

ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF NEIGHBORHOOD ON
STATE-BUILDING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

David George Garcia, Doctor of Philosophy, 2013

Dissertation directed by: Professor William L. Reed III
Department of Government and Politics

Why is state-building more advanced in some sub-Saharan African countries than in others? And, over time, what accounts for the steady gains, steady declines, or gains followed by declines (or vice-versa) observed in the state-building trajectories of Africa's states? This dissertation endeavors to shed light on these questions by assessing the impact of one suspected cause of state-building variation: the way power is distributed among states and their neighbors. Specifically, this dissertation assesses whether the relative distribution of power provides incentives or disincentives to regimes in charge of states to pursue policies that are conducive or detrimental to state-building. Employing OLS, two hypotheses are tested: one which predicts that regimes in charge of relatively weak states promote policies conducive to state-building, and another which predicts that regimes in charge of relatively weak states opt for a strategy of personal rule that runs counter to the imperatives of state-building. Findings are mixed and often contingent upon how state-building is measured; when state-building is assessed in terms of how

proficiently the state regulates social and economic life, provides infrastructure services to its population, and promotes human development, support is found for the latter hypothesis. Yet when state-building is measured in terms of how well the state monopolizes the legitimate use of force or forges convergence between nations and the state, no statistically significant relationship in either direction is found. Thus, while there is at least some evidence that the regional distribution of power impacts the state-building process, it does not appear to do so quite as robustly as expected.

EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF NEIGHBORHOOD ON STATE-BUILDING IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by

David George Garcia

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2013

Advisory Committee:

Professor William L. Reed III, Chair
Professor David Cunningham
Professor Kurt Finsterbusch
Professor John McCauley
Professor George Quester

I would like to express gratitude to my friends and family for their support as I worked on this project, and to my committee chair, Bill Reed, for his advice and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1	1
The State of Africa's States	1
The Research Question and Puzzle.....	3
What Does "State-Building" Mean, & How do We Know it When We See it?	5
Explaining When, Where, How, & Why State-Building Succeeds or Fails	27
Conclusion and an Outline of Chapters 2-5	37
CHAPTER 2	40
Introduction: Agency, Structure, and the Role of Relative Power	40
Altering the Agency-Structure Dynamic: Charles Tilly and Interstate War.....	42
The Agency-Structure Dynamic in the Twenty-First Century Global South	48
Revising Tilly: Relative Power and State-Building in the Twenty-First Century	60
Summary and Conclusion	82
CHAPTER 3	84
Introduction: Testing the Link Between Relative Power & State-Building	84
The Research Design	85
The Procedure and Results.....	102
Assessing the Relationship Between Relative Power and State-Building.....	112
Summary and Conclusion	116
CHAPTER 4	118
Introduction: Relative Power & State-Building Revisited: Does Context Matter?	118
Uncovering the Relationship Between Context, Relative Power, & State-Building.....	119
The Procedure and Results.....	123
Assessing the Relationship Between Context, Relative Power, & State-Building	143
Summary and Conclusion	157

CHAPTER 5	158
How & Why Relative Power Impacts State-Building: Theory & Findings.....	159
Pathways for Future Research in the Area of State-Building	162
Policy Implications of the Dissertation’s Findings	170
Summary and Conclusion	171
APPENDIX.....	172
Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 3	172
A Summary of the Results of Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 3	176
Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 4	177
A Summary of the Results of Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 4	187
Summary and Conclusion	199
BIBLIOGRAPHY	200

CHAPTER 1

1.0 The State of Africa's States

In June of 2011 *Foreign Policy* magazine, in collaboration with The Fund for Peace, released its seventh annual Failed States Index assessment. The contents of the index were predictable; of the 12 states most in danger of failing, eight were African. Moreover, not a single African state received an assessment higher than “borderline,” with most scoring either “in danger” or “critical.”¹ The problems facing Africa's states are well-known and to a large degree similar across borders. The continent is dominated by weak, illegitimate rulers whose powerbases are often composed entirely of members of their own ethnic groups. Domestic needs often go unmet, due either to misappropriation of resources or a legitimate inability of the national economies to generate sufficient revenue. Political instability, decrepit or altogether-absent infrastructure, weak institutions, and the proliferation of disease are a handful of the usual consequences.

Numerous development statistics bear out the above characterization of Africa's states. In 2009, despite having received nearly 900 billion dollars in official development assistance since 1970,² African states south of the Sahara desert had an average life expectancy of 53.5 years, a literacy rate of 66 percent, a GDP per capita of 922 dollars (compared to a GDP per capita of 37,016 dollars in the United States) and were able to provide just 32 percent of the members of their populations with access to a sanitary

¹ The Failed States Index 2011 can be found at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings

² Official Development Assistance (ODA) data can be found at:
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/27/42139250.pdf>

means of human waste disposal.³ Moreover, despite both a larger military expenditure as a percentage of GDP between 1988 and 2009 than any other region save for the Middle East, as well as the deployment of tens of thousands of international peacekeeping troops, military observers, civilian police and staff per year, sub-Saharan African states remain the world's most internally fragmented.⁴

Yet, while every sub-Saharan African state faces serious political, economic, and human development challenges, it would be a mistake to view the continent as a monolith; there is, in fact, considerable variation between the strength of its states. On one extreme lie states like Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – the former with an internationally recognized government that controls at best a handful of city blocks, and the latter whose vast territory and dearth of roads make the projection of power far beyond the capital city impossible.⁵ On the other end of the continuum are states like Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. While by no means problem-free, these states maintain monopolies on the legitimate use of force within their borders (arguably meeting the minimum threshold of stateness) and have relatively good records when it comes to redistributing resources to their populations. Botswana, for example, has avoided the resource curse and parlayed revenue generated from its primary export – diamonds – into an 84 percent literacy rate, an infant mortality rate lower than that of all but four sub-Saharan countries, the provision of clean water to 95 percent of its

³ These statistics were taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators datasets, found at: <http://data.worldbank.org/>

⁴ Data on military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, available between 1988 and 2009, comes from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and can be found at: <http://www.sipri.org/databases>. Data on troop, military observer, civilian police and staff data can be found at: <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko>

⁵ For an account of the impact of geography and population disbursement on state-building, see: Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

population, and a GDP per capita over four times the continent average.⁶ And just as the range is broad between Africa's weakest and strongest states, there is considerable variation in the strength of the states that fall somewhere in between.

1.1 The Research Question and Puzzle

The fact that the African continent is not a monolith but rather composed of states occupying various positions on a state-strength continuum begs the question: to what can this variation be attributed? Why is state-building more advanced in some countries than in others? And, over time, what accounts for the steady gains, steady declines, or gains followed by declines (or vice-versa) observed in the state-building trajectories of Africa's states?⁷ The objective of this dissertation is to offer some answers to these questions by focusing on one suspected cause of state-building variation – the relative distribution of power. To that end, the dissertation will assess whether the way power is distributed among states and their neighbors provides incentive or disincentive to regimes in charge of states to pursue policies that are conducive or detrimental to state-building.

What makes the puzzle of sub-Saharan Africa's state-building variation more interesting (and allows for an apples-to-apples comparison) is that Africa's sub-Saharan states largely began their state-building projects at the same time and encountered (and continue to encounter) similar economic, political, and social challenges. Of the sub-Saharan countries that were colonized (and all but two were), nearly 80 percent became

⁶ These statistics were taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators datasets, found at: <http://data.worldbank.org/>

⁷ To illustrate this, using numbers taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators datasets, consider the extent to which a state's citizens have access to clean water and improved sanitation facilities – two measures of infrastructure development, which is itself one measure of state strength. Over an 18 year period, beginning in 1990, Malawi saw the percentage of people with access to improved sanitation facilities rise consistently from 42 percent to 56 percent, and the percentage of people with access to clean water rise from 40 percent to 80 percent; in contrast, over the same period, the percentage of people in Sudan with access to clean water fell consistently from 65 percent to 57 percent, and the percentage of people with access to improved sanitation facilities remained essentially unchanged at 34 percent.

independent over the eight-year period of 1960 – 1968. And although the Europeans administered their respective colonies somewhat uniquely,⁸ colonialism impacted in many similar ways every state that emerged following the bestowment of independence.⁹ Today, many African states continue to be characterized by economies that are burdened by low levels of development and rely on the export of competition-plagued primary products, a public sector with poor leadership and weak bureaucracies, and societies that to varying degrees identify with their respective ethnic or regional members rather than with the state. Yet over the last 50 years, despite economic, political, and social headwinds, some states and their leaders have made meaningful advances in state-

⁸ For a very good overview of the colonial powers' philosophical and ideological reasons for selecting either an indirect or centralized method of governing their colonies, see Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 149-154. For an explanation that relies less on ideology and more on the facts on the ground – namely demographics, population density, and socio-economic status – see A. L. Adu, "Post-Colonial Relationships," *African Affairs* 66, no. 265 (1967): 296-297.

⁹ Crawford Young nicely captures the fundamental nature of colonialism with a quote from a French spokesman in 1912: "That the colonies are made for the metropolis, for the many and varied advantages that the metropolis may draw from them, is evident: if colonies, the foundation of which nearly always costs the metropolis so much money and sacrifices and which exposes them to such great risks, were not made to serve those metropolises, they would have no *raison d'être*, and one cannot see by what aberration civilized states would dispute them with so much rude jealousy," taken from Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 97. See also Rene Lemarchand, "Burundi in Comparative Perspective: Dimensions of Ethnic Strife," in *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, eds. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (London: Routledge, 1993) for an account of the devastating post-colonial impact of the Europeans' divide and rule policies. See William A. Munro, "Power, Peasants and Political Development: Reconsidering State Construction in Africa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, no. 1 (1996): 124-131 for an account of the colonial powers' incursions into the African countryside and the lasting impact on patterns of local authority, stratification, property rights, and the division of labor. And see Bruce J. Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," *African Affairs* 97 (1998): 329-341 for an argument claiming that the colonial legacy is one of "bureaucratic authoritarianism, pervasive patron-client relations, and a complex dialectic of assimilation, fragmentation and competition...making the full-scale development of both capitalism and the nation-state difficult, if not unlikely." Finally, for an account of some of the Europeans' less harmful enduring contributions – advancements in literacy, a unifying national language, the incorporation of Africa into the independent state system, medical advances, and the introduction of a civil service – see: A. Adu Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonialism* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 95-98; R. Hunt Davis, "Interpreting the Colonial Period in African History," *African Affairs* 72, no. 289 (1973): 387-389; and Robert J. Cummings, "Africa Between the Ages," *African Studies Review* 29, no. 2 (1986): 8.

building while others have foundered. In a nutshell, the objective of this project is to shed new light on why.

1.2 What Does “State-Building” Mean and How Do We Know it When We See it?

Before moving forward, an explanation of what is meant by “state-building” is in order.

The concept is ambiguous and has been used inconsistently in the literature. Variations on “state-building” – state craft, state formation, stateness, state-strength, et cetera – are used at times synonymously, and at times to refer to entirely different phenomena.

Perhaps most common is confusion regarding the use of state-building and nation-building; some scholars (and policy-makers) use these terms interchangeably, whereas others contend that nation-building is just one component part of a larger state-building process.¹⁰ Still others argue that the actual objective of the developing countries is nation-*destroying* rather than nation-building.¹¹ There is also disagreement about what should be emphasized in a definition of state-building. For example, is it reasonable to take into account the form of government when assessing a state’s position on a state-building continuum? That is, should democratic states be considered more advanced simply because they are democratic? Or, in defining and measuring state-building, should primacy be given to what a state produces in actual results – say, its ability to monopolize force within its territory (given that this is perhaps the most basic expectation of a state)? In other words, what matters? And even when there is general agreement about what should be included in a definition of state-building, there are often disputes over proper

¹⁰ Karin von Hippel, for example, begins her article on external intervention and democracy promotion by writing that nation-building “really means state-building,” – a claim with which many state-building and nation-building scholars would disagree. In Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building,” *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2000): 96.

¹¹ Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” *World Politics* 24, no.3 (1972): 336. What Walker Connor refers to as “nation-destroying” is elsewhere referred to as “nation-building” – that is, attempting to form a convergence between the state and the various nations which reside inside its territory.

measurement. Consider the critical need for all states to acquire the capacity to accumulate revenue. All states need money to pay for basic state activities, but should the *source* of a state's revenue matter? Should a state that relies on foreign aid or on a handful of enclaves within its territory to fund its activities be considered as strong as a state that depends on the successful, broad taxation of its population? Unfortunately, muddled, narrow, and inconsistent definitions and measurements have made theory-building difficult as scholars talk passed one another and develop apples-to-oranges explanations regarding what matters when it comes to "state-building."

1.2a The Challenge of Defining State-Building

The primary impediment to reaching a consensus on a meaningful definition of state-building is, logically, a lack of consensus on what exactly is expected of a state and how it is expected to go about meeting those expectations. The Montevideo Convention, signed in 1933, articulated just four vague criteria necessary for statehood under international law: states were required to possess a defined territory, a population, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The Convention was quiet on what was expected of government vis-à-vis the population residing inside the territory of the state. Moreover, as Karin von Hippel notes, while the four criteria specified in the Montevideo Convention are necessary for the initial recognition of a new state, their weakening or disappearance later does not require that the international community rescind its recognition of statehood.¹² In fact, the development of international norms protecting juridical sovereignty and non-intervention have allowed for even defunct "quasi-states" that have lost control over their territory and prey on their

¹² Karin von Hippel, "Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building," *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2000): 108.

populations rather than provide political goods to exist indefinitely.¹³ While at one time the majority of states failed and disappeared – and were allowed to do so – today international law prohibits the annexation and incorporation by the strong of even the world’s most hapless states.¹⁴

Looking to international law for an account of the expectations of states provides, for reasons laid out above, only minimal and general guidance in developing a definition of state-building. Yet, while international law has continued to cleave to the four very general requirements laid out in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, international norms have evolved in such a way as to expand the areas of public and private life over which states are expected to exercise jurisdiction.¹⁵ This supplementation to the Montevideo Convention includes not only an expansion of what states *ought* to do, but what they have come to be *expected* to do – both by fellow states (or, at the very least, those in the Global North) and by their own populations. To illustrate this point, Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli chronicle the expansion of state jurisdiction, organization, and authority between 1870 and 1970. They find that states, once primarily responsible for national defense and the regulation of trade, have come to be expected to provide a wide array of services to their populations that promote human development and go well beyond the mere provision of security.¹⁶ The evolution of the British state provides a good, if not exaggerated, example of the expansion of the state and the extent to which the normative justness of the state’s role in society has become all but taken for granted.

¹³ See Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

¹⁴ Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa,” *International Security* 14, no. 4 (1990): 124.

¹⁵ For a very good elaboration on this point and an examination of the evolution of views about statehood, see Thomas D. Grant, “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents,” *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 37, no. 2 (1999).

¹⁶ George M. Thomas et al., *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1987),

Comparing budget presentations delivered in Britain in 1853 and 2007, Ghani and Lockhart show how state obligations ballooned from a minimalist commitment to the payment of the military and public debt in 1853, to a broad public spending agenda aimed at advancing human development, social welfare, and social justice in 2007.¹⁷ Indeed, the 2011 street demonstrations throughout Europe in response to debt-plagued governments peeling back their welfare states, the Arab Spring revolts fuelled by populations fed up with the inability or unwillingness of their leaders to affect human and economic development, and the April 2011 uprising in Uganda sparked by the government's failure to ease the impact of rising commodity prices demonstrate – looking at just the first six months of 2011 – the expansive role that populations have come to expect the state to play in their lives. Key to all of this – and it is the central argument made in the work of Thomas et al. – is that the expanded expectations of state behavior are *exogenous* to any particular state; states are expected to play a certain role in their citizens' lives *because* they are states.¹⁸

¹⁷ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 118-120.

¹⁸ In addition to the advancement of economic and human development – and perhaps as or more difficult for many states in the Global South – Thomas et al. note that, today, states are also expected to incorporate their populations by way of legal citizenship. Yet, writing in 1987, Thomas et al. note that, once citizenship has been extended, states may legitimately do as they please with their populations without the fear of external intervention. In 2013, of course, even this is no longer true as states are now expected to not only incorporate their populations, but to do so without committing human rights violations. The international norm of non-intervention that long protected states guilty of committing human rights violations has since been significantly weakened. A selective reading of the U.N. Charter coupled with the argument that states guilty of human rights abuses implicitly surrender their right to sovereignty has been used to justify external intervention. For elaboration, see: Iain Attack, "Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Intervention," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3 (2002), and Julie Mertus, "Beyond Borders: The Human Rights Imperative for Intervention in Kosovo," *Human Rights Review* 1, no. 2 (2000). For a very good discussion of evolving international human rights norms and an account of how states were, as late as the 20th century, permitted to employ population transfer as a means of population/citizenship engineering, see: Jennifer Jackson Preece, "Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms," *Human Rights Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (1998).

The preceding paragraphs have made headway in shining light on the question of what is expected of states by looking to international law and international norms. Only with a thorough understanding of what is expected of states can a meaningful definition of state-building be created. Yet context matters, and some academics and political elite contend that the evolving and growing expectations put upon states exceed what those in the Global South can reasonably be expected to meet.¹⁹ To take Karel Vasak's three generations of human rights as an example, it is difficult to expect states in the Global South to guarantee their populations the "luxuries" of environmentally-friendly development or the allocation of resources to preserve and promote cultural heritage – third-generation rights – while these states still struggle to provide life-sustaining first and second-generation rights. Moreover, the nature or *degree* of appropriate and desirable state intervention is contextual even if what is expected of states is not. While all states, for example, are expected to promote the medical well-being of their populations (the expectation), there is no single method by which every state is expected to do so; just as the British would not agree to swap their government-heavy National Health Service for the United States' current model, there is no political support in the United States for healthcare reform that involves anywhere near the role that government plays in the British N.H.S. And finally, just as there is disagreement among academics, policy-makers, activists, and populations on the question of how much ought to be expected of states, and no consensus on precisely how a state should go about meeting expectations, there is also dispute over whether or when ends can be said to justify means. Take, for

¹⁹ See Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995). Ayoob notes that the young states in the Global South are pressured to rapidly and peacefully build their states despite the fact that state-building in the Global North took centuries to complete and was stunningly violent.

example, the normative-positivist debate on the value of democratic governance.

Particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, pressure has been put on states to respect civil liberties and democratize (or, at the very least, indicate an intention to move in that direction). Yet a reasonable argument can be made that necessary pre-conditions for successful democratization do not currently exist in much of the Global South. Charles Tilly captures the essence of the problem as follows: “Beyond a very small scale, *no democracy survives in the absence of substantial governmental capacity*.”²⁰

Piggybacking on Tilly, Thomas Carothers contends that recent, optimistic thinking on democratization is flawed because it assumes high-capacity states. In fact, where states are not strong but characterized by insecurity, internal conflict, and a precarious hold on power by elites, Carothers writes that “the core impulses and interests of power holders – such as locking in access to power and resources as quickly as possible – run directly contrary to what democracy-building would have required.”²¹ Worse still is the possibility that premature democratization could exacerbate problems in the Global South and actually retard rather than advance state-building progression.²² The African state, for example, has been described as “an association of individuals and a community of communities.”²³ Competition more frequently occurs between *communities* – ethnic, regional, religious – than individuals or policy-centered political parties, and is too often played out in a zero-sum fashion. Indeed, African political liberalization has typically

²⁰ Charles Tilly, “Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization,” *Sociological Theory*, 18, no. 1 (2000): 6.

²¹ Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 8.

²² Admittedly, this is also an argument frequently made by despots who seek for selfish reasons to avoid democratization. See Thomas Carothers, “The Sequencing Fallacy,” *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 1 (2007). Carothers balances the legitimate need for a capable, effective state with the fear that elites will selfishly postpone indefinitely a move toward democracy by recommending *gradual* democratization rather than waiting until all optimal preconditions are entirely in place.

²³ Richard Joseph, “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives,” *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (1997): 366.

spawned enormous numbers of political parties oriented not around policy platforms, but sectarian differences.²⁴ Generally, democracy militates against zero-sum games; elected leaders must think twice before wielding power in a zero-sum fashion lest they lose the next election and find themselves subject to the will of the formerly oppressed.²⁵ Yet this logic holds only if future elections are guaranteed. In fact, belief in the certainty of “another chance” is understandably lacking in many of Africa’s nascent democracies. The fear that winners will rule despotically and deprive losers of political, economic, and civil rights remains, according to Samuel Makinda, “one of the abiding problems of political evolution in Africa.”²⁶ Given the political and social realities in much of the Global South, a push by outsiders to uniformly link state legitimacy at the international level with democratic governance might be counterproductive; not only are important preconditions absent in many states, but premature democratization has the capacity to further pull nations within a state apart rather than forge a convergence between nations and the state. Context matters and internal dynamics vary by state. For this reason, when assessing “what states are expected to do,” it may be wise not to overemphasize means relative to ends; if State-A meets particular human and economic development goals as successfully as State-B, yet is less democratic, relies on greater state involvement vis-à-vis free market principles (another developing international norm), or opts for any other method that may run counter to prevailing or developing international norms, it does not

²⁴ Michael Bratton, “Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions,” *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 1 (1997): 79.

²⁵ Adam Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense” in *The Democracy Sourcebook*, eds. Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 13.

²⁶ Samuel M. Makinda, “Democracy and Multi-Party Politics in Africa,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 4 (1996): 567.

necessarily make sense to score State-A any lower than State-B merely because of the means by which State-A reaches the ends that are expected of it.

The objective of the pages above has been to examine the evolving debate over what is expected of states (all states – *because* they are states) with the aim of putting together a complete and meaningful definition of “state-building.” Yet problems abound. International law makes statehood contingent upon just a handful of broad conditions and therefore provides only minimal guidance in developing a definition of state-building. And the sheer breadth of established, nascent, and as of yet unrealized but desired norms that reflect what is (or ought to be) expected of states – both means and ends – adds significant substance, but risks both diluting the definition of state-building and obfuscating what are the *most* critically important tasks a state must perform. The key, then, is to identify a sufficiently broad, but not *too* broad, core set of most critically important tasks a state must carry out, and the way I propose to do so is by looking to the conditions that give rise to state failure and collapse. The logic of this approach is very simple: if state failure or collapse is the worst possible outcome for states and their populations, it makes sense to classify as “most critical” the tasks carried out by states that militate against failure or collapse.²⁷ Looking to what states must do to avoid failure or collapse provides a *meaningful* assessment of what are the most critical state activities (all states – regardless of context) and can be used to develop an equally meaningful and substantive definition of state-building.

²⁷ “State failure” and “state collapse” are not synonyms; state collapse is often used to refer to an even worse condition that follows state failure. Additionally, some might quibble with the claim that state failure or collapse is the worst possible outcome for states and their populations. Conceivably, failure or collapse could be a blessing for persecuted segments of the population as they might come to find themselves beyond the reach of a weakened state. However, in most other cases, the melting away of the state or its devolvement into criminal, predatory behavior makes life significantly more difficult for its population.

1.2b The Imperatives of the State

The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security: Robert Rotberg correctly writes that states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their populations. As a result, these populations eventually come to regard both their governments and states as illegitimate and turn instead to non-state actors.²⁸ Perhaps the most important political good a state provides is the provision of security. Indeed this was recognized by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes over 350 years ago. Hobbes contends that groups of people come together and willingly surrender individual rights to government on the condition that it insulate them from the state of nature – one which Hobbes famously classified as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Where states have lost either the capacity or willingness to provide security, the human toll has been devastating; a recent article in the *New York Times* reports on a study measuring the rate of rape in the Democratic Republic of Congo – by all accounts a failed state with a minimal government presence in much of the country – at one rape every minute.²⁹ Where the state loses control over segments of its territory it naturally becomes impossible to guarantee the security of its population. In such cases, citizens rationally transfer loyalty away from the state and look to sectarian sub-state leaders to fill the vacuum.³⁰ The case of Laurent Nkunda, a former Tutsi rebel leader in eastern-Congo, and the region's Tutsi minority illustrates this point nicely. With Tutsi in the anarchic eastern portion of the Democratic Republic of Congo threatened by an absence of government

²⁸ Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): 85.

²⁹ Jeffrey Gettleman, "Congo Study Sets Estimate for Rapes Much Higher," *The New York Times*, 11 May 2011.

³⁰ Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): 90.

protection and marauding militia (those Congolese Tutsi with means crossed the border each night to sleep in Rwanda),³¹ Nkunda led a rebel group – aimed ostensibly at the protection of Tutsis – that at one point looked strong enough to threaten the central government in Kinshasa.

The Regulation of Social and Economic Life: Just as states must provide security to militate against failure, they must also regulate social and economic life. Effective states adopt and implement rules and regulations that protect their populations from the dangers that come with industry, commerce, urbanization, and the inevitability of asymmetrical information in the marketplace. They lay the necessary groundwork for markets to function effectively, and do all of the above predictably, consistently, and uniformly throughout their territories. When the state fails to do this, its population becomes vulnerable to environmental hazards; food and drug contamination; merchants' businesses suffer as customers, contending with asymmetrical information that favors the merchant, invariably doubt the quality of the goods being sold; foreign investment suffers as companies become disinclined to invest in a state that cannot predictability and consistently guarantee the protection of property rights; and the population often finds itself at the mercy of a corrupt bureaucracy that makes decisions and allocates values on a personal rather than routinized basis.

A look to the history of recently failed states reveals a chronic unwillingness or inability of government to protect the rule of law and regulate social and economic life. Yet it is important to recognize that the state's failure to provide this political good is not only a symptom of state-failure, but a cause; the outright failure of the Congolese state, manifested in a war that erupted in 1996 and directly or indirectly killed up to five-

³¹ Lydia Polgreen, "Fighting in Congo Rekindles Ethnic Hatreds," *The New York Times*, 10 January 2008.

million people, was preceded by decades of corrupt, personalized rule that deliberately gutted the public sector. And in Sierra Leone, J. Anyu Ndunbe traces back to the 1970s a general lawlessness and public-sector decay that ultimately resulted in the early-1990s failure of that state.³² Much like the effect of the state's failure to provide security to its population, the absence of the rule of law and the failure to regulate social and economic life results in a loss of legitimacy, hope, and trust and leads to vulnerable populations taking desperate steps in a bid to survive that further undermine the strength of the state.³³ Michael Chege captures this nicely in his study of state failure in Sierra Leone. He writes: "As economic and institutional decay set in, the regime lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the people it claimed to govern. Then, as public institutions led by the organizations of law and order imploded, the stage was set for anomie as alienated youths hired themselves to rebel leaders and international criminals with a broader agenda."³⁴

The Provision of Infrastructure: Adding to the list of the most essential positive political goods that effective states adequately provide to their populations – and states prone to failure do not – is a functional infrastructure, the facilitation of human development, and the forging of a convergence between nations and the state. The provision and upkeep of infrastructure (roads, railways, dams, telephone lines, power plants, ports, harbors, airports, etc.) is essential to the state's ability to provide security to its population, combat foreign threats, extend administrative control throughout the country, promote the human development of its population, and facilitate the proper

³² J. Anyu Ndumbe, "Diamonds, Ethnicity, and Power: The Case of Sierra Leone," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12, no.4 (2001): 90-91.

³³ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 127.

³⁴ Michael Chege, "Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no.3 (2002): 159.

functioning of markets.³⁵ When states do not generate sufficient power, hospitals cannot provide care, productive work cannot be done at home after dark, and the operations of business are disrupted. Indeed, the World Bank finds that power outages cost firms unable to afford a backup generator up to 20 percent of their sales.³⁶ Where roads are decrepit or absent, farmers cannot ship their goods to market and rural populations cannot access health and education services located a distance away. And where entry points – border crossings and ports – are underdeveloped and undermanned, delays reduce efficiency and prove economically costly; the World Bank notes that the 2,500 kilometer trip from Lusaka, Zambia to the port of Durban in South Africa takes roughly eight days – four for travel and four spent at border crossings. Moreover, a delay of one day at port costs a medium-size vessel an average of \$35,000³⁷ and, when transporting agricultural goods, spoilage associated with a one-day delay reduces exports by roughly six percent.³⁸

As discussed in the introductory paragraph of this chapter, the majority of the world's endangered or failing states are found on the African continent. It is therefore not surprising to find that the state of Africa's infrastructure lags the rest of the world. Looking at Africa's low-income countries compared to their non-African low-income peers, African states have just one-third the paved-road density of other low-income countries, have the capacity to generate just 12 percent of the power generated in non-African countries, provide electricity to 14 percent of their populations compared to 41 percent outside of Africa, and provide a sanitary means of human waste disposal to just 34 percent of their populations compared to 53 percent outside the continent. A

³⁵ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 147.

³⁶ *Africa's Infrastructure*, eds. Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2010), 52.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 19, 251.

³⁸ *African Development Report 2010* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 133.

comparison of Africa's middle-income countries with their non-African middle-income peers reveals a similar performance gap.³⁹ The suggested causes of Africa's deficit include but are certainly not limited to the perverse effects of enclave economies, civil conflict, ineffective governance and institutions, and cumbersome environmental realities.⁴⁰ Yet whatever the cause, the reality is that standard of living and state-effectiveness on multiple levels is significantly impacted by the quantity and quality of infrastructure stocks, and states that hope to move on a continuum away from state failure must not neglect this aspect of development.

The Promotion of Human Development: Also critical to the prevention of state failure is investment in and promotion of human development. This includes the provision of education resources, healthcare services, and other social programs that improve the welfare and life-chances of populations. State investment in the human development of its population is key to the creation of a middle class (and all the benefits that come with it), upward social mobility, the creation of a skilled labor pool from which businesses can draw, and shrinking income and wealth inequality.⁴¹ States that neglect this essential activity risk a calamitous evaporation of legitimacy as the welfare of populations declines and it becomes clear that the state has left its citizens to fend for themselves.⁴² Indeed, Jean-Paul Azam contends that redistribution of the state's resources

³⁹ *Africa's Infrastructure*, eds. Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2010), 48.

⁴⁰ For a good quantitative assessment of the causes of Africa's infrastructure deficit – and an argument that the primary culprit is vast territories coupled with low population densities and low levels of urbanization, see: Tito Yepes, Justin Pierce, and Vivien Foster, *Making Sense of Africa's Infrastructure Endowment: A Benchmarking Approach* (January 2008) Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Working Paper 1. Available at <http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/library/doc/412/making-sense-sub-saharan-africa%E2%80%99s-infrastructure-endowment-benchmarking-approach>

⁴¹ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 142.

⁴² Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): 88.

is a core factor in domestic war and peace, and the occurrence of civil conflict is closely tied to the state's provision of services to its population.⁴³ Azam focuses in particular on the provision of education and its connection to formal sector employment and high wages in the cities. Where there is scant opportunity for a good education, rural communities have fewer qualified members to send into the cities for employment, and in turn receive smaller remittances on which they rely to survive.⁴⁴ Moreover, given the explosive mix of ethnicity and politics, states that not only fail to adequately address the human development of their populations but also allocate resources in a discriminatory fashion are likely to find themselves at particular risk of internal conflict and failure.

Botswana, one of Africa's most persistently stable states, provides a good example of the benefits yielded from a serious attempt to promote human development. One of Africa's most impoverished states at independence, Botswana has since become a regional leader on a host of development indicators. And despite poverty that is characteristic of developing countries, the state has retained broad legitimacy in part because it has been able to effectively provide its citizens with desirable services. According to a series of surveys conducted by the World Bank Institute (WBI), the effectiveness of Botswana's government puts it in the 70th percentile globally.⁴⁵ In comparison, the Sub-Saharan regional average falls in the 27th percentile. Health and education spending make up the largest expenditures in Botswana's budget. In 2009,

⁴³ Jean-Paul Azam, "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 4 (2001): 442.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 437.

⁴⁵ Data is available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp. Government effectiveness is measured by the quality of public service provision, quality of policy formulation and implementation, competency of civil servants, independence of the civil service from political pressure, and the credibility of the government's commitment to its public policies.

public expenditures on education accounted for 16.2 percent of the budget⁴⁶ while spending on healthcare made up 16.7 percent.⁴⁷ In fact, Botswana spends more public money per capita on healthcare than all but one country in sub-Saharan Africa.⁴⁸ And while HIV/AIDS threatens to potentially destabilize the country, here too the state has been engaged. Hospitals in Botswana test every patient (unless consent is refused), and political elite aggressively promote HIV/AIDS awareness; indeed, Botswana's former president went so far as to publicly reveal that he had himself been tested.⁴⁹ And, finally, an urban bias in the provision of services common throughout Africa seems to be less pronounced in Botswana;⁵⁰ in 2006, the latest year for which data is available, life expectancy at birth for urban residents exceeded that of rural residents by just three years. Moreover, rural residents had a crude death rate less than 1.5 times that of urban residents, and an infant mortality rate of 5.2 percent compared to an urban rate of 4.2 percent.⁵¹ And so, although poverty remains stubbornly high, Botswana has made considerable progress since independence and has had a series of governments that have made good-faith efforts to promote the human development of the country's population – facts to which Botswana's consistent stability can in no small part be attributed.

The Shaping of a National Identity: Anchoring the list of the most essential positive political goods that effective states provide to their populations is perhaps the

⁴⁶ http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=198&IF_Language=eng

⁴⁷ <http://apps.who.int/ghodata/?vid=1901>

⁴⁸ Data available at: <http://apps.who.int/ghodata/?vid=1901#>

⁴⁹ Charles H. Cutter, *Africa* (Harpers Ferry: Stryker-Post Publications, 2004), 134.

⁵⁰ For elaboration on political elites' fear of destabilizing urban riots and their self-interested strategy of discriminating against rural populations to placate urban populations, see the seminal work on this subject: Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). See also: Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, "The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 1 (1996): 32.

⁵¹ Data taken from *Botswana Demographic Survey 2006*, available at: http://www.cso.gov.bw/images/stories/Demography/2006_bdsrprt.pdf

most important of all – the facilitation of a convergence between nations and the state. Africa's ethnicity problem has received a great deal of attention and academics have filled books with proposed causes, effects, and solutions. The scope of the problem is far beyond what can be addressed here, but its nature is succinctly captured by the early 19th century Italian statesman Massimo d' Azeglio. Assessing the state-building process underway in Italy, d' Azeglio wrote: "We have made Italy, now we must make Italians."⁵² What was true of Europe centuries ago is now the reality faced by much of Sub-Saharan Africa; with territorial borders fixed, state leaders must work to make the geographical map align with the social reality on the ground. Disparate populations within a state must come to identify with and maintain loyalty to the state above and beyond any sub-state identity. This is not to say that stability and state effectiveness depend on the complete subjugation of every sub-state identity, or even necessarily a convergence between nations and state as strong as that found in the Global North. Yet the state must successfully shape national identity to the extent that governing can be carried out without a consistent reliance on force or coercion, secessionist or irredentist movements that threaten to break apart the country either do not emerge or are supported by only a fringe, and the eruption of ethnic-based intrastate violence on anywhere near the scale seen in Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, and other states in the region becomes unthinkable.⁵³

⁵² This quote is taken from David Welsh, "Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa," *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1996).

