ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: AMERICAN POPULISM, POLITICAL INFORMATION, AND TRADE OPINION

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Trade policy is a complex issue that involves economics and international politics. Traditionally, Americans have not often expressed opinions on trade policy due to its high issue complexity and because Democrats and Republican politicians since the later part of the 20th century have been inconsistent in their support for neoliberalism or protectionism. Despite this, populist candidates like Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump have repeatedly used their support for protectionist policies to differentiate themselves from more mainstream candidates. Using multiple public opinion surveys and survey experiments, this project explores how populism, anti-expert sentiment, anti-capitalism, diversity anxiety, and ethnonationalism influence American's views on free trade policy and shows that all these factors are associated with greater support for protectionist policies. Additionally, this project examines and adjusts for the unusually high level of non-response regarding questions about trade policy.

This project also analyzes what causes Americans to think trade policy (specifically, the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership) is more important. This project finds that Americans who believe themselves to be strangers in their own country are more likely to believe the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific partnership is important. Meanwhile, Americans who believe the United States is less respected than in the past are less likely to believe the Trans-Pacific Partnership is important. Two survey experiments are conducted to see how the presence of "don't know" responses in trade opinion questions and patriotic framing shift attitudes on trade policy. In both cases, issue framing does not significantly shift opinion on trade policy.

This project carries out a longitudinal study to see how the same group of Americans shift their attitudes on trade policy over a multi-year time frame. Generally, these shifts are very small; however, Americans with differing views on regulation displayed the greatest attitudinal shift. Initially, Americans who wanted more government regulation were the most protectionist while Americans who wanted less government regulation were the least protectionist. Over the multi-year period, this association became significantly less visible. Finally, this project analyzes how economic attitudes, immigration attitudes, economic identity, immigrant identity, local immigrant populations, and local economic data influence views on trade policy. The study finds that immigration attitudes are closely aligned with views of trade policy.

AMERICAN POPULISM, POLITICAL INFORMATION, AND TRADE OPINION

by

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List of Abbreviations

ACS: American Community Survey

AFL-CIO: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

ANES: American National Elections Study

CCES: Cooperative Congressional Election Study

DFVSG: Democracy Fund Voter Study Group

DK: “Don’t know” response

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GOP: Grand Old Party, Republican Party

H-O: Heckscher-Ohlin model

ID: Identification

LMC: Labor market competition

NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement

NAICS: North American Industry Classification System

PNTR: Permanent normal trade relations

OLS: Ordinary least squares

TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership

UMD: University of Maryland

US: United States

USITC: United States International Trade Commission

WTO: World Trade Organization

ZIP: Zone Improvement Plan, USPS postal codes

Chapter 1

Introduction and Overview of Trade Opinion Literature: Gaps in the Theory and Opportunity for Expansion

Introduction

In 2018, considering his proposed tariffs of steel and aluminum, then President Trump declared: "trade wars are good and easy to win." It is possible to dissect the statement in one of two ways: substantively or symbolically. On the one hand, trade policy provides material benefits and disadvantages based on which sectors benefit and which sectors are hurt through the implementation of new tariffs. Symbolically, the messaging invokes a kind of economic battle between the United States and the rest of the world. This statement also has a secondary effect. Trade is fundamentally a highly complicated policy area with poorly understood economic effects among Americans. Yet, Trump undermines that complexity in nearly every element of his now famous – or infamous – declaration. When complicated, nuanced policy is framed in such simplistic ways to the American public, trade policy can present an opportunity to better understand how Americans develop and change their views on complex, lower salience issues.

Questions about public policy direction are often complex and difficult to understand among the general public. This is especially true among subjects that can frequently only be understood in a national, rather than local context, such as international trade, tariffs, and protectionism. Whether the debate surrounds trade policy, healthcare, infrastructure, taxation, immigration, or other often abstract political concepts, it is necessary to condense and contextualize such policies in a way that permit the public at large to learn and process the information. Politicians and political elites can frame the debate around the issue and rally public support using a variety of mechanisms that are often used to simplify complex subjects. When issues are firmly cemented as part of a party platform, such as deregulation for the Republican

Party or combatting climate change for the Democratic Party, party identification and partisan strength can help shape individual views. Among issues that are not central to party platforms, it is often necessary to contextualize and simplify policy issues.

Some ways in which political elites contextualize issues is by demonstrating the individual and local effects that a certain policy issue can have, often through simple pocketbook economics and the dichotomy between the populace and the elite (Bonikowski and Gidrom 2016). It is also necessary to simplify issues by limiting nuance surrounding the issue such as the tradeoffs that arise with establishment, repeal, or change of a particular area of public policy. With this in mind, international trade and related issues such as globalization, outsourcing, and tariffs are in a particularly unusual spot as a public policy issue, particularly one that has been increasing in relevance since the beginning of President Trump's campaign. International trade policy is not a strongly partisan issue among the general electorate. Nor is it a consistently partisan issue within party platforms given that the Republican Party has shifted from being largely pro-free trade throughout most of the 20th century towards favoring protectionism with the advent of the Trump presidency. International trade policy is also, by its very nature, an international issue, making it more difficult to contextualize the issue in a local lens. For many Americans, it is difficult to demonstrate the direct pocketbook effects of trade policy or show how trade policy affects a local community. It is also a policy area with nuances and complications. Free trade can expand the economy; however, this may also come at the cost of decreased job security for some American workers. These nuances in conjunction with national scope of the issue and its inconsistent partisan orientation make it ripe for further analysis.

There are two central elements to formation of trade opinion: having an opinion on trade and formulating a preferred policy position. Much of the trade opinion literature has been

focused on the latter element, but the literature has paid insufficient attention to the process of having any opinion at all, regardless of opinion direction. Given the complexity of the question, free trade questions have generally high levels of non-response. In the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2016 survey questionnaire, when prompted with a survey item about the respondents' feelings towards foreign import limits, 44.5 percent of respondents provided a "haven't thought much about this" (ANES 2018).[1] In the 2016 Democracy Fund Voter Study Group survey questionnaire, when prompted with a question about whether the respondent favored or opposed increasing free trade with other nations, 24.7 percent of respondents provided a "not sure" response (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017). More confusingly, trade opinions may be highly inconsistent; however, this is difficult to verify because survey questionnaires use inconsistent measures for evaluating trade opinion. In the aforementioned 2016 ANES, in the survey question that tasked responds to report their favorability or opposition towards import limits, 65.7 percent of respondents indicated support for import limits (when excluding the DK responses in the version of the question that includes DK responses). In the aforementioned 2016 Democracy Fund Voter Study Group data, 78.2 percent of respondents favored increasing free trade with new nations (when excluding DK responses); however, in the same survey, 61.4 percent of respondents believe that free trade will reduce the number of American jobs and 61.5 percent of respondents believe that free trade will reduce the wages of American workers (as opposed to increasing those values or having no impact). Alternatively, 55.6 percent of those respondents believed that free trade would lower the prices of goods (as opposed to having no impact or increasing the price of goods).

[1] For many surveys used during this project, the data and codebooks were released after the year of the survey. Because of this, the dates of the citations for the data sets do not match the dates of the surveys. Consequently, when citing these data sets, this project will use the date that the data was released. By contrast, when using these data sets for tables and figures, this dissertation will show the year that the respective firm conducted the survey.

This high level of non-response regarding trade questions, internal complexity surrounding opinions about the issue, and possible internal inconsistency indicates that it is not only important to understand why people have certain opinions about trade policy, but also to understand why some individuals engage with trade policy altogether. Additionally, it is necessary to move beyond the simple support versus opposition framework for understanding complex issues like trade policy as such question framings exclude potential ambivalent views towards such complicated policy issues.

Following this, the central question of my dissertation is as follows: given that trade policy is such a complicated issue, and that non-response on the issue is so high, what are the factors (political, economic, local, or otherwise) that activate engagement with the topic? Consequently, it is necessary to better understand the conditions that lead individuals to form opinions on trade policy. Given that international free trade is such a complex issue, what are the mechanisms that cause people to form their opinions on trade policy? Do local economic and/or immigration conditions influence trade opinion? Comparatively, what roles do economic and immigrant identities play in shifting trade attitudes? This is relevant in the context of the political climate of the Trump and Sanders populist political era. Since international trade is such a high complexity issue, why did it become such a point of contention during the Trump campaign and presidency? Given that trade policy became so contentious and divisive regardless of party affiliation, did people change their minds about trade policy during this time period – and, if so, who changed their minds? Examining trade policy issue formation and opinion change, consequently, provides a useful means for understanding how American voters change their views on newly framed issues.

Overarching these questions, I will examine the association between trade formation and networks of attitudes: populism; diversity anxiety; ethnonationalism; and broader immigration attitudes. I will argue that support for trade policy, given its complex and high salience nature, is reliant on both institutional and expert trust. From this, populism forms as an antithesis to institutional and expert technocratic values by focusing on the will of the people over the advice of expert opinion and institutional norms. Support for technocratic policy sway and institutional norms has demonstrable value as an attitudinal axis beyond understanding the evolution of trade opinion as it will help to separate Trump and Sanders-style populists from their more orthodox party base – a separation that is difficult to meaningfully make when simply analyzing most policy preferences. Additionally, individuals with anxiety about the benefits of the increasing diversity of America will also be more skeptical of the benefits of open trade policy, demonstrating that opposition to trade policy does not necessarily represent a purely economic consideration, but instead a reflection of respondents' views about the national itself. Similarly, respondents high in ethnonationalist attitudes, who actively reject diverse and multicultural frameworks of America will also be more hostile to trade. Finally, undergirding these broader attitudinal views, I will show that immigration attitudes will shift trade opinion, with stronger anti-immigration sentiment strongly correlating with anti-trade sentiment.

It is also essential to acknowledge the time dimension when understanding trade opinion formation and intensity. Prior to the 2016 election, trade was one of the few nonpolarized issues with significant splits in support among respondents from both parties, but broader consensus among elites **(**Williamson 1990**).** However, given that Trump in 2016 made trade policy into a major campaign issue – and more broadly attacked trade agreements during his tenure in office – it is necessary to see how opinion towards trade policy shifted from the time before Trump was a

national political figure to his campaign and finally during the time he was president. More importantly, it is essential to understand why those attitudinal shifts happened.

There are two immediately major and interrelated counter-arguments to the validity and importance of studying the political behavior surrounding trade policy. First, if trade policy is often too complicated for the common American voter to properly evaluate, what is the purpose of studying the topic? Second, on a related note, if trade policy orientation and alignment has reoriented over different political eras, are not views on trade policy simply reflective of political orientation? At a theoretical level, trade policy may be reflective of deeper, internally consistent populist sentiment. Trade policy requires a high degree of trust in elite figures and international organizations. Consequently, opposition or favorability to trade policy (and other internationalist policies) may represent a willingness to actively engage is a broader, more nebulous, and more complicated economic and political world.

Overview of Literature

This chapter will first compare several competing explanations for trade opinion: partisan affiliation, individual-level socioeconomic status and personal retrospective evaluations of the economy, sociotropic evaluations of the economy, individual-level attitudinal factors, demographic variables, local demographic and sociopolitical variation, and methodological considerations. Ultimately, I will argue that that the typical catalog of items thought to influence trade policy is insufficient, as it is necessary to understand how trade opinion changes over time to better understand how individuals formulate opinions on trade by examining the factors that influence whether someone holds any opinion at all. In addition, it is necessary to understand how individuals shift their opinions on trade policy over time. Consequently, this will serve the argumentative basis for understanding why trade policy is an issue area that continues to cut

across partisan affiliation. By analyzing how trade opinions change over time, and by determining which individuals are more likely to become engaged in trade policy, it is therefore possible to better understand how and why right-wing and left-wing American populists (the Trump and Sanders branches of their respective ideologies) diverge from mainstream economic orthodoxy on trade opinion. Similarly, it is relevant to evaluate the degree to which respondents indicate that trade policy is an important policy area. Given that trade policy has historically been a low salience issue, it is also important to determine what raises its salience among some people.

Economic Self-Interest Models

Economic self-interest forms the theoretical basis for the classic behavioral models of trade. While the economic benefits of trade policy are debatable, trade liberalization likely results in material and economic benefits for some groups at the cost of material losses for others within that country. Thus, if individuals are acting rationally within their economic self-interest, those should support trade expansion when they are personally advantaged or their groups are advantaged and they should oppose free trade if the opposite is true (Cohen 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). The trade opinion literature utilizes three economic models to form the theoretical basis for opinion variation surrounding trade opinion: the Heckscher-Ohlin model; the specific factors model (or Ricardo-Viner model); and the Stolper-Samuelson model. The next section will delve into the three specific economic models, how they have been applied to the trade opinion literature, the efficacy of their application, and the implications derived from the application of these economic models to public opinion research.

The Heckscher-Ohlin model (H-O model) (Balistreri 1997; Kapstein 1999; Ohlin 1967; Rodrick 1997) is the base theoretical framework to provide the contextual reasons why some

individuals in certain countries and economic contexts would stand to benefit from trade liberalization, whereas other individuals in different economic contexts would be similarly disadvantaged. The H-O model is a corollary of the Ricardian proposal of comparative advantage within globalized economic communities, wherein inherent discrepancies in the amount and production of certain goods lead to utility maximization when those economic communities trade the excess of their good for the excess goods of another economic community. Utility is maximized when all communities focus on producing the goods that they are relatively optimal at producing. This is true even if one economic community is, in absolute terms, more efficient at producing the goods of other economic communities, but the good is produced less efficiently than the optimally efficient good, because producing the good less efficiently would result in unnecessary opportunity cost (Ricardo 1817).

The H-O model follows this proposition of comparative advantage between nations, building a case for importing and exporting dependent on material abundance and material need. Nations will export the goods dependent on economic factors that the nation has in relative excess and import goods dependent on factors that the nation has in relative scarcity. Factors that determine the ability of a nation to produce a certain good efficiently include labor, capital, and land. Labor is one such resource that can be traded on the global market, and it is especially relevant the abundance and scarcity of skilled and unskilled labor within nations. This is due to the argument that it is in certain nations' comparative advantage to export either high-skilled or low-skilled labor dependent on the economic factors of the country itself (Ohlin 1967**)**. Because labor is the factor in production that has a political voice in itself, it is the factor that is of greatest concern to the study of trade opinion. One political implication is that utility and good maximization can only be effectively achieved in a globalized, interconnected trade community.

Moreover, because economic communities will inevitably have both high and low-skilled laborers regardless of the advancement of the country, these models build a framework predictive of economic and political problems because of internal tensions caused by individual laborers not producing optimally within a developed, globalized country.

When applied to public opinion theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin model (Balistreri 1997; Kapstein 1999; Ohlin 1967; Rodrick 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) creates a broad theoretical foundation for these advantaged and disadvantaged groups within the realm of trade liberalization. Following the previously discussed theoretical explanation about why certain groups are advantaged and others disadvantaged by trade liberalization, the trade opinion literature makes a facially direct application wherein trade opinions follow in accordance with economic realities. Under the Heckscher-Ohlin model, individuals within developed, industrialized nations with advanced skills stand to benefit from trade whereas unskilled workers from those same nations would face greater economic hardship as a result of increased competition. Because unskilled labor is common throughout the world, and because industrialized, developed nations like the United States have higher standards of living and worker protections when compared to many developing nations, blue collar workers would face a greater threat of wage competition as a result of free trade. Blue collar workers are not the only economic group threatened by increased trade liberalization. While often indirectly protecting the economic interests of blue-collar workers, trade unions oppose increasing free trade so as to preserve the economic protections afforded to unionized workers in the absence of cheaper, less protected international labor (Conybeare and Zikula 1996; Kaptsein 1999; Lawrence 1996; Peters 2020; Rodrick 1997; Rogowski 1989; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Shoch 2000). To build the case for self-interest based models for trade opinion, the literature has turned to other models

to show that advantaged and disadvantaged groups may not be as clearly defined as one would expect in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.

Within the broader economic and trade liberalization literature, the Ricardo-Viner model (alternatively known as the specific factors model) both builds upon and differentiates from the Hecksher-Ohlin model by placing greater focus on how labor functions differently as a factor of production when compared to other factors of production including land and capital. The Ricardo-Viner model differs from the Heckscher-Ohlin model because the H-O model assumes that factors (such as land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship) can shift freely across economic sectors. Unlike land and capital, labor is able to move relatively freely between differing economic communities – whether by moving to a different country, changing jobs, or moving within a country; however, there are restrictions in movement of labor across economic sectors because moving across economic sectors is not costless for laborers. Contrarily, the Ricardo-Viner model proposes that all factors do not necessarily move freely across economic sectors and that some factors are more capable of moving across sectors than other factors. Thus, when the Ricardo-Viner model's assumption of sector movement restriction is specifically applied to the trade opinion literature, favorability or opposition to trade policy is dependent on how trade liberalization affects a particular industry (Krugman et al. 2015; Leamer and Levinsohn 1994; Samuelson 1971; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Because each economic community has limits on the amount of capital and land freely available, and labor maximizes the utilization of these two factors with diminishing returns, there is necessarily a limit to the total number of laborers within a specific economic community given the limits determined by the capital and land available. Moreover, trade liberalization has differing effects on different segments of national economies. Industries that specialize in exports benefit from trade liberalization because broader, globalized

economic systems provide a larger market and greater opportunity for expansion. By contrast, industries that create products that compete directly with imported goods face limited opportunities for market expansion and thus greater potential labor restraints as the industry needs to adjust to its more limited market scope (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005). In line with the H-O model and comparative advantage theories, the Ricardo-Viner model produces a globalized economic scenario wherein industries are only maximally operating when producing goods in which a country is relatively efficient compared to other countries in a globalized economic community. Inherently, this creates internal contradictions within national economies, especially among disadvantaged economic sectors, and provides a logical impetus towards anti-globalization sentiment.

When applied to trade opinion literature, the Ricardo-Viner model (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005; Samuelson 1971) suggests that industrial sectors will either favor or oppose free trade as a result of whether that industry benefits or is harmed by free trade liberalization. Individual attitudes towards trade liberalization follows in accordance with whether trade liberalization provides industries from differing sectors expanded economic opportunity or limited factors of production caused by greater competition. In contrast, the expectations set by the H-O model, where lower-skilled workers will favor trade restrictions regardless of economic sector, the application of the Ricardo-Viner model contextualizes individual opinion around economic sectors because factor types cannot easily move between industries (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Generally, individuals from export industries will favor expanded free trade because of expanded economic opportunity; industries competing with imported goods will favor protectionism because of the threat of competition; and individuals within industries that do not predominantly engage in trade should be more favorable to free

trade than import industries (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005). Arguably more relevantly, trade liberalization can expand the scope in which an export industry can grow, thus resulting in a greater demand for laborers in that sector. Contrarily, industries that compete with international goods decreases the demand for laborers within that economic sector, and thus, trade liberalization policies may result in an unemployment threat.

The Stolper-Samuelson model is the third major economic model utilized within trade opinion literature. Whereas the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Ricardo-Viner model focus on how comparative advantage of products within specific economic communities results in expansion or contraction of economic opportunity dependent on available factors of production, the Stolper-Samuelson model examines the association between the incorporation of factors of production within a product, its price, and wages (Rho and Tomz 2017; Samuelson 1941) Further incorporating the theory of comparative advantage, the Stolper-Samuelson model asserts the proposal that, when the price of a good is increased, the price of the factors of production (land, labor, or capital) increase at different rates. If one factor of production is used more intensely than another factor (or factors) of production to produce that good, then the price of that factor increases disproportionately compared to the other factors of production (Rho and Tomz 2017; Samuelson 1941).

The trade opinion literature has also incorporated elements of the Stolper-Samuelson model when addressing the possible economic reasons behind variance in trade liberalization views among the general population. It argues that favorability or opposition towards free trade is dependent on whether the respondent owned the means of production and how labor-intensive a particular product is. Under the Stolper-Samuelson model (Mayda and Rodrick 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Rho and Tomz 2017; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), employers

of skill intensive labor should favor free trade expansion while laborers in a labor-intensive industry should oppose free trade liberalism and support protectionism. This follows as an extension and incorporation of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem with the Heckscher-Ohlin model: if a particular product is extremely labor intensive, then it will increase the cost of wages relative to the cost of other factors of production. Consequently, individuals from industries that are labor-intensive are more economically threatened by a globalized economy that can produce the same goods at lower cost, thus ultimately lowering the relative wages for labor-intensive goods. By contrast, skill-intensive labor is not as readily abundant, and thus an increase in price to the product would result in a comparative increase in price to the wages of highly skilled laborer. As a consequence, globalization expands economic opportunity with less immediate price competition. Meanwhile, the opposite effect should occur with capital-intensive imports, since capital-based protectionism is in the economic interest of the capitalist and capital-based liberalism is in the economic interest of the laborer. This is because protectionism will increase the relative price of capital and thus lower the relative wages of the laborers. By contrast, capital liberalization will lower the relative cost of capital and increase the relative cost of wages by making the product more relatively wage intensive (Mussa 1974; Rho and Tomz 2015; Rho and Tomz 2017). Both the specific factors model and the Stolper-Samuelson model indicate that respondents' occupational industry may play a stronger role than economic class in determining free trade attitudes. While opinion papers with robust details about respondents' industry are relatively scarce within the literature, Rho and Tomz (2015) find that individuals do not systematically attempt to privilege their own industries through supporting greater protectionism of specific industries, demonstrating that self-interest models for free trade opinion may be flawed and incomplete in their approach.

While all three of these models broadly present self-interest motives when applied to public opinion research, they each present different fundamental groundwork that drives economic interest-based decision making. Applications of the H-O model to public opinion literature suggest that relative skill is the defining interest-based characteristic that will shift trade opinion. Individuals with greater levels of skill within an advanced economy like the United States will be more likely to favorable to open trade, while those with less relative skill will be more likely to be opposed to open trade (Conybeare and Zikula 1996; Kaptsein 1999; Lawrence 1996; Peters 2020; Rodrick 1997; Rogowski 1989; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Shoch 2000). By contrast, by assuming that relative skill is not readily transferrable across economic sectors, the Ricardo-Viner model assumes that the individual laborer is not making informed economic decisions based on their own individual skill level. Instead, individuals serve as representatives of broader industry-based interests. Functionally, this means that relative skill is not the determinant of trade opinion, but whether a particular industry is advantaged or disadvantaged by the openness of trade policy and how competitive a specific sector is within the global economy (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005). Functionally, the Stolper-Samuelson model, when applied to public opinion, also suggests individuals make trade decisions based on occupational and industrial incentives rather than individual incentives; however, the Stolper-Samuelson model creates different fundamentals, requiring the specification of the type of trade liberalization. Given that capital liberalization would increase the relative price of wages, individuals from wage-intensive sectors may be more open to certain types of trade liberalization that increase international access to capital. By contrast, trade policy that decreases the relative price of wages would likely be less supported by individuals from wage-intensive sectors. Consequently, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem adds a theoretical wrinkle

that requires further specification of the economic effects of particular trade liberalizing policies (Mussa 1974; Rho and Tomz 2015; Rho and Tomz 2017).

The economic self-interest model has received inconsistent support throughout the literature. Schlozman and Verba (1979) argue that political attitudes and political activation in the latter half of the twentieth century was becoming more and more decoupled from socioeconomic status and class awareness. More so, they argue that class-based and group-based politics are not necessarily one and the same as attitudes and political opinion about class-based political issues. They also note that working-class Americans, compared to other nations, have an unusually low level of class-consciousness, potentially weakening efforts to pursue collective economic benefits. Consequently, collective self-interest need not necessarily lead to pluralistic collective action. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) show that certain advantaged and highly skilled groups are more likely to favor trade liberalization, as they find that higher levels of education and technical skills are positively associated with preferences for trade liberalization. Rankin (2001) supports Scheve and Slaughter's assessment that blue collar and union members, as groups, are more likely to oppose trade liberalization policies; however, other demographic variables like education and income have inconsistent effects on trade opinion. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) further demonstrate that traditional subgrouping of individuals by skill, education, and income has inconsistent effects on trade policy preferences. Collectively, there is a wide theoretical basis for why economic conditions and relative prices of labor and skill-investment would influence individual level opinion towards trade liberalization. However, despite the broad array of theorems explaining contextual bases for why individuals would either support, oppose, or be neutral to free trade policies, the direct connection between self-interest and trade opinion

is limited and inconsistent. Consequently, there is a swathe of the literature dedicated to showing a more theoretically limited, but statistically consistent basis for variation in trade opinion.

Sociotropic Economic Evaluations, Partisanship, and Ideology

While traditional measures of economic group-based self-interest have had an inconsistent quantitative effect on trade policy preference, the literature demonstrates that sociotropic evaluations of the economy and trade policy may be a more reliable determinant of trade opinion. Contrary to pure economic self-interest, the literature on sociotropic politics argues that individuals use economic indicators and data to evaluate how economic policies have affected the country as a whole and then make political judgments and decisions based on that data. While personal economic situations, frequently determined by income and retrospective economic evaluations, influence certain policy opinions, individuals often use national economic indicators, local conditions, and news coverage to evaluate how certain policies are influencing the national economy (Brody and Sniderman 1992; Kinder and Kiewet 1979; Kinder and Kiewet 1981; Kiewet and Rivers 1984; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mutz 1992; Reeves and Gimpel 2012). Mansfield and Mutz (2009) demonstrate that evaluations of how trade affects the national economy as a whole is a strong predictor of individual level preferences for trade liberalization. This indicates that trade policy, given that it is a more nationalized as opposed to a personalized economic issue, may be better represented by sociotropic indicators of national economic conditions as opposed to purely rational individual and group self-interest.

Trade policy is unusual from most facets of public opinion in that partisanship is not highly associated with trade opinion. Moreover, there is no immediately clear reason why we would expect partisanship to shape judgments about trade policy. Given that trade policy is an unusually complex policy issue, individuals should not be expected to be able to evaluate the

costs and benefits of trade policy and may be likely to respond to partisan and ideological heuristic shortcuts when forming policy opinion on trade (Citrin and Green 1990; Citrin et al. 1990; Sears and Funk 1991). Classically, there is some theoretical support for partisan divergence on free trade, as Democrats should be more supportive of protecting poor working groups, whereas Republicans should be more supportive of less regulated and more open markets (Destler 1995; Hughes 1978; Jacoby 1997).

Nationalism, Isolationism, and other Non-Economic Attitudes

A diverse set of attitudinal variables separate from party, ideology, economic self-interest, and socoiotropic economic evaluations have found more consistent support throughout the trade opinion literature. Classical political theorists argued that nationalist attitudes should influence international economic policy and their related attitudes (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Johnson 1965). Specifically, Johnson (1965) proposes that nationalism can have a dualistic and seemingly internally incoherent influence on national economic policy. Namely, nationalistic countries that are less economically developed should make an effort to economically develop as rapidly as possible. Historically, however, nationalistic countries pursuing economic development may attempt to industrialize when it is to the country's comparative advantage to develop agricultural output first. It is therefore logical that, in certain circumstances, nationalist sentiment may coincide with support for economic protectionism. If nationalistic countries are inclined to produce goods beyond the economic capacity and development of the country, protectionism would permit the country to produce economic goods despite the country acting in its own comparative disadvantage (Johnson, 1965). However, Johnson's proposal more effectively explains why a nationalistic state would promote protectionist policy, but insufficiently explains why a nationalistic individual would support protectionist policy.

Trade policy can potentially serve a more symbolic role than a functional role (Cohen 2001; Destler and Balint 1999; Mayer 1998; Rankin 2001; Sears 2001). Instead of trade opinion being driven by complex, nuanced, and low-salience economic concerns, feelings about trade policy may be representative of attitudes about the disposition of national and cultural strength. These national and cultural sentiments provide a heuristic, or cognitive shortcut that informs an individual's decision-making process when forming an opinion on trade policy (Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1991; Rankin 2001). Developing the argument that favorability or opposition to trade policy is a symbolic attitude, Rankin (2001) argues that conceptions of national identity, namely generalized American patriotism; the desire to protect American cultural autonomy from external influence; and feelings about American cultural identity may influence trade opinion to varying degrees. The economic effects of trade liberalization may be poorly understood and infrequently discussed politically; however, globalization may shift perceptions of national and cultural identity because it can potentially weaken or change an individual's attachment to their own national identity (Cohen 2001; Rankin 2001; Rho and Tomz 2017). Additionally, feelings of national superiority are generally associated with a greater tendency to oppose free trade and favor protectionism, though this effect is inconsistent (Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rouke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Rankin 2001).

The trade opinion literature has similarly linked free trade opposition to isolationist attitudes (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Rho and Tomz 2017). Mansfield and Mutz (2009) assert that Americans with isolationist tendencies are significantly less inclined to support free trade policy and expansion; however, these policy associations function despite a clear economic link between isolationist tendencies and free trade.

Collectively, the strong association between isolationism and opposition to free trade policy dovetails with the earlier proposal that the concept of trade policy serves a symbolic rather than operative role, especially within the context that trade opinion may be more consistently driven by sociotropic evaluations of the national economy rather than individual retrospective economic evaluations (Cohen 2001; Destler and Balint 1999; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Mayer 1998; Rankin 2001; Sears 2001). Regardless, this leaves a major question regarding the trade literature: why is an economic and complicated political issue frequently driven by non-economic attitudes? The trade opinion literature requires a synthesis of economic self-interest models that provide an effective theoretical mechanism for trade opinion and economic interest with alternative models that link trade opinion with attitudinal variables. One possible avenue for synthesis is to dismiss the argument that symbolic conceptions of nationalism and isolationism are not directly linked to economic well-being, especially when acknowledging that individuals view trade policy through a national as opposed to individualized retrospective economic evaluations. Isolationism and nationalism may be a simple frame for portraying complicated national and international policy issues.

In a similar manner to the association between nationalist tendencies and trade opinion, authoritarian dispositions have also been associated with trade policy. Johnston (2013) associates authoritarianism, specifically values that represent the individual need for security, with increased support for protectionist import policies. Similarly, Johnston (2013) shows an inconsistent association between the personal need for simple, certain, and complete values with support for protectionism towards imports. Theoretically, there may be an association between the need to keep the world localized, domestic, and simple with the preference for import

limitations (Feldman 2003; Johnston 2013; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Jost and Hunyady 2005; Schwartz 1992).

Group conflict, social identity theory, group bias, and ethnocentrism have also been tied to trade opinion, despite the unclear causal link between these attitudinal frameworks and trade opinion. Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 2013) demonstrate that anxieties towards out-groups that is represented through isolationist attitudes, nationalism, and ethnocentrism influence, again to varying degrees and somewhat inconsistent degrees, trade opinion and outsourcing opinion. Moreover, Mansfield and Mutz (2013) further shows that individuals with a worldview that clearly separates in-groups and out-groups as well as individuals who are opposed to foreign engagement are more opposed likely to oppose outsourcing. Mutz and Kim (2017) further tie trade policy opinion to Tajfel and Turner's (1986) social identity theory, arguing that Americans seek to maximize the interests of the American in-group, even if it comes at the expense of absolute benefit for both in-group and out-groups. Collectively, these arguments provide further support for the proposal that trade policy is a symbolic policy position; however, these values evaluate the symbolic value of trade values in a different manner than isolationism or nationalism. Whereas isolationism and nationalism position one country against a broader international framework; attitudes like ethnocentrism, social identity theory, and intergroup relations are a step further removed from an international and economic framework in which it would be reasonable to evaluate trade opinion. One way of addressing the incongruence between the values that influence trade opinion and the operational value of trade policy would be to view isolationism and nationalism as symbolic of domestic attitudes like ethnocentrism, group conflict, and social identity. This ultimately dovetails with one of the major issues present within the trade opinion literature: it is unclear how trade opinions develop and which opinions

influence the development of other opinions. Moreover, these broader concepts are linked through a broader theory of institutional trust. Because the effects of trade are not immediately relevant to most individuals, it is likely they need to trust in the good will of political and economic institutions as well as outsiders to also trust in the economic benefits of trade liberalization. If trade opinion is a completely symbolic issue, then it would stand to reason that either these domestic attitudes and/or isolationist and nationalist attitudes develop before trade attitudes develop. Additionally, it is plausible that there are economic and geopolitical factors that provide the context for why certain individuals develop trade attitudes.

Demographic Values: People and Places

The literature has examined multiple demographic values that are associated with variation in support for trade policy. Education is the most frequently discussed demographic value within the literature because it represents a point of overlap and debate between the segment that argues that trade policy is a function of rational choice and the segment that believes trade policy is representative of non-economic attitudes. Across the literature, increased educational attainment has been generally associated with increased support for trade liberalization (Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1963; Johnston 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). The trade opinion literature disagrees in the mechanism in which education influences trade opinion. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use years of education as an instrument to measure economic factor type, arguing that education is a measurement of individual skill level. Following this line of argumentation, lower education is associated with stronger support for trade restrictions in line with the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Stolper-Samuelson models. Contrarily, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) propose that higher

education is associated with greater preferences for trade liberalization because more educated individuals are more likely to be tolerant towards outgroups. Consequently, it is outgroup tolerance that drives openness to liberal trade policy.

The trade opinion literature has also examined the role that union membership has on trade preferences. The literature has generally associated trade union membership with greater support for protectionist trade policies (Johnston 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Rankin 2001; Rho and Tomz 2017). Similar to the association between education and trade opinion, the link between trade union membership and support for protectionism is also debatable. The rational economic choice segment of the literature presents the more direct argument: trade unions seek to protect workers from economic competition. Thus members of trade unions are more likely to be opposed to trade liberalization in order to preserve their employment and economic wellbeing (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Rankin 2001). Contrarily, it is possible that union membership does not influence trade preferences in a directly economic way. Alternatively, union membership may provide an information environment that provides information about the globalization and trade liberalization, thus shifting union member views indirectly (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). Additionally, the majority of union members in the United States work in sectors of the economy that are not influenced by trade – such as positions in education. Therefore, the argument that the association between trade union membership and opposition towards free trade demonstrates that union members oppose trade liberalization for self-interested economic reasons may be facile (Mansfield and Mutz 2013).

Income levels have had an inconsistent and generally weak influence on the direction of trade opinion throughout the literature (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Rankin 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Mayda and Rodrik (2005) propose that higher incomes are associated with greater support for trade liberalization; however, Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 2013) find little evidence that income or occupation wage influence trade opinion. In contrast to a variable like education which is a more direct measure of individual skill level, income is a measure of individual economic outcomes and, consequently, is more likely to be muddied by other variables. Therefore, there is debate about the viability of utilizing income as an instrument for measuring skill level and as a means for testing the viability of the Heckscher-Ohlin model as a self-interest explanation for variation in trade opinion. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) utilize occupational wage as a measure of income and find that higher income is generally associated with greater support for trade liberalization; however, they acknowledge that income may reflect values other than skill and also use education level as an alternative means of measuring skill level within the economy. Despite the inconsistent association between income and trade preferences and the problems associated with using it as a measurement tool, blue-collar laborers appear to be somewhat more likely to oppose trade liberalization (Lawrence 1996; Rankin 2001). In this case, blue-collar status may be more representative of skill-level than income; however, blue-collar status is limited in its specificity without information about laborer's industry – which, in conjunction, could be used to assess the efficacy of the H-O model versus the Ricardo-Viner model as a theoretical explanation for variation in trade opinion.

The literature has shown that gender has had a consistent and sizable influence on trade policy preferences with women typically demonstrating greater favorability towards protection

policies and greater hostility to trade liberalization and outsourcing (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Guisinger 2016; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz, 2013; O'Rourke and Sinott et al. 2001). Despite the consistent effect of gender across the trade opinion literature, the association is largely understudied beyond the exploration of the effect by Burgoon and Hiscox (2004). Unlike demographic variables like union membership and education which can be associated with individual skill level, the association between gender and trade preferences does not have an immediately apparent theoretical connection. Despite this, the gender effect is generally more consistent and substantively stronger relative to more theoretically relevant demographic variables such as income. Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) propose that the gender effect is representative of differences in exposure to economic theory in secondary education, proposing that exposure to economic theory increases support for trade liberalization by exposing individuals to the benefits of trade liberalization; however, Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) lack direct evidence to support this explanation.

While gender has had a consistent negative association with trade opinion, two other demographic factors, race and age, have failed to consistently shift trade opinion – despite ethnocentrism's relatively strong association with trade policy opinion (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). Race has consistently not influenced the direction of trade opinion and has often been excluded from trade opinion models (Johnston 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). Mansfield and Mutz (2013) have found that non-whites display somewhat more support for outsourcing than whites; however, this effect is not immediately apparent in other analyses of other elements of trade policy. Moreover, Johnston (2013) has found a selection bias wherein black respondents are less likely to respond to trade questions. Alternatively, age has consistently influenced trade opinion outcomes with older

cohorts typically opposing trade liberalization and supporting trade barriers (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Johnnston 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Rho and Tomz 2017); however, the effect has not been consistent as some analyses have found no relationship (Rankin 2001). Moreover, Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) find that the association between age and cohort may be muddy and dependent on an inter-relationship between age, gender, and education.

The trade opinion literature has also evaluated the influence of location-based demographic variables on trade opinion; however, much of the research has been limited and under-developed. The trade opinion literature has largely excluded urban, rural, and suburban divisions as an explanation for trade opinion; however, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find little-to-no association between urbanization and trade opinion. With that in mind, Rankin (2001) did examine regional variation in trade policy opinion. The Northeast, Midwest, and Pacific were more likely to favor more liberal import policies; however, there was no significant geographic variation in opinion relating to NAFTA (Rankin 2001). Regardless, regional and demographic variation in trade policy is lacking for several reasons. Firstly, geographic variation may be more pronounced in the context of Trump making protectionist appeals to the industrial Midwest and other parts of the country. Therefore, it is necessarily to examine more recent geographic variation to evaluate potential geographic shifts in trade opinion over time. Regional adherence towards populism has been analyzed previously and consequently may be relevant in a post-2016 political era (Bickel and Brown 2008). Second, it is necessary to use more economically relevant and more micro-level geographic data to provide a more relevant and theoretically appropriate analysis of variation in trade opinion data. In other words, it is necessary to determine whether individuals in more industrialized geographic networks develop different trade attitudes than individuals outside of those areas.

Methodological Limitations in the Literature

While the literature is still largely dedicated to the division between economic interest-based theories and attitudinal based explanations for variation in trade opinion, there are a number of methodological problems that persist within the literature. Most prominent of these issues is the unusually high number of non-answers to trade opinion questions and the literature's insufficient attention given to the causal factors of non-answers to trade related questions. Johnston (2013) gives the most attention to this widely understudied element in the literature. While most of the literature is primarily concerned with factors that influence opposition or support for trade related policies, Johnston (2013) utilizes a Heckman model to help further analyze selection discrepancies. Age, race, education, political interest, sophistication, partisan strength, and need for certainty are all shown to have some degree of influence over the likelihood to provide answers to trade opinion questions (Johnston 2013). While these demographic factors provide some information relating to why individuals choose to answer trade questions, the results are limited and should be expanded in light of the high degrees of non-response within the literature. Therefore, it may be illuminating to explore which economic and attitudinal factors increase or decrease engagement with trade questions. This may be especially relevant because of the proposal in some segments of the literature that certain groups (like higher-education or trade unions) socialize their members to engage with trade policy in different ways (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Mansfield and Mutz 2009).

