossed over the differences in aggressive and active containment, describing Dual Containment as "a decision that the United States and its allies should now treat Iran as harshly as it treats Iraq."[60] The *Washington Post* report did much the same; as it stated, "the new U.S. objective is to ensure that both Iran and Iraq remain

equally weak."[61] Even before major administration figures such as Lake, Christopher, Albright, and Clinton publicly endorsed the policy, these immediate reactions illustrate how the symbolism undergirding Dual Containment quickly caught on with American journalists.

While Indyk's address introduced Dual Containment to public audiences, the new strategy was one of many priorities being juggled by Clinton and his aides the summer of 1993. Clinton's particular focus on domestic reform helped fuel criticism that he believed "foreign policy can be relegated to a backburner," and what limited foreign policy attention he did have went mostly to crises in Somalia and Bosnia.[62] As a result, major administration figures spoke relatively sparingly about Iran, Iraq, or Dual Containment in the months following Indyk's speech.

Still, Clinton's limited utterances about the Gulf confirmed many of the symbolic elements introduced by Indyk. At the dedication of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., for example, Clinton likened Iraq's "oppression of the Kurds" and Iran's "abusive treatment of the Baha'i" to the Nazi "evil represented in this museum."[63] By lumping all these atrocities, Clinton conflated and reinforced the negative depictions of Iraq and Iran found in Indyk's address. He performed the same maneuver in other utterances. Cases in point, he told Larry King that he would "not allow Iraq, Iran, and other agents of terrorism and assassination to dominate the world politically and to terrorize innocent people," and during an interview with CNN, Clinton denounced Iraq and Iran as countries that commit "brutal human rights abuses" and "persist in working to develop weapons of mass destruction."[64]

Clinton also did not flinch from punishing Hussein for violating the sanctions imposed on Baghdad. When Kuwaiti intelligence informed the White House about a plan to assassinate George H.W. Bush, Clinton responded by ordering a nighttime attack on Iraqi intelligence

headquarters. In a nationwide address to explain his actions, Clinton told Americans that the plot "was no impulsive or random act." Rather, the "elaborate plan devised by the Iraqi Government" was proof of Hussein's continued "outlaw behavior." Leaning on the criminality metaphor, Clinton then took the opportunity to denounce not only Iraq but also make clear that the strike comprised "a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism."[65] Within the context of the Dual Containment strategy, Clinton's threat all but named Iran as a secondary audience that should view the strike as a warning shot intended for it as well.

What Clinton implied, Secretary Christopher often stated outright. During a diplomatic trip to Japan, for instance, Christopher pressured Tokyo to end its commercial relationship with Iran; during a press briefing he stressed "the fact that Iran was accumulating weapons of mass destruction, that they were exporting terror, that they were involved in human rights abuses."[66] He also helped organize a tour of the White House for Salman Rushdie, the novelist against whom Iran had issued a death threat for supposed heresy. Christopher reportedly told Rushdie that he and his colleagues "stand firmly with him against the forces of intolerance."[67] Through these statements Christopher reaffirmed the dualism at the heart of Dual Containment. He painted a picture in which the freedom-loving United States was pitted against the "forces of intolerance" in the Gulf. In short, he conveyed the message that the United States stood against evil, symbolized by the Iraqi and Iranian regimes.

Other administration figures contributed to this characterization of Iran. Dee Dee Myers, Clinton's press secretary, emphasized the threat Iran posed to Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. "Hezbollah has the backing of the Iranian government, and they are enemies of the peace process," she told a gathering of reporters. "[T]he President, Secretary Christopher, and others are committed to not letting enemies of the peace process disrupt or interrupt or dismantle it in

any way."[68] Similarly, presidential advisor David Gergen also warned that Iran aimed to disrupt the Gulf status quo via bloodshed; he emphasized that the president had an "increasing level of concern about the threats posed by Iran" such as "state-sponsored terrorism."[69] In sum, Clinton administration discourse in the months after Indyk's address rearticulated the symbolism used to introduce the Dual Containment strategy in the Gulf.

By late 1993 Clinton's foreign policy came under increasing fire from commentators. The *Economist* magazine, to cite a particularly acerbic example, called on Clinton to "overhaul his foreign-policy team." As the periodical worried, "America's allies are entitled to feel anxious… resolve and strong voices are not to be found in the offices in Washington where foreign policy is made."[70] Academics such as Stanley Hoffman and Gaddis Smith called Clinton's platform, respectively, "a minimalist policy with maximalist, very lofty language" and "[b]anality on stilts." Fellow Democrats even voiced dissatisfaction with Clinton at times. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D—ME) gave his understated assessment: "There is always room for improvement."[71]

Adding to this chorus of criticism were attacks on Dual Containment. Paul D. Wolfowitz chided the administration for leaving it to Indyk to announce the strategy. This decision, he argued, signaled that the administration had not devoted "high-level attention to this problem" or made "a clear commitment" to containing Iraq and Iran.[72] His disapproval was mild compared to others. Writing for the Cato Institute, Barbara Conry reproved the administration for adopting Dual Containment, which she called "a risky strategy that relies on a vast and precarious network of alliances, assumes Washington can restrict Iranian and Iraqi military buildups, and requires a prolonged U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region." Even in the case that the strategy succeeded in isolating Iraq and Iran, she predicted, it would likely only lead to an "anti-U.S.

alliance between Tehran and Baghdad… making a regional war—which the United States will have little hope of avoiding—nearly inevitable."[73] These reproaches of Dual Containment attacked the strategy on prudential (not necessarily symbolic) grounds, questioning the ability and willingness of the United States to fulfill the stated goals of the policy.

Few criticisms matched the fury of F. Gregory Gause III, a scholar at Columbia University who thundered against "The Illogic of Dual Containment" in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*. "The dual containment policy is shot through with logical flaws and practical inconsistencies and is based on faulty geopolitical premises," he charged in the opening of the essay. "Dual containment offers no guidelines for dealing with change in the gulf, and it ties American policy to an inherently unstable status quo," Gause continued, reiterating in stronger terms what prior critics had already said. Yet he went a step further by questioning the necessity of American leadership and the image of U.S. responsibility for the Gulf that stood at the heart of Dual Containment. "Worse yet," he argued, "it assigns to the United States a unilateral role in managing gulf security issues at a time when the American capacity to influence events in Iran and Iraq is at best limited."[74] Unlike many other critics, Gause contested the symbolism that lay underneath the Dual Containment strategy, refusing to conflate the threats posed by Iraq and Iran as well as rejecting the notion of U.S. responsibility for Gulf defense. His attack made clear Dual Containment and its attendant conception of sovereignty were far from universally accepted.

Two developments in 1994 set the Dual Containment strategy on a trajectory it would follow over the remainder of Clinton's presidency. First, the Republicans won the midterm elections that fall in a landslide, picking up eight Senate races, 10 governorships, and 54 seats in the House of Representatives. These results left the GOP in control of both chambers of Congress, which they would retain over the rest of Clinton's time in the White House. Since the

Republicans were generally more hawkish on Iran and Iraq, this situation left little room for the administration to moderate its Gulf strategy.[75] Case in point, months after the election new Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA) gave a speech denouncing Iran as a "totalitarian" state and calling for a strategy designed "to force the replacement of the current regime in Iran, which is the only long-range solution that makes any sense."[76]

Second, the administration publicly reaffirmed its commitment to the Dual Containment strategy in a *Foreign Affairs* essay by Anthony Lake. Lake reiterated the main elements of Indyk's speech. Identifying Iran and Iraq as "backlash states," Lake depicted U.S. Gulf policy in terms of obligation.[77] As he averred, the United States "has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain, and through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community." By proclaiming a "special responsibility" to restrain wayward nations, Lake claimed a unique American duty to "deal with them" that entailed a continuing U.S. mandate "to maintain a favorable balance and protect U.S. friends and interests in the gulf." Lake thus reasserted the mental image of American guardianship and military domination of the Persian Gulf.

Lake's essay recast Dual Containment as an essentially negative vision, as its focus on containing Iran and Iraq furnished an enemy-centric picture of the region. Rather than build up U.S. allies or try to advance a cause, Lake described the strategy in terms of what it prevented these states from doing; it "will cost Iraq the opportunity to manipulate… and rob Iran of its ability to promote turmoil." Lake stressed that Dual Containment "does not mean duplicate containment." Yet his summary of the policy indulged in a degree of binary framing nonetheless, portraying U.S. strategy as a long-term struggle to force Iraq and Iran "to understand that there is a price to pay for their recalcitrant commitment to remain on the wrong side of history." Lake

likened the effort to the strategy of Soviet containment, which he described as the "containment of an outlaw empire." Concluding, he drew on Cold War imagery and the sheriff metaphor to designate the challenge as one of "containing the band of outlaws we refer to as 'the backlash states.'"[78] Taken as a whole, Lake's essay presented a portrait of Dual Containment built on two dominant images: the United States as the duty-bound guardian of the Gulf and a set of foes to be contained for a long time. These images added up to a negative vision for the region premised on preventing change and isolating enemies.

Lake's article marked one of the last times a major administration figure used the Dual Containment phrase to describe U.S. strategy in the Gulf. Clinton declined to use the term in public statements, and it soon disappeared from official discourse.[79] As Alex Edwards notes, the label proved controversial since it muddied the distinctions in U.S. policy toward Iran and Iraq respectively.[80] Indyk himself admitted that the "words *dual containment* created the false impression that we would deal with both rogue regimes in the same way."[81] Despite the disappearance of the metaphor in official rhetoric, however, the symbolism at the root of Dual Containment continued to dominate administration discussions of Persian Gulf defense strategy.

The Rhetoric of Dual Containment: American Suzerainty over the Gulf

While Dual Containment set the broad parameters for U.S. conduct in the Gulf under Clinton, the administration adopted a handful of polices meant to refine the strategy over the ensuing years. It rejected attempts by the Rafsanjani government in Tehran to attract U.S. oil investment, such as when it barred a deal with Conoco worth over $1 billion.[82] On top of debilitating sanctions, Clinton ordered multiple military strikes against Iraq that culminated with Operation Desert Fox in 1998.[83] Congressional legislation played a role in this evolution, such as

the bipartisan Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.[84] These efforts all updated the Dual Containment strategy and translated it into particular policies, overshadowing embryonic steps toward reconciliation with Tehran taken late in Clinton's tenure. By the close of the Clinton presidency, the Dual Containment strategy remained in place—although critics like James Phillips of the Heritage Foundation attacked the administration for clinging "to its faltering containment policy" rather than "seeking to oust Saddam."[85]

Phillips' comment is instructive, for it illustrates how the continuation of the Dual Containment strategy did not mean the end of political debate over American Gulf policy. Indeed, the Clinton administration faced opposition far and wide. Right-wing hawks like Phillips attacked the president for not being more proactive in plots to overthrow Iraq or Iran; as time wore on, the international resolve to uphold the U.N. sanctions on Baghdad waned.[86] On Iran, Clinton faced domestic critics among oil companies and the foreign policy establishment alike, many of whom chastised Clinton for seeking the "legal isolation of Iran" and lambasted Dual Containment as "a geopolitical dead end."[87] The Clinton administration's approach to the Gulf was nothing if not harshly contested. In the face of this criticism, the administration and its friends in the press sallied forth to defend Clinton's Gulf strategy by promoting three images: the United States as the Gulf's guardian, Iran and Iraq as dangerous threats to their neighbors, and a long-term struggle to contain them both. The net effect of these interlocking images was to assert the United States as a suzerain power over the Gulf that dominated the region's foreign policy.

Image #1: United States as Gulf's Guardian

Perhaps the least contested aspect of the administration's rhetoric, Clinton and his team repeatedly portrayed Gulf security as an American responsibility. This picture of U.S. guardianship of the Gulf built on the rhetoric of Twin Pillars, Strategic Consensus, and the New

World Order. But whereas these prior metaphors contained a competitive dimension such as the Soviet rivalry or need to set the terms of the post-Cold War world, Clinton depicted America's role in the Gulf as a natural outgrowth of its "indispensable" leadership on the international stage.[88] As the president declared in a 1995 speech, "Imagine what the Persian Gulf would look like today if the United States had not stepped up… because we did it, the world has a better chance at peace and freedom."[89] In Clinton's telling, protecting the Gulf was an extension of America's international mission to promote and protect liberal democratic capitalism.

This image was often on display when Clinton spoke about the U.S. military presence in the Gulf. In an address in Ohio, for instance, he called American soldiers "the finest fighting force in the world," who "stand up for freedom… [and] have stood down Iraq's threat to the security of the Persian Gulf."[90] During the Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign, he praised "the brave American men and women in uniform who are carrying out our mission in Iraq… what they are doing is important. It will make the world a safer, more peaceful place for our children in the 21st century."[91] Clinton used similar language when it came to Iran. He praised U.S. sailors for their "much-needed" and "important mission in the Arabian Gulf" of "maritime sanctions enforcement."[92] On a visit to Germany, Clinton told an audience of U.S. service members that it was their "awesome power" that "protected the security of the Persian Gulf."[93] And on a visit to London, Clinton exhorted his British hearers to continue "fighting together for victory in the Persian Gulf," reminding them that "we can create a future even more true to our ideals than all our glorious past."[94] Time and time again, Clinton tied the image of troops in the Gulf to notions of American global leadership. These repeated invocations depicted U.S. and allied soldiers as a force for democracy arrayed against tyrannical regimes, which helped buttress

Clinton's claims that his Gulf strategy possessed international authority even during times when international consensus for U.S. policy was lacking.

Clinton's subordinates also described the United States as responsible for Gulf defense. Press Secretary Mike McCurry told reporters that "no one else is in the same position as the United States to provide that [global] leadership in the post-Cold War era" and that U.S. leadership extended to "security issues related to the Middle East, including Iraq and Iran."[95] In an address at Georgetown University on U.S. policy toward the Gulf, Secretary of State Madeline Albright asserted, "American leadership and power are required…. Our resolve on this point is unwavering."[96] Sounding similar notes, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told reporters that Clinton's goal was to bring "freedom to the people of Iran."[97] While administration figures made sure to mention the contributions of allies, they overall described U.S. guardianship of the Gulf as a key part of the nation's global leadership role. In this regard, they framed the United States' deep involvement in Gulf politics and the positioning of troops across the region as a natural, uncontroversial state of affairs, continuing the logics of prior presidential metaphors.

Much newspaper coverage during the Clinton era operated similarly. Stories reported everything from troop movements to oil prices to the latest threat from Baghdad, rarely stopping to question the presence of U.S. troops in the Gulf or the self-proclaimed guardianship role the United States had assumed in the region. For example, a *New York Times* article published August 18, 1995, described American efforts to isolate Iraq in detail, as the administration was "trying to speed the downfall of Saddam Hussein" while still trying to "walk a fine line" in avoiding another war.[98] Another story written during the 1996 campaign told how Clinton launched retaliatory strikes after Baghdad fired on U.S. warplanes and was "dealing with the problem of Iraq."[99] These news stories, by depicting Iraq as a "problem" for the United States to

solve, implicitly adopted the same frame of mind as the administration figures above. The Gulf and its political conflicts were simply an American responsibility to manage.

The large U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf did occasionally earn coverage in newspapers other than the *New York Times*. The *Washington Post* ran a story titled, "Persian Gulf, U.S. Danger Zone: Military Has Been Committed to Hot Spot Despite Risk" near the end of Clinton's presidency. Under Clinton, it relayed, the military had stationed about 20,000 troops in the region at a cost of $1.5 billion per year. This mission, the report stated, "has grown into an open-ended commitment, largely unexamined in public." It quoted University of Maryland professor David Segal, who stated, "I suspect that most Americans have no sense of the number of personnel we have in the Gulf region, or that they regularly engage hostile targets." As the report continued, it cited other experts and Washington officials who argued that while the American commitment to the Gulf "is unavoidable," it was at least becoming "more routine and predictable… more manageable."[100] This story painted a more complex picture than conventional news coverage of the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf.

