

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: SOVEREIGNS OF SANCTUARIES: HOST STATE RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION

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While political scientists have long studied nation-states' domestic repression of anti-government dissent, there is a growing awareness that such coercion extends across international borders. Nation-states pursue and repress their nationals abroad through a predatory process known as transnational repression (TR). Host states, those nation-states in which expatriate dissidents seek refuge, are crucial to the defense against and deterrence of TR. Yet host states' role in and reactions to TR remains underexplored by scholars. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by identifying the factors that lead host states to defend victims of TR, disregard foreign repression of individuals within their territory, or actively collaborate with predatory origin states. I theorize that host states engage in cost-benefit calculations when responding to instances of TR, and in addition to considering the benefits derived from their relationships with predatory states, host state executives also consider the risk of backlash should they facilitate TR or not respond to public instances of it. This backlash can originate from external actors such as interested third

states, as well as internal actors such as civil society or autonomous host state agents. I adopt a mixed methodology to assess the validity of hypotheses derived from these theoretical bases.

First, I leverage new availability of cross-national datasets identifying individual acts of TR. From these incidents, I conduct statistical analyses on which predatory states are most likely to commit TR, which host states are most likely see such TR targeting victims in their territory, and what type of bilateral relationships lend themselves most to TR. From there I build on this merged dataset, collecting original data on host-state reactions to TR through targeted Nexis Uni searches to create the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD). Using the HRRD, I conduct further statistical analyses to assess my hypotheses and identify predictors of host state actions countering TR, as well as active complicity with origin states. I follow this quantitative analysis with a series of comparative case studies, comparing exemplars of my theory in which external and internal backlash to incidents of TR corresponded to responsive host state actions with those where it did not. In doing so I parse through causal mechanisms which are difficult to measure through cross-national statistical analysis. I argue that while host states' laxity on TR is frequently explained as a derivative of their mutually beneficial relationships with predatory states, scholars would do well take a more expansive view of the factors which lead host states to view certain coercions as assaults to national values and community, and others as peripheral.

SOVEREIGNS OF SANCTUARIES:
HOST STATE RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION

by

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Dedication

For Jamal, Orlando, and Ronni.

For those who, in their pursuit of justice, have spoken truth to power and been haunted by the specter of violence far from the comfort of home.

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This dissertation would not have been possible without the support, guidance, and feedback I have received from far too many to list. Any omission, of which I know there are many, is unintentional and indicative of the number of people who have offered their support.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

The phenomenon of transnational repression (TR), or the repression of nationals outside of their country of origin by said country's government, has been most closely associated, at least in recent years, with its perhaps most famous victim, Jamal Khashoggi. Khashoggi's murder in Saudi Arabia's Istanbul Consulate captured headlines in the weeks and months that followed as details of the calculated and grisly crime conducted on the orders of Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman trickled out. While much has been revealed about the crime, its planning, and the personalities involved (Hiatt 2018; ODNI 2021), it is worth considering the location. Why did Saudi authorities choose to lay their trap in Istanbul, when Khashoggi had been living in exile in the United States? The Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, sitting on what is now Khashoggi Way, was an easy commute from the dissident journalist's Northern Virginia home (Nover 2018). Why not dispatch the butchers, bone saws and all, to Foggy Bottom instead?

The answer may seem obvious: murdering a *Washington Post* columnist in Washington, DC, entailed far higher costs and risks of exposure. How would the US react to a foreign government assassinating a dissident in the heart of its capital? While this may have been what deterred the Saudi authorities, such a killing would not have been unprecedented. Forty-two years prior, on September 21, 1976, Chilean agents detonated a bomb placed under the car of Orlando Letelier, a former minister

to the deposed President Salvador Allende, killing him and his associate Ronni Moffit. The explosion left a smoldering shell of a vehicle on a street bearing many of Washington, DC's embassies (McPherson 2019). Yet Pinochet's government had not felt encumbered by the risks of such a high-profile assassination, at least not to the degree that it dissuaded them from targeting Letelier.

Why then did Saudi Arabia wait until Jamal Khashoggi had left the United States to target him, while Chile had felt confident detonating a car bomb in Washington, DC, to kill Orlando Letelier?¹ Clearly Chile and Saudi Arabia had both perceived their abilities to strike at victims in the US, and crucially the risks of doing so, differently. What was it about the United States of 1976 that made it appear more welcoming to despots and assassins than its 2018 incarnation? How did the US-Chilean relationship differ from the US-Saudi one in such a way as to deter the occurrence of TR in the former's territory? These questions underscore the important role that host states play in deterring or facilitating TR. Scholars have yet, however, to theoretically explore the agency of host states in a holistic fashion. Little work has been done to empirically assess the circumstance in which host states actively impose costs for TR, and what drives them to do so.

This dissertation takes steps to address this gap, theorizing that host states engage in their own cost-benefit analysis when determining how to respond to incidents of TR. Like the predatory states in this comparison, host states are also cognizant of the risk of backlash. When backlash is great enough, I argue that host

¹ Special thanks to Joe Wright for pointing out the contrast of these examples and their relevancy to this dissertation.

states are more likely to take responsive actions to TR, seeking justice for victims and/or imposing costs on perpetrators. When backlash is low however, host states may choose not to respond to TR, or actively facilitate it. To test my theory, I adopt a multi-methodology, drawing on quantitative data, in the form of a new dataset, the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD) containing origin data on host state responses to TR, as well as qualitative case studies.

The Stakes and the Agenda

While not a new phenomenon, the pace of TR appears to be accelerating (Fisher 2021). Repressive states, according to Alexander Cooley (qtd. in Fisher 2021), see “very few repercussions” to such repression as “a very clear green light.” While both recent (Allan 2018) and long since passed (E. Goldstein 2018) cases of TR have prompted diplomatic and political responses such as sanctions and diplomatic expulsions from host states, many have elicited apathy at best, and complicity at worst. Such states are, as Cooley suggests, positioned to deter, prevent, and if necessary, retaliate against, TR. Indeed, host states would appear at first glance appear to be inclined to do so, given that acts of TR frequently involve violations of host states’ sovereignty and monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Adamson and Tsourapas 2020; Moss 2016). In contrast, host states can and often do cooperate with predatory states seeking to repress their nationals from afar (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d). Sympathetic host governments deploy their security services to harass and detain on émigré dissidents (Lewis 2015), extradite them to the predatory state (Dukalskis 2021; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021), or allow predatory states a free hand to deploy their own agents on host state territory (Garvey 1980; Glennon 1984). In

doing so, host states provide predatory states with infrastructure and opportunities otherwise unavailable to them, significantly reducing the costs of TR (Shain [1989] 2005: 157-161).

Despite the pivotal role host states can, and have played in deterring or encouraging TR, the literature on TR largely side-steps the role of host states. Few scholarly works have attempted to identify causal factors behind host state apathy, acquiescence, or reprisal. Moreover, the true frequency and severity of host state responses, both retaliatory and complicit, is unknown. This dissertation will seek to fill this gap, identifying the factors which lead host states to retaliate against or conspire with predatory states for TR.

Drawing on the nascent TR literature, and broader political science scholarship, I identify three categories of causal factors determining host state responses to TR. The first of these components is the oft-cited host state rational-choice based on its bilateral relationship with the predatory state. Predatory states are more likely to find cooperative partners in host states with whom they provide needed economic, security, or political benefits. Likewise, such host states are less likely to retaliate when predatory states employ unilateral methods of TR. This, generally, is where discussions of host states end in existing scholarship of TR. I provide new factors with my second category however, that of the risk of backlash to the host state. I argue that when seen as ineffective at preventing or responding to TR, or complicit in the act itself, host states face backlash from both internal and external actors. External actors, such as interested third-party states and international organizations (IOs) can impact the state's international standing, while internal actors,

from opposition parties to activists, can impose political costs on host state leaders. Finally, I argue that the identity of victims of TR, and as a corollary the identity of the host state, impacts how host states react to TR. That Muslim émigré's religious identity has negatively impacted host state's reaction to their persecution in a post-9/11 world has been offered (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). I, however, expand this rationale, proposing that certain ethnic, religious, and gender identities lend themselves not only to negative but positive host state reactions.

To test my theory, I adopt a mixed method approach, introducing quantitative analysis in a domain that has been examined largely using qualitative case studies. I leverage the availability of new datasets of instances of TR, merging Alexander Dukalskis' (2021) Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database (AAAD) and Freedom House's Transnational Repression Database (FHTRD) (Freedom House 2021; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). Using these cases I first examine the selection of states involved in TR. I adopt a quantitative methodology, creating logistic regression models to identify the effect of my theorized variables on the likelihood of TR in certain potential host and predatory states, as well as which tactics are most likely to be employed. I also examine whether "stronger" bilateral capacity between potential host and predatory states lends itself to an increased likelihood of the occurrence, and severity, of TR.

Examining host state responses to TR on a cross-national scale requires the collection of new data. As such, I use targeted Nexis Uni searches to collect data on responses to incidents documented in the aforementioned dataset, creating the Host Responses to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD). Using the HRRD I again

conduct a quantitative analysis to identify whether my theorized variables are correlated to host state actions countering TR, or host state involvement in said repression. Having identified correlates to certain host state responses, I conduct a series of four comparative case studies of host states responding to TR in their territory. I do so to parse through causal mechanisms which are difficult to differentiate through cross-national quantitative analysis.

Transnational Repression

First introduced by Dana Moss (2016), the term transnational repression (TR) refers to repression by emigrant-sending states conducted outside of their territorial borders against members of their diasporas.² As noted, the Saudi assassination of emigrant journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul is a widely cited example of TR. In contrast, Iran's incitement to assassinate Salman Rushdie would not be considered TR, as Rushdie is not a member of an Iranian diaspora. Likewise, the Russian poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny would not be considered TR because the act occurred within Russian territory. While the United States' extraordinary rendition and torture of individuals suspected of ties to terrorist groups, was both transnational and repressive, it does for our purposes not fall into the category of TR unless it was conducted against a U.S. national residing abroad.³

² The concept has been described in the literature under different names, see Cooley and Heathershaw (2017), Jörum (2015), Israel (1998), Shain ([1989] 2005), and Garvey (1980) for examples.

³ Scholars also vary on whether they include perpetrators of violent activities as victims of transnational repression. The Central Asian Political Exile Dataset (Furstenberg et al. 2020), for example, excludes those convicted of war crimes and terrorism within a jurisdiction with a high standard of the rule of law, as well as members of proscribed ("according to the US list or another plausible list") terrorist groups. Under Furstenberg et al.'s (2020: 7-8) criteria for example, Ayman al-Alawki, who was killed in a 2011 U.S. drone strike in Yemen, would not be considered a victim of transnational repression despite being a U.S. citizen, as he was affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Victims of TR are often referred to as exiles or émigrés, the latter signifying the political nature of their exit, or as emigrants and diaspora members. Each term carries different meanings. In practice I use each interchangeably when referring to those targeted for TR for the purposes of this dissertation. While TR frequently refers to extraterritorial repression of victims who emigrated from the coercing nation, it can in the broadest terms refer to victims who belong to the predatory state's diaspora, for example second generation nationals whose parent(s) emigrated from the predatory state. The nation states in which victims of TR reside and are targeted in, I refer to as host states. I refer interchangeably to the nation states from which the victim's diasporic identity originates as predatory states, origin states, and occasionally home states, borrowing the first, more evocative, term from McSherry (2005).

While domestic repression has been a widely studied in the social sciences, defining repression itself is not without difficulty. Much of the research on repression focuses on its impact on social movements and political mobilization, with Tilly (1978: 55) defining political repression as actions which governments take to impose costs against groups seeking to influence said government. Goldstein (1978: xvi-xviii) offers a narrower definition to include actions which "grossly discriminates" against challengers to "existing power relationships or key governmental policies" due to their "perceived political beliefs." Such discrimination takes the form of violations of "first amendment-type rights" and due process. A variation of this definition is advocated by Davenport (2007), who highlights its utility in excluding certain categories of state coercion such as crime prevention or structural inequalities, while also being comprehensive enough to recognize that states pick and choose from

a broad array of methods and tactics to engage in repression. The tension between broader and narrower definitions of repression are ones which the literature continue to balance (Earl 2011) with scholars selecting definitions which suit the purposes of their particular studies (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017). For our purposes however, it is worth highlighting two limitations of the Goldstein (1978) and Davenport (2007) definitions.

First, while both definitions exclude state coercion for the purpose of crime control, Oliver (2008) calls into question whether such a distinction can be made between “ordinary crime” and dissent. She points to the blurring of these lines during the so-called race riots of the 1960s, and the mass policing of Black communities as a means of controlling and incapacitating agents of Black resistance. The implications of this argument extend to TR, as predatory states often target nationals abroad by accusing them of committing ordinary crimes, sometimes accurately but with a political motivation (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017). Secondly, Goldstein (1978, xxi) excludes discrimination “based on factors *other* than political belief; e.g. sex, skin color, national origins, sexual preferences.” Given that states pre-emptively repress ethnic groups (Beiser-McGrath 2019), the definition of repression should perhaps be broadened to include coercion along ethnic, racial, and religious lines based on a perceived threat from the community if not the individual members or organizations perceived political beliefs. This perhaps gives credence to broader definitions which widen the scope from Goldstein’s (1978) violations of “first amendment-type rights” to those such as Cunningham’s (2003: 210) “any action to increase the cost” and whose end is widened to preempt perceived threats to “regime beliefs, institutions,

and actions” (Nugent 2020: 297) or “status quo policy or distribution of power” (Ritter and Conrad 2016: 86).

Regardless of the specificities of their varying definitions, scholars have documented the diversity of tactics of domestic repression (Bagozzi, Berliner, and Welch 2021; Earl 2003; Moss 2014; Shen-Bayh 2018). Likewise, by meticulously examining and comparing case studies, scholars have documented the range of tactics authoritarian states employ to silence dissent from current and former members of their national communities living overseas. Predatory states often silence perceived threats through assassinations or by repatriating émigré victims via extraditions and renditions (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; McSherry 2019). Surveillance and threats are also widely employed (Jörum 2015; Lewis 2015) as are threats directed toward family and friends in the home state (Adamson and Tsourapas 2020; Moss 2016). Some scholars have introduced frameworks of these mechanisms (Erdi Öztürk and Taş 2020) often through cross-national analysis (Furstenberg et al. 2020; Glasius 2018; Moss 2016; Tsourapas 2021). These frameworks have categorized the tactics of TR in “stages” with an implied linear progression in either practice or severity (Furstenberg et al. 2020) and as repertoires “in constant formation” (Erdi Öztürk and Taş 2020: 67).

In one of earliest works to thoroughly examine anti-exile activity by regimes, Shain ([1989] 2005: 161) lists three factors determining a regimes propensity to repress transnationally: the “regime’s perception” of “exiles’ threat”; their “available options and skills for suppressing” exiles through coercion; and “the regime’s cost-benefit calculation of such coercive activities.” Focusing on the third factor, one can

argue that the benefits of coercive TR have been well documented since Shain's ([1989] 2005) writing. Examining "authoritarian image management" through the lens of regimes' internal and external security, Dukalskis (2021) notes that obstructing specific critics can reduce pressure from foreign publics, opposition to foreign policy goals, and sever links between external actors and internal dissidents. Moss (2016) suggests that TR has a deterrent effect on émigré populations long after the emigration process, finding that the looming threat of coercion constrains their ability to speak freely about homeland politics, and relegates anti-regime activity to fringe movements. This fear is particularly potent given the reliance of predatory states on informant networks within diaspora communities, creating division within communities. Likewise, exposure created through online surveillance requires activists to remain up-to-date on the latest technologies for their own security, leading to "security paralysis" and burnout (Michaelsen 2020b). In short, the benefits of TR lie in its ability to stifle criticism which threatens regimes' internal and external security in a manner such that the coercive act has chilling ripple effects throughout the diaspora.

Table 1-1. Dukalskis' Typology of Transnational Repression	
Threatened	Denotes an individual reporting being personally threatened by agents of their home state. Threats by online "trolls" were generally excluded because they are so ubiquitous and difficult to verify.
Family Threatened	Denotes an individual's family being coerced in the home state to target the exiled individual.
Arrested/detained	Denotes individuals who are arrested or detained in a foreign state on behalf of their state or are formally arrested or detained in foreign state by officials from the home state.
Attacked	Denotes an individual who was physically assaulted by the host state or its proxies while abroad.
Extradited	Denotes individuals who were formally extradited to their home state while living in a foreign state or where there was an attempt to do so.
Abducted	Denotes an individual who was kidnapped or where there was an attempt, likely with the intent to extradite her/him back effectively informally to the home state.
Assassinated	Denotes an individual who was killed or where there was an assassination attempt
<i>Note: Derived verbatim from Dukalskis' (2021: 208) coding criteria for the Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database (AAAD).</i>	

Given these effects, it is no wonder that TR has long been a staple in international relations. While scholars typically begin with Leon Trotsky's 1940 assassination in Mexico City to illustrate the long history of TR, the targeting of diasporas is a tradition pre-dating the 20th century. In 1894, an Austro-Hungarian minister in Washington, DC, argued for the establishment of a consulate in Pittsburgh, PA, noting that pan-Slavic elements within the diaspora could be better

monitored closer to the source. When the eventual Pittsburgh Consul departed with the US entry into WWI, he left with the consulate's lawyer sealed files on several dissidents within the local Austro-Hungarian emigrant community (Agstner 2012: 274, 277). Some thirty years before the Pittsburgh consulate was contemplated, Qajar Persian diplomats directly appealed to the Ottoman government to either extradite the exiled Bahá'u'lláh, the prophet-progenitor of the Bahá'í faith, or expel him from Baghdad. Eventually, the Sultan ordered his internal banishment to Adrianople (Taherzadeh 1977: 55-59). As Bahá'u'lláh settled into his new home, a US military officer contracted British citizens in Fort Garry, Canada to drug and capture two Dakota chiefs who had fled into British territory due to the recent US-Dakota War (Folwell 1924: 443-445). As British subjects⁴, and not American soldiers, had committed the physical abduction, officials saw no legal barrier preventing them from hanging the two at Fort Snelling, Minnesota in 1865 (Chomsky 1990: 43-46).

TR was however long established as a practice of statecraft by the 19th century and pre-dates even modern nations and states. The Book of Jeremiah (26:20-23) describes how the King of Judah dispatched agents to Egypt to pursue the fleeing prophet Uriah. His officers returned with Uriah who was swiftly executed, which Westbrook (2008: 319) claims could not have occurred had the Pharaoh not consented to an extradition. The Negus of Abyssinia was not so cooperative, according to the early Islamic historian Ibn Ishaq, when the polytheist Quraysh rulers of Mecca sent emissaries seeking the extradition of Muslim refugees. Though the

⁴ Chomsky (1990) asserts that the assailants were British soldiers acting unofficially, while Folwell (1924) does not specify.

envoys attempted to ply the Negus with gifts of fine leatherwork, the early Muslims won him over, leading the Negus to proclaim that “not for a mountain of gold would I allow a man of you to be hurt” (Guillaume 1978: 150-153).

Host States: Responsive or Complicit?

The aforementioned historical examples of TR illustrate the important role host states often play in the success or failure of anti-émigré coercion. Predatory states often turn first to host states in order to eliminate the need to deploy their own agents to coerce exiles on foreign territory (Shain [1989] 2005: 157). Most incidents of TR are “undertaken through the co-optation of or cooperation with authorities in the host country” (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d: 4). While extraditions and renditions are the most straightforward method of cooperation, it is not the only. Nor does one have to look back to the seventh century BCE Levant to find examples. In the 1970s, South American military regimes coordinated a campaign of TR of each other’s leftist and democratic exiles in what would eventually become Operation Condor. This campaign included the 1974 assassination of Chilean General Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires which was committed through a coordinated effort of Pinochet’s agents and Argentine security officials (McSherry 2002). Likewise, in 1976 two Uruguayan politicians were abducted and later found tortured and murdered in Argentina, with evidence pointing to the involvement of both Montevideo and Buenos Aires (McSherry 2005).

Under what conditions do host state authorities cooperate with TR? In what circumstances could an observer expect a host state to behave as the Negus and protect those sheltering in their territory, or as the Pharaoh and turn them over to their

persecutors? Moreover, what can one expect of host states when predatory states escalate and target dissidents unilaterally on their territory? Folwell (1924: 445) notes that earlier referenced rendition of the Dakota chiefs without formal permission from British authorities would have “at one time in our history” resulted in a “sharp demand for apology and reparation” as a violation of British sovereignty. Such a rebuke, however, does not appear to have occurred.

Here again, we need not look back as far to find examples of variations in host state responses. After Russian defector Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned with a nerve agent in Salisbury, the UK government took a range of retaliatory responses, including ending high-level bilateral contact with Russian officials, expelling 23 Russian agents, naming two GRU agents as the suspects and seeking an Interpol ‘Red Notice’ for their detention and extradition (Allan 2018). In contrast, the 1979 assassination of a Serbian American opposition journalist and his fiancé’s nine-year-old daughter in Chicago went unsolved. Anderson (1979), in addition to suggesting Belgrade’s involvement, linked the murder to a classified Senate Foreign Relations Committee report which concluded that the FBI did not consider its purview to protect against or investigate such crimes against political dissidents, and had at times pulled back from investigating TR at the behest of the CIA. Though the FBI would receive reliable intelligence that Tito’s security agents were behind the killing, and earlier attempts on Yugoslav émigrés were documented, the FBI chose not to pursue the activities of Yugoslav intelligence agents (Anderson 1979a).

Host State Roles

What difference does the role of the host state make in the TR of diasporas? And what has the burgeoning literature on TR established as motivating the response and position of host states? As noted, the default path for predatory states is to seek the cooperation of host states, and such cooperation is more common than not when TR occurs. By targeting dissidents abroad, authoritarian states adopt “the practice of internal security within the territory of a foreign state” (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017: 191). Yet these authoritarian predatory states lack the same security infrastructure that is at their disposal internally. Predatory states will draw on informers, online surveillance, and espionage networks organized by embassies (Dukalskis 2021: 67) as well as criminal organizations (Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw 2021), but by cooperating the host state can in essence subcontract its domestic security infrastructure. Recall that the second of Shain’s ([1989] 2005: 161) three factors determining whether or not predatory states will pursue exiles is the options and skills and their disposal. Direct attacks on émigrés require “complex and coordinated diplomatic, coercive, and espionage activities” for success (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021: 10). Assassinations in particular are suggested by Moss (2016: 482) to be rare occurrences as they require the deployment of covert agents “capable of subverting domestic security forces.” Shain ([1989] 2005: 161) himself notes that the “drastic” measures taken in lieu of host state cooperation “demand complicated operational skills.”

Host states, however, do not simply lower the costs of TR by subcontracting their security personnel, or by lowering the threshold of necessary operational skills

to silence dissidents. Shain's ([1989] 2005: 161) final factor is a cost-benefit analysis of potential coercive acts and as the UK's actions against Russia following the Skripal poisonings show, host states can retaliate against predatory states for unilateral acts of TR. If those costs are high enough, they may outweigh the benefits of TR. The nascent literature on TR makes frequent, yet vague and passing, references to its international costs to the predatory state. These references often center on the inherent violations of host-state sovereignty many tactics of TR involve. Moss (2016: 482) notes for example that assassinations violate host-states' monopoly over violence, and therefore risk jeopardizing host-predator diplomatic relations. Lewis (2015: 154) likewise theorizes that violent attacks provoke strong responses from host states because they challenge (host) state sovereignty, while Adamson and Tsourapas (2020: 10) note that "targeting individuals abroad can have high costs when it violates the sovereignty of powerful states." Shain ([1989] 2005: 162) took so seriously the potential negative response to TR that he hypothesized that regimes which were more dependent on international support and more vulnerable to external criticism, would be more restrained in their anti-exile activity.

It is clear then that host states play an important role in imposing costs on predatory states which seek to repress their nationals abroad, either by declining to cooperate, or retaliating after the fact. Despite this, the literature on TR has for the most part side-stepped the role of host states. Many scholars have lamented the lack of robust policy responses to TR by host states (Dukalskis 2021; Garvey 1980; Glennon 1984; Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d, 2022a, 2022b) but an explanation of variation in host state responses is thus far elusive. Even if the norm is for host

states to ignore, or be ignorant of, cases of TR, we know that this is not always the case. As outlined, many host states coordinate acts of TR with predatory states, while in certain, perhaps high profile or highly violent incidents, host states react with statements of condemnation or policies punishing offending predatory states. Not only is holistic, cross-national assessment of the rates at which host states respond complaisantly, apathetically, or antagonistically needed, but so too is a causal explanation for host state variation.

Some scholars of TR have made early first steps to address the role of host states. In the context of host state reactions to broader diaspora governance initiatives, Baser and Féron (2021) identify situations in which predatory state campaigns can cause a negative reactions from host states, who sense threats to their security and sovereignty. These reactions, however, are neither “coordinated” nor “consistent” as host states prefer to respond using “existing political and diplomatic means.” Anstis and Barnett (2022) outline potential host state responses to digital TR (DTR), noting that while host states have largely ignored the tactic, they are subject to positive obligations under international human rights law. Meanwhile, cases study reports by Freedom House note that in certain host states, a lack of awareness of the issue of TR (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022f, Han 2022), a securitized view of migration and migrants (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022f, Han 2022), and close relations with predatory states (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022e, Han 2022) make diaspora communities particularly vulnerable.

Despite this progress, there is a broad recognition that more work is needed. Concluding their article on “proxy punishment” or coercion of families of diaspora

members as a means of TR, Moss, Michaelsen, and Kennedy (2022: 13) call for future research with larger samples of host states, and which addresses whether “proxy punishment can be mitigated by host-country interventions or bilateral relations.” Likewise, Dukalskis et al. (2022: 14) concludes that there is both more to be understood about host-predator cooperation in TR, and that no studies have yet “systematically or comparatively examine available policy responses, their implementation, or efficacy.” This dissertation answers these calls and offers a theory of host state responses to TR, as well as the first empirical, quantitative and cross-national analyses of a novel dataset of these responses.

Towards a Theory of Host State Response

What factors determine host state responses to TR? Which determine how cooperative host states are to requests for assistance from predatory states? As noted, the literature wavers between lamenting the lack of robust responses from host states to suggestions that TR could lead to such consequences. Sovereignty is a recurring theme in the latter, the idea being that by violating the host state’s territorial sovereignty and monopoly on the legitimate use of force, predatory states are committing a transgression which will lead to reprisals. Recent scholarship of sovereignty, however, is less absolutist, recognizing that sovereignty can be transferred and contracted between states (Cooley and Spruyt 2009) and is “widely recognized but also frequently violated” by states (Krasner 1999: 8-9).

Another recurring theme to the literature is that host state responses are determined by the benefits, whether economic, political, or security, which they receive from their bilateral relationship with the predatory state. Shain ([1989] 2005)

theorized that predatory states seek to leverage these benefits to pressure host states to surrender or crack down on exiles. In the era of oversight over, and critique of, the US intelligence community, marked most notably by the Church Committee, legal scholars expressed pessimism at the governmental response to harassment of émigrés from countries considered friendly to the United States. Both Garvey (1980) and Glennon (1984) felt that such coercion was being hidden and ignored by US law enforcement and intelligence, as well as other executive agencies, due in part to the intelligence sharing with friendly states and risks to US intelligence operations and foreign interests. More recent scholars have suggested Arab and Central Asian states' cooperation with Chinese anti-Uyghur repression can be explained in part by economic benefits derived from Chinese trade and investment (Jardine and Greer 2022; Jardine, Lemon, and Hall 2021).

These benefits comprise the first component of my theory. I argue that host states, like predatory states, engage in a cost-benefit analysis when faced with the prospect, or aftermath, of TR. In ignoring TR, coordinating with predatory states, or retaliating against predatory states, host states must consider what they stand to gain or lose. In cases in which the predatory state provides the host state with benefits such as aid, trade, investment, intelligence sharing, security training, or political cooperation in international organizations, the host state stands to lose by retaliating or even failing to cooperate with predatory state requests to engage directly in repression. Such geopolitical considerations alone cannot, however, explain variation in host state responses.

Consider the host-predator dyad of Ukraine and Russia. The former found itself host to two men, both hailing from the Caucasus and both persecuted by Russian authorities.⁵ The first of these men was Chechen and had been accused of plotting to assassinate the president of the puppet-republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. After being cleared of those charges, he fled to Ukraine where in 2012 he was arrested and accused of conspiring to bomb Vladimir Putin's motorcade. The Kremlin-aligned government under Viktor Yanukovich seemed ready to extradite the Chechen victim to Russia when the European Court of Human Rights warned against such a move. Instead, the Chechen victim was tried and kept in detention within Ukraine until 2014 when the Maidan Revolution and subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine swept a new government into power with a radically altered geo-political outlook. The Chechen victim was released from prison and almost immediately joined a militia fighting Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas. He and his wife became heroes within Ukraine, and when gunmen wounded the Chechen victim and assassinated his wife during an ambush on route to their home outside of Kyiv, the head of Ukraine's National Security Council stated that the act required a "harsh and suitable response," while the Prime Minister mourned her loss on social media.

⁵ There is growing concern that naming individual victims of transnational repression poses ethical concerns as it risks drawing attention to their case and potentially placing them at risk of physical or psychological harm. For this reason, I refer to each of the preceding victims anonymously, identifying them by their ethnicity. As a general rule, throughout this dissertation I attempt to replicate this process and refer to individual victims anonymously. Often this means omitting citations that would readily identify the victim, though I am happy to share these with researchers. I make exceptions in certain cases, for instance when the victim is deceased, or when they have been outspoken about their persecution and such persecution has been widely reported on in major media or non-government organization (NGO) sources. In Chapter 6, I discuss in depth my methodology for limiting my references to identifying information about victims of TR.

Yet this geo-political shift alone cannot explain Ukrainian state's shift in treatment Russian dissidents, nor can gratitude to those who took up arms on Ukraine's behalf. In 2016, two years after Maidan and in the midst of Ukraine's war against Russian proxy forces, another Russian dissident, this time an Ingush man who had fled religious persecution, arrived in Ukraine. Immediately he was detained on a request from Russian authorities who accused the Ingush man of fighting with the so-called Islamic State in Syria. After roughly a year in detention he was released as his case continued in the courts. Like the Chechen victim, the Ingush victim quickly joined a militia fighting on Ukraine's behalf in the Donbas, checking in with the court periodically. Eventually, while eating dinner with his fellow fighters in Kharkiv, the Ingush victim was detained by police and quickly renditioned over the border into Russia. When news of the rendition broke however, public backlash was swift. Members of the Ingush victim's, mostly Chechen, volunteer battalion joined with far-right activists, as well as several MPs, to protest outside of the Prosecutor General's Office. Similar protests occurred outside of the Ukrainian Parliament and in Lviv, all demanding resignations of the prosecutor general and his deputy and greater legal protection for foreign volunteers. The Prosecutor General's Office quickly announced criminal investigations of law enforcement officers from various agencies along with promises the veterans would never again be turned over to Russia.

By examining both the cases of these Chechen and Ingush victims it becomes apparent that geopolitical exchange and shifts alone cannot explain the variation in Ukraine's treatment of these two victims. Two phenomena at play can be identified however, which comprise the latter two components of my theory. First, in both

cases, the victims attracted attention, in this case from a wider Ukrainian audience driven by nationalist appreciation for their service in the militias. This publicity and public admiration entailed costs to Ukraine when it mishandled their cases. In the case of the Ingush victim, by cooperating with Russian authorities against a militia member, the case immediately drew attention from nationalists who castigated authorities for their apparent treachery against the war effort. Likewise, once the Chechen victim and his wife were attacked in Kyiv, the Ukrainian government stood to lose public support if it failed to take an attack against war heroes seriously. These may be extreme cases given the wartime context, but they demonstrate an important aspect of TR. Publicized events can attract backlash against the host state when interested parties feel that it is mishandling the case. In this case, a nationalist public can protest and support opposition parties. In other cases, the party may be a non-government organization (NGO), political bloc, or government actor such as an inspector general or judge with the ability to conduct oversight. The second component of my theory, therefore, is that publicized actors can impose backlash on host states which act against the actor's interests, which the host state seeks to predict and preempt.

The third component of my theory centers on the identity of victims of TR. In both cases illustrated, the victims were Muslims. This did not preclude the Chechen victim, and particularly his wife, from becoming valorized within Ukraine and, after the Maidan revolution, by the Ukrainian government. Muslim identity did however likely play a strong role in the case of the Ingush victim in which the Ukrainian security apparatus accepted Russian accusations, particularly in the context of the so-

called Islamic State's campaign of terror. Scholars have posited that the Global War of Terror has eroded international norms against extraterritorial violence, and weakened the West's ability to push back against the practice on principle (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). Schenkkan and Linzer (2021) however also note that Muslims particularly face unique threats from TR as states restrict Muslim migration out of concern for terrorism.⁶ I expand this logic however, arguing that certain classes of victim are less likely to attract support from the host state, either because of biases internal to state actors, or because their identity precludes the aforementioned backlash. Put simply, certain victims will be less likely to attract sympathy from backlash-imposing actors or host state government because of their identity.

Proceeding Chapters

In the next six chapters I proceed to outline and empirically assess my theory of the factors driving variation in host state responses to TR. In the next chapter I outline my theory of the interplay between host and predatory states in incidents of TR. I outline this interplay in the form of a simple game and expound upon the aforementioned factors which I hold influence the behavior of host states.

In my methods chapter, I outline the data sources from which I will conduct much of my analysis for this dissertation, the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD). I compile the HRRD by joining cases of TR documented in the Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database (AAAD) (Dukalskis 2021) and Freedom House's transnational repression database (FHTRD) (Freedom

⁶ See also Chaudhary and Moss (2019) on the criminalization of Muslim diasporas.

House 2021; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). The resulting dataset documents 1378 cases of TR between 1991-2020, including 42 unique predator states and 100 unique host states. I overview the processes in which I compiled the HRRD and in which I added to it by collecting original data on host state responses to TR. Through targeted searches on Nexis Uni of individual cases of TR, I am able to add variables to the HRRD measuring a range of potential host state responses, including public statements at different levels of government, diplomatic retaliation, and criminal investigation. I also document recurrent features of the victims, including their residency status. Finally, I address of how questions on the occurrence of TR can be answered without data on the non-occurrence of TR, outlining my strategy to identify predator-year, host-year, and dyadic observations in which TR could have occurred, but did not.

In Chapter 4, I proceed by asking what factors determine which predatory states conduct TR and which host states see victims in their territory targeted for TR? Potential predatory states engage in a rational-choice calculus to target potential victims with TR. Likewise, certain host states with potential victims make more facilitating environments for TR and are therefore more likely to end up in the HRRD than more resilient host states. I analyze the data in three stages using logistic regressions to assess the odds of TR occurring in certain predator monad-years, host monad-years, and predator-host dyad-years.

My analysis provides insight into the types of predatory states with the greatest odds of committing TR. Greater respect for political liberties and physical integrity at home decreases the odds that a state will engage in TR, while a greater

use on ideology to justify rule increases the odds of violent direct tactics of TR occurring. Predatory regimes with higher presidentialism scores, which I use as a standing in for personalism, likewise have greater odds of conducting TR. Finally, distinctions could be made regarding factors associated with different autocratic regime types, though not in the ways the literature would suggest.

I argue that host state selection in the HRRD can be attributed both to domestic factors of host states and their dyadic relationship with the predatory state. My analysis of host year monads reveals that democracies have lower odds of experiencing TR against victims in their state, even when controlling for a regional bias favoring reporting of TR in Western states. Stronger judicial constraints on the executive and a divided government were also associated with lower odds of TR occurring. I attribute these relationships to the heightened risk of backlash in these host states which decreases predatory states willingness to engage in TR. In turning to dyadic years, I find that host states which are economically dependent on predatory states have greater odds of seeing victims in their territory targeted with TR. More broadly, more interconnected dyads in which host and predatory states shared a larger political and economic bandwidth had greater odds of seeing TR occur. I conclude this chapter by noting that data from the HRRD suggests TR appears to be a phenomenon in which a well-theoretically defined class of predatory states coerces diasporas in host states which are both well connected and economically important to them, and preferably non-democratic.

In the next chapter I outline my analysis of original data on host state responses to TR. Leveraging this data I create linear probability models to explore

when host states take actions considered responsive or complicit in the wake of TR, and when they opt not to respond to TR.⁷ The results broadly support my theory that host state decision making is driven in part by backlash, both internal and external. I demonstrate that when third states, neither host nor predatory, intervene to apply pressure on host states on behalf of victims, there is a higher probability that host states will take responsive actions. Likewise, when victims of TR are host state residents, citizens, or have been granted asylum in the host state, there is a lower probability that host states will engage in complicit acts. Troublingly however, I find that while there is a lower probability that democracies will engage in complicit actions, this does not translate to an increased probability of taking responsive actions. Instead, the probability is greater that democracies will take no response to TR. Likewise, when victims of TR are accused of terrorism or extremism, there is a higher probability that host states will take complicit actions.

In Chapter 6 I provide enhanced depth to my analysis by examining four case studies of TR. By examining cases in which high external and high internal backlash led to favorable outcomes in the form of some degree of justice for the victims of TR, I am able to explore more fully the casual pathways in which backlash can lead to responsiveness. However, Chapter 6 also included analysis of two case studies in which high internal and external backlash did not lead to host state responsiveness. In examining these cases I am able to identify potential confounding factors and

⁷ Tables for all models are included in Appendices A & B. Linear probability models were created through the Stargazer package. An idiosyncrasy between the p-values and displayed “stars” calculated by Stargazer and my R calculations were noted, however, these disparities did not impact my interpretation. In only one case did a coefficient’s p-value drop from statistically significant to $p < 0.1$ in these tables. In Table B-8, the displayed Stargazer p-value of “fiscal capacity” ($p < 0.05$) dropped to $p < 0.1$ in my calculations. For consistency’s sake, I am leaving the tables intact.

circumstances which can block pathways to responsiveness. I end in Chapter 7 with my conclusions including observations that may suggest in future research agendas.

Conclusion

Scholarly understanding of TR has expanded rapidly following public awareness of extreme cases such as the assassination of the North Korean leader's half-brother Kim Jong-Nam and the abduction of Rwandan genocide hero Paul Rusesabagina. Through careful examination of Libyan and Syrian (Moss 2016), as well as Central Asian (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017), Iranian (Michaelsen 2020b), and Chinese (Jardine, Lemon, and Hall 2021) campaigns of TR, as well as cross-national studies (Dukalskis 2021; Tsourapas 2021), we have a firm understanding of the tactics predatory state regimes use to coerce their diasporas and the benefits they extract from this repression. To fully grasp the cost-benefit analysis which these regimes engage in when deciding to target their nationals overseas, we need to fully grasp the costs they risk by engaging in such behavior. So much of these costs, theoretically, rely on the behavior of the host state whose laws and territorial sovereignty would be violated by unilateral TR, and whose cooperation, through extraditions and detentions, can facilitate the silencing of émigré dissidents. Unfortunately, much of the literature on TR sidesteps the role of host states, and, to my knowledge, no work of political science attempts to explain variation in host state responses to TR.

This dissertation contributes to the literature by filling an important gap in our understanding of TR. I theorize that three major factors drive how responsive host states are, either to overtures to cooperate with predatory states in TR, or to unilateral

TR by the p state. First, host states must weigh the benefits obtained from their bilateral relationship with predatory states, in the form economic aid or trade, and security or political assistance. Next, host states must weigh, and seek to mitigate, the possibility of backlash from internal and external actors should they appear weak or complicit in publicized incidents of TR. Finally, the identity of the victim impacts the backlash host states can anticipate, both due to the biases of host government actors, and the biases of the larger host society.

In the proceeding chapters I outline my theory in depth and introduce the HRRD, a novel dataset of incidents of TR. Using the HRRD I provide an overview of available data on TR and conduct a quantitative analysis of the selection effect of potential predatory and host states who become perpetrators and hosts of TR. In the following chapter I conduct additional quantitative analysis to ascertain how well my theory explains host state responses to publicized incidents of TR, using novel data gathered through targeted Nexis Uni searches. I follow this with comparative case study and concluding chapters.

Chapter 2: A Theory of Host State Responses to TR

Introduction

How do states respond to acts of repression against individuals or communities under their sovereign protection? How do they react when such repression is directed by foreign powers? Consider three cases, each involving comparatively severe cases of transnational repression (TR) with varying responses from host states. In 1984, the London headquarters of the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), a UK-based organization founded by South African exiles to oppose Apartheid, was the target of an arson attack. Though this attack took place in a broader series of bombings and burglaries launched by the white South African state targeting its anti-Apartheid exiles, as in other such cases, the British state's response was largely apathetic (Israel 1998). The same could not be said of the German state after the 2017 abduction of a Vietnamese asylum-seeker from Berlin by Hanoi's agents. Germany, which had maintained good relations with Vietnam prior to the abduction, expelled two Vietnamese diplomats and suspended visa-free access for Vietnamese diplomatic passport holders. German officials also prosecuted and imprisoned a lower level conspirator for his role in the abduction, in the process publicly exposing the role of Vietnamese police and diplomats in the plot.

A few years earlier in 2013, Italian police raided the home of a Kazakh opposition figure, detaining his wife and young daughter in the process. Though the two had residency permits for the European Union, they were forcibly turned over to

Kazakh diplomats and deported several days later. The result was an international and domestic scandal in which international organizations (IOs) and human rights non-government organizations (NGOs) lambasted Rome (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017). Italy's President delivered a blistering address criticizing the case, and Italy's opposition parties arranged a vote of no confidence against the Interior Minister which they believed would cause the fall of the government (Mackenzie 2013; Povoledo 2013). Eventually, the Italian government rescinded its deportation order and allowed the dissident's family to return (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017).

As these cases demonstrate, host states vary in how they respond to TR. Some take an apathetic stance; others are strict defenders of their sovereignty and arbiters of national and international law. Still others conspire with predatory origin states, deploying their police and prosecutors to harass, detain, and deport political dissidents. Moreover, as the Italian case indicates, responses are not static but may shift and evolve as political leaders react to new information. What accounts for this variation of responses? Moreover, how representative are these three cases of the reactions of host states to TR?

Scholarship on TR has thus far largely been a conversation of victims and perpetrators. Case studies and fieldwork have provided valuable insight both into the coercive tactics of (usually) authoritarian sending regimes and their silencing effect on diaspora communities. This malignant strand of diaspora engagement does not take place in a vacuum, however. Host states have their own complex relationships with resident diasporas and diaspora-origin states. Scholars have noted that these host states have an obligation under international (Anstis and Barnett 2022) and domestic

law (Garvey 1980) to protect all residents and visitors, including foreign nationals, from coercion by foreign states. Scholars (Dukalskis 2021; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021) and journalists (NYT Editorial Board 2021; Fisher 2021) alike have decried a perceived impunity of TR stemming from a dearth of imposed costs on perpetrating states. Yet a comprehensive assessment of why and when, not just how, host states respond both positively and negatively to TR is lacking.

This chapter seeks to narrow this blind spot by offering a theoretical explanation of the factors which lead to host states to counter, disregard, or coordinate acts of TR. I build on the nascent TR literature, as well as broader political science scholarship, to identify predictors of host state action. These predictors can broadly be classified into three categories: host-predator bilateral relations, backlash, and identity. Subsequent chapters outline analysis using original cross-national data to assess the ability of these factors to explain host state reactions to TR. I conclude by holding that, while comparatively more attention has been given to the rational-choice calculations of host states in responding to TR based on their diplomatic relationship with the perpetrators, both backlash and identity have significant effects.

Transnational Repression

As discussed in the previous chapter, TR was first introduced into the lexicon by Dana Moss (2016) and has rapidly expanded as a topic of academic inquiry in recent years. Predatory states, governing the nations from which victims originate, draw on a wide repertoire of repressive tactics, such as assassination, extradition, and threats, to coerce diaspora members. These diaspora members are targeted outside of the predatory state's territory and within the territory of a host state. Individual and

cross-national case studies have been the preferred methodology of scholars of TR⁸, and from these studies we've learned a great deal about the tactics of TR and its effect of diaspora communities.

Scholars had, of course, studied what we now know as “transnational repression” prior to the introduction of the term.⁹ One of these scholars, Yossi Shain ([1989] 2005: 161), offered an early theory of the predisposition of predatory states to repress exiles. Three factors, he posits, determine a regimes propensity to repress transnationally: the “regime’s perception” of “exiles’ threat”; their “available options and skills for suppressing” exiles through coercion; and “the regime’s cost-benefit calculation of such coercive activities.” The first of these is historically well established as a rational concern for predatory states. A range of exiles from Vladimir Lenin to Khalifa Haftar to Ruhollah Khomeini have played a leading role in the overthrow of their home governments. TR not only coerces targets into silence, but by intimidating and sowing the seeds of mistrust, silences dissent within the broader diaspora (Moss 2016). However, the latter two factors, and therefore the predatory state’s propensity to commit TR, can be altered by the host state’s decisions.

Host State Alternatives

The absence of a holistic, causal, and scholarly examination of host states’ reaction to TR is surprising, not least because of the theoretically crucial role they play in either inhibiting or facilitating such repression. Host states have opportunities

⁸ See for examples Moss’ (2016) and Cooley and Heathershaw’s (2017) comparative studies of Arab and Central Asian predatory regimes, respectively, as well as Lewis’ (2015) case study of Uzbekistani transnational repression and Jardine, Lemon, and Hall’s (2021) examination of China’s campaign of anti-Uyghur transnational repression.

⁹ See for example Garvey (1980), Glennon (1984), and Israel (1998).

to both preempt and respond to acts of TR. At each of these points, they face the choice of supporting, opposing, or ignoring the predatory state's activity.

Authoritarian states targeting dissidents abroad adopt “the practice of internal security within the territory of a foreign state” (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017: 191). Such states however have limited abilities to reconstitute their security apparatuses abroad and must therefore rely on embassies (Dukalskis 2021: 67) as well as criminal networks (Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw 2021) to act as their agents. Given the comparably tenuous structure of these regime's external security networks, host states frequently have the ability to limit, in Shain's ([1989] 2005: 161) terminology, predatory states' “available options and skills.” Certainly, the advancement of the Internet and ubiquity of social media has opened new avenues for monitoring diasporas (Moss, Michaelsen, and Kennedy 2022) which compared to physical methods of TR are cheaper and can be conducted virtually from within the predatory state's territory (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). Even so, these tactics do not place predatory states fully out of the grasp of host states (Anstis and Barnett 2022). Proxy punishment also provides predatory states literal physical distance between the host state and the act of repression, but it remains an open question whether host states mitigate such attacks (Moss, Michaelsen, and Kennedy 2022).

Host states can and often do facilitate the repression of émigrés and diaspora members in their territory, providing predatory states with additional options and skills. Close bilateral cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence has led Russia to detain targets of Uzbekistan and allow Tashkent's officials to interrogate the victims, frequently followed by extradition (Lewis 2015). Regional security

arrangements such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017) as well as international bodies such as Interpol (Lemon 2019) often facilitate the easy transfer of political prisoners. Even more extreme measures, such as killings, disappearances, and torture, have been coordinated between host and predatory states, as occurred in South America's Cold War-era Operation Condor (McSherry 1999).

Aside from furthering or constraining the abilities of predatory states, host states can also shift predator's calculus through post-hoc actions. Recall that Shain ([1989] 2005: 161) noted that in addition to "options and skills" exile-hunting regimes conduct "cost-benefit analysis of such coercive activities." While the primary benefit of TR may be the silencing of the target or the broader community as an outgrowth of widespread fear (Moss 2016), the predatory state must also preemptively consider costs which could be imposed in response. As noted in the prior chapter, the literature is sparse in discussing these costs, but a recurring theme is the potential to offend the host state for violating its sovereignty (Adamson and Tsourapas 2020; Dukalskis 2021; Lewis 2015; Moss 2016). Shain ([1989] 2005) took so seriously the potential negative response to anti-exile coercion that he hypothesized that regimes which were more dependent on international support and more vulnerable to external criticism, would be more restrained in their anti-exile activity. Host states principally rely on "diplomatic tools" to counter unwanted diaspora-governance policies (Baser and Féron 2021: 13). An example of such imposed costs using diplomatic measures can be seen in Pretoria's decision to recall its ambassador to Rwanda, expel Kigali's diplomats (Linzer 2021), and stop issuing

visas to Rwandan citizens (Kanuma 2018) after a series of assassinations and assassination attempts against Rwandan military and intelligence defectors in South Africa.

At both ex-ante and ex-post junctions, host states may not respond to acts of TR. Gorokhovskaia and Linzer (2022d, 2022a, 2022b) analyze host state responses in seven countries, noting that many lack awareness of TR as a threat and that even some which do are inconsistent in holding predatory states accountable. Germany for instance, reserves forceful responses, such as criminal prosecution and diplomatic expulsions, for only “high-profile, violent acts” (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022a: 2). In the United States, Garvey (1980) lamented that authorities rarely protect victims foreign-based repression. Forty years later, Dukalskis (2021: 80-81), mirroring the sentiments of many scholars of TR, concluded that most states do not pay a price for anti-exile repression.




Figure 2-1. Repression Game

Game representing progression of TR. Points represent decision nodes. Decision nodes can lead to terminal (black) nodes in which the game ends, (white) nodes representing a move by nature (random), or subsequent decision nodes. Curved lines represent continuous ranges.