⁵³ The onus of forging a convergence between nations and the state falls on the state. However, there is a broad literature that contends that ethnicity is a powerful, deeply meaningful, historical-given that satisfies a biological desire to know what one is by knowing what one is not. Along these lines, lasting subordination of nations to and convergence with the state should not be expected. On the other hand, the assumption in these pages is that ethnicity is far more malleable; the "ancient hatreds" argument is overdone and the salience of ethnicity is in large part influenced by the political allocation of values. That is, the decisions of state-elite can significantly affect the extent to which nations and the state converge.

Insufficient convergence between nations and state is a significant contributing factor to state failure. While it may not be a *necessary* condition,⁵⁴ the state's inability to shape national identity increases the chances of failure by provoking legitimacy crises, slowing social and economic development, and laying the groundwork for intractable civil violence. As Joel Migdal argues in his work on the relative strength of states and societies, the state is just one among many institutions that attempt to exert control over extremely complex societies.⁵⁵ In much of the Global South, given the often weak convergence between nations and states, it is a battle that the state often loses. This can have a perverse effect on public policy as state elites, aware of their relatively weak positions and precarious security environments are often inclined to adopt self-interested, defensive, and deferential postures that may facilitate their individual survival, but undermine greatly the process of state development.⁵⁶ This reality is captured nicely in Pierre Englebert's quantitative project aimed at explaining Africa's consistently negative showing in empirical studies of economic growth. Not surprisingly, Englebert finds that Africa's history of tepid economic growth can be partially attributed to low levels of state legitimacy and the related decisions of state elite to pursue self-serving, anti-growth, neo-patrimonial policies at the expense of those that are impersonal but also conducive to development.⁵⁷ In short then, after 30 years, Peter Ekeh's conception of the dialectic of Africa's "two publics" continues to ring true; so long as the convergence between nations and state remains weak, the state/civic public will inevitably not receive what it is due as

⁵⁴ Marina Ottaway, for example, cites Haiti as a case where the state failed despite its citizens sharing a common identity. See "Nation Building," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, 17.

⁵⁵ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Pierre Englebert, "Solving the Mystery of the AFRICA Dummy," *World Development* 28, no. 10 (2000).

resources that should be used to promote political and economic development are instead funneled into society/the primordial public.⁵⁸

An inability to shape national identity not only threatens the state by spawning legitimacy crises and impeding development, but by significantly increasing the risk of catastrophic civil violence. Englebert, Tarango, and Carter convincingly show over a 40 year period that both suffocation (bringing together people that have historically lived under different systems) and dismemberment (dividing a single group among several contiguous states) have a positive effect on the occurrence of civil war, political instability, and secession attempts.⁵⁹ The colonial legacy of suffocation and dismemberment in sub-Sahara Africa is well known and is a reality to which a great deal of civil conflict can be attributed. Yet the case made by some that there is something inherently dangerous about diversity fails to tell a large part of the story; in fact, diversity becomes dangerous when ethnicity becomes politically salient.⁶⁰ Donald Rothchild cleverly makes this case by arguing that the same security dilemma that realists claim motivates interstate behavior can also explain domestic intergroup interactions.⁶¹ Where the state is strong, there is healthy convergence between nations and state, and individuals can expect fair treatment regardless of ethnicity, intergroup relations are generally predictable and peaceful. On the contrary, where states are weak, the distribution of resources is influenced by ethnicity, and the state has failed to sufficiently

⁵⁸ Peter P. Ekeh, "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17, no. 1 (1975): see especially pages 108-111.

⁵⁹ Pierre Englebert, Stacy Tarango and Matthew Carter, "Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 10 (2002).

⁶⁰ For a nice overview of this debate, see: Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 1-25. Note also that Englebert et al., cited above, do not control for convergence between nations and state, equal treatment, or other variables commonly thought to influence the political saliency of ethnicity.

⁶¹ Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation* (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution Press, 1997), particularly pages 1-89.

shape national identity, a climate of fear and suspicion prevails. In such an environment, without a credible state-backed security-guarantee, threatened and paranoid sub-state leaders have incentive to mobilize their groups for war.⁶² Moreover, once groups are on alert, even a local disturbance with ethnic undertones can begin a chain reaction that quickly spreads well beyond the site of the initial incident.⁶³

The above text has argued that states failing to sufficiently shape national identity are susceptible to destructive civil violence. What makes matters worse is the potentially intractable nature of ethnic conflict once it begins. There is a growing literature that examines the effect of ethnicity on conflict duration yet, not surprisingly, scholars cannot reach agreement on its significance. Positions on the question have tended to be influenced by the primordialist/ascriptive versus instrumentalist/political salience debate, with advocates of the former arguing for intractability, and the latter arguing against. In truth, both are probably partially correct. As McGarry and O'Leary argue, many issues that contribute to ethnic violence are to some extent non-tradable. For example: autonomy, language, the right to cultural preservation, territorial homelands, social respect, and prestige. This has the effect of creating situations perceived to be zero-sum over which bargaining and conflict resolution can be difficult.⁶⁴ Yet many issues are not as inherently non-tradable as argued. There are middle-grounds between complete regional autonomy or less comprehensive multicultural allowances; the outright

⁶² Anecdotally, a BBC investigation, for example, found rival ethnic groups in Kenya who fought following the 2007 election already beginning to rearm in advance of the 2012 election. See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8293745.stm>

⁶³ Leo Kuper, "Genocide and the Plural Society," in *Ethnicity*, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 262-269.

⁶⁴ John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Eliminating and Managing Ethnic Differences," in *Ethnicity*, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 333-340. See also: Robin M. Williams, Jr., "The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International Perspectives," *Annual Review of Sociology* 20 (1994): 59-60.

prohibition of a language or elevating it to an official status; the secession of a group and its territorial homeland or state-ordered military occupation; and control of the state or the risk of group annihilation. Admittedly, however, deeply suspicious populations and insecure states have often been unsuccessful at negotiating tolerable middle-ground solutions before enduring a great deal of battlefield destruction. Therefore, intractability, while not inevitable, is certainly a fate tempted when ethnic conflict erupts.

Finally, the emergence of ethnic conflict may potentially impact the calculations of additional groups considering their own confrontations with the state. One of the more compelling parts of the collective action literature is that which examines the relationship between the initiation of conflict and the perception of risk and reward. While the initiation of an uprising against the state is significantly less likely in the face of certain defeat, weak states, already plagued by internal conflict, prove tempting grounds for the emergence of additional ethnic movements as the risk of an uprising appears to decline, and the prospect for success appears to increase.⁶⁵ Tarrow, for example, contends that the emergence of contention is even more closely related to a calculation of opportunities-versus-constraints than to the social and economic deprivation that groups experience,⁶⁶ while Tilly argues that resource-deprived groups actually tend to act *defensively* given their lack of means with which to mount a challenge against the state. Yet, like Tarrow, Tilly qualifies his argument by noting that relatively greater constraints than opportunities put less of a brake on collective action when group survival is perceived to

⁶⁵ See James B. Rule, *Theories of Civil Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), particularly chapter 8; and Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), chapter 9.

⁶⁶ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 5.

be threatened ⁶⁷ – no source of solace for the state, given the existential nature of much ethnic conflict. Therefore, in light of what has been written above, the imperative of forging sufficient convergence between nations and state should be clear: states that fail to do so risk a snowball effect by which one conflict weakens the state, inviting additional challenges, until the state fails entirely.

The objective of the preceding pages has been to establish the most essential activities carried out by the state, with the aim of using that list to craft a substantive and meaningful definition of state-building. Adopting a minimalist approach to the question, I have argued that if the worst possible outcome for states is failure or collapse, the list of “most essential activities” should be limited to those which militate against this fate. In doing so, I aim to provide clarity and parsimony to a concept – state-building – that has been muddled to such an extent by value-laden and context-specific contributions that it risks losing all meaning and usefulness. It is only with a meaningful definition of state-building in hand that I can turn to the research question this project will attempt to answer: why, over the previous 50 years, despite political, social, and economic headwinds, have some states made progress on the state-building continuum while others have stagnated or regressed?

1.2c State-Building Defined – But is it Meaningful, and is it a “Process?”

On the basis of the above list of “most essential” activities, state-building can concisely be defined as the process by which the state increases its capacity to protect, regulate, construct, develop, and unify. The definition places a decided emphasis on ends (or results) rather than means. For example, I do not include “capacity to extract” or “tax-

⁶⁷ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* ()

ratio” as a measure of state-building, despite the fact that it is common – and at times, the only – measure used in the literature.⁶⁸ While tax-ratio may indicate whether or not the state is able to penetrate society, and revenue generated from taxation can provide the state with resources needed to protect, regulate, construct, develop, and unify, it tells nothing about what the state actually does with the revenue it extracts. A state that effectively collects revenue from its population but does not reinvest it in a way that benefits the public good surely cannot be considered a state-building success. In fact, the misappropriation of public money could conceivably work as an impetus for state-*failure*. Similarly, a low level of tax extraction does not necessarily indicate state-weakness; Saudi Arabia does not tax the income of its citizens, but is considerably more advanced on the state-building continuum than many states that do. Botswana deliberately kept taxes low on its rural population to maintain its loyalty in light of disproportionate economic gains made by more affluent classes.⁶⁹ And, as van de Walle points out, certain economies simply better lend themselves to taxation than others.⁷⁰ It may therefore be a mistake to conclude solely on the basis of successful tax extraction that Congo-Brazzaville is more advanced on the state-building continuum than Ethiopia, given that Ethiopia’s agrarian economy is inherently more difficult to tax than Congo’s natural resource economy. Moreover, results will be prioritized when measuring each of the components of my definition of state-building. For example, the percentage of a state’s budget allocated to education (a possible measure of how well the state promotes human

⁶⁸ See, for example, the work of Cameron Thies, who has written extensively on state-building and routinely uses tax extraction as his primary measure of state-building progress. For his justification, see: Cameron G. Thies, “War, Rivalry, and State-Building in Latin America,” *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 454-459.

⁶⁹ Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Botswana: Comprehending the Exceptional State,” in *The African State: Reconsiderations*, eds. Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002), 24.

⁷⁰ Nicolas van de Walle, “The Economic Correlates of State Failure: Taxes, Foreign Aid, and Policies,” in *When States Fail*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 100.

development) tells us something, but literacy rates tell us more. Measurement issues and the benefits and drawbacks of an emphasis on means and ends will be addressed more thoroughly in Chapter 3.

With a definition of state-building in hand, the final issue to consider deals with the degree to which it makes sense to consider state-building a “process.” A potential drawback to a definition of state-building cobbled together by the fusion of multiple component parts is the possibility that the components may not be meaningfully related in a collective way. In other words, each component part might be an important property of states, with meaningful commonality stopping there. If true, the meaningfulness and cohesion of the definition of state-building would be weakened. Yet, as argued above, I believe my definition at least partially avoids this problem by maintaining focus on a single, most important objective: developing the capacities necessary to avoid state-failure. Thus, each component part of my definition is geared toward a common end. What is unclear, however, is how strongly (or not) the component parts interact to strengthen (or weaken) one another. In other words, to what extent does improvement in the provision of security also lead to an improvement in human development? If such relationships are found to exist between components, a meaningful “state-building process” can truly be said to exist. This question will be addressed and answers suggested in Chapter 5.

1.3 Explaining When, Where, How, & Why State-Building Succeeds or Fails

State-building in the Global South has become a matter of interest to policy-makers in the Global North, academics, journalists, and others. The attention has been driven by both humanitarian and security concerns, and the initiation of action to right weakened states

has become more politically feasible in the aftermath of the Cold War and more urgent in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Academics have been troubled by the emergence and endurance of weak, economically-backward rump states in the years since decolonization and have written extensively on suggested causes and solutions. Policy-makers in the Global North, fearful of the national security threats posed by weak states⁷¹ and no longer confined by the sphere-of-influence politics of the Cold War, have increasingly become advocates for development, good governance and even military intervention in cases of extreme state weakness. The end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century has alone seen the international community intervene in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to name just a handful of locations. Even the U.S.-initiated wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – wars that arguably were neither undertaken to repair nor caused by state weakness – became nearly entirely about state-building once combat operations to remove the heads of state had succeeded. Yet, although interest in state-building is broad, reaching a consensus on its main impediments and facilitators has been difficult. The remaining pages in this chapter will briefly review the work that has been done to date toward that end, suggest shortcomings to the existing approaches, and preview the contribution that this project aims to make toward answering the question of why state-building advances in some places at certain times but stagnates or regresses in others.

1.3a Explaining State-Building Variance: Agency Versus Structure

Given the breadth of the existing literature on state-building and the wide range of facilitators and impediments suggested by policy-makers and scholars, a method by

⁷¹ For a very thorough account of the characteristics of weak, failed, and collapsed states and their international security consequences, see Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002).

which to organize the debate might be helpful. The method I propose divides explanations aimed at accounting for state-building successes and failures into two groups: agency and structure. Structural explanations often assume a benevolently-intentioned political elite hamstrung by adverse conditions they did not create, and struggle to overcome. While leadership matters, it is largely non-agency variables – geography, artificial borders, ethnic heterogeneity, societal fragmentation, low levels of human development, an international system not conducive to state-building, and the like – that primarily drive or impede state-building progress. By contrast, agency explanations look to leadership and contend that political elite have significantly greater means of overcoming structural challenges and building their states than structuralists assume. When state-building stagnates or regresses, agency proponents are more inclined to point to a failure of leadership.

Agency: Agency-oriented attempts to explain where and why state-building succeeds or fails strongly emphasize political elites and the decisions they make. While decisions are not made in a vacuum and political elites respond to incentive-structures shaped by their environments, proponents of the agency approach ultimately look to elite behavior to explain where and why state-building succeeds and fails. As Frank Stark shows, much of the optimism in Africa at the time of independence centered on the personal popularity of political elites, faith in the transformative power of individual leaders, and a belief that elites would be able to overcome structural impediments and develop their states.⁷² Yet over time, given the glacial progress of state-building in much of sub-Saharan Africa, the emphasis has turned to what political elites have done wrong.

⁷² Frank M. Stark, "Theories of Contemporary State Formation in Africa: A Reassessment," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24, no. 2 (1986).

In addition to attributing blame to incompetence, backwardness, or pathology, segments of the literature on state-building have argued that elites perceive a contradiction of some sort between their own interests and the imperatives of state-building and make strategic decisions that help the former but hurt the latter.⁷³ Indeed, there is an abundance of data to support the contention that political elites are often not serious about optimally developing their states. Especially revealing is the extent to which the abuse of power by those in public positions is tolerated. In a 2010 study of public sector corruption, Transparency International found that nearly 75 percent of the world's states scored below 5 on a scale of 10 (highly clean) to 1 (highly corrupt).⁷⁴ The data on sub-Saharan Africa is even grimmer, with no state except Botswana achieving a score above 5, and 56 percent of region's population having reported paying a bribe to at least one civil servant in the year 2010.⁷⁵ By comparison, the next largest regional rate – in the Middle East – was 36 percent. Political elite have also deliberately undermined bureaucratic institutional structures lest they be used by potential rivals to develop constituencies of their own.⁷⁶ Illustrating the reality of calculated bureaucratic neglect, but also great paranoia, the regime in Sierra Leone felt compelled to rely on the private mercenary group Executive Outcomes, rather than the national army, to repel rebels from the outskirts of its capital during a low-point in its mid-1990s civil war. Political elite have been willing to go so far as to advance their personal interests out of civil war. Paul Collier cites evidence in Sierra Leone of state elite collaborating with rebels as a means

⁷³ For a nice overview of this argument, see: Stein Sundstol Eriksen, "The Politics of State Formation: Contradictions and Conditions of Possibility," *The European Journal of Development Research* 17, no. 3 (2005).

⁷⁴ http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results

⁷⁵ http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010/interactive

⁷⁶ See William S. K. Reno, "Mines, Money, and the Problem of State-Building in Congo," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 26, no. 1 (1998). See also William Reno, "War, Markets, and the Reconfiguration of West Africa's Weak States," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 4 (1997).

of personal financial enrichment.⁷⁷ And in Ivory Coast, the president and members of his regime used the chaos generated by the 2002 civil war to consolidate control over the cocoa industry and divert 170 million dollars into private regime coffers.⁷⁸

Structure: Structuralists disagree with agency assertions that state-building stagnation or regression is the result of political elites that have little interest in developing their states and only work to do so when and to the extent that they personally benefit. Instead, structuralists are inclined to contend that political elite have more benevolent intentions but confront barriers to state-building that they did not create and are hard-pressed to surmount. Making matters more difficult for elite is that they are not only faced with a multitude of structural impediments – artificially drawn borders that took no account of ethnic group distribution; the consequences of divide-and-rule governance of the colonial period; the chicken and egg problem of weak institutions coupled with simultaneously low GDP and legitimacy; strong societies relative to weak states; restive border areas; and territories that are either so geographically large that impoverished states find it beyond their means to extend authority beyond areas close to the capital city, or so small as to make the creation of markets and populations of scale impossible – but are also expected to defy history and build their states peacefully and quickly – restrictions not placed on the Global North during its own period of state-building.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Paul Collier, “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in *Greed and Grievance*, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), 97.

⁷⁸ Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa,” *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008): 121.

⁷⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995).

While structuralists are in agreement regarding the nature of what facilitates or impedes state-building, there is no consensus on the likelihood of overcoming structural impediments. Optimists contend that state-building merely takes time and are not invariably disheartened by the outbreak of civil conflict, legitimacy crises, and other manifestations of state-weakness. Rather, these disruptions should be interpreted not as evidence of state-failure, but as evidence of a nascent state-building process underway.⁸⁰ Pessimists, however, are inclined to believe that structural impediments are more difficult to surmount and, in cases, state-building efforts counterproductive. Richard Joseph contends that the continent's difficult political geography has in many cases already resulted in the practical irrelevance of official state borders, with reconfiguration in order if there is to be hope of functional states one day emerging.⁸¹ Others go further and lament a status-quo that props up hopelessly unviable states, while arguing that state-building would better be facilitated if the legal and diplomatic underpinnings of the international system were modified. In cases of extreme state-weakness, Jeffrey Herbst urges the international community to consider decertification and the repeal of state sovereignty,⁸² while Helman and Ratner propose that states be placed into United Nations trusteeships.⁸³

1.3b The Merits and Shortcomings of Agency and Structure

While there are merits to both agency and structural attempts to explain what facilitates or impedes state-building, neither category is without its shortcomings. Explanations

⁸⁰ See, for example: Michael Niemann, "War Making and State Making in Central Africa," *Africa Today* 53, no. 3 (2007): 23. Niemann looks at violence as state-building and argues that what look like crises are often actually processes underway to create sustainable political communities.

⁸¹ Richard Joseph, "Africa: States in Crisis," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 3 (2003): 164-167.

⁸² Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996-1997).

⁸³ Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1992-1993.

drawing on structure surely shed light on very real obstacles faced by elites as they move to develop their states. It is difficult to dispute that diversified economies endowed with a skilled labor force fare better for development than those driven by natural resources extracted from just a handful of locations within a state. Or, that states with borders more accurately reflecting social realities on the ground are more amenable to peace, or that political elite afforded more time and flexibility by the rules and norms governing the interstate system might ultimately produce better-developed states. Yet the problem with structural explanations is their determinism. In fact, there are many cases where states with daunting structural environments have excelled (at least relative to other developing states), while states with friendlier environments have foundered.⁸⁴ Botswana, for example, has drawn on diamond mining – accounting for over 30 percent of GDP and nearly 70 percent of export earnings – to become one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most developed countries.⁸⁵ Meanwhile Somalia is internally fractured to such an extent that it has not had a functioning central government in 20 years despite 85 percent of the population sharing membership in the Somali ethnic group. Time is also an unhelpful way to explain state-building variation among states in the Global South given that many states gained their independence at approximately the same time, yet some have since fared considerably better than others. Yet this is not to say that structure tells us very little

⁸⁴ Jeffrey Herbst, who looks to geography – namely the physical size of a country and the distribution of its population – to explain where state-building is more likely to succeed or fail, nicely captures the need for nuance. He writes that geography is not destiny, but “only a given.” *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 159.

⁸⁵ The case of Botswana contradicts the argument that political elites are inclined to neglect the development of all but those few areas from which resources are extracted when the bulk of a state’s wealth is extracted from just a handful of physical locations. See David K. Leonard and Scott Straus, *Africa’s Stalled Development* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003). See also the work of Tito Yepes, Justin Pierce, and Vivien Foster who quantitatively show that enclave economies have a detrimental effect on the development of infrastructure. *Making Sense of Africa’s Infrastructure Endowment: A Benchmarking Approach* (January 2008) Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Working Paper 1. Available at <http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/library/doc/412/making-sense-sub-saharan-africa%E2%80%99s-infrastructure-endowment-benchmarking-approach>

about state-building and where it is and is not likely to succeed; in fact, it has a great deal of potential. There is, however, often a need for more nuance and a recognition that state-specific intervening variables are also meaningfully at work.⁸⁶

Just as structure by itself provides an incomplete explanation of state-building progression, stagnation, and regression, agency approaches also require complementation. This is not to say that elites alone do not have extraordinary capacity to affect their states' development. Mobutu Sese Seko of the former-Zaire is believed to have embezzled over five-billion dollars during his 30-year presidency, and his deliberate strategy of sabotaging the public sector is well-known.⁸⁷ Zimbabwe's transformation from one of Africa's most prosperous states to one of its most fragile can largely be attributed to the leadership decisions of its president, Robert Mugabe. Yet elites do not operate in a vacuum and their decisions (and the impact of their decisions) are often conditioned by environment. To take economic development as an example, a great deal has been written about the importance of good-governance, the promotion of market-friendly institutions, and policies that favor an otherwise-minimally intrusive state. Such an agency-centered approach, however, fails to consider larger structural issues and the impact they have on what even the best-intentioned elites can reasonably be expected to deliver. Economic development is affected by the quality of governance – agency – but also by structural building-blocks of the economy over which agency may have little immediate control. Structural variables including the skill-level of the workforce, the physical size of the country (making markets of scale feasible or unfeasible), and the nature of exports (competition-plagued primary products versus industrial or service-

⁸⁶ Colin Leys makes a similar argument in his critique of dependency theory. Colin Leys, *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), Chapter 5.

⁸⁷ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/26/indonesia.philippines>

sector goods) conceivably matter to economic development as much as agency.

Similarly, institutions, central to economic development, can be destroyed by the actions of political elite (agency) but also severely hamstrung by populations unwilling to recognize as legitimate the authority of their governments to make and enforce laws and regulations (structure).⁸⁸ The Global South further suffers from low GDP (structure) resulting in unavoidably inadequate institutional investment despite what may be the best of elite intentions.⁸⁹

1.3c The Symbiotic Relationship of Agency and Structure

The preceding paragraphs have examined agency and structural attempts to explain where and why state-building succeeds or fails. The reality is that each, on its own, often has only partial explanatory power. A more complete explanation demands recognition that structure and agency affect one another and calls for consideration of the relationship *between* the two, centered on the assumption that one cannot be thoroughly understood in isolation from the other. Consider one component of my definition of state-building, the regulation of social and economic life, as an example. One might point to a state in which this component of state-building is weak, cite weak institutions, unenforced laws, and bureaucratic agencies staffed on the basis of nepotism rather than merit, and conclude that state leadership (agency) is to blame – and not entirely unreasonably. Yet a compelling case can be made that the decisions of leadership (agency) are strongly

⁸⁸ Pranab Bardhan argues that dysfunctional and ineffective institutions are often permitted to live on due to agency self-interest; that is, vested interests profit from the structure of institutions even if they do not function to serve the greater public good. “Distributive Conflicts, Collective Action, and Institutional Economics,” in *Frontiers of Development Economics*, eds. Gerald M. Meir and Joseph E. Stiglitz (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2001), 275-279.

⁸⁹ See Robert Klitsgaard for an account of the detrimental consequences of weak investment in public institutions – namely brain-drain and corruption. *Adjusting to Reality: Beyond “State versus Market” in Economic Development* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991), 85-139.

influenced by the nature of structure. An insecure regime, primarily interested in its own survival, may look at the fragmented society over which it attempts to exercise control and conclude that weak bureaucratic agencies better serve its interests in that they are less likely to be used by potential rivals to form constituencies hostile to the regime. Further contributing to such a calculation are the rules (structure) that govern the international system. States today exist in an environment in which borders are fixed, annexation is impermissible, and sovereignty is granted to all states regardless of their capacity or willingness to effectively govern their territories. With state continuity guaranteed, political elites may feel more free to neglect or even deliberately sabotage the development of their states while narrowly focusing instead on their own survival. Not surprisingly, the nature of agency's decisions have the potential to make structure even more of a threat (which in turn affects agency), completing the feedback loop.⁹⁰ Thus, considering the example of the regulation of social and economic life, an understanding of what may ostensibly appear to be a case of poor leadership is thoroughly enriched when considering agency *along* with structure. Each aspect of state-building, from the success with which the state provides security to its population, to the extent to which human development is promoted, is best understood by considering the effect of structure on agency, and vice-versa. Each matters a great deal and alone can tell only part of the story.

⁹⁰ Of course not every structural variable will be affected by agency. Although structural variables such as geography, the artificiality of borders, and the rules and norms of the international system that govern state behavior affect the decisions made by agency, agency decisions will not be able to impact these "fixed" structural variables. When I refer to the impact of agency's decisions on structure, I am referring to areas over which agency could conceivably have influence such as the extent to which society recognizes the state and regime as legitimate, or reversal of performance deficits that characterize numerous components of human development and make governance and state-building challenging for even the best-intentioned regimes.

1.3d Agency, Structure, and the Role of Relative Power as Mediator

To this point I have argued that state-building progression can best be understood by assessing how agency and structure impact one another. Whether state-building progresses or not depends heavily on the agency-structure dynamic. But what precisely is responsible for shaping the dynamic in such a way as to yield state-building success in some cases, and stagnation or decline in others? In other words, if the relationship between agency and structure matters to state-building, what mediates the relationship? To refer back to the example of the regulation of social and economic life, can a particular variable be identified that compels state elites to build institutions where, in the absence of the variable, elites would calculate that their interests are better served by keeping institutions weak? Can the same variable explain corresponding shifts in the level of threat posed by structure to agency? And is a similar pattern between agency, mediator, and structure found when my other four components of state-building are considered? As discussed in the initial sections of this chapter, Africa's sub-Saharan states largely began their state-building projects at the same time and encountered (and continue to encounter) similar economic, political, and social challenges. Yet state-building progression has been uneven. The objective of this project is to uncover a solution to this puzzle by looking to states' agency-structure dynamics and assessing the impact of a mediating variable by which I hypothesize the dynamics are shaped – relative power among states.

1.4 Conclusion and an Outline of Chapters 2 – 5

Chapter 1 set out to accomplish several objectives. It began by showing that the conventional-wisdom perception of Africa as a destitute monolith is an inaccurate

portrayal of the continent. In fact, the range between Africa's weakest and strongest states is broad, with considerable variation in strength among those states falling somewhere in between as well. It then moved to introduce the research question that this project will attempt to answer: that is, why is state-building more advanced in some countries than in others? And, over time, what accounts for the steady gains, steady declines, stagnation, or gains followed by declines (or vice-versa) observed in the state-building trajectories of Africa's states? The chapter then laid out a number of problems with the way state-building has been assessed to this point – centered primarily on the inability of scholars, policy-makers, activists, and others to reach a consensus on what is expected of the state and what tasks ought to be considered the most critical. In an attempt to avoid getting bogged down by these broad and disparate “wish-lists” while bringing some much-needed cohesion and meaning to the debate, a minimalist approach to defining and measuring state-building was urged; if state failure or collapse is the worst possible outcome for states and their populations, it makes sense to classify as “most critical” those tasks carried out that militate against this fate. A list of five tasks was compiled: the provision of security and monopolization of the legitimate use of force; the regulation of social and economic life; the provision and maintenance of infrastructure; the promotion of human development; and the shaping of a national identity. Finally, Chapter 1 concluded by discussing the benefits and shortcomings of agency and structural approaches to explaining state-building variance, while arguing that a mediator – the relative distribution of power among states – should be expected to meaningfully influence the agency-structure dynamic.

Chapter 2 will assess in detail the role that relative power is expected to play in the relationship between agency and structure, and thus also where state-building is likely to progress, stagnate, or decline. It will conclude with the presentation of three hypotheses. Chapter 3 will lay out the methodology employed in this dissertation to test the relationship between the distribution of power among states and state-building proficiency and conclude by presenting the findings of those tests. Chapter 4 will piggyback on the results of the tests carried out in Chapter 3 and dig a bit deeper. In doing so, Chapter 4 will assess the impact of relative power on state-building when neighbor-specific variables, time-specific variables, border-specific variables, and domestic-specific variables are each factored into the equation. Chapter 5 will conclude the dissertation by reviewing its findings, assessing the possible policy implications of those findings, and suggesting a number of promising and necessary areas for future research.

CHAPTER 2

2.0 Introduction: Agency, Structure, and the Role of Relative Power

In the latter part of Chapter 1 I suggested that the catalysts and retardants of state-building be organized into two categories: agency and structure. I went on to argue that state-building's successes and failures cannot be thoroughly understood unless agency and structure are considered together, as one affects the other. I concluded Chapter 1 by introducing the central argument to be tested in this project – that the relative distribution of power among states shapes what takes place *within* states – namely how the agency-structure dynamic plays out – and therefore influences where state-building advances, stagnates, or declines.

To test my hypothesis I will focus on states in sub-Saharan Africa and limit my examination of the impact of relative power on state-building to states sharing contiguous borders. This approach has a handful of benefits. Limiting my analysis to sub-Saharan Africa will enable me to assess why states with similar social, economic, and political circumstances build their states with varying degrees of success. An examination limited to contiguous neighbors has both theoretical and policy benefits; on the theoretical side, I aim to fill a void in the existing literature that has placed a premium on work assessing the role that the Global North plays in advancing or retarding the state-building progress of the Global South, or on scholarship that looks nearly exclusively *inside* a state to assess why its state-building project has progressed, stalled, or regressed. What has largely been ignored and is poorly understood is that role that region and, in particular, contiguous neighbors play in the state-building process. Where the impact of neighbors

has been addressed, it has often been done anecdotally rather than empirically. An emphasis on *contiguous* neighbors has practical benefits as well. The reality of interstate relations in sub-Saharan Africa is that, with few exceptions, states do not have the capacity to project force beyond their contiguous neighbors. Moreover, so-called “spill-over” effects emanating from domestic politics disproportionately affect contiguous states. To include dyads of states in my study that cannot conceivably threaten each other’s security – state or regime – (in which case the relevance of relative power would be minimized) would risk generating results that do not show a relationship that actually exists.¹ Finally, as to the potential policy benefits of this research, evidence of a relationship between relative power and state-building might serve as a guide by which foreign aid is better-allocated. Critics of the deployment of foreign aid to developing states have lamented, not entirely unreasonably, that the results have been disappointing given the amount of money invested. Evidence of a relationship between relative power and state-building could facilitate better-targeted giving in which aid is not only distributed to a target state, but to its neighbors in an effort to create a relative power distribution friendlier to state-building.

Meanwhile, Chapter 2 will proceed as follows: I will begin by briefly reviewing perhaps the most famous explanation of state-building in which an external variable is linked to the internal agency-structure dynamic – Charles Tilly’s use of interstate war to explain state-building in early-modern Europe. I will then adjust Tilly’s basic framework and present my own theory of state-building for the twenty-first century in which an alternative agency-structure dynamic is proposed, and relative power is swapped for

¹ For elaboration on the risks associated with pooling data, see Douglas Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), particularly chapters 4-5.

interstate war. Next I will review a number of assumptions essential to my theory, and conclude by introducing the specific hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 3.

2.1 Altering the Agency-Structure Dynamic: Charles Tilly and Interstate War

Since the 1992 publication of Charles Tilly's *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, the assertion that "war makes the state and the state makes war" has become one of the most thoroughly debated in the state-building literature.² Tilly's argument, centered on the state-building process in early-modern Europe, is beautifully simple: faced with a hostile international environment, political elite had to develop a sufficiently powerful defensive capability or face certain elimination. The development of a suitable defense, however, was financially costly and left rulers with no choice but to turn to their populations for the necessary revenue. To compel a population resistant to central authority and with limited national identity to provide the resources needed to build a defensive capability, the state took on the role, as Tilly put it in an earlier work, of a neighborhood mobster; in exchange for revenue, the state provided its population with protection against external threats, both legitimate and embellished.³ Capturing the power of war, Jeffrey Herbst asserts that "fighting wars may be the only way whereby it is possible to have people pay more taxes and at the same time feel more closely associated with the state."⁴ In short, the threat of external annihilation forged a relationship of mutual dependence in which the state relied on society, and society came to rely on the state.

² See Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).

³ Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 170.

⁴ Jeffrey Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," *International Security* 14, no. 4 (1990): 122.

2.1a Interstate War and its Relationship to State-Building

Interstate war (or its threat) had a profound impact on the agency-structure dynamic in early-modern Europe which ultimately gave rise to the emergence of well-developed states. The “war makes states” literature has tended to emphasize three ways in particular by which interstate war shaped the agency-structure relationship and facilitated state-building: it spurred a convergence between nations and state; compelled and enabled states to increase their administrative capacities and penetrate their societies; and produced a “ratchet” effect whereby the scope and strength of the state, enlarged during war, did not revert to its pre-war size after hostilities had ended. Emile Durkheim nicely captures the effect of war on nationalism, writing that it “force[s] men to close ranks and confront a common danger, the individual thinking less of himself and more of the common cause.”⁵ Chris Hedges expands on Durkheim by linking war to the filling of an emotional void. He writes: “Lurking beneath the surface of every society...is the passionate yearning for a nationalist cause that exalts us, the kind that war alone is able to deliver.”⁶ The threat of interstate war also compels a state to penetrate society but, at the same time, produces a society more agreeable to the infringement. To extract sufficient resources to pay for war, a state must develop a sophisticated administrative capacity throughout its territory. Yet while essential to the collection of taxes and the defense of the state from outside aggressors, a greater administrative capacity benefits state-building far more broadly. And finally, war produces a ratchet effect whereby states, having invested in developing a greater administrative capacity during times of war, continue to spend what is necessary to maintain that capacity’s upkeep. Similarly, populations that

⁵ Quote taken from Michael C. Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” *International Organization* 50, no. 2 (1996): 243.

⁶ Chris Hedges, *War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 45.

have relented to taxation in the face of immediate threats come to see a greater tax burden as acceptable and it overtime becomes normalized.

