ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: THE LESSONS OF TREACHERY IN POLYBIUS' *HISTORIES*

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This dissertation offers a new analysis of Polybius of Megalopolis' *Histories* by looking at the Achaean historian's many depictions of treachery and deception during the third and second centuries BCE. Chapter 1 introduces the topic and explores how Polybius' moral evaluations of treachery consistently center on the personal gain of the betrayer and the context of the situation. Chapter 2 surveys instances of treachery and deception taken against friends and allies in the *Histories*, which are remarkably even-handed. Polybius makes allowances for certain betrayals in the face of extreme necessity and wicked allies, and he is especially critical of treachery committed despite past kindnesses. Chapter 3 discusses Polybius' accounts of treachery and deception carried out against one's own state. In addition to showcasing continued Polybian contextual nuances, the chapter emphasizes the frequency and severity at which these internal betrayals occur in monarchies, when compared with republics, providing insight into Polybius' attitude toward monarchies, republics, and the morally corrupting weight of power on different forms of government. Significantly, the Romans remain unique in the *Histories* in their utter lack of any such internal treachery. Chapter 4 explores instances of diplomatic deception employed during times of war, maintaining that Polybius allowed for a significant amount of

diplomatic deception and maneuvering when a formal treaty or truce had not been sworn. In the *Histories*, when oaths are sworn, the Romans are typically the victims of such treachery, often characterized by Polybius as παρανομία. The exception to this is Polybius' condemnation of Marcius Philippus' deceptions against Perseus in 172/171, which seems inconsistent given Polybius' heavy praise of Scipio in 203 and Flamininus in 198/197 for strikingly similar deceptions. This deviation matches Polybius' efforts throughout the *Histories* to fabricate a contrast of earlier Roman virtue with contemporary Roman depravity. Chapter 5 adopts a "Greek vs barbarian" lens to argue that Polybius connected the acquisition of power with the moral decline and political collapse of the state – both of which are forecasted by Polybian descriptions of παρανομία. Notably, throughout the *Histories* the Romans never exemplify such παρανομία. The interconnection between moral corruption and pragmatic consequence is emphasized in Polybius' descriptions of the many unjustified instances of treachery throughout his work, all of which are carefully shown to have dire consequences for the culprits. The dissertation concludes by arguing that Polybius realized that in the new unipolar reality of Roman domination, the only check on tyrannical Roman behavior would have to come from the Romans themselves. Thus, Polybius uses his fabricated model of past Roman virtue and present Roman depravity to challenge the Romans to surpass the benevolence of their ancestors, while warning the Romans about what would happen should they resort to "barbaric" tyranny. These didactic efforts suggest that Polybius wrote the *Histories* with a Roman readership in mind.

THE LESSONS OF TREACHERY IN POLYBIUS' *HISTORIES*

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction and Purpose of Study

INTRODUCTION

The Greek historian Polybius remains our most important source for the transition of the Roman Republic from a regional power to an intercontinental hegemon. As a member of a leading family in Megalopolis, Polybius anticipated a career as a leading statesman for the Achaean League, following in the footsteps of his father, Lycortas.[1] By 170/169 B.C.E.,[2] Polybius had been elected to the position of cavalry commander (ἵππαρχος) and was tactfully handling the delicate position in which the League found itself during the Third Macedonian War as it tried to maintain full independence while remaining a faithful ally to Rome. Polybius' hopes for a successful political career, however, were brought to a swift end with the Roman decision in 167 to bring a thousand leading Achaeans back to Italy as political detainees. Polybius was among this number. Due to close ties with Lucius Aemilius Paulus, a leading Roman senator and the consul who defeated King Perseus of Macedon at Pydna in 168, and his two sons, Fabius Aemilianus and Scipio Aemilianus, Polybius was allowed to remain in Rome rather than be exiled to a small town in Italy as most detainees were.[3] During his time in Italy, Polybius' relatively unfettered access to the Roman archives, to visiting Greek envoys, and to leading

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[1] Lycortas served as the στρατηγός of the Achaean League in 185/4 and 182/1 B.C.E. Lycortas also worked as a close political ally to Philopoemen, the most influential member of the Achaean League for a generation, serving as στρατηγός eight times.

[2] All subsequent dates in this dissertation will be assumed to be before the common era (B.C.E.) unless otherwise noted.

[3] For a (rightly negative) detailed look at the various aspects of these Achaeans in Italy and other Roman detainees, see: Erskine (2012). For additional look at the negative aspects of Polybius' time in Rome: Allen (2006) 201-223; for positive look: Eckstein (1995) 7-8; Champion (2004) 17-18; McGing (2010) 14, 139-141; for mixed look: Walbank (1972) 8-10, 172.

Roman families allowed him to compose his great work, ultimately covering the history of the

Mediterranean from 264 to 146.[4]

The initial purpose of Polybius' work is made clear in his introductory first book: "For

who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of

polity the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole

inhabited world to their sole government - a thing unique in history?" (1.1.5).[5] While the swift

rise of Rome as the Mediterranean's unipolar hegemon between 220-167 no doubt forms the

central question of his *Histories*, however, a second, vital question is also explored by Polybius.

A careful reading of the Greek historian's portrayal of the events which brought about the

ultimate interweaving (συμπλοκή) of the Eastern and Western Mediterranean suggests that

Polybius is equally concerned with the manner in which the Romans ruled over the

Mediterranean, both during the rise of their hegemony beginning in 220 and following its

completion, which Polybius places in 167.[6] Indeed, such a question, spurred on by contemporary

events, caused Polybius to extend his historical narrative to cover events through 146, climaxing

with the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in that year. Thus, Polybius' entire work can be

read as an evaluation of whether Roman actions were morally acceptable in pursuit of hegemony

and in the aftermath of the establishment of that enormous hegemony.[7] It is on these evaluations,

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[4] The first fifteen books of the *Histories* were composed in Rome between 167-150, hence his references to Carthage as a city still in existence. The next twenty five books then were composed after 146 when Polybius was no longer a detainee in Rome. On this dating, see: Walbank (1972) 18-19; followed by Eckstein (1995) 10; arguing against the earlier thesis of Erbse (1951) 157-179 and (1957) 269-297 that the entire text was written after 146.

[5] This dissertation relied upon the Loeb Classical Library edition for all ancient sources.

[6] On Polybius' tracing of *symploke*, see Walbank (1975) 197-212. On Polybius' concern with Roman rule and its establishment, see Eckstein (1985); Eckstein (1995); Erskine (2003); McGing (2010); Baronowski (2013).

[7] Eckstein (1995) 10-11.

specifically regarding Polybius' judgments about instances of treachery and the moral and

pragmatic lessons he gives to states in general, that this dissertation will focus.

In book 36, Polybius recounts wide public disagreement among the Greeks over the

morality of Roman actions in 149 against Carthage, in which Rome, after a series of demands,

ultimately told the Carthaginians to rebuild their city at least ten miles from the coast. One

argument against this action was that:

> The Romans were, generally speaking, a civilized people, and that their peculiar merit on
> which they prided themselves was that they conducted their wars in a simple and noble
> manner, employing neither night attacks nor ambushes, disapproving of every kind of
> deceit and fraud, and considering that nothing but direct and open attacks were legitimate
> for them. But in the present case, throughout the whole of their proceedings in regard to
> Carthage, they had used deceit and fraud, offering certain things one at a time and
> keeping others secret until they cut off every hope the city had of help from her allies.
> This, they said, savored more of a despot's intrigue than of the principles of a civilized
> state such as Rome, and could only be justly described as something very like impiety
> and treachery (36.9.9-11).[8]

This argument levied against the Romans by the Greeks fits into an argument made by some

scholars that Polybius believes that the Romans by 167 had begun a moral decline, paralleling

the Carthaginians in Spain in the last decade of the 200s and also mirroring the plummet of

Philip V, the king of Macedon, into moral depravity at around the same time.[9] This notion of an

upright Roman past but depraved Roman present, mirrored in the Greek sentiments voiced

above, is likewise seen in Polybius' treatment of three strikingly similar instances of diplomatic

deception carried out by Scipio Africanus against the Carthaginians in 203 (14.5.14), by

Flamininus against Philip V in 198/197, and by Marcius Philippus in 172/171 against Perseus

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[8] Translation by Loeb (2010).

[9] For Polybius' own assertion of Roman decline, see 31.25.3-10; 36.9.9-11 as well as parallel accounts in
Livy 62.47.4-9 and Dio 3.7.1. Polybius points toward earlier instances of moral decline as well, beginning
in 232 with the Flaminian land bill and continuing during the 2nd Punic War with the Roman seizure of art
at the capture of Syracuse in 212. Discussions of this decline, see Briscoe (1964) 66-77; Walbank (1972),
(1975), (1977), and (1980); Eckstein (1995); Erskine (2003); Champion (2004). This notion is discussed
in chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation.

(Livy [P] 42.43.2). Despite the similar context underlying these instances of diplomatic deception, Polybius condemns Philippus' actions while praising the actions of his predecessors. Again, Polybius' readers are left with a picture of a glorified Roman past and morally decaying Roman present (discussed in detail in Chapter 4).[10]

This dissertation will argue, however, that in general such a claim is a contradiction of Polybius' own narrative, which presents the earlier Romans of the First and Second Punic Wars as constantly engaging in stealthy nocturnal battles, deceptive diplomacy, and even acts of treachery. Indeed, Polybius himself emphasizes that both of these wars were caused in large part by acts of treachery - the hypocritical Roman decision to aid the treacherous Mamertines in 264 and the Romans' treacherous seizure of Sardinia in 237.[11] Significantly, these two acts of deception and treachery bookend the first volume of Polybius' *Histories*, setting the tone and theme of his work. Despite these instances of Roman treachery, however, instances of Roman treachery throughout the *Histories* are remarkably rare. Indeed, on the whole, the Roman rule of the Mediterranean was marked by Roman moderation and benevolence rather than cruelty and treachery. The Roman treatment of Carthage in 149, which ultimately was legally justified given the Carthaginian *deditio*, does not match the generally favorable portrayal of Roman hegemony that Polybius gives throughout his work.

Despite his favorable narrative, Polybius' decision in Book 36 to present the fracturing of popular Greek opinion over Roman rule is hard to ignore, as is the contradiction within his own narrative of presenting the early Romans as wholly against treachery, deception, and even night

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[10] Polybius likewise praises the nearly identical actions taken by Sosibius and Agathocles (as well as Antiochus IV) in 219/218 (5.63-65).

[11] Polybius regard the Romans' action in 264 as hypocritical due to the earlier decision to execute the treacherous soldiers who took over the city of Rhegium in what Polybius believes to be similar fashion (1.7). For these events, see Harris (1979); Hoyos (1997); Rosenstein (2012). For differing interpretations of these events, see: Harris (1979); Carey (1996); Rich (1996), Hoyos (1997); Eckstein (1995); Eckstein (2006).

fighting (13.3; 36.9.9-11; cf. Livy [P] 42.47.5-6; *Pun.* 79).[12] Why do such contradictions appear

within Polybius' *Histories* in his discussion of the Romans? It is from this question that this

dissertation will begin by examining the many acts of treachery which are described throughout

Polybius' historical narrative.[13]

This dissertation argues that while Polybius, like other Hellenistic historians before him,

condemns many instances of treachery on moral grounds, he believes that certain acts of

deception and treachery against friends and allies are acceptable in the face of extreme necessity

or in opposition to wicked allies (ch. 2). Polybius likewise allows for some leeway when

statesmen deceive fellow citizens for patriotic reasons rather than for reasons of self-interest (ch.

3). Similarly, while violations of sworn oaths, truces, and treaties are strictly condemned by

Polybius, he allows for a great deal of maneuvering when no such formal promises are made (ch.

4). Ultimately, this dissertation finds that Polybius does not condemn *all* instances of treachery,

but rather consistently approaches such betrayals with a great deal of context and nuance.[14]

In analyzing these cases of deception and treachery, some immoral and some acceptable,

this dissertation also concludes that Polybius utilizes treacherous behavior as a framework to

warn the Romans specifically of the negative pragmatic consequences that necessarily

accompany such morally depraved acts. Such a notion is in line with Polybius' theoretical

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[12] This judgment of Roman behavior in 149 is, of course, only one of the four opinions given. Two of the four opinions, however, mark Roman action as treacherous, which is quite telling. Equally telling is Polybius' decision to include this debate at all and give it such a prominent position within his *Histories*.

[13] The closest look at deception and treachery in Polybius' *Histories* comes from Eckstein (1995) 84-117. Eckstein's insightful analysis of these instances rightly works to paint Polybius as a morally-concerned historian (see below). This dissertation, however, ultimately disagrees with Eckstein's claim that Polybius condemned all acts of deception without consideration of circumstance, and argues that Polybius' complex evaluation of deception is key to understanding his views toward Roman Imperialism and one of his intended audiences (i.e., the Greek political elite). Since Eckstein's 1995 work, little has been done with the larger question of deception and treachery in Polybius' narrative. Thus, for example, Turner (2010), who looks at deceit in the Greco-Roman world, has no chapters on Polybius or even the 264-146 period of the Roman Republic.

[14] Contra Eckstein (1995) who maintains that Polybius condemns all acts of deception and treachery on moral grounds.

discussion of the Cycle of Polities (*anacyclosis*) in Book 6, which associated behavior such as treachery and lawlessness (παρανομία) with the imminent collapse of the state. In viewing "Greek" versus "barbaric" qualities of all states as a litmus test for the moral and political health of the polity, this dissertation argues that Polybius believed that the moral and pragmatic elements of all actions were necessarily intertwined. Thus, armed with the inconsistent notion of a non-treacherous Roman past, Polybius challenges the Romans to act according to these past moral principles that he prescribes or else face inevitable disaster in the long term (ch. 5).

Yet Polybius believed that one of the main ways that states turned toward moral depravity and lawlessness (παρανομία) was through the acquisition of power (5.108.5). Such power was especially morally volatile for monarchies, given the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual. In drawing parallels between Philip V and the Romans, Polybius implicitly raises the question of whether the Romans after 167 will be able to remain virtuous given their hegemony across the entire Mediterranean. This dissertation concludes with two larger claims that are underrepresented in the current Polybian scholarship - that Polybius himself was not sure if the Romans would continue to rule with moderation or dominate the Mediterranean through tyranny, choosing to show the consequences of the latter rather than making his own judgment; and that one of the most important and overlooked intended readers of Polybius' *Histories* were the Romans themselves.[15] These chapters will be discussed in more detail in the third section of this chapter.

LITERATURE REVIEW

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[15] For Polybius' general support of imperialism, see Momigliano (1972-1973) 697-699; Momigliano (1975) 29-31, 48-49; Momigliano (1977) 67-77; Baronowski (2013) 10-11, 65-113, 164-175;.

While this dissertation will focus upon a great deal of scholarship focused on war, morality, and imperialism during the Middle Roman Republic, I will also engage in three other scholarly debates. These are the question of Polybius as a moral versus a purely "Machiavellian" historian; scholarly disagreements over Polybius' attitude toward the Romans; and the debate over the primary audience(s) of Polybius' work.

The question of whether Polybius was concerned with morality throughout his *Histories* only surfaced as a point of scholarly contention at the start of the twentieth century. Before this, scholars since the Middle Ages had regarded Polybius as a morally-minded writer similar to most other ancient historians.[16] Thus, we see notable scholars and thinkers including Jean Bodin, Christopher Watson, Isaac Casaubon, John Dryden, John Adams, Friedrich Nietzche, Rudolf von Scala, and Carl Wunderer all holding this view.[17] After the turn of the century, however, an increasing number of scholars began to view Polybius as a writer concerned with expounding a brutal realism rather than ethics or morality. In 1940, André Aymard argued that Polybius' basic intellectual stance was grounded in strict pragmatism.[18] He was followed by Paul Pédech, whose 1964 study depicted Polybius as lacking any sentiment toward those figuring in his history.[19] Most influential in solidifying this scholarly view was Frank Walbank, whose articles in the 1960s and 1970s as well as his 1972 book described Polybius' "ruthless" and "utilitarian" standard of historical judgment in regard to both individuals and communities.[20] Polybius,

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[16] Eckstein (1995) 16-27 provides an exhaustive account of the scholarly discourse on Polybius as a moral historian prior to the publication of his own book.

[17] See Eckstein (1995) 17-18, n. 74-79. On John Bodin, see Momigliano (1974), 132. On Christopher Watson, see: Walbank (1979), 19. On Isaac Casaubon, see Momigliano (1976), 93. On John Dryden, see Dryden (1698). On John Adams, see Chinard (1940), 43-44. Friedrich Nietzche (1980), 15; Von Scala (1890); Wunderer (1905).

[18] Aymard (1940) 19 and n. 3.

[19] Pédech (1964) 219.

[20] For Polybius as a utilitarian lacking of interest in ethics per se see Walbank (1965) 8; Walbank (1972), 173. For Polybius' general ruthlessness based on a preoccupation with pragmatic success or failure, see Walbank (1965) 11; Walbank (1970) 304; Walbank (1972) 178-181; Walbank (1974) 9-13, 23, 27-

according to Walbank, was indifferent toward morals and ethics, and only interested in whether

actions resulted in pragmatic outcomes, leading toward the expansion or solidification of

imperial power.[21] Walbank's presentation of Polybius' "Machiavellian" worldview has

influenced many scholars, including Kenneth Sacks (1980), David Ladouceur (1987), William

Reiter (1988), Peter Green (1990), and Andrew Erskine (1990).[22]

During these decades, scholars arguing against the notion of a Machiavellian worldview

in Polybius' *Histories* were few. In 1969 Petzold argued that although Polybius may have

adopted a utilitarian stance in the early volumes of his work, he became more interested in

morality in his later volumes.[23] Petzold's argument, however, was rejected by Walbank and other

scholars, as was Burkhard Meissner's 1986 thesis that Polybius was in fact concerned with the

morality of individual and state actions.

The first serious challenge to Walbank's notion of Polybius as a Machiavellian historian

came from Arthur Eckstein in his 1995 work, *Moral Visions in the Histories of Polybius*.[24]

Eckstein argued that Polybius was in fact heavily concerned with the morality of actions

regardless of their results, and that the historian's moral outlook was largely determined by his

aristocratic background which emphasized not only honor and courage but also self-restraint and

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28. These views are also found throughout Walbank's three-volume *Historical Commentary on Polybius* (1957-1979).

[21] Eckstein (1995) argues that moralizing passages in *The Histories* receive little scrutiny in the *Commentary*: cf. II:132 (Polyb. 9.9.9-10); II:264 (Polyb. 19.49); III: 320 (Polyb. 27.20); III:403 (Polyb. 29.26). Instead, Walbank emphasizes Polybius' amoral worldview and judgment based upon strict "Machiavellianism": cf. Walbank (1957-1979) II: 480 (Polyb. 15.24.4-6); III: 454 (Polyb. 30.27).

[22] Sacks (1980) 132-136, n. 30; Ladoucer (1987) 108-9; Reiter (1988) 30-33; Green (1990) 278-82; Erskine (1990) 185-186. Likewise, Pomeroy (1986) 422-423. Walbank likewise renewed his argument that Polybius' focus on the practical over any possible moral lessons that might be gleaned from the study of the past sets him apart from the other Hellenistic historians. See Walbank (1990) 263-266.

[23] Petzold (1969) 43-49, n. 1, 53-64; rejected by Walbank (1974) 6-7 and 24; as well as Gabba (1977) 71. Petzold's thesis is also rejected by Musti (1972) 1120-1121; although Musti (1978) 74-83 is more willing to accept strong moral concerns within Polybius' last ten volumes. This moral concern is again denied by Gruen (1984) I:247, n. 162; and by van Hooff (1975) 56-67.

[24] Eckstein (1995).

integrity. In his exhaustive look at numerous *exempla* throughout Polybius' histories, Eckstein demonstrated that there are actually relatively few moments where Polybius seems to endorse a Machiavellian worldview. Conversely, there are various instances in which Polybius clearly condemns actions as immoral regardless of their results. Thus, Polybius is quick to criticize the deceptive actions of the Epirotes in 220 and 170 as well as the treacherous actions of the Romans in 238/7. Polybius, Eckstein argues, is quite concerned with the morality of individuals and states, just as all Hellenistic historians were during this period.

Since the publication of Eckstein's book, the scholarly consensus has largely shifted back in favor of viewing Polybius as a moral historian. John Rich largely agrees with Eckstein's defense of Polybius' moral concerns, as have subsequent scholars, including Andrew Erskine, Craige Champion, Ryan Balot, Donald Baronowski, and Jarrett Carty.[25] Thus Ryan Balot argues that moral decline is essential to understanding the ultimate collapse of the Roman state within the cycle of polities (ἀνακύκλωσις), noting: "Like all historians of his time, Polybius wrote in the conviction that historical understanding could educate his readers in virtue, particularly through the use of *exempla*."[26] Jarrett Carty likewise argues that for Polybius: "The sole test of a perfect man is the power of bearing high-mindedly and bravely the most complete reverses of fortune."[27] Even Walbank attributed a greater importance of morality to Polybius' *Histories*. While his 1980 article, "The Idea of Decline in Polybius," argues that notions of social decline resulting from moral depravity in Polybius are unique to his discussions in Book VI, his later 1998 article, "A Greek Looks at Rome: Polybius VI Revisited," agrees that these notions of moral degradation can be found elsewhere in the *Histories*, notably with the perceived Roman

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[25] Rich (1999); Erskine (2003); Champion (2004); Balot (2010); Baronowski (2013); Carty (2016).
[26] Balot (2010) 496.
[27] Carty (2016) 26. See likewise Maier (2012).

decline following 168/167.[28] While most scholars agree on the importance of individual and collective moral behavior in Polybius' *Histories*, however, there is still room for disagreement regarding whether or not Polybius places greater weight upon moral considerations than pragmatic concerns, or indeed if these are even mutually exclusive.[29] Ultimately, this dissertation argues that for Polybius notions of moral action and pragmatic result are inseparable, as some long-term negative pragmatic consequence will always follow treacherous action in the Mediterranean world.

The second body of scholarship which this dissertation will address is the question of Polybius' attitude toward the Romans.[30] Scholars have propounded various interpretations regarding the Achaean historian's support of or opposition toward Roman action throughout the Mediterranean. Some historians argue that Polybius generally saw Roman rule as a negative phenomenon. According to Binyamin Shimron, for example, Polybius held that while smaller states needed to cooperate carefully with Rome at times, Roman rule on the whole was marked by injustice and greed.[31] Fergus Millar similarly believes that the Greek historian developed an "increasingly distant and hostile view of Roman domination."[32] Karl-Ernst Petzold, Erich Gruen, and Ryan Balot argue that books 30-39 in particular demonstrate Polybius' hostile view toward the Romans.[33] Finally, Craige Champion maintains that Polybius indirectly supported Greek resistance to Roman domination through representing the Romans as barbarians against Greek Hellenism and by describing the Romans, though capable of both justice and injustice, as having

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[28] Walbank (1980) 200-208 and (1998) 289-291, fn 25..
[29] Balot (2010) 503.
[30] For a succinct overview of much of this scholarly debate with regard to Polybius' judgment of Roman imperialism, see Baronowski (2013) 5-11.
[31] Shimron (1979-1980) 94-117.
[32] Millar (1987) 4.
[33] Petzold (1969) 59-64; Gruen (1984) 346-351; Balot (2010).

an increasingly corrupt moral character.[34] This notion of a Polybian Greek/barbarian dichotomy

presented by Champion and picked up by Emma Nicholson will feature prominently in Chapter

5.[35]

Other scholars believe that Polybius adopted a more positive outlook toward Roman

imperialism. Theodor Mommsen holds that Polybius was a close supporter of Rome, being the

first Greek to recognize that the Greeks would inevitably submit to superior Roman political

control.[36] Fustel de Coulanges likewise argues that the Achaean historian wholly endorsed the

Roman domination of Greece, both as a political leader in support of Rome during the Third

Macedonian War and as a historian in praise of the conservative Roman constitution.[37] Polybius,

Fustel de Coulanges holds, understood that the true conflict across the Mediterranean was found

within cities, not between them, as social classes struggled for supremacy. Thus, Polybius

renounced Achaean and Greek independence and supported Rome first out of fear of democracy

and later out of admiration of the Romans.[38] Peter Green also maintains that Polybius

collaborated with the Romans as a politician and as a historian, demonstrated by his sharp

condemnation of the nationalistic Achaean leaders in 146.[39] Arnoldo Momigliano suggests that

Polybius supported and collaborated with Roman imperialism both because he viewed this

expansionism as natural and because he saw it as a beneficial check against social reform -

popular rule threatened mob rule, revolution, and uncertainty for the land-holding elite.[40] Thus,

Greeks states ought to avoid futile military action against the Romans.[41]

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[34] Champion (2004).
[35] Nicholson (2020).
[36] Mommsen (1868) 3.487-91.
[37] De Coulanges (1858).
[38] De Coulanges (1858) 104.
[39] Green (1990): 279-283.
[40] Momigliano (1972-1973) 697-699; (1975) 29-31, 48-49; (1977) 67-77.
[41] Momigliano (1975) 48-49.

Scholars such as Domenico Musti, Arthur Eckstein, and Donald Baronowski suggest that Polybius' support of Roman imperialism was more nuanced. Musti argues that Polybius believed smaller states should prudently work with Rome to preserve as much dignity and independence as possible, avoiding the extremes of hopeless military resistance and undignified servitude. And while certainly aware and critical of the abuses of power possible under Roman domination, the Achaean historian was never opposed to Rome.[42] Similarly, Eckstein believes that Polybius not only supported such a policy of prudent cooperation but observed it himself as the *hipparch* of the Achaean League.[43] Again, Eckstein contends that while Polybius may have condemned certain Roman actions on moral grounds, he was never fundamentally opposed to Roman imperialism.[44] Baronowski also maintains that Polybius viewed Roman domination in a positive light, as he saw imperialistic endeavor in general as an admirable venture and as he saw Roman domination in particular as advantageous for the Greek upper class. Polybius likewise believed, Baronowski holds, that Roman wars were nearly always sufficiently justified and that Roman rule on the whole was marked by moderation.[45]

Frank Walbank offers a particularly dynamic interpretation of how Polybius viewed the Romans. He argues that the Greek historian's views shifted from cautious opposition to cynical detachment to ultimately strong support. Prior to 167, as a leading figure in the Achaean League during the war against Perseus (170-168), Polybius was cautiously opposed to Rome. While he was a political detainee in Rome (167-150), however, he became cynically detached in his views of Roman action and policy, with occasional criticism, as evidenced by Books 1-15 written during this period. Lastly, following the events of 149-146, Polybius became a strong supporter

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[42] Musti (1978) 44-84.
[43] Eckstein (1995) 197-225, 265-282.
[44] Eckstein (1995) 100-109, 229-230.
[45] Baronowski (2013) cf. 10-11, 65-113, 164-175.

of Roman domination, seen in Books 16-39, and especially in books 30-33. Any instance of criticism toward the Romans in these later books, Walbank argues, results from the fact that this material was based on Polybius' notes written while still in captivity. Thus, the later Books 35-39 clearly show the Achaean historian's identification with Roman domination.[46]

Many scholars, however, have found difficulties with Walbank's interpretation. Karl-Ernst Petzold and Erich Gruen, for example, both maintain that Polybius' outlook toward the Romans continued to be negative, even in Books 30-39.[47] Arthur Eckstein, moreover, holds that Polybius in 170-168 encouraged and engaged in prudent cooperation with the Romans, not cautious opposition as his own father wanted.[48] Eckstein also argues that there is no change in Polybius' opinion toward Rome between his earlier (1-15) and later (16-39) books. Polybius, for instance, criticizes certain Roman actions throughout the *Histories* as immoral, making it difficult to maintain that he was either cynically detached or strongly supportive of Roman domination.[49] Likewise, Eckstein believes that one of Polybius' central concerns in his *Histories* is the welfare of smaller and subject states. It is this motivation that led Polybius to advise the Greek states to avoid either extreme of hopeless war against Rome or abject and undignified servility. Again, such concerns undermine the likelihood that Polybius was either cynically detached from or closely identified with Roman power.[50]

Jean-Louis Ferrary also challenges the idea that Polybius was a strong supporter of Roman domination, pointing to the fact that Polybius happily describes the discrediting (32.6.3-9) and deaths (32.5.1-3) of the overly pro-Roman statesmen who controlled many of the Greek

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[46] Books 1-15 cover the years 264-202; Books 16-39 cover the years 202-145; Books 30-33 cover the years 168-152; and Books 35-39 cover the years 152-145.
[47] Petzold (1969) 59-64; Gruen (1984) 346-351.
[48] Eckstein (1985) 277-281.
[49] Eckstein (1995) 100-109, 229-230.
[50] Eckstein (1985) 265-282; (1995) 197-225.

states following the Third Macedonian War. Ferrary argues that throughout his *Histories*,

Polybius subscribes to the belief that weaker states should work to preserve as much

independence as possible from Rome. Such concerns do not lend themselves toward the

interpretation of Polybius as either cynically detached or strongly pro-Roman. Yet, Ferrary holds

that the entire *Histories* is generally favorable to Rome and that Polybius did not shift his views.

Thus Ferrary reads Books 30-33, which Walbank believes to be dominated by Polybius' cynical

and anti-Roman sentiment, as favorable to Rome on the whole. While the Achaean historian did

criticize the Romans at times, he believed that for the most part Rome ruled with moderation and

beneficence toward her subjects.[51] Scholars both before and after Eckstein and Ferrary have

largely rejected Walbank's interpretation on similar grounds.[52]

Other scholars, such as Gaetano de Sanctis, Marcello Gigante, and Michel Dubuisson

argue that Polybius' support of Rome was more sycophantic. De Sanctis argues that Polybius

defended Roman imperialism both as a leader of the Achaean League and as a historian,

knowing full well that it would mean the end of Greek freedom. Like Fustel, de Sanctis holds

that Polybius was merely interested in protecting his status and wealth, and that of the upper

class, against social reform, proving him to be a traitor, a coward, and a Roman apologist.[53]

Similarly, Gigante suggests that Polybius was mentally assimilated to Roman political values. As

a result, the Greek historian was quick to emphasize Rome's political, military, and moral

superiority, praise Rome's mixed constitution, and describe the inevitability of Roman

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[51] Ferrary (1988) 286-291, 306-348. Ferrary likewise believes that Polybius felt certain reservations about Roman actions against Carthage in 149, disliking the deceptive diplomacy leading up to their final demand to abandon the city. This view is echoed by Momigliano (1972-1973) 697-699; (1975) 29-31; (1977) 67-77. Green (1990) 279-283 also advances this same argument. I will be discussing the outbreak of the 3rd Punic War in detail.
[52] Musti and Shimron reject Walbank's thesis on similar grounds (though Shimron believes that Polybius' views were hostile to Rome). See Musti (1978) 44-84; Shimron (1979-1980) 94-117, cf. 114.
[53] De Sanctis (1935) 625-630.

domination across the Mediterranean.[54] Lastly, Dubuisson argues that Polybius assimilated his

thinking to Roman views owing to his long exposure to the Latin language. Thus, Polybius'

thoughts and judgments became heavily influenced by Roman attitudes, leading to his positive

portrayal of Roman actions and policies.[55]

Despite these claims of pro-Roman attitudes or even sycophantic support of the Republic,

most scholars believe that Polybius expressed a certain intellectual distancing from Rome

regardless of whether he saw Roman imperialism as a positive or negative phenomenon.

Shimron, for instance, holds that the Achaean historian was always primarily concerned with the

welfare of the Greeks and felt that they should preserve as much independence from Rome as

possible - a notion supported by Eckstein and Ferrary.[56] Hansulrich Labuske offers a similar

interpretation, suggesting that Polybius' views were inherently reflective of the Greek upper

class and that Polybius believed the mixed Roman constitution - good as it was - would

eventually collapse through natural decay.[57] Fergus Millar likewise argues that Polybius felt

reservations about Roman domination, as his perspective privileged the idea of the Greek *polis*.

G.A. Lehmann also stressed Polybius' Greek perspective, claiming that the Achaean historian

based his model of Roman imperialism upon the interactions between Philip II and the Greek

states in the 4th century.[58] Similarly, Gennaro Sasso maintains that while Polybius admired the

Roman state he was quick to criticize unjust Roman actions and would have preferred for Greece

to remain outside the bounds of Roman hegemony.[59] Karl-Ernst Petzold argues that while

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[54] Gigante (1951) 33-53.
[55] Dubuisson (1985) 273-287 and (1990) 233-243.
[56] Shimron (1979-1980) 94-117. Eckstein (1985) 265-282; (1995) 197-225. Ferrary (1988) 291-306, 321-348.
[57] Labuske (1969) 339-344.
[58] Lehmann (1989-1990) 66-77. Andrew Erskine (2003) takes a similar approach by demonstrating how Polybius' *Histories* were written not from the perspective of a supporter but from the perspective of an outsider - one waiting to see if the Romans would act justly and be able to maintain their empire.
[59] Sasso (1961) 73-76.

Polybius understood the need to cooperate with Rome (28.3; 28.6.1-7; 28 12.1-2), he preferred Philopoemen's policy of initially resisting Roman demands to the more proactive compliance recommended by Aristaenus (24.11-13). Petzold also suggests that Polybius' early account of Achaean history (2.37-71) contrasts the Roman Republic, which relied upon political, military, and economic superiority, with the Achaean League, which relied instead on ethical principles.[60] Craige Champion also establishes Polybius' intellectual distance from Rome by suggesting a dichotomy within the *Histories* between a civilized Hellas and a barbarian Rome, intentionally creating negative portrayal of the Romans within Greek intellectual thought (1.11.7; 5.104; 9.37; 11.6; 12.4).[61] Ultimately, as even Frank Walbank admits, "Polybius remained primarily an Achaean. Both in his life and in his writing he never wavered in one criterion - what he regarded as the best policy for Achaea."[62] This interpretation of Greek first and Roman second is echoed by Carl Wunderer, Arnaldo Momigliano, Donald Baronowski, and the historians noted above.[63]

It is clear that some scholars hold that one of Polybius' chief concerns was avoiding social reform or revolution which would undermine the wealth and status of the Greek upper class. Fustel de Coulanges, for example, asserts that throughout his *Histories* Polybius consistently expressed enmity toward unrestrained democracy and social reform. Conversely, he saw the conservative mixed constitution of the Romans as the best safeguard against social disruption for the wealthy Greek upper class.[64] Peter Green likewise argues that Polybius accepted Roman control of Greece because he believed it would help to maintain social

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[60] Petzold (1969) 43-53, 91-100.
[61] Champion (2000a), (2000b), and (2004).
[62] Walbank (1974) 29-30.
[63] Baronowski (2013) 10-11, 65-113, 164-175. Momigliano (1972-1973) 697-699; (1975) 29-31; (1977) 67-77. Wunderer (1927) 46-47.
[64] De Coulanges (1893) 119-211.

conservatism.[65] This interpretation is echoed by Jean-Louis Ferrary, who holds that the Achaean historian saw the conservative constitutions imposed on the Achaean cities by the Romans following 146 as working to defend the traditional social order of domination by the landed rich.[66] Similarly, Hansulrich Labuske argues that while Polybius regretted the loss of Greek freedom to Roman domination, he acknowledged that Rome was the surest way to maintain the current political and social order.[67] Ultimately, these social concerns, the importance of which many scholars have acknowledged, paint Polybius as remaining intellectually distant from Rome even if he saw important positive aspects of Roman imperialism.[68] Yet on the whole, most scholars tend to view Roman domination through the eyes of Polybius as a positive and justifiable phenomenon.[69]

The third and final important question debated by scholars that will prove central to this dissertation concerns Polybius' intended audience or audiences. As a member of the Greek elite, it is clear that Polybius, like most ancient historians, was writing for fellow aristocrats.[70] In describing "by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government - a thing unique in history" (1.1.5), Polybius wrote primarily for Greek aristocrats back home, for the Roman elite themselves, or for both. Knowing who the Achaean historian's intended audience or audiences were, and thus how he intended his work to be read, influences how scholars analyze and understand certain Polybian passages as well as the *Histories* as a whole. For example, to a Roman reader, Polybius' discussion of Rome's seizure of Sardinia in 238/7,

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[65] Green (1990) 279-283.
[66] Ferrary (1988) 291-306, 321-348.
[67] Labuske (1969) 339-344.
[68] Acknowledge as well by Eckstein (1995) and Baronowski (2013) 10-11, 65-113, 164-175.
[69] Baronowski (2013) 10-11.
[70] Ripat (2006) 155-174; Roller (2009) 153-172.

the *nova sapientia* of Marcius Philippus' actions in 171, and the Greek opinions on Roman action at Carthage in 149 can be read didactically as well as historically. Ultimately, the issue of audience is central to understanding the underlying motivations behind Polybius' great work, beyond a simple recounting of the events of the third and second centuries. This important question, however, has seen little variance from scholars.[71]

Very few scholars have argued that Polybius may have written his work with a Roman readership in mind. Michael Dubuisson argues that Polybius' work, given the historian's heavy Romanization in both language and thought, was intended for a Roman audience just as much as for a Greek readership, although the *Histories* on the whole were written as a defense of Roman imperialism.[72] Similarly, Craig Champion suggests that Polybius' target audiences were both the Roman senatorial aristocracy and the Greek political elite.[73] Thus, Polybius worked at times to frame his historical narrative using contemporary Roman political ideals such as the fixation on moral decline and on past generations.[74] Ultimately, however, Champion's larger work argues that Polybius' framework on the whole featured the Greek binary of civilized Greek versus uncivilized barbarian, including Romans as βάρβαροι, suggesting that they acted badly in Polybius' judgment. Likewise, Champion concludes that Polybius' indirect subversions of these Roman claims of outstanding morality, as, for example, in the speeches of Greek statesmen, suggest he primarily catered to his Greek audience. Lastly, Ryan Balot, writing about Polybius in terms of republican political theory, argues that the central didactic purpose behind Polybius'

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[71] The fact that most historians have not seriously considered multiple audiences for Polybius' *Histories* is surprising in itself. Such an isolated view of the readership of any work is restrictive to its understanding, both generally and specifically. This point has been made most saliently by Richlin (2005) with regard to Plautus' intended audience in the years immediately before Polybius wrote.

[72] Dubuisson (1985) 266-267, 273-287 and (1990) 233-243.

[73] Champion (2004) 173-203.

[74] Champion (2004) 173-175.

work was "to educate the Roman aristocracy in the virtues necessary for exercising hegemonic power successfully in the ancient Mediterranean world."[75] Thus, Polybius attempts to educate his readers through the Roman tradition of *exempla*, such as the lesson of mercy championed by Aemilius Paullus in talking with his war council following his victory at Pydna (29.20.2-4).[76]

Despite these few prominent scholars, the vast majority of historians argues, or more often assumes, that Polybius was writing exclusively for the Greek political elite. Thus, Dubuisson's arguments have been denied by Walbank and later scholars, and Champion's and Balot's claims of an intended Roman audience have largely been ignored.[77] Peter Green, for example, cautions readers to keep in mind that Polybius was writing specifically for a Greek audience in hopes of convincing them to accept Roman rule.[78] Brian McGing likewise asserts that the Greek elite must be Polybius' main audience, to explain the need for two introductory books on the history of Rome and Carthage (1.3.7-8).[79] Hans Beck also maintains that Polybius' goal was to "familiarize the Greek audience with affairs in the western Mediterranean."[80] Andrew Erskine argues as well that the Greeks were Polybius' primary audience, suggesting that Book 6 was written as an explanation of Greek failure, as opposed to Roman institutional success, and that the *Histories* on the whole were written for the Greeks in the face of the collapse of the familiar Hellenistic power structure by the Romans.[81]

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[75] Balot (2010) 483, 496-502. Such a focus is also suggested by Erskine (2003). Erskine, however, ultimately believes that Polybius, in recounting lessons in the maintenance of empire based on Carthaginian and Roman activity in Spain during the late 3rd century, is speaking generally to Greek holders of power and not with a Roman readership in mind. Thus, Erskine (2013a) and Erskine (2013b) reassert that the Greek aristocracy was always Polybius' intended audience.

[76] Balot (2010) 498-499.

[77] Dubuisson is arguing against Walbank (1972) 3-4. Denied by Erskine (2013a).

[78] Green (1990) 269-285.

[79] McGing (2010) 67, 184.

[80] Beck (2013) 141.

[81] On Book 6 as parallel of Greek failure, see Erskine (2013a). On Greek audience in the face of the collapse of the Hellenistic system, see Erskine (2013b).

Other scholars also work under the assumption that Polybius was writing for a Greek audience. Domenico Musti argues that one of the main lessons housed within Polybius' *Histories* is one of moderation for smaller states, holding that these states should carefully work in league with Rome in order to preserve as much independence and dignity as possible by avoiding the extremes of futile military resistance against Rome and unquestioning servitude.[82] Arthur Eckstein likewise argues that through his narrative Polybius advises the Greeks and other secondary powers in the Mediterranean to prudently cooperate with the Romans. Working directly against the Romans could no longer lead toward political success for the state - a fact with which Polybius quickly came to terms with as a leading Achaean statesman. It is this central concern for those living under Roman hegemony, Eckstein holds, that guides Polybius' *Histories.*[83] Jean-Louis Ferrary agrees with Eckstein (1985) and Musti as well, pointing to the Greeks as the intended target of Polybius' lessons on showing weaker states how to maintain as much independence and dignity as possible in the face of the new Roman domination.[84] Felix Maier also assumes a Greek audience in his recent work, which looks at whether or not Polybius believed Rome's rise to power was unpredictable, weighing both the recurring patterns of history as well as the agency of individual action and the influence of unexpected chance.[85] Finally, Donald Baronowski also maintains that Polybius' focus, and his intended readership, always remained upon the smaller states the Mediterranean and future enemies of Rome as the Achaean historian advised these states on how to survive through cooperation while preserving as much independence and dignity as possible, pointing out Greek leaders who failed in this balance such

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[82] Musti (1978) 44-84. Echoed as well by Shimron (1979-1980) 94-117.
[83] Eckstein (1985) 265-282; (1995) 197-225.
[84] Ferrary (1988) 291-306, 321-348
[85] Maier (2012). Maier's lack of consideration for a potential Roman readership is noted by Champion (2015).

as Critolaus and Diaeus who led a self-destructive Achaean war against Rome in the 146 (38.10.8).[86] Polybius also worked at times to point out how enemies of Rome might have fought against the Romans more effectively, as with his critique of Hannibal for not fighting the Romans until after completing the subjugation of Spain (11.19.6-7).[87]

Those scholars who believe that Polybius was concerned with maintaining the social stability of the Greek propertied class likewise approach the *Histories* with the assumption that Polybius was intending for a Greek readership. Fustel de Coulanges assumes a Greek audience for Polybius' *Histories*, believing that the Achaean historian's work was written in part to justify Roman rule as a sure maintenance of contemporary social conservatism.[88] Gaetano de Sanctis follows this tradition begun by Fustel de Coulanges and holds that Polybius cared only about protecting his own wealth and status and that the historian hoped to justify Roman rule to Greeks back home in order to accomplish this.[89] Similarly, Hansulrich Labuske argues that Polybius acknowledged that Roman rule was beneficial to the security of the current social and political order.[90] Arnoldo Momigliano likewise sees Polybius as encouraging Roman rule to the Greeks as a safe check against social reform.[91] Jean-Louis Ferrary also follows this tradition, maintaining that Polybius wrote his *Histories* to justify Roman rule, thereby safeguarding Greek social conservatism.[92] Finally, Peter Green argues that Polybius positively portrayed Roman imperialism for a Greek audience so that his Greek readers would accept the social stability and protections that would accompany Roman domination.[93] Overall, the current trend in Polybian

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[86] Baronowski (2013) 120-121, 164-167.
[87] Baronowski (2013) 127, 166.
[88] De Coulanges (1893) 119-211.
[89] De Sanctis (1935) 625-630.
[90] Labuske (1969) 339-344.
[91] Momigliano (1972-1973) 697-699; (1975) 29-31, 48-49; (1977) 67-77.
[92] Ferrary (1988) 291-306, 321-348.
[93] Green (1990): 279-283.

scholarship is to assume that Polybius was writing with a Greek audience in mind. This dissertation, however, will furnish evidence to establish that Polybius' work was written with a Roman readership in mind, even if he anticipated a primarily Greek audience, so as to teach Roman statesmen how to rule moderately and thereby maintain the stability of their empire.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This dissertation on treachery in Polybius' *Histories* will take the form of five chapters. This first chapter has served to offer an overview of the structure of the project, introduce the main lines of inquiry, and detail the ultimate conclusions of the work. This section also contained an extended literature review, including and expanding upon the scholarly debates presented in this dissertation. Chapter 2: "Treachery and Deception against Friends and Allies" details Polybius' presentation and analysis of various betrayals carried out against friends and allies. Chapter 3: "Treachery and Deception against One's Own State" examines instances of treachery committed by individuals against fellow citizens. Chapter 4: "Diplomatic Treachery and the Roman Paradox" will look at Polybius' judgment on instances of diplomatic deception and double-dealing, and how Polybius uses such examples to frame his evaluation of Roman imperialism. Chapter 5: "Polybius, Rome, and the Lessons of Treachery" argues that, based on the conclusions from the previous three chapters, portions of Polybius' *Histories* were written with a Roman readership in mind, warning both Greeks and Romans about the political decline that necessarily follows the moral decay of the state into lawlessness (παρανομία).

The substantive chapters of this dissertation will in part expand upon Arthur Eckstein's chapter on deception and breaks of good faith in his *Moral Visions in the* Histories *of Polybius*.[94]

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[94] Eckstein (1995) 84-117.

Eckstein holds that there exists a "general pattern of praise for good faith, and condemnation of treachery and deceit, that is found throughout *The Histories*."[95] Eckstein's goal in analyzing these cases of deceit and treachery is to establish that, contrary to Walbank, Polybius was generally concerned with the morality, not just the utility, behind the actions of states and individuals. While Eckstein is convincing in this argument, a more nuanced look at these individual cases of deceit and treachery is needed. There appears to be a clear difference to Polybius, for example, between deception and treachery. While deception can be acceptable in a variety of cases (for instance deceiving the enemy on the battlefield, the conducting of a night attack, or obscuring troop movements), treachery, where one betrays those who ought to be in one's protection or betrays one's city and countrymen to a more powerful enemy for personal gain or security, is rarely justifiable in Polybius' eyes.[96] Eckstein tends to combine these into one single condemnable category, but the distinction is important. And indeed, there remains great nuance within Polybius' assessment of "treachery." The criteria for Polybius' judgment are complicated.

Thus, when the Rhodian envoy Astymedes speaks to the Senate in 166 (13.4), it is not his deception of the Romans concerning past Rhodian actions that Polybius condemns, but rather the fact that he betrays the confidences of fellow Greeks by informing the Romans of past Greek indiscretions, thereby "betraying their confidences" (30.4.16).[97] Similarly, in 170 the prominent Epirote statesmen Theodotus and Philostratus worked in secret with Perseus and attempted to

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[95] Eckstein (1995) 84.

[96] Polybius 18.13-15 provides a brief discussion of who constitutes a traitor in Polybius' eyes, holding traitors to be those who "put their cities into the hands of the enemy" (18.15.2) or "submit their countries to the domination of a superior power" (18.15.3). This discussion, highlighting as well what constitutes acceptable action, largely serves as a defense of Aristaenus' actions on behalf of Achaea during the autumn of 197 in breaking the Achaean alliance with Philip V to side with Rome during the 2nd Macedonian War. `

[97] πόρον μηνυτὰς γενομένους τῶν συνειδότων.

kidnap a new Roman consul, A. Hostilius Mancinus, as he journeyed through Epirus on his way

to command the Roman army in Greece (27.16). Polybius' primary moral criticism is not with

the deception at work but rather with the fact that this action was carried out despite the alliance

that Epirus shared with Rome.[98] The Epirote politician Charops committed similar "wickedness"

(πονηρίας) when he brought up false charges against his political enemies to the Romans

(27.15.6). Again, Polybius' focus here is not on the deception itself, but rather on the treachery

that Charops is committing by betraying fellow citizens to Rome.

While these instances of treachery certainly work to establish Polybius as a morally-

minded historian, there is not always a uniformity among them. Thus, as this dissertation will

analyze, certain instances of deception are judged much more harshly by Polybius than others.

Context remains crucial to Polybius' moral judgments, and the context differs based upon who is

being deceived and betrayed (i.e., allies vs enemies vs fellow citizens). As Eckstein admits,

there are even a number of instances of deception and treachery which Polybius seemingly does

not condemn at all. Examples include Scipio Africanus' fabricated dream[99] (10.4-5, 10.14-11-12;

11.7), his actions at the siege of New Carthage in 209, and his deceptive diplomacy leading up to

the battle of the Camps in the spring of 203[100] (14.1; 2.7-8; 3.2-3; 2.11-12). Similar approval is

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[98] For support of a formal treaty of alliance, see Hammond (1967) 621; Walbank (1979), *Commentary* III: 315. For arguments against a formal treaty, see Gruen (1984) I: 23; Eckstein (1995) . For more on this affair in general, see Oost (1954) 75-77. For the political "success" of the kidnapping attempt despite its failure, see Meloni (1953) 257; Oost (1954) 77; Hammond (1967) 627-628; Deininger (1971/2012) 175, Walbank (1979) III: 316.

[99] Walbank (1967) II: 192. Eckstein (1985) 85 argues that Polybius is only interested in seeking to counter the widespread view that Scipio's success had only come about from luck and divine assistance as opposed to combination of talent, skillful calculation, and intelligence that the historian believed was responsible.

[100] Eckstein (1995) 86-87 argues that Polybius' praise surrounding this passage (14.5) stems from the skill required to conduct a successful night operation rather than a praise of Scipio's trick itself. This is one of Eckstein's few less-than-convincing interpretations, as the utter lack of any condemnation on the trickery itself is most telling. This dissertation will offer a more convincing reason for Polybius' decision to refrain from directly condemning Scipio is this passage, namely that the Achaean historian did not want to detract from the devastating situation of the Second Punic War from which Scipio rescued Rome and that he did not want to undermine his subsequent claim that Marcius Philippus' later act of deception against

given to Hiero II's treachery against his own mercenaries[101] (1.8.3-4; cf. 7.8.1-8) as well as

Aratus of Sicyon's deception toward the voters of the Achaean League[102] (2.47-51); and

Flamininus' deceptive negotiations with Philip V in the winter of 198.[103] There seems to be

something more complex at work throughout Polybius' *Histories* than a blanket condemnation of

deception and treachery. The reasons that Polybius chooses to emphasize some actions as

immoral and not others will be answered throughout this dissertation (Chapters 2-4).

Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 work to provide an exhaustive survey of the different

types of treachery presented by Polybius throughout his *Histories*. Chapter 2, which focuses on

acts of treachery carried out against friends and allies, finds that Polybius criticizes all instances

in which a state betrays friends and allies for reasons of self-interest. Polybius' condemnation is

especially harsh when these acts of treachery are carried out despite past kindnesses and

expectations of friendship. For example, Polybius harshly condemns the multiple acts of

treachery carried out by the Mantineans against the Achaean League during the Cleomoneann

War in 227 despite Achaean forgiveness and generosity (2.57-58). When the city was eventually

captured by Antigonus in 223, working alongside the Achaeans, it was pillaged and the male

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Perseus marked the *nova sapientia* of his day - the same reason why Polybius also chooses to refrain from condemning Flamininus in 198. Pfeilschifter (2005) 91-110.

[101] Eckstein (1995) 90-91 emphasizes that Polybius' focus here is on the the evil and rebellious mercenaries rather than Hiero's actions, which are handled carefully given a difficult situation. Here too, however, Polybius' lack of a clear condemnation is telling.

[102] Eckstein (1995) 91-92 suggests that Polybius does not condemn Aratus' actions here because his deceptions were not intended to be destructive but rather came from some "higher patriotism" and were carried out due to sheer necessity (2.47.8). This interpretation, drawn from Bickermann 1938: 287-88, is problematic as it suggests that Aratus' necessity trumps the morality of his actions, which does not support Eckstein's ultimate thesis. Polybius' judgments about instances of treachery and deception entail both moral and pragmatic considerations, making them more blurred and complicated than Eckstein admits.

[103] Eckstein (1995) 94-96 suggests that Polybius did not believe that Flamininus' actions represented a betrayal of either Rome or its allies in the war given the benefits of making peace at the time. Eckstein's argument, however, does not address the deception toward Philip, similar to Scipio's actions in 203. See n. 86.

citizens sold into slavery (2.58.12).[104] Polybius maintains that such a punishment did not fit the

impious crime (τὸ μέγιστον ἀσέβημα, 2.58.7) of the Mantineans. Polybius does allow for the

betrayal of friends and allies, however, in the face of extreme necessity or in opposition to

wicked allies. Thus, Demetrius' betrayal of the treacherous Teuta in 229 (2.11.4-5) and

Hannibal's betrayal of some of his Italian allies in 211, given the limited military options he had

at his disposal (9.26), are found to be acceptable.

Chapter 3 finds similar nuance with Polybius' assessments of acts of treachery carried out

against one's own state. Polybius condemns not only instances of technical "treachery"

(παρασπόνδημα), in which someone betrays his city to the enemy for personal gain, greed, and

ambition, but also more general examples of treacherous actions taken against fellow citizens -

including their murder, extortion, and betrayal for personal gain. Thus we see a sharp rebuke of

Lagbasis' attempt in 218 to deliver the city of Selge to Achaeus (5.74.7) as well as the decisions

of Charops (27.15.2-16) and Callicrates (24.8.9) to turn over political rivals to the Romans on

trumped-up charges. Similar treacheries are found within the Hellenistic courts during the late

third and early second centuries. In instances in which statesmen work against fellow citizens for

patriotic reasons, however, Polybius often refrains from such criticism. We find this with the

Achaean historian's acceptance of the decision of Aratus of Sicyon in 225/224 to submit the

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[104] On Antigonus' capture, see Cohen 1995: 123. Polybius sharply criticizes Phylarchus' emotive and dramatic description of the capture of Mantinea in order to paint Antigonus and the Macedonians as well as Aratus and the Achaeans as excessively cruel (2.56). Thus, Polybius highlights a scene of Mantinean women naked, weeping, and disheveled. For Polybius' portrayal of women as out of control during crises and their general threat to the social order (resembling the popular masses), see Eckstein 1995 150-157; cf. 9.6.3-4; 12.24.5; 15.29.9; 32.15.7; Champion 2004a: 125-126. On the corresponding hysteria and superstitions of such women, see von Scala 1890: 258. On the larger problems with Phylarchus' account of the torture and death of Aristomachus, see Meister 1975: 101, 107; Eckstein 2013: 316-329. For the favoring of Phylarchus' account over Polybius' description, see Hagemans and Kosmetatou 2005: 135–36. On the consistency between Polybius' account of the betrayals of Mantinea and Aristomachus:

Achaean League under Macedonian domination in order to prevent imminent destruction at the hands of Cleomenes III of Sparta (2.51).

Chapter 4 continues this look at Polybius' complex understanding of acts of treachery and deception by looking at instances in which states utilize deceptive diplomacy with enemy states. Instances in which states attack diplomats are universally condemned by Polybius, as are instances in which states violate sworn truces or terms of surrender. For example, in 203/202 during the Second Punic War, the Carthaginians do both when they first violate the sworn truce with Rome and then proceed to treacherously (παρασπόνδησιν) attack the Roman ambassadors Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius (15.2.5-13; cf. 15.4.2). When no such formal agreements have been made, however, Polybius sees diplomatic diplomacy as not just acceptable but even as clever and praiseworthy. We see this with his portrayal of Scipio leading up to the Battle of the Camps in 203/202 (14.1.1-14.2.14). In this way, Polybius takes a very legalistic (one might even say Roman) approach to what qualifies diplomatic treachery.

Ultimately, the most notable findings from these three chapters is not Polybius' nuanced approach to instances of treachery, but the general pattern that emerges of who is carrying out these acts. Across all three of these chapters, we find that monarchies are especially prone to commit acts of treachery. Philip V, though given a nuanced treatment by Polybius, often receives the lion's share of the Achaean historian's condemnation. Indeed, Chapter 3 finds that there are far fewer instances of treachery against one's own state carried out by members of republics, and while there are instances of deception deployed against fellow citizens, it is typically done for patriotic reasons that benefit the state. Such patriotism is rarely found in monarchies. Equally interesting is the general lack of treachery exhibited by the Romans in Polybius' work. While there are a few instances of Roman action condemned by Polybius, such as the Roman seizure of

Sardinia in 238/237, these cases are few and far between. Indeed, there are no instances of outright treason at Rome - a fact that sets the Romans apart from the Greek states, both large and small. In looking at some of the more severe instances of treachery, Polybius often describes these states as in a state of lawlessness (παρανομία) - an attribute that Polybius associated with the moral and political decline of the state as it moves from exhibiting "Greek" virtue to "barbarian" depravity.[105] The Romans are never once described by Polybius as exhibiting παρανομία, and in fact they are nearly always the victims of such παρανομία carried out by other states. In other instances, the Romans are described by Polybius as the champions against παρανομία. Thus, the Roman arrival in Greece with the Second Macedonian War was the result of the pleas of Greek city-states in response to Philip's παρανομία.[106] The Romans are likewise depicted as liberating the Greek cities from the παρανομία of the Illyrians in 229 (2.8.13), and from the παρανομία of the Galatian Gauls in 189 (21.40.2; 3.3.5).

Eckstein also holds that Polybius always condemns acts of treachery on moral grounds, regardless of positive or negative consequences. A strong case will be made in Chapter 5, however, that Polybius intentionally associates negative long-term pragmatic effects to these morally depraved actions.[107] In arguing that Polybius believed that it was impossible to separate the morality of statesmen's actions from the pragmatic consequences that would necessarily follow, this dissertation relies upon Polybius' discussion of the Cycle of Polities (*anacyclosis*) in Book 6 as well as the presence of a moral Greek/barbarian dichotomy through the *Histories*.[108]

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[105] On this dichotomy, the dissertation pulls most heavily from Champion (2000) and Nicholson (2020).
[106] Eckstein 2009: 75-98.
[107] As an example, one may look to the treacheries committed by Philip V and Antiochus III against the boy king Ptolemy III in 203/2. While there are pragmatic benefits from this deplorable action (especially with Antiochus), Polybius makes it clear that the long-term results are the destruction of each of these kingdoms. This example (ironically) is most strongly supported by Eckstein (2005) 228-242; Eckstein (2008) 121-180. This question of long-term consequences from Roman actions will be one of the two main focuses in the final chapter of the dissertation.
[108] Champion (2000) and Nicholson (2020).

These distinctions, I will argue, are significant for Polybius' authorial purpose as they allow him to provide moral lessons to both the Greeks and the Romans of his own time, warning the Romans of the dangers of treacherous behavior, which ultimately plunges the state into lawlessness (παρανομία).

In addition to warning about the consequences of immoral treachery, Polybius utilizes various instances of Roman deception and treachery to present the notion that the Romans of his own time were not as ethical and morally upright as their ancestors. As we have already seen in the claim of one of the Greek speakers in 36.9.9-11, Polybius likewise suggests that the *nova sapientia* with which Romans such as Marcius Philippus in 172/171 acted was something that past Romans, and even the more austere contemporary Romans, would never have endorsed (Livy [P] 42.43.2). Such a notion is echoed as well in Appian's recounting of the Carthaginians' claim that the Romans of the generation of the 50s were not like their forefathers (*Pun.* 79). Appian relies on a Greek source for this material, and given these themes, Polybius is likely to be that source. In many ways, however, Polybius' own narrative undermines this claim, as there are just as many (or as few) instances of Roman deception and treachery committed in the third century as there are in the second. Despite Polybius' suggestion of a more virtuous Roman past, Roman deception both in diplomacy and on the battlefield was present throughout the entirety of the *Histories*.[109] Such a contradiction is a result of Polybius' attempts to achieve multiple purposes in his work - in this case to accurately recount the events behind Rome's rise to power as well as to present the notion that Rome in the middle second century was in a state of moral

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[109] This chapter will look at the three instances of Roman deception in which an interest in coming to terms is fabricated: Scipio's actions before the Battle of the Camps in 203, Flamininus' actions with Philip V in the winter of 198/7, and Philippus' actions with Perseus in 171. Despite scholars' attempts to excuse some and not others, their similarity begs the question of why Polybius goes out of his way to condemn Philippus' actions and not the previous two cases. The answer, this chapter argues, is that this decision strengthens his portrayal of a morally decaying contemporary Roman state, while condemning all three cases of deception equally would undermine it.

decline.[110] The reason behind such a presentation again points to Polybius' concern with a Roman readership, who could strive to remain or return to the same moral character that defined the Romans of the First and Second Punic Wars. This is not meant to deny the existence of a Greek readership, which has been rightfully well-established and explains Polybius' decision to explain certain Roman traditions to an uninformed audience.[111] Rather, the Achaean historian is equally concerned with teaching the Romans how to maintain their rule through moderation and restraint as he is with showing the Greeks how to live successfully under this new hegemony. Following in the footsteps of previous Hellenistic historians who wrote under the hegemony of the Hellenistic kings, Polybius strives throughout his work to create a notion of the ideal Roman statesman, just as his predecessors described the ideal king. In doing so, the Achaean historian hoped that Roman readers would conform themselves to this model, thus placing internal limitations on Roman behavior at a time when external limitations were no longer possible.[112]

The argument that Polybius' *Histories* was written with a Roman readership in mind is further supported by the number of moral lessons which are geared toward first first-rank powers, not the Greeks and other second-rank states. In other words, when it comes to direct didactic commentary, for the Achaean historian the need to rule with beneficence and

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[110] The reason for Polybius is interested in intentionally framing the Roman state in this light will be discussed in the fifth and final chapter of this dissertation.

[111] To suggest that Book 6, for instance, was written with an exclusively Greek audience in mind is dubious: McGing (2010) Erskine (2013a). The Romans of Polybius' generation such as Scipio Aemilianus, Fabius Aemilianus, and Cato would also have been interested in seeing an analysis of the Roman constitution.

[112] Bosworth (2010) has shown that such "created" notions of kingship could in fact be put forth by the monarchs themselves. Thus the mid-late 4th century moral imperative for kings to always remain truthful (deceit and dishonesty were inherently "unregal") can be traced to ideology created by Alexander himself rather than Hellenistic writers. And the successor kings that followed in some ways were forced to conform to this moral standard. Such ideological posturing, both positive and negative, was of course prevalent throughout the ancient world as with the common portrayal of Greek vs. Barbarian. See Champion (2000a) and (2004), as well as Prag (2010) who shows how a series of Syracusan tyrants, from Gelon to Hiero II, utilized the free Greeks vs. invading Barbarians propaganda, mirroring the Persian invasion of Greece in 490 and 480.

moderation is emphasized even more strongly than the need for secondary states to avoid the extremes of undignified servitude or futile war - the latter considered by many scholars to be a central concern of Polybius' work.[113] For example, in describing the steady decline of King Philip V's morals at the end of the third century, Polybius suggests: "Perhaps it may be said of all kings that at the beginnings of their reigns they talk of freedom as of a gift they offer to all and style all those who are thus loyal adherents their friends and allies, but as soon as they have established their authority they at once begin to treat those who placed trust in them not as allies but as servants" (15.24.4-6). Claims such as this directed toward first-rank states, most notably Philip V, Antiochus III, and Rome, are frequent throughout the *Histories*. Likewise, there is a clear transition from applying such lessons to Philip V and other kings to applying these lessons to Rome at the time following Pydna in 167 and following, drawing clear parallels in Polybius' work between Philip V and Rome. This dissertation argues that Polybius believed that Rome herself (i.e the Roman aristocracy), like kingship, risked moral decay if enough interstate power became concentrated into the hands of the Senate.[114] And while Polybius threatens the idea that the Romans of his own day were not as morally straight as their predecessors, it is clear from his

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[113] See for example: Musti (1978) 44-84. Shimron (1979-1980) 94-117. Eckstein (1985) 265-282; (1995) 197-225. Ferrary (1988) 291-306, 321-348. Baronowski (2013). These two concerns for Polybius are, of course, in no way mutually exclusive. The emphasis, however, has been placed by scholars on Polybius' concern for the secondary states.

[114] The question here is one of self-control. With the acquisition of more and more power, a greater amount of self control is needed by the king or the state in question. Thus, Polybius' accounting of Philip V is largely concerned with his lack of self control, as if he were an animal (7.13.7, 15.20.3). Conversely, Polybius praises the resolute self-control in the face of the fear and panic following disaster at Cannae in the summer of 216. One might likewise compare the self-control demonstrated by Scipio Africanus in Spain in 210 following the capture of New Carthage, as he refused a beautiful captive spanish woman offered to him by his men (10.19.3-7), with the paralleled lack of self-control exhibited by Antiochus III in his marriage to "Euboea" of Chalcis, spending the winter in drunken lust and unconcerned with the affairs of the war (20.8.1-5). Erskine (2014) argues that lack of self-control in the form of anger begins to become prominent amongst the Roman senators following Pydna. Before Rome's massive acquisition of power, it was the Greeks and other states angry at Rome (i.e., Carthage, Aetolia); after becoming the uncontested hegemon of the Mediterranean, however, it is Rome who becomes increasingly angry at others.

narrative that the Romans had not yet reached that tipping point. Whether the Roman

backhanded dealings with Carthage in 149 would become the new normal or whether the

Romans would continue to rule with moderation, as they demonstrated with the Achaeans in 146,

Polybius himself appears to be uncertain.

Chapter 2: Treachery and Deception against Friends and Allies

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the present chapter is to survey Polybius' descriptions and moral analysis of acts of treachery and deception carried out against friends and allies. While such breaks of good faith are often condemned by Polybius, he does suggest that certain betrayals may be morally acceptable given the context. As we will continue to see throughout this dissertation, the Achaean historian's criteria for judgment remain complex. The reason behind Polybius' frequent criticism of these treacherous actions carried out by governments against friends and allies stems from the expectation of mutual trust and security that typically exists between such states, excluding certain groups such as barbarians and mercenaries as we saw in the previous chapter. It is when such expectations of loyalty are betrayed that Polybius is especially harsh in his criticism and moral condemnation of those who commit such treacheries. In other words, the violation of sworn or written agreements (παρασπόνδημα) is made all the worse when there is an expectation of friendship.

For Polybius, the existence of friendship between states is just as important, perhaps more so, than the formal treaty legalizing an alliance through oaths to the gods. In fact, it is often to past good deeds fostering friendship that Polybius points in emphasizing these relationships, rather than sworn oaths and agreements. Thus, Polybius highlights the generosity that Philip II showed to the Athenians and other Greeks following the battle of Chaeronea in 338 (5.9.8-10.5), the leniency exhibited by Antigonus Doson toward the Spartans after the battle of Sellasia in 222 (2.70), and the good will shown toward the Spartan exiles by Philopoemen and the Achaeans following the

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assassination of Nabis of Sparta in 188 (21.32c).[1] Good deeds such as these are what define and maintain alliances, and it is these friendly actions that are frequently invoked in defense of these relationships, as we see with the Spartan relationship to both the Antigonids (4.16.1-5) and the Achaeans (22.11) in the above cases.

This, of course, is not to say that Polybius does not hold treaties and sworn oaths as significant in determining judgment on acts of treachery. Indeed, Polybius' condemnation of the violation of such sworn oaths is clear in describing the actions of Nabis of Sparta against the Messenians (16.13) as well as in Lyciscus' speech before the Spartan Assembly urging them to keep faith with Philip V during the First Macedonian War (9.34-40). The same concern is shown in Polybius' emphasis on the sworn oaths exchanged in 163 between Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII Physcon in dividing their kingdom (31.10). Yet Polybius admits that not all alliances share the same expectations of loyalty.[2] Thus, as will be discussed momentarily, the Roman alliance with the Carthaginians following the Lutatius Treaty in 241 carried far less weight than other alliances based on friendship or kinship. The context behind sworn oaths always mattered, and in the ancient Mediterranean world, defeated enemies did not always become loyal friends.

It is on these relationships of alliance and/or friendship that this chapter focuses. In discussing Polybius' many descriptions and moral judgments of these breaks of good faith, these occurrences will be divided into three main categories: (I) Attacking Allies, (II) Deserting Allies during Wartime, and (III) Sabotage within Alliances.

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[1] The description of the Achaean annexation of Sparta into the League in 192 appeared in Polybius 19, but is now lost, although we can reconstruct a good deal from Livy. For more on the political background, see Walbank, *Commentary* III: 137-138; and Errington, *Philopoemen*, 137-143. Welwei, *Könige und Königtum*, 26-37 suggests that Polybius weighed the actions of Philip and Antigonus in a purely utilitarian light, but in 150-156 later admits the moral code behind Polybius' criteria; emphasized by Eckstein, *Moral Visions*, 84-85.

[2] Again as we saw in chapter 2 with the problematic alliance with the Gauls.

I. ATTACKING ALLIES

It is important to emphasize the differences that existed across different types of alliances. The context surrounding the formation of the alliance mattered a great deal to the expectations of loyalty and friendship between the states in question. For example, the relationship between Rome and Hiero II at the eve of the Second Punic War was quite different from sentiments shared between Rome and Carthage, despite both being Roman allies. The reality that Carthage only became a Roman ally in 241 due to its defeat in the First Punic War is significant. Such "formal alliances" between enemies stemming from peace settlements differed in both essence and expectation from the voluntary "friendship alliances" that were rooted in kinship, tradition, and mutual assistance. While this chapter will strive to differentiate these examples, it is striking that Polybius' method of judgment sees little variance between these two types of relationships. His willingness to condemn or condone the betrayal of both purely-formal alliances and friendship alliances depends on a similar set of contexts.

Condemned Attacks against Friendship Allies

The Aetolian League, the traditional rival of the Achaeans, is often presented by Polybius as treacherous toward their friends and allies. While Polybius may harbor some patriotic biases against the Aetolians, it is clear at least that he passes moral judgment upon their actions with the same standards that he does to all states, including his own.[3] Thus, it is only when the Aetolians

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[3] On Polybius' pro-Achaean bias and animosity toward the Aetolians especially, see Usher 1969: 121; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 324, 367; Walbank 1974: 10-11 and 20; Edmund 1977: 129-136; Reiter 1988: 20-21, 32-33, 137; Green 1990: 277-278; Goldsworthy 2007: 14. Yet, while such bias may have existed, Polybius strives to remain objective in his moral evaluations. Thus, we must note his willingness to criticize both Achaea and Rome when appropriate, even condemning some of his personal heroes such as Aratus of Sicyon and Philopoemen. See chapter 1 as well as Wunderer 1927: 96; Eckstein 1995: 8-10, 36-38, 100-102, 113-114, 239-240, 275.

betray their allies out of greed and desire for territorial expansion (which is admittedly often in the *Histories*) that we find Polybius' condemnation present. We can see, for example, his harsh condemnation of the Aetolians during the Cleomenean War. In 229, the Aetolians contrived with Antigonus Doson, the regent of Macedon, and Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, to attack the Achaean League. Antigonus was already hostile toward the Achaeans due to Aratus' treacherous seizure of the Acrocorinth 15 years earlier, and the Spartans were eager to expand their own territory and hold over the Peloponnesus (2.45).[4] For Polybius, such behavior fits with the Aetolians' natural tendency toward injustice and self-interested greed (ἔμφυτονἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν φθονήσαντες, 2.25.1). And yet it is the context of the Aetolian decision to go to war with Achaea that results in Polybius' scathing criticism of this Aetolian treachery to start off the Cleomenean War. In the previous chapter, Polybius emphasizes that during the war between the Aetolians and Demetrius II Aetolicus, only one year earlier, the Achaeans decided to put aside any historic ill will that existed between the two leagues and made an alliance with the Aetolians, supporting them loyally throughout the war (2.44.1-2; 2.46.1).[5] And according to Polybius, their cooperation during the war against Demetrius resulted in sociable and friendly (κοινωνικὴ καὶ φιλική) feelings springing up between the Achaeans and Aetolians for the first time.[6] It is thus in the face of this newfound expectation of friendship and cooperation that the Aetolian decision in

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[4] On Aratus' seizure of the Acrocorinth, see: Polyb. 2.43.1-4. Hammond and Walbank 1988: 324 argue that Aratus' actions throughout this period lack any sort of conscience.

[5] Demetrius reigned until 229 when he was defeated in battle by the Dardanians, leaving the child Philip V on the throne. For a detailed look at this earlier period in Greece, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 317-336.

[6] Hammond views Polybius' description here as mere partisanship, arguing that the alliance with Aetolia had just as much to offer the Achaeans, allowing Aratus to have a free hand in the Peloponnesus, focusing his efforts against Athens, Argos, and Megalopolis. See Hammond and Walbank 1988: 324; cf. Urban 1979: 64. While Hammond is right to emphasize that the alliance was mutually beneficial, it does not take away from the genuine friendly feelings that Polybius claims existed between the two leagues, and likewise does not take away from the treacherous actions of the Aetolians that followed, at least according to Polybius' interpretation. On the chronology and diplomatic motivations and behind the triple alliance of Aetolia, Sparta, and Macedon in 230/229, see De Laix 1969.

229 to betray Achaea falls. Indeed, the Aetolian attack on the Achaean League was such a violation of good faith that the Aetolians were openly ashamed (αἰσχυνομένους) at what they were doing (2.46.1) - a realization that only accompanies some of the worst instances of treachery in Polybius' narrative.[7]

The last example of Aetolian treachery occurred at the onset of the Syrian War between Rome and Antiochus III in 192. At the end of the Second Macedonian War in 197, the Aetolians had hoped that they would be rewarded for their support of Roman actions in Greece since 214. The league had dominated central Greece throughout most of the third century before the resurgence of Macedon under Antigonus and Philip, and much of their primary goal in originally bringing Rome into Greece was to reassert this dominance. Yet when the Romans finally defeated Philip at Cynoscephalae in 197, helped in no small part on the battlefield by the Aetolians, the settlement that followed sorely disappointed these imperialistic hopes.[8] While the Aetolians as allies of Rome had hoped that the Antigonid dynasty would be destroyed, leaving the Aetolian League as the sole power in central Greece, the Romans not only spared Macedon, but kept Philip on the throne with a good deal of his territorial and military power intact, insistent that no Greek state would be the unrivaled power in the region.[9] The Aetolians likewise had hoped for a number

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[7] Thus, in addition to 2.46.1, Polybius attributes similar shame (αἰσχύνη) to Philip's poisoning of Aratus (8.12.6), the Aetolian actions against Greece during the First Macedonian War (11.5.3), Philip and Antiochus' treacherous actions against the young Ptolemy V in 203/2 (15.20.3), Philip's treachery toward the city of Cius (15.23.5), in the context of Callicrates' sycophantic and self-destructive policy of support for Rome (25.8.3-6), and others. See chapter 2.

[8] Polyb. 18.18-27. On the details of the battles, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 432-443.

[9] The relief of some smaller Greek states was not just at the Romans withdrawing from Greece, but also at the Roman decision to not greatly enhance the power of the Aetolians or another Greek state. See Eckstein 2012: 288-294; cf. Ferrary 1988: 82. Eckstein 2012: 297-298 rightly describes Greece as an informal Roman sphere of interest from which both Macedon and the Seleucids were excluded. The primary concern of the Romans was stability in the region with little/no upkeep, given their other military and administrative commitments in the western Mediterranean, especially the Celts in northern Italy and the Celtiberians in Spain: Sherwin-White 1980; Sherwin-White 1984: 9-10. In these calculations of danger, however, Flamininus and the Romans were ultimately wrong: Mommsen 1903: 721; Eckstein 2012: 300-305. On the political motivations behind the Roman decision to leave Greece, unwilling to once

of territorial accessions, including Phthiotic Achaea in Thessaly, but were only given Phocis and Locris in central Greece.[10] Instead, most of the smaller states throughout Greece were given their freedom and independence by the Romans, announced in the 196 Isthmian Declaration.[11] Thus, after Rome's withdrawal from Greece in 194, the Aetolians almost immediately began to look for ways to subvert the Roman settlement and take for themselves what Flamininus and the Roman commission had failed to give to them.

By 193 the Aetolian government was looking for powerful allies that could help muster the strength to stand against Rome. Sparta was a prime candidate, but the Spartan tyrant Nabis had already been checked by Flamininus in 195 and forced to give up Argos and the port of Gytheum, and in 192 Sparta was largely checked by the strengthened Achaean League as well as a supporting

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again increase the total number of praetors and thereby further intensify consular competition, see Rosenstein 2012: 192-193.

[10] All three of these areas had once belonged to the League: Phthiotic Achaea around 229, Phocis until it defected around 225, and Locris until it had been conquered by Philip in 208. It was Flamininus especially, upset with Aetolian claims of primary credit for Cynoscephalae, who blocked several Aetolian requests, including the accession of Phthiotic Achaea. See Eckstein 1987a: 287-289; Walsh 1993; Walsh 1996: 353; Eckstein 2012: 288, n. 60. Conversely, Flamininus' good relationship with the Achaean leader Aristaenus of Dyme resulted in the significant Achaean recovery of Corinth. See Briscoe 1981: 85; Eckstein 1990; Eckstein 2012: 288-294.

[11] On the description of the Isthmian Declaration in the summer of 196, see Polyb. 18.44-48; Livy 33.30-35; Plut. *Flam*. 10ff; App. *Mac.* 93ff; Justin 30.4.11ff; Val Max. 4.8.5; Zon. 9.16. The Roman decision to free the Greeks is first hinted at in Aristaenus of Dyme's speech to the Achaeans in the autumn of 198 (Livy 32.31.36): see Eckstein 1990: 54-58. The notion is echoed by the Greek envoys at Rome (Polyb. 18.11.7): see Ferrary 1988: 68, n. 34; Walsh 1996: 352. First hints at a complete Roman withdrawal comes from King Amynander of Athamania, speaking for Flamininus (Polyb. 18.44.2): see Sacks 1975: 102-103; Eckstein 1990: 49. The decision made by the Roman senate and announced at Corinth in 196 was that all the Greeks except the former subjects of Philip were "to be free and to enjoy their own laws" (Polyb. 18.44.2; Livy 33.30.2). This decision applied to the Greek states of Asia Minor as well: Derow 2003: 61-62. Polybius' description of the sincerity of this Roman declaration is supported by the numerous and extravagant honors dedicated to Flamininus and the Romans following 196: Walbank 1967: 613-14; Eckstein 2012 296-297. Mandell 1989: 91 views such honors as mere sycophancy. Similar praise of Flamininus' actions in Greece appear in a poem written by Alcaeus of Messene between 196-193, contrasting a liberating Flamininus with a despotic Antiochus III. See Gruen 1984 147, n. 88; Ferrary 1988: 86; Eckstein 2012: 297. For scholars who view the Isthmian Declaration as a thinly veiled sham that really announced Rome's new domination over all of Greece, see: Harris 1979: 142; Ferrary 1988: 86, 93; Mandell 1989: 90-94; Derow 2003: 61-62. Ultimately, however, the fact remains that by the end of 194 not a single Roman legionary or *socius* remained east of the Adriatic. No new Hellenic league of allies is formed. No Roman provinces were established, as had been done in Spain in 197. No system of *clientela* was put into place: Eckstein 1980; Gruen 1984: ch. 4; Burton 2003; despite Badian 1958 74-75; Errington 1972: 151-155; Mandell 1989: 91. On the overarching scholarly debate on the Isthmian Declaration and its consequences, see Eckstein 2012: 283-302.

Roman naval squadron.[12] Philip V was likewise unwilling to help, and in fact the Roman Senate had allowed Philip to increase his strength after the war so as to prevent Aetolian expansion.[13] For these reasons, the Aetolians looked outside of Greece for aid, turning to Antiochus III. They fabricated claims that everyone in Greece was begging the Syrian king to liberate the Greek cities from Roman oppression.[14] When Antiochus' minister Minnio met with the Panaetolian Assembly in the spring of 192, the Aetolians passed a decree appointing Antiochus as the arbitrator between Aetolia and Rome and as the liberator of Greece.[15] Flamininus, already in Greece at the head of a diplomatic delegation to stop the breakup of the Roman settlement of Greece, asked the Aetolians why as Roman allies had not simply brought their grievances to the Roman Senate. The response from the Aetolian leader Damocritus was that before long the Aetolians would be in Rome, dictating terms of peace on the banks of the Tiber.[16] It was thus out of anger and greed that the Aetolians chose to insult and betray the Roman alliance and bring Antiochus into Greece.[17]

These Aetolian actions between 193-192 are condemned by Polybius, who believes that once again the great evil (κακῶν μεγάλων 18.39.1) of the entire war arose from the Aetolians' unrestrained greed and desire for territorial aggrandizement. The most apparent act of treachery

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[12] Livy 34.41. When Nabis did resume hostilities, initially recapturing Gytheum from the Achaeans, he was soon defeated by Philopoemen and forced to remain behind the walls of Sparta.

[13] Philip's loyalty was subsequently rewarded, as following the war the Senate allowed him to keep the recently conquered Demetrias among other cities in the region, forgave the remaining indemnity he owed, and released his son Demetrius as a hostage in Rome.

[14] For the important role that second-tier states played as catalysts for the war with Antiochus, see McShane 1964: 131-143; Grainger 2002: 155, 163-164; Eckstein 2006; Eckstein 2012: 319-321.

[15] For the great insult of this Aetolian action against the Romans, see Eckstein 1988; Grainger 2002: 177-179.

[16] Livy 35.33.3-10; App. *Syr.* 21; Zon. 9.19. On the authenticity of this Aetolian insult, see Briscoe 1981: 194; Eckstein 2012: 323.

[17] On Antiochus' arrival into Greece in 192: Livy 35.43.1-6. Antiochus' confusing handling of the entire war in Europe no doubt stemmed from his misinformation about the situation in Greece. He likewise certainly underestimated Rome's commitment to Greece despite their seeming abandonment of the region in 194: Rosenstein 2012: 195-196. The suggestion that Rome withdrew its troops from Greece to bait Antiochus into invading and offering the Romans a pretext for war is far too cynical: Harris 1979: 219-223; Mandell 1989: 91; Derow 2003: 63-64.

was the Aetolian efforts to "make war upon the Romans" (Livy 36.1.5-6) despite still being their allies. And in facilitating this, in 192 further acts of treachery were carried out against the cities Chalcis and Demetrias in an additional attempt to undermine the Isthmian Declaration and weaken Roman influence in the region.[18] In order to keep the balance of power in Greece dispersed, the Romans had declared that these cities were to remain fully independent. Ignoring the terms of the settlement, the Aetolians made a failed attempt to capture Chalcis and succeeded in capturing Demetrias and forcing it to join the league, soon using Demetrias as collateral for Antiochus' willingness to invade Greece. These actions as well as the public invitation to Antiochus to land in Europe and facilitate this war against Rome were enough for the Romans to declare war, before even hearing of Antiochus' actual crossing.[19]

During the same year, the Aetolians also treacherously betrayed their new Spartan allies, when Nabis appealed to Aetolia for reinforcements in his war against Achaea, which remained allied to Rome. Rather than bolster the defenses of the city, however, the Aetolian reinforcements murdered Nabis during a training exercise and attempted unsuccessfully to capture Sparta for themselves.[20] The perception of treachery was made clear during the later Aetolian attempts at peace with Rome. In Polybius' depiction of their negotiations with Lucius Valerius Flaccus at Hypata in 189, Flaccus reminds the Aetolians that they were the ones who betrayed the friendly relations (φιλανθρώπων, 20.9.8) that had existed between the two states. This established friendship and the expected loyalty that ought to have stemmed from it is likewise acknowledged by Leon, son of Kichesias, the Aetolian envoy who attempts to make peace before the Roman

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[18] Along with Corinth, these cities comprised the "Three Fetters of Greece" which had been utilized by Macedon to solidify strategic control over southern Greece. The importance of these cities is attested to by the Greek envoys to Rome during the Second Macedonian War (Polyb. 18.11). See Walsh 1996: 357.
[19] On the timing of the Senate's decision, see Derow 1976.
[20] Livy 35.35, relying on Polybius.

Senate (21.31). In Leon's speech, the Aetolians accept that the Romans are justified in their anger toward them, as they had betrayed them despite the many benefits the Romans had bestowed upon them (21.31.7). While Leon's admission of guilt was in service of securing better terms with the Romans, Polybius' choice to include this assertion of treachery is significant. And it ultimately was due to this feeling of betrayal that in the peace treaty Rome uniquely demanded that the Aetolians respect the supremacy and power of the Roman people and take as enemies any people with whom the Romans were at war (21.32.2).[21]

The final aspect of Aetolian treachery surrounding the Syrian War, in addition to their betraying and attacking allies on both sides of the conflict, was their decision to betray Greece to a foreign power for territorial gain. Polybius suggests that their decision to solicit the aid of Antiochus against their Roman allies was carried out with no valid pretext other than their own greed for increased power and the territory that they had hoped the Romans would offer them in 196. In many ways, this Aetolian decision to bring in foreign aid closely resembles one of Polybius' own definitions of what types of actions constitute treachery: "...or still more justifiably to those who, admitting a garrison and employing external assistance to further their own inclinations and aims, submit their countries to the domination of a superior power" (18.15.3).[22] Taken on the level of all of Greece, it is clear that in 192 the Aetolians submitted all of Greece, so recently freed from the possibility of Roman occupation, to the domination of a superior power (i.e., Antiochus III) in hopes of securing the state's desires for territorial aggrandizement.[23]

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[21] This Roman demand for the Aetolians to obey Roman orders was only brought to bear against the Aetolians, suggesting the Romans' anger at the Aetolians for both betraying their alliance and friendship and for beginning the war with Antiochus. Cf. Livy 38.11.2 (*sine dolo malo*). On the details of the peace with Aetolia, see Eckstein 2012: 333-334. On the language of the terms, see Gruen 1984: 279, n. 33.

[22] ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία πάλιν ὅσοι φρουρὰν εἰσδεχόμενοι καὶ συγχρώμενοι ταῖς ἔξωθεν ἐπικουρίαις πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ὁρμὰς καὶ προθέσεις ὑποβάλλουσι τὰς πατρίδας ὑπὸ τὴν τῶν πλεῖον δυναμένων ἐξουσίαν. On Polybius' various definitions of treachery, see chapter 1.

[23] On the genuine "freedom" of the Greeks following the Isthmian Declaration in 196, see above n. 47.

Nor was this Polybius' first condemnation of the Aetolians calling a foreign power into Greece to fulfill their own ambitions. The Aetolians' self-interested willingness in 214 to coordinate with the Romans against Philip and the Achaeans is likewise condemned by fellow Greeks on similar grounds. While not acting directly against allies as the case in 192, Polybius uses a number of Greek spokesmen to argue that the Aetolians betrayed the loyalty that they ought to have held toward Greece as a whole. Thus, in speaking before the Spartan Assembly in 211, Lyciscus of Acarnania emphasizes that the Aetolians, in calling in foreigners who intend to enslave (δουλείας, 9.37.7) the Greeks, are bringing in the Romans not against Philip, but against the whole of Greece (κατὰ πάσης Ἑλλάδος, 9.37.8 and again 3.38.9).[24] Likewise, at the end of summer 207, an ambassador, probably from Rhodes, spoke before the Aetolian assembly at Heraclea, condemning their treacherous decisions to side with the foreign power of Rome.[25] The ambassador emphasizes that the Aetolians have not been fighting "in defense of the Greeks" (ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων), but rather for the "enslavement and ruin of Greece" (ἐπ᾽ ἐξανδραποδισμῷ καὶ καταφθορᾷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 11.5.1).[26] According to the speaker, the Aetolian treachery against all of

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[24] Lyciscus goes on to compare the Roman presence in Greece to the Persian invasion by Xerxes in 480 (9.38.1-6).

[25] Polyb. 11.4-6; cf. Livy 28.7.

[26] It should be emphasized that the while Rome in 212 and Antiochus III in 192 are supported in Greece by the Aetolians' greed and hopes of expansion, the decision to appeal to Rome in 201/200 by several Greek states, including Athens, Pergamum, Rhodes, and Ptolemaic Egypt, was made out of desperation in the face of the increasingly aggressive policies of Philip V and Antiochus III. This new expansion of these two kings is best exemplified in their joint alliance in 203/2 known as the Pact of the Kings in which they agreed to dissect and appropriate various parts of Ptolemaic Egypt know ruled by the boy Ptolemy V (Polyb. 15.20. On the breakdown of the tripolar Hellenistic system previously in place, and the resulting power-transition crisis that shook the Eastern Mediterranean, see in great detail Eckstein 2006: 269-275; Eckstein 2012: 121-229. On the importance of power-transition crises for shaping international relations, see Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1988; Lemke and Kugler 1996: 3-33; Geller and Singer 1998: 72-75. By 201 the situation in the East had become so dire that the traditionally bitter rivals of Rhodes and Pergamum felt the need to enter into an alliance against Philip. Indeed, hostility toward Rhodes had been a major feature of Attalid foreign policy since its rise to prominence in the 230s. These reversals of policy among a great many others listed in Eckstein 2012: 121-229 have not been adequately addressed by scholars who view Rome's decision to intervene in the East in 200 as stemming solely from aggressive Roman expansionist tendencies: Harris 1979: ch.5; Derow 2003: 58-60.

Greece, then, is a source of great shame (αἰσχύνην, 11.5.3) - a condemnation Polybius reserves for the worst instances of treachery - just as their actions against the Achaeans had been in 229 at the onset of the Cleomenean War.[27] Polybius did not have to include the Rhodian speech of 207. His decision to do so is significant.

The next series of betrayals we will examine were carried out by Philip V of Macedon. In many ways, Philip serves as the central character of much of Polybius' work, shedding light on the Achaean historian's view of kingship, treachery, imperialism, and Rome.[28] Despite claims by some scholars that Polybius is uncritically hostile toward Philip in his *Histories*, it is clear that Polybius' evaluation of Philip's character and actions remains complex throughout his work.[29] Thus, we find Polybius praising Philip as the "darling of the Greeks" throughout most of the Social War (7.11-14) as well as receiving praise from Polybius in the period following the Second Macedonian War (25.3.9-10; 33.7), including his decision to burn the royal correspondence immediately after Cynoscephalae in 198 (18.33), thereby protecting his secret supporters from Roman reprisal.[30] Following Philip's consolidation of power in Greece in 217 after an impressive victory over the Aetolians and Spartans in the Social War and his decision to form an alliance with Hannibal against Rome in 215, however, Polybius explains that the Macedonian king began to sink into moral depravity, moving away from the generous leadership that had fostered him so

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[27] On Polybius' attachment of αἰσχύνη to acts of treachery, see chapter 2.

[28] Philip's connection with Polybius' evaluations of Rome, including the consequences of Philip's accumulation of power, will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.

[29] On Polybius' complex judgments and his objectiveness in general, including his willingness to criticize Rome and even Achaea (including Aratus and Philopoemen) when the situation calls for it, see chapter 1 as well as Wunderer 1927: 96; Eckstein 1995: 8-10, 36-38, 100-102, 113-114, 239-240, 275. Emphasizing Polybius' bias toward friends of Rome and against enemies of Rome, see Usher 1969: 121; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 324, 367; Walbank 1974: 10-11 and 20; Edmund 1977: 129-136; Reiter 1988: 20-21, 32-33, 137; Green 1990: 277-278; Goldsworthy 2007: 14. Gruen 1981: 180 acknowledges some of the complexities of Polybius' presentation of Philip, but still holds that "his history is overwhelmingly hostile to the Macedonian king."

[30] See Eckstein 1995: 210-215, 226-227.

much goodwill throughout Greece during the war: "This was the beginning of the revolution in his character and his notable change for the worse" (7.11.1). And indeed, Philip's actions in the years to come were marked by numerous instances of treachery and betrayal of friends and allies.

In 215, according to Polybius, Philip encouraged a factional rebellion at the allied city of Messene, resulting in the massacre of many of the leading pro-Achaean officials as well as nearly two hundred citizens (7.12.9).[31] Afterward, hoping to capture the citadel, he went into the city and up to the citadel on the pretense of making sacrifices to Zeus and debated treacherously seizing the fortress. His advisor, Demetrius of Pharos, encouraged Philip to do so, arguing that with the Acrocorinth and Mount Ithome under his control, he would control the entire Peloponnese (7.12.3).[32] Luckily, according to Polybius and his moral view of the alliance, Aratus of Sicyon, who had been absent and unable to prevent the initial treachery against Messene, managed to convince Philip, against the king's own inclination, that the resulting loss of goodwill from his allies was not worth capturing the citadel. Yet while the king, ashamed of himself (ἐνετράπη, 7.12.9), leaves Messene without committing a second unjustified act of treachery against the city, Polybius emphasizes that this was just the first of his great crimes (τῶν μεγίστων ἀσεβημάτων, 7.13.6).[33] Polybius' description of the transformation of Philip's character from this point forward is one of his most critical (7.13.7):

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[31] Polybius' account of the initial treachery at Messene is lost and only hinted at indirectly. For the full account, see Plut. *Arat.* 49.

[32] As in the works of other historians (i.e Herodotus), the influence of advisors and counselors constitutes a major theme of Polybius' *Histories*. Thus, the adverse effects of Demetrius of Pharos on Philip V (7.11.1); Hermeias' treacherous advice to the young Antiochus III (5.41.1-3; cf. 5.42.7; 5.49-50); and Pantauchus' influence on a young Genthius (29.3.5-4.3). See ; Walbank 1933: 122-156; Welwei 1963: 138; Eckstein 1995: 147, n. 109.

[33] It is difficult to maintain that Polybius views Philip's actions at Messene, both intended and realized, in a purely pragmatic context without thought to morality, as suggested by Walbank 1967: 58 and Sacks 1980: 135. On the interpretation of Polybius' moral evaluation of Philip's treacher at Messene, see Eckstein 1995: 88-89. On Polybius' belief that the moral and the pragmatic could not be separated from one another, see chapter 6.

Henceforth, as if he had had a taste of human blood and of the slaughter and betrayal (παρασπονδεῖν) of his allies, he did not change from a man into a wolf, as in the Arcadian tale cited by Plato, but he changed from a king into a cruel tyrant.[34]

Nor did Philip's treachery against his allies end at Messene. Thus, in 208 upon returning to the allied city of Argos and presiding over the Nemean games, Philip continued to flex his absolute power (μείζω καὶμοναρχικωτέραν, 10.26.2) over Greece by treacherously seducing Achaean wives, widows, and any other women whom he chose.[35] To prevent any resistance from the men, Philip levied false charges against the husbands and sons to intimidate them, acting against his allies in a "most outrageous and lawless manner" (πολλὴν ἀσέλγειαν καὶ παρανομίαν, 10.26.4).

Philip's treacherous behavior appears in the years after the Second Macedonian War as well. In 185, Roman envoys informed Philip that he would have to evacuate his garrisons from several Thracian cities he had captured from Antiochus as a Roman ally in 191-188, including Maronea and Aenus.[36] Philip removed his troops from the Maronea, but then proceeded to form a plot with Onomastus, the Macedonian governor of Thrace, who in turn solicited the help of Cassander, a member of the Macedonian court, who was on good rapport with the people of Moronea. At night Cassander brought Thracian soldiers into the city, resulting in the massacre of a large number of citizens (22.13.1-10).[37] And when Cassander was to be sent back to Rome and

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[34] On the correct moral interpretation of this passage, see Eckstein 1995: 90. Van Scala 1890: 20 n. 2, 99 and Walbank 1967: 61 mistakenly view this passage's primary purpose to be a Polybian intellectual criticism of Plato, *Rep.* 8.565D. On the Arcadian legend that those who tasted human flesh remained werewolves forever: Paus 8.2.6. Mount Lycaeon (Wolf Mountain) towered gloomily over Polybius' city of Megaloplis.

[35] Cf. Livy 27.30.31.

[36] See Walbank 1979: 184.

[37] Cf. Polyb. 22.6; Livy 31.16; 39.24. Hammond and Walbank 1988: 456-457 question whether Philip actually had a role in the massacre. Perhaps the Thracians simply took advantage of the departure of the Macedonian garrison from the city. Polybius at least, however, believes that Philip was complicit and thus he subsequently condemns his treachery against Maronea.

interrogated by the Senate, Philip arranged for him to be murdered in order to conceal his own role in the treachery. The Macedonian officer died from poison somewhere in Epirus (22.14.5).[38]

Perhaps Polybius' sharpest condemnation of Philip V's treachery comes from his description of the so-called "Pact between the Kings" that was formed between Philip and Antiochus in 203/2. Upon the premature death of Ptolemy IV in 204, the two Hellenistic kings decided to partition the territory of the helpless five-year-old Ptolemy V and divide it between them, Philip taking part of Egypt as well as Caria and Samos, and Antiochus seizing Coele-Syria and Phoenicia (3.2.8; 15.20.1-2).[39] While some sources say that this was just a rumor, Polybius sharply criticizes Philip and Antiochus, saying that it was their natural duty to maintain the possession of the child's realm (15.20.2). Instead, the kings exhibited their unrestrained and animalistic natures (ἀνέδην καὶ θηριωδῶς, 15.20.3) through the evil aggression (κακοπραγμονεῖν, 3.2.8) they committed against Ptolemy; Polybius describing them as sharks consuming smaller fish (15.20.3). Polybius continues to describe their unbounded covetousness (πλεονεξίας) as representing "impiety toward the gods and savagery toward men" (15.20.4).[40] Even more significant was the fact that Philip was in talks to become Ptolemy V's father-in-law at the same time that he was betraying him with the pact with Antiochus. And before long, Philip and Antiochus even began to break faith (παρασπονδούντων, 15.20.6) with one another.

Polybius makes it clear to his readers that these treacheries committed by Philip and Antiochus were unjustifiable. Once again, these treacherous actions are emphasized by Polybius as shameful (αἰσχύνης, 15.20.3). And while even tyrants (οἱ τύραννοι) put forth the effort to

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[38] Livy 39.34-35.

[39] While sources other than Polybius note the existence of the pact, these sources are mostly later, confused, and at time contradictory: Polyb. 3.2.8, 14.1a.4-5, 15.20, 16.1.8-9, 24.6; Justin 30.2.8; Pomp. Trog. *Prol.* 30; Hieron. *In Dan.* 11.13. Somewhat confused: App. *Mac.* 4; John Antioch. Frg. 54. Explaining pact as rumor: App. *Mac.* 4; Justin 30.2.8.

[40] πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀσεβείας καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὠμότητος.

provide some trivial pretext (βραχεῖαν πρόφασιν) for their treachery, in this case the kings did not even do this, unabashedly confirming that their aggression against Ptolemy was without pretext or justification (οὐδ᾽ οὖν...βραχεῖαν δή τινα προβαλλόμενοι τῆς αἰσχύνης πρόφασιν, 15.20.3).

While the historicity of the pact has been questioned by some scholars, its existence does fit with the larger geopolitical transformation that had occurred in the East with the power vacuum created by the decline of Ptolemaic Egypt.[41] This triadic balance of power between the three Hellenistic kingdoms had defined foreign policy in the region since the start of the 3rd century, and the new imbalance saw newfound Antigonid and Seleucid aggressions against Ptolemaic territories as well as a number of second-rank states.[42] It was this pressure that caused Pergamum, Athens, Rhodes, and Ptolemy, in desperation, to appeal to Rome for aid in 201/200, knowing full

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[41] On the full acceptance of Polybius' version of the pact, see Schmitt 1964: 226-236, 242; Schmitt 1969: 228-291; Eckstein 2006: 269-275; Eckstein 2012: 129-179; Rosenstein 2012: 182-183. On the pact as a coordinated effort to dismember Ptolemaic territory outside of Egypt proper, see Scullard 1980: 246, n. 2; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 343; Green 1990: 304. On the pact as non-interference, see Briscoe 1973: 37-39; Berthold 1976: 100-101; Berthold 1984: 110-111; Klose 1982: 64-68; Will 1982: 116; Gruen 1984: 387; Buraselis 1996: 154, n. 19; Lampela 1998: 76; Ma 1999/2002: 74-76; Wiemer 2001: 84. On the denial of the pact as an invention of Rhodian sources: Magie 1939: 32-44. On the pact as confusion regarding a local agreement between Philip and Zeuxis, the Seleucid commander in Asia Minor, over Pergamum and Rhodes, see Errington 1971: 336-354; Erington 1986: 5, n. 16. On other denials of the pact, see de Regibus 1951: 99; de Regibus 1952: 97-100; Habicht 1957: 239-240, n. 106; Habicht 1982: 146; Badian 1958: 64, n. 3; Badian 1964b: 135, n. 3; Rawlings 1976: 18-19, 23, n. 26; Harris 1979: 312, n. 2; Warrior 1996: 16-17. On the significance of the pact for the development of events and foreign policy in the East at the end of the 3rd century, see Holleaux 1935: 306-322; McDonald and Walbank 1937; Walbank 1940: 127-128; Chamoux 2002: 114; Eckstein 2006: 269-275; Eckstein 2012: 212-269; Rosenstein 2012: 182-183. On the denial of the pact's influence, see Magie 1939; Balsdon 1954: 37; Badian 1958: 64; Errington 1971: 347-354; Rawlings 1976: 18-19, 23, n. 26; Ager 1991: 16-22; Warrior 1996: 17, n. 16; Derow 2003: 58-59.

[42] A number of key factors led to the decline of Ptolemaic Egypt at this time. Beginning around 216, Egypt faced a rebellion of the indigenous population against the Ptolemaic regime. By 207/6 the rebellion had become widespread. The rebels spread across Upper Egypt and parts of the Nile Delta, and in 205 priests of Amon in Thebes declared the indigenous rebel general Haronnophris to be the new pharaoh, replaced by Chaonophris after his death. The rebels hired Ethiopian and Nubian mercenaries and slaughtered Hellenistic administrators throughout the region. In Alexandria, the Ptolemaic regime was further crippled by the death of Ptolemy IV, leaving a five year old on the throne to be "guided" by various caretaker governments, soon leading to frequent coups and riots throughout the capital. Unfortunately for Ptolemaic Egypt, these troubles also coincided with the return of Antiochus II (now Antiochus the Great) from his conquest in Afghanistan and Iran. See Pestman 1969; Pestman 1995; Mittag 2003: 168-172; Eckstein 2006: 104-105; Eckstein 2012: 124-129. On the indigenous pharaohs, see Clarysse 1978; Veisse 2004: 83-99. On the hiring of mercenaries and fate of the the Greeks in the Egyptian countryside, see Veisse 2004: 18, 85-86, 129.

well that they might be trading away their own independence.[43] But for us, the most important point is that Polybius, at any rate, certainly believed the pact had been made between the kings. And as a result, he condemns Philip and Antiochus, under the assumption of its existence, for treachery against Ptolemy V whom they should have supported on moral grounds, and for treachery against each other.

The next example of treachery against one's allies comes from the Third Macedonian War. By 170, the second year of the war, Epirus was an ally of the Romans. It is uncertain whether the alliance had been formalized by a treaty or if it was an informal but traditional arrangement.[44] Despite this friendly relationship, however, the prominent Epirote statesmen Theodotus and Philostratus plotted with Perseus against the Romans. Thus, when they caught wind that the incoming Roman consul, Aulus Hostilius Mancinus, was traveling through Epirus to the Roman army in Thessaly, they attempted to kidnap him and deliver him to Perseus. It was only through the keen perception of his host, Nestor the Cropian, that danger was averted as he rested at the town of Phanata (27.16.1-6).[45] Polybius' condemnation of the unjustified treachery is clear, calling the act impious and treacherous (ἀσεβὲς πρᾶγμα καὶ παράσπονδον) in the opinion of all men (27.16.1).

As we saw with the Aetolian betrayal of Achaea in 229, Polybius is especially harsh in his condemnation when some expectation of friendship and loyalty exists, established by past instances of kindness. The following examples continue to establish this pattern, as first seen from

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[43] For the best detailed defense of the existence of the Pact as Polybius describes it, and its important connection to the power-transition crisis in the Greek East, including the Roman decision to intervene in 200, see Eckstein 2012: 121-269, esp. 129-138.

[44] See Eckstein 1995: 99, n. 51. On the formal treaty, see Hammond 1967: 621; Walbank 1979: 315. Against, see Gruen 1984: 23.

[45] On the resulting consequence being many Epirotes feeling forced to side with Macedon given the now ruined Epirote relationship with Rome, see Oost 1954: 75-77. In this light, the pro-Macedonian intentions behind the plot were a success: Meloni 1953: 257; Oost 1954: 77; Hammond 1967: 627-628; Deininger 1971: 175; Walbank 1979: 316; Eckstein 1995: 99.

treacherous Carthaginian actions in Spain during the Second Punic War. When Hannibal marched toward Italy in June of 218, the Romans were fully expecting to contend with the Carthaginian general in Spain.[46] Thus, in late September the consul assigned to Spain, Publius Cornelius Scipio, after some delay due to the attack of the Boii in northern Italy, landed his army at Massilia with plans to check Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone.[47] When he discovered that Hannibal had in fact already crossed the Rhone three days before, Publius returned to Italy to contend with the Carthaginian general while his brother, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, continued to lead the legions on to Spain. The Romans in Spain under Gnaeus, rejoined by Publius after he recovered from his wounds received at the battle of the Ticinus, achieved a great deal of success during these years, successfully establishing a strong network of allies and forcing the Carthaginians back south across the Ebro by achieving important victories at Cissa in 218 and Dertosa in 215. In 211, however, both Scipio brothers were defeated and killed in the battle of the Upper Baestis - Publius at Castulo and Gnaeus at Ilorca.[48]

It was at this time, Polybius explains, that the Carthaginian generals, now that they had solidified control over Spain, began to treat their allies treacherously: "The Carthaginian commanders had mastered the enemy, but were unable to master themselves" (9.11.1).[49] The best example of this is the Spanish chieftain of the Ilergetes, Andobales.[50] One of the Carthaginian

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[46] On Hannibal's march, see: Proctor 1971: 13-80; Rosenstein 2012: 117-120.

[47] The other consul of 218, Ti. Sempronius Longus had been assigned to Sicily and thus the intended campaign in Africa.

[48] On these Roman defeats: Hoyos 2015: 167-168. On the gains made up until this point, possibly including Saguntum, see Meyer 1924: 451; Scullard 1930: 52-53; Richardson 1996: 30-32; Erskine 2003: 229, n. 1.