Simply further exploring the causal factors that influence variation in whether a respondent answers a trade opinion question is insufficient, however. In light of the renewed political focus on trade policy, it also relevant to examine how individuals develop and change opinions on trade and understand what causes individuals to have greater interest in trade policy

(Guisinger 2016; Guisinger 2020). One possibility is that some people certain areas may be more sensitive to trade policy because industries cluster in certain locations (Busch and Reinhardt, 2000). Moreover, because trade policy has realigned from a cross-cutting political issue to an increasingly partisan political issue, it is relevant to understand why certain individuals develop polarized views on an issue in which many respondents lack an opinion (Guisinger 2016; Guisinger 2020). Given that trade opinion has realigned so dramatically over a short period of time, there is a greater need for exploration of time series data to track the developments of trade opinion over time and the causal factors that promote these shifts.

Synthesis of Theories of Trade Opinion

One of the primary goals of this research is to bridge the theoretical divide between the two schools of understanding trade opinion. Many of the earlier explorations of trade opinion functioned on the assumption that trade opinion was a direct function of economic self-interest and that respondents would favor or oppose trade policy dependent on whether trade liberalization would help or harm the individual's livelihood. The later trade opinion literature dismisses this case and frames trade opinion as the product of socialization and attitudinal variables like isolationism, authoritarianism, and nationalism. While the later trade opinion research was more consistent, it was insufficient in answering a key question: why do non-economic attitudes influence an economic policy position? Similarly, the earlier trade opinion literature placed too much emphasis on the economic mechanisms that would cause some individuals to benefit and others hurt from trade liberalization. This segment of the trade opinion literature may have been weakened by discrediting that trade opinion is the product of economic factors. While it may be logical to argue that individuals employed in industries that benefit from trade liberalization would favor more open trade policy, the mechanisms that influence such

behavior are neither obvious nor easy to understand (Rho and Tomz 2017). Mansfield and Mutz (2009) and Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) point to education, trade unions, and other institutions as socializing factors that change the way individuals view trade policy. However, these socializing institutions may present help to frame group-based economic self-interest in a more easily understandable way for individuals. Moreover, self-interest trade policy frequently analyzes the benefits of trade policy in absolute rather than relative terms. Mutz and Kim (2017) show that perceptions of winners and losers influence trade policy and that individuals maximize national benefit over total benefit. Classical trade models of comparative advantage present counterintuitive propositions that nations should focus on producing products that they are comparatively efficient at producing to produce the greatest absolute value. However, national economies are complex and do not necessarily operate towards idealized comparative advantage. Inclinations towards isolationism and nationalism may be influenced by the individual's need for relative advantage in a global economic system.

In order to better understand trade opinion, this research will examine several elements of trade opinion to present a better idea of how trade opinion changes over time. First, it is necessary to examine the unusually high degree of neutral and non-responses to trade question. Second, it is necessary to understand how trade views change over time through the usage of a panel study. Third, it is necessary to evaluate differences in issue importance surrounding trade to evaluate why certain individuals are more invested in trade. Beyond these expansions to broaden the concept of trade opinion as a dependent variable, there are a number of demographic, economic, and attitudinal independent variables that this research will explore.

First, this research will explore the role of populism both as a historical construct and as a modernized construct. Second, this research will analyze the association between views of

national respect and domestic anxieties on trade values. Third, this research will evaluate how local economic and demographic variation influences trade opinion. Fourth, this research will explore how demographic and cultural anxieties and ethnonationalist inclinations shift trade opinion.

Summary of Chapters

In the next chapter, I will present a historical framework for understanding conservative populism as a movement while contrasting populist candidate argumentative styles. More specifically, I will analyze the role of populist isolationism, anti-elitism, and anti-bureaucratic values on trade views. From this analysis, I will show how opposition to trade policy as a highly complex and international issue area is congruent with these populist values. Additionally, this analysis of anti-institutionalist and anti-elitist populism will investigate trade opinion on a methodological level by incorporating Heckman models.

In the third chapter, I will examine trade policy as a function of anxiety towards multiculturalism within America. While trade policy is both economic and international in scope, views and anxieties about multiculturalism within the United States are neither economic nor international, but domestic and racialized. I assess this multicultural friction and its influence on trade opinion in two different ways: diversity anxiety – skepticism towards the benefits of more globalized and multicultural America – and ethnonationalism – a rigid and traditionalist view of Americanism. I find that both these values are associated with opposition to trade policy.

The fourth chapter will examine trade opinion beyond its conventional scope. The literature broadly views trade opinion in a directional manner – evaluating support or opposition towards free trade proposals, protectionism, and outsourcing; however, this dependent variable is

limited for several reasons. An overly simplistic binary assessment of trade opinion fails to account for high degrees of non-opinion within the subject. This chapter will present two survey experiments: the first evaluates whether non-response options in survey wording shifts trade opinion and the second evaluates the influence of nationalist framing on support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. These studies broadly find that separate framings of trade questions do not broadly shift views towards trade policy; however, there are some smaller issues surrounding question and response framing. Moreover, it is necessary to evaluate differences in levels of interest in the subject. Here, I find that respondents who believe that US is less respected internationally are less likely to find trade policy to be important while respondents who find themselves to be a stranger in their own country are more likely to find trade policy to be important.

The fifth chapter will analyze a panel of respondents over a series of surveys across several years. I will analyze how separate subgroups of respondents change in their views of trade policy across three separate surveys during 2011, 2016, and 2017. Not only does this analysis track which respondents shift from support to opposition to free trade (or vise versa), this analysis also tracks which respondents express non-opinions during these three periods. Finally, this chapter will also present a model for evaluating the causal factors that resulted in shifts in trade opinion during these three periods. Overall, the research finds that people with traditionally conservative views about the role of government regulation exhibited the greatest shift towards protectionism; however, the effect is still relatively small.

The sixth chapter analyzes the competing effects of economic and immigrant influences on trade policy. Economic and immigrant constructions are evaluated in three separate ways: through policy attitudes, identities, and local economic and demographic variation. Trade policy

is measured in different ways across two years. Across both years, attitudes about immigration are highly associated with views towards trade policy. The final chapter presents a broader conclusion about the findings on trade opinion and non-opinion and presents a framework for future study within the topic.

Chapter 2

The Legacy of Populism and Populist Influence on Trade Opinion

Introduction

Along with the proposal to build a Mexican border wall, trade policy was also a central facet of Donald Trump's candidacy and later presidency. Invoking elements of American populism, Trump repeatedly attacked various institutions and proposed traditionally supported by the neoliberal free trade orthodoxy. He railed against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) while favoring the implementation of tariffs and sought to reduce the trade deficit between America and other countries. Trump's decision to make populist appeals to the American public increased the salience of an issue that is highly complicated, economic in nature, and not traditionally polarized, given that both Republicans and Democrats have made appeals both for and against expanding trade liberalization.

This chapter seeks to accomplish two goals. The first goal is to produce a political framework of American populism across several populist candidates. By analyzing American populism in the context of anti-elitism, anti-globalism, and skepticism towards political and economic institutions, this comparative framework will help to define American-style populism and understand its appeal to varying segments of the county. Additionally, this chapter will present a theoretical framework for understanding why individuals who are skeptical of political and economic elites and American institutions would be similarly skeptical of international trade policy.

The second goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that opposition to expert and elite opinion, both elements of populist rhetoric, will result in a decreased likelihood of supporting trade policy. Because trade policy is a complex and not immediately intelligible policy issue,

belief in the efficacy of trade policy fundamentally requires institutional trust. Similarly, belief in the effectiveness of experts requires a similar level of trust. Populism focuses on presenting policy choices that are simple and easily understandable by the common person. By contrast, concepts like trade policy require complex knowledge and trust in the elites and experts who make complex policy decisions. Ultimately, because both Sanders and Trump ran populist political campaigns in 2016 and 2020, I will seek to show in this chapter and in later chapters that populist and technocratic viewpoints are orthogonal to the traditional political spectrum within public opinion. Belief in the efficacy of free trade is a product of this populist vs. technocratic spectrum because trust in free trade requires trust in external actors who specialize in complex issues. That said, both views towards elites and institutions are not rooted in economics. It is plausible that there is a broader skepticism towards economic institutions that shifts the publics' views on trade. As such, it is necessary to examine how individual views towards the system of capitalism itself help to shape economic views. Throughout this chapter, I will demonstrate empirically that various elements of populism – including skepticism of government institutions, bureaucrats, capitalism, and the media – are all associated with trade opposition.

Background and Theory of Populist Appeals

Following Kazin's (1995) framework of American populism, populism is deeply focused on what constitutes the rigid, majoritarian definition of Americanism. As per this conception, Americanism is not simply a broad and loosely defined concept that permits a diverse array of individuals from many backgrounds to lay equal claim to mantle of Americanism. Rather, social, moral, legal, and political values of the United States should reflect the views of the values espoused by the majority (or plurality) group. The importance of the definition of Americanism

to understanding certain Americans' (populist or otherwise) views on internationalism and trade policy will be further analyzed in Chapter 3 wherein views on trade policy will be analyzed in the context of view on American identity, ethnonationalism, and diversity anxiety. This concept of majoritarian Americanism runs contrary to cosmopolitanism, which frames Americanism, and other national identities, through the lens of appreciating and valuing people of diverse backgrounds, religions, and languages (Colás 2011).

The populist, rigid definition of Americanism coincides with a powerful and grassroots sentiment of anti-elitism (Kazin 1995). Majoritarian populism and anti-elitism as themes prevalent within populism are functionally similar concepts; however, while majoritarian Americanism is focused on rigidly defining the in-group, anti-elitism seeks to narrowly define the outgroup. Intriguingly, these two populist themes effectively frame racial and ethnic issues through the lens of politics and democracy: populism presents the will of the majority whereas elitism only functions to preserve the status quo. One way in which this anti-elitism manifested in both campaigns was through messaging and voter sentiment that the American political system was taking power away from the narrowly-defined American people. In the case of both opposition to an elite outgroup and a preservation of the American majority, a common theme in populism is the political framing of a political movement as a grassroots movement rather than a subset of a political party or ideology (Kazin 1995; Rohler 1999). Populist political candidates, including Trump, capitalized on what many Americans believed to be a corrupt, undemocratic, and rigged political system. Historically, many supporters of George Wallace in 1968 indicated that they felt powerless within the American political system (Carlson 1981; Rohler 1999). Comparatively, Trump repeatedly proposed the claim through the 2016 campaign trail that the electoral system was rigged against him (Sinclair et al. 2018). Both Sanders and Trump in 2016

sought to frame their respective primary systems as anti-democratic and systematically rigged against their non-traditional campaign and policy platforms (Klein, 2016). Anti-elitism also dovetails with anti-cosmopolitanism because cosmopolitan values, wherein people of diverse cultural background are accepted and integrated into the broader American framework, are only immediately prevalent within urban areas with large immigrant and racial minority populations.

Perhaps most integral of all populist themes was the proposal that American values could only be protected by the working class, especially Americans who produced goods (Kazin 1995). Historically, Wallace throughout his varying campaigns for governor and president portrayed himself as a champion and defender of the white working class, portraying white working-class Americans as systemically oppressed by government bureaucrats. Consequently, Wallace was able to make substantial political inroads with working-class whites (Armstrong 1970; Rohler 1999). Similarly, Trump made substantial inroads in the 2016 presidential election by appealing and drawing support from voters who belonged to labor unions, which had traditionally disproportionately supported the Democratic Party. Trump also drew further white working-class support by making the erosion of manufacturing and coal-mining a central tenet of his campaign (Bonn 2019; Frazee 2019).

Populist candidates, including Trump and Wallace, were successful in framing their populist appeals as a working-class movement against the bureaucratic elites to restore majoritarian norms in a corrupt and rigged political system. That said, it is impossible to ignore the incorporation of racial appeals that were central to both campaigns. While racialist appeals are not necessarily foundational to a populist movement, at least per Kazin's (1995) framework, ethnic conflict and anxiety were undeniably a central tenet of Trump's and Wallace's respective political campaigns. Wallace and Trump both actively denied that their policies were engaging

with race as an issue, instead choosing to frame their proposals in the context of state and local governance, law and order, security, economics, immigration, nationalism, international aid, and/or interventionalism (Rohler 1999). Consequently, this often provides a problem in the realm of public opinion when trying to understand values like internationalism, trade opinion, and immigration at the individual voter level. Because elite messaging frames elements of populism through varying ways, often deliberately avoiding discussion of socially sensitive and controversial topics, it is often difficult to extricate the voters who engage with the racialist aspects of American populism from the voters who adhere to the economic elements of populism and the individuals who adhere to the international aspects of populism.

While it is undeniable that there are racialist elements of some of these populist campaign appeals, the racialized elements of these victimization appeals were muddied or overshadowed by the incorporation and entanglement of economic issues and anti-elite rhetoric. Victimization is a common theme in populist rhetoric, as it provides a framework wherein a visible out-group threat exploits and oppresses a people. Wallace presented a scenario where the white working class was oppressed by an academic, bureaucratic, and institutionalist elite who sought to invalidate the moral authority of the American white majority (Rohler 1999).

Despite Wallace actively seizing upon dissatisfaction and victimization on the movement and political and economic gains of African-Americans, Wallace generally avoided explicit discussions about racial tensions between black and white Americans. Instead, Wallace often engaged with race issues in an indirect way, depicting racial scenarios that were often absurdist; however, when Wallace was discussing racial issues, it was plainly apparent that he was discussing issues that affected black and white Americans. Yet, Wallace in his 1968 campaign still tried to downplay his previous stances and policies on race as a former governor of

Alabama. He widely proclaimed that his efforts and his policies were not racist, that he shared wide support in Alabama among people of all races, and that his policies that advanced industrial development with Alabama provided jobs and economic help to many African American Alabamians (Makay and Brown 1972; Worthington 1992).

Comparatively, while Donald Trump in 2016 made similar defenses to dismiss alleged racism, Trump also made more direct and unambiguous racial attacks. Most infamous of his rhetoric was his assertion that Mexican immigrants (and other immigrants from Latin American countries and the Middle East) were disproportionately bringing drugs, crime, and rapists into the United States (Donald Trump 2015). Additionally, Trump also sought to frame racial problems through economic and societal contexts. He prominently pitched, rhetorically, to black voters the following question in his 2016 campaign: "You're living in poverty, your schools are no good, you have no jobs, 58% of your youth is unemployed – what the hell do you have to lose?" (Trump 2016).

The subsumption of racial issues under the broader scope of economic problems is not unique to conservative populists. Bernie Sanders, in his campaigns, made demonstrable efforts to tie racial injustices to economic injustices. Sanders issued comments that were broadly congruous with his populist conservative counterpart: "We have to end institutional racism, but we have to deal with the reality that 50 percent of young black kids are unemployed, that we have massive poverty in America, that we have an unsustainable level of income and wealth inequality" (Sanders 2015). Under Sanders-style leftist populism, issues of racial injustice are part of a broader system of economic injustice; however, the economic system does disproportionately affect people of color. It is relevant to note Sanders' choice to frame major racial issues under the context of broader economic injustice did receive criticism from segments

of the left who proposed that racial injustices in the United States were a separate issue entirely (Dann 2015).

Collectively, this populist effort to focus on economic issues over issues of race dovetails with populist opposition to conventionalist trade deals, which both Sanders and Trump pushed during their campaigns. Trade liberalization inherently requires internationalism. As will be explored further in the next chapter, one frame for understanding free trade and public response towards free trade policy is through internationalism, isolationism, multiculturalism, and national superiority (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rouke and Sinnott et al. 2001; and Rankin 2001). However, economic frames (as opposed to multicultural, internationalist, or racialist frames) permit populist candidates to promote opposition to open trade policy as a means to protect lower-wage workers from international competition.

While it is undeniable that there are racialist elements of some of these populist campaign appeals, they were muddied or overshadowed by the incorporation and entanglement of economic issues and anti-elite rhetoric. Victimization is a common theme among populist rhetoric, as it provides a framework wherein a visible out-group threat exploits and oppresses a people. Wallace presented a scenario where the white working class was oppressed by an academic, bureaucratic, and institutionalist elite who sought to invalidate the moral authority of the American white majority (Rohler 1999).

Populist candidates Trump and Wallace enjoyed disproportionate support among young, white males who were disaffected from the political establishment (Hochschild 2016; Zwiers 2019). Both candidates were deeply invested in the concept of the American dream and engaged with the reality that its ideals were not as readily attainable to many, despite the way in which the

American dream is mythologized. In Wallace's addresses, he proposed that anti-discrimination policies were hurting the opportunities for white Americans. Similarly, Trump appealed to a white electorate, disaffected in the wake of the 2008 recession, who believed that their claim to the American dream was under attack by the rapidly improving social status of racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities (Rohler 1999; Zwiers 2019). While anti-globalization movements have been common from the 1980s and 1990s, Wallace effectively stoked white economic and racial anxieties and isolationist sentiments existing since the foundation of the United States. The coalescence of these sentiments into a singular cohesive ideological movement is much more novel – with Trump's campaign and presidency serving as its vanguard.

Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) frame this populist style as a contrast between the will of the people and the will of the elites. Notably, they argue that there is a partisan framework to the type of populist appeals. While Democratic populist candidates are disproportionately more likely to present economic populist arguments, Republican populist candidates (between 1952 and 1996) were more likely to incorporate anti-statist populist arguments. In other words, while Democratic populist were more likely to attack the inherently unfairness of the economic system and the influence of Wall Street, anti-statist Republican populists attacked specifically "bureaucrats, big government, [and] Washington elites" (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016). Consequently, when analyzing how populist attitudes influence trade policy, there are two plausible avenues. Immediately, it is possible that trade policy could be perceived in an economically populist lens – i.e., that trade policy is a systemic problem that harms the common person. Alternatively, trade policy can be a function of anti-statist populism. In this way, populists can frame pro-trade economists as a type of elite who threatens the economic wellbeing of common people.

Collectively, historically populist attitudes can lead to trade skepticism across multiple avenues. The most direct causal method involves institutional trust. Thomas Frank (2016) frames the political debate around the passage of NAFTA as a professional-class and elite driven narrative. Because economic and bureaucratic elites framed globalization as inevitable, the United States would need to respond by embracing international trade liberalization to connect the world economically, improve working wages, and improve jobs (Frank 2016). This broader sense of international inevitability contradicts with the preferences of trade unions which sought to protect workers from competition brought about by international trade liberalization. The elite-driven consensus in Washington in favor of trade liberalization, or the "Washington Consensus," inherently undermines efforts by politicians and trade unions to push for greater international labor protections by denying those heterodox views a political voice in the debate (Williamson 1990; Frank 2016). Consequently, it is logical for individuals who lack trust in elite-driven opinion to also be skeptical of the elite-driven consensus on the economic benefits of trade liberalization.

Individuals with populist tendencies need not only distrust experts. As demonstrated earlier, populist candidates and their supporters are also skeptical about the functionality of their institutions, including democracy (Carlson 1981; Kazin 1995; Rohler 1999). In such scenarios, populists demonstrate lowered levels of institutional and establishment trust. Such individuals may believe that institutions are functioning in fundamentally corrupt ways – i.e., the media provides biased information or elections provide results that do not truly align with the will of the true majority. Individuals who are skeptical about the legitimacy of such institutions would also likely be skeptical about the legitimacy of the benefits of international trade frameworks.

Because international trade is so nebulous and expansive, it is difficult for skeptical individuals to perceive any economic benefits.

Geurkink et al. (2020) corroborate this populist framework but add an additional wrinkle, proposing that while political trust and populist attitudes are correlative, they are separate constructs. Given that this project is focused on the role how elite and institutional distrust affects trade views and given the historical populist context presented earlier, this project will present institutional and elite distrust as elements of populism. Populist leaders and populist messaging stoke distrust in institutions, media, economic systems, and bureaucrats. This institutional trust is a necessary element for individuals to find open trade to be efficacious because benefitting from liberal trade policy relies on the goodwill of external actors. That said, further studies which extricate populist attitudes from institutional trust may be beneficial when examining their effects on trade support. Mudde (2004) proposes that populism pits the will of the people against the corrupt elite. For the scope of this project, trust in expert opinion relative to trust in the common people should serve as a sufficient measure of populist attitudes. By contrast, trust in government and economic institutions may be more representative of broader institutional trust.

Hypotheses

Next, this project will seek to determine whether populist views and attitudes have a demonstrable effect in shifting American's views on trade policy. Specifically, this chapter will analyze two manifestations of populist attitudes: anti-establishment views that represent opposition and skepticism of American political institutions and anti-expert views that represent an opposition towards trust in elite and bureaucratic viewpoints and decision-making capability.

Both views are likely not completely orthogonal as both measures fundamentally relate to individual trust – either towards individuals (experts) or to institutions.

Hypothesis 1: Anti-establishment populist values will be negatively associated with support for trade policy expansion and positively associated with support for tariffs.

In examining hypothesis 1, it is necessary to tie the elements of American populist values to policy positions that were promoted by populists, particularly Trump. This section will show whether populist values influence populist policy directly. Moreover, it will address the political effect of populist values of internationalist policy position. Anti-establishment populist attitudes demonstrate a broader distrust in American institutions such as the media, elections, and the economy. Consequently, a lack of trust in many institutions, predominantly the media, is a central element of this anti-establishment viewpoint.

Hypothesis 2: Stronger anti-expert views will decrease the likelihood of supporting expanding free trade.

In a similar vein to anti-establishment populist attitudes, it is necessary to evaluate the influence of anti-expert populist attitudes. Whereas anti-establishment populist attitudes measure a broader distrust in American institutions, anti-expert populist attitudes measure a broader antipathy towards expert opinion, especially expert opinion that contrasts mainstream viewpoints. Anti-expert populist views are expected to coincide with an increased likelihood of opposing trade policy because experts require trust. Trade policy is often complicated and counter-intuitive to common people. Individuals who do not exhibit that level of trust in experts to make complicated and nuanced policy choices likely do not have demonstrated confidence in the portrayed economic benefits of trade policy. Broadly speaking, it is likely that both distrust

towards institutional and distrust towards experts are highly interrelated concepts. At present, they help to build a broader theory that institutional distrust is associated with opposition to trade policy; however, future studies may want to disentangle these concepts from one another.

Hypothesis 3a: Stronger support for capitalism will be directly associated with support for expanding free trade.

Hypothesis 3c: Democratic identity will interact with support for capitalism. Republicans and independents who oppose capitalism will be more opposed to free trade than Democrats.

To more holistically evaluate the influence of populist attitudes on trade policy preference, it is necessary to move into more explicitly economic values. While questions about personal views about the ideal role and expanse of government within the economy are relatively common questions, questions asking Americans about their feelings about capitalism are less common. This is a necessary distinction because the former frames the issue as a comparison between the government and the private sector. By contrast, by examining feelings about capitalism itself, respondents can present their feelings about the economic system in absolute rather than relative terms. Because open trade is an international policy that arises as a result of capitalistic systems, it is logical that anti-capitalistic individuals would also be more supportive of protectionist policy. It is also necessary to evaluate the role that anti-capitalistic sentiments plays specifically among partisans individuals, especially Democrats. Opposition to free trade policy is likely ideologically congruent among Republicans and independents who are more skeptical of trade policy, because they would likely be skeptical of broader international economic systems. By contrast, Democrats may demonstrate less ideological coherence on this particular issue because of competing interests. On the one hand, Democrats are more likely to be skeptical about the benefits of capitalism than Independents or Republicans; however,

Democratic support for trade policy may shift less in line with feelings about capitalism because open trade policy represents both internationalist and economic values.

Populism, Capitalism Support and Trade Opinion: Data and Methods

This section will evaluate the influences that anti-elite populist values have on trade views. For the data, this analysis uses the 2016 Democracy Fund Voter Study Group data set, providing a sample size of 8,000 respondents. Most scales and values used in this data analysis will use data from the December 2016 wave of this survey; however, the sex of the respondent is derived from the 2011-2012 wave of the survey. The dependent variable is a binary variable evaluating whether the respondent favors or opposes expanding free trade to new countries, with favoring the expansion marked as a 1 and opposition to the expansion marked as a 0. "Don't know" responses were recorded as a non-response and will be corrected for using a two-stage Heckman probit model. The primary independent variable used to determine the influence anti-establishment populism are six related questions from the 2017 Democracy Fund Voter Study Group survey. These question task the respondent with evaluating whether they believe elections don't matter; whether America is a fair society; whether the economic system is biased; whether the respondent believes the mainstream media; whether the respondent believes they have a voice in what the government does; and whether the respondent believes elites understand the problems the respondent faces.[2] To evaluate the influence that anti-establishment attitudes have

[2] Six survey items are used to evaluate the influence of anti-establishment populism. Higher scores on each of these items is associated with a higher level of anti-establish populism. Some scores from these questions were inverted for internal consistency. Each of these items translates to a four-point Likert scale with 1 equating to "Strongly agree"; 2 equating to "Agree"; "3 equating to "Disagree"; and 4 equating to "Strongly disagree.". The first question asks respondents how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement: "Elections don't matter; things stay the same no matter who we vote in." The scores from this value were inverted so that greater agreement is associated with greater expected anti-elitism. The second question tasks the respondent with evaluating their agreement with the following statement: "America is a fair society where everyone has the opportunity to get ahead." The third item asks respondents to evaluate their agreement with the following statement: "Our economic system is biased in favor of the wealthiest Americans." The values from this question were inverted for internal consistency. The fourth item

on trade opinion, this section will utilize a multivariate Heckman probit model.[3] Heckman models have previously been used in trade opinion due to high degrees of non-response in surveys (Johnston 2013). For the selection model, three variables will be used: news interest, age, and gender. The models use a four-point ordinal scale to measure political and news interest. The lowest value on this scale indicates that the respondent pays attention to public affairs and government hardly at all, the next value indicating that the respondent pays attention only now and then, then next value indicating that the respondent pays attention some of the time, and the highest value indicating that the respondent pays attention of the time. News interest will be excluded from the outcome model for the Heckman models and serve as the instrument in with previous literature (Johnston 2013). News interest functions well as an instrumental variable, because theoretically individuals with lower levels of news interest should be less politically engaged and less likely to express an opinion on trade.

This selection model (including age, gender, and news interest) will be the basic selection model for this and future models; however, it may be expanded with additional variables in the selection model when necessary. As will be demonstrated further in Chapter 4, age, gender, and news interest typically have the greatest influence on whether someone has an opinion on trade policy. Moreover, these three variables are orthogonal to each other. While it may seem

tasks respondents with evaluating how strongly they agree with the following statement: "You can't believe much of what you hear from the mainstream media." The scores from this value were inverted so that greater agreement is associated with greater expected anti-elitism. The fifth question tasks respondents with evaluating their agreement with the following sentence "People like me don't have any say in what the government does." The values of this question item were inverted for greater internal consistency. The sixth question tasks respondents with evaluating how strongly they agree with the following statement: "Elites in this country don't understand the problems I am facing." The scores of this value were also inverted so that greater agreement is associated with greater expected anti-elitism. While this question directly related to anti-elitism, question will likely have an unexpected association with trade opinion given the proximity to the 2016 election. Consequently, the proximity between the election and the issuing of the question item muddies the validity of this question. Future extensions involving similar questions should expect to see different responses because the questions will not be influenced by the timing of the survey (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017).

[3] See Table A.2 in the appendix for the standard probit model.

incomplete to exclude education from the selection model, there are several reasons for excluding it. First, the higher level of question engagement in the selection model that is associated with higher levels of education is largely subsumed under higher levels of news interest. Education, when subdivided, typically fails to have any influence on the selection model when news interest is also included. Additionally, there are methodological problems with education measures. Most immediately, national surveys do not have consistent measures for education. More problematically, education measures – as presented in many national surveys – are not incremental, even if they are measured incrementally on a scale. For example, a 2-year degree is frequently scored higher than some college obtainment, even though the latter might have more education. As such, education is too problematic and ineffective to include in the selection model.

The second multivariate model will analyze the 2017 wave of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group data set, which was conducted in July of 2017 and includes 5,000 respondents from the same panel as the earlier 2016 study. The dependent variable for this model is the same as in the 2016 survey; however, it uses 2017 results. Similarly, a Heckman probit model will be utilized to correct for a high degree of non-response. The selection model will include the same three variables as the first Democracy Fund Voter Study Group analysis. The six question items regarding feelings about the legitimacy and fairness of American institutions were not present in the 2017 wave. However, three question items about respondents' feelings towards expert opinion were present. Because these three survey items were more internally consistent than the six anti-establishment populist views, these three items will be added into a 10-point anti-expert populist scale. These three questions task the respondent with determining whether he or she would put their faith in ordinary people over expert opinion; whether the respondent believes that

scientific facts don't help; and whether the respondent believes that ordinary people can use expert help to understand complicated and technical problems.[45] For this model, all independent variables except sex utilize the 2017 versions of the survey items.

Several control variables were also included in these multivariate models of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2016 and 2017 data. First, the models include six dummy variables that measure the respondents' income brackets.[6] The respondents' education is also measured through six dummy variables. [7] The models will include a three-point model measuring the national economic trend with the lowest value indicating the economy is getting better, the middle value indicating it is staying the same, and the highest value indicating that the economy is getting worse. Additionally, the models will include a three-point ordinal scale measuring respondents' personal finances in retrospect. The lowest value indicates the respondent is better off this year than last year; the middle value indicates the respondent's finances are about the same; and the highest value indicates the respondent's finances are worse

[4] Three survey questions are composited together to form the 10-point anti-expert populist scale. All three questions were evaluated on a four-point Likert scale with the lowest value indicating "Strongly Agree," the next value indicating "Somewhat Agree," the next value indicating "Somewhat Disagree," and the highest value indicating "Strongly Disagree." Some survey questions were inverted for internal consistency. The first question tasks the respondent with evaluating their views on the following statement: "I'd rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts and intellectuals." The scores of this survey item were inverted for internal consistency. The second question tasks the respondent with evaluating the following statement: "When it comes to really important questions, scientific facts don't help very much." The scores of this survey item were inverted for internal consistency. The final question asks the respondent to evaluate their views on the following statement: "Ordinary people can really use the help of experts to understand complicated things like science and health" (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018).

[5] See table A.1 appendix for Cronbach's alpha score.

[6] Individuals with family incomes less than 20,000 dollars a year are marked at the lowest bracket. Individuals with family incomes between 20,000 dollars and 39,999 dollars a year are the next bracket. The next bracket includes individuals with family incomes between 40,000 dollars and 69,999 dollars. The next bracket includes individuals that make between 70,000 dollars and 99,999 dollars. The next bracket represents individuals that make between 100,000 dollars and 149,999 dollars. The highest bracket represents individuals that make more than 150,000 dollars a year (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017, 2018).

[7] The lowest bracket includes respondents who haven't completed high school. The next bracket includes respondents who are high school graduates. The next bracket includes individuals with some college education. The next bracket includes individuals with a two-year degree. The next bracket includes individuals with a four-year degree. The highest bracket includes individuals with post-graduate education (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017, 2018).

than last year. A dummy variable is included to account for whether the respondent belongs to a labor union.[8] To measure ideology, a five-point ordinal Likert scale will be used, with the lowest score indicating the respondent is the most liberal and the highest score indicating the respondent is the most conservative. Similarly, a three-point Likert scale will be used to measure the respondents' party ID, with the lowest value indicating the respondent associates with the Democratic Party, the middle value indicating that the respondent is an independent, and the highest value indicating the respondent associates with the Republican Party. The respondent's age will be measured as an interval variable. Female will be included as a dummy variable to evaluate the influence of gender (O'Rourke and Sinnott et al. 2001). The influence of race will be measured through three dummy variables: white, black, and Latino.

The third study evaluates the influence of populist values on the strength of the respondents' support for the usage of tariffs to protect American workers. This study uses a different dependent variable for measuring trade values; however, this variable is consistent with the theoretical concept measured. Thus, consistent results should provide more empirical confidence. This study uses the 2018 ANES Pilot study which includes 2,500 observations. As opposed to a simple binary support versus opposition, support for tariffs is measured through a 7-point Likert scale, with the highest values indicating that tariffs will help American workers the strongest and the lowest value indicating the belief that tariffs will hurt American workers the strongest. Methodologically, this survey analysis will use a multivariate ordinary least squares regression to evaluate the influence of the independent variables on the support for tariffs. A

[8] This variable is available in the 2016 model, but unavailable in the 2017 model.

Heckman model will not be used because a “don’t know” response option was not present in the dependent variable.

Several independent variables were included to evaluate the influence of anti-establishment populist values and replicate the influence of some of the variables in the anti-establishment populism scale. Media trust was an element of the anti-establishment populism scale and will be included as a separate ordinal variable based 5-point Likert scale in this regression. The variable of media trust measures how much the respondent trusts the media to report the news fairly. The lowest value equates to a high degree of trust, whereas the lowest value equates to no trust. The next two questions surround the topic of corruption. The first variable is based on a question that asks the respondent to indicate how many people within the government are corrupt on a five-point Likert scale. The lowest value indicates that the respondent believes no government officials are corrupt, whereas the highest value indicates that the respondent believes all government officials are corrupt. The next variable is a seven-point Likert scale tasking the respondent with evaluating whether corruption in government has increased, decreased, or stayed the same since Donald Trump became president. The lowest scores indicate that corruption has increased greatly and the highest scores indicate that corruption has decreased greatly.

Several control variables were included in the second survey data analysis and many of them are the same as they were in the first analysis. Party ID, ideology, family income, age, education, news interest, and race were measured the same between both analyses. For the ANES 2018 pilot study data, there was no variable for labor union membership, so that variable was dropped. Additionally, there was no variable for personal finances in retrospect. Instead, a 3-point Likert scale was used to evaluate financial worry, with the lowest score indicating that the

respondent is not worried about their current personal financial situation, the middle score demonstrating ambivalence, and the highest score indicating that the respondent is worried about their financial situation. Instead of national economic trend, the model includes a 3-point measure of how the respondent feels about how the economy will do in the next 12 months. The lowest value indicates the respondent thinks the economy will get better, the middle value indicates the respondent thinks the economy will stay the same, and the highest value indicates the respondent thinks the economy will get worse.

For the final study of this chapter which evaluates the role of capitalist sentiment on trade policy support, the 2021 Critical Issues Poll will be utilized. This poll, which was conducted between June 22nd and July 21st of 2021, included 3379 survey respondents. For this survey, I submitted a set of five questions which respondents scored on a five-point Likert scale with a range from strong support to strong opposition and a middle value indicating that the respondent neither supported nor opposed the proposed value. The dependent variable measuring trade support utilized a five-point Likert scale instead of the more common binary measure of support.[9] While this measure uses a different way of measuring the dependent variable, consistent support should strengthen the empirical findings. To evaluate the role of capitalist support and other variables on trade expansion, a multivariate OLS model is employed. The model includes four additional questions as independent variables – all measured as five-point Likert scales. First, the model measures support for capitalism. [10] Next, the model measures

[9] The survey asked respondents the following: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Increasing amounts of trade with other countries has been good for the United States." (Question modified from American National Election Studies, multiple years).
[10] The survey asked respondents the following: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Free market capitalism is mostly good for the average American." (Original question).

whether respondents prefer to purchase American-made goods.[11] Third, the model measures whether the respondent believes American-made goods are higher-quality.[12] Finally, the model measures individual levels of patriotism.[13] Additionally, the model includes an interaction variable between support for capitalism and Republican partisan identity.

Several of the control variables were slightly modified for this survey compared to other survey regressions. Rather than measure party ID on a 3-point Likert-scale, the uses three dummy variables for Democratic, Republican, and independent partisan affiliation so as to incorporate the aforementioned interaction variable. The survey also measures ideology on a 7-point scale instead of a 5-point scale. Income levels are measured in six separate income categories.[14] Education levels are measured in four separate categories.[15] The respondent's age, gender, and race are evaluated as control variables in the same way as previous data analyses.

[11] The survey asked respondents the following: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Whenever possible, I prefer to purchase American-made goods." (Original question).
[12]The survey asked respondents the following: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? In general, American-made goods are higher quality than imported goods." (Original question).
[13] The survey asked respondents the following: "How much do you agree with the following statement: I would rather be a citizen of American than any other country in the world." (Question modified from Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017).
[14] The six categories are as follows: less than 30,000 dollars per year; 30,000 to 50,000; 50,000 to 75,000; 75,000 to 100,000; 100,000 to 150,000; and 150,000 dollars or more per year.
[15] The four education categories are as follows: less than a high school diploma; high school diploma; some college; and college graduate or higher.

Populism and Trade Opinion: Results

	Table 2.1. Dependent Variable:
	Support for Free Trade Expansion (Democracy Fund 2016)
Selection	
News Interest	.217*** (.023)
Age	.006*** (.001)
Female	-.512*** (.034)
Constant	-.153*** (.086)
Outcome	
Elections don't Matter	-0.006 (0.008)
America is Fair Society	-0.009 (0.008)
Economy Biased Towards Wealthy	-0.033*** (0.009)
You can't Believe Media	-0.049*** (0.007)
I don't have say in Government	-0.012 (0.008)
Elites don't Understand my Problems	0.0005 (0.008)
Party ID	-0.028*** (0.010)
Ideology	-0.014* (0.008)
Labor Union	-0.048** (0.019)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.066*** (0.009)
Personal Finances in Retrospect	-0.025** (0.010)
High School Graduate	-0.067 (0.048)
Some College	0.044 (0.048)
2-year	0.038 (0.050)
4-year	0.106** (0.049)
Post-grad	0.140*** (0.050)
Less than 20k	0.025 (0.025)
20k to 39,999	0.041* (0.024)
40k to 69,999	0.054** (0.025)
70k to 99,999	0.049* (0.026)
100k to 149,999	0.034 (0.029)
Age	0.003*** (0.000)
White	-0.051** (0.025)
Black	-0.045 (0.032)
Hispanic	-0.032 (0.035)
Female	-0.091*** (0.003)
Constant	1.138*** (0.067)
Observations	4385 observed, 2195 censored
Log Likelihood	-6,019.27
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2.1 demonstrates mixed support for hypothesis 1 – that greater anti-establishment populist views are associated with greater hostility towards free trade policy. Table 2.1 evaluates the effect of independent factors on the likelihood of supporting free trade expansion during 2016. As per the outcome model of the 2-stage Heckman model, only two populist survey items are statistically significantly associated with decreasing the likelihood of supporting trade expansion: feelings about the fairness of the American economy and whether it is biased towards the wealthy and trust towards the media. Belief in personal efficacy in one's government is also negatively associated with supporting free trade; however, this effect only approaches statistical significance. The selection model of the 2-stage Heckman model shows three major factors that influence the likelihood of responding to a trade question: news interest, age, and gender. Respondents that are more engaged with the news and older respondents are much more likely to be responsive to trade questions while women are less likely to be responsive to trade questions. Gender plays both a strong role within the selection model and in the outcome model. As per Table 2.1, women are both significantly less likely to issue a response to trade related questions, and much more likely to indicate opposition to free trade expansion.

All anti-establishment populist survey items were measured on a four-point scale for the purpose of evaluating substantive significance. On average, respondents who most agreed with the position that the economy was rigged in favor of the wealthy were 9.8 percentage points less likely to support free trade expansion when holding all other variables constant than respondents who most disagreed with this statement. Respondents who felt most strongly that the media could not be trusted were an average of 14.6 percentage points less likely to support free trade

expansion than respondents who were most trusting of the media.[16] Education and income play smaller roles. More highly educated respondents were slightly more likely to be supportive of free trade in the outcome model. Income, by contrast, has a less linear effect, as median income respondents are slightly more likely to be supportive of expanding free trade relative to higher and lower income earners.

