

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: THE ETHNO-RACIAL DIVIDE IN
NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME CHANGE: THE
ROLE OF CITY SEGREGATION AND
IMMIGRATION (2000-2013)

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Despite continuing crime declines in the early 2000s, the ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime remains a durable feature of American city life. During this period, cities also transformed in drastic ways, two of which were through decreasing levels of Black/White (B/W) residential segregation and increasing immigration. City levels of immigration may interact with the continuing deleterious influence of B/W segregation to shape how different neighborhoods fare in this continuing crime decline and explain the disparate levels of crime decline evidenced across ethno-racial neighborhoods. With panel data (2000-2013) from the National Neighborhood Crime Study, I use fixed effects linear regressions to examine how changing city-level immigration and B/W segregation work together to shape neighborhood crime change for ethno-racial neighborhoods. My findings suggest that when in cities with increasing segregation and immigration, durably Black neighborhoods have smaller associated crime declines compared to all other ethno-racial neighborhoods. Additionally, durably Black

neighborhoods only experience the crime reduction benefits of increasing immigration in cities when B/W residential segregation drastically declines.

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by

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandparents, whose lives I grew up hearing about and learning from. The belief that no one can take your education away from you and that your integrity is of utmost importance. Because of these stories and lessons, I became interested in the law, criminology, and inequality. Nanu, Nanaji, Dadima, and Dadaji, I wish you could be here today, but I hope you are looking down proudly.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

While the Great American Crime Decline (Zimring, 2007) sustained city-level reductions in crime through the beginning of the 20th Century, inequality in crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods remains a durable feature of American city life (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Lyons et al., 2022; Papachristos et al., 2018). Extant research has found that crime is highest in Black¹ neighborhoods and lowest in White neighborhoods, with Latino and other ethno-racial neighborhoods² in the middle (Krivo et al., 2009; Peterson & Krivo, 2010). This pattern remains despite continuing crime declines, with Black neighborhoods remaining at the highest ends of the crime distribution by 2013 (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2020; Lyons et al., 2022; Papachristos et al., 2018). Black neighborhoods also experienced the smallest declines compared to other ethno-racial neighborhoods.

Though ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime between neighborhoods is an enduring feature of city life, the magnitude of this divide may vary across cities. Cities set the stage for neighborhood-level processes that impact their ability to control crime (Logan & Molotch, 2010; Lyons et al., 2013; Vélez & Lyons, 2014). The demographic forces of Black/White (B/W) residential segregation³ and immigration are important parts of city life and may shape variation in neighborhood crime change and, more specifically, concentrate the benefits of

¹ Neighborhoods are defined by their majority racial/ethnic population (e.g., Black neighborhoods have predominantly Black residents).

² Minority and Integrated Neighborhoods

³ Segregation can occur on along a range of dimensions across economic, social, and political lines. For this study, I only focus on residential segregation.

crime declines in some neighborhoods over others based on ethno-racial composition. Given that neighborhood well-being is tied to the city it is in, and demographic changes impact the entire city (Wilson, 1997), it is essential to consider how changes across cities shape the variation in ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime change.

B/W residential segregation is the residential separation of Whites and Blacks within cities and has been identified as the lynchpin that ties the racial, social structure to inequalities in neighborhood conditions for Black and other minority neighborhoods compared to White neighborhoods (Peterson and Krivo, 2010). More specifically, it drives racial disparities by maintaining resources and opportunities in White but not Black (and other minority) neighborhoods. Although some research suggests that all neighborhoods in cities with high levels of B/W segregation have higher crime rates (Krivo et al., 2009), residential segregation is particularly detrimental for Black neighborhoods. Black neighborhoods face the harshest consequences of segregation in their social and economic conditions which manifest in high crime rates. In contrast, increasing immigration can be a beneficial force that helps drive down crime (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). City levels of immigration may interact with the continuing deleterious influence of B/W segregation to shape how different neighborhoods fare in this continuing crime decline and explain the disparate levels of crime decline evidenced across ethno-racial neighborhoods (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Lyons et al., 2022; Papachristos et al., 2018).

It remains unclear how changes in B/W segregation and immigration across cities impact neighborhood crime and whether city contexts help explain ethno-racial

inequality in neighborhood crime change. In the early 2000s, B/W racial residential segregation declined slightly (Krivo et al., 2020) while immigration increased across US cities (Steil & Vasi, 2014). This decrease in segregation and the continuing crime decline could potentially ameliorate the racial-spatial divide and reduce the disparity that puts Black neighborhoods at the highest end of the divide. Concomitantly, increasing immigration across cities over this period may also affect the distribution of neighborhood crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods. Both city-level B/W residential segregation and immigration set up cascading conditions through differential investments, housing discrimination, and political action that produce varying neighborhood conditions and have consequences for how crime changes across neighborhoods (Lyons et al., 2022; Ousey & Kubrin, 2018; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson, 2012; Sampson et al., 2018; Sampson & Wilson, 1995).

On the one hand, immigration may soften the detrimental impacts of B/W segregation to help reduce the ethno-racial divide in crime (Park & Iceland, 2011; White & Glick, 1999). A softening of the divide may occur through immigrant revitalization that creates better neighborhood conditions through a more equal distribution of resources and, thus, decreased ethno-racial inequality in crime with more considerable reductions in crime in non-White neighborhoods (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Ramey, 2013). Contrastingly, as rising immigration increases the presence of other racial/ethnic groups (i.e., Latino and Asian immigrants), this could magnify the negative consequences of B/W segregation, widening crime gaps, further disadvantaging Black neighborhoods (who are already the most marginalized), isolating them from resources and manifesting in smaller crime declines compared to

other neighborhoods (Krysan & Crowder, 2017). Latino neighborhoods may remain protected from these negative consequences of B/W segregation on disadvantage through the Latino paradox, where increased disadvantage does not lead to higher crime rates (Sampson, 2008; Sandoval-Strausz, 2019). This argument suggests that these forces could differentiate Latino neighborhoods from White and Black neighborhoods. B/W segregation and immigration may interact in these various ways to perpetuate ethno-racial inequality by developing a Black/non-Black, White/non-White, or tri-racial divide in neighborhood crime change.

To examine the impact of city changes in B/W segregation and immigration on ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime change, I use two waves of the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS2-P). I explore how changing city levels of immigration and B/W residential segregation shape the ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime change from 2000 to 2013 for both violent and property crime. I specifically focus on how the interaction between city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration explain the differences in crime change for ethno-racial neighborhoods. To examine this relationship, I use a sample of 7,875 census tracts located in 75 urban cities in the US. I classify neighborhoods by the durability and change in their ethno-racial composition, resulting in 10 distinct ethno-racial neighborhood types: durably White, changed from White, durably Black, changed from Black, durably Latino, changed from Latino, durably Minority, changed from Minority, durably Integrated, and changed from Integrated. I examine the relationship between changing city B/W segregation and immigration on neighborhood crime change comparing the relationship across the ethno-racial neighborhood types.

I seek to contribute to explorations of ethno-racial inequality in crime change by considering that while traditionally, scholars conceptualize race and immigration independently, they are both elements of the racial, social structure and are likely working together to shape varied patterns of crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods. Specifically, understandings of race focus on the racial, social structure in creating and maintaining the color line that divides Black and White Americans (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; Peterson and Krivo, 2010). Concurrently, examinations of immigration and crime focus on whether increased immigration increases crime in the US. Though primarily protective for most communities, immigration may work similarly to B/W segregation to concentrate advantages in specific ethno-racial neighborhoods over others (i.e., benefits in White, Latino, and multi-ethnic neighborhoods over Black neighborhoods specifically). I will work to conceptualize and examine how immigration interacts with the racial, social structure manifested through B/W residential segregation. Not considering the interplay of immigration and B/W segregation directly into explorations of ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime change means that research continues to ignore that race and immigration may interact in ways that have likely consequences for the color line that permeates society and manifests in durably higher levels of crime in Black neighborhoods.

I conceptualize how changing city levels of immigration and B/W residential segregation operate together to influence the color line represented by ethno-racial disparities in neighborhood crime change. First, I discuss how continuing US city crime declines cascade across ethno-racial neighborhoods and then consider how

changes in B/W segregation and immigration shape the divide in crime change between neighborhoods. For example, as previously established, Black neighborhoods began the 21st century with the highest crime levels (Peterson & Krivo, 2010). By comparing the levels of crime change between ethno-racial neighborhoods, I might find that durably Black neighborhoods had a larger crime drop than White or other ethno-racial neighborhoods (Sharkey, 2018). Then, I will be able to directly examine whether changes in city B/W segregation and immigration impact the levels of the crime decline in durably Black neighborhoods. Understanding how city changes in B/W segregation and immigration manifest in the ongoing disparity between ethno-racial neighborhoods will give us insight into how the color line for neighborhood crime may be upheld. With these findings, I can speak to the generalizability of the decline and how changing B/W segregation and immigration in cities is changing the ethno-racial divide between neighborhood crime rates over time.

Understanding these patterns is also particularly important because ethno-racial inequality in crime change may exacerbate other inequalities witnessed by communities and individuals (Sharkey, 2018). Increased crime levels are related to other adverse neighborhood conditions, such as increased poverty and worse housing conditions (Sharkey, 2018). These consequences are also important for individual health and well-being (Sharkey, 2018). Recognizing that continuing disparities in crime and crime change may perpetuate other harmful conditions for both neighborhoods and individuals, I consider the broader implications of this analysis in

understanding how crime may cycle into additional social costs in minority neighborhoods.

In the following chapters of this dissertation, I begin with a literature review in chapter 2 to set up my hypotheses about the consequences of city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration on the ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime change. I set the stage for my explorations by paying particular attention to the variation in crime declines across ethno-racial neighborhoods and how city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration may shape the color line for neighborhood crime change. In chapter 3, I explain the NNCS2-P dataset, my measures, and my analytic strategy. Finally, in chapter 4, I begin with a descriptive look at the variation in ethno-racial neighborhood crime change and city levels of B/W residential segregation and immigration in the data. I then conduct a set of fixed effect linear regressions to examine the relationship between changing B/W residential segregation and immigration on neighborhood crime change for the different ethno-racial neighborhoods. My findings suggest that changing city levels of B/W segregation and immigration create a Black/non-Black divide in neighborhood crime change. Specifically, all other ethno-racial neighborhoods have larger associated violent crime declines compared to durably Black neighborhoods when in cities with increasing B/W segregation and immigration. I discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the continuing ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime rates sustained by racially variant patterns of crime change and suggest areas for future work.

Chapter 2: The Varied Impacts of City Changes in B/W Segregation and Immigration on the Ethno-Racial Divide in Neighborhood Crime Change

The Crime Drop

In the mid-1990's crime rates plummeted across the United States in what became known as the Great American Crime Decline (Zimring, 2007). The crime decline was unexpected, large, and widespread demographically and geographically (Baumer et al., 2012). It was present across multiple crime types and is highlighted by a 38% decrease in all crimes, a 43% decrease in homicide, and a 37% decrease in property crimes from 1990 to 1999. The decline continued for more than 16 years (Barker, 2010). While the decline was evident across the nation, some areas notably experienced larger declines than others, along with more variation in the decrease for smaller geographic units, such as cities and neighborhoods (Barker, 2010; Baumer et al., 2018).

Looking closely at the sub-national level, there is more variation in crime declines across US cities, and the extent to which cities experienced the same trends as the nation depends on the studied period (Baumer et al., 2018). While some studies find that trends across US cities follow national trends closely (McDowall & Loftin, 2009), others find that there may be more heterogeneity in crime trends across cities (Baumer & Wolff, 2014). Specifically, McDowall and Loftin (2009) find that trends across cities from 1960 to 2004 closely follow the national trends, leading them to conclude that crime changes across smaller units mirror the larger trends. Contrastingly, McCall et al. (2010) show that not all cities experienced the same trends in homicide as the nation between 1976 and 2005. These differences varied in

magnitude and timing compared to national trends (Baumer et al., 2018). Baumer and Wolff (2014) find that in the 1990s, there was more uniformity in these declines but more variation in crime trends across cities in the 2000s (2000-2010) (Baumer et al., 2018).

The extent of the crime decline becomes more complicated as we consider the patterns at the neighborhood level. The patterns across census tracts (i.e., neighborhoods) and smaller geographic units are more complex, as crime tends to be more spatially concentrated in these units, and some smaller places experience little to no crime and thus are not likely to have much change (Curman et al., 2015; Weisburd et al., 2004; Wheeler et al., 2016). While a large set of literature focuses on the national crime decline, a relatively smaller portion examines how the fall plays out across neighborhoods.

Despite the sizeable national reduction in crime, the studies at the neighborhood level find that most neighborhoods have crime rates that remain relatively stable at low levels. However, most of these studies only examine single cities in their analysis and do not offer insight into how neighborhood crime changes across cities. For example, Weisburd et al. (2004) found that 84% of Seattle street segments had persistently low crime levels between 1984 and 2004. They found that 14% of the segments experienced declines that mirrored the city. Similarly, trends in Albany suggest the same results (Griffiths & Chavez, 2004; Wheeler et al., 2016). Although most neighborhoods experienced stability, a small percentage of neighborhoods did experience crime changes that reflected the national trends. For example, Griffiths and Chavez (2004) find that non-gun-related homicides declined

by almost 48% in Chicago tracts between 1980 and 1995, with 40% of tracts experiencing the same trends as the city (Stults, 2010). Studies examining changing crime rates after 1990 find only a few areas with increasing crime (Weisburd et al., 2004) or no places with increasing crime levels (Curman et al., 2015; Krivo et al., 2018; Wheeler et al., 2016). Research within specific cities suggests that at least some census tracts show patterns that parallel larger city-wide trends. These findings suggest variation within cities across neighborhoods, highlighting that some places experience crime trends as the city and others do not. The differential distribution in the crime drop may be driven by city conditions that set the stage for variation in neighborhood crime declines (Krivo et al., 2009; Lyons et al., 2013; Velez et al., 2015).

Correlates of the Crime Drop

When explaining the forces that drove the crime decline, researchers have largely focused on national analyses, with limited work on neighborhoods or on multi-level explanations of crime declines. I consider the range of these explanations briefly before discussing the more limited literature on neighborhood crime change. Of the national correlates of the crime decline, researchers have argued for a range of possible explanations, including better policing, increased incarceration, legalization of abortion, demographic shifts such as decreasing sizes of younger cohorts, better economic conditions, increases in immigration, and urban development (Barker, 2010; Baumer, 2008; Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 2008; Levitt, 2004; Zimring, 2007). In addition, arguments focused on urban ecology and, thus, changing social cohesion, and social control levels are also prevalent in explaining these declining crime rates

(Bursik, 1988; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). These arguments include better housing conditions, increased collective efficacy, changing youth culture, and immigration (Sampson, 2008). The focus on the changing contexts of urban environments in shaping the crime decline implies that important changes across cities likely affect the rates of crime change throughout the city.

Though they are more limited, studies of neighborhood crime change highlight that neighborhood crime patterns may be related to a few crucial factors. These include changing levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, housing stability, increasing percentages of immigrants, decreasing populations, and increasing minority populations (Krivo et al., 2018; Stults, 2010). These changes in structural factors that underlie inequality in neighborhood crime can then lead to varying patterns of crime change across neighborhoods. Inequality in neighborhood crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods may change as urban contexts evolve and drive patterns of crime change.

Despite declines, crime continues to be concentrated in a few neighborhoods within a city—those that are more economically disadvantaged and minority communities (Papachristos et al., 2018; Peterson & Krivo, 2010). A critical factor in shaping this durability in crime within these neighborhoods is a concurrence of multiple forms of disadvantage. Neighborhood disadvantage has many dimensions, including poverty, lack of family structure, high unemployment, and high crime rates. These elements of disadvantage tend to be maintained in urban neighborhoods concentrating violence and other deleterious conditions (Sampson, 2012). In addition, drastically different levels of disadvantage across ethno-racial neighborhoods are tied

to the ethno-racial patterning of neighborhood crime and, thus, change in ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime over time.

In the first decade of the 2000s, many changes occurred that might shape the way the crime decline manifested across neighborhoods. Specifically, there was significant socioeconomic upheaval at this time with the Great Recession. This led to increased poverty across all neighborhoods (Jargowsky, 2014), increased unemployment, and racialized consequences for minority neighborhoods that began the century with higher levels of disadvantage (Owens & Sampson, 2013). Socioeconomic disadvantage remains an important predictor in explaining neighborhood crime rates and crime change. The attenuated consequences of the Great Recession, which had varied impacts on ethno-racial neighborhoods, also set the stage for racially inequitable patterns of crime change.

Crime Decline and Racial Inequality

I discuss the extant literature focused on understanding the ethno-racial variation in neighborhood crime declines to explore how city contexts may shape these patterns. The extant research clearly establishes that neighborhood crime rates vary extensively by ethno-racial composition (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; DuBois et al., 1996; Shaw & McKay, 1942). However, relatively less work has examined whether the spatial distribution of the US crime decline has manifested equally across all neighborhoods. In their book *Divergent Social Worlds*, Peterson and Krivo (2010) highlight the large disparities in neighborhood crime rates between ethno-racial neighborhoods in 2000, six years into the crime decline. Their analysis using data from 8,931 neighborhoods in 87 cities, elucidates that Black neighborhoods have five

times the amount of violent crime as White neighborhoods, with neighborhoods of other ethno-racial compositions in the middle of this distribution (i.e., multiethnic neighborhoods, Latino neighborhoods, etc.). However, this divide in neighborhood crime has not only proved evident at the beginning of the 21st century, but it appears to be durable and reproduced over time despite the continuing crime decline (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018, 2020; Light & Ulmer, 2016; Lyons et al., 2022; Papachristos et al., 2018).

How crime declines manifest spatially across ethno-racial neighborhoods is an important element of continuing neighborhood inequality in crime (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Peterson & Krivo, 2010). To understand the variation across neighborhoods in levels of crime decline, it is important to consider which neighborhoods benefitted from the drop and whether these changes mitigated inequality in neighborhood crime. Suppose it holds that declines were concentrated in previously privileged neighborhoods (i.e., White, low disadvantage, low initial crime rates). Then the “Great American Crime Decline” (Zimring, 2007) may have only exacerbated inequality between ethno-racial neighborhoods. However, suppose crime declines were concentrated in neighborhoods with high initial crime levels, which thus had the furthest to fall (i.e., Black neighborhoods, high disadvantage, high initial crime levels). In that case, the crime decline may have weakened longstanding inequalities between ethno-racial neighborhoods. The extant literature remains divided on which neighborhoods declined the most. However, they do reach a consensus that no matter which neighborhoods declined the most, inequality between

ethno-racial neighborhoods in crime remains well into the first decade of the 21st century.

The disparate findings in this literature may be due to the periods and cities examined (Baumer et al., 2018). Baumer et al. (2018) acknowledge that since the early 2000s, there has been more heterogeneity in crime trends across geospatial units in the US. Especially at smaller geographic levels, the story is more complex because the findings about the patterns of crime change largely depend on the rates within a single city or over different periods. Additionally, since neighborhoods are small units, their crime levels are more likely to be stable. However, recent work using crime data from 1990 through the early 2000s challenges this idea and reinforces that these spatial units also experienced widespread declines.

Focusing on Chicago, Papachristos et al. (2018) examine both relative and absolute changes in crime to understand (1) the magnitude of the change in crime and (2) how the rate of improvement compares across neighborhoods. They examine trends from 1990 to 2009 and find that all neighborhoods within the city experienced declining crime rates. Specifically, homicide rates in the most violent neighborhoods declined by 33%, resulting in a smaller gap between these neighborhoods and the rest of the city. However, the safest neighborhoods in 1990 were the ones that declined the most and had the largest rates of crime declines. More specifically, they find that in 2009, violent crime remained concentrated in the most disadvantaged, minority communities with the highest initial crime levels. They also found that inequality between the lowest and highest crime neighborhoods increased by 10% because of lower rates of improvement for the highest crime neighborhoods. While they do not

examine different racial neighborhoods directly, their findings have implications for understanding ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime change. Considering that Black neighborhoods are likely to have the highest levels of crime and White neighborhoods the lowest (Peterson & Krivo, 2010), their findings suggest a widening gap between Black and White neighborhoods. Of note, this analysis is focused solely on Chicago, which remains a hypersegregated city with higher crime rates than much of the country (Massey & Tannen, 2015), so it may be likely that these trends may be specific to this city context.

