ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: LOCAL DYNAMICS IN CIVIL WARS:
HOW CIVILIANS RESIST VIOLENCE

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Doctor of Philosophy, 2024

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This thesis addresses puzzles related to violence against civilians in civil wars. Specifically, the thesis emphasizes civilians' roles in influencing rebel groups' decisions to escalate indiscriminate violence against civilians in conflicts.

Previous literature on violence against civilians suggest that rebel groups in civil wars may kill selectively or indiscriminately. These studies argue that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive since it eliminates incentives for civilian collaboration with the perpetrator. Yet, indiscriminate violence remains a common phenomenon. Why do rebels use indiscriminate violence when doing so is counterproductive? What explains the occurrence and intensity of indiscriminate violence?

The thesis answers the puzzle by focusing on civilian mobilizations against rebel groups. It argues that civilians' resolve to mobilize against rebel groups is important in influencing rebels' decisions to escalate indiscriminate violence. Civilians can signal this resolve by engaging in violent and nonviolent risky mobilization against rebels. Statistical tests, which are based on

conflict event data collected from civil wars in Africa, reveal that the occurrence, long duration, and high frequency of civilian mobilization negatively correlate with violence. The thesis further traces a detailed single case study on Boko Haram and four cross comparison cases to provide qualitative evidence on the mechanisms of the theory.

The thesis makes two theoretical contributions to the field of conflict. First, when explaining indiscriminate violence, the thesis shifts the attention to civilians' decisions and resolve to reduce violence. Second, the theory provides novel mechanisms on how civilians mobilize to deter rebel groups from using indiscriminate violence. The mechanisms also link specific predictions on the conditions under which civilians are likely to be successful in deterring rebels from using violence.

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by

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2024

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List of Abbreviations

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ADM1	1st Administrative level
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANPP	All Nigeria Peoples Party
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ATCC	Association of Peasant Workers of the Carare
AUC	United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
BBOG	Bring Back Our Girls
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
CRIC	Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca
ELN	National Liberation Army
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FORGE	Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence
GAM	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
GED	Geographical Event Data
HSMF	Holy Spirit Mobile Forces
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISIS	Islamic State
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province
ISWAP	Islamic State's West Africa Province
JAS	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad
JW	Jehovah's Witnesses
JNIM	Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin

LDU	Local Defence Units
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEC	Major Episodes of Contention
MAQL	Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame
MNO	Mozambican National Resistance Movement
MONUC	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
NGO	Non-governmental organizations
NAVCO	Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes
NSA	Non-state Actor dataset
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OSV	One sided violence
PCSJA	Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
SCAD	Social Conflict Analysis Database
SPLA-Nasir	Sudan People's Liberation Army - Nasir
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UP	Patriotic Union
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
UPDM	Uganda's People's Defense Movement
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
VDP	Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 The Puzzles

In 2015, the rebel group Boko Haram captured the town of Baga in North-East Nigeria. Upon their entrance, the group burned houses and engaged in massacres of local civilians for several days (HRW, 2020). Fast forward to 2019, the group once again regained control over the town. Expecting violence from the rebels, many fled before the group's arrival. However, to the locals' surprise, the group refrained from attacking civilians. Instead, rebel soldiers urged civilians to stay and claimed they could redistribute resources from local elites for sharing (Freeman, 2019).

Closer examinations of Boko Haram's actions present a vexing puzzle for the study of one-sided violence. Despite the group's claims of re-branding and shifting its strategy to winning "hearts and minds," they continued to attack civilians in other towns frequently. Throughout 2019 and 2021, Boko Haram transported its members from town to town via trucks and motorcycles, executing women and children, burning United Nations' facilities, and displacing countless communities (Agence France Presse, 2019; Sahara Reporters, 2021).

We know, based on previous studies, that violence against civilians undermines the state's credibility to protect civilians and can provoke the state into using excessive force against would-be rebel supporters. Both outcomes would be helpful in increasing civilians' support for rebel

groups (Crenshaw, 1981). Existing explanations also link one-sided violence with strategies such as attrition or spoiling, where rebels attack civilians to intentionally delay or threaten to spoil the prospect of peace (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Lake, 2003). However, it has been shown both empirically and theoretically that these strategies do not pay. Fortna (2015) shows that rebels' use of terrorist attacks can lead to a 53 percent decrease in success in gaining victory among autocracies and a 21 percent decrease among democracies. In addition, she suggests that while violence increases rebels' prospect of survival, "when it comes to achieving a rebel group's political goals, the disadvantages of terrorism generally outweigh its advantages" (p. 549).

Scholars have also sought to explain rebels' use of violence at the local level. Kalyvas (2006) argues that rebels are likely to selectively target civilians in territories they control while engaging in indiscriminate violence in contested territories due to a lack of reliable information. This insight sheds light on the variation in violent strategies rebels employ locally, but it is less helpful in accounting for the variation in indiscriminate violence Boko Haram often uses in contested areas. Rebels frequently contest territories with incumbent states, yet they do not massacre civilians every time they capture a town. For instance, in August 2017, Boko Haram killed 33 civilians in the Lake Chad region and issued threats against the state's presence. The region remained contested between the rebel group and Nigeria. However, the following year, locals in the same region reported that the group was "friendly and nice to those who come to the area" (Carsten & Kingimi, 2018).

What explains variations of indiscriminate violence within rebel groups at a local level? Why do rebels still use indiscriminate violence when doing so is counter-productive?

A common characteristic of the existing literature is its insufficient attention to civilians' decisions to mobilize against violence. Beyond participating in, being victims of, and fleeing from

violence, civilians often resist by mobilizing violently and non-violently against rebel groups. In Nigeria, Boko Haram's kidnapping activities sparked widespread non-violent mobilizations by civilians in northeastern regions. The "Bring Back Our Girls" campaign urged the state to intensify its counterinsurgency efforts and garnered significant support from both domestic and foreign elites (Gaffey, 2017). Additionally, many communities during the same period directly sponsored the formation of communal militias to violently resist Boko Haram. In Colombia, Kaplan found that civilians non-violently organize themselves into local committees to prevent violence and extortion by rebel groups (Kaplan, 2017). In South Sudan, communities sponsored the activities of the Arrow Boys to resist violence from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Koos, 2014). In Afghanistan, civilians played direct roles in establishing communal militias, which later received U.S. support to fight against the Taliban (Osman & Clark, 2018).

To integrate civilians' resistance efforts into explanations of violence, it also necessary to account for why these mobilizations occur in the first place. Scholars that have observed these resistance efforts point out that it is highly risky to mobilize against rebel groups. Kalyvas (2006) says "...even if villagers initially joined the militias under coercion, they may quickly learn to fear and hate the rebels" (p. 109). Kaplan (2017) likewise suggests "protest may anger armed actors and provoke greater repression if it fails" and can "become sitting ducks if they are outgunned" (p. 50-51). Yet, the fact that civilians mobilize often in civil wars against rebels suggests that, beyond the existence of coercion, civilians perceive these tactics to be effective weapons to reduce violence from rebel groups. These observations thus lead to a second puzzle: Despite the risks of mobilization, why do civilians still choose to do it?

Closely related to the second puzzle, the third puzzle of this dissertation investigates the conditions under which the most ruthless rebels can be deterred by civilian mobilizations. Most

literature on the effectiveness of civilian agency against rebel groups limits its theoretical scope to rebels more likely to use selective violence within their territories. For example, Kaplan (2017) explicitly states that his theory does not apply to more ruthless rebels (p. 18). A significant body of literature focuses on peace territories in civil wars (Mouly et al., 2019). Research on rebel governance often centers on rebels' peaceful behaviors, as previous scholarship has overlooked rebels' governing actions beyond violence (Mampilly, 2012). However, outside of peaceful territories and rebels' governance behaviors, civilians are far from passive. Given the traumatic nature and brutality of violence, understanding if and when civilians can deter ruthless rebels is a pressing and urgent task.

The fourth puzzle of this dissertation explores the logic of resistance against rebels. Previous literature on civilian autonomy and resilience is useful for describing how civilians adapt to the impact of violence but often falls short in elaborating on how civilians use mobilization as a viable deterrence strategy to influence rebels' incentives. What is the strategic logic of mobilization?

1.2 Definition of Violence

This dissertation primarily examines physical violence, where rebels inflict harm on civilians. Within this broad category, Kalyvas (2006) defines the distinction between selective violence and indiscriminate violence. Selective violence occurs when rebels target individuals based on extensive information provided by their collaborators. Indiscriminate violence, on the other hand, targets groups rather than individuals, often due to a lack of specific information. Kalyvas suggests that although the purposes of both types of violence are similar, aiming to coerce and

control a population, the methods differ based on the availability of information.

Both selective and indiscriminate violence are forms of coercive violence, intentionally inflicted on civilians to help rebels achieve control. More broadly, categorical violence occurs when insurgents harm individuals based on their identity or category (Goodwin, 2006). This dissertation investigates the nuances and implications of these different types of violence in the context of rebel strategies and civilian responses.

The focus of this dissertation is studying the variation of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by rebel groups. The focus leaves out violence that is carried out selectively based on individuals' actions. I do not, however, make distinctions between indiscriminate violence (violence carried out against the guilty) and categorical violence (violence toward groups with specific identities) since restricting to either types of violence necessarily pre-supposes rebels' motivations in using violence. For the same reason, I will also not make distinction between violence that appears random, perpetrated for emotional purposes, and coercive violence.

A major implication of this definition of violence is that it encompasses both terrorist violence and civil war violence, each of which may be driven by distinct motivations. As Fortna (2015) summarizes, indiscriminate terrorist violence aims to influence a wider audience and convey specific political messages. This type of violence is a common tactic in the rebels' repertoire during civil wars. Indiscriminate civil war violence may occur because rebels lack information about their targets, are unwilling to discipline lower-ranked soldiers, or believe violence is an effective means to forcibly collect resources.

When categorizing violence, this dissertation does not presuppose rebels' strategic motivations. Instead, it broadly distinguishes between indiscriminate violence and selective violence, examining the different contexts and implications of each.

1.3 Theory Overview: How Civilians Signal Resolve Through Mobilization

This dissertation argues that by engaging in risky mobilizations against rebel groups, civilians can signal their resolve to deter violence perpetrated by rebel groups. I define resolve as civilians' willingness to accept risks and stand firm in order to deter rebels from victimizing civilians. The central claim of the theory is that civilian mobilization is part of a bargaining process with rebels. By collectively mobilizing against rebel groups, civilians transmit information regarding their resolve to *continue* adding costs onto rebels. The key prediction is that rebels being rational actors are likely to decrease or abandon violence against civilians given that civilians' mobilizing efforts are sufficiently costly to *both* civilians and rebels.

Civilian mobilizations, even in civil wars, can rely on diverse forms of tactics. I broadly define mobilization as visible and collective activities that undermine rebels' strategic interests in wars. Within this broad category, I detail the mechanism of two types of tactics. Through nonviolent tactics, civilians pressure the incumbent state to intensify counter-insurgency campaigns against rebels. In doing so, civilians achieve two goals. First, by pressuring the state, civilians can credibly threaten to raise rebels' costs of survival. Second, because exposing their alignment to the state and escalating counter-insurgency campaign could be equally devastating for civilians, civilians transmit information regarding their resolve to resist violence. Similarly, through violent tactics, civilians mobilize communal militias to resist rebel groups. Given that the risks of coordinating militia groups are high, coordination reveals civilians' resolve to stop rebels from using violence.

My argument's core logic partly draws from deterrence and bargaining literature from IR (international relations), which has emphasized the importance of credibly revealing resolve to

adversaries. Among nuclear deterrence literature, for example, scholars have argued that the willingness to take risks for disastrous outcomes to occur can deter actors from further transgressions (Schelling, 1980; Powell, 1990). Likewise, in inter-state war literature, placing "trip-wire" troops in harms' way signal the threatener's commitment to a goal. States' efforts to mobilize demonstrate their willingness to continue accepting costs. (Fearon, 1995; Slantchev, 2004).

My theory's logic is thus similar to classic deterrence theories. Instead of sending threats to escalate nuclear conflicts, civilians' violent and non-violent tactics reveal civilians' commitment to impose costs on rebel groups. The revealed commitment deters rebels from escalating violence against civilians.

1.4 Gap I: Explaining One Sided Violence at a Local Level Across Time

Scholars agree that rebels use violence as a viable strategy to gain concessions from the incumbent state (Crenshaw, 1981; Hultman, 2007, 2009; Hoffman, 2004; Pape, 2006). First, rebels attack civilians to provoke violent crackdowns from the state. In this case, rebels exploit the civilians' negative reception of the state's repression, which legitimizes the cause of rebellion for fence-sitters (Crenshaw, 1981). This strategy has been shown to be particularly effective against autocratic states, where leaders are more willing to violate civilians' human rights while attempting to defeat insurgents (Fortna, 2015).

Second, rebels use violence to signal the resolve to fight against the state. Pape argues that suicide terrorism is often used by rebels to signal resolve toward the state. Because killing oneself while blowing up targets is costly, "attackers could not have been deterred by a threat of costly retaliation" (Pape, 2006, p. 28). Similar threats are made by rebel groups when a peace process

is underway. By using violence against civilians, rebels signal their willingness to sacrifice the current bargaining position and walk away from the peace process if additional demands are not met (Lake, 2003). Given the costs of continuing to fight are high, states are forced to offer further concessions following the attack. Thus, contrary to the previous strategy, democracies in this scenario are more vulnerable since violence is primarily used to convince the public that there will be more pain if the state still refuses to offer concessions.

Third, violence against civilians has been argued to be a useful strategy to advertise the group's cause and publicize the group's willingness to achieve goals among the group's network. By using costly violence against civilians, rebels demonstrate their commitment to the cause and their willingness to take concrete actions to change the status quo. (Bloom, 2005). Kydd & Walter (2006) distinguish insurgents between zealots and sellouts, where zealots are more willing to gain significant concessions from the state but at a higher price. Since it is more likely to gain civilians' support by driving a harder bargain, rebels will opt to attack civilians to show that they are zealots (p. 76).

These strategies are often used by weaker rebel groups. A strand of explanations further explores the variation of rebel organizations. Crenshaw (1981) says "The observation that terrorism is a weapon of the weak is hackneyed but apt" (p. 387). Rebels use violence to provoke the state's response when rebels lack mobilization capacity. Violence is used as an instrument to overcome "mass passivity." Likewise, while rebels prefer killing civilians to demonstrate their resolve to gain concessions, the primary reason is that they cannot hope to send signals by directly confronting states on the battlefield. Since civilians are less protected than military targets, killing civilians initially appears to be a cheaper way to demonstrate a state's inability to protect its territories. (Moore, 1995). However, rebel groups that are stronger and more capable of at-

tracting participation face higher costs of using violence. In the longer term, violence destroys resources necessary for rebels' fighting capacities (Bates et al., 2002), decreases the pool of recruits (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006), and makes civilians more likely to collaborate with the state in the future (Wood, 2010).[1]

By focusing on the competition between rebels and states, scholars have made significant progress in understanding rebels' general strategy selections. The literature is particularly informative in answering why rebels use violence and when such strategies are more attractive compared with other alternatives. However, there are several limitations to this approach.

First, the above-suggested literature cannot accurately account for rebels' decisions to use violence at a local level. While rebels may use violence as a provocation, signaling, or out-bidding strategy, none of these explanations account for why certain locations witness more violence than others. Why do rebels believe that some locations are viable to carry out these strategies? Second, most of the above literature does not account for the fact that violence is generally counterproductive. As Fortna (2015) has shown, while violence helps rebels to survive, it does not contribute to rebels' success in achieving political goals. The disadvantage of using these tactics outweigh the advantages. This thus poses a puzzle on why rebels would use these strategies in the first place. Third, all of the above literature accounts for civilians' role in being a victim or potential participants but does not consider civilians as strategic actors to resist violence. Civilians, therefore, are depicted as lacking agency.

Literature on civilian-rebel relations provides useful explanations of local variations. Kalyvas (2006) argued that rebels choose between indiscriminate violence and selective violence.

[1] It is also worth noting that beyond mobilization capacities and fighting capabilities, other rebel organizations' characteristics are shown to affect violence. For example, rebel organization's cohesion and members' commitment to groups overall ideology are both important for rebels to vary strategies in controlling soldiers' behaviors (Weinstein, 2006; Cohen, 2016)

Both types of violence are used primarily to coerce support among civilians. Within controlled territories, rebels are more likely to selectively target civilians to deter the community's collaboration with the state. Among contested territories, where rebels lack control, insurgents opt to use indiscriminate violence to target a group of suspected collaborators. One major reason is that rebels lack precise information on the target's identity. Thus, Kalyvas (2006) argues that rebels use violence primarily because of the degree of presence and control a group has in a territory. Balcells (2011) argues that actors in civil wars engage in indirect violence, where actors use imprecise weapons that obviate the need for face-to-face interactions to kill. Due to the lack of information, actors may use indirect violence in an area that has a high density of supporters for political opposition. In addition, actors would also use direct violence, which necessitates killing through face-to-face interactions.

Framing the occurrence of indiscriminate violence as consequences of identification problems still does not resolve two issues. First, if indiscriminate violence occurs because of a lack of insurgent presence, then why do some contested areas suffer indiscriminate violence more often than others? Second, if Kalyvas' theory captures all aspect of violence, then we should expect insurgents categorically carry out large scale massacres to every town that is contested. Yet, as shown in the beginning of this chapter, this is not necessarily the case. Rebels' behaviors adapt and evolve over time at a local level. Information on civilian targets may not necessarily be the only factor.

Geographic explanations account for local variations of violence by linking a location and its population's characteristics to rebels' behaviors. Urban and rural divisions, for example, have been argued to affect the likelihood of violence. De la Calle (2017) argues that rebels are less likely to use violence in urban areas because rebels heavily depend on clandestine activities to

survive. Since the civilians can decide to switch support against rebels at any time, rebels will focus more on securing legitimacy. In contrast, rebels are less likely to seek legitimacy in rural areas since doing so is pointless when merely sufficient presence can translate to legitimacy. Koren (2017) however, argues that urban cities such as the capital signifies political value to the state. Rebels are more likely to signal their resolve in capital cities since doing so can more directly coerce elites and intimidate the public. Scholars have observed that dense cell phone coverage, which typically correlates with urban density, encourages insurgent coordination and thereby indirectly contributes to violence.(Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013).

Beyond the occasional contradictory conclusions drawn from geographic explanations, the literature mentioned above tends to depict civilians as static attributes of various locations, which may be a fundamental source of the issue at hand. While this assumption is theoretically convenient, it overlooks the dynamic nature of civilian behavior. Civilians can, and often do, change their behaviors over time, thereby potentially altering rebels' perceptions of the costs associated with using violence in a particular location. It is reasonable to argue that rebels have strong incentives to use violence in capital cities to signal resolve. However, depending on how civilians respond to rebel actions, rebels may subsequently adjust the intensity of violence in those locations. On this front, existing geographic explanations still lack insights into how civilians' actions could potentially influence and alter rebel behaviors across space.

1.5 Gap II: Explaining Why Civilian Mobilization Occurs

Civilians frequently violently and non-violently challenge rebel groups in civil wars. What explains these occurrences? One explanation focuses on selective incentives. Generally speaking,

Olson (2009) defines selective incentives as exclusive rewards to those who are participating. Because only those who mobilize can reap the returns of resistance against rebel groups, participants can eliminate free-rider issues. For civilian mobilizations, there are two types of selective incentives: tangible and intangible. Tangible selective incentives involve survival, financial incentives, and various provisions of material goods exclusive to communities that decide to mobilize against rebels. In contrast, intangible selective incentives involve the preservation of community norms, integrity of a community's identity, and emotional incentives.

Explanations that focus on tangible incentives argue that civilians primarily mobilize for security and financial rewards. Given that not resisting is riskier than resisting, civilians opt to resist (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). Koos (2014) observed that in Uganda, many civilians joined Arrow Boys since doing so provides security to family members. The U.S justified its decisions to support Afghan communal militias on the ground that "The ALP allow guys to stay at home and protect their families and their villages" (Walsh, 2011). Additionally, the U.S officials believed that financial motivations played key roles in keeping the civilian resistance alive, and thus exerted significant efforts to implement an accurate and secure payment system (Clark, 2017). As another example of non-violent mobilizations, Vüllers & Krtsch (2020) recently suggest that protesting, compared with fleeing, is a viable alternative to "affect their living conditions" (p. 3).

However, these assertions have not yet adequately addressed the risks civilians face when mobilizing. As I will discuss more extensively in later chapters of this dissertation, both violent and non-violent resistance tactics face significant risks beyond exposure to rebels' retaliations. Furthermore, plenty of evidence on the ground suggests that civilians are indeed aware of the risks of mobilizing when discussing in groups. Kaplan (2017) during his fieldwork in Colombia finds that the villagers were quite dismissive when it comes to arming themselves, "...they were

not soldiers, had no weapons, and would easily be crushed by the standing armies" (p. 183). Similarly, Idler et al. (2015) observed that in Colombia, some villagers refrained from resisting rebels' demands due to perceived risks. As one villager stated, "When problems arise, instead of supporting the leader, people would say, 'Well, you wanted to start as an informant [by talking to the armed actors], now you have to do this yourself!' " (p. 7).

A variant of tangible incentives focuses on the incumbent's role in mobilizing civilians against rebels. This type of explanation highlights the coercive nature of mobilization. Kalyvas (2006) says :"The primary purpose of militias is 'population control' and that militias provide useful information for states to gather intelligence and fight enemies (p. 107). Further elaborating on this idea, Schubiger (2021) argues that civilians mobilize against rebels to signal loyalty toward the state. Mobilization is thus useful for the state to distinguish between the "guilty" and the "innocent." Mobilizing therefore is also a safety mechanism that ensures civilians' survival against the state's indiscriminate violence.

The role of mobilization in states' efforts against rebel groups is evident. Civilians are often forced at gun points to enlist in militias to fight rebels and protest against rebels. However, there are also plenty of protests and militias coordinated mostly by civilians themselves. States only became involved at a later point. For example, the U.S. ALP program was primarily aimed at linking *existing* communal militias in Afghanistan as a coordinated network, not creating them from the ground up. The Algerian civil wars' Legitimate Defence Groups (GLD) originated by Berbers to defend themselves and were only integrated by the state later on (Abdo, 1994). Furthermore, while mobilizing against rebels provide safety against violence from the state, it tends to exacerbate violence from belligerents at a later date. Kalyvas (2006) has pointed this out when discussing militias, "Ironically, the local character of militias that permits the gathering of in-

formation so necessary to political actors may also turn them into indiscriminate weapons with counterproductive effects" (p. 108).

There also exist a few explanations that focus on ideational or cultural factors. Arguments related to intangible incentives focus on the community's social norms and the desire to preserve them. These explanations may explain why civilians would mobilize in high-risk environments. Masullo (2020) argues that "ideational factors" drive civilians' decisions to mobilize against rebel groups. Community leaders and local political elites leverage existing norms to engage in non-cooperative activities against rebel groups. Leaders' efforts to mobilize thus interact with civilians' existing beliefs and cause the outcome (i.e. resistance). Mobilizing against rebels, therefore, is in part a fulfillment of one's existing normative commitments. Kaplan (2017) also suggests the culture of peace thesis, where civilians become subscribed to pacifism and engage in non-violent rebellions against rebel groups. Arguments on emotion suggest that the anger to loss and destruction caused by insurgents can overcome risks and lead people to mobilize. In a similar vein, the pleasure of resistance may lead one to mobilize (Wood, 2003).

1.6 Gap III: Explaining the Outcomes of Mobilizing Against Ruthless Rebels

A primary challenge of the civilian agency literature is to show that civilians' actions are not merely epiphenomenal to conflict dynamics between rebel groups and incumbent states (Kalyvas, 2006). Kaplan concludes that it is social cohesion that facilitates civilians' cooperation against rebel groups and allows communities to survive threats of violence. Kaplan (2017) notes, however, "Communities are more likely to be overrun in the midst of heavy fighting or when facing highly resolute or ruthless groups" (p. 18) A similar view is shared by Mampilly (2012),

who suggests that rebel governance tends to fall apart when insurgents become preoccupied with fighting with the incumbent state. This is described clearly in the Sri Lanka case, "During this final phase of the war, civilian governance in the rebel-held territory went through a rapid process of decline, as the organization devoted its resources to its military wing in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to preserve its shrinking territorial base" (p. 127).

The current state of the literature on civilian mobilization, therefore, makes it difficult to theoretically and empirically demonstrate that civilians' agency is not merely a consequence of external conditions. In other words, the relationship between civilian resistance and absence of violence could be spurious. The existence of peace mechanisms established by civilians could be entirely dependent on the existence of conditions that enabled rebels to stay peaceful. In addition, it is possible that there exists reverse causation, where the existence of "civilian agency" or "mobilization," were enabled by rebel groups who were less likely to carry out indiscriminate violence.

The assumption that the most resolute and ruthless rebels are unlikely to be peaceful with civilians is perhaps the cause to the above problems. Yet, terms such as "resolute" and "ruthless" do not necessarily suggest that rebels cannot be deterred by civilians to use violence. First, "ruthless" or "brutal" are only implying the sheer intensity of violence a rebel group has perpetrated. They say nothing about the rebels' underlying incentives to kill, and they especially say little about rebels' strategic incentives (i.e. incentives based on the actions civilians could take). Furthermore, drawing conclusions based on the intensity of violence necessitates speculating causes merely based on outcomes, which has been shown to be the cause of tautological theories in civil wars (Kalyvas, 1999).

Terms such as "resolute" likewise provide little insight on why rebels could not be deterred

from using violence by civilians. Existing literature tends to attribute rebels' violent behaviors to shifting goals. Fortna (2015) suggests that rebels use terrorist violence because they are focusing on short-term goals of survival. Wood (2014) argues that when rebels face setbacks on the battlefield, rebels tend to resort to violence and looting to survive. Stewart (2021) argues that the reason behind variations of rebel governing behaviors is determined by rebels' process of defining goals. However, merely having goals or being compelled by conflict conditions to be resolute in pursuing them does not preclude the possibility of negotiation. Political actors frequently appear resolute as a strategic tactic to achieve their objectives. Yet, it's not uncommon for resolute actors to de-escalate conflicts. As Fearon (1995) persuasively argues, actors are capable of reaching agreements even when issues seem indivisible. Rather, it's private information and commitment problems that often impede actors from reaching a mutually acceptable resolution.

Thus, the variation in violence and rebels' behaviors toward civilians is perhaps not solely due to the rebels' ruthless or resolute nature but also influenced by civilians' actions that alter the rebels' bargaining range. This thus leads to the final puzzle: how do civilians deter rebels from using violence?

1.7 Gap IV: The Logic of Civilian Mobilization Against Rebels

Prior literature on how civilians mobilize against rebels follows two primary themes: autonomy and resilience. Descriptions that document civilians' autonomy stress how civilians restrain from taking sides and establish local institutions to prevent belligerents from using violence. Similar to autonomy, resilience literature describes civilians' learning and adaption, both of which reduce the likelihood of deaths from violence. The two themes suffer from conceptual challenges

and fall short of clarifying the strategic aspect of mobilization and deterrence.