2.1b Interstate War and its Relationship to State-Building: Today's Global South

Charles Tilly's theory of war and state-building encounters significant problems when applied to today's Global South. In fact, Tilly has argued that his theory is non-generalizable and is not intended to explain state-building outside of early-modern Europe (although this has not entirely discouraged scholars from trying). Primarily responsible for the limited scope of Tilly's theory is a change in the nature of the international system. During the period of European state-building sovereignty was not guaranteed but earned; territorial boundaries remained unchanged only if they could be defended, military conquest was common, and states that could not generate the resources to defend themselves were absorbed by more powerful entities. Consequently there was tremendous incentive for states under these circumstances to not only bargain with their populations, but to strengthen administrative capacity in order to successfully fight wars. Out of this international environment emerged strong, centralized European states.

Today, rules governing the state-system are such that Tilly's "war makes states" theory of state-building is significantly more difficult to apply. Whereas sovereignty once had to be earned, today it is bestowed upon all states as a condition of their recognition as states by the international community.⁷ And while interstate war was common and territorial borders changed regularly as strong states preyed on the weak, today interstate war is rare and the alteration of borders is prohibited by both international law and norms.

⁷ See Robert Jackson for elaboration on "positive" versus "negative" sovereignty, as well as for a history of the evolution of sovereignty from a privilege to a right. "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," *International Organization* 44, no. 4 (1987). And "Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of International Affairs* 46, no. 1 (1992).

In fact, of the seven principles in Article 3 of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) charter, five relate to juridical sovereignty, peaceful negotiation of disputes, and respect for territorial integrity.⁸ The founding president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, captured the motivation for border preservation as follows: “Our borders are so absurd that they must be regarded as sacrosanct.”⁹ Indeed, in the 48 years since the OAU was founded, internationally-recognized border changes in sub-Saharan Africa resulting from war have occurred just once.¹⁰ In total just four interstate wars have been fought in the years since independence.¹¹ As a result of such a profound change in the nature of the international system, the model presented by Tilly in which a dangerous, war-prone environment mediates the agency-structure relationship in a manner conducive to state-building is no longer entirely relevant; instead, a compelling case can be made that the current laws and norms governing the international system impact the agency-structure dynamic in ways *detrimental* to state-building.

2.1c Assessing the Relevance of Tilly: Agency, Structure, and the Twenty-First Century

In light of an international environment that discourages war and forbids territorial conquest, many who adhere to Tilly’s “war makes states” theory are understandably pessimistic about the prognosis for state-building in the Global South. Herbst has argued that war is essential to state-building, as necessary fundamental changes to the agency-structure dynamic are impossible to achieve without it.¹² Atzili contends that the illegality

⁸ The OAU charter can be found at: http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf

⁹ Quote taken from Rupert Emerson, “The Problem of Identity, Selfhood, and Image in the New Nations,” *Comparative Politics* 1, no. 3 (1969): 301.

¹⁰ Eritrea gained territory from Ethiopia as a result of its 1998 – 2000 war.

¹¹ Of these, just two – Somalia-Ethiopia and Uganda-Tanzania – had battlefield deaths large enough to meet the definition of interstate war employed by the Correlates of War project. I am also including both the Second Congo War, fought between 1998 and 2003, which drew in the armies of eight African states, and the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, fought between 1998 and 2000.

¹² Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa,” *International Security* 14, no. 4 (1990): 118.

of territorial conquest has deprived states of the opportunity to pursue territorial expansion – once an incentive to develop capacity.¹³ Sorensen claims that negative sovereignty or guaranteed state survival removes the incentive to build strong states capable of surviving over the long term, and Eriksen argues that the absence of war coupled with external sources of funding (foreign aid) eliminates the need for elites to strengthen their states' administrative capacities to extract resources and build reciprocal relationships with populations from which taxes would be extracted.¹⁴ In short, the existing state system in which war is rare, borders are fixed, annexation is impermissible, and sovereignty is bestowed upon all states regardless of their capacity produces a state elite with scant reason to link state strength with state survival, and a society lacking the impetus to tie its own physical well-being to the strength of its state.¹⁵

Despite the limitations of Tilly, not every adherent to the war-makes-states model is equally pessimistic about the prospects of state-building in the Global South. Cameron Thies, in a series of articles, has tested the effects of a less threatening international incident – rivalry – on state-building, and finds that it is positively correlated with tax extraction.¹⁶ And Taylor and Botea apply Tilly to two historically war-prone states in the Global South, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and discover that the model *is* generalizable provided that the existence of a core ethnic group (the exception in many states) and a

¹³ Boaz Atzili, "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict," *International Security* 31, no. 3 (2006/2007): 140.

¹⁴ Georg Sorensen, "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't it Work in the Third World?" *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 3 (2001): 347; Stein Sundstol Eriksen, "The Politics of State Formation: Contradictions and Conditions of Possibility," *The European Journal of Development Research* 17, no. 3 (2005): 402.

¹⁵ Indeed, today, well-being is in places tied to one's ability to *escape* the reach of his state.

¹⁶ Cameron G. Thies, "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000," *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004); and Cameron G. Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005).

revolutionary ideology precede the onset of war.¹⁷ Still, external variables, whether war or rivalry, inserted into Tilly's model cannot have the impact they did in early-modern Europe when applied to today's Global South. This is a point that Thies concedes by noting that states remain weak despite his finding of a relationship between interstate rivalry and tax extraction.¹⁸ Similarly, Eriksen finds that even war is of limited use in strengthening today's states, as involvement in the Second Congo War did little to compel its participants to better-centralize state power or increase state control over society.¹⁹ The problem almost certainly lies in today's limited nature of war; for Tilly to work, nothing short of war that threatens the existence of the state and population residing within it is sufficient to adequately shock the agency-structure dynamic. Yet, for reasons laid out above, war of this nature is out of the question. Long-term rivalries and limited wars may very well move the state-building needle, but a replication of what occurred in early-modern Europe is not possible in the Global South today.

Although neither the external context of states in early-modern Europe nor the nature of the state-building process undertaken can be replicated today, some things from centuries ago do remain the same. Namely, a group of states again finds itself in the early stages of state-building with some having made advances on the state-building continuum and others having stagnated or declined. Additionally, just as the external environment advanced the state-building trajectories of early-modern European states, I contend that it continues to have the potential to do so today in the Global South – albeit in different

¹⁷ Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, "Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World," *International Studies Review* 10 (2008).

¹⁸ Cameron G. Thies, "War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 452.

¹⁹ Stein Sundstol Eriksen, "The Congo War and the Prospects for State Formation: Rwanda and Uganda Compared," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 7 (2005): 1099.

ways, influencing the agency-structure dynamic in an entirely different manner than what was proposed by Tilly, and with necessarily more muted results.²⁰ The remainder of this chapter will lay out my theory explaining the state-building variation seen in the Global South generally and in sub-Saharan Africa particularly by drawing on relative power between states to capture where and why state-building has progressed, stagnated, or declined. In doing so I will first lay out what I believe to be the nature of the agency-structure dynamic dominant inside the states of today's Global South. I will then argue that relative power between those states has the capacity to alter their agency-structure dynamics, and I will conclude by assessing the impact of the alteration on state-building progression.

2.2 The Agency-Structure Dynamic in the Twenty-First Century Global South

The nature of the agency-structure dynamic common in today's Global South is considerably different than that which characterized the states that successfully developed in early-modern Europe. In a truly Hobbesian international environment, survival of the state, its regime, and its inhabitants depended on a pact between agency and structure, discussed above, in which each provided the other with essential resources. Out of this relationship emerged developed nation-states. Today no such international environment exists and neither regime survival nor the survival of society depends on a strong state. In fact, a strong state apparatus is often perceived as *threatening*, demonstrated by the calculated weakening of states by their regimes and attempts to escape the state by their

²⁰ It is worth noting that just as a threatening, war-prone external environment ultimately helped to produce well-developed states in early-modern Europe, it also resulted in the defeat and disappearance of *most* states. That is, while a rising tide may have raised all ships, those that were raised the least were defeated and absorbed by those that were raised the most. Today, the external environment of states, while influential, is not likely to produce state-building results at either extreme. It will not be powerful enough to impact the agency-structure dynamic in a way that produces exceptionally strong states, but it also will not result in the elimination of the system's weakest states.

societies. The symbiotic relationship between agency and structure, at one time benefiting both while facilitating state-building, yields decidedly different results today; with survival no longer dependent upon a strong state, structure can resist the encroachments of agency and agency can prioritize short-term regime interests rather than interact with structure in a manner that might ultimately strengthen the state. The relationship becomes one in which agency reacts to difficult and threatening structural conditions by adopting a method of governance geared toward regime survival in the near-term, but which has the unintended effect of making structure even more threatening over the long-term. Contrary to the agency-structure dynamic that produced strong states in early-modern Europe, the prevalent dynamic today is a recipe for state weakness or failure.

2.2a The Impact of Structure on Agency

Turning to the specifics of the agency-structure dynamic common to states in sub-Saharan Africa, it makes sense to begin with an assessment of the effect that structure has on agency. Africanists have paid structure a great deal of attention, and with good reason. The continent's structural challenges are well-known: borders, drawn in Berlin at the onset of colonialism, were crafted with the objective of preserving intra-European peace rather than reflecting social reality as it existed on the ground. Indeed, Feyissa and Hoehne calculate that 42 percent of the total length of Africa's land borders consists of parallels, meridians, and equidistant lines.²¹ Former Nigerian leader Obafemi Awolowo's classification of Nigeria as a "mere geographical expression" captures the reality nicely.²²

²¹ Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne, "State Borders and Borderlands as Resources," in *Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa*, eds. Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne (Suffolk: James Currey, 2010), 3.

²² David Welsh, "Ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa," *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1996): 478.

Consequently, at independence, Africa's leaders were left to confront not only populations that did not identify with their own states or regimes, but often identified more strongly with those outside their borders. The geographical size of Africa's states has also been problematic, with many states drawn too large – the Democratic Republic of Congo, perhaps the most egregious example, is the size of Western Europe – containing populations too dispersed to enable either the adequate provision of infrastructure or the exercise of social and economic control by the state.²³ In other cases, states are too small to allow for the creation of markets of scale. Arguments claiming that structure influences the capacity of elites to deliver on socio-economic development are a bit more controversial, with proponents pointing to problems believed to be associated with a state's subordinate position within the global economy, or even the geographical *location* of many sub-Saharan African states. Jeffrey Sachs, for example, argues that a state's distance from the equator affects its prospects for socio-economic development, with tropically-located states at a relative disadvantage.²⁴

While a long list of structural challenges confronts political elites in sub-Saharan Africa, common to each is the capacity to severely undermine regime legitimacy. The impact of structure on regime legitimacy is perhaps most evident where state elite attempt to penetrate society and centralize state control but find their encroachment rebuffed by local centers of power seeking to preserve their own rules and values.²⁵ Confronting

²³ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

²⁴ Sachs notes that many diseases thrive in warm, wet environments adversely affecting human health, while agriculture is negatively impacted by pests and the quality of soil in tropical regions. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Tropical Underdevelopment," CID Working Paper No. 57, available at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/publications/faculty-working-papers/cid-working-paper-no.-57>

²⁵ See the example of Catherine Boone who points squarely to the nature of a state's rural social structure to explain when and where attempts by the state to penetrate rural agriculture will succeed or fail. Boone finds that it is indigenous authority structure, class structure, and variations in the geographic scope and influence of grass root political organizations that matter most. Catherine Boone, "State Building in the African

precisely this scenario, the former president of Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo, once lamented that “...the decisions we take do not manage to reach the entire territory,” and called on the West to “disarm the rebels who prevent my decisions from reaching the whole country.”²⁶ Society may resist state encroachment for a number of reasons, ranging from a belief that submission to state penetration would jeopardize individual or group security, to a desire to keep the state from expropriating for itself locally-generated revenue. The latter is a particular problem in sub-Saharan Africa, with the World Bank putting the size of the region’s informal sector – economic activity neither taxed nor regulated – at roughly 41 percent that of GDP.²⁷ It is, however, the (arguably understandable) refusal of segments of society to recognize the state as the only legitimate purveyor of force that has led to so much of the continent’s misery. Demonstrating a refusal to cede control to the state, the 2006 mobilization of the CNDP in eastern-Congo, a powerful rebel group headed at the time by Laurent Nkunda, was an outgrowth of fear that the state would not offer protection to Tutsis against a massacre by Hutus. Describing the Congolese Tutsi as facing a “time bomb,” one local Tutsi justified the presence of Nkunda’s militia to Human Rights Watch as follows: “... We are not asking for much, just survival.”²⁸ Whatever the reason, the decision to escape from or

Countryside: Structure and Politics at the Grassroots,” *The Journal of Development Studies* 34, no. 4 (1998): 4. See also Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Finally, for a compelling argument that the projection of authority and penetration of society was as difficult for the European colonial powers as it is for African heads of state today, see Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 58-96.

²⁶ Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa,” *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008): 126.

²⁷ Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn, and Claudio E. Montenegro, “Shadow Economies All Over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007,” Policy Research Working Paper 5253, available at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2010/10/14/000158349_20101014160704/Rendered/PDF/WPS5356.pdf

²⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Renewed Crisis in North Kivu*, 23 October 2007, 19, no. 17 (a), available at: <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/10/22/renewed-crisis-north-kivu>

directly challenge the state reflects a belief that one's lot is better off without it.²⁹ The implications for regime legitimacy are clear. Structure, however, does not only cause the crises of legitimacy that threaten political elites but also *reflects* them. That is, just as structure impacts agency, agency impacts structure. It is to the impact of agency on structure that I will now turn.

2.2b The Impact of Agency on Structure

To understand what drives regime behavior as it relates to structure in sub-Saharan Africa, it is necessary to recognize three truths: first, in an environment in which state survival is guaranteed, the primary concern of any regime is its own survival. Second, due in part to the nature of structure discussed above, regimes face crises of legitimacy. And third, points one and two contribute to an atmosphere of extreme regime insecurity. It is likely not a surprise that regimes value their own continuity, yet regime survival is a particularly acute concern in sub-Saharan Africa given the ill will generated by the authoritarian and often brutal methods by which many regimes have governed. In an insightful quantitative study on the ultimate fates encountered by Africa's political leaders, John Wiseman writes: "The number of times I had to type 'assassinated,' 'executed,' 'imprisoned,' 'tortured,' and 'exiled' was, by simple repetition, a constant reminder of an unpalatable but inescapable feature of politics in all too many states."³⁰ Not only do fallen regimes have to contend with retribution from their own populations, but loss of diplomatic immunity that comes with the position of head of state can also

²⁹ Victor A. Olorunsola, "State Responses to Disintegration: Withdrawal and Adjustments in the Political Economy," in *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, eds. Donald S. Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 189.

³⁰ John A. Wiseman, "Leadership and Personal Danger in African Politics," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 4 (1993): 658. It must be noted that Wiseman includes in his quantitative analysis not only heads of state, but lower-level regime officials as well as opposition leaders.

result in punishment abroad. The indictment of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court is speculated to have played a role in his decision to remain in power rather than retire.³¹ Thus, to understand agency's interaction with structure, one must take into account the imperative of regime survival coupled with what are often low levels of legitimacy and high levels of regime insecurity. What has emerged from this equation is a method of governance – aptly characterized as “personal rule”³² – that emphasizes the protection of the regime in the near-term, yet impacts structure in such a way as to make regime survival more tenuous, regime legitimacy more precarious, and state-building progression less robust over the long-term.

Governance in sub-Saharan Africa, generally speaking, can be characterized in two ways: first, it is profoundly personal; that is, who gets what, when, and how is determined by the particular whims of a state's regime coupled with its strategy to retain power. Ties between regimes and a monolithic “public” are weak; instead, regimes selectively form links with natural allies in society whose active support can be counted on, as well as with threatening strong-men whose acquiescence can be bought. In short, the aim of the regime is to secure enough loyalty to prolong its survival. Second, it follows that administrative efficiency is not valued, the consistency that comes with strong institutions is not a priority, and formal rules that govern politics and the economy are disregarded.³³ As in the Global North's most developed states, constitutions exist, bureaucratic agencies are staffed, and legislative bodies convene to pass laws. Yet, in

³¹ Rob Crilly, “Save Darfur? The A-List Idealists May be Doing the Very Opposite,” *The Telegraph*, 7 April 2010, available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/7561955/Save-Darfur-The-A-list-idealists-may-be-doing-the-very-opposite.html>

³² Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

³³ Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), xix.

sub-Saharan Africa, these key components of the state suffer from varying degrees of “hollowness.”³⁴ Cruise O’ Brien puts it as follows: “Between the ambitions of the elite and the survival stratagems of the masses, the state often appears to survive essentially as a show, a political drama with an audience more or less willing to suspend its disbelief.”³⁵ Put differently, “the state is a government of men and not laws.”³⁶

Three conditions, introduced above, are behind the nature of governance in so much of sub-Saharan Africa: regime survival is *the* imperative; regimes enjoy sub-optimal levels of legitimacy; and regime insecurity often runs high. Yet too often “poor governance,” including a poorly performing civil service, regulatory policies that constrain the private sector, and tolerance of corruption, is attributed to pathology or a deficiency in the intellectual wherewithal of the regime in charge of the state. If only ethical individuals could topple regimes that use the state as a means of personal enrichment and crony empowerment, the argument goes, the quality of governance would improve and with it the socio-economic development of the state’s population. Equally misguided is the notion that “poor governance” is the result of a dearth of expertise, potentially remedied by a crush of international organizations tasked with assisting in the construction of an institutional framework that mirrors that found in the Global North. In fact, the first attribution is wishful thinking, and the second contains an incorrect conclusion following from a faulty premise. The reality is that the tendency to interpret personal rule and the ills that come with it as the product of pathological leaders is

³⁴ Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, “The Show of the State in a Neo-Colonial Twilight: Francophone Africa,” in *Rethinking Third World Politics*, ed. James Manor (New York: Longman Publishing, 1991), 146.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 10.

misguided. It is not an aberration, but the way Africa works.³⁷ Political elites govern the way they do because structure is the way it is; behavior appearing to reveal the “aberrant personalities”³⁸ of political elites is often actually a calculated, deliberate, and even rational response to low levels of legitimacy, high degrees of insecurity, and the imperativeness of survival.

It is the nature of structure and its impact on agency that compels Africa’s political elite to reject institutionalism and turn to personal rule. Were the state strong enough to penetrate and create separation from society on its terms, regime security would be less endangered, the policy-making process would be more insulated from pressure by society’s strong-men, and political elites would feel freer to develop and then govern within institutions. Indeed, such a state-society balance is credited with enabling the institutionalization of public policy in Botswana.³⁹ Yet the relationship between state and society in much of sub-Saharan Africa does not mirror that found in Botswana. Confronting threatening elements in society they cannot defeat outright, regimes attempt to pay off or co-opt key strongmen by incorporating them into the state apparatus.⁴⁰ Natural allies of regimes – often group-based and centered on ethnicity – are similarly rewarded for their loyalty. Yet society’s strongmen, not powerful enough to seize control of the state, also benefit from personal politics. With constituencies of their own, and the

³⁷ Larry Diamond, “Class Formation in the Swollen African State,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 4 (1987): 581.

³⁸ “Aberrant personality” is the term used by Henry Bienen to describe Africa’s political elite who, he finds, are disproportionately likely to govern without a social or political agenda save for remaining in power and advancing the interests of their own ethnic groups. In: Henry Bienen, “Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa,” *Political Science Quarterly* 108, no. 2 (1993): 273.

³⁹ Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Botswana: Comprehending the Exceptional State,” in *The African State: Reconsiderations*, eds. Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002).

⁴⁰ See Rothchild and Foley who advocate for a big-tent policy and the stability they believe comes with it, despite its costs in terms of economic efficiency. Donald Rothchild and Michael Foley, “African States and the Politics of Inclusive Coalitions,” in *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, eds. Donald S. Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

cherished status of patron dependent on their ability to secure resources for constituents, access to the fruits of the state can be invaluable.⁴¹ Thus, far from achieving a degree of insulation from society and a free hand to institutionalize the workings of the state, regimes find that they are beholden to and even penetrated by the parochial interests of their societies' strongmen.⁴²

The environment described above is not conducive to institutionalism, as institutionalism threatens rather than advances the immediate interests of power-holders in both the state and society. Political elite, preoccupied with their survival and tasked with the challenge of managing society's strongmen, reasonably conclude that it is faster, cheaper, and safer to buy the compliance of powerful individuals or groups than it is to accumulate legitimacy by developing and then governing within the confines of strong institutions.⁴³ Militating against institutionalism is a lack of powerful, mobilized constituencies for reform.⁴⁴ The upending of a system of personal rule would immediately threaten vested interests in both the state and society, yet the implementation of institutionalism and the emergence of its socio-economic benefits would take time.⁴⁵ Thus it is a gamble that insecure political elites are reluctant to take. Moreover, formal institutions are themselves a threat to political elites as they can be used by potential

⁴¹ For a fantastic account of the appeal of patrimonial politics to society, see Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

⁴² Joshua B. Forrest, "The Quest for State Hardness in Africa," *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 4 (1988): 426.

⁴³ William Reno, "Clandestine Economies, Violence, and States in Africa," *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 2 (2000): 440.

⁴⁴ The capitalist class makes sense as a natural constituency as it would surely benefit from the stability and predictability of institutionalism, yet Africa's capitalist class is quite weak. For example, only two percent of African businesses have more than 10 employees while most operate in the informal sector with between one and three. Moreover, indigenous Africans own less than one-third of the continent's large industrial firms. Of the continent's companies that are owned by Africans, one country - South Africa - is dominant; in 2007, 38 of the top 50 largest African-owned firms were South African. See Roger Southall, "The Scramble for Africa and the Marginalisation of African Capitalism," in *A New Scramble for Africa?*, eds. Roger Southall and Henning Melber (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), 363-368.

⁴⁵ Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, "The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 1 (1996): 37.

rivals to develop constituencies of their own. Migdal speaks to the elaborate steps taken by political elites to keep the bureaucracy clipped, from frequently shuffling officials between agencies to prevent the coalescence of personal loyalties, to staffing the most sensitive departments with regime loyalists rather than the best and brightest.⁴⁶ Society's strongmen, like political elites, also stand to lose from the abandonment of personal rule. Strongmen have come to rely on patronage from the state in the form of money and jobs to distribute to their clients.⁴⁷ As their status depends on the ability to meet the needs of constituents, a transformation of the relationship between state and society threatens strongmen personally.

To this point what has been emphasized is the impact of structure on agency and its manifestation in agency's decision to govern by personal rule. The effect of personal rule on structure has been narrowly assessed, with a focus on how it impacts society's strongmen. Yet its influence extends much further, drastically shaping structure and impacting the lives of every member of society. Njuguna Ng'ethe, arguing for more research on leadership style and its effect on the state, writes that identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, resource distribution, and the success and failure of economic development are each linked to leadership and governance.⁴⁸ Indeed personal rule uniquely affects each of Ng'ethe's structural variables; it is, however, a myopic way to govern and over the long term has the unintended effect of reinforcing and even

⁴⁶ Joel S. Migdal, *States in Society: Studying How States Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 73-84.

⁴⁷ For a very good account of the symbiotic relationship between the state and society's strongmen, particularly the reliance of strongmen on the state's largesse, see Donald I. Ray and E. Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, "The New Relevance of Traditional Authorities in Africa," *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 37/38 (1996): especially 27-28.

⁴⁸ Njuguna Ng'ethe, "Strongmen, State Formation, Collapse, and Reconstruction in Africa," in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), 256.

strengthening a structural environment hostile to the security of political elites. Regime legitimacy ultimately suffers as there is invariably insufficient patronage available to meet the needs of everyone, forcing the regime to discriminate against certain groups. Moreover, rather than usurp the influence of strongmen, their use by the state as a conduit through which to channel patronage to society actually increases their stature and power. Also affected by personal rule is the development of the nation-state, essential to long-term political stability. Larry Diamond nicely captures how political elite, lacking sufficient patronage to neutralize all threats, rely on the manipulation of ethnicity and pit groups against each other to divert attention from the regime.⁴⁹ Posner, arguing that group identity is situational, strategic, and affected by one's environment, contends that ethnicity becomes politically salient when it is linked to the distribution of resources by the state.⁵⁰ And Mengisteab argues that minority groups, lacking confidence that their interests will be advanced, will never incorporate into a non-neutral state – the very definition of a state that shuns institutionalism.⁵¹ Far from enhancing the security of political elites, personal rule increases competition for control of the state as livelihoods come to depend on it. Finally, personal rule is detrimental to socio-economic development. Aside from the fact that a vibrant private sector depends on the predictability, stability, and security that comes with institutionalism, personal politics shuns long-term planning and extensive investment in the enhancement of bureaucratic

⁴⁹ Larry Diamond, "Class Formation in the Swollen African State," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 4 (1987): 586.

⁵⁰ Daniel N. Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2-4.

⁵¹ Kidane Mengisteab, "Africa's Intrastate Conflicts: Relevance and Limitations of Diplomacy," *African Issues* 31, no. ½ (2004).

capacity on which state-sponsored socio-economic development depends.⁵² Thus, while personal rule may make sense as a short-term strategy for political elites who confront threatening structural environments and are desperate to survive, it ultimately affects structure in ways that exacerbate their insecurity.

In sum, state elites in sub-Saharan Africa have long opted for a strategy of personal rule in which governance through institutions is shunned, and patronage networks, often centered on ethnicity, thrive. Elites make this choice because they are vulnerable and insecure and calculate that personal rule optimizes their chances of survival. Yet what may be good for regime survival in the near term runs counter to what is necessary for state-building to excel in the longer term. The configuration of and reliance upon patronage networks prevents the state from separating itself from society. Moreover, the inevitably unequal distribution of patronage from the state to society's various strongmen over time breeds resentment and works against the forging of convergence between nations and the state. Finally, to the detriment of social and economic development, deliberate efforts to cripple the bureaucracy coupled with the refusal to govern through institutions deprive the private sector of the consistency and predictability it covets, and encourages the misallocation of the state's resources. Thus, the consequence of regime insecurity over time is less rather than more robust state-building.

The objective of Chapter 2 thus far has been to illustrate how the symbiotic relationship that exists between agency and structure impacts the state-building process. In doing so I first reviewed the work of Charles Tilly in which an external shock – a

⁵² William Reno, "Clandestine Economies, Violence, and States in Africa," *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 2 (2000): 440.

Hobbesian international environment – is attributed to the shaping of the agency-structure dynamic in a way that promoted state-building in early-modern Europe. I then assessed the relevance of Tilly to today's Global South in light of a fundamentally different international environment. Lacking the threat of state-annihilating interstate war, the relationship between agency and structure in today's Global South has developed very differently than it did in early-modern Europe, with significant implications for state-building. Next, I turned to the agency-structure dynamic in the Global South and reviewed what I believe to be the impact of structure on agency, particularly the role it plays in contributing to the crises of legitimacy and environments of insecurity confronted by Africa's political elite. Structural conditions that are fixed (that is, unlikely to change) – namely arbitrarily-drawn borders and difficult geography – influence the extent to which another structural element, society, accepts as legitimate the regime in charge of the state. Regime illegitimacy manifests itself in a number of ways, from attempts by society to escape the reach of the state by disappearing into the informal sector of the economy, to initiating armed conflict with the state in an effort to change the regime in power. Finally, I assessed the impact of agency on structure and argued that agency, responding to a threatening structural environment, opts for a method of governance – personal rule – that serves its needs in the near-term, but impacts structure in ways that make it more threatening over the long-term.

2.3 Revising Tilly: Relative Power and State-Building in the Twenty-First Century

To this point I have argued that state-building progression can best be understood by assessing how agency and structure impact one another. Whether state-building progresses or not depends heavily on a state's agency-structure dynamic. But what

precisely is responsible for shaping the dynamic in such a way as to yield state-building success in some cases, and stagnation or decline in others? In other words, if the relationship between agency and structure matters to state-building, what mediates the relationship? To refer back to the example of the regulation of social and economic life, can a particular variable be identified that compels state elites to build institutions where, in the absence of the variable, elites would calculate that their interests are better served by keeping institutions weak? Can the same variable explain corresponding shifts in the level of threat posed by structure to agency? And is a similar pattern between agency, mediator, and structure found when my other four components of state-building are considered? As discussed in the initial sections of this chapter, Africa's sub-Saharan states largely began their state-building projects at the same time and encountered (and continue to encounter) similar economic, political, and social challenges. Yet state-building progression has been uneven. The objective here is to uncover a solution to this puzzle by looking to states' agency-structure dynamics and assessing the impact of a mediating variable by which I hypothesize the dynamics are influenced – the relative distribution of power among states. The remainder of Chapter 2 will lay out precisely how I suspect relative power can affect the agency-structure dynamic internal to states and how the impact on the agency-structure relationship is likely to affect where state-building advances or declines. In doing so, it will note two assumptions that are central to my theory, and conclude by putting forward a handful of testable hypotheses to be assessed in Chapter 3.

2.3a State-Building: Agency, Structure, and the Role of Relative Power

At the outset it must be said that relative power, or any exogenous variable for that matter, is unlikely to have a transformative impact on the agency-structure relationship on par with the Hobbesian international environment emphasized in the work of Charles Tilly. The international environment in which the states of early-modern Europe developed proved a great boon to state-building because it tied the survival of regimes to their ability to overcome structural obstacles, penetrate society, and develop their states, and tied the welfare of society to the strength of their regimes and states. Yet absent the chronic threat of interstate war and territorial conquest, a similarly robust drawing-together of regimes and societies is not likely. Society today has much less to lose than it once did, and it is no longer confronted with the choice of uniting behind a devil it knows or risking conquest by a devil it doesn't. Concerns associated with relative power (that is, the power of other states relative to one's own) are simply unlikely to be great enough to compel society to mobilize behind the state and its regime. Yet this is not to say that exogenous variables no longer have the capacity to influence what happens inside states; in fact, there is good reason to believe that concerns associated with relative power can move the needle when it comes to state-building. Although relative power itself is unlikely to alter the way society would otherwise interact with the state (including its regime), it poses a very real threat to regimes and influences how they decide to go about interacting with structure (including society). And how regimes, or agency, interact with structure has a great impact on state-building's progression, stagnation, or decline. Given the dismissal of the notion that society is threatened by the power of other states, the theory that relative power matters to the agency-structure dynamic (and thus to state-

building) hinges on the case that relative power matters a great deal to political elites. Before the precise mechanism by which relative power is believed to impact state-building can be laid out, the case that it matters to political elites must be established. I turn here now.

2.3b Assumption #1: States are Fearful of their Immediate Neighbors

Central to every major theory of international politics is the assumption that states view with fear or suspicion the intentions of other states. Whether attributed to an unsavory human nature as emphasized by traditional realists, or to the insecurity and uncertainty that comes with anarchy as emphasized by neo-realists and neo-liberals, common to each theory is the belief that states are compelled to take seriously their defenses against the ambitions of other states.⁵³ Given that threats travel most easily over short distances and many states are simply unable to project force far beyond their own borders, states have historically been most fearful of their contiguous neighbors.⁵⁴ Yet scholars of the Global South have found fault with mainstream international relations theory on the grounds that it may have explained power politics in Europe, but does not capture the nature of the state or its external behavior in the Global South today. In a break with traditional international relations theory, Mohammed Ayoob contends that the nature of state behavior in the Global South is largely a manifestation of security predicaments that originate *internally*, rather than externally.⁵⁵ Similarly, John Clark notes that the neo-realist assumption of internal order and external anarchy (which compels states to fear

⁵³ Naturally, the means by which states are believed to go about this – and even the perceived extent of the threat – varies based on the theory of international politics.

⁵⁴ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4.

⁵⁵ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995).

one another) should be inverted when assessing the Global South.⁵⁶ In fact, the idea that states meaningfully interact at all has been called into question. The active formation of alliances – an assumption of mainstream international relations theory – is noticeably less common outside the Global North.⁵⁷ And, as the initial pages of this chapter noted, the outbreak of interstate war has been rare and norms protecting the preservation of borders rigidly respected. The quantity of interaction not directly related to state security has been similarly scrutinized. Intra-African trade volume ranks among the lowest in the world with only 10 percent of Africa’s trade occurring exclusively between members of the continent, compared to rates of 40 percent in North America and 60 percent in Western Europe.⁵⁸ Taken all together, it is understandable that Douglas Lemke felt compelled to preface his own study of interstate politics in the Global South with the following concession: “I am well aware there may not be much interaction among underdeveloped states to either understand or anticipate in the first place.”⁵⁹ Given the dearth of traditional interaction among states coupled with what appears on the surface to be a generally peaceful and non-cut throat international environment, it is not surprising to find scholars of the Global South calling into question the generalizability of mainstream international relations theory or the assumptions on which it is based.

While critics of mainstream international relations theory correctly point to disparities between the expected and actual behavior of states in the Global South, it

⁵⁶ John F. Clark, “Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa’s International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” in *Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory*, eds. Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

⁵⁷ Stephanie G. Neuman, “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?” in *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 1-12.

⁵⁸ See the blog post titled “Can Africa Trade with Africa?” written by the Vice President for the World Bank’s Africa region, Obiageli Ezekwesili. Available at <http://blogs.worldbank.org/meetings/can-africa-trade-with-africa>

⁵⁹ Douglas Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 162.

would be a mistake to take the critiques too far and conclude that states and elites exist in semi-vacuums, face minimal danger from, and need not worry about the intentions and capabilities of one another. Alliance-formation in sub-Saharan Africa, while not robust as that found in the Global North, is also not altogether absent. For example, regional security institutions have historically been weak in the Horn, East and Central Africa, yet relatively coherent and active in West and Southern Africa.⁶⁰ And while intraregional trade significantly lags the rest of the world, it is not for an absence of trade-friendly institutions; in fact, all but two African states have membership in a regional trade agreement, and many states in more than one.⁶¹ Moreover, to argue that states in the Global South have only rarely fought interstate wars is not to say that they are incapable of doing so, or will not do so more frequently in the future. Sub-Saharan Africa has been independent for just 50 years, making for a relatively short period of observation. Of the 50 years, the first 30 fell during the Cold-War – a period during which sphere-of-influence politics and the risk of turning a cold war hot may have limited the viability of waging war. And although interstate war in sub-Saharan Africa has been remarkably rare, militarized interstate disputes (MID) stopping short of war have not. Indeed, of the 42 states in sub-Saharan Africa, all but *one* have been involved in an MID with a contiguous neighbor at some point since independence.⁶² This is hardly surprising given that conditions on the continent are ripe for interstate conflict as young, insecure states have a

⁶⁰ Francis M. Deng et al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 137-143.