Exploring these patterns across a more extensive range of cities over a similar period, Friedson and Sharkey (2015) use data from six cities (Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Philadelphia, St. Petersburg, and Seattle) from 1990 to 2010. Their findings suggest that crime declines were larger in neighborhoods with initially higher crime and disadvantage. On average, Black and Hispanic neighborhoods had larger reductions than White neighborhoods. Additionally, the gap in violence between White and non-White neighborhoods in 2010 was smaller than in the previous 10 to 20 years in these cities. Despite these large declines and changes, crime remained concentrated in the neighborhoods with the highest initial crime levels, the most disadvantaged and minority (Black and Hispanic) neighborhoods. The declines in violent crime across these neighborhoods did ameliorate some ethno-racial disparity in neighborhood crime. Still, the spatial distribution of crime between these neighborhoods remains a stable component of city life. This highlights that the relative distribution of violent crime remained similar across neighborhoods despite larger declines in the neighborhoods with initially higher crime.

However, the level of stability in ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime remains disputed, as Krivo and colleagues (2018) find that the divide in neighborhood crime for the most marginalized communities increased between 1999 and 2013. Examining 2700 neighborhoods across 18 cities from the NNCS, their findings support Friedson and Sharkey (2015) that most neighborhoods experienced declining violent and property crime rates. However, some neighborhoods experienced increasing crime rates—a pattern unique to primarily Black neighborhoods. Although most Black neighborhoods followed the same patterns as the rest of the neighborhoods with declining crime rates, a proportion of them increased or maintained stable crime levels. Comparatively, Latino and racially integrated neighborhoods experienced declines like White neighborhoods that may be attributed to increased immigration. Their results suggest that Black neighborhoods remain the most marginalized despite also experiencing crime declines. Over time, other minority neighborhoods will resemble White neighborhoods in their crime levels, leaving Black neighborhoods further alienated with the highest crime rates. These findings suggest that the distribution of neighborhood crime will change with Black neighborhoods alienated from the rest of the ethno-racial neighborhoods.

In support of this argument of increasing ethno-racial inequality between neighborhoods, Krivo et al. (2020) examine the distribution of crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods (8,557 neighborhoods in 71 cities) from 2010-2013. On average, violent crime was lower for all neighborhoods in 2010. They find that the distribution of crime by neighborhood types remains unchanged from that highlighted by Peterson and Krivo (2010). White neighborhoods maintained the lowest crime

levels, multi-ethnic neighborhoods at 2.08 times, Latino at 2.61, Minority at 3.7, and Black at 5.24 times the rate of violence for White neighborhoods. Additionally, they examine both the levels of crime decline and the percentage of the drop. Black neighborhoods had the largest absolute decreases in crime, reinforcing the argument that they would have the largest declines because they had the most potential to fall, given initially high rates (Sharkey, 2018; Friedson & Sharkey, 2015). However, the relative measures of percent change account for how crime changed relative to where it started, telling a different story. White and minority neighborhoods had a 30% decline, Latino and multiethnic neighborhoods had a 40% decline, and Black only 15%. While absolute drops are important because the number of homicides decreased, the relative measures highlight the disparate extent of declines across these cities, suggesting that gaps between White and Black neighborhoods were large. Specifically, in 2000 violent crime rates were 5% higher in Black compared to White neighborhoods, but by 2010 this difference increased to 6%. This is an increase in inequality, although crime continued to decrease, and all neighborhoods experienced the protective benefits of the crime decline. Important to note as well is that same as in 2000, in 2010, 90% of Black neighborhoods had more violent crime than White neighborhoods (Krivo et al., 2020).

Like violent crime, the property crime gap between Black and other neighborhoods increased. While all neighborhoods experienced declining property crime, rates in Black neighborhoods only fell 21% compared to other ethno-racial neighborhoods, which experienced declines between 30-40%. Krivo and colleagues (2020) highlight that the national crime decline also extended to neighborhoods, but

this does not mean that all neighborhoods benefitted equally or that the fall reduced inequality. These findings suggest the durability and the replication of the divide in crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods, with Black and White neighborhoods at the highest and lowest ends of the distribution.

As established by these studies (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018, 2020; Papachristos et al., 2018), crime declines occurred for all ethno-racial neighborhoods independent of the number of cities examined or the period studied. Despite crime declines, the ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime is replicated over time, with Black neighborhoods maintaining the highest crime rates and White neighborhoods the lowest. However, what remains contested is which neighborhoods declined the most: (1) the most privileged neighborhoods (Papachristos et al., 2018) or (2) the most disadvantaged and minority neighborhoods (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018, 2020). Additionally, whether these declining crime rates manifest in reductions in inequality between ethno-racial neighborhoods is still unclear. It could be that Black neighborhoods experience the largest declines but remain with the highest crime along crime distribution. Potentially, the relative distribution of crime remains unchanged (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015), or Black neighborhoods become further marginalized as patterns shift, reducing crime rates across other minority neighborhoods (i.e., Latino, multiethnic) that reduce their crime levels to those of White neighborhoods (Krivo et al., 2018, 2020; Papachristos et al., 2018). This potential variation in crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods is an important source of heterogeneity in the neighborhood crime decline. I explore

whether differential impacts of city changes in B/W segregation and immigration for ethno-racial neighborhoods may explain this variation.

Sources of Neighborhood Crime Change

While the literature examining neighborhood crime change focuses on how crime declines manifest differently across neighborhoods, it does not fully explore the reason for these disparate patterns across ethno-racial neighborhoods. Lyons and colleagues (2022) put forth a dynamic racial structure perspective to explain how the evolving US racial structure shapes inequality in neighborhood crime change over time. They argue that work needs to be more comprehensive in understanding how changing structural conditions across neighborhoods reinforce or challenge the ethno-racial divide in crime. They contend that evolving segregation creates varied structural conditions across neighborhoods that explain the disparate levels of crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods. Specifically, changes in segregation manifest in ethno-racial neighborhoods that either remain segregated or diversify over time through the development of multi-ethnic neighborhoods. These experiences with residential segregation and diversification create varied neighborhood socioeconomic conditions and access to resources for different ethno-racial neighborhoods. This ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood conditions then creates racially variant patterns of crime change that are evidenced across neighborhoods.

Lyons and colleagues (2022) test their theory using the NNCS2-P to examine changes in homicide and burglary for 7,875 census tracts across 75 cities from 2000 to 2013. First, they conceptualize neighborhood change in racial/ethnic composition by durability and change in their populations. Then they predict neighborhood crime

change across these ethno-racial neighborhoods. Compared to durably White neighborhoods, all ethno-racial neighborhoods had significantly smaller declines, on average, for violent and property crime. However, the gap was largest for durably Black neighborhoods. Additionally, Latino and multi-ethnic neighborhoods fare better than Black neighborhoods with their declines. They have reduced gaps with White neighborhoods, suggesting the development of a Black/non-Black divide (J. Lee & Bean, 2010).

Given their argument that evolving segregation and diversification across neighborhoods sets into motion varying patterns of neighborhood structural conditions that set the stage for inequitable patterns of crime change, they examine how changing socioeconomic conditions explain the gaps between ethno-racial neighborhoods. They specifically examine neighborhood changes in disadvantage, housing conditions (e.g., home loans, foreclosure rates, and % renters), and demographics (e.g., % males, population). Overall, they find that these changing structural characteristics partially explain the gaps in crime change between durably Black and durably White neighborhoods. However, this pattern diverges for durably Latino neighborhoods, which had large declines in crime despite high levels of disadvantage. Their findings suggest that Latino neighborhoods are moving closer to White neighborhoods, leaving Black neighborhoods marginalized and likely separated from the rest of the ethno-racial neighborhoods, suggestive of a Black/non-Black divide.

While Lyons and colleagues (2022) propose that neighborhood experiences with segregation and diversification in their populations influence patterns of

neighborhood crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods, they do not fully consider how changing city conditions directly shape the continuing ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime. As highlighted by the work examining crime declines across neighborhoods, there is important variation in crime declines across ethno-racial neighborhoods that are possibly driven by social changes occurring across cities that may explain this variation (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018, 2020; Papachristos et al., 2018). Large differences across cities in crime levels, experiences with changing socioeconomic conditions, and demographic conditions may suggest that patterns from one city cannot be generalized to others (Hyra & Rugh, 2016; Krivo et al., 2018). It is this difference that remains unexplained. I propose that city contexts are understudied and underexplored and may explain the variation between ethno-racial neighborhoods in crime declines.

The Role of City Contexts

Building on the conceptualizations of Lyons and colleagues (2022) and the traditional ecological perspective of crime that focus on explaining differential crime rates across neighborhoods, I consider the role of city conditions in explaining varied patterns of crime change and continuing ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime. Traditional understandings of social disorganization consider the community structures that lead to drastically different conditions and result in higher crime rates in Black and Latino neighborhoods compared to White neighborhoods (Sampson & Wilson, 1995; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Structural and institutional discrimination patterns concentrate disadvantages (e.g., unemployment, poverty) in minority communities that create social isolation and reduce collective efficacy, increasing

crime in Black and Latino neighborhoods (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson, 2012; Wilson, 1997). While social disorganization and ecological perspectives on crime primarily focus on neighborhood conditions, this ignores the broader political and structural forces across cities that shape neighborhood experiences with crime (Sampson & Wilson, 1995). It is vital to consider crime and crime change within the larger social context across multiple cities to understand the conditions that underlie neighborhood crime change (Krivo et al., 2018; Lyons et al., 2022).

Peterson and Krivo (2010) and Lyons and colleagues (2022) argue that the racial, social structure creates structurally varied conditions across ethno-racial neighborhoods that are reinforced through evolving social, economic, and political actions. This explanation directly implies a hierarchical structure that ties the community's fate to the macro-structural context in which it exists to shape neighborhood outcomes and racial differences in community contexts. Sampson and Wilson (1995) directly articulate this by stating that macro-structural forces (e.g., segregation, immigration, migration, housing policies, and economic change) interact with factors at the neighborhood level (e.g., disadvantage, poverty) to impact the social organization of communities. Racial segregation, economic transformation (including increased unemployment), immigration, and housing discrimination across US cities combine to concentrate disadvantages in inner-city neighborhoods, particularly Black neighborhoods.

Directly understanding the embedded structure of neighborhoods within cities is essential when considering divergent crime trajectories between ethno-racial neighborhoods through the continuing crime decline (Krivo et al., 2018). Though the

limited availability of longitudinal and multilevel data has stymied this empirical work (Krivo et al., 2018), substantial variation across cities can shape neighborhood patterns of crime change. Moreover, while the literature on the crime decline and its causes has focused on changing economic conditions, policing, incarceration, and population changes (e.g., abortion), considerations of structural and cultural differences across city life are not fully integrated into this narrative (Baumer et al., 2018).

Cities may have many social, economic, and political differences that can shape a neighborhood's vulnerability to crime (Lyons et al., 2013; Ramey, 2013; Vélez et al., 2015; Vélez & Lyons, 2014). The extant literature considers how changing city-level political opportunities (Lyons et al., 2013; Vélez et al., 2015) and immigrant reception contexts (Ramey, 2013) shape the neighborhood-crime relationship. These findings reveal that city conditions related to immigration and political opportunities shape neighborhood crime patterns and have implications for divergent pathways of neighborhood crime change. However, this work has yet to consider how changing city contexts shape divergent patterns of crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods. The result is a knowledge base lacking a thorough understanding of structural forces at the city level that work to either exacerbate or mitigate ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime change (Lyons et al., 2022).

The early 2000s are critical in understanding how city-level changes shape ethno-racial neighborhood differentials in crime change. Over this time, the demographic landscape of US cities is changing extensively and concurrently with the continuing crime decline (Krivo et al., 2018; MacDonald & Sampson, 2012).

Since the turn of the century, cities have undergone large demographic changes in their racial/ethnic makeup because of the concomitant forces of B/W residential segregation and immigration in ways that could either increase or decrease neighborhood crime (Barker, 2010). However, we rarely explore how they work together to shape disparate patterns of neighborhood crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods.

Overall, cities have experienced increasing levels of immigration through both internal migration of foreign-born populations and new immigrants into the US (Ramey, 2013). Cities have also experienced slow decreases in B/W residential segregation (Rugh & Massey, 2014). Increased levels of immigration are associated with lower crime rates across US cities, and cities with large immigrant populations experienced some of the steepest crime declines in the 1990s (Sampson, 2008). These protective benefits of immigration continued into the early 2000s with empirical evidence that immigration is associated with decreasing crime (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). Concurrently, the decreasing rates of B/W residential segregation may also be associated with reduced gaps in criminogenic community conditions between neighborhoods, specifically Black and non-Black neighborhoods (Krivo et al., 2020). I hypothesize that continuing ethno-racial disparity in neighborhood crime change is associated with the changing city contexts of B/W residential segregation and immigration. I propose that these forces work together to shape differences in crime declines across ethno-racial neighborhoods.

B/W Residential Segregation

In *Divergent Social Worlds*, Peterson and Krivo (2010) argue that racial residential segregation is the linchpin that ties the racial, social structure to inequalities in violent and property crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods. Bonilla-Silva (2001, 2004) discusses this racial structure as a system where society's political, social, economic, and ideological aspects are organized along racial lines resulting in one racial group maintaining dominance in the hierarchy and benefitting the most from the social structure while others are continuously disadvantaged. Those with structural advantages work to ensure their continued benefits by preserving the status quo (Peterson & Krivo, 2010). The theoretical propositions that highlight the role of racial residential segregation in reproducing unequal neighborhood conditions across groups of color imply a multi-level structure where city segregation leads to an unequal distribution of resources that concentrate disadvantages in Black/minority neighborhoods over White ones (Krivo et al., 2009).

More directly, the racial, social structure is manifested through residential segregation that fosters unequal living conditions that propagate social and institutional inequalities which concentrate privileges in White compared to all other ethno-racial neighborhoods and lead to the highest levels of disadvantage in Black neighborhoods. These structurally inequitable neighborhoods then maintain varying levels of concentrated disadvantage that impact a neighborhood's ability to engage in informal social control to maintain collective efficacy, leading to increased crime (Sampson & Wilson, 1995). It is these highly different ecological contexts between Black and White neighborhoods that shape the disparity in neighborhood crime

through increased social isolation and concentration of disadvantage that creates varying structural barriers that undermine the social organization and lead to higher levels of crime (Massey & Denton, 1993; Sampson & Wilson, 1995; Wilson, 1987).

The extant literature has established that sustained differences in crime rates between Black and White neighborhoods are due to a divergence in ecological contexts created by high levels of B/W residential segregation (Lyons et al., 2022; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Continued B/W segregation sets into motion disparate pathways of neighborhood change through changing levels of concentrated disadvantage associated with unequal changing crime rates that result in continued disparities in neighborhood crime for different ethno-racial neighborhoods (Lyons et al., 2022). While analyses focused on neighborhoods have explored divergent rates of crime declines across ethno-racial neighborhoods in the early 2000s (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018, 2020; Lyons et al., 2022; Papachristos et al., 2018), Lyons and colleagues (2022) explored directly how continuing socioeconomic marginalization creates this ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime change. Focused on characteristics of neighborhood change, these existing models do not fully explain the variation in crime declines across ethno-racial neighborhoods.

Work by Light and Thomas (2019) and Krivo and colleagues (2009) examine directly how B/W residential segregation impacts crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods. Light and Thomas (2019) suggest that the impacts of B/W segregation may vary by ethno-racial group. They disaggregate these findings by examining changes in non-Hispanic White and non-Hispanic Black rates of violence across 103 MSAs from 1970 to 2010. They hypothesize that increased metro-level

B/W segregation will be related to higher levels of non-Hispanic Black homicide but lower levels of non-Hispanic White homicide. They argue that as B/W segregation increases, Whites will isolate themselves from Blacks and urban violence by moving to less dangerous suburbs. Their results support this hypothesis and find that increased B/W residential segregation is associated with increased non-Hispanic Black but decreased non-Hispanic White homicide rates. Light and Thomas (2019) conclude that their findings suggest that decreases in segregation are related to declining gaps in Black/White rates of violent crime. However, given their focus on the MSA, they likely find these declining gaps through increased White movement into suburbs over time. They do not examine whether these gaps change within the central city or consider that increased levels of segregation may negatively impact all neighborhoods within the city (Krivo et al., 2009).

Examining the multi-level context of B/W segregation on neighborhood crime rates, Krivo et al. (2009) argue that increased B/W residential segregation in cities inhibits the ability of communities to collectively organize and work together to solve common problems such as crime. Specifically, B/W segregation limits partnerships across racial groups within a city that could be beneficial in reducing crime problems throughout the city, increasing conditions conducive to higher crime rates throughout all neighborhoods. Using the NNCS and examining 7,622 neighborhoods across 79 cities, they find that even when controlling for neighborhood disadvantage, citywide B/W residential segregation increases neighborhood violence for neighborhoods of all ethno-racial compositions (White, Black, Latino, Integrated) and does not operate in different ways for different racial groups. However, Whites remain privileged by

residing in cities with lower levels of B/W residential segregation and thus reduced exposure to its adverse impacts on crime.

The literature on B/W residential segregation is inconclusive on the impacts of changing levels of B/W residential segregation on crime rates across ethno-racial neighborhoods. The analysis by Krivo and colleagues (2009) suggests that high levels of city B/W residential segregation increase crime for all ethno-racial neighborhoods but does not explore this relationship longitudinally. If racial segregation negatively impacts all ethno-racial neighborhoods but is still related to higher crime in Black neighborhoods, then decreases in segregation would suggest reducing gaps in crime between Blacks and Whites. However, there is limited research examining the relationship between residential segregation and ethno-racial neighborhood crime change. The analyses focused on race-specific crime change across cities or MSAs suggest that declining B/W segregation may reduce crime in Black neighborhoods but not White neighborhoods (Light & Thomas, 2019; Light & Ulmer, 2016). However, this literature largely ignores the consequences of B/W segregation on crime change in Latino or multi-ethnic neighborhoods.

Knowing that racial residential segregation manifests in disparately higher crime rates in Black and minority neighborhoods compared to White neighborhoods (Lyons et al., 2022; Peterson & Krivo, 2010), this literature does not fully consider the impact of changing city levels of B/W residential segregation on changing crime rates across ethno-racial neighborhoods by including comparisons between Black, White, Latino, and multi-ethnic neighborhoods. Additionally, this literature does little to consider the changing ethno-racial heterogeneity in the US through declining B/W

segregation and increased immigration that may explain ethno-racially variant pathways of neighborhood crime change.

Immigration

Research suggests that immigration revitalizes neighborhoods by decreasing disadvantage through increasing informal social control and stimulating economic growth (Light & Ulmer, 2016; Adelman et al., 2019; Feldmeyer et al., 2019; M. T. Lee & Martinez Jr., 2009; M. T. Lee & Martinez, 2002; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009). Immigration also increases family and community ties through the increased prevalence of two-parent households. This results in stronger family structures and strengthened community institutions such as churches and schools (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009, 2018; Wadsworth, 2010). Immigration increases economic growth through increased entrepreneurship, job creation, and increased supplies of low-wage workers. This leads to increased business investment and employment targeted toward growing populations. These strong ties to the labor market, along with those to community institutions such as churches, can also increase levels of social control by increasing social ties and collective efficacy to strengthen community institutions (Feldmeyer et al., 2019).

The empirical literature at the neighborhood and city level broadly supports these propositions of revitalization and finds that the increased immigration is either protective against crime or has a null effect (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). In cities and neighborhoods with high immigrant populations, immigration created urban renewal and economic growth (Barker, 2010; Sampson, 2008). Specifically, at the city level, the overwhelming finding is that immigration reduces crime (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009,

2018; Wadsworth, 2010). This relationship is supported by both cross-sectional and longitudinal research that finds that cities with increasing immigrant populations experienced larger decreases in crime between 1990 and 2000 (Stowell et al., 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). At the city level, Martinez and Lee (2000) find that border cities with high levels of immigrants (i.e., San Diego and El Paso) have low crime rates. Portes and Stepick (1994) find evidence of this in Miami, where immigration helps lower crime rates through revitalizing city structures. In many ways, immigrants are helping to revive communities that may have previously been plagued with higher crime rates and more deleterious economic conditions (Martinez et al., 2010), and these benefits may likely be spread throughout the city to all neighborhoods (Light & Ulmer, 2016). Immigration may extend its revitalization benefits to all disadvantaged minority neighborhoods. Immigration may not only concentrate benefits in immigrant communities but also create a legacy that increases socioeconomic advantages in all neighborhoods (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013).

