ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:	THE ETHNIC COMMUNITY: URBAN FORM, PEACE, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE IN URBAN INDIA
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What causes some cities to have higher levels of ethnic violence than others do? This research explores whether the urban form affects the level of ethnic violence in a city.

Here, the term urban form refers to identifiable physical characteristics of a city: paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks. Contemporary understanding of the physical city, as a determinant of outcomes or even as a target in ethnic violence is very limited. Although ethnic conflict is a prominent global phenomenon, ethnic violence occurs in some narrow streets and crowded neighborhoods, but not others. In addition, social scientists have focused on the ethnicization of urban spaces, but its effect on levels of ethnic violence is largely unstudied.

The central hypothesis is that cities where the urban form is "ethnicized" are more likely to experience violent ethnic conflict than cities where the urban form is largely shared, secular, or multiethnic.

India is a rapidly urbanizing globalized country with much ethnic diversity, features typical of many post-colonial nations in the global Southeast. The study involved a simultaneous ethnographic, geographic, and spatial comparison of two Indian cities, Surat and Ahmedabad, and the Hindu-Muslim ethnic relations in those cities. Ahmedabad has experienced the most Hindu-Muslim violence of any Indian city (using number of violence-related deaths as a measure). In contrast, Surat has been peaceful. This disparity is especially interesting since Surat and Ahmedabad are part of the same Indian state with similar linguistic, political, and demographic features. These questions are addressed through an analysis of semi-structured interviews and cognitive mapping exercises. The study includes 66 respondents: 36 in Surat and 30 in Ahmedabad.

The research concludes that the urban form is an important factor in ethnic conflict. This finding has several research and policy implications which include a shift in the way various practitioners operate in the urban context.

THE ETHNIC COMMUNITY: URBAN FORM, PEACE, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE IN
URBAN INDIA

By

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Dedication

To Maria Nemeth and Aai

December 14th

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"I dare not touch the problem of Hindu-Moslem unity. It has passed out of human hands and has been transferred to God's hands alone."

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Young India, January 13th, 1927)

On the morning of February 27th, 2002 in Godhra, Gujarat-- the Sabarmati Express pulled into the Godhra railway station. A mundane morning soon transformed into something tragic and monstrous. The event is now known in India simply as Godhra, and Godhra, the town, is known simply for the event. Versions differ, but allegedly a mob of 2000 Muslims attacked the train just after it left the station and set fire to one of its compartments. Fifty-nine people, including twenty-seven women and ten children were burnt to death. The crowded setting notwithstanding, it is hard to obtain a clear picture of exactly what happened. Conspiracy theories from media and political parties are plentiful. One side suggests that the attack was a false-flag attack by Hindu nationalists with an eye on the upcoming state elections. On the other hand there are suggestions of an international conspiracy orchestrated by Pakistan's infamous intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Others offer more innocuous explanations, such as an accidental fire or a small altercation, along ethno-religious lines, growing into something that no one could control. In the absence of the objective truth about an event it becomes difficult to understand reasons for that event. Without the 'what' it is hard to answer the 'why'. Years later, the narratives related to the Godhra train burning incident remain deeply contested.

More important than the event, it was what happened, and did not happen, after Godhra that sets the ground for this dissertation. In the days that followed, Gujarat saw the worst ethnic violence since the tumultuous days of the post-Babri Masjid [1] riots of 1992-93. In 2005, the Indian government released the official figures--790 Muslims and 254 Hindus were killed, 223 reported missing and another 2,500 injured[2]. Then in 2009, the official death toll was revised to a total of 1180 with some of the missing declared dead after the stipulated seven-year period[3]. The unofficial figures vary wildly, with claims of 2000-5000 Muslims being killed.

Most of the violence was concentrated in cities. Among the cities, Ahmedabad saw the worst violence. Surat, however, was relatively quiet. In Ahmedabad there were reports of mobs 10,000 strong attacking Muslim neighborhoods. In Surat, apart from the occasional clash or arson, nothing much happened. To describe Surat as 'peaceful' would be folly, but peace and violence, like most things, can be relative.

This dissertation, thus, investigates this significant local variance in levels of violence and the role of the physical city in this variance. What follows ahead is a comparison of the interethnic attitudes and urban form in Ahmedabad and Surat. This dissertation explores the role of the urban form in ethnic conflict and violence. As described later in

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[1] In 1992 Hindu nationalists demolished a Mosque in Ayodhya. The Mosque was commissioned by a Mughal emperor Babur in 1527 A.D. on the site of a demolished Hindu temple. The Babri Masjid riots were the worst riots in India's history since 1947 (partition of India).
[2] Source: BBC- 11 May, 2005 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4536199.stm)
[3] Source: The Times of India- 16 Feb, 2009 (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Gujarat-riots-toll-to-go-up-from-952-to-1180/articleshow/4133625.cms)

this chapter and in greater detail in Chapter 2, this dissertation uses a spatial lens to look at ethnic relationships: friendly, conflictual, or murderous.

The Research Project

Amidst growing awareness that ethnic conflict is largely urban and localized this dissertation asks two questions:

> 1. What causes some cities to have higher levels of ethnic violence than others do?

> 2. Does the urban form affect the level of ethnic violence in a city?

To answer these questions: First, the dissertation compares the interethnic attitudes and urban forms in the two cities, Surat and Ahmedabad. Second, it provides an understanding of the role of the urban form in ethnic conflict.

Presented below are the following parts of the dissertation:

- Context
- Need
- Hypothesis
- Definitions
- Conceptual Framework

Context

"The growth of cities will be the single largest influence on development in the 21st century". These were the opening words of UNFPA's (United Nations Population Fund) 1996 State of World Population Report. In 2008, for the first time in human history, more than half the people in the world were living in cities. According to the World Bank, the "developing world" adds nearly 70 million new urban residents each year and accounts for 90% of the urban growth (World Bank, 2009). As the world is rapidly urbanizing, ethnic identity and along with it ethnic conflict have regained prominence (Fox, 2004; Marty & Appleby, 1991, 1993, 1994) In India, for instance, there is a tendency to view the Hindu-Muslim conflict as a pan-India phenomenon; however, more than 90% of the deaths related to this violence occur in urbanized areas (Wilkinson, 2004), while 69% of the population is rural (Indian Census, 2011). This suggests that the characteristics of the cities, in particular two facets of cities, namely the urban form and interethnic attitudes, may affect conflict/peace and vice-versa. Human interactions occur in a spatial setting. The built environment provides various opportunities for human interactions. There is considerable awareness of the role of the physical city on urban crime. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), suggests that simple interventions such as street lighting, narrower streets, windows facing the street, and the like have a significant impact on crime. Indeed, most people are aware of their surroundings and can identify safe and unsafe areas just as potential offenders rely on spatial cognition to pick targets. A crime is a complex event. It occurs when four things come together: a law, an offender, a victim and a place. (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993). The above definition of crime

includes the importance of the environment, which is, more often than not, the built environment.

Indeed, the environment is integral to any social event. The research thus began with a simple question:

If the urban form can measurably affect levels of crime, could it also be influential in larger urban issues such as ethnic urban violence?

Collective violence represents a forceful decision. Through violence, mobs and even governments enforce an "ethnically guided spatial change" (Yiftachel, 2006). For instance, when a mob destroys a mosque it destroys not only a place of worship but also a cultural space; gone are the kebab or Koran sellers around it and often the incentives to rebuild that mosque. This violence thus affects the urban form. In turn, the urban form also affects levels of ethnic violence. This reciprocal relationship of urban form and ethnic violence may be crucial to understanding ethno-urban conflict, including the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India.

Ethnic violence extracts a terrible cost, in property, relationships, and lives in India. Thus, the subject of the Hindu-Muslim conflict has been the focus of many scholarly analyses. Scholars explain the violence using various conceptual frameworks. Brass (1997, 2003) suggests that the history of these ethnic groups provides ample fuel for violence and that a small excuse can lead to a violent episode. This suggestion of history and historical grievances as a motivator comes up in many ethnic conflicts. History, however, is not set in stone, but is rather fluid and changes with the present. An example from Indian history from William Dalrymple's book "Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42"

is particularly illustrative here: during the British campaigns of Afghanistan, Governer

General of British India Lord Ellenborough through his reading of James Mill's History

of India - a book which Mill famously wrote "without ever bothering to visit India,

knowing any Indians or learning any Indian languages" - had absorbed the entirely false

idea that the doors of the tomb of Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030) were the legendary

sandalwood gates that the Sultan had allegedly stolen while looting the great Hindu

temple of Somnath in Gujarat." To impress the local Hindu population and the Hindu

princes of British power and how the 800 year old insult was avenged by their British

rulers, "the gates were duly paraded around India". This fanfare received, "no reaction

from the Indian princes, and still less from the Hindus, neither of whom had been aware

that they were missing any gates." A parade of an allegedly stolen Hindu temple gate

returned from Islamic Afganistan[4] would become cause for a nationalist celebration in the

more ethnically charged atmosphere of the 21st century, truth of the gate's authenticity

notwithstanding[5]. This reactivation of a "chosen trauma" causes what Volkan (1998) calls

"time collapse". In time collapse the reading of the history becomes very selective,

people forget the peace of yesterday and focus on the trauma from centuries ago. Time

collapse also involves "equating the past enemy with the current one", in India, for

instance Hindus can equate their neighborhood Muslim tea-seller to the thousand year old

Afghan raider Mahmud of Ghazni. Tambiah (1996) also postulates that memories of the

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[4] The preferred nation though, for many Hindu-nationalist, would be Pakistan.
[5] In the Hindu nationalist infleunced India there is a rewriting of history to exonerate all the atrocities committed by Hindu rulers on their Hindu subjects and implicate all the Islamic rulers, similiarly across the border in Pakistan foreign raiders, such as the aforementioned Mahmud of Ghazni have been accorder hero status just due to their claim of being Islamic even though their raids were devastating for the then Muslim populations. Since spoils of war inspired many of the raids more than any religious fervor.

past and its events become instigators of new events. So historical events, real or mythical, are used to invoke a sense of injustice or conflict which leads to violence. Some scholars focus on the role of electoral politics in the continuation of the violent conflict (Shah, 2004; Wilkinson, 2004). The 2002 riots are often seen as an example of the role of electoral politics in the violence. The right-wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) allegedly used the violence to garner more votes by projecting itself as a protector of Hindus and as a victim of conspiracies. The BJP won 10 more seats in the Gujarat assembly than their previous haul of 117 seats in 1998. However, violence can also become a narrative of governmental failure to protect citizens and there are considerable risks involved with instigating such violence, especially as a ruling party. Violence for electoral gains requires a very high degree of sophistication. Others suggest that rapid globalization and neo-liberal economic policies play a role in the conflict (Chatterjee, 2009). There are attempts to explain this conflict in light of declining civic institutions (Engineer, 2003; Oommen, 2008; Varshney, 2002). In Ahmedabad, Varshney contends that the decline of the labor unions combined with the decline of the Congress Party led to a fraying of Hindu-Muslim relationships. There are also suggestions that the violence represents a social contract periodically enforced (Berenschot, 2009). Violence here is seen as a mechanism to put certain groups in their place. This idea ties in well with the fact of rapid socio-economic change due to globalization. In such a case a traditionally weaker community may gain economic superiority or political dominance and hence another community may use violence as a tool to maintain the status quo.

Need for this study

It is tempting to view the Hindu-Muslim conflict, which bears the legacy of the slaughter of nearly a million people during India's partition in 1947, as a national or even sub-continental phenomenon. This conflict may threaten regional or even global peace but as shown later, its immediate effects are typically local. This threat to regional or global peace comes from the scalability of the rhetoric from Hindu-Muslim to India-Pakistan. The two nuclear-armed nations have already fought four wars in the last seven decades. A fifth war that could potentially suck in powers like China, United States, Russia, and the Arab world may be unlikely but by no means impossible. While a global scale conflict may be unlikely, a small conflict with Pakistan also has the potential to inflame ethnic passions within India. Of course, neither World War 3 nor an ethnic civil war in India is a foregone conclusion, indeed the opposite may be also be true where improving Hindu-Muslim relationships could foster peace between India and Pakistan, or vice-versa India-Pakistan peace may promote greater ethnic amity within India. Either way, the stakes remain incredibly high.

Thus, research about the Hindu-Muslim conflict is, not surprisingly, plentiful. Most of this research focuses on the history of the violence and its sociological causes. There is now, however, a growing awareness of the urban nature of violence (Varshney, 2003). However, few researchers have bothered to focus on urban peace. And it is the violent and divided cities, like Ahmedabad, that attract much more scholarship. Researchers hone in on factors such as declining textile industry (Mahadevia, 2007), political patronage (Berenschot, 2008), institutionalized discrimination (Desai, 2010; Jaffrelot & Thomas,

2012), ghettoization and borders (Mahadevia, 2007), or cultural issues (Shah, 2015) as sources for the conflict in Ahmedabad. However, the lack of comparative studies bears the risk of mistaking correlation for causality.

Varshney (2003) is an exception to this trend and instead provides a comparative analysis of cities with urban peace and violence. He even compares Surat and Ahmedabad, the cities that are the focus of this research. Varshney posits that differences in civic life in these cities explain the difference in the levels of ethnic violence. However, he does not take the "spatial turn" and treats the cities as abstract entities formed entirely by social and economic networks. In contrast, De & Desai (2003) do include geographical aspects in their exploration on the territorial rivalries within Surat and Vadodara (also known as Baroda). However, even this study does not involve itself with the more localized aspects of the urban form.

In divided cities, the ethnicity of any urban form may be a matter of dispute. An unclaimed, un-ethnicized[6] structure may be lost to the others. Chatterjee (2009) describes how Muslim landmarks were 'Hinduized' during the violence of 2002. The physical form of the city thus becomes a weapon, a trophy, and symbol. Despite the centrality of the physical city, at least as a theater of conflict, at this point very little is understood about the role of the physical form of the city. A more comprehensive and comparative picture of the urban form, its ethnicization and its interaction with ethnic conflict is needed for understanding the nature of ethnic conflict in cities.

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[6] For the purpose of this research ethnicization is defined as: The ascription of an ethnic identity. A detailed definition is provided later in this chapter.

So, within the regional and global threats lies a much localized reality. In India, eight cities together account for 45.5% of all urban riots related deaths from 1950 to 1995 (Varshney, 2002). This figure is even higher (around 51%) once we add the 2002 Ahmedabad riots. As Varshney (2002) points out, this variation in the levels of violence is perplexing and prompts a comparative study of ethnic peace and conflict.

Hypothesis

The central hypothesis is that cities where the urban form is "ethnicized" are more likely to experience violent ethnic conflict than cities where the urban form is largely shared, secular, or multiethnic. An ethnicized urban form "makes certain choices more likely than others" (Krupat, 1985). An ethnicized urban form indicates a lack of shared places and hence a lack of shared experiences. Violence exaggerates these differences and compels groups to "ethnicize" the urban form even more for defense, defiance, or dominance. The dissertation thus relies on two sets of hypotheses, one concerned with interethnic attitudes and other with the urban form: It is hypothesized that the interethnic attitudes in Ahmedabad and Surat will be similar. However, the urban form, as described by the respondents will be different and Surat will have lower levels of ethnicization as compared to Ahmedabad.

As the following chapters will show the urban form is significant to the study of ethnic violence, as an indicator of interethnic attitudes and relationships and facilitator of violence. The interethnic attitudes, however, play a far more significant role in ethnic violence and hence no clear causal links can be immediately established between ethnic violence and urban form, although the correlations are strong.

Definitions

Key terms are briefly defined here. Chapter 2 includes an in-depth discussion of the literature that informs these definitions.

Ethnicity

For the purpose of this research, ethnicity is seen as a concept that occupies the social sphere, at once as a primordial and a constructed social concept. Primordial ethnicity pertains to the idea of ethnicity based largely on geography and race where it is considered natural and immutable. Primordial ethnicity thrives in isolation. Constructed ethnicity is symbolic and thrives in contrast. Ethnicity is thus a method of classifying individuals/groups and defining group boundaries using common ancestry, mythology, history, kinship, religion, language, shared territory, and/or geographic origin and is primordial and/or constructed.

Ethnic Identity

Ethnic identity is identification or labelling of a person or place based on their ethnicity. It can be adopted by the individual or group or assigned by outsiders and is defined mainly in terms of difference and contrast with another similar social identity. Ethnic identity can change but its importance relies on contrast.

Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict is a dispute between two or more parties where ethnic identity is the primary mark of membership on either side of the dispute. Not all ethnic conflicts result in violence. The cause of an ethnic conflict may be a dispute about resources or territory, but the narrative of the conflict is primarily ethnic. Additionally, in such cases the

resolution of the resource or territorial disputes does not automatically resolve the ethnic conflict.

Ethnic Violence

Ethnic violence is the intentional and targeted use of physical force across an ethnic divide, by one or multiple parties, involved in an ethnic conflict. The method and scale of ethnic violence can vary without affecting its intentionality. The scale of the violence can range from a street level skirmish to genocide; similarly the methods can range from protests to terrorist attacks. Simply put, in ethnic violence, the perceived identity of the victim is the most important motivator of violence.

Ethnicization

Ethnicization is the ascription of an ethnic identity.

Ethnicization of the urban form is assigning an ethnic identity to a physical structure in the city that is not necessarily or inherently ethnic. Ethnicization is the extent to which ethnic identity dominates the overall identity of any element of the urban form.

Urban Form

The urban form is the physical characteristic of an urban area consisting of one or more of the following identifiable physical elements: paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks. At its simplest, the urban form refers to the physical city.

Conceptual Framework

The framework of this dissertation relies on two important terms: Interethnic attitudes and the urban form.

Interethnic attitudes

Franzoi (2000) defines an attitude as a "positive or negative evaluation of an object". An interethnic attitude is the positive or negative evaluation of the members of one ethnic group by the members of another ethnic group. An attitude represents more than just a belief or a perception about the other, rather interethnic attitude involves an emotional investment.

Triandis (1971) describes an attitude, "as an idea charged with emotion which predisposes a class of actions to a particular class of social situations" (p.2). So, an attitude is an actionable belief, individuals and groups may not follow through with action but the potential for action remains. Group attitudes may or may not represent an aggregation of individual attitudes. Sometime group attitudes are a result of an underlying culture or religious dogma. There may be myths or orthodoxies that individuals of the group do not believe in but the group does. Interethnic attitudes influence every social situation where ethnicity is of salience. Like individual attitudes, interethnic attitudes too have the following components:

Cognitive- Represents awareness of the other ethnicity and one's own ethnicity as contrasted against the other's ethnicity.

Affective-Represents a comparative positive or negative view of the other as benchmarked against the affect towards one's own ethnic group. For instance, the morality of the other is measured against a benchmark set by one's own group.

Behavioral- The behavioral aspects of interethnic attitudes manifest in multiple ways depending upon the opportunity and need to express the cognitive and the affective.

Groups may have positive or negative feelings for another ethnicity but if their paths do not cross then there is no need for any noteworthy behavior. The way a group actually acts towards another ethnic group ultimately represents how invested one group is in another's fate. A negative view of the other ethnic group thus does not always translate into exclusion and violence.

The behavior related to interethnic attitudes is the strongest predictor of the outcomes of an ethnic conflict. This is to say that actions speak louder than words or attitudes. Citing Gurr (1969), Horowitz (2001) describes how ethnic violence in the West declined after the Second World War. The absence of serious repression and a general disapproval of lethal violence are seen as factors that contribute to the lower levels of violence. In the US for instance, the black-white divide remains the most significant cleavage with apprehensions about the other group on either side but the negative interethnic attitudes are weakened in absence of serious ethnic violence and overt repression.

Urban Form

There is an increasing focus on the physical aspects of the city in urban issues by social scientists. However, while there are suggestions that spatial planning and urban design can be used for peace building (Charlesworth, 2006; Bollens, 2006) and beliefs that that "poor planning" can lead to violence (Yusuf, 2012), as yet there is no framework to test these beliefs about the role of the physical city.

The urban form, as described here, lends itself as an apt framework to research ethnic violence in urban areas for the reasons stated below:

1. The city is a physical entity and is composed of the five elements of urban form:

paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks. These elements are universal i.e.,

every city's urban form is composed of the same elements.

2. People assign meaning to these elements. This meaning can be personal or social,

so the narratives people have about their cities include tales and memories of

streets, borders, neighborhoods, transit points, and important landmarks.

3. The five elements of the urban form afford an opportunity to study the city using

a coherent kit of parts and not as a whole. Using the five elements, one can

construct what Lynch (1960) calls an image of the city.

The Current Research

The research design is qualitative and comparative. The design is focused on

investigating attitudes and spatial characteristics of two cities. This dissertation defines

qualitative research as a research approach that collects data about individual responses

and reactions to events, people, and places and analyzes said data with an aim to preserve

the complexity and subjectivity of the data whilst presenting an actionable picture of

reality. A comparative case study approach allows the research to avoid confusing

correlation for causality. Here a comparative case study is a comparison of attitudes and

urban forms in the two cities using the case study method. The case study method treats

each city as an independent case during data collection but compares and contrasts the

data to answer questions about the constants in the two cases i.e., urban form and

interethnic attitudes. The comparison is especially crucial because in the cases of an

event, like ethnic violence, it is easy to look at preceding conditions in a city and assign causality to singular factors.

Qualitative research is also very useful given the absence of reliable data about the violence in India. The data attached to the violence are unreliable because of two reasons: 1) they are typically contested along ethnic or political lines; 2) the data are often released long after public perceptions regarding the violence are already formed. Thus, there is healthy skepticism and/or apathy towards such data. Anecdotes and perceptions of the violence dictate decisions and attitudes more than numbers. Even in parts of the world where reliable data is collected and accepted people typically value anecdotes over statistics (Kahneman, 2011). Statistics of casualties or property do not have a bearing on how individuals perceive these events. These numbers also cannot capture the public perception of the events and the power that these perception have over future directions.

To explain the local variance in violence and the role of the urban form in ethnic conflict, this dissertation investigated the effect of the urban form on interethnic attitudes. The research primarily relied on semi-structured interviews and cognitive mapping with respondents. The research focused on the differences in attitudes of Hindus and Muslims living in homogenous and heterogeneous neighborhoods.

To gather this information, the respondents were asked questions about their attitudes towards the other group and their understanding and perception about the urban form. A variety of questions probed various aspects of interethnic attitudes. Questions were related to religiosity, food, friendship, perceptions and stereotypes, intermarriage,

violence, and the ethnic relationship. Respondents were also asked about their

perceptions of the ethnicity of the urban form elements.

The analysis of these responses provides an insight into the differences in perceptions

between Suratis and Ahmedabadis. It highlights how people view members of the other

ethnic group and their cities. An analysis of these differences helps identify the

significance of the urban form in ethnic conflict and ethnic violence. The research

provides an understanding of how ethnic identities of individuals, groups, and cities are

formed in the midst of violence, conflict, and peace.

Conflict and violence are sustained by interethnic attitudes and fostered within a

physical city. Harmful interethnic attitudes are not a unique phenomenon but in some

cities the pathways to lethal violence from such attitudes are too short. How do such

cities differ from other cities with similar characteristics where the pathways to violence

are less direct? This is a crucial question and this dissertation provides a critical part of

that answer.

A Map of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized as follows:

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter provides an understanding of the key terms, like ethnicity, urban form,

ethnicization, ethnic conflict, and the general circumstances of the conflict in India. The

chapter reviews previous cross-disciplinary frameworks and methods used to study ethnic

conflict and violence, especially in India. The chapter highlights the gaps in the literature that this dissertation will fill.

Chapter 3: Surat and Ahmedabad: History and Geography

Like the previous chapter, which broadly addresses the conflict in India, this chapter addresses the specific issues related to the two cases. This chapter provides a brief introduction to the history and geography of the two cities. The chapter presents parts of the two cities crucial to understanding the research that follows. It merges previous scholarly research about the two cities with observations in the field.

Chapter 4: Research Design: Locus, Populace, and Narratives

This chapter outlines the research design and the rationale in detail. Additionally it highlights the neighborhood profiles in the two cities and presents four respondent vignettes as a reminder of the individual narratives in the study of groups.

Chapter 5: Results and Answers

This chapter answers questions that help test the hypothesis. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first, chapter 5A pertains to interethnic attitudes and 5B to the urban form. The four questions that help test the hypothesis are presented below; the importance of these questions is discussed in Chapter 5.

1. *What are the primary similarities and differences in the interethnic attitudes in the two cities?*

2. *What are the predominant beliefs about the last episode of violence*

amongst Hindus and Muslims? What are the salient differences between

these beliefs?

3. *How do Hindus and Muslims perceive the ethnicization in their respective*

   cities?

4. *What are the differences in the urban form and in ethnicization of urban*

   form in the two cities?

Based on the answers to these questions, the following chapter addresses the importance

of the urban form in the study of ethnic violence in cities.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter presents the importance of the urban form in a study of ethnic violence in

cities. It answers the question of why the urban form matters and what can be done with

that knowledge. The final discussion offers policy and methodological recommendations

for planners, designers, researchers, and urban stakeholders.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

This review highlights what is known about ethnic conflict[7] and urban form. Within this broad framework the investigation focuses on ethnic violence in Indian cities. The review also examines the meanings of terms that form the framework of the dissertation. Terms like ethnicity or ethnic conflict, are used in different academic disciplines, therefore it is important to present the way in which these terms are used in this dissertation. The first purpose of this review, then, is to explore existing literature on the terms related to ethnic conflict in cities. Also, it will explore the literature about the urban form as part of the physical city. The second purpose is to highlight the need to study the urban basis of ethnic violence. The third purpose is to highlight the limitations of the current literature, vis-à-vis the following issues:

a) Role of the physical city in ethnic conflict.

b) The limitations of the literature on ethnic conflict in India with a focus on Ahmedabad in Gujarat.

Finally, the review concludes with the role of this dissertation and directions for future research about ethnic violence in cities.

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[7] Used here as violent and non-violent conflict. Violent conflict is specified as ethnic violence wherever mentioned.

Research on Urban Ethnic Conflict: Terms, Concepts, and Causes

Ethnic conflict gains attention especially when it is accompanied by violence. Conflict without violence can go unnoticed. In some cases this violence can also turn lethal. It is difficult to trace the causes of what Horowitz (2002) calls the "murder of strangers by crowds" alluding to both the lethal ethnic violence and the amplification of ethnic conflict following such violence.

The chapter discusses the central concepts related to urban ethnic conflict, namely ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and ethnic violence. This is followed by a discussion of the urban form. Finally, the chapter focuses on ethnicization in the urban context.

Ethnicity

Here ethnicity is defined as a method of identifying individuals/groups (Levine, 1999) based on real or imagined origins of a group. This idea of value of origins are often related to primordialism, which treats group origins as natural. Ethnicity is thus based on primordial assumptions but is also constructed. The constructed phase of ethnicity relies on defining group boundaries (Barth, 1969) using primordial ideas of common ancestry, mythology, history, kinship, religion, language, shared territory, and/or geographic origin.

Ethnicity is a critical concept because it is hard to escape in human society. Not only does it have its origins in ancient, even prehistoric human society in the form of some primordial groups, but where it is not present it gets invented. The invention of ethnicity takes place partly for convenience and partly for defining the self (group or individual).

Sometimes these inventions can also be imposed, as was the case with many colonized societies where artificial ethnicities were invented based on some notion of primordial differences between groups. Some of these inventions are now wholeheartedly accepted by the groups as purely primordial. These inventions of ethnicity are continuous new sects, geographic groups, where imagined ancient histories continually make their presence felt. As an example consider the religious ethnicity which is a curious force within ethnicity. If a new religion or sect comes up today (constructed ethnicity), it can have an ancient being as its titular head (primordial origins). An existing or ancient primordial ethnic group can be a friend or an enemy (defining boundaries). The argument then becomes "we are the (new) followers of the ancient one and this is our ethnicity". The developing in-group/out-group dynamic further defines the boundaries of the new ethnicity. This is an instance of constructed ethnicity with primordial fantasies. The ethnic group can consider itself ancient or natural as soon as the boundaries are well defined. This is not ethnicity but rather the process of ethnicity. And ethnicity is a living concept whose survival depends on two or more groups being involved.

Ethnicity is hard to define and forces people to invent multiple definitions from multiple perspectives and each field of science and social science offers its own interpretation of ethnicity. Thus the term ethnicity not only has multiple definitions (polysemous) but also can be synonymous with other terms, such as race, religion etc. (Green 2006). The term ethnicity is correctly synonymous with race, religion, national origins, geographic origins etc. indeed the structure of ethnicity can be built on any foundation no matter how removed from a primordial origin. Purists of race, religion etc. may wish to parse it away

from ethnicity, and indeed these concepts are independent concepts but enough parts of these concepts act like ethnicity to suggest that they can be ethnicity. Nagel (1994) suggests a model of ethnicity that stresses the "fluid, situational, volitional, and dynamic character of ethnic identification". She argues for a model that emphasizes a "constructed" view of ethnicity that emerges from a negotiation with the "other". This negotiation with the other is seen in India, where the Hindu ethnicity or ethnic identity is strengthened as a response to the appearance of the foreign other in the form of the Muslims. According to Levine (1999), ethnicity is that method of classifying people (both self and other) that uses origin (socially constructed) as its primary reference.

For the purpose of this research ethnicity is seen as a concept that occupies the social sphere at once as a primordial and a constructed social concept. The primordialist view, which treats ethnicity as natural, often "situates ethnicity in the psyche, so deeply that society and culture are bent to its will" (Levine, 1999). Primordialist explanations of ethnicity are largely discounted now (Chandra, 2001); however, it still forms the basis of a constructed ethnicity. Ethnicity is often perceived to be primordial by the ethnic groups, especially in conflict, even though most of the meanings surrounding an ethnicity are social constructs. The adopted or ascribed narratives that bind members of the group together create these perceptions. Even if one sees ethnicity as constructed, the narratives surrounding it are primordial. These narratives are both, self-imposed and ascribed. As Barth (1969) notes, to understand ethnicity one must understand the ethnic boundary between two or more ethnicities; for him, "the critical focus of investigation becomes the ethnic boundary and not the cultural stuff that it encloses" (p. 5). For Barth, this boundary

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and its maintenance through a rationale (historical or mythological) is important for defining ethnicity (Venkatesh, 1995). These boundaries primarily include people and culture.

The boundaries are walls with large gates i.e., people and cultural practices enter or exit regularly but the inside and outside are always well defined. People[8] can also be pushed in or out in these boundaries. Visualize ethnicity then as a large but mobile wall around an amoeba like organism that consumes and expels people (and by extension their geographies) and culture as it moves through space and time. Some of course leave this organism willfully and when large enough groups in a geography leave then the organism appears to move. So, through the process of cultural appropriation, reform movements, addition of new members, and interactions with other groups, ethnic groups mutate and new group boundaries arise and are sometime given a new name.

Consider the ethnicity of Buddhism for example, it originates in modern day Nepal encompasses most of India and co-opts its cultural practices (originally based in Hinduism) but as enough people exit and the Hindu ethnicity resurges the organism moves east consuming its people and coopting cultural practices as far away as Japan. Today Nepal is the only Hindu theocracy in the world and famous for its animal sacrifices in temple grounds, a cultural practice which Buddha rallied against 2600 years ago. The ethnicity of 2600 years ago in Nepal and contemporary Buddhism in the Far

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[8] Here people denotes groups not necessarily individuals, since individuals can have multiple identities (even multiple ethnic identities) and live among different groups that share them.

East may seem to have little in common but they share the same boundaries. This is how the ship of Theseus that is ethnicity moves and maintains itself.

The "cultural stuff" (Barth, 1969) that these boundaries protect is far more malleable than the boundary itself. Indeed, the intra-ethnic life of members of an ethnicity can be devoid of any ethnic narratives i.e., there is no need to be ethnic within ethnic boundaries. So the maintenance of any ethnicity is about maintaining ethnic boundaries and not about maintaining ethnic cultural practices. Cultural practices are an important part of ethnicity but they are not a stable aspect of ethnicity. Just as bunnies and eggs have become an important cultural aspect of Easter in some Christian societies, in spite of having no mention in the central text of the religion, they can just as easily be removed without affecting Christianity or the more central cultural practice of Easter. According to anthropologists, an ethnic group is: biologically self-perpetuating, with similar cultural values, has members who identify with the group, and has a distinct field of communication and interaction (Barth, 1969). This notion, though reasonable, ignores the many changes in cultural values, intergroup communication, and interactions that take place within ethnic boundaries. Also biological self-perpetuation, though advantageous, is not an assurance to the survival, much less growth of an ethnic group if its members leave group and step out of its boundaries. Culture is based in meaning and as long as groups loosely agree on meaning and the principles, philosophies, or values those meanings represent they can coalesce around a cultural practice for any length of time. When these principles, philosophies, or values lose their legitimacy then the group culture either transforms, with the explicit purpose of maintaining group boundaries or

the group diminishes or perishes. In religious groups, reformist movements often will claim to be the real heirs to a group's primordial ancestry. The members of the group that insist on maintaining the principles, philosophies, or values that have lost their legitimacy can now become outcasts or minorities.

Ethnicity thus survives with the help of malleable cultural practices and group identity sustained by contrast (read boundaries). The contrast or/and differences between ethnicities on either side of a border are not always explicitly clear, indeed they are often indistinguishable to a third-party observer. However groups can attach strong values to these differences, something Freud aptly called the "narcissism of small differences". Societies evaluate groups and individuals and their morality or legitimacy based on otherwise trivial differences in cultural practice. Ethnicity thus turns trifles such as beard length, methods of animal slaughter, concepts of food purity, even pronunciation of certain words, into critical aspects of how a person is evaluated.

Principally, ethnicity itself serves the purpose of a label, but here the label can have life and death implications because of the meanings that are attached to it. Even this label is subject to change as groups can decide what label they prefer thus modifying the primordial basis of ethnicity but not the group boundary or integrity (Martin, 1991). As Levine (1999) notes, conceptualizing ethnicity as a label or as a method of classifying people provides the methodological advantage of the ability to make distinctions between people. Additionally such a definition of ethnicity does not burden itself with explaining why ethnic differences exist. Finally, one crucial element that is missing from contemporary explanations of ethnicity is the element of time. A person or a group is not

always an ethnic person or an ethnic group. Sufficient contrast combined with evaluative judgment (associated with the narcissism of small differences) makes the ethnicity of a person matter. Ethnicity as a method of classification and identification is relevant only in the presence of the other. The 'other' here does not need to be another ethnic person, the only qualification of the other is that he/she/they are not "us"[9]. This is not to suggest that the ethnic characteristics (culture, race, language, heritage etc.) disappear in the absence of the other, merely the value of ethnicity. Indeed, in the absence of a viable other, a group's culture is not an ethnic culture at all.

Ethnic groups believe that they share some form of common ancestry, real or mythical, based on their current similarities (Weber, 1978). This idea of collective ancestry is central to ethnicity and is often associated with at least some "notion of ascription" (Horowitz, 1985). These primordial ideas are then sustained by a sense of shared destinies and values. There is also a sense of shared history and memory. Fearon (2003) suggests that the members of an ethnic group can have distinguishable cultural features, however it is important to add a caveat to this distinguishability. Said distinguishability is not always objective but rather includes differences that members of the group or members outside the group have assigned some value to. For example, minor differences among Catholics and Protestants can have lethal implications in some cases whereas in a different time or places they are largely indistinguishable.

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[9] Ironically, even members of the same group can be 'othered'. Consider the current discourse in some political circles of true Americans versus Muslims which completely ignores the reality of Americans who are also Muslims. Here the ethnicity of Muslim Americans as Muslims is considered dominant as against the ethnicity of Christian Americans as Christians.

Finally, ethnicity is often diluted by modern socio-political concepts but it can almost never be eliminated, only transformed or softened. Any ethnicity is real in time but not in space i.e., it is very real when groups decide it is real but can just as easily be forgotten, ignored, or replaced temporarily or permanently. For instance, in the 20th century nations with national anthems and flags for which people lived and died have ceased to exist and meanings associated with said ethnicity rendered meaningless beyond history books e.g. the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. To say that the nationalism based ethnicity was not real then would be a false, that ethnicity is now merely a concept and has no meaningful influence on reality. The way ethnicity operates with the help of culture, people, boundaries and contrast gives it a lasting importance in the human societies. Human blood (literally and figuratively) and cultural practices maintain ethnic boundaries. There is a fervor attached to the boundary, the cultural stuff within the boundaries, the identity, and the members of the group. The "primordialist fervor" of ethnicity as Geertz (1963) calls it, rises in the presence of conflict and along with it rises the value of ethnic identity.

This is a good segue to review the next important term: ethnic conflict.

Ethnic Conflict

This review of the literature related to ethnic conflict deals with three aspects of ethnic conflict: First, a general explanation of ethnic conflict, its role and its causes. Second, literature addressing violent ethnic conflict or ethnic violence. And third, the Hindu-Muslim ethnic conflict (violent or otherwise) in India, its brief history and reasons.

Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict is a dispute between two or more parties where ethnic identity is the primary mark of membership on either side of the dispute. Not all ethnic conflicts result in violence. The cause of an ethnic conflict may be a dispute about resources or territory, but the narrative of the conflict is primarily ethnic. In an ethnic conflict not only is ethnic identity the primary mark of membership, but it is the only aspect on which compromise is impossible (except when one group en masse converts to the other group's religion).

Assessing the value of ethnicity in a conflict is very difficult. Some scholars suggest that ethnic conflict is merely a way of framing issues and for the most part ethnicity is irrelevant to the conflicts we mistakenly mark as "ethnic"(Gilley, 2004). Mueller (2000), for instance, goes so far as to suggest that the Rwandan genocide was not a case of ethnic war and that it was merely a result of "marauding bands of violent, opportunistic, and often drunken thugs" with ethnicity only as a "ordering device". In other words, ethnic conflict is a misnomer-it is not that the conflict is ethnic, but merely that one of the parties involved in the conflict is ethnic (Cordell & Wolff, 2009).

While it may be true that participation in the actual violence is typically minimal and only small minorities participate in the actual murders, it is the silent majority that enables ethnic violence. So the "marauding bands of violent, opportunistic, and often drunken thugs" (Mueller, 2000) are typically able to operate only in an ethnically charged environment. Ordinary conflicts when viewed through the prism of ethnicity or when allowed to be ethnicized can be transformed into complex events with a greater longevity. So the role of ethnicity as an effective ordering device does not reduce its value in a

conflict but enhances it. The grievances surrounding this dispute may be economic, social, or political but ethnic identity occupies the central narratives and defines the framework. An ethnic conflict may begin with a certain event or a situation but it does not necessarily end after the resolution of said event or situation. Ethnicity is more effective in sustaining conflicts, as against, say, class or political ideology because ethnicity is an effective device for ordering not just conflict but many other aspects of life. Ethnicity also governs other mundane aspects of life, such as diet, occupations, etc. (Horowitz, 2001). Along a significant ethnic fault line all differences, especially competing differences, are magnified and assigned different meanings. These meanings, and the narratives and stereotypes, attached to them, directly affect the conflict (Brass, 2003; Breman, 2002; Engineer, 2004; Oommen, 2008; Varshney, 2002) and the nature of violence (if any) associated with it (Appadurai, 2006; Horowitz, 2001).

Ethnic Violence

For the purpose of this research violence is defined as the application of physical force. This is what Bufacchi (2005) calls the 'Minimalist Conception of Violence' which is violence accompanied by destructive force. Violence represents an additional commitment to the either maintaining superiority, as in a ranked conflict (Horowitz, 1985) or challenging the status quo. Economic, political, or social uncertainty can be a strong motivator of violence (Gurr, 1970) because the political, social, and psychological status of all parties is threatened. Uncertainty and change also present an opportunity to the disenfranchised or the already powerful to add to their power. During times of strife different groups can negotiate their position. Conflict along ethnic lines is multifaceted;

its origins, motivations, and objectives vary (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009). The violence here goes beyond just ending life or bodily harm, and themes such as cleansing (e.g. destruction of monuments, killing without any concern of victim's age), emasculating (e.g. sexual violence against women with the aim of mocking men, genital mutilations), and dehumanizing (e.g. calling members of a group animal names, cannibalism) are employed within physical violence (Appadurai, 2006). The physical violence is exaggerated through meaning.

Conflict, typically, emerges when groups believe that there is a zero-sum dynamic between them. It is easier to resolve a conflict when the zero-sum belief is centered on tangible entities such as material resources[10] because groups can negotiate about them or conquer them. Intangible resources such as perceived power, influence, or moral superiority are harder to negotiate. Of course, often the intangible relies on the tangible thus presenting an indirect way to negotiate. Violence is itself a forced negotiation and often has clear measurable goals (Horowitz, 1985).

A comprehensive understanding of ethnic violence can be developed only with an understanding of the motivations for ethnic violence. These motivations are complicated and linear causal explanations potentially hide more than they reveal. The linear causal explanation of violence may include things derived from the narcissism of small differences among groups and/or simple resource motivations. Consider two hypothetical justifications of a violent attack, one that says, "We attack them because they eat meat"

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[10] Basic needs based conflicts can become very violent and intractable too without the need of ethnicity. Food and water related conflicts can be very difficult to negotiate but they can be solved by providing food and water.

(narcissism of small differences, cultural issues) or "we attack them because they stole our land" (resource, socio-economic issues). The conflict may not cease even the group being attacked turns vegetarian or turns over said land. Factors that justify violence are often not the same that perpetuate violence. Meaningfully solving an ethnic conflict and associated violence involves addressing both factors, which is what makes it so difficult.

Discussed below are some causal frameworks of ethnic violence but it is important to note that ethnic violence, is typically caused by a concert of reasons.

Greed and grievance- This dichotomous explanation is popular among rational choice analysts. And though greed and grievance are often seen as polar opposites they frequently co-exist since the greed of one group generates grievance in the other (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009). Groups can be greedy about resources, power, social position, and economic opportunity. Groups can even be greedy about victimization narratives (associated with moral high grounds) which straddles the boundary between greed and grievance.

The idea of greed as an originator of conflict suggests that conflict is a result of elite competition over resources and ethnicity serves as a ruse for the same (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004). Wealthy and politically connected ethnic elites often lead and instigate ethnic conflict (Horowitz 1985; Fearon and Laitin, 2000). In a time when development due to globalization has been unequal (Steinbruner and Forrester, 2004) financing by resourceful elites can go a long way. Concerns about economic inequality and relative depravation are said to produce grievances. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that the grievance is an excuse by the greedy, but there are arguments that

grievances can be genuine motivator of conflict (Gurr, 1969). As Murshed & Tadjoeddin (2009) explain, greed means the 'economic opportunity' to engage in conflict. However, this explanation does not articulate why the greed and grievance dichotomy is especially effective in ethnic conflict. Surely, the poor have more grievances against the rich? Then why is the class conflict not a significant source of violence, and even when it is, why does it usually play out along ethnic lines? An expression of grievance lends a high moral ground for fighting groups.

The economic explanations of ethnic conflict are crucial, but conflict also serves as a source of political motivation and ethnic cohesion (Steinbruner, 2000). Greed or grievance is not a sufficient motivator of conflict but may prove effective in justifying the primordial sentiments. The reverse, however, is also possible where primordial sentiments are added to preexisting grievances to justify violence.

Politicians and political motivations- This is in line with the observation that democracy, especially in its infancy, or if poorly managed, provides fertile ground for ethnic violence (Besançon, 2005, Horowitz, 1994). In the wake of declining power structures, status quos are threatened and conflicting groups increasingly view the situation as a zero-sum game. This effect is compounded if there is any violence, since physical harm or loss of life constitutes a much stronger indication of hostilities compared to economic competition or other non-violent forms of conflict. Political motivations, especially electoral politics (Brass, 1997) have stronger effects on identity conflicts than on non-identity conflicts (Sambanis, 2001) since the borders between two identity-based groups are usually very clearly defined. Politicians almost rarely initiate a

conflict but tend to build on existing primordial sentiments (Geertz, 1963). The major

contribution of politicians seems to be their ability to articulate these sentiments in

coherent terms. They also broadcast the sentiments through preexisting channels of

propaganda and legitimize them by an authoritative argument.

So when one goes looking for causes of ethnic violence one encounters them in all

spheres of life: economic, political, cultural, and psychological. The cultural motivations

of violence are tied in with the psychological motivations of violence.

Cultural and psychological motivations-   In an interview with the Independent,

Volkan (2004) said, "In 1977, Anwar Sadat went to Jerusalem--which was an astonishing

thing. And he gave credit to psychology. He said, "Seventy percent of the problems

between us (Israelis and Arabs) are psychological." He was wrong, of course. Ninety

percent of them are." Resource competitions and political actors may help violent

outbursts but for the violence to sustain and achieve a spectacular status, cultural and

psychological motivations are essential. The cultural stuff keeps even the victor of a

resource competition engaged in the conflict. And as mentioned earlier, these cultural

aspects of ethnicity may be entirely temporary and, in the case of religious ethnicity, may

have no meaningful basis in the central texts of a religion.

Perceived cultural peculiarities gives rise to stereotypes. The stereotypes associated with

groups lend meaning to the differences that groups perceive within each other. Horowitz

(1985) classifies the stereotypes associated with competition as 'advanced' and

'backward'. Within the backward stereotypes he lists characteristics like poor, lazy,

ignorant, easygoing, etc. In the advanced stereotypes are characteristics like aggressive,

shrewd, stingy, cunning etc. Groups can thus explain their own group's perceived

backwardness or advancement using stereotypes. As a group envies, say the economic

advancement of the other group, it can explain it as a result of them being "money

hungry" or "stingy". A similar in-group advancement can be a result of being "good with

money" or "sensible" while another group's poverty is understood as a result of being

"lazy". So the effort to maintain moral superiority is always part of the psychology of

ethnic violence. Even in the violence of 2002, some Hindus expressed pride about how

Hindu mobs killed Muslim women without first raping them[11]. This alluded to the higher

sense of morality even in violence.

Apart from hatred, ethnic violence is also fertile ground for fear, anxiety, distrust, grief,

and anger. Volkan (1980) suggest that the fear associated with groups in ethnic violence

is the same fear at the root of all individual fears, i.e., the fear of death. Groups even in

comfortable majorities, e.g., 1 billion Hindus in India, are afraid of "dying off". These are

real fears even if they are irrational. The prevalent view among policymakers is that it is

better to 'regulate the conditions' that promote violence than understand the psychology

of ethnic violence (Hardin, 1997). This research agrees with part of the premise, which is

to say policymakers can create conditions that prevent violence. However, it places a

premium on the cultural and psychological motivations of ethnic violence, partly because

of the high value that actors in ethnic violence place on cultural and psychological

matters. In conflicts, groups not only negotiate over resources and personal well-being

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[11] When the reporter pointed out that some women may have been raped the subject of the interview said
that some non-Hindus like the members of a nomadic tribe, the Chharas may be responsible for the same.
Source: http://www.tehelka.com/2007/11/after-killing-them-i-felt-like-maharana-pratap/2/

but will actively sacrifice the same to preserve cultural aspects of ethnic life. This research sees the cultural and psychological motivations as part of the long game or the marathon of ethnic conflict that truly allows the associated ethnic violence.

Ethnic Conflict and Violence in India

India is probably the most diverse state in the world (Varshney 2002) and each unique ethnic group makes its own attempt to preserve its own identity. In cities, there is a vast homogenizing modernist force that often threatens to devalue the unique nature of ethnic identities. This homogenizing modernist force includes for instance, the transportation systems that force groups of people in close quarters (remember ideas of untouchability and impurity are still part of the Indian ethos). It also includes the absence of neat physical boundaries between communities based on their professions. Then the fear of "dying off" by dissolving with the "others" in the city becomes real. Urban integration is a threat to group identity for some groups. Hence groups pursue physical and cultural urban segregation even if it threatens intergroup peace and causes ethnic violence. The Hindu-Muslim conflict is the most significant ethnic conflict among all other ethnic conflicts in India.

The partition of India along the Hindu Muslim lines, has further exacerbated the situation. Add to this post-independence ethno-nationalism coupled with rising minority uncertainties and insurgencies, the conflict is nearly ever-present and frequently threatens to erupt into violence. It is useful here to review the possible causes of Indian violence as mentioned in the literature.

Brass (1997, 2003) suggests that the history of these ethnic groups provides ample fuel for violence and that a small excuse can lead to a violent episode, however one needs an "institutionalized riot system" to organize the violence. The riot system creates an ecosystem around the violence of stakeholders who gain from the violence. An institutionalized riot system includes ethnically oriented criminal individuals or gangs that may be activated for a riot with the help of some instigation and often cash. These individuals serve as the experienced lieutenants who lead inexperienced foot soldiers into battle. The ecosystem within which these people operate must have some people higher up in the pecking order who gain in status as a result of the violence. Of course, this is not always the obvious result, and thus employing an institutionalized riot system is a serious gamble. The job of the members of this system "is to keep a town or city in a permanent state of awareness of Hindu-Muslim relationships." For Brass (2003) violence in India is not an expression of anger or a continuation of history, but is employed in the service of specific objectives (typically political or electoral gains).

Tambiah (1996) also forwards the idea of past events instigating future events. Escalation, thus, happens through memory of the past where existing fears merge with a desire for revenge and retribution. And as Volkan (1998) suggests any wrong, no matter how ancient, can be avenged in the present. So historical events, real or mythical, are used to invoke a sense of injustice or conflict which leads to violence. Other scholars focus on more immediate concerns such as the role of electoral politics in the continuation of the violent conflict (Shah, 2004; Wilkinson, 2004). One can say that ethnic violence is inspired by the ancient and executed by the immediate.

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Other scholars point to rapid globalization and neo-liberal economic policies as forces that create immediate uncertainties and insecurities to instigate violence (Chatterjee, 2009). Within these immediate concerns there are attempts to explain this conflict in India as a result of declining civic institutions (Engineer, 2003; Oommen, 2008; Varshney, 2002).

Finally, Berenschot (2009) suggests that the violence represents a periodic reinforcement of the social contract (Berenschot, 2009). The idea of a social contract is important. Non-violent ethnic conflict is often a result of everyone agreeing to a certain code of behavior where every member on both sides "knows his/her place". Often it is when this idea of "place" is violated that violence can erupt. This "knowing of one's place" is almost never a reasonable position and creates winners and losers which leaves the door open for greed and grievance. For instance, it could mean a Hindu and Muslim violating the code and leaving their place to marry each other. Endogamy and/or religious conversion is critical to maintaining ethnic boundaries in the Hindu-Muslim conflict.

As mentioned before the study of ethnic violence is incomplete without the study of ethnic peace. Scholars have often been intrigued by the reasons of why certain cities in India are more prone to Hindu-Muslim violence compared to others. Apart from Varshney's study highlighting the reasons based on civic life and inter and intra communal linkages, Wilkinson (2004) provides the most compelling list of possible causes of "town-level variation in Hindu-Muslim violence". The reason he calls it "town" level variation is because 93% of deaths from 1950 to 1995 took place in towns or what we can call urbanized areas. The argument that Wilkinson provides is predominantly

based on electoral politics. According to him, local electoral politics incentivizes ethnic violence and conflict. There are other compelling explanations for the conflict and violence in India. In the Hindu-Muslim case in India there are two main economic explanations-

a. The slumlords and real-estate developers using ethnic violence to drive away people from high-value land for profit.

b. Growing competition in an ethnically divided labor market.

Though certain groups profit from the riots or events of violence it is difficult to prove that the events were started with the idea of that profit in mind.

Another explanation for the violence is the formation of Pakistan. India's partition based on the two-nation theory created one of the largest migration of refugees in history. Nearly 7.5 million Hindus and Sikhs migrated to India from Pakistan, while a large majority of Muslims chose to stay in India because of assurances from Indian leaders few concessions were made for Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan. The argument against the Muslims was that while affluent Muslims stayed in India because of the value of their fixed assets, affluent Hindus and Sikhs fled Pakistan leaving behind all their fixed assets. The RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), the ruling BJPs parent organization, and its Hindu nationalism became a refuge and a source of ideology for many of these refugees. They already had their own reasons for animosity towards the Muslims and the organizations like RSS ensured formalization of this hatred.

Finally, there is the idea that there has been so much large-scale lethal violence between Hindus and Muslims in history that it is difficult for India to have any semblance of

lasting peace. At the core of this argument is what we can call the pre-emptive strike. Communities have exaggerated perceptions of atrocities of the past and more so of atrocities that may be committed in the future on them, hence many communities argue that their offensive against another community is part of their defense strategy.

Finally, according to Varshney the absence of inter-ethnic civic engagement is one of the leading causes of violent ethnic conflict. This is especially marked when there is a greater intra-ethnic civic engagement. His explanation is reasonable and even testable (considering evidence from his study of six Indian cities) but it offers few explanations about the conditions in which civic engagement becomes possible. Varshney also does not establish the urban setting in which these interethnic linkages can be formed. Even as his research is replicable his solutions are not. The final prescription he offers is that the state should see 'civic society as a precious potential ally' (for ethnic peace). The unfortunate and cynical observation around that is that states do see civic societies as a precious ally, they may just not any value in ethnic peace. Indeed, his case studies are from urban areas where these interethnic linkages have proven effective in preventing conflict but only when they have been inorganically introduced there has been by state actors. According to Chandra (2001), Varshney's version of interethnic civic engagement is really inter-ethnic economic interdependence.

There are several explanations of malaise of ethnic violence but often these explanations come without subsequent prescriptions for the disease. This goes back to the central problem of ethnic conflict and violence, which is even if some factor causes ethnic violence removing that factor does not ensure ethnic peace.

The potent significance of ethnicity or ethnic identity gives rise to the phenomenon of ethnicization. Ethnicity's significance for classification, discrimination, in-group unity, and by extension, collective action, is unparalleled. Gender, economic status, modern nationalities, can all be subverted in the face of ethnic identity by political actors. The reverse is also possible, but difficult. People and the urban form, can both be ethnicized. The process and motivations of ethnicization of people are distinct from the ethnicization of the urban form[12]. Since this research deals primarily with the ethnicization of the urban form presented below is a discussion about the urban form. The chapter then returns to addresses ethnicization in greater detail and highlights the differences between the ethnicization of people and the urban form.

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[12] I am grateful to Ifigeneia Kokkali, Research Fellow at Politecnico di Milano, for her input about the discussion on ethnicization.

Urban Form

A city is a physical entity. The urban form includes most of the inanimate and immobile physical elements of a city. At its simplest, the urban form refers to the physical city. This research uses a Lynchian framework of the physical city. In his seminal work, *The image of the city* (1960) Lynch answers the questions about how humans perceive the city. He suggests that people see the city as a built image and that this built image includes five distinct elements of the urban environment: paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmark. While these elements can be studied independently they function in a city in concert and their meanings and labels can overlap. For instance, a path can become a landmark or an edge. And as Lynch notes, a district includes all other elements within itself.

Lynch (1960) speaks of the five elements of the physical city: paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks (See Appendix A) these elements cover the entire spectrum of the physical city.

There are other ways in which the term "urban form" can be interpreted or analyzed. Often its meaning is dependent on the disciplines or the tools used to study it but typically it serves as a term for all physical inanimate objects of the city. M.R.G. Conzen, a pioneer of studying urban form and urban morphology, thinks of the urban form as anything that includes, in part or as a whole the following elements: streets, lots, and buildings (Conzen& Conzen, 2004). In other words it is defined as, a confluence of "three corresponding elements: the street plan, land subdivision, and built objects." (Scheer & Petkov, 1998). The urban form, like most aspects of the physical city, is

created by people's actions, whether motivated by culture, religion, economics, necessity, or social causes. At the same time, it results in spatial flows of persons, goods, and information. A broad spectrum of actors, both public and private, shape the urban form. According to Schwarz (2010), the urban form includes the physical structure and size of the urban fabric and population distribution. The physical structure means all of the built environment: any structure (e.g. building) or place (e.g. garden). Further, citing Batty & Longley (1994), Schwarz states that urban form is the *result* of a multitude of influences, such as site, topography, economy and demography and planning interventions. These influences and interventions create an image of a city and its urban form. Lynch offers a more universal view of the urban form, according to him it is a spatial pattern of the city, it is the all "large, inert, permanent physical objects in a city" (Lynch, 1981).

At its simplest, the urban form refers to the physical city. The urban form becomes a symbol of human activities, lives, and relationships (Gaffikin and Morrissey, 2011; Soja, 2008). The symbolism of urban form originates from the fact that it is a reminder of events, activities, and behaviors. The urban form can also be commemorative of the joys and sorrows of a city. The starkest examples are of course victory arches or war memorials but beyond that the most mundane elements of urban form can have a specific commemorative meaning for certain groups. The corner store can become a reminder of simpler times and a symbol of nostalgia and more valuable culturally to a certain group than an elaborate victory arch. The significance of the urban form, however, depends on

the qualities and values people assign to the urban form[13]. This transformation of meaning can work with any of the other elements of the urban form: paths, edges, districts, and nodes. This research focuses on the ethnic meanings and valuations people associate with the urban form. Therefore, each of these elements or any combination of their grouping can be ethnicized.

Ethnicization: Concept and Meaning

The current literature primarily applies the term ethnicization with regard to people. People, individuals and groups both, are ethnicized by other people. The potent significance of ethnicity or ethnic identity gives rise to the phenomenon of ethnicization of people, and places or urban form as this research demonstrates. Ethnicity is a highly effective tool for classification, discrimination, in-group unity, and by extension, collective action. Political actors in a community can subvert gender, economic status, modern nationalities, using ethnic identity. This subversion is used to unite or divide people. Disparate groups of people with varying goals and lives can be ethnicized to unite under the banner of ethnicity. Alternatively, a group of people can be divided by ethnicizing a certain section of people and undermining any common elements of humanity. Occasionally, the reverse is possible, where economic status, gender, nationality can dominate, but ethnicity often endures[14].

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[13] For instance, a landmark, say an ancient temple of the goddess Minerva may have had a religious and sacred quality in 1st Century BC but today it may be a museum for tourists, its meaning completely transformed, even though its shape may be the same.

[14] The old adage, blood is thicker than water, often makes a return after a brief societal departure from ethnicity. Of course, not all ethnic groups consist of blood-relatives but notions of ethnic blood are common in ethnicization and ethnic conflicts.

Ethnicization of People Vs Urban Form

Sarna (1978) defines ethnicization as the assignment of an ethnic identity by outside forces to a person or a group. This narrow view of ethnicization suggests that ethnic identity is not a matter of choice. For a group or a person this view of ethnicization is not accurate since a person can ethnicize oneself. However, a space or an element of the urban form is necessarily assigned an ethnic identity by people. Ethnicization, thus relies on the social constructionist (i.e. assigned by people and not inherent) view of ethnicity and ethnic identity. Ethnicization of people is a process by which persons "from one society become ethnics in another" (Greeley, 1974). This is true, typically for immigrants, since they are seen as outsiders and different from the norm. Of course, this notion of ethnicization of immigrants ignores the possibility of another phenomenon which turns natives into immigrants. Here a group that is part of a society for many years, even centuries, is characterized as outsiders or immigrants. These outsiders can be invaders, refugees, or people whose ancestors were immigrants.

It can also serve as a motivator for political action when applied to one's own group. Eder et al. (2002) define ethnicization as events through which secular claims about economics and political grievances are "justified by reference to a collective identity". This self-ethnicization by a group can become a unifying force that facilitates action. Ethnicization thus can become a source of benign classification or harmful discrimination, this distinction is especially crucial when looking at ethnicization of the urban form.

Urban Form

Ethnicization is the extent to which the ethnic identity of any element of the urban form dominates the overall identity after it has been assigned an ethnic identity.

Presented below are the important features of ethnicization and some differences between the ethnicization of people versus of the urban form[15]. :

1. The ethnicization of an urban form requires popular consensus built over time. Mere assignment of ethnic identity does not ensure meaningful ethnicization of an urban form. This consensus is then reinforced or lost by behaviors.

2. The ethnicization of the urban form lasts longer than the ethnicization of people. People can be temporarily or even mistakenly ethnicized[16] and then de-ethnicized equally fast but ethnicization of the urban form is long lasting since it is formed by consensus and behavior. Since ethnicization of the urban form involves active investments monetary and social.

3. In the face of a hostile (real or perceived) majority some minorities (such as immigrants) can start investing in an "ethnic infrastructure" [Taboada-Leonetti, 1984, cited in Kokkali, (2015)]. Of course sometime this "ethnic infrastructure" or ethnicized urban form can come up even without hostility. For instance, purely need-based Spanish speaking businesses or churches in communities in the United

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15 I am grateful to Ifigeneia Kokkali, Research Fellow at Politecnico di Milano, for her input about the discussion on ethnicization.

[16] Like Sikhs attacked in the US because some people confuse them for Muslims. But even though this temporary ethnicization can have a meaningful impact it does not typically have consensus or staying power.

States where there may be no discrimination. Also, ethnic communities may come together for purely economic purposes, especially if the labor or trade is organized along ethnic lines. This was especially true in India where certain castes or religious sects dealt in certain trades. So, it made economic sense for the cobbler caste, for example, to invest in an economic conglomeration of all activities related to cobbling. Benign economic motivations of conglomeration and ethnicization can change, especially as and when the historical trades disappear. Ethnic motivations may replace economic motivations seamlessly. The ethnicization that follows this change may not always be benign. The ethnicization of the urban form or any space can thus inadvertently become a source of discrimination.

4. All ethnicization involves some construction of boundaries. Ethnicization of people creates the boundaries of social and political differences. Similarly the ethnicization of the urban form involves clear boundaries that define ethnic identity. These boundaries further contribute to the extent of ethnicization.

5. Also, ethnicization of the urban form typically arises from a sense of division between two or more ethnic groups where sharing a space or place becomes difficult or impossible due to hostility. In divided cities, the ownership of a neighborhood and its constituent parts is often a matter of dispute. An unclaimed un-ethnicized structure may be lost to the others. Chatterjee (2009) describes how Muslim landmarks were "Hinduized" during the violence of 2002.

6. Ethnicization allows the physical form of the city to become a weapon, a trophy, and symbol. Scholars who include the physical city as a component of the conflict ignore these details of the urban form and focus on territory as the central concept of physical space (Falah, 2003; Mahadevia, 2002; Yiftachel & Carmon, 1997). The stories of ethnicization of urban form elements are crucial to understanding the nature of ethnic conflict.

As the research shows, there is significant evidence that ethnicization makes a meaningful difference in the ethnic conflict in the two cities in Gujarat.

Ethnic Conflict in Gujarat

Gujarat has a long history of ethnic violence along the Hindu-Muslim divide. There are instances when other conflicts have sparked Hindu-Muslim violence, in 1985 an inter-caste Hindu riot soon transformed into a Hindu-Muslim riot. This review of the literature finds a dearth of comparative analysis and a disproportionate focus on violent cases (typically, Ahmedabad).

Focus on Violent Cases

The problem of synecdoche affects some of the literature associated with ethnic violence. Scholars write about the part but may talk about the whole. The discussion starts case-specific in Ahmedabad but the problem is soon projected on to Gujarat and even the entire nation. There are two paradoxical effects of this problem of synecdoche: One, scholars often talk about a single case as representative of the entire state or nation. And

two, they may explain the conditions in Ahmedabad as unique concerns in a discussion about violence and discrimination when the very same conditions can be observed in Surat or other peaceful cities. If research shows that the smallest excuse can cause Hindu-Muslim violence then to state that 'mill-closures' or 'neo-liberal economic' policies cause this violence is misleading at best. Varshney (2002) again, is an exception, and adapts a comparative approach and presents a balanced view of the Ahmedabad as a violence-prone city.

A lot of local issues get traction in times of conflict and certainly these local issues have a role to play as provocations for, or excuses of violence but, causality is difficult to establish without appropriate comparative analysis. The discriminatory practices of local authorities and segregation (Jaffrelot & Thomas, 2012; Mahadevia, 2002) neo-liberal economic policies and growing nationalism (Chatterjee, 2009, 2011), ethnic prejudices and militant vegetarianism (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012; Mehta, 2013) have been offered as factors which may cause or inspire violence. Consider vegetarianism, it is true that Hindus frequently express disdain about the fact that most Muslims are meat-eaters. However, many Sikhs, Parsis, and Christians in India are meat-eaters but are not subject to the same primordial fervor as the Muslims.

The path to violence, however, is never straightforward and is influenced by many factors. Also these factors can be observed in other places too. According to Horowitz (2003) four conditions typically come together in an ethnic conflict to transform it into ethnic violence (specifically, lethal ethnic violence):

   o   A hostile relationship, not necessarily ancient, 'that produces antipathy'

- A strong emotional response to events, typically seen as outrage.

- A feeling of justification of killings

- A reduced fear of consequences when committing violent acts. Participants in urban ethnic violence are typically risk averse i.e., attacking mobs do not have people who are keen on martyrdom. Mobs mostly consist of opportunistic individuals who are part of a mob mostly because they seek safety in numbers. They commit violence, with some assurance that there will be no immediate and even long-term costs associated with it.

In his study of Ahmedabad, Berenschot (2008) observes that Hindu nationalism, ethnic prejudices and militant vegetarianism are a significant factor in even the richest neighborhoods but much of the violence is concentrated in poorer neighborhoods. The poorer communities need the local leadership's patronage for access to civic amenities and hence they can be mobilized by political actors. Berenschot states that local patronage channels use ethnic tensions for electoral gains and profit from the division by ensuring constituents vote along ethnic lines. This suggests that local neighborhood level factors may be far more important than even city level factors. The presence of violence, however, may also be a result of convenient availability of foot soldiers combined with opportunism.

So while global and national factors are important, causal relationships are difficult to establish between them and local violence. For example, expressing concerns about the

confluence of globalization and Hindu nationalism in Ahmedabad Chatterjee (2011)

states that,

> "'New urban politics' in Ahmedabad is, therefore, not a case of ethnocentric local
>
> resisting 'economic modernization', it is an interplay of ethnocentrism,
>
> entrepreneurialism and technocracy dialectically embedded through performance
>
> and documentation. The pantheon of 'new urban politics' includes Adam Smith,
>
> Euclid and the *mahant*[17] sharing the same chariot—Adam Smith's invisible hand
>
> and the grand priest's Hindutva offensive, perform the 'god trick' of
>
> ethnoreligious market fundamentalism."

Her description may be accurate, and the tone of concern valid but these conditions of

ethnocentrism, entrepreneurialism, and technocracy can be observed in other cities too.

The question then becomes which came first, the nexus described above or the conflict

and the discrimination against minorities? Similar conditions of discrimination and

violence existed up to the 1990s even as India was steeped in socialist principles. So can

it be argued that the divisions that facilitate violence and conflict are maintained not

because of the new "entrepreneurialism and technocracy" or "Adam Smith and Euclid"

but in spite of them or through them?