⁶¹ See the World Trade Organization's interactive website for a list of and details about the RTAs to which states belong. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/rta_participation_map_e.htm?country_selected=none&sense=b

⁶² See the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset, available at: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>

particularly high potential to generate regional volatility.⁶³ Particularly inflammatory are disputes over territory, which sub-Saharan Africa has in abundance.⁶⁴ 62 percent of states in the region with at least one land border are currently involved in a territorial dispute with another state, and in many cases have disputes with more than one state.⁶⁵ Desperate regimes might also opt to provoke neighboring states in an attempt to generate nationalist sentiment at home and distract from domestic problems.⁶⁶ And while draconian outcomes such as the incorporation of losers by winners are no longer probable consequences of interstate war, the risks to political elite remain great. Of Africa's four interstate wars, one – the invasion of Uganda by Tanzania – resulted in the overthrow of the regime, and another – the Second Congo War – likely would have had the same result had neighboring allies not come to the aid of Congolese president Laurent Kabila.

While the prevalence of formal state-to-state interaction such as the formation of alliances, trade, and interstate war has to date been relatively underwhelming in sub-Saharan Africa, *non*-formal cross-border interaction occurs frequently. This takes the form of non-state actors in separate states interacting with one another (such as a rebel

⁶³ Ibid, 50.

⁶⁴ Scholars have published extensively on the linkage between territorial disputes and interstate conflict, often finding that territory is among the variables most strongly correlated to the onset of militarized conflict. For evidence of this relationship along with an explanation of the salience of territory, see John A. Vasquez, "Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 3 (1995); Paul R. Hensel, "Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict," in *What Do We Know About War?*, ed. John A. Vasquez (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000); and Paul D. Senese, "Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict: Assessing a New Joint Explanation," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 4 (2005).

⁶⁵ Note, however, that efforts to resolve disputes can range from belligerently amassing troops along a disputed border, to filing a grievance with an international body. Indeed, the former is quite rare. For a list of the states involved plus a synopsis of the disputes, see <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2070.html>

⁶⁶ Herbst suggests this possibility, yet Jack Levy contends that it is only an effective strategy for states with a preexisting sufficiently high degree of internal cohesion – ruling out a sizable portion of Africa. Lacking a minimal degree of internal cohesion, interstate war will actually exacerbate domestic tensions. See Jeffrey Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," *International Security* 14, no. 4 (1990):119. And Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

group in Uganda collaborating with a rebel group in Rwanda), or states interacting with non-state actors in neighboring states (such as the government of Ethiopia providing aid to an insurgency in Eritrea). In fact, such non-formal cross-border interaction poses as much or more of a threat to state and regime security as formal state-to-state interaction. Largely giving rise to the robustness of non-formal cross-border interaction is the chronic condition of *domestic* insecurity coupled with three (not necessarily mutually-exclusive) realities in sub-Saharan Africa: borders on the continent are extremely permeable; internal conflict is endemic to the region and easily spills over borders; and state and non-state actors have a history of calculated intervention into the affairs of their neighbors. Each of these circumstances has the capacity to threaten the primary objective of Africa's regimes – survival – and thus compels a preoccupation with one's neighbors.

Permeable Borders: The inability of states to project authority into their hinterlands coupled with the unaffordable administrative costs of border patrol has made Africa's borders among the most porous in the world.⁶⁷ Levan Griffiths calculates that the continent's 50,000 miles of border are protected by just 345 official road crossing points, amounting to one official crossing point for every 145 miles of border.⁶⁸ Of all official crossing points – whether road, rail, or waterway – 40 percent have no government presence at the actual border, with custom posts often set back as far as 60 miles.⁶⁹ Consequentially, individuals have been able to move across borders with relative ease. The impact of border permeability on state and regime security has ranged from

⁶⁷ Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne, "State Borders and Borderlands as Resources," in *Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa*, eds. Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne (Suffolk: James Currey, 2010), 12.

⁶⁸ Levan Griffiths, "Permeable Boundaries in Africa," in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities*, eds. Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (New York: Pinter, 1996), 72.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 70.

negligible to catastrophic. Nomadic herdsman cross borders as their animals graze, and populations on one side of a border visit socially with populations on the other side at no cost to the state or its regime. More problematic is the prevalence of smuggling, made easy by permeable boundaries, as governments are denied tax revenue on goods illicitly moved in and out of their states. But, without question, the greatest threat posed to regimes by porous borders is the ease with which they can be crossed by armed, non-state actors seeking to wage war against their governments. By way of example, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group that fought an 11-year civil war with the government of Sierra Leone, was based on the Liberian side of the border and invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. Similarly, rebels in 2006 used bases along the Chad-Sudan border to organize and launch an invasion that quickly spread to the capital city of N'Djamena. In these cases and others, rebels took advantage of foreign support and easily penetrable borders to carry out attacks against the regimes in charge of their states.

Spillover: The propensity for domestic conflict to spill over borders compels political elites in sub-Saharan Africa to preoccupy themselves with the internal politics of their neighbors. Indeed, the literature shows that African states possess traits that amplify their risk of both producing and becoming victims of conflicts that spill over borders. Central among these traits is the absence of a convergence between nations and states. Englebert et al. find that states with borders that partition previously unified populations are at an elevated risk of interstate conflict.⁷⁰ Similarly, Miller finds that a region's propensity for interstate peace or war is best explained by the success with which its members have formed nation-states, and Carment corroborates the finding by showing

⁷⁰ Pierre Englebert, Stacy Tarango, and Matthew Carter, "Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 10 (2002): 1101.

that domestic conflicts centered on ethnicity are disproportionately likely to stoke interstate violence.⁷¹ The nation-state - interstate war connection may be explained by kin-country syndrome, or by the tendency of ethnic civil wars to produce large numbers of destabilizing refugees.⁷² Spillover, even if it does not trigger interstate hostilities, can produce domestic instability in its recipient states. Sambanis finds that the probability of a state experiencing ethnic civil war rises if its neighbors are also engaged in wars of the same type.⁷³ This may be partially attributable to a demonstration effect given that the internal political circumstances of states are very similar across sub-Saharan Africa, and “lesson-drawing...takes place constantly”.⁷⁴ Lemarchand attributes the heightened political salience of ethnicity in Burundi – ultimately erupting in genocide – to the demonstration effect of the 1959-1962 Rwandan Revolution. As persecuted Rwandan Tutsis fled across the border into Burundi and shared their horrifying experiences, it became clear to Burundi’s Tutsis that control of the state must be kept from the hands of Hutus lest they face a similar fate. Indeed, Lemarchand writes that “no other event did more to sharpen the edges of ethnic hatreds in Burundi than the Hutu revolution in neighboring Rwanda.”⁷⁵

External Intervention: While the formation of interstate alliances in sub-Saharan Africa has not been particularly robust, states have aggressively allied with rebel groups

⁷¹ Benjamin Miller, “When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace,” *International Studies Review* 7, no. 2 (2005). And David Carment, “The International Dimension of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory,” *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 2 (1993).

⁷² Myron Weiner, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows,” *International Security* 21, no. 1 (1996): 24.

⁷³ Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (2001).

⁷⁴ Francis M. Deng et al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 148.

⁷⁵ Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (New York: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996), 60.

engaged in conflict with the regimes of their neighbors. To note just a handful: Sudan has supported the LRA in Uganda and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in Ethiopia, and Uganda and Ethiopia the SPLA in Sudan; Uganda allied with the Rwandan Patriotic Front which ultimately moved into Kigali and assumed power, and soon after teamed up again to assist the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, which toppled then-Zairian president Joseph Mobutu; Sudan has aggressively supported Islamist movements in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt; the RUF, which at one point in its civil war effectively overthrew the government of Sierra Leone, was backed heavily by Liberia; and sheer exhaustion prevents a listing of the myriad central-African states that have either been affected by or sponsored the LRA, PRA, ADF, Interahamwe, ex-FAR, FNCL, and ex-CNDP – all operating out of the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁷⁶ Indeed, Christopher Clapham writes that the proliferation of African insurgencies and the willingness of neighboring states to lend their support have “blurred the distinction between government and insurgency.”⁷⁷

Behind the decision to support insurgencies in neighboring states is a calculation that doing so will increase *regime* security. As with domestic policy, foreign policy decisions are made primarily with an eye toward the advancement of *regime* longevity, rather than what is necessarily in the best interest of the state.⁷⁸ Therefore, political elites

⁷⁶ For elaboration on these relationships, see *African Guerrillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998). And Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, “Sudan: The Authoritarian State,” in *The African State: Reconsiderations*, eds. Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed Ismail Samatar (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002), 214.

⁷⁷ Christopher Clapham, “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies,” in *African Guerrillas*, ed. Christopher Clapham (Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998), 16.

⁷⁸ Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, “Foreign Policy Making in Africa: An Introduction,” in *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, eds. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, and Terrence Lyons (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 7. Also John F. Clark, “Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa's International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” in *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, eds. Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave, 2001). And for a fantastic argument that

will opt to intervene in the affairs of their neighbors in order to bolster their standing at home, or to retaliate for or deter additional intervention by neighboring states into their own internal affairs. Given the outsized role of ethnicity in domestic politics, namely the extent to which regimes rely on ethnic constituencies to maintain their grips on power, it is not surprising to find that ethnicity plays a role in shaping the foreign policies of Africa's states;⁷⁹ Saideman finds that ethnic ties between the constituents of African regimes and the rebel groups fighting next door strongly influence the decision of regimes to provide rebels with support.⁸⁰ And Lemarchand captures the strength of the link between ethnicity, regime security, and foreign policy in declaring the foreign policies of Tutsi heads of state in the Great Lakes region largely reducible to "The friends of the Tutsi are our friends, and the friends of the Hutu are our enemies."⁸¹

The preceding pages have provided at least some evidence for the case that Africa's political elite have good reason to fear their neighbors despite a relative dearth of formal state-to-state interaction. While formal interstate interaction may not be particularly robust, conditions in sub-Saharan Africa are such that political elites at the helm of states must nevertheless view with utmost skepticism the intentions and behavior of proximate states. What largely compels Africa's political elite to fear their neighbors

Africa's states make their balancing decisions on the basis of internal rather than external threats, see Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991).

⁷⁹ This is consistent with the finding of Russett and Graham – challenging realism's unitary actor assumption – that political elites factor in domestic public opinion when crafting their national security policies. Bruce Russett and Thomas W. Graham, "Public Opinion and National Security Policy: Relationships and Impacts," in *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

⁸⁰ Stephen M. Saideman, *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), chapter 6. And Stephen M. Saideman, "Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 1 (2002): 40.

⁸¹ Rene Lemarchand, "Foreign Policymaking in the Great Lakes Region," in *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, eds. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, and Terrence Lyons (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 93.

is a chronically insecure domestic landscape coupled with the reality of permeable borders, a tendency for conflicts to spill into neighboring states, and conditions that favor the calculated intervention of state and non-state actors into the affairs of their neighbors. In this context, non-formal cross-border interaction between groups of non-state actors, or states and non-state actors, has thrived. The capacity of such interaction between neighbors to circumvent the primary objective of every regime – survival – has not been lost on Africa's political elite.

2.3c Assumption #2: States are Preoccupied with the Relative Power of Their Neighbors

Perhaps no concept has received more attention from students of international relations than power. Although there is no consensus on precisely *how* power drives interstate relations, from its effect on when states will cooperate with one another, to when they will go to war, no interstate phenomena can be fully explained without considering the role played by power; indeed, power and interstate politics are inextricably linked. The centrality of power to the study of international relations is straightforward: power is immensely important to all states. Samuel Huntington concisely but thoroughly captures the imperative of power as follows: "Power enables an actor to shape his environment so as to reflect his interests. In particular, it enables a state to protect its security and prevent, deflect, or defeat threats to that security. It also enables a state to promote its values among other peoples and to shape the international environment so as to reflect its values."⁸² Or, as Waltz puts it, power "provides the means of maintaining one's autonomy in the face of force that others wield."⁸³ It is, in short, a currency that states

⁸² Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," in *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, eds. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), 308.

⁸³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 194.

must possess if they wish to dictate – rather than have dictated to them – the terms of their relations with other states.

The role of power in international relations becomes significantly more complicated when we move beyond merely assessing its value to states, and turn instead to questions related to its distribution. Namely, to what extent are states preoccupied not only with their own power, but with the power of other states? If state A gains two units of power but state B gains three units, does state A celebrate its gain of two units, or does it lament the outcome given that state B gained an additional unit? In other words, do states ask “will both of us gain?” Or do they ask “who will gain more?”⁸⁴ Power can only be understood in relative terms. On the one hand it is a finite resource; every one of the world’s states cannot simultaneously accumulate power. Instead, any accumulation of power by one state necessarily results in other states losing power. This is not necessarily to say that every state cannot simultaneously become richer or more militarily mighty in absolute terms. Each of the world’s states might simultaneously accumulate five units of economic or military growth, but the net effect would be a wash and the distribution of *power* would not change. In addition, the fact that power is not employed in a vacuum compels it to be understood in relative terms. Any foreign policy decision made by any state, including the decision to do nothing, is conditioned by its cache of power and inevitably impacts fellow states. Therefore, because power is neither accumulated nor employed in a vacuum, it is meaningless to simply say “state A is powerful.” Because power is not an end but a means to the same end pursued by every state (the realization of its values, whatever they may be), “state A is powerful” is only meaningful when “powerful” is considered in terms of “powerful” relative to *whom*.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 105.

Given the way power works, a state that asks only “will I gain?” and fails to concern itself with “who will gain more?” opens itself up to the possibility of losing its autonomy from and influence over other states. As Huntington puts it, “to ask whether primacy matters is to ask whether power matters.”⁸⁵ Yet states are not invariably threatened by every exchange that results in a loss of some relative power. Instead, states define each unique situation and act on the basis of that definition.⁸⁶ In taking into account the circumstances surrounding an exchange, coupled with specific knowledge of the other states involved, states calculate not only whether another’s gains *can* be used to their disadvantage, but whether they are *likely* to be.⁸⁷ If state A believes that an increase in the relative power of state B may threaten its security, it will surely move to keep state B from making a gain or move to protect itself from fallout associated with the gain once it is made. But if the nature of the relationship between state A and state B is such that neither believes its security is likely to be threatened by the other, the distribution of power should matter less. In short, the prioritization of relative power is dependent upon the nature of the relationship between states, and the level of confidence those states have that their security vulnerabilities will not be exploited.

Relative Power in Sub-Saharan Africa: An adjustment to realism proposed by Stephen Walt in which he argues that states actually fear and respond to *threats* rather than power has gone a long way toward explaining otherwise-puzzling behavior in the

⁸⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” in *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, eds. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), 307.

⁸⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 406.

⁸⁷ Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 276. Also, see Stephen Walt for his amendment to the realist argument that anarchy compels states to automatically fear and balance against power. Walt, instead, argues that states balance against threats. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

Global North. If fear of power by itself motivated the behavior of states, one would expect to find, among other things, the Canadian side of the border among the most militarized in the world, significant integration of Europe nonexistent, and U.S. preponderance following the termination of the Cold War immediately challenged. But with threats prioritized rather than power, and states in the Global North confident that their security will not be threatened by one another, destabilizing behavior associated with the security dilemma has been negligible, tremendous cooperation has taken place, and power disparities have been allowed to grow largely unchecked. Yet the relaxed threat environment that has shaped the interactions of states in the North has not been replicated in the Global South generally, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. This is due to a diametrically divergent set of conditions that characterize both the internal and external environments of the two groups of states. Whereas states in the North are internally coherent, states in the South are fractured and regimes chronically insecure; whereas the security of borders in the North is relatively strong and the survival of regimes is not threatened by activity emanating from the territory of neighbors, the presence of myriad cross-border threats poses an immense challenge to the welfare of regimes in the South; and while a long history of interaction and growing integration has forged trust and tied the fates of states in the North, nothing close exists in the South. Mohammed Ayoob writes of the extreme nervousness with which states in the South view the activities of their neighbors, and contends that a harmony of interests is “conspicuous by its absence.”⁸⁸ Even friendships are precarious and fleeting. Only two years after facilitating the installation of Laurent Kabila as president of the Democratic

⁸⁸ Mohammed Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World” in *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 38.

Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda invaded in a bid to remove him. And once inside the DRC, the two states had a bizarre falling-out which saw their militaries fight battles with one another that nearly escalated to war. Until that point very close – Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni supported the Rwandan insurgency that led to Paul Kagame becoming president, and years earlier Kagame served in Museveni’s rebel army, ultimately becoming his intelligence chief – Museveni reportedly believed that a Rwandan invasion was imminent.⁸⁹ Indeed, the debate over whether states fear power or threats – an enormous preoccupation of mainstream international relations theory – is largely irrelevant in sub-Saharan Africa where power and threats are one and the same.

Given that each state in sub-Saharan Africa, assuming reach, both threatens and is threatened by its fellow states, every state must preoccupy itself with the question of relative power. This holds true whether one accepts the unitary actor view of states, or believes instead that the foreign policies of states in the Global South are aimed more squarely at supporting regime survival than promoting a broader set of national security interests.⁹⁰ Both the national security of states as well as the interests of their regimes can be threatened by powerful neighbors. Because cross-border interaction can either alleviate or exacerbate domestic security challenges, and Africa’s regimes have a long history of intervening abroad in a bid to shore up security at home, the distribution of power among states is especially salient.⁹¹ A power disadvantage may invite cross-border intervention by reducing the risk that the intervening states will face damaging

⁸⁹ “Tea and Talk on the Edge of War,” *The Economist*, 8 November 2001.

⁹⁰ A critique often leveled against the application of international relations theory to the Global South claims that traditional national security concerns and policies are weak or absent in the South as elites prioritize their own survival relative to the security of the state.

⁹¹ Mohammed Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society: Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 3 (1999): 251.

retaliation. Likewise, a power advantage may serve as a deterrent; Christopher Clapham writes that much of the counter-insurgency strategy of apartheid-South Africa and the former Rhodesia centered on raising likely punitive costs to a level that would compel their neighbors to deny territorial bases to threatening insurgents.⁹² In addition, a region's most powerful members are uniquely positioned to manage regional conflicts in ways that benefit themselves.⁹³ This perk is particularly valuable given the outsized impact of the external environment on domestic security.

Evidence of the importance of relative power to political elites in sub-Saharan Africa can be found in the interstate jostling that takes place within regional organizations. Contrary to arguments that claim states in sub-Saharan Africa do not aspire to regional domination and seldom compete with one another,⁹⁴ the success or failure of regional organizations often hinges on whether its member-states can work through concerns associated with relative power. The inability of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya to establish a mutually-agreeable hierarchy contributed to the destruction of the East African Community in the 1970s.⁹⁵ And although the West African region has integrated to an extent not seen elsewhere on the continent, preoccupation with relative power abounds. Characteristic of the region is a Nigerian state that endeavors to be seen as an indispensable leader, and a countervailing group of francophone states that may benefit from the resources provided by Nigeria, but are at best apprehensive, and at most

⁹² Christopher S. Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 216.

⁹³ Francis M. Deng et al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 133.

⁹⁴ See John F. Clark, "Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa's International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," in *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, eds. Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 92.

⁹⁵ Francis M. Deng et al., 158.

fearful of its hegemonic aspirations.⁹⁶ Indeed, the ECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention in Liberia's civil war – largely funded and led by Nigeria – was opposed by Ivory Coast in part to deliver a setback to Nigeria.⁹⁷

The objectives of this section have been to make clear the importance of power, demonstrate that power is only meaningful when thought of in relative terms, and flesh out the conditions under which states are likely to fear and respond to one another's power. In doing so, I have accepted Stephen Walt's argument that states do not instinctively fear power, but threats. In other words, the prioritization of relative power is dependent upon the nature of the relationship between states and the confidence those states have that their security vulnerabilities will not be exploited. For example: domestic stability, an absence of cross-border activity that threatens the security of regimes, and trust generated by a long history of interaction and integration has minimized the importance of relative power among states in the Global North. Yet the reality of a completely different internal and external environment in sub-Saharan Africa has made a distinction there between power and threat largely meaningless. The nature of the continent's internal and external security climates – and one feeds the other – compels paranoid political elites to adopt the hardline realist position that all power must be feared, as every state (with reach capability) is an immediate or potential threat.

⁹⁶ Adekeye Adebajo, "Pax West Africana? Regional Security Mechanisms," in *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, eds. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 291-296.

⁹⁷ Clement A. Adibe, "Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Anglophone West Africa," in *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, eds. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, and Terrence Lyons (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 25.

2.3d The Hypothesized Impact of Relative Power on State-Building

In arguing that the political elite of sub-Saharan Africa have good reason to fear the power of their neighbors, I have spoken to the deeply insecure internal and external environments in which states in sub-Saharan Africa exist, and discussed how the power of one's neighbors might be used to threaten regime security. Having done so, I am now in a position to lay out the specific hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 3. Hypotheses that speculate on the relationship between relative power and state-building can be grouped into two very general categories: those that suggest political elites will feel threatened by the power of their neighbors and respond in ways that facilitate state-building, and those that suggest political elites will feel threatened by the power of their neighbors and respond in ways that are detrimental to state-building.

Threatened Facilitators: A threatened facilitator considers the power of his neighbors to be a security threat – that is, a threat to the regime if not to the state – and responds with behavior that facilitates state-building. As laid out above, threats commonly emerge from activity that originates in neighboring states, spills over borders, and impacts structure in recipient states in ways that threaten the security of the regimes in charge of those states. The objective of the threatened facilitator is to reduce the threat posed by powerful neighbors by increasing regime legitimacy at home. In doing so, a leader aims to make the structure of his state less of a threat by bringing as broad a segment of society as possible under regime control and minimizing the pool of disenfranchised and disgruntled individuals that could otherwise be employed by neighboring states to destabilize the regime. To do so a leader might commit to, among other things, the provision of positive political goods to the population, the adoption of

policies that aim to unify disparate populations, and the prioritization of good governance. All, in theory, should build domestic support and increase regime legitimacy while reducing the viability of external interference and minimizing the damage that can be done to the regime. Thus:

- *H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-building progression will increase as states lose power relative to neighbors.*

Threatened Impeders: Like the threatened facilitator, the threatened impeder is fearful of the power of his neighbors but responds with policies that ultimately retard rather than facilitate state-building. Aware that structure may be used by powerful neighbors to destabilize the regime, the threatened impeder opts to shore up regime security by neutralizing structure. Yet his attempts to do so rely not on building legitimacy through the institutionalization of politics, the broad provision of positive political goods or the promise of good governance, but on personal politics and the selective cooptation of opponents. While this strategy may shore up regime security in the near-term, it will not fundamentally transform structure and runs counter to the imperatives of state-building. Thus:

- *H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-building progression will decrease as states lose power relative to neighbors.*

The initial sections of Chapter 2 discussed at length the nature of the agency-structure relationship in sub-Saharan Africa and concluded that political elites, driven by the goal of regime survival, opt for patrimonial rather than institutional rule in the face of threatening structural environments. It therefore stands to reason that political elites will, to the detriment of state-building, double down on personal rule when an already-threatening structural environment is made more dangerous by the presence of powerful neighbors. With the survival of regimes in immediate jeopardy but the longevity of states guaranteed, political elites simply will not prioritize the development-friendly, legitimacy-building strategies that are costly in the near-term and take time to bear fruit. Instead, in the face of threats, allegiance to the near-term safety and expediency of personal politics is far more likely. While the notion that a threatening international environment retards rather than facilitates state-building runs counter to the theories of Charles Tilly and those who have since tried to make variations of Tilly work in the Global South, it does reflect the reality of politics in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore I expect to find no evidence of support for H1 but do expect to find H2 substantiated.

By way of extension, I suspect that preponderant states will show a greater tendency toward state-building. Given that a power disadvantage is believed to further threaten political elites and provoke a doubling-down on the state-building-adverse strategy of personal rule, it reasons that preponderance will reduce the threat posed by neighbors to political elites and therefore the perceived need to rely more strongly on personal rule. This is of course not to say that a favorable power distribution will be sufficient to compel political elites to abandon personal rule altogether. Regime insecurity brought on by a difficult structural environment will persevere whether or not

states are more powerful than their neighbors. What I argue is that preponderance will make structure *less* threatening and a more pronounced move toward personal rule less urgent. Therefore:

- *H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors. Worded differently, state-building progression will increase in states as they gain power relative to their neighbors.*

2.4 Summary and Conclusion

Chapter 2 set out to make the case that relative power plays a central role in the state-building process underway in today's Global South. To this end I first laid out how the symbiotic relationship between agency and structure has impacted the state-building process, both historically and today. In doing so I briefly reviewed the work of Charles Tilly in which an external shock – a Hobbesian international environment – is suggested to have shaped the agency-structure dynamic in a way that promoted state-building in early-modern Europe. I then assessed the relevance of Tilly to today's Global South in light of a fundamentally different international environment. Lacking the threat of state-annihilating interstate war, the relationship between agency and structure in today's Global South has developed very differently than it did in early-modern Europe, with significant implications for state-building. Next I turned to the agency-structure dynamic as it exists in today's Global South and laid out what I believe to be the impact of structure on agency, and vice-versa. To sum it up, structure contributes mightily to the crises of legitimacy and insecurity confronted by Africa's political elite. Agency in turn, responding to a threatening structural environment, opts for a method of governance –

personal rule – that serves its needs in the near-term, but impacts structure in ways that make it more threatening over the long-term. I then proposed that a mediator – relative power – can be expected to meaningfully influence the agency-structure dynamic and thus when and where state-building will progress, stagnate, or decline. Chapter 2 concluded with an examination of two assumptions key to my theory – that states in sub-Saharan Africa both fear their neighbors and take seriously relative power – and then laid out three hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 3. It is to the testing of these hypotheses and the methodology employed that this dissertation now turns.

CHAPTER 3

3.0 Introduction: Testing the Link Between Relative Power and State-Building

The objective of the first two chapters of this dissertation has been to lay the groundwork necessary to carry out the task of Chapter 3: to test the relationship between relative power and state-building and thereby shed light on the question of why state-building progresses in some states, but stagnates or declines in others. In doing so I first defined precisely what is meant by “state-building” and sought to provide some cohesion to a question that has produced an unwieldy array of answers. I then assessed both the internal workings of states in sub-Saharan Africa as well as the nature of the external environment in which Africa’s states exist. On the basis of these assessments, I hypothesized that state-building performance is influenced by the relative distribution of power among states. More specifically, that states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors will prove to be less prolific state-builders than states at a power advantage.

In fact, tests of my hypotheses produced a mixed bag of results. Results were consistently in line with expectations when state-building was measured in terms of the promotion of human development, yet somewhat contradictory when measured in terms of the regulation of social/economic life, and the provision of infrastructure. And no statistically significant relationship of any kind between the relative distribution of power and state-building progression was found when state-building was measured in terms of the monopolization of force/provision of security, or the shaping of a national identity. Independent variables included in my models did tend to explain a good deal of variance in the dependent variable. When state-building was measured in terms of how well the

state promotes human development, the total variance in state-building explained by the models ranged from 12 to 25 percent, depending on how power was calculated and whether or not hegemons were included or excluded. When state-building was measured in terms of the provision of infrastructure, the range was 35 to 42 percent, and when state-building was associated with the regulation of social and economic life, the amount of variance accounted for ranged from 20 to 25 percent.

That said, Chapter 3 will proceed as follows: first I will present my dependent, independent, and control variables and lay out how they will be operationalized and coded. Next I will discuss the methodology employed to test my hypotheses. And finally I will present in detail the results of the tests and discuss their implications.

3.1 The Research Design

In examining the impact that the distribution of power in one's neighborhood has on state-building, I will look at the entirety of sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of its island states (Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles, and Cape Verde) as these states have no contiguous neighbors. I will also exclude the north-African states of Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. These states identify politically more with the Middle East than with Africa, are significantly wealthier, have different colonial histories, and confront agency-structure realities that diverge from those common to states south of the Sahara desert. And, finally, I exclude Somalia. Because my argument assumes an integral role for central government in the state-building process and Somalia has been altogether-without for over two decades, its inclusion in this project would be inappropriate. That leaves a total of 41 states to be included in my project. My analysis will begin with data from the first year that two contiguous states are both independent

(therefore the inclusion of the Chad-Sudan relationship would first occur in 1960) and end with data from 2007. The year 2007 was selected as an end-point because it is the final year for which data on the independent variable – relative power – is available.

The decision to define region (or neighborhood) narrowly – as dyads of states that share a border, rather than as the group of states that make up West, Central, South, or East Africa, or even all of sub-Saharan Africa – was made given the very limited reach of most African states. The reality is that most African states lack the capacity to project force much beyond their immediate borders. Moreover, most non-state threats to regimes travel most easily across immediate borders. It therefore does not make sense to assume that states that cannot conceivably reach one another threaten one another.¹

Consequently, for the purposes of this dissertation, neighborhood is best limited to contiguous states.

I have opted to aggregate all annual time-series data into five-year observations. In the handful of instances where data is unavailable for all five years of an observation, I take the mean when data exists for three or more years, and drop observations where it exists for less than three years. While the aggregation of data must be carefully considered as it risks masking meaningful variation within the aggregated span of time, in this case the benefits far outweigh the risks. First, change occurs very slowly, both in the distribution of power among neighbors (the independent variable) and also in my five measures of state-building (the dependent variable). The aggregation of annual data into observations of five years better captures meaningful *trends* and reduces the risk that an observation is skewed by a one-time statistical inaccuracy or anomaly. Moreover, it takes

¹ In fact there are even instances where two contiguous states may be unable to “reach” each other’s capitals. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the two states are unable to threaten each other.

time for political elites to sense a shift in the relative distribution of power, act on the shift, and for that action to manifest in state-building advancement or retardation.

Looking, for example, for an impact on state-building in Liberia in 1995 based on a shift in the relative distribution of power during the same year assumes first that political elites both sense and react to *annual* shifts, and second that reactions yield immediate results.

Neither scenario is probable. Instead, elites are likely to perceive and respond to a *trend* in the distribution of power over more than a single year, and it is sure to take some time before their corresponding actions impact state-building progression. Therefore, I aggregate data into five-year observations and then lag the independent variable to allow it an opportunity to demonstrate (or not) an impact on the dependent variable. For example, the distribution of power among Liberia and its neighbors in the period 1990 – 1994 is predicted to impact my five measures of state-building in Liberia in the period 1995 – 1999.

3.1a The Dependent Variable

Opting for a minimalist definition – that is, one centered on the most essential tasks that states must carry out to avoid failure or collapse – I have defined state-building as the process by which states monopolize force and provide security; regulate social and economic life; provide infrastructure services; promote human development; and shape national identity. As noted in Chapter 1, my approach deviates methodologically from others common in the literature in that I define state-building quite broadly – compared, for example, to those who define and measure state-building in terms of only one

variable.² Conversely, there are of course much broader definitions and many other components of state-building that might have been included. My decision to focus on only the five components is not to say that they are the only components that matter; yet, in choosing the five components, I have attempted to provide a definition of state-building that has a logic to it, is broad enough to capture the general state of the state, but is not so broad and inclusive that it renders “state-building” nearly meaningless. Relative to more narrow definitions, my approach makes it significantly more difficult to neatly measure state-building and classify states as either strong or weak, as state strength is likely to vary depending on the particular component being measured. It does, however, provide a more nuanced and honest picture of state-building and thus makes the trade-off worthwhile.

The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security: There is perhaps no better sign that a state has lost its monopoly on the legitimate use of force and is unable to provide security to its population than the presence of large-scale political violence. Not only does the existence of internal violence demonstrate quite clearly that the state is not entirely in control of its territory, but it poses a threat to the security of its population on a magnitude unlike anything else. To measure the degree to which a state monopolizes the legitimate use of force and provides security to its population, I will draw on the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset produced by the Center for Systemic Peace.³ The MEPV dataset provides annual time-series data on all major episodes of internal political violence for every country in sub-Saharan Africa

² It has been common to define state-building in terms of the extent to which the state has penetrated society, measured exclusively by tax-ratio. As argued in Chapter 1, state capacity to penetrate society says nothing about what is actually done with the capacity. My operationalization of state-building should prove more useful as it is ends-oriented rather than means-oriented.

³ The dataset can be accessed at: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>

beginning with the year of independence. To merit inclusion in the dataset, an episode must be characterized by the sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups resulting in at least 500 directly-related deaths. Given that the magnitudes of all episodes of internal political violence are of course not equal, episodes in the MEPV dataset are coded on an 11-point ratio scale (0-10, with a score of 0 indicating no MEPV and 10 the most severe MEPV) on the basis of how thoroughly the normal networking and functioning of society was disrupted. Factored into this calculation are the extent of fatalities, population dislocations, resource depletion, and the psychological trauma incurred by populations. I have opted to take the 11-point scale generated by the Center for Systemic Peace and dichotomize it. For every five-year period during which a state averages an MEPV score greater than 1.5, I assign a score of 0 indicating the absence of a monopoly on the legitimate use of the force and the inability to provide security to the population. For every five-year period that a state averages an MEPV score between 0 and 1.5, I assign a score of 1 to indicate the presence of security and the monopolization of the legitimate use of force. I choose an MEPV score of 1.5 as the cutoff given that a move from category 1 to category 2 on the MEPV scale represents an escalation of the breadth and duration of violence from small-scale and sporadic to larger-scale and entrenched.⁴

⁴ Another option is to use the more ordinal data rather than create a dichotomous variable. I opted against this possibility because I was not satisfied that the scale was truly ordinal – at least not insofar as what I was trying to measure. While the scale does initially move from no violence (0) to sporadic violence (1) to more frequent violence (2), it is quite clear that after a score of 2, the state has lost all capacity to routinely provide security to its population and monopolize the legitimate use of force. Categories 2-10 assume that the state has lost this capacity, and instead capture only how *much* and what type of violence the population has endured. I am less interested in this for the purpose of my dissertation. By way of example, the MEPV dataset codes Somalia a 5 on its scale of 1-10. Clearly the government of Somalia since 1991 has at times controlled no more than a few city blocks and lost complete capacity to provide security and monopolize force (which is what I wish to measure), yet because the country has not endured inordinate violence, it received a code of 5 rather than a code closer to 10. To use the more ordinal data in my dissertation would

The Regulation of Social and Economic Life: I draw on the “regulatory quality” variable from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset to measure how well states regulate social and economic life within their borders.⁵ Specifically, the variable captures how effectively states adopt and implement policies that ultimately promote private sector development. The WGI dataset provides annual time-series data and is the most sophisticated and thorough source available; regrettably, however, the first year for which it provides data is 1996. The fact is that time-series data on governance and regulation is very scarce until the mid-1990s. Transparency International, for example, did not initiate its Corruption Perception Index until 1995 and, although Economic Freedom of the World has time-series data for various economic indicators dating back to 1970, it also provides no data on economic regulation or quality of governance until 1995. Yet, given the importance of this component of state-building, I believe it makes more sense to include it in the project despite the total of just 114 five-year observations than it does to ignore it altogether.

The Provision of Infrastructure: Measuring the provision and quality of infrastructure over time in sub-Saharan Africa poses a challenge as comprehensive time-series data going back more than a few years and covering a wide array of infrastructure stocks is scarce. Data on the existence and quality of roads, for example, is available only intermittently beginning in 1990 and availability varies widely by country. Similarly, although data on various measures of energy production dates back to the early 1970s, availability is limited to just half the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. And where data is both comprehensive in its coverage and longitudinally-sufficient, it often does not

paint a misleading picture of what it is that I am actually trying to measure (not the extent of violence, but the *government's capacity* to prevent it).