Immigration is protective against crime through the revitalization mechanisms associated with decreasing disadvantage, increasing economic growth, and increasing social control (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009, 2018; Wadsworth, 2010). This increased social control may benefit the entire city and be associated with lower crime rates across all ethno-racial neighborhoods. However, only a limited number of studies focusing on the relationship between immigration and crime use a multi-level or longitudinal framework to assess whether the protective impacts of immigration cascade to all ethno-racial neighborhoods equally over time. While extant findings suggest that the prevalence of immigrants at the city level is protective against crime,

what remains unclear is how immigration works with B/W residential segregation across cities to shape patterns of crime change equally to all neighborhoods within the cities or, as some research suggests, only to some neighborhoods.

Overall, immigration can spur the revival of cities and benefit a city's economic and cultural institutions through increased economic expansion and social control (Adelman et al., 2019; Feldmeyer et al., 2019; M. T. Lee & Martinez Jr., 2009; M. T. Lee & Martinez, 2002). However, these benefits may or may not be equally experienced by all ethno-racial neighborhoods within the city in ways that have implications for the color line and ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime change (Card, 2009; Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Light & Ulmer, 2016; Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010). Immigration may further marginalize Black neighborhoods, specifically (Card, 2009; Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010; Smith & Edmonston, 1997) or may benefit all minority neighborhoods and reduce gaps with White neighborhoods (Ellen & O'Regan, 2009; Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Light & Ulmer, 2016). This may depend on how immigration interacts with the pre-existing structures of B/W residential segregation that concentrate disadvantages in minority (mainly Black) neighborhoods within the city. It is imperative to have more in-depth, rigorous studies examining neighborhoods' temporal dynamics because there is limited knowledge about how pathways of neighborhood change evolve in response to city changes in immigration and how they interact with other types of change (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018; Sampson et al., 2002).

Implications for the Color Line

To understand how city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration may set the stage for disparate levels of crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods, I first discuss the trends in both of these forces across US cities and then how they might work to reshape the color line between ethno-racial neighborhoods.

B/W residential segregation has declined since 1980, while Asian and Latino segregation from Whites increased between 1980-2000 (Logan et al., 2004). Although these trends show decreasing B/W segregation, Blacks are still the most highly segregated racial group (Logan et al., 2004), and 50% of Black and 40% of Latinos live in segregated neighborhoods (Logan & Zhang, 2010). Overall, residential segregation is entrenched in many large cities that maintain high levels of B/W residential segregation despite small declines (Massey et al., 2009). These consistently high levels of B/W segregation in large cities are partly reinforced through White avoidance of majority-minority areas and “white flight” from integrated areas (Logan & Zhang, 2010). At first glance, it may appear like smaller cities are experiencing more residential integration. However, this is because of an increase in multi-ethnic or global neighborhoods (with a combination of White, Black, Hispanic and Asian residents) and not a decrease in B/W segregation (Friedman, 2008; Logan et al., 2004). These changing patterns of B/W segregation are continually shaped by racial discrimination in housing and mortgage lending and increasing income inequality that perpetuate racialized systems of disadvantage (Pager & Shepherd, 2008).

While a racial structure has been evident throughout US history (Bonilla-Silva, 2004), it has been represented by the high residential separation between Blacks and Whites. However, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (also known as the Hart-Cellar Act) drastically altered the composition of minority groups in the US by spurring massive growth in non-White immigration. By removing the quota system based on national origin, the policy allowed for increased immigration from Latin American, Asian, and African countries (Wolgin, 2015). Beginning in the 1970s, there was a drastic change in the racial/ethnic composition of immigrants and, thus, increased diversity across many US cities. By 1995, immigrants from Latin America composed the largest percentage of new immigrants in the US (Lopez et al., 2015). In the 21st century, immigrants are predominantly non-White, speak languages other than English, and come from a range of class, religious, and cultural backgrounds (Steil & Vasi, 2014). Additionally, immigrants in this period are more spatially concentrated in metropolitan areas and are increasingly moving to new cities and not only remaining in the traditional immigrant destinations of the past (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018; Steil & Vasi, 2014). Because of these changes, immigrants are now a common feature of more cities and may be ushering in a new period of residential integration between racial/ethnic groups (Iceland, 2009; Logan & Zhang, 2010).

An important part of the discussion is how the growth of immigration across the US alters the pathways of neighborhood ethno-racial composition change (Logan & Zhang, 2010). While the broader trend is toward developing multiethnic or global neighborhoods (Logan & Zhang, 2010), there is evidence that Whites are still hesitant to reside in the same neighborhoods as Black residents. Confirming this, Logan and

colleagues (2004) find that as the population of Hispanic and Asian residents increases, there is no change in B/W residential segregation. This suggests that immigration and B/W segregation remain concomitant forces pushing us to question how changes in both of these across cities simultaneously work to alter neighborhood pathways of crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods and what this means for the B/W color line for crime in the US. This shifting landscape sustains a separate but unequal urban geography in which minority, but not global, neighborhoods experience a myriad of disadvantages, including limited access to quality schools, jobs, and connections to larger opportunity structures (Logan & Zhang, 2010)

In 1903 W.E.B Du Bois famously stated that the “problem of the twentieth century will be a problem of the color line.” While he was referring to the B/W divide that had been a longstanding element of American history, questions as to whether this line persists over a century later are essential in understanding the racial divide still present in the US (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; J. Lee & Bean, 2010). The passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Immigration-Nationality Act in 1965 pointed toward potentially improving racial/ethnic relationships. However, Black Americans remained separated economically and socially from Whites. At the same time, the country faced the influx of immigrants who fit into neither category of Black nor White. Given these changing landscapes, scholars have suggested three ways the color line might be shifting in response to these patterns: (1) a White/non-White divide, (2) a Black/non-Black divide, or (3) a tri-racial hierarchy (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; J. Lee & Bean, 2007, 2010). These potential pathways of change in the color line might be reinforced by changing city demographics of immigration and B/W

residential segregation that set into motion unequal paths of neighborhood crime change and shift the distribution of ethno-racial neighborhood crime.

White/non-White Divide in Neighborhood Crime Change

With the reforms of the 1960s, Black and other non-White groups were unified through their non-White racial identity by politicians (Hollinger, 2008). This led to the perception of Latino and Asian immigrants as racial minorities and people of color whose experiences share similarities to Black over White Americans (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, and Haller, 2005). By doing this, the legislation highlighted that these immigrant groups are different from those that came before (e.g., Irish and Italians) and assimilated. This may place Asians and Latinos on the Black side of the divide, creating and reinforcing the development of a White/non-White divide (Hollinger, 2008; Portes et al., 2005).

Considering that B/W residential segregation concentrates disadvantages in Black and minority neighborhoods (Peterson and Krivo, 2010), immigration may work with declining B/W segregation to sustain larger crime declines in non-White neighborhoods. By increasing city-wide collective efficacy, creating better neighborhood conditions, and supporting more equal distribution of resources through revitalization (Ramey, 2013), declining B/W segregation and increasing immigration may create a White/non-White divide in crime change.

Some research focused directly on ethno-racial neighborhoods finds that increased B/W segregation has negative consequences for all neighborhoods (Krivo et al., 2009; Peterson, 2012), while others focused on crime across cities or MSAs suggest that B/W segregation does not impact White homicides or protects Whites

from crime (Light & Thomas, 2019; Peterson & Krivo, 1999). B/W segregation concentrates advantages in White compared to Black neighborhoods, and so when declining could have different consequences for White compared to Black neighborhoods.

Although not directly focused on immigration, a multi-level analysis by Ellen and O'Regan (2009) suggests that crime declines in neighborhoods are influenced by city racial composition. Specifically, they find that the largest crime declines occurred in cities where the relative proportion of minority residents increased the most. Additionally, poorer neighborhoods with larger percentages of minority residents also declined the most. This analysis suggests that the changing racial composition of a city's residents has a role in how neighborhood crime changes and what neighborhoods decline the most. This is important because increased immigration today is racially diverse and non-White (Steil & Vasi, 2014). These findings may speak to overall neighborhood crime declines in cities with increased minority populations, but also that the protective impacts of increased immigration might be more concentrated in minority neighborhoods (i.e., Black, Latino, and multi-ethnic neighborhoods).

Although there is limited research exploring how the impact of immigration on ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime varies across cities, some work has examined the impact of Latino immigration, specifically on race-specific crime rates across cities. This work may offer some insight into the potential consequences of city immigration on different ethno-racial neighborhoods. For example, Harris and Feldmeyer (2013) suggest that Latino immigration may destabilize cities without long

histories of immigrant settlement and be associated with increased violence for Blacks and Hispanics. They suggest larger gaps in crime rates between Whites and minority groups when immigrant populations increase. They found that Latino immigration was associated with crime reductions for Latinos and Blacks but did not affect White homicide rates. These findings imply that increasing immigration impacts crime differently depending on neighborhood ethno-racial composition. Specifically, they might suggest that increases in immigration may be protective for Black and Latino neighborhoods. When B/W segregation declines and immigration increases, there could be a development of a White/non-White divide with smaller declines in White compared to non-White neighborhoods. To find support for a White/non-White divide, I expect differences in crime change for all ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably White neighborhoods. I hypothesize that these differences may be reinforced through larger crime declines for durably White neighborhoods compared to others when located in cities with increasing B/W segregation and immigration.

H₁: When in cities with increasing B/W segregation and immigration, durably White neighborhoods will have larger crime declines compared to all other ethno-racial neighborhoods

Black/non-Black Divide in Neighborhood Crime Change

However, a Black/non-Black divide (J. Lee & Bean, 2007, 2010) might suggest that changing patterns of segregation and immigration work together to alienate Black neighborhoods further and restrict them from benefits, while other minority neighborhoods experience lower crime rates that place them closer to White

neighborhoods. Latino and Asian immigration may be exacerbating the historic racial divides of the US and reinforcing a Black/non-Black divide (Lee and Bean, 2010; Lee and Bean, 2007). Over time the development of the model minority myth has divided racial minorities while using Asian individuals as a comparison for all other minority racial groups. Additionally, throughout history, groups that once were considered ethnically different have been successfully integrated (e.g., Italian and Irish immigrants), while Black Americans have always been seen as separate (Gans, 2005). Recent Latino and Asian immigrants have distanced themselves from Blacks, further isolating them by not integrating into one as “people of color.” Scholars also argue that Whiteness is expanding to incorporate Asians and Latinos, further dividing them from Blacks (Gallagher, 2004). Because of this unique placement of Blacks and their history of separation, Asians and Latinos may be falling on the non-Black side and fostering the growth of the Black/non-Black divide.

Although immigration may work to revitalize cities highlighted by decreasing crime rates (Martinez & Lee, 2000; Ousey & Kubrin, 2018; Portes & Stepick, 1994), there may be more variation in the levels of protective effects across ethno-racial neighborhoods. There is a body of work suggesting that the impact of immigration may depend on socioeconomic status (Bean & Bell-Rose, 1999). Specifically, a National Academies of Science report indicates that people with higher education and more capital benefit more from immigration (Smith & Edmonston, 1997). This suggests a lack of uniformity in the impact of immigration across groups and the likelihood that immigration may only impact wage inequality for those at lower ends of the socioeconomic spectrum (Card, 2009). This may mean specific consequences

for Blacks who are disproportionately likely to have lower socioeconomic status and lesser capital to protect themselves from the potential labor market consequences of immigration (Farley & Frey, 1994; Frey & Farley, 1996). Due to the consequences of B/W residential segregation that are associated with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage in Black neighborhoods, immigration may magnify these consequences and widen crime gaps and set Black neighborhoods on a different trajectory of crime change from all other ethno-racial neighborhoods.

Shihadeh and Barranco (2010) support this and find that increases in Latino immigration are related to Black homicide through increased competition for low-skilled jobs. More specifically, the strain on the labor market is related to Black homicide through rising Black unemployment. This increased Black unemployment and its corresponding increase in homicide may then be connected to higher crime rates in neighborhoods with predominantly Black residents.

Other minority groups, such as Latinos, may be protected despite higher socioeconomic disadvantage due to segregation, in a phenomenon often called the Latino Paradox (Light & Thomas, 2019; Sampson, 2008). This phenomenon refers to the idea that although Latino communities generally maintain high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, increased immigration reduces crime despite the potential for immigration to concentrate some consequences in highly disadvantaged communities (Light & Thomas, 2019).

Despite higher levels of economic disadvantage, Latino neighborhoods experience what Sandoval-Staraus (2019) calls “Latino urbanism.” This refers to changes in the built environment that renew public spaces and increase socialization

within community spaces. This is tied to increased social control through strong kinship and family ties that increase social control in these neighborhoods and are associated with lower neighborhood crime rates despite structural disadvantages (Burchfield & Silver, 2013; Sandoval-Strausz, 2019; Vélez & Peguero, 2022). If immigration impacts wage inequality among disadvantaged neighborhoods, high collective efficacy will protect Latino neighborhoods from the negative consequences of increasing labor market competition. This may be varied from the impact of immigration on Black neighborhoods, which may not be protected from increasing labor market constraints in response to immigration. To find support for a Black/non-Black divide, I expect that all ethno-racial neighborhoods will have differences in crime changes from durably Black neighborhoods. I hypothesize that these differences will be shaped by smaller declines in durably Black neighborhoods when city B/W segregation and immigration are increasing.

H₂: When in cities with increasing B/W segregation and immigration, durably Black neighborhoods will have smaller crime declines compared to all other ethno-racial neighborhoods

Tri-racial Divide in Neighborhood Crime Change

And finally, a third perspective highlights that the reality may be completely different with the development of a new tri-racial hierarchy composed of Whites, honorary Whites, and collective Blacks (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; Lee and Bean, 2007). Whites mainly include traditional Whites, White Latinos who have entirely assimilated, and light-skinned racial minorities. The honorary Whites will include light-skinned Latinos, Japanese Americans, Korean Americans, Asian Indians,

Chinese Americans, Filipinos, and most Middle Eastern Americans. And finally, the collective Blacks will comprise of Blacks, dark-skinned Latinos, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). To foster this hierarchy, we may see a combination of the factors explained that could contribute to the White/non-White or Black/non-Black divides (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). Specifically, some immigrants may be separating themselves from Blacks while others feel more solidarity toward Blacks than Whites due to their racial status.

A tri-racial divide (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; J. Lee & Bean, 2007) might suggest that White and integrated neighborhoods may experience the benefits associated with lower crime levels, with segregated Latino neighborhoods maintaining levels in the middle and segregated Black neighborhoods with the highest levels of crime. Increasing immigration and declining B/W segregation shift the city landscape, creating potentially separate and unequal patterns across ethno-racial neighborhoods that impact the ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime and crime change. Though not directly examining neighborhood crime rates, Light and Ulmer (2016) find that increasing Latino immigration is associated with declining gaps in Black-White homicide rates but is not associated with changing White-Hispanic gaps or Black-Hispanic gaps when controlling for changing segregation. This might suggest that while Black and White gaps are changing, there may be differences for Hispanic neighborhoods that differentiate their patterns of crime change from these neighborhoods. The development of a tri-racial divide would include explanations for both a White/non-White and Black/non-Black divide operating in unison for different ethno-racial neighborhoods that place White and Black neighborhoods at the two

ends of the distribution of crime change and other ethno-racial neighborhoods in the middle. For evidence of a tri-racial divide, I expect that all ethno-racial neighborhoods will have differences in crime change compared to durably White and durably Black neighborhoods. I hypothesize that the impact of city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration will be different for minority and integrated (durably Latino, durably Minority, durably Integrated, changed from Latino, changed from Minority, changed from Integrated) neighborhoods compared to durably Black and durably White neighborhoods.

H₃: When in cities with increasing B/W segregation and immigration, minority and integrated neighborhoods will have smaller crime declines compared durably White neighborhoods and larger crime declines compared to durably Black neighborhoods

In all three of the above scenarios, the incorporation of immigrants may shift the racial divide in neighborhood crime. I do not anticipate differences in how the color line would change for violent versus property crime change. Most of the extant literature on neighborhood crime change focuses on violent crime change (Papachristos et al., 2018; Friedson & Sharkey, 2015) and does not provide insight into whether patterns are different for property crime change. Lyons and colleagues (2022) suggest that structural inequalities influence ethno-racial differences in violent and property crime change. For this reason, I expect similar findings across the models for violent and property crime change.

The Current Study

To build on the body of work using the NNCS (Krivo et al., 2009, 2018, 2020; Lyons et al., 2013, 2022; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Vélez et al., 2015), I examine how changing city levels of B/W residential segregation and immigration change crime for ethno-racial neighborhoods from 2000 to 2013. Since the turn of the century, the ethno-racial composition of cities has changed because of the concomitant forces of declining B/W residential segregation and increasing immigration. Still, their interaction has rarely been explored in shaping patterns of crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods.

I begin by recognizing the variation in how ethno-racial neighborhoods experience crime declines through the early 2000s (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018, 2020; Lyons et al., 2022; Papachristos et al., 2018). I argue that this variation may be due to the consequences of city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration. Building on the prior literature, I explore this variation descriptively. I then use an embedded ecological approach to explain how city demographic changes in B/W segregation and immigration shape crime change for different ethno-racial neighborhoods. The NNCS is a suitable dataset to answer these questions because it contains a representative sample of U.S. cities with crime and sociodemographic data at both the city and neighborhood levels. This dataset has been used multiple times to understand neighborhood crime rates (Lyons et al., 2013; Vélez et al., 2015), and the NNCS2-P incorporates the second wave of data spanning 2010-2013 (Lyons et al., 2022).

Currently, only a few studies examine the conditions that set the stage for varying crime declines across ethno-racial neighborhoods (Sharkey, 2018). It is important to directly examine how changing city conditions shape crime change in different ethno-racial neighborhoods. Extant work suggests that violent and property crime continues to concentrate in marginalized neighborhoods, with the distribution of crime across neighborhoods remaining unchanged (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018, 2020; Lyons et al., 2022; Papachristos et al., 2018; Zimring, 2007). However, these analyses do not fully consider how changing city levels of immigration and B/W segregation shape neighborhood crime change and potentially perpetuate ethno-racial inequality. Analyses that do not consider the variation within cities over time in shaping crime declines across ethno-racial neighborhoods are incomplete in understanding the larger structural context of neighborhood crime change. Thus, I focus on how changes in city B/W segregation and immigration shape neighborhood violent and property crime change for ethno-racial neighborhoods and sustain either a White/non-White divide, a Black/non-Black divide, or a tri-racial hierarchy (Bonilla-Silva, 2001).

To understand how changing city levels of B/W segregation and immigration interact to shape varying patterns of crime change for ethno-racial neighborhoods, I first identify neighborhoods based on their racial/ethnic composition. Then, given stability and change in neighborhood racial/ethnic composition, I consider ten unique neighborhood types based on previous work using the NNCS (Lyons et al., 2022; Peterson & Krivo, 2010). I broadly define these neighborhoods as durable (durably White, durably Black, durably Latino, durably Minority, and durably Integrated) or

changing (changed from White, changed from Black, changed from Latino, changed from Minority, and changed from Integrated)⁴.

The neighborhood crime data in the NNCS come from official police statistics. It is imperative to consider the quality and reliability of officially sourced police data when studying racial inequality. This is particularly important considering racialized policing and differences in willingness to report to the police for people of different races. Policymakers, police departments, and individual officers have biases that impact policies, perceptions of crime, and responses that disadvantage people of color (Gaston, 2019). Discussions of racially discriminatory policing suggest that the overrepresentation of Blacks in drug arrests reflect racial discrimination (Gaston & Brunson, 2018; Alexander & West, 2012). Findings suggest that racial disparities in police encounters and police stops are attributable to racially discriminatory policing practices (Gaston & Brunson, 2018; Alexander & West, 2012).