Similarly, quarrels over vegetarianism, housing discrimination, ethnic prejudice, can all

be observed in varying degrees in many other cities. Which raises some important

questions:

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[17] The article talks about the mahant, a Hindu priest, blessing a procession which in some cases has led to
violence. Euclid is a stand-in for technocratic top-down planners in this quote.

- Where does the tipping point lie for conflict to turn violent and violence to turn lethal?

- If one is interested in preventing violence based on the causal assessments mentioned above where does one allot resources[18]?

- Finally, how does an ethnic divide endure even as the social, political, cultural, and economic conditions change?

While this dissertation does not directly address these questions, it acknowledges their significance and complexity. As a response to the same, the dissertation makes an attempt to stay local in its results and offers only general methodological and investigative suggestions. Existing literature that relies on singular case studies often ignores the complexity of the conflict and its path to violence. Therefore any attempt to provide answers that draw causal relationships with current conditions within a limited time frame and at a limited geography is problematic. Here, Volkan's (1998) idea of "time collapse" is again informative, actors in ethnic conflicts may instigate violence based on current social, economic, or political conditions but they can often draw motivation from any point in history and "equate the past enemy with the current one". There is no necessity of objective truth in the history, which can justify or motivate violent actions. The past is thus irrelevant except in the way in which it is interpreted. Also, ethnic

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[18] It must be stated here that these complicated questions may help explain the appeal of theories which put resources (land, minerals, jobs, etc.) at the center stage of ethnic conflict(Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004). They make the problem look manageable to governments and aid agencies. And if the peace is achievable through signing checks and a resource reallocation then everyone goes home a winner. However, though successful in some cases, mere reallocation of resources is not enough to prevent most conflicts.

conflict or violence between two communities is not a binary condition where one group is pitted against another but it is typically layered and much more complicated. Motivations of the decision makers or leaders and foot soldiers can be, and usually are, very different. Also, a vast majority of individuals do not participate in the violence but facilitate it by their silence, either out of fear or approval with the cause. Then there are also peacemakers on both sides and even their motivations can vary. The diagram below is an attempt to capture the complexity of the actors on both sides of an ethnic divide.

Figure 1 Ethnic Conflict and violence participants. Layers and overlaps.

Figure 1 indicates limited types of the actors and relationships. There are many other types which may affect the conflict. There may be a case where violent actors exist only

on one side or where there are no leaders among the peacemakers. The object of this figure, thus, is to indicate that no matter what the situation the ethnic response will be multilayered and complicated. To reduce it to a binary Hindu-Muslim or majority-minority narrative can be dangerous as it may play in to hands of the people who are most interested in a binary narrative.

Conclusions

Ethnicity and ethnic conflict attract plenty of research and resources (for violence if not peace). In spite of the growing attention to the largely urban nature of ethnic conflict and the importance of the physical city research that focuses on the physical city's role in ethnic conflict is very limited. An associated concern is literature that focuses on the generalities of the physical city without any significant attention to local level details or perceptions of the citizens. Even as some preliminary research focuses on the physical city in ethnic conflict it does not focus on what Lynch calls "the city in the mind". This dissertation merges this "city in the mind" with conceptions of ethnicity in the mind.

Some scholars use urban planning as a primary framework to study ethnic and other urban cleavages (Bollens, 2004, 2006, 2007; Calame & Charlesworth, 2009; Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011; Graham 1998, 2006). And, although there is little research specifically studying the urban form with ethnic violence, there are examples of scholarship that increasingly deal with other physical aspects of the city, such as urban segregation (Mahadevia, 2002; Rajagopal, 2010), spatial cultures and syntax (Raman, 2003). However, there are also suggestions about using spatial planning and urban design for peace building (Charlesworth, 2006; Bollens, 2006). Crucially, studies have not yet dealt

with the role of the urban form in ethnic violence even as increasingly commentators

acknowledge the role of "poor planning" (Yusuf, 2012). This acknowledgement of

physical space as an important part of social science is often described as the 'the spatial

turn (Soja, 1989, Warf and Arias, 2009).

Gaffikin & Morrissey (2011) provide the most comprehensive review of the use of urban

planning to address ethnic violence. They review multiple cases with peculiar urban

planning challenges and explain the importance of space and its meaning in conflict.

Their discussion deals with offer four main types of spaces:

1. Ethnic Space: Immutable space where clear demarcations are important and
   respected.

2. Neutral Space: Space safe to all sides and typically used for employment or
   leisure.

3. Shared Space: Space that facilitates contact and engagement across the societal
   divisions.

4. Cosmopolitan Space: Space with an international character.

As Gaffikin & Morrissey (2011) themselves point out within this outwardly neat

differentiation there remains "contested space" where meanings and ownership is

contested across the ethnic divisions. These broad universal divisions may be correlated

to violence and may even cause violence. The authors highlight the importance of "peace

lines" or "peace walls", which are the borders that segregate ethnic spaces[19]. They use the

example of Belfast as a divided city. The peace-lines are indeed physical barriers in

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[19] In this dissertation, the peace-lines are analogous to edges or borders and ethnic spaces to ethnicized
neighborhoods.

Belfast, in some cases 60 feet tall (to prevent stone pelting). The peace lines have become prime locations for ethnic violence where a large portion of the ethnic violence is concentrated. The crucial question that the research does not answer is related to the physical characteristics of the peace line before the barriers went up. The predecessors to these ironically named barriers were not necessarily formally built walls but emergent divisions, could they have been addressed with a design and policy intervention that did not reinforce division but diminished it? Did the predecessors share characteristics which can be observed in cities other than Belfast? What impact did the peace lines have on the conflict?

Similarly, Mahadevia (2002) and Chatterjee (2009) look at the physical city in Ahmedabad specifically but do not address the issue of local level factors. However they do look at socio-economic transitions in the city and the rising neo-liberal policies. However again the approach deals with the idea of territory or neighborhood identity and transitions. Again the research states the importance of a role for the physical city but does not provide any clear evidence for its importance or the specifics of its role. A simple question might be do certain spaces facilitate violence and if yes, why and how?

There are several limitations to the location centric approaches, i.e. studies that use location, concentrations, or territoriality of groups in the city, to study urban ethnic conflict with and the physical city. First, most studies do not address the density, scale, or the design of the place involved. For instance a ghetto in India versus a ghetto in France may have more differences than similarities in their physical structures. This makes any comparisons difficult since the factors influencing the flow of people and goods may be

completely different. Second, the experience of the physical space depends on the user. Many studies involving geographical explorations of urban violence do not ask the inhabitants of the geography their perceptions of the space. In such studies the judgments about the quality of the space are either entirely based on some allegedly universal measure of the city or the researcher's assumptions about the space. One can apply the same method to study two very different cities (or cases) however applying the same value metric to evaluate very different cities is problematic. Boston and Baghdad may be measured with the same yardstick but value and meaning of two identical urban neighborhoods invariably going to be different for Baghdadis versus Bostonians. Indeed many American slums would be considered luxurious accommodations in most other parts of the world. The particular experience of the physical city for a citizen is as critical as the nature of the physical city. Highlighting one without the other provides an incomplete picture of the place and makes it harder to replicate the methods.

In summary, there is an increasing focus on the physical city but there is a big gap in the literature about the actual urban form and its influence on ethnic violence. The idea that peace lines end up becoming targets for violence is clear but can only a comprehensive policy change and a peace process prevent the violence or can a design intervention also be effective? Clearly, there is appetite for design solutions as authorities and private entities thought raising the height of the barrier to 60 feet was a good idea. The question, however remains can these intentional urban form changes in the city be made demonstrably effective to reduce the conflict or violence.

Role of the Dissertation and Future Research Directions

Ethnic conflict and violence are inherently difficult subjects to research. Data are not always easily available and given the emotional nature of the subject, biases and prejudices among study subjects and even researchers can be a challenge. Current understanding of ethnic violence in cities and especially the role of the physical city is basic at best. Nevertheless, there are a few facts we can state with reasonable confidence. Ethnic violence is more prevalent in urban areas, there is a large variation in levels of violence between cities (Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004), and within cities it is violence is confined to certain neighborhoods (Mehta, 1998; Horowitz, 2001). Currently, however, we lack an understanding of the mechanism of violence and the role of the physical city. It is true that cities are at a greater risk of ethnic violence but even within cities there are many differences. Outwardly, Ahmedabad and Surat may be very similar but there are differences that may contribute to the drastically different levels of violence. Varshney (2002) offers, differences in the civic life, as a reason for the variance however he does not address the urban form. The current research addresses the issue about the urban form whilst carrying out a comparative analysis. The primary role of this dissertation is to highlight the local urban form and evaluate its effect on the conflict and levels of violence. The research also looks at the interethnic relationships through a social and spatial lens. Gaffikin and Morrissey (2011) include multiple case studies and highlight the role of planning in their study too, but stop short of explicitly discussing the role of the urban form. There is, at present, no known published research that compares two cities while looking at the urban form and the interethnic attitudes, especially from

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the global south-east. The only other piece of literature that comes close is a report produced by De & Desai (2003) where they compare Surat with Vadodara (also known as Baroda). De & Desai (2003) even include geographical aspects of the city in the research but limit their exploration to the territorial rivalries within the Surat and Vadodara. Finally this dissertation provides a people's account of the conflict and its contours. The dissertation, though not a microhistory of the conflict, employs the approach within the context of the case studies. Along with the history that finds its way into government records and academic journals, there is another version of reality that occupies popular contemporary perception, the microhistory of any event. Gonzalez likens microhistory to a local history, and which Nietzsche calls the "antiquarian or archeological history" [Gonzalez, 1972 cited in Ginzburg, Tedeschi, & Tedeschi, (1993)]. In this context, "micro" is not just a reference to the scale or the local nature of the narrative, but more importantly to the method in which there is a "search for answers to large questions in small places" (Charles Joyner, quoted by Shifflett, 1995). Indeed, microhistories and microhistorical methods are often useful in highlighting the views of the oppressed or the subaltern[20]. Here, the approach is useful given the contested nature of reality that is typical to ethnic conflict. Accepting a formal history of the conflict comes with the inherent risk of promoting a biased or a sanitized version of history.

Future studies should build on other comparable cases of peaceful and violent cities, which share similarities. Since this dissertation is limited in its scope, there is a vast

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[20] Charles Joyner used this approach for his 1985 book about the experience of slavery, "Down by the Riverside"

opportunity to study even Surat and Ahmedabad in greater depth. A potentially

controversial but crucial direction for future research can be comprehensive 'ethnic

maps' of a city, so a Hindu map, for instance, would be a map of the city according to

Hindus. There is also an opportunity to study the transformations in cities through ethnic

lenses. New development and growth in a divided city can favor one ethnicity over

another or in may become a unifying force that erases differences, it is important thus to

have a capacity to track these changes. There are multiple cities across the world with

some level of ethnic violence, future research should develop a system to track changes

in the urban form, interethnic attitudes, and socio-economic conditions. Measures that

would evaluate state and private urban interventions with an eye on the risk of potential

violence is as important as economic cost of the intervention. At this stage, it seems

inevitable that more people will be moving to cities and face the challenge of ethnic

conflict. Hence it is incumbent upon researchers and stakeholders to make humanity's

future urban habitat a more peaceful place.

Even as existing literature provides an incomplete framework but compelling argument to

study ethnic violence in the city it is necessary to localize this research and apply it to

specific cases. The following chapter introduces the two cities which are the focus of this

research.

Chapter 3: Surat and Ahmedabad: History and Geography

The Indian Subcontinent

In a lecture delivered in Minneapolis on November 26th 1893 Swami Vivekananda[21] compared the political and religious lives of life of the United States and India, "If you will come to India and talk with the workman in the field, you will find he has no opinion on politics. He knows nothing of politics. But you talk to him of religion, and the humblest knows about monotheism, deism, and all the isms of religion. You ask: 'What government do you live under?' and he will reply: 'I don't know. I pay my taxes, and that's all I know about it.' I have talked with your laborers, your farmers, and I find that in politics they are all posted. They are either Democrat or Republican, and they know whether they prefer free silver or a gold standard. But you talk to them of religion; they are like the Indian farmer, they don't know, they attend such a church, but they don't know what it believes; they just pay their pew rent, and that's all they know about it -- or God." Things have changed a lot in both nations since 1893. But the idea of religion as the lifeblood of India still persists even as politics has gained in importance[22]. Politics and religion have often competed for attention in India and the Indian subcontinent. Within politics, secular politics attempts to frame the Indian identity in terms of secular nationalism and religious politics frames India as the ancient land of the Hindus (mostly).

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[21] Swami Vivekananda was a 19th century monk who was a leading scholar of Hinduism and is considered an authority on Hinduism. His influence on political Hinduism from Gandhi to the current prime minister is without parallel. Like with all great preachers his message is now distilled to a few aphorisms and is frequently used by politicians out of context. This is not very different from how politicians in America claim to know the heart of the forefathers or the *real* meaning of the constitution.

[22] One can also suggest that religion has become far more important in American politics than it was in 1893.

For most of the 21st and 20th century, religious politics has dominated even as secular politics makes its presence felt. The major influences in Indian polity are based in religion even as the Indian constitution was framed by a secular modernist. This is not unique to India just as in the United States the founding fathers insisted on the separation of church and state, with limited success, one may add. In India too attempts at a modern secular state have faltered in the face of the influence of religion. The formation of Pakistan as a Muslim theocracy from the body of India is the starkest example of the influence of religion. Proclamations of secular nationalism as a response to this act sustained for a few decades but religion-based politics was never far behind. Of course not all politics based in religion is what one would describe as right-wing politics. Gandhi's soft version of Hindu politics which included Muslims was also based in religious values just as his insistence on non-violence was based on Jain influences.

The Indian subcontinent has a rich Hindu and Muslim past. However puritanical Muslims, especially in Pakistan, deny their Hindu or Buddhist heritage. As Pakistani commentators like Marvi Sirmed and Hassan Nissar point out the 500 Million subcontinental Muslims cannot all be descendants of invading Persians, Turks, or Arabs. Similarly, some of the most significant cultural, artistic and social accomplishments take place during periods of Islamic rule in India. There is a concentrated effort by puritanical Hindus to deny this rich Islamic heritage of the country[23]. Puritanism in the Indian context relies on defining the boundaries of a religious group and an unyielding

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[23] A revisionist version of Indian history states that the Taj Mahal (built by the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan) was originally a Hindu Shiva temple. The revisionist historian Purushottam Nagesh Oak who popularized this conspiracy theory has also made other assertions about the Kaaba in Mecca having a Hindu history.

interpretation of the historical victimization of the groups by the other group/s. Of course this cultural bifurcation of India as Hindu or Muslim is inherently flawed. A number of religious (for example Buddhist and Jain.) and regional forces influenced ancient and modern India.

The fault lines, created by a history of violence between Hindus and Muslims, forces the two communities to focus on differences more than similarities. Sikhs and Hindus, for instance, have had serious violent conflict but the two faiths have multiple overlaps and practitioners frequently worship in each other's shrines without any problems. Similarly, many Islamic sects such as the Shia Bohras or Sufis were persecuted during the reign of puritanical Sunni rulers (Engineer, 2008) but there was sufficient religious and ideological overlaps to prevent mass violence[24]. The case of the Sufis is unique since many rulers were deeply influenced by Sufism yet sometimes persecuted practitioners or Sufi sages.

Within India, Gandhi's land of birth, the state of Gujarat has been a laboratory for experiments in Indian politics since the early 20th century. A discussion about the Indian state of Gujarat is followed by a discussion of the two cities in this research, both of which are located in Gujarat.

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[24] The new Wahhabi or Salafi influenced Islamic schools in the subcontinent (especially Pakistan) are an exception to the understanding that exists between various sects of Islam.

Gujarat: Types and Stereotypes of an Indian State

The Public Relations (PR) image of Gujarat in India, and may be even globally, is that of Vibrant Gujarat. Vibrant Gujarat is an investors' summit held every 2 years since 2003. Gujarat's prominence as one of India's most investor friendly states in a nation otherwise embroiled in red tape is a result of administrative efforts as well as a carefully crafted PR campaign. A similarly savvy PR campaign, coupled with a strong anti-incumbency, also carried the Chief Minister Narendra Modi to the premiership of India in 2014. Few, however would dispute the business friendly policies of the state. This business friendly state though has prohibition (with all the bootlegging that comes with prohibition) and strong, even violent, vegetarianism. Contemporary Gujarat is thus full of contradictions.

This land of Gandhi, who was often atavistic and had romantic notions of rural resurgence of India, is now the primary manufacturing hub of the country. Although, according to some, even Gandhi had what has been called a Gujarati "mercantile ethos" (Yagnik, 2005). According to Yagnik (2005), it is this regional mercantile ethos that gave the Indian sub-continent its three greatest

Figure 2 Gujarat, located on the west coast of India. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

dealmakers- Gandhi from the Hindu Modh-Vaniya business caste, Mohammed Ali Jinnah (founder of Pakistan and a Khoja Muslim trader) and Dadabhai Naoroji (grandfather of India's independence movement) a Parsi Zoroastrian trader[25]. So a Hindu, a Muslim and a Parsi Gujarati, thoroughly changed the history of a subcontinent.

Gujarat's mercantile ethos received a boost when India liberalized its economy in the 90s. Since then, it has been one of the pioneer business states in the union of India. The credit of course also goes to all the people of Gujarat. In popular culture the stereotypical traits attached to a *Gujjubhai*[26] are a strong business acumen and a unitary focus on all things monetary. The Gujarati is seen as socially conservative and economically neo-liberal (similar to fiscal-conservativism in American politics).

In 1608, Gujarat became the first region in India to encounter another nation's mercantile ethos- the British. An East India Company ship dropped anchor at Surat (Yagnik, 2005). Also as legend suggests, the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama was aided by a Gujarati pilot in his discovery of a sea route to India (Ransley, 2014). Gujaratis often cite this legend as testimony to the enterprising nature of Gujaratis. While, Gujarat's history dates nearly 2 millennia, the story relevant to this research starts in the 12th century with the invasion and plunder by the Mahmud of Ghazni[27]. It is the first violent encounter of

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[25] These stereotypes may be surprising or even in poor taste to western sensibilities but they are integral to the story of Gujarat. These ascribed ethnic characteristics are also internalized ethnic narratives for many communities in Gujarat and in India.

[26] Gujaratis are called Gujjus in India. The term is neither neutral and thus can be used in a positive or a negative connotation depending upon the user. Gujjubhai, would translate to the Gujarati Brother, partly because Gujaratis themselves attach the suffix bhai or ben (sister) when they talk to people.

[27] Mahmud of Ghazni's invasion and plunder, and subsequent invasions by Ghori, Khilji etc, especially of the Somnath temple has acquired a new significance in the Hindu and Muslim right-wing literature. For Hindus it is the mark of the ultimate insult whereas Islamic scholars of the past, present Ghazni's destruction of Hindu temples as a model to be followed by an Islamic ruler (Yagnik, 2005). Pakistan has

largely Hindu Gujarat with an Islamic army. In the 12th Century this was considered a foreign invasion. The narrative has since transformed, and it is now seen as an Islamic invasion, thanks to the relentless efforts of puritanical Hindus and Muslims, and political strategies of the British (Dalrymple, 2013). After Ghazni's invasions, Islam spreads throughout the Indian subcontinent sometimes through violence and other times through the influence of Sufi mystics[28].

Gujarat's mercantile ethos combined with the presence of many significant ports has made it an economically significant, even affluent, region in India. Gujarat, in general, and Southern Gujarat specifically, has always attracted traders and raiders in equal measure. Thus, in the last millennium, parts of Gujarat have been ruled or dominated by the Chalukyas, the Khiljis (Delhi Sultanate), the Portuguese, the Mughals, the Marathas, and the British. One

Figure 3 Gujarat Political Map. Surat and Ahmedabad marked with blue dots. Source: Wikimedia Commons

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even named two of its ballistic missiles as Ghori and Ghazni. Pakistan, as an idea, always seems to lurk in the background when talking about Hindu-Muslim relationships.

[28] This is another historical bone of contention between scholars and people. For some, the spread of Islam was entirely peaceful for others it was entirely violent.

may also add the Congress and the current ruling party, the BJP, to the mix.

Within this frontier[29] state of the Indian Union I focus on two cities: Surat and

Ahmedabad.

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[29] Gujarat is about a 1000 miles from the Khyber Pass, through which all invading armies from Alexander onwards have entered the Indian subcontinent. Also it has a large coastline with the Arabian Sea punctuated by excellent ports.

Politics in Gujarat

The story of 20th century Gujarat politics is a story of the rise and fall of Gandhi's influence and Gandhian ideology. And while Gandhi is far more relevant to the politics of Ahmedabad, his organization's influence on Surat's politics was no less significant. Ahmedabad and Surat are in lock step with the rest of Gujarat when it comes to electoral politics (Varshney, 2002). Early 20th century Gandhian politics included lofty goals such as independence from the British Empire, social reform in Hindu society, and Hindu-Muslim unity. Since India's independence in 1947, the politics soon devolved into a cynical identity-based politics based on ethnic equations for electoral gains. The rise of the Hindu Nationalist BJP is seen as the strongest factor in contributing to ethnic violence. Much before the Hindu Nationalists had electoral gains they had made social and organizational gains on the ground.

For Gujarat, like India, the road to ethnic violence hell was indeed paved with good intentions. There are two well-intentioned Gandhian interventions that had the most adverse effects on the ethnic relationships and political stability in India and in Gujarat. The first is the Khilafat movement and the second is the prohibition of alcohol in Gujarat inspired by Gandhi.

The Khilafat movement

The Khilafat movement is an oddity in Indian history. It was a movement to preserve the Ottoman Empire, which Gandhi supported with the express aim of defeating imperialism-albeit of the British variety. In an effort to ease the increasing feeling of vulnerability and isolation of the Muslims of British India, Gandhi supported the Khilafat movement

(Herman, 2008) as part of the non-cooperation movement. The real goal was to integrate Muslims in the mainstream struggle against the British Empire along with the Hindus. And it did work for a while. Unfortunately, like most of Gandhi's initiatives, the Khilafat movement burdened his followers with a task that demanded high moral courage and fortitude. In the midst of serious Hindu-Muslim resentments after the Moplah rebellion[30] instead of aiding the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity, the Khilafat movement became a symbol of Muslim otherness from the Hindus. The accusations that Muslim loyalties lay with foreign lands under the Ottoman Empire gained credence in the minds of Hindu nationalists. It also meant that Gandhi's legitimacy as a Hindu leader was sullied because he was accused of appeasing Muslims by the Hindu nationalists. Ironically, it is Gandhi who can be considered one of the first Hindu nationalists since he and his lieutenants brought the elements of Hindu prayer and Hindu metaphors into the freedom struggle against the British (Yagnik, 2005). In an effort to unite India's Hindus and Muslims, Gandhi's actions had inadvertently deepened the divide. Of course, it is wrong to blame Gandhi entirely, after all people resorted to violence in spite of Gandhi's exhortations for non-violence. Also, the Hindu-Muslim relationships in feudal Malabar were very different from mercantile Gujarat, yet the ascendance of religious ideologies in political movements granted more power to religious leaders. Given that Hindus and Muslims had been historically engaged in many conflicts, many religious leaders had serious

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[30] In 1921 the Moplhas of Malabar (in south India) revolted against the British rule and Hindus landlords allied with the British. However what was essentially a battle over tenancy, land rights, and British policies soon devolved into and anti-Hindu massacre followed by a violent repression of the Muslim Moplahs by the British government and army (Dhangare, 1977). Many Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam and the Moplahs also declared parts of Malabar as parts of the Khilafat. This meant Hindu support for the Khilafat movement nearly evaporated (Yagnik, 2005).

misgivings about members of the other community. They also used similar nervousness in their ranks to shore up their political positions within the community.

Paradoxically as Gandhi's stature as an Indian leader rose his stature as a leader of the Hindus and as a leader acceptable to the Muslims declined. Gandhi's, and by extension the Congress's, diminishing ethno-religious legitimacy was very costly. Barely three decades after Hindus and Muslims united for the Khilafat movement the Hindu-Muslim relationship reached its nadir in the mutual genocide during India's partition in 1947.

Prohibition

Gujarat is a dry-state i.e., it is prohibited to drink alcohol there if you are a resident. As a non-resident you can go to the Department of Prohibition and Excise, Government of Gujarat and get a liquor permit. Apparently though approaching a bootlegger is much easier[31]. In an attempt to pay homage to Gandhi's strong anti-alcohol stance Gujarat became a dry-state after independence. Predictably, it gave rise to bootleggers.

Today, the bootlegging mafia is also divided along ethnic or communal lines in certain cities (Yagnik, 2005). Hindu and Muslim bootleggers often attack each other under a communal guise. Needless to say, given the high profit margins, the bootleggers can become very rich. And with financial capital many bootleggers enjoy a rich social and political capital. The bootleggers were often divided along ethnic lines and used violence

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[31] A personal note about alcohol in Gujarat: In my many months of travel in India, over the last few years the only place where people (family, friends, and friendly strangers) offered alcohol in their houses, was Gujarat. Offering a drink is not part of the Indian host's repertoire typically. However in Gujarat it's almost a sign of respect and concern, it is as if my hosts were saying, "We understand how hard it must be in this dry-state for an outsider, we can help."

to compete in business. These criminals and their capacity for violence became the central actors in the institutionalized riot systems in the state.

Within the state the violence is concentrated in the cities, which is even more concerning given that the state's urban population has nearly doubled since the 1971. Ahmedabad is the epicenter of violence in Gujarat and has experienced violence with striking regularity. Surat also experiences small instances of ethnic violence but apart from the horrific violence in 1992 it has been largely peaceful. The following section introduces the two cities and provides context for the research.

Surat and Ahmedabad: The Twins that Aren't

The list of similarities between Surat and Ahmedabad is long. They are, part of the same Indian state, have similar population sizes, with similar ethnic compositions, and both cities speak the same language-Gujarati (neither a necessity nor a norm given India's linguistic diversity).

City	Urban Population (2011 census)	Hindu population percentage	Muslim population percentage	Average Literacy percentage	Area
Surat	**4,467,797**	85.31%	11.63%	87.89%	126.1 Sq. Miles
Ahmedabad	**5,577,940**	81.56%	13.51%	88.16%	179.2 Sq. Miles

It must be noted that the population of Surat has grown at a much faster pace compared to Ahmedabad and hence it may be that their population numbers are even closer to each other today than they were in 2011. Surat and Ahmedabad are only 154 miles apart from each other and have good rail and road connectivity. In my research, I also found that people from the two cities often share familial and business relations. However, equally noteworthy are the differences. Indeed the differences become more significant in light of the many similarities. These differences are not just limited to the matters pertaining to the Hindu-Muslim conflict. The differences are perceived across the political, economic, and social spectrum (see Chapters 5 and 6 for elaboration). The underlying premise is one where the two cities are sufficiently alike to compare and sufficiently different to explain the variance in ethnic violence. Despite their complex and confounding mutual relationship the two cities remain an exemplar pair for the purposes of comparing ethnic violence (Varshney, 2002)

Surat

Surat affords an interesting opportunity to study a former medieval port with a colonial

past and a capitalist neo-liberal present. Surat embodies, in its present and its history, the

trials and possibilities faced by many cities across the globe: a rapidly changing economy

coupled with political and cultural upheavals. Presented below is a brief discussion about

the geography, socio-economics, culture, and politics of the city. A more comprehensive

discussion of the people and their social life of the two cities is included in the discussion

about the neighborhoods in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Geography

Located on a bend in the Tapi River, contemporary Surat straddles the Tapi along the

south-western coast of Gujarat. The city center is
a mere 10 miles from the Arabian Sea and 15
miles away from the Hazira port which is
located in the Surat district. The Tapti-Hazira
estuary or the Tapi estuary was once sufficiently
navigable that ships sailed right into the heart of
Surat. Since then the river has been dammed
and at least three bridges in Surat (with more
being built) span the banks making the medieval
ports defunct. The original walled city of Surat,
now known as the Old City, had a total area of
3.158 Sq. miles and was considered proper Surat
till 1963. Many villages surrounded this city.
Since then many of these villages have
urbanized and become a part of the Surat city
which now has a total area of 126 Sq. miles and

Figure 4 Surat and its neighborhoods. Source: Author Drawn Map on ESRI base map. ARCGIS

continues to expand. (Source: Surat Municipal Corporation). In spite of all these changes the essence of the city survives. Here it helps to look at the city as an organism- one that grows and transforms completely yet its identity as itself remains intact. So over the years (centuries really) Surat has become a version of itself; its rulers, size, language, and economy have transformed but enough traces remain for one to call it by the same name[32].

Socio-economics

Recognized globally for its diamond and its textile industry, Surat is often seen as the economic capital of Gujarat. Even in history, Surat was the most important western port of the Mughal Empire (Nadri, 2015) till the rise of Bombay or Mumbai (Das Gupta, 1979; Maloni, 2002). The relentless raids by the Marathas in the 17th and 18th century, the decline of the Mughal Empire, and the rise of the British Empire led to the decline of Surat (Das Gupta, 1979; Yagnik, 2005). While British ascendency ensured stability in Surat, it did not restore the dominance of its ports or its dominance within the larger story of India. The de facto political capital of the Gujarat region has been Ahmedabad[33] since the 14th century.

In Surat, the Makkai Pool (literally Bridge of Mecca) was a starting point for ships and eventually steamers to take pilgrims from western India to Mecca's port Jeddah. Even Surat's current municipal corporation is housed in a building called Mughal Sarai, the word "sarai" means travelers inn. It was built in 1644 A.D. during the reign of the

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[32] More or less. Parts of Surat were better recognized as Rander for most of its History. Portuguese accounts of the sack of Surat are really accounts of the sack of Rander. Also according to some the original name of the city is Suryapur (Sun City).

[33] The capital of Gujarat is actually Gandhinagar, located 14 miles north of Ahmedabad, however while the seat of Government is in Gandhinagar true political power still stays in Ahmedabad. Power has also been in Baroda but Ahmedabad has dominated politically especially in the 20th century.

Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan, to house pilgrims on their way to Mecca. It is also important to note here that old Surat was located on the east of the Tapi and to its west was the town of Rander, which is now a part of Surat (included in Surat city limits in 1975). Talking about most Indian cities is like talking about the ship of Theseus, all its elements have transformed comprehensively.

Surat's ports aided this comprehensive transformation and sped the march of time. Just as ships sailed from Surat they also sailed to Surat, and brought traders, sailors, and immigrants who enriched Surat's economy and its culture.

Surat is home to various ethnicities and their trades. The textile industry and diamond industry employ large numbers of Suratis. While the diamond industry is Hindu dominated the textile industry has traditionally involved both Hindus and Muslims. Muslims were considered adept at certain aspects of the textile trade and specific Hindu castes occupied other aspects of the trade. The old city grew around these trades and the urban pattern followed a system where different streets had occupants from different ethnicities. This urban pattern primarily catered to the economic activity of the city. Economic interdependence has been touted as the cornerstone of Surat's relative peace (Varshney, 2002). It is here that the predetermined roles of the communities come into play in maintaining a social order. As Desai (2006) suggests, "If one goes by sheer communal[34] prejudices by snapping economic ties with the other community, the entire

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[34] Communal is code for ethnoreligious or religious in India. It is often associated with violence as Indian media calls ethnic violence communal violence. The adjective has hence gained a negative connotation and its antonym in Indian English is now secular. So a politician is either communal or secular and can wear the label of communalism or secularism as a badge of honor since both words are insults when applied to political opponents.

system of industrial production and market could be jeopardized." The various Hindu castes and Muslim sects are dependent on each other for a functional supply chain or access to markets in the textile industry. However, what happens to these relationships with increasing global competitiveness is up for debate. The one factor preventing a formalization or corporatization of these markets and trades is the advantages of informality that the communities enjoy. Many transactions are orally conducted simply on the basis of mutual trust. Apart from saving time and money by avoiding lengthy paperwork or formal legal contracts these oral contracts also have a tax saving advantage in many places. Often in real-estate transactions between developers and home-buyers in India a certain percentage of the deal may take place in "black". So for instance, if an apartment is for sale for a million rupees, the developer quotes his/her price at eight hundred thousand on paper thus avoiding taxes on two hundred thousand rupees. This tax evasion is also beneficial for some buyers who themselves may have two hundred thousand in undisclosed income from other "black" transactions that they would like to invest (S. Anklesaria Aiyar, S, 2008).

One can imagine this parallel 'black' economy and its advantages and disadvantages. In Surat too these informal agreements save time and money. In the absence of legal

contracts the relationship is paramount. This is not to suggest that tax evasion is what keeps the peace in Surat.

These transactions are a national phenomenon in India but in Surat these transactions are possible across ethnic divides due to traditional business relationships. Indeed nationally these transactions are most prevalent in real estate deals and even in Surat, the sale of an apartment to a member of another caste or religion is nearly impossible. Below is a sign

from Surat's Jhapa Bazar, it states,

"Notice:

- Shri Ram-Temple Jhapa Bazar Hathifaliya- this neighborhood (street) is only for the Hindu dwellers.

Figure 5 Exclusive Real estate. Photo credit: Nishpriha Thakur (used with permission)

- Anyone from other religions (apart from Hindus) should not purchase house in this locality.

- If anyone from another community is seen buying a house in this neighborhood the current residents must be informed."

This rampant housing discrimination is a result of the predetermined trade roles of individual communities. At some point in pre-industrial history the strong trade-

community correlation meant that an agglomeration of economies aided economic

activity. Trades such as weaving or production of yarn were carried out at home. Thus a

weaver colony, often along communal or caste lines simply aided ease of business. Even

then, adjacency to another allied trade and by extension another community, say yarn

makers, was crucial. In the dense neighborhoods of old Surat this adjacency meant a lot

and still means a lot in terms of cohabitation and maintenance of relationships. In

contrast, when in 1992 Surat did see violence, the violence was restricted to shantytowns

and slums where migrant laborers and temporary workers lived together without strong

relationships (Varshney, 2002). Another aspect of this issue is the overwhelmingly male

population of the slums. In absence of the housewives[35] building relationships with the

other community when the men are at work, many neighbors were strangers to each other

in spite of the high density.

Culture

Formal culture is a lofty term and may invoke ideas of grandeur, history, and the distilled

wisdom of a land. Formal culture is often called "culture" with a capital "C". This capital

C culture dominates the ethnographic literature and does so at the risk of ignoring culture

with a small "c", which includes the mundane and the frivolous (Cunliffe, 2009;

Murdock, 1989). Capital "C" culture includes the culture that people espouse to be

valuable or proclaim to outsiders and small "c" culture is culture in which people invest

everyday with their actions. The true culture of a place is a product of all that is lofty and

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[35] Housewives does not mean a non-working woman in this context. Women are deeply engaged in economic activity while at home. Small businesses and trades are often run from home by women in Surat, and India at large. The mercantile ethos has no gender.

the mundane. Indeed the mundane dominates in the public psyche and governs everyday activities. Culture with a Capital "C" shows up in narratives and the stories that communities tell themselves, and others, about themselves. Also the culture with a capital "C" informs and influences all aspects of the small "c" culture and vice versa.

Part of Surat's small "c" culture is a frequently mentioned adage, *Surat nu jaman ne Kashi nu maran*-literally "(It is best to) Eat in Surat and die in Kashi" (a Hindu holy city). The contemporary Surati firmly subscribes to the first part of this prescription. The culinary culture of Surat, like that of all cities with migrants, is rich. In Surat, food becomes a uniting factor among Hindus and Muslims, as will be seen in the following chapters. Eating out, especially street food, is a part of Gujarat's culture and can be observed in Ahmedabad and more so in Baroda. However Surat's street food culture transcends either in scale and frequency. After work hours one can scarcely find a street food stall or corner not flocked by large groups of people. In other parts of class-conscious India one does not see upper middle class or even middle class people flocking to street food stalls. However in Surat it is not uncommon to find an expensive car parked near a street food cart while the entire family sits on the pavement to enjoy a local delicacy.

Local delicacies, of course, are not very local and trace their histories to other lands. In India, as in Surat, "American sweetcorn" is a popular food: steamed corn kernels spiced with pepper and salt or localized with some Indian masala. Other foods are not as decidedly foreign. Another popular now Gujarati delicacy is the Dabeli, spiced mashed

vegetables between two buns, it uses the Portuguese recipe for the buns[36]. Also, now considered quintessentially Surati, the Khausa, traces its origin to the Burmese Khau Suey. The Khausa, came to Surat with traders from Burma. Rander, which is now a part of the Surat city had long standing trading connections with Burma. Enterprising Arab traders settled in Rander in the 13th century. Thanks to their skilled navigation these once Arab communities developed strong trade links with China, South-East Asia, Arabia, and Africa. This trade made the local population prosperous and the intermingling of various cultures ensured a widening culinary palate. Indeed, Surat was an important trading conduit between the Middle-East and South-East Asia by the 16th century (Subrahmanyam, 2000). Even as the trade and prosperity suffered setbacks because of the Portuguese (especially on Rander) and Maratha raids in the 16th and 17th century, the culture of Surat flourished under multiple influences. Surat, its trials and tribulations notwithstanding, has maintained a cosmopolitanism since medieval times. In contrast, Ahmedabad can be considered much more parochial. Another opinion, in testimony to its cosmopolitan, mercantile, and nautical culture, Surat also had a bustling red-light district (A. Yagnik, personal communication, March 17, 2014).

Although contemporary Surat is less cosmopolitan than it was in the medieval times; immigration to Surat is now more intra-national than international. Also, few traces of its bustling nautical culture remain. The port at Hazira functions like any other modern port and is self-sufficient thus it rarely brings in international sailors to the city. The one major

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[36] Indian wheat breads typically do not use yeast or fermentation. The contemporary raised Indian breads owe their origins to Middle-easterners (Arabs, Persians, etc.) or the Europeans (Portuguese, and a lesser extent the British).

international trade that contemporary Surat enjoys is the diamond industry. Occasionally the diamond industry brings in traders and merchants from Israel and Belgium or businesspersons from China. However, often Surati traders travel to Tel-Aviv or Antwerp to purchase diamonds (Engelshoven, 1999). Ironically, this intensely international trade has its own parochial characteristics within Surat. The Kathiyawadi Patels dominate the diamond industry in Surat and are slowly overtaking the Palanpuri Jains as the dominant force in the world diamond market. The Patels and Jains are now the dominant force in Antwerp's diamond market (the Hoveniersstraat) and are taking over from the Hasidic Jews (Shah, 2008).

Thus within Surat's cosmopolitan culture exist occupations, trades, businesses, and neighborhoods that are divided along ethnic lines. Chapter 5 discusses, in detail, how the neighborhoods are divided not just along the Hindu-Muslim divide but also along caste lines within Hindus, and sectarian lines within Muslims.

Another aspect of Surat's culture is its religions. During my conversations, people, mostly in jest, claimed that since commerce is the true religion of Surat there is little Hindu-Muslim violence. While there is some truth to this remark it does not take away from the influence of religion on the city. Religious landmarks punctuate the city's landscape just as frequently as religious festivals punctuate its calendar. Hindus, Muslims, and Jains are the dominant religious groups in Surat. Christians, Parsis, and, to a lesser extent Sikhs and Buddhists, are also part of the population. In Hinduism there is a concept of an *alive* or *awake* holy place. At an *alive* temple the deity seemingly answers prayers sooner. This idea has permeated into all other faiths too. People often spoke about

these shrines or temples as being "powerful", and typically used the English word, power, to describe the effectiveness. The Parsi Agiyari (temple) built in 1823 A.D. is supposedly *alive and powerful*. Similarly, every year, miracles are attributed to the Sufi saint Khwaja Dana's Dargah (tomb/shrine). The Dargah is as popular among Hindus as it is among Muslims. Unlike traditional mosques, the Dargahs are open to all faiths and it is not uncommon to see Muslims offering namaz on one side and Hindus offering incense on another side within the same shrine. There are many such examples of such a syncretic relationship (Desai, 2003). These syncretic expressions of religiosity are now threatened from both sides. There is an increasing opposition to worship at shrines as puritanical interpretations of Islam gain a foothold within Surat and India at large. On the other hand there is also right-wing Hindu opposition to worship at Islamic shrines. During the riots shrines where Hindus and Muslims worshipped together were attacked by Hindu rioters in other cities. In 1992 a smaller shrine, in Surat was also damaged. However it has since been restored[37].

So within this business-minded city a sense of religiosity or/and spirituality persists. In India it is hard to measure Hindu interest in religion since metrics such as church attendance cannot be applied. However, it can be observed within the shops and markets where one can find a small shrine with an idol of a deity or a photograph of a Guru. These shrines can be simple or elaborate and typically will have incense or a lamp burning in front of them. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 elaborate more on these subtler aspects of

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[37] I visited this shrine with one of my respondents at his behest. He had seen its partial destruction. According to this respondent the people who were allegedly involved, all suffered in one way or another. This was said as testimony to the power of the shrine.

culture but it is important to note the context of contemporary urban culture in the two cities.

Surat, like other Post-colonial cities has experienced the countercurrents of regionalization with globalization. So while Surat has become a more Gujarati city, and more or less shed its Mughal, Portuguese and British past, it has also internationalized in other ways. The distinct architecture that one sees in the old city and parts of northern

Figure 6 Hajira Badi Jumma masjid/mosque

Rander is frozen in time, character, and place while its surrounding city *looks* indistinguishable from other cities of the world. Although it is true that given Surat's

exposure to multiple cultures, the architecture of the past too was internationalized substantially. Figure 6 shows Rander's Hajira Badi Jumma mosque in Surat with its multitude of stylistic flourishes.

As mentioned earlier, according to some Suratis the city's true religion is commerce. And like the syncretism inspired by Sufi saints, commerce too contributes to the peaceful co-existence of Hindus and Muslims.

Politics

The political life of Surat is based within its economic life. The origins of contemporary Surati politics are found in the British rule and the growing textile trade of 17th and 18th century Surat. Even before that, Surati politics under the Mughals was characterized by trade, where through patronage and protection the ruler facilitated the commercial activities and ambitions of the Surati. Politics in Surat has often been subverted by economics more than identity or religion. This is not to suggest that ethnoreligious politics is not important in Surat but that ethnoreligious political alliances are also used to facilitate economic activity, even it if includes economic activity that actively creates ethnic winners and losers.

In 1795, Surat saw riots where the poorer Muslims attacked the shops and houses of Bania (Hindu trader castes). According to Subramanian (1985) this act of violence was a response to the disappearance of Mughal power and the new "Anglo-Bania" alliance in Surat politics. The Anglo-Bania alliance, an alliance between Hindu traders and the British rulers of the East India Company meant that once powerful Muslim trading elites could no longer sustain their dominance. The riots, which included destruction of account

books, was a response against the changing economic and political order of the city. This economic change also included a political shift from a culture of patronage (as with the Mughal royals) to hegemony (British colonial rule). By 1857, India and by extension Surat was official under the dominion of the English Queen. Indeed that is when Queen Victoria becomes the Empress of India and British rules and value systems become desired in parts of Gujarat. The curios case of political systems is such that a nationally dominant formal political system is replicated in the local politics of a place. So in the 19th century, the hegemony of the Anglo-Bania alliance became the norm in Surat (Haynes, 1991). It is not until the advent of the most notable member of the Bania caste in the form of Gandhi that the political discourse transformed to being associated with notions of the public good. Indigenous values of sacrifice for your fellow human, regardless of ethnic identity, transformed the politics and by extension the economics of Surat. Non-cooperation with the British during the freedom movement also incentivized cooperation among Hindus and Muslims.

Post-independence and post-Gandhi Surat's politics returned to the ideas of hegemony but this hegemony was still focused on economic dominance more than ethnic dominance. And even as the Hindu elites continued their dominance on the politics and economics of Surat it did not exclude Muslim elites (at least in economics). Later in the 20th century the Hindu nationalist parties win most elections in Surat. In spite of this Hindu political dominance punctuated by attempts at ethnic dominance in Surat the focus on economic life and interdependence keeps all-out ethnic politics at bay.

Summary

Surat is more firmly rooted in the mercantile ethos of Gujarat compared to its northern counterpart Ahmedabad. The port city has also seen boom and bust cycles and was relegated to the role of playing second fiddle to Mumbai on the west coast which saw explosive growth in the 20th century under British and then Indian rule. Surat's textile industry prospered after the textile industry declined in Ahmedabad and Mumbai. Dismantled looms found their way to Surat and were reassembled in smaller workshops (Yagnik, 2005). These small enterprises today produce nearly 60% of the artificial silk in India. Surat is also home to migrants from other Gujarati towns and villages and other Indian states. Thanks to the migrants, some permanent other seasonal for the textile and diamond trades, Surat's population has grown more than tenfold since the 1970s.

This city of migrants inspires the aspirations of many who move there and while outsiders don't become Gujaratis they do become Suratis.

Ahmedabad

Of the two cities Ahmedabad has drawn more scholars and authors. There are three factors that prompt this skewed attention to Ahmedabad:

1. The current concentration of political power

2. Rampant ethnic violence

3. The legacy of Gandhi.

Apart from fewer resources to study Surat, another problem with the disproportionate attention to Ahmedabad is the synecdochical use of Ahmedabad for conclusions about Gujarat or even India. Chapter 6 will address this problem in greater detail.

Ahmedabad has become a metaphor for the deteriorating Hindu-Muslim relationship. And in contrast with Surat it is even starker. In Ahmedabad, it may seem that the political beneficiaries of ethno-communal violence have outnumbered the political beneficiaries of ethno-communal peace for the last 6 decades. As Varshney (2002) suggests, "Communal peace did not require intercommunal engagement involve *all* Hindus and Muslims-only that if some people of groups tried to disrupt the peace, substantial mechanisms be available for intercommunal communication and for organized intervention." These "substantial mechanisms" have been defeated and undermined in one violent event after.

Like Surat, Ahmedabad is also a river city. It is the seventh largest metropolitan region in India, traces its origins to the 15th century when it was founded on the eastern bank of the river Sabarmati.

Geography

Ahmedabad is located on the banks of the river Sabarmati. It is the most important city in Gujarat and is in Central Gujarat. Its location makes it an ideal political (not official) capital of Gujarat. Western Gujarat is much less densely populated.

Old Ahmedabad is located on the eastern bank of the Sabarmati and it was home of the textile industry in Ahmedabad. The images of Ahmedabad which dominate press releases from the government are often from West Ahmedabad. This new Ahmedabad is the modern globalized city

Figure 7 Ahmedabad, and its neighborhoods. Source: Author Drawn Map on ESRI base map. ARCGIS

with ambitions of becoming a global metro (Mahadevia, 2007).

Figure 8 The Sidi Saiyad Jali mosque and its carved latticework windows. This iconic latticework in the mosque has become a symbol of all things Ahmedabad. The iconic latticework is often used as a logo by various stores and agencies.

Unlike Surat the old walled city in Ahmedabad is much more susceptible to ethno-communal violence. The Sabarmati River certainly has a right side and a wrong side in Ahmedabad, unlike the Tapi in Surat. However some of the most attractive historical landmarks, including the Sidi Saiyad Jali, are located on the east of Sabarmati.

The one anomaly in west Ahmedabad is the neighborhood, Juhapura. It is a Muslim Ghetto of nearly 400000 people (some estimates put it at half a million). Juhapura, which is one of the neighborhoods studied for this research is bound on one side by the

Sabarmati and on other sides by Hindu dominated west Ahmedabad. Juhapura can be seen as a splinter of the old city in the east that flew off and landed in West Ahmedabad due to the force of the 2002 riots. Ahmedabad's East-West or Old-New dichotomy is the most striking feature of its contemporary geography. Contemporary Ahmedabad, is a city of approximately 7 million people (projections from Census, 2011) which is spreading rapidly around its ancient walled core. The walls have since disappeared, leaving the ornate *Darwazas* (gates) behind as lonely artefacts useful only as place markers in the urban landscape.

Socio-economics

Ahmedabad's history, as Ahmedabad, starts in 1411 when Ahmed Shah laid the foundation for a new city on the banks of the Sabarmati. He was a ruler of the Islamic Muzaffarid dynasty (also known as the Ahmedabad dynasty) which ruled over the Gujarat Sultanate till the Mughals conquered the kingdom in the 16th century (Gokhale, 1969). There are reports that there was a town named Asawal, Ashapalli, or Karnavati on the eastern banks of the Sabarmati that Ahmed Shah used as his site for his new capital (Yagnik, 2011). The Hindu name Karnavati, is popular among Hindu-nationalists who like to deny Ahmedabad's Islamic roots.

During the Mughal times Ahmedabad became an important textile city. Textiles weaved in the city found their way all the way up to Europe. Later the cities fortunes experienced a decline due to the political uncertainty and declining Mughal power. This brought on sixty years of Maratha rule in 1758. However, even Maratha power began to decline soon after and their general misrule and high taxes further exacerbated Ahmedabad's misery.

Between 1758 and 1818, a span of just sixty years the city changed hands between

Mughals, Marathas (the competing Peshwas and Gaekwads), and the British. These

transitions, often violent, were also accompanied by ethnic upheavals. While the Mughal

rulers were biased towards Muslims, the Maratha rulers were Hindu. Yet Hindu Maratha

rule did not mean better days for Hindu Ahmedabadis. Ahmedabadis welcomed the

stability of British rule after the upheavals of the preceding years in 1818.

British rule brought with it the global advantages of trade that came with have an Empire.

Their ability to provide access to an international market in Europe, just as the Mughals

had done in the previous century meant Ahmedabad could get back to business. The

British also brought with them the benefits of the industrial revolution which was

transforming Western Europe. In 1861, an Ahmedabadi founded only the second textile

mill in India -Ahmedabad Spinning and Weaving Company Limited. It is important to

note here that while British colonial rule brought stability and technology to Ahmedabad

it should not be fodder for colonial apologists. Indeed, in 1861, on the other side of the

globe a former British colony, was in the early stages of a barbaric Civil War and few

would argue that it made them a candidate for civilizing British rule.

It was during these times that Ahmedabad became known as the Manchester of India[38],

thanks to its prowess in textile manufacturing. Between 1861 and 1946 the textile

industry grew from just one textile mill to 74 textile mills (Census, 1961, in Yagnik,

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[38] The tag "Manchester of India" or "Manchester of the East" has been used for several Indian cities with strong textile manufacturing in the 19th and the 20th Century. 19th century Manchester was the center of Lancashire's cotton textile industry. The raw cotton, of course, came from India, and the finished goods from Lancashire were sold to Indians. Soon Indian entrepreneurs realized that with the right equipment and labor they could compete with Lancashire (Yagnik, 2011).

2011). However, post-independence (1947) political and economic missteps eventually led to the decline of textile mills. This decline in fortunes and influence was as rapid as their growth. Ahmedabad today still produces significant amounts of textiles but with greater automation and a fewer percentage of its population engaged in the production the influence of the textile industry is limited in civic affairs. In the 1990s many textile mills closed and an estimated 100000 of 170000 textile workers lost their jobs [Jhabvala, (1995) cited in Mahadevia, (2007)]. The mill closing also meant that there was an industrial area and cheap labor available on the east of the Sabarmati River in and around old city Ahmedabad. Chemical factories with lax regulation, some diamond polishing unites, and other small-scale industries filled in some of the vacuum left by the mill closures (Yagnik, 2011). However these jobs did not ensure the same kind of social cohesion or economic stability that the textile mills provided. As the mill barons moved to west Ahmedabad, upkeep of once luxurious homes became impossible and to this date one can find large palatial houses in a state of disrepair without any occupants in the old city where living space is at a premium.

Ahmedabadi society lives in what Yagnik (2011) calls the three Ahmedabads: the original walled city, the industrial neighborhoods that surround the walled city, and the posh Ahmedabadi on the west of Sabarmati. Families that have lived in the city for generations still occupy pols in the old city in some cases, the old city has the original Ahmedabadi in it. These families include Hindu and Muslim families and will often have some history of participating in the textile trade. The neighborhoods that surround the old city are mostly working class and due to the industrial decline and economic uncertainty

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people who are often engaged in the informal sector. Lower caste Hindus and poorer

Muslims share these neighborhoods. The rapidly changing ethno-political equations of

the late 20th century in the city meant that tenuous alliances between lower castes and

Muslims were no longer a bulwark against ethnic strife. These neighborhood are also

home to immigrant labor which adds another layer of complexity in the ethnic equations.

Immigrants may not side with neighbors but may side with their ethnic group. The

absence of urban and neighborhood pride, sorely missing in Ahmedabad (discussed in

following chapters), poses another challenge to ethnic peace in these neighborhoods. In

2002, these peripheral neighborhoods saw some of the worst violence. Finally, upper

caste and class Hindus, few lower caste and Muslim elites occupy the posh areas of

western Ahmedabad.

Culture

As a city that saw firsthand, the Gujarat Sultanate, the Mughals, the Marathas, the British,

India's Industrial revolution, Gandhi, and the post-independence fervor of Modernist

architecture there is no dearth of true culture with a capital "C" in Ahmedabad.

According to Yagnik (2011) in terms of antiquity only Delhi (India's capital) is the only

major city older than Ahmedabad. However, its glorious history has been frequently

interrupted by unparalleled violence and upheavals. And as the old city descended into

squalor and despair in the late 20th century its cultural icons too have fallen into disrepair

and disuse. Ahmedabad's famous darwazas (gates) are surrounded by shops and slums.

The monuments are thus used but it becomes impossible to appreciate their beauty in any

formal sense. This tussle between the formal and informal is discussed in detail in chapter

5 & 6. The visual loss of these monuments to use and abuse means that the markers of old city pride are lost. In the old city there is a rich culture with the small "c" however it dominates at the expense of culture with a capital "C". This is not to say that it is a necessarily bad that small "c" culture supersedes, however one does lament the capital "C" receding.

The old city's culture is a lament of the once glorious past. There are ancient markers of rich architecture and design at every corner but surrounded by an often desperate poverty. Also the remnants of 19th and 20th century industrial glory, closed mills and old textile tycoon mansions are reminders of the once formidable industrial prowess of East Ahmedabad.

Figure 9 The Delhi Darwaza: From glorious gateway to annoying traffic bottleneck.

One can say that the Sabarmati is a border that allowed Ahmedabad to survive its periods of tumolt and decline. When East Ahmedabad declined and was marred by violence the people and businesses had a choice to move within the confines of Ahmedabad to a *safer* location. Even Muslims move to the Juhapura ghetto from the old city, its population increasing roughly ten fold in the 14 years since the 2002 riots.

Thus West Ahmedabad[39] stands in contrast with the East and offers modernity and optimism. The Indian Institute of Management (IIM-India's foremost management school designed by the American architect Louis I. Kahn), the Vikram Sarabhai Community Science Center, and the Centre for Environment Planning & Technology (CEPT) are the few 20th century Indian icons that call West Ahmedabad their home. The value of these institutions is significant as they bring an educated ambitious class of individuals to Ahmedabad. This influence seems to stop at the edge of the Sabarmati. And indeed when it does cross the river the resulting interventions seem foreign, as discussed in Chapter 6. So while Ahmedabad enjoys pockets of cosmopolitanism on its academic and institutional campuses their impact on 7 million Ahmedabadis is debatable. Also, many students migrate out of Ahmedabad after CEPT or IIM.

 The East-West dichotomy in Ahmedabad also mirrors the Hindu Muslim dichotomy. In percentage terms, the East has more Muslims than the West. This difference is also mimicked in religious terms. Apart from Juhapura most mosques in Ahmedabad are

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[39] Again, in Surat the river does not divide the city into developed and underdeveloped or old and new. Instead in Surat the new posh city encircles the old city and is even influenced by it.

located in East Ahmedabad. The lack of residential access to West Ahmedabad for Muslims is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Surat and Ahmedabad have both faced many challenges. However Surat has faced more natural disasters whereas Ahmedabad has faced more manmade disasters. The regularity of ethno-communal violence in Ahmedabad has left a deep impact on the city. In 1969 India's first major post-independence riot took place in Ahmedabad. The riot claimed 660 lives. A Muslim Shrine in East Ahmedabad was razed to the ground and in its stead a Hanuman temple was built-the temple was called Hulladia Hanuman-literally meaning Lord Hanuman of the Riots (Yagnik, 2011). Many of these makeshift temples where the ethnic meaning of the place was contested were also constructed in 2002. The Old city and East Ahmedabad in general is embroiled in a culture of ethnic contest and ethnic exclusivity. There are other surviving expressions of a syncretic past in small shrines, however the ethnic contest has been reinforced decade after decade. After 1969 Ahmedabad saw major riots in 1985, 1989, and 1992. Apart from these riots, there were always small skirmishes between Hindus and Muslims.

The culture of the old city is not just about violence, poverty, and despair. And there are

slums in West Ahmedabad too. In fact in the old city there is a traditional urban neighborhood configuration of *pols*. The Ahmedabadi *pol* is an institution unto itself. According to Mahadevia et.al. (2014) each *pol* is homogenous in religion, caste and community. The pol is an

Figure 10 A mixed use street in Kalupur in East Ahmedabad.

independent community with its own shrine and its own social and political order (Yagnik, 2011). The life and relationships of the *pols* have a legendary status in Ahmedabad's folklore and people often talk about family-like relationships with other members of the pol. Of course the *pol* also restricts its members and *poliyo* is an Ahmedabadi insult which means a sheltered person or a socially backward person (Shah, 2015). Spatially the closest comparative element to a *pol* is a cul-de-sac in American suburbia.

Politics

After the tumultuous centuries which included rule by the Ahmedabad dynasty, the Mughals, the Marathas, and the East India Company, Ahmedabad experienced a brief interlude of stability as part of the British Empire. The Victorian age brought with it Victorian politics and in the mid-nineteenth century the city had its first municipal

corporation. Thus began the molding of Ahmedabad, along with the rest of the country, into a governance structure that would later become a western style constitutional democracy. While there was some pushback against the British rule in Ahmedabad, Gandhi posed the first serious and local challenge to it. While Gandhi's influence in Surat was tangential his influence in Ahmedabad was very direct. Gandhi is known as the Saint of Sabarmati (the river in Ahmedabad) in India. After returning from South Africa Gandhi made Ahmedabad his headquarters. This act again pushed the city into political limelight. And his attempts at Hindu-Muslim unity put the Hindu-Muslim relationships in the city in the limelight too. After Indian Independence, India's partition, in 1947 and, Gandhi's death in 1948, the city experienced the effects of a post-independence and post-WW2 financial boom. However, these positives soon waned by the 1960s when India experienced a crushing defeat against China in a war and in 1969 Ahmedabad experienced the worst Hindu-Muslim violence for any city post-independence. The ruling Congress carries some blame for this.

After India's partition the Congress's grassroots cadre was, along with trade unions, a strong bulwark against Hindu-Muslim violence. The grassroots organization of the Congress and allied unions lost their efficacy as electoral politics came to the forefront.

The Congress did not have any qualms about using criminals and caste politics to consolidate their political positions (Engineer, 1992). The Congress is said to have sheltered and patronized the notorious gangster and bootlegger Muslim Abdul Latif in Ahmedabad. Latif became a feared and despised name in the average Hindu household. Thanks in part to Latif, Ahmedabad had a strong underworld of illicit-liquor thriving with

political and civic corruption (Shani, 2010). This unholy politician-gangster nexus

ensured that the gangsters could enjoy significant political influence. He became a poster

boy for such clout and a symbol of ethnic dissatisfaction for the Hindu majority. Latif

also lent unwarranted legitimacy to the stereotyping of Muslims as criminals or

criminally inclined. Additionally, the political patronage he enjoyed furthered the notion

that the ruling Congress was biased towards Muslims. The right-wing BJP was able to

present itself as the savior of Hindus simply by presenting an alternative to Latif (Dayal,

2008). The Congress used an electoral formula which ensured a certain degree of

electoral success. The KHAM formula consisted of consolidating the votes from

Kshatriya (a Hindu caste), Harijans (lower castes), Adivasi (tribal communities) and

Muslims. While this included enough people to win votes it did not include every part of

the Hindu majority. There were other powerful Hindu groups that felt disenfranchised in

political circles and even unsafe after the rise of Latif. The Congress also did not allow

non-criminal or disloyal Muslim leadership to rise. With effective gerrymandering it

ensured that Muslim areas could not elect a Muslim representative without the Congress

bringing some Hindu votes. The formula worked well, electorally speaking, and gave rise

to the kind of political hubris and mismanagement that is characteristic of all monopolies

(Ali, 2015). Now with a Hindu Nationalist government in power, Congress' old

gerrymandered districts (along with new efforts) ensure that of the 182 seats in the 2012

Gujarat assembly only 2 MLAs (Members of Legislative Assembly) are Muslims.

It is thus part of popular folklore that all ethnic conflict in Gujarat (and India at large) is

about politics which is to say that politicians engineer violence for political gains.

Typically, politicians respond to societal dynamics rather than influence them and in matters of ethnic passions even great leaders can fail to influence outcomes[40].

Summary

Ahmedabad has a more complicated history than Surat. It is not that Surat did not face militaristic and political challenges but that they do not recur at the same frequency as in the case of Ahmedabad. Additionally, the city also experienced much more ethnic violence. The added misfortune is, as this research shows in the following chapters, that Ahmedabad's geography and its urban typology follows every trend in its socio-economic fortunes very closely. The city cannot completely break away from its own history and hence it seems to break away from itself. This explains the new posh western Ahmedabad where people can forget the existence of the older messier Ahmedabad across the river.

Regardless, Ahmedabad has a rich 600 years old history and its people have seen tyrants, saints, wars, and riots. The challenges it faces today may be resolved and Ahmedabad may once again prosper (not just grow).

Conclusion

Both cities have seen their fortunes wax and wane in the last four centuries but because Surat was not a political capital it did not quite have the target on its back as Ahmedabad

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[40] The Hindu-Muslim problem was effectively Gandhi's greatest defeat. Not only did India split into two parts, India and Pakistan (eventually 3 with Bangladesh) but the split was a blood-soaked affair. In spite of statements like, "Yes I am (a Hindu), I am also a Muslim, a Christian, a Buddhist, and a Jew" for most Indian Muslims Gandhi was a decent but still a Hindu leader and because of such statements for the right-wing Hindus he was a Muslim sympathizer(Herman, 2008)The timing of this statement is especially salient, Gandhi said this when he was on his way to a meeting with Jinnah in 1944, in response to right-wing Hindus who were demonstrating against Gandhi agreeing to meet Jinnah.

did. Surat was a target of opportunistic looting raids but given its relatively low political profile belligerents in history do not seem interested in destroying it or ruling it, other than to control its trade routes.

Also, while both cities attracted migrants given their occasional economic booms it seems there was a difference in how these people travelled to these cities. Ahmedabad's migrants throughout history seem to be people who travelled *to* Ahmedabad. Surat's migrants seem to be people who travelled all over the world and settled in Surat. This is of course only a speculative reflection but it may be backed by the fact of Surat's dominance as a western port for centuries. At least one prominent Ahmedabadi envied Surat's ports. Ranchhodlal Chhotalal, the same person who founded Ahmedabad's first textile mill had proposed a large canal that would connect Ahmedabad to the Arabian Sea.

Writing about Surat and Ahmedabad, and indeed about most Indian cities is always an exercise in writing history. Not only do the cities come with a long history but also they are changing rapidly. However something ancient and timeless persists in the lives of old cities.

The two cities are at the vanguard of the new India story. Just as Ahmedabad's and Surat's textile mills were pioneers in the socialist labor movement today the two cities are

capitalist fortresses. In a way, given their mercantile ethos, their labor movements and flirtations with socialism were an aberration.

After this limited but crucial history and profile of the two cities the following Chapter focuses on the neighborhoods, people, and narratives included in this research. It also addresses the framework used to study them.

Chapter 4: Research Design: Locus, Populace, and Narratives

This chapter outlines the criteria for selecting the two cities and the six neighborhoods in those cities that are the focus of this research. The neighborhoods are next described in greater detail to create a richer context before the results are presented in Chapter 5. The procedures by which fieldwork was carried out and data analyzed are presented. The fieldwork and data analysis follow the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2. Finally, the Chapter concludes with four individual profiles of the respondents. These profiles serve as a reminder of the nature of fieldwork before presenting the results in Chapter 5. More significantly, the profiles are a reminder that all groups are after all made up of individuals.

Locus

The overall research design is largely qualitative and uses mixed methods analysis for a comparative study. The research focused on two Indian cities, Surat and Ahmedabad, which have been discussed in Chapter 3. Within these two cities the research focused on three neighborhoods in each city. The neighborhoods were selected based on similarities in demographics and within and across the two cities. Since neighborhood level data is hard to come by, ward level data and consultations with scholars and informants in both

Neighborhood	Ethnic composition	Location
N1	Majority Hindu	Sharing a physical border with N2
N2	Majority Muslim	Sharing a physical border with N1
N3	High levels of ethnic heterogeneity.	Not sharing a physical border with N1 or N2[1]

the cities[41] were used. The wards (political districts) were not used as the primary

geographical unit of study. This is simply because the neighborhoods that people

perceived as their geographical units and ward boundaries often do not coincide. For

instance, Juhapura, the neighborhood that dominates the discourse in Ahmedabad as a

Muslim ghetto, has no political or official existence of its own. Its areas fall under

Sarkhej and Vejalpur ward which is one of Ahmedabad's largest and most rural wards at

14.6 sq. miles. This stands in contrast with the Kalupur-Daryapur neighborhood, whose

boundaries align well with the two political wards of the same names and occupy a total

of 0.8 sq. miles.

The neighborhoods, based on the criteria presented in the table above, were the best

candidates in the two cities. The first neighborhoods selected in either city were the

majority Muslim neighborhoods. Muslims are a minority in both cities (approx. 12% in

Surat, 14% in Ahmedabad.) and are concentrated in a few neighborhoods. This meant

that the choices for Muslim majority neighborhoods were generally limited. Rander and

Juhapura are also the first neighborhoods that locals spoke about when asked about a

Muslim neighborhood. Additionally, Juhapura in Ahmedabad has become a focus of

much scholarship, especially since the riots. Both these neighborhoods also had Hindu

majority neighborhoods that they share a physical border with. As mentioned earlier the

sizes of the neighborhoods were different but more than the geographic size or population

the focus was the ethnic composition. Each neighborhood is also a comprehensive

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[41] I am grateful to Prof. Kiran Desai at CSS Surat, Nishpriha Thakur, my Surat assistant Neeti Patel-Parekh, Prof. Achyut Yagnik at SETU, and Zaheer Janmohammed for helping me evaluate my choices about the neighborhoods.

neighborhood, which is to say it has within it enough population and structures to provide a sufficient case for study and comparison.