[16] Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values approach is unavailable to estimate predicted probabilities for Heckman models. See table A.2 in the appendix for robust probit models without the Heckman correction that use the observed values approach.

	Table 2.2. Dependent Variable:
	Support for Free Trade Expansion (Democracy Fund 2017)
Selection	
News Interest	.298*** (.028)
Age	.004* (.002)
Female	-.505*** (.097)
Constant	-0.024 (.135)
Outcome	
Expert Composite	-0.017*** (0.003)
Party ID	-0.015 (0.099)
Ideology	-0.019** (0.08)
National Economic Trend	-0.051*** (0.010)
Personal Finances in Retrospect	-0.024** (0.011)
High School Graduate	0.046 (0.053)
Some College	0.024 (0.054)
2-year	0.096* (0.054)
4-year	0.091* (0.054)
Post-grad	0.101* (0.055)
Less than 20k	-0.045* (0.027)
20k to 39,999	-0.041* (0.021)
40k to 69,999	0.000 (0.019)
70k to 99,999	-0.003 (0.020)
150,000+	0.016 (0.024)
Age	0.002*** (0.001)
White	0.003 (0.025)
Black	-0.012 (0.033)
Hispanic	0.032 (0.037)
Female	-0.009 (0.012)
Constant	1.086*** (0.077)
Observations	2449 observed, 846 censored
Log Likelihood	-2,182.726
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The Heckman model for 2017 data reinforces the findings from Table 2.1. News interest is a consistent predictor of the likelihood of responding to a trade policy question, with respondents with greater news interest responding more consistently to trade policy questions. Older respondents and males are also more likely to respond to trade policy questions. For the 2017 model, more educated respondents were more likely to answer the free trade question; however, income did not appear to have a consistent influence. When moving from the lowest value to the highest value (a nine-point shift), respondents are an average of 15.5 percentage points less likely to support free trade policy when holding all other variables constant. Consequently, hypothesis 2 – that anti-expert populist views decrease the likelihood of supporting trade policy – is supported.[17]

There is one discrepancy worthy of note between the 2016 and 2017 waves of this survey which are brought to light in the 2-stage Heckman models. Most prominent is the changing role that gender plays in the outcome models. While women are more likely to issue DK responses across both years, the effect of gender is radically different within the outcome model. In 2016, women are significantly less likely to be supportive of free trade expansion; however, in 2017, gender has no effect within the outcome model. While the variables within both models are not the same, such a strong discrepancy across two years is worthy of further exploration.

[17] Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values approach is unavailable to estimate predicted probabilities for Heckman models. See Table A.3 in the appendix for robust probit models without the Heckman correction that use the observed values approach.

	Table 2.3. Dependent Variable:
	7-point Tariff Support (ANES 2018 Pilot Study)
Media Trust	0.290*** (0.039)
Corrupt Government	0.073* (0.038)
Trump Change Corruption	0.326*** (0.032)
Party ID	0.349*** (0.122)
Ideology	0.170*** (0.044)
News Interest	-0.038 (0.047)
Next Year Economic Direction	-0.634*** (0.065)
Financial Worry	-0.081* (0.042)
Less than 20k	0.001 (0.125)
20k to 39,999	0.041 (0.101)
40k to 69,999	0.131 (0.094)
70k to 99,999	0.017 (0.098)
150,000+	-0.132 (0.108)
High School Graduate	0.123 (0.207)
Some College	0.243 (0.213)
2-year	0.133 (0.217)
4-year	0.189 (0.214)
Post-grad	0.217 (0.220)
Age	-0.003 (0.002)
White	0.165 (0.206)
Black	0.309 (0.213)
Latino	0.119 (0.214)
Female	-0.033 (0.062)
Constant	0.838**(0.357)
Observations	1,910
R^2	0.649
Adjusted R^2	0.645
Residual Std. Error	1.106 (df = 1886)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are robust.

Table 2.5 provides further, albeit conditional support for hypothesis 2, showing that certain elements of modern anti-establishment populism influence the likelihood of believing that tariffs will help America workers. Table 2.5 shows further evidence that lack of trust in the media is associated with populist beliefs, specifically surrounding trade policy and tariffs. Less trust in the media to reliably provide factual news is associated with an increased belief that tariffs will support American workers when holding all other values constant. When moving from the first quartile to the third quartile on trust in media policy (a three-point jump on a five-point scale), a respondent is expected to move an average of .87 points more favorable towards tariffs as a method of supporting American workers when holding all other variables constant (between a .64 and a 1.11-point increase at the 95 percent confidence level). The two corruption variables tell a much more complicated story. Belief in corruption itself is not statistically associated with how strongly someone supports tariffs as a way to support American workers. However, respondents that believe Trump was successful in fighting government corruption are significantly and substantially more likely to believe tariffs will help American workers. This indicates that populism and populist values may be contingent on trust in political officeholders.

Capitalism Support and Trade Opinion: Results

	Table 2.4. Dependent variable:
	5-point International Trade Support (Critical Issues Poll 2021)
Capitalism Support	0.330*** (0.034)
Democrat	0.744*** (0.122)
Republican	0.064 (0.066)
Democrat * Capitalism Support	-0.183*** (0.038)
Prefer to Buy American	-0.039* (0.022)
American Products Superior	-0.033 (0.022)
Patriotism	-0.014 (0.019)
7-point Ideology	-0.096*** (0.016)
30,000 to 50,000	0.051 (0.067)
50,000 to 75,000	0.061 (0.066)
75,000 to 100,000	0.116* (0.066)
100,000 to 150,000	0.169** (0.067)
150,000+	0.172** (0.069)
Less than HS	-0.110 (0.204)
High School Diploma	-0.177*** (0.061)
Some college	-0.098** (0.040)
White	-0.093 (0.089)
Black	-0.183* (0.108)
Hispanic	-0.007 (0.108)
Age	0.006*** (0.001)
Female	-0.288*** (0.033)
Constant	2.699*** (0.168)
Observations	3,107
R^2	0.169
Adjusted R^2	0.164
Residual Std. Error	0.779 (df = 3085)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are robust.



Table 2.4 presents the effects that support for capitalism and the interaction between Democratic identity and capitalism support have on support for trade policy. Broadly speaking support for capitalism is substantively and statistically significantly associated with support for international trade. Respondents who are more supportive of capitalism as a system are more likely to be supportive of free trade policy. Complicating this association is the interactive role that partisanship plays. Democrats are generally more supportive of free trade policy; however, feelings towards capitalism shifts opinion towards trade the least among Democrats. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the effect that support for capitalism has on support for trade policy when subdivided by party ID.[18] As Figure 2.1 shows, both independents and Republicans who are less supportive of capitalism are much less supportive of free trade policy. Meanwhile, independents and Republicans who are more supportive of capitalism are much more supportive of free trade policy. Among Republicans, each one-point increase on the 5-point capitalist favorability scale is

[18] While Table 2.4 uses robust standard errors to measure the model across all respondents, the measures in figure 1 do not use robust standard errors to measure the effect when subdivided by political party.

associated with a .30-point increase on the 5-point favorability scale for international trade. By contrast, Democrats are much more inelastic. Each one-point increase in favorability towards capitalism among Democrats is associated with only a .14-point increase in favorability towards international trade. With this in consideration, Democrats who are highly skeptical of capitalism still tend to be reasonably supportive of international trade; however, the same cannot be said of Republicans or independents.

On the five-point trade support scale, using the predict function on unweighted data, Republicans who were the least supportive of capitalism scored at average of 1.78 out of 4 while independents who were the least supportive of capitalism scored an average of 2.09 out of 4 (scores ranged from 0 to 4 on the five-point scale).[19] Democrats who were the least supportive of trade policy were predicted to score a much higher score of 2.70 on the 5-point scale. In descriptive terms, these values mean that independents who are the least supportive of capitalism are somewhat opposed to trade to middling, while Democrats are still somewhat supportive. For comparison, Republicans who were the most supportive of capitalism were predicted to score a 3.00 on the 5-point scale; Democrats who were the most supportive of capitalism were predicted to score a 3.27 out of 4; and independents who were the most supportive of capitalism had a predicted score of 2.92 out of 4. Descriptively, this means that all respondents who are the most supportive of capitalism are generally somewhat supportive of trade policy, regardless of partisan affiliation. Interestingly, Republicans, Democrats, and independents who are all highly supportive of capitalism tended to hold similarly supportive views on trade policy.

[19] It is worth noting that there were significantly fewer independents than Republicans or Democrats in this sample. This data set included 1568 Democrats and 1383 Republicans; however, there were only 428 independents.

It is worth acknowledging that Republicans, Democrats, and independents typically have very different views about capitalism. Using nationally weighted averages, Democrats' mean favorability towards capitalism was approximately of 2.07 out of 4 with a standard deviation of 1.16 indicating that the mean Democrat respondent had a middling view towards capitalism. Republicans' mean favorability towards capitalism was approximately 3.18 out of 4 with a standard deviation of .97. This shows that the average Republican is somewhat supportive of capitalism. Independents had a mean favorability of 2.47 out 4 with a standard deviation of .99 which means that independents are more supportive of capitalism than Democrats, but less supportive of capitalism than Republicans. Finally, it is worth acknowledging that there is still a sizable error term in this model. As such, an expansion that includes other attitudes such as immigration is necessary.

Conclusion

The beginning of the chapter presented a framework for understanding modern populist rhetoric and presented a theory for why populist individuals would be skeptical of international trade policy. Fundamentally, institutions and experts require individual-level trust. Individuals who are skeptical of the efficacy and intention of experts and institutions are likely also distrustful towards an international, nebulous economic system. While experts may argue that international trade is fundamentally good for an economy, populist-inclined individuals may be inherently skeptical. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, future studies would benefit from a clearer separation between populist attitudes and political trust when analyzing their effects on the likelihood of supporting free trade. That said, at its crux, populism frames the will of the people against the will of the elite (Mudde 2004). Because of this, faith in experts (as measured by anti-elite populism in this study) is likely a sufficient measure for evaluating populism. By

contrast, views about rigged political and economic institutions may be more representative of institutional trust.

When analyzing several elements of populism through the lens of modern voting behavior and its influence on internationalist policy, the data indicates that some elements of populism do influence internationalist policy proposals. As such, hypothesis 1 (anti-establishment and anti-institutionalist populism will be associated with greater opposition to trade policy) is generally supported by the data. When looking at data from 2018 specifically, trust in the media as a source to provide reliable news was strongly associated with support for tariffs as a means to help American workers. One method of interpreting this is to view media figures as media elites and populism as a political avenue to fight back against the elite control of fact dissemination. William Davies (2018) writes: "In fact, much of what we believe to be true about the world is actually taken on trust, via newspapers, experts, officials and broadcasters." The lack of trust in the dissemination of factual evidence gives way to alternative factual narratives. Trade policy, because it requires high levels of political knowledge, may be a policy area that is traditionally elite-driven; however, because of its perceived effects on American workers, populists make, address, and consider trade policy in an unorthodox way.

Similarly, hypothesis 2 (anti-expert populism will be associated with greater opposition to trade policy) finds support from the evidence. Respondents who were very distrusting of experts were significantly less likely to support free trade than respondents who are very trusting of experts. That said, while distrust of experts explained some variation in trade opinion, it did not overwhelmingly explain trade opinion. Therefore, it is likely that other attitudinal factors beyond populist and anti-expert opinion play a role in shifting trade opinion. When comparing the populist beliefs that the economy is rigged with populist antipathy towards experts, both

populist attitudes influence trade policy. Further research is necessary to determine whether anti-statist populism or economic populism play a greater role in shaping trade policy attitudes (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016).

This chapter also examined the roles that views on capitalism have in shaping trade opinion, specifically in the context of partisanship. Hypothesis 3a predicted that individuals who were more supportive of capitalism would be more supportive of trade policy. Hypothesis 3b proposed that partisanship played an interactive role with capitalist attitudes and Democrats' views towards trade policy would be less responsive to their views on capitalism. Both of these hypotheses were supported by the data. Capitalist attitudes were strongly associated with support for trade policy among independents and Republicans, but relatively weakly associated with support for trade policy among Democrats. All respondents who were very supportive of capitalism tended to have similarly supportive views on trade policy, regardless of partisan affiliation. With this in mind, protectionism may serve as a way for conservatives and moderates who are skeptical of the system of capitalism to express their values – especially considering that support for capitalism is central to conservative ideology.

On a methodological level, some of the opinion models presented in this model included two-step Heckman models. Trade opinion, as previously established in the first chapter, includes a very high degree of non-response and "don't know" responses. While not every trade-related survey item question includes a specific "don't know" response option, it is important to accommodate for non-random non-response. When available, the two-stage Heckman models demonstrated that three values played a strong role in the selection model: news interest, age, and gender; however, age had weaker and more inconsistent effect in the selection models. Respondents with greater levels of news interest and men were consistently more likely to issue

responses to trade related questions. Older respondents were inconsistently more likely to register responses than younger respondents. When possible and when appropriate, this selection model will be incorporated in later models. In future chapters, addition attitudinal variables will be included in the selection model; however, the basic paradigm (age, gender, and news interest) will always be presented as a separate model for comparison.

Moving into the next chapter, I will shift focus from institutional, economic, and elite skepticism towards anxiety and hostility towards the changing demographics of the United States. As stated earlier, it is impossible to completely extricate the racialized appeals made during populist campaigns from the anti-elite and anti-institutional rhetoric used. Thus, in the next chapter, I will explore how both anxieties and hostilities to a changing America shift Americans' views towards international trade policy.

Chapter 3

Diversity Anxiety, Ethnonationalism, and Trade Opinion

Introduction

Within the political behavior literature, the causal basis for trade opinion has not been particularly well understood. Despite a large swathe of theorizing, much of the literature that connects free trade opinion to self-interest based models has found mixed results. On the other hand, the free trade opinion literature has more recently associated trade policy opinion with attitudinal variables that do not, on their face, have anything to do with free trade. The newfound political salience of trade and trade policy in the 2016 election make it necessary to re-evaluate and re-analyze the factors that contribute to free trade opinion. Given that free trade is a highly complex issue, it is plausible that individuals are using partisanship to help form their policy opinions.

Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, then candidate Donald Trump strayed from economic orthodoxy by attacking the efficacy of numerous world trade deals and calling for trade reform that would put, as he stated in June 2016 speech in Pennsylvania and reiterated in his 2017 inaugural address, "America first." While not a classically partisan issue, given that major trade expansions have been entered into under both Republican and Democratic administrations, Donald Trump made a particular effort to cast the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a "disaster" of a trade deal, while simultaneously attacking the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and arguing for the negative economic effects that arise from an expanding trade deficit – especially between the United States and China (Trump 2016). However, Trump was not alone in his skepticism towards free trade policy. Independent socialist (and later Democratic) presidential candidate Bernie Sanders also attacked the American economic orthodoxy of free trade. In a 2015 interview with Vox

reporter Andrew Prokop, Bernie Sanders declared that "unfettered free trade has been a disaster for the American people." Unlike Trump, who invoked Reagan to provide partisan justification for his positioning, Bernie Sanders attempted to chastise both parties for their bipartisan support of numerous free trade deals, claiming that many free trade agreements, namely NAFTA, "[were] pushed by corporate American with many Democrats including Bill Clinton and the Republicans working to support him" (Prokop quoting Sanders 2015).

With this in mind, there are four broad categories of explanation for American trade opinion. First, trade opinion may be influenced by economic standing. Individuals may be purely acting out of economic self-interest and adjusting their trade preferences to match their self-interest. Second, trade opinion may simply be a reflection of partisanship because trade policy is so complex; however, it should be noted that partisanship itself is influenced by economic standing, making it difficult to completely disentangle partisanship from economic standing. Third, trade opinion may be the product of sociotropic evaluations of the country. The fourth possible explanation for trade opinion is that trade opinion is reflective of values that do not have any direct relationship to the economy, including feelings about changing demographics, isolationist tendencies, or racial anxiety.

With the changing political landscape surrounding the issue of free trade and major candidates from both parties arguing against free trade, it is possible that partisanship plays a smaller role because of the cross-cutting nature of the issue. On the other hand, given that Trump won the primary prior to the 2016 election, while Sanders failed, it is plausible that partisanship had become a reliable heuristic for voters to make a decision about a complex issue like free trade. It is also plausible that socioeconomic factors such family income and education or sociotropic evaluations of the national economy influence trade opinion. However, I will argue

that it is individual-level opinions that do not directly involve the economy that are the primary influencers of trade opinion. Specifically, I will show that diversity anxiety – a general wariness about the changing demographics of the United States and the possible economic implications of that demographic change – and ethnonationalism – a framework of viewing Americanism through a more rigid and traditionalist lens – are two factors that contribute to trade opinion. Unlike previous analyses that associate such non-economic opinions, like isolationism and nationalism, diversity anxiety and ethnonationalism are different because they are both views that are associated with conceptions of American identity and evaluate how the changing demographic makeup of the United States challenge that identity. Meanwhile, isolationism and nationalism compare the United States internationally against other nations (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mutz and Kim 2017; Rankin 2001). Consequently, I will argue that feelings about international trade do not necessarily need to reflect individual opinions about the United States standing compared to other countries in an internationalist context, but instead reflect uncertainty and opposition to changes in the American demographic landscape and the perceived economic consequences that may arise with it.

Background and Theory

This chapter will compare four competing explanations for trade opinion: partisan affiliation, individual-level socioeconomic status and personal retrospective evaluations of the economy, sociotropic evaluations of the economy, and individual-level attitudinal factors. This chapter will show that individual-level attitudinal factors are the most consistent explanation for trade opinion prior to the 2016 presidential election. Building on the literature that connects attitudinal variables to trade opinion, this project will present two novel scales: ethnonationalism and diversity anxiety. While similar to attitudinal variables such as isolationism, nationalism, and

patriotism, ethnonationalism, and diversity anxiety are different in that they do not involve an international comparison between the United States and other nations, even though free trade is fundamentally an international issue (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001; Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mutz and Kim 2017; Rankin 2001; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). Free trade may also be affected by internally-directed anxieties about diversity and a direct opposition to a changing framework for viewing traditional, conceptions of Americanism. On the one hand, diversity anxiety and ethnonationalism do not directly deal with international policy; however, unlike other measures, diversity anxiety might represent a potential group-based economic anxiety to a changing demographic framework. International trade and demographic change are both things that are nebulous, difficult to understand, unable to be influenced by most people, and may influence economic opportunity. Additionally, free trade and multiculturalism represent cosmopolitan values and ideas that nebulously and indirectly work towards the greater economic benefit of the country. Diversity anxiety and ethnonationalism represent a questioning and active rejection, respectively, of these values**.** Because free trade and multiculturalism are both complex concepts with poorly understood effects among most people, diversity anxiety represents an uncertainty about the positive benefits of multiculturalism and free trade, whereas ethnonationalism seeks to define Americanism through a simpler, more rigid, more traditionalist, and more identitarian framework.

Economic self-interest forms the theoretical basis for the classic behavioral models of trade. While the economic benefits of trade policy are debatable, trade liberalization likely results in material and economic benefits for some groups at the cost of material losses for others within that country. Thus, if individuals are acting rationally within their economic self-interest, those should support trade expansion when they are personally advantaged or their groups are

advantaged and they should oppose free trade if the opposite is true (Cohen 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). The Heckscher-Ohlin model (Kapstein 1999; Ohlin 1967; Rodrick 1997) creates a broad theoretical foundation for these advantaged and disadvantaged groups within the realm of trade liberalization. Under the Heckscher-Ohlin model, individuals within developed, industrialized nations with advanced skills stand to benefit from trade whereas unskilled workers from those same nations would face greater economic hardship as a result of increased competition. Because unskilled labor is common throughout the world, and because industrialized, developed nations like the United States have higher standards of living and worker protections when compared to many developing nations, blue collar workers would face a greater threat of wage competition as a result of free trade. Blue collar workers are not the only economic group threatened by increased trade liberalization. While often indirectly protecting the economic interests of blue collar workers, trade unions oppose increasing free trade so as to preserve the economic protections afforded to unionized workers in the absence of cheaper, less protected international labor (Conybeare and Zikula 1996; Kaptsein 1999; Lawrence 1996; Rodrick 1997; Rogowski 1989; Shoch 2000).

To build the case for self-interest based models for trade opinion, the literature has turned to other models to show that advantaged and disadvantaged groups may not be as cleanly defined as one would expect in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The specific factors model, alternatively referred to as the Ricardo-Viner model (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005; Samuelson 1971), demonstrate that industrial sectors will either favor or oppose free trade as a result of whether that industry benefits or is harmed by free trade liberalization. Generally, export industries will favor expanded free trade because of expanded economic opportunity; industries competing with imported goods will favor protectionism because of the threat of

competition; and individuals within industries that do not predominantly engage in trade should be more favorable to free trade than import industries (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005).

The Stolper-Samuelson model presents a third rational interest-based model for formulating free trade opinion. It argues that favorability or opposition towards free trade is dependent on whether the respondent owned the means of production and how labor-intensive a particular product was. Under the Stolper-Samuelson model (Mayda and Rodrick 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), employers of skill intensive labor should favor free trade expansion, while laborers in a labor-intensive industry should oppose free trade liberalism and support protectionism. Meanwhile, the opposite effect should occur with capital-intensive imports, since capital-based protectionism is in the economic interest of the capitalist and capital-based liberalism is in the economic interest of the laborer (Mussa 1974; Rho and Tomz 2015). Both the specific factors model and the Stolper-Samuelson model indicate that respondents' occupational industry may play a stronger role than economic class in determining free trade attitudes. While opinion papers with robust details about respondents' industry are relatively scarce within the literature, Rho and Tomz (2015) find that individuals do not systematically attempt to privilege their own industries through supporting greater protectionism of specific industries, demonstrating that self-interest models for free trade opinion may be flawed and incomplete in their approach.

The economic self-interest model has received inconsistent support throughout the literature. Schlozman and Verba (1979) argue that political attitudes and political activation in the latter half of the twentieth century was becoming more and more decoupled from socioeconomic status and class awareness. More so, they argue that class-based and group-based

politics are not necessarily one and the same as attitudes and political opinion about class-based political issues. They also note that working-class Americans, compared to other nations, have an unusually low level of class-consciousness, potentially weakening efforts to pursue collective economic benefits. Consequently, collective self-interest need not necessarily lead to pluralistic collective action. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) show that certain advantaged and highly skilled groups are more likely to favor trade liberalization, as they find that higher levels of education and technical skills are positively associated with preferences for trade liberalization. Rankin (2001) supports Scheve and Slaughter's assessment that blue collar and union members, as groups, are more likely to oppose trade liberalization policies; however, other demographic variables like education and income have inconsistent effects on trade opinion. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) further demonstrate that traditional subgrouping of individuals by skill, education, and income has inconsistent effects on trade policy preferences. More so, Rankin (2001) and Mansfield and Mutz (2009) show that other attitudinal variables, such as isolationism, sociotropic evaluations of the United States economy, and conceptions of national identity may have a more consistent influence on trade preferences.

While traditional measures of economic group-based self-interest have had an inconsistent quantitative effect on trade policy preference, the literature demonstrates that sociotropic evaluations of the economy and trade policy may be a more reliable determinant of trade opinion. Contrary to pure economic self-interest, the literature on sociotropic politics argues that individuals use economic indicators and data to evaluate how economic policies have affected the country as a whole and then make political judgments and decisions based on that data. While personal economic situations, frequently determined by income and retrospective economic evaluations, influence certain policy opinions, individuals often use national economic

indicators, local conditions, and news coverage to evaluate how certain policies are influencing the national economy (Brody and Sniderman 1992; Kinder and Kiewet 1979; Kinder and Kiewet 1981; Kiewet and Rivers 1984; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mutz 1992). Mansfield and Mutz (2009) demonstrate that evaluations of how trade affects the national economy as a whole is a strong predictor of individual level preferences for trade liberalization. This indicates that trade policy, given that it is more nationalized as opposed to personalized economic issue, may be better represented by sociotropic indicators of national economic conditions as opposed to purely rational individual and group self-interest.

Trade policy is unusual from most facets of public opinion in that partisanship is not highly associated with trade opinion. Moreover, there is no immediately clear reason why we would expect partisanship to shape judgments about trade policy. Given that trade policy is an unusually complex policy issue, individuals should not be expected to be able to evaluate the costs and benefits of trade policy, and may be likely to respond to partisan and ideological heuristic shortcuts when forming policy opinion on trade (Citrin and Green 1990; Citrin et al. 1990; Sears and Funk 1991). Classically, there is some theoretical support for partisan divergence on free trade, as Democrats should be more supportive of protecting poor working groups, whereas Republicans should be more supportive of less regulated and more open markets (Destler 1995; Hughes 1978; Jacoby 1997). However, as of the 2016 general election, the opposite partisan divergence would appear to be true prior to controlling for other variables in a multivariate regression as Republicans are slightly more likely to oppose free trade when compared to Democrats (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018).

While the trade opinion literature has not focused overwhelmingly on the potential partisan and ideological influences on public opinion, this may be because few national

politicians prior to the 2016 election made politicizing free trade and protectionism a central campaign issue. Because trade opinion is an unusually complex issue, it is possible that partisan cues may simplify a previously complex political question. Medrano and Braun (2012) provide theoretical support for the assessment, by arguing that uninformed citizens lack the necessary information to make rational decisions about free trade, and develop attitudes that reflect political endorsements, among other shortcuts. Thus, survey data gathered from around the 2016 presidential election may capture a partisan element that was not previously manifest in earlier public opinion surveys. Rho and Tomz (2017) argue that voters are uninformed about the effects of trade policy and demonstrate that greater information about the effects of trade policy increase the likelihood that the respondents would favor self-interest policy preferences and, to a lesser extent, are more concerned about the economic implications towards other groups. Consequently, the increased politicization and dissemination of information about trade policy may influence trade opinion in divergent ways.

A diverse set of attitudinal variables separate from party, ideology, economic self-interest, and socoiotropic economic evaluations have found more consistent support throughout the trade opinion literature. Rankin (2001) finds that conceptions of national identity, namely generalized American patriotism, the desire to protect American cultural autonomy from external influence, and feelings about American cultural identity may influence trade opinion to varying degrees. More so, feelings of national superiority are generally associated with a greater tendency to oppose free trade and favor protectionism, though this effect is inconsistent (Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rouke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Rankin 2001). Classical political theorists argued that nationalist and isolationist attitudes should influence international economic policy (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Johnson 1965).

Johnston (2013) associates authoritarianism with increased support for protectionist policies. Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 2013) demonstrate that anxieties towards out-groups that is represented through isolationist attitudes, nationalism, and ethnocentrism influence trade opinion and outsourcing opinion – again to varying degrees and somewhat inconsistent degrees. Moreover, Mansfield and Mutz (2013) further shows that individuals with a worldview that clearly separates in-groups and out-groups as well as individuals who are opposed to foreign engagement are more opposed likely to oppose outsourcing. Mutz and Kim (2017) further tie trade policy opinion to Tajfel and Turner's (1986) social identity theory, arguing that Americans seek to maximize the interests of the American in-group, even if it comes at the expense of absolute benefit for both in-group and out-groups.

The more novel intergroup conflict and identitarian-based theories of trade opinion are promising; however, they may be incomplete theoretically and impractical for application to survey-based data. Incorporating Rankin (2001) with Theiss-Morse's (2009) theories of identity and Mansfield and Mutz (2009)'s theories of out-group anxiety, it is plausible that broader ethnonationalist tendencies may explain variation in trade opinion. Ethnonationalist attitudes would be defined as a proclivity towards defining Americanism through a narrow and exclusive set of traits. More specifically, respondents with ethnonationalist attitudes would be more likely to define Americanism through a Christian, European, and native born lens. Similarly, feelings about diversity may also influence trade opinion. In accordance with Mansfield and Mutz's (2009, 2013) and Mutz and Kim's (2017) theories, individuals who that are more open to diversity and the benefits of diversity may be more likely to support trade liberalization.

Given their similarities, it is important to separate the two novel measures of ethnonationalism and diversity anxiety from other attitudinal measures that have largely been

associated with trade opinion: patriotism, nationalism, and isolationism. As stated earlier, the largest difference between diversity anxiety and nationalism, patriotism, and isolationism is that ethnonationalism and diversity anxiety are both internally-facing attitudes that are concerned with the changing demographic makeup of the United States. While free trade with other nations is an international policy, free trade opinions may be influenced by attitudes that are not associated with the United States' perceived standing in the world. Thus, while the previous free trade literature disassociated free trade opinion from economic self-interest, this project shows that free trade opinion need not necessarily be associated with the United States' international standing (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001; Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mutz and Kim 2017; Rankin 2001; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983;).

It is also important to disentangle ethnonationalism and diversity anxiety from each other and from other similar values, including racial resentment, same race preference, and ethnocentrism. Broadly speaking, while both diversity anxiety and ethnonationalism evaluate individual level concern to the changing identity of Americanism, ethnonationalism refers to rigid interpretations of American identity and translates to predominantly white identity politics. Ethnonationalism relates more directly to an individual desire to maintain a rigid, traditionalist, and identitarian conception of Americanism. Diversity anxiety is different because it more closely plays to future anxieties about changing American demographics and is more directly associated with economic elements. It functions as a group-based framework to represent economic anxieties about a changing demographic landscape in the United States. In other words, diversity anxiety represents an economic anxiety towards multiculturalism, whereas ethnonationalism is an active rejection of multiculturalism. Ethnonationalism is separate from ethnocentrism, same race preference, and racial resentment because it attempts to define

American identity through rigid, traditionalist, and identitarian concepts. Ethnocentrism and same race preference are more directly associated with an increased preference given towards one's own racial and ethnic background, whereas racial resentment is symbolic racism and prejudice against African-Americans (Henry and Sears 2002; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; Mansfield and Mutz, 2009**)**. Alternatively, anxiety diversity and especially ethnonationalism invoke a conception of an American identity and, consequently, display either anxiety or antipathy towards forces that may change that identity. Diversity anxiety and ethnonationalism should be more associated with trade opinion because free trade, like demographic change, is a complex and nebulous concept with poorly understood possibly deleterious economic effects. Diversity anxiety provides a group-based framework for addressing the perceived fears that arise with increased multiculturalism in the United States. Ethnonationalism goes further by actively rejecting multiculturalism in favor of a simpler, identitarian framework.

Hypotheses

If individuals were purely motivated by self-interest, they should form trade policy preferences based on whether they, personally, or their economic group are helped or harmed by free trade liberalization. Despite this, self-interest models have been unreliable and limited in their explanatory power (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005). Instead, isolationist attitudes and ethnocentrism contribute to trade opinion formation. The former attitude evaluates assessments of whether the United States should be involved with foreign affairs, whereas the latter is a measure of broader prejudice towards out-groups. Both are negatively associated with favorability towards free trade. Additionally, assessments of American cultural identity, as manifested through evaluations of the importance of preserving immigrant cultures

and favorability towards allowing more immigrants to migrate to America, influence trade opinion. Increased acceptance towards immigrants' integration into American culture is positively associated with favorability towards free trade policies. Collectively, feelings, anxieties, and prejudices about other groups and nations contribute to trade opinion (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Rankin 2001). From this foundation, I develop two novel hypotheses.

First, opposition towards the changing racial dynamic of America and diversity in general should be negatively associated with trade opinion. Diversity attitudes represent assessments of how individuals place America in an increasingly integrated, diverse, cosmopolitan, and globalized world. Additionally, diversity attitudes should indicate the level of comfort that an individual has towards a rapidly diversifying America. Second, ethnonationalism signifies a traditionalist, racialist, and identitarian view of what Americanism signifies. By combining cultural notions of national identity with the previous literature on the effect of ethnocentrism, individuals who have a rigid view of national identity should be more likely to oppose free trade. These views should be associated with opposition towards free trade because individuals high in ethnonationalism should be more likely to be opposed to the benefits of an international economic system and instead prefer a traditionalist, American-centric economy. Alternatively, ethnonationalism should be associated with opposition to free trade because individuals with a more rigid paradigm of Americanism are less cognizant of other nationalities and thus less likely to view free trade as beneficial.

Hypothesis 1: An increase in diversity anxiety will be negatively associated with the likelihood to favor an expansion of free trade.

Hypothesis 2: An increase in ethnonationalism will be negatively associated with the likelihood to favor and expansion of free trade.

Second, partisan identification may be associated with free trade opinion. While the literature has genuinely found an inconsistent association between partisanship and free trade opinion, Donald Trump's focus on the issue during the 2016 presidential election might have made it more salient. Consequently, stronger Republican Party identifiers should be more likely to oppose free trade. As an alternative argument, because Trump's campaign cross-cut against pro-free trade Republican orthodoxy, it is plausible that party identity will be an effective heuristic for trade preferences. However, because Trump made opposition to the pro-free trade Republican orthodoxy a central symbol of his campaign and because free trade policy has traditionally been a low salience issue until the 2016 general election, I hypothesize that Republican Party attachment should be associated with greater opposition to free trade.

Hypothesis 3: Stronger attachment to the Republican Party will be negatively associated with the likelihood to favor and expansion of free trade.

Lastly, individual level economic factors (Cohen, 2001; Conybeare and Zikula 1996; Kaptsein 1999; Lawrence 1996; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005; Mussa 1974; Rankin 2001; Rho and Tomz 2015; Rodrick 1997; Rogowski 1989; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Shoch 2000) and sociotropic factors (Brody and Sniderman 1992; Kinder and Kiewet 1979; Kinder and Kiewet 1981; Kiewet and Rivers 1984; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mutz 1992) have received broader focus and support (albeit inconsistent support) by the trade opinion literature. The hypotheses regarding sociotropic and individual level characteristics are in line with the literature.

Hypothesis 4a: Individual-level indicators or economic well-being will be associated with the likelihood to favor an expansion of free trade. Respondents that have greater education and higher income will be positively associated with the likelihood to favor free trade. Respondents

from blue-collar industries will be negatively associated with the likelihood to favor free trade. A decline in personal finances in retrospective will be negatively associated with the likelihood to favor free trade.

Hypothesis 4b: Sociotropic evaluations of the national economy will be associated with the likelihood to favor and expansion of free trade. Respondents that feel like the national economy is trending in the wrong direction will be more likely to oppose an expansion of free trade.

There will also be a number of control variables included in the models. To help to disentangle diversity anxiety and ethnocentrism from other similar attitudes, I will include control variables for racial resentment, patriotism, and ethnocentrism. This should potentially lend support to the notion that these scales measure separate attitudes. Next, ideology will be included as a variable in one of the two models. It is plausible that ideology is a more durable identifier than party identification. Thus, even while this project hypothesizes that Party ID will be used as a heuristic – and thus more Republican respondents are more likely to be opposed to free trade – it is plausible ideology follows the more traditional pro-free trade conservative orthodoxy. Age, race, and gender will also be included as demographic control variables.

Data and Methods

For the data set, I use the 2016 Democracy Fund Voter Study Group survey data set. The data set consists of a broad sample of 8,000 American participants. Most questions and scales used in this model will use data taken from the November 29th to December 29th, 2016 wave of the survey. One variable, the sex of the respondent, was derived from the 2011-2012 wave of the survey. For all of the models, the primary dependent variable will be whether the respondent favors expanding free trade to other countries. This will be measured as a binary variable, where

favorability is recorded as a 1 and opposition is recorded as a 0. "Don't know" responses were marked as missing data for all variables. Methodologically, all of the models will be multivariate probit models. The first model excludes racial resentment, same race preference, ideology, and national economic trend evaluations. The second model adds national economic trend evaluations. This second model will help further detect the possible influence of partisanship, as national economic evaluations and partisanship may be linked (Enns, Kellstedt, and McAvoy 2012). The third model adds ethnocentrism, patriotism, and racial resentment as independent variables to support the claim that ethnocentrism and diversity anxiety are separate attitudinal variables. Additionally, the third model adds ideology. While partisanship and ideology are not one and the same, they do frequently covary. The inclusion of submodels that both include and exclude ideology may help to evaluate the influence of partisanship on trade opinion, especially if ideology and partisanship influence trade opinion in opposite directions – which is possible given how Trump's opposition to free trade went against traditional conservative economic orthodoxy.

This project creates two novel methodological scales, the diversity anxiety scale and the ethnonationalism scale, and applies it to the trade opinion literature. The diversity anxiety scale is a 16-point ordinal scale that is comprised of five questions. [20] The Cronbach's alpha of this scale

[20] The five questions that comprise the diversity anxiety scale are all four-point scales, with the lowest value indicating the least diversity anxiety, and the highest value indicating the greatest opposition. The first question asks respondents to indicate how important it is to accept people of diverse backgrounds. Placing lesser importance on it is recorded as having greater diversity anxiety. The next four questions prime respondents with the knowledge that the census projects that America will be a majority-minority country by 2043. The second question asks respondents if "Americans will learn more from each other and be enriched by exposure to different cultures." Individuals who disagree with this more are recorded as having greater diversity anxiety. The third question asks respondents if "a bigger, more diverse workforce will lead to more economic growth." Individuals who disagree with this more are recorded as having greater diversity anxiety. The fourth question asks respondents if demographic change will cause there to be "too many demands on government services." Stronger agreement with this is positively associated with diversity anxiety. The final question asks the respondent if demographic change will cause there to "not be enough jobs for everybody." Stronger agreement with this is positively associated with diversity anxiety (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017).

is .79, indicating a reasonable degree of inter-item consistency and reliability. Higher scores on the diversity anxiety y scale indicate greater opposition to the importance and benefits of diversity. The ethnonationalism scale is a 19-point scale that is comprised of six questions.[21] The Cronbach's alpha of this scale is .83, indicating a high degree of inter-item consistency and reliability for the measure.[22] Higher scores on the ethnonationalism scale indicate a more rigid and traditionalist interpretation of what the respondent considers to be an American. To evaluate the possible impact of partisanship of trade opinion, I will be using a 7-point party ID scale, the lowest scores indicating the strongest attachment to the Democratic Party and the highest score indicating the strongest attachment to the Republican Party.

The models will use a variety of variables to evaluate individual-level economic preferences. First, the models will use six dummy variables to evaluate the income brackets for the respondents.[23] Education is also measured as six dummy variables.[24] The models will also include a binary variable to evaluate whether the respondent is a member of union. Finally, the

[21] The six questions that comprise the ethnonationalism scale are all four-point scales, with the lowest value indicating the least ethnonationalism, and the highest value indicating the greatest ethnonationalism. The first question asks respondents to indicate how important being of European descent is to being American. The second question asks respondents to indicate how important having been born in America is to being American. The third question asks respondents how important having American citizenship is to being American. The fourth question asks respondents how important having lived in America is to being American. The fifth question asks respondents how important being able to speak English is to being American. The final question asks respondents how important being Christian is to being American. For all items, greater importance is associated with higher degrees of ethnonationalism (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017).

[22] See Table B.2 in the appendix for full inter-item relation tables.