[49] This passage is emphasized by Eckstein 1995: 227-229 in tracing the moral degeneration of the Carthaginian commanders in Spain. Erskine 2003 uses the passage to describe Polybius' larger pragmatic lesson for the creation and maintenance of empire, looking at the Carthaginians' failures as opposed to Scipio's successes in Spain.

[50] Andobales and his brother Mandonius (3.76) were said to be the most powerful and influential chieftains in Spain during these years. Livy (22.21; 27.17) uses the name Indibilis rather than Andobales,

commanders, Hasdrubal the son of Gesco, due to his own greed (πλεονεξία), attempted to extort a large amount of money from Andobales (9.11.2). And when the Spanish chieftain refused, relying on the good faith (τῇ προγεγενημένῃ πίστει πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, 9.11.4) he had shown to Carthage throughout the war, Hasdrubal committed a second act of treachery by bringing up false charges against him and ultimately forcing him to hand over his daughters as hostages (9.11.2-4). Still more, we later discover that Andobales' wife and daughters were abused by the Carthaginians, as were other women in their possession (10.18; 10.38). Hasdrubal's actions toward his allies, Polybius maintains, were especially treacherous given the keen loyalty that Andobales had shown the Carthaginians during the conflict with the Romans. Indeed, the Spanish chieftain had willingly forfeited his own dominion for a time rather than betray Carthage to the Romans (3.76), earning him praise from Polybius as "the most faithful friend the Carthaginians had in Spain" (9.11.3).[51] Given Andobales' notable loyalty and friendship toward Carthage and the lack of any possible pretext, Polybius says that Hasdrubal's treachery is marked by arrogance (ἀγερωχία, 10.35.8) and injustice (ἀδικία, 10.37.8-9).[52]

Polybius similarly emphasizes the past kindnesses that the Romans had shown Demetrius of Pharos in 229/8, which in and of themselves should have guaranteed his loyalty to the treaty he had with Rome. During the First Illyrian War against Queen Teuta of the Ardiaei, Demetrius, then Teuta's governor of Corcyra, switched his support to Rome, surrendering the island to the Romans and serving as an advisor for the remainder of the conflict. To reward his support, the Romans gave Demetrius his own coastal dominion between the remnants of the Ardiaean kingdom and the

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but they are the same person. See, for example Moret 2002-2003: 23-33; López Férez 2011: 71-106; Hoyos 2015: 323, 532; Slavik 2018: 160-161, n. 50.

[51] ὡς τὸν πιστότατον τῶν κατ᾽Ἰβηρίαν φίλων.

[52] For a detailed look at the importance of Andobales to Polybius' didactic narrative and the lessons on imperialism derived from it, see Erskein 2003. For a sequence of these events, including Andobales' defection to Scipio and attempts to rebel from the Romans twice, see: De Sanctis 1917: 468-469, n. 38; Walbank 1967: II.14-15.

Lissus river. This decision, as well as the terms of the treaty of 228 sworn by Teuta as regent of her stepson Pinnes on behalf of the Ardiaei, forbidding the Illyrians from sailing south of the Lissus for war, demonstrated a clear desire to establish a balance of power in the region to keep Roman involvement in the region minimal and ensure that Italian merchants would no longer be victims of Illyrian piracy.[53] It is unclear if the friendly relationship between Demetrius and Rome at this time existed as an informal *amicitia* or a formal treaty of alliance.[54] Regardless of the nature of this relationship, it is clear that Demetrius was bound by the same restriction concerning the Lissus - even more clearly after he became the regent of Pinnes in or shortly after 228. Despite the treaty and Rome's kindness, however, Demetrius aggressively operated south of the Lissus throughout the decade. Thus, Demetrius created friendly factions amongst the tribes south of the Lissus, including the Parthini.[55] These factions eventually took over many of their cities in favor of Demetrius (Polyb. 3.18.1).[56] By 225/222 he also managed to gain control of the Atintani, east of

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[53] Eckstein 2012: 51-53. On the peace treaty of 228: Polyb. 2.12.3, cf. 2.11.17; App. *Ill.* 7. On the geographic motivations behind the peace: Hammond 1968: 7-9. It seems that only polities to come into Roman *amicitia* and *fides* at this time were Apollonia, Epidamnus, Corcyra, Issa, and the tribes of the Parthini and Atintani. See Badian 1964a: 7, 23-24. Those who maintain a Roman desire to maintain control over Illyria in 229/8 must grapple with the fact that for an entire decade following the First Illyrian War there were no Roman diplomatic interactions with any cities across the Adriatic, let alone Roman troops or ships in Illyria. Strategic coastal cities like Oricum and Aulon were likewise intentionally left neutral and independent. This largely suggests Roman disinterest in the region, provided its continued stability and balance of power.

[54] On the relationship as *amicitia*, see Hammond 1968: 7-9; Ferrary 1988: 24-44; Hammond 1989; Wilkes 1992; Eckstein 2012: 42-60, though Hammond, Ferrary, and Wilkes maintain that the cities of Illyria remained under direct Roman control despite the informal relationship. Derow 1991: 268-270 argues for the existence of a formal alliance, based on a fragmentary inscription from the island of Havar (ancient Pharos), which mentions the renewal of an alliance (συμμαχία) between Rome and Pharos. Followed by: Coppola 1993: 105-127; Heftner 1997: 186; Habicht 1997: 185-194. The use of the Havar inscription as evidence of this alliance is tenuous, however, demonstrated by Eckstein 1999; Eckstein 2012: 45-58. As evidence Eckstein points to the uncertainty of the inscriptions dating (see too Robert 1960: 539-540) and the Roman decision not to bring the much more strategically important city of Epidamnus into an alliance if control of Illyria was the motivating factor behind Roman foreign policy in 229/8. On Epidamnus, see Ferrary 1988:30-31. On the city' strategic importance, see Hammond 1968: 2, 4.

[55] See Hammond 1968: 4; Eckstein 2012: 60. On the earlier Ardiaean influence in this region, se App. *Ill.* 7.

[56] Badian 1964a: 15 emphasizes that this process reflects long-term strategic foreign policy on the part of Demetrius.

Epidamnus (App. *Ill.* 8).[57] The late 220s likewise saw Demetrius capture the strategic city of

Dimallum, 100 miles south of the Lissus (Polyb. 3.18.1). And in fact Demetrius' earlier decision

to take over as regent of Pinnes, thereby once more united all of the Ardiaei, clearly undermined

the motivations behind the Roman peace treaty of 228.[58] Thus, Demetrius' decision in 220 to sail

south of the Lissus with ninety warships and raid as far south as the Peloponnesus and as far east

as the Cyclades (3.16.3) was simply the final act in a series of treacheries against Rome and in

violation of the 228 treaty.[59]

Some scholars have doubted Polybius' description of Demetrius' aggressive behavior

leading up to the 219 expedition, as well as the details of the raid itself, suggesting that Polybius

was uncritically biased against Demetrius, given the later rivalry between Demetrius and Aratus

in the court of Philip V.[60] Yet there does not seem to be any valid reason to doubt Demetrius'

actions were contrary to the treaty (παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας, 3.16.3). Polybius' depiction of Demetrius'

character is in line with the views of contemporary sources who knew Demetrius personally.[61] Nor

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[57] Thus we find the Atintani fighting against Rome in 219 (App. *Ill.* 8). See Hammond 1968: 9, n. 37; cf. Hammond 1989: 14; Eckstein 2012: 60.

[58] Arguing that Polybius was acting in cooperation with Rome: Badian 1964a: 12-16. Thus, Dio frg. 53 = Zon. 8.20 suggests that Demetrius became regent before the treaty of 228. This is unlikely, however, as the treaty was sworn between Rome and Teuta. This also would fly in the face of the Roman desire to divide Illyrian power between Teuta and Demetrius: Hammond 1968: 7, n. 24; Petzold 1971: 206; Errington 1989: 91; Eckstein 2012: 58.

[59] See Eckstein 1994: 58, 49; Eckstein 2012: 60-61.

[60] Arguing that Polybius' characterization of Demetrius is negatively biased: Badian 1964a: 12-16; Eisen 1966: 108-109; Errington 1972: 106-108; Errington 1989: 12-16. On Polybius' misrepresentation of the 219 attack: Badian 1964a: 14; Gruen 1984: 371; Coppola 1993: 50-51. The suggestion that Demetrius' 219 raid somehow did not violate the terms of the 228 treaty seems quite unlikely. At the time of the raid, Demetrius was the regent of the the Ardiaei, and his partner, Scerdilaidas, was the brother of King Agron. See: Hammond 1966: 243; Gruen 1984: 368-369, n. 48; Eckstein 2012: 61. Derow 2003: 54 argues that Demetrius acted to preempt the Roman aggression that was inevitably going to come, as Rome checked its victims off of a list. Again, such a claim is not supported by the evidence, especially given the lack of control that Rome maintained in the region both after 228 and after 219.

[61] Polybius is keenly aware of the pro-Roman slant of his source on Demetrius, Fabius Pictor, and thus approached his information with caution (3.8.1-9.8). See Meister 1975: 127-149; Eckstein 2012: 59, n. 132. And despite their biases, Polybius' other sources on Demetrius, including Aratus of Sicyon, who served as an advisor to Philip V alongside Demetrius, are universally critical of Demetrius. For a full discussion of Polybius' sources, see Eckstein 1994.

should we be surprised with Demetrius' willingness to aggressively push his holdings in Illyria. Any Illyrian warlord, even more so as a Greek ruling over Illyrians, would have had to continue to prove himself and justify his command to the tribes under his control.[62] Demetrius was no different.[63] After all, it was his aggressive, risky decision-making that had earned him his own realm in 228. We could likewise point to his conduct in the battle of Pharos in 219 (3.18.1-19.8) and at the later battle of Messene in 215 (3.19.11) as further evidence of his risky, perhaps incautious, behavior.[64] At any rate, Polybius' belief in the treacherous nature of Demetrius' actions in 220 and before is clear, and his condemnation of this break of faith with Rome is intensified by the past kindness that Rome had shown to him in 228. It was thus "oblivious of the benefits that the Romans had conferred on him" (ἐπιλελησμένον μὲν τῶν προγεγονότων εἰς αὐτὸν εὐεργετημάτων ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, 3.16.2) that Demetrius embarked on his expedition south of the Lissus.

Similarly, in 202/1 Nabis the tyrant of Sparta broke faith with the Aetolians, Eleans, and Messenians by refusing to come to their aid when attacked as his oaths and treaties had promised (16.13.1-3). Moreover, in addition to ignoring their appeals for aid, Nabis took the opportunity to launch his own attack against Messene in an attempt to betray (παρασπονδῆσαι, 16.13.3) the city.

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[62] Scholars disagree whether Demetrius was a Greek or an Illyrian. For Demetrius the Greek: Scullard 1980: 193; Chamoux 2002: 97; Champion 2004a: 113; Eckstein 2012: 60. On Demetrius the Illyrian: Edwards 1984: 475; Hoyos 1997: 201; Walbank 2002: 117.

[63] Dell 1970b: 30-38; Dell 1970a: 116-117; Petzold 1971: 212; Eckstein 1994: 50-55; Eckstein 2012: 59-60. Some scholars have suggested that Macedon was at the heart of Demetrius' decision to launch his raid south of the Lissus as well as Rome's decision to go to war with Demetrius. See Holleaux 1935: 131-146; Harris 1979: 138; LeBohec 1987: 203-208; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 353-354; Wilkes 1992: 162; Coppola 1993: 55-58, 84; Champion 1997: 118; Lampela 1998: 63. This, however, is unlikely given the lack of any Roman entrenchment in Illyria following Demetrius defeat in 219. Surely a strong Roman position of control in the region would have been the best safeguard against possible Macedonian aggression (or a more efficient means of later Roman aggression) if this had been central to Roman interests at this time.

[64] Eckstein 2012: 60.

Polybius' condemnation is clear from his description of Nabis and his followers as defined by their impiety and wickedness (ἀσέβειαν ἢ πονηρίαν, 16.13.2).[65]

The actions of the Illyrian warlord Scerdilaïdas are likewise criticized by Polybius. Scerdilaïdas had fought as an Aetolian ally during the Social war alongside Demetrius of Pharos, bringing ninety ships down the Adriatic to join in the invasion of Achaea (4.16).[66] Disillusioned with the Aetolians, however, Scerdilaïdas eventually became Philip's ally in the war.[67] At the end of the war in the autumn of 217, however, under the flimsy pretext of still being owed money by Philip, Scerdilaïdas treacherously sailed to Leucas and treacherously attacked (παρασπονδήσαντες, 5.95.3) an allied squadron of ships whose commanders believed the Illyrians still to be friends and allies.[68] Polybius makes it clear to his readers that greed and lust for power were the real motivating factors behind Scerdilaïdas' decision; thus, following the attack, the Illyrian continued to attack merchants and plunder the region off of Cape Malea (5.101.1). He likewise pillaged the town of Pissaeum in Pelagonia and forced several cities of the Dassaretae, including Antipatreia, Chrysondyon, and Gertus, to revolt (ἀφεστηκυίας) from Philip (5.108.2-3), ultimately mounting a serious invasion against Macedon. Throughout the latter half of book 5, Polybius continues to emphasize Scerdilaïdas' treacherous and deceitful actions in a negative light (δόλου, 5.95.1; παρασπονδήσαντες, 5.95.3; παρεσπονδηκέναι, 5.101.1; παρεσπόνδησε, 5.108.1),

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[65] See also Polybius' earlier negative portrayal of Nabis' character: 13.6.8.

[66] Scerdilaidas was allies with Demetrius, though operating independently: Polyb. 4.16.9-10. He was likely the brother of King Agron, as his son Pleuratus (Livy 31.28.1) shares his name with Agron's father (Polyb. 2.2.4). His royal blood is likewise suggested by his status as the in-law of King Amynander of Athamania, a state located between Epirus and Aetolia (Polyb. 4.16.9). See Hammond 1966: 243; Gruen 1984: 368, n. 48, 369; Eckstein 2012: 61, n. 140. On possible tensions between Scerdilaidas and Demetrius, resulting from Scerdilaidas' displeasure at the Greek Demetrius who betrayed Teuta in 229 acting as regent for Agron's son Pinnes, see Coppola 1993: 90; Eckstein 2012: 72, n. 196.

[67] Polyb. 4.29.7 suggests Scerdilaidas entered into the Hellenic Symmachy as early as autumn of 220: μεθέξειν τῆς κοινῆς συμμαχίας. See Coppola 1993: 85; Eckstein 2012: 66.

[68] The squadron of ships was Macedonian, under the authority of Taurion, Antigonus' commander in the Peloponnese. Agathinus of Corinth and Cassander were commanding the squadron at the time of the attack (5.95.3).

portraying his actions, given their lack of justifiable pretext, as typical Illyrian piracy (λήζεσθαι, 5.101.1).

The final two examples in this section continue this model of expected loyalty given past acts of kindness.[69] When Scipio Africanus arrived in Spain in 209 to continue the campaign against the Carthaginians following the deaths of his father and uncle, the Spanish chieftains and brothers Andobales and Mandonius defected to him in the face of Carthaginian acts of treachery.[70] At this time, Scipio showed the chieftain great generosity; he not only eventually ensured that Andobales and Mandonius became the leading chieftains in Spain, but he also treated Andobales' wife and daughters with exceptional gentleness upon capturing them among the Carthaginian hostages at Carthago Nova in 209.[71] Yet despite this generosity, upon hearing that Scipio had fallen ill, Andobales and Mandonius betrayed their alliance with Rome in 206, demonstrating their faithlessness (ἀθεσίας, 11.31.1) and started a widespread rebellion among the Spanish tribes.[72] Scipio soon recovered and put down the rebellion, defeating Andobales and Mandonius in battle (Polyb. 11.28, 11.31, 11.33).[73] Despite their betrayal, Scipio surprisingly decided to show the chieftains an even greater act of generosity by not only sparing their lives but actually allowing them to maintain control of their territory.[74] The following year, however, upon Scipio's departure from Spain to bring the war against Carthage to Africa, Andobales and Mandonius rebel against Rome for the second time, eventually being defeated and killed by the Romans under Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius.[75] It is unfortunate that Polybius' account of this second treacherous

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[69] Notably missing from this section are the cases of possible acts of treachery committed during the Third Punic War as well as the Achaean War. These two conflicts will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.
[70] See above.
[71] Polyb. 9.11; Livy 26.49; Dio 16.8. See above.
[72] Livy 28.24.
[73] Cf. Livy 28.31-34
[74] App. *Ib.* 6.37.
[75] Livy 29.1-3; App. *Ib.* 6.38.

rebellion is lost. His criticism of Andobales and Mandonius in initially breaking their alliance with Rome, however, is clear. By clearly paralleling the chieftains with the Roman mutineers of 206 (11.25-30), Polybius condemns their shared faithlessness (ἀθεσίας) and recklessness (τόλμης, 11.31.1) and praises Scipio for defeating both treacherous groups (11.33).

In 170, the people of Cydon on Crete were in a close-knit alliance with the city of Apollonia near Cnossus. Polybius explains that these cities were not only friends but enjoyed a sworn treaty of joint citizenship that was kept in the temple of Idaean Zeus (28.14.3). Despite these strong expectations of friendship and loyalty, however, the Cydonians treacherously attacked Apollonia, killed all of the men and kept the women, children, and property for themselves (28.14.4).[76] In Polybius' judgment, such a betrayal is hard to imagine, even "surpassing all other instances of treachery that the Cretans habitually commit" (28.14.2). Thus, he calls the actions of the Cydonians a "shocking act (πρᾶγμα δεινὸν) of treachery (παράσπονδον) condemned by all" (28.14.1). Once more, for Polybius the treacherous betrayal of an ally is deemed far more malicious when the ally is innocent of any wrongdoing and when previous acts of kindness and friendship ought to warrant unshakable loyalty rather than betrayal.

Condemned Attacks against Formal Allies

Polybius was certainly aware of the inherent differences between various types of alliances. While some long-held alliances carried strong expectations of loyalty, other temporary alliances, notably those formed between traditional enemies as part of a peace settlement ending a recent conflict, were understood as fragile and were not expected to remain unbroken should circumstances change. Such attitudes seem to have been common throughout the Mediterranean,

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[76] On Polybius' moral condemnation of the treachery, see Eckstein 1995: 24, 110. On the political consequences of the seizure of Apollonia, see Walbank 1979: 348-349.

in which most states often saw such treaties as fleeting and temporary.[77] Indeed, Polybius warns his readers to be mindful of when alliances and friendships are formed "under the pressure of circumstances," as in these cases, the conquered state will be "waiting for a favorable opportunity" to betray their obligations (3.12.5-6).[78] In many ways, it was the duty of a wise general and statesman to keep such suspect allies on a short leash.[79] Despite these expectations, however, Polybius remains critical when these treaties are broken without some justifiable pretext. Once again, the following examples demonstrate that in the face of past kindness or generosity, such treachery is even more harshly condemned by the Achaean historian than cases in which only legality binds states together in alliance. Thus, while the Polybian model of judgment remains complex, patterns continue to emerge.

One of the best-known examples of Roman treachery appears in the final chapter of Polybius' introductory first book. The Roman seizure of the island of Sardinia in 238/7 has been fiercely debated by historians, with little consensus. While the sequence of events surrounding Rome's occupation of the island can be clearly established, scholars have largely failed to convincingly explain Roman motivations.[80] Following the end of the First Punic War in 241, Carthage was unable to immediately pay its mercenaries from the war due to the indemnities owed to Rome. Before long, the negotiations between Punic leadership and the mercenaries broke down,

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[77] See Klose (1972); Adcock and Mosley 1975; Jones (1999); Giovannini (2007); Eilers (ed.) 2009; Grainger (2010): 89-90; Grainger (2017). Recently, Grainger 2017 suggests that the shared respect among the Macedonian generals following Alexander's death actually saw the Hellenistic powers in the East as more prone to keeping to the terms of these treaties, opposed to the more unreliable diplomacy of the Western Mediterranean and the Greek polis.

[78] While Polybius' discussion here emphasizes the importance of the context behind the formation of these alliances, it says a great deal more about the responsibility that statesmen have in recognizing the likelihood of treachery and being on guard against it. See chapter 2.

[79] Polybius' praise of Hannibal for approaching his alliance with the Gauls is a good example, see chapter 2.

[80] On a clear breakdown of the events between 241 and 238/7, see Harris 1979: 190-192; Eckstein 1995: 100-101; Carey 1996; Rosenstein 2012: 68-69.

and the Carthaginians found themselves besieged by their own mercenaries, joined before long by rebelling Numidian and Libyan tribes as well as the cities of Utica and Hippacritae (1.82.8).[81] In 239 both the city of Utica as well as the rebellious mercenaries on Sardinia appealed to the Senate for Roman protection and help against Carthage. Despite these pleas, the *patres* declined the opportunities to undermine the Carthaginians, choosing, as Polybius says, to remain loyal to the terms of the Lutatius Treaty (Ῥωμαῖοι τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον, 1.83.5; τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια, 1.83.11). It was only in late 238 or early 237, when Carthage had finally regained the upper hand in the conflict, that Rome accepted a second appeal for help from the mercenaries who had since been pushed out of Sardinia by the local populace. Rome deployed troops to occupy the island, and when the Carthaginians protested and prepared their own forces, Rome threatened war and demanded an additional 1200 talents to be paid in a lump sum.

The decision for this reversal of Roman policy has divided scholars.[82] Harris sees the events of 238/7 as the result of typical aggressive Roman ambitions.[83] Rosenstein likewise sees the policy as a "calculated act of cynical opportunism," suggesting that Rome, surprised at how quickly Carthage had recovered following the early stages of the Libyan War, hoped to weaken Carthage financially by adding on an additional indemnity and depriving her of the revenue coming from Sardinia.[84] Yet those seeing the Sardinia seizure as motivated by Roman greed or aggression have failed to explain why the Romans turned down the initial appeal from the Carthaginian mercenaries on Sardinia in 239.[85] This is especially troubling since at that time Carthage was weak, and the

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[81] For the multiple treacherous actions of the mercenaries led by Mathos and Spendius, see chapter 1.
[82] See Hoyos 1997:132-143.
[83] Harris 1979: 190-192.
[84] Rosenstein 2012: 68-69.
[85] The trouble with interpreting Roman motivations given the sequence of events is best described by Carey 1996; and acknowledged but not adequately addressed by Rosenstein 2012: 69.

Romans would have had a reasonable pretext for hostilities toward Carthage, given the attacks on Italian merchants during the early phases of the war (1.83.7-11; 3.28.3).[86] Proponents of Roman defensive imperialism, in this case, face the same difficulty with interpreting the sudden reversal of policy.[87] Again, if the Romans saw Sardinia as essential to the long-term defense of the Republic, why not secure it in 239 when Carthage would surely be unable to resist and when a justifiable pretext was at hand? Thus, some scholars, at a loss, have suggested that the Roman action at Sardinia was an aberration or that perhaps, as Carey proposes, the return of Sardinia to its native inhabitants gave the Romans moral (and legal) license to claim it for themselves.[88]

Regardless of the motivations of the *patres* in 238/7, Polybius' judgment is clear on the issue - the Romans acted treacherously and in violation of the Lutatius Treaty signed in 241.[89] The Achaean historian is unwaveringly critical of the Roman decision, going so far as to call the seizure

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[86] De Sanctis 1907: 399-401. De Sanctis suggests that the 238/7 seizure of Sardinia may have been justified given these Carthaginian attacks on Italian merchants, but this directly contradicts Polybius' own analysis of the affair, saying that this conflict had been adequately concluded, and indeed on quite friendly terms, well before Rome's decision to occupy the island (1.83.8; 3.28.3). The Romans were so pleased with the Carthaginians' willingness to release the captured merchants that they in turn set free three thousand Carthaginian aristocrats who had been kept as hostages following the First Punic War. Thus lingering Roman resentment over the whole affair seems unlikely. The release of so many hostages so soon after the war also undermines scholarly suggestions that Rome had always planned on resuming hostilities with Carthage. On the later Roman defense of the Sardinia seizure based on these Italian merchants, see Eckstein 1995: 101-102, n. 59. Walbank 1957: 356 assigns this tradition to contemporary polemics from the late 150s, while Pedech 1964: 192 places it with Fabius Pictor.

[87] For defensive concerns with Sardinia, see Errington 1972: 32-33. Eckstein 2006: 168 acknowledges such concerns without suggesting they formed the primary motivating factor for the Romans in 238/7.

[88] On Roman actions in 238/7 as exceptional, see Badian 1958: 43; Bengtson 1970: 84. On the admittedly legalistic interpretation that the Romans believed that Carthage no longer held claim to the island, see Carey 1996. This notion is entertained by Eckstein 2004: 168-169, who admits, however, that even if the Romans believed this to be true, no one else, including Polybius, saw the affair this way. Other historians has looked toward internal Roman politics to explain the reversal of policy, suggesting the ascendancy of a particular faction within the Senate, although there is little evidence to support such a claim: see Frank: 1914: 113; Lippold 1963: 119, n. 176.

[89] Eckstein 1995: 100-102 rightly points to Polybius harsh judgment of the Romans in the case of Sardinia as evidence for the historian's objectivity in dealing with his history of Rome. For the view that Polybius was biased toward the Romans as a client of the Aemilii of the Romans more generally, see Usher 1969: 121; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 324, 367; Walbank 1974: 10-11 and 20; Edmund 1977: 129-136; Reiter 1988: 20-21, 32-33, 137; Green 1990: 277-278; Goldsworthy 2007: 14.

of the island and the added indemnity a "robbery" (*ἀφαίρεσις*, 3.30.4).[90] Indeed, the Romans' false

accusations against the Carthaginians as they attempted to recover possession of their islands

following the Libyan War as well as the humiliating addendums to the Lutatius Treaty are seen as

morally unjustifiable and in clear violation of the treaty of 241 (1.88.8-12).[91] This behavior is in

clear contrast to the earlier Roman action only five chapters prior when Polybius emphasizes that

they "loyally observed the treaty" despite multiple reasons not to do so (1.83.11).[92] When the

Carthaginians attempted to negotiate with the Romans, certain that justice (*τοῖς δικαίοις*) was on

their side, given the provisions of the Peace of 241, the Romans refused to even discuss the issue

(3.10.1-3). Again, later in his discussion of the diplomatic history between Rome and Carthage,

Polybius explains that while the Roman invasion of Sicily in 264 was "not contrary to sworn oaths"

(*οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους*, 3.28.1), the Roman action in Sardinia in 238/7 did constitute treachery that

was "contrary to all justice" (*παρὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια*).[93] The seizure of Sardinia is ultimately

condemned because it was "impossible to discover any reasonable pretext or grounds" (*οὔτε*

πρόφασιν οὔτ' αἰτίαν εὕροι τις ἀνεύλογον) to justify the Roman decision (3.28.1). So presumably,

if the Romans had had a reasonable pretext, then their seizure of Sardinia, despite still constituting

a violation of the Lutatius Treaty, would have been more justifiable in Polybius' view.[94] While the

existence of treaties and sworn oaths matters, the context remains at the core of Polybius' moral

evaluation of such acts of treachery and the intensity of his condemnation.

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[90] While Mauersberger 1956-1975: I:1 col. 297 takes ἀφαίρεσις to mean a "seizure," Eckstein 1995: 100-101, n. 58 suggests the more weighted definition of "robbery" given the repeated moral condemnation that Polybius ties to the Roman action in 238/7. Cf. Walbank 1957: 358. The term ἀφαίρεσις does not appear elsewhere in the extant text.

[91] For Polybius' larger moral condemnation of the Romans over Sardinia, see Eckstein 1995: 100-102.

[92] *τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια.*

[93] For Polybius' aside on the multiple treaties formed between Carthage and Rome: Polyb. 3.21.8-3.28. For a detailed analysis of this diplomatic history, see Serrati 2006: 113-134; although note Eckstein's correct objections to the co-called Philinus Treaty: Eckstein 2010.

[94] On the question of the importance of pretexts for pursuing wars, see Baronowski 2011: 73-77.

The Aetolians are likewise condemned by Polybius throughout the *Histories* for carrying out such treacherous breaks of faith against formal allies, including their own member states. In order to convince Cleomenes to go to war with the Achaeans in 229, the Aetolians allowed the Spartan king to treacherously attack (παρασπονδουμένους, 2.46.3) and capture some of their most important cities, including Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus.[95] This breach of faith (πεπραξικοπηκότος, 2.46.2) by Cleomenes is condemned by Polybius, as is the Aetolian decision to allow it to happen to members of their own league. In the Aetolians' minds, these betrayals were acceptable if they resulted in Cleomenes becoming a more formidable enemy of the Achaeans (2.46.3).[96] It is thus with no pretext other than the Aetolians' own greediness (πλεονεξία, 2.45.6) for power at the expense of Achaea, and in clear violation of the good faith that had been so recently fostered by the Achaeans' assistance against Demetrius, that Polybius harshly condemns the Aetolians' unjust aggression (χειρῶν ἄρχεινἀδίκων, 2.45.6) in 229.

Similar instances of Aetolian treachery resurfaced a decade later during the Social War, which saw the Aetolian League and the Spartans once again fighting against the Achaeans and Macedon.[97] In 221, relying on the weakness of the young and untried King Philip (4.3.3; 4.5.3), and naturally inclined to become prosperous through war and brigandry (4.3.1-4), the Aetolians treacherously attacked the city of Messene, even though the Messenians were their own friends and allies (φίλων ὄντων καὶ συμμάχων, 4.3.9).[98] First, on the pretense of a public mission to the

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[95] Plutarch maintains that these of the Aetolian League voluntarily requested Spartan occupation: Plut. *Cleom.* 4. For this interpretation, see Hammond and Walbank 2001: 342.

[96] Polybius notes the strange reversal of Aetolian policy here (2.46.3): "He saw too that they, who on previous occasions, owing to their lust of aggrandizement, found any pretext adequate for making war on those who had done them no wrong, now allowed themselves to be treacherously attacked and to suffer the loss of some of their largest cities simply in order to see Cleomenes become a really formidable antagonist of the Achaeans."

[97] On these recurring conflicts between Macedon and the Aetolians, see Scholten 2000: 200-212.

[98] Philip was only seventeen in 221, and thus unable to assume the Macedonian throne until July of 220. Eighteen appears to have been the age of majority for Macedonian kings as can be seen from the cases of Perdiccas and Heracles as well as Philip. At eighteen, kings and princes were likewise allowed to

nearby allied town of Phigaleia, Dorimachus raised a band of brigands and raided the crops and cattle of the Messenians (4.3.5-4.5). Next, upon the Messenians forcing Dorimachus to desist from these raids, the Aetolians attacked Messene directly with their entire army (4.6.7-12). And indeed, a few weeks earlier the Aetolians had carried out raiding expeditions all across Greece - capturing and selling a royal Macedonian ship near Cythera, pillaging the coast of Epirus, attempting to capture Thyrium in Acarnania, and briefly occupying the fortified post in Megalopolis called Clarium, though this fort was swiftly recaptured by Timoxenus, the Achaean Strategos, and Taurion, the Macedonian garrison commander stationed in the Peloponnesus (4.6.1-4).[99] Moreover, on their march to Messenia, the Aetolians pillaged the Achaean territory of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea (4.6.9). Once again, in the face of expectations of peace following the conclusion of the Cleomenean War of 229-222, the Aetolians attacked their allies in 221 without valid justification (μηδεμίαν πρόφασιν, 4.5.2) other than their own lawlessness (παρανομία, 4.5.2).[100]

Nor were the Epirots or King Philip shocked at the Aetolians' actions, as such treachery, according to Polybius, was simply their habit (τῶν εἰθισμένων, 4.16.2). Throughout the next twenty chapters, the Achaean historian repeatedly emphasizes that the Social War began due to these unjustifiable treacheries. Thus at the meeting of the Achaean Assembly at Aegium following the Aetolian attacks, the embassy from Messenia explains how they were unjustly and treacherously (ἀδικουμένοις καὶ παρασπονδουμένοις, 4.7.2) attacked, and the Achaeans show their outrage (μάλιστα...δεινὸν, 4.7.4) at the Aetolian decision to enter into Achaea under arms in clear

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qualify for military service. See Hammond and Walbank 1979: 185; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 165, 371 n. 2. Thus, the decision of the Hellenic Symmachy at Corinth should be attributed to Philip himself and not the continued work of his guardians.

[99] For a description of the events leading up to the declaration of Hammond and Walbank 1988: 370-371.

[100] The only half-hearted pretext that is mentioned is the rebuke of Dorimachus by the ephor Scyron at Messenia for his raids on Messenian farmland (4.4). Polybius emphasizes, however, that even Dorimachus understood that the exchanges did not constitute any pretext for the attack (4.4.11, 4.5.2).

violation of the treaty (παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας, 4.7.4). At a subsequent Achaean Assembly meeting at Megalopolis, Polybius' readers are again reminded of the Aetolians' treacheries (παρασπονδουμένους, 4.9.2). When the assembly decides to send embassies to the members of the Symmachy on the question of what actions to take against Aetolia as well as the admission of Messenia to the alliance, they once more emphasize how the Aetolians had twice crossed troops into Achaea in breach of the treaty of 222 (παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας, 4.15.1). Finally, in the meeting of the members of the Symmachy, these acts of treachery, as well as the attacks against the Boeotians, Phocians, and Epirotes, are once more described and ultimately written into the preamble of their unanimous decree to wage war against Aetolia (4.25.1-5).[101]

More Aetolian treachery can likewise be found during the war in 218. Marching his army into the western Peloponnesus, Philip began his invasion of Triphylia after successfully capturing Alipheira (4.78). In order to defend this allied region from the Macedonians, the Aetolian commander, Phillidas, had been sent with six hundred soldiers (4.77.6-7). After the fall of Alipheira, however, rather than defend Triphylia and the other surrounding cities, Phillidas treacherously plundered many of the houses in the city and left the people of Triphylia to their fate. In doing so, Polybius maintains, the Aetolians betrayed (προδοθέντας, 4.79.3) their allies and deserted (ἐγκαταλείπεσθαι, 4.79.3) them in their hour of need. Polybius leaves little room for doubt in his presentation of these Aetolian actions. Without any justification, and in clear violation of multiple treaties and alliances, these Aetolian acts of treachery can only be (and are) sharply condemned by the Achaean historian.

Philip V demonstrates similar unjustifiable treachery toward the people of Cius in 202. Although Cius was a member of the Aetolian League, with whom Philip was at peace by a formal

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[101] Even more treacherous than the actions of the Aetolians during the Social War were the betrayals of the Spartans against the Symmachy. This will be discussed in detail in the following section.

peace treaty, Philip proceeded to attack the city in coordination with Prusias, king of Bithynia, his relative by marriage. When diplomats from Rhodes and other neutral states attempted to bring the issue to a peaceful conclusion, Philip stalled negotiations while the city was ultimately captured and destroyed (15.22-23). A similar fate met the neighboring city of Myrlea, and both sites were handed over to Prusias.[102] Polybius' condemnation of Philip's actions is clear. As with his actions in Argos, Philip's enslavement of the Cians and destruction of the city was a shameful (αἰσχύνεσθαι, 15.23.5) act of treachery (παρασπονδοῦντι, 15.22.2), lacking any semblance of pretext or justification. Thus, Polybius characterizes Philip's unjust (ἀδίκως, 15.22.3) actions as cruel and treacherous (ὠμότητα, τῆς ἀθεσίας, 15.23.3-4), in line with his growing reputation among the Greeks for cruelty and impiety (ὠμότητος, ἀσεβείᾳ 15.22.3).[103]

Again, Polybius' condemnation of treachery is even more severe when it is committed against allies who have been especially kind or charitable, as we saw with Polybius' presentation of the Achaean alliance with Aetolia against Demetrias. A similar diplomatic betrayal was carried out by the Spartans against the Achaeans in 185/4 despite the past kindnesses the Achaeans had shown to the Spartan exiles, including the Spartan envoys Areus and Alcibiades, who appealed to the Roman senate against Philopoemen and the Achaeans (22.11.7-8):

> These men both belonged to those old exiles who had recently been restored to their country by Philopoemen and the Achaeans; and it particularly excited the anger of the Achaeans that, after so great and recent a kindness as they had shown the exiles, they at once met with such flagrant ingratitude from them that they came on a mission against them to the ruling power and accused those who had so unexpectedly saved them and restored them to their homes.

This model of Polybius' moral condemnation of breaking faith with friends and allies despite past kindnesses is likewise emphasized in the 210 speech of Lyciscus the Acarnanian statesman before

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[102] For a detailed look at Philip's imperialistic aims in the north Aegean, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 412-416.

[103] On Polybius' moral condemnation of Philip's actions at Cius, see Eckstein 1995: 88-89.

the Spartan Assembly, responding to the Aetolian attempt by Chlaeneas to convince the Spartans

to join the Aetolians in the war against Philip.[104] After pointing out the hypocrisy of Chlaeneas in

emphasizing past indiscretions committed by the Macedonians, given the Aetolians' own frequent

disregard for piety and good faith, Lyciscus emphasizes the good deeds that the Antigonids had

done for Sparta (9.34-40).[105] He points to the fact that while the Aetolians defended Greece from

the barbarian attack on Delphi in 279, the Macedonians have been preventing such attacks and

fending off northern barbarian aggression for centuries (9.35.1-5). He likewise reminds the

Spartans of the generosity shown to them by Antigonus Doson at the end of the war against

Cleomenes. After defeating the Spartans at Sellasia in 222, Antigonus should have sacked the city

and exercised his right of war (9.36.4). Instead, he chose to treat the Spartans with leniency, expel

their tyrant, and reestablish their ancient constitution. Such an act of benevolence (εὐεργεσίαν),

Lyciscus argues to the assembly, could not be surpassed by any other example in history (9.36.2).

And indeed, at public festivals throughout Greece, the Spartans themselves had proclaimed

Antigonus to be their savior and benefactor (εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα) for this kindness (9.36.5). The

Acarnanian statesman likewise reminds the Spartans that while, on principle, states ought to hold

to their alliances, it is morally justifiable to break an agreement with an ally if changing

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[104] On Chlaeneas' speech before the Spartan Assembly (above): Polyb. 9.28-31. Lyciscus and Acarnania, of course, had a vested interest in keeping Sparta out of the war. Acarnania had long been on intimate terms with Macedon, and Acarnania was at risk of being occupied by the Aetolians under the terms of the Aetolian treaty of alliance with Rome (Livy 26.24). Regardless of his motivations, though, Lyciscus' discussion of expected loyalty reflects a strong moral argument in line with Greek expectations of treachy, although he ultimately did not succeed in keeping Sparta neutral during the war despite his emphasis on the previous generosity that Macedon had showed to Sparta.

[105] In cataloguing some of the Aetolians' past evil (κακῶν, 9.34.5) Lycuscus points to the Aetolian treachery against the Achaeans in the Cleomenean War (9.34.6), the attempted enslavement and partition of Acarnania with Alexander of Epirus (9.34.7), the plundering of the temple of Poseidon on Taenarus and the temple of Artemis at Lusi by Timaeus (9.34.8-9), the pillaging of the the temple of Hera at Argos by Pharycys and the temple of Poseidon at Mantinea by Polycritus (9.34.10), the violation of the Pamboeotian festival by Lattabus and Nicostratus (9.34.11), the outrages against the temples of Dium and Dodona (9.35.6), Such actions, Lyciscus argues, is expected from Scythians or Gauls rather than Greeks.

circumstances call for such a decision (9.37.1-3). Even more important than a treaty of alliance, however, is the existence of past acts of kindness and generosity. Thus, Lyciscus maintains that "the piety (ὅσιόν) of observing a written treaty is less than the impiety (ἀνόσιον) of fighting against your preservers" (9.36.12).[106]

Again, Lyciscus' argument fits closely with Polybius' own model of acceptable treachery. If the status quo is maintained, there is rarely a justifiable reason for breaking good faith with friends and allies. Also of central concern is the expectation of loyalty created from past acts of kindness between states, so important in fact that Lyciscus holds this relationship above formal treaties. He ends his speech by reminding the Spartans that "above all considerations, you should bear in mind the favors conferred on you by Antigonus" (9.39.6). It should not be overlooked that Lyciscus' pro-Macedonian speech at Sparta in 210 was a bit of sophistry, delivered on behalf of Acarnania, a Macedonian ally.[107] And in fact, Chlaeneas' better account of the historic Macedonian oppression of the Greeks ultimately swayed the Spartans to join the Roman alliance later that year (9.28-31). What is significant in Lyciscus' speech, though, is the genuine belief by the Acarnanian speaker, and indirectly by Polybius himself, that the kindness of Antigonus warranted a sense of loyalty that went beyond treaties and legalism. Again, it is when such friendly relationships are betrayed or ignored that Polybius levies his harshest criticism against instances of treachery.

A similar treacherous act of unjustified aggression is highlighted by Polybius at the start of the war fought between Pharnaces of Pontus and Eumenes II of Pergamum from 181-179.[108]

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[106] καὶ μὴν οὐχ οὕτως ὅσιόν ἐστι τὸ τὰς ἐγγράπτους πίστεις βεβαιοῦν, ὡς ἀνόσιον τὸ τοῖς σώσασι πολεμεῖν· ὃ νῦν Αἰτωλοὶ πάρεισιν ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦντες.

[107] On Lyciscus' speech as one example of a larger anti-Roman fervor throughout Greece during this period, see Holleaux 1935: 37; Rich 1984: 144-146; Champion 2000a: 434-435; Eckstein 2012: 109-110, 117; contra Berthold 1984: 106, n.12.

[108] Walbank 1979: 267-269.

The previous war fought between the two kings, which had ended in early 181, had resulted in a treaty between the two powers.[109] Despite this agreement, however, in the winter of 181/180 Pharnaces deployed ten thousand troops under his commander Leocritus and ravaged Galatia (24.14.15). Polybius emphasizes that Pharnaces' invasion was clearly violating the terms of the treaty (πάντας τοὺς τῆς πίστεως ὅρους ὑπερβαίνειν τὸν Φαρνάκην, 24.14.3). Eumenes and Ariarathes likewise explained to the Roman legates the infidelity and cruelty (24.25.7) that allegedly defined Pharnaces' character. And upon failing to convince him to settle the war diplomatically, the Romans saw that even though Pharnaces himself knew that he was in the wrong and "had no confidence in his own case" (24.25.8), he "was not in the least inclined to make peace" (24.15.11). Yet while Polybius' criticizes Pharnaces for breaking faith with Eumenes without just cause, there is no condemnation of Eumenes, who, Polybius admits, also breaks the terms of the treaty by mobilizing his own army in the spring of 180. The acceptability of Eumenes' actions, of course, stems from the radically different context that defined the treaty following Pharnaces' initial decision to break the agreement. Pharnaces' treachery, unsurprisingly, allows Eumenes to act contrary to the terms of the 181 treaty without moral condemnation from Polybius, even though Eumenes had not been directly attacked by Pharnaces.

The Achaean historian's assessment of the behavior of the Macedonians in 150 is equally critical. Following Perseus' defeat at Pydna in 168, Rome divided Macedon into four allied (but intentionally disunified) republics.[110] For twenty years, this system was stable until the Macedonians flocked to a pretender to the throne, Andriscus the Pseudo-Philip, siding against the Romans. This Macedonian treachery was carried out, according to Polybius, in the face of the great

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[109] Livy 38.39.

[110] The capitals were Thessalonica, Pella, Amphipolis, and Pelagonia. For details on the Roman peace settlement of 167, see Gruen 1982: 157-167; Errington 1990: 216-217; Hatzopoulos 1996: 43-46; Bringmann 2007: 99-100; Eckstein 2010: 245.

friendship and generosity that Rome had shown in 167. Polybius emphasizes these Roman favors: "the entire country had been delivered from the arbitrary rule and taxation of autocrats, and, as all confessed, now enjoyed freedom in place of servitude, and the several cities had, owing to the beneficent actions of Rome, been freed from serious civil discord and internecine massacres" (36.17.13).[111] Given these benefits, as well as the complete irrationality of the Macedonian decision, Polybius is at a loss with how to explain their actions, twice referring to the decision as madness sent by the gods (δαιμονοβλάβειαν, 36.17.15). His moral condemnation, continuing his negative attitude toward the Macedonian decision described in 36.10, is clear. The Macedonians' break of faith with Rome in choosing to side with Andriscus is all the more treacherous given the past kindnesses shown by the Romans in 167.[112] Thus, Macedonian freedom and peace were now replaced with exile, torture, murder, and, ultimately, a complete loss of independence (36.17.13).[113]

Acceptable Attacks against Friends and Allies

Given certain context surrounding the act of treachery, however, Polybius does make some allowance. As we saw above, the moral reasoning to betray alliances is stressed by Lyciscus the Acarnanian in his 211 speech before the Spartan Assembly during the First Macedonian War. While states should strive to remain faithful to their allies, Lyciscus explains that changes in circumstances can allow for such breaks of faith (9.37.1-3). The ability to betray unfit allies is

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[111] Μακεδόνες μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἐτετεύχεισαν φιλανθρωπιῶν, κοινῇ μὲν πάντες ἀπολυθέντες μοναρχικῶν ἐπιταγμάτων καὶ φόρων καὶ μεταλαβόντες ἀπὸ δουλείας ὁμολογουμένως ἐλευθερίαν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις ἐκλυθέντες ἐκ μεγάλων στάσεων καὶ φόνων ἐμφυλίων διὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων.

[112] Again, this is Polybius' interpretation. The Macedonians may have viewed the situation differently given the brutal deportation of the Macedonian elite, see Livy 45.32, with Dahmen 2018.

[113] On the settlement of 148, see Kallet-Marx 1995: 11-41; against Gruen 1984: II.434-436.

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likewise emphasized in the preceding speech of Chlaeneas the Aetolian before the Spartan Assembly (9.28-31). Despite being allies of the Aetolian League, the Spartans had remained neutral in the war. In trying to convince the assembly to declare war against Philip, Chlaeneas reminds the Spartans that they can only justifiably abandon the alliance in favor of Macedon if they could "point to some act of injustice committed by the Aetolians or some great benefit conferred by Macedonia" (9.31.6). Thus, in proving that neither of these circumstances existed, Chlaeneas points to the fact that the present alliance with Aetolia had been formed *after* the generosity shown to Sparta by Antigonus Doson in 222 following Sellasia. Therefore, the alliance should be kept.[114] While he is arguing that such a pretext does not exist for the Spartans in 211, Chlaeneas' speech, like that of Lyciscus, emphasizes the fact that such circumstances could allow for such breaks of faith without condemnation.

In Polybius' estimation, there are two main categories of context that allow states to betray their allies without condemnation. The first justification deals with the question of compulsion. When circumstances force states to break faith with their allies or else face their own destruction, Polybius finds such treacherous behavior to be acceptable. In the case of Hannibal's treachery toward his allies in Italy, Polybius is hesitant to condemn the Carthaginian general on moral grounds. In attempting to analyze Hannibal's character (9.22-26), Polybius considers whether some of Hannibal's actions during his years fighting in Italy were driven by his great greed (φιλάργυρος, 9.22.8; 9.25.1; 9.25.4).[115] Apparently, this love of money consumed both Hannibal and his friend Mago, the commander in Bruttium, so much that the two generals refused to work together when capturing cities throughout Spain and Italy so as to not have to share the profits with

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[114] The central pillar of Lyciscus' argument in favor of Sparta siding with Macedon (see above).
[115] Polybius maintains that Hannibal's greed was attested to in detail by Massanissa among others (9.25.2-4).

one another (9.25). In Polybius' mind, however, it was the pressing circumstances rather than greed that pushed Hannibal to act treacherously against many of his Italian allies. Following the Roman recapture of Capua in 211, Hannibal realized that he would be unable to guarantee the safety of all of the cities that had defected to him in central and southern Italy. If he kept his forces consolidated in one location, he would be unable to support his scattered allies, and yet if he spread his troops across the region, his divided forces would be locally overwhelmed by the Romans (9.26.1-5). As a result, Hannibal decided to abandon and betray (παρασπονδέω) a number of those Italian cities with whom he had sworn treaties, rather than see them voluntarily return to the Romans or give up their Carthaginian garrisons (9.26.6-8):

> He was therefore obliged to abandon openly some of the cities and to withdraw his garrisons from others, from fear lest if they transferred their allegiance, he should lose his own soldiers as well. In some cases, he even allowed himself to violate the treaties he had made, transferring the inhabitants to other towns and giving up their property to plunder, thereby causing such offence that he was accused both of impiety (ἀσέβειαν) and cruelty (ὠμότητα).[116]

In pointing to the pragmatic circumstances limiting Hannibal's possibilities in Italy, Polybius concludes that it is ultimately very difficult (λίαν δυσχερὲς) to pass judgment on the Carthaginian general's actions. Despite accusations of impiety (ἀσέβεια) and cruelty (ὠμότης) by the Italians, Polybius refuses to condemn Hannibal for making the best of a bad situation. Once again, the context, in this case a strategically weak Carthaginian position in Italy, is at the heart of Polybius' moral judgment of acts of treachery committed against allies.

Similar compulsion contextualizes the various acts of treachery committed by Philip V during the winter of 201/200 in Bargylia. After the indecisive naval battle of Chios in 201, in which

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[116] διόπερ ἠναγκάζετο τὰς μὲν προδήλως ἐγκαταλείπειν τῶν πόλεων, ἐξ ὧν δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐξάγειν, ἀγωνιῶν μὴ κατὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πραγμάτων συγκαταφθείρῃ τοὺς ἰδίους στρατιώτας. ἐνίας δὲ καὶ παρασπονδῆσ᾽ ὑπέμεινε, μετανιστὰς εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ ποιῶν ἀναρπάστους αὐτῶν τοὺς βίους. ἐξ ὧν προσκόπτοντες οἱ μὲν ἀσέβειαν, οἱ δ᾽ ὠμότητα κατεγίνωσκον.

Philip's fleet came off much worse than the allied Rhodian and Attalid fleet, Philip ravaged the countryside of Pergamum before marching south into Lydia and Caria. After occupying Bargylia in the autumn of 201, however, Philip found winter fast approaching and his fleet blockaded within the bay.[117] Starving, cut off from his supply lines, and unable to return to Macedonia, Philip was forced to scavenge for food for his army throughout the winter, "leading the life of a wolf" (16.24.4).[118] While he received some logistical support from Zeuxis, Antiochus' governor of Asia Minor, Philip was forced to resort to stealing (ἁρπάζων καὶ κλέπτων), threatening with force (ἀποβιαζόμενος), and even resorting to flattery (αἰκάλλων) for food from the surrounding cities of Mylasa, Alabanda, and Magnesia (16.24.5-6).[119] In the end, Philip even attempted to treacherously (φύσιν αἰκάλλων) capture Mylasa and succeeded in devastating and capturing Alabanda to alleviate his logistical problems (16.24.7).[120] Despite these betrayals, however, Polybius does not condemn Philip's actions at Bargylia. In fact, his only criticism of Philip's attempted treachery against Mylasa is his poor management of the plot. Rather, unlike his previous aggressions throughout Greece, the Aegean, and Asia Minor, Polybius deems Philip's actions during the winter of 201/200 acceptable given the context. As with Hannibal's position in Italy in 211, at Bargylia

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[117] On the details of these events, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 411-416 and (briefly) Eckstein 2012: 161-165.

[118] Walbank 1967: 529 places τοῦ χειμῶνος ἤδη καταρχομένου (16.24.1) between November 20 through December 20, following Pedech 1964: 462-463. See Holleaux 1923: 354; Holleux 1924: 314, n. 1; Holleaux 1932: 534-536; Aymard 1932: i. 53, n. 1 who place winter at the time of the autumn equinox.

[119] The Hellenistic city of Mylasa (modern Milas) lay twelve miles east-north-east of Iasus: Strabo 14.658-659; Magie 1950: i. 85-86, ii. 907, n. 129; Walbank 1967: 531. The autonomous Carian city of Alabanda (modern Araphisar) lay sixteen miles south of Maeander near the Marsyas river: Strabo 15.660-661; Magie 1950: i. 130, ii. 992, nn. 30-31; Walbank 1967: 531. The city was renamed Antioch of the Chrysaorians sometime in the mid third century: Holleaux 1935: 141-157; Walbank 1967: 531-532. The Ionian city of Magnesia (Magnesia-on-Maeander) was located at the foot of Mount Thorax, about three miles north of the Maeander: Strabo, 14.647; Magie 1950: i. 78-79, ii. 894-195 n. 101; Walbank 1967: 532.

[120] Polybius only mentions Philip devastating the territory of Alabanda (16.24.8), but it appears as though he occupied the town itself, as in 197 it remained under the control of Philip's general Deinocrates (Livy 33.18.7). See Walbank 1967: 532.

Philip was contending with the survival of his army. Thus, in the face of possible starvation and destruction, Philip's treacheries against Mylasa and Alabanda are not condemned by Polybius.

A second justification is rooted in responding to wicked allies. Thus, the Achaean historian does not condemn Hannibal in 218 for raiding the countryside of some of his Gallic allies living between the Trebia and the Po, as these Gauls had been secretly negotiating with the Romans to try and ensure their safety from both sides of the conflict (3.69.5-7).[121] Polybius sees Hannibal's decision as justified given these treacherous negotiations that had been carried out despite the alliance that already existed between the Gauls and the Carthaginian commander. According to Polybius, Gallic self-interest, in this case attempting to guarantee diplomatic protection regardless of the outcome of the war, provided Hannibal with a reasonable pretext for turning on his allies. As we saw above, the treacherous actions of Pharnaces likewise drove Eumenes II to break the peace treaty between the two kings by mobilizing his own forces in the spring of 180. In light of Pharnaces' earlier violation of the treaty in the winter of 181/180 by sending ten thousand troops under Leocritus to ravage Galatia (24.14.15), however, Polybius does not condemn Eumenes' later break of the treaty. Rather, Pharnaces' invasion clearly violated the terms of the treaty (πάντας τοὺς τῆς πίστεως ὅρους ὑπερβαίνειν τὸν Φαρνάκην, 24.14.3), allowing for Eumenes' own break of the treaty.

Such context of betraying wicked allies is also seen in the case of Hannibal's attack on Saguntum in the late spring of 219, if we are willing to step into the scholarly quagmire of this affair.[122] If we accept that Saguntum was a Roman ally by this time, then Hannibal's attack

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[121] On Polybius' general praise of Hannibal, see 10.33.1–7; 11.19.1–7; 15.15.3–16.6; 23.13.1–2; cf. 3.69.12–14; 9.22.7–26.11; Pédech 1964: 216; Champion 2004a: 117.

[122] On this fiercely debated affair, see: De Sanctis 1907: 417-418; Hampl 1972: 428-430; Walbank 1957: 170–172; Badian 1958: 47–52; Dorey 1959–60; Astin 1967: 594; Schmitt 1969: 201-207, no. 303; Harris 1979: 201–2; Eckstein 1984; Rich 1996: 23–30; Hoyos 1997: 154–73; Eckstein 2006: 71-72; Baronowski 2011: 69-70; Eckstein 2012; Rosenstein 2012: 119-120.

constitutes a clear violation of the 241 Lutatius Treaty which protected allies from attack, as Polybius acknowledges (3.30.3). While scholars have been divided on the nature and timing of the relationship between Saguntum and Rome, Polybius' description of the debate between Rome and Carthage following the fall of Saguntum makes it clear that Saguntum was in fact a Roman ally (σύμμαχος) by the time of Hannibal's attack.[123] Thus, the Carthaginian senate's defense of Hannibal's actions was not that Saguntum was not a Roman ally, but that it had not been an ally in 241 at the signing of the Lutatius Treaty (3.21.5). Polybius' earlier description of Hamilcar's acknowledgement of the alliance between Rome and Saguntum (3.14.10) suggests its existence: "Hannibal tried as far as he could to keep his hands off this city, wishing to give the Romans no avowed pretext for war, until he had secured his possession of all the rest of the country, following in this his father Hamilcar's suggestions and advice." While this passage only proves the existence of a friendly relationship between Rome and Saguntum before Hamilcar's death, Polybius indicates that this relationship was more formal at least by the Roman embassy to Hannibal in the winter of 220 (3.15.8): "To Carthage, however, he sent, asking for instructions, since the Saguntines, relying on their alliance (συμμαχία) with Rome, were wronging some of the peoples subject to Carthage."[124] Nor does the suggestion of an earlier establishment of this alliance clash with the unilateral Ebro Treaty signed in 226, in which Hasdrubal promised to keep the Carthaginians south of the Ebro River.[125] While it is

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[123] For those who argue for the existence of the alliance, see Hampl 1972: 428-430; Walbank 1972: 164; Harris 1979: 201-202; Baronowski 2011: 69-70; Rosenstein 2012: 119-120. For those who view the relationship as an informal *amicitia*, see Astin 1967: 577-596; Eckstein 1984: n. 82; Eckstein 2006: 71-72; Eckstein 2012. For the view that there was no serious relationship formed at all, see: Astin 1967: 594. For the view that Saguntum somehow became incorporated into the Roman empire, see Loreto 2011: 196.
[124] Cf. 3.15.5.
[125] We should hesitate to draw connections between Saguntum and the Ebro Treaty as some scholars have done. The treaty made no specific mention of exemption to Saguntum: see Rich 1996: 5 and n. 14. The treaty was also not bilateral, meaning it did not restrict Roman activity south of the Ebro, see Eckstein 2012 and earlier Badian 1979:161-164; Eckstein 1984: 57-62. Likewise Carthaginian commercial and diplomatic activity continued north of the Ebro after 226: see Rodriguez Adrados 1946:

uncertain just how long this alliance had been established, it is likely that the Saguntines entered under Roman protection sometime before 229, and certainly by 226.[126] At any rate, it is clear that Polybius believed that when Hannibal attacked Saguntum in 219, though not the true cause (αἰτίαν, 3.30.3) of the war, was a treacherous attack on a Roman ally in contradiction to the terms of the Lutatius Treaty, regardless of the Carthaginian senate's attempts to argue unconvincing legalities (3.21; cf. 3.29-30).

And yet, despite this violation, Polybius does not condemn Hannibal's attack on Saguntum, given the context of the situation. Instead, he views Hannibal's decision to go to war with Rome as acceptable. For Polybius, it is the Roman seizure of Sardinia in 238/7 that provided Hannibal with the justification needed to violate the Lutatius Treaty without moral condemnation. And indeed, the Achaean historian emphasizes that the Roman treachery over Sardinia was the second and most important (μεγίστην) cause of the war (3.10.5).[127] Thus, given the earlier Roman action at Sardinia and the additional war indemnity which was "unjustly" (ἀδίκως) forced upon Carthage (3.15.10), Polybius has no moral qualms with Hannibal's attack on Saguntum and subsequent march into Italy despite their violation of the Lutatius Treaty of 241 and Hannibal's march north

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167-73. For recent debate over the motivations behind the Ebro Treaty, see: Rich 1996: 23; Bender 1997: 91-94; Twyman 1997; Urban 1999: 43, 130; Williams 2001, chap. 4; Bringmann 2001: 370; Rosenberger 2003; Hoyos 2003: 81-84; Beck 2005: 252; Erdkamp 2008: 139; Erdkamp 2009: 507-508; Loreto 2011: 193-198; Hoyos 2011: 216-219; Eckstein 2012.

[126] For dating the relationship with Saguntum before 228: Sumner 1972: 475-476; Eckstein 1984; Eckstein 2006: 171; Baronowski 2011: 69-70. Eckstein places the arrangement in 231, though he maintains that it was only an informal *amicitia*. For dating the alliance around 226: Harris 1979: 201-202; Rosenstein 2012: 119-120. It should be noted that Harris is open to the possibility of an earlier establishment. Errington 1970: 42-44 places the alliance in 223. Other scholars maintain that it remains to difficult to propose a specific date: Walbank 1957: 170; Hampl 1972: 429.

[127] Throughout his work, Polybius (3.6.1-7.3) differentiates between *αἰτίαι* ("causes" – what were the true motivations behind the war), *προφάσεις* ("pretexts" – what justifications were given for going to war), and *ἀρχαί* ("beginnings" – what actions actually set off the war). The other two causes for the war were the anger of the Barcids toward Rome and the success of the new Carthaginian power in Spain (3.9.6-12.6). For more on the Polybian framework of causation, see Momigliano 1960: 20; Pedech 1964: 70-93, 191-194; Petzold 1969: 11 n. 1, 17, 139; Walbank 1972: 157-161; Eckstein 1989: 1-4; Eckstein 1995: n. 61; Walbank 2002: 4 and n. 22; Baronowski 2011: 73-77.

violating the Ebro Treaty of 226. After initially being forced to "yield to the circumstances" (εἴξαντες τοῖς καιροῖς) of the Sardinia seizure in 238/7 (1.88.12; 3.10.3), the Carthaginians were finally ready to justly repay the Romans for their previous treachery.

Admittedly, Polybius does find fault with how Hannibal conducted the affair at Saguntum itself. When Roman envoys met with Hannibal (3.15.4-8) at the start of winter in 220 to warn him against attacking Saguntum, the Carthaginian general asserted that his attack on the Roman ally would be justified as the Romans had recently been called in to arbitrate a political dispute at Saguntum and had unjustly put to death some of the leading Saguntine citizens. Thus, Hannibal maintained, he was only acting to guard the interests of the people of Saguntum (3.15.4-8). Polybius criticizes Hannibal for this decision, accusing him of acting with "irrationality and violent anger" (πλήρης ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου, 3.15.9) by providing "ridiculous pretexts" (προφάσεις ἀλόγους, 3.15.9) and inventing a non-existence cause (τὴν δ᾽ οὐχ ὑπάρχουσαν, 3.15.11) for the war.[128] Because of this mistake, Hannibal appeared to be starting the war contrary to justice (ἀδίκως, 3.15.11). Instead, Polybius explains, Hannibal should have stated the actual reason for his hostility toward Saguntum and the Romans, which would have made his alleged violation of the treaty of 241 acceptable and justified - the unjust Roman seizure of Sardinia and the imposition of additional indemnities (3.15.10). We should note here that for Polybius the acceptability of Hannibal's violation of the Lutatius Treaty and Ebro Treaty (if Hannibal crossed the river before war was declared) is never in doubt, but rather Hannibal's lack of a serious cause in providing justification. The acceptability of the Carthaginian violation of these treaties is emphasized later in 11.19.6 when Polybius criticizes Hannibal, not for attacking Saguntum and going to war with

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[128] Baronowski 2011: 75.

Rome but for doing so before he had finished conquering Spain and solidifying his power.[129] In Polybius' mind, while the effectiveness of the public presentation of the war might be in question, the act itself of marching against Rome and her allies is not condemned as it had already been justified by Roman behavior in 238/7.

These exemptions from Polybius' moral condemnation fit with the general model that has been unfolding throughout our look at these various breaks of good faith. Certain contexts, such as imminent destruction or previous treacheries committed by the allies in question, make such acts of betrayal acceptable in Polybius' eyes.[130] Thus, the Carthaginian breaking of the Lutatius treaty is acceptable, given that they had been forced to "yield to the circumstances" of the Roman seizure of Sardinia in 238/7 (1.88.12). Hannibal's decision to attack his own Gallic allies and ravage their territory is also not condemned by Polybius, given the Gauls' own treacherous double-dealings that preceded it in negotiating with the Romans behind Hannibal's back (3.69.5-7). So too is Eumenes II's decision to mobilize troops in the spring of 180 in contradiction of the peace treaty with Pharnaces, justified in light of Pharances' earlier treacherous invasion. The Achaeans were likewise "forced to put up with what was naturally offensive to them" with regard to Philip's treacherous actions against Argos and other allies (10.26.6). As we will see, this context excuses the later Achaean decision to betray their treaty of alliance with Macedon and join the Romans in 198. Without such pretexts, however, treachery against friends and allies who have done no wrong is criticized by the Achaean historian. Thus, Polybius notably praises the Achaeans for avoiding the personal gain (ἰδίᾳ λυσιτελοῦς, 2.40.5) that corresponded with these acts of treachery, as the

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[129] The willingness for Polybius to analyze how Hannibal might have maneuvered more effectively against the Romans likewise suggests a certain degree of objectivity and a lack of pro-Roman bias.

[130] While such risk of destruction makes betrayal acceptable in Polybius' eyes (see especially section below on states switching sides during war), he does hold that keeping faith despite this risk is honorable and praiseworthy. Thus, note his high praise of the Megalopolitans' willingness to lose their city and lives to Cleomenes rather than break faith with the Achaeans (2.61.7-12). Polybius holds that no other action could be more noble (κάλλιον, 2.61.11).

Achaeans did in 224 when they were initially unwilling to betray Corinth to Antigonus Doson (2.51.6-7).

II. DESERTING ALLIES DURING WARTIME

One of the most common acts of treachery that appear throughout the *Histories* is switching sides during the course of a war. Such a betrayal may either be carried out by the community as a whole, such as the Achaean decision to desert Philip in 198, or by a smaller faction from within a city or state, as was the case at Tarentum in 216. In many ways, the latter example aligns closely with Polybius' own definition of who should be considered a traitor (προδότας, 18.13.1; προδότην, 18.13.3).[131] While it is often difficult to determine who qualifies as a traitor, Polybius holds traitors to be (18.15.2-4):

> Those who in a season of imminent danger, either for their own safety or advantage or owing to their differences with the opposite party, put their cities into the hands of the enemy, or still more justifiably to those who, admitting a garrison and employing external assistance to further their own inclinations and aims, submit their countries to the domination of a superior power. It would be quite fair to class all the above as traitors.[132]

Such acts of treachery, Polybius maintains, are typically done for personal reasons at the expense of the state. Thus, he likewise defines as traitors those who submit to have their cities garrisoned, the city laws abolished, and its freedom of action and speech deprived, often for their own personal benefit (18.14.9). Such betrayals, of course, represent treachery against one's own state - a concept that will be discussed more closely in chapter 4. On the other hand, acts of treachery against allies

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[131] See chapter 2.

[132] μάλιστα δ' ἂν προστρέχοι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φέρων, ὅσοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν κατὰ τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς περιστάσεις ἢ τῆς ἰδίας ἀσφαλείας καὶ λυσιτελείας χάριν ἢ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους διαφορᾶς ἐγχειρίζουσι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τὰς πόλεις, ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία πάλιν ὅσοι φρουρὰν εἰσδεχόμενοι καὶ συγχρώμενοι ταῖς ἔξωθεν ἐπικουρίαις πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ὁρμὰς καὶ προθέσεις ὑποβάλλουσι τὰς πατρίδας ὑπὸ τὴν τῶν πλεῖον δυναμένων ἐξουσίαν. τοὺς τοιούτους ὑπὸ τὸ τῆς προδοσίας ὄνομα μετρίως ἄν τις ὑποτάττοι πάντας.

for the purpose of strengthening the state are often seen as justifiable by Polybius, as we will see at the end of this section (18.13.4-14.1-15). Once again, whether the treachery is carried out by individuals within a city or by the state as a whole, Polybius' acceptance or condemnation is dependent upon the contexts surrounding the decision.

Condemned Betrayals of Allies by Individuals during Wartime

Such a betrayal occurred in 218 during the Second Punic War with the city of Clastidium in Cisalpine Gaul. It was at Clastidium in 222 that Marcus Claudius Marcellus had defeated the Insubres, saving the city from destruction and winning the rare *spolia opima*, killing King Viridomarus in hand-to-hand combat.[133] Four years later, the city was betrayed (πραξικοπήσας) to Hannibal by the commander of its garrison, a native of Brundisium named Dasius (3.69.1).[134] Polybius makes it clear that the city itself had not been in any serious danger from Hannibal. Clastidium had withstood an extended siege by the Insubres in 222, and Hannibal was in no position to conduct such an operation given his tenuous logistical support and the fact that he now faced a combined consular army, as Tiberius Sempronius Longus had just joined forces with Publius Cornelius Scipio after a forty-day march from Lilybaeum (3.68.12-15). Rather than the

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[133] On the battle and Marcellus' *spolia opima*: see Polyb. 2.34.5-9; Livy *Per.* 20; Cic. *Tusc.* 4.49; Verg. 6.855-59; Prop. 4.10; Manil. *Ast.* 1.787ff.; Val. Max. 3.2.5; Festus 204L; Sil Ital. 1.133, 3.587, 12.278-80; Front. *Strat.* 4.5.4; Plut. *Marc.* 7-8, *Rom.* 16.7-8, *Comp. Pelop.* and *Marc.* 1.2; Flor. 1.20.4; Eutrop. 3.6; Ampel. 21, *vir ill.* 45; Oros. 4. Our sources indicated only two other instances of this honor during the republic, won by Romulus from Acron, the King of the Caeninenses, and by A. Cornelius Cossus in the fifth century. On Romulus: Livy 1.10; Cic. *Rep.* 2.7.12-10.17; Festus 202-204L, ILS 64 = I I 13.3.70; Dion. Hal. 2.34.4; Prop. 4.10; Plut. *Rom.* 16; Val. Max. 3.2.3; Flor. 1.1.11; Serv. A. 6.859; Sol. 1.20, *vir ill.* 2.4. On Cossus: Livy 4.19-20; Prop. 4.10; Dion. Hal. 12.5; Festus 204L; Val. Max. 3.2.4; Manil. *Astr.* 1.788; Front. *Strat.* 2.8.9; Plut. *Rom.* 16, *Marc.* 8; Serv. A.6.841 and 855; Flor. 1.6.9; Ampel. 21; Priscian 5.13. On the tradition of the *spolia opima*, see Oakley 1985: 398; Rich 1996 124-125; Stewart 1998: 79-88; McDonnell 1999: 552; Flower 2000: 34-64 with sources. On the *spolia opima* as a reinvented tradition with serious political implications in the Augustan period, see Harrison 1989: 408-414; Rich 1999: 544-555; Flower 2000: 34-64.

[134] The commander is unnamed in Polybius. See Livy 21.48.8-9. Fronda 2010: 62 points to Disias as an example of how native Italians could increase their own local influence and standing through relationships with Rome.

safety of the city, then, it seems that the commander of the garrison defected to Hannibal for the personal honors (ἐτίμησε μεγαλείως) with which the Carthaginian general did, in fact, reward him (3.69.4). Nor is there any trace of unjust action taken by the Romans against the city. The only prior account mentioned by Polybius is the 222 Roman salvation of the city from the Insubres. Thus in not only unjustly securing Clastidium itself for Hannibal but also the much-needed stores of grain that were held there, Dasias is declared by Polybius to be a traitor (προδότην, 3.69.4). Indeed this example fits perfectly with the Achaean historian's own definition just described above.

A similar instance of treachery in favor of Hannibal is found with the city of Tarentum in 212, representing one of Polybius' lengthier accounts in his work (8.24-34). In early spring, Hannibal returned to Tarentum with hopes of capturing the city. He had tried and failed to secure the city and its port during the previous year despite a great deal of effort (Livy 25.1).[135] Hannibal's chance now came, however, when a group of young Tarentine aristocrats, led by Philemenus and Nicon, offered to betray the city to him.[136] Over the next few weeks, the youths continued to leave the city under the pretext of hunting excursions and visit Hannibal in his camp to discuss how to carry out their plot (8.24-25).[137] In these discussions, Polybius tells us that the Tarentines were careful to justify their decision to break faith with Rome, bringing different accusations (κατηγορίας) against the Romans (8.24.7).[138] Again, the need to do so suggests that such acts of

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[135] On the pattern of Greek cities in Italy breaking their alliances with Rome and joining Hannibal between 214-212, see Lomas 1993: 62-76; Lazenby 1996: 43-44; Fronda 2010; Lomas 2011. The case of Tarentum and the region of Magna Graecia is discussed in most detail by Fronda 2010: 188-233.
[136] Livy places their number at 13 and also names Phileas and Democrates: 24.13, 25.7-11, 26.39, 27.16. Eckstein 1995: 146, n. 106 places this example alongside other Polybian examples of the disastrous decisions made by youths. He does not, however, discuss the treachery at Tarentum in its own right.
[137] On the importance of the proximity of Hannibal's army in eliciting defections among Rome's allies, see; Ciaceri 1928-1940: III.132-146; Fronda 2010: 109-110.
[138] Part of the Tarentine indignation came from the harsh punishment the Roman inflicted on the hostages from Tarentum who attempted to escape from Rome (Livy 25.7-8). It is unfortunate that Polybius' discussion of the affair is largely fragmentary (8.24.3). Despite this justification, Polybius still

treachery could be justified given the context. Hannibal happily agreed to the plot (πρᾶξιν) to betray the city, instructing them to first ingratiate themselves with Gaius Livius, the Roman commander of the city, as well as the soldiers guarding the Temenid gate into the city. Thus, before long the guards would open the gates for Philemenus whenever he approached the walls of the city (8.25.5-10). Hannibal and the conspirators chose to act on a day when Gaius Livius would be drinking at a festival so that he would not catch wind of the scheme (8.25.11). Everything went according to plan, as the drunk Roman commander was unaware of the betrayal of the city (8.27).[139] The youths signaled to Hannibal who had arrived outside the city at around midnight, and they treacherously killed the guards on watch and opened the Temenidgate for the Carthaginians (8.28). Hannibal's plan was not a complete success, however, as many of the Romans, including Gaius Livius, as well as those Tarentines loyal to Rome, managed to reach the port citadel, ultimately denying Hannibal his greatest hope of capturing the city (8.29-34). While Polybius acknowledges the skill with which Hannibal's plan is carried out, he ultimately condemns the actions of the Tarentines involved in the treachery.[140] The Achaean historian emphasizes that the people of Tarentum were not acting out of patriotism or protection of the state but rather from "arrogance caused by their own prosperity" (τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ὑπερήφανον, 8.24.1).[141] It was this same arrogance that brought Pyrrhus to Italy at the risk of Tarentine independence.[142] Polybius also places this account within his description of the betrayal of Achaeus (8.15-21, 8.35-36),

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maintains the Tarentine treachery in this instance as unjustified given his clear condemnation of the traitors (see below). Rome was, after all, punishing the Tarentine hostages for breaking faith with Rome with the obvious goal of siding with Hannibal.

[139] Livy omits the account of the banquet. See Brauer 1986: 188.

[140] Polybius often praises the generals who utilize traitors while condemning the traitors themselves. See chapters 4 and 6.

[141] On Polybius' general theory that wealth and power must be handled with care or else lead to moral degradation, see Eckstein 1995: 74, 246.

[142] On the negative presentation of Tarentum by Livy, see Lomas 2015: 56 who views Tarentum as the "chief villain" of Livy's narrative of the war in Southern Italy. See, however, Walbank 1972: 100-101 who believes Polybius' main source for Tarentum during the war to be pro-Hannibal.

inviting his readers to draw connections between these similar acts of betrayal. While he hesitates on whether to blame those kings and commanders who fall victim to treachery (8.35-36), Polybius is clear that in the face of sworn agreements and expected loyalty, the traitors who carry out such betrayals are to be condemned. Thus he holds that these traitors, such as those who betrayed Achaeus, are met with universal hatred and contempt (διαβολὴν δὲ καὶ μῖσος τοῖς πράξασιν, 8.36.9).

Indeed, the betrayal of Achaeus in 213 is met with clear condemnation from Polybius. In 223, Seleucus III Ceraunus was assassinated while on campaign in Asia Minor by members of his own army led by Nicanor and Apaturius. Achaeus, who had accompanied Seleucus and who was his cousin (4.51.4), initially remained loyal to the royal family, despite the urging of his own troops to take control of the Seleucid throne (4.48.10). Thus, he proceeded to protect the throne for his young cousin, Antiochus III, by putting the assassins to death and securing control of the entire region against Attalus of Pergamum. The brilliant success of this campaign, however, caused Achaeus to reverse course in 220 and assume the diadem as if he were the rightful king of the Seleucid Empire (4.48.11).[143] Achaeus continued to rule unchallenged by Antiochus III, who had been persuaded by his treacherous advisor Hermias to pursue a war against Ptolemaic Egypt, which would eventually end in defeat at Raphia in 217.[144] By 213, Antiochus had managed to successfully defeat Achaeus' armies in the field and had trapped his cousin within the citadel of Sardis, where he had held out for two years. It was only through a carefully contrived betrayal that Achaeus was ultimately captured and executed.

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[143] The case of Achaeus' original treachery toward Antiochus III will be discussed in chapter 4. On Achaeus' career as an example of the unceasing nature of warfare that gripped the region and the Mediterranean as a whole, see Ma 2002: 58, n. 20; Eckstein 2006 92-93.

[144] The betrayals of Hermias as well as other instances of treacherous court intrigue will be discussed in chapter 4.

In an attempt to save Achaeus, who had been the Ptolemy's ally in their war against Antiochus, the Ptolemaic chief of state, Sosibius, sent a Cretan named Bolis to rescue the Seleucid prince from Sardis in 213.[145] Bolis, a member of the royal Ptolemaic court, was to secretly work with his friend and relative, Cambylus, who commanded the Cretan soldiers in Antiochus' army. Thus, with financial backing from Sosibius and accompanied by Nicomachus of Rhodes and Melancomas of Ephesus, who were intimate friends of Achaeus, Bolis put the plan into action (8.15). When he met with Cambylus to discuss the scheme, however, both men agreed to betray Achaeus (and Sosibius) and to instead deliver the Seleucid prince to Antiochus (8.16.5-8). Believing that the plot was still being carried out in good faith, Nicomachus and Melancomas wrote letters to Achaeus in cipher, urging him to trust Bolis and Cambylus.[146] Convinced, Achaeus attempted to sneak out of the citadel at night accompanied by Bolis, who ultimately betrayed his trust and delivered him in bondage to Antiochus (8.17-20). Polybius' contempt for the actions of Bolis is clear. Without any justifiable pretext, the Cretan breaks faith with both Achaeus as well as Sosibius and Ptolemaic Egypt. Polybius makes it clear to his readers that Bolis is motivated strictly by personal greed - a "thoroughly Cretan point of view" (8.16.5). Thus, in deciding to betray Achaeus, Bolis and Cambylus "did not take into consideration either the rescue of the man in danger or their loyalty to those who had charged them with the task, but only their personal security and advantage" (ἀλλ᾿ ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀσφαλείας καὶ τοῦ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς συμφέροντος, 8.16.6). Polybius likewise emphasizes that it is not his own carelessness that results in Achaeus' death (8.36) but rather the unsavory faithlessesness (ἀθεσίας, 8.21.10) of Bolis and Cambylus. And as we saw above, it is in this aside that Polybius further condemns this treachery by explaining

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[145] On the dating of the affair, see Walbank 1967: 3, 5, 93. Bolis is unknown outside of this account: Launey 1949: i. 260, 567 n. 16.
[146] On such uses of ciphers, see Aen. Tact. 31.

that while it resulted in general pity toward Achaeus, his betrayals were met by all with universal

hatred and contempt (8.36.9).

The treachery carried out by the exiles of Cynaetha during the Social War elicits a similar

response from Polybius.[147] At the onset of the war in 220, the Aetolian army under Dorimachus

marched through Achaea and appeared before the city of Cynaetha in Arcadia (4.17.3). For many

years the city had been consumed with bloody factional strife until the pro-Achaean faction

managed to take control of the city, supported by an Achaean garrison and governor, and exile

three hundred members of the opposing faction.[148] Upon receiving petitions from these exiles

wishing to regain their property and citizenship, the ruling faction agreed with Achaean permission

(4.17.4-8). So the Cynaethean exiles returned. and the Achaean garrison was dismissed. Yet

despite this great exhibition of generosity shown to the exiles by both the Cynaetheans and the

Achaeans, and despite swearing the most binding oaths (λαβόντες πίστεις τῶν παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις

νομιζομένων τὰς ἰσχυροτάτας, 4.17.9) sealed with a sacrifice to the gods, the exiles decided to

betray the city to the Aetolians.[149] Polybius explains that no sooner than they had been restored,

the exiles began to solicit the Aetolians with offers to betray the city to them (τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ

τοὺς πιστεύσαντας ἀσεβείας 4.17.11). The betrayal of the city was ultimately carried out by those

exiles who held the office of Polemarch. These magistrates were responsible for shutting the gates

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[147] On the background of the Social War, see: Fine 1940: 129; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 373-389.

[148] Most scholars have focused not on the treachery at Cynaetha, but on Polybius' explanation for the lawless strife (παρανομία) that had consumed the city. Polybius attributes the situation to a failure of education combined with the natural harshness of the region in Arcadia where they resided. Thus, as the abandonment of education (4.21.11) had caused the chaos, a return to education, especially in music, was the only solution to return the Cynaethans from their current bestial states back to gentle and mild humans (4.21.3-4). See Wunderer 1905: 39; Pedech 1964: 307; Eckstein 1995: 137-138; Walbank 2002: 197-200; Derow 2012: 81-82. On the general nature of decline associated with Cynaetha, see Eckstein 1995 137-138; Walbank 2002: 197-200; Baronowski 2011: 138-142.

[149] The dissention was connected with a split of opinion over Cleomenes' reforms and their larger class implications throughout the Peloponnesus. On the revolution at Cynaetha in context of the larger series socio-economic revolutions throughout Greece in 227-146, see Mendels 1982: 88-90, 106. Only Polybius' treatment of Cleomenes, see Mendels 1978: 161-166; Mendels 1981: 101-104.

of the city at night and guarding the keys. One night, these treacherous Polemarchs murdered their colleagues and opened one of the city gates so that the Aetolians could rush into the city while also scaling the walls with ladders, thereby overwhelming the unsuspecting defenders (4.18.1-7).[150] The scheme was ultimately successful, and the Aetolians soon captured Cynaetha.

Polybius believes that this betrayal is especially heinous given the goodwill shown to the exiles by the Cynaetheans and the Achaeans in allowing them to return to the city. It is not just against their allies and fellow citizens (πατρίδι), but against their preservers (σώσασι, 4.17.10) that they were plotting, despite owing their very safety and survival to them (4.17.12). Their actions were likewise in violation of the sacred oaths that they had sworn before the gods (4.17.9; 4.17.11). Nor, Polybius emphasizes, did the exiles have some cause or pretext (αἰτίας ἢ προφάσεως, 4.17.10) with which to justify their treachery. Instead, at the same time that they were pledging their faith over the sacrifice to the gods, they were impiously devising how to break faith with heaven and with those who trusted them (τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τοὺς πιστεύσαντας ἀσεβείας, 4.17.11). Polybius' harsh condemnation here fits with our model of treachery against allies. In choosing to betray the Achaeans as well as their own kinsmen and go over to the Aetolians, despite the recent acts of generosity, the Cynaethean exiles are only concerned with personal desires. Polybius affirms this notion and the complete lack of justification of their actions by praising the Aetolians for killing the exiles and plundering their property upon capturing the city (4.18.7).[151] The death of the exiles, he maintains, was the one act of justice (δικαιότατον) among all of the injustices (ἀδίκων, 4.18.7) of that day.

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[150] There appears to have been a strong element of undisciplined mob violence at work with the subsequent massacres. See Ferrabino 1921: 142-144; Walbank 1940: 29-30; Walbank 1957: 464; Mendels 1982: 88-90; Walbank 2002: 197-200

[151] The city seems to have been completely destroyed by the Aetolians, hence Strabo 8.8.2 claims that it no longer exists. The city seems to have been resettled, however, as it is later visited by Pausanias (8.19.1).

The chaotic Spartan desertion of the Hellenic Symmachy during the Social War, described immediately after the betrayal of the Cynaethean exiles, receives similar condemnation.[152] Despite their standing alliance with the Macedonians, certain Spartan citizens, led by three of the ephors, decided to begin talks with the Aetolians to form a secret alliance (ἀπορρήτων συμμαχίαν, 4.16.5). After murdering the ephor Adeimantus as well as Sthenelaus, Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and other leading Spartan citizens, these conspirators brought in the Aetolian envoy Machatas to begin negotiations (4.22.11-12; 4.34.1-5).[153] The negotiations were again stalled, however, when Gyridas and other Spartan elders spoke out against the prospect of betraying Macedon (4.23.6-11). After another round of murders and the reestablishment of the Spartan monarchy under King Lycurgus, however, the last of the resistance were killed or exiled, allowing Sparta to finally desert the Symmachy and join the Aetolians (4.35).[154] Polybius asserts that this betrayal was especially treacherous given the recent kindness that Antigonus Doson and the Macedonians had shown the Spartans following their defeat at Sellasia in 222, granting them their liberty (ἠλευθερωμένοι, 4.22.4).[155] Thus, Adeimantus reminds the Spartans that the Macedonians were their benefactors and preservers (εὐεργέτας καὶ σωτῆρας, 4.22.10), and later the Spartan elders emphasize all of the benefits (εὐεργεσίας, 4.34.9) that Antigonus and the Macedonians had bestowed upon them.[156] It

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[152] For a brief summary of these events, see Baronowski 2011: 138-139. Baronowski places the strife at Sparta within a larger context of decline throughout Greece during this time. On Sparta as a member of the Hellenic Symmachy, see Polyb. 4.9.4; 4.23.4; 4.23.6; Walbank 1957: 470.

[153] The multiple instances of treachery committed at this time by Spartans against their own state will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.

[154] On the socio-economic revolutionary concerns behind this revolution at Sparta, see Mendels 1982: 90-91.

[155] On the battle of Sellasia: Polyb. 2.65-69; P*Cleom* 28; P*Phil* 6; Walbank 1957: 272-275; Pritchett 1965: 59-70; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 349-356, 359-361. On Antigonus' proper treatment of Sparta, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 361-362; Eckstein 1995: 147, n. 112.

[156] As opposed to injuries that the Spartans had received at the hands of the Aetolians under Charixenus and Timaeus, when invaded Laconia, devastated the country, enslaved the villages of the Perioeci, and attempted to capture sparta through fraud (δόλου) and force (4.34.9). Eckstein 1995: 147 uses this passage as evidence of the role of elderly statesmen in restraining violent and unrestrained youth in the *Histories*.

is in spite of this expected friendship, then, that the Spartan betrayal takes place, described by Polybius as absurd and vicious (ἀλογίας καὶ κακίας, 4.34.1). The Spartans acted in this case not with any justifiable pretext but with hopes of treacherously expanding their own power in the Peloponnesus, believing that Philip was too young to be an effective king (4.22.5).

Condemned Betrayals of Allies by States during Wartime

While the above examples highlight the betrayal of individuals or factions within a state, it is just as common in the *Histories* for the state as a whole to treacherously switch sides during war. Again, such betrayals are defined by Polybius as being carried out without justifiable pretext. Thus, he emphasizes that the treacherous defection of Capua to Hannibal in 216 following the Roman defeat at Cannae was carried out not from fear of safety but due to their greed and need for luxury and extravagance (τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν, 7.1.1).[157] The defection of Syracuse under Hieronymus in 215 is likewise criticized.[158] When the Romans reminded Hieronymus that justice (δίκαιόν, 7.3.4) demanded that he keep to the terms of the alliance established by Hiero II, the young tyrant demonstrated his own poor character in meeting the Roman envoys with rudeness and insultingly demanding that the Romans return all of the gold, grain, and other gifts that Hiero had given to them during his reign, and that they cede all of the territory and cities east of the Himeras river to Syracuse (7.5.7).[159] In choosing this course of action, and shortly after signing a treaty of alliance with the Carthaginians, Hieronymus was greatly influenced by Adranodorus, the

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[157] On the political contexts and wavering loyalty behind Capua's betrayal of Rome, see (most comprehensively) Fronda 2010: 100-147, esp.103-130. See also Ungern-Sternberg 1975: 26-45; Lazenby 1978: 66; Frederiksen 1984: 238-239; Goldsworthy 2000: 193-194. On the dangers of prosperity according to Polybius, see Eckstein 1995: 70-82, esp. 74-75. On the context and tradition of Polyb. 7.1.1, see von Ungarn-Sternberg 1975: 39-41.

[158] Cf. Livy 24.4-5.

[159] Hieronymus was the son of Gelo, who had died before his father Hiero II (Livy 23.30.10-12). His mother was Nereis of Epirus (Livy 24.4.5). He was only fifteen upon assuming the throne in 215 (Livy 24.4.6). See Walbank 1967: 30-32. On the geography of these rivers in Sicily, see Walbank 1967 34.

son-in-law of Hiero, as well as Hippocrates and his brother who captivated him with dramatic stories of Hannibal's victory over the Romans (7.4.4).[160] Polybius paints this decision as both treacherous and unwise, placing the defection and subsequent violation of the treaty (παραβαίνειν συνθήκας, 7.3.4; 7.5.1) within the context of his larger condemnation of Hieronymus' bad character (7.3-8), standing in contrast with the excellent character of his grandfather, Hiero II (7.8). Thus, Polybius describes Hieronymus as gullible (μετεωρισθέν 7.4.4-6), unstable (ἀκατάστατον, 7.4.6; ἀκαταστασίαν, 7.4.8), mentally deranged (μανίαν, 7.4.8), and exceedingly capricious and violent (διαφερόντως εἰκαῖον καὶ παράνομον, 7.7.5).[161] Indeed, Hieronymus' complete lack of character and judgment (ἀκρισίαν, 7.5.3) is so dangerous that most of the members of his advisory council, chosen by Hiero to ensure his grandson ruled justly, are too afraid to even speak their mind when he proposes backing Carthage against Rome.[162]

The defection of some of the Celtiberians from Spain to Carthage near the end of the Hannibalic War was likewise carried out without any justifiable pretext. Despite the generosity that Scipio had shown to the Celts during his campaigns against the Carthaginians from 211-206 (perhaps best exemplified by his treatment of Andobales, detailed above), some of these Celts who

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[160] Hiero had appointed fifteen guardians for Hieronymus (Livy 24.4.3-5), led by Andranodorus, Hiero's son-in-law (24.5.7). By dissolving the the guardianship, Andranodorus was able to divert power into his own hands (24.4.9).

[161] Polybius' critique of Hieronymus in 7.7.5 is accompanied with an explanation that previous scholars who have described his rule have been too dramatic in their portrayal of Hieronymus as a terrible and bloodthirsty as previous tyrant such as Phalaris and Apollodorus. He believes that while the young tyrant was certainly unsavory, such extreme accusations are unlikely, given that Hieronymus was only fifteen when he came to power, and he only ruled for thirteen months before his death (7.7.1-8).

[162] Hieronymus' rule was short and chaotic, lasting only thirteen months. He was assassinated in 214 at the city of Leontini by a group of conspirators led by Deinomenes (Livy 24.7). The section of Polybius 7.6 that presumably would have detailed his death is lost, the extant beginning of this chapter describing the topography of Leontini. On the geography of Leontini, see Schubring 1874: 365-389; Rizza 1949; Walbank 1967: 36-38. The death of Hieronymus and the subsequent capture of Syracuse in the autumn of 212 by Marcus Claudius Marcellus marked the end of the city's independence which had been so carefully and effectively guarded by Hiero II for over fifty years. See Walbank 1967: 164-166; Eckstein 1985: 273-276; Eckstein 1987: 133-165; Eckstein 1995: 143; Eckstein 2006: 175, n. 243; Derow 2012: 282-283; Hoyos 2015: 159.

had come to terms and joined the Romans in Spain decided to betray Scipio and cross over to Africa to renew the fight against Rome, driven by greed.[163] Polybius is clear that this decision constituted an act of treachery (παρασπόνδως, 14.8.10) against Scipio and the Romans. Thus, at the Battle of the Great Plain in June of 203, the Celts fought bravely, knowing that they had little hope of receiving mercy from the Romans given their betrayal (14.8.9-10):

> Nor could they expect to be spared if made prisoners, owing to their treachery to Scipio in thus coming to fight in the service of Carthage against the Romans in spite of his never having been guilty of any acts of hostility to them during his Spanish campaigns.

Again, had Scipio treated them unjustly or cruelly in Spain, they would have had some pretext to justify this betrayal. Given Scipio's magnanimity toward the Spanish throughout the campaign, however, the decision to desert to Carthage finds condemnation from Polybius.[164]

A similar situation can be found with the defection of Utica and Hippacritae during the Libyan War. By 240, most of the Libyan cities had joined the rebel cause against Carthage. The cities of Utica and Hipparcritae, however, remained loyal to Carthage despite being placed under siege by the rebels. After a failed effort by Hanno the Great (1.74), the siege was finally broken by Hamilcar Barca, who defeated the Libyan rebel army (1.75-76).[165] Despite their initial loyalty and their subsequent liberation, however, Utica and Hippacritae surprisingly decided in 239 to desert the Carthaginians and join the rebel cause (1.82).[166] This defection (ἀπέστη, 1.82.8) was made worse by the atrocities that they carried out to prove their loyalty to the rebels. They butchered (ἀποκτείναντες) the five hundred Carthaginian soldiers who had been sent to keep the

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[163] For greed driving barbarians decisions in general, see Eckstein 1995: 122-123; Champion 2004a: 143.
[164] On Scipio's kindness toward the Celtiberians during his campaigns in Spain, see Polyb. 10.15.5; 10.17.6-15; 10.18; 10.34.1; Livy 26.50; Erskine 2003: 232-233; Rosenstein 2012: 162.
[165] On these events, see Meltzer 1896: 375-376; Veith 1912: 2.531; De Sanctis 1916: 386-387; Walbank 1957: 137-142; Hoyos 2007: 87-124; Rosenstein 2012: 68-70.
[166] Cf. Diod. 25.3.2.

cities safe from the rebels, threw the corpses from the city walls, and refused to let the Carthaginians bury their companions (1.82.10).[167] Given the recent actions taken by the Carthaginians in defense of Utica and Hippacritae, Polybius is highly critical of these cities' decision to desert to the Libyan rebels. Thus, he describes the unjustifiable the defection to the cause of the Libyans (ἀλόγου πρὸς τοὺς Λίβυας ἀποστάσεως, 1.82.9) as wicked and unpardonable (ἀνήκεστον, 1.88.3). As with the Celts in 203, when Carthage gains the upper hand in the war in 238 and most of the Libyan cities come to terms, Utica and Hippacritae are unwilling to surrender, as they are unable to expect any terms from Carthage given their unjustified treachery toward their own benefactors (1.88.2).[168] Ultimately, such a betrayal without any semblance of pretext fits well with Polybius' description of the Libyan War as far exceeding all other wars in cruelty and defiance of principle (ὠμότητι καὶ παρανομίᾳ, 1.88.7).

This is the context in which Boeotian faithlessness is condemned by Polybius. In 245, the Boeotians entered into an alliance (συμμαχίαν, 20.4.4) with the Achaeans against the Aetolian League. Upon being defeated by the Aetolians in battle, however, the Boeotians forgot their courage, turned to drink (20.4.5-7), and immediately decided to abandon (ἐγκαταλιπόντες) the Achaeans and desert (προσένειμαν) to the Aetolians (20.5.2).[169] Polybius suggests that the Boeotians were driven by cowardice and faithlessness rather than serious concerns for their own safety, as an Achaean army had already been dispatched to assist them against the Aetolians (20.4.5). Thus, Polybius describes this decision to be amongst their "chief errors" (κεφάλαια ἀγνοίας, 20.5.1). A few years later in 236, during a war against Demetrius II of Macedon, the

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[167] Eckstein 1995: 244 suggests that Polybius sees these outrages as the tendency of human nature toward violent fluctuations and turbulence.

[168] The cities are ultimately reduced by Hamilcar and Hanno, though it is unclear which general captured which city.

[169] On Polybius' criticism of the drunkenness and sloth of the Boeotians, see Eckstein 1995: 287-288.

Boeotians once more treacherously deserted their allies, this time abandoning (ἐγκαταλιπόντες) the Aetolians and joining (παραγενομένου) the Macedonians (20.5.3).[170] Again, Polybius emphasizes that no justifiable pretext existed, as the Boeotians deserted as soon as Demetrius arrived with his army, without even a thought of resistance (οὐδενὸς πεῖραν, 20.5.3).[171] Polybius' portrayal of these instances of Boeotian betrayal is overwhelmingly negative. Indeed, the Achaean historian chooses to place his description of the desertions within a broader discussion of how the Boeotian state had declined following the battle of Leuctra in 371, a transformation from sound health and renown (εὐεξίαν καὶ δόξαν, 20.4.1) to civil strife, lawlessness, and gluttony (20.6.1-6) - where most had more dinners than there were months on the calendar (20.6.6)![172] Nor is this just Polybian prejudice against the Boeotians. The Achaeans in 245 were not alone in being deserted. Rather the Boeotians had proven themselves to be unfaithful allies to everyone.

As we have seen from these examples of treachery against allies, Polybius is especially critical of those who betray their allies despite past instances of friendship and kindness. Perhaps the best example of such a case is the betrayal of the Achaeans by the city of Mantinea on two separate occasions during the Cleomenean War. In 227, during the early years of the war, the Mantineans decided to desert (ἐγκαταλιπόντες, 2.57.1) the allied Achaean League and place their city into the hands of the Aetolians and then later Cleomenes (2.57.1). Polybius again emphasizes that this treachery was carried out of their own free will (ἐθελοντὴν, 2.57.1) and not in the face of imminent destruction or some other justifiable pretext.[173] Mantinea was later recovered and

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[170] On the difficulty of dating Demetrius' invasion, given the necessary reliance upon inscriptions, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 326.

[171] On Demetrius II's invasion and the immediate Boeotian capitulation, see Walbank 1979: 69; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 326-327.

[172] ὥστε πολλοὺς εἶναι Βοιωτῶν οἷς ὑπῆρχε δεῖπνα τοῦ μηνὸς πλείω τῶν εἰς τὸν μῆνα διατεταγμένων ἡμερῶν.

[173] While the circumstances surrounding the betrayal are uncertain, Walbank's suggestion that perhaps the Mantineans had Achaea's blessing in their defection to the Aetolians is ungrounded: Walbank 1957:

occupied by the Achaeans when the city was betrayed (πραξικοπήσαντος, 2.57.2) to Aratus.[174]

Yet, despite the treachery (ἁμαρτίαν) of the Mantineans, Aratus treated them with such kindness

that it became celebrated (περιβόητον, 2.57.3). Thus, he ordered his troops to leave the

Mantineans' property undisturbed and promised the Mantineans safety if they would join the

league (2.57.5). Polybius describes Aratus' treatment of Mantinea as carried out on the kindest

possible terms (φιλοφροσύνης, 2.57.7), an example of unsurpassed mercy and generosity (2.57.8).

It is in the context of such unwarranted kindness that the Mantineans betrayed the Achaeans

for a second time. To avoid being undermined by the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians, as well as

to prevent factional strife from within the city, the Mantineans asked the Achaeans to provide them

with a garrison, which the league did; as Polybius puts it, they sent their own citizens away from

their own homes and families to protect the liberty (ἐλευθερίαν) and safety (σωτηρίαν) of Mantinea

(2.58.1-2). Soon after the arrival of the garrison, however, the Mantineans decided to slaughter

(κατέσφαξαν) the Achaean soldiers and hand over (ἐνεχείρισαν) their city to the Spartans (2.58.4).

Polybius argues that it is not easy to name any greater or more atrocious act of treachery (οὗ μεῖζον

παρασπόνδημα καὶ δεινότερον οὐδ᾽ εἰπεῖν εὐμαρές, 2.58.4) than this betrayal by the Mantineans.

At the very least, the friendship and gratitude (χάριν καὶ φιλίαν) that they owed to the Achaeans

should have compelled the Mantineans to allow the garrison to depart under terms - something

that is typically accorded even to enemies, 2.58.5-6).[175] Again, the betrayal of expected loyalty

present in this situation draws harsh condemnation from Polybius (2.58.8):

263; opposed Aymard 1938: 208. The likely reason stems from the same factional (and class) strife that gripped the city and resulted in the second betrayal as well.

[174] On Aratus' recapture of Mantinea during his tenth year as strategos in 227, see Plut. *Arat.* 36.2; *Cleom.* 5.1-2; Paus. 2.8.6; cf. Polyb. 4.8.4; Walbank 1957: 263.

[175] On the notion of international understanding guiding appropriate behavior in the ancient world, see Herod. 7.136.2; and for shared laws amongst the Greeks specifically, see Thuc. 3.58, 3.67.6, 4.97.3; Eurip. *Med.* 536 ff.; 1339 ff.; *Hec.* 1199 ff.; *Andr.* 173 f.; *Heracl.* 130 ff., 1010; cf. 965 ff.; *Suppl.* 311, 526; Walbank 1957: 264.

> Vengeful murderers of the very men who previously on capturing their city had left them unharmed and who now were guarding their liberties and lives — against such men, one asks oneself, can any indignation be too strong?[176]

When the city was eventually captured by Antigonus in 223, working alongside the Achaeans, it was pillaged and the male citizens sold into slavery (2.58.12).[177] Polybius suggests that such a punishment did not fit the impious crime (τὸ μέγιστον ἀσέβημα, 2.58.7) of the Mantineans, as those who are not guilty of such impiety (ἀσέβειαν, 2.58.10) often suffer this fate. Rather, some far heavier or more extreme penalty would have been (2.58.11).[178] Despite some scholars, Polybius' harsh condemnation of the Mantineans does not stem solely from some pro-Achaean bias but rather from the same standards that he applies to instances of treachery not involving Achaea (cf. 1.82; 1.83; 5.95; 7.3-8; 8.36; 9.11; 11.31; 15.20; 15.22-23).[179] The back-to-back Mantinean treacheries are committed without any justifiable pretext and in the face of unwarranted kindness and friendship.

The betrayal of such expected good faith is likewise seen in the Aristomachus' treachery against the Achaeans. Aristomachus became the tyrant of Argos in 235, following the reigns of his

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[176] τὸ γὰρ τούτων αὐτόχειρας γενέσθαι καὶ τιμωροὺς οἵτινες πρότερον μὲν κατὰ κράτος λαβόντες αὐτοὺς ἀθῴους ἀφῆκαν, τότε δὲ τὴν ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐφύλαττον, πηλίκης ὀργῆς ἐστιν ἄξιον;

[177] On Antigonus' capture, see Cohen 1995: 123. Polybius sharply criticizes Phylarchus' emotive and dramatic description of the capture of Mantinea in order to paint Antigonus and the Macedonians as well as Aratus and the Achaeans as excessively cruel (2.56). Thus, Polybius highlights a scene of Mantinean women naked, weeping, and disheveled. For Polybius' portrayal of women as out of control during crises and their general threat to the social order (resembling the popular masses), see Eckstein 1995 150-157; cf. 9.6.3-4; 12.24.5; 15.29.9; 32.15.7; Champion 2004a: 125-126. On the corresponding hysteria and superstitions of such women, see von Scala 1890: 258. On the larger problems with Phylarchus' account of the torture and death of Aristomachus, see Meister 1975: 101, 107; Eckstein 2013: 316-329. For the favoring of Phylarchus' account over Polybius' description, see Hagemans and Kosmetatou 2005: 135–36. On the consistency between Polybius' account of the betrayals of Mantinea and Aristomachus:

[178] Baronowski 2011: 98 uses the punishment of the Mantineans to place the Roman actions toward the captured city of Carthage in 146 into perspective as not excessively brutal for this period.

[179] Walbank 1957: 264 - "in the light of party and patriotic prejudices so strong that they lead him to such callous judgments…"; Champion 2004a: 125-126. Both scholars fail to realize that Aristomachus' punishment did not stem from his actions as a tyrant but from his actions as a traitor. Polybius' subsequent discussion of the wickedness of traitors must be taken generally, regardless of the Achaean decision to cooperate with Aristomachus before his betrayal.

brother and father.[180] In 229, however, he was forced to lay down the tyranny due to the unexpected death of supporter Demetrius II and surrender the city to the Achaean League. Despite his past loyalties, however, rather than punish the tyrant, the Achaeans protected (περισταλεὶς) Aristomachus and brought the city into the league, even electing him Strategos of the league in 228/7 (2.60.4). Polybius describes this act of Achaean kindness as most lenient and generous (πραότητος καὶ καλοκἀγαθίας) and quite contrary to Aristomachus' own expectations (2.60.4). Yet despite these unwarranted benefits (φιλανθρώπων) given to him by the Achaeans, he decided to desert (ἀποσπάσας) the Achaeans at a critical moment in the Cleomenean War and bring Argos over to the Spartans (2.60.6). Such an act of treachery (παρεσπόνδησεν, 2.60.3), in spite of the recent kindness shown to Aristomachus, sees sharp condemnation from Polybius. What fate, the Achaean historian muses, could be too bad for such a man (2.60.3)? The tyrant ought to have suffered more than being just drowned in the sea by the officers at Cenchreae upon Aratus' recapture of the city in 223 (2.60.3). Indeed, even the more gruesome demise that Phylarchus erroneously reports Aristomachus to have suffered, being racked to death at night at the hands of Aratus and Antigonus (2.60.7), ought to have been applauded and honored by all right-thinking people (τιμωρησαμένοις ἔπαινος καὶ τιμὴ συνεξηκολούθει παρὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις, 2.60.2). A more fitting punishment for Aristomachus' treachery, Polybius proposes, would be to have him led around the entire Peloponnesus and tortured as a public spectacle until he died (2.60.7).[181]

Acceptable Betrayals of Allies during Wartime

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[180] Cf. 2.44.6. On the sequence of tyrants, see Walbank 1957: 265, with notes.
[181] The punishment of Aristomachus is likewise pointed to by Baronowski 2011: 98 in his framing of the discussion of Carthage. See above, n. 168.

While the above examples are criticized by Polybius given their lack of any justifiable pretext, when such a pretext is present, the Achaean historian condones the desertion and betrayal of allies even during wartime. Such justifiable pretexts fall into two main categories.

The first type features instances where treacherous or impious actions negate the responsibility of allies to remain loyal. In his definition of treachery, Polybius maintains that some men who betray certain kings and princes or induce their country to desert friends and allies due to the bidding of circumstances (περιστάσεις, 18.13.5) should not be considered traitors (προδότην, 18.13.3). The Achaean historian points to an example from his own state, with the decision of the Achaeans, led by Aristaenus, to desert Philip in favor of Rome during the Second Macedonian War in 198.[182] Polybius maintains that by betraying Achaea's alliance with Macedon, Aristaenus conferred the greatest benefit (μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν, 18.13.6) on his country and avoided its utter destruction (ἄρδην ἀπολώλει, 18.13.8). Thus, by assuring not only the safety (ἀσφαλείας) of the league but the increase of Achaean power (αὐξήσεως τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, 18.13.9), the Achaeans honored Aristaenus as a benefactor and preserver (εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα, 18.13.10) of the state.