As for the mixed neighborhoods, the choice of Nanpura in Surat was straightforward. It is the most important neighborhood in the old-city where Hindus and Muslims still live in close proximity to each other. Some other neighborhoods have similarly high levels of heterogeneity but Nanpura is also a historically significant neighborhood. During fieldwork there were a few occasions when the strict boundaries were cumbersome since an informant would find a person ready for the interview only for the interviewer to discover that the person lives just outside Nanpura. Similarly, some merchant in Nanpura would agree to the interview but then the interviewer would discover that merchant's house was just outside Nanpura's official borders. In Ahmedabad too, the choice of Kalupur-Dariyapur was based on the neighborhood's ethnic composition. The other aspect of that choice was related to whether Kalupur or Dariyapur alone would be sufficient for the study. Kalupur and Dariyapur are two different wards in the Ahmedabad municipal corporation. There were three primary reasons why the two wards were studied as one neighborhood- 1. Many locals frequently mentioned the two wards as one neighborhood and did not see them as distinct; 2. Combining the two wards allowed a greater part of the old-city to be studied; 3. Ahmedabadis were much more reluctant to talk about the violence, Nanpura-like difficulties couldn't be afforded in old-city Ahmedabad.

In the hindsight, the most significant and effective aspects associated with the choice of the neighborhoods are by coincidence and not by design. Kalupur-Dariyapur and

Nanpura, the heterogeneous neighborhoods are located in the old-city of both cities.

Juhapura and Rander, the Muslim neighborhoods are across the river in both the cities.

Just as the Hindu neighborhoods on their borders, Vejalpur and Adajan are. This very

significant similarity that allows a tight comparison of the cases was admittedly not a

factor in the initial neighborhood selection. However, as this research will show, the

coincidence of finding a tight geographic comparison while searching for a meaningful

ethnic composition is not a coincidence at all.

Presented below are the profiles of these neighborhoods.

Brief Neighborhood Profiles

The three neighborhoods include one with a majority Hindu population, another with a majority Muslim population, and one with high levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The dissertation addresses the neighborhoods in this chapter. Later, Chapter 5 provides greater details of the urban form and the residents of the neighborhood.

The three neighborhoods differ in their population levels, densities and historical significance. However their relative proximity and their comparative features with their counterparts in the other city were crucial in their selection. In the profiles, as indeed throughout the research, a distinction is made between the neighborhood according to the people and the neighborhood according to the urban administration (or as the municipal corporations call them 'wards'). This is especially important in the case of Ahmedabad's Juhapura but the distinction applies for most neighborhoods.

Neighborhoods	Population (Census, 2011 figures or estimates[3])	Area (in sq. miles)	Population Density (people per sq. mile)
Nanpura	52,421	0.44	119,000
Rander	114,632	1.52	66,000
Adajan	196,970	2.28	86,000
Kalupur-Dariyapur	117,294	0.837	140,136
Juhapura	400,000*	3.01	133,000
Vejalpur (ward area)	290,000*	1.2	148,000

*Figure 11 Neighborhood populations (*note below)*

*Juhapura and Vejalpur, as neighborhoods, do not have the same borders with their respective official wards. Indeed Juhapura, does not even have any official existence. Similarly, some of Vejalpur ward's area and hence the population is actually a part of what would one consider Juhapura. Hence the estimates for both neighborhoods.

The Three Surati Neighborhoods

In Surat the research focused on three neighborhoods namely- Nanpura, Rander, and

Adajan.

Figure 12 Nanpura, Rander and Adajan in Surat City. Source: Author Drawn Map on ESRI base map. Ward Data from Surat Municipal Corporation ARCGIS

Nanpura-Ethnic Heterogeneity

Nanpura is often considered a bastion of Hindu-Muslim amity within Surat. However, it

has seen some of the worst rioting in 1992. Located at the heart of Surat, Nanpura is in

what is known as the old city in Surat. A ring road has replaced the wall that once

surrounded medieval Surat. And unlike Ahmedabad, Surat's gates are merely namesakes

for new neighborhoods. Nanpura has a rich tradition of business and culture. To its south

and southwest are Surat's new, posh, and aspired neighborhoods like Athwa-gate,

Majura-gate and Umra. To its north
and northwest are the old city
neighborhoods like Sonifalia,
Nanavat and Gopipura. To put the
nature of these neighborhoods in
context, one can simply state that
Nanpura looks south with aspiration
and north with recognition or even
relief. Nanpura is probably the most
important neighborhood in the old
city. Official Nanpura and the

Figure 13 Nanpura in Surat City, Source: Author
Drawn Map on ESRI base map. ARCGIS

people's Nanpura are slightly different geographical entities. Many people in wards like

Nanavat or even Gopipura claimed to be living in Nanpura. Nanpura residents claimed

landmarks in official Nanavat or Sonifalia as their own.

Nanpura is not just the heart of Surat today, but it was central to medieval Surat's

nautical trade (Jha, 2013). Many of the elites then called Nanpura home. The Hindus and

Muslims in Surat enjoyed trade relations thanks to the ancient Surat port which was

located very close to Nanpura. Nanpura is not just home to Surat's Hindus and Muslims

but Parsis, Jains and some Christians also call Nanpura home. Among the minorities the

Parsis, in particular, have been in Nanpura for more than two centuries and played a

critical role in trade, especially as brokers of the East India Company (Haynes, 1991).

Hindus and Muslims have lived in relative amity in Nanpura. Part of the reason is that

Hindu and Muslim communities are both divided along caste and sect lines (Haynes,

1991), according to Varshney (2002) intra-ethnic divisions may be conducive to

interethnic cohesion. However the recurring violence of the 20th century along with the

political uncertainty during the freedom struggle reinforced the Hindu-Muslim divide as

the primary ethnic divide. Violence among Hindus and Muslims in the past was often

seen as violence between a Hindu caste and a Muslim sect[42]. Muslim and Hindu

communities till the 20th century were internally divided and often had alliances across

the Hindu-Muslim divide along the lines of common trade or social class (Haynes, 1991).

Contemporary Nanpura has a population of around 62,000 people (Source: Surat

Municipal Corporation) and is a middle class neighborhood. Nanpura's population has

not seen the same growth as other neighborhoods in Surat, and indeed across India. This

may be because Nanpura is a medium-rise and high density neighborhood. Also in the

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[42] These nuanced narratives of violence are now limited to academia or local communities, in popular psyche the narratives of the past are neatly structured along the Hindu-Muslim binary.

last 20 years there has been rampant growth around the old city, as Surat added nearly 90

Sq. Miles to the city. Many residents also moved after the 1992 violence. Yet, old

structures are disappearing or being renovated constantly. The narrow streets of Nanpura

are interspersed with newer wider streets that seem to have made their way through the

newer city. However, Nanpura still carries the traces of the past, with a Parsi Fire

Temple, a Dutch Garden, and the Mughal Sarai.

Rander-The Muslim Neighborhood

Rander's history, like Nanpura, is rich. Rander is effectively Surat's first neighborhood. Rander's significance in Gujarat's history can be gauged from the fact that one can meet people whose surname is Randeria (meaning of or from Rander) belonging to at least three different religions-Hinduism, Islam, and Zoroastrianism. Rander shines in the history of Surat, although Surat

Figure 14Rander in Surat City, Source: Author Drawn Map on ESRI base map. ARCGIS

and Rander were different towns in the past, now Rander is relegated to the position of a

ghettoized, and economically gentrifying, Muslim neighborhood. It is one of those

places whose glory days are clearly in the distant past but traces and memories of those

days are never to be forgotten. Subrahmanyam (2000) quotes Antonio da Silveira in

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1530, as, "Rander, a center of considerable promise in the trade of the Indian Ocean, never rallied from this blow."

As a 66 year old Muslim man in one of my interviews remarked with considerable pride and nostalgia:

> *Rander was far more important than Surat, Surat was just a speck of dust. Rander was the first to have electricity, first to have running water, first to have street lighting. Then there was the gate of Mecca, there was a big port here, from where ships went to Mecca. Up there (to the North) is Jahangir Pura, this is where King Jahangir (Mughal emperor of India from 1605 to 1627) had visited --so it is Jahangir Pura. No one even knew Surat. See Randeris were trading with Burma, Saudi etc. hence we have khausa here which originally comes from Burma.*

People who use the demonym Randeri are a dying breed even within what is now considered Rander. As its boundaries have grown, Rander's significance has shrunk. Its relationship to Surat is comparable to Jaffa's relationship to Tel-Aviv- their fate is intertwined but their fortunes hitherto are inversely proportional.

Patel (2014) talks about Rander as '*Mian-bhaiyo no Nariman Point*' (The Nariman Point of Mian-bhais, which is slang for Muslims and Nariman point is an affluent Mumbai neighborhood). Rander's relative affluence is easy to notice. It is more affluent than old city neighborhoods, but pales in comparison with the more affluent neighborhoods of southern Surat. Like Nanpura, the people's Rander and official Rander are two different entities. Northern Rander is where one finds the oldest structures with intricate details and traditional Randeri homes. The influence on Rander's residential architecture ranges from the original Vernacular to late colonial. Houses in the new Rander in south include mostly apartments and some concrete Bungalows. Some of these bungalows may have

elements of old architecture thrown in but most could just as easily be transplanted to Barcelona or Bengaluru. The typology of Old Rander is distinct. Homes are akin to row houses with a narrow façade and a deep plan. Also there is typically an *otla* in the front. The *otla* is a low porch at the entrance and is often used as a space for gathering or transition into the house.

Old Rander still has some Hindu and Jain families. However most of Rander's nearly 120,000 residents are Muslims. And while old Rander is fairly dense, newer Rander has a lower population density.

Adajan-The Hindu Neighborhood

Adajan is the newest, the most populated, and the fastest growing (for two decades) among the three Surat neighborhoods. Adajan and Rander, both officially became a part of Surat's Municipal limits in the 1970s. However, unlike Rander, Adajan does not really have an urban past. Adajan-gam (lit. village) is recorded in history however there are no specific references to Adajan-gam in the

Figure 15 Adajan in Surat City, Source: Author Drawn Map on ESRI base map. ARCGIS

history of the Portuguese attacks on Surat and Rander. However it's past is no indication of its present or its potential future. Explosive, is the only way one can describe Adajan's

growth. Adajan went from roughly 60,000 residents in 1991 to more than 200,000 today (Source: Surat Municipal Corporation).

The population growth in Adajan comes from many immigrants to the city. While old Adajan still has rural pockets, most of the once idyllic village has transformed into high-rise buildings. The urban typology is indicative of middle class aspirations and typical across urban India. There is typically a cluster of high rise apartments that stand on columns with parking underneath, the scooters eventually give way to cars as the economy improves. There is a courtyard between these apartments and the wall that surrounds this cluster has a gate that displays a fancy or religious name for the apartment complex. Ambitious and immodest names like 'Elite Apartments', 'Royal Apartments', and 'Regency Plaza' are very common.

However, while Rander hosts the Muslim elites along with middle class Muslims, Adajan is squarely middle and upper middle class. To clarify, many of Adajan's Hindus and Rander's Muslims have similar economic status but the Hindu elite live elsewhere in the city. Muslim elites don't have access to many other neighborhoods and hence are forced to live in Rander. So Rander, as a neighborhood that includes Muslim elites is still comparable only to Adajan but it would compare less favorably, in appearance and amenities to elite Hindu neighborhoods. Many Hindu elites have bungalows or lavish apartments on the other side of the river in the neighborhoods like City Light. Adajan's repute as a rural area still affects its contemporary appeal.

When it comes to ethnic violence, Adajan enjoys multiple advantages. The neighborhood is almost exclusively Hindu and borders on the more affluent parts of Rander. Chapters 5

and 6 elaborate these advantages in detail, and contrast it with Adajan's Ahmedabadi counterpart.

The Three Ahmedabadi Neighborhoods

In Ahmedabad the research focused on three neighborhoods namely- Kalupur-Dariyapur,

Juhapura, and Vejalpur-Jivraj.

Figure 16 Juhapura, Vejalpur and Kalupur-Dariyapur in Ahmedabad
Author Drawn Map on ESRI base map. Ward Data BISAG, Govt. of
Gujarat. ARCGIS

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Kalupur-Dariyapur- Ethnic Heterogeneity

Located in old Ahmedabad, Kalupur and Dariyapur are actually two different political

wards that are often mentioned together as one neighborhood. Their proximity and

potentially even their rhyming names may be factors. Also the similarity in Architectural

and urban typology is unmissable. People described the neighborhoods and the old city as

"original Ahmedabad".

The *Pols*' prominent features:
1. Narrow Streets with closely spaced 2 or 3 story buildings closely spaced.
2. Tall and narrow facades and a deep floor plan.
3. Higher floors extend onto the street for shade during Ahmedabad's hot summers and stormy monsoons.
4. Street layout based on a broken asymmetrical grid with multiple dead-ends that allows many pols to function as independent communities.
5. More affluent households had a small courtyard within the house.

Figure 17 The Ahmedabadi Pols

The quintessential Ahmedabadi *pol* finds full expression in this neighborhood. While

newer architectural typologies have attempted a takeover, the narrow streets, tight knit

communities, and a tense ethnic situation make it difficult to execute serious changes.

The neighborhood is surrounded by other similar neighborhoods. The neighborhood was

at the center of the textile boom. Many of the 19th and 20th century textile mills

surrounded the old city to its east. The closure of some of these mills in the industrial belt

that encircles the old city has meant loss of employment for many residents. Apart from that it has also resulted in a clustering of slums just outside the old city limits.

The neighborhood is less affluent than its counterpart in Surat. However the entrepreneur and business ethos is similar. There are many small businesses in the neighborhood. While the pols are typically residential just at their entrance there are often small shops that cater to the needs of the smaller neighborhood or a few pols. Kalupur-Dariyapur and Nanpura have a similar history, with their ancient glory and relative current decline but Kalupur-Dariyapur's decline is much more precipitous. A general sense of decay, decline, even despair is visible in Kalupur-Dariyapur. It is not that Nanpura does not have its pockets of poverty or that Kalupur-Dariyapur does not have some pockets of affluence however the trend-lines, heading down, are steeper in Ahmedabad. It is easier to find structures in a state of disrepair in Kalupur-Dariyapur compared to Nanpura. This does create some challenges for comparing the two cities even as the income and education levels in the two samples are comparable.

The neighborhood has experienced many upheavals in the last century and a half. Apart from being the epicenter of the ethnic violence (before 2002), it has also seen economic boom and bust with the advent and decline of the textile industry. The fate of the community relationships was also tied to this boom and bust (Varshney, 2002). The informal economy is dominant in the neighborhood. This kind of small business is subject to a lot of volatility. For instance, peddling goods on the street leaves one at the mercy of the weather or worse-- urban planners. These small business owners are not always so by choice. Many were formerly employed in mills but since their closure have

been forced to find odd jobs or start businesses. Self-employment resulted in the rupture of many social ties that relied on being employed together in the same mills. Of course this story holds true for many adjoining neighborhoods. These small informal businesses are also susceptible to looting and arson during riots. However, people in Kalupur-Dariyapur have witnessed a contrasting growth and development across the river, seemingly unaffected by their decline.

Juhapura-The Muslim Neighborhood

Among the three neighborhoods Juhapura is the largest. However, Juhapura has no administrative existence or recognition. Juhapura is part of the Sarkhej Ward and Vejalpur ward in Ahmedabad. And while Juhapura itself is intensely urban, many parts of Sarkhej are actually rural and have agriculture as their primary occupation.

Juhapura includes parts of eight different urban areas of: Juhapura, Maktampura, Fatehwadi, Makarba, Sarkhej, Okaf, Vejalpur and Gyaspur. In 2006, it was included in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation city limits as a part of the New West zone (Mahadevia, Desai, & Vyas, 2014).

The neighborhood is effectively the largest Muslim ghetto in India. Population estimates are close to 400,000 or even half a million. Juhapura is however a uniquely ethnic ghetto. There are no limits on the economic circumstance of the residents. Muslim slum dwellers and Muslim millionaires are all trapped in Juhapura. To its east is the Sabarmati River, and to its West and South are Hindu neighborhoods where it cannot expand. The neighborhood is growing fast vertically with new high rises that only a few of its residents can afford. The North is more accepting but there are building code restrictions

such as agricultural land laws which are frequently violated by developers. While the developers violate these laws it is their hapless clients who will typically pay the price for the same. Juhapura's new developments, legal and illegal are exclusively geared towards Muslims. Buildings have Arabic inspired names such as Alif Apartments, Zamzam Apartments, or Hatim Apartments (see Figure 18). There are two factors that that must be noted in analyzing the new trend of Arabic names-

Figure 18 A new project hoarding near Juhapura Ahmedabad, the buildings exclusively designed for upper class Muslims. Notice the Arabic text along with English and Gujarati.

1. Many Muslim owned buildings and businesses across India tend to have identity neutral names such as Gujarat Trading. The purpose of such nomenclature is often defense during riots. A clearly Muslim owned business may become more susceptible to attack. However, Juhapura there is already recognized as almost a 'Muslim city' (Jaffrelot, 2012) so obscure naming strategies offer limited defense.

2. The accusation and the feeling of being less Muslim than their Arab counterparts has always bothered sub-continental Muslims. Indian Islam's initial influences

were Persian and Turkic. However with of Saudi Arabia's economic rise has

meant its cultural influence is wider and deeper.

Juhapura, far from being immune to these influences, is at the epicenter of such factors.

After the riots of 2002, in the face of government apathy, it was religious and sometimes

foreign groups that took over the task of rebuilding and aid. The riots are also the reason

why Juhapura has become a true representative of all Muslim sects and social classes in

Ahmedabad. Before the riots, Juhapura was mostly a lower middle class and poor

neighborhood. There were a few pockets of affluent Muslims but the Muslim elites either

lived in the more lavish parts of the old city or even in some majority Hindu

neighborhoods. During those days Juhapura served as a safe space during times of

violence for some elites but never as a permanent residence. However while the presence

of Muslim elites provides some economic opportunity and political capital it comes at a

price for the majority. Now the center of Juhapura is occupied by the elites and the

periphery is occupied by the poor and slum dwellers. Chapter 5 discusses this geographic

organization and its causes and effects in detail.

Vejalpur-Jivraj-The Hindu Neighborhood
Vejalpur-Jivraj is a middle class dominant Hindu neighborhood that shares a contentious

border with Juhapura to its South and aspires to be like the posh neighborhoods to its East

and North. Like its Surati counterpart, Vejalpur is also a *relatively* middle class

neighborhood, as some Muslim elites might aspire to live by the standards of the Hindu

middle class that inhabits Vejalpur.

The neighborhood has some tall buildings but for the most part one sees a typology of smaller apartments offset from the street along narrower secondary streets. Like its Surati counterpart Adajan, Vejalpur too was a rural area on the fringes of Ahmedabad city (Desai, 1987). However its growth, while still rapid has not been as explosive since Vejalpur's urbanization started earlier and was steadier than Adajan or other aspirational neighborhoods of Ahmedabad.

Vejalpur, is a relatively quiet and mostly residential neighborhood. Apart from the main street the traffic in Vejalpur is surprisingly forgiving compared to the rest of Ahmedabad and certainly compared to Juhapura. One of the major reasons for this is that the National highway (similar to an interstate in the U.S.) passes through Juhapura. This road is parallel to the Dr. Jivraj Mehta Marg (*marg* is road) which becomes Vejalpur Road. The traffic that is leaving and entering the city from the West and the South is usually on the national highway. This has also meant that the traffic accidents are concentrated close to the national highway which bisects Juhapura (for details see Chapter 5).

According to Roy (2006) the western suburbs of Ahmedabad, generally followed the Anglo-American model of suburbanization and the urban bourgeoisie moved outside the traditional city limits to "preserve their economic and cultural segmentation" (p. 4364). The stark exception of course is Juhapura. Vejalpur is not a ghetto in the same way as Juhapura, however, it does not follow the Anglo-American model completely. In the 1992-93 riots Muslims in Vejalpur were threatened and many left their houses to move in Sanklit Nagar (a part of Juhapura). Many Hindus lived in Sanklit Nagar but they too were threatened by Muslims and left their houses and moved to Vejalpur (Desai, 2010). So

despite their many differences Vejalpur is similar to Juhapura in housing a population of

internally displaced persons. Many of these people are typically economically challenged

and thus forced to live on the edges of the neighborhoods, in proximity with the Muslims.

So, the poorer residents of Vejalpur are pushed to its southern edge. However, Vejalpur

does not have the kind of makeshift slums visible in Juhapura. Slums in Juhapura often

include poor sanitation and an absence of any paved streets, by contrast, even the poorest

parts of Vejalpur have concrete structures with streets to match.

Research Design

Research design, as Yin (1989) suggests, addresses the "logical problem" and not a "logistical problem". Research design is also critical in identifying what data, and by extension, which data collection methods, will be needed to draw the anticipated conclusions from the research (Payne & Williams, 2005). However, good research design also affords a certain degree of methodological flexibility. It acknowledges that the actual process of research will affect the not just the answers but can transform the questions too. There is a fine balance between this flexibility and adhering to the structural integrity of the design. This balance is especially critical in dealing with human subjects. The research subjects decide how any part of the research methodology (in this case, interviews) can be addressed. The nature of the response invariably affects the methods. Thus it can be said that flexibility and structural integrity of the research are not contrary to each other but are complimentary to each other, and methodological components can be moved around without affecting the overall research design. The research approach is inductive and attempts to answer questions which will provide theoretical and empirical understanding of the connection between urban form and ethnic conflict. Research design is not simply a process of charting a path between a question and an answer but it involves providing a reliable and valid research structure.

The research had two parts: studying the urban form of Ahmedabad and Surat and interviewing residents of Hindu and Muslim neighborhoods regarding their perceptions of the urban form and their attitudes towards the members of the other group.

The Research design uses a qualitative and comparative approach to study the spatial characteristics of the two cities and their effect on its people and ethnic violence. The spatial quality of the research was the innovative element of the research. This also meant that respondents were often not familiar with such questions. Simply put, discussions about interethnic attitudes and relationships are a part of everyday life for many, but people rarely focus on the ethnic meanings of the urban form in small talk. This meant that in questions about ethnic spaces--given the dearth of existing tropes and standard replies --respondents were forced to think about their answers and often ended up providing a deeper insight on interethnic attitudes.

Presented below is an explanation of what it means for the study to employ a qualitative and comparative approach to the study of spatial characteristics.

Qualitative

The research is mainly qualitative. The research examines the relationship of urban form and ethnic violence and the role of ethnicization through the people who experience it and interact with it on a daily basis. Apart from the complexity and subjectivity of "reality" that qualitative research allows, it also affords a level of intimacy with context. This contextual intimacy, along with the intimacy with people, further aids in creating a nuanced explanation of the mechanisms that affect the lives of people in that context. In research that focuses on micro level information, nuance is crucial to the understanding of discourses. This is especially true in the phenomenon of ethnicization.

The study of segregation has dominated Western academia when it comes to its focus on ethnic (typically racial) relations in the city. In Surat and Ahmedabad, on the surface the levels of segregation are likely to show more similarities than differences. Indeed many scholars who study Ahmedabad singularly cite its segregated neighborhoods as a cause of or factor in ethnic violence (Field & Levinson & Pande & Visaria, 2008; Mahadevia, 2007; Mahadevia, 2014). The qualitative study of ethnicization allows a study of the two layers of ethnic issues in neighborhoods: 1. Ownership, 2. Access. This layering is important since even if one group 'owns' a neighborhood but the other can access it then the segregation may matter much less than when access and ownership are both in question. Access to the 'other's' space softens the impact of segregation (see Chapters 5 and 6).

Qualitative research thus allows the flexibility of multiple meanings and interpretations without insisting on a singular narrative. This is especially useful given the often conflicting narratives and stories in research involving ethnic conflict. It also allows the researcher access to the meaning embedded in public symbols, social acts, and gestures.

Comparative

The research relies on a comparative case study method. The research also presents a new methodological and analytical framework but does not attempt a sweeping generalization (Yin, 2003). The investigation of the ethnic meanings of urban form relied primarily on interviews since ethnicization of the physical form does not merely involve assigning the binary ethnicity of Hindu or Muslim. It involves investigating what this ethnicized form means to the people from either ethnic group. Thus, in Surat and Ahmedabad the research

investigated how individuals and groups make sense of their urban environment in the face of complicated interethnic relationships. Figure 19 shows what each case study with the research design entails in terms of data collection. Across the two cases, data collected from each of these methods are compared.

It is important to note that it is the *meaning* derived from the data that are compared, which is to say if information regarding the meaning of a particular feature or phenomenon was obtained through an interview in Ahmedabad it is very likely that it was compared with the information collected through a mental mapping exercise or an informal conversation. This is again testimony to the flexibility of qualitative research.

Figure 19 Research Design- basic structure based on (De Vaus & de Vaus, 2001)

The research compares the interethnic attitudes and the urban forms in the two cities through the residents of the two cities. The underlying framework (conceptual and spatial) and the many similarities between Surat and Ahmedabad are the constants across

the two cities. The matching conceptual framework are of course by design. On the other hand, some similarities in the spatial framework are a coincidence often discovered during the fieldwork or even during analysis. For instance, while the research design called for three comparable neighborhoods in each city the fact that two of the neighborhoods are located on the same side of the river and one neighborhood is located within the old city is a coincidence, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. The significance of this coincidence, that further allowed a tighter comparison between the cases, was understood and appreciated in the hindsight and not as part of the initial research design.

The case study follows a history of contrast in the levels of ethnic violence in Surat and Ahmedabad juxtaposed against multiple similarities between the two cities. The comparison can be criticized since in spite of many similarities there are also many differences (See Chapter 3). However hitherto many studies have focused on individual cities, especially violence prone cities. It is easier to ask the question, "Why did people fight here?" than ask the question, "Why did people not fight here?" Indeed the critical question, if such comparative cases are available, should be, "Why did people fight here and not there?" (Berenschot, 2008). A singular case study potentially provides a more comprehensive picture of that case and is critical in establishing explanations but it is difficult to establish causal connections. For instance, in Ahmedabad, unemployment among mill workers is seen as a cause for the ethnic violence in 1969 (Shani, 2007). However another factor preceded the violence in 1980s and another still in 2002. So, if any excuse causes violence then it is safe to say that the underlying causes are more complicated and that offering single factor explanations is difficult. Indeed even

predictive events such as, mill closures or unemployment, do not imply causality (De Vaus & de Vaus, 2001). Thus this research is primarily exploratory and investigates the probabilistic role of the urban form as a factor in ethnic violence, whilst acknowledging that many other factors contribute to the transition from peace to violence.

Spatial

Here the adjective spatial stands for all the physical aspects of the city--its geography, architecture, urban planning and even the destruction of physical structures. Talking about a city without talking about its spaces presents an incomplete picture of the city. The physical city is integral to this research. Within that there is a focus to understand the physical city through the ethnic lens according to its inhabitants. The research used a mental mapping process where the respondents either drew or directed the drawing of a map. The quest was to get a rough approximation of what people think of as their neighborhood. Respondents typically drew a map starting from their house or place of work and charted paths to places of interest within the city. For this part of the study the methodological framework used by Lynch (1960).

Cognitive Mapping provides the essential information about how respondents view their city. A major advantage of the mapping and spatial questions, discovered in the field, involved the relative novelty of the approach. When it comes to interethnic attitudes respondents often relied on standard responses[43]. However, as mentioned earlier, in

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[43] For instance in questions about responsibility of violence-- politicians were squarely and consistently blamed. Now there may be an objective truth behind that assertion but the blanket blame on an amorphous group called 'politicians' seemed like a stock answer. It is part of common wisdom versus individual assertion.

questions about ethnic spaces there are no standard replies and respondents were forced to think about their answers and often ended up providing a deeper insight on interethnic attitudes.

In dealing with space the binaries of ethnic identity i.e., Hindu vs. Muslim, come into stark focus. Indeed the mapping exercise and questions about space, "exposed and emphasized the scale and the environmental context" (Fenster, 2009, p. 496).

Fieldwork Methods: Design and Procedure

The fieldwork was carried out between October 2013 and April 2014 and included a prior visit in May-June 2011. The lynchpin of the fieldwork was a semi-structured interview that included mapping exercises. The interview included analyzing the urban form of the city as seen by the residents. This represents the most crucial and innovative aspect of this research. In speaking and drawing (people often requested the interviewer to draw on their behalf) respondents offered an opportunity to study the convergence of the physical, social, and the emotional in the city. According to Lynch (1960) every city has a public image and this image is a result of a series of public images held by some critical number of people. In his research, Lynch concludes that people perceive a city as an image. He also suggests that the image is made up of five distinct elements of the built environment: paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks. An approximate ethnic image of the city is constructed using this mapping exercise along with the questionnaire. For this part of the study I rely on the methodological framework used by Canter and Craik (1981), Lynch (1960), and Matei and Ball-Rokeach (2001).

Respondents

The study interviewed 66 Hindus and Muslims across 6 neighborhoods in Ahmedabad and Surat.

In Surat, 36 respondents were interviewed, 18 Hindus and 18 Muslims in three neighborhoods. Rander-a majority Muslim neighborhood, Adajan-a majority Hindu neighborhood and Nanpura-a neighborhood with high levels of heterogeneity. Similarly in Ahmedabad, 30 respondents were interviewed, 12 Hindus and 18 Muslims in Juhapura-a majority Muslim neighborhood, Vejalpur-Jivraj-a majority Hindu neighborhood and Kalupur-Daryapur-a neighborhood with high levels of heterogeneity. For the sake of privacy and confidentiality, given the sensitive subject matter, a unique respondent ID was assigned to each respondent and no names or even pseudonyms were used. So a respondent code AJM28FSix can be understood as shown below-

A J M 28 F Six					
Ahmedabad	Juhapura	Muslim	Age	Female	Sixth Interview in the neighborhood

Figure 20 Respondent code explanation.

It is hard to overstate how concerned people were about privacy and confidentiality.

The accompanying table provides relevant information about the respondents in each city. The differences in the number of interviews and the relatively fewer Hindu interviews in Ahmedabad are explained in the section about Sampling and Access below.

Ahmedabad Male-20 Female-10	Median Age-40							
Birthplace		**Income Range (in Indian Rupees)**						
In-City	Outside City	Outside Gujarat	0-5000	5001-10000	10001-20000	20001-40000	40001-60000	60001-100000
21	7	2	7	5	9	3	2	1
Surat Male-25 Female-11	Median Age-40							
Birthplace		**Income Range (in Indian Rupees)**						
In-City	Outside City	Outside Gujarat	0-5000	5001-10000	10001-20000	20001-40000	40001-60000	60001-100000
19	10	7	0	6	10	7	2	3

Figure 21 Incomes and place of birth of Respondents.

There are two significant observations in the table in Figure 21.

1. In the sample, more Suratis, 47 percent were born outside Surat compared to Ahmedabadis, 30 percent. This observation is significant given the presence of Surati urban pride versus the lack of Ahmedabadi urban pride, as shown in chapter 5.

2. Surati respondents in the sample are generally in the higher income range compared to their Ahmedabadi counterparts. There are two reasons for this-

   a. In Surat, eight respondents offered no income data, compared to three in Ahmedabad. One suspects that in percentage terms that might have evened out the number of lower income Suratis. Otherwise, Surat and Ahmedabad

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have comparable per capita GDP according to a 2008, National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER) report.

b. More significantly a greater percentage of women and a greater percentage of Muslims were interviewed in Ahmedabad. In Ahmedabad, 33% of respondents in the sample were women, compared to 30 percent in Surat. Also in Ahmedabad, 60 percent of the respondents were Muslim compared to 50 percent in Surat. Both groups, women and Muslims, are generally less affluent compared to (all) men and Hindus. This slightly skews the Ahmedabad income ranges towards the lower side.

Additionally, a complete list of respondents with their demographic data--including age, gender, religion, neighborhood, birthplace, education, occupation, income range and income source, and the number of years the respondent has lived in a neighborhood can be found in Appendix B.

Sampling and Access

The primary sampling method used was 'purposeful sampling'. According to Patton (2005), "the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry" (p. 230). However in this research the "information-richness" was occasionally secondary to certain other purposes. The purpose oriented criteria are as described:

- Location: The respondent had to be in one of the three selected neighborhoods in the city.

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- Religion: The respondents was based on the neighborhood and in heterogeneous neighborhoods based on previous interviews to ensure balance.

- Age: At least 24 years or older. The rationale for the participants being 24 years and older is that the participants would have been at least 13 years of age during the 2002 riots. Additionally an attempt was made to ensure representation of diverse age groups.

- Gender: While gender was not a variable in the investigation an attempt was made to ensure a relatively balanced sample.

- Diversity and Comparability: In many cases an attempt was also made, sometimes successfully or otherwise, to ensure similar respondents across neighborhoods and cities. For instance a successful attempt was made to access educational professionals (teachers, principals) across almost all geographical locations. However a similar attempt to find former or current textile workers was not successful.

Access:

The sample was accessed through different approaches. Primary contact was established with some respondents through key informants in each neighborhood. In each case the respondent was not be available or willing but many suggested other potential contacts. Contact was often established through phone or text messages. As the sample grew the respondents often suggested other respondents however in many cases they were too similar to the respondents already interviewed and hence were not interviewed. In some

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cases the respondents were accessed directly in market places or on the street. The *success rate* in such a 'cold calling' approach, a method employed especially in Ahmedabad, was close to 15%, one interview for every 6 refusals. Occasionally there were some respondents who refused after realizing that there was no compensation involved. But, by and large the reason for refusal was the 'sensitive' subject matter of the research. Assurances of complete anonymity were the biggest factor in successfully convincing many respondents[44]. The motivations of the respondents to participate were varied. Some participated due to recommendations while others participated with a view to tell their story. This was truer in Ahmedabad than Surat. And especially so among Ahmedabadi Muslims.

While many Muslims were motivated to tell their stories it was harder to find Hindu respondents, especially in Ahmedabad. The challenge in accessing Hindus in Ahmedabad was partly due to fewer Hindu informants in the selected neighborhoods--the Hindu informants in Ahmedabad were typically located in the most affluent neighborhoods as were their contacts. Apart from the location of informants Hindus also refused interviews by saying something to the effect of, "The riots are ancient history it is time to move-on." It is useful to contextualize this response in the brief history of the aftermath of the riots. The right-wing political parties and organizations are eager to co-opt the vast majority of Hindus in their fold. There is greater movement to establish a unified Hindu population, devoid of caste distinctions (Patel, 1999, Yagnik & Sheth, 2005). It is an ambitious but ironic venture since the upper castes can be as opposed to lower castes as Muslims in

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[44] This was true for me and my research assistants.

some cases. However many lower castes aspire to be part of the mainstream Hindu

community and often adopt the biases and prejudices that some powerful groups in the

upper castes may harbor against Muslims. But these attempts to homogenize Hindus

under the umbrella of Hindutva or even a monochromatic Hinduism is difficult.

However, the post-riot lack of nuance on part of liberal (typically English speaking)

media, academics, and non-rightwing politicians which inadvertently created a false

binary of Hindus as villains and Muslims as victims made it easier for the co-opting of

Hindus by right-wing politicians. Right-wing politicians in turn used this as an

opportunity to assuage the fears of many Hindus who felt wrongly implicated (morally,

not legally) as villains in the riots (Shah, Patel, & Lobo, 2008). Savvy politicians changed

the frame of the discussion from villainous Hindus to peace-loving but brave Hindus

(Fernandes, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2013). Here 'brave' is code for willing to be violent. The

irony is that most Muslims understand the nuances and do not blame all Hindus for the

violence conducted by some Hindus or Hindu politicians, just as most Hindus do not

blame all Muslims for the actions of a few Muslims (see Chapter 5 & 6 for more details).

However there is enough distrust in some places that Hindus feel falsely accused.

Also, as mentioned in Chapter 2, academics and NGOs focused on Muslim victims of the

riots and ignored the fewer, but significant, numbers of Hindu victims. Within this

context, asking Hindus about the riots was seen as an affront by some. The assumption

was that all research will ultimately become "Hindu-bashing". There was also a fear of

'sting operations', in spite of assurances of no links to media some Hindus were afraid

that their recorded voices with any anti-Muslim views will become part of the evening

news[45]. The presumption of bias on part on anyone with an audio recorder and a notebook was disturbing but understandable, and thus access to Hindu interviews was much harder.

Muslims, while more willing, were also suspicious in some cases. One respondent explicitly asked me if I was a part of the CBI (the FBI equivalent of India).

Hindu or Muslim, once the rapport was established then most people were very helpful and strived to provide me with resources and contacts. And often seemed genuinely disappointed when I told them I could not interview their cousin or friend who lived in a neighborhood that was not part of my research.

The Self

In this research the researcher is explicitly an integral part of the process and does not assume that there is a fixed and knowable version of reality which the researcher discovers. Indeed, the central challenge of this research is the shifting and interpretive nature of reality that the research examines. Yet, just because subjects and meanings are shifting does not mean there is no reality. For all research, validity is crucial and is derived, in part, from an explicit exploration of the research methods. The researcher, especially in research that involves fieldwork, is crucial to the research method. The beauty, and the peril, of *fieldwork is that the fieldworker is his own instrument and can*

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[45] This specific fear was expressed by a potential Hindu respondent in Surat, who was introduced to me by another informant and after the first few questions stopped the interview and asked me to erase the audio file. In spite of which he had a long conversation with me and allowed me to hand write notes about his responses. The later friendly informal conversation indicated a trust in me but not in the institutions he perceived I represented.

even observe himself. This recognition of the researcher, as a person and an inevitable participant, is not new in anthropology and ethnographic sociology (Bernard, 2006; Agar, 1996) however it is rare in urban planning research and rarer still in political science. The often paradoxical ideal is of a researcher deeply engaged yet detached. A rigorous process of data analysis affords some detachment. The data collection, however, is possible only through deep engagement. Here engagement is not a euphemism for subjectivity or lack of rigor. Rather it implies a more rigorous fieldwork which insists on rich data from respondents which in turn means accepting the vulnerability of a relationship. The incumbent subjectivity is resolved, as mentioned earlier, through analysis. The idea of silent authorship, where the researcher is excluded in the presentation of findings, is now increasingly challenged [Charmaz & Mitchell, 1997 cited in Holt, (2003)]. *Yet,* there is an argument to exorcise the self in research writing, not due to the irrelevance of self but more so due to its inevitability (Walshaw, 2009)--and maybe even due to its complexity (Holt, 2003).

In this research I adopt the middle path, my voice is relevant and inevitable but not dominant. My identity-- age, gender, education, language, and ethnicity-- influences the research and even the respondents but its effect is on the narratives not on the results. A more pragmatic point in limiting any first person narratives is, even with all its necessary significance it cannot, does not, compete with the voices of sixty-six respondents. Often in interviews the respondents choose to answer the questions not necessarily based on the question but based on the story they want to tell. The answers to these questions are found because the interview asks the same question in different ways. For instance, I

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never ask the real question-"What do you think about Muslims/Hindus?" rather the aggregation of answers to questions about intermarriage, sharing food, or interethnic friendships provides the answer. Also the data analysis process does not necessarily leave it open for me to interpret these answers as I choose, since the research is not testing a theory the codebook is generated based on the analysis of the interviews (See Data Analysis: NVIVO and Mapping later in this chapter.)

The stories my respondents tell and the observations I make in the field, likely cannot be replicated. The methods, however, can be replicated and results tested, even in an entirely different setting. The question then becomes is the discussion of authorship or "self-as-researcher" even relevant? I contend that it is, for the following reasons:

1. There are elements in any social science research which are irreplaceable. The "self" is primary among those elements. A frank discussion of the self thus saves the reader from making assumptions about the researcher's biases. While it is true that the researcher may not herself be aware of all her biases some disclosures are in order. In such cases perfection cannot be allowed to be the enemy of the good.

2. Social science research about complex human affairs deals with a shifting reality. Which does not mean that it cannot be studied however it does mean that the context within which the subject is studied needs to be delineated, researcher included.

3. The discussions about reliability and validity of qualitative research are also fluid and ongoing (Merrick, 1999). For research to have longevity beyond the

immediate context it is incumbent upon researchers to present the context in as much detail as time and space permit. A clear presentation of context allows any reader of the research to understand the lenses the researcher uses, by choice or by default.

The Interviewers (Self included)

As a Parsi Indian NRI (non-resident Indian) I experienced several advantages. The Parsi community has enjoyed a good relationship with Hindus and Muslims in Gujarat. Also, the Parsis are considered honest and generous. This popular perception reaped benefits literally from the first day in Gujarat. I could secure a rental property for my stay in Surat in a predominantly Hindu neighborhood because of my Parsi name and American university background. Also, in Ahmedabad, I stayed in a Parsi Dharamshala (travelers' home) in old-city Ahmedabad.

And while being a Parsi paved the way to some interviews, coming from America provided an unexpected benefit in the interviews. Many respondents took it upon themselves to educate me about the details of certain situations even when I knew many such details. I was concerned if there were places where respondents chose not to reveal certain information based on the assumption that an 'American' would not understand certain ideas. Hence it was a fine balance between establishing my bona-fides as an Indian whilst still making sure that respondents felt the need to clarify certain nuances. Often it simply meant chiming in with, "I did not know that" or "Tell me more about it." Or, when it came to neighborhoods or locations, "Where is that?" Of course this was not

always the case of pretense of ignorance but a desire to see it from the respondent's perspective.

Of the 66 interviews I personally conducted nearly[46] 50 interviews. In Ahmedabad, 4 interviews of Muslim women were conducted by a Muslim female research assistant[47]. Eventually, Muslim women were easier to access than Hindu women in Ahmedabad. Neeti, my Surat research assistant, was a Surat native and became one of the primary informants also, she was also instrumental in translating the interview questionnaire to Gujarati. She also had previous fieldwork experience due to her work at Surat's Center for Social Studies. Neeti is a Hindu and hence I had expected her to have good access among other Hindus, however her rapport with Muslims too was credible. One of the challenges in training the research assistants was to probe the assumptions. To not accept sentences such as, "as you know..." on face value. Their familiarity with the cities and their context came with the risk of preconceived notions shared between the interviewer and the respondent. For this, I had an opportunity to work with Neeti in Surat much more closely, and could observe a few mock interviews--including interviewing her (not included in the research) as part of training and translation. The research assistant in Ahmedabad was a relatively liberal conservative Muslim, which is to say that she could work with me but her family did not allow her to be with me outside of her house. So all meetings were conducted in her living room. Since I was introduced to her by one of her male relatives, after the initial introductions, she was no longer in a veil and her family

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[46] 'Nearly' since some interviews were conducted along with the research assistant in Surat.
[47] She did not wish to be named.

spoke about it as if bestowing some honor on me or assigning me some certification of honorability. Given that she would interview other Muslim women for the research, some in *purdah*[48], and the otherwise restricting work environment I had no such opportunity to train her. Other than sharing two mock interviews, that I conducted on tape with notes and providing her those interviews as a reference. However, her interviews delivered in depth and intimacy what they lacked in breadth and exploration[49]. Thus, there were many challenges in the interview process. The concerns for interviewer bias or familiarity were primary. Apart from that, even my own familiarity and comfort grew as time went by in the field. Respondents in all interviews switch between informant and respondent roles naturally in a semi-structured interview. However, this is the reason for the rich data that semi-structured interviews provide. The freedom to 'travel' between themes and roles is critical.

Many respondents thus became friendly or even friends and transitioned to the role of informants. Much more difficult were the few interviews that were conducted with the informants who became respondents. In such cases there was always an implication of what was said earlier. I had to remind the informant that the interview recording needs to have explicit mentions of events or ideas.

In participant-observer situations there was always a struggle to recognize the switch from participant to observer. Note taking in the field was not always possible, neither was

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[48] Literally purdah means a veil or curtain. As a custom purdah translates to female seclusion from non-familial males.
[49] I would have preferred Neeti to conduct the Ahmedabad interviews also but travel to Ahmedabad was not permitted by her family.

photographing some of the richest moments given the strict anonymity. I was also forced to ask about or think about including certain details which respondents or informants mentioned off the record. While I left out anything that was said off the record it is nearly impossible to leave out the meaning and the knowledge gleaned from it.

The Interview

The most important tool used to mitigate these challenges was the interview questionnaire itself. Effectively the interview can be reduced to a few simple questions such as-

- What do you think about the other community?

- How are your relationships with them?

- What is your opinion and experience of the last violent event?

- What do you think about your neighborhood? and

- How do you see your city as an ethnic entity?

However the interview included 46 unique questions. The questions were, to an extent, repetitive and approaches similar questions in different ways. This allowed the respondent the room to contemplate his/her answers. Also in investigating attitudes there is a key difference between espoused attitudes and real attitudes.

The challenge in investigating the Hindu-Muslim relationship in India lies in the fact that there is so much talk about it in the media and among people that many people have stock answers ready for most questions. There were questions where respondents seemed to

repeat what they thought was expected of them. For instance, in questions about what can be done to improve relationships-- in many responses I clearly heard echoes of the 'national integration' propaganda campaigns from the 1980s and 90s. This seeming repeat of rhetoric cannot be challenged directly since it may truly be what a respondent believes. However, skepticism about the same is the nature of research. One can (and does) investigate what it means when respondents rely on clichéd answers but do not answer the primary questions. This is where the respondent often answers one question when she is actually answering another question. Therein lies the value of a relatively long semi-structured interview. It allows the respondent and the interviewer time to think.

Challenges: Fieldwork and Beyond.

There were many challenges faced in the field. The most dominant was accessing enough respondents based on the criteria mentioned earlier. That was a difficult but mostly a logistical challenge and even when respondents refused interviews they informed the overall research. One of the most interesting reasons for rejecting the interview came from many educated Hindus who said something to the effect of *'I do not think myself as just a Hindu, I am an Indian first, if you want to ask me questions as an Indian I am happy to answer them.'* Then there were people who insisted on speaking without the recorder. I had very interesting conversations with such people and in some cases convinced a few to speak on the record but invariably there was a difference in tone.

However the most significant challenge, one that I personally underestimated, was the emotional and psychological toll of listening to people's experiences of the riots. The study of human conflict is in effect the study of human misery and one is invariably

sucked into the narratives and responds with empathy. This challenge was multiplied

three-fold since each interview had to be translated, transcribed and then analyzed. There

is something strange about hearing an adult cry in the first place-- and then to hear a

recording of the same, often multiple times for the translation, it is an unenviable task.

Hearing someone cry naturally invokes the desire to offer empathy and help. As a

researcher it is hard to offer empathy and near impossible to offer help. Not only is one

concerned about loss of objectivity or a breach of research ethics but also about time. It

may seem callous to say that time spent with someone who is suffering is wasted but

often the problems were so big that an hour or two more with me likely would not make a

difference.

In many instances it seemed like the first time that anyone had asked questions about the

pain involved in experiencing violence in one's city or neighborhood. At this point it is

important to highlight the limited mental health resources available in India. In 2013,

India's National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS) reported that

there were only about 4,000 psychiatrists, 1,000 psychologists and 3,000 social workers

in India*(Finally, a national survey on mental health disorders in India* , 2013). These

figures are stunningly low for a country of more than a billion individuals In contrast,

according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015) the United States has around 30,000

psychiatrists for less than a third of India's population. While it is unfair to make this

comparison given the availability of other resources, such as community and family

networks in India; the community is not always equipped to deal with such traumatic

events. The frustration associated with being unable to make any immediate impact is

very real and troublesome. Social workers who deal with trauma often report secondary trauma and compassion fatigue (Boscarino, Figley, & Adams, 2004; Bride, 2007). However, far less attention has been paid to similar experiences of academics and field researchers (D. Travis, personal communication, February 24, 2016). Without undermining the value of challenges faced by social workers it may be said that the challenges faced by academics are worse given the lack of resources or mandate to make any immediate impact on the situation. Research protocols set by organizations like the Institutional Review Board (IRB) offer training and guidelines which rightly protect the human participants of research however not enough attention is paid towards protecting the researcher. The large dataset based quantitative research that dominates contemporary social science, often a result of "physics envy", protects researchers by divorcing them from the context.

These frustrations and occasionally anger is revealing. For instance, I noticed that initially I was more upset with contradiction or hypocrisy than with outright expressions of prejudice. However, later these contradictions were more markers of complexity of the matter than individual flaws. Also, hypocrisy indicated that some people espoused different values than they practiced but at least they valued those values. As La Rochefoucauld famously said, "Hypocrisy is a tribute vice pays to virtue." Similarly, in later interviews, revelations of trauma were less bothersome because the shock value was missing and there was greater faith in what humans can endure. Overall, charting these feelings, reactions, and shifting perspectives revealed the presumptions and biases, and more significantly the shaky ground that these biases stand on. Thus the long ruminations

with the data and information reveals a truths about the research and the researcher. Research entails not just an explanation of the data but also parsing out the meaning of the data. Rich data keeps providing 'meaning' the more one analyzes it but the process of analysis has to be somewhat mechanical. Which is to say that the process cannot rely on the perceptions and emotions of the researcher. The data analysis process and the multiple questions are thus a safeguard against researcher bias however it does not provide any emotional or psychological safeguards.

In hindsight, I would have prepared as assiduously anticipating my own reactions as I did anticipating respondent reactions. The old story of the woodcutter sharpening his axe is relevant here. The woodcutter who thinks of sharpening his axe as a waste of time eventually does expend more time than the woodcutter who takes a break to sharpen his axe after every tree. In fieldwork the researcher is his own most crucial tool and there are multiple forces dulling his edge. These forces include, but are not limited to, inclement weather, rejection, suspicion, and eventually the subject matter of the interviews and interactions. A robust support network combined with a deep awareness of the psychological costs are as necessary in the field as a notebook and fresh batteries in the voice recorder.

Data Analysis: NVIVO and Mapping

The analysis of the interviews, conversations, maps, and other local and national data is designed to discover the link and relationship between the urban form and ethnic violence. As mentioned earlier, the conceptual framework for this study relies on two important terms: interethnic attitudes and the urban form. The framework investigates the connections and influences between the urban form, interethnic attitudes, and ethnic conflict in the city. The conceptual framework takes into account the factors that influence these connections. Within ethnic conflict there are two categories, non-violent ethnic conflict and violent ethnic conflict (physical violence). The line between the two categories of ethnic conflict is thin but distinguishes one from the other. The state of violence, even when anticipated or expected, always has a profound impact on the situation. Violence, especially lethal violence, is always stunning to societies given the finality of death. The journey from negative attitudes to non-violent conflict and from non-violent conflict to violent conflict is not always linear. Violence influences interethnic attitudes, violence without negative interethnic attitudes is hard to sustain and harder still to repeat[50].

NVIVO analysis

For my analysis I primarily used NVIVO 10 and NVIVO 11 (NVIVO qualitative data analysis Software; QSR International Pvt. Ltd. Versions 10, 2013 and Version 11, 2015). In

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[50] The Hindus generally have a positive view of the Sikhs, so in spite of a bloody conflict centered on Sikh nationalism, often framed around religious lines, there is little leftover animosity between the groups. The presence of intermarriage, sharing of food and festivals may not have prevented the nationalistic fervor but once that was defeated, the positive interethnic attitudes and the absence of deep primordial sentiments, prevented a lingering ethnic conflict.

the Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) the strategy of categorical aggregation was used to capture similar themes using a coding scheme that followed the questionnaire. Another allied coding scheme relied on themes that emerged in the first round of coding.

Creating a Coding Scheme

As mentioned earlier, the research approach is inductive and provides theoretical understanding of the connection between urban form and ethnic conflict. The research begins with the theoretical assumption that interethnic attitudes have a meaningful effect on interethnic conflict and violence. Yet, the fact is little research of this nature is conducted in peaceful cities. As a result of which though it is true that one will find negative interethnic attitudes in conflict prone cities it does not follow that negative interethnic attitudes cause conflict since we do not know if even peaceful cities have negative interethnic attitudes. The dearth of comparative and urban form research in conflict studies meant that a grounded theory be developed through the analysis of the data. Hence, a new coding scheme was created based on a first-pass coding of a few interviews. Some of these codes[51] were later segregated by city, religion, and neighborhood. For instance, while the code about the 'members of the other community as friends' was common for Hindus and Muslims (although the data can be analyzed separately) the code for 'Positive traits of Hindus (according to Muslims)' applies, for obvious reasons, only to responses by Muslim respondents.

Based on further coding there were new emergent themes which created their own codes. These themes were further parts of certain meta-concepts such as inter-ethnic attitudes,

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[51] NVIVO terms codes as nodes.

safety, or discrimination. Additionally, cluster analysis of words using the Pearson coefficient of similarity also yielded themes where various demographic traits could be tweaked to see a broad similarities/differences between respondents. A more detailed explanation and application can be seen in Chapter 5.

Other Analysis

Some key photographs were also coded in NVIVO to highlight recurring themes in the physical city. Some of the codes used were the same as the codes used for the text of the interviews, however the sources were separated since the content was not linked to any respondent but instead was created by the researcher or in some cases borrowed from other sources. The photographs were also situated on the city maps along with the respondent narratives, this is discussed in the next section on Mapping.

Mapping

Each respondent either drew or dictated a map of his or her experience of the city. These maps were then converted to data that can be used by plotting it on to a formal map. The conversion of maps into data is based on simply noting the places mentioned and the context in which they are mentioned. So, if a respondent describes a certain element of the urban form is mentioned as 'posh' in the mapping exercise then other mentions of that element are checked within all interviews. This referencing paints a picture of a certain element and provides a certain value (not numeric value) to it. Examples of these maps are seen in Chapter 5B.

One of the surprises of fieldwork was that many respondents did not have any formal cartographic understanding of the city. The interviewers carried a formal map of the city for reference and many respondents reported seeing a map of their own city for the first time. Comments that indicated genuine discovery, like, "Oh so the river is here." Or "So this is where the railways station is" were not uncommon.

The Cognitive mapping techniques are typically from the global north-west where cartographic knowledge seems relatively high. There is no Indian equivalent, at least in the 80s or 90s, of going cross country in a car with a large map. Information about the city and how people engage, live, and travel within it (Lynch, 1976) is based in a cognitive map that uses spatial mnemonics often entirely devoid of real cartography. This spatial mnemonics is indeed universal and not by any means exclusively Indian. However cognitive mapping abilities differ between individuals (Foley & Cohen, 1984) and individuals use "different types of strategies to encode and decode" their geographical knowledge (Kitchin, 1997). This idea of individual difference can be extended to the cultural level. So beyond experiential similarities and differences that cognitive maps reveal they can also potentially reveal underlying cultural nuances[52]. For instance respondent drawn maps often become 'directions' which is to say a typical map starts with 'We are here' and then the respondent starts charting a path to some place or the other. Where the respondent 'goes' or rather takes the interviewer on a journey to is

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[52] Again, I notice this difference having been trained in the United States in urban planning. The question of whether I would have noticed the same if I had never left Indian shores is difficult to answer. Is it a cognitive "normal" that so many Americans use terms like "turn North" or "due East" in their everyday language or is it normal that many of my respondents merely used hand gestures to point towards indicate landmarks or neighborhoods? The question, is as interesting as it is challenging, and beyond the purview of this research.

indicative of certain value systems. For instance, more affluent Suratis charted a path to Dumas, an area south of Surat just outside city limits where richer Suratis can have holiday homes and the Surat airport is also located on the way. On the other hand middle class maps typically took one to the Surat railway station. These differences don't often find articulation in the research but they are informative to the researcher.

However the mapping analysis did not merely rely on the respondent drawn or dictated maps. Indeed that was a significant, yet small part of the mapping. The mapping primarily concerned itself with exploring the following questions about the respondent's urban experience:

1. Which neighborhoods or districts (as Lynch would describe them) are seen as Hindu Muslim or heterogeneous or neutral?

2. How is the interethnic relationship played out in the urban context?

3. What is the dominant image of the city and how are parts of the urban form (paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks.) experienced in the same?

These individual based questions are used to answer the two aggregate questions:

1. *How do Hindus and Muslims perceive the ethnicization of urban form in their respective cities?*
2. *What are the differences in the urban form and in ethnicization of urban form in the two cities?*

Four Profiles: Place, Person, and Narrative

The methods and analytical approaches described above provide a broad view of the issues. In Chapter 5 the methods help provide answers to the specific questions that need to be answered to test the hypothesis. In that sense the ethnography is purposeful and designed to answer specific questions. Additionally, the immersive ethnographic fieldwork provides context, and by extension, situational credibility to the data and the results. This relates to Geertz's (1988) idea of "being there". To the idea of "being there" I would attach the idea of "being then." As mentioned earlier, fieldwork, especially the full time variety, where one is always in field and does not return 'home' in the night, meant being surrounded in space and time by what one is supposed to observe. And an immediate reality can become hard to observe.   The idea of "going native" becomes even trickier when one is also, at least in part, "native" oneself (Kanuha, 2000). A social worker himself, Kanuha, talks about how the "most demanding and painful" experiences of her career have involved working "social identities" with which she was strongly affiliated. Being a semi-insider (speaking Gujarati and being Indian but being neither Hindu/Muslim nor a native of Gujarat) provided some access and some distance at once. However it was impossible to not get involved, affected, and influenced. "Going and being native" and "being there and then" thus provides a reward in depth but exacts a price in objectivity. It also blunts observations on occasion. The clearest testimony to my own blunted observation was when sorting through my photographs of Ahmedabad and Surat, (especially Surat, since it was 'home' base) I realized that I had failed to capture some significant urban features, places that I visited almost on a daily basis and was even

journaling about. A photograph is a memory aid in research. One uses memory aids when one suspects that one might forget something and it is difficult to conceptualize forgetting something that is always in front of your eyes, this is again the issue of going native. Most people don't take photographs of their familiar spaces it is the exotic that draws attention. Going native means soon enough few things are exotic. A clear example of this is the fewer photographs I took in Surat and especially in Adajan. As a neighborhood, too many parts of Adajan looked exactly like my temporary home in Surat's Umra neighborhood. What part of the familiar does one focus the camera's lens on? In context of this deep involvement and occasionally blunted observation I am grateful for the spatiotemporal and cultural distance that writing this dissertation in America for a largely American audience affords me. This for me is a point of methodological departure from Miles and Huberman (1994) usual prescription that field notes and interviews must be coded on the same day. One challenge was pragmatic, the interviews were in Gujarat or Hindi and each hour of audio required at least 5 hours or more to translate, often requiring consultations with local contacts about the nuanced meanings of certain peculiar Gujarati phrases. Additionally, I did not begin with an existing theory and thus an existing codebook. Also, the final code book is over 40 pages long. However, most important is the distance from "then and there" which methodologically provided an opportunity to use the ethnography to frame a theoretical discussion of the urban for and ethnic conflict. Also I am appreciative of the methodological distance and observational edge that the interview coding method itself provides. Indeed, each interview, was

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eventually translated, transcribed, deconstructed, and aggregated. The eventual aggregation provides many answers.

In an attempt to put distance so as to be able to use the fieldwork, I do not wish to disassociate from the fieldwork or the respondents. Each interview was an individual event within a rich and complicated context that answered questions that the preliminary research had not asked. Here I do not mean the respondents answered unasked questions, but the interview process, in its entirety, revealed aspects of local reality and beliefs.

Introduction

To do justice to that experience and knowledge, four individual interviews are profiled in detail here. These profiles are part biographical and part experiential. These selected interviews are not presented to buttress the results and conclusions in Chapters 5 and 6. Instead, they provide a rich context and present a gamut of fieldwork experiences. The context included place (city, neighborhood, street) persons (the respondent and the interviewer) and narrative (ethnicity, city, and time). Most importantly I hope these profiles serve as reminders of the significance of individuals in the study of groups. Here I present four such profiles an Ahmedabadi Muslim, an Ahmedabadi Hindu, a Surati Muslim, and a Surati Hindu. The four profiles are all male, and that is to an extent inevitable. There are a few reasons for this unfortunate gender disparity:

1. Female assistants in Surat and Ahmedabad, were involved in conducting some interviews, so the notes about these interview settings are sparse in some cases and it means that I personally interviewed fewer women than men.

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2. Interviews with men, as can be seen in the profiles, often ended with a long informal (but informative) chat involving a walk to the local tea stall or a ride on the respondent's scooter through the neighborhood. Within the Indian cultural context, sharing such moments with a person of the opposite gender was out of the question. And would have not been decorous. Indeed in many cases, even within the interviews, it was a challenge to inhibit husbands or family members from interjecting their views.

One of the reasons these profiles are presented in a chapter on the design and analysis of the research is that they highlight what it means to say one has qualitative data. Viewed objectively these profiles are four examples of the data which is part of this research. For instance, the story that the Ahmedabadi Muslim tells in his interview cannot in a meaningful way become part of the coding scheme. However it is a reminder of the cultural belief system and context within which the research takes place. The sense of place that this research insists on is not just the urban space but also the psychic space that people inhabit.

Finally, these profiles offer the reader a chance to acquaint themselves with the people whose names this research obscures. The reader may be very different in personality and place from these people but one hopes that there are enough similarities to remind one of the fact that no one really is a stranger or a foreigner.

One Ahmedabadi Muslim

Age – 72 years
Birthplace – Ahmedabad
Neighborhood-Kalupur-Dariyapur
(heterogeneous)
Occupation - Grocery Store owner
Education - Some Schooling
Income – Rs.12000 per month
($180)
Code- AKM72MThree

I met Akbar[53] in Dariyapur through another respondent whom I had interviewed in Juhapura. The Juhapura respondent used to live close to Akbar before he moved to Juhapura. I had heard about Akbar through another respondent but he could not introduce me to Akbar since he did not know him very well.

I met Akbar at his shop late afternoon one day. Akbar was expecting me but he had a customer he was serving when I got there. He weighed and packed the rather paltry amount of loose lentils for his female Muslim customer and then turned his attention towards me. He is old with and abundance of wrinkles, has a white wispy beard and wears a white skull cap to match. Although I was the interviewer there, the first few questions came from him.

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[53] Each respondent, as noted earlier was assigned a unique identifying code. This respondent's code is AKM72MThree however for convenience and ease of reading I will address him here as Akbar (not his real name) and use similar pseudonyms for other individuals.

"How did you get the *shauk* to study this?" The Urdu word *shauk* means hobby or fondness and sounds like the English word shock. To this I replied that I first got the shock of 2002 riots and hence got the *shauk* to study Hindu-Muslim violence. Akbar generously rewarded my elementary bilingual word play with laughter and repetition.

Causes of Violence

Akbar freely provided opinions and anecdotes throughout the interview. The violence is clearly personal for him. Many respondents in Surat and in Ahmedabad spoke about the violence as being something that happens 'there' and not 'here'. Akbar lives and works in what other people call 'there' and has done so all his life. Even as I was interviewing him I couldn't help but wonder how many riots, major and minor, he must have seen since his birth in the 1940s. Noteworthy riots took place in 1946, 1953, 1965, 1969, 1985, 1992, and 2002. As if each decade of his life can be remembered by a riot. As he says, *"Now, in Ahmedabad, most of the riots take place in the Dariyapur neighborhood and even within Dariyapur, most of the riots take place right here. This is the epicenter of rioting in Ahmedabad. In Dariyapur, this place is known as the border between India and Pakistan."* At this point, I asked which side of this border is India and which side is Pakistan or rather which area is considered Hindu and which area is considered Muslim? *"From here, all the way to the railway station, we have a Muslim area and from across the street, all the way to Gandhi Ashram, you will have a Hindu area. Now the sad part is when we were children, this was a small neighborhood called Nagina Pol. During those days, one would see that if there were 10 Hindu houses, there were another 10 Muslim houses and again maybe 15 Hindu houses. So, people lived together and they would*

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participate in each other's joys and sorrows and there was deference towards each other in everyone's eyes." Akbar used the word 'Sharam' which would normally translate to shame but this idea of deference or shame is closely tied to the rise of sexual violence in ethnic violence in India. According to Professor Yagnik, almost till 1992 and more so till 2002, in independent India, rapes and sexual assault were not a mainstay of any Gujarat riots. In fact, based on past statistics, the number of women killed was minuscule compared to the men killed in every riot (A. Yagnik, personal communication, March 17, 2014). My assumption is that the talk about shame is a reference to the rampant rise in sexual violence in the recent riots.

The obvious question here is, why not leave such a neighborhood? He is not rich, but there are many far poorer than him who have moved. When I asked him about it he said, *"I have been a member of the Peace Committee here since 1975 and I thought to myself that if even I move to Juhapura, then the other members of the Peace Committee may also move and the poor people here who cannot afford to go to other neighborhoods like Juhapura will not have any hope for peace in the neighborhood. So, I thought if people like me start moving, then there will be more riots and more Muslims will suffer in those riots."*

The task of a peace committee member in Ahmedabad is truly unenviable. It comes with some social prestige, at least the Muslims knew Akbar and seemed to respect him. However it also implies that when the stone pelting starts instead of seeking shelter one has to seek allies on the other side.

Peace here, is akin to a ceasefire. He tells me about a cricket match that he organized with the help of other Hindu members of the peace committee. The people involved in the match

included some Hindu nationalists and Muslim politicians and even a Hindu temple priest. Within this event was a ceremony where they honored a Hindu nationalist local leader for participation. Akbar proudly even showed a photograph of the event, a Muslim politician wearing white kurta and skull cap throwing a ball at a Hindu priest in saffron robes who is holding a bat. At that moment, admittedly I was impressed, in the last few months here I have come to appreciate these small successes and how much effort, by individuals, goes into accomplishing them. But once removed from "being there" I could not and cannot help but rue the situation that makes even modest goals hard to achieve. To put this societal 'achievement' into context, these are neighbors who share a very dense urban space and years of history. The history is marked by violence but there is also a deep syncretic tradition and multiple cultural and linguistic overlaps. Again, this is not to undermine the value of the work of individuals but more so to highlight the lasting effect of ethnic violence or riots.

The Devil's Recipe of a Riot

"Someone who may have been a lower caste Hindu would stab a cow and the poor cow injured, would run back into the Hindu area and the Hindus would then come back and attack the Muslim area but this tactic has now become old." This interview was conducted in 2014, much before the 2015 cow and beef politics restarted. Before the temple issue in Ayodhya, beef politics was the main point of contention between Hindus and Muslims. This old tactic has made a serious and scary comeback in India.