The basic logic of civilian autonomy is this: Given that showing defiance against either rebels or states will invite violence, civilians are safer and restrained from taking sides. Instead, civilians choose to maintain autonomy by establishing mechanisms to avoid violence. Ample descriptive evidence supports this view. Anderson & Wallace (2012) document a series of case studies that suggest civilians would organize and negotiate with rebels to carve out "peace zones." Mindanao communities in the Philippines refused to directly participate in rebel organizations and avoided confrontations between Christians and Muslims by persuading both the incumbent state and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to lay down arms in designated areas. The Madhu Sanctuary in Sri Lanka, which was established primarily by local religious elites, provided a shelter for civilians' in the midst of fighting between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the incumbent. Elaborating on the idea of peace zones, Kaplan specifies how civilians prevent violence through local institutional mechanisms. The ATCC, for example, would leverage pre-existing ties between rebels and civilians to prevent rebels from mistakenly targeting innocent civilians. The ATCC also was responsible for negotiating with armed groups over issues such as taxation and local economic developments (Kaplan, 2013).

The civilian autonomy literature faces conceptual challenges on distinguishing between resistance and submission. As Kalyvas (2006) has argued, violence is a "joint process" and Information transferred between rebels and civilians can also take many forms (p. 173). Civilian autonomy literature so far may have only clarified mechanisms on how selective violence occurs in locations consolidated by rebels. For example, local institutions may be seen as a device to prevent rebels from killing innocent civilians, but it can be also seen as a mechanism on how rebels single out and kill "the guilty" (Kaplan, 2013). In other words, the 'civilian autonomy'

theories remain largely a matter of framing and interpretation and, as a result, do not offer novel predictions about violence.

The resilience literature does not address these conceptual issues. Drawing from disaster management, scholars argue that civilians can avoid violence by focusing on adapting and recovering from violence. As Juncos & Joseph (2020) have put it, "adaptation is a key theme of resilience...Communities and individuals adapt to their changed circumstances as they seek to rebuild social and cultural cohesion" (p. 297). Explaining communal violence in civil wars, Krause (2018) explains how civilians mobilize to "adapt to a changing conflict environment and prevent killings" (p. 68). Thus, resilience literature only focuses on how civilians cope and adapt to the impact of violence, but does not explain how civilians mobilize to influence rebels' incentives from perpetrating violence.

A subset of civilian autonomy literature stresses the importance of "peace culture." In the process of building local institutions that prevent killings, civilians coerce rebels to restrain from targeting civilians by spreading the norm of pacifism. Such argument is deeply embedded within peace-building communities. The USAID for example, suggests that empathy and compassion are essential for sustaining reconciliation and problem-solving across divisions (Moberg et al., 2009, p. 5). But existing evidence does not entirely support this view. For example, during the Sri Lanka civil war, churches often became the targets of attack by belligerents. Kaplan (2013) likewise observed that many civilians in Colombian villages were targeted by rebel groups despite their preference for pacifism. [2]

A final set of literature considers civilians' everyday resistance against rebels. Scott (1985)

[2] It is however debatable whether pacifism is a necessary condition to deter rebels from targeting civilians. Civilians may be able to mobilize against rebels because local populations are die hard supporters for pacifist principles. Pacifism, therefore, in theory could provide the necessary legitimacy for civilians mobilizations to occur (Masullo, 2020).

defines everyday resistance tactics as "ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot-dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth" (p. 29). These tactics indeed exist and perhaps are commonly used by civilians to resist rebels. Civilians in Rwanda buried bananas to trick Interahamwe into believing that the mounds are graves of Tutsis that the community helped to kill. Gowrinathan & Mampilly (2019) find that civilians in Sri Lanka manipulated rebels' own cultural beliefs against the groups' treatment toward civilians. For example, women exploited LTTE's deference to women by feigning physical weakness in front of rebels' administrative offices. Doing so allowed the women to reliably access LTTE's officers and inquire about their missing husbands' locations.

An important element of everyday resistance tactics is that it avoids confrontation with rebel groups. Everyday tactics are thus often carried out in secret and by individuals. Theoretically, it remains difficult to argue that everyday resistance can make a significant impact on rebels' general behavior patterns. It is more plausible, as Scott has suggested, that these tactics are merely temporarily delaying rebels from using violence. Moreover, the fact that most of these tactics are covert makes it empirically challenging to analyze. I will revisit these tactics in a later chapter of this dissertation.

1.8 Contributions

Why do rebels use violence against civilians when doing so is counterproductive? My theory argues that rebels' perceptions on civilians' resolve matter. Civilian mobilizations serve as a credible signal of a community's resolve to deter rebels from abusing civilians. My theory emphasizes the role of information in conflicts between civilians and rebel groups. It is worth noting

that the type of information I emphasize is distinct from the one suggested in Kalyvas' theory. While Kalyvas (2006) suggests that it is the reliability of information regarding civilians' identity that decides whether rebels use indiscriminate violence, I suggest it is important to account for rebels' beliefs on a community's willingness to sacrifice in order to achieve goals.

My theory proposes a solution to the puzzle on why civilians still mobilize when doing so is costly. Instead of focusing on the selective incentives of mobilizations, I shift the focus to strategic interactions between rebels and civilians. Civilians mobilize in civil wars precisely because doing so is costly enough to be credible. Of course, this is not to say that sending such a signal represents the true motivations of civilians. It is likely, as scholars have recognized, that individuals often have mixed motivations to engage in specific actions, which may reinforce a certain aspect of motivation at a later time (Kalyvas, 2006).

The theory's logic does not face strict restrictions on the types of rebels. The logic may extend to ruthless rebels who often resort to massacres to achieve goals. The theory, therefore, directly avoids the conceptual difficulties in distinguishing resistance and submission. With this being said, my theory may work better under certain conditions better than others. I engage with this issue more extensively in empirical chapters.

Policy-wise, the dissertation provides insights on how states should anticipate conflicts between rebels and civilians. States in distant and recent wars have invested heavily in mobilizing civilians in civil wars. In Afghanistan, the U.S devoted billions to arming local communal militias against the Taliban, only to bring the program to an abrupt end years later (Times, 2013; Altman, 2020). The Colombia local government spent years coordinating with local elites to carry out non-violent campaigns in peace territories in hopes of pressuring armed groups but with only limited success (Mouly et al., 2019). These efforts have good intentions and may have achieved

success to some extent, but have neglected two crucial aspects of civilian mobilizations in civil wars. First, the primary function of mobilization against rebel groups is to provide information to rebel groups and signal civilians' resolve to take risks. Thus, increasing civilians' resistance capability for the sole sake of eliminating rebel groups is unlikely to signal useful information. Second, risks are inherent to the logic of mobilizing against rebel groups. One should therefore expect bloodshed and increase preparedness for civilians' decisions to mobilize.

The theory also engages with policy debates on states' counterinsurgency strategies. If the primary function of mobilization is to convey information regarding civilians' resolve, then states' strategies to displace civilians into safe zones or humanitarian camps are likely to complicate existing understandings between rebels and civilians and unnecessarily prolong rebels' beliefs that violence is an effective strategy.

1.9 Plan of the Dissertation

This chapter has outlined the puzzle and contribution of this project. The rest of this dissertation will be split into four chapters. In Chapter two, I will provide details of the theory. I will begin this chapter by specifying the context and relevant actors involved in the theory. Next, I will argue that civilians' resolve to use capabilities is essential to deter rebel groups. The chapter will then progress to outline two main mechanisms: one involving non-violent tactics and the other involving violent tactics.

The theory of this dissertation will be supported by both quantitative and qualitative case study evidence. In Chapter three, I use large-N event data in Africa at both country and subnational level to test the effect of the occurrence, frequency, duration and spread of civilian mobi-

lization on violence. The primary objective of these quantitative analyses is to establish statistical correlations between civilian mobilization and one-sided violence. I first begin by testing whether civilian mobilization can decrease violence on country-year level. Next, I narrow the focus to rebel groups that have perpetrated high levels of violence, examining whether mobilization is negatively correlated with a reduction in violence in areas targeted by rebel attacks.

Chapter five focus on case studies in Nigeria. I will go beyond correlation evidence presented in Chapter three and probe the existence of the proposed mechanisms. Systematic patterns across time and space can only tell us the correlation between variables, but does not directly test the mechanisms. It is difficult to tell through existing results if indeed the correlation is driven by the proposed mechanisms without making strong assumptions. Therefore, in Chapter five, I conduct process-tracing case study analyses. The case studies will specifically aim to open the "black box" of correlation presented in this chapter and focus on testing the plausibility of the mechanisms. The process-tracing method is described in detail in Chapter four.

Chapter six will focus on four mini cases beyond Nigeria. The cases will serve two purposes. First, multiple cases could be used to study the conditions under which the mechanisms are likely to exist. Second, by increasing the number of cases, one could gain more confidence in the hypothesized theory.

The selected cases in Chapter six include resistance campaigns both within and outside of Africa. In Mozambique, some civilians formed Namprara militias while others participated in the Jehovah's Witness campaign to categorically reject Renamo's control. In Colombia, the indigenous communities mobilized "Le Guardia" to limit FARC's violence against civilians. In Afghanistan, the Hazaras formed militias and protested non-violently to resist the Taliban's encroachment. Finally, in Northern Uganda, the LRA faced widespread armed resistance from the

Arrow Boys. These cases contain both civilians' successes and failures in resisting rebels. The varied conditions across cases can also plausibly illustrate conditions under which the mechanisms could exist and contribute to the outcome.

In the final chapter, I will present a summary of findings regarding the general observed trend, as well as the observed scope and conditions of each mechanism. Additionally, this chapter will offer preliminary discussions on everyday resistance and policy implications.

Chapter 2 Theory

2.1 Theory Scope

My theory argues that rebels will likely reduce indiscriminate violence with the presence of civilian mobilization. Successful deterrence depends on rebels' belief that civilians are willing to continue imposing costs despite the risks of mobilizing. Mobilization from civilians thus serve as a credible signal, which indicates that unless violence stops the costs imposed on rebels will continue.

The theory features various actors. Before further elaborating its details, it is important to first define the context and actors relevant to the theory. First, all actors in my theory operate in the context of intra-state armed conflicts. Among the larger pool of intra-state armed conflicts such as nonviolent revolutions, isolated terrorism incidents, or sustained lower-intensity conflicts, my theory is more applicable to the context of moderate to higher intensity violent conflicts, which usually involve state-rebel(s) dyads that have at some point in time reached over 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.

Consistent with the UCDP's definition, I define a state as an "internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specific territory" or "an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory." UCDP defines

rebels as non-governmental "opposition organizations," that has "announced a name for their group" and has used "armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility" (Pettersson, 2020).

Civilians are neither rebels nor the incumbent government that holds executive power. Under the broad category of civilians, civilians could exist either as individuals or as some kind of organizations. They could be ordinary civilians with no affiliation to the government, local councils, village committees, city governors, and NGO participants. Their primary objective is to survive and achieve local rather than national or revolutionary goals.

Communal militias are the leaders of local violent organizations established directly in a community. The ACLED defines the communal militia as "identity militias," and it "signifies armed and violent groups organized around a collective, common feature including community, ethnicity, region, religion or, in exceptional cases, livelihood" (Raleigh et al., 2010). Although communal militias may share overlapping interests with a community and at times could look like civilians, their primary interests tend to be expanding the organization's political influence over local elites and have incentives to claim a monopoly over the territory separate from both rebel groups and the state when possible. As the ACLED has explained, "An armed group claiming to operate on behalf of a larger identity community may be associated with that community, but not represent it (i.e. Luo Ethnic Militia in Kenya or Fulani Ethnic Militia in Nigeria). Recruitment and participation are associated with the identity of the group. Identity militias may have a noted role in the community, such as the long-term policing units common among Somali clans."

Rebels and civilians can share common goals at the beginning of an insurgency campaign. An incumbent state's inability to accommodate civilians' material and identity grievances is necessary for civil wars to occur (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Cederman et al., 2010). Made up of political

entrepreneurs, early joiners of an insurgency especially share these grievances and will claim to fight on behalf of the aggrieved (Weinstein, 2006). At this stage, given the high cost of battle, many civilians refuse to rebel (Lichbach, 1998; Weinstein, 2006; Staniland, 2014). Instead of rebellion, most civilians would sit on the fence.

Civilians' and rebels' preferences diverge as the insurgency progress. Within rebels' territories, rebels seek control through selective violence against perceived oppositions (Kalyvas, 2006). Many innocent civilians are often killed in the process due to rebels' lack of information. Beyond rebels' backyard, rebels would carry out bombings or massacres that have dense popular support for the state (Balcells, 2011). During intensified campaigns, civilians regardless of their identity are placed in cross-fires. Destruction of states' infrastructures also leads to the suspension of education, public transport, and humanitarian aid. Moreover, regardless of rebels' control over a territory, because rebel groups tend to lack mechanisms and resources to discipline or maintain recruits, they allow or purposely push rebel members to violate civilians' human rights (Weinstein, 2006; Wood, 2014; Cohen, 2016).

2.2 Civilians' Strategies Against Indiscriminate Violence

Civilians have options to do nothing, collaborate, and mobilize. If civilians wish to deter indiscriminate violence, mobilizing against rebel groups could be a viable tool to impose costs and deter future offenses.

First, civilians can do nothing to respond to rebels. This entails staying innocent or fleeing. Staying innocent by doing nothing is difficult since belligerents often have poor information regarding a population's behaviors or preferences. As Kalyvas & Kocher (2007) have convincingly

shown, many innocent civilians become victimized when an armed actor decides to collectively target civilians. Alternatively, fleeing is a viable option for individual civilians. However, conventional wisdom suggests that there is safety in numbers. As more civilians flee from a community, the community becomes weaker as it becomes less capable of organizing in the future (Kaplan, 2017). In addition, depending on the rebels' dependency on local resources, fleeing may unintentionally conflict with the rebels' desire to rule the area. To deter mass exodus, rebels may exacerbate violence on roads by erecting checkpoints (Schon, 2016).

Second, civilians could choose to collaborate with rebels by providing intelligence. This strategy is viable when rebels are using violence to target individual oppositions. When violence is indiscriminate against an area rebels do not control, civilians may be killed regardless of one's preferences toward an insurgency (Kalyvas, 2006). Thus, indiscriminate violence eliminates civilians' incentives to collaborate with insurgents since doing so is no better than doing nothing.

A third option is a mobilization. Civilians could choose violent and non-violent tactics. Both tactics involve *sponsoring* or signaling support toward violent or non-violent organizations that undermine rebels' goals. Nonviolent tactics include village to national level gatherings, marches, public shaming, and non-cooperation activities[1]. In neighboring regions of Nigeria and Cameroon, civilians engaged in large-scale cross-national protests and marches to condemn Boko Haram's kidnappings and massacres. Civilians would pressure incumbent states to act. For instance, in Congo, civilians in both rural and urban regions engaged in riots and protests to pressure the state to address Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)'s human rights abuses.

[1] Non-cooperation activities, or declaring non-alignment is when civilians publicly declare that they do not support either side. Peace zones may become rebels' priority targets when insurgents wish to establish their reputations as zealots.

Violent tactics similarly aim to deny rebels access by building armed checkpoints around communities, scheduling armed patrols, ambushing rebels, or battling against rebel raids. Organizing violent mobilizations requires civilians to utilize the rank-and-file structures of nearby communal militias for recruiting and disciplining recruits. Often communal militias are mobilized along ethnic lines. Examples of these can be seen in Somalia in the 2010s when the frequent occurrence of one-sided violence by Al-Shabaab prompted civilians to mobilize their clan militias to push against rebel control. As another example, the volunteer force for the Defense of Homeland (VDP) in Burkina Faso consisted almost exclusively of Fulanis (Raleigh et al., 2010; Schmauder, 2021).

It is extremely important to note that my theory does not suggest civilians are the organizations (both violent or non-violent) that sustain campaigns against rebel groups. While civilians are essential parts of these organizations, the elites within those organizations may have strong political interests other than deterring violence. It should be emphasized that civilian mobilization involves providing support toward these organizations through direct participation, monetary sponsorship, or vocal support.

2.3 Main Theory Logic

I have shown that civilians have the motivation and means to challenge rebel groups. I argue that demonstration of civilians' resolve is crucial in achieving deterrence success against rebel groups. By "resolve", I am referring to civilians' willingness to accept risks and stand firm to achieve goals against rebels. The term is used more often in inter-state conflicts, where resolve influences opposing actors' belief in the threatener's willingness to fight wars that are costly

(Fearon, 1997).

In civil wars, mobilizing against rebels entails high risks and commitments. First, previous studies on non-violent revolutions have consistently shown that larger turn-outs correlate with a higher likelihood of success against strong and repressive opponents. In maximalist non-violent campaigns against autocrats, for example, the larger the protest turn-outs, the less risky for by-standers to participate. Furthermore, diverse participants can have a higher probability of drawing identity connections with opponents' security forces, therefore achieving loyalty shifts within opponents' security forces. In contrast, during civil wars, when states and rebels frequently engage in violence to achieve battlefield victory, there exists very little safety for sustained non-violent campaigns. Participants in non-violent rebellions may also serve as "efficient targets," allowing rebels to identify and assassinate potential dissidents. Adding to the existing difficulties, civil wars often are fought in a highly polarized context. Supporters for states are unlikely to cooperate with supporters of rebel groups to protest due to deep ethnic and religious cleavages.

Second, violent tactics require civilians to coordinate with communal militias. Communal militias may be capable to inflict high military costs on rebel groups, but militia groups put civilians at higher risk of rebels' violent retaliation and potential abuse from militia members. Unlike rebel groups, communal militias more often only have bows, arrows, knives, and hunting rifles. On the other hand, modern-day rebel groups often at the very least have light infantry weapons. It is not rare for rebels to have access to heavily armored land units, naval capabilities, and even air capabilities. It is, therefore, unlikely that communal militias can completely shield the community from rebels' retaliations if rebels decide to do so. Furthermore, communal militias are known to abuse civilians. In Afghanistan, the U.S.-sponsored communal militia group ALP was known for abusing civilians through extortion, private executions, and rape (HRW, 2011).

Civilians heavily rely on communal militias to mobilize violently. However, the relationship between communal militias and civilians is complicated. Civilians do not have full control over communal militias, which can exert a disproportional amount of influence over the local community over time. In East Timor, civilians formed communal militias to defend themselves against attacks from GAM. Many of these communal militias, however, quickly became co-opted by local criminal gangs and opportunistic politicians as pawns to further abuse civilians (Barter, 2013). Even without such influence, external communities are fearful of being dominated by ethnic/tribal rivalries that have mobilized. Thus, mobilizing in one community can have the cascade effect of mobilizing surrounding hostile communities, unintentionally increasing the insecurity in the area. As an example, interviews through the Human Rights Watch in Afghanistan suggest that local civilians were especially wary of ethnic rivalries' mobilizing efforts. Hundreds of elders in 2011 sought support from Kabul in response to the surrounding community's armament. These fears were justified based on what unfolded in the following years. These communal militias initially established to protect civilians against the Taliban had abused their influence by carrying out frequent extortion and violence against civilians (HRW, 2011).

Civilians do not have control over communal militias, but if they do have the resolve to coordinate with them and mobilize against rebels, rebels face a higher cost of escalating one-sided violence. The high cost is generated by the potential instability within and between rebels' consolidated territories. Deterrence therefore can be successful when rebels are aware of such costs.

Successful deterrence depends on rebels' belief regarding civilians' willingness to accept the above risk to mobilize. If civilians have no resolve, then civilians are likely to be bluffing and give up resisting before the costs inflicted on rebels materialize. If, however, rebels anticipate

civilians to stand firm and escalate conflicts despite the high risks, then rebels will be deterred by the potential costs of an escalated conflict. Since escalated conflicts with civilians are costly, rebels are better off avoiding abusing civilians.

By beginning and continuing to mobilize, civilians can signal their resolve to rebel groups and reveal that they will continue to impose costs. Rebels would, at some point, believe that civilians have sufficient resolve to accept any disastrous outcomes to deter rebels from perpetrating violence.

The above logic is drawn from the literature on nuclear crises in international relations. Schelling for example argued that credible threats rely on actors' abilities to "leave something to chance." He illustrated this dynamic with an analogy of sharp and rounded cliffs. In one scenario, one could imagine two people are tied together with a rope and looking down at a sharp-edged cliff. Since no one would deliberately jump off the cliff to bring about their destruction, threats to jump off the cliff will not be credible. Now imagine another scenario, where two people are again tied together but facing a rounded edge cliff where both would drag down further into the chasm if one chooses to slip down a bit further, then threats become credible as fear of falling increases (Schelling, 1980). Powell (1990) further clarified that for something to be left to chance, threats must require reactions outside of the threatener's control. The high rate of failure of a computer chip on a nuclear launch site or inefficient bureaucratic command outside of a small group of decision makers' control can become factors that credibly convince the adversaries to back down before the risks materialize.

In the case of mobilizations against rebel groups, civilians certainly do not have nuclear weapons at their disposal to issue threats. Instead, civilians are exposed to a diverse pool of actors who are often beyond civilians' control. By mobilizing, civilians are capable of leveraging

actors at local and state levels to impose costs on rebel groups.

There are various ways with which civilians mobilize and impose costs on rebel groups. I discuss both non-violent and violent mechanisms in more detail below.

2.4 Non-Violent Tactics' Mechanisms

Incumbent pressure argues that civilians in violence affected areas will rally in incumbent dominated areas (usually urban and/or capital centers), to pressure state actors into carrying out more radical military measures against the offending rebel group. Incumbents take great efforts in interpreting and securing political opinions from key supporters. To stay in power, leaders must minimize the risk of removal by first maintaining existing loyalists' support. Mobilizations, especially those that are coordinated by states' loyalists against rebels, provide incentives for the incumbent to take radical actions to satisfy their base. Failure to satisfy the existing base of support will have consequences for the leaders. First, leaders not only face violent contests with rebel groups but face chances of elimination by competing political parties. When the incumbent fails to demonstrate her competence to handle the crisis, the competitors will turn this failure into an opportunity to rally against the incumbent. This is precisely what happened in Nigeria. Due to the continued violence caused by Boko Haram, President Goodluck Jonathan's supporters became increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo and repeatedly engaged in protests to urge more radical actions. While the president managed to postpone the election and staged an offensive campaign against the rebel group, his opponent Muhammadu Buhari was able to draw overwhelming support from the violence-affected area and replaced Jonathan in 2015 (Guardian, 2015).

One should note that the point I am making here is not that scorch-earth counterinsurgency strategies are effective against rebels. In fact a substantial amount of literature suggests otherwise (Crenshaw, 1981; Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). Insurgents often will adapt to opponents' tactics and attempt to maximize gains in some ways. Bystanders' response to long term state indiscriminate violence is even more fluid and complex. The point is that by protesting, civilians introduce unpredictability into rebels' calculations and complicate the insurgents' timing in carrying out plans. If civilians in an area have the necessary resolve to escalate protests to a significant scale, rebels are better off attacking civilians elsewhere where communities do not have such resolve.

Diffusion involves a scenario where civilians would stand their ground without backing down even when rebels threaten to intensify indiscriminate violence (Masullo Jimenez, 2015). The logic is that if civilians could continue to stay put and stand their ground, it is possible to produce embarrassment for the top leadership, proving that rebels in fact do not have control over their key territories as they claimed. Furthermore, the existence of defiance may further inspire nearby regions to imitate, thus further complicating rebels' control.

2.5 Violent Tactics' Mechanisms

Territorial disturbance argues that violent civilian mobilization could create disturbance within rebel territories, thus could coerce rebels into reducing violence. To sustain an insurgency, rebel groups rely on consolidated territories for logistical support. More importantly, rebels rely on their credibility to protect civilians living under their roof. Doing so establishes a foundation for the development of social welfare systems as well as international diplomatic ties. Maintain-

ing a functioning policing system, therefore, is crucial to rebel groups. Directly sponsored by the community, communal militias often create insecurities within consolidated territories. For example, the ethnic Javanese communal militias would carry out violence in Acehnese communities, which were the primary source of support for the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) (Barter, 2013). Koglweogo communal militia, which is sometimes referred to as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), killed hundreds of Fulanis, who had provided substantial support for Islamist rebel groups in exchange for security (Schmauder, 2021).

Rebel groups face many enemies that wish to overthrow rebels' monopoly of control over consolidated territories. Civilians by mobilizing thus could create *Rival's opportunity*. This includes both local political rivalries and factions within the rebel groups. Continued disturbances within rebels' territories thus will create opportunities to question rebel groups' legitimacy to rule. The consequences of this kind of failure can be observed in the case of SPLM/A in Sudan during the 1990s. During this period, the rebel group had prioritized battlefield victory against the state and neglected their base of support. In addition, given the group's inability to control the members' behaviors, many communities as a response began mobilizing communal militias to defend themselves (Stringham & Forney, 2017). While most militias originated to provide security, some later began attacking civilians living under SPLM/A's rule. These disturbances, especially among the Nuer communities, provided Rick Machar an opportunity to break away from the group and establish a splinter group named SPLA-Nasir (Young, 2003; Young & Lebrun, 2006).

Mobility constraint suggests that the cost of pacifying civilian mobilizations is exacerbated by the increased difficulty in transporting between consolidated territories. The cost is especially high in irregular civil wars, where rebels must move across contested territories to reach a location for either safety or logistical tasks. al-Qaeda in Somalia for example, targeted business leaders

as a strategy to reduce the cost of shifting local clans' loyalty away from existing businesses and toward the rebel group. This strategy, however, provoked mobilizations within local clans to ambush the group along its transportation route between Djibouti and Somalia. The ambushes in the long-run increased al-Qaeda's transportation costs and caused complaints among its regional leaderships (Clunan & Harold, 2010).

2.6 Information Problem

Rebels will not attack civilians that have the high resolve to mobilize since violence will produce costly backlashes at both the national and local levels. This then implies that we will only observe violence against civilians with no resolve. We should not, therefore, see rebels attack and suffer a high cost doing so. However, a cursory glance over existing evidence suggests that this is not the case. Rebels often attack civilians and provoke backlashes that raise the cost of insurgency later on. As an example, the escalation of violence caused by the ELN in Colombia provoked large scale non-violent protests in its peace territory. The armed group then was forced to temporarily agree not to involve the community in the conflict (Mouly et al., 2019). Why did the group escalate violence only to suffer backlashes from civilians?

Previous studies suggest that rebels attack civilians as a deliberate strategy to achieve goals. What is missing is that strategies and outcomes are separate and should not be confused. Deliberate strategies can lead to inefficient outcomes provided that actors do not have sufficient information (Fearon, 1994, 1995). Put simply, this suggests that violence against civilians is partly caused by rebels' decisions based on a lack of information. For empirical validation, one could consider the following quote from a declassified document taken from al-Qaeda's communications,

> The biggest mistake was made when the Mujahidin targeted and then killed members of the Anbar tribes near a police recruitment station. The Mujahidin could have easily chosen not to carry out that operation. The Mujahidin were not under direct attack by those members of the Anbar tribes. Also, the members of the Anbar tribes were not on their way to attack the Mujahidin in their hideouts. That attack had caused the tribes to withdraw their support for the Mujahidin. The attack also stirred up very bad feelings (Combating Terrorism Center Harmony Program, 2005).