At other times, individual pundits argued against the deployment of so many military personnel to the Gulf. William Pfaff of the *Chicago Tribune*, for instance, contended that there "is no rationale" for such a heavy U.S. presence; in his telling, "The Pentagon's natural institutional reaction was to acquire air bases, deploy forces and greatly enlarge the American connection" with Gulf allies after Desert Storm. The result, he concluded, was the semi-permanent presence of a "huge projection force" sustained "at considerable expense to the taxpayer."[101] Pfaff's essay shows that while the increased number of U.S. troops in the Gulf under Clinton often went unexamined in mainstream coverage, it did not go wholly uncontested.

But like many criticisms, his op-ed attacked Dual Containment for prudential, tax-based reasons, leaving its symbolism untouched.

A handful of foreign policy analysts also critiqued Clinton's regional strategy and directly challenged the image of U.S. Gulf guardianship. According to Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, for instance, the U.S. presence in the Gulf and the Dual Containment policy rested upon "myths, holdovers from the Cold War" such as the "retention of the U.S. role as primary security arbiter in the Gulf and maintenance of the U.S. presence there as a symbol of a global American security commitment." For them, the impression that the United States was "the ultimate security guarantor for regimes in the region" had the effect of "placing American prestige and credibility on the line across the board. Under these circumstances almost any assertion of greater regional influence by any actor appears a direct challenge to Washington." "Being out on a limb in the Gulf," as they deridingly labeled Clinton's strategy, was not a smart approach and "leaves little room for fine calculations of national interest."[102] Fuller and Lesser, in short, portrayed U.S. credibility as being potentially wasted in the Gulf rather than embracing Clinton's arguments and the image of guardianship he promulgated.

A few vivid examples should not detract from the wider context, however. Many commentators endorsed the administration's strategy and embraced the idea that the United States should protect and police the Persian Gulf. Kent E. Calder, to cite but one *Foreign Affairs* essay, warned that the "dynamic" economies of East Asia were poised to grow "increasingly dependent on the volatile Middle East—including Iran and possibly Iraq—where the oil is abundant." It therefore behooved American policymakers to act in accordance with "the strategic importance of the area" as the value of its oil reserves was "undeniable."[103] Beyond the debate of foreign policy experts, many Americans also supported the broad defensive role adopted by the

United States in the Gulf. When Clinton dispatched more troops to deter an Iraqi attack on Kuwait in 1994, his actions were approved on average by a 74 to 23 percent margin.[104] These impressions lasted as well. A March 1999 Pew poll found that a sizable majority believed that if a war broke out in the Persian Gulf, then the United States "would have a responsibility to do something about the fighting there."[105] Taken as a whole, these points of evidence suggest that despite arguments to the contrary, most Americans accepted the image of U.S. Gulf guardianship integral to the administration's rhetoric of Dual Containment.

Image #2: Iran and Iraq as Dangerous Threats to Neighbors

Stark enemy images of Iraq and Iran comprised the next symbolic element of the rhetoric of Dual Containment. These depictions obviously built on prior enemy images of both states circulating in public discourse, such as the criminal metaphor for Hussein and the lawlessness portrait of Iran advanced by Reagan. Prior presidential depictions of each state supplied Clinton with a strong foundation on which he and his team could condemn both countries, as witnessed in Indyk's address and Lake's denunciation of "backlash states." In keeping with these negative portrayals, Clinton consistently depicted each Gulf state as a threat to its neighbors, U.S. interests, and the peaceful regional order. In a divergence from earlier administration rhetoric, however, Clinton labored to distinguish the different kinds of threats posed by each state.

Clinton hardly had to convince Americans that Iraq presented a danger. A majority of Americans—72 percent to 22 percent—thought the United States should keep troops in the Gulf to deter Saddam.[106] Even more Americans, 78 percent, favored military action against Iraq if it again massed troops on its border with Kuwait.[107] In fact, a 22-point majority believed that the United States should have fought longer during Desert Storm to depose Hussein.[108] From airstrikes to sanctions, the measures the Clinton administration adopted against Baghdad were in

line with mainstream opinion. Far from disavowing war, as Clinton told a reporter, "We should keep all our options open."[109]

In line with this policy, Clinton hammered home the message that Iraq was a peril to its neighbors. Images of criminality and danger shone through to his second term, even when the threat of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait appeared diminished. As he told reporters after the 1998 midterms, "Saddam Hussein has used weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles before; I have no doubt he would use them again if permitted to develop them."[110] Cabinet members reinforced this dire picture in their public messaging. Secretary of State Albright, for example, forcefully upbraided Hussein in her United Nations address on September 12, 2000. "Baghdad has flatly refused to accept the [U.N.] resolution," she attested. "The regime's strategy is to ignore its United Nations Charter obligations and to seek to preserve at all costs its capacity to produce the deadliest weapons humanity has ever known."[111] Albright's stark depiction, like Clinton's own language and countless other denunciations of Hussein, tattooed on American minds an image of Iraq that was a threat to its neighbors, U.S. interests, and the world.

Indeed, Clinton's anti-Iraqi efforts grew more popular as time progressed. Journalists often adopted his ominous framing of Iraq's weapons programs.[112] When asked which country posed the biggest threat to the United States in Clinton's first term, more Americans answered Iraq than Russia, China, Japan, and Germany combined.[113] A poll taken in 1999 found that 49 percent even supported the United States *attacking* Iraq to overthrow Hussein in an offensive war.[114] It speaks volumes that a near majority of Americans outright endorsed a U.S. assault on Baghdad over two years before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This staunch support for regime change shows the widespread identification of Saddam's Iraq as a threat worth going to war to remove.

The administration's rhetoric about Iran was more complicated. On one hand, the president had described the Iranian regime as a terrorist-backing source of violence from his earliest days in office. In a press conference with Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, for instance, Clinton denounced Iran for its efforts "to try to destabilize the country" and lamented "Iran's involvement in terrorism and its active opposition to the Middle East peace process."[115] This framing comported with the attention Clinton devoted to combating terrorism more broadly, which he portrayed as a kind of "divine calling" for the United States.[116] In that sense, Iran stood against the divinely-sanctioned, American-led democratic world order. While Clinton attacked both Iraq and Iran for supporting terrorism, he and his team repeatedly emphasized that Iran was "the number one state supporter of terrorism" and "the number one proponent of terrorism."[117]

This condemnatory tone shone through most powerfully in Clinton's 1995 speech to the World Jewish Congress in New York. He told his audience that "Iran's appetite for… nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them has only grown larger." Rather than respond to U.S. attempts at engagement, "Iran has broadened its role as an inspiration and paymaster to terrorists." Hence, Clinton argued, the United States had a moral obligation to oppose Iran and keep its rigorous sanctions in place. "It would be wrong to do nothing," Clinton exhorted the crowd. "It would be wrong to stand pat in the face of overwhelming evidence of Tehran's support for terrorists that would threaten the dawn of peace," he concluded.[118] In the picture painted by the president's rhetoric, Iran represented a danger to Israel, to the United States, and to world peace; its pursuit of nuclear weapons and support for terrorism—assassination, bombings, hijackings, etc.—elevated the issue from a pragmatic to a moral plane. After the address, Clinton quickly issued Executive Order 12959, essentially ending U.S. trade with

Iran.[119] These symbolic actions amplified the enemy image of Iran and forcefully conveyed the message that Iran's nefarious misdeeds demanded stiff opposition.[120]

On the other hand, the administration moderated its treatment of Iran later in the president's second term. As Albright records, she and Clinton were "intrigued by the possibility of better relations with Iran," and when Mohammad Khatami won the Iranian presidency in 1997, it seemingly offered a chance to pursue better relations.[121] Iran under Khatami pursued a less ideological foreign policy, courted foreign investment, and aimed for better ties with other nations.[122] Clinton, in turn, toned down his depictions of Iran. He taped a 1998 Ramadan message in which he said that bilateral "differences are not insurmountable" and that he desired "more exchanges between our peoples."[123] In an interview near the end of his time in office, Clinton likewise declared that while he and his team "did not support and did not condone anyone who would support terrorist actions, and that we had some difficulties with Iran," he still believed that it was possible for the United States "to have a constructive partnership with Iran."[124] Clinton's rhetoric after 1997 softened the dire image of Iran he painted earlier in his presidency, although he still frequently voiced concern over Iranian state-sponsored terrorism.

Cabinet members followed the president's lead. Perhaps the most striking example of the administration sounding a more mollifying tone toward Iran came in Secretary of State Albright's 1998 address in which she outlined "a road map leading to normal relations." As she reminded hearers, the administration found the Iranian regime's "vitriolic and violent" temperament toward Israel to be "inflammatory and unacceptable." Yet Albright also highlighted several positive developments. Khatami had "publicly denounced terrorism" and improved "Iran's record in the war on drugs." These signs, she declared, provided hope for "a very different relationship" between the United States and Iran. If these steps "translated into a

rejection of terrorism as a tool of Iranian statecraft," it would do much to bring "the wall of mistrust down."[125] Albright's address marked an evident softening of administration language toward Iran, as she voiced optimism in Iran's ability to change. Nor was this a temporary rhetorical shift. She followed her address with a *Foreign Affairs* essay insisting Iran must "abide by international norms of proliferation and terror" while the two countries explored "a potentially historic opportunity to lower the walls of mistrust."[126] Perhaps most importantly, she conceded the American role in the 1953 coup in Iran in a remarkable March 2000 speech, the first time a major U.S. government official publicly acknowledged U.S. culpability.[127]

Many foreign policy commentators mirrored the administration's rhetorical shift toward Iran. For example, prior to 1998, nearly all *Foreign Affairs* essays that addressed Iran portrayed it in a menacing manner. Richard Haas stressed "the threats posed by Iran and Iraq" toward U.S. Gulf allies.[128] Walter Lacquer warned that "Iranian agents in Turkey, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere" were hard at work trying to buy radioactive material for a "primitive nuclear weapon."[129] Edward G. Shirley told readers that "there are no moderate fundamentalists" in Iran.[130] Even the handful of articles that broke with these dire depictions still acceded to the basic image of Iran and the United States as enemies. Milton Viorst's 1995 account of a recent trip to Tehran, for example, argued that "permanent hostility toward Iran serves no purpose," but the article still gave notice to readers that virtually all Iranians "resounded with pride in an Iran free of American domination."[131] These essays all traded in images of Iranian terrorism, violence, or fanaticism, thereby reinforcing administration portrayals of the Islamic republic.[132]

After 1998, it became much more common for analysts to call for strategies of engagement rather than containment toward Iran. The spread of less threatening images of the Islamic republic corresponded to these arguments. For example, Robin Wright wrote an article

heralding the arrival of "hard-earned pragmatism" across Iranian society; "Iran has begun contributing to the spread of public empowerment around the world," he rejoiced.[133] Far from dire images of a looming danger, Wright's essay portrayed an Iran that was leaving fanaticism and terrorism behind. Other essays, even from longstanding hawks like Haas, promoted similarly benign impressions of Iran.[134] Rather than images of a terrorist peril, these writers described a promising future that was starting to bloom in Tehran, and in so doing they went beyond administration rhetoric in their positive portrayals of Iran.[135]

Of course, the administration did not totally abandon its emphasis on Iranian misconduct or cease portraying Iran as a threat wholesale. Bruce Riedel, who had taken Indyk's position, told the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "[T]here are serious issues about Iran's actions that still need to be addressed and need to be changed." According to Riedel, Iran presented three threats: its "efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction," its "dangerous connections to terrorist organizations around the world," and its "violent opposition to the Middle East peace process."[136] Taken together, these three issues depicted an Iran that was still a danger to its neighbors. Riedel's speech outlined an image of Iran characterized by continuity with previous administration rhetoric.[137] The State Department annual report on terrorism, like Riedel, reinforced this fearsome portrayal.[138]

Mainstream news coverage also did not fully abandon enemy images of Iran. Indeed, more than half of *New York Times* articles mentioning Iran during Clinton's second term also referenced a key term related to Iran's "rogue" status.[139] News coverage of Iran in the newspaper was quite negative in many other respects as well, with some of the top stories reporting on Iran's "dubious" trials against supposed Israeli spies, its spot in the world terrorism rankings, and its missile and nuclear weapons programs.[140]

Likewise, feature articles in *Reader's Digest* alerted readers that Iran had acquired "front-line" ballistic missiles to add to its "considerable arsenal" of weapons and denounced "Iran's Muslim tyranny."[141] These ominous impressions were amplified by NGOs like Amnesty International, which also depicted Tehran as a murderous regime that threatened its neighbors. In 1993, its director alleged "a growing pattern of killings" whose "bloody trail leads back to Tehran." In spite of administration protestations, the organization kept shedding light on Iranian human rights violations into the late 1990s.[142] Moreover, pollsters continued to count Iran as a "potential enemy" that might require higher U.S. defense expenditures to combat.[143] Other articles specified how both Iran and Iraq engaged in terrorism targeting Americans, conflating the threats posed by each into a generalized fear of "Super-Terrorists."[144]

Adding to this negative picture were several outspoken members of Congress such as Senator D'Amato, who denounced Iran's "twisted criminal acts of terrorism" and declared that Iran was "issuing a direct challenge to the West in the waterway so vital to the flow of oil: the Persian Gulf."[145] Furthermore, behind the scenes U.S. intelligence kept alerting the White House that Tehran's ballistic missile program would soon be able to strike Israel and that Iran was monitoring U.S. facilities in the Gulf to scout potential weaknesses.[146] These warnings, whether from the CIA or Senate floor, bolstered the image of Iran as an aggressive terrorist state, thereby complicating any U.S.-Iranian rapprochement as the Clinton era came to a close.

In full, the Clinton administration's depictions of Iraq and Iran relied on the image of these countries as "rogue" or "backlash" states. This notion foregrounded the U.S.-led liberal democratic order as a normative condition for international politics. These countries, by opposing the United States, were thus aligning themselves against not only Washington but also the "international community" invoked by Albright, Clinton, and other administration officials.

Whereas this basic picture of Iraq remained constant in administration rhetoric, foreign policy commentary, and press coverage, near the end of Clinton's presidency, he began to describe Iran in more optimistic, conciliatory language. These depictions of Iran did not break from the logic of prior depictions; they portrayed it as a rogue state taking its first steps toward reconciliation with the United States (and by extension the international community). While several commentators expressed hope the two countries would normalize relations and restore ties, press coverage of Iran generally remained skeptical and continued to trade in enemy images of the country as with Iraq.

Image #3: Long-Term Mission

Finally, the Clinton administration not only depicted the Gulf as a U.S. responsibility, but also portrayed the American mission in the Gulf as a long-term commitment. The original project of Soviet containment, as George Kennan argued in his "X" article, comprised an unswerving determination to "confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."[147] In similar fashion, Clinton outlined a long-range commitment to preserving and enlarging the orbit of peaceful democracies by keeping "rogue states" like Iraq and Iran at bay. In the Gulf, this project entailed a willingness to, as Clinton said during a clash with Iraq, "remain there… to enforce the will of the international community."[148]

Clinton in particular tended to describe efforts in the Gulf conditionally, which had the effect of framing the U.S. mission as an indefinite commitment. In the wake of the Operation Desert Fox bombings in 1998, for example, Clinton called on Republicans and Democrats to affirm the "ongoing mission" of the United States to "degrade his [Hussein's] capacity to develop and to use weapons of mass destruction or to threaten his neighbors."[149] By emphasizing

that the isolation of Iraq would remain his policy until Baghdad satisfied the conditions laid down by the United Nations, the president depicted Dual Containment as a long-term responsibility. He did not shy away from this picture. Indeed, another time Clinton told Congress that until "the day when Iraq joins the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member… containment must continue."[150] In virtually all of his reports to Congress on the sanctions in place to limit Hussein, Clinton stressed that the restrictions and U.S. efforts to uphold them would remain in place until Iraq reformed, beginning with the removal of Hussein.