Racially biased policing impacts a range of practices such as unwarranted stops based on race (vehicle and pedestrian stops), discriminatory police conduct, and differential protection of neighborhoods based on racial composition (Brunson & Weitzer, 2009). More specifically, extralegal forces such as an individual's race or a neighborhood's racial composition continue to inform differential policing practices for minorities (Gaston & Brunson, 2018). Neighborhood context can also shape both police practices and police-citizen relations (Brunson & Weitzer, 2009). Brunson and Weitzer (2009) find that individual race and neighborhood racial composition are more important in shaping experiences with police and are related to negative

⁴ The specific operationalization of these neighborhood ethno-racial types is included in chapter 3.

experiences for Blacks. These heightened numbers of police stops and discriminatory policing practices can bias official crime statistics for Black neighborhoods resulting in inflated crime statistics in Black compared to White neighborhoods (Alexander & West, 2012). This creates grave concerns about using official statistics for drug and less serious crime types.

While racialized policing practices may still bias official police statistics for serious violent (e.g., homicide and robbery) and property crimes (e.g., burglary), there is limited empirical evidence that differences in these serious crime rates among ethno-racial neighborhood types are attributable to police biases or differential reporting to police. More specifically, these more serious crimes are less impacted by reporting biases across different races and their neighborhoods (Xie and Baumer, 2019; Baumer and Lauritsen, 2010; Krivo et al., 2020). Thus, by focusing on neighborhood levels of violence and burglary I strive to minimize the possibility of bias in understanding the disparity in crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods.

Chapter 3: Data and Methods

Data

I use the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS2-P) panel dataset that includes two waves of data from the NNCS1 and NNCS2 (Lyons et al., 2022). The wave 1 data (NNCS1) provides information from 1999-2001 and has tract-level information for 91 cities with populations over 100,000. The wave 2 data cover 2010-2013 and contain data for tracts for 84 cities included in wave 1⁵. The overall panel

⁵ I refer to the second wave of data as 2010 though it includes crime data from 2010-2013.

dataset consists of 8,856 tracts in 81 cities. Crime data are reported by police departments and contains information on violent and property crimes as reported by official police statistics. The data include demographic and socioeconomic information from the American Community Survey (2008-2012) and the Census (2000). Mortgage lending information comes from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and foreclosure data is from Realty Trac. The data are normalized around 2010 census boundaries (Krivo et al., 2023).

Analytic Sample

The final analytic sample consists of 7,875 census tracts in 75 cities (see Appendix A for a list of cities) (Lyons et al., 2022). Six cities in the dataset do not have valid data for the violent and property crime measures, so I exclude them from the analysis. Additionally, there are 28 tracts with missing data that either do not allow for spatial weights for neighborhood crime or lending information, so I also exclude them. As reported by Lyons and colleagues (2022), the 75 cities included in this sample are representative of U.S. cities with populations over 100,000 in 2010 across poverty levels, racial/ethnic composition, and crime rates. However, these cities are concentrated in the West, are larger and more racially segregated than others (see Lyons et al., 2022 Appendix A for this comparison).

Dependent Variables

I measure two types of crime at the neighborhood level: violent and property crime. I focus on both violent and property crime to gain a broader understanding of how inequality in crime is changing over time. Violent crime includes neighborhood

rates of robbery and murder per 1,000. Property crime is measured as neighborhood rates of burglary per 1,000⁶. Given that these data come from official police reports, I use statistics on homicide, robbery, and burglary since they are more likely to be reported than other crimes (e.g., drug, assault) and less likely to face reliability issues in measurement (Skogan, 1975). Official data on these crimes are also less likely to be influenced by disparate policing and willingness to report across ethno-racial neighborhoods (Krivo et al., 2020).

To measure crime change, I use the difference in crime rates between the two periods (crime at T2 minus crime at T1) for each neighborhood. This measure represents the change in the crime rate for a particular neighborhood. I use separate dependent variables for violent and property crime change. Neighborhood violent crime change ranges from a decline in the rate of 80.37 per 1,000 to an increase of 27.59 per 1,000. Neighborhood property crime change ranges from a decline in the rate of 131.32 per 1,000 to an increase of 38.02 per 1,000.

Independent Variables

City B/W Residential Segregation

Given my interest in how immigration interacts with the long-standing racial structure in the US, I measure B/W residential segregation specifically. I focus on B/W residential segregation because of the history of residential segregation in the United States and the longstanding history of residential separation between Black

⁶ These rates are calculated as multi-year averages to increase reliability because of year-to-year fluctuations in crime. For Time 1 (2000), the rate is a three-year average for 1999-2001, and for Time 2 (2010), the rates include a four-year average for 2010-2013.

and White Americans. I use a measure of evenness⁷, the dissimilarity index, as a measure of segregation. This measure focuses on how two groups are spatially distributed across the city. Evenness is not measured in absolute terms; instead, it focuses on how groups are spread around the city in relation to each other. Segregation is the lowest when every neighborhood has the same proportion of Blacks and Whites as the entire city, and segregation is highest when no one of either group lives in the same neighborhood (Massey & Denton, 1993). The dissimilarity index is the most common measure of residential evenness. It measures the percentage of a group that would have to move for each neighborhood to have the same percentage of that group as the city overall. The index ranges from complete segregation (=100) or complete integration (=0) (Massey & Denton, 1993; NNCS Codebook). The dissimilarity index for each time is measured using the formula below (NNCS Codebook). I take the difference between the two (T2-T1) to measure the change in B/W residential segregation between the two waves at the city level.

$$D_{bw} = \left[.5 * \sum_{j=1}^n \left| \left(\frac{b_j}{B} \right) - \left(\frac{w_j}{W} \right) \right| \right] * 100$$

where b_j and w_j are the numbers of Blacks and Whites, respectively, in tract j ; n is the number of tracts in the city; and B and W are the respective total numbers of Blacks and Whites in the city.

⁷ Though there are five different dimensions of residential segregation (evenness, exposure, clustering, concentration, and centralization), I focus on evenness using the dissimilarity index because it is the most relevant for understanding the city-context I am interested in that then plays out through different neighborhood ethno-racial concentrations. Additionally, the dissimilarity index is the most widely used measure of residential segregation and will allow me to compare my findings to previous work. As a sensitivity analysis, I will also use a measure of exposure in the B/W isolation index that measures the extent to which individuals are only exposed to those within their groups. I will also measure exposure through an index that measures the extent to which minority groups are exposed to the majority group (Massey and Denton, 1993).

City Immigration

My second primary independent variable of interest is city-level immigration change. To capture immigration at the city level, I use an index of three components (1) percent foreign-born, (2) percent linguistically isolated, and (3) percent new immigrants (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). Linguistic isolation is the percentage of households in which no one 14 or older speaks English very well. New immigrants are the percent of the total foreign-born population who entered the United States within the last ten years. I use an index because it provides a more comprehensive understanding of the presence of immigrants at the city level that goes beyond just the level of foreign-born populations. Language diversity and recent immigrants are also crucial in shaping the immigration context (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018) through which neighborhoods may have differential patterns of crime change. I calculate the change in immigration as the difference in the index in 2010 and 2000⁸.

Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Classification

Given my interest in how the relationship between city levels of B/W residential segregation and immigration impacts different ethno-racial neighborhoods, I classify neighborhoods into ten categories based on their ethno-racial composition over time⁹. These measures represent the levels of segregation at the tract level.

⁸ As a sensitivity analysis, I will also estimate the models with each component of the index independently.

⁹ I base these categories on those in Lyons et al. (2022). However, I limit my classifications to 10 rather than their 21 categories. I combine all integrated neighborhoods rather than separating them by the specific White and non-White combination. Additionally, dividing the sample into 21 categories decreases the sample size, which is a concern for my analyses.

Segregation is represented in the development of these neighborhoods where individuals of different ethno-racial compositions are concentrated in neighborhoods by ethno-racial composition.

Following Peterson and Krivo (2010), I first create five ethno-racial composition categories at each wave (Table 1). These include (1) White, (2) Black, (3) Latino, (4) Minority, and (5) Integrated¹⁰. The segregated White, Black, and Latino neighborhoods are defined by $\geq 70\%$ of their population being in that racial category. Minority neighborhoods are those where any pair of non-whites comprised $\geq 70\%$ of the population (B+H, or B+A, or B+O, or H+A, or H+O, or A+O). Integrated neighborhoods are those where any combination of White and another racial group (Black, Hispanic, Other) $\geq 70\%$ of the population. I then create the ten categories based on the durability and change in their ethno-racial composition¹¹. Durable neighborhoods are those whose ethno-racial composition did not change (durably White, durably Black, durably Latino, durably Minority, and durably Integrated). Changed neighborhoods are those that either became segregated or became increasingly racially mixed (changed from White, changed from Black, changed from Latino, changed from Minority, and changed from Integrated).

¹⁰ I use the term integrated to solely identify the composition of the population and recognize that this does not mean that these neighborhoods are socially integrated.

¹¹ I base these categories off those in Lyons et al., (2022). However, I limit my classifications to 10 rather than their 21 categories. I specifically combine all integrated neighborhoods together rather than separating them by the specific White and non-White combination. Additionally, dividing the sample into 21 categories decreases the sample size which is a concern for my analyses.

Table 1. Neighborhoods Ethno-Racial Classifications at T1 and T2 (n=7,875)

Ethno-Racial Composition at T1	Ethno-Racial Composition at T2				
	<i>White</i>	<i>Black</i>	<i>Latino</i>	<i>Minority</i>	<i>Integrated</i>
<i>White</i>	2,409	0	0	0	885
<i>Black</i>	0	794	0	37	68
<i>Latino</i>	0	0	547	6	74
<i>Minority</i>	0	2	41	224	98
<i>Integrated</i>	121	69	217	135	2,508

The neighborhoods are more likely to be durable (about 78%) (table 2). The most considerable proportions of neighborhoods are either durably White (26.02%) or durably Integrated (31.85%), suggesting stability in neighborhood ethno-racial composition is most common in the sample. Table 2 also highlights that these ethno-racial neighborhoods vary across the cities in the sample. Evidently, some neighborhoods are less common across all the cities and are not present in all or even most cities. I will explore this variation further in my descriptive analyses in chapter 4.

Table 2. Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Types

	N	Percent	City
<i>Durable</i>			
Durably White	2,049	26.02%	67
Durably Black	794	10.08%	29
Durably Latino	547	6.95%	22
Durably Minority	224	2.84%	26
Durably Integrated	2,508	31.85%	70
<i>Changing</i>			
Changed from White	885	11.24%	68
Changed from Black	105	1.33%	28
Changed from Latino	80	1.02%	14
Changed from Minority	141	1.79%	19
Changed from Integrated	542	6.88%	54

Control Variables

Tract-level Controls

In addition to the primary variables of interest, I include a set of neighborhood controls. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for all the tract-level control variables. Considering that disadvantage is essential to shaping neighborhood crime (Peterson & Krivo, 2010), I measure the change in neighborhood disadvantage. I use a disadvantage index that averages the standardized scores of six different variables at each time point. This includes (1) the percentage of employed individuals in sector low-wage jobs¹², (2) the unemployment rate for those between the ages of 16-64, and (3) percent of the employed population working as professionals and managers (reverse-coded), (4) percent of female-headed households, (5) percent of individuals 25 and over who are high school graduates (reverse coded), and (6) the poverty rate¹³. To measure change, I take the difference between the indices at both time points.

Housing conditions are also important in understanding the disparity in crime rates across ethno-racial neighborhoods (Peterson, 2012; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson et al., 2018). To control for these conditions, I include four measures of housing conditions: (1) change in mortgage lending, (2) change in the foreclosure rate, (3) change in vacant housing units, and (4) change in renter-occupied housing units. The measure of mortgage lending is the dollar amount of home loans per housing unit (in the 1000s) calculated at both time points and differenced for the

¹² Low-wage jobs are defined as those with the lowest mean incomes: (1) health care support, (2) food preparation and serving related occupations, (3) building and grounds cleaning and maintenance, (4) personal care and service, (5) farming, fishing, and forestry and (6) material moving.

¹³ The poverty rate is the percentage of the population who income in the year prior was below the poverty level.

change. I log the measure of home loans in my analysis to deal with the skewness of the distribution. The foreclosure rate is operationalized as the change in the average foreclosure rate per 1,000 housing units. I also account for the change in the percentage of vacant housing units and the change in the percentage of renter-occupied housing units to understand changing levels of housing stability at the tract level.

Additionally, I include a measure of immigration to account for the tract-level relationship between immigration and crime. In this study, I am interested in how the presence of immigrants in the city impacts tract-level crime for different neighborhoods independent of immigrant status and thus controls for the existence of immigrants at the tract level. I measure the immigration index at both periods and subtract the difference to calculate the change in immigrants. To account for the presence of a higher-risk criminal population, I control for young males aged 15-34. Additionally, I consider the role of spatial proximity to high-crime neighborhoods as an important factor in shaping neighborhood crime change. I include a spatial lag for crime change for each neighborhood that accounts for violent or property crime depending on the dependent variable. These lags represent the average violent crime change or burglary change for adjacent census tracts. The spatial lag is constructed by multiplying the tract characteristic by a row standardized first-order spatial contiguity matrix that uses a queen criterion (Lyons et al., 2022; Peterson & Krivo, 2010).

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood Controls¹⁴ (n=7,875)

Variable	<i>Change</i>	<i>Time 1</i>	<i>Time 2</i>
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Disadvantage	0.01 (0.37)	-0.01 (.87)	0.00 (0.83)
Home Loans	3.3 (41.22)	15.33 (43.42)	18.63 (28.96)
Foreclosure Rates	10.73 (20.76)	4.46 (16.02)	15.19 (19.32)
% Renters	1.39 (9.84)	48.99 (25.27)	50.38 (24.23)
% Vacant	4.37 (6.71)	6.85 (5.63)	11.22 (8.43)
Immigration Index	0.00 (0.44)	0.00 (0.96)	0.00 (0.93)
% Males 15-34	-0.21 (4.29)	16.11 (5.64)	15.90 (5.98)

City-level Controls

In addition to the set of neighborhood controls, I control for a group of city characteristics based on the literature that city conditions are relevant in shaping a neighborhood's ability to control crime (Logan & Molotch, 2010; Vélez & Lyons, 2014; Wilson, 1997). I present descriptive statistics for the city-level controls in table 4. I include a measure of residential stability at the city level that is important for crime and may be related to both changing levels of immigration and segregation. Specifically, I look at the change in the percentage of the population who moved in the last five years. I also control for disadvantage at the city level to understand how the city structure sets the stage for neighborhood crime rates. The disadvantage index at the city level is calculated similarly to the neighborhood measure. I also control for city demographic characteristics. I measure the change in the non-Hispanic Black population, the change in the population of young males aged 15-34, and the difference in the city population.

¹⁴ The value for home loans represents the amount in dollars and not the logged value I use in the models.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for City Controls (n=7,875)

Variable	<i>Change</i>	<i>Time 1</i>	<i>Time 2</i>
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Population	28,317.38 (98,347.22)	1,135,983 (1,233,791)	1,164,300 (1,226,324)
% Young males	-0.24 (0.93)	16.49 (2.04)	16.25 (1.89)
Disadvantage	-0.07 (0.25)	0.25 (0.74)	0.18 (0.73)
% Moved	-33.64 (4.14)	52.58 (5.12)	18.94 (3.93)
% Black	-0.48 (2.42)	20.59 (14.65)	20.10 (14.42)

Methods

I begin with descriptive analyses to understand the sample, including the summary statistics of the dependent and the primary independent variables. I also include a set of descriptive analyses to document the city contexts and the distribution of ethno-racial neighborhoods across different patterns of city changes in B/W segregation and immigration. I then explore the impact of changing B/W segregation and immigration on changes in property and violent crime using regression models. In these models, I use an interaction term between city B/W segregation, city immigration, and the ethno-racial neighborhood type to understand the concurrent impact of these city forces in shaping crime change for the different ethno-racial neighborhoods.

Analytic Strategy

With two time points, the fixed effect (FE) and first difference (FD) estimators produce identical estimates and test statistics (Wooldridge, 2006). I use a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with the time-demeaned variables to estimate the within-neighborhood change. I account for the neighborhood-level fixed effects, which control for any unobserved or observed time-invariant factors in the model. Though the ethno-racial neighborhood classifications are time-invariant, I can

include them in these models because they assess whether the impact of the time-varying variables (i.e., B/W segregation and immigration) differs for each neighborhood type (Johnson, 2005). To account for the correlation among neighborhoods within the city, I cluster the standard errors on the city.

My analyses focus on how neighborhoods changed compared to themselves in the prior time period – also referred to as *within-neighborhood change*. Given that neighborhoods remain in the same city, these models are thus within-neighborhood within-city changes. These models allow me to understand how a neighborhood changes over time and control for any (observed or unobserved) variables that do not change within neighborhoods over time. By controlling for these time-stable characteristics, the fixed effects model gets rid of the variation between neighborhoods and cities. Therefore, this method does not allow me to directly examine the variation between neighborhoods and cities over time.

I estimate the models with the three-way interaction that allows me to directly compare the relationship between changing city immigration and B/W segregation on neighborhood crime change between the ethno-racial neighborhoods. To test my hypotheses, I compare these relationships between ethno-racial neighborhoods paying particular attention to comparisons to durably Black and durably White neighborhoods. The models use durably Black neighborhoods as the reference category. I then conduct a set of post-estimation f-tests to compare all the

neighborhoods to durably White neighborhoods. I estimate the equations below for both violent and property crime change¹⁵.

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta Crime_i = & \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta Segregation_i) + \beta_2(\Delta Immigration_i) \\ & + \boldsymbol{\beta}(\textit{EthnoRacial Neighborhood Type}_i) \\ & + \boldsymbol{\beta}(\textit{EthnoRacial Neighborhood Type} * \Delta Segregation \\ & * \Delta Immigration_i) + \boldsymbol{\beta}(\Delta Neighborhood Controls_i) \\ & + \boldsymbol{\beta}(\Delta City Controls_i) + \varepsilon_i\end{aligned}$$

Sensitivity Analyses

Immigrant Race

I conduct a set of sensitivity analyses that examine the heterogeneity in immigration across US cities. As highlighted above, immigrants were diverse and came from many racial backgrounds at this time. Therefore, it is important to explore whether the influence of immigration on crime varies depending on the race of the immigrants (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). I first collect new data from the American Community Survey and the Decennial Census¹⁶ on the self-reported race of immigrants in 2000 and 2010 in US cities. For these estimates, I use race breakdowns for White non-Hispanic, Black, Asian, and Hispanic immigrants¹⁷.

¹⁵ The bolded betas represent a vector of coefficients for each predictor. Additionally, the models include the two-way combinations of the three variables in the interaction (changing B/W segregation, immigration and ethno-racial neighborhood type).

¹⁶ For 2000, I use data from decennial census Summary File 3 (tables: PCT063I, PCT063H, PCT063D, PCT063B). For 2010, I use the American Community Survey 5-year estimates (2008-2012) (Tables: B06004D, B06004B, B06004H, B06004I).

¹⁷ No data was available for cities that separate ethnicity for Black or Asian immigrants. Since I use each variable in the models individually, there should not be a problem with the correlation between the variables. However, Black Hispanic immigrants or Asian Hispanic immigrants may be included in both the individual race and Hispanic Foreign-born models.

I replicate the fixed effects models used in the main models above but replace the global immigration index (in my main models) with the change in the percent of the race specific foreign-born as a proportion of the total population. I also use a cumulative measure of the total foreign-born population to compare to the race-specific measures and compare them to each other¹⁸. I then conduct a set of seemingly unrelated regressions¹⁹ that allow me to compare the coefficients across each model to understand whether the influence of changing levels of immigration and B/W segregation on crime change in ethno-racial neighborhoods varies by the race of the immigrants.

Quantile Regression

I estimate a set of quantile regressions considering that the relationship between city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration may vary depending on the percentile of crime change. Specifically, I conduct a set of quantile regressions to compare the relationship between city changes in segregation and immigration for the ethno-racial neighborhoods when examining different portions of the distribution of crime change. I estimate a set of simultaneous quantile regressions with bootstrapped standard errors that allow me to compare the coefficients directly for each quartile (25, 50, and 75).