Some scholars have taken Polybius' praise of this treachery in 198 as evidence of purely utilitarian concerns behind the *Histories*, suggesting that the Achaean historian judges actions by the success of their outcomes with little regard for moral concern.[183] Such an interpretation, however, disregards the context within which Polybius places the decision to betray Philip. The kindness that Philip and Antigonus Doson had shown to the Achaean League throughout the 220s had since been overshadowed by nearly twenty years of unjustifiable treachery and abuse at the hands of Philip. Again, we can point to Polybius' description of Philip's actions against leading

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[182] On the controversial nature of the decision even within Achaea, see Eckstein 1987.

[183] Walbank 1967: 564-566. Musti 1978: 73; cf. 78, 87 refers to this strict focus on outcome regardless of method as the "arc of political possibility." See too Schmitt 1974: 80 on the pragmatic concerns of the second-rate power. Opposed: Eckstein 1995: 200-203.

Achaean men and women of Argos in 208 (10.26).[184] Like most kings, Philip is described as treating his allies (συμμαχικῶς) increasingly not as friends (φίλους) but as if they were servants and he the master (δεσποτικῶς, 15.24.4).[185] As will be discussed in the next chapter, schemes and plots carried out against tyrants (τύραννοι), which Philip had clearly become (15.20.3) during the years leading up to the Second Macedonian War, are nearly always condoned by Polybius. Thus, in 198 the Achaeans were not treacherously deserting a stalwart ally, thereby betraying some semblance of expected loyalty, but rather justly breaking faith with an impious and tyrannical king.[186] This emphasis on Philip's bad behavior is Aristaenus' speech to the Achaeans in 198 from Livy, based on Polybian material. While Aristaenus does point to the military realities of Roman strength (Livy 32.21.15-20; 32.21.28-36), he emphasizes Philip's wickedness, both past (32.21.22-25) and current (32.21.10-15), as justification for abandoning the Achaean alliance with Macedon.

Similar acts of justified desertion and betrayal appear throughout the *Histories*. In the autumn of 240, during the Libyan War, Hamilcar found his army trapped by the rebel forces. After defeating a rebel army under Spendius at the Battle of Bagradas River, Hamilcar continued to march along the river, weakening the rebel hold on the nearby towns.[187] At some point during his march, however, Hamilcar set up camp within a mountain valley, against the advice of his general staff (1.77.6). Capitalizing on this opportunity, Spendius, who had since raised a fresh army,

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[184] See above, pp. 43-44.

[185] This interpretation differs from (but does not necessarily contradict) the notion that the Achaeans primary concern in 198 was the threat of a devastating Roman attack. See Hammond and Walbank 1988: 274; Eckstein 1995: 201-202; though Eckstein 2012: 283-284 also acknowledges the Achaean dislike of Philip's tyrannical behavior as a factor. On Aristaenus' speech derived from Polybian material (Livy 32.21.36): Aymard 1938: 91-94; Eckstein 1990: 53-58; Eckstein 2012 283-284, n.37.

[186] In 197, Aristaenus likewise convinced the Boeotians and Thebans to desert Phillip using similar arguments as those made to the Achaean league the year before. See Briscoe 1973: 248; Eckstein 2012: 284.

[187] On the Battle of Bagradas River, see Polyb. 1.76; Bagnall 1990: 116-117; Lancel 1999: 17; Hoyos 2007: 115-124. On the positioning of the armies leading up to the battle: Polyb. 1.67.7. Spendius' Campanian was probably Spedius: Walbank 1957: 135; cf. Huss 1985: 255, n. 19; Hoyos 2007: 7, n. 1.

trapped the Carthaginians within the valley, the Libyans blocking the main pass, and the Numidians preventing escape from the rear pass (1.77.7).[188] It was at this time, however, that Hamilcar was approached by Naravas, the Numidian chieftain who commanded the force of 2,000 Numidian cavalry in Spendius' army.[189] Although an ally of the Libyans, Naravas decided to desert to the Carthaginians and betray Spendius, bringing over the Numidian horsemen to Hamilcar's army (1.78.1-9).[190] Polybius is clear that it was only due to Naravas' treachery that Hamilcar was able to defeat Spendius in a hard-fought battle (1.78.11).[191] Despite this betrayal, breaking faith with the Libyans, Polybius does not condemn Naravas' actions. Instead, he praises the Numidian chieftain for his high repute (ἐνδοξοτάτων, 1.78.1) martial spirit (πλήρης ὁρμῆς πολεμικῆς, 1.78.1), fearlessness (τολμηρῶς, 1.78.3), daring (τόλμαν, 1.78.6), and courage (θάρσει, 1.78.8), as well as for his brilliance service (ἐπιφανεστάτην χρείαν, 1.78.11) in the battle itself. Like with Philip V in 198, the context of Naravas' alliance with Spendius and the rebels allows for such a betrayal, although we cannot know Naravas' specific motives. Polybius' account of the war continually describes the mercenaries constantly committing terrible atrocities (ἀσεβήματα, 2.1.3) and the war itself as conducted contrary to the principles recognized by all mankind (παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔθη ποιησάμενοι, 1.70.6).[192] It is thus in the face of such impiety (ἀσέβειαν, 1.79.8),

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[188] Bagnall: 1990 117; Lancel: 1999: 17. Lancel suggests that the mountain pass was located near the town of Nepehris. On the location as in the valley of Khangat el Hadjaz: Veith 1912: 2.539 ff., maps and d; on the location as north of the Bagradas, see De Sanctis 1916: 389, n. 19; Walbank 1957: 143.
[189] On Naravas' background, see Loreto 154-155; Storm 2001: 23; Hoyos 2003: 226. On the family connection between Naravas and the Barcas, see Hoyos 2003: 21-22, 223; though note the complications of understanding Naravas' loyalties given our limited evidence: Hoyos 2007: 146-147. Walter 1947: 242-243 mistakenly fabricates a homosexual connection between Naravas and Hamilcar.
[190] See Hoyos 2007: 146-150.
[191] Polybius says Hamilcar killed 10,000 and captured 4,000 rebels in the battle. On the possibility that these number were exaggerated to heighten Hamilcar's reputation, see De Sanctis 1916: 389, n. 20; Walbank 1957: 143-144.
[192] See chapter 1.

treachery (παρεσπόνδησαν, 1.79.10), and cruelty (ὠμότητι, 1.88.7) that Naravas betrays Spendius without condemnation from Polybius.

Criticism is likewise absent from Polybius' description of the treachery carried out by Demetrius of Pharos against Teuta, the queen of the Ardiaei. In the year leading up to the First Illyrian War, the Illyrians continued to push south along the Adriatic coast. In the spring of 229, an Illyrian fleet, likely commanded by Demetrius of Pharos, defeated a joint Achaean-Aetolian fleet near Paxos.[193] The result was the successful completion of the siege of Corcyra, which was garrisoned under the command of Demetrius (2.10.7-9).[194] Yet despite his alliance with Teuta, when the war with Rome began, he soon deserted the Ardiaean queen and handed over the city (πόλιν ἐγχειριεῖν) and his other holdings to the Romans (2.11.4). Despite this betrayal, however, Polybius does not condemn Demetrius' treachery.[195] Again, this is understood within the context of the historian's presentation of Teuta. The queen is described as greedy (2.8.4) and suffering from the short-sightedness typical of a woman (λογισμοῖς γυναικείοις, 2.4.8). Her raids against the Greeks are defined above all else by their lawlessness (παρανομίαν, 2.11.5). Similar lawlessness (παρανομίᾳ, 2.8.13) is seen in her hostile dealings with the Roman envoys, Lucius and Gaius Corucanius, who demand an end to the Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic. Her demeanor toward the envoys is arrogant and overbearing (ἀγερώχως καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφάνως, 2.8.7), and Polybius emphasizes her "womanly temper" and irrationality (γυναικοθύμως καὶ ἀλογίστως, 2.8.12). Teuta ultimately orders the death of the younger envoy during his return to Italy, thereby defying

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[193] 2.10.1-6. On the successful Illyrian strategy resembling the Roman boarding of Carthaginian ships using the *corvus* at Mylae in 240, see Walbank 1957.

[194] On the nature of Demetrius' control over Pharos after the 228 settlement and during the Second Illyrian War, see Derow 2015: 271-272.

[195] Champion 2004a: 113 mistakenly views Polybius' condemnation of Demetrius between 229 and 214 as static. As we have seen, however, with Polybius judgment of Philip V, the Achaean historian often gives complex evaluations, believing that people can change for better (and more often for worse) over time.

international law (παρ' ἀνθρώποις ὡρισμένων δικαίων, 2.8.12).[196] In Polybius' estimation, Demetrius' decision to abandon Teuta and support the Romans is justified given the queen's wickedness.

The decision of the Megarians to leave the Boeotian League, despite a standing treaty of alliance, also received no condemnation from Polybius. Megara had been a member of the Achaean League at the onset of the Cleomenean War in 229/8.[197] When they became cut off from the Peloponnesus by Cleomenes' occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth in 223, however, they decided to become members of the Boeotian League instead, leaving the Achaeans with permission from the league.[198] In 193, however, the Megarians decided to abandon their Boeotian allies and return to the Achaean League. Yet the reason for the Megarian decision to desert the league did not stem from a disregard for sworn treaties but rather the complete state of decadence and debauchery that had gripped the Boeotians at this time (20.4-6).[199] The former Boeotian glory of the early fourth century had since turned to disaffection (καχεκτοῦντες, 20.4.1). It was thus detesting this situation (μισήσαντες μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην κατάστασιν, 20.6.7) that Megara justly abandoned the Boeotians. Indeed, Polybius' entire description of the Megarian decision to desert the league is contingent upon (διὸ, 20.6.7) the earlier Boeotian indecency and decadence, as was the case with Naravas' and Demetrius' desertions.

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[196] On the tradition of the murdered Roman envoy, see Polyb. 2.8.9-13; App. *Ill.* 6; Dio frg. 19.45 = Zon. 8.19. For discussion, see Gruen 1984: 360-361; Eckstein 2012: 41. On the failed diplomacy and the Senate's reaction to the murdered envoy, see Hammond 1968: 5-6; Eckstein 2012: 41, 51-51.

[197] On the earlier ethnic foundations of the Boeotian League, see Mclnearny 2014.

[198] Etienne and Knoepfler 1976: 323-331 place the incorporation of Megara into the Boeotian League in 224. Robert 1969: 1267 argues that Megara was a member of the Achaean confederation from 243-224 and 192-146, residing in the Boeotian league during the interim. On the desertion in general, see Liddel 2009: 426, n. 82.

[199] Cf. Livy 36.6.

The final example of this first type of justifiable betrayal, in which Polybius condones the betrayal of those consumed by wickedness and decadence, can be found in Spain during the Second Punic War with the defection of Andobales in early 208. A chieftain of the Illergetes, Andobales had been one of the most loyal supporters of the Carthaginians (9.11.3), leading the Spanish to defeat at Cissa in 218 against the Romans under Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus (3.76).[200] After ten years of loyalty, however, Andobales betrayed his alliance with the Carthaginians and deserted to Publius Cornelius Scipio, Calvus' nephew (10.37.7-38.6).[201] Rather than condemning the Spanish chieftain, however, Polybius emphasizes the Carthaginian outrages (Καρχηδονίων ὕβριν, 10.38.1) that precipitated his decision.[202] The Carthaginian outrages included the licentius treatment of the wives and daughters (γυναῖκας καὶ θυγατέρας ἀσελγείας, 10.38.1) of Andobales and his friends who had been captive at Carthago Nova, treating them not like hostages (ὁμήρων), but like prisoners and slaves (αἰχμαλώτων καὶ δούλων, 10.38.2). Andobales is especially keen to justify his treachery to Scipio. Thus, he emphasizes that in the past he had always been loyal (πίστιν, 10.37.7) to his alliance (συμμίξαντες, 10.37.7) with Carthage. Andobales assures Scipio that he is not unjustly accusing the Carthaginians (ἀδίκως ἐγκαλοῦντες Καρχηδονίοις, 10.37.9), but accurately portraying the injustice and violence (ἀδικίας καὶ ὕβρεις, 10.37.8) of the Carthaginians in Spain. It is not out of self-interest but on account of the many injustices (πολλὰς ἀδικίας ἀναλογιζόμενοι, 10.37.10) of the Carthaginians.

Polybius' condoning of Andobales' actions is especially telling given the parallel instance of treachery in Spain carried out by the chieftain Abilyx. While he also held the

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[200] On career of Andobales and his brother, see above pp. 47-48.
[201] On the defection, see De Sanctis 1917: 454, n. 18; Walbank 1967: 247-248; Lazenby 1978: 139; Briscoe 1989: 59; Owens 2017: 98-99.
[202] On Hasdrubal's treachery toward Andobales, see above page 47-48.

reputation of being extremely loyal and devoted (εὔνοιαν καὶ πίστιν, 3.98.2) to the Carthaginians in Spain, Abilyx formed a scheme to betray (παρασπονδήσας, 3.98.4) the Carthaginians in 217.[203] He tricked the Carthaginian general Bostar, who led operations against the Romans south of the Ebro, convincing him to release the Spanish hostages and return them back to the Spanish tribes. Instead of escorting the hostages back to their villages, however, Abilyx instead turned them over to the Roman generals Scipio and Corvus who were then able to accrue the goodwill of the Spanish through their release (3.98.6-99.9).[204] Despite the similarities between Abilyx's treachery and the betrayal of Andobales, Polybius is critical of Abilyx, condemning him for making the decision with only self-interest in mind (3.98.2-3). For while the Carthaginians were acting with faithlessness and arrogance (ἀπιστίαν καὶ βαρύτητα 3.99.7), a similar justification to the examples Polybius accepts above, this was not what drove Abilyx's treachery.[205] Instead, he acted "in a manner thoroughly Spanish and barbarian on the question of betraying the hostages" (3.98.2), considering only whose prospects were better and which state would be more expedient to back (3.98.3).[206]

The first category of acceptable betrayal, according to Polybius, is caused by the wickedness or general moral degeneration of those who are justly deserted during war. The second category deals with compulsion. While it might be more honorable to refuse surrender, Polybius believes that handing a city over to the enemy under the threat of overwhelming force

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[203] Cf. Livy 22.22; Zonaras 9.1. On the source minor variants, see Walbank 1957: 432.
[204] On the plot, see Walbank 1957: 432; McGing 2013: 184; Owens 2017: 51. On it's exaggerated significance in Polybius, see De Sanctis 1917: 128-131. It is quite unlikely that the account is simply a duplication of Scipio's later capture of the hostages New Carthage as Beloch 1915: 361 suggests.
[205] On the cruelty of the Carthaginians in Spain, see above pp. 47-48.
[206] Eckstein 1995: 122.

and imminent destruction is justifiable.[207] Thus, in the context of the cities of Coele-Syria following the Battle of Raphia in 217, Polybius surmises (5.86.9):

> Perhaps all men at such times are more or less disposed to adapt themselves to the needs of the hour, and the natives of these parts are naturally more prone than others to bestow their affections at the bidding of circumstances.[208]

To voluntarily desert to the enemy too swiftly, however, is usually not done with the safety of the city in mind. Thus, during his initial invasion of the province in 219, some of the cities of Coele-Syria immediately went over to Antiochus III without offering resistance, while those who chose to weather the king's attacks mostly managed to hold out against him and remain uncaptured (5.62.5-6).[209] As we saw above with the betrayals of the Boeotians in 245, Utica and Hippacritae in 239, Mantinea in 227 and again shortly afterward, Clastidium in 222, Capua in 216, Syracuse in 215, and Tarentum in 212, when such defections occur without an imminent threat of destruction (and without the context of unsavory allies), Polybius is sharply critical. Whereas when city governments are forced to come over to the enemy, despite attempts to resist such an outcome, Polybius refrains from condemnation. Perhaps the best example of this comes from the Second Punic War with the cities of Capua and Petelia.[210] While Capua defected to Hannibal without resistance in 216 for reasons of greed (7.1.1-2; see above), the city of Petelia in southern Italy remained loyal to Rome, enduring an eleven-month siege,

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[207] On Polybius' praise of the refusal to surrender, see his descriptions of Megalopolis (2.61.7-12) as well as Abydos (19.29.3-34.12). See Eckstein 1995: 22-23, 51-55, 66, 111, 199. On Polybius' special attachment to Megalopolis, see Roy 2003: 88-89; Baronowski 2011: 172.

[208] ἴσως μὲν οὖν εἰώθασι πάντες περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους καιροὺς ἁρμόζεσθαί πως ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ παρόν: μάλιστα δὲ τὸ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐφυὲς καὶ πρόχειρον πρὸς τὰς ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ χάριτας.

[209] On the Polybius' limits to yielding to circumstance at the expense of honor, see Eckstein 1995: 196, 222. On the ethnic generalizations against the inhabitants of Coele-Syria, see Champion 2004a: 28-29. On the tendency for these cities to switch sides without conscience, see Champion 2004a: 28-29; Portier-Young 2011: 69, n. 105;

[210] Petelia lay 8 km north of the mouth of the Neaethus River, founded by Philoctetes. See Strabo 6.254; Serv. *ad Aen.* 3.402; Solinus 2.10; Walbank 1967: 30.

before finally coming to terms with Hannibal (7.1.3).[211] Thus, it was only after eating all of the leather and tree bark within the city that they finally surrendered, with the approval (συνευδοκούντων, 7.1.3) of the Romans.

Similar praise is shown toward the city of Gaza. Polybius testifies that the people of Gaza are far superior to the other peoples of Coele-Syria in terms of loyalty (πίστιν) and courage (τόλμαν, 16.22a.3). For while all the other towns of Syria quickly went over to the Persians upon their invasion of the region, Gaza alone refused to defect to them until they had been reduced by a siege (16.22a.4).[212] Again, when Alexander swept through the region in 332, having successfully captured Tyre and enslaved its population, Gaza alone dared to withstand the Macedonian king, keeping faith with the Persians. It was only after a two-month siege, during which the Gazans exhausted every resource (πάσας ἐξήλεγξαν τὰς ἐλπίδας, 16.22a.5) that they finally came to terms with Alexander.[213] Gaza shows this courageous loyalty (πίστιν, 16.22a.6) again in 201 when Antiochus invaded Coele-Syria.[214] Polybius explains that once again the Gazans "left no possible means of resistance untried in their effort to keep faith with Ptolemy" (16.22a.6).[215] Rather than condemn cities such as Gaza and Petelia for eventually surrendering and defecting to the enemy, Polybius praises these cities for their refusal to break

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[211] Cf. Livy 23.11.7; 23.20.4-10. 23.30.1-2; Frontin *Str.* 4.5.18; App. *Hann.* 29; Val. Max. 6.6 ext. 2; Sil. 12.431-432. On the siege and Rome's inability to provide aid, see Walbank 1967: 29; Fronda 2010: 155-159; Clark 2014: 75-76. On the Polybian text, preserved in the Athenia and Suda, see Levene 2010: 127. The siege was either conducted by Hanno (App. *Hann.* 29; cf. Livy 23.41.12, 24.1.1) or Himilco (Livy 23.30.1). Following the siege, the Romans were able to collect 800 surviving Petelians with whom they later resettled the city (App. *Hann.* 29): see Fronda 155-156, nn. 30-32. Caltabiano 1977: 45-47 sees this number as too high to be believed.

[212] Von Scala 262 believes Polybius' source for this account is Zeno, but there is not enough evidence to support any claim of identification.

[213] Cf. Arr. 2.26-27; Diod. 17.48.7; Joseph. *Ant. Iud.* 11.320-325; Strabo 16.759; Plut. *Alex.* 25.3-4; Mela 1.64; Zon. 6.10. See Walbank 1967: 528. The siege concluded in October of 332. On the details of the siege, see Engels 1978: 72, n. 7; Ahlstrom 1993: 895-896; Martin and Blackwell 2012: 73-74.

[214] On the similar example of the Selgians (Polyb. 5.73.8-9; cf. Strabo 12.7.3), see Ma 2000: 359.

[215] σπουδάζοντες διαφυλάξαι τὴν πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαῖον πίστιν.

faith until they are forced to submit to the enemy at the point of a sword. Such resistance, Polybius explains, is a great and noble (καλῶν, 16.22a.7) act - not diminished by the final defection.[216]

III. SABOTAGE WITHIN ALLIANCES

The final section of this chapter will explore instances of deception and treachery from *within* alliances. At times states or individuals act to undermine their allies without initiating outright defection. These examples range from back-door negotiations to hamstringing the goals of the alliance for personal gain. Following our pattern of Polybius' complex evaluation of such accounts, the Achaean historian continues to maintain that the context behind such behavior is essential to determine its acceptability. As with the cases of treacherously attacking allies and the cases of deserting allies during wartime, certain treacherous behavior might be viewed as justified in the light of past evils carried out by the ally in question. As we will see, Polybius likewise draws a distinction between states blatantly undermining the well-being of an alliance and states being careful to ensure that the alliance does not result in a loss of their own independence.

Selfish Needs of the State over the Alliance

One category of such internal sabotage that Polybius condemns is when states selfishly place their own needs above the needs of the alliance. One example of such criticism comes from his description of the self-interested actions of the Epirotes during the early stages of the

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[216] See Eckstein 1995: 22, 68, n. 46, 249, n. 43; Champion 2004a: 28-29; Grabbe 2008: 321; Eckstein 2013: 325. Eckstein points to this example as evidence for Polybius' concern with moral action and his desire to instill such character into his readership. On the dating of the siege, see Walbank 1967: 523, 527.

Social War. In 219 Philip V marched through Epirius, joined by his Epirote, Achaean, and Cretan allies, and entered Ambracia.[217] The Macedonian king was planning on invading the interior of Aetolia and surprising the enemy. Indeed, Polybius emphasizes that had he chosen to do so, the formidable and unexpected invasion would certainly have put an end to the entire war (4.61.3). He was persuaded against this decision, however, by the Epirotes and instead agreed to first capture the nearby city of Ambracus.[218] This decision stemmed from the Epirotes' desire to eventually conquer the city of Ambracus for themselves, hoping to use a freshly captured Ambracus as their base of operations. In this way, Polybius maintains, the Epirotes were strictly "considering their own particular advantage above all that of the allies" (τὸ σφέτερον ἀναγκαιότερον τιθέμενοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων, 4.61.5).[219] Polybius calls this behavior foolish (ἀγνοίας) and divisive (φιλονεικίας, 4.63.1). The breach of faith with the alliance's interests ultimately cost the Hellenic Symmachy another two years of warfare.

Polybius likewise points to the decision of the peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea to break faith with the Achaean League during the Social War by looking exclusively to their own interests. These cities had been under increasing pressure from the Elean general Euripidas. While the outstanding payments owed to the mercenaries from the recent war against Cleomenes were a factor, the primary reason for the delayed Achaean response to the threat was the lack of energy and daring on the part of the Achaean strategos Aratus the younger (4.60.3).[220] Thus, when their petitions to the Achaean League remained unanswered, the Dymaeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans refused to pay their contributions to the league and

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[217] On the details and chronology of his campaign, see Walbank 1933: 38-42; Walbank 1957: 514-515; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 337-378.

[218] Hammond 167: 137 f.

[219] On Philip's successful siege, see Campbell 2011: 139-140, 145.

[220] Cf. Polyb. 2.37.3; Walbank 1957: 514. On Polybius' critique of Aratus the younger for his laziness, see Eckstein 1995: 278, n. 22.

instead used the money to hire a private mercenary force to secure their lands from attack

(4.60.5).[221] In doing so, Polybius maintains, these cities were acting properly regarding their

own affairs but were breaking faith with regard to the league, establishing an evil (πονηρᾶς)

precedent for the future (4.60.5-6).[222] While the need to hire their own forces was justified by

Aratus' poor leadership, there was no need to stop paying their contributions to the league,

given their ability to afford such payments (4.60.10). The correct balance, then, for these cities

would have been to consider their own interests while also continuing to observe their

engagements with the League.[223] Polybius concludes that such breaks of faith with the league,

conducted exclusively with self-interest in mind, were ultimately even more disappointing

given that these cities were some of the actual founders of the League.[224] It is for these reasons

that Dyme, Phaerae, and Tritaea receive blame (ἐγκλητέον) from Polybius (4.60.10).

The Romans were rightfully accused of such violations of good faith as well during the

later stages of the First Macedonian War. It was largely based upon the promised support of

the Romans that the Aetolians decided to renew hostilities with Philip in 211.[225] Soon the

coalition against Philip included Attalus of Pergamum as well as the Spartans, Elians, and

Messenians.[226] Despite these promises, however, Roman assistance in the war remained

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[221] See Champion 2004a: 126-127; Mackil 2015: 475-476, n. 34; Kralli 2017: 286; On the people of Dyme offering these mercenaries citizenship as an additional payment, see 2008: 49-54, n. 4.

[222] 4.60.10: ἐχρῆν γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν χρείαν μὴ παραλιπεῖν, εὐκαιροῦντάς γε δὴ καὶ δυναμένους, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν πολιτείαν δίκαια συντηρεῖν.

[223] On Polybius' praise for such self-reliance in general: 2.47.1; 2.50.11; 2.53.1; cf. 2.55.9; 4.60.6-10. See Eckstein 1995: 278, n. 21. Such independence, however, ought not to be ensured at the expense of duty to one's allies.

[224] Urban 1979: 5. Polybius likewise suggests that the damages inflicted upon these cities would have been subsidized at least in part by the Achaean treasury, see Freeman 1893: 241-242; Walbank 1957: 514.

[225] Livy 25.30, 26.24. See Walbank 1940: 82-85. On dating the alliance, seeBadian 1958b: 197-203; Rich 1984; Eckstein 2012: 88-89.

[226] On the debate in the Spartan assembly on whether or not to join in the war against Philip, despite the past kindness shown toward Sparta by the Macedonians under Antigonus Doson, see above pp. 61-63.

minimal. While Rome did work with Attalus to maintain naval pressure on Philip, only a single Roman legion (of the 20 active legions) was sent to Greece in 211, and even this was pulled out by 208, acting upon the earlier report to the Senate by Marcus Valerius Lavaenus, the Roman commander in Greece, that the alliance was keeping Philip in check.[227] It is clear that Rome's focus remained on Hannibal's continued presence in Italy. The ultimate success of the alliance in Greece meant little to the Romans so long as Philip remained bogged down and unable to assist the Carthaginian general in any meaningful way. Indeed, by 206 the Aetolians realized that with the Roman disinterest and Attalus' withdrawal, they were largely bearing the brunt of the war themselves. The Romans were perfectly content to fight against Philip to the very last Aetolian.

Thus, in addition to the claims that the Aetolians had been betraying all of Greece by bringing in foreign troops, the opponents of the Roman-Aetolian alliance point out the break of good faith involved with the lackluster Roman dedication to the war.[228] This is seen in the speech given during the war by a Macedonian orator, likely at Aegium in 209, describing the nature of the alliance (10.25).[229] The speaker compares the Romans to the heavily-armed phalanx of an army, allowing the light troops to carry out most of the active fighting and suffer the losses but taking credit for the result (τὴν δ' ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ἐκβαινόντων ἡ φάλαγξ καὶ τὰ

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[227] Livy 26.28. Laevinus returned to Rome upon hearing that he had been elected consul *in absentia* for 210 along with Marcus Claudius Marcellus (for the fourth time). See Broughton 1951: 277. The command in Greece passed to the proconsul Publius Sulpicius Galba: Polyb. 9.41-42; Livy 26.26.1-4.

[228] On the claims that the Aetolian League was shamelessly (αἰσχύνην, 11.5.3) helping Rome enslave Greece, put forward by Lysciscus of Acarnania before the Spartan Assembly in 211 (δουλείας, 9.37.7), as well as by the Rhodian ambassador before the Aetolian Assembly in 207 (ἐξανδραποδισμῷ, 11.5.1), see above pp. 61-63. On the great effort by multiple Greek states to convince the Aetolian League to come to terms, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 406; (in great detail) Eckstein 2012: 91-113. On Roman disinterest, see Eckstein 2002 18, n.54 and 56; Eckstein 2012: 90, 104-106; opposed: Riche 1984: 131, 150-151; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 401, 407. Livy, based upon Polybian material confirms this: 29.12.1; 32.21.17; 26.11.11. See Briscoe 1973: 1-2; Briscoe 1981: 1-2.

[229] Cf. Livy 27.29.9. On the dating and likely context of the speech, see Holleaux 1935: 35, n.4; Schmitt 1957: 195; Walbank 1967: 229-230; Eckstein 96-96.

βαρέα λαμβάνει τῶν ὅπλων, 10.25.2). The Romans, then, will either withdraw from the alliance unharmed if the Aetolians are defeated or claim victory and subjugate all of Greece if the Aetolians are victorious (10.25.4-5). While this claim of Greek enslavement was overblown, the suggestion that Rome broke faith with the Aetolians and allowed them to embroil Philip in a war of distraction was difficult to deny. Thus, the main thing that Rome won in Greece during the First Macedonian War was a reputation for violence and betrayal.[230] Note that Polybius is "bipartisan" in his condemnation of Roman actions, both here and with Sardinia in 238/7. He does not hesitate to criticize the Romans when they fail to meet his moral standard of behavior.[231]

Personal Agendas over the Alliance

Another form of sabotage is seen in the actions of individuals, carrying out their own personal agendas at the expense of the alliance. The Macedonian advisor Apelles represents such a break of good faith. Apelles had briefly served as regent for young Philip V in 221 before the king came of age, and during the early stages of the Social War, he remained one of Philip's chief advisors (4.76.1). Despite his privileged position, however, Apelles is believed by Polybius to have carried out a conspiracy against the allied Achaeans and later against Philip himself.[232] During the early stages of the war, the leading Achaean statesman, Aratus of Sicyon, had become an increasingly trusted advisor to Philip (4.82.3). Thus, according to Polybius, we find Philip following his advice in his decision not to severely punish the Spartans for continuing to act upon pro-Aetolian sentiments (4.24). Because of his great personal dislike

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[230] See Holleaux 1935: 235, n.2; Walbank 1940: 99, n. 9; Rich 1984: 144; Eckstein 2012: 104-106.
[231] See Champion 2004a.
[232] On the details of Apelles' plot against Philip, see chapter 4.

of Aratus as well as his desire to see the complete loss of Achaean independence (ἄγειν ὑπὸ τὸν ζυγὸν τῷ κατὰ βραχὺ τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, 4.82.2), Apelles conspired to remove Aratus from this position of influence and undermine the alliance.[233] To achieve his scheme (ὑπόθεσιν, 4.76.3), he attempted to stir up contempt between the Achaean and Macedonian soldiers by allowing the Macedonians to force Achaean soldiers from their billets and appropriate their booty (4.76.4). He likewise insulted, flogged, and imprisoned Achaean soldiers on trumped-up charges, hoping to teach the Achaeans to accept any Macedonian punishment without resistance (4.76.5-7). And when Aratus brought the matter before the king, Apelles began threatening and plotting against the Achaean statesman (4.76.8-9).

First, he solicited all of Aratus' political opponents throughout the league and worked to fix the Achaean elections. By convincing Philip to station his army at Elis, he was able to convince and threaten enough Achaeans to vote for Eperatus of Pharae as strategos over Timoxenus who had been nominated by Aratus (4.82.4-8).[234] Next, Apelles continued his attack (ἐνεχείρει) on Aratus by leveling the false accusation (διαβολὴν, 4.84.1) against him that he had intentionally undermined Philip's hopes of achieving an alliance with the Eleans (4.84-85).[235] This had allegedly been told to Apelles by the Elean strategos Amphidamus. Yet when this informant fled his city under suspicion of treason and appeared before Philip, the accusations were proven false (4.86.1-8). Later Apelles also used trickery (δόλος) to attempt to undermine Aratus' influence by getting Taurion, who had earlier been appointed by

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[233] Walbank 1957: 527-528. On these conspiracies against Aratus and later against Philip himself as exaggerated by Polybius, see: Walbank 1940: 51 f.; Errington 1980: 27-34; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 282-285. While Apelles' actions against Aratus were almost certainly motivated by Macedonian patriotism, what matters is Polybius' presentation of his actions against the Achaean League, which, though perhaps biased, fit into his intellectual model of betrayal.

[234] Ferrabino 1921: 181 ff.; Walbank 1940: 47-48; Walbank 1957: 535-536.

[235] The Elean strategos, Amphidamus, had been captured at Thalamae and had told Philip that he could get the Eleans to come over to Philip. Despite Philip's generous offer of guaranteeing them no garrison or tribute and the return of all their captured hostages and property, the Eleans refused to defect (4.84.2-7).

Antigonus Doson to supervise Peloponnesian affairs, removed from his position (4.87.1-11).[236]

In the end, when Apelles' treacherous schemes failed, his co-conspirators, Leontius and

Megaleas, resorted to attempting to stone him to death (5.15.1-9).[237] The actions of Apelles'

and his friends intentionally undermined the alliance between Macedon and Achaea in favor

of Macedon. Such repeated break of good faiths against both Aratus and the Achaean League

highlights Apelles' emphasis on his own personal jealousies and ambitions (ζηλοτυπίας καὶ

πλεονεξίας, 4.87.4) over the mutual wellbeing of the alliance. And according to Polybius, his

ultimate failure and suicide, due to his own stupidity and ambitions (ἀφροσύνης καὶ

πλεονεξίας, 4.87.10) and his malicious (ἀσέλγειαν, 5.28.9) conduct toward Aratus, was well

deserved (ἀρμοζούσης τυχόντες, 5.28.9).[238]

Nor was this the last personal grudge toward Aratus that played out at the expense of

the alliance. After Philip V's treachery toward the allied city of Messene in the autumn of 215,

first encouraging a massacre between its citizens and then plotting to capture the citadel on the

pretense of making a sacrifice to Zeus (7.12), the king grew increasingly hostile toward Aratus.

When the Achaean statesman called out Philip's wicked actions, Philip first felt ashamed

(ἐνετράπη, 7.12.9) but soon grew to resent Aratus (8.12.2). It was for this reason, Polybius

maintains, that despite the Macedonian-Achaean alliance, Philip ordered Taurion, his

commissioner in the Peloponnesus, to poison Aratus in 213 (8.12.2-6).[239] Polybius calls

Aratus' murder evil (κακόν, 8.12.4) and makes it clear that the king was guilty of the greatest

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[236] Apelles attempts to do the same with Alexander, the captain of Philip's royal bodyguard. Of the five men left by Antigonus to oversee the kingdom, Alexander and Taurion were the only two not in league with Apelles. Megaleas, the secretary in chief, and Leontius, the captain of the peltasts, were the other two member. See chapter 4.

[237] On Polybius' framing of the conspiracy for literary effect, see McGing 2010.

[238] On the notion of acts of treachery corresponding with deserved consequences, see chapter 6.

[239] Aratus was *strategos* when he died in this year: Walbank 1967: 87.

brutality (τὴν μεγίστην ἀσέλγειαν, 8.12.1).[240] Philip's betrayal of Aratus, and thus the Achaean

League, is made even more reprehensible by the great loyalty that Aratus had shown to him

for nearly a decade. Polybius laments that after acting in union with Philip in so many great

enterprises (τοσούτων καὶ τηλικούτων κεκοινωνηκὼς ἔργων) and after such devotion to the

king's interests, Aratus was given a truly rotten reward (τἀπίχειρα, 8.12.6) for his loyalty. Thus

at one point, aware of Philip's crime against him, Aratus summoned his trusted servant and

pointed to his own blood that he had coughed up, saying, "That, Cephalon, is the reward I have

received from Philip for my friendship" (8.12.4).[241]

Personal animosity without regard to alliances is demonstrated by the Romans as well.

During the Third Macedonian War, Eumenes II of Pergamum angered the Roman senate by

secretly negotiating with Perseus (29.5-9, see below).[242] Their response was not only to distrust

the Pergamese king (30.30.5, 31.1.6-7) but to carry out a series of political attacks against him,

undermining the long-standing alliance. When Eumenes' brother, Attalus II, came to Rome in

167 to congratulate the senate on the victory over Perseus and to request help with the Galatian

threat against Pergamum, the senators attempted to use Attalus to undermine Eumenes (30.1.1-

4).[243] Showing him lavish kindness and honor, they privately advised Attalus to come before

the Senate, not as a supporter of his brother but as a contender for the Pergamene throne

(30.1.7-8). Attalus, led on by his own ambitions, initially agreed to ask the Romans for his own

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[240] Cf. Pausanias 2.9.4. Scholars disagree on whether Aratus was in fact poisoned. Thus Porter 1910: 84 suggests that both Aratus and Aratus the younger suffered from Tuberculosis. It is true, however, that in addition to Aratus, Philip was said to have killed: Callias and Epicrates (Walbank 1940: 3-7); Chariteles of Cyparissia (Livy. 32.21.23); Eurycleides and Micon of Athens (Paus. 2.9.4; Treves 1940: 147-149); Cassander (Maronea *epist.* 22.14.2-6); and his son Demetrius (Livy. 40.5-16, 20.3-24; 8.54-56; Diod. 29.25; Justin. 32.2-3; Plut. *Arat.* 54.3; *Aem. Paul.* 8.6 f.; Zon. 9.22; Walbank 1940: 252); and attempted on Philopoemen (Plut. *Philop.* 12.2; Paus. 8.50.4; Justin. 29.4.11). See Walbank 1967: 87-88.
[241] "ταῦτα τἀπίχειρα τῆς φιλίας, ὦ Κεφάλων, κεκομίσμεθα τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον."
[242] Cf. Livy 44.24.9.
[243] On the devastating Galatian raids against Pergamum at this time, see Polyb. 29.22.4, 30.1.2; McShane 1964: 183, n. 24; Eckstein 1995: 121.

kingdom, making secret agreements with several leading senators (30.1.9-10).[244] Disaster was averted, however, due to Eumenes' foresight (ὀττευσάμενος, 30.2.1) as he had sent his trusted physician Stratius to Rome to watch over Attalus and guard against such plots (30.2.1-2). Stratius was able to convince Attalus to remain loyal to his brother, and the Pergamene prince abstained from bringing the agreed-upon requests before the Senate (30.3.1-5).

While Polybius' main condemnation in this passage is geared toward Attalus, calling his willingness to go against his brother insane (ἀλόγου, 30.2.4), the Romans are likewise placed in a negative light for plotting against their allies.[245] Thus, Polybius emphasizes the Senate's break of good faith (ἀθετήσασα τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν, 30.3.7) with Attalus when it set free the cities of Aenus and Maronea almost immediately after promising Attalus that they would gift them to him (30.3.3-7).[246]

Polybius is likewise critical of the decision of the Roman Senate during the winter of 167 to refuse an interview with Eumenes when he came to Rome (29.6.4; 30.19).[247] In fact, Eumenes was the only king who did not come to Rome at this time (30.19.15-17).[248] Much to Rome's discredit, even the undignified King Prusias of Bithynia, who came before the senate dressed like a slave, was permitted an audience and granted his demands.[249] Polybius likewise makes it clear that the Roman Senate was not acting with justice on its side but rather with the

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[244] On the Roman plan to split the power of Pergamum, see Eckstein 1995: 108, n. 87, 229.

[245] On Polybius' negative view of the leaders of less powerful states who unwisely stirred up Roman anger or hastily solicited Roman intervention, see Momigliano 1975: 48-49; Musti 1978: 44-48, 69-78; Shimron 1979-1980: 94-117; Eckstein 1985: 265-282; Eckstein 1995: 206-225, 233-236; Baronowski 2011: 79.

[246] Champion 2004a: 160-161. On Attalus' later relationship with Rome while king, see Gruen 1984: 584–92.

[247] Cf. Livy 45.44.19. This was justified under the false pretext of the senate's current stance of hostility toward all kings (30.19.5-7).

[248] Erskine 1991.

[249] Polybius is highly critical of Prusias and the Roman acceptance of his dishonorable flattery. Polybius claims that the king was "unsurpassable in unmanliness, womanishness, and servility" (καὶ γυναικισμοῦ καὶ κολακείας οὐδενὶ, 30.18.5) and "utterly contemptible" (εὐκαταφρόνητος, 30.18.7).

hope of thoroughly humiliating (πάντη πάντως βουλόμενοι ταπεινοῦν) Eumenes and thereby encouraging the Galatian Gauls to redouble their war effort (διπλασίως ἐπιρρωσθήσονται πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον) against Pergamum (30.19.11-13).[250] This lack of good faith on the part of the Romans is seen again in the actions of Gaius Sulpicius Gallus in 164.[251] Gallus had been sent to Greece and Asia by the Senate to investigate the accusations that had been made against Eumenes by various envoys from Prusias as well as from other cities throughout Asia, claiming that the king had refused to listen to the Roman order to evacuate Galatia and that he was working with Antiochus IV against Rome (31.1.2-7).[252] Rather than conduct an honest investigation of these claims, however, Gallus instead came to Sardis and allowed any accuser to come forward and publicly make foul and abusive (αἰσχρολογίαν καὶ λοιδορίαν, 31.6.4) accusations against Eumenes, regardless of fact or decency (καθόλου πᾶν ἕλκων πρᾶγμα καὶ κατηγορίαν, 31.6.4; 31.6.1-5). The ten-day-long farce and the abuse against Eumenes, representing the Roman Senate's continued attempts to undermine Eumenes at the expense of the previous friendship shared between Rome and Pergamum, is sharply condemned by Polybius.[253] Thus, he refers to Gallus' actions against Eumenes as "indiscretions" (ἀλογημάτων, 31.6.1) being carried out by a "deranged mind" (παρεστηκὼς διανοίᾳ, 31.6.5), and he calls the Roman behavior in general toward the king "grievous" (βαρύτερον, 31.6.6).

Secret Negotiations with the Enemy

Alliances can likewise be treacherously undermined through secret negotiations with the enemy. While such correspondence can be justified against wicked allies, as we saw with

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[250] Champion 2004a: 160-161; Baronowski 2011: 79.
[251] For details on Gallus, see Walbank 1979: 464-465.
[252] Cf. 30.30.2-4; Walbank 1979: 456.
[253] Eckstein 1995: 264, n.100; Baronowski 2011: 80.

the Achaean defection to Rome in 198, when motivated solely by self-interest and in complete disregard to the well-being of the alliance, Polybius is highly critical. In 218 several of Hannibal's Gallic allies living between the Trebia and the Po had been secretly negotiating with the Romans to try and ensure their safety from both sides of the conflict (3.69.5-7).[254] Polybius condemns Gallic self-interest in working against the alliance, explaining that Hannibal's subsequent decision to raid the Gauls' countryside was justified given these treacherous negotiations despite their standing alliance.

Similar diplomatic double-dealings are seen with the Epirotes during the Social War. When envoys of the Hellenic Symmachy sent by Philip arrived in Epirus in 220, the Epirotes confirmed the decree and voted for war against the Aetolians.[255] At the same time, however, they kept in communication with the Aetolian League, falsely informing them that they had decided to stay out of the war (4.30.6-7). Thus, he calls the Epirote decision both ignoble (ἀγεννῶς) and two-faced (ποικίλως, 4.30.7).[256] Polybius is critical of this deception, which was carried out at the expense of the Symmachy to maintain the safety of Epirus alone. Walbank suggests that Polybius' condemnation of the Epirote action stemmed only from his hostility toward a strategy that took Philip's focus out of the Peloponnesus (i.e., aiding Achaea) and into the north-west. Such a claim, however, ignores the moral underpinnings of Polybius' critique of working against the larger alliance – indeed, a critique that he levies against certain Achaean cities (4.60.3-10).[257] Polybius' condemnation of these actions is also highlighted

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[254] On Polybius' general praise of Hannibal, see 10.33.1–7; 11.19.1–7; 15.15.3–16.6; 23.13.1–2; cf. 3.69.12–14; 9.22.7–26.11; Pédech 1964: 216; Champion 2004a: 117.
[255] On the background of the war, see Walbank 1940: 24-32.
[256] Eckstein 1995: 98 emphasizes that Polybius' condemnation of the Epirote deception is not affected by the pragmatic benefits that it brought, ultimately resulting in substantial territorial gains at the expense of the Aetolians. Contra Sacks 1980: 132-134 who argues that Polybius' sole concern was imparting pragmatic and technical advice to his readers.
[257] Walbank 1959: 477.

through his parallel praise of the Acarnanians. While the Epirotes looked to their own safety, the Acarnanians remained loyal to the Symmachy, openly declaring war on the Aetolians (4.30.2).[258] Moreover, it was the Acarnanians, if anyone, who might have been justified in delaying such a move, given their proximity to Aetolia, their relative military weakness, and the recent defeats and suffering at the hands of the Aetolians (4.30.3).[259] Thus, Polybius describes them as noble (γνήσιοι, 4.30.4) and lauds them for their straightforwardness (γνησίως, 4.30.2), devotion to duty (καθήκοντος, 4.30.4), and steadfastness (στάσιμον, 4.30.5).[260]

The Achaean historian is likewise critical of the actions of the Messenians at the onset of the war. Despite joining the Hellenic Symmachy in 220, the Messenians refused to go to war with Aetolia until the allies had first captured the Aetolian city of Phigalea, which threatened their borders (4.31.1).[261] In thus placing their own safety and self-interest above their duty to the alliance, the Messenians are compared with the Thebans, who disgracefully (αἰσχίστην) and harmfully (βλαβερωτάτην) abandoned Greece in 480 and went over to the Persians, fearing their own safety (4.31.7). Polybius condemns the Messenian leaders as acting strictly in their own interests (ἰδίαν λυσιτελοῦς, 4.32.1), motivated by wickedness (κακίας) and cowardice (δειλίας, 4.31.8). This Messenian break of faith with the Hellenic Symmachy is made even worse by the fact that the Social War, in large part, began due to the willingness of

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[258] Hammond and Walbank 1988: 373-374.

[259] On the devastating Aetolian attacks upon Acarnania of the late 240s and 230s, see Walbank 1957: 239-240, 477.

[260] On Polybius praise of Acarnanian actions despite long-term negative consequences, see Eckstein 1995: 57-58. The Acarnanians do gain territory as a result of the Social War, but this conflict with the Aetolians eventually destruction as the hands of the Roman-Aetolian alliance in 212/211. See Polyb. 9.40.4-6; Livy 26.25; Walbank 1933: 123-124; Walbank 1967: 182-183.

[261] Eckstein 1995: 58-59. Eckstein suggests that the policy of the Messenians in 220 was both ethically improper as well as pragmatically self-defeating; opposing Walbank 1957: 478, 527; Pedech 1964: 547; Petzold 1969: 100, n.1; Lehmann 1974: 189-192.

the Achaeans and other members of the alliance to protect Messenia from Aetolian aggression in 220 (4.5-9).[262]

Diplomatic double-dealing occurred during the Third Macedonian War as well. In 168, Eumenes II opened up a line of communication with King Perseus, despite being openly at war with Macedon as an ally of Rome.[263] These secret intrigues (ἀπορρήτων, 39.7.3) were carried out through Eumenes' agent, Cydas the Cretan (always a bad sign), who would pass messages along to Perseus through various contacts (29.6.1-2). In their discussions, Eumenes offered to either remain neutral in the war or even to work out a peace settlement with Rome if Perseus would pay him appropriately for his services (29.8.5).[264] While such offers would have shouted treachery to the Romans (as they clearly did when the Senate heard the rumors), Polybius emphasizes that, in reality, Eumenes had no desire to betray his alliance with Rome or to see Perseus victorious in Greece (29.7.1-3). Indeed, Eumenes' dislike (ἀλλοτριότητος) and hostility (δυσμενείας) toward Perseus was well known (29.7.2).[265] Instead, Eumenes hoped to trick (ἐξαπατᾶν) Perseus into giving up some of his wealth, playing upon the Macedonian king's desperate position as he was hemmed in on all sides by the Romans (29.7.4). Yet this self-interest in the form of Eumenes' greed worked to undermine his alliance with Rome, as the king placed his own avarice above his duties to his allies. Thus, Polybius calls these schemes ridiculous (γελοίαν), earning Eumenes the reputation as the most avaricious

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[262] Such a conflict exemplifies part of the problem of a federal state. Individual member-polities had different interests. The accession of Megalopolis to the Achaean League, for example, was important, but also brought conflict with Sparta. Polybius does not seem sympathetic to this, though he is more sympathetic toward Messene - perhaps because the war began over an Aetolian attack on the city.

[263] Cf. Livy 24.44.9.

[264] Cf. Dio 20.66.1. On the context of the war that led to the proposal, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 532-434; (briefly) Eckstein 1995: 73.

[265] On the reasons for such fierce Hellenistic royal rivalries in general, see Austin 1986: 454-465.

(φιλαργυρωτάτου) king in the Mediterranean (29.8.2).[266] In his following discourse on the evils of avarice (29.9.1-13), Polybius likewise continues to criticize the king of Pergamum for his behavior, describing him as foolish (μωροποιεῖσθαι, 29.9.1) and thoughtless (ἀλογιστίας, 29.9.12).[267] Indeed, such an unjustified break of good faith with the Roman alliance in many ways deserved the fallout with Rome that followed (29.9.6).[268]

The actions of the Rhodians during the war with Perseus provide another example of such treachery. Throughout most of the war, the leadership of Rhodes was divided over support for Rome or Perseus (29.10-11). By 168, however, the Macedonian king had drawn many of the Rhodians to his side (29.4-5).[269] Thus despite the previous friendship shared between Rhodes and Rome against Philip and Antiochus, when the pro-Perseus faction gained the upper hand in Rhodes, the assembly decided to arbitrate the war, treating both sides as equals (29.11.1-5).[270] The Rhodians also began forming a confederation that could be positioned against Rome if the peace negotiations fell through, forming an alliance with the Cretans and

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[266] Polybius is likewise critical of Perseus' actions during these negotiations, called the most unprincipled king in the Mediterranean (29.8.2). Like Eumenes, Perseus' own avarice prevents him from willingly paying the price for Eumenes' services (29.8.3-9). Polybius explains that in refusing to do so the Macedonian king missed a great opportunity. For if he had given money to Eumenes, he would have either in fact received the king's aid against Rome, or at the very least he would have gotten the better of Eumenes causing him to become the enemy of the Romans (29.9.7-11). On Perseus' misstep, see Welwei 1963: 58.

[267] On Polybius' condemnation of avarice in connection with the exchange between Perseus and Eumenes, see Walbank 1979: 369; Eckstein 1995: 73, 244. Here Polybius does underemphasize the fact that Eumenes was a great military conqueror for Pergamum in 188-172, exemplified by the massive Pergamon Altar, adorned with military themes, that is now in Berlin.

[268] The historicity of this exchange has been debated by scholars, see Schleussner 1973: 119-123; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 533-534; and most lucidly Gruen 1984; Cf. 29.5; Livy 44.24.7-26.2. For argument against the historicity of this exchange, see Magie 1950: 22; McShane 1964: 181-182; Walbank 1979: 365-366; Gruen 1984: 561-563. For those who follow Polybius, see Frank 1914: 207; Meloni 1953: 335-341; Badian 1958: 102-103; Lehmann 1967: 173, n. 49; Errington 1972: 242-243; Scullard 1973: 214, 286-287; Hopp 1977: 57-58. At any rate, however, it is clear that Polybius believed these rumors to be true.

[269] Cf. Livy 44.23; 44.29.6.

[270] On the context behind the Rhodian assembly meeting in April, including Perseus' recent naval successes, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 536. On the Rhodian actions in 168 fitting into the larger tradition of smaller states arbitrating conflicts, see Eckstein 1988: 429-433.

several other cities (29.10.6-7). Polybius criticizes the Rhodian decision as inexcusable

(ἀναπολόγητον, 29.10.5) and foolish (ἄγνοιαν, 29.19.2). The Rhodian attempts at arbitration

did not go well. Largely due to poor timing (Polybius attributes it to the guiding hand of *Tyche*),

when the Rhodian envoys arrived in Rome to urge the Romans to end the war, Lucius Aemilius

Paullus had already defeated Perseus at Pydna. Thus, the Rhodian mission to Rome appeared

to be an attempt to rescue and save Perseus (ἐξελέσθαι τὸν Περσέα καὶ σῶσαι, 29.19.9) from

utter defeat rather than a neutral attempt at arbitration (29.19.1-11).[271] The Senate further

scoffed at the suggested notion that the Rhodians were attempting to act in the best interests of

the Greeks and Romans, for if this were their true purpose, they would have come to arrange a

peace during the two years Perseus had been ravaging Thessaly (29.19.6-9).

Indeed, the self-interested motivations of the Rhodians were confirmed in 166 when

the Rhodian envoy Astymedes came to Rome. In an attempt to mend relations with the

Romans, Astymedes made the Rhodian breach of faith look less severe by exaggerating (and

reminding the Romans of) the previous offenses carried out against Rome by other Greek states

(30.4.12-14). Polybius makes it clear that the speech, which Astymedes later published, was a

treacherous betrayal of all of Greece, comparing his actions to traitors who betray their friends

and confidences for money or out of fear (30.4.15-17). Rather, politicians who refuse to betray

their allies receive well-deserved praise, as Philip V did in burning the royal correspondence

after his defeat at Cynoscephalae so the Romans would not discover those who had been

secretly supporting him (18.33.1-3).[272] Thus, Polybius maintains that Astymedes' break of

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[271] On the proper role of allies in "negotiations," from the Rhodian point of view, see Ager 1991. On the role of τύχης (29.19.2) throughout the *Histories*, see Alvarez de Miranda 1956: 40, n. 1; Walbank 1957: 16-26, 155; Pedech 1964: 141-143; Balasch 1972: 366-378; Walbank 1972: 60-64; Eckstein 1995: 254-284; Walbank 2007: 349-355; Baronowski 2011: 151-152 ; as well as chapter 5 below. Cf. Polyb. 11.5.8; 23.10.6; 29.19.2; cf. 1.4.5.

[272] On this connection between Philip in 198 and Astymedes in 166, see Wunderer 15; Eckstein 1995: 97-98.

faith with his fellow Greeks was "by no means becoming in a politician" (οὐδαμῶς ἂν πρέπειν

ἀνδρὶ πολιτικῷ δόξειεν, 30.4.15) and should be universally disapproved (δυσαρεστήσειν,

30.4.17).[273]

Acceptable Instances of Working against Allies

Yet we should not confuse Polybius' condemnation of undermining alliances for self-

interested benefit with the notion that the Achaean historian believed states should help their

allies without thought for the future. We have already seen this with the Achaean negotiations

and eventual alliance with the Romans in 198 at the expense of their alliance with Philip.

Polybius deems it acceptable to work against one's own alliance given certain

circumstances, such as ensuring the independence and liberty of one's state in the years to

come. Thus, he levies harsh criticism at Greek statesmen such as Asymedes and Callicrates,

who attempt to foster and maintain Roman friendship at the expense of Greek independence

by revealing disloyal Greeks to the Senate (14.8.9-10.14; 30.2.12-14).[274] Such truths, Polybius

maintains, would have been better concealed from (περιστέλλοντας, 38.4.7) the Romans in

order to preserve the independence and liberty of the Greeks. Indeed, such deception was the

duty of any Greek (38.4.7-8).[275] Rather, Polybius believes that it is possible and, in fact, proper

for a state to look after its own well-being while at the same time remaining true to its friends

and allies. Again, such a demand for balance is seen in his complex condemnation of the

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[273] On Rome's ultimate decision to avoid war but cripple Rhodes economically by making Delos a free port, see Polyb. 30.4-5, 30.31.9-12; Livy 45.3.3-8; 45.10.10-14; 45.20.4-10; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 560-561.

[274] On Polybius' sharp condemnation of Callicrates (discussed in chapter 4), see Derow 1970: 13; Eckstein 1995: 204-206. Callicrates, of course, was responsible for Polybius' own exile in 167: Polyb. 30.13.9-11, 30.32.1-2; Paus. 7.10.11; Livy 45.31.5.

[275] In the case of Asymedes (14.8.9-10), it should be emphasized that Polybius does not condemn the fact that the Rhodian envoy deceives the senate, but only that he does so at the cost of other Greek states.

Tritaeans, Pharaeans, and Dymaeans during the Social War for their refusal to pay their dues to the Achaean League (4.60.10). While these cities were right to consider their own interests (ἰδίαν χρείαν) in hiring a group of mercenaries to prevent Aetolian raids, they failed to observe their engagement with the League (πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν πολιτείαν δίκαια συντηρεῖν, 4.60.9-10). States, Polybius argues, should not strive for personal benefit at the cost of ignoring obligations to their allies. Thus, the Achaean historian praises Hiero II for striking this balance in his alliance with Rome following the First Punic War. Throughout the Libyan War, and especially during its early stages when the Carthaginians had become shut into their city by the mercenaries, Hiero went out of his way to offer assistance to Carthage (1.83.2-4).[276] By doing so, Hiero was staying true to the terms of his alliance with Carthage from the Peace of 241 (1.83.1). Nor was he attempting to undermine his friendship with the Romans (indeed, Hiero remained an unwavering ally of Rome when war eventually resumed between the two powers in 218). Rather, Hiero believed that the existence of Carthage as a counterweight to Roman domination would allow the king to maintain his own independence and his equitable friendship with the Romans (1.83.3). By thus looking out for Syracuse's best interests while still maintaining friendship with Rome, Hiero's acted wisely (φρονίμως) and sensibly (νουνεχῶς, 1.83.3).[277]

The difficulty of maintaining this balance is best seen in the Achaean League's policy toward Rome during the Third Macedonian War in 170/169. In discussing whom to support during the war, some Achaean statesmen, led by Lycortas, argued that Achaea should remain wholly neutral in the conflict, thereby not incurring Rome's wrath by undermining their friendship with

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[276] The treaty signed in 241 stipulated that both Rome and Syracuse (as with their other allies) would offer certain assistance to Carthage if called upon. While the both states loyally answer these appeals, Polybius emphasizes Hiero's promptness and eagerness to help the Carthaginians.
[277] Eckstein 1985: 272-273; Eckstein 1995: 208; Hoyos 2015: 191-192; Baronowski 2011: 168.

the Romans but likewise not aiding in the increase of Roman power at the cost of Greek independence (28.7.1-5). Archon, on the other hand, advised his faction to side with the Romans, thereby preserving Achaean influence in Greece and preventing later accusations of disloyalty from Rome. This second policy was ultimately adopted by the league, supported by Ariston of Megalopolis, Xenon of Patrae, and Polybius himself.[278] Indeed, it was presumably Polybius' support of this policy that resulted in his being elected hipparch in this year (28.7-9).[279] Significantly, both sides of the debate, as well as Polybius' own account, ignore that the Achaean League had a formal treaty of alliance with Rome with formal obligations to render aid. For Polybius, legality remains secondary to independence and liberty.

In many ways the meeting recalls the earlier debate between Philopoemen and Aristaenus over how to deal with the Romans (24.11).[280] Aristaenus advocated that the Achaeans ought to act preemptively in agreement with Roman wishes while maintaining their own laws unless a law was in direct contradiction to Roman instructions (24.11.4-5). Philopoemen, on the other hand, advised a stance of resistance, only following Rome's requests when pushed unless they were contradictory to Achaean law. In these cases, the League ought to resist and appeal the matter before the Senate, though they would ultimately comply under protest if pressed (24.11.6-8). Polybius ultimately approves of both policies, calling Philopoemen's honorable (καλήν) and Aristaenus' reasonable

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[278] Badian 1952: 76-80; Pedech 1969: 252-255; Errington 1969: 207-208; Gruen 1984: 508; Eckstein 1985: 278-279; Eckstein 1995: 5-6.

[279] Walbank 1972: 167.

[280] Walbank 1979: 264 places the general disagreement on policy as originating from the 191 *synodos*. Cf. Plut. *Philop.* 17.3; Paus. 8.51.4; Livy 36.35.7; De Sanctis 1923: 172; Aymard 1938 362-363, n. 23; Badian 1952: 80. Holleaux 1935 136 ff. places the debate later in 186/5, during Aristaenus' last *strategia*. It should be noted, however, that it is much more likely that the speeches from Polybius 24.11-13 represent general policy disagreements rather than a historical debate. See Pedech 1964: 417. For general discussion of these passages, see Aymard 1938: 362-363, n. 23; Gelzer 1964: 149-150; Pedech 1964: 417; Errington 1969: 219-220; Petzold 1969: 43-44; Eckstein 1995: 202-204; Baronowski 2011: 168; Eckstein 2012: 360-361.

(εὐσχήμονα 24.13.8), although both policies strove to defend Achaea's independence (unlike Callicrates' later policy).[281]

These examples highlight the difficulty of maintaining a proper balance between self-interest and duty to friends and allies. Polybius himself attempted to ride this line in 169 when the Achaean assembly decided to offer their complete military assistance to Rome against Perseus (28.12.1-4). Polybius was sent to deliver the decree to the Romans, but he intentionally delayed the offer to consul Quintus Marcius Philippus until after the threat of Perseus in Thessaly had passed (28.13.1-2).[282] Despite this, Polybius does work on Rome's behalf by personally accompanying Philippus in his mountain offensive against Perseus at this time (28.13.6). He likewise later encourages the Achaean Assembly to refuse the requests of Appius Claudius Centho for additional troops, secretly acting in the interests of Philippus (28.13.7).[283] Again, no mention is made by Polybius of the formal treaty of alliance and its obligations. In this way, his actions reflect the same balance between preservation of Achaean independence and duty toward Roman friendship that he uses to judge allies throughout the *Histories*.

As mentioned above, Polybius' allowance for working against allies likewise extends to those working to combat wicked and untrustworthy allies. For example, in the winter of 218/217

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[281] On the translations of καλήν and εὐσχήμονα, see Petzold 1969; 45-46; Musti 1978: 77; Walbank 1979: 266-267; Green 1990: 274; Baronowski 1995: 17, n. 5 who suggest that while Aristaenus' policy was safe, εὐσχήμονα was something less than truly honorable. On a more positive definition, which seems in line with Polybius' other uses of εὐσχήμονα throughout the *HIstories* as well as his praise of Aristaenus in the next sentence (24.13.9), see Mauersberger 1956-1975: I.2 col. 1044; Ferrary 1988: 297, n. 102; Eckstein 1995: 202-204; Baronowski 2011: 168, n. 2.

[282] See Lehmann 1967: 201-203; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 536-537; Eckstein 1995: 6-7; Baronowski 2011: 169. On Philippus' movements in Thessaly, see Meloni 1953: 293, n. 2; Pritchett 1969: 170-171; Walbank 1979: 346-347.

[283] On Polybius' hand in Roman factional politics in this instance, see Lehmann 1967: 300, n. 329; Deininger 1971: 182; Walbank 1979: 346-347 (with sources); Eckstein 1995 6-7, 280; Baronowski 2011: 169. De Sanctis 1923: 307-308 and Meloni 1953: 315, n. 3 suggest that Polybius worked through personal contacts such as his friend Cephalus (Polyb. 27.15.10) to convince the Achaean Assembly to refuse Claudius' request for aid. Briscoe 1964: 70 suggests Marcius intended to put the Achaeans into a difficult position with Rome.

Hannibal decided to deceive his Celtic allies by disguising his own appearance. By wearing different colored wigs and outfits each day, he was so successful with his ploy that even his close friends often failed to recognize him (3.78.1-4).[284] Despite this deception, Polybius does not condemn the Carthaginian general as he uses the disguises in response to the Celtic faithlessness (ἀθεσίαν) and the possibility of assassination attempts (ἐπιβουλὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα) from these allies (3.78.2). Indeed, this is just one event in a series of passages that praise Hannibal for the wise handling of his fickle barbarian allies.[285] Polybius likewise abstains from criticizing the deception of Zeuxis, Antiochus' governor of Asia Minor.[286] After Philip V's invasion of Pergamum, impiously ravaging various temples and altars throughout the countryside (16.1.4-6), he sent messages to Zeuxis requesting grain.[287] According to Polybius, such assistance had been promised in the treaty (συνθήκας) signed between Philip and Antiochus III in 203/202 (16.1.8).[288] Despite this alliance, however, Zeuxis deceived Philip, pretending (ὑπεκρίνετο) to honor the agreement, but in reality sending him insufficient supplies (16.1.9). Polybius' lack of condemnation stems from Philip's own wickedness that contextualizes his actions in Asia Minor and the events preceding the invasion, betraying allies and attacking the gods. Thus, Polybius characterizes Philip as unrestrained and animalistic (ἀνέδην καὶ θηριωδῶς, 15.20.3), treacherous (παρασπονδούντων, 15.20.6), shameful (αἰσχύνης, 15.20.3), and raving mad (λυττῶντι, 16.1.2).

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[284] On Hannibal's disguises: Livy 22.1.2-4; Zon. 8.24; Walbank 1957: 412. Miltner 1943: 16 suggests that the Gauls at this time were especially hostile toward Hannibal due to his return to their territory in 218/217 after passing south into Liguria (Livy 21.59.10).

[285] For example see Polyb. 2.32.8; 3.70.4; 3.78.2. On Polybius judgment of faithless barbarians in general, see chapter 2.

[286] On the status and importance of Zeuxis as Antiochus' most important general in Asia Minor, see Eckstein 2012: 168-178.

[287] On the context of Philip's invasion of Asia Minor, see Polyb. 15.20-24; cf. Livy 31.17.

[288] On the Pact between the Kings, see above pp. 40, 44-46. On the connection between this agreement and the Pact (15.20.6), see rightly Eckstein 2012: 168-178. Magie 1939: 39 doubts the existence of any agreement between Philip and Zeuxis, let alone a connection to the pact of 203/2. Errington 1971: 351-352 acknowledges the agreement, but believes it was tied to a local agreement between Philip and Zeuxis.

The final example of acceptable treachery against allies emphasizes the unjust detainment of Demetrius I Soter, the son of Seleucus IV Philopator, in Rome as a result of the peace treaty of 188.[289] Following the death of his uncle, Antiochus IV Epiphanes, who had taken the throne upon Seleucus' death in 163, a nine-year-old Antiochus V Eupator took the throne.[290] As he should have been the legitimate ruler, Demetrius asked the Roman Senate to let him return to the East.[291] The Senate, according to Polybius, acting not according to justice but rather in its own interests, preferring a young and manipulatable Antiochus V on the throne, refused Demetrius' request (31.2.4-6; 31.11.11). Indeed, many, including Polybius, had come to see Demetrius' detention as unjust (παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον), given the earlier death of his father (31.2.1).[292] Given this Roman injustice, the Achaean historian maintains that Demetrius was able to deceive Rome and go against the Senate's wishes without condemnation. In fact, Polybius says he himself advised Demetrius to take matters into his own hands and escape back to Syria (31.11.5-6) - an action that was extremely dangerous for Polybius as a detainee in Rome. And once Demetrius did escape in the summer of 162 and became the ruler of Syria, Demetrius continued to foster friendship with the Romans, turning over the assassin of Gnaeus Octavius, the anti-Roman orator Isocrates (32.2), and Andriscus, the later pretender to Macedonian throne in 154.[293] In light of such a context of injustice (3.11.11), and clearly evidenced by Polybius' own complicity, the Achaean historian views Demetrius' deception and disobedience toward Rome as fully justified.

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[289] These passages (31.11-15) were likely based upon Polybius' detailed notes on the actual event. See Walbank 1979: 478; Eckstein 1995: 11, n. 44.

[290] See Morkholm 1966: 36-37.

[291] App. *Syr.* 6.46.

[292] See rightly, Musti 1978: 81; Eckstein 1995: 105-106; opposed Walbank 1974: 12 who sees Polybius as either detached from or approving of the Roman decision.

[293] On the turning over of Andriscus to Rome (and his escape): Diod. 31:15; 31.40a (Polybian context; cf. 31.40); Zon. 9.28; Walbank 1979: 560. Rome did eventually recognize Demetrius as king, first by the envoy Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus in 161/160 (Polyb. 31.33.3-4) and later by the Senate in the spring of 159 (32.2.3-14). See Gruen 1984: 664-665.

CONCLUSION

The number of instances of treachery carried out against friends and allies throughout Polybius' *Histories* is striking.[294] Rather than a blanket condemnation of such betrayals, however, Polybius seems to assess each instance on its own merits (or lack thereof). His moral analysis remains complex. Thus, without justification given certain contexts, Polybius believes that such breaches of faith should be condemned for moral as well as pragmatic reasons. Nor does the Achaean historian refrain from emphasizing when the Romans, or even certain Achaean cities, engage in such treacherous behavior. Rather, the survey of these instances of treachery supports our Polybian model that some breaches of good faith are acceptable and can be justified, given previous breaks of faith or general decadence and degeneracy by the ally, or extreme compellence of circumstances. Likewise, even among those instances of treachery that Polybius condemns, he emphasizes certain cases as being especially heinous given the betrayal of expected loyalties.

In instances of states treacherously attacking their friends and allies, Polybius is consistent in his analysis. When states betray and attack their allies without what he considers justification, the Achaean historian is always critical. Thus the Roman "robbery" of Sardinia in 237 (1.88.8-12); the treachery of Hasdrubal and the Carthaginians against their Spanish allies after 211 (9.11.1-4, 10.18, 10.38); the decision of Nabis of Sparta to abandon its Peloponnesian allies in 202/201 (16.13.1-3); Scerdilaïdas betrayal of Philip in 217 (5.95, 5.101, 5.108); Pharnaces of Pontus' treacherous invasion of Galatia in 181/180 (24.14-15, 24.25); and the

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[294] Certain significant instances of Roman treachery or deception, including their support of the Mammertines in 264, Flamininus' diplomatic deception in 199/198, and Roman action surrounding the Third Punic War have been omitted from this chapter, as they will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.

wicked plots of the Epirote statesmen Theodotus and Philostratus against the Roman consul

Aulus Hostilius Mancinus in 170 (27.16) all receive condemnation from Polybius.

The Aetolians and Philip V are especially prone to such betrayals in the *Histories*. Thus,

Polybius points to the Aetolian betrayal of Achaea at the onset of the Cleomonean War in 229

(2.44.1-2, 2.46); the subsequent Aetolian betrayal of Messenia and attack on Achaea in 220 to

begin the Social War (4.3-6); the Aetolian abandonment of the allied city of Triphylia during this

war (4.77-79); and the Aetolian decision to invite foreign powers into Greece, in 214 with the

Romans (9.37-38, 11.5.3) and in 192 with Antiochus III (18.39.1, 20.9.8, 21.37). Philip V is

likewise condemned for repeated breaks of good faith between his victory in the Social War and

his defeat at Cynoscephalae, including his treachery at Messene in 215 (7.12-13), at Argos in 208

(10.26), at Cius and Thasos in 203 (15.22-25), and in working with Antiochus III in 203/2 to

treacherously divide and absorb various Ptolemaic holdings (15.20).

The emphasis on Aetolian and Macedonian treachery is not surprising given Polybius'

personal dislike of the Aetoliean League, the ancestral enemy of the Achaean League, and his

wish to justify the Achaean decision in 198 to abandon its alliance with Philip (18.13). Despite

this, Polybius' assessments of both Aetolia and Macedon are not made uncritically. Rather, the

Achaean historian praises Philip's actions throughout the early years of his reign during the

Social War. According to Polybius, it is the accumulation of power that results in the shift of

Philip's character toward tyranny and treachery. Polybius' understanding of both Philip's

character as well as the system of monarchy in general will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

As with his assessment of the Aetolian betrayal of Achaea in 229 despite recent Achaean

kindness, there are also certain instances in which Polybius' criticism is even harsher, given the

existence of kinship or past kindnesses that ought to have guaranteed the loyalty and friendship

of the treacherous states in question. Additional examples of such betrayals include the decision of Demetrius of Pharos to violate his treaty with Rome despite the benefits Rome had bestowed upon him in 229 (3.16); the betrayal of the Spanish chieftains Andobales and Mandonius in the face of Scipio's extreme generosity in Spain (11.28, 11.31, 11.33); the 170 break of faith and attack on Apollonia near Conossus by the Cydonians in Crete despite ties of citizenship (28.14); and the Macedonian decision in 150 to betray Rome and join Andriscus even after Rome had granted them freedom and independence from a tyrant (36.10, 36.16).

Despite the condemnation, however, in the face of wicked allies or extreme necessity, Polybius does condone such breaks of faith, as emphasized by Lyciscus of Acarnania in his 211 speech before the Spartan Assembly (9.36.37). Thus Hannibal's attack on Saguntum and ultimately Italy in 219 was justified due to the past Roman treachery at Sardinia (3.15.4-11), and his 218 attack against his own Gallic allies was justified by the recent decision of the Gauls to treacherously negotiate with the Romans (3.69.5-7). Hannibal's betrayal of some of his Italian allies in 211 was likewise justified, given the limited military options he had at his disposal (9.26). Similar justification is given for Philip V's treacherous action in Bargylia in 201/200 (16.24).

Polybius' descriptions of acts of betrayal featuring the desertion of allies during wartime are similar. Polybius condemns the several cities for deserting the Romans without reasonable justification during the Second Punic War, including Clastidium in 218 (3.69.1-4), Capua in 216 (7.1.1), Syracuse in 215 (7.3-8), Tarentum in 212 (8.24-34), and several Celtic groups who came to Africa to assist the Carthaginians between 205 and 203 (14.8.9-10). The betrayals of Utica and Hippacritae in 238 (1.80), the Boeotians against the Achaeans in 245 (20.4.4-5.2) and later the

Aetolians in 236 (20.5.3), Abilyx's betrayal of the hostages at Saguntum to the Romans (3.98.2-4), and the treachery of Bolis and Cambylus against Achaeus in 213 (8.16.20).

Again, the expectation of loyalty given past acts of kindness often solicits a harsher condemnation from Polybius. Thus, the Achaean historian is especially scathing in his criticism of the multiple acts of treachery carried out by the Mantineans against the Achaean League during the Cleomoneann War in 227 despite Achaean forgiveness and generosity (2.57-58), the treachery of Aristomachus against the Achaean League under similar circumstances (2.60), the Spartan betrayal of the Hellenic Symmachy in the war in spite of Antigonus Doson's recent decent kindness (4.22-23, 4.34-35), and the treachery of the Cynaethean exiles against their Achaean benefactors in 220 (4.17.18).

But certain desertions are deemed acceptable by Polybius, given past indiscretions committed by the allies in question. Thus, Polybius finds Naravas' desertion to Hamilcar in 240 during the Libyan War (1.78), Demetrius' betrayal of Teuta in 229 (2.11.4-5), Theodotus' treachery against Ptolemy in 219 (5.40.1-3, 5.61.3-5), Andobales' betrayal of Carthage in Spain (10.37.7-38.6), the Achaean decision to desert Philip V in 198 (18.13), and the Megarian abandonment of the Boeotian League in 193 (20.6.7) as all justifiable. Polybius likewise condones the 216 decision of Petelia in southern Italy to come to terms with Hannibal (7.1.1-2) as well as the decisions of the Gazans to surrender to the Persians in the 6th century (16.22a.4), to Alexander in 332 (16.22a.5), and to Antiochus III in 201 (16.22a.6), as such steps were only taken as a last resort after every attempt at resistance had been made.

Finally, Polybius' depictions of treacherous actions carried out by states in their own interest at the expense of the alliance, but short of leaving the alliance, suggest these nuances as well. The Achaean historian criticizes the self-interested actions of the Epirotes in 219 at the

expense of the Hellenic Symmachy (4.63.1-5); the cities of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea who look to their own safety at the expense of the Achaean League (4.60.3-10); and the decision of the Romans to wage a war against Philip without genuine concern for their Aetolian allies (10.25). Polybius also condemns personal grudges that undermine alliances, such as Apelles' schemes against Aratus and the Achaeans during the Social War (4.76, 4.82, 4.84, 4.87); Philip's grudge against Aratus in 213 (8.12.1-6); and the Roman attacks on Eumenes II after the Third Macedonian War (30.1-3, 30.19.15-17, 31.1.2-7). Conducting secret negotiations with the enemy is likewise criticized as treacherous by Polybius. For this reason, the double-dealings of the Epirotes in 220 at the onset of the Social War (4.30.6-7), the Messenian refusal to conduct this same war despite being its cause (4.31-32.1), the secret negotiations between Eumenes II and Perseus during the Third Macedonian War (29.6-9), and the treacherous diplomacy carried out during this same conflict by the Rhodians (29.10-11, 29.19) are condemned. Once more, given the context of wicked or degenerate allies, such breaches of faith may be deemed acceptable by the Achaean historian, including Hannibal's deception of the Gauls in 218 (3.78.1-4), Zeuxis' failure to provide meaningful help to Philip V in 201 (16.1.4-6), and Demetrius of Syria's decision to escape from Rome against the Senate's wishes (31.2.4-6, 31.11.5-11). Polybius likewise acknowledges the complexities at play as states attempted to balance duty to allies with their own security and independence, witnessed by his praise of Hiero II's balanced support of Carthage during the Libyan War as a check on Roman power (1.83.1-4) and the policy debates of the Achaeans over dealing with Rome in the 180s (24.11-13) and in 170/169 (28.7), including actions taken by Polybius himself (28.13).

These examples lend themselves to a Polybian model of analysis that is both nuanced and complex, concerned with individual actions and specific circumstances. Ultimately, Polybius'

depictions of these various acts of treachery committed against friends and allies confirm that his judgment cannot be understood in general terms of approval or condemnation. The context behind these breaks of good faith matters. Chapter 3 will continue to solidify the importance of these contexts, focusing on Polybius' analysis of acts of treachery committed against one's own state.

Chapter 3: Treachery and Deception against One's Own State

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will continue to survey Polybius' descriptions of the many acts of treachery and deception that appear throughout the *Histories*, this time turning toward instances of betrayal carried out against one's own state. Polybius was concerned with such betrayals on a personal level, as it was Callicrates' break of faith with his fellow Achaeans that ultimately resulted in Polybius' exile to Rome in 167 (24.8-10).[1] The Achaean historian likewise points to similar self-interested motivations shown by Diaeus and Critolaus in 146 that brought about the end of an independent Achaean League (38.9-18). Thus, Polybius knew the internal devastation that such betrayals could wreak upon a state, especially polities of second-rate power. It is no surprise then that we find sharp condemnation accompanying many of his descriptions of such treachery. Polybius points toward the courts of the Hellenistic kings as being especially susceptible to such acts, spending a great deal of emphasis on the betrayals of Apelles and his co-conspirators against Philip V (4.82-87, 5.2, 5.4-5, 5.7, 5.15-16, 5.25-29), Hermeias in the court of Antiochus III (5.40-42, 5.49-51, 5.55-56), and the actions of Scopias and Agathocles as advisors to Ptolemy V (15.25-26, 15.28-30, 15.33). While some of the treacheries discussed in this chapter feature attempt to betray one's own state to the enemy, more often, these instances center around personal greed and desire for personal power at the expense of the state.

Yet as we saw with the complexities of the Polybian framework of understanding acts of treachery against friends and allies, Polybius offers a similarly nuanced look at the motivations behind these breaks of good faith. In addition to Polybius' strict notion of treason which he outlines

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[1] Cf. 30.13.9-11, 32.1-2; Paus. 7.10.11; Livy 45.31.5. See Eckstein 1995: 6, 204, n. 43; Eckstein 2012: 369, n. 104.

in 18.13-15, this chapter will also explore more general instances of treacherous behavior in which individuals strive for personal gain at the expense of the state. Once again, context is at the heart of Polybius' judgment. Thus, following in Plato's footsteps, the Achaean historian condones certain instances of statesmen and kings deceiving soldiers or citizens for the good of the state.[2] Staying true to our Polybian model, the distinguishing factor remains personal motivation. Acts of deception or even treachery that are carried out for the good of the state, to further its security and independence or driven by sheer necessity, are generally deemed acceptable. In this way, Polybius' criteria for judgment are at the same time moral and utilitarian.[3] We see this with deceptions carried out by Aratus during the Cleomenean War (2.47.6-11), by Molon in his rebellion against Antiochus III (5.43.5-8), and by Scipio Africanus during his campaign in Spain (10.2-6, 10.11.5-9). When such breaks of faith are motivated by personal greed or ambition, however, which is more often the case in the *Histories*, Polybius is unwaveringly critical, regardless of the perpetrator. And the range of justification for breaking faith with one's own state and his fellow citizens is narrow.

The most significant finding from this chapter is the frequency and severity at which these acts of treachery are committed by actors within monarchies compared with republics. While these treacheries do occur in republics, they are often motivated by patriotic intentions rather than a desire for personal ascendency. Moreover, Rome stands apart from all the Greek states, both large and small, in that there is no instance of treachery against the state committed within Rome. This distribution of these instances of treachery in the *Histories*, this chapter argues, stems from Polybius' belief that monarchies were more easily morally corrupted than republics and mixed constitutions, given the concentration of power in the hands of a single ruler rather than a larger

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[2] Plato *Rep.* 3.414b-415d.
[3] On the inability to differentiate between the moral and the pragmatic in judging the consequences of acts of treachery throughout the *Histories*, see chapter 5.

political body. As Rome stands in Polybius' mind as the greatest example of a mixed constitution, the state has managed to stave off such corrupting influence and the internal treacheries that accompany it.

In surveying these instances of treachery and deception that appear throughout the *Histories*, these betrayals will be grouped into three categories: (I) Treachery against fellow Citizens, (II) Treacherous Court Intrigue, and (III) Deception of the Populace and Soldiery.

I. TREACHERY AGAINST FELLOW CITIZENS

These betrayals, in many ways, fit the Achaean historian's own musings about what constitutes treachery (18.13-15). When it is only certain individuals within a state, rather than the government as a whole, who push the state toward defection, such instances often feature treachery toward fellow citizens as well as toward allies, as was the case with Cythaetha in 220 (4.17-18) and with Tarentum in 212 (8.24-34). Polybius' condemnation of such treachery is not rooted in the act of defection itself but in the motivations of self-interest that underscore these breaks of faith. Indeed, Polybius emphasizes that those who are forced to switch allegiances or friendships at the bidding of circumstance should not automatically be named traitors (18.13.5). Rather, it is only those who betray their own city to the domination of an enemy or submit their city to a garrison who ought to be condemned as guilty of treason (προδοσία, 18.15.2-4). Again, Polybius defines such treachery as carried out for personal ambition (ἰδίας πλεονεξίας, 18.14.9), for their own safety and advantage (ἰδίας ἀσφαλείας καὶ λυσιτελείας, 18.15.2), for their political agenda (ἀντιπολιτευομένους διαφορᾶς, 18.15.2), or for their own aims (ἰδίας ὁρμὰς, 18.15.3). This self-interest is only earned at the expense of the state, resulting in the abolition of its laws (καταλύοντες

τοὺς νόμους, 18.14.9), the end of citizen freedoms (ἀφηρο ῦντο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, 18.14.9), or its domination by a superior power (πλεῖον δυναμένων ἐξουσίαν, 18.15.3).

Condemned Treachery against Fellow Citizens

These criteria match Polybius' harsh condemnation of the Epirote statesman, Charops. At the direction of his influential grandfather, Charops studied in Rome and eventually came to dominate political life in Epirus from the end of the Third Macedonian War until his death in 160/159 (27.15.1-5; cf. Polyb. 30.12; 30.13.4; 30.32.12). Though still young, upon his return to Epirus, Charops attempted to undermine the statesmen directing Epirote policy. Even at this early stage, Polybius characterizes him as overly ambitious, restless, presumptuous, and filled with every sort of wickedness (μετέωρον ὄν τῇ φύσει καὶ πάσης πονηρίας ἔμπλεων ἐκορωνία, 27.15.6). Thus, in order to solidify his own control over the state, Charops leveled fabricated and overblown accusations against these leaders to the Romans (27.15.8-9). Polybius makes it clear that Charops' actions occurred at the expense of the state, as these statesmen, such as Cephalus, had held the very best opinion (ἀρίστης...γνώμης) in dealing with the escalating conflict between Rome and Perseus (27.15.10).[4] Initially, Cephalus had hoped that no war would arise between the two powers, as such a war would threaten the independence of smaller states in Greece regardless of the victor (27.15).[5] After the war began, however, he desired to act justly by keeping strictly to the terms of the Epirote alliance with Rome without becoming unduly subservient (ἀγεννῶς...ὑπηρετεῖν) to them (27.15.12).[6] Polybius' praise of Cephalus as a wise and steadfast

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[4] For general discussion, see Eckstein 1995: 99, 206, 209; Baronowski 2011: 168.
[5] On the view that the conflict was a choice between Roman hegemony and Macedonians domination, see Walbank 1963: 7-8; Walbank 1979: 308; Musti 1978: 79; Eckstein 1995: 209, n.58, 215.
[6] On the nature of this alliance, see Hammond 1967: 621; Walbank 1979: 315 arguing for a formal treaty. See Gruen 1984: 23; Eckstein 1995: 99, n.51 for informal but traditional alliance. On the importance of

man (φρόνιμος καὶ στάσιμος ἄνθρωπος) stands in contrast with Charops' wicked and restless actions (27.15.10).[7] These treacherous attacks on Cephalus and the other Epirote statesmen succeeded, as these leaders were either arrested and brought to Rome (27.15.14) or, in Cephalus' case, forced against their wishes to flee to Perseus (27.15.15-16).[8]

Nor was this an isolated occurrence of treachery carried out by Charops against his fellow citizens. By the end of the Third Macedonian War in 168, Charops dominated politics in Epirus with claims of Roman backing, as Lucius Anicius Gallus and Lucius Aemilius Paullus had brought many Epirote statesmen under even slight suspicion back to Rome (32.5.6). Polybius describes Charops' rule as consumed with cruelty and lawlessness (ὠμότητα καὶ παρανομίαν, 32.5.5), as the Epirote statesman committed every kind of crime (δεινῶν, 32.5.7) and surrounded himself with all of the worst and most unprincipled men (τῶν χειρίστων καὶ τῶν εἰκαιοτάτων ἀνθρώπων, 32.5.8), motivated solely by personal greed and desire for power. Charops openly murdered fellow citizens in the marketplace and in their own homes and had others assassinated on the roads and at their country estates (32.5.11-12). All of this was for the purpose of confiscating the property of his victims to line his own pockets. He likewise proscribed wealthy citizens, both men as well as their wives, threatening them with exile if they did not pay him off (32.5.12-15). And even after he had extorted all of their money, he proceeded to bring them before the popular assembly at Phoenice, the populace already having been fully terrorized and corrupted (φόβον...δελεαζόμενοι) into

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smaller states maintaining a careful balance between futile hostility and servile adherence toward Rome, see Musti 1978: 74, 79; Eckstein 1995: 99, 206, 209-210, 234; Baronowski 2011: 168-169

[7] On additional praise of Cephalus' character when he took his own life after the Macedonian defeat at Pydna, see Polyb. 30.7.1-4; Eckstein 1995: 41-42.

[8] Gruen 1984: 512. On the connection between many of the Epirotes feeling forced to commit themselves to Perseus and the failed Epirote attempt to kidnap the new Roman consul Aulus Hostilius Mancius in 170 (27.16), see Meloni 1953: 257; Oost 1954: 75-77; Hammond 1967: 627-628; Deininger 1971: 175; Walbank 1979: 316; Eckstein 1995: 99.

submission, and convinced the people to sentence them to death as enemies of Rome (32.6.1-2).[9] Polybius, then, describes Charops as working to corrupt the body-politic of the Epirote state, contrary to the duty of statesmen to uplift the character of the body-politic (cf. Polybius' praise of Philipoemen, 2.40.1-2). This in itself was another betrayal of his own state.

Polybius makes it clear that in carrying out these various acts of treachery against his own people, Charops was motivated by personal greed and lust for power rather than by hopes to stabilize Epirus or by some genuine loyalty toward the Romans.[10] Indeed, when Charops came to Rome in 160/159, wishing for the Roman Senate to place its stamp of approval on his treacheries, he was disappointed (32.6.3-4). Both the highly influential Lucius Aemilius Paullus and the *princeps senatus* and *pontifex maximus*, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, refused to allow Charops to come into their homes when they caught wind of his crimes (32.6.5). The senate likewise refused to give Charops an answer, instead informing him that they would send legates to inquire into the state of affairs in Epirus (32.6.7-8).[11] Polybius praises Roman resolve in this instance, describing the Romans as maintaining high principle (κάλλιστον...δεῖγμα τῆς Ῥωμαίων αἱρέσεως, 32.6.4) and hating iniquity (μισοπόνηρον, 32.6.6). And in true fashion, Charops returned home, lied to his fellow citizens about the senate's response, and even published a fabricated letter from the Senate approving of his actions (32.6.9). In this way, Charops relied upon (alleged) foreign support to maintain his own political power, fitting Polybius' definition of treachery in 18.13. It was ultimately only Charops' death that freed Epirus from his wickedness. Thus, Polybius compares

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[9] For overview of Charops' crimes, see Eckstein 1995: 99-100, 145; Baronowski 2011: 140. For Polybius condemnation of Charops as a demagogue, see Champion 2004a: 221.

[10] On the notion of Charops' individual depravity paralleling the collective degeneracy of the Epirotes at this time, see Champion 2004a: 152, n.29.

[11] Cf. 30.13. On Charops' visit to Rome, see Gruen 1984: 124, 166; Baronowski 2011: 96.

Charops with Lyciscus in Aetolia, Mnasippus of Coronea in Boeotia, Chremas in Acarnania, each a curse (ἀλιτηρίων) upon Greece, whose deaths were a sort of purgation (καθαρμόν, 32.5.1-4).[12]

Similar criticism is found in Polybius' condemnation of the Achaean statesman Callicrates of Leontium during an embassy to Rome in 181/180.[13] Following a petition brought before the Roman Senate by Spartan exiles, the Senate sent a message to the Achaean League, urging the Achaeans to reinstate these exiles (24.1.4-5).[14] At the Achaean Assembly meeting in which this Roman request was discussed, the majority of the Achaeans sided with Lycortas - Polybius' father - who suggested that, despite Roman wishes, the League ought to refuse the reinstatement of the exiles, as such a move would violate their own laws and promises (24.8.1-5). In the minority opinion was Callicrates, who urged the assembly to put no consideration, including Achaean law, before the will of the Romans (24.8.6). Upon the assembly agreeing with Lycortas' policy, the League government sent Callicrates, Lydiadas of Megalopolis, and Aratus of Sicyon as envoys to explain the Achaean position to the Roman Senate. When they appeared before the Senate, however, Callicrates betrayed the wishes of the Achaean League and expressed his own personal policy, levying accusations against his political opponents (24.8.9), highlighting the previous instance of the Achaean League going to war with Messenia against Roman wishes (24.9.10-13), and imploring the Romans to take a more direct hand in Greek affairs (24.9.1-9).[15] By doing so,

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[12] Lyciscus receives much of the same condemnation from Polybius, as he too dominated politics in Aetolia through treacherous false accusations against his rivals (Polyb. 30.13.11; Livy 45.31.1-2, taken from Polybius). On the similarities between the treacherous actions taken by Charops and by Callicrates in Achaea, see Eckstein 1995: 265; and below.

[13] For the context and background of the embassy to Rome, see Derow 1970: 13-15; Walbank 1979: 260-262.

[14] Cf. Livy 40.20. On the background of the Achaean conquest of the Peloponnesus between 192 and 188, see Gruen 1984: 462-475; Eckstein 2012: 323-333.

[15] On Callicrates' speech, see Badian 1958: 91; Deininger 1971: 138; Walbank 1979: 260-264; Eckstein 1995: 203-206; Baronowski 2011: 80-82, 166-169; Eckstein 2012: 367-369.

Callicrates reasoned, the Romans would be supporting those politicians (himself included) who acted on Rome's behalf without reservation.

Polybius' condemnation of Callicrates' actions is clear, believing the Achaean statesman to be a traitor to both the League and Greece as a whole. Thus, rather than acting to defend the just claims (τὰ δίκαια) of Achaea, he did the opposite (τοὐναντίον), working against what was best for the League (24.10.13). Indeed, up until this point, relying on the loyalty they had shown to Rome during the wars against Philip and Antiochus, the Achaeans had been able to deal with Rome on more or less equal terms (ἰσολογίαν ἔχειν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, 24.10.9). This Achaean independence, however, began to fade due to Callicrates' treacherous actions in 181/180. Polybius calls Callicrates the initiator of great calamities for all of Greece, and especially for the Achaeans (μεγάλων κακῶν ἀρχηγὸς γέγονε πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, 24.10.8), and he describes Callicrates' betrayal as the beginning of a change for the worse in Greece (χεῖρον ἐγένετο μεταβολῆς, 24.10.10). Acting upon Callicrates' advice, the Romans began to encourage a more sycophantic following throughout Greece and even arranged for a coalition of Aetolians, Epirots, Athenians, Boeotians, and Acarnanians to pressure Achaean policy (24.10.6), a decision which Polybius believed affected Rome for the worse as well, replacing their true friends (φίλων ἀληθινῶν) in Greece with mere flatterers (κολάκων, 24.10.5).[16]

Callicrates' break of faith with his own state is likewise reinforced by the subsequent discussion of the policies advocated for by the Achaean statesmen Aristaenus and Philopoemen in the 180s (24.11-13), which is appended as a sort of commentary. While the politicians disagreed

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[16] Polybius considered these true friends, who had previously dominated Greek politics in the 180s, to be the men who worked for the best policy (βέλτιστον, 24.10.4) in dealing with Rome, one based upon independent friendship. Cf. 27.12.10-11. See Eckstein 1995: 41, 206-207; Eckstein 2012: 368-369. The Roman decision at this time should not, however, be seen as as a shift toward direct Roman imperialism over the Greeks as some have suggested: Badian 1958: 89-91; Lehmann 1967: 289-296; Errington 1969: 200-205; Deininger 1971: 136-143, 199-202. See rightly Eckstein 2012: 368-369 who emphasizes that this shift was gradual.

on how readily the Achaeans ought to consent to Roman requests, Polybius emphasizes that both men, unlike Callicrates, were attempting to act in the best interest of Achaean independence.[17] Thus, he calls Philopoemen's policy honorable (καλήν) and Aristaenus' policy reasonable (εὐσχήμονα 24.13.8); and although they differed, both were honorable.[18] Ultimately, Callicrates' treacherous actions in 181/180 mark him as a traitor according to Polybius' own definition, as Callicrates betrayed Achaean independence to the domination of a superior power for personal political gain. Rather than shaping a patriotic policy as Aristaenus, Philopoemen, and Lycortas had done, Callicrates' actions were solely driven by personal motivations, hoping to become ascendant in Achaean politics through Roman backing. And indeed, after his appearance before the Roman Senate, he was elected *strategos* for the following year (24.10.14).[19]

Nor was Callicrates the only Achaean statesman to garner Polybius' criticism. In the winter of 185 - five years before the debate scene between Philopoemen and Aristaenus - Quintus Caecilius Metellus came before the Achaean magistrates who were meeting at Argos. When he spoke, he admonished the Achaeans for how they had been treating the Spartans since their induction into the Achaean League in 191 and demanded that the League remedy the situation.[20]

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[17] For the comparison between Callicrates and Aristaenus and Philopoemen, see Lehmann 1967: 249-250; Walbank 1979: 267; Eckstein 1995: 203-204.

[18] On the translations of καλήν and εὐσχήμονα, see Petzold 1969; 45-46; Musti 1978: 77; Walbank 1979: 266-267; Green 1990: 274; Baronowski 1995: 17, n. 5 who suggest that while Aristaenus' policy was safe, εὐσχήμονα was something less than truly honorable. On a more positive definition, which seems in line with Polybius' other uses of εὐσχήμονα throughout the *HIstories* as well as his praise of Aristaenus in the next sentence (24.13.9), see Mauersberger 1956-1975: I.2 col. 1044; Ferrary 1988: 297, n. 102; Eckstein 1995: 202-204; Baronowski 2011: 168, n. 2.

[19] On the possibly exaggerated political impact of Callicrates speech, see Gruen 1984: 498-500. Gruen emphasizes that Callicrates' ascendancy between 180-175 was only temporary, pointing to the fact that of the names of the Achaean *strategoi* elected in the ten years following Callicrates' term, they all belonged to the anti-Callicrates faction: Xenarchus (175/174), Archon (172/171 and 170/169), and Xenon (before 167).

[20] In 191 Philopoemen had secured Sparta as a member of the League, despite resistance from the Spartans. In 189, a group of Spartans massacred Achaean sympathisers in Sparta. In response, Philopoemen, the strategos of that year, punished those guilty by executing eighty Spartans at Compasium, located on the Laconian frontier (Polyb. 22.3.1-4). Plutarch, following Polybius, puts the

While the majority of Achaean leaders, led by Philopoemen, Lycortas, and Archon, defended Achaean policy regarding Sparta (22.10.8) and refused to summon the popular assembly without a written request from the Senate, as the terms of the treaty with Rome stipulated (22.10.10-12), both Aristaenus and Diophanes of Megalopolis betrayed their duty to Achaea. Polybius explains that through his silence, Aristaenus indicated his tacit disapproval of the Achaean treatment of Sparta, thereby siding with Caecilius over the League (22.10.3).[21] Even more treacherously, Diophanes spoke before the council, suggesting to Caecilius that not only had Achaea been in the wrong in dealing with Sparta but that the League under Philopoemen had similarly mismanaged the affairs of the Messenians, thereby undermining the Edict of Flamininus, which had stated in 196 that all Greek cities would be governed by their own laws (22.10.5-6).[22] As with Callicrates' later actions before the Roman Senate in 181/180 and the Rhodians in 167, Diophanes betrayed Achaea by bringing such matters to Rome's attention - matters that it was his duty to keep concealed (38.4.7). Indeed, Polybius makes it clear that it was not misguided patriotism but rather personal dislike of Philopoemen that drove their actions (22.10.4, 14). As such, the Achaeans blamed Aristaenus and Diophanes for both Caecilius' visit as well as the earlier visit in 189 of Marcus Fulvius, creating unnecessary friction between the League and Rome (22.10.14). As such, Polybius notes that following their support of Caecilius, Aristaenus and Diophanes were viewed by the Achaeans with suspicion (ὑποψία, 22.10.15).

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number of executed Spartans at 80, though he notes other sources place the number as high as 350 (Plut. *Phil.* 16).

[21] Polybius' interpretation of Aristaenus' silence has been accepted without question by Castellani 1963: 91-93; Lehmann 1967: 263-265; and Deininger 1971: 121-122. Errington 1972: 167-171; Walbank 1979: 192-193; and Gruen 1984: 486 call into doubt Polybius' claims, Errington going so far as to paint Polybius as blindly following Philopoemen's political propaganda. Either way, Polybius' feelings on the matter are clear as were the real suspicions about Aristaenus at the time: Polyb. 22.10.14-13, 24.13.10.

[22] On the situation in Messene and Philopoemen's interference in the Spring of 188, see Errington 1969: 155, n. 1; Walbank 1979: 193-194 (with notes); Champion 2004a: 128-129.

Polybius levies similar criticism at several Greek statesmen during the Third Macedonian War. Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius, the legates whom the Roman proconsul Aulus Hostilius Mancinus sent throughout Greece in 169, arrived before the Aetolian assembly meeting at Thermum to request that the Aetolians should give hostages (28.4.1-2). Rather than defend Aetolian interests, however, most of the statesmen used the meeting to try and advance their own personal political ambitions. Thus, Proandrus denounced his political opponents to the Romans (28.4.3). Lyciscus went so far as to say that the Romans ought to have punished not just the leaders of the faction opposed to Rome but all their supporters as well, calling out Archedamus and Pantaleon. Such treacherous actions, Polybius maintains, were not motivated by concern for the state but by the personal ambitions and squabbles of the Aetolian statesmen in question, making them shameful and servile toward an outside power (ἀναισχύντως καὶ ἀνελευθέρως) according to Pantaleon (28.4.9). Rather it should have been their duty to protect their fellow Aetolians against Roman reprisal (cf. 38.4.7).

Similar treachery is found among the Acarnanians when Popilius and Octavius arrive there shortly after leaving Thermum. At the assembly meeting at Thyreum, Chremas and Glaucus leveled false accusations (διαβάλλειν τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους, 28.5.5) against their political opponents, even going so far as to beg the Romans to establish garrisons in Acarnania (28.5.1-5). As with Proandrus and Lyciscus, this treachery was clearly motivated by their own personal ambitions, and they were willing to sacrifice the independence of the state to achieve this - a clear example of treachery is defined by Polybius at 18.13-15. Thus, the statesman Diogenes rightly informed the Roman legates that Chremas and Glaucus desired to establish their own power

(κατασκευάζεσθαι δυναστείαν) and use the garrison to execute their own ambitious projects (ταῖς αὐτῶν πλεονεξίαις, 28.5.5).[23]

Clear condemnation is likewise found in Polybius' description of the traitorous Logbasis at the city of Selge in Pisidia, a region in southwestern Asia Minor.[24] During Achaeus' treasonous conquests in Asia Minor in 218 during the Fourth Syrian War, the Selgians had been defeated in battle during their siege of Pednelissus by Achaeus' commander Garsyeris (5.72-73).[25] Now looking to the defense of their own city, the Selgians sent Logbasis, one of their leading citizens, to attempt to negotiate reasonable terms. Logbasis was chosen because he had been friends with Antiochus Hierax, the son of Antiochus II (5.74.4-5), and had raised Laodice, the daughter of King Mithridates II of Pontus, the wife of Achaeus, and the sister-in-law of Antiochus III (5.74.4-5; cf. 5.43, 8.22-23).[26] Upon meeting with Garsyeris, however, rather than pursue what was in the best interest of Selge (ἀπέσχε τοῦ βοηθεῖν τῇ πατρίδι), Logbasis sought to betray the city to Achaeus (ἐγχειριεῖν αὐτοῖς τὴν πόλιν, 5.74.7). Thus, while Garsyeris offered the Selgians a truce and continued to drag out negotiations, Achaeus made his way toward the city, and Logbasis prepared his treacherous designs (5.74.9). Logbasis secretly collected a number of soldiers at his house, men who had come into the city from Garsyeris' camp to purchase provisions (5.75.8), and on the day when the entire Selgian citizenry gathered in assembly to finalize negotiations, he signaled to

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[23] The claim is made by Diogenes, who wisely advises the Roman legates to not forced a garrison upon the Acarnanians as if they were enemies (28.5.3-4). Polybius gives the reader no reason to doubt Diogenes' claims.

[24] Selge had originally been a colony of the Spartans: Strabo 13.7.3.

[25] On the background of Achaeus' campaign in Pisidia against Attalus, see Meloni 1950: 161-183; Walbank 1957: 600-601; Will 1982: 47-48; Ma 1999: 58; Dmitriev 1999: 397-411; D'Agostini 2014: 44-45 (with notes). On Attalus' counterattack against Achaeus at this time (cf. Polyb. 5.77.2-78.6), see Meloni 1949: 535-533; Meloni 1950: 161-183; Walbank 1957: 600-601; Schmitt 1964: 161; Dmitriev 1999: 397-411; Ma 1999: 55-59; Ager 2012: 421-429. On the cessation of these hostility after Raphia, which included the recognition of the kingdom of Pergamum (Polyb. 5.107.4), see Schmitt 1964: 264-267; Ma 1999: 59-60; Grainger 2010: 216-218.

[26] On Logbasis' connection with Laodice and the complex web of relations across the Syrian court, see Walbank 1957: 600-601; Thornton 2002: 449; D'Agostini 2014: 45-51. On the career of Hierax, see Walbank 1957: 600.

Achaeus and Garsyeris to attack as the guards were all away from their posts (5.75.9-76.2).[27] It was only blind luck that saved the Selgians, as a goatherd noticed the approaching forces and warned the assembly in time to repulse the attack on the city (5.76.3-9). With Logbasis' treachery (πράξεως) now evident, a group of Selgians likewise went to his house and murdered him, his sons, and the soldiers gathered (5.76.4). Polybius criticizes Logbasis as a traitor to his own city, emphasizing that after nearly losing their independence due to Logbasis' impious treachery (ἀσέβειαν), the Selgians managed to preserve their city due to their own valor (σφετέραν εὐτολμίαν, 5.76.11). Rather than keep faith with his own people, Logbasis' motivations were inspired by his eagerness to receive the rewards that Achaeus would bestow upon him for betraying the city.

In many ways, Logbasis' treacherous attempt to betray Selge to a foreign power parallels the actions of the exiles of Cynaetha in the Peloponnesus during the Social War.[28] Polybius explains that in 220, after petitioning the pro-Achaean faction in control of the city, some 300 exiles were allowed to return to Cynaetha and reclaim their citizenship and property (4.17.4-8). Despite this show of goodwill, however, and despite swearing the most binding oaths (λαβόντες πίστεις τῶν παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις νομιζομένων τὰς ἰσχυροτάτας, 4.17.9) to the gods, the exiles immediately decided to betray the city to the Aetolians (τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τοὺς πιστεύσαντας ἀσεβείας 4.17.11).[29] When the Aetolians consented to the plot, those exiles who held the office of

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[27] Polybius condemns this practice of allowing such interchange between the city and the hostile camp, pointing to the countless times that such a practice has allowed for the betrayal and fall of cities. In the refusal of people to recognize this and change their ways, he muses that while humans are supposed to be the most cunning (πανουργότατον) of all animals, they are the most easily duped (εὐπαραλογιστότατον, 5.75.2-6). Eckstein 1995: 146, n. 106, 247 connects this Polybian critique especially with the disastrous inexperience of youth. Walbank 1957: 601 connects this passage with Polybius larger concern with history as a lesson in the art of generalship, including his book on *Tactics*.

[28] On the background of the Social War, see: Fine 1940: 129; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 373-389.

[29] Polybius' explains that the city had been consumed with lawless strife (παρανομία) caused by a failure of education combined with the natural harshness of the region in Arcadia. Thus, as the abandonment of education (4.21.11) had caused the chaos, a return to education, especially music, was the only solution

Polemarch treacherously killed their colleagues at night and opened the gates for the Aetolians to attack the city and overwhelm the unsuspecting Cynaetheans (4.18.1-7).[30] Again, Polybius' condemnation of this betrayal of fellow citizens is especially harsh given the kindness shown to the exiles in allowing for their return to the city. This instance, then, did not just constitute a betrayal of their fellow citizens (πατρίδι), but of their very preservers (σώσασι, 4.17.10), despite owing their own safety and survival to them (4.17.12). Indeed, at the same time that they were pledging good faith through sacrifices to the gods (4.17.9-11), they were impiously plotting to break faith with heaven and with those who trusted them (τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τοὺς πιστεύσαντας ἀσεβείας, 4.17.11). Nor, Polybius emphasizes, did the exiles have some cause or pretext (αἰτίας ἢ προφάσεως, 4.17.10) with which to justify their treachery. Rather, in choosing to betray their own kinsmen and betray the city to the Aetolians, the Cynaethean exiles were only concerned with personal desires. Polybius ultimately confirms this complete lack of justification for their actions by praising the Aetolians for killing the exiles and plundering their property upon the recapture of Cynaetha (4.18.7).[31] The death of the exiles, he maintains, was a supreme act of justice (δικαιότατον) among all of the injustices (ἀδίκων, 4.18.7) on that day.