Clinton's subordinates also framed U.S. Gulf strategy as a long-term exercise. In a press briefing on terrorism, Press Secretary Mike McCurry told reporters that the president intended "to send a very clear and unambiguous signal to Iran: There cannot be normal relations until Iran stops this type of unacceptable behavior in the world."[151] By placing the onus for change on the targeted nation, McCurry affirmed that the United States would continue its current policy until Iran reformed. The logic of this depiction meant that U.S. policing of the Gulf required outlasting the theocratic regime until Tehran reformed.[152]

Albright, by the same token, insisted that the U.S. commitment would constitute an enduring undertaking. "We will not allow Iraq to regain by stonewalling the Security Council what it forfeited by aggression on the battlefield," she declared in a 1997 speech. She declared, "To those who ask how long our determination will last; how long we will oppose Iraqi intransigence; how long we will insist that the international community's standards be met, our answer is—as long as it takes."[153] This address followed the same reasoning as McCurry and Clinton. Each figure unequivocally framed the U.S. commitment to Dual Containment—the isolation of Iraq and Iran—as an effort that would continue until the objectives were achieved.[154] The corollary to this portrayal was the premise that the U.S. presence in the Gulf would continue

into perpetuity, since Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Iran, displayed few signs of modifying their behavior to the extent desired in Washington.

Perhaps the most direct challenge to the image of a long-term U.S. commitment to Gulf security came in the form of a 1997 research project at the Air Command and Staff College housed at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. Authored by Jerry L. Mraz, the study argued that while Dual Containment "is a sustainable policy for the region," it "should be a temporary policy only." In place of a long-term effort to force Iraq and Iran to reform via containment, Mraz suggested "a policy of incremental engagement toward Iran and Iraq."[155] This study recapitulated a common critique of Clinton's Gulf strategy by arguing that it was not a sound policy to pursue indefinitely. Still, however, Mraz's paper accepted that Dual Containment was sustainable, at least for now, and did not call for a troop drawdown or withdrawal from the region.

Indirect challenges were much more common, such as humanitarian depictions of the economic damage wrought by U.S. or U.N. sanctions in press coverage of the region. During the leadup to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, for example, news reports relayed how the proposed legislation "has drawn sharp criticism from France, Germany, and other European allies that say it could do serious damage to their [Libya and Iran] economies."[156] Humanitarian objections were more common in relation to Iraq, however, as the administration maximally interpreted U.N. sanctions to impose serious costs on Hussein's regime. As Joy Gordon writes in *Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions*, "the U.S. goal was simply to cripple Iraq's economy," which led to "an increasingly serious public relations problem" for the administration.[157] In response, officials blamed Hussein for the suffering caused by the sanctions. As Albright declared, "Had Saddam spent Iraq's money on humanitarian goods, his people's suffering would have been far less. Instead he squandered his country's assets rebuilding

weapons factories and constructing lavish palaces."[158] Even if these attempts at blame-shifting were successful, they still circulated accounts of everyday misery in the Gulf. These images disrupted the logic of Dual Containment by creating a link between U.S. sanctions and human suffering. Rather than the picture of an American foe slowly being brought to heel, humanitarian images of the economic pain experienced by ordinary Iraqis and Iranians insinuated that Dual Containment should not be a long-term strategy.

Foreign Affairs hosted few articles about the timetable of the U.S. mission to the Gulf. A few scholars, however, offered more measured assessments of the costs and benefits of America's presence as time wore on. For example, Richard K. Betts alerted readers, "It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destructions of the World Trade Center" were it not for "U.S. military and cultural hegemony" in the Gulf. In linking the threat of terrorism to American domination of the Gulf, Betts offered a counterimage to the notion that a long-term mission was a costless or prudent endeavor. Nevertheless, Betts concluded, "It is too late to turn off foreign resentment by retreating."[159] Hence, while Betts called into question the wisdom of a perpetual U.S. presence in the Gulf, suggesting this strategy might encourage radical terrorist attacks on the American homeland, he stopped short of actually panning the sanctions, troop deployments, and long-term thinking that upheld Dual Containment.

New York Times coverage rarely questioned the purpose or timetable for U.S. troop deployments in the Gulf as well. An in-depth article explaining the plan to base American soldiers across the Gulf, for example, stated that the forces were there "to counter any future Iraqi military threats to Kuwait and to increase the American military presence in the Persian Gulf region." Following this uncritical description, the story then gave positive quotes from a Pentagon official— "another test of our resolve"—and Defense Secretary William Perry—

"Saddam is a crafty character… [and] a long-term threat to be contained."[160] By pairing such glowing commentary with neutral reporting, the paper rearticulated the basic image of long-term commitment. This story matched *Times* coverage in general. While articles appeared that relayed worries about U.S. ability to simultaneously fight wars in the Gulf and east Asia or fears that U.S. Gulf policy was "frozen" in an antagonistic stance toward Iraq that annoyed European allies, few overtly negative stories criticizing Dual Containment ran.[161] Even in the final months of the Clinton presidency, when some had grown weary of the "long and often tortured diplomacy" necessary "to contain Mr. Hussein," the *Times* editorial board reminded readers that a strategy of containment was "far more useful" than any alternatives.[162] Hence, coverage in the nation's biggest newspaper recirculated the image of a long-term U.S. military commitment in the Gulf more or less favorably throughout the Clinton era.

Although few pollsters asked Americans how long they believed U.S. forces would remain in the Gulf, findings near the end of Clinton's time in office suggest that many expected a continued antagonistic relationship with Iraq and Iran into the future. A 1999 poll found that 45 percent of Americans still thought of Iran as an enemy, and this impression hardly weakened a year later.[163] A March 2000 survey reported that citizens would rather endure higher gas prices than the government attempt to lower prices via better relations with Iraq and Iran; another poll that June discovered 83 percent believed that Iran represented a threat to the United States.[164] Given the Clinton administration's oft-stated commitment to keeping forces in the Gulf until its aims were achieved, these responses suggest that Americans expected their soldiers to remain there into the 2000s—notwithstanding any humanitarian concerns over human suffering caused by sanctions.

In total, all three images of the rhetoric of Dual Containment primed Americans to view the Gulf as a region of U.S. responsibility. The symbolic elements outlined above built on previous metaphors and earlier administration rhetoric; the rhetoric of Dual Containment promoted a picture of the Gulf in which the United States had not only a duty to protect, but also police the region by isolating Iraq and Iran until they joined the "international community."[165] This preventative vision portrayed the United States as the Gulf's guardian over the long haul, with the expectation that containment would inexorably force Iran and Iraq to change their ways over time. These symbolic elements, though far from uncontested, were in the end recirculated by the press and found widespread adoption among ordinary Americans, who largely accepted the picture of the Gulf painted by the rhetoric of Dual Containment. These images, in turn, set the stage for the younger Bush's presidency and its interventionist Gulf policy agenda in several ways.

From Clinton to Bush: The Rhetorical Legacy of Dual Containment

President George W. Bush is often seen as having inaugurated a new era in U.S. relations with the Middle East and wider Muslim world, with the Persian Gulf playing a particularly significant role in his foreign policy. After 9/11, Oz Hassan writes, Bush "asserted the need to reject the status quo in the Middle East" and instead pursue "the *freedom agenda*," which translated to a program of militarized democracy promotion in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond.[166] Over the course of Bush's presidency, the United States launched a worldwide "crusade" against terrorism, carried out special operations strikes on radical Islamist groups across the globe, forcibly removed the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, and threatened another regime change war with Iran.[167]

Although the origins of this agenda are much debated, several scholars and commentators describe Bush's foreign policy vision as a new direction for the United States. Perhaps the most prominent example of this thinking is James Mann's *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, a *New York Times* bestseller account of the Bush administration's foreign policy team.[168] As Mann records, pundits like Maureen Dowd and Thomas Friedman expected Bush to "retread" the foreign policy of his father. "These predictions of restoration and continuity were soon shown to be wrong. From its first months in office the new Bush foreign policy team made clear that it would deal with the world in new ways," Mann writes. "They represented an epochal change, the flowering of a new view of America's status and role in the world."[169] According to Mann's account, Bush's foreign policy signified a break with the past. In this telling, Bush imposed a strategic vision for interacting with the world beyond American shores, a new vision centered on military power and the belief "that it no longer needed to make any compromises or accommodations (unless it chose to do so) with any other nation."[170] The Persian Gulf, the reasoning goes, simply served as the primary site where this fresh vision of a reinvigorated, militarized American exceptionalism worked itself out.[171]

Yet as far as the Gulf is concerned, there are significant symbolic connections stretching from Clinton to Bush. Just as Dual Containment built upon the symbolism and metaphors of prior presidents, so Bush's rhetoric of freedom, democracy promotion, and counter-terrorism drew from the Clinton administration's utterances related to the Gulf. While an exhaustive analysis of the links between Clinton and Bush would require much more space than is available here, it is worth highlighting three symbolic threads connecting the rhetoric of Dual Containment to George W. Bush's foreign policy discourse.[172]

First, Clinton embraced the expansive U.S. mission in the Gulf articulated by his predecessor. As mentioned above, the Pentagon began basing large numbers of troops, warships, and aircraft across the Gulf during his time in office. Critically, this move to permanently station U.S. troops across the region came at a time when the United States, to quote Indyk's 1993 address, was "no longer competing for influence in this volatile region."[173] Clinton's tenure was characterized by the unparalleled global supremacy of the U.S. military; more than a superpower, it had become a "hyperpower," to use the term coined by French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine in 1995.[174] Yet rather than take the possible exit ramp from the region afforded by this preponderance of power, the Clinton administration instead doubled down on the notion of U.S. regional guardianship.

This symbolism of American responsibility for Gulf security provided a critical rhetorical resource for Bush as he made his case for the invasion of Iraq. For example, he was able to frame the removal of Hussein as a uniquely American responsibility. Bush told an audience in New Hampshire, "In order to keep the peace, Mr. Hussein and the world community must work to disarm him. And if they won't… we will not let the world's worst leaders threaten, blackmail, hurt America, our friends and allies, with the world's worst weapons." Framing his call to action in the language of duty, Bush left no doubt what he meant: "We cannot ignore history. We must not ignore reality. We must do everything we can to disarm this man."[175] At other times Bush was able to depict the aim of regime change as an obligation the United States incurred to protect its Gulf allies. In a speech in Jacksonville a month before the invasion, Bush told his hearers, "We have an obligation to protect…. We'll protect America and our friends and allies from these thugs."[176] Beyond the logistical operations made possible by possessing bases in the Gulf, images of U.S. guardianship, the conflation of national and international mandates, and the

expanded notions of responsibility for Gulf defense gave Bush a rhetorical resource to make his case for the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Second, Clinton's rhetoric of Dual Containment offered an essentially negative vision dedicated to maintaining the military status quo in the Gulf. Clinton's containment policy was defined by what it was preventing, not by what it was proactively doing, and it was bolstered by declarations of a long-term U.S. commitment to isolating Iraq and Iran. By pouring so much energy into arresting any increase in Iraqi or Iranian power, the administration eschewed the opportunity to cast a positive vision for Gulf transformation. As the slow process of Dual Containment wore on, Americans grew impatient with the imperceptible rate of change. As Jim Lobe reported in 1997, many supposed that "dual containment has outlived its usefulness." Among its critics was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who contended that the policy was "at an impasse." Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor for the elder Bush, agreed: "At the present time, we're frozen in immobility."[177]

Dissatisfaction with Dual Containment thus set the stage for Bush's freedom agenda in the Gulf. Bush's policy of regime changes and democracy promotion through military power amounted to a change in the timing of American Gulf strategy, not a fundamental shift in geostrategic objectives. As Joseph Stieb writes in *The Regime Change Consensus*, Bush simply vowed "to *accelerate* worldwide democratization" by "transforming Middle Eastern politics." [178] Stated otherwise, what Clinton proposed to accomplish slowly—remove Hussein—Bush promised to do quickly. Mehran Kamrava captures this feeling: "From a more pragmatic standpoint, the policy of dual containment was taking too long to show tangible results."[179] By repeatedly depicting Iraq as a threat and calling for a patient strategy of containing Hussein until his own people removed him from power, Clinton primed American audiences to support a

policy that promised to hasten the timetable of this objective. The dualism and enemyship inherent in the rhetoric of Dual Containment thereby set the table for Bush's war rhetoric by impressing images of Iraqi malefaction on American minds and, by calling for a long-term commitment, stimulating an appetite for a timelier solution to the "problem" of Iraq.[180]

Finally, Clinton's focus on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and radical Islamists paved the way for Bush's War on Terror in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Fears over "Islamic fundamentalism" skyrocketed during Clinton's time in office.[181] Indeed, Clinton himself admitted that he did not know the best way to prosecute "the war against terror" or how best to respond to "those young men who have bought some apocalyptic version of Islam and politics that together causes them to strap their bodies with bombs and blow themselves to smithereens and kill innocent children."[182] To be sure, Clinton was careful to distinguish between state-sponsored terrorism and this new form of transnational terrorist threat. As he stated in his address to the 1999 Third Way Summit in Florence, Italy, "the biggest problems to our security in the 21st century and to this whole form of governance will probably not come from rogue states… but from the enemies of nation-states, from terrorists."[183] He depicted radical Islamist groups as a distinct danger that differed from the terrorism sponsored by Iran, Iraq, Libya, and other rogue states.

In like measure, Clinton was also careful to distinguish between Islam and the beliefs of radical terrorist groups inspired by Islam. He and his team sought "to make absolutely sure" that Middle Easterners did "not see in our dual containment policies a rejection or hostility towards Islam itself."[184] For Clinton, these terrorists were not tied to a particular nation or state or religion but represented a new kind of threat that demanded new forms of response. And this threat was one of his greatest foreign policy concerns. As Chin-Kuei Rsui records, Clinton

elevated "the war against terrorism" to one of his top security issues during his final years in office.[185] It was in response to this perceived new danger that Clinton ordered retaliatory strikes (Operation Infinite Reach) in Sudan and Afghanistan after Al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.[186]

These fears were echoed in popular press outlets such as *Reader's Digest*, which boosted the overall salience of radical Islamist terrorism. For example, Fergus Bordewich luridly recaptured the violence of Algeria's civil conflict in his article, "Radical Islam's Bloody Battlefield." He painted a picture of violent fanatics waging a cruel guerilla war to remake their society in their ideological image; writing with alarm, he reported, "They have cut the threats of schoolgirls for failing to wear the veils prescribed by Islamic fundamentalists." Likening the situation to Iran, Bordewich described how "religious extremists preaching Islam as the solution" were seeking to take over a country in the Middle East.[187] This essay illustrates how popular press publications not only worked to sear violent images of frightening Islamist terrorists in the minds of their readers but were also less careful than Clinton in drawing clear distinctions between various groups. In fact, some writers thought the Clinton administration was not acting urgently enough. A.M. Rosenthal, for example, condemned the administration for not doing more to stop terrorism. "Almost all the terrorism directed against the United States originates in the Middle East," he warned, "Never has America been so passive about an open threat."[188]

These anxieties made their way into the pages of *Foreign Affairs* as well. To be sure, writers such as Bernard Lewis offered nuanced treatments of "so-called Islamic fundamentalists, who see Western civilization, and particularly American popular culture, as immoral and dangerously corrupting."[189] Lewis omitted any mention of terrorism in his discussion of Islamism, as did other writers like Ali A. Mazrui.[190] Yet the image of threatening radical Islamist

terrorism still filtered into other articles. Fouad Ajami, for instance, wrote sympathetically about the "frightened middle class, desperate to hold on to its small cultural liberties against the Islamists' reign of virtue and terror" in Iran and elsewhere.[191] Taken as a whole, these essays testified to the growing salience of Islamists and Islamist terrorist organizations in establishment foreign policy circles.

Moreover, Clinton devised a fresh metaphor hearkening back to the challenges of World War II to define these new threats under a single rubric: the "unholy axis." Likening the nation's present-day foes to the Axis powers, Clinton declared in his 1997 address before the United Nations, "We're all vulnerable to the reckless acts of rogue states and to an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers, and international criminals. These 21st century predators… are our enemies."[192] By asserting that these groups represented a collective enemy of the assembly, Clinton extended his tendency to speak on behalf of the international community to this fresh danger, depicting the United States as the leader of a global campaign against stateless terrorist organizations and their ilk.