The "mistake" was referring to al-Qaeda's violent tactics in targeting civilians that had expressed willingness to be recruited by the Iraqi security services. The group in 2005 repeatedly detonated car bombs near police buildings to intimidate groups that were "collaborating with the infidel crusaders" (HRW, 2005). At around a similar period, the rebel group also increased attacks against civilians, spreading fears and doubts among Iraqis regarding the U.S.' abilities to protect local communities (Worth, 2005). These attacks underestimated civilians' resolve and provoked widespread mobilization at the tribal level. In response to the violence, hundreds of thousands of Anbar tribes were willing to violently resist. Many eventually formed the Anbar Salvation Council as well as Anbar Revenge Brigades, both of which ventured out to Western Iraq to hunt down al-Qaeda (FDD's Long War Journal, 2006).

2.7 Observable Implications

If civilian mobilization itself is theorized as a credible signal to continue imposing high costs, rebels should reduce violence when there is presence of mobilization.

Hypothesis 1 ($\mathbf{H}_{occurrence}$): *Occurrence of civilian mobilization will lead to reduction of rebel*

violence.

This is not to say that rebels will always place complete trust in the signal. The quality of the signal may vary. If rebels believe that the civilians' mobilization is merely bluffing, then mobilization can only serve as an opportunity for rebels to eliminate revealed threats. In this case, rebels will be more likely to use violence even if mobilization has occurred in previous times.

Thus, how mobilization occurs matters in deterring violence. Credibility depends on how costly the action is and the extent to which civilians are willing to mobilize to materialize this cost if rebels use violence. The frequency, duration, and spread of mobilization reveal this willingness. First, the frequency of a mobilization indicates the number of point locations as well as the speed of escalation in a given geographical boundary and time frame. The higher the frequency, the more certain rebels will be that civilians are willing to accept the risk of mobilizing and allow the state or nearby actors to react.

Hypothesis 2 ($\mathbf{H}_{frequency}$): *Higher frequency of civilian mobilization will lead to reduction of rebel violence.*

Duration refers to the temporal length of mobilization. Mobilization can take time to coordinate and grow, but rebels cannot accurately predict whether a shorter length suggests bluffing. As the duration of mobilization extends, the quality of the signal regarding civilians' resolve increases. Duration, therefore, has a non-linear relationship with rebels' decisions to use violence.

Hypothesis 3 ($\mathbf{H}_{duration}$): *Mobilization will lead to more rebel violence in the short run, but will dampen violence in the long run.*

Spread indicates the spatial impact of civilian mobilization. The higher the spread, the more likely civilians will accept the risk to allow the mobilization to attract national attention

and local actors' involvement. Rebels are also concerned about the likely impact of mobilization on consolidated territories. Violence against civilians therefore can be deterred provided that the cascade of mobilization spreads far enough.

Hypothesis 4 ($\mathbf{H}_{spread}$): *Further spread of civilian mobilization will lead to reduction of rebel violence.*

2.8 Civilians' Capability

My theory has focused on the role of resolve when civilians mobilize, but has not explicitly mentioned the role of capability. I briefly discuss the relationship between capability and resolve in this section. To reiterate, resolve is civilians' willingness to take risks in order to deter rebel groups from using violence. Capability refers to civilians' available resources to deter violence. These resources may be demonstrated by the number of potential participants in a non-violent protest, the diversity of a protest, the number of members in a communal militia, the quality of equipment of a militia, or the amount of support each tactic may have.

Capability can be further divided in two categories. Offensive capability can inflict higher costs on rebel groups. For example, having higher number of participants in a protest can increase the likelihood of both drawing state security forces' support and suspending rebel territories' daily operations. Better equipped communal militias can inflict higher casualties to rebel groups. Defensive capability is civilians' capacity to absorb costs from rebels' retaliatory attacks. Having higher number of participants can lower participants' risks of being targeted for revenge attacks. Higher fighting capacities of communal militias likewise can make rebels' offensives to a village more costly.

The capability argument is still compatible with the theory on resolve. It is possible for civilians to have both the resolve and capabilities to mobilize. Higher capabilities may only make the costs inflicted on rebels higher and rebels' revenge attacks less damaging. On the other hand, resolve demonstrates civilians' willingness to accept the risks associated with coordinating mobilization itself. These risks include, but are not limited to, the state's potential overreaction to rebel activities, abuse of power by communal militias, and opportunistic responses from local actors to the instability in rebel territories.

2.9 Chapter Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have built a theoretical framework for civilian mobilization against rebel groups. I argue that rebels will reduce violence contingent on whether civilians could credibility signal their resolve to continue imposing costs. Based on this theory, I have further proposed mechanisms for both violent and non-violent resistance tactics. Empirically, I expect that rebels should reduce the use of indiscriminate violence when confronted with a significant level of resistance from civilians.

Chapter 3 Quantitative Evidence

3.1 Introduction

Violence against civilians perpetrated by rebel groups depends on civilians' resolve to mobilize and accept the subsequent costs. As I have further argued in Chapter 2, by mobilizing violently and nonviolently, civilians are able to signal such resolve to rebel groups, thus reducing violence in the future. I predict, therefore, that the spread, frequency, and duration of mobilization decide the quality of the signal and decrease violence. I test these hypotheses in this chapter through a series of cross-national statistical tests.

The primary objective of this chapter is to establish a negative correlation between the mobilization signal and violence against civilians. This correlation, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, can be observed in both national and local levels, across different time units of analyses. Therefore, this chapter will proceed by first focusing on a country year level. I test the long term correlation among 86 intra-state conflict dyads in Africa since 2010. Next, I further test the hypotheses exclusively among rebel groups that have often used one-sided violence and in areas and time periods where such violence has occurred. I then proceed by evaluating a number of alternative hypotheses based on additional data and existing results. These hypotheses include the capability of mobilization, rebel characteristics, rebel losses, the existence of natural resources, and UN presence. Finally, I conduct a number of robustness tests to increase my confidence in

the results.

3.2 Data Collection

I collect the occurrence of both violent and nonviolent anti-rebel civilian mobilization events from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010). For violent events, I rely on the dataset's note column to include events that involve the activities of a communal militia. As a first pass, such events are filtered by the ACLED's 'interaction codes.' ACLED defines communal militias as "identity militias" that are organized around common features such as "community, ethnicity, region, religion or, in exceptional cases, livelihood." The preferences of these types of groups tend to be "in the pursuance of local goals, resources, power, security, and retribution." Activities involving these types of actors are anticipated to be directly facilitated and organized by civilians. Therefore, they are coded as violent anti-rebel civilian mobilizations in my dataset. In the below example taken from ACLED, it was observed that an unnamed communal militia group attacked against JNIM.

> "On 19 November 2020, presumed JNIM militants attacked Dogon farmers in Yarou Plateau (Bandiagara, Mopti). Village self-defense responded to the attack. No casualties were reported."

Below is an example where I am less certain if the events belong to ACLED's communal (identity) militia category or political militia. The dataset defines political militia as "associated with defined ethnic, regional or other identity communities" but "operate outside of ethnic homelands and for goals other than the promotion of ethnic interests." The Misratan Libya Dawn fighters in ACLED has been coded as communal militias. However, the group had allied with

Libya Dawn movements to defeat other rebel groups such as IS, which indicate broader goals than local ones. These events therefore are dropped from the analyses.

> "Four Misratan militiamen from the 166 Brigade were killed and several wounded when Islamic State of Tripoli forces overran Sirte's Gulf Power station, taking the last key point in the coastal town that was still held by Libya Dawn military."

For nonviolent events, I follow two sets of criteria. First, protests or riots must implicate rebel groups. I include riots since it tends to be unclear and subjective in media reports on whether an event is a riot or a non-violent protest. This criterion is fulfilled by first filtering the 'interaction codes' to exclude events where armed confrontations are involved. Among these remaining events, I searched for relevant events by rebel names or the names' abbreviations. Second, nonviolent events must also negatively implicate rebels (i.e. not pro-rebel rallies). These kinds of events are again filtered through the ACLED's note columns. Below is an example where protests negatively implicate rebel groups:

> "More than 200 women from various groups held a peaceful protest across Ibadan, the Oyo State capital, over the 234 girls abducted by Boko Haram insurgents at the Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok in Borno State. The women, aged between 50 and 65, wept as they marched through the city in torn dresses."

In another example, protests appear to be pro-rebel protests. Such cases are dropped since they are less relevant to the analyses and clearly do not negatively implicate rebel groups:

> "(9/13/2003,Democratic Republic of Congo,Ituri)"Riots because MONUC started its campaign and raids titled Bunia Without Arms and it coincided with what the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) considers as its third anniversary"

Thus, unlike existing datasets such as Major Episodes of Contention (MEC) or Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO), where the goals are to measure a continuous period of campaigns against a target group, the collected data in this project focuses on the contentious events that have occurred within a geographical region and time bracket (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Chenoweth, 2015). Such approach can provide measurements related to where and when civilians have challenged rebel groups.

I combine both non-violent and violent events into a single dataset and aggregate combined observations to my dataset. If there exist either violent or nonviolent anti-rebel civilian mobilizations in observed time periods, mobilization occurrence is coded as one. Otherwise, the non-occurrence of mobilization is coded as zero. I then count the spread of mobilization by counting the total number of unique location names associated with a mobilization in an unit of analysis. Frequency of mobilization is the total number of events recorded by ACLED. The duration is calculated by counting the accumulated time periods a mobilization has occurred in a region against a rebel group. The counter resets if mobilization is not recorded. Both spread and frequency are lagged one time period to evaluate the effect of the variables in subsequent times.

Data for the dependent variable is collected from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED 21.1) (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). The dataset is suitable for my analyses since it indicates the number, location, date, and perpetrator of violence against civilians. I sum the civilian deaths count to each appropriate level of analyses in this chapter.

I account for confounding effects and variables that represent alternative explanations in my analyses. First, when rebels are stronger, they tend to resort to more peaceful tactics if the costs of responding with increased violence to civilian mobilizations outweigh the potential damage. To

include rebel strength in the analyses, I draw from the Non-state Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013). The variable is coded as one if the rebel group is coded as 'parity' or 'much stronger' in the NSA dataset.

Second, rebels with ethno-nationalist and Maoist ideologies are much more willing to demonstrate their abilities to control territories, therefore are likely to respond to mobilizations with less violence. To account for this possibility, I utilize the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset, which records rebels' founding ideologies. (Braithwaite & Cunningham, 2020). When NSA or FORGE do not contain any information on a rebel and/or at a given year, I follow the datasets' coding procedure and fill in the information. I code the variable here as one if the rebel group is coded as 'communist' or 'independent' in FORGE.

Third, rebels should be particularly concerned about the potential backlash from civilians when international sponsors are mindful of human rights violations. Previous research has shown that democratic sponsors are more likely to deter rebels from abusing civilians (Salehyan et al., 2014). Although the NSA dataset records rebels' foreign sponsorships, it does not specify whether the sponsor is authoritarian or democratic, I follow Salehyan et al.'s coding strategies to code the percentage of democracies within rebel's foreign state supporters (Salehyan et al., 2014). When there exist no records at all on a rebel group's foreign sponsors in the dataset, I again follow NSA's and Salehyan et al.'s coding procedure to fill in the information.

Across spatial units, I also take account of mountainous terrain and the presence of natural resources. Mountainous areas may be more prone to violent reactions from rebels since limited transportation and communication prevent rebels from suffering national media and foreign actors' backlashes. Therefore, I use PRIO-grid data to calculate the mean proportion of moun-

tainous terrain in an ADM1 area (Tollefsen et al., 2012).[1] Natural resource rich regions affect rebels' intensity of preference to use violence by incentivizing the recruitment of opportunistic members (Weinstein, 2006). I collect natural resource variables with a PRIO-grid dataset, which provides information on the presence of gems, diamond, gold, and petroleum in 50km by 50km grids across the globe.[2] I aggregate these variables together, spatially join the grid cells with the final dataset, and create a dichotomous variable that accounts for the presence of natural resources in each ADM1.

There exists several limitations of the data. First, there is an abundance of zeroes in both dependent and independent variables. In most analyses, both dependent and key independent variables have over 60% of zeroes. To deal with this issue, I use the zero-inflated negative binomial model. One benefit of this strategy is that it accounts for over-dispersion in the negative binomial count model. Another advantage is that the model accounts for unobserved zeroes in the dataset. Since the dependent variable is death count, zeroes may represent both non-occurrence of violence and occurrence without fatalities. Being a two-part process, the model first includes a logistic regression to predict whether the zero is generated by a different process.

Second, rebels' characteristics may change across time and local areas but the existing data does not account for such variation at a granular level. Rebel strength is accounted for by including a country-level dichotomous variable. This is not ideal because rebel strength may significantly fluctuate from one point of time to another. To partially address this issue, I record two separate variables in my analyses. In country year level of analyses, I include a total count of

[1] PRIO-grid data is available in polygons. For mountainous data, each polygon contains the mean proportion of mountains. When data is collected at a sub-national level, it is possible for an ADM1 area to cover more than one grid, I re-group the polygons by ADM1s and re-calculate the mean proportion for each ADM1 polygon.

[2] Within these natural resources, I focus more exclusively on lootable resources (gems, secondary diamond, placer gold, and petroleum) (Lujala et al., 2005; Lujala, 2009; Balestri, 2012)

rebel battle deaths taken from UCDP GED data. In sub-national level, I include a dichotomous variable that records significant losses of power of each rebel group in each year. This includes, for example, mass demobilization, major loss of strength from group fragmentation, or withdrawal of support by a primary foreign supporter. I rely entirely on UCDP encyclopedia's reports to produce the yearly binary variable.

Third, there may exist selection bias that cannot be easily ruled out. All of the analyses in this chapter are based on data collected from intra-state conflicts in Africa. The choice is made based on the abundance of information in this region. Similarly, conflict data since 2010 has improved both in quantity and quality. Thus, a significant amount of analyses are based on data post-2010. These choices thus lead to selection bias that cannot be easily detected. Furthermore, civilians may selectively protest or violently mobilize against rebel groups when rebels are least likely to be violent. This problem is similar to many existing conflict studies. The United Nation peacekeeping missions for example, tend to occur when spikes of violence is already on the decline. The negative correlation thus may exist simply because peacekeeping missions are deployed in more peaceful times. I address these issues by varying the level of analyses. Hypotheses are tested across all major rebel groups and rebel groups that are more violent against civilians (i.e. have killed more than 25 civilians in a year). In addition, I focus on both yearly and monthly level of analyses. Beyond this chapter, I will test the mechanisms of the hypotheses and examine possibilities of selection bias with case studies.

Table 3.1: Country Year Data

Mean	St. Dev.	Max	Min	Pct. Zeroes	Variable
53	307	5063	0	0.61	OSV_{rebel}
1	2	29	0	0.83	Non-violent tactic spread_{t-1}
1	4	30	0	0.84	Violent tactic spread_{t-1}
2	5	38	0	0.74	All tactic spread_{t-1}
1	5	46	0	0.84	Violent tactic frequency_{t-1}
1	5	68	0	0.83	Non-violent tactic frequency_{t-1}
0	1	8	0	0.83	Non-violent tactic duration
0	1	8	0	0.84	Violent tactic duration

* N=321

3.3 Country Year Test

I will first conduct tests at a country-year level. The dataset includes 86 intra-state conflict dyads recorded in UCDP armed conflict dyadic dataset (version 21.1) in Africa (Pettersson, 2020). I include intra-state armed conflicts where the most recent conflict episode took place from 2010 to 2020 (including the start of 2010 and the end of 2020). All conflicts are aggregated to country-year where UCDP GED had recorded rebels' activities. This process yields 392 observations (321 with lagged variables) with 41 unique rebel groups across 24 different African countries. I then aggregate and combine data on civilian mobilization, rebel characteristics, and geography to this level of analysis.

Table 3.1 shows the key independent and dependent variables of the data. Among the data, most key variables have over 60% of zeroes. The highest civilian deaths occurred in Nigeria in 2014, when Boko Haram reportedly killed over 5000 civilians. The distributions of key independent variables from a glance are similar, but the maximum values are occurring at different locations. For example, the highest number of civilian deaths coincides with civilians' use of non-violent tactics in 29 locations within Nigeria in 2014 against Boko Haram. However, the highest



Figure 3.1: Spatial Distribution of OSV in Africa

spread of violent resistance tactics against rebel groups is observed in Mali against JNIM, where the group was responsible for a hundred deaths. This hints that the two methods used against rebels tend to occur in different contexts.

Figure 3.1 illustrates static spatial patterns of civilian deaths and mobilization frequencies. All variables are summed to each country. The higher counts of civilian deaths positively correlate with civilian mobilization frequencies. The highest civilian deaths were occurring in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, violent resistance concentrated in Libya, and non-violent resistance concentrated in Somalia and Cameroon. In Mozambique, where rebels have caused a high number of civilian deaths, there exists very few records of non-violent methods but a notable number of violent resistance.

The static maps, therefore, suggest two characteristics of civilian mobilizations. First, similar to what has been suggested in the theory, the process of mobilizing against rebel groups is



Figure 3.2: Temporal Variation in Libya (Top) and Somalia (Bottom)

dynamic. Civilian mobilization against rebels occurs in places where rebels have used violence. Second, the fact that violent and non-violent methods do not always appear together suggests the need to separately model the two tactics.

The top of Figure 3.2 shows the temporal patterns of civilian death counts and the frequency of violent and nonviolent events in Libya.[3] Both resistance frequencies spike up when death counts spike up in 2016. Referring back to the data, these activities could be primarily attributed to IS' conflicts with civilians in Libya. All values shown in the figure declined immediately following 2017. Communal militia activities spike again in 2017 without spikes in civilian deaths.

As another snapshot of the data, the bottom of Figure 3.2 shows the temporal variations in Somalia. Civilian deaths, primarily perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, rose in 2016. The increase was accompanied by increases in non-violent and violent civilian resistance. Similar to the trend observed in Libya, all values shown in the figure decline around similar periods.

Together, results from two countries shown in Figure 3.2 indicate that the count of civil-

[3] All variables here are not lagged

Table 3.2: Country Year Models With All Tactics

	Dependent variable:		
		OSV_{rebel}	
	($\text{M1}_{ZINB\ Count}$)	($\text{M2}_{ZINB\ Count}$)	($\text{M3}_{ZINB\ Count}$)
$\text{OSV}_{rebel,t-1}$	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Rebel deaths	−0.026 (0.347)	−0.038 (0.352)	−0.032 (0.354)
Rebel strength	0.158 (0.461)	−0.038 (0.522)	−0.015 (0.521)
Foreign support	−1.044** (0.508)	−1.075** (0.522)	−1.069** (0.521)
Natural resources	0.031 (0.662)	0.083 (0.672)	0.092 (0.675)
Ethnic tie	−0.803* (0.411)	−0.676 (0.429)	−0.686 (0.429)
Mobilization occurrence_{t-1}	−0.995*** (0.352)		
Mobilization frequency_{t-1}		−0.030* (0.018)	
Mobilization spread_{t-1}			−0.043 (0.028)
Mobilization duration	0.957*** (0.241)	0.883*** (0.264)	0.886*** (0.270)
Mobilization duration^2	−0.107*** (0.035)	−0.108*** (0.038)	−0.108*** (0.038)
Constant	3.536*** (0.910)	3.535*** (0.936)	3.514*** (0.936)
Observations	321	321	321
Log Likelihood	−753	−755	−755

*p<0.1;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors displayed in parenthesis. Zero component of each model has the same specifications as count part.

ian deaths is negatively correlated with the rise of civilian mobilization in previous periods. $\text{H}_{occurrence}$ and $\text{H}_{frequency}$, therefore, receive initial support.

I statistically model the results in Table 3.2 by first looking at the occurrence, frequency, duration, and spread of civilian mobilization, with both violent and non-violent tactics aggregated together. The results suggest strong support for the claims that the occurrence and longer duration correlate with less violence in the future. In M1, I include the occurrence and duration of civilian mobilization against rebel groups. *Mobilization occurrence*$_{t-1}$ appears negative and statistically significant at 0.05 level. The non-linear term of duration is positive, while the squared term is negative. This provides support for the claim that mobilization duration follows an inverse "U" shape correlation with violence. However, the results only provide weak support for $\text{H}_{frequency}$ and H_{spread}. As shown in M2 and M3, both frequency and spread of mobilization are negative

Table 3.3: Country Year Models With Non-Violent Tactics

	Dependent variable:		
	OSV_{rebel}		
	($\text{M4}_{ZINB\ Count}$)	($\text{M5}_{ZINB\ Count}$)	($\text{M6}_{ZINB\ Count}$)
$\text{OSV}_{rebel,t-1}$	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Rebel deaths	0.266 (0.336)	0.336 (0.348)	0.166 (0.307)
Rebel strength	−0.038 (0.498)	0.114 (0.501)	
Foreign support	−1.541** (0.532)	−1.373* (0.536)	−1.164* (0.518)
Natural resources	−0.120 (0.668)	−0.175 (0.680)	−0.610 (0.681)
Ethnic tie	−0.341 (0.403)	−0.308 (0.412)	−0.706 (0.369)
Non-violent tactic frequency_{t-1}	−0.152** (0.051)		
Non-violent tactic spread_{t-1}		−0.102 (0.080)	−0.103 (0.063)
Non-violent tactic duration			1.010** (0.286)
Non-violent tactic duration^2			−0.116** (0.044)
Constant	4.026** (0.932)	3.811** (0.941)	4.319** (0.718)
Observations	321	321	321
Log Likelihood	−761.470	−764.172	−750.825

*p<0.05; **p<0.01. Standard errors displayed in parenthesis. Zero component of each model has the same specifications as count part.

but both are not significant at 0.05 level.

As hinted earlier by the exploratory results, the weak significance may suggest that violent tactics and non-violent tactics need to be evaluated separately. Therefore, I fit zero-inflation models for violent and non-violent methods. In Table 3.3,I first include the frequencies of protests as *Non-violent tactic frequency*$_{t-1}$ in M4 and include *Non-violent tactic spread*$_{t-1}$ in M5. I fit the spread and duration variables together in M6.[4]. In addition, I include a temporal lag of the dependent variable in the model to account for temporal dependencies. All models are fitted with rebel characteristics at the country level.

The results of Table 3.3 provide support for $\text{H}_{frequency}$ and $\text{H}_{duration}$. H_{spread}, however, continues to receive little support. In M4, higher frequencies of protests negatively correlate with

[4] Fitting frequency with duration variables here results in perfect collinearity. I also have dropped the strength variable in M6 since the model does not converge with the strength variable included.

Table 3.4: Country Year Models With Violent Tactics

	Dependent variable:		
		OSV_{rebel}	
	($\text{M7}_{ZINB\ Count}$)	($\text{M8}_{ZINB\ Count}$)	($\text{M9}_{ZINB\ Count}$)
$\text{OSV}_{rebel,t-1}$	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Rebel deaths	0.105 (0.360)	0.111 (0.361)	−0.033 (0.363)
Rebel strength	0.409 (0.532)	0.382 (0.534)	
Foreign support	−1.005 (0.563)	−1.025 (0.563)	−1.149* (0.519)
Natural resources	−0.399 (0.690)	−0.402 (0.691)	−0.171 (0.718)
Ethnic tie	−0.533 (0.423)	−0.515 (0.423)	−0.623 (0.400)
Violent tactic frequency_{t-1}	0.018 (0.022)		
Violent tactic spread_{t-1}		0.022 (0.030)	−0.006 (0.035)
Violent tactic duration			0.404 (0.299)
Violent tactic duration^2			−0.063 (0.047)
Constant	3.931** (0.973)	3.945** (0.975)	4.117** (0.769)
Observations	321	321	321
Log Likelihood	−764	−764	−759

*p<0.05; **p<0.01. Standard errors displayed in parenthesis. Zero component of each model has the same specifications as count part.

counts of civilian deaths. M5 suggests that a higher spread of protests can lead to a reduction in violence, but the correlation is statistically insignificant at 0.05 level. $\text{H}_{duration}$ receives support in M6, where a higher duration of protests can lead to increased violence, but a longer duration correlates with a decrease of violence.

Next, I fit three similar models for violent tactics. Unlike the results from Table 3.3, Table 3.4 indicates that the frequency and spread of violent tactics are positively correlated with violence perpetrated by rebel groups. The coefficient directions for duration hold. All key independent variables are insignificant at 0.05 level. $\text{H}_{occurrence}$,$\text{H}_{frequency}$, and $\text{H}_{duration}$ therefore do not receive any support for violent tactics at this level of analysis.

Substantive significance of the main results can be found in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. Figure 3.3 provides predictions and prediction intervals for violent and non-violent tactics ag-



Figure 3.3: Violent and Non-violent Tactics Aggregated (National Level)

gregated (M1 through M3), while Figure 3.4 provides predictions and prediction intervals for non-violent tactics (M4 through M6). Looking from the top left of Figure 3.3, having mobilized, either violent or non-violently, on average reduces 100 counts of violence against civilians per country-year and for each rebel group. Both increases in frequency and spread predict lower deaths. Smaller increases in duration predict increase in civilian deaths, but the increase quickly drops off as duration reaches four years.

Figure 3.4 suggests similar results as 3.1.3. Higher frequency of protests lead to approximately 100 lower counts of deaths, and duration suggests a non-linear prediction pattern. The prediction interval of spread appears uncertain. While the mean prediction shows a downward



Figure 3.4: Only Non-violent Tactics (National Level)

trend, the interval shows a "U" shaped pattern. Comparing Figure 3.3 and 3.4, it is worth pointing out that when both tactics are aggregated, high frequency of mobilization faces much stronger uncertainty over the reduction of OSV as compared with only non-violent tactics aggregated. This may serve as preliminary evidence that non-violent tactics could be more effective overall in reducing violence provided the mobilization frequency is high.

3.4 Sub-national Test

So far, I have tested my hypotheses on a country-year level. Doing so reveals that the occurrence of civilian mobilization is negatively correlated with reduction of violence against civilians. Non-violent mobilization tactics' higher frequency and long duration is negatively correlated with violence against civilians. However, tests conducted so far on violent tactics do not provide any support for the proposed hypotheses. It is possible that all of the above results are affected by the unit of analysis, which can produce selection bias and obscure variations at a more granular level.

In this section, I test my hypotheses on rebel groups that have killed at least 25 civilians in one year in Africa since 1997. I focus on these rebel groups during areas and times when they

Table 3.5: Sample Data

Rebel	Country	ADM1	Year	OSV_{rebel}
ADF	Uganda	Kabarole	1998	117
...	...	...	...	...
ADF	Uganda	Kabarole	2007	0
ADF	Uganda	Bundibugyo	1998	9
...	...	...	...	...
ADF	Uganda	Bundibugyo	2007	0
ADF	Uganda	Kampala	1998	4
...	...	...	...	...
ADF	Uganda	Kampala	2007	5

were most active in killing civilians. The primary space and time unit of analysis focuses on the first administrative level (ADM1) per year. I include a rebel group in my dataset starting from the earliest occurrence of civilian victimization perpetrated by that rebel group in one country. In each rebel group unit, only ADM1s that have experienced any one-sided violence carried out by that rebel group are included in the dataset.