The Carthaginian statesman Hasdrubal abandoned his own state in a similar way at the end of the Third Punic War. After a three-year campaign, the Romans in the spring of 146, now under the command of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, had managed to capture the Cothon wall of

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to return the Cynaethans from their current bestial states back to humanity (4.21.3-4). See Wunderer 1905: 39; Pedech 1964: 307; Eckstein 1995: 137-138; Walbank 2002: 197-200; Derow 2012: 81-82. On the general nature of decline associated with Cynaetha, see Eckstein 1995 137-138; Walbank 2002: 197-200; Baronowski 2011: 138-142.On this strife's connection with Cleomenes' reforms and the larger series of socio-economic revolutions throughout Greece in 227-146, see Mendels 1982: 88-90.

[30] On the undisciplined mob violence at work with the subsequent massacres. See Ferrabino 1921: 142-144; Walbank 1940: 29-30; Walbank 1957: 464; Mendels 1982: 88-90; Walbank 2002: 197-200

[31] The city seems to have been completely destroyed by the Aetolians, hence Strabo 8.8.2 claims that it no longer exists. The city seems to have been resettled, however, as it is later visited by Pausanias (8.19.1).

Carthage, seize control of the city's double harbors, and launch an attack against the Byrsa - the walled citadel overlooking the city.[32] It was at this point that Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian politician who had governed Carthaginian affairs and led the resistance against Rome since 149, attempted to surrender the city to Scipio in exchange for his own safety (38.20.1-10).[33] Hasdrubal's decision to seek out personal safety rather than pursue the best interests of the remaining Carthaginians is condemned sharply by Polybius as well as by the Carthaginians who witnessed his betrayal.[34] It had only been a short time before that Hasdrubal had announced to the Numidian king Golosses, acting to arrange negotiations with Scipio, that "the day would never come on which he would look both upon the son and upon his city being consumed by flames, for to perish within the flames of one's native city was a noble funeral for wise men" (38.8.8-9).[35] Thus, while Polybius says that such high-souled (μεγαλόψυχον) words ought to be admired (θαυμάζειν), the reality of

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[32] As Scipio Aemilianus systematically destroyed the city, the 50,000 surviving Carthaginians in the Byrsa surrendered in exchange for their lives (App. *Pun.* 130). No terms were given, however, to Hasdrubal, his wife, and his two sons, nor to the 900 Italian deserters. The number of survivors varies across our sources: Florus 1.31.16 places it at 36,000 and Oros. 4.23.2-3 places it at 55,000. Hasdrubal along with his family and the deserters too refuse in the temple of Eshmoun (Asclepius) before ultimately surrendering. See Walbank 1979: 720-721. On assault of Carthage and the Carthaginian defenses, see Walbank 1979: 695-696, 720-721; Goldsworthy 2000: 338-349; Campbell 2006: 113-114.

[33] Hasdrubal had commanded the Carthaginian forces in 150 against Massinissa, but was condemned to death after being decisively defeated and causing the Romans to raise an army in response to the Carthaginian violation of their treaty (App. *Pun.* 316-342). Hasdrubal evaded execution, however, raising an army and remaining outside of the city (App. *Pun.* 347). He was reinstated by the Carthaginians in 149 when they decided to resist the Roman demand to rebuild their city further inland (Polyb. 36.3-7; App. *Pun.* 347-441; Dio 32.6, 32.9). Between 149 and 147 he led Carthaginian forces with moderate success against the Romans in the countryside (App. *Pun.* 479-483, 519-527, 596-604). Shortly after Scipio Aemilianus' arrival in Africa, Hasdrubal transferred his army to Carthage itself and assumed total authority over the city (App. *Pun.* 560-562; cf. 526-527). For a summary of these events, see Walbank 1979: 695-696; Baronowski 2011: 117-118.

[34] Eckstein 1995: 46-47, 265-266; Baronowski 2011: 98-99, 199, n. 4.

[35] οὐδέποτε ταύτην ἔσεσθαι τὴν ἡμέραν ἔφασκεν ἐν ᾗ συμβήσεται τὸν ἥλιον Ἀσδρούβαν βλέπειν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα πυρπολουμένην· καλὸν γὰρ ἐντάφιον εἶναι τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὸ ταύτης πῦρ. At this juncture, Scipio had offered Hasdrubal safety for himself, his family, his slaves, ten additional families of his choosing, and ten talents of his private wealth in exchange for the surrender of the city (38.9.4). Walbank 1979: 697-698 argues that this saying is an adaptation of the saying spoken to Dionysius I by Heloris when proposing to flee the besieged city of Syracuse in 196 (Isoc. *Archid.* 44-45; Diod. 14.8.5, 20.78.2; Plut. *Cato mai.* 24.8; Aelian, *Var. hist.* 4.8). Thus, when spoken by Hasdrubal in 146 it would have evoked associations with tyranny.

Hasdrubal's actions was just the opposite, marked by ignobility (ἀγεννίαν) and cowardice (ἀνανδρίαν, 38.8.10).[36]

Hasdrubal's betrayal of Carthage was the final act of treason in a series of self-interested decisions carried out by the Carthaginian leader.[37] While the Carthaginian populace suffered and died from famine and starvation, Hasdrubal hosted drinking parties and multi-course banquets for his friends (38.8.11-12), "living (and looking) like a fatted ox at a festival" (38.8.7).[38] Polybius likewise emphasizes that the Carthaginian leader maintained his control over the city through violence and terror against his fellow citizens, ruling not as a patriotic statesman but as a self-interested tyrant (τύραννος, 38.8.13). The final series of condemnations stems from Polybius' comparison with Hasdrubal's wife as well as with the Achaean statesman Diaeus. With Carthage nearly captured, Hasdrubal came before Scipio as a suppliant, begging for his life. Upon seeing this, some of his fellow citizens abused him for his willingness to seek out his own safety rather than the salvation of the state, ridiculing him for his cowardice (ἀνανδρίαν) and baseness (ἀγεννίαν, 38.20.4-5).[39] Indeed, Hasdrubal's ἀνανδρίαν (literally his "lack of manhood") at this moment is set in contrast with his wife, who was among the Carthaginians witnessing his betrayal. She berated Hasdrubal by name, questioning how he could treacherously desert (αὐτομολήσας) his fellow citizens, shamelessly abandon (ἀναισχύντως ἐγκαταλιπὼν) his own state, and secretly

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[36] Baronowski 2011: 98-99, 199, n. 4 points to this episode as an example of Polybius' tendency to highlight instances of arrogant behavior that is met with corresponding humiliation with the reversal of circumstances. On Polybius' paralleling of Scipio Africanus as a man of action and not empty words, as opposed to Hasdrubal's empty assertions (cf. 31.29.11), see Eckstein 1995: 253, n. 53.

[37] Baronowski 2011: 117-119 suggests that Polybius' critique of Hasdrubal's actions is largely contingent upon the ultimate (and unnecessary) destruction of Carthage as a result. Polybius' condemnation, however, stems from Hasdrubal's treacherous actions regardless of their outcome. Hasdrubal's disastrous policy against the Romans, should not be equated with his ultimate betrayal of his own state. On the latter, also see Pedech 1964: 200; Eckstein 1995: 218, n. 100.

[38] διαιτᾶσθαι παραπλησίως τοῖς σιτευτοῖς βουσίν. On Polybius' (separate) criticism of Hasdrubal's policy,

[39] On Polybius' condemnation of cowardly leadership, including Aratus of Sicyon (4.8.5-6) and Diaeus and Critolaus (Paus. 7.15.2-4, 7.16.3-4), see Eckstein 1995: 170, n. 33, 243, n. 22.

go over to the enemy (ὑπέλθοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, 38.20.9). As we saw in the previous chapter, the great shame (ἀναισχύντως) associated with Hasdrubal's treachery is telling of Polybius' criticism. While Hasdrubal refused to even meet his wife's eyes, she maintained her "freedom-loving and pure" character (ἐλευθερίως καὶ σεμνῶς) and ultimately died by throwing herself and her children from the citadel into the burning streets, thereby earning the noble funeral (καλὸν ἐντάφιον) to which Hasdrubal referred earlier (38.8.9).[40]

Polybius also emphasizes that Hasdrubal's self-interested treachery against his own state was in many ways reflective of similar actions carried out in Achaea in 146 by the statesmen Critolaus and Diaeus: "It would not be easy to find two men more alike than those who then swayed the destinies of Greece and Carthage" (38.8.14).[41] The origins of the Achaean War against Rome stemmed from the ongoing question of Sparta's membership within the Achaean League that Rome had failed to address definitively. Despite repeated pleas by Q. Caecilius Metellus, the Roman consul concluding the war against Andriscus in Macedonia, to keep peace with the Spartans, the Achaeans marched against Sparta both in the spring and the fall of 148 and crushed its attempt to break away from the League. A delegation from Rome finally arrived in the summer of 147, led by L. Aurelius Orestes, to address the issue.[42] Aurelius informed the Achaeans that not only Sparta, but also Corinth, Argos, Heraclea, and Orchomenus, were to be stripped from the League. The Achaean response was violence against the Roman ambassadors, who barely managed to escape with their lives (at least according to their report to the Senate upon their

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[40] For the death of Hasdrubal's wife and children, see Livy *Ep.* 51. Note in describing Hasdrubal's wife as ἐλευθερίως, Polybius also offsets her character against the tyrannical behavior exhibited by Hasdrubal in leading Carthage (38.8.13). On her courage opposing Hasdrubal's cowardice, see Eckstein 1995 46-47, 265-266; cf. App. *Pun.* 131-132.

[41] διότι προστάτας πραγμάτων ὁμοιοτέρους τῶν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τότε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ὑπαρξάντων οὐκ ἂν εὕροι τις ῥᾳδίως. On this connection to Critolaus and Diaeus, see Walbank 1979: 698; Baronowski 2011: 120-121.

[42] On the dating of this embassy, see Morgan 1969: 437; Walbank 1979: 699.

return).[43] Despite this, the next Roman delegation that came to Aegium under Sex. Julius Caesar sought reconciliation rather than punishment, forgiving this foolish transgression (ἀλογημάτων, 38.10.2) against Aurelius Orestes and no longer threatening to detach the aforementioned members of the League (38.9.1-4; cf. 38.10.1-5).[44] Thus, Polybius maintains that when the war did break out, it was not Roman aggression that was to blame but the folly of Achaean leadership, namely Critolaus and Diaeus. The Achaean historian points to the fact that, unlike with the events surrounding the Third Punic War, the Achaean War was carried out against Rome in such an unreasonable manner (οὐδ᾽...εὔλογον) that even posterity would be forced to condemn Achaean action at this time (38.1.5).

Yet more than just reckless, the actions taken by Critolaus and Diaeus were treacherous against the Achaeans themselves.[45] While those Achaeans of sound mind (σωφρονοῦν 38.10.6) recognized the gift of Roman leniency, Critolaus worked to undermine Sextus' attempts to make peace, first sabotaging the attempts at Tegea to reach a settlement between Sparta and Achaea (38.11.2-6), and after Sextus' departure from Greece, traveling from city to city to stir up resentment against the Romans (38.11.7-9).[46] He likewise worked to solidify power in his own

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[43] For an overview of this sequence of events, see Gruen 1976: 53-66; Ferrary 1978: 769-770; Harris 1979: 240-244 (though cynical); Walbank 1979: 698-708; Champion 2004a: 159-160; Rosenstein 2012: 229-231; Baronowski 120-123.

[44] Livy *Per.* 51; Paus. 7.14-1. Aurelius Orestes and Sextus Julius had been co-consuls in 157. Scholars have pondered the reversal of Roman policy against Achaea at this time. Polybius himself suggests that the Senate had no actual plans to break up the Achaean League, but rather were bluffing to curb Achaean aggression (38.9). Some scholars, however, cynically suggest that the Romans were merely playing for time as their wars in Africa, Spain, and Macedonia were still unsettled. See Gruen 1976: 46-69; Harris 1979: 240-244; Derow 1989: 319-323; Rosenstein 2012: 230-231.

[45] For more on Polybius' negative judgment of Achaean leadership in this period, see: Eckstein 1995: 159, 169-170, 220, 265-266; Kallet-Marx 1995: 73-74; Champion 2004a: 160, 166-167; Baronowski 2011: 120-124.

[46] Despite promising to come to Tegea to work on a settlement with Sparta, Critolaus convinced the Achaeans to send him alone to negotiate on their behalf. Throughout the negotiations, however, Critolaus refused to compromise on any points and informed Sextus that he was unable to make any binding decisions without first consulting the Achaean Assembly. Sextus realizes that he is intentionally blocking negotiations (ἐθελοκακοῦντα, 38.11.6) and ends the conference. On this diplomatic sabotage and

hands by encouraging the forgiveness of debts and the release of debtors from prison, thereby baiting (δελεαζόμενον) the mob (πλῆθος) to support any decision he made (38.11.11).[47] These personal motivations became even more clear at the Achaean Assembly meeting six months later. When Caecilius Metellus caught wind of the confusion and disorder (ἀκρισίαν καὶ ταραχὴν, 38.12.1) that had sprung up throughout the Peloponnesus, he sent another delegation to Achaea comprised of Gnaeus Papirius, Popilius Laenas the younger, Aulus Gabinius, and Gaius Fannius. Yet when they came before the Achaean Assembly at Corinth, once more hoping for reconciliation, the Achaeans threw them out of the meeting with shouts and jeers (θορύβου καὶ κραυγῆς ἐξέβαλον, 38.12.4).[48]

With the mob now firmly backing him, Critolaus solidified his power over Achaea affairs as had been his plan all along (εὐχὴν, 38.12.7). He claimed that those who did not act with him against Roman wishes were behaving no better than women (38.12.9), and when some of the Achaean elders sought to check him, he intimidated them with the soldiery (38.13.1) and leveled accusations of treason against them (συνεργοῦντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, 38.13.3).[49] In this way, he brought charges against his political opponents, including Euagoras of Aegium and Stratius of Tritaea, who had previously met with the Roman legates (38.13.4-5). Having further stirred up the crowd with

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discussion on the meeting in general, see Larsen 1968: 187; De Sanctis 1964: 142; Walbank 1979: 702-703; Baronowski 2011: 123.

[47] See Fuks 1970: 79-81; Walbank 1979: 703-705.

[48] On the connection between this event at Corinth and the ultimate destruction of the city by Mummius, see Veyne 1975: 819; Kallet-Marx 1995: 84-85. Morgan 1969: 439, n. 82 suggests that this Roman embassy was sent for the purpose of precipitating a war with Achaea. This is unsupported by either Polybius or Pausanius (c.f. 7.15.2), and seems unlikely in its own right.

[49] ἐὰν μὲν ἄνδρες ὦσιν, οὐκ ἀπορήσουσι συμμάχων (38.12.9). These members of the γερουσίας (38.13.1) were likely the body of advisors to the Achaean strategos (δαμιουργοῖς, 23.5.16; cf. Livy 32.22.2, 38.30.1-5). On the organization of these Achaean magistrates, see Walbank 1957: 219-220; Veligianni-Terzi 1977: 103-107; Walbank 1979: 705-707; Rhodes 1997: 106-107; Baronowski 2011: 205, n. 26. who along with the he *arkhontes* of the Achaean League, consisting of the strategos and his board of advisors (the *damiourgoi*). The troops guarding Critolaus were likely a selection of Achaean troops serving as his bodyguard as general, unlikely a separate company of mercenaries as Musti 1967: 205 suggests.

these claims, Critolaus persuaded them first to vote for renewed war against Sparta, knowing full well this meant war with Rome as well (38.13.6), and then to pass an unconstitutional decree (ἕτερον ψήφισμα παράνομον) granting the strategos absolute power over Achaean affairs, granting Critolaus something resembling despotism (μοναρχικὴν ἀνέλαβεν ἐξουσίαν, 38.13.7).[50]

Polybius' condemnation of Critolaus and Diaeus is patent. As we have already seen, the Achaean historian places sole responsibility for the downfall of the League onto the leadership of 148-146. Thus, he calls these leaders an intentional selection from each city of the most inferior, most impious, and most outrageous men (ἐπίτηδες ἐξ ἑκάστης πόλεως κατ᾽ ἐκλογὴν οἱ χείριστοι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ καὶ λυμαινόμενοι τὸ ἔθνος).[51] Polybius views Critolaus and Diaeus as betraying the Achaean League by corrupting the body-politic from within (38.10.8) in order to solidify their own position. Nor was the ultimate end of Achaean independence surprising, given the ignorance and wickedness (ἀπειρίαν καὶ κακίαν) of those in power (38.10.13). The result of their senseless policy (ἄγνοιαν) was a miserable Achaea (ταλαίπωρον ἔθνος, 38.10.12) that would continue on in its driveling state (ἐκορύζων αἱ πόλεις, 38.12.5) caused by the inflamed populace until the league's dissolution in 146.

Polybius holds Critolaus personally responsible for many of these disastrous decisions during the years leading up to the war.[52] He is described as an ignorant madman (ἄγνοιαν καὶ

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[50] On the apparent Achaean surprise at Rome's decision to intervene with force, see Polyb. 38.16.11-12; Paus. 7.15.3-6, 7.15.10-11; Walbank 1979: 701-702; Gruen 1984: 522. On the illegality of the vote to consolidate power in Critolaus' hands, see Walbank 1979: 707-708.

[51] Eckstein 1995: 139, n. 85, 159; Champion 2004a: 166-167, 187-188, 220, 232 places Critolaus and Diaeus among those unsavory leaders condemned by Polybius for choosing demagogic policies. Thus, see similarly the policies of Scopas and Dorimachus in Aetolia (13.1.1-3); Malpagoras at Cius (15.21.1-2); Agathocles at Alexandria (15.25.36); and certain Aetolian factions in the 170s (Livy 42.13.8, taken from Polybius). On Polybius' presentation of Critolaus as a tyrant, see Musti 1967: 203-205.

[52] On Polybius' critique of and blame of war on Achaean leadership, see Kallet-Marx 1995: 73-74, n. 65; Eckstein 1995: 159, 169-170, 220, 265-266; Baronowski 2011: 122-123. Kallet-Marx suggests that blaming Critolaus and Diaeus was also a way for Polybius to shift responsibility away from the Achaean populace. On accusations of cowardice, especially leveled at Critolaus, see Paus. 7.15.2-4 (Critolaus) and Paus 7.16.3-4 (Diaeus). Yet we can see Achaean determination to resist the Romans, despite Polybius' claims: Polyb. 38.16-18; De Sanctis 1964: 153; Fuks 1970: 87-88; Gruen 1984: 522-523. We

μανίαν, 38.11.6) during his diplomatic sabotaging at Tegea, and called a cheat and a fraud (ἐμπορεύων καὶ μεθοδευόμενος, 38.12.10) in his attempts to convince the crowd to renew war with Sparta against Roman wishes. Ultimately, Polybius holds Critolaus' actions to be completely lacking in reason (οὐδενὶ λόγῳ) and in violation of the laws of both gods and men (ἀσεβεστάτοις καὶ παρανομωτάτοις, 38.13.8). Indeed, Critolaus' mobilization of the populace against the Romans as well as against his political opponents in Achaea closely parallels the action of Spendius and the Carthaginian mercenaries in Polybius' first book. In this instance, Spendius intentionally persuaded the mercenaries to commit impious (ἀσέβειαν, 1.79.8) atrocities against the Carthaginian commander Gesco in the face of surprising leniency shown by Hamilcar.[53] By doing so, Spendius managed to solidify power in his own hands, stir up the mercenaries against Carthage, and attack political opponents who spoke out against him, calling them traitors and enemies (προδότας καὶ πολεμίους, 1.80.3). The similarities paralleled by Polybius are striking and not at all flattering for Critolaus, as the Achaean leader pushes the Achaean League toward a destructive point of no return by stirring up the mob to commit atrocities at Corinth.

Critolaus' time as strategos of the Achaean League in 147/146 was short-lived, however, as he was killed in or after the battle of Scarpheia in 146.[54] The Achaean forces under Critolaus

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should note that Polybius' critique of their failure to conduct the war with ample courage and energy speaks against the notion that Polybius was somehow in full support of the Roman war against Achaea, despite Walbank 1972: 16-20. See Eckstein 1995: 220, n. 107-108.

[53] Spendius convinced the mercenaries to treacherously (παρεσπόνδησαν, 1.79.10) arrest Gesco and then ultimately to torture and kill the Carthaginian commander as well as all the other Carthaginians whom they had taken prisoner. They did this by cutting off their hands, then their other extremities, then breaking their legs, and finally throwing them into still alive into a pit to die (1.80.11-13). The speakers who argued for leniency (or at least the avoidance of torture) were themselves stoned to death (1.80.9). On this account, see chapter 2.

[54] When the Senate heard that Critolaus had openly declared war against Rome as well as Sparta, and that the Achaeans had been joined by Boeotians and Chalcidians, they sent the consul Lucius Mummius with a fleet and army to wage war against Achaea. Hoping to receive credit for settling the conflict himself, however, Metellus brought his army from Macedonia through Thessaly, marching along the coast. Critolaus, who was besieging Heraclea Oetea to force it back into the League, caught wind of Metellus' approach and retreated to Scarpheia situated on the coast of Locris. Pausanias suggests that

were crushed by the Roman forces under Metellus, leaving command of the League in the hands of Diaeus, the strategos of the previous year.[55] Yet Polybius' assessment of Diaeus is no less critical. And indeed, it is Diaeus and not Critolaus who is negatively paralleled with Hasdrubal in 38.8.14.

As with his predecessor, Diaeus' actions constituted a clear betrayal of Achaean interests. By freeing twelve thousand slaves in every Achaean city (38.15.3-5), extorting money from wealthy men and women (38.15.6, 15.11), and forcing all men who could bear arms to muster at Corinth (38.15.7), Diaeus plunged Achaea into a total state of confusion, disorder, and despondency (πλήρεις ἀκρισίας, ταραχῆς, δυσθυμίασ, 38.15.8).[56] Indeed, Polybius maintains that Diaeus' ignorant and frenzied leadership (προεστῶτος ἀγνοίᾳ καὶ παρακοπῇ, 38.16.2) brought utter ruin (ὄλεθρον εἰσέφερον, 38.16.1) to the League, causing Achaeans to envy those Greeks who had already been killed (38.15.9 cf. 38.16.4-10). Polybius' condemnation of Diaeus' leadership over Achaea in 146 ultimately comes through most severely in his recounting of the strategos' treacherous actions taken against his own people. Following the Roman victory at Scarpheia, Metellus offered peace to the Achaeans on surprisingly lenient terms, sending word through Andronidas, Philo of Thessaly, and other Achaean statesmen who had been sent as an embassy to the Roman commander (38.17.2-5). Despite these kind offers, however, Diaeus convinced the assembly to refuse peace, not believing that he would personally escape punishment given his role in the affair (38.17.7).[57] In this way, he betrayed his duty to his country (γενναίως),

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Critolaus drowned in the salt marshes off of the coast during the battle or ensuing flight, while Livy asserts that he poisoned himself: Pausanias 7.14-15; Livy *Ep.* 52; Orosius 5.3.

[55] On the earlier career of Diaeus, see Walbank 1979: 701.

[56] On Polybius' critique of Diaeus, see Walbank 1979: 701, 712-717; Eckstein 1995: 139, 159, 169-170, 265-266; Champion 2004a: 160, 166-167; Baronowski 2011: 97, 120.

[57] Similar motivations prompted the refusal of Utica and Hippocritae to surrender to Carthage in 238 (1.88.1-2), again drawing parallels between the Achaean leadership and the wicked Mercenaries of the Libyan War.

placing his own safety above the safety of the Achaean people (πολλῶν σωτηρίας, 38.17.8). The

disastrous results that followed for Achaea were a reflection of Diaeus' wicked character

(38.18.1).[58] He likewise treacherously imprisoned and murdered his fellow statesmen to further

guarantee the preservation of his own power and the continuation of anti-Roman sentiment. Thus,

upon their return as ambassadors to Metellus, he imprisoned Andronidas, Lagius, Archippus, and

even Sosicrates, the current hipparchus of the League (38.18.2), going so far as to torture Sosicrates

to death on the rack (38.18.3). The others were only released after Diaeus had exacted money from

them (38.18.4-5). Nor was this an isolated incident. Polybius explains that shortly before, he had

similarly flogged and racked Philinus as well as his sons to death, torturing them before each

others' eyes, surpassing even barbarians in his insanity and lack of judgment (τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ τῆς

ἀκρισίας, 38.18.6-7). The Achaean historian concludes his condemnation of Diaeus by marveling

at the fact that his wild insanity (ἄνοιαν καὶ μανίαν) did not result in the complete destruction of

Achaea (38.18.8). Rather, the League's salvation came from the swiftness of its defeat, preventing

Diaeus from fully revealing the additional treacheries he had planned and ending the conflict

before Roman anger could become further aroused (38.18.9-12). Ultimately, while Polybius

criticizes the decision to fight a hopeless war against Rome, it is the actions taken by Critolaus and

Diaeus against their own state for personal gain that Polybius condemns most severely.

Examples of treacherous actions carried out against fellow citizens are also found

within the Spartan state, beginning with Polybius' depictions of the Social War. Following the

dissolution of the Spartan monarchy after Antigonus' victory at Sellesia in 222, the Spartans

began to fall into various political factions fighting for control of the state. By 220, at the onset

of the Social War between Philip V and the Aetolians, this factionalism had deeply divided

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[58] ὅθεν ἐν τοιούτοις ὄντος τοῦ διαβουλίου καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀκόλουθον ἐξέβη τῶν δοξάντων.

Sparta, with three of the five ephors throwing their support behind the pro-Aetolian faction (4.22.5).[59] When Philip unexpectedly marched south and forced the Aetolians to retreat from the Peloponnesus, however, two of these ephors were afraid that the third, Adeimantus, would reveal their disloyalty to the king (4.22.7).[60] Thus, they arranged for some of the younger Spartan men to attack Adeimantus during an assembly at the temple of Athene of the Brazen House. The treacherous attack resulted in the murder of Adeimantus as well as Sthenelaus, Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and other leading citizens (4.22.8-11). According to Polybius, in acting not to preserve Spartan independence but acting for personal considerations, these ephors acted treacherously against their fellow citizens, carrying out such great wickedness (κακοπραγμοσύνην) that some of Philip's advisors suggested that he destroy the city (4.23.8).[61] The Achaean historian confirms his condemnation of these actions by drawing a parallel between this treachery and various instances of Spartan treachery (παρασπονδήσαντος) that occurred in the past, pointing to their capture of the Cadmea in 382 (4.27.4), their refusal to liberate the Greek cities that were declared free and independent under the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas in 387 (4.27.5), and their expulsion of the Mantineans from their home in 385 (4.27.5-6).[62] Polybius maintains that such behavior, as with Spartan treacheries during the Social War, highlighted Spartan folly (ἀνοίᾳ) and wickedness (κακίας, 4.27.7). He likewise

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[59] Polybius explains that these ephors did not believe Philip would be able to affairs in the Peloponnesus given his young age. This is the same motivation behind Aetolian aggressions that began the Social War (4.5.3).

[60] While political allies to an extent, it appears that Adeimantus disapproved of the wicked character of his two fellow ephors. He was clearly right to be concerned given what followed. On Spartan treachery and disloyalty toward Philip despite the past kindness of Antigonus in 222, see chapter 2.

[61] Some Spartans had anticipated the ephors treachery and had already fled to Philip, informing his council that Adeimantus had not been responsible for the disturbances as the ephors maintained (4.22.12-23.1-2). See Hammond and Walbank 1988: 372-373. For a full discussion of this threat of destruction, see chapter 5.

[62] Baronowski 2011: 66-67.

later calls the ephors' massacre (σφαγῆς, 4.34.3) of their fellow citizens insane and wicked (ἀλογίας καὶ κακίας, 4.34.1).

Nor did Spartan treachery in the war end with Adeimantus' death. The pro-Aetolian faction set about making a formal alliance with the Aetolians. Using the young men to intimidate the ephors (δεδιότες τὴν τῶν νέων συστροφήν, 4.34.6), they forced them to promise to restore the ancient monarchy and to allow Machatas, the Aetolian envoy, to speak before the Spartan general assembly (4.34.4-6). The Aetolian proceeded to denounce the Macedonians with reckless and random accusations (εἰκῇ μὲν καὶ θρασέως κατηγορῶν) while heaping absurd and false praise upon the Spartans (ἀλόγως καὶ ψευδῶς ἐγκωμιάζων, 4.34.7), but the assembly ultimately decided to maintain the alliance with Macedon at the bidding of several of the elder citizens (4.34.7-10).[63] Unwilling to allow their personal ambitions to be sacrificed, however, the leaders of the treacherous faction once again decided to betray their fellow citizens. Thus, at a certain ancient religious ritual in which men of military age processed in arms to the temple of Athene of the Brazen House, the leaders arranged for some of these men to fall upon the ephors and kill them as they made sacrifices in the sanctuary (4.35.2-3). Polybius calls this a most impious crime (πρᾶγμα ἀσεβέστατον 4.35.1), made worse by the fact that the treachery was committed without regard to the safety that ought to have been afforded to anyone who took sanctuary in the temple. Instead, all of the ephors were butchered at the very altar and table of the goddess (4.35.4).[64] Next, the faction of violence

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[63] The elders reminded the people about the benefits conferred on them by Antigonus and the Macedonians in 222 as well as the injuries Sparta had received at the hands of Charixenus and Timaeus when the Aetolians had invaded Laconia, devastated the countryside, and enslaved Spartan villages, and attempted to capture Sparta itself and reinstate the Spartan exiles (4.34.9). On previous Macedonian benefits, see chapter 2.

[64] τότε δὲ διὰ τὴν ὠμότητα τῶν τολμώντων εἰς τοῦτ' ἦλθε καταφρονήσεως ὥστε περὶ τὸν βωμὸν καὶ τὴν τράπεζαν τῆς θεοῦ κατασφαγῆναι τοὺς ἐφόρους ἅπαντας. On Polybius' emphasis on and outrage toward the *neoi* in Sparta, see Eckstein 1995: 145-146 (with following examples). Similar condemnation, based on the young's lack of experience and restraint, is found with Philip V at Thermum in 218 (5.12.5); a

killed the elder Gyridas, expelled those who had spoken out against the Aetolians at the assembly, selected new ephors from their own faction, concluded the alliance with the Aetolians, and reinstated the ancient Spartan monarchy (4.35.5-15).

Polybius condemns this violence against fellow citizens, holding the leaders to lack consideration for all mankind (καθόλου τὴν πρὸς πάντας ἀλογίαν ὑπέμενον, 4.35.6) and calls their policy insane (ἀνοίας, 4.35.15). The new ephors were even so strongly motivated by personal concerns that they nominated Lycurgus as one of the two kings, not because of royal blood but because he had paid each of them a talent (4.35.14). And indeed, these ephors soon met a fitting (ἁρμόζουσαν) and deserved (πεπονθέναι) fate for their treachery (4.81.5).[65] Chelion, believing that the ephors had unjustly passed over his rightful and lawful claim to the throne in favor of Lycurgus, attempted to bring about a revolution in Sparta, following in Cleomenes' footsteps.[66] While his own treacherous attempt to seize power ultimately failed, Chelion did succeed in killing all of the ephors as well as other members of the opposing faction. In this way, τύχη worked to ensure that their previous treacheries against their own state did not go unpunished (4.81.5), not unlike Polybius' similar assessment of τύχη's work to seek justice for the crimes of Philip V (15.20).[67]

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young Antiochus III at Raphia in 217 (5.85.11); Aratus of Sicyon at Cynaetha in 241 (9.17.9); Prince Demetrius of Syria and his friend Apollonius (31.11.7; 31.13.8); Charops in the 160s (32.5.8); and the young king Genthius (29.13.2).

[65] On Polybius' disgust with the behavior of the ephors in accepting these bribes, see Wunderer 1927: 12; Eckstein 1995: 71. On Polybius' condemnation of such avarice more generally, see 6.46.3; 6.56.1-4; 6.56.13-15; 18.34.7; 36.17.7.

[66] On Chelion as an example of Polybius' larger contempt with statesmen who pursue demagogic politics, see Welwei 1966: 290-292; Mendels 1979: 311-333; Mendels 1982: 106-108; Eckstein 1995: 139; Champion 2004a: 185-193; Champion 2004b: 199-203. For other examples, consider Gaius Flaminius (2.21.8; 2.33.7; 3.80-83); Nabis (13.6-8); Chaeron (24.7); Critolaus and Diaeus (38.10.8; 38.13.8; 38.15.5; 38.17.8; 38.18.2-6). On the connection between Spartan instability and decline and Cleomenes III and other tyrants such as Machanidas and Nabis, see Walbank 1972: 145; Baronowski 2011: 139. On Polybius' complex evaluation of Cleomenes as both the restorer and destroyer of the Spartan mixed constitution (cf. Livy 38.34.3, based on Polybius), see Shimron 1964: 147-155; Walbank 1966: 303-312; Walbank 1972: 145. Cleomenes' own complex

[67] On this fitting punishment for the ephors and the role of τύχης (4.81.5) in facilitating it, see chapter 5.

Some forty years later, treacherous behavior resurfaced in Sparta with the demagogue Chaeron in 181/180.[68] In order to gain power despite his lack of education and low station, the young Spartan built up a reputation with the populace and acted on their behalf, relying upon force rather than the rule of law (24.7.1-2).[69] While scholars have been right to point to Polybius' condemnation of Chaeron as a demagogue, equally important are the treacherous means by which he strived to maintain personal power at the expense of his fellow citizens.[70] Thus, according to Polybius, Chaeron not only illegally appropriated public funds for his own personal use without concern for laws, public decrees, or magistrates (οὐ νόμου στοχαζόμενος, οὐ κοινοῦ δόγματος, οὐκ ἄρχοντος, 24.7.4), but he also stole all of the property belonging to the sisters, wives, mothers, and children of the Spartan exiles, distributing it randomly to the poor to further solidify his own power at the expense of fellow citizens (24.7.3).[71] We should make clear that Charon's actions were driven by his own personal desire and greediness at the expense of others (πλεονεξίαν, 24.7.6) rather than by some misguided sense of ideological patriotism. Worse still, when a number of fellow citizens, led by Apollonidas, attempted to check Chaeron's illegal and self-serving behavior by auditing the public accounts, he had Apollonidas murdered in broad daylight (24.7.6). It is only when word of these treacheries

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[68] The exact dating of this account is uncertain. See Walbank 1979: 17-18, 259-260

[69] Chaeron must not have been without regard, as he had been a member of the Spartan embassy to Rome in either 181 or 184/3 (24.7.1). On the dating of this embassy, see Derow 1970; Walbank 1957: 259. Walbank suggests that Chaeron might have risen to prominence as a member of the tyrants' party (cf. 23.4.7).

[70] For Polybius' condemnation of Chaeron as a demagogic reformer, see Welwei 1966: 290-292; Mendels 1982: 106-108; Eckstein 1995: 139; Champion 2004a: 188, n.53, 221. Similar condemnation is found with Polybius' description of Cleomenes (2.47.3-4; 4.81.14); Cheilon (4.81.1-14); Dorimachus and Scopas of Aetolia (13.1.1-2.5); Nabis (13.6.1-8.7); Molpagoras of Cius (15.21.1-8); Perseus (25.3.1-8); Antiochus Epiphanes (26.1a.1-2, 1.1-14); and Diaeus (38.15.1-16.11; cf. 38.17.1-3).

[71] These Spartans had been exiled by Cleomenes, Lycurgus, Machanidas, or Nabis (cf. 21.1.4); restored in 188 (22.11.7); exiled once more in 183 (23.5.18); and partially restored again in 182 (23.18.2), those showing ingratitude toward the Achaean League remaining in exile. See Walbank 1979: 259-260.

reached the rightfully indignant (ἀγανακτήσαντος) Achaeans that Charon was finally tried and condemned by the strategus for his actions (24.7.7).

Instances of treachery against one's own state carried out by kings can be found in the *Histories*. Polybius explains that during the 180s, Philip V slowly reverted back into the treacherous and tyrannical ruler that had defined his character between 215-198.[72] Thus, the Achaean historian describes Philip's secret plans to go to war once more against the Romans because he was upset with Roman efforts to restrict Macedonian imperialism in Thrace (22.6; 22.13-14; 23.8) and with Roman favor shown exclusively toward his son Demetrius (23.7).[73] This came to a head in 183, only 13 years after the Romans had spared Philip at the expense of his own people.[74] Polybius suggests that in order to punish him for all of his previous wicked and criminal acts (ἀσεβημάτων καὶ παρανομημάτων), τύχη sent a host of furies, the avenging spirits of his many victims, to torment him day and night (23.10.2-3).[75] Thus affected, in his madness, Philip carried out a number of treacheries against his own subjects. First, he deported entire families from major and coastal cities throughout Macedonia, transferring them to the country of Emathia and filling the cities instead with loyal Thracians and barbarians (23.10.4-

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[72] For Philip's treacheries during this earlier period, see chapter 2..

[73] Cf. Livy 39.53. Many scholars have doubted Polybius' interpretation of the eventual war that would break out between Rome and Macedon. For those who suggest that it was actually Roman aggression that occurred during these years, see: Colin 1905: 204-212; Edson 1935: 191-202; Walbank 1938: 55-68; Walbank 1940: 223-257; Meloni 1953: 29-34, 41-60; Badian 1958: 92-84; Welwei 1963: 50-54; De Sanctis 1969: 242-250; Errington 1972: 195-201; Briscoe 1972: 25-26; Walbank 1974: 10-11, 23; Gabba 1977: 68; Harris 1979: 227-233; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 513-515; Derow 1989: 316. For those who accept Polybius' interpretation, at least concerning the lack of Roman desire to go to war either Philip or Perseus, see Pedech 1964: 125-134; Gruen 1974: 221-246; Eckstein 2008: 364-367; Burton 2011: 122; Rosenstein 2012: 216-217; Burton 2017: 121-123. For a detailed discussion of the scholarly debate on both sides, see Burton 2017: 78-123. On Polybius' belief, see Eckstein 1995: 214-215.

[74] Cf. Livy 40.3.3.

[75] On the role of Tyche here, see Walbank 1938: 55-68. A full discussion of the role of Tyche's relationship to acts of treachery appears in chapter 5. On this particular instance, see Welwei 1963: 50; Pedech 1964: 125-128; Eckstein 1995: 215, 241. On the connection of 23.10.2-3 with tragic theater, specifically Orestes and the curse of the house of Artreus, see Walbank 1979: 229. Note the similarities between this account and the rumored madness inflicted on Antiochus IV as divine punishment (31.9.4).

5).[76] Philip's actions caused such mourning and uproar (πένθος καὶ τηλικοῦτον θόρυβον) that it seemed as if the entire state was being carried off into captivity (δοριάλωτον, 23.10.6). Next, in response to the open objections that this caused from many of his friends, including Admetus, Pyrrhichus, and Samus, Philip not only put them to death but went so far as to find and imprison their sons and daughters (23.10.7-8).[77] Again, according to Polybius, the way Philip treated these young Macedonians excited the pity of all (παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐλεεινήν, 23.10.11).

Finally, according to Polybius, Philip's ultimate act of treachery was the murder of his own son, Demetrius, in 180. Concerned with Demetrius' pro-Roman policy, Philip unjustly executed Demetrius on charges of treason. Even more guilty of treachery in Demetrius' murder, Polybius explains, however, was Philip's eldest son, Perseus. Bitterly jealous of Demetrius' popularity both in Rome and among the Macedonians, Perseus worked to remove Demetrius as a threat to his succession to the throne, corrupting Demetrius' friends and plotting against him (23.7.6-7).[78] Perseus went so far as to forge a letter from Flamininus suggesting secret intrigues between Demetrius and the Romans.[79] Through this deception, Perseus managed to convince Philip to order Demetrius' execution. According to Polybius, Perseus'

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[76] On the nature of these barbarian troops, see Griffith 1935: 73, 77-78; Walbank 1979: 230. On this intentional contrasting between citizen and barbarian, see Champion 2004a: 83, n.52.

[77] Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 53e. Hammond and Walbank 1988: 485 argues that such action, though not admirable, was necessary for Philip to ensure the stability of the state.

[78] On the causes and context of the rift between the two brothers, see Burton 2017: 48-50. Some scholars such as Edson 1935: 193; Walbank 1940: 239-241; Errington 1972: 199; Waterfield 2014: 162 argue that the rift was intentionally fostered by the Romans to create instability within the Macedonian royal family. Such an interpretation, however, may confuse intentions with results: Gruen 1984: 202; Burton 2017: 49. Perseus was the son of either an Argiver seamstress called Gnathaenion or Polycratea, the daughter of Aratus of Sicyon. For sources and discussion, see Meloni 1953: 10-15; Burton 2017: 50, n. 54.

[79] Some scholars suggest that the letter from Flamininus was authentic: Edson 1935: 200; Walbank 1940: 251; Meloni 1953: 51-52. For acceptance of the forgery: Pareti 1952: 742; Gruen 1990: 426; Waterfield 2014: 164. Errington 1972: 200, 288, n. 28 is uncertain. For discussion, see Gruen 1974: 202, n. 3; Burton 2017: 49-50. Livy, taken from Polybius, at any rate firmly maintains its existence: Livy 40.23.7-24.1; 54.9-56.1. For the argument that Polybius unjustly maligns Perseus' character, see Giovannini 1969: 857.

treacherous actions against his brother were driven primarily by his own envy, leading to the death of Demetrius as well as certain conflict with Rome.[80] While Polybius' presentation of these events has received some criticism from modern scholars, claiming that Polybius went out of his way to demonize the Antigonids in order to absolve the Achaean desertion of their alliance with Macedon in 200, what matters for our present study is the fact that the Achaean historian condemns both Philip and Perseus for these perceived acts of treachery against their own subjects. Ultimately, the wickedness of Demetrius' death can only be described as a cruel drama (δρᾶμα) being produced in Tyche's theater house (23.10.12).[81] In reality, a case can be made that Philip and Perseus were in fact working to solidify the stability of Macedon by eliminating political concerns, especially given Demetreus' dubious loyalty toward a war against Rome. What remains important for our purposes, however, is Polybius' intentional rhetoric in his justification for condemning Philip and Perseus at this time.

Polybius portrays the wickedness of Genthius, the king of Illyria from 181-168, in a similar light. Although the passage of the *Histories* is only fragmentary, Polybius' condemnation of Genthius' character in 29.13.1-2 is clear.[82] According to the Achaean

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[80] The extant text of Polybius only details Perseus' plotting up to 182: 22.6.11, 13-14, 18; 23.1-3, 7-11; cf. Livy 39.23-29, 33-35, 46-48, 53; 40.2-16; Diod. 29.16; App. *Mac.* 9.6; Plut. *Aem.* 8.4-5. Polybius' account, however, is preserved in Livy 40.20-24, 54-56; cf. Diod. 29.25; Plut. *Arat.* 54.3; *Aem.* 8.6. On our sources for Philip's final years, see Gruen 1974: 221-223, n.1; Burton 2017: 39-55. For the connection between Demetrius' death and inevitable conflict with Rome, see Benecke 1930: 255; Edson 1935: 201; Badian: 1958: 95; Errington 1972: 201; Gruen 1990: 426; Waterfield 2014: 166. For conflict arising at a later date (such as Eumenes' speech before the Senate): Gruen 1984: 416-417; Rosenstein 2012: 212-217; Eckstein 2013: 89.

[81] Some scholars have doubted Polybius' negative portrayal of Philip V, both in 183 and in general, suggesting that on the whole he was a man of character and religious devotion. See Hammond and Walbank 1988: 485-486 (with notes). Again, what matters for our purpose is Polybius' presentation of the Macedonian king.

[82] 29.13.1-2 (taken from Athen. 10.440A) would have come shortly after 29.11.6, discussing Genthius in connection with the Third Macedonian War. Polybius' text can partially be reconstructed from Livy 44.30.6-32.5. See Walbank 1979: 376-377. Genthius' fleet was swiftly defeated by the praetor Lucius Anicius Gallus after which he was besieged in Scodra and forced to surrender after a month in June of 168: Plut. *Aem.* 13.2; App. *Ill.* 9; Flor. 1.29; Eutrop 4.6.4; Zon. 9.24. On the nature of the alliance between

historian, Genthius' reign was defined by a great number of licentious acts (πολλὰ...ἀσελγῆ), often aimed at his own subjects and exacerbated by his youth and the fact that he was always drunk day and night (νύκτωρ τε αἰεὶ καὶ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν μεθύοντα, 29.13.1).[83] As a king, Genthius treated his subjects with great cruelty (ὠμῶς), including his own brother (29.13.2). Polybius recounts how the Illyrian king treacherously put to death his brother Plator just before he was about to marry Etuta, the daughter of the Dardanian king Monunius II, and then proceeded to take her as his own wife.[84] While some scholars have pointed to Genthius' murder of his brother as a necessary step toward ensuring the stability of his own rule, Polybius chooses to condemn Genthius for acting with the wickedness and depravity typically associated with reckless youth.[85] So rather than acting out of necessity or a desire to ensure the stability of his state, Genthius is found treacherously murdering his own brother due to his unrestrained drunken lust toward Etuta (29.13.2).[86] Indeed, Polybius frames this murder as just the worst example of a long list of actions carried out against his own people motivated by personal gain and desire.[87]

Acceptable Treachery against Fellow Citizens

Perseus and Genthius against Rome, see Polyb. 28.8; Livy 43.20; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 524-530, 534-538.

[83] On Polybius' condemnation of Genthius' drunkenness, see Eckstein 1995: 286-288.

[84] Plator was Genthius' full brother, the son of Pleuratus and Eurydica. Genthius murdered Plator along with his two friends Ettritus and Epicadus. Walbank 1979: 377 assumes this to have occurred soon after Genthius' accession c. 181 (cf. 28.8.1), but Wilkes 1992: 172 places the murder in 169.

[85] It is likely that Genthius felt that Plator's marriage to Etuta, would have threatened his own power in Illyria. On the possibility that this murder was to ensure the protection of his own throne, inspired by Perseus' own example, see Walbank 1979: 377; Gruen 1984: 421. On the negative Polybian portrayal of youth with regard to Genthius, see Eckstein 1995: 141, 145.

[86] An emphasis rightly noted by Eckstein 1995: 287.

[87] On the notion of Genthius' individual depravity paralleling the collective degeneracy of the Illyrians, see Champion 2004a: 152, n.29.

Taken together, these examples constitute a clear pattern of Polybian condemnation toward those who act treacherously against their fellow citizens. Both in cases of technical treason as well as in more general instances of treachery toward fellow citizens in which such actions are motivated by greed or lust for power, as is typically the case, the Achaean historian is unwaveringly critical of these statesmen. Yet certain contexts allow for such betrayal. If acting not with hopes of personal gain but from some genuine desire to secure the strength and liberty of the state, such behavior is justified. Indeed, it is this patriotic motivation that Polybius suggests his own Achaean League embodied in dealing with allies and fellow citizens alike (2.42.5-6):

> Though they took so much part in the enterprises of others, and especially in many of those of the Romans which resulted brilliantly, they never showed the least desire to gain any private profit from their success but demanded, in exchange for the zealous aid they rendered their allies, nothing beyond the liberty of all states and the union of the Peloponnesians.[88]

While Polybius' statement is a clear example of Achaean propaganda, the justification for such actions is clear. When statesmen act not for private profit (ἰδίᾳ λυσιτελοῦς) but in the interests of the state, their actions are condoned by the Achaean historian.

Perhaps the most common allowance made by Polybius for violence against fellow citizens is in the case of tyrants. Just as in the case of wicked allies from the previous chapter,

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[88] πολλοῖς γὰρ κοινωνήσαντες πραγμάτων, πλείστων δὲ καὶ καλλίστων Ῥωμαίοις οὐδέποτε τὸ παράπαν ἐπεθύμησαν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων οὐδενὸς ἰδίᾳ λυσιτελοῦς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτῶν φιλοτιμίας, ἣν παρείχοντο τοῖς συμμάχοις, ἀντικατηλλάττοντο τὴν ἑκάστων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν Πελοποννησίων. Walbank 1957: 234 views this passage as implying that credit ought to go to Achaea to the liberty extended to the Greeks through their Roman allies: the Declaration of Corinth in 196, the defeat of the tyrant Nabis in 195, and the removal of Antiochus III from Greece in 191. On similar notions of Achaean policy as propaganda championing middle-class stability against social revolution, see Tarn 1952: 90 ff., 122 ff; Walbank 1957 234-235. On Polybius' parallel of Achaean imperialism with the expansion of liberty, see Eckstein 1995: 275. On Polybius' emphasis of Roman and Achaean temperance and benevolence opposed to the recklessness of the Gauls and Aetolians, especially in the first five books of the *Histories*, see Champion 2004a: 141-142. On the narrative purpose of this passage, see Miltsios 2013: 130. On accusations of Polybius' idealized notion of Achaean expansion and present in the Peloponnesus, see recently Kralli 2017: 149-152.

acting against tyrannical statesmen becomes justified in the *Histories*. Those who have already

transgressed laws through violence and corruption lose legitimacy and provide a just cause to

others for treachery and rebellion. Again, Polybius is clear in his discussion of the difficulties

of determining guilt and justice that context is at the heart of any moral judgment of such

actions (2.56.14-16):

> Who, for instance, does not think it an outrage for a free man to be beaten? But if this
> happens to one who was the first to resort to violence, we consider that he got only his
> desert, while where it is done for the purpose of correction or discipline, those who strike
> free men are not only excused but deemed worthy of thanks and praise. Again, to kill a
> citizen is considered the greatest of crimes and deserving the highest penalty, but obviously
> he who kills a thief or adulterer is left untouched, and the slayer of a traitor or tyrant
> everywhere meets with honor and distinction. So in every such case the final criterion of
> good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes
> of the doer.[89]

Polybius' decision in this passage to equate traitors and tyrants (τύραvv... καὶ προεδρείας) is

telling, as is his argument for justifying actions taken against them. In working against their

own state for personal gain, both traitors and tyrants have already betrayed expectations of

loyalty and goodwill that ought to exist between citizens, and subsequent actions taken against

them by fellow citizens are not just acceptable but become praiseworthy.

This is the case with Prusias II. Due to the king's cowardly, licentious, and unvirtuous

behavior (36.15.2-5), his subjects formed an implacable resolution (ἀμετάκλητον ὁρμὴν) not

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[89] πολλοῖς γὰρ κοινωνήσαντες πραγμάτων, πλείστων δὲ καὶ καλλίστων Ῥωμαίοις οὐδέποτε τὸ παράπαν ἐπεθύμησαν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων οὐδενὸς ἰδίᾳ λυσιτελοῦς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτῶν φιλοτιμίας, ἣν παρείχοντο τοῖς συμμάχοις, ἀντικατηλλάττοντο τὴν ἑκάστων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν Πελοποννησίων. This passage is taken from Polybius' critique of Phylarchus: see Grethlein 2013: 249-250; Eckstein 2013: 314-338. On the (following) Greek and Roman legal context of Polybius' claims, see Walbank 1957: 263. An adulterer caught *in flagranti delicto* could be killed without penalty in both Greece and Rome: Lysias 1.26; Cato *ap. Gell.* 10.23.4-5. Similar immunity was granted to citizens who killed a thief at night (or during daylight if he resisted with a weapon). For law in the Twelves Tables, see Riccobono 1941: I.57-59. For law in various Greek legal codes, see Hitzig (*RE*) 1893: col. 391. Greeks were especially prone to condone tyrannicide: Arist. *Pol.* 2.7.13.1267a 12ff. A law to this effect may have existed at Athens: Andoc. *De myst.* 96-97; von Scala 1890: 44 n. 1, 140.

only to throw off their allegiance but to seek personal vengeance upon him (36.15.6).[90] Given Prusias' previous behavior, Polybius deems such treacherous actions taken by the Bithynians to be fully justified.[91] The Greeks and Egyptians of Alexandria likewise rose up against Agathocles in 203/202 without condemnation from Polybius. Given Agathocles' outrages and wickedness, torturing fellow citizens (15.27.4-10), violating sacred temples (15.27.1-3) and raping brides, virgins, and young girls throughout the city (15.25.22-24), the populace and soldiery were justified in rising up and killing Agathocles and even his entire family (15.33, 15.34.6).[92]

A similar uprising occurred in 162 with the people of Cyrene against Ptolemy VIII Physcon. In this instance, Polybius likewise does not condemn the Cyreneans for revolting and leading an army against the king.[93] Polybius emphasizes that the cause of the rebellion was in fact Physcon's own wickedness. For the Cyreneans had seen Ptolemy's evil disposition during his occupation of Alexandria during the prior year, where he acted like a tyrant rather than a

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[90] On Polybius' earlier critique of Prusias during his visit before the Roman Senate, see chapter 2. On Polybius' condemnation of Prusias in 36.15, see Eckstein 1995: 37, 123, 156, 265. On the contrast of Prusias' cowardice with the manliness of the Bythinians (36.15.2-3), see Eckstein 1995: 224, n. 123; Champion 2004a: 71, 258. On the Bythinian culture and customs more generally, see (with notes) Walbank 1979: 674-675. For those who point to Polybius description of Prusias as evidence of a negative Western attitude toward the East as effeminate, see Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1983: 20; Pomeroy 1986: 421; Konstan 2000: 18, n.9.

[91] Prusias was ultimately killed at Pergamum by his son Nicodemes, likely at the connicance of Attalus: Livy, *Ep.* 50.

[92] Cf. Justin 30.1.2. His sister Agathoclea had been the favorite mistress of Ptolemy IV, and his mother Oenanthe had wielded enormous influence in the royal court. On Agathocles ancestry and their backgrounds, see Walbank 1967: 480-485. On their deaths, see Dunand 2007: 256; Johstono 2017: 1-20. On Agathocles' death and an example of the dangers that mercenaries posed, even against their own employers, see Eckstein 1995: 125-127. Eckstein 1995: 132 emphasizes the negative threat to social order involved in the popular uprising in Alexandria in 200 and the ensuing massacre. It should be emphasized, however, that Polybius does not condemn the populace itself, as was the case with the Boeotians in 197 (18.43.8), but keeps his condemnation focused solely upon Agathocles and his disastrous wickedness; cf. Champion 2004a: 257.

[93] For context, see Walbank 1979: 486-488; Eckstein 1995: 103-104, 110; Baronowski 2011: 12, 83-84.

king (οὐ βασιλικήν, ἀλλὰ τυραννικὴν, 31.18.14).[94] It was thus for the sake of their own liberty (ἐλευθερίαν, 31.18.15) that the people of Cyrene rebelled against this government.[95]

The Achaean historian's acceptance of Scopas' murder in 196 follows this same trajectory. After a failed coup in Alexandria, Scopas is killed. Rather than condemn Aristomenes or Ptolemy V for executing his own agent and member of the royal court, Polybius explains that such action was justified given Scopas' own treacherous plotting and unrestrained ambition. Indeed, one of Scopas' friends, Dicaearchus, was first racked and scourged before being put to death (18.54.6). Polybius maintains that such torture was wholly deserved and approved of by both gods and men, as Dicaearchus had previously been appointed by Philip V to oversee his earlier treacherous attacks against the Cyclades and other cities on the Hellespont with whom the king was officially at peace (18.54.7).[96] This acceptance of Dicaearchus' torture and death is echoed in Polybius' treatment of the Ptolemaic statesman Deinon.[97] When the plot by Agathocles and Sosibius to murder Arsinoe III and secure the regency for themselves reached Deinon, rather than report it and preserve the kingdom, he chose to support the coup (15.26a.1). Polybius grudgingly approves of Agathocles' later decision to kill Deinon, who had begun lamenting his mistake, calling Deinon's deserved (ἁρμοζούσης) death "the justest of Agathocles' many iniquities" (τῶν ἀδίκων ἔργων...δικαιότατον, 15.26a.2).

Perhaps the most famous instance of acceptable treachery against one's own state in the *Histories* is the decision of Aratus of Sicyon to invite Antigonus Doson into the

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[94] Cf. Diod. 31.17-20. See Walbank 1979: 468.

[95] The rebellion against Ptolemy VIII is discussed in more detail in the following section.

[96] Polybius further removes the possibility of excessive cruelty on the part of Ptolemy V by emphasizing that those Aetolian who had not been complicit in Scopas' plot were allowed to return home with their property (18.54.12). On the background of Dicaearchus, see Walbank 1967: 625-626.

[97] We do not know what Deinon's station was or how he was in a position to receive information about the plotted murder. See Walbank 1967: 488.

Peloponnese in 225/224. Ironically, Aratus had dedicated the past twenty-five years working to rid the Peloponnese of any Macedonian presence, leading the Achaean League to control the northern two-thirds of the peninsula by 230.[98] The League came under attack soon after, however, by a resurgent Sparta under the capable king Cleomenes III, aided by the Aetolians (2.46).[99] Secret negotiations with the Macedonian king Antigonus III Doson began in 228 (2.47-48), and by the winter of 225/224, Aratus believed that the Achaean League faced destruction unless an outside power intervened (2.51).[100] His decision in 225/224 to once more introduce the foreign power into the Peloponnese could be seen by some as a betrayal of Achaea. While Cleomenes was defeated at Sellasia in 222, Achaea was reduced to a subordinate role within a new Hellenic Symmachy led by Macedon, and Corinth and the Acrocorinth, one of the Fetters of Greece, now was surrendered by Achaea to Macedonian control, guaranteeing Macedonian access to the Peloponnese.[101] Given the outcome, the contemporary historian Phylarchus did not hesitate to declare Aratus a traitor to all of Greece for his actions.[102] Polybius likewise says that even Aratus had misgivings about the difficult decision (2.47.10-11).

Despite such accusations, however, Polybius defends Aratus' actions, given the context of the situation. Had Aratus not grudgingly allied with Macedon in 225/224, the League may well have been destroyed. By Polybius' own definition of treachery, Aratus did not act out of concern for personal ambition (ἰδίας πλεονεξίας, 18.14.9), his own safety and advantage (ἰδίας

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[98] For the expansion of the Achaean League under Aratus, see Urban 1979: chaps. 2-4.

[99] On the Spartan threat to the Achaean League, see Walbank 1957: 239-245; Urban 1979: 117-201; Eckstein 1995: 92, 198.

[100] On Aratus' decision, see Gruen 1972; Eckstein 1995: 198-199; Champion 2004a: 122-123.

[101] On the Achaean position within the Hellenic Symmachy, see Aymard 1938: 54-61; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 351-353, 362-363; Nottmeyer 1995: 165.

[102] See Africa 1961: ch. 3; Eckstein 1995: 198.

ἀσφαλείας καὶ λυσιτελείας, 18.15.2), his political agenda (ἀντιπολιτευομένους διαφορᾶς, 18.15.2), or for his own aims (ἰδίας ὁρμὰς, 18.15.3). Rather, the sheer necessity to ensure the safety of the Achaean League drove his actions, as Aratus acknowledges in his own memoirs (cf. Plut. *Arat.* 41.4) - a claim Polybius accepts. It was thus not an honorable partnership with Macedon to fight against Cleomenes and the Aetolians, as Gruen suggests, but, in Polybius' view, an alliance forged out of desperate necessity that was intended to secure the survival of the Achaean League with hopes of a resurgence in the future.[103] Nor were such hopes misguided. The League was ultimately able to once more rid itself of Macedon in 198 by allying with Rome against Philip V, and shortly after, under the leadership of Philopoemen, was able to take control of the entire Peloponnese for the first time.[104]

It is also striking that Polybius rarely condemns captured soldiers who give up information to the enemy. For example, during the 225 Gallic invasion of Italy, the Roman advance guard under the consul Gaius Atilius Regulus captured a number of Gallic foragers (2.27.2). Upon being interrogated, one of the prisoners revealed to him that the main army of Gauls was in Etruria near Telamon and that the other consul Lucius Aemilius Papus had been shadowing their movements (2.27.3).[105] Atilius' subsequent arrival at Telamon was likewise revealed to the Gauls in a similar manner. Initially thinking that some of Aemilius' cavalry had gotten maneuvered around their flank at night, the Gauls later discovered through a Roman prisoner that it was in fact the second consular army under Atilius (2.27.6-8). Antiochus III's 218 capture of the city of Rabbatama in Judaea was also achieved through information from a

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[103] Gruen 1972: 622-623; cf. 619-620. Eckstein 1995: 198-199 rightly emphasizes that Aratus acted out of necessity in 225/224.

[104] On the 198 Achaean decision to abandon Macedon, led by Aristaenus, see chapter 2.

[105] On the battle of Telamon and its background, see Walbank 1957: 204-206; Baronowski 1993: 181-202; Goldsworthy 2000: 129-130; Rosenstein 2012: 116-118.

prisoner.[106] Despite collapsing the city's wall and repeated zealous attacks led by the competing Seleucid commanders Theodotus and Nicarchus, the city was ultimately only successfully captured when a prisoner revealed the location of the underground tunnel that the defenders had been using to draw fresh water (5.71.8-9). With this passage blocked, the inhabitants soon ran out of water and surrendered the town (5.71.10).[107]

The final example stems from the final months of the Third Macedonian War in 168. Shortly before the battle of Pydna, a detachment of Roman troops under the command of Scipio Nasica and Fabius Maximus moved undetected over the mountains and into Macedonia, flanking Perseus' position in the mountains.[108] Perseus was ignorant of the Roman movement until a Cretan deserter from the Roman army informed him that the Roman detachment was approaching his rear, allowing him to send twelve thousand troops under the commander Milo to contend the heights behind his position (29.15.1-3).[109]

The lack of any condemnation from Polybius on all of these accounts is intriguing. It is perhaps within the context of torture and the threat of death that the Achaean historian feels such treacheries become justifiable. Thus, while Polybius points to those who refrain from

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[106] The city of Rabbatama is more commonly referred to as Rabbah of Ammon: *Deut.* 3.11; *2 Sam.* 12.26; *Jer.* 49.2. Today Rabbatama is the city of Amman, Jordan's capital. On background and geography of the city, see Walbank 1957: 597.

[107] On Antiochus' campaign throughout this region, ending at Raphia in 217, see Taylor 2013: 56-64.

[108] Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum was the son of Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica (consul in 191) and the grandson of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus (consul in 222). He would become one of the most influential Romans of his generation, later becoming Pontifex Maximus in 150 and *princeps senatus* in 147: Cic. *de Sen.* 3.50. Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus was the eldest son of Aemilius Paullus and brother of Scipio Aemilius. He was adopted by Quintus Fabius Maximus and became consul in 145. On their movements and the geography of this account with notes, see Pritchett 1969: 159-160; Walbank 1979: 383-386; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 545-547; Burton 2017: 161-163.-167. On the subsequent maneuverings between Aemilius and Perseus, see (succinctly) Burton 2017: 161-163; and earlier De Sanctis 1923: 369-376; Meloni 1953: 376-377; Meloni 1954; Pedech 1964: 453 n.126; Pritchett 1969: 145 n.1; Walbank 1979: 381.

[109] Taken from Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 15-16; Cf. Livy 44.35. Milo likely should be Midon, cf. 27.8.5; Livy 44.32.9; Walbank 1979: 383. On the negligence of the Macedonians in this instance, see Eckstein 1995: 165, n. 14.

revealing information to the enemy even under torture as brave and praiseworthy (30.4.16), it was expected and in many ways anticipated that those placed under torture would disclose sensitive information.[110] It is also likely that Polybius is less concerned with the moral agency of such prisoners and deserters, given his intended aristocratic readership.[111] For Greek and Roman statesmen reading the *Histories*, it would have been a reality of warfare that soldiers could give and give up valuable information.

II. TREACHEROUS COURT INTRIGUE

One common theme that emerges from the *Histories* is the importance of kings having wise and benevolent advisors to check their wicked tendencies.[112] In recounting the early influence of Aratus of Sicyon on Philip V, for instance, Polybius emphasizes that when the king took the advice of Aratus, he refrained from committing injustices (οὐχ οἷον ἀδικήσας) and in fact attracted the affection of all the Greeks (ἅπαντας δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας εἰς τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὔνοιαν ἐπήγετο, 7.14.4; cf. 7.14.2). When he later listened to Demetrius of Pharos, however, Philip showed impiety to the gods (ἠσέβει...τοὺς θεούς), transgressed laws of war (ὑπερβαίνων τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους), and undermined his own position in Greece by showing both friends and enemies that he was implacable and cruel (ἀπαραίτητον καὶ πικρὸν, 7.14.3; cf. 7.14.5).[113] Indeed, Polybius muses that the choice of friends and advisors is essential to the success of any

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[110] Polybius' praise of such individuals is in the context of his condemnation of Astymedes of Rhodes, who readily sells out his fellow Greeks to the Romans out of fear of an uncertain danger (30.4.6-17). On Astymedes' betrayal of Greece, see chapter 2; cf. Walbank 1979:420-421; Eckstein 1995: 96-97.

[111] For recent work on Polybius writing as and for aristocrats, see Ripat 2006; Roller 2009.

[112] For example, see Walbank 1972: 157. On the interworkings of the Hellenstic Courts, see multiple authors in ed. Andrew Erskine, Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, and Shane Wallace (2017).

[113] Cf. 5.12.5-8. On the context of Polybius' claim concerning Philip's treachery against the Messians, see chapter 2. On the negative influence of Demetrius on Philip, see Champion 1997: 122-124; Farrington 2011: 332.

king, especially those who come to the throne early in life (7.14.6).[114] In this regard, advisors and other members of such royal courts often held considerable power and influence within the state, especially during the reigns of young or weak monarchs. Sosibius' control of Ptolemaic affairs from 221-203 as Ptolemy IV spent his days in drunken debauchery is just one example of such power. It is thus Sosibius and not Ptolemy who negotiates with Antiochus III leading up to and after the battle of Raphia in 217 (5.63, 5.87.6-8).

Yet just as wise advisors could solidify a monarch's power and security, wicked and reckless advisors often sought to attain power for themselves at the expense of the state and feed the flames of the king's potential for hubristic ambition and cruelty. Indeed, such inherent dangers and instability led Polybius to criticize monarchy in general as a form of governance.[115] Thus, the early years of young kings were often plagued both by rivals to the throne and by self-interested advisors whom these kings had to contend with or else face destruction. Such a situation is seen, for example, with Philip V, Antiochus III, Hieronymus of Syracuse, and Ptolemy V. The Antigonids, Seleucids, and Ptolemies are especially prone to such internal instability in the *Histories*. Despite the complexities of such court politics and intrigues, however, all of the examples from these Hellenistic royal courts fit with Polybius' larger condemnation of treachery in the service of self-interest carried out against fellow advisors or the king himself. When advisors and ministers act to secure their own power and authority at the expense of the state, the Achaean historian remains critical.

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[114] See Champion 1997: 122-124; Farrington 2011: 332.

[115] For this argument in detail, see chapter 5. Thus throughout the *Histories* we only find four examples of "good" kings: Hiero II, Massinissa, Attalus I, and Eumenes II. Instead, Polybius believes that the natural tendency of kings (just like the institution of monarchy more generally) is to descend into tyranny. Thus in 15.24.4-6 he muses: "Perhaps it may be said of all kings that at the beginnings of their reigns they talk of freedom as of a gift they offer to all and style all those who are thus loyal adherents their friends and allies, but as soon as they have established their authority they at once begin to treat those who placed trust in them not as allies but as servants."

Treachery within the Antigonid Court

Philip V faced treacherous intrigue from within his court early on in his reign from a number of advisors, including Apelles, Leontius, and Megaleas. Philip came to the throne in 221 at the age of 17 with the premature death of his uncle, Antigonus III Doson.[116] In addition to inheriting the throne, Philip also inherited many of Antigonus' friends and officers as advisors, including Apelles, whom Antigonus had personally assigned to be one of Philip's guardians (4.76.1). As discussed in the previous chapter, Apelles' initial designs during the Social War centered around reducing the Achaeans to Macedonian subjects rather than allies (4.76.1-2; 4.82.1-2). Thus in attempting to bring the Achaeans under the yoke (ἄγειν ὑπὸ τὸν ζυγὸν τῷ κατὰ βραχὺ τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, 4.82.2), he abused Achaean soldiers (4.76.3-7), fixed the Achaean elections of 219/218 (4.82.4-8), and brought false charges (διαβολὴνm) against Aratus (4.84.1; 4.85.1-3).[117] When these accusations were revealed to have been fabricated, however, Philip began to grow suspicious of Apelles (4.86.8).[118]

It was at this point that Polybius says that Apelles began to plot against Philip himself, hoping to accrue power in his own hands and overturn the management of Macedonian affairs that

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[116] On Philip's ascension and historical background, see Walbank 1940: 295f.; Errington 1967:19-21; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 362-364, 367-371.

[117] On the clash of interests between Aratus and members of the Macedonian court, see Walbank 1940: 44-45; Walbank 1957: 527. On the argument that the importance of this initial clash between Aratus and Apelles was overblown by Polybius, see Errington 1967: 23. On Apelles' potential involvement in the Achaean elections of 219/218, see Aymard 1938: 239f.; Walbank 1940: 47-48, 134; Walbank 1957: 535; Errington 1967: 23-24; (skeptically) Hammond and Walbank 1988: 381. On Polybius' overestimation of Aratus' influence over Philip, see Errington 1967: 24-25. Errington 1967: 19-20 emphasizes that the two main problems inherited by Philip from Antigonus were the Macedonian nobles of Dosan's generation and the peculiar relationship shared with Achaea and Aratus. In fact, Antigonus' decision to organize Greece into the Hellenic Symmachy stemmed in large part from his desire to appease Achaean public opinion and claims that Aratus had been traitorous for inviting the Macedonians back into the Peloponnese to check Spartan expansion under Cleomenes. Cf. Treves 1935: 36; Walbank 1940: 15-16. On Aratus' own attempts to control Philip and use the Symmacy for Achaean benefit, see Errington 1967: 21-22.

[118] On the belief that Polybius was guided hereby the Achaean version of this incident, see Walbank 1940: 59; Walbank 1957: 536.

had been left behind by Antigonus (4.87.1-10).[119] Polybius explains that Antigonus had wisely arranged leadership of the state to provide no pretexts for rivalries or quarrels among the courtiers (4.87.7).[120] Thus, he had placed Apelles as Philip's guardian, Leontius as the Captain of the Peltasts, Megaleas as the Secretary in Chief, Taurion as the High Commissioner for the Peloponnese, and Alexander as the Captain of the Bodyguard (4.87.8).[121] As Leontius and Megaleas were already loyal to him, Apelles set about attempting to remove Taurion and Alexander from their positions, thereby securing control of the entire management of Macedonian affairs (4.87.9-10). To accomplish this, Apelles slandered Alexander (4.87.5) and attempted to trick (δόλος 4.87.4) Taurion, heaping false praise upon him and telling him that he ought to be positioned at the king's side (4.87.1-4).[122] Polybius has no trouble condemning Apelles' actions as folly (ἀφροσύνης), stating that Apelles' only motivation was his greed for power at the expense of others (πλεονεξίας, 4.87.10). Moreover, unable to stand the diminishment of his own power, having lost influence over the king, Apelles proceeded to form a conspiracy (συνωμοσίαν) with Leontius and Megaleas against Philip in 218 (5.2.8). He instructed Leontius and Megaleas to remain with the king and undermine his efforts in the war with Aetolia (5.2.8). Meanwhile, Apelles withdrew to Chalcis, where he prevented supplies from reaching Philip (5.2.8-10).[123] Indeed, the

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[119] Some scholars entirely doubt the existence of any conspiracy, seeing instead Philip removing rivals on trumped-up charges. See most strongly Errington 1967; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 381-385. What matters here, of course, is only what Polybius believes and how he judged these perceived events.

[120] On Polybius' general detestation of courtiers, see von Scala 1890: 45; Eckstein 1995: 222.

[121] On the appointment of these nobles and their corresponding roles, see Beloch 1927: 386-387; Bickerman 1938: 196-197; Walbank 1957: 536-537 Errington 1967: 26-27; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 368-369. Walbank 1957: 536 mistakenly assumes they were all guardians of Philip. On the possibility that the hostility between the conspirators and Taurion were sparked by differences in strategy, Taurion arguing for the increased importance of relying on naval supremacy, see Errington 1967: 26-27. In fact, Errington 1967: 33-35 argues that Taurion was the major force behind convincing Philip to have Apelles, Leontius, and Megaleas killed.

[122] On this political maneuvering of these Macedonian nobles, see Errington 1967:21-22; cf. Bengtson 1944: 357f.; Walbank 1957: 536.

[123] Apelles' removal to Chalcis, and therefore out of Philip's court, does not suggest any suspicion of treachery, but perhaps Philip's unwillingness to become too attached to him. On this suggestion and the parallels with Alexander the Great and Parmenio, see Errington 1967: 29. Hammand and Walbank 1988:

situation for Philip grew so dire that he was forced to sell silver plates from his own table (5.2.10).[124]

A chance to undermine Philip's efforts came during his siege of the city of Palus in June of 218. Upon the refusal of the garrison to come to terms, Philip set fire to the supports and brought down a part of the wall.[125] He then ordered the peltasts under Leontius to force their way through the breach and capture the city (5.4.8-9). Polybius says that at this point in the siege, the city should have been easily captured (5.4.12). Instead, Leontius held to his agreement with Apelles and treacherously sabotaged the attempt three times by deterring the soldiers from pushing into the city (τοὺς νεανίσκους ὑπερβάντας τὸ πτῶμα διέτρεψαν, 5.4.10).[126] In this way, and by Leontius and other officers he had corrupted making deliberate shows of cowardice (ἐθελοκακοῦντες δὲ καὶ παρ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀποδειλιῶντες αὐτοί, 5.4.11) in order to demoralize the soldiers, Philip was ultimately forced to abandon the siege. Leontius' actions at Palus, then, constituted clear treachery (ἐθελοκακήσαντας, 5.100.7) against Philip, the Macedonian state, and the Macedonian soldiers under his command.

Leontius continued his attempts to treacherously undermine Philip's war efforts in the coming weeks. In hopes of drawing Philip away from his siege at Palus, Dorimachus had attacked Thessaly with half of the Aetolian army, and Lycurgus had invaded Messenia with a Spartan army (5.5.1). As a result, envoys from both the Acarnanians and the Messenians came to the king,

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382 suggest that in fact it was a step up for Apelles, granting him authority over all Macedonian officials in northern and central Greece.

[124] Errington 1967: 28 are sceptical of this detail from Polybius. Polybius remains unclear on the specific objectives of the conspiracy: Errington 1967: 28. Walbank 1940: 51-52 suggests that their goal was to undermine naval operations.

[125] On this technique of underpinning, see Schneider 1908: 14-16; Walbank 1957: 541; cf. Vegetius 4.24; Apollodorus, *Poliorc.* 145.6 ff.

[126] Errington 1967: 30-31 denies that Leontius intentionally prevented the capture of the city, suggesting that to do so would have been immediately obvious. Yet Leontius is not punished following the battle. Cf. Hammond and Walbank 1988: 381, n. 3; Anson 2008, 147. Contra: Hatzopoulos 1996, 1: 299.

seeking his aid. Those from Acarnania urged him to invade and plunder the now unprotected Aetolia, which would in turn force the Aetolian forces under Dorimachus to stop their attack on Macedonia (5.5.2). The Messenians, on the other hand, begged Philip to cross over to the Peloponnese, attack Lycurgus' army, and liberate Messenia. Gorgus the Messenian likewise emphasized that since the Etesian winds had set in, Philip could cross from Cephallenia to Messenia in a single day, a move which would surely catch Lycurgus off-guard (5.5.3-4).[127] Continuing to betray the king's interests, Leontius sided with Gorgus and advised Philip to sail his army to Messenia, knowing that while the Etesian winds made it easy to travel south to Messene, these same winds made the return voyage impossible. Polybius argues that by giving this insidious advice (λυμεωνευόμενοι...συνεβούλευον, 5.5.8), Leontius hoped to force Philip to remain in Messenia for the remainder of the summer while the Aetolians plundered Thessaly and Epirus unchallenged (5.5.6-7).[128] Aratus, however, advised Philip to pursue the invasion of Aetolia and take advantage of the opportunity as Dorimachus had left the region with half of the Aetolian forces (5.5.8-9). Already suspicious of Leontius due to his intentional cowardice at Palus, and now certain of his treachery (κακοπραγμοσύνην, 5.5.10), Philip followed Aratus' advice.

With his army bolstered by the full force of the Acarnanians, Philip decided to invade the district of Thermum, the ancestral heartland of the Aetolian League (5.6.6).[129] Given the great natural strength of the country, such an attack would be quite unexpected, much to Leontius' annoyance. According to Polybius, Leontius believed that this surprise attack on Thermum, in

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[127] Gorgus was the most prominent statesman at Messenia during this period, leading the pro-Achaean faction. Cf. Polyb. 7.10.2-5; Paus. 6.14.11. See Walbank 1940: 72, n.3; Walbank 1957: 541.

[128] On the notion that the dangers of the Etesian winds were exaggerated or even fabricated by Polybius' Achaean source, see Walbank 1940: 53; Walbank 1957: 541; Errington 1967: 31; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 381, n. 3. Instead, Errington argues that instead Leontius was following the traditional strategy supported by Apelles of solidifying Macedonian control over the Peloponnesus. Philip's refusal to support Messenia, then, was caused by his desire to secure a more glorious victory.

[129] Errington 1967.

addition to the swiftness and unexpectedness (ταχεῖα καὶ παράδοξος) of Philip's march into Aetolia, would render the Aetolians completely incapable of dealing with the Macedonians (5.7.1-2). As a result, Leontius treacherously attempted to delay the invasion, in hopes of allowing the Aetolians some time to organize a defense, suggesting that Philip ought to give the soldiers an extended period of rest before the attack (5.7.3). Once again, however, Philip instead listened to Aratus and continued his march into Thermum, aware of Leontius' attempts to undermine (ἐμποδίζοντας, 5.7.4) his success by delaying the invasion (5.7.4-6). And the invasion of Thermum was in fact a brilliant success (5.8-13).[130] In addition to devastating the countryside and dealing a great blow to Aetolian morale, Philip captured and destroyed a great deal of supplies and booty, including over 15,000 fine suits of armor (5.8.3-8).[131]

Polybius explains that Leontius' treacherous intent became even more apparent during the subsequent festivities following the victory. Rather than showing the same joy as everyone else, Leontius and Megaleas were upset with recent events, further arousing the suspicion (ὑπονοίᾳ) of Philip and his guests (5.15.1). And as their drinking became excessive, they showed their true colors (ἐξεθεάτρισαν, 5.15.2), finding Aratus and pelting him with stones as he had been the cause of their failed plans to undermine Philip (5.15.3-5).[132] When the crowd intervened to stop the violence and Philip learned of what had occurred, he severely reprimanded Megaleas and his companion Crinon - Leontius had slipped away during the confusion (5.15.7). Yet not only did they express no regret, but insolently told Philip that they would continue to try and kill Aratus.[133]

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[130] On the topography of Philip's march on Thermum, see (with notes) Walbank 1957: 543-546.

[131] On the moral consequences of Philip's decision to ravage the sanctuaries on Demetrius' advice, see Eckstein 1995: 145, 167, 212, 242-243; Baronowski 2011: 125-126.

[132] On Polybius' general condemnation of such drunken behavior, see Eckstein 1995: 285-289, esp. 287.

[133] Errington 1967: 31-32 suggests that this was the behavior not of treacherous advisors, but of Macedonian nobles who were insulted at Philip's affection toward Aratus and Demetrius, foreigners, over themselves. On the traditional balance of honor between the Macedonian monarchy and members of the royal court, see: Roisman 2003.

So, Philip fined them twenty talents and imprisoned them until it could be paid (5.15.8-9). The next morning, Leontius came before the king and attempted to intimidate (καταπλήξεσθαι, 5.16.2) him into releasing Megaleas, but his attempt failed due to Philip's confidence (5.16.1-4). After sailing to Leucas, Philip and his advisors tried the case of Megaleas and Crinon.[134] Acting as accuser, Aratus laid out the plot that Leontius and his companions had formed with Apelles, pointing to their treacherous actions at the siege of Palus and their other attempts to undermine the state for their own selfish gain (5.16.5-7). Polybius remains clear that their goal had been to intimidate Aratus and isolate Philip so that they could do whatever was to their own advantage (αὐτοῖς δοκῇ συμφέρειν, 5.16.9). With Aratus' strong case against them, supported by numerous witnesses, Megaleas and Crinon were found unanimously guilty. Crinon remained in prison, but Megaleas was released with Leontius acting as a surety for his fine (5.16.8).[135]

Scholars have rightly raised concerns over the objectivity of Polybius' account of the rivalry between Apelles and his followers and Aratus, suggesting that Polybius was perhaps following the official account of the purge put forward by Philip to justify his violence toward certain Mecedonain nobles he felt to have grown too powerful.[136] Polybius was after all a patron of Aratus and would have taken pains to place the Achaean leader in the best light possible. Yet while there may be a reason to read Polybius' portrayal of Aratus with a wary eye, Polybius does not refrain in other passages from criticizing Achaeans such as Aratus (4.8.1-11) and Philopoemen

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[134] For the belief that the trial was used as a legal weapon by Philip against the rights of the army, see: Aymard 1950: 78, n.54; Walbank 1957: 552–555; Errington 1967, 32. Hatzopoulos 1966: 298-303 claims that Philip in fact followed legal procedures. For a detailed look at the proceedings against Megaleas and Crinon, see Walbank 1957: 550-552. Crinon is otherwise unknown outside of this context.

[135] For a clear overview of this affair, see Roisman 2012: 136-138.

[136] On the suggestion that no such conspiracy existed, but that Polybius was perhaps following the official account of the purge put forward by Philip to justify his violence toward certain Macedonian nobles he felt to have grown too powerful, see Errington 1967: 29-30, 33-34. Hammond and Walbank 1988: 383 instead sees the alleged conspiracy stemming from Greek sources. For our purposes, Polybius' version of events continues to fit in with his model of nuanced condemnation of acts of treachery.

(22.19) when their actions warrant such criticism. What matters for our purposes is Polybius' portrayal of Apelles and his followers as being driven by personal greed and hubristic ambition with little concern for Philip V or the Macedonian people - treachery which ultimately results in their deaths.

Even at this point, however, Leontius and the other conspirators had not given up hope of intimidating Philip and taking control of the state. When the army took up quarters in Corinth, Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemaeus proceeded to spread rumors among the peltasts and other Macedonian troops that Philip had not been giving them their fair share of the war booty and that the king was considering stripping some of their privileges (5.25.1-2).[137] Upon hearing this and goaded on by the conspirators, these soldiers tried to plunder the tents of Philip's prominent friends and even attempted to ransack the royal apartments, throwing the entire city into chaos (5.25.3-4).[138] When Philip returned to Corinth to restore order, there was no mistaking who had been responsible for the uprising. For the moment, however, the king pretended that the situation was settled, as he needed to focus his attention on his campaign in Phocis (5.25.6-7).

Convinced that he would be unable to effect anything further to undermine Philip, Leontius appealed to Apelles, asking him to return from Chalcis (5.26.1-2). According to Polybius, Apelles had not remained idle in the north. In addition to hamstringing Philip's supplies, he had more or less assumed control of the state under his own authority, telling everyone that due to Philip's youth, it was really he who ruled the kingdom (5.26.3-4). Thus, Polybius muses that matters of state were referred to Apelles and the votives and gifts sent by various Greek states rarely

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[137] Ptolemaeus held some military post, perhaps the commander of the *agema*. See Walbank 1957: 558. The *agema* was made up of 2000 hand-picked peltasts, similar to the *agema* of hypaspists in Alexander's army; cf. Tarn, *Alex.* 2.148 ff.

[138] Hammand and Walbank 1988: 232 doubts that Leontius and (likely) Ptolemaeus, the actual commanding officers, had a hand in the uprising, as the uncontrollable soldiers would have reflected poorly on them.

mentioned the king but always mentioned Apelles by name (5.26.5). Again, Philip was well aware

of this betrayal, but the current circumstances of the war had forced him to reserve action (5.26.6).

Having convinced even himself of his importance, Apelles arrived at Corinth and was greeted by

a grand reception from Leontius, Megaleas, Ptolemaeus, and the peltasts. Many officers and

soldiers likewise accompanied him to meet Philip. Before he could enter the royal quarters,

however, an usher rebuffed him as he had been ordered to do, informing him that the king was

engaged, reminding Apelles and those gathered that he remained subject to the orders of the king.

With his plans and expectations foiled, Apelles and his fellow conspirators soon realized

that they had failed in their plot to undermine Philip. Apelles remained an honored member of the

royal court and attended state banquets but did not participate in councils and was not allowed an

intimate audience with the king (5.26.15). Seeing the writing on the wall, Megaleas attempted to

flee to Athens, but when the Athenian strategi refused to receive him, he returned to Thebes

(5.26.14; 5.27.1-2).[139] Upon learning of Megaleas' attempted desertion, Philip sent the peltasts

under Leontius off on assignment and had Leontius arrested (5.27.4). When the peltasts heard

about Leontius' arrest, they begged Philip not to put him on trial in their absence.[140] Further

exasperated by their unwavering support of Leontius, however, Philip decided to put him to death

immediately (5.27.5-8).[141]

Shortly after, Rhodian and Chian embassies that had been negotiating for peace with

Aetolia returned and reported to Philip that the Aetolians were ready to come to terms at any price

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[139] Walbank 1957: 560 suggests that Megaleas was likely turned back by the Athenian frontier guard and therefore continued north to Thebes. Athens went through great lengths to protect their neutrality during the war.

[140] On the right to a trial in the Macedonian assembly, see Aymard 1950: 129-131; Walbank 1957: 561; Anson 2008: 148–149; Roisman 2012: 198. On certain amounts of freedom of speech granted to the Macedonian soldiery, see Adams 1986: 46–47.

[141] Polybius argues that Philip's subsequent capture of Thebes, as his attempts to storm the city were no longer hamstrung by Leontius' treachery, went a long way to showing the peltasts and other troops that he had been right to execute Leontius as a traitor (5.100.1-8).

(5.28.1-2). Despite these reports, Polybius claims that Megaleas still worked to sabotage the peace efforts, writing letters to the Aetolians urging them to continue the war and informing them that Philip was about to run out of supplies (5.28.4).[142] Rather than reaching the Aetolians, however, these letters were intercepted and brought to Philip. Any lingering doubts about the treacherous behavior of Megaleas and Apelles disappeared, and Philip placed Apelles into custody and ordered Megaleas to be arrested. Unwilling to be put on trial and further shamed for their treachery, both Megaleas and Apelles took their own lives (5.28.7).

In recounting Apelles' conspiracy against Philip and the treacherous actions carried out by Apelles, Leontius, and Megaleas, Polybius is unwaveringly condemnatory. He sees their self-serving actions as a clear betrayal of Philip, their fellow Macedonian soldiers, and the state as a whole. This is seen clearly in Leontius and Megaleas' willingness at Palus to allow many of their own soldiers to die (τραυματίας δὲ καὶ πλείους γεγονότας τῶν Μακεδόνων, 5.4.14) in order to undermine Philip and the Macedonian war effort. Nor were these men, according to Polybius, somehow guided by patriotism or considerations of the state. Instead, from the beginning of Polybius' narrative, the Achaean historian suggests that they were only concerned with overriding Antigonus' settlement of Macedonian affairs and gaining control of the state for themselves. Their only motivations were selfish ambition and lust for power, acting strictly for their own advantage (αὐτοῖς δοκῇ συμφέρειν, 5.16.9).[143] Indeed, it is due to this treacherous behavior and outrageous conduct (ἀσέλγειαν) that Polybius believes that these men ultimately met with the end they deserved (τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τυχόντες καταστροφῆς, 5.28.9). And while some scholars have cast

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[142] For the view that these letters were likely genuine, see Hamond and Walbank 1988: 382-383.
[143] On Polybius' description of the conspirators being responsible for their own deaths given their wickedness and treachery, see Pomeroy 1986: 410-411.

doubt on Polybius' version of events, what matters for our purposes is how the Achaean historian

described and subsequently condemned these alleged acts of treachery.

Polybius' condemnation of Apelles, Leontius, and Megaleas is similar to his

characterization of Demetrius of Pharos, discussed above. Acting as one of Philip's main advisors

near the end of the Social War and during the years following, much to the king's moral

degradation, Demetrius' constantly attempted to steer Philip toward hostility with Rome.[144]

Indeed, according to Polybius, Demetrius was so insistent that Philip dreamt of little else (5.108.5),

so that in 215 Philip concluded an alliance with Hannibal against Rome and attempted to expand

his hegemony into Illyria.[145] Yet Polybius remains clear that in no way was Demetrius acting to

benefit Philip but rather to advance his own agenda (5.108.6-7):

> Demetrius did not do this out of consideration for Philip, whose cause was, I should
> say, only of third-rate importance to him in this matter, but actuated rather by his
> hostility to Rome and most of all for the sake of himself and his own prospects, as
> he was convinced that this was the only way by which he could recover his
> principality of Pharos.[146]

As with Apelles and the other conspirators in 218-217, Demetrius' self-interested motivation earns

Polybius' criticism.[147] While the Achaean historian offers a negative characterization of Demetrius

throughout the *Histories*, counterbalancing his wickedness with Aratus' wisdom, Polybius remains

consistent at least in this regard. Those court advisors who are driven by their own greed and lust

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[144] On Demetrius' role in Philip's moral decline, especially at Thermum and Messenia, see Baronowski 2011: 125-126. On Philip's hasty decision in 217 and its disastrous consequences for Macedon according to Polybius, see Walbank 1940: 64-67; Walbank 1975: 199-204; Eckstein 1989: 10-12; Eckstein 1995: 142-143.

[145] On Philip's Illyrian prospects, see Eckstein 2012: 80-91.

[146] ἐποίει δὲ ταῦτα Δημήτριος οὐ Φιλίππου χάριν — τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ τρίτην ἴσως ἐν τούτοις ἔνεμε μερίδα — μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους δυσμενείας, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐλπίδων: μόνως γὰρ οὕτως ἐπέπειστο τὴν ἐν τῷ Φάρῳ δυναστείαν κατακτήσασθαι πάλιν.

[147] On Polybius' condemnation of Demetrius, see Walbank 2012: 125-126. On Demetrius' motivations, see Ferrabino 1921: 195f.; Errington 1967: 26; Baronowski 2011: 125-126. Nor is Polybius alone in his condemnation, given Fabius Pictor's similar assessment of Demetrius.

for power rather than their duty to the king whose service they are in are condemned by Polybius for their treacherous behavior - a problem that all kings faced, not just those of the Antigonid dynasty. The reasons behind Polybius' portrayal of monarchy as attracting such corrupt individuals will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.

Treachery within the Seleucid Court

Much like Philip's ascension to the Macedonian throne, Antiochus III was relatively young when he became the king of the Seleucid kingdom in 223/222.[148] He was only 18 when he inherited the throne after his brother Seleucus III Ceraunus was unexpectedly murdered in Anatolia by some of his own soldiers (4.48.5-9; 5.34.1-2; 5.40.4-6).[149] Unlike Philip's early years as king, however, Antiochus found his kingdom in complete disarray. In addition to facing a treacherous advisor in the figure of Hermeias, his chief minister, Parthia remained in open rebellion under the chieftain Arsaces, Bactria had broken off under the satrap Diodotus, and parts of Asia Minor remained detached, controlled by Attalus I of Pergamum. Most severely, Antiochus faced treachery from among his own friends and family. Upon taking the throne, Antiochus entrusted the government of Asia west of the Taurus to his cousin Achaeus and the satrapies of Media and Persia to the brothers Molon and Alexander, respectively (5.40.6). Due to their disregard of the young king as well as their hatred of Hermeias, however, they soon revolted against Antiochus in 222, attempting to stir up the upper satrapies as well (ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαστρέφειν ἐνεχείρησαν τὰς ἄνω σατραπείας, 5.41.1).[150] Molon and Alexander also hoped to convince Achaeus to join in their

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[148] On the chronology of his ascension, see Schmitt 1965: 3. On Antiochus' role as a commander of the eastern satrapies before this date, see Bengtson 1944: 84; Schmitt 1965: 108-109.

[149] Cf. Appian, *Syr.* 66; BCHP 10; BCHP 12.

[150] On the rebellion and its motivations, see: Schmitt 1964: 116–129; Will 1982: 17–23; Fischer 1988; Grabowski 2010: 116; Strootman 2011: 72. On the frequency at which rebellions occurred in the

treason (ἐπιβολῆς, 5.41.1), but Antiochus' cousin remained loyal at this time. It was only later in 220, after his successes against Attalus, that Achaeus also decided to rebel against Antiochus, accepting the diadem and naming himself king.[151] Yet many of the troubles that plagued Antiochus during the early years of his reign were created or exacerbated by his treacherous advisor Hermeias.[152] It was in part their fear of Hermeias' cruelty and wickedness (ὠμότητα καὶ κακοπραγμοσύνην) as chief minister that caused Molon and Alexander to rebel (5.41.1).[153] Hermeias likewise encouraged Achaeus' later break with Antiochus by showing Antiochus III forged letters indicating coordination between Achaeus and Ptolemy IV against the Seleucid king (5.42.7).[154] For our purposes, more important than the historicity of these events is Polybius' presentation and judgment surrounding Hermeias. And indeed, there is no clear reason why Polybius would exaggerate these claims.

Hermias was a Carian who had served as chief minister since Seleucus III began his unsuccessful expedition against Attalus in 225 (5.41.2). Entrusted with the government in the king's absence, Hermeias immediately began to solidify his own power. Thus, he punished the influential members of the court he was jealous of (ἐφθόνει) by bringing false and trumped-up charges (χειροποιήτους καὶ ψευδεῖς) against them, showing himself to be cruel and relentless

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Hellenistic world, see Strootman 2011: 72. On the dating of the rebellion, see Beloch 1927: 193-195; Meloni 1949: 539, n.1; Walbank 1957: 571.

[151] Cf. Polyb. 5.57.

[152] On important and complex relationship between Seleucid monarchs and the court, see Herman 1997: 199-224; Meißner 2000: 1-36; Mooren 1998: 122-133; Weber 1997; Winterling 1998: 661-665; Spawforth 2007: 1-16; Strootman 2011: 63-89, esp. N.7. Strootman argues that much of the earlier scholarship has failed to bring modern court studies into the study of the Seleucids. On the foundation such theory, see: Elias 1969.

[153] On Hermeias' role as chief minister, see Bickerman 1938: 187-188; Walbank 1957: 571.

[154] Polybius (4.48.11) acknowledges that Achaeus' own ambitions also played a major role in the decision. On the role that Hermeias played in influencing the Achaeus' decision to rebel, see Schmitt 1964: 171–173; Will 1982: 23–26; Ma 2000: 57. On the notion that Achaeus' rebellion was in fact influenced by Ptolemy's assistance Holleux 1942: 132; Huss 1976: 35-36. Many scholars have rejected this theory, however: Schmitt 1964: 166–167; Hölbl 2001: 129. On this debate in general, see Grabowski 2010: 117, nn.12-13.

(ἀπαραίτητος...καὶ πικρὸς) and savage by nature (φύσει δ' ὠμὸς, 5.41.3). Polybius says that he was especially jealous of Epigenes, the popular general who had brought back part of Selecus' army from Asia Minor (5.41.4-5).[155]

Polybius makes it clear that Hermeias was working to undermine Antiochus as well. Therefore, when the council discussed how to handle the rebellion of Molon and Alexander, he slandered Epigenes for suggesting that Antiochus ought to deal with the rebels immediately in person (5.41.6-9), calling him a plotter and a traitor (ἐπίβουλονὄντα καὶ προδότην, 5.42.1) who wished to lure the king into a dangerous situation.[156] In reality, however, according to Polybius, Hermeias wished for the rebellion to continue so that Antiochus would be surrounded on all sides by wars and enemies, allowing him to escape punishment for his past wickedness and continue to influence the running of the state because the king would need his assistance (5.42.6).[157] According to Polybius, had Antiochus followed Epigenes' advice and confronted Molon and Alexander immediately, the rebellion would not have spread. Instead, Hermeias appointed Xenon and Theodotus to lead an army against Molon and urged the king to take the field instead against Ptolemy IV, given his reputation for lethargy and debauchery (5.42.4).[158] To convince Antiochus fully of this course of action, Hermeias proceeded to treacherously forge letters from Ptolemy to Achaeus, in which Ptolemy urged Antiochus' cousin to usurp the government and declare himself

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[155] On Hermeias' savage nature, see Champion 2004a: 78. On court rivalries in general, see Taylor 2013: ch. 2.

[156] On the influence of the royal court in making these decisions, and the inability of Hellenistic monarchs to make their own decisions at times, see Mooren 1998: 122-133; Strootman 2011: 73.

[157] μόνως οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων, εἰ πανταχόθεν τῷ νεανίσκῳ περισταίη πόλεμος, οὔτε τῶν πρότερον ἡμαρτημένων ὑφέξειν δίκας οὔτε τῆς παρούσης ἐξουσίας κωλυθήσεσθαι διὰ τὰς χρείας καὶ τοὺς ἀεὶ περιισταμένους ἀγῶνας τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ κινδύνους..

[158] Strootman 2011: 73 sees Antiochus as siding with Epigenes and his faction against Hermeias. If this is true, or if Antiochus was cleverly playing the courtiers against one another, there is little evidence for it in Polybius' account. On the notion that plans to reclaim Coele-Syria originated during the reign of Seleucus III, see Schmitt 1964: 152–153. Huss 1976: 26-27 argues that instead the idea had not been conceived prior to 223/2.

king, promising him ships and money to help in the inevitable war with Antiochus (5.57-9).[159] According to Polybius, the result of this treacherous step was that Achaeus was now in fact forced to name himself king and rebel against Antiochus (5.57.1-3). The ensuing revolt lasted until 213, and Achaeus was only prevented from invading and occupying Syria in 220 by the disaffection of his own troops (5.57.4-8).

The first campaign against the rebels in the East did not end well for Antiochus, according to Polybius, much to Hermeias' delight. As Epigenes had warned, Molon's control over Media already constituted a serious threat, given the size, strength, and prosperity of the district (5.44). He was moreover joined by many of the nearby satrapies (5.43.6). Rather than face Molon and Alexander, the generals Xenon and Theodotus, who had been sent against the rebels, were too terrified to risk battle and instead withdrew into the towns of Apollonia (5.43.7-8). Polybius says that at this point all of Asia believed Molon to be unstoppable, and indeed he planned to siege Seleucia in Mesopotamia, the second capital of the Seleucid empire, but was prevented from crossing the Tigris by Antiochus' general Zeuxis (5.45.1-4). At this point, Antiochus wanted to deal with the rebellion in person before it grew even more widespread, but again Hermeias kept to his original treacherous design (πρόθεσιν, 5.45.6), instead sending Xenoetas the Achaean against Molon in 221 with a fresh army.[160] Yet Xenoetas was likewise defeated by Molon, his forces surprised at dawn by the rebel army that he thought had fled in fear the day before (5.46.6-5.48.1-10). With Xenoetas' defeat, Molon subsequently captured Seleucia with little resistance (5.48.11-12). He likewise proceeded to take control of Babylonia and the Persian Gulf, ending his conquest

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[159] Scholars disagree on the authenticity of such a letter: Grabowski 2010: 120, n.28. The existence of such a letter is questioned by Holleaux 1935: 132, n.3; Schmitt 1964: 161-163; Walbank 1967: 502, 573; Huss 1976: 28. Schmitt argues that such a fabrication actually would have been against Hermeias' interests as it could have derailed the campaign against Ptolemy. On the argument that the letter was a later invention by Seleucid court historians, see Meloni 1949: 542; Will 1962: 91. For an overview of Hermeias' scheming presented by Polybius, see Taylor 2013: ch. 2.

[160] Grabowski 2010: 17-18.

at Susa, where he captured all but the citadel, which remained in the hands of the general Diogenes (5.48.13-15).

When news reached Antiochus that Xenoetas had been defeated and that the upper satrapies had also now defected, he decided to abandon his campaign in Coele-Syria for the moment and turn his full attention to Molon's rebellion (5.46.5; 5.48.17).[161] Gathering his council to discuss what course of action to take, Epigenes again was the first to suggest that the king needed to personally deal with the rebels swiftly and decisively (5.49.1-2). Once more, however, Hermias, hoping, according to Polybius, to keep Antiochus embroiled in wars on all sides, slandered Epigenes, bringing false and random accusations against him (ἀστόχους δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς ποιούμενος κατηγορίας Ἐπιγένους, 5.49.4), insulting Antiochus and most of the council in the process (5.49.5). When the council decided to follow Epigenes' advice, he pretended (συνυποκριθεὶς) to agree readily with the course of action (5.49.7).[162] In reality, he continued to work against Epigenes and Antiochus. Thus when a mutiny broke out in the army that had assembled at Apamea, because some of them had not been fully paid, Hermeias blackmailed Antiochus, agreeing to pay the money owed to the soldiers only if Epigenes did not accompany the king on his campaign against Molon (5.50.1-3).[163] When Antiochus was forced to comply with Hermeias' wicked disposition (Ἑρμείου κακοηθείας, 5.50.5), this not only forced Epigenes to retire into civilian life but also intimidated the other members of the royal council, revealing what happened to those who did not fall in line (5.50.6; 5.50.9). To ensure Epigenes would never threaten his influence over Antiochus again, Hermeias then bribed one of Epigenes' slaves to plant a forged letter between Molon and Epigenes

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[161] For a summary of the entire events surrounding Molon's rebellion and Antiochus' response, including the ultimate death of Hermeias, see Taylor 2013: ch. 2.

[162] Farrington 2011: 337 points out Antiochus' ability during the council to not be swayed by Hermeias' personal encomium.

[163] It was common for kings to rely on their wealthy friends and courtiers for money. See Strootman 2007: 147.

in Epigenes' home. Upon finding this letter, Alexis, the commander of the citadel at Apamea who had conspired with Hermeias, swiftly put Epigenes to death (5.50.10-13).[164] Antiochus was led to believe that Epigenes had been treasonous, and the members of the royal court who suspected Hermeias' treachery were too afraid to speak against him (ἦγον δὲ τὴν ἡσυχίαν διὰ τὸν φόβον, 5.50.14).

With Epigenes removed, Hermeias accompanied Antiochus on his campaign against Molon without interference. After passing the worst of the winter at Antioch, Antiochus again held council to determine the best way to approach Molon, who was in Babylon, and to ensure his logistics remained intact (5.51.1-3).[165] Revealing his lack of military experience, Hermeias advised that the army should march along the Tigris and cross at the King's Canal to engage Molon (5.51.4). Such a march would have ended in disaster for the king. Fortunately for Antiochus, Zeuxis advised against this route, despite his fear of Hermeias because of the recent fate of Epigenes (5.51.5). Zeuxis explained to the king that Hermeias' plan would see the army undertaking a six-day march through the desert before reaching the canal. The canal itself was likewise already held by the enemy and would prove impossible to cross, forcing Antiochus to then retreat back through the desert, all with poor provisions (5.51.6-7). Instead, he suggested that the army cross the Tigris immediately. Such a maneuver would ensure that their forces remained properly provisioned, given the fertility of the country (5.51.9) and the fact that the people of the Apolloniatis would support Antiochus, having only sided with Molon out of necessity and fear

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[164] On Polybius' condemnation of Hermeias for this treachery, see Eckstein 1995: 100.

[165] For an overview of all three council meetings during these years, see McGing 2010: 119-121. For a detailed look at the actions taken by Antiochus and the court throughout the war against Molon, see Grabowski 2010: 116-119.

(ἀνάγκῃ...καὶ φόβῳ, 5.51.8).[166] Crossing the Tigris would likewise force Molon to give battle, because Antiochus' army would cut off Molon's ability to retreat to and receive supplies from Media (5.51.10-11). And indeed, this is just what happened. Upon hearing of Antiochus' crossing, Molon was forced to rush back toward Media, where he came into contact with Antiochus' troops in Apollonia (5.52.4-7). Antiochus' presence in the region proved as disastrous for Molon as Epigenes had originally predicted, causing many of Molon's soldiers to desert before he could successfully carry out his intended nighttime attack (5.52.8-12). Similarly, when the two armies subsequently met in battle, Molon's entire left flank deserted to the king, removing any hope of victory (5.54.1-2).[167] Rather than face the torture in store for them if they were captured, Molon and all those who had helped to orchestrate the rebellion (5.54.3-5) committed suicide.

Even this victory was spoiled by Hermeias, however. Keeping up his harsh character (Ἑρμείας δὲ τηρῶν τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἐπέφερε, 5.54.10), the chief minister ignored Antiochus' own moderate settlement and brought harsh punishments against the people of Seleucia. Hermeias fined the city a thousand talents, sent certain magistrates into exile, and executed and tortured many of the Seleucians by mutilation, the sword, and the rack (5.54.10).[168]

At this point, Antiochus wanted to march against Artabarzanes and the other barbarian princes who lay beyond the borders of his own provinces, hoping to prevent them from supporting anyone who rebelled against him in the future (5.55.1-2).[169] Hermeias was initially against this new campaign, owing to its danger. Yet, according to Polybius, Hermeias remained only

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[166] We could note the people of the Apolloniatis as another example of acceptable treachery against allies given that they only betrayed their allegiance with Antiochus out of the necessity of the circumstances. See chapter 2.

[167] At this point Hermeias' influence within the court was still great enough that he was chosen to command the left flank of Antiochus' army along with Zeuxis: 5.53.6–7. On the importance of this honor which was reserved for the most important *philos* or the crown prince, see Strootman 2011: 76, n. 41.