This formulation banding together terrorists, rogue states, drug cartels, and crime syndicates reappeared in Clinton's other foreign policy speeches. He followed this performance with his 1998 State of the Union address in which he went into even more detail over why Americans should fear terrorists: "We must combat an unholy axis of new threats from terrorists, international criminals, and drug traffickers," he warned, "And they will be all the more lethal if weapons of mass destruction fall into their hands."[193] This metaphor comparing the challenge of twenty-first century terrorism to the Axis powers of World War II dramatically elevated the specter of danger terrorists posed to American society, crystallizing the shifting attitudes toward seeing the Middle East as a source of threats. By symbolically raising the stakes by invoking

weapons of mass destruction, Clinton raised the profile of this danger and established a vital rhetorical precedent that would be built upon by George W. Bush as he inaugurated a new era of American intervention and (mis)interpretation in the Gulf.

Taken together, these three symbolic dimensions of Clinton's rhetoric paved the way for Bush's freedom agenda in the Persian Gulf. Rather than downplay U.S. regional commitments or withdraw, Clinton affirmed the image of American Gulf guardianship and its implied understanding of sovereignty. He offered a negative vision of perpetual containment until Hussein was removed, which set the stage for Bush to expedite the timeline for regime change in Iraq. And he denounced the "unholy axis" of terrorists, rogue states, and other bad actors on the world stage, even suggesting that they might use weapons of mass destruction to kill Americans if given the chance. These symbolic elements of Clinton's speech did more than build upon the foundation of metaphors used before him; these elements laid the groundwork, rhetorically, for Bush's agenda of democracy promotion and regime change in Iraq. It is little wonder that when "containment" was horrifically shattered on September 11, 2001, that many Americans responded—quickly—by calling for war in the Gulf.[194]

Conclusion: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment

Clinton's Gulf strategy continued the foreign policy path outlined by his White House predecessor. Dual Containment emerged over the course of his first term as a means to suppress Iraq and Iran—preventing these two "backlash states" from upsetting the regional status quo—without getting entangled in a politically unpopular and prohibitively expensive war. The stated goals were different with each country. The policy of "aggressive containment" was meant to instigate regime change in Iraq, while the administration hoped that "active containment" might

induce Iran to mollify its antagonistic behavior toward the United States and its allies. Although the term Dual Containment fell out of favor, its symbolic elements continued to saturate the Clinton administration's discussions of the Gulf, drawing on familiar images to justify police actions and sanctions in a faraway region. Three dominant images—U.S. guardianship of the Gulf, enemy depictions of Iran and Iraq, and a long-term American commitment—permeated administration discourse and circulated throughout press coverage of the region. While these images were contested, their constitutive force did much to shape attitudes toward the Gulf. Consequently, the younger President Bush was able to draw on the symbolic resources already in place to construct his freedom agenda in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

In his book *Why Containment Works*, Wallace Thies states that Dual Containment punctuated the gradual transformation of the United States into the dominant power of the Persian Gulf. "In 1977, when Jimmy Carter succeeded Gerald Ford as president, the United States had no permanent military presence in or around the Gulf," he notes. By the close of the Clinton era, the United States not only had tens of thousands of soldiers stationed across the Gulf, but its "wealth and power were so much greater than those of… Iraq, and Iran that the United States could respond in many and varied ways to whatever these states were doing."[195] American regional supremacy was so unquestioned that it could decide how and where to strike its enemies at the hour of its choosing, even using the Gulf as a base from which it could launch operations and project power in nearby regions. One military strategist called the pre-positioned military bases in the Gulf the "linchpins of U.S. deterrence strategy."[196]

The metaphors examined in this study, starting with Twin Pillars and culminating with Dual Containment, played a critical role in bringing this state of affairs about. These metaphors shaped American policy debates and popular impressions of the Gulf. They exerted powerful

constitutive force as they cast the Gulf as an U.S. responsibility to protect, thereby easing the process of U.S. military, diplomatic, and strategic investment in a region formerly beyond the scope of Pentagon defense planning. And they conveyed a vision of sovereignty in which the United States was entrusted with the exclusive right to hold rogue states accountable on behalf of the international community. By the end of Clinton's presidency, the United States enjoyed unmatched military supremacy in the Gulf. What the United States chose to do with that power—along with the images, metaphors, and strategies that shaped American minds into the twenty-first century—is another story.

Notes

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[3] William J. Clinton, "Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China," May 28, 1993, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-most-favored-nation-trade-status-for-china.

[4] Stephen M. Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 79.2 (2000): 64, 79.

[5] On unipolarity, see Richard Haas, "Paradigm Lost," *Foreign Affairs* 74.1 (1995): 43-58. On the *New York Times* competition, see Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), ix-x.

[6] William J. Clinton, "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Democratic National Convention in New York," July 16, 1992, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-democratic-national-convention-new-york.

[7] William J. Clinton, "Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News," March 24, 1993, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-dan-rather-cbs-news-1.

[8] "Beyond the Cold War: The New Enemy," *Los Angeles Times*, March 3, 1993, B12. See also: Kim Murphy, "Militant Hezbollah Now Works Within the Lebanese System," *Los Angeles Times*, February 22, 1993, A7; Mark Matthews, "N.Y. Bombing Suspect May Be Linked to Radical Islamic Group," *Baltimore Sun*, March 5, 1993, 6A; William M. Carley, "Bombing in New York Bears Some Hallmarks Of Mideast Terrorists," *Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 1993, A1; Clinton, "Interview with Dan Rather," March 24, 1993.

[9] Henner Förtig, *Iran's Rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars* (Reading, U.K.: Garnet, 2002), 198-199.

[10] As James M. McCormick notes, the Clinton administration's internationalist bent was reflected in its commitment to "America's global competitiveness" in economics, opening up international markets diplomatically, and "international peacekeeping" militarily. James M. McCormick, "Foreign Policy Legacies of the Clinton Administration for American Administrations in the Twenty-first Century," in *The American Century? In Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. Roberto Rabel (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 85-87.

[11] William J. Clinton, "Excerpt of Remarks in Milwaukee," October 2, 1992, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/excerpts-remarks-milwaukee.

[12] Rosemary Hollis, "The U.S. Role: Helpful or Harmful?" in *Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War*, ed. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 201.

[13] Clinton, "Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News," March 24, 1993.

[14] Joseph Stieb, *The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 98-129.

[15] "How Powerful Is Saddam Still?" *CBS News*, August 24, 2000, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-powerful-is-saddam-still/.

[16] As mentioned in the previous chapter, this policing power shares many similarities to the authority claimed by Theodore Roosevelt and other presidents to intervene in Latin American affairs.

[17] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," *Foreign Affairs* 70.4 (1991): 18.

[18] "The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," State Department Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo. For two opposing viewpoints on this process, see: Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 256-298; Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 275-285.

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[20] For a brief overview, see: Kenneth Katzman, "Evolution of U.S.-GCC Defense Cooperation, November 14, 2018, *Gulf International Forum*, https://gulfif.org/evolution-of-u-s-gcc-defense-cooperation/.

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[22] Terry Atlas, "U.S. expects to push Israelis, Arabs at revived talks," *Chicago Tribune*, April 22, 1993, L7.

[23] Doyle McManus, "Christopher to Press for Mideast Talks," *Los Angeles Times*, February 17, 1993, A4.

[24] James Schlesinger, "Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 72.1 (1992): 23.

[25] "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992," State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 30, 1992, NSA, 2.

[26] R. James Woolsey, "The End of the Cold War: Where Do We Go From Here?" March 11, 1993, CIA Electronic Reading Room, 7, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp97m00518r000600780001-9. Sasan Fayazmanesh argues that the origins of the Dual Containment policy can be traced to the Carter administration's supposed green light for Hussein to invade Iran in 1979, which started the U.S.-led process of containing and degrading Iranian power in the Gulf through military and economic measures. Sasan Fayazmanesh, *The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 2-3.

[27] Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, "Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors," *Foreign Affairs* 72.1 (1992): 124-126.

[28] New York Times/CBS News, CBS News/New York Times Poll: March National Poll II, Question 21, USCBSNYT.040193.R61, New York Times/CBS News, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1993), Dataset.

[29] Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004), 240.

[30] Under U.N. Resolution 712, Iraq would be eligible to exchange $1.6 billion in oil for humanitarian aid. Although he rejected this offer in 1991, he accepted a revised oil-for-food program approved by the Clinton administration in 1995. "Resolution 712," September 19, 1991, United Nations Security Resolutions, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/712.

[31] Joel Brinkley, "Iraq Rations Fuel as U.N. Sanctions Hinder Refineries," October 19, 1990, *New York Times*, A1.

[32] Nicholas Arons, "U.S.-Supported Iraqi Opposition," *Foreign Policy in Focus* 6.10 (April 2010): 1.

[33] "H.R.5434 - 102nd Congress (1991-1992): Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992," July 2, 1992, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-bill/5434.

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[35] National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1, 1993, NSA, https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/1993.pdf, 1, 8.

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[37] As Alex Edwards notes, Indyk chaired the interagency working group that considered policy options for Iraq and Iran and, according to an interview conducted by Edwards of Ellen Laipson (a former CIA, NSC, State Department, and National Intelligence Council official), Indyk deserves the principal credit for the policy. Alex Edwards, *"Dual Containment" Policy in the Persian Gulf: The USA, Iran, and Iraq, 1991-2000* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 55, 166.

[38] Douglass Little, *Us versus Them: The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the Green Threat* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 107.

[39] "Beyond the Cold War," *Los Angeles Times*.

[40] Martin Indyk, *Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 30.

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[42] Indyk, *Innocent Abroad*, 37.

[43] Elaine Sciolino, "Gunning For Saddam," *PBS Frontline*, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/sciolino.html; Martin Senn, *Wolves in the Woods: The Rogue State Concept from a Constructivist Perspective* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press,

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[45] Indyk, *Innocent Abroad*, 39-40.

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[48] For more on Enlargement or Democratic Enlargement, see: James D. Boys, *Clinton's Grand Strategy* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 80-93.

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[50] Indyk, *Innocent Abroad*, 41-42.

[51] All subsequent quotations of this speech come from the manuscript published online by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Martin Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East," May 18, 1993, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/clinton-administrations-approach-middle-east.

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[53] Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East," May 18, 1993.

[54] Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East," May 18, 1993.

[55] Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East," May 18, 1993.

[56] Paul A. Chilton, *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 190.

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[72] Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," *Foreign* Affairs 73.1 (1994): 40.

[73] Barbara Conry, "Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 33: America's Misguided Policy of Dual Containment in the Persian Gulf," November 10, 1994, Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/fpb033.pdf.

[74] F. Gregory Gause III, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," *Foreign* Affairs 73.2 (1994): 56-57.

[75] Alex Edwards, "*Dual Containment" Policy in the Persian Gulf: The USA, Iran, and Iraq, 1991-2000* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 114-116.

[76] John Diamon, "Replacing Iran Regime Advocated by Gingrich," *Washington Post*, February 9, 1995, A30.

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[78] Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign* Affairs 73.2 (1994): 45-55.

[79] This trend held even when questioners used the Dual Containment label, such as in Clinton's interview with Wolf Blitzer on April 13, 1995. William J. Clinton, "Interview With Wolf Blitzer and Judy Woodruff of CNN," April 13, 1995, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-wolf-blitzer-and-judy-woodruff-cnn.

[80] Edwards, "*Dual Containment" Policy in the Persian Gulf*, 57.

[81] Emphasis in original. Indyk, *Innocent Abroad*, 43.

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[83] Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004), 289.

[84] Edwards, "*Dual Containment" Policy in the Persian Gulf*, 63, 68.

[85] James Phillips, "How Clinton's Troubled Middle East Policy Has Collapsed on Two Fronts," Heritage Foundation, October 13, 2000, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/how-clintons-troubled-middle-east-policy-has-collapsed-twofronts.

[86] Stieb, *The Regime Change Consensus*, 98-100.

[87] Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, "Persian Gulf Myths," *Foreign Affairs* 76.3 (1997): 47.

[88] William J. Clinton, "Interview on CNN's 'Global Forum With President Clinton,'" May 3, 1994, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-cnns-global-forum-with-president-clinton.

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[92] William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With United Nations Security Council Resolution," July 9, 1997, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-reporting-iraqs-compliance-with-united-nations-security-27.

[93] William J. Clinton, "Remarks to Troops in Baumholder, Germany," December 2, 1995, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-troops-baumholder-germany.

[94] William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the Parliament of the United Kingdom in London," November 29, 1995, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-parliament-the-united-kingdom-london.

[95] Mike McCurry, "Press Briefing by Mike McCurry," February 3, 1995, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-briefing-mike-mccurry-541.

[96] Madeline K. Albright, "Policy Speech on Iraq," March 26, 1997, Archive of Women's Political Communication, Iowa State University, https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/21/policy-speech-on-iraq-march-26-1997/.

[97] Sandy Berger, "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger," September 5, 2000, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-briefing-national-security-advisor-sandy-berger-2.

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[99] William Neikirk, "U.S. Warns Iraq of Retaliation," *Chicago Tribune*, September 12, 1996, D1.

[100] Thomas E. Ricks, "Persian Gulf, U.S. Danger Zone: Military Has Been Committed to Hot Spot Despite Risk," *Washington Post*, October 15, 2000, A1.

[101] William Pfaff, "There is no rationale for U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf," *Chicago Tribune*, July 9, 1996, NW11.

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[103] Kent E. Calder, "Asia's Empty Tank," *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 59-60.

[104] Cable News Network (CNN)/USA Today, Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll: Iraq Reaction, Question 9, USGALLUP.807026.Q06, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1994).

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[106] Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times Poll: National Politics, Question 50, USLAT.347.R53, Los Angeles Times, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1994).

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[109] William J. Clinton, "Interview With April Ryan of the American Urban Radio Networks in Baltimore," November 1, 1998, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-april-ryan-the-american-urban-radio-networks-baltimore.

[110] William J. Clinton, "Remarks on the Military Strikes on Iraq and an Exchange With Reporters," December 17, 1998, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-military-strikes-iraq-and-exchange-with-reporters.

[111] Madeline K. Albright, "Address at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the United nations General Assembly," September 12, 2000, Archives of Women's Political Communication, Iowa State University, https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/21/address-at-the-10th-plenary-meeting-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-sept-12-2000/.

[112] Brody A. Richard, "International Crises and Public Support for President Clinton," *Javnost – The Public* 7.3 (2000): 56-66.

[113] Voter News Service (VNS is an association of ABC News, CNN, CBS News, FOX News, NBC News and the Associated Press.), Voter News Service National Election Day Exit Poll, 1994, Question 26, USVNS.94EXIT.QRY, Voter News Service (VNS is an association of ABC News, CNN, CBS News, FOX News, NBC News and the Associated Press.), (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1994); Cable News Network (CNN)/USA Today, Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll: Contract with America, Question 5, USGALLUP.94N28.Q27, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1994).

[114] 49 percent to 43 percent "think that the US (United States) should use American troops to overthrow him." NBC News/Wall Street Journal, NBC/WSJ Poll # 1999-4096: Retirement/Politics/Social Science, Question 57, USNBCWSJ.99MAR.R13B, Hart-Teeter Research Companies, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1999).

[115] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference With President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt," April 6, 1993, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-with-president-hosni-mubarak-egypt-4.

[116] Carol K. Winkler, *In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 136.

[117] Sandy Berger, "Press Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Assistant Secretary Dan Tarullo, and Undersecretary Larry Summers," June 9, 1995, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-briefing-deputy-national-security-advisor-sandy-berger-assistant-secretary-dan; Mike McCurry, "Press Briefing by Mike McCurry," May 21, 1996, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-briefing-mike-mccurry-330. For an example of Clinton condemning Iraq as a state-sponsor of terrorism, see: William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With United Nations Security Council Resolutions," June 6, 1994, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-reporting-iraqs-compliance-with-united-nations-security-11.