[23] Individuals with family incomes less than 20,000 dollars a year are marked at the lowest bracket. Individuals with family incomes between 20,000 dollars and 39,999 dollars a year are the next bracket. The next bracket includes individuals with family incomes between 40,000 dollars and 69,999 dollars. The next bracket includes individuals that make between 70,000 dollars and 99,999 dollars. The next bracket represents individuals that make between 100,000 dollars and 149,999 dollars. The highest bracket represents individuals that make more than 150,000 dollars a year (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017).

[24] The lowest bracket includes respondents who haven't completed high school. The next bracket includes respondents who are high school graduates. The next bracket includes individuals with some college education. The next bracket includes individuals with a two-year degree. The next bracket includes individuals with a four-year degree. The highest bracket includes individuals with post-graduate education (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017).

models will use a measure of personal finances in retrospective, a three-point ordinal variable with higher values indicating that the respondent is worse off financially when compared to the previous year. To evaluate sociotropic economic attitudes, the models will use a three-point ordinal scale asking the respondent to indicate his or her feelings about whether the economy is getting better or worse. Higher scores are associated with a more negative feeling about the trend of the economy.

The models will include several other attitudinal variables that serve as control variables. Additionally, the model will use a 13-point ordinal racial resentment scale with higher values indicating greater racial resentment.[25] While I am unable to utilize Mansfield and Mutz's (2009) measure of ethnocentrism, originally created by Kam and Kinder (2007), I created a convenience variable using feeling thermometers that evaluates the respondent's feelings towards his or her own group relative towards his or her feelings towards other groups to compensate for this.[26] Additionally, in accordance with Rankin (2001), the model will utilize the patriotic conceptions of nationalism using a 7-point scale. The scale is a partial convenience scale based on Rankin (2001)'s patriotic nationalism measure, as the data set lacks a question about whether the

[25] This scale is comprised of four questions, each of which are scored on a four-point scale. The first question asks the respondent to scale how much they agree with the following prompt: "Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors." Greater agreement is associated with greater racial resentment. The second prompt proposes the following prompt: "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." Greater agreement is associated with greater racial resentment. The next prompt says: "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class." Greater disagreement is associated with greater racial resentment. The final prompt says "Today discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities." Greater agreement is associated with greater racial resentment (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017).

[26] This variable uses the respondents' feeling thermometer values towards whites, blacks, Asians, and Hispanic. This variable is only restricted towards those racial groups. The variable measures the respondents feeling thermometer of his or her own racial group divided by the average feeling thermometer value applied to each other racial group (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017).

respondent thinks the United States is a better country than other countries.[27] Finally, a five-point ideology scale will be used. The lowest scores indicate that the respondent is the most liberal, whereas the highest scores indicate that the respondent is the most conservative.

Finally, all models will include a number of demographic variables to serve as control variables. Gender is the most quantitatively supported control variable in the literature. The literature broadly finds that women are more likely to oppose trade liberalization policies when compared to men (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Guisinger 2016; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; O'Rourke and Sinott et al. 2001). Race will be included through three dummy variables: white, black, and Hispanic. Finally, the respondent's age will be included as an interval variable. Additionally, news interest will be included as a four-point ordinal variable.[28] News interest will be removed from the outcome models in the Heckman models to serve as the exclusion.

In addition, a Heckman model will demonstrate the effects of these variables on the likelihood of supporting free trade when corrected by selection models. Both outcome models will use the expanded model 3 of the standard probit model which includes all available independent variables. The Heckman probit will include two separate selection models. The first selection model will include only news interest, age, and gender as independent variables. The second selection model will also include ethnonationalism as an additional variable.

[27] The 7-point scale will be based on two four-point questions. The first question asks respondents to evaluate how much they think other countries should be more like America. Higher scores on this variable indicate that respondents agree stronger with the premise that other countries should be more like America. The second question asks respondents if they "would rather be a citizen of America than any other country in the world" (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017). Higher scores are associated with greater patriotic nationalism.

[28] News interest is measured as a four-point scale. The lowest value on this scale indicates that the respondent pays attention to public affairs and government hardly at all, the next value indicating that the respondent pays attention only now and then, then next value indicating that the respondent pays attention some of the time, and the highest value indicating that the respondent pays attention of the time.

Results[29]

	Table 3.1. Dependent variable:		
	Likelihood of Favoring Expanding Trade to New Countries (Democracy Fund 2016)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Diversity Anxiety	-0.105*** (0.009)	-0.096***(0.009)	-0.091***(0.013)
Ethnonationalism	-0.045***(0.007)	-0.040***(0.007)	-0.043***(0.009)
Party ID	-0.001 (0.012)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.022 (0.020)
Labor Union Member	-0.181** (0.072)	-0.151* (0.075)	-0.132 (0.093)
News Interest	.024 (0.035)	0.028 (0.036)	0.015 (.048)
Personal Finances in Retrospect	-0.162*** (0.040)	-0.081 (0.043)	-0.087 (0.054)
20,000 to 39,999	0.085 (0.088)	0.045 (0.091)	0.158 (0.114)
40,000 to 69,999	0.163 (0.086)	0.132 (0.089)	0.247* (0.111)
70,000 to 99,999	0.250** (0.095)	0.215* (0.098)	0.307* (0.121)
100,000 to 149,999	0.226* (0.102)	0.197 (0.105)	0.376** (0.132)
150,000+	0.132 (0.120)	0.100 (0.123)	0.199 (0.151)
High School Graduate	-0.016 (0.175)	-0.045 (0.183)	-0.341 (0.240)
Some College	0.023 (0.177)	0.001 (0.185)	-0.309 (0.242)
2-Year Degree	0.080 (0.184)	0.049 (0.191)	-0.262 (0.250)
4-Year Degree	0.279 (0.180)	0.224 (0.188)	-0.003 (0.246)
Post-Graduate	0.415* (0.188)	0.367 (0.195)	0.026 (0.254)
Age	0.013*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.003)
White	-0.109 (0.102)	-0.110 (0.104)	-0.155 (0.133)
Black	-0.128 (0.133)	-0.122 (0.137)	-0.184 (0.176)
Hispanic	-0.083 (0.147)	-0.069 (0.150)	-0.268 (0.188)
Female	-0.453*** (0.051)	-0.437*** (0.052)	-0.428*** (0.065)
National Economic Trend Evaluation		-0.217*** (0.038)	-0.182*** (0.048)
Racial Resentment			-0.029** (0.011)
Same Race Preference			0.033 (0.035)
Ideology			0.123** (0.042)
Patriotism			0.088*** (0.028)
Constant	2.764*** (0.290)	2.900*** (0.300)	2.467*** (0.399)
Observations	4549	4403	2765

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Note: Data reported in log odds ratios. Standard errors are robust.

[29] All predicted probability figures use submodel 3. All predicted probability figures use Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values method.

Figure 3.1. Predicted Probability of the Likelihood of Favoring Free Trade Expansion by Diversity Anxiety Scale (Model 3 Values) (Democracy Fund 2016)



Across all models, the effect of diversity anxiety is statistically significant and in the predicted direction with a z-score of -11.5 in model 1, a z-score of -10.3 in model 2, and a z-score of -7.13 in model 3.[30] To demonstrate substantive significance in the probit model, I use Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values approach to evaluate the substantive effect of these independent variables. Moving from the first to third quartile in the diversity anxiety score (using model 3's values) results in an average of a 9 percentage point drop (between an 6.7-point and a 11.3-point drop at the 95 percent confidence interval) in the likelihood that an individual will favor free trade when holding all other values constant. The first and third quartile values for the diversity anxiety variable are unusually close together – 9 and 13, respectively, for a scale that ranges from 5 to 20. When moving from the minimum value to the maximum value on the scale, respondents are an average of approximately 35.8 percentage points less likely to support an

[30] Diversity anxiety is skepticism about the perceived benefits of demographic change and multiculturalism. Ethnonationalism represents a traditionalist, identitarian framework for perceiving Americanism.

expansion of free trade when holding all other values constant (between approximately a 25.4 percentage point and a 45.2 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence interval). Considering that approximately 81 percent of respondents favor expanding free trade when excluding "don't know" responses, individuals that are very opposed to diversity and the benefits of diversity are much less likely to favor expanding free trade. With this in mind, hypothesis 1 (diversity anxiety will be negatively associated with favoring trade expansion) is supported by the data.

Figure 3.2. Predicted Probability of the Likelihood of Favoring Free Trade Expansion by Ethnonationalism Scale (Model 3 Values) (Democracy Fund 2016)



Ethnonationalism also receives support across all three models and is statistically significant and in the expected direction in all three models. Substantively, utilizing Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values method with model 3's values, when moving from the first quartile in ethnonationalism to the third quartile in ethnonationalism (a change in value from 12 to 19 on the scale), respondents are an average of about 8.0 percentage points less likely to support expanding free trade (between 4.9 and 10.9 percentage points less likely at the 95

percent confidence interval). The first and third quartiles in ethnonationalism are somewhat further apart than they are with diversity anxiety. Consequently, moving from the lowest values to the highest values in ethnocentrism results in an average of approximately a 20.0 percentage point drop in the likelihood that the respondent supports free trade when holding all other values constant (between a 12.4 and 27.1 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence interval). Regardless, with this in mind, hypothesis 2 (ethnonationalism will be negatively associated with favoring trade expansion) is also supported by the data.

Across all models, party ID has no statistical significance when accounting for other variables in a multivariate probit model. Moreover, despite the fact that national economic trend evaluations and partisanship may be linked, partisanship is still not statistically significant in model 1 where economic trend evaluation is not included (Enns, Kellstedt, and McAvoy 2012). Because of this, hypothesis 3, where stronger Republicans will be more likely to oppose a free trade expansion, is not supported by the data. This indicates that party ID may not have become a viable heuristic in the wake of the 2016 general election, despite the newfound salience of trade. Party ID is insignificant in the model that uses ideology and model 1 which does not include ideology, further demonstrating that partisanship did not play as significant role in affecting trade opinion in 2016. Consequently, it is plausible that because Trump differed starkly from the traditional pro-free trade Republican orthodoxy, party identification was not an effective heuristic to explain free trade preference. Interestingly, when controlled for other factors, conservatism is positively associated with favorability towards expanding trade. It is possible that ideology overtook partisanship in providing the classical explanation for trade policy opinion, where Democrats were more likely to oppose it and Republicans were more likely to favor it (Destler 1995; Hughes 1978; Jacoby 1997).

The effect of individual level socioeconomic factors on the likelihood to support free trade is generally mixed. When subdivided into dummy variable categories, educational attainment has an inconsistent association with trade policy with post-graduate education being the only educational level to be significantly and positively associated with supporting a trade expansion. The effect of family income similarly mixed but is generally more consistent than the effect of education. However, generally across all models, greater family income is positively associated with the likelihood to support free trade expansion. Consistent with the literature, labor union membership is also fairly consistently and negatively associated with the likelihood to support and expansion of free trade; however, this effect is not statistically significant in model 3. Individual evaluations of personal finances in retrospect do not have a consistently statically significant association with the likelihood to support an expansion of free trade; however, the coefficient of the personal finances in retrospect variable is on the margins of being significant and in the expected direction in models 2 and 3. In model 1, when national economic evaluations are excluded, individual retrospective economic evaluations are statistically significant and negative, indicating that these variables may be collinear. Regardless, the marginal significance of personal financial evaluations is telling, especially when compared to the much stronger and more reliable effect that sociotropic evaluations of the national economy have on trade opinion. In total, hypothesis 4a, the individual self-interest hypothesis, receives weak and inconsistent support.

Figure 3.3. Predicted Probability of the Likelihood of Favoring Free Trade Expansion by Feelings about the National Economic Trend (Model 3 Values) (Democracy Fund 2016)



On the other hand, sociotropic evaluations of the national economy have a consistent effect. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the likelihood of supporting free trade given different views of the national economy (using model 3 of Table 3.1.) Individuals who feel that the national economy is getting worse are about 8.9 percentage points less likely to support an expansion of free trade than individuals who feel the economy is getting better (between a 4.4 and a 13.2 percentage point decline at the 95 percent confidence level). Consequently, hypothesis 4b, that more negative evaluations of the national economic trend will reduce the likelihood of favoring a free trade expansion, receives fairly strong support. In accordance with the literature's findings, gender plays a strong role in influencing trade opinion, as women are significantly more likely to oppose an expansion of free trade when compared to men (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Guisinger 2016; O'Rourke and Sinott et al. 2001; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). Age also plays a surprisingly significant role, as older respondents are significantly more likely to favor an expansion of free trade to other countries than younger respondents. It is possible that this indirectly represents economic self-interest, as older cohorts are less likely to be in the labor

force. Thus, this older cohort is less likely to experience many of the negative effects of trade liberalization, such as job loss, and more likely to experience the positive effects of trade liberalization, including lower prices. However, this possible explanation is speculative and requires more expansive research.

Heckman Model Results

	Table 3.2. Dependent variable:	
	Likelihood of Favoring Expanding Trade to New Countries (Democracy Fund 2016)	
	(1)	(2)
Selection		
News Interest	0.264*** (.026)	0.216*** (.028)
Age	0.007*** (.001)	0.005*** (.002)
Female	-0.567*** (.038)	-0.547*** (.040)
Ethnonationalism		0.013*** (.005)
Constant	-.034 (.112)	0.319 (.143)
Outcome		
Diversity Anxiety	-0.024*** (0.003)	-0.024*** (0.003)
Ethnonationalism	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)
Party ID	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Ideology	0.034*** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.010)
Patriotism	0.021*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)
Racial Resentment	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
Same Race Preference	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Labor Union Member	-0.040* (0.023)	-0.040* (0.023)
National Economic Trend Evaluation	-0.047*** (0.013)	-0.047*** (0.011)
Personal Finances in Retrospect	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.013)
20,000 to 39,999	0.056* (0.031)	0.056* (0.031)
40,000 to 69,999	0.080*** (0.030)	0.081*** (0.030)
70,000 to 99,999	0.091*** (0.032)	0.092*** (0.032)
100,000 to 149,999	0.100*** (0.033)	0.101*** (0.033)
150,000+	0.070* (0.037)	0.070* (0.037)
High School Graduate	-0.091 (0.058)	-0.091 (0.058)
Some College	-0.079 (0.058)	-0.079 (0.058)
2-Year Degree	-0.063 (0.060)	-0.063 (0.060)
4-Year Degree	-0.005 (0.058)	-0.005 (0.058)
Post-Graduate	0.007 (0.060)	0.007 (0.060)
Age	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
White	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.034 (0.030)
Black	-0.044 (0.040)	-0.044 (0.040)
Hispanic	-0.065 (0.045)	-0.065 (0.045)
Female	-0.103*** (0.026)	-0.107*** (0.025)
Constant	1.157*** (0.093)	1.115*** (0.094)
Observations	4,960 (2195 censored and 2765 observed)	4,576 (1811 censored and 2765 observed)
Log Likelihood	-4,437.854	-4,168.787
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Model 1 of Table 3.2 demonstrates similar findings to previous selection models: respondents with higher degrees of news interest and older respondents are more likely to have an opinion on free trade policy, while female respondents are significantly less likely to have an opinion on free trade policy. Model 2 of Table 3.2 expands on this basic selection model and shows interesting findings. Higher levels of ethnonationalism are associated with a modest increase in the likelihood of presenting an opinion on trade-related questions. As is consistent with some of the previous Heckman models, the effect of gender on trade support is less pronounced when a Heckman correction is applied; however, women are still more protectionist than men. Consistent with the standard probit models, education appears to have an insignificant and inconsistent effect. Comparatively, the addition of ethnonationalism to the second submodel does not substantially change the coefficients on the model.

Substantively, the effects of diversity anxiety and ethnonationalism remain relatively stable in the Heckman model when compared to the standard probit model.[31] Using model 2 values, moving from the lowest diversity anxiety score to the highest results in an average of a 36.6 percentage point drop in the likelihood of supporting expanding free trade when holding other variables constant (between a 27.6 and 45.6 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). The substantive effect of ethnonationalism in the outcome model was also similar to the standard probit models when using the model 2 values. Shifting from the lowest ethnonationalism score to the highest ethnonationalism score resulted in an average of a 21.0 percentage point drop in the likelihood that that the respondent would support expanding free trade when holding other variables constant.

[31] Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values approach was not available for Heckman model predicted outcomes. The average case method for predictions was used instead for these predictions. Future studies will incorporate the observed values models to Heckman 2-stage models.

Conclusion

Collectively, the data suggests the possibility that trade policies reflects internal anxieties about non-trade related issues and may not require an international framing. Taken collectively, isolationism, ethnocentrism, ethnonationalism, and diversity anxiety may all be broadly related in that individuals with these ideas are opposed to a changing, more cosmopolitan, and more integrated world. Isolationism, however, is focused on the interaction between the United States and the rest of the world, whereas ethnonationalism and diversity anxiety are internally-oriented viewpoints. This contributes to the research that trade opinion is a reflection of preferences that are not related to international economics, as neither ethnonationalism nor diversity opinions relate to international arrangements. Moreover, ethnonationalism has no association with economic policy and only some elements of diversity opinion are indirectly related to economics. Consequently, this study finds that rationalist and internationally-oriented thinking may play a lesser role than a potentially reactionary response to the changing demographics of the United States. Methodologically speaking, diversity anxiety in particular serves as a very powerful and reliable predictor of trade attitudes. With this in mind, the selection models add an additional wrinkle: higher levels diversity anxiety is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of responding to the specific trade question item. By contrast, ethnonationalism is positively associated with the likelihood of answering the trade question item within the selection model. It is plausible that diversity anxiety makes respondents more uncertain about trade policy, while ethnonationalism increases the certainty of the individual's opinions.

There is a conundrum in the trade opinion literature. Values like ethnocentrism and foreign policy attitudes should have little influence on trade attitudes; however, they are much more predictive of trade policy attitudes than traditional self-interest models (Mansfield and

Mutz, 2009). Additionally, authoritarianism (Johnston 2013), patriotism and nationalism (Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rouke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Rankin 2001), sociotropic economic evaluations (Brody and Sniderman 1992; Kinder and Kiewet 1979; Kinder and Kiewet 1981; Kiewet and Rivers 1984; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mutz 1992), ethnonationalism, and diversity anxiety are the attitudinal variables that contribute most strongly and consistently toward trade opinion, but these attitudinal models lack a consistent theoretical model to explain mass trade opinion. On the other hand, individual interest-based models (Cohen, 2001; Conybeare and Zikula 1996; Kaptsein 1999; Lawrence 1996; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005; Mussa 1974; Rankin 2001; Rho and Tomz 2015; Rodrick 1997; Rogowski 1989; Scheve and Slaughter 2001 Shoch 2000;) have a much more well-developed theory, but lack strong or consistent quantitative support.

Broadly speaking, my research further supports the notion in the literature that demonstrates that trade policy is reflective of attitudes that do not relate directly to economics. Authoritarianism and ethnonationalism receive broad support in both models, further showing that non-economic attitudes may influence trade opinion. Theoretically speaking, trade opinion may be a product of broader cosmopolitanism, internationalism, and multiculturalism. Consistent with Mansfield and Mutz (2009), the anxiety towards a diversifying America and the diversity anxiety among some Americans may be a sociotropic evaluation of the direction of the country – and trade opinion may be influenced by that. Alternatively, feelings about trade policy may simply be a reactionary response to a more inter-connected, globalized, and diverse economy. Diversity anxiety, ethnonationalism, and isolationism may all collectively be different facets of a broader anti-cosmopolitan sentiment. With this in mind, it may be worthwhile to see how these

anti-cosmopolitan attitudes influence immigration attitudes. It is possible that both immigration attitudes and free trade opinion are similarly influenced by anti-cosmopolitan attitudes.

There were two major limitations with the study. The first was the aforementioned usage of a convenience variable to measure ethnocentrism, rather than the more detailed ethnocentrism variable developed by Kam and Kinder (2007). It is entirely plausible that ethnonationalism and ethnocentrism are correlated with each other as ethnonationialism measures traditional, rigid, and potentially racialist views of Americanism, whereas ethnocentrism measures out-group feelings relative to in-groups. The second, and more major limitation, is the absence of a measure that evaluates respondents' preference for isolationism, which is highly statistically significantly associated with trade opinion (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). While isolationism, on its surface, should not co-vary highly with either diversity anxiety or ethnonationalism, future expansions that include isolationist opinion data are necessary.

Lastly, while the data supports the hypotheses that ethnonationalism, diversity anxiety, and sociotropic economic evaluations all influence trade expansion opinion and individual level economic indicators weakly affect trade expansion opinion, the data does not support the hypothesis that partisanship influences trade expansion. However, it should be noted that the data in this survey was limited exclusively to the 2016 presidential election. Consequently, it would be fruitful to evaluate the effects of diversity anxiety and ethnonationalism on trade opinion in different elections. It is plausible that the 2016 election was a unique case, causing certain values to have a stronger influence on trade opinion than others. While conservatism is still positively associated with trade opinion, the data does not support the argument that the increased salience of trade policy during the 2016 election made partisanship a reliable heuristic for evaluating trade opinion. Finally, it is important to note that individual-level economic factors were

unusually weak predictors of trade opinion, indicating that economic status was not the primary influencer of trade opinion in the 2016 election. Collectively, this chapter largely supports the arguments proposed by the more recent literature that free trade opinion is more reflective individual values that are not directly related to economic self-interest; however, this chapter provides also provides a basis for future study by showing that domestic anxieties may influence international trade opinion. Despite the fact that international trade is, by its name, an international issue, domestic American identity frameworks may play a substantive role in shaping such an internationally-oriented value.

Chapter 4

Trade Policy Activation, Non-Interest, Ambivalence, and Methodological Considerations

Introduction

The trade opinion literature has largely been focused on whether individuals support or oppose trade policy; however, there is an underdeveloped understanding of why individuals have opinions on trade policy in the first place. Questions about public policy direction are often complex and difficult for many in the public to understand. This is especially true because trade policy is a subject that can frequently only be understood in a national, rather than local context, such as international trade, tariffs, and protectionism.

This chapter seeks to broaden the understanding in the trade opinion literature to better understand why people develop views about trade policy. It will do so in two ways. First, it is necessary to assess the methodological consequences of the presence or absence of non-opinion answers within survey questionnaires. This is important to determine whether linear agree/disagree scales properly capture respondents' views on trade policy. Given that there is a high degree of non-opinion within trade policy because it is a complex issue, it is necessary to evaluate whether agree/disagree scales that either ignore or remove the non-opinion option skew survey data about trade opinion. Second, it is necessary to understand the correlates of interest in trade policy so as to understand why certain individuals develop views on trade policy while others do not develop opinions. This chapter and the next will establish the attitudinal correlates of trade opinion engagement as well as examining the interest area correlates with trade opinion. Collectively, these explorations of trade opinion, trade opinion interest, and lack of opinion in

trade policy seek to build a greater understanding of the how people first engage with trade policy before becoming activated and developing an opinion direction.

International trade and related issues such as globalization, outsourcing, and tariffs are an unusual public policy issue, particularly one that has been increasing in relevance since the beginning of President Trump's 2016 campaign. International trade policy is not a strongly partisan issue among the general electorate. Nor is it a consistently partisan issue within party platforms given that the Republican Party has shifted from being largely pro-free trade throughout the majority of the 20th century towards favoring protectionism with the advent of the Trump presidency. International trade policy is also, by its very nature, an international issue, making it more difficult to contextualize the issue through a local lens. For many Americans, it is difficult to demonstrate the direct pocketbook effects of trade policy or show how trade policy affects a local community. It also a policy area with nuances and complications. Free trade can expand the economy; however, this may also come at the cost of decreased job security for some American workers. These nuances in conjunction with national scope of the issue and its inconsistent partisan orientation make it ripe for further analysis. The trade opinion literature has often viewed trade as a single-dimensional scale that evaluates how strongly an individual supports or opposes elements of trade policy such as outsourcing or tariffs. However, given the high level of complexity surrounding trade policy, there are two additional and interrelated dimensions of international trade opinion that are understudied: whether individuals have an opinion on trade policy in the first place and the degree of importance individuals place on trade policy.

The trade opinion literature has given insufficient attention to these two additional dimensions of trade policy: issue importance and presence of opinion. Given the complexity of

the question, free trade questions have generally high levels of non-response. In the ANES 2016 survey questionnaire, when prompted with a survey item about the respondents' feelings towards foreign import limits, 44.5 percent of respondents provided a "haven't thought much about this" response (ANES 2018). In the 2016 Democracy Fund Voter Study Group survey questionnaire, when prompted with a question about whether the respondent favored or opposed increasing free trade with other nations, 24.7 percent of respondents provided a "not sure" response (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017). More confusingly, trade opinions may be highly inconsistent; however, this is difficult to verify because survey questionnaires use inconsistent measures for evaluating trade opinion. In the aforementioned 2016 ANES, in the survey question that tasked responds to report their favorability or opposition towards import limits, 65.7 percent of respondents indicated support for import limits (when excluding the DK responses in the version of the question that includes DK responses). In the aforementioned 2016 Democracy Fund Voter Study Group data, 78.2 percent of respondents favored increasing free trade with new nations (when excluding DK responses); however, in the same survey, 61.4 percent of respondents believe that free trade will reduce the number of American jobs and 61.5 percent of respondents believe that free trade will reduce the wages of American workers (as opposed to increasing those values or having no impact). Alternatively, 55.6 percent of those respondents believed that free trade would lower the prices of goods (as opposed to having no impact or increasing the price of goods).

This high level of non-response regarding trade questions, internal complexity surrounding opinions about the issue, and possible internal inconsistency indicates that it is not only important to understand why people have certain opinions about trade policy, it is also important to understand why some individuals engage with trade policy altogether and why some

individuals place a higher priority on trade issues than other individuals. The trade opinion literature has often attempted to study economic self-interest with mixed results; however, understanding the factors that influence issue importance may broaden our understanding of trade opinion formation and opinion intensity (Cohen 2001; Kapstein 1999; Ohlin 1967; Rodrick 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). In this chapter, I argue that trade activation is primarily associated with political interest, with more politically informed individuals being more likely to have an opinion on trade policy; however, individuals with anti-cosmopolitan views – isolationist views that are skeptical of international frameworks – are also more likely to hold sophisticated views on trade opinion.

This chapter addresses the methodological concerns for high-levels of non-response within the study of trade opinion. Survey item non-response is widely studied within the survey methodology literature, but the research is often under-utilized in more specialized areas of public opinion, including trade literature. This is problematic given that trade opinion is a particularly specialized segment of public opinion and requires a high degree of political knowledge in order for respondents to have an informed opinion. Consequently, I expect that trade opinion questions should elicit a high degree of "don't know" (DK) responses from respondents. Many of these "don't know" responses are treated as non-responses and missing data within the literature. However, this may not be the optimal method of evaluating trade opinion. By neglecting DK responses, two major issues may arise. First, there may be valuable data that could be neglected by failing to investigate linkages between characteristics and attitudes and the likelihood of issuing a "don't know" response to a trade-related question. Second, it is possible that linkages between descriptive characteristics of respondents and respondent attitudes and trade opinion may actually be influenced by the presence or absence or

of a DK option in public opinion surveys. Additionally, recording DK responses as missing data may obfuscate how descriptive characteristics and attitudes influence trade opinion. Finally, trade is a highly complex policy area. Methodologically, surveys have failed to permit respondents to express ambivalence towards policy preferences, including trade policy preferences, where ambivalence may be common among the American electorate.

Background and Theory

Previous chapters have explored the two broad frameworks for understanding trade opinion: through economic and class-based self-interest models and non-economic attitudinal models. This framework of understanding views on trade policy is limited in both methodological and substantive ways, particularly given the weak understanding of why certain groups are disproportionately more or less likely to support free trade policies. Gender has frequently had a powerful and consistent effect on views towards trade policy; however, neither economic interest-based models nor identity and attitudinal factors can effectively explain why women are significantly more likely to oppose free trade policies even when accounting for factors such as income, ideology, partisan identity, isolationism, and other political attitudes (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Guisinger 2016; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; O'Rourke and Sinnott et al. 2001). Moreover, there are limitations to analyzing trade opinion only through a linear framework measuring agreement and disagreement. Free trade is highly complex, relatively low salience, and has readily visible benefits and downsides that are less likely to be obfuscated due to the inconsistent ideological and partisan polarization of the issue. Because of this, trade opinion surveys often can't differentiate between a non-opinion on trade (due to the respondent not knowing or not having an opinion) and individuals who have nuanced or mixed opinions on trade policy.

The methodology involved in evaluating how surveys ask trade opinion questions and how researchers should analyze said data has been under-studied. The literature widely uses survey data to evaluate public opinion on trade-related matters. Both surveys and the trade opinion literature use a highly varied array of questions to evaluate trade opinion. Given that trade opinion is a complex issue, the way that surveys ask questions, the response choices that are provided to respondents, and the way that researchers choose to code certain response options may all influence trade opinion data. Among these methodological options is the choice of whether to include or exclude "don't know" options in survey questionnaires and in data analysis. The trade opinion literature tends to exclude "don't know" responses; however, it is possible that there is relevant information in such survey answers. Additionally, it is possible that the inconsistent presence and absence of "don't know" responses in survey questionnaires produce significant skews in the data.

While underrepresenting the implications of non-opinions is generally more methodological in nature, the lack of study on the intensity of opinion towards trade policy is a more substantive concern. By methodologically evaluating trade opinion using a scale measuring exclusively support and opposition, the trade opinion literature is not evaluating the importance of trade issues to individual respondents. It is plausible that individuals can have mixed opinions on trade policy; however, they present a great deal of interest within the topic. Given that trade policy is a highly complicated and lower-salience issue to many voters, but highly relevant to the international economy, it is of greater importance to determine which respondents express greater interest and concern in trade policy. Some individuals may hold a great level of interest in the topic, but their greater understanding leads to more conflicted views. For example, a more neoliberal Democrat may support liberalized trade to expand international cooperation; however,

they may be skeptical of its potentially detrimental effects on the poor. Krosnick's work greatly contributed to the political behavioral effect of issue importance – namely, that it serves a mediating role connecting individuals with idiosyncratic political views to making political decisions within a political environment. Furthermore, Krosnick argues that issue areas are relevant and confine political interest so long as the issue area remains salient to the individual and there are no significant national events that shift the political focus to a specific issue area (Krosnick 1988, 1990). Moreover, individuals who are highly invested in specific issue areas are likely to evaluate candidate and elected official performance based disproportionately on how that particular elected official executes and presents policy and policy platforms related to that issue area (Fournier et al. 2003; Krosnick 1990).

The role of issue salience is, thus, highly integral to understanding trade opinion and potentially bridging the literary divide between the economic interest schools of trade opinion and the attitudinal schools of trade opinion. One of the central tenets of proponents of the self-interest models is that favorability or opposition towards trade policy is influenced by contextualized economic factors. However, simply measuring trade opinion linearly and neglecting to account for interest and salience levels fails to properly present the broader picture of trade opinion. It is instead plausible that economic factors present a context that makes trade policy questions more salient to individuals rather than directly influencing respondents' opinion preference.

The survey methodology literature has provided extensive insights into the causes for different types of survey nonresponse. "Don't know" responses on surveys are a type of item non-response – a non-response wherein the survey taker has agreed to participate in the survey but lacks the ability to produce a valid and differentiated opinion on a particular question.

Whereas question refusals are most likely to occur on particularly sensitive survey questions (such as questions asking for detailed personal information and questions about socially undesirable behaviors), "don't know" responses are most likely to occur on particularly difficult and demanding survey questions (Bradburn et al. 1978; Converse 1977; Shoemaker et al. 2001; Sudman et al. 1996). The literature has pointed to several reasons for "don't know" responses within survey questionnaires. One possibility is that certain questions are much more demanding than other questions. For questions that require much more effort and involve topics in which respondents do not have a personal experience, respondents may be more likely to issue a "don't know" response because they often to not have the motivation to imagine an esoteric scenario (Converse 1977; Fazio 1989; Sudman et al. 1996). It is also possible that questions that demand higher levels of cognitive effort from respondents may also result in a higher proportion of "don't know" responses (Shoemaker et al. 2001). Consequently, because trade opinion (and even more specifically, foreign import limits) is not personally related to many segments of the population and may be cognitively demanding, it is possible that differences in question wording and the topic itself may result in a disproportionately high number of "don't know" responses. While there is no direct methodological counterpart to show the relatively high degree of non-response among trade protection in the ANES 2016 survey data set[32], some comparisons indicate the unusually high degree of non-response among trade questions. Among applicable web respondents indicating their preferences on foreign important limits, 44.5% of web respondents respond with "haven't thought much about this." Meanwhile, on a 7-point scale question asking respondents whether the government should provide many fewer services or many more

[32] In terms of survey methodology, the standard foreign import limit question is unique among the ANES 2016 survey data set. No other question in the web survey features its response options of "Favor," "Oppose," and "Haven't thought much about this," excluding other response options such as "Refused" and "Don't know" which is only applicable among FTF respondents (ANES 2018).

services, only 15.6% of web respondents responded with "haven't thought much about this." On another 7-point scale question asking respondents whether the government should intervene and regulate businesses for environmental protection, 16.8% of respondents issued a "haven't thought much about this" response (ANES 2018).

Alternatively, it is possible that “don’t know” responses are indicative of neutrality on a particular survey item instead of a lack of knowledge. In public opinion questionnaires, survey items often attempt to determine whether the respondent has a positive or negative evaluation of a particular topic as well as the intensity of the respondents’ opinion on that topic (Alwin 1992). Survey methodologists often debate about whether it is preferable to include an even or odd number of response options for a particular survey item. Fundamentally, providing an odd number of response options on a survey item permits respondents to include a neutral category. On the other hand, providing an even number of response options on a survey item push respondents who might otherwise be predisposed to choose the middling category into the response group that they lean more strongly towards (Alwin 2007; Krosnick et al. 2005; Sturgis et al. 2014). When presented with a neutral response option in a survey item, respondents who may otherwise lean weakly in a particular direction may engage in “satisficing” wherein they choose the neutral option because it is easier than committing themselves to a particular side of the issue (Krosnick 1991). The middle category in a survey item with an odd-number of response categories may indicate that the respondent wanted to issue a “don’t know” response. The presence of a neutral option permits the respondent to choose a non-committal answer while not having to issue a “don’t know” response because admitting a lack of knowledge on the topic may not be socially desirable (Sturgis et al. 2014).

Methodologically, trade opinion questions are often only bimodal with or without a "don't know" option. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, because free trade and trade protection have tradeoffs and are not strongly partisan issues, respondents may have conflicted feelings about free trade. In such a circumstance, it is possible that don't know responses may indicate that the respondent has a neutral standpoint on a particular issue – essentially a reverse effect of what Sturgis et al. (2014) viewed in their research. Second, the absence of a scale that evaluates the intensity of respondents' opinion prevents researchers from determining how strongly the public feels about free trade and more particularized trade items. Third, when surveys lack a scale evaluating the intensity of trade opinion, it is more difficult to determine which items are more relevant and more accessible for evaluating the public's perception of free trade. More complex survey questions asking for the respondents' views of trade protection may not be as relevant and accessible as more generalized questions about free trade.

The survey methodology literature has also evaluated whether certain demographics are more or less likely to issue a "don't know" response on a survey question. Among these demographics, the literature has generally found that females, respondents with less education, and respondents who are older tend to be disproportionately more likely to issue "don't know" responses than their male, more educated, and younger counterparts (Dillman et al. 2002; Francis and Busch 1975; Grabosky et al. 2014; Shen et al. 2018; Young 2012). The literature has also delved into the association between income, employment, socioeconomic status, and marital status and the likelihood of issuing a "don't know" response; however, the literature is either inconsistent or generally does not find an association between these demographic characteristics

and the likelihood of issuing a DK response (Craig and McCann 1978; Francis and Busch, 1975; Grabosky et al., 2014, Shen et al., 2018).

Hypotheses

Trade opinion – and to an even greater degree, opinion on foreign import limits – are generally high-complexity questions. As such, I expected that respondents would be likely to issue a "don't know" response when the option is permitted. This in and of itself is not necessarily problematic for the study of trade opinion. While it may be worthwhile for the literature to determine what attitudes and demographics lead respondents to be more or less likely to issue a "don't know" response, the inconsistent presence of a "don't know" option within public opinion surveys is only problematic if there is a consistent skew towards respondents favoring or opposing foreign import limits as a result of the presence or absence of a "don't know" option. If it is, in fact, the case the presence or absence of a don't know option within the survey data skews the responses of respondents, then a more consistent survey methodology may be necessary to better evaluate trade opinion.

Hypothesis 1a: On foreign import limit opinion survey questions, respondents presented with a "haven't thought much about this" option will have a different mean favorability rate when compared to respondents that lack such an option.

It is also important to investigate whether there are skews in import limitation opinion among subgroups in addition to more generalized skews among the public at large. The survey methodology literature is generally consistent in its findings that women, older individuals, and individuals with less education are more likely to issue "don't know" responses; however, this does not necessarily mean that mean opinion on foreign imports will be skewed when excluding

"don't know" responses as missing data (Dillman et al. 2002; Francis and Bush 1975; Grabosky et al. 2014; Shen et al. 2018; Young 2012). Because the survey methodology literature about the non-response rates of subgroups dovetails with the common finding within the trade opinion literature that women are significantly more likely to oppose free trade policy than men, I argue that the presence or absence of non-response options within survey questions causes a gender gap within survey questions about trade policy (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; O'Rourke and Sinnott et al. 2001).

Hypothesis 1b: On foreign import limit opinion survey questions, when subdividing the survey by gender, male and female respondents will be differently affected by the presence or absence of a "haven't thought much about this" option. When a non-response option is present, males will be more likely, on average, to support free trade policy. When no such non-response option is present, males and females will have similar mean support for free trade policy.

The trade opinion literature has explored associations between nationalist inclinations and trade opinion. The literature has demonstrated that opinion towards free trade policy has a symbolic, rather than functional, purpose to express patriotic and nationalist sentiment (Cohen 2001; Destler and Balint 1999; Mayer 1998; Rankin 2001; Sears 2001). Instead of trade opinion being driven by nuanced economic concerns, attitudes on trade policy demonstrate evaluations of national strength relative to an international framework. Despite trade policy being a highly complicated and low-salience political issue, these national evaluations help provide individuals with a more visible heuristic when evaluating trade policy (Citrin and Green 1990; Rankin 2001; Sears and Funk 1991). More specifically exploring the usage of trade opinion as a means of evaluating national strength, Rankin (2001) presents three conceptions of national identity which

influence trade opinion: American patriotism, American cultural autonomy, and the desire to maintain it in an international framework, and adherence to American cultural identity.

While economic processes like globalization and tariffs are complicated on a policy level, issues like globalization serve a symbolic role that threaten individuals' attachment to their own national identity (Cohen 2001; Rankin 2001; Rho and Tomz 2017). At a more holistic and more quantitative view, individual feelings of national superiority tend to be associated with a greater opposition to free trade policy and neoliberalism in favor of protectionism; however, the quantitative effects of these are inconsistent (Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rouke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Rankin 2001). While the literature has associated nationalism with trade policy, a major question remains unresolved: when it comes to trade policy, are these nationalist attitudes set by attitudinal predispositions? Alternatively, as may be indicated by ideological discrepancies within the survey data, can nationalist attitudes on globalist policy be activated by different framings? In other words, it is possible that presenting complicated economic arguments in an economically nationalist and populist way shifts respondents' views towards protectionism.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents who receive information on the Trans-Pacific Partnership in a protectionist framing will be more likely to oppose the TPP than respondents who receive the same information without the protectionist framing.