¹⁸ I compare these models to a model using % foreign born total because data on the index measures cannot be disaggregated by race so I cannot create an index for each immigrant race group.

¹⁹ Seemingly unrelated regressions jointly estimate error across separate regressions and do not assume 0 covariances when conducting a test of equality of coefficients.

Chapter 4: Results

Descriptive Statistics

Neighborhood-level

To understand the patterns of crime change for neighborhoods in the cities in my sample, I begin with descriptive analyses examining the average changes in neighborhood violent and property crime rates. Considering the three possible color lines (White/non-White, Black/non-Black, or a tri-racial hierarchy), I then examine the changes in crime for the different ethno-racial neighborhoods.

On average, neighborhoods at Time 1 had 4.18 violent crimes per 1,000 and decreased by about one violent crime per 1,000 in Time 2 (Table 5). Similarly, property crime fell by an average of 1.24 crimes per 1,000. While previous evidence (Baumer et al., 2018) suggests the crime decline continued across US cities into the 2000s, there is less consensus on how these patterns cascaded down to neighborhoods. The trends in these data support the idea that overall, US and city crime declines (Baumer et al., 2018; Zimring, 2006) extend to neighborhoods through the beginning of the 21st century.

Table 5. Average Neighborhood Crime Change (n=7,875)

<i>Dependent Variable</i>	<i>Change</i>	<i>Time 1</i>	<i>Time 2</i>
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
<i>Violent Crime</i>	-0.93 (3.86)	4.18 (5.74)	3.24 (4.09)
<i>Property Crime</i>	-1.24 (7.63)	11.56 (9.82)	10.32 (8.48)

Given my interest in the color line and the potential inequity in crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods, I compare crime change across all the neighborhoods. Of the neighborhoods that maintained their racial composition from Time 1 to Time 2

(i.e., durable neighborhoods), durably Latino neighborhoods experienced the largest average violent crime declines. Durably White neighborhoods experienced the smallest declines on average; however, they started and ended with the lowest crime rates. Durably Black neighborhoods had some of the smallest reductions in violent crime, decreasing 0.86 crimes per 1,000 but maintained the highest levels of crime for all ethno-racial neighborhoods on average. Durably integrated and minority neighborhoods had crime declines close to those of the durably Latino neighborhoods. For neighborhoods whose racial composition changed, those that changed from White had the smallest declines, while those that changed from Black had the largest. Neighborhoods that changed from Black experienced crime declines of about 3.36 violent crimes per 1,000. Changed from Latino, Minority, and Integrated neighborhoods all experienced violent crime declines between those that changed from White and those that changed from Black, representative of the ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime. Overall, for all the ethno-racial neighborhoods, their position in the distribution of violent crime rates remains the same compared to other neighborhoods from Time 1 to Time 2. So, although Black neighborhoods began with the highest violent crime levels and experienced large declines when they integrated (changed from Black), both durably Black and changed from Black neighborhoods still experienced the highest violent crime rates at Time 2. At the other end of the distribution, neighborhoods that started as White (stayed White, changed from White) remained at the lowest crime levels.

Table 6. Average Violent Crime Rates by Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type (n=7875)

	<i>Violence Change</i>	<i>Time 1</i>	<i>Time 2</i>
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
<i>Durable</i>			
Durably White	-0.46 (1.80) ⁺	1.66 (2.62)	1.20 (1.68)
Durably Black	-0.86 (4.91) [*]	9.97 (6.65)	9.10 (5.30)
Durably Latino	-1.61 (2.15) ^{*+}	4.27 (3.03)	2.66 (2.06)
Durably Minority	-1.19 (3.61) [*]	6.49 (4.23)	5.30 (3.91)
Durably Integrated	-1.18 (4.70) [*]	4.35 (6.20)	3.18 (3.67)
<i>Changing</i>			
Changed from White	-0.16 2.33) ^{*+}	1.89 (2.82)	1.73 (2.38)
Changed from Black	-3.36 (6.70) ^{*+}	10.19 (9.82)	6.83 (5.88)
Changed from Latino	-2.71 (5.37) ^{*+}	6.99 (6.30)	4.28 (6.78)
Changed from Integrated	-1.09 (3.61) [*]	4.68 (5.27)	3.59 (3.53)
Changed from Minority	-2.22 (8.27) ^{*+}	7.43 (11.40)	5.20 (5.68)

Note: t-tests * p<.05 compared to durably White + p<.05 compared to durably Black neighborhoods

Directly exploring the differences between all the neighborhoods, I find significant differences in violent crime declines for most ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably White and durably Black neighborhoods. For violent crime change, all ethno-racial neighborhoods differed from durably White neighborhoods. Compared to durably Black neighborhoods, all ethno-racial neighborhoods, except those that changed from Integrated and durably integrated, had differences. This set of t-tests suggests the development of a tri-racial color line in how crime change plays out across ethno-racial neighborhoods, with differences in patterns of crime change for all ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to both durably Black and durably White neighborhoods.

For property crime change, I find similar patterns for all ethno-racial neighborhoods except durably Black neighborhoods. These neighborhoods had an average increase in property crime rates of about two crimes per 1,000. Of the durable neighborhoods, durably Latino neighborhoods experienced the largest declines, and

durably White the smallest. Except for changed from White neighborhoods, all other changing neighborhoods experienced large crime declines. Like violent crime, durably White neighborhoods began and ended with the lowest crime levels. Additionally, neighborhoods that changed from Minority experienced the largest drop in property crime at a decrease of almost four crimes per 1,000. Despite large declines in neighborhoods that changed from Black, they remain with the highest property crime rates next to durably Black neighborhoods. Compared to durably White neighborhoods, all other neighborhoods had significant differences in patterns of crime change except for durably Minority and durably Integrated.

Table 7. Average Property Crime Rates by Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type (N=7,875)

	<i>Property Crime Change</i>	<i>Time 1</i>	<i>Time 2</i>
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
<i>Durable</i>			
Durably White	-1.31 (4.91) ⁺	8.43 (6.15)	7.13 (5.12)
Durably Black	2.00 (8.99) [*]	18.97 (9.69)	20.97 (9.05)
Durably Latino	-2.41 (3.77) ^{*+}	8.39 (5.72)	5.98 (4.47)
Durably Minority	-1.77 (5.03) ⁺	10.93 (7.71)	9.15 (6.31)
Durably Integrated	-1.61 (8.39) ⁺	12.32 (10.62)	10.71 (8.42)
<i>Changing</i>			
Changed from White	-0.78 (7.92) ^{*+}	9.69 (8.49)	8.91 (7.84)
Changed from Black	-3.54 (11.35) ^{*+}	20.03 (13.16)	16.48 (8.96)
Changed from Latino	-3.08 (7.14) ^{*+}	11.78 (10.51)	8.70 (6.26)
Changed from Minority	-3.94 (12.59) ^{*+}	12.78 (20.95)	8.84 (11.20)
Changed from Integrated	-1.99 (9.46) ^{*+}	13.53 (10.30)	11.54 (8.26)

Note: t-tests * p<.05 compared to durably White, + p<.05 compared to durably Black neighborhoods

These patterns of violent and property crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods highlight a replication of a Black/White crime divide at Time 2, where they remain at opposite ends of the violent crime rates (durably White at the lowest and durably Black at the highest). My findings suggest different patterns than what may be expected from prior literature. I do not find that neighborhood crime declines

concentrate in neighborhoods that began with the highest crime rates (Friedson and Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018, 2020) or those that were already the most privileged (Papachristos et al., 2018). Instead, the story is more complex, and how crime declines manifest across racial neighborhoods over time may be related to how the racial composition of their population changes. I find that neighborhoods that were more likely to have increases in their White populations (changed from Black, changed from Latino, changed from Minority) had some of the largest violent and property crime declines. For example, Black neighborhoods began with the highest violent crime rates but experienced the largest declines when integrating (changed from Black); otherwise, they had some of the smallest changes in crime rates (durably Black). Except for neighborhoods that began as White, all others experienced larger declines when they integrated compared to if they remained durable. These findings suggest that crime declines may be more pronounced in neighborhoods with increased White residents. This may suggest a tri-racial pattern where these changing neighborhoods shift toward durably White neighborhoods and other segregated neighborhoods (durably Latino and durably Black) maintain differences.

City-level

Next, I descriptively explore the city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration. These trends reinforce what we know about B/W residential segregation and immigration (Logan et al., 2004; Massey et al., 2009; Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). On average, B/W residential segregation is decreasing across cities in the United States. Interestingly, the patterns of immigration are a little bit more complex. When examining the changes in the individual components of the

immigration index, I find divergent patterns. Specifically, while most cities have increasing foreign-born populations and linguistic isolation, the percentage of new immigrants is slightly declining. Overall, the immigration index highlights a rising immigrant population at the city level (Table 8).

Table 8. Change in Primary City-Level Independent Variables (n=75)

	<i>Change</i>	<i>Time 1</i>	<i>Time 2</i>
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
B/W Residential Segregation	-2.69 (4.61)	46.90 (18.27)	44.20 (16.37)
Immigration Index	0.00 (0.21)	0.00 (0.97)	0.0 (0.97)
Percent New Immigrant	-0.64 (1.92)	7.31 (5.23)	6.67 (4.43)
Percent Linguistically Isolated	0.78 (1.38)	6.56 (7.39)	7.34 (7.39)
Percent Foreign Born	2.18 (2.23)	15.63 (12.58)	17.81 (12.63)

Since I am interested in how B/W residential segregation and immigration interact, I examine the variation in patterns of change in B/W segregation and immigration change across cities. Of note, there are no cities where B/W segregation and immigration stayed the same; thus, only four categories are present in table 9. The table shows that most cities experienced decreasing immigration and B/W residential segregation (41%). The second largest proportion of cities had increasing immigration and decreasing segregation (29%). And of note, there are some cities where both immigration and B/W segregation are increasing (16%), and immigration is decreasing, but segregation is increasing (13%) (Table 9).

Table 9. Changing Immigration and B/W Segregation across Cities (n=75)

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Immigration & B/W Segregation Increasing	12	16.00%
Immigration Increasing & B/W Segregation Decreasing	22	29.33%
Immigration Decreasing & B/W Segregation Increasing	10	13.33%
Immigration & B/W Segregation Decreasing	31	41.33%

The distribution of ethno-racial neighborhoods also varies across the patterns of change in city immigration and B/W segregation (table 10). Overall, all the ethno-

racial neighborhoods are most common in cities with decreasing immigration and B/W segregation. For durable neighborhoods, there is variation in durably White, durably Black, and durably Integrated neighborhoods across the other city patterns. However, less than 1% of durably Latino and durably Minority neighborhoods are in cities with increasing immigration and segregation. For changing neighborhoods, a similar pattern holds with changed from White, changed from Black, and changed from Integrated spread across the city combinations of segregation and immigration, while changed from Latino and changed from Minority are not represented much in cities with increasing immigration and segregation.

Overall, the distribution of ethno-racial neighborhoods suggests that, although city levels of B/W segregation and immigration may change, there is some variation in exposure to city conditions for ethno-racial neighborhoods. More specifically, specific ethno-racial neighborhoods are not limited to cities with only one pattern of segregation and immigration change. This is important for my analysis in understanding how the range of possibilities of change in cities with segregation and immigration shapes different neighborhoods. Given that all ethno-racial neighborhoods experience different combinations of segregation and immigration change, it is important to understand how these different patterns create a unique set of circumstances that shape their ability to control crime.

Table 10. Distribution of Ethno-Racial Neighborhoods by City B/W Segregation and Immigration Change

	Immigration & B/W Segregation Increasing	Immigration Increasing & B/W Segregation Decreasing	Immigration Decreasing & B/W Segregation Increasing	Immigration & B/W Segregation Decreasing
<i>Durable</i>				
Durably White	10.03%	24.16%	13.23%	52.32%
Durably Black	16.50%	18.39%	5.29%	59.82%
Durably Latino	0.73%	10.05%	20.84%	68.37%
Durably Minority	0.89%	9.38%	10.71%	79.02%
Durably Integrated	11.04%	20.57%	11.44%	56.94%
<i>Changing</i>				
Changed from White	15.25%	26.55%	13.45%	44.75%
Changed from Black	10.48%	25.71%	8.57%	55.24%
Changed from Latino	1.25%	2.50%	22.50%	73.75%
Changed from Minority	0.00%	6.38%	12.06%	81.56%
Changed from Integrated	12.55%	16.97%	19.37%	51.11%

Fixed Effects Linear Regression

Violent Crime Change

In the regression model below, I estimate the relationship between changing city levels of immigration and B/W residential segregation on neighborhood violent crime change for different ethno-racial neighborhoods, including all controls. Since I am interested in the racial divide in crime change, the models presented use Durably Black neighborhoods as the reference category. Still, I include comparisons to Stayed White to explore a White/non-White divide and comparisons between all other ethno-racial neighborhoods to examine a tri-racial divide in how city changes in B/W segregation and immigration shape crime change. Looking at the controls, I find that increasing percentages of recently moved populations in the city are associated with

declining neighborhood violent crime rates, and population growth is associated with decreasing violent crime. Also, as expected, neighborhood-level measures are related to violent crime change. Specifically, increasing neighborhood disadvantage increases violent crime, increasing males between 15-34 reduces crime, and increasing proportions of renters increases crime. Also, spatial proximity to high-crime neighborhoods increases violent crime. (Table 11).

Table 11. Fixed Effects Regression Predicting Violent Crime Change (N=7,785)

Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City Immigration Change X City B/W Segregation Change	β (SE)	
Durably White	-1.51 (0.352)	**
Changed from White	-1.51 (0.338)	**
Changed from Black	-1.57 (0.598)	*
Durably Latino	-0.74 (0.650)	
Changed from Latino	-1.33 (1.343)	
Durably Minority	-2.08 (0.439)	**
Changed from Minority	-2.44 (1.366)	
Durably Integrated	-1.29 (0.316)	**
Changed from Integrated	-1.27 (0.372)	**
Number of observations	7875	

Notes: Durably Black are the reference category. All controls are included in the model. Standard errors are clustered on the city and reported in parentheses. Estimates for the full model are included in appendix B. ** p<.01, * p<.05

Examining the relationship between city changes in immigration and B/W residential segregation for the different ethno-racial neighborhoods, I find that compared to Durably Black neighborhoods, increasing city immigration and B/W segregation is associated with larger violent crime declines in all other ethno-racial

neighborhoods (except changed from Latino). These findings suggest a Black/non-Black divide separating how changes in immigration and B/W residential segregation in cities impact durably Black neighborhoods compared to other neighborhoods. The comparisons between the other ethno-racial neighborhoods and durably White neighborhoods reinforce this. I do not find evidence that the relationship between city changes in immigration and segregation differs for most of the ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably White (table 12). There are differences between durably Black neighborhoods (as expected) and also with neighborhoods that were durably Minority compared to durably White neighborhoods.

To suggest a White/non-White divide in these patterns, I would expect differences between durably White neighborhoods and all other ethno-racial neighborhoods in relation to changing immigration and segregation. However, I do not have any evidence to support this hypothesis. Additionally, to find evidence of a tri-racial pattern, I would expect that durably White and durably Black neighborhoods have differences from all other ethno-racial neighborhoods. However, given that I find differences for the other ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably Black neighborhoods, but not durably White neighborhoods, my findings do not suggest a tri-racial divide. I find apparent differences in how city changes in immigration and B/W segregation shape violent crime change for durably Black neighborhoods that indicate a Black/non-Black pattern.

Table 12. F-Tests Comparing the effect of B/W Segregation and Immigration on Violent Crime Change to Durably White Neighborhoods


	<i>Violent Crime Change</i>
	F-statistic
<i>Durable</i>	
Durably Black	18.37***
Durably Latino	2.70
Durably Minority	5.67**
Durably Integrated	3.80
<i>Changing</i>	
Changed from White	0.01
Changed from Black	0.01
Changed from Latino	0.02
Changed from Minority	0.50
Changed from Integrated	1.35

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To discuss this Black/non-Black pattern, I look more closely at the predicted violent crime change at varying levels of change in immigration and segregation. For durably Black neighborhoods, I find that the influence of immigration depends on the change in B/W segregation (figure 1). The relationship between B/W segregation and immigration on violent crime change for these neighborhoods depends on whether segregation is declining or increasing and at what rate of change. When durably Black neighborhoods are in cities with dramatic declines in B/W segregation (minus 1 SD=-7.31), increasing city levels of immigration are beneficial in reducing violent crime. However, when durably Black neighborhoods are in cities with smaller declines in B/W segregation (mean=-2.69) or increases (plus 1 SD=1.92), increasing immigration increases violent crime. These findings suggest that how immigration and segregation work together to change violent crime for durably Black neighborhoods depends on how B/W residential segregation is changing and indicate that the consequences of B/W residential segregation may be larger than directly influencing neighborhood

resources and restrict benefits of other city-wide changes for durably Black neighborhoods.


Figure 1. Predicted Violent Crime Change for Durably Black Neighborhoods



Note: The values of segregation change represent the city-level mean (-2.69) and one standard deviation above (1.92), and one below (-7.31).

Looking directly at the non-Black neighborhoods (figure 4), I find that changing levels of B/W segregation and immigration shape violent crime change for these neighborhoods similarly (Figure 2). Though there appears to be more variation in the point estimates for the ethno-racial neighborhoods when B/W residential segregation is increasing (=1.92) or decreasing more than the mean (= -7.31) for these neighborhoods, overall, the confidence intervals highlight that the influence of B/W residential segregation and immigration is not differentiable for these neighborhoods (see appendix C for each neighborhood separately).

Figure 2. Predicted Violent Crime Change for Non-Black Neighborhoods



Note: The values of segregation change represent the city-level mean (-2.69) and one standard deviation above (1.92), and one below (-7.31).

As highlighted in the comparisons to durably White and durably Black neighborhoods, there is no evidence that the relationship between changing B/W segregation and immigration is different for durably Latino neighborhoods. However, there may be some unexplained variation in Latino neighborhoods related to their racial identity. Latino neighborhoods include White-Hispanic and Black-Hispanic; perhaps this is why there may not be differences with either durably White or durably Black neighborhoods. This finding does not necessarily counter the larger Black/non-Black divide in the change in neighborhood violent crime. Instead, it might suggest that durably Latino neighborhoods may need to be disaggregated further with their racial identity. Doing this might help parse out the variation in the relationship of changing city B/W segregation and immigration on crime change in these neighborhoods and understand where they fall in this divide.

These findings suggest that B/W segregation is so detrimental to durably Black neighborhoods that only when it declines do these neighborhoods experience the benefits of increasing immigration. Specifically, B/W segregation continues to marginalize durably Black neighborhoods. It isolates them from the potential benefits of immigration and sets them on a different path of crime change from other neighborhoods. The takeaway is that immigration does not outweigh the consequences of Black/White segregation; instead, continued B/W segregation impedes Black neighborhoods from experiencing the crime reduction benefits that may come from increasing immigration in a city.

Property Crime Change

In the subsequent analyses, I estimate the relationship between changing city levels of immigration and B/W residential segregation on neighborhood property crime change for different ethno-racial neighborhoods, including all controls (Table 13). For the controls, I find that, similarly to violent crime, increased city proportions of recently moved populations are associated with decreasing neighborhood property crime. Additionally, neighborhood-level increases in vacant housing units, disadvantage, and proximity to neighborhoods with higher property crime are all associated with increasing neighborhood property crime rates.

Table 13. Fixed Effects Regression Predicting Property Crime Change (N=7,875)

Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City Immigration Change X City B/W Segregation Change	β (SE)
Durably White	-2.17 (1.186)
Changed from White	-2.16 (1.194)
Changed from Black	-2.32 (2.910)
Durably Latino	-2.58 (1.574)
Changed from Latino	-5.19 (3.305)
Durably Minority	-1.89 (1.400)
Changed from Minority	-2.85 (1.789)
Durably Integrated	-1.63 (1.194)
Changed from Integrated	-1.36 (1.241)
Number of observations	7875

Notes: Durably Black are the reference category. All controls are included in the model. Estimates for the full model are included in appendix D. Standard errors are clustered on the city and reported in parentheses. ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Examining the relationship between city changes in B/W segregation and immigration on changes in property crime rates for different ethno-racial neighborhoods, I find different results than those for violent crime change. I do not find evidence of a color line for property crime differentiating the patterns of B/W segregation and immigration on neighborhood crime change between the ethno-racial neighborhoods (Table 13 and Table 14). These results are different than the Black/non-Black color line present for violent crime change. They suggest that the relationship between city B/W segregation and immigration may not differ across ethno-racial neighborhoods for property crime or that I am not able to identify a difference.