To illustrate, Table 3.5 shows sample rows of the dataset. Here, ADF was first seen perpetrating one-sided violence in Uganda starting in 1998. Specifically, ADF began killing civilians in Kabarole Uganda and its surrounding regions in 1998 and was last seen killing five civilians in Kampala Uganda in 2007. Therefore, I have recorded ADF's violent activities in ADM1s that have experienced the rebel group's violence from 1998 to 2007. If no ADF violence is seen in the included ADM1s, then the Civilian Deaths variable is coded as zero.

The dataset includes 47 rebel groups, extracted from referencing UCDP GED and UCDP one-sided violence datasets (Pettersson, 2020). The overall distribution of the dataset is shown in Table 3.6. For the dependent variable, close to 70% of the data is zero. This issue is much more obvious for independent variables. Less than 10% of mobilization frequency is recorded as one. The duration variable is similarly rare. Although the maximum number of months where mobi-

Table 3.6: Summary Statistics (ADM1-Year)

Mean	St. dev.	Max	Min	Pct. zeroes	Variable
15	88	3174	0	68%	OSV_{rebel}
0	0	1	0	93%	Mobilization occurrence
0	1	23	0	93%	Mobilization frequency
0	1	12	0	93%	Duration

* N=2490

lization has occurred one year is twelve, the number disguises the fact that most mobilizations happen in short periods each year. When I disaggregate the data into a monthly level of analysis, I find that the majority of events tend to persist for less than six months, with the longest duration being one to three months. It is very rare for mobilization to persist for a whole year.

Figure 3.5 shows Boko Haram's civilian victimization activities and the frequency of civilian mobilizations between 2009 and 2015. It can be seen that while Boko Haram preferred to inflict violence against civilians mostly in northern Nigeria, the group also operated in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Furthermore, civilian mobilizations against Boko Haram tend to occur in areas exposed to the group's attacks. In the majority of the presented cases, both the occurrence (non-occurrence is indicated by a flat line for frequency counts) and the rise of civilian mobilization frequency are accompanied by subsequent declines in violence. Figure 3.5, therefore, provides support for $H_{occurrence}$ and $H_{frequency}$.

Table 3.7 shows zero-inflated negative binomial models' count parts. $H_{occurrence}$ has received empirical support from M10. More frequent civilian mobilizations against rebel groups in the previous year lead to reductions in violence in the subsequent year. The result for $H_{duration}$ is mixed. M11 suggests that higher mobilization duration is correlated with higher one-sided violence, but the nonlinear term is insignificant at a 0.05 level. Still, the nonlinearity form is the same as expectations. With a positive linear term and a negative squared term, the duration



Figure 3.5: Boko Haram OSV

variable exhibits an inverse 'U' shape correlation with rebel violence.

It is possible that the main effects can be more easily observed in monthly periods. To further investigate, I vary the unit of analysis from year to rebel-ADM1-month. I have aggregated other variables according to the appropriate unit of analysis. Furthermore, I have added a spatial lag (queen criterion) to control for neighboring ADM1's one-sided violence perpetrated by the same rebel group in the same month.

In Table 3.8, M12 assesses the effect of binary anti-rebel mobilization occurrence in the subsequent month. M12 indicates that the occurrence of mobilization negatively correlates with rebel violence in the subsequent month. This thus further strengthens $H_{occurrence}$, indicating that the occurrence of mobilization per month reduces rebel violence. In M13, I disaggregate *Mobilization occurrence* into exclusively violent mobilization types (i.e. only violent mobilizations

Table 3.7: Rebel ADM1 Year

	Dependent variable:	
	OSV_{rebel}	
	($\text{M10}_{ZINB\ Count}$)	($\text{M11}_{ZINB\ Count}$)
Mobilization occurrence$_{t-1}$	−0.670** (0.216)	
Mobilization frequency$_{t-1}$		−0.116* (0.055)
Mobilization duration	0.458** (0.159)	0.467** (0.174)
Mobilization duration^2	−0.029 (0.019)	−0.030 (0.021)
Rebel strength	−0.134 (0.212)	−0.126 (0.213)
Ethnic tie	−0.255 (0.158)	−0.291 (0.158)
Natural resources	0.176 (0.139)	0.222 (0.138)
Mountainous terrain	−0.195 (0.310)	−0.135 (0.310)
$\text{OSV}_{rebel,t-1}$	0.005** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)
Rebel ideology	0.015 (0.266)	0.057 (0.266)
Rebel loss	0.326* (0.166)	0.350* (0.166)
Foreign support	−0.370* (0.172)	−0.366* (0.172)
Democratic support pct.	0.159 (0.589)	0.209 (0.594)
Constant	3.095** (0.156)	3.026** (0.156)
Observations	2,490	2,490
Log Likelihood	−4,652	−4,655

*p<0.05; **p<0.01. Standard errors displayed in parenthesis. Zero component of each model has the same specifications as count part.

have occurred in a month). Doing so reveals a consistently significant effect. However, when I switch from exclusively violent to exclusively nonviolent mobilization occurrence, the binary measure becomes insignificant. It is possible that the result may be primarily driven by the fact that nonviolent mobilizations are significantly weaker than violent ones during armed conflicts. But it is also likely caused by the fact that there are far fewer nonviolent mobilization cases in this dataset.

In M14, I assess the effect for mobilization frequency and duration on a monthly scale. Consistent with previous results, $\text{H}_{frequency}$ and $\text{H}_{duration}$ here have received stronger support. Mobilization frequency is negatively and significantly correlated with reductions in violence in the following month. Coefficients for duration also jointly exhibit an inverse 'U' shape. The

Table 3.8: Rebel ADM1 Month

	Dependent variable:		
	OSV_{rebel}		
	(M12$_{ZINB\ Count}$)	(M13$_{ZINB\ Count}$)	(M14$_{ZINB\ Count}$)
Mobilization occurrence$_{t-1}$	−0.804** (0.211)		
Violent mobilization$_{t-1}$		−1.146** (0.228)	
Mobilization frequency$_{t-1}$			−0.187* (0.084)
Mobilization duration	0.702** (0.194)	0.707** (0.192)	0.668** (0.198)
Mobilization duration^2	−0.073 (0.038)	−0.068 (0.038)	−0.078* (0.037)
Rebel strength	−0.048 (0.130)	−0.047 (0.129)	−0.055 (0.130)
Ethnic tie	−0.584** (0.098)	−0.577** (0.098)	−0.569** (0.098)
Natural resources	0.276** (0.085)	0.277** (0.085)	0.276** (0.085)
Mountainous terrain	0.845** (0.180)	0.789** (0.181)	0.829** (0.181)
$\text{OSV}_{rebel,t-1}$	0.017** (0.002)	0.017** (0.002)	0.017** (0.002)
Civilian deaths spatial lag	0.014** (0.002)	0.014** (0.002)	0.013** (0.002)
Rebel ideology	0.332* (0.156)	0.331* (0.156)	0.346* (0.156)
Rebel loss	0.122 (0.103)	0.115 (0.102)	0.137 (0.103)
Foreign support	0.028 (0.115)	0.038 (0.114)	0.043 (0.115)
Democratic support pct.	−2.153** (0.518)	−2.179** (0.517)	−2.177** (0.518)
Constant	1.393** (0.090)	1.400** (0.089)	1.372** (0.089)
Observations	30,424	30,424	30,424
Log Likelihood	−14,427	−14,422	−14,432

*p<0.05; **p<0.01. Standard errors displayed in parenthesis. Zero component of each model has the same specifications as count part.

nonlinear term in the monthly level of analysis becomes significant.

I test the frequency and duration of each mobilization tactic in Table 3.9. Once again, M15 suggests that at a sub-national level, non-violent tactics waged against rebel groups in areas affected by violence are ineffective. In contrast, M16 indicates that higher frequency and duration of violent mobilization tactics are negatively correlated with civilian victimization.

Figure 3.6 shows the substantive effect on yearly level data. Holding all else at the base or mean level, the occurrence of mobilization leads to around ten fewer deaths per year. Looking at the center panel of Figure 2, the frequency of mobilization also leads to a reduction in one-sided violence. As duration increases from zero to seven months, the difference between mobilizing

Table 3.9: Rebel ADM1 Month Violent and Non-Violent Tactics

	Dependent variable:	
	OSV_{rebel}	
	($\text{M15}_{ZINBCount}$)	($\text{M16}_{ZINBCount}$)
Violent tactic frquency$_{t-1}$	-0.224^{*} (0.088)	
Nonviolent tactic frquency$_{t-1}$		0.044 (0.292)
Rebel strength	0.149 (0.128)	0.148 (0.129)
Ethnic tie	-0.777^{**} (0.094)	-0.701^{**} (0.094)
Natural resources	0.278^{**} (0.082)	0.283^{**} (0.082)
Mountainous terrain	0.875^{**} (0.180)	0.737^{**} (0.181)
Lag civilian deaths$_{t-1}$	0.018^{**} (0.002)	0.018^{**} (0.002)
Rebel ideology	0.610^{**} (0.152)	0.573^{**} (0.152)
Rebel loss	0.168 (0.102)	0.163 (0.102)
Foreign support	0.049 (0.112)	0.033 (0.113)
Democratic support Pct.	0.188 (0.443)	0.120 (0.440)
Violent tactic duration	0.649^{**} (0.212)	
Violent tactic duration^2	-0.078^{*} (0.039)	
Non-violent tactic duration		0.627 (0.601)
Non-violent tactic duration^2		-0.113 (0.230)
Constant	1.612^{**} (0.085)	1.624^{**} (0.084)
Observations	31,095	31,095
Log Likelihood	$-15{,}116$	$-15{,}157$

*p<0.05; **p<0.01. Standard errors displayed in parenthesis. Zero component of each model has the same specifications as count part.

once per year and twice per year widens to as much as around 20 civilian deaths in one year in each ADM1.

The substantive effect for longer duration is uncertain. One to three months duration is positively correlated with one-sided violence. The occurrence of a consecutive mobilization that is as long as three months leads to approximately 50 more civilian deaths per year than no mobilization. While there exists a sign of decline when duration is high, the effect is uncertain. The confidence interval becomes much wider as the duration approach beyond 3 months. The uncertainty is not surprising given the rarity of duration. In the appendix, one can see that only 15 out of 2886 observations (0.05%) correspond with a duration equal to 3 months.



Figure 3.6: How Occurrence, Duration, and Intensity of Mobilization Affect OSV at Sub-national Level

I examine the frequency and duration closer in Figure 3.7, where it shows monthly variations' substantive effects. It shows that one additional civilian mobilization against rebel groups would lead to approximately five fewer civilian deaths on average per month. The effect becomes larger as civilians mobilize for a longer consecutive period. This again provides support for the hypotheses that longer and more intense mobilizations would lead to less rebel violence.

To understand the effect of duration better, I look at a sub-sample of the data at rebel ADM1 monthly level. Doing so helps me to hold most control variables constant while examining the relationship between the duration of mobilization and rebel violence. Among all 47 rebel groups that have been included in the dataset, only Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, JNIM, and ADF have experienced more than three months of anti-rebel civilian mobilizations. [5] Figure 3.8 shows a

[5] Strictly speaking, there are five rebel groups. Boko Haram since 2015 has been separately coded as IS in both ACLED and UCDP datasets. I discuss coding issues associated with this more extensively in the Appendix.



Figure 3.7: How Duration and Intensity of Mobilization Affect OSV at Sub-national Level

bivariate time series correlations between civilian victimization perpetrated by Boko Haram (also known as and separately coded as IS since 2015) and mobilization duration.

Looking at Figure 3.8 from left to right, one can see that the data's first recorded occurrence of longer-term mobilization was in 2014 in Borno Nigeria. The mobilization coincides with Boko Haram's northern offensive, where the rebel group committed high-level violence against civilians. Following the mobilization, violence temporarily declined but quickly spiked up again in 2015. None of the following periods in Borno experienced a similar level of mobilization. However, in 2016 violence quickly declined. One could attribute this to the change of leadership in Boko Haram and the consolidation of territories. But it is striking how the decline corresponds with a 12-month consecutive mobilization that occurred in Borno's neighboring region, Extreme Nord. In the Appendix, I also look at a sub-sample of Al-Shabaab, which experienced 9 months of mobilizations. Given the Al-Shabaab's high strength, it is not surprising that the rebel group used much less violence than Boko Haram. However, it is unclear in this case if mobilization



Figure 3.8: Boko Haram (ISIS From 2015) OSV Temporal Patterns

had deterred Al-Shabaab from its abusive behaviors. The high spike in mobilization duration does coincide with a low level of violence, but it does not signify a systematic shift in rebel behavior. Unfortunately, mobilization duration with similar lengths is not available in my dataset. Thus, while there is some evidence supporting $H_{duration}$, existing data is quite limited for definite conclusions.

3.5 Alternative Hypotheses

The capability of civilian communities to mobilize, rebel characteristics, rebel losses, the existence of natural resources, and UN presence may all provide alternative explanations for the variation of one-sided violence. I evaluate these explanations based on additional data and existing model results already presented in this chapter.

Having the capability to mobilize may deter rebels from using violence since higher capabilities once mobilized can cause a higher number of casualties, a wider spread of instabilities in rebels' territories, and higher difficulty to extract resources. Therefore, having higher capabilities

Table 3.10: Historical Data

Mean	St. Dev.	Max	Min	Pct. Zeroes	Variable
13	175	6273	0	0.92	Civilian deaths
1	3	48	0	0.64	Historical Nonviolent duration
1	2	5	0	0.64	Historical Nonviolent participation
2	7	109	0	0.76	Historical communal violence

* N=1678

are expected to negatively correlate with violence in the future.

A direct measure of community capability to mobilize does not exist. One way to measure it is by looking at historical patterns of mobilization in an area and determine where this area is less affected by violence perpetrated by rebels during conflicts. To do this, I first assemble a new dataset with ADM1-conflict-year level of analysis. The dataset includes all intra-state conflicts since 2010 and affected countries' ADM1s.

Next, I collect the historical average protest duration and an average number of participants from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD). The dataset provides the location, time, and characteristics of all protests that occurred in Africa and were reported by the Associated Press and Agence France Presse before 2010. I also collect communal militia activities by focusing on the historical intensity of violence in the area, as reported by ACLED. The ability to inflict violence between communities in the past here serves as a rough proxy for the capability to use violence against rebel groups.

Table 3.10 shows the data distribution. The duration variable represents the average number of days a protest has occurred in an ADM1 in the past. According to SCAD's coding, participation is coded as a categorical variable from one to seven. Here, the maximum participation is five, where at least 10,000 to 100,000 have participated in a protest in the past. one is the lowest value and represents less than ten people in a protest. On average, most protests do not exceed

Table 3.11: Conflict Year

	Dependent variable:
	OSV_{rebel} ($\text{M17}_{ZINB\ Count}$)
Historical deaths	0.002 (0.002)
Rebel strength	−0.658 (0.700)
Foreign support	−1.156 (1.104)
Natural resources	1.078* (0.443)
Ethnic tie	−1.441 (0.777)
Mountains	1.705 (1.618)
Historical duration	0.038 (0.087)
Historical participation	0.173 (0.141)
Historical communal violence	−0.024 (0.016)
Constant	3.685** (0.507)
Observations	1,678
Log Likelihood	−1,129.102
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01

ten participants and beyond one day at a sub-national level. Communal violence is simply the average number of fatalities caused (partly) by communal militias. On average, there are two fatalities per ADM1 in the past and the maximum number reaches 109.

I fit the zero-inflated count model in Table 3.11. The model, however, does not offer any support for the capability argument. Instead, the model suggests that having historical capabilities to mobilize enables rebels to perpetrate violence. Both high *Historical duration* and *Historical protest* participation are positive and insignificant at 0.05 level. Historical communal violence is negative but insignificant at a 0.05 level.

Accounting for rebel characteristics is important to explain violence against civilians. Rebel groups that are least likely to perpetrate violence against civilians are those that have high strength, strong central control, foreign support, and separatist or Maoist ideologies. Looking across data from section 3.1, among 86 intra-state dyads, none of the rebel groups share all of these char-

acteristics at once. Groups such as Zintan Military Council, Al-Shabaab, and IS in Libya share some characteristics. These groups do appear less violent than others. However, some of them still perpetrate violence against civilians. Al-Shabaab, for example, although known to have parity strength with the incumbent government and have moderate central control, still on average kill approximately a hundred civilians per year. IS despite having parity strength and high central control, killed approximately a hundred civilians in 2015 but quickly decreased its violence in the following years.

Statistical models offer mixed support for explanations centering on rebels' characteristics. In all tables, rebels' strength remains negative, indicating that strong rebels are less likely to kill more civilians. But most times coefficients representing rebel strength are not significant at the 0.05 level. It does not appear that rebel central control and foreign support arguments receive strong support in the existing models. All models indicate that having strong central control correlates with higher violence, which is the opposite of the expectation. Having foreign support receives favorable results in most models. However, coefficients of foreign support become positive in Table 3.6 despite holding the same parameters in Table 3.5 constant. The argument regarding rebels' ideology receives no support. Rebel groups that have separatist ideologies appear to be more likely to use violence against civilians. Based on the availability of data here, it is unknown whether Maoist rebels are less likely to use violence since it is rare for rebels to have Maoist ideologies post-1997.

Existing arguments also suggest that rebels are more likely to kill civilians when rebels face losses on the battlefield over time. Consistent with results on rebel strength, having losses and higher rebel deaths positively correlate with higher civilian deaths.

All geographic explanations receive support from the collected data. Rebels are more likely

to be violent when they do not share ethnic ties, in areas that are rich in lootable natural resources, and mountainous terrains. One should further note, however, that although the correlation between natural resources and violence is strong, most rebel groups operate in regions that have natural resources. Based on data from 3.1, for example, 90 percent of the observations have natural resources. Most regions where rebels operate likewise have mountainous terrains. This is not surprising, as rebels are more likely to launch their rebellions in places that have rugged terrains and natural resources to survive. This thus suggests that geographic explanations, particularly natural resources and mountainous terrains, are statistically correlated with violence mostly because rebels tend to be active in regions rich with these features.

3.6 Further Investigation

I conduct additional investigations. First, the zero-inflated negative binomial model is not the only strategy to deal with excessive zeros. Another model is the hurdle model, which, like the zero-inflated model, also accounts for over-dispersion. The difference between the two models lies in the ways they deal with zeros. In the hurdle model, the zero stage is only a simple logistic regression that predicts zeros. But in the zero-inflated model, the zero stage not only predicts mere observed zeros but also predicts structured zeros. Thus, in the count part of the hurdle model, the negative binomial will only include positive counts that are assumed to have a different data generating process than zeros. From the theory so far, it is not entirely clear which model is more appropriate to account for zeros. One could certainly appreciate the existence of structured zeros (non-fatal attacks), but it is also plausible that a hurdle dynamic exists (separate dynamic when there exists escalation of deaths). I have looked at both models' results and compared the

goodness of fit. If both report similar effects, then I have the additional confidence that my results are robust. Hurdle models' results are consistent with existing models, but usually with a slightly weaker fit to the data.

In addition, it is necessary to evaluate the main results' zero models, especially for section 3.1, where it is possible to investigate whether mobilizing can pre-preemptively deter violence. Unfortunately, both hurdle and zero-inflated models do not suggest mobilization can predict the occurrence of civilian targeting. The results indicate that while mobilization is negatively correlated with future periods of violence against civilians, it does not entirely prevent the occurrence of violence.

To further eliminate the possibilities that the coefficient directions are entirely driven by the existence of temporal dependencies, I further reduce my dataset's unit of analysis to Rebel-ADM1. I then fit a Poisson and quasi-Poisson model with the same set of parameters as M1 and M2. All count variables are aggregated to their average values for each rebel group and ADM1. All binary indicators are aggregated to the mean and are assumed to be one if any value is above zero. This process has reduced the dataset to 361 observations. Although this procedure is quite extreme, it is useful to examine if the models' coefficients are behaving similarly to before. As shown in the Appendix, the results suggest that mobilization occurrence is positively correlated with one-sided violence in Poisson and quasi-Poisson models. This is expected given that temporal elements no longer exist and civilian mobilization tends to occur where rebels escalate violence. The coefficient representing mobilization frequency on the other hand remains negative. This emphasizes that accounting for the logic of civilian mobilization is important when modeling civilian behaviors in civil wars.

I account for heterogeneity across rebel groups and spatial units by re-estimating all previ-

ous main results with fixed effect quasi-Poisson models. The reason for using quasi-Poisson models here is because implementing fixed effects is difficult for hurdle and zero-inflated models. I find that by accounting for fixed effects, the coefficient directions hold. Mobilization occurrence$_{t-1}$, Mobilization frequency$_{t-1}$, Mobilization spread$_{t-1}$ with a similar set of parameters in Table 3.2 country-year level of analysis are all significant at 0.05 level. Non-violent tactic spread$_{t-1}$ originally included in M3 also becomes significant at 0.05 level. Re-estimated quasi-Poisson fixed models with data included in section 3.2 offer little support for all proposed hypotheses. Most key independent variables, including frequency and occurrence, are positive and sometimes significant at 0.05 with varied specifications. However, one should take these results with caution since often the models' key parameters have unusually high standard errors. This is partly due to the rarity of dependent variables and independent variables.

Finally, certain models in the main results have omitted variables to fit the main results. Doing so is necessary since many independent variables, especially rebels' characteristics and mobilization characteristics, are rare to be non-zero. In section 3.1, I have omitted *Rebel ideology* since rebels with separatist or Maoist ideologies are rare in the dataset. Here, I re-introduce the variable by omitting *Rebel strength*. Alternatively, I have also re-coded the variable by coding all rebels with some kind of coherent religious ideologies or separatist ideologies as one since existing research suggests that having religious ideologies likewise is correlated with less violence (Ginsburg, 2019). Both of the above operations do not change the main results.

3.7 Statistical Results' Conclusion

Collectively, the evidence presented in this chapter favors the main theory. Simple bi-variate time-series and spatial patterns suggest that civilians mobilize when rebels perpetrate violence. All data suggests that violence declines following civilian mobilizations. All hypotheses have received evidence of support among statistical models. To the very least, one could not confidently accept the null hypotheses that there is no relationship between civilian mobilization and the decrease of civilian victimization perpetrated by rebel groups.

Among all hypothesized relationships, $\mathrm{H}_{occurrence}$, $\mathrm{H}_{frequency}$, and $\mathrm{H}_{duration}$ receive the most consistent support. The majority of the models, across different units of analyses and model specifications, support these three hypotheses. H_{spread} receives only limited support. The hypothesis has only received support in one type of model specifications.

The results in this chapter also lend support to several alternative hypotheses. Among rebels' characteristics, I find that the strength and losses of rebel groups most strongly predict the intensity of violence against civilians. Rebels are most likely to use violence when they are weaker and have suffered losses. Lacking ethnic ties with the local population and occupying areas with natural resources likewise positively predict violence.

There exist several limitations of this analysis. First, I have not found strong evidence that an area's mobilization capability affects rebels' decisions to increase violence. However, this null result may be due to the difficulty in directly measuring a community's mobilization capability.

Second, due to difficulty in measurements, both key independent and dependent variables are quite rare. While the difficulty has been partially addressed by zero-inflation models, the rarity has inflated the uncertainty in each model's predictions. There exist two ways to further address

this issue. One way could be using matching. The other way could be using case studies. Due to the availability and precision of existing data, I chose the latter option. In the following chapters, I introduce case studies to illustrate both the main theory framework and the mechanisms.

Chapter 4 Case Study Introduction

4

Figure 4.1: Mechanism Flowchart



Starting from Chapter five, this dissertation will use qualitative methods to evaluate the plausibility of the mechanisms. The case study will use a theory-testing variant of process tracing detailed by Beach & Pedersen (2019). The primary objective of the case studies is to provide

evidence for the existence of causal mechanisms.

Case study methods are aimed at testing three aspects of the theory that large-N tests cannot easily reveal. By looking at each actor's statements and behaviors, I can infer whether the actors are following the patterns of strategic interactions predicted in Chapter two. These patterns first begin with civilians' strategic choice to engage in risky mobilization against rebel groups. As I have argued, civilians use non-violent and violent methods to deter rebel groups from further using violence. Second, depending on the tactics, I expect to find evidence on how these methods impact state and local actors' behaviors. For non-violent tactics, I look at how civilians pressure the state to add costs on rebels and rebels' supporters. For violent tactics, the focus is on communal militias as well as rebels' local rivalries' response to civilian mobilization. Third, responding to the mobilization's influence on state and local actors, rebels evaluate civilians' resolve to escalate and respond accordingly by either escalating or decreasing level of violence.

As Beach & Pedersen (2019) have summarized, there are three types of process tracing methods. Theory-testing case studies focus on testing the presence of mechanisms. The goal is to build beyond detected statistical associations and trace the mechanisms of the theory. Theory-building case studies aim to dive deep into a case and develop a theory on why a correlation has occurred in a case. Third, scholars may use case-centric case studies to find a system of explanations that have caused a puzzling outcome.

My case study is the theory-testing variant, where the primary goal is to detect whether the proposed causal mechanisms exist in each case. The goal, therefore, is no longer probing correlations between the outcome and the main explanatory variable, but looking into if the process that created the outcome is consistent with expectations. Consistent with Beach & Pedersen (2019)'s definitions, I define "causal mechanism" as a "theory of a system of interlocking parts

Table 4.1: Mechanism Operationalized

Mechanism	Predicted evidence
Civilians make strategic choices to engage in risky mobilizations	Expect to see (1) civilians weigh pros and cons on whether to mobilize (2) civilians mobilize when the risks of doing so is clearly high
Civilians decide to mobilize violently or non-violently	Expect to see (1) (violent mobilization) civilians coordinate with communal militia groups. (2) (non-violent mobilization) civilians pressure the state to initiate counter-insurgency against rebel groups
(1) (violent mobilization) Communal militias threaten both civilians and rebels' survival	Expect to see (1) rebel group faces increasing level of territorial instability (2) increasing number of opportunistic groups challenging rebel's rule (3) rebels face increasing costs to transport between territories
(2) (non-violent mobilization) incumbent state threatens both civilians and rebels' survival	Expect to see (1) the state's campaign cause losses on rebels and indiscriminately target civilians (2) rebel's supporters lose confidence in rebels' abilities to maintain an insurgency
Rebels observe the scale of the mobilization and decide whether to use violence in the future	Expect to see rebels stop using violence when civilians remain resolved despite the high accumulated costs on civilians

that transmit causal forces from X to Y" (p. 29). This implies, therefore, I am going beyond probabilistic correlations but focusing on whether parts or the entirety of the theory are sufficient and/or necessary to produce the outcome presented in each case.