Akbar then spoke about how the riots are always engineered and never spontaneous, even if they are meant to look like that. But he also spoke about the underlying volatility and the

mutual distrust of the Hindu Muslim relationships that facilitates this engineered violence. The fact that something as inane as an injured cow was enough to trigger mass murder, was alluded to by many other respondents however Akbar pointed to the literal devil in the detail with a story. He said, *"I will tell you a story that will be a useful lesson for you for the rest of your life. There was a man who was a very pious devoted man and the devil saw his devotion and wanted to interrupt his devotion to Allah. So, one morning, when the old pious man was waking up to offer the morning Namaz, the devil came to him and said 'It is still night. You can sleep.' So, the man went to sleep and for the first time in his life, he missed his morning prayers. When he finally woke up, he cried a lot and prayed to Allah a lot. Seeing this, Allah was very pleased with him. When the devil saw that, he wanted Allah to be angry with this man but instead Allah is pleased with him, the next morning the devil himself went to wake up the man. This old man then asked the devil 'Why do you do such things to hurt people?' The man asked him 'Why do you do such things which cause rapes and murders and the destruction of Mosques and Temples and the murder of children?' To this, the devil replied that, 'I do not do these things but it is your human beings who do all these things.' But the old man insisted that it is not the people, but you, the devil who does these things. The devil said to the old man that I will prove to you that it is human beings who are involved in all these things and not me. So, the devil asked the old man to come with him to a bazaar where they sold sweets. In the bazaar, a shopkeeper was making jalebis[54]. In the preparation of jalebis, they use a syrup. The devil dipped a finger in that syrup and touched that finger to a wall. The old man asked him what he was doing to which*

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[54] Jalebi is an Indian dessert, one of the many versions of fried dough dipped in syrup.

the devil said 'Have patience. You will see what happens.' As soon as the syrup was applied to the wall, a housefly came and sat on that syrup to drink that syrup. To catch this fly, a gecko came down the wall and as soon as she saw the gecko, a cat attacked the gecko. Just then, a Khan Sahib had come to the shop to buy jalebis. As soon as the dog saw this cat pouncing towards the gecko, the dog attacked the cat and in doing so, spilled over the large utensil which held the hot syrup. This syrup fell on the man making the jalebis and he was seriously burnt. Seeing this, the Khan Sahib was attacked by the other shop owners who said that because of you and your dog, our man is so seriously burnt. In the fight that ensued, the Khan Sahib was beaten up very seriously but when he went back to his neighborhood, he told his neighbors what had happened to him in the sweet bazaar. The people upset with the treatment of the Khan Sahib came with a thousand men to the sweet bazaar and a riot started in which many shops were burnt and people were killed. Seeing all this, the old man asked the devil 'What did you accomplish by doing all this? You did such a horrible thing.' to which the devil replied 'Old man, what have I done? All I did was feed a fly.' This is really the story of our human society. This is the story of all the communal riots."

Historically, many flies have been fed in Ahmedabad. Apart from the disturbing reality of the smallest excuse being enough for murderous events more disturbing is the air of normalcy and expectation that surrounds it in Ahmedabad. Indeed, Akbar's Ahmedabad is a very different city from the one slated to become a megacity. Indeed his world is bracketed by geographical, psychological, and sociological features that are not always

apparent. The walls around old Ahmedabad may have disappeared but for some new

invisible walls have come up.

Akbar expressed concern about the after effects of minor events but I suspect he too has

accepted the seeming inevitability of such a reactionary culture. By the time I met Akbar

I had already heard so many stories and narratives about the immense overreaction that

even for me there is an air of normalcy to it. The equation that suggests a dead cow or

Holi[55] colors on a mosque equals murderous violence is part of everyday existence. This

makes it hard to assess here whether expressed mutual respect and sensitivity are based

on the actual relationship or the threat of violence. In a place where respect and fear can

be indistinguishable one wonders how much clout the soft-spoken Akbar and his peers

can have.

Conclusion

Akbar is a street level diplomat. His words are balanced without seeming measured. He

never squarely accuses the Hindus maybe because he has seen as many Hindu

peacemakers, upright Hindu police officers, and may be even allied Hindu politicians, as

he has seen instigators and perpetrators of violence. Also, his worldview doesn't allow

him to acknowledge many villains because every villain is a potential ally. Even when he

reminisces about violent events there is barely any talk of the perpetrators. Apart from a

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[55] Holi is a Hindu festival of colors where people throw color on each other. Color accidently or
deliberately thrown on a mosque has become the cause of many violent encounters in India.

slant remark about lower caste Hindus as perpetrators, which is also a mark of nuance, all references to the perpetrators are tangential and abstract.

One of the central tenets of effective communication is the focus on the feelings and plight of the victim rather than the crime of the perpetrator. Rosenberg's (2003) ideas about nonviolent communication where the focus is on feeling without judgement, where crimes are discussed without any punitive considerations are expressed in Akbar's interview. One wonders if he developed these skills on his own or was formally trained in any peace building methods. Unfortunately Ahmedabad offers Akbar plenty of opportunities to hone his skills.

One Ahmedabadi Hindu

Age – 58 years
Birthplace – Outside of the city
Neighborhood-Vejalpur (Hindu)
Occupation – Tailor/businessman
Education – Some schooling
Income – Rs.15000 per month ($230)
AVH58MTwo

For me, Vejalpur interviews were hard to come by. I spent many afternoons talking to many store owners and their clients about my research. And in response to my request for interviews many people proffered their opinions on the matter. However, when it came to a recorded interview, many people refused, and suggested I simply write down what they say, or people suggested I go and talk to someone they recommended. Typically people recommended another shop owners a few blocks away.

Figure 22 Micro-Location of the shop

I met Manek (not his real name) through such a recommendation by another shop owner whose shop was very close to Manek's shop. Manek had a small tailoring shop. Bespoke clothing is not a luxury in India, and certainly not in Ahmedabad where fabric, sold by the yard, is readily available[56]. Manek's shop is located in a single story shopping plaza. In the US the closest building type would be a strip mall. However it is a strip mall devoid of parking for anything except a few scooters. Being a tailor means he does not have to display his wares. Even the interior is muted at best, there are some stitched clothes waiting for their owners. There is a store front where Manek was sitting behind a small plywood desk. His shop is just off the main street and on the non-residential side of the street. The boundaries between commercial and residential are frequently blurred in Ahmedabad but on Manek's side of the street it's mostly commercial.

The Frontier Hindu

A crucial feature of his shop[57] is its proximity to the border with Juhapura, "mini-Pakistan" as it is snidely referred to, although Manek does not use that phrase. One of his tailors, is a Muslim who crosses the border every day to work for Manek. A fact about which Manek seems a little proud, *"In fact, one of my workers[58] here is a Muslim who*

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[56] I had already taken advantage of this luxury and had taken an evening off to go cloth shopping with one of my informants. My informant's knowledge of what constituted good cloth was impressive, and he readily ordered the store owner around on my behalf to produce many reams of cloth for a shirt.

[57] And even his house, which he told me was about half a kilometer west of his shop. Of course, he just pointed to the west, I noted the direction. Very few respondents used actual directions and often relied on pointing in interviews, unhelpful in audio. This was a difficult challenge for note taking.

[58] This is from the original translation however he used the word *karigar*-which is actually closer to artisan than worker.

lives in Juhapura and if he needs something, I can go to his house and I do not have any

problem with that and if I need something, he will come to my shop to help me out." In

Ahmedabad this is no mean feat.

Indeed after the interview Manek offered to take me on tour of the border after once

suggesting during the interview that he could take me into Juhapura. The tone of the offer

was such that he might as well be bragging about giving me a personal tour of the White

House.

In spite of my several visits to Juhapura and near complete comfort in all parts of

Juhapura, I accepted his offer. I did, to an extent, feign ignorance about Juhapura and the

border, or at least did not reveal the extent of my awareness. However, I figured it was

more along the lines of courteously listening to a joke one has heard before. Also,

hitherto I had only seen the border from the other side, through Muslim eyes. I did not

want to miss the chance of seeing it through Hindu eyes. I did not bring my bag or my

recorder to this go-along, he assured me my valuables will be safe in his shop. Manek just

pulls his store shutter down and does not lock it. His store's offset location must provide

some security. As we walked towards the border Manek asked me about my life in India.

I give him some elementary information about being from Nagpur, which like

Ahmedabad was a textile hub, and where my father did work in a textile mill. However,

the textile connection does not resonate with Manek. I guessed that he likely never

associated with the mill workers from the old city since he moved in from a village

outside of Ahmedabad directly on this side of the river. And almost within 5 years of

Manek's migration from rural Gujarat to Ahmedabad, the textile industry sees a

precipitous decline (obviously due to no fault of Manek). At the border Manek points towards Juhapura which is now just 50 feet away. He talks about how the people on the other side are poor and how even they do not want violence. However, he alludes to the link between non-vegetarian food and violence. This idea of non-vegetarianism and its relationship to violent behavior or valiant behavior (if one is a meat-eater) seems to have widespread acceptance. In spite of his claimed comfort we never actually cross into Juhapura and skirt along the border as he points to the areas where there was most stone pelting with "thousands" of Hindus and Muslims facing off. We finally crossed the street/border and on the Juhapura side of the approach a small tea-stall that is set up just in front of another shop. He gestures for two cups and soon the vendor pours out the chai from a kettle into two tiny plastic cups. These tiny plastic cups could indeed put a thimble to shame. Manek simply tosses it on a growing garbage pile near-by, I am tempted to look for a trash can but do not want to seem prudish so I follow suit and duly contribute to the pile of garbage. The size of the cups softens the guilt of littering. We returned to his shop after the mandatory tussle about who will pay for the chai with both of us insisting to pay. It's a rare victory for me.

History and Beliefs

Manek's verbal confidence but visible caution vis-à-vis the border and Juhapura needs to be put in context. Unlike Akbar, Manek is not a born urbanite. He moved to Vejalpur when he was 23 years old from a village. And indeed he never crossed into Ahmedabad, he moved to Vejalpur village in 1979 and Ahmedabad grew into Vejalpur later. The 80s were turbulent times for Ahmedabad. From Vejalpur the inner city must have looked

intimidating. The textile mills were closing fast, and it all came to head with the 1985

riots, which started among Hindu castes, but soon became a Hindu-Muslim riot and the

violence lasted for months. He spoke about how scary it was to go into the old city,

which was then seen as a Muslim area. *"I remember during the days of Madhav Singh*

Solanki[59], there was a lot of fear of stabbings. My brother used to go to the old city in

those days for his work, almost every day. So my brother actually asked me to make him

a jacket that was stab proof. Now this was during the Congress days. So in those days, if

you went into the old city, somebody would stab you from behind and move ahead even

before you knew who has stabbed you. There must have been at least 400-500 stabbings

in those years. People used to be afraid to go into the city, into the old city, I mean." This

is part of the reason why Narendra Modi is popular among Hindus. As Manek explained,

"Except 2002, ever since Narendra Modi became the Chief Minister, there has never

been a time where there was even a small riot in the city. I remember, before those days,

if you had to travel from Jamalpur to Vatva or in that area, it was almost impossible but

now you can go anywhere in the city without any fear. Yes, 2002 was a horrible sight, no

doubt about that but since then, almost for 12-13 years, we have not even had a small

incident in the city. I remember, before 2002, even Jamalpur was not considered safe.

People thought it was difficult to go in those neighborhoods. I remember the same was

the case with Daryapur where if you wanted to go in there, you were almost afraid for

your life."

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[59] Madhav Singh Solanki was a Congress chief minister of Gujarat in the 80s and well known for his KHAM (Kshatriya and Harijan,(Hindu castes) Adivasi (local aboriginals), and Muslims as a voting bloc, loyal to the Congress Party) electoral formula

Manek is a decent man and never makes the case for the riots as an 'apt lesson to errant Muslims'. Some Hindus in my investigations and apparently many others in research carried out immediately after the violence seem to make this pro-violence case. He has, like many other Indians, purchased the idea that "this violence is started by people who want power, especially political power". He has grievances with Muslims and believes that there should be Uniform Civil Code and no separate laws for Muslims. I may have even noted a hint of envy when answering my question about Hindu-Muslim marriages he said, *"Also, amongst the Muslims, there is permission to marry five women but Hindus are not allowed to marry five women.[60]"* However he also earnestly points out that, *"Only a very small percentage of the Muslims are involved in bad activities. Most of them that I know are good businessmen and are honest businessmen. There are a few of course, who earn their living by becoming goons and showing off their superiority in a neighborhood as far as I know, the majority of Muslims are good, honest business people who are interested in earning a living."*

I am forced to wonder if contact with one Muslim employee and a handful of Muslim clients have softened his views or is it his rural past?

Conclusion

Manek is a moderate.

He is not as invested in and as dependent on peace as Akbar but he prefers it. He prefers Hindu superiority over the Muslims but not at the expense of violence. Proximity to

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[60] Polygamy is a frequent accusation on Muslims in India. However official figures suggest no significant difference between Hindus and Muslims in polygamy rates.

Muslims, working with Muslims, and his rural past, all contribute to his moderation. Regardless of this, the Muslims, as a community, are still a little alien to him. The view of the Muslim side of the city from his shop allows him to see their average and mundane lives but the Muslims still are the others. This is not a problem unique to Manek. Majorities everywhere struggle with recognizing minorities; not always because of any mal-intent but mostly because of fewer opportunities for exposure and a limited emotional resources to engage with strangers. During my interviews, when I asked people about visiting Hindus/Muslims people often replied saying that I don't visit the other community but I don't even have time to visit my own family members. Apathy was a stronger force than animosity in many cases.

Also, Manek employing a Muslim worker is no mean feat. He clearly does not do it with the express intent of fostering peace between the two communities but it does.

The Ahmedabadis: Manek, Akbar, and Others

In some ways Manek and Akbar are opposites. Akbar sits at the epicenter of Ahmedabad's violence, quite literally; whereas Manek stays on the fringes of such violence. Akbar's fortunes are, and have been, more aligned with Ahmedabad's fortunes. Its riches may not affect him very much but its primary misfortunes-mill closures and riots change his world. On the other hand Manek avoids such a high correlation with Ahmedabad; first by being a migrant to the city and second by never moving into the old city. The difference is not just a factor of their religious identities, indeed old city Hindus experience the old Ahmedabad's misfortunes much more closely than Manek ever did. But unbeknownst to them they are potential allies and share a lot in common. They both

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wish the city and the other community well. If they have any misgivings about the other community it is more a matter of detail than anything else. For Manek, perceptions of Muslim polygamy and criminal tendencies, are troublesome, but do not define all Muslims. His complaints are against the Indian State, which he feels discriminates against Hindus, and in the same breath he complains about affirmative action for lower caste Hindus and desires a meritocracy. Similarly, Akbar recognizes the mortal threat he could face from Hindus, but it does not dent his nuanced view. As a peacemaker he is in the business of nuance and as a businessman he is in the business of peace. Peace, as Suratis point out again and again, is good for business. The two profiles, Manek and Akbar, are not representative of all Ahmedabadi Hindus and Muslims, rather they present the range of individual perspectives and the prospect of meaningful peace in a violence prone city. A few hundred feet away from Manek I interviewed another Hindu who spoke at length about Hindus in prison for riots while Muslims roamed free, *"…it is very sad that so many Hindus were arrested after 2002 because this is a Hindu country and if Hindus raise their voice against the injustices done to them, you put Hindus in jail but the Muslims who were participating in riots are now roaming free in the protection of the government.* "Another Hindu in Vejalpur had never made the 50 feet journey to cross into Juhapura in all the years he had lived there or had any Muslim friends or acquaintances. On the other hand Muslims don't overly blame Hindus for the violence but fear is a factor in those measured responses, which tangentially touch upon Hindu politicians. Even India's current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who was the Chief Minister of Gujarat during the riots, gets mentioned, but almost never by name. The conversation about him

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is limited and at best he is referenced with the suggestion, 'you know who I am talking about.'[61] There is increasing frustration with the power differences among the Muslims. This frustration turns in to fear for some people as they struggle with the idea of trust. Trust between the two groups is more important to the Muslims, since many Muslims cannot help but do business with Hindus. Hindus on the other hand can avoid Muslims, if they choose, for a relatively lower cost.

This idea that Hindus don't trust Muslims is overtly expressed in many everyday activities, whether it is refusal to rent or sell property or whether it is in hiring employees. However, what is often not spoken about is the fact that the mistrust is mutual. For Muslims, the mistrust manifests in curtailing engagement with the Hindus. The Muslims also fear discrimination by Hindus and dread the uncertainty of their relationships. As a Muslim educator and businessman said, *"So for most Hindus that I deal with money is (important)… so when it comes to business, all is good but I don't know what is in their hearts. I am not saying all are bad but I simply don't know."* It is easy to see this mutual

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[61] Again a contrast with the United States may help, imagine if regular Republicans were afraid to accuse President Obama of being a "socialist" or if Democrats were afraid to openly criticize G.W. Bush for the war in Iraq, in anonymous interviews. Here an observation by the Hindu Monk Swami Vivekananda in a letter dated January 1897 is informative in the contrast between the two countries, "If you ask a ploughman in England, or America, or France, or Germany to what party he belongs, he can tell you whether he belongs to the Radicals or the Conservatives, and for whom he is going to vote. In America he will say whether he is Republican or Democrat, and he even knows something about the silver question. But if you ask him about his religion, he will tell you that he goes to church and belongs to a certain denomination. That is all he knows, and he thinks it is sufficient.

Now, when we come to India, if you ask one of our ploughmen, "Do you know anything about politics?" He will reply, "What is that?" He does not understand the socialistic movements, the relation between capital and labor, and all that; he has never heard of such things in his life, he works hard and earns his bread. But you ask, "What is your religion?" he replies, "Look here, my friend, I have marked it on my forehead." He can give you a good hint or two on questions of religion. That has been my experience. That is our nation's life."
This contrast is fading but still meaningful.

mistrust as a mark of prejudice, and indeed in some cases it is, however its root lies in a deep fear. For Muslims that fear is based in past experiences of violence where Muslim minorities in largely Hindu neighborhoods were targeted. Similarly there are Hindus who worry about Muslims being targeted in their neighborhoods. Clearly the experience of such mistrust is far more damaging to the Muslims but also affects Hindus. Undermining Hindu sentiments about this mistrust is dangerous because it creates the impression of appeasement (a politically charged sentiment in India) of Muslims. Also, the idea that in a conflict fears of only one side can be acknowledged is indicative of a zero-sum mentality and one that works to perpetuate the conflict. In India this zero-sum approach to the conflict has meant savvy politicians get in the roles of communal messiahs and become protectors of communities.

There is a socio-psychological path that devolves from tolerance to prejudice, from prejudice to conflict, from conflict to structural violence, and from structural violence to physical violence. Not every traveler on this path ends his/her journey with physical, or even structural, violence in Ahmedabad. However enough travelers have, and therein lies the tragedy of Ahmedabad. However there is hope as the same Muslim educator and businessman said, *"And I still believe that good Hindus outnumber bad Hindus. During the riots the Muslims had no voice it was ultimately the Hindus who fought for Muslims. There are good people in all religions."*

The simple truth that is often lost or at least understated in many narratives is that Ahmedabad is a violence prone city, Ahmedabadis are not violent people.

One Surati Muslim

Age-41
Birthplace- Surat
Neighborhood-Nanpura
(Heterogeneous)
Occupation- Scrap metal dealer
Education- Third standard.
Income-Rs. 20,000 ($305)
SNM41MSeven

I met Khan (not his real name) after several attempts. Another respondent had recommended him as a potentially interesting and informative subject. When I asked this respondent about Khan's whereabouts, he gave me directions to his workshop. He informed me that Khan is a member of the local peace committee and also described Khan's peculiar red cap as an identifier. Khan is a scrap dealer and his workshop is located on a corner off of Kadershah ni Nal. The Nal (as many Suratis refer to it) has a certain notoriety in Surat. And its reputation had preceded it. I had read about it even before I started my fieldwork in Surat. The Nal is a sensitive area, as they like to call it in India.

At the workshop there are about 3 or 4 young teenage boys. One of the boys seems to be directing the others and an older worker to carry out certain tasks. However other than the adult worker the others do not seem very busy. I introduced myself and told him the purpose of my visit. I assume the supervisor teen is Khan's son or a close relative. He whips out a phone and calls Khan and to his best ability tries to describe the purpose of my visit. After some looks and smiles he hands me the phone and asks me to describe the purpose of my visit. Khan is my seventh interview in Nanpura and likely my 30th

interview overall, by now I have the spiel pat down. Khan asked me to hand over the phone to the boy after telling me that he'll join us soon. So far I am sitting on a small stool which has been welded together using scrap pieces. After the phone call I am promoted to a plastic chair.

The workshop is a small scale ecological hazard of sorts. Battery acid is leaking close to where I sit. Inside, the older worker hammers away at what looks like an old air conditioner. Suddenly one of the teens throws some large piece of scrap at another and luckily, the other dodges the projectile with lightning reflexes. The beginning of a friendly banter. After, teasing the teen who flinched and dodged the projectile, the minor mock fight (which could have easily injured someone) ends. The teen in-charge asks me if I'd like to have chai. I tell him there is no need for such formalities but he suggests that he is ordering some for everyone anyway. The chai arrives in the usual, thinner than paper, plastic cups. After about 40 minutes of waiting Khan calls his teen assistant to let me know that he won't be able to make it to the workshop today. I ask him for an alternative time and after getting an appointment for another day I take my leave.

10 days and about 3 more visits to his workshop pass before I finally met Khan.

Peacekeeping 101

Khan's appearance is as described: a sparkling white kurta and pajama, with a truly unique red cap. The white clothing[62] is an anomaly in these parts. We sit down at his

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[62] Surati winters are not cold but without any rains the soil becomes dry and loose and it gets really dusty especially in poorer areas where paving and parks are both scarce. Clothing can, and often does, get dirty very quickly, so people tend to wear clothing which hides stains. After fieldwork in the Naal my clothes went straight into the washing machine.

workshop and just as I begin to explain the purpose of my visit we hear screeching tires

followed by a loud crash. As I turn around to look, about 60 feet away, I see two men and

a motorbike spilled on the street and the culprit car that hit them. As the driver shuffles

out of the car I notice the younger victim get up and dust himself off. Having had some

experience in Indian accidents, I brace to witness a loud argument or even a fist fight. But

before the loud argument begins out of the corner of my eye I see Khan leave his seat and

dart towards the scene of the accident. Somewhere in my head, it instantly registers that

this is a good rich moment in ethnography, the kind that anthropologists write about.

However admittedly, my other instinct is to get on my own motorbike and head in the

other direction. Notoriety suggests that rubbernecking at a Nal accident is not always a

good idea. The last 'incident' at the Nal, only a few months ago, had ended with arson

and rioting. For better or worse I cautiously follow Khan. And predictably a loud

argument ensues within seconds. I gather only elementary details about the victims and

the car driver. The victims are a father and son, the son was riding with his father riding

pillion to a hospital. The father is sick with something else already before the accident.

Khan helps the old man up. The teenage boys from Khan's workshop attend to the bike

and cart it to the side of the street. The argument has now become a conversation and

slips seamlessly between the victims' fate thanks to the position of the stars, to Indian

roads, and offer for help on part of the car driver. Khan is deftly guiding the conversation

to less contentious issues, he talks fatalistically about how many accidents happen on the

street. He asks the older victim about where he is hurt. The old man gestures towards his

left leg. I see he has bruises and scratches on his arm too but the left leg must be what hurts most. Finally, he helps the old man sit on a raised platform outside a building's compound wall[63] and sits crossed legged on the dusty street with complete disregard to his own sparkling white clothing. He picks up the old man's foot rests it on his lap and moves his trousers up for inspection. The parts around the ankle are beginning to swell already. Khan diagnoses it as sprained and immediately dispatches one of the teens[64] to get Iodex[65], presumably from his house. The teen races off on his bike. Meanwhile Khan starts to massage the old man's foot while his son and the car driver talk. The car driver offers to take the old man to the hospital. The son, though calmer now, is not pliant. Khan's teen assistant returns within minutes with the Iodex which Khan uses liberally. While still seated on the road, a foot in his lap, and massaging an ankle, he finally convinces everyone, that 'accidents happen, these things are not in our hands, the parties should cooperate with each other and head to their respective destinations'. This episode, where the car driver and the victims were all Hindus ended without any violence or serious fighting thanks to a Muslim's timely intervention and humble service.

After that eventful hour the interview with Khan is postponed again.

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[63] Walls around building compounds are called compound walls in India.
[64] So far I have counted 4 teenage boys in Khan's workshop. My assumption is at least one is Khan's son (or all are) and others are his friends. Since I have scarcely seen them do any actual work I never found out.
[65] Iodex is a popular Indian balm used for sprains and body aches. Its strong menthol and mint odor is what all body aches, and by extension many sportspersons and grandparents, smell like in India.

How to Stop a Riot

The next time I met Khan we walked from his workshop to his shop, which is located on the other side of the Kadershah Ni Nal roundabout. Of course I started by expressing my admiration for his efforts the other day. He mentioned how it was his job to do it and I confessed how my inclination was to head in the other direction. During the interview when I asked him about the people he approached during times of ethnic tensions or at the beginning signs of ethnic tensions, he said, *"First, we will alleviate these matters by looking at what immediate help can be offered. So if somebody has to be taken to the hospital or something like that, we will deal with that and we will deal with that together and again this happens as I mentioned earlier from both sides.*

So recently there was an accident of a Jain, and this poor kid was on the street for half an hour without getting any medical attention. One of our Muslim boys helped him, took him to the hospital. In fact, when the parents finally got to the hospital, this kid's parents touched the feet of this kid of ours. So, we have taught these things to our kids and they have really improved because of it. In fact, it has helped the attitude of our children. I remember these people have said, we are Jains, you are Muslims and I have told them that it does not matter. We are ultimately all human beings. So, it really helped to create a good relationship and a good example in this neighborhood."

He values his neighborhood but it has posed many challenges for him. The area that surrounds Kadershah Ni Nal is impoverished. It is surrounded by more affluent Hindu parts of Nanpura and across the Nal in Gopipura by the Machhimar (fisherman caste) neighborhood. The Machhimar and the Muslims previously engaged in serious ethnic

conflicts. Even in 2002, as most of Surat stayed relatively calm in the Nal there was always the risk of murderous violence. As Khan described 2002, *"Oh, there was a lot of rioting right around this area. So, on one side there was stone pelting, some people burnt some cars and other bikes and other vehicles. We had to work really hard to prevent things from blowing up. In fact, both communities worked really hard to make sure that there was some peace. Our people stood in all directions, there were teams of 10 people everywhere and they were making sure that nothing goes wrong after this. So, if somebody was coming out with bad intentions, we stopped them and we made it very clear that there will be no violence in our neighborhood. See, we soon realized that these are not our people. The people who were coming in this neighborhood, they were all coming from outside and the people who permanently live in this part are the people that these people are attacking. These people who are fighting they are not from this neighborhood and since we stopped them, there was very little damage done in this neighborhood and in this city frankly. But to be fair it was such a difficult situation, such a dangerous situation that who knows that 200 or 500 people might have died because of these things but we were very lucky that we could prevent it."*

The stakes are high for peace and violence. The peacemakers, Hindu and Muslim, resisting rioters have to contend with the real risk of bodily harm or being misunderstood for rioters by the police. There is also a risk of being termed a traitor to one's ethnic identity. In Ahmedabad there were reports of Hindus, who were defending or sheltering Muslims, being killed by rioting Hindus. When I asked Khan why involve oneself in these matters, he gave me at least one good reason, *"See, since 1992 nobody stood up*

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against these things; nobody stood up against these violent forces. So, if we do not stand up today, then our kids will not learn from us. That is why it is very important to counter this to stand against these things at this point and set an example for the kids and because we were brave then and because we stood for things then even the police helped us." However, it was later, when he took me on a motorbike tour of the neighborhood, that he revealed a more personal reason for his activism. In the aftermath of the much bloodier 1992 riots in Surat his family was displaced and forced to live in a tent in a refugee camp for a few weeks. The camp was apparently located in a graveyard.

Conclusion

Khan, like Akbar is a peacemaker.

His job, though not easy, has been easier than Akbar's job. In 2002, only in his mid-20s, he learnt a lesson of what relative success in peacemaking looks like. Having witnessed the immense cost of violence only 10 years before that, as a teenager, the lesson must have been crystal clear. Khan, is young, ambitious, and a businessman, he typifies the Surati Muslim or even just the Surati, in that way. His ambitions are not just personal but extend to his community and his neighborhood. When I asked him about the difference between Hindu and Muslim neighborhoods he spoke about the "light smile" on the face of the Hindus, he said, *"See, if we look at our neighborhood, the fact is that it will be full of scream and noise. On the other side, if you go there, it should be full of peace and quiet. If there is even one child in our neighborhood, he will make sure that he makes enough noise for everyone. First thing you notice in the Hindu neighborhood is the level of peace and quiet. You will also notice a high degree of discipline. You will also notice*

the level of decent design in those areas. Also in Hindu areas, you will see the Hindus are always happy. He has a light smile on his face but here if we look at us Muslims, you will see that we are always a little bit sad because life has really put a lot of burdens on these people." He sees education as a way to achieve that "light smile" As someone who only got a primary school education and dropped out in third grade he has learnt the value of education the hard way. This theme of Hindus being more educated and hence better off in life recurs throughout the research (see Chapters 5 & 6). Muslims like Khan look at the violence against their communities and see economic freedom as the answer. There are others who see religious purity and staunchness in faith as the answer but their numbers are limited in Surat. Khan is typical of the Surati Muslim in this regard. He is interested in peace for progress and in progress for peace. This is not to say that the Muslims blame themselves for the violence but many see a way to peace within not without. They see India's unprecedented economic progress and their Hindu counterparts, some who grew up with them on the same streets, excel because of education and ambition. Many Muslim adults want to ensure that their children do not miss out on the opportunities of the 21st century. Whether Khan's dream of Muslims with a "light smile" in his neighborhood will come true is hard to say. Merely not dropping out does not ensure education and mere education does not ensure opportunity. Plus there are so many other challenges in the way. However, Khan's insistence on peace and education is as heartening, as his desire for a better future.

One Surati Hindu

Age-45
Birthplace- Ahmedabad
Occupation- School Administration
Education- Bachelor's Degree
Income-Undisclosed
SAH45MSeven

I met Anil (not his real name) through my Surati research assistant, Neeti. We meet in his office, at the school in Adajan, along with my research assistant. Anil has an office in the school with a large desk. A glass top covers the wooden desk. It is a well-lit office but not very bright, which is a relief after riding a motorbike in the sun[66]. Neeti had already briefed him regarding my research. After preliminary greetings Anil immediately offered answers to my primary question by stating that in 'Surat Hindus and Muslims enjoy a greater business relationships compared to Ahmedabad hence the levels of Hindu-Muslim violence are lower'. Many Suratis had offered this insight when I told them about my research.

I suddenly notice the difference between his Gujarati and the Gujarati I have been hearing in poorer neighborhoods. Anil speaks a very unadulterated Gujarati, and because of that I am glad that Neeti is present for this interview. In Muslim areas a lot of the Gujarati is mixed with Hindi/Urdu words. My spoken Gujarati has been described to me by people as Parsi Gujarati. I later discovered that Parsi Gujarati was closer to the local dialect in areas around Surat in South Gujarat, where the Parsi community first settled (Isaka, 2002). It made sense, because people in Ahmedabad asked me if I was from Surat and

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[66] I had spent nearly an hour looking for directions to this school. In absence of accurate GPS, my phone map had taken me to a completely different place.

told me that I spoke a very Surati Gujarati (I am not from Surat or South Gujarat.) Admittedly, my ear is not trained to catch these subtle nuances. These subtle linguistic difference are an important feature of ethnic relations. Apart from the form of a language spoken by social elites many other forms of the same language are relegated to the status of 'dialects' (Isaka, 2002). The 'correct' Gujarati is what people like Anil speak. He is, indeed, a very soft-spoken articulate man. Neeti leads the formal interview and I interject occasionally with explanations[67].

Religion and Conflict

The framing of the Hindu Muslim conflict as a religious conflict is problematic. It is not religious in the sense that the two communities fight over the theological or philosophical differences. However it is not convincing to say that religion has nothing to do with the conflict. In the context of an interview about the conflict related aspects of religion many respondents offered their view on the difference between religion, religiosity, and spirituality. As Anil said, *"My religion is important to me but it is mostly about something that gives me the inspiration to do good things in life. If your religion inspires you to do wrong things than it is no*t *a good religion. In fact I do not believe that any religion asks you to harm other people."* He seemed pained by the fact that religion has been commercialized and politicized. When asked if the riots had changed his views about religion, he suggested that, *"If anything it strengthened my beliefs that what I believe about religion is true. I believe that religion has being unnecessarily*

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[67] As part of Neeti's training in conducting a field interview.

commercialized. See religion is not about being less or more religious. There are a lot of people who are just hypocrites about religion." He also suggested that it is important to respect other faiths. Especially when one is in a region dominated by another faith, *"A religious person will believe in the right things no matter where he is and if he is in a different region then he honors and respect the religion of that region. So if someone goes to Saudi Arabia he can respect their religion without making sure that it does not harm our religion. If one believes, that there is no such things in my religion or there are no provisions for these things or these rituals in my religion then we should not participate in it. Let me give you an example, if we are sitting in a group and there is a call to prayer for namaz then even if we do not participate in the number as it is our job to make sure that we sit quietly and respect their ritual. This is the way to respect their ritual, here saying that I do not believe in that ritual and continuing to do our own work on our laptop or stand up and walk away it is not appropriate to indulge in such behavior. Respecting is important whether we believe or not is irrelevant. I do feel that even the Muslims should behave in the same way (when it comes to interacting with the Hindus)."* I sense a mild critique levelled at Muslims here. However *which* Muslims is he talking about? Anil's relationship with Muslims is not based on media portrayals or political narratives. He knows many Muslims, has worked with many Muslim, shared walls and food with Muslims. So where does this sense of Muslims not respecting Hinduism come from? It is a difficult question to answer however one suspects there is a class component to this view. As he later says, *"Very frankly speaking, amongst the Muslims, religiosity in the true sense, is seen in the educated Muslims. Amongst less*

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educated Muslims more than religiosity you will find religious fanaticism. This religious fanaticism is wrong in every religion. So the lack of education is what causes this religious fanaticism, now the fact is that the levels of education are lower amongst the Muslims." Both Hindus and Muslims express this mild or strong disdain or dismay for less educated members of the other community. Chapter 5 discussed the reasons for this class based dislike.

Relationship, Loss, and Nostalgia

Anil describes his relationships with some Muslims as g*her jeva sambandh* (relationships, as if we were family). He was not exaggerating when he described the relationships as familial, *"My mother does not have a brother so when she ties a Rakhi to this person. The person that she ties it to is actually a Muslim."* The Rakhi festival is a Hindu festival that celebrates brothers and sister. It entails the sister tying a decorated thread around the brother's wrist reminding him that's it is his duty to protect her. Patriarchal undertones notwithstanding, a Hindu tying it to a Muslim shows a great degree of trust and a significant bond.

Similarly, a Muslim family lived close to his house but moved after the 1992 riots. According to him, if you were a minority in any neighborhood, Hindu or Muslim, after 1992 you moved. Many respondents described similar events, Anil's story of changing neighbors and changing neighborhoods is a common one in Surat. However many also described moving away from the more heterogeneous Old Surat to segregated neighborhoods and then moving back to the old city within a few years. But the old relationships have lasted in some cases. He was beaming with pride when he described

how the Muslim family entrusted him with an important responsibility in their daughter's wedding, "I remember when their daughter was getting married I helped their son in law with all his shopping. They had a very big family in the city, even in Deen Dayal society, but they gave this responsibility to me and not do their family members. And whenever they visited the neighborhood they would bring some relative to meet us. So we had such close relationships with these people. So think about how important it is to handle groom's shopping! I mean this responsibility is typically given to a brother or a brother in law or even the father of the bride himself." He also expressed a nostalgia for the time when the two communities lived together before 1992. However very often he, and others, express these dates merely as dates. There is hardly any elaboration of the events, the tension and the angst that must have surrounded the decision to move for so many families. The expression of fear from the moving families. The subtle message to loved and unloved neighbors alike that says, 'we don't feel safe among you'. Events of 1992 or 2002 are remembered simply as 1992 or 2002. Occasionally there is a reference to the preliminary event- Babri Masjid or the Godhra incident. This abbreviation of a personally experienced part of one's history is likely testimony to its impact. Humans shorten ideas when they occupy too much space and when they are referenced often. Dates as names are convenient since they also serve the dual purpose of memorializing the events. There is certainly a point when this abbreviation becomes too abstract or too hollow with temporal decay of meaning. One assumes that '1992' has reached that point[68].

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[68] 9/11, for instance, is similarly referenced in the American political discourse. When people say it one can imagine that it implies the assumption that the other is grasping the same ideas and beliefs about the referenced event. However how much of the meaning is conveyed may be difficult to assess. The diverging viewpoints on meaning do not necessarily have to differ be between polar opposites say, patriotic

Regardless, his recent relationships with Muslims are 'clear' as he described them. He described how he disagreed about a certain behavior among his Muslim colleagues and candidly criticized them for the same. According to him, *"Our relationships are very good and hence we can have these conversations."*

Conclusion

Anil is a proud Surati and forthright with his opinions.

For him, like some other Hindus, Muslims are not an abstract group of people but they are his colleagues, friends, and even family. So he does not hedge his answers about Muslims and talks about his clear relationships with Muslims. He acknowledges the sub-continental level of the conflict (India and Pakistan) but chooses to understand the differences between that conflict and the local conflict. For him Muslims, like Hindus, are individuals and he may see some things that he does not like about the Muslim community but it does not affect his genuine affection for individual Muslims. Since he sees similar flaws in the Hindu community too, though to a lesser degree.

The story of the old city in Surat that inspires nostalgia in him, features Muslims prominently. I am not sure how much of the story is myth[69] and how much is reality but either way it's an inclusive story.

Americans vs. Jihadists; that difference is easy to understand. However the divergence is more difficult when parties on the same side of the discourse may agree without knowing that they may actually disagree. The different levels of decay of meaning is impossible to assess without a thorough investigation.

[69] As a migrant who visits the homeland every two years or so, I get to test my nostalgia often and it is usually mythical. It is easy to be nostalgic about India in an Air-conditioned room here but 110 degree weather and hour long traffic jams has a way of tempering such sentiments. But there is no real cure to nostalgia.

The Suratis: Khan, Anil, and Others

Khan and Anil are more representative of Surat than their Ahmedabadi counterparts are representative of Ahmedabad. In Surat, in spite of their very different circumstances, their paths are more likely to have crossed. Surat's old city ties its Hindus and Muslims together, if not literally then through history or through a geographic necessity-all roads lead to or through the old city. Khan and Anil are also both victims of violence. Khan, of course, in a much more literally, as an internally displaced person within his own city as a teenager. But for Anil, violence has also meant a change in his life over the years. It is again important to remember that rapid change has been the one constant in the life of many Indian cities. Since the early 90s Surat has tripled its area and quadrupled its population. Add to this rapidly changing environment a violent event and the social fabric can get stretched beyond recognition. However Anil's nostalgia for a seemingly unified past is not entirely exceptional, there were other Suratis, Hindus and Muslims alike, who spoke about the good old days. The irony lies in the fact that many of these people are the ones who left integrated neighborhoods. Now they may not have left necessarily for ethnic reasons, for many it was other secular concerns such as a larger house, better schools, and modern amenities of newer apartments, but the fact is that integrated neighborhoods were not high on the priority. On the other hand, Hindus and Muslims like Khan, live in close proximity with the members of the other community. They deal with the risks and rewards that this proximity brings every day.

Suratis typically were not very extreme in their views. As an informant suggested, "the sweet water of the Tapi River" makes the Suratis sweet. However, that is not to suggest

there were no prejudicial views in Surat. Hindus and Muslims, while largely tolerant and accepting of each other had certain interethnic attitudes which revealed past grievances or future concerns. Among Hindus there was again an ideas of the Hindus as the aggrieved party in the conflict. This idea, while far more prevalent in Ahmedabad, was not entirely missing in Surat. As a young 43 year old Surati Hindu said[70], *"See let me put it this way. If someone spits at your parents photograph what will you do. (Interviewer Neeti- I will be upset, angry with that person) Now that's just a piece of paper which carries the photo of your parents. But it invokes fire in you. So now think that for more than 600,000 years the country is following Lord Ram, so if you do anything to that to hurt that idol that feeling people will feel angry. Now think that for hundreds of years people keep doing this. I think it is really wrong. And the way it is being treated like OK if you see in my own presence this city had so many temples and mosques and churches. I have not heard that any mosque or church was demolished. But so many temples were demolished because it comes in the way of the development. SO why can't Muslims say that our mosque is coming in the way we can remove it? If you go to USA or Australia anything that comes in between development they will remove it. Why only Hindu places have been removed and why places of Islam and churches are not being removed. So people have patience but how long will people keep the patience. If you do not respect the feelings of majority how long will it keep mum? So this non respecting behavior will end."* The paradox was that this respondent was upset with my assistant Neeti for asking questions about religion in the 21st century and said something to the effect of 'religious differences

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[70] The respondent used both Gujarati and English, so an attempt was made to preserve the English sentences without any grammatical edits.

don't matter in this day and age, only humanity matters.' These cognitive dissonances in Surat pose a difficult question- which expressed belief should one believe? Should one believe the expressed idea of Hindus as victims of a state that sides with the government or the idea of the irrelevance of religious differences in the 21st century? True the question reduces a complex problem to a simple binary but either way it remains a difficult question. One suspects that the respondent, and others like him, are indeed sincere to both beliefs. It is desired that ethno-religious differences should not matter but the perception of discrimination challenges that idea. Also, as the respondent articulates above, the idea that Hindus have made all the concessions in the relationship was present in many interviews, and is indeed a mainstay of the right-wing politics in India. Within this context any violence can change perceptions very rapidly, even in Surat. As a female Hindu described her beliefs in the aftermath of the 2002 riots, "*Even after two or three years I could not get this hatred and anger out of my mind. So for years my mind was full of anger against them and even they had the same feelings. Of course the violence happened on both sides but we only see the violence that they committed, right? But now things have quieted down and I don't feel that anger anymore.*" One can imagine if the violence was followed up by more violence within the 2-3 year period after the riots or if there had been more violence in Surat how the perceptions and attitudes could have changed drastically.

Surat is resilient to the forces of violence, for now, but it's a cautious peace. And Suratis would do well to not rely merely on business ties to have a more enduring peace.

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Conclusion

Qualitative research entails investigating reality whilst acknowledging many aspects of the context within which said reality exists. The research design presented here, brings to attention an important but ignored aspect of the context, the urban form. However the research also acknowledges that it is ultimately people who make the urban form meaningful. So the human and spatial context are both an integral parts of this qualitative research. The research design separates them these parts for convenience but with the eventual goal of merging the results from these investigations into one comprehensive narrative. As the research aims to show the ideas that people have about people and the ideas they have about their urban forms are not separated and their meanings are often the same.

The individual profiles presented above are also a reminder of the reality that individual lives are central to any research about humans. If researchers who study ethnic conflict, ostensibly as a means to prevent it, argue that people cannot with be treated merely as members of a group then it is incumbent upon them to use their research to remind people of the individuality of those members. Even within collectivist and communitarian societies it is the individual who can choose to be a part of a community. There may be opposition to individualism from within communities since it is seen as selfish or abandoning a group. And there may be opposition to it from the perspectives of ethnicists who insist that identity, and not character, is destiny. However insisting on the individual's character still remains the most significant argument against ethnic conflict.

Individualism is not always moral but at least it insists that one may only murder a person and not a people.

After the necessary reminder of the individual's value to research above, it is safe to present some aggregate results in the following chapters.

Chapter 5: Results and Answers

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between ethnic violence and the urban form--in particular, the effect they have on each other. This chapter presents the results of the research and answers the questions necessary to test the hypothesis. The central hypothesis is that cities where the urban form is 'ethnicized' are more likely to experience violent ethnic conflict than cities where the urban form is largely shared, secular, or multiethnic. A positive test of this central hypothesis is that interethnic attitudes in Ahmedabad and Surat would be similar and the urban form would be dissimilar. The extent to which the hypothesis is true would make a case for the significance of the urban form and ethnicization in violent ethnic conflict.

The chapter makes a case for the significance of the urban form. It also highlights the relative insignificance of interethnic attitudes. Briefly, the results of the analysis are as follows:

- Interethnic relationships matter more than interethnic attitudes. That is, what ethnic groups say about each other is less important than their relationships.
- These interethnic relationships affect the urban form and its ethnicization. They also affect the way ethnic groups perceive the urban form and its ethnicization[71].
- This urban form and ethnicization in turn affect interethnic relationships. Hence, an ethnicized urban form hampers interethnic relationships and can make cities

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[71] Ethnicization of the urban form is largely a matter of psychologically assigning identity to the elements of the urban form. However, ethnicization has physical manifestations i.e., one can observe and identify ethnicization as an objective physical reality.

more susceptible to violent ethnic conflict.

- Surat and Ahmedabad have similar interethnic attitudes but different interethnic relationships. They also have significant differences in their urban form and especially in the extent of ethnicization of the urban form.

Finally, the Chapter answers four questions that provided the analytical framework of the interview questionnaire and research in general. The questions are also critical in testing the central hypothesis about the role of the urban form and its ethnicization on violent ethnic conflict:

1. *What are the primary similarities and differences in the interethnic attitudes in the two cities?*

2. *What are the predominant beliefs about the last episode of violence amongst Hindus and Muslims? What are the salient differences between these beliefs?*

3. *How do Hindus and Muslims perceive the ethnicization of urban form in their respective cities?*

4. *What are the differences in the urban form and in ethnicization of urban form in the two cities?*

The first part of the chapter, Chapter 5A presents the results of the analysis and Chapter 5B answers the above questions.

A Note on Analytical Choices

The chapters below do not present a detailed analysis of each interview question nonetheless; they do consider analysis of each question. The decision to highlight some of the analysis through elaborate charts and text at the expense of some others involved some difficult choices. Indeed some questions yielded very interesting results compared to others but there are practical limitations of time and space. Such a rich stream of information flows from every one of the 46 questions that it is impossible to present an aggregated answer for each of the questions. Moreover, even when possible to present an aggregated answer one has to ensure that it is meaningful for this research and helps test the hypothesis.

The NVIVO based analysis of the sixty-six interviews across six neighborhoods in two cities, with more than a hundred thousand words worth of respondent interviews, using more than 220 codes and eleven demographic attributes for each respondent presented an exciting but challenging problem of plenty. Hence, the results presented below represent only a small percentage of the analysis from NVIVO. Often a simple sentence stating the relevant fact stands in place of some elaborate analysis in NVIVO. In addition, only a few of the more than two hundred charts from NVIVO find a place in the dissertation. Some analysis did not provide an answer for any of the four questions that test the hypotheses. In some cases, this vagueness may be interesting in itself but it does not yield a crisp answer to the interview questions. The following chapters aim at clarity and representativeness through data and respondent quotes. Quotes, images, field observations, and maps that are relevant appear throughout the dissertation. In addition,

while these relevant pieces dominate the dissertation, it is useful to mention that almost every word in every interview has an analytical code and thus represented in the data.

Respondent Quotes Selection

The respondent quotes are exemplars that highlight the analytical discoveries. They are also exemplary statements often made by some of the most articulate respondents. During the first round of interview coding, the coding scheme did not follow the interview questions; instead, used many broad themed free codes such as 'Vegetarian Vs Non-vegetarian (meat eater)' or 'Nostalgia'. Additionally, the most interesting statements were coded at a node simply titled 'Quotable Quotes'. This node was not exclusive and actually covers nearly a fifth of all the interview text.

Then, a second round of coding involved adding codes for specific questions. After the second round of coding, each question was individually analyzed with the explicit aim of answering the four hypotheses testing questions. Then if a certain node emerged as dominant such as 'Very Good friends' in the example above it was easy to simply find one or many interesting quotes coded at 'Very Good friends' and 'Quotable Quotes'.

Chapter 5A: Results

Results: Interethnic attitudes

In exploring and understanding interethnic attitudes, several themes emerged from the in-depth interviews around the clear and subtle differences between the Hindus and Muslims. Given the occasionally lethal nature of the conflict and heightened awareness of the sensitivities surrounding the subject respondents on both sides were cautious in expressing their views but given multiple opportunities of expressing themselves through many questions, a cohesive narrative invariably emerged for each respondent and by extension each group. The first part of the interviews focused on the following themes:

1. Perceptions of religiosity and role of religion

2. Specific Interethnic attitudes

3. Quality of Interethnic relationships

These inevitably change with time. Therefore, people and researchers must continually reassess the dynamics between groups especially in the cases involving conflict or violence. Conflict and violence exaggerate this state of flux and attitudes or relationships can deteriorate rapidly and seemingly without warning. This research investigates and analyzes wide spectrum of attitudes and relationships. The 80-year-old respondent allows an opportunity to peek in the past and the 25-year-old allows speculation of the future. This knowledge is not predictive but it allows stakeholders to anticipate future threats and opportunities. The document delineates the discussion below between Hindus and Muslim and within each section are comparisons between Suratis and Ahmedabadis.

The Muslims

Introduction

Muslims in Surat and Ahmedabad differed a lot in their views. In spite of multiple

overlaps and even family ties to the other city, the urban experience of the Ahmedabadis

is vastly different from the experience of the Suratis. Surati Muslims also clustered

closely as shown in Figure 23.

The Surati Muslims cluster together in their word usage much more compared to Ahmedabadi Muslims. Word usage correlation is a broad measure of similarity but it provides elementary indicators on the similarity between cases. Consider these three sentences: 1. Raju is a very good person, and I admire him. 2. Raju is

Figure 23 Ahmedabad and Surat Muslims clustered by Word similarity using Pearson correlation coefficient. Here the respondent codes starting with "S" are Surati Muslims and the ones starting with "A" are Ahmedabadi Muslims. The crossing lines indicate strong correlation among Surati Muslims' word usage on the left vs. the relative lack of correlation between Ahmedabadi Muslims.

nice and admirable. 3. Raju is a very bad person. I do not admire him. Here clearly one

and two convey the same meaning but the Pearson correlation coefficient is negative at -

0.416 whereas the one and three are opposite opinions but their Pearson correlation

coefficient is positive at 0.416. The interviews are much longer than the one sentence

example here. The average word count of the interview (just interviewee responses minus

demographic data) is 2273 and median length is 2079. Across 66 interviews and nearly a

Table rows	Clustered by--	Table columns	Table cells
Sources	Word similarity	Each different word that appears in the text of the sources	The number of times the column's word appears in the

Figure 24 How NVIVO 11 generates the Word similarity using the following structure.
(Table Source: QSR website- http://www.qsrinternational.com/)

150000 words, the coefficient correlation had enough cases and words to present a

realistic picture of correlation.

The lack of clustering of Ahmedabadi Muslims is especially interesting when one

considers the Ahmedabadi Hindu view of Ahmedabad Muslims as a cohesive unit that

operates in unison and speaks in one voice. Even in a correlation cluster analysis of

codes[72] (to which the interviews were coded) Ahmedabadi Muslims clustered nearly on

similar levels as Surati Muslims. In fact Surati Muslims were closer to each other based

on neighborhood lines whereas Ahmedabadi Muslims clustered together along age lines.

This shows the importance of geography (neighborhood level geography) in Surat versus

Ahmedabad. In Surat physical proximity between aids the proximity of beliefs.

Using coding as a measure, generally the Pearson coefficient of correlation was much

lower (a high of 0.507 between two Ahmedabadi Muslims and a high of 0.442 among

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[72] Codes exclude demographic attributes such as Age, gender, religion, income etc., however some codes
are exclusive to neighborhoods which falsely reduces correlation but the impact is expected to be minor
since neighborhood level codes constitute only 30 of the 330 other codes.

Surati Muslims). This broadly indicates that overall, Muslims differ in their views on many topics. The chapter later refines these broad results to present a comprehensive picture of the Muslims in Ahmedabad and Surat.

The reason to give word similarity prominence over coding similarity is that there are codes exclusive to the cities, which would anyway favor a closer clustering of cities, but in large parts, the words the respondents use are similar. As further shown by Figure 25 and Figure 26 below. The figures show word clouds of top 10 most used words by Surat's and Ahmedabad's Muslims[73]. The word clouds show that even as respondents use

Figure 25 Surat Muslims top 10 used words

Figure 26 Ahmedabad Muslims top 10 used words

similar words they may end up conveying very different sentiments. The slight differences in the number of references about Hindus by Surati Muslims vs. Ahmedabadi

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[73] Words are a minimum of five letters length and stemmed words are included with a word. The software, for example, processes 'talk' and 'talking' as the same word.

Muslims actually represents the vast difference in the level of comfort in speaking about the other community.

Religiosity and the role of religion

For Muslims, being a religious person is important and the subsequent religiosity has a specific meaning. For Muslims, religiosity meant being an observant Muslim who follows the edicts of Islam. It is merely about ones ethnic identity as a Muslim but about the prescribed practices of Islam. Of the 36 Muslims interviewed across the two cities 25 reported as being observant Muslims. Here observant meant offering Namaz 5 times a day or a expressing the desire to offer Namaz 5 times a day. Some Muslims rued the fact that their work did not afford them the time to offer Namaz five times a day. As a young 26-year-old Rickshaw driver from Ahmedabad said,

> *Yes, I am religious. I try to pray regularly but because of work, I am not always able to. In Islam you have to be pure to pray, sometime I leave for work to the (railway) station early in the morning and hence cannot pray. Sometime I am far away from a mosque.*

A 57-year-old retired Vice-Principal from Surat detailed her effort to ensure the religiosity of her children as such:

> *Yes, I am very religious. In fact, I will say that I am very very religious. (Interviewer: "could you describe how you consider yourself very religious?") So, from the morning when we start our day to the evening, we have religion in our life. Even with my husband, it is the same. From the very first light of the day, we pray to God. In fact, that was one of the reasons we wanted to stay in Kathor because the children should get some religious education. In Kathor, that education was possible. In bigger cities, with English medium[74] schools, that kind of education*

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[74] In India, an 'English medium school' is any school where the primary medium of instruction is English versus any regional Indian language like as Gujarati.

becomes difficult. So, I wanted to be sure that my children learnt the Quran from the very early age. Now, in Kathor, there are very good facilities for children to learn more about the Quran. So, when my children were young, I used to actually travel from Kathor all the way to Surat for my job, every day. (The distance between Kathor and Surat is nearly 17 miles and given Indian roads, it takes around 1 hour to do this journey. Making this journey daily is a sign of immense commitment to the religious education of the children.) *So, my daughter finished studying the Quran at age 9 and my son finished at age 10. Therefore, after they made the foundation of their religion strong, only then did we leave Kathor and then after the religious training was done, to give them the worldly training, we moved to the city.*

The way in which Surati and Ahmedabadi Muslims identified themselves as Muslims was nearly identical. Both saw value in practice of daily rituals and considered Islamic teachings as a valuable guide for living. In fact, Surat's Muslims were slightly more likely to describe their faith as a primary guiding belief versus as a source of peace or as a source of some humanitarian principles. However, Ahmedabadis were much more likely to say that the 2002 riots made them more religious in one way or another. Some saw religion as an ultimate refuge and believed only God saved them during the riots. Others expressed the necessity of learning more about Islam. The riots forced Muslims to investigate their own religious identity. All identity conflicts force individual to define themselves as members of a group. Violent conflict makes this self-reflection more likely. As Surati Muslims typically said that 2002 did not change their religious beliefs because –

1. The riots had nothing to do with religion. Or

2. The riots were not significant to cause any such changes.

The most salient difference between Surat's and Ahmedabad's Muslims, vis-à-vis

religiosity, was their participation in Hindu festivals. Participation did not necessarily

mean active participation in the religious rituals but more so in the secular aspects of the

festival, such as bursting firecrackers during Diwali or simply exchanging *mithai* (Indian

sweets). Even observant Muslims in Surat expressed their willingness to participate in

Hindu festivals or recalled fond memories of participation. Now this difference may seem

obvious since more Muslims in Surat have Hindu friends, but it is the reasons that the

Ahmedabadi Muslims cite that make this difference interesting. As one 50 year old, street

vendor from Juhapura in Ahmedabad said:

> *No, such things are not allowed in our religion. They are right in their*
> *place to follow their own religion. See Islam says that if someone is*
> *following their religion you cannot call them wrong but if you know it is*
> *wrong then you don't do it. Now look at Navratri, I know some Muslims*
> *also go and dance there but it is not right.... girls and boys dancing*
> *(together) and it is a fact that girls get pregnant after the festival. What*
> *kind of festival is that?*

This non-participation during Hindu festivals was across the socio-economic and

geographic spectrum among Ahmedabadi Muslims. Half of the Ahemdbadi Muslims

expressed either a complete lack of interest or opportunity in participating in Hindu

festivals. Others either passively participated or had participated in the past. Passive

participation typically involved wishing acquaintances or collegues on the festival. In

contrast a 35-year-old Surat Garage owner from Nanpura said:

> *Yes, of course. In Diwali, I have to go to all my Hindu friends and of*
> *course, also in Uttran (the kite flying festival). Now Diwali is very*
> *important and so is Uttran. We do not participate in Holi, and as for*
> *Navratri, when we were in school, we used to participate in the Navratri*

dance. During school days I remember, there was not a single Navratri park in the city that we did not visit with friends.

Both respondents described themselves as observant Muslims.

The difference in self-reported active participation is also significant as shown in the Figure 27 below. A total of 44% of Surati Muslims participated in Hindu festivals compared to only 11 percent of Ahmedabadi Muslims.

Figure 27 Active Participation in Hindu Festivals by number of Muslims in Surat Vs Ahmedabad (out of 18 Muslims in each city)

The Surati Muslims are freer in many ways, for them religion does not negatively affect their relationship with Hindus and their relationship with Hindus does not dictate their religiosity. See table below.

	Active Participation in Hindu festivals (A)	Observant Muslims (B)	Overlap (A)&(B)	Islam as Primary Guiding Belief (C)	Overlap (A)&(C)
Surati Muslims (Total 18)	8	13	7	11	5
Ahmedabadi Muslims (Total 18)	2	12	1	9	1

Figure 28 Religiosity and relationships with Hindus among Surati and Ahmedabadi Muslims

Overlap (A) & (B) =Observant Muslims who actively participate in Hindu festivals.

Overlap (A) &(C) =Muslims whose primary guiding belief is Islam who actively participate in Hindu festivals. Again, if one looked at only Ahmedabadis the false conclusion may be that being an observant Muslim or having Islam as a primary guiding belief negatively affects Muslim participation in Hindu festivals and by extension Hindu-Muslim relationships. Although the truth is that, the violence forces Ahmedabadi Muslims to seek refuge in their religion and independently deteriorates their relationships with Hindus. Even the correlation between Muslim religiosity and Hindu-Muslim relationships is tenuous at best.

Relationships with Hindus

One of the most important questions in the interview pertained to having friends from the

other group. An impressive fifteen out of eighteen Surati Muslims reported they had very

good Hindu friends (as against just 'acquaintances', 'knowing one person', or 'no

Figure 29 Muslim respondents with very good Hindu friends. X-axis shows number of cases coded in each neighborhood (with percentage of cases coded)

contact' with Hindus) in stark contrast only five Ahmedabadi Muslims reported having very good Hindu friends. See Figure 29.

In addition, Ahmedabadi Muslims spoke about their Hindu friends in general terms and avoided specifics. A 41-year-old Ahmedabadi Muslim businessman in Kalupur described his friendship with Hindus as follows:

> *"Of course, I have very good relationships with most of my Hindu friends. They are all very nice people actually."*

Even after prodding there were few details forthcoming about specific relationships. Surati Muslims, on the other hand, got into the details of these relationships without any encouragement. The question elicited richly detailed stories about a specific relationship. As a 45-year-old Muslim businessman in Surat's Nanpura neighborhood described his relationship with his best friend, who was a Hindu:

> *Just before you came in, my Hindu friend, Raju (name changed) had called me, and I consider him my brother. He is a Hindu and I am a Muslim… and he is a Pandya. Pandya means Hindu Pandit (Priest) Brahmin, but we are like brothers. If I do not talk to him for a few days, then his mother will call me and ask me, so how come you haven't called your best friend these days? So even his mother considers me like a son. Today I can say that I have 2 mothers, one Muslim mother who gave me birth and one Hindu mother who took care of me so many times in my life. So even though she is a Brahmin and I am a Muslim, she is like my mother (here my assistant who's a Hindu female asked the respondent, how did he come to know his Hindu friend?). We were together in school and have been friends for years now. When he got married, it was a Hindu ceremony and in the Hindu ceremony, the elder brother sits next to the groom and applies a tilak (a tilak is a mark put on the forehead which bears a significance in the Hindu rituals). So, when he was getting married in Saurashtra, I was with them and when the people there asked where is the person who will sit in your elder brother's place, he said that this is the person. When I told them my name and they found out that I was a Muslim, they initially said that this is not*

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acceptable for a Muslim to be present in the rituals at which point both, his mother and my friend said that he is the elder brother here and he will only perform this ceremony. So, when I sat down there for the rituals, I felt that this religion is basically about humanity. It is humans who divide religion into I am a Hindu you are a Muslim and all that. But the true religion is about brotherhood and humanity. Once you cross these boundaries of religion, then you get to a point where your relationship and your friendship is evergreen, that is a truly sustainable relationship. You may not believe this but this is true. I just spoke to him on the phone 10 minutes ago (here the respondent took out his cell phone as evidence)

The depth of friendship that the respondent describes is unique, likely even within intra-ethnic relationships and certainly within interethnic relationships. That being said friendships where relationships were analogous to familial relationships are not unique in Surat. In Surat, these friendships survive in spite of negative experiences with the other community. The above respondent had described his horrific experience of the riots:

Those were very bad days. Just a day before the Godhra attack, my uncle had died in Ahmedabad, so I had gone to the funeral in Ahmedabad. On the day of the Godhra attack, I was actually in the train travelling from Ahmedabad to Surat. So after the news of the attack spread and the news came to the train at Baroda, some people got on to the train and started looking for Muslims. I went to the train toilet and I stuffed my mouth with a handkerchief so I will not make any noise but I could hear that the Muslims in the train were being beaten up. I was very afraid until Surat came. Luckily, at Surat, my friends had come to pick me up but I spent that entire journey afraid for my life.

The fact that this experience of violence did not sour relationships between the two friends is astounding and more likely in Surat. Interethnic relationships can withstand interethnic violence if that violence is not local. Moreover, local interethnic relationships can prevent interethnic violence. The question, 'what came first' is not suitable here since it is not a binary system of interethnic relationships and interethnic violence/peace.

Relationships and violence/peace depend on multiple factors. Nevertheless, relationships have a potential to thwart violence and local violence can adversely affect relationships.

Bread and Daughter

There are other relationships, apart from friendships, that are also critical in interethnic relationships. In India, ties of Roti and Beti (literally, bread and daughter) often describe the links between two communities. The simple assumption is that if communities eat together and intermarry then their relationship is strong. An example often cited is the relationship between some Hindus and Sikhs or between Jains and Hindus. Both issues, Roti and Beti, stand as significant challenges between the Hindus and the Muslims. The former dominates in frequency and the latter in intensity. Rightwing political parties or groups, such as the BJP, frequently highlight the meat-consumption, specifically beef, of the Muslims as a sign of a fundamental difference. Additionally, they depict intermarriage, typically if it involves a Muslim man and a Hindu woman, as something that involves malice on part of the Muslim man. Most recently, Love Jihad[75] became a prominent electoral controversy, with Hindu leaders promising to 'save our girls'. In addition, there is a strong cultural association of meat eating with predisposition to violence. In absolute numbers, more Indian Hindus eat meat than Indian Muslims but in Gujarat, there is a broader cultural aversion to meat among the Hindus and especially among the small but influential Jain population.

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[75] Love Jihad is a popular Indian conspiracy theory according to which gangs of Muslim men lure Hindu girls into marriage and then convert them to Islam. There have been sporadic cases of some fanatics doing this; however, the conspiracy theorists vastly exaggerate the scale and spread of such societal ills. One can say much more about the patriarchal assumptions that underline such conspiracy theories.

Intermarriage is complicated because it forces society to deal with the issue of the religion of progeny and affects the numerical strength of a group. The underlying assumptions about patriarchy further complicates the issue since groups see it as 'losing a girl' to the other side. . In India, as in many other parts of the world, women take the husband's family name and by extension his ethnic identity. The Indian subcontinent is infamous for 'honor killings' of couples in interethnic marriages. This enforcement of endogamy is not always lethal but interethnic couples can pay a high social price. Along the Hindu-Muslim ethnic divide, the violence against the couple has the potential to become a riot.

However, even in an issue as controversial as intermarriage, Surati Muslims expressed a greater acceptance of intermarriage. See Figure 30.

Figure 30 Acceptability of Intermarriage

The only condition in which more Ahmedabadi versus Surati Muslims accept intermarriage is if the Hindu spouse converts to Islam. Four Ahmedabadi Muslims versus two Surati Muslims suggested that as a prerequisite to intermarriage.

Even when Muslims in either city made arguments against intermarriage, they included some notable stipulations and salient differences. As a 32-year-old, Muslim Ahmedabadi engineer from Juhapura suggested:

See, I do not think it is acceptable because the fundamentals of the two people are very different. Now, they may get married because of love, but these things are not sustainable, because ultimately because of the person's beliefs, there will be conflict in the relationship.

Another Surati Muslim, a 41-year-old scrap dealer from Nanpura in Surat expressed opposition using euphemisms and included more nuanced stipulations:

Frankly, I will say that kids of any community, girls and boys should not do this at all. First and foremost, those relationships do not last and it creates such a sentiment of disharmony in the community. These families are not really based on love. It is actually not just about love, right, it is about two families. And really when these kids do it, these things do not really last in my opinion. So, I really think this has to be avoided and it always creates disharmony in the community. These things, instead of bringing people closer, it creates a bigger divide. Especially if it is my daughter, my child, then I will feel bad, if she goes away. If it's somebody else's child, they will feel bad if she goes away. So, these things really have to be avoided. When this happens between the two communities, it is invariably harmful.

Similarly when it came to the question of eating together, Surati Muslims reported eating with Hindus in far greater numbers.

In both matters, Surati Muslims realize that they are being progressive and express a

degree of pride in their interaction with the Hindus. While prima facie the Surati Muslims

Figure 31 Eating with Hindus regularly and during festivals. Suratis vs Ahmedabadis.

are better off than the Ahmedabadi Muslim is, they face challenges too. The Surati

Muslims are aware of the challenges faced by Muslims in places like Ahmedabad or

Baroda. Many respondents in Surat had family ties in these cities and even experiences of

violence, especially from 1992. Nevertheless, they also share ties with Hindus in Surat.

These ties are not just in business but they are with neighbors (or former neighbors),

friends, and colleagues are work. The Surati Muslim acknowledges that some Muslims

face discrimination and violence from some rightwing Hindus but they have figured out a

way of maintaining relationships with Surati Hindus. For them a nationwide deterioration

of the Hindu-Muslim relationship is not an indictment of the Hindus they know and even love. Their delicate balancing act presents a model for success in complicated interethnic relationships.

For them, the relationship with the Hindus and the Hindus are distinct entities.