Table 14. F-Tests Comparing the effect of B/W Segregation and Immigration on Property Crime Change to Durably White neighborhoods


	<i>Violent Crime Change</i>
	F-statistic
<i>Durable</i>	
Durably Black	3.36
Durably Latino	0.12
Durably Minority	0.12
Durably Integrated	4.99**
<i>Changing</i>	
Changed from White	0.00
Changed from Black	0.00
Changed from Latino	0.87
Changed from Minority	0.20
Changed from Integrated	3.02

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Even though there is no evidence of differences between ethno-racial groups, I still examine durably Black neighborhoods specifically. Looking at the predicted changes in property crime at varying levels of immigration and B/W segregation change, I find a slightly different pattern for durably Black neighborhoods compared to violent crime change (Figure 3). Like violent crime, I find that when durably Black neighborhoods are in cities with dramatic declines in city B/W segregation (minus 1 SD=-7.31), increased city immigration reduces property crime.

I also find that when in cities where B/W segregation declines at the mean (mean= -2.69), smaller declines in immigration also help reduce property crime for durably Black neighborhoods. These patterns highlight that for property crime, declining B/W segregation (at any rate) and increasing immigration lower property crime rates for durably Black neighborhoods (see appendix E for all other ethno-racial neighborhoods).

Figure 3. Predicted Property Crime Change for Durably Black Neighborhoods



Note: The values of segregation change represent the city-level mean (-2.69) and one standard deviation above (1.92), and one below (-7.31).

Sensitivity Analyses

Immigrant Race

In the next set of analyses, I look more closely at the heterogeneity in immigrant race at the city level. For the cities in my analysis, the increase in the foreign-born is driven by increases in all racial groups (White, Asian, Black, and Hispanic). The Hispanic foreign-born population grew the most on average, followed by the Asian and Black foreign-born populations. Although slightly increasing on average, the White foreign-born remained relatively constant in the cities. This trend highlights that across the cities in the sample, the racial composition of immigrants remained heterogeneous, with larger growth in non-White foreign-born groups (Table 15).

Table 15. Immigrant Race Descriptive Statistics

	<i>Change</i>	<i>Time 1</i>	<i>Time 2</i>
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Percent Foreign Born	2.18 (2.23)	15.63 (12.58)	17.81 (12.63)
Percent White Foreign Born	0.08 (0.60)	2.74 (2.07)	2.82 (2.37)
Percent Black Foreign Born	0.43 (0.53)	1.00 (1.58)	1.43 (1.97)
Percent Asian Foreign Born	0.72 (0.94)	3.43 (3.47)	4.14 (3.93)
Percent Hispanic Foreign Born	0.90 (1.50)	7.97 (10.97)	8.87 (10.86)

Next, I examine how the relationship between city changes in B/W segregation and immigration on neighborhood crime change varies depending on the race of the immigrants (Black, White non-Hispanic, Asian, Hispanic) (Tables 16 and 17). I compare these findings to those for the total foreign-born population since it captures all immigration. I estimate the models using each measure of immigration independently and then estimate a set of seemingly unrelated regressions to compare the coefficients across the models.

First, compared to durably White neighborhoods, I find that increasing foreign-born populations and B/W residential segregation are associated with increasing violent and property crime in durably Black neighborhoods (Table 16). Additionally, I see differences in the relationship between increasing overall foreign-born and B/W segregation for other ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably Black neighborhoods for violent crime change. These findings are the same as those in the main models reported above. However, I do not find evidence of this relationship when examining each racial immigrant group individually for violent and property crime. These findings suggest the same Black/non-Black divide that I find in the main models presented above when measuring the change in the overall percent of foreign-born in the city. However, my findings do not support a Black/non-Black

divide when examining city immigration for each racial group separately (see Appendix F for comparison to durably White neighborhoods).

Table 16. Fixed Effects Linear Regression Predicting Crime Change for Race-specific Immigration Measures (Durably Black reference)

Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City Immigration Change X City B/W Segregation Change	% Foreign Born		% White Foreign Born		% Black Foreign Born		% Asian Foreign Born		% Hispanic Foreign Born	
	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change
<i>Durable</i>										
Durably White	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.20** (0.08)								
Durably Latino	-0.14** (0.04)		-0.93** (0.45)				-0.54** (0.25)			
Durably Minority	-0.19** (0.04)				-0.91** (0.43)				-0.21** (0.07)	
Durably Integrated										
<i>Changing</i>										
Changed from White	-0.10** (0.04)					-1.99** (0.92)				
Changed from Black	-0.19** (0.08)									
Changed from Latino			-1.09** (0.54)						-0.22** (0.10)	
Changed from Minority					-1.91** (0.89)					
Changed from Integrated										

Note: These are the coefficients and standard errors for the regression using durably Black as the reference category for the three-way interaction (immigration, segregation, neighborhood type). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. Estimates of the complete models available upon request. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Although there is some variation between the models in the relationships between changing immigration and segregation on crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods, I do not find any evidence that these relationships vary by the racial composition of the immigrants. Using a set of seemingly unrelated regressions, I find

that for all other ethno-racial neighborhoods, there is no evidence that the relationship between immigration and segregation on neighborhood violent crime changes depending on immigrant race. Similarly, I do not find any evidence for property crime change that the relationship between segregation and immigration varies by immigrant race for all ethno-racial neighborhoods. These findings suggest an immigration effect and not a race effect (immigrant-race effect), where overall city changes in immigration shape neighborhood crime change for ethno-racial neighborhoods. These findings suggest that overall city levels of immigration may be more important in understanding the multi-level context of immigration on neighborhood racial inequality in crime change than the race of the immigrants.

Quantile Regression

As a sensitivity analysis, I conducted a set of quantile regressions to compare the relationship between city changes in segregation and immigration for the ethno-racial neighborhoods when examining different portions of the distribution of crime change. I then estimate a set of simultaneous quantile regressions with bootstrapped standard errors that allow me to compare the coefficients directly for each quartile (25, 50, and 75). I do not find any evidence that the relationships between city changes in B/W segregation and immigration for both property and violent crime change for ethno-racial neighborhoods vary depending on the quartile of crime change.

For violent crime change, I find evidence of a Black/non-Black divide when examining the relationship at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the distribution of violent crime change. These findings support the findings from my main models that

when durably Black neighborhoods are in cities with increasing B/W segregation and immigration, they have smaller associated crime declines than other ethno-racial neighborhoods across the entire distribution of crime change. That is, it does not matter if crime change was relatively high or low, the influence of city changes in segregation and immigration on the divide in neighborhood crime change was similar.

Table 17. Quantile Regression Predicting Violent Crime Change (50th percentile)

Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type # City Immigration Change # City B/W Segregation Change	β (se)
Stayed White	-0.90 ** (0.298)
Changed from White	-0.92 ** (0.296)
Changed from Black	-0.98 (0.667)
Stayed Latino	-0.20 (0.452)
Changed from Latino	-1.16 * (0.556)
Stayed Minority	-1.59 ** (0.309)
Changed from Minority	-1.10 (0.969)
Stayed Integrated	-0.89 ** (0.290)
Changed from Integrated	-0.86 ** (0.334)

Notes: These estimates are for the models at the 50th percentile. Simultaneous Quantile Regression Models suggest no statistical differences at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile. Durably Black is the reference category. All controls are included in the model. Standard errors are clustered in the city and reported in parentheses. Estimates for the full model are included in appendix G.

However, for property crime change, my findings are different than those found in the main models that predict the average property crime change. Examining the changes in the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of property crime change, I now find support for a Black/non-Black divide in patterns of property crime change. These

findings suggest that durably Black neighborhoods will have smaller associated property crime declines compared to all other ethno-racial neighborhoods across the distribution of crime change when they are in cities with increasing segregation and immigration. These findings are different from the main models predicting average property crime change, where I do not find any evidence of a color line. The quantile regression models suggest that when examining parts of the distribution separately, property crime may be similar in some ways to violent crime, and city segregation and immigration may work together to shape a Black/non-Black divide in crime change.

Table 18. Quantile Regression Predicting Property Crime Change (50th percentile)

Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type # City Immigration Change # City B/W Segregation Change	β (se)
Stayed White	-3.22 ** (0.729)
Changed from White	-3.27 ** (0.735)
Changed from Black	-3.02 (1.603)
Stayed Latino	-3.35 ** (0.807)
Changed from Latino	-2.84 (1.640)
Stayed Minority	-2.45 * (1.152)
Changed from Minority	-3.67 (2.463)
Stayed Integrated	-3.11 ** (0.741)
Changed from Integrated	-3.11 ** (0.808)

Notes: These estimates are for the models at the 50th percentile. Simultaneous Quantile Regression Models suggest no statistical differences at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile. Durably Black is the reference category. All controls are included in the model. Standard errors are clustered in the city and reported in parentheses. Estimates for the full model are included in appendix H.

Chapter 5: Discussion

The longstanding ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime is well established in the prior literature (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Lyons et al., 2022), but what remains contested is the extent to which crime declines are concentrated across ethno-racial neighborhoods (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Papachristos et al., 2018). There may be important variation across cities in how their demographic characteristics change over time, shaping how crime declines manifest across ethno-racial neighborhoods. I hypothesize that it is the changing city conditions of B/W residential segregation and immigration that shape the variation in crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods. To explore this, I first examined the varying levels of crime change for 10 distinct ethno-racial neighborhoods. I then examined the role of changing city levels of immigration and B/W residential segregation on inequality in crime change across these neighborhoods. Specifically, I suggest three possible color lines that may develop in response: (1) a White/non-White divide, (2) a tri-racial divide or (3) a Black/non-Black divide (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; Lee & Bean, 2007; 2010).

The Color Line

Violent Crime Change

For a White/non-White divide I expected that all other ethno-racial neighborhoods²⁰ would have differences in patterns of crime change compared to

²⁰ I refer to durably Latino, durably Minority, durably Integrated, changed from White, changed from Black, changed from Latino, changed from Minority and changed from Integrated neighborhoods as “all other ethno-racial neighborhoods.”

durably White neighborhoods, but no differences compared to durably Black. This divide may develop through the unification of Latinos and Asians with Blacks in their status as racial minorities. This pattern suggests that the traditional White/Black divide would extend to include these groups on the Black side of the range (Hollinger, 2008; Portez et al., 2005; Bonilla-Silva). These neighborhoods would also have patterns similar to each other. I expected that there would be differences in how B/W segregation and immigration shape crime declines in these neighborhoods compared to durably White neighborhoods. However, I do not find evidence of this White/non-White divide because (1) the other ethno-racial neighborhoods have significant differences in crime change compared to durably White *and* durably Black neighborhoods and (2) there is no evidence that the relationship between city changes in segregation and immigration on crime change differ for the other ethno-racial neighborhoods (except for durably Black) compared durably White neighborhoods.

While all other types of ethno-racial neighborhoods do have significant differences from durably White neighborhoods in levels of crime change, they also maintain differences from durably Black neighborhoods. Additionally, I do not find that when city B/W segregation and immigration change the impact on neighborhood violent crime change differs for the other types of ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably White neighborhoods. A potential White/non-White divide is not supported as I do not see clear differences in patterns between durably White neighborhoods and the rest of the other ethno-racial neighborhoods. Also, the rest of the neighborhoods are not unified in their patterns of crime change since I find

differences between the other ethno-racial neighborhoods and durably Black neighborhoods.

These findings could suggest a tri-racial divide in neighborhood violent crime change, where I expected differences in levels of crime change for all ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably Black and durably White neighborhoods. That is that all other ethno-racial neighborhoods would have levels of violent crime change that are significantly different from durably White and durably Black neighborhoods. The variation in racial/ethnic identities of new immigrant groups may foster the development of this divide and differentiate traditional White, honorary Whites, and collective Blacks (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; Lee & Bean, 2007). Additionally, I expect that city changes in B/W segregation and immigration would influence neighborhood crime differently for all other ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably White and durably Black neighborhoods.

The patterns of neighborhood violent crime change I see suggest that there are differences in violent crime change for all other ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably White and durably Black neighborhoods. However, I do not find any evidence that city changes in B/W segregation and immigration shape neighborhood violent crime change differently for the other ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably White and durably White Black neighborhoods. I do see differences in the other ethno-racial neighborhoods in the impact of city changes in B/W segregation and immigration for violent crime change compared to durably Black neighborhoods. However, I do not find evidence of differences from durably White neighborhoods. This suggests that the other ethno-racial neighborhoods do not fit into the divide

between durably White and durably Black neighborhoods, rather they may be closer to White neighborhoods in their relationship with city level sources of changing segregation and immigration suggesting a Black/non-Black divide.

For a Black/non-Black divide in neighborhood crime change, I expect differences between durably Black neighborhoods and all other ethno-racial neighborhoods in levels of crime change. I also expect that when located in cities with increasing B/W segregation and immigration durably Black neighborhoods will have smaller associated crime declines compared to all other ethno-racial neighborhoods. I find support for both of these expectations that (1) durably Black neighborhoods have significant differences in violent crime change from other ethno-racial neighborhoods and (2) city increases in B/W segregation and immigration are associated with smaller declines in violent crime for durably Black compared to all other ethno-racial neighborhoods.

This Black/non-Black divide is maintained through the racial, social structure that not only reinforces B/W segregation but may also deteriorate ties between minority groups and concentrate the benefits of immigration in some neighborhoods over others (Krivo et al., 2009). Also, continued B/W segregation is associated with unequal pathways of neighborhood crime change through changing levels of concentrated disadvantage that result in disparities across ethno-racial neighborhoods (Lyons et al., 2022). The protective influence of immigration on crime may be restricted from Black neighborhoods when B/W segregation increases. At the same time, B/W segregation may not weaken the benefits of immigration for White, Latino,

and other ethno-racial neighborhoods. Latino and White neighborhoods may be protected from increasing B/W residential segregation but not Black neighborhoods.

In support of my hypotheses, I find a difference in the patterns between durably Black and non-Black neighborhoods. Specifically, when B/W residential segregation and immigration increase, other ethno-racial neighborhoods have larger associated crime declines than durably Black neighborhoods. This pattern suggests that these city changes may be working together to concentrate disadvantages and marginalize Black neighborhoods in particular. However, looking closely at the patterns in durably Black neighborhoods, it is clear that the influence of changing B/W segregation and immigration is more nuanced.

While durably Black neighborhoods differ from other ethno-racial neighborhoods, there is also heterogeneity in crime change within durably Black neighborhoods depending on how city B/W residential segregation and immigration change. For durably Black neighborhoods, the relationship between these forces depends on whether B/W residential segregation is increasing or decreasing. Specifically, in cities where B/W segregation declines, increasing immigration helps lower violent crime rates for durably Black neighborhoods. This finding suggests that the consequences of B/W segregation for Black neighborhoods are so large that they only experience the city-wide benefits of immigration when B/W segregation is declining at a larger rate. The findings also suggest that increasing B/W segregation and immigration are associated with rising violent crime rates for durably Black neighborhoods.

Property Crime Change

My findings suggest a Black/non-Black color line in how city B/W segregation and immigration impact neighborhood violent crime change. However, the relationship for property crime is different. The descriptive results suggest similar patterns to violent crime change where all other ethno-racial neighborhoods have significantly different levels of crime change compared to durably White and durably Black neighborhoods. However, I do not find support that when city B/W segregation and immigration change the influence on neighborhood property crime change varies across ethno-racial neighborhoods. More specifically, I do not identify any differences in the impact of city changes in B/W segregation and immigration between all the ethno-racial neighborhoods. These models do not suggest a clear color line separating the influence of city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration on changes in property crime for different ethno-racial neighborhoods.

I examine the patterns for durably Black neighborhoods despite lacking support for my hypotheses about the color line. Durably Black neighborhoods have a more nuanced relationship with city changes in B/W segregation and immigration that is conditional on the rate of decline in segregation for violent crime declines. Hence, I examine if this pattern holds for property crime change. For durably Black neighborhoods that are in cities with declining B/W segregation and increasing immigration, there are larger associated property crime declines. These findings are slightly different from those for violent crime change. For property crime, any city declines (at the mean or larger) in B/W segregation and increasing immigration are protective for durably Black neighborhoods. For violent crime change, only drastic

declines in city B/W residential segregation (minus 1 SD) are protective. Though being in cities with smaller declines in B/W segregation may be beneficial for durably Black neighborhoods for property crime change, overall city declining segregation and increasing immigration are helpful in working to reduce neighborhood violent and property crime rates.

Unpacking Durably Black Neighborhoods

My findings elucidate the intractability of B/W residential segregation in marginalizing durably Black neighborhoods. Segregation concentrates structural disadvantages in Black neighborhoods, resulting in higher violent crime rates (Massey & Denton, 1993; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Light & Thomas, 2018; Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Combined with the unequal distribution of social and economic resources across racial groups, segregation leads to heightened rates of poverty and other adverse conditions (e.g., joblessness, family disruption, lack of education, etc.) in Black neighborhoods (Light & Thomas, 2019; Sampson et al., 2018; Sampson & Wilson, 1995). The racial, social structure perpetuates these consequences of segregation and organizes institutional resources along racial lines that reinforce White privilege and harm Blacks. Through the organization of the housing market, schools, health care, criminal justice, labor market, and other policies, this hierarchy continues to create structurally inequitable neighborhoods for racial groups.

Peterson and Krivo (2010) imply that city residential segregation creates unequal neighborhood conditions through an unequal distribution of resources that concentrates disadvantages in Black neighborhoods. Krivo and colleagues (2009) find

that all ethno-racial neighborhoods have higher crime rates when located in cities with high levels of B/W residential segregation. But Whites are less likely to live in these cities, and Blacks are more likely to reside in them (Krivo et al., 2009; Massey and Tannen, 2015), heightening the consequences of increasing segregation in these neighborhoods. Additionally, the magnitude to which segregation concentrates disadvantages in Black neighborhoods makes them vulnerable to a combination of harmful structural conditions that lead to higher crime rates. These consequences of segregation on crime change may be unique to Black neighborhoods and suggest that they remain isolated from other citywide changes that could benefit these neighborhoods. Additionally, given that Black neighborhoods are more likely to be in cities with higher levels of B/W residential segregation, the consequences of increasing segregation may be heightened compared to all other ethno-racial neighborhoods.

My findings suggest that slight declines in city levels of B/W segregation are not enough to change the context of segregation from high to moderately segregated and make a difference in the structural contexts for durably Black neighborhoods²¹. For this reason, larger declines in B/W residential segregation may be necessary to sustain changes in violent crime and allow for immigration to work to reduce crime in these neighborhoods. The results suggest some important findings given that as B/W residential segregation declines at a larger rate, increasing immigration works to reduce violent crime for durably Black neighborhoods. This finding is possibly driven

²¹ In my sample, durably Black neighborhoods begin and end the period with the highest levels of disadvantage and had the most minor declines in disadvantage)

by the fact that Black residents are more likely to live in hyper-segregated cities. Although the number of hyper-segregated cities has declined over time, those that remain hyper-segregated have not changed much in levels of Black segregation (Massey and Tannen, 2015). My data include eight cities²² that Massey and Tannen (2015) identified as hypersegregated in 2010. Hypersegregated cities are those where Blacks are segregated on at least four of the five dimensions of segregation (unevenness, isolation, clustering, concentration, and centralization). For the dissimilarity index as a measure of unevenness that I use in these analyses, they identify highly segregated areas as those with a dissimilarity index of 60 or greater, moderate with 30 to 60, and low with less than 30. In my data, durably Black neighborhoods are likelier to be in high segregation cities than durably White neighborhoods, which are in moderately segregated cities on average.