[168] These magistrates were called Adeiganes. See Walbank 1957: 583.

[169] Davidson 1991: 22 points to Antiochus' wishes here as an example of imperialistic aims being extended after a victory.

concerned with his own treacherous lust for power, evidenced by the reversal of his advice (5.55.4-5):

> When, however, the news came that a son had been born to Antiochus, thinking that possibly in the interior Antiochus might meet with some misfortune at the hands of the barbarians and give him the opportunity of compassing his death, he gave his consent to the expedition, feeling sure that if he could put Antiochus out of the way he would be himself the child's guardian and master of the kingdom.[170]

Polybius' characterization of Hermeias, then, remains consistent. He was only concerned with increasing his own authority, even if it came at the expense of his fellow citizens or the king himself.[171] His treacherous actions finally came to a head, however, when Apollophanes, the king's physician and friend, begged the king to deal with Hermeias before Antiochus met the same fate as his brother (5.56.1-2).[172] Hermeias, he said, no longer put any restraint on his arbitrary exercise of authority (5.56.1). When Antiochus agreed with Apollophanes' fears and suspicions, they hatched a plan to assassinate the chief minister (5.56.6).[173] Feigning fits of dizziness, Antiochus was ordered by Apollophanes to take early walks in the cool air. During one of these walks in which Hermeias accompanied the king and his chosen cohort, he led the chief minister away from the camp, where he was stabbed to death by the king's friends (5.56.7-12).[174] Thus, according to Polybius, the

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[170] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ προσπεσόντος υἱὸν γεγονέναι τῷ βασιλεῖ, νομίσας καὶ παθεῖν ἄν τι τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἐν τοῖς ἄνω τόποις ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ παραδοῦναι καιροὺς αὐτῷ πρὸς ἐπαναίρεσιν, συγκατέθετο τῇ στρατείᾳ, πεπεισμένος, ἐὰν ἐπανέληται τὸν Ἀντίοχον, ἐπιτροπεύων τοῦ παιδίου κύριος ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτός.

[171] See Champion 2004a: 249.

[172] According to Appian (*Syr.* 66) Seleucus was poisoned by his *philoi*.

[173] Strootman 2011: 73-74 suggests that Antiochus had been waiting from the very start to get rid of Hermeias, but lacked the wealth and prestige to stand up to him until after his victories against the rebels under Molon and against Artabazanes. If true, such a situation mirrors Hermeias' attempts to have someone other than Antiochus fight the rebels and his hesitation toward the subsequent campaign against Artabazanes. Such a recreation is complicated, however, by the fact that during the earlier council meeting in 221 Antiochus is willing to go against Hermeias' wishes in delaying the campaign in Coele-Syria to personally deal with Molon and Alexander.

[174] For a summary of the plot, see McGing 2010: 121-122.

kingdom was freed from a source of fear and constant embarrassment (ἀπολυθεὶς φόβου καὶ δυσχρηστίας πολλῆς, 5.56.14). When news of Hermeias' death became public, according to Polybius, all the people praised Antiochus with approval, applauding the end of the chief minister even more heartily than the king's victories against Molon and Artabarzanes (πάντων τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἀποδεχομένων τάς τε πράξεις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐπιβολάς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν δίοδον ἐπισημαινομένων τὴν Ἑρμείου μετάστασιν, 5.56.14). And when word reached Apamea, the women stoned to death Hermeias' wife, and the boys did the same to Hermeias' sons (5.56.15).[175]

Throughout Polybius' lengthy description of Hermeias' multiple acts of treachery against Antiochus, his condemnation is clear.[176] By prolonging the rebellion started by Molon in 222 (4.41.1) and encouraging Achaeus' rebellion in 220 (5.42.7-8; 5.57.1-5), Hermeias attempted to keep Antiochus embroiled in wars on all sides in order to ensure his own influence over him (5.42.5-6). The chief minister's treachery against his fellow council members, killing Epigenes (5.50.10-14) and terrifying the others (5.50.9; 5.50.14; 5.51.5), likewise left Antiochus in want of good advice in his campaign against Molon. It was only Zeuxis' willingness to offer sound military advice despite his fear of Hermeias that prevented Antiochus' forces from being devastated (5.51.5-11). Polybius remains clear that Hermeias was strictly motivated by personal ambition rather than any loyalty to

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[175] Eckstein 1995: 152-153 points to this passage as example of violence accompanying moments when women become involved in public affairs. On the friends who made up Antiochus' court following the deaths of Molon, Hermeias, and Achaeus, see Strootman 2011: 74-81.

[176] Polybius' unwaveringly negative characterization of Hermeias is perhaps indicative of his reliance upon a single literary source. Most scholars suggest that Polybius' depiction of Hermeias as a stock wicked advisor is exaggerated: see Taylor 2013: ch. 2. On Polybius' source, see Schmitt 1964: 130–157, 175-178; Lehmann 1967: 357–360; Walbank 1967: 570–571; Walbank 1972: 157; Huss 1976: 8–20; Primo 2009: 136–138; Grabowski 2010: 116. Grabowski suggests that Polybius likely based his account on accounts from the Seleucid court which had made Hermeias into a scapegoat for one or more blunders during this period. Again, for our purposes Polybius' internal consistency in evaluating these various acts of treachery is what matters.

Antiochus or the state. This is made even more apparent when he treacherously hoped that Antiochus would die while fighting across the borders of his empire, allowing Hermeias to control the state with supreme authority in place of Antiochus' nearly born son (5.55.4-5). Given these multiple acts of treachery, Polybius concludes that Hermeias' assassination was by no means adequate to his crimes (οὐδεμίαν ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν ἀξίαν τῶν αὐτῷ πεπραγμένων, 5.56.13). In Polybius' eyes, a swift death was too good for a man so treacherous and wicked.[177]

Treachery within the Ptolemaic Court

The Ptolemies faced their share of treacherous court advisors as well. Perhaps the most wicked courtiers to appear in this period were Sosibius and Agathocles. Although little is known of his origins, Sosibius began serving as the chief minister of Ptolemy IV Philopator almost as soon as the young king took the throne in 221.[178] It was under Sosibius' direction that many of Ptolemy's family members were killed during his first year as minister, including the king's half-brother Lysimachus, the king's brother Magas, and the king's mother Berenice (15.25.2). This worked to shore up Ptolemy's claim to the throne (5.34.1-2) and brought the king further under Sosibius' influence, who carried out much evil in the court (ἔτι δὲ κακοποιὸν ἐν βασιλείᾳ), according to Polybius (15.25.1). He likewise later killed Cleomenes when he saw the exiled Spartan king as a threat (5.35-38), as discussed below.[179]

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[177] Pomeroy 1986: 410-411. Polybius' condemnation here is similar to his judgment of the death of Aristomachus the tyrant of Argos (2.60.7); see chapter 2.

[178] On the suggestion that Sosibius had already been entrenched in the royal court under Ptolemy III Euergetes, see Holleaux 1912: 370-376; Walbank 1957: 567.

[179] On Cleomenes' attempted coup, see below.

At some point Sosibius began to share control of the state with Agathocles. Polybius mentions Agathocles assisting Sosibius with drilling the army during the winter of 218/217 while the latter worked to delay Antiochus III's incursion into Coele-Syria (5.63.1-4).[180] At any rate, Sosibius and Agathocles worked together in 204 upon the premature death of Ptolemy to seize control of the regency of the five-year-old Ptolemy V Epiphanes. Fearing that Ptolemy IV's wife and sister, Arsinoe III, would take control of the young king's guardianship, Sosibius and Agathocles had the queen murdered in the palace before she learned of her husband's death (15.25.1; 15.33.11).[181] After murdering Arsinoe, Sosibius and Agathocles proclaimed Ptolemy V king and read a forged will (διαθήκην...πεπλασμένην) that named them his guardians (15.25.5), although Polybius calls them false and unfaithful guardians (ψευδεπίτροπος, 15.25.1).[182] Polybius describes Agathocles alone now paying the soldiers for their support (15.25.6; 15.25.11) and sending off other distinguished members of the court on assignments outside of Egypt. While the date and cause of Sosibius' death is not known, it seems likely that it occurred shortly after Ptolemy V took the throne; thus we find Sosibius' son Ptolemy among the political rivals that Agathocles sent away from the capital, in this case to renew ties with Philip V (15.25.13).[183] In similar fashion, Pelops, son of Pelops, was sent to Antiochus; Ptolemy,

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[180] On Agathocles' rise to prominence, see Walbank 1936/1985: 38-56; Bolansée 2005: 250-253; Miltsios 2009: 495-97.

[181] Arsinoe was allegedly much loved by the public and had even played a pivotal role at the battle of Raphia where she may well have commanded a section of the phalanx. On her popularity, see Tyldesley 2006: 194. On her involvement at Raphia, see Meyers 2000: 397.

[182] Huß 2001: 450, 474f.; Hōlbl 2001: 127ff., 134.

[183] On the possibility of Agathocles murdering Sosibius, see Polyb. 15.25.34. For the argument that Sosibius simply died from age, see Walbank 1967: 483.

son of Agesarchus, was sent to Rome; and Scopas the Aetolian was sent to Greece (15.25.13-16).[184]

According to Polybius, Agathocles' treacherous behavior did not end with Arsinoe's death. After sending away the influential courtiers, he filled these positions with his most useless and reckless friends (εἰκαιοτάτους καὶ θρασυτάτους, 15.25.21). He then proceeded to spend his days drinking and raping brides, virgins, and young girls throughout the city (15.25.22-24).[185] And when Agathocles, rather than make amends for his actions, continued each day with his sexual violence, arrogance, and indolence (ὕβρεως, ὑπερηφανίας, ῥαθυμίας, 15.25.23), the populace grew even angrier with the chief minister, already incensed over his involvement in the death of Arsinoe (15.25.24; cf. 15.25.8-10).[186] For the moment, the people of Alexandria had no leader to unite behind, but they hoped that Tlepolemus, the governor of Pelusium, would help to stop Agathocles' outrageous behavior (ὕβριν, 15.25.29). Tlepolemus had initially been content with his station, believing capable men would be put in charge of Ptolemy V's guardianship. According to Polybius, when Tlepolemus saw that it was Agathocles who now controlled the government, however, and aware of his support among his own troops and in Alexandria, he became more receptive to the idea (15.25-29). When Agathocles caught wind of Tlepolemus' sentiments, he wasted no time in attempting to undermine his rival. He brought a number of false accusations against Tlepolemus before Ptolemy, some exaggerated and others completely fabricated (15.25.35), suggesting that the governor was

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[184] On this treacherous affair, see Grimm 1997: 233-249; Cheshire 2009: 349-350. On possible Polybian bias against Ptolemy IV and his courtiers, see Huß 2001: 474f.; Hölbl 2001: 133.

[185] On Polybius' condemnation of Agathocles' wicked behavior, see Eckstein 1995: 139, 246-247; Champion 2004a: 257; Farrington 2011: 331; Johstono 2017: 1-3.

[186] Polybius emphasizes that the people of Alexandria hated Agathocles even more than they loved Arsinoe (15.25.10).

working to betray Alexandria to Antiochus III (15.25.34-35). He likewise later made an emotional appeal to the soldiers in Alexandria, starting with the Macedonian Guard, saying that Tlepolemus was attempting to take the Ptolemaic throne for himself, bringing forward witnesses who claimed to have seen preparations being made for a coronation ceremony (5.26.1-7). The soldiers were not convinced (5.26.8).[187]

Meanwhile, Agathocles continued his wicked actions against fellow citizens in Alexandria, doing nothing to conciliate the populace. The people were especially exasperated (ὀργὴν ἐπιτεῖναι) by his actions against Danae, Tlepolemus' mother-in-law (5.27.1). Agathocles and his men impiously dragged Danae out of the temple of Demeter, paraded her unveiled through the city, and threw her into prison (15.27.2). Polybius claims that this outrage so incensed (ἀγανακτοῦν) the populace that they no longer spoke out against Agathocles in private but met openly to plot against him (15.27.3). After considering fleeing the city but realizing he had failed to plan for this inevitability (15.27.4), Agathocles decided to assume complete tyrannical control (τυραννικὴν ἐξουσίαν, 15.27.5) over the city, beginning by enlisting conspirators and arresting or killing those who worked against him. One such victim was Moeragenes, a member of the bodyguard. Upon receiving word that Moeragenes was in communication with Tlepolemus, Agathocles ordered that he be interrogated and tortured by his secretary of state, Nicostratus. Just before Moeragenes was to be tortured, however, Nicostratus left on urgent business, leaving Moeragenes naked but unharmed in the royal palace (15.27.7-28.4). Moeragenes eventually made his way to some of the Macedonian troops and urged

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[187] The Macedonian Guard were the most important part of the Ptolemaic army, controlling their own land. They were likely not all of Macedonian origin. See Granier 1931: 140-144, who, according to Walbank, exaggerates their political importance in Alexandria Griffith 1935: 111 ff.; Launey 1949: 308 ff.; Walbank 1967.

them to act now with the will of the people behind them and overthrow Agathocles (15.28.5-9). The Macedonians agreed, rousing the other soldiers as well and soon causing the movement to spread among the populace like wildfire (15.29.1-4). At this same time, Tlepolemus arrived outside the city (15.29.6), sealing Agathocles' fate. Yet when he learned of these developments, rather than prepare to flee or take some other suitable action, according to Polybius, Agathocles continued to feast and party in his usual manner (15.29.6-7). His wife, Oenanthe, likewise continued her normal wicked behavior toward her fellow citizens after fleeing to the Thesmophoreum temple, calling the noblewomen who tried to comfort her beasts (θηρία) and telling them she would make them eat the flesh of their own children (γεύσειν ὑμᾶς τῶν ἰδίων τέκνων, 15.29.11-12).[188]

With the entire populace of Alexandria up in arms, including the women and children (15.30.1-2; 15.30.9-10), Agathocles and his family were swiftly overthrown. Agathocles was led in chains into the crowd, where he was immediately stabbed to death by the people (15.33.6). Later, his relative Nicon was brought in, as was Agathoclea, who had been stripped naked along with all of her sisters and other relatives (15.33.7). Lastly, they dragged Oenanthe from the Thesmophorium and brought her to the theater naked and on horseback (15.33.8). All of these guilty individuals proceeded to be stabbed, bitten, clawed, and torn limb from limb (πεσόντος τὰ μέλη διέσπων) by the angry mob (15.33.9).[189] And while this was happening, a group of young women, hearing that

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[188] This temple was identified with the Thesmophoria fertility ceremony held each year throughout Greece in honor of Demeter. On the identity of this temple in Alexandria, see (with notes) Walbank 1967:490.

[189] Cf. Justin 30.1.2; Plut. *Cleom.* 33; Athenaeus 6.251; 13.576.. His sister Agathoclea had been the favorite mistress of Ptolemy V, and his mother Oenanthe had wielded enormous influence in the royal court. On these Ptolemaic women, see Pomeroy 1990: 49-51. On Agathocles ancestry and their backgrounds, see Walbank 1967: 480-485. On their deaths, see Dunand 2007: 256; Johstono 2017: 1-20. On Agathocles' death and an example of the dangers that mercenaries posed, even against their own employers, see Eckstein 1995: 125-127. Eckstein 1995: 132 emphasizes the negative threat to social order involved in the popular uprising in Alexandria in 200 and the ensuing massacre. It should be

Philammon, the treacherous man who had killed Arsinoe III, had returned to Alexandria, went to his house and killed him, also strangling his son and dragging his wife naked into the square where they killed her as well (15.33.11-12).

In Polybius' mind, these deaths were justified given the treacherous behavior shown by Agathocles and his relatives in killing Arsinoe and in the weeks following. Agathocles' death at the hands of fellow citizens was brought about by his own wickedness and brought about by his cowardice and indolence (ἰδίαν ἀνανδρίαν καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν, 15.34.6). The Achaean historian remains clear in his account of Agathocles that the chief minister's actions were strictly motivated by his own desire for power and debauchery, caring little about the actual well-being of Ptolemy V, despite claims to the contrary (cf. 15.31.4). As with Hermeias, Agathocles, according to Polybius, did not receive the death that his treacheries deserved (τοῦ μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς, 15.33.6). Thus, when the crowd stabbed him, Polybius calls this an act of benevolence rather than enmity (οὐκ ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλ᾽ εὐνοούντων, 15.33.6).

Similar treacherous actions were taken against the Ptolemaic crown by Scopas of Aetolia. While not a subject of the Ptolemaic Kingdom, following the end of the First Macedonian War and the reforming of the Aetolian constitution in 204, Scopas came to Egypt, where he was received into the Ptolemaic court and eventually commanded the Egyptian forces in Coele-Syria against Antiochus with early success; but he was forced to surrender in Sidon after the battle of Panium in 200.[190] He likewise worked to raise a

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emphasized, however, that Polybius does not condemn the populace itself, as was the case with the Boeotians in 197 (18.43.8), but keeps his condemnation focused solely upon Agathocles and his disastrous wickedness; cf. Champion 2004a: 257.

[190] Polyb. 13.1-2, 16.18-19, 39; Josephus *Antiq.* 12.3.3; St. Jerome *ad Daniel* 11.15-16. For more on Scopas' service to the Ptolemaic court, see below. On the earlier career of Scopas, see Briscoe 1974: 58-59; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 373-375, 389; Champion: 2004a: 135-140. On Scopas' campaign against Antiochus, see Taylor 2013: 90-92.

mercenary force of 6000 Aetolians for King Ptolemy V, commissioned by Agathocles.[191]

In 196, inflamed by his success in acquiring such a large mercenary force, the vast wealth he had accumulated, having robbed many valuables from the palace (18.55.2), and the loyalty of this mercenary force, Scopas attempted to forcibly take control of Ptolemaic affairs.[192] His hesitation in carrying out the coup, however, proved to be his downfall. Thus, before he could execute his treacherous plot, he was apprehended by chief minister Aristomenes, who had grown suspicious of his frequent closed-door meetings at his house (18.53.5-11). After a predetermined trial, in which Scopas was accused of treason by Aristomenes as well as foreign ambassadors (18.54.1-5), Scopas and all his friends were condemned to death and killed by poison that same night.[193] Polybius' condemnation of Scopas' treacherous plotting and unrestrained greed and ambition (φιλαργυρία...πλεονεξίαν) is clear (18.55.1-2).[194] Yet, the Achaean historian criticizes Scopas for his failure in the attempt as well. Polybius declares that when Cleomenes attempted his coup against Ptolemy IV in 219, he had very few resources at his disposal, but nevertheless he acted boldly and earned a glorious death (καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν, 18.53.3). Yet Scopas, despite having more resources and many supporters, and the fact that Ptolemy V was still a child (παιδὸς), failed to even begin his coup due to his own hesitation (18.53.4). Polybius reminds his reader: "There are many who yearn for glorious and bold undertakings, but few actually attempt them" (18.53.1).[195] Such a claim shows Polybius'

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[191] Livy 31.43.

[192] Polybius evidently described the details of the attempted coup in detail in 18.53, but this is now lost. See Walbank 1967: 623-627. On the larger theme of the threat of mercenaries to the existing social order, see Eckstein 1995: 127, n.28. Polybius distrusted mercenaries and saw those of Alexandria as especially arrogant: 34.13.3; Griffith 1935: 127-130.

[193] The exception being Dicaearchus who was racked and scoured before being killed (18.54.6).

[194] Eckstein 1995: 46, 139, 251.

[195] τῶν γὰρ παραβόλων καὶ καλῶν ἔργων ἐφίενται μὲν πολλοί, τολμῶσι δ' ὀλίγοι ψαύειν.

multi-faceted analysis of events. Polybius maintains that, having already decided on treason (which Polybius condemns), Scopas should have acted more boldly. Thus, by committing treason in a timid way, Scopas received condemnation from Polybius twice over.

The dispute between Ptolemy VI Philometor and his younger brother Ptolemy VIII Physcon in the 160s constitutes another example of royal treachery. Despite being the rightful king, Ptolemy VI had been treacherously attacked in 164 by his brother and his troops, forcing the king to flee to Rome.[196] The Senate sent Lucius Canuleius Dives and Quintus Marcius Philippus as envoys who helped to settle the issue diplomatically in 163 (31.10.4).[197] The result was that the kingdom would be divided, with Ptolemy VI ruling over Egypt and Cyprus, while the younger Ptolemy VIII received Cyrene - a division that Polybius says exceeded his expectations and hopes (παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα καὶ παραδόξως, 31.10.5). Both kings agreed (λάβοι), exchanged solemn oaths (ὅρκους), and sealed the agreement with sacrifices to the gods (σφαγίων τμηθέντων...δοίη, 31.10.5).[198] Despite these vows, however, during the following year, in 162, Ptolemy VIII went back on his word and came before the Roman Senate, asking to be given control over Cyprus as well (31.10.2-3).[199] While Polybius' condemnation of Ptolemy VIII's treachery is clear, emphasizing that the king's acquisition of Cyrene, which had been sealed over sworn oaths, was a great and wholly undeserved show of goodwill by Ptolemy VI, it is in some ways overshadowed by

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[196] Cf. Livy, *Ep.* 46; Diod. 31.18.1-2; Val. Max. 5.1.1; Trog. *prol.* 34; Zon. 9.25.3.

[197] On the identity of these envoys, see Otto 1934: 93-94; Walbank 1979: 475; Eckstein 1995: 103-104; cf. Livy *Ep.* 46. It is unclear how pivotal a role the Romans played in arbitrating this agreement. Otto 1934: 90-94 believes it was crucial, but Gruen 1984: 696-697 suggests there was minimal Roman involvement, supported by the fact that both envoys were non-consular in 164.

[198] On the details and dating of this agreement, see Walbank 1979: 474-475.

[199] On the irony that Physcon diminished Ptolemaic power in his desire for more territory, see Ferrary 1988: 309-310; Eckstein 1995: 104, n. 69.

the criticism of the Roman Senate. For the Senate did in fact accede to the younger

Ptolemy's request and repartition the kingdom, against the advice of Cenuleius and

Philippus (31.10.4; 31.10.6). Polybius argues that backing the treacherous Physcon was

reprehensible, as the senators were acting in their own interest (ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ

συμφέροντι, 31.10.6) and contrary to justice (ἀλόγως; παρὰ...δίκαιον, 31.2.1; 31.11.7), just

as they had in detaining Demetrius of Syria.[200] Polybius' condemnation, then, reflects not

only Physcon's treachery but the subsequent Roman wickedness in supporting it.[201]

Acceptable Court Intrigue

As with the other categories of treachery we have examined, there are certain

circumstances in which Polybius allows for deception and breaks of faith to be carried out

within Hellenistic courts. While treachery and deception within court politics are condemned

when carried out for personal gain and ambition, such actions may be taken without reproach

if motivated by concern for the state or to combat a wicked king or advisor. Again, Polybius

reminds his readers that "the slayer of a traitor or tyrant everywhere meets with honor and

distinction" (ὁ δὲ τὸν προδότην ἢ τύραννον τιμῶν καὶ προεδρείας τυγχάνει παρὰ πᾶσιν,

2.56.15). In this context, it is not surprising that Polybius condones and even praises such

initiative.

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[200] The Romans hoped to divide the powerful Ptolemaic kingdom and were happy to diminish the strength of Ptolemy VI who was a capable and mild ruler. On Polybius' dislike of Ptolemy VIII Physcon, see Polyb. 31.10.4-5; 31.18.4; Eckstein 1995: 104-105, n.71; On Polybius approval of Ptolemy VI, including his personal friendship with Ptolemy's envoy Menyllus, see Polyb. 31.12.8-13; 39.7.5-6 Diod. 31.18.1; Gruen 1984: 699; Eckstein 1995: 104-105.

[201] See Petzold 1969: 60f.; Musti 1978: 81; Eckstein 1995: 104-105; Baronowski 2011: 83-84. On Roman wickedness in this instance and during this period in general, see chapter 6. Contra Walbank 1940: 172-173; Walbank 1974: 12; Walbank 1979: 476 who views Polybius' judgment of Roman action in this instance as purely utilitarian.

Hence, we find Philip V putting Leontius to death without trial in order to prevent trouble with the peltasts (5.27.5-8). Antiochus III and Apollophanes similarly deceive Hermeias and lure him away from camp in order to have him murdered (5.56.1-12). And in the face of Agathocles' wickedness, the populace and soldiery of Alexandria rise up in open revolt, led by Tlepolemus, to seek vengeance (τιμωρίαν, 15.28.8) against the chief minister (15.29-33). Each of these instances is fully justified in Polybius' reckoning. Indeed, when these wicked courtiers are ultimately killed, the Achaean historian is often dissatisfied that they did not have more horrific deaths to match their treacheries.[202] The deaths of these treacherous courtiers are condoned by Polybius, given their crimes, wickedness, and danger to the state.

When kings act with similar wickedness, actions taken against them by courtiers and subjects likewise receive acceptance from the Achaean historian. Perhaps the best example of this was the multiple plots taken against Ptolemy IV Philopator. While the Ptolemaic kings in the past had paid careful attention to foreign affairs (5.34.4-9), Ptolemy IV, seeing that his main rivals Antigonus and Seleucus had both died and left young kings on the thrones, instead spent his days in drunken debauchery (ἀπρεπεῖς ἔρωτας καὶ τὰς ἀλόγους καὶ συνεχεῖς μέθας, 5.34.10), handling the administration his kingdom entirely with negligence and indifference (ἀνεπίστατον...καὶ δυσέντευκτον, 5.34.4). Polybius says that as a direct result of this foolish behavior, Ptolemy soon faced more than one conspiracy (ἐπιβούλους) against him, the first being from Cleomenes (5.34.10-11).

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[202] Thus while Apelles, Leontius, and Megaleas met the ends they deserved for their treacherous crimes (τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τυχόντες καταστροφῆς, 5.28.9), as did Deion (ἁρμοζούσης, 15.26a.2), Polybius says that Hermeias' death was by no means adequate to his crimes (οὐδεμίαν ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν ἀξίαν τῶν αὑτῷ πεπραγμένων, 5.56.13). Agathocles' death likewise did not reflect what his treacheries deserved (τοῦ μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς, 15.33.6). And Dicaearchus only received the death he deserved (καθήκουσαν) after being racked and scourged (18.54.6-7).

Following his defeat at Sellasia in 222, Cleomenes had fled to Egypt, where he was taken in by his ally, Ptolemy III Euergetes, who seemingly promised to assist him in reclaiming the Spartan throne (5.35.1). By the time Cleomenes was ready to return to the Peloponnese, however, Ptolemy IV was ruling and was unwilling to listen to the Spartan king's request.[203] Instead, Polybius says, the king continued in his thoughtlessness and folly (εὐήθως καὶ ἀλόγως, 5.35.6).[204] Sosibius, who more or less ran the kingdom in Ptolemy's stead (5.35.7), likewise refused to help Cleomenes, despite the past services he had shown to the chief minister in helping Sosibius safely consolidate power by killing members of the king's family (5.36.1-7; cf. 15.25.1-2). Instead, fearful of his skill as a general and his influence over the mercenaries (5.35.8-10; 5.36.6-7), Sosibius placed Cleomenes under house arrest, armed with fabricated evidence that the Spartan king was gathering supplies for a revolution. Given these betrayals and Ptolemy IV's indolence (cf. 5.35.10; 5.37.10), Polybius finds Cleomenes' subsequent decision to attempt to cause a rebellion among the populace of Alexandria to be acceptable (5.39.1-5).[205] In fact, Polybius praises Cleomenes for the attempt, knowing full well that it had little chance of success, but because Cleomenes was willing to die a glorious death (εὐθανατῆσαι, 5.38.9; cf. καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν, 18.53.3), proving him to have "a great capacity for the conduct of affairs, and in a word designed by nature to be a captain and a prince" (5.39.6).[206] Polybius' decision to draw parallels between Cleomenes and Hector in 5.38.10

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[203] On this context and Cleomenes' coup in general, see Walbank 1957: 566-569.

[204] On Polybius' moral concerns with the debauchery of Ptolemy IV: Préaux 1965: 364-375; Eckstein 1995: 75, 83, 243, 246, 275, 286. On the notion of Polybius' portrayal of Ptolemy's indolence as overstated, see Huss 1976; denied by Hauben 1981: 389-403.

[205] Cf. Plut. *Cleom.* 33. On Polybus' source(s) for his account of Cleomenes' attempted coup, see Ferrabino 1921: 304; Momigliano 1928-1929: 257; Walbank 1957: 565-567 (with notes).

[206] ἀνὴρ γενόμενος καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὁμιλίας ἐπιδέξιος καὶ πρὸς πραγμάτων οἰκονομίαν εὐφυὴς καὶ συλλήβδην ἡγεμονικὸς καὶ βασιλικὸς τῇ φύσει. This praise of Cleomenes (5.38.9) is the only passage in the extant *Histories* where Polybius uses this verb: εὐθανατῆσαι. On Polybius' praise of Cleomenes' energy and glorious death, see Eckstein 1995: 45-46, 251.

follows this line of praise, highlighting the Spartan king's high energy in clear contrast with the sloth of Ptolemy IV.[207] The blame for the conspiracy and Cleomenes' ultimate fate is not the Spartan king but the wicked and indolent Ptolemy IV. Ultimately, Ptolemy IV was unfaithful to the promises of Ptolemy V, justifying Cleomenes' decision to launch a rebellion.

The next treacherous conspiracy against Ptolemy IV, this one carried out by Theodotus the Aetolian in 219, is similarly condoned by the Achaean historian.[208] Theodotus was an Aetolian general who had come into the Ptolemaic court. He had been given command over the important province of Coele-Syria by Ptolemy IV and was instrumental in preventing Antiochus III's first attempt on the region in 221, stopping the king's invasion at Gerrha (5.40.1-3; 5.46.1-5; 5.61.3). Despite these great services (ἀξιολόγους χρείας, 5.40.2; 5.61.4) to Egypt, however, only two years later, Theodotus betrayed Ptolemy and handed over much of Coele-Syria to Antiochus, joining the Seleucid king and transferring the fortresses of Tyre and Ptolemais to his control (5.61.5).[209] Rather than seeking personal advancement, though, Theodotus' decision to desert to Antiochus stemmed from the past wickedness of Ptolemy and his court (5.40.1-3):

> Holding the king in contempt owing to his debauched life and general conduct and mistrusting the court circles, because after recently rendering important service to Ptolemy in various ways and especially in connexion with the first attempt of Antiochus on Coele-Syria, he had not only received no thanks for this but on the contrary had been recalled to

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[207] Polybius draws on a quotation from *Iliad* 22.305-305, a part of Hector's final speech before his fatal confrontation with Achilles. See Eckstein 1995: 45-46. Walbank 1957: 430, 569 suggest that this passage was merely literary artistry, but the allusion certainly fits with Polybius' general praise of the Spartan king at the end of his life.

[208] Walbank 1957: 587 places this betrayal in August 219 placed on the trilingual stele from Pithom, indicating that Raphia occurred twenty-six months after the defection. Theodotus was from Calydon. For more on Theodotus' earlier career, including the likely murder of Magas, see Benecke: 1934 35-38; Bengtson 1937-1952: ii.159-60; iii.166-171; Walbank 1957: 570; Bar Kochva 1976: 90, 124-127. More recently, see Taylor 2013.

[209] Ptolemais, modern day Acre, was named by Ptolemy II in the 260s. Walbank 1957: 587 places the founding in 261. See Strabo 16.758; Diod. 15.41.

Alexandria and had barely escaped with his life, he now formed the project of entering into communication with Antiochus and handing over to him the cities of Coele-Syria.[210]

Given these initial breaks of faith with Theodotus by Ptolemy and his advisors, despite his having prevented Antiochus from capturing Syria-Coele, Theodotus' decision in 219 is justified in Polybius' eyes given Ptolemy IV Philopator's wicked and depraved character.[211] Thus, as with Cleomenes, the Achaean historian emphasizes justifications for Theodotus' desertion, both in 5.40.1-3 as well as in 5.61.3-5, and shows his readers just how delicate kings must be when utilizing and rewarding those in their employ.

The final example again comes from Ptolemaic Egypt, this time with Ptolemy VIII Physcon. When the Romans decided in 162 to back Ptolemy VIII against his elder brother and grant him control over Cyprus, despite the initial agreement that Cyprus and Egypt would remain in the hands of Ptolemy VI, they sent envoys led by Titus Torquatus and Gnaeus Merula to carry out this decision. During the negotiations with Ptolemy VI, however, the news reached them that the people of Cyrene had decided to openly rebel against Ptolemy VIII (31.18.6).[212] Despite the fact that this uprising ignored the agreement that the younger Ptolemy would hold Cyrene, Polybius does not condemn the Cyreneans. Rather, the Achaean historian sees the rebellion, which was in fact supported by Ptolemy Sympetesis, whom Physcon had placed in

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[210] τὰ μὲν καταφρονήσας τοῦ βασιλέως διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ὅλης αἱρέσεως, τὰ δὲ διαπιστήσας τοῖς περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν διὰ τὸ μικροῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις ἀξιολόγους παρασχόμενος χρείας τῷ βασιλεῖ περί τε τἄλλα καὶ περὶ τὴν πρώτην ἐπιβολὴν Ἀντιόχου τοῖς κατὰ Κοίλην Συρίαν πράγμασι, μὴ οἷον ἐπὶ τούτοις τυχεῖν τινος χάριτος, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀνακληθεὶς εἰς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν παρ᾽ ὀλίγον κινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βίῳ, διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἐπεβάλετο τότε λαλεῖν Ἀντιόχῳ καὶ τὰς κατὰ Κοίλην Συρίαν πόλεις ἐγχειρίζειν.

[211] Préaux 1965: 364-375; Eckstein 1995: 75, 83, 243, 246, 275, 286. The description of Ptolemy IV Philopator throughout the Histories is overwhelmingly negative. The Ptolemaic king is lazy (5.34.4; 5.34.10; 5.86.3), frequently drunk (5.34.10; cf. 14.11.2), debauched (5.37.10), ineffectual (5.38.8-9), and weak (5.63.7). Polybius explains that Ptolemy had abandoned a life of virtue (καλῶν) in favor of a life of dissipation (βίον ἄσωτον, 14.12.3). What little virtue Ptolemy IV had exhibited before the war with Antiochus completely disappears after Raphia.

[212] On the details of this revolt, including the nearby towns that joined, see Walbank 1979: 486-488.

charge of the region (31.18.6-7), as justified given the wicked disposition of Ptolemy VIII.[213] The motivation is clear - the Cyreneans' hatred of Ptolemy VIII for his poor behavior and character (cf. 31.10.4). For they had witnessed Ptolemy's disposition during his time in occupation of Alexandria, acting not as a king but as a tyrant (οὐ βασιλικήν, ἀλλὰ τυραννικὴν, 31.18.14).[214] For these reasons, Polybius chooses not to condemn the Cyreneans for disloyalty, instead criticizing Ptolemy VIII for causing them to rebel by his repulsive behavior - again showing how careful kings needed to be toward their subjects and the result of failing to do so.[215]

Overall, our nuanced Polybian model remains predictable in looking at these various instances of treachery within the Hellenistic courts. When kings and courtiers act for the good of the state and in response to the wickedness of others, Polybius condones or accepts their acts of deception and breaks of faith. As we saw with Polybius' presentation of courtiers such as Apelles, Hermeias, and Agathocles, however, it is more often the case that these advisors and ministers undermine their kings and fellow courtiers, not for the good of the state but motivated by their own greed and ambitious desire for power. In these instances, Polybius remains unequivocally condemnatory. In addition to his assessment of the acceptability of such treacheries and deception, Polybius continuously urges kings to treat even ambitious self-interested courtiers and agents carefully and with justice. Anything less, Polybius believes, results in serious repercussions for the kings and threatens the stability of the state, as evidenced by the rebellions against the Ptolemies orchestrated by Scopas, Cleomenes, and Tlepolemus.

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[213] On Ptolemy Sympetesis' powerful position controlling the Pentapolis and Libyan provinces, see: Bengtson 1937-1952: III.157; Walbank 1979: 486.

[214] Cf. Diod. 31.17-20. See Walbank 1979: 468.

[215] On Polybius' condemnation of Ptolemy VIII, see Eckstein 1995: 12, 104-105, 261, n. 81.

III. DECEPTION OF THE POPULACE AND SOLDIERY

This final section will consider various cases of deception used against the populace or the army. It is perhaps not surprising the statesmen employing deception similar to Plato's *noble lie* (γενναῖον ψεῦδος) often do not receive rebuke from Polybius.[216] Yet context and circumstances remain key for the Achaean historian. Thus, lies and deception carried out by leaders to achieve personal gain, often at the expense of the state, are condemned as treacherous, even if not technically meeting his definition of treason (18.13-15). If such deception is motivated by a desire to advance the state and preserve its success and liberty, however, Polybius condones and even encourages such behavior. Again, this is why he is so keen to emphasize that the various intrigues carried out by the Achaean League, notably by Aratus, were not done with the desire to gain some private profit (ἰδίᾳ λυσιτελοῦς), but rather to unify the Peloponnesus and ensure the liberty (ἐλευθερίαν) of its states (2.42.5-6). Whatever bias and patriotism may have guided his interpretation of the Achaean conquest of the Peloponnese (the Aetolians certainly had a much more cynical view of the Achaean expansion), Polybius' framework for evaluation remains constant for our purposes.

Condemned Instances of Deceiving the Populace and Soldiery

When statesmen trick or deceive the populace in order to facilitate their own personal agendas without regard for the well-being of the state and its people, Polybius does not hesitate to criticize such behavior. As we already saw in the previous section, his condemnation of the Macedonian courtiers, Leontius and Megaleas, includes their wicked attempts to mislead the

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[216] Plato, *Rep.* 3.414e–415c.

soldiery against Philip V in 218. According to Polybius, this deception was yet another treacherous step (cf. κακοπραγμοσύνην, 5.5.10) taken by Leontius and Megaleas to undermine Philip and maintain control over the management of the state. Similar criticism is found in the deceptions carried out by Sosibius and Agathocles in 204, concealing the news of the Ptolemy IV' death as well as the circumstances of Arisonoe III's murder (5.25.1-7; 15.33.11). The treacherous courtiers likewise falsely claimed that Ptolemy IV had appointed them as joint guardians over his son, reading a forged (διαθήκην...πεπλασμένην) will as evidence of their new status (15.25.5).[217] Indeed, Polybius holds that these deceptions were part of the reason for the people of Alexandria to begin despising Agathocles and longing for the day when they could rise up and justifiably kill him (5.25.7-11, 5.25.24-25). They did not have to wait very long.

Mathos and Spendius, the leaders of the Libyan and mercenary forces against Carthage in the Mercenary War following the First Punic War, are condemned by Polybius as well for selfishly starting and continuing the war. In 239, aided by his new Numidian ally Naravas (1.78.1-9), Hamilcar managed to defeat Spendius' 25,000-strong army of rebel and Utican troops at the battle of Bagradas River (1.78.10-12).[218] Following the battle, Hamilcar showed remarkable magnanimity by pardoning all of the enemy troops that had been captured, allowing them to either join the Carthaginian army or freely depart (1.78.13-15).[219] Spendius and Mathos, worried that Hamilcar's offered clemency would encourage the Libyans and mercenaries to capitulate, decided to trick their forces into committing some impious crime (ἀσέβειαν) that would force the war to

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[217] On Polybius' condemnation of Agathocles' wicked behavior, see Eckstein 1995: 139, 246-247; Champion 2004a: 257; Farrington 2011: 331; Johstono 2017: 1-3.
[218] On Bagradas River, which marked Carthage's first major victory in the war, see Walbank 1957: 143-144; de Sanctis 1967: 378, n. 20; Bagnall 1990: 116-117; Loreto 1995: 156; Hoyos 2007: 115-124, 149-153.
[219] On Hanibal's clemency, see Loreto 1995: 157-158; Hoyos 2007: 152-153.

continue (1.78.8).[220] After all, they had set the war ablaze to begin with in 240 with similar impious actions (1.70.5-6), treacherously (παρεσπόνδησαν, 1.79.10) arresting Gesco and a number of other Carthaginian officers who had come to negotiate terms of pay (1.70.1-6). This time, Spendius and Mathos convinced the assembly to torture and kill Gesco and seven hundred other Carthaginian prisoners, cutting off their hands and other extremities before breaking their legs and throwing them into a ditch to die (1.80.11-13). These leaders were able to convince the assembly to commit these atrocities by presenting letters, either fabricated or overblown according to Polybius, that had been allegedly sent from Sardinia and Tunis, claiming that certain people in the rebel camp were secretly negotiating with the Carthaginians to release the prisoners (1.79.9-14).[221] Thus, if Gesco was not killed immediately, the rebels would soon be fighting against him on the battlefield (1.79.13). They likewise lied to those gathered, claiming that Hamilcar did not actually intend to spare the lives of those who surrendered to him, but rather the Carthaginian general planned to kill all of them once they came into his power (1.79.11-12). Anyone who disagreed with this course of action was called a traitor and an enemy (προδότας καὶ πολεμίους, 1.80.3), and those who argued against torturing Gesco given his previous kindness toward the mercenaries (1.80.8; 1.80.12; cf. 1.70.1-3) were stoned to death by the crowd, mangled as if by wild beasts (ὥσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίων διεφθαρμένους, 1.80.10).[222]

Polybius' condemnation of Spendius and Mathos' deception and subsequent imious wickedness (ἠσεβηκότας, 1.81.2) against Gesco is clear.[223] Just as they had since the outbreak of

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[220] On the rebel concern over Hamilcar's clemency, see Hoyos 2007: 168-170.

[221] On these letters as fake, see Pedech 1964: 291; Huss 1985: 261; Ameling 2011: 110-111. Contra Loreto 1995: 158 who believes both letters were genuine. Hoyos 2007: 165-168 suggests that the letters may have been genuine, though they were clearly utilized by the rebel leaders for their own purposes.

[222] On the rebels, especially their leaders, becoming wild beasts at this point of the war according to Polybius, see Walbank 1957: 145; Eckstein 1995: 126-129, 175, 177, 247-248; Champion 2004a: 30-63; Hoyos 2007: 171-172.

[223] On the details of the torture and death of Gesco and the other prisoners, see Hoyos 2007: 171-172.

the war, these leaders continued to act for personal benefit. After all, Spendius' entire motivation for encouraging the rebels to go to war with Carthage was so that he could avoid punishment for being a runaway Roman slave (1.69.5). Mathos likewise pushed for war as he was concerned that he might get punished for playing a large part in the initial unrest among the mercenaries in 241/240 (1.69.6). It is thus motivated by selfish concerns that Spendius and Mathos deceive (thereby causing the deaths of) the rebels and consequently receive Polybius' condemnation.

Similar deceptive actions to undermine clemency were carried out by Diaeus during the Achaean War in 146. After the Achaean defeat and Critolaus' death at the battle of Scarpheia, Caecilius Metellus offered generous terms to the Achaean embassy that had been sent (38.17.2-4).[224] Diaeus, who had now replaced Critolaus as strategos, however, refused to even bring this offer before the assembly, misleading the Achaeans about the prospect of an immediate end to the war. To ensure this, Diaeus spread false rumors among the populace that the members of the embassy, Andronidas and his colleagues, were in league with the Romans and not interested in Achaea's best interests (38.17.5-6). Instead, as soon as the envoys returned, they were arrested and led off in chains (38.17.2). Those who supported them were likewise treacherously punished. Even Sosicrates, the league's *hipparch*, was racked and tortured to death by Diaeus for having presided over the decision to send the embassy to Metellus in the first place (38.18.2-3). Polybius explains that Diaeus deceived the Achaean people, not for the betterment of the league but with a mind for his own safety since he did not believe that he would escape Roman wrath even if the populace was granted clemency (38.17.7). Thus, in betraying his duty to his country (not acting γενναίως), he placed his own safety above the safety of the Achaean people (πολλῶν σωτηρίας, 38.17.8).[225]

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[224] Cf. Livy *Ep.* 52; Pausanias 7.14-15; Orosius 5.3.
[225] See Eckstein 1995: 139. On the determination of Achaean leadership to resist the Romand, despite Polybius' critique, see Fuks 1970: 87-88; Gruen 1984: 522.

Polybius likewise condemns the Rhodian statesmen Deinon and Polyaratus for their attempts to deceive the Rhodians. In 171, during the early phases of the Third Macedonian War with Perseus, Gaius Lucretius, the praetor commanding the Roman navy in the Adriatic off Cephallenia wrote to the Rhoadians asking them to send ships to bolster the allied navy (27.7.1).[226] When the letter arrived, many of the Rhodian leaders, including Agathagetus, Rhodophon, Astymedes, and the prytanis Stratocles approved of the proposal (27.7.1-3; 27.7.13).[227] Deinon and Polyaratus, however, attempted to undermine the proposal, believing that they could make personal gains by bringing Rhoades over to Perseus (27.7.4).[228] To do this, they lied to the assembly, telling them that Stratocles had not been sent by the Roman praetor but rather by Eumenes, hoping to drag the Rhodians into the war and cause needless suffering and expenses (27.7.8-9).[229]

According to Polybius, Deinon and Polyaratus knew that the letter had in fact come from Lucretius but were hoping to stir up animosity against the Romans and entice the Rhodians to support Perseus instead (27.7.10-11).[230] Nor was this deception motivated by some attempt to safeguard Rhodian liberty and independence from the Romans. Rather, both men acted strictly for reasons of personal gain. For Polyaratus' pretentiousness and vanity (ἀλαζονικώτερον ὄντα καὶ κενόδοξον) had caused him to go into debt (ὑπόχρεων), and he hoped that Perseus would reward

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[226] Lucretius served as the *duumvir navalis* on the coast of Liguria in 181 (Livy 40.26). As praetor he was assigned the fleet against Perseus with forty quinqueremes (Livy 42.48). On Lucretius' full background, see Walbank 1979: 302.

[227] On these pro-Roman politicians, see (with notes) Walbank 1979: 303.

[228] On this affair, cf. Livy 42.48.8; 56.6. On the political factionalism in Rhodes at this time, see Eckstein 1995: 41-43, 261.

[229] Polyb. 27.7.6-7. While Rhodes and Pergamum had always been traditional enemies, animosity and suspicions had recently been renewed during Eumenes' war with Pharnaces, when Eumenes attempted to blockade the Hellespont, and due to later disputes over Lycia. The details of Eumenes' infringement into eastern Peraea is not known. See Fraser and Bean 1954: 114-117; Walbank 1979: 304, Gruen 1984: 555-556.

[230] On the background and context of the Rhodian relationship with Rome during the war, see Gruen 1984: 550-565.

him for bringing the Rhodians to his side (27.7.12). And Deinon, who was greedy and reckless (φιλάργυρον ὄντα καὶ θρασύν), believed that the support of a king would be the best way to secure his own wealth and advancement (ἐπανορθώσεως, 27.7.12). It was not for their support of Perseus that Polybius condemns Deinon and Polyaratus, as is evident from his later assessment of those statesmen who chose to side with Macedon during the war in which he praises some despite siding against Rome (30.6-9), but rather due to their attempts to deceive the Rhodian assembly in order to facilitate their own personal agendas.[231] Polyubius' negative portrayal of Deinon and Polyaratus is questioned by some scholars, notably Eric Gruen. Gruen argues that Deinon and Polyaratus worked to position Rhoades in opposition to Eumenes and were not largely motivated by pro-Perseus or anti-Rome sentiments. In this way, Gruen maintains, they hoped to keep Rhodes out of the war for the good of the demos, and in fact they were largely successful as the Rhodian fleet saw no action during the course of the war (Polyb. 27.7.15-16; Livy 42.56.7, 44.28.1-3; cf. Meloni 1953: 243-244, 350).[232] While such a claim certainly fits with the general Rhoadian concern for their own independence and for their ancestral rivalry with Pergamum, it is not clear, however, that Deinon and Polyaratus were not also motivated by the personal concerns as Polybius suggests. After all, they could have expected personal rewards from Perseus for simply keeping the Roadians out of the war entirely. Regardless of the genuine motivations of Deinon and Polyaratus, what matters for our purpose is Polybius' interpretation of their actions, which focuses on their desire for personal gain without concern for the state.

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[231] Cf. Livy 45.26.5; 45.31.4. While Polybius' assessment of Deinon and Polyaratus is extremely negative in 30.8-9, calling them stupid and cowardly (τὴν ἀβουλίαν καὶ...τὴν ἀγεννίαν), this stems from the fact that both statesmen tried to deny their attachment to Perseus and later flee, despite openly supporting him in the Rhodian assembly during the war and having their correspondence with the king captured and published. For full discussion, see Eckstein 1995: 41-43; cf. Otto 1934: 89, n.6; Walbank 1965: 11; Walbank 1970: 304; Walbank 1972: 87; Gruen 1975: 60-63, 81; Walbank 1979: 429-431; Sacks 1980: 136, n. 30; Ferrary 1988: 549, n. 9; Champion 2004a: 257.
[232] Gruen 1975: 70; cf. Meloni 1953: 243-244, 350.

Acceptable Instances of Deceiving the Populace and Soldiery

Yet there are many examples throughout the *Histories* where such acts of deception are condoned and even praised by Polybius. Philip V's response to the attempt in 218 by Leontius and Megaleas to stir up the troops in Corinth against him (5.25.1-5), for example, finds Philip purposefully misleading the soldiers. While he planned to punish those responsible for the insurrection, he pretended (ὑποκριθεὶς) to be content with offering a general amnesty. Polybius explains, however, that Philip's feigned ignorance of the culprits stemmed from the pressure of current circumstances (σαφῶς μὲν εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀρχηγοὺς τῆς κινήσεως γεγονότας, οὐ προσποιηθεὶς δὲ διὰ τὸν καιρόν), as his focus and attention was needed for his current military operations in Phocis (5.25.7; cf. 5.24.12; 5.26.1). Polybius finds such deception acceptable, given Philip's goal of safeguarding the state and Macedonian interests against treacherous factions from within the royal court. This is also why Polybius refrains from criticizing Philip for later deceiving the peltasts when he arrested and rightly (δικαίως, 5.100.7) killed Leontius, sending the soldiers off on a pretend assignment to Triphylia under the command of Taurion (5.27.4).[233] This was because Philip, according to Polybius, had come to see Leontius as a threat to the state.

Perhaps the most famous character in the *Histories* who is praised for skillfully employing such deception against his own people for the good of the state is Scipio Africanus. Polybius tells his readers that many previous writers have failed to appreciate properly the calculation (λόγον, 10.2.26), sound judgment (τῶν εὐλογίστων, 10.2.27), and intelligence (φρένας, 10.2.7) that guided Scipio's actions during the Second Punic War, instead attributing his success to unexpected fortune

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[233] On the freedom of the Macedonian soldiery to intervene in court politics, see Adams 1986: 46–47.

(παραλόγως) and mere chance (ταὐτομάτῳ, 10.2.5).[234] But it was not by following the suggestions of dreams and omens (ἐνυπνίων...καὶ κληδόνων) that Scipio managed to win an empire for Rome (10.2.9). Rather, with clear calculation and foresight (λογισμοῦ καὶ προνοίας, 10.2.13), Scipio understood that his men would more courageously and willingly (εὐθαρσεστέρους καὶ προθυμοτέρους) face dangers if they believed that his projects were divinely inspired (θείας ἐπιπνοίας, 10.2.12).[235] Polybius offers two clear examples of such deception.

First, Polybius explains that in 217[236] Scipio's brother Lucius was standing for the aedileship but was likely to lose due to stiff competition among the patricians (10.4.1-3).[237] As their mother was making sacrifices and prayers on behalf of Lucius' election, Scipio lied to her, saying that he had recently had the same dream twice that both he and Lucius had been elected to the aedileship and that she greeted them and kissed them (10.4.4-6).[238] In this way, Scipio managed to not only gain permission to run for office from his mother (his father was away commanding the Roman forces in Spain), but he successfully put into the minds of the Roman people that he was favored by the gods. And Scipio's plan (ἔννοιαν, 10.4.3) worked, resulting in both his and Lucius' election to the aedileship. For when he appeared suddenly before the Roman people in the forum, given his great popularity despite his age (10.5.6), they elected him as aedile and also elected Lucius on his behalf (10.5.1-3). While Scipio earned a reputation for being able to

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[234] See Eckstein 1995: 85-86, 179, 191. On the Scipionic traditions that developed before and after Scipio's death, see (with notes) Walbank 1967: 196-197. On the lingering tradition even after Polybius, see App. *Mac.* 9.1; cf. Carawan 1988: 225.

[235] On Polybius' emphasis on Scipio's intellect and careful calculation, see Walbank 1967: 192; Eckstein 1995: 85-86.

[236] The actual date was 213, see below.

[237] On the unlikelihood of Scipio winning election with his brother, see Broughton 1951: 267. Livy 25.2.6 places his election to *aedilis curulis* in 213 along with his cousin, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus - see below.

[238] On Polybius' portrayal of Scipio's mother Pomponia as easily overcome by emotion, typical of women in the ancient world, see Eckstein 1995: 150-157, esp. 152. According to Pliny (*Nat. Hist.* 7.47) and Silius (13.613ff.) Pomponia died when Scipio was born. This story must have been invented later to mythicize Scipio's birth. See Munzer 1920: 162, n.1; Walbank 1967: 200.

commune with the gods (10.5.7), Polybius again urges his readers to remember that it was in fact Polybius' awareness of the disposition of the Roman people (10.4.3) and his ability to cleverly (εὐστόχως) navigate the complexities of the court of public opinion (10.5.7) that resulted in the successful election of him and his brother.[239]

It was neither divine intervention nor mere chance that framed the outcome of the election, but Scipio's shrewdness, calculation, and foresight (ἀγχίνοιαν, λογισμοῦ, προνοίας, 10.5.8). Nor was it for his own advancement that Scipio deceived the Roman people, for Polybius is clear that he only ran for office himself as it was the only way that his brother could successfully get elected (καὶ μόνως οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων κἀκεῖνον καθίξεσθαι τῆς προθέσεως, 10.4.3). For Polybius, Scipio's deception demonstrated his best qualities of cleverness and hard work (ἐπιδεξιότητα καὶ φιλοπονίαν, 10.5.9).[240]

There are several historical inaccuracies with this account. Scipio was aedile in 213, not 217 as Polybius' text suggests (10.4.5).[241] It was also not his brother Lucius but his cousin Marcus Cornelius Cethegus who was elected with him.[242] Yet regardless of the historicity of the account of Scipio's election, Polybius' confirms his willingness to accept certain instances of deception carried out against the populace.

In the second example, Scipio deceived his own men rather than the Roman people. In 210, Scipio landed with his army at the mouth of the Ebro with the intention of capturing Carthago Nova in a surprise attack while each of the three Carthaginian forces was away from the city.[243] In

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[239] On Polybius' admiration for Scipio's ability to manipulate the populace, see Eckstein 1995: 244, n.28; Champion 2004a: 149, 186.

[240] Contra Eckstein 1995: 85-86 who views Scipio's deception as outside the scope of Polybius' praise.

[241] Cf. Livy 25.2.6-8; Mommsen 1864: 98; Broughton 1951: 267, 340; Walbank 1967: 199.

[242] Lucius, in fact Scipio's younger brother, was not elected until 195. See Meyer 1924: 430-433; Broughton 1951: 340; Walbank 1967: 199-200.

[243] On the dating of Scipio's arrival in 210 and the attack on New Carthage in 209, see Walbank 1967: 191-192. Scipio's attack on New Carthage, see Walbank 1967: 191-196; Keegan 1993: 265; Eckstein 1995: 177-182; Goldsworthy 2000: 173-175; Rosenstein 2012: 161-163; Richardson 2018: 458-474.

a speech to encourage his men before the upcoming attack, Scipio details the strategic importance of capturing the city and promises gold crowns to those who first mount the walls and show exceptional courage (10.11.6). His final encouragement, however, is a lie that the very idea to attack Carthago Nova had actually come from the god Neptune, who had appeared to Scipio in his sleep and promised him manifest divine aid during the attack (10.11.7).[244] And indeed, during the battle Scipio advanced with a group of men through the lagoon, as the tide had gone out as Scipio had predicted, and led a successful attack on the undefended wall (10.14.10-11). The Roman army saw this as the promised divine assistance from Neptune and redoubled their assault against the city (10.14.12-15). Such deception, Polybius maintains, is not just acceptable but in many ways the responsibility of a good commander, who should encourage his men to face dangers and fight to preserve the state.[245] And indeed, Polybius says that the newfound confidence in Neptune's divine assistance (θεοῦ προνοίᾳ) resulted in the Roman army approaching the battle with great eagerness and enthusiasm (μεγάλην ὁρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν, 10.11.8).

These two instances of Scipio's deception are important for our understanding of Polybius' moral framework. While Polybius strives to demonstrate to his reader that Scipio's success was due to careful calculation rather than divine aid or luck, the fact remains that Scipio utilized deception to secure the 213 election and to bolster his troops in 209. In fact his deception is a major part of Polybius' praise, noting how Scipio is able to accurately perceive the current situation and take advantage of opportunities through calculation (10.5.6). It is not enough to say, as Eckstein does, that Polybius' lack of condemnation stems from these being "mild" or "not serious" cases of

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[244] On the fabricated Neptune dream holding a central place in Polybius' account of Scipio's successful attack on Carthago Nova, see rightly Walbank 1967: 213.

[245] As before, Polybius' greatest praise of Scipio at New Carthage is his careful calculation. See Pedech 1964: 219; Roveri 1964: 138-139; Eckstein 1995: 177-182; Champion 2004a: 149-150, nn.18-22, 256-257.

deceit.[246] The suggestion that Scipio may in fact have had such dreams is likewise special pleading.[247] Rather, Polybius believes that deception and secrecy remain important skills that ought to be employed by generals in the field and at home, as evidenced in 9.13.1-3 (discussed below), a passage that serves to contextualize his praise and comparison of Hannibal and Scipio.[248] But commanders should employ deception so long as it is carried out for the good of the state and not at the expense of faithful friends and allies. Scipio's deceptions in 213 and 209 are not overlooked by Polybius in order to focus on Scipio's praiseworthy intellect and hard work (10.5.8-9) but also to serve as evidence of Scipio's skill in action.[249] Nor does Scipio receive special treatment in this regard. Similar deception appeared in Molon's rebellious campaigns against Antiochus III as well.[250] In order to encourage and motivate his troops and officers against the fresh royal armies sent against them under Xenon and Theodotus in 221, Molon produced forged threatening letters (ἀνατατικὰς καὶ ψευδεῖς...ἐπιστολὰς) from Antiochus to steel their resolve (5.43.5). Again, such deception goes without condemnation from Polybius, given Molon's attempts to encourage the army. In these instances, any personal gain that might result from such deceptions was not achieved at the expense of the state.

Deception was similarly used by Aratus of Sicyon during the Cleomenean War.[251] When Aratus realized by 227 that the Achaeans would need Macedonian aid to avoid total defeat at the

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[246] Eckstein 1995: 85-86.

[247] On the suggestion that Scipio was a mystic, see de Sanctis 1916: 452; Scullard 1973: 23-25. Scullard's assertion that Polybius never directly says that Scipio lied about the dreams is in clear disagreement with the spirit of 10.2.12: "Publius in this manner always instilled the belief in the people that his plans were based upon divine inspiration" (Πόπλιος δὲ παραπλησίως ἐνεργαζόμενος αἰεὶ δόξαν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὡς μετά τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ποιούμενος τὰς ἐπιβολάς).

[248] This point will be seen even more clearly in the next chapter.

[249] Eckstein 1995: 244, n.28 later admits Polybius' praise of Scipio's ability to manipulate the religious feelings of the populace.

[250] On the context and details of Molon's rebellion against Antiochus, beginning in 222, see: Schmitt 1964: 116–129; Will 1982: 17–23; Fischer 1988; Grabowski 2010: 116; Strootman 2011: 72.

[251] On the similarities between Polybius' account of Scipio's dream (10.11.7, 10.14.11-12) and Aratus' deception, see Eckstein 1995: 92, n.22.

hands of Cleomenes, he formed a plan to enter into secret (ἀδήλως, 2.47.9) communications with King Antigonus Doson, using the Megalopolitans as an intermediary (2.48.1-8).[252] Polybius explains that Aratus decided not to pursue these negotiations openly (προδήλως), as this would allow the Spartans and Aetolians to attempt to prevent his designs (2.48.7). More importantly, if the Achaeans learned of his attempts at diplomacy with the Macedonians, it would damage the spirit of the Achaean troops (τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διατρέψειν), as they would think that he had abandoned all hopes of the Achaean army maintaining the security of the state on its own - which was the very last thing Aratus wanted (ὅπερ ἥκιστα φαίνεσθαι πράττων ἐβούλετο, 2.47.8).[253] Thus, Aratus was "consequently compelled in public both to do and say many things quite contrary to his real intention, so as to keep his design concealed by creating the exact opposite impression" (ἐξ οὗ πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἠναγκάζετο καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός, δι᾽ ὧν ἤμελλε τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔμφασιν ὑποδεικνύων ταύτην ἐπικρύψεσθαι τὴν οἰκονομίαν, 2.47.10).[254]

Despite deceiving his own people and troops, however, Aratus does not receive Polybius' condemnation, because it was done in hopes of preserving the state given the circumstances of the war rather than for some selfish motivation. Indeed, by 225/224, Cleomenes threatened the very existence of the League. In this case, Eckstein acknowledges that Polybius' allowance stems from the patriotism and necessity (2.51.4) driving Aratus' deception, though he sees this example as an exception to the rule, motivated by "special circumstances."[255] Yet as we have seen, Polybius readily condones many instances of deception and treachery carried out due to necessity or driven

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[252] On the dating of these negotiations to the autumn of 227, see rightly Fine 1940: 137ff,; Walbank 1940: 12-14; Walbank 1957: 246; contra Dow and Edson 1937: 179 who place the negotiations in 225.

[253] Eckstein 1995: 91-92.

[254] Hence, while Aratus worked to form the alliance with Antigonus, we find him publicly speaking out against an alliance with Macedon, arguing that such a policy should only be adopted as a last resort (2.50.11).

[255] Eckstein 1995: 91-92.

by concern for the wellbeing of the state. Polybius' complex moral framework avoids both uncritical blanket condemnation as well as utter utilitarian pragmatism. Context and nuance remain central.

Similar justification is given to T. Quinctius Flamininus during the winter of 198/197 in his negotiations with Philip V.[256] Flamininus and Philip agreed to send an embassy to Rome to approve terms for peace (18.10.3). The consul's motives are given fully by Livy and Plutarch, drawing on Polybian material, and hinted at heavily by the Achean historian.[257] At this point in time, the Roman consul was not certain if his command over the war would be extended. If he was to be prorogued, Flamininus wanted the war to continue so he could defeat Philip in a great battle. If his command was not extended, he wanted the credit and glory of being the commander who brought the war to a close.[258] Flamininus dispatched to Rome Amynander, the king of the Athamanes, along with his legates, Quintus Fabius, Quntus Fulvius, and Appius Claudius Nero. These agents of Flamininus, along with his friends in the city, discovered that both consuls for 197 would be kept in Italy due to concern over the Gauls (18.11.1-2). Assured of the extension of Flamininus' command, these agents managed to sabotage any change of peace with Philip. When they came before the Senate, the Roman and Greek envoys denounced Philip and emphasized that as long as Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinth remained in Macedonian hands, it would be impossible for the Greeks to have any semblance of liberty. Indeed, Philip himself had rightly pronounced these strongholds to be the "Fetters of Greece" (πέδας Ἑλληνικάς, 18.11.5).[259] Philip's envoys, wholly unprepared for any discussion of Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinth, were unable

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[256] This example is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
[257] Livy 32.32.5-8; Plut. *Flam.* 7.1; cf. Polyb. 18.10.7 and 18.12.1. See Holleaux 1923; Briscoe 1973*:* 227-228; Eckstein, 1995: 93, n. 25; Burton 2017: 32.
[258] Described by many historians. See succinctly Rosenstein 2012: 186.
[259] On this and above, see: Livy 32.32-7, Plut. *Flam.* 5.6, 7.1-2; App. *Mac.* 8; Zon. 9.16.4-5; Just. *EPit.* 30.3.8; Plut. *Mor.* 197A.

to answer the Roman Senate's demands on whether they would relinquish control of these cities (18.11.11-13). As such, the Senate continued the war against Philip and appointed Flamininus as their commissioner in the affairs of Greece (18.12.1), all according to Flamininus' plan.

Polybius' praise of Flamininus' skillful and deceptive diplomatic maneuvering with Philip as well as with the Roman allies and the Roman Senate could not be clearer:

> Now all had fallen out as Titus had wished, a little by chance, but mostly as a result of his foresight… For he was as sharply sagacious a man as Rome has ever produced, and had handled not only the public enterprises but also his private projects with a skill and intelligence that could not be surpassed, and this though he was quite a young man, not yet more than thirty.[260]

Instead of criticizing or condemning Flamininus for deceptively utilizing the peace negotiations with Philip to secure both his personal position as well as the strategic position of the Romans and their allies in the war (Philip had pulled out of Locris and Phocis, believing a peace agreement would be reached), Polybius praises Flamininus' actions as both skilled (εὐστόχως) and intelligent (νουνεχῶς, 18.12.4).[261]

Polybius, at least, clearly did not see Flamininus' actions as betraying Rome. The Achaean historian emphasizes that Flamininus handled Rome's public enterprise as well as his private projects with skill and intelligence (18.12.4).[262] Moreover, the result of his deceptive

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[260] ταχὺ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διασαφηθέντων ἐγεγόνει τῷ Τίτῳ πάντα κατὰ νοῦν, ἐπὶ βραχὺ μὲν καὶ ταὐτομάτου συνεργήσαντος, τὸ δὲ πολὺ διὰ τῆς αὑτοῦ προνοίας ἁπάντων κεχειρισμένων. [3] πάνυ γὰρ ἀγχίνους, εἰ καί τις ἕτερος Ῥωμαίων, [καὶ] ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ γέγονεν: [4] οὕτως γὰρ εὐστόχως ἐχείριζε καὶ νουνεχῶς οὐ μόνον τὰς κοινὰς ἐπιβολάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ἐντεύξεις, ὥσθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν μὴ καταλιπεῖν. See Eckstein 1995: 93 for translation.
[261] Polybius' likewise uses εὐστόχως to describe Scipio Africanus' "skillful" deception of the Roman populace (including his mother) during his campaign for aedileship in 213. See Eckstein 1995: 85-86.
[262] On Polybius' understanding of prorogation as a significant consideration for commanders within republican systems of government, see Lehahmn 1976: 168-172; Badian 1970: 25, 47; Eckstein 1995: 94. On Polybius' personal encounters with Scipio Aemilianus' own concerns over prorogation during the Third Punic War, see Walbank 1957: 91; Eckstein 1995: 94, n. 30.

negotiations with Philip was a better strategic position for the Romans, as Philip had withdrawn

from the defensible Locris and Phocis in exchange for the two-month truce (18.10.4).[263] Nor can

we view the situation of 198/197 through the lens of Flamininus' ultimate victory over Philip at

Cynoscephalae in 197. Rather, during the time of the negotiations, the war effort had proven

difficult for the Romans, especially given its general unpopularity among the Roman people.[264]

During the First Macedonian War, Philip had successfully defended Macedon from the Romans,

though minimal Roman forces were sent in 214 and even less in the following years. More

significantly, with Rome's focus on the war with Carthage in Italy, Philip had successfully

forced Pergamum to withdraw from the war in 208 and convinced the Aetolians to come to terms

in 206 after they had suffered heavy losses without Roman support.[265] This in turn brought the

Romans to peace talks in 205, ending with a compromise settlement somewhat in Philip's

interest.[266] The current war against Philip hadn't been much better for the Romans. The army that

landed in Illyria in the autumn of 200, led by the year's consul, P. Sulpicius Galba, made little

headway against Philip. Despite some diplomatic victories, Galba failed to entice the Aetolians

to enter the war against Philip, and in 199 he failed to break through the Pindus Range into

western Macedon with his own army.[267] Thus, Galba ended the year back on the Adriatic coast

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[263] See Badian 1970: 41; Eckstein 1995: 94. On the blow this may have had to Philip's pride, see Holleaux: 1923: 1; Eckstein 1995: 94 n. 31.

[264] On the unwillingness of the Romans to go to war with Philip, see Livy 31.13.2-4 and 33.25.8. On Roman difficulties against Philip during the campaign, see Eckstein 1976: 126-142; Eckstein 2008: 276-282. On senatorial motivations, see rightly Rosenstein 2012: 179-185.

[265] Polyb. 11.7.2-3; Schmitt 1957: 211; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 405-406; Rich 1984: 147-148.

[266] Walbank 1940: 205; Schmitt 1969: 543; Gruen 1984: 381; Errington 1989: 104-105; Eckstein 2012: 111-112.

[267] Galba managed to gain King Amynander of Athamania, Pleuratus the ruler of the Ardiaei, and the Dardanian chieftain Bato as allies. See Livy 31.28.2; Walbank 1940: 141; Eckstein 1976: 126-127; Eckstein 2012: 278-279. On Galba's failure with the Aetolians: Livy 31.28.3. On Galba's failed mountain campaign, see Hammond 1966: 39ff.

where he had started.[268] Moreover, when the Aetolians did decide to enter into the war in the summer of 199, they were decisively defeated by Philip in Thessaly.[269] In the winter of 199/198, the Roman army was so demoralized that the new Roman commander P. Villius faced a serious mutiny among the soldiers.[270] Nor was Flamininus' campaigning in 198 particularly effective.[271] The young (under 30) Roman consul had relatively little command experience, and like Galba his military operations, this time approaching Macedon through Thessaly, ended in a significant defeat at the hands of Philip at Atrax - a battle that reinforced Philip's belief in Macedonian military dominance (Livy 33.4.1) and caused Flamininus to question the effectiveness of the Roman legion against the heavy Macedonian phalanx (Livy 32.18.1).[272] Even with the successful efforts of his brother Lucius to bring the Achaean League over to the Roman alliance in the autumn of 198, Flamininus' year in Greece was largely marked by military failure and a continued reputation for Roman brutality.[273] From Philip's perspective, he had more than handled the offensive of the Romans and their Greek allies between 200 and 198, just as he had in 214-205, and his position in the war seemed secure, if not dominant.[274] Thus, Flamininus' potential peace settlement of 198/197, which carried significant concessions to Rome and her

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[268] Most of what Galba had obtained between 200 and 199 was a reputation for brutality, continuing his legacy as a Roman commander in Greece in 210-207. See Paus. 7.8.2; Eckstein 1976: 126; Eckstein 2012: 277-278.

[269] On the Aetolian defeat, Livy 31.41.7-42.9.

[270] Livy 32.3.2 attributes much of the unrest to decisions made under Galba's leadership.

[271] Despite Rosenstein 2012: 185-186. On Philip's loss of ground in 198 (which should not be overstated) and his decision to begin peace talks with the Romans, see Eckstein 1976: 119-142.

[272] Both Livian passages were based on Polybian material: Briscoe 1973: 1.

[273] Paus. 7.8.1; App. *Mac.* 7. Thus, for example, see the victimized cities of Phaloria (Livy 32.15.2-3); Eretria (Livy 32.16.15-17); Carystus (Livy 32.17.1); and Elateia (Livy 32.24.6-7); Eckstein 1976: 135, n. 51; Eckstien 2012: 2012: 280-281. Of course, it was fear of this Roman brutality, in part, that Aristaenus invoked to convince the Achaean League to desert Philip. See Livy [P] 32.21; Eckstein 1976: 138-141; Eckstein 1990:53-58; Eckstein 2012: 281, 283-284.

[274] Walbank 1940: 147; Errington 1972: 143.

allies would have likely been viewed by the Romans as a satisfactory outcome to a difficult and unpopular war.[275]

While Flamininus' deception was intended to maximize his personal political advantage, Polybius emphasizes that he did not do so at the expense of the Roman state. And as Polybius describes, Flamininus' plan is ultimately a success. As soon as the negotiations ended and Philip sent his embassy to Rome, Flamininus set about securing his own position and giving Philip no advantage (αὑτὸν ἀσφαλιζόμενος ἐπιμελῶς καὶ πρόλημμα τῷ Φιλίππῳ ποιῶν οὐδέν, 18.10.3). During the two-month truce that had been agreed between Philip and the Roman consul, Flamininus ordered Philip to evacuate his garrisons from Phocis and Locris and took steps to protect the Roman allies from the Macedonians (18.10.4-5).

Polybius also condones the deception of one's own troops during the planning and execution of military objectives. Just as with military strategy today, such secrecy was an integral part of successfully conducting ancient warfare. Thus, Polybius admits that "in military operations what is achieved openly and by force is much less than what is done by stratagem and the use of opportunity" (ἔργων ἐλάττω τὰ προδήλως καὶ μετὰ βίας ἐπιτελούμενα τῶν μετὰ δόλου καὶ σὺν καιρῷ πραττομένων, 9.12.2).[276] The successful commander must work to oversee every detail of an operation and keep his plans secret (λαθεῖν), even from his own troops.[277] In Polybius' estimation, the ability to keep such designs secret often determines their success (9.13.1-3):

> Therefore in such enterprises, commanders must be careful about every detail. The first and foremost requisite is to keep silence, and never either from joy if some

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[275] Eckstein 1995: 94.

[276] Some have seen Polybius' praise of such deception as a clear contradiction of his latter comments in the context of Philip V which seem to condemn such instances of contemporary deception and treachery (13.3), suggesting that only the Romans adhered to some of the noble principles that embodied how the ancients conducted warfare with transparency and honor. It should likewise be noted that in 13.3 Polybius is only speaking about treachery toward allies (13.3.1-2) and deception toward enemies (13.2-8). As such, this passage will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

[277] This passage appears to have been a section of a fuller discussion from Polybius' book on *Tactics*. See Walbank 1967: 138.

unexpected hope shall present itself, or from fear, or from familiarity with or affection for certain persons, to reveal one's design to anyone unconcerned in it, but to communicate it only to those without whom it cannot be put in execution, and even to these not earlier than when the need of their services renders it imperative.[278]

Deceiving one's own troops and concealing plans and strategies from them, then, constituted a major piece of what Polybius considered to be a skilled and competent general.[279] Given that such misdirection was motivated by circumstances of war and hopes of safeguarding the state, Polybius ultimately praises these instances of deception.

Examples of such deception in the *Histories* include Lagoras' plot to capture Sardis in the autumn of 215 on behalf of Antiochus III (17.15-18),[280] Hannibal's capture of Tarentum (8.24-34), and Scipio's capture of New Carthage (10.6).[281] In each of these cases, Polybius praises the

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[278] τὸ κατορθοῦν μόλις ἱκανὰ πάντα. διὸ χρὴ μηδενὸς ἀφροντιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐπιβολαῖς τοὺς ἡγουμένους. ἔστι δ᾽ ἀρχὴ μὲν τῶν προειρημένων τὸ σιγᾶν, καὶ μήτε διὰ χαρὰν παραδόξου προφαινομένης ἐλπίδος μήτε διὰ φόβον μήτε διὰ συνήθειαν μήτε διὰ φιλοστοργίαν μεταδιδόναι μηδενὶ τῶν ἐκτός, αὐτοῖς δὲ κοινοῦσθαι τούτοις, ὧν χωρὶς οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ προτεθὲν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν, καὶ τούτοις μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ὁ τῆς ἑκάστου χρείας καιρὸς ἐπαναγκάζῃ.

[279] See Champion 2004a: 149, n.22. Eckstein 1995: 178-179 views the general as a guarantor of order and stability, placing self-discipline, calculation, and hard work over emotion.

[280] For over a year, Antiochus III had sieged the city of Sardis, held by his cousin Achaeus who had rebelled against him in 220. Lagoras, a certain Cretan veteran in the king's army, came up with a plan to capture the city despite its natural strength. Lagoras successfully scaled the wall at night and opened the city gates. Like Theodotus, Lagoras had deserted from Ptolemy IV. See Walbank 1967: 63-64. Lagoras wisely holds that the (7.15.2-4) the most seemingly well defended strongholds are often easily captured due to a false sense of security. On Polybius using Lagoras to undermine the exemplum of proverbial strength (cf. Hdt 1.84; and Lucian, De Mercede Conductis 13), see Davidson 1991: 11-12, 17. Davidson rightly argues that Polybius emphasizes the fact that seemingly difficult tasks are often quite feasible simply because of their perceived difficulty. Thus, in addition to Lagoras' capture of Sardis in 215 (7.16-18), we could point to the Rhodian's blockade running at Lilybaeum in 250 during the First Punic War (1.47); Philip V's attack on Thermum in 218 (5.8-13); Hannibal's march through the marshes of Etruria in 217 (3.78.8-79.1), and Scipio's attack on New Carthage in 209 (10.11-17). On the topography of Sardis, including the location and details of the Saw, see Walbank 1967: 63. On the importance of perception versus reality, including the perceived impregnability of Sardis, see McGing 2010: 103.

[281] Upon landing in Spain, Scipio exhorted his troops, making it seem as if he intended to attack one of the Carthaginian armies in the region (10.6.1-5). Instead, Polybius explains that in actuality Scipio had revealed his true plan to no one (ἄδηλον πᾶσι ποιῶν τὴν αὑτοῦ πρόθεσιν, 10.6.7). For "the fact was that he had decided not to do any of the things he had announced publicly, but to suddenly attack the town in Spain which they had named Carthage" (ἦν γὰρ αὐτῷ κεκριμένον πράττειν ὧν μὲν εἶπε πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς μηδέν, προύκειτο δὲ πολιορκεῖν ἐξ ἐφόδου τὴν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ Καρχηδόνα προσαγορευομένην 10.6.8). Only Laelius was eventually told of the plan, as he was to bring the Roman fleet to New Carthage at the same time the army arrived: Eckstein 1995: 179; Champion 2004a: 149, n.22. By keeping his plan

general's decision to deceive their own troops in order to ensure the success of the military operation. Deception in these cases is condoned by Polybius as they are carried out in order to benefit the state rather than for the sole purpose of obtaining personal gain.

As with the other categories of deception and treachery discussed in these past two chapters, these instances of deceiving the populace are condemned by Polybius based on the circumstances surrounding them. While deceiving the people or the army can be acceptable if done for the good of the state, as will be discussed shortly, when done for reasons of personal greed and concern, the Achaean historian condemns such acts of deception.

As we will continue to see in the next chapter, when it comes to military strategy and operations, Polybius understands the importance of secrecy and deception. Such instances of deception are typically motivated by the circumstances of warfare and the desire of commanders to safeguard their state from enemy forces, finding the Achaean historian's acceptance and even praise.[282] Polybius understands from personal experience the need at times for statesmen to deceive the populace for the good of the state. Such misdirection, however, should always be handled with careful calculation (ἐκλογισμῶν τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων, 10.6.12), as he constantly praises Scipio for, and never carried out for personal gain at the state's expense.

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to attack Carthago Nova a secret, keeping both enemies and his friends in the dark (10.6.11), Scipio was able to capture the city and placed the Carthaginians on the defensive in Spain with a single blow. On Scipio's secrecy leading up to his attack on New Carthage as a mark of a skilled and careful general, see Eckstein 1995: 179. On Scipio's attack on New Carthage, see Walbank 1967: 191-196; Keegan 1993: 265; Eckstein 1995: 177-182; Goldsworthy 2000: 173-175; Rosenstein 2012: 161-163; Richardson 2018: 458-474.

[282] Polybius even refrains from criticizing the Gauls for such deception, recognizing the wisdom of keeping the planned invasion of Italy in 236 a secret from the Romans (2.21.4), though the invasion itself was without pretext (2.21.3). Thus, Polybius does not condemn the Gauls for keeping their own people in the dark about the planned invasion. The fact that this secrecy ultimately doomed the invasion, when the Boii attacked the Transalpine Gauls upon their arrival and killed their own leaders, unaware of the planned coordinated invasion (2.21.5), says more about the general barbarism and treachery of the Gauls in the *Histories*.

CONCLUSION

This chapter highlighted the striking number of instances of treachery and deception that appear in the *Histories* carried out against one's own state. The definition of treachery that Polybius offers in 18.15 is foundational. He condemns those who betray their city to a foreign enemy (ἐγχειρίζουσι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τὰς πόλεις, 18.15.2) or who submit their country to the domination of a superior power (πλεῖον δυναμένων ἐξουσίαν, 18.15.3) for the sake of personal ambition (ἰδίας πλεονεξίας, 18.14.9), for their own safety and advantage (ἰδίας ἀσφαλείας καὶ λυσιτελείας, 18.15.2), for their political agenda (ἀντιπολιτευομένους διαφορᾶς, 18.15.2), or for their own aims (ἰδίας ὁρμὰς, 18.15.3). Yet it is clear from this survey of the *Histories* that Polybius' criticism goes beyond this, also condemning those who treacherously murder, betray, and deceive fellow citizens in the pursuance of personal power and wealth without regard to foreign intervention. It is this context of this personal vs patriotic motivation that proves essential for our understanding of the Polybian model of condemnation and acceptance. Thus, those who are forced to deceive, betray, and even murder for the preservation of the state are never criticized by Polybius, given the circumstances surrounding their actions.

Examples of acts of treachery carried out against fellow citizens exemplify this distinction. Matching closely with Polybius' definition, we find several instances of individuals or dactions acting to deliver their own city into the hands of another power for personal gain. Logbasis' attempt in 218 to deliver the city of Selge to Achaeus (ἐγχειριεῖν αὐτοῖς τὴν πόλιν, 5.74.7); the treacherous betrayal of Cynaetha to the Aetolians by the Cynaethean exiles (τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ τοὺς πιστεύσαντας ἀσεβείας, 4.17.11) in 220; and Hasdrubal's ignoble (ἀγεννίαν) and cowardly (ἀνανδρίαν, 38.8.10) hope in 146 to had over Carthage to Scipio Aemilianus in exchange for his own personal safety (38.8.1-10) all fit this description. Each of these cases was motivated by

personal ambition or hope of safety rather than some attempt to ensure the safety of the state. Thus, Logbasis acted against the best interest of Selge (ἀπέσχε τοῦ βοηθεῖν τῇ πατρίδι, 5.74.7); the Cynaethean exiles betrayed their fellow citizens (πατρίδι) and therefore their very preservers (σώσασι, 4.17.10); and Hasdrubal's cowardice (ἀνανδρίαν) and desire for his own safety led him to treacherously desert (αὐτομολήσας) his fellow citizens, shamelessly abandon (ἀναισχύντως ἐγκαταλιπὼν) his own state, and secretly go over to the enemy (ὑπέλθοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, 38.20.9).

Other examples fall into Polybius' definition more loosely, those who willingly cede their states' independence to Roman domination for personal advancement and power. This situation can be found in Charops' false implications of fellow Epirote statesmen to the Romans during the Third Macedonian War in order to achieve sole rule in Epirus (27.15.2-16) as well as in Callicrates' betrayal of the Achaean League in 181/180 during the embassy before the Roman Senate, in which he levied accusations at his political opponents (24.8.9), emphasized previous instances of the Achaeans ignoring Roman wishes concerning Messenia (24.9.10-13), and asked the Romans to more directly control Greek affairs (24.9.1-9), thereby diverging from both Philopoemen's honorable (καλήν) policy and Aristaenus' reasonable (εὐσχήμονα 24.13.8) policy. Such cases are likewise found in the earlier speech of the Achaean statesman Diophanes in 185, telling Quintus Caecilius Metellus that Achaea had been in the wrong in dealing with the Spartans and Messenians (22.10.5-6); the denouncement of their political opponents to the Romans of the Aetolian statesmen Proandrus and Lyciscus (28.4.1-9); and the similar false accusations (διαβάλλειν τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους, 28.5.5) against their rivals by Acarnanian statesmen Thyreym, Chremas, and Glaucus, going so far as to ask the Romans to establish garrisons in Acarnania (28.5.1-5). Again, personal interests frame these treacheries, and they receive corresponding condemnation from

Polybius. Thus, Charops acts to solidify control over Epirus (27.15.8-9), Callicrates betrays the Achaean League with hopes of dominating Achaean politics with Roman backing (24.9.10-13), Diophanes was mainly motivated by his personal dislike of Philopoemen (22.10.4, 14), Proandrus and Liscus acted in a shameful and servile (ἀναισχύντως καὶ ἀνελευθέρως, 29.4.9) fashion to outmaneuver their political opponents, and the Acarnanian statesmen betrayed their state's interests to achieve their own ambitious projects (ταῖς αὐτῶν πλεονεξίαις, 28.5.5). Polybius believed it was the duty of such men to keep the past mistakes of their states concealed from the Romans rather than illuminated for personal gain (cf. 38.4.7). Instead, personal ambitions prevailed.

Polybius presents some additional cases of treachery against one's state as carried out without regard to a foreign power. In order to maintain his wealth and power in Epirus, Charops openly extorted, proscribed, and murdered fellow citizens (32.5.11-15). Hasdrubal ruled as a glutton (38.8.7-12) and a self-serving tyrant (τύραννος, 38.8.13) over the starving Carthaginians in order to maintain control over the city. Critolaus intimidated fellow citizens and pushed the Achaean League into a self-destructive war with Rome (38.11-13) in order to establish his own despotism (μοναρχικὴν ἀνέλαβεν ἐξουσίαν, 38.13.7). Diaeus followed suit, maintaining his control by extorting and murdering fellow Achaeans and sabotaging Roman attempts to grant the League a lenient peace settlement (38.15-18), thereby betraying his duty to his country (γενναίως) and placing his own safety above the safety of the Achaean people (πολλῶν σωτηρίας, 38.17.8). The pro-Aetolian faction in Sparta during the Social War employed similar treacheries to solidify power. Thus they murdered the ephor Adeimantus and other leading citizens in 220 (4.22.8-11), later killed all of the ephors (4.35.2-3), and subsequently killed or exiled many of the elders and those who spoke out against the Aetolians (4.35.5-15). Sparta also saw treacherous actions in

181/180 with the ambitious demagogue Chaeron, as he stirred up the populace, embezzled public funds, stole land and money from leading citizens, and murdered those who opposed him (24.7.2-6). Genthius enforced his rule through similar crimes (13.1-2). Polybius likewise describes Philip V as solidifying his rule in Macedon between 183-180 by treacherously deporting entire families from major and coastal cities throughout the region (23.10.4-5), murdering his friends who objected to his behavior (23.10.7-8), and ultimately murdering his own son Demetrius (23.10, cf. 23.7).

Again, at the heart of Polybius' condemnation of these instances of treachery is the fact that they were all motivated by personal greed and ambition. Yet when such actions are carried out for patriotic reasons rather than for private profit (ἰδίᾳ λυσιτελοῦς, 2.42.5-6), Polybius refrains from such criticism. Thus, Polybius makes special allowance for actions taken against traitors and tyrants (2.56.14-16), as both threaten the security and independence of the state. Indeed, killing such men is praiseworthy (τιμῶν καὶ προεδρείας, 2.56.15) in his eyes. For this reason, Polybius condones the treachery of Prusias II's subjects (6.15.6); the uprising of the Greeks and Egyptians in Alexandria against Agathocles in 203/202 (15.27-33); and the rebellion of the Cyreneans against Ptolemy VIII Physcon in 162 (31.18.14-15). In all of these cases, the people were acting to secure their own liberty against wicked and tyrannical rulers. Polybius likewise praises the torture and murder of both Dicaearchus (18.54.6-7) and Deinon (15.26a.1-2) as just recompense for their past treacheries. Other betrayals are accepted by Polybius given the necessity of circumstances, most famously the decision by Aratus of Sicyon in 225/224 to submit the Achaean League under Macedonian domination in order to prevent imminent destruction at the hands of Cleomenes III of Sparta (2.51). Polybius is clear that Aratus' actions were driven by patriotism and necessity and not by personal ambitions or greed. Similar necessity is perhaps also why Polybius refrains from

condemning soldiers who give up information to the enemy while under interrogation, as seen during the Gallic invasion of Italy in 225 (2.27.2-3; 2.27.6-8) and during Antiochus III's siege of Rabbatama in 218 (5.71.8-10).

The second section looked specifically at treacherous intrigue within the Hellenstic court, a theme that dominates the early books of the *Histories*. Polybius continues to condemn advisors who are motivated by personal greed and ambition at the expense of the state. Thus, at the Antigonid court, Polybius describes Apelles' attempt to overturn Macedonian affairs and consolidate power for himself (4.87.1-10); Apelles' attempts to sabotage Philip V's supply lines (5.2.8-10); Leontius and Megaleas' treacherous prevention of the capture of Palus (5.4.6-11); Leontius' attempt to strand Philip's army in Messenia for the summer of 218 (5.5.3-9); Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemaeus' efforts to stir up the Macedonian soldiers in Corinth against Philip (5.25.1-7); and Megaleas' attempts to undermine the peace negotiations between Philip and the Aetolians (5.28.4). The Seleucid court sees similar treacheries under Hermeias, according to Polybius. In an effort to maintain his control over the state, Hermeias attacked and murdered fellow court advisors who opposed him (5.41.6-9; 5.49.4-5; 5.50.1-13); undermined efforts to quell Molon's rebellion (5.42.4; 5.45.6) and encouraged Achaeus' rebellion (5.57-9) in order to keep Antiochus III hemmed in and in need of his support (5.42.6; 5.45.6); and ultimately hoped for Antiochus' death so that he could rule the kingdom as the guardian of the king's newborn son (5.55.4-5). Treachery is likewise found within the Ptolemaic court with Sosibius and Agathocles. Polybius explains that these advisors treacherously seized control of the guardianship of the young Ptolemy V by treacherously murdering Queen Arsinoe III (15.25.1; cf. 15.33.11) and presenting a forged will (διαθήκην...πεπλασμένην, 15.25.5) from Ptolemy IV. After Sosibius' death, Agathocles assumed tyrannical power (τυραννικὴν ἐξουσίαν, 15.27.5) in Alexandria and spent his

days exerting his sexual violence, arrogance, and indolence (ὕβρεως, ὑπερηφανίας, ῥᾳθυμίας, 15.25.23) over the population. He slandered (15.25.35), arrested (15.27.2; 15.27.7-28.4), tortured (15.27.7-28.4) and attacked the family members (15.27.2) of his political opponents. Polybius' condemnation of all of these treacherous and ambitious court advisors is clear.

As with treachery against one's own state in general, some court intrigue that might be otherwise condemned is condoned by the Achaean Historian given the context. Kings, statesmen, and advisors who are traitorous or become wicked or tyrannical can often be betrayed without criticism. Thus, Polybius allows for Philip V's deceptive actions to kill Leontius and undermine Megaleas and Apelles (5.27.5-8) as well as for the secret plot by Antiochus and Apollophanes to kill off Hermeias (5.56.1-12). The open revolts of the people of Alexandria against Agathocles in 203/202 (15.29-33) and the Cyreneans against Ptolemy VIII Physcon in 162 (31.18.6-15) are likewise condoned by Polybius. The Achaean historian similarly allows for Cleomenes' attempt coup in 219 to take control of Alexandria (5.38-39) and Theodotus' earlier defection to Antiochus in the same year (5.61.5), given Ptolemy IV's laziness (5.40.1-3), drunken debauchery (5.34.10; 14.12.3; cf. 14.11.2), weakness (5.38.8-9; 5.63.7), and wickedness (14.12.3). In presenting these instances of treason and rebellion against wicked kings, Polybius urges kings to act with care and justice when dealing with their courtiers and agents. Failure to do so results in dire consequences for both the monarch and the state.

Finally, Polybius condemns instances of deception carried out against the populus or soldiery if done strictly for personal gain. The lies told by Leontius and Megareas to stir up the soldiers in Corinth against Philip V in 218 (5.25.1); the presentation of a forged will (διαθήκην...πεπλασμένην) by Sosibius and Agathocles to the people of Alexandria (15.25.5); the ploys of Mathos and Spendius to keep the rebel forces from coming to terms with Hamilcar in 239

during the Mercenary War (1.79-80) and the similar steps taken by Diaeus in 146 during the Achaean War to prevent peace with the Romans (38.17.7-8); and lies told by the Rhodian statesmen Deinon and Polyaratus in 171 during the early phases of the Third Macedonian War to sabotage the Rhodian alliance with Rome for personal gain (27.7.8-11) are all condemned by Polybius. In each of these instances, the populace or soldiery is deceived for personal gain. Yet when such deception is employed out of necessity or for the good of the state, Polybius makes allowances. Thus, Philip V deceives his own troops in 218 to play for time in dealing with his treacherous advisors (5.25.7; cf. 5.24.12; 5.26.1); Scipio Africanus misleads the Roman people in 213 (217 according to Polybius) in order to secure his and his brother's election to the aedileship (10.4-5); Scipio deceives his own soldiers in 210 in order to bolster their morale before the attack on New Carthage (10.11.5-7); and Aratus of Sicyon deceives the Achaeans between 228 and 225/224 as he entered into secret negotiations with Antigonus III Doson (2.47.8-48.8). Polybius likewise holds such deceptions to be an important skill that commanders ought to wield both on and off the battlefield. In this way, Polybius praises Logbasis' attack on Sardis in 215 (7.16.4-7), Hannibal's attack on Tarentum in 212 (8.26.7), and Scipio's attack on New Carthage in 209 (10.6.7-11), as the success in each of these cases was due in part to the commander's ability to keep even their own soldiers and officers in the dark about the details of his true intentions.

In addition to this chapter's findings on the nuances of Polybius' portrayals of technical treason and more general treachery, the most important findings concern the pattern that emerges of who is primarily responsible for such acts throughout the *Histories*. First, in Polybius there are *far more* instances of treachery in monarchies than there are in republics. Second, instances of deception that do occur in republics are generally much milder than in monarchies and often occur for patriotic reasons rather than for pure personal advantage. Third, there are no instances of

228

outright treason at Rome, and very few instances of deception in general, marking Rome as exceptionally different from all the Greek states, large, medium, and small.

These findings tell us a good deal about Polybius' attitude toward monarchies in general. There is something, Polybius believes, inherently flawed within monarchies in general that both attract and mold kings and courtiers who are willing to carry out acts of treason, deception, and violence with the sole goal of their own personal gain. While such acts do occasionally occur in Republics, they are few and far between. Monarchies, on the other hand, seem almost to attract such behavior. We do not have to look far to find one of the primary problems that Polybius finds with monarchies - the concentration of a large amount of power in the hands of a single individual. Unlike republics, which work to diffuse power across a group of people, monarchies necessarily concentrate the power of the state within one person. This not only means that the kings themselves wield great power, but that their courtiers indirectly wield this power. In other words, men like Hermeias, Appelles, and Agathocles could never achieve as much power and influence within a republic as they were able to do within their respective monarchies. This great concentration of power and its corrupting influence attracts and encourages treacherous and deceitful kings and courtiers.[283]

In Book 15, Polybius explains: "Perhaps it may be said of all kings that at the beginnings of their reigns they talk of freedom as of a gift they offer to all and style all those who are thus loyal adherents their friends and allies, but as soon as they have established their authority they at once begin to treat those who placed trust in them not as allies but as servants" (15.24.4-6). We

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[283] Thus throughout the Histories we only find four examples of "good" kings: Hiero II, Massinissa, Attalus I, and Eumenes II. Instead, Polybius believes that the natural tendency of kings (just like the institution of monarchy more generally) is to descend into tyranny. The connection between the concentration of power, the associated tendency toward treachery, and the corresponding health of the state will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.

see then a direct correlation between the acquisition and solidification of a king's power and his turn toward treachery. This connection is described in even greater detail by Polybius in his portrayal of the moral decline of Philip V. According to Polybius, it is due to Philip's accumulation of power and plans for "world domination" (δυναστείας) in 217 that causes a "revolution in [Philip's] character and his notable change for the worse" (7.11). Polybius is clear about this trajectory in Book 27:

> At the time when King Philip grew great and was powerful in Greece, no one had less regard for good faith and law, but when the wind of his good fortune veered, he was the most moderate of men. When finally he entirely came to grief, he attempted to adapt himself to all contingencies and by every means to build up his kingdom again (27.17.9-10).

By understanding Polybius' belief that the concentrated power inherent in monarchies corrupted all but the most virtuous kings and courtiers, we can see why there are so many more instances of treason and personally motivated acts of deception within monarchies in Polybius' work. The relative lack of such treachery within republics follows naturally. By utilizing mixed constitutions to diffuse this power into the hands of a larger group of statesmen, we find a shift. While in monarchies only the most exemplary individual can resist moral corruption, in republics only the least virtuous statesmen become corrupted. Rather than for reasons of personal power and gain, statesmen in republics tend to either deploy deception for patriotic reasons or not at all. It is for this reason that Polybius holds republics to be the "best of all living constitutions" (6.10.14).[284] While Polybius certainly has a bias toward republics, his analysis of why they are morally superior is both interesting and relevant to his views on the Romans.

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[284] Such a comparison assumes that the moral health of the state has not already crumbled according to Polybius' discussion of anacyclosis in Book 6 - a notion that will be discussed in full detail in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

Rome, then, in Polybius' mind, stands as the best example of a Republic. While the Greek states have far fewer instances of treachery and deception than monarchies, Rome remains unique in its relative lack of such behavior. There is not a single instance of outright treason at Rome in the *Histories*. Polybius' judgment of Rome as the best example of a mixed constitution is evident in his discussion of the Roman constitution in Book 6, in which he states that it is "impossible to find a better system than this" (6.18.1). Polybius goes on to compare Rome with other republics and finds Rome superior to all of them for different reasons. According to Polybius, the Romans were better equipped for imperialism (6.50); were in the prime of their state, unlike the Carthaginians (6.51); had better military institutions and discipline (6.19-42); had superior religious institutions (6.56.6-15); and worked to foster courage and patriotism through a number of rituals and institutions (6.53-54) - not least of all the reading during a Roman statesman's funeral of all of the services he had rendered to the state, to be remembered for generations to come (6.54.2). It is ultimately the virtue of these institutions, according to Polybius, that allowed the Romans to conquer the Mediterranean in less than 53 years (6.2.3). This interesting connection between moral virtue and the political health of the state will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

The unique position of the Romans found in this chapter, then, fits Polybius' larger praise of Roman virtue detailed in Book 6. Statesmen of republics, given their mixed constitutions which work to diffuse the power of the state, are less prone toward self-serving acts of treachery and deception than kings and courtiers of monarchic systems. And Rome, which stands in Polybius' mind as the greatest and most virtuous republic at this time, sees almost no instances of treachery or deception at all. Polybius hints at this fact in 13.3.7 when he again marks the Romans as unique in that they were the only remaining state that still honored transparency and a lack of deception

and treachery in warfare. How consistent Polybius' statement is, in light of his portrayal of the Romans throughout the *Histories,* will be examined in the following chapter, which focuses on instances of treacherous and deceptive diplomacy carried out during times of war.

Chapter 4: Diplomatic Treachery and the Roman Paradox

The final category of treachery that will be explored entails instances of breaches of faith during negotiations carried out in times of war. Given Polybius' careful attention to issues of warfare and diplomacy, it should not be surprising that the Achaean historian appears to have been deeply concerned throughout the *Histories* with this third category of deception. In the ancient world, the frequent breakdown of diplomacy often resulted in the initiation or continuation of warfare. Instances of successful diplomacy before fighting began were rare, leaving matters to be primarily decided on the battlefield - until the establishment of the *Pax Romana*.[1]

Such interstate difficulties, proponents of the realist model of international theory argue, were the realities of a system that was consumed by anarchy and lacked international law.[2] Yet while realists are right to emphasize the absence of any positive international law in a modern sense, an impossibility given the complete lack of a reliable enforcement system other than public opinion, certain shared customs and understandings did exist in the ancient world resembling some early form of international law.[3] Notions like the sacrosanctity of temples and the immunity of envoys were basic natural rights protected by the gods that all civilized states theoretically understood and followed. Such violations of the laws of gods and men are often referred to by Polybius as παρανομία, perhaps best translated as "lawlessness."[4] Theoretically,

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[1] On this positive benefit of the establishment of the Roman domination, see Goldsworthy 2016.

[2] Applied to the ancient world, see Eckstein 2006: 6, n. 9, 12-13; Eckstein 2009: 253-276; Eckstein 2012: 9, n.15. See also Waltz 1959: 159-160; Aron 1973: 6; Waltz 1979: 102; Schelling 2000. realist theory also undergirds the work of earlier Roman historians, for example Badian 1958: 67, 104-105, 111; Badian 1959: 113-139; Harris 1979: 1, 259-261; for discussion, see Burton 2009.

[3] For the argument for some semblance of effective international law in the ancient Mediterranean world, see Burton 2009: 237-252.

[4] For examples of παρανομία: 1.7.4; 1.84.10; 1.88.7; 2.8.13; 2.11.5; 2.59.4; 2.59.6; 2.60.2; 3.3.5; 3.6.13; 4.5.2; 4.20.2; 5.11.2; 6.4.10; 7.7.4; 8.8.4; 8.35.6; 9.29.3; 9.30.1; 9.35.6; 10.26.4; 11.5.7; 13.6.4; 14.12.4; 15.8.11; 18.37.9; 21.41.2; 22.13.9; 22.14.6; 23.10.14; 30.11.; 31.9.2; 31.9.4; 31.12.4; 32.5.5; 32.6.3; 33.7.2; 38.18.4-5; cf. 4.17.10-11; 7.14.3; 14.1.4; 15.20.4; 18.54.8-9; 22.10.8; 21.40.2; 30.12.1-2; 32.15.9-

only barbarians, mercenaries, and tyrants acted in transgression of such basic tenants, evidenced

in the *Histories* by the Gaul's multiple instances of treachery toward Roman envoys and by

Philip's violation of sacrosanct temples at Thermum (5.8.7-8; 5.12.1-5; 7.14.3; 11.7.2-3) and

Pergamum (16.1.5-6). The reality, of course, was that these laws were *often* followed, but not

always. And as realists emphasize, there was little to be done on an international level about such

breaches. Yet to ignore what the Romans would later term the law of nations (*ius gentium*)

overlooks the sense of expected good faith that was supposed to undergird diplomatic

negotiations in the ancient world.[5] Such expectations were especially important for small states,

which often had little recourse if a more powerful state betrayed this good faith. This was a

concern recognized two centuries earlier by Thucydides: "The strong do what they can, and the

weak suffer what they must" (Thuc. 5.89.1).

The purpose of this chapter is to explore how far Polybius believed this good faith in

diplomacy ought to extend. As with treachery against allies and against one's own state, Polybius

was keenly interested in diplomatic betrayals, believing that such treachery (ἐπιπολάζουσαν

κακοπραγμοσύνην, 13.3) was especially prevalent in his own time. While the Achaean historian

always condemns acts of treachery carried out against envoys who ought to be protected by

natural law, he does allow for certain acts of deceptive diplomacy during and leading up to open

warfare. Violations of formal treaties or agreements sealed by oaths to the gods are uniformly

condemned. But in situations less than that, Polybius gives wide leeway to misleading or

double-dealing actions. He often sees such deceptive diplomacy as clever, and it is up to the

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13; 38.8.1; 38.13.8. On Polybius' use of παρανομία, see the following chapter; cf. Eckstein 1995: 122; Champion 2004a: 243-244.

[5] Burton 2009: 237-241. For Roman legal protections for foreigners trying to settle disputes with Rome, see Jolowicz and Nicholas 1972: 48, 102-103; Lintott 1999: 11, n.7, 107, n. 59. Cf. Justinian, *Digest* 1.1.9; 1.2.28. On this transformation into the law of nations (*ius gentium*), see Jolowicz and Nicholas 1972: 102-103; Nörr 1989: 15; Bederman 2001: 84-85. On rights granted to foreign individuals under terms of treaties, see Bederman 2001: 6; Low, 2007: 77-128.

interlocutor to be aware of the danger of any agreement not sealed by oaths. These cases are especially interesting as, unlike in the previous two chapters, the Romans are complicit in such instances of disingenuous diplomacy. The three similar, though not identical, instances of such Roman diplomacy by Scipio Africanus in 203 (14.1-4), Quinctius Flamininus in 198/197 (18.10-12), and Marcius Philippus in 172/171 (Livy [P] 42.39-43) are important for our understanding of Polybius' moral framework of both treachery as well as of the Romans. These examples of disingenuous Roman diplomacy, taken in context with Roman deception leading up to the Third Punic War in 149, ultimately lend toward a deeper understanding of the purpose behind the *Histories*.

In discussing Polybius' views on and the implications of this final type of treachery, this chapter will be divided into three sections: (I) Treachery against Envoys, (II) Disingenuous Diplomacy, and (III) Polybius' Framework and the Roman Paradox.

I. TREACHERY AGAINST ENVOYS

The states of ancient Italy and Greece believed that both their own envoys (*legati*, πρεσβευταί, κήρυκες) and those from foreign powers were inviolable (*sancti*, ἱεροὶ καὶ ἄσυλοι), protected by the gods.[6] For Polybius, this protection fell under "the laws of gods and men" to which all states ought to adhere, what the Romans would later call *ius gentium*. Such sacrilegious violations would inevitably result in the wrath of the gods and even the religious pollution of the entire state.[7] This is seen clearly in Herodotus' account of the Persian invasions of Greece under Darius in 490 and under Xerxes in 480. When Persian envoys arrived in Athens and Sparta in

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[6] Broughton 1987: 50; cf. *Digesta* 50.7.18. On the protected status of envoys in the ancient world, see Mosley 1973: 2, 14. On the release of envoys, even if war was declared, see Watson 1967: 165.

[7] On the punishment of such treachery, see; Tac. *Ann.* 1.39.5; (destruction of Corinth in 146) Livy *Per. 52*; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 11; (Tarentum in 275) Broughton 1987: 50, n.1.

491, they were treacherously killed, thrown into a pit in one city and into a well in the other (*Hdt.* 7.133). Herodotus tells his readers that both cities faced calamity as a result - Athens meeting some uncertain disaster, perhaps the subsequent destruction of the city by Xerxes (7.133), and Sparta falling under the curse of Talythybius (7.134). Nor did the Spartans easily lift the curse, as the two Spartan noblemen, Sperchias and Bulis, that were sent to Xerxes as recompense for the slain heralds were not accepted by the king. Instead, Xerxes received the Spartans with hospitality, telling them that he would not, as they had done, "make a mockery of human law by slaying heralds" (συγχέαι τὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα ἀποκτείναντας κήρυκας), nor so easily free them from their guilt (7.136).[8] Ironically, it had been the Greeks, not the Persians, who had acted like barbarians in transgressing this law that all civilized states were supposed to follow.