[118] William J. Clinton, "Remarks at the World Jewish Congress Dinner in New York City," April 30, 1995, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-world-jewish-congress-dinner-new-york-city.

[119] William J. Clinton, "Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995," May 9, 1995, Federal Register 24757, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-05-09/pdf/95-11694.pdf.

[120] While it is beyond the purview of this study, it is also worth noting that Congress also pursued a harsh agenda targeting Iran. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, for instance, placed U.S. sanctions on foreign entities dealing with Iran, going beyond the Clinton administration's unilateral sanctions regime. This legislative agenda continued into Clinton's second term via efforts like the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998, which Clinton vetoed but responded to by extending executive branch sanctions against several foreign corporations dealing with Iran. Edwards, "*Dual Containment" Policy in the Persian Gulf*, 66-72; Stuart D. Goldman, Kenneth Katzman, Robert Shuey, and Carl E. Behrens, "Russian Missile Technology and Nuclear Reactor Transfer to Iran," in *Iran: Outlaw, Outcast or Normal Country?* ed. Albert V. Benliot (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), 45-47.

[121] Madeline Albright and Bill Woodward, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir* (London: Macmillan, 2003), 319. Khatami's interview with CNN journalist Christine Amanpour in January 1998 set the stage for this attempt at improved U.S.-Iran relations, as he called for a "dialogue of civilizations" and confessed "that what we seek is what the founders of the American civilization were also pursuing four centuries ago. This is why we sense an intellectual affinity with the essence of the American civilization." "Transcript of Interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami," CNN, January 7, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html.

[122] Anastasia Th. Drenou, "Iran: Caught Between European Union-United States Rivalry?" in *Iran's Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad*, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshmi and Mahjoob Zweri (Reading: U.K.: Ithaca Press, 2011), 73-88; Michael Axworthy, "Diplomatic Relations Between Iran and the United Kingdom in the Early Reform Period, 1997-2000," in *Iran's Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad*, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshmi and Mahjoob Zweri (Reading: U.K.: Ithaca Press, 2011), 105-114; Christin Marschall, *Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 142-147, 193-195; Donette Murray, *US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations since the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 90-115.

[123] William J. Clinton, "Press Briefing by Mike McCurry," January 29, 1998, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-briefing-mike-mccurry-82.

[124] William J. Clinton, "Interview With Wolf Blitzer on CNN.com," February 14, 2000, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-wolf-blitzer-cnncom.

[125] Madeline Albright, "Albright's Remarks on Iran: 'Khatami Deserves Respect,'" *New York Times*, June 18, 1998, A16.

[126] Madeline K. Albright, "The Testing of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 77.6 (1998): 54.

[127] Madeline K. Albright, "Remarks Before the American-Iranian Council," March 17, 2000, U.S. Department of State Archive, https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/2000/000317.html.

[128] Richard Haas, "The Middle East: No More Treaties," *Foreign Affairs* 75.5 (1996): 57.

[129] Walter Lacquer, "Postmodern Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 75.5 (1996): 30.

[130] Shirley's larger argument was that the Iranian population was becoming disillusioned with the revolution, but he still did not call for improved relations. Edward G. Shirley, "Is Iran's Present Algeria's Future?" *Foreign Affairs* 74.3 (1995): 30.

[131] Milton Viorst, "The Limits of the Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 74.6 (1995): 76, 69.

[132] Another trend in *Foreign Affairs* commentary was debates over the extent the United States should try to prevent European allies from trading with Iran. This issue is somewhat beyond the purview of this study. For an example of this type of analysis, see: Charles Lane, "Germany's New Ostpolitik," *Foreign Affairs* 74.6 (1995): 77-89.

[133] Robin Wright, "Iran's New Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 79.1 (2000): 145.

[134] Richard N. Haas, "What to Do with American Primacy," *Foreign Affairs* 78.5 (1999): 42-43.

[135] Martin Senn demonstrates the continuity of the "rogue states" paradigm in U.S. treatments of Iraq and Iran in his comprehensive analysis of the rogue states concept. Senn, *Wolves in the Woods*, 69-96, 120-136, 203-207; "U.S. Declares 'Rogue Nations' Are Now 'States of Concern,'" *New York Times*, June 20, 2000, https://www.proquest.com/blogs-podcasts-websites/u-s-declares-rogue-nations-are-now-states-concern/docview/2233377021/se-2?accountid=14696.

[136] Bruce O. Riedel, "U.S. Policy in the Gulf: Five Years of Dual Containment," May 6, 1998, U.S. Department of State Archive, https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/nea/980506_riedel_iraq.html.

[137] Riedel's speech also emphasized the continued threat from Iraq, saying, "Saddam Hussein's track record is all too clear. He will continue to challenge the international community because his goals remain regional domination and revenge for past defeats." Riedel, "U.S. Policy in the Gulf," May 6, 1998.

[138] "U.S. Report calls Iran No. 1 Terror Sponsor, Despite New Leader," *New York Times*, May 1, 1998, https://www.proquest.com/blogs-podcasts-websites/u-s-report-calls-iran-no-1-terror-sponsor-despite/docview/2236094308/se-2?accountid=14696.

[139] 3,786 articles out of 7,304 articles from January 20, 1997, to January 20, 2001, mentioning Iran also mentioned one or more of the following terms: rogue, threat, danger, terror, terrorism, outlaw, protest, weapons. Search conducted using ProQuest New York Times database.

[140] "Iran's Missile Test," *New York Times*, July 24, 1998, 20; "Iran's Terrorist Ranking," *New York Times*, May 8, 1999, 14; "Iran's Dubious Espionage Trial," *New York Times*, April 16, 2000, 14.

[141] Bennet's article was placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK) on October 3, 1996. Ralph K. Bennet, "Defenseless Against Missile Terror," *Reader's Digest* (October 1996): 102-103; Said Al-Ashmawy, "Islam's Real Agenda," *Reader's Digest* (January 1996): 156.

[142] Rick Atkinson, "Killing of Iranian Dissenters: 'Bloody Trail Back to Tehran,'" *Washington Post*, November 21, 1993, A1; "Amnesty International Report: Iran Tortures Dissident Clerics," June 4, 1997, *Jerusalem Post*, 5.

[143] Poll question from the University of Maryland: "I would like you to think about how much the US (United States) spends on defense as compared to its potential enemies. For discussion sake, let's include as potential enemies Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Here are some possible levels that have been suggested. Please tell me which makes the most sense to you." Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland Poll: June 2000, Question 10, USUMARY.00ISSU.Q081, Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2000).

[144] William Webster, "Can We Stop the Super-Terrorists?" *Reader's Digest* (January 1997): 93, 95.

[145] Alfonse D'Amato, "Regarding Iran," March 23, 1995, Congressional Record Vol. 141, No. 54, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/1995/03/23/senate-section/article/S4519-1; Fayzamanesh, *The United States and* Iran, 74.

[146] Robert Mason, *Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 28-31.

[147] George F. Kennan (X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25.4 (1947): 581.

[148] William J. Clinton, "Remarks on the Return of the United States Delegation to Haiti," October 16, 1994, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-return-the-united-states-delegation-haiti.

[149] Clinton, "Remarks on the Military Strikes on Iraq," December 17, 1998. It is important to note that Clinton ordered these strikes in the lead up to his impeachment hearings for his affair with Monica Lewinsky. Clinton's detractors, including many Republicans, saw Operations Desert Fox as an attempt to distract from his misconduct and the impeachment proceedings. The *Chicago Tribune* for instance, wrote an editorial stating, "Even before bombs began to fall, critics of Clinton in Congress began questioning his motivation for battering Iraq…. Such skepticism is understandable and is part of the price of Clinton's personal recklessness." "Gambling on Operation Desert Fox," *Chicago Tribune*, December 17, 1998, D30.

[150] Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders," July 9, 1997. Clinton used similar language in his 1998 State of the Union address. William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 27, 1998, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-8.

[151] Mike McCurry, "Press Briefing by Mike McCurry," March 14, 1995, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-briefing-mike-mccurry-472.

[152] Berger made this reasoning explicit in a 1998 interview. A *Washington Post* profile cited him stating, "I've always said containment is aesthetically displeasing but strategically sufficient." Frank Ahrens, "The Reluctant Warrior; National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, a Onetime Dove Who Has Learned the Value of Claws," *Washington Post*, February 24, 1998, C1.

[153] Albright, "Policy Speech on Iraq," March 26, 1997

[154] This view was upheld behind closed doors as well. For example, one anonymous State Department official in the United Arab Emirates told Christin Marschall in an interview, "They particularly like the relationship with the US because they know that we are here for the long haul. This is comforting for the UAE and the other Gulf states as we defend them against Iran and Iraq." Marschall, *Iran's Persian Gulf Policy*, 192, 247.

[155] Jerry L. Mraz, "Dual Containment: US Policy in the Persian Gulf and a Recommendation for the Future," Research Paper, Air Command and Staff College, March 1997, iv, v, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a394040.pdf.

[156] Eric Pianin, "Clinton Approves Sanctions For Investors in Iran; Libya," *Washington Post*, August 6, 1996, A8.

[157] Gordon, *Invisible War*, 199.

[158] Madeline Albright, *Madam Secretary* (New York: Miramax, 2003), 274. A February 2000 State Department Report also stated that "we will… continue our efforts to increase humanitarian relief for the people of Iraq, over the obstructions of the regime." U.S. Department of State, "Saddam Hussein's Iraq," September 13, 1999, Executive Summary, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/saddam-husseins-iraq.

[159] Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs* 77.1 (1998): 40-41.

[160] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Plans to Keep Planes and Tanks in the Gulf Area," *New York Times*, October 14, 1994, A1.

[161] Steven Erlanger, "Gulf War Alliance: 6 Years Later, Seams Fray," *New York Times*, November 5, 1997, A6; Eric Schmitt, "Some Doubt U.S. Ability to Fight Wars on 2 Fronts," *New York Times*, October 17, 1994, A9.

[162] "Rhetoric and Reality on Iraq," *New York Times*, December 10, 1999, A34.

[163] Henry Luce Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation Poll: June 1999, Question 102, USPOTM.99ASIA.R5L, Potomac Associates/Opinion Dynamics, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1999). In 2000, Gallup reported that more than three-quarters of Americans considered Iran unfriendly(44 percent) or an enemy (34 percent). Gallup Organization, Gallup Organization Poll: May 2000, Question 50, USGALLUP.00MY18.R33L, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2000).

[164] Fox News, Opinion Dynamics/Fox News Poll # 2000-097: 2000 Presidential Election/Gun Laws/Price of Gasoline, Question 35, USODFOX.032400.R26, Opinion Dynamics, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2000); Time Magazine/Cable News Network (CNN), Yankelovich/Time Magazine/CNN Poll: 2000 Presidential Election, Question 53, USYANKP.061600.R15D, Yankelovich Partners, Inc., (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2000).

[165] William J. Clinton, "Interview on CNN's 'Global Forum With President Clinton,'" May 3, 1994, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-cnns-global-forum-with-president-clinton.

[166] Oz Hassan, "Bush's Freedom Agenda: Ideology and the Democratization of the Middle East," *Democracy and Security* 4.3 (2008): 268.

[167] George W. Bush, "Remarks on Arrival at the White House and an Exchange With Reporters," September 16, 2001, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-arrival-the-white-house-and-exchange-with-reporters. For comprehensive overviews of Bush's foreign policy agenda, see: Ilan Peleg, *George W. Bush's Foreign Policy: Moving Beyond Neoconservatism* (New York: Routledge, 2018); Alexander Moens, *The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush: Values Strategy, and Loyalty* (New York: Routledge, 2016); Donette Murray, David Brown, and Martin A. Smith, *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism* (New York: Routledge, 2018); Melvin Gurtov, *Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

[168] "BEST SELLERS: April 4, 2004," *New York Times*, April 4, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/04/books/best-sellers-april-4-2004.html.

[169] James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004), xi-xii.

[170] Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, xii.

[171] See Daniel Larison, "The 'Freedom Agenda' Was A Disaster For The Countries Affected By It," American Conservative, May 14, 2012, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-freedom-agenda-was-a-disaster-for-the-countries-affected-by-it/; Jeremy Pressman, "Power Without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East," *International Security* 33.4 (2009): 152-155; Robert L. Ivie, *Democracy and America's War on Terror* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 123-147. For

an account offering the contrary perspective, see: Joan Hoff, *A Faustian Foreign Policy: Dreams of Perfectibility from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 168-170.

[172] In making a case for continuation between the Clinton and Bush administrations' approach to the Gulf, I am elaborating on an argument made by Chin-Kuei Tsui, who seeks to debunk "the myth of President George W. Bush's foreign policy revolution." Tsui contends "that President Bush's foreign policy largely followed that of his predecessors, [I] and suggest a long continuation rather than a revolutionary shift in U.S. counterterrorism policy after 11 September 2001." Chin-Kuei Tsui, *Clinton, New Terrorism and the Origins of the War on Terror* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 7.

[173] Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East," May 18, 1993.

[174] Sergio Fabbrini, *America and its Critics: Virtues and Vices of the Democratic Hyperpower* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008), ix.

[175] George W. Bush, "Remarks to the Community in Manchester, New Hampshire," October 5, 2002, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-community-manchester-new-hampshire-1.

[176] George W. Bush, "Remarks at Naval Station Mayport in Jacksonville," February 13, 2003, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-naval-station-mayport-jacksonville.

[177] Jim Lobe, "U.S.-GULF: Former Foreign Policy Chiefs Assail 'Dual Containment,'" April 18, 1997, *Inter Press Service*, http://www.ipsnews.net/1997/04/us-gulf-former-foreign-policy-chiefs-assail-dual-containment/.

[178] Emphasis added. Stieb, *The Regime Change Consensus*, 13.

[179] Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 205.

[180] In September 2002, 86 percent of Americans thought it was very or somewhat urgent to "resolve the problem of Iraq." Program on International Policy Attitudes, PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll: Foreign Policy Problems/Iraq/Military Force/Weapons of Mass Destruction/United Nations, Question 5, USUMARY.200209.Q01E, Knowledge Networks, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2002).

[181] William J. Clinton, "Background Briefing by a Senior administration Official on Kohl's Visit," February 9, 1995, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/background-briefing-senior-administration-official-kohl-visit.

[182] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel in Jerusalem," March 14, 1996, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-with-prime-minister-shimon-peres-israel-jerusalem.

[183] William J. Clinton, "Remarks at a Dinner for the Conference on Progressive Governance for the 21st Century in Florence, Italy," November 20, 1999, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-dinner-for-the-conference-progressive-governance-for-the-21st-century-florence.

[184] William J. Clinton, "Background Briefing by a Senior Administration Official," October 29, 1994, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/background-briefing-senior-administration-official-39.

[185] Tsui, *Clinton, New Terrorism, and the Origins of the War on Terror,* 69.

[186] Peter L. Bergin, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Touchstone, 2001), 121; John M. Diamond, *The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 290-292; Mark Ensalaco, *Middle Eastern*

Terrorism: From Black September to September 11 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 225-227.

[187] Fergus M. Bordewich, "Radical Islam's Bloody Battlefield," *Reader's Digest* (November 1997): 169-173.

[188] A.M. Rosenthal, "We Do We Tolerate Terrorism?" *Reader's Digest* (February 1997): 110.

[189] To be sure, Lewis did not mention terrorism in his article. Bernard Lewis, "The West and the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 76.1 (1997): 127.

[190] Ali A. Mazrui, "Islamic and Western Values," *Foreign Affairs* 76.5 (1997): 130.

[191] Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Inheritance," *Foreign Affairs* 7.5 (1997): 145.

[192] William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the 52d Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 22, 1997, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-52d-session-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-city.

[193] William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 27, 1998, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-8.

[194] In a CNN poll conducted ten days after the attacks, 73 percent of Americans favored going to war with Iraq against only 20 percent opposed. And 90 percent said it was "very important" (68 percent) or "somewhat important" (22 percent) to remove Hussein from power if the United States took military action in response to the attacks. Cable News Network (CNN)/USA Today, Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll: Terrorism Reaction Poll # 3, Question 21, Question 29, USGALLUP.01SP21.R15, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2001).