Attitudes towards Hindus: Positives, Negatives, and Religiosity

One of the fieldwork questions that often made respondents shift in their seats, with unease or as if in preparation to answer a difficult question, was when asked to list positive and especially negative traits/stereotypes they associated with the other community[76]. However when they did speak they did so with degree of knowing confidence. Here too Suratis answered these two questions with much more clarity and assertiveness. This assertiveness was also evident in the number of words they used to describe the positive or negative traits of Hindus.

<u>Positive Traits of Hindus</u>

According to most Muslims the positive trait they most associated with Hindus was their focus on education. Respondents who spoke about the Hindu focus on education were typically very quick with that answer and spoke about it with genuine admiration, frequently mixed with envy. While more educated Muslims were more likely to speak about the perceived Hindu focus on education even less educated Muslims valued it. For

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[76] As an example of for more educated audiences I often spoke about the positive stereotypes associated with Indians in foreign country as being good in Mathematics or computers/software etc. For less educated respondents I often spoke gave examples of stereotypes associated with people from certain Indian states.

Muslims it was not just a case of Hindus being more educated but some also expressed

regret that Muslims were not as educated or as focused on education. See Figure 32

Figure 32 Hindu Focus on Education as a positive mentioned by Muslims (by educational level)

The perceived Hindu focus on education also ties in to another idea, which is the Hindu

dominance in business. As a 29-year-old Muslim, himself a successful businessman, in

Ahmedabad's Juhapura neighborhood pointed out:

> *I admire two things about Hindus. They are always trying to get more*
> *educated. Even business people who are only 10th pass will take a course*
> *in computers for their business, if it means increasing profit. And the*

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other thing is their business mind. See our people will say if I can live happily in 10000 then that's enough, for Hindus they are always thinking of how to convert 10000 to 20000 and 20000 to 30000.

It is useful to point out here that many people in India attribute the stereotype of being business-savvy to Gujaratis and the Gujaratis have internalized the stereotype. Even the Indian Prime Minister, himself a Gujarati, while on a state visit to Japan said, "Being a Gujarati, money is in my blood...commerce is in my blood."[77]

Ahmedabadi Muslims were less likely to mention any clear positives for Hindus (4 versus 2 Surati Muslims). Instead some made general statements such as this by a 68-year-old Rickshaw driver from Juhapura:

They are also good people; there is no doubt about that. In addition, ultimately I believe that if anyone follows their religion in the right way, then nobody can hurt anyone. There is no religion in the world, which teaches you to kill another human being.

When questioned about negative traits the same respondent curtly replied:

I cannot really comment on that. As I said, there are good and bad people in every community.

In clear contrast a 64 year old Surati Muslim from Rander said,

It is hard to say; now people are all the same. Even during riots the poor will fight, the educated move on. It is ultimately unemployed people who will indulge in such activities. (They say) 'Let me loot this, let me loot that', you know with the riot as an excuse. Now see if I am doing business, will I look at a person and wonder if this is a Hindu or Muslim? Business people don't care. When criminals get involved then this happens-you know the riots.

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[77] http://www.ndtv.com/cheat-sheet/am-gujarati-money-is-in-my-blood-says-pm-narendra-modi-in-tokyo-657597

Surati Muslims also mentioned another positive in Hindus, which none of the

Ahmedabadis mentioned. Here Surati Muslims praised Hinduism not Hindus. They spoke

about the freedom that Hinduism offers to its adherents. As a 38-year-old, Surati from

Rander said:

> *There is a lot of flexibility in Hinduism. So (they have) flexibility and openness and there is the no rigidity in their religion or in the people. Also I like the fact that they have a lot of charity in terms of food in their temples, if you're ever hungry and you're starving I'm sure that there will be a temple that will feed you. So some temple like Swaminarayan, or Jalaram or something like that will feed you.*

> *This flexibility is very positive; there is hardly any rigidity in their religion. Now in our religion, doesn't matter if you actually do it, there are very very clear prescriptions whether about Namaz or fasting or charity.*

> *So among Hindus this charity about food and this flexibility is something I see as positive. Now in Islam there is a little bit of this in Sufis.*

Negative Traits of Hindus

For most Muslims mentioning any negatives of the Hindus seemed difficult. Especially in

Ahmedabad people declined to comment on any negatives instead chose to suggest that

there are 'good and bad people in every community'. One may see this as a sign of fear

or apprehension in speaking about the majority. However the Muslims don't seem to

blame the Hindus for the riots instead squarely blame politicians (without taking names)

for the violence.

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Broadly, the negatives traits of the Hindus, according to Muslims, fall into two categories-

1. Anti-Muslim behavior or attitudes
2. critiques of the Hindus or Hindu religion

Anti-Muslim Behavior or Attitudes

There was a growing concern about Hindu attitudes about Muslims. In answering other questions from the interview, such as questions about the effects of the riots many Muslims mentioned that Hindus would not hire 'our boys'. Alternatively, people suggested that Hindus were insensitive to Muslim plight.

A young, 28-year-old, educated Muslim woman and an older, 64-year-old, woman, a street vendor, expressed strikingly similar sentiments. With the former said:

> *I really would not like to comment on it, but I do feel that they should see us as human beings.*

The latter said:

> *See, nobody is bad because of their religion. But, I do feel that they should understand our pain.*

Suratis expressed similar concerns but for them the concerns were often more personal and less pressing. For Suratis, the matter of food was important and Surati Muslims expressed dismay at some Hindus looking down upon the food they served. As a 41-year-old, Surati homemaker complained about Hindus and Jains:

Well their rejection of our food sometimes bothers me. I mean even when they come to your house sometimes they refuse water... it is not like the water has meat in it. Especially Jain people will do it very often.

It is important to note here the difference in the grievances here. For the Surati Muslim the experience is personal and painful at a very different level. One may say that at least the Surati has Hindus and Jains coming to her house. The rejection of water can be appalling or unfortunate but it still is within the bounds of a relationship. This rejection is disrespectful, and hence distressing, for some Suratis. There were of course Muslims who see these differences as natural. Just as a Muslim rejects alcohol for religious reasons a Hindu may reject water. For the Ahmedabadi Muslims they are more concerned with Hindus dehumanizing them than disrespecting them.

The dehumanization that some Muslims feel in Ahmedabad is a direct result of the violence. The sexual violence combined with the rumored or verified forms of degradation of the bodies of victims was clear evidence of dehumanizing. The act of defiling or maiming a body represents an investment in the dehumanization because of a "surplus of rage" (Appadurai, 2006). This personalization of violence deeply concerns Ahmedabadi Muslims. Suratis are also aware of the horror stories of rape and maiming from Ahmedabad but there are some key experiential differences:

- The neighbors-against-neighbors dynamics of violence further personalizes the violence for Ahmedabadi Muslims. In an informal interview, a social worker described the experience of going to the houses of poor Hindus with equally poor Muslim survivors to reclaim looted property like old TVs or even pots and pans.

- In contrast, recall the useful distinction Surati Muslims can make between other Hindus and Surati Hindus.

- The 158 miles between Surat and Ahmedabad seem to abstract the violence for Surati Muslims.

The lack of meaningful interethnic relationships in Ahmedabad compounds this fear of being dehumanized. As mentioned earlier interethnic attitudes are independent of interethnic relationships. This may partially explain why Ahmedabadi Muslims, when probed about the negative traits of Hindus suggest the Hindus have no negatives. This is a trite answer based originating in the general lack of relationships in Ahmedabad. Seven Ahmedabadi Muslims and five Surati Muslims said that the Hindus had no negative attributes. Notably, all five Surati Muslims had at least one very good friend who was a Hindu versus only three Ahmedabadis.

<u>Critiques of the Hindus or Hinduism</u>

Surati Muslims are much more comfortable criticizing Hindus than Ahmedabadi

Muslims. Alcohol consumption of the Hindus and idolatry or personality worship in

Hinduism stand out as the main critiques. Here too, Muslims who have very good friends offer critiques freely. For Suratis when they criticize Hindus they are merely criticizing people they know.

Figure 33 Critiques of the Hindus or Hinduism

For instance, a 35-year-old Surati Muslim from Nanpura described his experience of

sharing food with his Hindu friends:

> *Yes, in some cases, because there are some Hindus who do not eat meat. So with them it is difficult to share food. But there are other Hindus, who especially come to our house or go out with us to eat because they want to eat meat. There is only one other thing, which is when there is alcohol involved, then I stay away from those parties. Hindus these days like to drink much more, it wasn't like this earlier. But these days, I know many Hindus, even educated Hindus, drink a lot.*

Again, in Surat we have criticism within the framework of a relationship. This type of

criticism is far less damaging, and may even be helpful, than blanket stereotyping.

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Religiosity of the Hindus according to Muslims

Most Muslims saw themselves as more or as religious as the Hindus. Some answered that religion is a matter of personal choice and that everyone is religious in his or her own way. The gist of such answers is, 'to each his own'[78]. See Figure 34.

Figure 34 Comparative Religiosity: Hindu Religiosity according to Muslims

As the 41 year old Ahmedabadi Muslim businessman in Kalupur spoke about comparative religiosity:

> *Of course. This is India. Everybody is religious. Everybody believes in God. Everybody is interested in going to the temple or going to the mosque. No matter who it is, whether it is Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, they are all interested in religion. They all believe in God. This is the specialty of India and as for religion, all religions are good. They*

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[78] Speaking about religion, respondents often treated me as a foreigner despite me establishing my Indian credentials in some cases. Some used or referenced Zoroastrianism (my religious identity) to explain their views about religion.

teach us to be good and do good things. No matter which religious book you take, whether it is the Bible or the Quran or the Gita or what is that Zoroastrian book called…..Oh the Gathas, yes. All those books teach us to be good people. So no matter which religion one believes in, as long as one believes in being good to his fellow human beings that is all that matters.

Respondents often spoke of religion as essential to life and the business of living. Moreover, to convince me, the Americanized Indian, many respondents referenced the value of religion especially in India (versus America?).

For Muslims in both cities, there was an acknowledgement of the structured nature of Islam versus the fluid and flexible nature of Hinduism. So even when respondents suggested that both communities are equally religious they admitted that it was easier to practice Hinduism versus Islam.

The Hindus

Introduction

Hindus in Surat and Ahmedabad live very different lives when it comes to their relationships to Muslims. Hindus also experience the two cities differently. Given the Hindu dominance in the city, Ahmedabadi Hindus enjoy some privileges compared to their Muslim peers but this dominance does not offer any advantages compared to the Surati Hindus. On the contrary, it presents many disadvantages. Dominant groups in unequal societies have an advantage only relative to the subjugated group; however, urban and social well-being depends on relationships. In addition, bad relationships, no matter what ones status in the relationship, negatively affect a person's or group's well-being.

Figure 35 Ahmedabad and Surat Hindus clustered by Word similarity using Pearson correlation coefficient

In contrast, with Muslims in Ahmedabad, it is the Ahmedabadi Hindus who cluster closer in the similarity of word usage.

Below are the word clouds of top 10 most used words by Surat's and Ahmedabad's Hindus[79].

Figure 36 Ahmedabad Hindus Top 10 words

Figure 37 Surat Hindus Top 10 words

There is disproportionate mention of the Muslims in all interviews. Part of the reason for this is that many Muslims often used pronouns like 'they' or 'them' to refer to Hindus. Ahmedabadi Muslims also used the English words H-class or M-class to refer Hindus or Muslims. A rather transparent codename for the two communities.

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[79] Words are a minimum of five letters length and stemmed words are included with a word for instance- 'talk' and 'talking' are seen as the same.

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Religiosity and the role of religion

Comparing Hindu and Muslim religiosity is fraught with challenges. The ascetic or mystical aspects of the two religions may fuse on occasion but the rituals and practices differ vastly. Through the centuries, mystics, saints, and social reformers have successfully brought the two communities together across the Indian sub-continent but the conflict has ensured that people focus on the differences. And, there are plenty of differences.

Being religious means very different things to the Hindus and the Muslims. When probed on their religiosity many Hindus spoke about the contrast against their Muslim peers. This is of course in part due to the nature of the research. However, even in absolute terms comparing Hinduism to any Abrahamic religion is at once difficult and inevitable. Colonial narratives of Hinduism, especially from scholars like Swami Vivekananda, often rely on a comparative framework. His expositions of Hinduism are gaining credence in post-colonial Hindu India since it marries national pride with religious identity.

British rule meant zealous missionaries often posed questions about the validity of Hinduism versus Christianity[80]. The intellectual responses to these questions are now tenets of popular Hinduism. In a letter written to people in India while he was in the

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[80] It is true that Muslims also faced similar questions but it was Mecca and not India that was the heart of Islam. Also there was an Islamic Empire (The Ottoman Empire), no matter how foreign, concurrent to the British Empire.

United States for the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions he talks about such a

questioning and criticism of Hinduism by foreigners:

> ***It is not true that I am against any religion. It is equally untrue that I am hostile to the Christian missionaries in India. But I protest against certain of their methods of raising money in America. What is meant by those pictures in the school-books for children where the Hindu mother is painted as throwing her children to the crocodiles in the Ganga? The mother is black, but the baby is painted white, to arouse more sympathy, and get more money. What is meant by those pictures which paint a man burning his wife at a stake with his own hands, so that she may become a ghost and torment the husband's enemy? What is meant by the pictures of huge cars crushing over human beings? The other day a book was published for children in this country, where one of these gentlemen tells a narrative of his visit to Calcutta. He says he saw a car running over fanatics in the streets of Calcutta. I have heard one of these gentlemen preach in Memphis that in every village of India there is a pond full of the bones of little babies.***

But in offering a comparative defense of Hinduism Vivekananda also underscores the

need and centrality for universalism in Hinduism. Offering a prayer at the end of an

address at 1893 World's Parliament of Religions on19th September 1893 as:

> ***May He who is the Brahman of the Hindus, the Ahura-Mazda of the Zoroastrians, the Buddha of the Buddhists, the Jehovah of the Jews, the Father in Heaven of the Christians, give strength to you to carry out your noble idea! The star arose in the East; it travelled steadily towards the West, sometimes dimmed and sometimes effulgent, till it made a circuit of the world; and now it is again rising on the very horizon of the East, the borders of the pacific a thousandfold more effulgent than it ever was before.***

As if in sync with such a view of religiosity a 38 year old Hindu man in Surat described

himself as very religious as follows:

> *Yes, I am very religious. I go to the temple very often but I also go to Khwaja Dana's Dargah (A Muslim saint's tomb in Surat.). I really like going there. It gives me a lot of peace.*

On the other hand, another Surati Hindu's idea of being very religious was very different but similarly crossed the borders of Hinduism and entered Jainism as such:

> *Yes, we have prayers every day in the house. In fact, I also work as a priest part time. So as a Brahmin I sometimes perform different rituals in the temple. So, I used to work at this temple in this very neighborhood but now I have reduced it because there is so much work pressure. This was actually a Jain temple but as a Brahmin, I can perform prayers in any temple.*

Across Surat and Ahmedabad, there were multiple layers of Hindu self-perceived religiosity with many nuances. Hindus spoke about being "spiritual but not religious", "religious but not ritualistic" or even being "culturally religious". This varied self-religiosity is consistent across the two cities and even consistent with how the Muslims perceive Hindus and Hinduism. For Hindus religiosity and religion are different since religiosity is dictated by the self. Amongst the Muslims, a clear measure of religiosity is whether the individual offers namaz 5 times a day or not. This is of course not the only measure and Muslims too spoke about people who were religious only for "show". But while a Muslim according to another may not be religious even if he offers namaz 5 times a day he certainly cannot be religious if he does not (even though he may be considered a good person.)

Surati Hindus reported as being less religious compared to their Hindu friends and family more often than Ahmedabadi Hindus. Respondents typically mentioned a family member who they thought was more religious. Many respondents spoke about their mothers as

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being more religious than them. And unlike the Muslims, Hindus in either city expressed no desire to become more religious. Only seven Hindus (versus 20 Muslims) claimed that their religion was their primary guiding belief. And even in those expressions of faith there was a certain vagueness, even after interviewing thirty Hindus it is difficult to pin down anything specific about the religiosity. There is some credence to what a 32 year old respondent in Surat's Adajan neighborhood said about Hinduism being a way of life:

> *As a whole it is a culture to be followed, it is just a way of life. For me, Hinduism is a way of life. I will take the facts and scientific things in Hinduism but I do not accept its Hindu mythologies. I will take a final verdict on how to live from Hinduism and see it was based on any scientific reasoning, and after analyzing if I feel that it is correct, then I will follow it. But I am not a blind follower of the orthodox mythologies.*

This self-perceived openness presents an identity challenge that stands in stark contrast with the Muslims[81].

Relationships with Muslims

Like the Muslims, even Hindus in Surat had more Muslim friends than Ahmedabadi Hindus. Eleven Surati Hindus, compared to two in Ahmedabad, said they had at least one very good Muslim friend. Some spoke about their relationships being 'like a family'. This is especially important in the Indian context given how involved families are in everyday life. And the responsibilities the go along with being almost a family member. As a 45 year old Surati from Adajan said,

> *There were occasions when we would assume the responsibility of certain tasks for their social functions also. I remember there was a*

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[81] The Hindu right-wing is now seen inventing dogma where often there was none. There are many occasions where some regional element of Hinduism is now subsumed or subjugated by a perceived national dogma often through intra-ethnic violence or threat of violence.

Muslim family that used to live very close to us before 1992 and I remember when their daughter was getting married I helped their son in law with all his shopping. They had a very big family in the city even in Deen Dayal society but they gave this responsibility to me and not to their family members. And whenever they visited the neighborhood they would bring some relative to meet us. So we had such close relationships with these people. So think about how important it is to handle groom's shopping do some person, I mean this responsibility is typically given to a brother or a brother in law or even the father of the bride himself.

Also useful to note here that more Surati Muslims had Hindu friends than Surati Hindus. This is simply because of the greater number of Hindus compared to Muslims.

Like with the Muslims there was a greater acceptance of intermarriage even among Surati Hindus, whereas more Ahmedabadi Hindus were completely opposed to marriage between Hindus and Muslims.

Figure 38 Acceptability of intermarriage

Conversion out of Hinduism to Islam is a chief Hindu concern. Hindus in both cities spoke about it, often expressing their dismay at the fact that when Hindu girls marry Muslim boys they become or are forced to become Muslims. It is interesting to note here that many Muslims were also concerned about the Hindu opposition to these marital conversions. For devout Muslims true conversion into Islam should be done for the faith and not for the love of any one individual. Some other Muslims also expressed the idea that given how important a concern this is for Hindus the marriages should not be allowed. Another factor here is the status of women in India in general[82]. Given the overall poor status of women in India and the perils women can face from their in-laws after marriage even when marrying within the bounds of caste and religion can be plentiful. The concerns thus expressed in interethnic marriages are thus not entirely without merit. The diminished social supports that a woman will face if she has married an 'outsider' are a factor in such opposition probably greater than the views about the other community. This is not to say that discriminatory attitudes do not play a role in opposition to intermarriage but to highlight the nuances attached to such opposition.

Books and articles alike point at the centrality of food and vegetarianism as a primary source of disgust towards Muslims in India (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012; Mehta, 2013.) While certainly part of the ethnic story nowhere this research does it come up as such a

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[82] The 2015 World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index ranks India 108th out of a 145 countries (compared to US at 28th or Iceland at 1st position.) While the Index can be taken with a pinch of salt given typically western perspectives on gender equality it is true that while some Indian women can certainly be considered far more liberated that their western counterparts there are too many women who suffer much worse than their western counterparts. The challenges faced by women who marry against the wishes of their family outside their caste or religion (honor killings, boycotts etc.) while limited are still stark reminders of a dark reality.

central concern. The flawed assumption that non-vegetarianism makes one more violent, hence Muslims are prone to violence is prevalent but by no means ubiquitous. It may be useful to delineate this occasional reference or critique of non-vegetarianism by Hindus in simple terms as follows:

1. There is Hindu-Muslim violence

2. Hindus, *in part and sometimes*, blame Muslims for this violence

3. They see food as one of the differences between the two communities.

4. Ergo they point to non-vegetarianism as one of the factors

If all meat eating Hindus had exceptionally good relationships with Muslims then one could suggest in some seriousness that peace over food is critical to Hindu Muslim amity. However, it is precisely the Dalit (lower castes) and OBC (other backward classes), who constitute a majority of Hindu meat eaters, making common cause with largely vegetarian Hindus from the Brahmin and Baniya castes in the 1980s that gives rise to a unified Hindu anti-Muslim narrative (Yagnik, 2011). So while it is crucial to highlight the importance of food in interethnic relationships there is a risk of overstating its importance. The rising non-vegetarianism across India (Hellin, J. et. all, 2015) has not translated into substantially better Hindu-Muslim relationships. Indeed one can argue that with the advent of international chains such as KFC or McDonalds, the upper caste Hindu no longer relies on the city's Muslim chicken tikka seller but instead enjoys a neatly packed sanitized multinational chicken.

Across the two cities, of the 30 Hindus interviewed only 6 described the vegetarianism as

a significant factor in Hindu-Muslim relationships. Some Hindus in Ahmedabad did point

to the perceived connection between non-vegetarianism and violent tendencies. As a 48

year old male Hindu shop owner from Ahmedabad's Vejalpur-Jivraj neighborhood said:

> *About the difference or changes, I can say that many Muslims are very fundamentalist and they do not have any qualms about eating blood (literal translation). The average Hindu has an aversion to blood. Now, because those people are used to eating meat, they do not have the same kind of aversion to blood as we do. So even if they cut a human being, it will not have a same effect on them as it will have on us Hindus. You see, their religion is an obsessive religion. They have to be obsessed with whatever they are doing and it is generally a fanatical religion. So you will not see such things among Hindus. The Hindu religion does not say that you are better than anyone else or that you have to convert anyone else to your way of thinking and in fact, if you notice now, the world is acknowledging the fanaticism of Muslim religion.*

Notice here that the respondent shifts from food to unrelated flaws in Islam (according to

him) mid-way through his answer.

Attitudes towards Muslims: Positives, Negatives, and Religiosity

As with the Muslims even amongst Surati Hindus there was a clarity and assertiveness in answering questions about Muslims. Again these answers were accompanied with personal anecdotes or there were references to specific Muslims when Suratis spoke about them compared to generic vague descriptions used by Ahmedabadis. Which is not surprising given how few Ahmedabadi Muslims claimed to have Hindu friends.

Positive Traits of Muslims

Religiosity is to Hindus what education is to Muslims. Hindus valued Muslim religiosity with some envy. According to Hindus, the Muslims were much more religious than Hindus were and while some focused on the social aspects of this religiosity (communal unity among Muslims) others noted the spiritual aspects. Another aspect of this Muslim religiosity was what Hindus described as unity (often using the English word). Hindu men viewed Muslim religiosity as a positive more often than Hindu women.

Figure 39 Muslim religiosity as a positive mentioned by Hindus (by gender

Apart from religiosity, which was mentioned by nine of the thirty Hindus across the two cities, the other positive traits represented a large variation of ideas. Hindus mentioned the following ideas as positive Muslims traits, see

Many respondents identify specific and obscure traits which no one else has mentioned. All the singular entries are by Surati Hindus. Surati Hindus saw these traits in some particular Muslim/s and even with their limited information they began to associate a positive trait, such as being 'Family-oriented', to the larger Muslim community.

Figure 40 Positive Traits of Muslims according to Hindus

Negative Traits of Muslims

The two negative traits of Muslims that dominated the Hindu narratives in Surat and

Ahmedabad were:

1. Religious Fanaticism
2. Natural Aggression

Religious Fanaticism

The Hindus in Surat and Ahmedabad often perceived the Muslims as blindly following

the Imams (Hindus often used the term 'Mullah'). As a 40 year old Hindu Ahmedabadi

said,

> *For me, it is clearly about fundamentalism and blind faith. So, blindly following whatever a Mullah or a religious book says is not a sensible thing to do. This is just my opinion. Now, I am not saying that all of them will be like that but the fact is that many of them will be like that.*

This critique of Muslims was not necessarily a critique of Islam. As a year old respondent

in Surat's Adajan neighborhood said:

> *See, there are some people who are not associating their religion to science. I have seen a Muslim lawyer working as an insurance agent take out an insurance policy for his kid, but in his Mosque the Imam said that insurance is not acceptable. I don't know which God came into this Imam's dream to tell him about life insurance. But anyway, this guy… you will not believe, he cancelled that policy in free look period and gave it back and he told the company that, "please understand, I cannot do anything." This guy is a well-educated guy who was driving a Chevrolet Magna at that time. This was a Rs. 800,000-Rs. 900,000 four years ago. I think this Magna has become Chevrolet Cruze now. So because such blind faith is so rampant in this religion that some Imams like this Maulana use this to get whatever they want. Have you seen that movie with Shah Rukh Khan, 'My name is Khan[83]? I think he is epileptic in that*

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[83] This 2010 movie was referenced by more than one respondent. The movies central plot revolves around an Indian Muslim in America who travels a long distance to meet President Bush to tell him, "My name is

movie or something like that (At this point, I interject and suggest that I think he is autistic in that movie, not epileptic}. Yes, I think autistic. So when he goes in the Mosque in the US to pray, he hears this Mullah talking about the interpretation of Islam which is clearly wrong and he basically corrects him with his correct interpretation. So when the religion can be used like this, there is a problem. So I see that so many Muslims are just buried under the heap of beliefs.

For Hindus, Muslim orthodoxy is just the flipside of their religiosity. Therefore, while Hindus hope that someday Hindus (presumably Hindus other than themselves!) too will be religious like the Muslims. They also assume that the newfound religiosity will be sans the trappings of orthodoxy or fanaticism. Hindus seem to see the Islamic faith as inherently one with puritanical elements and somehow assume that similar traits are impossible within Hinduism. This worldview ignores the orthodox elements of caste and gender within contemporary Hindu society and the stringent puritanism of 17th or even 20th century Hinduism.

Natural Aggression

From the late 19th century, especially after the First War of Independence or the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, the British recruitment of Indian subjects relied on the theory of martial races. The theory, a product of "Victorian social Darwinism" and "indigenous caste hierarchy" divided Indians, and other colonial subjects into warlike and non-warlike races (Das, 2011). Indians and even their colonial cousins Bangladesh and Pakistan[84] have

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Khan and I am not a terrorist." Khan being a common Muslim surname. After encounters with violent Islam and an American police force the movie, in true Bollywood style, ends with President Obama telling the protagonist, "Your name is Khan and you are not a terrorist".

[84]More than a century later, and 18 years after the British had left the Indian subcontinent, during the 1965 War against India the theory still held sway. There was an assumption in Pakistani President Ayub Khan's administration that the meek vegetarian Hindu army could not stand against the meat eating Pakistani army. Needless to say, the outcome of the war was not correlated to dietary preferences of the 'races'.

internalized many of these theories though science and history have thoroughly debunked them. The British considered some Indians like the Muslims, especially Pathans, or Sikhs, war-like and suitable for soldierly duties. Unless the Hindus were Rajputs, or Jats- generally members of warrior castes, the British considered them meek and cowardly. In the colonial lexicon, the Bengalis were suited for clerical mildly intellectual work, the Gujarati Hindus for business or accounting and so on and so forth for all Indians. Of course, only the true Englishman could be a soldier and an intellectual at once.

Thus when Hindus speak about natural aggression of Muslims it is often a continuation of the theory of martial races. Muslims also internalize this critique, which describes 'natural aggression' but they see it as an asset. One of my Muslim respondents, outside the context of a formal interview, described a police officer pulling him over for a traffic violation. When the police officer found out he was a Muslim Pathan, according to my respondent, the police officer was afraid and let him go. Whatever the motivations of the police officer or the veracity of the story, the respondent liked the idea that Pathans are intimidating. Fear is anyway good currency during strife.

Hindus on the other hand see this classification of Muslims as 'naturally aggressive' as evidence of their own positive Hindu self-image as peace loving. One can sum up the new right-wing Hindu self-description as 'peace loving but firm'. A slogan that best encapsulates this self-image pertains to India's conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir. The slogan says,

"Dudh mangoge toh kheer dege,
Kashmir mangoge toh cheer dege"
        "If you ask us for milk we'll give you kheer (a dessert made from milk)

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(But) If you ask for Kashmir we'll cut you"

Many Hindus may see their aggression as self-defense or justified by the noble purpose of 'teaching a lesson' to errant Muslims. A 39-year-old Ahmedabadi Hindu man expressed this sentiment of natural Muslim aggression along with an allusion to a measured Hindu response here:

> *As I said, this is because of the blind belief that the Muslims have and that community is very short tempered and hot blooded. Now, nothing like that has happened since the Godhra scandal but in this area, you can never say what will happen when. Before Godhra, the riots and stone pelting was a regular business.*

These presumptions about the "natural" traits of the other community are crucial to maintain the boundaries between the two communities. Here the other may be 'like' us but can never quite be us.

Conclusion

Strong emotions and attitudes are difficult to compartmentalize. Distilled forms of emotions such as hatred, love, respect, or disrespect can exist only in statistics and fiction. In most cases, the reality that surrounds these emotions is in a state of flux and constantly dilutes the emotion itself. Therefore, Hindus and Muslims do not have a positive or a negative attitude towards each other. They tend to have both types of attitudes in varying degrees. For instance, hatred often comes with envy. Envy in turn comes with respect. Similarly, love comes with familiarity and familiarity may bring a healthy disrespect. Emotions and attitudes that occupy the space between two communities are complicated to say the least. That is why a Muslim, who complains about Hindu alcohol consumption, can be the best of friends with a Hindu bootlegger.

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That is also, why a Hindu who believes that there is rampant appeasement of Muslims and discrimination against Hindus in India stands up to defend Muslims during a riot. In another case, a Muslim, whose parents Hindu rioters murdered, spoke proudly of how a Hindu client rides only in his rickshaw. These are singular anecdotes and one remembers that the plural of anecdote is not data. Although, lost in that pedantic admonishment is the fact that even though anecdotes do not provide data they can be rich in meaning. Moreover, data, such as presented above, does not always do justice to the meaning and complexity of issues.

For Surati Hindus and Muslims, the complexity of attitudes is a source of hope. The complexity brings nuance which seems to delay judgment and by extension extreme violent action. In Ahmedabad, on the other hand, some attitudes have established themselves as truths thus limiting the extent to which they one can challenge them.

Not all attitudes are equal. There are layers of attitudes, their significance and effect rising and falling based on the context. The negative attitudes rise to the top during times of conflict and their effectiveness increases when the conflict is violent. The uncertainty and fear incumbent with violent conflict forces people to look for certainties about reality. Including certainties about attitudes. Unfortunately, the vilest attitudes and emotions about the nature of the other community are typically in the foreground with conflict and violence. In Surat, it is evident that the pockets of peace and cooperation that survived and developed since the anomalous violence of 1992 have pushed some of the extreme attitudes to the bottom. In stark contrast, the violence that recurs almost every decade revalidates the extreme attitudes in Ahmedabad. The extreme attitudes may not

directly cause violence but make the choice of violence easier in certain cases. Nevertheless, these extreme attitudes make structural violence more likely than not. For instance, the attitudes about Muslims and their perceived tendency to violence or terrorism is one of the reasons for the extreme ghettoization of Muslims in Ahmedabad.

In conclusion, the attitudes matter but they matter less than their hierarchical structure and context. Negative attitudes do not always have a negative impact if there are other positive attitudes that can counter them.

Results: Beliefs about Episodic Violence

This research does not necessarily address the historical narratives associated with the 2002 riots. Simply because the truth with a capital 'T' about the violence is neither forthcoming nor available at this point. Also when respondents narrate a traumatic memory of violence, probing them on the details is not useful. So when a respondent makes a claim about the events the research treats it as a part of the truth but not as truth with a capital 'T'. For example, a 50-year-old Muslim woman in Surat described surviving the 1992 riots as:

> *I remember in 1992 we were saved by Allah. There was a large Hindu neighborhood near where we lived but there is also a Muslim Cemetery close to it. Some Hindus were coming to attack us but they saw that Muslim graves were opening and people were rising with swords in their hands. They got scared and we were saved.*

This is a true story, while being just a story. It is important to note here, that for this respondent, graves opening and phantoms rising with swords was a more believable proposition than the potential non-violence of Hindu neighbors or the efficiency of local police. Of course, everything the respondents say is also not merely treated as a story but there is no way to investigate an event, believable or otherwise in any significant detail. In violence that claimed nearly a 1000 lives (officially) and, over 1,100 Muslim-owned hotels, the homes of 100,000 families, over 15,000 business establishments, around 3,000 handcarts, and over 5,000 vehicles (The Concerned Citizens Tribunal, 2002) when a respondent said she saw a burning car or lost a loved one the interviewer gave a nod of acceptance.

The Muslims

The experience of the violence for Muslims in the two cities is starkly different. Surati Muslims spoke about the violence in distant terms. The violence, for Surati Muslims is distant in space and in time. For Ahmedabadi Muslims the violence was close to home and its effects are still tangible. Of course for Suratis and Ahmedabadis alike the violence itself is framed within the context of the larger Hindu Muslim conflict.

Muslims: Causes and History of the Conflict

Blame and Responsibility: Politicians, as a group, were uniformly unpopular among Muslims however more so in Ahmedabad than Surat. Nine Ahmedabadi Muslims versus Four Surati Muslims blamed politicians for the conflict. Of course Muslims in neither city named names during the recorded interviews but occasionally some respondents would candidly blame certain politicians or political parties. As a 64-year-old street vendor in Ahmedabad's Muslim ghetto Juhapura said,

> _See, it is true that the BJP is a party for the Hindus. I have no problem with that. But, I just say this, that Muslims are also a part of this country. If good things happen to Muslims, then will the country not benefit from it? You say that there is development everywhere in Gujarat. But if you come to my colony, then you will see that we are living like animals._

People saw politicians as beneficiaries of the violence and conflict. In Surat respondents also spoke about 'some bad people' being involved. The idea there was that it's only a small minority of people who engage in violence. These some bad people were characterized as uneducated, fanatics, and/or unemployed. As the 57 year old retired Muslim retired Vice-Principal in Surat suggested:

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Now, among Hindus and even amongst Muslims, there may be that 15-20-25%, I do not know the exact percentage of people. There are people who are excessively fundamentalist about religion. Maybe it is because of lack of education or because of brainwashing by someone. These are the people who cause problems. In today's generation, most of the kids don't care about these things and without help and cooperation from each other, neither communities nor the nation can prosper. If I need something from you, I must come to you and if you need something from me, you must come into me. We cannot fall into this idea of one is a Hindu or one is a Muslim. So, we have to maintain our bonds and work together. Whoever it is, whether Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Parsi or Christian, we have to work together and be Indians first. Remember, first we are human beings, next we are Indians and third, we are Muslim or Hindu or whatever your religion is.

Surati Muslims, were quick to suggest that the conflict is politically engineered with the help of 'some bad people' and not social. According to Surati Muslims, 'some bad people' were involved while the rest of 'us' (Hindus and Muslims) were interested in peace and business. Respondents also often alluded to the idea that the common man is just interested in earning his daily bread. Only one Ahmedabadi Muslim blamed 'some bad people'. It is pertinent to ask here who are these vague entities that many Suratis reference? First, Surati Muslims are not blind to the growing divide between Hindus and Muslims or the widening trust deficit since the 1992 and 2002 riots across the Gujarat or even India. However, they differentiate between the conflict and violent episodes. Or rather they have the luxury to differentiate between the two. Ahmedabadis speak in alarmist terms about the prospect of future violence. As a 41-year-old Ahmedabadi Muslim from Juhapura said,

I remember in 1992 when the Rathyatra came to Ahmedabad, I was standing right there on the street. I saw the violence of 1991, 1992 and even 1993. When it comes to tension, no excuse is too small. We can have violence in the city over a cricket match.

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Further, during our interview he said,

> *Even an India-Pakistan cricket match scares us. We are happy when India wins because if there is some Pakistan supporter here, we will have to answer for it. Muslims will have to pay the price if Dhoni (Indian Cricket captain in 2014) loses a match.*

This sense of impending violence makes it harder to differentiate the conflict from violence. A similar attitude of 'anything can happen' was noticed in some Suratis located near the Kadershah Ni Nal area in Nanpura.

Another key difference between Surati and Ahmedabadi Muslims was their faith in the authorities. While no one rated politicians or civil servants highly in their ability to control violence there was a perception in Ahmedabad that if the authorities wanted to control the violence they could have. This allegation about absence of political or administrative will, gains credence given that Muslims in Ahmedabad see the police acting with promptness in matters of everyday crime, especially if the accused are Muslims. For Suratis they have the contrasting experience of relative peace in 2002. The idea that 2002 could have been much worse but for whatever reason it wasn't, is appreciated by Surati Muslims.

Muslims in both cities were uncomfortable talking about the history of the conflict. While people occasionally pointed to the partition of India or the 1992 Babri Masjid destruction and subsequent riots there was no coherent narrative about the history of the conflict or its historical origins. Surprisingly, there was also a lack of awareness around historical episodes of violence.

When speaking about historical origins, some Muslims in Ahmedabad spoke about the British policy of divide and rule and its continuation by post-independence politicians of

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India. None of the Muslims mentioned the idea that the conflict has ancient roots or origins. The furthest people travelled in time to assign blame was to the British days. This may not seem surprising but the right-wing Hindu and Muslim leaders both speak about the conflict in millennial terms. M.D. Deshpande, the Hindu right-wing author of a book ambitiously titled 'Gujarat Riots: The True Story: The Truth of the 2002 Riots' starts his book in 636-37 AD, dates corresponding to the Islamic invasion of some parts of India. Similarly, Muslim politicians and leaders, sometime in India, and more frequently in Pakistan talk about 'the Thousand Years of Muslim rule over Hindus.' This thoroughly distorted view of the subcontinent's history did not seem to have much purchase among most respondents. Not because the respondents leaned elsewhere ideologically but due to indifference to historical causes.

Muslims were more concerned about the proximate causes than the historical narratives--although one can connect the proximate causes to ancient history. For instance, one of the sources of violence has been the issue over the consumption of beef[85]. Historically, the slaughter of cows by invading Muslim forces (historical accounts describe them as foreigners or Turkic, not Muslims), for food or instigation, has been a cause of conflict between Hindus and Muslims. There are two important factors associated with this issue. First, exactly when cows became holy in Hindu society remains a question of historical debates among Hindus of different castes and political leanings. Second, it is during the 16th and 17th century that Muslim historians and writers accord the status of ghazi or holy

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[85] Beef in India constitutes of cow, buffalo, water buffalo, and bullock meat. Hindus mostly have a beef with consumption of cow-meat.

warrior to earlier invaders and narrate horrific violence as valor (Talbot, 1995). Hindu nationalists now uphold this later re-writing of history by Islamic authors as the truth. The early cow-protection movement was a tool to fight the British (Yang, 1980). During the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, the rumor that British musket cartridges were dipped in pork and beef fat was a source of unity between Hindus and Muslims. One would have to 'bite the cartridge'[86] to access the powder. After independence, cow-protection transformed from an anti-British movement to a movement with anti-Muslim overtones (Van Der Veer, 1987). One can see the proximate effect of this ancient issue in what a 38-year-old Muslim from Surat said,

> *Another example of tension that I can think of, that is actually recurring during the time of Eid, especially Eid-al-Adha* (Festival of the Sacrifice). *In Rander, every-time cow protection groups (*Goraksha dal*) will raid the neighborhood, so even before the police comes these groups are here raiding the neighborhood. The whole neighborhood gets tense during this time. Now, I am NOT saying that there is no consumption of beef. There are religious fundamentalists who do it but also the fact is the beef unfortunately is cheaper than chicken or mutton.*

> *But I ask where are these cow-protection groups (*Goraksha dal*) when the cows died because of eating plastic bags disposed of by people, these people will not even give a rupee to the cow charities. Their sole aim is to go into Muslim neighborhoods and create tension.*

The recognition or knowledge of history is not a prerequisite to its ability in influencing contemporary events. For Muslims the stories of the slaughter of cows by ancient Islamic rulers and invaders is not a major source of concern or guilt. Muslims may not always correlate their respect or recognition for an Islamic ruler to his treatment of the Hindu subjects. This is not always a result of malice but simply of ignorance and/or a different

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[86] According to some, this is the origin of the phrase 'bite the bullet', as in to endure something unpleasant.

evaluation system. Especially in the face of a more immediate issues, like the harassment by cow-protection groups. For Muslims, in general, any past Islamic glory is much less important than present grievances. On the other hand, Hindus freely draw connections between ancient Islamic kings and present day Muslims.

Time and space both separate Hindus and Muslims.

Broadly, if and which history matters or does not is not the only source of conflict between two groups. Where and when history matters or does not also makes a difference. When one group wants to resolve 16th century quarrels and the other wants to resolve 21st century quarrels the conflict becomes harder to manage.

Much more so in Ahmedabad than Surat. For Surati Muslims their largely unwritten (certainly unread) history of commerce with Surati Hindus takes precedence over legends of cows and kings. Which is why even when history intervenes in the present the Suratis may not always see it as an effect of history and may be more surprised than the Ahmedabadis. The 1992 riots scarred Surat, just as 2002 riots scarred Ahmedabad, but the two cities took different lessons from the violence.

In reality, the connections of modern day cow protection groups to their historic legacy or the connections of the modern day illegal beef producer or consumer[87] to Islamic invaders of yore is tenuous at best. The continuity of these group identities and by extension their antiquity may be questionable but groups build and break these connections as necessary

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[87] There is a ban Beef consumption and production in many Indian states.

(Talbot, 1995). When groups assign ethnicity, they also assign its component parts. Groups can assign antiquity, lineage, and history.

As seen later in this chapter, the past is much more important to Hindus. The Hindu-Muslim conflict has historical origins but the contest between the groups is not about the meaning of historical events but on a more fundamental level on the relevance of history itself.

A Note on the Violence of 2002

Surat's relative peace stands in stark contrast with the high intensity violence in Ahmedabad. So while respondents in either city talk about the same time, they also talk about very different spaces.

Many scholars (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012; Jaffrelot, 2006; Mehta, 2013) have called the riots in Ahmedabad a pogrom[88] or even a genocide against Muslim. The violence in Gujarat can be called a pogrom given the organized attacks on Muslims. However, this research does not use the term 'pogrom' to describe the event because of the following reasons--

1. The word has its unique history and meaning that I find difficult to apply to events in the Indian sub-continent without distorting local nuances;

2. It assumes clear ethnic hierarchies between Hindus and Muslims. This may be true now but for a large part of Ahmedabad's and India's history the ethnic

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[88]One wonders if western journalists use the term pogrom versus the more generally accepted 'riot' in the Indian subcontinent because riots in the global North-West are typically non-lethal and there seems a certain romanticism attached to rioting protestors.

hierarchies have been fluid;

3. Scholarship that uses the term often undermines the average Hindu's nervousness about political or radical Islam and focusses squarely on the rise of Hindu nationalism. It also undermines the pockets of syncretic relationships nurtured by Hindus with Muslims.

4. While throughout the dissertation I use terms such as 'violence' or '2002' or the generally acceptable 'riot', personally I defer to a term Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer uses in his academic writing, 'carnage'. Although even he used the term genocide in journalistic articles.

5. Finally, it implies that there were only Muslim victims in the violence and does not do justice to the much fewer but still significant 254 Hindu casualties.

The Riots and non-Riots, in Ahmedabad and Surat

> *I was very young, and in those days how much can you understand. Nothing happened in this part but we knew that the situation was very tense. And you know… for the first time in my life, I saw my father scared.*

>   A 29 year old Muslim businessman in Juhapura, Ahmedabad

Not all Muslims experienced violence in Ahmedabad. Yet, fear was the common denominator in the descriptions about the violence. Of the total 18 Ahmedabadi Muslims interviewed, six had lost a loved one in the violence. A mob had attacked one of the respondents who presented scars from the attack as evidence during the interview. Others still, expressed experiencing a tangible fear for their lives and remembered being concerned about the survival of friends and family.

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Ahmedabadi Muslims were clearly the most concerned group when it came to mortal

danger as seen from the chart below.

Figure 41 Ahmedabadi Muslims and fear for life

Ahmedabadi Muslims also see the violence as a continuation of the generally

deteriorating Hindu-Muslim relationship and the declining social status of Muslims. The

violence thus is a lethal symptom of a larger ailment. For many Suratis it is an aberration

in the social fabric or simply a fact that affects other people.

Surati Muslims were also at pains to suggest that they had nothing to do with this violence or conflict. So for instance, in Ahmedabad fear posed a greater difficulty in finding people to interview, in Surat it was more about a measured indifference. People, who declined formal interviews, spoke in terms of "what do we have to do with all these things." This often happened after long informal conversations about Hindu-Muslim relationships and the riots. Many even offered advice on how urban planning education would be better used to do something useful like improve traffic conditions in Surat and Ahmedabad[89].

Memories of 2002 were either stark and full of rich detail or entirely vague. There were of course respondents in Ahmedabad who did not want to talk about the memories of the violence or who spoke about it much more candidly, once the formal interview was over. The most disquieting case was of a Rickshaw driver from Juhapura. The person who was not originally a rickshaw driver but used to have his own workshop, which was burnt during the riots. After the interview was over and the voice recorder was turned off, the respondent casually mentioned that a mob had murdered his parents during the riots. It is surprising because nowhere in the interview does he mention this very crucial fact. Even when he expressed what had happened, he said it almost without emotion and used the English word 'offed' to describe the murder of his parents. It may be that the term offed was appropriate as a way to distance himself from the horrific reality of the murder of his

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[89] Admittedly, a tempting proposition given the traffic issues in Surat and Ahmedabad.

parents, killed in their own house in the old city. The house was set on fire and eventually there was a gas cylinder blast in the house.

Therefore, while some respondents may have embellished details of the violence many more hid them, often only to disclose them in a more informal setting[90]. This is another reason why it is important to talk about the beliefs about violence more than the facts of violence[91].

A way to highlight the difference between the experiences of Surati and Ahmedabadi Muslims is to look experiences of similar events. Female respondents, typically responsible for feeding the children and the family, spoke about the access to food as an indicator of the situation during the riots. As a 41-year-old, Surati homemaker said:

> *It was very tense, we were all afraid. My children were small at that time. They did not go to school so they were asking about why did what they are not going to school. The kids' schools were closed for 4 or 5 days. But, vegetable vendors we're still coming here to deliver vegetables… even Hindu vegetable vendors were doing it. Even my rickshawalas were coming. Only the schools were shut down. Besides that, I do not think anything serious happened.*

This experience was common in Surat. Muslims were concerned but often experienced only some inconvenience. The contrast for Ahmedabadi Muslims in similarly mundane

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[90] I did not include these unrecorded conversations as part of the coded interviews in deference to the wishes of the respondent. So many of these conversations often do not influence the formal analysis. Nevertheless, many such informal conversations contributed greatly to my understanding of the issues.
[91] This statement is true only in the context of this research, given its limited scope. The facts surrounding the violence are critical for criminal justice and reconciliation. In addition, for historians who may finally be able to offer an objective account untainted by political or ideological leanings. In nearly 4 years of concentrated research and accessing every source possible, I am unable to assert confidently any facts about the violence given how much of the research is ideologically motivated.

matters is noteworthy. A 30-year-old homemaker from Ahmedabad narrates the dramatic events that transpired in her neighborhood:

> *Yes, we were very worried. We used to pray to God and offer Namaz and we used to stay at home locked in with the children. We were just imprisoned in the house. Our children used to cry for milk but there was a rumor that the milk had been poisoned, so we were afraid to give milk to our children. I remember that after a few days when the milk van came in the area, it was one of the men here who finally went up to the milk van and took a pouch of milk, cut it with his teeth and drank the whole pouch to check if there was poison in the milk. Only after that, did we start giving milk to our children. We used to cry so much in those days.*

For Ahmedabadi Muslims the violence made the ordinary act of buying milk for children dramatic. The community's capacity to discredit a malicious rumor should not rely on the heroism of a young man. Rumors serve as an important facilitator and justification of violence (Brass, 2003). Rumors can help build the hatred required to have the necessary motivation for ethnic violence. One can imagine a situation where a rumor, such as the one above, goes unchallenged. The idea that the other community is not averse to poisoning milk meant for children can become a mobilizer for a call to violence. It is difficult to speculate the origins of the intentions behind these rumors but their ease of use and their potential effectiveness is clear.

Surat also saw some rumors (about imminent attacks, rapes, or mass murder.) but in Surat, there were local mechanisms to challenge such rumors. In addition, the relative absence of violence made the rumors less believable. On the other hand, in Ahmedabad given that Hindu rioters had killed some children the emotional proposition that other Hindus may poison children became more believable. The idea that only some members of a community are killers is difficult to accept when one does not know which ones. This lack of

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information gives rumors a greater potency. The content of a rumor is thus far less significant than its context. Surati Muslims thus weathered the onslaught of rumors much better than Ahmedabadi Muslims. The limited levels of violence was the primary resistance to the potency of rumors. For Surati Muslims, there are two prominent beliefs attached to the very limited violence in Surat:

1. It was concentrated in just a few parts of the city. They see these parts of the city as sensitive areas within the city where, one expects violence anyway.

2. The scale and scope of violence was nothing compared to the violence in cities like Ahmedabad and Baroda. In addition, the violence was minimal compared to the violence that Surat experienced in 1992.

In the aftermath of the violence, attitudes and relationships changed in both Ahmedabad and Surat. Ahmedabad's horrific violence may have caused irreparable damage whereas in Surat the limited violence presented an opportunity to celebrate relationships and rebuild damaged relationships.

The Aftermath

Violence has the potential to affect many things but it affects intergroup relationships in a serious and complicated way. Surati and Ahmedabadi Muslims recognize this and spoke about it freely. Half of the Surati Muslims said, the relationship was bad for a few years after the violence but it has improved since. Only five of the 18 Ahmedabadi Muslims interviewed made a similar observation. Among the Ahmedabadi Muslims, surprisingly more Muslims in the mixed neighborhood of Kalupur-Dariyapur believed that the relationship had improved after the initial sourness. In contrast, many Juhapura Muslims were of the opinion that the divide was growing.

A 32-year-old Juhapura Muslim said,

> *Yes, it changed many things. If you saw earlier, during Navaratri, many Muslims used to participate in Garba, so there is already a religious restriction against going and participating in Navaratri or Garba. But back in the day, people would still go because they had friends or knew some Hindu who had invited them. Now all that has completely stopped. And the second thing that changed is that people stopped visiting each other's homes. Back in the day, if there was Diwali or Eid, people would freely go to each other's homes to celebrate. So, even lighting fire crackers with Hindus or Hindus would come to eat the Eid feast. Now that has almost stopped. Not the only people who do these things are those who have very close relationships with each other. See, before 2002, even if you have some neighbor or even somebody you did not know very well would come to your house for Eid. Or you would go to somebody you did not know very well for Diwali.*

It is worth noting that the relationships in Surat were much better even before the 2002 violence and in no small part played a role in preventing the violence. According to some Muslims, the relationships in Ahmedabad are worse than the pre-violence days. This explains the high anxieties and uncertainties about future violence, which further hinder any progress towards more building and rebuilding relationships. As shown in Figure 42

half of the Muslim respondents feel that after the downturn in relationships immediately

after 2002, the relationships have improved again.

Respondents	Bad for a While, Better Now	Growing Divide	Mutual Suspicion	Loss of Trust	No Change	Subtle Changes
Surati Muslims	9 (50%)	3 (17%)	4(22%)	3 (17%)	2 (11%)	3 (17%)
Ahmedabadi Muslims	5 (28%)	4 (22%)	1 (6%)	3 (17%)	1(6%)	0 (0%)

Figure 42 Change in Hindu-Muslim relationships after 2002, according to Muslims.

The Hindus

Like the Muslims, the experience of the violence for Hindus in the two cities was also starkly different. Many Surati Hindus thought of the violence as something that affected other people and in Surat amounted to only a few tense days. Ahmedabadi Hindus on the other hand were eager to highlight that the violence did not just affect Muslims but also Hindus.

Hindus: Causes and History of the Conflict

Blame and Responsibility: Hindus too blamed politicians for the violence and conflict but not as much as Muslims did. Of all the groups, Ahmedabadi Muslims blamed politicians the most. Ahmedabadi Hindus were also more likely to blame politicians than Surati Hindus or Muslims. The politicians may deserve the blame but they are also rather easy candidates for blame.

Although most are quick to incriminate politicians as the causes and benefactors of violence, politicians, no matter how perceptive or influential, operate within the confines of some social context. The foot soldiers of violence, the apathy to suffering and often, the funding for the violence comes from the masses.

Apart from politicians, the Hindu story of causes of violence and the conflict in general revolves around three other P's: Partition, Pakistan, and the Past.

Hindus may use the three P's to explain the conflict. They may also use it to blame Muslims obliquely for the conflict but more so to exonerate the Hindu community or

India (Muslims included) in general. A 40-year-old Hindu in Ahmedabad sums up this

triad in his answer about the historical origins of the conflict:

> *But if you really want the history of these things, then you will have to go all the way back to the partition and Jinnah creating Pakistan and even our Congress leaders accepting the creation of Pakistan or you can even go back to the time of the Mughals. So, if you are talking about the history of this violence, then you can go back a 1000 years. Also, you have to understand that the British wanted us Indians to keep fighting amongst ourselves because if we did not fight, then they could not rule. So the British followed a rule of 'Divide and Rule' in India. So in my understanding, if you are talking about the history of this problem or this violence, then it is really a difficult and complicated history. But, in the modern days, it is not about the history. It is about the religious fundamentalism that is affecting them.*

Here 'them' is the Muslims. He also mentions politics in his answer but it is the politics of

the past. The perceived pro-Muslim Congress is to blame for the formation of Pakistan in

1947. Another, 39-year-old Ahmedabadi echoes this sentiment in starker tones. He speaks

of the Muslims as a monolith in the Indian subcontinent and through history:

> *See, these things have been going on since before independence. First, they fought and broke India into two and made Pakistan but they are not happy with just Pakistan, they also want Kashmir. And, today India is rising fast in the world. Soon we will be the number one superpower in the world. But, the Pakistanis cannot bear it.*

Hindus in Ahmedabad seem to take a much broader pan-India or global view of Muslims.

The abstract other, Muslim or Hindu, is invariably scarier than the Ahmedabadi Hindu or

Muslim. As a 60-year-old Hindu shop-owner in Vejalpur said,

> *I mean that if you look at it, you have to consider things like the Babri Masjid. And (Muslims), destroying the temple to build the Masjid there. Now frankly, if that were not done you would not have 1992 when the Masjid was destroyed. So I ask you this, who destroyed the temple first? However, nobody looks at that, people just look at the destruction of the*

Masjid in 1992, but nobody looks at Babur (Mughal emperor) building the Masjid on the site of Hindu temple in the first place. Therefore, you have to put these things in the right perspective. You have to understand where these things come from, and I am just saying this because you are asking me the question.

Note that according to this narrative the Ahmedabadi Muslim is someone who has a more meaningful relationship with a Mughal emperor from 400 years ago than with the Hindu across the street. Unfortunately, such narratives can become self-fulfilling prophecies and both the Hindus and the Muslims can buy into such narratives.

Viewed through the framework of the three P's: Partition, Pakistan, and the Past, a Muslim's individuality is easily undermined in Ahmedabad. Add to this the added layer of the perceived global threat of Islamist terrorism (more accurately puritanical Salafist terrorism). As a 39-year-old Ahmedabadi Hindu expressed,

As I said, I think they are much more religious than our people. Their religiosity is to the level of fanaticism. See, all religions are good but in those people, you find too much fanaticism. In today's world no matter where you go, you will find Muslims involved in terrorism. So, if you go to China today you will see Muslims are involved in terrorism, if you go to America you will see them involved in terrorism. In India, you do not even have to ask and we have Pakistan, which is like the headquarters of all the terrorists. So, the question should be asked, how is it that all terrorists are Muslims?

This view of Muslims is more indicative of poor local relationships and fears than it is of any global reality. The figure below encapsulates this bleak view of Muslims that some Hindus in Ahmedabad and even some in Surat may hold. The figure obviously oversimplifies some Hindu assumptions and presents the bleakest picture. By no means do all Hindus believe that their Muslim neighbors are influenced by or responsible for Pakistan, partition, terrorism, and past Islamic conquests. Nevertheless, the idea that these

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inherently negative events or concepts and Muslims are related makes it less likely for Hindus to build positive relationships with Muslims. Conversely, Muslims recognize that some Hindus view them through these lenses, which makes it more difficult for them to engage positively with Hindus.

Figure 43 A bleak view of Muslims and their linkages.

Relationships withered by periodic local ethnic violence cannot bear the burden of perceptions of international terrorism and historical grievances.

On the other hand, relative local peace limits the influence of global and external issues on local relationships. For example, Surati Hindus had a more nuanced view of the causes of violence. When asked about the reasons of why there is any conflict (the word used

was tension) among Hindus and Muslims, Surati Hindus tended to make a case for the

conflict as an aberration in otherwise normal relationships. They saw the conflict as

something to be ashamed of and hence refuted or underplayed (especially in front of me,

an outsider). Surati Hindus were often more interested in looking for specifics to defend

Surat's reputation than looking for specifics to defend Hindu reputation or tarnish

Muslim reputations. A 47-year old Surati Hindu woman explained the situation with

greater nuance as follows:

> *There have been a few instances of this (rioting) between the fisher folk (from the Machimaar castes) and Muslims in Kadershah Ni Nal. Now the fisher folk are considered Hindus, but they are a little short tempered. Therefore, it happens between the Muslims and the fisher folk. Also, this happens more on the Kadershah Ni Nal square. You see, there are many vehicles parked there and there is a lot of traffic. So, these things can happen much more there.*

This woman lived in Surat's heterogeneous Nanpura neighborhood very close to

Kadershah Ni Naal (a conflict prone node in Surat). Most of her neighbors were Muslims

as were a large portion of her students (she offered paid tuitions at home). Later she even

drew a distinction between the Muslims who were her neighbors and the Muslims near

Kadershah Ni Nal. This theme of 'our' Muslims or 'our' Hindus with a clear distinction

drawn between Surati Hindus or Muslims as distinct from other Hindus or Muslims

recurred often in Surat. Her characterization of the Machimaar or fisher folk, a Hindu

caste traditionally involved in fishing, as short-tempered allows her to assign blame on

geography and class or caste more than religion. This nuance, rarely seen in Ahmedabad,

is much more prevalent in Surat. One of the critical features of this nuance is that it is

invariably local; one notices that it does not paint all Muslims or Hindus with a broad

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brush and allows assignment of responsibility. It may be against most contemporary

sensibilities to make a statement assigning blame to a certain caste or a part of the

neighborhood but it is a challenge to the dominant narratives that promote societal

divisions. In addition, it contributes to the relative peace in Surat. This localized

understanding is not immune to external pressures or instigations but it provides a buffer

against blanket generalizations. As the same woman pointed out-

> *See, in India, Muslims are associated with Pakistan and there is a history*
> *of fighting between India and Pakistan. So, these things have really made*
> *a home in the minds of the people here. So if a Muslim says anything,*
> *then Hindus get upset very quickly.*

Surati Hindus also alluded to growing Islamic radicalization and fanaticism. Some also

admitted to radicalization within the Hindu community. As a 39-year-old Surati Hindu

woman in Adajan remarked,

> *As I said, the Muslims are very beholden to their own religion they have*
> *too many restrictions. And, they believe that their religion is superior to*
> *our religion so they do not accept us. And, of course the Hindus are*
> *beholden to their religion and they believe in the superiority of their*
> *religion.*

Surati and Ahmedabadi Hindus also blame the conflict and the violence on factors like

lack of education, some bad people, and bad attitudes. Here lack of education may mean

lack of secular or religious education. Respondents articulate the idea of 'some bad

people' as people who follow their faith blindly or who are inclined towards violence.

They also commented on the attitudes such as blind faith, fanaticism, fundamentalism,

and notions of ethnic supremacy.

In addition to political motivations, the typical explanation for the conflict and for most

societal ills (e.g. crime) was factors like lack of education, knowledge (religious or

secular), and unemployment. Although there was a perception among nearly a third of the

Hindus interviewed in Surat and Ahmedabad that Muslims commit more crimes. Again,

compared to Surati Hindus more Ahmedabadi Hindus thought that Muslims were more

likely to commit crimes. Apart from general prejudices, there is a strong geographic

explanation for this perception (discussed later in this chapter). Briefly stated, in Surat,

Hindus can, and do, access the middle class Muslim neighborhoods with relative ease.

Thus, they engage with the Muslim middle and upper middle class even when they are

not involved in business with Muslims. In contrast, the Ahmedabadi Muslim middle-class

is not only geographically secluded from the Hindus but also relatively smaller than

Surati Muslim middle-class.

The Riots and non-Riots, in Ahmedabad and Surat

> *See, we did not really face any problems in those days. My father was
> actually stuck in a factory that we used to own, and I was much younger
> and my mother, my sister and I were alone in the house. But, we did not
> face any problems. There was a curfew, but apart from that, there was
> no problem. In fact, in our area if Muslims from other area are coming
> in during times of rioting, then the Muslims from our area will not let
> them enter this area because they do not want their reputation in the
> neighborhood to be spoiled. So, the elders among the Muslims will stand
> at the main entrances to the neighborhood and they will not allow any
> outsider to enter the neighborhood. So, nothing like this can happen
> here.*
> <div align="right">A 30-year-old Hindu businessman in Surat</div>

Most Surati Hindus experienced no violence in 2002, there was one exception among the

eighteen interviewed and his experience of the violence was because of being in

Ahmedabad during the riots. As for Ahmedabadi Hindus, the violence affected them much more compared to Surati Hindus but much less compared to Ahmedabadi Muslims. For Ahmedabadi Hindus the violence represented uncertainty whereas for Surati Hindus it was mostly an inconvenience, especially in hindsight. Some Surati Hindus expressed feeling concerned about their safety. Yet unlike Ahmedabadi Hindus, Surati Hindus were much less likely to describe specific instances or causes of feeling unsafe. Ahmedabadi Hindus witnessed some violence although the riots did not affect any of the respondents directly. Like most people in the city, the scale of the riots awed Ahmedabadi Hindus. Respondents often alludes to the large mobs, which some witnesses claimed were thousands strong. A 58-year-old Hindu man in Ahmedabad's Vejalpur neighborhood narrated what he saw on the border between Vejalpur and Juhapura as:

> *When I came back to Vejalpur, I saw that that there were thousands of people here and just near the border, there were the two groups facing off with each other. You see the border is very close to where we are right now, near my shop. There was a lot of stone pelting going on there. Then the police came and they started firing tear gas shells.*

The 32-year-old Surati Hindu who had the unfortunate experience of being in Ahmedabad when the riots broke out emphasized the scale of the mob and the also the inaction or helplessness of the police as:

> *There were so many people on the streets, everything was closed but there were thousands of people on the streets and they were destroying Muslim shops. So, they had a big log with them and there were five people on one side of the log and another five people on the other side of the log and they were using it to ram down shutters of shops. They would break the shutter and then loot the shop. Then when I looked, I saw there was a police van with seven or eight policemen standing there and on other side there must have been 500 of these people. So I asked my boss, "Why aren't the police doing anything?" And my boss said to*

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me that if the police intervene, the mob will remove their clothing, you think the police do not have family? See that is the literal point, yes for a policeman the duty comes first, but that duty needs to have some logic in it. 7 people and 500 people, how is it even possible to do anything?

Even as Hindus expressed their fear of the awesome scale of violence, it is important to note that it did not scare them away. Hindus do not explicitly mention, acknowledge, or even appreciate the fact that the largely Hindu mobs were not a serious threat to other Hindu. They were not unsympathetic to the plight of Muslims and many did acknowledge the disproportionate violence. A 73-year-old, Hindu from the mixed neighborhood of Kalupur Daryapur wisely noted:

> *When I first heard about it, it was unbelievable, what had happened in Godhra. So, I understand that people were upset but you have to understand that afterwards, the Muslims suffered a lot. There must have been so many houses burnt in those times, because you could see the smoke coming from all directions. Though we are very close to the police station, we were still afraid. But, as I said, nothing happened in our lane very much. It was really a terrible time.*

Nevertheless, it is easy to see the odd dissonance of witnessing an energetic violent mob in close proximity that is entirely harmless simply because of one's ethnic identity. One can only speculate upon the respondent's assumptions and thoughts about such an experience[92]:

1. The mob is scary but these are my people.

2. The mob is harmless to *me* ergo they are harmless to everyone.

3. The mob and its actions are natural.

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[92] This should have been a follow up question in some of the interviews however, it never occurred to me then. Therein lies part of the trouble with 'going native' one begins to see things as 'natural or obvious' forgetting that a violent mob acting out the worst human passions should be a cause for reflection.

4. The mob's harmlessness inspires relief.

These are simplifications of a complex emotion and, to an extent, a product of my own experience of being an intrepid researcher as a non-Hindu in Muslim and a non-Muslim in Hindu neighborhoods. Identity affords some comfort even when one does not invest in it. None of this diminishes the potential trauma of witnessing such violence for the Hindus but it contextualizes the violence along ethnic lines. Indeed, the Hindus do it themselves, if not overtly.

Overall, three major themes emerge in talking to Ahmedabadi Hindus about the riots:

1. The violence was a reaction to Godhra (Justification).

2. The violence affected Hindus too and the media neglect this fact (Hindus as victims).

3. The violence had some positive side effects (No violence since 2002)

The situation in Surat, just like Ahmedabad, was tense. There were many rumors but compared to Ahmedabad, it was a "picnic". As a 25-year-old Surati Hindu woman from Adajan pointed out:

> *I remember the feeling in those days. I remember people would send phone calls and send text messages saying that people with knives are coming to your house so we would lock the gate and shut the door and try to protected as much as possible. Now obviously all these things were rumors but it seems people in those days were just sitting at home so they needed something to entertain themselves. And, all these fake text messages would come. I also remember in one of those days my mom and I left the home at five in the evening and it was so quiet that it felt like we had stepped into an abandoned place or a desert where nobody lives.*

*See it was almost like a picnic, we would have neighborhood guard (from among the people) in the night, the society gate would be closed, and a menu for the night would be fixed. Our housing society is mostly Hindu so we would decide that we would cook potato and puri (*fried Indian bread*).*

Not all parts of Surat were quite as quiet. Opportunistic violence took place in Surat too but it did not have the lethal brutality of Ahmedabad. Some neighborhoods in the north saw some violence between Hindus and Muslims but as a respondent pointed out the economic motivations soon superseded ethnic motivations. A man who now lives in Adajan now but lived closer to the old city neighborhoods in 2002 explained these transitions. The 39-year-old Hindu, and former diamond industry worker, said:

See this started close to Mahidharpura and then spread towards Bhagal. Now a lot of these people are from Kathiyawad side. The Kathiyawadis are also short tempered like the Muslims. They are very nice people if you are nice with them but they will not heed anything if they become angry. So, though it started as a Hindu-Muslim thing, it became a problem with the diamond industry. There was a lot of damage in the diamond workshops. So what was initially a problem between Hindus and Muslims, soon became an internal problem of the diamond industry. The prices of diamond in those days had fallen a lot. There was a lot of anger about that, because many of these people work on percentages of the cost of a diamond. When the diamond prices fall, their income goes down a lot. There was anyway anger about that. So a lot of diamond industry equipment was damaged during those days. Many of these diamond workshops were set on fire in those days. There were cars and bikes parked outside that were set on fire. But after about fifteen or twenty days, they realized that in attacking the diamond workshop and the workshop owners, they had caused damage to their own income. Because what happens is, by the time the work rotation could get back to normal it took almost one month. A lot of these poor diamond workers were left without work for almost one month. After that event, nothing like that has ever happened again, because it was really a very difficult time for most of the diamond workers.