Beyond investigating the underlying methodological mechanisms and potentially biases within trade opinion survey questionnaires, it is also necessary to explore variation in attitudes about the importance of trade policy and related policies. The literature has largely been focused on the individualized opinion direction; however, similarly to how the literature underrepresents the importance of non-opinion in a highly complicated issue area, the literature also does not

sufficiently explore why trade policy is important to certain individuals. Trade opinion arguments grounded in self-interest models present a contextual framework wherein individuals will support or oppose trade policy dependent on whether trade policy is beneficial or harmful for the individual, the individual's group, and/or the individual's industrial class (Cohen 2001; Kapstein 1999; Ohlin 1967; Rodrick 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). However, it is a more immediately relevant question to evaluate whether trade policy is important to individuals who are in potentially more precarious economic circumstances. Consequently, individuals who are less educated and who have lower incomes are more likely to find trade policy – specifically, membership within the Trans-Pacific Partnership – to be more important because trade policy presents a more immediate economic threat to that individual.

Hypothesis 3a: When evaluating how important an individual finds the membership and/or withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership to be as a political issue, individuals with higher family incomes are less likely to find the Trans-Pacific Partnership membership to be an important issue.

Hypothesis 3b: When evaluating how important an individual finds the membership and/or withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership to be as a political issue, individuals with higher levels of education are less likely to find the Trans-Pacific Partnership membership to be an important issue.

The self-interest frameworks for understanding trade opinion are only one school of thought. The attitudinal models argue that trade policies are representative of personality and attitudinal characteristics such as isolationism, authoritarianism, nationalism, and ethnocentrism (Johnston 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrick 2005; Mutz and Kim 2017; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001). Mutz and Kim (2017) present a

competitive framework for understanding trade international preferences, arguing that individuals favor trade policy when they believe that the United States stands to gain from international trade. Contextually, Mutz and Kim find that some Americans favor trade policy that maximized relative advantage by helping the United States at the cost of hurting the trade partner instead of maximizing absolute gains for all parties involved. Collectively, the literature suggests that the perceived position of the United States and the perceptions of what the United States stands to gain are central to directional alignment on trade opinion. However, again, the broader focus on trade preference only touches on one element of trade opinion and does not extend to engagement and interest in trade policy as a whole.

It is therefore also necessary to evaluate whether these feelings of competition and national comparison influence engagement with trade opinion. The attitudinal segment of the trade literature finds that feelings of national superiority have a complicated association with trade policy, as extreme nationalism and authoritarianism are negatively associated with supporting trade policy; however, the feeling that one's nation is superior can be positively associated with favorability towards trade policies (Johnston 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2017; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001). Issue importance has the potential to simplify this complicated association between national identity and trade opinion, because it simply tasks the individual with expressing how broadly invested they are with trade policy. Marcus and Mackuen (1993) propose that enthusiasm stimulates interest, whereas anxiety encourages political learning and weakens reliance on heuristics. Incorporating these theories together, individuals that believe the United States is more internationally respected should generally express greater interest in trade policy. By contrast, individuals who believe the United States is

less respected and view the United States as weaker internationally should be less likely to engage in trade policy.

Hypothesis 4a: When evaluating how important an individual finds the membership and/or withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership to be as a political issue, individuals that feel like the United States is less respected internationally are less likely to find the Trans-Pacific Partnership membership to be an important issue.

While the previous section analyzed the role that international comparisons between the United States and other countries have on engagement with trade policy, this analysis is also limited in scope. While it is possible and logical to frame trade policy as an international issue because trade policy fundamentally represents and international issue, it is not necessarily true that trade policy and trade policy engagement are strictly representative of international competition. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) show that international policy is influenced by ethnocentrism, an attitude more likely to have a domestic dimension than a purely international dimension.

With this in mind, engagement in trade policy may have a domestic dimension in addition to the aforementioned internationalist dimension. Whereas feelings about the position of the United States within the world represent a broader, internationalist framework wherein the United States is in competition with other states, it is also plausible that trade policy can be indicative of more domestic feelings and anxieties. Individuals who feel anxious that they live in an increasingly diverse and cosmopolitan nation may then become more engaged in trade policy. For such individuals, trade policy is not directly about competition between the United States and other nations but is instead representative of a broader cosmopolitan framework – but economic and international instead of racial and domestic. Engagement and interest in trade

policy may consequently be euphemistic. Individuals who perceive themselves as out of touch with the changing United States may engage with trade policy because it represents one of the most convenient congruent issue areas to interest in broader globalism and cosmopolitanism.

Hypothesis 4b: When evaluating how important an individual finds the membership and/or withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership to be as a political issue, individuals that feel like they are a stranger within the United States are more likely to find the Trans-Pacific Partnership membership to be an important issue.

Survey Experiment 1: Data and Methods

To evaluate whether the presence or absence of DK responses influences response choice, this survey experiment uses the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2016 Time Series study. The 2016 ANES Time Series survey includes 1,180 face-to-face interviewees and 3,090 surveys conducted over the internet to produce a total sample size of 4,270 American adults. This survey will only use the 3,090 surveys conducted over the internet and exclude the responses conducted face-to-face. It is important to note that face-to-face interviewees had a separate "don't know" response that was available for both versions of the question. This separate "don't know" response category was not available to web survey respondents. It is because of this separate response option that face-to-face respondents were excluded from the survey experiment so as to improve the internal validity of the experiment. The survey was taken in two waves. The first was a pre-election wave conducted from September 7th, 2016 through November 7th, 2016. The second wave of surveys was conducted post-election from November 9th, 2016 through January 8th, 2017. As of the 2016 ANES Time Series survey, 7 percent of questions posed to respondents were revised from previous iterations of the survey (DeBell et al. 2018). Included among these was a revision of a question asking respondents about their opinion

on whether they favor or oppose foreign import limits. The standard version of the question is as follows:

"Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought much about this?" (American National Election Studies 2016).

The revised version excludes the "haven't thought much about this" option and reads as follows.

"Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports?" (American National Election Studies 2018).

Both the revised and standard version of the question were issued randomly to respondents. 1,266 respondents (1785 total respondents, including face-to-face respondents) received the revised version of the question that excludes a "haven't thought much about this option", whereas 1,324 respondents (1,863 total respondents) received the standard version of the question

This analysis will evaluate how the presence or absence of "don't know" (or "haven't thought much about this") responses in surveys influence response to trade opinion questions in two ways. The first will be through descriptive statistics of respondent subgroups to evaluate descriptively whether some groups are disproportionately more likely to issue DK responses than other subgroups. Second, this survey experiment will compare the likelihood of favoring limiting foreign imports of both randomly selected groups via an unpaired t-test. For the respondents that

have received the revised version of the question (which excludes a "haven't thought much about this" response option), their responses will be valued as whether they favor or oppose limits on foreign imports. For respondents that were selected to receive the standard version of the question, all "haven't thought much about this" responses will be recorded as missing data for the t-test. The study will then compare the mean level of favorability towards foreign import limits of each group. The purpose of this t-test, consequently, will be to evaluate whether the presence or absence of DK response options significantly skews data in trade opinion question. Additionally, I will then examine whether the presence or absence of a DK response option has significant skews when the groups are subdivided based on gender.

Survey Experiment 1: Results

Figure 4.1. Response Frequencies of All Respondents (ANES 2016)



Table 4.1. T-test of all Web Respondents (ANES 2016)

	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Dev.	95% Confidence Interval
Standard Question	732	.642	.018	0.480	[.607 ─ .677]
Revised Question (No DK)	1250	.604	.014	0.489	[.577 ─ .631]
Combined Questions	1982	.618	.011	0.486	[.697 ─ .639]
Difference		.038	.022		[-.006 ─ .082]
t-value					1.693
Pr(|T|>|t|)					0.091

As expected, DK responses are particularly high when a DK response is available – 44.5 percent of responses, the most frequent response among all choices. When comparing both groups of all respondents, respondents may be slightly more likely to favor import protections when given a DK response than respondents that do not have such an option; however, this effect only approaches statistically significance when comparing the two groups of all respondents. Including a "don't know" response in the survey questionnaire increases the mean favorability for import limits by about 3.8 percentage points (between a .6 percentage point drop and an 8.2 percentage point increase at the 95 percent confidence interval) when recording the DK responses as missing data. Overall, hypothesis 1a – that respondents will have different mean favorability when a DK response is present – may be weakly supported, but further research is necessary.

Figure 4.2. Response Frequencies by Gender (ANES 2016)



Table 4.2a. T-Test of Male Respondents (ANES 2016)

	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Dev.	95% Confidence Interval
Standard Question	377	.605	.025	.490	[.555 – .654]
Revised Question (No DK)	575	.595	.020	.491	[.555 – .635]
Combined Questions	952	.599	.016	.490	[.568 – .630]
Difference		.010	.032		[-.054 – .074]
t-value					0.308
Pr(|T|>|t|)					0.759

Table 4.2b. T-test of Female Respondents
(ANES 2016)

	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Dev.	95% Confidence Interval
Standard Question	347	.706	.024	.456	[.658 ─ .754]
Revised Question (No DK)	670	.603	.019	.490	[.566 ─ .640]
Combined Questions	1017	.638	.015	.481	[.609 ─ .668]
Difference		.103	.031		[.042 ─ .164]
t-value					3.331
Pr(|T|>|t|)					0.001

In accordance with the survey methodology literature, women respond with DK responses at higher rates than men on questions about trade opinion. When presented with a DK option, 49.86 percent of women responded with DK, whereas only 38.7 percent of men responded with a DK response. Additionally, the data suggests that the inclusion of a DK response option in survey questions about favorability towards foreign import limits has a much greater effect on women than on men. Among men, the inclusion or exclusion of a DK response option does not have a statically or substantively significant effect on mean favorability towards foreign import limits. However, the presence of a DK response option causes women to be more likely to support foreign import limits. When a DK response option is present, women are an average of 10.3 percentage points more favorable towards foreign import protection (between a 4.2 percentage point and 16.4 percentage point increase at the 95 percent confidence level) when recording the DK response as missing data. Interestingly, when no DK response option is present, men and women are nearly identical in their favorability towards foreign import limits. Substantively speaking, this study suggests that the aforementioned gender gap in trade opinion

(O'Rourke and Sinnott et al., 2001, Mansfield and Mutz, 2009) may be less prominent and more nuanced than previously asserted. When comparing male and female respondents who received that standard question (which includes DK responses), women were 10.1 percentage points more likely than men to favor import limits. Given the relatively low salience and high complexity of trade opinion, the suggestion that gender, when excluding DK responses, frequently influenced trade opinion more than personal financial evaluations or other economic factors was immediately interesting. However, this research suggests a more nuanced case: women may be more likely to issue a non-opinion on the subject than men. When forced to issue an opinion on the subject, the research suggests that the gender gap may not be present. Therefore, hypothesis 1b – that women will respond differently than men when a DK response is present – is supported by the data. Additionally, this data is consistent with Heckman models in earlier chapters that demonstrated that women are less likely to respond to trade question.

Survey Experiment 2: Data and Methods

The next data analysis evaluates a survey experiment presented to undergraduates during the Spring of 2021. During this study, I presented undergraduates with two separate frames for understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its effects. These frames were randomly assigned; however, the number of respondents in each group was set to be approximately equal. During the neutral frame, respondents read a passage that described the potential economic effects of the TPP. [33] During the assigned protectionist frame, the same information was

[33] The following is the full neutral frame prompt: The United States joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016 and left the agreement a year later in 2017. If enacted fully into effect, it is predicted that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would have created a small, but sizeable net increase in jobs. By 2032, it is predicted that there would be about 128,000 net new jobs. While the TPP would have led to a net increase in jobs in the United States, some economic sectors would decline relative to predicted baseline levels. Relative to baseline levels, the TPP would have led to .2 percent drop in total employment in manufacturing sectors. GDP growth from the TPP was expected to be divided among laborers and capital rents. Skilled laborers would have received 41% of the increases in GDP by 2032, resulting in an .19% increase in real wages relative to baseline predictions and a .08% increase in

presented; however, the information was nested in statements about the need to 'buy American.'[34] This survey experiment evaluates whether issue framing on trade policy shifts trade policy support.

The survey was conducted online between mid-February and mid-May of 2021 and included 610 respondents across three waves. All the respondents were undergraduate students who participated in the survey experiment for class credit. The following descriptive statistics were recorded: gender; age; race; partisan identification (measured as Republican, Democrat, independent, other, or not sure); ideology (measured on a 5-point scale from very conservative to very liberal); and whether the respondent is an American citizen. Respondents were not required to answer any question and were permitted to leave any question blank. Because the survey analyzed the effect of American nationalist framing on trade preferences, the data was restricted to American citizens. Of the respondents, 323 were female, 278 were male, and 2 were other. The average age was 19.7 years. Additionally, 356 were self-described Democrats; 131 were

employment levels. Unskilled laborers were expected to receive 25% of the increases in GDP by 2032, resulting in a .18% increase in real wages relative to baseline predictions and a .07% increase in employment levels. Capital rents would account for 34% of the increase in GDP growth by 2032, but the GDP of natural resources would see a net decline.

[34] The following is the full protectionist frame prompt: Trade policy may seem like a broadly economic issue, but it is both a national and a personal issue for many Americans. National trade policies like the TPP can have economic effects, but it is up to individual Americans to make individual economic choices. These choices include individual decisions about what companies Americans choose to buy products from. The United States joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016 and left the agreement a year later in 2017. If enacted fully into effect, it is predicted that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would have created a small, but sizeable net increase in jobs. By 2032, it is predicted that there would be about 128,000 net new jobs. While the TPP would have led to a net increase in jobs in the United States, some economic sectors would decline relative to predicted baseline levels. Relative to baseline levels, the TPP would have led to .2 percent drop in total employment in manufacturing sectors. GDP growth from the TPP was expected to be divided among laborers and capital rents. Skilled laborers would have received 41% of the increases in GDP by 2032, resulting in an .19% increase in real wages relative to baseline predictions and a .08% increase in employment levels. Unskilled laborers were expected to receive 25% of the increases in GDP by 2032, resulting in a .18% increase in real wages relative to baseline predictions and a .07% increase in employment levels. Capital rents would account for 34% of the increase in GDP growth by 2032, but the GDP of natural resources would see a net decline. Trade policy, like the TPP, have several economic consequences on the United States. Politicians, both Democrats and Republicans, believe that the best way to help American businesses is to buy American products from American businesses.

self-described independents; 81 were self-described Republicans; and 25 described themselves as another political affiliation.

The primary independent variable of study evaluated respondents' feelings about whether the TPP would have benefitted, hurt, or would have had a neutral effect on the United States and was posed immediately after the survey prompt.[35] To evaluate the influence of protectionist framing on this survey response item, this study conducts an unpaired t-test. Subsequent exploratory questions asked respondents whether they choose to buy American goods, foreign goods, or had no preference.[36] Additional questions were also exploratory in scope. An additional exploratory question asked respondents whether they believe American goods are superior, imported goods are superior, had no preference, or believed the quality depended on the product.[37] To support the exploratory data, two questions from the 2021 Critical Issues Poll are included.[38] See appendix C for more information on the additional questions.

[35] Respondents were asked "Do you believe that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would have benefitted the United States, hurt the United States, or do you think that its effects would have been neutral?" Responses were scored on a 3-point ordinal scale. Respondents could choose "hurt" (scored as the lowest value), "neutral" (scored as the next lowest value), or "benefitted" (scored as the highest value). "Don't know" responses were excluded. This is a modified version of a question from the 2017 version of the DFVSG survey.

[36] Respondents were asked "Whenever possible, do you prefer to buy American-made goods, buy imported goods, or do you have no preference?" Responses were scored on a 3-point ordinal scale. Respondents who indicated that they prefer to "Buy American-made goods" scored the lowest value. Respondents who chose "No preference" scored the next lowest value. Respondents who chose "Buy imported goods" received the highest score. "Don't know" responses were excluded.

[37] Respondents were asked "In general, do you think American-made goods are of mostly better quality than imported goods, do you think imported and American-made goods are of generally equal quality to foreign imported goods, do you think foreign imported goods are of mostly better quality than American-made goods, or do you think the quality depends on the type of product?" This response was recorded on a three-point ordinal scale. Respondents who chose "American goods are generally superior to foreign goods" scored the lowest value; respondents who chose "American goods are generally equal in quality to foreign goods" or "The quality of American and foreign goods depends on the type of product" received the next lowest score. Respondents who chose "Foreign goods are generally superior to American goods" received the highest score. "Don't know" responses were excluded.

[38] The survey asked respondents the following questions: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Whenever possible, I prefer to purchase American-made goods" and "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? In general, American-made goods are higher quality than imported goods." (Original questions).

Survey Experiment 2: Results


Figure 4.3. TPP Effect Response Frequencies by Party Identification
(UMD Experiment 2021)
Independent
Republican
Democrat
Total
Protectionist Frame
Neutral Frame
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
DK
Hurt
Neutral
Benefit

Table 4.3. T-test of All Respondents
(UMD Experiment 2021)

	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Dev.	95% Confidence Interval
Neutral Frame	259	1.463	.040	.648	[1.385 ─ 1.514]
Protectionist Frame	264	1.383	.043	.699	[1.300 ─ 1.467]
Combined Questions	523	1.423	.030	.675	[1.364 ─ 1.482]
Difference		.080	.059		[-.035 ─ .196]
t-value					1.371
Pr(|T|>|t|)					0.171

Table 4.3 presents the mean values of support for the TPP among respondents from both the neutral frame response and the protectionist frames. The dependent variable evaluating TPP was measured on a three-point ordinal scale, with respondents indicating that the TPP would have hurt the US scored as a 0, neutral responses scored as a 1, and responses indicating the TPP would have been beneficial scored as a 2. "Don't know" responses and non-answers were both excluded from the data set. Overall, the neutral frame prompt had 49 missing observations while the protectionist frame prompt had 38 missing observations. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the relative frequency of responses. Overall, respondents from both frames were more likely to believe the TPP was beneficial than harmful. Among those surveyed, 46.1 percent of respondents in the neutral frame and 44.4 percent of respondents in the protectionist frame believed that the TPP was beneficial compared to 7.1 percent and 10.9 percent of the respondents in the protectionist and neutral frames respectively who believed that the TPP hurt the United States. While the TPP was a high-complexity issue, both frames presented the economic effects of the TPP. Therefore,

DK responses were relatively low at 15.9 percent (neutral frame) and 12.6 percent (protectionist frame).

When comparing the mean response values for both the neutral and the protectionist frame, we see a small decline in support for the economic benefits of the TPP. This was the expected direction from hypothesis 2 – that respondents with a protectionist framing of the TPP will be more likely to be opposed to the TPP; however, this effect does not reach statistical significance in the expected direction. Respondents in the protectionist frame saw a .080-point decline in support for the benefits of the TPP on a 3-point ordinal scale (between .035-point increase and .2-point decline at the 95 percent confidence level); however, this does not reach a level of statistical significance. Consequently, hypothesis 2 is not sufficiently supported by the data.





Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present exploratory questions posed to survey respondents about their product preferences and their views about the quality of foreign versus domestic goods. Overall, most respondents had an ambivalent or neutral view about the quality of American goods. 60.1 percent (neutral frame) and 63.2 (protectionist frame) indicated that they had no preference when making purchasing decisions between foreign and American goods. There was a sizeable subsection of the respondents that indicated they preferred to buy American when possible – 35.7 percent of the neutral frame respondents and 32.1 percent of the protectionist frame respondents. A very small percentage of respondents indicated a preference for foreign goods – 3.2 percent of the neutral frame respondents and 3.0 percent of the protectionist frame respondents.

Views about the quality of foreign versus American goods largely align with the respondents' purchasing preferences; however, there is one point of nuance. Overwhelmingly, respondents chose either the neutral response option or the conditional response option. Among

respondents, 65.3 percent (neutral frame respondents) and 66.9 percent (protectionist frame respondents) believed that the relative quality of foreign versus domestic goods was contingent on the type of product being purchased. Here, 10.7 percent (neutral frame respondents) and 12.3 percent (protectionist frame respondents) believed that foreign and American goods were roughly similar in quality. Like the question about purchasing preferences, a very small group (6.2 percent of the neutral frame respondents and 5.3 percent of the protectionist frame respondents) believed that foreign goods were superior in quality. The point of nuance between the good quality question and purchasing preference question lies in the relatively small number of respondents who think American goods are superior in quality (13.9 percent in the neutral frame and 11.9 percent in the protectionist frame). Consequently, while there is a sizable subset of respondents who preferred to purchase American goods, those respondents did not necessarily also believe that American goods were superior in quality. The prevalence of ambivalent responses to questions of purchasing and quality preference as well as the large number of neutral responses on the TPP question indicates that standard trade policy question may fail to capture ambivalence among the electorate.

While the previous survey responses are largely exploratory in scope, they are supported from the data from the 2021 Critical Issues Poll – a nationally representative poll of Americans including 3,379 respondents. Like the questions presented to the experiment, I submitted the following questions: first, how much the respondent preferred to purchase American goods whenever possible and second, how much the respondent believed that American goods were generally higher quality than imported goods. Both questions were scored on a five-point Likert scale ranged from 0 to 4 with a 0 indicating strong opposition, a 4 indicating strong support, and a 2 indicating that the respondent neither agreed nor disagreed. Unlike the question in the survey

experiment, there was no option to choose that good preference was dependent on the type of good. With this in mind, a similar trend between purchasing preference and good quality emerges. Using a weighted sample among all respondents, the mean respondent scored a 3.24 out of 4 (with a standard deviation of .87) when asked whether the respondent preferred to buy American goods whenever possible – indicating that most were generally more likely to buy American-made goods. There is a small partisan disparity in this question. Republicans are the most likely to prefer to buy American with a mean of 3.54 and an SD of .69; independents are slightly less likely to prefer to buy American with a mean of 3.12 and an SD of .96; and Democrats are the least likely to prefer to buy American with a mean of 2.99 and an SD of .91.

While most respondents, regardless of party, generally preferred American goods, respondents were more divided about whether American goods were of higher quality. When asked whether American goods were of higher quality, respondents scored an average of 2.67 out of 4 with an SD of .97. This shows that survey respondents fell somewhere between somewhat believing American goods were superior and neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement that American goods were superior. Like the question about whether the surveyed individual preferred to buy American goods, there was a small partisan divide among whether the respondent believed American goods were superior. Republicans were the most likely to believe American goods were higher quality with a mean of 2.97 and an SD of .85, indicating that Republicans somewhat believed American products were superior to imported products. Democrats and independents were more ambivalent on the topic. Democrats scored 2.41 out of 4 with an SD of .97 while independents scored a 2.57 out of 4 with an SD of 1.01. In conjunction with the earlier exploratory questions, the slight discrepancy among these two values (preference

for buying American goods and belief that American goods are superior) indicates that international purchasing preferences among Americans may be complex and ambivalent.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Issue Importance and Correlates of TPP Interest: Data and Methods

To evaluate the factors that influence respondent issue importance in the membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the survey analyses will utilize the 2018 Democracy Fund Voter Study Group survey. The 2018 VSG includes 6,005 adult Americans and was recorded online between April 5 and May 14, 2018 and a 5,000 observation sample taken in July of 2017. The following measures of TPP issue importance use the July 2017 survey sample.

To measure the attitudinal associates with TPP membership, the study utilizes a novel dependent variable. The 2017 wave of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group tasks respondents to indicate whether the respondent supports Trump's promise to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and how important the issue is for the respondent. The variable originally is measured as a five-point Likert scale that measures the lowest value as indicating the respondent supports Trump's promise and that that the promise is a high priority for the respondent; the second lowest value indicating that the respondent supports Trump's promise and that it is not a high priority; the middle value indicating that the respondent neither supports nor opposes the promise; the second highest value indicating that the respondent opposes the promise but the action is not a high priority for the respondent; and the highest value indicating that the respondent opposes Trump's promise and it is a high priority for the respondent (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018). This variable will be transformed into a binary variable with non-responses that are accounted for with a selection model. The binary variable excludes the response wherein the respondent neither supports nor opposes the promise to

withdraw from the TPP will be excluded entirely. Respondents who indicate that the promise to withdraw from the TPP is not a high priority will be recorded as a 0 (regardless of support or opposition to the promise), while respondents who indicate that the promise is a high priority will be recorded as a 0.

The model uses a two-stage Heckman model to evaluate the influence of the independent variables on this binary variable. Unlike in previous models, the censored variable is not a traditional DK or non-response answer, but a response that does not align with the relevant values of this study. Because of this, it is necessary to evaluate the determinants of the excluded responses within the selection model. There are two versions of the Heckman model with two separate selection models but the same outcome model. The first version of the selection model includes the standard variables of news interest, age, and gender while the second version of the selection model adds the "US respect" and "Stranger in country" variables, which I explain in the next section.[39] News interest will be included in the selection model but excluded from the outcome model of the Heckman probit, following the suit of the Heckman models in previous chapters.[40] See Table C.1 in the appendix for the standard probit model.

This model includes several independent variables to evaluate the attitudinal values and individual characteristics that correlate with TPP issue importance. To evaluate whether the respondent feels like a stranger in their own country, the model uses a four-point Likert scale.

[39]As explained in previous chapters and explored in this chapter, these three values (age, news interest, and gender) have the most consistent effect on survey outcomes and are orthogonal. The selection model excludes education because it has a relatively weak effect and education measures are categorical rather than ordinal, muddying the selection model. The study evaluates the additional attitudinal variables in a second model. This is a robustness check to determine how these attitudes affect the model.

[40] To evaluate news and government interest, a four-point Likert scale evaluating interest in government and political affairs is used. The lowest score indicates that the respondent follows government affairs hardly at all, whereas the highest value indicates that the respondent follows government affairs most of the time. Don't know responses were excluded.

The lowest score indicates that the respondent strongly disagrees with the sentiment that they are a stranger in their own country and the highest value indicates that the respondent strongly agrees with that sentiment. A three-point scale is used to evaluate how the respondent feels about whether the United States is more or less respected by other countries than in the past. The lowest value indicates the respondent believes the United States is more respected; the middle value indicates no change in perceived international respect; and the highest value indicates that the respondent believes the United States is less respected than in the past. Another three-point scale evaluated whether the respondent believes whether life in America is better (the lowest value), about the same (the middle value), or worse (the highest value) than it was fifty years ago. (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018).

Both models included utilize the same set of control variables. The models include six dummy variables that measure the respondents' income brackets[41] and six dummy variables that indicate the respondents' level of education. [42] The models will include a three-point ordinal scale measuring respondents' personal finances in retrospect wherein the lowest value indicates the respondent is better off this year than last year; the middle value indicates the respondent's finances are about the same; and the highest value indicates the respondent's finances are worse than last year. The model also includes a three-point scale measuring the trend of the economy. The lowest value indicates the economy is getting better; the middle value indicates the economy

[41] Individuals with family incomes less than 20,000 dollars a year are marked at the lowest bracket. Individuals with family incomes between 20,000 dollars and 39,999 dollars a year are the next bracket. The next bracket includes individuals with family incomes between 40,000 dollars and 69,999 dollars. The next bracket includes individuals that make between 70,000 dollars and 99,999 dollars. The next bracket represents individuals that make between 100,000 dollars and 149,999 dollars. The highest bracket represents individuals that make more than 150,000 dollars a year (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018).

[42] The lowest bracket includes respondents who haven't completed high school. The next bracket includes respondents who are high school graduates. The next bracket includes individuals with some college education. The next bracket includes individuals with a two-year degree. The next bracket includes individuals with a four-year degree. The highest bracket includes individuals with post-graduate education (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018).

is about the same; and the highest value indicates the economy is getting worse. The study includes a five-point ordinal Likert scale measuring ideology, with the lowest score indicating the respondent is the most liberal and the highest score indicating the respondent is the most conservative. Similarly, the study includes a three-point Likert scale to measure the respondents' party ID, with the lowest value indicating the respondent is associated with the Democratic Party; the middling value indicating the respondent is an independent; and the highest value indicating the respondent is a Republican. The model accounts for age, gender[43], and race, with the latter measured by three separate dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is white, black, or Latino.

[43] While all other variables utilize the 2017 wave of the survey data to evaluate responses, gender data utilizes the data captured in December 2011 wave of the survey. It is unlikely that the time gap between responses makes a sizable difference in the data.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Issue Importance and Correlates of TPP Interest: Results

	Table 4.4. Dependent variable:	
	Likelihood of Saying TPP Is Important (Democracy Fund 2017)	
	(1)	(2)
Selection		
News Interest	0.415*** (.026)	0.375*** (.027)
Age	0.006*** (.002)	0.005** (.0002)
Female	-0.411*** (.040)	-0.369*** (.041)
US Respect		-0.239*** (.032)
Stranger in Country		0.082** (.023)
Constant	-1.219*** (.123)	-0.558** (.159)
Outcome		
US Respect	-0.106*** (0.014)	-0.086*** (0.015)
Stranger in Country	0.064*** (0.010)	0.057*** (0.011)
America Trend	0.004 (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)
Party ID	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.015)
Ideology	0.014 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)
National Economic Trend	0.016 (0.016)	0.015 (0.016)
Personal Finances in Retrospect	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.016)
High School Graduate	-0.135* (0.079)	-0.135* (0.079)
Some College	-0.115 (0.080)	-0.113 (0.081)
2-Year Degree	-0.158* (0.081)	-0.156* (0.081)
4-Year Degree	-0.180** (0.080)	-0.178** (0.081)
Post-Graduate	-0.143* (0.081)	-0.140* (0.081)
Family Income Less than 20k	0.089** (0.040)	0.088** (0.040)
Family Income 20k to 39,999	0.082** (0.032)	0.081** (0.032)
Family Income 40k to 69,999	0.030 (0.029)	0.030 (0.029)
Family Income 70k to 99,999	-0.011 (0.030)	-0.012 (0.030)
Family Income 150k or More	0.021 (0.035)	0.021 (0.034)
Age	0.001* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
White	-0.015 (0.038)	-0.014 (0.038)
Black	0.014 (0.051)	0.014 (0.052)
Hispanic	0.070 (0.054)	0.070 (0.054)
Female	0.028 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.054)
Constant	0.673*** (0.112)	.624*** (0.118)
Observations	4,651 (1669 censored and 2982 observed)	4,507 (1525 censored and 2982 observed)
Log Likelihood	-4,845.056	-4,711.856
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 4.6. Predicted Probability of Saying TPP Membership High Priority by US International Respect (Democracy Fund 2017)



Figure 4.7. Predicted Probability of Saying TPP Membership High Priority by Feeling like a Stranger in own Country (Democracy Fund 2017)



The two Heckman models show similar, albeit not identical results. Across both models, perceptions of international respect towards the United States and the feeling of being a stranger within one's own country were statistically significant. In the outcome model, when moving from the perception that the United States is more respected now than in the past to the

perception that the United States is less respected now than in the past, the likelihood that the respondent will state that TPP membership is a high priority issue drops an average of about 21.5 percentage points from a 61.1 percent likelihood to a 39.6 percent likelihood when holding other values constant.[44] Holding other values constant, moving from strong disagreement to strong agreement in the perception that the respondent is a stranger in his or her own country causes the respondent to be an average of about 19.5 percentage points more likely to indicate that the TPP is a high priority issue – an increase from about 33.8 percent to 53.3 percent likelihood. Collectively, both models support hypotheses 4a and 4b. Additionally, both these values influence the expanded version of the selection model. Feeling that the US is less respected makes the respondent more likely to indicate a neutral feeling to the decision to withdraw from the TPP. Meanwhile, a respondent that feels like they are a stranger within their own country is less likely to indicate such a neutral response. Consequently, hypotheses 4a and 4b are supported by the data.

Hypothesis 3a– that greater levels of family income negatively associated the likelihood that the respondent will indicate that TPP is a high priority issue – does not receive strong support from either version of the selection model. No value in the model is statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis 3a is not supported by the data. Hypothesis 3b – which predicts that greater levels of education will negatively associated with the likelihood of indicating that the TPP is a high priority issue – receives weak support. Relative to respondents without high school diplomas, most respondents with higher levels of education are slightly less likely to indicate that the TPP is a high priority issue. Additionally, within the outcome model, age is positively

[44] Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values approach is not available for Heckman models, so the average case approach for evaluating substantive significance was used instead. Future studies should incorporate the observed values method to Heckman models. See table C.1 in the appendix for standard probit model with the observed values approach.

associated with the likelihood of indicating TPP membership is a high priority. By contrast, gender has no effect on TPP priority within the outcome model. Moreover, within the selection model, older respondents are less likely to indicate a neutral response to the TPP membership question, while women are more likely to issue a neutral response. While the omitted response in this model is different from the "don't know" responses in previous models from earlier chapters, the results are consistent.[45]

Conclusion

When looking at a group of all respondents prior to subdivision by gender, the presence of a DK response option is generally associated with a small, usually positive increase in the mean preference for import limits. However, given that the effect only approaches the statistical significance threshold and because the effect is relatively small, it is not completely necessary that future researchers account for such data skews when analyzing respondents at large. However, there are a few caveats. First, when subdividing the respondents based on different subcategories, the presence of a DK option almost always increased the mean favorability towards foreign import protection. Second, DK response is generally very high among all respondents and among subcategories. Third, face-to-face respondents were excluded from the data in this survey because they were presented with a separate "don't know" option that was applicable to both versions of the question. A future expansion that includes FTF respondents may be invaluable. Overall, including a DK response as a separate categorical variable (when available) in trade opinion research may improve our understanding of mass trade opinion. Trade

[45] See table C.1 in the appendix for a comparative analysis with a standard probit model.

opinion is a substantively important and relatively understudied field in the public opinion literature. Mass attitudes on trade opinion are subcategory of political opinion that, to a large degree, is not overwhelmingly driven by partisan affiliation in the present – though, interestingly, non-opinion may be driven by partisan affiliation. Tracking how non-opinion in trade views shift over time and ensuring methodological consistency surrounding the inclusion (or exclusion) of DK responses will help to enrich the literature's understanding of trade opinion.

On the other hand, women are more strongly and significantly affected by the presence or absence of a DK response option. Women being more susceptive to the presence or absence of DK responses is generally in line with research from the survey methodology literature; however, the partisan discrepancy is fairly novel (Dillman et al. 2002; Francis and Bush 1975; Grabosky et al. 2014; Shen et al. 2018; Young 2012). Throughout the trade opinion literature, gender has frequently been associated with a decrease in favorability towards trade opinion. The survey experiment, in conjunction with the later survey results provided congruent results when TPP was measured both with and without middling responses. This research analysis sheds some new light on these demographic influences and suggests that there may be a methodological explanation for the demographic differences in trade opinion.

The high prevalence of DK responses in surveys only tells a part of the story regarding mass opinion on trade policy. Trade policy is an issue area wherein individuals may present ambivalent and contextualized viewpoints. While the data is not representative of a population at large and should be expanded to a more representative sample, there were several interesting points within the survey data. Most notably, most respondents did not indicate strong preferences between foreign and domestic goods; however, there was a sizable contingency of respondents that preferred to buy American. More interestingly, while there was a sizable minority of

respondents that preferred to buy American goods whenever possible, there was a significantly smaller minority of respondents that believed American good were of higher quality. This nuance, in conjunction with the large number of respondents who indicated neutral or contingent responses suggests that there may be a degree of ambivalence towards trade policy that is not captured in traditional trade policy survey item questions.

When analyzing the role that attitudinal, economic, political, and characteristic variables have on trade engagement, there were several notable findings. Interestingly, neither education nor income had a strong association with trade engagement as was hypothesized. One possible explanation is that news interest is a much stronger explanatory variable for TPP issue importance. News engagement is likely positively colinear with both education and income. Consequently, the hypothesis that individuals with lower income and education when news interest (and other variables) were held constant may have only found weak support because of this aforementioned collinearity.

Additionally, perceptions of international respect and perceptions of being a stranger within one's own country strongly and consistently influenced TPP priority and the likelihood to rate TPP as a high priority issue. Interestingly, the belief that the US is less respected than it was in the past is negatively associated with TPP priority, whereas the feeling that a respondent is a stranger in one's own country is positively associated with TPP engagement. I argue that, when the US is compared to other countries internationally, trade policy has a more internationalist function. In this case, individuals compare the United States to outside countries in a competitive framework. Contrarily, in more domestic frameworks, trade opinion serves as a correlate of more domestic and anti-globalist anxieties.

Chapter 5

Trade Opinion Change from 2011 to 2017

Introduction

Trade policy and its public perceptions were brought to the forefront of American politics between the years of 2015 and 2017. On the policy end, President Obama's signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016 proved to be one of the defining actions in the final year of the Obama administration. With trade policy at the forefront once more, international and governmental institutions presented the economic effects as generally positive for the United States; however, there would be uncertainty how the benefits of the newfound trade liberalization would trickle down to citizens.

The United States International Trade Commission (USITC), in May of 2016, modeled that the adoption of the TPP would expand employment by 128,000 full-time jobs by 2032 – a small, but not insignificant employment expansion. In terms of real income, the USITC predicted that the TPP would expand real wages for laborers by .19% by 2032 with virtually no difference in the expected real wage increase between unskilled and skilled laborers (.18% versus .19% respectively). The International Trade Commission's prediction on the effects on GDP was similarly small. By 2032, the USITC predicted that the TPP would expand the United States' GDP by 42.7 billion dollars, or a marginal 0.15 percent increase relative to the expected economic baseline for 2032 (Signoret et al. 2016). Comparatively, the World Bank predicted significantly more positive, albeit still modest economic results for signatories of the TPP with few predicted negative outcomes. The World Bank predicted that the adoption of the TPP would increase TPP members' GDP by an average of 1.1 percent by 2030 – with a sizable range from .4 percent to 10 percent. In terms of sectoral output, the World Bank concurred with the USITC that the TPP would not disproportionately benefit American unskilled or skilled labor sectors as both

would see very modest and relatively equal growth (World Bank 2016). Collectively, the economic predictions largely concurred on the same central premise: the economic impact of the TPP on the American economy and American workers would be small, veering on irrelevant. Most prominently, the economic impact was largely either positive or, at the very least, not harmful.

However, policy is separate from politics and 2016 was a presidential election year for the United States. On both sides of the political spectrum, populist leaders were diverging from the mainstream to express their distaste for the United States' incorporation into the new free trade framework. Sanders counteracted the claims made by the World Bank and USITC, claiming that TPP would cause the United States to lose jobs to foreign competition. Moreover, Sanders proclaimed that the adoption of the TPP would lead to the decline of manufacturing jobs, citing that manufacturing jobs were lost as a result of NAFTA, Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China, and the Korea Free Trade agreement (Sanders 2015). By contrast, the USITC projected that the changes to employment for manufacturing sectors would be largely marginal. Only employees in leather products and electronic equipment saw sizable declines in employment – a 1.5 percent and .8 percent drop relative to baseline by 2032. All other manufacturing sectors saw marginal effects relative to the expected baseline levels by 2032. Moreover, Sanders framed the TPP as a deal intended to expand the power of multi-national corporations against the will of unions, American laborers, and environmental groups.