Conducting the theory-testing process tracing method first involves explicitly conceptualizing the mechanisms into different parts. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 4.1. The figure is divided into three parts, each part features a major aspect of the theory. The first part features civilians' decisions to mobilize. Civilians may use violent or non-violent tactics. The second part outlines the tactics' implications on both civilians and rebel groups. The third part involves rebels' observations and conclusions on whether civilians have resolve. If civilians still decide

to mobilize at a high scale despite the risks to a community, then rebels are deterred from using violence.

I operationalize these mechanisms into predictions in Table 4.1 of this chapter. This involves transforming the concepts into observable implications. For each mechanism, I maximize the corresponding prediction's uniqueness, certainty, and feasibility. Uniqueness refers to the unusual occurrence of an event that cannot be easily explained by other theories (the gun is smoking in the suspect's hands). Certainty refers to the collected data's necessity in proving the theory is correct (the suspect must be alive to commit a murder). Feasibility refers to the possibility that I can accurately observe the evidence.

It is necessary to balance all three characteristics of evidence in case studies. In part one, I will use public interviews and event reports found in NGO and news sources. Directly finding statements related to the evidence that civilians are making the calculations to deter rebel groups by mobilizing is less feasible. Finding such evidence will update my confidence in my theory. On the other hand, reports regarding risks to mobilize for civilians are the pre-requisite of the theory (therefore certain and less unique) in civil wars. Not finding this type of evidence can significantly decrease the theory's credibility.

Part two focuses on interactions between civilians, communal militias, state, rebel groups, and rebels' supporters. If the mobilization is violent, then I expect to see an increasing number of communal militias participate in resisting rebel groups. If the mobilization is non-violent, I should find evidence of the state being non-violently pressured to initiate campaigns against rebel groups. The resulting campaign is expected to cause some losses on rebels. Evidence related to both tactics can be more easily found in local news articles, NGO reports, and various conflict event database. Evidence would be highly unique if it directly indicates that communal militias

are exploiting the opportunity when rebels are fighting off the initial waves of communal militias mobilized by civilians. Likewise, state officials admitting in news interviews that they are fighting against rebels because of the recent complains from civilians would be highly certain. However, these types of evidence may be less unique. For example, state incumbents would likely hide their true intentions to fight rebels and use protests as a convenient excuse. This would mean that regardless of the protests, state would always find some excuse to fight rebels.

Part three reveals the final outcome of the mechanisms. Depending on whether civilians remain resolved to mobilize, rebels in the subsequent period are expected to act either violently or more peacefully. I rely on de-classified documents, news reports, NGO reports, and rebels' public statements to evaluate this part. Finding evidence on why rebels choose to vary their levels of violence would be highly valuable. For example, finding direct evidence where rebels speaking about civilians' willingness to take risks and the impact on the group's efforts to fight against the state would be highly unique but difficult to obtain. It is, however, necessary to find sequential evidence where civilians maintain the momentum of mobilization despite all the risks prior to rebels' decisions to decrease violence.

I select cases based on the presence of independent variables, dependent variables, and relevant scope conditions in a case. In total, I have selected five cases: Boko Haram in Nigeria Borno, Renamo in Northern Mozambique, FARC in Colombia Indigenous Territories, Taliban in Central Afghanistan, and LRA in Northern Uganda. In all five cases, there were presence of a noticeable level of civilian mobilization against rebel groups. I combine both single case process tracing and multiple case cross comparisons for my case study analysis.

In Chapter 5, I select the Boko Haram case for an in-depth study. The reason for picking Boko Haram for single process tracing is due to the existance of both non-violent and violent

civilian mobilization activities, which make it easy to verify the proposed mechanisms. The abundance of English local news in Nigeria, translated rebel communiques, journalists and politicians' memoirs like-wise will improve the accurately and certainty of the found evidence.

Beyond information availability, Boko Haram has been considered a well-equipped insurgent organization that frequently uses indiscriminate violence against civilians. At the on-set of the conflict, civilians in the Boko Haram case, on the other hand, lacked weapons and faced significant risks to openly oppose Boko Haram. Yet despite these obstacles, as civilians remained resolved to mobilize both violently and non-violently, Boko Haram shifted its strategy to a "heart-and-mind" centric approach. Within this thesis' theoretical scope, the Boko Haram case is a "most-likely" case, where the existance of independent variable, observed outcome, and external conditions make it probable for proposed mechanisms to exist. While such findings are unlikely to significantly boost my confidence beyond the selected cases, not finding the mechanism would effectively invalidate my hypotheses. In addition, finding the mechanisms' presence offer greater confidence that the detected association is indeed driven by the mechanisms.

In Chapter 6, I select the rest of the four cases for comparison purposes. The primary purpose of using cross-comparison analysis is to further establish the scope and conditions that mechanisms that are likely to be present. In addition, by illustrating that the mechanisms exist in an increasing the number of cases, it would be helpful to increase one's confidence that the mechanisms suggested in the theory are plausible. Finally, finding detailed information on civilian mobilization against rebel groups, like the level of detail presented in the Boko Haram case, is a common challenge in this field of inquiry. However, by connecting together fragmented pieces of information from various cases, I could demonstrate that, in general, the observed absence or abundance of mechanisms could lead to varied behaviors among rebel groups.

Chapter 5 Nigeria

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will trace Boko Haram's violence against civilians and the development of civilian resistance against the group. The chapter will focus on Nigeria, specifically Borno. The goal of the case study, as described in the previous chapter, is to provide evidence for the existence of the proposed mechanisms in one case instead of further establishing correlations. I will begin the case by first describing the geographical conditions, the relationship between local civilians and rebel groups since the early 2000s, and the conditions that led to civilians' resistance against Boko Haram. Following these descriptions, I will focus on presenting various pieces of evidence that support the existence of the proposed theoretical mechanisms. Figure 5.1 shows the relevant events that took place during the period of observation. At the end of this chapter, I will summarize the evidence and discuss the plausibility of the mechanisms proposed by both the primary and alternative theories.

The Boko Haram case, as I will show in this chapter, is a most likely case for the theory proposed in the second chapter. The group starting in mid-2013 began killing civilians indiscriminately. The uptick in violence coincided with coordinated resistance from civilians in Borno and nearby areas. The continued resistance triggered an increased number of local challengers and more intense state-level counterinsurgency campaigns. The resistance was crucial in changing

rebels' beliefs that indiscriminate violence is inefficient and that a more peaceful approach to civilians would be necessary for victory.

The case also shows support for several prominent theories outlined in the first chapter. First, signal theories argue that rebels kill civilians to demonstrate their willingness to continue violence for a better bargaining position (Pape, 2006). Consistent with signal theories, Boko Haram does perpetrate violence against civilians to signal its resolve to rebel against the Nigerian federal government. Second, Kalyvas argues that rebels often kill indiscriminately when they lack information on the targets (Kalyvas, 2006). Boko Haram often resorts to selective violence against state collaborators and communal militias' participants when they have sufficient information on local residents. This provides support for Kalyvas' theory's mechanisms. However, evidence also suggests that Boko Haram at times would still kill indiscriminately when they have sufficient information. Third, Wood argues that rebels would resort to killing when suffering losses (Wood, 2014). Boko Haram frequently resorted to looting and killing for short-term survival. However, as demonstrated by this case, Boko Haram chose to loot without killing civilians at a later period. This thus suggests that the rebels could still choose to be more peaceful toward civilians even if they suffered losses on the battlefield. Finally, civilian resistance capacity arguments suggest that resistance may provide physical protection for civilians in an area. However, while Borno civilians' violent resistance benefited from local communities' resources, communal militia groups were often poorly equipped to provide protection. Furthermore, by sponsoring violence, communities often exposed themselves to Boko Haram's revenge attacks. Both outcomes illustrated in this case decrease one's confidence in the capacity argument.

The evidence has limitations. First, given Boko Haram's modus operandi and civilians' preference to non-violently protest in a country's capital, it is difficult to exclusively focus on

Borno throughout the case. At times, it is necessary to introduce events outside of Borno. Most of the descriptions and key evidence, however, will remain within Borno's administrative borders.

Second, there may exist bias in the cited sources. This case study will utilize both primary source and secondary sources accumulated over the two decades. Primary sources include rebel leaders' lectures, written communications, radio transmissions, audio messages, video announcements, rebels' magazines, witnesses' diaries, memoirs, political elites' announcements, etc. Secondary sources include local news, international news, scholarly publications, NGO reports, and recorded scholars' interviews. Each source may suffer bias. Rebels are often aware of their letters' security implications and may choose to omit particular information. Rebel members may obfuscate facts to fit their narratives against other actors. In local news, given Boko Haram's tendencies to use selective violence against journalists, some information may not be reported. I overcome these possible challenges by consulting sources from all sides of the conflict whenever possible. Among secondary sources, I avoid reporting events based on one source and focus on known facts repeatedly shown in multiple outlets.

Finally, given the availability of data, it is difficult to account for village-level variations in Borno. Still, the information presented should sufficiently contribute to our understanding of the plausibility of the theories' mechanisms.

5.2 Case Description

Located in the Northeast of Nigeria, Borno shares borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The area features diverse landscapes. In the South, the Mandara mountains stretch across populous towns and extend into Cameroon. The middle of Borno is covered by a dense forest popularly

Figure 5.1: Timeline



known as the Sambisa Forest. Further up north, Lake Chad extends across the upper borders of Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Southwest of Chad. Given the rugged terrain and remote locations, communities in Borno often lack effective government presence. The lack of social services and employment opportunities is common in the region. In 2004, for example, Borno's literacy rate was approximately 30 percent, which was close to 30 percent below the national average (Kalli,

2011). In addition, climate change has facilitated the shrinkage of Lake Chad, which remains a significant source of food and farm-based income for many in the area. (Mahmood & Ani, 2018). Due to insufficient government presence and a lack of legitimate means for income, participation in criminal networks is an attractive alternative. Besides robbery and banditry, organized smuggling has been a profitable and prevalent means to sustain livelihoods among youths. Local Nigerians referred to the smugglers as *achaba*, who preferred to drive small Chinese motorcycles and would agree to carry items ranging from everyday products to weapons illegally across borders (MacEachern, 2018, p. 129).

These above-mentioned landscapes provide favorable conditions for insurgencies. In 2003, a religious group known as the "Al Sunna Wal Jamma" appeared in the northeast, headed by a well-known *Imam* named Mohammed Yusuf (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). The group was well-regarded and had extensive ties with local political elites. Its leader Mohammed Yusuf was a student of an influential cleric Ja'afar Mahmud Adam. Yusuf and his group also played significant roles in facilitating the election of Borno's governor Ali Modu Sheriff in early 2003. Upon Sheriff's victory, a close friend of Yusuf (known as Alhaji Buji Foi) was appointed as a Commissioner for Religious Affairs as a good gesture (Walker, 2018, p. 153). The relationships between Yusuf's sect and local communities, however, broke down in late 2003 as the group escalated violence against opposing sects. The group subsequently relocated further north from Maiduguri and established a safe haven somewhere near the Niger border. Between 2003 and 2004, members of the group, at the time popularly known as the "Nigerian Taliban," carried out sporadic attacks against nearby police stations and attempted to jailbreak its members from prisons (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014; MacEachern, 2018, p. 159). Responding to the group, the Nigerian military forces captured the group's sanctuary and forced the sect members to scatter. Sometime before or

during the Nigerian Taliban's brief existence, Yusuf escaped to Saudi Arabia and only returned to Maiduguri after the military operation against the Nigerian Taliban had mostly concluded (Walker, 2018, p. 151).

Upon Yusuf's return, many of his former students and members of the Nigerian Taliban reintegrated under his leadership. Yusuf distanced himself and his members away from the Nigerian Taliban and focused instead on non-violent means to preach and recruit. His sect's influence rapidly grew and was able to expand various branches beyond Maiduguri. Its main branch was known to consist of multiple religious councils as well as security departments (Walker, 2018, p. 152). The local population regarded the sect as an important and influential educational institution. A resident remarked in 2010 that "There wasn't a mosque like this in the whole of the country, where you could go and attain as much knowledge." and "everyone was aware of who they were" (Walker, 2016). Inside Yusuf's mosque compound, known as Ibn Taimiyya Masjid, the group offered incoming residents Islamic knowledge, shelter, marriage, and employment opportunities (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). This influence yielded significant interactions between Yusuf's sect and local elites. Before 2009, Yusuf again participated in influencing Sheriff's re-elections.

Nevertheless, Yusuf's group had a paradoxical relationship with the local population. On the one hand, the group was well-received at all levels of society and was able to leverage its influence to operate above the law. On the other hand, Yusuf and his followers' preaching appeared increasingly belligerent toward the government and received significant friction against competing sects and scholars. Yusuf's preaching usually consists of his interpretations of Islam and his belief that western education is toxic. Occasionally, both Yusuf and his followers mocked and rejected the Nigerian government's authority. The group officially was known as Jama'atu Ahlis

Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS). Informally, the local population outside the sect referred to the group as "Boko Haram." In one of the remaining records of Yusuf's public debates, Yusuf was seen humiliated by a local scholar on his stance that western education should be forbidden (Cook, 2018, p. 11). Outside of Mosques, Yusuf's members repeatedly clashed with Izala sect members over the right to congregate in mosques, resulting in multiple arrests. Although these arrests were quickly dismissed, Yusuf's rhetoric only became much more violent. In one of his preaching sessions, Yusuf suggested that the locals "misunderstood us as a set of people prone to fighting" but warned that "opposition from the government is enough to spur us to start fighting" (Cook, 2018, p. 75).

The degree of Yusuf's influence combined with the group's rhetoric alarmed Nigeria's security forces, especially given the military's recent experience with Niger Delta in Southern Nigeria and the growing global jihadist influence. In July 2009, the group clashed with the military, resulting in hundreds of deaths and at least a thousand arrests (Nossiter, 2009). Yusuf was arrested and then secretly executed without a trial. The specifics of the confrontation are disputed by both Yusuf's group and the military. The security forces claimed that the group was preparing to launch a "holy war." As a response, the military launched "Operation Flush" and eliminated the group (AP, 2009). Yusuf and his group claimed that the culmination of harassment and violence inflicted on their sect caused the sect to respond with violence. During Yusuf's interrogation, he insisted that the police had destroyed all his branches across the region and opened fire on his compound (Cook, 2018). In one of his last public messages to his group, Yusuf cited instances where his members were killed by Operation Flush at a funeral and then were threatened to be attacked again when attempting to donate blood to injured sect members in the hospital (Cook, 2018, p. 167).

The military crackdown in 2009 was highly traumatic to the relationship between Boko Haram and local communities. At the onset of the crackdown, Boko Haram's farmlands in Bauchi state were raided by the government. The military also bulldozed the infamous Ibn Taimiyya Masjid into ashes, removing a significant landmark representing the group's local influence. In the process, the security forces re-labeled the group as the Nigerian Taliban, killed hundreds of the sect's members, and imprisoned members' families (Zenn, 2014). State violence was highly indiscriminate. By the end of the operation, the state claimed to have captured and killed a thousand members. Many of these arrests and violence were likely targeted at innocent civilians, who could not be distinguished from Boko Haram. A Maiduguri resident on his way to the bus to flee from the city was randomly picked up and interrogated by the police for his ties with Boko Haram. Upon realizing that this man had no ties with the group, the police told him "You are better off sheltering here...if you go to the mosque, if you go outside, you will be a dead man" (The New Humanitarian, 2015). When asked by journalists about the lives of innocent civilians, security forces responded "There is no way we can identify exactly who is a member of the group...most were not in uniform...some wore red bands" (The New Humanitarian, 2015).

Association with Boko Haram quickly became a taboo for both ordinary civilians and community elites in the area. Upon driving out most of the group's fighters, the military conducted house-to-house searches and claimed to have made up to 4000 arrests (Vanguard News, 2009b; The Canadian Press, 2009). Many local political elites, including Borno's governor Ali Modu Sheriff, were accused of supporting Boko Haram. Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume was tried for terrorism based on his alleged ties with the group. A government contractor Alhaji Bunu Wakil was accused of being a major sponsor for Boko Haram (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). All of these elites denied the accusations and most were let off the hook as the Nigerian public's attention

shifted away from Borno.

5.3 Boko Haram Re-emerges With Selective Violence

Despite the military's scope of operation, Key leaders of Boko Haram escaped upon Yusuf's death. These leaders include Yusuf's eldest son Abu Musab al-Barnawi and the group's second-in-command Abubakar Shekau. Approximately one month following the military crackdown in 2009, the sect issued a public statement, which clarifies its stance on western education and vows to carry out violence in most major cities in Nigeria "in a way no one has ever done before" (Vanguard News, 2009a). These threats, however, at the time appeared to be empty as the security forces had already destroyed much of the group's resisting capacity. As expected, the group went quiet after the statement. Desperate for money and weapons, the group spent much of the time between late 2009 to early 2010 secretly establishing reliable shelters and procuring weapons. Shekau sought advice and support from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Cook, 2018, p. 213). Eager to expand its influence in Central Africa, the AQIM agreed to provide at least 200,000 euros, weapons, shelters for safety, and training to members of Boko Haram.

In July 2010, Boko Haram re-emerged with a series of video messages featuring Abubakar Shekau. These videos generally include three themes. First, based on the events in 2009, the group vowed to unleash violence against local political elites, who were labeled by the group as traitors (Cook, 2018, p. 207). Second, Shekau reiterated his commitment to jihad and called on his followers to fight "unbelievers" (Cook, 2018, p. 211). Third, in return for AQIM's support, Shekau openly offered tribute to global jihadists, including Al-Qaeda's Osama B.Laden and ISIS' Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Cook, 2018, p. 212). These public messages were soon followed by a

leaflet purposely left behind during a prison break. In the leaflet, the group claimed responsibility for the prison attack and repeated its grievance over the 2009 crackdown (Cook, 2018, p. 225).

The group's threats were quickly followed up with violence against civilians. The group was highly selective in its targets. Often the killing was carried out in close range by a small group of members riding *achaba* styled motorcycles against community elites and members of the police department. Most of the violence also occurred in the streets of Maiduguri and nearby cities. In late August 2010, several gunmen on bikes dressed in black overalls drove by and killed two policemen. In the same month, two gunmen attacked Yobe's former governor Ibrahim Gaidam's residence, resulting in one death. By September, the group had already assassinated six policemen (Daily Trust, 2010b). Some of the attacks showed clear motives in deterring public condemnations and collaboration with local police forces. An Islamic cleric was killed a day after issuing criticism toward the group (Daily Trust, 2010e). A retired policeman was found dead near his house after providing testimonies against suspected Boko Haram members in court (Daily Trust, 2010b).

Selective violence was effective in spreading fear and deterring collaboration between the local population and security forces. Several prominent local Islamic scholars went into hiding following the series of revenge attacks (Daily Trust, 2010d). Muslim clerics avoided speaking about Boko Haram in public assemblies (Daily Trust, 2011h). Civilians refrained from providing information to government authorities. The local police chief suggested that "Information gathering is a tedious task" (Daily Trust, 2010a). A police commissioner further estimated that 90 percent of the residents in Maiduguri were hesitant in providing information to the security forces. Those who were willing to disclose information distrusted the police and preferred traditional authorities' protection (Daily Trust, 2010a).

Nevertheless, a significant number of civilians rejected the federal government's military intervention. A national poll in 2011 conducted in Nigeria suggests that close to sixty percent of the Nigerian population preferred dialogue with Boko Haram instead of military intervention. Four out of five respondents that voted for dialogue come from the Northeast. Most of those who supported military intervention lived in Southern Nigeria (Daily Trust, 2011e). Balancing between the Southern and Northern support, Goodluck Jonathan refrained from issuing state-wide emergencies and declared it as "not an option" (Daily Trust, 2011b). Instead, Jonathan continued to order limited military operations coordinated between the military and local police department (Daily Trust, 2011a). These military operations were controversial among local civilians, particularly due to security forces' indiscriminate violence. One civilian complained in a news interview, "The Boko Haram people are actually planting bombs to attack specific targets but the soldiers are shooting at everyone they see" (Daily Trust, 2011f). Likewise, local elders argued that the military presence did nothing but cause a mass exodus in Maiduguri.

Deterring collaboration was not the only explanation for Boko Haram's violence at the time. In late 2010, following a bomb attack on a police station, the group's spokesperson agreed to an interview with the Hausa Service of the BBC and the Voice of America. During the interview, the group made more concrete demands to the Nigerian government. Two specific issues stood out. First, the group demanded amnesty for both detained and active members of the federal government. Second, the spokesperson demanded more accommodations for Islamic practices (Daily Trust, 2010c). These demands were repeated over the next two years. In August 2011, for example, another spokesperson of the group argued that the government was infringing on the rights of Muslims and insisted that the only condition for a ceasefire was the unconditional release of all the group's members.(Daily Trust, 2011c). An informant likewise suggested that "Boko

Haram wants the release of arrested members as a condition for a ceasefire. Then discussions will follow" (Daily Trust, 2012b).

Civilians in Borno placed significant faith in concession and dialogue between 2010 and 2012. Former Gombe State Governor Muhammad Danjuma Goje agreed to issue a public apology on Daily Trust to Boko Haram members following the sect spokesperson's demands. The newly elected Borno governor Kashmin Shettima referred to Boko Haram members as "brothers," and emphasized that the best solution to violence would be "to engage them in a dialogue so that they can return home and unite with their loved ones" (Daily Trust, 2011d). These sentiments are echoed by the Borno Elders Forum, which is an influential local committee that is consisted of scholars and traditional authorities. In one statement, the forum called Boko Haram as friends (*yaanaa*) and urged for both sides to engage in dialogues, "The yaanaa should consider the general populace who are their brothers and sisters and do everything within their powers to ensure their safety" (Daily Trust, 2011g).

The results of the appeals for dialogues are at best mixed. Although Boko Haram repeatedly demanded opportunities for peace talks, leaders of the group regarded civilians' efforts with suspicion. Boko Haram's spokesperson, when discussing civilian mediation efforts publicly, emphasized their members' memories in 2009 and viewed some local elites as part of the system. (Daily Trust, 2011c). In private, Boko Haram continued to invite prominent local scholars and elites to various events. A prominent Islamic scholar Dahiru Bauchi recalled in a news interview on Boko Haram's efforts during this period, "I approached the sect that we had made so many promises, but with no action. If would agree to it, we should observe a cease-fire for three months...They have been inviting me through so many prominent people. They've persuaded me to attend their functions for more than ten times now, but I did not honour them" (Daily Trust,

2014m).

Several negotiation attempts were made possible with civilians' efforts to facilitate peace talks between the rebel group and the federal government (Daily Trust, 2012a). All of the talks, however, broke down due to a lack of commitment by both sides. In 2012, two senior clerics brokered a negotiation between Boko Haram leaders and the Nigerian government. The talk was unsuccessful as the group accused the federal government as "insincere" to address the demands (Daily Trust, 2012b). The federal government on the other hand frequently complained that Boko Haram was unwilling to come out from hiding, thus making direct talks difficult (Daily Trust, 2012a). Another major peace-talk was arranged in the summer of 2012. Ten commanders of Boko Haram in secret agreed to attend negotiations at the Borno governor's lodge in Maiduguri. As one informant noted, "I don't know how the governor was able to convince them. I think they just took the risk because amongst them was a wanted man...there was no way he could have been arrested because the governor made everybody to agree that the sect leaders must safely leave the venue of the meeting" (Daily Trust, 2012c). While Boko Haram laid out similar demands as before, the deal once again broke down as the federal government disagreed on the extent of concessions.

5.4 Boko Haram Escalates Indiscriminate Violence

As the talks repeatedly broke down, Boko Haram continued to escalate violence. In March 2013, Goodluck Jonathan announced on his Maiduguri trip that amnesty would not be possible. Five hours after his speech, Boko Haram detonated a series of explosions at various locations in Maiduguri (Daily Trust, 2013e). Following the attack, the group began using less selective violent

tactics in public venues and educational institutions. The group members especially preferred to target schools, killing pupils and teachers via bombs and bullets. A local witness suggested that three men pretended to visit a school's exam record office and opened fire on staff and visitors. Three other attacks occurred at the same time, all targeted at secondary schools in Borno and Kano (Daily Trust, 2013c).

Abundant reports suggest that Boko Haram in 2012 and 2013 also perpetrated a large number of kidnapping and looting activities. The kidnapping activities can be explained by a mix of political and financial incentives. In July 2012, several clerics imams were abducted by unknown gunmen at night. Witnesses suggested that the gunmen usually called these victims by name and abducted them upon confirmation. Some of the abducted had connections to those who were arrested by the security forces based on suspicion of being members of Boko Haram (Daily Trust, 2013l). In many cases, Boko Haram demanded ransoms up to twenty million Nairas for the kidnapped victims' return (Daily Trust, 2013p). In addition, alleged members of Boko Haram were seen robbing ATMs across the Northeast. These looting activities were likely facilitated by Boko Haram's newly admitted sub-groups, which had already established criminal reputation in the area. Local youth thugs known as the ECOMOG, Yan Kalare, and Sara Suta, began reportedly looting in cities under the jihad banner (Walker, 2018, p. 155).

Some leaders of Boko Haram expressed concern over their members' behaviors in private. More specifically, a number of leaders became uneasy over Shekau's comfort in permitting indiscriminate violence and looting, "Al-Shekawi makes things worse by not stopping at this point, but adding to this the permitting of bloodshed and possessions... keeping people away from the straight path, and criminals' exploitation of the opportunities to distort the religion and the jihad in the view of the masses" (Jawad Al-Tamimi, 2018). These concerns were forwarded as a series

of letters to AQIM. As a response, AQIM advised a more selective approach to violence and looting,"You do not take from each individual except the sum that does not destroy him or bringing him to ruin...Kidnapping should be the last resort, as burning is the last medicine..." (Jawad Al-Tamimi, 2018). It appeared, however, Shekau ignored this advice.

Despite the concerns, most prominent members of Boko Haram continued to adhere to Shekau's orders. Abu Musab al-Barnawi, one of the few leaders who expressed discomfort with indiscriminate violence, was videotaped in 2014 standing in front of bodies, declaring his readiness to "kill, slaughter, and scatter," asserting his willingness to be Shekau's "bullets" in his gun. (Walker, 2018, p. 162) A group named Jama'atu Ansarul Musulmina fi Baladis Sudan (Ansaru) in early 2012 emerged and publicly claimed that they rejected Boko Haram's violence toward Muslims. The group appeared to be a splinter group originating from Boko Haram (Zenn, 2013). Yet, the group engaged in similar tactics to abduct civilians and made little attempts to hide its coordinated activities with Boko Haram (Walker, 2016, p. 159).