Figure 2-1 displays the decision nodes for host states as well as those for predatory states in a simplified game of TR. As described in this section, host states have two opportunities to counter, not respond to, or coordinate TR, once before and once after the actual act. When predatory states decide to repress, host states often have at least some forewarnings. The predatory state will likely approach the host state to ask for assistance, or if not, the host’s domestic security system may obtain intelligence related to planned or future coercion. The fugitive status of potential victims or their position in predatory state political conflicts which risk traversing international boundaries may be public knowledge. The details of concrete plans for coercion may also remain private. At the very least, policies on the granting of

asylum provide hosts states with an opportunity to preemptively provide legal protection and support for potential victims of TR.

If the host state decides to collaborate with the predatory state it widens the range of tactics that they can undertake in their second decision node. If, however, the host state attempts to preempt the coercion it can significantly shrink the range of available tactics to the predatory state, by either depriving them of options and skills or adding additional costs. If the host state is then able to detect a subsequent act of TR, it can choose not to respond or to impose costs on the offenders. In addition, the host state may choose to justify its earlier collaboration, if applicable, or the act of coercion itself. In the same vein it may cover up the incident, or either state's involvement.

It should be noted that these reactions are not static and host states reactions can switch from apathy to complicity to defiance as instances of TR evolve. Turkey for example, shifted in the aftermath of the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi from revealing recordings of the killing and organizing a multilateral response to seeking a reproachment with Saudi Arabia and agreeing to transfer the criminal trial to Riyadh (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022e). Instances such as these demonstrate that it is not only predatory states, but host states which undertake their own cost-benefit analysis in situations of TR. As the costs and/or benefits of different responses shift, host states reevaluate their course of action. The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the factors which drive this cost-benefit analysis, and therefore host state reactions to TR.

Predicting Host State Responses

Host states often can detect and disrupt TR before it occurs. By imposing costs through diplomatic means host states can also punish occurrences of TR after the fact, potentially altering future cost-benefit analysis by predatory states. Given their unique position to stymie TR, one would think that the causal mechanisms behind a host state's imposition of costs would be an area of greater interests for scholars. To the best of my knowledge, however, no scholarly work of political science has solely and directly examined the causal mechanisms behind host states' reaction to TR.¹⁰ This dissertation will do so, and the remainder of this chapter outlines a theory of the, often conflicting, factors driving host state responses to TR. I argue, that while most scholarly focus has been directed toward host states rational choice weighing of their diplomatic relations to predatory states, the risk of backlash and the identity of the victim play significant roles in determining host state behavior. In essence, I seek to correct for omitted variable bias in prior discussions of host state reactions to TR.

¹⁰ Two legal scholars, Garvey (1980) and Glennon (1984), examined host states reactions to anti-émigré harassment and violence in the aftermath of a series of high-profile incidents in the US and congressional reports on the topic. Likewise, Baser and Féron (2021) address host state responses in the context of a wider discussion of reactions to diaspora governance policies. Anstis and Barnett (2022) provide valuable insight into *what* host states can do, but do not assess *why* and *when* they would do so. Similarly, Gorokhovskaia and Linzer (2022a:g) and Han (2022) analyze the comparative responses of seven host states and identify best practices and failings. Most recently Michaelsen and Ruijgrok (2023) quantitatively examined how host state contexts impact the likelihood of TR and the TR tactics employed.

Assumptions and Starting Points

Ignoring the Issue

In Figure 2-1, I outline that at both nodes of the TR game, host states have the option of collaborating with predatory states, imposing costs, or ignoring the offense. Scholars of TR tend to be in agreement: a more common path taken by host states is to not respond to coercion of émigrés in their territory (Dukalskis 2021; Garvey 1980; Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d, 2022b, 2022a). The reasons for states to choose this response are multifold. Host states may have trouble identifying cases of TR because of other actors' incentives to maintain secrecy. Not only do predatory states who violate the international and domestic law by coercing across borders have a motive to conceal their responsibility, but victims also may choose not to come forward with evidence of their coercion, precisely because such reporting may attract further dangers to themselves and their families (Dukalskis 2021). Even when victims do come forward to authorities, establishing that predatory state actors are behind the coercion can be difficult. The use of criminal contractors and intelligence agents, as opposed to uniformed predatory state security services as is often the case in domestic repression, obscures responsibility. Moreover, tracing a threatening letter or social media post, or an assault by a masked passerby, to a foreign state can be challenging if not impossible. This certainly may be dependent on the precise tactic employed by the predatory state. However, even in extreme cases, such as assassinations, host state investigators may need to expend considerable time and resources to establish to establish a conspiracy linked to the predatory state (Dukalskis et al. 2022).

Even when evidence tying an incident to a predatory state is attainable, and a victim is forthcoming, ignoring such cases is often the most common course for host state police and security services. Victims, even in democratic states with comparatively high rule of law, often complain that reports to police go nowhere (see Al-Jizawi et al. 2022). Supporters of an Azerbaijani dissident who was the victim of a 2021 stabbing attack noted that French police were slow to respond and reluctant to examine possible political motives to the crime (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d). Police reluctance to investigate is particularly severe when the coercion is difficult to trace or originates abroad, such as intimidating phone calls from international numbers (Al-Jizawi et al. 2022; Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d). Still other victims are reluctant to engage with police out of fear, particularly racial and ethnic minorities or those whose immigration status places them in legal jeopardy (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022g).

Some of this apathy by police can be attributed to a lack of awareness of TR as a phenomenon and of the resources available to law enforcement to pursue cases and provide protection to victims. As such, advocates have been calling for increased education and training of law enforcement agencies (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). Beyond awareness, host states often simply do not consider the coercion against, often noncitizen, foreign nationals as violating their perception of national security (see Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022f). US law enforcement and intelligence for example largely ignored TR of Korean and Yugoslav communities in the United States, considering it outside of their purview or less important than other national security challenges (Anderson 1979b, 1979a; US Congress 1978).

Beyond this, there is a possibility that higher levels of host state governments do not respond to TR simply because they are unaware of its occurrence. This may occur, as noted, due to obscurity by the predatory state, lack of reporting from the victim, or dismissal by lower-level host state law enforcement officials who are unaware of their capabilities or the issues at play. This may also occur, however, due to purposeful obscurity by host state law enforcement and intelligence. These agents are often the first to learn of TR, and in most contemporary states enjoy a wide latitude of autonomy and control of classified information. Garvey (1980: 81-82), responding to TR within the United States, described an “underground to international law” in which these agents tacitly allow TR in their territory based in “custom, mutual interest, and international consensus.” The hidden nature of these incidents and the agencies monitoring them, allows agents to discretely ignore predatory state coercion in exchange for intelligence sharing and cooperation on operations. While Garvey (1980) notes the knowing complicity of the legislative and executive branches, Glennon (1984: 6-8) paints a hypothetical scenario in which a faux predatory state, Tinaria, deploys its secret police to the United States. In this scenario, these secret police partially inform the CIA of their activities, while the CIA and FBI exchange information on this activity but fail to escalate this information up the chain of command. The State Department, kept partially out of the loop but aware of the damage to Tinaria-CIA/FBI relations if there is US retaliation, fails to alert Congress of a CIA-Tirana intelligence liaison agreement.

Given the multitude of causal paths which lead to host states ignoring TR, it is tempting to conclude that a non-response is the standard response to extra-territorial

coercion. As I have shown however, cases in which host states have responded by imposing diplomatic costs on predatory states do occur. Moreover, many host states go beyond apathy to outright collaboration with predatory states, often in the form of detaining and extraditing political dissidents. Instead of asking why host states do not respond to TR, a better way to move forward is to ask what causal mechanisms lead host states to respond to TR, *as opposed to not*.

Sovereignty

While the literature on host state responses to TR is slim, a recurring theme is that sovereignty, once violated, pushes host states into enacting costs on predatory states. These claims are often made in passing without any great discussion, yet they are made consistently by a number of scholars. Adamson and Tsourapas (2020: 10) claim that “targeting individuals abroad can have high costs when it violates the sovereignty of powerful states.” Moss (2016: 482) theorizes that assassinations violate host states’ monopoly over violence, and therefore risk jeopardizing host-predator diplomatic relations. Lewis (2015: 154) likewise theorizes that violent attacks provoke strong responses from host states because they challenge (host) state sovereignty.

At first glance, these claims would seem to lend themselves to traditional interpretations of state sovereignty in which nation states are “closed units” intolerant of outside interference (Herz 1957: 477) and possess a monopoly of violence (Weber 1994). This absolutist interpretation of the implications of sovereignty in world affairs has however come into question in recent decades. New concepts such as the

responsibility to protect (R2P) and the dictates of the Global War on Terror have challenged the precept that states have absolute authority within their territory and the expectation of non-interference, though that this was ever the case has also come into question (see Glanville 2013). Sovereignty, is in fact “widely recognized but also frequently violated” by states which act in accordance of their “material and ideational interests” (Krasner 1999: 8-9). This “organized hypocrisy” of sovereignty according to Krasner gives “weight to the importance of power asymmetries” forcing “smaller weaker states” to compromise Westphalian principles in the face of pressure (Krasner 1999: 50, 55). This is not to say that the concept of sovereignty carries no weight. As a concept, sovereignty still has cachet, and its violation can evoke strong reactions from states and populaces (Laruelle 2012; Menshawy 2019; Yvan 2020). But sovereignty is a malleable concept subject to limitations. In the context of incursions by predatory states for the purpose of TR, we cannot assume a strong host state response simply because the action involved a violation of sovereignty.

Legal Norms and Processes

Other legal principles and norms, both domestic and international, are applicable when considering both the practice of TR and the rights and responsibilities of host states. Domestically, laws often protect victims of TR from tactics such as assaults, threats, and assassinations to the same degree that they would protect non-foreign nationals. In discussing anti-exile coercion in the United States, Glennon (1984) noted that constitutional protections such as first amendment rights are guaranteed to “resident aliens” in the same way that they are to citizens.

Moreover, tacit agreements to facilitate TR by allowing predatory agents to conduct

such acts, are not at the discretion for host state officers to give when they violate such legal protections (Glennon 1984). Enforcement of laws protecting foreign nationals is however inconsistent. Moreover, laws tailored to address and combat the unique features of TR are still lacking, even in states like the United States where awareness of the threat of TR has grown (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022g). Antis and Barnett (2022), for example, lament that host states have largely failed to enact laws and policies to address the phenomenon of digital transnational repression (DTR) in which victims are harassed and surveilled digitally, rather than physically. The physical space between victims and perpetrators naturally raises questions about the ability of host states to hold predators accountable, and yet Antis and Barnett (2022) note that international law obligates states to enact regulations to ensure that human rights such as the rights to privacy, free expression, and peaceful assembly, are upheld in their territory.

Garvey (1980) pointed to civil law and suits as a means with which to hold both predatory state authorities accountable and as illustrated in Chapter 6, there are cases in which civil suits have been brought against complicit host state actors. There are barriers to these suits, as will be discussed shortly, however. More broadly, the enforcement of domestic laws protecting victims of TR is dependent on the strength and willingness of the host state law enforcement and judiciary to do so. As has been discussed, this often does not come to fruition, in part due to statecraft norms which outweigh legal ones in determining the behavior of host state agents. In studying the activity of “friendly intelligence services” in the United States, which included surveillance of the Korean diaspora, the Senate Select Committee of Intelligence

quoted a U.S. official who expressed their expectation of other nations would gather intelligence in the U.S. given that the U.S. had done so in other countries (U.S. Congress 1978).

Likewise, international law and norms provides protections for victims of TR but their enforcement has been uneven. A commonly invoked principle applicable to the potential extradition of targets of TR is that of non-refoulment. Present in a number of international treaties and agreements, including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights, the principle of non-refoulment forbids the return of individuals to states where they would likely face persecution or torture (Duffy 2008).¹¹ As with broader other international norms and agreements regulating the treatment and protection of refugees however, domestic procedures to protect non-refoulment vary. Thailand for example does not have an established legal process for individuals to claim asylum, having never ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Instead, refugees are forced to adhere to an informal process of registering with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) and remaining in the country without legal recognition (Han 2022).

Extradition procedures between states vary and are often the subject of bilateral agreements. These agreements emerge, and are often reflective, of the relative influence of states interested in pursuing their nationals overseas (Unterman 2015). Frequently, victims of TR will be targeted with a “Red Notice” from Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organization. Interpol acts as an international

¹¹ As with all principles there are exceptions, see Duffy (2008).

association of law enforcement agencies from around the world, aiming to provide intelligence sharing, including on criminal suspects. Red Notices are alerts which signal that the sending country is pursuing a suspect believed to be abroad. If spotted, other law enforcement agencies are requested to detain the suspect on the assurance that a formal extradition request will be forthcoming. These requests, however, are non-binding, and while Interpol has rules in place preventing the use of its systems to pursue political dissidents, the organization has come under scrutiny for the abuse of the Red Notice system by authoritarian regimes (Bromund and Kopel 2013; Lemon 2019). Authoritarian regimes have, however, constructed their own regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) with similar mechanisms for intelligence sharing which have been used to target political opponents (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017).

Host State Strength and Interests

Triadic deterrence (Atzili and Pearlman 2012), later amended to triadic coercion (Pearlman and Atzili 2018), provides a useful starting point in examining the role of host state interests and strength in their responses. Both theories describe attempts by states to threaten or punish host states into cracking down on or denying sanctuary to non-state actors. There are important distinctions between situations of TR and those that Atzili and Pearlman (2012) and Pearlman and Atzili (2018) examine, which mostly consists of violent non-state actors in neighboring host states conducting cross-border raids. The threats and punishments, for example, which the sending states dispense are militaristic in nature and target the host state rather than

the non-state actor (Pearlman and Atzili 2018). Nevertheless, some lessons can be ascertained from these theories to apply to TR. Triadic deterrence is most likely to succeed when host states are strong. Strong host states have the institutional capacity to stop a strong non-state actor and enforce decisions made by the political center, the ability to withstand internal backlash from taking on popular non-state actors, and the ability to enforce “uncompromised sovereignty” and limit the operational autonomy of non-state actors (Atzili and Pearlman 2012: 306-07). Atzili and Pearlman (2018) add two prior stages for determining the success of triadic coercion: the credibility of the state’s threats based on a balance of power, and the host state’s predisposition to stopping the non-state actor’s activities.

I will build on several of these points later in this chapter, but for now it is worth focusing on the concept of a strong host state target. As noted, predatory states often attempt to pressure or persuade host states to cooperate in their anti-exile coercion. The utility of such efforts on the part of the predatory state, however, is in part dictated by the strength of the host state. If for example, an émigré resides in a portion of a host state’s territory where it has no operational control, attempting gain the cooperation of the host state would be pointless. Moreover, in certain cases, predatory states may view host state intelligence or security services as unreliable and weak. In cases of weak host states, predatory states may simply be able to bribe local officials to cooperate, rather than escalate the issue to a higher diplomatic level. Moreover, weak host state will likely be less capable of detecting incursions or retaliating effectively against TR.

Host State Interests

Thus far, I have asserted that host states, in addition to predatory states, engage in a cost-benefit analysis in incidents of TR. In the course of these games, host state players must decide whether to join the predatory states repressive activities, or not respond to the repression, or to impose costs. The majority of cases of TR fall into the middle category because of the secretive nature of these operations and the reluctance of victims to come forward. This is further complicated by the fact that states are not unitary actors but comprised of a variety of individuals actors embedded in bureaucracies with often competing interests. Ignorance and interests drive some agents, including police and intelligence agents, to look the other way. “Higher level” host state actors are less likely to be approached for cooperation by predatory states when they preside over weak states and are less capable of retaliating against incursions. Finally, host state actors are driven by often competing interests when either cooperating with, or retaliating against, predatory states.

In this section, I outline three factors behind host states interest in acting on TR. These factors are not mutually exclusive and are in fact often competing. Some are more salient at different levels of host state governments, and I expect that the position of the actor within the host state government will determine their action. Later in the paper, I present a table of potential hypotheses that can be derived from these sections.

Bilateral Relations

While violations of host state sovereignty are a frequently alluded to catalyst for diplomatic retaliation, the interests of the host state in relation to their bilateral relations with the predatory state are perhaps the most cited predictor of host state action. These interests are wide-ranging. Recall that Shain ([1989] 2005) postulated that predatory states more dependent on international support, specifically in the economic, diplomatic, and military realms, would be more likely to restrain their anti-exile activity. I posit that the inverse also holds. Host states are more likely to restrain their response to TR, or even take part as a co-conspirator in the repression, if it secures international support that they highly value. Shain ([1989] 2005) suggests as much by noting that predatory origin states often exert diplomatic pressure on exile-hosting states to entice them to curtail their political activities and thereby reduce the need for predatory states to engage in costly acts such as assassinations. He points to historical examples in which Francisco Franco and Muammar Qadhafi made international agreements, in the form of military assistance to France and a treaty of union with Morocco, respectively, contingent on crackdowns on political exiles. More recently, Turkey raised the specter of blocking Sweden and Finland's accession into NATO, calling for negotiations over its accusations that the countries are host to exiled Kurdish and Gulenist "terrorist organizations" (Coskun, Spicer, and Sezer 2022).

Such *quid pro quo* arrangements are particularly common in the world of intelligence and security cooperation, with authoritarian agencies often requesting intelligence on exiles or a free hand to operate in their partner's territory (Sepper

2010). As discussed, Garvey (1980: 80) argued that host states allowed foreign agents to operate within their territory “because of the mutual benefits realized for their foreign intelligence and policing interests.” Host state’s also must confront risks to their intelligence personnel within the predatory state’s territory should counter-measures be taken (Glennon 1984), a threat that was itself explicitly communicated by the Shah of Iran in order to facilitate the continued targeting of Iranian exiles in the United States (Anderson 1979c).

Aside from transactional security arrangements, economic relations and agreements can be leveraged for cooperation on diaspora issues. This has been a particular source of focus in analysis of China’s campaign of TR against its perceived adversaries in the diaspora, particularly Uyghurs. As early as 1994, Chinese officials began promoting trade deals in Central Asia with the *quid pro quo* that those regimes would crackdown on their Uyghur residents (Jardine, Lemon, and Hall 2021). The growth in Chinese trade volume has been tied to Arab states’ engagement in anti-Uyghur repression (Jardine and Greer 2022). Thai and Turkish treatment of Uyghurs has likewise been conditioned by the nations’ economic relations with Beijing (Han 2022; Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d).

In contrast, predatory states with disadvantaged exchange asymmetries with the host state find themselves more often on the receiving end of retaliation for their anti-exile activities. A range of bilateral transactions, from military aid, trade and investment, intelligence, political and ideological support, can be leveraged by predatory states to gain the compliance of émigré hosting states. Host states which attract a greater level of transfers, both proportional and total, would be more inclined

to acquiesce to the predatory state to retain them. If such transfers are valued by the host state enough, it will be willing to forgo a response or even collaborate in the repression of diasporas within their territory, at the cost of adherence to international and domestic legal principles and defense of their own sovereignty. Without a dependence on predatory state trade, aid, or political support, other interests such as defense of sovereignty may become more salient and drive host states toward retaliation, or at least away from cooperation.

Host state reactions to diaspora governance are unlikely to be negatively assertive against perceived “close political or ideological” allies (Baser and Féron 2021, 13). Conversely, adversarial predatory states make tempting targets for retaliation. Incursions by adversarial powers into the host states territory are likely to be viewed as greater national security threats and challenges demanding an answer. The diaspora targets of such assaults often serve the host states geo-political purposes by contesting the predatory state regime (Marinova 2017; Vanderbush 2009) while highlighting their persecution likely furthers these campaigns in the court of international public opinion. That some of the U.S.’s firmest responses to TR on its shores appear to be directed against China and Iran are illustrative.¹² It may also be in the interests of the host state to refrain from retaliating against an adversary of equal power parity, or even cover up the incident itself to avoid escalation (see Carson 2015, 2018). The Reagan administration’s response to TR from Qadhafi’s Libya prompted Glennon (1984: 39) to warn against ignoring similar activities of traditional

¹² The US has sanctioned and criminally charged Iranian and Chinese agents for transnational repression within the United States, see Blinken (2021, 2022) and US Department of Justice (2022).

US allies, while targeting Libya simply because it was a “a weak and rather ineffectual adversary.”

It is worth closing by re-enforcing that the host states interest in its bilateral relations with the predatory state are likely to having varying salience to different agents of the host state. In the United States, Garvey (1980, 87) theorized that Congress and the executive branch were particularly driven in cases of anti-émigré coercion to minimize harm to the country’s “foreign intelligence and foreign relations interests.” The concerns can trickle down in the form of directives to, for instance, police who may otherwise be disinterested in the country’s foreign investment.¹³ Other, more autonomous agents may be less inclined to act with foreign relations in mind.

Backlash

As noted, many cases of TR are never publicly reported, giving host state agents comparatively freedom to act behind the scenes. When such cases are reported however, host states face backlash pressuring them to action. In this section, I outline how backlash can impact host states’ calculus and what factors make certain host states more vulnerable to backlash.

External Backlash

Backlash takes two forms, external and internal. Consider, as an example of external backlash, West Germany’s collaboration with French intelligence against

¹³ For an example, see Huffman’s (2021) reporting on Pakistani police harassment of Uyghur residents in the aftermath of Chinese investment.

Algerian nationalists in Bonn's territory. At the time Algeria was governed as French départements, meaning such repression would logically fall into the category of TR. In October 1958, the Soviet news agency TASS revealed details of Franco-German coordination. The story was published in newspapers throughout the world and as France was in the midst of bloody counter-insurgency in the North African colony, East Germany began spreading the story as part of its propaganda efforts. Middle Eastern audiences were particularly incensed, with the West German Ambassador to Iraq going so far as to claim to his superiors that stories of Franco-German collaboration were more harmful to the country's reputation than those claiming a revival of Nazi-era stances (von Bülow 2013).

Host states do not simply weigh their relations with the predatory state when formulating a response to TR but also their relations with interested external states and audiences. As with other human rights abuses, international non-government organizations (NGOs), media outlets, and international organizations (Ios) such as the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) may "name and shame" host states they view as complicit, amplifying news of these abuses worldwide (Hafner-Burton 2008). International civil society organization may intervene on behalf of international victims to pressure host states to protect victims or halt extradition proceedings (Han 2022). State adversaries of the predatory state may place pressure on the host state to retaliate, seeking to exploit the controversy for their own political gain. They may likewise consider the absence of retaliation to signal the host state's shifting toward the enemy bloc.

Host states must also consider how their responses to TR will impact their reputations. As discussed, sovereignty is valued inconsistently in the international system. To the degree to which it is valued however, public violations by predatory states may be viewed as challenges to the host state. Certainly, if the predatory state is adversarial, the host state may risk being seen as irresolute on the international stage for backing down. In their review of the literature, Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth (2014) observe that the study of reputation in conflict studies often focuses on reputations for resolve, with scholars largely in agreement that not only the national public, but leaders and elites care deeply about their status and reputation. While Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth (2014) note that the modern study of reputation was introduced as part of the emergence of deterrence theory during the Cold War, the importance of prior actions in cultivating reputations and informing observers continues to find empirical support (Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo 2021; Renshon, Dafoe, and Huth 2018). By backing down, host states may be unable to deter future violations (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015), in the form of TR or other territorial incursions.

Internal Backlash

Internal backlash in contrast, emerges from actors and collectives internal to the host state's society. It can be driven by public outrage, political opposition, or a network of activists with the capability of imposing costs on the host state. Consider as an example, the Ben Barka Affair which rocked the early days of the Fifth French Republic. Mehdi Ben Barka, a prominent Moroccan opposition leader, disappeared in Paris near the famed Brasserie Lipp on October 29, 1965. While the details remain

unclear, investigations have suggested that French police and intelligence worked with Moroccan agents under royal adviser Mohamed Oukfir to kidnap Ben Barka, who was later reportedly killed (E. Goldstein 2018). The disappearance, less than two months before the French presidential election, became a prominent scandal for Charles de Gaulle, with investigative journalists publishing a series of articles between December 1965 and January 1966 raising questions about the conduct of French police and security agents (Chalaby 2004). Lurid accounts from a supposed undercover agent who claimed to have witnessed Ben Barka's torture, followed by a perceived cover-up by the government, were exploited by de Gaulle's opposition. A scandal emerged, the scale of which *Time Magazine* (1966) claimed at the time had not been seen in France since the Dreyfus Affair.

The Ben Barka Affair, like the Italian scandal outlined at the beginning of this chapter, may be an extreme example in the intensity of the controversy it evoked. However, the core lesson that host states, governed by politicians, face political costs when their handling of TR reveals complicity or incompetence, holds. Political leaders of any regime type can be subject to punishment by domestic forces (Croco 2011; Weeks 2008). In democracies, however, "leaders generally view public approval as an asset and disapproval as a political cost," (Tomz 2007: 831-832) and the avenue for the public to enact punishment is more direct in the form of free and fair elections. The degree to which voters influence, or care to influence, foreign policy is a long-running debate within political science. Recent experimental studies have cast doubt on the salience of foreign policy issues for voters (Clary and Siddiqui 2021). However, other scholars are more optimistic. Aldrich et al. (2006) for instance

hold that the US public does, inconsistently, influence US foreign policy. Crucially, they hold that varied partisan policies are necessary, so that publics can match their preferences toward distinguishable platforms. Powlick and Katz (1998) likewise assume that most foreign policy decisions go unnoticed by the US public, but when elite divisions emerge, the media reflect these divisions in their reporting which prompts elite factions to vie for public support. In rare cases, foreign policy decisions are so controversial they evoke widespread public opposition at the start, and prompting Congress to press for alterations. Moreover, foreign coercion within a host state territory is distinct from the majority of foreign policy issues citizens would assess, in that it is in their backyard and intrinsically linked to their sense of security. Host state publics are more likely to find foreign nation issuing threats, assaulting, or even assassinating people in their backyards more threatening and therefore more salient than the majority of foreign policy issues.

The study of audience costs, or the domestic costs which leaders face should they back down from a conflict, provides further insights into how public backlash may be imposed. Complementing the importance of partisan platforms, the number of political parties, which signal a heterogenous political elite inclined to whistle-blow on the state leadership, impacts audience cost generation (Potter and Baum 2014). That heterogeneity is however, conditioned on access to the independent media. This makes sense, as media serves as a crucial vehicle for information critical of elected leaders, to be transmitted to voters. Strategically deceptive sources of information, such as government leaders and their office-seeking opposition, are unlikely to provide citizens with the quality information necessary punish elected

officials in the form of audience costs (Slantchev 2006). “Non-political” information sources such as an independent media, would however inform the public in a way that is neither “noisy” or “potentially biased” (Slantchev 2006: 446). Potter and Baum (2010: 453) go so far as to argue that “the audience costs argument implicitly requires a free press.”¹⁴ However, a free press and democratic governance covary, making these theories difficult to distinguish from regime type arguments (Potter and Baum 2014).

Within the literature on TR, while a critique of democratic host states responses is growing (Michaelsen and Furstenberg 2021), there remains a repetitive suggestion that democracies may be less amenable to hosting the phenomenon. The rationale behind this more hostile stance, however, is often disconnected from democracies’ electoral features. TR is more likely to be discovered and publicly exposed in democracies, which is likely to lead to a backlash against the predatory *origin* state (Dukalskis 2021). This pressure in turn, places pressure on elected host state agents to shift their policies toward the predatory state. Interestingly, in their examination of Tajik political exiles, Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw (2021) contrasts the fate of Group 24, which mostly remained in the post-Soviet space, with that of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), whose members faced comparatively milder TR owing to their greater presence within the European Union. The authors note that outside of the “politicised justice system” of Russia, victims

¹⁴ More recently, Baum and Potter (2019) have questioned whether the nature of the contemporary information landscape of social media bubbles has minimized public’s desire to constrain their leaders in foreign policy matters.

were able to avoid extradition on the basis of the international legal principle of non-refoulement (Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw 2021: 15).

Backlash by Agent

Thus far I have discussed internal backlash as imparting pressure on host state principals, in the form of elected leaders, to act against a predatory state. As noted however, the interests laid out in my theory have varying salience to different host state actors. Security and intelligence services enjoy a wide degree of autonomy and are less susceptible to internal backlash than elected legislators. In states where the security services are particularly autonomous and empowered, it is more likely that host states will collaborate with predatory states or not respond to their incursions. Likewise, judicial agents, in the form of judges and prosecutors enjoy a wide degree of autonomy in liberal democratic states. As suggested by Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw (2021), these autonomous judicial branches with oversight authority may also act as agents of backlash, by preventing significant cooperation with predatory states. Judges may deny, and, depending on the extent of autonomy, prosecutors may refuse to process deportations of political asylees. Garvey (1980: 88-89) argued that while the US executive and Congress prioritize foreign interests over the well-being of émigrés, the judicial branch (particularly in civil law) is the least vulnerable to the “underground.”

Moreover, these autonomous judiciaries may be used by other agents of backlash to apply pressure to host states. Recall, that the victims of TR are often protected by both domestic and international law. The latter, for example, prevents the deportation of detainees to locations where they would likely face torture or

persecution. Prior studies have concluded that democracies are more likely to honor international agreements on child labor (Von Stein 2014), the laws of war (Morrow 2007), human rights (Neumayer 2005), and environmental protection (Neumayer 2002) which they ratify. This compliance comes, in part, from the ability of interested parties to enforce the state's international legal commitments through domestic courts (Hathaway 2007; Powell and Staton 2009; Von Stein 2014). Democracy in and of itself may be inconsequential, as the robustness of a state's adherence to the rule of law is more predictive of compliance with certain international agreements (see Simmons 2000).

Host state courts can also serve as the vehicle to apply repercussions against offending predatory states. Victims can and have sought judgements and damages against predatory states in civil suits brought in host state courts. Activists successfully sued Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos for the 1981 murder of two Seattle-based Filipino opposition activists, leading to a judgement by a US federal jury that the Marcoses were responsible for the assassinations (Cheung-Miaw 2021). Such civil litigation in federal courts can serve as a remediate for victims of TR, as Garvey (1980) noted. In some states however, legal barriers exist which prevent dissidents from suing foreign sovereigns (Nia 2021). Such was the case for the families of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit, who initially won a judgement in a US district court against Chile for their loved ones' assassinations, but were then prevented from collecting in subsequent rulings (A. McPherson 2021).

Plaintiffs also frequently face difficulty in meeting their burden of proof by establishing a relationship between their, often anonymous, assailant and the

predatory state. Host state security agencies with access to such information often resist disclosure on national security grounds. For these same reasons, even sympathetic prosecutors may face difficulty in moving a criminal case forward (Glennon 1984). Nevertheless, it is far from unheard of for predatory state agents to be criminally charged for their actions, particularly in more extreme cases of TR. Most often, the agents facing charges are the foot soldiers issuing the threats and conducting violence, rather than those issuing orders from the safety of the predatory state. Often these agents are not official agents of the predatory state, but contractors employed secretly to maintain a degree of separation between the state and its repression. Even so, host state court proceedings can publicly implicate the predatory state in these activities without holding them criminally responsible. Such was the case of a Swedish court, which implicated Russian and Chechen officials in the trial of two would-be assassins contracted to commit the crime. In some cases, prosecutors and courts go even further and hold officials of the predatory state criminally accountable, as occurred when a Belgian court convicted an Iranian ambassador of providing explosives to bomb an opposition rally outside of Paris.

Identity

Another underexplored factor influencing host state reactions to TR is identity. Here I refer to both the victim and host state identities. Identity has an independent impact on host state behavior, acting through biases of host state actors. Identity also interacts with backlash, limiting the pressures from internal and external actors on host states. While Muslim identity has been identified as placing victims in more precarious positions vis-à-vis host states (Chaudhary and Moss 2019;

Schenkkan and Linzer 2021), the range of identities which can impact host state responses are wider.

Certain types of diaspora engagement policies which are perceived as threatening to core territorial sovereignty and national security matters are more likely to elicit limitations by the host state. The perception of threat on the part of the host state however is often intrinsically linked to its perception of its ideological identity and the national community which it represents (Baser and Féron 2021). Likewise, threats to state authority are known to diffuse across borders, as in cases of democratic diffusion or the spread of democratic movements across borders (Goldring and Greitens 2020; Starr 1991). When authoritarian regimes perceive their situation as similar to that of another regime, they see assisting their autocratic peer against its opposition as the only acceptable strategy (Odinius and Kuntz 2015). Moulton (2019) draws parallels to this phenomena and the anti-communist containment strategy of the Cold War, describing a “dictators’ domino theory” that emerged among several Caribbean Basin states beginning in the late 1940s. Early efforts at international police cooperation were similarly undertaken by like-minded European autocracies in the 19th century in order to counter anarchists, social democrats, and labor activists (Deflem 2000). Operation Condor likewise saw right-wing South American military dictatorships coordinate the repression of left-wing dissidents (McSherry 2005). Host states are more likely therefore to collaborate against victims whose ideological identity is deemed threatening, often due to their opposition to ideological similar predatory states.

Since 2001 counter-diffusion policies have been adopted by ideologically similar and dissimilar states to limit the spread of a common, yet vaguely defined, terrorist threat. The common threat of terrorism has provided predatory states with a useful catch-all label to discredit dissidents and absolve their own abuse. Schenckan and Linzer (2021) document the term's invocation¹⁵ by countries such as Rwanda, Turkey, and China, as well as in 58% of the incidents of TR that they catalogue. These trends largely match broader research on autocracies strategic labeling of dissidents as terrorists in order to justify domestic mass-killings (Edel and Josua 2018) and repression (Roberts 2020). In addition to malleability of the "terrorist" label, scholars of TR have voiced concern that US counter-terror initiatives such as the targeted killing and extraordinary rendition programs have at least limited Western capabilities to push back on TR on principle, and at worst eroded global norms on extraterritorial violence (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; Schenckan and Linzer 2021).

The metastasis of the Global War on Terror has however, affected certain communities more than others. Schenckan and Linzer (2021) likewise observe that of the incidents of TR which they document, 78% target individuals of Muslim origin. While they observe that this is in part due to the number of Muslim-majority predatory states and the persecution of Uyghurs by China, they also highlight the role of restrictions on Muslim migration due to fears of Islamist terrorism. Chechen exiles, the predominant target of Russian TR, are particularly vulnerable when seeking protection in Europe due to Chechnya's historical association with terrorism.

¹⁵ Specifically, terrorism or extremism.

Chechens are not alone however, as broader Muslim diasporas in non-Muslim majority states have faced criminalization in the aftermath of the Global War on Terror (Chaudhary and Moss 2019). Host states for example, often expressed concern over foreign religious organizations influence over the Turkish diaspora, linking them to fears of radicalization (Baser and Féron 2021).

More broadly, host states may view diasporas with various religious and ethnic backgrounds with suspicion, even as the diasporas face persecution by their predatory states. The “durability of diasporic institutions” is theorized to be linked to the host state’s perception of the predatory state and its tolerance for multiculturalism (Shain 1994: 815). Depending on how the host state defines the national community, the mere existence of a diaspora may evoke fears of dual loyalties, which when exacerbated by diaspora governance initiatives by the predatory state often push host states to take countermeasures (Baser and Féron 2021). In these cases, the push to counter predatory state is not driven by affinity for the targets but by a concern that the predatory state’s hold on the target constitutes a threat. This perception of victims of TR as belonging to another state or part of a larger threat often leads host states to overlook TR.

Diaspora members may find themselves further categorized into the host state’s social hierarchy, adding layers of marginalized identities such as racial groupings insignificant in the predatory state (Chaudhary and Moss 2019). Residency and citizenship status are such categories, with certain refugees and migrants afforded legal status and others denied. Scholars of TR have repeatedly noted that more restrictive migration regimes enable and worsen TR (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer

2022g, 2022b; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). Tentative legal status makes victims more hesitant to reach out to host authorities (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022b, 2022g) and provides opportunities for predatory states to harass and have victims deported (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021).

Those with legal status in the host state, particularly citizenship, in contrast find themselves in an elevated social position with greater leverage to call upon the host state for assistance. While dual nationals have historically been viewed with suspicion as potential security threats stemming from dual loyalties (Shevel 2019), citizenship is a theoretical entrance into the national community. As members of the nation, would-be victims have expectation of protection from the national government. While all individuals, citizens, and non-citizens, in host states territory would be entitled to legal protection from incursions by predatory states, such citizenship provides an extra impetus for host states to respond. This impetus is not without challenges, as hostage-taking of dual nationals demonstrate. While states often negotiate for the release of their citizens arrested and imprisoned in hostage taking maneuvers, their status as subjects of two sovereigns has created legal debates over the extent to which one state can provide diplomatic protection against the other (Forcese 2005). Moreover, the identities of would-be victims intersect, with host states retaining lukewarm positions towards dual nationals of certain backgrounds, particularly those whose identity is securitized (Malek 2019; Shevel 2019).

Intertwined with legal status are other ethnic, racial, gender identities which impact how host states perceive victims, as well as actors which can impose backlash on host states. Immigrants often find themselves injected into new ethnic, racial, and

religious hierarchies within host societies (see Ajrouch and Kusow 2007; Marrow 2009). Host actors in turn assign attributes and preferences based on these classifications. Prior research has demonstrated differential attitudes towards certain classes of immigrants and refugees by host state respondents. Conjoint survey experiments have found that US respondents for example, prefer female newcomers to males (Adida, Lo, and Platas 2019; Steele, Abdelaaty, and Than 2023) and Christians to Muslims (Adida, Lo, and Platas 2019). Newman and Malhotra (2019) suggest that expressed US preferences for highly skilled immigrants veils racial prejudice against immigration from Latin America. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the targeting of certain classes of migrants and diaspora members will receive less sympathy from host citizens who were ambivalent about their presence in the country.

The flip side of this web of identities is that certain victims may in fact benefit from their identity categories, with biases in favor of the émigrés leading to a more favorable host state response to TR. Host states with a majority, or sizable minority, co-ethnic populace may act to protect co-ethnic victims. Scholars of civil conflict have concluded that rebel movements are more likely to receive external support from states with whom they share ethnic bonds (Saideman 2001; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). Likewise, when ethnic-kin is disempowered or under threat, states in the developing world often provide asylum refuge to co-ethnics (Abdelaaty 2021; Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein 2022). This policy support is often motivated by public support for co-ethnics abroad, with democracies being more susceptible to public pressure and therefore more likely to enact such policies (Blair, Grossman, and

Weinstein 2022). Elite policymakers have independent motives to support co-ethnics however. Admitting co-ethnic refugees while excluding non-co-ethnics can, for example, make salient ethnic identity and biases among constituents, mobilizing support in the process (Abdelaaty 2021). Supporting a co-ethnic under threat of TR could likewise, placate host state publics while also mobilizing in-group tribalism for political purposes.

Furthermore, gender engenders certain would-be victims with greater leverage and sympathy vis-à-vis the host state. As noted, prior studies have demonstrated a documented preference among US respondents, for female newcomers. This preference goes beyond a negative preference against male newcomers (Adida, Lo, and Platas 2019). Moreover, if we consider TR as a crime, it is worth remembering responses to female victims of crime can be different than responses to their male counterparts. The so-called “missing White-woman syndrome” in the US results in less media attention for missing persons who are male and/or Black than missing White women (Sommers 2016). Likewise, certain female targets of TR appeal to host states and societies who assign them characteristics of weakness and dependency to conform to a narrative of victims in need of saving (see Schwöbel-Patel 2018). In Western host societies, the misogynistic flavor of TR by predatory states such as Iran (Michaelsen 2020a) further bolsters support for female victims by conforming to Orientalist narratives of oppressed women in need of Western liberation (see Crawley 2022).

Victims are not solely passive recipients of support or apathy from host societies. Diasporas have agency unto themselves, mobilizing to form organizations

centered on both cultural identity and homeland politics (Kopchick et al. 2022). Once mobilized, diasporas lobby for change not only in predatory state politics (Shain and Barth 2003) but also in the host state's foreign policy (Shain 1994). Certain diasporas have enjoyed disproportional political weight and successfully steered host state policies. The Cuban diaspora has, for instance, heavily influenced US foreign policy toward its island origin state (Pérez 2014).

Politically influential diasporas could also push host states to acquiesce to predatory state repression. In such a hypothetical, an influential and largely origin-regime loyal diaspora would be antagonistic toward their co-nationals who dissent from the regime or are persecuted religious or ethnic minorities. They may push for greater overall cooperation between the host and predatory state, leading the host state to adopt a cooperative relationship and collaborate in the monitoring and detention of dissident émigrés. Unilateral predatory state repression could also be met with trepidation from host state officials who fear the reaction of the diaspora should they retaliate.

Interaction and Hypotheses

How do these factors interact in practice, and what is their comparative weight in influencing host state reactions to TR? It is worth beginning by reiterating several assumptions. First, the majority of cases of TR evoke no response from host state authorities because they are unknown by means of victims and predatory states obscuring the incidents, or because low level host state authorities who initially detect the incident are unaware of the scale of the issue and the resources at their disposal.

As such, the incident is never reported to host state actors with any real authority to take retaliatory action. Next, while I refer to responses by *the* host state, host states are not unitary actors. Rather host states consist of principals, in the form of political leaders, and a variety of agents with varying interests and levels of autonomy. These agents may clash in how they wish to respond to an incident of TR.

Table 2-1 displays a summation of hypotheses that can be gleaned from the theory which I have outlined in this chapter. Briefly, host states on an adversarial footing with predatory states, which are electoral democracies with liberal traits such as a vibrant political opposition capable of gaining electoral power, a free press, engaged citizenry, and an independent and autonomous judiciary are more likely to retaliate against TR, and less likely to collaborate with predatory states or forgo responding to their activities. When predatory states are dependent on host states for aid, trade, or political support, host states will have sufficient leverage to retaliate for the former's TR. When TR targets women, victims whose race, ethnicity, or citizenship empowers them in the host's social hierarchy, and victims who belong to an empowered diaspora opposed to the predatory state, retaliation is also more likely. Likewise, when an independent judiciary is present in the host state, or when international organizations or third (non-host or predatory) states decry TR, host state actions countering TR are more likely. In contrast, when host states give their security services wide ranging autonomy, when they share a similar government type and ideology with a predatory state, when they trade and receive aid from the predatory state, and when they are dependent on the predatory state for aid, trade, or political support, those host states are more likely to collaborate with predatory states

conducting TR or choose not to respond to these incursions. Likewise, when the states host an empowered pro-origin state diaspora, they are more likely to collaborate.

This list is not exhaustive, nor do I intend to address each of these hypotheses in this dissertation. In chapters centered on empirical analysis, I will briefly highlight relevant portions of my theory and draw from them pointed hypotheses. Moreover, we can expect many of these factors to cohabitate cases of TR. The impact of identity may in fact be felt through its impact of backlash. In other words, as I will outline below, certain victim's identities may directly magnify backlash, thereby influencing host state responses. What however, is the comparative weight of bilateral relations, backlash, and identity determining host state responses to TR?

Table 2-1. Likelihood of Host Reaction to Transnational Repression			
		Collaborate	Counter
Bilateral Relations	Adversarial Relationship	-	+
	More Trade/Aid from Predator	+	-
	Dependent on Predator	+	-
Backlash (Internal and External)	Electoral Democracy	-	+
	Active Opposition Party	-	+
	Free Press and Engaged Citizenry	-	+
	Independent and Autonomous Judiciary	-	+
	Powerful and Autonomous Security Services	+	-
	IO Pressure on behalf of victim/against predator	-	+
	Third State Pressure on behalf of victim/against predator	-	+
Identity	Similar Gov. Type or Ideology as Predator	+	-
	Victim Ethnically Similar to Host Majority	-	+
	Victim Citizen of Host State	-	+
	Female Victim	-	+
	Empowered anti-Origin Diaspora	-	+
	Empowered pro-Origin Diaspora	+	-

In his analysis of Hizballah's practice of taking Western hostages, Ranstorp (1997) notes the tension facing the liberal democracies which confronted the

Lebanese group. These states had an obligation to protect their citizens from violence, and hence, secure the release of their citizens. But they also had a duty to pursue the national interest, the interests of the collective, which in they interpreted to mean countering international terrorism. In cases of TR host states formulate their response by first considering what they conceive to be the national interest. All things being equal, this lends itself to the hypotheses outlined under the bilateral relations section of my theory: host states are receptive to repression stemming from predatory states they extract gains from, while hostile to those with which they have adversarial relations. However, what is in the national interest is subjective. Heads of state, foreign ministries and security services view their international relations as primal to the national interest. Judicial actors as well as NGOs and the broader populace see maintaining the rule of law and protecting society from incursions by foreign powers as core to the national interest. Opposition parties too fan these concerns as a means to gain power.

Because they hold the levers of power, executive agents and principals of the host state can placate actors fomenting backlash while pursuing policies to further their international interests. As backlash increases however, the host state will move closer to something resembling retaliation. In Garvey's (1980: 87) words "only in the most extreme cases" which prompt "domestic and international outrage is the host state likely to act. Even then, however, the response is likely to be belated and inadequate." Courts, which operate autonomously in liberal societies from the executive, can impose their own retaliation against the predatory state using the more

limited means at their disposal. How host state executives, courts, and populaces view the national interest is however, also mediated by the identity of the victim(s).

Certain victims, such as ideological adversaries, trigger a perception of threat to host state executive while likely marginalizing the victim from host state society and thereby diminishing any backlash. Other victims, however, trigger emotive responses from within the host state. Their status may be one of privilege within the host state, such as those with citizenship or ethnic ties to the host majority which cause both host executives and populaces to re-conceive that their national interest is to defend the target of extra-territorial repression. Still other's identity plays on the biases of the host society, such as the need of patriarchal states to rescue "damsels in distress." These identity factors then, both shift host state principals' conception of the national focus from bilateral relations to protection of the individual, while intensifying backlash, or the risk of it.

My theory does not provide for a simple flow chart displaying "if identity is so and bilateral relations are so then x will happen." Rather, host state responses can be thought of as the sum of backlash, bilateral relations, and identity. The formula begins with a large, negative value of backlash in most cases, signifying that most instances of TR remain out of the public eye. To attain a positive (firm) response to TR, backlash must be equal or greater to bilateral relations. Firm responses may also occur in part due to a positive value for bilateral relations, demarking hostile relations between the predatory and host state. Both backlash and bilateral relations are impacted by the addition victim identity however, certain victim identity's pressure host states to retaliate by magnifying backlash and unconsciously evoking sympathy

from host state principals. Marginalized victims, however, diminish backlash and trigger unconscious biases on the part of host state leaders.

Conclusion

This dissertation asks what determines the reactions of states which witness acts of repression committed within their territory and directed by foreign states. Because scholarly research on TR has been dominated by examinations of the predatory state and victims, existing research on host state reactions is sparse. This dissertation seeks to correct this omission.

I began by illustrating the menu of alternatives available to diaspora-hosting states in instances of TR. In addition to ignoring violations, host states can retaliate against predatory origin states, or choose to cooperate with them before or after the actual act of repression. Cooperation provides predatory states with a security infrastructure it would otherwise be unable to replicate overseas, reduces the risk of legal repercussions for their agents, and provides an opportunity to have their dissidents extradited home. It is no wonder then that unilateral acts of TR are comparatively rare and becoming rarer (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d).

What remains unclear is why. Why would host states choose not to respond to violations of their sovereignty, or accept a duopoly of violence with a predatory state? I have presented a novel theory of host state reactions to TR contain three broad categories of predictive factors. First, rational choice bilateral interests dictate that host state principals should not respond to, or even collaborate in, TR when they gain in their bilateral relations with the predatory state and have the prospect of continued gains. These gains are broad and can encompass economic or political capital, as well

as military or intelligence cooperation. Likewise, host states are more reticent to retaliate against predatory states which enjoy a power asymmetry and on whom the host state is dependent for material support. Finally, host states are more willing to retaliate against adversaries, using these violations of human rights and international law as ammunition for their broader geopolitical battles.

Secondly, backlash can hamper a host state's willingness to collaborate in TR and push it towards retaliation. I distinguish between internal and external backlash, the latter stemming from foreign and the former from domestic actors that apply pressure on the host state if it is seen as ignorant or complacent in anti-emigrant violence. The former relates to domestic pressures and can be driven by a variety of internal actors. Internal actors who can apply pressure on host states vary from frustrated populaces mobilized by NGOs and political opposition to autonomous agents such as courts who pursue justice and block collaboration with predatory states. The scandal diminishes the leadership's political capital and leads to punishment in elections.

Lastly, the identities of both the host state and the victims impact reactions to TR. The degree to which host state principals prioritize the communal benefits of bilateral relations with the predatory state over the individual needs of victims is dictated in part by where the victim's identity places them on a social hierarchy. Likewise, victim's identity impacts the perception of domestic actors such as NGOs, courts, and citizens in determining the extent of backlash against host state principals. Citizens, with ethnic or racial ties to the host state majority, or women, particularly those fleeing Muslim majority societies to Western host states, are particularly likely

to elicit sympathy and therefore host state retaliatory and protective actions. Racial minorities, Muslims, ideological adversaries, and those with tenuous legal status in contrast are devalued by actors across the spectrum of host societies.