> Large, multi-national corporations that have outsourced millions of good paying American jobs to China, Mexico, Vietnam, India and other low-wage countries think the TPP is a great idea. They understand that this legislation will allow them to accelerate efforts to hire cheap labor abroad. The TPP is also strongly supported by Wall Street and

large pharmaceutical companies who believe their global profits will increase if this agreement is passed (Sanders 2015).

For Sanders, TPP and other similar international trade policies are not just about economic specifics. International trade policies like the TPP provide multi-national corporations with the power to shape national economies into their interest. Sanders' populist messaging shows that trade policy is just as much about trust as it is about numbers. While NAFTA, PNTR with China, and the TPP were all passed under Democratic presidents, favorability towards protectionist measures had been common among the American left, particularly among labor unions such as the AFL-CIO (AFL-CIO 2019). Presenting a leftist populist message, Sanders branded the TPP as a product of the corporations and Democratic elites against the interests of the common laborer. Similarly, Trump seized upon this populist discordance; however, the effort to use trade policy as a wedge issue was more theoretically difficult. Trade liberalization has classically been an element of economically conservative neoliberalism (DeMint, 2015). That said, in accordance with the number of free trade agreements passed under both Republican and Democratic administrations, Williamson proposed the concept of the "Washington Consensus" of bipartisan support for a pro-free trade neoliberal agenda (Williamson, 1990). A similar concept of broader consensus was proposed as the "no-brainer" consensus during the legislative push for NAFTA, as the majority of experts supported free trade; however, this expert-level consensus was undermined by broader opposition to NAFTA among congressional Democrats and trade unions. Specifically, there was a broad consensus among technocrats that even if economic globalization had unfavorable economic effects for the poor, the push towards globalization was inevitable (Frank, 2016). Thus, while Sanders had the support of liberal groups

for his divergence from the bipartisan consensus, Trump still had the ability to frame himself as an outsider against the pro-free trade agenda of Washington.

Trump attacked the "Washington Consensus" as an effort by ignorant political elites to undermine the economic prosperity of the American people. Similarly to Sanders, Trump framed the adoption of the TPP as an effort to destroy American manufacturing while simultaneously supporting the economic ventures of foreign "currency cheaters" (Trump 2016).

> We allowed foreign countries to subsidize their goods, devalue their currencies, violate their agreements and cheat in every way imaginable, and our politicians did nothing about it. Trillions of our dollars and millions of our jobs flowed overseas as a result. I have visited cities and towns across this country where one-third or even half of manufacturing jobs have been wiped out in the last 20 years. Today, we import nearly $800 billion more in goods than we export. We can't continue to do that. This is not some natural disaster, it's a political and politician-made disaster. Very simple. And it can be corrected and we can correct it fast when we have people with the right thinking. Right up here. It is the consequence… It is the consequence of a leadership class that worships globalism over Americanism. This is a direct affront to our founding fathers, who — America wanted to be strong. They wanted this country to be strong. They wanted to be independent and they wanted it to be free. Our founding fathers understood trade much better than our current politicians, believe me (Trump 2016).

Several elements are immediately remarkable about Trump's framing of trade policy prior to 2016 and the passage of the TPP. First, Trump frames trade policy as cheating – foreign governments are cheating by manipulating currency to expand their exports and the *Washington Consensus* is similarly cheating American manufacturing. Second, Trump connects conservatism

to opposition to trade policy, suggesting that adherence to the founding principles of America would lead to policy that more directly favors American manufacturing. Thus, even though free trade is traditionally an element of economic conservative neoliberalism, Trump presents opposition to trade as an element of traditional conservatism. Third, in a similar vein to the appeal to traditional American values, Trump frames modern free trade policy as a catastrophe caused by the elites that could be solved by simpler and more traditional policymaking. Fourth, Trump presents a dichotomy: the support of globalism versus the support of Americanism. By presenting this dichotomy, Trump rejects the neoliberal assertion that open trade policy is mutually beneficial to all participants. Consequently, trade policy that protects American labor and manufacturing helps make the country stronger and more independent. Finally, Trump asserts that the trade deficit is problematic, arguing the need to export more and/or import less to further the goal of economic independence.

Design and Hypotheses

Collectively, the period between 2011 and 2017 serves as a focal point for trade policy. In 2015 and 2016, the development and signing of the TPP made trade policy a major issue for the first time since NAFTA. Populist segments of both the Republican and Democratic Party rejected the adoption of the TPP. Both Sanders and Trump, as presidential candidates, made opposition to trade orthodoxy and the "Washington Consensus" central elements of their campaigns (Williamson 1990). Then, soon after taking office in 2017, Trump withdrew from the TPP in January of 2017 as one of his first major presidential actions. Thus, under this time frame, trade policy became much more salient at both the policy and political level. While the economic effects of the TPP were marginal, the backlash to its adoption and populist politicians' framing of its effects are more relevant to public opinion of policy issues. With the context that trade

policy is a typically low-salience issue with complicated ideological associations, it is important to study how opinion towards trade policy changed during this period because it broadens our understanding of how mass attitudes change in response to changes in political messaging and changes in policymaking.

To better understand how individuals change their views towards trade policy during this period of time, the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group panel study survey will be utilized to evaluate shifts in trade opinion between the years of 2011 and 2017. Respondents express their opinions towards trade policy at three points in time: 2011, 2016, and 2017. These three points are important because they will indicate respondents' views on trade policy at a baseline level in 2011 when trade policy was not salient and there were no major party leaders attacking the "Washington Consensus" on trade policy. At the 2016 time point, the data will show how those same respondents view trade policy in the context of the enactment of the TPP and populist efforts to renege on the trade agreement (Williamson 1990). Finally, in 2017, respondents' views towards trade policy will show how opinion had shifted in response to the abandonment of the TPP by President Trump. One limitation of this study is that it does not show how opinions towards trade change in response to the 2018 trade war between the United States and China. If possible, future expansions should include this time period.

In this context, there are several elements to explore when analyzing how trade opinion changes over time. This study will present data in two ways. First, this analysis will use descriptive statistics to show how differing groups changed their views on trade over time. Second, this study will include more expansive multivariate models to evaluate which variables are the strongest determinants of opinion change between 2011 and 2017. With that context, all

hypotheses presented here will relate to the multivariate models; however, the descriptive data will still be analyzed.

Most immediately, it is necessary to study how partisanship and ideology influence how trade opinion changes over time. Given that Trump won both the Republican primary and the 2016 general election, it is expected that Republican respondents are the most likely to shift their views to become more opposed to trade policy between 2011 and 2017. Conversely, because Obama signed the TPP in 2016 and presented pro-free trade elite messaging, Democrats, as a whole, will become more supportive of free trade policy between 2011 and 2017. That said, partisan differences will not fully explain shifts and divergences in trade opinion during this time period. Because Bernie Sanders similarly attacked the "Washington Consensus" on trade policy, it is necessary to examine trends based on 2016 primary voting patterns.

Hypothesis 1: Republican respondents (in 2011) will become increasingly more opposed to free trade between 2011, 2016, and 2017 when compared to Democrats and independents. Conversely, Democratic respondents (in 2011) will become increasingly supportive of free trade policy between 2011, 2016, and 2017.

When examining the influences of change in trade opinion, it is insufficient to only examine partisanship and elite messaging as the basis for understanding why individuals shift their position on trade issues. As mentioned previously, both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party presented populist challenges to free trade orthodoxy. It is also necessary to examine ideological reasons for variation. Ideology will be evaluated in two ways: first, as a spectrum from liberal to conservative and second, as an evaluation of the respondents' views towards government regulation. It is expected that ideological evaluations of the role that government should have in regulating the economy will play a more substantive role in

determining which individuals are most likely to shift their positions on trade. Both support of free trade and opposition to government regulation are elements of conservative neoliberal economic orthodoxy (Busch 2012). By comparison, social conservatives were not as widely supportive of free trade due to occasional moralistic concerns, such as trade policy with authoritarian regimes (Bauer 1996; Busch 2012). Consequently, as a result of changes in conservative messaging following Trump's ascendancy into the Republican Party, protectionism no longer became antithetical to anti-regulatory economic conservatism so long as it helped the United States and its workers. Consequently, individuals who are most supportive of decreasing government intervention will be more likely to shift their views towards opposing free trade.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents (in 2011) who support decreasing government regulation will be more opposed to free trade between 2011, 2016, and 2017 when compared to respondents who want more government intervention or who believe that the current amount of government regulation should be maintained.

It is also important to evaluate how demographic characteristics and news interest influence change in trade opinion. The free trade literature shows that individuals with higher levels of education are consistently more supportive of free trade policy (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Johnston, 2013; Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). As trade policy became more salient during this time frame from 2011 through 2017, it is expected that views towards free trade will continue to diverge. Both Sanders and Trump portrayed free trade as economically hostile towards unskilled workers; however, education is a direct measure of higher skill. Therefore, because this time period increased the salience of trade policy and because higher skilled workers benefit more from open trade, more educated

respondents should be more likely to be supportive of trade policy in contrast to the increasing populist hostility towards free trade (Kapstein 1999; Ohlin 1967; Rodrick 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). By contrast, individuals with higher levels of news interest (when controlled for other variables), should generally be more inclined to oppose free trade over this period in response to the increasing political opposition to free trade policy.

Hypothesis 3: Highly educated respondents (in 2011) will become increasingly more supportive of free trade policy between 2011, 2016, and 2017. By contrast, less educated respondents (in 2011) will become increasingly less supportive of free trade policy between 2011, 2016, and 2017.

Hypothesis 4: Highly politically interested respondents will become less supportive of free trade policy between 2011, 2016, and 2017 when compared to less politically interested respondents.

Both Trump and Sanders also made numerous appeals to the manufacturing sector, arguing that the open trade policies of the TPP and similar policies under previous administrations were harmful to American manufacturers. If the H-O model is applicable to shifts in trade policy over a time period, individuals from areas with greater manufacturing sectors (as a proportion of the total local economy) will become more opposed to trade policy as trade policy becomes more salient and more major politicians argue for protectionism (Kapstein 1999; Ohlin 1967; Rodrick 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). By contrast, respondents from areas with larger trade sectors will shift their views to be more supportive of free trade, because the economic benefits of open trade are more readily present.

Hypothesis 5: Respondents from areas with larger manufacturing industries as a proportion of the local economy at baseline levels will be more likely to shift their opinion towards opposing free trade.

Hypothesis 6: Respondents from areas with larger combined trade industries (wholesale and retail) as a proportion of the local economy at baseline levels will be more likely to shift their opinion towards supporting free trade.

Finally, it is necessary to expand the scope of trade opinion beyond simply measuring whether a respondent supports or opposes free trade. It is also necessary to understand whether a respondent has an opinion about trade policy and what variables cause respondents to develop opinions on trade over this time period. With that in mind, it is expected that news interest will be the primary determinant of whether a respondent develops a binary opinion on trade policy from 2011 through 2017. However, news interest may differently influence whether a respondent has a binary opinion on trade policy. Individuals with high degrees of news interest may be more likely to develop an opinion on trade policy because trade policy became more salient during this time period. Alternatively, individuals with high degrees of news interest may be more likely to issue a non-opinion over this time because Trump and Sanders politicized the negative effects of trade policy. Consequently, a non-opinion may reflect ambivalence towards trade policy. However, given that respondents with more news interest tend to respond more to trade questions, it is likely that higher news interest will be associated, on average, with a stronger shift towards providing an opinion.

Hypothesis 7: Greater levels of news will cause respondents to issue fewer non-opinion responses on trade policy questions between 2011, 2016, and 2017.

Data and Methods

To evaluate shifts in trade opinion, the 2018 Democracy Fund Voter Study Group panel survey is utilized. The study analyzes the same panel of respondents at three periods: 2011, 2016, and 2017. The total number of observations is 6357 for the 2016 values and 4748 for the 2017 values. This analysis evaluates whether the respondent supports expanding free trade to other countries between two time periods: between 2011 and 2016 and between 2011 and 2017. This study uses three separate dependent variables to evaluate change in trade opinion during this time period. These variables are used to model both the 2011 through 2016 analysis and the 2011 through 2017 analysis. The first measure presents non-opinion as a neutral value between opposition and support. Thus, the first trade change variable is a five-point scale from -2 to +2, with negative values indicating a shift towards opposing trade and positive values indicating a shift towards supporting trade. [46] The second measure excludes non-opinion answers. The second measure of trade change is a three-point scale from -1 to +1.[47] The third measure to evaluate trade change measures whether the respondent developed an opinion or stopped having an opinion on trade policy between the two time periods. The third measure of trade change is a three-point scale from -1 to +1, with positive values measuring a shift towards having an opinion while negative values measure the opposite.[48] Methodologically, to evaluate the influences on

[46] A score of -2 indicates that a respondent was previously supportive of free trade and later opposes it. A score of -1 indicates that a respondent was previously supportive of free trade and later issued a "don't know" opinion or that the respondent previously issues a DK response and later opposed free trade. A score of 0 indicates no change between the two periods. A score of +1 indicates that the respondent previously opposed free trade and later issued a DK or the respondent previously issued a DK and later expressed support for free trade. A score of +2 indicates that the respondent previously opposed free trade and later supported free trade.

[47] A score of -1 indicates that the respondent previously supported free trade and later opposed it. A score of 0 indicates no change among the respondent. A score of +1 indicates that the respondent previously opposed free trade and later supported it.

[48] A score of -1 indicates that the respondent previously registered a binary opinion (either support or opposition) towards free trade and later issued a non-opinion. A score of 0 indicates no change between the two periods. A score of +1 indicates that the respondent previously had a non-opinion on trade policy and later registered a binary opinion.

these three dependent variables, multiple multivariate OLS regressions will be conducted for both the 2011 through 2016 period and the 2011 through 2017 period.[49] Additionally, descriptive data will be presented to demonstrate changes in opinion among multiple groups across these time periods. The descriptive data will include supplemental data from the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) study, which include 5464 and 1851 applicable observations, respectively. The ANES data will evaluate respondents' feelings about placing new limits on imports to protect American jobs. While the ANES data is not a time series like the DFVSG data, it will provide additional support and analysis.

Several independent variables will be included the multivariate models. First, the models will measure respondents' feelings in 2011 about whether there is too much, the right amount, or too little government regulation as a three-point scale. Respondents who believe that there is too much regulation receive the highest score, while respondents who believe that there is too little regulation receive the lowest score. Additionally, the models will measure the respondents' change in opinion about government regulation between 2011 and 2016 or between 2011 and 2017 as a five-point scale.[50] The respondents' partisanship and ideology at the 2011 level are included as independent variables. The models measure the respondents' partisanship as a 3-point variable (measured from Democrat to independent to Republican). The models measure the respondents' ideology as a 5-point variable (measured from very liberal to very conservative).

[49] While an ordered model is possible here (particularly for the model that tracks change and includes DK as a midpoint), multiple OLS models are clearer for demonstrating absolute change in opinion of this period. The three models should be examined collectively given concerns about the validity of measuring DK as a midpoint within the model that does so.

[50] The five-point government regulation opinion change scale is structured the same way as the previous scales measuring change between two points in time. A negative value indicates a movement towards favoring more government regulation whereas a positive value indicates a moment towards favoring less government regulation.

The multivariate OLS models use localized industry data from the American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year 2011-2016 data set. Because the 5-year ACS data is limited to 2011 through 2016, only the models that evaluate the change in trade opinion between 2011 and 2016 will utilize local industry data. This analysis examines three industrial sectors: manufacturing, wholesale trade, and resale trade. Manufacturing is measured separately; however, wholesale trade and resale trade sectors are combined. The ACS 5-year data provides ZIP code-level data indicating the percentage of the local area's economy that is controlled by a certain economic sector. The ZIP code data is then merged with the respondent data based on the respondents' 2011 ZIP code.

The model will include the respondents' news interest at the 2011 level as a four-point scale, with greater values indicating more news interest. Additionally, the models will include six education categories, each separated as an individual dummy variable.[51] The respondents' 2011-level personal finances in retrospect will be measured as a three-point scale. Additionally, the respondents' 2011 view of the national economic trend will be measured as a three-point scale. The lowest value indicates that the respondent believed that the economy was getting better in 2011 and the highest value indicates that the respondent believed the economy was getting worse in 2011. In accordance with previous models that measure non-opinion, gender and age (measured at 2011 levels) will also be included.

[51] The six education categories are as follows: Not a high school graduate, high school graduate, some college, 2-year degree, 4-year degree, and post-graduate.

Descriptive Data





Figure 5.1a (the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2011-2017 data) visualizes illustrates change in trade opinion across the three years among all respondents who were included in the original 2011 wave of the survey. All respondents that were added to the survey after 2011 were excluded. It is important to note that while 2011 and 2016 have similar number of submitted responses (7970 observations versus 7993 observations, respectively), 2017 has significantly fewer submitted responses at 5963 observations. Figure 5.1a demonstrates that the largest shift in opinion occurs between 2016 and 2017, where support for free trade increases by over 13 percent. Additionally, respondents in 2017 were less opposed to free trade policy and

issued fewer DK responses. By 2017, while DK responses overall had dropped by about 3 percentage points, opposition to free trade had dropped more substantively by about ten percentage points. Comparatively, when assessed as a whole, shifts in trade opinion between 2011 and 2016 are much more stable. Figure 5.1b corroborates the results using ANES 2012 and 2016 data, showing that, taken as a whole, views on trade policy among all respondents was stable between 2012 and 2016. That said, the ANES data indicates that trade opinion among American respondents is complicated, as a plurality of respondents both support expanding trade to new countries and support foreign import limits. That said, more respondents express a non-opinion on foreign import limits.

Figure 5.2a. Support for Trade versus Party ID by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Figure 5.2b. Support for Import Limits versus Party by Year (ANES 2012–2016)



Figure 5.2a illustrates changes in trade support the three time periods with the respondents subdivided by party when using the DFVSG 2011-2017 data. In accordance with the data visualized in Figure 5.1a, respondents in 2017, regardless of party affiliation, consistently became more supportive than in either 2016 or 2011. See Figures D.1a, D.1b, D.1c, and D.1d in the appendix for shifts in non-opinion during this time. Figure 5.2a demonstrates that partisan differences regarding trade policy are small but present between 2011 and 2017. At the 2011 and 2016 levels, support for free trade was almost indistinguishable between independents and Republicans; however independent gradually converge closer towards Democrats by 2017. Between 2011 and 2016, support for free trade diminished among Republicans and Independent, but increased among Democrats. Among the ANES 2012 and 2016 data (Figure 5.2b), we see consistent trend. Democrats become less supportive of import limits while Republicans become increasingly supportive, indicating that Republicans became increasingly accepting of protectionist policy during this time frame.

Figure 5.3a. Support for Trade versus 2016 Primary Support by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Using the DFVSG data, Figure 5.3a measures respondents' support towards trade policy dependent on their support in the 2016 Republican primary election. The three subdivisions are among Trump supporters, other voters in the Republican primary, and all other respondents who did not vote in the Republican primary. Given that the data is based on 2016 primary support, there are likely some respondents who are grouped in the "all else" category who would qualify as Republicans. Most notably, voters who voted for a candidate other than Trump in the Republican primary are consistently the most supportive of free trade across 2011, 2016, and 2017. At the 2011 level, Trump supporters are more distant from Republicans who would eventually support a candidate other than Trump on trade issues than they are from other voters. The gap in support for trade policy is consistent and substantial among GOP voters across all three time periods. In 2016, all voters who voted in the Republican primary, regardless of candidate, decreased in their support for trade relative to their 2011 levels while all other respondents increased their support. See Figures D.2a and D.2b in the appendix for more information on trade opposition and trade non-opinion among Trump Republicans.

Figure 5.3b. Support for Trade versus 2016 Primary Support by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Using the DFVSG data, Figure 5.3b measure respondents' opinion towards trade policy based on their chosen candidate in the 2016 Democratic primary election. The three subdivisions

are among Sanders supporters, other voters in the Democratic primary, and all other respondents who did not vote in the Democratic primary. At the 2011 level, later Sanders voters are the least supportive of free trade policy at about 53%, which is about 5 points lower than later Trump supporters during this time period. Unlike Trump primary supporters, Sanders supporters slightly increased their support for free trade between 2011 and 2016. By 2017, supporters of Sanders in the 2016 primary had converged with other Democrats on trade policy. See Figures D.2c and D.2d in the appendix for further information on opposition and non-opinion change among Sanders Democrats.

Figure 5.4a. Support for Trade versus Regulation by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Figure 5.4b. Support for Import Limits versus Ideal Amount of Government Regulation of Business by Year (ANES 2012–2016)



The DFVSG data (Figure 5.4a) demonstrates change in trade opinion subdivided by respondents' feelings towards government regulation of businesses in the economy. At the 2011 level, individuals who express that there is too much regulation are the most supportive of free trade, while respondents who believe that there is too little regulation are the least supportive of free trade. However, by 2016, respondents that believe there is too much regulation in the economy and respondents who believe there is too little regulation in the economy converge while respondents who support the status quo become the most supportive. By 2017, respondents who believe there is too much, too little, or enough regulation converge on their views about trade policy and become virtually indistinguishable. The ANES 2012-2016 data corroborates this assessment. Respondents were grouped by their ideal preference for the amount of government regulation in the economy. The descriptive data indicates that, at the 2012 levels, there was more ideological consistency between views on government regulation in business and views on protectionism; however, by 2016, respondents who wanted a high amount government regulation of business converged with respondents who wanted a low amount of government regulation in business. Counterintuitively, respondents who wanted a medium amount of government regulation in business were the least supportive of import limits across both time periods. See Figures D.3a, D.3b, D.3c, and D.3d in the appendix for more information about shifts in opposition and non-opinion during this time.

Figure 5.5. Support for Trade versus Education by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Compared to partisan and ideology differences, there is a larger divergence between respondents based on education in the DFVSG data. Across the three time periods, respondents with some college education are between 15 and 19 points more supportive of free trade when compared to their counterparts without college education. However, this difference converges slightly in 2016 and 2017 when compared to 2011 levels. This convergence is even more visible regarding opposition to free trade expansion. See Figures D.4a and D.4b in the appendix for more information about shifts in opposition and non-opinion when divided by education levels.

Results

	Table 5.1. Trade Change 2011 to 2016 (Democracy Fund). Dependent variable:		
	Trade Change (all)	Trade Change (no DK)	Trade Change (DK)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Government Regulation (2011)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.021** (0.009)	-0.017* (0.010)
Party ID (2011)	-0.045*** (0.017)	-0.020* (0.010)	0.003 (0.011)
Ideology (2011)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.017** (0.009)
News Interest (2011)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.020* (0.011)
High School Graduate (2011)	-0.176** (0.081)	-0.086* (0.049)	-0.044 (0.051)
Some College (2011)	-0.171** (0.081)	-0.080 (0.049)	-0.016 (0.051)
2-year (2011)	-0.194** (0.085)	-0.088* (0.052)	-0.026 (0.053)
4-year (2011)	-0.214*** (0.081)	-0.102** (0.049)	-0.037 (0.051)
Post-grad (2011)	-0.183** (0.083)	-0.084* (0.050)	-0.020 (0.052)
Economic Trend Evaluation (2011)	0.019 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.010)
Age (2011)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Female (2011)	0.033 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.013)
Constant	0.544*** (0.111)	0.239*** (0.070)	0.131* (0.070)
Observations	6,357	4,106	6,357
R^2	0.016	0.011	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.008	0.003
Residual Std. Error	0.814 (df = 6344)	0.396 (df = 4093)	0.511 (df = 6344)
F Statistic	8.401*** (df = 12; 6344)	3.727*** (df = 12; 4093)	2.711*** (df = 12; 6344)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors are not robust.		

Table 5.1 demonstrates the influences of shift in trade opinion between 2011 and 2017 among the same panel of respondents. The dependent variable in submodel 1 demonstrates total levels of change in support for free trade among the panel that includes DK opinions as a median point. Positive values are associated with shifts towards support or DK responses while negative

values are associated with shifts towards opposition or DK responses. The dependent variable in submodel 2 demonstrates levels of change in support for free trade but excludes respondents who issued a DK response in either period. Submodel 3's dependent variable measures shifts trade from a DK response to a directional opinion (either support or opposition) or vise versa. Positive values indicate a shift towards having an opinion while negative values indicate a shift towards non-opinion.

In general, both the submodels that include and exclude DK opinions appear to be similar with some changes; however, the submodel that only evaluates shifts between opinions and non-opinions shows inconsistent effects. Between 2011 and 2016, the factors that influenced directional change (as expressed in submodels 1 and 2) in opinion on trade policy at a statistically significant level were: baseline-level views on government regulation in business, baseline level party ID, baseline news interest, and education. On government regulation, respondents who wanted less government regulation in business became increasingly opposed to free trade. This also had a small effect on shift towards having an opinion in general. Similarly, respondents who were more Republican also became increasingly opposed to free trade between 2011 and 2016. Thus, hypotheses 1 and 2, that Republicans and respondents who support less regulation and business will both be increasingly oppositional to free trade are supported with regards to the 2011 to 2016 time frame. Respondents who shifted to affiliate more with the Republican Party also became more oppositional to free trade between 2011 and 2016; however, this effect only approached significance when DK responses are excluded (submodel 2). Moreover, party identification does not shift whether the respondent move towards or away from having an opinion. Interestingly, more conservative respondents were more likely to change towards expressing a DK opinion during this time frame as demonstrated in submodel 3.

Respondents with greater levels of baseline news interest consistently expressed greater opposition to free trade between 2011 and 2016. Surprisingly, respondents with more news interest were more likely to express a DK opinion; however, this effect only approaches statistical significance. Still, this association seemingly contradicts the expectation of hypothesis 7. That said, it provides some evidence that a DK response may express conflicted opinion in some cases as opposed to non-opinion. For the 2011 to 2016 time frame, hypothesis 4, that respondents with greater news interest at baseline levels will be more oppositional to free trade, is supported. Interestingly, hypothesis 3 – that respondents with more education at baseline levels will be more supportive of free trade – is not only not supported but contradicted. More educated respondents become more oppositional to free trade during to 2011 to 2016 time frame.

Substantively, it is necessary to state that these effects are relatively small as trade views were relatively stable during this period. Using submodel 1 (which measures shift directionally and includes DK responses as a median point), respondents who wanted less government regulation in the economy shifted an average of .096 points against free trade on a 5-point scale compared to respondents who wanted more government regulation when holding all other variables constant (between .033 and .159 points at the 95 percent confidence level). Comparatively, news interest had a slightly stronger but still modest effect. Using submodel 1, respondents with the most news interest shifted an average of .219 points towards greater opposition to free trade policy during this period when all other variables are held constant (between.121 and .317 points at the 95 percent confidence level). Thus, while these shifts are statistically significant, the shifts are modest.

	Table 5.2. Trade Change 2011 to 2017 (Democracy Fund). Dependent variable:		
	Trade Change (all)	Trade Change (no DK)	Trade Change (DK)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Government Regulation (2011)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.045*** (0.010)	0.001 (0.011)
Party ID (2011)	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.012)
Ideology (2011)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.010)
News Interest (2011)	-0.008 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)
High School Graduate (2011)	-0.041 (0.085)	-0.089* (0.052)	0.021 (0.054)
Some College (2011)	-0.085 (0.085)	-0.096* (0.052)	0.014 (0.054)
2-year (2011)	-0.096 (0.090)	-0.127** (0.054)	0.068 (0.057)
4-year (2011)	-0.142* (0.085)	-0.150*** (0.051)	0.048 (0.054)
Post-grad (2011)	-0.133 (0.087)	-0.153*** (0.052)	0.074 (0.055)
Economic Trend Evaluation (2011)	0.073*** (0.017)	0.044*** (0.010)	-0.012 (0.011)
Age (2011)	0.0004 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)
Female (2011)	0.070*** (0.023)	0.032** (0.014)	-0.008 (0.015)
Constant	0.332*** (0.120)	0.265*** (0.073)	0.095 (0.076)
Observations	4,748	3,272	4,748
R^2	0.017	0.025	0.010
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.022	0.007
Residual Std. Error	0.765 (df = 4735)	0.370 (df = 3259)	0.484 (df = 4735)
F Statistic	6.806*** (df = 12; 4735)	7.045*** (df = 12; 3259)	3.819*** (df = 12; 4735)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors are not robust.		

The trade opinion change model between 2011 and 2017 is substantially different than the trade opinion change model of 2011 to 2016. This is not surprising given that 2017 saw a dramatic shift in opinion towards trade policy in a single year. Between 2011 and 2017, the most consistent predictors of change in trade opinion were baseline views of government regulation and national economic trend evaluation. Unlike the 2016 model, baseline news interest did not

have any effect on any of the measures of trade opinion change between 2011 and 2017. Respondents who wanted less government regulation in business became more opposed to trade policy between 2011 and 2017, further supporting hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 – that respondents with more education will become increasingly supportive of free trade policy – is contradicted again in the 2011 through 2017 model; however, this is only statistically significant in model 2. More educated respondents at baseline levels became more opposed to free trade policy; however, this is only statistically significant in the submodel that excludes DK responses (submodel 2). Interestingly, respondents with negative baseline evaluations of the national economy are more likely to be supportive of free trade by 2017. The reason for the shift may be due to the politicization of evaluations of the economy in conjunction with the transition into the Trump presidency. Additionally, women are more likely to be supportive of free trade policy by 2017. Finally, similar to the 2011-2016 model, conservatives at baseline are more likely to issue a DK response in 2017.

	Table 5.3. Trade Change 2011 to 2016 with Local Data (Democracy Fund) Dependent variable:		
	Trade Change (All)	Trade Change (no DK)	Trade Change (DK)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trade Percent (2011)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Manufacturing Percent (2011)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Government Regulation (2011)	-0.048*** (0.016)	-0.020** (0.009)	-0.018* (0.010)
Party ID (2011)	-0.044** (0.017)	-0.021** (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)
Ideology (2011)	-0.019 (0.014)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.018** (0.009)
News Interest (2011)	-0.072*** (0.017)	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.018* (0.011)
High School Graduate (2011)	-0.178** (0.081)	-0.089* (0.049)	-0.042 (0.051)
Some College (2011)	-0.169** (0.081)	-0.081 (0.049)	-0.018 (0.051)
2-year (2011)	-0.197** (0.085)	-0.092* (0.052)	-0.027 (0.053)
4-year (2011)	-0.209** (0.081)	-0.100** (0.049)	-0.038 (0.051)
Post-grad (2011)	-0.177** (0.083)	-0.084* (0.050)	-0.020 (0.052)
Economic Trend Evaluation (2011)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.010)
Age (2011)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Female (2011)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)
Constant	0.514*** (0.122)	0.257*** (0.077)	0.106 (0.077)
Observations	6,260	4,039	6,260
R^2	0.017	0.011	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.008	0.004
Residual Std. Error	0.814 (df = 6245)	0.396 (df = 4024)	0.511 (df = 6245)
F Statistic	7.526*** (df = 14; 6245)	3.250*** (df = 14; 4024)	2.618*** (df = 14; 6245)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The results from Table 5.3, which include local industrial data, are largely consistent with the data from Table 5.1, which analyzed change in trade opinion between 2011 and 2016. Mostly notably, hypothesis 5 – that individuals from ZIP codes with higher levels of manufacturing as a percentage of their total industry will become less supportive of free trade– is not only not supported, but contradicted. In fact, respondents from areas with high levels of manufacturing express significantly more support for free trade policy at the 2016 level; however, this effect is only statistically significant in submodel 1 which measures directional change with DK as the midpoint view. Hypothesis 6 – that respondents from ZIP codes (in 2011) with larger trade sector as a proportion of their local economy between 2011 and 2016 will be more supportive of free trade– is not supported. Across all three submodels, respondents from ZIP codes with larger trade sectors had no statistically significant influence on shifts in trade opinion during this period. Collectively, Table 5.3 demonstrates that local economic sectors in 2011 have a weak and inconsistent effect on shifts in trade opinion during this period.[52]

Conclusion

From analyzing changes in voter opinion between 2011 through 2017 using both the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group and American National Election Studies data, several trends became apparent. The first is that most of the shifts in trade opinion during this time were relatively small. While trade policy became a political issue since the 2016 presidential campaign season, protectionist Democrats and free trade Republicans still exist within their respective

[52] Out of sample predictions of this model are a relevant concern. Most relevantly, the process of engaging with these trade questions at an earlier period (2011) may skew the data towards higher levels of issue engagement. Despite this, the greatest change in trade views happened between 2016 and 2017 rather than between 2011 and 2016, indicating that trade views are volatile and susceptible to political changes rather than broader class-based attitude shifts. Still, even though the survey is representative of the broader United States demographically, caution should be used before extrapolating this data outside of the sample, especially because the data demonstrates that trade attitudes can be so volatile.

parties. Additionally, free trade as a broader ideological concept is still generally popular among American respondents, especially during the 2017 period. It is also important to note that while trade opinion changed among subdivisions of respondents, trade opinion did not change much among all respondents 2011 and 2016. In 2017, support for trade saw a sizeable jump. It is possible that this is in response to Trump's choice to abandon the TPP. Overwhelmingly, when looking at the OLS models, most of the variation in trade change is still in the error term.

Second, ideological factors, attitudes, and partisan affiliation were the main driving determinants of trade divergence as opposed to demographic factors. While it was expected that highly educated respondents (at 2011 levels) would become more supportive of free trade while respondents from manufacturing areas (at 2011 levels) would become more opposed to free trade, the opposite was true. Views on government regulation of business were one of the most consistent determinants of change on trade opinion between 2011 and 2017. In 2011 (DFVSG) and 2012 (ANES), there was more apparent consistency between views on regulation and views on trade policy. Respondents who wanted more government regulation of business wanted more protectionism. By contrast, respondents who wanted government to play a smaller role in business wanted less protectionism. However, over this period, respondents who wanted more government intervention in business became more supportive of free trade while respondents who wanted less government intervention became less supportive.

Additionally, partisanship and news interest played a role in shifting respondents' opinions on trade. Especially between 2011 and 2016, respondents who were engaged in the news saw a sizable decline in their support for free trade policy. This is likely due to two things: first, 2016 was a presidential year and political engagement would be higher than usual. Second, both Trump and Sanders attacked free trade policy more than previous candidates in the recent

political era. Thus, candidates presented more negative information about trade to respondents. When examining partisans, Democrats became more supportive of free trade during this period while Republicans became more opposed between 2011 and 2016 – only to become more supportive again in 2017, like other groups. Ideology had a surprising role in the submodels that measures shift towards and away from opinion. In all models, regardless of time frame, conservative respondents were more likely to shift towards not having a trade opinion view. It is possible that Trump's attacks on global trade policy had a slight demobilizing effect among conservatives.

Beyond simply analyzing differences across parties, it is necessary to analyze differences within parties. There is a clear difference on trade policy between Trump Republicans and other Republicans. This gap persisted from 2011 to 2017. Non-Trump Republicans are consistently the most supportive group towards free trade, as is consistent with conservative economic neoliberalism. While Sanders Democrats were initially more protectionist than other Democrats, they gradually converged on trade opinion with other Democrats. What is most important, however, is that these protectionist differences between Trump Republicans and Sanders Democrats and their more mainstream counterparts existed at the 2011 level – prior to both candidates entering the race. Thus, while it is likely that Trump and Sanders shifted their voters in a protectionist direction, these voters previously were more inclined to protectionism than the rest of their co-partisans.

Finally, the data trends provided some indication that, among some respondents, "don't know" responses may not necessarily indicated true non-opinion. Among the same respondents, 3 percent of college-educated respondents shifted towards a DK response between 2011 and 2016. Additionally, between 2011 and 2016, respondents with greater news interest were

marginally more likely to shift to a DK response. These effects are small, but it is typically expected that more educated and more interested respondents would be more likely to develop an opinion, rather than express a non-opinion. Thus, it is possible that among some individuals, a DK response on trade policy expresses a conflicted opinion.

Chapter 6

Local Demographics, Immigration Attitudes, and Trade Opinion

Introduction

As demonstrated in the previous chapters, opinion towards trade policy manifested as a wedge issue that separated populist partisans from establishment figures within their own party. While views on trade policy have changed over time, there are real and conditionally enduring differences that separate mainstream neoliberal conservatives and liberals from their populist, anti-trade counterparts. Additionally, I have argued that attitudes about a changing demographic landscape within the United States trade views. People who have economic anxieties about the shifting demographics of the United States and people who hold more rigid views of American identity tended to be more likely to oppose free trade policy. Invariably, another major policy issue has followed a similar trajectory within the past few election cycles: immigration.

Throughout this chapter, I will examine local demographic and economic variables in conjunction with individual attitudes and identities. While previous chapters indicated that there are political differences on trade policy separating mainstream American partisans from populist partisans, this chapter will analyze a more fundamental question: do individual's views on trade policy have a real connection to the impact of free trade on their community? Furthermore, when we compare economic and demographic local data, economic and immigration attitudes, and both economic and immigrant identities, which of these categories have the strongest influence on forming trade opinion? This project will seek to address this question by constructing a multifaceted approach to examine how economic and immigration factors influence trade opinion through three separate avenues: economic and immigration attitudes; immigrant and trade union identities; and local unemployment, immigration, and trade variation. This chapter

will ultimately show that immigration attitudes have the strongest influence on trade opinion. Comparatively, economic and immigrant identities less substantively shift opinion on trade. Finally, local foreign-born demographic trends have a weaker influence on trade attitudes, while economic demographic trends and export variation have to no influence on trade opinion.

Background

Similar to trade policy, immigration policy has also been an inconsistent partisan issue throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Moreover, framing and perception of immigration policy may matter as well. While Obama managed to win large majorities of the Latino vote during the 2008 and 2012 elections, he significantly increased the number of deportations of undocumented immigrants relative to the previous Bush administration. In 2011, Pew Research showed that only 41 percent of Latinos knew that the Obama administration had increased the number of undocumented immigrant deportations relative to the George W. Bush administration – with 36 percent of respondents indicating that there were about the same number of deportations and 10 percent of respondents indicating that there were fewer deportations. While disapproval of Obama's immigration policy was high among Latinos (59% disapproval overall) – it was especially high among Latinos who could correctly identify that the Obama administration had, in fact, increased the number of deportations of undocumented immigrants. It is important to note that, as per this report, only 33% of Latinos identified immigration policy as an extremely important issue – less than jobs, education, health care, taxes, or the federal budget deficit (Pew Research 2011). This report demonstrates several characteristics about immigration policy. First, like trade policy, it is a lower salience issue. Second, actual immigration policy – at least during 2011 – did not necessarily follow partisan lines, as Obama had a functionally stricter policy than his Republican predecessor. Third, partisan alignments and partisan perceptions may not

necessarily reflect the reality of how policy is enacted. As more overtly demonstrated throughout the Trump administration, immigration policy, like trade policy, is processed and analyzed through symbols and perceptions of how the country should operate in an international scope.