Additionally, by 2010, about 1/3 of Black urban residents still lived in hyper-segregated cities suggesting that it may take larger declines in B/W segregation for these residents to feel the benefits associated with declining segregation and increasing immigration (Massey & Tannen, 2015). The cities likely to see some decline in segregation (i.e., at the mean level) may remain hyper-segregated, sustaining a uniquely disadvantaged environment for durably Black neighborhoods. For durably Black neighborhoods to experience the benefits of immigration and alleviate some of the harshest consequences of B/W segregation, they may need to be located in cities with larger declines in segregation that shift them from hyper to moderately segregated.

²² Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Boston, Dayton, Hartford, Kansas City

As the extant literature suggests, B/W residential segregation shapes inequality in neighborhood crime and higher crime rates in Black neighborhoods through concentrated disadvantage (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson & Wilson, 1995; Sampson et al., 2018). In my analysis, I find declines in B/W segregation and increasing immigration work to reduce crime for durably Black neighborhoods, net of changes in disadvantage. This suggests that segregation and immigration shape crime in these neighborhoods outside of changing their levels of disadvantage. One element that may be important is the ability of changes in B/W residential segregation and increasing immigration to change levels of collective efficacy throughout a city that may work to reduce crime. I cannot measure collective efficacy in my models because it would be almost impossible to have this information across 75 cities. However, patterns of collective efficacy are important for understanding the mechanisms that may be important in explaining this relationship and may help understand the findings.

When B/W residential segregation is high, it inhibits the ability of communities to organize to solve problems such as crime collectively (Krivo et al., 2009). More specifically, there will be limited partnerships across racial groups within the city that otherwise may aid in city-wide crime reduction. However, when B/W segregation is declining, this may mean that racial groups can collectively organize and work to solve city-wide problems that lead to crime reduction for all neighborhoods, especially durably Black neighborhoods (Krivo et al., 2009). Additionally, because Black neighborhoods maintain extremely high levels of disadvantage and high rates of social isolation (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson &

Wilson, 1995; Wilson, 1987), the positive impacts of revitalization may only benefit these neighborhoods when B/W segregation is declining. These patterns may explain why, despite controlling for changing levels of disadvantage, changes in city B/W residential segregation and immigration still impact violent crime change for durably Black neighborhoods.

The Color Line and Durably Latino Neighborhoods

Though B/W segregation concentrates disadvantages in all non-White neighborhoods, my findings for durably Latino neighborhoods do not suggest a clear pattern compared to durably White and durably Black neighborhoods. For durably Latino neighborhoods, I find that their levels of crime change are different from both durably White and durably Black neighborhoods. However, I do not find any evidence that city changes in B/W segregation and immigration shape crime change differently for durably Latino neighborhoods compared to durably White or durably Black neighborhoods. The lack of a difference compared to durably Black and durably White neighborhoods makes it harder to identify which side of the color line they fall on.

Theoretically there are a few possibilities of where Latino neighborhoods might fall on this color line. By concentrating disadvantages in all communities of color (Peterson & Krivo, 2010), B/W residential segregation may sustain structural conditions in Latino neighborhoods that are closer to those of Black neighborhoods and increase crime within Latino neighborhoods (Martinez, 2003; MacDonald & Sampson, 2012). This possibility suggests that Latino neighborhoods would fall on the non-White side of the White/non-White divide when B/W segregation changes.

Contrastingly, the Latino paradox suggests that higher rates of concentrated disadvantage do not increase crime in Latino neighborhoods (Sampson, 2008; Sandoval-Strausz, 2019). Given that Latino neighborhoods may experience more benefits through increased immigration and the development of ethnic enclaves (Sampson et al., 2018), their levels of crime change may be less dependent on patterns of B/W segregation suggesting a Black/non-Black divide. However, the findings do not suggest either of these patterns.

I do not find that changes in city B/W segregation and immigration explain patterns of neighborhood violent crime change differently for durably Latino compared to durably Black or durably White neighborhoods. However, there are differences between durably White and durably Black neighborhoods in the influence of city changes in B/W segregation and immigration on violent crime change. So, I contend that there is likely variation within durably Latino neighborhoods that may make it difficult to differentiate them from either durably White or durably Black neighborhoods.

Durably Latino neighborhoods are heterogenous in their racial makeup and likely include White and Black Latino residents. A potential tri-racial divide may separate light-skinned Latinos as Whites and dark-skinned Latinos as collective Blacks (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). This implies that differences in skin tone may be masked by including all Latinos as one racial/ethnic group in a single neighborhood and not considering the racial and ethnic identities of Latinos separately. It is possible that White-Latino neighborhoods share similarities to durably White neighborhoods and Black-Latino neighborhoods to durably Black neighborhoods. These

neighborhoods may have similar relationships with changing city B/W segregation and immigration, suggesting that the color line may still separate Black and non-Black racial groups without ethnic differences. This could explain the variation within durably Latino neighborhoods in the influence of B/W segregation and immigration, making them undistinguishable from the patterns for durably Black or durably White neighborhoods.

Examining the patterns for the other multi-ethnic neighborhoods (Integrated and Minority) might suggest that durably Latino neighborhoods would fall on the non-Black side of the divide. These other multi-ethnic neighborhoods have a mix of Black, Latino, and White residents (among different racial identities and multi-racial people) and likely include Black and White Latinos in their populations. Their differences in crime change compared to durably Black neighborhoods might suggest that White-Latino and Black-Latino neighborhoods would still land on the non-Black side of the divide. However, dividing White-Latinos and Black-Latinos as separate Latino neighborhoods may still be necessary for parsing out the variation in the relationship between city changes in segregation and immigration on crime change for these neighborhoods and allow us to identify the differences with durably Black neighborhoods.

The Durability of the Divide in Crime Declines

My analyses highlight that the ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime change endures through 2013. However, I also find some divergent results compared to previous work examining crime declines across ethno-racial neighborhoods (Papachristos et al., 2018; Friedson & Sharkey, 2015). Recall my earlier discussion

about whether US crime declines extend to neighborhoods and whether neighborhood crime declines are concentrated in neighborhoods with the highest initial crime rates (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018; 2020) or those that were more privileged (Papachristos et al., 2018). I discuss the levels of crime change for different ethno-racial neighborhoods below and suggest that neighborhood crime declines may be related to the changing racial composition of neighborhoods.

Durably Black and durably White neighborhoods remain at the two ends of the distribution of crime despite declines in violent crime for all neighborhoods. Notably, these neighborhoods have some of the most minor violent crime declines of all ethno-racial neighborhoods. For durably White neighborhoods, the small decreases in violent crime still sustain them with the lowest violent crime rates by 2013. However, slight declines in durably Black neighborhoods keep them at the highest end of the divide, with the highest crime rates in 2013. Though both neighborhood types have minor changes, this does not mean that small reductions have the same implications for them over time. For durably White neighborhoods, small changes keep them at the lowest, while for durably Black small changes keep them at the highest. These findings suggest that there is no clear pattern in crime change that depends solely on a neighborhood's initial crime rate, as indicated by previous work (Papachristos et al., 2018; Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018; 2020).

My findings are somewhat different than what we may expect from the literature, where the debate is centered around whether (1) the most privileged (Papachristos et al., 2018) or (2) the most disadvantaged and minority neighborhoods

(Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2018; 2020) had the largest declines in crime. I find that the largest violent crime declines were more likely to be concentrated in the neighborhoods that changed and became multi-ethnic (i.e., changed from Black, changed from Latino, and changed from Minority). These neighborhoods were more likely to become integrated with White, suggesting that neighborhoods that began with smaller White populations that increased over time had benefits associated with larger violent crime declines. Of note, these neighborhoods did begin with higher violent crime rates. Still, these findings suggest that it is not that neighborhoods that had the furthest to fall declined the most but did so when the racial composition shifted with increased White residents. This finding adds a layer of complexity to the previous debate about how crime declines are concentrated across neighborhoods. Looking at this pattern more closely and directly comparing to both durably White and durably Black neighborhoods, I find significant differences in their levels of violent crime change, suggesting a unique pattern for these other ethno-racial neighborhoods.

Similar patterns hold for property crime change with differences in crime change for all ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably White and durably Black neighborhoods. Like violent crime, the divide in property crime remains stable, with durably Latino and durably Black neighborhoods maintaining the two ends of the range. However, one important difference is that durably Black neighborhoods stand out with increased property crime on average. This is not entirely unexpected, given a similar finding in the extant literature (Krivo et al., 2020; Lyons et al., 2022). This finding highlights a divergent pattern for durably Black neighborhoods for

property crime change compared to all other ethno-racial neighborhoods. Patterns for property crime change also indicate that some of the largest declines are in neighborhoods that became multi-ethnic (changed from Black, changed from Latino, and changed from Minority). Once again, it is not only that these neighborhoods began with the highest property crime rates and thus had the largest potential for change; instead, they experienced larger crime declines with increasing White residents.

An increase in White residents in these neighborhoods may mean a change in the structural conditions that lead to larger reductions in crime. White neighborhoods are largely protected from the most deleterious conditions and are more likely to have concentrated advantages because of the racialized history of social and economic policies (Sampson et al., 2018; Krivo et al., 2009). Residential segregation shields Whites from crime and other social problems through increased privileges in access to resources and social institutions (Peterson & Krivo, 2010). Thus, an increase in the number of White residents may mean that these neighborhoods have increased access to social and economic institutions that can reduce disadvantages and result in larger declines in crime for these neighborhoods. These patterns for violent and property crime change might suggest that these neighborhoods that integrated with White may exhibit patterns like White neighborhoods and remain protected from the deleterious consequences of B/W residential segregation that impact Black neighborhoods reinforcing the development of a Black/non-Black divide I find in how city changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration shape crime change.

Implications of Studying the Early 2000s

To fully understand how these changing demographics of B/W segregation and immigration shape neighborhood crime change, I consider the implications of the period of this analysis in explaining my findings. The early 2000s highlight a unique time in the history of immigration, segregation, and crime change in the US. By 2010, the overall foreign-born population reached 40 million, the largest raw #s in US history (Camarota, 2011). From 2000 to 2010, almost 14 million new immigrants settled in the US, marking the highest decade of immigration in history (Foner et al., 2018). Immigrants continued to settle in new immigrant destinations, moving away from traditional destinations with longer histories of immigration. Latin American immigration comprised 58% of all recent immigrants between 2000 and 2010. In addition, the trend in non-White immigration expanded and continues to change the racial makeup of the US. By 2015, the non-Hispanic White population declined from 83% to 62% from 1970; the Hispanic population grew from 4 to 18%, and the Asian population from less than 1% to 6%. Additionally, an increase in Black immigration from Africa and the Caribbean has also changed the composition of American Blacks, with almost 10% now being foreign-born (Foner et al., 2018).

In my data, percent new immigrants are relatively constant (less than a 1% decline) across the cities. This may be because these large cities are receiving less recent immigrants than they were previously, and new immigrants also increasingly settle in smaller cities not included in these data (Ousy & Kubrin, 2018). Additionally, the 2% increase in the percent foreign born also likely highlights this

trend that cities are not showing the same average percent increase as the country, potentially because larger proportions of immigrants are settling outside large cities.

By 2010 the racial composition of immigrants became increasingly varied with increased Hispanic, Asian and Black immigrants (Forner et al., 2018). My data highlight these changes with increasing Hispanic, Asian, and Black immigration across the cities. This changing racial composition of immigrants is important to the overall racial and ethnic diversity of cities and may change how immigration shapes crime change. Ousey and Kubrin (2018) highlight that researchers usually examine immigration as a whole and do not consider the heterogeneity in racial identities among immigrants. To address this, in a set of sensitivity analyses, I examine the differences in the relationship between immigration and B/W segregation on neighborhood crime change across the ethno-racial neighborhoods based on the race of the immigrants. I do not find that the differences in ethno-racial neighborhoods compared to durably Black neighborhoods replicate the findings for overall immigration for any immigrant race group. Comparing the models, I also do not find that the relationship for each ethno-racial neighborhood and city changes in immigration and B/W segregation varies by the race of the immigrant group. These findings suggest that the influence of city changes in immigration and segregation does not depend on immigrant race. Instead, it is an immigration effect and not a race effect for this multi-level relationship between city changes in immigration and segregation in neighborhood crime change.

Looking to the future, immigration trends suggest a slowing of new immigrants into the US (Sampson, 2008b) while the second generation continues to

grow. By 2016, children with at least one immigrant parent comprised about 25% of the US child population (Zhou & Gonzales, 2019). This 1.5- and second-generation population will determine the long-term implications of immigration across the US (Zhou & Gonzales, 2016). These children, like their parents, come from diverse social, racial, and economic backgrounds. Considering the racial stratification permeating US society, segmented assimilation theory suggests that second-generation immigrants will have different pathways of incorporation (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). These changing patterns may be necessary for understanding the continuing legacies of immigration on neighborhood inequality over time. As prior work has suggested, second-generation immigrants have offending rates higher than first-generation and similar to other native-born offending rates (Bersani, 2013). These patterns of offending and segmented assimilation may suggest that to understand the influence of immigration, we may need to look at the second generation more closely. In my analysis, the second generation is captured in the racial/ethnic composition of each neighborhood. However, as this population gets larger, it may become more important to examine them rather than their foreign-born parents to understand the legacies of immigration on ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime change.

Additionally, immigration continues to change residential contexts and city landscapes. Between 2000 and 2010, the largest metropolitan areas saw their foreign-born population increase by at least 50% (Orfield & Luce, 2013). While central cities might have experienced small changes in their immigrant populations (as my data highlights), movement into the suburbs may be important for understanding the

immigration context moving forward. These changing patterns of immigration have created “shades of grey” in metropolitan areas that once comprised mainly of Brown cities and White suburbs (Lung-Amam, 2017). Changing immigration and racial integration have not only shaped central cities but also reshaped suburban residential and social contexts (Lung-Amam, 2017).

In more recent years, suburbs that are predominantly non-White and diverse have experienced larger population growth than the majority of White suburbs (Orfield & Luce, 2013). Using Silicon Valley as an example, immigration has drastically changed the social, economic, and cultural context of the suburbs and smaller cities. These patterns have created varied residential contexts, even among immigrants. Some are pushed furthest from the city as real estate values go up (e.g., Southeast Asians, Latinos, and African Americans), and others have created their own communities and built their neighborhoods to meet their lifestyles and needs (e.g., Asian Americans and Afghanis) (Lung-Amam, 2017).

Asian Americans (particularly Indian and Chinese immigrants) are the fastest-growing racial minority group in US suburbs. By 2017, about 62% lived in the suburbs of the 100 largest metro areas in the US (Frey, 2015). Traditionally excluded from mainstream suburban economic and social life, Asian Americans have created their own spaces in the suburbs of Silicon Valley as they became wealthier than previous generations and achieved middle and upper-middle-class status. They moved into more advantaged neighborhoods with better education and have changed the spatial landscape of the area. Considering that Asian immigration is outpacing Latino immigration, these are important changes that may be influential in understanding

how immigration continues to shape American life and may restructure cities and their metropolitan areas (Lung-Amam, 2017). Future communities and crime work should integrate these complex patterns by moving beyond central cities. Doing so will provide a more nuanced understanding of the continuing ways immigration interacts with segregation over time to shape crime change.

As evidenced in my data, I study a period of continuing crime declines across the US. While my findings help understand how crime declines were distributed across ethno-racial neighborhoods, they also provide some insights into patterns of crime change even if crime increases. Increasing city B/W segregation and immigration are associated with larger crime declines for all ethno-racial neighborhoods than durably Black neighborhoods. This suggests that increases in city segregation and immigration may be related to smaller crime increases for these neighborhoods than durably Black neighborhoods. Additionally, the results for durably Black neighborhoods and property crime change may provide some insight into these relationships when crime increases. Durably Black neighborhoods are the only ones with an average increase in property crime. The findings suggest that when these neighborhoods are in cities with declining B/W segregation and increasing immigration, property crime increases will likely be smaller.

Applying my framework and findings to the recent increases in crime across US cities beginning in the covid-19 pandemic, I might expect that the consequences of this increase in homicide (particularly gun violence) and burglary (Meyer et al., 2022) would be concentrated in Black neighborhoods over other ethno-racial neighborhoods. My findings might suggest that large demographic shifts in cities

through out-migration, increases in unemployment and poverty rates, along with large health disparities (Toukabri & Delbe, 2022) highlight the long-standing consequences of B/W segregation, and since immigration halted during this period, violent crime would continue to concentrate in durably Black neighborhoods sustaining a Black/non-Black divide.

Limitations

I consider several limitations of this work. There may be some concerns with reverse causality, temporal order, and selection effects. Specifically, while I examine the role of changing B/W segregation and immigration on neighborhood crime change, it is possible that neighborhood crime could inform how segregation and immigration change. There are also multiple facets upon which immigrants might consider which cities to live. Immigrants may be more likely to live in cities with lower crime rates or consider cities' pre-existing racial composition before moving there. Immigrants are more likely to cluster in immigrant enclaves with others of the same racial/ethnic background. The presence of enclaves in a city might increase the percentage of immigrants (Park & Iceland, 2011). This increase in immigration in these cities will shape the cities' racial composition and the presence of different ethno-racial neighborhoods leading to a rise in multi-ethnic neighborhoods (Logan & Zhang, 2010). Cities with enclaves or longer histories of immigration may be more likely to experience city-wide benefits of immigration as compared to new destinations (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). These concerns with temporal order may make it hard to identify the effect of changing immigration and segregation on crime because it may also be likely that crime levels impact changes in immigration and

segregation. In these models, I do not fully account for the context of immigration (e.g., enclaves, destination type) and political conditions that might be important in understanding the consequences of changing immigration on neighborhood crime change (Lyons et al., 2013; Velez et al., 2015).

Additionally, by using fixed effects regressions, I only examine *within*-neighborhood changes over time. This approach is optimal because it allows me to control for any observed or unobserved time-stable characteristics within neighborhoods over time. However, the models do not account for unobserved time-varying characteristics (e.g., policy changes, collective efficacy, etc.). Additionally, by estimating within-neighborhood change, I cannot directly examine the variation between neighborhoods and cities (e.g., the region of the country) that may shape crime change.

With a cross-national analysis, I do not focus on variation between city contexts that may be important in understanding these relationships over time. For example, I cannot take a closer look at one city like Los Angeles with these analyses and examine how its unique history and context may further inform patterns of crime change in these cities for different ethno-racial neighborhoods. Though this is a trade-off with conducting a larger national analysis, I recognize that these models do not speak to these important differences between cities. Future work would benefit from drilling down to a specific city and exploring its unique history and cultural context that informs patterns of crime change for ethno-racial neighborhoods.

Due to data restrictions, I only examine the change between two time points, and this does not allow me to consider how past levels of crime, segregation, or

immigration shape patterns of crime change. I cannot account for this endogeneity in my current models. In the future, with another wave of data, I could employ more rigorous estimation techniques, such as dynamic panel models (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998) that allow the use of prior levels of the dependent variable and independent variables in the models through the framework of instrumental variables. These models would help control for previous levels of segregation, immigration, and crime that may also set the stage for racially variant patterns of crime change.

Additionally, the NNCS relies on official crime statistics reported by police departments. Though the data for robbery, homicide, and burglary are more likely to be reliable (Skogan, 1975; Krivo et al., 2020), there are still potential problems in using this data considering racially disparate policing practices and over-policing in racially marginalized neighborhoods (Gaston, 2019). Also, the NNCS is designed to be representative of large US cities. However, this does not account for a large portion of US residents who live outside large cities. My analyses only speak to the processes within central cities and do not account for smaller cities, metro areas, and suburban or rural areas. As immigration patterns change and people leave cities for the surrounding suburbs (Light & Thomas, 2019), it is important to consider how segregation and immigration shape patterns outside these large cities.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime remains a durable feature of American city life despite reductions in crime through the early 2000s (Lyons et al.,

2022). This inequality in crime is perpetuated by inequality in patterns of crime change across ethno-racial neighborhoods (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Krivo et al., 2020; Lyons et al., 2022; Papachristos et al., 2018). However, the magnitude of this divide in crime may vary across cities, and demographic changes in B/W residential segregation and immigration may shape these racially inequitable patterns. City B/W residential segregation and immigration may work together to sustain differences in crime change for ethno-racial neighborhoods. Overall, my findings suggest that the processes related to city B/W residential segregation and immigration in shaping patterns of neighborhood crime change vary for durably Black neighborhoods. These findings indicate that B/W segregation continuously marginalizes Black neighborhoods. Specifically, while immigration is protective across US cities and works to reduce crime (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018), durably Black neighborhoods may be blocked from its benefits unless B/W segregation declines.