⁵ The dataset is available at : <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>

capture what this dissertation requires. For example, consider data on the percentage of people who have access to a sanitary means of human waste disposal. The World Bank provides time-series data for every country in sub-Saharan Africa dating back to 1990. While ostensibly a very good measure of infrastructure breadth and performance, the reality of sanitation throughout sub-Saharan Africa is that it is a *household* issue largely ignored by government. Less than half of Africa's largest cities have waterborne sewer systems, and more than half of the continent's countries reported no spending on sanitation at all.⁶ Therefore, what is ostensibly solid data on the provision of infrastructure actually captures *individual* or household means and initiative rather than government performance, as governments across the continent have shunned responsibility for developing sanitation infrastructure.

Yet despite the obstacles laid out above, good data does exist for a handful of types of infrastructure and thus makes possible a general assessment of state performance. In measuring state performance, I draw on data that captures the number of fixed telephone lines per 1,000 people, as well as the percentage of a state's population that has access to clean water. Both types of infrastructure are essential to people's lives, and both are characterized by heavy state involvement. The availability and comprehensiveness of data is also good. Annual time-series data on fixed telephone lines, provided by The World Bank, is available for every country in sub-Saharan Africa from 1975 through 2007. Data on access to a source of clean water is less thorough but still adequate; The World Bank provides data for every country in sub-Saharan Africa every five years,

⁶ *Africa's Infrastructure*, eds. Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2010), 333.

beginning in 1990 and ending in 2007.⁷ To combine data on fixed telephone lines and access to clean water into a single measure of infrastructure provision, I first standardize both variables (to prevent fixed line numbers which can be quite large from overwhelming numbers on access to clean water which can be no greater than 100) and then take the sum of the standardized fixed-line and water z-scores for each year. As with all other variables, annual data is then aggregated into five-year observations.

The Promotion of Human Development: How well the state promotes the human development of its population will be measured by GDP per capita (held constant at year 2000 levels) and life expectancy at birth. Annual time-series data for each variable, taken from the World Development Indicators dataset, is available for every country in sub-Saharan Africa. Data is generally available from independence through 2007 but in a handful of cases GDP per capita data does not become available until the mid-1980s. Even so, in these few cases, there are nearly 25 years for which data on life expectancy and GDP are both available. My measure of human development closely mirrors the United Nations' well-known Human Development Index (HDI) but I opt not to use it and exclude variables that capture educational attainment.⁸ My reason has to do with data availability; education accounts for one-third of the HDI yet data on education does not consistently become available in sub-Saharan Africa until between 2000 and 2005. Consequently, over 25 percent of states in sub-Saharan Africa have no HDI score until the year 2000 or 2005. While the need to exclude education attainment from my

⁷ Data on both fixed telephone lines and access to an improved source of water come from The World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>

⁸ The HDI measures human development in terms of health, standard of living, and knowledge. Health is captured by life expectancy; standard of living is captured by GNP per capita; and knowledge is measured by mean years of schooling attained by adults.

measurement is not ideal, it is likely indirectly captured by GDP per capita. Therefore, taken together, life expectancy at birth and GDP per capita should serve as an accurate proxy for how well the state promotes human development. To generate a single measure of how well the state promotes the human development of its population, I take the sum of each state's annual standardized z-score for GDP per capita and life expectancy and aggregate it over a five-year period.

The Shaping of a National Identity: Anchoring the list of state-building components is the shaping of a national identity. Of the five components of state-building, national identity – or, the extent to which a convergence between nations and state is forged – is the most difficult to measure. The source of the difficulty is that nationalism is a sentiment; whereas the provision of infrastructure can easily be measured by looking at tangibles such as the number of working telephone lines or the percentage of a population with access to a clean source of water, the same cannot be said for the degree to which a population identifies with sub-state groups vis-à-vis the state. Recognizing the sub-optimality of using a proxy to measure nationalism, *Afrobarometer* initiated a first-of-its-kind series of public opinion surveys in which, among other questions, Africans were asked how closely they feel to their ethnic groups relative to their states.⁹ While a great first step toward measuring nationalism by going directly to its source, the *Afrobarometer* data has its shortcomings. First, it provides data for just 18 of 42 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 18 countries for which data is available, in no case does it precede the year 1999 and in most cases does not become available until the mid-2000s. Moreover, simply asking people how closely they feel to their ethnic groups relative to their states can produce misleading results as responses may be influenced by

⁹ See <http://www.afrobarometer.org/>

what is taking place when the question is asked. For example, respondents in sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to identify with their ethnic groups when a national election is near.¹⁰ Therefore, given the shortcomings of data acquired through the administration of public opinion surveys to date, I must rely on a proxy to capture how closely nations and the state converge. In doing so I have drawn heavily on data from the Polity IV project, particularly its assessment of the regulation and competitiveness of political participation within states.

The characteristics of political participation within states, as measured by Polity IV, are a very good indicator of how closely nations and states converge. By assessing how members of a population organize and conduct themselves in the course of competing for state power or attempting to influence public policy, much can be revealed about *how* people self-identify, and where the greatest value in identification and association is believed to lie – that is, with one’s sub-state group or the broader population of the state. Unlike traditional measures of nation and state convergence such as the ELF index which captures only how diverse a state is but says nothing about how nations actually relate to one another and to the state, data that speaks to the nature of political competition is solidly centered on *results*. The Polity IV project measures the condition of political competition annually, from independence through 2007, in every state on a scale that ranges from suppressed (only very minimal political activity is permitted outside the regime) to institutionalized electoral (stable and inclusive political groups compete for political influence in an open electoral system free of coercion). Between these two extremes are categories of political competition that range from

¹⁰ Ben Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner, *Political Sources of Ethnic Identification in Africa* (December 2007) Afrobarometer Working Paper 89. Available at www.afrobarometer.org

intense factionalism and faction-based restrictions (characterized by zero-sum politics and political activity that is ordered around exclusionary parochial or ethnic-based groups that have incompatible interests) to far more inclusive environments in which remnants of parochial or ethnic factionalism still exist, but politics is not perceived to be zero-sum and political organizations are largely big-tent.¹¹

For the purpose of my dissertation I have used Polity IV data to assign every country an annual score of either 1 (adequate convergence between nations and the state) or 0 (absence of adequate convergence between nations and the state). The Polity data was, in places, sufficient to assign a code of either 1 or 0; for example, annual observations coded by Polity as factional/restricted, factional/competition, electoral transition: persistent conflict/coercion, and institutionalized electoral received codes of 0, 0, 1, and 1 respectively. Coding became more difficult where political competition was suppressed or restricted (and coded as such by Polity IV) as the absence of political competition logically prevented an assessment of how it was carried out. This was quite common in sub-Saharan Africa from the years surrounding independence until the early 1990s when the continent underwent a wave of political liberalization. In such cases where an assessment of nation and state convergence was not possible by looking at the Polity IV data, I relied on country histories, evidence of ethnic conflict, evidence of political and economic discrimination, and instances of protests and rebellions to determine whether to assign a score of 0 or 1. I was able to confidently do so every year,

¹¹ The Polity IV coding scale is as follows: 1) Suppressed; 2) Restricted; 3) Imposed Transition: Loosening or Tightening Restrictions; 4) Uninstitutionalized; 5) Gradual Transition from Uninstitutionalized; 6) Factional/Restricted; 7) Factional/Competition; 8) Electoral Transition: Persistent Conflict/Coercion; 9) Electoral Transition: Limited Conflict/Coercion; 10) Institutionalized Electoral. For a detailed description of each, see the Polity IV codebook, pages 71-86, available at: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>

from independence through 2007, for all but seven states. Of these seven states, data necessary to make an assessment of nation and state convergence becomes available in the 1970s, 1980s, or very early 1990s. This allows, at *minimum*, 20 annual observations for every country on the continent. As is the case with every other variable, I have aggregated annual data into five-year observations. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this proved to be no problem. In a select handful of cases, however, a five-year period contained years during which a state received a score of 1, and years during which that state received a score of 0. To reconcile the discrepancy I assigned a five-year period a score of “1” if it was composed of three or more annual observations receiving scores of “1.” The same applies to the assignment of scores of “0.”

3.1b The Independent Variable

The relative distribution of power among contiguous states is expected to influence when and where state-building advances, stagnates, or declines. To capture how power is distributed I draw separately on three measures: the Composite Index of National Capability data (CINC) produced by The Correlates of War project; GDP per capita, and GNP per capita. These measures are the overwhelming choices of those who study (and measure) national power, yet none are entirely without problems. CINC data is by far the most comprehensive, factoring into its calculation of national power a country’s total population, urban population, military size, military expenditure, energy consumption, and iron and steel production.¹² Yet reliance on CINC data, at least given the research design of this dissertation, may be problematic for two reasons: first, despite what is ostensibly a very comprehensive measure of national power, CINC scores are likely to be

¹² To calculate a CINC score, a state’s percentage of the world’s total power in each of the six components is calculated. Then, those six percentages are summed and divided by six.

driven by just one of their components – population size. And second, due to the makeup of CINC data, there appears to be a sub-optimal amount of variance in states' relative power positions. In other words, a state that is determined by CINC data to be relatively weak in 1960 is likely to remain relatively weak in every year that follows. Given the potential drawbacks of CINC data, I also opt to run analyses of the impact of the distribution of power on state-building using GDP and GNP in lieu of CINC. While not as comprehensive as CINC, the calculation of relative power based on GDP and GNP does avoid the pitfalls associated with a reliance on CINC scores. It should also be noted that GDP, GNP, and CINC are highly correlated.

In every case, whether the independent variable is calculated using CINC, GDP, or GNP, a state's relative power position is calculated by dividing its own power score by the sum of its power score and its neighbors' power score. This generates a number between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating complete relative weakness, and 1 indicating complete dyadic preponderance.¹³

CINC scores are available for all 42 states in sub-Saharan Africa, every year, from independence through 2007. GDP and GNP scores are also available for every state in sub-Saharan Africa, but in places do not become available until sometime after independence. Because change in capabilities occurs slowly and states are not likely to adjust policy on the basis of yearly fluctuations (not least in part because one year is hardly enough time to *perceive* a change in capabilities), I have opted to measure relative power in five-year increments. This simply requires calculating the average capabilities score of each state in a contiguous dyad over a five-year period. Additionally, in

¹³ Results did not fundamentally change when tests were replicated using a dummy-coded independent variable with power parity set at a ratio of 70 percent or greater.

calculating how a state measures up to its neighbors, I aggregate relative power data for all contiguous states and generate what amounts to a neighborhood score. It simply makes little sense to assess the power distribution of contiguous dyads in isolation from one another. For example, Uganda has five contiguous neighbors: The Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Tanzania. In the year 2007, using CINC data, Uganda was preponderant relative to Rwanda, approaching parity relative to Kenya and Tanzania, and significantly weaker relative to the DRC and Sudan. While relative strength vis-à-vis Rwanda should enhance the degree to which Uganda perceives itself as secure, weakness relative to the DRC and Sudan can be expected to have the opposite effect. Given that all neighbors matter, a dyadic breakdown of the distribution of power makes it impossible to conclude anything more than “Uganda is stronger than some of its neighbors and weaker than others.” A much more enriching approach that sheds greater light on Uganda’s overall relative power position aggregates data on each of its neighbors and generates an overall neighborhood score. To ensure that the methodology discussed in this paragraph is clear, I provide the following table to demonstrate how Uganda’s relative power position was calculated (in this case, using CINC data) for the five-year period ending in 2007:

Year	State_1	State_2	CINC_1	CINC_2		Year	State_1	State_2	CINC_1	CINC_2
2003	UGA	DRC	0.0013608	0.0035385		2006	UGA	DRC	0.0012962	0.0042208
2003	UGA	KEN	0.0013608	0.0015017		2006	UGA	KEN	0.0012962	0.0017243
2003	UGA	TAZ	0.0013608	0.0017803		2006	UGA	TAZ	0.0012962	0.0019128
2003	UGA	RWA	0.0013608	0.0007061		2006	UGA	RWA	0.0012962	0.0007268
2003	UGA	SUD	0.0013608	0.0024405		2006	UGA	SUD	0.0012962	0.0025986
2004	UGA	DRC	0.0013214	0.003556		2007	UGA	DRC	0.0013199	0.0041745
2004	UGA	KEN	0.0013214	0.0015931		2007	UGA	KEN	0.0013199	0.001777
2004	UGA	TAZ	0.0013214	0.001843		2007	UGA	TAZ	0.0013199	0.0019317
2004	UGA	RWA	0.0013214	0.0007141		2007	UGA	RWA	0.0013199	0.0005813
2004	UGA	SUD	0.0013214	0.002527		2007	UGA	SUD	0.0013199	0.0030763
2005	UGA	DRC	0.0012872	0.0034654						
2005	UGA	KEN	0.0012872	0.0016711		Average CINC_1	Average CINC_2	Power Score		
2005	UGA	TAZ	0.0012872	0.0018837		0.0013171	0.0021337	0.3816827		
2005	UGA	RWA	0.0012872	0.0007248						
2005	UGA	SUD	0.0012872	0.0026724						

Uganda's relative power score of .3816827 indicates that it is relatively weaker than its neighbors over the five-year period 2003 – 2007.

One concern that needs to be addressed is the potentially obfuscating impact of sub-Saharan Africa's regional hegemons. Given the outsized power of just a handful of states, a contiguous state can find itself preponderant relative to every neighbor but the regional hegemon, yet still receive a relative power score that indicates relative weakness. This occurs because the national capabilities of the hegemon are so disproportionately large that its CINC, GDP, or GNP score overwhelms and masks all but its own relationship with the state in question. By way of example, consider the power distribution between Cameroon and its neighbors from 1990 – 1994 according to CINC data. The first table includes Nigeria, a regional hegemon and contiguous neighbor to Cameroon, while the second does not:

Year	State_1	State_2	CINC_1	CINC__2		Year	State_1	State_2	CINC_1	CINC__2
1990	CAO	EQG	0.00079	0.000038		1993	CAO	EQG	0.000773	0.000041
1990	CAO	NIG	0.00079	0.006165		1993	CAO	NIG	0.000773	0.00653
1990	CAO	GAB	0.00079	0.000185		1993	CAO	GAB	0.000773	0.000184
1990	CAO	CEN	0.00079	0.000202		1993	CAO	CEN	0.000773	0.00021
1990	CAO	CHA	0.00079	0.000598		1993	CAO	CHA	0.000773	0.000533
1990	CAO	CON	0.00079	0.000311		1993	CAO	CON	0.000773	0.000391
1991	CAO	EQG	0.000811	0.00004		1994	CAO	EQG	0.000776	0.000035
1991	CAO	NIG	0.000811	0.006433		1994	CAO	NIG	0.000776	0.006948
1991	CAO	GAB	0.000811	0.000194		1994	CAO	GAB	0.000776	0.000166
1991	CAO	CEN	0.000811	0.000246		1994	CAO	CEN	0.000776	0.00021
1991	CAO	CHA	0.000811	0.000634		1994	CAO	CHA	0.000776	0.000605
1991	CAO	CON	0.000811	0.000372		1994	CAO	CON	0.000776	0.000336
1992	CAO	EQG	0.000769	0.000041						
1992	CAO	NIG	0.000769	0.006495		Average	Average	Power		
1992	CAO	GAB	0.000769	0.000179		CINC_1	CINC_2	Score		
1992	CAO	CEN	0.000769	0.000214		0.0007838	0.0013157	0.373327		
1992	CAO	CHA	0.000769	0.000582						
1992	CAO	CON	0.000769	0.000353						

Year	State_1	State_2	CINC_1	CINC_2		Year	State_1	State_2	CINC_1	CINC_2
1990	CAO	EQG	0.00079	0.000038		1993	CAO	EQG	0.000773	0.000041
1990	CAO	GAB	0.00079	0.000185		1993	CAO	GAB	0.000773	0.000184
1990	CAO	CEN	0.00079	0.000202		1993	CAO	CEN	0.000773	0.00021
1990	CAO	CHA	0.00079	0.000598		1993	CAO	CHA	0.000773	0.000533
1990	CAO	CON	0.00079	0.000311		1993	CAO	CON	0.000773	0.000391
1991	CAO	EQG	0.000811	0.00004		1994	CAO	EQG	0.000776	0.000035
1991	CAO	GAB	0.000811	0.000194		1994	CAO	GAB	0.000776	0.000166
1991	CAO	CEN	0.000811	0.000246		1994	CAO	CEN	0.000776	0.00021
1991	CAO	CHA	0.000811	0.000634		1994	CAO	CHA	0.000776	0.000605
1991	CAO	CON	0.000811	0.000372		1994	CAO	CON	0.000776	0.000336
1992	CAO	EQG	0.000769	0.000041						
1992	CAO	GAB	0.000769	0.000179		Average	Average	Power		
1992	CAO	CEN	0.000769	0.000214		CINC_1	CINC_2	Score		
1992	CAO	CHA	0.000769	0.000582		0.0007838	0.000276	0.7395735		
1992	CAO	CON	0.000769	0.000353						

Excluding Nigeria, in no year between 1990 and 1994 did any of Cameroon's six contiguous neighbors have a larger CINC score. Put differently, Cameroon was more powerful than five of its six neighbors in each year from 1990 through 1994. Yet, due to the outsized strength of Nigeria, Cameroon appears to be relatively weak with a relative power score of 0.373. However, when Nigeria is selected out, Cameroon presents as

convincingly preponderant relative to its five remaining neighbors with a relative power score of 0.739.

Dealing with the effect of regional hegemons is complicated because they certainly do alter the security considerations of their neighbors. Yet, as illustrated above, their inclusion in relative capabilities calculations potentially provides a misleading account of the way power is truly distributed. I will therefore run two analyses – one with all regional hegemons included, and one with regional hegemons *selectively* selected out.¹⁴ In certain cases where states have few contiguous neighbors it makes no sense to select out regional hegemons. Swaziland, for example, is bordered by just Mozambique and South Africa. Given that it accounts for one-half the total number of states contiguous to Swaziland, the inclusion of South Africa can hardly be said to distort the true picture of how power is regionally distributed. In cases where states border any of the regional hegemons *and* have a total of five or more contiguous neighbors, I select out the hegemon.

3.1c The Control Variables

To get an unadulterated picture of how the distribution of power among states affects state-building, it will be necessary to control for three variables: gross domestic product,¹⁵ the population density of a state, and the state's total population. The need to control for GDP is straightforward: while a large GDP by no means guarantees that a state's wealth will be distributed fairly and productively, a state with greater financial

¹⁴ When CINC data is employed, states considered to be regional hegemons include Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa. When GDP and GNP are used to measure national power, regional hegemons include Gabon, Libya, Equatorial Guinea (beginning in 1997 when GDP and GNP spike due to the discovery of oil), Botswana, and South Africa.

¹⁵ GDP will only be controlled for when CINC data is used to measure national power; it is not appropriate to control for GDP when national power measurements are derived from GDP or GNP.

resources at its disposal will have the means to develop not enjoyed by its poorer neighbors. By holding GDP constant, the true impact of relative power on state-building will be better illuminated. For similar reasons it is necessary to control for the population density of a state (that is, the number of people per square kilometer of land area). An immensely large state with a dispersed population will find the economics of providing infrastructure throughout its territory to be particularly daunting, and will simply have a more difficult time *reaching* its population to shape national identity, provide security, regulate social and economic life, and promote human development. Finally, I control for total population. As population rises, the burden on the state to provide political goods grows to levels not experienced by states with smaller populations. By holding population constant, I eliminate from consideration the possibility that weak (or strong) state performance on my five measures of state-building is merely a consequence of the number of mouths a state has to feed. All three control variables have been logged.

3.2 The Procedure and Results

Chapter 2 concluded by laying out three hypotheses about the impact of the regional distribution of power on state-building progression. The first hypothesis adopted a “threatened facilitator” logic and predicted that the insecurity caused by an unfavorable neighborhood distribution of power would compel political elites in charge of relatively weaker states to work harder to broadly provide positive political goods and develop their states in a bid to increase their legitimacy and security. Therefore, H1 predicted that state-building progression would rise as a state’s power relative to its neighbors declined. Arguing that this is not the way politics in sub-Saharan Africa work, I doubted the likelihood of finding support for this hypothesis. The second hypothesis took the opposite

approach and predicted that political elites in charge of relatively weak states would behave like “threatened impeters” rather than facilitators and take steps to increase regime security that simultaneously undermine state-building. Therefore, H2 predicted that state-building progression would decline as a state’s power relative to its neighbors declined. In light of my understanding of the way African politics work, I accepted this hypothesis. Finally, the third hypothesis is essentially an extension of H2 and posits that state-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to neighbors than in states at relative power disadvantages. I expect to find support for H3.

Because this project takes the unusual but necessary step (see Chapter 1) of dividing the dependent variable (state-building) into five component parts, each of the five components of state-building must separately be regressed on the independent variable (the relative distribution of power). This will of course generate five sets of results. As discussed above, I have lagged the independent variable to allow it time to affect (or not) the dependent variable. Because there is no way to know precisely how long it should take for political elites in charge of states to respond to their relative power positions and for those responses to manifest themselves in state-building growth or decline, I test models with lags of both five and 10 years. For certain components of state-building (the development of infrastructure, for example, given that it is slow and labor-intensive), it makes sense to assume that progress or decay might take longer to manifest itself. Ten years should be enough time to ensure that I am not missing an effect that actually exists, but not so long that I am discovering something spurious. Yet as it turns out, in no case was a relationship for any set of variables found to be statistically significant at two lags but insignificant at one lag. In a handful of cases statistical

significance found at one lag (five years) evaporated at two lags (10 years). This indicates that a lag length of one is appropriate and results reported below are therefore generated from models with a one-period lag of the independent variable. Finally, I generate separate models that both include and exclude Africa's regional hegemons given that their outsized power can arguably paint a misleading picture of how power is truly distributed in a region.

Before the results of tests that assess the impact of relative power on state-building are presented, three conditions that may influence results must be addressed. The first deals with possible autocorrelation – often an issue in time-series data. Observations must be independent of each other, yet knowing, for example, how Uganda performed on some measure of state-building in 1976 tells a lot about how it performed on the same measure one year later. In other words, the 1977 observation may not be entirely independent of the 1976 observation. Because autocorrelated data has the potential to skew results, it is a good idea to apply a correction. I do so in the appendix of this dissertation by replicating tests while employing Prais-Winsten GLS rather than OLS. It turns out that results are similar whether possible autocorrelation is corrected for or not.

A second possibility to consider is that of finding greater state-building advancement in states that began the state-building process from less advanced positions. It may be that certain states see more robust advancement in state-building not because of their relative power positions, but because they simply have more room to advance. Take, for example, Ethiopia and Botswana between 1986 and 1990 and consider how proficiently each provided a clean source of water to their populations (one measure of the quality of infrastructure provision). In Botswana, 93 percent of the population had

access to a clean source of water during this five-year period, yet in Ethiopia the number was just 17 percent. Clearly the potential for growth in Ethiopia dwarfed that of Botswana. Therefore, the possibility that gains or losses in relative power may not entirely drive the extent to which state-building advances or declines cannot be entirely discounted. Some states are simply in a better position to grow more rapidly given their slower starts.

A final concern is the possibility that the independent variable (the relative distribution of power - calculated by CINC, GDP, and GNP) is itself a function of state-building. In other words, state-building advancement or decline results in a more or less favorable relative power position. While endogeneity is a possibility, concern might be more warranted if the independent variable were a CINC score, GDP or GNP *alone*, rather than a *ratio derived* from a CINC score, GDP or GNP. In other words, it is one thing to say that GDP or GNP increases as states monopolize force, regulate social and economic life, provide infrastructure, promote human development, and shape national identity. But it is another to say that a state's *regional share of power* increases as it makes absolute advancements in the monopolization of force, regulation of social and economic life, provision of infrastructure, promotion of human development, and shaping of a national identity. It may, but it also may not. Equally or more important is what takes place in neighboring states. State A may make state-building advances which play a role in growing its own GDP, but if neighboring states do the same at similar or greater rates, State A's relative power position will erode despite any advancements it has made. In short, while endogeneity may conceivably bias results, it is no sure thing that a state's regional power position is a direct function of its state-building robustness.

3.2a The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security

I use a linear probability model to test the relationship between the distribution of power and the monopolization of force and the provision of security.¹ The model can be written as $Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \varepsilon$ where Y is a latent variable that measures how thoroughly the state monopolizes force and provides security, and X_1 (the distribution of power) is continuous and has a possible range of 0 to 1. The results of this procedure, with and without the inclusion of Africa's regional hegemons, can be found below in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.

Table 3.1: Relative Power and the Monopolization of Force/Security (with hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	.010	.154	.947	.100	.140	.477	.205	.156	.190
Population Density	.063	.044	.158	-.006	.050	.903	.011	.053	.841
Total Population	-.238	.074	.002	-.219	.049	.000	-.216	.053	.000
GDP	.113	.068	.098	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	277	-	-	202	-	-	165	-	-

Table 3.2: Relative Power and the Monopolization of Force/Security (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	.148	.162	.359	.076	.158	.631	.146	.174	.401
Population Density	.067	.044	.135	-.001	.050	.978	.022	.053	.674
Total Population	-.299	.083	.000	-.221	.050	.000	-.222	.054	.000
GDP	.093	.068	.170	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	277	-	-	202	-	-	165	-	-

¹ Of my five components of state-building, three are measured with continuous data while data for the remaining two (the monopolization of force, and the shaping of national identity) are structured dichotomously. In the latter two cases I opt to use linear probability models rather than logistic regression for the sake of consistency. As a check, I also ran a logistic regression for each and found no change in either the direction of the coefficients or the models' statistical significance.

In no case, regardless of whether CINC, GDP, or GNP is used to calculate how power is distributed, is the relative power coefficient statistically significant. This holds true whether or not Africa's regional hegemons are included or excluded from the models. Coefficients are, however, positive as predicted by Hypotheses 2 and 3, yet large p-values indicate that there is no meaningful relationship between a neighborhood's distribution of power and how effectively its regimes monopolize the legitimate use of force and provide security to their populations.

3.2b The Regulation of Social and Economic Life

I test the relationship between the distribution of power and the regulation of social and economic life using ordinary least squares regression. The model can be written as:

$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \varepsilon$ where Y is a variable that measures how well the state regulates social and economic life, and X_1 represents the relative distribution of power. Possible values of the independent variable again range from 0 to 1, with 0 representing total relative weakness, and 1 representing total relative strength. The results of these procedures, with and without the inclusion of Africa's regional hegemons, can be found below in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.

Table 3.3: Relative Power & the Regulation of Social/Economic Life (with hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-.781	.368	.036	1.41	.263	.000	1.56	.264	.000
Population Density	.108	.102	.295	-.183	.095	.057	-.169	.093	.071
Total Population	.413	.173	.019	.067	.092	.468	.057	.090	.529
GDP	.791	.141	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	115	-	-	115	-	-	114	-	-

Table 3.4: Relative Power & the Regulation of Social/Economic Life (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-.881	.396	.028	1.52	.297	.000	1.60	.294	.000
Population Density	.080	.101	.429	-.105	.095	.274	-.085	.094	.365
Total Population	.485	.195	.014	.008	.092	.933	-.009	.090	.919
GDP	.791	.140	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	115	-	-	115	-	-	114	-	-

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 reveal a statistically significant, negative relationship between the distribution of power variable and the regulation of social and economic life when CINC scores are used to measure how power is distributed. The relationship holds whether or not the powerful influence of Africa’s hegemons is included in the models. These findings support the “threatened facilitator” logic behind Hypothesis 1, but indicate that Hypotheses 2 and 3 should be rejected. Yet an entirely different picture emerges when the distribution of power is measured by GDP or GNP rather than CINC data. When the independent variable is derived from GDP or GNP, a *positive* and strongly significant relationship is consistently found to exist between the distribution of power, and how well states regulate social and economic life. This finding was expected and lends support to the “threatened impeder” logic behind Hypotheses 2 and 3.

3.2c The Provision of Infrastructure

Consistent with what has been done above, I test the relationship between the distribution of power and the provision of infrastructure using ordinary least squares. The model structure is written as $Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \varepsilon$ where Y is a variable that measures the extent to which the state provides infrastructure services to its population, and X_1 represents the relative distribution of power. The results of this procedure, with and without the inclusion of Africa’s regional hegemons, can be found below in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.

Table 3.5: Relative Power and the Provision of Infrastructure (with hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-.606	.740	.414	5.31	.688	.000	5.59	.760	.000
Population Density	1.06	.209	.000	-.040	.251	.873	.091	.269	.737
Total Population	-.231	.358	.521	-.956	.242	.000	-1.10	.254	.000
GDP	3.63	.292	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	128	-	-	121	-	-	107	-	-

Table 3.6: Relative Power and the Provision of Infrastructure (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-1.34	.796	.096	5.48	.798	.000	5.37	.874	.000
Population Density	1.03	.206	.000	.258	.259	.321	.422	.283	.139
Total Population	.116	.402	.773	-1.17	.252	.000	-1.34	.269	.000
GDP	3.71	.288	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	128	-	-	121	-	-	107	-	-

The model in which hegemons are included and CINC scores are used to calculate the distribution of power (Table 3.5) generates a negative coefficient for the distribution of power variable. This would provide support for Hypothesis 1, but the minimum threshold of statistical significance is not met. However, when the outsized impact of Africa's hegemons is removed (Table 3.6), a statistically significant negative relationship between the relative distribution of power and the effectiveness with which states provide infrastructure to their populations emerges at the $p < .10$ level. The negative coefficient indicates that as states gain power relative to their neighbors, the extent to which they provide infrastructure services to their populations suffers. This unexpectedly indicates that Hypothesis 1 should be accepted, and calls for the rejection of Hypotheses 2 and 3.

Yet when both GDP and GNP are used in lieu of CINC data to measure the distribution of power, an entirely different relationship materializes. The coefficient on

the independent variable becomes *positive* and highly significant ($p < .001$) in every case – regardless of whether regional hegemons are included or excluded. Support is thus found for Hypotheses 2 and 3, as expected.

3.2d The Promotion of Human Development

I test the relationship between the distribution of power and the promotion of human development using ordinary least squares. Again, the model can be written as:

$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \varepsilon$ where Y is a latent variable that measures the condition of human development, and X_1 represents the relative distribution of power. The results of these procedures, with and without the inclusion of Africa's regional hegemons, can be found below in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, respectively.

Table 3.7: Relative Power and the Promotion of Human Development (with hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	2.14	.584	.000	11.39	2.01	.000	14.13	2.06	.000
Population Density	-.634	.174	.000	-1.11	.716	.122	-.985	.708	.166
Total Population	-1.29	.276	.000	-1.74	.705	.014	-2.26	.702	.002
GDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	298	-	-	223	-	-	186	-	-

Table 3.8: Relative Power and the Promotion of Human Development (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	1.63	.628	.010	10.64	2.31	.000	13.01	2.38	.000
Population Density	-.571	.179	.002	-.512	.731	.485	-.124	.729	.865
Total Population	-1.18	.315	.000	-2.20	.728	.003	-2.89	.740	.000
GDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	298	-	-	223	-	-	186	-	-

Whether CINC scores, GDP, or GNP is used to measure how power is relatively distributed, findings show a statistically significant, positive relationship between the

independent variable and how effectively the state promotes human development. That is to say that as states increase their share of power relative to neighbors, they more effectively promote the human development of their populations. Support is thus found, as expected, for Hypotheses 2 and 3, while Hypothesis 1 – oriented around the assumption of a “threatened facilitator” – can be rejected.

3.2e The Shaping of a National Identity

A linear probability model is used to assess the relationship between the distribution of power and the formation of a national identity. The model can be written as

$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \varepsilon$ where Y is a latent variable that measures whether or not convergence exists between nations and the state, and X_1 represents the relative distribution of power.

The results of this procedure, with and without the inclusion of Africa’s regional hegemons, are found below in Tables 3.9 and 3.10.

Table 3.9: Relative Power and the Shaping of a National Identity (with hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-.192	.177	.278	-.044	.168	.796	-.097	.195	.619
Population Density	.216	.052	.000	.164	.061	.008	.170	.067	.013
Total Population	-.134	.087	.125	-.263	.057	.000	-.253	.065	.000
GDP	.408	.078	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	278	-	-	217	-	-	184	-	-

Table 3.10: Relative Power and the Shaping of a National Identity (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-.245	.186	.190	-.127	.188	.500	-.225	.215	.296
Population Density	.207	.052	.000	.160	.061	.009	.162	.067	.016
Total Population	-.102	.097	.292	-.256	.058	.000	-.241	.066	.000
GDP	.413	.077	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	278	-	-	217	-	-	184	-	-

Negative coefficients on the independent variable appear to lend unexpected support to the “threatened facilitator” logic behind Hypothesis 1, yet the relationship between the distribution of power and the forging of a national identity in all cases failed to meet the threshold of statistical significance.

3.3 Assessing the Relationship Between Relative Power and State-Building

This dissertation set out to fill a void in the existing state-building literature which has to date focused extensively on the role played by the Global North in the South’s development, or on the role of the South itself – namely its missteps – in its own development. Less thoroughly studied has been the impact of region and, in particular, contiguous neighbors. In moving to fill this void, I first accepted the premise that insecurity generated by difficult structural conditions provides incentive to political elites to govern in ways that are personally expedient, but run counter to the longer-term demands of state-building. I then suggested an addition to the theory of “personal rule” by bringing the external, namely region, into play. Arguing that political elites in sub-Saharan Africa have good reason to be threatened by the activities and intentions of their neighbors, I suggested that an unfavorable distribution of power would further undermine regime security and compel political elites to turn even more sharply toward personal rule and away from a method of governance that is conducive to state-building.

Tests of my hypotheses produced results that varied by the component of state-building assessed and the measure of national power – CINC, GDP, or GNP – employed. Some components of state-building were found to be readily influenced by the regional distribution of power, while others were not. How well a state regulates social and economic life, provides infrastructure services to its population, and promotes human

development all clearly appear to be impacted by relative power, while no such case can be made for how effectively a state monopolizes force or shapes national identity.

Generally speaking, the expected relationship between the distribution of power and state-building was more likely to materialize when GDP or GNP was used to calculate national power than when CINC scores were employed. For example, when GDP and GNP were employed, support was found for the “threatened impeder” logic behind Hypotheses 2 and 3 in the case of three of five components of state-building, but just one of five components when CINC data was used. And in no case did the use of GDP or GNP to measure national power produce findings that lent support to the “threatened facilitator” assumption behind Hypothesis 1 (which I expected to be able to reject), yet for two components of state-building some support for Hypothesis 1 was found when CINC data was used to capture the distribution of power (how well the state regulates social and economic life and provides infrastructure services). That results diverged so profoundly in places depending on how relative power was measured was a bit of a surprise, yet likely owes to the overwhelming influence of total population in the CINC scores. The table below concisely captures the findings of Chapter 3. An empty cell indicates that no statistically significant relationship was found. A checkmark indicates that support was found for the relevant hypothesis. For the reader’s convenience I re-list the three hypotheses below. Again, I expected to be able to reject Hypothesis 1, and accept Hypotheses 2 and 3.