5.5 The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) Emerges

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), more locally known as the *yan gora* emerged in Maiduguri in 2013. The group was, at the time, made up primarily of ordinary residents of Maiduguri willing to physically confront and pursue Boko Haram members. A mix of explanations may account for the emergence of the group. First, the CJTF emerged in an environment where community leaders' response toward Boko Haram had slowly shifted from accommodation to resistance. The increasingly indiscriminate nature of violence perpetrated by the rebel group and ineffective negotiation efforts from the federal government prompted civilians to seek

self-protection. Such sentiment is especially shared by Christian community elites, who began openly rejecting the idea of amnesty and regarded Boko Haram as criminals that could not be easily appeased, “While we’re to turn the other cheek when we’re slapped, the master didn’t say, ’If they cut one of your legs, present them with the second leg for cutting’ ” (Daily Trust, 2013k). Prominent Muslim elders’ view likewise began to shift. An Emir named Anka Alhaji Mohammad Ahmad Anka reversed earlier decisions for amnesty and instead argued in public that “Amnesty is for those people you know, you don’t give amnesty for people you don’t know” (Daily Trust, 2013b). Second, the government’s continued inability to distinguish civilians from Boko Haram members forced the residents to send signals of loyalty via visible actions. By participating in resistance, civilians may evade blames and arrests from the Nigerian military (Nagarajan, 2018b). Third, continued federal military intervention intruded upon the local’s sense of independence from outsiders’ control. Participants found renewed pride by taking matters into their own hands (Nagarajan, 2018b).

The presence of CJTF at the onset largely remained spontaneous and short of coordination within or across community levels. Many participants obtained melee weapons forged from local blacksmiths and set up checkpoints across the city streets to look for traces of Boko Haram (Daily Trust, 2013s). In some cases, some participants decided to raid Boko Haram’s hideouts in rural areas on their own (Trust, 2013).

Although some of the vigilante activities were fruitful in aiding the military in capturing rebel members, often the group pursued their own justice without turning in the suspects. Upon capturing perceived members of the rebel group, CJTF preferred engaging in torture and burning the suspects alive (Daily Trust, 2013g; Nagarajan, 2018a). In some cases, members of CJTF would deliberately target civilians that are perceived to be supporters of Boko Haram. In July

2013, a group identified as CJTF accused a local ANPP politician as being a Boko Haram sponsor and set his residence on fire (Daily Trust, 2013j). Furthermore, the growing power of the group attracted youth street thugs such as the ECOMOG, which extorted money in the streets by harassing passing vehicles (Daily Trust, 2013n).

Boko Haram responded to CJTF with violence and adaptation. Leaders of Boko Haram quickly declared war against CJTF, "We have established that the youth in Borno and Yobe states are now against our course...We have also resolved to fight back." Daily Post (2013) The declaration was backed up with a series of revenge. A group of vigilantes when searching for Boko Haram was ambushed by several gunmen in a village named Dawashi, resulting in 40 CJTF casualties (Daily Trust, 2013h). In Maiduguri, rebels leveraged the lack of female participants in CJTF by deploying female members or disguising men in women's clothes to bypass stop-and-search checkpoints (Daily Trust, 2013s). Given the difficulty to distinguish members from Boko Haram members in battles, some participants of CJTF decided to roll up their trousers to easily identify each other. This information was leaked to Boko Haram, who then also rolled up their trousers and ambushed the CJTF (Daily Trust, 2013a).

Still, the increased presence of CJTF placed pressure on Boko Haram's operation in urban areas, thus forcing the group to relocate to the rural mountains (Daily Trust, 2013f). But the shift in location did not indicate a shift in behavior toward civilians. Violence toward civilians became increasingly indiscriminate. In Gwoza and Bama, rebel groups stormed villages with explosives, killed community elites, and looted livestock before leaving (Daily Trust, 2013o,f). The group especially showed no restraint toward towns suspected to have supported the CJTF. In Baga, approximately two hundred civilians were killed during a series of clashes between Boko Haram and the federal military (Daily Trust, 2013d). The top leadership of the rebel group emphasized

the existence of CJTF in Baga, and openly admitted its responsibility for the attacks. Shekau in a video message declared, "We are responsible for the attack in Malam Fatori, the killings of vigilantes in Baga, attacks in Bama, Gamboru Ngala and Damaturu" (Daily Trust, 2013m). This view was echoed by other rebel leaders such as Abu Musab al-Barnawi, "When we enetered the city [Baga] there were people called stick carriers kato de Gora [Civilian JTF]: they collaborated with the armies of the tyrants..." (Cook, 2018, p. 370)

Rebels' escalated attacks against civilians and the accompanying influence of the CJTF forced local elites into making difficult choices. It was clear that Boko Haram had become increasingly willing to use indiscriminate violence. Yet, embracing CJTF for protection would likely fuel further violence and invite instabilities in the future. Notably, many worried that the CJTF would develop into a separate rebel group upon Boko Haram's defeat (Daily Trust, 2013n).

Local elites approached CJTF initially with caution but eventually decided to publicly recognize and endorse CJTF. In the late summer of 2013, the Borno governor introduced reorientation programs for CJTF members. Known as the Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES), the primary goal of the program was to ensure that the CJTF could reintegrate into societies (Daily Trust, 2013i, 2014p). Later, Borno's deputy governor warned that "The idea of the Civilian JTF trying to take laws into their hands by acting alone is wrong. This must stop now" (Daily Trust, 2013i). Local elites soon abandoned the cautious attitude in early 2014. Speaking jointly with a vigilante leadership, Governor Kashim Shettima openly referred to Boko Haram as "terrorists," and urged federal military assistance, "the Federal Government must be proactive by equipping the military and also motivate the vulnerable soldiers who are left in the bushes with only AK47 rifle and few bullets while on the other hand the terrorists, who are well trained and motivated, have anti-aircraft missiles, rocket-propelled grenades and countless explosives" (Daily

Trust, 2014p,d). In Maiduguri, the governor began criticizing elites who decided to flee Borno and praised CJTF, "My appreciation goes to you, the youths, for standing by us at this trying moment. You have exhibited a sense of patriotism and love for our state and in the process" (Daily Trust, 2015c). Likewise, Borno's Elder Forum reversed earlier conciliatory attitudes and blamed the federal government for a lack of resolve, "...we have to accept that the government has failed in its responsibility of protecting us, not because it is not capable, but because it lacks the political will to do so" (Daily Trust, 2014j). The vocal support was quickly transformed into action on the ground. Kashim Shettima formally recognized CJTF by agreeing to provide salaries and equipment. Later, the governor further donated thirty armored vehicles to the CJTF (Daily Trust, 2014e,d).

There were notable variations of response at the village level. Some village communities decided to flee instead of continuing to resist. Some villages gave up at the onset of organizing CJTF due to a lack of participation in fighting Boko Haram. A resident from Gwoza noted that their community decided to flee upon Boko Haram's presence, "they asked for CJTF amongst us. We all said there's none even if we have them but they'll intimidate and shoot to scare us but we said no, there's none amongst us. We started telling our CJTF to leave in the night and slowly they left through the bush...The CJTF escaped first then we followed" (Nagarajan, 2018a).

These variations, however, were against the larger trends observed in the area. Sub-variants of CJTF sprung up across communities. Major groups include the hunters (*kungiyar maharba*), vigilante (*yan banga*), and Shuwa vigilante. Reports indicated that approximately 200 sub-groups of CJTF developed in this period with the support given by communities (Nagarajan, 2018a,b, 2019).

Boko Haram was enraged by the proliferation of coordinated resistance. In one of the first

video messages addressing CJTF, Shekau remarked on the resistance with significant contempt, "So, look at this man calling himself 'Civilian JTF.' You are not 'Civilian JTF'! I will give you a new name: 'Civilian TBL.' *trouble*. You are 'Civilian TBL...I deliberately choose to mention those words in English, so that you will understand my intention and focus.' " (Cook, 2018, p. 290) The contempt was especially obvious when speaking of CJTF's capacities to wage wars, "...Armored cars - or let me call them by their popular name "caterpiller" Civilian JTF...Has a lion ever fought with an ant?" (Cook, 2018, p. 323) At the same time, Shekau also expressed disbelief that civilians would refuse monetary concessions, "Since I was born, I have never seen people refusing money, so why are you contending with Allah? I don't tolerate nonsense. You are contending with my Allah, but you do not refuse money, bastards!" (Cook, 2018, p. 291-292)

5.6 Indiscriminate Violence and the Bring Back Our Girls Campaign (BBOG)

Insufficient federal government presence allowed Boko Haram to expand its activities beyond rural Maiduguri and carry out massacres with impunity. Violence against civilians was particularly indiscriminate and brutal against perceived CJTF collaborators. As noted by researchers' field reports, some communities were spared mostly because they did not coordinate with CJTF, "...where there was no CJTF presence, armed opposition groups still assert that it is their territory but have not engaged in destructive attacks until recently. Similarly, Ngamdu brokered an agreement with armed opposition groups in which, in exchange for not organizing a CJTF unit or allowing soldiers to deploy in the community, they did not attack the area" (Nagarajan, 2018a). Similarly, in Gwaram, rebels roamed free but did not kill civilians. Residents noted that Boko Haram members would openly carry guns and attend prayers. Violence and destruction were pri-

marily carried out selectively against individuals, as residents noted, "...The guard of the Sharia court happened to be a friend. He narrowly survived. He told me that when they stormed the court, they asked him to show them the house of the judge and he told them that the judge used to come from Kano..." (Daily Trust, 2014h)

Violence during this period, especially kidnapping activities, could again be explained by Boko Haram's desire to force the federal government into offering concessions. The primary grievance remained largely the same as before. Boko Haram preferred the federal government to release the group's members from captivity (Daily Trust, 2013r). Furthermore, Shekau developed a personal grievance in 2013 over the fact that his wife and children were captured in Yobe by the security forces (Daily Trust, 2013q). This personal grievance was shared by his cadres as the security forces believed that holding rebels' families hostage would be an effective tactic to negotiate with Boko Haram (Walker, 2018, p. 165).

It is likely that a mixture of personal grievance and insufficient security force presence motivated Boko Haram to keep approximately 200 schoolgirls hostage in Chibok. The details of the attack are blurry. According to survivors' memories, a sub-group of Boko Haram decided to loot construction supplies near Chibok in April 2014 (BBC, 2017). Local security forces claimed that they were alerted of the group's attack, but were delayed by an ambush when attempting to reach Chibok. The lack of security presence thus left civilians in the area vulnerable. Upon Boko Haram's arrival, the group easily overpowered the defense and set towns' houses ablaze (New Zealand Herald, 2014). To the rebels' surprise, a large group of Christian schoolgirls was spending overnight at a secondary school's dormitory nearby. Rebels initially debated the fate of the girls. Most eventually agreed to bring the girls to Shekau's hideout in Sambisa forest for further decisions (BBC, 2017).

News of the kidnapping soon spread. Security forces on the following day confirmed the attack, “A group of terrorists yesterday night attacked Government Girls Secondary School Chibok” (Daily Trust, 2014c). However, the Nigerian military hesitated to release information regarding the kidnapping and suggested that only a dozen girls were missing. These claims were contradicted by local civilians, most of whom believed that Boko Haram had kidnapped more than a hundred girls in one night (Daily Trust, 2014k). Beyond Borno, Goodluck Jonathan did not immediately react to the attack in public. Instead, Jonathan the next day after the attack was photographed dancing at a rally for his reelection campaign in one of the Northern Nigeria city Kano. A week after the attack, Jonathan briefly offered condolences to only a dozen girls that were alleged missing. It was only after two weeks did Jonathan finally decided to acknowledge that hundreds of girls have been kidnapped (New Zealand Herald, 2014).

Goodluck Jonathan’s initial reluctance to acknowledge the kidnapping may be explained by the lack of reliable intelligence and suspicion toward local elites in Borno. From the beginning of Chibok crisis, Jonathan believed that the kidnapping was an exaggerated conspiracy fabricated by Northern elites to upset his upcoming re-election (Walker, 2018, p. 186-187). From Jonathan’s perspective, this was a plausible story since Boko Haram at first had not provided concrete proof of the abduction.

Nevertheless, as intelligence accumulated, Jonathan remained reluctant to act. Many civilians in Borno called on Jonathan to visit Chibok to demonstrate the administration’s commitment to dealing with the crisis. However, Jonathan suggested that the calls were likely plots to assassinate him, “Sometime, in the heat of the moment, one got the impression that I was being goaded to appear there in the great expectation of something untoward happening to me. I was to access Chibok in a helicopter that would have flown over Boko Haram infested areas” (Cross River

Times, 2018). This belief is reinforced by his aides, who publicly expressed doubts on behalf of Jonathan in the news, “Only God knows what some persons wanted to achieve by insisting on the presidential trip to Chibok” (All Africa, 2014).

The protracted inaction forced civilians to seek self-help. Some families of Chibok decided to individually venture into the Sambisa Forest for negotiation. These attempts were called off by adjacent villages, who convinced the families that doing so would be too risky (New Zealand Herald, 2014). A more coordinated movement emerged in the North and Abuja. At the onset of the movement, women from Borno appealed for dialogue between Boko Haram and the federal government, “We wish to appeal to the insurgents to lay down their arms and embrace dialogue. We assure them of our motherly support toward rehabilitating them when the need arises” (Vanguard, 2014). At the same time, these appeals were mixed with threats,“We are ready to go into the forest and search for the girls. In fact, we are prepared to risk our lives and get up to Boko Haram camp and appeal to them to release the children to us so that they can reunite with their parents” (Vanguard, 2014b). As it became apparent that these calls were ignored by rebels, activists quickly switched tactics and concentrated efforts to pressure military action from Jonathan. Under the banner Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG), activists and the victims’ families marched together in Abuja to pressure Jonathan in pursuing Boko Haram (Daily Trust, 2014a). Similar protests quickly multiplied in locations such as Kano and Kwawa. Many protesters carried signs inscribed with “Bring Back Our Girls” and asked governors to deliver grievance letters to Jonathan (Vanguard, 2014a; Daily Trust, 2014l).

By the end of April, the news of the kidnapping had already spread beyond Nigeria. The Western Allies, notably France and the U.S, secretly reached out to Jonathan for the possibility of foreign military aid. Jonathan rejected these offers and expressed his preference to pursue his

own strategies (New Zealand Herald, 2014). Several factors explain Jonathan's rejection. First, Jonathan at the time was preparing for private negotiations with Boko Haram to arrange the release of Chibok girls. Upon receiving a videotape from Boko Haram proving that the group had captured the girls, Jonathan was willing to exchange captured rebel members with the kidnapping victims (The Telegraph, 2014). Second, Jonathan was concerned about Nigeria's international image and the implications of sovereignty. As explained by an official within the U.S State Department, discussions of aid at first remained private since "doing so would make the Nigerians less likely to accept our help" (New Zealand Herald, 2014). These concerns emerged at an especially sensitive time when Jonathan was concentrating efforts to rally his re-election campaign (Walker, 2018, p. 187).

Jonathan's refusal to receive aid and his willingness to negotiate by trading prisoners fueled increased participation in the BBOG movement (dai, 2014). Jonathan and his close allies first responded to the protests with avoidance, slander, and arrests (New Zealand Herald, 2014). During a BBOG protest in Abuja, a police officer was overheard by journalists saying that he had orders "from above" to prevent more gatherings from taking place (Daily Trust, 2014g).In early May, BBOG members demonstrated at the National Assembly. Two protest leaders were arrested and accused by First Lady Patience Jonathan of impersonating the families of the kidnap victims. (Postmedia Breaking News, 2014). Both Patience Jonathan and the police refuted these claims and suggested that the leaders were only invited over to the police station for information on the missing Chibok girls (Legit, 2014).

On the second week of May, as part of a sign for concession, Jonathan finally agreed to visit Chibok. Information regarding the president's arrival in Borno, however, was leaked prior to the visit (Cross River Times, 2018). Both Jonathan's close allies and foreign advisors persuaded

him not to proceed with the visit. Instead, Jonathan flew to Paris and gained additional assurance that he would be generously assisted by The Western Allies (Daily Trust, 2014i). On May 17th, Jonathan officially accepted foreign military support to pursue Boko Haram. As part of the compromise, most of the military support was airborne, with a focus on deploying surveillance drones and reconnaissance support.

In the following weeks, Jonathan intensified efforts to remedy his domestic image over his failure to rescue the Chibok girls. Upon his return from Paris, Jonathan hired a U.S public relations firm Levick to counter BBOG's influence (Owen & Usman, 2015). Overnight, a group named GEJites hung billboards around Abuja, pleading with others to "Bring Back Our President" (Daily Trust, 2014n). Levick similarly launched a BBOG parody campaign named "Release Our Girls Now," in which participants would wear white shirts and violently harass BBOG supporters (Daily Trust, 2014n). Furthermore, the federal capital police banned all protests by BBOG, arguing that "dangerous elements will join groups under the guise of protest and detonate explosives aimed at embarrassing the government." The attempts to parody and forbid BBOG protests were received poorly by the public (Daily Trust, 2014n). Abuja High Court soon ruled the ban illegal (Daily Trust, 2014f). When Jonathan attempted to meet with the Chibok's families, he was humiliated as none of the families showed up to the meeting (qed, 2014). Instead, BBOG leadership arranged meetings between the families of Chibok and Jonathan's political rival, Buhari, who promised more concrete efforts to escalate counterinsurgency against Boko Haram and rescue kidnapped victims. (Daily Trust, 2014o).

As a last-ditch attempt to win back support, Jonathan in 2015 argued that he needed six more months beyond the original term limit to fight Boko Haram (Daily Trust, 2015b). The Nigerian Election Commission denied the six months proposal but agreed to postpone the elec-

tions for six weeks (DW, 2015). The delay proved insufficient, as Buhari later claimed electoral victory over Jonathan. (Owen & Usman, 2015).

5.7 Boko Haram Changes Tactics

A more serious and coordinated attempt to recapture territories controlled by Boko Haram was well underway beginning in the summer of 2014. Jonathan asked for an additional one billion dollars on top of the existing military budget to fight Boko Haram. He withdrew troops specifically trained overseas to combat the Niger Delta insurgency and deployed them to the North. This decision particularly puzzled and frustrated Western allies, as these troops were primarily trained for naval operations in Southern Nigeria. (Walker, 2018). To increase manpower, Jonathan further signed six-week contracts with multiple foreign mercenaries from Israel and South Africa (Premium Times, 2015; Walker, 2018).

Violence against civilians in the counterinsurgency campaign was highly indiscriminate. At times, the campaign had quite literally scorched earth on rebels' territories. The security forces heavily relied on fighter jets and mechanized units to drop explosives on areas that are perceived under rebels' control (Daily Trust, 2014b; Walker, 2018). Witnesses suggest that these attacks were coordinated under imprecise intelligence, "I saw a plane circling the hills, I wondered what it was looking for when the insurgents were quite obviously at a different location" (Daily Trust, 2014b). Members of security forces, who frequently complained about the difficulty in distinguishing civilians from rebels, confirmed this explanation in interviews in 2015, "The members have the same looks as other people around, more so as the tradition is the same and so they dress alike... It is true some innocent civilians have found themselves locked up or tortured due to no

fault of their own" (Dietrich, 2015).

In early 2014, Boko Haram had extensive control over much of the Northeastern territory in Nigeria. Local experts remarked that the group had control over territories the size of Belgium (Pettersson, 2020). By the end of 2015, the group's control dramatically shrunk. Many of the group members were scattered along the mountainous areas bordering Cameroon or retreated deeper into the Sambisa Forest. Given the loss of territories, the group was cut off from recruits and resources. In particular, due to a lack of reliable access to fuel, some members began switching from motorcycles to horses (Newspeak, 2015).

Boko Haram remained defiant in public messages. In a series of video messages issued by Shekau, the group repeatedly called for exchange of prisoners, "You have been going around saying "bring back our girls", bring back our army!" (AFP News Agency, 2014) In addition, Shekau in videos disputed victories claimed by the federal government, "You claimed victory in Damboa. Bloody liars!...We did not go out there to settle-rather we went there to kill" (Cook, 2018, p. 324).

At the same time, Boko Haram escalated efforts to govern captured territories. In August 2014, the group officially declared caliphate under ISIS and renamed several locations under its control, "The mujahadin have adopted the policy of winning hearts and minds in the cities they have entered. It is not lost upon you that your mujahadin brothers are lacking in military and administrative abilities" (Cook, 2018, p. 345). However, rebels in communique complained about the difficulty in holding territories due to its violent reputation and continued killings perpetrated by the CJTF:

These cities, most of their dwellers were Stick Carriers, and assisted the unbeliev-

> ers. We warned them, again and again, but they went back to their ways, and even increased in their terror to the point where the people of Bama for example went out with sticks and knives to the districts under our control, and demanded from the villagers to return from our proclamation, and accept stick-berating against us. When villagers refused, they killed them and burned their homes with those inside...As for the city masses, we pardoned them and demanded that they stay in their dwellings, but they refused and fled to Cameroon and Chad, either fearing us or fearing the unbelievers' return for revenge. We said to them: "There is no cause for fear, do not leave the House of Islam and immigrate to the unbelievers' dwellings ruled by constitutions." But they refused (Cook, 2018, p. 345).

In private, voices of disagreement grew louder among rebel leaders as Boko Haram suffered continued setbacks on the battlefield. There were numerous complaints against Shekau. For example, members complained about Shekau's leadership style as autocratic and argued that Shekau would deny lower-ranked fighters access to food while enjoying a luxurious lifestyle. A recurring theme among the complaints was Shekau's treatment of civilians. While Shekau favored indiscriminate violence based on location, many argued that violence should be more selective. In a letter written by Shekau to ISIS central leadership, Shekau noted, "Abu Musa'ab al-Baranwi and those with his are saying that if a Muslim enters a land of unbelief, but does not manifest his enmity to the unbelievers there, he is not an unbeliever. However, we say that such a person is an unbeliever..." (Cook, 2018, p. 442) Other rebel members disagreed with this view, believing that their setbacks so far were caused by the indiscriminate violence:

> They are fighting people who are not supposed to be fought. For example, around

> the area of two rivers, there is a town upon where hoisted the flags, yet they go there, fight them and confiscate their property. We were in the consultation meeting when he was informed and admonished, but he refused to take any countermeasures. This is because according to his ideology, whoever is not with him are unbelievers and shedding their blood is permissible...We are tired of being pursued by unbelievers. It is because of all these issues that the unbelievers are pursuing us. We have deviated from Allah's path...Something must have happened that for almost a year we are being chased by these animals. We are seeing that if these issues are not resolved, there is no way we will become victorious (Cook, 2018, p. 450).

The debates within Boko Haram led to visible inconsistencies in its approach to civilians in the same locations. In January 2015, Boko Haram conducted attacks against towns that were approximately a hundred kilometers south of Chibok. Local security forces eventually earned the upper hand and regained control of the area by late February. Residents in the area reported that rebels later came back with helicopters and spread leaflets to apologize for violence perpetrated by their group, "Today, we have burnt all the villages and killed people that are not of the same faith with us...Brothers it is time for us to rethink our actions and stop the aimless destruction and wanton killings under the disguise of religion and jihad" (Daily Trust, 2015a).

Shekau remained unusually silent in public during much of the debate. In late spring of 2015, the fallout between Shekau and other senior rebel leaders became apparent. Abu Musa'ab al-Baranwi and other senior leaders accused Shekau of having intentions to assassinate them and took their fighters away from Shekau. The timing of the split coincided with ISIS officially recognizing al-Baranwi as the legitimate Caliphate. In the next few months, al-Baranwi appeared in an

interview conducted by the ISIS magazine, in which al-Baranwi recognized his faction as ISWAP (Islamic State's West Africa Province) and distanced the group from indiscriminate bombings, "We also don't consider or associate automatically people living in the area controlled by our enemy as traitors. We don't authorize or approve such attacks" (Lyammouri, 2016). Shekau disputed this view in audio messages and continued to call his own faction as Jamaatu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Daawati wal-Jihad (Foucher, 2021). Several years later, following a series of clashes between Shekau's faction and ISWAP, Shekau blew himself up as he was surrounded by al-Baranwi's men (Times, 2021).

In contrast to Boko Haram's previous practices, the group under al-Baranwi's leadership concentrated attacks on security forces. Rebel violence following 2015 became significantly more selective. Locals in northern Borno remarked on the change, "The raids and the killings stopped and we were free to move with our herds for grazing" (Vanguard, 2017a). As of 2017, while the group did engage in looting, civilians were usually spared in the process (Vanguard, 2017b).

5.8 Discussion of Evidence

The Boko Haram case presents a typical example of the theory discussed in the second chapter. The group during its insurgency developed strong preferences to use indiscriminate violence toward civilians. However, as the civil war progresses, the group began to believe that indiscriminate violence was ineffective in achieving victory. At a local level, corresponding to this change of belief, Boko Haram had dramatically decreased its use of indiscriminate violence in Borno and surrounding areas since 2015.

For both violent and non-violent tactics, mechanisms described in the theory are present.

The predicted evidence and found evidence for proposed mechanisms are both listed side by side in Table 5.1 below. Despite the risks of collaborating with CJTF, local elites began sponsoring the militia. The sponsorship accelerated the proliferation of communal militias across the area, resulting in increased challenges against Boko Haram. As seen in the rebels' communique, these militias also caused significant disturbances in the rebels' governed territories. In addition to violent tactics, the BBOG's campaign presents a classic case of nonviolent tactics' mechanisms. The movement mostly focused on pressuring the state to intensify counterinsurgency campaigns against Boko Haram. The participants' open insistence for an increased federal military presence in Borno 2014 stands in contrast to the area's earlier stance against federal military intervention prior to 2013. As the state's counterinsurgency intensified, Boko Haram suffered significant setbacks on the battlefield, which impacted the rebels' belief that appeasing civilians would be necessary to achieve victory.

Was civilian mobilization a necessary and sufficient condition for Boko Haram to deescalate indiscriminate violence? To recap, necessity entails that a condition must have occurred if one has observed an outcome. Sufficiency, on the other hand, entails that an outcome must occur following a condition.

Civilian mobilization is a necessary condition for Boko Haram to change its behavior. Initially, the rebel group would not have altered their behaviors while Shekau was in charge. In Shakau's last known audio message, Shekau insisted that indiscriminate violence is an appropriate tactic against civilians. Shekau's insistence stood in contrast with al-Baranwi and other key rebel leaderships, who instead argued for a more peaceful approach. Second, rebels would not have changed their leadership without significant loss. As indicated by rebels' internal communications, loss (as well as the implications of loss, such as famine) in 2014 and 2015 were frequently

suggested by al-Baranwi's supporters as reasons to overthrow Shekau's leadership. Loss, therefore, provided necessary grievance for rebels to challenge Shekau. Third, Boko Haram would not have experienced significant set-backs without intensified counterinsurgency campaigns as well as a proliferation of local resistance, both of which required civilians to take risks and mobilize.

It is worth noting the order of events that led to Boko Haram's change of behavior. First, Shekau's audio message was dated following the break up of the group. This suggests that Shekau would have continued to use indiscriminate violence if he continued to be in charge. Second, the leadership change was not observed prior to 2014. As indicated by the case description, many rebel leaders harbored disagreement with Shekau's treatment toward civilians. Some chose to complain to AQIM leadership via letters. Yet these rebels largely tolerated Shekau's orders until the group experienced significant losses in 2015. Third, rebels' loss on the battlefield occurred mostly in 2015, which coincided with the state's escalated operations against the group. To the very least, without the state's counterinsurgency efforts, Boko Haram would have an easier time maintaining its level of control in the area. Fourth, intensified counterinsurgency operations occurred following BBOG's campaign, which suggests that state's counter-insurgency efforts did not incentivize communities to mobilize. This means that risk taking was a necessary condition for civilians to mobilize.