There are a few noteworthy issues in this statement. First, like many other Suratis, it assigns some blame on specific Hindu sects. Second, it calls into question the notion that economic decline and ethnic violence are inextricably connected. The rise of ethnic tensions and the decline of the textile industry in Ahmedabad have a correlation. Causality may be harder to establish. The decline of the unions where Hindus and Muslims worked and collaborated may be a causal factor of greater relevance (Varshney, 2002). Indeed the dwindling fortunes of the diamond industry in 2002, which only certain Hindu sects dominate, may have played a role in preventing violence in Surat. The role of the business community is important in general. For instance, two opposing conspiracy theories from Surat attempt to explain the relative peace in Surat (Desai & De, 2003):

1. Hindu financiers could not finance the riots due to the economic downturn.

2. Hindu business elites prevented violence because they did not want the violence to exacerbate the city's financial troubles.

There is no evidence for either theory, which assume motivations and influence of the faceless elites. Nevertheless, Surati Hindus and Muslims do mention the role of business in preventing violence and they do so with pride.

Finally, three themes emerge in talking to Surati Hindus about the riots:

1. The violence of 2002 was an excessive overreaction to Godhra (Violence, even if justified, needs to be proportional.)

2. It mostly affected other people and where it affected Hindus, they were partly

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to blame (The Hindu self as neutral. Hindus neither perpetrators nor victims.)

3. The violence did not affect the city in any major way because of Surat's

    unique business ties (Source of pride for Surat).

The Aftermath

The immediate aftermath of the 2002 riots was a time of suspicion and even hatred

between the two communities in both cities. Surati and Ahmedabadi Hindus and Muslims

both believe that things have improved since. As seen in the chart below, Surati Hindus

and Muslims suggest the relationship deteriorated in the immediate aftermath but

recovered after a while. Respondents see this recovery period as somewhere between a

few days to a few years.

Figure 44 Recovery Period, or return to normalcy in interethnic relationships, in Surat and Ahmedabad.

It is important to consider a few facts to appreciate the data presented in the chart. The

study involved fewer Ahmedabadi than Surati Hindus, twelve versus eighteen. At the

neighborhood level, Surati Hindus from the heterogeneous neighborhood of Nanpura

actually had a more positive view the relationships in the aftermath of the riots. A 47-

year-old, Surati teacher drew the distinction between Suratis from Nanpura versus Suratis who do not live in heterogeneous neighborhoods as:

> *See, now people who live on the same street will have to talk to each other. But, people who do not live in the mixed areas are a little afraid to go to each other's neighborhoods. But, even that lasts only for a few days. Afterwards, it gets resolved because people simply forget about it.*

As the respondent mentions, interaction is an imperative in close proximity but with distance, there is a tendency to minimize risks. These risks are not necessarily lethal but may merely involve avoidance of the discomfort of being in the other's presence. In heterogeneous neighborhoods people discriminate more specifically. Respondents also spoke about the growing divide, mutual suspicion, and loss of trust in the aftermath of the riots, see Figure 45.

Respondents	Bad for a While, Better Now	Growing Divide	Mutual Suspicion	Loss of Trust	No Change	Subtle Changes
Surati Hindus	6	2	0	1	2	1
Ahmedabadi Hindus	5	3	2	2	2	0
Respondents	Bad for a While, Better Now	Growing Divide	Mutual Suspicion	Loss of Trust	No Change	Subtle Changes
Surati Muslims	9	3	4	3	2	3
Ahmedabadi Muslims	5	4	1	3	1	0

Figure 45 Respondents also spoke about the growing divide, mutual suspicion, and loss of trust in the aftermath of the riots.

Broadly speaking, in Surat, prejudiced Hindus or Muslims decide that they do not want to be around Muslims or Hindus who live near Kadershah Ni Nal. As such, their discrimination is discriminating. On the other hand, prejudiced Hindus and Muslims in homogenous neighborhoods may decide that they do not want to be around any Muslims and Hindus. If one cannot perceive which Hindus or Muslims, if any, are dangerous it helps to fear all Hindus or Muslims. In addition, when the perceived risks are lethal, like in Ahmedabad, there are no incentives for heterogeneity or integration.

Answer One

Introduction

The answer to the question about the similarities and differences in the interethnic attitudes reveals two important things about the nature and significance of interethnic attitudes and cities:

1. Interethnic attitudes and relationships are independent.

2. Urban pride is an important counterbalance to ethnic pride.

There are some differences in the interethnic attitudes between the two cities but they are more similar that anticipated at the beginning of the research. The crucial difference between the two cities is the interethnic relationship. Truly, the more provocative discovery is that relationships are not a good indicator of attitudes or vice versa. In absence of a relationship, it is indeed easier, not harder, to develop positive or negative attitudes about groups or persons. In Surat, positive relationships buffer the effect of negative interethnic attitudes whereas in Ahmedabad an environment of distrust encumbers even positive interethnic attitudes.

Suratis, across ethnic lines, admire their city and this admiration plays a role in better interethnic interactions and relationships. Suratis, in general, are proud of their identity as Suratis. On the other hand, in Ahmedabad almost no one in Ahmedabad seemed enthusiastic about his or her city. The fact that the interviews were about ethnic violence and Ahmedabadis have little to be proud of on that front, explains some absence of

Ahmedabadi pride. However, Suratis use the word Surati to refer to themselves very often whereas there is no self-referencing (or naming as Ahmedabadis) by Ahmedabadis. In Ahmedabad ethnic pride is more important than urban pride.

The Answer

Hindus and Muslims occupy an important place in each other's lives in both cities. The Hindu-Muslim conflict is an important factor in the relationship and the interethnic attitudes but it is not the only factor. In Surat, the conflict is an important but not dominant factor in the Hindu-Muslim relationship. On the other hand, in Ahmedabad the conflict dominates the discourse of the relationship and interethnic attitudes.

So the question becomes, why is the conflict a secondary factor in Surat?

In Surat, the two communities interact far more often than in Ahmedabad. Their business engagements combined with a permissive urban form (see Chapter 5B) make Hindu-Muslim interactions far more likely in Surat. In Ahmedabad, circumstances may force Hindus and Muslims in close quarters causing inevitable interactions but neither the quantity nor the quality of interactions match those in Surat.

Figure 46 on the following page shows a hierarchy of interethnic interactions by quality. At the apex are familial interactions such as marriage or close familial ties through Indian festivals like Rakhi[93]. Interactions other than violence or lethal violence are assumed to be without physical violence, of course violence can occur within the context of any of

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[93] Rakhi or Rakshabandhan is a Hindu festival where sisters tie a thread around their brother's wrist as a reminder of his vow to protect her. In some part of India, this has become a tradition between Hindus and Muslims. Where Hindu women or Muslim women tie threads on the wrists of men from the other community.

these interactions. The base is lethal violence. The graphic distinguishes lethal violence

from other types of violence because lethal violence has a greater likelihood of retaliation

attached to it. Given that even the strongest parties in a conflict cannot renegotiate death,

Family (assumes violence free familial relationships)

Friendships

Business Partnerships

Coworkers

Commercial or Transactional interactions
(day-to-day business transactions)

Conflict

Violence

Lethal Violence

Figure 46 Hierarchy of the quality of interethnic interactions

retribution is the only recourse according to some.

Familial relationships are rare in both cities. In Surat, friendships and business

partnerships are relatively commonplace. As are interethnic coworkers, at least in the

textile trade, if not in the diamond industry. To top it off there are also several value

neutral transactions. These include the mundane day-to-day transactions such as the

Hindu riding a Muslim's auto rickshaw or Muslims buying from Hindu stores. In

Ahmedabad, the interactions between Hindus and Muslims dominate in this value neutral category. Some Ahmedabadis can, and do, avoid even these interactions thanks to a growing ethnic infrastructure in segregated neighborhoods. In addition, Ahmedabad has seen a lot more interactions involving lethal violence in the last two decades. Surat too has some experience with the lethal violence but not as bad as Ahmedabad. Finally, Surat may not be a model of interethnic interactions and relationships but it is better than Ahmedabad. This is an inevitable part of any comparative research and does not entail exaggerating Surat's accomplishments or downplaying them but more so as way to keep Surat's successes in perspective.

Comparing Interethnic attitudes

The memory of episodic violence does affect the interethnic attitudes in Surat. Nevertheless, two factors counter these memories:

1. The nostalgia of a unified past.

2. The positive experiences in the present.

The latter depends in large part on the former. The nostalgia, based on truth or even myth, provides an excuse to view the other favorably. Some individuals validate their nostalgia with the aid of small contemporary positive experiences. People see the present as positive in contrast with the violence and the prospect of negative interethnic attitudes or prejudice. For instance, when Hindus are nice to Muslims or vice versa, individuals on either side take note of such behavior as, "She was nice to me even though she is a Hindu/Muslim." One may argue that this is merely the other side of the same kind of

ethnocentric behavior that can blame an entire ethnic group for the crimes of its individual members and thus not a positive. Nevertheless, there is another scenario, which is far worse where people consider the crimes of the individual as indicative of the group but not his/her positives

On the contrary, in Ahmedabad, the recurring bouts of violence have sown seeds of mistrust. Even Ahmedabadis experience some interethnic interactions, but positive interethnic attitudes and relationships need time and space to develop. If the prospect of bloody violence always looms then the incentives to invest in any positive relationship are limited. If lethal violence is a possibility, it is easier and desirable to invest in defense and distance more than in relationships. In Ahmedabad, ghettoization of Muslims, coupled with the Hindu flight from mixed neighborhoods shows that the people have indeed invested in defense and distance where possible. Surat also has a similar problem of ghettoization, but as discussed later in chapter 5B the scale and quality is different.

Attitudes and Relationships

Interethnic attitudes can grow and change with or without interethnic relationships. Hindus often express very positive attitudes about Sikhs or Zoroastrians often without any personal interethnic relationships or interactions with either Sikhs or Zoroastrians. Similarly, the most negative attitudes about Muslims or Hindus propagate best in absence of any relationship but can also exist within a framework of positive relationships. For instance, in Surat interethnic relationships are much better than in Ahmedabad but that does not necessarily translate to positive interethnic attitudes. Indeed, often the Suratis offer the same critiques of the other community as Ahmedabadis but that criticism within

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the framework of a relationship. Within a relationship, such a critical attitude has the characteristics of a grievance specific to the relationship, without a relationship such a critical attitude can become prejudice. This candid conversation between individuals about sensitive religious matters indicates a positive relationship regardless of negative interethnic attitude or stereotypes associated with it. Just an understanding that Hindus or Muslims have negative attitudes about each other does not explain the complexities of the relationships. Negative attitudes do not always lead to negative action and positive attitudes do not suggest positive action or even prevent negative action. Binaries such as positive and negative do not fully explain the complex interethnic attitudes. Attitudes are part of a larger context and the path from any attitude to action is long and winding.

Indeed Surat's success and Ahmedabad's failure is partly explained by the Suratis' willingness to work with each other despite the complexities in the Hindu-Muslim relationships. They are also willing to exert the extra effort of dealing with complexity of attitudes and relationships between the Hindus and Muslims in general. They also have experiences of positive interactions with the other community. In Ahmedabad, fear and doubt, through violence or the threat of violence, have made interactions full of caution. Candid interactions are better than cordial interactions. Therefore, while Suratis and Ahmedabadis have some similarities in their broad interethnic attitudes, the relationship differences are vast and meaningful.

A relationship, even with disagreements, has the potential to prevent violence. In Ahmedabad, people form interethnic attitudes in absence of the other and is hence often based on popular opinion more than personal experience. These attitudes are not

necessarily negative but bouts of violence prevent many interpersonal relationships, which in turn makes violence prevention harder. Mere belief in the goodness of the other is not strong enough a force to counter the antipathy that leads to violence.

Apart from the distinction between the relationships and attitudes, Suratis and Ahmedabadis also view their cities differently and use the cities as a lens to view the other.

Attitudes and Urban Pride

The generally positive assessment of Surat by Suratis also helps explain the difference in attitudes between Surat and Ahmedabad. Suratis may have some negative beliefs about members of the other community in general but they draw a distinction between the average Hindu or Muslim versus a Surati Hindu or Muslim. Exogenous conflicts and violence may produce an environment of antipathy in general but Suratis still treat *their* Hindus or *their* Muslims differently. This no-true-Surati approach stems from Surati pride and the strength of interethnic Surati relationships. This belief in Surati exceptionalism is critical to tempering antipathy and sustaining relationships. Suratis often attributed the violence in Surat to migrants or anyone whose identity as a Surati they could challenge. Of course, urban pride and urban exceptionalism does not supersede ethnic pride but it makes violence the last resort not the first recourse.

In Ahmedabad, the urban identity or urban pride recedes in the background in the face of ethnic questions. Ahmedabadis do not accord special status to Ahmedabadis of the other ethnicity or even themselves like their Surati counterparts. Interethnic attitudes in

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Ahmedabad are universal in that regard and largely devoid of the local nuance peculiar to Surat. Urban pride is hard to develop amidst recurring violence or the threat of violence.

As noted, in Chapter 2, Ahmedabad has a long list of achievements, such as the textile industry, ancient monuments, Gandhi, premier educational institutions etc. certainly more so than Surat. Surat's economy seems better now but even that was not always the case. The critical difference is that Ahmedabad's interethnic history is a less harmonious history. Clearly, the achievements of kings, politicians, and tycoons, are not enough to instill urban pride. Citizens value the peace and prosperity that they experience firsthand more than any past or present glory.

Conclusion

The relationship with another group can become a lens through which a group views and morally defines itself. If a group characterizes the other group as an adversary, especially an evil adversary then: 1. Murder becomes less unacceptable and part of the necessary evil in dealing with the other. 2. Internal moral code of a group changes drastically, since morality becomes relative to the other group and not absolute within the group. The cognitive stress, which forces a group to look within, imposed by the presence of another group is part of the psychological distress that groups in conflict experience. The need to question one's own values and morality is stressful and groups often rebel by blaming and shaming the other. The suspension of an absolute moral code is what makes lethal violence possible. For example, once this moral code is suspended then groups can frame killing only the men of a group as 'sparing women and children'. This reframing of the immoral as the moral is possible only in the presence of a hated other.

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In adversarial relationships, groups prefer the feeling of being dominant to the feeling of being dominated. They forget or never discover in accepting such zero-sum assumptions that the feeling associated with social harmony is far superior to the feeling associated with dominance.

Significant relationships, such as the Hindu-Muslim relationship, exert significant influence on the self-image of the groups. The other or the enemy, powerful or otherwise, dictates a group's self-image in large parts (Volkan, 2009). Groups construct their identity by defining borders and contrast.

Answer Two

The answer to the question about episodic violence reveals that Hindus and Muslims in both cities agree that the 2002 riots represented a shift in the scale and the quality of violence. There are four main categories of beliefs attached to this violence:

1. Beliefs about who or what is responsible.

2. Beliefs and experiences of the violence.

3. Beliefs about the aftermath.

4. Beliefs about the context surrounding the violence.

Beliefs: Blame and Responsibility

Overwhelmingly, both communities in both cities blame the politicians for the violence. Blaming politicians is not exactly a revelation or a discovery; it is part of the folklore of ethnic violence in India. The common explanation of ethnic violence goes something like this, "The two communities don't want to fight, but politicians encourage violence to capture ethnic constituencies." This rather simplistic explanation typically helps make sense of a complicated relationship and shocking violence. The explanation, though not convincing, remains very popular.

Although even as people squarely blamed politicians, some also questioned the intelligence and the motivations of the masses that follow these politicians. Some also blame people who 'misunderstand religion' or who are fanatical about religious issues.

In Ahmedabad, some Hindus spoke about the fanaticism of Muslims as a factor that led to the violence and stressed the idea that without the violence in Godhra there would have been no violence in Gujarat.

Beliefs: Experience of the Episode

Episodic violence represents an interesting, albeit tragic, opportunity to study ethnic communities. For one, violent episodes are memorable, there are clear, and ethnic versions of what happened. Additionally, one cannot talk about an episode of violence without revealing some beliefs about the factors that surround the violence.

Among Muslims, there was a sense of almost awe about Hindu rage regarding Godhra. Moreover, among some Hindus, there was a sense about the excessive nature of the reaction to Godhra.

More Ahmedabadi Muslims experienced the violence first hand than any other group. Many Ahmedabadi Muslims, including one who was attacked and injured by a mob, expressed a tangible fear for life. Moreover, while the violence overwhelmingly affected Ahmedabadi Muslims, all other groups commented on the uniqueness of the violence. Some Ahmedabadi Hindus insisted on making the point about the fact that some Hindus were also victims of the violence[94]. The two communities also agree on the unprecedented nature of the violence.

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[94] There is a sense that politically and ideologically left-leaning journalists or researchers are in the business of demonizing

Suratis appreciated the relative lack of violence in Surat, especially when contrasted against Ahmedabad and some other cities. Also for many Suratis, even the small instances of violence were very far away from their home or business in their assessment. It is hard to understand how anyone decides what is 'far' and what is 'near', some respondents spoke about violence or protests as having taken place miles away when in reality it was only a few streets away. One can partly understand this dissonance between real and perceived distance by appreciating-

A. the contrast with other violent cities like Ahmedabad and

B. the isolated nature of the violence.

In Ahmedabad too, the experience of violence was dependent upon geographical location but people perceived the violence as closer and some perceived themselves to be in imminent danger. Moreover, while only some neighborhoods saw serious violence, a few unfortunate respondents were either stuck in, or had to travel through, these neighborhoods.

Beliefs: The Aftermath of the violence

It is the aftermath of the violence, more than it causes and its experience, where the Hindus and Muslims differ the most. Many Hindus see the absence of serious violence since the riots as an unseen benefit or even a positive outcome of the riots. They acknowledge that the relationship has deteriorated but given that, most Hindus do not rely upon the Muslims for goods, jobs, or services the tangible effect of this deteriorated relationship is limited. In addition, the subsequent reduction in levels of recurring

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violence comes with tangible benefits. Unfortunately, for a small minority of Hindus, this relative absence of recurring violence has lent false credence to the sordid belief that the riots were an apt lesson to the Muslims.

On the other hand, many Muslims see an increase in the structural violence[95] as a direct result of the riots. Many Muslims, especially Ahmedabadi Muslims, experienced tangible financial and social loses in the aftermath of the violence because of decline in a Hindu clientele and limited access to jobs due to discrimination[96]. In Surat, the situation is much better but there was a sense of mistrust and growing distance between the two communities for a few years after the riots. The difference between Surati and Ahmedabadi Muslim's beliefs about the aftermath of the violence is that the Suratis have seen a marked improvement after the few years of mistrust immediately after the violence. This upswing in relationship health is also present in Ahmedabad but it is neither pronounced nor trusted.

Both groups believed that there had been negligible changes in the in-group relationships.

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[95] The structural violence that Muslims experience and perceive is also a result of a new strategy of low intensity high impact violence. This dissertation will address the structural violence and the concept of low intensity high impact violence in detail in the conclusion of this Chapter and Chapter 6.

[96] Both ideas are statistically and politically hard to prove and controversial. It is hence important to note that the above statements represent beliefs of the Muslims. The controversy surrounding the 2005 Sachar committee report on the condition of Muslims is an indicator of the same. The center-left Congress party led political alliance- United Progressive Alliance (UPA) commissioned the report in 2005. The committee tabled the 403-page report in Parliament in November 2006. It presented a bleak picture of the state of Muslims and ironically embarrassed the allegedly pro-Muslim Congress and the allegedly anti-Muslim BJP. Since, the Congress has been the ruling party for most of the 69 years since India's independence. Moreover, it also embarrassed the BJP since it disproved their claim that Muslims are recipients of most state programs and that there is little or no discrimination against Muslims in India.

Beliefs: Context of the Violence

One of the more surprising findings of the research was the general lack of a comprehensive picture of the reasons of violent conflict from either Hindus or Muslims. People seemed genuinely unaware of the historical context that surrounds the violence. The proximate causes i.e., reasons related to the immediate context such as recent violence, electoral mobilization, propaganda, incitement, trigger events seemed to dominate the reasons offered for violence. In academia, politics, and media it is common to hear experts trace the origins and the context of the conflict to the middle ages. One may accept that historical incidents or myths excite passions but a straight line from an allegation of some medieval injustice by one group towards another is difficult to draw.

Prior to the fieldwork and based on the literature review it seemed likely that the following explanations would dominate as the historical context:

    i.   16th century construction and 20th century destruction of the Babri Mosque.

    ii.   The Islamic invasion of northern India.

    iii.   India's partition into India and Pakistan.

    iv.   The British policy of divide and rule.

Nevertheless, while respondents alluded to all these factors no single factor stood out and very few Hindus spoke about the invasions or construction of the mosque. Indeed when asked about historical context, respondents expressed a desire to talk about recent political history. It was clear that for Hindus and Muslims it was the proximate causes

mattered more than the historical excuses that are in vogue in academia, politics, and media.

Smart and motivated political operators can articulate immediate insecurity, injustice, and inequality using historical chosen traumas as analogies. Thus, even as people forget, or vaguely remember, the historical chosen traumas the outrage associated with it remains. If the immediate context is conflictual or even uncomfortable, the people can express this outrage in various ways, including violence.

The four explanations of historical context mentioned above are indeed common to Surat and Ahmedabad[97]. Therefore, it may be that people's beliefs about the historical context are secondary to the immediate provocations.

So, is history merely a convenient excuse?

It may seem so, given this discovery about beliefs and relative unimportance of the historical context. It is also in line with Brass's (2003) assertion that ethnic violence is a tool to achieve specific social, political, and economic goals. Nevertheless, even if there is nothing inherently conflict promoting in the real history of two communities its contemporary interpretation with "chosen traumas" that makes a difference. Chosen traumas can serve multiple purposes, it can serve as a mobilizing force for a group or a

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[97] Although the events affected the two cities in different ways. For instance, the British policy of divide and rule may have been more significant in Ahmedabad, given its importance in Gandhi's freedom struggle. Yet, Ahmedabadis Hindus, for example, do not attribute a greater importance to this than Surati Hindus. Although, Ahmedabadi Muslims do mention this more often than Surati Muslims. Either way, it is hard to trace a line from these historical causes to any current violence in specific geographies.

justification for violence against the enemy. It can also simply be useful to occupy the position of a victim in a conflict which lends instant moral high ground. It is thus possible to rewrite history to highlight conflict or peace (Horowitz, 2001). This rewritten mythical history is more important than any accurate history. One thing is certain that the details of this history do not matter. As mentioned in Chapter 2, motivations of the decision makers or leaders and foot soldiers can be, and usually are, very different. History serves as a useful tool in the hands of the leaders to motivate foot soldiers and the masses.

For example, consider the 16th century construction and 20th century destruction of the Babri Mosque. The historicity of the mosque's origins remains contested but most historians accept that the Mughal emperor Babur commissioned the mosque in the 16th century; hence, it is safe to assume that the alleged temple destruction took place around the same time. Ergo the trauma is at least 400 years old. Why is an alleged 400-year-old event the inspiration, if not source, of contemporary violence? It is because if any contemporary grievances exist then it is easy to resurrect historical or even mythical quarrels for the conflict. Here 'conflict' is akin to an organism that needs sustenance and has a certain degree of autonomy. Individuals and groups may place a premium on the maintenance of the conflict as it allows them to make sense of the differences between groups. For example, in this study, even respondents who had very positive attitudes towards the other community never challenged the differences between the two communities. There was a strong belief about a fundamental difference between Hindus and Muslims. If the differences come with the prospect of conflict, especially violent conflict, then history can become a useful tool to provide stories for the conflict. In

addition, as will be shown later in this chapter, history comes with its own geography.

Therefore, in absence of a present and proximate excuse, any event, real or imaginary,

from 400 years ago and 800 miles away can provide the reasons to maintain the conflict

or escalate it to violence. On the face of it, the destruction of a temple and a building of a

mosque in its stead does seem like a strong provocation. Just as for some the 1992,

destruction of the mosque is a strong provocation. One may argue that it need not be so

because between the 16th and the 21st century, the Hindus and Muslims have also had a

long history of cooperation and friendship replete with positive events[98]. Again, consider

Volkan's (1998) idea of "time collapse" where actors in ethnic conflicts may instigate

violence based on current social, economic, or political conditions but they draw

motivation from any point in history.

Conflict and violence evoke uncertainty, insecurity, and a complex array of beliefs and

emotions. To explain these feelings and for the sake of cognitive ease and confirmation

bias (Kahneman, 2011), individuals may rely on history. This history, as mentioned

earlier, need not even be true. Indeed, as history, true or false, may help explain emotions

or justify violence, the violence itself can be useful to validate history.

Chapter 5B explores how the conflict and violence influences and is influenced by the

urban form.

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[98] Of course, this is not to suggest that Hindu Muslim relationships between the 16th and the 21st century
were always conflict and violence free. Nevertheless, the choice to focus on the negatives or the positives
rests with the communities.

Chapter 5B: Results Urban Form

Introduction

Chapter 5B presents the results from the urban form study of the research. It uses the interview, respondent drawn maps, and image analyses to study the role of the urban form in ethnic conflict and violence. In addition, it clarifies the relationship between urban form and interethnic attitudes (discussed above). Finally, it lays the groundwork for the discussion of how the urban form and interethnic attitudes are linked to the levels of interethnic violence.

The urban form piece of the puzzle of local variance in ethnic violence rests on ethnicization and the differences in the urban form. The investigation of the same relies on a framework that includes ethnicization and physical characteristics (which may have ethnic features). An example of ethnicization is something like, "These apartments are Muslim because Muslims live here." An example of physical characteristics is the minarets of a mosque, which clearly indicate that a structure is a mosque and hence identified as Muslim. This ethnic identification does not necessarily mean ethnicization. As mentioned earlier, Ethnicization is the extent to which the ethnic identity of any element of the urban form dominates the overall identity after it has been assigned an ethnic identity. The difference between ethnicization and ethnic identification is best explained by the following example:

The Taj Mahal in India is a prominent landmark of Islamic Architecture and its campus includes a mosque, which means the monument is closed on Fridays for Friday prayers.

Yet, in spite of its ethnic identity as Muslim, it is not ethnicized as Muslim simply because its value as an Indian monument and as a marvel of architecture dominates. To frame it in an American context, even though each politician ends his/her speech in America with 'God Bless America' (ethnic identity largely Judeo-Christian) the country is not yet a theocracy or largely ethnicized as Judeo-Christian. So a mosque is always ethnically Muslim but it may not necessarily be ethnicized in popular perception or ethnicize (Islamize) its surroundings by becoming a marker for a Muslim neighborhood. A structure's ethnic identity can remain intact even as its non-ethnic or secular identity grows; this is where perception plays a role. The questions then become, are some places more susceptible to ethnicization versus others and are people cognizant of this ethnicization? This is where Lynch's framework of imageability is useful. For Lynch imageability is "that quality in a physical object, which gives it a high probability of evoking a strong image in any given observer". He equates it to 'legibility', or 'visibility'. Lynch (1960) uses the five elements paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks, for the imageability of the city. An urban form element's image is context dependent. In this research, the imageability is within the context of ethnic identity. During the interviews, however, the respondents were free to address the urban form without exclusive focus on the ethnicity. In short, the adjectives used for an element were not simply limited to Hindu or Muslim but respondents also used words like posh, beautiful, poor, or dirty.

The results of the analysis, presented below, up to the final part of the chapter, which concludes by answering the two central questions relating to the urban form:

1. *How do Hindus and Muslims perceive the ethnicization in their respective cities?*
2. *What are the differences in the urban form and in ethnicization of urban form in the two cities?*

The chapter presents these results in two ways:

First, it addresses the ethnicization of the urban form among the respondents. It also addresses the issues regarding the image of the city according to the respondents and presents ethnicized people's maps of the two cities. The discussion follows all the neighborhoods. Second, within the analysis of each neighborhood there are specific observations about ethnicization and urban form. The chapter ends by answering the second question in a conclusive comparison of Surat and Ahmedabad.

Perceptions of Ethnicization of Urban Form

The way people perceive the ethnicization of a city and its urban form depends on the following factors:

1. Their understanding of the ethnicization of their own neighborhoods
2. The extent of access (physical and psychological) people have to the city,
3. Their perception of themselves and others as ethnic persons in an ethnicized space.

Ethnicization levels of the urban form vary by each neighborhood in the Surat and Ahmedabad. The first half of the discussion below presents these perceptions of ethnicization on a neighborhood level. The geographic analysis combined with analysis of interviews provides an insight into the urban form of each neighborhood. It also reveals how the location of the respondents affects their perceptions about the urban form of their respective cities. This hyperlocal approach affords a preview into the structure of

the neighborhoods and the significance of the neighborhood within the city. The second

half of the discussion compares access, comfort, and places of interaction in Surat and

Ahmedabad, among Hindus and Muslims. This discussion uses some of the same data

presented in the neighborhood level analysis. It follows the same framework as the

discussion on interethnic attitudes in Chapter 5A. The discussion first compares Hindus

and Muslims and within each section compares Suratis and Ahmedabadis.

The neighborhood level discussion follows a slightly different method of coding.

The analysis first codes the respondent answers to general thematic codes such as 'A

general description' (of the neighborhood), 'History' 'Important places in the

neighborhood'. Then the aggregate text in the general thematic code is analyzed for

specific themes such as the urban form descriptions, neighborhood pride, mention of

ethnic markers, or borders. This coding of a code, versus coding individual respondents

helps to present a unified view of the neighborhood in spite of the small sample size on

the neighborhood level (between 9 to 12 respondents). This analytical approach is

applied to four of the questions that are exclusively neighborhood specific and to

descriptions of the city by neighborhood (see Part 2 of this Chapter).

- Question 37: Can you tell us a little bit about your neighborhood? How big is it?

- Question 38: What are the important places in your neighborhood?

- Question 39: What do you think are the main characteristics of your neighborhood? How has the neighborhood changed over the years? Can you say something about the history of the neighborhood?

- Question 40: How is your neighborhood different from a Hindu/Muslim neighborhood? Can you give some examples?

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As a reminder, the three neighborhoods include one with high levels of ethnic heterogeneity, another with a majority Muslim population, and another with a majority Hindu population. Respectively the three Surat neighborhoods are Nanpura, Rander, and Adajan. The three Ahmedabad neighborhoods are Kalupur-Dariyapur, Juhapura, and Vejalpur-Jivraj.

Surat

The three neighborhood descriptions follow similar outline and present comparable maps. Since there is a difference in the nature of the neighborhoods, there are significant differences in the urban form elements covered and highlighted. Each neighborhood in Surat, and Ahmedabad, tells a different story of the urban form. The neighborhood descriptions diverge and follow slightly different frameworks. Read in concert they present a comprehensive story of the urban form and urban geography. For instance, the discussion about Nanpura highlights the significance of nodes and hence the discussion emphasizes nodes. Similarly, in Rander, the edges or borders are especially significant and hence the discussion emphasizes the same. Presenting a straightjacket narrative of each neighborhood following the same format is counterproductive since it does not allow the various themes to come to the fore.

The section about Nanpura, the first neighborhood covered, addresses many pan-Surat issues to lay the groundwork for the discussions that follow.

Figure 47 Surat Map, with the three neighborhoods

Nanpura: Heterogeneity to Harmony

Figure 48 Nanpura, top 10 words used to describe the neighborhood.

The residents of Nanpura are aware of the uniqueness of their neighborhood's ethnic heterogeneity and generally proud of it. A word frequency analysis[99] of the top ten words of a 'general description' of Nanpura presents possibly the most encouraging word cloud of the research. The top five words here are people, Nanpura, together, living, and neighborhood. To be sure, this outcome is not typical even within Surat. Contrast the same analysis for Surat's Hindu majority Adajan neighborhood and very different set of words is apparent. In Nanpura, people value the notion of living together, whereas in Adajan themes of development and buildings dominate. See Figure 49.

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[99] Words are a minimum of five letters length and stemmed words are included with a word for instance-'talk' and 'talking' are the equal for analytical purposes.

Figure 49 Adajan, top 10 words used to describe neighborhood

The nostalgia for the old Surat that many Suratis displayed is thus not be entirely unfounded since Nanpura is the old Surat. Residents often describe Nanpura as 'original' Surat and its residents as 'original' Suratis. As mentioned earlier this idea of native versus nonnative Surati is important to most Suratis and especially so in Nanpura. As mentioned earlier the idea of Surati pride is important in the city and Nanpura has more of it than other neighborhoods. Especially, Muslims of Nanpura as seen in the Figure 50

Figure 50 Surati Pride: Positive remarks about the Surati as a Person. Numbers of Respondents making positive remarks and what percentage of respondents made positive remarks about the Surati in Each neighborhood. There are 12 respondents in each neighborhood.

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A factor that explains this difference among Hindus and Muslims of Nanpura is how long

the Muslims of Nanpura had been living in Nanpura. Five of the six Muslims of Nanpura

had been in the neighborhood longer than 20 years compared to only one Hindu. Apart

from claimed loyalty and love for the neighborhood, one reason for this lack of mobility

is that Muslims simply cannot buy or rent in many neighborhoods in Surat or

Ahmedabad. Another surprising element of this finding is that while some Hindus view

the old city and by extension, Nanpura, as a Muslim neighborhood clearly Hindus can

and do move into Nanpura. This is surprising because many Hindus in Surat see Muslim

neighborhoods as poor neighborhoods that are dirty and prone to violence. Despite the

fact that the median age of the Surati Muslim respondents is slightly lower at 37.5 versus

the Surati Hindu respondents at 41.5, Surati Muslims are generally less mobile. As seen in the case of Nanpura in Figure 51 more Muslims than Hindus have lived in Nanpura longer than 20 years. The trend is also intact across Surat, as seen in the adjoining chart in Figure 52.

Figure 51 Muslims spend more years in the same neighborhood.

Figure 52 Years in the neighborhood for Surati Hindus and Muslims

For Surati Muslims the lack of mobility within Surat is an extension of their general lack of mobility in the state of Gujarat. Most Surati Muslims interviewed were born in Surat and Gujarat, see Figure 53, on the following page.

This shows that not only are Surati Muslims more likely to stay in Surat but also stay within the neighborhoods in which they were born. There were specific instances of older Surati Muslims who had lived in other cities for a few months or years for a trade or job but returned to Surat and their own neighborhood. A similar trend is observed in Ahmedabad; however. Ahmedabadi Hindus are more likely to be born in Ahmedabad, compared to their Surati counterparts.

Figure 53 Birthplace of Surati Respondents by religion. This graph includes 100% of Hindu and Muslim respondents in Surat.

Two other variables that are interesting but difficult to address (given the limited scope of the research) are gender and education. The one Muslim respondent born outside of Gujarat, and two of the four Muslim respondents born outside Surat were women. This is often a result of women marrying and moving into the husband's house after an arranged marriage. Thus given the patriarchal nature of the society even the cases of Muslims moving into Surat is not mobility by choice[100]. Similarly, while Surati Hindus are better educated than Surati Muslims (nearly 44.4% of Muslims had only basic schooling) nearly

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[100] This does not mean the women for forced or not forced into marriages but simply that they chose spouses and not cities. Although in the case of Surat, there is anecdotal evidence of Ahmedabadis marrying into Surati families or migrating to Surat to escape Ahmedabad.

half of the Surati Muslim respondents born in the city had bachelor's or master's degree. Education does not seem to ensure Muslim migration or mobility into Surat. This absence of Muslims born outside Surat in the sample is surprising for the following reasons:

1. Surat is home to the highest percentage of internal migrants in India among cities with more than a million residents (UNESCO, 2013). Fifty eight percent of Suratis are internal migrants[101]. Given that, the research includes Rander and Nanpura both with high Muslim populations it is fair to expect that the sample would capture at least some Muslims who had migrated into Surat.

2. Around 66% of the Hindu respondents were born outside Surat, which is only slightly higher than UNESCO's estimate of 58% for all Suratis.

It is within this ethnic, social, and economic context that the study addresses the urban form of Nanpura. Presented below are some maps of Nanpura that highlight some of the urban form characteristics of the neighborhood. The maps also show the locations of the interviews.

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[101] The Census of India defines an internal migrant as a person residing in a place other than his/her place of birth or one who has changed his/her usual place of residence(UPR) to another place. The UNESCO report considers an internal migrant someone who has changed his/her UPR.

Maps of Nanpura

To its south and northwest Nanpura has two borders, the Tapi River and the edge of old Surat. The river is a natural edge and largely immutable but even the southern edge has become almost immutable. The southern edge was the wall that surrounded old city Surat and now is an important arterial street with multiple flyovers (bridges). To its Northeast & east are other neighborhoods of old Surat. Maps at this scale cannot show all the details but they indicate the general structure of the neighborhood.

Nanpura is not only bound on two sides but its narrower streets and old neighborhoods also limit vertical expansion, although there are some high-rise buildings closer to the water's edge, tall apartments are generally rare.

Notice also, the close proximity between mosques and temples in Nanpura (see Figure 54). These mosques and Hindu temples, along with some churches, a few Jain temples, a Parsi temple, and other

Figure 54 Respondent location and length of stay in years, and Places of Worship in Nanpura

shrines (most too small to record) share an area of around 0.44 Sq. Miles with nearly 60000 residents.

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Nanpura is home to many Surati landmarks, places of worship, government offices, historical structures, and gardens. The landmarks add to the importance of Nanpura. Apart from the landmarks, the

Nanpura in Surat

Major Streets

Nodes and Landmarks

Figure 55 Nodes, Landmarks, and Paths

neighborhood is also home to some important nodes in the city. Nanpura includes the most ethnically significant node in Surat, Kadershah Ni Nal (discussed at length later in this chapter.) The Figure 55 shows the location of some of these nodes and landmarks and some of the major streets in Nanpura. The major streets of Nanpura, in the map above, are the few streets where two cars can pass each other side-by-side, otherwise, many streets in Nanpura are narrow alleys fit for scooters, bikes, and a single car.

Figure 56 Formal vs. Perceived Borders of Nanpura

Nanpura residents are good at mapping the edges of their neighborhoods, partly because the southern and western edges are easy to identify as mentioned above. Some respondents included some landmarks just to the north of Nanpura within Nanpura thus extending the border a few hundred feet to the north, while others excluded some posher areas of the southeast thus slightly shrinking the neighborhood (see Figure 56). In the figure, the dotted green lines show perceived borders of Nanpura. These perceived borders are a result of data from the interviews and cognitive mapping exercises.

A People's Map of Nanpura

The interviews and mapping with the respondents in Nanpura provide insight into how residents view their neighborhood. The map presented below combines data from the mapping exercise and integrates places or spaces mentioned in the interviews. The map highlights the major paths with directions that respondents take out of the neighborhood.

It also highlights what the respondents consider as ethnically sensitive areas, commercial areas, and nice/posh areas.

Figure 57 Respondent Map of Nanpura from verbal and graphic descriptions of Nanpura and its surrounding neighborhoods.

Most respondents insisted that Nanpura is a very big neighborhood. Objectively this is not true. Nanpura has an area of around 0.44 sq. miles compared to Rander at 1.52 sq. miles and Adajan at 2.28 sq. miles[102]. So why do more than half the respondents speak of Nanpura as a large neighborhood. There are three factors for the same:

1. One of the factors is the population density. Nanpura is a much denser neighborhood with a population density of approximately 119,000 people per sq. mile compared to Adajan's population density of 86,000 people per sq. mile or the Surat metropolitan area average of 35,000 people per sq. mile.

2. In addition, Nanpura's old city layout with narrower streets and the relative absence of a grid means that traffic is slower so travelling from one end of Nanpura to another can feel like covering a greater distance than the actual distance.

3. Most crucially, Nanpura is full of important landmarks and reference points. The absence of a suburban monotony means that a traveler crosses more landmarks on their way to a destination thus creating the illusion of traversing greater distances. Although it is difficult to pinpoint how exactly the urban form affects the perception of distance there is evidence supporting of a correlation between the two (Krizek, Horning, & El-Geneidy, 2012). The complex landscape forces travelers to mentally mark more elements thus creating an illusion of greater distances (Nasar et al., 1985; Raghubir and Krishna, 1996)

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[102] Neighborhood Area based on ArcGIS map drawn for this research, there are slight differences between this and the official neighborhood are for some neighborhoods because of the way the political ward boundaries are drawn.

The medium-rise high-density urban topography of Nanpura combined with a more

traditional (non-grid) urban plan layout lends Nanpura a unique and varying physical

characteristic. The neighborhood changes as one goes deeper into the city center. See

Figure 58 The old map of Surat from 1877 with contemporary Nanpura Superimposed. The 1877 Map is from Haynes (1991) The text from the old Haynes map is not relevant or current.

Figure 58 which shows the 1877 map of Surat with contemporary Nanpura. The original

city was bounded by walls and distinctly-named gates. The walls that surrounded the old

city until the 19th century have given way to streets and flyovers (bridges). The erstwhile

gates are namesakes of new neighborhoods and intersections along the ring road that has

replaced the walls. Majura Gate, Athwa Gate, or other gates are now names of the new

neighborhoods and the intersections. The 'gates' in question have, for the most part, been

demolished.

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Center and Epicenter in Nanpura

Nanpura's center is somewhere around Kailash Restaurant, respondents reference their directions and their maps from Kailash restaurant (see map in Figure 59). The epicenter of ethnic conflict is on the edge of Nanpura in Kadershah Ni Nal[103] (also known simply as the Nal). The actual location of Kadershah Ni Nal is just a Node on the eastern border of Nanpura; however, as respondents get further away from the Nal their perception of where the Nal begins expands.

The map below in Figure 59 serves as guide to a reading of Nanpura, read in

Figure 59 A Location Reference Map of Nanpura

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[103] 'Nal'in Gujarati means 'valley' so Kadershah Ni Nal means the valley of Kadershah, although in an urban context it would typically refer to a stepwell used for fetching water.

conjunction with the table; it addresses some of the most important nodes and landmarks in Nanpura.

To read the map below follow numbers on the map on the table. The map and the table highlight the urban form elements most significant to the ethnic narrative of the neighborhood.

Other urban form elements are also significant to Nanpura's ethnic identity; the final analysis of Surat's urban form later in this chapter addresses those elements.

The table in highlights the diversity of urban form elements within Nanpura. Of the five elements of the urban form, nodes and edges are particularly significant in the context of ethnicization. Most significant is the node-edge hybrid explained below with the example of Kadershah Ni Nal.

No.	Name	Urban Form Element Type	Significance, Evaluation, and Meaning
1	Kailash Restaurant	Node and Landmarks cluster	Perceived Center of the Neighborhood Node made significant by a Cluster of Landmarks No significant ethnic meaning or identity Node with some socio-economic transitions
2	Kadershah Ni Nal	Node-Edge Hybrid (see explanation below)	Perceived Center of ethnic conflict in the neighborhood and City. Node located on significant Hindu-Muslim edge. Significant and contested ethnic identity. Node with ethnic transitions.
3	Athwa Gate Circle	Node on Edge	Transition Node between the new city and old city. Node with significant socio-economic transitions between the upper/middle class new city and middle/lower-class old city. Primary node to cross the river into west Surat
4	Majura Gate Junction	Node on Edge	Transition Node between the new city and old city. Node with significant socio-economic transitions between the upper/middle class new city and middle/lower-class old city.
5	Jain Building Cluster	District and Landmarks cluster	Perceived Posh/Aspirational area within old city Ethnically Identified as Jain/Hindu Ethnically exclusive.
6	Western Nodes	Nodes and Landmarks cluster	Nodes with significant geographical transitions from old city to western Surat across the river. Clusters of old and historically significant landmarks surround the nodes. Primary perceived ethnic identity (by Suratis): Muslim Primary perceived ethnic identity (by Nanpura residents): Heterogeneous to Muslim

Figure 60 Significant Urban Form Elements in and around Nanpura

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The Node near Kadershah Ni Nal is an important intersection of streets and ethnic boundaries. The Node near the Nal is located on an ethnic edge between Hindus and Muslims[104]. To its South is an affluent cluster of largely Jain neighborhoods (see no. 5 Figure 59 and in the table above). To its East and North is the largely Hindu fisher-folk settlement. Small clusters of Muslims occupy the western side of the Nal in Nanpura. Intense activity typically characterizes a node, such that traffic and people go to and from it to various parts of a neighborhood or city. The Nal sits at an intersection of five important streets (see Figure 61)

The Nal however is not just a node but also an edge, a hybrid of a node and an edge. A node-edge hybrid is not just a node on an edge but it is a node where the edge condition dominates. The edge condition here refers to the idea of a sudden transition such that people can distinguish between two areas (districts). The Hindu side of the Nal and the Muslim side of the Nal are easy to distinguish for the people who live close to the Nal.

If the Nal's edge condition is dominant, then why is it not simply an edge?

Some reasons for the node-edge hybridization in spite of the dominant edge condition are as follows:

1. The node remains significant because it is a point where people congregate to fight, collaborate, or negotiate.

2. The edge is fluid but the node is stable i.e. the boundary between Hindus and

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[104] According to some respondents, the divisions between Hindus and Muslims here are best described as divisions between Khandeshi Muslims (Muslims from the state of Maharashtra) and the Macchis Hindu (Hindu caste of fishermen and sailors).

Muslims is fluid near the Nal because people soften the border with everyday activity and thus temporarily change the ethnic composition of the neighborhoods.

3. The edge also loses some of its import in peacetime when people congregate at the node to conduct business or for celebrating community events. Indeed the reverse of this condition is also true as will be seen along the nodes on the border between Juhapura and Vejalpur where though the nodes can be characterized physically as nodes the edge condition is so overpowering that the nodes as functional nodes are irrelevant.

4. The ethnic significance is strongest at the node and dissipates as one travels away from the node, even along the edge. Perceived distance from the node is important for many Suratis as explained below.

Perceived Distance from the Node

According to most Suratis, the epicenter of ethnic violence and conflict in Surat is the Nal. Even Nanpura residents draw the boundaries around Nal and prefer to distance themselves from it even if they are only a few hundred feet away. The closer they are to the Nal the evaluation of where the Nal begins changes. People in Nanpura draw a line between Kadershah Ni Nal and their location and exaggerate the distance.

In Figure 61 below, of the three Hindu and three Muslims interviews between the Kailash restaurant node and Kadershah Ni Nal only one respondent (marked in blue) described as being close to Kadershah Ni Nal and the others, except the respondent located at the node spoke of the Nal as being very distant from their location. Perceptually the Nal is distant for most respondents.

The 35-year-old Muslim garage owner, who admitted to being close to the Nal, explained this in simple terms:

> Now, we are located very close to Kadershah Ni Nal, so people are afraid to come here because this is considered a sensitive area. So, there are business people here who put Timaliyawad on their business card instead of Kadershah Ni Nal.

Figure 61 Real vs perceptual distance from the Nal

This psychological distancing from a place helps people cope with two problems. The first is the threat of being associated with a place with a bad reputation. The second is the constant fear of potential violence. If one believes one is not part of a place that is prone to violence, then one can cease being afraid of such events. This does not mean that this distance is merely a result of a defense mechanism. The perceptual distance has a basis in real behaviors. People do avoid travelling in the direction of the Nal and often simply do not need to travel in that direction. Maps people drew often stuck to wider and nicer roads as their preferred paths and consistently avoided the Nal. In Figure 57 (in People's map of Nanpura), notice the paths moving away from the ethnically sensitive area around the Nal. The wider nicer streets, which serve as an alternative to travelling through the Nal, may themselves be a result of the Nal's history and reputation.

Finally, this distancing of the Nal confines its influence to a much smaller area and as a result ensures relative peace in its surroundings. More crucially it characterizes the violence and conflict as a hyperlocal neighborhood conflict and not a pan-India Hindu-Muslim conflict.

The respondents in Nanpura see it as a quintessentially Surati neighborhood and they are correct about that because Nanpura is a good representation of the espoused Surati values. Nanpura reflects the dichotomy of Surat: its syncretic values and the lurking threat of ethnic violence. In places like the Nal, there is always a threat of small incidents turning into a violent clash. On the other hand, the mercantile ethos that frequently defies ethnic boundaries and the syncretic spirit of ancient saints often confines conflict to the Nal. Neither the mercantile ethos nor the history of saints is immune to threats. On a brighter side, the people of Nanpura are aware of this and proud of their relatively peaceful past of coexistence. Muslim respondents are prouder of the syncretic values of Nanpura in general because they have lived in Nanpura longer. Figure 62 below shows how Muslims describe their neighborhood compared to their Hindu neighbors. For Muslims, the neighborhood pride stems from experience and is associated with the


Figure 62 Descriptions of Nanpura, by Hindus and Muslims of Nanpura

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elements of the urban form. They see themselves as heirs of the ancient landmarks and the defiant moments of peace in Surat (especially 2002).

This is not to say that Nanpura is free of ethnicization. There is some ethnicization of the urban form in Nanpura. There are elements whose ethnic identity or even just their association with ethnic issues is paramount. One may also say that some Hindus, from outside Nanpura, ethnicize all of Nanpura as Muslim. Additionally, some areas (districts) within Nanpura are completely ethnicized as Hindu or Muslim. Here the ethnic districts change within a few alleys or even within a single alley. These few clusters of houses include only a few houses and hence may not qualify being called a district. One of the reasons why ethnic enclaves are harder to form within Nanpura is the relative proximity of mosques and temples to each other. Within the bounds of Surat's old city, the distance between a median mosque[105] and median temple is a meager 0.2 miles. In Nanpura, there is an example of a temple and a mosque only 260 feet from each other[106]. As mentioned earlier, the nodes are critical to people's imagery and ethnic experience of Nanpura. Kadershah Ni Nal dominates the discourse about Surat's Hindu Muslim divide within and without Nanpura.

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[105] A Median Center of Spatial statistics in ArcGIS "identifies the location that minimizes overall Euclidean distance to the features in a dataset." For this analysis, 37 temples and 54 mosques were plotted and analyzed.

[106] There are even more examples extreme given smaller Muslim shrines and tiny Hindu public temples are not a part of this dataset.

The irony of Nanpura is that though it is a very heterogeneous neighborhood, it also

includes the starkest ethnic border near the Nal. Respondents in Nanpura thus tend to disown the Nal even as they include some landmarks from the North within Nanpura, which do not fall into its official borders. Otherwise, the official borders of Nanpura most closely align with the unofficial borders unlike Adajan and Rander.

Respondents like Nanpura, but they admire other neighborhoods. The wider streets of neighborhoods in south Surat are appealing when compared to some of old Surat's narrow

Figure 63 A typical lane in old Surat

alleys (see Figure 63)

The respondents were aware of a distinct advantage and a disadvantage of these narrow

alleys and the resultant density:

The advantage of the density is that stores, restaurants, places of worship and even offices

are easily accessible. A Nanpura Hindu or Muslim is never more than a third of a mile

away from a temple or a mosque.

The disadvantage is that the old city is prone to frequent traffic jams. The traffic has a

more insidious side to it. Respondents across Surat spoke about how a small bike

accident between a Hindu and a Muslim in the narrow alleys can cause a big problem.

Going back to the Nal, a Muslim respondent narrated a funny[107] anecdote of a Parsi man

near Kadershah Ni Nal:

> *I remember a funny incident. There was a Bawaji (*common slang for
> Parsis in India*). You know a Parsi guy like you who used to come to my
> garage. One day when I was done repairing his bike, he started to ride
> towards Kadershah Ni Nal side and then suddenly turned around and
> came back. I saw him and I asked him why are you coming back this way
> and he said, "Oh, I am not going the direction of that intersection. Two
> days ago, I had an accident and a bicycle rider came in front of me.
> Within minutes, there was a big crowd and they extorted Rs.200 (*around
> $3.50*) from me. So I have no interest in going from this side. I would
> rather take a longer route." Now these things happen a lot here.*

Road rage converted to ethnic rage is a common concern in both cities. In the anecdote,

the Parsi man's relative ethnic neutrality might have prevented any escalation. Of course,

not every accident near the Nal ends in extortion. In Chapter 4, there is an example of an

accident where a respondent deescalated the situation deftly. Narrow crowded alleys

nevertheless pose a challenge to the relative amity within Nanpura.

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[107] Funny only in hindsight with some schadenfreude.

Summary

Nanpura is a microcosm of 19th and 20th century Surat. The 21st century survivability of

Nanpura, as Nanpura, is hard to predict. The walls around it are long gone although the

river still protects one edge. The river as a stable unyielding edge is a big advantage for

Nanpura especially when compared to its Ahmedabadi counterpart Kalupur-Daryapur

(see comparison later in the Chapter). Apart from a few parts of Nanpura, mostly around

the Nal, it is not a depressed neighborhood. On the contrary, it is a diverse and bustling

neighborhood. Yet, as Hindus get opportunities to leave and Muslims do not, Nanpura is

at the risk of becoming an exclusively Muslim neighborhood. So far, its prime location

within Surat prevents it from becoming an ethnic or economic ghetto. This prime location

and its aspirational residents may ironically end its medium-rise high-density urban

topography and traditional (non-grid) urban plan. Such a change may promote

displacement[108] and ethnicization or it may transform the neighborhood into a posh

heterogeneous neighborhood. The outcome will likely be a mixture of both.

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[108] Gopi Talav, a 500-year-old Lake around a mile east of the Nal, in the old city became a site of a heritage restoration and urban renewal project in 2013. The first phase of the 4 million dollar project has resulted in a beautiful lake inaugurated in December 2015.In spite of the violent protests many of the 1400 houses and 120 shops, slated for demolition have been demolished. Some of the displaced residents had been there for four generations. In an article titled "Few recreational facilities, all plagued by problems" published on 26th of May, 2016, The Times of India complained about the visitors and state of the newly inaugurated attraction saying, "Similarly, Gopi Talav, due to its geographical location, has yet to become a recreational spot for the residents. It is people from the walled city who mostly visit Gopi Lake, and that too because of the attraction of street food. People from other areas hardly visit Gopi Talav due to presence of slum settlements around the lake"

The study of Nanpura's ethnicization and the urban form leads to the following observations:

1. Nodes are not just significant as meeting points or intersections but within this context, they adhere closer to what Lynch describes as a "thematic concentration"[109]. The Nal is an example of a thematic concentration node as well as a strategic node (node with multiple entrances and exits). The theme at the Nal is ethnicity, within the context of ethnic cooperation, contest, or conflict.

2. Nodes are transmitters of their themes but the edges people perceptually draw around them can limit or filter its influence. In Nanpura, residents filter out the ethnocentric theme of the Nal and convert it to a geographically limited problem based on specific ethnic and economic reasons. People thus adopt or reject a node based on their preferences but also based on the opportunities that the urban form provides. Nanpura's heterogeneous districting means there are more opportunities and benefits to intermingle than invest in the conflict at a node (see Figure 64). In the figure below, in example 'A', the short length of the edge and the influence limiting edge drawn around the node ensures that node-edge hybrid does not transmit its theme. In addition, the heterogeneous nature of the small districts combined with the edge around the thematic node allows a more nuanced

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[109] Lynch's themes are typically more benign focused on cultural aspects.

understanding of the conflict. In example 'B' the node can influence its surroundings more since the perceptual borders around it are weak and the ethnic edge can grow along the greater ethnic divide available to it. The edge may eventually subsume the node entirely and become a strong flashpoint for violence or an impenetrable divide (literal and/or psychological).

Figure 64 Heterogeneity is a counter to node influence

3. People can and do perceive distances (paths) based on their evaluation of ethnic meaning or risk. The active avoidance and distancing from ethnically sensitive areas creates a very real feeling of distance.
4. Heterogeneity, in spite of conflict, can be a strength when married to a nuanced discrimination of people and places.
5. Clearly defined edges of the neighborhood may help build a neighborhood level

identity and pride. This, again, is a strength only in the context of ethnic heterogeneity. The strong edges (the river and the edge between old-city and new Surat) will become ethnically significant and even prone to violence if Nanpura ever becomes an exclusively Muslim neighborhood.

Nanpura's urban density and history of some violence means that respondents are not always sure of the sustainability of its relative peace. Yet in Nanpura the violence and expectation of violence is located mostly around the Nal. However, as a node, the Nal can spread its influence in the adjoining areas. Just as violent actors choose the Nal as a theatre for violence, so do peacemakers. The prescription for preventing violence by focusing on certain areas in a city is not new but so far, there has been little research on what makes a place a flashpoint. This research shows that the node-edge hybrid is a strong contender for investigation in cities where there is violence along ethnic divides. Future researchers of ethno-urban violence will do well to ask themselves the following questions:

1. Which locations in the city are prone to violent ethnic conflict?
2. Are some of these locations node-edge hybrids?
3. Can the node-edge hybrids be isolated and secured?
4. Are the best isolation strategies soft strategies, such as changing the perceptions of the people? Alternatively, are the best strategies hard strategies, such as intervening with security and urban design and planning interventions?
5. What are the prominent characteristics of these node-edge hybrids? Are they clusters of landmarks, or important transit points, or historical significant

contested nodes etc.?

Cases like the Nal can inform us about the nature of these areas and the design and planning interventions that can limit or amplify their influence. Chapter 6 addresses these specific prescriptions for planners and policy makers in detail.

The following section is about the Surati neighborhood of Rander. Against all odds, Rander's status as a homogenous Muslim neighborhood is a strength[110] and not a weakness due to the relative peace in Surat, socio-economic factors and the resultant urban form.

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[110] Strength only in the context of violence prevention. Not all Randeris are in Rander by choice.

Rander: Homogeneity as Strength

Rander's own history is rich and identity is rich. It was not even a part of the Surat municipality until 1970. For residents its Muslim identity and its uniqueness as a neighborhood is important. They also talk a lot about the people

Figure 65 Rander, top 10 words used to in neighborhood descriptions

of Rander and not always in a positive tone. The comparisons of Rander with Hindu neighborhoods often involved mentions of the civic-minded Hindus who knew how to keep their neighborhoods clean and get work done from the civic authorities.

Rander is effectively two neighborhoods in one geography and one identity. The old Rander has a living heritage and bears testimony to Rander's antiquity. New Rander is the refuge of relatively affluent Muslims from the old city Surat. Yet unlike Nanpura's Muslims who were proud of Nanpura's and the old city's heritage many of Rander's newer Muslims were neither proud nor even aware of Rander's history but instead were proud of old-city Surat. One factor that explains this well is that more than half of Rander's respondents had lived in Rander for less than 20 years. In contrast three of the

four oldest Randeris, age 50, 64, and 66 had lived in Rander all their life. For Muslims, even the limited mobility within Surat generally means moving from the old-city to Rander.

Nostalgia is not entirely missing in Rander but the younger Randeris are nostalgic about Surat and not Rander. In addition, as mentioned earlier Randeri Muslims are low on Surati pride compared to their Nanpura counterparts (see Figure 50 the Section Nanpura: Heterogeneity to Harmony). There are two explanations for this:

1. Randeri Muslims often moved to Rander after the violence of 1992 in the old city
    or 2002 riots. The riots in 2002 were minimal but those who could afford to move
    did so to avoid any future risks. Muslims said they did not move exclusively due
    to the risk of violence but cited it as a factor for their or others' move to Rander.
    In addition, they see the old city as congested or dilapidated.

2. Rander is not the first choice of many affluent Muslims but it is often their only
    choice. This absence of choice caused by active biased housing practices, likely[111]
    plays a role in the general lack of pride.

The new and the old Randeris typically occupy different part of the neighborhood. Northern Rander is the old or original Rander. Southern Rander includes the new development which a 66-year-old *original* Randeri described as "what you people call

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[111] 'Likely' because some forms of prejudice and discrimination are often considered natural in India and indeed all over the world.

Rander". These two sides of Rander inhabit different urban forms. Their experience of the neighborhood and the city is very different.

Apart from the old and the new Rander there is also the official Rander. The administrative and political borders of Rander extend beyond the Muslim neighborhood. The maps below explain these complicated borders and the urban form.

Maps of Rander

As seen in the map here in Figure 66, the Randeris in the north have lived in Rander much longer than southern Randeris. Other factors separate the Northern Randeris and the southern Randeris. None of the southern Randeris earned less than or claimed their household expense as less than

Figure 66 Respondent Location and length of stay in years in Rander

20,000 rupees. None of the northern Randeris said their income/expense was more than

20,000. Some in the north did not disclose their income or expense because they were not earning any money themselves and relied on their families for sustenance.

Like Nanpura, Rander too is bound on one side by the river. In Rander, as mentioned earlier, the dichotomy of old and new is starker in the urban form. In Nanpura, where newer development has crept in, it's typically organic i.e., it's a gradual process of replacing the old with the new. In Rander newer projects have come up in the last few decades on once vacant or sparsely occupied land. The urban form contrast, discussed later is thus extreme.

For Randeris, borders of where Rander starts and ends may be different within Rander but its

Figure 67 Places of worship, Rander

borders with other neighborhoods follow the clusters of mosques. Rander is majority Muslim but not exclusively Muslim, indeed the official Rander ward (administrative/political unit) borders extend well into Hindu neighborhoods. The Randeris do not refer to these parts as Rander; instead, they use their local names like Ramnagar, Morabhagal, and Jahangirpura.   However while there are a few Hindu

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temples in Rander there are no mosques outside the borders of what people consider

Rander. The one mosque outside the perceived edge (see Figure 68) of Rander is an

eidgah[112] (circled above in the northwest corner of Rander).

Figure 68 Formal vs Perceived borders in Rander

Notice how the respondent-drawn borders follow roughly the same edge on the west and

east but have very different perceptions of where Rander starts and ends along the north

and south. In the map above the western edge follows a street known as Rander Road. To

its east is the aptly named New Rander Road, which is the site of newer development.

The new residents that occupy these apartments and bungalows see the beginning of the

causeway bridge as the northern edge of Rander. Conversely, the northern residents start

Rander just above the newest developments along New Rander Road.

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[112] An eidgah is an open-air gathering ground used for special prayers or Salat al Eid (Eid prayers) for Eid ul-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. Unlike most mosques, it is not used all year round and is peculiar to the Indian subcontinent.

In the north there are old mosques built by Muslim royals and businesspersons from the 15th to the early 20th centuries. The cluster of mosques in the south mostly includes new 21st century mosques built by wealthier Muslims.

Unlike Nanpura, Rander is not full of popular important landmarks. The landmarks people mention are old mosques or new schools. When asked about important places in Rander, a 58-year-old physician who had lived in Rander for only ten years dryly replied:

> *There is nothing special about this area. The old city is very beautiful but it is also mostly poor (people). Otherwise, you can look at the riverfront and then there are some good mosques here which are good to look at, but as I said I do not really go to the mosque very much.*

While this opinion is especially harsh the fact is the landmarks of Rander do not inspire its residents. For Randeris the temporary landmarks, such as the Eid markets with their street food

Rander road and New Rander road are the most dominant streets in Rander.

Rander in Surat

Major Streets   **Nodes and Landmarks**

Figure 69 Nodes, Landmarks, and Paths

A People's Map of Rander

The way people exit and experience Rander is especially important in Rander's urban form. Rander depends on the rest of Surat for entertainment and commerce. There are some shops and restaurants in Rander but the neighborhood is not self-sustaining.

Rander's street food is famous but limited and isolated from other activities, like the cinema. For most Randeris, the nearest movie hall is more than two miles away

Figure 70 People's map of Rander

Neighborhoods typically grow outward, away from the city; Rander is peculiar, as it has grown inward towards Surat. There are two reasons for this:

1. Rander was an independent town for most of its history, even as it was always associated with Surat, first as a twin-city and then as a satellite.
2. Rander's growth is the result of the economic elite moving into the neighborhood after 1992 and 2002. There are two important issues associated with this move which affect the social fabric and the urban form of Rander and even Surat:
   a. The relatively higher economic status of Muslims meant that they could afford land closer to the city and many Hindu developers were willing to sell them apartments (often initially constructed for Hindus but all apartments within the building are sold to Muslims, the buildings often retain their ethnically Hindu names even as they are inhabited by only Muslims).
   b. The better economic status of these migrant Muslims means the buildings are taller than their north Rander counterparts are and hence the urban form differences are noticeable (see Figure 71).

Figure 71 New vs Old Rander

Intra-ethnic and interethnic edges of Rander

A 2009 report by Urban Management Center (UMC) submitted to the Surat Municipal

Corporation (UMC, 2009) about the Rander Gamtal (see Figure 72) a historically

significant part of the old

neighborhood) found that

more than 95% of the

buildings were less than 3-

stories tall. In contrast, apart

from the few bungalows

along New Rander road most

of the buildings in New

Rander are more than 10

stories tall and include posh

new apartments. These stark

urban topography

differences create an edge

Figure 72 Old Rander within Rander

between these older areas of Rander and newer Rander. This edge is largely intra-ethnic

i.e., between Muslims. The interethnic edge in or around Rander (see perceptual border

of Rander in Figure 68) is ambiguous. Indeed, the interethnic edge is not even *around*

Rander since there are Hindu temples and residents even within the perceived borders of

Rander. Which is to say Randeri Muslims do not draw their neighborhood's borders to

exclude the few Hindus who live on the east of Rander Road.

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This relatively non-ethnic understanding of the neighborhood's edges has an important cause and an important effect.

Cause: The cause involves the way Muslims populated New Rander after 2002. The Muslim migration to Rander was a result of the fear of violence but not actual violence (within Surat). The absence of violence meant that even though relationships were tense in some cases the strain did not affect interethnic commerce to an extent that it affected many property sales. This meant that Hindus and Muslims occupied similar looking buildings within the same neighborhood. Even though individual buildings are ethnically homogenous, neighborhood blocks are not. This does not mean there are no edges between Hindus and Muslims but that they are difficult to identify using the urban form or, to use a Lynch phrase, the edges have low imageability.

Effect: These low visibility or imageability borders mean that Hindus and Muslims have a harder time focusing on their differences. The urban form at these poorly imageable or soft interethnic edges is not a good reminder of ethnic difference.