H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage.

H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage.

H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage.

Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Monopolize Force – with Hegemons									
Monopolize Force – ex Hegemons									
Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Social/Economic Life – with Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Provide Infrastructure – with Hegemons					✓	✓		✓	✓
Provide Infrastructure – ex Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Human Development – with Hegemons		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
Human Development – ex Hegemons		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
National Identity – with Hegemons									
National Identity – ex Hegemons									

Unexpectedly, no statistically significant relationship of any kind was found between the regional distribution of power and the **monopolization of force and provision of security**. It appears, therefore, that the national capabilities of a state

relative to its neighbors plays no role in how effectively the state monopolizes force and provides security to its population. Also surprising was the statistically significant *negative* relationship found between the distribution of power and the **regulation of social and economic life** when CINC data was employed, implying that relatively *weak* states perform best on this measure of state-building. Yet results were reversed when both GDP and GNP were swapped for CINC scores and strong support was found for Hypotheses 2 and 3 as expected. The same relationship was found between the distribution of power and the **provision of infrastructure** with results generated from CINC scores unexpectedly lending partial support to H1, but results falling completely into line with expectations when GDP and GNP were employed. Results were again consistently in line with expectations when the impact of relative power on the **promotion of human development** was assessed. And, finally, no statistically significant relationship of any kind between the regional distribution of power and the forging of **convergence between nations and states** was found.

The at-times contradictory results presented above make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the relationship between relative power and state-building. Looking at my five components of state-building, in just one instance does a hypothesis find support across all three measures of national power. Instead, conclusions at times depend heavily on which indicator of national power is employed. As the table above shows, support was found for Hypotheses 2-3 in the cases of three of the five components of state-building when GDP and GNP were the indicators used. In the remaining two cases – the monopolization of force/provision of security and the forging of a national identity – no relationship of any kind was found. Yet when CINC scores were substituted

in, these findings were directly contradicted in two cases – where state-building was associated with the regulation of social and economic life, and the provision of infrastructure services – as support for H1 was found.

Given the inconsistencies laid out above, the “true” impact of relative power on state-building will in places depend on the reader’s preferred method of measuring national power. I have indicated that I believe GDP and GNP are the better measures. All three measures are highly correlated. Yet, while CINC scores are made up of a handful of important components of state-strength, the population components risk overwhelming all other properties. Moreover, due to the structure of CINC scores, states are more likely to remain confined to one relative power position. In other words, variance is smallest when CINC scores are employed. Yet while GDP and GNP are arguably the most appropriate measures of national power for this project, all three have been included so the reader may decide for herself.

3.4 Summary and Conclusion

The objective of Chapter 3 was to test the relationship between relative power and state-building with the aim of shedding light on why state-building progresses in some places at some times, and stagnates or declines in other places at other times. Results provide some evidence that neighbors do at times matter and the regional distribution of power plays some role in the decision to adopt policies that either support or retard the state-building process. While an interesting finding by itself, context is lacking. Chapter 3 has shown that the regional distribution of power appears to affect progress on certain components of state-building, but it says little about any additional circumstances that cause it to matter more or less. Chapter 4 will move beyond a very general assessment of

the impact of relative power on the state-building process and explore whether the interacting effects of additional variables have any impact on this relationship.

CHAPTER 4

4.0 Introduction: Relative Power & State-Building Revisited: Does Context Matter?

In Chapter 3 I tested three hypotheses that made very general predictions about the impact of relative power on state-building. I hypothesized that the regional distribution of power influences the state-building process, but built no additional context into my models. Yet drilling down a bit further is sure to tell more of the story. One way to do so is by incorporating interaction terms into the models. Rather than assume that the relationship between an independent and dependent variable is the same in all cases – a limitation of the standard additive multiple regression model – an interactive model allows for the possibility that the impact of an independent variable on a dependent variable will change as levels of other variables change. In other words, the impact of an independent variable on a dependent variable may be *conditional* on the level of some additional moderating variable. By including an interaction term, a more thorough understanding of the circumstances under which variables relate to each other can be gained.

With this in mind, the theory-building potential of my project may be enriched by assessing whether certain moderating variables affect how *strongly* the regional distribution of power impacts the state building process. That is, when certain conditions are met (or not met), does the distribution of power increase (or decrease) the propensity of states to pursue policies that are friendly to state-building? In other words, are relative power concerns likely to be *greatest* for states at certain times and under certain

circumstances? The objective of Chapter 4 is to shed light on when and where relative power matters the most.

4.1 Uncovering the Relationship Between Context, Relative Power & State-Building

At the outset it bears saying that the objective of Chapter 4 should not be perceived to contradict or hedge against the argument made above that *all* states in sub-Saharan Africa must necessarily suspect their neighbors and take the distribution of power very seriously; it is only to assess whether or not conditions unique to certain neighborhoods and certain states affect the *degree* to which neighbors are feared, the regional distribution of power serves as a source of preoccupation to political elites, and state-building is ultimately affected. That said, I test the effect of relative power on state-building in the company of four additional types of insecurity-breeding variables: those that capture the level of conflict in each state's neighborhood; the vulnerability of each state's borders; the international norms in vogue at a given time that regulate interstate behavior, and the domestic instability in each state. Ultimately, although each was expected to influence the relationship between relative power and state-building, just two – border vulnerability and domestic instability – were consistently found to do so.

4.1a The Hypothesized Impact of Context on the Salience of Relative Power

Neighborhood Conflict

A host of problems confronted by young states – ranging from domestic insecurity and the propensity of neighbors to fan the flames, to the prevalence of interstate territorial disputes – have made sub-Saharan Africa a particularly volatile region. As spoken to at length in Chapter 2, the intentions and behavior of contiguous neighbors must necessarily

preoccupy political elites to an extent not necessary in most of the Global North. Yet, while no state in the region is sufficiently strong or internally secure to take lightly its immediate neighbors, some areas on the continent have proven less-threatening than others. For example, Sudan has been engaged in a militarized interstate dispute (stopping short of war) with at least one neighbor for a total of 24 years since it became independent. Contrast the international security situation of Sudan with that of Malawi which has had just one MID lasting a total of only one year. Consistent with the logic laid out in Chapters 2 and 3, the impact of relative power on state-building is likely to be affected by the tranquility of one's neighborhood. When threat-levels are more muted, the impetus for rulers to adopt policies that run counter to the imperatives of state-building should weaken. Conversely, states that exist in particularly threatening neighborhoods should find their regimes more inclined to opt for policies that may increase regime security in the near-term, but set back the state-building agenda. Therefore:

- *H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be more muted when there is a recent history of neighborhood conflict than when there is no recent history of neighborhood conflict.*

Border Vulnerability

A primary threat to the security of regimes in sub-Saharan Africa stems from the continent's lengthy, largely-unpatrolled international borders. With over 50,000 miles of border protected by just 345 official road crossing points,¹ borders are easily penetrated by armed state and non-state actors seeking to destabilize regimes. Yet border vulnerability is not distributed evenly across the continent; Djibouti, for example, has

¹ Levan Griffiths, "Permeable Boundaries in Africa," in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities*, eds. Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (New York: Pinter, 1996), 72.

international borders that total 305 miles while Democratic Republic of Congo must contend with a figure over 17 times as large – 5,225 miles. Because shorter borders are easier to patrol than longer borders, it reasons that regimes in charge of states with the former will feel more secure than those in charge of states with the latter. Given the damage that can be done to regimes by threats originating across borders, regimes in states with shorter borders to patrol should perceive their neighborhoods to be less threatening than regimes in states with longer borders. Therefore:

- *H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be less robust in states with longer borders than in states with shorter borders.*

International Norms

In addition to both a state's history of militarized conflict and the vulnerability of its borders, the international norms in vogue at a particular time should affect precisely how threatening the power of its neighbors is perceived to be. At center here is the pressure placed on states in sub-Saharan Africa to both respect the human rights of their populations and liberalize politically. Careful not to overstate the progress that has been made, the states of sub-Saharan Africa have, since the end of the Cold War, acquiesced somewhat to the demands of the Global North and taken steps to democratize and better-protect the human rights of their populations. While still extremely sensitive to external intervention in internal affairs, democratic and human rights norms have even found their way into the governing documents of regional organizations. In a near total break with the Organization of African Unity charter ratified in 1963, its successor organization, the African Union, cites among its objectives the protection of human rights and the

promotion of democratic principles, popular participation, and good governance. In fact, the African Union Constitutive Act makes explicit the right of the AU to intervene in member states in cases of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.² While Christopher Landsberg's claim that we are witnessing "nothing short of a major restructuring of Africa's governance ethos and intervention in defense thereof"³ is certainly overstated, the fact that sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention have become more conditional in the years since the end of the Cold War must surely alarm the continent's political elite. This is particularly true given that the issues on which the right to be left alone increasingly hinge – democratic governance and the protection of human rights – are those with which African regimes struggle most mightily. Therefore:

- *H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be more muted in the years following the Cold War than in years during which the Cold War was ongoing.*

Domestic Instability

To this point in Chapter 4 I have hypothesized that the nature of states' unique relationships with their neighbors affects the degree to which they are preoccupied with the distribution of power. The relative distribution of power should matter more to states with a recent history of militarized interstate disputes, long borders, and in the years following the end of the Cold War. Yet just as the *international* context should matter to the salience of the distribution of power, so should politics at home. As argued in Chapter 2, domestic politics are closely linked to the preoccupation of regimes with their

² The African Union Constitutive Act is available at:
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Constitutive_Act_en_0.htm

³ Christopher Landsberg, "The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism," in *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, eds. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 125.

neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa; regime insecurity brought on by a legitimacy deficit characterizes the internal reality of Africa's states, and is often made worse by the actions of neighbors. The distribution of power among states comes into play because a power disadvantage might invite cross-border meddling by neighbors who have less reason to fear damaging retaliation. Conversely, a power advantage serves as a deterrent. Given that the fear of neighbors is driven in part by the threat they pose to regime security, it reasons that the preoccupation with neighbors will decline as regime security increases. In other words, if the regime in charge of state A feels insecure because of its own domestic crisis of legitimacy, it has good reason to worry that the actions of a meddling neighbor – say, mobilizing segments of the population against the regime – will make the crisis worse, potentially resulting in its overthrow. On the other hand, if the regime in charge of State A enjoys a greater degree of domestic legitimacy and security to begin with, it should have less reason to worry that its fate may be threatened by its neighbors.⁴ Therefore:

- *H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be less robust in states with greater domestic insecurity than in states with less domestic insecurity.*

4.2 The Procedure and Results

To assess whether or not relative power affects state-building differently in the presence or absence of certain moderator variables, multiplicative interaction terms were created and hierarchical regression was performed. The initial model can be written as

⁴ Again, this is not to contradict the argument made in Chapter 2 that *all* states in sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by certain structural conditions that make for precarious regime security. It is only to say that regimes in some states are better-off than others.

$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \varepsilon$ where Y is a variable that measures state-building progression, X_1 represents the relative distribution of power, and X_2 represents the moderator variable.

The complete model, with the multiplicative interaction term included, is written as

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_1 X_2 + \varepsilon$$

F statistics were calculated to determine whether models containing interaction terms meaningfully increased the variance accounted for in the dependent variables above and beyond the models excluding interaction terms. A failure to generate statistically significant F statistics indicates that models including interaction terms are no better than those excluding interaction terms; that is, no meaningful interaction can be said to exist. On the other hand, in cases where f-tests generated statistically significant F statistics, it can be concluded that moderator variables have a meaningful impact on the relationship between relative power and state-building. The results of all f-tests can be found in the results tables below.

Procedurally, much of the methodology in Chapter 4 mirrors that of Chapter 3. Again, each state's relative power position has been calculated using CINC scores, GDP, and GNP, and results are reported for each measure. And I again generate separate models that include and exclude Africa's regional hegemons given that their outsized power may arguably paint a misleading picture of how power is truly distributed in a region.

Results tables, found below, have been produced to show the impact that each of the four moderator variables have on the relative power – state-building relationship. In every case I report coefficients for the independent variable (β_1), the moderator variable (β_2), and the interaction term (β_3), along with standard errors. Coefficients should be

interpreted as *conditional*; that is, β_1 represents the effect of a one-unit increase in X_1 (relative power) on Y (state-building progression) in the sole case where X_2 (the moderator variable) has a value of zero. And $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ should be interpreted as the effect on a one-unit increase in X_1 on Y in the sole case where X_2 has a value of one. Given that three of the four moderator variables assessed here are dichotomous – with possible values of either zero or one – interpretation generally is very easy. But in the case of border vulnerability where border length – a continuous variable – is used as a proxy, the values of zero and one are essentially meaningless; clearly in no case does the sum of a state's borders amount to zero or one mile in length. Therefore, in the case of border vulnerability, more meaningful values of X_2 will have to be plugged into the equation $\beta_1 + \beta_3(X_2)$ to gauge how an increase or decrease in border length affects the relationship between relative power and state-building.

Finally it bears saying that at first glance, making sense of the results below and drawing comprehensive conclusions may seem like a daunting task given that national power is measured three different ways, state-building is broken down into five components, and hegemons are both included and excluded. Yet the complexity is partially unavoidable but also less of an impediment than it may appear. As Chapter 1 spelled out, “state-building” simply cannot be reduced to a single, simple-to-measure proxy variable for the sake of methodological tidiness – at least as I have defined it. Doing so inevitably fails to adequately capture what is in fact a complex, multifaceted process, and renders conclusions about “state-building” spurious. Therefore, making sense of the impact of moderator variables on five separate components of state-building is a necessary burden. Also appearing to complicate the interpretation of results is the use

of three separate measures of national power. This can lead to messy conclusions such as “ X_2 has a particular effect on the relationship between X_1 and Y when X_1 is calculated using CINC scores, but no effect when GDP is used, and an altogether different effect when X_1 is generated using GNP.” Yet it is a mistake to conclude, on the basis of contradictory results, that no sense can be made of the findings; the fact is that the three measures of national power are not of equal quality and results generated by each are not intended to be compared. In Chapter 3 I laid out my concerns about the use of CINC data and expressed a preference for the use of GNP. Yet use of CINC scores, GDP, and GNP are all common enough in the literature that I have decided to run models in which each are employed and simply allow the reader to decide for herself which results to prioritize. The point is, findings are not meant to be compared across measures of national power and should certainly not be discredited when unanimity is absent.

4.2a Neighborhood Conflict

I rely on data from the Correlates of War’s Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset to classify neighborhoods as prone to conflict or prone to peace.¹ A MID is defined as a “case[s] of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state.”² The MID project is immensely useful given that threatening interstate behavior takes many forms that often stop short of war. Indeed the notion of an “African Peace” drawn from the fact that the continent has seen just four interstate wars since independence is turned on its head by the MID data;

¹ Available at: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>

² Daniel M. Jones, Stuart M. Bremer, and J. David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, no 2 (1996): 163.

between just 1993 and 2001, Africa had 63 intra-continental militarized interstate disputes.³ The MID dataset includes all 42 states in sub-Saharan Africa, is in time-series format, and begins with the year of independence and ends with an observation for 2001. I have created a dichotomous MID variable by assigning a score of 1 to states in each year during which they were engaged in a MID with a contiguous neighbor, and a score of 0 in each year during which they were not. Further, because the perception of a neighborhood threat is unlikely to entirely dissipate immediately after normal peaceful relations are restored, I have also assigned a code of 1 to the first five years following the conclusion of a MID. For example, the MID dataset shows that Zimbabwe was engaged in an MID in the year 1988 but in no years after. Yet it makes little sense to assume that all was forgotten by 1989. Instead, the Zimbabwean regime likely continued to feel threatened given what took place in 1988, not least in part because of the possibility that hostilities might be reignited. Assigning a score of 0 to the year 1989 – implying that the Zimbabwean regime had as much reason to fear its neighbors as states long at peace – would therefore be misleading. By assigning a code of 1 to years 1989 – 1993, I account for the window during which trust between Zimbabwe and its neighbors was *gradually* restored.

Tables 4.1 – 4.6, found below, present the expected effects of neighborhood conflict (with MID history serving as a proxy) on the relative power – state-building relationship. Looking at each of my five individual components of state-building separately, neighborhood conflict was found to affect the relative power – state-building relationship as follows:

³ Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart A. Bremer, “The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21, no. 2 (2004): 136.

1) The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security

In no instance was neighborhood conflict found to have a statistically significant impact on the relative power – state-building relationship when the component of state-building under assessment was the monopolization of force and provision of security. This held true regardless of how the distribution of power was calculated (using CINC scores, GDP, or GNP), or whether Africa's regional hegemons were included or excluded in models.

2) The Regulation of Social and Economic Life

Again, neighborhood conflict was in no case found to have a statistically significant impact on the relationship between relative power and state-building, this time when the component of state-building assessed was the regulation of social and economic life.

3) The Provision of Infrastructure

Once again the existence of neighborhood conflict was not found to have a statistically significant impact on the relative power – state-building relationship, regardless of how the distribution of power was calculated, or whether hegemons were included or excluded in models.

4) The Promotion of Human Development

Only in the model in which national power was measured by GNP and hegemons were included was neighborhood conflict found to mediate the relative power – state-building relationship (Table 4.5). Because the value of β_1 was larger than $\beta_1 + \beta_3$, H_1 is confirmed as expected. That is, there is evidence that as states comparatively gain power, state-building progresses more robustly when there is no history of neighborhood conflict than when there is such a history.

5) The Shaping of a National Identity

In just one case, where CINC scores were employed to calculate national power, was neighborhood conflict was found to have a statistically significant effect on the relative power – state-building relationship when state-building was measured in terms of strength of national identity (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Yet counter to expectations, the value of β_1 is in every case smaller than the value of $\beta_1 + \beta_3$, indicating that relative power gains coupled with a history of neighborhood conflict leads to *more* robust state-building progression than relative power gains coupled with neighborhood tranquility.

Table 4.1: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – CINC – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.037	.198	.000	.080	-.042	.186	.821	274
Regulate Social/Economic Life	.157	1.01	.196	.273	-1.02	.969	.298	91
Infrastructure	-.369	1.14	.342	.367	-.253	1.09	.817	127
Human Development	2.52	.779	.510	.332	-.323	.771	.675	283
National Identity	-.392	.233	-.199	.096	.417	.214	.053	259

Table 4.2: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – CINC – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.187	.200	.011	.082	-.053	.178	.765	274
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-.048	1.03	.223	.273	-.986	.961	.308	91
Infrastructure	-1.06	1.18	.376	.372	-.276	1.07	.797	127
Human Development	2.01	.802	.468	.346	-.204	.747	.785	283
National Identity	-.538	.233	-.236	.098	.464	.204	.023	259

Table 4.3: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GDP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-.123	.235	-.174	.141	.360	.298	.228	199
Regulate Social/Economic Life	1.85	.700	.156	.368	-.532	.779	.497	91
Infrastructure	4.26	1.47	-.229	.793	1.51	1.67	.366	120
Human Development	15.25	3.43	5.00	2.05	-5.94	4.31	.170	208
National Identity	-.360	.289	-.265	.175	.423	.366	.249	198

Table 4.4: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GDP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.037	.265	-.048	.166	.065	.334	.846	199
Regulate Social/Economic Life	2.15	.786	.258	.423	-.790	.877	.370	91
Infrastructure	3.91	1.74	-.578	.953	2.18	1.95	.265	120
Human Development	12.50	3.95	3.71	2.46	-2.44	4.94	.622	208
National Identity	-.596	.311	-.362	.196	.596	.395	.133	198

Table 4.5: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GNP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.062	.259	-.154	.156	.226	.331	.496	162
Regulate Social/Economic Life	1.63	.642	-.024	.360	-.056	.743	.940	90
Infrastructure	4.35	1.46	-.556	.820	1.72	1.73	.322	106
Human Development	18.71	3.55	4.99	2.12	-7.24	4.49	.109	171
National Identity	-.482	.339	-.304	.208	.530	.434	.223	165

Table 4.6: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GNP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.235	.296	.014	.183	-.153	.369	.679	162
Regulate Social/Economic Life	1.89	.719	.100	.410	-.381	.825	.645	90
Infrastructure	3.80	1.72	-.784	.988	2.13	2.00	.288	106
Human Development	15.81	4.23	3.94	2.60	-4.26	5.22	.415	171
National Identity	-.755	.371	-.387	.232	.662	.465	.156	165

4.2b Border Vulnerability

Given that the resource-strapped states of sub-Saharan Africa should have a more difficult time adequately patrolling lengthier borders than shorter borders, I assess border vulnerability by looking at border length. Data on border length comes from the Centre for the Study of Civil War and is available for each of the 42 states in sub-Saharan Africa.⁴ I aggregate the length of each state's international borders, convert data from kilometers to miles, and then take the log of border length in miles. Because border length is a continuous variable and in this case $X_2=0$ is meaningless, assessing its impact on the relative power – state-building relationship is slightly more complicated than simply looking at β_1 and $\beta_1 + \beta_3$. Instead I take low, medium, and high values of logged border length and plug them into the equation $\beta_1 + \beta_3(X_2)$ to get an intuitive sense of how an increase or decrease in border length affects the relative power – state-building relationship.

Tables 4.7 – 4.12 below lay out the extent to which border vulnerability and the regional distribution of power were found to interact and affect state-building. The interactive effect on each of my five components of state-building is as follows:

1) The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security

Only when national power was measured using CINC scores was border vulnerability found to have a statistically significant impact on the relative power – state-building relationship (Tables 4.7 and 4.8). The nature of the impact was as anticipated; a strengthening relative power position coupled with shorter borders was found to be better

⁴ See: <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Length-of-International-Boundaries/>

for state-building than a strengthening relative power position coupled with longer borders. H1 is therefore supported.

2) The Regulation of Social and Economic Life

When state-building was associated with the regulation of social and economic life, border vulnerability was found to be a statistically significant moderator variable regardless of how national power was computed. Yet, *how* exactly border vulnerability was found to impact the relative power – state-building relationship depended on which measure of national power was employed. As expected, when CINC data was employed (Tables 4.7 and 4.8), shorter borders coupled with a strengthening relative power position was found to be associated with more robust state-building than longer borders coupled with relative strengthening. Yet when GDP and GNP were used to measure national power (Tables 4.9 – 4.12), shorter borders coupled with relative strengthening was unexpectedly found to disproportionately hurt state-building progression. That is, state-building was found to advance more robustly when borders were longer rather than shorter. Therefore, H1 is supported when CINC scores are employed, but rejected when GDP and GNP are employed.

3) The Provision of Infrastructure

Once again, border vulnerability was found to impact the relative power – state-building relationship across all three measures of national power, yet exactly how it did so depended on which measure of power was employed. When power was calculated using CINC scores, state-building was found to advance more robustly when relative strengthening was coupled with shorter borders than with longer borders (See Tables 4.7 and 4.8). This finding was expected and lends support to H1. However, when GDP and

GNP were used to calculate national power, results were reversed; state-building was unexpectedly found to advance at a greater rate when borders were *longer* rather than shorter (Tables 4.9 – 4.12). Support for H1 therefore erodes when GDP and GNP are swapped for CINC scores.

4) The Promotion of Human Development

Border vulnerability was found to moderate the relationship between relative power and state-building when both GDP and GNP were used to calculate national power (Tables 4.9 – 4.11). In the case of GDP, models containing and excluding hegemons alike were statistically significant. Yet models in which GNP was used to measure national power were statistically significant only when hegemons were included; the selecting-out of regional hegemons resulted in an erosion of significance. Unexpectedly, in every case, state-building advancement was found to be more muted when relative power gains were coupled with shorter borders than longer borders. H1 is thus rejected.

5) The Shaping of a National Identity

Border vulnerability proved to be a statistically significant moderator variable when state-building progression was measured by the strength of convergence between nations and state, and GDP and GNP (but not CINC) were used to measure national power (Tables 4.9 – 4.12). Yet unexpectedly, state-building progression was shown to suffer as border length *decreased*. This finding runs counter to the prediction of H1.

Table 4.7: Interact – Border Length – CINC – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	2.50	.993	1.08	.252	-.725	.302	.017	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	6.47	2.19	1.69	.543	-2.14	.658	.002	115
Infrastructure	8.45	4.79	.921	1.18	-2.76	1.45	.059	128
Human Development	-1.48	4.22	-2.11	1.07	.994	1.27	.436	298
National Identity	-1.30	1.16	-.623	.300	.318	.352	.368	278

Table 4.8: Interact – Border Length – CINC – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	2.32	.972	1.09	.250	-.628	.294	.034	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	5.90	2.16	1.68	.539	-1.99	.647	.003	115
Infrastructure	8.06	4.65	.761	1.16	-2.86	1.40	.043	128
Human Development	1.78	4.18	-2.17	1.07	-.170	1.26	.893	298
National Identity	-1.57	1.14	-.631	.297	.390	.344	.258	278

Table 4.9: Interact – Border Length – GDP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-1.64	1.33	.598	.307	.565	.420	.180	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-5.14	2.10	.360	.553	2.14	.666	.002	115
Infrastructure	-22.28	5.57	-4.87	1.39	8.74	1.77	.000	121
Human Development	-41.50	19.65	-6.88	4.46	16.63	6.17	.008	223
National Identity	-5.44	1.56	-1.19	.354	1.69	.489	.001	217

Table 4.10: Interact – Border Length – GDP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-1.48	1.46	.593	.314	.518	.470	.272	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-6.93	2.24	.075	.556	2.82	.729	.000	115
Infrastructure	-26.99	6.17	-5.80	1.45	10.55	2.00	.000	121
Human Development	-36.32	21.89	-7.71	4.68	15.09	7.03	.033	223
National Identity	-5.78	1.68	-1.24	.360	1.81	.538	.001	217

Table 4.11: Interact – Border Length – GNP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-1.38	1.50	.319	.332	.514	.475	.281	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-4.95	2.16	.104	.550	2.12	.689	.003	114
Infrastructure	-20.56	6.09	-5.87	1.49	8.38	1.95	.000	107
Human Development	-37.96	20.34	-6.72	4.44	16.52	6.44	.011	186
National Identity	-5.77	1.86	-1.12	.405	1.79	.588	.003	184

Table 4.12: Interact – Border Length – GNP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-.517	1.61	.371	.340	.225	.523	.668	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-5.89	2.33	-.128	.569	2.49	.760	.001	114
Infrastructure	-19.79	6.99	-6.17	1.64	8.22	2.28	.000	107
Human Development	-19.69	22.73	-6.55	4.75	10.54	7.33	.152	186
National Identity	-5.36	1.97	-1.10	.413	1.65	.635	.010	184

4.2c International Norms

Tables 4.13 – 4.18 lay out the impact that one particular international norm, sovereignty/non-intervention, was found to have on the relative power – state-building relationship. As explained above, I associate the Cold War years with a period of time during which the norm of non-intervention was on a more secure footing, and the post-Cold War years with a period of relative weakening. Coding the Cold War variable was straightforward with each observation receiving a code of 1 if it fell during the Cold War, and a code of 0 if it fell after. Looking at each of my individual components of state-building separately,⁵ the relative strength and weakness of the norm of sovereignty/non-

⁵ Data assessing how well a state regulates social and economic life does not become available until after the Cold War ended. It is therefore impossible to test for an interaction effect and I exclude this component of state-building from my analysis.

intervention was found to affect the relative power – state-building relationship as follows:

1) The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security

In no case, regardless of how national power was measured or whether hegemons were included or excluded, was the norm of non-intervention found to mediate the relationship between the distribution of power and state-building progression.

2) The Provision of Infrastructure

Tables 4.13 – 4.18 reveal that in no instance, regardless of how national power was measured, was the norm of non-intervention found to have a statistically significant impact on the relative power – state-building relationship when the component of state-building under assessment was the provision of infrastructure.

3) The Promotion of Human Development

Again, in no case was the norm of non-intervention found to have a statistically significant effect the relative power – state-building relationship. It did not matter how power was measured or whether Africa's regional hegemons were included or excluded.

4) The Shaping of a National Identity

When state-building was measured in terms of the bond forged between nations and state, a statistically significant interactive effect was identified when CINC data was used to measure national power and hegemons were excluded from the model (Table 4.14). Yet the value of β_1 was unexpectedly greater than the value of $\beta_1 + \beta_3$, indicating that a more favorable relative power position is associated with more robust state-building in the post-Cold War era than when the Cold War was ongoing. This finding contradicts H1.

Table 4.13: Interact – Cold War – CINC – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.082	.215	-.012	.086	-.063	.195	.748	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	-.510	.804	-.527	.351	.137	.777	.860	128
Human Development	2.41	.777	-1.11	.323	.448	.735	.542	298
National Identity	.184	.223	-.093	.092	-.285	.199	.154	278

Table 4.14: Interact – Cold War – CINC – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.278	.221	-.005	.088	-.112	.186	.550	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	-1.24	.850	-.522	.359	.153	.746	.838	128
Human Development	2.12	.816	-1.08	.338	.354	.716	.621	298
National Identity	.237	.233	-.047	.094	-.375	.192	.051	278

Table 4.15: Interact – Cold War – GDP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-.013	.221	-.133	.133	.189	.289	.513	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	5.00	.828	-.995	.659	.716	1.46	.624	121
Human Development	11.71	2.98	-1.64	1.85	-.536	4.04	.895	223
National Identity	.151	.228	-.052	.151	-.417	.333	.212	217

Table 4.16: Interact – Cold War – GDP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.050	.249	-.072	.156	.041	.324	.900	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	5.17	.968	-.981	.796	.638	1.68	.705	121
Human Development	12.83	3.47	-.062	2.24	-3.94	4.67	.401	223
National Identity	.145	.257	.037	.176	-.591	.369	.111	217

Table 4.17: Interact – Cold War – GNP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.091	.219	-.117	.145	.236	.318	.459	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	5.08	.873	-1.24	.787	1.56	1.79	.385	107
Human Development	12.64	2.76	-2.40	1.92	3.43	4.22	.417	186
National Identity	.074	.244	-.011	.182	-.481	.402	.234	184

Table 4.18: Interact – Cold War – GNP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.163	.241	-.002	.170	-.035	.353	.920	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	5.10	1.02	-.888	.944	.568	2.00	.777	107
Human Development	13.35	3.17	-.643	2.35	-.765	4.88	.876	186
National Identity	.011	.266	.087	.209	-.667	.438	.130	184

4.2d Domestic Instability

To measure domestic instability and regime security I use as a proxy a state's history of *coup d'états*. Data on the occurrence of coups is available from the Center for Systemic Peace in time-series format, from independence through 2007, for each state in sub-Saharan Africa.⁶ The data not only captures successful coups, but unsuccessful and plotted coups as well (I will refer to coups, successful or not, as coup events). The prevalence of coup events may demonstrate that a regime is popularly legitimate or illegitimate, or that a leader has or has not successfully consolidated his position in power to an extent that potential challengers do not believe that the probability of a successful coup is greater than the probability of failure. More generally, frequent coup events can indicate that there is something specific about the politics of a state that makes it difficult

⁶ Available at: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>

to rule. In any case, whether or not a coup is attempted tells us something about how secure a regime perceives itself to be; because its own survival is a priority and a *coup d'état* directly endangers that objective, the extent to which a regime perceives itself to be secure or insecure should correspond to the volume of recent coup activity.

Contingent on whether or not a state experienced a coup event in a given year, I assign every state a code of 0 (the regime is not especially insecure) or 1 (the regime is especially insecure). The data compiled by the Center for Systemic Peace is in time-series format, yet needs to be modified slightly in order to truly capture how secure a regime perceives itself to be. For example, there was an attempted coup in Burundi in 1966 but none in 1967. In light of the coup attempt just one year earlier, it would be far-fetched to argue that the regime felt secure in 1967 simply because no coup attempt occurred in that year. In fact, the coup event in 1966 was still surely close in mind. To account for the negative effect of a recent coup event on how regimes perceive their own security, I assign a code of 1 to the first five years following a coup event whether an event occurred in those years or not. Burundi, therefore, receives a code of 1 for the years 1967 – 1971.

Tables 4.19 – 4.24, found below, lay out exactly when and to what extent domestic insecurity and the regional distribution of power interact to affect state-building. Looking individually at each of my five components of state-building, the extent to which states have been afflicted with *coup d'état* events was found to affect the relative power – state-building relationship as follows:

1) The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security

There is some evidence that the relative power – state-building relationship is mediated by coup event history when GNP (but not CINC or GDP) is employed to measure

national power (Table 4.24). When hegemons are excluded from models, a statistically significant relationship exists at the $p < .10$ level. Because β_1 is positive and $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ is negative, the indication is that state-building declines as states gain power relative to neighbors when there is a recent history of coup events, but advances as expected when there is not. That $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ is smaller than β_1 indicates that state-building advances more robustly when relative strengthening is coupled with an absence of recent coup events. Support is therefore found for H1.

2) The Regulation of Social and Economic Life

There is additional evidence that coup event history mediates the independent-dependent variable relationship when state-building progression is measured by how effectively social and economic life is regulated. While no statistically significant interaction effect was found when CINC data was used to measure national power, the use of GDP and GNP produced consistently significant results (Tables 4.21 – 4.24). As expected, the value of β_1 is in all cases larger than $\beta_1 + \beta_3$. This indicates that relative power gains are associated with greater state-building advancement when there is *no* recent history of a coup event than when there *is* such a history. Support is thus found for H1.

3) The Provision of Infrastructure

Coup event history was found to have a statistically significant impact on the relative power – state-building relationship when the component of state-building under assessment was the provision of infrastructure. A significant relationship was found when both GDP and GNP were used to measure national power, no matter whether hegemons were included or excluded from models. Values in all cases were positive as expected, indicating that state-building advances as states gain power relative to their neighbors.

And in all cases the value of β_1 exceeded that of $\beta_1 + \beta_3$, indicating that state-building advances more when states have not experienced recent coup events. Support is thus found, as expected, for H1.

4) The Promotion of Human Development

In no case, regardless of how national power was measured or whether hegemons were included or excluded, was coup event history found to mediate the relationship between the distribution of power and state-building progression.

5) The Shaping of a National Identity

Compelling evidence that coup event history mediates the relationship between relative power and state-building was found when state-building progression was measured in terms of how strongly nations and states converge. Tables 4.21 – 4.24 indicate that a statistically significant interaction effect exists when both GDP and GNP are used to measure national power. The inclusion or exclusion of Africa's regional hegemons from models does not alter this finding. In all cases the value of β_1 exceeded the value of $\beta_1 + \beta_3$, indicating that state-building advancement is more robust as states gain power relative to neighbors when there is *no* recent coup event, compared to when there *is* a history of such an event. Support is thus found for H1 as expected.