Further accounting for alternative mechanisms is important to establish sufficiency. Below, I highlight various prominent theories that are most relevant to the Boko Haram case.

The signal argument suggests that rebels use violence against civilians to signal the state regarding their resolve to achieve goals (Pape, 2006). The argument receives clear support throughout this case. Boko Haram often announce their demands immediately prior to or following their attack on certain areas. The fact that the group decided to detonate bombs within 5 hours fol-

lowing Goodluck Jonathan's announcement that there will be no negotiations provides strong evidence that the group's primary motivation to use violence is to signal its preferences and impact outcomes on the bargaining table. However, the signal argument ignores local mechanisms described in the case that may explain the intensity and occurrence of violence. For example, it is insufficient to explain why Boko Haram would refrain from using violence later on at the same locations.

Kalyvas' explanation of indiscriminate violence receives limited support in this case (Kalyvas, 2006). The group would indeed often kill selectively when it has sufficient information on the target. As described in the case, Boko Haram members would often consult civilians on the culpable collaborators and kill based on the provided information. But Kalyvas' theory performs less well when explaining cases where rebels raze entire villages only based on its past associations with CJTF. To prove that Kalyvas' theory is sufficient to trigger Boko Haram's change of behavior, one would have to see no indiscriminate violence when rebels have information on the target. However, based on the rebels' internal communique, Shekau would indiscriminately attack a location despite having the means and information to kill selectively. Evidence also shows that at a later stage of the civil war, Shekau's method was questioned by many rebel leaders, including those who were initially willing to follow Shekau's orders to carry out killings.

The loss-to-looting theory argues that rebels will resort to looting or become more ruthless when they have suffered losses on the battlefield. (Wood, 2014). This theory is most relevant to the case when rebels escalate violence. Under Shekau's leadership, Boko Haram often used looting and kidnapping as viable strategies to replenish its resources, especially when it was under pressure from Nigerian security forces. However, loss appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient to fully explain the group's behavior. It is not necessary because looting could still

be relatively peaceful. Witnesses suggest that rebels under al-Baranwi's leadership would loot communities without attempting to engage in massacres. Furthermore, the theory is insufficient because despite Boko Haram repeated losses in 2015, the group became more peaceful toward civilians.

An important mechanism to note in the Boko Haram case is the intra-group conflict. It appears that disagreements among rebels and the change of leadership played direct roles in changing Boko Haram's behaviors. As seen in this chapter, Shekau did not change his belief throughout the case and insisted that indiscriminate violence would be effective to sustain the group's survival. Many other rebel leaders disagreed with Shekau's view. Furthermore, it appears that al-Baranwi's leadership directly led to Boko Haram's change of behaviors.

As noted in the beginning of this section, both leadership change and disagreements are consequences of civilian mobilization. Therefore, it is likely that the causal chain between civilian resistance and indiscriminate violence is much longer than I anticipated for this particular case. Coordinated resistance against rebel groups triggered Boko Haram's moderate factions' beliefs that drastically changing the group's conduct toward civilians would be necessary. Moderate factions thus act on such beliefs and coerce other rebel leaders to behave more peacefully toward civilians in the future.

The civilian resistance capacity argument receives mixed support in this case. The establishment of CJTF certainly has benefited from local communities' resources and a large number of willing recruits. Secondary reports and local news reports indicate that CJTF members have provided valuable intelligence to the Nigerian military. Information provided by the CJTF volunteers worked especially well with the Nigerian military's "leapfrog" tactic, in which the military would position its troops in predicted locations of Boko Haram based on local informants' intelli-

Table 5.1: Summary of Evidence

Predicted evidence	Case evidence
Expect to see (1) civilians weigh pros and cons on whether to mobilize	(1) CJTF posed strong security risks to civilians. (Local witnesses, news reports)
(2) civilians mobilize when the risks of doing so is clearly high	(2) Borno civilians pressured state to escalate counterinsurgency campaigns despite their refusal of state's presence earlier (news reports)
Expect to see (1) (violent mobilization) civilians coordinate with communal militia groups.	(1) Borno civilians coordinate with CJTF by providing salaries, equipments, and vocal support (news reports)
(2) (non-violent mobilization) civilians pressure the state to initiate counter-insurgency against rebel groups	(2) civilians launched BBOG campaign (news reports)
Expect to see (1) rebel group faces increasing level of territorial instability	(1) rebel supporters complain about CJTF killing wrecking havoc in consolidated territories (rebels' communique)
(2) increasing number of opportunistic groups challenging rebel's rule	(2) Emergence of splinter group within Boko Haram (news reports, secondary analyses)
(3) rebels face increasing costs to transport between territories	(3) no evidence
Expect to see (1) the state's campaign cause losses on rebels and indiscriminately target civilians	(1) states' campaign caused losses on Boko Haram (news reports, rebels' communique)
(2) rebel's supporters lose confidence in rebels' abilities to maintain an insurgency	(2) Boko Haram members complaining that their treatment toward civilians was the primary reason for their lack of victories between 2014-2015. (rebels' communique)
Expect to see rebels stop using violence when civilians remain resolved despite the high accumulated costs on civilians	Boko Haram used less indiscriminate violence following 2015. (Local witnesses, news reports)

gence. However, the fact that CJTF has been poorly equipped to fight Boko Haram is recognized by all sides of the conflict. Boko Haram members preferred to call CJTF members "stick carriers" (Cook, 2018). Local news reports indicate that CJTF members often used weapons forged in blacksmiths to protect themselves (Daily Trust, 2013s). Most importantly, as described in the case, communities often become targeted despite having the ability to mobilize and sponsor CJTF activities. This is the opposite of what one could observe if civilians' capacity could deter rebels from using violence. Furthermore, rebels are simply too mobile and fluid to be deterred from the communal militia's physical capacities. Therefore, what is crucial is civilians' willingness to continue supporting communal militias despite their lack of physical capabilities.

5.9 Chapter Conclusion

In summary, I have found evidence for all of the proposed mechanisms in the Nigeria case. However, one should note that finding all mechanisms of a theory in a case is rather rare. A single case also does not allow one to understand the conditions under which the hypothesized variable is likely to produce an outcome. Therefore, in the following chapter, I focus on four different cases to further illustrate the plausibility of the mechanisms.

Chapter 6 Mozambique, Colombia, Afghanistan, Uganda

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will introduce four cases where one will most likely observe the proposed causal mechanisms. The benefit of the small-N analysis, as opposed to single case process tracing or large-N quantitative evidence, is that I could compare the plausibility of each mechanism and gain a detailed understanding of the conditions under which the mechanisms are most likely to lead to an outcome. Unlike single-case process tracing, I can offer evidence that my proposed mechanisms are generalizable. In addition, in cases where mechanisms exist but outcomes are contrary to expectations, I will be able to generate new mechanisms and hypotheses.

I select my cases primarily based on the strong presence of violent or non-violent resistance against rebel groups in civil wars. The selected cases - Renamo in Northern Mozambique, FARC in Colombia Indigenous Territories, Taliban in Central Afghanistan, and LRA in Northern Uganda - are often discussed within recent NGO and scholarly reports. In general, the availability of information in these cases makes cross-comparative research possible. In each case study, I conduct process tracing on the onset, duration, and aftermath of a resistance. Furthermore, given that there may exist various resistance organizations within the same conflict, I mostly focus on a specific region and time periods where I can identify the presence of the resistance.

Due to data constraints, in previous chapters I mostly only measured non-violent tactics

based on the existence of protests. In this chapter, however, I am also including "peace zones" organized by civilians in my measurement. I specifically only include peace zones that were established to resist both rebel and state control. For example, the ATCC in Colombia would not be discussed since for the most part, civilians in the ATCC "peace zones" did not resist but co-existed with rebels. The ATCC was mostly established to protect innocent civilians from FARC's selective violence within areas where the rebels already had solid control. On the other hand, the Jehovah's Witnesses (JW) peace zone in Mozambique entirely refused to submit to Renamo's control and thus has been included in the case studies.

6.2 Northern Mozambique - Renamo

Renamo, also known as the Mozambican National Resistance Movement (MNRM) was born out of an interstate conflict between Mozambique and Rhodesia in the late 1960s and mid-1970s (Rich, 2016). At the time, the newly established Mozambique Marxist government Frelimo posed significant security and ideological threats to its former Portuguese colonists and Rodhesians. In particular, Frelimo was known to have hosted the ZANU insurgency to operate in shared borders between Rhodesia and Mozambique. As a response, the MNRM was created and trained largely by the Rhodesian and Portuguese intelligence services to conduct reconnaissance missions across borders. As the political environment in Rohdesia shifted, however, it became increasingly apparent that direct connections between the Rhodesian government and the rebel group were no longer tenable. The group was then "handed off" to the South African government's intelligence department for continued management.

It appears that two major factors contributed to Renamo's rapid membership growth in

Mozambique. First, the group had routinely relied on abductions for recruitment. Periodically, the group would venture into contested territories and march civilians living in communal villages into Renamo's military bases (Minter, 1989). Younger capable males were trained to become armed members. Boys were sent to Renamo's "initiation schools", be assigned foot patrol duties, or be forced into material transportation duties. While some anecdote evidence suggests that some women were also trained to become armed, most records indicate that many women were used for sex by higher-ranking rebel members.

Second, besides a frequent and consistent routine of abductions, Renamo had a high capability to adapt to rural traditional elites' grievance against Frelimo's systematic and uncompromising Marxist reform (Hall, 1990; Rich, 2016). Under the reform, many countryside elites, especially chieftains, lost their privileges that would have survived under the colonists' rule. In addition, civilians living in scattered settlements were forced into poorly managed communal villages, which caused significant grievance among ordinary peasants. Among many of the dissident movements that grew out of such resentments, Renamo was able to successfully leverage its organizational discipline and state-sponsored resources to stand out as an attractive option for the rural population.

Renamo's treatment toward civilians differed across territories. Records from survivors highlighted three types of areas: tax area, control area, and destruction areas (Minter, 1989). It appears that in both tax and control areas, Renamo was able to exert control and collect taxes. The difference between the two zones lies in the group's degree of control. Renamo was only able to establish extensive patrols, schools, health services, and administration services to inhabitants in control areas. The relationship between civilians in tax areas and the group was much more one-sided. Periodically rebels would, with little in return, make various demands such as food,

labor, or women. In destroyed areas, Renamo would loot, abduct, torture, and burn in a routine manner. Those who dared to resist would be publicly executed.

Renamo used a mix of indiscriminate and selective violence against civilians at high frequencies. Reports reveal that among 169 survivors, they witnessed approximately 600 violent incidents combined in two years (Minter, 1989). While these violent incidents occurred more routinely and openly in destruction areas, civilians living in tax and control areas would also often be subjected to rape, torture, executions, and relentless workload demands. This is especially the case in tax areas, where civilians would be made into "porters" and transport resources to the rebel's military bases. Some reported that those who were not capable of keeping up the pace and rest without permission would be killed.

The lack of government protection and repeated attacks from Renamo sparked both violent and non-violent resistance from civilians. In the case of violent resistance, the Naprama militia was organized by Manual Antonio, who claimed to possess magical abilities to make its recruits invincible against Renamo's bullets (Wilson, 1992). During recruitment, new members would be given the so-called "vaccines," which would convince them that they would be immune from any physical attacks. This spiritual narrative, combined with existing grievances, provided civilians with opportunities to collectively resist Renamo. The militia quickly swelled up in numbers. By the early 1990s, Antonio claimed that he had 30,000 members under his command. Seeing the success of the group, The Nampula's Provincial Governor, for example, commented that: "the people, tired of war, are embracing superstitious beliefs, in an attempt to find a way out of the war." The Renamo's president later publicly acknowledged in an interview that "Naparama offers the peasantry a choice, and a chance to reject Renamo."

The overall response of Renamo was primarily violent with a lack of behavior shift. At

the onset, Renamo taunted that "Red (blood) must cover White (symbol of Naprama)" (Wilson, 1992). Civilians and communities that were suspected to have joined or supported Nampara became priority targets for an especially brutal level of violence. As Wilson had pointed out, these attacks were partly motivated by Renamo's desire to demonstrate that Naprama memberships do not provide immunity to bullets or knives. At the same time, in a further effort to claim dominance over Namprara's spiritual narrative, Renamo was eager to show that it had created an "antidote" against the vaccines. To lure Nampara members away from Antonio's leadership, Renamo was also suspected of being involved in establishing a separate militia with similar vaccine capabilities. By December 1991, Renamo was finally able to kill Manuel Antonio, who upon death was deliberately shot and stabbed an excessive amount of times to debunk his claims of invincibility. Given Antonio's disproportional level of influence to maintain the militia, the movement against Renamo lost its momentum after his death.

In the case of nonviolent resistance, the Jehovah's Witness movement, also known as the Witness, likewise received a significant amount of attention (Wilson, 1992). The key part of the movement was to establish peace zones and categorically reject Renamo's coercive control. The Witness followers adhered to Christian pacifism, welcomed displaced civilians, and offered them conversion. These peace zones, such as the ones in Carico, were located primarily near or within Renamo's control areas, which by default should have been subjected to rebel's various demands.

Renamo initially responded to the peace zones with coercion. The group began by abducting inhabitants in the Witness zone to its military bases. These efforts, however, did not convince the Witness Zone to concede. The Witness' continued defiance surprised Renamo, who then briefly left the zone alone. Violence flared up again after the brief period of peace as some Renamo members returned to Witness Zones to loot and torture. The conflicts between the Witness

and the local Renamo units soon drew attention from the rebel's upper leadership, who then decided to forbid members from harassing the Witness and executed members who dared to violate the peace.

The *disturbance* mechanism is found in the Renamo case. The overall participation in the violent resistance, despite mostly being made up of part-time members with rudimentary weapons, threatened Renamo's prospects of securing a monopoly of control. The continued spread of the Naparama movement was successful in forcing Renamo's temporary withdrawal from places like Zambezia, which prior to the movement was considered the rebel's stronghold. These disturbances in the rebel's territory were detrimental to the group's logistical supply, as the rebel group heavily relied on these areas' fertile soils to farm (Wilson, 1992). Even in areas such as Milange, where Renamo was able to continue to rule, Naparama was still able to undermine Renamo's base of support by competing with the group's spiritual legitimacy.

The logic of *diffusion* for non-violent resistance tactics may be at work in contributing to Renamo's decision to back down from continued attacks. Wilson, for example, suggested that part of the reason why Renamo would concede to the Witness was that the rebel's leadership was worried that the continued conflict would have "consequences for their power with the surrounding population" (Wilson, 1992). Given the Witness' proximity to the rebels' rear base, and given that most of its support came from coercion and abduction, provoking further challenges would have been significant to Renamo's survival.

However, I could not find evidence of mechanisms such as *rival's opportunity* or *mobility constraint*. Beyond the Naparama movement, it does not appear that Felimo was responding to any major anti-Renamo protest campaigns (if they ever existed) in conflict zones. Furthermore, while there were visible disagreements within Renamo, which resulted in a split of the group,

the quarrel primarily arose out of the group's discrimination toward non-Nau members (Roesch, 1992). Finally, the fact that Naparama was able to push Renamo out of important strategic locations did not affect rebels' transporting capabilities (Vines, 2013). While it is true that Renamo heavily relied on local porters and foreign support to sustain itself, the group was consistently receiving supplies via air from the South African government. These transportation methods likely enabled the group to overcome constraints related to ground transport.

6.3 Colombia Indigenous Territories - FARC

The history of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia could be traced back to the 1940s when a series of violent conflicts between the communist left and the oligarch right eventually led to a country-wide anti-communist campaign in 1955. The root of the conflict is multidimensional. One popular interpretation of the conflict is that decolonization led to dramatic land reforms that deprived rural peasants of rights to own lands (Molano, 2000; Metelits, 2009). The peasants, without land and viable means of advancing economically, quickly placed their support on Marxist political parties. While there was some initial progress on pushing the conservative right for further change nonviolently, the situation took a sudden turn as the leader of the leftist movement Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was assassinated in 1948. From that point on, a large number of communist insurgent groups sprung up across Colombia, which provoked the incumbent government to respond with bombing campaigns in rural areas.

The FARC was formed after the partial defeat of these communist insurgents (Molano, 2000). Building on existing leftists' support, the rebel group was successful in carving out pieces of territory around Cauca regions. Due to the lack of state presence, FARC was able to implement

its policies and provide a monopoly of social welfare systems to civilians. At its height, the group developed a significant presence in both illicit and legitimate domains. In the drug trafficking business, FARC embedded itself in existing coca cartels and served as a guardian of local criminals against government incursions. Within the Colombian state, FARC had enough support by the late 1980s to launch its political party UP (Patriotic Union), which was successful in gaining seats in both the House and the Senate.

The relationship between FARC and civilians between the 1970s and 1980s was largely a peaceful one (Metelits, 2009). Given the weak government presence as well as a consolidated base of peasant support, the group mostly ruled without resorting to any notable level of violence. During this era, civilians in FARC-controlled areas were capable of erecting various organizations to protect innocent villagers from selective violence. The ATCC, as described in great detail by Kaplan, was one of these organizations. It is worth noting that while these organizations claimed to be neutral, it was largely subject to FARC's control (Kaplan, 2017). For example, as suggested by existing accounts, it appears that the organization was mostly used to reconcile differences between rebel groups and local civilians. In cases where rebels insist on killing certain individuals, the organization would prefer to avoid confrontation and choose to pressure these individuals to escape from their communities.

The peaceful era finally came to an end in the late 1980s (Metelits, 2009). State-sponsored paramilitaries by this point had built up enough support and resources to be confident in directly challenging FARC's control in its territories. Most of these paramilitaries were organized by an array of right-leaning oligarchs and drug cartels who were threatened by FARC's continued growth. It is worth noting that while these groups claimed to be "self-defense" organizations, they were purposely created by the Colombian government to repress the leftist peasant movements.

The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), for example, was built up and maintained by the Colombian state and wielded significant influence on higher-ranking military officials within the government.

Territorial contest led to a spike in violence against civilians. While previously relying on selective violence, FARC suddenly changed its tactics and resorted to large-scale indiscriminate massacres (Metelits, 2009). As the peasants reported "If people were suspected of being against FARC then, the insurgents would investigate the claim. Today, however, they will just kill you." The targets of the attacks ranged from suspected informants to children who had little connection with the state. These violent incidents increased in frequency and intensity throughout the 1990s and 2000s, leaving various communities in ruins.

Among the affected population, the Colombian indigenous groups were the most active in organizing against FARC. While collectively known as the "Indigena," these groups were made up of a diverse array of ethnic subgroups such as the Nasas, Misak, and Totoroes (Azizova et al., 2016). The primary motivation of these groups was to protect the indigenous population's regional autonomy, preservation of indigenous culture, and security against civil war violence. Some of these organizations were able to also draw support from a broad range of left-leaning peasants who were seeking security from both FARC and the paramilitaries.

Unlike the ATTC, where the primary goal was to reconcile differences between civilians and rebels peacefully, the indigenous resistance was notably more radical and open in resisting FARC's violence. The groups used both non-violent and violent tactics to challenge rebels (Azizova et al., 2016; Masullo Jimenez, 2015; Masullo, 2020). Some communities, such as the Peace Community of San Jose Apartad (CSJA), used conventional non-violent methods such as marches, leaflets, and letters to protest violence by both the state and the rebel group. In addi-

tion, some villages rejected violence by openly declaring to be completely neutral between both the state and FARC. The Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC), for example, suggested their tactics were "Active Neutrality," which involved mobilizing unarmed "La Guardia" to patrol and monitor towns (Aljazeera, 2019).

There were also some primarily violent resistance groups built up from the indigenous population. The Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (MAQL) in Cauca, for instance, claimed to protect the indigenous with force (Azizova et al., 2016). These violent tactics did not last long enough, however, as the groups were not as successful in gaining recruits compared with non-violent alternatives.

Despite decades of efforts, the success of this resistance was mostly negative. In cases where communities declared themselves completely neutral and refused to back down, violence spiked up and did not noticeably decrease (Masullo Jimenez, 2015; Pettersson, 2020). Given the frequency of massacres against indigenous communities in the early 2000s, it does not seem that the group had revised its strategy to engage with local indigenous groups substantially. By 2016, the decline in violence was mostly caused by the signing of peace treaties with the Colombian government. There are of course a few success stories. For example, the CRIC had been able to mobilize a large number of civilians spontaneously to rescue community elites who were either kidnapped or about to be assassinated by the FARC (Azizova et al., 2016; Aljazeera, 2019). Some evidence suggests that CRIC was also effective in confronting rebels from implementing rules in the early 1980s. However, these stories do not indicate that CRIC had changed FARC's decisions to use indiscriminate violence.

Most of the mechanisms were absent. Given the weakness of violent resistance, FARC was capable of maintaining control of most of its core territories. There is no indication that other op-

portunistic actors were attempting to leverage the resistance to overthrow FARC's control. This is most likely due to the resistance's insistence on being completely neutral and pacifist. Furthermore, while groups such as CRIC were popular among the indigenous, they mostly restricted participation within their own communities.

There are indications of the presence of the *incumbent pressure* mechanism in the Colombia case. Due to CRIC's continued pressure (using non-violent tactics) on the state and international organizations, FARC in its final days appeared highly aware of the potential punishments that would be associated with indiscriminate violence against the indigenous. Notably, FARC's higher commands issued apologies for "mistakenly" bombing approximately 70 Choco inhabitants in cross-fires against the paramilitaries in 2002 (Colombia Reports, 2014). These apologies were issued directly by the group's negotiators with the government in 2014 and only came in a context where FARC was attempting to push for a ceasefire. However, one should interpret this evidence in the context of "success" with caution, as the group's apology had little bearing on what it had been doing on the ground. Regardless, what this does suggest is that FARC was indeed aware that victimized civilians with sufficient presence could harm its credibility to bargain for peace.

6.4 Central Afghanistan (Hazara Heartlands) - Taliban

The civil war phase of the Afghanistan war officially began in 2002 when the U.S. and its Western allies decided to retaliate in the wake of the 9/11 attack by overthrowing Osama bin Laden (Collins, 2011). While the Western allies were initially successful in removing the Taliban regime, they were unable to completely defeat the regime's key elites. With the support of Pakistan, many of the former government elites were able to escape and launch an insurgency

in hopes of regaining incumbency. The Taliban thus was born in this context.

From the onset, the Taliban was able to retain and expand territorial control via night letters (Terpstra, 2020). As the war progressed, the group began setting up parallel governance in areas with weak Afghanistan state presence. Given its capability to provide security and stability, combined with the group's strong Islamic religious appeal, the Taliban was successful in establishing robust influence over a large swath of areas.

In addition to the Taliban's preference to provide public goods to areas under its control, it was ruthlessly efficient in dispensing punishment to those who dared to step out of bounds (Terpstra, 2020). These punishments often involved particularly brutal and public executions such as beheading and amputations (Aljazeera, 2014). While many of these executions were carried out on those who had violated the Sharia law, punishments were also frequently imposed on those who were suspected to be spying for the state.

Within Taliban's strongholds, civilians favored diplomacy over resistance (Jackson, 2021). These diplomatic efforts involved local elders leveraging existing conflict dynamics to make additional demands on various aspects of rebel governance. While the Taliban was often perceived by the locals as uncompromising, as circumstances shifted, the rebel group would often agree to bargains that would previously be deemed impossible. As Jackson based on her fieldwork suggests "Civilians paid attention to the balance of the conflict over time, and they slowly gained more insight into Taliban interests and behavior." These diplomatic strategies achieved a reasonable degree of success, provided the demands didn't clash with the group's military objectives. For example, over the course of the war, the Taliban had consistently displayed hostility toward state-affiliated workers. Despite this long-held hostility, civilians were able to facilitate large public projects that required the Taliban to temporarily cooperate with NGOs and state workers.

Outside of its controlled territories, the Taliban appeared much more ruthless and uncompromising. The group frequently resorted to indiscriminate violence, often with the use of IEDs that would detonate near heavily populated areas. In 2013, the group announced that it had its own definition of civilians, which includes "those who are in no way involved in fighting: the white-bearded people, women, children and common people who live an ordinary life" (Aljazeera, 2014). This definition thus effectively allowed Taliban members to freely execute those who were unarmed but worked for the state and NGOs. In addition, despite this claim, many ordinary civilians, who were determined by the group to be mere "casualties," were killed by the Taliban in IED explosions. To inflict collective punishments, the Taliban would resort to arson and kidnappings to coerce the state's supporters into submission.

Throughout the Afghan war, it is worth mentioning that due to the U.S.' keen interest in involving local civilians in fighting the Taliban, there were continuous efforts to actively raise communal militias with state-wide coordination. One such example is the Afghan Local Police (ALP) (Moyar, Mark, 2014). However, the effects of these efforts were quite mixed. Some proponents of these militia groups suggest that the presence of these militias provided security. There is also some evidence indicating that the Taliban had chosen a re-conciliatory approach to communities after recapturing villages under the ALP control (Osman, Borhan, 2018). Many suggested that the protective effect is far from robust. From a theoretical standpoint, given the state's heavy involvement, as well as the involuntary nature of enrollment in some cases, it is difficult to truly assess the mechanisms and outcomes of these groups.

Regardless, there were still many areas that were unprotected by the ALP, and still were able to resist the Taliban entirely on their own. Some of these areas are located in central Afghanistan, the so-called "Hazara Heartlands", which were heavily populated by the Hazaras. Since most of

these areas were far from both the Taliban and the state's influence, the communities mostly remained autonomous since the beginning of the war. In 2018, the Taliban began expanding its territory and pushing into these areas. Some communities received letters from the Taliban, who asked elders whether they would comply with taxation and recruitment demands (Adili, Ali Yawar, 2018). These taxes were around 100,000 kaldars, which were significantly higher than the locals could afford. In addition, the letters proclaimed that the areas would be under the Taliban's de-facto control, and demanded civilians to obey the Sharia law. To back up its threats with actions, the Taliban further deployed its "red unit", which had the slogan "be captured or die," and brought a series of IED attacks and kidnappings that were aimed at deterring any resistance (Suroush, Qayoom, 2018).

Several Hazara communities requested the Taliban to give a few more months for consideration. It appeared, however, that the Taliban had little patience (Adili, Ali Yawar, 2018). The Taliban's local commands quickly received the green light to more aggressively collect taxes. Some communities eventually complied under the condition that they would not be attacked and rebels would not be allowed to carry arms in certain areas. Still, many communities instead chose to support communal militias, notably Jabha-ya Moqawamat, which was organized by a man named Abdul Ghani Alipur, who had a record in leading private militias and wielded substantial influence in the area (Rahimi, Zahra, 2021). The support given was partly due to the Taliban's recent record of violence against the Hazaras. Particularly, the Taliban's attacks on Khas Uruzgan, Jaghori, and Malistan districts, which were all heavily populated by the Hazaras, who increasingly feared that the Taliban would persecute the ethnic group due to its Shia religious beliefs.