This dissertation will empirically assess aspects of the preceding theory in an effort to broaden our understanding of the role host states play in TR. In the next chapter, I introduce my own dataset of incidents of TR and methodology I will utilize in this dissertation to assess my theory.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Introduction

The study of TR emerged from the realization that authoritarian states widely follow their nationals overseas for the purpose of ending perceived challenges to their rule. Through qualitative studies of the practices of particular predatory states (Jardine, Lemon, and Hall 2021; Lewis 2015), and the adaptability of different diaspora groups (Moss 2016), our theoretical understanding of TR has grown. There are, however, still theoretical gaps to be filled. As I argue in this dissertation, there is still much we don't understand about host state responses to TR. Luckily, to help fill those gaps, and empirically assess existing theory, we now have the data to expand our methodological repertoire. Emerging first from area studies scholars seeking to document the repression of exiles from their respective regions (Furstenberg et al. 2020), cross-national datasets documenting individual instances of TR are now available to scholars (Dukalskis 2021; Freedom House 2021; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). Utilizing these datasets however requires forethought to their limitations. Data of TR is "radically incomplete" as both predatory states and victims seek to obstruct public awareness of these illicit acts, the latter out of understandable concern for their well-being (Dukalskis 2021). Moreover, while these datasets expand our ability to empirically assess a number of questions, there is still more data to be gathered.

In this chapter I introduce the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD), an original cross-national dataset of incidents of TR and the accompanying responses of host states. HRRD cases are derived from two existing

cross-national datasets documenting individual incidents of TR: Alexander Dukalskis' (2021) Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database (AAAD) and Freedom House's Transnational Repression Database (FHTRD) (Freedom House 2021; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). Variables from these datasets are retained and additional variables added through original data collection on host state responses to TR. I outline the procedures followed both to join the AAAD and FHTRD, as well as the data collection procedures used to provide the HRRD its unique value. I then conclude by illustrating descriptive statistics of the HRRD and what they can tell us about the practice of TR.

Data Limitations and Availability

As outlined in the introduction of this dissertation, there is a fundamental challenge with analyzing data on TR. Such data is, in the words of Dukalskis (2021: 70) "radically incomplete" because of the inherent secrecy that practices of TR entail. Predatory states usually have every reason to keep their predatory behavior hidden from public view precisely because of the potential costs of such actions. Victims too often hesitate to come forward with allegations of threats, violence, or attempted renditions against their state of origin. In doing so they risk attracting more attention to themselves along with further, and perhaps more severe TR. Lastly, and most challenging for assessing my theory, host state agents themselves may actively seek to obstruct incidents of TR from the public eye.

Public awareness of TR, as my theory notes, poses risks to host state authorities. Observers could judge authorities to have been ineffective at preventing foreign states from committing illicit acts within the sovereign territory of the host

state. They could assess that the authorities are incapable, or worse, unwilling, to retaliate against the predatory state in defense of the host state's laws and sovereignty. Any of these judgements could have costs for host state agents and authorities: the HRRD documents several cases in which agents of the host state are dismissed from their positions for conspiring with the predatory state or being derelict in their duties to prevent TR. Perhaps even more commonly, the intelligence and security apparatuses of the host state often have mutually beneficial arrangements with their counterparts in the predatory state. These relationships often lead the host security services, who would be in position to first detect and intercept predatory agents seeking to conduct TR, to quietly ignore the predatory state's actions or actively facilitate them (Garvey 1980; Glennon 1984; Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d; Israel 1998).

These issues of the obscurity of TR from public view are particularly noteworthy given the reliance on public reporting in cross-national datasets on TR. The HRRD draws its cases, individual instances of TR, from Dukalskis' (2021) AAAD and Freedom House's FHTRD (Freedom House 2021; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021), both of which cite publicly available evidence such as media reporting as well as non-government organization (NGO) and international organization (IO) reports. Dukalskis (2021) outlines his search procedures for identifying cases of TR, which involve search engine queries in multiple languages. Freedom House (2021) does not reveal how it came to identify its cases of TR, but its dataset links to a comparatively greater amount of source material, again in the form of media articles, NGO reports, and IO reports. Naturally, there are biases independent of aforementioned

obstructions which are not necessarily malicious, biases which at a broader level impact the types of human rights abuses covered by news organizations and NGOs (Ramos, Ron, and Thoms 2007; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005). In my overview of the HRRD later in the chapter, I illustrate the most glaring of the biases in our data on TR. In subsequent chapters, I control for them, demonstrating that it is possible to draw significant findings even when accounting for said biases.

There are a variety of ways in which the obstacles to identifying cases of TR can be overcome. The diligent work of both scholars and human rights advocates to identify previously unknown information on TR by combing archives, police reports, and the testimony of witnesses and victims, often at great personal cost, should not be understated.¹⁶ Most significantly, victims of TR who have risked their security to publicize their cases not only provide scholars with valuable insight into the practices of specific regimes, but the broader processes involved in TR. Some scholars have examined historical campaigns of TR, such as McSherry (2005, 2019) and Lessa (2022) who have examined the counter-dissident campaigns of Operation Condor. At the time TR occurs, states may consider evidence of, or records documenting, TR to be sensitive to national security, keeping them classified and out of scholars' reach. Examining of historical cases opens the possibility that such records may have since been declassified, or the predatory regimes in question have fallen and subsequent legal or truth and reconciliation initiative have made documentation of TR more widely available. While valuable for providing more insight into the decision

¹⁶ On said personal costs, see Wrong (2024)'s description of the harassment she faced after publishing details of Paul Kagame's campaign of assassination against exiled Rwandans.

processes of states in perpetrating TR, relying on such data also risks a temporal bias as the international norms, technology, and geopolitical realities of today are vastly different than those of previous eras.

As outlined in the theory of this dissertation, I seek to overcome the inherent biases in our data on TR by limiting the scope of my research question. This dissertation is concerned with *public* cases of TR: those cases which at some point became public knowledge, whether through media or NGO reports, state press releases, or revelations from victims themselves. I ask how host states react to cases of TR when they become public knowledge. I theorize that the publicity of cases of TR entails costs, such as backlash, as well as benefits. How host states weigh these costs and benefits in deciding how to respond to TR is, I argue, important to understanding how predatory states perceive the risks of TR.

Creating the HRRD

Cases for the HRRD are derived from the AAAD and FHTRD. Both are globally cross-national datasets whose unit of analysis is individual incidents of TR. Basic descriptive variables of the events of TR, including the victim's name, host state, predatory state, as well as year and month of the incident are common to both the AAAD and FHTRD. There are however important distinctions, some of which needed to be overcome in order to create a functional unified dataset.

The AAAD consists of 1177 incidents of TR occurring between 1991 and 2019, with 35 predatory, and 80 host states documented. The FHTRD is more limited temporarily, with incidents occurring between 2014 and 2020. The number of cases is also smaller, with 607 incidents listed in 79 host states. Naturally there is overlap

between the two datasets given the partial overlap in timeframe. Yet there are benefits to drawing on both sources to study TR. On average the FHTRD cites more public sources per case and provides valuable notes detailing cases for researchers. Drawing on the AAAD however, allows for more temporally generalizable conclusions to be drawn. Moreover, the transparent search procedures which the AAAD documents, as well as the inclusion of the “extradition attempt” tactic provides utility which I will utilize in my methodology in ways soon to be explained.

Joining the AAAD and FHTRD involved first grouping incidents by host-predator dyad and then randomizing the order these dyads occurred. This allowed for analysis of a random sample of the cases before the completion of data collection. Within each host-predator dyad, cases were ordered by date, with earlier cases appearing first. Once this process was complete, cases which were documented in both the AAAD and FHTRD were joined together to avoid duplication. This process was cumbersome, automated tools to identify overlap by victim’s name often missed cases of duplication as AAAD and FHTRD coders listed victims by different names, sometimes due to distinctions in transliteration. In some instances, coders interpreted data differently, listing the same cases under different dates, tactics, or even host states. As a result, the process of joining together involved reviewing the dataset to identify duplicates visually.

Another challenge in creating the HRRD was defining the unit of observation. In both the AAAD and FHTRD each observation represents a tactic used against the victim at a specific point in time. For example, one victim of TR may face both an assault and a threat simultaneously, but their cases would be listed separately in both

the AAAD and FHTRD. Both theoretically and methodologically it made sense to recognize that these tactics may be utilized jointly, or in quick succession. Therefore, the HRRD merged all cases in which a victim was targeted in the same dyad in a one-month period.

An additional challenge came in how the AAAD and FHTRD document mass incidents involving multiple victims. The AAAD makes every effort to disaggregate mass incidents to every individual victim the coders could identify. However, when specific individuals could not be identified, the incident was listed as a single case in the AAAD (Dukalskis 2021). In other words, if ten dissidents were detained and their names known, they would constitute ten separate observations. However, if a month later, fifteen more dissidents were detained, but their names were not available in public reporting, the AAAD would list it as a single observation. This created methodological issues in utilizing AAAD quantitatively without transforming the unit of analysis. Simply creating “blank” observations to mass incidents listed as single observations in the AAAD was not feasible without reviewing each case, as the AAAD’s variable for mass incidents and the number of victims was utilized both in cases in which mass incidents were aggregated and disaggregated. As my analysis in the next two chapters will show, I adopted two strategies to adapt to this challenge.

First, I left the coding decisions of the AAAD and FHTRD on the definition of a unit of observation unchanged. Second, for my analysis in both the descriptive statistics later in this chapter, and in the proceeding chapter, I aggregated observations to the dyad/monadic year level. Variables for the tactics of TR in this iteration of the HRRD are dichotomous, indicating if, for example, an assassination occurred in the

listed dyad/monad-year. This approach has a number of benefits. First, the distinction between aggregated and disaggregated mass incidents is no longer relevant, as both will appear identical in the dyad/monad-year format. Second, while the potential that duplicate cases remains, they too are less significant as even if cases listed separately in the AAAD and FHTRD remained, they would feed into the same dichotomous variable. Lastly, as noted previously our data is “radical incomplete” (Dukalskis 2021: 70). Therefore, measuring TR as a dichotomous variable avoids the inevitable bias that attempting to capture the scale of TR, in terms of number of victims or incidents, entails. In other words, we can be confident that our observations of the occurrence of TR are accurate, but we are less confident in the accuracy of our data on the scale of the phenomenon.

The next chapter will feature entirety of the aggregated dyad/monad-year HRRD, which I will draw on to identify predictors of the occurrence of TR by particular predatory states, and in particular host states and host-predator dyads. In Chapter 5, I introduce originally coded data on host responses to TR.

Tactics

One hurdle to overcome in joining the AAAD and FHTRD is that each uses slightly different criteria for categorizing the tactics employed in an incident. Table 3-1 displays these differences, but the major differences can be summarized as following. The FHTRD limits itself to documenting physical instances of TR directed at the victim themselves, while AAAD includes a category of “family threatened” which encompasses instances in which the victim’s family in the predatory state were threatened as a means of reaching the victim. The FHTRD lumps together

assassinations and assassination attempts, while the AAAD includes separate codes for attempts at assassinating, abducting, or extraditing the victim. This latter code is particularly useful as it identifies cases in which the predatory state sought the victim’s return by means of cooperation with the host state. While there a variety of ways in which these attempts could be unsuccessful, including a simple lack of reporting follow-up on pending extraditions, in at least some cases this code indicates the host state decided not to cooperate with the origin state.

Table 3-1. AAAD vs FHTRD Classifications	
AAAD Codes	FHTRD Codes
Assassination	Assassination or Assassination Attempt
Assassination Attempt	
Attacked	Assault
Abducted	Rendition
Abduction Attempt	N/A
Arrested/Detained	Detention
Extradited	Unlawful Deportation or Rendition
Extradition Attempt	N/A
Threatened	Intimidation
Family Threatened	N/A
N/A	Unexplained disappearance
<i>Note: Full descriptions of the AAAD and FHTRD coding criteria can be found in Dukakis’ (2021) for the AAAD and in Freedom House (2021) as well as Schenckan and Linzer (2021) for the FHTRD.</i>	

One other major distinction is the FHTRD’s use of the categories “rendition” and “unlawful deportation” and the AAAD’s use of the categories of “extradited” and “abducted.” Under the Freedom House (2021) criteria, rendition includes any transfer of the victim from host state to origin state territory “without legal process, or with the barest fig leaf of a legal process.” This can include abductions by the predatory state, or illicit deportations by the host state. This is useful data, but the questions this dissertation addresses are better suited by identifying the agent responsible for

transferring the victim, rather than the shade of legality the transfer entailed. I therefore recoded cases categorized as renditions in the FHTRD into one of two categories.

First, cases in which the host state deported the victim, as well as those in which host state agents were seen detaining and transferring the victim and those in which credible evidence suggests the host state agents took direct part in the transfer, were recorded as extraditions. Direct involvement in the transfer by the host state means that host state agents were present at the apprehension and exchange of the victim, not simply that they approved of or shared information to prepare for, the incident. Cases in which unknown assailants or predatory state agents abducted the victim and returned them to predatory state territory, and no credible evidence links them to the host state, I recoded as abductions. In many of these cases, host state involvement is plausible or even probable, but no evidence is available. In others, no information is available on the transfer, only that the victim disappeared and then reappeared in predatory state custody. The default is to recode the case as an abduction if there is no evidence of direct host state involvement, but this should not be seen as discounting the potential role the host state may have played in the event.

Recoding involved the review of all cases labeled as renditions by Freedom House. For most cases which were also labeled as abductions or extraditions by the AAAD, the AAAD's coding was then adopted. The broader dyad was examined to see if the same victim was recently 'detained' in which case an extradition code would be appropriate. I then moved to review the Freedom House notes. In most

cases, these gave a clear indication of how the case should be recoded. If ambiguity remained, I then reviewed the sources listed.

Another distinction between the AAAD and FHTRD, one which required a strategy to adapt to the HRRD is the FHTRD's use of the tactic "unexplained disappearance." Freedom House (2021) defines unexplained disappearances as those in which "a person has disappeared and the origin country government is presumed responsible, but there is no confirmation as to where the person physically is." Frequently, in incidents documented by both the AAAD and FHTRD in which the FHTRD documented the case as an unexplained disappearance, the AAAD would code the incident as an abduction. Here I again reviewed cases categorized by the FHTRD as an unexplained disappearance. When the location of the victim was unknown, I retained the unexplained disappearance code. To align with this dissertation's interest in whether host state authorities are complicit in TR, I disaggregated this code into two variations: host-linked unexplained disappearances and predator linked unexplained disappearances. For those unexplained disappearances in which there was evidence to suggest host state agents were directly involved in the abduction, cases were coded as host-linked while others remained predator-linked.

Data Overview

The HRRD is created by joining of cases of TR documented by the FHTRD and the AAAD, for a total of 1378 unique cases of TR occurring between 1991 and

2020.¹⁷ Cases involving the same victim targeted in the same month were aggregated into one observation, while cases without years or host states listed (and not readily identifiable) were removed. I then aggregated the HRRD into a host state-predatory state dyad year dataset, with dichotomous variables indicating whether or not each act of TR was conducted within the dyad-year. This dyad-year dataset contains 611 observations.

As Table 3-2 shows predatory states utilize a variety of tactics to coerce their nationals abroad, but several are more widely employed. The numbers and percentages in Table 3-2 correspond to the occurrence of these tactics in dyad-years of the HRRD. Because a variety of tactics may have been employed in a given dyad-year the addition of observations listed is greater than 100% and the total number of dyad-years in the HRRD (611). For each host-predator dyad-year dichotomous variables indicated the use of each of these tactics. In 35.84% of all dyad-years, the predatory state was successfully able to have a host state detain a victim, while in 24.22% of the dyad-years a victim was extradited by the host state. Interestingly, in roughly the same number of observations, an attempted extradition occurred in which the victim's transfer was not documented.

¹⁷ Later in this chapter when discussing data collection for the HRRD, I reference 1511 cases in the HRRD. After removing those cases marked for deletion however, and those without years or host states listed, left 1378 cases to analyze.

Table 3-2. HRRD Dyad-Year Observations			
Tactic	Occurrence	Tactic Class	Class Occurrence
Assassinations or Attempts	67 (10.97%)	Direct Violent Tactics	146 (23.90%)
Abductions or Attempts	48 (7.86%)		
Assaults	32 (5.24%)		
Unexplained Disappearances – Predator Linked	7 (1.15%)		
Unexplained Disappearances – Host Linked	3 (0.49%)	Co-Opt Tactics	363 (59.41%)
Extraditions	148 (24.22%)		
Extradition Attempts	141 (23.08%)		
Detentions	219 (35.84%)		
Threats or Intimidations	121 (19.80%)	Threat Tactics	176 (28.81%)
Family Threats	80 (13.09%)		

Threats or physical intimidations are also relatively common, occurring in 19.8% of the dyad-years. Family threats, referred to as “proxy punishment” (Moss, Michaelsen, and Kennedy 2022) and “coercion-by-proxy” (Tsourapas 2021) in the literature, likewise are common, and represent instances of the predatory state threatening the victim’s family, which still resides in the predatory state’s territory, in order to coerce them from afar. Most tactics of direct violence, in the form of abductions and assaults are relatively rarer, with each occurring in less than ten percent of dyad-years respectively. The most extreme tactic of TR, and perhaps after the Khashoggi murder most recognizable, assassinations and attempts occur in 67 (10.97%) dyad-years.

In Table 3-2, I group tactics according to a parsimonious and theoretically informed classification scheme. Threats, both directly against the victim and against the victim’s family in the predatory state are classified as “threat tactics” and occur in 28.81% of dyad-years in the HRRD. Next, cases which by definition involve an

attempt, failed or successful, to co-opt the host state and utilize its apparatus to coerce the victim are classified as “co-opt tactics” and occur in 59.41% of dyad-years in the HRRD. Co-Opt tactics include attempts to have the victim extradited by the host state, the host state detaining the victim, and the unexplained disappearances linked to the host state. Lastly cases which do not by definition necessitate co-opting the host state and include direct acts of violence against the victim are classified as “direct violent tactics” and occur in 23.9% of the dyad-years in the HRRD. It is worth highlighting that it is entirely possible that events involving direct violent tactics also included a degree of cooperation with the host state. Likewise, this is not to suggest that tactics classified as “co-opt” or “threats” do not entail violence. Rather, without having reviewed the details of each and every case in the HRRD, this classification system provides a way for me to draw informed inferences about the types of TR employed with particular respect to their relationship to the host state.

Figures 3-1 and 3-2 highlight the predatory and host states within the HRRD, with color coding based on the frequency which these states are present as part of a host-predator dyad-year observation in the HRRD. The majority of predatory states are in Eurasia, with China, Turkey, Russia, Uzbekistan, and North Korea recurring most frequently. African states are also represented, though their TR is less recurrent. Host states are more geographically diverse in the HRRD. Again however, they are heavily centered in Eurasia with Russia, the UK, France, and Turkey recurring most frequently. The United States is the fifth most recurring host state in HRRD dyads, though generally American, as well as African, states appear underrepresented.




Figure 3-1. HRRD Predatory States by Frequency of Dyad-Year Occurrence
“Warmer” colors indicate more frequent recurrence of predatory state in dyad-year version of HRRD.




Figure 3-2. HRRD Host States by Frequency of Dyad-Year Occurrence
“Warmer” colors indicate more frequent recurrence of host state in dyad-year version of HRRD.

Absence of TR

In Chapter 4, I draw on both this dissertation’s theory and the HRRD to identify factors which increase the odds of TR being conducted by potential predatory states, and in potential host states and predatory-host dyads. Doing sets the stage for my ultimate objective, to identify factors contributing to host states responses to TR. There is an important methodological issue to tackle before I can move on to this

stage of the analysis, however. How can I assess the odds of TR occurring if the HRRD only documents cases in which TR did occur? In other words, how do I identify events which didn't occur, or more specifically, states which could have conducted or been host to TR, but weren't? In this section I outline my strategy to identify these cases at each level: predatory, host, and dyadic.

Identifying predatory states which could have reasonably conducted TR, but, based on the existing data, didn't, is the most straightforward of the stages, courtesy of Dukaskis (2021). Data collection for the AAAD involved the examination of 88 countries which were considered authoritarian between 1991-2019, for a total of 1880 predator-years examined.¹⁸ While this led to identifying predator-years in which TR did occur, it also helps identify predator-years in which TR did not occur, to the best that researchers could determine using publicly available information. I retain every predator-year observation of TR in the HRRD that falls within the AAAD search list and add on regime-year's which are in the AAAD search list but which no TR was documented. I draw on both AAAD and FHTRD data, but again only those predator-years within the AAAD search list. This necessitates removing some data points from the HRRD, dropping the number of predator-years with TR observed to 230, with 1650 predator-years added in which no TR is observed.¹⁹

Identifying potential host states, and by extension dyads, is more challenging. International data on bilateral flows of migration and the presence of diasporas is limited and non-comprehensive. Moreover, such data would not capture temporary

¹⁸ In contrast the FHTRD is broader in scope and does not specify a targeted search criterion.

¹⁹ Democracies do engage TR, however scholars' postulate that they likely do so less often. See Dukalskis et al. (2022).

travel which leads some victims in the HRRD to the host state in which they will be targeted. To identify potential host states for the predatory states listed by the AAAD I rely on several sources. First, I draw on the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Refugees (UNHCR)'s data on refugee and asylum seeker flows from 1951-2019, listing dyads in which that year or any year prior up to 1951 the presence of refugees from potential predatory states was reported (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees n.d.).²⁰ Next, I include dyads which, from in the year reported or any year prior up to 1951, were contiguous, as reported by the COW Direct Contiguity Dataset (v 3.2) (Stinnett et al. 2002). This allows me to not only capture dyads with a recorded presence of refugees and asylum seekers from the predator to the host state, but also dyads which by nature of their proximity it can be safely assumed have hosted an historic and continuous flow of expatriates and migrants. By that logic I also include dyads which inhabit the same world regions designated by the UN Statistics Division (n.d.). This allows for me to capture migration flows which occur within regions and may not otherwise be captured, such as, for example, Honduras to the United States, and Poland to the United Kingdom. Finally, because both former-USSR states and the Arab states have historically hosted a great degree of migration due to political and cultural ties but are not in the same region due to UNSD coding, I include dyads for these "regions" as well.²²

To summarize, to in order to identify the odds of TR occurring, I develop and implement a strategy to identify cases in which TR could have occurred, but based on

²⁰ As well as "other people in need of international protection" and "others off concern to UNHCR."

²¹ While the searches were conducted for UNHCR data beginning at to 1951 the earliest relevant data is from 1960.

²² I use membership in the Arab League as a measure of an Arab region.

the observational evidence at hand, did not. I draw on Dukalskis (2021) AAAD search criteria for a full list of potential predatory states, including those which were not observed to have committed TR. I then identify potential host states by including states in with historic refugee flows, historically contiguous states, and states in the same broad region. The result of adding these non-event “nulls” to my data is that my sample size can be found in Table 3-3.

Table 3-3. Sample Summary			
	TR	Non-TR	All
Predator Year	230 (12.2340%)	1650 (87.7660%)	1880 (100.00%)
Host Year	372 (6.9938%)	4947 (93.0062%)	5319 (100.00%)
Predator-Host Dyad Year	538 (0.3829%)	139,961 (99.6171%)	140,499 (100.00%)
<i>Note: Rows represent different variants of the HRRD while columns represent observations in which TR was/wasn't present, or for the last column, all observations.</i>			

Host Responses

In Chapter 5 I turn from asking, “what factors increase the odds of TR occurring,” to asking what factors determine how host states respond to incidents of TR. In the process, I draw on originally collected and coded data on host state responses to individual acts of TR. In this section, I review my data collection and coding procedures. Data collection on this portion of the HRRD is ongoing, however as noted previously, the randomized order of the HRRD allows me to draw inferences from the sample of the HRRD in which this data has already been collected.

Data collection on the HRRD began with a review of the source documents linked by either (or both) the AAAD and FHTRD. Coders would summarize and

record key data points from these sources in a narrative sheet. Coders were specifically instructed to record: the details of the incident itself; all elements of the host state's response; the identity of the responding agent; third state or IO responses; reactions of other political figures; the identity, citizenship, residence, and asylum status of the victim; accusations that the victim was engaged in terrorism or extremism; as well as all relevant dates. After recording data from the source documents, coders were then asked to conduct a series of targeted searches on Nexis Uni for additional data. The core of these search commands were the victim's names as well as the host and predatory state identifiers. Searches were, at their broadest, limited temporally from the date of the incident to December 31, 2021. Depending on the data available from the source documents and the number of results in initial Nexis Uni searches, coders would conduct more limited searches by narrowing the temporal window of possible results, or by adding additional search terms relevant to the tactics of TR utilized. In certain circumstances, coders also conducted Google searches to gather additional data.

Data was stored in narrative sheets containing description of all incidents in a given dyad. Most of the data collection was conducting by myself, however, in the Summer and Fall of 2022 an undergraduate research assistant, Joao Victor Oliveira, also conducted data collection. The involvement of an undergraduate research assistant in the project was made possible by a grant obtained from the UMD GVPT Comparative Politics' Section. From these narrative sheets, I would derive relevant information to code the original variables documenting the host state's response to incidents of TR as well as other relevant information. These variables can generally

be grouped into several categories: those pertaining to the victim's identity; those documenting certain host state responses; variables documenting the responses of legislatures, judiciaries, and the political opposition; and several miscellaneous variables, including those on third state and IO responses. Before giving a description of the relevant variables coded for this dissertation, I will address how the HRRD data coding process conformed to the scope of this dissertation.

In many cases in the HRRD, the occurrence of TR did not become public knowledge until weeks, months, or years after the fact. This of course is not unusual, as there are likely many cases of TR that are never publicly revealed. This presents a central challenge to any researcher attempting to study TR quantitatively. For this reason, as outlined at the start of this chapter, I limit my claims and theory to how host states respond to *public* incidents of TR. By public I mean those incidents in which information indicating that there has been an occurrence of TR eventually entered the in the public domain. It may not be widely reported, but an interested party can access it. Extraditions and extradition attempts are a partial exception to this limitation, as much of the host state decision making may occur under an umbrella of privacy, but the cases eventually are reported publicly which may lead to a backlash. To accommodate this limitation of my claims, most variables which I code are limited to events which occurred five years after the incident became public knowledge.

After coding began on the HRRD it quickly became apparent that many cases of TR were not occurring in isolation. Frequently, victims would be targeted en-masse by the predatory state, resulting in a unified response from the host state. This may occur as part of a mass-round up of asylum seekers, or a targeted assassination of

multiple members of an exiled opposition group. Recall, depending on the availability of information on certain cases, AAAD coders either disaggregated such incidents into multiple observations or coded them as one aggregated observation. While I left these decisions untouched in my analysis of the total HRRD in Chapter 4, I adopted a different strategy for Chapter 5's analysis of a samples of the HRRD with originally coded data. In reviewing these cases individually, I include an identity number for each "linked case" comprising of a stand-alone case of TR targeting one victim, or multiple cases in which the victims targeted in the same dyad near simultaneously and grouped together for the purposes of host state responses. In Chapter 5, I aggregate data on each linked case to avoid artificially inflating host state responses to events with many victims.

Coding for the HRRD is ongoing, and findings are therefore preliminary. However, at the time of this writing, I have coded data for 308 individual cases of TR which are aggregated to 138 linked cases for analysis. In the course of coding, I reviewed 385 of 1511 cases. Of these 78 cases were identified as duplicates and merged, deleted due to missing dates or failing to meet coding definitions, or identified as having occurred in a different host-predator dyad and moved for latter coding.²³ In Chapter 5, I will provide descriptive statistics of this sample, as well as an overview of the range of original variables I draw on for my analysis.

²³ In general, the HRRD does not add additional cases of TR, even if new victims and incidents come to light in the coding process. However, in one unique circumstance, in which the source code listed two victims but only coded one incident, a new case was added.

Deletions

A final methodological note worth discussing is the issue of deletions. In general, I made every effort to retain as much information from the AAAD and FHTRD in the HRRD. However, there were circumstances in which incidents documented in the AAAD and FHTRD were not retained. First, as discussed, Chapter 4 will examine the full HRRD, not just those cases in which original data on host state responses has been collected. Doing this, and specifically, comparing incidents in the HRRD with observations in which TR did not occur, required adopting the AAAD's search list to define the predatory states examined. This necessitated eliminating some cases, particularly those derived from the FHTRD in which the predatory state did not conform to the AAAD's criteria of an authoritarian state. Moreover, cases in which no year and the relevant host state were not defined or easily identified, were not included in this analysis. Next, Chapter 5 examines a (randomized) sample of the HRRD in which original data on host state response was collected. In this analysis, it was not necessary to limit the scope of analysis to AAAD-listed predatory states. The analysis in Chapter 5 will not compare observations of TR with those observations of non-TR, rather responses of host states will be examined in the sample in which TR occurred.

However, in the process of collecting data, and in earlier iterations of cleaning the data, there were instances in which cases from the AAAD and FHTRD were dropped from the HRRD. Again, the attempt was to retain as many incidents of TR listed in the AAAD and FHTRD as possible. However, the HRRD attempts to capture information on distinct, specific incidents of TR in which a host state could feasibly

respond to when it became public knowledge. Therefore, when coded incidents described general trends, campaigns, or overall persecution, and not distinct events, the case was removed. Likewise, if coders did not feel the description of the incident corresponded to criteria of incident types (tactics) in the HRRD, the case was likewise deleted.

Finally, if source materials did not indicate that the victim of TR was a member of a diaspora originating from the predatory state, or was not a national of the predatory state, the case was removed. Here diaspora and national were purposefully interpreted as broadly as possible to provide as much deference to the AAAD/FHTRD coders as possible. For example, one case in the HRRD describes Russian TR of an ethnic Chechen, Georgian citizen. The victim in question belonged to a Chechen community that has long resided in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. A narrow interpretation of what qualified a victim of TR may exclude this incident as the victim was not a Russian citizen and both he and his community is native to Georgia. A decision was made, however, to retain this incident in the HRRD, as a broader interpretation would be that the majority of the Chechen diaspora originates from Chechnya, as did the Pankisi Gorge community prior to the 19th century (Sanikidze 2018).

In Chapter 4, cases in which no year could be identified were deleted, as analysis required aggregating to the dyad/monad-year. In Chapter 5, cases in which no month and year could be identified were deleted, the thinking being that those cases in which a month cannot be identified are less specific and discrete, making it more difficult for host states to respond to. Finally, if in the process of coding original

data in preparation of Chapter 5's analysis, it was determined that source documents were no longer accessible, and the facts of the incident could not be verified, the case for deleted.

Conclusion

As this chapter began, so it is worth repeating. There are serious theoretical and methodological considerations that any scholar researching issues of TR must address. While new data availability has begun to allow scholars to address questions on TR quantitatively, it also camouflages serious limitations based on means in which information on TR is obscured. This chapter has set forth a methodology to address these challenges, starting by limited the scope of future analysis to those cases of TR which eventually became public knowledge. By joining together two large, cross-national datasets on TR, the Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database (AAAD) (Dukalskis 2021) and the Freedom House Transnational Repression Database (FHTRD) (Freedom House 2021; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021) I gain access to a broad range of documentation on incidents of TR. This chapter outlined the process by which the contrasting classifications of the AAAD and FHTRD were unified into a new categorization. By adding original data collected on host state responses to this dataset I create the Host Responses to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD). The next chapters will focus on the analysis of HRRD data to answer a series of questions derived from my theory. First, in Chapter 4 I will seek to identify factors correlated with TR being perpetrated by particular predatory states and occurring in particular host states and predator-host dyads. To do this, this chapter has outlined a

methodology for identifying observations of “non-TR,” i.e., observation years in which TR was not observed to have occurred. Next, in Chapter 5 I will seek to identify correlates of host state reactions to TR which are either “responsive” in that they seek justice for the victim and/or confront the predatory state, or those reactions which facilitate TR by involving collaboration with the predatory state. Here again, this chapter has outlined the methodology that was undertaken to collect this original HRRD data on host state responses.

State Selection

Introduction

As outlined, high profile events such as the murder of *Washington Post* columnist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia's Istanbul consulate has spurred a scholarly interest in transnational repression (TR), or the repression of nationals outside of the nation-state's territorial borders. This early research has largely focused on understanding the tactics of the repressing predatory states from which émigrés leave, and their effects on diasporic communities. This has largely been undertaken using qualitative field work and individual or comparative case studies.²⁴ In this chapter, I present one of the first quantitative analysis of newly available data on TR. Using the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD) I expand discussion of TR from offending states to host states. I ask what factors are correlated with potential host states hosting TR and appearing in the HRRD.

My analysis proceeds in three stages, two at the monadic level with examinations of the domestic factors associated with potential predatory states conducting TR, and with potential host states being selected by predatory states as worthwhile environments for TR. In addition, I expand my analysis to the dyadic level by examining the nature of the host-predator bilateral relationships and their effect on predatory states decision to conduct TR. My findings provide support to

²⁴ Two papers have recently been published which do seek to explain the use of TR by predatory states (Dukalskis et al. 2023), and its occurrence against victims in certain host states (Michaelsen and Ruijgrok 2023), with quantitative methods.

early theoretical hypotheses offered by Yossi Shain ([1989] 2005), namely that more personalized and domestically intolerant rule in predatory states is associated with an increased odds of engaging exiles with TR. Likewise, I find that greater economic ties between host and predator states, as well as a greater economic dependence by the host state on the predatory state, is associated with an increased likelihood for TR. Finally, my findings suggest that host state democracy can dissuade predator states from coercing émigrés.

Risks of Transnational Repression

As outlined in my previous theory chapter, much of the research on TR has focused on factors endogenous to the predatory state which drives it to pursue its nationals overseas. In one of earliest works to thoroughly examine anti-exile activity by regimes, Shain ([1989] 2005: 161) lists three factors determining a regimes propensity to repress transnationally: the “regime’s perception” of “exiles’ threat”; their “available options and skills for suppressing” exiles through coercion; and “the regime’s cost-benefit calculation of such coercive activities.” The options-and-skills available to predatory states, as well as their cost-benefit calculations, are, I argue, underexplored in contemporary explanations of where and when TR occurs. Crucial to understanding both, I theorize, is the role of host states. Unilateral TR, particularly violent offenses such as assassinations, requires a degree of resources and skills (Moss 2016; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021; Shain [1989] 2005) which significantly increase the cost of such repression. By obtaining cooperation from the host state the predatory state can co-opt the security infrastructure, in the form of police, intelligence services, detention facilities, etc. of the former, decreasing their costs.

However, unilateral acts of TR which violate host states sovereignty can also incur costs in the form of damage to bilateral relations (Adamson and Tsourapas 2020; Moss 2016).

How host states are likely to respond to unilateral TR, and whether they are willing to cooperate in such repression, shapes predatory state's cost-benefit analysis. If one assumes that predatory states behave rationally, then which host state potential victims reside in shapes the decision of whether to repress them and with which tactics. To date however, few scholars have examined the role of host states in TR. Concluding their article on "proxy punishment" or coercion of families of diaspora members as a means of TR, Moss, Michaelsen, and Kennedy (2022: 13) call for future research with larger samples of host states, and which addresses whether "proxy punishment can be mitigated by host-country interventions or bilateral relations." Likewise, Dukalskis et al. (2022: 14) concludes that there is more to be understood about host-predator cooperation in TR.

Moreover, new availability of data on TR (Dukalskis et al. 2022) has yet to be widely leveraged for quantitative analysis.²⁵ Much of the literature relies qualitative fieldwork and on single and comparative case studies, with newer datasets used as a library of such cases and for descriptive statistics. The shortcomings of these data may contribute to this hesitancy to employ higher level statistics. TR is an inherently secretive practice, with predatory states seeking to obscure their criminal behavior and victims hesitant to speak publicly for fear of retribution. Existing datasets often

²⁵ Again, Dukalskis et al. (2023) and Michaelsen and Ruijgrok (2023) make important early contributions in this direction.

rely on publicly available information of such cases by media and non-government organizations (NGOs), both of which are subject to reporting bias (Dukalskis et al. 2022). Nevertheless, these shortcomings must be weighed against an overreliance on qualitative methodologies which, in isolation, could skew progress in the study of TR based on the idiosyncrasies of case studies.

My theory rests on the premise that host states engage in their own cost-benefit calculations when faced with public cases of TR. Internal and external factors can push host state executives toward facilitating, or at the very least not-responding to, TR. The host state may be dependent on its economic or security relations with the predatory state. It may view the victim and their broader diasporic community as a securitized threat to be managed, or at the very least a non-constituent group to be ignored. Likewise, however, host states also face the prospect of internal and external backlash for the handling of TR. A variety of actors, both domestic and foreign, may have a vested interest in protecting victimized diaspora members. Externally, certain foreign states may see highlighting or combatting TR as a means to further their position in a geopolitical struggle with the predatory state. Other states may be drawn to advocate for victims of TR who hold citizenship in their countries. Internally, host states could face backlash from civil society groups if they are seen as facilitating or being inept in responding to foreign state-backed human rights abuses within against individuals in the host territory. Legislators may become involved if blocs of the electorate express concern, particularly when the victim(s) belongs to a politically relevant constituency. Opposition groups may exploit such perceived mishandling of cases of TR for electoral gains. Autonomous prosecutors may pursue criminal cases

in relation to TR, while interested groups could pursue civil cases against both host and predatory agents before independent judiciaries.

In the next section I outline relevant portions of my theory, deriving hypotheses which I will assess in three stages of analysis at the predatory, host, and dyadic levels.

Hypotheses

What drives the cost-benefit analysis of predatory states considering employing TR? As noted, much of the literature has thus far focused on the regime and domestic considerations of predatory states. Here is where this paper will begin, but not where we'll end. Instead, I argue that the nature of the state hosting targeted diasporas, as well of the predator's relationship with these host states, has a significant and thus far unidentified impact of predatory state calculus.

Predatory States

TR provides benefits to predatory regimes by stifling perceived threats such as anti-regime opposition movements in the diaspora, and the pressure these diasporas are able to bring to bear through foreign publics and their ties to internal dissidents (Dukalskis 2021; Moss 2016). The literature, however, is less thorough in examining how these threats are perceived differently by different potential predatory regimes. The broader political science literature on repression has theorized variation in repression based on a regime typology (Davenport 2007b; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Spinks, Sahliyah, and Calfano 2008; Tilly 1978). Davenport (2007) for instance finds that single party regimes are the least repressive of autocracies, whereas military

regimes are more likely to engage in violent repression. Within the Middle East, Spinks, Sahliyah, and Calfano (2008) find that monarchies are more likely to respect personal integrity rights.

H1: Potential predatory states vary in their use of TR by regime type, single party and monarchical autocracies less likely to engage in TR, particularly violent TR, and military run autocracies more likely.

In his early work on anti-exile repression, Yossi Shain (1989 [2005]) was however, notably hesitant to attribute propensity to engage in anti-exile repression based on a typology of regimes, noting that the decision to target exiles is dependent in part on how secure or beleaguered regime officials feel. Shain (1989 [2005], 162) does however offer a series of untested hypotheses on the conduct of predatory states toward exiles, among them. From these, I derive my own hypotheses to test.

H2: Predatory states which are more repressive against opposition domestically are more likely to engage in TR.

H3: Predatory regimes are more likely to engage in TR against an ideologically opposed opposition.

H4: Personalistic predatory regimes are more likely to engage in TR, particularly violent TR.

Host States

If predatory states are more likely to target victims with TR based on their internal institutions and proclivities, they may also be more likely to target victims in certain host states whose domestic makeup makes such repression less costly. This may mean that certain domestic factors are correlated with an increased likelihood that host states will cooperate with predatory states efforts to repress their diasporas. It may mean that those factors constrain or encourage host states in retaliating against

unilateral TR. Either way, the domestic conditions of hosts would then alter the predatory states cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether or how to coerce their diasporas.

Within the literature on TR, while a critique of democratic host states responses is growing (Michaelsen and Furstenberg 2021), theorizing also suggests that democracies may be less amenable to hosting the phenomenon, and may mitigate the worst such practices. TR may be more likely to be discovered and publicly exposed in democracies, which is likely to lead to a backlash against the *predatory* state (Dukalskis 2021). On the other hand, some have suggested that Western democracies which attract more asylum seekers are more exposed to TR and called for more research on how democratic host states vary in enabling TR (Dukalskis et al. 2023).

Historically, several high-profile cases of TR, particularly those involving host state complicity, have been accompanied by public outrage and pressure of host state governments. The Ben Barka Affair, involving the presumed assassination of Moroccan dissident Mehdi Ben Barka in Paris, led to a well-publicized scandal exploited by Charles de Gaulle's opposition and an eventual rift in French-Moroccan relations (E. Goldstein 2018; Time Magazine 1966). Theoretically, political leaders of any regime type can be subject to punishment by domestic forces (Croco 2011). In democracies, however, "leaders generally view public approval as an asset and disapproval as a political cost," (Tomz 2007: 831-832) and the avenue for the public to enact punishment is more direct in the form of free and fair elections. Moreover the number of political parties, which signal a heterogenous political elite inclined to

whistle-blow on the state leadership, impacts the generation of audience cost, or the domestic costs which leaders face should they back down from a conflict (Potter and Baum 2014).

Beyond the direct electoral costs which may deter host state governments from cooperating in, or ignoring, TR, there are other potential domestic checks. In their examination of Tajik political exiles, Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw (2021) contrasts the fate of Group 24, which mostly remained in the post-Soviet space, with that of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, whose members faced comparatively milder TR owing to their greater presence within the European Union. The authors note that outside of the “politicised justice system” of Russia, victims were able to avoid extradition on the basis of the international legal principle of non-refoulment (Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw 2021: 15).

Such legal principles, applicable to the practice and prevention of TR, may be particularly salient in democracies when enshrined in international law and agreements. Numerous studies have confirmed that democracies are more likely to honor international agreements which they ratify (Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005; Von Stein 2014). This compliance may come from the ability of interested parties to enforce the state’s international legal commitments through domestic courts (Hathaway 2007; Slaughter 1995; Von Stein 2014). Host state courts can also serve as the vehicle to apply repercussions against offending predatory states. Garvey (1980) noted that Filipino and Chilean dissidents in exile had successfully brought civil suits against predatory states, and suggested civil litigation in federal courts as a remedy to émigré repression.

I theorize that host state governments face potential backlash by ignoring TR or cooperating in its practice. As noted, this backlash can come from a variety of sources, from dissatisfied constituents at the polls, to opportunistic opposition politicians, or courts enforcing domestic and international law. Depending on the domestic composition of the host state, the risk of backlash may be greater. For instance, the risk of opposition parties using incursions by foreign states on the host incumbents watch for electoral gains is likely less salient in non-democracies which afford limited autonomy to opposition parties. Likewise, in democratic states in which the opposition party maintains partial control of a divided government, such as when the legislature and executive branch are held by different parties, we could expect the opposition to use its authority to launch hearings and investigations for political advantage. Host states in which interested actors outside of government have a greater organizational capacity to lobby and advocate can likewise impose greater costs on apathetic or complicit host states. Predatory states must predict the likely response of host states to their coercive efforts. When such factors are present they will be less likely to follow through with TR.

H5: Predatory states are less likely to conduct TR against targets in host states which are more susceptible to internal backlash to their (mis)handling of cases of TR.

Bilateral Relations

On the issue of bilateral relations' impact on patterns of TR, the literature offers more clues. Yossi Shain ([1989] 2005: 162) held that predatory state's cost-benefit analysis would be dictated in part by its "vulnerability to outside criticism, its dependence on international support (economic, diplomatic, and military)." The fifth

of Shain's ([1989] 2005: 162) hypotheses on predatory state behavior held that the more dependent predatory states were on such support, the more likely they were to "restrain" their "antiexile measures." Subsequent scholars have explicitly noted that TR risks jeopardizing the predatory state's bilateral relations with the host state (Lewis 2015; Moss 2016), which can be particularly costly when the host state is "powerful" (Adamson and Tsourapas 2020).

On the other side, host states responses to TR are thought to be dictated in part by their bilateral relations with the predatory state. Dukalskis et al (2023) finds that predatory states with greater diplomatic representation abroad are more likely to engage in TR, though crucially the study does not examine whether the placement of these diplomats in particular host states has an impact. Arab and Central Asian states' cooperation with Chinese anti-Uyghur repression has been linked to economic benefits derived from Chinese trade and investment (Jardine and Greer 2022; Jardine, Lemon, and Hall 2021). Passivity in the face of TR, or outright cooperation with predatory states, has also been linked to mutually beneficial intelligence sharing operations (Garvey 1980; Israel 1998). Baser and Féron (2021: 5) note the selective defense of sovereignty in the face of diaspora governance initiatives by predatory states, holding that "asymmetrical power relations, tight pre-existing links, and relations" and "common historical baggage" can help explain limits host states place on predatory states. Knowing the benefits host states receive from their bilateral relations, predatory should be able to preemptively adjust their risk assessment in conducting TR, based on their perception of the likelihood that the host state will react negatively or cooperatively.

Theoretically, dependence has contrasting effects which may influence predatory state decision making on whether to target émigrés in a particular host state, and if so, with what tactics. On the one hand, predatory states more dependent on certain host states may perceive a greater threat from émigrés residing in these states. Local émigrés are better positioned to lobby the host state or influence the host state populace to adopt their anti-predatory state opinions. In doing so, they jeopardize host state resources which the predatory state requires. On the other hand, acting on this perceived threat is potentially more costly, as host states may react negative to unilateral TR which violates its sovereignty and impose consequences. Host states aware of their comparative advantage in their bilateral relationship with the predatory state and the leeway it gives them in diplomatic decisions may likewise be selective in their cooperation with predatory states seeking to coerce emigrants.

When host states are dependent on predatory states however, this may both decrease the perceived threat predatory states feel from émigrés and provide them with a greater array of coercive tactics. Émigré lobbying may appear less threatening to predatory states knowing that host state leaders will be less receptive to calls to reduce lucrative exchanges. Likewise, predatory states may seek to leverage host state dependence into cooperation in silencing exiled dissidents. Predatory states may also feel more comfortable engaging in unilateral TR, predicting that host states will not be willing to sacrifice needed resources over incursions into their sovereign territory targeting foreign migrants.

H6: Predatory states are more likely to engage in TR against targets in host states which are dependent on the predatory state.

Methodology

As outlined in the prior chapter, to assess the odds that certain predatory states commit TR, that victims in certain host states are targeted for TR, and that certain predator-host dyads see an exchange of TR, I proceed in a three-stage analysis. In each stage, I draw on cases of TR identified in the HRRD in which TR was observed to have occurred. These observations can also be disaggregated into different tactic classes, outlined in the previous chapter, which include “co-opt” tactics such as extraditions and detentions. In these instances, predatory states attempt or are successful in eliciting host states to facilitate TR. Also possible are “direct violent” tactics, such as assaults and assassinations. These tactics do not necessarily require the active involvement of predatory states, although this by no means excludes the possibility of their involvement. They also involve, when successful, direct, physical coercion to have occurred against the victim in the predatory state.²⁶ To compare the occurrence of TR and these tactics however, I draw on cases in which TR could have occurred but there is no observational data available to confirm it did. To identify potential predatory states, I drew on the Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database (AAAD)’s (Dukalskis 2021) search criteria. To identify potential host states, and by extension host-predator dyads, I drew leveraged data on historic refugee flows, historically contiguous states, and states in the same broad region. As such, each stage of the analysis will draw on different variants or “cuts” of the HRRD, organized

²⁶ Unsuccessful attempts such as attempted assassinations, which may not include direct physical coercion, are also included.

around predator-year monad, host-year monad, and dyad-year observations. I begin with analysis of predatory states, and then continue to host states and dyads.

Predatory Analysis

To assess my first four hypotheses, I first turn to the predator-year monad extension of the HRRD, including “null” non-occurrences in which no TR was documented. My primary dependent variable is an indicator of whether TR is documented in a given predator-year monad. However, tactics of TR vary widely from those requiring the cooperation of the host state, i.e., extradition requests, to those which are explicitly violent and may not involve host state cooperation, such as assassinations. Thus, for my second model I use “Co-Opt tactics” as my dependent variable, which includes all tactics which by definition alone implicate the host state as a partner in TR: detentions, extraditions and extradition attempts, and host-linked unexplained disappearances. For my third model my dependent variable is “Violent Direct tactics,” which includes the tactics (assassinations, assaults, abductions, and predator-linked unexplained disappearances) which are all explicitly violent and do not by definition necessitate host state involvement.²⁷

I draw on several sources for measures of my independent variables, as well as controls. I mimic Dukalskis et al. (2023) in using V-Dem’s (v12) (Coppedge et al. 2022) ruling party (v2x_ex_party) and military dimension (v2x_ex_military). In addition, I also draw on the hereditary dimension index (v2x_ex_hereditary). These

²⁷ This is not to minimize the violent nature of many threats and the violence that can occur during extraditions. Moreover, I am limited by the data on drawing direct conclusions on host state involvement in these categories. It is quite possible that host states are involved in some assassinations and abductions. Further coding on the HRRD is underway to identify host state involvement in each case.

indices measure the degree to which the power base of the chief executive is drawn from the ruling party, military, or hereditary succession, which I use as a stand-in for the degree to which the predatory state fits into the classification of a single-party, military, or monarchical authoritarian regime. Likewise, I draw on V-Dem's measure of presidentialism (`v2xnp_pres`), which measures the degree to which the president's rule is personalized and free from external checks, as a stand-in for the personalization of the regime. Presidentialism skews high in my sample of autocratic predatory states, so I create an indicator variable noting the top quartile of measures of presidentialism in the sample. To test H3 I also draw on V-Dem's "ideology" (`v2exl_legitideol`) which measures the degree to which a regime promotes a specific ideology to justify its rule. To measure tolerance for opposition (H2) I draw on V-Dem's measure of respect for physical integrity (`v2x_clphy`) and for political liberties (`v2x_clpol`).