Polybius condemns those who violate the international custom of safeguarding envoys in a similar barbaric light. It should not be surprising, then, that throughout the *Histories*, it is often barbarian tribes that treacherously attack or capture envoys, exemplified by the Gauls and Illyrians. Such violations almost always resulted in immediate declarations of war, if the conflict was not already raging.[9] One instance of such treachery is found during the Gallic attack on Arretium in 283.[10] Upon marching into central Italy, the Sesones and other Gallic tribes placed Arretium under siege and defeated the Roman army that had been sent under the praetor Lucius Caecilius (2.19.7-8).[11] After this defeat, the Roman forces nominated a certain Manius Curius to

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[8] See Broughton 1987: 50, n.1.
[9] Bedermann 2001: 116.
[10] On Polbius' larger sketch of Gallic incursions into Italy from which this example is taken, see Mommsen 1879: 365 ff.; Walbank 1957: 184-191; De Sanctis 1960: 337-341, 357-360; Errington 1967: 96-108; Corbett 1971; Morgan 1972: 309, n.3; Brennan 1987: 244.
[11] On the background of the Gallic invasion, see Corbett 1971: 657-658; Harris 1979: 82; Brennan 1994: 244-245.

take command of the remaining army.[12] The new commander sent legates to the Gauls to negotiate the return of the prisoners; however, the Gauls treacherously (παρασπονδήσαντες, 2.19.9) killed the envoys.[13]

Similar treachery was seen with the Boii Gauls in 218. Upon hearing that the Carthaginians would soon be arriving over the Alps, the Boii broke faith with the Romans and invaded the territory of the newly formed colonies of Placentia and Cremona, despite the Romans still having hostages from the previous war (3.40.5-7).[14] The Roman settlers, including the former consul Gaius Lutatius and two former praetors who had been sent to oversee the partitioning of the country, were driven into the colony of Mutina, where the Gauls besieged them (3.40.8-9). When Lutatius and the other two men of high rank requested a parley (λόγους...συνελθεῖν, 3.40.10) with the Boii, the Gauls agreed.[15] Upon leaving the city to negotiate, however, the Roman statesmen were treacherously (παρασπονδήσαντες, 3.40.10) captured and kept as hostages.[16]

Nor were these treacherous barbarians limited to the Western Mediterranean. By 230, the barbarian Illyrians, consolidated under the Ardiaei tribe, carried out rampant piracy throughout the Adriatic.[17] When an increasing number of merchants from Brundisium and the allied Italiote

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[12] On Manius Curius' election to command, see Walbank 1957: 188-189. On this Manius Curius as a different person than the famous Manius Curius Dentatus, see Corbett 1971: 660-661; Brennan 1994: 245.

[13] On the example of the Sesones as an example of typical Gallic treachery in Polybius, see ch. 1 and below; Eckstein 1995: 122-123; Champion 2004a: 114. On the possibility that this version of events reflects Fabius' version that was careful to establish a *bellum iustum*, see Beloch 1926: 454; Walbank 1957: 189.

[14] On the context and impact of this Gallic invasion, under the Boii's new leadership, see Richardson 1986: 31-33; Eckstein 1987: 26-27; Fronda 2010. On the details and dating of the foundation Placentia, see Walbank 1957: 374-375; Fronda 2010.

[15] According to Livy (21.25), the two praetorians were C. Servilius and M. Annius. See Scullard 1951: 273-274; Broughton 1951: 241-242; Walbank 1957: 375.

[16] Champion 2004a: 114.

[17] On the context and background of the consolidation of Illyrian power, largely incited by the collapse of Epirus, see Hammond 1966: 241-242; Dell 1970: 118; Marasco 1986: 78-80; Wilkes 1992: 137-149; Dany 1999: 130; Eckstein 2012: 30-39.

Greek city-states complained to Rome of the attacks in the Straits of Otranto between Italy and Greece, the Roman Senate decided to send envoys to the Ardiaean leader, Queen Teuta, who stood as regent for Pinnes, the infant son of the recently dead Agron (2.8.3).[18] The two Roman ambassadors (πρεσβευτὰς, 2.8.3; πρέσβεις, 2.8.6), Lucius and Gaius Corucanius, arrived and complained to Teuta about the Ardiaean piracy, demanding that she put an end to it (2.8.6). When Teuta replied arrogantly (ἀγερώχως καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφάνως, 2.8.7) that it was not their custom to dictate the private actions of those Illyrians who decided to capture booty on the sea, the younger Roman envoy retorted that the Romans would intervene with force and change the Illyrian custom (2.8.10-11). According to Polybius, the Roman envoy's frankness so incited Teuta that she ordered him to be assassinated during his return to Italy, revealing her "womanly temper" and irrationality (γυναικοθύμως καὶ ἀλογίστως, 2.8.12).[19] In his condemnation, Polybius is clear that the Teuta's actions constituted a violation of international law (παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις ὡρισμένων δικαίων, 2.8.12). And it was this violation (παρανομίᾳ, 2.8.13) that made war between Rome and Illyria inevitable.

Similar treachery resulted in the Roman war with the Dalmatians in 157/156. Reminiscent of the Ardiaei over seventy years earlier, the Illyrian tribe of the Dalmatae had been carrying out piracy throughout the region. When the people of Issa and Daorson sent embassies to Rome in 158 to complain, the Romans sent a commission under Gaius Fannius to investigate.[20] According to

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[18] The Roman response, though hesitant in coming, would work to further secure Roman hegemony over southern Italy. On the serious concern surrounding the Illyrian piracy, see Badian 1964a: 4-5; Eckstein 1980: 196; Gruen 1984: 69; Marasco 1986: 44-69; Eckstein 2012: 33-39; cf. Pohl 1993: 59-69; contra Derow 1973: 118-134; Harris 1979: 195-197; Errington 1989: 87-88.

[19] On the tradition of the murdered Roman envoy, see Polyb. 2.8.9-13; App. *Ill.* 6; Dio frg. 19.45 = Zon. 8.19; cf. Pliny *NH* 34.24. For discussion, see Harris 1979: 195-196; Gruen 1984: 360-361; Eckstein 2012: 41. On the failed diplomacy and the Senate's reaction to the murdered envoy, see Hammond 1968: 5-6; Eckstein 2012: 41, 51-58. On Polybius' gendered account of Teuta, see Petzold 1971: 204; Harris 1979: 195; Eckstein 1995: 152-153.

[20] The Dalmatians had been subject to Pleuratus, but when he died and was succeeded by Genthius, they revolted and attacked the surrounding territories and cities (32.9.3-4).

Fannius' report, however, upon arriving and speaking with the Dalmatians, they not only refused his requests to make amends to those they had attacked, but they stole the Roman envoys' horses and were only prevented from harming them by their quiet departure (32.13.2-3). According to Polybius, it was this outrage toward Fannius and the Roman envoys that the Senate pointed to as the reason for going to war with the Dalmatians in 157 (32.13.9).[21] Polybius emphasizes that it was really the Roman desire to campaign in this new part of Illyria (32.13.5) and to ensure that the Roman legions did not become effeminate through inactivity (32.13.6-7) that drove the subsequent war.[22] Despite the scholarly attention that these deepest Roman motivations (πλεῖστον, 32.13.4) have drawn, the treacherous mistreatment of Fannius and the other Roman ambassadors by the Dalmatians was a clear breach of international law and by itself would have been a just reason for the Roman decision to go to war - in addition to the Dalmatian refusal to cease its piracy throughout the region.[23] Indeed, there is no indication from Polybius that anyone questioned the justification of the Roman war given the treatment of the envoys.

This series of events is seen with the Ligurians as well in 154. In this year, the people of Marseilles sent ambassadors before the Senate to beg for help against the Ligurian barbarians (βαρβάρων, 33.8.3), primarily the Oxybii and Decietae, who had invaded their territory and placed the cities of Antibes and Nice under siege (33.8.1-2).[24] The Romans attempted to curb the

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[21] On the Roman concern over public opinion here and in general, see Walbank 1979: 535.

[22] Later authors claimed that the Romans were acting in response to a Dalmatian attack on Roma allies, though this at least was clearly not the justification offered by the Senate in 157. See App. *Ill.* 11; Livy *Per.* 47; cf. Strabo 7; Zonar. 9.25; cf. Dzino 2010: 62-64; Rosenstein 2012: 225. On the argument that Polybius' claims reflect his own presentation of self-interested Roman foreign policy after Pydna, see Wilkes 1969: 30-31; Gruen 1984: 430-431. Contra Harris 1979: 233-234; Walbank 1979: 535; and Isayev 2017: 248 who accept Polybius' interpretation without question.

[23] On scholars who emphasize Roman aggression in this year, see Harris 1979: 233-234. On the need for Rome to check Dalmatian aggression due to the abolishment of the Illyrian monarchy in 167, see Rosenstein 2012: 225-226. On Polybius' larger emphasis on the employment proper pretexts (*prophasis*) and the differentiation with the true motive or cause (*aitia*), see Baronowski 2011: 74-75.

[24] The Ligurians were located between Nice and Marseilles: Pliny *NH* 3.47. On the background and the relations between Massalia and Rome, see Walbank 1979: 549-550.

Liguarian aggression diplomatically by sending a commission led by Flaminius Popilius Laenas and Lucius Pupius (33.9.1).[25] Far from receiving the Roman envoys as law and custom dictated, however, the Ligurians attempted to prevent the Romans from landing at Aegitna (33.9.3). And finding that Flaminius had already landed on shore, the barbarians pillaged his baggage (33.9.4), killed several of his slaves and freedmen (33.9.5-6), and wounded Flaminius himself (33.9.6). Flaminius only managed to escape death by cutting away his shore and anchor cables and fleeing to Marseilles (33.9.6-7).[26] When the Roman Senate heard about the Ligurians' treacherous attack on the envoys, they immediately declared war on the Oxybii and Deciatae and sent the consul Quintus Opimius north (33.9.7).

The Galatian Gauls of Asia Minor attempted a similar treacherous attack against the Roman consul C. Manlius Vulso in 189.[27] After defeating the Tolistoboii at Mount Olympus (21.37; 21.39.1; cf. Livy 38.19-23) and the Tectosages near Ancyra (Livy 38.24-27), Manlius received envoys from the Tectosages asking him to meet between the camps to negotiate a peace (Polyb. 21.39.2).[28] The Tectosages, however, had no intention of hashing out a peace with the Romans and instead were hoping to treacherously capture or kill Manlius under the pretense of the good faith peace talks (21.39.9).[29] For this purpose, the Gauls readied a thousand cavalry and prepared to attack the consul upon his arrival (21.39.10). And indeed, when Manlius and the Gallic princes finally met, after several postponements by the Gauls to buy time to evacuate their families and

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[25] On the identity of these envoys, see Walbank 1979: 550-551.

[26] On this assault on Flaminius, see Isayev 2017: 248.

[27] On Manlius' campaign against the Galatians, see Magie: 1950: 21; Gruen 1984: 549-550; Rosenstein 2012: 197 cf. Polyb. 21.33-39; Livy 38.12-27.

[28] On the background of these tribes, see Walbank 1979: 152.

[29] Cf. Livy 38.25.

property (21.39.9), it was only luck that saved Manlius from treachery, as additional Roman cavalry happened to be nearby, providing protection to Roman foragers (21.39.13-14).[30]

These instances throughout the *Histories* of barbarians committing treachery against envoys were not a surprise to Polybius. For the Achaean historian, as Greece was threatened by barbarian attack even in his own time, barbarians represented a force of uncivilized chaos that threatened to overrun order and stability.[31] In establishing this cultural construct, Polybius paints the barbarians as unwilling, perhaps even unable, to keep any promises or sworn oaths, given their tendency to degenerate into uncontrolled greed and violence.[32] Thus, the Achaean historian describes the Pergamene government as gripped by constant fear of Galatian treachery (5.78.4; 15.24.7; 24.14.6-7), and the plan of the Iberian chieftain Abylix to betray Carthage and deliver Saguntum to the Romans in 217 is described as "typical of an Iberian and a barbarian" (Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ βαρβαρικόν, 3.98.3). Indeed, Polybius believed that the untrustworthiness of the Gauls was so commonplace and inherent that the phrase "Gallic treachery" (Γαλατικὴ ἀθεσία) was proverbial (2.32.8).[33] It is for these reasons that Polybius condemns those generals who fall victim to barbarian treachery (10.32-33; 21.39) and praises those who guard against it (3.52-53; 3.81).[34] Given the complete lack of faith and tendency toward παρανομία that defined the Gauls and other barbarians throughout the Mediterranean, Polybius argues that those who trust their vows and promises are fools.

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[30] On this instance of Gallic treachery, see (briefly) Eckstein 1995: 122; Champion 2004a: 243.

[31] Thus by not understanding philosophy, literature, and other knowledge, King Prusias II of Bithynia is criticized by Polybius as living a barbarous life (βάρβαρον βίον, 15.6). See Eckstein 1995: 123.

[32] On Gallic violence, see 3.3.5; 5.111.2; 10.31.10-11; 18.37.9; 21.40.2. On Gallic greed, see 2.7.6; 2.19.3; 2.22.2; 2.35.6; 3.78.5. On the argument that it was fear of the Romans and not greed, despite Polybius' account, that drove the Gauls to war in the 220s, see Harris 1979: 197-199; Dyson 1985: 28-29; contra Eckstein 1995: 122-123.

[33] Cf. 3.70.4; 3.78.2; Eckstein 1995: 122. Eckstein argues that barbarians were one of several groups that threatened the social order of the Ancient Mediterranean, much to the dismay of Polybius and all aristocrats. For Polybius' view toward the untrustworthy barbarians, see chapter 2.

[34] See chapter 2.

Polybius extends this criticism to mercenaries as well, seeing sellswords as posing a similar threat to the social order. As with his construct of barbarians, Polybius presents mercenaries (μισθοφόροι) as frequently tending toward παρανομία.[35] The fact that the majority of mercenary troops in his own time were composed of Thracians and Gauls must have also lent toward this comparison.[36] In Polybius' mind, the unreliability of mercenaries both on and off the battlefield often met with disastrous and treacherous results.[37] Thus we find mercenaries betraying the people of Messana (1.7.3-4); the Carthaginians at Agrigentum (2.7.7) and Eryx (2.7.8); nearly pillaging and betraying Amphipolis (Livy [P] 44.44.4-6); betraying the Romans at the temple of Venus Erycina (2.7.8); betraying Phoenice in Epirus (2.7.9-11); and attempting to betray the Ptolemaic regime at Alexandria (5.36.1-5; 18.53-55).[38] The treacherous nature of mercenaries in the *Histories* is perhaps best described by Polybius in his account of the Mercenary War. In 240, Carthage sent the general Gesco to Tunis to negotiate (διαλύσεις, 1.69.5) with the mercenaries and finalize their payments owed from the First Punic War (1.69.1). The Libyans, however, stirred up by Spendius and Mathos, proceeded to arrest Gesco and the other Carthaginians present (1.70.4), put them into chains (1.70.5), and pillage their belongings (1.70.5).[39] Polybius' condemnation of the mercenaries' treatment of Gesco is clear, calling it a violation of law and good faith (εἰ παράνομόν τι πράξειαν καὶ παράσπονδον, 1.70.5), impious (ἀσεβεῖς, 1.70.6), and contrary to the principles recognized by all mankind (παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν

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[35] 1.70.5; 1.84.10; 13.6.4; 16.13.2.

[36] Griffith 1935: 252-254.

[37] For the impulsiveness of mercenaries during battles, see 1.30.11-12; 1.75.4; 16.37.6-7. For the disaffection that mercenaries often showed to their officers or employers, see 1.9.3; 1.9.6; 1.67.4-5; 15.25.20.

[38] Eckstein 1995: 126-127. On Polybius' disgust of the mercenaries of Alexandria, see Griffith 1935: 127-130; cf. Polyb. 34.13.3. On the account of the Thracians at Amphipolis in Livy 44.44 as derived from Polybius, see Nissen 1863: 264.

[39] See Hoyos 2007: 63-76. On the identities and backgrounds of Spendius and Mathos, with no clear consensus, see De Sanctis 1916: 374; Griffith 1935: 220; Walter 1947: 234-235; Loreto 1995: 109-110; Hoyos 2007: 68-69.

ἀνθρώπων ἔθη ποιησάμενοι, 1.70.6).[40] The mercenaries' treachery toward Gesco became even

more pronounced in 239 following their defeat against Hamilcar at Bagradas River. At this point,

Mathos and Spendius convinced the mercenaries to inflict further harm on Gesco and the other

Carthaginians they had treacherously arrested at Tunis (οὓς παρεσπόνδησαν ἐν τῷ Τύνητι,

1.79.10). Leading them out of the camp, beginning with Gesco, they cut off the Carthaginians'

hands and other extremities, broke their legs, and threw them into a trench to die (1.80.11-13).[41]

Again, Polybius' view of the mercenaries' actions is clear, calling this treachery an impious

crime (ἀσέβειαν, 1.79.8; ἠσεβηκότας, 1.81.2) and referring to them as wild beasts (ὥσπερ ὑπὸ

θηρίων, 1.80.10). The Achaean historian's multiple condemnations of the mercenaries for

impiety in their treatment of Gesco stems not just from their betrayal of his status as a diplomatic

agent but from the fact that they broke faith with the Carthaginian general despite his previous

acts of kindness toward them (1.68.13; 1.80.8; 1.80.12; cf. 1.81.8).[42] Such betrayals, Polybius

recognizes, were one of the dangers of employing unreliable mercenary forces.[43]

Given Polybius' cultural construct of the ever-treacherous barbarian and mercenary, more

interesting are the instances of treachery against envoys committed by civilized states. Only two

such cases exist in the extant *Histories*. The first took place in the autumn of 203 near the end of

the Second Punic War. Despite the few minor successes that the Carthaginian fleet found at Utica

in the spring, the defeat and capture of the Numidian king Syphax at Cirta some weeks later by

Giaus Laelius and Massinissa drove the Carthaginians to make an armistice with the Romans while

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[40] On the παρανομία of the mercenaries, see Eckstein 1995: 123.

[41] Hoyos 2007: 167-172.

[42] On the details of the betrayal of Gesco, see chapter 3.

[43] On Polybius fear and hatred of mercenaries, see Momigliano 1976: 91-92; Eckstein 1995: 125-129.

peace negotiations took place, in reality buying time for Hannibal to return to Africa.[44] Despite the armistice, however, the Carthaginians treacherously captured a number of Roman transport and supply ships that had been forced into the bay of Carthage by a storm (15.1.1).[45] Polybius emphasizes Scipio's righteous anger at this Carthaginian violation of the solemn oaths of the truce (παραβεβηκέναι τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας, 15.1.2; ἀθετεῖν δὲ τολμῶσι τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας, 15.1.9) in the face of genuine Roman efforts to reach a peace agreement - indeed Scipio's proposed peace settlement had already been ratified by the Roman people (15.1.3-4).[46] After learning of this breach of good faith, Scipio sent Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius as ambassadors to speak with the Carthaginians (15.1.3-14). The legates admonished the Carthaginians for their faithlessness and folly (τὴν ἀθεσίαν καὶ τὴν ἀβουλίαν, 15.1.14), reminding them that it had been Carthaginian envoys who had recently come begging on hands and knees for the Romans to show mercy and reach a peace agreement (15.1.7-8). Yet far from making amends for their betrayal, Polybius holds that certain members of the Carthaginian Senate devised a plan (παρεμβολήν, 15.2.5) to treacherously kill the Roman envoys. A short distance before the Romans had returned to their camp, the Carthaginian ships responsible for safely escorting them left abruptly, allowing the Roman quinquereme to be attacked by several ships from Hasdrubal's fleet anchored near Utica (15.2.6-12). It was only due to the skill and courage of the Roman crew and the assistance of nearby camp foragers on the coast that the ambassadors escaped with their lives (15.2.13).[47] According to Polybius, the result of this second act of Carthaginian treachery was the

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[44] On Carthaginian successes against Scipio at Utica, see 14.11; On the defeat and capture of Syphax, see Livy 39.11. On factional politics within Carthage as an element pushing for peace with Rome, see Scullard 1930: 134.

[45] Cf. Livy 30.24. The contingent was under the command of Cn. Octavius.

[46] For the terms of the treaty, see Livy 30.16.12; App. *Lib.* 32; Walbank 1967: 441-442. On Scipio's righteous indignation, see Champion 2004a: 148-150.

[47] For the details of the plot, see Walbank 1957; Lazenby 1998: 216. The story also appears in Livy 30.25.3-8; App. *Lib.* 34; Dio 17.75. The version in Polybius is not doubted by most scholars. Nor does the

renewal of hostilities, carried out with an even fiercer and angrier spirit than before (γενομένων δὲ τούτων αὖθις ὁ πόλεμος ἄλλην ἀρχὴν εἰλήφει βαρυτέραν τῆς πρόσθεν καὶ δυσμενικωτέραν, 15.3.1; παραβεβηκότες εἶεν οἱ Φοίνικες τὰς σπονδάς, 15.4.3), as the Romans were aware that they had been treacherously attacked (παρεσπονδῆσθαι, 15.3.2; παρασπόνδησιν, 15.4.2), and the Carthaginians were conscious of their guilt (συνειδότες σφίσι τὰ πεπραγμένα, 15.3.2) and degeneration into παρανομία (παρανομίας, 15.8.11). Polybius' condemnation of the Carthaginian treachery is further emphasized by Scipio's corresponding refusal to abuse the Carthaginian envoys that had been detained by L. Baebius following the recent Carthaginian attack on the Roman envoys (15.4.5-12). By refusing to stoop to similar treachery, Scipio emphasized the Carthaginian παρανομία in contrast (15.4.9-12):

> [Scipio] ordered Baebius to treat the Carthaginian envoys with all courtesy and send them home, acting, I think, very rightly and wisely. For aware as he was of the high value attached by his own nation to keeping faith with ambassadors, he took into consideration not so much the deserts of the Carthaginians as the duty of the Romans. Therefore restraining his own anger and the bitter resentment he felt owing to the late occurrence, he did his best to preserve "the glorious record of our sires," as the saying is. The consequence was that he humiliated the people of Carthage and Hannibal himself by thus requiting in ampler measure their baseness by his generosity.[48]

The second example of treachery against envoys appears during the onset of the Achaean War in 146. Despite repeated requests from Quintus Caecilius Metellus, the Roman consul operating against Andriscus in Macedonia in 148, begging the Achaeans to keep peace with the

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argument from Treu 1953: 50-51 that its absence from the fragmentary *Rylands Papyri* 3.491 suggests its fabrication hold any weight.

[48] τοὺς δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων προσέταξε τῷ Βαιβίῳ μετὰ πάσης φιλανθρωπίας ἀποπέμπειν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, πάνυ καλῶς βουλευσάμενος, ὥς γ᾽ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ φρονίμως. θεωρῶν γὰρ τὴν σφετέραν πατρίδα περὶ πλείστου ποιουμένην τὴν περὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς πίστιν, ἐσκοπεῖτο παρ᾽ αὑτῷ συλλογιζόμενος οὐχ οὕτως τί δέον παθεῖν Καρχηδονίους, ὡς τί δέον ἦν πρᾶξαι Ῥωμαίους. διὸ παρακατασχὼν τὸν ἴδιον θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσι πικρίαν, ἐπειράθη διαφυλάξαι, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν "πατέρων εὖ κείμενα ἔργα." τοιγαροῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι πάντας ἥττησε ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν αὐτόν, ὑπερθέμενος τῇ καλοκἀγαθίᾳ τὴν ἐκείνων ἄνοιαν.

Spartans until a Roman delegation could be sent to handle growing tensions over Sparta's membership in the League, the Achaeans marched against Sparta in the spring and fall of 148 and crushed its attempt to break away from the League. The Roman delegation under L. Aurelius Orestes finally arrived in 147 to settle the issue, declaring that the League should give up not only Sparta, but Corinth, Argos, Heraclea, and Orchomenus as well, a restructuring that would dramatically curb Achaean power.[49] According to Polybius, though claims were exaggerated by the Roman ambassadors upon their return to Rome (38.9.1-2), the Achaean response to the Roman envoys was physical violence, forcing them to flee in order to save their own lives.[50] Nor was this the only treachery shown toward Roman envoys. In the following months, the Achaeans led by Critolaus and Diaeus worked to stir up the populace (38.11.7-9) and undermine relations with the Romans (38.11.2-6), despite the following delegation under Sex. Julius Caesar offering reconciliation and no longer suggesting any dismemberment of the League (38.9.1-4; cf. 38.10.1-5).[51] When word of the ensuing confusion and disorder (ἀκρισίαν καὶ ταραχὴν, 38.12.1) reached Caecilius Metellus in the north by 146, he attempted to once more defuse the situation diplomatically. This time the Roman delegation was composed of Cn. Papirius, Popilius Laenas the younger, A. Gabinius, and C. Fannius (38.12.1). Yet when the Roman ambassadors came before the Achaean Assembly at Corinth, their attempts at reconciliation were met with shouts and

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[49] On the dating of this embassy, see Morgan 1969: 437; Walbank 1979: 699.

[50] For an overview of this sequence of events, see Gruen 1976: 53-66; Ferrary 1978: 769-770; Harris 1979: 240-244 (though cynical); Walbank 1979: 698-708; Champion 2004a: 159-160; Rosenstein 2012: 229-231; Baronowski 120-123.

[51] Livy *Per.* 51; Paus. 7.14-1. Aurelius Orestes and Sextus Julius had been co-consuls in 157. Scholars have pondered the reversal of Roman policy against Achaea at this time. Polybius himself suggests that the Senate had no actual plans to break up the Achaean League, but rather were bluffing to curb Achaean aggression (38.9). Some scholars, however, cynically suggest that the Romans were merely playing for time as their wars in Africa, Spain, and Macedonia were still unsettled. See Gruen 1976: 46-69; Harris 1979: 240-244; Derow 1989: 319-323; Rosenstein 2012: 230-231. For more on Polybius' negative judgment of Achaean leadership in this period, see: chapter 4: Eckstein 1995: 159, 169-170, 220, 265-266; Kallet-Marx 1995: 73-74; Champion 2004a: 160, 166-167; Baronowski 2011: 120-124.

jeers (θορύβου καὶ κραυγῆς ἐξέβαλον, 38.12.4) and eventually physical force (ἀπορρήτων). In the

end, the Roman legates were forced to flee to friendly cities throughout Greece (38.13.9), as

Critolaus was plotting to attack them (πραγματοκοπεῖν καὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἐπιβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας,

38.13.8). Polybius' condemnation of the Achaean treatment of the Roman envoys on both

occasions is clear. The abuse of the earlier delegation under L. Aurelius Orestes is called a foolish

transgression (ἀλογημάτων, 38.10.2), and the Achaean violence in both instances places the blame

for the subsequent war squarely on the shoulders of the poor Achaean leadership. Thus, Polybius

holds that these treacheries against the Roman envoys were in line with the unreasonable manner

(οὐδ'...εὔλογον, 38.1.5) in which the Achaeans acted against Rome, condemned by those of sound

mind (σωφρονοῦν 38.10.6). As some scholars have argued, the treacherous Achaean treatment of

the Roman envoys at Corinth likely played a part in the later decision by L. Mummius Achaicus

to destroy the city at the end of the war.[52] Perhaps most damning is Polybius' decision to refer to

the second treachery against the legates sent by Caecilius Metellus as παρανομία (*παρανομωτάτοις,*

38.13.8).

These two cases of παρανομία beyond the expected treacherous behavior of barbarians and

mercenaries are intriguing. Polybius does not shy away from labeling these attacks against envoys

as παρανομία, inevitably connecting both Carthage (παρανομίας, 15.8.11) and the Achaean

League (*παρανομωτάτοις,* 38.13.8) with barbaric behavior that was considered by civilized states

as a violation of international (and divine) law.[53] Such parallels suggest that Polybius viewed

strong, capable leadership as one of the central pillars necessary for a state to maintain law and

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[52] On the connection between this event at Corinth and the ultimate destruction of the city by Mummius, see Veyne 1975: 819; Kallet-Marx 1995: 84-85. Morgan 1969: 439, n. 82 suggests that this Roman embassy was sent for the purpose of precipitating a war with Achaea. This is unsupported by either Polybius or Pausanius (c.f. 7.15.2), and seems unlikely in its own right.

[53] On the Polybian concept of the Greek-barbaric dichotomy that frames his work, see the following chapter and Champion 2004a: 193-203 and Nicholson 2020; for Romans as honorary Greeks, see Champion 2000a: 426-427; Champion 2004a: 47-57.

order. Without such capable and virtuous leadership, states would inevitably degenerate into the lawlessness that encapsulated the barbarians tribes. Also interesting is the fact that both of these instances of παρανομία are committed by republics. Given Polybius' admiration for mixed constitutions, one might expect these instances of treachery against envoys in the *Histories* to be carried out by monarchs.[54] Indeed, such a portrayal would fall in line with the Polybian model that kings and tyrants were much more likely to engage in acts of treachery. Instead, Polybius condemns the two republics for their degeneration into παρανομία. Polybius' possible motivation behind this presentation leads to an even more important finding. Of the nine instances of treachery committed against envoys that appear in the extant *Histories*, whether perpetrated by barbarians or by members of a republic, eight of these instances were carried out *against* the Romans, and none of them by the Romans.[55]

There seem to be two ways to interpret such a pattern. First, we might look at such a favorable depiction of events for the Romans across this 140-year period as evidence of a Polybian pro-Roman bias, suggesting that the Romans were always on the side of justice during their rise to power. Such an interpretation, however, ignores Polybius' largely balanced account of the Romans throughout the *Histories* and his willingness to criticize both individual Romans as well as the government as a whole.[56] As we have already seen, the Romans were certainly guilty of treachery

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[54] De Coulanges 1893: 119-211; Gigante 1951: 33-53; Labuske 1969: 339-344.

[55] The exception being the παρανομία carried out against Gesco by the Carthaginian mercenaries.

[56] In itself, the fact that scholars have been so divided on Polybius' attitude toward the Romans suggests the Achaean historian's balanced portrayal. Thus, for example, on Polybius as having a negative view of the Romans, see Petzold 1969: 59-64; Shimron 1979-1980: 94-117; Gruen 1984: 346-351; Millar 1987: 4; Balot 2010. On Polybius as being pro-Roman, see De Coulanges 1858: 104; Mommsen 1868: 487-491; De Sanctis 1935: 625-630; Gigante 1951: 33-53; Momigliano 1972-1973: 697-699; Momigliano 1975: 29-31, 48-49; Momigliano 1977: 67-77; Dubuisson 1985: 273-287; Dubuisson 1990: 233-243; Green 1990: 279-283. On a more dynamic take on Polybius' judgment of Rome, see Walbank 1957-1979; Musti 1978: 44-84; Ferrary 1988: 286-291, 306-348; Eckstein 1995: 197-225, 265-282; Baronowski 2013: 10-11, 65-113, 164-175. On Polybius as intellectually distant from Rome, see Wunderer 1927: 46-47; Sasso 1961: 73-76; Labuske 1969: 339-344; Petzold 1969: 43-53, 91-100; Momigliano 1972-1973: 697-699; Momigliano 1975: 29-31; Momigliano 1977: 67-77; Lehmann 1989-1990: 66-77; Champion 2000a; Champion 2000b; Erskine 2003; Champion 2004a Baronowski 2013: 10-11, 65-113, 164-175..

at times, and Polybius does not hesitate to condemn the Romans when he believes that they have acted unjustly, as the following section continues to emphasize.[57] Instead, it seems more likely that Polybius' presentation of these instances of παρανομία was intended to warn his readers of the dangers of committing such treachery. In each of these instances, Polybius emphasizes not only that justice was on the side of the Romans as the victims, regardless of their motivations, but that for the perpetrators of the treachery the end result was catastrophic. Before long, sometimes in a matter of days, the barbarians, Achaeans, and Carthaginians were all met with crushing defeat. Such a pattern suggests that Polybius believed that acts of treachery, regardless of short-term gain, ultimately meritted poor pragmatic results for the individuals or states in question - a claim that will be made in full in the following chapter. If this is true, Polybius' presentation of these instances of παρανομία committed against envoys, in violation of international law, suggests that those who carried out treachery would inevitably be punished. In this way, Polybius' framework served both as a praise of and as a warning to the Romans. Should the Romans also degenerate toward παρανομία, they too would find defeat. Such a warning seems likely to have been intended for a Roman readership.[58]

II. DISINGENUOUS DIPLOMACY

While Polybius is unwilling to make any allowance in his judgment of treachery committed against envoys, his presentation of instances of deceptive diplomacy is more nuanced. Regardless of the outcome, there seems to have been some overt expression of entering into good faith that accompanied diplomatic negotiations in the ancient world. Promises offered during

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[57] The most famous example is the Roman "theft" (ἀφαίρεσις) of Sardinia in 237, which Polybius argues was a betrayal of good faith with Carthage and a clear violation of the treaty of Lutatius signed in 241 (3.10.4, 28.1-2, and 30.3-4).
[58] See below.

such negotiations were typically taken to be serious and authentic, excluding the unreliable assurances of barbarians. Despite these assumptions, however, there are multiple instances of disingenuous diplomacy that occur throughout the *Histories* in which promises made during negotiations are immediately broken. In other instances, Polybius describes kings and statesmen who enter into diplomatic negotiations without any intention of actually reaching a settlement, only feigning a willingness to negotiate in order to gain some advantage in the war. In both cases, the good faith that ought to exist between the two sides is betrayed. Despite this breach of faith, however, Polybius is not universally critical of all instances of disingenuous diplomacy. While the Achaean historian does condemn men such as Philip V who treacherously go back on guarantees made during negotiations, he makes some allowance for those who deceptively enter into negotiations without any desire for peace. In Polybius' mind, it would seem that, until definite promises and guarantees were made, diplomatic negotiations remained a tool for prudent commanders to utilize not only for making peace but for gaining advantage during war.[59] It was a matter of deception versus treachery and lawlessness. In addition to this moral and pragmatic framework with which Polybius approaches such negotiations, it is telling that the vast majority of these instances of disingenuous diplomacy in the *Histories*, both condemned and condoned, are carried either by monarchs or by the Romans - the latter serving as the topic of the final section of this chapter.

Condemned Instances of Disingenuous Diplomacy

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[59] As discussed below, Polybius' condemnation of Q. Marcius Philippus in this regard is surprising and speaks toward his authorial intent beyond just the war with Perseus. At any rate, Polybius' condemnation of Philippus for such deceptive and advantageous diplomacy appears to be the exception and not the rule.

While Polybius allows for deceptive diplomacy in some instances, it is clear that he

condemns those who treacherously go back on promises made during negotiations. Such

betrayals undermined the assurances of good faith that were supposed to accompany these

guarantees, not unlike the promises and sworn oaths that undergirded treaties. Again, the

Carthaginian actions in 203 were an example of such treachery. After Laelius' defeat of Syphax

at Cirta in the autumn, the Carthaginians entered into negotiations with the Romans, ultimately

agreeing to an armistice while a peace settlement could be determined.[60] And in fact, a

settlement was agreed upon and sworn to by the Carthaginians so that Scipio was able to send it

back to Rome for ratification (15.1.3-4). Thus, the subsequent decision of the Carthaginians

almost immediately after these negotiations to capture a number of Roman transport and supply

ships that had been forced by a storm into the bay of Carthage was a clear act of treachery

(15.1.1).[61] The Carthaginian government had deceptively continued negotiations with Scipio

even after it knew that it would not accept the terms of the peace settlement, hoping instead to

buy time for Hannibal to return to Africa (15.2.3).[62] Yet it was ultimately their treacherous

(παρεσπονδῆσθαι, 15.3.2; παρασπόνδησιν, 15.4.2) violation of the promised truce, and therefore

the peace settlement that had recently been ratified by the Roman people (15.1.3-4), that draws

Polybius' sharp condemnation as he acknowledges Carthaginian guilt (συνειδότες σφίσι τὰ

πεπραγμένα, 15.3.2) over the breach of faith.[63] Polybius emphasizes that the Carthaginian

violation of the sworn oaths of the truce (παραβεβηκέναι τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας, 15.1.2;

ἀθετεῖν δὲ τολμῶσι τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας, 15.1.9; παραβεβηκότες εἶεν οἱ Φοίνικες τὰς

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[60] On the defeat and capture of Syphax by Laelius and Massinissa, see Livy 39.11.

[61] Cf. Livy 30.24.

[62] Cf. Livy 30.16.14-15; Lazenby 1998: 213.

[63] For the terms of the treaty, see above; Livy 30.16.12; App. *Lib.* 32; Walbank 1967: 441-442. On the contrast between Roman virtue and Carthaginian barbarism in Polybius' account, see Champion 2004a: 148, n. 14.

σπονδάς, 15.4.3) and the subsequent attack on Roman envoys (15.2.4-15) were the major factors in the continuation of the war and the total defeat of the Carthaginians.[64]

Despite the Carthaginians in 203, most instances of treacherous diplomacy in the *Histories* are carried out by monarchies. This is perhaps not surprising given the tendency of such men and their kingdoms toward treachery, as we saw in the previous chapter. In Polybius' mind, the willingness of kings to engage in such treacherous behavior marked the inevitable decline of all but the most exceptional monarchs from kings into tyrants due to their failure to maintain correct ethics (τοῦ μὲν καλοῦ διαψεύδονται; cf. 4.77.4; 15.20.1-3; 15.24.5-6).[65] As with most categories of treachery in the *Histories*, Philip V of Macedon is one of the best examples. In 15.20, we find Polybius sharply condemning the actions of Philip and Antiochus III upon the premature death of Ptolemy IV in 204. Rather than safeguard the interests of the five-year-old Ptolemy V now on the throne, Philip and Antiochus instead formed a pact in 203/2 in order to divide Ptolemaic territory between themselves, Philip taking part of Egypt as well as Caria and Samos, and Antiochus seizing Coele-Syria and Phoenicia (3.2.8; 15.20.1-2) - the so called "Pact of the Kings."[66] Polybius criticizes both kings for their unrestrained and animalistic natures

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[64] Walbank 1967: 441-442.

[65] Eckstein 1995: 88.

[66] While sources other than Polybius note the existence of the pact, these sources are mostly later, confused, and at time contradictory: Polyb. 3.2.8, 14.1a.4-5, 15.20, 16.1.8-9, 24.6; Justin 30.2.8; Pomp. Trog. *Prol.* 30; Hieron. *In Dan.* 11.13. Somewhat confused: App. *Mac.* 4; John Antioch. Frg. 54. Explaining pact as rumor: App. *Mac.* 4; Justin 30.2.8. While scholars have failed to reach a consensus on the details and historicity of such a formal pact, Polybius at least believed in its existence and significant. On the full acceptance of Polybius' version of the pact, see Schmitt 1964: 226-236, 242; Schmitt 1969: 228-291; Eckstein 2006: 269-275; Eckstein 2012: 129-179; Rosenstein 2012: 182-183. On the pact as a coordinated effort to dismember Ptolemaic territory outside of Egypt proper, see Scullard 1980: 246, n. 2; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 343; Green 1990: 304. On the pact as non-interference, see Briscoe 1973: 37-39; Berthold 1976: 100-101; Berthold 1984: 110-111; Klose 1982: 64-68; Will 1982: 116; Gruen 1984: 387; Buraselis 1996: 154, n. 19; Lampela 1998: 76; Ma 1999/2002: 74-76; Wiemer 2001: 84. On the denial of the pact as an invention of Rhodian sources: Magie 1939: 32-44. On the pact as confusion regarding a local agreement between Philip and Zeuxis, the Seleucid commander in Asia Minor, over Pergamum and Rhodes, see Errington 1971: 336-354; Erington 1986: 5, n. 16. On other denials of the pact, see de Regibus 1951: 99; de Regibus 1952: 97-100; Habicht 1957: 239-240, n. 106; Habicht 1982: 146; Badian 1958: 64, n. 3; Badian 1964b: 135, n. 3; Rawlings 1976: 18-19, 23, n. 26; Harris 1979: 312,

(ἀνέδην καὶ θηριωδῶς, 15.20.3) through the evil aggression (κακοπραγμονεῖν, 3.2.8); their

unbounded covetousness (πλεονεξίας) as representing "impiety toward the gods and savagery

toward men" (τῆς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀσεβείας καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὠμότητος, 15.20.4);

and their shameful behavior (αἰσχύνης, 15.20.3) that even tyrants would shy away from. Yet

according to Polybius, Philip's treachery ran deeper still. During the time of his pact with

Antiochus to dismember the Ptolemaic kingdom, Philip was in negotiations with the Ptolemaic

government at Alexandria to marry one of his daughters to Ptolemy V (15.25.13; 16.22.16), a

process that had likely begun before the death of Ptolemy IV.[67] Given the unstable situation in

Alexandria with the ascension of the young king in 204 and widespread fear of an invasion by

Antiochus III, these appeals to Philip only became more urgent by the spring of 203, as chief

minister Agathocles ironically hoped to secure Philip's position as a guarantor of the young

Ptolemy's rule (15.25.13).[68] Thus, we find Philip participating in diplomatic negotiations with

the Ptolemeys to become the father-in-law of Ptolemy V while at the same time working with

Antiochus to destroy the boy. Such treacherous diplomacy exemplified the shamefulness

(ἀσεβείας) and impiety (αἰσχύνης, 15.20.3) that defined Philip's behavior in this period and

constituted a serious breach of faith (παρασπονδούντων, 15.20.6) with both Ptolemy and

Antiochus.[69]

Treacherous diplomacy is likewise carried out by Philip at Cius in 202. Having begun his

eastward expansion into Asia Minor, Philip decided to attack the city of Cius in Bithynia, despite

n. 2; Warrior 1996: 16-17. On the significance of the pact for the development of events and foreign policy in the East at the end of the 3rd century, see Holleaux 1935: 306-322; McDonald and Walbank 1937; Walbank 1940: 127-128; Chamouz 2002: 114; Eckstein 2006: 269-275; Eckstein 2012: 212-269; Rosenstein 2012: 182-183. On the denial of the pact's influence, see Magie 1939; Balsdon 1954: 37; Badian 1958: 64; Errington 1971: 347-354; Rawlings 1976: 18-19, 23, n. 26; Ager 1991: 16-22; Warrior 1996: 17, n. 16; Derow 2003: 58-59.
[67] Holleaux 1935: 78-79; Huss 1976: 128-129; Eckstein 2012: 142-144, 148.
[68] On the fear of Seleucid aggression, see Huss 1976: 84; Eckstein 2012: 143-146.
[69] On Polybius' condemnation, see Eckstein 1995: 88-89; Eckstein 2006: 90; Baronowski 2011: 76.

its status as an ally of the Aetolian League.[70] When diplomats from Rhodes and other neutral

states attempted to bring the issue to a peaceful conclusion, Philip stalled negotiations while the

city was ultimately captured and destroyed (15.22.4; 15.23.1-3). A similar fate met the

neighboring city of Myrlea, and both sites were handed over to Prusias, the king of Bithynia and

Philip's brother-in-law (15.22.1).[71] The worst aspect of the affair was Philip's promise to the

Cians that they would be spared. Instead, after agreeing to surrender under these assurances, the

Cians were enslaved and their city destroyed (15.23.3; 15.23.9). Polybius' condemnation of

Philip's actions at Cius is clear, calling his breach of faith a shameful (αἰσχύνεσθαι, 15.23.5) act

of treachery (παρασπονδοῦντι, 15.22.2), lacking any semblance of pretext or justification. Thus,

Polybius characterizes Philip's unjust (ἀδίκως, 15.22.3) actions as cruel and treacherous

(ὠμότητα, τῆς ἀθεσίας, 15.23.3-4), in line with his growing reputation among the Greeks,

especially the Rhodians, for cruelty and impiety (ὠμότητος, ἀσεβείᾳ 15.22.3).[72] In this way,

Polybius explains, through his treachery Philip did just as much to betray himself (15.23.5).

A similar instance of treachery occurred in this same year upon Philip's return from his

campaign in the northern Aegean. Polybius says that Philip's return to Greece was marked with

one act of treachery (παρασπόνδημα, 15.24.1) after another. The most notable of these instances

took place at Thasos, an independent state strategically located off the Macedonian coast. Upon

his arrival, the Thasians told Philip's general, Metrodorus, that they would willingly surrender to

Philip so long as he promised to leave the city under its own laws and free of garrison or tribute

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[70] On Philip's campaign, see Walbank 1940: 108-127; Gruen 1984 (with detailed sources): 384, n.142; Hammond and Walbank 411-416.

[71] Walbank 1940: 115; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 413. For a detailed look at Philip's imperialistic aims in the north Aegean, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 412-416; Eckstein 2012: 181-201.

[72] On Polybius' moral condemnation of Philip's actions at Cius, see Eckstein 1995: 88-89. On the hatred toward Philip shown by the Rhodians, see Walbank 1967: 477; Berthold 1976: 97; Berthold 1984: 112; Errington 1989: 252; Ager 1991: 20; Baronowski 2011: 76; Eckstein 2012: 148, 191-192.

(15.24.2). Philip agreed; however, upon entering the city he betrayed the Thasians and instead enslaved the entire population.[73] According to Polybius, in carrying out such a blatant act of unjustifiable treachery against Thasos, Philip revealed his own fickleness and faithlessness (τὴν ἀθεσίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀβεβαιότητα,15.25.4) to the whole world.[74] Polybius likewise calls Philip's actions at Thasos thoughtless and crazy (ἀλόγιστον...καὶ μανικόν) for anyone aspiring to universal domination (15.24.6).[75] Despite some scholars, however, Polybius' claim in 15.24.5-6 should not be taken as a reflection of a purely pragmatic viewpoint or as evidence for "the absence of any moral criterion."[76] Such an interpretation would ignore the context of the larger trajectory of Philip's character and the heavy moral condemnation of Philip that Polybius emphasizes in book 15 especially (15.20; 15.22-23). Rather, the emphasis on the pragmatic as well as on the moral in Polybius' account of Philip's diplomatic treachery at Thasos in 202 allows the Achaean historian to criticize Philip for stupidity as well as wickedness.

The final example of disingenuous diplomacy that is condemned by Polybius is carried out by King Cleomenes III of Sparta. In 242, the Agiad king, Leonidas II, Cleomenes' father, was exiled from Sparta due to internal divisions surrounding the social reforms that had been initiated by the Eurypontid king, Agis IV, Cleomenes' brother-in-law. Upon Leonidas' exile, Cleombrotus, one of Agis' supporters, became the new king of the Agiad line. In 241/240, however, Leonidas managed to return to Sparta, depose Cleombrotus, and eventually arrest and execute Agis.[77] With

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[73] Hammond and Walbank 413; Eckstein 1995: 88; Eckstein 2012: 148, 208-209.

[74] Cf. Livy 33.30.3.

[75] Baronowski 2011: 90. The full passage at 15.24.5-6 reads: "Therefore they are disappointed of any credit for noble conduct, though as a rule they do not miss their immediate interest. But who would not qualify as perfectly irrational and insane the conduct of a prince, who, engaging in vast enterprises and aspiring to universal dominion, with his chances of success in all his projects still unimpaired, yet in matters of no moment, in the very first matters he was called upon to deal with, proclaimed to all his fickleness and faithlessness?"

[76] See (quote) Walbank 1967: 480; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 413. Eckstein 1995: 88 is right to emphasize that Polybius has *both* moral and pragmatic lessons for his readers.

[77] On Agis' reforms and death, see Green 1990: 153; Cartledge 1996.

Leonidas' return to the throne and Cleomenes' marriage to Agis' widow, Agiatis, stability was momentarily returned to the Spartan government.[78] The Eurpontid monarchy passed to the infant son of Agis, Eudamidas III, and Cleomenes succeeded his father to the Agiad throne upon Leonidas' death in 235. Upon the death of Eudamidas in 228, Cleomenes invited Archidamus V, the brother of Agis IV who had fled to Messenia in 241/240 upon Agis' murder, to return to Sparta and take up the Eurpontid throne. Polybius explains that these negotiations were conducted through a Messenian named Nicagoras, who had protected Archidamus during his exile (5.37.1-3). According to the Achaean historian, Cleomenes promised Archidamus his safety, perhaps even having their agreement (συνθήκας, 5.37.3) made formal through a ratification (κυρωθέντων, 5.37.4) by the Spartan Assembly. Despite these guarantees, however, when Cleomenes met Archidamus upon his approach to the city, he had him treacherously put to death.[79] Polybius' condemnation of Cleomenes' breach of faith with Archidamus in 228 becomes clear in light of Cleomenes' death in Alexandria in 219. For it was Nicagoras, seeking vengeance upon the exiled Spartan king for his earlier treachery against Archidamus (προϋπάρχουσαν, 5.37.12), who worked with Sosibius to plant false evidence in order to accuse Cleomenes of a planned coup against Ptolemy V (5.38.1-7).[80]

These instances of treacherous diplomacy paint a clear pattern. When direct oaths, assurances, or guarantees are given and agreed upon during diplomatic negotiations, these

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[78] Pausanias 7.7.2. On the important roles played by the Spartan wives and family members of these kings during this year, especially Chilonas, Cleomenes' sister, and Agiatis, wife to both Agis and Cleomenes, see Pomeroy 87-88.

[79] Plutarch instead attributes Archidamus' death to the same assassins who had earlier murdered his brother Agis, the king of the other Spartan line. According to Plutarch, likely following Phylarchus, these assassins feared the vengeance of Archidamus. See Plut. *Cleom.* 5. Less likely is Pausanias' account that Agis died in battle: Paus. 8.10.4; 8.27.9. On the various accounts, including doubt on Polybius' claims that Cleomenes was behind Archidamus' death, see Walbank 1957: 568-569.

[80] See Walbank 1957: 568 who incorrectly places all of the blame in the incident on Archidamus for trusting Cleomenes.

promises must be upheld. Those who treacherously break their sworn word breach the good faith of the negotiations and are condemned by Polybius, reflecting the παρανομία of the barbarians and mercenaries who attack envoys. Thus, the Carthaginians in 203 violated both their sacred oaths (ὅρκους, 15.1.2; 15.1.9) as well as the treaty with Rome (συνθήκας, 15.1.2; 15.1.9; σπονδάς, 15.4.3); Philip V's negotiations to become Ptolemy V's father-in-law while forming a pact with Antiochus III in 203/2 to divide up the Ptolemaic kingdom constituted a breach of faith with both kings (15.20.6; 15.25.13; 16.22.16); Philip's treacherously broke his promises in 202 to spare the cities of Cius (15.23.3; 15.23.9) and Thasos (15.24.2) and their inhabitants; and Cleomenes went back on his treaty (συνθήκας, 5.37.3) with Archidamus V in 228, which had guaranteed the exiled Spartan king his safety upon his return to the city. It is also noteworthy that nearly all of these condemned instances in the *Histories* are perpetrated by monarchs, reinforcing Polybius' belief that kings were especially prone to become corrupted by the power of their positions and treacherously break their promises.

Instances of Disingenuous Diplomacy Accepted by Polybius

When such formal guarantees and treaties are not promised during diplomatic negotiations, Polybius often allows for some diplomatic deception. Polybius believed that it was the duty of statesmen and commanders to outmaneuver their enemies both militarily as well as diplomatically. Indeed, it was common practice during Polybius' own day, as it was throughout the entire ancient and modern periods, for commanders to enter into diplomatic negotiations in an attempt to stall the progress of a war so as to gain some advantage. This was one of the main reasons for the Carthaginian decision to enter into negotiations with Scipio in 203 - hoping to buy time for Hannibal to return to Carthage from Italy (15.2.3). Despite claims by some scholars that Polybius

detested this sort of disingenuous diplomacy, it is clear from his description of such instances in the *Histories* that he found such skilled deceptive maneuvering to be not just acceptable but even praiseworthy.[81] Thus, it is not the decision of the Carthaginians to enter into negotiations to play for time in 203 that draws Polybius' condemnation, but their breach of faith in breaking the truce and treaty (15.1.2-9; 15.4.3) that they had agreed to as well as their treacherous attack on Roman envoys (15.2.4-15).[82] Ultimately, much like his praise of skillful deception on the battlefield and on campaign, Polybius admired those who could use diplomatic negotiations to the advantage of their own state, so long as no formal guarantees were violated in the process.

Disingenuous diplomacy also appears during Polybius' account of the Fourth Syrian War without condemnation. Following the defeat of the rebellion under Molon and Alexander in 220, Antiochus returned to his proposed invasion of Coele-Syria that he had abandoned in 221.[83] The invasion came in 219, encouraged by the defection of the Ptolemaic general Theodotus, who brought large areas of the region over to Antiochus (5.61.3-62.6).[84] As Antiochus quickly captured important cities, including Seleucia Pieria, Tyre, and Ptolemais, the situation grew increasingly dire for the Ptolemaic government.[85] Meanwhile, Ptolemy IV, thinking that the young Seleucid and Macedonian kings would not pose a threat, had spent his days (ἀπρεπεῖς ἔρωτας καὶ τὰς ἀλόγους καὶ συνεχεῖς μέθας, 5.34.10) handling the administration his kingdom entirely with

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[81] Eckstein 1995: 88-102.

[82] On the possibility of some in Carthage as genuinely working for peace with Rome, see Scullard 1930: 134.

[83] On Molon's rebellion against Antiochus, see in detail ch. 4 as well as Taylor 2013: ch. 2.

[84] Walbank 1957: 587 places this betrayal in August 219 placed on the trilingual stele from Pithom, indicating that Raphia occurred twenty-six months after the defection. Theodotus was from Calydon. For more on Theodotus' earlier career, including the likely murder of Magas, see Benecke: 1934 35-38; Bengtson 1937-1952: ii.159-60; iii.166-171; Walbank 1957: 570; Bar Kochva 1976: 90, 124-127. More recently, see Taylor 2013.

[85] The capture of Seleucia (5.60-61.2), Tyre (5.62.2), and Ptolemais (5.62.2). Ptolemais, modern day Acre, was named by Ptolemy II in the 260s. Walbank 1957: 587 places the founding in 261. See Strabo 16.758; Diod. 15.41.

negligence and indifference (ἀνεπίστατον...καὶ δυσέντευκτον, 5.34.4; cf. 5.42.4), and leaving it ill

prepared for Antiochus' invasion (5.63.7-8):

> Ptolemy, whose obvious duty it was to march to the help of his dominions, attacked as they had been in such flagrant defiance of treaties, was too weak to entertain any such project, so completely had all military preparations been neglected.[86]

Thus, the defense of the kingdom fell upon Ptolemy's chief ministers, Agathocles and

Sosibius (5.63.1). Realizing that in the army's current state the kingdom was defenseless against

Antiochus' aggression, the ministers actively began to make preparations for the war. With great

energy and efficiency, they recalled and assembled their mercenary forces from around the

Mediterranean (5.63.8); personally ensured that necessary provisions had been gathered for the

troops (5.63.9-10); had these soldiers properly drilled and trained (5.63.14; 5.64.3-4); reorganized

and reoutfitted the entire army (5.64.1-3), including a force of 20,000 native Egyptians; and took

care to encourage and motivate the troops (5.64.7).[87] In all of these preparations, Polybius praises

Sosibius and Agathocles not only for their own initiative and effectiveness but for wisely

(εὐκαιρότατα, 5.63.13) appointing skilled and appropriate leaders to oversee the various aspects

of training, reorganizing, and supplying the new army (5.63.11-13; 5.65.1-8).[88] All of these

military preparations, however, were only possible due to the diplomatic deception employed by

Sosibius and Agathocles against Antiochus. Polybius explains that in order to buy time for their

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[86] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πτολεμαῖον τοῦ μὲν ἐκ χειρὸς βοηθεῖν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασιν, ὅπερ ἦν καθῆκον, οὕτως παρεσπονδημένοι προφανῶς, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιβολὴν εἶχον διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὠλιγώρητο πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὰς πολεμικὰς. Both before and after Raphia, Polybius describes Ptolemy as lazy (5.34.4; 5.34.10; 5.86.3), frequently drunk (5.34.10; cf. 14.11.2), debauched (5.37.10), ineffectual (5.38.8-9), and weak (5.63.7). Polybius explains that Ptolemy had abandoned a life of virtue (καλῶν) in favor of a life of dissipation (βίον ἄσωτον, 14.12.3). On Polybius' moral concerns with the debauchery of Ptolemy IV: Préaux 1965: 364-375; Eckstein 1995: 75, 83, 243, 246, 275, 286. On the notion of Polybius' portrayal of Ptolemy's indolence as overstated, see Huss 1976; denied by Hauben 1981: 389-403.
[87] On the outfitting of native Egyptians, see Taylor 2013: 135. On the reorganization of the army, see Fischer-Bovet 2015.
[88] Griffith 1935: 254-263; Launey 1949. 30-32; Walbank 1957: 588-589; Eckstein 1995: 166.

preparations, the chief ministers entered into negotiations with the Seleucid king, pretending that they had no intention of resisting him with force but would instead continue the same policy of neglect that had gripped Ptolemy IV' reign (5.63.1-2). By deceiving Antiochus of their true intentions, Sosibius and Agathocles hoped to relax Antiochus' advance through Coele-Syria (5.63.2).[89] And indeed, the deception worked. The chief ministers received Antiochus' envoys, as well as those from Rhodes, Byzantium, Cyzicus, and Aetolia attempting third-party arbitration, at Memphis for prolonged negotiations, allowing the military operations at Alexandria to continue without Antiochus' knowledge (5.63.4-5; 5.66.8-9). Polybius emphasizes that these disingenuous negotiations "gave Sosibius and Agathocles what they needed - a delay and time to make their preparations for war" (5.63.6).[90] Ultimately, the diplomatic deception was a brilliant success, buying Ptolemy's ministers enough time to organize and field a strong army that would go on to defeat Antiochus decisively at Raphia in 217 (5.82-85). Despite Sosibius and Agathocles' reliance on deception during their diplomatic exchanges with Antiochus, as well as with the Greek arbitrators, Polybius praises the two ministers for their role in turning away Antiochus' invasion. Their energy and initiative stand in clear contrast with Ptolemy IV's indolence (5.34.4; 5.34.10; 5.86.3), and it is their efforts that save the kingdom - not that outcome alone guarantees Polybius' praise. Rather, the Achaean historian emphasizes that the decision of Sosibius and Agathocles to deceive Antiochus was "the only course possible under present circumstances" (ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ δυνατὸν ἔλαβον πρὸς τὸ παρόν, 5.63.1).

Nor were the Ptolemaic ministers the only ones feigning peace during the diplomatic parleys of 219/218. Polybius explains that Antiochus himself likewise entered into negotiations with the Ptolemaic envoys in order to forestall the war. As winter approached, he agreed to a four-

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[89] On the inevitability of war breaking out between the two powers, see Eckstein 2006: 100-101.
[90] εἰς τὸ λαβεῖν ἀναστροφὴν καὶ χρόνον πρὸς τὰς τοῦ πολέμου παρασκευάς.

month armistice (ἀνοχάς τε ποιήσασθαι τετραμήνους, 5.66.2) and led the Ptolemaic envoys to believe that he would be willing to reach a peace settlement with very lenient terms (συγκαταβήσεσθαι τὰ φιλάνθρωπα, 5.66.2). This, of course, was "very far from being the truth" (ταῦτα δ᾽ ἔπραττε πλεῖστον μὲν ἀπέχων τῆς ἀληθείας), as Antiochus fully intended to take all of Coele-Syria, by force if necessary (5.66.3).[91] In reality, Antiochus wanted to buy time to address Achaeus' attempts to break away from the Seleucid kingdom (5.66.3; cf. 5.57.1-58.1; 5.61.6). Thus, by deceptively feigning his willingness to settle the war with Ptolemy diplomatically, he hoped to winter his army back in Seleucia without losing the advantage he currently held in Coele-Syria.[92] Polybius describes the irony of the situation, however, as it was really Antiochus who had been fooled into thinking that Ptolemy would never dare to face him on the battlefield (5.66.5-9):

> Antiochus took his departure and on reaching Seleucia dismissed his forces to their winter quarters and henceforward neglected to exercise his troops, feeling sure he would have no need to fight a battle, since he was already master of some portions of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia and expected to obtain possession of the rest by diplomacy and with the consent of Ptolemy, who would never dare to risk a general battle. This was the opinion held also by his envoys, as Sosibius, who was established at Memphis, always received them in a friendly manner, and never allowed the envoys he himself kept sending to Antiochus to be eyewitnesses of the preparations in Alexandria.[93]

Neither the disingenuous diplomacy carried out by Sosibius and Agathocles nor Antiochus' similar deception is criticized by Polybius. Feigning a willingness to make peace was a standard diplomatic ploy that was used throughout the ancient world, and Polybius understood the need for

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[91] Grabowski 2010: 121-122; Grainger 2016: 103-115.

[92] On Antiochus' position in Coele-Syria in 219-217, see Walbank 1957: 592-593.

[93] ἐπανῆλθε· καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν Σελεύκειαν διαφῆκε τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς παραχειμασίαν. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη τοῦ μὲν γυμνάζειν τοὺς ὄχλους ὠλιγώρει, πεπεισμένος οὐ προσδεήσεσθαι τὰ πράγματα μάχης διὰ τὸ τινῶν μὲν μερῶν Κοίλης Συρίας καὶ Φοινίκης ἤδη κυριεύειν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐλπίζειν ἐξ ἑκόντων καὶ διὰ λόγου παραλήψεσθαι, μὴ τολμώντων τὸ παράπαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Πτολεμαῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν ὅλων συγκαταβαίνειν κίνδυνον. ταύτην δὲ συνέβαινε τὴν διάληψιν καὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς ἔχειν διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐντεύξεις αὐτοῖς τὸν Σωσίβιον ἐν τῇ Μέμφει προκαθήμενον φιλανθρώπους ποιεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν παρασκευῶν μηδέποτε τοὺς διαπεμπομένους πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἐᾶν αὐτόπτας γενέσθαι.

such deception during war. Indeed, Polybius praises Sosibius for carrying out his deception so effectively, making careful preparations (παρασκευῶν, 5.66.9) so that his real intentions would remain hidden. Ultimately, as neither Antiochus nor the Ptolemaic chief ministers violated any formal promises (the agreement to the four-month truce over the winter of 219/218 was not breached by either side), Polybius finds no fault with their deception.

Not surprisingly, Polybius portrays Philip V as especially prone to such disingenuous diplomacy. This is seen during his capture of the city of Prinassus in Caria during the course of his 201 campaign in the northern Aegean. Following the naval battles of Lade and Chios, Philip invaded Pergamum before turning south and marching his army into Lydia and Caria.[94] During Philip's operations in Caria, Polybius explains that the Macedonian king attempted to capture the city of Prinassus, first launching several direct assaults that failed due to the city's strong defenses and ultimately proceeding to place the city under siege (16.11.1-2). The siege proved no better, however, as Philip's attempts to mine underneath the city walls proved impossible due to the rocky soil (16.11.2-3). Instead, Philip devised the following deceptive ploy (ὑπάρχειν ἐπινοεῖ τι τοιοῦτον, 16.11.3) to try and capture the city through trickery. During the day, he had his soldiers make noises underground as if the mines were progressing, and at night he brought in dirt from elsewhere to give off the appearance that a great portion of the city's walls was being successfully undermined (16.11.4).[95] During the negotiations that ensued with the defenders of the Prinassus, Philip lied to them, telling them that he had already underpinned two hundred feet of their wall and would collapse the fortifications if they did not surrender (16.11.5). Fooled by Philip's deception, the Prinassians proceeded to surrender the town after Philip gave guarantees of their

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[94] On Philip's activity during this year of the Cretan War, including the battles of Lade and Chios, see Walbank 1940: 121-137; Sherwin-White 1978: 126-130; Eckstein 2012: 157-168.
[95] On Polybius description of the siege tactics, see Campbell 2011: 140; Teytelbaum 2019: 27.

safety (16.11.5-6).[96] There is no criticism of Philip's actions from Polybius in this passage. Indeed, on the whole Polybius praises Philip's energy during his campaigns in 201 and 200 (16.28.3-9).[97] While Philip ultimately made formal guarantees of safety to the people of Prinassus, the diplomatic negotiations up to that point were open to manipulation and deception, as were all negotiations. Had Philip violated his promise and killed or enslaved the Prinassians upon their surrender, this would have been a different story, no doubt drawing Polybius' sharp condemnation as had been the case with the cities of Cius (15.22-23) and Thasos (15.24.1-6) during the previous year. As it happened though, Philip's diplomatic deception was the work of a clever and industrious commander rather than a treacherous one.

Polybius presents another instance of disingenuous diplomacy by Philip V following the end of the Syrian War in 188. Between 188-184, envoys from various states came to Rome to complain about Philip's aggression in Greece and in Thrace. 185 saw an especially hostile group of envoys come before the Senate to condemn the Macedonian king. King Eumenes and exiles from Maronea informed the Senate of Philip's capture of a number of cities in Thrace, most importantly Aenus and Maronea (22.6.1-2), while a number of Athamanians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians had also lost cities to Philip during the war with Antiochus (22.6.3).[98] The result was a diplomatic delegation led by Q. Caecilius Metellus that ultimately ordered Philip to evacuate Aenus, Maronea, and the other cities in Thrace, which he had used as a base of operations for his

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[96] Cf. Polyaen. 4.18.1; Walbank 1967: 512-513. Note Philip's willingness at Prinassus to offer such terms of surrender, compared to his later unwillingness to do so at Abydos (16.30.7; cf. Livy [P] 31.16.5). See rightly Eckstein 1995: 50-52, n. 72; contra Golan 1985: 400-401.

[97] Eckstein 2012: 164.

[98] On the independence of Aenus and Maronea as part of the Peace of Apamea, given their economic importance, see Livy 39.2-6; Walbank 1940: 216; Eckstein 2012: 345. Eumenes II of Pergamum confidently argued that Aenus and Maronea should in fact be turned over to him, given his support of Rome in the Syria War, evidently speaking not as a client of Rome but as a powerful and independent friend: Livy 39.27.2-6 (based on Polybian material); Walbank 1940: 233; Burton 2003; Eckstein 2012: 345, 354. Many of these independent cities had factional divides over supporting Philip or supporting Eumenes. See, for example, Aenus: Polyb. 22.6.7

northern campaigns in 184.[99] Caecilius' decision to restrict Philip's aggression in Thrace was later confirmed by the Senate in 183, which resulted in another delegation sent in the spring to ensure that Philip had in fact removed his garrisons from the Thracian cities (22.13.1-2). Philip's response was to orchestrate the massacre (μεγάλη σφαγὴ) of the population of Maronea before the arrival of the second Roman delegation (22.13.1-14.6; cf. 23.8.2), venting his fury on the unhappy people of Maronea (ἐναπηρείσατο τὴν ὀργὴν εἰς τοὺς ταλαιπώρους Μαρωνείτας, 22.13.2).[100] The Roman delegation under Ap. Claudius Pulcher severely rebuked Philip, despite his attempts to conceal his complicity in the massacre, but took no further action against the Macedonian king (22.13.8-12; 22.14.6).[101] According to Polybius, by this point Philip had already decided to prepare for a war with Rome, his hostility toward the Romans already seen by Appius (22.14.6) as well as by his own people (22.14.7).[102] Yet, as he revealed to his friends Apelles and Philocles, Philip needed more time to prepare for a conflict with Rome (22.14.8):

> He was, therefore, in general quite eager to resist and attack them by any and every means. But as he had not sufficient forces to execute some of his projects, he set himself to consider how he might put off matters for a little and gain time for warlike preparation.[103]

In the diplomatic negotiations with Rome that followed, Philip was careful to pretend to want reconciliation and cooperation, masking his true feelings and intentions. He immediately sent

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[99] The delegation, which became known as the Congress of Tempe (cf. Livy 39.25-28) was also composed of M. Baebius Tamphilus and Ti. Claudius Nero (22.6.6); cf. Livy 39.24 which lists the third legate as Ti. Sempronius. On Philip's campaigns of 184, including the defeat of Thracians threatening Byzantium, see Polyb. 22.14.12; Livy 39.35.4; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 468-471.

[100] Cf. Livy 39.34.35.

[101] On Senatorial passivity during this period, see Gruen 1984: 125, 233; Eckstein 2012: 350-354, n. 33.

[102] Walbank and other scholars have emphasized that Philip was preparing for what he deemed an inevitable war with Rome, not a war of revenge that he planned to initiate. See Walbank 1940: 236; Gruen 1974: 232; Walbank 1979: 199.

[103] καθόλου μὲν οὖν πρόθυμος ἦν εἰς τὸ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀμύνασθαι καὶ μετελθεῖν αὐτούς: πρὸς ἔνια δὲ τῶν ἐπινοουμένων ἀπόχειρος ὢν ἐπεβάλετο πῶς ἂν ἔτι γένοιτό τις ἀναστροφὴ καὶ λάβοι χρόνον πρὸς τὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον παρασκευάς.

his son Demetrius to Rome to repair relations with the Romans (22.14.9-10).[104] Demetrius was respected by many of the Roman senators due to his time in Rome as a hostage following the Second Macedonian War.[105] And when another Roman embassy came in the late summer of 183, this time under Q. Marcius Philippus, Philip ensured that all of the Senate's demands had been met in full, including the evacuation of his garrisons along the eastern Thracian coast (23.4.16; 23.8.1-2; 23.9.4-7).[106] Philip's cooperation with Roman demands was, of course, disingenuous, serving only as a ploy to buy time for his military preparations against Rome, though the Romans were not unaware of his true feelings (23.9.4-7). Polybius makes this clear during Marcius' visit to the king, explaining that "Philip set right all other matters about which the Romans directed him, as he wished to give no sign of hostility to them and thus gain time to make his preparations for war" (23.8.2).[107] Thus, while evacuating those Thracian cities specified by the Senate, Philip continued to actively campaign against the barbarians of central and western Thrace throughout 183-179 (23.8.4-7), even forming a close alliance with the Bastarnae, evidently through a marriage between Perseus and a royal princess.[108] Though unlikely, Livy claims that Philip planned to use the Bastarnae along with the Scordisci and Thracians to invade Italy, the plan only failing due to Philip's untimely death in 179.[109] Despite Polybius' negative portrayal of Philip during the final years of his life, describing him as being plagued by the Furies and the spirits of his many victims (23.10.2), Polybius does not criticize the Macedonian king for the disingenuous diplomacy that he

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[104] Rosenstein 2012: 212-213.
[105] On Demetrius' popularity in Rome and the subsequent jealousy of Philip and Perseus, see ch. 4.
[106] Cf. Livy 39.53; 40.2.6.
[107] διωρθώσατο δὲ καὶ τἄλλα πάντα, περὶ ὧν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι προσεπέταττον, βουλόμενος ἐκείνοις μὲν μηδεμίανἔμφασιν ποιεῖν ἀλλοτριότητος, λαμβάνειν δ' ἀναστροφὴν πρὸς τὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον παρασκευάς.
[108] On these campaigns, see (183): Livy 39.53.12-14; D.S. 32.15.5; (182-181): Livy 40.5-22. The Livian passages were likely based on Polybian material, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 468-470.
[109] Livy 39.35.4; cf. Justin 32.3.5; Trog. *Prol.* 32; Polyb. 22.14.12. On the impossibility of such a claim, see Walbank 1979: 22; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 468, 470.

carried out against the Romans between 183-179.[110] Philip's decision to go to war with Rome was ultimately fatal for the Macedonian dynasty (περὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλέων οἰκίαν ἤδη τις ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν ἐφύετο κακῶν ἀνηκέστων ἀρχή, 22.18.1), which is why it draws Polybius' criticism (not because it is against Rome).[111] While the war was eventually fought under Perseus in 171-168, Polybius argues that it was Philip's planning and desire to attack Rome that remained the real cause (αἰτία, 22.18.9; cf. 22.18.2-11) of the conflict.[112] Once war had been decided upon, however, Philip's attempts to deceive the Romans while he energetically prepared his own forces and resources were wise and reasonable, and receive no condemnation from Polybius.

Similar acceptance is found in Polybius' account of the Roman envoy that was sent to Antiochus IV in 166. This Roman delegation, headed by the ex-consul Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, had been sent to discover the king's sentiments toward the Romans in the wake of the end of the Sixth Syrian War between the Seleucids and Ptolemies.[113] The war had ended on the Roman orders, delivered by C. Popillius Laenas in 168, during the infamous day of Eleusis, preventing Antiochus from completing his capture of Alexandria and totally defeating Ptolemaic Egypt.[114] Antiochus returned home and by 166 was holding spectacular festivals and military parades at

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[110] On the haunting of Philip, see Walbank 1938: 59-62; Eckstein 1995: 241

[111] See Polyb. 22.18.8; Eckstein 1995: 215.

[112] Scholars have rejected Polybius' placement of the onus for the conflict on Philip. For example, see: Gruen 1974: 221-246; Gruen 1984: 399-419; Rosenstein 2012: 216..

[113] On the origins of the war: Livy 42.29.5-6; Polyb. 27.19; 28.1.1-7; 28.12.8-9; Justin 34.2.7; Appian, *Syr.* 66; Zon. 9.25; 1 Macc. 1:16; Jos. *Ant.* 12.242; Otto 1934: 44-45; Swain 1944: 80-81; Turner 1948: 148-161; Sachs and Wiseman 1954: 208; Morkholm 1966: 42-49, 68, n. 16; Will 1967: 265-266; Walbank 1979: 322-323; Aupert 1982: 263-277; Gruen 1984: 650-652. On the events and politics of the war itself, see: Polyb. 28.1.1-7; 28.12.8-9; 28.18; 28.19-20; 28.21.1-5; 28.22.1 28.23.4; 29.23.4; 29.26.1; cf. 30.26.9; Livy 44.19; 45.11-12; Diod. 30.14; 30.16-18; 31.1; Jos. *Ant.* 12.243; 1 Macc. 1:18-20; Otto 1934: 51-67; Morkholm 1966: 80-84; Will 1967: 268-269; Fraser 1972: 211-212; Walbank 1979: 321-324, 357-358; Gruen 1984: 652-660.

[114] On Day of Eleusis, see Polyb. 29.27.1-10; Livy 45.12.3-8; Appian, *Syr.* 66; Diod. 31.2; Justin 34.3.1-4; Cic. *Phil.* 8.23; Vell. Pat. 1.10.1; Val. Max. 6.4.3; Pliny, *NH* 34.24; Plut. *Mor.* 202F; Otto 1934: 81; Will 1967: 273; Gruen 1984: 658-660; Baronowski 2011: 94.

Daphne, a suburb of Antioch, exhibiting his military might and attempting to surpass the *gloria* of Aemilius Paullus' triumph for his defeat of Perseus in 167 (30.25-26).[115] According to Polybius, the Roman senate, wary of Antiochus' possible hostility toward Rome given his military strength and popularity, sent a Roman delegation under Ti. Sempronius to investigate the following year.[116] Yet despite the fact that Antiochus *was* in fact hostile to the Romans (30.27.2-4), the Seleucid king deceptively showed such lavish courtesy and hospitality to Semponius during the diplomatic visit, even giving up his own palace to the delegation (30.27.2-3), that the Roman envoy returned home fully convinced of Antiochus' friendship with Rome - going so far as to criticize other Roman senators who questioned the king's sincerity (30.27.2). Despite the deceptive approach that Antiochus employed during the visit, rather than condemn the king in this particular instance, Polybius acknowledges his skilled (ἐπιδεξίως, 30.27.2) conduct in dealing with Sempronius and masking his true feelings about the Romans. And indeed, the Roman Senate remained in the dark about Antiochus' outlook and took no action against him (30.30.7-8).[117]

Eckstein claims that Polybius' portrayal of Antiochus in 30.27 is critical, given the earlier emphasis on the king's tendency toward shameful (30.26.6-8) and treacherous (παρασπονδήσας, 30.26.9) acts.[118] Yet it is clear from the text that this criticism refers not to the subsequent negotiations with the Roman delegation but to Antiochus' first invasion of Ptolemaic Egypt in 170-169, treacherously attacking the child king Ptolemy VI Philometer and despoiling sacred temples (30.26.9). We cannot, therefore, take Polybius' general condemnation of Antiochus IV as a critique of his specific actions during the negotiations with the Roman envoys in 166. As we

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[115] On Antiochus' pageantry at Daphne, see Bunge 1976: 53-71; Walbank 1979: 448-453; Gruen 1984: 660.
[116] Baronowski 2011: 80.
[117] Cf. Diod. 31.17; Gruen 1976: 77; Gruen 1984: 660-661.
[118] Eckstein 1995: 90.

have already seen, Polybius strives to provide nuanced characterizations of the leaders who appear in the *Histories*. Thus, even praiseworthy statesmen such as Philopoemen are criticized at times (22.19.1-4), just as generally wicked kings such as Philip V receive praise from Polybius when it is deserved (4.77; 7.11; 18.33). The Achean historian is both able and willing to separate actions from their agents. Nor should we see Polybius' use of ἐπιδέξιος as an underhanded slight against Antiochus. While Eckstein takes ἐπιδέξιος to mean "clever," thus falling into Polybius' general disgust for the willingness of governments and individuals in his own day to employ clever tricks and deceit (13.3), the term can also mean "skilled."[119] In fact, this is a better definition given the five other appearances of ἐπιδέξιος throughout the extant histories. In all of these appearances, ἐπιδέξιος is used as a term of praise, including Polybius' admiration for Scipio Africanus' skill (ἐπιδεξίως) in negotiating with Hasdrubal and Syphax (11.24a.4) and his approval of the skillful (ἐπιδεξίως, 3.19.13) manner in which L. Aemilius Paullus defeated Demetrias on the island of Pharos in 219 and brought the Second Illyrian War to a close.[120] Thus, Polybius sees Antiochus' diplomatic deceit as praiseworthy, given the king's ability to skillfully stave off Roman inquiries.[121] And while some scholars are right to emphasize that the main point of 30.27 is not to praise Antiochus but to criticize the gullibility and naivete of T. Sempronius, this does not take

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[119] Eckstein 1995: 90.

[120] The other appearances of ἐπιδέξιος are likewise positive: Cleomenes' skillful (ἐπιδεξίως) manner of sparking loyalty in those he commanded (4.35.7); Cleomenes' brilliant social skills (ὁμιλίας ἐπιδέξιος, 5.39.6); and the rhetorical skill (ἐπιδεξίως) of the writer Alcaeus (32.2.5).

[121] Walbank's view of 30.27 as "Machiavellian" is also a misunderstanding of Polybius' framework. As we have seen, the Achaean historian condemns and condone's actions without regard to who carries them out and what results from them. In Polybius' mind, Antiochus actions in 166 were permissible because he did not violate a direct promise or oath, not because he was ultimately successful in duping the Romans. See Walbank 1967: 454.

away from Polybius' decision to frame Antiochus' disingenuous diplomacy in a good light in order to do this.[122]

The final example of disingenuous diplomacy can be found during the months leading up to the Achaean War in 146. After the Achaean League had gone to war with Sparta to keep it in the League despite multiple requests by the Roman consul Q. Caecilius Metellus operating in Macedonia for the League to abstain from such action, a Roman embassy under L. Aurelius Orestes arrived in the summer of 147 to censure the Achaeans for their conduct, announcing that they were to not only give up Sparta but also lose control of Corinth, Argos, Heraclea, and Orchomenus.[123] The Achaean response was violence against Orestes and the other Roman ambassadors (38.9.1-2). Despite this, the next Roman delegation that arrived at Aegium, this time headed by Sex. Julius Caesar genuinely attempted to reconcile the situation without punishing the Achaeans (38.9.1-4; cf. 38.10.1-5).[124] Despite the Roman attempts to avoid war, however, the Achaean leadership under Critolaus and Diaeus had already decided to push the League into armed conflict with Rome (38.10.12).[125] Evoking an old proverb, Polybius describes the Achaeans "taking with the left hand what the Romans gave with the right" (38.10.9).[126] Thus, in the negotiations that followed, Critolaus and the other inept Achaean leaders attempted to deceive Rome into believing that they would cooperate with Roman requests. Polybius describes this disingenuous diplomacy at work from the moment of Sex. Julius' arrival at Aegium. Diaeus and

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[122] Cf. 30.30.7-8; Pedech 1964: 317; Eckstein 1995: 90. Again, Polybius' blame rests on the statesman being deceived (Ti. Sempronius) rather than the person carrying out the deception (Antiochus): see chapter 2.

[123] On the dating of this embassy, see Morgan 1969: 437; Walbank 1979: 699.

[124] Thus, there was no more talk of removing members from the Achaean League: Livy *Per.* 51; Paus. 7.14-1. Aurelius Orestes and Sextus Julius had been co-consuls in 157. On the reversal of Roman policy against Achaea at this time, see chapter 4: Gruen 1976: 46-69; Harris 1979: 240-244; Derow 1989: 319-323; Rosenstein 2012: 230-231.

[125] For their motivations, see ch. 4.

[126] οὐ μόνον τὰ διδόμενα τῇ δεξιᾷ παρὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐδέχοντο τῇ λαιᾷ χειρί.

Critolaus led the majority of the Achaeans present in pretending to agree with the Romans, courteously agreeing to meet with him and the Spartans at Tegea, when in reality they were hostile to the Romans and remained deeply tainted and disaffected (ἔμενε δὲ νοσοῦν καὶ διεφθαρμένον, 38.10.7). Polybius says that Diaeus and Critolaus believed that the Romans were too burdened with their wars in Africa and Spain to resist hostile Achaean action (38.10.10) - it was a mistake that would cost Achaea its independence (38.10.8; cf. 38.10.12).

The Achaean deception continued during the following negotiations at Tegea near the end of 147. Despite their previous claims that they were willing to cooperate with the Romans and come to a settlement with the Spartans, Critolaus and his party decided instead to send Critolaus alone to the conference in order to prevent any settlement from being reached (38.11.3). And indeed, he was successful in sabotaging the negotiations, claiming that he could not make any concessions without the vote of the Achaean assembly (38.11.4-5). When Sextus and his colleagues realized that Critolaus was intentionally obstructing the conference, they returned home to Italy, claiming that Critolaus had acted like an ignorant madman (ἄγνοιαν καὶ μανίαν, 38.11.6). There is no doubting Polybius' contempt for Critolaus, Diaeus, and the other Achaean leaders pushing for war with Rome at this time, calling them the most inferious, most impious, and most outrageous men (οἱ χείριστοι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ καὶ λυμαινόμενοι τὸ ἔθνος).[127] Throughout Book 38, Polybius likewise describes this leadership as ignorant and wicked (ἀπειρίαν καὶ κακίαν, 38.10.13), passing senseless policies (ἄγνοιαν) that doomed Achaea (ταλαίπωρον ἔθνος, 38.10.12). Polybius' account is especially hostile toward Critolaus for his leading role in the

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[127] Eckstein 1995: 139, n. 85, 159; Champion 2004a: 166-167, 187-188, 220, 232 places Critolaus and Diaeus among those unsavory leaders condemned by Polybius for choosing demagogic policies. Thus, see similarly the policies of Scopas and Dorimachus in Aetolia (13.1.1-3); Malpagoras at Cius (15.21.1-2); Agathocles at Alexandria (15.25.36); and certain Aetolian factions in the 170s (Livy 42.13.8, taken from Polybius). On Polybius' presentation of Critolaus as a tyrant, see Musti 1967: 203-205.

debacle, calling him a cheat and a fraud (ἐμπορεύων καὶ μεθοδευόμενος, 38.12.10), and describing his actions as completely lacking in reason (οὐδενὶ λόγῳ) and in violation of the laws of both gods and men (ἀσεβεστάτοις καὶ παρανομωτάτοις, 38.13.8). Despite this negative portrayal of Critolaus, however, we should not confuse Polybius' general condemnation of Critolaus for his responsibility for the Achaean War, and the subsequent loss of Achaean independence with the Achaean historian's assessment of the disingenuous diplomacy employed him Critolaus and members of his faction in 147. It is not the active deception of the Achaeans at Aegium and Tegea that Polybius condemns, but the decision of the Achaean leadership to go to war with Rome - an act of foolishness and insanity (ἄνοιαν καὶ μανίαν, 38.18.8) especially considering the Roman willingness to forgive the earlier unjustified assault on Orestes and the other Roman envoys.

On the whole, Polybius' framework for dealing with instances of disingenuous diplomacy remains consistent. The Achaean historian believes that a formal guarantee or promise, such as a period of truce or the assurance to leave a captured population unharmed, must be kept regardless of the motivations behind it - hence his strong criticism of the Carthaginians in 203, Philip V at Cius and Thasos in 202, and Cleomenes III in 228. On the other hand, Polybius suggests that in the negotiations leading up to such formal agreements, statesmen can (and should) deploy deception and misdirection in order to gain an advantage over the enemy. This is most commonly seen with peace negotiations being used to stall the progress of a war - thus Sosibius and Antiochus III's deceptions in 219/218, the Carthaginian attempt in 203, and Philip V's actions in 198/197 are not condemned by Polybius. The decision of Philip V in 185-179, Antiochus IV in 168, and the Achaean government in 147 to use disingenuous diplomacy to try and obscure their hostile feelings toward the Romans are similarly accepted by Polybius. At the heart of Polybius' judgment, as we saw with other categories of treachery, lies expectations of honesty. Formal truces and assurances

given by civilized states were seen to be trustworthy in the ancient world - indeed, they had to be for any form of pseudo-international law to be maintained. Such expectations could find their roots in moral obligations as well. Thus, we find Polybius especially critical of Philip V's decision to deceive and betray Ptolemy V, who was only a child and who was likely to become his own son-in-law. It is also important to reemphasize the fact that the majority of these instances of disingenuous diplomacy in the *Histories*, both condemned and condoned, were carried out by kings. Indeed, in the above examples, the only two exceptions were Carthage at the end of the Second Punic War and the Achaean League surrounding the Achaean War in 147 - the same two states who during these periods were also unique in being the only non-barbarian states to carry out attacks against sacrosanct diplomats (discussed above). In Polybius' interpretation, both Carthage (15.8.11) and Achaea (38.13.8) during these years had degenerated into a state of παρανομία. It is intriguing that such acts of treachery, which monarchies seem to carry out regularly, are only carried out by republics when in a state of complete degeneration. This seemingly confirms Polybius' negative outlook toward monarchies and their tendency toward corruption. It also allows us to draw interesting conclusions about Polybius' understanding of the Roman Republic, which, as we will discuss in the final section of this chapter, he also condemns for acts of disingenuous diplomacy.

III. ROMAN DECEPTIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE POLYBIAN FRAMEWORK

Until this point, little has been said about the instances of deceptive diplomacy carried out by the Romans in Polybius' *Histories*. Given the number of military campaigns waged by the Romans throughout Polybius' work, it is not surprising that at times the Romans employed similar deceptive diplomacy against their enemies. In particular, Polybius describes the Romans

feigning a willingness to seek peace in order to gain some strategic or tactical advantage, not

unlike Sosibius and Antiochus III in 218/217. While the Romans often appear on the side of

justice in Polybius' work (for instance, nearly being the sole victims of treachery toward

envoys), the Achaean historian is willing to criticize Roman action during the conquest of the

Mediterranean. As we have already seen with his description of the Roman seizure of Sardinia in

238/237 and Rome's abandonment of its alliance with Aetolia in 214-206, Polybius does not

hesitate to condemn the Romans for acts of treachery that he finds morally unacceptable.[128]

Thus, while Polybius praises the skillful diplomatic maneuvering of Scipio Africanus preceding

the Battle of the Camps during the Second Punic War in 203 and of Flamininus in the winter of

198/197 during peace negotiations with Philip V, Polybius criticizes the diplomatic deception

carried out by Q. Marcius Philippus in 172/171 on the eve of the Third Macedonian War (Livy

[P] 42.39-43) as well as with the tricky Roman diplomacy toward Carthage in 149 leading up to

the Third Punic War (Polyb. 36.3-6; cf. 36.9). As we will see, Polybius appears to have

inconsistencies in his moral judgments of these instances of disingenuous Roman diplomacy,

suggesting that the Achaean historian may have a pedagogical framework intended for his

Roman readers.

The Deception of Scipio in 203

The first example of such condoned deception comes from Scipio Africanus' African

campaign during the final years of the Second Punic War. Much of Scipio's success in both

Africa and Spain can be traced to his successful utilization of deception against the Carthaginians

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[128] Seizure of Sardinia: 1.88.8-12; cf. 3.10.1-4; 3.13.1; 3; 3.15.9-11; 3.28.1-2; 3.30.4. Abandonment of
Aetolian alliance: 10.25.

(as well as deceiving his own troops and people when necessary).[129] This can be seen most clearly in his actions leading up to the battle of the Camps in the spring of 203. In 205 Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus) was granted permission by the Senate to stage an invasion of Africa while the main Roman forces kept Hannibal checked within Italy. The Roman invasion ultimately came in 204, with Scipio establishing a fortified camp near the city of Utica.[130] Soon, Scipio found his position dangerous as he attempted to besiege the city as the Carthaginian commander Husdrubal and the Numidian prince Syphax arrived with a significantly larger army and blockaded Scipio on a peninsula near Utica (14.1.5).[131] Hoping to convince the Numidian king Syphax to desert to the Romans, Scipio continuously sent messengers to Syphax (14.1.3-5). The Numidian king's response, however, was that Scipio should return to Italy and Hannibal return to Africa - a notion which was a nonstarter for Scipio (14.1.9-10).

During these negotiations, Scipio's messenger informed him that the Numidians had largely created their shelters using reeds or branches, without any earthen foundation. As such, the shelters would be extremely flammable, and indeed most of the Numidian troops were residing outside of the trench and palisade of the camp (14.1.6-8,15). In order to take advantage of this situation, Scipio deceptively led Syphax to believe that he would consider a settlement in which Rome and Carthage would return to their respective territories. Encouraged by this lie, Syphax became much more open to parleys, resulting in Roman more messengers frequenting both the camps of both the Numidians as well as the Carthaginians under Hasdrubal (14.1.11-

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[129] On Scipio's fabrication of divine dreams to win election (10.4-5) as well as to secure his own troops (10.11.6-8), see chapter 4. For example, find Scipio's deceptions at Carthage in 209 (10.14-15); at Ilipa in 206 (11.22-23); at Battle of the Camps in 203 (14.3.4; 4.14.1-10).

[130] On the invasion, see briefly Rosenstein 2012: 172.

[131] Polybius places Scipio's forces around 30,000 (cf. Livy 29.45) soldiers compared to the Carthaginian and Numidian forces numbering over 80,000 (14.1.14). On the events leading up to the negotiations, see Eckstein 1995: 86.

14). In reality, Scipio was using these men to spy out the weaknesses of both camps for his planned attack, even disguising expert observers as slaves so they could move about the enemy camps without suspicion (14.1.13). Once all of his preparations (κατασκευή, 14.1.8) were complete, Scipio positioned his fleet and siege weapons as if he meant to blockade Utica from sea and fortified his infantry on a hill overlooking the city (14.2.1-4). Next, Scipio sent his envoys back to Syphax to inquire about the peace terms they had been discussing, instructing them to remain at the Numidian camp until Syphax told them whether the terms were acceptable to the Carthaginians as well. This ploy convinced Syphax that Scipio was anxious to make peace. (14.2.5-7). The result was that while Syphax sent messengers to Hasdrubal, the Numidians became lax in their camp. When the Carthaginians accepted the peace terms and Syphax came back to Scipio, however, the Roman general informed Syphax that the peace could not be accepted as members of his council were against the truce (14.2.8-12). Polybius emphasizes that in this way, Scipio put an end to the formal peace negotiations so that none could claim that he had broken the truce or find fault with his conduct (τὸ γινόμενον ἀνεπίληπτον ἕξειν ὑπέλαβε τὴν προαίρεσιν, 14.2.14).

The result of Scipio's ruse was that both Syphax and Hasdrubal were caught completely unprepared for Scipio's surprise attack on their camps (14.3.2-3). Relying upon the spies who had frequently visited the enemy camps under the pretense of peace negotiation, Scipio divided his forces and attacked both enemy camps in the middle of the night. Both camps were ultimately set aflame (14.4.5-10; 14.5.3-11), resulting in the deaths of the majority of the Carthaginian and Numidian troops, described in detail by Polybius (15.5.14): "It is not possible to find any other disaster which even if exaggerated could be compared with this, so much did it

exceed in horror all previous events."[132] Polybius praises Scipio's success in the highest terms (14.5.14): "Of all the many brilliant deeds performed by Scipio, this event seems to me the have been the most brilliant and adventurous (κάλλιστον καὶ παραβολώτατον).

Eckstein argues that Polybius' commendation of Scipio in 14.5.15 refers to the technical military achievement of the successful night assault on the Carthaginian and Numidian camps rather than the deceptive diplomacy that allowed the attack to occur.[133] This seems to be a proper interpretation of Polybius' praise in this passage. Polybius' portrayal of the accomplishment as "very adventurous" (παραβολώτατον) clearly refers to the ambitious night operation rather than the preceding diplomacy. Indeed, Polybius spends four full chapters of Book 9 instructing his readers on the difficulties and dangers inherent in such low-light operations (9.14.6-18.4).[134] Scipio's success is thus a reflection of his brilliant generalship and organization. Eckstein strives to create a separation between a praiseworthy attack on the camps and "an example of thorough bad faith and deception."[135] Yet such a distinction seems unnecessary and presumes that Polybius would have condemned Scipio's deceptive diplomacy during the winter of 204/203. As we have already established in the examples of non-Roman deceptive diplomacy, Polybius found such skillful utilizations of diplomacy by statesmen to gain strategic advantages to be acceptable and often praiseworthy, so long as no sworn agreement was violated. This is why Polybius emphasizes the fact that Scipio had concluded negotiations with Syphax before attacking (14.2.14). Polybius understood that diplomacy was as much a tool for the skilled general as the battlefield.

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[132] διὸ καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς οὐδὲ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν εἰκάσαι δυνατὸν οὐδενὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν· οὕτως ὑπερπεπαίκει τῇ δεινότητι πάσας τὰς προειρημένας πράξεις.
[133] Eckstein 1995: 86-87; also Roveri 1964:61.
[134] Eckstein 1995: 87; cf. Roveri 1964: 61.
[135] Eckstein 1995: 86.

While Polybius' praise of Scipio as being brilliant and adventurous (κάλλιστον καὶ παραβολώτατον) does refer specifically to the night attack, the tone of Polybius' account of Scipio's actions throughout 204/203 is overwhelmingly positive - including the weeks of deceptive diplomacy. Certainly, no Polybian condemnation is present in the passage. Rather, Scipio's forethought and ingenuity presented by Polybius in clear contrast to the ignorance and indolence shown by Syphax and Hasdrubal. As we have seen throughout the *Histories*, Polybius does not refrain from criticizing the behavior of those who break good faith, Romans included. The reason for Polybius' lack of condemnation of Scipio's diplomatic maneuvering during the 204/203 is simple: the Achaean historian found Scipio's actions to be praiseworthy.

Given Polybius' acceptance of the non-Roman instances of disingenuous diplomacy discussed above, his praise of Scipio should not be all that surprising. The Roman commander was careful not to violate any formal truce - a treachery that would have brought the Achaean historian's sharp condemnation. Indeed, Polybius emphasizes that Scipio was careful to do just this, sending an embassy to Syphax to end negotiations so that nobody could find fault with his conduct (γενομένης δὲ τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ταύτης ἅπαν τὸ γινόμενον ἀνεπίληπτον ἕξειν ὑπέλαβε τὴν προαίρεσιν, 14.2.14).[136] Instead, the situation highlighted Scipio's diplomatic and military shrewdness while criticizing Syphax and Hasdrubal for their lack of awareness (14.3.2-3). Ultimately, it is difficult not to read 14.1-5 as Polybian praise for all of Scipio's actions, including his diplomatic maneuvering during the winter of 204/203.

Eckstein's claim, following Walbank, that Polybius is somehow subtly criticizing Scipio's deception through the use of the word *κατασκευή* seems like special pleading.[137] Eckstein and Walbank take *κατασκευή* to mean "trick" in a pejorative sense. Yet defining

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[136] On Scipio's sense of honor in publicly breaking negotiations before attacking, see Pedech 1964: 219.
[137] Cf. Champion 1995: 331.

κατασκευή this way does not conform with Polybius' own use of the word. Polybius uses the

term κατασκευή sixty-nine times throughout the *Histories*, and it never refers to a "trick."

Rather, κατασκευή typically refers to some type of "construction," often physical but taken

figuratively in places, specifically "buildings," or "property," or some form of "preparation."[138]

It is this last definition that fits best in 14.1.8, as Scipio is carefully making the proper

"preparations" for his planned attack on the enemy camps. Polybius uses κατασκευή in this same

way to describe Scipio Asina preparing his ships to attack the Carthaginian fleet in 260 (1.21.1);

the preparations made throughout Italy in advance of the Gallic invasion of 225 (2.23.11); the

preparations of arms and equipment by the Ptolemaic army in 219/218 (5.63.11); the control over

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[138]For Polybius use of κατασκευή to mean a type of physical construction, see: the "construction/design" of Roman ships and the corvus (1.22.3 twice; 1.23.5); the Rhodian blockade runner (1.47.5); Hannibal's canoes to cross the Rhone (3.42.3); Hannibal's rafts to bring elephants across the Rhone (3.46.2); ships captured by Antiochus III at Tyre and Ptolemais (5.62.3); the "construction" of good buildings in the city of Paeonium (4.65.3); "construction" of Menelaus' house in Homer (34.9.14); admirable walls of Psophis (4.70.10); wall across Tarentine harbor by Hannibal (8.34.2); the "reconstruction" of the Colossus of Rhodes after the great earthquake (5.89.3); "construction" of bronze statue of Athena at Alipheira; the "construction" of missile weapons for the defense of Syracuse against the Romans (8.7.2); the importance of "constructing" ample walls and missiles (5.75.5); the importance of proper measurements and calculations in the "construction" of ladders (5.98.3); "construction" of thin brass plates by Aetolians at Ambracia (21.28.8); the "construction" of siege works by Antiochus III at Gadara (5.71.5); by Marcellus at Syracuse (8.4.3); by Antiochus at Sardis (8.15.5); by Philip V at Echinus (9.41.12); by Philip at Thyatira (16.2.3); the "construction" of artificial defenses at Hercte by Hamilcar (1.56.5); by Nicolaus against Antiochus III (5.69.2); at Lissus against Philip (8.13.3); the "creations/works" of art destroyed at Thermum (5.9.2); the "formation" of the straits on the Hellespont (16.29.8). For κατασκευή referring to technical construction, see: the "make/design" of the inferior arms of the Celts (2.30.7); Celtic swords (2.33.3); the *parma* shield used by Roman velites (6.22.2); early Roman shields based on Greek design (6.25.8 and 6.25.9); Scipio's knowledge of the "construction" (the city plan) of New Carthage (10.8.6); the "manufacturing" of tin in the British Isles (3.57.3). On Polybius' use of κατασκευή to mean figurative constructions, see: Polybius' discussion of the "establishment" of the Roman empire (2.2.2); Polybius' discussion of the "establishment" of power by Agathocles of Syracuse (9.23.2); the "creation" of civilizing and softening influences amongst the Arcadians (4.21.4); the "construction" of a plot on behalf of Alexander Balas by Heracleides (33.18.10); monarch as "created" from kingship (6.4.7); Perseus' inferior "accomplishments"(23.7.5); the literary "material/creations" of Polybius, Zeno, and other writers (1.13.5; 2.37.5; 4.1.5; 8.9.3; 11.8.1; 16.17.9; 16.18.2; 16.20.4). On κατασκευή as specific property/booty, see: the "booty" captured by Romans from Agrigentum (1.19.15); acquired from Illyrian raid of Epirus (2.8.4); taken by Hannibal at Saguntum (3.17.10); captured by Philip at Thermum (5.8.8); secured from Roman capture of New Carthage (10.16.1); Attalus' royal "property/furniture" captured by Philip (16.6.5; 16.6.6); Perseus' royal "property/furniture" captured by Aemilius Paullus (18.35.4); lack of property among Celts (2.17.9); abundant property of Elis (4.73.6). On Polybius' use of κατασκευή to mean specific buildings, see: the "buildings" razed by Philip during his pillaging at Thermum (5.8.4; 5.11.4); "buildings" within the city of Agrigentum (9.27.1); rich "buildings" at Seleucia (5.59.8) and at Ecbatana (10.27.5); private "houses" in Syracuse (9.10.13); "palace" of Ptolemy IV (18.55.2).

preparations for war exercised by Roman consuls (6.12.5); Hannibal's preparations for the siege of the acropolis at Tarentum in 212 (8.34.1); the preparations made by Scipio's army following his capture of New Carthage in 208 (10.20.6); and Attalus' preparations for the war against Prusias in 181 (33.12.1). In none of these other appearances is κατασκευή used negatively.

Some scholars have likewise pointed to the seeming contradiction between Polybius' praise of Scipio's deceptive diplomacy leading up to the battle of the Camps in 203 and the historian's earlier discussion in 13.3, which seems to condemn treachery (κακοπραγμοσύνη, 13.3.1), fraud (κακομηχανεῖν, 13.3.2), and deception (13.3.2-3) which had become standard practice by his own day.[139] Only the Romans, Polybius holds, still maintained some of the ancient principles (ἀρχαίας αἱρέσεως) of open and direct warfare (13.3.7). The Achaean historian says (13.3):

> Philip became addicted to that kind of treacherous dealings which no one indeed would say in any way became a king but which some maintain to be necessary in practical politics, owing to the present prevalence of treachery. The ancients, as we know, were far removed from such malpractices. For so far were they from plotting mischief against their friends with the purpose of aggrandizing their own power, that they would not even consent to get the better of their enemies by fraud, regarding no success as brilliant or secure unless they crushed the spirit of their adversaries in open battle. For this reason they entered into a convention among themselves to use against each other neither secret missiles nor those discharged from a distance, and considered that it was only a hand-to-hand battle at close quarters which was truly decisive. Hence they preceded war by a declaration, and when they intended to do battle gave notice of the fact and of the spot to which they would proceed and array their army. But at the present they say it is a sign of poor generalship to do anything openly in war. Some slight traces, however, of the ancient principles of warfare survive among the Romans. For they make declaration of war, they very seldom use ambuscades, and they fight hand-to-hand at close quarters. These reflections are occasioned by the excessive prevalence among our present leaders both in the conduct of public affairs and in that of war of a keenness for double-dealing.[140]

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[139] See Walbank 1967: 417, 430; Eckstein 1995: 86-87, n.6.

[140] ἐγένετο περὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κακοπραγμοσύνην, ἣν δὴ βασιλικὴν μὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδεὶς ἂν εἶναι φήσειεν, ἀναγκαίαν δὲ βούλονται λέγειν ἔνιοι πρὸς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐπιπολάζουσαν κακοπραγμοσύνην. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολύ τι τοῦ τοιούτου μέρους ἐκτὸς ἦσαν· τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἀπηλλοτρίωντο τοῦ κακομηχανεῖν περὶ τοὺς φίλους χάριν τοῦ τῷ τοιούτῳ συναύξειν τὰς σφετέρας δυναστείας, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τοὺς πολεμίους ἡροῦντο δι᾽ ἀπάτης νικᾶν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες οὐδὲν οὔτε λαμπρὸν οὐδὲ μὴν βέβαιον εἶναι τῶν κατορθωμάτων, ἐὰν μή τις ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς μαχόμενος ἡττήσῃ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοὺς ἀντιταττομένους. διὸ καὶ συνετίθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς μήτ᾽ ἀδήλοις βέλεσι μήθ᾽ ἐκβόλοις χρήσασθαι κατ᾽

Taken outside of its proper context, this passage suggests Polybius' disdain for deception and trickery in warfare and politics, including ambushes and night operations. Such a claim, however, misunderstands the twofold purpose of Polybius' statement in 13.3 and flies in the face of his frequent praise of generals and statesmen throughout the *Histories* for employing such deception (discussed below).[141] In fact, Polybius holds that the ability of commanders to understand and employ secretive attacks and maneuvers constitutes one of the most important skills that the successful general must possess (9.12-16).[142] As the previous two chapters have demonstrated, it is the circumstances rather than the act that Polybius looks to in his moral evaluations. Instead, the passage in 13.3 serves first as a condemnation of Philip V's willingness to commit wicked acts of treachery (κακοπραγμοσύνη, 13.3.1) against his friends and allies,

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ἀλλήλων, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ συστάδην γινομένην μάχην ἀληθινὴν ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι κρίσιν πραγμάτων. ᾗ καὶ τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλήλοις προύλεγον καὶ τὰς μάχας, ὅτε πρόθοιντο διακινδυνεύειν, καὶ τοὺς τόπους, εἰς οὓς μέλλοιεν ἐξιέναι παραταξόμενοι. νῦν δὲ καὶ φαύλου φασὶν εἶναι στρατηγοῦ τὸ προφανῶς τι πράττειν τῶν πολεμικῶν. βραχὺ δέ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἴχνος ἔτι τῆς ἀρχαίας αἱρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεμικά: καὶ γὰρ προλέγουσι τοὺς πολέμους καὶ ταῖς ἐνέδραις σπανίως χρῶνται καὶ τὴν μάχην ἐκ χειρὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ συστάδην. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τὸν ἐπιπολάζοντα νῦν ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον ἐν τῇ κακοπραγμοσύνῃ ζῆλον περὶ τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἔν τε ταῖς πολιτικαῖς καὶ πολεμικαῖς οἰκονομίαις.

[141] On the connection between 13.3 and examples of Roman deception, including the 172 policy with Perseus, see Nissen 1863: 252; Klotz 1940-1941: 19; Trankle 1977: 134, n.6.