[195] Thies, *Why Containment Works*, 83-84.

[196] Sami G. Hajjar, "U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects," Strategic Studies Institute, March 2002, vi, 42-43, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1495.pdf.

CONCLUSION

The Axis of Evil and Beyond

In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush revealed to the American people that they faced a new global adversary in the wake of 9/11. Identifying Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as "regimes that sponsor terror," he warned that these nations exported violence, sought to threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction, and had "something to hide from the civilized world." According to Bush, these regimes represented a new danger that simply could not be ignored. Their activities "pose a grave and growing danger," he warned; they could even provide chemical or nuclear weapons to terrorists, thereby "giving them the means to match their hatred." In the face of such peril, he cautioned, "indifference would be catastrophic." He therefore outlined his vision for a War on Terror, admonishing Americans that as "peril draws closer and closer… it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight." To sum up this vision, Bush offered a new version of a Cold War metaphor (Reagan's "Evil Empire") to guide public interpretation of the fresh challenge facing the United States. Likening this emergent enemy to the war machines of Nazi Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and imperial Japan, President Bush proclaimed: "States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world."[1]

On a strategic level, Bush's address worked to conflate multinational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda with "outlaw states" like Iraq and Iran. His words welded these two distinct threats into a single enemy image; the *Axis of Evil* condensed various foes of varying capabilities into a monolithic bloc that the United States should oppose as an outgrowth of its commitment to freedom.[2] Symbolically, Bush interlaced two strands of enemyship rhetoric into a

united whole. Each thread—rogue states and terrorism—grew out of previous presidential discourse about the Persian Gulf. Without Clinton's attacks on backlash states, the elder Bush's vision of U.S. authority over the Gulf, or Reagan's efforts to build a coalition of nations standing against malevolent forces, the younger Bush's rhetoric would have lacked a firm substratum of enemy images upon which to craft this vision.

By depicting these enemies as a singular hostile force, Bush reframed the 9/11 attacks as the opening shots of a two-sided international conflict pitting those who love freedom against those who wished to destroy the American way of life. Reflecting the realist tropes and assumptions of U.S. Cold War rhetoric, Bush instructed his audiences that "These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are." Bush globalized the War on Terror in Cold War ways, sending troops to fight terrorist organizations in faraway lands and establishing CIA "black sites" around the world to interrogate suspected terrorists.[3] According to the president, the conflict was as simple as freedom versus terrorism: "So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk."

This rhetorical maneuver allowed Bush to weave a Cold War-like narrative in which America must again take up its mantle as freedom's champion to wage war against freedom's enemies in the Middle East.[4] Bush echoed Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and his father, who all at various times had framed Gulf defense as a two-sided struggle between the camp of freedom (epitomized by the United States and its allies) and those who opposed them (the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, Islamist terrorists). This simplified narrative played a prominent role in Bush's case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Critically, these rhetorical tactics enabled Bush to translate the 9/11 attacks—which were already being avenged in Afghanistan—into momentum for Operation Iraqi Freedom and its long, violent shadow.

Viewed retrospectively, Bush's 2002 address marks a watershed moment for American involvement in Gulf politics, making his address akin to Harold Wilson's notice of the British withdrawal east of Suez. The Axis of Evil metaphor heralded a conflict-ridden trajectory for U.S. security policy in the region. In Iraq, it presaged a huge investment of American blood and treasure over the next 20 years in warfare against native insurgents, foreign fighters, and the so-called Islamic State.[5] With Iran, the metaphor marked an end to the relative détente engineered by Khatami and Clinton.[6] The two countries repeatedly clashed over Iran's nuclear program and support for proxy forces across the Middle East during Bush's tenure.[7] This renewed antagonism, in turn, introduced a set of strategic problems Bush's successors have struggled to solve, with U.S. policy lurching between a policy of diplomatic accommodation (Barrack Obama's "nuclear deal" with Tehran) and aggressive posturing (Donald Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign to punish Iran's economy).[8] And in the wider Middle East, the Axis of Evil metaphor announced a host of policies that enmeshed the United States even deeper in the region's conflicts through more sustained military engagement. From record-breaking arms deals with Riyadh to drone strikes in the mountains of Yemen, desert fighting in Syria to counter-terrorism in the Sinai, the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East has only grown since Bush's 2002 address.[9]

Yet the Axis of Evil address equally marks the conclusion of a long road trodden since the 1971 British withdraw from the Gulf in the heart of the Cold War. This study has attempted to provide an answer to the question of how Americans' understanding of the Persian Gulf changed so drastically from Wilson's 1968 withdrawal speech to Bush's 2002 Axis of Evil address. It is difficult to overstate the distance covered between these moments. U.S. strategists, politicians, and journalists immediately reacted to Wilson's speech by lamenting that "it would

be no easy matter to replace the British" in the Persian Gulf. As Gerald Griffin wrote in the *Baltimore Sun*, "What can the United States do? Well, what it cannot do is simply to move into the bases and territories occupied by the British. Even if the United States had the forces to spare, a new American presence probably would not be acceptable… and might well prove more disruptive than stabilizing."[10] The possibility of the United States filling the supposed power vacuum appeared farfetched and fantastical.

And yet 34 years after Wilson's address, American military bases dotted the Gulf. George W. Bush promised he would leave no "terror camps intact and terrorists states unchecked" en route to launching 20 years of war in Iraq as well as countless drone strikes and covert operations across the region. Far from a distant region removed from everyday life, many Americans today are all too familiar with the Persian Gulf. Since Bush's speech, few regions have absorbed as much U.S. attention and resources; the construction of the Gulf in presidential discourse has equally undergone a metamorphosis. That the United States might assume the role of Britain in the Persian Gulf, replete with military bases, alliance networks, and overall public acceptance of this "protective" mission, went from fanciful to reality in less than four decades. This is a story that unfolded along three interrelated axes: presidential rhetoric, press coverage, and U.S. assertions of sovereignty over the Gulf states.

Project Summary: Presidential Rhetoric and the Persian Gulf

Following Wilson's 1968 address, U.S. policymakers conceptualized the Gulf as a "vacuum" that faced the prospect of Soviet aggression without the resources to defend itself. But unlike previous instances in which American strategists moved to fill ostensive vacuums overseas, this time the U.S.-Vietnam conflict left the United States bereft of resources and public

willingness to “stabilize” the region with its own power. In the face of this strategic conundrum, Nixon and his team developed the *Twin Pillars* policy.

Complementing the goal of reducing the U.S. military footprint abroad, Twin Pillars entailed massive arms sales to Saudi Arabia and especially Iran. By equipping these two American allies to police the Gulf, Nixon hoped to create a friendly counterweight to Soviet attempts to destabilize the region. The Twin Pillars policy, envisioned in a Cold War context, was upheld by a constellation of images that depicted the Gulf as a volatile region, Saudi Arabia and Iran as sources of order, and the United States as the key player facilitating the rise of Saudi and Iranian power. These images permeated American political discourse until the fall of the Shah’s regime in Tehran, continuing in some fashion until the Carter Doctrine address.

Like many of Carter’s critics, Ronald Reagan excoriated the president for the ongoing hostage crisis in Iran. Upon winning the 1980 election, Reagan cast a vision of a reinvigorated U.S. commitment to winning the Cold War. Famously calling the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” Reagan’s first term was characterized by an active foreign policy agenda accompanied by a plethora of metaphors like the “march of freedom” and “city on a hill.” *Strategic Consensus* fit well within this rhetorical arsenal as the administration’s chosen metaphor to describe its Middle East strategy. Asserting that American allies as varied as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel all saw the Soviet Union as the main threat to their security, the portrait painted by this metaphor was one of a unified anti-Soviet bloc working to thwart Communist designs on the Gulf and its oil. Instead of merely serving as a regional backstop, this picture presumed active American leadership of Middle East defense. Strategic Consensus glossed over deep divisions among U.S. allies to depict a united front against Soviet aggression, Communist infiltration, and radical movements in a critical theater of the Cold War.

While the Strategic Consensus plan fell apart as a policy, the metaphor's logic smoothed the redefinition of each former "pillar" in political discourse. Consistent with the image of seamless alignment among the United States and its allies, Saudi Arabia went from being portrayed as an unstable autocracy to a vital ally, accentuating the progressively intimate security partnership between the world's oldest democracy and absolute monarchy. Iran, no longer the "pillar" of U.S. strategy as it was under the Shah, came to be increasingly demonized by Reagan. Khomeini's regime steadily gained the upper hand in its bloody eight-year war with Iraq. The administration accordingly "tilted" toward Baghdad and reviled Iran as a barbaric, terrorist-sponsoring state. Reagan then adapted his rhetoric to depict Iran in the same way that he had described Moscow—as a frightening threat that sought to undermine America's Gulf friends and dominate the flow of oil. This rhetorical shift was reinforced by a rise in hostility between the United States and Iran, climaxing with a series of high-profile clashes in which American armed forces attacked the Iranian navy (on purpose) and shot down an Iranian commercial airliner (accidently). These events helped acclimate Americans to U.S. military operations in the Gulf and underscored the extent to which many now viewed Iran as the primary enemy in the region.

George H.W. Bush continued many of Reagan's Gulf policies upon entering the White House, including the "tilt" toward Iraq, antagonistic approach to Iran, and staunch support for Saudi Arabia. When Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, Bush responded by making the case for intervention to reverse Hussein's gains, reiterating many of the points used by Reagan to argue that he could not allow a country hostile to the United States to dominate the Gulf. Yet many Americans did not find this case persuasive. Instead, Bush and his team made their case for war based on internationalist principles, prosecuting this argument through a panoply of metaphors like *Gulf crisis as test* and *Hussein as criminal*. Bush organized these appeals into a composite

metaphor meant to summarize his vision of a peaceful post-Cold War world: the *New World Order*. By the time U.N. approval for the liberation of Kuwait was granted, Americans had warmed to the idea that the situation represented a test for the post-Cold War order and that military action was necessary.

Bush invoked the New World Order constantly during the campaign to liberate Kuwait. In doing so, he offered an essentially rhetorical rationale for war: the United States must defeat Hussein to send a warning to other would-be tyrants. The logic of his depiction was Orientalist insofar as it presumed that Iraq's defeat was meant to serve as an object lesson validating American military and moral supremacy. As he made this argument, he dramatically expanded the scope of U.S. strategic objectives in the region. Far from the preventative case to merely stop enemies from impeding the flow of oil made by Reagan, President Bush declared that the New World Order entailed opposing tyranny, rooting out terrorism, expanding democracy, and halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction across the region. Bush thus pioneered a set of new rationales to justify a policing presence where the United States became the military hegemon of the region, bolstered by the close ties Reagan mobilized with local allies. This "New World Order" helped rationalize a continued U.S. presence in the Gulf in the wake of Iraq's defeat and the Soviet Union's collapse.

Clinton took office at a time of American exuberance, as the United States entered a "unipolar" era of geopolitics characterized by the triumph of democracy, capitalism, and freedom worldwide. The Gulf, however, remained a troubled region in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. Iran and Iraq resided outside the pro-democratic order, with each country standing accused of pursuing weapons of mass destruction, supporting terrorism, and oppressing its people. When the World Trade Center was bombed scarcely a month into Clinton's presidency, it spotlighted the

urgency of developing a strategy to deal with terrorism as well as Iraq, Iran, and other "rogue states" who defied the American-led global order.

In response, the Clinton administration outlined a strategy it branded *Dual Containment* that borrowed explicitly from the containment rhetorics of the Cold War. By marginalizing Iraq and Iran through economic sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and (in the case of Iraq) periodic military strikes, the United States could prevent another Gulf crisis, keep the oil flowing, and maintain a favorable regional status quo. There was little need to go to war to forcibly replace these regimes, the thinking went, so long as the United States could contain these countries and their harmful influence. As part of this strategy redolent of the Cold War, Clinton and his subordinates continually affirmed the image of the United States as the region's guardian and depicted Iraq and Iran as threats to national interests, allies, and the Arab-Israeli peace process; they raised the salience of terrorism and "Islamic fundamentalism" in the process. Clinton thereby confirmed the expansive American role in the Gulf outlined by his predecessor, which helped pave the way for the younger Bush's freedom agenda while laying rhetorical touchstones for the Axis of Evil address in the aftermath of 9/11. As Jackson Diehl of the *Washington Post* wrote in 2003, "Clinton, too, perceived the evil—or unholy—axis, and the imperative that the United States stand up to the gathering threat."[11] Clinton ultimately introduced key elements of the interpretive framework Bush employed to make his case for spreading democracy across the Middle East, presaging deeper U.S. entanglements in Gulf political affairs after 9/11.

Viewed broadly, perhaps the most striking feature of this presidential discourse is the rhetorical continuity and symbolic accretion. From all the twists and turns from Nixon to Clinton, presidents consistently articulated an American strategic responsibility to safeguard Gulf security on some level. Each step taken by a president from Twin Pillars to Dual

Containment offered a springboard for his successor to initiate a strategy drawing the United States ever deeper into Gulf affairs. Nixon tasked two Gulf countries to fill the vacuum. When the Iranian pillar collapsed, Reagan reacted by mobilizing allies to back U.S. efforts to combat Soviet and Iranian power. Hussein's imperial annexation of Kuwait trigger the elder Bush to develop a full-scale strategy that turned the United States into a police power in the Middle East. Clinton extended such paternalistic assumptions by containing the enemy nations that would ultimately make up the Axis of Evil so foundational to the Bush Doctrine. By the close of the Clinton era, in the words of presidential scholar William E. Leuchtenberg, the United States "wielded an iron first" in the Gulf, forcefully using its power to shape Gulf countries' behavior.[12]

The symbolic continuity of these metaphors is noticeable. Twin Pillars framed the Gulf as an inherently unstable region, drawing on the expansive Cold War universe of imagery in which the United States stood for forces of democracy, justice, freedom, and order against the communism of the Soviet Union, which toppled monarchies, flourished in the shadows, and grew from the seeds of disorder. This basic picture of Gulf instability (and thus vulnerability) provided the symbolic foundation for the security metaphors that followed. Strategic Consensus presumed the need for a united front against Soviet imperialism. The New World Order framed the United States as freedom's champion pushing back against the world disorder pursued by terrorists, dictators, and spreaders of weapons of mass destruction, using American might to intervene in the Gulf as a police power to reverse the ill-gotten gains of Saddam. Dual Containment likewise portrayed Iran and Iraq as sources of disorder and chaos, reckless and reprobate states that needed to be kept in check by the United States to prevent their harmful influence from contaminating others. The image of Gulf instability served as the bedrock upon which newer metaphors built and indeed continue to build.

Even as each president built on the metaphors and policies of their predecessor, there were also important differences. Nixon approached the region from a realist perspective, giving arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia in hopes that an increase in these countries' military power would translate to a stabilized Gulf immune to Soviet subversion. Carter, by contrast, campaigned on human rights, appealed to idealism, and decried America's status as the world's leading weapons dealer—all while selling F-16s to the Saudis and authorizing a hardening of U.S. defense posture in the Gulf.[13] Nixon's realism and Carter's idealism both led to deeper U.S. involvement in Gulf security. Reagan, to cite another example, justified U.S. military action in the Gulf on the basis that protecting "the free flow of oil" was vital to American national interests and national security. A mere two years later, Bush then advocated for intervention on internationalist grounds, arguing that the principles of global conduct violated by Iraq demanded that the United States go to war to free Kuwait with the backing of a coalition of nations. Clinton drew from these various strands, in turn, to argue for the isolation of Iraq and Iran through Dual Containment on the basis that these countries threatened the democratic global order.