The threat perception of predatory states which drive them to commit TR is a factor not only of idiosyncrasies of the regime and leader but of objective reality. Predatory state regime under greater threat from challengers may be more inclined to repress, not only domestically but transnationally. To control for this I include several variable drawn from the REIGN Dataset (Bell, Besaw, and Frank 2021). First, I include a maximum REIGN's "`pctil_risk`" in a given year. This variable is a percentile of the estimated risk of a military coup in a given month. I take the largest (highest risk) of a coup in the aggregated year (i.e., Max Coup Risk) to show the

highest risk a regime faced from a coup in the year.²⁸ The REIGN dataset also provides the names of the leader of the regime, from which I create a dummy variable indicating is an individual transfer of power took place and the leader of the country changed. Lastly, I include an indicator variable of whether an election for the leader of the country occurred in a given year, draw from REIGN's "election_now". As Dukalskis et al. (2023) argue, elections can increase the threat perception of authoritarian regime and generate incentives for repression.

Lastly, I include a control variable to account for the varying capabilities of predatory states to conduct TR. While some methods of TR are resource cheap and widely accessible (Adamson and Tsourapas 2020; Michaelsen 2020b), others, particularly unilateral operations involving the deployment of agents, are more resource intensive (Moss 2016; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021; Shain [1989] 2005). To control for state capacity I draw on the State Capacity Index (statecap_base_fiscal) which indexes V-Dem measures of state's rule of law, administrative capacity, and fiscal capacity among others (O'Reilly and Murphy 2022).

Figure 4-1 displays the odds ratio of the coefficients of my three logistic regression models. Crucially, and for ease of interpretation, coefficients which were not significant in any of my three models were removed from the figure for ease of interpretation but can be found in a breakdown of the models in Table A-1. In line with H1, which postulated that different strands of political regimes are more or less likely to engage in TR, we see that predatory states with measures of party and

²⁸ I choose this measure as opposed to taking the average coup risk in a year which would risk camouflaging extremities in the data. For example: a regime may face a high coup risk in for the first six months of the year, engage in a crackdown the next month, resulting in exceptionally low coup risk measures the rest of the year, thus lowering the average despite the earlier tension the regime felt.

hereditary power bases have lower odds of committing TR, including both host-co-opt and violent tactics. Curiously, so too do regimes with higher measures of military power bases – a finding at odds with Davenport’s (2007) finding on domestic repression. I will return to this finding shortly with a robustness check which yields further insight. In line with H2, predatory regimes which are more respectful of physical integrity rights and political liberties, i.e., are less repressive of their domestic populations, also have lower odds of engaging in TR and both subsets of TR measured.




Figure 0-1. Odds Ratio of Predator Use of TR
Three models comparing TR, Co-Opt Tactics, and Violent Direct Tactics use by predatory state with rest of sample displayed. Central point represents odds ratio while bars represent upper and lower confidence interval. Variables which are not statistically significant in any of the three models are not displayed.

H3 held that ideologically motivated predatory regimes would be more inclined to conduct TR because their conflicts with external opposition would take on an ideological dimension. The results of Figure 4-1 show that regimes which rely more on ideology have higher odds of conducting violent tactics of TR, suggesting

that ideology itself may drive some regimes to take steps which are comparatively more extreme and more often unilateral when confronting exiled opponents. It is worth noting however, ideology does not have a significant effect on the odds of a predatory state conducting TR or co-opt tactics of TR. Finally, in line with H4, Figure 4-1 shows that regimes in the top quartile of presidentialism, i.e., personalized rule, have higher odds of conducting TR and the two subsets of TR examined.

It is worth taking a moment to examine the effect of our control variables in the models outlined in Figure 4-1. Predatory regimes with greater state capacity do appear to have greater odds of conducting TR, and specifically of conducting violent tactics. This mirrors literature noting that unilateral TR is often a resource intensive process that involves deploying agents overseas with the ability to avoid detection (Moss 2016; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021; Shain [1989] 2005). Control variables for the threat posed to predatory regimes by opposition however appears more mixed. Changes in leadership and elections in the predatory state do not impact the odds of that state conducting TR at a statistically significant level. Increases in the estimated size of the opposition to the regime likewise does not impact the odds of the regime conducting TR, though it does seem to decrease the odds of the state engaging in host co-opt TR tactics. Moreover, a greater risk of a military coup decreases the odds of predatory states conducting TR, rather than increasing it. While this appears counterintuitive, a logical interpretation of these findings is that states facing the risk of a military coup would be less likely to focus their attention on external adversaries, rather than internal (military) ones. That domestic opposition and times one would logically associate with greater domestic repression do not effect the odds of states

conducting TR or in fact lower the odds that they will do so also has a logical explanation. Dukalskis et al. (2023) analysis of predatory state's propensity to commit TR presents evidence of a lagged effect in which TR complements domestic repression after repressed opposition flees abroad. While my findings suggest more domestically repressive states have greater odds of conducting TR, it may also be that incidents such as elections, and factors such as opposition size, representing a greater domestic threat to regimes trigger greater domestic repression which in turn then lead to greater TR at a later date.

Before moving on to host state monads it is worth noting that as a robustness check on the reliability using V-Dem's power base indices and presidentialism measure as stand-ins for regime types. In these models (see Table A-4) I instead use the REIGN dataset's (Bell, Besaw, and Frank 2021) measures for government type, creating indicator variables if during a given year the state had a dominant party, military-based, monarchy, or personal dictatorship as its government. While the findings for personal, party, and monarchy are robust in mirroring the direction and significance of those in Figure 4-1, military regimes have greater, not lower, odds of conducting TR in these models. Moreover, the coefficients of military regimes are quite high, reflecting perhaps the comparatively smaller number of military regimes in our sample. Nevertheless, this should cause pause and prevent us from drawing strong inferences as to the odds of military regimes conducting TR.²⁹

²⁹ As a further robustness check, I include run my initial models as Firth penalized logistic regression and linear probability models (see Table A-2, A-3). I repeat this robustness check across all stages of my analysis.

To conclude this section, this analysis is, to my knowledge, one of the first to provide supporting evidence for elements of Shain's (1989 [2005]) seminal theory on the cost-benefit analysis of regimes considering anti-exile coercion, using a quantitative, large-N methodology. This analysis suggests that regimes which draw more heavily on ideology are more likely to conduct violent tactics of TR against nationals overseas perceived as threats. These perceived threats appear to be more salient for regimes in which authority is centralized and personalized, which are also more likely to conduct TR. Likewise, those regimes which repress domestically appear more likely to repress abroad. While Shain (1989 [2005]) warned against relying on a typology of regimes to predict such extra-territorial coercion, the data suggests that regimes which the chief executive's selection is based on hereditary rule or the ruling part, have lower odds of conducting TR.

Host State Analysis

For my analysis of host states, I draw on several variables to assess H5: that predatory states will be less likely to conduct TR in host states which are more susceptible to internal backlash should they mishandle incidents of TR. As executives in democracies face a greater risk of backlash from discontent constituents and political actors, this would appear to be the most straightforward measure of internal backlash risk. I create an indicator variable from the "regimes of the world" variable within V-Dem (v2x_regime), marking a state as democratic if they are either an electoral or liberal democracy (Coppedge et al. 2022; Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg 2018). Beyond democracy, I draw on two related variables in the form of V-Dem's judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon) and V-Dem's civil society

participation index (e_v2x_cspart). As noted, an independent judiciary may impose costs on a host executive for facilitating TR, as well as provide opportunities to impose costs directly on the predatory state by empowering independent prosecutors to seek criminal cases, or domestic parties to pursue civil cases against predatory agents. Civil society groups interested in the position of migrant and diaspora communities, and issues of human rights and legal quality can theoretically place pressure on the host state to block or counter TR.

Theoretically, in situations of divided governance, an opposition seeking to exploit the misdeeds of the executive could use their position of power in the legislature to do so. So I also include V-Dem's (Coppedge et al. 2022) divided party control index (v2x_divparctrl) which measures the degree to which one party controls both the executive and legislative branches of the state. Election years may heighten partisan divisions, creating incentives for opposition actors to highlight perceived failings, therefore I draw on the REIGN dataset's (Bell, Besaw, and Frank 2021) election_now variable to create a dichotomous variable if an election for de facto leadership occurred in the observed year. From the same dataset I also create a dichotomous variable if there was a change in the de facto leader of the state in a given year, using both measures to account for the times of turnover and intense partisan competition. I draw on two V-Dem variables "representation of disadvantaged social groups" (v2lgdsadlo) in which higher values indicate greater representation of disadvantaged socio-economic groups in the legislature, and "exclusion by socio-economic group" (v2xp_exlecon) in which higher values indicate a greater rate of denial of government services and access to governed spaces based

on socio-economic group. Theoretically, societies with more stratified social hierarchies which disadvantage diaspora communities would see less intense backlash of public cases of TR.

Internal pressures however do not go only one way. It is entirely possible that forces internal to host state may pressure officials against responding to acts of TR in ways that protect victims or counter-predatory states. These forces may likewise pressure officials to ignore TR acts, or even conspire with the predatory state. One such force frequently requiring in the literature is the security establishment of host states. Host state actors whose domain primarily concerns national security often view issues of migration and TR through a securitized lens and are willing to work with predatory state partners in ways which facilitate TR while strengthening the relationship with the host state. To test the relative strength of these security interests in the host state and the impact they may have on the predatory state's calculus, I draw on the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies' Global Militarization Index (von Boemcken et al. 2023). The GMI combines three subindices of expenditures, personnel, and heavy weapons, and measures militarization in terms of the resources allocated by the state to the military, as opposed to other sectors and services.

For controls, I include an indicator variable for host states whose UN world region (United Nations Statistics Division n.d.) is Europe (not including Russia), North America, or Australia and New Zealand. The purpose of controlling for geography is due to control for reporting bias, as noted the sample of host states in the HRRD is biased toward Western states. That these states are also disproportionately

liberal democracies means that any analysis that did not control for this reporting bias would likely bias analysis of the role internal backlash features such as democracy play on the propensity of these states to host TR. To control for state capacity, while avoiding capture elements of capacity overlapping with judicial strength such as rule of law and impartiality of administration, I draw on two V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2022) variables. First, I draw on the fiscal capacity of the state (v2stfisccap_ord) which V-Dem measures using a five point-ordinal scale. The latter two of these points, which scholars (O'Reilly and Murphy 2022) have pointed out correspond to a linear progression in state capacity, indicate the state relies on taxes (property, income, trade, transactions, etc.) to meet its expenditures. The former three indicate that the state relies on either direct control of economic assets, foreign sources of revenue, or is unable to fund itself. I create a dichotomous variable indicating whether the host state is able to meet its financial responsibilities through the collection of taxes (3 and 4 in v2stfisccap_ord). Lastly, I draw on V-Dem's variable for the amount of territory the state controls (v2svsterr) measured in terms of the percentage of the states territory it can exert hegemonic control.




Figure 0-2. Odds Ratio of Host State Victim Facing TR

Three models comparing TR, Co-Opt Tactics, and Violent Direct Tactics occurrence in host state with rest of sample displayed. Central point represents odds ratio while bars represent upper and lower confidence interval. Variables which are not statistically significant in any of the three models are not displayed.

Figure 4-2 displays the odds ratios of the coefficients of my logistic regression models. Parameters which were not statistically significant across any of my three models were removed for ease of interpretation, but can be found in Table A-5.³⁰ As expected, and in line with H5, I find that democratic states are less likely to host TR, as well as the two aforementioned subsets of TR. Crucially, these findings hold even if we control for the bias in our data which favors reporting of TR in Euro-Western host states. As Figure 4-2 shows, the HRRD is more likely to record TR in host states located in Europe, North American and Australia/New Zealand. There is less theoretical basis to believe are more likely to occur in these locations³¹, rather a

³⁰ As a robustness test, I also include variations of my models in Firth penalized logistic regression and linear probability forms, see Tables A-6 and A-7.

³¹ Recently Dukalksis et al. (2023) has posited that Western states which attract more asylum seekers may likewise attract a greater amount of TR. This observation is could potentially provide some insight to these findings, though I argue that biases in the reporting of TR likely also plays a significant role.

reliance on publicly available reporting by coders results in an overreporting of events in European/Western nations with a heavy media and NGOs presence. Likewise, that these countries are more democratic means there is an increased likelihood of these cases, and cases of detentions and extraditions by these governments, leaking to the public realm (Dukalskis 2021). Even controlling for this regional bias however, we can see that non-Western democracies are less likely experience TR.

In line with H5, a strong independent judiciary capable of checking to executive also decreases the odds of TR being reported, and importantly of predatory states attempting to co-opt the security apparatuses of host states for anti-diaspora coercion. We see less evidence to support an alternative operationalization of internal backlash: our measure of civil society participation does not significantly impact the odds of TR occurring. This may be an indictment more of our data than of our theory. The heavy presence of impacted and influential diasporic organizations, as well as human rights NGOs may be more important than a catch-all rate of participation in civil society. One further operationalization of internal backlash that achieves some statistical significance is a divided government. While division is not correlated with increased odds of TR being employed, or the predatory state attempting to co-opt the host state for TR, the odds do significantly decrease that violent, often unilateral, tactics of TR will be employed in host states where the executive and legislative branches of government are divided between parties. This may suggest that predatory states see their odds of evading detection and denouncement for direct violent TR lower when the political leadership of the host state is divided. Opposition politicians may, for example, seek to exploit the executive's mishandling of TR in such

scenarios. It is worth noting however that the occurrence of transition and anticipated transition, elections and changes in the leader of the host state, do not have an impact on the odds that TR will occur. One would think, for example, that the incentive to highlight an executive's mishandling of TR would be most heightened when an election is on the horizon. It is also possible however that the incidents of TR which become public scandals imposing costs on the executive are so rare as to not factor into predatory state decision making. In this case, our measures of democracy and judicial constraints may capture something more systemic in the functioning of these host states which deter predatory state incursions. Future research should seek to disaggregate the components of democracy further to identify components which deter TR.

One further aspect of internal backlash I examined is worth highlighting: the degree to which disadvantaged socio-economic groups are represented in government and/or excluded from government services. As Figure 4-2 displays, both variables are significant for TR and both subsets of TR examined. However, their direction is contradictory. When disadvantaged groups are more represented in the host state legislature, the odds of TR occurring decrease. However, when there is higher exclusion based on socio-economic status, the odds of TR occurring also decreases. The former finding mirrors my expectation that host state societies which tolerate, incorporate, and service disadvantaged communities would likely do the same for migrant communities. This would provide diaspora communities with greater access to resources to turn to in incidents of TR, and with a more receptive state and public

to come to their aid. The latter, and stronger of these two findings however would seem to provide evidence against this theory.

One factor which may be driving these contrasting results could again be an externality of democracy: states with marginalized communities represented in the legislature may be more democratic. Even after controlling for democracy these underlying traits may be driving the significance and direction of this coefficient. It may also be that states with greater exclusion attract less migrants of the type that would be targeted for TR. As noted, this chapter's methodology is limited in that it has been able to identify host states where individuals from the predatory state have, or likely have, fled to. Yet this does not capture the scale of said migration. It may then be that host states with more politically motivated refugees tend to score as less exclusionary and also that host states with more of these types of refugees are more likely to experience TR.

Finally, it is worth highlighting the effect of the controls for state capacity and potential issues of reporting bias they may signify. One of the measures for state capacity, fiscal capacity is statistically significant and substantively positive in our models. For fiscal capacity this significance means host states capable of financing themselves by collecting taxes have higher odds of experiencing TR, and TR with co-opt and violent tactics. For territorial control however, host states able to exert hegemonic control over a greater percentage of their territory does not impact the odds of experiencing TR in a statistically significant manner. For co-opt tactics, these readings would appear to make sense, predatory states may have more to gain from seeking cooperation with a capable host state. That the effect of state capacity is,

however, still positive for TR in general may signify a reporting bias. Afterall, there would seem to be a decreased risk of detection and consequences for TR when conducted in a weak state. One could speculate that the effect of TR is driven by the (positive) effect of co-opt tactics, yet the effect for violent tactics is, at least for fiscal capacity, very positive. It may be that predatory states fear what dissidents living abroad in strong states can accomplish in terms of lobbying their host state or advancing their political positions, as opposed to dissidents in exile in weak states. It may also be that TR which occurs in weak states tend to be underreported by the public sources which both the AAAD and FHTRD draw from.

Before concluding this section, however, it is worth highlighting the results of several robustness checks I conducted on these models. In addition to running these models as Firth penalized logistic regressions and linear probability models (see Tables A-6 and A-7), I also explored alternative measures of my IVs of interest, as well as alternative sample selections. In Table A-8, I substitute my measure of states in Europe, North America, and Australia/New Zealand, with a dichotomous indicator of V-Dem's (Coppedge et al. 2022) politico-geographic region (`e_regionpol`) of Western Europe and North America. This measure also includes Australia/New Zealand but crucially excludes some European states, particularly those outside of Western Europe. The substitution does not alter the results of our findings, except to increase the significance of the regional bias in favor of Western host states, which have greater odds of seeing TR and violent direct TR tactics.

Next, in Table A-9, I substitute judicial constraints on the executive for V-Dem's (Coppedge et al. 2022) rule of law index (`v2x_rule`), civil society

participation of V-Dem's core civil society index (v2xcs_ccsi), and exclusion on the basis of socio-economic status to V-Dem's exclusion on the basis of social group (v2xpe_exlsogr), which is contextual to each country but can include identity markers such as ethnicity and religion. The former of these variables are less tailored to my hypotheses, with the core civil society index capturing not only civil society participation rates but also repression of civil society. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that when making these substitutions, Democracy no longer significantly affected the odds of TR, while higher scores on the core civil society index was correlated with lower odds of TR and its subsets. Finally, to address the possibility that the selection of host states in which TR did not occur impacts the results of my models, I repeat them on a sample of the data in which all host states hosted UNHCR reported refugees. The results, in Table A-10, do not differ significantly from the primary models of this stage of the analysis.

The size of the N in this analysis, and even more in the next stage of analysis when I examine dyad-year observations, warrants further examination of these results. Accounting for the deletion of certain host-year monads for which independent variable data is not available, 3981 monads were examined in Figure 4-2. In the next stage, that number rises sharply with 137,883 dyads were in Figure 4-3. Larger N's, generally make statistical significance easier to achieve. Prior research has raised this concern, as well as the need to examine the predictive power of models. Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (2010) advise that scholars decrease their traditional reliance on p-values, instead examining the model's predictive power. They conduct a series of k-fold cross-validation and examine the Area Under the

Curve (AUC) of an R-Curve of their models in three stages. At each stage, they remove one independent variable and examine the resulting AUC, repeating the process for each independent variable. They then remove the most predictive independent variable (whose absence cause the greatest decrease in the model's AUC) and used that model as a baseline for the next stage. From this, they could identify the independent variables driving the predictive power of their models.

I repeated Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke's (2010) methodology with logistic regressions of my model, the results of which can be found in Table A-11. I found that for the first model, in which TR is the dependent variable, exclusion based on socio-economic status proved to be most predictive. After removing this variable, I found the regional indicator variable for Europe, North America, and Australia/New Zealand to have most predictive power. Repeating this process a third time, I found territorial control to have the third most predictive power. AUC ranges from 0.5, which indicates an unproductive model, to 1.0 which indicates a perfectly predictive model. The AUC for my models decreased from 0.6862 to 0.6647 when removing exclusion, then to 0.6466 when removing the regional indicator, and to 0.6254 when removing the host state's territorial control. A simple bivariate model regressing TR on exclusion by socio-economic status yielded an AUC of 0.6392. These results highlight the importance of exclusion to our models and a need for more theorizing on its role in deterring TR. Likewise, the predictive power of Euro/Western regionality underscores the need to seriously consider regional bias in our data on TR, while the power of territorial control is particularly noteworthy given is statistical

insignificance in our models. This, perhaps suggests that host state strength is an underlying factor driving increased odds of TR.

In summary, this stage of analysis confirms important, but unavoidable from a researcher's perspective, shortcomings of existing data on TR, namely that a reliance on publicly reported cases of TR necessarily biases that data toward incidents occurring in Western states. By controlling for this bias, my findings indicate that democracy alone does mitigate TR in a statistically significant way. Moreover, the strength and independence of the judiciary, measured by its capability to constrain the executive, also significantly lowers the odds of TR being reported. These findings alone provide evidence in support of H5, that host states with greater susceptibility to internal backlash have lower odds of having individuals in their territory targeted in incidents of TR. However, there is a need for further analysis. The models also suggest that host state capacity, in the form of fiscal capacity, drastically increases the odds of TR occurring. Moreover, while representation of disadvantaged groups in the host state legislature decreases the odds of TR occurring, host state exclusion by socio-economic status likewise decreases the odds of TR occurring. Further analysis, in the form of both an examination of host state responses quantitatively, and through process tracing of case studies, will help elucidate the factors driving these findings.

Bilateral Relations

For the final portion of my analysis, I turn to the bilateral relations of predatory states to host states and ask how these relationships impact the odds of TR occurring. H6 holds that predatory states are more likely to conduct TR against

targets in host states which are dependent on the predatory state – the logic being that these host states are more likely to facilitate TR to further their bilateral relationship with the predatory state and are less likely to impose costs for TR in order to preserve said relationship.

Naturally, bilateral dependency can be operationalized in a variety of different ways, drawing on economic, security, and political measures. For our purposes, I rely heavily on the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Future's Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) (Moyer et al. 2021). Moyer et al.'s (2021) measure of FBIC consists of two components which are disaggregated: bandwidth and dependence. Bandwidth is described as a relationship's "pipeline volume" and consists of weighted scores for total trade and trade agreements, diplomatic level of representation, intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership, arms transfers, and military alliances. In essence, bandwidth attempts to capture the size of the dyadic relationship. This is disaggregated to component political, economic, and security bandwidths. Dependence on the other hand, captures the context of this relationship and which side of the dyad can more credibly leverage it. Dependence consists of weighted scores for trade as a percentage of total trade and GDP, aid as a percentage of total aid and GDP, and arms imports as a percentage of military spending and all arms imports. Here again, dependence is disaggregated to economic and security components, and to the host's dependence on the predator and the predator's dependence on the host. Both dependence and bandwidth are measured on an index of 0-1. While bandwidth is unidirectional, again measuring the size and scope of the relationship, the value of the predatory state's dependence on the host

does not necessarily mirror the host state's dependence on the predator, as dependency combines scores for trade, arms imports, etc., as percentages of total trade, military spending etc.

The models for this stage of the analysis include as independent variables Moyer et al.'s (2021) scores for the host states economic and security dependency on the predatory state. In addition, I include Moyer et al.'s (2021) scores for the predatory state's economic and security dependency on the host state. Given that the predatory state initiates TR against targets in the host state, and their dependency, or lack thereof, likely influences their decision to do so, these are worthwhile controls to the models. Likewise, I include measures of the economic and security bandwidth of the host-predator relationship.³² This allows me to control for the possibility that dependency (i.e., the direction of the relationship) is less important than the actual size of the relationship between host and predatory states.

Political bandwidth is the final remaining component of the FBIC, which consists of an index of weighted scores for the diplomatic representation, alliances, and shared membership in IGOs between states in a dyad. Rather than including political bandwidth as a control however, I choose to include indicator variables for the level of diplomatic representation of the predatory state in the host state, and of the host state in the predatory state. I derive these variables from the Diplomatic Representation Data (DRD) (Moyer, Turner, and Meisel 2021) coding each variable a

³² I alter these measures slightly, creating dichotomous variables representing the top quartile of both measures in the HRRD dyadic sample. This is to mitigate the unusually high coefficient which result from including the unaltered measures for security bandwidth, which I include in Table A-15. I also include Firth penalized logistic regression and linear probability versions of these altered models in Tables A-13 and A-14.

“1” if the “level of representation” was scored at or above a 0.375 indicating the state was represented by a diplomatic presence above that of an interest desk. If the score was below a 0.375 or no diplomatic presence was documented in the DRD, I assigned the dyad a “0.” These variables are core components of the FBIC’s political bandwidth measure, which means the inclusion of both in model requires careful forethought. By including diplomatic presence rather than political bandwidth we can note the relative importance of the direction of diplomatic presence. Scholars of TR have noted that embassies often serve as hubs to plan and coordinate acts of TR (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017), therefore controlling for the predatory state’s diplomatic presence in the host state is in essence controlling for its TR, or certainly unilateral TR, committing capabilities. Likewise, the host state’s diplomatic presence in the predatory state may influence its capability to impose costs, influencing the decision making of the predatory state.

Finally, I include several control variables based on the geography of dyad and history of militarized disputes or colonial rule. Baser and Féron (2021) note that shared history, including colonial history, can influence the perception of diaspora governance policies. I draw on the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Colonial History Dataset (v 1.1) (Hensel 2018), which identifies colonized states “primary colonial ruler,” “most responsible for shaping the development of the entity.” From this I identify dyads in which the host state was the primary colonial ruler of the predatory state and vice versa, measured as dichotomous variables. Next, I include a dichotomous measure of whether or not the dyad is contiguous, including water borders up to 400 miles, from the COW Direct Contiguity Dataset (v 3.2) (Stinnett et

al. 2002), as well as dichotomous variables indicating whether or not both states are located in the same UN region (UN Statistics Division n.d.). Finally, I draw on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID v5) dataset (Palmer et al. 2020) to create a dichotomous variable if a MID was documented between the dyad beginning twenty years prior to the first year of the HRRD (1971) to the observed year.




Figure 0-3. Odds Ratio of Predator-Host Dyad Facing TR

Three models comparing TR, Co-Opt Tactics, and Violent Direct Tactics occurring in dyad with rest of sample displayed. Central point represents odds ratio while bars represent upper and lower confidence interval. Variables which are not statistically significant in any of the three models are not displayed.

Figure 4-3 depicts the odds ratios of the coefficients of the three logistic regression models of this stage. As with prior stages, for ease of interpretation, if a coefficient was not significant in any of the models it is omitted from Figure 4-3 but can be found in Table A-12. Contrary to H6, the host state's security dependence on the predatory state does not significantly impact the odds that the predatory state will use TR to target its nationals in the host state. However, evidence supporting H6 can be found by the coefficients for the host state's economic dependence on the

predatory state. As this dependence increases, so to do the odds of TR, as well as co-opt tactics and violent tactics, occurring. In terms of effect, a one standard deviation increase in the host's economic dependence on the predatory state increases the odds of TR occurring by 0.2717.

In addition to the host's dependence on the predatory state, the predatory state's dependence on the host state is also significant. Across the board, the predatory state's security dependence on the host has a larger impact, while increases in the predatory state's economic dependence on the host increases the odds that TR and violent tactics of TR will occur. Bandwidth paints a similar picture: greater economic bandwidth in a dyad increases the odds of TR and the two subsets of TR measured occurs, while increases in security bandwidth increase the odds of TR and co-opt tactics of TR occurring.

Taken together what do these findings mean? How does the size and direction of the host-predator dyadic relationship impact whether or not the predatory state chooses to engage in TR, and if so, what type of TR? Overall, more economic exchange between predatory and host states has a greater (positive) impact on the odds of TR occurring than does security exchange. In part, this may be through the impact of migration – with greater numbers of individuals travelling between economically interconnected states leading to greater opportunities for TR to occur. Directionally however, we can see that the host state's economic dependence on the predatory state has a much larger impact than the predatory state's dependence on the host state. This may indicate that when a host state is economically dependent on the predatory state, the predatory state senses that it has a freer hand to repress within the

host's territory. Either the host state will cooperate, or its economic dependence can be counted to prevent it from retaliating for a breach of its territory. Why security dependence does not follow this pattern is puzzling and warrants further examination. It may be a selection effect on the part of the victims: the heavy security dependency is a more visible cue to dissidents of the potential ease with which predatory security agents could follow them to the host state, thus deterring dissent or travel.

In terms of security dependence, as noted that host state's security dependence on the predatory state does not have a statistically significant impact on the odds of TR occurring. However, the predatory state's security dependence on the host state does impact the odds of TR and its subsets occurring and appears to have a generally higher impact than the predatory state's economic dependence. This could indicate that when the predatory state is the junior partner in a security arrangement, they tend to believe that their senior partners will facilitate, or at the very least not impose costs for, their TR efforts. Evidence that a similar tolerance occurs when the host state is the junior partner is not found in the models, though as stated in the previous paragraph, this may be a selection effect on the part of émigrés at play.

The significance of the model's controls are also worth highlighting. A history of the host state colonizing the predatory state increases the odds of TR occurring. This could reflect migration trends or speak to a tolerance of TR by former colonial powers which often maintain strong relationships with their former colonial holdings. It may also reflect the permissive environment for TR created by lingering social hierarchies in former colonial states in which migrants from former colonial holdings are placed near the bottom. Geographically, contiguous dyads have greater odds of

TR occurring, however dyads which are not contiguous but in the same broad region have lower odds of witnessing TR. The presence or history of MIDs increases the odds of TR occurring, which may reflect fears of the predatory state that host states could use diasporic opponents to further their position in a geo-political conflict.³³ Finally, as the literature suggests, the predatory state's which have a diplomatic presence in the host state have increased odds of conducting TR and the studied subsets of TR.

I conduct several robustness checks on these results, which can be found in Tables A-13-A-19. As with prior sections, I re-run my analysis as Firth-penalized logistic regression and linear probability models in A-13-A-14. In Table A-15 and A-16, I rerun my analysis both with the full range of security and economic bandwidth, and without the variables, respectively. The most significant change comes in the former, with the significance of the predator's security dependence on host dropping to levels not statistically significant, and the impact of the host state's security dependence on the predator state increasing to significant levels. The purpose of limiting these variables to dichotomous variations was due to the inflated coefficients their full range produces. Given that omitting the variables entirely results in findings similar to our main model, the evidence still weighs heavier that the predator state's security dependence on the host has a stronger effect than the inverse. Nevertheless, it is worth considering this and tempering the confidence in this finding. In Tables A-17 and A-18, I vary my sample selection, limited the sample to those dyads in which

³³ For more on this phenomenon see Marinova (2017).

the exchange of UNHCR refugees were reported³⁴ (A-17) and in which both UNHCR refugees and contiguity was reported³⁵ (A-18). Rerunning the models in these samples did not drastically alter the findings, although a decrease in the significance of the predator's economic dependence on the host state was reported.

As in the previous section, I also address my dyadic models predictive power by replicating Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (2010)'s methodology of conducting k-fold cross-validation focusing on the AUC of the R-Curve. I find that for the first model, in which TR is the dependent variable, economic bandwidth had the most predictive power of any independent variable, followed by the host state's economic dependence on the predatory state, and the predatory state's diplomatic presence in the host state. The AUC for my models decreased from 0.9009 to 0.8921 when removing economic bandwidth, then to 0.8793 when removing host state economic dependence, and to 0.8712 when removing the predatory state's diplomatic presence. A simple bivariate model regressing TR on economic bandwidth yielded an AUC of 0.8025. These findings both suggest that many of the results highlighted in Figure 4-3 are reflective also of the predictive power of my models. Likewise, the comparatively high AUC in this analysis suggests that bilateral predator-host considerations may have more explanatory value to the question of the occurrence of TR, than the risk of internal backlash. The full results can be found in Table A-19.

These findings suggest that TR is largely a practice between familiar states. Predatory states are more likely to target nationals in the territory of host states with

³⁴ As well as "other people in need of international protection" and "others of concern to UNHCR."

³⁵ Including dyads which had been historically contiguous.

which they share strong economic connections, particularly when the host state is economically dependent on the predatory state. This latter finding provides evidence to H6 that predatory states are more likely to commit TR against targets in host states which are dependent on them. Evidence that host state's security dependence on the predatory state is not significant, however the odds of TR occurring are greater when the predatory state is dependent on the host state for its security needs.

Conclusion

The threat of TR has garnered increased attention from scholars and policymakers alike. Major powers and minor states, from China and Russia to Nicaragua and Burundi, have followed their nationals across international borders for the purposes of coercing them into silence (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). Yet while important strides have been made in documenting the tactics employed by these regimes to export their repression, the literature has so far been limited both theoretically and methodologically in important aspects. Focus has so far been directed at the motives and means of oppressing predatory states without a thorough examination of the other side of the international equation: the dissuading and enabling effect of states which host persecuted émigrés. Likewise, while several cross-national datasets of incidents of TR have been released, few works have attempted to leverage them for large-N quantitative analyses.³⁶

In this chapter, I took a first step in addressing these gaps in the literature. Using the HRRD, I examined the selection of states involved in TR, both predatory

³⁶ There are several notable and recent exceptions, see: Dukalskis et al. (2023), Michaelsen and Ruijgrok (2023).

and host. I began by asking what factors of potential authoritarian predatory states are correlated with the choice to engage in TR, and the selection of certain tactics of such repression. Next, I examined the comparative domestic composition of potential host states and sought to identify factors correlated with the choice of TR by predatory states. Finally, I examined the impact of bilateral relations on the predator-host dyad, asking if predatory states select TR in certain host states, based on dynamics of the bilateral relationship it shares with them.

Table 4-1. Findings Summary			
Analysis	H	Summary	Findings
Predator Analysis	H1	TR practices vary by predatory state regime type. Single party and monarchical regimes = less TR/violent TR Military regimes = more TR/violent TR	Mixed
	H2	More domestic repression = more TR.	Support
	H3	Ideologically opposed opposition = more TR.	Partial, Weak
	H4	Personalistic regimes = more TR and more violent TR.	Support
Host Analysis	H5	More susceptible to internal backlash = less TR	Support
Dyadic Analysis	H6	Host more dependent on predator = more TR	Support (for economic dep.)

In my examination of predatory states, I determined that variations exist between authoritarian regime types. Predatory states with higher measures of party, hereditary, and military power bases had lower odds of conducting TR, with the latter contrasting with existing research on internal repression (Davenport 2007b). I also provide findings supporting early, yet heretofore untested, hypotheses offered by Yossi Shain ([1989] 2005). Predatory regimes with higher respect for physical integrity and political liberties had lower odds of conducting TR. Likewise,

predatory states with higher levels of presidentialism, which I used as a stand-in for personalism, had increased odds of conducting TR. In contrast with Shain ([1989] 2005) predators reliance on ideology did not significantly affect the odds they would conduct TR, though it did increase the odds they would conduct direct violent tactics of TR..

Likewise, domestic components of the host state government impacts predator state decision making. My analysis supported my hypotheses that host states more susceptible to internal backlash would have lower odds of seeing victims in their territory targeted for TR. Many of the features making states more susceptible to internal backlash are correlated with democracy, which I find mitigates the frequency of TR. Most significantly, I find that even controlling for an overreporting bias in the data of incidents of TR in Western countries, democratic states still have lower odds of seeing TR against foreign nationals they host. Likewise, my models suggest that the odds are lower that predator states conduct TR against victims in host states with a stronger, independent judiciary capable of constraining the executive, particularly when employing co-opt tactics. This finding again holds even when controlling for a regional effect of overreporting in Western states with higher judicial autonomy. My analysis however does not support the notion that higher level of civil society participation or a more empowered opposition lowers the odds of TR occurring in a state, although as I outline, certain robustness checks to indicate a possible important role of civil society. This does not however mean that the work of advocates and human rights NGOs to lobby for the protection of asylum seekers is in vain, nor does it mean that high profile incidents of TR can erupt into scandals which opposition

politicians exploit for political gain. Rather, future scholarship should seek more precise measurements and new techniques to disaggregate the ways in which these democratic phenomena can deter TR.

Host state governments which are divided between parties have lower odds of seeing direct, violent TR tactics employed against foreign national in their territory. Again, this would seem to validate the core of H5, that the risk of internal backlash to the host state mitigates the odds that predatory states will engage in TR, as such backlash may pressure host states to impose costs for TR. In instances of divided governments, we might expect an empowered opposition to exploit the mishandling of apparent and extreme TR for their political purposes. However, it is worth noting that elections and changes in the host state leadership do not impact to odds of TR occurring, which we would also expect as times in which host state opposition would look to exploit misconduct on the part of the host state executive. Moreover, while we would expect that host states with more rigid social hierarchies which disadvantage migrant communities and foreign nationals would decrease the risk of internal backlash and increase the risk of TR, the two operationalization's of this concept (exclusion and representation) yielded opposing results, warranting further examination.

When choosing whether to engage in TR in certain host states, I find that predatory state choices vary by the nature of their bilateral relations. My findings suggests that the size of the host states economic "bandwidth" with the predatory state, as well as the host states economic dependence on the predatory state and the diplomatic presence of the predatory state in the host state, are most predictive of the

decision to engage in TR. Host states with more economic connections, in the form of aid and trade, with the predatory state are more likely to host TR. This likelihood is further increased when the host state is more dependent, economically, on the predatory state, suggesting that predatory states sense that they will more likely be able to leverage their economic advantage to convince the host state to facilitate TR by extraditing or detaining the victim, or at the very least to not impose costs for unilateral acts of TR. Curiously, I do not find evidence to support that a similar phenomenon occurs when the host state is dependent for its security on the predatory state. Instead, when the predatory state is more dependent for its security on the host state, the odds of TR occurring increase. Further analysis should explore whether this is a selection effect on the part of émigrés, a case of senior partners in a security relationship acquiescing to their clients perceived security needs by facilitating/not responding to TR, or another phenomenon.

This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I expand the scope of scholarship on TR. Methodologically, by conducting one of the first quantitative analyses of cross-national data on the phenomenon, and theoretically by examining the role of host states and their bilateral relations with predatory states in the decision whether or not, and how, to conduct TR. Secondly, by showing that the decision to conduct TR is statistically correlated in the HRRD with factors which can theoretically be tied to the costs and benefits predatory states derive from such repression, this challenges researchers to think hard about the selection of states within datasets on TR. Several unavoidable biases, such as the reporting and visibility of cases, have been identified in such datasets which researchers will have to continue

to grapple with (Dukalskis et al. 2022). One bias less discussed however is the repression choices predatory states make which eliminate potential cases in these datasets. Essentially, predatory states are selecting instances and environments to repress extra-territorially which maximize the benefits they receive and minimize the costs they pay.

Finally, this chapter demonstrates a range of potential avenues for future research. The negative correlation between military bases of power in predatory states and instances of TR stands in contrast with existing literature on domestic repression (Davenport 2007), warranting a more fine-grained or qualitative approach.

Meanwhile, future research should attempt to establish a firmer causal chain in the negative correlation between TR and democracy, as well as the mitigating effect of judicial constraints of the executive, the contrasting findings on the social environment of the host state, and the impact on the direction of the security relationship in host-predator dyads. Methodologically, alternative models and strategies to identify “null” host states/dyads should be explored. While the Firth penalized logistic regression is widely employed by political scientists in dealing with rare events data, it is not impervious. Though I found no significant distinctions between my primary dyadic models and Firth dyadic models, the intercept and several independent variables in the dyadic stage Firth models did report very high Z-scores and corresponding p-values, which I attribute to the extreme rarity of TR events at this stage of the data and the limitations of model. While the strategy I have outlined is quite thorough in identifying “null” host states/dyads, future scholarship

may seek to narrow the sample of these cases or explore alternative modelling techniques.

In the next chapter, I introduce originally collected data on host state responses to TR. Using this data, I assess with quantitative methods whether internal and external backlash can explain why certain host states respond to TR by imposing costs on the predatory state and seeking justice for the victims, and others do not. In the following chapter, I will explore four instances of TR in host states with varying levels of susceptibility to internal and external backlash using qualitative process tracing.

Chapter 4: Host State Responses

Introduction

A daring prison escape ended in 2018 with capture for 11 Uyghur men but kicked off a diplomatic headache for Malaysian authorities. Arrested as part of a mass-round-up of Uyghurs in Thailand, the men had escaped from prison and crossed to border into northern Malaysia, evading authorities for months before being captured. Claiming to be Turkish citizens, the men requested to be allowed to travel to Turkey. Talks began with Thailand on returning the escaped prisoners, but quickly, Chinese officials began pressuring Malaysian authorities to return the men to China. There they would doubtless join their co-ethnics as victims of the Chinese state's campaign of persecution and mass-internment of its Turkic minorities (Smith Finley 2021). Shortly after news of the men's capture broke however, the U.S. State Department publicly urged Malaysia to provide the UN refugee agency access to the detainees to assess their eligibility for resettlement, warning they may face torture and mistreatment if Beijing's requests were heeded.

The Malaysian government had to make a choice, would it placate China or honor the United States' requests? Adding to the international constellation of interests involved in the case, a new Prime Minister had taken office weeks after the men's capture and had taken a decidedly less friendly stance with Beijing. While his predecessor had deported 29 Uyghurs to China in his last full year in office, Prime Minister Mahathir's government eventually freed and let the 11 Uyghurs fly to

Turkey. This international dispute, in which the coercive apparatus of the Chinese state extended across its borders, is an example of what has entered the lexicon as transnational repression (TR). Moreover, while incidents of TR have included unilateral assassinations and abductions, the case of the 11 Uyghur detainees is exemplary, both of the frequent reliance of predatory states on established channels to request the detention and extradition of their nationals, and of the key role host states play in determining the success or failure of TR.

Much of the research on TR has focused on the means and motives of predatory states and the calculus they make in determining when and how to target their nationals abroad. To fully understand this calculus however it is necessary to understand the ways in which host states facilitate and deter TR. If predatory states are likely to face costs such as diplomatic reprisals, they should be less likely to resort to TR. If, however, they find a collaborator in the form of the host state willing to detain and extradite émigrés, TR will be less costly for the predatory state. I argue that host states engage in their own calculus in deciding how to respond to TR. Host states can facilitate TR by working with predatory states, they can respond forcefully by defending émigrés in their territory and impose costs on the predatory state, or they can simply opt not to respond to an incident of TR.

To gain a greater insight into this host state calculus, I draw on the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD), an original database of host state responses to individual incidents of TR. The preceding chapter outlined traits of predatory states, origin states, and relations among them that are correlated with the occurrence of TR using all 1378 complete cases of TR in the HRRD. Analysis reveals

a number of factors which appear to deter predatory states from engaging in TR, such as a unified government in host state democracies, as well as factors which seem to encourage repression, such as strong political and economic connections with the host state. This work sets the stage for us to explore the question of how and why host states respond differently to TR when it does occur. Host states can impose costs on predatory states by taking responsive steps such as expelling diplomats or revealing incriminating information and protect victim(s) by turning down requests to extradite them, among other steps. But host states can also take steps to collaborate with predatory states, often by detaining and extraditing the victim(s), or simply choose not to respond to incidents of TR.

In this chapter, I argue that a crucial component of host state calculus in deciding how to respond to TR is the prospect of backlash from internal and external actors. To test hypotheses derived from this argument, I code original data in the form of the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD), in which I document host state reactions to individual incidents of transnational repression.

Options for Host State Responses

When faced with the prospect of imminent TR, or reacting to its occurrence, diaspora hosting states have several options in choosing how to respond. The first, and perhaps most common response is quite simply, a non-response. Gorokhovskaia and Linzer (2022d, 2022a, 2022b) note that in the seven host states they analyzed, inconsistency in holding predatory states accountable for their actions was

widespread. Responding to a spate of anti-émigré attacks in the United States, Garvey (1980) lamented that authorities rarely protect victims of foreign-based repression.

Secondly, host states can respond forcefully to protect their sovereignty and the rights of diaspora members in their territory and impose costs of offending predatory states. Criminal cases can be brought, diplomats can be summoned, sanctions imposed, evidence of the predatory state's culpability trotted out before reporters, and extradition requests shot down with prejudice. While these responses may be rarer, they are certainly not unheard of. After an Iranian hit squad gunned down four Kurdish opposition party members in a Berlin restaurant, Germany prosecuted several of the assassins, publicly accused Tehran of directing them (Agence France Presse 1993), and subsequently severed relations with the Islamic Republic for six months (Geitner 1997). Even less dramatic incidents can attract host state penalties. After a Tibetan-Canadian student faced threats in the wake of their election to student government, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police offered protection (Blanchfield 2020) and the press secretary of the Canadian Minister for Science and Sport emphasized that any "malicious interference... by foreign representatives to Canada would be inappropriate."

Lastly, host states can actively facilitate TR by cooperating with predatory states to silence or render diasporic opponents. Most often, this occurs when the host state detains and extradites the victim back to the origin state. Doing so provides predatory states with a repressive infrastructure that would be otherwise difficult to replicate overseas. Rather than covertly deploy or contract agents abroad, predatory

states can simply transmit an extradition or detention request through established channels.

Incentives for Host States to Respond

There are two key, dynamic factors that contribute to the chance that host states will respond in a certain way. Host states face pressure both from within and without when faced with instances of TR. First, host states are embedded in a complex network of relationships that can impact their response decisions. The attention of third party (external) states to TR can create costs for the host state, as can pressure placed on it by the predatory state (external). Second, the government of a host state must respond (to varying degree, of course) to pressure from the public and interested domestic actors around instances of TR.

The Role of External Backlash

As outlined in previous chapters, existing scholarship on TR has established that predatory states often deploy diplomatic pressure to convince host states to crackdown on émigré dissidents (Shain [1989] 2005), and that their efforts are often successful. Most cases of TR involve the cooperation of host states through tactics such as extraditions (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d). Recent scholarship has shown that the comparative size of a predatory state's diplomatic presence overseas is positively correlated to increased odds that it will engage in TR, with these diplomatic outposts serving both as hubs for intelligence gathering covert action against dissent

and to rally host state support for TR (Dukalskis et al. 2023).³⁷ A wide range of diplomatic leverage to incentivize host state complicity in TR, from the use of economic benefits, such as trade deals (Jardine, Lemon, and Hall 2021), to security benefits such as intelligence sharing (Sepper 2010), have been documented in case studies.

In many cases of TR however, host states face costs from other international actors if they are seen as complicit in TR (or at the very least ineffectual in responding to it). International organizations (IOs), particularly those specializing in human rights and the care of refugees, can name and shame (DeMeritt 2012; Lebovic and Voeten 2006) complicit host state for violating their international obligations. Moreover, host states also risk drawing the diplomatic ire of other states. These states (external to the host and predatory state) may become involved due to a long-running geopolitical dispute with the predatory state, as we might expect the US to do in cases of Iranian or Chinese TR. Such involvement may include not only shaming the predatory state seen as particularly vulnerable to damage to such criticism (Terman and Byun 2022) but also pressuring the host state to resist overtures to join in TR, or to themselves join in confronting the predatory state. These states may also publicly express concern for victims of TR, in part to bolster their reputation as advocates of human rights (Terman and Byun 2022). In other cases, however, predatory states target individuals who have established citizenship, residency, or asylum in another

³⁷ Crucially however, this study does not determine that TR is more likely to occur in host states where these diplomats are stationed.

state besides the host state. These individuals and their families have recourse contact these third-party states and seek remediation.

In some cases, third states have incentives to intervene on the victim's behalf because they victims are linked to important constituencies. When Portugal detained a vacationing Sikh nationalist with asylum status in the UK at the request of India, British politicians sprung to action.³⁸ The head of the Labour party sent an open letter requesting the Portuguese Prime Minister intervene, while conspicuously mentioning the importance of the Sikh community in the UK. Eventually, the Portuguese Ministry of Justice decided that the case could not be continued as deporting an individual with asylum in a fellow EU state would violate international agreements.

There are, however, factors which may mitigate the risk of backlash against host state inaction or complicity to TR. Certainly, third states may avoid critiquing friendly predatory or host states for their involvement in TR at the risk of causing them reputational damage (Terman and Byun 2022). Beyond such realist considerations however are international norms that broadly impact the degree to which external actors are willing to tolerate the violation of TR victims' legal and human rights. Scholars of TR have linked its practices with those of the post-9/11 Global War on Terror, noting both that the widespread use of these tactics such as rendition and targeted killings by Western democracies to combat terrorism undercuts their ability to denounce the use of these same tactics by autocrats for the purpose of stymying external dissent, and that such actions may have in fact eroded international

³⁸ See Chapter 6, Portuguese case study.

norms against extraterritorial violence (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021).³⁹

Others have noted that to justify their domestic repressive campaigns, authoritarian regimes have employed accusations of terrorism, at least partially in an attempt to deflect international criticism (Edel and Josua 2018)⁴⁰ as well as amalgamate in perception dissidents with the intended targets of Western counterterrorism efforts (Roberts 2020). This approach is widely employed in cases of transnational repression, with the majority of cases of TR documented by Freedom House, involving the predatory state accusing the victim(s) of terrorism or religious extremism (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). It is probable then that this strategy on the part of predatory states may be effective at diminishing any reticence on the part of host state to collaborate in TR, and of external actors to intervene in defense of victims.

The Role of Internal Backlash

Beyond external factors, internal factors also determine the reaction of host states. I theorize that the costs of backlash against host states which collaborate with predatory states, or appear inept in reacting to TR, can be imposed by internal actors as well as external ones. These actors are potentially numerous, from human rights activists, fellow diaspora or community members, or interested politicians. Certain

³⁹ On the latter argument, see Birdsall (2018).

⁴⁰ It should be noted that both Uzbekistan and Egypt, the focuses of Edel and Josua (2018), attracted international criticism for the mass killings they justified with accusations of terrorism.

domestic features give these actors more avenues to impose costs on host states and thus should make host states more cautious in ignoring or participating in TR.