Table 4.19: Interact – Coup History – CINC – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.092	.185	.014	.080	-.142	.179	.427	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-.696	.394	-.067	.189	-.251	.397	.529	115
Infrastructure	-.368	.832	.018	.395	-.469	.834	.575	128
Human Development	2.04	.726	-.497	.322	-.137	.732	.851	298
National Identity	-.054	.205	-.095	.093	-.246	.198	.215	278

Table 4.20: Interact – Coup History – CINC – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.170	.185	-.018	.083	-.047	.172	.783	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-.794	.423	-.089	.196	-.140	.385	.717	115
Infrastructure	-.969	.883	.165	.411	-.673	.815	.411	128
Human Development	1.18	.739	-.705	.337	.378	.706	.593	298
National Identity	-.228	.207	-.162	.096	-.070	.190	.712	278

Table 4.21: Interact – Coup History – GDP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.237	.230	.093	.143	-.250	.303	.410	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	2.09	.408	.475	.256	-1.52	.543	.006	115
Infrastructure	6.95	1.23	.859	.729	-2.82	1.53	.068	121
Human Development	11.77	3.24	.118	2.00	-.988	4.30	.819	223
National Identity	.312	.253	.072	.154	-.947	.332	.005	217

Table 4.22: Interact – Coup History – GDP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.247	.242	.130	.159	-.328	.326	.316	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	2.39	.472	.636	.309	-1.81	.623	.004	115
Infrastructure	7.23	1.37	.821	.846	-3.05	1.72	.080	121
Human Development	11.19	3.61	.085	2.35	-1.68	4.83	.729	223
National Identity	.145	.279	.031	.178	-.792	.367	.032	217

Table 4.23: Interact – Coup History – GNP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.453	.273	.165	.167	-.434	.347	.213	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	2.26	.411	.534	.263	-1.54	.554	.006	114
Infrastructure	7.77	1.38	1.32	.824	-3.92	1.70	.023	107
Human Development	12.04	3.48	-1.96	2.13	1.94	4.50	.668	186
National Identity	.090	.296	-.042	.180	-.881	.383	.023	184

Table 4.24: Interact – Coup History – GNP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.526	.282	.274	.181	-.674	.364	.066	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	2.48	.468	.682	.311	-1.82	.622	.004	114
Infrastructure	7.76	1.52	1.31	.948	-4.30	1.89	.025	107
Human Development	11.36	3.87	-2.11	2.49	.804	5.02	.873	186
National Identity	-.070	.320	-.083	.204	-.711	.414	.088	184

4.3 Assessing the Relationship Between Context, Relative Power, & State-Building

Early in section 4.2 I noted the apparent complexity of the chapter's findings. For one thing, the fact that national power is measured three different ways (using CINC scores, GDP, and GNP) might seem to make it difficult to draw comprehensive conclusions about interaction effects given that results tend to vary across measures. However, as addressed above, interpretation becomes quite manageable (and more appropriately undertaken) when results associated with each of my three measures of national power are assessed separately and not directly compared. At least not in a first cut. In other words, it makes more sense to select a single measure of national power (again, my preferred measure is GNP) and draw conclusions about interaction effects based upon findings generated when that particular measure was employed. The alternative approach – attempting to compare results across measures of national power and then throwing up

one's hands and declaring the findings of Chapter 4 meaningless or hopelessly lacking in credibility because results were found to vary – makes considerably less sense.

With the aim of bringing together the findings of Chapter 4 and making the interpretation of results a bit easier, I have created two summary tables. Both tables are divided into three columns – one for each measure of national power (CINC scores, GDP, and GNP). The first summary table is designed to depict the circumstances under which support was or was not found for Hypothesis 1. Recall that H1 predicted that state-building progression would be less robust when relative strengthening was coupled with greater levels of neighborhood conflict, border vulnerability, erosion of the norm of sovereignty/non-intervention, and domestic instability. Interpretation of the table is straightforward, with a checkmark indicating support for the hypothesis, an “X” indicating the hypothesis was rejected, and an empty field indicating the absence of a statistically significant interaction. The first summary table is found below.

Measure/Moderator	CINC					GDP					GNP				
	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability	
	H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1	
Monopolize Force – with Hegemons		✓													
Monopolize Force – ex Hegemons		✓												✓	

Measure/Moderator	CINC					GDP					GNP				
	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability	
	H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1	
Social/Economic Life – with Hegemons		✓	na				X	na	✓			X	na	✓	
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons		✓	na				X	na	✓			X	na	✓	

Measure/Moderator	CINC					GDP					GNP				
	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability	
	H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1	
Infrastructure – with Hegemons		✓					X		✓			X		✓	
Infrastructure – ex Hegemons		✓					X		✓			X		✓	

	CINC					GDP					GNP				
	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability	
Measure Moderator															
	H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1	
Human Development – with Hegemons							X				✓	X			
Human Development – ex Hegemons							X								

	CINC					GDP					GNP				
	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability	
Measure Moderator															
	H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1	
National Identity – with Hegemons	X						X		✓			X		✓	
National Identity – ex Hegemons	X		X				X		✓			X		✓	

While the summary table above neatly presents the circumstances under which H1 was corroborated or rejected, it does not depict whether state-building actually advanced or declined in *absolute* terms as a result of relative power – moderator interactions; it only indicates whether or not state-building declined *more* in the presence or absence of certain moderating circumstances. State-building, for example, may have been found to advance in absolute terms whether or not a state recently experienced a coup event; this is valuable information not captured by the summary table. Instead, all that is discernible from the table is whether state-building progression held up *better* in the face of a recent coup event or in its absence. Whether or not state-building advanced or declined in absolute terms is unknowable.

To remedy this issue I have produced a second results table, found below. Interpretation is straightforward and is as follows: A field containing a “plus” mark indicates that state-building was found to advance. A “minus” indicates decline. By way of example, consider where state-building is associated with the monopolization of force/provision of security and the distribution of power is calculated using GNP: state-building is found to advance (indicated by a “plus”) where relative strengthening is coupled with the absence of domestic instability, but decline (indicated by a “minus”) where it is not.

Recall, moreover, that a primary objective of Chapter 4 was to shed a bit more light on the specific findings of Chapter 3. Where, for example, Chapter 3 found that the relative distribution of power by itself did not impact the state-building process, did that finding change when certain moderator variables were introduced? Similarly, where relative power alone *was* found to affect state-building progression, what impact if any

were moderator variables found to have on that relationship? In short, the findings of Chapter 4 need to be meshed with those of Chapter 3. To visually depict whether or not (and if so, how) the findings of Chapter 3 changed when moderator variables were introduced, I have color-coded the results table below. Fields colored **orange** identify areas where a relationship between relative power and state-building only materialized once moderator variables were added to models. In other words, areas where Chapter 3 failed to show that relative power by itself had any statistically significant impact on state-building progression. Fields colored **blue** identify areas where relative power alone *was* found by Chapter 3 to have a statistically significant impact on state-building progression. The question in these cases is whether the introduction of moderator variables altered *how* state-building progression was impacted.

For ease of comparison I re-post results tables from Chapter 3. Recall that a checkmark indicates support for a hypothesis, and an empty field indicates the absence of a statistically significant relationship. The three hypotheses from Chapter 3 are re-posed below. Recall that I expected to be able to reject Hypothesis 1, and accept Hypotheses 2-3.

H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-building progression will increase as states lose power relative to neighbors.

H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-building progression will decrease as states lose power relative to neighbors.

H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors. Worded differently, state-building progression will increase in states as they gain power relative to their neighbors.

Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Social/Economic Life – with Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓

Measure/Moderator	CINC								GDP								GNP							
	Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability	
Social/Economic Life – with Hegemons	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No
			-	+	na	na					+	+	na	na	+	+			+	+	na	na	+	+
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons	Yes	No	-	+	na	na					+	+	na	na	+	+			+	+	na	na	+	+

Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Provide Infrastructure – with Hegemons					✓	✓		✓	✓
Provide Infrastructure – ex Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓

Measure/Moderator	CINC						GDP						GNP											
	Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability	
	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No
Infrastructure – with Hegemons			-	+							+	-			+	+			+	+			+	+
Infrastructure – ex Hegemons			-	+							+	+			+	+			+	+			+	+

Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
National Identity – with Hegemons									
National Identity – ex Hegemons									

Measure/Moderator	CINC						GDP						GNP											
	Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability	
	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No
National Identity – with Hegemons	+	-									+	-			-	+			+	-			-	+
National Identity – ex Hegemons	-	-			-	+					+	-			-	+			+	-			-	-

In all, perhaps most noticeable about the two summary tables of results are the large number of fields that are empty, indicating that moderator variables often had no statistically significant impact on the relative power – state-building relationship. Yet although my four moderator variables were overall not as influential as expected, and did not at all times alter the relative power – state-building relationship in the direction predicted, some clearly behaved as expected more often than others. Moreover, the extent to which state-building was impacted by an interaction between the distribution of power and moderator variables varied across my five components of state-building. Summary findings are as follows:

- Mattering least among the four moderator variables was the degree of reverence for the norm of sovereignty/non-intervention which was scarcely found to affect the relative power – state building relationship; its interaction with the independent variable affected just one of five components of state-building when national power was measured using CINC scores, and had no impact on any component of state-building when GDP and GNP were employed.
- Mattering most among the four moderator variables was border vulnerability which, when interacted with the independent variable, was found to affect three components of state-building when CINC scores were used to measure national power, and four components of state-building when GDP and GNP were used.
- Regardless of how national power was measured (using CINC scores, GDP, or GNP), moderator variables were more likely to matter when state-building was associated with the regulation of social-economic life and the forging of a national identity, and

less likely to matter when associated with the monopolization of force, the provision of infrastructure, and the promotion of human development.

Not only does the summary table help to flesh out which moderator variables most often impacted the relative power – state-building relationship, or which components of state-building were most frequently affected, but it also neatly lays out *how* interactions between moderators and the independent variable were found to impact state-building progression. A complete rundown of results need not be recited again – however there are a few general takeaways worth mentioning:

CINC

- In no instance did the neighborhood conflict, international norms, or domestic instability moderators impact the relative power – state-building relationship the way H1 predicted they would.
- Border vulnerability was the moderator variable that most consistently affected the relative power – state-building relationship as expected.
- No moderator variable was found to impact the relationship between relative power position and the forging of a national identity as expected.

GDP

- Neighborhood conflict, border vulnerability, and international norms moderator variables were in no places found to impact the relative power – state-building relationship in the way H1 anticipated.
- When found to affect the relative power – state-building relationship, the domestic instability moderator in every case did so as predicted by H1.

- In no case was any moderator variable found to impact the relationship between relative power and how effectively states monopolize force and provide security to their populations.

GNP

- The border vulnerability moderator variable was found to impact the relationship between relative power and four components of state-building, but never as predicted by H1.
- The neighborhood conflict moderator variable was found to have a statistically significant effect on the relationship between relative power and just one component of state-building, while the international norms moderator variable was never found to affect the relationship between relative power and state-building.
- Domestic instability was found to impact the relationship between relative power and four of five components of state-building; in every case it did so as H1 predicted.

In all, the primary surprise of Chapter 4 was how infrequently moderator variables were found to affect the relationship between relative power and state-building. The results, otherwise, were mostly predictable. Although all four moderator variables were expected to impact the relative power – state-building relationship, it makes sense that some were found to do so more often than others. It is not a surprise that reverence for the norm of sovereignty/non-intervention was found to have the scarcest impact, given that the pre-to-post Cold War shift in the norm has been subtle; while the norm has arguably weakened in the previous 20 years, it has certainly not eroded entirely.

Domestic instability, on the other hand, poses a clear threat to regime security. Finding that it commonly impacted the relative power – state-building relationship was therefore

not surprising. Equally predictable was the frequency with which the border vulnerability moderator variable was found to impact the relative power – state-building relationship. Yet it often did not do so as expected. While results were in line with expectations with CINC scores were employed to measure national power, the use of GDP and GNP produced results indicating that state-building progression was more robust when relative strengthening was coupled with longer borders than shorter borders. This finding is confounding, given that longer borders should heighten regime insecurity and incentivize regimes to pursue policies that run *counter* to the interests of state-building.

4.4 Summary and Conclusion

Briefly put, the objective of Chapter 4 was to take the findings of Chapter 3 and add context. While the findings of Chapter 3 showed that, in places, the distribution of power appears to matter to state-building, little was said about any additional circumstances that cause it to matter more or less. Chapter 4 set out to address this deficit by assessing how the impact of the regional distribution of power on state-building progression changes contingent upon four moderator variables: neighborhood conflict, border vulnerability, international norms, and domestic instability. In short, Chapter 4 aimed to shed light on when and where relative power matters the most. Chapter 5, the final chapter of this dissertation, has three objectives: to briefly review the arguments and findings of the dissertation; to assess possible policy implications of the findings; and to suggest new ideas for research that might advance our understanding of the state-building process.

CHAPTER 5

5.0 Introduction

State-building has received a good deal of attention from academics, policy-makers, and non-governmental organizations alike. Yet despite the time and resources that have been dedicated to understanding and advancing state-building, gaps remain in our knowledge, and performance across the Global South has been spotty. Over the course of the previous four chapters I have moved to fill in some of these gaps and make a contribution toward solving the puzzle of why state-building has advanced in some places at certain times, but stagnated or declined in others. In other words, I have shed some light on the causes of state-building variation in the Global South. In doing so I have moved beyond the two approaches commonly found in the literature: those which look exclusively *inside* a state to make sense of its state-building performance, and those which look to a state's relationship with the Global North – often emphasizing themes of neocolonialism. Instead, I have focused on an area that has received considerably less empirical analysis and is not well-understood – that is, the effect of region on state-building. In doing so I accepted the need to take seriously the role of domestic politics, but argued that state-building performance is best understood when public policy decisions are seen to at least partially reflect the politics *between* states, namely those that share borders.

The initial objective of Chapter 5 is to briefly review the main theoretical arguments and findings of the previous four chapters. Having done so, I will then conclude the dissertation by suggesting a few paths for future research in the area of state-building. While state-building to date has received a tremendous amount of

attention, there remain important areas yet to be adequately explored, and questions yet to be adequately answered.

5.1 How & Why Relative Power Impacts State-Building: Theory & Findings

In my explanation of variation in state-building performance in the Global South, I have taken seriously the role played by domestic politics, but argued that state-building performance is even better understood when domestic political behavior is seen to at least partially reflect the politics *between* states. But before incorporating the role played by neighbors into my analysis of state-building performance, I first attempted to provide some order to the debate about *which* domestic factors are most responsible for state-building success or failure by categorizing explanations into two groups: those which are agency-oriented, and those which are structure-oriented. Both approaches look inside the state to account for state-building performance, but emphasize different variables.

Agency approaches emphasize the role of political elites and the decisions they make – decisions often said to be motivated by self-interest or greed, and running counter to the imperatives of state-building. Structural approaches are more inclined to assume that political elites have benevolent intentions and do seek to build their states, but confront barriers they did not create and have trouble overcoming. Artificially-drawn borders at the turn of the twentieth century, the divide-and-rule tactics of colonial powers, exploitative economic relationships with the Global North, strong societies, restive border areas, and geographical boundaries that are either too large or too small for viable statehood are among the reasons cited by structuralists for subpar state-building in the Global South. While both approaches have their merits, I have argued that neither is by itself able to adequately explain state-building's successes and failures; structural

explanations are invariably too deterministic, while agency approaches tend to ignore very real structural obstacles and overstate what political elites can realistically be expected to deliver. In fact, I argued that a more complete understanding of where and why state-building succeeds or fails requires that agency be considered alongside structure, and vice-versa. Political elites after all make decisions that impact state-building, but those decisions are informed by the structural environments they confront.

Having argued that state-building progression hinges on the dynamic between agency and structure, I then went on to hypothesize that international politics might influence that dynamic in such a way as to facilitate state-building advancement in some cases, and stagnation or decline in others. Specifically, I suggested that the way power is distributed in a region may either be facilitative or detrimental to state-building progression. My suggestion that an external variable might influence internal politics in such a way as to affect state-building is not new; Charles Tilly argued that the constant threat of state-annihilating war did just that in early-modern Europe. Yet changes to the rules that govern the international system have rendered Tilly's model nearly irrelevant today. In fact, whereas Tilly contended that chronic international insecurity in early-modern Europe altered agency-structure dynamics in ways *conducive* to state-building, I have argued and attempted to demonstrate that international insecurity has actually had the opposite effect on state-building in today's Global South. In short, without abandoning the idea that international politics can influence the internal agency-structure dynamics of states (and, with it, state-building progression), I have tried to modify Tilly for the twenty-first century.

To that end, I hypothesized that regimes in charge of states at relative power advantages vis-à-vis their neighbors would be more proficient state-builders than those in charge of states at parity. And regimes in charge of states at parity with their neighbors would be more proficient state-builders than those in charge of relatively weak states. In making these predictions I accepted two premises: First, no longer faced with the threat of defeat on the battlefield followed by incorporation and subjugation, regimes today have less incentive to make long-term and costly investments in increasing state capacity, and populations have less incentive to turn to the regimes in charge of states for protection. With state survival all but guaranteed, chronically insecure regimes facing multiple structural threats at home have turned first and foremost to ensuring their own survival. To that end, regimes have favored a strategy of personal rule and shunned political and economic institutionalism. While in the near-term such a strategy may buttress regime security, it is highly detrimental to state-building. And second, while state survival is no longer credibly threatened by neighbors, regime survival *is*. Regimes consequently have good reason to fear their neighbors. A regime surrounded by more powerful states should feel a heightened sense of insecurity and, with it, a greater urgency to prioritize personal rule at the expense of governance through institutions.

Overall, results of tests assessing the impact of relative power on state-building were a mixed bag; strong support was found for my hypotheses when state-building was associated with the regulation of social and economic life, the provision of infrastructure services, and the promotion of human development. Yet results failed to meet the threshold of statistical significance when state-building was measured in terms of the forging of a national identity or the monopolization of force and provision of security.

Having showed that relative power, in places, does appear to influence state-building progression, I set out to add context to my findings. I did so by testing whether or not relative power matters more or less in the presence or absence of certain moderator variables. In cases, moderators were found to matter. Border length and domestic instability, for example, were often found to affect how the regional distribution of power impacted state-building. Yet in all, moderator variables failed to impact the relationship between relative power and state-building as comprehensively as I expected.

While the regional distribution of power was in places found to impact state-building, all in all it did not do so as robustly or comprehensively as I had expected. It is interesting to consider whether and in which direction my findings might change in the years ahead. Naturally, if the interstate environment in sub-Saharan Africa remains as it is today, there is good reason to expect my findings to hold up going forward. Yet Africa could conceivably one day see considerably more inter-state violence than it has to this point; many of the so-called correlates of war exist on the continent. Should this happen and by extension neighbors become more threatening, it may be that a replication of my study would produce findings more strongly in line with my hypotheses.

5.2 Pathways for Future Research in the Area of State-Building

5.2a The Role of Region

State-building in general has hardly been a research area neglected by academics. In fact, it is a poster child for cross-disciplinary research, studied by economists, historians, political scientists, sociologists, and others. Yet despite the attention paid to state-building, particular aspects remain understudied. Most glaring is the impact on state-building of region – an oversight that I have attempted to address in this dissertation. Yet

what I have done – looking at how the regional distribution of power affects state-building performance – only scratches the surface. As additional paths tying region to state-building are explored, our understanding of where, when, and why state-building advances, stagnates, or declines will surely increase.

One obvious approach is to move beyond relative power and explore the impact of additional region-specific cross-border variables on state-building progression. When done at all, this has too often been carried out superficially, without rigorous empirical assessment. We may have an idea about which types of cross-border variables affect state-building performance, but we do not always know for certain that they do so, how they do so, or when they do so. To take one component of state-building and provide an example, it is believed that cross-border refugee flows can affect a state's capacity to forge a sense of national identity. But do refugee flows help or hurt? On the one hand, refugees have the potential to antagonize existing ethnic cleavages in recipient states. On the other hand, refugees could serve as an out-group against which citizens of recipient states might unite. Additionally, to what *extent* do refugee flows advance or retard state-building progress? Does the size of the refugee flow matter? Are there additional circumstances that cause refugee flows to matter more or less? And does strength or weakness in other components of state-building offset or accelerate the effect of refugee flows on the state's capacity to shape national identity? Depending on the component of state-building being assessed, other possible region-specific cross-border variables worth looking at include the four used as moderator variables in this dissertation, the volume of bilateral trade with neighbors, the magnitude of civil conflict in neighboring states, the ethnic make-up of neighboring states, and whether or not political elites in charge of

neighboring states share an ethnicity. In short, our understanding of state-building would benefit from a greater emphasis on how region affects state-building, namely a more comprehensive and rigorous assessment of the regional cross-border variables believed to do so. Ultimately this might enable us to predict which states are most and least likely to make state-building advances simply by looking at their neighbors.

5.2b State-Building and Democratization

This dissertation has focused nearly exclusively on the effect of an external variable – the regional distribution of power – on an internal process – state-building. Yet an area ripe for additional research is how state-building progression affects the trajectory of another internal process – democratization. The process of democratization has received a lot of attention in recent years in light of the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and more recently the 2010 Arab Spring movement in the Middle East and North Africa. And prior to these events, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the international system underwent what Samuel Huntington called democracy’s “third wave.” In Central and Eastern Europe, former satellites of the Soviet Union, upon receiving their independence, rejected authoritarianism and began to meander down the path of democratization. A similar thing happened in South America as authoritarian governments in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile were removed from power and replaced with governments at least ostensibly committed to democracy. The literature has extensively examined these transitions with the objective of developing a theory that explains and predicts when and where a democratic transition is likely to be initiated, and under what conditions democracy is likely to be consolidated.

Sometimes overlooked is that Africa in the 1990s underwent its own transition. Michael Bratton calculates that between 1985 and 1989, only nine African states held competitive legislative elections. Moreover, of these nine, four were marred by state interference or other irregularities.¹ In contrast, Freedom House now classifies 23 states in sub-Saharan Africa as at least partially democratic. Clearly, substantial political liberalization has occurred in sub-Saharan Africa in a relatively short amount of time. Yet, while the old days of unapologetic authoritarianism across the continent have waned, democracies have in most cases not yet become consolidated.² Using Freedom House classifications, sub-Saharan Africa hosts just eight consolidated democracies. Instead, many states remain in democratic limbo; they are no longer entirely authoritarian, yet the transition to democracy has not been completed.³ The question is whether consolidation is a near-term possibility, or whether indefinite limbo or reversal of democratic gains is more likely.

At one time it was conventional wisdom that the initiation, sustainability, and consolidation of a democratic transition required a country to possess certain internal characteristics. Often associated with Seymour Martin Lipset, the pre-condition approach held that neither democratic transitions nor consolidation were possible in states lacking a certain level of socio-economic development. States, it was argued, must be industrialized, urbanized, have high GDPs, and possess educated populations. Yet scholars began to chip away at Lipset's pre-condition approach. Dankwart Rustow, for

¹ Michael Bratton, "Deciphering Africa's Divergent Transitions," *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 1 (1997): 90.

² Linz and Stepan consider democracy consolidated when its practice has become routinized and internalized in social, institutional, and psychological life. That is, when democracy has become "the only game in town." Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5.

³ Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 8.

example, contended that just one condition was necessary for transition and consolidation – national unity.⁴ And more recently it has become popular to disregard the pre-condition approach altogether and talk instead about agency, strategic choice, and the interactions and bargaining among elites that supposedly facilitate the process of democratization.

The strategic choice approach to explaining the initiation of democratic transitions is not entirely without its merits. Transitions do not materialize from thin air. They are driven by choices made by elites. Moreover, the fact that democratization has taken root at all in sub-Saharan Africa discredits the notion that the initiation of a transition does not occur absent a certain level of socio-economic development; of the world's ten poorest countries, four have initiated (but not yet consolidated) a democratic transition. Still, focusing too heavily on agency and strategic choice at the expense of necessary pre-conditions is a mistake. While the evidence indicates that transitions can be initiated in a variety of environments – socio-economically developed or not, nationally unified or not, formidable state capacity or not – longer-term democratic sustainability and consolidation requires more. Absent certain pre-conditions, preventing the rolling back of democratic gains and ultimately consolidating democracy becomes extremely difficult.

Existing research to this effect could use more precision. It is one thing to argue that the consolidation of democracy is rare absent certain pre-conditions, but how *many* of these pre-conditions are necessary, and how *much* of each? At what stage of the state-building process, for example, is democracy optimally introduced, not only to minimize the risk of a transition being reversed, but also to minimize the time between the initiation of the transition and consolidation? While it is useful to know that democracy is more

⁴ Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (1970): 350.

likely to survive and ultimately be consolidated where force is monopolized by the state, human development is promoted, social and economic life is regulated, infrastructure is in good repair, and convergence between nations and state is strong, how *much* of these things are necessary? In other words, at what *stage* of each component of state-building does the initiation of a democratic transition optimally occur? By now enough democratic transitions have been initiated, reversed, consolidated, or have languished somewhere between authoritarianism and consolidation to enable a more detailed and substantive discussion of democracy's pre-conditions.

5.2c State-Building and the Need for Conceptual Clarity

As I discussed at some length in Chapter 1, no consensus is found in the literature as to what precisely constitutes state-building. Naturally, therefore, how state-building ought to be measured is also disputed. This has made theory-building difficult. In an attempt to overcome this problem, I suggested a definition and measurement criteria guided by a single theme: what are the most basic tasks a state must carry out in order to avoid the worst possible fate for itself and its population – that is, state failure or collapse. In doing so I identified five tasks. This was my best effort to produce a definition and measurement technique oriented around something meaningful – avoiding state-failure – yet also broad enough to capture what the immensely complex undertaking of state-building entails. I am confident that my approach is superior to those which, for the sake of methodological neatness, rely on a single proxy variable such as tax extraction or political liberalization to measure the progression of state-building. I am not convinced beyond doubt, however, that my five components are superior to all others that might be imagined, or even that there are only five components. Moreover, I am not convinced that

it is impossible to adequately capture “state-building” with a single proxy variable. I have only yet to come across one that works. The point is that I have done my best to provide some order to a messy literature. Going forward, the generation of more meaningful theories about state-building requires that additional work be done in this regard.

A final question worth considering addresses the extent to which state-building should be considered a “process” at all. I have suggested that state-building be thought of in terms of five component parts. Others might suggest another number, but in any case it would be worthwhile to understand how each component part relates to the others. How, for example, does strength or weakness in one component of state-building affect the strength or weakness of the other components? How strong are these relationships, and which components seem to be most and least closely related? In attempting to develop the state, which components should be prioritized, and in what order? If we were to find, for example, that the regulation of social and economic life suffers considerably absent a monopolization of the legitimate use of force, but holds up equally well whether or not convergence has formed between nations and the state, this would not only shed light on how precisely state-building advancement ultimately unfolds, but where domestic and foreign resources should be devoted.

5.2d State-Building Research and the Problem of Data Quality

State-building is a subject ripe for additional research, and the preceding pages of this chapter have suggested a handful of paths it might take. Yet, arguably, nothing would do more to advance the possibilities for and quality of research in state-building than the availability of higher-quality data. As it is, much of the data available on countless aspects of state behavior and performance – from military expenditures, to literacy rates,

to the number of fixed phone lines per 1,000 people – comes from the state itself; the quality of the data, therefore, depends on how seriously the state takes the collection of statistics. Perhaps not surprisingly, data quality is believed to vary along with a state's wealth and stability. As states become richer and more stable, the quality of their data collection processes improve. And, conversely, impoverished, fragile states produce poorer quality data. The problem for the state-building research agenda is of course that researchers tend to be most interested in the very states that are least equipped to collect and provide high-quality data. The integrity of research findings may therefore be compromised as conclusions are drawn based on available data that is of low-quality, or from outputs generated by statistical procedures that non-randomly select out states from datasets due to missing data.⁵

The data quality problem is one with which any student of state-building who opts for a quantitative research project must contend, and I certainly have here. Where possible, however, I have taken steps to minimize risk. I have selected measures of variables that are inclusive; data on the quality and availability of education was my preferred way to measure how well states promote human development, but the number of states with missing data was large enough that I opted instead for an alternative. In an effort to mitigate the possibility of relying entirely on low-quality data, when possible I measured my variables with multiple sources of data. To take infrastructure provision as an example, rather than rely solely on the number of fixed telephone lines per 1,000 people, I also incorporated the percentage of the population with access to clean water. Similarly, how well states regulate social and economic life is calculated from multiple

⁵ For a very good discussion of the problems caused by poor data quality and availability in the Global South, see Douglas Lemke, "African Lessons for International Relations Research," *World Politics* 56, no. 1 (2003).

measures. The goal is to refrain from putting all my eggs in one basket. Still, despite whatever precautions were taken, there will justifiably be questions about the credibility of this dissertation's findings. Key to high-quality research on state-building going forward is the availability of high-quality data.

5.3 Policy Implications of the Dissertation's Findings

The findings of this dissertation may be of most interest to those working on development issues in the Global South. Unfortunately, the findings indicate that the entity best-positioned to promote development – the regime in charge of the state – is often inclined to favor policies that do harm rather than help. This makes solutions to the development deficit in the Global South more difficult to come by, as simply providing more foreign aid to regimes in charge of underdeveloped states is unlikely to generate much return. Problematically, threatening structural environments confronted by political elites are what drive the decision to opt for self-serving and development-adverse policies, yet there is little appetite in the international community for solutions relied upon long ago to make structure more manageable. Jeffrey Herbst's provocative call, however serious he was, to "give war a chance" is a non-starter. Certainly any extension of Mohammed Ayooob's argument that state-building is an inherently violent process incompatible with international human rights norms is a non-starter. And both great power politics and the preferences of regimes in charge of states in the Global South take the option of boundary changes by way of secession or irredentism off the table. Still, although any advancement in state-building is likely to be marginal in much of the Global South given that the threat posed by structure to regimes is unlikely to dissipate in any near-term future, there are policy options available that may help around the edges.

First, foreign development aid channeled through the state should be targeted at states with structural conditions that pose the least threat to regimes. Aid to these states is more likely to be used as intended. For similar reasons, given how the regional distribution of power was found to affect state-building progression, the provision of foreign aid to states that are preponderant relative to neighbors should receive priority over states that are comparatively weak. Yet another option for providers of foreign aid is to bypass the state all-together and channel resources toward community development. In doing so, the risk that the state will misuse funds intended for development is alleviated. The downsides, however, are that state capacity can be further undermined, states are often resistant to development initiatives they have been frozen out of, and effective community development projects require community organization and a high level of social capital – qualities at times in short supply.

5.4 Summary and Conclusion

The final chapter of this dissertation first reviewed the theoretical arguments and findings of the previous four chapters. It then touched on possible paths for future research in the area of state-building and concluded with a brief section on the policy implications of my findings. With much of the world in the relatively early stages of state-building, the subject is sure to remain relevant for quite some time. The better it is understood, the more effectively those in a position to help can do so. In exploring an international dimension to state-building beyond the usual two areas of focus – how might foreign aid help today, and how war helped centuries ago – I have hopefully brought to light new knowledge and expanded the debate.

Appendix: Replications with Prais-Winsten GLS

As discussed in Chapter 3, my dissertation relies on time-series data which is commonly characterized by autocorrelation. Indeed, Durbin-Watson tests consistently indicate the presence of autocorrelation in my data. Yet the data is not only time-series, but also cross-sectional, making testing for and diagnosing of autocorrelation considerably more complicated. Rather than ignore the possibility that autocorrelated data has skewed my results, I correct for it using the Prais-Winsten method of generalized least squares regression. As it turns out, results generated from models employing OLS and Prais-Winsten are very often consistent. Results of the Prais-Winsten replications are found below – first those for Chapter 3, followed by those for Chapter 4.

A.1 Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 3

Recall that the objective of Chapter 3 was to test the relationship between relative power position and state-building progression. Three hypotheses were submitted and I expected to be able to reject H1, but accept H2-3.

H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage.

H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage.

H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage.

It turns out that swapping OLS regression for Prais-Winsten GLS did not change results when state-building was measured in terms of the monopolization of force and provision of security, the regulation of social and economic life, or the provision of

infrastructure services. Results did change when state-building was associated with the promotion of human development and the forging of a national identity, but only slightly; in both instances, results of the Prais-Winsten replications corresponded with those generated by models using OLS when GDP and GNP were employed to measure national power, but diverged when CINC scores were used. Results tables are found below.

A.1a The Monopolization of Force and the Provision of Security

Table A.1: Relative Power and the Monopolization of Force/Security (with hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-.026	.199	.894	.091	.172	.596	.127	.181	.482
Population Density	.051	.058	.381	-.014	.061	.816	.010	.062	.870
Total Population	-.225	.095	.018	-.202	.061	.001	-.205	.063	.001
GDP	.132	.085	.123	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	277	-	-	202	-	-	165	-	-

Table A.2: Relative Power and the Monopolization of Force/Security (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	.161	.206	.436	.079	.192	.681	.085	.198	.670
Population Density	.060	.059	.308	-.010	.062	.872	.016	.063	.796
Total Population	-.304	.104	.004	-.205	.061	.001	-.208	.064	.001
GDP	.113	.084	.182	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	277	-	-	202	-	-	165	-	-

A.1b The Regulation of Social and Economic Life

Table A.3: Relative Power & the Regulation of Social/Economic Life (with hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-1.08	.388	.006	1.54	.279	.000	1.54	.270	.000
Population Density	.055	.098	.577	-.177	.091	.055	-.156	.090	.086
Total Population	.525	.176	.003	.068	.091	.458	.039	.089	.666
GDP	.789	.132	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	115	-	-	115	-	-	114	-	-

Table A.4: Relative Power & the Regulation of Social/Economic Life (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-1.19	.402	.004	1.75	.305	.000	1.68	.291	.000
Population Density	.011	.099	.912	-.087	.092	.344	-.066	.091	.471
Total Population	.615	.194	.002	.008	.089	.928	-.021	.088	.808
GDP	.798	.131	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	115	-	-	115	-	-	114	-	-

A.1c The Provision of Infrastructure

Table A.5: Relative Power and the Provision of Infrastructure (with hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-1.44	.888	.108	5.45	.758	.000	5.29	.791	.000
Population Density	1.02	.231	.000	.039	.253	.879	.097	.269	.719
Total Population	.080	.424	.851	-.750	.261	.005	-.955	.272	.001
GDP	3.48	.321	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	128	-	-	121	-	-	107	-	-

Table A.6: Relative Power and the Provision of Infrastructure (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-2.69	.939	.005	5.68	.859	.000	5.07	.884	.000
Population Density	.908	.231	.000	.348	.264	.190	.398	.284	.164
Total Population	.695	.473	.145	-.953	.264	.000	-1.16	.283	.000
GDP	3.57	.317	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	128	-	-	121	-	-	107	-	-

*A.1d The Promotion of Human Development***Table A.7: Relative Power and the Promotion of Human Development (with hegemons)**

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-2.72	.719	.000	10.62	2.42	.000	12.44	2.37	.000
Population Density	-1.00	.198	.000	-1.29	.825	.118	-2.24	.808	.006
Total Population	1.31	.326	.000	-1.26	.842	.137	.506	.826	.541
GDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	298	-	-	223	-	-	186	-	-

Table A.8: Relative Power and the Promotion of Human Development (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-3.50	.724	.000	11.15	2.67	.000	12.31	2.56	.000
Population Density	-1.25	.209	.000	-.734	.848	.387	-1.65	.826	.047
Total Population	1.76	.352	.000	.895	.845	.291	.103	.841	.902
GDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	298	-	-	223	-	-	186	-	-

A.1e The Shaping of a National Identity

Table A.9: Relative Power and the Shaping of a National Identity (with hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-.665	.222	.003	-.138	.210	.511	-.166	.222	.456
Population Density	.192	.068	.005	.133	.073	.070	.176	.076	.022
Total Population	.148	.103	.153	-.157	.072	.031	-.178	.077	.022
GDP	.348	.090	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	278	-	-	217	-	-	184	-	-

Table A.10: Relative Power and the Shaping of a National Identity (without hegemons)

Variable	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value	B	S.E.	P-Value
Relative Power	-.679	.227	.003	-.206	.232	.376	-.203	.238	.394
Population Density	.160	.070	.023	.122	.074	.099	.166	.076	.031
Total Population	.182	.113	.108	-.149	.072	.040	-.170	.077	.029
GDP	.344	.090	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	278	-	-	217	-	-	184	-	-

A.2 A Summary of the Results of Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 3

The summary table below concisely captures the extent of support found for each of my three hypotheses when Prais-Winsten GLS was employed. An empty cell indicates that no statistically significant relationship was found, and a checkmark indicates that support was found for the relevant hypothesis.

Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Monopolize Force – with Hegemons									
Monopolize Force – ex Hegemons									
Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Social/Economic Life – with Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Provide Infrastructure – with Hegemons					✓	✓		✓	✓
Provide Infrastructure – ex Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Human Development – with Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Human Development – ex Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
National Identity – with Hegemons	✓								
National Identity – ex Hegemons	✓								

A.3 Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 4

Recall that the objective of Chapter 4 was to test whether or not relative power affects state-building differently in the presence or absence of four moderator variables: neighborhood conflict, border vulnerability, international norms, and domestic instability.

Tests in Chapter 4 employed ordinary least squares regression, but are replicated here using Prais-Winsten GLS. Results do not diverge profoundly; while statistical significance at times emerges or erodes depending on whether OLS or Prais-Winsten is employed, all findings that are statistically significant across both methods of regression are consistent. In other words, beyond the emergence or erosion of statistical significance, results never change as OLS is swapped for Prais-Winsten. Results tables are found below.

A.3a Neighborhood Conflict

Recall that H1 read as follows:

As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be more muted when there is a recent history of neighborhood conflict than when there is no recent history of neighborhood conflict.

Overwhelmingly, results generated by models employing OLS correspond to those generated by models employing Prais-Winsten. Results diverge in just one instance – where state-building is assessed in terms of the strength of convergence between nations and state, GDP is used to measure national power, and hegemons are selected out (Tables A.13 and A.14). Here, results become statistically significant when Prais-Winsten is employed, whereas they were not when OLS was used. Counter to the prediction of H1, the value of β_1 is smaller than the value of $\beta_1 + \beta_3$, indicating that relative power gains coupled with a history of neighborhood conflict leads to *more* robust state-building progression than relative power gains coupled with neighborhood tranquility.

Table A.11: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – CINC – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.063	.236	.066	.081	-.103	.194	.589	274
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-.659	.935	.179	.241	-.527	.863	.617	91
Infrastructure	-.766	1.20	.426	.353	-.560	.999	.921	127
Human Development	-2.13	.819	.134	.216	.361	.527	.443	283
National Identity	-1.12	.263	-.232	.081	.511	.190	.007	259

Table A.12: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – CINC – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.259	.237	.080	.084	-.118	.189	.589	274
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-.808	.921	.251	.240	-.635	.853	.534	91
Infrastructure	-1.94	1.23	.493	.355	-.640	.976	.573	127
Human Development	-2.83	.804	.172	.220	.140	.510	.921	283
National Identity	-1.14	.262	-.239	.084	.480	.185	.010	259

Table A.13: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GDP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-.121	.261	-.156	.145	.396	.310	.229	199
Regulate Social/Economic Life	1.72	.653	.099	.315	-.178	.724	.735	91
Infrastructure	4.69	1.22	-.332	.669	1.60	1.47	.248	120
Human Development	14.90	3.22	3.63	1.58	-4.29	3.41	.228	208
National Identity	-.480	.298	-.246	.162	.525	.350	.136	198

Table A.14: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GDP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.048	.291	-.037	.167	.108	.342	.921	199
Regulate Social/Economic Life	2.07	.732	.143	.381	-.332	.846	.733	91
Infrastructure	4.23	1.49	-.930	.860	2.70	1.80	.123	120
Human Development	14.73	3.58	2.91	1.81	-2.64	3.73	.489	208
National Identity	-.638	.326	-.317	.188	.645	.389	.092	198

Table A.15: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GNP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.159	.288	-.023	.162	.002	.346	.921	162
Regulate Social/Economic Life	1.399	.574	-.099	.309	.268	.679	.733	90
Infrastructure	4.808	1.295	-.259	.719	.871	1.591	.484	106
Human Development	18.56	3.547	4.065	1.796	-7.077	3.843	.067	171
National Identity	-.498	.344	-.225	.192	.504	.412	.216	165

Table A.16: Interact – Militarized Interstate Disputes – GNP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.349	.326	.139	.187	-.347	.381	.361	162
Regulate Social/Economic Life	1.645	.628	-.085	.362	.164	.767	.732	90
Infrastructure	3.835	1.534	-.785	.915	2.069	1.921	.272	106
Human Development	18.59	3.98	3.892	2.076	-6.267	4.274	.132	171
National Identity	-.668	.384	-.318	.224	.672	.463	.136	165

A.3b Border Vulnerability

Recall that H1 read as follows:

H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be less robust in states with longer borders than in states with shorter borders.

Again, results generated when Prais-Winsten was applied largely mirror those generated by OLS. There are just two instances where results diverged, and in both cases results that were statistically significant when OLS was employed became insignificant when Prais-Winsten was applied. First, where state-building is assessed in terms of infrastructure provision and CINC scores are used to measure national power, and again where state-building is associated with the promotion of human development and GDP is used to calculate national power (Tables A.17 – A.20). The complete set of tables below

lay out how border vulnerability and the regional distribution of power were found to interact and affect state-building.

Table A.17: Interact – Border Length – CINC – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	2.41	1.30	1.13	.342	-.699	.393	.055	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	5.33	2.28	1.00	.613	-1.91	.682	.007	115
Infrastructure	4.49	5.47	.604	1.42	-1.79	1.65	.168	128
Human Development	-.827	4.93	-3.59	1.39	-.718	1.47	.564	298
National Identity	-1.33	1.57	.074	.443	.207	.469	.921	278

Table A.18: Interact – Border Length – CINC – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	2.25	1.27	1.15	.339	-.599	.382	.096	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	4.61	2.25	1.06	.607	-1.71	.664	.014	115
Infrastructure	2.99	5.31	.433	1.40	-1.70	1.58	.163	128
Human Development	-1.73	4.81	-3.16	1.36	-.599	1.41	.921	298
National Identity	-1.83	1.54	.106	.439	.350	.455	.439	278

Table A.19: Interact – Border Length – GDP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-1.94	1.48	.694	.399	.670	.468	.141	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-2.67	2.08	.359	.646	1.39	.667	.037	115
Infrastructure	-18.37	5.35	-4.21	1.67	7.67	1.71	.000	121
Human Development	-10.70	18.64	-.518	6.28	6.94	5.96	.229	223
National Identity	-5.00	1.62	-.732	.502	1.56	.514	.002	217

Table A.20: Interact – Border Length – GDP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-2.07	1.61	.659	.410	.722	.522	.188	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-4.91	2.18	-.122	.649	2.25	.722	.002	115
Infrastructure	-23.30	5.75	-5.53	1.73	9.60	1.89	.000	121
Human Development	-15.50	20.12	-2.31	6.53	8.87	6.60	.196	223
National Identity	-5.45	1.73	-.820	.512	1.73	.563	.002	217

Table A.21: Interact – Border Length – GNP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-1.35	1.63	.412	.411	.490	.521	.308	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-2.89	2.15	.044	.639	1.47	.699	.037	114
Infrastructure	-21.41	5.97	-4.81	1.73	8.71	1.94	.000	107
Human Development	-20.56	19.86	-.380	5.95	10.84	6.42	.082	186
National Identity	-4.17	1.83	-.284	.541	1.31	.590	.024	184

Table A.22: Interact – Border Length – GNP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-.729	1.74	.456	.423	.279	.568	.557	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-4.46	2.27	-.430	.659	2.07	.755	.007	114
Infrastructure	-21.38	6.70	-5.49	1.90	8.79	2.22	.000	107
Human Development	-13.82	20.94	-.528	6.29	8.71	6.87	.224	186
National Identity	-4.23	1.90	-.317	.552	1.33	.621	.029	184

A.3c International Norms

Recall that H1 read as follows:

H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be more muted in the years following the Cold War than in years during which the Cold War was ongoing.

Once again, results generated by models employing OLS almost always correspond to those generated by models employing Prais-Winsten. Results diverge in just two instances: first, where state-building is assessed in terms of the strength of convergence between nations and state and CINC scores are used to measure national power, and again where relative power is calculated using GNP (Tables A.23 and A.27 – A.28). In both cases, results become statistically significant when Prais-Winsten is employed, whereas they were not when OLS was utilized. And in both cases the value of β_1 was unexpectedly greater than the value of $\beta_1 + \beta_3$, indicating that a more favorable relative power position is associated with more robust state-building in the post-Cold War era than when the Cold War was ongoing. This finding contradicts H1. Complete results for all five components of state-building are found below.

Table A.23: Interact – Cold War – CINC – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.104	.250	-.032	.088	-.081	.200	.586	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	-1.30	.922	-.811	.260	.476	.600	.581	128
Human Development	-1.39	.779	-.738	.228	.083	.529	.921	298
National Identity	-.156	.253	.056	.082	-.519	.185	.006	278

Table A.24: Interact – Cold War – CINC – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.362	.257	-.034	.090	-.120	.191	.440	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	-2.43	.967	-.783	.263	.456	.569	.575	128
Human Development	-2.09	.800	-.695	.233	.107	.507	.921	298
National Identity	-.122	.261	.080	.085	-.540	.179	.003	278

Table A.25: Interact – Cold War – GDP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	-.031	.236	-.158	.132	.207	.289	.516	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	5.02	.766	-.914	.411	.261	.931	.921	121
Human Development	11.20	2.87	-1.05	1.46	-1.96	3.21	.616	223
National Identity	.023	.248	-.019	.132	-.408	.291	.148	217

Table A.26: Interact – Cold War – GDP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.015	.266	-.115	.156	.098	.326	.921	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	5.15	.873	-.994	.496	.410	1.07	.641	121
Human Development	12.01	3.22	-.622	1.73	-2.73	3.63	.479	223
National Identity	-.020	.277	.021	.156	-.472	.328	.148	217

Table A.27: Interact – Cold War – GNP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.088	.231	-.062	.146	.080	.316	.679	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	4.56	.815	-1.12	.532	.899	1.20	.454	107
Human Development	11.12	2.76	-2.33	1.62	2.46	3.50	.507	186
National Identity	.056	.254	.147	.153	-.647	.332	.062	184

Table A.28: Interact – Cold War – GNP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.130	.256	.020	.169	-.107	.347	.921	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Infrastructure	4.45	.917	-1.04	.622	.539	1.31	.676	107
Human Development	11.21	3.04	-2.29	1.85	1.99	3.80	.511	186
National Identity	.045	.278	.169	.175	-.647	.359	.078	184

A.3d Domestic Instability

Recall that H1 read as follows:

H1: As states gain power relative to their neighbors, state-building progression will be less robust in states with greater domestic insecurity than in states with less domestic insecurity.

The results of tests conducted using OLS and Prais-Winsten again largely mirror each other, although of my four moderator variables, divergence is greatest when domestic instability is interacted with relative power. When CINC scores were employed to calculate national power and state-building was measured in terms of the promotion of human development, results became statistically significant (and substantiated H1) when Prais-Winsten was employed, whereas they failed to meet the threshold of significance when OLS was used. When CINC scores were swapped for GDP and the provision of infrastructure was assessed, results that were significant when OLS was employed became insignificant when Prais-Winsten was applied. And when GNP was used to measure national power, statistical significance eroded somewhat when Prais-Winsten was utilized and state-building was associated with the provision of infrastructure and the forging of a national identity, but increased when associated with the monopolization of force and provision of security. Complete results of the Prais-Winsten replications are found in Tables A.29 – A.34, below.

Table A.29: Interact – Coup History – CINC – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.116	.236	.077	.085	-.219	.193	.277	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-1.31	.435	-.167	.153	.410	.355	.196	115
Infrastructure	-.935	1.02	.058	.388	-.722	.840	.367	128
Human Development	-2.03	.824	.222	.236	-.878	.535	.103	298
National Identity	-.467	.258	.015	.084	-.263	.185	.145	278

Table A.30: Interact – Coup History – CINC – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.252	.233	.062	.089	-.158	.186	.441	277
Regulate Social/Economic Life	-1.39	.436	-.168	.156	.392	.328	.194	115
Infrastructure	-2.03	1.07	.214	.404	-.895	.826	.237	128
Human Development	-3.19	.780	.166	.240	-.722	.494	.125	298
National Identity	-.642	.251	-.053	.088	-.096	.177	.582	278

Table A.31: Interact – Coup History – GDP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.379	.257	.203	.143	-.486	.317	.147	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	1.92	.360	.309	.199	-.916	.459	.051	115
Infrastructure	6.01	1.16	.088	.585	-1.08	1.28	.453	121
Human Development	11.21	3.21	-.361	1.52	-1.40	3.57	.623	223
National Identity	.393	.271	.188	.136	-.994	.313	.002	217

Table A.32: Interact – Coup History – GDP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.394	.274	.248	.162	-.563	.344	.129	202
Regulate Social/Economic Life	2.21	.415	.390	.241	-1.00	.518	.059	115
Infrastructure	6.29	1.31	.068	.698	-1.16	1.47	.461	121
Human Development	10.73	3.55	-1.00	1.79	.241	3.93	.921	223
National Identity	.159	.305	.106	.162	-.724	.351	.035	217

Table A.33: Interact – Coup History – GNP – With Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.606	.297	.328	.170	-.812	.365	.038	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	1.94	.367	.330	.210	-.864	.482	.079	114
Infrastructure	5.89	1.36	.273	.749	-1.28	1.59	.364	107
Human Development	12.61	3.41	-.366	1.75	-1.47	4.04	.921	186
National Identity	.220	.301	.112	.158	-.939	.361	.010	184

Table A.34: Interact – Coup History – GNP – Ex-Hegemons

Dependent Variable	B1	S.E.	B2	S.E.	B3	S.E.	F Sig	N
Monopolize Force/Security	.674	.311	.427	.186	-.999	.384	.013	165
Regulate Social/Economic Life	2.16	.419	.393	.248	-.917	.528	.094	114
Infrastructure	5.89	1.53	.320	.886	-1.70	1.81	.298	107
Human Development	12.38	3.78	-.419	2.04	-1.36	4.37	.645	186
National Identity	-.098	.335	-.059	.187	-.473	.397	.199	184

A.4 A Summary of the Results of Prais-Winsten Replications: Chapter 4

In all, results seldom diverged when OLS was swapped for Prais-Winsten GLS. With the aim of making the interpretation of results presented above a bit easier, I have again created two summary tables. Both tables are divided into three columns – one for each measure of national power (CINC scores, GDP, and GNP). The first summary table is designed to depict the circumstances under which support was or was not found for Hypothesis 1. Recall that H1 predicted that state-building progression would be less robust when relative strengthening was coupled with greater levels of neighborhood conflict, border vulnerability, erosion of the norm of sovereignty/non-intervention, and domestic instability. Interpretation of the table is straightforward, with a checkmark indicating support for the hypothesis, an “X” indicating the hypothesis was rejected, and an empty field indicating the absence of a statistically significant interaction. I include the

results of tests employing both OLS and Prais-Winsten to make interpretation easier. The first summary table is found below.

OLS												
Measure/Moderator	CINC					GDP					GNP	
	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability
Monopolize Force – with Hegemons	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1
Monopolize Force – ex Hegemons		✓										✓
Prais-Winsten												
	CINC					GDP					GNP	
	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1
Monopolize Force – with Hegemons		✓										✓
Monopolize Force – ex Hegemons		✓										✓

OLS												
Measure/Moderator	CINC					GDP					GNP	
	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability
Social/Economic Life – with Hegemons	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons		✓	na			X	na	✓		X	na	✓
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons		✓	na			X	na	✓		X	na	✓
Prais-Winsten												
	CINC					GDP					GNP	
	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1	H1
Social/Economic Life – with Hegemons		✓	na			X	na	✓		X	na	✓
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons		✓	na			X	na	✓		X	na	✓

OLS														
Measure/Moderator	CINC					GDP					GNP			
	Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict	Border Vulnerability	International Norms	Domestic Instability
	H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1
National Identity – with Hegemons	X						X		✓			X		✓
National Identity – ex Hegemons	X		X				X		✓			X		✓
Prais-Winsten														
	CINC					GDP					GNP			
	H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1		H1	H1	H1	H1
National Identity – with Hegemons	X		X				X		✓			X	X	✓
National Identity – ex Hegemons	X		X			X	X		✓			X	X	

Recall the closing pages of Chapter 4 in which I generated a table depicting whether state-building advanced or declined in *absolute* terms as a result of relative power – moderator interactions, not only whether it declined *more* in the presence or absence of certain moderating circumstances. I again do so, this time with the results of the Prais-Winsten replications. Again, interpretation is straightforward and is as follows: A field containing a “plus” mark indicates that state-building was found to advance. A “minus” indicates decline. Fields colored **orange** identify areas where a relationship between relative power and state-building only materialized once moderator variables were added to models. In other words, areas where relative power by itself failed to have a statistically significant impact on state-building progression. Fields colored **blue** identify areas where relative power alone *was* found to have a statistically significant impact on state-building progression. The question in these cases is whether the introduction of moderator variables altered *how* state-building progression was impacted.

For ease of comparison I re-post results tables from the Chapter 3 Prais-Winsten replications. Recall that a checkmark indicates support for a hypothesis, and an empty field indicates the absence of a statistically significant relationship. The three hypotheses from Chapter 3 are re-posed below. Recall that I expected to be able to reject Hypothesis 1, and accept Hypotheses 2-3.

H1: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-building progression will increase as states lose power relative to neighbors.

H2: State-building progression will be weaker in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power advantage. Worded differently, relative state-building progression will decrease as states lose power relative to neighbors.

*H3: State-building progression will be greater in states at a power advantage relative to their neighbors than in states at a power disadvantage relative to their neighbors.
Worded differently, state-building progression will increase in states as they gain power relative to their neighbors.*

Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Social/Economic Life – with Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓

Measure/Moderator	CINC								GDP								GNP							
	Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability	
	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No
Social/Economic Life – with Hegemons			-	+	na	na					+	+	na	na	+	+			+	+	na	na	+	+
Social/Economic Life – ex Hegemons			-	+	na	na					+	+	na	na	+	+			+	+	na	na	+	+

Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
Provide Infrastructure – with Hegemons				✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Provide Infrastructure – ex Hegemons	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓

Measure/Moderator	CINC								GDP								GNP							
	Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability	
	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No
Infrastructure – with Hegemons											+	+									+	+		
Infrastructure – ex Hegemons											+	+									+	+		

Measure	CINC			GDP			GNP		
	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3	H1	H2	H3
National Identity – with Hegemons	✓								
National Identity – ex Hegemons	✓								

Measure/Moderator	CINC								GDP								GNP							
	Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability		Neighborhood Conflict		Border Vulnerability		Cold War		Domestic Instability	
	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Long	Short	Yes	No	Yes	No
National Identity – with Hegemons	-	-			-	-					+	-			-	+			+	-			-	+
National Identity – ex Hegemons	-	-			-	-			+	-	+	-			-	+			+	-	-	+		

A.5 Summary and Conclusion

To account for the possibility that my data are autocorrelated, I re-ran tests conducted in Chapters 3 and 4, this time applying Prais-Winsten GLS rather than ordinary least squares regression. In this appendix I have reported the results of those tests. While the problem of autocorrelation may be overstated given that my data is cross-sectional, it turns out, in any case, that the Prais-Winsten replications do not diverge all that much from results generated by the application of OLS.

Bibliography

- Adebajo, Adekeye. "Pax West Africana? Regional Security Mechanisms." In *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, 291-318. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
- Adibe, Clement A. "Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Anglophone West Africa." In *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, 15-40. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001.
- Adu, A.L. "Post-Colonial Relationships." *African Affairs* 66 (1967): 295-309.
- African Development Report 2010*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Atack, Iain. "Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Intervention." *Security Dialogue* 33 (2002): 279-292.
- Atzili, Boaz. "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict." *International Security* 31 (2006/2007): 139-173.
- Ayoob, Mohammed. "From Regional System to Regional Society: Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 53 (1999): 247-260.
- Ayoob, Mohammed. "Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World." In *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, edited by Stephanie G. Neuman, 31-54. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
- Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Security Predicament*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.
- Azam, Jean-Paul. "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa." *Journal of Peace Research* 38 (2001): 429-444.
- Bardhan, Pranab. "Distributive Conflicts, Collective Action, and Institutional Economics." In *Frontiers of Development Economics*, edited by Gerald M. Meir and Joseph Stiglitz, 269-290. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2001.
- Bates, Robert H. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- Berman, Bruce J. "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism." *African Affairs* 97 (1998): 305-341.
- Bienen, Henry. "Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa." *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (1993): 271-282.

- Bienen, Henry, and Jeffrey Herbst. "The Relationship Between Political and Economic Reform in Africa." *Comparative Politics* 32 (1996): 23-42.
- Boahen, Adu A. *African Perspectives on Colonialism*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
- Boone, Catherine. "State Building in the African Countryside: Structure and Politics at the Grassroots." *The Journal of Development Studies* 34 (1998): 1-31.
- Bratton, Michael. "Deciphering Africa's Divergent Transitions." *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (1997): 67-93.
- Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Carment, David. "The International Dimension of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory." *Journal of Peace Research* 30 (1993): 137-150.
- Carothers, Thomas. "The Sequencing Fallacy." *Journal of Democracy* 18 (2007): 12-27.
- Carothers, Thomas. "The End of the Transition Paradigm." *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2002): 5-21.
- Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. Oxford: James Currey, 1999.
- Chege, Michael. "Sierra Leone: The State That Came Back From the Dead." *The Washington Quarterly* 25 (2002): 147-160.
- Clapham, Christopher. "Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies," In *African Guerrillas*, edited by Christopher Clapham, 1-18. Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 1998.
- Clapham, Christopher S. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Clark, John F. "Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa's International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era." In *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, edited by Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw, 85-102. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Collier, Paul. "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective." In *Greed and Grievance*, edited by Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, 91-112. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
- Connor, Walker. "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics* 24 (1972): 319-355.

- Crilly, Rob. "Save Darfur? The A-List Idealists May be Doing the Very Opposite." *The Telegraph* 7 April 2010.
- Cruise O'Brien, Donal B. "The Show of the State in a Neo-Colonial Twilight: Francophone Africa." In *Rethinking Third World Politics*, edited by James Manor, 145-165. New York: Longman Publishing, 1991.
- Cummings, Robert J. "Africa Between the Ages." *African Studies Review* 29 (1986): 1-26.
- Cutter, Charles H. *Africa*. Harpers Ferry: Stryker-Post Publications, 2004.
- David, Steven R. "Explaining Third World Alignment." *World Politics* 43 (1991): 233-256.
- Davis, Hunt R. "Interpreting the Colonial Period in African History." *African Affairs* 72 (1973): 383-400.
- Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman. *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996.
- Desch, Michael. "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" *International Organization* 50 (1996): 237-269.
- Diamond, Larry. "Class Formation in the Swollen African State." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25 (1987): 567-596.
- Eifert, Ben, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner. "Political Sources of Ethnic Identification in Africa." Afrobarometer Working Paper 89. December 2007.
- Ekeh, Peter P. "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17 (1975): 91-112.
- Emerson, Rupert. "The Problem of Identity, Selfhood, and Image in the New Nations." *Comparative Politics* 1 (1969): 297-312.
- Englebert, Pierre. "Solving the Mystery of the AFRICA Dummy." *World Development* 28 (2000): 1821-1835.
- Englebert, Pierre, Stacy Tarango, and Matthew Carter. "Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries." *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2002): 1093-1118.
- Englebert, Pierre, and Denis M. Tull. "Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa." *International Security* 32 (2008): 106-139.

- Eriksen, Stein Sundstol. "The Politics of State Formation: Contradictions and Conditions of Possibility." *The European Journal of Development Research* 17 (2005): 396-410.
- Eriksen, Stein Sundstol. "The Congo War and the Prospects for State Formation: Rwanda and Uganda Compared." *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005): 1097-1113.
- Esman, Milton J. *Ethnic Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
- Ezekwesili, Obiageli. "Can Africa Trade with Africa?"
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/can-africa-trade-with-africa>
- Feyissa, Dereje, and Markus Virgil Hoehne. "State Borders and Borderlands as Resources." In *Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne, 1-26. Suffolk: James Currey, 2010.
- Forrest, Joshua B. "The Quest for State Hardness in Africa." *Comparative Politics* 20 (1988): 423-442.
- Foster, Vivien, and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia. *Africa's Infrastructure*. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010.
- Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Congo Study Sets Estimate for Rapes Much Higher." *The New York Times* 11 May 2011.
- Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. *Fixing Failed States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart A. Bremer. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21 (2004): 133-154.
- Grant, Thomas D. "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 37 (1999): 403.
- Griffiths, Levan. "Permeable Boundaries in Africa." In *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities*, edited by Paul Nugent and A.I. Asiwaju. New York: Pinter, 1996.
- Hedges, Chris. *War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning*. New York: Anchor Books, 2002.
- Helman, Gerald B, and Steven R. Ratner. "Saving Failed States." *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1992-1993, 3-20.
- Hensel, Paul R. "Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict." In *What Do We Know About War?* edited by John A. Vasquez, 57-84. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000.

- Herbst, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. "Responding to State Failure in Africa." *International Security* 21 (1996-1997): 120-144.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. "War and the State in Africa." *International Security* 14 (1990): 117-139.
- Human Rights Watch. "Renewed Crisis in North Kivu." 23 October 2007.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "Why International Primacy Matters." In *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, 307-322. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999.
- Jackson, Robert H. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Jackson, Robert H. "Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of International Affairs* 46 (1992): 1-16.
- Jackson, Robert H. "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World." *International Organization* 44 (1987): 519-549.
- Jackson, Robert H, and Carl G. Rosberg. *Personal Rule in Black Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
- Jones, Daniel M, Stuart M. Bremer, and J. David Singer. "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Studies* 15 (1996): 163-213.
- Joseph, Richard. "Democratization in Africa After 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives." *Comparative Politics* 29 (1997): 363-382.
- Joseph, Richard. "Africa: States in Crisis." *Journal of Democracy* 14 (2003): 159-170.
- "Kenyans Rearming for 2012 Poll." BBC News.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8293745.stm>
- Keohane, Robert O. "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War." In *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, edited by David A. Baldwin, 269-300. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
- Khadiagala, Gilbert M, and Terrence Lyons. "Foreign Policy Making in Africa: An Introduction." In *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, 1-13. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001.

- Klitsgaard, Robert. *Adjusting to Reality: Beyond "State versus Market" in Economic Development*. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991.
- Kuper, Leo. "Genocide and the Plural Society." In *Ethnicity*, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 262-269. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Landsberg, Christopher. "The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism." In *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
- Lemarchand, Rene. "Foreign Policymaking in the Great Lakes Region." In *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, 87-106. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001.
- Lemarchand, Rene. *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*. New York: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996.
- Lemarchand, Rene. "Burundi in Comparative Perspective: Dimensions of Ethnic Strife." In *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, edited by John McGarry and Brendan O' Leary, 151-171. London: Routledge, 1993.
- Lemke, Douglas. "African Lessons for International Relations Research." *World Politics* 56 (2003): 114-138.
- Lemke, Douglas. *Regions of War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Leonard, David K, and Scott Straus. *Africa's Stalled Development*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003.
- Levy, Jack S. "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique." In *Handbook of War Studies*, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky, 259-288. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
- Leys, Colin. *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- Linz, Juan J, and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Makinda, Samuel M. "Democracy and Multi-Party Politics in Africa." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 34 (1996): 555-573.
- McGarry, John, and Brendan O' Leary. "Eliminating and Managing Ethnic Differences." In *Ethnicity*, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 333-340. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

- Mengisteab, Kidane. "Africa's Intrastate Conflicts: Relevance and Limitations of Diplomacy." *African Issues* 31 (2004): 25-39.
- Mertus, Julie. "Beyond Borders: The Human Rights Imperative for Intervention in Kosovo." *Human Rights Review* 1 (2000): 78-87.
- Migdal, Joel S. *States in Society: Studying How States Transform and Constitute One Another*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Migdal, Joel S. *Strong Societies and Weak States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Miller, Benjamin. "When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace." *International Studies Review* 7 (2005): 229-267.
- Munro, William A. "Power, Peasants, and Political Development: Reconsidering State Construction in Africa." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38 (1996): 112-148.
- Ndumbe, Anyu J. "Diamonds, Ethnicity, and Power: The Case of Sierra Leone." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12 (2001): 90-105.
- Neuman, Stephanie G. "International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?" In *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, edited by Stephanie G. Neuman, 1-29. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
- Ng'ethe, Njuguna. "Strongmen, State Formation, Collapse, and Reconstruction in Africa." In *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, edited by I. William Zartman, 251-266. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995.
- Niemann, Michael. "War Making and State Making in Central Africa." *Africa Today* 53 (2007): 21-39.
- Olorunsola, Victor A. "State Responses to Disintegration: Withdrawal and Adjustments In the Political Economy." In *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, edited by Donald S. Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, 189-207. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
- Ottaway, Marina. "Nation Building." *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002.
- Polgreen, Lydia. "Fighting in Congo Rekindles Ethnic Hatreds." *The New York Times* 10 January 2008.
- Posner, Daniel N. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

- Preece, Jennifer Jackson. "Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms." *Human Rights Quarterly* 20 (1998): 817-842.
- Przeworski, Adam. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." In *The Democracy Sourcebook*, edited by Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub, 12-17. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.
- Ray, Donald I, and E. Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal. "The New Relevance of Traditional Authorities in Africa." *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 37/38 (1996): 1-38.
- Reno, William. "Clandestine Economies, Violence, and States in Africa." *Journal of International Affairs* 53 (2000): 433-460.
- Reno, William S.K. "Mines, Money, and the Problem of State-Building in Congo." *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 26 (1998): 14-17.
- Reno, William. "War, Markets, and the Reconfiguration of West Africa's Weak States." *Comparative Politics* 29 (1997): 493-510.
- Rotberg, Robert I. "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure." *The Washington Quarterly* 25 (2002): 83-96.
- Rothchild, Donald, and Michael Foley. "African States and the Politics of Inclusive Coalitions." In *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, edited by Donald S. Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, 233-264. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
- Rothchild, Donald. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
- Rule, James B. *Theories of Civil Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Russett, Bruce, and Thomas W. Graham. "Public Opinion and National Security Policy: Relationships and Impacts." In *Handbook of War Studies*, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky, 239-257. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics* 2 (1970): 337-363.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D. "Tropical Underdevelopment." CID Working Paper No. 57.
- Saideman, Stephen M. "Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (2002): 27-50.

- Saideman, Stephen M. *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Samatar, Abdi Ismail. "Botswana: Comprehending the Exceptional State." In *The African State: Reconsiderations*, edited by Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar, 17-51. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (2001): 259-282.
- Schneider, Friedrich, Andreas Buehn, and Claudio E. Montenegro. "Shadow Economies All Over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007." Policy Research Working Paper 5253.
- Senese, Paul D. "Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict: Assessing a New Joint Explanation." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2005): 769-779.
- Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad. "Sudan: The Authoritarian State." In *The African State: Reconsiderations*, edited by Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed Ismail Samatar. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002.
- Sorensen, Georg. "War and State-Making: Why Doesn't it Work in the Third World?" *Security Dialogue* 32 (2001): 341-354.
- Southall, Roger. "The Scramble for Africa and the Marginalisation of African Capitalism." In *A New Scramble for Africa?* edited by Roger Southall and Henning Melber, 357-385. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009.
- Stark, Frank M. "Theories of Contemporary State Formation in Africa: A Reassessment." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24 (1986): 335-347.
- Tarrow, Sidney. *Power in Movement*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Taylor, Brian D, and Roxana Botea. "Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World." *International Studies Review* 10 (2008): 27-56.
- "Tea and Talk on the Edge of War." *The Economist*, 8 November 2001.
- Thies, Cameron G. "War, Rivalry, and State-Building in Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2005): 451-465.
- Thies, Cameron G. "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 53-72.

- Thomas, George M., John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli. *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1987.
- Tilly, Charles. "Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization." *Sociological Theory* 18 (2000): 1-16.
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States*. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992.
- Tilly, Charles. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 169-191. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978.
- Van de Walle, Nicolas. "The Economic Correlates of State Failure: Taxes, Foreign Aid, and Policies." In *When States Fail*, edited by Robert I. Rotberg, 94-115. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Vasquez, John A. "Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality." *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (1995): 277-293.
- Von Hippel, Karin. "Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation-Building." *The Washington Quarterly* 23 (2000): 95-112.
- Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
- Weiner, Myron. "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows." *International Security* 21 (1996): 5-42.
- Welsh, David. "Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa." *International Affairs* 72 (1996): 477-491.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46 (1992): 391-425.
- Williams Jr., Robin M. "The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International Perspectives." *Annual Review of Sociology* 20 (1994): 49-79.
- Wiseman, John A. "Leadership and Personal Danger in African Politics." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31 (1993): 657-660.

Yepes, Tito, Justin Pierce, and Vivien Foster. "Making Sense of Africa's Infrastructure Endowment: A Benchmarking Approach." Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Working Paper 1 (2008).

Young, Crawford. *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.