While immigration policy was inconsistently partisan within the first two presidencies of 21st century, the Trump presidency and the accompanying political era helped to polarize both immigration policy preferences and perceptions of the extent to which illegal immigration was a problem. In 2019, the Pew Research center demonstrated a sizeable partisan discrepancy when asked whether they believed most immigrants entered the United States legally. While about three quarters of all immigration to the United States was legal and documented, only 36 percent of Republicans believed that most immigrants were living in the United States legally in contrast to the 47 percent of Republicans who believed that most immigrants in the United States resided illegally. By contrast, 54 percent of Democrats were able to correct identify that most immigrants were living in the United States legally while 36 percent of Democrats stated that they believed that most immigrants lived in the United States illegally. However, while there were sizable, but not overwhelming, differences in the partisan gap about the extent of illegal immigration within the United States, there is also a demonstrable racial and ethnic gap on this issue – one that does follow along typical race-based partisan alignments. Forty-eight percent of whites were able to correctly identify that more immigrants existed within the United States legally, while 38 percent believed, incorrectly, that most immigrants were residing in the country illegally. By contrast, 59 percent of Latinos believed that most immigrants in the U.S. were residing illegally compared to the 33 percent of respondents who answered correctly. Somewhat ironically, while more Republicans issued a DK response to this question than Democrats (17 percent to 10 percent respectively), only 8 percent of Latinos issued a DK response on this question relative to 15

percent of whites (Gramlich 2019). Taken together, while there is a sizable and counterintuitive racial and ethnic gap on this factual question, it is unavoidable that there is a demonstrable partisan gap in the ability to correctly identify a fact about immigration trends within America.

While the there is a clear partisan discrepancy on facts about immigration, there is an even more pronounced partisan division among policy preferences towards immigration that has exacerbated during the Trump era. Among these policy issues, the most prominently polarized immigration symbol was none other than support for a border wall or fencing between the United States and Mexico. As per the Cato Institute aggregation of public opinion surveys, between 2007 and 2013, there was stable public support for a border barrier – with slightly more respondents supporting some form of border barrier than opposing it. However, from 2014 through 2018, overall public support for a border wall drops precipitously. Moreover, support for a barrier between the United States and Mexico became increasingly partisan between 2005 and 2019. In 2005, 52 percent of Democrats and 58 percent of Republicans supported a border barrier as per an aggregate of public opinion polls. Throughout the next decade, Republican support for a border barrier gradually increases; but Democratic support for a border barrier drops precipitously as soon as Donald Trump makes the issue a central campaign issue (Ekins, 2019).

When evaluating views of immigration overall, similar partisan trends become apparent. When looking at support for increasing or decreasing immigration broadly among the American electorate, Gallup shows support for increasing immigration levels has increased substantively between 1965 and 2019. The percentage of respondents who support the present immigration levels and desire a decrease in immigration levels remains relatively constant over the course of the decades. Thirty-nine percent of respondents desired the status quo level in 1965 and 37

percent of respondents desired the status quo in 2019. By contrast, 33 percent of respondents wanted a decrease in immigration levels in 1965 while 31 percent of respondents wanted a decrease in immigration levels in 2019 – with very sizeable increases in support for decreased immigration during the 1990s. The percentage of respondents who wanted an increase in immigration levels was only 7 percent in 1965 and remained stable until 2010. By 2019, support for an increase in immigration increased dramatically to 30 percent support among American respondents (Norman 2019). The Pew Research Center further expands on this, indicating that change in support for immigration has a partisan dimension. In 2006, as per the Pew Research Center, support for increasing or decreasing immigration levels was not substantially partisan. Forty-three percent of Republicans supported decreasing legal immigration while 37 percent of Democrats held the same views; 38 percent of Republicans wanted immigration levels to stay the same while 36 percent of Democrats wanted legal immigration to remain at status quo levels; and 15 percent of Republicans and 20 percent of Democrats wanted legal immigration levels to increase (Pew Research Center 2018).

By 2018, support for increasing legal immigration levels increased among respondents from both parties; however, the change was much more prominent among Democrats. By 2018, 40 percent of Democrats and 22 percent of Republicans supported increasing legal immigration levels. Support for decreasing immigration levels dropped to 33 percent among Republicans and 16 percent among Democrats by 2018. Meanwhile, support for maintaining immigration levels did not change significantly – 39 percent of both Republicans and Democrats supported maintaining legal immigration levels by 2019 (Pew Research Center 2018). Additionally, further evidence shows that that immigration policy was a wedge issue during the 2016 presidential campaign, but it became increasingly partisan in the months after Trump was inaugurated

(Gimpel 2019). Collectively, this demonstrates that attitudes towards immigration levels have a partisan dimension as a result of the Trump era, but one that was mitigated by greater support for increasing immigration levels.

Collectively, Trump tied his support for restricting immigration, expanding the border wall on the Mexican border, and attacking the "Washington Consensus" on trade policy all together as part of his new policy platform – fundamentally changing parts of the previous GOP platform that broadly supported free trade (Cheney and Palmer 2016; Williamson 1990). In conjunction, Trump sought to shift the business-oriented economic policies of the Republican orthodoxy to better serve the American working class, especially given that the white, working class was a crucial segment of the American electorate that helped to deliver the White House to Trump (Tyson and Maniam 2016). Through restrictions to immigration and the expansion of the border wall on the Mexican border in conjunction with renegotiating trade agreements to nominally give preferential treatment to American industries, Trump sought to use the powers of the presidency to make the labor market more secure and financially prosperous for the American worker (Peters, 2017; Peters, 2020).

Much of the political science literature has focused on whether immigration attitudes are contingent on real world economic factors – including the effects of trade policy. It is important to address the dependent variable used within these analyses. Throughout the body of work that analyzes connections between trade policy, immigration, and immigration attitudes, immigration attitudes are the primary dependent variable (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Goldstein and Peters 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015; Kessler 2001; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Mayda 2006; Peters 2020; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Research evaluating the effect of immigration on foreign trade is

more limited and less behavior-oriented in scope, focusing on the effect that immigrants have on stimulating foreign trade by increasing information flows between the country in which the immigrant works and the immigrant's country of origin (Hatzigeorgiou 2010). With that in mind, there are several ways in trade policy evaluations would differ from evaluations of immigration policy. Most immediately, trade policy evaluations are economic in scope, whereas immigration attitudes are not directly economic policy. Trade policy evaluations are influenced by feelings about the national economy, indicating that individuals evaluate trade policy as a national issue (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). By contrast, immigration is more complex. While immigration policy is nationally oriented and highly centralized in scope, with broad powers granted to the presidency, the effects of immigration policy are much more localized. While import tariffs from protectionist policy may affect industrial sectors and produce a more dispersed effect, immigration policy has a more demonstrable effect on ports of entry.

That aside, the literature that analyzes immigration attitudes through the lens of economic policy, trade policy, and economic conditions has shown several important trends. One of the most controversial proposals within the literature is the labor-market competition (LMC) hypothesis which proposes that the perception of labor market threat influences immigration attitudes. Some studies find broad support for the LMC hypothesis at the aggregate level, showing that threat to the labor market shifts individuals' attitudes against immigration policy (Kessler 2001; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). On the other hand, several studies find weak or inconclusive evidence for the LMC hypothesis when analyzed at the aggregate level (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; McLaren and Johnson 2007). Alternatively, Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo (2013) propose that aggregate analyses of economic threat fail to capture the conditional and localized

nature of the economic threat of immigration. By contrast, while the labor-market competition has received mixed support as an explanation for variation in immigration attitudes, trade policy is more demonstrably economic in its policy is more national in the scope of its outcomes. Therefore, when incorporating immigration into the scope of trade policy, it is possible that this previously weak and inconsistent aggregate-level predictor may be more visible.

While the labor-market competition hypothesis receives mixed support throughout the literature, the literature finds much more consistent support for the argument that immigration threatens individuals' cultural and national identity. This identity-based theory for the explanation of immigration attitudes argues that the prospect of immigration changes the demographic, cultural, and traditional makeup of the country as a greater influx of immigrants move into a new country (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Citrin, Reginold, and Green 1990; Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Kinder and Kam 2009). Invariably, questions of immigration ultimately connect to national conceptions of race and identity. Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) directly engage with the broader question of the contextual role of immigration threat within the United States, proposing that the perceived threat of immigration cannot be sufficiently explained by the costs associated with immigration alone. Instead, Brader, Valentino, and Suhay show that, among white American respondents, the perceived threat of immigration is dependent on where the immigrant is immigrating from – with Latino immigrant priming more anti-immigrant sentiments when the costs of immigration are emphasized when compared European immigrants (Brader, Suhay, and Valentino 2008). Collectively, while economic conditions tend to only provide limited explanation for variation in immigration attitudes, cultural and racial values and perceptions consistently influence views of immigration.

Similarly, many of these evaluations of the cultural identity and immigration attitudes dovetail with the trade literature. Trade policy can often perform a more symbolic role, rather than a purely functional and economic interest-based role (Cohen 2001; Destler and Balint 1999; Mayer 1998; Rankin 2001; Sears 2001). Rankin (2001) proposes that symbols of national identity associated with patriotism, national sovereign autonomy, and cultural identities are all conditionally determinants of trade views. Similarly, in-group and out-group dynamics influence shift individual's views on trade policy, with American individuals seeking to maximize the relative gains for America and, occasionally, desires to financially harm American trade partners while simultaneously providing a benefit for America (Mutz and Kim 2017; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). Trade policy preferences represent a reflection of individual conceptions of national superiority as well as perceptions of whether Americans are the perceived winner or loser within a trade deal (Mutz and Kim 2017). Feelings of national superiority are also generally associated with support of protectionism; however, this association is somewhat inconsistent (Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rouke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Rankin 2001). Consequently, there are theoretical parallels between the cultural and national identity threat explanation of immigration attitudes and the identity and national evaluation-based explanations of trade policy. In both cases, an out-group presents a cultural threat to national identity. Individuals who are more perceptive to those threats are more likely to be opposed to both immigration and trade.

Given the increased politicization of both trade policy and immigration policy and given that both policy issues served as a way for the Trump campaign to differentiate itself from and later reconfigure the orthodox Republican Party platform, it is likely that immigration policy and trade policy are connected issue areas. As demonstrated throughout the literature, both the trade

attitude literature and the immigration attitude have demonstrated convergent explanatory theories, both immigration attitudes and trade policy attitudes are connected to broader anxieties about the changing culture of the United States. However, one of the key points of separation between trade policy and immigration policy is that immigration is more local in the scope of its effects, whereas trade policy is at a broader, more national level. Moreover, it is important to account for the effects of individual identities given the consistent role that identity-based threat plays in shifting immigration attitudes. Consequently, when evaluating the influence of immigration on trade policy attitudes, it is necessary to conceptualize immigration and economic values in three different ways. First, it is necessary to evaluate national and attitudinal immigration and economic sentiments through a national evaluation of the economy and through individual immigration policy preferences. Second, it is necessary to study identity-based characteristics, both economic and ethnic. Third, it is necessary to look at local variation in immigration factors and trade-based factors. Collectively, this multi-faceted approach can provide a more holistic way of understanding how and whether economic, trade, and immigration factors shift trade opinion.

Theory and Hypotheses

To evaluate the influence of these national attitudes, economic and foreign identities, and local economic and immigrant variation, two different years will be analyzed: 2016 and 2018. A few separate, but interrelated, independent variables will be used to measure trade opinion more broadly across of a variety of different policy framings. In 2016, respondents will express their support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership directly while, in 2018, respondents will express whether they support Donald Trump's decision to withdraw from the TPP. Additionally, in 2018, views on trade policy will be measured through individual views towards specific import tariffs.

Because this project seeks to examine the effects of economic and immigrant influences on trade opinion, it is relevant to have dependent variables that more directly capture both the economic and international facets of trade policy. On this front, the TPP is more international in its framing because the issue policy focuses on international cooperation while the economic effects are more nebulous. By contrast, import tariffs are more economic in framing because their economic effect is more immediately visible.

The first method of measuring economic and immigration evaluations is to measure attitudes at a national scale, given that both immigration and economic policies are both visible at the national level. To measure the association between national attitudes towards immigration policy, a scale measuring respondents' views on immigration attitudes will demonstrate those individuals' preferred immigration legislation. Given that both the immigration literature (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Citrin et al. 1997; Citrin, Reginold, and Green 1990; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Kinder and Kam 2009) and the trade policy literature (Cohen 2001; Destler and Balint 1999; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Mayer 1998; Mutz and Kim 2017; Rankin 2001; Sears 2001) have demonstrated that immigration policy and trade policy both represent a threat separate from a purely economic threat, immigration preferences will likely capture the preferred policy changes that would result in a more isolationist and protectionist country. The trade literature has demonstrated that national evaluation of the economy and economic policies can be associated with trade views (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Mutz and Kim 2017); however, these views can also be contingent on partisan perception (Enns, Kellstedt, and McAvoy 2012). Consequently, national economic evaluation should be associated with trade policy; however, negative national economic evaluations may be associated with less support for free trade policy in 2016 and more

support for free trade policy in 2018 given that Trump had assumed office in 2017 after making opposition to trade orthodoxy a central campaign issue.

Hypothesis 1: Respondents with anti-immigrant policy attitudes are more likely to oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership and more likely to be supportive of import tariffs.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents who evaluate the national economy as trending in the wrong direction will have a conditional association with trade policy preferences. In 2016, respondents with negative national economy evaluations will be more opposed to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In 2018, respondents with negative economic evaluations will be more supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and more opposed to import tariffs.

Additionally, it is relevant to evaluate the role of identity-based factors for determining trade policy preferences. The immigration literature demonstrates that immigration policy may demonstrate a cultural threat to some individuals. While it is relevant to measure national immigration attitudes directly, it is also necessary to separately measure the role those identities play in shaping trade views. If open immigration presents a direct cultural threat to certain individuals, we should expect that foreign-born individuals (both citizens and non-citizens) should not experience that same cultural threat. Additionally, non-citizens may more actively engage in international commerce by purchasing foreign goods or through interacting with people from their country of origin. Consequently, foreign-born respondents would be more likely than their native-born counterparts to support trade policy. By contrast, union membership functions as an economic identity. The trade literature has consistently demonstrated that trade union membership increases the likelihood of protectionist policy preferences (Johnston 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Rankin 2001; Rho and Tomz 2017). However, the trade policy literature has not sufficiently examined how former trade union members feel about trade policy. Due to the declining union membership in the United States,

protectionist inclinations may be more prominent among former union members because the economic threat of a more globalized world may have already occurred, costing the individual his or her union job (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019).

Hypothesis 3: Foreign-born respondents, both citizens and non-citizens, will be more supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and less supportive of import tariffs.

Hypothesis 4: Both current and former union members will be less supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and more supportive of import tariffs.

Finally, while trade policy may be shaped by individual identities and attitudes about national economic and immigration policy, it is also necessary to analyze local variation in economic, demographic, and trade statistics. Individuals from local areas with higher levels of unemployment may be more threatened by economic liberalism, especially with a more competitive job market. Thus, such respondents would be less supportive of trade liberalization policies. By contrast, people from local areas with a higher percentage of foreign-born individuals will likely be more socialized to operating within an international framework and may engage in more international commerce. Therefore, such respondents would be more likely to support open trade policy. It is also necessary to evaluate how variations in local trade statistics shift trade policy attitudes. In accordance with the Ricardo-Viner and Hecksher-Ohlin model (Kapstein 1999; Krugman et al. 2015; Leamer and Levinsohn 1994; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrick 2005; Ohlin 1967; Rodrick 1997; Samuelson 1971; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), there should be two competing effects of localized trade variation on trade opinion. Individuals from counties with higher levels of exports as a percentage of their economy should be more likely to oppose trade liberalization policies because imports present a competing product or service and thus an economic threat. By contrast, individuals from counties with

higher levels of export-based jobs should be more supportive of trade liberalization, because the employment benefits of trade policy are more visible. In addition, there will be divergence on how exports shift trade opinion due to how the benefits of trade liberalization are dispersed at a local level. Among counties with a high amount of exports as a percentage of GDP but a lower number of export-based jobs, the benefits of trade liberalization will be concentrated. Among counties with a lower number of exports as a percentage of GDP but a higher number of export-based jobs, the benefits of trade liberalization will be more dispersed – and thus more visible.

Hypothesis 5: Respondents from ZIP codes with a higher number of foreign-born people will be more supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and less supportive of import tariffs.

Hypothesis 6: Respondents from ZIP codes with a higher amount of unemployment will be less supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and more supportive of import tariffs.

Hypothesis 7: Respondents from counties with a higher percentage of their economy that is based on exports will be less supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and more supportive of import tariffs.

Hypothesis 8: Respondents from counties with a higher percentage of their jobs that are connected to exporting will be more supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and less supportive of import tariffs.

Data and Methods

Two surveys are used to evaluate the influence of these independent variables on trade policy opinion: the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) from years 2016 and 2018. The CCES provides a very large sample size: 64,600 cases for the 2016 version and 60,000 cases for the 2018 version.[53] While most control variables in the study remain consistent

[53] This drops to 63,826 observations for the 2016 study and 59332 observations for the 2018 after local-level variables were included.

through both studies, survey items about policy positions changed in both their framing and substance. Therefore, while questions are similar between 2016 and 2018, they are not completely interchangeable. Notably, regarding dependent variables, for the 2016 version of the CCES, respondents are asked whether they are either for or against "the Trans-Pacific Partnership Act Free trade agreement among 12 Pacific nations (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and the US)." (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). By contrast, in the 2018 CCES study, the respondent chooses whether they support or oppose the following executive order: "Withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, a free trade agreement that included the U.S., Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Canada, others" (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2019). In addition to differing question wording, it is expected that the directionality of these issue responses will be switched, given that the 2016 version asks whether respondents support the TPP and the 2018 version asks whether respondents support withdrawing from the TPP. Compared to numerous other surveys on similar trade-related questions, these questions on the TPP lack a "don't know" option. The 2016 version of the question also has the option to skip while the 2018 version of the question does not; however only 128 respondents chose to skip the question in the 2016 version of the study. Additionally, for the 2018 version exclusively, there are a series of policy items measuring how respondents feel about a series of tariffs, from which I created 4-point tariff scale.[54] To evaluate the hypotheses, probits are used for the models with TPP-related questions and an OLS is used for the model with the tariff scale.

[54] This 4-point scale is a modification of three trade policy items; however, two of the policy items are interrelated. First, respondents were asked if they support or oppose "$50 billion worth of tariffs on goods imported from China." Respondents who supported the policy received a 1, while respondents who opposed the policy received a zero. The next two questions ask whether the respondent supports or opposes "25% tariffs on imported steel and 10% on imported aluminum, EXCEPT from Canada, Europe and Mexico" and whether they support or oppose "25% tariffs on imported steel and 10% on imported aluminum, INCLUDING from Canada, Europe and Mexico." Respondents who opposed both proposals scored a 0 on the scale. Respondents who supported tariffs excluding Canada, Europe,

Measures compiling immigration attitudes and evaluations of the economy will be independent variables used to measure respondent sentiments and preferences at a national level. The CCES does not have a national economic trend issue item; however, it includes a measure that evaluates whether the economy has gotten better or worse over the past year. A three-point scale is used to measure national economic evaluation, with the lowest score indicating that the economy has gotten better, the next score indicating that the economy has remained the same, and the highest score indicating that the economy has gotten worse.[55] As was the case with the dependent variables, survey items on national immigration attitudes changed between the 2016 and 2018 version of the survey and are thus not completely consistent with one another. Regardless, these scales should be internally consistent with broader views towards immigration policy. For the 2016 version of the CCES, a 5-point scale measuring four separate immigration policy items measures respondents' immigration attitudes.[5657] For the 2018 version of the CCES,

and Mexico, but excluded tariffs on everyone scored a 1. Respondents who supported steel and aluminum tariffs on all imported goods scored a 2, regardless of their response to the question about import tariffs on steel and aluminum excluding Canada, Europe, and Mexico (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2019).

[55] The original variable in the CCES is measured as a five-point Likert scale from indicating that the nation's economy has "gotten much better" to indicating that the economy has "gotten much worse." This was transformed into a 3-point variable measuring that the economy has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse for greater item consistency with other surveys (Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2017; Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks, 2019).

[56] The 5-point immigration policy scale for the CCES 2016 model is a composite of four issue items, measured by whether or not the respondent indicated support for a particular policy approach. No issue items were skipped. For some variables, not choosing a policy item would result in a higher score on the immigration policy scale. First, respondents were asked whether they supported "[granting] legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes." Respondents who did not support this option scored a 1 while respondents who supported this option received a 0. Second, respondents indicated whether they supported "[increasing] the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border." Respondents who supported this scored a 1 while respondents who did not support this scored a 0. Third, respondents indicated whether they supported "[granting] legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school." Respondents who selected this option scored a 0, while respondents who did not select this option scored a 1. Finally, respondents indicated whether they supported "[identifying] and [deporting] illegal immigrants." Respondents who selected this option scored a 1 while respondents who did not select this option scored a 0. The composite is a sum of all these measures. In addition, there were three additional immigration questions in the CCES 2016 survey. These were not included because they were non-randomly distributed among only 13,269 respondents (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017).

[57] See appendix E.1 for Cronbach's alpha.

a 6-point scale measuring respondents' support for broadly different immigration-related policies measures respondents' immigration attitudes.[58][59]

To evaluate the independent effect of respondent identity, both economic and immigrant, several dummy variables are included consistently across all models. To measure immigrant identity, the models include two separate dummy variables for foreign-born citizens and foreign-born non-citizens. To measure economic identity, the models will include two separate dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is a current labor union member and a former labor union member are included. The analysis does not measure whether the respondent has family members who belong to a labor union or previously belonged to a labor union.

To measure local demographic variation, including immigration and economic pressures, four separate local demographic variables are included in the models. Within the CCES 2016 and 2018 studies, respondent ZIP codes are publicly available data. These ZIP codes are then merged with local level data. From the American Community Survey (ACS) 2016 and 2018 studies, the model incorporates ZIP code level demographic variables measuring local unemployment levels

[58] The 6-point immigration policy scale for the CCES 2018 model is a composite of five issue items, measured by whether or not the respondent indicated support for a particular policy approach. No issue items were skipped. For some variables, not choosing a policy item would result in a higher score on the immigration policy scale. First, respondents indicated whether they supported or opposed the following statement: "increase spending on border security by $25 billion, including building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico." Respondents who supported this proposal scored a 1 on the scale while respondents who opposed this proposal scored a 0. Second, respondents indicated whether they supported "[providing] legal status to children of immigrants who are already in the United States and were brought to the United States by their parents. Provide these children the option of citizenship in 10 years if they meet citizenship requirements and commit no crimes (DACA)." Respondents who support this proposal scored a 0, where respondents who opposed this proposal scored a 1. Third, respondents indicated whether they supported or opposed "[reducing] legal immigration by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based migration." Respondents who supported this proposal scored a 1 while respondents who opposed this proposal scored a 0. Fourth, respondents indicated whether they supported or opposed the following statement: "Withhold federal funds from any local police department that does not report to the federal government anyone they identify as an illegal immigrant." Respondents who support this proposal scored a 1 while respondents who opposed this proposal scored a 0. Finally, respondents indicated support or opposition to "[sending] to prison any person who has been deported from the United States and reenters the United States." Respondents who support this proposal score a 1 while respondents who oppose this proposal score a 0. The composite is the sum of these measures. While there was another issue question in the 2018 version of the CCES, it was excluded because it comprised multiple items already addressed in the composite (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2019).

[59] See appendix E.2 for Cronbach's alpha.

and foreign-born proportions (American Community Survey 2016, 2018). Additionally, county-level export data from the Brookings Institute is incorporated into the model.[6061] Two separate county level variables are incorporated into the models. The first variable measures the proportion of the county's GDP that is comprised of exports across all industries. The second variable measures the proportion of the jobs within the county that are related in some way to exporting.

Several additional control variables are incorporated into the models. The models include a series of six dummy variables measuring respondents' family income[62] and education levels.[63] The CCES 2016 and 2018 do not include a standard personal finance in retrospect variable; however, it does include an issue asking whether household income has increased or decreased over the past year. Consequently, a three-point ordinal scale measuring personal retrospective income evaluation is included, with the lowest level indicating that household income has increased and the highest level indicating that household income has decreased.[64] ZIP code level

[60] In the CCES 2016 and 2018 surveys, there are an extremely high number of missing values for respondents' counties. Consequently, to remedy this issue, a ZIP code to county crosswalk for 2016 and 2017 from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development is used to transpose counties onto ZIP codes (Department of Housing and Urban Development 2016, 2017).

[61] County-level export data from the Brookings Institute is only available on a yearly basis up to 2017. Thus, while the 2016 model includes county-level export data from 2016, the 2018 models include county-level export data from 2017 (Brookins Institute 2019).

[62] Individuals with family incomes less than 20,000 dollars a year are marked at the lowest bracket. Individuals with family incomes between 20,000 dollars and 39,999 dollars a year are the next bracket. The next bracket includes individuals with family incomes between 40,000 dollars and 69,999 dollars. The next bracket includes individuals that make between 70,000 dollars and 99,999 dollars. The next bracket represents individuals that make between 100,000 dollars and 149,999 dollars. The highest bracket represents individuals that make more than 150,000 dollars a year (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017; Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2019).

[63] The lowest bracket includes respondents who haven't completed high school. The next bracket includes respondents who are high school graduates. The next bracket includes individuals with some college education. The next bracket includes individuals with a two-year degree. The next bracket includes individuals with a four-year degree. The highest bracket includes individuals with post-graduate education (Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2017; Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2019).

[64] The original variable in the CCES is measured as a five-point Likert scale from indicating that the respondents' family's income has "increased a lot" to indicating that the family's income has "decreased a lot." This was transformed into a 3-point variable measuring that household income has increased, stayed the same, or decreased in the past year (Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2017; Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2019).

population density is also included as a variable in the absence of an urbanization variable within the CCES 2016 and 2018 data sets.[65] A five-point ordinal scale measuring ideology (from very liberal to very conservative) and a three-point ordinal scale measuring party affiliation (from Democratic to independent to Republican) are also included as control variables. News interest will be included as a four-point ordinal scale, with the lowest value indicating that the respondent pays hardly any attention to public affair and the highest value indicating the respondent pays attention to public affairs most of the time. Age, sex, and whether the respondent is white, black, or Hispanic are also included as control variables in the models.

[65] ZIP code population and ZIP square mileage were both from the ACS 2016 and 2018 datasets. ZIP code density is measured as ZIP code population (at a particular year) divided by the square mileage of the ZIP code (American Community Survey 2016, 2018).

Results

	Table 6.1. Dependent variable:
	Support for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CCES 2016)
Immigration Scale	-0.123*** (0.005)
Economic Evaluation	-0.155*** (0.097)
Immigrant Citizen	0.292*** (0.027)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.355*** (0.054)
Current Union Member	-0.082*** (0.023)
Former Union Member	-0.150*** (0.016)
ZIP Foreign Born Proportion	0.402*** (0.067)
ZIP Unemployment Proportion	-0.527*** (0.180)
County Export GDP Proportion	-0.539** (0.269)
County Export Jobs Proportion	0.442 (0.390)
Party ID	-0.094*** (0.010)
Ideology	0.058*** (0.007)
News Interest	-.304*** (.008)
ZIP Population Density	0.000** (0.000)
Income Retrospective	-0.098*** (0.009)
Less than 20k	0.033 (0.027)
20k to 39,999	0.053** (0.022)
40k to 69,999	0.007 (0.021)
70k to 99,999	0.028 (0.022)
150k+	0.059** (0.029)
High School Graduate	0.147*** (0.043)
Some College	-0.060 (0.044)
2-Year	-0.052 (0.046)
4-Year	-0.087** (0.044)
Post-Grad	0.165*** (0.046)
White	-0.071* (0.025)
Black	0.093*** (0.031)
Hispanic	0.073** (0.033)
Age	-0.008*** (0.000)
Female	0.147*** (0.013)
Constant	1.472*** (0.062)
Observations	47,905
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are robust.

Figure 6.1. Immigration Attitudes and TPP Support (CCES 2016)



Figure 6.2. Economic Evaluation and TPP Support (CCES 2016)



In 2016, attitudinal evaluations of the economy and immigration both demonstrated statistically and substantively significant effects on support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. To demonstrate substantive significance of the probit models for 2016 and 2018, the models utilize Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values approach to predict the likelihood of support for the TPP in 2016 or support for withdrawal in 2018. Figure 1 shows the mean predicted probabilities of supporting the Trans-Pacific Partnership at each immigration score level. Moving from the lowest immigration score level (individuals who support the most open immigration policies) to the highest immigration score level (individuals who support the most restrictive immigration policies), the models show a mean of a 17.8 percentage point drop (between a 16.3-point drop to a 19.3-point drop at the 95% confidence level) in the likelihood of the respondent supporting the Trans-Pacific Partnership when holding all other variables constant. National economic evaluations demonstrate similar effects. Individuals who believe that the national economy has gotten worse in the past year were, on average, 10.9 percentage points less likely to support the TPP than individuals who thought the economy had gotten better (between a 9.6 and a 12.2 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level) when holding all other variables constant. Collectively, the attitudinal data for 2016 supports hypotheses 1 and 2.

Similarly, in 2016, both economic and immigration identities showed statistically and substantively significant effects on support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. When holding all other variables constant, immigrant citizens were an average of 9.3 percentage points more likely to support the Trans-Pacific Partnership (between 7.6 and 11.0 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level) compared to the respondent pool broadly. This effect was even more prominent among immigrant non-citizens, who were 10.8 percentage points more likely to support the TPP on average (between 7.5 percentage points and 14.` percentage points at the 95

percent confidence level) when holding other variables constant. Economic identities, by contrast, made respondents less likely to support the TPP. Current union members were only slightly less likely to support the TPP as they were 2.5 percentages points less likely to support the TPP (between 1.0 percentage points and 4.1 percentage points less likely at the 95 percent confidence level). Former union members saw a more pronounced drop in the likelihood of supporting the TPP. On average, former union members were 5.2 percentage points less likely to support the TPP on average when holding all other variables constant (between a 4.1 and a 6.3 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). Collectively, the 2016 results support hypothesis 3 and 4.

Figure 6.3. Foreign-born Proportion and TPP Support (CCES 2016)



Local level immigration and economic data generally had a weaker effect on TPP support when compared to attitudinal and identity factors. Local foreign-born population had a slight effect on TPP support. Moving from zero percent foreign-born at the ZIP code level to thirty percent foreign born with the ZIP code caused an average of a 3.8 percentage point increase in support for the TPP (between a 2.4 percentage point increase to a 5.1 percentage point increase

in support at the 95 percent confidence level). Moving from a 5.1 ZIP code level unemployment to a 9.1 ZIP code unemployment rate (a shift from the first quartile to the third quartile) resulted in a very small drop in the likelihood of supporting the TPP: a .7 percentage point drop (between a 1.2 percentage point drop and a .3 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). County level export variables also had a weak and inconsistent effect. Moving from 6.9 percent to 11.6 percent of exports as a percentage of the County's GDP (a shift from the first quartile to the third quartile) resulted in a .9 percentage point drop in the likelihood of supporting the TPP (between a .1 percentage point drop and a 1.7 percentage point drop in the likelihood of supporting the TPP at the 95 percent confidence level). Meanwhile, the effect of the proportion of the county's jobs that are export related failed to meet statistical significance. Consequently, the 2016 data provides modest support for hypotheses 5 (that local level immigration levels will cause an increase in support for the TPP), and weak-to-negligible support for hypotheses 6, 7, and 8 (that local level economic and export data will affect TPP support).

In addition to the attitudinal, identity, and local variables, the 2016 data set presents several interesting findings that were not hypothesized. Most interesting is the divergent effects of partisanship and ideology. On average, Republicans were 6.3 percentage points less likely to support the TPP than Democrats when holding all other variables constant (between a 4.9 and a 7.7 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). By contrast, strong conservatives are an average 7.1 percentage points more likely to support the TPP than strong liberals (between 5.2 and 9.1 percentage points more likely at the 95 percent confidence level). Additionally, both age and gender have very strong effects on the likelihood of supporting the TPP. Women are an average of 5.1 percentage points more likely to support the TPP when compared to men (between 4.2 and 6. percentages point at the 95 percent confidence level). Moving from the first

quartile age (33 years) to the third quartile age (61 years) results in a 7.7 percentage point drop in the likelihood of supporting the TPP (between a 6.9 and an 8.6 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level).

Most surprising of all was the influence of news interest on the likelihood of supporting the TPP. While news interest frequently had no influence on protectionism in standard probit models in previous chapters, the same was not true for this data set. Compared to the least engaged in political news, respondents who were the most engaged in politics were 29.6 percentage points less likely to support the TPP than respondents who were the least engaged (between a 28.1 and a 30.1 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). It is likely, however, given the consistent findings of previous selection models in previous chapters, that respondents with lower levels of news interest may have not had an opinion on the topic and gave a response when they otherwise would have abstained.

	Table 6.2. Dependent variable:
	Support for Trans-Pacific Partnership Withdrawal (CCES 2018)
Immigration Scale	0.355*** (0.006)
Economic Evaluation	-0.238*** (0.013)
Immigrant Citizen	-0.036 (0.037)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.132** (0.068)
Current Union Member	0.046 (0.033)
Former Union Member	0.036* (0.022)
ZIP Foreign Born Proportion	-0.010 (0.092)
ZIP Unemployment Proportion	0.577** (0.283)
County Export GDP Proportion	1.331*** (0.304)
County Export Jobs Proportion	-1.772*** (0.479)
Party ID	0.179*** (0.013)
Ideology	0.157*** (0.010)
News Interest	.144*** (.010)
ZIP Population Density	0.000 (0.000)
Income Retrospective	-0.149*** (0.013)
Less than 20k	0.089** (0.034)
20k to 39,999	-0.014 (0.029)
40k to 69,999	-0.040 (0.027)
70k to 99,999	-0.005 (0.029)
150k+	-0.050 (0.037)
High School Graduate	-0.141*** (0.050)
Some College	-0.151*** (0.051)
2-Year	-0.157*** (0.054)
4-Year	-0.223*** (0.051)
Post-Grad	-0.324*** (0.054)
White	-0.069** (0.035)
Black	-0.112** (0.044)
Hispanic	0.038 (0.043)
Age	0.001 (0.001)
Female	-0.062*** (0.017)
Constant	-1.432*** (0.078)
Observations	42,751
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are robust.

Figure 6.4. Immigration Attitudes and TPP Withdrawal Support (CCES 2018)



Figure 6.5. Economic Evaluation and TPP Withdrawal Support (CCES 2018)



As stated earlier, CCES policy questions are not consistent between 2016 and 2018. While 2016 asked respondents whether they supported the TPP, 2018 asked respondents whether they supported the executive order to withdraw from the TPP. Consequently, for many independent variables, the effect on the dependent variable reversed relative to the 2016 model. In 2018, immigration attitudes have a very powerful effect on the likelihood of supporting the executive order to withdraw from the TPP. Moving from a 0 to a 5 on the 2018 version of the immigration scale results in an average of a 56.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of supporting the withdrawal from the TPP when holding other variables constant (between a 54.9 and a 58.1 percentage point increase at the 95 percent confidence level). Compared to 2016, economic evaluations of the past year had an opposite effect. In 2018, respondents that thought the economy had gotten worse in the past year were an average of 9.1 percentage points less likely to support the withdrawal from the TPP compared to respondents who thought the economy had gotten better when holding other variables constant (between a 7.9 and a 10.3 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). Consequently, because both attitudes about immigration policy and the national economy were statistically and substantively significant and because the direction of the effect of the perception of the national economy switched relative to 2016, hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported by the 2018 data.

Relative to 2016, identity-based factors became much less significant in affecting the likelihood of supporting the executive order to withdraw from the TPP. Only former union members and immigrant non-citizens were statistically significantly different regarding the likelihood of supporting withdrawing from the TPP. Former union members were an average of 1.5 percentage points more likely to support withdrawing from the TPP compared to other respondents when holding all other values constant (between .6 percent and 2.4 percentage

points more likely at the 95 percent confidence level). Immigrant non-citizens were an average of 3.8 percentage points more likely to support the withdrawal from the TPP (between .7 and 7.0 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level). Surprisingly, while statistically significant, this is in the opposite direction that was predicted in the hypothesis. Moreover, while this effect is modest, it is inconsistent with the 2016 results. All other identities failed to have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of supporting the TPP. It is important to note that in 2016 and in 2018, both personal income in retrospect and evaluations of the national economy had the same directional effect on TPP support and TPP withdrawal support. In other words, individuals who thought the economy had gotten worse and said their family income was worse in the previous year were less likely to be supportive of the TPP in 2016. Conversely, in 2018, respondents who thought the economy had gotten worse and said their family income worse in the previous year were less likely to support the withdrawal from the TPP. Collectively, the 2018 data provide no support for hypothesis 3 (that foreign-born individuals will be less likely to support withdrawing from the TPP) and weak and contextual support for hypothesis 4 (that union members will be more likely to support withdrawing from the TPP).

When evaluating local level statistics, the effects of local foreign-born populations on support for withdrawing from the TPP followed a similar trajectory in 2018 as foreign-born identities. ZIP-level foreign-born populations did not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of supporting the withdrawal from the TPP. ZIP-level unemployment rates had a very weak effect on the likelihood of supporting the withdrawal from the TPP. Moving from a 4.0 percent ZIP code unemployment rate (the first quartile among respondents) to a 7.1 percent unemployment rate (the third quartile among respondents) resulted in an average of a .5 percent increase in the likelihood of supporting withdrawing from the TPP (between a .1 and a .8 percent

increase at the 95 percent confidence level). County-level export data had a somewhat stronger effect on 2018 TPP attitudes compared to unemployment levels; however, the county-level export data is from 2017 so caution on the interpretation of the results is necessary. When all other variables were held constant, moving from a 7.1 percent proportion of exports as a share of county GDP (first quartile) to 11.9 percent (third quartile) resulted in an average of a 1.1 percent increase in the likelihood of supporting withdrawing from the TPP (between a .5 and a 1.7 percentage point increase at the 95 percent confidence level). By contrast, when all other variables were held constant, moving from a 5.9 percent share of import jobs as a percentage of county jobs (first quartile) to a 9.6 percent share, there was an average of a 1.3 percentage point drop in the likelihood of supporting withdrawing from the TPP (between a .5 percentage point drop and a 2.0 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). Collectively, the 2018 TPP data does not support hypothesis 5; however, it provides limited and weak support for hypothesis 6, 7, and 8.

The 2018 TPP withdrawal support data also illuminated the influence of several other variables that were not hypothesized. While in 2016, ideology and partisanship moved in different directions regarding TPP support, ideology and partisanship moved in the same direction for 2018. Unsurprisingly, Republicans and conservatives were more supportive of Trump's executive order to withdraw from the TPP. Age and gender remained significant influences on TPP withdrawal support. Women were 2.3 percentage points less likely to support withdrawing from the TPP (between a 1.6 percentage point drop and a 3.1 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). Age, by contrast, failed to achieve statistical significance. News interest was once again a strong predictor of support for the TPP withdrawal. Respondents with high levels of news interest were 9.7 percentage points more likely to support the TPP

withdrawal executive order (between a 8.4 and a 11.0 percentage point increase at the 95 percent confidence level).