First, it is possible that democratic host states are less likely to respond complicitly to TR, and are more likely to take responsive steps, because of their electoral systems and accountability to voters. Early work on anti-exile coercion expressed a pessimism that the US executive or legislative branch would do all but the minimum in responding to TR because of the countervailing pressures of national security derived from relations with predatory states (Garvey 1980). Pressure from the public, informed by an interested parties such as non-government organizations (NGOs), may however press elected officials to acknowledge and respond to incidents of TR. If so, we would expect legislators to be most sensitive to the will of the public and the desire to avoid being caught in a scandal. Opposition politicians particularly may sense an opportunity by highlighting perceived misconduct or ineptitude on the part of the governing party. This in turn may create pressure for the host state to make public efforts to respond to the incident of TR.

Secondly, judicial actors with a degree of autonomy may act independently to impose costs on predatory states, complicit host state actors, and defend émigré victims. Judiciaries are more insulated from the broader foreign policy considerations host state agents of the executive branch face (Garvey 1980). They therefore may be more inclined to decide extradition cases on their merits and prosecute cases of unilateral TR regardless of the assailant. It should be noted that backlash from judicial independence is difficult to disaggregate from electoral backlash as both are hallmarks of democracy. Recently, Michaelsen and Ruijgrok (2023:5) have

demonstrated that predatory states are more likely to utilize TR tactics involving collaboration with democratic host state, which they attribute to the “rule of law and guarantee of fundamental rights inherent to democracies.” Disaggregating these features then is best undertaken through qualitative process-tracing.

Finally, the identity of the victim likely assists in creating domestic pressures which push host states toward complicity, responsiveness, or non-responsiveness. As alluded to, certain ethnic and religious communities undoubtedly find that their calls for help fall on deaf (host state) ears because of xenophobia. The degree to which host societies provide access to public resources and spaces to minority groups and those economically disadvantaged may impact the effort to which the host state is willing to bring to bear to remedy their persecution. One of the most prescient identities however overlaps with legal status – namely the victim’s residency and citizenship. While non-residency does not erase host state’s legal responsibility to preserve their sovereignty, enforce their laws, and abide by international laws, it may de facto diminish the sense of responsibility officials feel toward the victim(s) and the costs these officials are willing to incur for preserving said victim(s) security. In contrast, membership in the national community may not only provide host state officials with a sense of responsibility but increase the number of non-state domestic actors willing to place pressure on their behalf.

This theory yields three hypotheses about the chances that host states will respond in different ways.

H1: Host states subject to more external backlash, such as from third states with an interest in the victim(s) through their residency, will be less likely to facilitate or ignore TR and more likely to take responsive actions.

H2: Host states subject to greater pressure from predatory states will be more likely to facilitate or ignore TR and less likely to take responsive actions.

H3: Host states subject to more internal backlash will be less likely to facilitate or ignore TR, and more likely to take responsive actions.

The Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD)

To test my theory, I have compiled the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD), an original dataset of host state responses to incidents of TR. While the previous chapter focused on the occurrence of TR, drawing primarily on simple observation of TR and specific tactics in the HRRD, in this chapter I draw on originally coded data on host state responses to incidents of TR in the HRRD. The data collection process is overviewed in Chapter 3; however, I will note here that this collection process is ongoing, meaning only a sample of the HRRD will be utilized for analysis in this chapter and findings are therefore preliminary. At the time of this writing, I have coded data for 308 individual cases of TR which are aggregated to 138 linked cases for analysis, comprised of a stand-alone case of TR targeting one victim, or multiple cases in which the victims targeted in the same dyad near simultaneously and grouped together for the purposes of host state responses. In the course of coding, I reviewed 385 of 1511 cases. Of these 78 cases were identified as duplicated and merged, deleted due to missing dates or coding errors, or identified as having occurred in a different host-predator dyad and moved for latter coding.

Before reviewing descriptive statistics of this sample, it is worth reiterating a limitation of this analysis. In many cases in the HRRD, the occurrence of TR did not become public knowledge until weeks, months, or years after the fact. This of course

is not unusual, as there are likely many cases of TR that are never publicly revealed. This presents a central challenge to any researcher attempting to study TR quantitatively. In the words of Dukalskis (2021: 70), our data is “radically incomplete.” For this reason, I limit my claims and theory to how host states respond to *public* incidents of TR. By public I mean those incidents in which information indicating that there has been an occurrence of a threat, detention, assassination etc. is in the public domain. It may not be widely reported, but an interested party can access it. Extraditions and extradition attempts are a partial exception to this limitation, as much of the host state decision making may occur under an umbrella of privacy, but the cases eventually are reported publicly which may lead to a backlash. To accommodate this limitation of my claims, most variables which I code are limited to events which occurred five years after the incident became public knowledge.

The HRRD sample contains data on cases of TR targeting victims in 39 host states originating from 24 predatory states. There are 55 unique host-predatory dyads in the sample, and incidents occur between 1992 and 2020. As Table 5-1 shows, the majority of incidents of TR in the sample involve attempts by the predatory state to co-opt the host state by having the victim extradited or detained by host state authorities. In about a quarter of cases the victim is threatened, or their family in predatory state territory is threatened with the aim of obtaining the victim’s compliance. In 23.91% of cases, the victim is directly targeted with unilateral predatory state violence in the form of assassination/attempts or abductions.

Table 5-1. Transnational Repression by Type			
Tactic	Occurrence	Tactic Class	Class Occurrence
Assassination	13 (9.42%)	Direct Violent Tactics	33 (23.91%)
Assassination Attempt	8 (5.80%)		
Assault	4 (2.99%)		
Abduction	7 (5.07%)		
Abduction Attempt	0		
Unexplained Disappearance - Predator Linked	1 (0.72%)		
Unexplained Disappearance - Host Linked	0	Co-Opt Tactics	75 (54.35%)
Detention	52 (37.68%)		
Extradition	27 (19.57%)		
Extradition Attempt	37 (26.81%)		
Threat	21 (15.22%)	Threat Tactics	35 (25.36%)
Family Threat	15 (10.87%)		
<i>Note: As multiple tactics/tactic classes may be used in the same incident, numbers and percentages do not correspond to the sample size (138 linked incidents) or 100%.</i>			

The HRRD captures a variety of forms of host state responses to TR. In 7.25% of cases for example, an individual implied to have been acting as an agent of the predatory state is arrested or indicted. In 8.70% of cases the incident leads to a diplomatic confrontation between the host and origin state. The most common responses however are statements: host state officials directly addressing the incident of TR. In 15.94% of cases, these statements contain denials of wrongdoing in the host states handling of the incident or the response to it. Finally, in just over 10.87% of cases, host state officials implicitly or explicitly blame the predatory state for conducting an act of TR. This blame can come in sensational forms, an intelligence official revealing that a murderer was directly contracted by the predatory state to assassinate a political dissident. Blame can also come in more subtle forms, such as a justice ministry deciding not to pursue an extradition but publicly recognizing that the

victim faces political persecution by the predatory state. Regardless of its form, the rarity with which officials of host states directly cast blame on predatory states demonstrates the challenge of achieving meaningful costs for TR.

The variation in the tactics of TR tactics make coding a one-size-fits-all variable indicating a host states responsiveness or complicity impractical. It would perhaps be overly optimistic, for example, to expect a host state to detain, prosecute, convict, and imprison a diplomat of a predatory state for threatening an émigré. Likewise, complicity, which I define as co-ordination between the host and predatory state for the purpose of TR, looks different when a predatory state submits a formal request for a dissident's extradition from when it dispatches assassins. To capture these gradations, the HRRD includes numerous variables designed to document specific host state responses. Many of these occur to infrequently to warrant analysis alone, however by aggregating responses of a similar vein, we can gain a fuller picture of the general direction host states take in responding to incidents of TR. Table B-11 displays the full breakdown of the following measures. Here I focus on an aggregate variable "responsive", which indicates that the host state has taken at least one of ten potential responses ranging from publicly releasing information incriminating the predator, offering police protection to the victim or their family, or terminating the processing of an extradition request. These responses are "responsive" in that they take positive moves to protect the victim's rights and safety and/or impose costs on the predatory state. The variable "complicity" is an created from six variables, ranging indications that the host state harassed the victim, detained or extradited the victim, or was suspected of coordinating a violent incident targeting

the victim. It should be noted that complicity and responsiveness are not mutually exclusive, in fact in 23.19% of cases the host state is both responsive and complicit. If the host state is neither responsive, nor complicit, and issues no statements, then it is marked as ignoring the incident.

As Table 5-2 shows, contrary to the gloomy predispositions of scholars, host states are responsive in 39.86% of cases documented in the HRRD sample. There responses may be insufficient to protect the victim or deter further TR, nevertheless it behooves us to understand the factors driving these responses to encourage more robust responses. In a majority of cases (59.42%) host states display some form of complicity, while in only a minority (21.74%) do they fail to respond. Complicity is unsurprisingly most common in cases where the predator seeks to co-opt the host state. However, most of the cases in which the host state is responsive occurs in the case of co-opt tactics as well. Threats, which are notoriously commonplace, difficult to trace, and in the case of coercion-by-proxy, occur outside of host state territory, are the most common tactic to be ignored by the host state.

Table 5-2. Summary Statistics				
	Violent Tactics	Co-Opt Tactics	Threat Tactics	All Tactics
Responsive	23 (41.82%)	28 (50.91%)	6 (10.91%)	55 (39.86%)
Complicit	12 (14.63%)	70 (85.37%)	2 (2.44%)	82 (59.42%)
Non-Response	4 (13.33%)	2 (6.67%)	26 (86.67%)	30 (21.74%)
Statements	26 (44.07%)	29 (49.15%)	6 (10.17%)	59 (42.75%)
Blame	12 (80.00%)	2 (13.33%)	1 (6.67%)	15 (10.87%)
Denial	7 (31.82%)	15 (68.18%)	1 (4.55%)	22 (15.94%)
All Responses (including Non-Responses)	33 (23.91%)	75 (54.35%)	35 (25.36%)	138 (100.00%)
<i>Note: Numbers indicate the number of linked cases in which values of both row and column are present. In columns 1-3 (Violent-Threat Tactics) percentages depict this number divided by the number of linked cases this response occurred across all tactics. In column 4 (All Tactics) percentages depict this number divided by the total number of linked cases.</i>				

In addition to reactions of host state officials, the HRRD collects data on the responses of other internal and external observers. Statements by host state legislators, as well as opposition figures are documented. When international governmental organizations or third-party states (neither predatory or origin) intervene in incidents of TR by either expressing concern over an incident or for the victim, or directly pressuring the predatory or origin state to act a certain way, this is also noted. Finally, relevant characteristics of the victim(s) are also documented. In 17.39% of cases for example, the victim(s) had citizenship, residency, or asylum in a third state besides the predatory or origin state. In 10.14% of cases, the victim(s) was

a citizen of the host state, while in 8.70% they had received asylum from the host state and in 44.93% they were residents of the host state.




Figure 4-1. Marginal Effects of External Backlash on Host State Response

Three models comparing host state responsive actions, complicit actions, and non-responses with rest of sample displayed. Central point represents average marginal effect while bars represent upper and lower confidence interval. Variables which are not statistically significant in any of the three models are not displayed.

To assess my first hypothesis, I construct a series of linear probability models⁴¹⁴² using indices for responsive, complicit, and non-responsive actions as dependent variables. For my independent variables I draw on original HRRD variables as well as variables derived from the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Future's Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) (Moyer et al. 2021). To assess H1, I include an original HRRD variable indicating whether the victim(s) in an incident were citizens, legal residents, or asylees in a third state (neither the host nor predatory state). In addition, I include three original variables measure the degree to which third states intervened in a particular incident of TR: by pressuring the host state on behalf of the victim, by pressuring the predatory state on behalf of the victim(s), or by publicly expressing concern for the victim(s). Next, I include an indicator variable marking whether an international governmental organization (IGO) undertook any of the previously outlined three forms of intervention on behalf of the victim(s). In line with H1, I would expect that the occurrence of any of these variables would increase the potential for external backlash on the host state, thereby increasing the probability that it would take responsive actions and decrease the probability it would take complicit actions or adopt a non-responsive stance. I also include an indicator variable marking whether the victim(s) were accused by the predatory state of terrorism or religious extremism

⁴¹ Linear probability models have been shown to have a variety of benefits (Timoneda 2021, Von Hippel 2015), including ease of interpretation, and have gained in popularity in recent years in fields such as economics (Breen, Karlson and Holm 2018). I also note that my sample is still relatively small which may bias the odds ratio of a logistic regression model (Nemes et al. 2009).

⁴² In addition to LPMs I also include Firth's Biased Reduced Logistic Regression Models in Table B-2. Firth Models are useful in cases of complete separation (Gim and Ko 2016), small samples (Rainey and McCaskey 2021), and rare events (Allison 2012).

in incidents occurring after the 9/11 attacks. In contrast, I expect that such accusations would lower the potential for external backlash given the international practices and norms that have emerged since 9/11 regarding counter-terrorism.

To assess H2 and the comparative influence the predatory state on the host state I include several FBIC variables. First, I include measures of the host state's economic and security dependence on the predatory state. The former consists of a combination the goods traded bilaterally as a percentage of total trade and GDP, as well as aid as a percentage of total aid and of GDP. Security dependence is measured as a combination of bilateral arms imports stock as a percentage of total arms import stock and total military spending stock. Both variables are indices ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating greater dependence. In line with H2, I would expect that as host state's dependence on the predatory state increases, so too does the probability it will take complicit actions. In addition, I include measures of the predatory state's economic and security dependence on the host state. If dependence can be thought of as the direction of the bilateral relationship between the host and predator state, the FBIC's measure for bandwidth can be thought of as the size of the relationship. I include the FBIC's measures for political, economic, and security bandwidth. Political bandwidth is measured as a combination of the level of diplomatic representation, and common IGO membership. Economic bandwidth is a measurement of both total trade and trade agreements, while security dependence combines both arms transfers and military alliances.

Figure 5-1 displays the marginal effects of each independent variable in my models when regressed on responsive actions, complicit actions, and non-responses

by host states to incidents of TR.⁴³ In line with H1 host state responses appear to be explained in part by backlash from external actors toward TR. In 13.04% of cases within this sample of the HRRD, third party states deploy pressure on host states on behalf of victims of TR. Figure 5-1 shows that the marginal effect of these actions is a 27.56% increased probability that the host state will take responsive actions. Interesting, when third party states employ pressure on predatory states this also increases the probability will take responsive actions by a 29.5% increased probability. Likewise, factors which decrease external backlash are correlated with an increase probability of host states taking complicit actions during or in response to incidents of TR. When victims of TR are accused of terrorism or extremism (post-9/11) the probability that host states will take complicit actions increases by 29.06%. Given that 42.03% of cases in our HRRD sample involve such accusations their negative impact is particularly wide ranging.

The results of our models displayed in Figure 5-1 also validate H2, though in perhaps unexpected ways. Greater security bandwidth between the predator and host state decreases the probability that the host state will take responsive actions. However, greater bilateral political bandwidth increases the probability of responsive actions, while greater predatory state security dependence on the host state likewise (greatly) increases the probability of responsive actions. As predatory and host states share a greater transfer of arms of military alliances, the likelihood that the host state will interfere with, retaliate against, or assist victims of TR decreases, as we expected. The degree to which the host state is dependent on these arms transfers does not seem

⁴³ Findings vary slightly from Firth's Logit models, see Tables B-2 and B-4.

to impact the likelihood that it will take responsive actions. However, when the predator state is more dependent on arms transfers from the host state, this may empower the host state – relieving some of the pressure to look the other way to the predator’s TR. While such dependence is not correlated with less complicit or non-responses, it is with an increased probability in responsive actions such that a one standard deviation increase in the predator’s security dependence on the host results in a 13.42% increased probability that the host state will take responsive actions.

It is worth re-iterating that responsive and complicit host state actions are not mutually exclusive. In fact, in 23.19% of cases in our HRRD sample host states take both responsive and complicit actions. This third category of “mixed” responses comprises a majority of cases in which responsive actions are taken (58.18%) and a significant portion of cases in which complicit actions are taken (39.02%). These cases may include instances in which the host state backtracks from earlier complicit actions or attempts to cover over them with actions which appear on the surface to indicate a responsive approach to TR. They may also include cases in which different actors within the host state adopt different approaches to responding to an incident of TR. To separate these cases from those in which host states solely take responsive or complicit actions, I replicate my procedures above, but using dummy variables for cases in which host states only took responsive actions, only took complicit actions, took mixed responses, or again – adopted a non-response.




Figure 4-2. Marginal Effects of External Backlash on Host State Response, Expanded

Four models comparing host state which have only taken responsive actions, only taken complicit actions, mixed responses, and non-responses with rest of sample displayed. Central point represents average marginal effect while bars represent upper and lower confidence interval. Variables which are not statistically significant in any of the four models are not displayed.

Many of the findings in Figure 5-2 demonstrate the robustness of the evidence outlined in Figure 5-1. Here again, in line with H1 when a third state pressures the host state the probability of that host state engaging in only complicit actions decreases by 35.17%. Meanwhile when third states pressure the predatory state, the probability that the host state will only engage in responsive actions increases by 31.07%. Meanwhile when victims are accused of terrorism or extremism (post-9/11) the probability that the host state engages in only complicit actions again increases and the probability of it taking no-response decreases. It is worth noting that when third states publicly express concern for the victim of TR, the probability the host state only takes responsive steps decreases by 35.29%. This may seem to contrast the earlier state finding that third state pressure on the predatory state increases the probability of only responsive steps, however many of these interventions are private. In 53.33% of cases in which a third state pressures the predatory state, they also express public concern for the victim. This finding then could be a case of reverse causality: third states are more likely to express concern when they note that that the host state has only taken responsive steps and feel the need for their intervention is lesser.

The models outlined in Figure 5-2 also provide further support for H2. A one standard deviation increase in bilateral security bandwidth decreases the probability that host states will only take responsive steps by 16.07% and increases the probability they will only take complicit steps by 16.39%. Meanwhile a one standard deviation increase in the predator's security dependence on the host decreases the probability the host state will only take complicit actions by 21.28% and increases the

probability the host state will take both complicit and responsive actions by 16.01%. This clarifies the strength of our conclusions on the impact of this variable based on models in Figure 5-1. Greater security cooperation with the predatory state, in other words, seems to suggest that host states are less likely to take responsive actions and more likely to take complicit actions. However, when the predator state is dependent for its security needs on the host state, this seems to relieve some pressure on the latter, decreasing the probability it will fully cooperate in TR but not increasing the probability it will fully cease doing so. Instead, host states in these situations have a greater probability of engaging in some complicit, but some responsive, actions.

To further assess the robustness of my findings I conduct additional analyses, which I include in Tables B-2-B-5. First, I rerun my analysis as Firth penalized logistic regressions (Table B-2), which are better suited for small samples than standard logistic regressions (Rainey and McCaskey 2021) . The most notable feature of this table is extremely large and small coefficients and standard errors for bandwidths as well as the predator's security dependence on the host. I therefore run my analysis again, dropping political bandwidth entirely and creating dichotomous variables for security and economic bandwidth in which states score above the upper quartile of the sample. Rerunning this analysis as an LPM (Table B-3) does not significantly alter my results from the primarily models, except insofar as the significance of economic and security bandwidth, as well as predatory security dependence on the host drops at points, whereas the significance of the host security dependence on the predator increases. The coefficients and standard errors for these Firth models are more reasonable (Table B-4). It is worth noting however that in both

Firth analyses the victim citizenship/residency/asylum in a third state and third state pressure on host drop to levels no longer statistically significant. Both the comparatively small size of the HRRD sample analyzed, as well as the comparatively rare occurrence of several of the variables analyzed, make LPMs a preferable analytic tool at this stage. However, these findings should be taken into consideration when considering the strength of the findings I have outlined.

As a final robustness check, I alter my strategy for compiling two of my dependent variables “responsive” and “complicit” host state responses. As outlined previously and in Table B-11, I utilize a broad swathe of variables to compile these dependent variables, with the understanding that what would be considered “responsive” in the case of, say, an assassination, may be too much to ask of a host state in the case of threats. This strategy is not infallible, as coding on the HRRD continues and the size of my random sample grows, my hope is to conduct more specialized analyses on host state responses based on the tactics employed by the predatory state. As a robustness check however, I create alternative measures of these variables (found in Table B-12) by narrowing the criteria for what is considered “responsive” and “complicit.” For the alternate responsive variable, I retain the variables for host state blaming the predatory state for the incident, a diplomatic confrontation, and the host state ignoring an extradition request from the predatory state. I also include the variable for arrests/indictments made against suspects, however I raise the threshold to only include arrests/indictments when the suspect is accused/suspected or known to have been acting as a predatory state agent. For the alternative complicit variable, I retain only variables indicating that an extradition or

detention occurred, and if the host state is suspected of complicity in a violent incident, with the threshold raised to medium, as opposed to low, confidence. In Table B-5 I compare LPMs in which these alternative variables are dependent variables with the original models. While there are some slight distinctions given the rarer occurrence of these alternative measures, the directionality remains the same across variables.




Figure 4-3. Marginal Effects of Internal Backlash on Host State Response

Three models comparing host state responsive actions, complicit actions, and non-responses with rest of sample displayed. Central point represents average marginal effect while bars represent upper and lower confidence interval.

To assess H3, that internal backlash motivates host state responses to TR, I replicate my methodology for external backlash and construct linear probability models using indices for responsive actions, complicit actions, and non-responses as my dependent variables. As discussed, internal backlash is derived from a variety of domestic actors with differing motivations. What unites these actors is disapproval of host state executives handling of TR when such handling is viewed as either complicit or inept. The means with which these actors are able to voice their dissatisfaction and impose costs on the executive is likely to differ depending on the domestic structure of host state institutions, however. For my first independent variables I draw on Lührmann, Tannenber, and Lindberg's (2018) "regimes of the world" variable in V-Dem v12 (Coppedge et al. 2022), creating an indicator variable for host states classified as democracies.

In addition, I draw on originally coded data in the HRRD for several more dichotomous independent variables. I theorize that internal backlash and overall host state response is mediated by the degree to which the victim(s) is viewed as an "insider" to the host state community. To account for this effect, I include original indicator variables noting if the victim(s) held host state citizenship, were granted asylum by the host state, or was a resident of the host state.⁴⁴ While the executive host state actors are in theory those most interested in maintaining a productive relationship with predatory states, legislators can likewise be motivated by such interests. They may also be influenced by constituents interested in imposing

⁴⁴ Note: this can be difficult to ascertain legally based on sources and data collected through Nexis Uni. As a result, this variable is marked "1" in practice if the victim(s) was living permanently in the host state, unless otherwise described as having undocumented status.

backlash on the executive. Opposition politicians likewise may have a vested interest in exploiting the executives mishandling of TR. I therefore include originally coded variables indicating if either a member of the national legislature or of the political opposition spoke publicly about the case of TR. In line with this I account for the degree to which the ruling party controls the government, drawing on V-Dem's divided party control index (v2x_divparctrl) in which the highest extremes indicate that different parties or non-partisan individuals control the executive and legislative branches.

Next, I note that the identity of victim's impacts the degree of potential backlash to their targeting for TR. Some of this is related to their membership in the national community as often defined by legal status, but also by national origin, ethnicity, region, and economic status. Much of this inclusion or exclusion is dependent on the structure of the host society and state, specifically the degree to which migrants, and more broadly minority communities are welcomed into public life and provided equitable resources. To measure this I draw on two V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2022) variables "representation of disadvantaged social groups" (v2lgdsadlo) in which higher values indicate greater representation of disadvantaged socio-economic groups in the legislature, and "exclusion by socio-economic group" (v2xp_exlecon) in which higher values indicate a greater rate of denial of government services and access to governed spaces based on socio-economic group.

Finally, to control for state capacity, while seeking to avoid capturing elements of capacity overlapping with judicial strength (tied heavily to democracy) such as rule of law and impartiality of administration, I replicate my process in the

prior chapter by creating an indicator variable from V-Dem's (Coppedge et al. 2022) fiscal capacity of the state measure (v2stfiscap_ord) to indicate that the host state is able to meet its financial responsibilities through the collection of taxes (3 and 4 in v2stfiscap_ord).

Figure 5-3 displays the results of my models. Here we can see that democratic host states are no more likely, at statistically significant levels, to engage in responsive actions in response to TR. Instead, democracies have a 35.15% reduced probability of engaging in complicit actions and a 29.10% increased probability of opting for a non-response. Assessing responses to TR through this most direct indicator of the potential for domestic pressure – democracy, associated with an interested civil society, popularly elected officials, and independent judiciary, does not fully support H3. Instead, we can say that the results support the idea that the risk internal backlash prevents complicit activity on the part of democracies, but that their preferred alternative is to not respond at all to incidents of TR.

The degree to which the victim of TR is seen as “belonging” to the host state as both a subject of its sovereignty and a member of its national community should theoretically influence the degree of backlash host states feel toward responding (or not) to their TR. As Figure 5-3 shows, when victims of TR are citizens of the host state, the probability of that host state engaging in complicit actions decreases by 33.36%. Likewise, when the victim has residency in the host state, the probability of the host state engaging in complicit actions decreases by 17.11%, and when they have received asylum in the host state, the probability of complicit actions decreases 34.32%. This warrants further explanation as there is a wealth of literature

on the vulnerability of asylum seekers to TR (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). This variable does not capture whether or not the victim(s) of TR are/were asylum seekers, but whether they had acquired asylum status and protection from the host state. In some ways this is unsurprising – 45.65% of cases in our HRRD sample included attempted or actual extraditions. A host state would logically be less likely to accept extradition requests, a complicit act, after previously granting the victim asylum. Host states may also feel more inclined to respond to TR when it targets individuals it has recognized as in need of sanctuary and granted legal protection. As coding on the HRRD is ongoing this finding may however prove to be spurious as the sample enlarges.

Other potential indicators of internal backlash including statements by host state legislators and political opposition figures, the strength of the ruling party's control over the government, and the representation of disadvantaged social groups in the legislature, do not affect at a statistically significant level the probability of host states taking responsive or complicit actions. What does however is the degree of exclusion based on socio-economic status in the host state, but not in the way expected. Rather than lower levels of exclusion indicating greater access to resources for migrants and in turn greater responsiveness to their communal needs, Figure 5-3 shows that a one standard deviation *increase* in exclusion increases the probability of the host state taking responsive actions by 16.52%. Why would greater exclusion from state resources on the basis of socio-economic status increase the probability that host states would respond to TR with actions which protect the victim and/or confront the predatory state? As noted more responsive host state actions are more

prevalent in cases of TR utilizing extreme and often unilateral violence. It may be that these cases are more prevalent in deeply unequal societies with an underserved population, resulting in this finding. In a perhaps related finding, host states which are fiscally capable of financing themselves through taxation have a 16.36% decreased probability of engaging in complicit actions.




Figure 4-4. Marginal Effects of External Backlash on Host State Responses, Expanded
 Four models comparing host state which have only taken responsive actions, only taken complicit actions, mixed responses, and non-responses with rest of sample displayed. Central point represents average marginal effect while bars represent upper and lower confidence interval.

As with external backlash, I replicate my methodology for internal backlash by analyzing additional LPMs which use indicator variables for cases in which the host state only employed responsive tactics, only employed complicit tactics, employed both, or engaged in a non-response as my dependent variables. As Figure 5-4 shows the results of these models largely mirror those of Figure 5-3 with some exceptions. Here again, democracies have a lower probability of engaging in only complicit actions, but a higher probability of not responding. A higher degree of exclusion based on socio-economic status results in a higher probability of host states engaging in a ‘mixed response’ of both complicit and responsive actions. The marginal effect of victim’s holding citizenship and residency in the host state is no longer statistically significant, however when the victim holds asylum in the host state, the probability that it will engage in only responsive actions increases by 38.57%. This leaves the most robust finding from both variants of models that of democracy increasing the probability of non-responsiveness and decreasing the probability of complicity. In addition, somewhat paradoxically given the vulnerability of asylum seekers, in incidents in which victims had asylum status in the host state, authorities were less likely to take complicit, and more likely to take “only responsive” actions.

As a robustness check of these findings, I again run variants of my models as Firth penalized logistic regressions (Table B-7). I note that the strength of my findings on democracy decrease, though democracies have a decreased probability of engaging in “only complicit” actions, as well as fiscal capacity. I also note large coefficients and standard errors for exclusion on socio-economic basis. As a further

check, I run two additional variations of my model as LPMs. The first, I substitute democracy for V-Dem's (Coppedge et al. 2022) polyarchy measure of electoral democracy ($v2x_polyarchy$) and exclusion on socio-economic basis to exclusion on social group basis ($v2xpe_exlsogr$). I also add an additional measure of state capacity in the form of the state's territorial control ($v2svsterr$), and drop victim's residency, opposition statements, and representation of disadvantaged social groups. The latter of these two were not significant in our initial models, and the first is less precise than citizenship and asylum status. In this model, polyarchy remains significant, though now electoral democracies have an increased probability of being only responsive. Likewise, legislator statements significantly increase the probability of states taking both responsive and complicit actions, and decreased probability of taking no response.

For a second robustness check, I replace exclusion on socio-economic basis and representation of disadvantaged social groups in my initial model with judicial constraints on the executive ($v2x_jucon$) from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2022). Here again, these alternative models produce similar results to my initial model. Judicial constraints does not significantly impact the probability of host state actions, however legislator statements do increase the likelihood of responsive and non-responsive actions. Most importantly, democracy decreases the probability of states taking complicit actions and increases the probability that opt for a non-response. As a final robustness check, I draw on the alternative measures of responsive and complicit actions I outlined in the previous section, using them as alternative dependent variables. Here again, there is little change in the findings, with the exception of

victim's residency and the host state's fiscal capacity no longer decreasing the probability of complicit actions at a statistically significant level, and exclusion by socio-economic status no longer increasing the probability of responsive actions. Crucially democratic host states remain less likely to engage in complicit actions.

Conclusion

What drives host state responses to TR? Scholars have pointed to mutually beneficial deals struck between host and predatory states leading to coordination on TR (Jardine, Lemon, and Hall 2021; Shain [1989] 2005). But what of the role of other external actors, such as interested third states and international organizations? Moreover, the role of internal actors and potential backlash from political opposition, voters, civil society, or the judiciary is less explored. Using the HRRD, an original dataset of host state response to incidents TR, I explore internal and external factors correlated with host state responsiveness to TR.

The findings suggest that we expand our view of the external forces which drive émigré hosting states responses to TR. My analysis provides some empirical support to earlier theorizing and case studies suggesting that host states are cognizant of their relationships with predatory states and the benefits and costs they would incur based on their reactions to TR. Predatory states are not the only international actors that host states face pressure from however, and my analysis demonstrates that these other actors have an impact on host state behavior. Specifically, I examine the role of non-predatory, non-host states. When these states become involved in responding to incidents of TR, my findings suggest they can impact host state behavior. When these states apply pressure to host states, there is an increased probability they will engage

in actions such as investigating incidents, terminating victim(s) extradition proceedings, or diplomatically confronting the predatory state. Likewise, there is a decreased probability that they will engage in complicit actions such as detaining victims or extraditing them to the predatory state, at least without also taking steps to responsive steps presumably to appease the third state. While causality is difficult to determine given the data and methodological limitations, this could suggest that third states clear the way for host states to take moves which stymie the predatory state. Moreover, my findings validate the concerns of activists and scholars who have been cognizant of the relationship between international norms and practices emerging from the Global War and Terror, and transnational repression. One of the more robust findings of this study is that when victim(s) who, post-9/11, have been accused of terrorism or religious extremism and targeted for TR, there is an increased probability that host states will engage in complicit actions. Given that a large proportion (42.03%) of cases in my sample include such victims, this is a particularly normatively concerning finding. Victim(s) and their advocates have a viable rationale to appeal to these states for support during incidents of TR, and these states themselves may feel obligated to intervene.

My analysis however also expands our understanding of host state decision making by demonstrating that factors internal to the host state likewise are correlated with certain reactions. Using originally coded data, I demonstrate that the structure of the host state, the inclusivity of the host society, and the claims victim(s) have toward membership in the national community impact the reaction of host states to incidents of TR. When victim(s) of TR are host state citizens or have been granted asylum by

the host state, there is a lower probability that the host state will take complicit actions. Moreover, I find that the probability of complicity between host states and predatory states is less likely when the host state in question is a democracy. However, this does not mean that democratic host states are more likely to take responsive steps which protect the victim(s) and/or impose costs on predatory states. Instead, I find that there is a higher probability that democratic host states will opt for a non-response to TR, taking neither actions that are responsive, nor complicit, nor making public statements addressing the incident. This would appear to validate two disparate observations by prior scholars, that potential victim(s) of TR are comparatively safer in democracies,⁴⁵ and that democracies are not taking steps sufficient to address the growing trend of TR (Dukalskis 2021; Garvey 1980; Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d, 2022b, 2022a).

This chapter represents early analysis of a sample of the originally coded HRRD. Further work is analysis is underway to gather a larger sample, and subsequent analysis may alter these findings. However, this chapter has demonstrated the validity of examining not only predator states decision calculus in determining when and how to commit TR, but host state's calculus in determining how to respond to it. Moreover, this paper has shown that quantitative methodology can be brought to bear to gain a greater understanding of responses to TR as well as the costs (or lack thereof) imposed on predatory state for committing TR.

⁴⁵ My theorizing on this comes from Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw (2021) who contrast the relative safety the Tajikistani opposition in exile was able to find in the European Union, as opposed to exiles who sought security in Russia and were in greater danger. The study however, notes that TR can and does occur in democratic spaces. This natural experiment, however, would seem to suggest a broad trend of TR being mitigated in frequency or severity by democracy in the host state.

Chapter 5: Case Study Analysis

Introduction

This dissertation has introduced a theory of host state decision making in the wake of incidents of TR. Central to my argument on how host states decide to respond to TR is the idea that there are external and internal forces pushing host state authorities. These forces push host states in the direction of denying the predatory state's overtures, protecting victims of TR, imposing costs for TR, as well as external and internal forces pressuring host states to facilitate or not respond to TR. When deciding to facilitate or not respond to TR, host state authorities must weigh the benefits they gain from these actions with the costs, in the form of backlash from external and internal actors who would perceive them as complicit or ineffective. The prior two empirical chapters have provided evidence to support elements of this theory. In this chapter, I employ qualitative methodology to both illustrate and explore the causal mechanisms of my theory. I accomplish this by process tracing four instances of TR.⁴⁶ Two cases which exemplify my theory center on host states which were exposed to high levels of prospective or actual internal and external backlash, respectively. These concluded with the host state responding by securing justice for the victim and countering the predatory state. A second two counter-cases

⁴⁶ Several of these "instances" are coded as multiple cases in the HRRD because they involve multiple tactics occurring over multiple months. For my purposes, I aggregate the data from each case to compile my case study.

are also examined in which high levels of external and internal backlash did not result in the host state taking a firm stance in opposition of the predatory state.

The purpose of these case studies is two-fold. First, by examining the intricacies of these cases, I am able to assess the validity of my theory with a degree of granularity that I am unable to replicate with quantitative analysis of the HRRD. As I will show, host state responses are not always linear. Instead, authorities react to new events, changing their responses in the process. The quantitative data exhibited in the prior chapter portrays such cases as mixed responses in which both responsive and co-operative actions were taken. By process-tracing individual cases of TR however, I demonstrate that what appears to be a bifurcated response on the surface, is in fact the result of rational actors responding to stimuli. Second, process tracing case studies of host state responses to TR illustrates the causal pathways in which my theory may play out in applied settings.

Case Selection

The logic of my selection process is as follows. First, I select two cases in which prospective or actual internal backlash level was high, and two in which external backlash was high. As discussed in my theory, there are a number of ways to operationalize both external and internal backlash. The risk of internal backlash increases through a variety of causal pathways. A mobilized civil society can exert pressure on host state authorities directly; autonomous judicial authorities can act to enforce protections for victims of TR; victims and their advocates can seek redress from independent courts; and political opposition can generate backlash on host state authorities perceived facilitation or ineptitude in the face of intrusions from foreign

powers. Theoretically, these pathways are more likely to occur in liberal democracies with greater judicial autonomy, active civil society, free media, and competitive elections.

To operationalize prospective internal backlash, I therefore selected two cases in which the host state scored highly on V-Dem's liberal democracy rating (Coppedge et al. 2022). As demonstrated in the prior chapter, democracies have lower odds of collaborating with predatory states. Examining these cases in depth will provide greater insight into the comparative validity of my theorized causal pathways in which internal backlash drives host state responses. To operationalize external backlash, I relied on several variables from the HRRD. First, I identified cases in which the victim had citizenship, asylum status, or residency in a third state. Second, I examined cases in which I coded an intervention from a third state. Lastly, I reviewed my notes on these cases to select those which appeared to have the most evidence of a concerted effort from external actors to intervene on behalf of the victim of TR.

Finally, I varied the ultimate responsiveness of the host state. For my exemplar cases intended to illustrate and examine my theory, I selected cases in which the host state ultimately worked to provide justice to the victim(s) of TR in a process that led to some form of confrontation, broadly defined to include any effort which undermined or sought retribution for the predator's TR efforts. with the predatory state. For my counter-cases, I selected cases where this did not occur to a significant effect. Instead, the host state facilitated TR in their territory. As we will see, there is variation in host state responses within this broad categorization. In my

counter-cases, the host states do at times take actions which appear aimed to achieve justice and confront the predatory state. In my exemplar cases as well, at times the host states take actions which facilitate TR. In one such case, involving the extradition attempt of a Sikh nationalist, the host state detained the victim for several months, but then, crucially, released him and denied the predatory state's request. When varying my dependent variable, host responses, I examine the totality of the evidence to determine whether the host state ended by taking responsive or collaborative steps.

This strategy of case selection draws on elements of the crucial case strategy described by Gerring (2008). Briefly, crucial case selection for comparative study involves selecting cases which are “most likely” and “least likely” to exhibit an outcome predicted by the theory. Distinctly though, these cases should be “most/least likely” in all but a variable of interest. In other words, a “least likely” case would have features which would otherwise predict a lack of host state responsiveness to TR, except for the presence of backlash, validating the theory. However, I differ in this strategy because the purpose of this chapter is not to empirically assess the hypotheses offered by my theory, but instead to explore the causal pathways and mechanisms exhibited in cases which support my theory. In addition, I seek to explore failures of these mechanisms and the role of confounding variables in blocking these pathways in cases where the outcome differed. In this sense, I select cases in which responsive action is “most likely” to occur *based on* my variable of interest: backlash. This variation allows not only for the exploration of the utility of

my theory, and an attempt to isolate the most significant causal pathways which lead to the desired outcome, but also to explore counter examples to my theory.

I begin by examining an exemplar case in which external backlash, in the form of a mobilized transnational movement and the British Labour party, occurred in response to the attempted extradition of a Sikh nationalist to India from Portugal. I likewise explore the internal backlash that resulted in Germany in the aftermath of the assassination of four Kurdish advocates by agents of Iran. For my counter-cases, I examine the extradition of a refugee to Tajikistan from Austria, in which the high risk of internal backlash did not prevent the victim’s return. Likewise, I explore the rendition of a Libyan opposition activist from Egypt in which external pressure from the Clinton administration was applied to Cairo. As noted, both cases of high internal backlash-risk which I examine occur in host states which were highly democratic, Germany and Austria. Both the victims in Portugal and Egypt were permanent residents of third states, and third states intervened on their behalf.

Table 6-1. Case Selection		
	External Backlash	Internal Backlash
Host Responsive (Exemplar)	Portugal (India)	Germany (Iran)
Host Collaborative (Counter-Case)	Egypt (Libya)	Austria (Tajikistan)
<i>Note: Host (Predator)</i>		

Methodology

I proceed with each case study by drawing primarily on data as part of the HRRD data collection process, and supplementing this with additional research. Here it is worth noting that the selection of cases is, in part, based on the availability of

data points to construct a narrative and draw conclusions from. As I point out in my counter-case of a young Tajik activist, the lack of evidence in the form of media reports may in and of itself be evidence of, or a contributing factor to, low backlash, at least in the form of public outcry. In each case study I begin by tracing both the timeline of the TR event, and the response of the host state. I complement evidence on the events of the specific case with broader reporting of the geopolitical context of the case, applicable observations from the TR literature, and insights from my theory of host states responses to TR. In most cases, my ability to make causal claims is limited by data availability. Rarely will host state officials provide direct insight into their decision-making calculus, and even in cases in which they were to make such statements, they would need to be interpreted in their own political context. Likewise, counterfactuals are impossible to assess, and I cannot assert that lacking a degree of actual and prospective backlash host state officials would make different decisions in a particular case. Nevertheless, by varying the outcome (host state responsiveness) while holding constant the degree of real and prospective backlash to host state officials, this chapter should help triangulate the mechanisms which make backlash effective at prompting host state responses, and the circumstances in which these mechanisms fail to deliver.

In conducting my case studies, I will not be using the names individual victims, will minimize the amount of identifying information I provide, and will omit citations which reference identifying sources. The reasons for this are multifold. In discussions with representatives from Freedom House concerns were raised about the impact on victims of TR of publicizing their cases and particular identifying

information. While the sources used to compile the HRRD, as well as the entire Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database (AAAD) (Dukalskis 2021) are publicly available, the cases of TR they describe had been publicized to varying degree.⁴⁷ Victims of TR, as has been noted, face the continuous risk of retribution for speaking out both to criticize the predatory state and to highlight the injustices they have faced. The victim of the cases I describe in this chapter has, since the incident in question, seen his parents' home in the predatory state raided by police. Another victim of TR described in the HRRD has been assassinated since an earlier attempt on his life was first documented.

Scholars of TR have been grappling with how best to address the continued risk to the individuals whose persecution is both of scholarly and normative interest. While many of these victims have themselves chosen to publicize their cases, some have not. Some may choose at later points to end their dissent for their own safety. Moreover, even those victims of TR who do publicize their cases may not be fully aware of the risks when doing so. The late Lee Ann Fujii (2012) illustrated the nuanced challenges these types of scenarios present and called for a shift from a procedural approach to research ethics, towards one which is an ongoing process centered on the human subjects of research. Following this advice, I have chosen to not only omit referenced to sources and identifying information provided by Freedom House at their request, but to omit the identities of all case study subjects, as well as references which directly identify the subjects. This information with publicly

⁴⁷ The Freedom House Transnational Repression Dataset (FHRTD) (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021) also draws on publicly available sources. Freedom House makes its data available to researchers upon request but has not publicly uploaded this data.

available sources will be available upon direct. I will also minimize references to subjects and cases which could be used to identify the subjects themselves, particularly when it does not speak to the key themes I address in my theory and seek to assess in this chapter. I make two exceptions in this chapter, identifying the cases of the Mykonos restaurant assassination and the rendition of Mansour Kikhia, under the rationale that the victims in the cases have been dead for nearly thirty years, both cases were highly publicized at the time, and, in the case of Mr. Kikhia, the predatory regime in question has since fallen from power. By the same logic, while I do not identify most victims of TR throughout this dissertation, I do reference individuals like Jamal Khashoggi and Paul Rusesabagina whose cases have been publicized to such a level that any reference in this dissertation has no effect.

Exemplar: External Backlash in Portugal

To highlight and parse out the impact of external backlash on host state considerations I turn to a case of TR against an Indian national in Portugal. Late in 2015, the victim had traveled to Portugal with his family for a vacation when he was unexpectedly detained by Portuguese police. The detention had come at the request of the Indian government via an Interpol Red Notice. The victim had spent at least twenty years in exile, allegedly for his political activism in favor of an independent Sikh state, Khalistan. After leaving India, where a family member had allegedly been tortured and killed at the hands of Indian authorities, the victim received political asylum in the United Kingdom, where he was residing at the time of his detention. The Indian government accused the victim of involvement with various Khalistani terrorist organizations and conspiring in a series of bombings in Punjab, India, as well

as the assassination of the leader of a Sikh affiliate of the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The latter of these crimes had prompted the involvement of the British government and the arrest of a number of Sikhs residing in England. There is no evidence, however, that the victim was one of those arrested, and in fact after investigating, British authorities declined to charge the victim with the terrorist offenses of which he was accused.

Initially, the Portuguese state appeared receptive to the appeals of Indian authorities. A Portuguese court held the victim in detention until a formal extradition request could be submitted by Indian authorities. The general public attorney of Portugal then requested the deadline for Indian authorities to share their evidence against the victim be extended, which was granted by the court, effectively extending the victim's detention. Punjab police made their way to Lisbon, evidence in hand to share with their Portuguese counterparts. Accompanying their case was a pledge that the victim would not be executed if surrendered to their custody. Broadly, these assurances are a legal mechanism to ensure that extraditing states do not violate international law against non-refoulement, or the return of individuals the countries where they are likely to face human rights abuses. In states, such as Portugal, where the death penalty has been abolished, assurances that the extradited will not face capital punishment are often sought before an extradition continues (Beltran de Felipe and Martin 2012). As human rights scholars have noted however, these assurances, particularly when given by states with a history of human rights abuses, often serve as

window-dressing to obscure culpability on the part of host states complicit in human rights abuses.⁴⁸

Thus far it appeared possible that Portugal would facilitate the TR of the victim by extraditing them back to India to face politically motivated terrorism charges. What made this case of TR unique was the level of backlash that the Portuguese state received by an external state and external civil society for their prospective extradition. The victim in question had never applied for British citizenship, pledging to die a refugee if his dream of an independent Khalistan was never achieved. He was, however, a long-term resident of England and a vocal advocate of Sikh nationalism, which connected him with a broad Sikh diaspora in the UK and beyond. Pro-government Indian media began reporting shortly after the victim's arrest that "pro-Khalistani" organizations in the UK and France had begun fundraising and contributing to the victim's legal defense. These pronouncements could be dismissed as propaganda aimed at shoring up New Delhi's warnings of vast networks of violent and well-funded separatists among the global Sikh diaspora. However, the impact of the Sikh community's advocacy can be seen in more tangible forms.

Pathways of External Backlash

Upon the arrival of Punjabi police in Lisbon, advocates of the victim filed a criminal complaint to the Portuguese Attorney General against three of the officers,

⁴⁸ See for example Huq's (2006) critique of the US practice of seeking assurances before extraordinarily renditioning terror suspects.

alleging human rights abuses which Portuguese law provided universal jurisdiction over. This tactic, while directed at the officers for their alleged human rights abuses in Punjab, mirrors the tactics of Chilean and Filipino victims of TR in seeking redress through host state courts (Cheung-Miaw 2021; A. McPherson 2021). Internationally, the victim's wife filed a petition with the European Parliament urging the deportation of the victim to the UK, rather than India. The core of the petition relied on existing treaties in which EU member states pledged to recognize asylum status granted to third state nationals by fellow EU states and extend them similar protections from refoulement. Similarly, the victim's wife and Sikh organizations asked for the intervention of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), noting that Portugal was a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention which outlines the definition and protections afforded to refugees.

There is no evidence that Portuguese authorities followed through with the petition to detain the visiting police officers from Punjab, nor that the European Parliament or UNHRC actively intervened to prevent the extradition of the victim. A response to a British EU MP inquiry on the topic was not given by the Vice President of the commission until after the case was resolved. In his response the Vice President noted that while he was aware of the detention and potential extradition, he lacked detailed information on the case. Nevertheless, the official urged respective member states (i.e. Portugal) to ensure that the case was settled "in accordance with established EU and international rules and procedures." However, the tactic of attempting to influence Portugal's response to TR by seeking the enforcement of its international treaty obligations matches observations in the literature on democracies

adherence to international law as well as expectations from my theory. Though in this case activists sought enforcement through international forums rather than domestic courts (Hathaway 2007; Powell and Staton 2009; Von Stein 2014).

Beyond legal challenges to Portugal's facilitation of Indian TR, international actors directly targeted Portuguese elected officials for pressure. A month after the victim was detained in Lisbon, a legal advisor to a US-based Sikh advocacy group claimed that members in the UK and US had sent 20,000 emails to the President of the Portuguese National Assembly requesting the victim's return to the UK. Several weeks later, several hundred Sikh protestors rallied outside of the Portuguese Parliament, with other protests held outside of Portuguese missions in New York, Washington, D.C., Toronto, and London. The direct pressure Sikh civil society could bring to bear on Portuguese elected officials was limited by demographics. In 2013, several years prior to the victim's arrest, Sikh community leaders estimated their population in Portugal to be only around four thousand, less than 50% of their population just three years prior due to an economic slowdown in the country. In line with Keck and Sikkink's (1998) theory of a boomerang effect, Sikh activists were able to appeal to well-placed British actors more capable of pressuring the Portuguese state. While Sikhs are likewise a comparatively small percentage of the national population⁴⁹, the community is geographically concentrated. In the lower tier local authorities of Sandwell and Birmingham, Sikhs constituted 7.5 and 6.3%, respectively, of the total population in 2021 (ONS 2023). Moreover, the Sikh vote is

⁴⁹ Roughly 0.9% of the population of England as of the 2021 census (ONS 2023).

politically concentrated, with Sikh Britons traditionally voting with the Labour Party (Duckworth, Kapur, and Vaishnav 2021).

Naturally, the Sikh community is not a monolith, nor is the Khalistani advocacy espoused by the victim universally popular with Sikh Britons. However, the geographic concentration and political relevancy of the victim's religious community, along with the successful mobilization of Sikh organizations on their behalf, appears to have convinced British politicians to intervene. A month into their detention, the MP of the victim's district rose before the House of Commons to decry "an abuse of our immigration system by the Indian authorities." He requested that the Home Office lobby the Portuguese government and European Commission for the victim's release, which prompted a promise from one of the office's ministers to examine the case. Another Labour MP and chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group for British Sikhs sent an inquiry to the British Minister of State for Europe, again requesting that the minister lobby Portuguese authorities, arguing that Indian authorities had sought a loophole by pursuing the victim in Portugal rather than appealing again to the British. Finally, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn directly appealed to Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa, noting his concern about protections for those granted asylum to freely travel within the European Union. Corbyn also conspicuously noted that the victim's potential extradition had "become a major issue within the very large Sikh community who live in the UK."