There is a clear symbolic pivot around the time of the Cold War ending. Twin Pillars and Strategic Consensus assumed a world in which the Soviet Union provided a dark foil to American power, and the symbolism of these metaphors adopted a kind of symmetry as a reflection of this picture. Twin Pillars provided counterpressure to the overbearing weight of Soviet aggression to the south; Strategic Consensus imagined an array of allied forces lined up to meet the brunt of Soviet power head-on. By contrast, the New World Order and Dual Containment were not explicitly responding to the threat of Soviet intervention but nonetheless applied Cold War assumptions and symbolism to U.S.-Middle East relations. Instead of pushing directly back against Soviet pressure, the United States in these schemas worked to progressively

advance the march of democracy, freedom, and capitalism in much the same way that the United States sought to spread democracy to combat the forces of communism. Resistance from hostile forces in the Gulf presented merely a temporary roadblock on that march. Thus, the halcyon vision of the New World Order and Dual Containment each positioned the United States as the protagonist guiding the world into a better future while managing the conflicts of the present. In the words of Robert L. Ivie, these metaphors drew upon the discursive legacy of the Cold War as they cast "the image of a heroic nation struggling globally to redeem itself by contesting the relentless forces of chaos and establishing a new World Order."[14] These metaphors thus drew upon Cold War symbolism even as they cast a vision meant to sustain U.S. engagement in the Gulf beyond the era of superpower rivalry.

All these symbols, of course, supplied critical rhetorical resources for George W. Bush, who framed the War on Terror as both a hopeful exercise in democracy promotion and a two-sided fight between America and its malevolent rival, "the terrorists."[15] Like all the metaphors outlined above, Bush's vision implied a certain level of instability and vulnerability. Terrorists "lurked" in the shadows as they plotted further violence, which meant that only stable, strong countries with capable security services would be able to uncover their plots and root them out. Terrorism presented America's dark opposite. Yet Bush also depicted the war in Iraq as an opportunity to transform the Gulf via the light of democracy. As he put it in a 2003 address to the American Enterprise Institute, "The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle [East]. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform…. Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region."[16]

The net result of these processes is that presidents seeking to warrant intervention in the Gulf have ample precedents they can invoke to justify their actions. Policy arguments tend to borrow from previously successful policy arguments; as Jerome Mahaffey writes, "implied doctrines" of public conduct can offer a "deep cultural reach" for those adept enough to adapt them for new purposes.[17] Consequently, administrations face no shortage of rhetorical resources from which to craft rationales for intervention. Idealism, realism, internationalism, national interests, oil, terrorism, tyranny, instability, and American exceptionalism can all be pressed into rhetorical service to justify military action in the Middle East. As shown in this study, all have been used before. The time period from Nixon and Clinton witnessed, if nothing else, an astonishing fecundity of rationales for U.S. intervention and military involvement in the Persian Gulf. These rationales grew from the symbolic soil so richly fertilized by presidential metaphors, which worked to rhetorically transform the Gulf region in American public discourse.[18]

The American Press and the Persian Gulf

To be sure, it would be a mistake to attribute the revolution in how Americans understand the Gulf to presidential rhetoric alone. The words of the White House cannot fully account for the incredible distance traveled between the speeches of Harold Wilson and George W. Bush. Journalists, analysts, and foreign policy commentators played an equally significant role in redefining the region through the ways in which they adopted, repackaged, questioned, and criticized presidential discourse about the Gulf. The story of how the United States came to dominate the Persian Gulf is incomplete without the press.

At times news coverage simply adopted and rearticulated administration rhetoric. Press recirculation of the "vacuum" metaphor and images of instability, for example, heavily reinforced the Nixon administration's portrayal of the Gulf as an explosive region that the Shah

and Saudi Arabia were steadily stabilizing though American support. Reporters amplified Reagan's negative depiction of revolutionary Iran, filling newspapers and magazines with sensational stories about the theocratic regime; they thereby eased the president's path toward redefining Iran as the Gulf enemy of the United States. Bush had little trouble getting his messages broadcast far and wide by a compliant press corps during Desert Storm, sparking complaints that his administration had manipulated news outlets into spreading pro-war propaganda though censorship, limited access to officials, and the falsified Nayirah testimony.[19] And Clinton hardly had to convince Americans on the street or in the newsroom that Iraq presented a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf.

At other times press coverage took the lead in forming public impressions of the Gulf, compelling presidents to follow suit. After the fall of the Shah and the Islamic Revolution in Iran, for instance, it was news coverage, not President Carter, that helped direct public attention toward the hostage crisis.[20] In like fashion, it was *Time* magazine that labeled Saddam Hussein "the most dangerous man in the world" months before the invasion of Kuwait. The Bush administration was instead quietly trying to pull Iraq into American orbit through diplomatic overtures and economic incentives.[21] Press accounts could also reinforce political constraints within which presidents had to operate, such as when Reagan was forced to feverishly campaign for the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia to secure the deal's congressional approval.[22] And whereas Clinton was careful to distinguish between state-sponsored and "grassroots" terrorism in the Islamic world, many news accounts were less careful, blurring the lines between "rogue states" and transnational terrorist organizations in a way that foreshadowed the Axis of Evil metaphor.[23]

Press outlets also frequently questioned presidential depictions of the Gulf. Nixon and Ford, for example, were dogged by critics in the press and the Democratic Party for the high

volume of U.S. arms sales to Iran; these detractors stressed that the weapons were destabilizing the Shah's regime rather than shoring up his strength. Reporters and news anchors disparaged Carter for his seeming impotence to resolve the hostage crisis in Iran, directly rebutting his attempts to assert American strength in the Gulf. The Reagan administration's Strategic Consensus policy was doubted from the start by foreign policy analysts. George H.W. Bush's picture of an idealized America serving as a model global citizen was disputed by journalistic accounts that uncovered his administration's pre-war ties to Hussein. Many in the press also questioned the coherence of the New World Order altogether and pushed back against the police power role in the Gulf carved out for the United States. Press outlets amplified the president's political opponents and their criticisms of U.S. Gulf security policy in many instances. Clinton's Dual Containment policy provides a case in point. He faced critics on the right and left, with some criticizing him for leaving Hussein's regime intact with others expressing outrage at the level of economic hardship U.S. sanctions had caused in Iraq.

It is thus clear that the press did not merely serve as a conduit for presidential messaging about the Persian Gulf. At the same time, press coverage in *Reader's Digest*, *Foreign Affairs*, and the *New York Times* did help amplify depictions of the Gulf that promoted a more robust U.S. presence in the region. In several critical moments, the press helped advance what Keith L. Shimko calls "metaphors of power," or metaphors that "frame the world and the United States' role in it in such a manner as to explain, justify, and lead to the exercise of American power" overseas.[24] Whether consistently portraying the Gulf as an unstable region or demonizing Hussein as an international criminal and would-be Hitler, the press outlets examined in this study made critical symbolic contributions to the steady redefinition of the Gulf in American public discourse as a region of U.S. responsibility.

Robert Entman's notion of "cascading activation" can help make sense of this process. In describing the power of presidential foreign policy rhetoric, he argues that administrations are sometimes able to impose a dominant interpretive frame through which the public comes to understand events (such as the 9/11 attacks). He likens this "frame dominance" to the downward flow of a waterfall. The ideas, images, and emotions engendered by the frame cascade downhill from the White House, through political commentators and the press, and to the public. Symbols flow much more easily downhill; it is difficult to "pump" the ideas and images back up to its source. To generate sufficient counterforce to achieve "frame parity," he argues, "requires not merely that the news provide bits of unrelated information critical of the administration's frame scattered throughout the coverage." "To reach frame parity," he argues, "the news must offer a *counterframe* that puts together a complete alternative narrative… possessing as much magnitude and resonance as the administration's."[25] Hence, although all the presidents examined in this study experienced critical coverage at times, the news coverage I examined did not exhibit a comprehensive "counterframe" the likes of which Entman describes. While press criticism may have periodically impeded the flow of ideas and political rivals may have diverted the stream on occasion, these president's security metaphors and the images they projected about the Gulf slowly but surely trickled into public discourse from several directions. These metaphors chained out across news sources and leaders' rhetoric, saturating political discussions of the Gulf.

The patterns of symbolic appropriation chronicled in this study contributed to the steady flow of imagery from presidential metaphors. There were two moments examined in the previous chapters when the White House changed power from a Republican to Democratic administration—Carter in 1976 and Clinton in 1992. Both times, the winning Democrat appropriated the previous administration's symbolic framing of the Gulf rather than offer a new

schema for interpreting events in the Gulf. In the 1970s, Carter adopted the basic picture of the Gulf as an unstable region advanced by Nixon and Ford; he and his fellow Democrats simply asserted that the source of instability was the unlimited arms sales authorized by Republican administrations. When the Shah fell, images of instability unsurprisingly guided public interpretation of events and the American policy response. Clinton likewise appropriated Bush's metaphor of Hussein as a criminal even as he and other Democrats excoriated the Bush administration for its dealings with Iraq, declaring the Republicans to be unfit to realize the promises of the New World Order.

Regardless of counterfactuals, by the late 1990s and early 2000s most Americans accepted the permanent basing of tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers in the Gulf, and a near majority supported going to war to remove Hussein even before the 9/11 attacks. These findings testify to the massive changes wrought in how Americans viewed the Gulf and their country's role in the region. These transformations in public understanding would not have been possible to the same extent without the power of the press, which provides "journalistic recontextualizations" of political discourse in innumerable press reports, news stories, and analyses of current events.[26] As John Oddo reminds us, such "recontextualizations" of presidential rhetoric in the press may work against "critical questioning" of administration rhetoric if there is not a comprehensive counterframe through which to interpret events. Hence, it seems fair to conclude that the press was integral to the constitutive force of presidential security metaphors for the Gulf. Like Entman's cascading waterfall, these metaphors coursed through press reports and commentary, helping structure American imaginings of the Gulf as a site of national security concern that required U.S. foreign policy attention, intervention, and domination.

The Persian Gulf and the "Problem" of Sovereignty

By the time of Clinton, as shown in the preceding chapters, it was common for political leaders to describe the U.S. mission in the Gulf in terms of guardianship. The United States protected its allies, safeguarded the flow of oil, and fought terrorism, serving as the region's security guarantor and regional hegemon. This picture of U.S. responsibility for the Gulf represented a conclusive answer to the "problem" the Gulf presented for American strategists. Since the dawn of the Cold War, U.S. defense planners had debated how to best protect the Gulf from hostile forces that may wish to dominate the region and its resources. British power provided an answer to the "question" of how to safeguard the sovereignty of friendly Gulf states until 1971. From Nixon to Clinton, the United States steadily assumed this (heavy-handed) guardian role, which provided a launching point for George W. Bush as he set in motion the 2003 invasion of Iraq and its aftermath.

The constitution of an American responsibility and right to protect the Gulf was reliant on a concerted rhetorical process mediated through the metaphors analyzed in this study. Michael Calvin McGee reminds us that the limits and nature of sovereignty are not given realities; the subject positions of sovereign and subject are constituted through rhetorical practice.[27] That is, understandings of sovereignty—including the duties and expectations that flow from particular formations of the rights of states–are formed through constitutive rhetoric.[28] The language used by political actors to discuss U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf implicitly constituted norms of sovereignty. The symbols, images, and logics they circulated help construct a picture of the Persian Gulf as a region the United States had a duty to protect and police.

By claiming that the United States possessed a right and even a duty to protect the Gulf from harmful forces, these rhetorical actors articulated what Luke Glanville calls "sovereignty's

rules," or the conditions under which states possess "rights to freedom from outside interference."[29] What began as a small number of "rules" imposed on Persian Gulf countries—face retribution for supporting Soviet communism—turned into an expansive range of prohibitions imposed on Gulf states perceived as residing outside the American-led order. By the time Clinton left office, the United States had articulated many "rules" Gulf countries must follow (do not export radical ideology, do not support terrorism, do not resolve disputes with violence, do not develop weapons of mass destruction, etc.) should they wish to remain in Washington's good graces. Hussein's repeated flaunting of these rules thus explains, in part, why so many Americans were willing to go to war to remove him.

The origins of U.S. intervention in the Gulf date to the close of World War II. American strategists since the mid-1940s had viewed the region as an arena of Cold War competition, which meant that the aim of U.S. foreign policy should be to prevent the states of the region from falling prey to Soviet encroachment. Defense planners believed that these countries were unable to safeguard their national autonomy from Communist depredations without outside aid. Supporting the British position in the region thus provided an easy way for officials at the Pentagon and State Department to prevent hostile forces from taking over the Gulf and its oil. When the British pulled out in 1971, U.S. policymakers interpreted the situation as a problem of how to replace the stabilizing presence Britain had provided in the Persian Gulf.

Over the next three decades presidential administrations claimed an increasingly direct U.S. role in superintending over Gulf affairs, ultimately solving the "problem" of Gulf sovereignty by articulating an American responsibility to defend (and police) the region from hostile forces. The Twin Pillars policy represented the first step on this path. Washington built patronage relationships with Tehran and Riyadh, working behind the scenes to arms its clients so

that they could maintain a pro-western regional order. When this strategy collapsed in 1979, Carter responded by issuing his eponymous doctrine. He declared that the United States would itself respond to an "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf."[30] These developments set the United States on the course of slowly assuming the mantle of Gulf guardianship and police powers over the ensuing 20 years. A handful of presidential decisions punctuated this assertion of U.S. authority in the Gulf.

To start, Reagan made good on the Carter Doctrine's promises in three ways. He ordered the U.S. Navy to protect oil tankers amidst the carnage of the Iran-Iraq War. He greenlit Operation Praying Mantis—an offensive strike on the Iranian navy—forcefully illustrating that the Carter Doctrine applied to enemies other than the Soviet Union. And he promised to defend the Saudi regime against internal as well as external dangers, which signified that U.S. policymakers were increasingly concerned about the domestic political affairs of Gulf states beyond issues of alignment in the Cold War. Through these actions Reagan put into practice the assertion of U.S. power made in the Carter Doctrine still reliant on Cold War sensibilities and symbols.

The elder President Bush constituted U.S. authority to police the politics of Gulf states even further. He proclaimed a commitment to creating a peaceful, friendly, and pro-American order in the region as part of his New World Order vision. Seen through the lens of sovereignty, Bush's assertion of an American responsibility to police the Gulf hearkened back to the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, in which Theodore Roosevelt announced that the United States would "exercise an international police power" when confronted with "flagrant cases of such wrongdoing and impotence" in Latin America. Like the precedent laid down by TR, Bush arrogated to the United States the right to act in the Gulf to ensure that

"wrongdoing"—tyranny, terrorism, and the development of weapons of mass destruction—was suppressed.[31] Desert Storm marked the first demonstration of this principle, reasserting American power to articulate the rules of sovereignty in the Persian Gulf.

Clinton, finally, worked out in practical form what this commitment to policing the Gulf looked like over a longer time horizon. At root, the Clinton administration's Dual Containment strategy turned to a Cold War commonplace to constitute a U.S. right to enforce international norms of conduct upon the individual "rogue" states in the Gulf. For example, the administration argued that Hussein's regime in Iraq had abrogated its right to Westphalian non-interference due to its aggression against Kuwait and brutal treatment of its own people (especially Kurds and Shi'a Muslims). Consequently, Clinton ordered numerous airstrikes and clandestine attempts to undermine Hussein's regime as a way to punish the dictator for violating U.N. resolutions meant to bring Iraq into alignment with global norms of conduct. While the United States also pursued punitive policies toward Iran as part of the Dual Containment strategy, these efforts did not escalate in the same manner. Iran's greater size, the lack of U.N.-authorized sanctions on Iran, and Iran's own moves toward reform later in Clinton's presidency, no doubt contributed to this outcome. Even still, Clinton officials depicted Iran in the same light as Iraq, and as with Iraq they demanded that Iran reform before being fully admitted into the "family of nations." As Albright put it in 2000, "Until these policies [supporting terrorism and pursuing nuclear weapons] change, fully normal ties between our governments will not be possible."[32]

Thus, by the time the younger Bush entered the White House, presidents had long articulated a right to protect the Persian Gulf from forces hostile to American national interests. Moreover, they went beyond propping up Middle East countries to combat communist encroachment and assuming the responsibility to merely *defend* the Gulf from external

aggressors. They also asserted the right and duty of the United States to *intervene* in the affairs of Gulf states like Iraq and Iran should they pursue maleficent ends (indeed, Reagan even pronounced a doctrine of pre-emption to justify Operation El Dorado, the military bombing of Muamar Qaddafi's Libya to deter terrorist attacks).[33] Building on the images embedded in their chosen Gulf security metaphors, presidents constituted these rights of intervention via their rhetoric and policies, even going so far as to articulate a "preventative war logic" that demanded the United States attack bad actors in the region to stop a greater conflict from erupted.[34] These presidents redefined the limits of Gulf states' sovereignty through their words and applications of military power.[35]

Indeed, Clinton's repeated claims that Iran and Iraq resided outside the family of nations amounted to a threat to revoke these countries' rights to noninterference in their affairs. Adopting the "sovereignty as license" metaphor, Jeremy Moses writes that the "'international community'… holds enormous power over licensing conditions, which may be used to shape the rules of international society and particularly to decide which states are included in or excluded from the 'international community.'"[36] Because these countries refused to play by the "rules" of ethical sovereignty and respecting human rights, the United States, from this vantage, reluctantly assumed the position of regional police officer to keep the Gulf in order. And in claiming the authority of the international community to police "rogue states" in the Gulf, the United States came to occupy a position that made the permanent basing of U.S. troops in the region seem warranted and natural—at least to American policymakers, defense planners, foreign policy commentators, and voters.