So is structural uniformity the foolproof solution to urban ethnic strife?

Not quite. The reason Rander's soft edges exist and seem to work in subduing ethnic differences is economic and historical. The fact is that Randeri Muslims not only can afford similar houses as Hindus but also that they can afford to live next to Hindus. There are many affluent Muslims in Ahmedabad, especially in its

most prominent Muslim majority neighborhood of Juhapura. Ahmedabadi

Muslims pay a premium to live away from Hindus due to a fear of violence. So

even as Randeri Muslims, live together with their 'own people' for safety they do

not pay a premium to live away from Hindus.

Rander, with its soft edges, is a Surati success story within the narrow context of ethnic

conflict. It is not a success story for its affluent Muslims. Notice the 10 most frequently

used words when Randeris compared Muslim and Hindu neighborhoods.

Figure 73 Rander, top 10 words used to compare Hindu and

Randeris generally viewed their own neighborhoods less kindly than some Hindus who viewed Rander from the outside. As an affluent 32-year-old, Adajan Hindu said in an

English interview:

> *You may say that they (Muslim neighborhoods) are more congested but if you look at posh Muslim localities like some parts of Rander, you cannot believe the kind of mind blowing beautiful and awesome houses that they have. You see the Muslims are also good in business, so you will see some areas and you will say, "Wow, Muslims live here? "Even Hindus don't have houses like this. So in Rander near the river bank, you see their bungalows and your mind will be blown.*

Evidently, there is a vast difference between the Hindus expectations of Muslims and the Muslims' aspirations for themselves.

Summary

Rander is at once a ghetto and not a ghetto. Like Schrodinger's cat, alive and dead at once, Rander too is a ghetto and non-ghetto at once. The notion that Rander may not be a ghetto is important to this research since then Rander's identity is then not merely limited to the ethnicity of its residents but also includes their non-ethnic characteristics.

Marcuse' (1997) in his discussion of the post-Fordist U.S. city further parses the ghetto into the enclave, the citadel, and the ghetto. Moreover, just as Marcuse noted that it is difficult to apply the definitions of the classic ghettos portrayed in urban history books to the post-Fordist city it is difficult to borrow these concepts for Rander without some loss of fidelity, although Marcuse's classifications are useful for discussing Rander. Marcuse defines a ghetto as a "spatially concentrated area used to separate and to limit a particular involuntarily defined population group held to be and treated as inferior by the dominant society" (p. 231). Parts of Rander fit this definition while others do not. Parts of Rander are also like Marcuse's enclaves "a spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, self-defined by ethnicity or religion or otherwise, congregate as a means of enhancing their economic, social, political and/or cultural development" (p. 242). Others parts of Rander are like Marcuse's citadel, which is "a spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, defined by its position of superiority, in power, wealth or status, in relation to its neighbors, congregate as a means of protecting and enhancing that position" (p. 247).

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Presented below are reasons why Rander is a ghetto and is not a ghetto. The discussion also addresses its status as an enclave and the presence of the citadels within it. This duality in Rander will help explain its shifting descriptions as a Muslim enclave, ghetto, and citadel.

Reasons why Rander is a ghetto:

1. Its overwhelmingly Muslim population is a result of the Muslim fear of Hindu-Muslim violence and housing discrimination.
2. Many Randeris cannot live anywhere but in Rander and some indeed might prefer to live elsewhere.

Reasons why Rander is not a ghetto

1. The above-mentioned preference to live elsewhere is not a preference to live with Hindus but a geographical preference.
2. Rander's borders are not hard borders, which means the judgements applied to the classic ghetto do not apply spatially to Rander. There is a difference between a Hindu suggesting Rander is a Muslim neighborhood and identifying Rander as a Muslim neighborhood.
3. The enclave like parts of Rander surround the ghetto-like parts and separate them from the Hindu neighborhoods. This is a reversal of what would be a typical pattern of an Indian ghetto. Typically, the elites form a citadel deep inside the ghetto and the poorer members form a ring that serves as a defense

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against the majority[113].

4. Rander has existed as an elite Muslim town before it became a neighborhood. Its fortunes, over the centuries, have waxed and waned and its identity as a ghetto is not quite final in any meaningful way.

Thus Rander, or many other neighborhoods do not fall into a neat binary as 'is a ghetto' or 'is not a ghetto' but there are varying expressions of ghetto-like characteristics or not. Finally, naming is not explaining, so these labels of citadel, ghetto, or enclave do not sufficiently explain all the nuances of Rander (or any other neighborhood) or its implications in preventing or promoting ethnic violence. This is where a discussion of the urban form is useful.

The study of Rander's ethnicization and the urban form allows the following observations:

1. Soft interethnic borders are possible when there are harder intra-ethnic borders on either sides. For now Rander's interethnic borders remain relatively soft. The following factors are important for understanding its opportunities and threats:

   a. The conceptual diagram (see Figure 74) shows the status of Rander's edges or borders. If the configuration changes such that the soft borders become hard and hard borders become soft, Rander's status as a ghetto will gain prominence. If Rander becomes a physically identifiable Muslim

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[113] A pattern uncomfortably close to the medieval pattern in Europe as the gentry occupied a citadel and the proletarians occupied the villages around the citadel to withstand the worst of invading forces.

neighborhood then it may become like other Indian ghettos where the

elites will abandon the edge and move inside. An episode of violence will

exaggerate this effect further but Rander is in part a product of fear of

violence and not actual violence so episodic violence may not be essential.

b. The presence of Hindu temples within the Muslim dominated areas of

**Soft Interethnic Border
due to similar urban form and
places of worship.**

Hindu District 1

Muslim District 2

**Hindu
District 2**

**Muslim
District 1**

**Hard intraethnic Border
due to major street
(Rander Road)**

**Hard Intraethnic Border
due to differences in urban form
(Old & New Rander)**

Figure 74 Interethnic Vs Intraethnic edges

Rander is a strength as it softens the border further.

2. The Rander that people identify as Rander (not the official landmass) is almost

completely ethnically Muslim. Nevertheless, ethnic neighborhoods like ethnic

communities rely on strong borders for identity. The fuzziness surrounding where

Rander begins or ends is a great strength for Rander. The paradox of Rander is

that despite its near complete ethnicization as Muslim its borders are not strong.

The absence of serious differences in the urban form with adjacent neighborhoods

combined with the fact that there are serious differences within Rander means that

while the abstract idea of Rander is ethnicized Muslim, it is harder to do so with

the physical entity.

3. Another advantage for Rander is the fact that most of its old and new residents have some experience living and working with Hindus. Seventy five percent of those interviewed said they were very good friends with Hindus. Fifty percent of Randeris said they were completely comfortable in Hindu neighborhoods. At fifty percent Randeri Muslims were the most comfortable group in the entire study.

Respondents complained about the fact that they could not buy houses in Hindu neighborhoods and in the same breath admitted that Hindus could not buy houses in Rander. Rander may be becoming more homogenous according which should be cause for concern for Randeris. The idea that Muslims are safer among their own has gained credence among many Muslims; there is some evidence from Ahmedabad that suggests that Muslims were much safer in the homogenous ghetto of Juhapura versus many heterogeneous neighborhoods (Lobo & Das, 2007). This movement towards homogeneity is a double-edged sword. The Hindu perception of Muslims as united (against Hindus), preferring ghettoization and by extension acting as a monolith is already common. This perception is especially preferable compared to the other explanation of Muslims consolidating in a neighborhoods, which is that there is housing discrimination against Muslims. Further ghettoization only strengthens this belief and increases differences between the two communities and the indifference towards each other. The movement towards ghettoization in places like Ahmedabad, where lethal violence was a reality in 2002, is unfortunate but understandable. However, if the same occurs in Surat and Rander becomes a homogenous ghetto it could be very counterproductive[114]. These questions of

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[114] The only people who can prevent this are Suratis with the local government. This is not a Hindu or a Muslim burden to bear.

homogeneity or heterogeneity typically do not vex local majority communities or neighborhoods. Homogenous neighborhoods do not cause violence but violence is more likely at their edges. A long and imageable edge reinforces the feeling of separation. Strong imageable edges may promote temporary security but may be detrimental to long term peace and relationships. Rander's soft-edges do not override interethnic mistrust or animosity but they make it more difficult to envision the ethnic differences in urban form. Surat's Hindus and Muslims cannot look at each other across these edges and point to the urban form differences as evidence of ethnic differences. Hard interethnic edges or imageable edges do not cause violence but they facilitate it due to the following reasons:

1. In a conflict, a hard edge becomes a defensive line that ethnic groups feel compelled to hold and defend.

2. A hard edge is also a location for starting violence or confrontation. Site selection is critical for people who insidiously want to initiate violence. A hard edge makes these locational choices too easy.

3. Even in peacetime, crossing a hard edge becomes an event for individuals, a mental marker that suggests 'you are now entering Muslim/Hindu territory.' This reinforces the feelings of difference and separation. Groups can subconsciously see these differences as evidence of fundamental ethnic differences, superiority/inferiority, or ethnic injustice.

The next section addresses Adajan, one of many Hindu majority neighborhoods in Surat. Adajan, like southern Rander, is a new neighborhood.

Adajan: The New Hindu Neighborhood

Adajan is a good marker for the much-touted Indian growth story. The most consistent message from respondents in Adajan about their neighborhood was, "There was nothing here, now look at all these buildings." As mentioned earlier themes of development and growth dominate the descriptions of Adajan (See Figure 49 in Nanpura: Heterogeneity to Harmony). Adajan and Rander share a few similarities and a border. Unlike Rander, however, Adajan's residents are not just migrants from old Surat but many were born outside Surat. Adajan offers an opportunity to study the growth of Surat and the relationships of migrants to their adopted home.

More than half of Adajan's respondents have lived in Adajan less than 15 years. Like Surat Adajan too has grown rapidly in the last two decades. To appreciate Adajan's rise within Surat, consider that Adajan's population in 1971 was 11,007 compared to Nanpura at 35,093. Today Adajan's population is more than 200,000 and Nanpura stands a little over 60,000. Between 1991 and 2011, Adajan's population more than tripled from 62,620 to 196,970 (SMC, 2016). Unlike Rander, however Adajan has grown outward i.e. away from Surat and its edges have become a prominent middle class suburb. Rander's soft but ethnicized borders limit the expansion of the Muslim neighborhood of Rander beyond its official borders, for now Rander must grow within its official borders or vertically.

Respondents in Adajan too, admire and appreciate the Surati identity. Considering the fact that Surat's last serious bout of violence took place in 1991, many firmly believe that Surat is a peaceful city and Suratis are peace-loving people. Not many people remember

the 1991 riots and many were not even born or moved to Surat after 1991. The 2002 riots did not affect Adajan.

Adajan's residents speak of rapid change and development. Indeed, Adajan's rapid growth means that change is its most prominent characteristic for the last two decades. Hence, it is difficult to pinpoint its other urban characteristics, its outskirts are home to a rapidly changing landscape and one can see billboards for new apartments and bamboo scaffolding in many places in Adajan. This is the Surati equivalent of the 'cranes on the skyline'.

Figure 75 Ariel view of Adajan in 2015 By Rahul Bhadane [CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

Maps of Adajan

The Tapi River forms the southern and southeastern edge of Adajan. Rander covers its northern and northeastern edges. The northern edge includes official Rander which is largely Hindu, so the Muslim neighborhood is only on one of its edges. Again, Rander Road, as mentioned in the section on Rander, interrupts this edge and a small portion of Adajan falls on the other side. Adajan-Patiya is the local name of this

Figure 76 Respondent location, length of stay in years, and places of worship in Adajan

neighborhood, which includes a small part of Rander and Adajan. The western edge is not a meaningful edge since the neighborhood's expansion keeps pushing at it. This neighborhood expansion includes largely new Hindu occupied households for now.

Notice also the small number of Hindu temples in Adajan. This relative scarcity of temples in Adajan compared to mosques in Rander or Nanpura has two reasons:

1. Hinduism is not a congregational religion that requires a daily or weekly

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temple attendance.

2. Adajan is a relatively new neighborhood although there are some very big and lavish temples within its borders.

Figure 77 Formal vs Perceived Borders of Adajan

For respondents in Adajan, the borders of Adajan are ever expanding. Yet, due to the presence of certain important streets, nodes, and landmarks along the edges, the borders they drew were relatively close to the official borders. Two of the edges, Rander to the northeast and the river in the southeast are easy to draw.

In the west the neighborhood is still expanding and that is where the new growth has come in: consider the comparative satellite images in Figure 78. Notice the farmland on and beyond the western edge in 2006 and its transformation into buildings in 2012.

Figure 79 Nodes, landmarks, and paths in Adajan

Adajan is the most significant neighborhood in western Surat. It is home to many newer

landmarks, such as schools, malls, and restaurants. Given the paucity of such amenities in

Figure 78 Satellite image of Adajan-2006 vs. 2012 (satellite image source: Surat Municipal Corporation)

Rander, Adajan is the entertainment and shopping hub for Randeris too. Most of the shops and entertainment are around the streets that connect L.P.Savani Circle, the node near Prime Arcade, and Gujarat Gas Circle. Gujarat Gas Circle is where Sardar Bridge from Athwa Gate (See Nanpura) connects to west Surat. Four significant bridges connect Rander and Adajan to eastern Surat. Three of these enter Adajan and a new bridge is under construction.

A People's Map of Adajan

Adajan has some posh areas closer to the river. There are also some areas away from the river, which have townhouses against the usual apartments. Yet Adajan is a new neighborhood and is not posh like some of neighborhoods on the other side of river, such as Athwa.

Like Rander near the edges of Athwa, there are some Muslims. Some of these Muslim communities are residual Muslim neighborhoods i.e., Adajan's transformation has yet to affect them. There are no mosques but one or two Muslim shrines are within Adajan's borders (see Figure 80)

Figure 80 People's map of Adajan

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Adajan and Rander share many such similarities. Adajan however is not a Hindu Rander. As a neighborhood, it has many more places of interest even as Rander grew at roughly the same rate between 2001 and 2011 as Adajan. Adajan's growth in amenities shopping, and entertainment is part

Figure 81 A Muslim shrine in Adajan close to a much larger Hindu temple.

a factor of its ethnic identity and partly a factor of its geography. The Hindu dominance certainly helps Adajan growth but its location aligned with the more affluent parts of the city across the river also helps. As mentioned earlier three bridges come into Adajan from eastern Surat and a fourth one will in 2017. This favorable geography is also an indication of ethnic dominance; indeed, Rander as a Muslim neighborhood (town) was conveniently located vis-à-vis the old city Surat with the Causeway Bridge as a connector in the 19th century.

The three Surati neighborhoods are metaphors for different periods in Surat's history. Rander represents the Mughal period and the naval trader past of Surat. Nanpura represents the colonial past and the 19th and 20th century Surati mercantile ethos. Adajan is on its way to become a 21st century neighborhood, technologically advanced yet ethnically homogenous.

As mentioned earlier, shops and entertainment are around the streets that connect

L.P.Savani circle, the node near Prime Arcade, and Gujarat Gas Circle (see Figure 79).

These three nodes have some similarities and serve different but complimentary

functions. See Figure 82.

No.	Name	Node Type	Significance, Evaluation, and Meaning
1	L.P.Savani circle	Node	Large Sized node on edge. No significant ethnic meaning or identity Node with some socio-economic transitions
2	Node near Prime Arcade	Node with Landmarks	Node with important leisure and commercial landmarks Significant day and night time usage.
3	Gujarat Gas Circle	Node at entrance to the neighborhood	Transition Node between the neighborhoods on the east of the river to the west of the river. Primary node to cross the river into east Surat.

Figure 82 Important Nodes in Adajan

L. P. Savani Circle: This node sits at the outer edge of Adajan in the northwest. Newer

apartments and shops surround it, and it is home to a namesake school, the node is large

and four roads merge into it from four direction, almost perfectly from East, West, North,

and South. Apart from a stores the node is home to some offices like banks, travel agents

etc. The circle is a new emerging business district.

Prime Arcade: Unlike L.P. Savani Circle, Prime Arcade is much more focused on

entertainment and leisure. Prime Arcade comes into its own in the evenings. The

surrounding restaurants and road eateries mean that the very wide pavement becomes a

makeshift outdoor restaurant with plastic chairs as people arrive in their cars and on their

motorbikes. A cursory analysis revealed that of the approximately 25 restaurants, eateries and cafes most were vegetarian.

Gujarat Gas Circle: This is where one typically enters Adajan. Although the node falls well within Adajan's official edges the perception of having entered Adajan begins at the circle, mostly because the bridge across the river drops one off at the Gujarat Gas circle. In itself, this node is not the center of any commercial or leisure activity but it is the staging point for commercial activity (traders, stores, offices etc.) to its northeast and leisure (shopping and restaurants) to its southwest.

These three nodes are part of the cultural and geographic reasons for the inward looking nature of the neighborhood:

1. Adajan's center are the streets that connect L.P.Savani circle, the node near Prime Arcade, and Gujarat Gas Circle. These streets are complete with all forms of shopping, entertainment, and amenities. Moreover, cater to a broad economic spectrum. Another important factor to consider is that this street or path as a center versus a node is a center means that one can travel within Adajan and experience the city. Simply put a family in Adajan can go on a fun drive within Adajan. Nanpura's density ensures there are no fun drives and Rander has only one major street in the form of New Rander Road where there are few pieces of visual interest or stops.

2. An observation made in the field and discussions with the respondents revealed that the nightlife in Hindu neighborhoods is very different from the nightlife in Muslim neighborhoods. Hindu neighborhoods just stay awake and active longer.

The street food around Prime Arcade in Adajan is available late in the evening. It is common to see families, not just single men, enjoy this food and almost festive atmosphere. In Muslim neighborhoods if food was available later in the evening one was sure to find only men there. The exception is the month of Ramadan when Rander becomes the late night hotspot.

Adajan also caters to its seniors and children well with the presence of many parks. Public gardens and parks in residential neighborhoods in Surat are relatively rare. Residents of Adajan thus value and use these open spaces well. It is very common to see parks with multiple activities going on during all hours of the day. It is common to find senior citizens practicing yoga, younger adults getting a round of badminton, children playing cricket, joggers, and young couples at the same time in otherwise small parks. These parks and gardens are also louder than most one can find in the US. People consider unattended children relatively safe as long as they are within earshot any adult who knows them. Children playing unattended in a park as a neighbor keeps an eye on them from their apartment balcony is common in Adajan and other neighborhoods. Apart from the parks and gardens maintained by the municipal corporation, there are parks which are a part of the many apartments within Adajan's borders. Nanpura too has many parks but they are not within visual ranges of residences the same way they are in Adajan. In Nanpura, the parks and gardens are urban features designed to beautify the city and not explicitly meant for leisure of its residents. These urban parks suffer from disrepair, disuse, and disrepute. Nanpura's public spaces are its streets and alleys, which

informally serve as a cricket ground, the venue for a wedding or religious festival, and whatever creative uses its residents decide.

In addition, Adajan's soft ethnic edge is insignificant to its residents since when they do look outside, unless it is for a meal with meat, they simply cross one of the bridges and enter the old city or new eastern Surat. Adajan, like other neighborhood around the world where the ethnic majority dominates does not see itself as an ethnic neighborhood. An indignant 43-year-old Adajan resident when asked to compare Hindu and Muslim neighborhoods gave an earful to the Hindu female interviewer:

> *I think you are living in the last century. Who has time to see who lives next door? Look at the technological growth. Who bothers who lives next door, so who bothers which area you are living in. You should be comfortable with the high tech environmental aspects of this era. Nobody has time about all this. If you think of labeling area as a religious area, it is an absurd thing.*
>
> *For me it is just about humanity.*

It is difficult to imagine the respondent as oblivious to housing discrimination that Muslims face but there may be some willful ignorance of facts. Only 16.67% respondents in Adajan describe the neighborhood as a Hindu neighborhood, a stunning fact considering the question about the neighborhood description is the 37th question in an interview replete with talk about ethnic identity. Compared to more than 58% of Randeris who describe the neighborhood as Muslim (The newer Randeris also make sure to describe Rander as posh or upper class). Adajan residents do classify their neighborhood as a Hindu neighborhood when asked to list Hindu and Muslim neighborhoods in the city.

Ethnicization and Adajan

Adajan's ethnic identity as a Hindu neighborhood is indisputable. The few Muslim parts of Adajan are on the other side of important streets and insignificant in size. Surat's municipal corporation designates some of these neighborhoods as slums. Apart from this, the Hindu dominance within Adajan is so complete that it is difficult to classify it as ethnicized in the absence of sufficient contrast. Adajan residents can also engage only with the Hindu neighborhoods of Surat if they choose. Many of the Adajan's respondent maps and urban descriptions of Surat stayed within the bounds of Adajan or only briefly referenced Rander or the old city (neighborhoods with Muslim presence or dominance). Typical maps focused around the primary streets mentioned earlier.

These spaces are not traditionally ethnicized according to the Hindus of Adajan and even thought the neighborhood is ethnically Hindu Randeris too utilize these amenities, however the extent and hours of use clearly vary.

Even with the soft borders mentioned earlier how many of the 200,000 Adajan Hindus will share significant relationships with the 100,000 Rander Muslims is difficult to assess. The urban form here is permissive and not excessively ethnicized but urban form may facilitate some behaviors and even exaggerate them but it cannot completely transform exisiting convenient behaviors. The once a year engagement with Rander in Ramadan for food (if one is open to eating meat or be around when people are eating meat) is useful but not necessarily transformative for the Hindu-Muslim relationships.

Thus Adajan and Rander together have an urban form configuration that may prevent violence and permit relationships due to the following conditions:

1. The topographical similarities shared near the ethnic edge as a result of economic similarites. Lynch's idea of imageability of a district is instructive here: the absence of a salient edge and a salience difference between the two districts ensures that Rander as a Muslim neighborhood rarely stands out in contrast with Adajan.

2. The relative isolation of large parts of Adajan from Rander, due to the attractive and well-connected nodes within Adajan. These nodes ensure residents stay and travel within Adajan. The Randeri Muslims and Rander is thus easy to ignore.

3. The strong connectivity that Adajan shares with the rest of Surat further makes it easy to ignore Rander.

Summary

Adajan is the future of Surat. There are other posher neighborhoods in Surat but Adajan's residents are proud of its growth and aware of the many amenities they enjoy. They do not need to cross the river and yet have multiple opportunities do so. Its Hindu dominance has been an asset for the neighborhood where the municipal corporation has been forced to invest in its growth by a new demanding middle class.

So far, it seems unlikely that Muslims, even Randeri Muslims, will make significant inroads into Adajan as residents. Similarly even Hindus may not need to buy apartments or land closer to Rander with the new bridge next year. The new bridge will mean that even residents in the outskirts of Adajan will suddenly be only a quick ride away from the nicer areas of Surat, which are largely Hindu and Jain dominated (see Figure 83).

The new bridge may also mean a further isolation of Rander, especially if the old city sees a precipitous decline in business and/or population.

Figure 83 The new bridge means a closer connection to Surat for Adajan.

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The study of Adajan's ethnicization (or the lack thereof) and the urban form allows the following observations:

1. Adajan has a network of significant nodes close to its center. This network of nodes located along significant paths creates a definite center for the neighborhood and thus improves its imageability. Adajan's image as a neighborhood is not dependent upon its edges; rather it draws from its core. Adajan's edges are indeed expanding and fuzzy.

2. The homogenous composition of the neighborhood combined with the central location of the nodes means the "thematic concentration" of the node is commerce and leisure. More importantly, it ensures that the nodes are not thematically ethnic even if they are Hindu dominated.

3. Neighborhoods and/or districts have an orientation vis-à-vis the city within which they are located. First people and paths dictate the way a neighborhood is oriented and then the orientation or directionality dictates the direction in which people travel. Adajan's strong relationship with the new city Surat is indeed a factor of the commercial activity in the new city. Following this, the new bridges and streets develop in specific directions based on demand and it further perpetuates the orientation of a neighborhood. Adajan's primary orientation is of course inward looking.

Adajan's focus on itself and its ability to ignore ethnic identity is a result of a long history of ethnic peace (In part due to the relatively short history of the neighborhood itself). For

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respondents in Adajan, Surat's ethnicized districts are too far away. They can also bypass these ethnicized districts.

In 2012, a violent conflict near Kadershah Ni Nal clashing groups set ablaze seven two-wheelers and three auto-rickshaws and the police arrested 82 people. When asked about incidences after 2002 not one person in Adajan knew about this disturbance. Adajan's insular nature is its strength but it does not contribute to the interethnic relationships within Surat. Adajan is likely not an exception, many other Hindu neighborhoods, and indeed other homogenous neighborhoods around the world, use this insularity to avoid ethnic or racial urban questions.

Surat Summary

Surat enjoys many advantages when it comes to the interethnic issues. Surat's urban form reflects the positive interethnic relationships that some Hindus and Muslims share. Another advantage is the relative absence of ethnic violence. Surat's violence, when it does happen, is geographically contained. This containment is real and perceptual. The perceptual containment is more important than the real containment. Ethnic violence, when contained, becomes a local problem. Contained violence is not peace but in some places, it is good enough. Of course, all violence is to some extent or another contained but if it is also perceptually contained then it reduces the ability of violence to spread. Imageability is critical to this ability of an urban form element to transmit violence. The starkest example of this in recent history are the attacks of September 11th, the destruction of the highly imageable and symbolic twin towers combined with the literally global broadcast of the event compounded the effect of the already horrific attacks and thrust a superpower into its longest war ever. A similarly lethal attack on a rural target may not have created the same reactions. Different observations about the urban form and the urban topography of the city can be drawn from the three neighborhoods:

1. Nanpura's nodes, node-edge hybrid, and ethnic and geographic borders,
2. Rander's intra-ethnic and interethnic borders, and
3. Adajan's core structured around nodes and paths.

These highlighted features are not exclusive to these neighborhood but are most

prominent in these neighborhoods. See Figure 84 for a summary of these similarities and

differences.

No.		Nanpura	Rander	Adajan
1	**Urban Topography**	Low-rise & Medium rise, high density.	Low & Medium-rise to High-rise with high density. Low-medium rise are older.	Mostly high-rise, with some low-rise bungalows or townhouses on the outer edge. High-density but with many open spaces.
2	**Location**	Within Old Surat and well-connected to New Surat by proximity	Western Surat well connected to Old-Surat with bridge across the river.	Western Surat well connected with New Surat by three bridges across the river.
3	**Urban Form**	Includes the most important ethnic edge-node hybrid within Surat. Strong edges (not ethnicized) with the new city. Some interethnic edges with neighborhoods in the old city.	Highlights the importance of soft-interethnic edges. Significant intra-ethnic edges within the neighborhood due to settlement patterns and urban topographical differences.	Significant Nodes with strong ethnic identity that respondents do not consider ethnicized. Primary themes assigned to these nodes include those of leisure and commercial activities.
4	**Growth**	Limited growth in the last two decades.	High growth with the exception of old Rander in the North	Extremely high growth in the outskirts in the last two decades.

Figure 84 Neighborhoods of Surat, similarities and differences.

Apart from these comparisons within Surat, the crucial comparison is between

Surati and Ahmedabadi neighborhoods. That comparison follows the next part about

Ahmedabad's three neighborhoods and their urban form. In Surat, largely, the memory,

and to some extent the history of violence is confined around the Nal. On the other hand,

in Ahmedabad there are many more reminders of violence within the city. Otherwise, benign elements of the urban form have memories of bloody violence attached to them in Ahmedabad. Moreover, there are many more witnesses of said violence.   In Surat, even those living within a stone's throw away from the Nal have little memory of witnessing the violence. Many in Ahmedabad, who now live far away from violent sites, carry those memories and lessons of the urban form with them to different corners of Ahmedabad. In reading about Ahmedabad's neighborhoods, it is important to keep in mind the context of recurring violence. Surat makes a case for considering the urban form as an important symptom of the ethnic and social, situation.   Ahmedabad reinforces that point and further helps connect ethnic violence and the urban form.

Ahmedabad

The three neighborhood descriptions of Ahmedabad follow a similar outline and present comparable maps as those in Surat. The discussion about Ahmedabad relies heavily on the lessons from Surat. The comparable urban form elements within comparable neighborhoods yield very different results given the slight differences in content and context of the elements.

The discussion about Kalupur-Daryapur follows a similar framework as Nanpura and it relies on a comparison with Nanpura. Like Nanpura, in the heterogeneous Kalupur-Daryapur too, a node-edge hybrid attracts attention. Similarly, in Muslim majority Juhapura, the river serves as an important edge. Unlike Rander, though, Juhapura's interethnic borders are not just strong but they are also highly imageable. The context of ethnic violence also affects the growth prospects of Vejalpur. This Hindu majority neighborhood despite Hindu dominance of Ahmedabad is limited in growth and commerce compared to its Surati counterpart Adajan. The discussion below will explain how conflict limits a community even if it is the dominant community in conflict.

There is one crucial difference between Surat and Ahmedabad. While even in Surat the official Rander versus the neighborhood people consider Rander are not the same, in Juhapura's case the matter is very different. As mentioned earlier, Juhapura as an official or political entity does not exist. Juhapura has no administrative existence or recognition. Juhapura is part of the Sarkhej Ward and Vejalpur ward in Ahmedabad. Therefore, the population and growth figures for Juhapura are difficult to verify. The figures presented below are often from other scholarly articles. Juhapura's borders in the maps below rely

on the respondent interviews and field observations. The most important consideration is the 'border' between Juhapura and Vejalpur.

Respondents, Hindu and Muslim, helped with specifically identifying the border by giving personal tours. The border is nearly 2 miles long and only partly follows the official border between Vejalpur and Sarkhej (the primary ward within which Juhapura is located). Similarly, Vejalpur extends beyond its official borders in the north into Jodhpur neighborhood as it loses some area to Juhapura. According to Muslim respondents, these discrepancies are a result of some very creative gerrymandering. The discussion on Juhapura will address the same.

The maps on the following pages presents both the official and unofficial neighborhoods.

Figure 85 The wards that include the three neighborhoods Juhapura, Vejalpur, and Kalupur-Dariyapur

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
Figure 86 The Hindu neighborhood Vejalpur and the Muslim neighborhood Juhapura.

As seen in the image above, a small part of Juhapura extends into the Vejalpur ward while the rest is occupies the Sarkhej Ward. The western edge of Juhapura is what locals consider the Sarkhej neighborhood and village. Apart from some areas close to Juhapura,

Juhapura is a little more than twice as big as Vejalpur but many parts of southern Juhapura include vacant marshy land along the river and a sewage treatment plant. Therefore, while on paper, Juhapura is nearly 3 sq. miles and Vejalpur is 1.2 sq. miles, the marshes and the sewage treatment plant occupy almost 1 sq. mile in Juhapura.

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
Figure 87 Ahmedabad Map, with the three neighborhoods

Kalupur-Dariyapur- Conflict, Peace, and Ethnic Heterogeneity

Kalupur-Dariyapur includes the two neighborhoods Kalupur and Dariyapur. Residents often speak of the two neighborhoods in twin terms as Kalupur-Dariyapur. Hindus and Muslims live in very close proximity in the neighborhood and speak of living together (see Figure 88). The urban layout here similar to Nanpura but the alleys can be narrower and more numerous. In addition, the neighborhoods do not have the Sabarmati River as an edge unlike Nanpura where the Tapi is a significant edge.

Figure 88 Kalupur-Dariyapur, top 10 words used to describe the neighborhood.

For the resident of Kalupur-Dariyapur the history of riots is never far away, although the last bout of rioting in 2002 seems to have moved away from the usual hotspots in the neighborhood. The neighborhood serves as an apt case study of violence-prone and post-violence neighborhood at once. Like Nanpura, former residents of Kalupur-Dariyapur or the old-city, who have moved away, provide more information about the neighborhood.

Recurring violence has ensured that the nostalgia about the neighborhood is restricted to personal memories or even memories of the quality of violence.

The Pol: A Mirror of Ethnic Life

Ethnicity is about place i.e., the place an individual or group occupies in the society. Cities mirror this idea of a person or group's place within the society. The Ahmedabadi pols mirrored the social, economic, and ethnic life of the city in the past. This unique underlying urban typology of the Ahmedabadi pol is a source of some strengths and weaknesses of Kalupur-Dariyapur (See Chapter 4). The pols are disappearing and transforming but the density, urban form, and values of the old-city continue to persist.

Some of the pols in and around Kalupur-Dariyapur are more than 250 years old. Historically the Ahmedabadi pol has been an accurate expression of the ethnic landscape and ethnic expectations in Ahmedabad. The ethnic landscape and expectations that the pols reflected are as follows:

1. Ethnic and professional homogeneity is desirable as it provides protection in times of ethnic violence.
2. The homogenous ethnic units (pol sized) speak with one voice about ethnic expectations and community issues.
3. The individual speaks to the community (within the pol) and then the community speaks to the city. Pols thus were a link between the individual and the city (Doshi, 1976).
4. The pols celebrated the accomplishments of their members and supported them during their need.

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The pols used to be homogeneous and the homogeneous pols could interact with the larger heterogonous community as an urban unit. The pols had strict rules about maintaining ethnic homogeneity. This was possible because of a leadership structure that also ensured that the pol spoke with one voice. Two important but opposite waves in the form of industrialization and deindustrialization in the 20th and 21st century have challenged the homogeneity of the pols and hence the meaningfulness of their urban structure. In the past during ethnic violence and invasions (17th and 18th century), the ethnically homogenous pols served as a gated community that would barricade its gates and protect its members (Doshi, 1976). It may also have served the purpose of preventing members of the pol from indulging in violence. The pol is a small district that constitutes a grouping of houses and has a clear edge. In its original form, it was an ethnic district. The foundational principles of the pol's urban typology are security and community. Both rely on strong in-group out-group biases for sustenance and the design of the pol furthers this feeling. The pol is an ethnic gated community and one is either inside the pol or outside the pol. More importantly, one is either of the pol or not of the pol.

The pol typology was a response to the insecurity that communities felt. Nevertheless, it has served the purpose of accentuating ethnic differences and not dissolving them. The pols seem like a poor model for ethnic relationships and even an underlying cause of some of Ahmedabad's misery. However, there were advantages to the pol's typology:

1. It structured the biases and laid the groundwork for rules of engagement between groups.

2. For communities it served the pol's design ensured a sense of community and a sharing.

3. As the urban typology of the pol vanishes, the new expression of these biases is a new ethnic violence without 'shame' i.e., violence involves that a higher degree of sexual violence (see 'One Ahmedabadi Muslim' in Chapter 4).

The pols are no longer the primary urban neighborhood type in the old-city but their influence is long lasting. The need for community and security is still primary. In absence of well-defined caste dependent trades and professions in the post-industrial economy,

Figure 89 Contrasting footprint-old & new city, Ahmedabad (Source: Agarwal, 2009)

the value of community has declined and security has become prime. The new urban typology, which includes distorted pols (ethnically heterogeneous, loosely knit communities.), differs considerably from the pols in some crucial aspects. For starters, the pols were beautiful and people took pride in their appearance. The design also aligned with the social life since it had developed over a long period. Street layouts are harder to modify than individual structures and even as concrete buildings and cheap boxy

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apartments replace old wooden structures, the dead-end street pattern of the pols survives

(see Figure 89 and Figure 90)

Kalupur-Dariyapur and indeed the old city now represents a high degree of dissonance. The urban form does not match the 21st century. The lasting effects of the typology of the pol is unsuitable for the ethnic and professional life of its inhabitants yet its influence on ethnic life endures in Ahmedabad.

Figure 90 Dead-end streets pattern Source: Raman (2003) citing Vastu-Shilpa Foundation, 1998, JethaBhai ni Pol, Kadia, Ahmedabad, Ahmedabad, VSF

Maps of Kalupur-Dariyapur

To the North and East of Kalupur-Dariyapur is the edge of old Ahmedabad or the original

walled city of

Ahmedabad. Beyond

this edge is

Ahmedabad's main

Train station, parts of

which are within

Kalupur's jurisdiction.

The Southern and

Western edge include

other neighborhoods

of the old city. The

western side of

Kalupur-Dariyapur

and beyond the

western edge is the

commercial heart of

the old city. There are

Figure 91 Respondent location, length of stay in years, and places of worship in Kalupur-Dariyapur

fewer mosques and temples in the western parts of the neighborhood.

The edges of Kalupur-Dariyapur are well-defined, although in the west the

neighborhood's edge3s become blurry due to commercial activity, that is to say one can

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cross over outside the Kalupur edge into another neighborhood without expressly realizing one has made the transition. Especially along the main street in the old city, Relief Road.

Relief Road runs East-West and connects the eastern edge of the old city to Ahmedabad's train station. All along the road, there are shops and markets. Additionally, small, specialized markets branch out from relief road in narrow alleys. On a stroll around the 1.3 mile, long road it is easy to

Figure 92 Relief Road in Kalupur-Dariyapur

stumble across small and curious economic conglomerations such as jewelers or shops

Figure 93 Nodes, landmarks, and paths in Kalupur-Dariyapur

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that sell all things related to tailoring or knitting etc. Yet this stretch of the neighborhood is not entirely commercial and there are many houses and residential pols along the road. Other major streets also branch out from Relief Road along the North-South axis. The western side of Relief Road includes the long defunct Relief Cinema. This locked cinema hall and prime piece of real estate rots away stuck in some legal dispute.

The formal borders of Kalupur-Dariyapur align closely with the perceived borders even as many respondents left out some of the area, which crosses the old city walls. The twin neighborhoods, Kalupur and Dariyapur have an official line dividing them but as mentioned earlier the divisions are superficial and a mere formality for the residents.

Figure 94 Formal vs Perceived borders of Kalupur-Dariyapur

A People's Map of Kalupur-Dariyapur

For most respondents, Relief road is the spine of Kalupur-Dariyapur. Apart from being a major arterial road, it is also the commercial center of the neighborhood and the old city. Relief road includes shops that belong to Hindus and Muslims. Hindu residences tend to be closer their shops or sometimes directly above their shops, in contrast Muslim shops and businesses were typically removed from their residences and clustered around commercial hubs (Raman, 2003).

Figure 95 Respondent Map of Kalupur-Dariyapur from verbal and graphic descriptions of the neighborhood.

This segregation also means that it is rare to find a Muslim owned shop operated by a woman of the household but with Hindu shops, it is easier to find women temporarily in charge of the shop. This residential and commercial segregation for Muslim businesses may be one of the reasons why Muslim women, who typically did not travel much beyond their homes, spoke of their Hindu-owned neighborhood grocery stores, especially when their homes were further away from any important commercial hub.

For respondents in Kalupur-Dariyapur the aspirational areas are located closer to the river but mostly beyond the river. As one travels west on Relief Road towards the river, the urban landscape changes drastically. The narrow alleys of the old city give way to broader, more organized streets (see below).

Typical Old City Street   **Western Edge of the Old City**   **Bridge to the New City**

Figure 96 Old City streets vs New City Streets

These narrow streets combined with the non-grid street layout makes change harder. Additionally, there is a whole new city beyond the river, where people seeking change can venture. In spite of the development on the western edge of the old city, there are a few possibilities of growth in the old city. There are certain top down interventions, as discussed below, which change the urban layout of the old city. These interventions create artificial order and newness but disturb the controlled chaos of the old city. In

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addition, the interventions are insensitive to ethnic issues and the locals and may create more problems than opportunities in the old city.

Intent and Interventions at nodes and edges

Kalupur-Dariyapur's urban form highlights the importance of the district as an element of the urban form. The individual pols and their ethnic histories pose a challenge for new interethnic relationships. However, there are edges and nodes, in an around the neighborhood, which also highlight the role of the urban form in Kalupur-Dariyapur's ethnic problems.

There are two areas, which are a stark example of this. The first is the western edge near Relief Cinema and Teen Darwaza (an ancient gate built in 1415) where conflicting aspirations meet on the edge of the neighborhood, second is a node-edge hybrid near Dariyapur Tambu Chowki where interethnic conflict has often resulted in physical

Figure 97 the Nodes and Edges

confrontation. These are by no means the only examples of the issues they highlight but they are certainly the most prominent examples.

The Teen Darwaza edge intervention

The intervention near Teen Darwaza is an attack of the formal on the informal. The formal economy and spatial intervention pushes at the informal economy and informal spaces. Here formal spaces are spaces designed by architects and urban designers with the blessings of the authorities. The informal spaces are the spaces created by the people who currently use the space and their designs maximize their activity (typically sales of goods.) A bustling informal economy surrounds Teen Darwaza in Kalupur-Dariyapur and its neighboring areas. However, the area also has a historical importance and hence the local administration is interested in developing and beautifying it, this development and beautification includes, invariably, a formalization of the urban form, urban function, and urban economy. The architecture of the Teen Darwaza and its adjoining historical buildings is indeed beautiful and deserving of repair and restoration. Although, any such intervention needs to account for the informal economy, the people who depend on it, and the sensitive ethnic situation.

Slum clearing, demolition of illegal structures, removal of hawkers from streets is a regular occurrence in most Indian cities, and preoccupation of municipal organizations. Therefore, Ahmedabad is not exceptional in that regard, where it is exceptional is in its history of frequent violence for the last century. The perception in Ahmedabadi Muslims is that the administration discriminates against Muslim. This delegitimizes the authorities and their interventions even if their intentions are benign. Combined with a pervasive

neo-liberal effort to formalize all transactions and by extension all businesses means there

is a general disregard for or discrimination against the informal urban economy. Hawkers

pose challenges to the 21st century urban planner in a nation like India. The middle class

(even as it shops for cheap wares in these informal spaces) demands spaces for leisure,

wider roads, and traffic uninterrupted by carts[115].In the above image, some of the formal

Figure 98 carving out a formal leisure space in the historical Teen Darwaza area while displacing the informal economy.

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[115] Hawkers in India often use four wheeled handcarts. Sometimes the hawkers do use these carts for selling their wares street to street. However, very often the cart serves as a pretense for moving while the hawker occupies the same spot year after year.

intervention literally squeezes the informal economy to the sidelines. This is often followed by an informal rebellion where peddlers reappear often with the blessings of local corrupt beat cops or municipal authorities. This informal economy, otherwise is tax exempt by default, ends up paying an informal 'corruption tax' or worse, hefty municipal fines and/or confiscation of goods.

The plaza above is like a hostile takeover of space, the formal city creeping into the informal city without ensuring participation. Here the formal city, at least perceptually, aligns with the Hindus and the informal city with the Muslims. There are eight mosques in a 0.2 mile radius (around 1000 feet) of Teen Darwaza and a very busy meat market (see one of the chicken stores in the Figure 99). It is very common to find goat or buffalo carcasses hanging from hooks as the butcher will carve out a piece on request. The presence of this market and the mosques ethnicizes this part of Kalupur-Dariyapur as a Muslim area since many Hindus in Ahmedabad view meat eating and

Figure 99 A store selling chicken in Kalupur-Dariyapur near Teen Darwaza. The chickens are slaughtered fresh on demand often in full view of the buyer.

certainly the job of a butcher as something mostly Muslims do. Even if the intervention is successful, as a leisure space, it will ensure a stark edge or ensure further creeping of the

formal city. Typically, any solutions that address local hawkers or slums are not based on inclusion in the space but relies on a model of displacement and resettlement. Again, even if this is feasible for the city's finances, in a place like Ahmedabad it can and does put strain on already tenuous interethnic relationships. This edge can thus further develop as a hard edge between the formal and the informal, the middle and the lower class, and finally as an edge between the Hindu state and its Muslim subjects. Here the Hindu state can develop into what Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004) call the "ethnocratic" state where governments enable ethnicization of spaces. In an ethnocratic state there is clear bias by the government towards one ethnicity, as a result of which any intervention by said government has the potential to be viewed as an ethnic intervention by the members of the other ethnicity. Large-scale formalization of spaces may actually reduce violence[116] but enhance the conflict.

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[116] The highly segregated, highly regulated, and 'formal' (cities without an informal economy) American cities seem to be able to control lethal violence. Clearly even as this segregation, regulation, and formalization controls violence it does not solve the underlying conflict and often seems to delay only violent confrontation which is expressed in ways unlike the ones seen in India.

Like in Surat's Nanpura, there is an important node-edge hybrid in Kalupur-Dariyapur. Unlike Nanpura, the intervention at the node is not grassroots activism but a police station. Tambu Chowki had a history of violence and was often the epicenter of violence in Kalupur-Dariyapur in pre-2002 riots. The violence at Tambu Chowki in 2002 was limited to stone pelting but the narrow alleys around it saw some clashes.

It is useful to compare Tambu Chowki to its Surati counterpart, Kadershah Ni Nal. The differences and similarities highlighted below explain the complications at Tambu Chowki:

1. Tambu Chowki is also a node-edge hybrid but with a poorly defined interethnic edge and a cluttered node. The surrounding urban typology includes several

Figure 100 Tambu Chowki Node: A node with too many streets.

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smaller streets or pol streets that clutter the node. (See map in Figure 100 below).

Apart from the obvious implications for street traffic, this kind of condition also

makes it difficult to control violence; the absence of clear grids and sectors is a

law-enforcement nightmare. Here the notion of 'too many streets' is relative to

nodes in a city with a grid layout where four streets meet in a neat square.

2. The same urban typology also means that the interethnic edge follows along

narrow alleys and not main streets. The edge is hence hyper-localized allowing for multiple points of confrontation. Hindu and Muslim houses also often have their backs to each other, which ensures proximity without ensuring intimacy. (See, Figure

Proximity sans intimacy

Figure 101 A layout such as the example above encourages intraethnic intimacy versus interethnic intimacy.

101). The Nal in Surat, is a clearer contested node where violence, and by

extension efforts for peace, are concentrated. Also as discussed earlier the Nal's

influence is constrained by the borders around it, whereas the node at Tambu

Chowki is akin to the center of a spider's web with multiple strands spreading

outward an effect compounded by the presence of multiple ethnic fault lines.

Summary

Kalupur-Dariyapur, along with the old city, is a repurposed neighborhood.

The pol typology was useful in a different era but its benefits are fading. It no longer provides the social, economic, and communal benefits that it did provide in simpler times in the 18ᵗʰ and 19ᵗʰ century. Since the pol developed as a response to the interethnic violence, it was essentially an ethnic enclave or even an ethnic fortress. The pol promotes segregation but true ethnic segregation in the new economy is difficult, especially in a place with Kalupur-Dariyapur's density. The urban typology of the pol limits access by creating smaller clusters within the neighborhood.

Even as a newer urban form creeps in from the west of the river Kalupur-Dariyapur is unprepared for that too. The neighborhood is caught between the past and the present. Its ethnocentric history has always made it unprepared for new changes. Kalupur-Dariyapur is a reminder of the cost of ethnic violence beyond life and property. Ethnic violence creates a closed and rigid society that leads to a closed and rigid urban form. The easiest and laziest way to achieve security is through exclusion, by building walls and closing spaces. The sense of security that the pols brought to 17ᵗʰ and 18ᵗʰ Ahmedabadis have left it largely, vulnerable to greater violence. The Hindu Muslim conflict is of course not a result of the pols but the pols explain the difference between Ahmedabad and Surat.

The study of Kalupur-Dariyapur's ethnicization and the urban form allows the following observations:

1. A security-centric design is counter to a peace and cooperation-centric design, because formal and informal security-centric design measures are easily violated

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during times of violent passions. To cite an extreme example, nations have fought battles across the oceans and mountain ranges, brick walls are no match in comparison. There is no substitute to meaningful interethnic relationships. Ethnic segregation is often a necessity and even in Surat, the streets were often ethnically segregated but the peculiarities of the pol and its contemporary adaptations make it an exceptionally exclusionary neighborhood design.

2. As mentioned in the discussion of Nanpura's Nal node in Surat it is useful to have heterogeneity around the node but heterogeneity works best in an urban space that allows inclusion and intermingling.

3. The pol or its contemporary descendant, an ethnically homogenous street that ends in a dead-end, poses a terrifying prospect for an outsider. During times of ethnic conflict, being stuck in an ethnically homogenous area with only one exit can be lethal.

4. The smaller unique districts of the pol also means that neighborhood pride a bulwark against ethnic pride in Nanpura in Surat is invariably tied to ethnic pride. Some pols are ethnically heterogeneous, but the heterogeneity means the value system of the pol, based around ethnic homogeneity does not apply.

5. Kalupur-Dariyapur also faces the threat of fraying edges, which further challenges pan-neighborhood pride and allows ethnic pride to take precedence. Therefore, if Muslims lose the shops and the markets near the Teen Darwaza edge, thus mutating the nature of the neighborhood radically Hindus in the pols may not see it as a loss for the neighborhood. The intense interethnic isolation engendered by

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the urban form can actually lead to the eventual death of the neighborhood and its lifestyle.

Finally, just because the pol is a uniquely Ahmedabadi element of the urban form (district) does not mean that it offers no lessons beyond Ahmedabad. The cautionary tale from Kalupur-Dariyapur is that any urban form element or configuration of elements that does the following has the potential to perpetuate violence:

1. Highlights ethnic differences.
2. Dissuades interethnic engagement and exaggerates intraethnic engagement.
3. Reminds people of past conflict and violence in direct and subtle ways.
4. Promotes proximity without intimacy, through extreme segregation in close quarters.

There are of course cases of complete segregation where the distance between the two groups is large and constant. That is not a recipe for peace but as the following section about Juhapura, a homogenous Muslim neighborhood, shows it can mean safety for at least some members of the neighborhood.

Juhapura: The Muslim Ghetto

Juhapura is one of the most important neighborhoods in the ethnic story of Ahmedabad. Its residents and its urban form are reminders of the displacement and

Figure 102 Juhapura, top 10 words used in neighborhood descriptions

distance that ethnic violence causes. Considered Asia's largest Muslim ghetto, Juhapura, unlike its Surati counterpart Rander is a relatively new neighborhood. In addition, unlike Rander, Juhapura's status as a ghetto is beyond doubt. It is a spatially concentrated area where Muslims live because many cannot live anywhere else because of fear and/or discrimination.

Juhapura's population and density has a tendency to multiply after riot events. In the sample too, forty-one percent of the respondents interviewed had moved to Juhapura after the 2002 riots. Another, forty-one percent had moved there after the riots of 1992. Although the riots were not always a direct reason for the move many acknowledged that the desire for safety, because of being amongst one's own people, was a factor.

Residents make the best of the inevitability of their location but there is an (expected) undertone of a complaint. The fact that the neighborhood receives fewer amenities compared to the northern Hindu neighborhood, Vejalpur-Jivraj compounds this general

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dissatisfaction with the neighborhood. Yet, the people most grateful about being in

Juhapura are the ones who have seen violence more recently in other neighborhoods. For

many residents of Juhapura, the neighborhood started as a temporary shelter, post-riots

and then became a permanent home. The slums are in different stages of growth and

development. Slums often begin as makeshift shelters and residents invest in better

buildings when the threat of displacement

subsides.

Of course, there is little assurance that the

otherwise proactive municipal corporation will

not vacillate in matters involving Juhapura

Muslims. An example of this came in 2015 when

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation razed

buildings in the Fatehwadi area of Juhapura. The

reason offered was that these buildings were on

land zoned as agricultural land. The obvious

question is how developers built the 127

buildings, some more than five floors tall

buildings, without the authorities finding out.

There was some violence during the protests

against the demolitions[117].

Figure 103 Scenes from the Fatehwadi demolitions in 2015. Source: Ahmedabad Mirror, March 29, 2015

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[117] None of the respondents interviewed were in these buildings. Although there were some in buildings whose legality may be in question.

Maps of Juhapura

As seen in the map here in Figure 104, Juhapura has plenty of mosques. There are very few old mosques as most have come up in the last 15 years. Most respondents have lived in Juhapura for less than 20 years, with many having made a move after 2002. Juhapura is also very economically diverse. Apart from a wide income, range of respondents the quality of housing also indicates the economic diversity of the neighborhood. Unlike Its Surati counterpart Rander, however Juhapura's poorer areas are not concentrated to one part of the neighborhood but are scattered across the neighborhood just like its affluent areas. One of the reasons behind this is that as Muslims displaced during riots came in Juhapura for shelter they

Juhapura in Ahmedabad

Mosques in Juhapura
(Some Temples across the border in Vejalpur-Jivraj)

☪ Mosque
🕉 Temple

Respondent Location and Years in neighborhood
- 0-10, Muslim
- 11-14, Muslim
- 15-20, Muslim
- 21-100, Muslim

Respondent Location and length of stay in neighborhood

Figure 104 Respondents and Places of Worship

often settled wherever land was available. Hence, also the vicious cycle of illegal settlements and demolitions as these urban refugees ignored zoning regulations temporarily. Later unscrupulous developers built on these lands often with municipal authorities turning a blind eye. Authorities claim that regulating Juhapura is difficult because it is a 'sensitive' area and many officials were afraid to go there (Sandesh TV News, March 2015). Although, respondents speculated that the more likely explanation was a nexus between corrupt developers and city officials/politicians. The situation is rich with irony. The same authorities that were afraid to go into Juhapura to prevent any construction from the very beginning later drove in on bulldozers to raze the same structures. Additionally, the developers are invariably Muslim and city officials usually Hindu. If one must, one can find hope in this burying of ethnic differences to cooperate in unscrupulous schemes. Poor and middle class Muslims often bear the financial and emotional brunt of these actions.

Apart from shantytowns and middle-class apartments, Juhapura also has affluent bungalows and townhouses. A Juhapura bungalow can easily cost 20 million rupees (nearly $300,000), a stunning amount considering that according to the Government of India, the per capita income in Gujarat in 2013-14 was 106,831 rupees, or $1,590. Moreover, Juhapura is not a desirable neighborhood by any metric apart from ethnic safety and community. Most of these relatively affluent areas are concentrated around Sarkhej-Ahmedabad Main Road or NH 947 where NH stands for National Highway. A National Highway is the equivalent of an interstate highway in America. The highway bisects the neighborhood. Since homes and businesses are located on either side of the

highway, crossing it on foot or on a motorbike is especially perilous. A Muslim school headmaster complained about the constant risk to students and the recurring fatal road accidents.

Figure 105 shows the landmarks and nodes in Juhapura. In spite of being a neighborhood of nearly 400,000 residents, there are few landmarks (apart from some new mosques) in Juhapura. As the school Headmaster said,

> *"(The only) Paved road in Juhapura is the national highway. There are no government offices, no gardens, no places for social gathering and no cinema halls. For me personally my mother buys from the Juhapura market. There are no branded clothes on sale here. Therefore, the kind of shopping that one enjoys happens outside of Juhapura. The only good thing is food, the food here is what we like... in a Muslim area."*

Figure 105 Nodes, Landmarks, and Paths

This is also the reason why there are few major streets in the neighborhood. Again, this is not necessary a marker of the villainy of all Hindu authorities but a combination of an unexpected settlement pattern, some apathy, and certainly some willful wrongdoing.

Figure 106 Semi-official vs. Perceived Borders of Juhapura

Figure 106 compares the perceived versus semi official borders of Juhapura. As mentioned above Juhapura does not really have any official status. Often people well within Juhapura's generally accepted borders did not consider their neighborhood as Juhapura instead relied on some narrower designation. However any confusion about the limits of Juhapura ended at its northern border with Vejalpur. As the following pages will make clear, Juhapura's interethnic edge is undisputable (no pun intended).

A People's Map of Juhapura

In absence of any meaningful landmarks, Sarkhej-Ahmedabad Main Road or NH 947 becomes the most significant feature within Juhapura. The road travels East-West and since most of Ahmedabad is located to the northeast, so are residents of Juhapura. The street is chaotic and scary even to those used to India's lethal roads.

For residents of Juhapura travelling along it is a daily risk but there are few options. Whether getting into or out of

Figure 107 Respondent Map of Juhapura from verbal and graphic descriptions of Juhapura and its surrounding neighborhoods.

Juhapura, respondents, regardless of their location within Juhapura used the road[118].

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[118] There are a few reasons this overdependence on NH 947:
1. It is one of the few paved streets and hence travelling along it is much faster.
2. If one decides to take internal roads, especially heading East or North, it is very easy to be stuck in the narrow alleys of the slums of Juhapura.
3. Even though Juhapura is a relatively new neighborhood, its haphazard development means that many streets are winding and end in dead-ends much like the old city. This absence of a clear grid makes all forms of vehicular transport rather inconvenient.

Edge Neighborhood, Juhapura

Edges dominate the story of Juhapura. For starters, the ethnic conflict and violence has pushed the neighborhood to the edge of Ahmedabad. In addition, the interethnic edge between Juhapura and Vejalpur is the neighborhood's most culturally significant urban form element. Respondents (from Juhapura and Vejalpur) offered tours of the 'border' or recommended it as one of places to see while in the neighborhood. There are also fuzzy intraethnic edges within the neighborhood. In Surat, Rander's soft interethnic edges with Hindu neighborhoods are very important in preventing complete ethnicization of Rander. In addition, Rander also has hard intraethnic edges due to clear differences in the urban form. In Juhapura, however, the intraethnic edges are soft and interethnic edges are hard. Varshney (2002) argues that weak intraethnic ties or even intraethnic conflict can be conducive to interethnic relationships. Rander and Juhapura demonstrate a similar phenomenon in the urban form.

The interethnic edge or 'border' is an extreme example of a hard interethnic edge. It is comparable to city-sponsored walls in Belfast or the American built Adhamiyah wall in Baghdad, except that the border in Juhapura is much more organic and the communities maintain and perpetuate it.

The Border

Northern Edge of Juhapura
(border with Vejalpur-Jivraj)

Figure 108 A map of the border. Numbers on the map are a key to the photographs.

The northern border with Vejalpur serves as a metaphor for interethnic relationships in Ahmedabad. It is also a reminder that the urban form not only expresses the ethnic life of a city but also exaggerates and perpetuates it. The following text uses the term 'border' to refer to this hard interethnic edge between Juhapura and Vejalpur.

The border starts relatively innocuously, with a no-man's land like expanse of ill developed or underdeveloped land and

Figure 109 Earlier half of the border. (Muslims to the left, Hindus to the right.)

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wide streets (in a low traffic environment) see Figure 109.

Yet the differences between the Muslim and Hindu areas are easy to see. Hindu

Figure 110 Hindu apartments and Muslim single story homes. Notice the wall along the newly constructed Hindu apartments.

neighborhoods include tall apartments whereas the Muslim areas are mostly single story brick buildings. Figure 110 makes this difference even more obvious. Labelling the new and even not even completely occupied apartments below as 'Hindu' apartments is not premature since the there is no prospect of in the near future of any Muslim being able to buy an apartment there or even wanting to buy an apartment there. Hard edges ensure complete ethnicization. Walls are not just a domain of the wealthier developers. In Figure

111 the Hindus (on the rights) and Muslims (on the left) have both built walls, permitting their financial means. Economists often talk about a peace dividend; in contrast, these walls are

Figure 111 Build a Wall and make the Hindus and Muslims pay for it.

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akin to a conflict tax. The funds used to build and maintain these walls are an unnecessary burden on the poor and middle class communities on either side.

Finally, the border ends (only with respect to Juhapura and Vejalpur) with a police station on the Hindu side of the border. As a Juhapura Muslim respondent pointed out during a tour of the border, it is to "keep the Hindus safe and to keep us (the Muslims) in check." Even if one does not accept such a pessimistic view of the location of the police station, it represents poor planning and a fundamental insensitivity to

Figure 112 The wall continues

the ethnic situation. Indeed, poor planning involves a single-minded focus on security without a focus on relationships.

Another feature of the border is the stark contrast in the economic situation of the Hindus and Muslims. This poses a dual challenge to interethnic perceptions and interethnic attitudes. For Muslims in Juhapura the visible contrast is a reminded of the discrimination by the authorities. As a 30-year-old,

Figure 113 the police station is akin to a punctuation mark at the end of the border between Juhapura and Vejalpur.

Juhapura Muslim said when asked to compare the neighborhoods,

> *You do not have to ask this question. Just cross this street and see the difference. On that side, you have trees and parks and there is peace and quiet there. But if you cross on this side, you will soon see heaps of garbage and if someone calls you on your phone, then you will have to shout to talk to them (because it is so noisy)*

Similarly, when residents look in from the other side from Vejalpur their view is of humble single story houses, slums, and even 'heaps of garbage'. This perpetuates negative stereotypes of Muslims.

The border, thus with its looming threat of violence means that property prices are lower near the border in Juhapura. This is exactly what one would expect of a typical ghetto in India. The Muslim elites form a citadel deep inside the ghetto and the poorer members form a ring that serves as a defense against the majority. As in Juhapura, even on the Hindu side in Vejalpur a similar situation exists albeit with notable differences (discussed in the following section about Vejalpur).

This urban pattern is in stark contrast with Rander, where the Muslim elites form a ring around old Rander. In Rander, in spite of some history of violence in Surat, the Muslim elites pay a premium to be in proximity of Hindus or at least do not pay a premium to avoid Hindus.

The border is a highly imageable edge. The edge condition dominates the border and its influence spreads in both the neighborhoods. The border governs decisions of the respondents and dictates many behaviors, whether it is the choice of buying property

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away from the border or building walls along the border. Even in the preference to conduct commercial and recreation activities within the neighborhood, the border's influence is strong. It is important to remember here that the last serious bout of violence along the border was in 2002. Therefore, it is not necessarily violence or even the memory of the violence that dictates the behavior of the people. It is also not just about the urban form. Indeed, the border is just a street and many cross streets punctuate the walls along the border[119]. What influences decisions is a combination of the history of violence and the urban form. In case of the border, the urban form serves as a constant reminder of the conflict. It serves as an easily imageable threshold between 'them' and 'us' for both sides. A hard edge ensures that people do not accidently cross into the other side. It is difficult to find the edge between Rander and Adajan in Surat and in contrast, it is all too easy to find the edge between Juhapura and Vejalpur.

Nodes along the border: At least a few nodes will punctuate most edges, especially if the edge is nearly two miles long, like the border, and is in a dense city like Ahmedabad. The border has nodes but they are defunct nodes. Even as important streets merge into the nodes along the border, the flow of people and goods through these nodes is limited or non-existent. As important and influential the urban form may be, in the end, it draws meaning from the people that use it. The mere merging of streets and paths does not ensure the emergence of a node. Even if all the structural elements of any of the five elements of the urban form exist for it to be imageable as a node, path, edge, landmark, or

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[119] Given popular avoidance of the border, it was often easier to travel along it thanks to the relatively low traffic (as evident in the photographs). Of course, in spite of having knowledge of the border's history and meaning the absence of any emotional attachment to said meaning or bias for or against the ethnicities involved, made it easier to use the border as a path.

district it needs a population to assign it that meaning. Just as the border between Juhapura and Vejalpur is actually a path but its '*pathness*' is entirely dominated by its edge condition.

Intraethnic edges in Juhapura: The edges between Muslims within Juhapura are mostly around economic lines yet hard to define. There are some clearly defined pockets of affluence and poverty but it is usually difficult to parse them out. The laissez-faire development of the neighborhood is responsible for this chaotic urban pattern. Respondents spoke about the neighborhood in sparing terms and descriptions often devolved into complaints (often valid) and/or comparisons.

Summary

Economic divisions, dates of settlement, and even sectarian concerns divide Juhapura among Muslims but these divisions pale in comparison to the interethnic divide with Hindus. Juhapura thus presents to the rest of Ahmedabad the appearance of a cohesive neighborhood. This perceived cohesion, which assumes all Muslims are a cohesive unit, reinforces its status as a ghetto. In addition, since outsiders avoid Juhapura, except driving through it on NH 947, they never appreciate the diversity or prosperity that exists within Juhapura.

Juhapura is also a good reminder of the fact that there is a link between neighborhood pride and neighborhood choice. In Surat, Rander too is a product of lack of choice but there at least the false sense of choice exists for people in a return to the old city Surat. Rander residents may be reluctant intra-city migrants but Juhapura has intra-city refugees. There is little hope or desire to return to neighborhoods like Kalupur-Dariyapur

for residents of Juhapura. Moreover, none of the other neighborhoods is available to them. Respondents in Juhapura were grateful to be there but none was proud to be there.

Asked about the important places in Juhapura a 64-year-old street vendor said, "There is nothing in Juhapura. What beautiful places will you find in a poor man's neighborhood?" Further, comparing Juhapura to Hindu neighborhood she said,

> *Everything is different, there they have water and drainage and even good roads. But here we don't have anything like that. (*Asked if she would ever like to go back and live in her old city neighborhood*) Yes, I would like to, but who will risk their life to be in a good house? Therefore, for me, Juhapura is still the best.*

Juhapura has thus became a safe but restricting neighborhood. Thoroughly ethnicized, outsiders perceive it as a threat and for insiders it is stifling.

The study of Juhapura's ethnicization and the urban form allows the following observations:

1. Hard interethnic borders or edges promote, perpetuate, and enhance the ethnicization of neighborhoods.

2. A crucial difference between a hard edge and a soft edge is the quality of opacity versus transparency. Soft, porous edges allow outsiders to filter in and out in a neighborhood thus promoting a more realistic picture of the neighborhood; hence, they have a transparency to them. Hard edges, on the other hand, dissuade movement and interaction thus presenting only a static or imaginary picture of the neighborhood. Hard edges are thus opaque and outsiders cannot really see deep

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into the neighborhood. This impaired vision leads to an impaired image of the neighborhood. The neighborhood is then easy to characterize as full of angry radicals and criminals, if an outsider chooses to do so. Again, such a hard edge is not the exclusive domain of ethnic ghettos or poor neighborhoods. An affluent gated community, in proximity with a middle class neighborhood may inadvertently inspire residents of the middle class neighborhood to make assumptions about the life and lifestyles of those on the other side of the gates[120].

3. Juhapura as an ethnicized district/ neighborhood offers its residents a sense of comfort vis-à-vis physical safety. This sense of comfort come at a high price, literally and figuratively. Juhapura's residents are forced to buy houses which for similar level of quality and would cost much less in Hindu neighborhoods. The riots, in spite of damaging the economy, drove up real estate prices in Juhapura.

The anger, hatred or whatever negative emotions the two groups feel towards each other has the ability to dissipate within individuals. However, this dissipation is difficult if there is constant reminder of the conflict that caused the negative emotions. These reminders can trigger a cycle of emotions and take individuals from 'feeling hatred' to hating and from 'feeling anger' to being angry. This repetition of emotions invariably transforms the character of individuals and societies and character is destiny. The urban form is a strong, subtle, and ever-present reminder of the situations that built it. This

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[120] Imagining one's rich neighbors spend all their time on a golf course sipping martinis is objectively similar to imagining that one's ethnically different neighbors are criminals and radicals with a short fuse. The consequences of such imaginations are of course very different. How one values these judgements depends on whether one is a consequentialist or deontologist.

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unique combination of a strong and subtle influence ensures that the urban form's deep influence on social life often goes unnoticed.