Justice Minister's Decision

Another request for an extension of the victim's detention was made and granted while the Portuguese Ministry of Justice weighed its options. The Portuguese Attorney General had forwarded to the Minister of Justice a request by Indian officials to extradite the victim, while the victim's defense team had forwarded a parallel request to deny India's request to the minister. It was the Minister of Justice, Francisca Van Dunem's, decision whether to move the case forward to trial or dismiss and release the victim. On the day that the Van Dunem's decision was announced Interpol (which had issued the initial Red Notice for the victim's detention prompting Portugal's decision to detain the Sikh nationalist) confirmed that it had removed all data on the victim from its system. Interpol had previously blocked the Red Notice days after being notified of the victim's asylum status. Whether this influenced the Minister of Justice's calculus is unknown, but their eventual decision was that India's extradition request would be denied. In explaining her decision, Van Dunem noted that the victim had obtained asylum in the UK at the time the crimes he was alleged to have taken part in occurred in India. Moreover, Portuguese authorities cited the UN Convention on Refugees and "the EU treaty covering a common asylum policy across the European Union."

It is impossible to know if, without the backlash of Sikh civil society and British MPs, Minister Van Dunem would have reached the same conclusion that Portugal's treaty obligations required it to deny India's extradition request. However, it is reasonable to assume that lobbying from Sikh civil society and British political actors widened media and public attention on the victim's detention and potential

extradition. They also brought to Portugal's obligations under international law to the foreground of the narrative surrounding the case and signaled to Portuguese decision makers that powerful interests within a fellow EU state were watching and could potentially impose costs should the victim be refouled. As Minister Van Dunem's decision was announced the victim's lawyer praised Portuguese authorities for their "courageous" decision. Had Van Dunem announced her intent to press forward with extradition proceedings, and had the victim been returned to Punjab for trial, how would Sikh activists, or Jeremy Corbyn have reacted?

While we cannot say for certain, one does not need to go to extreme lengths to conclude that such a move would have imposed greater costs on Portuguese authorities than denying the victim's extradition. British authorities would not have needed to sever a nearly 650-year-old alliance to signal their frustration with the Portuguese decision in ways which could be felt. Moreover, Portugal's failure to abide by its treaty obligations could have opened it to consequences stemming from cases brought by domestic or international courts. Even if British authorities were to decide that the fate of a single boisterous activist did not warrant diplomatic energy, Sikh activists could easily have brought suit against Portuguese authorities in these forums. The reputational costs should not be understated. Sikh activists both raised attention of the victim's pending extradition and framed it as the unjust repression of a refugee exercising their right to free expression, as opposed to India's framing of the case as routine counter-terrorism cooperation between two states. To the degree that the activist's narrative was adopted, Portugal's reputation in a region of strong liberal norms would have taken a hit.

In addition to demonstrating a potential causal pathway in which external backlash, or the specter of it, leads to the jettisoning of a predatory state's requests for assistance in TR, this case study also demonstrates that external backlash does in fact occur in cases of TR. While it is undoubtable that the majority of victims of TR remain nameless with their cases never publicized in the media and concern for their well-being never broadcast by third state politicians, cases of such as these do occur. In understanding the types of external actors which involve themselves in TR and the mechanisms with which they signal their concern, we gain potential insights into how and when this backlash can be effectively in stemming TR.

Timing and Directionality

Before moving onto the next case of TR, one involving high levels of internal backlash, it is first worth acknowledging directionality of the backlash. In the above-described case, the victim was held in detention in Portugal as they awaited a potential extradition to India. External allies rallied to their support in an effort to prevent this extradition. But where would these actors' energy have gone have the victim been extradited before the story broke? While we cannot say for certain, unfortunately the circumstances described are not unusual. From another HRRD case we can see that external actors' pressure campaigns are not always primarily directed at the host state. This similar case centered on another individual who had fled violence in their state of origin to the UK, but one who had obtained British citizenship, and was detained and extradited back to the predatory state.

The victim was the leader of an Ethiopian opposition group who, during a flight layover in Sana'a, was detained and shuttled quickly to Ethiopia. The victim's location was initially unknown, but once it was discovered that they had been renditioned British diplomats leveled their outrage at Yemeni officials, summoning the Yemeni ambassador to confirm the extradition and then publicly denouncing Yemen's actions as unacceptable and contrary to their international treaty obligations. Attention however, quickly turned to Ethiopia, as it was there that authorities planned to prosecute, and potentially execute the victim. Foreign Minister Boris Johnson sought to quietly ensure that the victim's death sentence was not carried out, while the victim's family filed for a judicial review of Johnson's handling of the case, and specifically, the Foreign Ministry's refusal to publicly call for the victim's release.

In this sense Portuguese authorities were, at least in part, victims of their own making. Had Portugal quickly deported the Sikh activist to India without giving the Sikh diaspora a chance to mobilize prior, it is quite likely that the majority of the latter's efforts would have been directed toward New Delhi rather than Lisbon. Of course, Portugal's strong rule of law proscribes legal procedures to be followed in response to an extradition request from another state, procedures which inevitably delay the extradition in order to provide the suspect the opportunity to mount a defense. While it is by no means unheard of for liberal democracies to quickly and illicitly rendition individuals abroad, particularly individuals accused of terrorism, this may mean that liberal democracies are more susceptible to external backlash when TR involves extradition attempts. Counter-intuitively, authoritarian host states with weak protections for asylum seekers may face less external backlash for

renditioning victims of TR because responsibility for the well-being of the victim is transferred from the host to predatory state.

Counter-Case: External Backlash in Egypt

Not all states which encounter high degrees of external backlash respond with high degrees of responsiveness, resulting in favorable outcomes for the victim and/or costs for the predatory state. To illustrate this observation and explore the causal mechanisms at play, I examine the 1993 disappearance of Mansour Kikhia in Cairo. Kikhia's case in many ways mirrors the case of Jamal Khashoggi some 25 years later. As with Khashoggi, Kikhia practiced his opposition to the Qadhafi regime from the security of his home in the United States. As with Khashoggi, Kikhia's disappearance and later confirmed death implicated a U.S. partner in the Middle East. Like its later the accusations against Mohamed bin Salman, the CIA found that (elements of) the Egyptian government was responsible for Kikhia's disappearance, resulting mounting pressure from the US. However, this external pressure did not convince the Egyptian state to give way or, as in other similar cases, offer a scapegoat. Instead, Hosni Mubarak doubled down and turned the accusations around, instead blaming the US for unduly pressuring Egypt on Kikhia to achieve its other goals.

Born in Benghazi, Mansour Kikhia had risen through the ranks of the Libyan state. First serving as a diplomat of the Kingdom of Libya, he went on serve as both Foreign Minister and representative to the United Nations for Muammar Qadhafi. In 1980, he defected and split his time in the U.S. and France. By December of 1993 he

was a legal U.S. resident, months away from earning his U.S. citizenship (Ibrahim 1993). As the founder and director of the Arab Organization for Human Rights, Kikhia traveled to Cairo to attend the organization's annual meeting (Said et al. 1994). There on December 10th, Kikhia was in the Al Safir Hotel. His wife would later claim that he had been drinking coffee with a Libyan Emissary (Ibrahim 1997). Others note that he left with two individuals who had identified themselves as Egyptian security agents (El-Tablawy 1999). Regardless, Mansour Kikhia was not seen again after that night. One of the only clues to his whereabouts came when a relative contacted his wife, alerting her that Kikhia was in Tripoli (Ibrahim 1993).

Kikhia's prominence, both as a high-level Libyan defector and former UN Ambassador, as well as a leading Arab activist for democracy and human rights in the region (Said et al. 1994) contributed to expressions of concern for his well-being by international actors. A week after he was last seen in Cairo, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a statement expressing concern for Kikhia and noting that he had taken up the disappearance with both the UN Human Rights Commission and Egyptian authorities (Associated Press 1993). Prominent Arab American intellectuals Edward Said and Rashid Khalidi, among others, submitted a letter to the *New York Times* editorial board calling for Kikhia's release (Said et al. 1994). Likewise, President Bill Clinton privately appealed to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak for assistance in locating the US resident (United Press International 1997b). Ibrahim (1993) reported that the Egyptian government's initial reluctance to respond to the disappearance changed when the United States began applying pressure and there appeared "widening indignation among Egyptians." Egyptian

officials began telling journalists that Mubarak had dispatched an aide to confront Tripoli while the Foreign Minister of Egypt declared that “if proven, the abduction of Kikhia in Egypt is an illegitimate and unacceptable matter.” Meanwhile, a spokesman for the Libyan opposition claimed Egyptian authorities had detained, interrogated, and deported a Libyan citizen suspected of involvement in Kikhia’s disappearance (Associated Press 1994).

At first glance, it appeared as though external backlash had pushed the Egyptian government to address the disappearance of Kikhia. Certainly, that is the image that Egyptian officials must have hoped to present as they informed foreign journalists of their concern for his well-being, and the tough stances they were taking against Qadhafi. However, answers were in short supply. Authorities either couldn’t determine, or would not reveal, what had happened to Kikhia and where he was now. As a result, external backlash did not relent. Kikhia’s wife, a U.S. citizen herself, appealed for assistance from well-placed external actors, meeting with Boutros-Ghali, President Clinton, and U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake (Ibrahim 1997; United Press International 1994). When the Egyptian government submitted the findings of its investigation into Kikhia’s disappearance to the U.S. in March of 1995, it did not satisfy American policymakers (United Press International 1995).

Appeals to the Egyptian government for information about Kikhia’s disappearance culminated in September of 1997, when Vice President Al Gore demanded the Egyptian investigation be reopened. It was hardly necessary, as the CIA had that summer concluded its own investigation finding that Egyptian agents had illicitly renditioned Kikhia to Libya, where he was executed. Less conclusive was the

level at which the operation had been approved, with a *Washington Post* source expressing uncertainty whether the two agents who had abducted Kikhia were acting on their own initiative or under orders. News of the CIA's conclusions subsequently were reported by the *Washington Post* (Associated Press 1997b).

Doubling Down

Elsewhere in the HRRD, public revelations that host state agents were culpable in the rendition of victims to predatory state territory resulted in high-profile reversals from host state officials. In Georgia, the rendition of an Azerbaijani journalist led to the President calling for an investigation and the eventual sacking of the heads of counter-intelligence and border security. In Ukraine, the rendition of a refugee and Donbas volunteer to Russia led to criminal charges against police and the firing of the Deputy Prosecutor General. In each case, when facing backlash for its complicity in an act of TR, the host state offered one of its own agents for tribute. Claiming, whether correct or not, that its involvement was limited to rogue actors, the host state pledged a thorough investigation and punishment for those who had collaborated with the predatory state. Given that the *Washington Post's* reporting of the CIA's conclusions had only directly implicated two security officers and not necessarily higher-level Egyptian officials, it would have seemed a reasonable route for the Egyptian government to take. In fact, Mubarak had previously conducted purges of the Interior Ministry and security forces in the aftermath of a police mutiny, denouncing abusive and derelict officials, while engaging in surface level reforms in

which security elites retained their authority (Sirrs 2013). It was not, however, the route that Hosni Mubarak chose to take this time.

On September 29th, 1997, after the *Washington Post* reported on the CIA's conclusions, Secretary of State Madeline Albright with her Egyptian counterpart and again, pressed him on Kikhia's disappearance (Balman Jr. 1997). Cairo was in no mood to make concessions, however, and launched a publicity campaign to flip the script and tie Washington's accusations to Egyptian-Israeli tensions. A month prior to the *Washington Post's* story breaking, an Egyptian court had convicted an Israeli Arab for espionage, leading to diplomatic tensions between Cairo and Tel Aviv (Ghalwash 1997). Speaking to the Arabic daily newspaper *Al-Hayat*, Egyptian officials mocked the CIA's conclusions as fantastic and the work of Zionist elements in Washington (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1997). In a speech commemorating the 1973 October War with Israel, Mubarak denounced the accusations as an attempt to pressure Cairo to release the convicted Israeli Arab. Refusing to reopen the investigation into Kikhia's disappearance, Mubarak also claimed that "if we did hand him over and this did not happen...we have that right" (Ghalwash 1997). *The New York Times* (1997) reported that Mubarak went even further, suggesting that the CIA had been behind Kikhia's abduction. What influenced the Egyptian host state's calculus that further concessions in light of Washington's accusations of involvement in the rendition of Mansour Kikhia were not in their interest? To answer this, it is worth examining both the nature of Washington's pressure campaign against Egypt and the nature of the Egyptian state itself.

Pressure from Washington

Mrs. Kikhia, for her part did not initially accept the CIA's conclusions that her husband was dead. She had held out hope that her husband was still alive and that he could somehow be returned to her. This hope led her to meet with Libyan officials, including Qadhafi himself, to beg for assistance in locating her husband (Agence France Presse 1994). When news of the CIA's report broke, Mrs. Kikhia denounced it as speculation and flew to Libya in attempt to arrange another meeting with Qadhafi (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1997). Previously she had been approached by the U.S. State Department who briefed her on Washington's findings that Mansour had been executed by Libyan authorities after Egyptian agents assisted in his rendition. Mrs. Kikhia left the meeting frustrated by what she interpreted as the politicization of her husband's disappearance. She told Ibrahim (1997) "...the Americans are telling part of the truth and trying not to embarrass their Egyptian allies..." Upset by the scant documentation State Department officials provided her, she resisted their request that she publicize news of her husband's death and the CIA's findings in a news conference. When she refused, she claims the officials told her the report's findings would wind up in the *Washington Post*.

Mrs. Kikhia believed that the United States was using her husband's disappearance and presumed death to shame and pressure Qadhafi's Libya. The Carter and Reagan administrations had previously expelled Libyan diplomats after the so-called "Mad Dog of the Middle East's" emissaries had distributed flyers inciting violence against Tripoli's adversaries in the diaspora and attempted to assassinate a Libyan student studying the United States (Doder and Koven 1980; Getler 1981).

Like Kikhia's friends and allies, Washington saw Qadhafi's arranged rendition and execution of his leading opponent in exile as another example of the wanton and ruthless violence of his regime. Unlike Kikhia's loved ones however, Washington's primary concern was isolating and undermining Qadhafi's regime. While U.S. officials almost certainly would have hoped for Kikhia's safe return, his death provided an opportunity to again highlight Qadhafi's flagrant violation of international liberal norms.

More complicated were the implications of Kikhia's disappearance for U.S.-Egyptian relations. Washington was reportedly confident it could pressure Egyptian authorities into compliance, but their will to do so was less apparent. Mrs. Kikhia reported that National Security Advisor Lake had seemed both disinterested in pressuring Cairo and arrogant in his ability to do so. "This is very easy. We have two buttons here: one says Egypt come, and the other says Egypt go," he reportedly told her. Egypt's economic dependence on aid Washington provided was assumed to be enough to ensure compliance (Ibrahim 1997). What compliance, however, was Washington hoping to ensure? And what pressure was it willing to apply to achieve it? Tensions between Washington and Cairo were certainly apparent in the fallout of the Kikhia rendition. These tensions led to a degree of naming and shaming by US government sources. State Department Spokesman James Rubin confirmed that the US had received "some indication of involvement by Egyptian officials in the matter," and denounced Mubarak's critical response to the report as "illogical" (Ibrahim 1997). *The Washington Post's* own reporting on the CIA's findings relied on

releases by unnamed government sources, which was accompanied by complaints of Egypt's non-cooperation (Associated Press 1997b).

Yet the background to this frustration was a larger tension between Washington and Cairo on isolating Libya. Egypt's economic and security interdependence with its neighbor made it hesitant to fully adhere to the United States' efforts to isolate Libya. Egypt had lobbied the United Nations to lift economic sanctions imposed on Libya and voted along with the majority of the Arab League to defy a ban on civil flights to the country (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1997; Ibrahim 1997). In this sense, evidence that Egyptian officials had, at some level, coordinated with their Libyan counterparts to rendition Kikhia not only caused concerns about violations of international law against a U.S. permanent resident. It indicated a degree of cooperation between Libya and Egypt that the United States was trying to minimize. Yes, the explicit demands of Washington to Cairo were to investigate fully the disappearance of Mansour Kikhia and to hold any officials who had illicitly helped transfer him to Libyan custody fully accountable. Implicitly however, there was also a signal that Egyptian cooperation with Libyan security agencies was unacceptable.

What pressures were the Clinton administration willing to place on Cairo to ensure its compliance in the Kikhia case? The imbalance in US-Egyptian bilateral relations, in terms of the economic and military assistance Washington provided to Cairo was, after all, only useful as leverage if there was a chance such aid would be diminished if cooperation was not obtained. Here again, the Kikhia case was only one portion of US-Egyptians tensions over Libya, which were themselves only one

component of the transactional relationship between the US and Egypt. More broadly, the Clinton administration was, for much of the duration of the Kikhia disappearance, embarked on an effort to secure peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

Maintaining security for Israel had long been a foundation upon which US support for Egypt rested, but efforts to achieve a broader peace deal rested on diplomatic assistance from Cairo. Obtaining this assistance, the *New York Times* Editorial Board (1997) reasoned, was the rationale behind what they perceived as the Clinton administration's hesitancy to fully "follow up" on the CIA's report of Egyptian involvement in Kikhia's rendition. The United States' diplomatic efforts in the broader region were in a delicate diplomatic balance, had Washington applied too much pressure on Egypt for assistance on Kikhia, causing excessive embarrassment to Mubarak, it would only be more difficult for it to achieve Cairo's support on pursuing peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. This, along with numerous other diplomatic priorities Washington had in mind for Cairo, may explain the comparatively tepid language used to describe Egyptian as opposed to Libyan involvement in the rendition. Mansour Kikhia was already dead, was it important to the United States that complicit host state authorities, perhaps low-ranking ones, be held accountable at the cost of derailing the US-Egyptian relationship? Or could that relationship be retained, with some light wrist slapping, and those perhaps more responsible for the killing, Qadhafi's regime, could be denounced and shamed?

Egyptian Calculus

Egypt would certainly have been aware of the balancing act facing the Clinton administration. Perhaps Mubarak reasoned that the release of the CIA's findings were as far as the Clinton administration was willing to go in holding Cairo accountable. Mubarak and his agents had, after all, responded favorably when US pressure first came. Mubarak's aides and ministers had said the right things shortly after the disappearance made headlines, but without conclusive answers as to where the opposition leader was US officials kept asking questions. By the time the CIA findings were reported however, Kikhia had been missing for almost four years. If the US was going to do anything besides complain, it surely would have done so by then. Particularly given that the CIA did not directly name higher ranking Egyptian officials as culpable. Instead, Mubarak and the Egyptian state would have to consider the costs of backtracking on their previous four years of denying any knowledge or culpability in the disappearance. How could an investigation into Kikhia's disappearance not have uncovered evidence of the involvement of Egyptian security agents without an active coverup by at least some higher-level officials?

Moreover, Egyptian complicity in the Kikhia disappearance implicated those with outsized political influence. The Egyptian state cannot be understood without an understanding the military-security complex referred to as the securitocracy. The concept of securitocracy is used to describe the outsized power of military-security elites within Arab states. The concept refers not only to the relative power these elites have to conduct internal repression, but the influence they can extend into other areas of policy and governance. In essence, the securitocracy has both the flexibility to

intervene in the domains of other, weaker, elements of the state, and to operate with few checks on its authority (Yossef and Cerami 2015). In seeking to explain the Arab Spring's failures that would come some twenty years after Kikhia's disappearance, Filiu (2015) dubbed the militarized states of Egypt and other Arab nations as modern-day Mamluks, after the class of soldiers who overthrew the Egyptian Sultan in the 13th century and ruled in his stead. Indeed, much has been made of the role of the military in Egyptian political life, particular after the Arab Spring revolution and Arab Winter coup in which generals played kingmakers.

However, at the time Kikhia's rendition, Egypt's generals had become more content in their barracks, retaining their position as the crucial political force in Egypt, but with a more indirect and less visible role than they played during the rule Gamal Abdel Nasser (Brownlee 2007; Harb 2003). Internal security comprised a larger portion of the security apparatus, with Brownlee (2007) describing Egypt as "more of a police state than a military state." The end of the Cold War led to a shift in the Egyptian securitocracy which allotted increased heft to the intelligence apparatus, known throughout the Arab world as the *mukhabarat*. Mäkelä (2014) dates this shift to 1996, three years after Kikhia's rendition and a year prior to the public release of the CIA's findings, with an Egyptian conference establishing an international cooperative framework to combat Islamist militants.

While reporting on Kikhia's rendition did not, as I can determine, specify the particular agency the two Egyptian agents who left with him from the Al Safir Hotel, it is safe to assume that they were linked to the politically influential *mukhabarat*. Any backtracking on the part of Mubarak or Egyptian officials would have found a

roadblock in the form of the securitocracy. Moreover, given the widespread unpopularity of the *mukhabarat* among the Egyptian populace (Sirrs 2013), publicly implicating it in the rendition of a prominent Arab democracy advocate may have had broader domestic implications. Again, Mubarak had, as recently as 1986, denounced scapegoats within the securitocracy (Sirrs 2013). The domestic pressures not to do so in this case therefore may be less consequential to high-level Egyptian officials than the perceived low risk of international backlash should Cairo holdfast.

The Judicial Approach

For their part, Mansour Kikhia's allies and loved ones firmly placed blame for his disappearance directly on Egyptian authorities. The organization he had helped found and at whose meeting he had disappeared, the Arab Organization for Human Rights, claimed in 1995 that Egyptian authorities were "legally responsible" for Kikhia's fate (United Press International 1995). Mrs. Kikhia decided to test this allegation, filing a civil suit against the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior for the disappearance of her husband. Her attempt initially failed, as a court found no evidence of "mistake or negligence" resulting in Kikhia's disappearance. To add insult to injury, the presiding judge reasoned that Mrs. Kikhia did not even have grounds to file suit, as he rejected evidence that she had been married to Mansour Kikhia (Associated Press International 1998). That her case was dismissed, and her relationship with her late husband was defamed as illegitimate, is perhaps unsurprising given the relative power of the Interior Ministry, and the comparative weakness of judicial autonomy, in Egypt. More surprising is that the status of Mrs. Kikhia's legal case did not follow a linear pattern, instead it ebbed and flowed.

The highpoint of Mrs. Kikhia's legal challenge came on February 22, 1999, when a court of appeals reversed the lower courts earlier ruling and determined that the Interior Ministry had been negligent when it failed to protect Mansour Kikhia. The court then ordered the ministry to pay Mrs. Kikhia the equivalent of \$33,000 (El-Tablawy 1999). This victory was short lived however, as less than a year later an appeals court again reversed a lower court's ruling, vacating the findings against the Interior Ministry (Associated Press International 2000). That the Egyptian courts, briefly, ruled in favor of Mrs. Kikhia and against the Interior Ministry is surprising, and may hit and deeper, unseen internal politics at play. In some ways the legal drama in Egypt mirrors that in Portugal, in the sense that belatedly, the victims of TR received some measure of justice. In Portugal, the Justice Ministry released the victim to return of his own free will home. Justice was not perfect, he had been detained wrongfully for several months, but the worst eventualities were avoided. In Egypt, justice was however fleeting, a judgement rendered seven years after the fact and reversed after less than a year. For the victim, it was of little use. In September 2012, nearly nineteen years after his disappearance, the body of Mansour Kikhia was discovered in Tripoli after the fall of the Qadhafi regime (Makar 2013).

Exemplar: Internal Backlash in Germany

To assess my theory that host states which perceive higher risks of internal backlash are less likely to facilitate, and more likely to impose costs for, TR I turn to a 1992 shooting that plunged German-Iranian relations to a low point. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Germany was in 1992 one of most democratic states in the world, as measured by V-Dem's measure of electoral democracy (Coppedge et al.

2022). Factors endogenous to Germany's democratic system, combined with the high profile nature of the offense, should have pushed the German state to impose severe cost on Tehran for its role in what would become known as the Mykonos Incident. However, as this section will show, the path from the Mykonos restaurant slayings to diplomatic sanctions against Iran was not straightforward.

At 11pm on September 17, 1992, two armed men entered the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin (Costello 1992). Already inside were four affiliates of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) including the group's Secretary General, Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, his associate and translator Nourollah Dekhordi, the KDPI's European representative, Fattah Abdoli, and its representative to Germany, Homayoun Ardalani (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center 2011). At the time the KDPI, Iranian Kurdistan's oldest opposition group, was engaged in an insurgency against the Iranian regime from their base in northern Iraq, launched in retaliation for the assassination of Sharafkandi's predecessor and in response to Kurdish protests in Iran. This insurgency would continue until 1996-7 when Iranian and Turkish assaults proved too costly for the group (Amnesty International 2008; Esfandiari 2016; Milburn 2017).⁵⁰ Sharafkandi and his associates were in Berlin at the time to attend the congress of Socialist International (Agence France Presse 1992a).⁵¹

⁵⁰ Amnesty International (2008) references KDPI sources in claiming that the group unilaterally suspended its military operation due to the challenges facing Iraqi Kurds, and calling for autonomy rejecting violence. As noted however, it does appear the insurgency resumed and continued through 1996-7.

⁵¹ The targeting of individuals whose organization was involved in armed conflict with the predatory state presents an interesting methodological question. Namely, does this constitute TR or is it simply the trans-nationalization of civil conflict? I have addressed this question in both my introduction and methodology chapters. Briefly however, many of the established definitions of repression limit the concept to the targeting of individuals for their non-violent political activities which are perceived to challenge the state (R. J. Goldstein 1978). Others take a more expansive view of what constitutes repression (Oliver 2008). In the study of TR, some scholars have made a concerted effort to limit the

After locating the group, the two armed men hurled insults in Farsi and opened fire, killing the four and wounding a fifth person before fleeing with a third accomplice (Costelleo 1992). Within 24 hours of the attack, police announced that the Staatsschutz, a unit handling politically motivated crimes, would be leading the investigation (Agence France Presse 1992a). A spokesman for the chief federal prosecutor cast suspicion on either “Iranians or Turkish Kurds” for having committed the murders (Costelleo 1992). It was not a logical leap to suspect Tehran’s involvement. Sharafkindi’s had succeeded his predecessor, Abdul Rahman Qassemlou, after the latter had been murdered in Austria in a crime widely suspected of being directed by Tehran (Costelleo 1992). In death, Qassemlou joined the ranks of Iranian intellectuals, defectors, monarchists, and minority leaders who had been slain abroad by the nascent Islamic Republic (Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran 2021).

In the months following the attack, reports trickled in of the arrests of suspects in the killing (Agence France Presse 1992b; Petty 1992). Finally on May 27, 1993, the German federal prosecutor’s office announced murder charges against two Lebanese and one Iranian national, and charges of complicity to murder against two Lebanese nationals. The suspects, prosecutors claimed, had operated at the direction of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian intelligence

concept in such a way that it does not apply to those who it can credibly be claimed have participated in war crimes or terrorism (Furstenberg et al. 2020). Some of the cases in the AAAD, including the Mykonos assassinations, involved those may have been involved in some form of armed violence against the predatory state. For the purposes of this dissertation and the HRRD, I chose to give wide latitude to the coders of the AAAD and FHTRD, retaining cases which involved an armed conflict component. Methodologically, I believe Germany’s response to the Mykonos murders has the strong potential to inform our understanding of host state responses to TR, even if one were to take a more narrow definition of what constitutes TR.

services (VEVAK). Kazem Darabi, the ringleader, was accused of being an agent of both the IRGC and VEVAK, while two collaborators were alleged Hizballah operatives (Agence France Presse 1993).

In October 1993 the Berlin District Court commenced what would evolve into a multi-year murder trial over the Mykonos incident (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1996b). Witnesses included a former president of Iran who claimed the killings were approved by President Ali Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Agence France Presse 1996) and Director of German Intelligence Klaus Gruenewald who claimed VEVAK had been behind the killings (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1996a). Bernd Schmidbauer, intelligence advisor to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, also testified, alleging that Iran's Minister of Intelligence Ali Fallahiyan had asked that the Mykonos trial be prevented during a visit to the Chancellor's office in 1993 (Geitner 1997). Before the trial concluded, German authorities issued an arrest warrant for Fallahiyan, whom they accused of ordering the assassinations (Valinejad 1996).

After three-and-a-half years on April 10, 1997, the Berlin court rendered its verdict. Darabi and three of his co-defendants were found guilty and handed prison sentences, while a fifth defendant was acquitted (Geitner 1997). Perhaps more significantly, the presiding judge, Frithjof Kubsch, ruled that those found guilty had been following orders issued by Iran's Special Affairs Committee which included Rafsanjani and Fallahiyan (Lockwood 1997). Shortly after the verdict was announced, Bonn and Tehran recalled their ambassadors while German officials warned their citizens not to travel to Iran and announced that four Iranian diplomats linked to the intelligence service were to be expelled (Geitner 1997; Lockwood

1997). In denouncing Iran's "flagrant violation of international law," the German Foreign Ministry announced the suspension of its policy of "critical dialogue" with Tehran, which had entailed diplomacy and trade in the hopes of empowering moderate factions in the regime (Lane 1995; McCathie 1997). In its outrage, Germany was joined by its allies. European Union officials announced the suspension of critical dialogue with Iran while inviting member-states to join Bonn recalling their ambassadors to the Islamic Republic (Geitner 1997). Within two days of the Berlin court's verdict, all EU states, with the exception of Greece, as well as Canada and Australia had recalled their ambassadors to Iran (Associated Press 1997; McCathie 1997; United Press International 1997a). The suspension of relations between Iran and European states would last six months (Evans 2014).

On the surface, it appears as though German officials did everything in their power to obtain justice for the victims of the Mykonos restaurant murders. Moreover, in their pursuit of justice, prosecutors and intelligence officials worked hand-in-glove to expose the depth of Tehran's involvement, publicly accusing high-level Iranian officials of involvement in the killings. German diplomats followed up with a judicial ruling finding the predatory regime culpable by recalling Bonn's ambassador and expelling Iranian diplomats. Moreover, the costs imposed by the German state and its allies appear to have had an impact on Tehran's cost-benefit calculations in conducting future acts of TR, with the Mykonos murders representing a peak in Iran's TR campaign of the 1990s, followed by a decline in the 2000s (Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran 2021).

As noted at the start of this chapter, democracy may be attributed to an increased risk of internal backlash through a variety of casual pathways. Previous quantitative analysis proved limited in identifying the most significant of these pathways. By parsing through data points qualitative however, I am better able to identify internal pressures exerted on German officials during the Mykonos Incident facilitated the firm response Bonn eventually took. Moreover, I am able to identify costs to such firm responses which, absent the potential for backlash, may have pushed Bonn toward a more muted response to the murders.

Reluctance to Confront

The major events outlined above chart a linear path from the initial police investigation to the diplomatic breakdown between Germany and Iran. Examining data points between these events, however, demonstrates a series of schisms which emerged at various points in the investigation between those advocating direct confrontation with Tehran and those preferring a more subdued response. Roughly a month after the murders, Schmidbauer held a secret meeting with Fallahiyan, who he would later testify had attempted to have the Mykonos shooter's trial blocked. It was a questionable choice at best given the suspicions that had already been raised of Iranian involvement in the assassinations, suspicions informed by over a decade of experience of Tehran's long-distance killings of exiles.⁵² When news of the meeting broke and attracted criticism however, Schmidbauer publicly denied that the evidence

⁵² Longer, if you include the Pahlavi regime's history of targeting exiles (Burke 1977; Shain [1989] 2005: 159-160).

pointed toward Iranian state involvement in the Mykonos murders (Evans 2014). The facts did not however, support those claims even three months into the investigation. In December 1992, *Stern* magazine reported that federal investigators had discovered, but kept secret, evidence implicating two Iranian diplomats in the shooting. Schmidbauer met with both German authorities and the Iranian Ambassador before deciding to allow the diplomats to return to Iran without announcement or judicial repercussions (Agence France Presse 1992b). Moreover, the German Federal Crime Office had proposed arresting Fallahiyan during his visit to Berlin for his suspected role in the murders. Their plan however, had been vetoed by the Chancellor's office (Lane 1995).

Another schism emerged in November of 1996 with demonstrations in Iran against the German government over allegations that Khamenei and Rafsanjani had been involved in the Mykonos murders. Students pelted the German Embassy with various projectiles, while at a rally in Qom clerics suggested issuing a fatwa against the Berlin prosecutors on the case similar to the one issued against Salman Rushdie (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1996c; Xinhua News Agency 1996). Some in the German state reacted firmly to these threats, with Justice Minister Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig pledging that the prosecutors work would continue without interference or intimidation. Development Aid Minister Carl-Dieter Spranger called for an end to critical dialogue with Iran in light of the threats made against German prosecutors (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1996c). In contrast, a core cadre of German executive officers whose purview included foreign policy, and who had been advocates of engagement with Tehran, attempted to ease tensions at the expense of defending the

integrity of the judicial process. Foreign Minister Klaus Klinkel stressed to his Iranian counterparts that the decisions of the prosecutors and courts in the Mykonos trial had been made independently of the German executive and did not represent the positions of the German government, which wished to maintain good relations with the Islamic Republic (Xinhua News Agency 1996). Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann called for an increase, rather than a decrease, in dialogue with Tehran (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1996c). Meanwhile Chancellor Kohl dispatched an apology to the Iranian government for any religious offense given (Evans 2014).

Even after convictions against the Mykonos assassins were reached and a diplomatic response ensued, there are data points suggesting that many in the German state wished to maintain an opening for future critical dialogue and, eventually, move on from the Mykonos Incident. In April 1997, a Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that critical dialogue with Tehran had been suspended temporarily, not permanently (Xinhua News Agency 1997). Years later in 2004, after the standoff with Iran passed, a memorial for the victims of the Mykonos murders was erected in Berlin, sparking backlash in Iran. In an interview with a Iranian newspaper, the Germany's Ambassador in Tehran, Paul von Maltzahn, expressed frustration that the memorial had led to another souring of ties between the two nations and distanced the German government from the memorial (Deutsche Welle 2004). Meanwhile, though Darabi and one of his co-conspirators, Abbas Rhayel, were sentenced to life in prison by the Berlin court, after serving fifteen years of their sentence both were paroled and deported in December of 2007 (Der Spiegel 2007). Though Deutsche Presse-Agentur (2007) argued that it was common in Germany for detainees sentenced to life in

prison to be paroled after 15 years, Der Spiegel (2007) noted that just a year prior a court had ruled that both Darabi and Rhyel should serve 23 years before their parole be considered. Trading Darabi as part of a prisoner exchange had been proposed several years prior by German authorities and Iran had repeatedly requested his release (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007b; Der Spiegel 2007).⁵³ This, along with the release of a German citizen from Iran a month prior to the parole of Darabi, led Der Spiegel (2007) to speculate that his release had been part of a prisoner exchange, a theory denied by German officials.

Pressure to Confront

My theory of host state responses to TR acknowledges that different host state agents have different interests which can contrast in the event of TR. Executive agents, particularly those involved within the security services, the diplomatic corps, and the principal in the form of the head of state/government will, I theorized, have a greater concern for the impact of any countering of TR on national security and the state's foreign relations. In democracies with separation of power between autonomous agents, such as the judiciary and elected officials, there are opportunities for host state agents to push back against these impulses. Moreover, the comparatively open nature of democracies allows for non-state internal actors to influence the response to TR. I have outlined above how, in response to the Mykonos Incident, the German host state responded by both prosecuting the assassins, naming

⁵³ Deutsche Presse-Agentur (2007a) claims that German authorities had always denied requests to swap Darabi as part of a prisoner exchange.

and shaming the Iranian predatory state, and imposing diplomatic costs. I have also outlined how elements of the German state sought to mitigate diplomatic fallout from the incident, even at the expense of enforcing German law and defending the state's sovereignty and judicial independence. What pressures, in the form of actual or prospective backlash, pushed Germany toward a path of confrontation rather than mitigation?

Undoubtedly the public and extremely violent nature of the act of TR contributed to firm German response. Assassinations conducted as part of TR do not inevitably lead to host state responses. The spectacle however, of multiple victims shot in a busy restaurant in Berlin by unknown gunmen, one of whom wielded an automatic weapon, would have placed pressure on the state to quickly bring the perpetrators to justice, even in a non-TR case. The resulting media frenzy which ensued, only heightened by the glaring implication that suspect with the strongest motive was not a person but a foreign state, undoubtedly put greater pressure on German officials to respond. Media scrutiny led to critical reports on Schmidbauer's contact with, and apparent coverage of, Iranian envoys, as well as the failure of German police to provide adequate protection to the victims and adequate surveillance of Darabi who was suspected of being a spy (Agence France Presse 1993).

The public nature of the crime and the media coverage of the crime had a cascading effect as politicians entered the fray and issued statements. When news of the attack first emerged, the Green Party argued that if Iranian state involvement was discovered, aid to Tehran should end, while investigators were encouraged by the

Social Democratic Party's leader to hunt for the killers where ever they were, even abroad (Kinzer 1992). Once indictments against the suspects were issued, Berlin's Green Party issued a call for Bonn to sever relations with Iran (Kinzer 1993). Some German legislators called for economic sanctions against Iran after Darabi and his co-conspirators were convicted, including freezing Iranian credits (Geitner 1997).

Joining calls for harsher penalties on Tehran were the Kurdish and anti-government Iranian diaspora in Germany. Figures in both communities repeatedly pointed the finger at Tehran as soon as news of the killings spread (Bridge 1992; Kinzer 1992). As with the transnational Khalistani Sikh movement, the transnational Iranian opposition and Kurdish diasporas attempted to apply pressure to the German government to give the Mykonos victims justice. Leaders of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a French-based Iranian opposition movement, blamed Bonn for complacency (Kinzer 1992, 1993). Kurdish leaders lobbied the Berlin prosecutors to expand the scope of their inquiry to senior Iranian leadership, while Kurdish protestors rallied after guilty verdicts were rendered demanding a trade embargo on Tehran (Geitner 1997; Hakakian 2011).

The Kurdish community in Germany, estimated at 3-400,000 in 1992, was both a sizeable and sympathetic group. Most Kurds in Germany were fairly recent arrivals who had fled from Turkey in the 1980s in the face of a post-coup crackdown. The recent ethnic cleansing of Kurds by Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War and in the aftermath of a failed post-Desert Storm uprising would have also been on the minds of many Germans as news of the Mykonos Incident broke (Costello 1992). One contemporary media report from the time speculated that the number of

Kurds in the country may have impacted German's opinions on the question of Kurdish autonomy and, assumedly by extension, the Mykonos Incident (Kinzer 1992). Of course, the Kurdish community was divided along axes such as national origin and political affiliation. These divisions could be tense, so much so that the prosecutor of the Mykonos case, Bruno Jost, believed at first that the killings had been the work of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) which had a history of violent confrontations with rival political factions in the diaspora (Hakakian 2011).⁵⁴

Prosecutorial Discretion

Central to the backlash which prevented a quiet resolution to the Mykonos Incident however, was the intervention of prosecutors operating with the degree of, not unchallenged, autonomy expected in a liberal democracy. In her history of the incident, Roya Hakakian (2011) documents how after initial announcements mentioned potential Iranian involvement, the Justice Ministry intervened and forbade chief prosecutor Alexander von Stahl from further releases without their prior approval. When Jost completed his indictments which directly accused Tehran of orchestrating the attack, von Stahl was ordered to have the final drafts approved by not only the Justice Ministry, but the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry as well. When two months passed without approval, von Stahl was told the copies of the indictment had been lost and that he should resubmit them. After a further delay, von Stahl decided to submit the indictment directly to the courts on the logic that any further

⁵⁴ In fact Adamson (2020) has since noted that the PKK has engaged in its own form of TR to ensure compliance within the transnational Kurdish community.

delay would violate the, by then imprisoned, accused's legal rights to a speedy trial. The move did not come without personal cost, according to Hakakian (2011), as von Stahl's party was firmly behind the policy of critical engagement with Iran. Two months after the charges were released, von Stahl was asked to resign by the Justice Ministry, allegedly over his handling of an unrelated case.

The pressure Hakakian (2011) documents on von Stahl and Jost to limit the scope of their investigation and avoid directly implicating Tehran demonstrate how perhaps improbable it was that the Mykonos case escalated to the level it did. Prior to the public release of the indictment outlining Tehran's involvement in the murders, German executives sought to weigh the costs of damaging Bonn's beneficial relationship with Tehran and backtracking their policy of critical engagement, against the benefits of upholding domestic law and protecting German sovereignty. It appears that many in leadership placed greater emphasis on the former, but once the accusations were made and an independent court ruled them credible, the ability of the host state to ignore the case was limited. Von Stahl and Jost are portrayed in these accounts as champions of the liberal rule-of-law who overcame the politics of convenience, and it is perhaps this ethos which motivates host state agents in liberal democracies to push back against the states natural inclination to delegate TR to a lower tier concern (Evans 2014; Hakakian 2011).

Exemplar: Internal Backlash in Austria

In this section, I explore a counter-example of my theory in which the host state faced a high risk of internal backlash, as operationalized as democracy, but did not respond by firmly defending the victim's rights and confronting the predatory

state. The case I draw from the HRRD and examine in depth involved the extradition of a victim to Tajikistan from Austria. The victim had fled to Austria sometime in early 2020, requesting asylum. Though a Tajik opposition activist later claimed the victim was not a member of any political party, he did openly support the National Alliance of Tajikistan (PMT), an umbrella organization of exiled Tajikistani political parties which had been declared a “terrorist and extremist organization” by the Tajikistani Supreme Court. When he was eventually extradited, Tajikistani state media reported that the victim was a member of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) which had likewise been banned as a terrorist organization in the country. State media asserted that the victim had undergone military training abroad in 2019 as part of an effort to overthrow the regime, and that he was wanted for both terrorism and treason.

The Tajikistani government sent an extradition request to Vienna, asking for the victim’s return in relation to his alleged terrorist activity. At first however, it did not appear they would find a receptive host state facilitator. Austrian authorities concluded, upon investigation, that the extradition request was politically motivated. However, the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum as well as Austrian courts overruled this initial decision. Unfortunately, as occurs with some HRRD cases, media coverage of Tajik activist’s extradition proceedings was sparse, leaving several gaps in the narrative. In early 2021 however, the victim was arrested pending his deportation scheduled to take place a month later. As in the previous case, the victim’s community rallied to support him. Tajik opposition activists abroad claimed that the victim was not a member of any political party and that any trial he faced in

Tajikistan would be patently unfair and the victim would likely be subject to torture and other mistreatment. A few days before the victim extradition, Tajik opposition figures gathered in Vienna to protest in favor of the young activist's release.

Unfortunately for the imprisoned activist, the Tajik community in Austria is as small and marginal of a political bloc as the Sikh community is in Portugal.

Furthermore, though this case study will focus on the impact of internal backlash on Austria's decision-making, it is worth noting that, unlike the Sikh diaspora and transnational pro-Khalistan movement, the opposition-minded Tajik diaspora did not appear to have access to a network of influential actors capable of intervening on their behalf. As best I can ascertain, the young activist had no foreign citizenship or asylum status, certainly not within a fellow EU state which would, as we have seen, bring certain additional treaty obligations to bear on Austria.

Several days after the Vienna protest, the Tajikistani Prosecutor General's Office confirmed in a statement that the young activist had in fact been extradited to Tajikistan, and that upon his deplaning at the airport he was taken into custody. The Prosecutor General lauded the cooperation of Austrian and EU law enforcement on issues of counterterrorism, which he credited with the return of the young activist. Three months after his forced arrival in Tajikistan, the young activist was sentenced to twenty years in prison for alleged extremism and treason, though as his family told reporters, the specifics of the accusations against the activist were never disclosed to them.

Oddly enough the activist's story does not end with the handing down of his sentence. Even after his arrest and imprisonment in Tajikistan, the young activist's

case continued to make its way through the Austrian legal system. One month after the Tajikistani court made its ruling, the Austrian Supreme Court followed up with a ruling of its own, though one more favorable to the imprisoned activist. The court determined that Austrian authorities had based their decision on outdated information on Tajikistan and that they had failed to give the activist the opportunity to depart Austria for a third country of his choice, rather than deporting him to Tajikistan. For these reasons, the court invalidated the extradition order against the activist and ordered Austrian authorities to secure his return. While legally significant, the ruling was practically unenforceable and largely symbolic in its most significant implications. Tajikistani authorities did not comment on the Austrian court's ruling, and it is unclear how Austrian officials would have secured the activists return.

As we can see, the Austrian state's response to Tajikistan's TR of an opposition activist fleeing political persecution was marked by fits and starts. Austria's liberal judicial system at times worked to protect the rights of the activist turned asylum seeker as my theory would predict, initially denying Tajikistan's extradition request and then seeking his return to Austrian territory. This liberal system however was countered by a security complex which viewed with suspicion certain migrants, imposed barriers to entry through an asylum process, and promoted cooperation the security apparatuses of foreign authoritarian regimes. In the previous case, German prosecutor's decision to name Tehran in their indictments of the Mykonos murders was opposed by political leaders. Prosecutors were just barely able to keep the scope of their case as is, though it appears to have cost the chief prosecutor his job. In the Austrian case these liberal judicial agents' activity proved

slow and insufficient to prevent to extradition of an asylum seeker from Tajikistan. This may reflect a weakness of internal backlash to prevent the ultimate facilitation of TR by the host state, at least through a pathway of judicial autonomy.

Migration and Counter-Terrorism

Though the purpose of this case is to compare the strength of internal backlash as a predictor of host state responsiveness, to do so it is worth also comparing several factors of the Austrian case to that of the Portuguese case. Both cases involved attempts to convince host states in the EU to extradite victims of TR accused of terrorism, one accused of involvement in Khalistani terrorism and the other with an Islamist opposition group dubbed radical. Both cases took place in the context of two transnational events which impacted European states receptivity toward asylum seekers and as I argue, the costs of turning away these refugees. The first of these is the so-called migration crisis, which in 2015 led 1.3 million asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries engulfed in civil conflict to flee to Europe (Connor 2016). The continued stream of asylum seekers, predominantly from the Middle East and Africa, led to securitized policies and narratives aimed at the defense of Europe against the otherized threat of refugees (Goodman, Sirriyeh, and McMahon 2017; Hintjens 2019). The backlash that followed promoted anti-migration populist movements, including in Austria where the People's Party under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz adopted decidedly anti-migrant positions to absorb the populist wave (Gady 2018).

Alone the transnational anti-migrant sentiment which afflicted Europe starting 2015 could be argued to have lessened the risk of internal backlash to host states

which facilitated TR, as populations became more receptive to more stringent asylum policies. However, coinciding with this anti-migrant sentiment was the broader context of the post-9/11 era in which new norms for countering alleged terrorist threats were established, supplanting the established international norm of non-refoulement. As outlined in my theory, the international regime of counterterrorism has adopted many of the tactics now employed by authoritarian regimes to pursue their dissidents in exile. In the best of circumstances this erodes the ability of good faith actors in the West to criticize TR due to charges of hypocrisy, at worst it has made TR more frequent by the creation of new international norms regarding practices of rendition and targeted killing (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; Schenkan and Linzer 2021). Moreover, the counterterrorism regime has created a malleable language of threat which authoritarian regimes are able to employ to justify their abuses and forge alliances of convenience with Western liberal democracies. Scholars have documented how the charges of terrorism have been employed to attempt to justify domestic repression (Edel and Josua 2018) as well as TR (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d). When predatory states can link their exiled targets to an amorphous threat of terrorists motivated by religious extremism, they play on the fears of Western democracies to co-opt them more easily. Moreover, the strength of the prevailing narrative of an unending threat of terrorism emanating from specific groups of people residing in specific parts of the world means that calls for the defense of due process under the law and basic human rights will be more marginal for those accused of terrorism than other offenses.

Nor are all accused terrorists created equally. As noted, both the Sikh nationalist from the Portuguese case and the Tajik activist in this case were accused by their respective states of origin with terrorism. Yet Khalistani terrorism, the type of which the Sikh nationalist was accused of committing, is not taken as seriously in the West as terrorism committed by Muslim extremists (Kugelman 2023).⁵⁵ The Tajik activist's affiliation with the nominally religious IRPT would seem to make him more susceptible to charges of terrorism which would resonate with Western audiences. Though Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw (2021) note that the IRPT's Islamist credentials are at times overstated and that the group has sought to forge a "Euro-Islam" it would be far from the first non-violent Islamist opposition or Muslim religious organization to be labeled as extremist by an authoritarian regime and then find itself under suspicion from Western authorities.⁵⁶ The international counter-terrorism regime created space for liberal democracies to cooperate with authoritarian regimes in repressing Islamist movements accused of terrorism and/or religious extremism.⁵⁷

Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw (2021)'s comparative analysis of TR against the Tajik opposition in exile notes that, compared to members of the other

⁵⁵ For an example of the disconnect between Western and Indian perspectives on the Khalistan movement, see Pillalamarri (2023) who expressed exasperation over the perceived threat of the movement in the wake of backlash over India's alleged assassination of a Sikh activist in British Columbia. Then compare to Fair's (2023) analysis that the Khalistan movement hasn't been a significant threat to Indian security for the last twenty years and its ghost instead serves as a useful tool for Narendra Modi to portray himself as a strongman ahead of elections.