In conceptualizing the processes of B/W residential segregation and immigration together in shaping varied patterns of neighborhood crime I set up three potential color lines: a White/non-White divide, (2) a Black/non-Black divide and (3) a tri-racial divide. My findings suggest a Black/non-Black divide that demonstrates the importance of understanding city contexts in explanations of inequality neighborhood crime change. City levels of B/W residential segregation maintain large disparities in the residential contexts of Black and White Americans (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Krivo et al., 2009). While city immigration is not always examined as a potential driver in explaining the ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018), it has clear implications for how the consequences of the racial, social

structure play out for neighborhoods. It is imperative to recognize that the racial, social structure may work to marginalize Black neighborhoods in new ways continuously. Specifically, increasing segregation and the disadvantages it brings may block the benefits of immigration for Black communities. Contrastingly, when city segregation declines, increasing citywide immigration helps reduce crime in Black neighborhoods. Recognizing that Black residents are more likely to reside in either highly or hypersegregated cities (Massey & Tannen, 2015), these findings suggest that reducing segregation can greatly benefit Black neighborhoods.

My findings also suggest that neighborhood crime declines are larger in neighborhoods who integrated with White (changed from Black, changed from Latino, changed from Minority). This pattern suggests that the unique structural advantages concentrated in White neighborhoods due to B/W residential segregation (Peterson & Krivo, 2010) may extend to these neighborhoods as their White populations grow. Though my findings only speak to this descriptively, future work should explore whether changing neighborhood racial composition leads to a change in structural conditions and, thus, larger declines in crime. If this holds true, it may also reinforce a Black/non-Black divide as these neighborhoods shift closer to durably White neighborhoods over time and further separate them from durably Black neighborhoods.

The legacies of these continuing disparities and marginalization of Black neighborhoods are essential in not only considering the direct consequences of violence in communities but the attenuated consequences on health, education, and worse housing conditions, among other social inequalities (Sharkey, 2018). The costs

of continuing B/W segregation are large and have been evidenced by the large disparities continuing through and exacerbated by the covid-19 pandemic. Without tackling these consequences of structural racism, Black neighborhoods will remain marginalized, facing the consequences of higher crime rates and other social costs.

The findings for durably Latino neighborhoods still leave some unanswered questions about what side of the color line they fall on. I do not find differences in neighborhood crime change due to city changes in B/W segregation and immigration for these neighborhoods compared to durably White and durably Black neighborhoods. Future work should consider disaggregating these neighborhoods by White-Latino and Black-Latino neighborhoods. For these neighborhoods, the intersections of their racial and ethnic identities may be important in understanding their experiences with B/W residential segregation and immigration.

Additionally, future work should directly consider how hypersegregated cities compare to highly and moderated segregated cities and how increasing immigration impacts neighborhoods within these cities. Additionally, future research should consider how varying city contexts, such as differences in political contexts through variation in social and economic policies, work to potentially ameliorate or exacerbate the Black/non-Black evidenced in these models. For example, cities that are more politically receptive to immigrants, have more political representation of minority residents, and create policies to reduce social and economic inequality may create contexts that could lead to better neighborhood conditions that benefit all ethno-racial neighborhoods (Ramey, 2013; Lyons et al., 2013; Pierotte et al., 2018).

My findings also suggest that city changes in B/W segregation and immigration may not shape the ethno-racial divide in property crime change the same way they do for violent crime change. Though I expected similar patterns, I do not find a Black/non-Black divide for property crime change. Most of the existing literature focuses on violent crime and potentially different pathways shape varying property crime changes for ethno-racial neighborhoods. These findings have implications for future work to consider why these relationships may vary for property crime change.

My findings highlight the intractability of B/W segregation on neighborhood inequality in crime and reinforce the idea that “it’s not that race matters, it’s that Black race matters” (Lee & Bean, 2007). Structural racism perpetuates the high levels of segregation among Black Americans and continues to marginalize these communities (Massey & Tannen, 2011). As the US moves forward and deals with the social and economic inequalities perpetuated and highlighted by the covid-19 pandemic, these findings remind us that the ethno-racial divide in neighborhood crime is longstanding. The racial, social structure continues to marginalize Black neighborhoods. Thus, researchers should consider how continuing racial divides in economic and social realities perpetuate drastically different contexts for Black and non-Black Americans and will continue to do so unless policies change to challenge the racial, social structure continuously upheld by B/W residential segregation.

My findings suggest that B/W residential segregation perpetuates structural inequalities in Black neighborhoods that shield them from the benefits of immigration and creates a Black/non-Black divide in crime change. These results indicate a

distinct marginalization pattern in response to B/W segregation in durably Black neighborhoods where immigration only benefits them when segregation declines. The costs of the continued racial divide perpetuated by the racial, social structure continues to concentrate crime in Black neighborhoods. As the field of communities in crime continues to develop in the 21st century, the Black/non-Black divide in crime change calls on us to reckon with the incessant marginalization of Black communities.

Appendices

Appendix A. List of cities (n=75)

City		
Akron	Hampton	Phoenix
Alexandria	Hartford	Plano
Anchorage	Hialeah	Portland
Arlington	Irving	Rockford
Aurora	Jacksonville	San Bernardino
Austin	Kansas City	San Diego
Bellevue	Knoxville	Santa Rosa
Boston	Lexington	Seattle
Buffalo	Lincoln	Simi Valley
Carrollton	Livonia	St. Louis
Chandler	Long Beach	St. Petersburg
Charlotte	Los Angeles	Stamford
Chicago	Louisville	Sterling Heights
Chula Vista	Madison	Tampa
Cincinnati	Memphis	Tempe
Cleveland	Miami	Toledo
Coral Springs	Milwaukee	Topeka
Dallas	Minneapolis	Tucson
Dayton	Naperville	Virginia Beach
Denver	Newport News	Waco
Eugene	Norfolk	Waterbury
Fort Collins	Oakland	Worcester
Fort Wayne	Oklahoma City	
Fort Worth	Overland Park	
Garden Grove	Pasadena	
Glendale	Pembroke Pines	

Appendix B. Fixed Effects Model Predicting Violent Crime Change (N=7,875)


	β (SE)	
City Immigration Change	6.28 (1.437)	**
City B/W Segregation Change	-0.07 (0.051)	
City Immigration Change # City B/W Segregation Change	1.45 (0.346)	**
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type		
Durably White	0.72 (0.383)	
Changed from White	0.28 (0.424)	
Changed from Black	-1.84 (0.954)	
Durably Latino	0.58 (0.401)	
Changed from Latino	-0.57 (1.468)	
Durably Minority	-0.06 (0.479)	
Changed from Minority	-2.78 (1.900)	
Durably Integrated	-0.05 (0.382)	
Changed from Integrated	-0.11 (0.456)	
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City Immigration Change		
Durably White	-6.15 (1.525)	**
Changed from White	-6.43 (1.454)	**
Changed from Black	-13.20 (4.211)	**
Durably Latino	-3.84 (2.676)	
Changed from Latino	-4.80 (5.369)	
Durably Minority	-8.65 (1.761)	**
Changed from Minority	-7.04 (6.144)	
Durably Integrated	-6.59 (1.308)	**
Changed from Integrated	-6.72 (1.575)	**

Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City		
B/W Segregation Change		
Durably White	0.09	
	(0.051)	
Changed from White	0.04	
	(0.059)	
Changed from Black	0.01	
	(0.090)	
Durably Latino	0.16	
	(0.100)	
Changed from Latino	-0.41	
	(0.391)	
Durably Minority	-0.09	
	(0.095)	
Changed from Minority	-0.79	
	(0.461)	
Durably Integrated	0.07	
	(0.047)	
Changed from Integrated	0.08	
	(0.071)	
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City		
Immigration Change X City B/W		
Segregation Change		
Durably White	-1.51	**
	(0.352)	
Changed from White	-1.51	**
	(0.338)	
Changed from Black	-1.57	*
	(0.598)	
Durably Latino	-0.74	
	(0.650)	
Changed from Latino	-1.33	
	(1.343)	
Durably Minority	-2.08	**
	(0.439)	
Changed from Minority	-2.44	
	(1.366)	
Durably Integrated	-1.29	**
	(0.316)	
Changed from Integrated	-1.27	**
	(0.372)	
<i>City Controls</i>		
Population Change	-0.00	*
	(0.000)	
Change in % Young Males	0.10	
	(0.087)	
Change in Disadvantage	-0.76	*
	(0.333)	
Change in % Recently Moved	-0.06	**
	(0.014)	


Change in % Black	-0.04 (0.046)	
<i>Neighborhood Controls</i>		
Change in Disadvantage	1.70 (0.374)	**
Change in Home Loans	-0.15 (0.094)	
Change in Foreclosures	-0.00 (0.005)	
Change in % Young Males	-0.04 (0.011)	**
Change in Vacant Housing Units	0.02 (0.012)	
Change in Renter Occupied Housing Units	0.02 (0.005)	**
Change in Immigration	0.09 (0.135)	
Spatial Violence	1.62 (0.181)	**
Intercept	-2.52 (0.617)	**
Number of observations	7875	

Notes: Durably Black are the reference category. All controls are included in the model. Standard errors are clustered on the city and reported in parentheses. ** p<.01, * p<.05

Appendix C. Predicted Violent Crime Change for all Ethno-Racial Neighborhoods



Appendix C Continued. Predicted Violent Crime Change for all Ethno-Racial Neighborhoods



Appendix D. Fixed Effects Regression Predicting Violent Crime Change


	β (SE)
City Immigration Change	3.85 (4.451)
City B/W Segregation Change	-0.34 (0.145) *
City Immigration Change X City B/W Segregation Change	2.21 (1.175)
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type	
Durably White	0.64 (0.754)
Changed from White	0.21 (0.849)
Changed from Black	-2.29 (1.977)
Durably Latino	-0.19 (1.093)
Changed from Latino	-4.32 (4.666)
Durably Minority	-1.03 (1.906)
Changed from Minority	-4.49 (2.799)
Durably Integrated	-0.16 (0.801)
Changed from Integrated	-0.85 (1.091)
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City Immigration Change	
Durably White	-3.02 (4.501)
Changed from White	-5.07 (4.570)
Changed from Black	-15.95 (13.156)
Durably Latino	-7.51 (5.844)
Changed from Latino	-20.36 (14.190)
Durably Minority	-6.97 (5.643)
Changed from Minority	-7.67 (9.160)
Durably Integrated	-3.32 (4.400)

Changed from Integrated	-4.47 (4.609)	
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City B/W Segregation Change		
Durably White	0.33 (0.139)	*
Changed from White	0.30 (0.154)	
Changed from Black	0.23 (0.263)	
Durably Latino	0.22 (0.301)	
Changed from Latino	-0.73 (1.088)	
Durably Minority	0.15 (0.376)	
Changed from Minority	-0.56 (0.513)	
Durably Integrated	0.33 (0.138)	*
Changed from Integrated	0.37 (0.199)	
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City Immigration Change X City B/W Segregation Change		
Durably White	-2.17 (1.186)	
Changed from White	-2.16 (1.194)	
Changed from Black	-2.32 (2.910)	
Durably Latino	-2.58 (1.574)	
Changed from Latino	-5.19 (3.305)	
Durably Minority	-1.89 (1.400)	
Changed from Minority	-2.85 (1.789)	
Durably Integrated	-1.63 (1.194)	
Changed from Integrated	-1.36 (1.241)	
<i>City Controls</i>		
Population Change	-0.00 (0.000)	
Change in % Young Males	0.26 (0.192)	


Change in Disadvantage	-1.82 (1.051)	
Change in % Recently Moved	-0.11 (0.045)	*
Change in % Black	-0.02 (0.066)	
<i>Neighborhood Controls</i>		
Change in Disadvantage	2.85 (0.707)	**
Change in Home Loans	-0.28 (0.228)	
Change in Foreclosures	0.01 (0.009)	
Change in % Young Males	-0.05 (0.027)	
Change in Vacant Housing Units	0.09 (0.023)	**
Change in Renter Occupied Housing Units	0.02 (0.014)	
Change in Immigration	-0.49 (0.282)	
Spatial Burglary	2.31 (0.215)	**
Intercept	-4.92 (1.624)	**
Number of observations	7875	

Notes: Durably Black are the reference category. All controls are included in the model. Estimates for the full model are included in the appendix. ** p<.01, * p<.05

Appendix E. Predicted Property Crime Change for all Ethno-Racial Neighborhoods



Appendix E Continued. Predicted Property Crime Change for all Ethno-Racial Neighborhoods



Appendix F. Fixed Effects Linear Regression Predicting Crime Change for Race-specific Immigration Measures (Durably White reference)

Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type X City Immigration Change X City B/W Segregation Change	% Foreign Born		% White Foreign Born		% Black Foreign Born		% Asian Foreign Born		% Hispanic Foreign Born	
	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change	Violent Crime Change	Property Crime Change
<i>Durable</i>										
Durably Black	0.11** (0.04)	0.20** (0.08)								
Durably Latino			- 0.53** (0.26)							
Durably Minority	- 0.08** (0.03)				-0.57 ** (0.19)	0.92** (0.40)			- 0.12** (0.04)	
Durably Integrated	0.03** (0.01)	0.07** (0.02)								0.11** (0.06)
<i>Changing</i>										
Changed from White			0.22** (0.09)							0.10** (0.03)
Changed from Black										
Changed from Latino										
Changed from Minority					- 1.57** (0.78)		1.32** (0.60)			
Changed from Integrated		0.09** (0.04)								

Note: These are the coefficients and standard errors for the regression using durably White as the reference category for the three-way interaction (immigration, segregation, neighborhood type) Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. Estimates of the complete models available upon request. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix G. Quantile Regression Predicting Violent Crime Change (25th percentile)

	β (se)	
City Immigration Change	2.21 (1.442)	
City B/W Segregation Change	-0.09 (0.047)	*
City Immigration Change # City B/W Segregation Change	0.88 (0.303)	**
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type		
Stayed White	0.38 (0.382)	
Changed from White	0.29 (0.388)	
Changed from Black	-0.57 (1.104)	
Stayed Latino	0.38 (0.454)	
Changed from Latino	-1.95 (0.512)	**
Stayed Minority	-1.03 (0.292)	**
Changed from Minority	-0.94 (1.689)	
Stayed Integrated	0.18 (0.364)	
Changed from Integrated	0.18 (0.408)	
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type # City Immigration Change		
Stayed White	-2.03 (1.435)	
Changed from White	-2.27 (1.435)	
Changed from Black	-3.72 (5.679)	
Stayed Latino	1.61 (1.955)	
Changed from Latino	-3.90 (2.234)	
Stayed Minority	-4.61 (1.349)	**

Changed from Minority	-1.53 (4.532)	
Stayed Integrated	-1.85 (1.395)	
Changed from Integrated	-1.61 (1.468)	
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type # City B/W Segregation Change		
Stayed White	0.09 (0.047)	
Changed from White	0.08 (0.046)	
Changed from Black	0.12 (0.118)	
Stayed Latino	0.20 (0.082)	*
Changed from Latino	-0.26 (0.133)	*
Stayed Minority	-0.18 (0.055)	**
Changed from Minority	-0.18 (0.356)	
Stayed Integrated	0.07 (0.044)	
Changed from Integrated	0.09 (0.058)	
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type # City Immigration Change # City B/W Segregation Change		
Stayed White	-0.90 (0.298)	**
Changed from White	-0.92 (0.296)	**
Changed from Black	-0.98 (0.667)	
Stayed Latino	-0.20 (0.452)	
Changed from Latino	-1.16 (0.556)	*
Stayed Minority	-1.59 (0.309)	**
Changed from Minority	-1.10 (0.969)	
Stayed Integrated	-0.89	**

	(0.290)	
Changed from Integrated	-0.86	**
	(0.334)	
Population Change	-0.00	
	(0.000)	
Change in % Young Males	0.01	
	(0.035)	
Change in Disadvantage	-0.12	
	(0.138)	
Change in % Recently Moved	-0.01	*
	(0.007)	
Change in % Black	-0.02	
	(0.026)	
Change in Disadvantage	0.71	**
	(0.143)	
Change in Home Loans	-0.03	
	(0.032)	
Change in Foreclosures	0.00	
	(0.002)	
Change in % Young Males	-0.01	
	(0.004)	
Change in Vacant Housing Units	0.01	
	(0.004)	
Change in Renter Occupied Housing Units	0.01	**
	(0.003)	
Change in Immigration	-0.02	
	(0.065)	
Spatial Violence	0.91	**
	(0.117)	
Intercept	-0.87	*
	(0.437)	
N	7875	

** p<.01, * p<.05

Notes: These estimates are for the models at the 50th percentile. Simultaneous Quantile Regression Models suggest no statistical differences at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile. Durably Black is the reference category. All controls are included in the model. Standard errors are clustered in the city and reported in parentheses. Estimates for the full model are included in appendix G.

Appendix H. Quantile Regression Predicting Property Crime Change (25th percentile)

	β (se)	
City Immigration Change	7.15 (2.749)	**
City B/W Segregation Change	-0.36 (0.097)	**
City Immigration Change # City B/W Segregation Change	3.24 (0.714)	**
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type		
Stayed White	-0.03 (0.659)	
Changed from White	-0.04 (0.655)	
Changed from Black	-2.70 (1.051)	*
Stayed Latino	-0.50 (0.810)	
Changed from Latino	-2.53 (2.919)	
Stayed Minority	0.13 (2.009)	
Changed from Minority	-0.38 (2.601)	
Stayed Integrated	-0.05 (0.659)	
Changed from Integrated	-0.72 (0.698)	
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type # City Immigration Change		
Stayed White	-6.61 (2.763)	*
Changed from White	-6.56 (2.685)	*
Changed from Black	-13.82 (10.362)	
Stayed Latino	-8.49 (2.904)	**
Changed from Latino	-11.88 (6.543)	
Stayed Minority	-5.95 (3.911)	

Changed from Minority	-7.53 (8.190)	
Stayed Integrated	-6.42 (2.673)	*
Changed from Integrated	-8.83 (2.612)	**
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type # City B/W Segregation Change		
Stayed White	0.34 (0.090)	**
Changed from White	0.29 (0.094)	**
Changed from Black	0.21 (0.165)	
Stayed Latino	0.35 (0.134)	**
Changed from Latino	0.17 (0.657)	
Stayed Minority	0.55 (0.532)	
Changed from Minority	0.25 (0.684)	
Stayed Integrated	0.36 (0.092)	**
Changed from Integrated	0.38 (0.110)	**
Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Type # City Immigration Change # City B/W Segregation Change		
Stayed White	-3.22 (0.729)	**
Changed from White	-3.27 (0.735)	**
Changed from Black	-3.02 (1.603)	
Stayed Latino	-3.35 (0.807)	**
Changed from Latino	-2.84 (1.640)	
Stayed Minority	-2.45 (1.152)	*
Changed from Minority	-3.67 (2.463)	

Stayed Integrated	-3.11	**
	(0.741)	
Changed from Integrated	-3.11	**
	(0.808)	
Population Change	-0.00	
	(0.000)	
Change in % Young Males	0.11	
	(0.090)	
Change in Disadvantage	-0.61	
	(0.645)	
Change in % Recently Moved	-0.04	
	(0.024)	
Change in % Black	-0.01	
	(0.056)	
Change in Disadvantage	1.20	**
	(0.354)	
Change in Home Loans	-0.04	
	(0.107)	
Change in Foreclosures	0.01	
	(0.011)	
Change in % Young Males	0.01	
	(0.013)	
Change in Vacant Housing Units	0.05	**
	(0.013)	
Change in Renter Occupied Housing Units	0.02	**
	(0.007)	
Change in Immigration	-0.51	**
	(0.130)	
Wqburgch2	1.78	**
	(0.171)	
Intercept	-1.59	
	(1.115)	
N	7875	

** p<.01, * p<.05

Notes: These estimates are for the models at the 50th percentile. Simultaneous Quantile Regression Models suggest no statistical differences at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile. Durably Black is the reference category. All controls are included in the model. Standard errors are clustered in the city and reported in parentheses. Estimates for the full model are included in appendix G.

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