The next section addresses Vejalpur, one of many Hindu majority neighborhoods in Ahmedabad. In Vejalpur too, the border dominates the urban form but nowhere to extent with which it is dominant in Juhapura.

Vejalpur: The Hindu Ahmedabadi

Vejalpur, like its Surati counterpart, started as a satellite village of Ahmedabad, the city eventually made Vejalpur a part of itself. Vejalpur is a quiet neighborhood with well-maintained streets and many pockets of greenery. These are the small luxuries mostly missing in neighboring Juhapura.

Respondents spoke about the development and the newness of the neighborhood and its past as a village.

Figure 114 Vejalpur, top 10 words used to in neighborhood descriptions

Many respondents had lived in Vejalpur the village and remembered the time when going to Ahmedabad was an event. As a 50-year old fruit seller said,

When I first came here, none of these buildings was here, but now it has become a part of the city because in those days, this was a village. I remember in those days when you went to the city, it meant you were crossing the river and going into, now what we call the old city but now this side of the city is much more developed than that side of the city. So Vejalpur has changed a lot. Forget 30 years ago…. even 15 years ago, things were very different. As for important places, just outside the city on this side, we have Sarkhej Roza. It is actually a very beautiful place. If you go there, it feels peaceful.

More than half of the respondents of Vejalpur had lived there for more than 21 years. Their experience of change was mostly positive and they appreciated the easy access to the new city on the west and the river. While older, residents still had a link to the old Ahmedabad, since some had worked there or conducted business there for newer residents Ahmedabad meant merely the new city. An upper middle class, 28-year-old female bank employee spoke about how even though the neighborhood was not one of the poshest in Ahmedabad she appreciated it:

I have many friends who live in places like Satellite or Paldi but I still prefer this neighborhood. Of course, if you want to go to fancy malls then you have to go in that direction. But we have lived here for so many years now and we find this neighborhood very safe and even housing prices here are going through the roof now. As for important places, as I said, it is just a residential neighborhood mostly. So we don't have any fancy places here, but there are some nice parks and even a few malls are coming here but I think I like the fact that it is easily accessible from all parts of the city. I can go from here to Satellite in 15-20 minutes, or I can even go to any mall there. So everything is very close by and we don't really need to go into the old city very often. I almost never cross the river to go to the other side. Only when we have to go out of town to go to the railway station, then we have to go through the old city. Even the airport we normally do not even have to go through the old city for that. So for me, Ahmedabad is just this side of the river.

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The irony is that for some Vejalpur, which joined Ahmedabad only a few decades ago, is now more a part of Ahmedabad that the old city which has been not just a part of Ahmedabad but has been Ahmedabad itself for over 600 years.

Maps of Vejalpur

Vejalpur or what is also locally known as the Vejalpur-Jivraj neighborhood is bound on

the south by Juhapura and Sarkhej. To its

north and east is new Ahmedbabd. The north

and east of Vejalpur includes some of the

more affluent neighborhoods in Ahemdbad,

although the most affluent neighborhoods of

Ahmedabad are located much further north.

Figure 115 a roadside Hindu Shrine near Vejalpur

There are relatively few temples in Vejalpur, however Hindu temples don't have a size

restriction and there are many undocumented Hindu shrines every few streets. These shrines can mean just a small symbolic knee high structure in the shape of a temple (see image)

Figure 116 Respondent location and places of worship in Vejalpur

Vejalpur is an official ward in the Ahemdbad municipality. The neighborhood includes

another smaller neighborhood known as Jivraj Park and hence the name Vejalpur-Jivraj.

Vejalpur itself typically refers to the western part of the neighborhood whereas Jivraj or

Jivraj Park is the eastern part of the neighborhood. Western parts of the neighborhood

border on the edges of Ahmedabad itself.

Figure 117 the various borders of the neighborhood.

Vejalpur is one of the many middle and lower middle class Hindu neighborhoods on the

west of the river. Of course the river has a meandering course so not all neighborhoods

are directly to the west of the river. The flight of Hindus from old or eastern Ahmedabad

meant that they created new neighborhoods or added old neighborhoods or satellite

towns/villages, like Vejalpur to the limits of Ahmedabad.

Figure 118 Nodes, landmarks, and paths in Vejalpur

Vejalpur, like its Muslim neighbor to the south has few significant landmarks and nodes however given the presence of major commercial and entertainment hubs to its north and west the residents perceive those areas are close to them and easily accessible. Indeed Shyamal crossroads, the northern most node of Vejalpur is a prominent hub in Ahmedabad and includes many entertainment and shopping options. Thus given how easy access is to these neighborhoods, residents of Vejalpur have much to aspire to in their surroundings but not much to envy. In the event of envy, they only need look south to Juhapura to feel better about their neighborhood.

A People's Map of Vejalpur

The posh areas of Vejalpur are mostly located away from its edge with Juhapura.

Although there are a few new residential projects coming up near the border. The sense

of security that the border assures combined with and because of the Hindu dominance in

Ahmedabad means that some risks become worth taking for Vejalpur. The commercial

centers of Vejalpur are located around the 132 feet Ring Road. The Ring Road goes all

around what was once the edge of Ahmedabad, with parts of Vejalpur falling just outside

Figure 119 Respondent Map of Vejalpur from verbal and graphic descriptions of Juhapura and its surrounding neighborhoods.

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it. Respondents spoke about the rapid development of the neighborhood but at the same time spoke about its relatively quiet and largely residential nature.

Vejalpur, in spite of its mixed-use zoning, is akin to an American suburb in some ways. Of course, mixed-use is neither a buzzword nor a rarity in Indian neighborhoods. It is almost a norm. A neighborhood without shops, schools, etc. has little value in India given the relatively low car ownership rates and the traffic conditions.

Vejalpur--Relative Advantages and Disadvantages

Vejalpur is an ethnically homogenous but economically diverse neighborhood. While it does not have the poverty of Juhapura slums, in the west and south of the neighborhood there are pockets of very humble housing. Most respondents interviewed there reported incomes of no more than 20,000 rupees ($300) per month. Yet the housing was well built and consisted of multistoried apartments. Just across the border, the single story poorly built tenements of Muslims stood in stark contrast. Compared to their northern and eastern Hindu neighbors the southern Vejalpur Hindus were less well-off but much better situated compared to their southern Muslim neighbors.

The neighborhood generally looks to the east. Apart from the fact that most of the city is located in the east, the southern hard edge forces the Vejalpur Hindus to engage even more with the rest of the Hindu city. Given that, the border seals the southern edge and effectively renders one of the streets unusable, the activity within the neighborhood clusters along Vejalpur road (also known as Dr. Jivraj Mehta Road) and then flows onto the 132 feet Ring Road. Vejalpur road thus becomes a tributary of the 132 feet Ring Road. The two roads are like bones along which the meat of the neighborhood is situated.

For Juhapura Muslims, crossing the border occasionally is an inevitability since there are many necessities that can be satisfied only in Hindu neighborhoods. Vejalpur respondents treated the border with utmost seriousness and if they crossed it, they boasted about crossing it occasionally. The perception of Juhapura as a crime-ridden poor neighborhood, thanks to the opaque border is strong among Hindus of Vejalpur. Ironically, this perception seemed strongest among people who lived closest to the

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border. A 28-year-old construction worker who lived only a few blocks away from the border expressed his objections and fears as:

> *I would say this butchering of animals is really bad and they are also involved in all kinds of illegal activities. So because of these illegal activities, tomorrow if I interact with them, even I may become a criminal and be influenced by those activities. So, our principle is very simple, simply--stay away from them. You can see the neighborhood from where we are right now and there are so many of them here but we never interact with them.*

Similar views translate into the residents accessing mostly other Hindu neighborhoods, especially the Hindu neighborhoods west of the river.

Unlike its Surati counterpart Adajan, the neighborhood is not completely self-sufficient but has good access to other neighborhoods. This relative dependence on other neighborhoods is a product of its location on the newer side of the river in Ahmedabad. In Surat, the old city and the bulk of the new city are both located on the same side of the river and the Hindu neighborhood Adajan and Muslim neighborhood Rander are on the other side of the river. In Ahmedabad, since Vejalpur is located on the newer more developed side of the river there is little need for building capacity for all amenities and facilities within the neighborhood. This phenomenon also highlights the role of the river as a significant perceptual edge. Crossing the river, regardless of actual distance, tends to become an event and thus people tend to distance themselves from the other side. The other side of the river is around three miles away for residents of Vejalpur, as is the neighborhood Satellite. Respondents often spoke about the closeness and access to Satellite and other parts of the new city (some even further than 3 miles) but distanced

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themselves from the other side of the river. Just the river does not create this distance. There are few incentives to cross the river based on what lies on the other side.

Respondents in Vejalpur and Juhapura do not agree on much but they both agree that Muslim neighborhoods are dirtier compared to Hindu neighborhoods. Their assessments of the reason for this difference are however different. The Muslims largely blamed the apathy of the civic authorities and Hindus in Vejalpur blamed the Muslims.

Figure 120 Comparing Vejalpur to Muslim neighborhoods top 15 words of Vejalpur respondents. Notice the proximity of 'Muslim' and 'dirty'.

As a 40-year-old respondent said,

> *I think there is a big difference. If you walk down this street right now, you will not see people just standing doing nothing. Also, you will notice if you go on the other side into Juhapura that the way the neighborhood is, it is very dirty. There are goats roaming around. There are chicken roaming around and there are young children roaming about. Now, it is not just about the money. I understand that people can be poor but if you go to villages outside of Ahmedabad, you will see there are very poor people there but they are still living very cleanly. There is no dirt, no dirtiness in those villages.*

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Ethnicization and Vejalpur

Vejalpur is an ethnicized neighborhood. Ethnicization is typically reserved for a minority group. Dominant groups often do not consider themselves as ethnic groups. A similar dynamic plays out in neighborhoods. In Surat, for instance the Hindu neighborhood Adajan has the ethnic identity as Hindu but is not ethnicized according to Hindus, since they can sufficiently ignore their Muslim neighbors.

More importantly in Surat, given the soft borders, Hindus can *passively* ignore their Muslim neighbors. In stark contrast, the hard border between Vejalpur and Juhapura forces Hindus to avoid *actively* Muslim areas and Muslims.

Especially, in the border areas of Vejalpur the presence and high visibility, due to the drastic contrast in urban form, of Muslims on the other side means Muslims are hard to forget. On the soft borders between Adajan and Rander, Hindus and Muslims become invisible to each other due to the relative indivisibility of their urban typologies and the poor imageability of the border. The paradox of Muslim presence in the border areas of Vejalpur is also that though they are highly visible they are also highly inaccessible.

The irony is rich here. Hindu dominance, which in zero-sum game should be an advantage, locks even Hindus in an ethnic framework. The presence of an ethnicized Muslim ghetto threatens to convert Vejalpur into an ethnicized Hindu ghetto. It indeed does so successfully for the border areas thus further hardening the border.

Summary

Vejalpur is a Hindu border neighborhood. It faces far fewer challenges than its southern Muslim neighbor does but it is a reminder that in an ethnic conflict even the winners are not quite winning anything. They just do not lose as much.

Residents of Vejalpur are aware of their advantages vis-à-vis their Muslim neighbors although some hold Muslims responsible for their misfortune. Yet residents do not seem to realize the lasting cost of the conflict to them. Vejalpur Hindus were keen to highlight Hindu losses during the riots. Nevertheless, they generally seem at ease with the larger conflict and accept it as a socio-political inevitability. Similarly, the border becomes an inevitable urban form manifestation of the socio-political reality. The border ethnicizes parts of Vejalpur as Hindu since the Muslim can look across the border and see a largely Hindu neighborhood. The Muslims do not see the neighborhood as anything but Hindu, other Hindu dominated neighborhoods for instance can be considered posh or simply inaccessible but the houses just across the border have a singular identity which is their Hindu ethnic identity. Ethnicization comes with certain costs and benefits and given Hindu dominance; so far, the benefits seem to outweigh the costs. Yet this equation ignores the reality that the benefits of the absence of ethnicization are far greater than the benefits of ethnicization.

The border can soften due to any or all of the following factors:

1. Integration across the border and ethnic heterogeneity.
2. Growth of similar urban forms on either side.
3. Access roads crossing the border, leading to un-ethnicized landmarks, nodes, or

places of interest.

4. Lasting ethnic peace and cooperation.

Other than these long term changes political and civil actors can intervene in ways, which can soften the border. They can organize festivals in which Hindus and Muslims both participate and at least temporarily transform the symbol of division into a space of unity. Ease of transportation, combined with creation of attractions in Juhapura, can aid movement from Vejalpur to Juhapura thus reduce the opacity of the border. Finally, they can encourage businesses to settle along the border so the street can become a commercially active street like Vejalpur Road. A mix of spatial and community planning can transform the border and by extension the two neighborhoods.

The study of Vejalpur's ethnicization and the urban form allows the following observations:

1. An element of the urban form can become a symbol of the conflict. This symbolism is a threat and opportunity at once. The edge between Vejalpur and Juhapura plays a role in perpetuating the conflict not just by its symbolism. It is also a reminder of the conflict and it aids behaviors, which keeps the communities apart. However, the opportunity lies in transforming a potent symbol. Of course, such actions would require immense civic and political will but a similar will is also required to orchestrate civic violence and mass murder.

2. In spite of their proximity to each other, Vejalpur and Juhapura have unequal access to other Hindu neighborhoods because of the hard edges and neighborhood

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ethnicization. This contrast in access furthers ethnicization and forces Juhapura to develop an ethnic infrastructure, which deepens isolation and ghettoization. Vejalpur's own ethnicization hardens the border and any future infrastructure within Vejalpur can become ethnicized.

3. A hard edge provides some safety but largely offers only a semblance of safety and not real safety (which only ethnic peace can offer.) The settlement patterns of Juhapura and Vejalpur reflect this reality since market forces push the relatively less affluent members of the both neighborhoods to the border. If the border assured real security then there would be no preference among Vejalpur residents to be further away from the border.

Vejalpur has seen real violence along the border and it has chosen to disengage with Juhapura in a serious way. The border, combined with easy access to the rest of Ahmedabad makes this disengagement easier. For Vejalpur residents, the ethnicization of Juhapura on the other side of the border and the Muslim slums along it skews the image of Muslim neighborhoods and by extension, Muslims.

Ahmedabad Summary

Ahmedabad faces many challenges in its interethnic relationships and the urban form, in the old and new city only multiplies these challenges. The recurring violence in Ahmedabad is not just a 20th century phenomenon, even though the respondents only spoke about incidences of violence from the 20th or just 21st century.

In Ahmedabad, the unfortunate fact is that whether it is the old city or the new city, the urban form becomes a reminder of the ethnic violence. Ahmedabad's disadvantages stand in clear contrast with Surat's many advantages around interethnic issues. Ahmedabad's urban form is indicative of the suspicions Hindus and Muslims share of each other. Recurring violence only justifies the need of this security based urban form. Like Surat, violence in Ahmedabad is also limited to some neighborhoods but unlike Surat these neighborhoods are spread across a wider geographic area within the city. The absence of interethnic violence in new and largely Hindu parts of the city, reinforces the belief that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together peacefully. For some Hindus it also reinforces their belief that Muslims are responsible for the violence.

Different observations about the urban form and the urban topography of the city can be drawn from the three neighborhoods:

1. Kalupur-Dariyapur's nodes, ethnicized districts, and ethnic borders,
2. Juhapura's interethnic borders, hard edges, and ethnicization and
3. Vejalpur's paths oriented away from the hard ethnic edge with Juhapura,

Again, these highlighted features are not exclusive to these neighborhoods. For instance, Kalupur-Dariyapur also has some hard ethnic edges but none like the one between Juhapura and Vejalpur. See Figure 121 differences for a summary of these similarities and differences.

	Kalupur-Dariyapur	Juhapura	Vejalpur
Urban Topography	Low-rise & Medium rise, high density.	Low (slums and bungalows) & Medium-rise to High-rise with high density.	Mostly medium rise with some high-rise, high to medium density but with some open spaces.
Location	Within old Ahmedabad and relatively poorly connected to new Ahmedabad due to the traffic on the main street connecting the two.	Western Ahmedabad, relatively isolated and insulated from the rest of Ahmedabad but street networks allow access from the neighborhood.	Western Ahmedabad well connected with the new Ahmedabad
Urban Form	Includes the most important ethnicized districts and most significant ethnic urban typology in the form of the pol.	Highlights the dangers of hard-interethnic edges. Includes a growing ethnic infrastructure which will further harden edges and isolate the neighborhood.	Highlights the dangers of hard-interethnic edges. Paths oriented to new Ahmedabad, away from Juhapura.
Growth	Limited growth in the last two decades.	Very high growth without sufficient urban development.	High growth but limited compared to Juhapura.

Figure 121 Neighborhoods of Ahmedabad, similarities and differences.

In Ahmedabad there are many reminders of violence within the city. Ahmedabad, as a case, is a reminder of how complicated ethnic narratives get attached to the urban form. To some extent then, covertly or overtly, all urban form is commemorative. Just as archaeologists can learn about the culture, place, and people from mere fragments of

otherwise mundane ancient structures, in cities people are always excavating meaning from the urban form that surrounds them. The critical difference is that the archeologist's approach is conscious and purposeful whereas the approach of the average city dweller is subconscious. The silent but ever present influence of the urban form adds to the other factors which burden Ahmedabadis with more conflict and violence than Suratis.

The following section summarizes this chapter with a brief comparison of the urban forms of Surat and Ahmedabad.

Urban Form: Surat vs. Ahmedabad

In spite of the many similarities between the two cities, the urban forms of Surat and Ahmedabad have some clear and identifiable differences. These differences are a result of their histories and local cultures. Both cities though, have a history at least some ethnic violence and conflict. The difference lies in the reactions to this violence through the urban form. Benjamin Franklin famously said, "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." Concerning the urban form one may say, "Those who would reject an urban form based on peace and cooperation, to purchase a little temporary safety through urban form, deserve neither peace nor safety." The decision of giving up essential liberty is never a singular act. Similarly, the decision to build an urban form specifically geared towards safety and exclusion is not a singular act but the accumulated result of a series of small acts. It is unfair to fault societies and communities for seeking safety and self-preservation but even in the worst situations, there is always some choice. In Surat, even when the violence and conflict dominated the history the urban form stayed geared towards cooperation in commerce of maintenance of relationships. Part of Rander's growth, for instance is a post 1992-93 riots phenomenon when Surat saw more violence than Ahmedabad yet there are few hard edges in Rander. Moreover, Surat certainly does not have anything remotely resembling the border or the ethnic districts like the pol. As mentioned earlier the typology of the pol in Ahmedabad is not just about segregation but active exclusion. Surat's old city has ethnic enclaves but the concern there is largely the conglomeration of economic activity, which correlated to ethnic groups (castes or sects).

Surat's urban form does not ignore ethnic violence (e.g. the Nal in Nanpura) but it rejects the primacy of ethnic violence as a deciding factor in the urban form. On the other hand, in Ahmedabad, the urban form is a reaction to the ethnic violence and conflict.

Chapter 6: Discussion, Implications, and Conclusion

Ethnic violence in cities poses a significant challenge to urban planners. Urban planning is, ideally, a process that produces plans and policies with the goal of influencing the lives of a city's inhabitants. The chief focus of urban planning is urban progress which planners assume is achieved though development and growth. Ethnic violence can render these often slowly drafted and long-term plans, redundant overnight.

Another challenge that ethnic violence poses for planners is that ethnic violence is fast and planning is slow. The best planners can do is preempt signs of ethnic violence and prevent ethnic violence through design and policy. Some planners, who focus exclusively on the technical and utilitarian aspects of the city, of may not even understand the irrational violence much less respond to it. Moreover, even when planning is responsive to ethnic violence planners first address the easier issues within a difficult problem. This desire towards cognitive ease is part of human behavior. Also, the temptation to address easier measurable questions with relatively quick short term results is the bane of all political bureaucracies. The difficult question that ethnic violence poses is the question of interethnic relationships. The easier question is the question of security and safety. Thus planners, along with politicians, police, community leaders, begin to manage symptoms while leaving the disease untouched. The disease can then make a comeback within years or decades. Traditionally it is not the planner's job to be the moral compass of a city but in cities with ethnic conflict the position for moral compass is often open and planners must strive to fill it. Part of being a moral compass then is to shun the low hanging fruit of safety and address the more difficult question of relationships.

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The urban form is an important indicator of these relationships and incidentally an important part of the planner's skillset. A planner thus has some expertise and indirect control over these issues. Ceding control of this part of planning and/or ignoring the urban form in planning are both dangerous and unethical especially in cities with ethnic violence. Planning is consequential. As mentioned earlier, planning is also slow and its effects can be very long lasting. Planners cannot abdicate their responsibility by claiming to be mere technicians. As the pages above show, planning (formal and informal) can have life and death consequences for centuries. For instance, the pols of Ahmedabad still affect its interethnic relationships. While 18th century planners can be excused for not foreseeing the 21st century problems, it is disheartening to see some 21st planners and urban design scholars in Ahmedabad attach a romanticism to the pol, without attention to its history, consequence, or meaning. This is not very different from the American romanticism with old town America without an awareness of what the history means to large swathes of its population.

This chapter discusses the importance of the urban form in ethnic violence based on the findings, and makes a case for its inclusion in the decisions of urban planners and other urban stakeholders. Presented below are the findings from this research followed by implications for planners, designers, peacemakers, and researchers in urban settings.

The Urban Form Records then Reminds

The urban form is a record of the life of a city. It records and reflects the social, ethnic, political, economic, and cultural life of a city. Even as Surat and Ahmedabad have many similarities the urban forms of the two cities have aptly recorded the smallest of differences in their lives. Peculiar ethnic equations or specific differences in their economic life are both reflected in their urban forms of the two cities. These differences are not merely perceptual but they are actual differences that inhabitants can identify. Also, these differences are meaningful i.e. the peculiarities of placement, structure, and configuration of the urban form mean something to the citizens that use it. Any change in the urban form thus must be done with the understanding that it modifies what the city means to its inhabitants. This is not to advocate gradualism in the modification of the urban form but rather to advocate awareness of meaning. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, violence poses the challenge of speed and in some instance the response of planning should be expeditious too.

Just as the urban form is a meaningful record of urban life it is also a reminder of the history of urban life. However this reminder is not a memory of events but of meanings. These meanings, which come with strong feelings, dictate behaviors. Here the word reminder does not imply that seeing a particular element of the urban form residents remember a specific instance of violence. Rather here, reminder means that it reminds people to act in ways as if they actually remembered the violence every single day. The urban form thus conditions residents in an almost Pavlovian way.

For instance, in Ahmedabad, the history of violence goes back to the 17th century. While

the history of 17th or 18th century violence is not a factor in popular memory, the

unfortunate fact for Ahmedabad is that, the urban form in the old city has inadvertently

recorded this violence. The pols and their descendent urban typologies serve as recorders

that play back the history of ethnic violence and subtly remind everyone of their original

ethnic motivations. The most glaring contemporary manifestations of an urban form

based around ethnic intent is the 'border'. Moreover, for now the border has an actual

history of violence attached to it. Residents can pinpoint where the stone pelting took

place or where someone died along the border. However, in the future, even if this

detailed memory of violence is lost, the border can continue its job of maintaining

differences and even governing social behavior. Memory of intent or even the original

event is irrelevant if the urban form has the potential to instill habits by dictating

behaviors. In Figure 122, an original instance of ethnic violence forces communities to

build an urban form that focusses on safety, defense, or the ethnic differences. The urban

form then dictates specific behaviors; these behaviors need not necessarily relate to ethnic

safety or even ethnic life. The urban form dictates simple mundane activities. However,

now these activities have embedded behaviors that revolve around avoiding members of

the other ethnicity, building intraethnic relationships, excluding members of other

ethnicities from certain festivals celebrations etc. Therefore, even if the overtones are

harmless there is an undertone of exclusion, which serves as a subtle but constant

reminder of some past violence. Indeed, by the time the urban form is dictating behaviors

(step 3 in Figure 122) there is a realistic possibility that the memory of the original

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violence is completely lost. These behaviors then become habits and habits become

culture or character. If the habits have enough exclusion, animosity, fear, and other

elements of structural violence embedded in them then, under the right circumstances,

there can be a new bout of violence. This new bout of violence can then transform the

urban form, for better or worse. Alternatively, it can simply remind residents of the need

of the existing exclusionary, ethnicized, and/or defensive urban form.

Figure 122 the cycle to perpetuate ethnic conflict.

Urban Pride Matters

The tale of the two cities, Surat and Ahmedabad, is about pride and prejudice. Suratis are proud of Surat even as they are proud of their ethnic identity. Ahmedabadis are proud of their ethnic and regional identities at the expense of being proud of Ahmedabad. One can argue that Ahmedabad has more places and things to be proud of. It has a rich history, architecture, and is developing at a fast clip, but unlike Surat it does not have healthy interethnic relationships. Surat and Ahmedabad have both seen violence, and all violence, for perpetrators and victims alike, brings some form of shame. But Ahmedabadis have a stronger memory of that violence not just because of its recurrence but also because of the fact that the city does not let its residents forget about it. The sense of pride a person feels for his/her neighborhood or city is multifactorial and urban relationships are at its center. Pride is also about ownership. Suratis, both Hindu and Muslim, take a stake in the city and claim ownership of the city. In Ahmedabad Muslims feel excluded from most of the city and Hindus talk about regional pride more than urban pride. The Hindus then consider themselves Gujarati first and Ahmedabadi second. They also do not consider the Muslims as Gujarati. In this worldview, Hindus are Gujaratis and Muslims are Muslims. Even in Surat, the adjective Gujarati and the identity associated with it is often owned by Hindus but they include the Muslims in the Surati identity which anyway enjoys precedence.

Urban pride is a bulwark against urban violence. Even as ethnic tensions run high urban pride can give rise to counter-narratives like, 'Muslims/Hindus may be bad and may deserve violence but we don't do such things in Surat' or, 'Yes, some Muslims/Hindus

are bad but not our Surati Muslims/Hindus.' In Ahmedabad, regional pride and ethnic pride disincentive urban peace. There even a perceived slight against Hindus or Muslims can become a call to arms against the other group. Groups see themselves and each other as residents and not citizens. The irony here is that it is Surat is home to more regional and national migrants more than Ahmedabad. There are more reasons to become a Surati, since the identity comes with the perks of ownership and community. Moreover, it is easier to become a Surati, one only need claim to be one.

Redefine Discrimination

The Sanskrit word for discrimination is *Vivek*. The word sees use in many other Indian languages, including Gujarati, and is a common name for Indian men and women (as *Vivekaa*). Academics, politicians, and policymakers must take a cue from Sanskrit and redefine discrimination and bring the English word over to mean something positive and not the usual negative definition since discrimination is a good thing.

Why is discrimination a good thing?

The usage of 'discrimination' as a near-synonym for bigotry is unfortunate. Bigotry, or its most notable manifestation in America, racism, is the inability to discriminate between the individuals of a group/race. A racist sees all members of a race as representatives of each other. The ability to discriminate would indeed challenge bigoted assumptions. The Suratis are more discriminating. They seem to know the difference between good members of an ethnic group (including their own!) and the bad members and this discrimination allows them to have a more honest relationship with each other. It is the

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inability to discriminate between a bandit and a baby of a group that leads to indiscriminate violence, actual and structural. Discriminating against individuals also allows for the prospect of reform. Groups can cooperate to reform individuals from either side of a conflict but one group cannot force another group to change, especially when within a majority of the members there is nothing that needs to be changed. Asking a peace-loving Muslim to 'give up violence' or asking an enlightened Hindu to 'stop being prejudiced' is not only bigotry but decidedly counterproductive.

Also if one must indiscriminately discriminate, there are certainly levels that may be less unacceptable than others. In places where ethnicity is the dominant fault line, geographic discrimination is better than ethnic discrimination. So far, the Suratis won't let any perfect vision of ethnic unity be the enemy of the good. This Surati discrimination, rooted in pragmatism, helps save Surati lives. Even this geographic discrimination is rooted in nuance. The distancing of the violence prone Nal in Surat is an example of this discrimination.

It is easy to split hairs about whether specific Surati behaviors are within the norms of western sensibilities, but that is counterproductive. The fact is that it is this discriminatory or politically incorrect[121] Surati behavior that creates fertile ground for any universal ideals of interethnic relationships and behaviors to be take root in the future. Suratis have rejected a puritanical orthodoxy of what positive interethnic relationships look like and have inadvertently created safe spaces for honest discussions

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[121] Politically incorrect according to some Indian and Western standards. A simple measure is that this language is not found in traditional state controlled media.

and disagreement. It is within this environment of openness and frankness that the resolution of conflicts is possible. Violence is the most direct threat to such spaces and discussions, indeed it is in the face of violence or its threat that these discussions cease and are either replaced by vitriol or platitude. Violence, real or structural, has a tendency to convince perpetrators and victims that this vitriol is gospel truth. Also in such an environment all the well-meaning platitudes become parodies of themselves. When well-meaning communities paint themselves into a corner where discrimination and by extension discussion becomes a crime they inadvertently cede to much ground to the ill-intentioned. It may be time for the parties of peace to wrest control of the behaviors associated with the word 'discrimination' and Surat offers a lesson in how to do it.

Peace and Violence are Local

Local variance has been a puzzle in ethnic violence. Why some cities, neighborhoods, or even streets are immune to violence when their surroundings are devolving into bloodshed is an important question. This research uses the framework of interethnic attitudes and the urban form to answer this question. The answer includes interethnic relationships and local specifics of the urban form. The responses to violence and conflict must by necessity be local and more importantly must acknowledge the local nature of violence and conflict. These responses include research, planning, policy, security, community initiatives, and peace-building.

The call to localization is not a call to narrowing focus; on the contrary it is a call to a comprehensive urban approach. Localization entails not getting lured by any assumptions about interethnic conflict but investigating street by street the origins and remedies for

any violence or conflict. It acknowledges that violence anywhere can become a threat to peace anywhere else, *if* it is allowed to. Local communities and policymakers in peaceful and violence-prone cities, neighborhoods, and streets are more empowered to act if they are convinced that they have some control over the interethnic fates of their spaces. For the most part there is no such thing as a pan-regional or pan-global ethnic conflict outside of the minds of people. The temptation to view any conflict as one between entire civilizations or religions or ethnicities is dangerous. It is this indiscriminate view of conflict that distracts from its local manifestations and worse, the many local opportunities to resolve it. Planners, designers, policymakers, peacemakers, and researchers must strive to reframe the conflict in local terms. The context of a thousand years of history or a subcontinental geography is important but its value depends on how much it is highlighted. Policymakers often revert to historical narratives of syncretic peace as a way to encourage groups towards peace but that approach is also fraught with risk since it leaves the door open for a counter narrative which can show groups fighting for a thousand years all around the subcontinent. A historical narrative is thus an unreliable, though occasionally useful, ally in countering conflict. Instead, a focus on challenges and opportunities with a clear here and now mindset and a forward looking approach is crucial. Again this is possible only when the intervening parties are bold enough to take charge of the ethnic narratives in the first place. An urban policymaker cannot change historical narratives or affect levels of violence beyond his or her sphere of influence, if peace in a city is contingent to peace in some other place or time then that peace cannot be lasting.

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A hyperlocal review of issues related to interethnic relationships, conflict, urban form problems, violence, and security is the only way to truly address any conflict. There are two important advantages to this hyperlocal approach:

1. Containment

    In Surat, the hyper-localization helps contain the violence, if any, to certain parts. More importantly it modifies the meaning of the violence. Instead of viewing the violence as an urban or ethnic problem citizens see it is as a neighborhood or street-level problem. This spatial containment, partly a result of the urban form, then also aids in containing the memory of the violent event to a specific place. So instead of some pan-India narrative about the conflict between Hindus and Muslims the violence becomes about 'trouble in that part of the town'. Spatial containment also seems to aid containing the violence in time because it contains how long the violence lasts. Spatial containment also reduces the time for which the memory of the violence is meaningful. When the narratives surrounding Hindu-Muslim violence are not contained in time and space, it becomes easy to smudge the timelines and relate one's present-day Muslim neighbor to some 16th century cruel Mughal king. Amplifying the meaning of the violence in space and time, like classifying an act of violence in the streets of Ahmedabad as part of a pan-India thousand year old struggle between Hindus and Muslims, does more to perpetuate the conflict than the act of violence itself. Indeed, even a false rumor of an act of violence is enough to ensure the longevity of the conflict. Localization or spatial containment combined with perceptual containment, attacks the

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propagation of the idea of conflict.

2. <u>Prospect of long-term resolution</u>

Researchers, planners, and policymakers too must then meticulously focus on the few problem areas instead of addressing some comprehensive interethnic conflict. This is not to say that there is no such thing as Hindu-Muslim conflict in India but that its remedies are local. Better relationships among Hindus and Muslims in enough neighborhoods would eventually translate into better relationships between Hindus and Muslims all across India. Long-term peace is then possible through enough local efforts all across the nation.

The reason greater attention must be paid to local efforts is that in the absence of a certain minimum degree of local resilience in *all* locations, a singular instance of violence can destabilize relationships all over the country. This is the reason why nations without violence for decades descend into bloody civil wars and genocides, seemingly overnight.

If unfortunately the conflict does take the form of a regional or national violent conflict, enough cities and towns with local peace efforts can ensure that fewer foot soldiers are available for any such conflict. Also in democracies it means that politicians have enough incentives to counter the violence.

Presented below are a few strategies that show how the hyperlocal approach can be applied in urban conflicts.

Hyperlocal Strategies

Planners, designers, policymakers, peacemakers, and researchers must identify specific geographies where violence occurs. Local police forces are often adept at identifying specific areas in a city which are prone to ethnic violence and will often deploy their resources accordingly. Researchers and peacemakers should focus their work in these areas.

For researchers, investigating local causes and effects may be more important than identifying global patterns. Data about how x percent change in national GDP results in y percent rise in ethnic violence are meaningless without the power to ensure that said GDP drop can be artificially and perpetually prevented. On the other hand researchers can use their skills to identify local causes and empower peacemakers and policymakers with their knowledge. Local causes are much easier to address, and if financial aid is needed, a small amount applied locally and specifically may have a much greater impact than a national level application of aid. When areas prone to violence buck the trend and do not succumb it also encourages the peacemakers and dissuades instigators of violence. Ethnic violence relies so heavily on symbolism that local symbolic peace can have a greater impact on people's perception of interethnic relationships than a statistical rise or fall in levels of peace or violence.

Planners and policymakers should use the urban form to contain the influence of the urban areas which are prone to violence. The urban form strategy for containing violence and its influence includes two approaches. One involves containing and influencing and the other involves isolating. The first strategy is preferable since it has the potential to

transform the urban area from being a hub of violence to a hub of peace. Violence can occur around landmarks, streets, and edges but nodes and districts are especially susceptible to being identified as hubs of violence. A violence prone node or district can be contained by limiting access to it and by creating contrasting areas of interethnic engagement around it. If planners can demonstrate that interethnic engagement is lucrative, financially and socially, then areas which experience interethnic conflict may be forced to change. An urban form which demonstrates that cooperation is superior to the desire for safety or defense is important. This cooperative urban form has the following characteristics:

1. Paths (streets) are not interrupted by ethnic edges and they do not become ethnic edges.

2. Edges are soft and not very imageable.

3. Districts do not have hard edges and there are no or very few drastic transitions in the urban typology.

4. Nodes are hubs of interethnic coopetition.

5. Landmarks are not ethnicized. And even if some landmarks are ethnicized their influence on the surrounding streets, districts, and nodes is limited. Which is to say the streets, districts, and nodes surrounding the landmarks are not similarly ethnicized by default.

A more detailed discussion on the urban form strategies follows later in this chapter.

No single factor is enough for peace

Many scholars have frequently pointed out, business can be very good for peace. However business ties alone do not ensure peace. Interdependence cannot be the only basis of peace.

Interdependence is not trust.

Interdependence may require some degree of trust but it is not as powerful a force as trust. Groups that need each other are not necessarily groups that trust each other. Interdependence forces people together but trust, fragile as it may be, is a more active force in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. In Surat, Hindus and Muslims are proud of the role of business ties in violence prevention. As mentioned earlier, the high level of nuance in Surat's interethnic attitudes and relationships plays a crucial role too. Indeed, it may play a crucial role in fostering the business relationships. An idea expressed again and again in both cities was that the average person does not want riots or violence. However, does the average person want the only thing that provides a truly secure environment i.e., a positive healthy relationship with the other community? A healthy relationship is complicated and involves many factors. When it comes to ethnic conflict in cities, the absence of violence can be considered a good place to start.

The case of Ahmedabad is especially instructive here.

Violence prevention requires a high degree of redundancy. In Ahmedabad after the disappearance of the textile unions as a glue between Hindus and Muslims there was no

other factor holding the two communities together. Specifically, there was no factor holding the unemployed and disgruntled working age men together.

This may be why many societies unbeknownst to themselves teeter on the edge of ethnic violence and when the one factor holding the peace disappears devolve into spectacular violence and surprise most people.

Approaches, Goals, and Strategies

Presented below are approaches, goals, and strategies to counter the effects of ethnic violence in cities for planners, designers, peacemakers, and researchers. None of these recommendations assume that some planners, designers, peacemakers, and researchers are not already highly effective and sensitive regarding ethnic violence in cities. Rather it only suggests that the recommendations are not yet standard within these disciplines. Indeed it is possible for a person to be a planner, designer, peacemaker, and researcher, but this multifaceted personality or even organization is, as yet, elusive.

Researchers here broadly includes anyone engaged in research in an urban area. While the focus here is peace and conflict, urban researchers investigating other issues may also benefit from these recommendations. Peacemakers here is also a broad term. It includes, aid workers in conflict zones, local peace committee members, politicians, observers, peacekeeping forces, and negotiators.

The recommended approaches, goals, and strategies include within them practitioner specific recommendations.

Approaches:

The approaches to ethnic violence in cities includes processes and attitudes. The spatial turn and the focus on the urban form is primary among these approaches and represents an attitudinal shift for planners, peacemakers, and researchers. On the other hand, designers who are already in the business of space and form, are encouraged to make a

shift towards understanding the ethnic meanings attached to said space and form. Presented below are some of these recommended processes and attitudinal shifts.

Opportunity and the Responsibility

The urban form and urban space is an opportunity to exercise control over issues related to ethnic conflict. Researchers and peacemakers are often the first on the field and the most intimately connected to the urban context.   Peacemakers must not only carry maps; they must also draw maps. Professional cartography is not needed here but when peacemakers communicate within communities or when they transmit information about the communities, they must spatialize this information. Similarly, researchers add to the collective knowledge and narrative of a place and different disciplinary perspectives may be crucial for understanding local context. This spatial context is crucial to the problem and any subsequent solutions. In urban research the city plays a crucial role, its ethnic, spatial, and cultural context may be important even if the research does not address these issues directly.

Planners, have the additional responsibility of making the spatial turn and an ethnic turn. As mentioned earlier, matters of ethnicity are well within the planner's purview and they must take ownership of the problem of ethnic conflict and violence and not cede all ground and responsibility to political or community actors. Education about ethnic issues is crucial here for planners and designers. This is where the collaborative process between planners, designers, peacemakers, and researchers is critical. Planners and designers must acknowledge that whether they like it or not their actions will affect outcomes of the conflict since in cities with ethnic conflict

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every intervention is potentially ethnicized. So it is best to do so with awareness of ethnic issues. Merely classifying an intervention as ethnically neutral does not make it so. Design professionals, especially, must understand the meaning and history of various urban form elements. In Ahmedabad for instance there are plenty of romantic notions attached to the pol. Local architecture schools, planning departments, and heritage preservation proposals gloss over or completely disregard the ethnic history and implications of the pol. Planners and designers must educate themselves to a meaningful history of the urban form and the cultural context of that urban form. They must anticipate the cultural impact of design interventions and not just the impact in terms of whatever short term goal it aims to achieve. Adding a lane to a street for the purpose of alleviating traffic may end up meaning something else to the people who live on the street. Even if these future predictions are incorrect it is important to note what was expected so that future actors can trace the distance between expectations and realities.

In summary, researchers and peacemakers have a lot to learn from designers and planners and vice versa. This goes to the heart of this research and its interdisciplinary approach which argues that parties of violence do not heed disciplinary boundaries and neither should parties of peace.

Recording the urban form and ethnicity
The challenges of planners and designers are distinct from the challenges faced by researchers and peacemakers. Researchers and peacemakers can address the ethnic issues and often have a mandate and expertise to do so, on the other hand planners

and designers are cautious when dealing with ethnic issues since they are unsure of their mandate.

Researchers and peacemakers are often tasked with keeping a record of violent events. Aid workers are often the only observers in violence prone cities and their reports are crucial to security forces and future researchers. The way they record violent events may help build a database that addresses the local nuances of the urban form of the violence prone city.

Similarly planners and designers must get in the habit of acknowledging ethnic issues in their study of a city. Even if political compulsions force a certain bias, it is best that a planner or designer records what a certain spatial intervention means when viewed through different ethnic lenses. If ethnicity matters to their constituents that then it should matter to the planners and designers too.

So the way researchers and peacemakers view ethnic violence and conflict in cities and the way planners and designers devise spatial responses to the same must change and converge. The way to approach a city with the explicit goal of reducing levels of violence and conflict involves acknowledging the urban form and ethnic issues simultaneously.

Finally, planners cannot be mere facilitators of the ambitions of politicians or even communities but they should have loftier goals. Presented below are the goals these practitioners should strive for in the city.

Goals

The above mentioned approaches are not just for academic rigor but rather for policy goals which the practitioners can keep in mind while going about their duties. For planners and policymakers these goals can be their primary goals or they can treat them as secondary goals as they pursue other goals. Researchers and peacemakers also contribute to these goals by their knowledge of the local context and the meanings directly be involved in

Spaces for Relationships

Interethnic relationships are central to interethnic peace. Relationships however, need a space within which they can be nurtured and cultivated. When groups interact with each other and observe each other in neutral spaces the possibilities of relationships grow. These spaces do not need to be specialized or formalized spaces, although designers can create such spaces. The more immediate goal should be ensuring that not too many spaces within the city are ethnicized and accessible only to certain ethnic groups.

Urban Pride

There may be limits to how much pride planners and designers can cultivate within a city but it is still an important goal. Urban pride, in the context of cities with interethnic conflict, depends on the following conditions:

A. Peace and harmony in interethnic relationships.

B. Experience of resisting the exogenous temptations to violence (in other words, resilience)

C. Urban growth in which all ethnic groups can participate.

Designers must design spaces which are inclusive and planners must organize the urban form elements to the same end. Urban pride is not a matter of the tallest building or the greenest parks but rather about how people can experience and partake in the tall buildings and green parks.

Control meanings of the urban form

This is a difficult but worthwhile goal for urban stakeholders. Ethnic meanings of the urban form are often related to narratives of violence or cultural hegemony, and efforts must be made to transform these meanings. The meanings related to violence must be transformed to those related to peace. If this transformation is not possible practitioners can diminish the ability of the urban form to remind people of the conflict. As is the case with creation of spaces for relationships, where urban forms with negative meanings cannot be subtracted, urban forms with positive meanings must be added.

Urban access for all

The notion that certain areas in the city due to their ethnic identity are inaccessible to certain groups is present in many cities. Policymakers should not allow these notions to persist. Even if not every group actually accesses every neighborhood or even needs to, the perception that, if need be, then individuals of said group can access any neighborhood is important. Urban pride, as mentioned earlier, is also contingent on participation. Ideally, groups should not see any neighborhoods as belonging

exclusively to any ethnic group. Concentrations or conglomerations of groups are not necessarily a problem till it becomes ethnicization.

Presented below are strategies that different practitioners can use to achieve these goals.

Strategies

To achieve the goals mentioned above and to execute the approaches advocated above the following strategies are recommended.

Strategies for peacemakers and researchers

The research calls on peacemakers and researchers to pay attention to the urban form and the spatial context in general. The following questions may be useful for the recording of these events or while conducting research:

a. What is the space where the incident took place? Is it a street, square, field, ground, building etc.?

b. What is the height of the buildings (if any) surrounding the area? How would you describe the space generally?

c. Is the space located between two quarrelling neighborhoods or within either of them or in a seemingly neutral space?

d. Why do you think the incident happened where it happened? What do you think is the motivation for site selection?

e. Does the space have a history attached to it? Does it have some cultural significance?

Peacemakers must also note the spatial and territorial ambitions of the people. It may be tempting to focus on abstract notions of ethnicity or measurable notions of income or resource competitions but a record of spatial aspirations is also important. These aspirations may not just mean the amount of space but also the quality of space that people engaged in conflict desire. After the fieldwork, researchers must include maps in urban research and describe spaces. Photographs are especially crucial in international research. An Indian street and an American street may not have much in common, and the fact that the word for both is the same may hide more information than in reveals.

Finally, researchers must localize their research as much as possible. Even large dataset based research covering large geographies should include some aspects of the rich context within the research to counter the potential falsehoods that emanate from 'averages' and 'means'. Spectacular cases that do not regress to the mean take entire societies by surprise. There are meaningful aspects and challenges within all research that necessarily slow down the research. Researchers should not add irrational disciplinary boundaries and methodological orthodoxies to existing impediments.

Strategies for urban planners and designers

The following strategies involve the actions to realign professional behavior to the approaches recommended above. The discussion is then followed by specific urban planning and policy strategies. Finally, there are urban form element specific recommendations.

Design professionals, such as architects and urban designers, who may see themselves as technicians of the urban form must also engage more actively in the meaning and implications of those forms. Some of these actions are direct design or policy interventions while others are subtle, attitudinal, or even subversive. For instance, it may be difficult for an architect commissioned to design an apartment building on the contentious border between Juhapura and Vejalpur, to meaningfully address the situation without a mandate to do so, but there are two actions he or she can take:

- Document and understand the cultural situation and make plans for an 'idealized' intervention.

- Add subtle design elements that subvert a horrible element of the urban form, which is the border.

Within neighborhoods planners must strive towards greater integration of neighborhoods. If a policy of integration is difficult to implement in certain cities planners must actively ensure a policy of softening borders between two neighborhoods. In Ahmedabad planners would do well to encourage interethnic cooperation between the two groups across the border. So far the evidence suggests that market forces and security based thinking are only making the border in Ahmedabad worse. The myth that things just improve over time without active interventions is not central to planning, but it seems belief in the myth is always tempting to parties involved in dealing with difficult problems.

Planners must use opportunities to de-ethnicize spaces and elements of the urban form wherever possible. Again this de-ethnicization is possible if the emphasis is placed on the secular meanings of places. So the ethnic demographic homogeneity of

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a neighborhood/district may not change but by improving access to the neighborhood planners can reduce ethnicization.

Policymakers must own the ethnic narratives in their cities. The pretense of de-ethnicization policy in an ethnicized city is dangerous. Local and federal laws may put limits on policymakers but all possible outlets to address ethnic issues must be explored. The planner responsible for zoning for a church cannot hide behind pronouncements of separation of church and state if the matter is ethnically contentious. Compartmentalized rationalism of the planner and policymaker is meaningless in an emotionally charged environment.

Strategies for the elements of the urban form

Presented below are some strategies for each of the five elements of the urban form. These elements typically function in concert and hence the delineations used below are simply for the purpose of clarity. A planner, designer, or researcher will have to use these strategies together, and only on rare occasions will any singular element of the urban form be addressed exclusively. Broadly the strategies are geared towards inclusivity and de-ethnicization, both of which tie into the four goals mentioned earlier.

The elements of the urban form are paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks.

<u>Paths</u>

Streets should be used for bringing groups together. Often certain streets become popular as a way to bypass a neighborhood and thus isolate it. This may be useful if interethnic interactions in the said neighborhood are recurrently violent but if it is

merely as a result of ethnicization then planners must divert streets into the neighborhood. This can be done by beautifying or improving the quality of the streets that go through said neighborhood. Similarly planners can introduce landmarks which are not ethnicized and address the needs of both groups. Finally, with paths, the most pressing issue is their transformation into edges. Planners and designers must ensure that streets (especially for long stretches) have equitable neighborhood and spaces on either side. Here, preventing the creation of the wrong side of the street is important. This involves an equitable distribution of resources. Some inequity may be inevitable but it must be limited to only the smallest length of a street's segment. Here a small length of street is context dependent, in a dense neighborhood it may be only a block length long and in a less dense neighborhood it may be a few hundred feet long.

In summary,

- Paths must bring groups together and not aid mutual avoidance
- Paths should not be allowed to become interethnic edges

<u>Edges</u>

Edges or borders as this research often refers this element of the urban form must be soft and porous. Strategies to soften edges are mentioned below. Here it is useful to read these strategies with the example of Ahmedabad's Vejalpur-Juhapura border in mind.

- Add streets that intersect and interfere with the border are important. These streets should have nodes at either end (in the two communities) that act like magnets

regardless of ethnic boundaries.

- Design contrast must be discouraged. A situation with slums on one side and tall apartments on the other side merely exaggerates the differences. Planners can address this by limiting building heights on one side or by encouraging economic development on the other side.

- If sufficient political will and legitimacy are available, then policymakers should introduce schemes that involve heterogeneous housing around the border.

- Even if political will and legitimacy are unavailable, policymakers can emphasize de-ethnicized groups along the border. A professional guild or hobby group that includes members of both community can soften these borders if their meeting spaces are placed on the edge. However these indirect assaults on ethnic divisions come with some risk as they can be seen as an effort to bring unwilling groups together. There is no escape from the direct and hard work of engendering interethnic relationships, which is why collaborations with peacemakers and researchers are so crucial.

Districts

The prescription for districts or neighborhoods is fairly straightforward and involves: integration and de-ethnicization. Straightforward clearly does not mean easy. The route to integration or heterogeneous neighborhoods is continuing and built with the help of improving interethnic relationships and urban policy. Urban policy may involve integrated public housing which always has the potential to get stuck in ethnic politics or be susceptible to local level corruption. For instance, housing

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schemes in India often involve the sale of lower cost units to middle or lower income families. Individuals buy these houses and rent them (illegally) to others. So even if the owners of apartments in a building give the appearance of heterogeneity and integration the entire building can become ethnically homogenous. Again, professional guilds or housing reserved for a diverse population of professionals can be the answer since it allows policymakers to exert greater control over occupancy. De-ethnicization is slightly easier since it can be accomplished by slowly increasing access and perception of accessibility to a homogeneous neighborhood. As mentioned earlier, ensuring that the borders between neighborhoods are soft and streets are purposed for bringing people closer can go a long way in aiding de-ethnicization of districts.

 Nodes

Nodes are critical in a city with interethnic conflict. Groups use nodes as staging areas for protests, or even clashes. Nodes, dues to their ease of access and high imageability, also attract media attention which becomes an added incentive for violent mobs. Planners must pay special attention to nodes on an interethnic edge to prevent them from becoming node-edge hybrids. The simplest way to do this is to exaggerate the node condition, by encouraging cross traffic, to undermine the edge condition.

Nodes are also excellent as meeting grounds for peace talks or interethnic harmony events. Planners can coopt the same visibility and ease of access that makes them a target of violent mobs for peaceful purposes.

Nodes within ethnic districts can also be used to encourage interethnic engagements. In a city with a history of ethnic violence entering the other group's neighborhood may invoke some sense of nervousness in individuals. Even access to an ethnicized node connected to a familiar path with some degree of interethnic interaction and secular activities (eating, shopping, and leisure) can embolden group members to peacefully challenge ethnicization of a neighborhood.

<u>Landmarks</u>

Landmarks are easy to ethnicize since they may already restrict access to others except members of a particular ethnicity. Despite this, planners should limit the influence of a landmark's ethnicization and not allow surrounding areas to become ethnicized. Again, encouraging access to the districts with judicious use of the strategies related to nodes, paths, and edges can help.

The most straightforward strategy would be to encourage de-ethnicized behaviors around an ethnicized landmark. This has two positive outcomes: one, it limits the ethnicization influence of a landmark; two, it allows members of the other group to observe each other in non-ethnic, and hence non-threatening, behaviors.

The indispensable ingredient

None of the approaches, goals, and strategies work without the presence of one indispensable ingredient: urban safety. Here urban safety entails a sense of security regarding one's own life, limb, and property. Policy makers must remember that urban safety is paramount. When offered the choice between positive interethnic relationships and safety of one's own group and self, individuals and groups will always choose safety.

Unscrupulous politicians will always try to manufacture this false choice wherever possible. Policymakers must ensure that heterogeneous neighborhoods are shining examples of urban safety. Positive and effective policing are critical in any city, but in cities with a history of ethnic violence crimes are blamed on entire groups. Mere rumors of crimes (such as rape or murder) blamed on the other group have devolved into lethal violence in India and around the world often. Even if it does not devolve into violence, if the culprit is not apprehended and brought to justice expeditiously, myths about who did it can become the foundation of present day dehumanization of the other or future violence. Bluntly put, policymakers that cannot ensure urban safety, across the ethnic spectrum, have no legitimacy to preach interethnic relationships. Sadly, given that the rule was true in India with Gandhi, where he lost legitimacy due to recurring Hindu-Muslim violence, the average mayor or urban planner cannot escape this rule. To say that this requirement of ensuring safety without appearing partisan is difficult is an understatement. It helps, however to remember that picking up pieces after a violent confrontation is always more difficult.

Few individuals, let alone groups, can muster meaningful sympathy and compassion for even the most innocent victims of the other group when there are recent memories of victims from one's own group. In ethnic conflict, groups treat compassion and sympathy, as limited resources and if they are required to use it for their own group then there is less left for the other group. Here, 'our people died too' becomes an acceptable response when groups are asked to express sympathy for innocent victims from the other side.

Therefore, regardless of ethnic biases and political compulsions, the commitment to individual security should be unwavering.

Conclusion

The urban form is an important factor in the ethnic violence in cities. It is not only affected by it but in turn affects it. Of course it is difficult to draw a linear causality from a certain element of urban form to a specific violent event, but it certainly makes some choices more likely than others. The border in Ahmedabad, for instance may not cause violence but it does sustain the conflict which may cause violence. Also, the border becomes a potential site for the violence.

As for what causes some cities to have higher levels of ethnic violence than others, this research contends that it is a combination of interethnic relationships and urban form. The surprising finding was that healthy interethnic relationships can thrive despite negative interethnic attitudes.

Both cities face different challenges. Surat's peace is by no means assured; the potential ghettoization of Surat's Muslim neighborhoods combined with a rapidly changing economy may leave Surat more susceptible to violence. However, so far it seems that Surat has a few lines of defense against large scale interethnic violence such as,

- Interethnic relationships
- Business ties
- An urban form that challenges ethnic conflict
- High degree of localization of violence

- Urban pride

- A generally nuanced understanding of ethnicity and ethnic conflict

As long as Surat keeps producing Suratis and converting outsiders to become Suratis, chances are that it will avoid serious violence or at least contain it.

On the other hand Ahmedabad is in desperate need of urban pride and an urban form that is not an artifact of every past instance of violence and conflict for the last 400 years. Ahmedabad's fifteen years of relative peace is not a peace of cooperation and inclusion; rather, it's a peace of security and exclusion. The city reflects the divisions between Hindus and Muslims more and more as time passes. Muslims are on the edges of the city and for the vast majority of the Hindu city they are out of sight and out of mind. This exclusion has forced Muslims to be autonomous and independent and create their own ethnic infrastructure within their neighborhoods. Muslim schoolchildren now have only Muslim classmates and often very few Hindu teachers. As Juhapura's population rises and it gains better facilities, there is a realistic possibility that Muslims may stop visiting the Hindu neighborhoods entirely. The Muslim middle-class is already hidden deep within Juhapura; the development of a comprehensive ethnic infrastructure would mean that only the poorest Muslims on the edges of Juhapura will ever be visible to the Hindu society, further skewing perceptions and reducing the prospects of any relationships. Ahmedabad, may have temporarily solved the security issues but it has also gone deeper into the ethnic conflict quagmire. An inclusive planning process around the border could become a small but meaningful intervention to build better relationships. If private sector

businesses cannot foster relationships, there is no reason why the public sector should not enter the fray.

Ethnicity, ethnicization, ethnic conflict, and ethnic violence are complicated issues, not just in Surat and Ahmedabad, but globally. These issues have been around far longer than urban planning or even social science. However, though every research paper on the matter can end with 'more research is needed' the fact is that we know enough to begin to act.

Appendices

Appendix A-The elements of the urban form

1. Paths- Paths are channels along which the observer customarily, occasionally, or potentially moves. They may be streets, walkways, transit lines, canals or roadways. Paths can be central to the image of the city since many people observe the city while on a path. All other elements can be organized around the paths.

2. Edges- Edges are linear elements not used or considered to be paths by the observer. They are the boundaries between two phases, linear breaks in continuity. They may not be as dominant as paths but for many people they help provide distinction to the different areas of the city.

3. Districts- Districts are medium-to-large sections of the city, conceived as having two dimensional extents, which the observer mentally enters "inside of". And which are recognizable as having some common identifying character.

4. Nodes- Nodes are points, the strategic spots in the city into which an observer can enter. If a node is strong enough it can attract enough people to create its own district. Some nodes may become the focus and epitope of a district, over which their influence radiates. They may be called *Cores*.

5. Landmarks-Landmarks, like nodes, are a reference point, but they are external, recognizable, and prominent Landmarks provide the observer a visual cue about the city. While many landmarks are monuments not all landmarks need to be

monumental. Often endowed with some degree of history or prestige but often

assigned importance not by the greatness of its architecture but by the residents of

the city. It may be important to note there that a landmark has a very different

meaning for the tourist of a

city when compared to the

resident. Seemingly

mundane features may gain

landmark status if enough

residents assign that status

to them.

LANDMARKS

Appendix B-Respondents

Ahmedabad Respondents

Respondent	Age	Gender	Religion	Neighborhood	Birthplace	Education	Occupation	Income	Income Source	Living in Neighborho
AJM30MTen	30	Male	Muslim	Juhapura	In-City	Some schoolin	Shop owner	0-5000	Self	15-20
AJM50MTwelve	50	Male	Muslim	Juhapura	In-City	Highschool	Street Vendor	0-5000	Self	15-20
AJM38MFour	38	Male	Muslim	Juhapura	Outside City	Basic literacy	Artist	0-5000	Self	15-20
AJM64FEight	64	Female	Muslim	Juhapura	Outside City	Some schoolin	Vegetable vendor	0-5000	Self	11-14
AJM28FSix	28	Female	Muslim	Juhapura	In-City	Bachelors	Part-time school teach	10001-20000	Self	15-20
AJM43FNine	43	Female	Muslim	Juhapura	In-City	Bachelors	Housewife	10001-20000	Family	15-20
AJM68MSeven	68	Male	Muslim	Juhapura	In-City	Some schoolin	Rickshaw driver	10001-20000	Self	11-14
AJM29MEleven	29	Male	Muslim	Juhapura	In-City	Bachelors	Business owner (resta	20001-40000	Self	11-14
AJM41MOne	41	Male	Muslim	Juhapura	In-City	Masters	Headmaster	20001-40000	Self	21-100
AJM32MTwo	32	Male	Muslim	Juhapura	Outside Gujarat	Masters	Eletrical engineer	40001-60000	Self	11-14
AJM60FFive	60	Female	Muslim	Juhapura	Outside City	Some schoolin	Housewife	5001-10000	Family	0-10
AJM52MThree	52	Male	Muslim	Juhapura	In-City	Bachelors	Ward Councilor	Unspecified	Self	21-100
AKM36FSeven	26	Female	Muslim	Kalupur-Daryapur	In-City	Some schoolin	Housewife	0-5000	Family	11-14
AKM72M	72	Male	Muslim	Kalupur-Daryapur	In-City	Some schoolin	Grocery store owner	10001-20000	Self	21-100
AKH39MTen	39	Male	Hindu	Kalupur-Daryapur	In-City	Bachelors	Service	20001-40000	Self	21-100
AKH30FEight	30	Female	Hindu	Kalupur-Daryapur	In-City	Some schoolin	Housewife	5001-10000	Family	11-14
AKM26MOne	26	Male	Muslim	Kalupur-Daryapur	In-City	Some schoolin	Rickshaw driver	5001-10000	Self	21-100
AKM37FSix	37	Female	Muslim	Kalupur-Daryapur	Outside City	Some schoolin	Housewife	5001-10000	Family	0-10
AKM30FFive	30	Female	Muslim	Kalupur-Daryapur	Outside Gujarat	Some schoolin	Housewife	5001-10000	Family	0-10
AKM41MTwo	41	Male	Muslim	Kalupur-Daryapur	In-City	Bachelors	Businessman	60001-100000	Self	11-14
AKH73MNine	73	Male	Hindu	Kalupur-Daryapur	In-City	Some schoolin	Retired	Unspecified	Family	21-100
AVH28MFour	28	Male	Hindu	Vejalpur	In-City	Some schoolin	Construction worker	0-5000	Self	15-20
AVH30MThree	30	Male	Hindu	Vejalpur	In-City	Highschool	Unemployed	0-5000	Self	0-10
AVH36FSeven	36	Female	Hindu	Vejalpur	In-City	Highschool	Housewife	10001-20000	Family	21-100
AVH40MSix	40	Male	Hindu	Vejalpur	In-City	Bachelors	In store	10001-20000	Self	15-20
AVH60MFive	60	Male	Hindu	Vejalpur	In-City	Highschool	Shop owner	10001-20000	Self	15-20
AVH50MEight	50	Male	Hindu	Vejalpur	Outside City	Some schoolin	Fruit seller	10001-20000	Self	21-100
AVH58MTwo	58	Male	Hindu	Vejalpur	Outside City	Some schoolin	Tailor	10001-20000	Self	21-100
AVH28FNine	28	Female	Hindu	Vejalpur	Outside City	Masters	Bank employee	40001-60000	Self	21-100
AVH48MOne	48	Male	Hindu	Vejalpur	In-City	Some schoolin	Iron works shop owne	Unspecified	Self	21-100

Surat Respondents

Respondent	Age	Gender	Religion	Neighborhood	Birthplace	Education	Occupation	Income	Income Source	Living in Neighborhood
SAH25FNOne	25	Female	Hindu	Adajan	In-City	Bachelors	Teacher	5001-10000	Self	0-10
SAH31FTwelve	31	Female	Hindu	Adajan	Outside Gujarat	Bachelors	School Teacher	5001-10000	Self	0-10
SAH39FNThree	39	Female	Hindu	Adajan	Outside City	Masters	Government Service	40001-60000	Self	11-14
SAH80FNFive	80	Female	Hindu	Adajan	Outside City	Some schoolin	Housewife	Unspecified	Family	0-10
SNH47FSix	47	Female	Hindu	Nanpura	In-City	Bachelors	Tuition teacher	10001-20000	Self	0-10
SNM57FNEleven	57	Female	Muslim	Nanpura	Outside City	Bachelors	Retired vice principal	10001-20000	Self	15-20
SNH41FNTen	41	Female	Hindu	Nanpura	Outside Gujarat	Highschool	Call cener	10001-20000	Self	0-10
SRM24FNNine	24	Female	Muslim	Rander	In-City	Bachelors	Lawyer-Advocate	Unspecified	Self	21-100
SRM41FOne	41	Female	Muslim	Rander	Outside Gujarat	Bachelors	Housewife	10001-20000	Family	15-20
SRM50FFour	50	Female	Muslim	Rander	In-City	Highschool	Housewife	10001-20000	Family	21-100
SRM26FEight	26	Female	Muslim	Rander	Outside City	Some schoolin	Housewife	Unspecified	Family	21-100
SAH71MTen	71	Male	Hindu	Adajan	In-City	Bachelors	Retired	Unspecified	Self	21-100
SAH28MEleven	28	Male	Hindu	Adajan	Outside City	Bachelors	Business	20001-40000	Self	15-20
SAH45MSeven	45	Male	Hindu	Adajan	Outside City	Bachelors	Principal	Unspecified	Self	21-100
SAH53MNTwo	53	Male	Hindu	Adajan	Outside City	Bachelors	Service	20001-40000	Self	15-20
SAH32MEight	32	Male	Hindu	Adajan	Outside Gujarat	Bachelors	Business consultant	60001-100000	Self	0-10
SAH43MNSix	43	Male	Hindu	Adajan	In-City	Masters	Business consultant	Unspecified	Self	0-10
SAH39MNine	39	Male	Hindu	Adajan	Outside Gujarat	Some schoolin	Insurance agent	20001-40000	Self	0-10
SAH68MFour	69	Male	Hindu	Adajan	Outside Gujarat	Some schoolin	Retired	Unspecified	Family	15-20
SNM25MThree	25	Male	Muslim	Nanpura	In-City	Bachelors	Shop owner and busin	10001-20000	Self	21-100
SNH68MTwelve	68	Male	Hindu	Nanpura	In-City	Highschool	Retired	10001-20000	Family	21-100
SNH30MOne	30	Male	Hindu	Nanpura	Outside City	Highschool	Shop owner and busin	20001-40000	Self	21-100
SNH37MTwo	37	Male	Hindu	Nanpura	Outside Gujarat	Masters	Insurance officer	20001-40000	Self	0-10
SNH38MNine	38	Male	Hindu	Nanpura	In-City	Some schoolin	Street vendor	5001-10000	Self	21-100
SNM35MFive	35	Male	Muslim	Nanpura	In-City	Some schoolin	Garage mechanic	5001-10000	Self	21-100
SNM35MFour	35	Male	Muslim	Nanpura	In-City	Some schoolin	Garage owner	10001-20000	Self	21-100
SNM41MSeven	41	Male	Muslim	Nanpura	In-City	Some schoolin	Scrap metal dealer	10001-20000	Self	21-100
SNM45MNEight	45	Male	Muslim	Nanpura	In-City	Some schoolin	Property broker	100000-150000	Self	21-100
SRM36MTwelve	36	Male	Muslim	Rander	Outside City	Bachelors	Textile Market Job	10001-20000	Self	15-20
SRM38MSix	38	Male	Muslim	Rander	In-City	Bachelors	Journalist	20001-40000	Self	0-10
SRM35MThree	35	Male	Muslim	Rander	In-City	Masters	School Principal	20001-40000	Self	11-14
SRM42MTwo	42	Male	Muslim	Rander	In-City	Masters	Government Employe	40001-60000	Self	0-10
SRM58MEleven	58	Male	Muslim	Rander	In-City	Masters	Doctor	60001-100000	Self	0-10
SRM64MSeven	64	Male	Muslim	Rander	In-City	Some schoolin	Electrician	5001-10000	Self	21-100
SRM66MFive	66	Male	Muslim	Rander	In-City	Some schoolin	Retired	Unspecified	Family	21-100
SRM28MTen	28	Male	Muslim	Rander	Outside City	Some schoolin	Restaurant Worker	5001-10000	Self	15-20

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