⁵⁶ See for example attempts in the US to ban the Muslim Brotherhood (McCants and Wittes 2017).

⁵⁷ See for example the US and UK's crackdown on the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group prior to a faction of the (non-imprisoned) leadership's ascension to al-Qaeda, to the benefit of the Qadhafi regime (Human Rights Watch 2012). See also Austria's attempt (overruled by the judiciary) to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood (Middle East Monitor 2021), and the UK and Germany's banning of Hizb ut Tahrir (Kenney 2024; McNeil-Willson 2024), both non-violent Islamist movements whose members are persecuted in authoritarian Muslim-majority states.

opposition party Group 24, IRPT members have had more success finding refuge in Europe and, partially as a result, experienced less severe TR than those remaining in the post-Soviet space. This may suggest that, overall, the international counter-terrorism regime did not disproportionately inhibit IRPT members from finding sanctuary in Europe. It is hard however, to explain the specific case of this young activist's extradition without considering the context of over the broader anti-migrant sentiment in Europe at the time and crucially the norms of the era which facilitated easier cooperation between states for the purposes of counterterrorism at the expense of liberal legal protections for the accused. The costs of both phenomena disproportionately fell on Muslims.

This can be seen in Austria's own reaction to an ISIS-inspired terrorist attack in Vienna in late 2020, several months before the young activist was detained. The attack prompted Chancellor Kurz to pledge to criminalize political Islam and led to Austrian police raiding the homes of Muslim academics and activists accused of affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and Palestinian Islamist movements (Al Jazeera 2020; Middle East Monitor 2021). As with Austria's deportation of the alleged IRPT activist, Austrian courts would later rule these raids illegal and pour cold water on authorities attempts to ban the Muslim Brotherhood (Middle East Monitor 2021). It was in this context that Austrian authorities accepted Tajikistan's claims that an asylum seeker in their country was affiliated with an Islamist terrorist group and as a result deported him. Certainly, Austrian authorities likely perceived a diminished risk of internal backlash as domestic forces pushed a right-wing governing coalition for stronger counter-terrorism action in the wake of a deadly

attack and more stringent asylum processing in the wake of a surge in migration. These forces however also diminished the prospect of external backlash as Austria pursued what had become an expected, if not acceptable curtailment of due process and the asylum protections. Combined, these factors likely mitigated and overwhelmed any internal backlash that would have otherwise occurred.

It is reasonable to suspect that had a non-Muslim asylum seeker been accused by a deeply authoritarian predatory state of membership in an extremist organization deemed non-threatening to Western states, push back from international civil society and the Western media would have been less restrained and belated. It is further reasonable to suspect that had the young activist been a refugee from a predatory state deemed a strategic rival to Western states, such as China or Russia, attempts to extradite him would have been more likely to attract criticism from Austria's EU or US partners.

Mitigating Democracy

Recall, that in the German case, democracy played a role in increasing internal backlash against German authorities in several ways. First, the story was widely reported by the free press who also covered critical missteps of the authorities. Second, civil society, in the form of the Kurdish and anti-regime Iranian diasporas mobilized to lobby German officials. Third, German opposition parties issued calls for a more confrontational approach to Iran. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, German prosecutors pursued the evidence and named Tehran in their indictments, guarding their autonomy along the way.

This case differed in several notable ways. First, the case of the Tajik activist did not attract nearly as much media coverage. I am somewhat limited in the strength with which I can make this claim. Most of the data used to describe this case came from sources supplied by the AAAD and FHTRD. The HRRD data collection process did not yield many additional sources, which may in part be factor of linguistic barriers: I lack the German, Tajik, or Russian fluency necessary to access these media's coverage of the Tajik activist's detention in Austria or Tajikistan. However, the lack of English language media coverage of the case, combined with the less spectacular TR tactics used (an extradition request versus a mass shooting), and the relative marginalization of Tajikistan in Western consciousness, all signal that this case was not widely discussed in local media.

Second, though members of the Tajik opposition in exile protested the activist's detention, it appears that the activist was unable to mobilize a larger civil society coalition on his behalf. This in turn may have impacted the media coverage of the case. Third, I was not able to locate any statements from Austria's political opposition on this case, although again, this may be a limitation of the data in capturing said statements. Finally, the Austrian legal system was able to provide a measure of symbolic justice to the victim but was patently unable to prevent his illegal transfer to Tajikistan. As noted in the German case, even when judicial officials are able provide justice in cases of TR, there is a narrow window for success to occur. Competing pressures within even democratic host states can easily overwhelm the strength and autonomy of courts and prosecutors. In the case of the Tajik activist, it appears that the increasingly stringent norms on asylum-seekers and

counterterrorism emboldened forces which overwhelmed the liberal expectations of the Austrian state.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented a comparative, qualitative analysis of four case studies. Two cases, that of a Sikh nationalist facing extradition in Portugal and the assassination of four Kurdish opposition figures in Germany, exemplify the theory this dissertation has presented. A close examination of these cases has also provided insight into the causal pathways in which external and internal backlash can lead host states to defend the rights of victims of TR and confront predatory states. Two additional cases, that of the extradition of a Tajik activist from Austria and the rendition of Mansour Kikhia from Egypt, provide counterexamples of my theory. In these cases, heightened external and internal backlash did not prevent the host states from facilitating TR. A closer examination of these cases provided insight into what blockages, or countervailing pressures can mitigate the impact of external and internal backlash.

There are a number of causal pathways in which external and internal backlash can be applied to host state authorities. Externally, a variety of international actors, from third-party states, international organizations (IOs), non-government organizations (NGOs), and transnational social movements can apply pressure to host state authorities in the hopes of securing justice for the victims of TR, as well as the assistance of the host state in confronting the predatory state. Moreover, as demonstrated in the case of the Sikh nationalist detained in Portugal and awaiting extradition to India, the actions of external actors can snowball, feeding into one

another. The Sikh diaspora and transnational Khalistani movement was instrumental in highlighting the precarious situation of the activist. Through protests, legal action, and letter-writing it sought to apply pressure on Portuguese authorities to reject India's request. Understanding that their direct influence in Portugal was limited however, the diaspora directed its appeals to the UK where the Sikh community had greater political power. British authorities, specifically Labour party leaders in the legislature, began appealing both to their ministers and to Portugal directly to release the activist, eventually succeeding.

In Egypt however, external backlash did not prove enough to shift Cairo's position. Here again, pressure was applied from multiple actors, such as the United Nations and prominent Arab intellectuals. It was the efforts of the Clinton administration however, that were perhaps most apparent and should have, according to my theory, resulted in Cairo taking a more confrontation approach to Tripoli. Once the US revealed evidence that Egyptian security agents had clandestinely renditioned Kikhia however, Cairo only doubled down. As we saw, Cairo likely did not perceive that backlash from Washington would be exponential. When Washington first expressed concerns, Cairo signaled a shift in approach, making visibly confrontational, yet measured, statements against Tripoli and detaining a suspect. However, when greater pressure was applied, it appears that Cairo decided that any further concessions would be too costly in terms of reputational loss, domestic considerations, and bilateral relations with Libya. Mubarak also, likely, reasoned that Egypt's position of geopolitical importance to the US would limit the severity of any future external backlash applied by the Clinton administration.

Likewise, my theory also describes a number of pathways in which internal pressure can be applied. Domestic civil society actors can directly appeal to elected officials. Media outlets and journalists can highlight perceived mishandling of TR, causing host leaders reputational costs to their constituents. Opposition parties can capitalize on these perceived missteps for political gain. Finally autonomous courts and justice ministries can pursue justice for the victims of TR, and block facilitation by other elements of the host state government. These pathways are, theoretically particularly strong in liberal democracies, driving my decision to review cases occurring in two highly democratic host states, Germany and Austria. In the aftermath of the Mykonos assassinations, we saw several of these mechanisms at play. German opposition parties called for a more confrontational approach to Iran, German media widely covered not only the murders, but the perceived missteps German authorities took in preventing and responding to the killings. In addition, both the Kurdish and anti-regime Iranian diasporas lobbied German authorities to impose costs on Tehran. Most significantly however were the roles of prosecutors who, withstanding countervailing pressure from other elements the German state, directly named Iranian authorities as the ringleaders of the murders. This in turn forced reluctant German officials to directly impose costs on Tehran.

In contrast, the Austrian judicial process did not provide a young Tajik activist a sufficient measure of protection. In the case in question, the Austrian courts eventually determined that the deportation order against the activist was illegal, but only after he had already been extradited to and imprisoned in Tajikistan. Why, given the strength of liberal democratic institutions of both countries, did Germany succeed

in providing a degree of justice to its victims of TR, and Austria did not? Here we saw that the success of German prosecutors in withstanding political pressure to deliver justice was far from assured. In the Austrian case, the incident of TR did not feature a spectacular display of violence and was less widely covered in the media. Moreover, the prevailing anti-migrant sentiment and norms of counterterrorism conspired to prejudice the Austrian state against the victim, who was an accused member of an Islamist opposition group designated a terrorist organization by Tajik authorities. Both factors empowered agencies of the state to take stricter measures against migrants, and particularly Muslim migrants, at the expense of liberal protections for asylum seekers enforced by the judiciary. Likely, these identity markers also would have made the victims situation less sympathetic to the broader Austrian populace, degrading the otherwise high risk of backlash.

Analysis of these cases points to certain causal pathways in which external and internal actors applied backlash to host state actors, and certain confounding mechanisms that may interfere with these pathways resulting in a responsive host state. External backlash appeared to have a greatest effect when delivered by state or political actors, such as Labour Party MPs. Likewise, despite the Egyptian government not fully investigating the rendition of Kikhia or holding those who facilitated it accountable, there is evidence to suggest the intervention of Clinton administration official prompted at least surface-level responses. The challenge of examining the effect of external backlash on host state responsiveness is that the intensity and duration of said backlash does not follow a linear pattern. The Clinton administration's high-level contacts with Cairo over Kikhia, and its decision to

publicly accuse Cairo of (some level of) complicity is about as extreme of a pressure campaign a third state mounts on a host state in the HRRD. Yet, Cairo likely reasoned that its strong bilateral ties with the US were not in significant danger over the issue and that it risked reputational and domestic fall out if it conceded the findings of the CIA's report.

Internal backlash likewise tended to travel through particular causal pathways most efficiently. While activism by diasporic groups was documented in both the German and Austrian cases, and in the former it was joined by wide media coverage and public statements by the political opposition, it is through the courts where the victims were able to achieve a modicum of justice. In the Mykonos Incident prosecutors dedicated to the rule of law and their own independence pushed forward a case which directly implicated Tehran. In Austria, the courts eventually ruled in favor of the victim and vacated the deportation order against him, albeit too late to have a meaningful impact. However, in both cases state agents with competing interests sought to influence the outcome of legal processes. In the German case, prosecutors were just barely able to preserve their autonomy in time to publicly make their case, essentially tying the hands of the rest of the German state. In Austria however, the courts were only successful at overturning an order to deport the Tajik activist after it had been completed.

While generalizability is always a concern with case study conclusions, this analysis does indicate that future scholarship would do well to examine certain phenomena in greater depth. First, future research should address the role third-party state play in influencing host state responses to TR. When are these states more

successful in persuading host states to take firm action against predatory states? Is external backlash less easily transferred between patron-client dyads such as the US and Egypt, or counterintuitively does closer relationships between third-states and host states diminish the influence of backlash?

Second, scholars should examine the role of judicial autonomy in host state responses to TR. Can a clear relationship between laws and policies which diminish relative judicial autonomy, even in liberal democracies, and host state responses be drawn? Finally, scholars who examine host state responses to TR quantitatively should continue to search for more finetuned measures of backlash. As demonstrated, democracy is not a perfect predictor of internal backlash. Confounding factors such as norms on migration and counterterrorism can impact the strength of state agents, such as judicial authorities, who would otherwise stand in the way of collaboration with the predatory state.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Introduction

This dissertation began with a simple puzzle. Why did Chile make the choice to target Orlando Letelier for assassination in Washington, DC, while Saudi Arabia chose to wait until Jamal Khashoggi could be lured to its Istanbul Consulate? The simplest answer, that Chile and Saudi Arabia assessed different risks to carrying out their respective operations in the United States, goes to the heart of this dissertation. I argue that predatory states which seek to engage in TR take the prospective environment of host states into account. Often, these predatory states judge the risks, in the form of costs imposed by the host state, to be low and proceed with TR. Sometimes, the risks of costs are high, but the rewards outweigh them. Regardless, to understand either scenario, we need to understand host state responses to TR. Unfortunately, the literature on TR has yet to fully address the role of host states.

This dissertation takes steps to address this gap. In developing a comprehensive theory of host state responses to TR, this dissertation outlines a novel approach to conceiving and analyzing the role of host states in facilitating and countering TR. By introducing the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD), I provide new and valuable data with which to gauge the frequency, strength, and direction of host state responses to TR. The HRRD also provides opportunities for scholars to triangulate factors which contribute to host state decision making and avenues for advocates and policy makers to surge attention to key leverage points in order to encourage positive outcomes for victims of TR. In this

concluding chapter, I summarize the main findings of this dissertation and highlight the contribution they offer to both the nascent literature on TR and to policy makers and advocates interested in combating TR. I also offer final thoughts on the direction ahead, both for the continued development of the HRRD and for broader scholarship on TR.

Towards a Theory of Host State Responses

While the TR literature has considerably more to say on the behavior of predatory states, some insights into host states do exist. While theoretically, predatory states risk incurring costs by violating the sovereignty of host states (Adamson and Tsourapas 2020; Lewis 2015), observations of these costs are anecdotally rarer. Host states are, it is observed, largely indifferent to the occurrence of TR (Dukalskis 2021; Garvey 1980; Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d, 2022b, 2022a). The abuse of foreign nationals or ethnic minorities is, for many states, of tertiary concern if at all (see Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022f). Worse yet, many states view the victims of TR themselves as a threat (Baser and Féron 2021), or as pawns which they can exchange to the predatory state for their own benefit (Shain [1989] 2005). Yet, we also know that this is not always the case. Costs have been imposed on predatory states in various instances and host states have adopted confrontational policies over the issue of TR. The question then becomes when do host states take action to ensure that justice is done for the victims of TR, and that predatory states suffer a consequence for their actions?

The traditional response is that when host states do respond, they act in accordance with their prevailing foreign policy and national security interests. Often this is seen in the cases of host states actively collaborating with predatory states to facilitate TR when they enjoy mutually beneficial political relationships. Sometimes, such as with TR emanating from Beijing, the host state is gains economically from the predatory state (Jardine and Greer 2022; Jardine, Lemon, and Hall 2021). Still in other instances, the host states security services regularly exchange intelligence with predatory state (Sepper 2010) and see the rights of victims of TR as a bearable cost to exchange for the continuation of these relationships (Garvey 1980; Glennon 1984). Unspoken is the converse: that host states with adversarial relationships with the predatory state may see confrontation and naming and shaming as a means to win the upper hand in a broader geopolitical struggle.

This dissertation adds to this theorizing by introducing the concept of backlash. I argue that internal and external to host states are actors which not only oppose ignoring or facilitating TR, but will impose costs of host state leadership if they are seen doing so. Externally these actors include foreign “third party” states with a vested interest in the case. Perhaps the victim is a citizen of theirs who has family in the 3rd state. Perhaps they were granted asylum in the 3rd state and were transiting through the host state. Or perhaps the 3rd state is an adversary of the predatory state and sees any facilitation of TR as a broader indicator of allegiances. Other external actors could include IGOs, such as the UNHCR. International civil society and transnational social movements could likewise involve themselves in cases of TR and advocate for the victims.

Internally too, a variety of actors can impose costs in the form of backlash for facilitating of failing to respond to TR. Constituents may see TR as indicative of host state leadership which is unable to enforce the nations laws and prevent the intrusion of foreign powers. They may be particularly incensed at cases involving particularly egregious violence or which demonstrate egregious incompetence or corruption on the part of host state officials. Political opposition may seek to exploit these instances for electoral gain, highlighting the perceived mishandling of the incidents by host state officials. Beyond this, separate actors within the host state itself may become a vehicle for backlash. Justice officials, eager to dispense justice and less encumbered by foreign policy concerns⁵⁸ may pursue criminal cases against the perpetrators of TR. Courts, particular when autonomous, may render verdicts against these perpetrators. Moreover, in host states with judiciaries capable of checking the authority of the executive, victims' advocates can file suit against predatory state officials for their actions (Cheung-Miaw 2021; Garvey 1980; A. McPherson 2021), as well as complicit host state officials.

Theoretically, when instances of TR become public, host state officials must consider the possibility that their actions or inactions will result in backlash. In acknowledging that eventuality they must weigh the costs and likelihood of backlash against the benefits of inaction or facilitation. I theorize that in host state environments where backlash is more likely the odds of predatory state engaging in TR is lower. Likewise in host states in which the risk of backlash is higher, the odds of host state authorities taking responsive measures to TR is higher.

⁵⁸ See Garvey (1980).

Findings

Methodology

To test my theory, I compiled the Host Response to transnational Repression Dataset (HRRD), a cross-national database of incidents of TR occurring between 1991-2020, as well as the host state responses to them. Individual incidents of TR contained in the HRRD were drawn from the Authoritarians Actions Abroad Database (AAAD) (Dukalskis 2021) and the Freedom House Transnational Repression Database (FHTRD) (Freedom House 2021; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021). After joining and randomizing the data, I collected data, primarily through targeted queries on Nexis Uni, on host state responses to these incidents of TR. In addition, valuable information on the victims themselves, including their residential status in the host state and whether or not they held third-state citizenship, was also collected and added to the HRRD.

Empirically assessing my theory on host state responses to transnational repression required first establishing when predatory states commit TR, in what host states are victims of TR most often targeted in, and what bilateral features increase the odds of TR occurring in a predator-host dyad. From these findings I could infer that victims residing in certain host states are more difficult or costly to conduct TR against. Doing so proved difficult however, as the HRRD documents only documents observations of TR actually occurring. To identify non-events, observations in which TR could have occurred but did not, I adopted a multi-pronged strategy. First, I transformed the HRRD into three variants, predator- year and host-year monads, and a predator-host-year dyad set. Next, I utilized Dukalskis' (2021) data collection

procedure for the AAAD to identify cases of predatory states which could have conducted TR, but were not observed to have done so. Next, I identified host states where victims were present but not targeted with TR by identifying states where UNHCR documented refugees had found traveled, states which were or had historically been contiguous, and states in the same UN region. Drawing on these datasets and utilizing logistic regression models, I outlined in Chapter 4 my findings on which predatory, host, and predatory-host dyads had the greatest odds of experiencing TR.

When TR Occurs

The resulting analysis made several novel contributions to our understanding of the patterns of TR. In terms of the predatory states with greater odds of conducting TR, I predicted that TR practices would vary by regime type, with single party and monarchical regimes engaging in less TR, particularly less violent direct tactics of TR, and military regimes engaging in more TR/violent direct tactics. This hypothesis however was only partially validated by the data, and I found that predatory states with stronger party, hereditary, and military power base dimensions were all less likely to conduct TR. Early theorizing on TR by Shain ([1989] 2005) suggested a number of expectations about the type of regime most likely to target exiles overseas. Drawing on this analysis, I predicted that repression domestically would positively correlate with TR. Likewise, I predicted that predatory states would be more likely to target opposition abroad on the basis of a deep ideological dispute, and that more

personalized regime would have greater odds of conducting TR, and particularly violent direct tactics.

Here the data supported most of my hypotheses. Predatory states with greater respect for physical integrity and political liberties have lower odds of conducting TR. While the HRRD does not contain information on ideological disputes between the predatory state and victim, V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2022) indicating the level of ideological justification for its rule a regime employs did not significantly effect the odds of TR being practiced. Predatory states which relied more on ideology did however have greater odds of using direct violent tactics of TR. Finally, predatory regimes with higher levels of presidentialism did have greater odds of conducting TR and direct violent tactics of TR.

With a firmer understanding of the types of predatory states more likely to conduct TR, I then turned my attention to the states with host victims of TR. Analysis of the HRRD data supported my prediction that host states which are more susceptible to internal backlash would be less likely to experience TR against victims in their territory. Several pathways of internal backlash proved significant in these models. Perhaps most important democratic host states had lower odds of seeing victims in their territory targeted with TR, and the two subsets of TR measured. This finding held even when controlling for a regional bias in the data, in the form of over-reporting cases of TR which targeted victims in Europe, North America, and Australia/New Zealand. Host states with stronger judicial constraints on their executive were also less likely to witness TR, or co-opt tactics. Lastly a divided government also decreased the odds of direct violent tactics of TR occurring against

victims in a host state. I infer from these findings that backlash can occur through a variety of pathways. Host states with a judiciary capable of checking the executive can hold state officials accountable for facilitating TR. Host states with a divided government may be at greater risk of an opposition party highlighting the perceived ineptitude or corruption of host state officials in their responses to TR for political gain. More broadly, many of the pathways for internal backlash theorized are broadly correlated with democracy, explaining the negative correlation with host state democracy and the occurrence of TR.

Finally, Chapter 4 presented analysis of predator-host dyadic traits correlated with increased odds of TR occurring. In line with my predictions, host states which are more dependent on predatory states had greater odds of seeing victims in their territory targeted with TR. Importantly this prediction only held true with economic dependency. A greater dependency of the host state on the predatory state for its security needs did not significantly affect the odds that TR would occur. When predatory states were dependent on the host state for their security needs however, the odds of TR did increase. More broadly, interconnected host and predatory state dyads in which a higher level of economic and security bandwidth was documented had greater odds of seeing TR occur. This gives credence to a wide variety of sources which claim host states often facilitate TR out of consideration of the beneficial relationships they have with the predatory state (Garvey 1980; Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022e; Han 2022; Jardine and Greer 2022; Jardine, Lemon, and Hall 2021).

In sum, the HRRD provides a unique tool to analyze not only the range of TR tactics, but also the probability that TR will occur within specific host state contexts.

This dissertation demonstrated that measures associated with my concept of internal backlash are also correlated with decreased odds that TR will occur. Likewise, host state economically dependent on the predatory state have greater odds of seeing TR against victims in their territory. This finding extends to forms of predatory dependence on the host state, suggesting that TR is most commonly practiced between interconnected states. With these findings established in line with my theory, this dissertation then addressed the issue of host responses to TR.

Host Responses

Drawing on a random sample of HRRD cases for which data on host state responses have been collected, this dissertation sought to address not only when TR occurs but how host states react to its occurrence. Data on these responses was wide-ranging. A variety of variables were collected that could be considered “responsive” or “complicit” at scales which made them unlikely to have occurred in response to all TR tactics. As such I created a series of dichotomous variables which indicate any of these actions labeled “responsive” or “complicit” occurred. In addition, I also coded “non-responses” in which neither responsive or complicit actions, or any statements on the part of host state officials were noted. In my analysis I again drew on my theory of backlash, expecting that host states more subject to external and internal backlash would be more likely to act responsively and less likely to take complicit actions or non-responses. In contrast, I expected host states more dependent on predatory states would be less likely to act responsively and more likely to engage in complicit acts or have non-responses to TR.

The results validate many of these expectations and the broader theory of backlash in the face of TR. Utilizing original HRRD variables I find that when third states, neither host nor predatory, intervene in the aftermath of TR it effects host states. When third states apply pressure on host states on behalf of victims, there is an increased probability that host states will take responsive actions. Likewise, when third states apply pressure on predatory states, there is a higher probability that host states will take responsive actions. Internally, I also utilized original HRRD variables on victim's residency status, believing that victims considering as "belonging" to the national community would be more susceptible to prompting internal backlash if their TR was mishandled. As expected, the results of Chapter 5 indicate that when victims of TR are host state citizens, residents, or have received asylum from the host state, there is a lower probability that host state authorities will engage in complicit actions. Democracy, the form of government so closely associated with many of pathways to internal backlash, did not increase the probability that host state authorities would engage in responsive actions. Democratic host states did, however, have a higher probability of engaging in "non-responses" and a lower probability of engaging in complicit actions.

One of the more robust findings of Chapter 5 pertains to a factor which can decrease the susceptibility to backlash. When victims of TR are accused of terrorism/extremism, 42.03% of cases in the HRRD sample analyzed, the probability that the host state will engage in complicit actions increases. It is established in the literature that predatory states will denounce non-violent political opponents abroad as terrorists (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021), applying a malleable concept to

individuals which, post-9/11, provoked a sense of threat and laxer standards of protection for suspects (Huq 2006). Labels of terrorist therefore decreases, although does not by any means eliminate, the risk that predatory states will face external backlash for targeting victims with TR.

My expectation that hosts states more dependent on predatory states would be more likely to engage in complicit acts found less support in the data. Host state dependency, both economic and security, did not significantly affect the probability that host states would take any action. Instead, predatory state security dependence on host states increased the probability that host states would have “mixed” responses, engaging in both complicit and responsive acts. Why this would be the case is unclear, although it may signal a willingness of host states in clientelist relationships to support predatory states anti-dissident aims.

Another unexpected finding came in the form exclusion based on socio-economic status. Initially this variable was included in Chapter 4 and 5 models to accounts for the social environment which could impact the risk of backlash. If host states excluded individuals from services and governed spaces on the basis of their socio-economic status, this may indicate a less accepting environment for migrants, diasporas, and other foreign nationals, providing them less resources to protect themselves. To the extent that such policies are reflective of a broader public opinion, this may decrease the risk of internal backlash in the wake of host state facilitation of TR. However, findings in Chapter 4 demonstrated that more exclusion resulted in lower odds of TR occurring. Likewise, data analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrated that more exclusion increased the probability that the host state would take responsive

actions. Why this is the case is again difficult to pinpoint, though one potential answer is a selection effect: dissidents fleeing abroad would be less likely to navigate to host states with high exclusion, hence less TR. Likewise predatory states may feel more emboldened by said exclusion and use more extreme tactics, resulting in more responsive actions by the host state.

Again, analysis of the HRRD provides unique opportunities for research into TR. While previous studies have used quantitative analysis to identify correlates of TR being practiced by predatory states and the targeting of victims in host states, none, to my knowledge has examined the aftereffect of TR. Namely, quantitative data analysis had yet, prior to this dissertation, to be leveraged to understand the nature of host state responses to TR. Analysis in Chapter 5 yielded important insights into factors correlated with increased probabilities that host states would facilitate TR, or respond by seeking justice for victims and/or penalties for the predatory state.

Case Exemplars and Counters

This dissertation adopted a multi-methodological approach to answering the question of how host states respond to TR. While Chapter's 4 and 5 outlined quantitative analysis of the HRRD, identifying correlates of TR occurring, and of certain host state responses to TR, Chapter 6 adopted a qualitative approach. Drawing on four examples from the HRRD, I demonstrated the utility and possible causal pathways of my theory that backlash can lead host states to adopt responsive actions in the face of TR. Examining the case of the attempted extradition of a Sikh nationalist from Portugal to India, I demonstrated how high external backlash on the Portuguese state coincided with the Minister of Justice's decision to deny India's

extradition request and release the Sikh nationalist. A transnational Sikh diaspora and nationalist movement mobilized to exert direct pressure on Portuguese authorities for their compatriot's release. Arguably more effective, however, was the pressure this movement was able to bring to bear on British politicians. The comparative political power of the Sikh community in the UK, as compared to Portugal, prompted opposition MPs to lobby both the British government and Portuguese authorities directly for the release of the Sikh nationalist. Their arguments were bolstered by the fact that the nationalist had in fact been granted asylum in the UK, which Portuguese authorities eventually accepted as legally binding them to release the victim.

High backlash does not however, always result in favorable outcomes for victims of TR. In addition to examining cases of TR in which backlash led to expected outcomes, I also examined two counter cases in which it did not. In doing so, this analysis demonstrates potential confounding factors which can overcome backlash, and circumstances in which backlash is not as effective as theorized. In examining a counter case of high external backlash, I outlined how, after a high-level Libyan dissident was covertly renditioned by Egyptian security agents, the Clinton administration lobbied and then named and shamed Egypt for its complicity. Rather than backtracking however, Egypt doubled down and accused the US of politicizing the case or even having a hand in the disappearance themselves. I note that while third state pressure was present in this case, the impetus for the United States appeared to be more directed at shaming Libya than Egypt. Moreover, the host state had to weigh the reputational and domestic costs it would face in backtracking with

its likely assessment that further costs imposed from the US would be marginal if materializing at all.

In examining the effect of internal backlash, I again select a case to exemplify my theory. In this case I examine the Mykonos restaurant assassination in Germany which targeted figures of Iran's Kurdish opposition. It was Germany's judicial system which would take the first responsive actions. German prosecutors indicted a number of suspects but also named high level Iranian officials as conspirators in the plot. After a guilty verdict was reached, German officials hands were tied and they both expelled a number of Iranian diplomats and recalled their ambassador to Tehran. The responsive steps taken by prosecutors, however, were not uncontested, and it is easy to imagine a counterfactual in which their efforts were unsuccessful. In such a case in which a Tajikistani activist was extradited from Austria, the courts eventually ruled Vienna's extradition order illegal. However, the justice system moved too slow and piecemeal preventing the activist from avoiding detention in their country of origin. In part, I argue, this was a factor an anti-migrant mood in Europe that was accompanied by a heightened fear of terrorism. Despite Austria's democratic government and liberal legal system, the potential extradition of a foreign activist accused of terrorism and of affiliation with an Islamist movement did not mount significant enough backlash to secure the victim.

Tracing the process in which victims of TR were targeted and host states responded, provided needed depth to this dissertation's analysis. In doing so, these case studies not only demonstrated the real-world application of my theory of backlash but also addressed areas where this theory can be expanded upon. These

case studies also illustrated the variety of pathways in which backlash can lead to host state action.

Contributions

This dissertation contributes to the still nascent literature on TR in a variety of ways. While scholars have leveraged cross-national datasets to identify correlates of TR being practiced by certain predatory states and targeting victims in certain host states, none to my knowledge have utilized data on host state responses. In other words, these works focus on the likelihood of TR occurring based on particular traits of the predatory and host states and their relationships. Inferences can be made from such analysis as to what may be emboldening predatory states to target victims in particular host states, including conclusions that certain types of host states are more likely to facilitate TR and other to impose costs on the predatory state or otherwise counter TR. However, without looking at the aftereffect of these incidents of TR we must rely on assumptions regarding the predatory state's decision calculus. This is particularly important when considering the costs of TR. While certain tactics of TR documented in cross-national datasets such as extraditions and detentions by definition involve a degree of complicity on the part of host state authorities, efforts by said authorities to block TR attempts, achieve justice for the victims of TR, and impose costs on predatory states, are less easy to readily discern from existing data.

By presenting originally collected and coded data on host state responses to TR in the form of the HRRD, this dissertation has been able to make assertions that were not previously possible regarding host state activity in the wake of TR. While scholars and activists have lamented a perceived dearth of costs imposed on predatory

states for TR (Dukalskis 2021; Garvey 1980; Glennon 1984; Gorokhovskaia and Linzer 2022d, 2022a, 2022b), none had yet documented with broad, cross-national quantitative data how common “responsive” actions are on the part of host states. What constitutes a firm enough response, and particularly what costs are sufficient to deter predatory states from conducting TR is still a matter for inquiry and debate. If my theory is correct, sufficient costs will be contextual to the particular predatory state.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, this dissertation has taken a step in the correct direction, demonstrating that host state responses to TR do vary and vary in ways that we can draw conclusions on the traits of states most likely to facilitate, respond to, or not respond to TR.

This dissertation also has implications for those interested in countering TR through policy. By drawing conclusions on the types of host states with the greatest probability of taking responsive, non-responsive, or complicit actions in the face of TR, as well as the pathways toward these outcomes, this dissertation has provided policymakers and human rights defenders with a map of leverage points to focus their energies. As outlined, this dissertation has shown that democracies more frequently engage in non-responses to TR, providing evidence to back assertions that while much progress has been made in certain democracies to recognize and counter TR, more work needs to be done. Some potential areas in which policies assist are in the areas of asylum processes, norms surrounding counterterrorism, security relationships, and the intervention of third states. Findings from Chapter 5 suggest that host states are more likely to engage in responsive actions when the victims of

⁵⁹ An observation I derive from Shain ([1985] 2005).

TR are citizens, residents, or have been granted asylum, with further analysis suggesting the latter of these is most robust. Naturally, this should not be taken as indicative that asylum seekers are not incredibly vulnerable to TR and other dangers. Rather, based on data at our disposal on public incidents of TR, host states are more inclined to act responsively when individuals they have already granted asylum are faced with TR. The most straightforward manner in which this may occur is to simply deny an extradition request against a victim who has been granted asylum. This provides further incentive to streamline and make accessible the process for applying for, and receiving, asylum in host states. Host states in which the granting of asylum is rarely granted, and the process to obtain it is long and opaque, potentially incentive predatory states to engage in TR.

Likewise, this dissertation presents evidence that the probability of host states engaging in complicit actions increases when the victim(s) of TR are accused of terrorism and/or extremism. This adds to the wealth of information we have on the utility to authoritarian states of the malleable labels of post-9/11 counter-terrorism discourse. A means of challenging TR and decreasing host state facilitation of it then includes a reassertion of due process in extradition and asylum hearings of individuals accused of these terrorism/extremism, and greater skepticism on the part of host state authorities of such accusations, particularly when originating from regimes with a history of human rights abuses. Next, this dissertation has presented evidence that host states which the predatory states are more dependent on for their security needs are more likely to engage in responsive actions, or at the least “mixed responses.” Advocates then may find more receptive partners in defending victims of TR in the

form of host states which enjoy an influential security relationship with the predatory state. Likewise, Chapter 5 illustrates evidence that the intervention of third states may assist in erecting barriers to TR. When such pressure is directed at the host state, host states are less likely to engage in “only complicit” actions, where pressure directed at the predatory state increases the probability that the host state will engage in responsive actions. As illustrated in the case of TR targeted against a victim in Portugal, well-placed activists and allies of victims of TR can apply pressure to third states to raise the issue. When they do, the evidence suggests they are able to at least mitigate facilitation on the part of the host state.

Future Research

This dissertation marks the starting point rather than the conclusion of analyzing the HRRD to understand host state response to TR. Chapter 5 presented an analysis of 138 linked cases derived from a random sample of the HRRD. Thus far, data on host state responses has been collected on 308 individual cases of TR in the HRRD. Data collection on these cases is ongoing, and as the sample of cases for whom host responses have been documented grows so to do the possible analytic approaches. Chapter 5 outlined two possible coding schemes drawing of a number of original variables documenting different possible actions which host states can take in response to TR. As more data is collected, these schemes can be adapted, and analysis can differentiate host state responses by tactic of TR employed. In subsequent rounds of analysis with more data points it is possible that the HRRD may point in different directions.

There are, in addition, limitations in the answers this dissertation can provide. It is worthwhile to ask, for example, what role the agency of victims plays in the location of incidents of TR. When a dissident flees their predatory origin state for example, what factors alter their calculus to seek asylum in one host state or another? These decisions could very reasonably play a role in the eventual findings of this dissertation's analysis. In other words, before the "repression game" in Figure 2-1 may begin not with an act from the host state or predatory state players, but from the victim themselves in determining their eventual host state destination. There has been interesting research conducted on a similar decision point of ousted dictator's and where they decide to seek shelter (Escriba 2017). It would be interesting to extend this line of research to the decision-making of different dissidents fleeing into exile. For the purposes of this dissertation, I assume that potential victims exist in a variety of host states and attempt to identify those states with larger populations of potential victims in Chapter 4 by highlighting states with established communities of asylum seekers, and those whose geographic proximity makes travel easier. The, albeit limited, research drawing on quantitative methodologies to analyze the occurrence of TR largely follows this basic approach if not the precise manner of achieving it (Michaelsen and Ruijgrok 2023). Future research should seriously grapple with the role that victims of TR themselves play in determining the host states in which they settle and the degree to which this ultimately impacts the trends we see in TR.

In line with the agency of the victims there are also other categorizations of victim identity which may be pertinent to host state responses. Data of victim's gender was captured in the HRRD but not included in the final models. Future

research should address the role that gender plays in host state responses, along with identities which intersect with gender such as age, religion, and ethnicity. In fact, there are a number of identity features which likely impact host state responses but this dissertation was not able to address. Some of these not only impact host state responses, but may themselves be products of host state responses, such as the residency and asylum status of victims in host states. While this dissertation limited these identity categories to the status of victims at the time of TR, research on proactive host-state policies which grant asylum claims, how they are informed by current or past TR and their impact on future TR would certainly be an important area of future study.

Much of the initial impetus for this project came from certain “high profile” cases such as the murders of Jamal Khashoggi and Kim Jong-Nam, and the abduction of Paul Rusesabagina. For very different reasons, each of these individuals possessed a quality or history which escalated publicity around their cases. Future research may explore new ways to take varying degrees of publicity into account in analysis, as well as highlight features which supercharge such publicity. The literature on TR points to the idea that predatory states have varying degrees of risk acceptance (Shain [1989] 2005). I assumed in this dissertation that predatory states have the capability to assess with some accuracy that incidents of TR which eventually became publicly knowledge could have been revealed. However, relaxing this assumption and exploring miscalculations or mistaken actions on the part of the predatory which led incidents of TR becoming public knowledge would likewise be an intriguing area of future study.

In addition to the opportunities for future research exposed by limitations of the scope and data of this project, the analysis presented in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 of this dissertation points to several potential avenues of future research. First, the ways in which host state democracy impacts predatory state calculus and the costs of TR warrants further examination. This dissertation presented evidence that, based on cross-national data of publicly known individual incidents of TR, the odds of TR occurring are lower against victims in democratic host states. Both co-opt tactics of TR involving attempts to have victims, for example, extradited or detained, and direct violent tactics involving assaults or assassinations, are less likely to occur in democracies. However, based on data compiled in the HRRD on host state responses to TR, it does not appear that this is driven by responsive actions on the part of democratic host states in the wake of incidents of TR. To the contrary, the odds are higher that democratic host states adopt a non-response approach to incidents of TR. Democracies are however less likely to engage in complicit actions which facilitate TR.

This dissertation addressed a number of potential pathways in which democracy may impact host state responses. Host states with higher measures of judicial constraints on the executive have lower odds of seeing victim in their territory face TR, while host states with a divided government have lower odds of seeing violent tactics of TR employed in their territory. Case studies involving TR targeting victims in Germany and Austria in Chapter 6 outlined a variety of causal pathways toward different host state response, which appear to be more common in democracies. Both cases highlight not only the ways in which an impartial justice

system can deliver justice to victims of TR, but also the perils of relying solely on the prosecutors and judges to act as barriers against predatory states and their facilitators.

Disaggregating the ways in which democracy deters both TR and the worst forms of TR facilitation is an important avenue of future research. While the liberal protections of justice systems in democratic states likely play a large role, what of other factors? Do the comparative restraints on security services play a role? Or the strength of a receptive civil society? What role do norms regarding the treatment of asylum seekers play and how quickly can those norms shift, leaving victims of TR vulnerable? Much of our understanding of these phenomena also come from observations of TR in Europe and North America. How do these pathways differ in democratic contexts outside of the West?

In addition to future research exploring the role of democracy on TR, scholars should take note of how different host states treatment of socio-economic classes plays a role in their responses to TR. This dissertation's findings that host states with higher exclusion on the basis of socio-economic status both lowers the odds of TR occurring and raises the odds of responsive actions being taken by these host states in the event of TR came as a surprise. While I have theorized that this finding may be driven by a selection effect, with migrants avoiding such societies and predatory states employing more extreme tactics which prompt responses, future scholars may be able to provide more clarity. Lastly this dissertation has highlighted the role that victim's identities may play in not only their persecution but the responsiveness of their host states. While prior scholars have noted detrimental corollaries of responses to certain victims' identities, such as the anti-Muslim bias leading to protections for

some Muslim victims of TR (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021), less well-explored is the citizenship and residency status of victims. While analysis in Chapter 5 did not validate my theory that victims who hold citizenship, asylum, or residency in third states would be more likely to see those third states intervene, prompting a responsiveness on the part of the host state, the case of the Sikh nationalist detained in Portugal demonstrates a causal pathway on how such an identity may provide favorable outcomes. Future scholars should consider how these positions can help victims of TR avoid the worst outcomes.

Beyond the substantive questions posed by this dissertation, several methodologically specific avenues are also worth exploring. First, as noted, this dissertation is the latest in a (as of yet short) series of studies examining TR with a quantitative methodology (Dukalskis et al. 2023; Michaelsen and Ruijgrok 2023). By collecting and analyzing new data on incidents of TR I hope to have demonstrated that the process of cataloguing cross-national information on TR is far from over. Moreover, while special considerations must be taken when working with TR data (Dukalskis et al. 2022), quantitative analysis provides an opportunity for scholars to draw more generalizable conclusions in examining what is a globalized phenomenon. On the other hand, data availability on TR is limited in several crucial areas of particular concern, including at the level of state decision makers. To the extent that documents outlining the back and forth between officials on cases and the weighing of how to proceed in responses to incidents of TR exists, it is often shielded behind a veil of state secrecy. The decision to limit this study to public information on publicized cases of TR need not apply to future scholars. Some may find data to be

more readily available in relation to older cases and campaigns of TR, as evidenced by the work of McSherry (2005, 2019) and Lessa (2022) on Operation Condor.

This dissertation has pointed to the utility of considering TR not only as a question of authoritarianism, human rights, or migration, but broadly as an IR question. In doing so, scholars may find insights and new avenues of exploration from other strands of IR literature. Some of these insights may require a more thorough consideration and debate as to what constitutes TR and who counts as a victim. As noted, some scholars have, for good reason, attempted to limit the concept of TR from spreading in such a way that it pertains to those accused of war crimes, terrorism (in certain circumstances), armed violence, and who are obviously guilty of the non-political crimes of which they are accused. As I have attempted to show however, many cases of TR inhabit a grey zone pushing the boundaries of these categories. Drawing on literatures on the transnationalization of civil conflict and counterterrorism may at times warrant a lowering of these analytic thresholds. Moreover, as others have pointed out (Dukalskis et al. 2023), there is an opportunity to examine all TR, not just originating from authoritarian regimes, as this dissertation did in Chapter 4 and 5, but also TR originating from democratic states. Finally, the impetus for this project, and for understanding host state responses to TR more broadly, is to better understand the disincentive structures which can be imposed to deter TR. Research which continues to examine the impact of policies countering-TR are therefore of particular value both academically and normatively.