[142] For example, Polybius spends a great deal of time detailing and describing the importance of conducting successful night marches and hidden maneuvers for commanders in the field. Indeed, based on his lengthy aside in 9.12-16, it is reasonable to assume that this topic constituted a major section of his book on Tactics which is now lost. In this passage, Polybius reminds his readers that "in military operations what is achieved openly and by force is much less than what is done by stratagem and the use of opportunity" (ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔργων ἐλάττω τὰ προδήλως καὶ μετὰ βίας ἐπιτελούμενα τῶν μετὰ δόλου καὶ σὺν καιρῷ πραττομένων, 9.12.2). Such operations, he continues, require care (μηδενὸς ἀφροντιστεῖν, 9.13.1) and secrecy (λαθεῖν, 9.12.8; cf. 9.13.2-5). In addition to maintaining secrecy, Polybius advises that commanders must have an understanding of the details of travel during the day and night on land and at sea (9.13.6), and most importantly (μέγιστον) a notion of timing and opportunities of the different seasons (καιρῶν, 9.13.7). In fact, in order to successfully carry out night operations in secret, Polybius stresses the importance of understanding astronomy (9.14.6), the differing lengths of nights throughout the year (9.14.7-12), and the passing of hours during the night, revealed only by a knowledge of the signs of the Zodiac on clear nights (9.15.4-11) and the brightness and position of the moon on cloudy nights (9.15.12-15). In offering such advice to his readership, Polybius is far from condemning such secretive maneuverings carried out at night. Rather it is the ability to successfully carry out such operations, reflective of the expertise, careful planning, and attention to detail necessary for their success, that marks a talented general. Such technical expertise and mastery of astronomy, Polybius explains, is the same reason why Homer rightfully praised Odysseus as "the most capable of commanders" (ἡγεμονικώτατον ἄνδρα, 9.16.1).

beginning with his atrocities at Messene (7.11-14) and continuing on throughout Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in the years to come. It is within this context of Philip "plotting mischief against his friends for the purpose of increasing his own power" (τοῦ κακομηχανεῖν περὶ τοὺς φίλους χάριν τοῦ τῷ τοιούτῳ συναύξειν τὰς σφετέρας δυναστείας, 13.3.2) that the passage is placed, continuing on to discuss Philip's wicked efforts to destroy the Rhodian navy and stir up the Cretans to make war on Rhodes (13.4.2). Secondly, this passage is intended by Polybius to highlight the notion that the Romans were unique in avoiding much of the double-dealing that plagued other states during his time. Rather than making a moral stand on the evils (κακοπραγμοσύνη, 13.3.8) of deceptive stratagems conducted during warfare, then, the intent of 13.3 is to underscore Roman exceptionalism, a notion echoed in 36.9. The didactic purpose behind Polybius' claim, which in some way stands in contradiction to his own description of the Romans throughout the *Histories*, will be discussed in the final chapter. For now, despite Polybius' tone in 13.3, the Achaean historian on the whole appears to praise acts of deception carried out on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations, so long as no formal agreement was violated in the process - Scipio's actions in 204/203 standing as a prime example of such shrewd and praiseworthy use of deception.[143]

The Deception of Flamininus in 198/197

In 198, Titus Quinctius Flamininus took command of the Roman war effort against Philip V during the Second Macedonian War. By the end of Spring, Flamininus had broken the Macedonian blockade and pushed the fighting north into Thessaly.[144] Sometime around November 198, as Flamininus was attempting to force his way into eastern Locris, Philip asked

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[143] See rightly Pedech 1964: 219 who notes that 13.3 is concerned with formal violations of the laws of war.

[144] On Flamininus' early campaign, see Eckstein 1976: 119-142; Rosenstein 2012: 185-186.

the Roman consul for a parley. In the ongoing talks, in which Philip remained in his ship, claiming that he feared for his life due to the treacherous Aetolians, Flamininus and his Greek allies demanded that the king pull out of Greece, renounce the lands he had gained in Illyria during the First Macedonian War, and return the areas of Asia Minor that he had conquered from Ptolemy during his 204-200 conquest.[145] Later, Philip and Flamininus spoke privately (18.8.4-10), and the king offered a compromised list of terms that were rejected by the Roman allies.[146] In the end, Philip asked to send an embassy to Rome, which was in line with Flamininus' original calculations (ἀρχῆς διαλογισμοὺς, 18.10.3). The consul's motives are given fully by Livy and Plutarch, drawing on Polybian material, and hinted at heavily by the Achean historian.[147] At this point in time, the Roman consul was not certain if his command over the war would be extended. If he was to be prorogued, Flamininus wanted the war to continue so he could defeat Philip in a great battle. If his command was not extended, he wanted the credit and glory of being the commander who brought the war to a close.[148]

And as Polybius describes, Flamininus' plan is ultimately a success. As soon as the negotiations ended and Philip sent his embassy to Rome, Flamininus set about securing his own position and giving Philip no advantage (αὐτὸν ἀσφαλιζόμενος ἐπιμελῶς καὶ πρόλημμα τῷ Φιλίππῳ ποιῶν οὐδέν, 18.10.3). During the two-month truce that had been agreed between Philip and the Roman consul, Flamininus ordered Philip to evacuate his garrisons from Phocis and Locris and took steps to protect the Roman allies from the Macedonians (18.10.4-5).

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[145] On the context leading up to this second parley between Flamininus and Philip V, see: Eckstein 2008: 279-282; Burton 2017: 31-32. On the subsequent defection of the Achaean League, see Holleaux 1935: 230; Larsen 1968: 230, 392-394; Errington 1969: 41-43, 72, 87; Briscoe 1973: 200-212; Eckstein 1976: 138-144; Eckstein 1987a: 278; Eckstein 1987b; Eckstein 1995: 200-202; Eckstein 2008: 281-284; Gruen 1984: 442-447; Derow 2003: 60; Burton 2011: 102-105; Waterfield 2014: 86-87.

[146] On the terms of these negotiations, see 18.8.8-9.2; Badian, *Flamininus*, 42-43.

[147] Livy 32.32.5-8; Plut. *Flam.* 7.1; cf. Polyb. 18.10.7 and 18.12.1. See Holleaux 1923; Briscoe 1973*:* 227-228; Eckstein, 1995: 93, n. 25; Burton 2017: 32.

[148] Described by many historians. See succinctly Rosenstein 2012: 186.

Meanwhile, Flamininus had dispatched to Rome Amynander, the king of the Athamanes, along with his legates, Quintus Fabius, Quntus Fulvius, and Appius Claudius Nero. These agents of Flamininus, along with his friends in the city, discovered that both consuls for 197 would be kept in Italy due to concern over the Gauls (18.11.1-2). Assured of the extension of Flamininus' command, these agents managed to sabotage any change of peace with Philip. When they came before the Senate, the Roman and Greek envoys denounced Philip and emphasized that as long as Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinth remained in Macedonian hands, it would be impossible for the Greeks to have any semblance of liberty. Indeed, Philip himself had rightly pronounced these strongholds to be the "Fetters of Greece" (πέδας Ἑλληνικάς, 18.11.5).[149] Philip's envoys, wholly unprepared for any discussion of Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinth, were unable to answer the Roman Senate's demands on whether they would relinquish control of these cities (18.11.11-13). As such, the Senate continued the war against Philip and appointed Flamininus as their commissioner in the affairs of Greece (18.12.1), all according to Flamininus' plan.

Polybius' praise of Flamininus' skillful and deceptive diplomatic maneuvering with Philip as well as with the Roman allies and the Roman Senate could not be clearer:

> Now all had fallen out as Titus had wished, a little by chance, but mostly as a result of his foresight… For he was as sharply sagacious a man as Rome has ever produced, and had handled not only the public enterprises but also his private projects with a skill and intelligence that could not be surpassed, and this though he was quite a young man, not yet more than thirty.[150]

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[149] On this and above, see: Livy 32.32-7, Plut. *Flam.* 5.6, 7.1-2; App. *Mac.* 8; Zon. 9.16.4-5; Just. *EPit.* 30.3.8; Plut. *Mor.* 197A.

[150] ταχὺ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διασαφηθέντων ἐγεγόνει τῷ Τίτῳ πάντα κατὰ νοῦν, ἐπὶ βραχὺ μὲν καὶ ταὐτομάτου συνεργήσαντος, τὸ δὲ πολὺ διὰ τῆς αὑτοῦ προνοίας ἁπάντων κεχειρισμένων. [3] πάνυ γὰρ ἀγχίνους, εἰ καί τις ἕτερος Ῥωμαίων, [καὶ] ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ γέγονεν: [4] οὕτως γὰρ εὐστόχως ἐχείριζε καὶ νουνεχῶς οὐ μόνον τὰς κοινὰς ἐπιβολάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ἐντεύξεις, ὥσθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν μὴ καταλιπεῖν. See Eckstein 1995: 93 for translation.

Instead of criticizing or condemning Flamininus for deceptively utilizing the peace negotiations with Philip to secure both his personal position as well as the strategic position of the Romans and their allies in the war (Philip had pulled out of Locris and Phocis, believing a peace agreement would be reached), Polybius praises Flamininus' actions as both skilled (εὐστόχως) and intelligent (νουνεχῶς, 18.12.4).[151]

Polybius' praise of Flamininus' actions has received much scholarly attention. Some scholars see Flamininus' actions in the winter of 198/197 as a betrayal of good faith with Philip V, the Roman allies, and even Rome itself. Holleaux, for example, holds that Flamininus' political maneuvering was on the verge of treason.[152] Similarly, Wood argues that Polybius' description of the Roman consul's political deception is in fact an attack on Flamininus.[153] Polybius' praise of Flamininus' actions, however, is clear and genuine.[154] And indeed, this praise continues to follow his commendation of generals and statesmen who skillfully utilize similar deceptive diplomacy to gain strategic advantages for their states, such as Sosibius in 219/218 and Scipio in 203. There is no reason to doubt Polybius' candid praise of Flamininus in 18.12.2-4. As for Holleaux's view that Flamininus' actions in 198/197 were somehow treacherous toward Rome or her allies, a closer look at the progress of the Second Macedonian War at this time is required.

Polybius, at least, clearly did not see Flamininus' actions as betraying Rome. The Achaean historian emphasizes that Flamininus handled Rome's public enterprise as well as his

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[151] Polybius' likewise uses εὐστόχως to describe Scipio Africanus' "skillful" deception of the Roman populace (including his mother) during his campaign for aedileship in 213. See Eckstein 1995: 85-86.
[152] Holleaux 1923: 164-176.
[153] Wood 1939: 102-103; acknowledged by Briscoe 1973: 23-24.
[154] See rightly: Badian 1970: 22-23; Eckstein 1995: 93, n. 28; Burton 2017: 32. Rosenstein 2012: 186-187 emphasizes the confidence that Flamininus held in his ability to sway the Senate to vote either way.

private projects with skill and intelligence (18.12.4).[155] Moreover, the result of his deceptive

negotiations with Philip was a better strategic position for the Romans, as Philip had withdrawn

from the defensible Locris and Phocis in exchange for the two-month truce (18.10.4).[156] Nor can

we view the situation of 198/197 through the lens of Flamininus' ultimate victory over Philip at

Cynoscephalae in 197. Rather, during the time of the negotiations, the war effort had proven

difficult for the Romans, especially given its general unpopularity among the Roman people.[157]

During the First Macedonian War, Philip had successfully defended Macedon from the Romans,

though minimal Roman forces were sent in 214 and even less in the following years. More

significantly, with Rome's focus on the war with Carthage in Italy, Philip had successfully

forced Pergamum to withdraw from the war in 208 and convinced the Aetolians to come to terms

in 206 after they had suffered heavy losses without Roman support.[158] This in turn brought the

Romans to peace talks in 205, ending with a compromise settlement somewhat in Philip's

interest.[159] The current war against Philip hadn't been much better for the Romans. The army that

landed in Illyria in the autumn of 200, led by the year's consul, P. Sulpicius Galba, made little

headway against Philip. Despite some diplomatic victories, Galba failed to entice the Aetolians

to enter the war against Philip, and in 199 he failed to break through the Pindus Range into

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[155] On Polybius' understanding of prorogation as a significant consideration for commanders within republican systems of government, see Lehamnn 1976: 168-172; Badian 1970: 25, 47; Eckstein 1995: 94. On Polybius' personal encounters with Scipio Aemilianus' own concerns over prorogation during the Third Punic War, see Walbank 1957: 91; Eckstein 1995: 94, n. 30.

[156] See Badian 1970: 41; Eckstein 1995: 94. On the blow this may have had to Philip's pride, see Holleaux: 1923: 1; Eckstein 1995: 94 n. 31.

[157] On the unwillingness of the Romans to go to war with Philip, see Livy 31.13.2-4 and 33.25.8. On Roman difficulties against Philip during the campaign, see Eckstein 1976: 126-142; Eckstein 2008: 276-282. On senatorial motivations, see rightly Rosenstein 2012: 179-185.

[158] Polyb. 11.7.2-3; Schmitt 1957: 211; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 405-406; Rich 1984: 147-148.

[159] Walbank 1940: 205; Schmitt 1969: 543; Gruen 1984: 381; Errington 1989: 104-105; Eckstein 2012: 111-112.

western Macedon with his own army.[160] Thus, Galba ended the year back on the Adriatic coast, where he had started.[161] Moreover, when the Aetolians did decide to enter into the war in the summer of 199, they were decisively defeated by Philip in Thessaly.[162] In the winter of 199/198, the Roman army was so demoralized that the new Roman commander P. Villius faced a serious mutiny among the soldiers.[163] Nor was Flamininus' campaigning in 198 particularly effective.[164] The young (under 30) Roman consul had relatively little command experience, and like Galba his military operations, this time approaching Macedon through Thessaly, ended in a significant defeat at the hands of Philip at Atrax - a battle that reinforced Philip's belief in Macedonian military dominance (Livy 33.4.1) and caused Flamininus to question the effectiveness of the Roman legion against the heavy Macedonian phalanx (Livy 32.18.1).[165] Even with the successful efforts of his brother Lucius to bring the Achaean League over to the Roman alliance in the autumn of 198, Flamininus' year in Greece was largely marked by military failure and a continued reputation for Roman brutality.[166] From Philip's perspective, he had more than handled the offensive of the Romans and their Greek allies between 200 and 198, just as he had in 214-205, and his position in the war seemed secure, if not dominant.[167] Thus, Flamininus'

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[160] Galba managed to gain King Amynander of Athamania, Pleuratus the ruler of the Ardiaei, and the Dardanian chieftain Bato as allies. See Livy 31.28.2; Walbank 1940: 141; Eckstein 1976: 126-127; Eckstein 2012: 278-279. On Galba's failure with the Aetolians: Livy 31.28.3. On Galba's failed mountain campaign, see Hammond 1966: 39ff.

[161] Most of what Galba had obtained between 200 and 199 was a reputation for brutality, continuing his legacy as a Roman commander in Greece in 210-207. See Paus. 7.8.2; Eckstein 1976: 126; Eckstein 2012: 277-278.

[162] On the Aetolian defeat, Livy 31.41.7-42.9.

[163] Livy 32.3.2 attributes much of the unrest to decisions made under Galba's leadership.

[164] Despite Rosenstein 2012: 185-186. On Philip's loss of ground in 198 (which should not be overstated) and his decision to begin peace talks with the Romans, see Eckstein 1976: 119-142.

[165] Both Livian passages were based on Polybian material: Briscoe 1973: 1.

[166] Paus. 7.8.1; App. *Mac.* 7. Thus, for example, see the victimized cities of Phaloria (Livy 32.15.2-3); Eretria (Livy 32.16.15-17); Carystus (Livy 32.17.1); and Elateia (Livy 32.24.6-7); Eckstein 1976: 135, n. 51; Eckstien 2012: 2012: 280-281. Of course, it was fear of this Roman brutality, in part, that Aristaenus invoked to convince the Achaean League to desert Philip. See Livy [P] 32.21; Eckstein 1976: 138-141; Eckstein 1990:53-58; Eckstein 2012: 281, 283-284.

[167] Walbank 1940: 147; Errington 1972: 143.

potential peace settlement of 198/197, which carried significant concessions to Rome and her

allies would have likely been viewed by the Romans as a satisfactory outcome to a difficult and

unpopular war.[168]

Nor, in light of Polybius' account, should Flamininus' diplomatic maneuvering be

viewed as a betrayal of the Roman allies. While it is true that the Roman allies would have

preferred a complete Macedonian withdrawal from Greece (18.7.1, 18.9.1), the terms of the

proposed peace settlement in 198/197 would have given them significant territorial concessions

from Philip (18.8.9).[169] Nor were the Roman allies necessarily bound by Flamininus' proposal,

as they sent their own envoys before the Senate to plead their case. Ultimately, despite the

diplomatic power that Flamininus wielded, any formal peace settlement would pass through the

Senate to be approved by the Roman people. Moreover, Polybius emphasizes that during the

two-month truce with Philip, Flamininus took energetic steps to protect the Roman allies from

any Macedonian aggression (18.10.5). As such, it is unlikely that the Roman allies, who

themselves agreed to Philip's embassy to Rome, would have seen the fruition of the 198/197

peace proposal as any sort of betrayal by Flamininus.

Of chief interest for this chapter, some scholars suggest that Flamininus' actions

constituted a clear betrayal of good faith with Philip V. Holleaux and Badian argue that during

the private talks between Philip and Flamininus, the Roman consul led Philip to believe that

certain topics would not be discussed during the peace embassy at Rome: namely Philip's control

of the Three Fetters of Greece. These private assurances, these scholars maintain, would explain

why Philip's envoys had no prepared response for the demanded liberation of Demetrias,

Chalcis, and Acrocorinth, and why Philip was willing to withdraw from Locris and Phocis in

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[168] Eckstein 1995: 94.
[169] Again, see rightly Eckstein 1995: 94-95.

exchange for the two-month truce.[170] Ultimately, however, such a reconstruction remains speculative. It is not clear that Polybius believed that the peace talks had been privately pre-arranged by Philip and Flamininus. Indeed, Polybius admits that it was "difficult to tell what each of them said on that occasion" (18.8.8). What *is* clear from Polybius' account is that no formal promises or agreements were made between Philip and Flamininus other than the agreed-upon two-month truce. And as Eckstein rightly argues, the only glimpse of bad faith is the fear held by Flamininus and his allies that Philip might break the truce, hence Flamininus' energetic effort to keep the Greece cities guarded (18.10.5).[171]

In this light, we should not be surprised that Polybius praises Flamininus for his skillful diplomatic maneuvering during the winter of 198/197. The only formal agreement made between Flamininus and Philip was the two-month truce during which hostilities were to cease so that the embassy could be sent to Rome. Had Flamininus broken this truce, he doubtlessly would have found Polybius' condemnation. Based upon Polybius' narrative, however, no such violation occurred. Instead, Flamininus skillfully and intelligently (18.12.4) used the prospect of a peace agreement with Philip as a way to strengthen the strategic position of Rome and her allies as well to ensure his own *gloria*. Again, this follows Polybius' acceptance of deceptive diplomacy as a tool that can and should be employed by generals and statesmen during times of war. And when this is done skillfully and effectively without violating any sworn promises or agreements, as evidenced by Sosibius in 219/218, Scipio in 203, and Flamininus in 198/197, such diplomatic maneuvering receives Polybius' praise.

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[170] Holleaux, 1923: 164; Badian 1970: 41-43; Eckstein 1987: 278-284; even further amiss: Balsdon 1967: 180-184.

[171] Eckstein 1995: 95. Eckstein views this in light of the development of Philip's wicked character throughout the *HIstorie*.

The Deceptions of Marcius Philippus in 172/171

By the winter of 172/171, Rome had decided to go to war with Perseus. The Macedonian's king's successful expansion in the region through marriages, alliances, and conquest had caused some of Rome's allies to appeal for Roman intervention. Most notably, King Eumenes of II of Pergamum, whom Perseus had tried to have assassinated at Delphi (Livy 14.14-18), urged Rome to check Perseus' growing power. By the end of 172 Perseus had been declared a public enemy, and war was looming.[172] In the Spring of 171, a commission was sent by the Roman Senate to Greece to examine the current situation. King Perseus invited one of the commissioners, Quintus Marcius Philippus, to a meeting, hoping to prevent a war (Livy 42.39).

Livy, relying upon Polybian material, is clear that Rome had already decided upon war. Thus, the willingness of Philippus to enter into peace talks with Perseus was completely disingenuous. Indeed, Philippus misled Perseus into believing that peace was possible and that the king should send envoys to Rome to finalize its terms (42.43.2). Philippus knew that a temporary truce would have to be agreed upon in order to facilitate this embassy to Rome. It was for this truce, Livy explains, that Philippus had opened up negotiations with Perseus: "It was deemed necessary to ask for a truce; this was what Marcius particularly wished for, and it had been his main object in granting the interview" (*ad id cum necessaria petitio indutiarum videretur cuperetque Marcius neque aliud colloquio petisset*, 42.43.2). For while Perseus was fully prepared and equipped for a war (*omnia praeparata atque instructa haberet*), the Romans were quite unprepared (*nihil enim satis paratum ad bellum in praesentia habebant Romani*,

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[172] On the causes of the Third Macedonian War with corresponding bibliography and notes, see most thoroughly Burton 2017: 78-123.

42.43.3). The purpose of Philippus' proposed truce, then, was to give the Romans needed time to prepare for the conflict without giving Perseus the initiative.

After concluding negotiations with Perseus, Philippus returned to Rome to inform the Senate of his diplomatic success.[173] Polybius recounted the details of this meeting and the subsequent events leading up to it in a lost portion of Book 27. Luckily, we can establish Polybius' opinion, as it has long been established that Livy's account of the senatorial discussion is based closely on Polybian material.[174] Livy says that Philippus bragged to his fellow senators that he had "deceived the king through the truce and hope of peace" (*decepto per indutias et spem pacis rege*, 42.47.1).[175] Philippus explained that while Perseus was fully prepared for war, the Romans were by no means prepared. Thus, the truce would deprive Perseus of this advantage and allow the Romans time to mobilize (42.47.2-3). According to Livy, most of the Roman Senate approved of Philippus' diplomatic maneuvering, holding it to have been the height of reason (*summa ratione*, 42.47.4). The elder senators, however, disapproved of Philippus' actions, claiming that they reflected neither the old ways nor Roman character (*antiqui moris...Romanas...artes*, 42.47.5).[176] These senators go on to argue (42.47.5-6):

> "Our ancestors," they said, "did not conduct their wars by lurking in ambush and making attacks at night, nor by feigning flight and then turning back upon the enemy when he was off his guard. They did not pride themselves on cunning more than on true courage (*nec...astu magis quam vera virtute gloriarentur*), it

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[173] There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the senatorial debate, despite Adams 1982: 256 and Gruen 1984: 414-415. Such a discussion parallels the senatorial debate at the onset of the First Punic War as well as the debate following Eumenes' visit to Rome in 172: see Burton 2011: 128-133; Burton 2017: 111,114-115.

[174] Nissen 1863: 250, Briscoe 1964: 68 n. 32; Walbank 1974: 10-11,23; Gabba 1977: 68; Eckstein 1995: 109 n. 90; Eckstein 2010: 243; Briscoe 2012: 313; Burton 2017: 110, n. 152.

[175] According to Livy, Atilius Serranus had also returned from Greece with Philippus to inform the Senate of the strategic truce.

[176] These elder senators would have included of men like Cato who lived through the days of Hannibal, Philip V, and Antiochus III; see Burton 2017: 111. On debate over the composition and motivations of the majority (*magna pars*) of senators in the debate and possible party affiliations, see: Frank 1914: 190-192; Scullard 1950: 194-200; Meloni 1953: 150; Briscoe 1964: 74-75; Will 1967:224; Mastrocinque 1975/1976: 40-34; Burton 2011: 326-328; Burton 2017: 111-113.

was their custom to declare war before commencing it, sometimes even to give
the enemy notice of the time and place where they would fight.

Such behavior, the elder senators maintained, was true Roman duty (*religionis haec
Romanae*), wholly different from Carthaginian cunning (*versutiarum Punicarum*) and Greek
cleverness (*calliditatis Graecae*, 42.47.8). While deception (*dolo*), craft (*arte*), and chance (*casu*)
might defeat an enemy in the short term, only through courage (*virtute*) and victory in a fair trial
of strength (*iusto ac pio...bello*), in which the rules of war were properly observed could an
enemy experience true defeat (42.47.8). For these reasons, Livy explains, the elder senators look
upon Philippus' "new and overly clever wisdom" (*nova ac nimis callida...sapientia*) with
disdain.[177]

Based on Livy's narrative, it seems clear that Polybius' original account of this senatorial
debate was quite critical of the *nova sapientia* being pushed by Philippus. With the majority of
the senators siding with Philippus' policy, Rome chose expediency (*utilis*) over virtue (*honestum,*
42.47.9).[178] Yet based upon the context of Philippus' disingenuous peace talks with Perseus, we
would expect Polybius to accept or even praise the Roman statesman's skillful use of deceptive
diplomacy. After all, similar deceptions were employed by Scipio in 204/203 and by Flamininus
in 198/197, and both received Polybius' praise. The deceptive diplomacy utilized by Sosibius
against Antiochus III in 219/218 (5.63-64) parallels Philippus' actions even more closely. In both
instances, the statesmen utilized disingenuous peace negotiations to establish a temporary truce.

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[177] For a clear summation of this senatorial debate, see Burton 2017: 111. On the debate in general, see
Meloni 1953: 202-203; Briscoe 1964; Errington 1972: 210-212; Derow 1989: 309-310; Eckstein 1995:
108. On the connection between this new policy and Polybius' condemnation of such deception in 13.3,
see Nissen 1863: 252; Klotz 1940-1941: 19; Trankle 1977: 134, n.6. This connection has the same
limitations as mentioned above by connecting it with Scipio's deception in 203/2.

[178] Note some similarities with the earlier Achaean debate between Philopoemen and Aristaenus, where
Polybius praises Philopoemen's noble (καλήν) policy toward Rome over Aristaenus' reasonable
(εὐσχήμονα) policy (24.13.8).

The purpose of the truce in both cases was not to facilitate genuine peace talks but rather to buy time for the army to prepare and mobilize against an enemy that had already done so. Yet despite these accounts being nearly identical, Polybius appears to condemn Philippus' actions in 171. More must be at work in Polybius' portrayal of the senatorial debate to account for this inconsistency. The emphasis on the virtues of the elder Romans, the Romans of the Second Punic War, with the expediency of the Roman *nova sapientia* of the present day seems to be key - a notion that will be unpacked in the final chapter. Indeed, we see a similar theme of a Roman moral decline in Polybius' account of the Third Punic War.

Roman Deception toward Carthage in 150/149 and the Glories of Romans Past

The final example of Roman diplomatic deception occurred during the diplomatic negotiations in 150/149 preceding the Third Punic War. Following Carthage's defeat in 201 at the end of the Second Punic War, Carthage was left crippled both militarily and economically. In addition to a sizable war indemnity to be paid back to Rome over the next 50 years, severe limitations were placed upon Carthage's ability to field an army. Ironically, this later stipulation of the treaty of 201 allowed Carthage to focus its energy entirely on its economy. The result was that the Carthaginians regained, and in fact surpassed, their economic prowess within a few decades. Thus, by 191 Carthage offered to repay its remaining indemnity in a single lump sum, some 8,000 talents of silver (Livy36.4.7). Indeed, Polybius claimed that Carthage was the wealthiest city of his day (18.35.9). The terms of the treaty of 201 also gifted King Masinissa all of the Carthaginian lands that his ancestors had possessed. The result of this clause was nearly constant conflict between Masinissa and Carthage in the following years, as the Numidian king "reclaimed" more and more Carthaginian territory. Each time, Numidian and Carthaginian

envoys arrived at Rome to resolve the dispute, as the treaty of 201 specified. According to

Polybius, the Romans always sided with Masinissa, because it was in their interest to always side

against Carthage (31.21.5-6).

The situation in Africa changed in 152 when another land dispute was again sent to Rome

for arbitration. This time, Carthage was unwilling to accept the judgment in favor of Masinissa

that was given by the Romans. It was this refusal that caused Cato, who was part of the Roman

embassy to Carthage, to begin his famous cries for *Carthago delenda est* in the Roman senate.[179]

Instead, in 151 the Carthaginians raised an army of 25,000 soldiers to defend their interests

against the Numidians with force. The result was that the untrained Carthaginian army was

decisively defeated and exterminated by the Numidians (App. *Pun* 70-73). Despite the

Carthaginian defeat, the Carthaginian decision to go to war with Masinissa marked a clear

violation of the treaty of 201.[180] According to Polybius, this was the suitable pretext (πρόφασις,

36.2.1) that the Romans had long been waiting for to declare war on Carthage (36.2.1-4). [181]

Thus in 149, despite a great deal of hesitation as to how it would affect the Mediterranean's

opinion of the Romans (36.2.4), Rome moved for war with Carthage.

Carthage was initially unsure of how to respond to the looming war with Rome. When

the people of Utica proactively surrendered to Rome, however, Carthage decided to try to avoid

a war (36.3.1-2). Thus, when the Carthaginian envoys arrived at Rome, they discovered that the

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[179] See Vogel-Weidermann 1989: 79; Miles 2011: 336; Rosenstein 2012: 235. Scipio Nasica Corculum, who was likely also a member of this same embassy to Carthage, represented the opposing faction. Scipio believed that Carthage should be preserved, as the continued fear of a historic enemy would unite the Roman populace and prevent social division. See Goldsworthy 2006: 333.

[180] For a clear summary of this period, see Rosenstein 2012: 233-239.

[181] On the Roman motivation for declaring war on Carthage, see Astin 1978: 283-288; Harris 1979: 234-240; Harris 1989: 142-162; Vogel-Weidermann 1989: 79-85; Rosenstein 2012: 233-239. Rosenstein convincingly argues that the primary motivating factor behind the Roman decision to go to war with Carthage was Roman concern over Carthage's economic prosperity and the long-term consequences that it might bring.

Roman people had already declared war and sent soldiers to Africa. At this point, the

Carthaginians formally surrendered to Rome, placing themselves fully into Roman faith (*dedere

se in fidem*, 36.3.9; 36.4.1). Upon receiving this surrender, the Roman Senate informed the

Carthaginian envoys that Carthage would retain its freedom, laws, and entire territory (36.4.4). In

order to receive these lenient terms, however, the Carthaginians would have to send 300

hostages, sons of senators, to Lilybaeum within 30 days and obey any additional orders from the

Roman consuls in Africa (36.4.6-8). After debating the matter in the Carthaginian senate, these

300 hostages were given over to the Romans (36.5.1-8). Next, the Roman consuls landed at the

Cape of Utica and were greeted by Carthaginian envoys, who informed him that they were

disposed to obey any Roman command (36.6.1-4). The consuls ordered Carthage to surrender all

of their arms and missiles without fraud or deceit (δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης, 36.6.5). Again the

Carthaginians complied and surrendered their arms, which included 200,000 suits of armor and

2,000 catapults (36.6.7). After disarming Carthage, the consuls proceeded to demand that the

Carthaginians abandon the city of Carthage and build a new city at least ten miles away from the

coast (Livy, *Ep.* 49). Thus by dangling the prospect of peace in front of Carthage, the Romans

successfully disarmed the Carthaginian population and ensured that the Carthaginians would

either destroy their city and its economic prosperity or begin a war against Rome at a significant

disadvantage.[182]

If Polybius directly condemned this act of Roman diplomatic deception in the *Histories*,

those chapters are lost.[183] Instead, Polybius appears to pass judgment on this Roman behavior by

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[182] This decision further supports the notion that the Romans were chiefly concerned with the wealth and prosperity of Carthage at this time (as well as what this wealth could purchase). See Rosenstein 2012: 233-239.

[183] The scene Polybius describes in Carthage following word of the final Roman demand (36.7.3) speaks more about the emotional and mob-like state of the Carthaginian populace than the cruelty of the Roman demand. Unlike in Rome following Cannae in 216, the Carthaginian senate and nobles are unable to control the population in 149.

shedding light onto how news of the Roman diplomatic maneuvering was viewed by the contemporary Greek world (36.9).[184] This should perhaps not be surprising, as Polybius claims that the Romans long hesitated over going to war with Carthage, given concerns over popular opinion among the Greeks (36.2.4). In total, Polybius offers four Greek opinions on the Roman behavior with Carthage in 149. Two of the opinions argue in favor of Rome, while the other two condemn Roman behavior, marking the Roman action as treacherous. Based on Polybius' presentation of these differing Greek points of view and his views on (Roman) imperialism presented throughout the *Histories*, I argue that Polybius generally agreed with all four Greek opinions, which are not as mutually exclusive as they initially appear. Roman behavior at Carthage. What is clear and beyond debate is that Polybius actively decided to include this evidence of wide public disagreement among the Greeks over the morality of Roman action in 149 - a debate that saw roughly half of the Greeks condemning Roman action, including claims of Roman impiety and treachery (ἀσεβήματι καὶ παρασπονδήματι, 36.9.11). This inclusion is telling.

The first Greek opinion (36.9.3-4) claimed that the Romans had acted both intelligently and effectively (φρονίμως καὶ πραγματικῶς) in the defense of their empire. For to destroy Carthage, which had disputed supremacy with Rome and which had been a perpetual menace (ἐπικρεμάμενον φόβον), was the act of intelligent and far-seeing men (νοῦν ἐχόντων εἶναι καὶ μακρὰν βλεπόντων).

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[184] There is no reason to doubt, as Polybius ascribes, that these opinions belonged to European Greeks, despite some scholars. Walbank 1977: 147-148 suggests that these opinions belonged to members of the Greek community in Rome; Casola 1983: 40 argues that they were the opinions of Roman senators; and Nistor 1985: 45-49 suggests that they belonged to influential people in Rome, both citizens and foreigners. On this debate generally, see Baronowski 2011: 101-102, n.6.

The second Greek argument (36.9.5-8) claimed that the policy of Rome in 149 marked a radical shift away from the moderation and leniency that had won Rome its empire. Rather, the Romans were gradually giving into a lust for domination, just as Athens and Sparta had done in the 5th and 4th centuries. And like these Greek city-states, this despotism would (φιλαρχίαν) lead Rome to the same end. For in the past, the Romans made war with every nation until their enemies agreed to obey them. But now, the Romans had demonstrated a new policy, first revealed in their treatment of Perseus, in which they utterly exterminated the Macedonian kingdom, and perfected in their decision with Carthage. For even though the Carthaginians had been guilty of no irremediable (ἀνηκέστου) offense against Rome and had obeyed all of Rome's orders, the Romans treated them with an irremediable and severe resolution (ἀνηκέστως καὶ βαρέως βεβουλεῦσθαι).[185]

According to the third Greek opinion (36.9.9-11), unlike the normal honorable manner in which the Romans conducted war, their treatment of Carthage resembled the intrigue of a despot and could justly be described as exhibiting impiety and treachery (ἀσεβήματι καὶ παρασπονδήματι):

> Others said that the Romans were, generally speaking, a civilized people, and that their peculiar merit on which they prided themselves was that they conducted their wars in a simple and noble manner, employing neither night attacks nor ambushes, disapproving of every kind of deceit and fraud (ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου), and considering that nothing but direct and open attacks were legitimate for them. But in the present case, throughout the whole of their proceedings in regard to Carthage, they had used deceit and fraud (ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου), offering certain things one at a time and keeping others secret, until they cut off every hope the city had of help from her allies. This, they said, savored more of a despot's intrigue than of the principles of a civilized state such as Rome, and could only be justly described as something very like impiety and treachery (ἀσεβήματι καὶ παρασπονδήματι).[186]

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[185] Cf. Polyb. 36.3.9-36.9.6.7.

[186] ἕτεροι δὲ καθόλου μὲν πολιτικὸν εἶναι τὸ Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἔθνος ἔφασαν καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἴδιον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σεμνύνεσθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ τοὺς πολέμους ἁπλῶς καὶ γενναίως πολεμεῖν, μὴ νυκτεριναῖς ἐπιθέσεσι χρωμένους μηδ᾽ ἐνέδραις, πᾶν δὲ τὸ δι᾽ ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου γινόμενον ἀποδοκιμάζοντας, μόνους

The fourth and final Greek stance (36.9.12-17) argued that the Romans were not guilty of

impiety or treachery due to Carthaginian unconditional surrender:

> And there were others who differed likewise from these latter critics. For, they
> said, if before the Carthaginians had committed themselves to the faith of Rome
> the Romans had proceeded in this manner, offering certain things one at a time
> and gradually disclosing others, they would of course have appeared to be guilty
> of the charge brought against them. But if, in fact, after the Carthaginians had of
> their own accord committed themselves to the faith of the Romans and given
> them liberty to treat them in any way they chose, the Romans, being thus
> authorized to act as it seemed good to them, gave the orders and imposed the
> terms on which they had decided, what took place did not bear any resemblance
> to an act of impiety and scarcely any to an act of treachery; in fact some said it
> was not even of the nature of an injustice. For every crime must naturally fall
> under one of these three classes, and what the Romans did belongs to neither of
> the three. For impiety is sin against the gods, against parents, or against the dead;
> treachery is the violation of sworn or written agreements; and injustice is what is
> done contrary to law and custom. Of none of these three were the Romans guilty
> on the present occasion. Neither did they sin against the gods, against their
> parents, or against the dead, nor did they violate any sworn agreement or treaty;
> on the contrary they accused the Carthaginians of doing this. Nor, again, did they
> break any laws or customs or their personal faith. For having received from a
> people who consented willingly full authority to act as they wished, when these
> people refused to obey their orders they finally resorted to force.[187]

δὲ τοὺς ἐκ προδήλου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον κινδύνους ὑπολαμβάνοντας αὐτοῖς καθήκειν. νῦν δὲ πάντα
περὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους δι᾽ ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου κεχειρικέναι, κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ μὲν προτείνοντας, τὸ δ᾽
ἐπικρυπτομένους, ἕως οὗ παρείλαντο πάσας τὰς ἐλπίδας τοῦ βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς τοὺς συμμάχους. τοῦτο δὲ
μοναρχικῆς πραγματοποιίας οἰκεῖον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικῆς καὶ Ῥωμαϊκῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ προσεοικὸς
ἀσεβήματι καὶ παρασπονδήματι κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἦσαν δέ τινες οἱ καὶ τούτοις ἀντιλέγοντες.
Translation by Loeb (2010). On Polybius' earlier claims of Roman transparency and honor during war,
see 13.3.7-8.

[187] εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὶν ἢ δοῦναι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν αὐτῶν οὕτως ἐχείριζον τὰ πράγματα,
κατὰ βραχὺ τὰ μὲν προτείνοντας, τὰ δὲ παραγυμνοῦντας, εἰκότως ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐνόχους φαίνεσθαι τοῖς
ἐγκαλουμένοις εἰ δὲ δόντων αὐτῶν τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν ὥστε βουλεύεσθαι Ῥωμαίους ὅ, τι
ποτὲ φαίνοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, οὕτω κατὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ὥς ποτε δοκοῖ σφίσι, τὸ κριθὲν ἐπέταττον καὶ
παρήγγελλον, οὐκέτι τὸ γινόμενον ἀσεβήματι παραπλήσιον εἶναι καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ παρασπονδήματι μικροῦ
δεῖν: ἔνιοι δ᾽ ἔφασαν οὐκ ἀδικήματι τὸ παράπαν: τριῶν γὰρ οὐσῶν διαφορῶν, εἰς ἃς τὸ πᾶν ἔγκλημα
φύσει καταντᾶν, εἰς οὐδεμίαν ἐμπίπτειν τούτων τὸ γινόμενον ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων: ἀσέβημα μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ
περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἁμαρτάνειν, παρασπόνδημα δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐνόρκους
καὶ τὰς ἐγγράπτους ὁμολογίας πραττόμενον, ἀδίκημα δὲ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς
ἐπιτελούμενον: ὧν οὐδὲν κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐνόχους εἶναι Ῥωμαίους: οὐ γὰρ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς οὐδ᾽ εἰς τοὺς
γονεῖς οὐδ᾽ εἰς τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐξαμαρτάνειν, οὐδὲ μὴν ὅρκους οὐδὲ συνθήκας παραβαίνειν, τὸ δ᾽
ἐναντίον αὐτοὺς ἐγκαλεῖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ὅτι παραβεβήκασι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ νόμους οὐδ᾽ ἐθισμοὺς οὐδὲ
τὴν κατ᾽ ἰδίαν πίστιν ἀθετεῖν: λαβόντας γὰρ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν παρ᾽ ἑκόντων ὃ βούλοιντο πράττειν, οὐ
πειθαρχούντων τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις, οὕτως αὐτοῖς προσάγειν τὴν ἀνάγκην. Translation by Loeb
(2010).

In order properly to assess Polybius' opinion regarding these Greek perspectives on Roman action in 149, an important distinction must be made. Scholars have typically viewed the Roman actions with Carthage as a single event to be praised or condemned, when in reality there are two different Roman decisions being judged by Polybius and Greek popular opinion. The first is the Roman decision to deceptively manipulate the diplomatic exchange with Carthage in a piecemeal fashion so that the city would be disarmed and isolated before the actual demand to relocate the city was given. The second is the final solution itself, in which Rome demanded that the Carthaginians abandon their city and resettle at least ten miles away from the coast (cf. Polyb. 36.7; App. *Pun.* 349, 355, 377-438). This distinction is important, as the first and second Greek opinions are only concerned with the final Roman decision and not the deceptive diplomacy employed to arrive there. Conversely, the third and fourth Greek opinions are primarily concerned with this deceptive maneuvering by the Romans. Moreover, the Greek opinions condemning Carthage are more concerned with changes in Roman behavior on the whole, whereas the opinions defending Rome, especially the fourth opinion, are concerned with the Roman action in 149. As such, it is possible, as I will argue, that Polybius agrees with both sides of the debate to some extent - that the Romans were technically in the right in 149 but that their actions constituted a disturbing departure from Roman honor and leniency.

Scholars have long debated how Polybius may have aligned with these Greek opinions.[188] Most believe that the Achaean historian sided more closely with the first and fourth opinions defending Roman action. Gelzer believed that Polybius sided with these opinions, believing that Polybius saw the harsh and treacherous methods utilized against Carthage as effective Roman

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[188] For this debate, including the discussion below, see (closely followed) Baronowski 2011: 102-105.

298

policy. Gelzer's conclusion was largely based on his belief that passages from Diod. 32.2 and

32.4, which advocate using ruthlessness in the defense of imperialism, were derived from

Polybius and represent his view.[189] Walbank likewise suggests that Polybius favored the Greek

opinions supporting Rome. Walbank argues that Polybius was highly critical of Rome's enemies

and believed that it was prudent for imperialistic states to defend their interests, regardless of

how ruthless this process became. In a weaker argument, Walbank likewise points to Polybius'

arrangement of the four Greek statements, holding that the first and fourth opinions are in a

favored position and have a longer defense in terms of space allotted to the statements.[190]

Petzold argues that Polybius instead supported the second and third Greek opinions

critical of Roman behavior in 149. Petzold points to other areas of the *Histories* in which

Polybius condemns similar harshness and extreme practices in terms that closely resemble the

language of the second and third Greek opinions.[191] Ferrary takes a more nuanced stance

regarding these Greek opinions. Based on the right of the Romans to defend their imperialist

interests and the interpretation of *dedito*, Ferrary argues that Polybius ultimately agreed with the

first and fourth opinions. Yet Ferrary sees the second and third opinions as a representation of

Polybius' reservations about the methods employed by Rome against Carthage in 149.[192]

Baronowski agrees with Ferrary's view. In addition to pointing to Polybius' understanding of

Roman *deditio*, Baronowski believes that Polybius portrayed the Roman rule of the

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[189] Gelzer 1931: 289-292. On the connection between Polybius and Diod 32.2 and 32.4, see Baronowski 2011: 106-112 who convincingly argues that while the passages from Diod are derived from Polybius, they do not represent Polybius' view on imperialism.

[190] Walbank 1965a: 7-12; 1970b: 296 and n. 35; 1972: 173-181; 1974: 13-21; 1977: 156-159; 1979: 663-664; 1981-1982: 247-256.

[191] Petzold 1969: 62-63.

[192] Ferrary 1988: 327-343. For other scholars who also believed that while Polybius agreed with the first and fourth statements, he expressed reservations by including the second and third opinions, see: Momigliano 1972-1973: 697-699; 1975: 29-30; Gabba 1977:71-73; Musti 1978: 54-57; (later) Walbank 2002: 19-20; Baronowski 2011: 103-105

Mediterranean from 168-146 as largely beneficent and moderate. Moreover, Baronowski sees the final order given to Carthage as both comparatively lenient as well as intelligent and effective in Polybius' eyes. Like Ferrary, however, Baronowski leaves room for some reservations in Polybius' view of the Roman actions in 149. Thus, Polybius himself suggested that the final Roman order might be considered harsh (38.1.5). Baronowski likewise argues that "Polybius disapproved of using deceit in warfare and international relations."[193] Baronowski points to 13.3, which again suggests that the Romans of the past avoided ambushes, night operations, and diplomatic deceit.[194]

Ferrary and Baronowski are right to point to a complex Polybian interpretation of the Roman handling of Carthage in 149. From what we have seen of Polybius' handling of different types of deception and treachery, it should not be surprising to see a nuanced judgment from the Achaean historian. Indeed, similar complexity is demonstrated by Polybius in his examination of the Roman appropriation of art from Syracuse during the Second Punic War. In this case he admits that while there is strong evidence to suggest that this action was morally right and advantageous for Rome, on the whole Roman conduct in this instance was still morally wrong (9.10.2-3). Yet while Ferrary and Baronowski suggest that the second and third Greek opinions represented Polybius' reservations, I suggest that these critical opinions suggest a deeper concern held by Polybius that extended beyond the events of 149. In other words, while the first and fourth opinions were concerned with the morality of Roman actions in 149, the second and third opinions were concerned with a large trend possibly taking place with Rome's treatment of the Mediterranean.

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[193] Baronowski 2011: 104.
[194] Baronowski 2011: 103-105.

The second Greek opinion suggests that during the period of 168-146, the Roman treatment of the Mediterranean had shifted from the moderation, leniency, and beneficence that had won Rome its empire to harshness (36.9.5-8). In many ways, this statement brings us back to the question of Polybius' attitude toward the Roman hegemony, discussed earlier. Scholars are remarkably divided on this question. While some scholars view Polybius as actively hostile toward Roman rule, others view the historian as a sycophant working to further the Roman cause.[195] More convincing is a nuanced presentation of Polybius' attitude toward Rome. Thus, scholars such as Musti, Ferrary, Eckstein, and Baronowski suggest that while on the whole Polybius viewed Roman rule in a positive light, the Achaean historian also encouraged smaller states to preserve as much independence as possible from Rome and condemned Roman action when he thought that it to be treacherous or extreme.[196] While Polybius' attitude toward the Romans is undoubtedly complex, however, the fact of the matter remains that the Achaean historian presents the notion of a shift in Roman policy beginning in 168. When combined with the debate in the Roman Senate in 172/171, it is easy to see Rome's handling of Carthage as the fruition of the *nova sapientia* used against Perseus some 23 years earlier.

This concern with a change among the Romans is echoed in the third Greek opinion concerning the events of 149 (36.9.9-11). The statement maintains that the Romans were

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[195] For the debate in general, see Baronowski 2011: 5-11. On the negative Polybian view of Rome, see Shimron (1979-1980) 94-117; Millar (1987) 4; Petzold (1969) 59-64; Gruen (1984) 346-351; Champion (2004); Balot (2010). On Polybius the sycophant, see Shimron (1979-1980) 94-117. Eckstein (1985) 265-282; (1995) 197-225. Ferrary (1988) 291-306, 321-348. For a less severe presentation of Polybius as heavily pro-Roman for various socio-economic and political reasons, see De Coulanges (1858) 104; Mommsen (1868) 3.487-91; Momigliano (1972-1973) 697-699; (1975) 29-31, 48-49; (1977) 67-77; Green (1990): 279-283.

[196] Musti (1978) 44-84; Ferrary (1988) 286-291, 306-348; Eckstein (1995) 197-225, 265-282; Baronowski (2013) cf. 10-11, 65-113, 164-175. Ferrary likewise believes that Polybius felt certain reservations about Roman actions against Carthage in 149, disliking the deceptive diplomacy leading up to their final demand to abandon the city. This view is echoed by Momigliano (1972-1973) 697-699; (1975) 29-31; (1977) 67-77. Green (1990) 279-283 also advances this same argument.

301

generally speaking not disposed to fighting war through any sort of deceit or fraud (ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου), including night attacks, ambushes, and deceptive diplomacy. When dealing with Carthage in 149, however, the Romans had done the opposite, using deceit and fraud (ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου) that one would expect from a despot to subdue Carthage through impiety and treachery (ἀσεβήματι καὶ παρασπονδήματι). Once again, this statement can be seen as a suggestion that the honorable and noble Rome of the past was shifting toward a more duplicitous and deceptive Rome of the present, especially when paired with the implications to the same effect that appear in the description of the senatorial debate in 172/171 over Marcius Philippus' *nova sapientia*. At the very least, Polybius appears to raise the question.

Also interesting about this third Greek opinion is the opening claim that the Romans refused to fight wars through any sort of deceit. In many ways this claim parallels 13.3.7-8, where Polybius makes the same claim. Such a claim, however, seems to contradict Polybius' own narrative of the Roman rise to power between 264 and 146. Thus we see multiple instances of secret maneuvering by Roman armies, largely at night, during the First Punic War in 264 (1.11.3-9) and in 250 (1.46.8); against the Gallic invasion in 225 (2.26.1-2; 2.27.6-8); during the Second Illyrian War in 219 (3.18.8-11; 3.19.2); during the Second Punic War in 218 (3.67.8-9), in 215 (8.5.4), in 209 (10.6), in 209/208 (10.35.7), and in 203 (14.4.1-3); and during the Third Macedonian War in 168 (29.15.1-3). The Romans can likewise be seen carrying out ambushes and surprise attacks. The First Punic War saw Lucius Caecilius Metellus goading Hasdrubal into an ambush at Panormus in 251 (1.40) and Publius Caecilius Metellus' attempted surprise attack at Drepana in 249 (1.49). During the Second Illyrian War, Lucius Aemilius Paullus ambushed Demetrius' army at Pharos in 219 (3.18-19). Roman surprise attacks also occurred throughout the Second Punic War: at Syracuse in 215 (8.5.1-5; 8.37.1-11), at New Carthage in 209 (10.14-

15), at Ilipa in 206 (11.22-23), and at the Battle of the Camps in 203 (4.14.1-10). In 189, Marcus Fulvius Nobilior reached a secret agreement to capture the acropolis of Same in Cephallenia during the night (21.32.b).[197] Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus similarly defeated the Cammani in Cappadocia through trickery in 165 (31.1.1). Finally, Scipio Aemilianus attempted to capture Carthage in 147 through the treachery of Hasdrubal (38.8.2-4). Rather than support the notion of an honorable Roman past and deceitful Roman present, these examples suggest that Rome used deception during wars throughout 264-146 - and in fact even more frequently between 264-201. These instances of Roman deception are either praised or accepted by Polybius without criticism, further confirming Polybius' nuanced acceptance of certain instances of deception - far from the blanket Polybian condemnation of deception suggested by some scholars.[198]

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[197] cf. Livy 38.29.10.

[198] This pattern holds true with non-Roman instances of deception during wars. For example, Polybius accepts nocturnal and secret maneuvering of armies: Epaminondas in 262 (9.8.3-12); the Gauls in 348 (2.18.7-8) and in 225 (2.25.6-7; 2.26.7); Carthage during the First Punic War in 250 (1.44.1-3; 1.46.4-47.5); Hamilcar during the Mercenary War in 240 (1.75.5-10); the Illyrian raid into Epirus in 230 (2.5.3-8); Antigonus III Doson in Cleomenean War in 222 (2.66.10); the Seleucid general Xenoetas and rebel general Molon in 221 (5.26.8-12; 5.47.4; 5.48.2); Molon in 220 (5.52.9-12); Achaeus' general Garsyeris against the Selgians in 218 (5.72.2-8; 5.73.6); Philip V during Social War in 219 (4.67.6-7) and in 218 (5.6.6; 5.18.2-3); Hannibal during the Second Punic War in 218 (3.42.4-9; 3.50.6-9), in 217 (3.83.2-5; 3.101.4-5; 3.93.3-94.6), in 212 (8.26.10; cf. 8.28.1-29.3), and in 211 (9.5.7-9); Philopoemen against Nabis in 200 (16.37.2-4); and Antiochus III during his Eastern campaigns against Parthia in 209 (10.31.2-3) and against Bactria in 208 (10.49.1-4). Polybius similarly praises or accepts ambushes and surprise attacks throughout the *Histories*: Aratus' capture of Sicyon (251/250), Corinth (243/242), and Megara (241) through treachery (2.43.3-8); a Carthagian surprise attack during the First Punic at Lilybaeum in 250 (1.45); ambushes by both sides during Mercenary War in 240 - Hamilcar's attack praised (1.74.7-12; 1.75.5-9; 1.84); Illyrian attack on the Aetolians besieging Medion in 231 (2.3.1-3); the Achaean capture of Mantinea through treachery in 227 (2.57); the Achaean surprise attack on Argos during Cleomenean War in 224 (2.53.1-2); Antigonus' capture of Orchomenus in 224 (2.54.9-14); Cleomenes' surprise attack on Megalopolis (twice) in 223 during Cleomenean War (2.55.1-9); Cleomenes' surprise invasion of Argolis in 222 - praised (2.64); Molon's surprise attack against Xenoetas in 221 (5.48.2-9) and (attempted) against Antiochus III in 220 (5.52.8-12); multiple ambushes and surprise attacks by Philip V during the Social War in 219 (4.63) and 218 (5.6.5-6; 5.7-8; 5.13.1-7; 5.18.3-11) - praised; Aetolian surprise attack on Aegeira during the Social War in 219 - described as brilliant (4.57-58); Antiochus' capture of Seleucia through treachery in 219 (5.60); Antiochus' capture of Ptolemais and Tyre through the treachery of Theodotus in 219 (5.61.3-5); Antiochus' capture of Atabyrium through a ruse in 218 (5.70.6-9); Antiochus' capture of Atabyrium through ambush and deception in 218 (5.70.6-9); Achaeus' attempted capture of Selgia through treachery in 218 (5.74.4-9); Hannibal's capture of Clastidium through treachery in 218 (3.69.1-4), at Trebia in 218 (3.71.1-9), at Lake Trasimene in 217 (3.84), ambushing Minucius in 217 (3.104), at Cannae in 216 (3.113-116), attacking the Roman camp near Rome in 211 (9.7.4-10), ambushing Marcus Claudius Marcellus by Numidian Cavalry in 208 (10.32-33) - Hannibal praised on multiple occasions; Elean ambush of Achaeans in 218 (5.17.3-4); Achaean ambush of Elean forces in 217 (5.95.5-10);

This notion of a shift away from a noble Roman past is also hinted at in the fourth Greek opinion (36.9.12-17). This fourth statement defended Roman behavior in 149, claiming that the Romans were free to act however they wished as Carthage had already surrendered unconditionally (*deditio*). Scholars have made much of this final statement, suggesting that it was the closest in line with Polybius' view.[199] For instance, Walbank argues that this is why Polybius chooses to make it the longest Greek opinion and the last one given.[200] The placement of this opinion, however, was largely necessitated by the fact that it directly responds to the third opinion. What is clear is that Polybius believed that the Romans were within their right to carry out whatever orders they pleased, given the Carthaginian *deditio*. At 20.9-10, a passage written after 146, Polybius warns his readers explicitly of what the *deditio* to the Romans entails - in this instance in the context of the Aetolian surrender at the end of the war with Antiochus III. *Deditio* meant that the surrendered party had to accept the Roman decision, whatever it was. And indeed, Mago the Bruttian makes it clear that the Carthaginians understood this as well (36.5).

Yet, while Polybius himself maintains that the Roman actions in 149 are legally unassailable, it is also not clear how convinced Polybius actually was at the painstakingly legal defense put forward by this statement. Just because the Romans had the legal right to do something does not mean that they necessarily had to or should have. Rather, the fact that the Romans were forced to resort to technical, legal arguments may be telling. Indeed, the length of

Ambush and counter-treachery against the Aetolians at Phanoteus by Alexander, Philip's commander in Phocis in 217 (5.96.4-8); Lycurgus' capture of Calamae in Messenia through treachery in 217 (5.92.4); Lagoras' surprise attack against Achaeas at Sardis in 215 - praised (7.15.1-11); Philip V's ambush during attack on Lissus in 213 - praised (8.13.4-14.11); Antiochus' capture of Sardis through treachery in 213 (8.15-21); Philopoemen's ambush on the Spartans in 200 (16.37.5-6); and Aetolian night surprise attacks during the siege of Ambracia in 189 - praised (21.27.1-6).

[199] Gelzer 1931: 289-292; Walbank (below); Momigliano 1972-1973: 697-699; Momigliano 1975: 29-30; Gabba 1977: 71-73; Musti 1978: 54-57; Ferrary 1988: 327-343; Baronowski 2011: 103.

[200] Walbank 1965a: 7-12; 1970b: 296 and n. 35; 1972: 173-181; 1974: 13-21; 1977: 156-159; 1979: 663-664; 1981-1982: 247-256.

this fourth Greek opinion can be viewed in a negative light. By carefully defining what constitutes impiety, treachery, and injustice, the second two-thirds of the Greek opinion is closer to an obnoxious scene out of *Euthyphro* than a praise of Roman action.

The moral weakness of this final Greek statement is highlighted further in the context of the Roman diplomatic exchange with Carthage at the onset of the Second Punic War in 218. According to Polybius, following Hannibal's capture and destruction of Saguntum, the Romans did not need to debate whether war would be declared on Carthage: "For how could the Romans, who had a year ago had announced to the Carthaginians that their entering the territory of Saguntum would be regarded as a casus belli, now when the city itself had been taken by assault, assemble to debate whether to go to war or not?" (3.20.2). The Romans instead sent ambassadors to Carthage and demanded that the Carthaginians give up Hannibal or else war would be declared (3.20.6-8). The Carthaginians attempted to justify Hannibal's attack on Saguntum by pointing to the legal language of the treaty of 241 and suggesting that while the treaty protected allies, Saguntum had not been a Roman ally at the time of the treaty (3.21.3-5) - a nonsensical suggestion accord to Polybius (3.29.4-10). The Roman response was that while Saguntum still stood, legal arguments and justifications could be made, but now that the city had been captured, the Carthaginians had to either give up the culprits or prepare for war (3.21.6-8). This scene stands in stark contrast to the justifications cited by the fourth Greek opinion sixty-nine year later. In 218, the Romans were unwilling to stoop to legalistic justifications for war when Roman honor and *fides* were at stake. In 149, the Romans were forced to rely on such legal justifications, as there was no honor involved with their behavior toward Carthage. This parallel again suggests a notion of an honorable Roman past compared to a morally lax Roman present.

Why though would Polybius suggest such a notion of a glorified Roman past - especially when his own narrative does not necessarily support such a claim? Such a paradigm can only have been put forward by Polybius for a Roman readership. By the defeat of Perseus in 167, and even more clearly by the end of 146, Rome had established herself as the unrivaled hegemon of the Mediterranean. As such, Polybius understood that as Rome lacked any serious military rival, there also was no longer any way to check Roman power and abuse. In the multipolar Mediterranean of the past, smaller states had always been able to choose which larger state (if any) to give its support. And if these allies became abusive or overbearing, they could be abandoned for a better, more benevolent option - a decision that Polybius claims was justified. For example, smaller cities and states saw shifting allegiance between Syracuse and Carthage in Sicily during the 5th and 4th centuries and Rome and Carthage in the second half of the 4th century; between Rome and Carthage in the Western Mediterranean in the 3rd century; between the Ptolemies and Selecucids in the East between the 4th and 3rd centuries; and between a number of states in Greece between the 5th and 2nd centuries, including Athens, Sparta, Macedon, Thebes, the Achaean League, the Aetolian League, and Rome at various points, ending with the final confrontation in 167 between Perseus and Rome. With the last rivals of Roman hegemony eradicated between 167 and 146, so too ended any reliable external check on Roman power. The only restraint on Roman power, then, would have to come from the Romans themselves.[201]

With this knowledge, Polybius creates the notion of a contemporary Roman society drifting away from the noble and honorable Rome of the past. Polybius highlights the

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[201] On the clearest argument of shifting alliances between rival powers, in the context of the Italian mainland during the Second Punic War, see Fronda 2010. For the pragmatic consequences of immoral imperialistic behavior in a bipolar system, see Erskine 2003. For the realist context of Rome's role in the ancient Mediterranean, see Eckstein 2006, especially 1-11, 118-243.

unwaveringly honorable principles of the Romans of the past in his discussion of Philip V's opposite character (13.3), in his presentation of the Roman debate over Philippus' *nova sapientia* (cf. Livy 42.47.5), and in the third Greek opinion concerning the Roman handling of Carthage in 149. This presentation is also emphasized in Polybius' assessment of the acts of Roman disingenuous diplomacy discussed above. Again, Polybius' implied condemnation of Philippus' deceptive diplomatic maneuvering with Perseus in 172/171 is a direct contradiction to his praise of similar actions carried out by Scipio against the Carthaginians in 203/202 and by Flamininus against Philip V in 198/197. Polybius likewise praises the diplomatic deception of Sosibius against Antiochus III in 218/217, which is nearly identical to the Roman situation of 172/171. Thus, there is strong evidence that Polybius goes out of his way to praise the Romans of the past (Scipio and Flamininus) while condemning the Romans of the present (Philippus and Roman consuls of 149).[202] And even when contemporary Romans like Scipio Aemilianus and Cato are praised by Polybius, they are distanced from the Romans of their day - instead associating them with great Roman generations of the past (cf. 35.4.8-14). Once again, this Polybian dichotomy seems to have been intended for a Roman readership. The notion of a morally depraved Roman present is much more of a suggestion than a claim by Polybius. In this way, it stands as a challenge for the Romans to answer. If they were able to "return" to the moderation and self-restraint that was exemplified by the Romans of the past, Roman power would remain moderate. In the end, this would be good for both Rome as well as for the Greek states living under its hegemony.

While these moral lessons and challenges in the *Histories* are intended for a Roman audience, this is not to suggest that the Romans were the primary audience of Polybius' work.

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[202] The Roman consuls of 149 were Manius Manilius and Lucius Marcius Censorinus.

Scholars have long claimed, and rightly, that Polybius' work was largely written for a Greek audience in mind as they navigated the new reality of life under Rome's Mediterranean hegemony. Polybius' motivation for extending his *Histories* another ten Books to account for Roman rule following 167 supports a Greek readership. He maintains that the purpose of these later books is for his readers to determine the nature of Roman rule and whether Roman rule should be accepted or fled (3.4). While such a question indicates a primary Greek audience, it can also be seen as another challenge to Roman readers.

And while Polybius often uses events from the Greek world to anchor his readers to certain years (e.g., the "28 years before the crossing of Xerxes" 3.22.1-2), it is just as often that Polybius utilizes events from Roman history for this purpose. Thus, for example, in describing Greek events, Polybius references the start of the Pyrrhic War (2.41.9-11); the defeat of Carthaginians in the First Punic War (2.43.5); the start of the First Illyrian War (2.44.2); Hannibal's attack on Saguntum (4.28, 4.66); and Hannibal's arrival in Italy (5.29.7-9). While such parallel dating certainly worked to build Polybius' notion of *symploke*, it also would have helped a Roman readership stay grounded in going through Polybius' narrative of Greek events (cf. 2.71.1-4).[203]

Amy Richlin has long criticized scholars for clinging to the notion that any author wrote with only a single audience in mind. While Fabius Pictor's history was written in Greek, suggesting a primary Greek audience, he also expected his readership to include Romans.[204] A diverse audience is likewise found in A. Postimius Albinus' *Annals*, again written in Greek (bad Greek according to Polybius) but with Roman readers in mind. Polybius, then, falls neatly into an older tradition of writing a history of Rome in Greek with both Greek and Roman readers in

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[203] On Polybius' notion of *symploke*, see Kagan 1975: 197 - 212.
[204] Dillery 2002: 1-13; Dillery 2009: 77-107; Marincola 2009: 11-23.

mind.[205] The prevalence of the Roman elite for reading Greek historiography by at least the middle of the first century is suggested by Cicero's emphasis that public speakers at Rome needed to know both Roman and Greek history (*De Orat*. 1.158; *Orat*. 120).[206] And Polybius' own comical account of Cato the Elder's engagement with the writing of Pstimius Albinus (39.1) suggests that at least some contemporary Roman aristocrats read Greek historiography. Ultimately, while Polybius' primary audience was the Greeks, the presence of Roman readers and the attention that Polybius showed them has been either ignored or underappreciated by most scholars.

Polybius seems to present the final year of the *Histories* as something of a fork in the road for the future of Roman imperialism. 146 marked the end of both Carthage and the Achaean League at the hands of the Romans. Polybius invites his readers to make a connection between Carthage and Achaea in Book 38, as he intentionally draws parallels between the start of both of these wars (38.1.5) as well as the Achaean and Carthaginian leaders who shared similar depraved natures (38.8.14): "It would not be easy to find two men more alike than those who then swayed the destinies of Greece and Carthage" (38.8.14). In Polybius' estimation, by 146, both states had fallen into degeneracy (exemplified by their παρανομία) and were subsequently destroyed as a result. Yet Polybius' judgment on Roman involvement is quite different.

As we have already discussed, Polybius' judgment of the Romans at the onset of the 3rd Punic War is not positive. Although Roman action against Carthage may have been technically permissible given the Carthaginian *deditio*, the lack of honor and beneficence exemplified by the deceptive Roman diplomacy in 149 gave Polybius serious misgivings - emphasized by the

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[205] On Polybius' intentional engagement with Roman cultural politics, see Champion 2000a; Champion 2004a.
[206] Marincola 2009: 14.

fracturing of Greek popular opinion toward the Romans. Thus, while Scipio Aemilianus is praised for his skill and moderation during the final stages of the war, Polybius presents him as an *exception* amongst the Romans (31.25.3-10). Despite the wicked Roman behavior in dealing with Carthage, however, Polybius presents Roman action in Greece between 148-146 as especially moderate. While Scipio had been the exception in Africa, nearly all of the Romans involved in the Achaean War, and during the months leading up to the conflict, acted with moderation and benevolence toward the Achaeans. Thus, despite the initial attacks on Lucius Aurelius Orestes, the Roman response was one of reconciliation, exemplified by the delegation led by Sextus Julius Caesar (38.9.3-10.7; 38.11.1-6) as well as the later delegation of Cn. Papirius and his colleagues (38.12.1-11). Indeed, Polybius argues that the Romans were so generous in their treatment of the Achaeans that while subsequent generations could lament the destruction of Carthage, it would be impossible to blame anyone other than the Achaean leadership for the subsequent destruction of the league (38.1.5).

We are left, then, with an interesting parallel between Carthage and the Achaean League. Despite the destruction of both Carthage and Corinth, the Roman action in the West was marked with deceit and treachery, while in the East the Romans acted with moderation and leniency. Perhaps, the Achaean historian saw both as future possibilities for the Roman domination. Thus, the question of whether the Romans of his own day ruled with the intrigues of despotism (μοναρχικῆς πραγματοποιίας) or with the moderation of a civilized state appears to have been left intentionally unanswered by Polybius (36.9.11). For Polybius' purposes, I would argue, having raised the question was enough. Indeed, Polybius did not yet know the answer. For in his mind it was not yet clear how the Roman rule would continue to develop. As evidenced by the divided opinions of the Greeks in 149 and the different handling of Carthage and Achaea in 146,

the jury was still out on how moderate Roman rule would be. Rather than provide a clear answer, Polybius intentionally leaves his judgment of Roman rule ambiguous - much to the frustration of scholars over 2,000 years later. For Polybius, however, this uncertainty was the point. The restraint or abuse of Roman power in the Mediterranean could be and would be ultimately determined by the Romans themselves. This was the great opportunity, and great fear, that marked the unipolar Mediterranean world at the close of 146.

CONCLUSION

This chapter explored Polybius' complex judgment on the morality of using deception during diplomatic exchanges. Polybius understood that successful diplomacy was one of the few barriers to constant warfare between states in the ancient world. While there was no enforcement mechanism for any formal system of international law in the ancient Mediterranean, a number of shared customs and understandings did exist. One such agreed-upon norm among civilized states was the sacrosanctity of envoys. Thus, Polybius views attacks against such envoys as clear instances of treachery. We see this with the Seseones' treacherous (παρασπονδήσαντες) murder of Roman envoys at Arretium in 283 (2.19.7-9); the Boii Gauls' treacherous (παρασπονδήσαντες) capture of Roman envoys at Mutina in 218 (3.40.5-10); Queen Teuta's assassination of Gaius Corucanius in 230 (2.8.12-13); the Dalmatians' attack against Roman envoys in 157/156 (32.13.2-3); the Liguarian attack against Flaminius Popilius Laenas (33.9.3-7); and the Galatian attack against Gaius Manlius Vulso in 189 (21.39.9-14); the Carthaginian mercenaries' treacherous (παρεσπόνδησαν) attack on Gesco at Tunis in 240 (1.69.5-70.10). In addition to these condemned instances of barbarian and mercenary attacks on envoys, Polybius also describes two instances of such treachery among "civilized states." In 203 during the

Second Punic War, the Carthaginians treacherously (παρασπόνδησιν) attempted to attack and kill the Roman ambassadors Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius (15.2.5-13; cf. 15.4.2). Similarly, in 147 during the months leading up to the Achaean War, a Roman delegation under Lucius Aurelius Orestes and later a second Roman delegation under Gnaeus Papirius were both met with physical violence and forced to flee Corinth (38.10.2-38.12.4). Every attack against envoys in the *Histories* is met by sharp condemnation by Polybius. Polybius believed that these acts of treachery against envoys were marked by the lawlessness (παράνομος, 1.70.5; 2.8.13; 15.8.11; 38.13.8) of the perpetrators. While this lawlessness was to be expected from barbarians and mercenaries, when "civilized states" exhibited such παράνομος, Polybius saw it as a sign of degeneracy preceding the eventual collapse of the state - a notion that will continue to be discussed in the final chapter.

This Polybian emphasis on lawfulness continues into the Achaean historian's judgment on acts of deceptive diplomacy. In this matter, Polybius is more nuanced. In instances where a state goes back on a formal promise or agreement, Polybius is unanimously critical. Thus, the treacherous (παρεσπονδῆσθαι, παρασπόνδησιν) Carthaginian attack in 203 on Roman transport and supply ships during an armistice (15.1.1-4; cf. 15.3.2, 15.4.2); Philip V's shameful (αἰσχύνης) and treacherous (παρασπονδούντων) partitioning of the Ptolemaic empire with Antiochus III in 203/202 (3.2.8; 15.20.1-3), despite ongoing processes for Philip to marry one of Ptolemy V's daughters (15.25.13, 16.22.16); Philip's shameful (αἰσχύνεσθαι) and treacherous (παρασπονδοῦντι) decision to destroy Cius and enslave its citizens in 202 after having given them assurances that they would be spared (15.23.2-9); Philip's similar treacherous (παρασπόνδημα) enslavement of the people of Thasos after they had surrendered on terms that they would be spared (15.24.1-2); and the treacherous (προϋπάρχουσαν) murder of Archidamus by Cleomenes of Sparta

in 228, despite promising him his safety in a formal agreement that was ratified by the Carthaginian Senate (5.37.1-4; cf. 5. 37.12) are all sharply condemned by Polybius. Given the presence of formal oaths, promises, or assurances, Polybius criticizes the above betrayals of good faith on moral grounds.

When no such formal agreements have been made, however, Polybius allows for a good deal of deception during the diplomatic process. Indeed, he holds disingenuous diplomacy to be a skill that can and should be used strategically by prudent commanders and statesmen. The Carthaginian decision to enter into an armistice with Rome in 203 for the sole purpose of buying Hannibal time to get back to Africa (15.2.3); Sosibius' decision in 219/218 to engage in peace talks with Antiochus so that the Ptolemaic army could be training and mobilized (5.63.1-5, 5.66.8-9); Antiochus' own willingness to enter into these same peace talk so he could address Achaeus' rebellion (5.66.3; cf. 5.57.1-58.1; 5.61.6) before finishing his march toward Alexandria; Philip V's capture of Prinassus in 201 through deceptive diplomacy (16.11.3-9); Philip's feigned compliance toward the Romans between 185-183 (22.13.8-12; 22.14.6-10; 22.18.9; cf. 22.18.2-11); Antiochus IV's own deception toward Roman envoys in 166 (30.27.2-3; 30.30.7-8); and Critolaus and Diaeus' similar deception toward Roman envoys in 147 (38.10.1-9), therefore receive no condemnation from Polybius - and indeed Sosibius' deceptive diplomacy receives Polybius' praise. Such nuanced distinctions undermine scholarly claims that Polybius approached deception in war and statecraft with a blanket condemnation.

Polybius' description of similar Roman acts of disingenuous diplomacy in some ways contradicts this model. In 203/202 preceding the battle of the Camps, Scipio Africanus entered into disingenuous peace talks with the Carthaginians and Numidians. His true purpose was initially to try and convince Syphax to defect to the Romans, but when he saw how vulnerable the enemy

313

camps were, Scipio intensified the peace talks so that he could scout out the weaknesses and approaches to the camps (14.1.1-14.2.14). In 198/197, Flamininus likewise disingenuously proceeded with peace talk with Philip V, knowing that if his command in Greece was extended, he would sabotage the attempts at peace (18.12.1-4). Polybius' praise of both of these commanders' use of deception is clear. Surprisingly, however, Polybius is critical of the disingenuous diplomacy, this *nova sapientia*, utilized by Philippus in 172/171, which held out the prospect of peace to Perseus so that the Romans would have time to mobilize their forces (42.43.1-3; 42.47.1-9). Polybius' condemnation of this deceptive policy is striking, considering his reaction to similar deceptions used by Scipio and Flamininus and considering the nearly identical diplomatic maneuverings of Sosibius in 219/218, which Polybius praises. Undergirding the Roman debate over Philippus' *nova sapientia* is a suggestion that the Romans 172/171 lacked the honor and transparency that marked the great generation of the Romans who fought against Hannibal and Philip V - men like Scipio and Flamininus. This same assertion of a gradual Roman moral decline is presented in the third opinion of the Greek debate over the handling of Carthage by the Romans in 149 (36.9.9-11). Overall, Polybius' presentation of the Roman diplomatic maneuvering, leading up to their final demand that the Carthaginians abandon their city and resettle at least 10 miles away from the coast, suggests that the Achaean historian was critical of certain aspects of the Roman handling of Carthage in 149.

Taken together, these Roman instances of disingenuous diplomacy and Polybius' conflicting judgments of them suggest that Polybius wanted his readers to ponder the notion of a glorified Roman past and morally depraved Roman present. Such a dichotomy seems to have been intended by Polybius for a Roman readership. The Achaean historian understood well that by 146, Rome held unrivaled power over the Mediterranean. The natural checks and balances that existed

for states living within a bipolar or multipolar system had disappeared, leaving Rome to act without fear of immediate reprisal. As such, Polybius realized that only the Romans themselves were capable of placing a restraint on Roman power. Polybius' didactic suggestion of an honorable Roman past that had gradually declined into a morally problematic Roman future served as a challenge for the Romans: a challenge to rule with the same leniency and honor shown by men like Scipio Africanus and Flamininus - by the glorious men who had defeated Hannibal and Philip V, defended Rome, and won Rome's empire. As such a challenge suggests, Polybius was undecided on what Roman rule of the Mediterranean would hold. His ambiguity in answering this question stems from his own uncertainty. It is clear that in 146, Polybius believed that both roads lay open for Rome. On the one hand was Rome's morally problematic handling of Carthage, which emphasized Roman harshness and ruthlessness, and on the other hand was the Roman leniency, benevolence, and moderation that largely marked Roman action toward the Achaean League. Only the Romans could decide which type of behavior would become the exception.

Chapter 5: Polybius, Rome, and the Lessons of Treachery

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation's survey of the numerous instances of treacherous and deceptive diplomacy, politics, and statecraft that appear throughout the *Histories* demonstrates that Polybius approached notions of treachery (παρασπόνδημα) with a very legalistic eye. The narrow presentation of treachery is provided in the fourth Greek opinion concerning Roman action against Carthage in 149 appears to match Polybius' own definition: παρασπόνδημα δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐνόρκους καὶ τὰς ἐγγράπτους ὁμολογίας πραττόμενον ("treachery is the violation of sworn or written agreements," 36.9.15). Such παρασπόνδημα, expressed most potently in attacks upon envoys and violations of formal truces, finds universal condemnation throughout the *Histories* (Chapter 4). In situations where no such formal promises are made, however, Polybius gives wide leeway to misleading or double-dealing actions, often viewing such maneuverings as clever and admirable. Indeed, it is up to the interlocutor to be aware of the dangers of such informal agreements. Thus, in Polybius' depiction of the Burning of the Camps in 203 (14.1-14.5), the Achean historian praises Scipio's shrewd deception as his most brilliant and adventurous act (κάλλιστον καὶ παραβολώτατον, 14.5.14), while condemning Syphax and Hasdrubal for their failure to remain vigilant in the face of informal assurances (14.3.2-3). Flamininus' doubled-handed diplomacy with Philip V during the winter of 198/197 similarly finds praise from Polybius, declaring the Roman consul's actions as both skilled (εὐστόχως) and intelligent (νουνεχῶς, 18.12.4).

Yet Polybius' emphasis on the legalistic nature of παρασπόνδημα is not to say that the Achean historian is not also acutely concerned with moral behavior beyond formal treaties and promises. Again, the Greek debate of 149 emphasizes this fact, as the fourth Greek opinion

attempts to exonerate the Romans of treachery (παρασπόνδημα) as well as impiety (ἀσέβημα) and injustice (ἀδίκημα, 36.9.15), which are presented as three distinct offenses, and each narrowly defined. Indeed, it is possible to see Polybian concern outside of a strict notion of παρασπόνδημα in the second and third Greek opinions, which suggest some misgivings toward the Roman action toward Carthage, despite the fact that the Romans were legally within their right to demand anything from Carthage due to the Carthaginian *deditio* - a legal reality emphasized by Polybius earlier in his work (20.9-10), and which the Carthaginians themselves appear to have understood, given Mago the Bruttian's speech (36.5). Similarly, some of the greatest betrayals in Polybius' work do not feature any sworn or written agreement to violate. Thus, while these cases are not παρασπόνδημα in a narrow sense, Polybius certainly saw them as treacherous in a broader context, as seen in his sharp condemnation of the actions of Philip V in 203/2 with the "Pact of the Kings" in which Philip and Antiochus worked to divide up the kingdom of the helpless five-year-old Ptolemy V between them (3.2.8; 15.20.1-2).

While certain narrowly defined behaviors such as treachery (παρασπόνδημα), impiety (ἀσέβημα), and injustice (ἀδίκημα) are universally condemned by Polybius, there are many events throughout the *Histories* that do not fall neatly into these categorical definitions, allowing Polybius to offer his own nuanced praise and criticism. Thus the Achaean decision to desert Philip V in 198 (18.13), the Megarian abandonment of the Boeotian League in 193 (20.6.7), and Hannibal's decision to attack Saguntum in 219 are all seen as acceptable to Polybius given the context surrounding these decisions. At times, Polybius' own moral judgments even appear to be at odds with one another. The best example of this is the diplomatic deception employed by Marcius Philippus during the winter of 172/171. Philippus' actions draw condemnation from Polybius, despite the Achaean historian's spirited praise of the similar deceptions employed by

both Scipio 203 (14.5.14) and Flamininus in 198/197 (18.12.4); and despite Polybius' praise of

nearly identical actions taken by Sosibius and Agathocles (as well as Antiochus IV) in 219/218

(5.63-65).

Despite Polybius' nuanced portrayals and judgments of these acts of treachery, certain

themes do emerge that offer valuable insight into the Achaean historian's opinion of the Roman

rule of the Mediterranean after 167. This concluding chapter argues that Polybius saw an

inherent connection between the moral and pragmatic health of the state, as evidenced by his

discussion of the Cycle of Polities (*anacyclosis*) in Book 6 of the *Histories*. Polybius believed

that states that exhibited "barbaric" vices rather than "Greek" virtues were approaching political

collapse - most potently seen with the appearance of παρονομία within the state. As evidence of

this, in every instance of treachery discussed in the previous chapters, a resulting pragmatic

consequence is emphasized by Polybius. By presenting such a claim, this chapter argues,

Polybius was able to warn both Greek and Roman readers alike of the political collapse that

would inevitably accompany the moral degeneration of the Roman state.

I. BARBARITY, *ΠΑΡΑΝΟΜΙΑ,* AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE STATE

During the past two decades, scholars have persuasively argued that a cultural

understanding of what was to be "Greek" and what it was to be "barbarian" informed Polybius'

Histories. Such cultural distinctions had been continuously defined and redefined since before

the Persian Wars of the fifth century BC and continued to be during the political and social

upheaval of the second century BC.[1] Polybius' use of these "cultural politics" has been used by

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[1] For Greek notions of Hellenism and barbarism, see Hall 1989; Coleman & Waltz 1997; Harrison 2002; Nippel 2002; Champion 2004a: 31-40; and Mitchell 2007: 39-76.

scholars to understand Polybius' view of the Romans as well as other powers in the

Mediterranean.[2] Craig Champion, followed by Emma Nicholson, likewise argues that a Greek-

barbarian spectrum was essential to the Polybian understanding (and acceptance) of the transition

of hegemonic power in Greece from Macedon to Rome.

The notion of Polybius' interpretation of Rome through cultural politics was first

presented by Champion in his 2004 *Cultural Politics*. Champion argues that Polybius presents a

coherent narrative that oscillates between a "cultural politics of assimilation," which attempts to

incorporate Rome into Greek culture, and a "cultural politics of alienation," which attempts to

distance Rome from associations with Greek culture and toward the barbarian end of the Greek-

barbarian spectrum.[3] Polybius' purpose for this dual portrayal of the Romans was to appease

different readers. While Roman aristocrats reading the *Histories* would appreciate (and benefit

from) Greek associations, Polybius' Greek audience, which was largely hostile toward the

Romans, would want the Romans portrayed as more akin to barbarians than to civilized Greeks.

Andrew Erskine argues that the Romans did not fit neatly into the cultural Greek-

barbarian dichotomy of Polybius' world. Rather, throughout the *Histories*, the Romans appeared

"both as different from Greeks and as different from typical barbarians."[4] Champion likewise

suggests that the Romans are treated by Polybius with cultural ambiguity, as they are sometimes

portrayed as barbarians and at other times presented as honorary Greeks.[5] Nicholson argues that

Roman Greekness shifted throughout the *Histories* to converse the Macedonian hegemony under

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[2] On Polybius' interpretation of Rome, see Champion 2000; 2004; and 2018; Erskine 2013; Moreno Leoni 2014; Nicholson 2020. For a recent application of Polybius' cultural politics to Philip V of Macedon, see Nicholson 2020.

[3] Champion 2004a.

[4] Erskine 2000 and 2013.

[5] For Romans as barbarians, see Champion 2004a) 193-203; for Romans as honorary Greeks, see Champion 2000a: 426-427; Champion 2004a: 47-57.

Philip V.[6] Thus, the Romans successfully replaced Macedon as the hegemonic power in Greece,

in part, because while Macedon was becoming increasingly barbaric, Rome was becoming

increasingly "Greek." This Polybian presentation, Nicholson maintains, also emphasized

Polybius' concerns over justifying the Achaean League's abandonment of the Macedonian

alliance in 198.[7]

The Greek-Barbarian Dichotomy in Polybius' Histories

From at least the sixth century BC, a fluid dichotomy of "Greek" and "barbarian" existed

in the Greek world. Scholars maintain that Hellenism in its simplest form was built around

common ethnicity, language, and religious and social customs.[8] And to be barbarian represented

everything opposite: non-Greek language and customs.[9] In addition to their use of an

unintelligible language, specific negative characteristics were often attributed to certain groups

of people. Thus, the Persians were frequently associated with extravagance, slavery, and

tyrannical rule (Aesch. *Pers* 226-246; Hdt. 9.122.3; Aristoph. *Acharn.* 80-83; Arist. *Pol.*

1285a14-22; Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.29.39); the Gauls were seen as drunken and irrational (Diod. 5.26;

Cic. *Pro Front. passim*); the Thracians were held to be corrupt and brutal (Pl. *Resp.* 435e; Arist.

[*Pr.*] 911a2-4); the Carthaginians were seen as jealous, power-hungry, and proponents of human

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[6] Nicholson 2020: 40-42, 52-66.

[7] Nicholson 2020: 42-43; cf. Polybius 18.13.4-10. For Polybius' understanding of traitors in this passage, see Eckstein 1987 and Golan 1996. Polybius' concern over the moral standing of the Achaean League after its abandonment of the Macedonian alliance is made even more clear from the speech of Thrasycrates to the Aetolian League in book 11, in which the Rhoadian statesman accuses the Aetolians of being traitors by allying themselves with the barbarian Romans and thereby waging war against the rest of Greece (11.4.10-5.9).

[8] See, directly Nicholson 2020, esp. 44; and earlier Browning 2002: 259; Mitchell 2007:19-23.

[9] See Hdt. 1.57.2-3, 8.144; Thuc. 2.68.5 vs Hdt. 1.57.2-3; Thuc. 1.6.1.

sacrifice (Diod. 20.14.4-7; Plut. *Mor.* 171c-d; Plb. 9.11.2-3); and the Egyptians were seen as savage and jealous (Pl. *Resp.* 436a; Plb. 15.33.10-11).[10]

This dichotomy often reemerged and became redefined during periods of political and social turbulence in Greece. We find for instance new and reemphasized notions of "Greekness" and Hellenic culture during the Persian Wars, surrounding the Peloponnesian War, alongside the rise of Macedon and the death of Alexander the Great, and with the emergence of Rome as the hegemonic power in Greece.[11] Yet even as early as the fifth century, such disparities between Greek and barbarian remained fluid and complex. Thus, we find in Euripides' *Andromache*, the notion of barbaric Greeks and noble barbarians.[12] Thucydides likewise believed that people could be more or less "Greek" or "barbarian" based upon their actions, as evidenced by his description of the Aetolians (1.5.3-6.2) and the Eurytanians (3.9.4.4-5).[13] This is likewise why Xenophon points to Persia as the model of the ideal monarchy in *Cyropaedia*, while painting the Persians as barbarians in the *Agesilaus*.[14] The rise of Macedon and the subsequent spreading of Greek customs and the Greek language across the Mediterranean throughout the Hellenistic period also complicated a strictly ethnic notion of Greekness, allowing certain cities and people to *become* Greek.[15] We see this transition at work in *Panegyricus* 50, in which Isocrates claims

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[10] For this list, see Nicholson 2020: 44; for Greek ethnography, see Skinner 2012. For the view that such traits could be attributable to the physical environment, see Champion 2004a: 76-80; Nicholson 2020: 44; Hdt. 1.142; 3.106; 9.122; Hp. *Aer*, 16 and 24; Arist. *Pol.* 1327b23-33; 1285a19-22; Plb. 4.21.1-3.

[11] On the emergence of Hellenic identities, see Hall 1989; Harrison 2002:3-4; Nippel 2002; Browning 2002; Champion 2004a: 31-40; Mitchell 2007; Nicholson 2020:43-44.

[12] See Hall 1989: ch. 5; Nicholson 2020: 44.

[13] Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 133-140; Nicholson 2020: 44.

[14] Harrison 2002: 4; Browning 2002; Nicholson 2020.

[15] Perhaps the best example of this is the frequent Macedonian claim of Greekness, first expressed by Amyntas I. See Borza 1982; Hammond 1988: 16-21; Mitchell 2007: 204-205. For Molossian claims, see Pi, *Nem.* 4.51-53, 7.38-40 and *Paean* 6.98-121; Eur. *Androm.* 1243-6; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 1; Mitchell 2007: 205-206. For claims of the city of Aspendus, see Curty no. 3; Strabo 14.4.2; Arrian, *Anab* 1.26.2-3, 26.5-27.4; Mitchell 2007: 203. For Greek ethnicity, see Malkin 2001. For discussion as a whole, see Nicholson 2020: 44-45, fn. 28. On the spread of Hellenistic culture, see Van Nuffelen 2009; Moyer 2011; Geiger 2014; Chrubasik & King 2017.

that to be called "Greek" no longer suggests membership of a race but rather a shared culture.[16]

By the mid-third century BC, we find Eratosthenes of Cyrene emphasizing action rather than

ethnicity: "It would be better to distinguish people according to their virtues and vices, since not

only are many of the Greeks wicked, but many of the barbarians are refined" (βέλτιον εἶναί

φησιν ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διαιρεῖν ταῦτα. πολλοὺς γὰρ καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶναι κακοὺς καὶ τῶν

βαρβάρων ἀστείους, Strabo 1.4.9).

By Polybius' day, it appears as though the notion of "Greek" and "barbarian" had largely

(though not entirely) shifted from the importance of ethnicity to the importance of character.[17]

Thus, to be "Greek" in the *Histories* is synonymous with what was good, just, and civilized,

while to be "barbarian" reflected the opposite of these virtues. That Polybius himself was

concerned with this continued Greek-barbarian dichotomy seems apparent throughout his text.

For example, Polybius recounts a series of speeches during the later years of the third century,

which call into question whether the Aetolians, Macedonians, and Romans should be considered

Greeks or barbarians. The speech of the Aetolian statesman Agelaus of Naupactus to Philip V

and his allies at Naupactus in 218 (5.104) emphasizes the "Greekness" (Ἕλλην, 5.104.1) of

Philip and the rest of the Greeks over the foreign (ἔξωθεν, 5.104.6) Romans, whom Agelaus

describes as barbarian invaders (τῶν βαρβάρων ἐφόδους, 5.104.1). Similar underpinnings are

found in the speeches of Chlaeneas the Aetolian and Lyciscus the Acarnanian before the Sparta

Assembly in 211 during the First Macedonian War (9.28-39).[18]

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[16] Browning 2002: 260; Champion 2004a: 31-36; Nicholson 2020: 44-45.
[17] See Champion 2004a: 245-253; Nicholson 2020: 45-46; cf. Schmitt 1957/1958: 38-48; Walbank 1957-1979: 2.176; Musti 1974: 131; Erskine 2000: 172; Gruen 2018.
[18] Nicholson 2020: 38-39. For a detailed look at these speeches, see Deininger 1973; Champion 1997; 2000: 429-441; and Champion 2004a: 193-203.

In Polybius' eyes, the best examples of good "Hellenistic" qualities often came from his own state, the Achaean League (2.38.6-55). Thus, the Achaeans are described as exhibiting justice and duty (κικαία), reason (λογισμός), courage (ἀνδρεία), and a concern for law and order as well as for freedom and equality.[19] Indeed, according to Polybius, it is the League's love of freedom, rather than great valor or wealth that sets it apart from the other Greek states: "One could not find a political system and principle so favorable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word so sincerely democratic, as that of the Achaean League" (2.38.6).[20]

For Polybius, opposite the Achaeans stood the barbaric Illyrians, Thracians, Gauls, and mercenaries. These peoples constituted serious threats to the social order of Polybius' day (2.35.1-10).[21] Take, for example, Polybius' descriptions of the Gallic invasions of Italy (2.14-35), the Gallic attack on Delphi in 279 (2.35), the Gallic and Thracian invasions of Byzantium (4.38, 45-46), and the constant attacks on Macedon by the Dardanians (cf. 4.66; 5.97).[22] Throughout the *Histories*, such barbaric people exhibit lawlessness (παρονομία), greed (πλεονεξία), irrationality (ἀλογιστία), unchecked passion (θυμός), savagery (ὠμός), and licentiousness (ἀσέλγεια). Polybius often presents such "barbarians" as placing the individual over the state, lacking education, being ruled by drunken passion, and turning into "wild animals" (ἀποθηριοῦσθαι; 1.67.6; 1.81.5-11; cf. Livy 42.59.2).[23]

Whether or not Polybius found these tribes of people to be *naturally* prone to these barbaric qualities, it is clear that Polybius believed that states could be more or less "barbaric"

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[19] For compilation of this list of Polybian qualities, see Champion 2004a: 68-69, 122-129, 255-259; followed by Nicholson 2020: 46.

[20] ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰλικρινεστέραν οὐκ ἂν εὕροι τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὑπαρχούσης.

[21] See Eckstein 1995: 115-129.

[22] Nicholson 2020: 46.

[23] For Polybius' notions of barbarians and their qualities, see Eckstein 1995 119-125; Erskine 2000: 168-169; and Champion 2004a: 67-75. For this list of qualities, see Champion 2004a: 67-75; followed by Nicholson 2020: 46.

(or more or less "Hellenic") based upon the virtues or vices of the state, occupying something of a middle ground in the Greek-barbarian spectrum. States such as the Aetolians, Spartans, Cretans, Boeotians, and Cynaethans appear at times as less Greek and more barbaric based upon their greed, treachery, savagery, and lawlessness. Thus, the Aetolians are presented as greedy and concerned only with plunder (2.43.9-10; 2.45.1; 2.46.3; 2.47.4; 2.49.3; 4.3.1-4; 4.5.5; etc.), reckless, animal-like (4.3.1) and non-Greek (18.5.8; cf. Livy 32.34.4n) as they raid friend and foe alike. In Polybius' mind, it is these barbaric qualities that explain why the Aetolians are the historical enemies of the noble Achaean League.[24] The Spartans are painted in a similarly negative light during the Cleomonean War in 229-222 (2.45.2-70.3) and during the Social War in 220-217 (4.26-36, 57-87; 5.1-30, 91-105), due in part to the "tyranny" of Cleomenes III (2.47.3; cf. 23.11.5; Livy (P) 34.31-32, 35-37). The Cretans are portrayed by Polybius as unjust and treacherous (δολιώτερα ... ἀδικωτέρας, 6.46.1-6.47.6) and as having unrestrained greed: "the Cretans are the only people in the whole world in whose eyes no gain is dishonorable." The Boeotians are likewise described as consumed by drunkenness (20.4.7), cowardice and panic (20.4.6-5.3; 20.6.12), opulence (20.6.5-6), and a complete lack of administering justice (20.6.1-5). Indeed, the Boeotians League had fallen so deeply into depravity that the city of Megara chose to break away from the League and return to the Achaean League - again underscoring the "barbaric" nature of the Boeotians in contrast to the noble "Hellenic" Achaeans.[25] The Cynaethans are also painted in a similar light in the *Histories*. Compared to the kind (φιλανθρωπία), hospitable (φιλοξενία), and pius (εὐσέβεια) Arcanians (4.20.1), the Cynaethans are said to be savage (ἀγριότητος), cruel (ὠμότητι), and lawless (παρανομία): "they far surpassed

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[24] On the Aetolians in the *Histories*, see Sacks 1975; Champion 2004a: 129-135; Champion 2007; Nicholson 2020: 47, n.37.. For specific examples of Aetolians treachery, see ch. 2.
[25] For the Boeotians in the *Histories*, see Feyel (1942); McGing (2010) 192-193; Muller (2013); Nicholson 2020: 47, n.37.

all other Greeks in this period in cruelty and lawlessness" (τοὺς καιροὺς διήνεγκαν τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὠμότητι καὶ παρανομίᾳ).[26]

With these examples in mind, we find a Greek-barbarian spectrum in the *Histories* with the Achaean League representing what it means to be truly "Greek" (i.e., civilized, just, courageous, noble, rational, faithful, dutiful, and proponents of law and order as well as freedom and equality), and with peoples such as the Gauls, Illyrians, and Thracians representing what it means to be "barbarian" (i.e., savage, cruel, faithless, lawless, irrational, greedy, and animalistic). For Polybius, the main catalyst behind the positive or negative characteristics of a citizen body was often the *politeia* and the social, educational, cultural, and religious institutions found within the state.[27] Thus, we find Polybius' explanation for much of the Cynaethans' savagery as stemming from their abandonment of the soothing practice of music (4.18.13-21.8). Ultimately, Polybius emphasizes that it is the actions (or inactions) of a city's leaders, rather than ethnicity or inheritance, that constitutes what determines how "Greek" or "barbaric" a state is. As such, when states, even Greek states like those described above, act with barbaric qualities, Polybius presents them as "barbarian" or "non-Greek."[28]

There is perhaps no better example of this Polybian framework than the nuanced descriptions throughout the *Histories* of Philip V of Macedon.[29] Philip V in many ways is the most prominent individual in the *Histories*, appearing extensively between books 4 and 25 as Polybius describes the king of Macedon's reign from 221 – 179. As we have seen, Philip

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[26] We should note that during these descriptions, the Spartans, Boeotians, and Cynaethans were in league with the Aetolians.

[27] Champion 2004a: 75-84; Erskine 2013: 233-235; Champion 2013; Nicholson 2020: 47-48.

[28] On the non-Greek portrayal of the Spartans and Cretans, cf. Pelling (1997) 54-55.

[29] For a comprehensive look at Philip V's life, see Walbank 1940/1960; for Philip's early years and kingship, see D'Agostini 2019; for Philip's sea policy, see Kleu 2015; for Macedonian context more generally, see Hammond 1989 and King 2018.

receives some of Polybius' sharpest rebukes for numerous acts of treachery and impiety. That is

not to say, however, that Polybius uniformly or uncritically condemns Philip throughout this

period.[30] Rather, Polybius' complex characterization of Philip throughout his reign, as an

individual capable of both admirable and deplorable actions, offers readers insight into the

historian's understanding of the decline of both monarchies and states in general. In exploring

Polybius' portrayal of King Philip V between the start of his reign in 221 and his defeat at

Cynoscephalae in 197, we see both the admirable ("Greek") Philip as well as the treacherous

("barbaric") Philip.

Philip the Greek

Polybius praises the early period of Philip's rule, from 221 to 217, holding Philip to be a

competent general and a loyal ally, earning respect from friends and enemies alike. Philip came

onto the throne in the summer of 221 after the unexpected death of his regent uncle, Antigonus

Doson (4.5). Only 17 at this time, Philip quickly found himself beset by enemies hoping to take

advantage of a young king and the newly perceived weakness of the Macedonian state. Despite his

young age, Philip pushed back a number of barbarian tribes to the north, including the Dardani,

foiling their attempts to invade Macedonia (4.66.1-7). Polybius explains that upon hearing news

of the plotted Dardanian campaign into Macedonia, Philip wisely put his current campaign with

the Achaeans on hold, fervently promising his allies that he would return, and marched his army

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[30] On Polybius' complex judgments and his objectiveness in general, including his willingness to criticize Rome and even Achaea (including Aratus and Philopoemen) when the situation calls for it, see chapter 1 as well as Wunderer 1927: 96; Eckstein 1995: 8-10, 36-38, 100-102, 113-114, 239-240, 275. Emphasizing Polybius' bias toward friends of Rome and against enemies of Rome, see Usher 1969: 121; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 324, 367; Walbank 1974: 10-11 and 20; Edmund 1977: 129-136; Reiter 1988: 20-21, 32-33, 137; Green 1990: 277-278; Goldsworthy 2007: 14. Gruen 1981: 180 acknowledges some of the complexities of Polybius' presentation of Philip, but still holds that "his history is overwhelmingly hostile to the Macedonian king."

back toward Macedonia. By looking after his own state and upholding good faith with his allies, Philip acted as Polybius believes a good king should.

The major conflict during this first period of Philip's life through which Polybius highlights Philip's good character was the Social War. Waged from 220 to 217, this war was fought by the Hellenic Symmachy (primarily Macedonia and the Achaean League), led by Philip, against a number of other Greek states (primarily the Aetolian League, Sparta, and Elis). The Social War, more than any other event in Philip's life, shed light onto the inherently good qualities that Polybius believed Philip possessed (4.77.1-3):

> Philip, then, both by his behavior to those with whom he was associated in the camp and by his ability and daring in the field, was winning a high reputation not only among those serving with him but among all the rest of the Peloponnesians. For it would be difficult to find a prince more richly endowed by nature with the qualities requisite for the attainment of power. He possessed a quick intelligence, a retentive memory, and great personal charm, as well as the presence and authority that becomes a king, and above all ability and courage as a general.[31]

Polybius praises Philip's general good character, paying special attention (μέγιστον) to his ability (πρᾶξις) and courage (τόλμα) as a general.

Indeed, Philip proved himself to be a brilliant commander throughout the war. Polybius describes Philip's ability to inspire his troops. At Lechaeum in the summer of 218, after realizing the importance of holding naval supremacy in the war, Philip personally trained his soldiers to serve as the rowers on his ships (5.2.4). Due to his personal charisma and dedication to his men: "The Macedonians obeyed his orders in this respect with the utmost alacrity" (5.2.4). Similarly, Philip demonstrated his ability to inspire his soldiers at the siege of Palus: "The Macedonians

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[31] Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις συνδιατρίβοντας καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς πρᾶξιν καὶ τόλμαν οὐ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς στρατευομένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι Πελοποννησίοις εὐδοκίμει. βασιλέα γὰρ πλείοσιν ἀφορμαῖς ἐκ φύσεως κεχορηγημένον πρὸς πραγμάτων κατάκτησιν οὐκ εὐμαρὲς εὑρεῖν: καὶ γὰρ ἀγχίνοια καὶ μνήμη καὶ χάρις ἐπῆν αὐτῷ διαφέρουσα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπίφασις βασιλικὴ καὶ δύναμις, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πρᾶξις καὶ τόλμα πολεμική.

worked with such goodwill that about two hundred feet of the wall was soon undermined, and the king now approached the wall and invited the garrison to come to terms" (5.7.4). Philip also displayed a sense of solidarity when, having been betrayed by Apelles, he willingly pawned off some of his own plates in order to pay his troops (5.3.10). Polybius' praise of Philip's personal charm and his ability to inspire his troops not only speaks toward his skill as a general, but also toward his abilities as a king. Philip's ability to maintain these positive social relationships with others, in this case his troops, was an essential element to being a successful king in Polybius' eyes.

Polybius likewise emphasized Philip's sound employment of military strategy and the energy with which he conducted the war. Polybius describes the energetic (ἐνεργής) siege operations carried out by Philip in the summer of 219, resulting in the capture of Ambracus in only forty days (4.63.1-3). From Ambracus, Philip marched to the Aetolian city of Phoetiae and assaulted it so vigorously that the garrison surrendered after two days (4.63.7-8). In fact, Phoetiae was taken so swiftly that Philip managed to ambush a relief force of Aetolians that had been sent to reinforce the city (4.63.9). Shortly after, Philip displayed tactical brilliance with the use of his peltasts to ward off attempts by the Aetolian cavalry to harass his army's march on Canope (4.64). Philip continued to display great energy by mobilizing some of his forces to Corinth late into winter, when the Greeks thought he had set up camp for the winter of 219/218 (4.67). This in turn led to Philip's successfully capturing the defensive town of Psophis with a swift and energetic attack (4.70-71). Shortly after, Philip also captured the city of Alipheira after an energetic attack in which he was the first to enter the city, having climbed up some precipitous rocks to the base of the citadel (4.78). Despite being mid-winter by this point, Philip continued to press his advantage,

forcing the Aetolians and Eleans to surrender and withdraw from the city of Samicum, securing the region (4.80).

At the siege of Palus in the summer of 218, Philip demonstrated his ability to strategically deploy various siege weapons to pin down the garrison while the Macedonians opened up mines beneath the city walls (5.3-4). Polybius intentionally makes the king (βασιλεὺς) the subject of his description, emphasizing that it was Philip, even more than his soldiers, who was actively carrying out the siege of the city (5.4.6). In the end, the attack on the city is only thwarted due to the treachery of Lentius. Polybius further emphasizes Philip's generalship by highlighting the king's forethought throughout the war. For instance, we see Philip's care and caution in safeguarding his fleet with a trench and palisade (5.3.5; 5.103.5) and in protecting his baggage train during marches (5.6.5-6). Perhaps Philip's most glorious achievement during the Social War was his successful attack on Thermus, the Aetolian capital (5.8-13). Due to the natural strength of the passes in and out of the region, Philip's decision to attack was bold, daring, and wholly unexpected (5.7.2). Rather than a reckless foray, Philip's attack demonstrated a calculated risk and an understanding of the Aetolian mindset, which paid off handsomely: "The Aetolians, never dreaming that Philip would so readily venture to throw himself into the country round Thermus owing to its great natural strength, were caught off their guard and absolutely unprepared for such an occurrence" (5.7.2).[32] Philip's forethought concerning the attack on Thermus was ultimately proven by his safe retreat out of the valley (5.13.1-7). Again, Philip follows this victory against the Aetolians with a swift

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[32] καθ᾽ ἕτερον δ᾽ ᾗ πρός γε τὸν ἐν τοῖς Θέρμοις τόπον οὐδέποτ᾽ ἂν ὑπολαβόντες Αἰτωλοὶ τολμῆσαι τὸν Φίλιππον οὕτω προχείρως αὐτὸν δοῦναι διὰ τὰς ὀχυρότητας τῶν τόπων ἔμελλον ἀπρονόητοι καὶ παντελῶς ἀπαράσκευοι ληφθήσεσθαι πρὸς τὸ συμβαῖνον. This ability for a commander to perceive the situation of war and take advantage of it was similarly seen from Cleomenes, the revolutionary Spartan king from 235-222, as he ravaged the countryside of Argos (2.64).

invasion of Laconia, taking the Spartans by surprise by the daring and energy (τολμηρότερον καὶ πρακτικώτερον) of his attack (5.18).

Polybius also emphasizes that Philip showed other "Greek" qualities during the course of the Social War. Philip shows moderation in his handling of the treacherous Spartans, following the revolution that took place in the city after the removal of Cleomens in 222 (4.24). Philip demonstrates his piety as he makes sacrifices to the gods on the Olympus and Evas hills at Sellasia during his campaign in 218 (5.24.7-9). The king likewise shows the great control and restraint he maintains over his soldiers, only allowing them to pillage the country when appropriate and safe, as opposed to the Aetolian's unrestrained need to plunder (4.65.1-2). Throughout the war, Philip's strategy is rational and calculated.