In the end, it was this rhetorical shift in how Americans viewed the Gulf and understood the United States' role in the region that greased Bush's path to persuasion for the invasion of

Iraq. James Jasinski writes that political communities reconstitute their sense of space in ways that give rhetorical texts "the capacity to position their audiences in different ways, in some ways moving them 'closer' to an object or bringing the object into the 'presence' of the audience."[37] The utterances examined in this study reconstituted the Persian Gulf in presidential discourse, bringing the region "closer" to the U.S. sphere of control and conservatorship. This spatial reconstitution carried with it notions of responsibility and a "license" to intervene that have contributed to the deeper entrenchment of the United States in the Gulf ever since.

Conclusion: The Legacy of Persian Gulf Security Metaphors

I have aimed to show that one cannot fully appreciate the position of the Persian Gulf in American politics without an understanding of the metaphors that helped change public interpretations of this region on a mass scale. From deeply impressed images of instability to frightening phantasms of tyrants and terrorists, the symbolism that sprung from these presidential security metaphors did much to shape the public discourse and political imagination of the United States. Collectively, the constitutive force exerted by Twin Pillars, Strategic Consensus, the New World Order, and Dual Containment invited Americans to see the Gulf as a volatile, vulnerable region at risk of falling under the sway of violent forces, thus necessitating a progressively heavier U.S. military presence to maintain order. The Cold War provided the historical backdrop and inventional resources for presidential meaning making in the Gulf. U.S. presidents pivoted from protecting the Gulf from external threats of communism to policing the Gulf to thwart internal threats of terrorism that endangered the safety of the United States.

Michael Osborn writes that metaphors help translate complex material to aid audience understanding. Metaphors in such instances, he continues, reveal "the intimate connection"

between rhetorical depiction and "political power… power to control the fate of others, and power to align and realign future trajectories."[38] The cases examined in this study illustrate the power of presidential metaphors to perform precisely this kind of translative work. As in the New Testament Parable of the Sower, these metaphors spread like seeds across the expanse of American public discourse. Falling on receptive soil, they then blossomed into a vast harvest of images and symbols that prepared the way for polices of intervention.

This transformation of the Gulf in presidential discourse has left a large political legacy. On a policy level, U.S. presidents can point to diverse precedents from previous administrations to justify their course of action in the region. Those arguments and justifications, in turn, float upon a sea of images and metaphors accumulated over decades of political debate about the Persian Gulf and its significance to U.S. defense strategy. These tides of images and metaphors, collectively, form the symbolic currents that convey implicit notions of sovereignty and American responsibility for Gulf security, pulling Washington in the direction of intervention on the basis of international duty as well as strategic interest. While today the American role in the Gulf is rarely seriously challenged, it is only because the alliance networks, arms deals, naval installations, air bases, and defense agreements that comprise the United States' daily presence in the Gulf are normalized. The seeming taken-for-grantedness of this arrangement constitutes perhaps the most important legacy of the Gulf security metaphors examined in this study.

This study points to the importance of metaphoric logics in analyzing foreign policy discourse, press coverage, and decision-making. Even when the policies attached to the various Gulf security metaphors examined here fell out of favor, the logics animating those metaphors often still guided the interpretation of events in the region. In that sense, the metaphors examined in the previous chapters illustrate Kirt Wilson's dictum that "[t]here is no text without context

and no context without text."[39] Each was grounded in concrete moments of articulation yet also helped construct a rhetorical context that guided press coverage, presidential decision-making, and public understanding(s) of the Persian Gulf. This project has demonstrated that students of foreign policy should consider the imaginative force of metaphor in shaping the discursive contexts within which political actors deliberate over strategies, crises, allies, enemies, situations, and national interests. By the same token, scholars of presidential rhetoric should pay attention to the long-range constitutive force of presidential metaphors to shape Americans' interpretation(s) of complex political issues, especially in the realm of international affairs.

Today, the United States faces new challenges to its global position. From the chaotic withdraw from Afghanistan to the "rising threat" of China, American strategists are rebalancing to address the dangers they anticipate for the twenty-first century.[40] Yet even as these new chapters in the chronicles of U.S. foreign policy begin, the Gulf still features prominently in the designs of Pentagon defense planners. Whether serving as a base for "over-the-horizon" air strikes against radical Islamists or as an oil supplier for U.S. allies, the Persian Gulf factors greatly in the strategic calculations of American policymakers.[41] This study ultimately shows how presidential metaphors translated complex foreign policies to the American public that helped facilitate the rise of U.S. power in the Gulf.

Notes

[1] George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 2002, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-22.

[2] As Alex Miles writes, Bush's "axis of evil" metaphor "suggested a degree of collusion and co-operation between Iran, Iraq, and North Korea [as well as terrorist organizations] that did not exist." Alex Miles, *US Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 111.

[3] For inside accounts of black site operations, see: Philip Mudd, *Black Site: The CIA in the Post-9/11 World* (New York: Liveright, 2019); Glenn Carle, *The Interrogator: A CIA Agent's True Story* (Pontiac, MI: Scribe Press, 2011), Michael Rater, "From Guantánamo to Berlin: Protecting Human Rights after 9/11," in *The United States and Torture: Interrogation, Incarceration, and Abuse*, ed. Marjorie Cohn (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 203-214.

[4] As Robert L. Ivie and Oscar Giner write, after 9/11 "terrorism became not just democracy's mortal antagonist but also its evil counterpart." Robert L. Ivie, and Oscar Giner, "Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37.4 (2007): 583.

[5] Over 8,000 U.S. service members and contractors died in Iraq from 2001-2019; during the same time span, the United States spent over $2 trillion on the Iraq war and nearly 300,000 Iraqis died from the violence. Neta C. Crawford and Catherine Lutz, "Human Cost of Post – 9/11 Wars: Direct War Deaths in Major War Zones," November 13, 2019, Watson Institute of International & Public Affairs at Brown University: Costs of War, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2019/direct-war-death-toll-2001-801000; Paulina Cachero, "US taxpayers have reportedly paid an average of $8,000 each and over $2 trillion total for the Iraq war alone," February 6, 2020, *Business Insider*, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-taxpayers-spent-8000-each-2-trillion-iraq-war-study-2020-2; "Iraq Body Count," Iraq Body Count Project, https://www.iraqbodycount.org/.

[6] The language of détente was explicitly used by Khatami. Khatami to Clinton, "Iran-U.S." Folder, Box 2962, Ken Pollack – Near Eastern Asian Affairs, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, Arkansas. See also: Malcolm Byrne, "Secret U.S. Overture to Iran in 1999 Broke Down Over Terrorism Allegations," May 30, 2010, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB318/#*.

[7] Bush, *Decision Points*, 415-419; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Acts to Limit Influence of Iran in Iraq's Politics,' May 1, 2003, *New York Times*, A14; Steven R. Wiseman and Thom Shanker, "Iran is Helping Insurgents in Iraq, U.S. Officials Say," September 20, 2004, *New York Times*, A15; Scott Peterson, "Behind Diplomacy, Iran Sees a Fight Coming," March 31, 2005, *Christian Science Monitor*, 6; Peter Grier, "U.S. Aim in Poking Iran: Negotiation?" February 14, 2007, *Christian Science Monitor*, 1.

[8] For several overviews of the strategic challenges U.S.-Iranian hostility engenders for American foreign policy, see: John P. Walters, "American Security Twenty Years After 9/11," September 9, 2021, Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/research/17252-american-security-twenty-years-after-9-11; Omid Rashimi, "Iran's New Pivot to Central Asia," April 14, 2021, Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/irans-new-pivot-to-central-asia/; Kenneth Katzman, "U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy," May 8, 2020, Congressional Research Service, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R45795.pdf; Judith S. Yaphe, Farideh Farhi, Bahman Baktiari, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Nuclear Politics in Iran," September 1, 2010, National Defense University, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/middle-east/middleEastPerspectives-1.pdf; Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, Martin Indyk, Suzanne Maloney, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Bruce Riedel, "Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran," June 2009, Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_iran_strategy.pdf.

[9] On the U.S. presence within the Multinational Force enforcing the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement in the Sinai Peninsula, see: Lucas Y. Tomlinson, "5 American troops killed in helicopter crash off Egypt's Sinai Peninsula," November 12, 2020, Fox News, https://www.foxnews.com/world/american-troops-killed-helicopter-crash-egypt-sinai-peninsula; "Mission Begins," 2021, Multinational Force & Observers, https://mfo.org/mission-begins.

[10] Gerald Griffin, "A Gulf and Peninsula," *Baltimore Sun*, January 22, 1968, A8.

[11] Jackson Diehl, "Facing the 'Unholy Axis,'" *Washington Post*, February 24, 2003, A21.

[12] William E. Leuchtenberg, *The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 788.

[13] Brian J. Auten, *Carter's Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 23-24, 160-163, 272-273, 290-301.

[14] Robert L. Ivie, "Tragic Fear and the Rhetorical Presidency: Combating Evil in the Persian Gulf," in *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), 176.

[15] As Bush declared in his September 20 response to the 9/11 attacks, "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-united-states-response-the-terrorist-attacks.

[16] George W. Bush, "Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Dinner," February 26, 2003, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-american-enterprise-institute-dinner.

[17] Jerome Dean Mahaffey, *Preaching Politics: The Religious Rhetoric of George Whitefield and the Founding of a New Nation* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2007), 250. Carolyn R. Miller likewise reminds us of the power of imitation, writing that the "imitation of rhetorical action ensures that the new text will be taken up… with a particular illocutionary force." Carolyn R. Miller, "Genre in Ancient and Networked Media," in *Ancient Rhetorics and Digital Networks*, ed. Michele Kennerly and Damien Smith Pfister (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2018), 183.

[18] By examining how the images, symbols, and implied logics of metaphors contributed to U.S. foreign policy actions in the Gulf, this study has sought to respond to the call of Fischer and Gottweis to produce studies that integrate "practices of visual representation into argumentative policy analysis." Frank Fischer and Herbert Gottweis, "Introduction: The Argumentative Turn Revisited," in *The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice*, ed. Frank Fischer and Herbert Gottweis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 14.

[19] John R. MacArthur, *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the 1991 Gulf War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 4-5.

[20] As discussed in chapter 2, Carter lamented in his presidential diary that the press had drawn such attention to the hostage crisis. Accounts from Carter and his chief aides seemingly reaffirm their displeasure at the level of coverage received by the hostage crisis in the closing days of the 1980 election; as Carter put it, "in spite of our caution, the hostage question was dominating the news." Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1995), 573; Brigitte L. Nacos, *Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 4-5.

[21] The notion that the press was ahead of the George H.W. Bush administration in characterizing Hussein as a criminal threat is reinforced in the scholarly literature. For example, according to Philip Smith, the Bush administration was "dithering" in the days prior to the invasion of Kuwait, and the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad cabled Washington to request that other Bush officials help "ease off criticism" of Iraq in the press and in Congress. Philip Smith, *Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez* (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 2005), 105.

[22] Nicholas Laham notes that Reagan pursued an "aggressive" strategy to counteract negative coverage in the press and from pro-Israel groups in Washington, including instructional press packets being distributed to every cabinet member and the president himself conducting targeted interviews with outlets such as the *Jewish Times*. Nicholas Laham, *Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of America's Competing Interests in the Middle East* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 106-107, 144.

[23] William J. Clinton, "Interview With Shlomo Rax and Jacob Eilon of Israeli Television Channel 2," October 31, 1998, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-shlomo-raz-and-jacob-eilon-israeli-television-channel-2.

[24] Keith L. Shimko, "The Power of Metaphors and Metaphors of Power: The United States in the Cold War and After," in *Metaphorical World Politics*, ed. Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 199

[25] Italics in original. Robert M. Entman, "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11," *Political Communication* 20 (2003): 418-420.

[26] John Oddo, *Intertextuality and the 24-Hour News Cycle: A Day in the Rhetorical Life of Colin Powell's U.N. Address* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2014), 14.

[27] Michael Calvin McGee "In Search of 'The People': A Rhetorical Alternative," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 61.3 (1975): 243.

[28] Robert Elliot Mills, "The Pirate and the Sovereign: Negative Identification and the Constitutive Rhetoric of the Nation-State," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 17.1 (2014): 107-108.

[29] Luke Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 130.

[30] Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress," January 23, 1980, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-state-the-union-address-delivered-before-joint-session-the-congress.

[31] Theodore Roosevelt, "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904, American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fourth-annual-message-15.

[32] Madeline K. Albright, "Remarks to the American-Iranian Council," March 17, 2000, Department of State Archive, https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/2000/000317.html.

[33] Carol Winkler, "Parallels in Preemptive War Rhetoric: Reagan on Libya; Bush 43 on Iraq," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 10.2 (2007): 303-333; Shawn J. Parry-Giles, "Constituting Benevolent War and Imperial Peace: U.S. Nationalism and Idyllic Notions of Peace and War," in *Public Address and Moral Judgment*, ed. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2009), 184-185.

[34] Jack S. Levy, "Preventative War and the Bush Doctrine: Theoretical Logic and Historical Roots," in *Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism*, ed. Stanley A. Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (New York: Routledge, 2007), 188-190; Shawn J. Parry-Giles, "GEORGE W. BUSH, SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS (20 January 2005)," *Voices of Democracy* 3 (2008): 126.

[35] Case in point, during Clinton's time in the White House the U.S. Air Force conducted tens of thousands of sorties to enforce the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. Michael O'Hanlon, "Clinton's Strong Defense Legacy," *Foreign Affairs* 82.6 (2003): 130.

[36] Moses, *Sovereignty and Responsibility*, 45-46.

[37] To use Jasinski's framework, these metaphors functioned to reconstitute the Gulf as an "idiom of public life" organized around issues of national security and military intervention. James Jasinski, "A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward an Understanding of the Discursive (Re)constitution of the "Constitution" in *The Federalist Papers*," in *Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases,* ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 77.

[38] Text italicized in original. Michael Osborn, *Michael Osborn on Metaphor and Style* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2018), 208, 274.

[39] Kirt H. Wilson, "The Racial Contexts of Public Address: Interpreting Violence During the Reconstruction Era," in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address*, ed. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 213.

[40] Robert Burns and Matthew Lee, "US Defense Chief Slams China as Rising Threat to World Order," *Associated Press*, February 15, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/europe-asia-pacific-ap-top-news-china-united-states-07b8744fa239890c83222d2a4ee5c7d9.

[41] Jordan Cohen, "The War in Afghanistan Has Not Ended If 'Over the Horizon' Operations Continue," October 13, 2021, Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/blog/war-afghanistan-has-not-ended-over-horizon-operations-continue; Anand Toprani, "Oil and the Future of U.S. Strategy in the Persian Gulf," May 15, 2019, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/oil-and-the-future-of-u-s-strategy-in-the-persian-gulf/.

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