Non-violent resistance among the Hazaras against the Taliban was surprisingly popular. Several notable non-violent movements drew significant support in response to the Taliban's

violence. The Tabassum movement and the Uprising For Change movements occurred around the 2014 and 2018 Afghan presidential elections. These movements were primarily sparked by various kidnapping events which resulted in the death of a nine-year-old girl and the throat-cutting of seven kidnapped Hazaras (Bose, Srinjoy and Ibrahimi,Nlamatullah, 2019). These non-violent movements attracted large and broad-based participation from Zabul, which was considered a Taliban stronghold. Protesters traveled from Zabul to Kabul, led by the "Zabul seven," and carried coffins of the victims in front of the presidential palace. The demands involved greater security measures, as well as new units that would be deployed in central Afghanistan (Bijlert, Maritine van, 2015).

At first, the response from the government was mostly suspicion, indifference, and lip service (Bijlert, Maritine van, 2015). Kabul officials suggested that the issue at hand was merely an ethnic conflict between the Pashtuns and Hazaras. Such a way of framing was poorly received by protesters, who then accused the government of being dismissive. Some representatives of the movement were eventually invited into the presidential palace for private negotiations, which led to a live-broad cast that featured some of the representatives directly meeting with Kabul's elites. At the same time, the Afghan government used this opportunity to lash out at protesters, suggesting that the movement was distracting the state from engaging with rebel groups.

The specific result of these non-violent movements from the state side is unclear. But the Taliban quickly adapted its strategy. Notably, for example, to alleviate fears of ethnic targeting in Balkhab, the Taliban claimed that it had installed a governor that had a Shia-Hazaras background, which according to observers was a rare gesture among the overwhelmingly Sunni-Pashtun dominated rebel group (Ruttig Thomas, 2020). This was also a reversal of the Taliban's older policies, which suggested that "Hazaras are not Muslim, they are Shi'a. They are kuffar [infidels]. The

Hazaras killed our force here, and now we have to kill Hazaras." In addition, in the year after the mass demonstration, there was a decline in Hazaras targeted kidnapping incidents, which had been a key grievance held by civilians in the area (Aljazeera, 2017).

Two mechanisms could be observed from the Afghan case. First, *incumbent pressure* mechanism is found in this case. The non-violent movement was able to exert strong and consistent pressure on the state to push for stronger anti-Taliban security measures. These non-violent protests, which insisted on blocking any attempt for reconciliation unless Hazaras' security was addressed, likely drew attention from the rebel group, as it coincided with the Taliban's push for peace talks with the state at the time. (Ruttig Thomas, 2020).

Second, there is evidence that *rival's opportunity* may be at work to explain the Taliban's behaviors. Starting in 2017, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) faction had also been attempting to carve out its own territories within the Taliban's control (Aljazeera, 2017). Realizing that the backlash from Hazaras militias could produce a viable environment for the Islamic State to grow, the Taliban chose to exploit ISKP's frequent use of violence against the Hazaras and attempted to compete with ISKP by portraying itself as a more moderate ruler. To "portray themselves as a nationwide movement due to the lack of any significant influence among ethnic Hazaras," the Taliban felt a stronger need to use less violent tactics to attract the ethnic group's support.

6.5 Northern Uganda (Acholiland) - LRA

The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) was launched in 1987 primarily as a continuation of an older conflict between the Acholi-populated Ugandan North and the Ugandan South (Cline,

2013). In the early 1980s, representing the Bantu-speaking Southerners, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) successfully waged a guerilla war against Obote's government and took over as the dominant political party. In its subsequent years of governance, the NRM carried out many massacres against both Acholi elites and ordinary civilians in various contexts. These events convinced the Acholi as well as the South in general to support Uganda's People's Defense Movement (UPDM), which was formed in hopes of reversing the status quo via violence. While the UPDM's campaign was ultimately unsuccessful, a cult-like organization named the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) led by a spiritual medium named Alice Auma "Lakewena" attracted a significant level of renewed support from an even broader area (ICG, 2004).

After the failure of HSMF, Alice's relative Joseph Kony created the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to continue the armed struggle. Given his connections with Alice, Kony drew many former believers of HSMF as recruits and gained support from the aggrieved Acholis (ICG, 2004). Due to the possibilities of support, the LRA spent most of its early days roaming in Acholiland. Periodically, starting from 1993, the group would retreat into Eastern Equatoria in Sudan, where the Sudanese government provided substantial support. The free access to Sudan allowed the group to establish a safe haven named "Kony Village," in which Kony and his fighters received consistent supplies from the Sudanese military (Cline, 2013).

Although Acholis' culture and grievance were both key parts of the organization, the LRA had been mostly unsuccessful in maintaining a high degree of support from Acholis (ICG, 2004). This is primarily because the LRA favored looting and coercion over any kind of governance throughout its existence. The relationship between the rebel group and its key supporters was hence quite ambiguous, as the Acholis perceived both the LRA and the incumbent government as illegitimate to represent Acholis' interests. For this reason, as the insurgency progressed, the

LRA became increasingly violent and heavily dependent on abductions to replenish its forces.

The frequency, intensity, and brutality of Indiscriminate violence carried out by the LRA are all quite high. The means of these attacks often involved limb breaking, mutilations, and rape (ICG, 2004; Cline, 2013). The designated targets in these attacks were often broad. Kony for example, in 2003 called his members to "kill all priests in Northern Uganda." Following this order, the group systematically targeted Christian churches throughout the next ten years (Cline, 2013). In addition to these lethal attacks, the LRA abducted a significant number of civilians, especially children, from targeted locations. According to former fighters, these abductions were motivated by a lack of recruits and labor. The abducted would be used as porters. Those who were young and were more susceptible to manipulations would be trained into full-fledged fighters.

The first signs of violent civilian resistance against the LRA appeared in 1993 in Gulu and Kitgum, later spread to Teso and communities in Sudan (Crisis Group, 2017). The Arrow Boys, also known as the Arrow group, at first was manned by former rebels who laid down their arms in previous conflicts and former government soldiers. The group was organized to provide security to the communities, but civilians also participated to protect their cattle from looting (Cline, 2013). While the Arrow Boys existed as a group, it existed more as a loose network among different communities that were willing to arm themselves against the LRA. In addition to the Arrow Boys, there existed various local self-defense forces such as Group 4, Local Defence Units (LDUs), and the Rhino Group. Some of these forces, such as the LDUs, had closer connections with the Uganda government and received decent support. Groups such as the Arrow Boys, however, had trouble gaining both arms and financial assistance, hence relying on rudimentary weapons such as bows and arrows to fight.

The existence and popularity of the self-defense militias prevented the LRA from effec-

tively consolidating territories via peaceful means. For example, in Teso, the LRA initially appeared friendly, offered to weed gardens, return lost animals, and made efforts to participate in locals' social events. The reaction from the Tesos was quite mixed, as the villager suggested that their strategy was to win popular support. But people were not happy with abductions" (Africa News, 2003a). A local official further suggested that "They wanted to spread their area of influence. The UPDF is taking over Gulu and Kitgum, so they came here. But the people of Teso have not joined them; we have the Arrows" (Lomo & Hovil, 2004).

The response from the LRA had been consistently violent without a notable shift in behavior. In 1993 for example, the LRA ramped up the frequency and brutality of violence specifically against the Arrow Boys and its associated communities. The group members would mutilate civilians' lips, ears, and mouths to spread terror and deter resistance. Similar responses were received in Teso in 2003, where Kony again unleashed a high level of violence against communities that supported the Arrow boys (Lomo & Hovil, 2004).

While significantly rarer and less organized than violent resistance, there were also a few cases of spontaneous non-violent movements against the LRA in Uganda. Most of these events occurred around 2003 and 2004. In Gulu 2003, Christian religious leaders in the Uganda North organized thousands to march and demand peace (Agence France Presse, 2003). In another event, twenty thousand civilians, mostly children, demonstrated in Kitgum to protest LRA's abduction and the government's neglect (Africa News, 2003c).

These events are characterized by two elements. First, some of the protests' themes focus primarily on dialogue and peace instead of security measures. These events allowed the incumbent state to interpret the events as merely against the LRA rather than the incumbent's inability to protect. The Uganda army spokesman commented in an interview "So the demonstration can-

not be against the UPDF or the government. It is against Kony's rebels" (Africa News, 2003c). Second, the protests that clearly demanded more security measures sometimes would break into riots, during which the Langis would accuse Acholis of supporting the LRA. In 2004, a demonstration initially intended to be peaceful eventually broke into a riot, where houses and businesses believed to be occupied by the Acholis were set on fire (Africa News, 2003b).

Since the LRA stayed consistently mobile throughout its existence and made very little effort to control territories, mechanisms such as *territorial disturbance*, *diffusion*, and *rival's opportunity* are all absent. Also given the fact that the LRA had little trouble moving from place to place, it does not seem like the proposed mechanism *mobility constraint* exists either. While one could argue that the Arrow Boys were successful in preventing the LRA from peacefully ruling *any* territories, these obstacles only made the LRA more dependent on looting and coercion. The only mechanism that seems to exist in this case is *incumbent pressure*, but the events associated with this mechanism appeared to be quite rare and the themes of protests were focused on dialogue rather than security.

6.6 Findings Summary

Table 6.1 in this chapter lists all the mechanisms that are present in each case. "✓" indicates that the mechanism has been found, "✓?" indicates a great degree of uncertainty associated with the found evidence. "×" indicates that I have found no evidence at all for this mechanism.

In all cases, I have found no evidence for *mobility constraint*. It appears that, mobility wise, rebels in general are more capable of adapting to changing environments in civil wars than I previously expected. All other mechanisms are found in at least one studied case. In particular,

Table 6.1: Case Evidence Summary

Case	Incumbent pressure	Diffusion	Rival's opportunity	Mobility constraint	Territorial disturbance
Renamo	×	✓	×	×	✓
FARC	✓	×	×	×	×
Taliban	✓	×	✓	×	✓
LRA	✓?	×	×	×	×

Incumbent pressure and *Territorial disturbance* are present in more than one case.

The LRA case in particular does not seem to contain any evidence to support most of the proposed mechanisms. While there does exist some traces of evidence to support *incumbent pressure*, the evidence is quite uncertain and rare. This result is likely to be caused by the fact that the LRA did not attempt to rule any kind of territories throughout its existence. The majority of the mechanisms in theory, on the other hand, require rebels not only to control but also to govern territories. For example, *territorial disturbance* suggests that rebels will back down from using violence provided that civilians cause logistical issues in rebels' rear base. But rebels such as LRA preferred to roam across different locations within a general region. Furthermore, while the LRA later attempted to govern, the Arrow Boys prevented the LRA from doing so categorically. Thus, LRA had consistently preferred plundering despite wide-spread resistance from civilians. Therefore, the LRA case, in contrast with others, further provides insights that rebels that control some degree of territories are most likely to respond to civilian resistance with less violence.

Among the four cases, Renamo is the only rebel group that experienced widespread and long-lasting violent resistance but did not show any signs of scaling back violence against civilians. Specifically, the Namparas caused Renamo to lose a large area of territories that were essential to the group's logistic supply. Yet instead of switching to a more conciliatory approach toward civilians like the Taliban or Boko Haram, Renamo consistently chose to adapt to the challenging circumstances via violence and deception. Furthermore, what explains Renamo's behavior

toward the Jehovah's Witness? Why did Renamo choose to avoid continued confrontations with the Witness but insist on fighting the Namparas? Both rebel group characteristics or territory possessions alone cannot explain this inconsistency.

One possibility is that Renamo perceived Namparas militia as representing purely Antonio's interest. In other words, Renmo might have subscribed to the belief that Nampara's existence was mainly caused by Antonio's mythical powers. If Antonio disappeared, civilians would not have the resolve to resist at all. Hence, there existed very little reason to change its behaviors toward the civilians if Antonio's mythical power was the focus of contention. Therefore, civilian resistance's survival that heavily depends on charismatic leadership is unlikely to change rebels' approach toward civilians to be more peaceful.

The leadership hypothesis is likely for two reasons. First, records indicate that Renamo's members genuinely believed that participants of the militia had invincibility. According to Wilson, much of the upper leadership's efforts to win back civilian support went into crafting a narrative that Renamo had devised a "counter-vaccine" that was more powerful than Antonio's. Second, in addition, Antonio purposely chose to monopolize the supply of his "vaccines" to himself instead of his followers. This choice made Antonio powerful but convinced rebels that the resistance would have stopped without Antonio. Indeed, during Antonio's final days, he became increasingly worried that he would be decapitated and the movement would end without him. Upon his death, the movement collapsed.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

The final chapter of this dissertation will include three sections. In the first section, I will provide a summary of the theory and empirical results presented in previous chapters. In the second section, based on the findings, I will make conjectures on the scope and conditions of each mechanism based on observed findings. In doing so, I further detail the conditions under which civilian resistance is most likely to reduce indiscriminate violence perpetrated by rebel groups. Finally, I will tentatively discuss everyday resistance and policy implications of the main theory.

7.1 Evidence Summary

My theory argues that rebels are most likely to reduce indiscriminate violence toward civilians who are willing to mobilize. Civilian mobilization's associated costs inflicted on rebel groups serve as signals that indicate the future costs for rebels if indiscriminate violence does not stop. The strength of the signal further depends on the spread and length of the resistance. This theory thus has several empirical implications. First, I expected that rebels who face any presence of resistance are likely to show signs of reducing indiscriminate violence as a concession. Second, I expected that resistance with higher frequency, longer duration, and higher spread would be more likely to deter rebel groups from carrying out violence. Finally, I suggested that since mobiliza-

tion may take time to grow and convince rebels that civilians are not bluffing, mobilization in the short run will only increase violence.

Based on statistical evidence, rebels who encounter any resistance tend to decrease indiscriminate violence when encountering civilian resistance. However, statistical evidence shows a high level of uncertainty on whether higher frequencies or longer durations would be more likely to reduce violence. There is also no indication in statistical models that spread itself will contribute to a lower level of violence. Existing evidence does consistently suggest, however, that in the shorter run, resistance from civilians can further provoke rebel attacks. Resistance's effect also does little to carry over to other conflicts in the future. This suggests that rebel groups in general do not change their behaviors based on what the communities have done in the distant past, only in the present.

Case studies show mixed empirical trends in terms of the frequency, duration, and spread of civilian resistance. In cases such as the FARC, LRA, and Renamo, rebel groups encountered high and persistent levels of resistance from civilians but did not back down from carrying out violence. In these cases, rebels only intensified violence in hopes of beating back disobedience. The results are not all negative, of course. In most of the cases, I found evidence that rebels would appease civilians who chose to resist by decreasing violence. For example, Boko Haram completely reversed its approach toward civilians in Borno. Renamo showed considerable restraints against the Witness peace-zone participants despite maintaining a high level of violence in other areas. The Taliban reversed its approach toward the Hazaras and chose to decrease kidnapping activities. Finally, FARC despite maintaining a similar level of violence toward the indigenous, was coerced into apologizing for its violent activities to appease civilians who continuously used non-violent resistance methods.

Both case studies and statistical evidence, therefore, suggest that the effectiveness of civilian resistance is not solely determined by frequency, duration, and spread. While the strength of the signal to show civilians' resolve is important, the effect of the signal further heavily depends on *how* the resistance affects insurgents' costs.

7.2 Mechanisms' Scope and Conditions

Incumbent pressure mechanism argues that by non-violently mobilizing and pressuring the state to improve security in violence-affected regions, civilians could credibly threaten the rebels' regional control and bargaining progress with the state. This mechanism is found frequently in presented cases. Based on observed cases, the effectiveness of this mechanism strongly depends on the level of threat posed by the non-violent movements against the incumbent's rule. In all cases where this mechanism played a strong role in changing rebels' behaviors, incumbents always faced domestic and/or international threats as potential consequences of not addressing the protests. In the Boko Haram case, Jonathan faced a strong electoral rivalry that gained support from the BBOG movement. This rivalry forced him to abandon a conciliatory approach and dramatically stepped up efforts to subdue Boko Haram via violence. This suggests that regime type may play a role in conditioning the effectiveness of this mechanism. Furthermore, even in less democratic states such as Colombia, the state was forced by international pressure, to address indigenous demands and further pressure the rebel group into changing its behavior. Thus, states that enjoy strong international ties, despite being less democratic, could also be responsive in affecting rebels' calculus.

Diffusion suggests that non-violent movements that actively defy rebels' demands could

simply stand their ground and threaten to inspire nearby areas to also resist rebels' control. Rebels thus have to preemptively reduce violence to prevent diffusion. This mechanism does not appear as often compared with other mechanisms. The reason could be that staying put and staying non-violent is simply too risky of a tactic even for communities with strong resolve to resist. However, Renamo indicates that when civilians were able to practice this tactic without backing down, there was a chance for rebels to reduce violence. Furthermore, it is likely that this mechanism heavily depends on the geographical location of the resistance. In the Renamo case, the Witness was located near Renamo's rear base. Compounded with the fact that Renamo heavily depended on coercion for control, realizing that the Witness may not back down regardless of the degree of violence, continuing to fail to intimidate could pose serious embarrassment to the group and threaten its image of control in surrounding areas. Furthermore, identity likely played a strong role in dictating the effectiveness of this mechanism. Renamo members were Christian believers who would carry bibles (Hall, 1990). Brutal attacks against the Witness, who was part of a mainstream Christian movement likely would pose contradictions to rebel members' religious beliefs.

Rival's opportunity argues that violent resistance from civilians could destabilize rebels' security and monopoly of control. Nearby rival armed actors would choose to exploit the opportunity and mount further challenges to the rebel group. While this mechanism is not found in most cases, it is clear that rebels are indeed conscious of the negative consequences if rivals can leverage the resistance. One obvious restriction of this mechanism is that it requires the existence of a rival that is strong enough to draw the rebel's attention.

Mobility constraint argues that rebel groups will likely be constrained by civilians mobility-wise. Rebels facing violent resistance will have difficulties transporting to different locations

without civilians' cooperation. I have not found any evidence for this mechanism. It is likely, however, that the lack of data on rebels' daily operations contributes to the lack of evidence.

Territorial disturbance is found in almost all cases presented in this dissertation. However, the effect of the mechanism varies greatly from case to case, suggesting that rebels only respond to this mechanism under restricted conditions. To recall, the mechanism argues that rebels will reduce violence as a concession when civilians contribute to significant logistical disruptions or territorial loss for the group. This mechanism is observed in the Boko Haram case when the group consistently faced difficulties in exerting control in territories where CJTF was present. Likewise, Renamo was forced to retreat under pressure from the Namparamas militia group, which gained a high level of popularity in areas that suffered frequent indiscriminate attacks. Two possible restrictions are noted here. First, rebels that choose to not consistently rule territories, such as the LRA, likely will not respond to this mechanism. Given that these kinds of rebel groups survive primarily based on looting rather than peaceful foraging, it is unlikely that territorial disturbance could impose significant costs on the group. Second, some rebel groups such as Renamo indeed had been exerting great efforts to rule territories. While the loss of fertile lands was painful, the group was able to survive due to support from foreign sponsors. Hence, territorial disturbance was less likely to force rebels to change their behaviors if the group was less reliant on territories for resources.

7.3 How Does Everyday Resistance Matter?

The basic idea behind everyday resistance is that participants of rebellions would use less visible forms of resistance tactics to disrupt the enemy from achieving goals. It is defined as "or-

dinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot-dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth" (Scott, 1985) Slander is by far the most common form of everyday resistance tactic that is present in most cases. For example, Boko Haram in Nigeria was rumored to have accepted foreign, particularly white members into its rank. It is unclear how this rumor began but it provoked strong reactions from the rebel leadership. In a rare and rather bizarre audio transmission, Shakau dedicated a significant portion of the transmission time attempting to clarify that all members were black. Renamo spent significant efforts to fight back against the narrative that their members had no longer enjoyed immunity from bullets due to the "vaccines" Antonios created. The introduction of the "vaccines," compounded with the fact that Antonio's men were said to be endowed with magic and from rebels' attacks, produced genuine fear among lower ranks of the rebel group (Wilson, 1992).

The problem with everyday resistance, as already pointed out by Scott (1985), is that the imposed cost is too insignificant for rebel groups. This allows rebels to easily adapt and innovate instead of fundamentally changing their behavior. Shakau in Boko Haram, for example, often used radio transmissions to beat back any rumors. Likewise, Renamo adapted to Antonio's "vaccines" by creating "anti-vaccines" Furthermore, in the longer run everyday resistance does not credibly signal one's resolve as it does not communicate one's willingness to take risks to achieve goals.

Therefore, everyday resistance in civil wars against rebel groups does not impose significant costs directly nor can it directly signal resolve that could effectively deter rebel groups. Instead, it is more likely that such kind of resistance makes it conducive for resistance to occur. There are two plausible mechanisms. First, everyday resistance such as slander could make rebels appear weaker than they actually are, therefore facilitating mobilization against rebels. In

the Renamo case, for example, the invention of "vaccines" makes participants of militia members invincible to any attacks. Spiritual blessings convinced village leaders that they could show defiance without worrying about reprisal attacks.

Second, everyday resistance could also make rebels appear non-negotiable and make bystanders believe that peaceful co-existence is impossible. In the LRA case, a persistent popular belief was that the rebel group was made up of "religious lunatics." Another widespread belief was that LRA members relied on cannibalism to survive when they ran out of food. It is likely that the formation of these beliefs made peaceful negotiation appear as an unlikely option with LRA.

7.4 Policy Recommendations

I will now conclude this dissertation with a few policy recommendations. First, this study suggests that civilian resistance could often have the opposite intended effect in the short run. This indicates that facilitating protection of civilians in areas where there is active defiance should take priority. Furthermore, it is clear that civilians often choose to take great risks to signal because of the lack of protection from state. However, evidence suggests that the effectiveness of signals works only under restricted conditions. More often the signal invites more violence even in a longer run. Therefore, there is indeed a "cycle of violence" where insurgent violence breeds more insurgent violence. It is perhaps better to ensure civilian safety in the first place instead of hoping for civilians to develop capabilities themselves. Finally, the mechanisms of the theory, together with empirical evidence, hints at a tentative link between state's democratic accountability and indiscriminate violence. Developing accountable institutions is perhaps the first step to ensure

that civilians could always have the upper hand when resisting rebel groups.

Appendix

A.1 Rebel Groups Included in the Data

Rebel Name
ADF
AFRC
ALiR
AQIM
Al-Shabaab
Ansar al-Sunnah
CMC
CNDD-FDD
CNDP
CNPSC
FARF
FDLR
FPR
FRCI
GIA
IS
JEM
JNIM
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad
Kamajors
Kamuina Nsapu
Kata Katanga
LRA
LURD
M23
MFDC
MPCI
MPIGO
Ntsiloulous
ONLF
Palipehutu-FNL
RCD
RUF
Renamo
SLM/A
SLM/A - MM
SPLM/A
SPLM/A - IO
Seleka
UNITA
UPC (Ali Darass Fulani supporters)
anti-Balaka

A.2 Duration

duration	number
1	285
2	43
3	15
4	9
5	5
6	3
7	2
8	2
9	2
10	1
11	1
12	1

A.3 Hurdle Models for M10-M11

Table A.1: Hurdle Models for M10-M11

	Dependent variable:	
	OSV_{rebel}	
	($\text{M10}_{HurdleCount}$))	($\text{M11}_{HurdleCount}$)
Mobilization occurrence$_{t-1}$	-0.986^{**} (0.235)	
Mobilization frequency$_{t-1}$		-0.159^{**} (0.055)
Duration	0.321 (0.172)	0.341 (0.195)
Duration^2	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.024)
Rebel strength	-0.286 (0.248)	-0.277 (0.249)
Ethnic tie	-0.286 (0.184)	-0.360 (0.185)
Natural resources	0.251 (0.162)	0.329^{*} (0.163)
Mountainous terrain	-0.158 (0.363)	-0.062 (0.367)
$\text{OSV}_{rebel,t-1}$	0.006^{**} (0.001)	0.006^{**} (0.001)
Rebel ideology	-0.046 (0.310)	0.018 (0.312)
Rebel loss	0.380 (0.200)	0.412^{*} (0.200)
Foreign support	-0.295 (0.204)	-0.290 (0.204)
Democratic support pct.	0.223 (0.681)	0.297 (0.691)
Constant	2.659^{**} (0.263)	2.527^{**} (0.272)
Observations	2,490	2,490
Log Likelihood	$-4{,}719$	$-4{,}733$
Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01

A.4 Aggregated Data Structure

Table A.2: Aggregated To Rebel Group Year Level Models

	Dependent variable:	
	OSV_{rebel}	
	($\text{M11}_{poisson}$))	($\text{M12}_{poisson}$))
Mobilization occurrence$_{t-1}$	1.315** (0.017)	
Mobilization frequency$_{t-1}$		−0.222** (0.003)
Duration	−0.009 (0.005)	0.534** (0.006)
Duration^2	0.0002 (0.0002)	−0.004** (0.0002)
Rebel strength	−0.050** (0.019)	−0.271** (0.020)
Ethnic tie	−0.374** (0.014)	−0.310** (0.015)
Natural resources	−0.086** (0.012)	0.015 (0.013)
Mountainous terrain	0.852** (0.025)	0.088** (0.027)
$\text{OSV}_{rebel,t-1}$	0.001** (0.00000)	0.001** (0.00001)
Rebel ideology	0.667** (0.026)	0.324** (0.025)
Rebel loss	0.351** (0.016)	0.513** (0.015)
Foreign support	−0.052** (0.016)	0.045** (0.016)
Democratic support pct.	−0.204** (0.076)	−0.537** (0.078)
Constant	3.643** (0.016)	3.837** (0.015)
Observations	361	361
Log Likelihood	−23,467	−23,998
Akaike Inf. Crit.	46,960	48,023
Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01

A.5 Quasipoisson

Table A.3: Quasipoisson

	Dependent variable:	
	OSV_{rebel}	
	(Quasipoisson)	(Quasipoisson)
Mobilization occurrence$_{t-1}$	1.315** (0.230)	
Mobilization frequency$_{t-1}$		−0.222** (0.046)
Duration	−0.009 (0.072)	0.534** (0.080)
Duration^2	0.0002 (0.003)	−0.004 (0.003)
Rebel strength	−0.050 (0.254)	−0.271 (0.265)
Ethnic tie	−0.374 (0.194)	−0.310 (0.197)
Natural resources	−0.086 (0.168)	0.015 (0.174)
Mountainous terrain	0.852* (0.340)	0.088 (0.357)
$\text{OSV}_{rebel,t-1}$	0.001** (0.0001)	0.001** (0.0001)
Rebel ideology	0.667 (0.354)	0.324 (0.342)
Rebel loss	0.351 (0.214)	0.513* (0.205)
Foreign support	−0.052 (0.215)	0.045 (0.216)
Democratic support pct.	−0.204 (1.023)	−0.537 (1.047)
Constant	3.643** (0.216)	3.837** (0.206)
Observations	361	361
Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01

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