Perhaps the most praiseworthy quality demonstrated by Philip during this early period was his loyalty to his allies. Philip's first act of the war was to send couriers to all of the Greek allies of the Hellenic Symmachy and hold a council at Corinth to deliberate what course of action should be taken against the Aetolians (4.22.1; 4.25.1). Polybius states that this attention shown by Philip to the allies showed both his mildness and magnanimity (πρᾳότητος καὶ μεγαλοψυχίας, 4.27.10). Even when Philip is forced to return with his army to Macedon to check the invasion of Scopias early in the war, he is careful to assure the Achaeans that he will return to assist them as soon as he is able (4.66.2-3). Indeed, at times Philip catered to the wishes of his Greek allies to his own detriment. Polybius states that had Philip invaded Aetolia immediately at the start of the war, rather than besiege and capture Ambracus at the request of the Epirotes, the entire conflict might have ended there and then (4.61.1-8). Philip is likewise quick to reward his allies with the spoils of war. For example, in 219 he hands over the captured city of Ambracus to the Epirots (4.63); the city of

Psophis to the Achaeans (4.72), which he is careful not to ravage or despoil; and the city of Lasion to the Achaeans (4.73).

Philip likewise is willing to listen to the advice of his allies and advisers. There are numerous examples throughout the war where Polybius makes it clear that Philip's council and advisors ("Philip and his friends") work together to make decisions. Examples include: how to deal with the unloyal Spartans in 221 (4.24); the decision to focus on naval supremacy in 218 (5.2); what to do following the failed siege of Palus (5.4.6-13); and how to successfully attack Sparta in 218 (5.22.1-8). In Polybius' mind, the most important advisor to King Philip was Aratus of Sicyon, one of the Achaean League's leading statesmen.[33] Polybius emphasizes that when Philip followed the advice of Aratus, the king made the right decisions. Thus, by heeding Aratus' suggestion and not sailing to aid Messenia, Philip avoided being trapped in Messenia all summer due to the unfavorable winds, as Leontius had hoped (5.5.1-10). Again, Philip listened to Aratus' advice to attack Thermus immediately, rather than rest his troops, against Leontius' suggestion, which was intended to give the Aetolians additional time to mount a defense against Philip's invasion (5.7.1-5). Indeed, Philip's willingness to listen to Aratus played a major role in the failed plots of the treacherous Leontius, Apelles, Megaleas, and Ptolemaeus (4.76-77; 5.4.10-13; 5.5.1-10; 5.7.1-5; 5.15-16.4; 5.25-29). In describing the loyalty and consideration Philip showed to Aratus and to the Achaeans in general, Polybius praises the king in an aside (4.77.1-3):

> Philip, then, both by his behavior to those with whom he was associated in the camp and by his ability and daring in the field, was winning a high reputation not only among those serving with him but among all the rest of the Peloponnesians. For it would be difficult to find a prince more richly endowed by nature with the qualities requisite for the attainment of power. He possessed a quick intelligence, a retentive

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[33] Aratus was largely responsible for the rise of the Achaean League's greatness during this period as well as its renewed ties with Macedon (2.43-10; 5.12.5-8; 7.12-14).

memory, and great personal charm, as well as the presence and authority that becomes a king, and above all ability and courage as a general.[34]

And just as Philip remained loyal to his Greek allies, so too did he keep his word with his enemies. With the capture of numerous cities, Philip offered terms to the garrisons as part of their surrender. Never once does Philip go back on his word (e.g., 4.63.1-3; 4.63.7-8; 4.71-72; 4.78; 4.80.11).

Ultimately, due to his natural abilities as well as his willingness to heed the advice of Aratus, Philip is described by Polybius in largely "Greek" terms. His conduct during the Social War shows him to be a just, magnanimous, mild, and charming king; a loyal and considerate ally; and a calculating, daring, and intelligent commander.[35] It is due to these qualities and the great benefits given to the Greeks during this period that Philip is described by Polybius as the "darling of Greece" (7.11.4-8).[36] This role as the benefactor of the Greeks is echoed in the speech given in 217 at the end of the war by the Aetolian statesman Agelaus.[37] Agelaus asks Philip to safeguard the Greeks against the barbarian threat in the West of the Romans and Carthaginians (5.104-105), urging Philip to consider the Greeks to be part of his own body (5.104.5).[38]

Philip the Barbarian

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[34] Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις συνδιατρίβοντας καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς πρᾶξιν καὶ τόλμαν οὐ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς στρατευομένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι Πελοποννησίοις εὐδοκίμει. βασιλέα γὰρ πλείοσιν ἀφορμαῖς ἐκ φύσεως κεχορηγημένον πρὸς πραγμάτων κατάκτησιν οὐκ εὐμαρὲς εὑρεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἀγχίνοια καὶ μνήμη καὶ χάρις ἐπῆν αὐτῷ διαφέρουσα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπίφασις βασιλικὴ καὶ δύναμις, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πρᾶξις καὶ τόλμα πολεμική.

[35] On Philip's use of speed during his campaigns, see McGing 2010: 100-116; McGing 2013: 189-191, 195-196.

[36] On Polybius' use of this term, see Nicholson 2018.

[37] On the expectation of Hellenistic kings to serve as benefactors of the Greeks, see Gauthier 1985; Bringman 1993; and Ma 2003: 179-183.

[38] On the possibly anachronistic elements of Aglaus' speech, concerning the panhellenic sentiment and *symploke*, see (historical) Deininger 1973; Gruen 1984: 324, fn. 34; (ahistorical) Morkholm 1967; Morkholm 1974; (mixed) Champion 1997; Nicholson 2020: 53-54, fn. 62.

Hints at the ultimate decline of Philip's character after 217 could already be seen during the Social War. As we have seen, when the king followed the advice of Aratus, he continued to demonstrate Greek virtue. Even during the war, however, Philip's loyalty to Aratus wavered at times. Thus, at the end of 219, Apelles convinced Philip to throw his support behind Aratus' political rival in the election for *strategos* (4.82). Later in 218, Philip followed the advice of Demetrius of Pharos. In listening to the Illyrian chieftain's advice, Philip barbarically devastated the religious temples, votive offerings, and statues of the gods at Thermus (5.11-12.4), an action which Polybius states only someone with a frenzied mind and soul (τρόπου καὶ θυμοῦ λυττῶντος) could commit (5.11.4). In this way, Aratus and Demetrius represented either end of the Greek-barbarian paradigm. As Philip continued to gain and solidify his own power after 217, however, the king continued to side with Demetrius and embody more barbaric qualities.

The Peace of Naupactus, ending the Social War in the summer of 217, brought about two important changes in Philip's political situation. First, the peace saw Philip become the preeminent military power in Greece. Second, the peace (and in fact the reason for it) allowed Philip to turn toward the west with thoughts of world domination. Polybius indicates that this newfound power that Philip wielded was ultimately the cause of the corruption of his character and of his public opinion in Greece: "For as he totally changed his principles, it was inevitable that he should totally reverse also other men's opinion of him, and that he should meet with totally different results in his undertakings" (5.108.5). As with Philip's decision to impiously destroy religious temples and offerings at Pius, Philip's hunger for world domination was kindled by Demetrius of Pharos.

The moral degradation of Philip's character is best seen through Philip's numerous acts of treachery between 217 and 198. Indeed, Polybius points to Philip's treachery at Messenia in 215 as the king's turning point for the worse: "this was the beginning of the revolution in his character

333

and his notable change for the worse" (7.11). In this year, according to Polybius, Philip encouraged a factional rebellion at the allied city of Messene, resulting in the massacre of many of the leading pro-Achaean officials as well as nearly two hundred citizens (7.12.9).[39] Afterward, hoping to capture the citadel, Philip went into the city and up to the citadel on the pretense of making sacrifices to Zeus and debated treacherously seizing the fortress. His advisor, Demetrius of Pharos, encouraged Philip to do so, arguing that with the Acrocorinth and Mount Ithome under his control, he would control the entire Peloponnese (7.12.3).[40] Ultimately, however, Aratus of Sicyon, who had been absent and unable to prevent the initial treachery against Messene, managed to convince Philip, against the king's own inclination, that the resulting loss of goodwill from his allies was not worth capturing the citadel. Thus, Philip, ashamed (ἐνετράπη, 7.12.9) of his actions, leaves Messene without committing a second unjustified act of treachery against the city. Yet, Polybius emphasizes that this was just the first of Philip's great crimes (τῶν μεγίστων ἀσεβημάτων, 7.13.6).[41] Again, the treachery at Messene was the first glimpse of Philip's degenerating moral character (7.13.7):

> Henceforth, as if he had had a taste of human blood and of the slaughter and betrayal (παρασπονδεῖν) of his allies, he did not change from a man into a wolf, as in the Arcadian tale cited by Plato, but he changed from a king into a cruel tyrant.[42]

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[39] Polybius' account of the initial treachery at Messene is lost and only hinted at indirectly. For the full account, see Plut. *Arat.* 49.

[40] As in the works of other historians (i.e Herodotus), the influence of advisors and counselors constitutes a major theme of Polybius' *Histories*. Thus, the adverse effects of Demetrius of Pharos on Philip V (7.11.1); Hermeias' treacherous advice to the young Antiochus III (5.41.1-3; cf. 5.42.7; 5.49-50); and Pantauchus' influence on a young Genthius (29.3.5-4.3). See ; Walbank 1933: 122-156; Welwei 1963: 138; Eckstein 1995: 147, n. 109.

[41] It is difficult to maintain that Polybius views Philip's actions at Messene, both intended and realized, in a purely pragmatic context without thought to morality, as suggested by Walbank 1967: 58 and Sacks 1980: 135. On the interpretation of Polybius' moral evaluation of Philip's treacher at Messene, see Eckstein 1995: 88-89. On Polybius' belief that the moral and the pragmatic could not be separated from one another, see later in this chapter.

[42] On the correct moral interpretation of this passage, see Eckstein 1995: 90. Van Scala 1890: 20 n. 2, 99 and Walbank 1967: 61 mistakenly view this passage's primary purpose to be a Polybian intellectual criticism of Plato, *Rep.* 8.565D. On the Arcadian legend that those who tasted human flesh remained

While Philip took Aratus' advice in 215, he appears to have done so with a bitter taste in his mouth. The king grew increasingly hostile toward Aratus, his shame turning into resentment (8.12.2; cf. 7.12.9). According to Polybius, this ill will toward Aratus ultimately resulted in Philip's decision to have Aratus poisoned in 213, despite the Macedonian-Achaean alliance (8.12.2-6).[43] In carrying out this wicked (κακόν, 8.12.4) betrayal, Philip was guilty of the greatest brutality (τὴν μεγίστην ἀσέλγειαν, 8.12.1).[44] Polybius maintains that Philip's betrayal of Aratus is even more shameful given the great loyalty that Aratus had shown the king for nearly a decade (8.12.6). This point is emphasized in Polybius' account of Aratus' word to his trusted servant Cephalon after he was poisoned. Pointing to some of his own blood that he had coughed up, Aratus told his servant: "That, Cephalon, is the reward I have received from Philip for my friendship" (8.12.4).[45]

With the weight of Aratus' restraint off of his shoulders, Philip's treacherous inclinations came forward during the following years. In 208, upon returning to the allied city of Argos and presiding over the Nemean games, Philip treacherously seduced Achaean wives, widows, and any other women whom he chose, flaunting his absolute power (μείζω καὶμοναρχικωτέραν) over the Greeks (10.26.2).[46] To prevent any resistance, Philip levied false charges against the husbands and sons to intimidate them, acting against his allies in a "most outrageous and lawless manner" (πολλὴν ἀσέλγειαν καὶ παρανομίαν, 10.26.4).

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werewolves forever: Paus 8.2.6. Mount Lycaeon (Wolf Mountain) towered gloomily over Polybius' city of Megaloplis.

[43] Walbank 1967: 87.

[44] Cf. Pausanias 2.9.4. Scholars disagree on whether Aratus was in fact poisoned. Thus Porter 1910: 84 suggests that both Aratus and Aratus the younger suffered from Tuberculosis. It is true, however, that in addition to Aratus, Philip was said to have killed: Callias and Epicrates (Walbank 1940: 3-7); Chariteles of Cyparissia (Livy. 32.21.23); Eurycleides and Micon of Athens (Paus. 2.9.4; Treves 1940: 147-149); Cassander (Maronea *epist.* 22.14.2-6); and his son Demetrius (Livy. 40.5-16, 20.3-24; 8.54-56; Diod. 29.25; Justin. 32.2-3; Plut. *Arat.* 54.3; *Aem. Paul.* 8.6 f.; Zon. 9.22; Walbank 1940: 252); and attempted on Philopoemen (Plut. *Philop.* 12.2; Paus. 8.50.4; Justin. 29.4.11). See Walbank 1967: 87-88.

[45] "ταῦτα τἀπίχειρα τῆς φιλίας, ὦ Κεφάλων, κεκομίσμεθα τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον."

[46] Cf. Livy 27.30.31.

Perhaps Philip's most famous example of treachery came with the so-called "Pact of the Kings" in 203/202. Following the unexpected death of Ptolemy IV in 204, Philip and Antiochus III decided to divide up the kingdom of the helpless five-year-old Ptolemy V between them (3.2.8; 15.20.1-2).[47] Polybius sharply criticizes Philip and Antiochus, saying that it was their natural duty to maintain the possession of the child's realm (15.20.2). Instead, they revealed their unrestrained and animalistic natures (ἀνέδην καὶ θηριωδῶς, 15.20.3) through the evil aggression (κακοπραγμονεῖν, 3.2.8) they committed against Ptolemy. Polybius goes on to describe the kings as sharks consuming smaller fish (15.20.3). Polybius continues to describe their unbounded covetousness (πλεονεξίας) as representing "impiety toward the gods and savagery toward men" (15.20.4).[48] Indeed, Philip had been in talks to become Ptolemy V's father-in-law at the same time that he was betraying him with his pact with Antiochus. And before long, Philip and Antiochus even began to break faith (παρασπονδούντων, 15.20.6) with one another. Polybius found such behavior to be shameful (αἰσχύνης, 15.20.3) and beneath even tyrants, who at least put forth the effort to provide some trivial pretext (βραχεῖαν πρόφασιν) for committing treachery (15.20.3).[49]

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[47] While sources other than Polybius note the existence of the pact, these sources are mostly later, confused, and at time contradictory: Polyb. 3.2.8, 14.1a.4-5, 15.20, 16.1.8-9, 24.6; Justin 30.2.8; Pomp. Trog. *Prol.* 30; Hieron. *In Dan.* 11.13. Somewhat confused: App. *Mac.* 4; John Antioch. Frg. 54. Explaining pact as rumor: App. *Mac.* 4; Justin 30.2.8.

[48] πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀσεβείας καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὠμότητος.

[49] As opposed to Philip and Antiochus in this instance, who admit that their aggression against Ptolemy was without pretext or justification (οὐδ' οὖν...βραχεῖαν δή τινα προβαλλόμενοι τῆς αἰσχύνης πρόφασιν, 15.20.3). On arguments for the historicity of the Pact, see chapter 2. On the full acceptance of Polybius' version of the pact, see Schmitt 1964: 226-236, 242; Schmitt 1969: 228-291; Eckstein 2006: 269-275; Eckstein 2012: 129-179; Rosenstein 2012: 182-183. On the pact as a coordinated effort to dismember Ptolemaic territory outside of Egypt proper, see Scullard 1980: 246, n. 2; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 343; Green 1990: 304. On the pact as non-interference, see Briscoe 1973: 37-39; Berthold 1976: 100-101; Berthold 1984: 110-111; Klose 1982: 64-68; Will 1982: 116; Gruen 1984: 387; Buraselis 1996: 154, n. 19; Lampela 1998: 76; Ma 1999/2002: 74-76; Wiemer 2001: 84. On the denial of the pact as an invention of Rhodian sources: Magie 1939: 32-44. On the pact as confusion regarding a local agreement between Philip and Zeuxis, the Seleucid commander in Asia Minor, over Pergamum and Rhodes, see Errington 1971: 336-354; Erington 1986: 5, n. 16. On other denials of the pact, see de Regibus 1951: 99; de Regibus 1952: 97-100; Habicht 1957: 239-240, n. 106; Habicht 1982: 146; Badian 1958: 64, n. 3; Badian 1964b: 135, n. 3; Rawlings 1976: 18-19, 23, n. 26; Harris 1979: 312, n. 2; Warrior 1996: 16-17. On the significance of the pact for the development of events and foreign policy in the East at the end of the 3rd century, see Holleaux 1935: 306-322; McDonald and Walbank 1937; Walbank 1940: 127-128;

Philip's treacherous nature in this period is likewise seen during his Aegean campaign in 202. Upon pushing into Asia Minor, Philip decided to capture the city of Cius in Bithynia, despite the fact that it was protected as an ally of the Aetolian League.[50] When diplomats from Rhodes and other neutral states urged Philip to refrain from attacking the city, Philip stalled negotiations long enough to capture and destroy the city (15.22.4; 15.23.1-3). During the siege, the Cians had surrendered on terms, Philip promising them that they would be spared. Instead, after agreeing to surrender under these assurances, the Cians were instead enslaved, and their city destroyed (15.23.3; 15.23.9). Polybius' condemnation of Philip's actions at Cius is sharp, calling Philip's breach of faith a shameful (αἰσχύνεσθαι, 15.23.5) act of treachery (παρασπονδοῦντι, 15.22.2), lacking any semblance of pretext or justification. Polybius characterizes Philip's unjust (ἀδίκως, 15.22.3) actions as cruel and treacherous (ὠμότητα, τῆς ἀθεσίας, 15.23.3-4), in line with his growing reputation among the Greeks for cruelty and impiety (ὠμότητος, ἀσεβείᾳ 15.22.3).[51]

Polybius maintains that Philip's journey back to Greece was marked by one act of treachery (παρασπόνδημα, 15.24.1) after another. The most notable betrayal occurred at the independent city of Thasos. Upon Philip's arrival, the Thasians told Philip's general, Metrodorus, that they would surrender to Philip so long as he promised to leave the city under its own laws and free of garrison or tribute (15.24.2). Philip agreed to these terms, but upon entering the city he betrayed the Thasians and instead enslaved the entire population.[52] Polybius criticizes Philip's treachery,

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Chamouz 2002: 114; Eckstein 2006: 269-275; Eckstein 2012: 212-269; Rosenstein 2012: 182-183. On the denial of the pact's influence, see Magie 1939; Balsdon 1954: 37; Badian 1958: 64; Errington 1971: 347-354; Rawlings 1976: 18-19, 23, n. 26; Ager 1991: 16-22; Warrior 1996: 17, n. 16; Derow 2003: 58-59.
[50] On Philip's campaign, see Walbank 1940: 108-127; Gruen 1984 (with detailed sources): 384, n.142; Hammond and Walbank 411-416.
[51] On Polybius' moral condemnation of Philip's actions at Cius, see Eckstein 1995: 88-89. On the hatred toward Philip shown by the Rhodians, see Walbank 1967: 477; Berthold 1976: 97; Berthold 1984: 112; Errington 1989: 252; Ager 1991: 20; Baronowski 2011: 76; Eckstein 2012: 148, 191-192.
[52] Hammond and Walbank 413; Eckstein 1995: 88; Eckstein 2012: 148, 208-209.

claiming that it revealed Philip's fickleness and faithlessness (τὴν ἀθεσίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀβεβαιότητα,15.25.4) to the whole world.[53]

Ultimately, Philip serves as a good example of Polybius' use of the Greek-barbarian spectrum in passing moral judgment upon individuals in his *Histories*. During the early years of his reign, Philip is described by Polybius as acting with justice, integrity, and loyalty - in other words, "Greek" qualities. He remains stalwartly faithful to his Greek allies and true to his word to his enemies, ultimately becoming seen as the "darling" and the defender of the Greeks (7.11.4-8; 5.104-105). Following the Peace at Naupactus in 217, however, Philip's character takes a turn for the worse, shifting increasingly toward the "barbarian" side of the spectrum. And in fact, Polybius' description of the acts of treachery closely match with the characteristics that are assigned to barbarians throughout the *Histories*.[54] Thus, Philip is described as *lawless* (παρανομίαν, 10.26.4), *unrestrained* (ἀνέδην, 15.20.3), *cruel* (ὠμότητος, 15.22.3; ὠμότητα, 15.23.3), *brutal* (μεγίστην ἀσέλγειαν, 8.12.1), *impious* (ἀσεβείας, 15.20.3; ἀσεβείᾳ, 15.22.3), *covetous* (πλεονεξίας, 15.20.4), *animalistic* (7.13.7; θηριωδῶς, 15.20.3), and of course *treacherous* (παρασπονδεῖν, 7.13.7; παρασπονδούντων, 15.20.6; παρασπονδοῦντι, 15.22.2; ἀθεσίας, 15.23.3-4; παρασπόνδημα, 15.24.1; ἀθεσίαν, 15.25.4; ἀβεβαιότητα, 15.25.4). Polybius emphasizes that such actions are "shameful" (ἐνετράπη, 7.12.9; αἰσχύνης, 15.20.3; αἰσχύνεσθαι, 15.23.5) for Philip to be conducting. And indeed, the behavior of Philip following Naupactus is markedly different from the magnanimous Philip during the Social War. While the "Greek" Philip worked closely with his

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[53] Cf. Livy 33.30.3. Baronowski 2011: 90. The full passage at 15.24.5-6 reads: "Therefore they are disappointed of any credit for noble conduct, though as a rule they do not miss their immediate interest. But who would not qualify as perfectly irrational and insane the conduct of a prince, who, engaging in vast enterprises and aspiring to universal dominion, with his chances of success in all his projects still unimpaired, yet in matters of no moment, in the very first matters he was called upon to deal with, proclaimed to all his fickleness and faithlessness?"

[54] On Polybius' classification of Greek and barbarian characteristics, see

allies and kept promises made to surrendered enemies, the "barbarian" Philip betrays and works against his Greek allies and goes back on formal promises made to cities and garrisons.

Polybius is clear on what he believes to be the cause of this "revolution in [Philip's] character and his notable change for the worse" (7.11). It was Philip's accumulation of power as a result of the Social War. Regardless of how grounded Philip's plans of "world domination" (δυναστείας) were in 217, Polybius' emphasizes the power-hungry greed with which Philip begins to view the world, urged by Demetrius (5.102.1; 5.104.7; 5.108.5). Ultimately, Philip's decision to look to expand his hegemony beyond Greece was the result of the newfound power that he had gathered as a result of Naupactus. And it was this power that caused the elevation of Philip's tyrannical qualities at the expense of his natural good qualities - this "notable change for the worse" (7.11). Polybius is clear about this trajectory in Book 27:

> At the time when King Philip grew great and was powerful in Greece, no one had less regard for good faith and law, but when the wind of his good fortune veered, he was the most moderate of men. When finally he entirely came to grief, he attempted to adapt himself to all contingencies and by every means to build up his kingdom again (27.17.9-10).

Here we are reminded of John Dalberg-Acton's proverbial remark that "power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely." Indeed, when Philip finds this power being taken from him following both Cynoscephalae in 197, we see some of Philip's former magnanimous character return. Thus, Polybius emphasizes that the first thing that Philip does upon his defeat is to rescue as many survivors from the battle as he could find (18.43.1). Next, Philip sends one of his aides to Larisa with orders to burn his royal correspondence, "acting like a true king in not forgetting his duty even in the hour of disaster (ποιῶν πρᾶγμα βασιλικὸν τὸ μηδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς λήθην ποιεῖσθαι

τοῦ καθήκοντος): for he well knew that if the documents fell into the hands of the Romans he would be giving them much material to use against himself and his friends" (18.43.2-3).[55]

Anacyclosis: The Cycle of Politeia and Paranomia

Much like his portrayal of Philip, Polybius offers a nuanced opinion on monarchy in general. Despite his role as a leading member of the democratic Achaean League, Polybius does not present monarchy as inherently evil. Rather, by judging Philip's actions, Polybius offers a portrayal of how a good king ought to act. While Polybius believes that the most important attributes of a good king are courage and skill on the battlefield as well as the ability to strengthen one's state, Polybius emphasizes two qualities that a good king must possess: social beneficence and moderation. It is these qualities that distinguish the benevolent king (βασιλεύς) from the wicked tyrant (τύραννος): "It is indeed the part of a tyrant to do evil that he may make himself the master of men by fear against their will, hated himself and hating his subjects, but it is that of a king to do good to all and thus rule and preside over a willing people, earning their love by his beneficence and humanity" (5.11.6). Such a distinction has already been discussed with regard to Philip in comparing Polybius' portrayal of Philip the king during the Social War with Philip the tyrant during the Pact of the Kings in 203/202 (15.20.3).

Nor does Polybius appear to find such tyrannical behavior rare. Instead, the Achaean historian maintains that the majority of kings, once power has been secured, will devolve into tyrants: "Perhaps it may be said of all kings that at the beginnings of their reigns they talk of freedom as of a gift they offer to all and style all those who are thus loyal adherents their friends

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[55] Welwei, *Konige und Konigtum*, 38-53; for Polybius' view of the various stages of Philip's career. Eckstein 1995: 98 views Polybius' description of Philip's actions as fitting into the larger general pattern of praise for good faith, and condemnation of treachery and deceit, that he argues is found throughout *The Histories*.

and allies, but as soon as they have established their authority they at once begin to treat those who placed trust in them not as allies but as servants" (15.24.4-6). Philip, then, appears to be the rule rather than the exception. This tendency is supported by the frequency at which treachery is carried out in monarchies as opposed to in republics, as discussed in the previous chapters. Kings who manage to maintain their benevolence despite the wielding monarchical power, kings like Hiero II, Attalus, and Eumenes II, are rare in the *Histories*. This fact alone suggests Polybius viewed monarchy as a problematic institution. For while Polybius believed that the monarchic system depended upon the willing approval and loyalty of a king's subjects, he also saw the use of fear and force, not social beneficence, as the most natural and easiest tools for kings to utilize. In this way, the very inclination of monarchy worked to undermine the social bonds that support it.

The tendency for kings to devolve into tyrants in the *Histories* is also addressed by Polybius in his discussion of the "Cycle of Polities" (*Anacyclosis*) in Book 6. In Polybius' theory of the decline of states, he maintains that monarchy is one of the three types of government, along with aristocracy and democracy. Polybius believed that each of these forms of government eventually devolved into a corrupted counterpart - monarchy descends into tyranny, aristocracy devolves into oligarchy, and democracy descends into mobocracy (6.4.7-10).[56] Polybius believed that all states moved naturally, inevitably, and sequentially through these six types of polities (6.3-10) in a cycle (*anacyclosis*).[57] The special case of the mixed *politeia* allowed cities to greatly reduce the corrupting decline of the state, though even these polities were not permanently removed from this cycle of decline and reformation. Hence, we see the descent of the Carthage into mob rule (6.51.6-

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[56] Polybius' identification of the six *politeiai* followed Aristotle's similar discussion: *Pol.* 1279a16, 1279a32-1279b4, 1287b36, 1310b40. For the Aristotilean influence on Polybius' discussion and the limitations of this association, see Walbank 1972: 131-152; Pocock 1975: 66-80; Nippel 1994: 7-10; Nelson 2004: 3-4.
[57] For Polybius' *anacyclosis*, see Walbank 1957-1979: 635-756; Pedech 1964: 303-330; Trompf 1979: 1-115; Alonso-Nunez 1986; Lintott 1999: 16-26, 214-220; Champion 2004a: 67-99; Seager 2013.

8), as Polybius' cycle predicts (cf. 6.57), despite its mixed constitution. The decline of the state was only slowed by the stability of the mixed constitution, not stopped entirely. Ultimately, the mixed constitution still primarily reflects one of the three forms of government, intertwined with elements of the other two. Thus, the Lycurgan constitution of Sparta (2.47.3; 6.3.8; 10.11; 23.11.5) grew out of the monarchy and ultimately returned back into monarchy.

Similarly, while Polybius believed that Rome represented the best mixed constitution, worthy of praise and emulation, the *Histories* suggest that Rome remained an aristocracy with elements of monarchy and democracy.[58] Thus, Polybius' aside in Book 6 in which he discusses the success of Rome is in many ways an explanation of how the Romans were able to pivot from the brink of destruction after the defeat at Cannae in 216 to hegemony over the entire Mediterranean only 50 years later:

> The Romans on their part owing to this defeat at once abandoned all hope of retaining their supremacy in Italy, and were in the greatest fear about their own safety and that of Rome, expecting Hannibal every moment to appear. It seemed indeed as if Fortune were taking part against them in their struggle with adversity and meant to fill the cup to overflowing; for but a few days afterward, while the city was yet panic-stricken, the commander they had sent to Cisalpine Gaul was surprised by the Celts in an ambush and he and his force utterly destroyed. Yet the Senate neglected no means in its power, but exhorted and encouraged the populace, strengthened the defenses of the city, and deliberated on the situation with manly coolness. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans were now incontestably beaten and their military reputation shattered, yet by the peculiar virtues of their constitution and by wise counsel they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy and afterward defeated the Carthaginians, but in a few years made themselves masters of the whole world (3.118.3-9).

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[58] Walbank (1972) sees the mixed constitution as a "mirage of divided powers and its almost mechanical system of checks and balances," which even blinds Polybius to the reality that the texture of political life in Rome ensured the domination of the *nobiles* (155). Baronowski (2011) similarly sees the importance of the aristocracy acting within this mixed constitution (141). For similar views, see McGing 2010: 179-180, 186-189.

Polybius argues that it is the courage of the Roman aristocracy and the virtues of their constitution (πολιτεύματος ἰδιότητι, 3.118.9) that saves Rome in 216. As Polybius maintains in Book 6, it is the strength of the Roman constitution and other institutions, notably the Roman religious and military institutions (cf. 6.56.11), that guarantee the continued health of the state, despite the crushing military defeats at the hands of Hannibal between 218 and 216.

Nor is Polybius' discussion in Book 6 merely theoretical. In the past decade, scholars have been right to emphasize that Polybius' discussion in Book 6 underpins his work as a whole.[59] Polybius' depiction of states throughout the *Histories* frequently associates the decline of the state with "barbaric" qualities of the Hellenic/barbarian spectrum previously discussed. Again, it is Philip's tyrannical behavior that ultimately alienates him from his Greek allies, resulting in his defeat at Cynoscephalae in 198 at the hands of the Romans. Similarly, the degeneration of Ptolemy IV leads to a potentially serious coup by Cleomenes in 219 and the initial inability to respond to Antiochus' invasion into Coele-Syria.

Nicholson is right to point to Polybius' Hellenic/barbaric dichotomy as being "explicitly tied to the 'health' of the political, institutional, military and social structures of the state."[60] The *Histories* frequently associates a number of "barbaric" attributes with these corrupt forms of governance, including: injustice (ἀδικία), false pretension (ἀλαζονεία), greed (πλεονεξία), irrationality (ἀλογία), lawlessness (παρανομία), and animal behavior and savagery (ἀποθηρέομαι / θηριώδης).[61] These same attributes are also associated with barbarians throughout Polybius' work

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[59] See Balot 2010; McGing 2010: 169-194; Maier 2012: 27-37; Moore 2020 who rightly emphasize the important connections between Polybius' political theory and his depiction of historical events. For the contrary view, which misses this connection, see Momigliano 1969: 27; Alonso-Nunez 1986: 17; Hahm 1995: 10, n.12.

[60] Nicholson 2020: 48.

[61] For the association of these traits with mobocracy, see Champion 2004a: 69,89-90, 241-244. Nicholson 2020: 39-40, 48-50 rightly also associates these traits with oligarchy and tyranny.

(above), allowing readers to infer that the corruption of these good forms of government (i.e., monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) ultimately results in a state that has descended into injustice, greed, irrationality, and lawlessness - in other words, a city of barbarians.[62] For example, during the shift of Philip's rule from a monarchy to a tyranny, Polybius describes the Macedonian king in Book 7 as a werewolf with the taste for human blood (7.13.7) and later in Book 15, he describes Philip as a hungry shark consuming smaller fish (15.20.3). Similarly, as this dissertation has shown, as states begin to break down and move toward their own collapse or destruction, there is a tendency for these states to commit frequent bouts of treachery (παρασπονδέω).

Perhaps the most scathing "barbaric" characteristic that Polybius associates with states is that of παρανομία. In the many instances of treachery and betrayal that Polybius recounts in his work, the worst instances are often characterized and condemned as παρανομία. In its over 50 appearances throughout the *Histories*, παρανομία is generally translated as "lawlessness." That said, Polybius typically reserves the term for his most severe rebukes of peoples, states, and statesmen. Thus, in its gentlest employment, it can be taken to mean "lawless violence," and in its most severe use, Polybius uses παρανομία to mean "outrages against the laws of gods and men," as some authors have correctly emphasized.[63] In all cases, the actions to which Polybius assigns παρανομία are typically marked by a violent betrayal of what is expected out of a state or ruler. As we have already seen in the previous chapter, violently attacking diplomats constituted one such violation. Destroying religious temples marked another example of παρανομία.

For Polybius, παρανομία was a common characteristic of the barbarian tribes on the fringes of the Mediterranean. Indeed, it was this lawlessness and disregard for common principles that made peoples like the Gauls, Illyrians, and Thracians a constant source of chaos and terror in the

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[62] For the association with barbarians, see Champion 2004a: 69,89-90, 241-244.
[63] See most notably the Classical Loeb Library edition.

minds of the Greeks and Romans. The frequency in which these peoples disregarded universal protections for diplomats has already been highlighted in the previous chapter. For example, Queen Teuta's treacherous actions against the Roman envoys, Lucius and Gaius Corucanius (2.8.13), as well as her unjustified raids against the Greeks (2.11.5) are both described as παρανομία. Indeed, it was this Illyrian παρανομία that led the Corcyreans to accept Roman protection in this year (2.8.13). Polybius similarly emphasizes the παρανομία of the Galatian Gauls of Asia Minor. The victory of Gnaeus Manlius over the Galatian Gauls in 189 marked the liberation of all nations west of the Taurus Mountains (21.40.2; 3.3.5). Polybius emphasizes that the Greek cities in Asia were even more pleased with the end of the Gallic παρανομία than with the end of tribute to Antiochus following his defeat in 188 (21.40.2). This same concern over barbarian παρανομία is seen with the Thracians. In negotiations with Philip V during the Second Macedonian War, Flamininus tells Alexander, Philip's legate, that the Romans had no intention of destroying the Macedonian kingdom, as this would open up the Greeks to the παρανομία of the Thracians (18.37.9).

As we have seen with Polybius' characterization of states and the Hellenic/barbaric framework, Polybius maintains that anyone is capable of barbarism based upon their actions and institutions. Thus, mercenaries are seen as being prone to παρανομία. For example, Polybius emphasizes the παρανομία of the Campanian treachery against the Messenians. The Campanians had been admitted as friends into Messenia only to occupy the city, massacre its citizens, and take possession of the widowed and orphaned wives and families. The Carthaginian mercenaries were likewise shown to exhibit παρανομία, exemplified by the countless atrocities carried out during the Mercenary War, which Polybius claims surpassed all other wars in terms of cruelty and lawlessness (παρανομία, 1.84.10). Polybius likewise emphasized the παρανομία of the Libyans in betraying the Carthaginians during this war (1.88.7). Similarly, Polybius praised Scipio Africanus

for his awareness in understanding the tendency of the Numidians toward παρανομία (14.1.4). Again, Polybius is particularly critical of the Aetolian League, emphasizing the παρανομία of the Aetolians in their unjustified attack on Messenia in 221 (4.5.2) as well as in their later destruction of temples at Dium and Dodana during the Social War (9.35.6).[64] Polybius maintains that the Aetolians made their living "by robbery and similar παρανομία (30.11.1). Polybius is critical of the Cynaethans as well, holding that "they far surpassed all other Greeks in this period in cruelty and παρανομία (4.20.1). Polybius goes on to explain that contrary to the kind (φιλανθρωπία), hospitable (φιλοξενία), and pius (εὐσέβεια) Arcanians, the Cynaethans had become cruel and lawless due to the abandonment of important institutions, namely the practice of music, the inhospitality of their climate, and their obsession with political rivalries (4.20-21).

The παρανομία of the Cynaethans serves as strong evidence for Polybius' belief that good polities with upright institutions encouraged the Hellenic qualities of reason, justice, duty, courage, and order, while bad polities encouraged the barbaric qualities of irrationality, passion, savagery, licentiousness, greed, selfishness, lack of restraint, and ultimately παρανομία. As a reflection of the health of the state, παρανομία, is a sign of the descent of monarchy into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy into mobocracy, following Polybius' notion of *anacyclosis* in Book 6 (cf. 6.7-8).

This is seen clearly in Polybius' association of παρανομία with kings who have descended into tyranny. Thus, Polybius uses "παρανομία" to describe the lawless character of Alexander, the tyrant of Pherae (8.35.6); the wicked crimes of Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta (13.6.4); the vicious character of Ptolemy Philopator, which resulted in a savage civil war (14.12.4; cf. 5.107); the

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[64] Polybius claims that the Aetolian's only justification was their own παρανομία. The only other half-hearted pretext that is mentioned is the rebuke of Dorimachus by the ephor Scyron at Messenia for his raids on Messenian farmland (4.4). Polybius emphasizes, however, that even Dorimachus understood that the exchanges did not constitute any pretext for the attack (4.4.11, 4.5.2).

outrages of Antiochus Epihphanes in his attempts to raid the sanctuary of Artemis at Elymais (31.9.2; 31.9.4); and the Roman envoy's description of King Prusias as carrying out "every kind of lawless violence" against Attalus (33.7.2). Indeed, in the case of Antiochus Epiphanes, his lawless aggression toward the sanctuary of Artemis even outraged the barbarian tribes of the region, which prevented Antiochus' advance (14.12.1-4). The Epirote statesmen Charops, acting as a tyrant between 167-157, likewise demonstrated παρανομία in carrying out "every kind of crime" (35.5.7) against his own people, going so far as to extort and murder fellow citizens openly in the marketplace and in their own homes (32.5.5; 32.6.3; cf. 30.12.1-3). Polybius similarly recounts the Persian kings' tyrannical treatment of Greeks in the 5th century (3.6.13) as well as the lawless violence of Antipater in dealing with the Greeks following his victory at Lamia (9.29.3) in terms of παρανομία.

Perhaps the most potent example is the παρανομία of the tyrant Aristomachus of Argos toward his countrymen (2.59.4). In addition to clearly rebuking Aristomachus, Polybius attaches this παρανομία to tyrants more generally, saying: "It would be difficult for anyone to bring a graver or more bitter accusation against a man. Why! the very word "tyrant" alone conveys to us the height of impiety and comprises in itself the sum of all human defiance of law and justice" (2.59.4). Anyone should be applauded, Polybius argues, for torturing and putting to death a tyrant who had committed such παρανομία (2.60.2).

Again, Philip V serves as a clear example of this devolution into barbaric tyranny, emphasized by his increasing παρανομία. Polybius maintains that it was when Philip consolidated power in Greece during the Social War that he turned to παρανομία (25.3.9). Thus, Polybius repeatedly criticizes Philip's ravaging of temples and votive offerings at Thermum in 218 as παρανομία (5.11.2; 7.14.3; 8.8.4; 9.35.6). Philip's treacherous actions in 215 against the

Messenians, both in fomenting factional rebellion in the city and then in considering occupying the citadel under false pretenses, are likewise deemed as παρανομία (8.8.4; 9.30.1; cf. 7.12). Similar παρανομία is seen in Philip's actions during the Nemean games at Argos in 208, where he forcibly seduced Greek wives and widows (10.26.4) as well as in Philip's pact with Antiochus III in 203/2 to partition up Ptolemaic territories (15.20.4). Philip's unjustified campaign against the Cyclades and Rhoadians as well as the Greek cities on the Hellespont in 205/204 is also deemed to be παρανομία by Polybius. In Book 18, Polybius praises the death of Dicaearchus, Philip's commander in these campaigns, as a just retribution for his παρανομία against both gods and men. According to Polybius, Dicaearchus always anchored his fleet next two the altars of Impiety (Ἀσέβεια) and Lawlessness (Παρανομία, 18.54.8-9). The end of Philip's reign also sees παρανομία with Philip's decision to massacre the population of Maronea in 185 (22.13.9; 22.14.6). Ultimately, Philip muses that the misfortunes that Philip encountered near the end of his life may well have been brought about by some divine wrath, owing to the παρανομία of his past life (23.10.14).

Nor is παρανομία only seen in the devolution of monarchy into tyranny. Polybius shows similar instances of παρανομία in the collapse of aristocratic and democratic states, including those governed by mixed constitutions. For instance, in Book 9, Polybius recounts the παρανομία of the leadership of Phocis, under Onomarchus and Philomenus, in their lawless seizure of the sanctuary (and treasury) of Delphi in 356 during the Third Holy War (9.33.4). Similar παρανομία is seen with the Carthaginians in the final years of the Second Punic War. In 203, despite a sworn armistice, the Carthaginians treacherously captured a number of Roman transport and supply ships that had been forced into the bay of Carthage by a storm (15.1.1). Moreover, when the Romans sent envoys to rebuke the Carthaginians, the Carthaginian response was an attempt to treacherously murder the envoys before they could return to the Roman camp (15.2.5). According to Polybius,

the Romans were aware that they had been treacherously attacked (παρεσπονδῆσθαι, 15.3.2; παρασπόνδησιν, 15.4.2); and the Carthaginians were conscious of their guilt (συνειδότες σφίσι τὰ πεπραγμένα, 15.3.2) and their degeneration into παρανομία (15.8.11). Similar παρανομία was also exhibited by Hasdrubal during the Third Punic War in his lawless treatment of Roman prisoners in 147. The leadership of the Achaean League likewise exhibited παρανομία during this same time. Polybius describes both the actions and projects of Critolaus during the winter of 147/146 (38.13.8) as well as Diaeus' willingness to imprison and extort fellow Achaeans (38.18.4-5) as παρανομία.

Polybius is clear in his association of παρανομία with mobocracy. In his discussion of the *anacyclosis* in Book 6, Polybius specifically claims that democracy inevitably gives way to the παρανομία of mob rule (6.4.10). Later, Polybius argues that the most important benefit of religious institutions is that they serve as a check against the "natural tendency of the common multitude toward παρανομία" (6.56.11). Indeed, we see such παρανομία at work in the lawless attack by the Syrian populace against Gnaeus Octavius, one of the Roman commissioners sent to destroy ships and elephants according to a senatorial decree in 162 (31.12.4; cf. Appian, *Syr*. 46).

This survey of Polybius' depictions of παρανομία throughout the *Histories* supports the notions of a Polybian Greek/barbarian dichotomy, as has been argued by scholars such as Champion and Nicholson.[65] In nearly every instance, the παρανομία reflected some act of treachery against the perpetrator's own people, against allies, or against enemy diplomats or prisoners.[66] As has been seen throughout this dissertation, Polybius criticizes such acts of unjustified betrayal, and his depiction of these acts as παρανομία is unquestionably negative. Such

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[65] Champion 2004a: 6, 58-59, 68; Nicholson 2020: 49-50.
[66] The other appearances of παρανομία not explicitly discussed above: Polybius' discussion of the παρανομία of Hieronymous during his short reign (7.7.4); multiple instances of the Achaean assembly discussing the παρανομία of accepting gifts and honors from foreign kings and states (22.8.2; 23.17.12; 27.17.1; 28.7.8).

behavior, Polybius maintains, is to be expected from barbarian tribes but certainly not from the leaders of "civilized" states. And as Polybius' "barbarians" are determined by actions and institutions as much as by ethnicity, Polybius likely saw individuals like Philip V, Charops, and Aristomachus as no less "barbarian" than the Gauls, Illyrians, and Thracians who constantly terrorized the Greek cities in the Eastern Mediterranean with their παρανομία.

Polybius' characterization of παρανομία likewise fits well into his presentation of the *anacyclosis* from Book 6. Barbarian tribes are quick to exhibit παρανομία in their lawless violence and disregard for diplomats and divine sanctuaries. Yet, when "civilized" states begin to exhibit similar barbaric παρανομία, it is a clear sign of their devolution into tyranny, oligarchy, or mobocracy. In this way, how virtuous or depraved a state and its leaders were provided a clear indication of the social health of the state and where on the *anacyclosis* the state sat.[67] Indeed, according to Polybius, the shift from monarchy to tyranny, aristocracy to oligarchy, or democracy to mob-rule meant the inevitable collapse of the state and its reformation under the new constitution along the cycle. In other words, this shift led to social and political revolution, which rarely happened without violence. Such a cycle would mean that the collapse of the state would typically be accompanied by various barbaric acts of treachery as the state and its leadership became consumed in παρανομία.

Indeed, we see such associations throughout the *Histories*. The result of Philip V's παρανομία throughout his life is first his defeat at the hands of the Romans (5.11.2; 7.14.13; 8.8.4; 9.30.1; 9.35.6; 10.26.4; 15.20.4; 18.54.8-9) and then later his death and the collapse of his kingdom (22.13.9; 22.14.6; 23.10.14; cf. 25.3.9). Similarly, Polybius points to the justified deaths of other tyrants such as Nabis of Sparta (13.6.4), Aristomachus of Argos (2.59.4), and Alexander of Pherae

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[67] Nicholson 2020: 48.

(8.36.6), as the direct results of their παρανομία. The Carthaginians were also defeated in 201 following their παρανομία during the Second Punic War (15.8.11) and then destroyed in 146 following their παρανομία during the Third Punic War (38.8.1). The Achaean League likewise loses its independence in 146 following the παρανομία of Critolaus (38.13.8) and Diaeus (38.18.4-5).

As we have already seen with Philip's consolidation of power within Greece, Polybius believes that the increase in power has a direct correlation to the likelihood of leaders to fall into moral depravity. States with good virtues and just institutions tend to be far more politically stable and successful. Ironically, however, as these good states become stronger, there is an increased likelihood that they devolve into παρανομία and ultimately collapse. Such a notion is in line with the inevitability of Polybius' *anacyclosis* which emphasizes the constant oscillation between good and bad forms of government and likewise a corresponding oscillation between the good and bad ends of the Greek/barbarian spectrum.[68] And while a state such as Rome is able to significantly slow down this degradation due to its strong institutions and balanced mixed constitution, it too must eventually continue along the cycle of polities.

II. POLYBIUS AND ROME

What then of Polybius' understanding of the Romans? No other question has been more fiercely debated among scholars during the past century.[69] By focusing on Polybius' portrayal of treachery and παρανομία throughout the *Histories*, a different understanding of the Romans emerges. For starters, the question of whether Polybius believed that Rome would eventually

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[68] Champion 2004a: 6, 58-59, 68; Nicholson 2020: 49-50.
[69] See chapter 1.

decline both politically and morally is clear from his notion of the *anacyclosis* in Book 6. Polybius believed that as states continued to accrue more power, they would begin to exhibit more unjustifiable behavior such as treachery and παρανομία. As a state that had gained control over nearly the entire Mediterranean, Rome had gained an enormous amount of power, and there was no reason for Polybius to believe that Roman might would do anything but continue to increase during the second half of the 2nd century. It was only a matter of time before the Romans, becoming morally corrupted by the concentration of so much power in the hands of a single state, would begin to exhibit barbaric qualities. As has been established, these qualities often corresponded with the collapse of states, moving inevitably along the *anacyclosis*. Yet while the inevitability of Roman moral decline and political collapse was clear to Polybius, it is not clear if he believed that the Romans had reached that point yet by 146.

On the whole, Polybius' portrayal of the Romans throughout the *Histories* appears to be largely positive. Polybius' placement of Book 6, in which he discusses the inevitable decline of all states, is also significant. The fact that Polybius' discussion of the constitutional devolution of monarchy into tyranny is placed to interrupt the narrative of Philip V's own shift from king to tyrant is intentional, shedding light on Polybius' view of Philip's descent into παρανομία.[70] Rather than emphasize a shift in the Roman government, however, Book 6 is largely an account of what institutions and form of government allowed Rome to successfully establish its hegemony across the Mediterranean. Indeed, in the structuring of his narrative of the Second Punic War, Polybius' placement of Book 6 works to emphasize the courage, wisdom, and steadfastness of the Roman Senate (3.118.3-9). Further evidence of this is likewise found in how Polybius chooses to conclude Book 6. Polybius ends with a final chapter on the Roman reaction to their defeat at the Battle of

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[70] On Polybius' very intentional structuring of his narrative, see (for example) Davidson 1991; Miltsios 2009 and 2013; and Miltsios & Tamiolaki 2018.

Cannae in 216, which serves to show "the perfection and strength of principle of the Republic such as it then was" (6.58.1). Following the battle, Hannibal had captured the eight thousand Roman soldiers who had garrisoned the Roman camp. In an attempt to ransom these men back to Rome, Hannibal sent ten of the soldiers to Rome after making them swear that they would return (6.58.3). One of these soldiers claimed that he had forgotten something at the Carthaginian camp and thus returned to the camp before departing for Rome, intending to claim that he had technically fulfilled his oath to return to Hannibal since he had doubled back to the camp (6.58.4). When these ten Roman captives arrived at Rome and pleaded for the Senate to pay their ransom, the Senate realized that in paying the ransom they would not only provide Hannibal with much-needed funds but also hamstring the courage of the Roman legions by showing that there might be safety in surrender (6.58.5-11). Instead, the Senate refused to ransom the captured Roman soldiers, defeating Hannibal's plans. Polybius claims that Hannibal's dejection at seeing how "steadfast and high-spirited the Romans were in their deliberations" was even greater than his joy had been at his victory at Cannae (6.58.13). And as for the ten Roman captives, the first nine kept their oaths and returned to Hannibal, and the soldier who attempted to outwit his responsibility through his ruse was sent back to Hannibal in irons (6.58.12). Ultimately, Polybius presents the Romans in Book 6 as exhibiting unyielding principle and honor.

Also telling is Polybius' depictions of παρανομία throughout the *Histories* as one of the clear signs of the devolution of a state toward barbarism and collapse. Of the over 50 appearances of παρανομία in Polybius' work, it is only leveled against the Romans on a single occasion. In Book 11, Polybius recounts the speech given in the autumn of 207 by a Rhoadian statesman before the Aetolian assembly at Heraclea (11.4-6.8; cf Livy 28.7). In the speech, the Rhoadian speaker argues that in maintaining their alliance with the Romans against Philip and the Achaeans, the

353

Aetolians are working to enslave the Greeks to Roman παρανομία (11.5.7).[71] This claim of παρανομία isn't particularly damning for the Romans. First, the speech did not necessarily reflect Polybius' own view of Rome's relationship with the Greeks. Rather, the speech represented an attempt by the Rhoadians to broker a peace between the Aetolians and Philip by presenting Rome as a universal non-Greek (and therefore barbarian) enemy against which all of Greece could find common ground. Second, these claims of Greek enslavement and παρανομία at Rome's hand are not realized by Polybius' own narrative. In 197 when the Romans did establish their hegemony throughout Greece, the result was not enslavement but actual freedom for the Greek cities (18.46). Indeed, by 194, despite the threat of a possible invasion by Antiochus III, not a single Roman legion remained in Greece.[72] Thus, based upon Polybius' own narrative, the earlier claims in 207 of Roman παρανομία in Greece could not have been farther from the truth.

More often in the *Histories*, we find the Romans acting in clear opposition to the forces of παρανομία. Thus, Polybius sees the Romans as the agents of Fortune in punishing Philip for his παρανομία throughout Greece, both during the Second Marceodnian War (5.11.2; 7.14.13; 8.8.4; 9.30.1; 9.35.6; 10.26.4; 15.20.4; 18.54.8-9) and at the end of Philip's reign (25.3.9; cf. 22.13.9; 22.14.6; 23.10.14). The Romans similarly responded in 229 to the παρανομία of the Illyrians under Queen Teuta (2.8.13; 2.11.5) and in 192 to the παρανομία of Nabis of Sparta (13.6.4). Polybius also presents the Romans in clear contrast with the Galatian Gauls, who Gnaeus Manlius defeats in 189, thereby safeguarding all of the Greek cities east of the Taurus mountains from the Gauls' παρανομία (3.3.5; 21.41.2). Roman action toward the παρανομία of Charops of Epirus between 167 and 157 is likewise praised by Polybius, calling it a "fine example of the Romans' high

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[71] A similar speech was made at the end of the Social War by Agelaus in 217, advising Philip to unite the Greeks in defense against the "barbarian" Romans and Carthaginians (5.104). Much has been made of Agelaus' speech by Champion 2000 and Nicholson 2020.
[72] Eckstein 2008: 121-180.

principle" (ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ κάλλιστον μὲν ἐγένετο δεῖγμα τῆς Ῥωμαίων αἱρέσεως, 32.6.4). The Achaean historian emphasizes that when Charops came to Rome seeking approval for his lawless violence, both Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the pontifex maximus and princeps senatus, and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the most influential senator in Rome due to his defeat of Perseus at Pydna in 168, refused to allow Charops to enter into their houses (32.6.5). The Senate likewise refused to answer any of Charops' requests (32.6.7).

In the *Histories,* rather than carrying out παρανομία, the Romans themselves are often the victims of such lawless violence. Thus, we find the Romans at the receiving end of παρανομία carried out by the Carthaginians against Roman envoys in 203 (15.8.11) and against Roman prisoners in 147 (38.8.1). The Roman envoy Gnaeus Octavius is likewise attacked by the Syrian populace in 162 as a result of their παρανομία (31.12.4; Appian *Syr*. 46). Indeed, Polybius' overall depiction of attacks on envoys throughout the *Histories* is telling. Far from seeing Romans carry out such παρανομία against enemy envoys, the Romans are the victims of such παρανομία in nearly every instance, as discussed in chapter 4. Thus, we find the Romans as the victims of such treachery in 283 from the Senones (2.19.9), in 229 from Queen Teuta and the Illyrians (2.8.12-13), in 218 from the Boii (3.40.10), in 203 from the Carthaginians (15.2.5), in 189 from the Galatian Gauls (21.39.10), in 157/156 from the Dalmatians (32.13.2-3), in 154 from the Ligurians (33.9.3-6), and in 147 from the Achaeans (38.9.1-2; 38.13.9). Such a portrayal speaks against any notion of the Romans as having devolved toward παρανομία.

Yet while Polybius' narrative presents the Romans as largely acting with moderation and other "Hellenistic" virtues, Polybius appears to have some reservations about the future of Roman hegemony. As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, evidence of Polybius' concerns can be

found in his paralleled accounts of the Achaean War and Third Punic War, which both ended in 146 marking the final events of his work.

On the whole, Polybius' presentation of Roman action during the Achaean War of 146 and the events leading up to it casts the Romans in a positive light. Despite multiple instances of Achaean treachery and double-dealing toward the Romans leading up to the war, including attacks on Roman envoys, nearly all of the Romans involved in the events leading up to the war act with moderation and benevolence. Thus, despite the initial attacks on Lucius Aurelius Orestes, the Roman response was one of reconciliation, exemplified by the delegation led by Sextus Julius Caesar (38.9.3-10.7; 38.11.1-6) as well as the later delegation of Cn. Papirius and his colleagues (38.12.1-11). Indeed, Polybius argues that the Romans were so generous in their treatment of the Achaeans that while subsequent generations could lament the destruction of Carthage, it would be impossible to blame anyone other than the Achaean leadership for the subsequent destruction of the league (38.1.5). Judging from his portrayal of the Romans in dealing with Achaea leading up to 146, then, Polybius affirms the overall message of his *Histories* - that the Romans generally acted with moderation and virtue.

In the case of the Third Punic War, however, Polybius casts the Romans in a troubling light. The deceptive manner in which the Roman Senate chose to demand the eventual destruction and relocation of the city (36.4.6-36.7; cf. Livy, *Ep.* 49) receives criticism from Polybius, albeit indirectly. Rather than directly condemning the duplicitous Roman diplomacy in 149, Polybius sheds light on how the Roman actions were viewed by the contemporary Greek world (36.9).[73] Polybius presents the Greek response as a series of four opinions. The first (36.9.3-4) and last (36.9.12-17) opinions argued in favor of the Roman action, while the second (36.9.5-8) and third

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[73] According to Polybius, the Romans themselves hesitated over going to war with Carthage with an eye for how the decision would affect popular opinion among the Greeks (36.2.4).

(36.9.9-11) opinions accused the Romans of impiety and teachery (ἀσεβήματι καὶ παρασπονδήματι, 36.9.11). The third opinion in particular claims that the Romans of old would never have employed such deceptive strategies, paralleling Polybius' own description of the Romans in 13.3.7-8. Such a claim, however, is at odds with Polybius' own narrative of the Roman wars between 264 and 201. The fourth Greek opinion supporting Roman action in 149 is equally problematic. The opinion takes on a painstakingly legal defense of *deditio* to defend Rome's diplomatic deception, which appears less impactful (though no less legally sound) when taken with the diplomatic exchanges between Rome and Carthage at the onset of the Second Punic War in 218. During this exchange, the Romans refused to listen to strict legal justifications (concerning the treaty of 241), as the decision to go to war was based upon Roman honor and *fides*. The fact that in 149 it is now the Romans peddling strict legal justifications in some ways strengthens the claims of the third Greek opinion that the contemporary Romans had departed from the unyielding principles that had guided their forefathers. Ultimately, it appears as though Polybius found both sides of the Greek debate to have some merit. Polybius believed that Rome was technically in the right, given the Carthaginians' *deditio*, discussed generally by Polybius on 20.9-10, which was written after 146. At the same time, however, much like the Greeks, Polybius had some misgivings about the deceptive way in which the Romans facilitated their demands following the Carthaginians' *deditio*, which stood in clear contrast to Roman diplomacy in 218, and indeed throughout the war (cf. 6.58.12). Indeed, Polybius' decision to include the four opinions, emphasizing Greek disagreement over the Roman action in 149 suggests the historian's own concerns.

During his portrayal of the war itself, Polybius likewise presents the Roman leadership as largely incapable, especially during the first two years of the war. While Scipio Aemilianus

357

receives significant praise from Polybius for his actions as a military tribune in 149 and then for his successful command of the war as consul in 147 and proconsul in 146, Polybius presents Scipio as a unique example of Roman principle and virtue for his day and age.[74] Scipio stands as an *exception* amongst the Romans in his skill and moderation (31.25.3-10), reflecting the great Roman generations of the past (cf. 35.4.8-14) rather than his contemporaries. Again, Polybius' portrayal works to create a dichotomy between the previous Romans of the Second Punic War and the present Romans of the Third Punic War.

Nor is this the only appearance in the *Histories* of the notion that the Romans were not as morally principled as their ancestors. While Polybius' portrayal of the diplomatic maneuverings of Quintus Marcius Philippus preceding the Third Macedonain War is lost, Livy relied heavily upon Polybius' account in his own history, providing us with a clear indication of Polybius' portrayal.[75] In the Spring of 171, Philippus successfully managed to convince Perseus to agree to a temporary truce so that envoys could be sent to Rome to solidify a peace agreement (Livy [P] 42.43.2). In reality, the prospect of peace was wholly disingenuous, and instead the truce allowed the Romans to mobilize against Perseus and undermine the Macedonian advantage in the war. While Philippus' deceptive diplomacy was met with approval by most of the Roman Senate, holding it to have been the height of reason (*summa ratione*, 42.47.4), the elder senators claimed that Philippus' actions neither reflected the old ways nor proper Roman character (*antiqui moris...Romanas...artes*, 42.47.5). These older senators went on to claim that their ancestors avoided ambushes, night attacks, and excessive cunning (42.47.5-6). They believed that Philippus'

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[74] For Scipio's unique discipline in 149, see Goldsworthy 2006: 343-344. For Scipio's courage in this year, see Bagnall 1999: 314-315.

[75] On the strong consensus of Livy's reliance on Polybius for these passages, especially the senatorial debate, see Nissen 1863: 250, Briscoe 1964: 68 n. 32; Walbank 1974: 10-11,23; Gabba 1977: 68; Eckstein 1995: 109 n. 90; Eckstein 2010: 243; Briscoe 2012: 313; Burton 2017: 110, n. 152.

diplomacy was more akin to Carthaginian cunning (*versutiarum Punicarum*) and Greek cleverness (*calliditatis Graecae*, 42.47.8) than to true Roman behavior. As such, they met Philippus' "new and overly clever wisdom" (*nova ac nimis callida...sapientia*) with great disdain.

In presenting the Senatorial debate in this manner, Polybius criticizes both Philippus' deceptive diplomacy as well as the principles of the contemporary Romans, suggesting that the Romans of unyielding honor and principle were only those few holdouts from the Second Punic War still surviving in the Senate. In other words, there has been a moral shift in Rome during the first half of the 2nd century. Again, there are problems with such an interpretation, as is evidenced by Polybius' own narrative of the Romans during these earlier years. As discussed in the previous chapter, the notion that the Romans did not employ ambushes, night attacks, or surprise maneuvers during the 3rd century, as suggested in the 171 Senatorial Debate (Livy [P] 42.47.5-6) and in the third Greek opinion concerning 149 (36.9.9-11) is blatantly false. Moreover, Polybius offers examples of remarkably similar diplomatic deception carried out by Scipio Africanus in 204/203 (14.2-5) and by Quinctius Flamininus in 198/197 (8.10-12). Rather than condemn these parallel instances of diplomatic deception, Polybius praises Scipio (14.3.2-3) and Flamininus (8.12.2-4) for their shrewd use of diplomacy to gain advantages for Rome.[76] By placing Philippus' deception at odds with the earlier deceptions of Scipio and Flamininus, despite their similarities, Polybius again works to create a dichotomy between a virtuous Roman past in the 3rd and early 2nd centuries as compared with a morally declining Roman present during and following the 3rd Macedonian War - a war which marked the completion of Rome's domination of the Mediterranean and the consolidation of an unprecedented amount of power by a single state.

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[76] Similarly, the diplomatic deception carried out by Sosibius against Antiochus III in 219/218 (5.63.64) is nearly identical to Philippus' actions in 171, and again receives praise from Polybius.

What then is the meaning behind these Polybian contradictions? Philppus' actions are condemned in 171, while earlier examples of deceptive diplomacy are not. Polybius presents the Roman leadership in the Achaean War as largely moderate and virtuous, but the leadership in the Third Punic War as largely incompetent. And Polybius repeatedly presents a dichotomy of a principled Roman past and a morally devolved Roman present, which contradicts his own narrative of Rome's rise to power and the maintenance of her hegemony across the Mediterranean. Ultimately, such a presentation suggests a didactic purpose in Polybius' work - one geared toward a Roman readership. The parallel examples of Roman action in 146 with Carthage and Achaea present two alternatives for the Romans. On the one hand, the Romans could continue to rule with moderation and virtue, "Hellenistic" qualities that had allowed for the Roman domination of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Romans could follow in the footsteps of Philip V and, with power firmly in their hands, play the part of the "barbaric" double-dealing tyrant. In this sense, Polybius' suggestion that the Romans had moved away from their virtuous past served as a warning and a challenge to the Romans. After all, in the new reality of unipolar Roman hegemony across the Mediterranean, the only check on Roman behavior would necessarily have to come from the Romans themselves.

Polybius' presentations of the Third Punic War and the Achaean War, then, are largely forward-looking. While it seems likely that Polybius saw Roman rule between 264 and 146 as largely moderate and virtuous (again it is the Carthaginians and the Achaeans at this time, not the Romans, that devolve into παρανομία), Polybius is not clear on how he thought Roman rule would progress after 146.[77] The Romans, despite the massive power that they wielded, had not yet devolved into παρανομία. Yet Polybius' narrative of the Roman diplomacy with Carthage in 149

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[77] Likewise, see Polybius' parallels condemnation of Diaeus and Hasdrubal at 38.8.13-14.

and the corresponding split in Greek opinion suggests that the Achaean historian continued to be concerned with Rome's inevitable progression along the *anacyclosis* toward παρανομία. Put simply, Polybius' *Histories* worked to warn the Romans that if they moved away from the "Hellenistic" principles and virtues that had won them their empire and adopted the "barbaric" qualities that exemplified barbarians, tyrants, oligarchs, and mob-rule, it would ultimately result in the collapse of the Roman state.

This notion that moral degeneration had serious pragmatic consequences is evidenced by Polybius' extensive presentation of unjustified treachery and deception throughout the *Histories*. In emphasizing the moral component of Polybius' work, Arthur Eckstein suggests that Polybius condemned instances of deception and treachery even if the state or leader benefited from the betrayal.[78] Given enough hindsight across the *Histories*, however, it appears as though Polybius is careful to show his readers that there is *always* some pragmatic consequence that results from these instances of treachery. Such a claim is supported by the survey of Polybius' presentation of various forms of treachery conducted across Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation.

In his portrayals of instances of treachery carried out against friends and allies or in violation of sworn treaties (Chapter 2), Polybius describes how these betrayals result in pragmatic consequences for the culprits. Thus, the Boeotian League's defection and betrayal of the Achaeans in 245 (20.4.4-5.2) and later the Aetolians in 236 (20.5.3), resulted in disaffection within the League and the defection of Megara during the Cleomenean War (20.6.7-12); the Roman "robbery" of Sardinia in 237 (1.88.8-12) is given by Polybius as the precipitating cause of the Second Punic War (3.13.1; 3.15.10; 3.30.4) - a conflict that very nearly marked the destruction of Rome; Demetrius of Pharos' violation his treaty with Rome, despite the benefits Rome had

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[78] Eckstein 1995: 84-117

bestowed upon him in 229 (3.16), resulted in his defeat by the Romans in 219; the treachery of Aristomachus against the Achaean League during the Cleomenean War (2.60) resulted in his torture and death (2.59); the multiple acts of treachery carried out by the Mantineans against the Achaean League during the Cleomoneann War in 227 despite Achaean forgiveness and generosity (2.57-58) resulted in the eventual sacking of the city and its recolonization by the Achaeans in 223; the Spartan betrayal of the Hellenic Symmachy in 220 during the Social War, in spite of Antigonus Doson's recent kindness (4.22-23, 4.34-35), ended in Sparta's defeat in the Social War; the treachery of the Cynaethean exiles against their Achaean benefactors in 220 (4.17.18) resulted in the subsequent torture and slaughter of many of the Cynaetheans at the hands of the Aetolians (4.18); the multiple Roman allies who betrayed Rome without reasonable justification during the Second Punic War, including Clastidium in 218 (3.69.1-4), Capua in 216 (7.1.1), Syracuse in 215 (7.3-8), Tarentum in 212 (8.24-34), received severe punishments upon their recapture; as did the cities of Utica and Hippacritae after their betrayal of Carthage in 238 (1.80); Scerdilaïdas' betrayal of Philip in 217 (5.95, 5.101, 5.108) resulted in a Macedonian counterattack into Illyria that was only stalled out due to the presence of a Roman fleet (5.110.8-9); the treachery of Hasdrubal and the Carthaginians against their Spanish allies after 211 (9.11.1-4, 10.18, 10.38) resulted in massive defections of the Scipio, allowing him to push the Carthaginians out of Spain by 205;[79] the betrayal of the Spanish chieftains Andobales and Mandonius in the face of Scipio's extreme generosity in Spain, not once but twice during the Second Punic War in 206 and 205 (11.28, 11.31, 11.33), resulted in their defeat by the Romans twice over;[80] the decision of Nabis of Sparta to abandon its Peloponnesian allies, including the Aetolians, in 202/201 (16.13.1-3) resulted in Nabis in turn

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[79] On this point, see especially Erskine 2003.
[80] Andobales was killed during the second revolt. Mandonius escaped the battle but was later turned over to the Romans (Livy 29.1-3).

getting betrayed and murdered by the Aetolians in 188 (Livy [P] 35.35); Pharnaces of Pontus' treacherous invasion of Galatia in 181/180 (24.14-15, 24.25) resulted in his total defeat in the ensuing war, losing nearly all of his holdings in Galatia and Paphlagonia (24.1, 24.5, 24.8-9; cf. Livy 40.20); the treacherous plots of the Epirote statesmen Theodotus and Philostratus against the Roman consul Aulus Hostilius Mancinus in 170 (27.16) resulted in the plundering of 70 cities in Epirus in 167 by the army of Lucius Aemilius Paullus (30.15.1); and the Macedonian decision in 150 to betray Rome and join Andriscus even after Rome had granted them freedom and independence from tyrant (36.10, 36.16) resulted in the defeat and reorganization of Macedon, severely limiting its power and independence.[81]

As we have seen, the Aetolians and Philip V are especially prone to such betrayals in the *Histories*. Polybius points to the Aetolian betrayal of Achaea at the onset of the Cleomonean War in 229 (2.44.1-2, 2.46); the subsequent Aetolian betrayal of Messenia and attack on Achaea in 220 to begin the Social War (4.3-6); the Aetolian abandonment of the allied city of Triphylia during this war (4.77-79); and the Aetolian decision to invite foreign powers into Greece, in 214 with the Romans (9.37-38, 11.5.3) and in 192 with Antiochus III (18.39.1, 20.9.8, 21.37). These betrayals all resulted in military defeats for the Aetolians, as they are driven out of Thessaly by Antigonus in 228, defeated by Philip V in 217, suffered severe defeats at Philip's hand during the First Macedonian War, especially between 209-207, and were defeated by the Romans in 189, resulting in a curtailing of the League's power and guarantees that the Aetolians would take as enemies any people with whom the Romans were at war (21.29-32).

Philip V is likewise condemned for repeated breaks of good faith between his victory in the Social War and his defeat at Cynoscephalae, including his treachery at Messene in 215 (7.12-

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[81] See Gruen 1984: 433–436; Eckstein 2010: 248

13), at Argos in 208 (10.26), at Cius and Thasos in 203 (15.22-25), and in working with Antiochus III in 203/2 to treacherously divide and absorb various Ptolemaic holdings (15.20). The result of Philip's treacheries against the Greeks was the appearance of envoys from Egypt, Pergamum, Rhoades, and Athens in Rome in 201 requesting assistance against Philip.[82] Within four years the Romans had crushed Philip's power and liberated the Greeks.

Polybius traces similar pragmatic consequences for acts of treachery against one's own state (Chapter 3). Polybius draws a clear pattern throughout the *Histories*. When a statesman or party, motivated by personal greed and ambition, betrays fellow citizens, the result is the significant weakening of the state. Thus, the treacherous betrayal of Cynaetha to the Aetolians by the Cynaethean exiles in 220 (4.17.11) resulted in the subsequent torture and slaughter of many of the Cynaetheans at the hands of the Aetolians (4.18); Charops' treacherous implications of fellow Epirote statesmen to the Romans during the Third Macedonian War (27.15.2-16) and extortion, proscription, and murder of fellow citizens (32.5.11-15) resulted in the pillaging and later economic and political collapse of the region; and the willingness of Diophanes in 185 (22.10.5-6) and Callicrates in 181/180 (24.8.9) to betray fellow Achaeans to the Romans resulted in less independence of the Achaean League and more Roman oversight.[83] Similar false accusations of political opponents to the Romans are seen with the Aetolian statesmen Proandrus and Lyciscus (28.4.1-9) and with the Acarnanian statesmen, Thyreym, Chremas, and Glaucus, going so far as to ask the Romans to establish garrisons in Acarnania (28.5.1-5).

Polybius likewise emphasizes that the result of Critolaus' intimidation of fellow citizens to establish his own power (38.13.7) and Diaeus' murdering of fellow Achaeans and sabotaging of

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[82] Eckstein 2009: 75-98.

[83] Callicrates' betrayal of the League, of course, also resulted in the 1000 Achaean hostages being sent to Roman with Polybius among their number.

peace attempts in hopes of ensuring his own safety (38.17.8) both resulted in the dissolution of the Achaean League and the end of Greek independence from the Romans. Similarly, the pro-Aetolian faction in Sparta during the Social War treacherously murdered the ephor Adeimantus and other leading citizens in 220 (4.22.8-11), later killed all of the ephors (4.35.2-3), and subsequently killed or exiled many of the elders and those who spoke out against the Aetolians (4.35.5-15), resulting in the near destruction of the city by Philip (5.17-24). In illustrating these pragmatic consequences, Polybius often points to the multi-generational effects that these treacheries have. For example, in some instances it is both the treacherous individual as well as their wives and children who are punished. Thus, Logbasis' treacherous attempt in 218 to deliver the city of Selge to Achaeus (5.74.7) resulted in the murder of both Logbasis as well as his sons (5.76.1-4); Philip V strives to solidify power by treacherously deporting entire families from major and coastal cities throughout the region (23.10.4-5), murdering his friends who objected to his behavior (23.10.7-8), and ultimately murdering his own son Demetrius (23.10, cf. 23.7); and Hasdrubal's ignoble (ἀγεννίαν) and cowardly (ἀνανδρίαν, 38.8.10) decision in 146 to had over Carthage to Scipio Aemilianus in exchange for his own personal safety (38.8.1-10) resulted in the suicides of his wife and children (38.20).

Similar condemnation and consequences are found in Polybius' descriptions of treacherous Hellenistic court advisors. At the Antigonid court of Philip V, Polybius describes Apelles' attempt to overturn Macedonian affairs and consolidate power for himself (4.87.1-10); Apelles' attempts to sabotage Philip V's supply lines (5.2.8-10); Leontius and Megaleas' treacherous prevention of the capture of Palus (5.4.6-11); Leontius' attempt to strand Philip's army in Messenia for the summer of 218 (5.5.3-9); Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemaeus' efforts to stir up the Macedonian soldiers in Corinth against Philip (5.25.1-7); and Megaleas' attempts to undermine the peace

negotiations between Philip and the Aetolians (5.28.4). The result was the suicide of Apelles and his son (5.28.7), the execution of Leontius (5.27.8), the suicide of Megaleas (5.28.7), and the execution of Ptolemaeus (5.29.6). Within the Seleucid court of Antiochus III, Hermeias attacked and murdered fellow court advisors who opposed him (5.41.6-9; 5.49.4-5; 5.50.1-13); undermined efforts to quell Molon's rebellion (5.42.4; 5.45.6); encouraged Achaeus' rebellion (5.57-9) in order to keep Antiochus III hemmed in and in need of his support (5.42.6; 5.45.6); and ultimately hoped for Antiochus' death so that he could rule the kingdom as the guardian of the king's newborn son (5.55.4-5). The result was the murder of Hermeias along with his wife and sons (5.56). Within the Ptolemaic court, Sosibius and Agathocles treacherously seized control of the guardianship of the young Ptolemy V by treacherously murdering Queen Arsinoe III (15.25.1; cf. 15.33.11) and presenting a forged will from Ptolemy IV (15.25.5). After Sosibius' death, Agathocles assumed tyrannical power (15.27.5) in Alexandria and spent his days exerting his sexual violence, arrogance, and indolence over the population (15.25.23). He slandered (15.25.35), arrested (15.27.2; 15.27.7-28.4), tortured (15.27.7-28.4) and attacked the family members (15.27.2) of his political opponents. The result was the murder of Sosibius, seemingly at Agathocles' hands, and the eventual murder of Agathocles himself along with his wife, children, and sisters - Agathoclea literally being torn apart limb from limb by the Alexandrians (5.63). Philammon, the treacherous man who had killed Arsinoe III, was likewise dragged out of his house and killed along with his wife and son (15.33.11-12).

Finally, Polybius emphasizes the pragmatic consequences of acts of diplomatic treachery carried out against enemies during times of war (Chapter 4). These consequences are especially clear in cases of lawless (παρανομία) attacks against diplomats. Thus, the Senones' treacherous (παρασπονδήσαντες) murder of Roman envoys at Arretium in 283 (2.19.7-9) resulted in their

immediate defeat and subjugation by the Romans (2.19.11-12); the Boii Gauls' treacherous (παρασπονδήσαντες) capture of Roman envoys at Mutina in 218 (3.40.5-10) was repaid by the Romans after the war with successive Roman victories at Placentia in 194 and at Mutina in 193, ending the Boii's power in Italy (Livy [P] 36.38-40); Queen Teuta's assassination of Gaius Corucanius in 230 (2.8.12-13) resulted in her defeat in the First Illyrian War; the Dalmatians' attack against Roman envoys in 157/156 (32.13.2-3) resulted in Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum defeating the them and ravaging their capital at Delminium in 155;[84] the Liguarian attack against Flaminius Popilius Laenas in 154 (33.9.3-7) resulted in the defeat of the Ligurian tribes by Quintus Opimius only days later (33.10); and the Galatian attack against Gaius Manlius Vulso in 189 (21.39.9-14) resulted in Vulso's total defeat of the Galatian Gauls shortly after (21.40.2); and the Carthaginian mercenaries' treacherous (παρεσπόνδησαν) attack on Gesco at Tunis in 240 (1.69.5-70.10) ultimately ended with the defeat and death of most of the mercenaries. Nor are such consequences only experienced by barbarian tribes. The treacherous (παρασπόνδησιν) Carthaginian attempt to kill the Roman ambassadors Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius near the end of the Second Punic War in 203 (15.2.5-13; cf. 15.4.2) resulted in the renewal of the war and the utter defeat of the Carthaginians by Scipio. Similarly, the Achaean attacks in 147 on a Roman delegation under Lucius Aurelius Orestes and later on a second Roman delegation under Gnaeus Papirius (38.10.2-38.12.4) resulted in the defeat and dissolution of the Achaean League the following year.

In instances where a state goes back on a formal promise or agreement, Polybius emphasizes similar long-term consequences. Again, the treacherous (παρεσπονδῆσθαι, παρασπόνδησιν) Carthaginian attack in 203 on Roman transport and supply ships during a sworn

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[84] Polybius' description of these events are lost. Cf. App. *Illyr.* 11; Strabo 84

armistice (15.1.1-4; cf. 15.3.2, 15.4.2) worked to undermine peace negotiations, leading to the renewal of the war and Carthage's defeat. Philip V continues to serve as a clear example of such consequences. After all, it is Philip's shameful (αἰσχύνης) and treacherous (παρασπονδούντων) partitioning of the Ptolemaic empire with Antiochus III in 203/202 (3.2.8; 15.20.1-3), despite ongoing processes for Philip to marry one of Ptolemy V's daughters (15.25.13, 16.22.16); Philip's shameful (αἰσχύνεσθαι) and treacherous (παρασπονδοῦντι) decision to destroy Cius and enslave its citizens in 202 after having given them assurances that they would be spared (15.23.2-9); and Philip's similar treacherous (παρασπόνδημα) enslavement of the people of Thasos after they had surrendered on terms that they would be spared (15.24.1-2); that contribute to the decision of the Greeks to appeal for Roman intervention and Philip's ultimate defeat in 197. Another clear example is found in Cleomenes of Sparta's treacherous (προϋπάρχουσαν) murder of the Spartan king Archidamus in 228. Despite having sworn a formal agreement promising Archidamus his safety upon his return to Sparta, Cleomenes treacherously put him to death anyways (5.37.1-5). Polybius emphasizes that Cleomenes' treachery ultimately resulted in his own death, as it is Nicagoras, the close friend of Archidamus who brokered the sworn agreement between Archidamus and Cleomenes, who ultimately undermines Cleomenes' position in the Ptolemaic court (5.37.5-38.8).

Based upon all of these examples of treachery throughout the *Histories*, a clear pattern emerges. Despite any short-term gains or advantages that might come about from treacherous behavior, the long-term consequences of such behavior are often nothing short of the death of the perpetrator or the decline of the state. Given this lesson in Polybius' work, a different understanding of the Achaean historian emerges. Rather than emphasize whether Polybius is more concerned with the morality or the practicality of actions taken by those in his narrative, as most

historians have done, the above survey suggests that Polybius viewed the moral implications of actions such as treachery as necessarily intertwined with the pragmatic consequences that such actions brought to bear. Again, such an understanding is rooted in Polybius' notion of the *anacyclosis*, which suggests that the collapse of the state is associated with the presence of "barbaric" actions such as treachery and παρανομία.

Nor does it seem that Polybius is merely concerned with the theoretical moral collapse of the state. Instead, his close association of immoral acts of treachery with serious practical consequences continues to present a didactic presentation in the *Histories* that is intended for a Roman readership. The message to the Romans is a warning. Despite their current hegemony throughout the Mediterranean, if the Romans turn to treachery and other "barbaric" traits, the Romans will inevitably be destroyed. Such a warning is not only evident from Polybius' discussion of the *anacyclosis* in Book 6, but from the countless examples he gives through the *Histories* of real states and individuals meeting their ends as a direct result of their treacherous behavior. This lesson is only amplified when taken with Polybius' notion of a glorified Roman past and depraved Roman present that he goes out of his way to emphasize with his depictions of the onsets of the Third Macedonian War in 172/171 and the Third Punic War in 149. Indeed, Polybius takes it upon himself to claim that the "truest" cause of the Second Punic War - a war that very nearly resulted in the total defeat of the Roman state - was the earlier treacherous Roman "robbery" (ἀφαίρεσις) of Sardinia (3.9-11; cf. 1.88.8-12).[85] Polybius likewise suggests that the Roman deceptions carried out under Philippus against Perseus in 172/171 and against the Carthaginians in 149 resulted in the continued deterioration of Greek public opinion toward the Romans (36.9.9-11). After all, the very presence of the Greek debate described by Polybius in Book 36 (and his decision to include

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[85] Polybius is clear that the Roman decision was a betrayal of good faith with Carthage and a clear violation of the treaty of Lutatius signed in 241 (3.10.4, 28.1-2, and 30.3-4).

it) exemplifies such popular discord over Roman rule. And given these portrayals of the Romans in these passages, it is difficult for readers not to think of the Romans when considering Polybius' earlier depiction of Philip V: "For as he totally changed his principles, it was inevitable that he should totally reverse also other men's opinion of him, and that he should meet with totally different results in his undertakings" (7.11.10).

Such a lesson for the Romans, however, implies that they had not already descended into παρανομία. Polybius is warning his readers (Greek and Roman alike) of what will happen *if* the Romans rule with cruelty, emotion, greed, and lawlessness - not that Roman morality had already collapsed. As we have seen, Polybius is generally impressed with the moderation and beneficence that marked Roman hegemony across the Mediterranean, including the Roman action leading up to the Achaean War in 146. The fact that there are no serious appearances of Roman παρανομία through his work is quite telling.[86] In the *Histories*, Rome is presented as a constant check on παρανομία rather than a cause of it, standing as a check against both lawless barbarians like the Illyrians and Galatian Gauls and power-hungry tyrants like Philip V and Charops. Yet while Polybius praises Roman virtue, he is all too aware of the inevitable moral decline of all states. This is why he both encourages the Romans to continue their virtuous behavior and warns them of the consequences of slipping into "barbaric" behavior. Thus, while Polybius is concerned about the destruction of the Roman state, he is more concerned with the well-being of those living under Roman rule and what they might befall during the moral collapse that would precede it.

III. CONCLUSION

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[86] Again, only the politically charged speech of the Rhodian ambassador makes such a claim.

This chapter suggests, as other scholars have done, that Polybius' work can be viewed through the lens of a Greek-barbarian dichotomy. Such "cultural politics" in the *Histories* seem to have less to do with ethnicity and more to do with character. Thus, the "Greekness" of a city or people, in Polybius' mind, was determined by the demonstration of "Greek" virtues such as justice and duty (κικαία), reason (λογισμός), courage (ἀνδρεία), and a concern for law and order as well as for freedom and equality. In this embodiment, Polybius believed that the Achaean League served as the primary example of these Hellenistic qualities. Conversely, states are portrayed as "barbaric" in the *Histories* based upon their demonstration of wicked qualities such as lawlessness (παρονομία), greed (πλεονεξία), irrationality (ἀλογιστία), unchecked passion (θυμός), savagery (ὠμός), and licentiousness (ἀσέλγεια). Polybius often presents such "barbarians" as placing the individual over the state, lacking education, being ruled by drunken passion, and turning into "wild animals" (ἀποθηριοῦσθαι; 1.67.6; 1.81.5-11; cf. Livy 42.59.2). While Polybius describes the Thracians, Gauls, and Illyrians as embodying these "barbaric" vices, Greeks also receive criticism in these terms. States such as the Aetolians, Spartans, Cretans, Boeotians, and Cynaethans appear at times as less Greek and more barbaric based upon their greed, treachery, savagery, and lawlessness. Polybius' notion of "Greek" and "barbarian," then, should be viewed as a spectrum on which all states rise and fall.

This nuanced moral framework presented in the *Histories* is most clearly seen in Polybius' description of the reign of Philip V. Philip is presented during the Social War as embodying many "Greek" qualities as he strives to remain loyal to his allies, conduct the war with courage and daring, and treat his enemies with justice and magnanimity. The result was the solidification of Philip's power in Greece and his reputation as the "darling of Greece" (7.11.4-8). Philip's role as a "Greek" is emphasized in Agelaus' request for Philip to stand as a Greek

bulwark against the barbarian threats in the West. Despite these Greek virtues demonstrated by Philip between 220 and 217, the Macedonian king, according to Polybius, soon "totally changed his principles" (5.108.5) and began to exhibit "barbarian" qualities. Thus, we find Philip betraying his Greek allies (7.11; 7.12.9; 8.12.2-6; 10.26.2), conducting impious acts (7.12; 15.22.3), going back on diplomatic assurances (15.22.4, 15.24.2), and carrying out numerous acts of lawlessness (παρανομία) (10.26.4; 15.20). As Philip adopts these barbaric qualities, Polybius describes the descent of his character as equivalent to the change from a man into a wolf, from a king into a tyrant (7.13.7). In other words, Philip had fallen from "Greek" to "barbarian." Thus, Philip is described as lawless (παρανομίαν, 10.26.4), unrestrained (ἀνέδην, 15.20.3), cruel (ὠμότητος, 15.22.3; ὠμότητα, 15.23.3), brutal (μεγίστην ἀσέλγειαν, 8.12.1), impious (ἀσεβείας, 15.20.3; ἀσεβείᾳ, 15.22.3), covetous (πλεονεξίας, 15.20.4), animalistic (7.13.7; θηριωδῶς, 15.20.3), and of course treacherous (παρασπονδεῖν, 7.13.7; παρασπονδούντων, 15.20.6; παρασπονδοῦντι, 15.22.2; ἀθεσίας, 15.23.3-4; παρασπόνδημα, 15.24.1; ἀθεσίαν, 15.25.4; ἀβεβαιότητα, 15.25.4).

According to the *Histories*, the main factor in Philip's shift in character was his accumulation of power as a result of the Social War. This notion that the acquisition of power ultimately results in moral barbarism is discussed extensively in Polybius' aside in Book 6 on the "Cycle of Polities" (Anacyclosis). Indeed, throughout the *Histories*, Polybius carefully associates morally declining states (tyranny, oligarchy, mobocracy) with the "barbaric" qualities of the Hellenic/barbarian spectrum. In this way, the virtues or vices exemplified by the state are reflective of the health of the state. This is perhaps best seen in Polybius' description of states and rulers that demonstrate "lawlessness" (παρανομία). Throughout the *Histories*, παρανομία is seen in the devolution of monarchy into tyranny, in aristocracy into oligarchy, and in democracy

372

into mobocracy. Thus, Nabis of Sparta (13.6.4), Ptolemy Philopator (14.12.4), Antiochus

Epiphanes (31.9.2-4), Prusias (33.7.2), Charops (35.5.7), Aristomachus of Argos (2.59.4-60.2),

and Philip V (8.8.4; 9.30.1; 18.54.8-9; 22.13.9; 23.10.14; 25.3.9); the Phocians under

Onomarchus and Philomenus (9.33.4), the Carthaginians in 203 (15.4.2) and in 147; the

Achaeans in 147/146 (38.13.8; 38.18.4-5), and the Syrian Populace in 162 (31.12.4) are all

described and criticized by Polybius in terms of παρανομία. For Polybius, παρανομία was a sign

of the moral and political collapse of the state, following the path of the *anacyclosis*. Throughout

the *Histories* the states and tyrants who exhibit παρανομία as always defeated or killed in short

order. Indeed, Polybius is careful to associate every instance of παρανομία and treachery in the

Histories with a corresponding pragmatic consequence, often resulting in the destruction of the

state or the individual. By presenting this pattern of moral corruption and pragmatic

consequence, Polybius uses his *anacyclosis* to underpin the *Histories* and his depictions of the

acquisition of power and the collapse of states.

In the context of the Romans, Polybius' emphasis on παρανομία is telling. Of the over 50

appearances of παρανομία in Polybius' work, it is only leveled against the Romans on a single

occasion by a Rhoadian statesmen in 207 (11.5.7). This claim of Roman παρανομία is made by

Polybius himself, and indeed Polybius' description of the Roman decision to withdraw entirely

from Greece by 194 undermines the argument of the Rhoadian statesman 13 years earlier.

Rather, the Romans are often presented in the *Histories* as the major power in the Mediterranean

working to combat παρανομία. The Romans are depicted as the response to Philip's παρανομία

in Greece, Teuta's παρανομία in 229 (2.8.13; 2.11.5), and Nabis' παρανομία in 192 (13.6.4).

Polybius likewise presents the Romans as combating the παρανομία of the Galatian Gauls in 189

(3.3.5; 21.41.2), Charops in 167 and 157 (32.6.4). The Romans are likewise often the *victims* of

the παρανομία of other states, as demonstrated by attacks on Roman envoys in 203 by the Carthaginians (15.8.11), in 162 by the Syrians (31.12.4); in 283 by the Senones (2.19.9), in 229 by Queen Teuta and the Illyrians (2.8.12-13), in 218 by the Boii (3.40.10), in 203 by the Carthaginians (15.2.5), in 189 by the Galatian Gauls (21.39.10), in 157/156 by the Dalmatians (32.13.2-3), in 154 by the Ligurians (33.9.3-6), and in 147 by the Achaeans (38.9.1-2; 38.13.9). Polybius' portrayal of the Romans in terms of παρανομία, then, is overwhelmingly positive.

On the whole, Polybius' work presents the Romans in a good light, describing the state and its mixed constitution as virtuous and exemplary. The Romans, according to Polybius, did not appear to show any signs of the παρανομία that accompanies the moral collapse of the state. Despite this praise of Rome, Polybius appears to have had concerns about how long this Roman magnanimity would last for the Mediterranean. When would the burden of the overwhelming amount of power and influence exercised by the Roman Senate become too morally corrupting for the Roman constitution and institutions to maintain? Polybius expresses these concerns by presenting his readers with the notion that the Romans of his own day were not as virtuous as the Romans of the past. Such a claim is made both in the Greek debate in 149 (36.9.9-11) as well as in Polybius' portrayal of the Third Punic War, in which Scipio Aemilianus' skill and moderation are seen as an exception among the Romans of his own time (cf. 35.4.8-14). This notion of the Romans in a state of moral decline is also suggested by Polybius in his condemnation of Marcius Philippus' deceptive diplomacy against Perseus in 171 (Livy [P] 42.47.4-8), despite Polybius' praise for strikingly similar acts of diplomatic deception carried out by Scipio Africanus in 204/203 (14.2-5) and by Quinctius Flamininus in 198/197. And indeed, the claim of a virtuous Roman past and depraved Roman present in many ways contradicts the *Histories* as a whole, which emphasizes Roman moderation and virtue *throughout* the work.

The presence of this contradiction within the *Histories* suggests that Polybius wished to leave the future of Roman hegemony ambiguous. The Achaean historian presents 146 as something of a flashpoint in which the future of Roman rule could follow either the moderation and benevolence of the Roman handling of the Achaean War or the deception and lethargy of the Third Punic War. Thus, the presence of this contradiction stems largely from the dual purposes behind Polybius' work geared toward a Roman readership. On the one hand, by emphasizing a moral dichotomy between Roman past and present, he is able to *challenge* the Romans to self-regulate their behavior by suggesting that they are not exhibiting the same level of *virtus* demonstrated by their fathers and grandfathers. For the Romans, the claim itself (regardless of the strength of the evidence) would be a serious one, as Polybius knows. Such Roman honor and its connection to the deeds of the family is noted clearly in Book 6. Polybius realizes that only the Romans can curb future wicked Roman behavior, given the current unipolar Mediterranean system. In the cases of Scipio and Flamininus, Polybius praises them because he finds their actions as well as their deceptions to be nuanced and praiseworthy. It is in Polybius' condemnation of Philippus that he seems to contradict himself in order to present this dichotomy.

On the other hand, Polybius also strives to *warn* the Romans that treacherous actions always have direct pragmatic consequences, and very serious ones at that. It is for this reason that Polybius chooses to emphasize the seizure of Sardinia in 237. In many ways, Polybius' portrayal of the onset of the Second Punic War is unique in its emphasis on Sardinia as the major cause of the war - which neither other historians nor the Carthaginians themselves make any reference to in their justifications. Due to the treachery over Sardinia, Rome is only saved from destruction at the hands of Hannibal due to the remarkable institutions of the Roman constitution and the fortitude of the Senate. Ultimately, Polybius strives to make arguments to a Roman

readership as to why the Romans must refrain from treachery on both a moral/cultural level, to meet or surpass the glory of their ancestors, as well as on a practical level, to avoid the political decline and destruction of Rome.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The *Histories* of Polybius is filled with a great many instances of treachery. In analyzing Polybius' portrayal of these acts, this dissertation identified instances of treason, as defined narrowly by Polybius in 18.13-15, as well as more general instances of treachery. In cases of betraying, deserting, and undermining friends and allies, Polybius largely condemns such unjustifiable behavior, especially in the face of kinship or past kindnesses. For example, Polybius condemns the decision of Demetrius of Pharos to violate his treaty with Rome despite the benefits Rome had bestowed upon him in 229 (3.16); the betrayal of the Spanish chieftains Andobales and Mandonius in the face of Scipio's extreme generosity in Spain (11.28, 11.31, 11.33); and the 170 break of faith and attack on Apollonia near Conossus by the Cydonians in Crete despite ties of citizenship (28.14). Polybius does, however, make allowances for such betrayals in the face of extreme circumstances and wicked actions taken by the ally. Thus, Hannibal's attack on Saguntum and ultimately Italy in 219 is justified due to the past Roman treachery at Sardinia (3.15.4-11), and his 218 attack against his own Gallic allies is justified by the recent decision of the Gauls to treacherously negotiate with the Romans (3.69.5-7). Hannibal's betrayal of some of his Italian allies in 211 is likewise justified, given the limited military options he had at his disposal (9.26).

In cases of betraying and deceiving those within one's own state, Polybius is equally critical. The Achaean historian sharply condemns Logbasis' attempt in 218 to deliver the city of Selge to Achaeus (5.74.7); the treacherous betrayal of Cynaetha to the Aetolians by the Cynaethean exiles (4.17.11) in 220; and Hasdrubal's ignoble and cowardly hope in 146 to hand over Carthage to Scipio Aemilianus in exchange for his own personal safety (38.8.1-10). Polybius emphasizes that each instance was motivated by personal ambition or hope of safety rather than some attempt to ensure the safety of the state. Logbasis acted against the best interest of Selge (ἀπέσχε τοῦ

377

βοηθεῖν τῇ πατρίδι, 5.74.7); the Cynaethean exiles betrayed their fellow citizens (πατρίδι) and therefore their very preservers (σώσασι, 4.17.10); and Hasdrubal' cowardice and desire for his own safety led him to treacherously desert (αὐτομολήσας) his fellow citizens, shamelessly abandon (ἀναισχύντως ἐγκαταλιπὼν) his own state, and secretly go over to the enemy (ὑπέλθοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, 38.20.9). In other cases, Polybius criticizes statesmen such as Charops (27.15.2-16), Callicrates (24.8.9), Diophanes (22.10.5-6), and Proandrus and Lyciscus (28.4.1-9), who willingly cede their states' independence to Roman domination for personal advancement and power. Similar self-serving activity is also frequently found within the Hellenic courts of the Antigonids, Ptolemeys, and Seleucids, as courtiers and agents of the court betray their kings as well as one another in the pursuit of increasing their own power, wealth, and influence. When these actions are carried out for patriotic reasons, however, Polybius condones such betrayals. Thus, the Achaean historian makes special allowance for betrayals of traitors and tyrants (2.56.14-16), as these men have already betrayed the social contract with the state. For this reason, Polybius condones the treachery of Prusias II's subjects (6.15.6); the uprising of the Greeks and Egyptians in Alexandria against Agathocles in 203/202 (15.27-33); and the rebellion of the Cyreneans against Ptolemy VIII Physcon in 162 (31.18.14-15). Other betrayals are accepted by Polybius given the necessity of circumstances, most famously the decision by Aratus of Sicyon in 225/224 to submit the Achaean League under Macedonian domination in order to prevent imminent destruction at the hands of Cleomenes III of Sparta (2.51). Polybius argues that Aratus' actions were driven by patriotism and necessity and not by personal ambitions or greed. Similar necessity is perhaps also why Polybius refrains from condemning soldiers who give up information to the enemy while under interrogation, as seen during the Gallic invasion of Italy in 225 (2.27.2-3; 2.27.6-8) and during Antiochus III's siege of Rabbatama in 218 (5.71.8-10).

In cases of diplomatic treachery carried out against enemies during times of war, Polybius is again critical. Attacks against envoys are a non-starter for the Achaean historian. Thus, we see Polybius sharply condemn the Seseones' treacherous (παρασπονδήσαντες) murder of Roman envoys at Arretium in 283 (2.19.7-9); the Carthaginian mercenaries' treacherous (παρεσπόνδησαν) attack on Gesco at Tunis in 240 (1.69.5-70.10); the Carthaginians treacherous (παρασπόνδησιν) attempt to attack and kill the Roman ambassadors during the Second Punic War (15.2.5-13; cf. 15.4.2), and the attacks by the Achaeans in 147 on Roman delegations during the months leading up to the Achaean War (38.10.2-38.12.4), among others. Similarly, in instances where a state goes back on a formal promise or agreement, Polybius is unanimously critical. For example, the treacherous (παρεσπονδῆσθαι, παρασπόνδησιν) Carthaginian attack in 203 on Roman transport and supply ships during an armistice (15.1.1-4; cf. 15.3.2, 15.4.2); Philip's shameful (αἰσχύνεσθαι) and treacherous (παρασπονδοῦντι) decision to destroy Cius and enslave its citizens in 202 after having given them assurances that they would be spared (15.23.2-9); Philip's similar treacherous (παρασπόνδημα) enslavement of the people of Thasos after they had surrendered on terms that they would be spared (15.24.1-2); and the treacherous (προϋπάρχουσαν) murder of Archidamus by Cleomenes of Sparta in 228, despite promising him his safety in a formal agreement that was ratified by the Carthaginian Senate (5.37.1-4; cf. 5. 37.12) are all sharply condemned by Polybius. When no such formal agreements have been made, however, Polybius allows for a good deal of deception during the diplomatic process. Indeed, he holds disingenuous diplomacy to be a skill that can and should be used strategically by prudent commanders and statesmen. The best two examples of this are Scipio Africanus' disingenuous peace talks with the Carthaginians and Numidians in 203/202 leading up to the battle of the Camps (14.1.1-14.2.14), and Flamininus'

disingenuous peace talks with Philip V during the winter of 198/197 - both which are heartily praised by Polybius.

While this dissertation's examination of Polybius' judgments on the many instances of treachery throughout *Histories* confirms Arthur Eckstein's emphasis that Polybius is a morally minded writer and thinker, it argues that Polybius approached treachery and deception with much more nuance than Eckstein suggests.[1] Rather than a blanket condemnation of treacherous behavior, Polybius looks to the individual contexts underlying each case. Thus, Polybius believes that friends and allies can be betrayed given past misdeeds and current conditions; members of one's own state can be betrayed if motivated by patriotism rather than personal gain; and informal promises and assurances can (and should) be manipulated during wartime, as long as they do not rise to the level of formal treaties or agreements sealed by oaths to the gods. Such nuance should not be surprising. After all, Polybius was a complex thinker, writing in a complex era.

Yet more significant than the emergence of these nuances in Polybius' presentation of treachery in his work are the patterns that emerge when these treacheries are viewed en masse. Throughout the *Histories*, there are *far more* instances of treachery in monarchies than there are in republics, revealing a good deal about Polybius' attitude toward monarchies in general. Polybius believed that the main reason behind this difference stemmed from the concentration of large amounts of power in the hands of a single individual within the monarchy. According to Polybius, this power worked to corrupt all but the most exemplary kings and courtiers, as seen most vividly in the moral decline of Philip V following the Social War (7.11; cf. 27.9-10). Republics, on the other hand, worked to diffuse this power into the hands of a larger group of statesmen, resulting in less moral corruption and consequently fewer instances of treachery. Polybius believed that rather

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[1] Eckstein (1995) 84-117; contra Walbank 1965: 8-11; Walbank 1970: 304; Walbank 1972: 178-181; Walbank 1974: 9-13, 23, 27-28.

than for reasons of personal power and gain, statesmen in republics tended to either deploy deception for patriotic reasons or not at all. It is for this reason that Polybius holds republics to be the "best of all living constitutions" (6.10.14).[2]

Rome, then, in Polybius' mind, stands as the best exemplar of a republic, as he discussed candidly in Book 6. While the Greek states have far fewer instances of treachery and deception than monarchies, Rome remains unique in its relative lack of such behavior. There is not a single instance of outright treason at Rome in the *Histories*, and there are remarkably few instances of Roman treachery in general. In this sense, the Romans are found to exhibit many of the "Greek" characteristics (courage, loyalty, justice, wisdom, order, etc.) that Polybius associates with virtuous states and statesmen, as opposed to "barbarian" vices (treachery, irrationality, cowardice, greed, etc.).[3] Polybius emphasizes that these "barbarian" vices, including treachery, are closely associated with the corrupt polities (tyranny, oligarchy, and mobocracy) that all states inevitably collapse into while traveling along the "Cycle of Polities" (*anacyclosis*, Book 6). Thus, Polybius intentionally draws clear and inseparable lines between the moral and political health of the state. This association is seen with Polybius' use of the word παρανομία, which is often associated with the collapsing moral foundation of the state into lawlessness. Significantly, in all the appearances of παρανομία throughout the *Histories*, the Romans are never found to be carrying out παρανομία. Instead, they are nearly always the *victims* of παρανομία, and in many ways the Romans become the force of justice that works to cleanse the agents of παρανομία. Thus, the Romans reacted to Philip's V's παρανομία against multiple Greek city-states at the end of the 3rd century, and they

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[2] Such a comparison assumes that the moral health of the state has not already crumbled according to Polybius' discussion of anacyclosis in Book 6.
[3] Champion 2000a; Nicholson 2020.

liberated the Greek cities from the παρανομία of the Illyrians in 229 (2.8.13), and from the παρανομία of the Galatian Gauls in 189 (21.40.2; 3.3.5).

While this lawlessness was to be expected from barbarians and mercenaries, when "civilized states" exhibited such παρανομία, Polybius saw it as a sign of degeneracy preceding the eventual collapse of the state. This claim is supported by the fact that Polybius works to show his readers that every instance of treachery in the *Histories* resulted in some pragmatic consequence - often the death of the individual and at times the collapse of the state. In other words, a tendency toward treachery appears as a symptom of a state in the midst of political and moral collapse. Polybius' decision to frame his work in terms of this moral cause and political effect worked to warn Roman readers that a moral descent into treacherous rule and behavior would ultimately mean the collapse of the Roman state. This claim suggests that while the Greeks remained Polybius' primary audience for his work, Polybius wrote some passages for a Roman readership - a fact that has been either underemphasized or ignored by most scholars. Polybius, then, like Fabius Pictor and Postumius Albinus, followed the older tradition of writing a history of Rome in Greek with both Greek and Roman readers in mind.

Nor is this the only warning that Polybius gives to a Roman audience. Throughout the *Histories*, Polybius presents the notion that the Romans of the past were more honorable and less deceitful than the Romans of his own day (140s). This claim is made by the older Roman senators in 172/171 ([P] 42.43.2), by some of the Greeks during the debate on Roman actions in 149 (36.9.9-11); by the Carthaginians during the Third Punic War ([P] App. *Pun. 79*); and by Polybius' own aside on the Romans (13.3). This notion of contemporary Roman moral decline is likewise suggested in Polybius' portrayal of the Third Macedonian and Third Punic Wars. Despite his praise of Scipio's and Falmininus' diplomatic deception against Carthage and Philip, Polybius condemns

Philippus' similar deception against Perseus in 172/171, highlighting it as an example of Rome's *nova sapiens,* which marked a departure of the honor of past generations. Polybius' decision to include the Greek debate over Roman actions against Carthage in 149, likewise suggest a departure from old Roman honor, especially when viewed next to Rome's diplomacy with Carthage at the onset of the Second Punic War, which showed disdain for legal arguments when honor was involved. And during the Third Punic War itself, Polybius emphasizes that Scipio Aemilianus was exceptional among the Romans of his own day, reflecting the great Roman generations of the past (cf. 35.4.8-14) rather than his lackluster contemporaries. In many ways, however, Polybius' presentation of a virtuous Roman past and morally depraved Roman present is both contrived and contradictory to his own narrative of events. On the whole, Roman action between 264 and 146 is marked by a remarkable lack of treachery and a skillful use of deception during times of war. If anything, there are more instances of treachery and deception before 167 than after it.

Taken together, Polybius' didactic lessons on the consequences of treacherous behavior suggest that Polybius wanted to warn and challenge a Roman readership toward self-regulation. By creating the notion of a more virtuous Roman past, Polybius challenged the Romans to live up to the actions of past Roman generations (cf. 6.56.11). And should the Romans fail to do so and descend into treachery, Polybius warns his readers that the collapse of the state will inevitably follow. The Achaean historian understood well that by 146, Rome held unrivaled power over the Mediterranean. The natural checks and balances that existed for states living within a bipolar or multipolar system had disappeared, leaving Rome to act without fear of immediate reprisal. As such, Polybius realized that only the Romans themselves were capable of placing a restraint on Roman power. In this regard, the *Histories* can be read as a challenge to the Romans to rule with

the same leniency and honor shown by men like Scipio Africanus and Flamininus - by the glorious men who had defeated Hannibal and Philip V, defended Rome, and won Rome's empire.

As such a challenge suggests, Polybius himself was undecided on how Rome's rule of the Mediterranean would progress. While Roman hegemony throughout the *Histories* was generally defined by remarkable leniency, moderation, and benevolence, Polybius understood that eventually all states degrade into παρανομία - even Rome. Whether Rome's moral decline would come about swiftly or in the distant future, Polybius believed, was largely up to the Romans themselves. In Polybius' mind, both paths remained open. Thus, he presents the events of 146 as something of a flashpoint for the future of Roman hegemony. On the one hand was Rome's morally problematic handling of Carthage, which emphasized Roman harshness and ruthlessness, and on the other hand was the Roman leniency, benevolence, and moderation that largely marked Roman action toward the Achaean League in the days leading up to the war. Only the Romans could decide which type of behavior would become the exception, and Polybius hoped to use the lessons of the treacheries of the past to inform that decision.

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