Appendix A: Supplementary Tables for Chapter 4

Table A-1. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of Predator Employing TR

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	4.770** (2.347)	4.503** (2.568)	1.942 (1.403)
Party Dimension	0.172*** (0.063)	0.123*** (0.052)	0.394* (0.179)
Military Dimension	0.036*** (0.023)	0.029*** (0.023)	0.007*** (0.008)
Hereditary Dimension	0.028*** (0.020)	0.017*** (0.017)	0.083* (0.085)
Presidentialism Top Quartile	1.684* (0.368)	1.789* (0.460)	2.111* (0.691)
Ideology	1.159+ (0.103)	0.993 (0.102)	1.339* (0.177)
Physical Integrity	0.140*** (0.071)	0.133** (0.083)	0.070*** (0.055)
Political Liberties	0.132** (0.088)	0.136* (0.109)	0.092* (0.101)
Opposition Size	0.914 (0.058)	0.848* (0.062)	1.175+ (0.105)
State Capacity	1.206* (0.110)	1.121 (0.123)	1.339* (0.189)
Max Coup Risk	0.240*** (0.100)	0.162*** (0.078)	0.237* (0.140)
Leader Change	1.422	1.058	0.349

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
	(0.470)	(0.449)	(0.265)
Election	1.088	1.139	1.134
	(0.228)	(0.276)	(0.350)
Num.Obs.	1659	1659	1659
AIC	1054.3	831.9	575.8
BIC	1124.7	902.3	646.2
Log.Lik.	-514.172	-402.973	-274.900
F	18.378	15.558	9.699
RMSE	0.31	0.27	0.22

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-2. Logistic Regression (Firth Penalized, Odds Ratio) of Predator Employing TR

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	4.646** (2.263)	4.380** (2.457)	1.900 (1.335)
Party Dimension	0.177*** (0.064)	0.129*** (0.054)	0.405* (0.181)
Military Dimension	0.038*** (0.024)	0.031*** (0.024)	0.008*** (0.009)
Hereditary Dimension	0.031*** (0.022)	0.021*** (0.020)	0.101* (0.097)
Presidentialism Top Quartile	1.676* (0.363)	1.773* (0.449)	2.068* (0.658)
Ideology	1.157+ (0.102)	0.993 (0.101)	1.331* (0.171)
Physical Integrity	0.146*** (0.074)	0.141** (0.087)	0.079*** (0.060)
Political Liberties	0.133** (0.088)	0.136* (0.107)	0.093* (0.098)
Opposition Size	0.915 (0.058)	0.852* (0.062)	1.173+ (0.102)
State Capacity	1.204* (0.109)	1.120 (0.121)	1.331* (0.182)
Max Coup Risk	0.244*** (0.101)	0.167*** (0.079)	0.245* (0.141)
Leader Change	1.448 (0.470)	1.106 (0.455)	0.430 (0.292)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Election	1.092 (0.226)	1.146 (0.274)	1.149 (0.345)
Num.Obs.	1659	1659	1659
AIC	1054.5	832.2	576.3
BIC	1124.9	902.6	646.7
Log.Lik.	-514.253	-403.117	-275.147
F	18.289	15.546	9.878
RMSE	0.31	0.27	0.22

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-3. Linear Probability Model of Predator Employing TR

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Party Dimension	-0.208*** (0.055)	-0.204*** (0.048)	-0.039 (0.044)
Military Dimension	-0.234*** (0.041)	-0.178*** (0.036)	-0.112*** (0.025)
Hereditary Dimension	-0.320*** (0.049)	-0.275*** (0.041)	-0.087* (0.034)
Presidentialism Top Quartile	0.103*** (0.025)	0.094*** (0.023)	0.054** (0.018)
Ideology	0.025** (0.009)	0.009 (0.007)	0.024*** (0.006)
Physical Integrity	-0.227*** (0.038)	-0.168*** (0.034)	-0.157*** (0.029)
Political Liberties	-0.110* (0.053)	-0.063 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.039)
Opposition Size	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.006)
State Capacity	0.018* (0.007)	0.007 (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)
Max Coup Risk	-0.145** (0.045)	-0.140*** (0.040)	-0.068* (0.034)
Leader Change	0.041 (0.026)	0.020 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.012)
Elections	0.003 (0.020)	0.004 (0.017)	0.001 (0.014)
Constant	0.482*** (0.052)	0.381*** (0.046)	0.212*** (0.037)
Observations	1,659	1,659	1,659
R ²	0.183	0.163	0.105
Adjusted R ²	0.177	0.157	0.098
Residual Std. Error (df = 1646)	0.312	0.272	0.222

F Statistic (df = 12; 1646) 30.657*** 26.799*** 16.056***

Note: +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

Table A-4. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of Predator Employing TR – Alternative

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	4.590** (2.138)	4.101** (2.217)	2.336 (1.577)
Party	0.410*** (0.108)	0.331*** (0.110)	0.484* (0.177)
Military	7.623*** (3.010)	10.737*** (5.041)	6.528** (3.989)
Monarchy	0.110*** (0.053)	0.073*** (0.047)	0.196* (0.130)
Personal	2.076** (0.485)	2.374** (0.644)	1.905+ (0.654)
Ideology	1.293** (0.122)	1.078 (0.119)	1.608** (0.235)
Physical Integrity	0.058*** (0.028)	0.066*** (0.039)	0.021*** (0.016)
Political Liberties	0.257* (0.162)	0.199* (0.150)	0.241 (0.233)
Opposition Size	0.751***	0.678***	0.918

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.077)
State Capacity	1.302**	1.200	1.513**
	(0.125)	(0.138)	(0.220)
Max Coup Risk	0.084***	0.056***	0.065***
	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.039)
Leader Change	0.927	0.634	0.267+
	(0.315)	(0.278)	(0.204)
Election	1.207	1.244	1.326
	(0.252)	(0.301)	(0.407)
Num.Obs.	1659	1659	1659
AIC	1056.3	832.3	588.1
BIC	1126.7	902.7	658.5
Log.Lik.	-515.142	-403.143	-281.067
F	17.445	14.481	9.793
RMSE	0.31	0.26	0.22

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-5. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of TR by Host State

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.063** (0.058)	0.102* (0.108)	0.010** (0.017)
Democracy	0.501*** (0.103)	0.510** (0.125)	0.469* (0.169)
Judicial Constraints	0.480* (0.178)	0.354* (0.149)	0.309+ (0.198)
Civil Society Particip.	1.909 (0.866)	1.262 (0.650)	3.609 (2.935)
Divided Party Control	0.910 (0.057)	0.952 (0.069)	0.768* (0.087)
Represent. Of Disadv.	0.723*** (0.054)	0.707*** (0.061)	0.731* (0.097)
Exclusion by SE	0.110*** (0.047)	0.093*** (0.046)	0.194* (0.140)
EUR/NA/ANZ	1.413* (0.244)	1.280 (0.262)	1.190 (0.367)
Fiscal Capacity	1.953*** (0.325)	1.717** (0.321)	3.392*** (1.040)
Territorial Control	1.010 (0.008)	1.007 (0.010)	1.008 (0.015)
Election	1.058 (0.150)	1.018 (0.172)	0.950 (0.246)
Leader Change	0.972 (0.164)	1.071 (0.217)	0.614 (0.221)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
GMI	1.001 (0.001)	1.001 (0.001)	1.001 (0.002)
Num.Obs.	3981	3981	3981
AIC	2261.1	1743.1	916.5
BIC	2342.9	1824.9	998.3
Log.Lik.	-1117.562	-858.558	-445.265
F	11.598	8.483	5.018
RMSE	0.28	0.24	0.16

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-6. Logistic Regression (Firth Penalized, Odds Ratio) of TR by Host State

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.067** (0.061)	0.110* (0.115)	0.013** (0.020)
Democracy	0.502*** (0.103)	0.511** (0.123)	0.469* (0.164)
Judicial Constraints	0.482* (0.177)	0.357* (0.149)	0.313+ (0.195)
Civil Society Particip.	1.894 (0.852)	1.254 (0.639)	3.526 (2.778)
Divided Party Control	0.911 (0.056)	0.953 (0.068)	0.771* (0.084)
Represent. Of Disadv.	0.725*** (0.054)	0.709*** (0.060)	0.732* (0.095)
Exclusion by SE	0.111*** (0.047)	0.095*** (0.046)	0.197* (0.137)
EUR/NA/ANZ	1.403* (0.241)	1.269 (0.257)	1.170 (0.351)
Fiscal Capacity	1.943*** (0.320)	1.710** (0.316)	3.319*** (0.981)
Territorial Control	1.010 (0.008)	1.006 (0.009)	1.006 (0.014)
Election	1.061 (0.149)	1.023 (0.171)	0.964 (0.242)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Leader Change	0.977 (0.164)	1.081 (0.216)	0.639 (0.221)
GMI	1.001 (0.001)	1.001 (0.001)	1.001 (0.002)
Num.Obs.	3981	3981	3981
AIC	2261.2	1743.3	916.9
BIC	2343.0	1825.0	998.7
Log.Lik.	-1117.613	-858.634	-445.473
F	11.573	8.514	5.127
RMSE	0.28	0.24	0.16

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-7. Linear Probability Model of TR by Host State

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Democracy	-0.046*** (0.012)	-0.031** (0.010)	-0.018** (0.006)
Judicial Constraints	-0.073** (0.028)	-0.078** (0.025)	-0.040* (0.016)
Civil Society Particip.	0.045 (0.031)	0.005 (0.027)	0.029+ (0.017)
Divided Party Control	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006* (0.002)
Represent of Disadv.	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.008* (0.003)
Exclusion by SE	-0.157*** (0.027)	-0.133*** (0.023)	-0.043** (0.015)
EU/NA/ANZ	0.042** (0.015)	0.016 (0.012)	0.006 (0.008)
Fiscal Capacity	0.047*** (0.011)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.006)
Territorial Control	0.0005 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0002)
Election	0.005 (0.012)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.007)
Leader Change	-0.003 (0.014)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.007)
GMI	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.00005 (0.0001)	0.00001 (0.00004)
Constant	0.106* (0.051)	0.126** (0.045)	0.032 (0.027)
Observations	3,981	3,981	3,981
R ²	0.038	0.027	0.016
Adjusted R ²	0.035	0.024	0.013
Residual Std. Error (df = 3968)	0.280	0.236	0.158

F Statistic (df = 12; 3968) 13.159*** 9.231*** 5.367***

*Note: +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001*
Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

Table A-8. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of TR by Host State – Alternative 1

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.057** (0.053)	0.099* (0.104)	0.009** (0.015)
Democracy	0.501** (0.108)	0.513** (0.127)	0.440* (0.169)
Judicial Constraints	0.442* (0.166)	0.337* (0.143)	0.275+ (0.182)
Civil Society Particip.	1.086 (0.509)	1.083 (0.573)	2.085 (1.747)
Divided Party Control	0.940 (0.059)	0.964 (0.070)	0.788* (0.090)
Represent. Of Disadv.	0.723*** (0.054)	0.704*** (0.060)	0.734* (0.098)
Exclusion by SE	0.138*** (0.055)	0.089*** (0.040)	0.298+ (0.197)
Western States	2.412*** (0.433)	1.440+ (0.315)	2.493** (0.854)
Fiscal Capacity	2.143*** (0.364)	1.788** (0.337)	3.772*** (1.184)
Territorial Control	1.013	1.009	1.010

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Election	1.038	1.013	0.930
	(0.148)	(0.171)	(0.241)
Leader Change	1.063	1.117	0.661
	(0.181)	(0.227)	(0.239)
GMI	1.001	1.001	1.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Num.Obs.	3981	3981	3981
AIC	2240.5	1741.8	909.4
BIC	2322.2	1823.6	991.2
Log.Lik.	- 1107.241	-857.906	-441.714
F	13.118	8.442	5.306
RMSE	0.28	0.24	0.16

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-9. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of TR by Host State – Alternative 2

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.536 (0.498)	0.798 (0.841)	0.049+ (0.081)
Democracy	0.752 (0.167)	0.793 (0.206)	0.572 (0.218)
Rule of Law	1.663 (0.596)	0.773 (0.316)	2.398 (1.528)
Core Civil Society	0.096*** (0.038)	0.093*** (0.042)	0.146** (0.097)
Divided Party Control	0.948 (0.060)	0.987 (0.072)	0.790* (0.091)
Represent. Of Disadv.	1.678** (0.278)	1.486* (0.292)	1.543 (0.461)
Represent. Of Disadv.	0.709*** (0.053)	0.696*** (0.060)	0.691** (0.091)
Exclusion by Social Group	0.090*** (0.037)	0.050*** (0.024)	0.344 (0.241)
Fiscal Capacity	2.034*** (0.339)	1.671** (0.311)	3.822*** (1.187)
Territorial Control	1.000 (0.009)	0.998 (0.010)	0.999 (0.015)
Election	1.052 (0.150)	0.989 (0.169)	0.971 (0.252)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Leader Change	1.029 (0.175)	1.139 (0.233)	0.629 (0.227)
GMI	1.000 (0.001)	1.001 (0.001)	0.999 (0.002)
Num.Obs.	3991	3991	3991
AIC	2235.1	1716.0	915.1
BIC	2316.9	1797.8	996.9
Log.Lik.	- 1104.553	-844.999	-444.551
F	13.308	10.621	4.960
RMSE	0.28	0.23	0.16

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-10. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of TR by Host State – Limited Sample

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.060** (0.057)	0.090* (0.099)	0.010** (0.017)
Democracy	0.481*** (0.101)	0.501** (0.125)	0.446* (0.162)
Judicial Constraints	0.526+ (0.195)	0.392* (0.165)	0.355 (0.227)
Civil Society Particip.	1.718 (0.788)	1.062 (0.554)	3.202 (2.614)
Divided Party Control	0.908 (0.057)	0.956 (0.070)	0.748* (0.086)
Represent. Of Disadv.	0.742*** (0.056)	0.717*** (0.062)	0.758* (0.102)
Exclusion by SE	0.100*** (0.043)	0.090*** (0.045)	0.188* (0.138)
EUR/NA/ANZ	1.445* (0.255)	1.333 (0.280)	1.189 (0.375)
Fiscal Capacity	1.994*** (0.338)	1.764** (0.336)	3.649*** (1.141)
Territorial Control	1.013 (0.009)	1.010 (0.010)	1.009 (0.015)
Election	1.030 (0.148)	0.981 (0.169)	0.957 (0.249)
Leader Change	0.981 (0.167)	1.098 (0.224)	0.608 (0.219)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
GMI	1.000 (0.001)	1.001 (0.001)	1.001 (0.002)
Num.Obs.	3685	3685	3685
AIC	2172.0	1675.5	891.0
BIC	2252.8	1756.2	971.8
Log.Lik.	- 1073.020	-824.736	-432.502
F	12.121	8.555	5.110
RMSE	0.29	0.24	0.16

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-11. K-Fold AUC Analysis of Host Logistic Regression				
Starting AUC (No IVs Removed)	Independent Variable	Stage 1 Value	Stage 2 Value	Stage 3 Value
0.6862033	Democracy	0.6795576	0.6630433	0.6438352
	Judicial Constraints	0.6823249	0.6653237	0.6478782
	Civil Society Particip.	0.6856047	0.6656947	0.6424578
	Divided Party Control	0.6872385	0.6641335	0.6419538
	Represent. of Disadv,	0.6706042	0.6582944	0.6393289
	Exclusion by SE	0.6647082	N/A	N/A
	EUR/NA/ANZ	0.6864685	0.6465703	N/A
	Fiscal Capacity	0.6816506	0.6526814	0.6816506
	Territorial Control	0.6852986	0.6613675	0.6253932
	Election	0.6873011	0.6658941	0.6477860
	Leader Change	0.6878872	0.6665366	0.6489023
	GMI	0.6823094	0.6612148	0.6369221

Table A-12. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of TR by Dyad

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Predators Econ. Dep. On Host	1.413** (0.164)	0.949 (0.154)	1.609* (0.368)
Predators Sec. Dep. On Host	2.160** (0.568)	3.426*** (1.083)	3.055* (1.603)
Hosts Econ. Dep. On Predator	4.111*** (0.557)	3.283*** (0.573)	2.922*** (0.825)
Hosts Sec. Dep. On Predator	0.691 (0.247)	0.783 (0.322)	0.798 (0.677)
Security Bandwidth (UP)	1.682*** (0.177)	2.604*** (0.378)	1.364 (0.296)
Economic Bandwidth (UP)	4.109*** (0.603)	4.987*** (1.022)	4.179*** (1.342)
Predator Colonized Host	1.012 (0.257)	1.528 (0.443)	0.840 (0.483)
Host Colonized Predator	3.108*** (0.509)	4.368*** (0.911)	3.258*** (1.114)
Contiguous	1.288* (0.150)	1.395* (0.203)	1.620* (0.380)
Same Region	0.507*** (0.054)	0.678** (0.094)	1.084 (0.251)
MID	1.856*** (0.210)	1.443* (0.219)	2.426*** (0.524)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Predator Diplo Rep.	3.583*** (0.806)	3.473*** (1.095)	4.160** (2.068)
Host Diplo Rep.	1.266 (0.246)	1.619+ (0.457)	1.195 (0.489)
Num.Obs.	137854	137854	137854
AIC	5475.0	3466.8	1579.1
BIC	5612.6	3604.5	1716.8
Log.Lik.	- 2723.483	- 1719.397	-775.568
F	80.527	52.713	20.581
RMSE	0.06	0.05	0.03

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-13. Logistic Regression (Firth Penalized, Odds Ratio) of TR by Dyad

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Predators Econ. Dep. On Host	1.415** (0.164)	0.954 (0.153)	1.621* (0.362)
Predators Sec. Dep. On Host	2.168** (0.567)	3.439*** (1.077)	3.116* (1.587)
Hosts Econ. Dep. On Predator	4.119*** (0.555)	3.300*** (0.570)	2.966*** (0.813)
Hosts Sec. Dep. On Predator	0.707 (0.250)	0.803 (0.325)	0.921 (0.729)
Security Bandwidth (UP)	1.681*** (0.175)	2.595*** (0.373)	1.359 (0.288)
Economic Bandwidth (UP)	4.087*** (0.595)	4.927*** (0.995)	4.076*** (1.266)
Predator Colonized Host	1.026 (0.257)	1.549 (0.442)	0.918 (0.493)
Host Colonized Predator	3.116*** (0.507)	4.375*** (0.905)	3.303*** (1.098)
Contiguous	1.290* (0.507)	1.397* (0.905)	1.622* (1.098)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
	(0.149)	(0.201)	(0.370)
Same Region	0.507***	0.677**	1.076
	(0.054)	(0.093)	(0.242)
MID	1.859***	1.449*	2.431***
	(0.209)	(0.217)	(0.512)
Predator Diplo Rep.	3.560***	3.417***	4.044**
	(0.793)	(1.056)	(1.922)
Host Diplo Rep.	1.254	1.588+	1.143
	(0.241)	(0.440)	(0.448)
Num.Obs.	137854	137854	137854
AIC	5475.1	3467.0	1579.7
BIC	5612.7	3604.6	1717.3
Log.Lik.	- 2723.535	- 1719.486	-775.829
F	81.839	54.237	22.191
RMSE	0.06	0.05	0.03

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-14. Linear Probability Model of TR by Dyad

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Predators Econ. Dep. On Host	0.003** (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Predators Sec. Dep. On Host	0.032*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.008* (0.003)
Hosts Econ. Dep. On Predator	0.019*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.004** (0.001)
Hosts Sec. Dep. On Predator	0.003 (0.007)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.003)
Security Bandwidth (UP)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001** (0.0004)	-0.00003 (0.0003)
Economic Bandwidth (UP)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.0004)	0.001** (0.0002)
Predator Colonized Host	0.020+ (0.011)	0.023* (0.010)	0.002 (0.004)
Host Colonized Predator	0.031*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.006* (0.002)
Contiguous	0.002 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Same Region	-0.002*** (0.0004)	-0.001* (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0002)
MID	0.006*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Predator Diplo Rep.	0.001*** (0.0003)	0.0005* (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Host Diplo Rep.	-0.001+ (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0001)
Constant	-0.00003 (0.0003)	-0.0004+ (0.0002)	-0.0005** (0.0002)
Observations	137,854	137,854	137,854
R ²	0.019	0.015	0.005

Adjusted R ²	0.019	0.015	0.005
Residual Std. Error (df = 137840)	0.061	0.047	0.029
F Statistic (df = 13; 137840)	207.179***	159.870***	54.026***

Note: +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

Table A-15. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of TR by Dyad – Alternative 1

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Predators Econ. Dep. On Host	1.581*** (0.191)	1.130 (0.190)	1.767* (0.420)
Predators Sec. Dep. On Host	0.790 (0.269)	0.794 (0.337)	2.993 (2.058)
Hosts Econ. Dep. On Predator	4.428*** (0.636)	3.704*** (0.695)	3.197*** (0.942)
Hosts Sec. Dep. On Predator	0.257** (0.110)	0.207** (0.105)	0.903 (0.843)
Security Bandwidth	4.597*** (1.184)	10.066** * (3.301)	1.160 (0.649)
Economic Bandwidth	4.761*** (1.068)	3.952*** (1.083)	3.350** (1.519)
Predator Colonized Host	0.880 (0.244)	1.311 (0.423)	0.789 (0.471)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Host Colonized Predator	3.121*** (0.534)	4.452*** (0.987)	2.899** (1.038)
Contiguous	1.041 (0.128)	1.099 (0.172)	1.563+ (0.390)
Same Region	0.468*** (0.050)	0.638** (0.088)	0.987 (0.228)
MID	2.135*** (0.243)	1.671*** (0.256)	2.671*** (0.580)
Predator Diplo Rep.	4.267*** (0.944)	4.444*** (1.379)	5.234*** (2.563)
Host Diplo Rep.	1.634** (0.311)	2.292** (0.635)	1.601 (0.645)
Num.Obs.	137854	137854	137854
AIC	5516.5	3510.7	1599.9
BIC	5654.2	3648.4	1737.5
Log.Lik.	- 2744.246	- 1741.346	-785.925
F	90.820	63.884	23.780
RMSE	0.06	0.05	0.03

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-16. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of TR by Dyad – Alternative 2

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Predators Econ. Dep. On Host	1.806*** (0.199)	1.248 (0.190)	2.089*** (0.454)
Predators Sec. Dep. On Host	4.092*** (0.980)	8.223*** (2.393)	4.400** (2.125)
Hosts Econ. Dep. On Predator	5.953*** (0.760)	4.905*** (0.798)	4.086*** (1.084)
Hosts Sec. Dep. On Predator	1.201 (0.412)	1.694 (0.668)	1.248 (1.011)
Predator Colonized Host	0.898 (0.231)	1.301 (0.384)	0.731 (0.422)
Host Colonized Predator	2.928*** (0.478)	4.041*** (0.842)	3.092*** (1.058)
Contiguous	1.488*** (0.176)	1.752*** (0.260)	1.833* (0.436)
Same Region	0.493*** (0.052)	0.637*** (0.087)	1.050 (0.242)
MID	1.916*** (0.218)	1.432* (0.219)	2.581*** (0.560)
Predator Diplo Rep.	4.896*** (1.078)	5.169*** (1.599)	5.566*** (2.718)
Host Diplo Rep.	1.958*** (0.369)	2.782*** (0.766)	1.745 (0.699)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Num.Obs.	137854	137854	137854
AIC	5625.4	3609.2	1604.0
BIC	5743.4	3727.2	1722.0
Log.Lik.	- 2800.690	- 1792.606	-789.984
F	99.591	66.847	26.549
RMSE	0.06	0.05	0.03

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-17. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of TR by Dyad – Alternative Sample 1

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Predators Econ. Dep. On Host	1.208 (0.155)	0.724+ (0.131)	1.297 (0.335)
Predators Sec. Dep. On Host	2.296** (0.633)	4.009*** (1.332)	3.664* (2.048)
Hosts Econ. Dep. On Predator	4.844*** (0.699)	3.826*** (0.692)	2.747** (0.866)
Hosts Sec. Dep. On Predator	0.450+ (0.185)	0.587 (0.274)	0.495 (0.503)
Security Bandwidth (UP)	1.733*** (0.199)	2.548*** (0.406)	1.383 (0.330)
Economic Bandwidth (UP)	4.594*** (0.765)	6.089*** (1.494)	5.878*** (2.260)
Predator Colonized Host	0.846 (0.227)	1.177 (0.360)	0.987 (0.592)
Host Colonized Predator	2.887*** (0.493)	4.337*** (0.948)	3.068** (1.107)
Contiguous	1.055 (0.139)	1.267 (0.208)	1.018 (0.266)
Same Region	0.743* (0.091)	0.920 (0.145)	1.879* (0.473)
MID	1.391** (0.173)	1.142 (0.189)	1.755* (0.421)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
Predator Diplo Rep.	3.498*** (0.932)	2.738** (0.987)	3.919* (2.361)
Host Diplo Rep.	1.441+ (0.318)	1.842+ (0.601)	1.434 (0.671)
Num.Obs.	67369	67369	67369
AIC	4521.6	2820.6	1291.7
BIC	4649.3	2948.3	1419.3
Log.Lik.	- 2246.821	- 1396.305	-631.847
F	56.824	39.415	12.854
RMSE	0.08	0.06	0.04

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-18. Logistic Regression (Odds Ratio) of TR by Dyad – Alternative Sample 2

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
(Intercept)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Predators Econ. Dep. On Host	1.253+ (0.151)	0.827 (0.139)	1.447 (0.339)
Predators Sec. Dep. On Host	2.082** (0.557)	3.265*** (1.049)	3.219* (1.714)
Hosts Econ. Dep. On Predator	4.221*** (0.577)	3.440*** (0.605)	3.026*** (0.838)
Hosts Sec. Dep. On Predator	0.542 (0.202)	0.607 (0.261)	0.684 (0.585)
Security Bandwidth (UP)	1.758*** (0.192)	2.741*** (0.420)	1.332 (0.292)
Economic Bandwidth (UP)	4.148*** (0.641)	5.538*** (1.278)	3.948*** (1.277)
Predator Colonized Host	0.975 (0.252)	1.425 (0.422)	0.834 (0.479)
Host Colonized Predator	3.303*** (0.542)	4.650*** (0.973)	3.495*** (1.192)
Contiguous	0.848 (0.105)	0.973 (0.150)	0.924 (0.222)
Same Region	0.755* (0.105)	0.896 (0.150)	1.841* (0.222)

	TR (1)	Co-Opt (2)	Violent Direct (3)
	(0.090)	(0.138)	(0.452)
MID	1.708***	1.363*	2.128***
	(0.192)	(0.206)	(0.451)
Predator Diplo Rep.	2.688***	2.545**	2.681*
	(0.621)	(0.854)	(1.307)
Host Diplo Rep.	1.321	1.753+	1.343
	(0.267)	(0.540)	(0.560)
Num.Obs.	72549	72549	72549
AIC	5021.6	3109.5	1510.9
BIC	5150.2	3238.2	1639.6
Log.Lik.	- 2496.776	- 1540.743	-741.439
F	58.440	38.714	15.025
RMSE	0.08	0.06	0.04

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table A-19. K-Fold AUC Analysis of Dyadic Logistic Regression				
Starting AUC (No IVs Removed)	Independent Variable	Stage 1 Value	Stage 2 Value	Stage 3 Value
0.9009451	Predators Econ. Dep. On Host	0.8998925	0.8891101	0.8728030
	Predators Sec. Dep. On Host	0.9006031	0.8927955	0.8808784
	Hosts Econ. Dep. On Predator	0.8958162	0.8793035	N/A
	Hosts Sec. Dep. On Predator	0.9010352	0.8920372	0.8779281
	Security Bandwidth (UP)	0.9002181	0.8909417	0.8779020
	Economic Bandwidth (UP)	0.8920744	N/A	N/A
	Predator Colonized Host	0.9010544	0.8922351	0.8778099
	Host Colonized Predator	0.8989113	0.8908111	0.8793671
	Contiguous	0.9000889	0.8911713	0.8782077
	Same Region	0.8973640	0.8887524	0.8783191
	MID	0.8969245	0.8871074	0.8743703
	Predator Diplo Rep.	0.8959126	0.8854240	0.8712163
	Host Diplo Rep.	0.9013607	0.8919131	0.8777736

Appendix B: Supplementary Tables for Chapter 5

Table B-1. Linear Probability Model of External Backlash

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Responsive (1)	Complicit (2)	Non- Response (3)	Only Responsive (4)	Only Complicit (5)	Mixed Response (6)
Political Bandwidth	3.357* (1.583)	-0.138 (1.438)	-2.397+ (1.438)	2.347* (1.033)	-1.147 (1.554)	1.009 (1.440)
Security Bandwidth	-0.772** (0.238)	0.311 (0.293)	0.312 (0.220)	-0.537** (0.186)	0.547* (0.268)	-0.236 (0.260)
Economic Bandwidth	0.467 (0.369)	-0.229 (0.360)	-0.043 (0.300)	0.334 (0.249)	-0.362 (0.410)	0.133 (0.336)
Host Econ Dep. On Pred	-0.186 (0.142)	0.152 (0.148)	-0.051 (0.116)	-0.104 (0.124)	0.234 (0.143)	-0.082 (0.121)
Host Sec Dep. On Pred	-0.160 (0.396)	0.812+ (0.484)	-0.672+ (0.397)	-0.191 (0.380)	0.781 (0.501)	0.031 (0.410)
Pred Econ Dep. On Host	-0.198 (0.132)	0.026 (0.134)	0.044 (0.107)	-0.154 (0.109)	0.070 (0.137)	-0.044 (0.127)
Pred Sec Dep. On Host	1.593*** (0.230)	-0.319 (0.379)	-0.326 (0.210)	0.625+ (0.324)	-1.287*** (0.260)	0.968** (0.372)
Victim C/R/A in 3 rd State	0.055 (0.135)	0.208+ (0.117)	-0.195** (0.063)	-0.006 (0.116)	0.147 (0.133)	0.061 (0.108)

3 rd State Pressure on Host	0.276*	-0.099	0.044	0.023	-0.352*	0.252 ⁺
	(0.135)	(0.120)	(0.084)	(0.101)	(0.142)	(0.135)
3 rd State Pressure on Pred	0.295*	-0.126	-0.152 ⁺	0.311**	-0.110	-0.016
	(0.124)	(0.115)	(0.082)	(0.101)	(0.117)	(0.139)
3 rd State Concern	-0.177	0.215 ⁺	0.144	-0.353***	0.039	0.176
	(0.140)	(0.117)	(0.106)	(0.099)	(0.120)	(0.146)
IO Intervention	0.033	0.158 ⁺	-0.180**	0.050	0.175 ⁺	-0.017
	(0.099)	(0.094)	(0.056)	(0.083)	(0.096)	(0.091)
Terror post- 911	-0.009	0.291***	-0.225**	-0.023	0.276**	0.014
	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.085)	(0.078)
Constant	-0.139	0.330	0.772***	-0.126	0.344	-0.013
	(0.218)	(0.211)	(0.221)	(0.126)	(0.230)	(0.201)
Observations	137	137	137	137	137	137
R ²	0.282	0.265	0.214	0.198	0.312	0.189
Adjusted R ²	0.206	0.188	0.131	0.113	0.239	0.103
Residual Std. Error (df = 123)	0.437	0.445	0.387	0.353	0.421	0.398
F Statistic (df = 13; 123)	3.711***	3.418***	2.577**	2.334**	4.290***	2.208*

Note: ⁺p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

Table B-2. Firth Penalized Logistic Regression of External Backlash

	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)	0.055*	0.437	7.479	1.500000e-02*	0.510	0.081
	(0.077)	(0.595)	(11.278)	(3.200000e-02)	(0.713)	(0.132)
Political Bandwidth	10114450.159+	0.366	0.000	3.902165e+08	0.000	115.990
	(93462480.425)	(3.352)	(0.000)	(5.110977e+09)	(0.002)	(1201.735)
Security Bandwidth	0.017**	3.871	6.156	5.400000e-02+	121.707**	0.308
	(0.026)	(4.802)	(9.109)	(8.200000e-02)	(213.377)	(0.432)
Economic Bandwidth	8.440	0.267	1.508	3.222000e+00	0.137	2.288
	(14.388)	(0.461)	(2.725)	(7.032000e+00)	(0.245)	(4.210)
Host Econ Dep. On Pred	0.373	2.418	0.583	8.120000e-01	3.247	0.576
	(0.279)	(1.758)	(0.472)	(6.750000e-01)	(2.585)	(0.456)
Host Sec Dep. On Pred	0.533	300.046	0.011	0.000000e+00	3.459	1.764
	(1.887)	(1099.496)	(0.039)	(1.000000e-03)	(10.692)	(5.841)
Pred Econ Dep. On Host	0.397	1.290	1.467	4.130000e-01	2.661	0.957
	(0.260)	(0.863)	(1.060)	(3.210000e-01)	(2.056)	(0.678)
Pred Sec Dep. On Host	5289.771**	0.196	0.207	4.705300e+01*	0.000**	88.734*
	(14092.813)	(0.333)	(0.479)	(9.199200e+01)	(0.000)	(164.226)

	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Victim C/R/A in 3 rd State	1.429 (0.980)	3.578 (2.986)	0.094+ (0.132)	1.978000e+00 (1.717000e+00)	2.281 (1.722)	1.542 (1.055)
3 rd State Pressure on Host	4.489 (4.227)	0.827 (0.941)	1.037 (1.525)	2.700000e-01 (4.450000e-01)	0.260 (0.261)	3.082 (2.601)
3 rd State Pressure on Origin	3.780+ (3.037)	0.284 (0.283)	0.303 (0.373)	4.105300e+01* (6.828600e+01)	0.386 (0.362)	1.088 (0.789)
3 rd State Concern	0.321 (0.275)	5.842+ (6.050)	4.157 (4.584)	7.000000e-03* (1.400000e-02)	1.164 (1.055)	2.112 (1.553)
IO Intervention	1.207 (0.655)	2.582 (1.614)	0.237+ (0.207)	1.519000e+00 (1.015000e+00)	2.043 (1.188)	0.886 (0.530)
Terror post-9/11	1.069 (0.483)	4.270** (1.995)	0.195** (0.116)	6.990000e-01 (3.990000e-01)	4.123** (2.021)	1.050 (0.515)
Num.Obs.	137	137	137	137	137	137
AIC	167.4	165.5	133.5	116.8	153.4	151.5
BIC	208.3	206.4	174.4	157.7	194.3	192.4
Log.Lik.	-69.708	-68.739	-52.765	-44.420	-62.707	-61.756
F	1.685	1.854	1.454	1.241	2.003	1.347
RMSE	0.41	0.41	0.36	0.32	0.39	0.38

Responsive	Complicit	Non- Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table B-3: Linear Probability Model of External Backlash - Alternative

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Security Bandwidth Top Quartile	-0.277 ⁺ (0.146)	-0.190 (0.149)	0.301* (0.119)	-0.119 (0.099)	-0.032 (0.168)	-0.158 (0.133)
Economic Bandwidth Top Quartile	0.157 (0.128)	0.080 (0.130)	-0.073 (0.104)	0.046 (0.097)	-0.031 (0.131)	0.111 (0.121)
Host Econ Dep. On Pred	-0.056 (0.134)	0.161 (0.127)	-0.166 (0.108)	0.013 (0.106)	0.231 ⁺ (0.128)	-0.070 (0.109)
Host Sec Dep. On Pred	-0.057 (0.153)	0.366** (0.126)	-0.197* (0.091)	-0.167 (0.109)	0.256 ⁺ (0.155)	0.110 (0.132)
Pred Econ Dep. On Host	-0.152 (0.137)	0.073 (0.120)	-0.017 (0.100)	-0.145 (0.113)	0.079 (0.121)	-0.007 (0.124)
Pred Sec Dep. On Host	0.290* (0.134)	0.080 (0.127)	-0.105 (0.091)	0.074 (0.113)	-0.136 (0.135)	0.217 ⁺ (0.121)
Victim C/R/A in 3 rd State	-0.025 (0.141)	0.182 (0.114)	-0.151* (0.063)	-0.022 (0.117)	0.185 (0.132)	-0.003 (0.120)
3 rd State Pressure on Host	0.243 ⁺ (0.140)	-0.149 (0.121)	0.043 (0.083)	0.063 (0.098)	-0.329* (0.152)	0.180 (0.148)
3 rd State Pressure on Pred	0.365** (0.130)	-0.076 (0.116)	-0.194* (0.081)	0.307** (0.103)	-0.133 (0.121)	0.057 (0.150)
3 rd State Concern	-0.128	0.187	0.155	-0.345***	-0.029	0.217

	(0.136)	(0.120)	(0.104)	(0.095)	(0.128)	(0.150)
IO	0.054	0.185 ⁺	-0.205 ^{**}	0.049	0.180 ⁺	0.005
Intervention	(0.118)	(0.095)	(0.063)	(0.085)	(0.107)	(0.099)
Terror post-911	0.012	0.254 ^{**}	-0.204 ^{**}	-0.008	0.233 [*]	0.020
	(0.097)	(0.088)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.094)	(0.084)
Constant	0.406 ^{***}	0.226 [*]	0.471 ^{***}	0.274 ^{***}	0.094	0.132
	(0.107)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.091)
Observations	137	137	137	137	137	137
R ²	0.157	0.279	0.229	0.154	0.218	0.127
Adjusted R ²	0.076	0.209	0.154	0.073	0.142	0.043
Residual Std. Error (df = 124)	0.472	0.439	0.382	0.361	0.448	0.411
F Statistic (df = 12; 124)	1.926 [*]	4.003 ^{***}	3.067 ^{***}	1.888 [*]	2.877 ^{**}	1.509

Note: ⁺p<0.1 ^{*}p<0.05 ^{**}p<0.01 ^{***}p<0.001

Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

**Table B-4: Firth Penalized Logistic Regression of External Backlash –
Alternative**

	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)	0.675 (0.315)	0.207** (0.116)	1.236 (0.681)	0.397 (0.228)	0.153*** (0.085)	0.170** (0.094)
Security Bandwidth Top Quartile	0.296+ (0.211)	0.310 (0.243)	8.372* (8.452)	0.349 (0.335)	0.837 (0.602)	0.439 (0.339)
Economic Bandwidth Top Quartile	1.912 (1.125)	1.609 (1.014)	0.711 (0.477)	1.166 (0.890)	0.899 (0.578)	1.916 (1.256)
Host Econ Dep. On Pred	0.809 (0.476)	2.849 (1.838)	0.331 (0.238)	1.094 (0.780)	3.047+ (1.911)	0.614 (0.440)
Host Sec Dep. On Pred	0.718 (0.484)	8.661** (7.048)	0.164+ (0.175)	0.186 (0.202)	3.081+ (2.081)	2.078 (1.632)
Pred Econ Dep. On Host	0.540 (0.325)	1.498 (0.964)	1.121 (0.812)	0.418 (0.302)	1.481 (0.996)	1.054 (0.698)
Pred Sec Dep. On Host	3.375+ (2.148)	1.429 (0.979)	0.390 (0.378)	2.548 (1.948)	0.554 (0.366)	3.275+ (2.241)
Victim C/R/A in 3 rd State	0.928 (0.595)	3.649 (2.913)	0.142 (0.185)	1.448 (1.186)	2.594 (1.737)	1.016 (0.677)
3 rd State Pressure on Host	3.099 (2.616)	0.740 (0.844)	1.278 (1.881)	0.270 (0.437)	0.223+ (0.199)	2.001 (1.601)
3 rd State Pressure on Origin	4.657* (3.531)	0.320 (0.336)	0.237 (0.296)	35.938* (58.783)	0.536 (0.433)	1.589 (1.136)
3 rd State Concern	0.510	5.681	3.042	0.012*	0.766	2.634

	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(0.400)	(6.028)	(3.334)	(0.022)	(0.600)	(1.907)
IO Intervention	1.291	2.711	0.211+	1.628	2.307	1.072
	(0.655)	(1.678)	(0.182)	(1.044)	(1.229)	(0.616)
Terror post-9/11	1.089	4.224**	0.202**	0.764	2.923*	1.087
	(0.461)	(2.023)	(0.122)	(0.426)	(1.304)	(0.526)
Num.Obs.	137	137	137	137	137	137
AIC	186.9	159.3	128.5	122.2	173.9	156.6
BIC	224.8	197.2	166.4	160.2	211.9	194.6
Log.Lik.	-80.433	-66.638	-51.239	-48.117	-73.967	-65.310
F	1.195	2.144	1.695	1.020	1.691	1.062
RMSE	0.45	0.40	0.35	0.33	0.43	0.39

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table B-5. Linear Probability Model of External Backlash – Alternative DVs

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Responsive	Responsive ALT Measure	Complicit	Complicit ALT Measure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political Bandwidth	3.357* (1.583)	1.990+ (1.025)	-0.138 (1.438)	1.274 (1.313)
Security Bandwidth	-0.772** (0.238)	-0.364+ (0.208)	0.311 (0.293)	0.164 (0.298)
Economic Bandwidth	0.467 (0.369)	0.172 (0.249)	-0.229 (0.360)	-0.142 (0.365)
Host Econ Dep. On Pred	-0.186 (0.142)	-0.115 (0.123)	0.152 (0.148)	0.036 (0.145)
Host Sec Dep. On Pred	-0.160 (0.396)	-0.351 (0.421)	0.812+ (0.484)	1.047* (0.506)
Pred Econ Dep. On Host	-0.198 (0.132)	-0.210* (0.102)	0.026 (0.134)	-0.037 (0.135)
Pred Sec Dep. On Host	1.593*** (0.230)	0.921** (0.352)	-0.319 (0.379)	-0.445 (0.389)
Victim C/R/A in 3 rd State	0.055 (0.135)	0.099 (0.121)	0.208+ (0.117)	0.201 (0.128)
3 rd State Pressure on Host	0.276* (0.135)	0.141 (0.110)	-0.099 (0.120)	0.092 (0.153)
3 rd State Pressure on Pred	0.295* (0.124)	0.411*** (0.112)	-0.126 (0.115)	-0.287* (0.115)
3 rd State Concern	-0.177 (0.140)	-0.400*** (0.119)	0.215+ (0.117)	-0.007 (0.118)
IO Intervention	0.033 (0.099)	0.020 (0.086)	0.158+ (0.094)	0.196+ (0.102)
Terror post-911	-0.009 (0.087)	-0.063 (0.066)	0.291*** (0.083)	0.280** (0.090)

Constant	-0.139 (0.218)	-0.039 (0.130)	0.330 (0.211)	0.089 (0.188)
Observations	137	137	137	137
R ²	0.282	0.299	0.265	0.291
Adjusted R ²	0.206	0.225	0.188	0.216
Residual Std. Error (df = 123)	0.437	0.330	0.445	0.444
F Statistic (df = 13; 123)	3.711***	4.034***	3.418***	3.877***

Note: +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

Table B-6. Linear Probability Model of Internal Backlash

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democracy	0.190 (0.179)	-0.348* (0.139)	0.250* (0.108)	0.063 (0.129)	-0.475** (0.177)	0.127 (0.169)
Host Citizen	0.050 (0.161)	-0.334** (0.128)	0.174 (0.119)	0.209 (0.139)	-0.174 (0.144)	-0.160 (0.133)
Host Asylum	0.194 (0.171)	-0.343** (0.121)	0.015 (0.153)	0.386* (0.164)	-0.152 (0.095)	-0.192 (0.127)
Host Resident	-0.014 (0.098)	-0.171* (0.083)	0.091 (0.068)	0.087 (0.058)	-0.071 (0.092)	-0.101 (0.096)
Legislator Statement	0.371+ (0.213)	0.149 (0.206)	-0.217* (0.093)	0.094 (0.166)	-0.128 (0.230)	0.277 (0.179)
Opposition Statements	0.088 (0.236)	-0.039 (0.233)	-0.111 (0.110)	0.132 (0.208)	0.005 (0.261)	-0.044 (0.200)
Fiscal Capacity	0.147 (0.120)	-0.164* (0.075)	0.078 (0.053)	0.083 (0.058)	-0.227+ (0.125)	0.064 (0.124)
Divided Party Control	-0.040 (0.048)	-0.031 (0.029)	0.027 (0.023)	0.005 (0.020)	0.014 (0.051)	-0.045 (0.050)
Rep. Disad. Social Groups	0.073 (0.058)	0.015 (0.044)	-0.043 (0.036)	0.033 (0.049)	-0.025 (0.051)	0.040 (0.050)
Exclusion by Socio-Econ	0.789* (0.317)	0.408 (0.288)	-0.367+ (0.196)	0.039 (0.304)	-0.342 (0.332)	0.750* (0.333)
Democracy: Divided Party Control	0.088 (0.097)	0.027 (0.070)	-0.009 (0.088)	-0.006 (0.065)	-0.067 (0.069)	0.095 (0.080)
Constant	-0.092 (0.139)	0.927*** (0.121)	0.100 (0.090)	-0.063 (0.129)	0.956*** (0.127)	-0.029 (0.138)

Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138
R ²	0.189	0.463	0.272	0.230	0.322	0.128
Adjusted R ²	0.118	0.416	0.209	0.163	0.263	0.052
Residual Std. Error (df = 126)	0.461	0.377	0.368	0.342	0.414	0.412
F Statistic (df = 11; 126)	2.674**	9.881***	4.287***	3.424***	5.441***	1.679+

Note: +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

Table B-7. Firth Penalized Logistic Regression of External Backlash

	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)	0.046** (0.050)	21.585+ (34.124)	0.034* (0.058)	0.026* (0.041)	11.836* (13.147)	0.076* (0.076)
Democracy	2.837 (2.482)	0.422 (0.518)	6.994 (9.900)	0.871 (1.150)	0.080* (0.079)	1.847 (1.637)
Host Citizen	1.199 (0.853)	0.144* (0.129)	6.261+ (5.946)	4.204+ (3.462)	0.430 (0.371)	0.468 (0.400)
Host Asylum	3.118 (2.630)	0.119* (0.124)	1.876 (1.741)	7.618* (6.987)	0.222 (0.337)	0.341 (0.352)
Host Resident	0.968 (0.446)	0.302* (0.169)	2.987+ (1.901)	2.439 (1.702)	0.675 (0.325)	0.606 (0.300)
Legislator Statements	4.612+ (4.247)	1.947 (1.973)	0.146 (0.237)	2.289 (2.270)	0.453 (0.470)	3.688 (3.399)
Opposition Statements	2.203 (2.460)	1.149 (1.368)	0.241 (0.454)	1.554 (1.756)	0.731 (0.909)	0.959 (1.041)
Fiscal Capacity	2.253 (1.652)	0.095 (0.147)	2.671 (3.746)	4.012 (6.131)	0.395 (0.270)	1.451 (1.027)
Divided Party Control	0.846 (0.218)	0.739 (0.289)	1.395 (0.614)	1.030 (0.498)	1.045 (0.255)	0.804 (0.207)
Rep. Disad. Social Groups	1.485 (0.481)	0.988 (0.441)	0.525 (0.261)	1.550 (0.667)	0.819 (0.280)	1.184 (0.390)
Exclusion by Socio-Econ	74.125*	34.402	0.091	0.470	0.068	43.360*

	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(136.531)	(79.123)	(0.256)	(1.156)	(0.140)	(73.637)
Democracy × Divided Party Control	1.413 (0.614)	1.325 (0.722)	0.767 (0.431)	0.986 (0.642)	0.709 (0.387)	1.703 (0.858)
Num.Obs.	138	138	138	138	138	138
AIC	179.6	132.6	121.6	118.6	154.0	156.3
BIC	214.8	167.7	156.8	153.7	189.1	191.5
Log.Lik.	-77.815	-54.290	-48.817	-47.298	-64.994	-66.175
F	1.541	3.474	2.231	1.613	2.609	1.172
RMSE	0.44	0.35	0.34	0.32	0.39	0.40

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent odds ratio of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of these ratios. AIC represents Akaike information criteria, BIC represents Bayesian information criteria, and RMSE represents Root Mean Squared Error.

Table B-8. Linear Probability Model of Internal Backlash – Alternative 1

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Polyarchy	0.168 (0.295)	-0.916*** (0.214)	0.340+ (0.175)	0.493* (0.210)	-0.591* (0.265)	-0.325 (0.286)
Host Citizen	0.028 (0.150)	-0.247* (0.102)	0.109 (0.114)	0.185 (0.129)	-0.091 (0.109)	-0.157 (0.115)
Host Asylum	0.258+ (0.152)	-0.245* (0.118)	-0.035 (0.139)	0.336* (0.158)	-0.167** (0.064)	-0.078 (0.131)
Legislator Statements	0.422*** (0.115)	0.219* (0.101)	-0.364*** (0.068)	0.164 (0.116)	-0.039 (0.093)	0.258* (0.127)
Fiscal Capacity	0.150 (0.120)	-0.095 (0.059)	0.080 (0.052)	0.022 (0.037)	-0.223* (0.114)	0.128 (0.118)
Territorial Control	-0.004 (0.007)	0.0003 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.010+ (0.005)	-0.010 (0.006)
Exclusion by Social Group	0.191 (0.314)	-0.013 (0.251)	-0.292+ (0.173)	0.334 (0.232)	0.129 (0.284)	-0.143 (0.311)
Constant	0.450 (0.724)	1.177* (0.568)	0.710 (0.517)	-0.814+ (0.458)	-0.087 (0.570)	1.264+ (0.686)
Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138
R ²	0.152	0.451	0.264	0.236	0.344	0.088
Adjusted R ²	0.106	0.421	0.224	0.195	0.308	0.039
Residual Std. Error (df = 130)	0.465	0.375	0.365	0.336	0.401	0.415
F Statistic (df = 7; 130)	3.320**	15.233***	6.652***	5.731***	9.723***	1.796+

Note: +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

Table B-9. Linear Probability Model of Internal Backlash – Alternative 2

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Responsive	Complicit	Non-Response	Only Responsive	Only Complicit	Mixed Response
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democracy	0.045 (0.178)	-0.397** (0.124)	0.381*** (0.102)	-0.027 (0.087)	-0.469** (0.161)	0.072 (0.174)
Judicial Constraints	-0.071 (0.280)	-0.156 (0.191)	-0.123 (0.161)	0.252 (0.155)	0.167 (0.262)	-0.323 (0.273)
Host Citizen	-0.006 (0.156)	-0.368** (0.129)	0.191 (0.124)	0.219 (0.139)	-0.143 (0.133)	-0.225+ (0.127)
Host Asylum	0.241 (0.167)	-0.326* (0.137)	-0.012 (0.151)	0.400* (0.157)	-0.168+ (0.088)	-0.159 (0.146)
Host Resident	-0.031 (0.098)	-0.184* (0.081)	0.096 (0.069)	0.092+ (0.054)	-0.060 (0.092)	-0.124 (0.097)
Legislator Statement	0.383* (0.192)	0.154 (0.211)	-0.213* (0.095)	0.088 (0.169)	-0.142 (0.215)	0.296 (0.180)
Opposition Statements	0.063 (0.211)	-0.054 (0.243)	-0.112 (0.117)	0.144 (0.210)	0.027 (0.243)	-0.081 (0.197)
Fiscal Capacity	0.149 (0.125)	-0.145* (0.064)	0.087+ (0.051)	0.057 (0.044)	-0.236+ (0.121)	0.092 (0.127)
Divided Party Control	-0.029 (0.058)	-0.012 (0.036)	0.038 (0.026)	-0.022 (0.029)	-0.005 (0.060)	-0.008 (0.060)
Democracy: Divided Party Control	0.057 (0.100)	0.003 (0.070)	-0.004 (0.090)	0.009 (0.065)	-0.046 (0.067)	0.049 (0.081)
Constant	0.239 (0.163)	1.154*** (0.090)	0.014 (0.081)	-0.161** (0.061)	0.754*** (0.152)	0.400* (0.166)
Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138
R ²	0.149	0.456	0.261	0.237	0.317	0.097
Adjusted R ²	0.082	0.413	0.202	0.177	0.264	0.026
Residual Std. Error (df = 127)	0.471	0.378	0.370	0.339	0.414	0.418
F Statistic (df = 10; 127)	2.220*	10.650***	4.474***	3.952***	5.904***	1.368

Note: +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

Table B-10. Linear Probability Model of Internal Backlash – Alternative DVs

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Responsive (1)	Responsive ALT Measure (2)	Complicit (3)	Complicit ALT Measure (4)
Democracy	0.190 (0.179)	0.026 (0.118)	-0.348* (0.139)	-0.355* (0.156)
Host Citizen	0.050 (0.161)	0.230+ (0.137)	-0.334** (0.128)	-0.212 (0.148)
Host Asylum	0.194 (0.171)	0.588*** (0.153)	-0.343** (0.121)	-0.273* (0.120)
Host Resident	-0.014 (0.098)	0.022 (0.061)	-0.171* (0.083)	-0.086 (0.097)
Legislator Statement	0.371+ (0.213)	0.216 (0.187)	0.149 (0.206)	0.184 (0.223)
Opposition Statements	0.088 (0.236)	-0.037 (0.201)	-0.039 (0.233)	-0.264 (0.262)
Fiscal Capacity	0.147 (0.120)	-0.025 (0.092)	-0.164* (0.075)	0.034 (0.136)
Divided Party Control	-0.040 (0.048)	0.022 (0.025)	-0.031 (0.029)	0.035 (0.052)
Rep. Disad. Social Groups	0.073 (0.058)	0.056 (0.041)	0.015 (0.044)	0.070 (0.058)
Exclusion by Socio-Econ	0.789* (0.317)	0.110 (0.245)	0.408 (0.288)	0.529+ (0.274)
Democracy: Divided Party Control	0.088 (0.097)	-0.022 (0.052)	0.027 (0.070)	-0.028 (0.085)
Constant	-0.092	0.040	0.927***	0.582**

	(0.139)	(0.086)	(0.121)	(0.181)
Observations	138	138	138	138
R ²	0.189	0.330	0.463	0.333
Adjusted R ²	0.118	0.271	0.416	0.275
Residual Std. Error (df = 126)	0.461	0.319	0.377	0.427
F Statistic (df = 11; 126)	2.674**	5.632***	9.881***	5.716***

Note: +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Robust standard errors displayed. Each column represents a separate model. The same sample is employed across models and dependent variables are dichotomous. Numbers in columns represent the coefficients of the respective independent variables, while numbers in parentheses represent their standard errors.

Table B-11. Host Response Dependent Variable Summary			
Indicator Variable	Freq.	Aggregate Variable	Freq.
Reveal new information incriminating predator	11 (7.97%)	If any: Responsive	55 (39.86%)
Blame Predator	15 (10.87%)		
Launch Investigation (non-Assassinations) ⁶⁰	15 (10.87%)		
Police Protection	8 (5.80%)		
Diplomatic Confrontation	12 (8.70%)		
Arrest/Indictment	14 (10.14%)		
Conviction	9 (6.52%)		
Ignored Extradition Request	5 (3.62%)		
Terminated Extradition Processing	19 (13.77%)		
Host Investigates, Fires, or Arrests Complicit Host Actors	5 (3.62%)		
Suspected Complicity in Violent Incident (low confidence or above)	12 (8.70%)		
Extradition	27 (19.57%)		
Detention	52 (37.68%)		
Provided Predator Access to Victim	10 (7.25%)		
Harassed Victim	8 (5.80%)		
Began Processing Extradition Request (not including completed extraditions)	28 (20.29%)		
No Statements	79 (57.25%)	If all: Non-Response	30 (21.74%)
Not Complicit	56 (40.58%)		
Not Responsive	83 (60.14%)		

⁶⁰ Investigations for assassinations are not considered responsive simply due to the frequency with which they occur in such cases. When the host state investigates a homicide they are conducting a basic law enforcement service that is not assumed in cases such as threats or a missing person.

Table B-12. Alternative Host Response Dependent Variable Summary			
Indicator Variable	Freq.	Aggregate Variable	Freq.
Blame Predator	15 (10.87%)	If any: Responsive	23 (16.67%)
Diplomatic Confrontation	12 (8.70%)		
Arrest/Indictment (Suspected or Known to be Predatory State Agent(s))	10 (7.25%)		
Ignored Extradition Request	5 (3.62%)		
Suspected Complicity in Violent Incident (<u>medium</u> confidence or above)	4 (2.90%)	If any: Complicit	67 (48.55%)
Extradition	27 (19.57%)		
Detention	52 (37.68%)		

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