	Table 6.3. Dependent variable:
	Tariff Scale (CCES 2018)
Immigration Scale	0.366*** (0.005)
Economic Evaluation	-0.1475*** (0.009)
Immigrant Citizen	0.059** (0.025)
Immigrant Non-Citizen	0.070 (0.059)
Current Union Member	0.070*** (0.018)
Former Union Member	0.032** (0.011)
ZIP Foreign Born Proportion	0.154*** (0.059)
ZIP Unemployment Proportion	0.837*** (0.187)
County Export GDP Proportion	0.504*** (0.185)
County Export Jobs Proportion	-0.630** (0.280)
Party ID	0.101*** (0.009)
Ideology	0.116*** (0.007)
News Interest	-.098*** (.007)
ZIP Population Density	0.000* (0.000)
Income Retrospective	-0.086*** (0.008)
Less than 20k	0.059*** (0.020)
20k to 39,999	0.036** (0.018)
40k to 69,999	0.004 (0.014)
70k to 99,999	0.019 (0.015)
150k+	-0.046** (0.019)
High School Graduate	-0.065* (0.036)
Some College	-0.094*** (0.036)
2-Year	-0.083** (0.037)
4-Year	-0.193*** (0.036)
Post-Grad	-0.263*** (0.037)
White	-0.049** (0.021)
Black	0.061** (0.031)
Hispanic	0.180*** (0.029)
Age	-0.002*** (0.000)
Gender	0.141*** (0.010)
Constant	0.861*** (0.052)
Observations	42,7114
R^2	0.534
Adjusted R^2	0.533
Residual Std. Error	0.772 (df = 42683)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are robust.

The tariff scale model in 2018 is broadly similar to the 2018 probit model evaluating support for TPP withdrawal. When measuring national attitudes and evaluations, immigration attitudes are a statistically and substantively significant predictor of views on tariffs. Moving from the lowest immigration score (supporting the most open immigration policies) to the highest score (supporting the most closed immigration policies) resulted in an average of a 1.83-point shift towards a more protection view of tariffs on the four-point tariff scale when holding other values constant (between a 1.82 and 1.84-point shift towards more at the 95 percent confidence level). Consistent with the 2018 TPP data, more negative economic evaluations were predictive of less support for trade tariffs. When holding other variables constant, respondents who thought the economy had gotten worse in the past year had an average of a -.30-point shift compared to respondents who thought the economy had gotten better (between a -.28 and a -.32-point shift at the 95 percent confidence level). Consequently, both hypotheses 1 and 2, which evaluate the effect of national immigration and economic attitudes, are supported by the 2018 tariff scale data.

Identity-based factors had mixed, but slight effects on the likelihood of supporting import tariffs. Immigrant non-citizens were statistically different from the rest of the respondents; however, immigrant citizens were an average .06 points more supportive of import tariffs on the four-point tariff scale when holding other values constant (between .01 and .11 points more supportive of import tariffs of the tariff scale at the 95 percent confidence level). While this only a slight effect, this effect runs contrary to the expectations of hypothesis 3 (that foreign-born respondents will be less supportive of tariffs). Economic identities had a similarly weak effect on tariff support. Current union members were an average of .07 points more supportive of tariffs

when holding all other variables constant (between .04 and .11 points more supportive of tariffs at the 95 percent confidence level). Former union members were .03 points more supportive of import tariffs when holding other variables constant (between .01 and .05 points more supportive of tariffs at the 95 percent confidence level). Consequently, the 2018 tariff data analysis provides modest support for hypothesis 4; however, economic identities are only weak predictors of import views in this model.

Local economic and immigration data had modest influence on the likelihood of supporting import tariffs; however, as was the case with immigrant identities, local immigration data shifted opinion in the opposite of the expected direction. Moving from the first quartile ZIP-level foreign born population proportion (3.5 percent foreign born) to the third quartile level (16.1 percent foreign born) caused an average of a .02-point shift in favor of tariffs (between a .01 and a .03-point shift towards more protectionist tariffs). Local economic data moved in the expected direction with weak effects. Moving from a 4.0 percent ZIP code unemployment rate (the first quartile) to a 7.1 percent unemployment rate (the third quartile) resulted in a .03-point increase in tariff support on average when holding other variables constant (between a .02 and a .04 shift towards protectionism at the 95 percent confidence level).

Moving from a 7.1 percent proportion of exports as a share of county GDP (first quartile) to 11.9 percent (third quartile) resulted in an average of a .02-point shift in favor of more tariffs (between a .01 shift and a .04-point shift towards greater support for import tariffs at the 95 percent confidence level). By contrast, holding other variables constant, a shift g from a 5.9 percent share of import jobs as a percentage of county jobs (first quartile) to a 9.6 percent share, saw an average of a .02-point drop in support for tariffs on the tariff scale (between a .0-point drop and a .04-point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). Overall, the 2018 tariff data

provides mixed results for hypothesis 5, 6, 7, and 8. Specifically, hypothesis 5, where respondents from a ZIP code with a higher proportion of foreign-born individuals would be more supportive of the TPP and less supportive of import tariffs, was partially contradicted. Respondents from such local areas were more supportive of the TPP in 2016 but not 2018. More importantly, such respondents were slightly more supportive of import tariffs.

Compared to the TPP models, the tariff models include some additional interesting findings. In accordance with much of the trade literature, women are more likely to be supportive of import tariffs than men (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; O'Rourke and Sinott et al. 2001;). With that said, women were also consistently more supportive of the TPP in both 2016 and 2018, indicating a complicated association between gender and international economic agreements. Age is an unusually strong predictor of tariff support – with older respondents being more supportive of tariffs and less supportive of the TPP. Additionally, respondents with higher levels of news interest were less supportive of import tariffs, which is inconsistent with the earlier TPP findings. Finally, while education was an inconsistent predictor of TPP support, it is a more consistent predictor of tariff support with more educated respondents being less supportive of import tariffs.

Conclusion

When evaluating the national attitudes, identities, and local variation, national attitudes typically had the strongest effect on shifting opinion on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and import tariff policy. In the case of economic evaluation, the discrepancy between 2016 and 2018 demonstrates that economic perceptions of the economy may be viewed through a partisan lens (Enns, Kellstedt, and McAvoy 2012). In 2016, respondents who viewed the economy as having gotten worse in the past year were more opposed to joining TPP; however, in 2018, respondents

who viewed the economy as having gotten worse in the past year were more opposed to withdrawing from the TPP. Given that withdrawal from the TPP was a campaign promise of the Trump administration, and given the partisanship of economic perceptions, negative perceptions of the economy likely served as a way for partisan respondents to express disapproval of the economic actions of the current administration.

By contrast, national immigration attitudes were a very consistent predictor of support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership and import tariff policy. Respondents who wanted a stricter immigration policy were consistently more likely to oppose the TPP and support increases in import tariffs in both 2016 and 2018. When comparing immigration attitudes on TPP support between 2016 and 2018, it is necessary to urge caution when evaluating the relative predictive strength of immigration attitudes on support for the TPP. The 2016 and 2018 CCES surveys had different dependent variables. The 2016 survey asked respondents whether they supported the TPP while the 2018 survey asked respondents whether they supported the executive order to withdraw from the TPP. More significantly, the immigration scales between the two years are different. The 2016 version of the scale includes four survey items and has a Cronbach's alpha of .686 whereas the 2018 version of the scale includes five survey items and has a Cronbach's alpha of .825. It is plausible that the 2018 scale is more effective and consistent at measuring immigration attitudes than the 2016 scale. Additionally, the 2016 and 2018 surveys included a different set of respondents and cannot be directly compared. Despite these caveats, it is alarming that the respondents who were most strict on immigration were only 17.8 percentage points less likely to support the TPP than their counterparts who were the most lenient on immigration; however, by contrast, respondents in 2018 who were the strictest on immigration were 56.0 points more likely to support the withdrawal from the TPP than their most lenient

counterparts. In conjunction with the earlier evidence that immigration attitudes had become more polarized, it is plausible that there was some degree of policy issue convergence between 2016 and 2018 (Pew Research Center, 2018).

Identity-based variables had a mixed and occasionally unexpected effect on TPP support and import tariff support. Union members generally behaved in the expected direction. Both current and former union members were generally more likely to support import tariffs and oppose the TPP; however, current union members were not significantly different from the rest of the population in 2018. For TPP related questions, former union members appear to be slightly more likely to be opposed to the TPP than current union members. It is worth noting that the effect of economic identity of TPP and import opinion was modest at most. Immigrant identity had an unexpected and inconsistent association with TPP and tariff support. Immigrant citizens and immigrant non-citizens were significantly more supportive of the TPP in 2016; however, by 2018, immigrant identity had no association with TPP support. Additionally, in 2018, immigrant citizens (but not immigrant non-citizens) were slightly more supportive of import tariffs. There are two plausible explanations for this. First, it is possible that views on the TPP are more reflective of internationalist views whereas opinions on import tariffs are more reflective of economic views. Second, the shift from immigrant identity affecting TPP support in 2016 to having no effect may dovetail with the possibility that immigrant attitudes strengthened as a determinant of TPP support. Thus, while immigrant identities had a cross-cutting effect in 2016, immigrant attitudes were so politicized and salient by 2018 that those identities were no longer significant. Regardless, more data is necessary to support this.

Local economic, export, and immigration statistics similarly had an inconsistent effect. The local population proportion that was foreign-born followed a similar trajectory to immigrant

identity. Local foreign born population proportion has a modest positive effect on TPP support in 2016 but did not have a significant effect in 2018. Additionally, local foreign born population proportion was associated with a slight increase in support for import tariffs. Local unemployment rate had a modest effect in the hypothesized direction. In both years, higher local unemployment made the respondent slightly more opposed to the TPP and more supportive of import tariffs. Similarly, local export data functioned in the direction hypothesized, but with very weak effects. Higher export proportion as a percentage of county GDP was weakly associated with opposition to the TPP and support for import tariffs. A higher proportion of county jobs that were related to exports, by contrast, were very weakly associated with support for the TPP and opposition to tariffs. Collectively, local data had a weak and inconsistent effect on TPP and tariff attitudes.

Chapter 7

Conclusion and Future Study

Overview

Donald Trump's decision to make trade policy a central message of his campaign and presidency remains one of the more interesting political decisions of the past few decades. The political decision served as a wedge issue for Democrats, turning Democratic partisans against their traditional trade union partners and other populist leftist figures such as Bernie Sanders. However, trade policy is a highly complicated and relatively low-salience issue wherein many respondents express that they lack sufficient information to make an informed opinion. This ultimately formed the fundamental question for my exploration into the various ways we understand views of trade in the Trump and post-Trump political era: if trade is so complicated and nuanced, why did it become a central focal point during Trump's campaign and presidency? Whose minds were changed on trade policy and why? Paradoxically, while Trump consistently used trade policy as a method to drive union members and voters without college education from the Democratic Party, news interest remained the strongest predictor of whether individuals even expressed an opinion regarding trade policy. Additionally, as consistently demonstrated throughout the previous chapters, partisan alignment failed to have a consistent effect on trade policy alignment both before and after Trump assumed the presidency. Interestingly, trade opinion did change during the Trump administration; however, the data indicates that individuals became more supportive of free trade policy during the early months of the Trump administration. While there were demonstrable differentiations across classes regarding trade preferences, differences in trade preferences did not appear to become more sharply polarized along class lines as Trump made trade policy more salient during his campaign and presidency.

Collectively, these findings consistently demonstrate that public attitudes towards trade – as demonstrated in opinion formation, interest, and opinion direction – are not cleanly explained by class and economic attitudes. Given that news interest remains such a consistent determinant of opinion formation, the high degree of non-response within survey responses, and the high issue complexity of trade policy, it is facile to assess that trade policy is largely only relevant to very few individuals and that most people simply do not care about trade policy. However, as per the 2017 wave of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group data set, at least 32.0 percent of respondents indicated that the decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership was a high priority issue (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018). Considering that the Trans-Pacific Partnership is so complex, it appears on its face that this level of interest is unexpected; however, individuals may not make decisions on trade policy based on the contents of the trade deal, but on messaging surrounding the issue.

New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, in a 2006 CNBC interview with Tim Russert infamously admitted the following:

> "We got this free market, and I admit, I was speaking out in Minnesota—my hometown, in fact, and guy stood up in the audience, said, `Mr. Friedman, is there any free trade agreement you'd oppose?' I said, `No, absolutely not.' I said, `You know what, sir? I wrote a column supporting the CAFTA, the Caribbean Free Trade initiative. I didn't even know what was in it. I just knew two words: free trade." (Thomas Friedman 2006).

Trade policy is a highly complicated issue, so it is unfair to expect regular Americans to possess a highly sophisticated viewpoint that addresses the benefits and downsides of open trade policy. In greater likelihood, trade policy is representative of secondary viewpoints. As addressed throughout the preceding chapters, populism, diversity anxiety, ethnonationalism; feelings about

the state of the United States in relation to the world, feelings about how an individual views him or herself in relation to the United States, and immigration attitudes are all associated with trade policy opinion and interest. Broadly speaking, these attitudes coalesce into broader conceptions of distrust between certain individuals and wider systems and systemic changes within the United States. Suspicion about the benefits of a diversifying United States, distrust towards experts and their relative knowledge compared to the average American, feelings of alienation with the country, and distrust towards open immigration all speak to a greater sense of distrust in a complicated, international system that open trade policy encapsulates.

Equally important, it is necessary to reiterate the values that consistently failed to demonstrate a causal association with trade opinion formation. Partisanship and partisan identity, on its surface, failed to consistently demonstrate any causal association with trade policy across multiple time periods. However, the data demonstrated small but consistent intra-party divisions on trade policy that even predated the rise of populist candidates like Trump and Bernie Sanders and presidential candidates. Even in 2011, individuals who would later pledge support to the populist candidates within their respective party were more hostile to free trade than individuals who would later support more mainstream candidates (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018). Additionally, race failed to have any consistent association with trade policy, which is interesting when evaluated in the context of the attitudinal values that consistently had an association with trade policy opinion, including immigration attitudes and anxiety towards the diversification of the United States. That said, there are some wrinkles here as well. While race consistently failed to have a consistent influence on trade policy, foreign immigrants were more likely to be supportive of open trade in 2016; however, this effect was not replicated in 2018 (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017; Ansolabehere et al. 2019).

Economic and class factors had mixed and inconsistent effects on trade opinion. Across several studies, income failed to have a consistent effect on trade views and trade interest. While it is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin-based attitudinal models that poorer respondents would be more opposed to liberalized trade policy, this argument failed to find consistent support throughout the numerous studies conducted during the previous chapters (Kapstein 1999; Ohlin 1967; Rodrick 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). However, while income failed to consistently demonstrate an effect on respondents' trade opinions, there are several economic factors that did influence trade policy to some degree.

Trade union membership played a nuanced role on support for trade policy initiatives. In the 2016 version of the CCES, current trade union members were less likely to support the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); however, this association was not replicated in the 2018 version of the CCES. However, in both the 2016 and 2018 versions of the CCES, former trade union members were significantly less likely to support the TPP.[66] Additionally, this effect only appeared to be present when examining the likelihood of supporting the TPP. When studying the effect of trade union membership and former trade union membership on the likelihood of supporting tariffs in the 2018 CCES study, current union members were typically more likely to oppose tariffs than former trade union members (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017; Ansolabehere et al. 2019). The literature has argued that trade union members are more likely to be opposed to free trade policies because trade unions seek to protect their members from foreign competition (Conybeare and Zikula 1996; Kaptsein 1999; Lawrence 1996; Peters 2020; Rodrick 1997; Rogowski 1989; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Shoch 2000). However, former trade union

[66] It is necessary to reiterate the caveat presented in Chapter 6 that the dependent variables measuring support for the TPP were not the same between 2016 and 2018 versions of the survey. Additionally, the two surveys were conducted among different sets of respondents (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017; Ansolabehere et al. 2019).

members remain a broadly understudied subsection of the American voting population. Future study examining why former union members may be even more hostile to free trade policy than their current union member counterparts may prove invaluable to further understanding the group-based and socialization effects that shape trade policy opinion. It is possible that respondents engage with the Trans-Pacific Partnership in a different way than they engage with tariff policy as evidenced by the discrepancy between support for tariffs and support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership among current and former trade union members.

While income and trade union membership had inconsistent and nuanced associations with trade policy support, economic evaluations had more consistent associations with support for trade liberalization. However, it is important to state that there is a distinction between the roles that personal retrospective evaluations played when compared to national economic evaluations. In both cases, personal and national economic evaluations appeared to be contingent on the political party in power. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, respondents who had a more negative evaluation of the national economy and who had a more negative evaluation of their own personal finances were less supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2016 with a Democratic president who was pushing for the agreement. However, in 2018 when Trump was president and actively opposed to the TPP, respondents who had a negative evaluation of the national economy and their own personal finances were less likely to be supportive of a withdrawal from the TPP. That said, it is necessary to address that while national economic evaluation consistently influenced support for trade policy, personal economic evaluations had a less consistent effect.

Like income, education had an unusually inconsistent role in influencing trade opinion, especially when evaluated in the context of another variable: news interest. Throughout the trade

opinion literature, education has had one of the most consistent associations with trade views, as respondents who attained higher levels of education tended to have more favorable views towards trade liberalization (Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1963; Johnston 2013; Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott et al. 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). However, incorporating two-stage Heckman models and including news interest as an additional variable in both the selection and outcome models (when applicable) muddied the previously established association. News interest consistently was associated with a higher likelihood of answering trade questions, but only inconsistently was associated with trade policy in any degree. It is likely that news interest and education are inter-related concepts as respondents with higher levels of education are likely more engaged with politics in general.

One of the intended goals of this project was to move beyond simply measuring trade views along a single directional axis measuring support against opposition. One such way was by measuring the likelihood of having a view on trade policy questions. As previously stated, respondents with greater news interest were more likely to have views on the subject matter. However, two other variables consistently influenced the likelihood of having an opinion on trade policy. First, women were significantly less likely to indicate an opinion on trade questions. The trade opinion literature has consistently found that women are more likely to be protectionist than men (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Guisinger 2016; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; O'Rourke and Sinott et al. 2001). As explored in the survey experiment in Chapter 4 with the 2016 American National Election Studies, this association may be more complicated, as women appeared to be no more protectionist than men when a "don't know" response was excluded (American National Election Studies 2017).

Age also appeared to play a consistent role in determining the likelihood of answering trade-related questions, as older respondents were consistently more likely to respond to such survey items. Beyond that, several variables had complex and unexpected effects on the likelihood of having an opinion on trade questions. As explored in Chapter 3, both respondents who were nervous about the economic and cultural benefits of a diversifying country and respondents with stricter ethnonationalist sentiments were less likely to indicate support for expanding free trade within the outcome model. There was greater nuance, however, in the selection model. Respondents with greater degrees of diversity anxiety were less likely to respond to the selected free trade survey item while respondents with higher levels of ethnonationalism were more likely to respond to that same item.

Chapter 4 further moved beyond basic directional models of understanding trade policy by exploring why certain respondents expressed greater degrees of interest in trade policy in general, specifically the TPP. Consistently, respondents who expressed greater levels of news interest were also more likely to indicate that membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership was a high priority issue. Beyond this, respondents who felt like the US was more respected now than in the past and respondents who felt like they were a stranger in their own country were both more likely to state that membership within the TPP was a high priority issue. This collectively present a complicated dynamic wherein interest in TPP membership is illustrative of how Americans view the United States relative to the rest of the world and how Americans view themselves relative to a changing country.

Chapter 5 of this project sought to investigate how trade views shifted over the course of a 6-year period when trade policy became more salient due to more pronounced campaign rhetoric against free trade policies. When investigating the views of 5,000 respondents across

these years, the general finding was that class-based distinctions did not lead to divergence in trade opinions (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018). Less educated respondents did not become significantly more opposed to trade policy while more educated respondents did not become significantly more supportive of trade policy. Instead, these shifts from 2011 to 2016 and 2017 were most consistently driven by two factors: how much the government should be invested in regulating in the economy and levels of news interest (both based on 2011 responses).

While class identity failed to lead to a divergence of opinion on trade-related questions, Chapter 6 explored how class and immigration attitudes, identities, and local data affected trade attitudes from 2016 to 2018 (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017; Ansolabehere et al. 2019). Consistent among both years studied and across multiple questions, the data demonstrates that immigration attitudes are closely linked with trade attitudes. What was less consistent, however, was the role that other factors played in shifting trade attitudes, as identities and local-level economic and foreign-born demographic statistics had inconsistent effects on support for free trade policies.

Future Study

Trade policy, prior to its increasing politicization during the candidacy and presidency of Donald Trump, was an idiosyncratic policy issue that served as a great instrument for understanding how mass perceptions change on policy issues and for examining how the American public addresses and engages with high-complexity issues with weak partisan cues. The economic effects of free trade policy are broadly difficult to understand, and it is never immediately clear who wins and who loses from greater levels of trade liberalization. In traditional applications, individuals and entities like trade unions saw trade liberalization as a

competitive threat to the lower-class worker, and it consequently followed that workers in such fragile positions would be less supportive of trade liberalization in order to protect their economic standing (Conybeare and Zikula 1996; Kaptsein 1999; Rodrick 1997; Lawrence 1996; Peters 2020; Rogowski 1989; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Shoch 2000). However, given that trade policy traditionally lacks such strong partisan cues and because its economic effects are so complicated, simple economic self-interest models fail to capture the broader implications of trade policy. Additionally, while other parts of the trade literature have presented stronger evidence that trade policy is representative of non-economic attitudes, these arguments are broadly focused on a variable that fails to capture the nuance, ambivalence, and – admittedly – ignorance many individuals have towards a policy area (Cohen 2001; Destler and Balint 1999; Johnston 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013; Mayer 1998; Mutz and Kim 2017; Rankin 2001; Sears 2001). Understanding the complexities present within respondents' attitudes on lower-salience issue items presents an avenue for a better understanding of how people's views on public policy change over time.

One of the most immediate purposes of this project is to investigate why people would express ignorance of trade policy – and by broader extension, other high-complexity issues. Ultimately, the results were largely unsurprising as respondents with high levels of news interest were significantly more likely to express an opinion on trade issues. However, moving beyond this, it is necessary for surveys and public opinion researchers to make a more conscious effort to discern between ignorance, indifference, and ambivalence, especially on non-polarized issues. Without clear political cues, individuals may feel less pressure to express cleanly polarized views and may, consequently, have more reservations in their support or opposition for certain policy

proposals. Many survey items fail to accommodate for the possibility of these complicated viewpoints.

Within the realm of trade policy, specifically, the partial partisan shift on protectionism presents another avenue for future study. Opposition to trade policy was a political method for populist conservatives to appeal to the working class. After decades of rising inequality, it is unclear whether the conventional business-oriented focus of the Republican Party is still a viable political strategy. Consequently, given that trade policy is representative of open and unconstrained capitalism, conservative protectionism may potentially function as a way for the Republican Party to appeal to voters who are more skeptical of the benefits of unregulated capitalism and may be more concerned about income inequality. Future studies should investigate potentially anti-capitalist sentiment among Republican and conservative voters and its possible influence on support for free trade.

Appendix A

Appendix for Chapter 2

Table A.1. Cronbach's Alpha for Anti-Expert Populism Scale (Democracy Fund 2017)

	Observations	Sign	Item-test Correlation	Item-rest Correlation	Average Interitem Correlation	Alpha
Rather put Trust in Ordinary People than Experts	4954	+	0.8411	0.6107	0.3188	0.4835
On Important Questions, Scientific Facts don't Help	4946	+	0.8004	0.5335	0.4166	0.5881
Ordinary People can use Help of Experts Complicated Matters	4959	+	0.7332	0.4137	0.5788	0.7332
Test Scale					0.4380	0.7004

	Table A.2. Dependent variable:
	Support for Free Trade Expansion (ANES 2018 Pilot Study)
Elections don't Matter	-0.028 (0.032)
America is Fair Society	-0.040 (0.033)
Economy Biased Towards Wealthy	-0.106*** (0.037)
You can't Believe Media	-0.214*** (0.032)
I don't have say in Government	-0.043 (0.034)
Elites don't Understand my Problems	-0.006 (0.035)
Party ID	-0.118*** (0.040)
Ideology	-0.048 (0.031)
Labor Union	-0.201*** (0.073)
News Interest	0.030 (0.037)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.261*** (0.037)
Personal Finances in Retrospect	-0.109** (0.042)
High School Graduate	-0.013 (0.176)
Some College	0.153 (0.178)
2-year	0.108 (0.185)
4-year	0.385** (0.181)
Post-grad	0.567*** (0.189)
Less than 20k	0.057 (0.090)
20k to 39,999	0.104 (0.087)
40k to 69,999	0.167* (0.096)
70k to 99,999	0.181*(0.103)
100,000 to 149,999	0.108 (0.121)
Age	0.012*** (0.002)
White	-0.216** (0.110)
Black	-0.201 (0.138)
Hispanic	-0.146 (0.152)
Female	-0.431*** (0.050)
Constant	2.200*** (0.295)
Observations	4,385
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are robust.

Table A.2 examines the influence of anti-institutional and anti-establishment populism on trade opinion in a standard probit model without a Heckman correction. Table A.2 demonstrates mixed support for hypothesis 2 – that greater anti-establishment populist views are associated with greater hostility towards free trade policy. In accordance with the two-stage Heckman model, the standard probit model shows that only feelings about the fairness of the American economy and trust in the media are associated with trade policy opinion.

To evaluate the substantive significance of populist values on trade opinion, Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values approach was used to determine the relative influence that populist values have on the likelihood that a respondent would favor free trade. Moving from the lowest agreement with the statement that the economy is biased towards the wealthy to highest agreement with the statement results in an average of a 7.3 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of supporting free trade (between a 12.1 and a 2.2 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence interval) when holding all other variables constant. Respondents who felt most strongly that the media could not be trusted were an average of 15.0 percentage points less likely to support free trade than respondents who most believed that the media could be trusted (between an 18.9 percentage point drop and an 11.3 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). While the effect of believing the media was untrustworthy on the likelihood of supporting trade expansion was similar in the standard probit model to the Heckman model, there was a difference in the substantive significance of believing the economy is biased across both models. By comparison, in the Heckman model, respondents who believed that the economy was biased in favor of the wealthy were 9.8 percentage points less likely to support free trade expansion (between 4.6 and 15.0 percentages points at the 95 percent confidence interval).

While not a dramatic change, this instance demonstrates that Heckman corrections when examining trade opinion are substantively relevant.

	Table A.3. Dependent variable:
	Support for Free Trade Expansion (Democracy Fund 2017)
Expert Composite	-0.110*** (0.022)
Party ID	-0.105* (0.063)
Ideology	-0.119** (0.048)
News Interest	0.091* (0.050)
National Economic Trend	-0.324*** (0.064)
Personal Finances in Retrospect	-0.118* (0.070)
High School Graduate	0.024 (0.260)
Some College	-0.030 (0.265)
2-year	0.412 (0.275)
4-year	0.344 (0.268)
Post-grad	0.576* (0.294)
Less than 20k	-0.201 (0.166)
20k to 39,999	-0.247* (0.141)
40k to 69,999	-0.014 (0.137)
70k to 99,999	-0.052 (0.144)
150,000+	0.215 (0.216)
Age	0.016*** (0.003)
White	0.025 (0.163)
Black	-0.116 (0.208)
Hispanic	0.085 (0.249)
Female	-0.267*** (0.081)
Constant	1.893*** (0.454)
Observations	2,782
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are robust.

The above model evaluates the effect of anti-expert populism on trade opinion in a standard probit model without a Heckman correction. To evaluate the substantive significance of anti-expert opinion values on support for free trade expansion, Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values approach was used. Moving from the first quartile level on the anti-expert populism scale (2 points) to the third quartile (5 points) results in an average of a 5.1 percentage

point drop in the likelihood of supporting free trade when holding all other variables constant (between 7.0 and a 3.2 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level.) When moving from the lowest value to the highest value (a nine-point shift), respondents are an average of 17.2 percentage points less likely to support free trade policy when holding all other variable constant (between a 24.5 percentage drop and a 10.3 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). Consequently, hypothesis 3 – that anti-expert populist views decrease the likelihood of supporting trade policy – is supported.

It is also relevant to evaluate the role of news interest in both Tables A.2 and A.3. News interest was used as the exclusion in all the Heckman models in this chapter (and will be included as the exclusion for future Heckman models). In Table A.2, news interest fails to have an impact on trade opinion direction. In Table A.3, news interest has an effect that only approaches statistical significance. This is relevant because news interest has a consistent role in shaping whether respondents have opinions on trade policy, but little-to-no role in shaping how respondents develop free trade opinions. Finally, it is worth further analyzing the role of gender. In Table A.3, which uses the 2017 wave, gender has a strong influence on trade opinion, despite gender having no effect in the outcome model of the Heckman probit counterpart. By contrast, in both Tables 2.1 and A.2 (which analyze the 2016 data), women are significantly more protectionist than men. The reason for the model discrepancy requires further exploration.

Appendix B

Appendix for Chapter 3

Table B.1. Cronbach's Alpha for Diversity Anxiety Scale (Democracy Fund 2016)

	Observations	Sign	Item-test Correlation	Item-rest Correlation	Average Interitem Correlation	Alpha
Diversity not Important to Americanism	7725	+	0.6764	0.4786	0.4685	0.7791
Americans will not Learn more from Cultures	7842	+	0.7997	0.6581	0.3931	0.7215
Diversity will not lead to Growth	7834	+	0.7960	0.6524	0.3953	0.7234
Diversity causes too many Demands on Services	7832	+	0.7648	0.6053	0.4143	0.7389
Demographic Change leads to too few Jobs	7833	+	0.6539	0.4476	0.4834	0.7892
Test Scale					0.4310	0.7911

Table B.2. Cronbach's Alpha for Ethnonationalism Scale (Democracy Fund 2016)

	Observations	Sign	Item-test Correlation	Item-rest Correlation	Average Interitem Correlation	Alpha
Importance of being White to Americanism	7510	+	0.6830	0.5286	0.4816	0.8228
Importance of being Born in America to Americanism	7740	+	0.8185	0.7157	0.4216	0.7847
Importance of American Citizenship to Americanism	7766	+	0.6583	0.4949	0.4935	0.8297
Importance of Living most of Life in America to Americanism	7696	+	0.8065	0.6991	0.4270	0.7884
Importance of Speaking English to Americanism	7794	+	0.7125	0.5667	0.4693	0.8155
Importance of being Christian to Americanism	7642	+	0.7635	0.6373	0.4463	0.8012
Test Scale					0.4566	0.8345

Appendix C

Appendix for Chapter 4

Additional Questions for 2021 Survey Experiment

The following were additional questions in the survey that were exploratory in scope. Respondents were asked whether they believed the US should rejoin or stay out of the TPP.[67] Next, respondents were asked about their beliefs on the benefits of trade between the United States and other countries.[68] Respondents were then asked whether the supported or opposed increasing free trade with other nations.[69] The next question asked respondents about their feelings about outsourcing.[70]

[67] Respondents were asked "Do you believe that the United States should rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or stay out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?" Responses were recorded as a binary variable. Respondents who answered "Rejoin the TPP" scored a 1, while respondents who answered "Stay out of the TPP" scored a 0. "Don't know" responses were excluded.

[68] Respondents were asked "Have increasing amounts of trade with other countries been good for the United States, bad for the United States, or neither good nor bad?" Responses were scored on a 3-point ordinal scale. Respondents who said trade with the US was "Bad" scored the lowest value; respondents who said it was "Neither good nor bad" scored the next lowest value; and respondents who said it was "Good" scored the highest value. "Don't know" responses were excluded.

[69] Respondents were asked "Do you favor or oppose increasing trade with other nations?" This is measured as a binary variable. Respondents who chose "Favor" were scored as a 1 while respondent who chose "Oppose" were scored as 0. Respondents who selected "Don't know" were excluded. This question was used by the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group across several years from 2011 onwards.

[70] Respondents were prompted with "Recently, some big American companies have been hiring workers in foreign countries to replace workers in the U.S. Do you think the federal government should discourage companies from doing this, encourage companies to do this, or stay out of this matter?" Responses were scored on a 3-point ordinal scale. Respondents who answered "Discourage" scored the lowest value; respondents who answered "Stay out of this matter" scored the next lowest value; and respondents who answered "Encourage" scored the highest value. "Don't know" responses were excluded. This question was used in the 2012 and 2016 versions of the ANES survey.

Standard Probit Model

	Table C.1 Dependent variable:
	Likelihood of Saying TPP Is Important (Democracy Fund 2017)
US Respect	-0.273*** (0.037)
Stranger in Country	0.172*** (0.028)
America Trend	0.009 (0.028)
Party ID	-0.031 (0.040)
Ideology	0.004 (0.029)
News Interest	0.142*** (0.041)
Family Income Less than 20k	0.236** (0.107)
Family Income 20k to 39,999	0.215** (0.086)
Family Income 40k to 69,999	0.079 (0.077)
Family Income 70k to 99,999	-0.031 (0.080)
Family Income 150k or More	0.051 (0.092)
High School Graduate	-0.334 (0.213)
Some College	-0.288 (0.216)
2-Year Degree	-0.401* (0.217)
4-Year Degree	-0.458** (0.214)
Post-Graduate	-0.362* (0.219)
Personal Finances in Retrospect	-0.060 (0.043)
National Economic Trend	0.041 (0.042)
White	-0.040 (0.103)
Black	0.035 (0.137)
Hispanic	0.183 (0.143)
Age	0.006*** (0.002)
Female	-0.042 (0.050)
Constant	-0.441 (0.341)
Observations	2,982
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Data reported as log odds. Standard errors are robust.

When analyzing Table C.1, the probit model that excludes neutral opinions, the influence of the feelings of national respect and the influence of feelings that an individual is a stranger

within one's own country are also strong. To evaluate substantive significance, Hanmer and Kalkan's (2013) observed values approach is utilized. When moving from the perception that the United States is more respected now than in the past to the perception that the United States is less respected now than in the past, the likelihood that the respondent will state that TPP membership is a high priority issue drops about 19.9 percentage points from a 61.3 percent likelihood to a 41.4 percent likelihood (between a 15.2 and a 26.6 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). Moving from strong disagreement to strong agreement in the perception that the respondent is a stranger in his or her own country causes the respondent to be about 18.7 percentage points more likely to indicate that the TPP is a high priority issue – an increase from about 35.4 percent to 54.1 percent likelihood (between a 12.7 and a 24.2 percentage point drop at the 95 percent confidence level). Notably, in the probit model, these effects produce an apparently linear effect on the likelihood of indicating that TPP membership. Collectively, both models support hypotheses 4a and 4b.

In the probit model where news interest is included, news interest positively and statistically significantly increases TPP membership priority and the likelihood of indicating that TPP membership is a high priority issue. In the probit model, there is also a positive correlation between news interest and likelihood that the respondent will indicate that TPP membership is a high priority. Moving from having hardly any interest in political news to having interest in political news most of the time results in a 15.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of indicating that the TPP is a high priority issue – a shift from a 31.4 percent probability to a 46.7 percent probability (between a 6.7 percentage point increase and a 23.5 percentage point increase at the 95 percent confidence level). Like international respect for the United States and the

sentiment that the respondent is a stranger in his or her own country, news interest has an apparently linear effect on the likelihood of indicating TPP membership is a high priority issue.

Appendix D

Appendix for Chapter 5

Opposition and Non-opinion Shifts

Figure D.1a. Trade Opposition versus Party ID by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Figure D.1b. Trade Non-Opinion versus Party ID by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Figure D.1a shows that Republicans, Democrats, and Independents were roughly equal in opposition to free trade at 2011; however, there is a small but clear divergence by 2016 and 2017. Figure D.1b demonstrates that, at the 2011 level, Democrats are slightly more likely to issue a DK response than either Republicans or independents, but this partisan disparity diminishes over time.





Utilizing the ANES 2012 and 2016 data, there are some differences relative to the DFVSG data when analyzing shifts in opposition and non-opinion. According to Figure D.1c, in 2012, the Republicans were the most likely to be oppositional to import limits while Democrats were the least likely. By 2016, these positions switched and Republicans became the least likely to oppose import limits while Democrats became the most likely to oppose import limits. Figure D.1d shows that Republicans were the least likely to issue a DK response in 2012 of any party affiliation and became even less likely by 2016.

Figure D.2a. Opposition to Trade versus 2016 Primary Support by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Figure D.2b. Trade Non-Opinion versus 2016 Primary Support by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Figure D.2c. Opposition to Trade versus 2016 Primary Support by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)





Eventual Trump supporters were more opposed to free trade than primary voters who did not back Trump and all other respondents. This effect is consistent across all three periods. In 2011, eventual Trump supporters were about 3 percentage points more oppositional to free trade policy. By contrast, despite lower support for free trade, eventual Sanders supporters in 2011 did not express greater opposition towards free trade policy. Non-Sanders Democrats were less likely to issue non-opinions than Sanders Democrats across all three periods.



Figure D.3b. Trade Non-Opinion versus Regulation by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Figure D.3c. Opposition to Import Limits versus Ideal Amount of Government Regulation of Business by Year (ANES 2012–2016)



Figure D.3d. Import Limit Non-Opinion versus Ideal Amount of Government Regulation of Business by Year (ANES 2012–2016)



Figure D.3a demonstrates that while respondents with different views on government regulation had slight differences in their opposition to free trade, those differences vanished by 2017. Figure D.3c shows that respondents who want a high amount of government regulation in business were the least oppositional to import limits in 2012, but the most oppositional to import limits in 2016. The opposite is true for respondents who wants a low amount of regulation in business. Those respondents were the most oppositional to import limits in 2012 and the least opposition to import limits in 2016. These trends, while modest, indicate that respondents became less ideologically constrained on matters of trade policy during this period.

Figure D.4a. Opposition to Trade versus Education by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



Figure D.4b. Trade Non-Opinion versus Education by Year (DFVSG 2011–2017)



In 2011, 26% of respondents without a college education oppose free trade expansion, while 16% of respondents with some college education oppose it. By 2017, this ten percent differential shrinks to approximately a 5 percent differential. It is also worthwhile to note that in 2016, both respondents with and without a college education gave more DK responses than they did in 2011. Given that the responses are among the same respondents and because trade policy became more salient in 2016, it is possible that non-opinion to trade policy questions demonstrates ambivalence or neutrality.

Appendix E

Appendix for Chapter 6

Table E.1. Cronbach's Alpha for Immigration Scale (CCES 2016)

	Observations	Sign	Item-test Correlation	Item-rest Correlation	Average Interitem Correlation	Alpha
Do not grant legal status to non-felon immigrants in US for 3 years	63826	+	0.7550	0.5270	0.3712	0.5822
Increase border patrol on U.S.-Mexican Border	63826	+	0.6498	0.3686	0.4178	0.6829
Do not grant legal status to immigrants brought illegally as children that graduated High School	63826	+	0.6826	0.4159	0.3864	0.6539
Identify and deport illegal immigrants	63826	+	0.7825	0.5719	0.2909	0.5517
Test Scale					0.3531	0.6858

Table E.2. Cronbach's Alpha for Immigration Scale (CCES 2018)

	Observations	Sign	Item-test Correlation	Item-rest Correlation	Average Interitem Correlation	Alpha
Increase spending on border security by $25 billion, including border wall	59018	+	0.8366	0.7238	0.4415	0.7598
Provide legal status to immigrants brought as children and provide citizenship in 10 years	59192	+	0.6496	0.4540	0.5621	0.8370
Reduce legal immigration through visa lottery	58018	+	0.7774	0.6342	0.4799	0.7868
Withhold federal funds from police departments that do not report illegal immigrants	59277	+	0.8263	0.7076	0.4480	0.7645
Send to prison anyone deported who reenters the U.S.	59262	+	0.7493	0.5925	0.4978	0.7986
Test Scale					0.4858	0.8253

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