ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: LATINO THREAT: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL THREAT ON CITY CAPACITY FOR SOCIAL CONTROL

Frank Donohue, Master of Arts, 2023

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In recent years, police killings of minority individuals have come to the forefront of scholars and the minds of the general public, with the highly publicized murders of George Floyd, Freddie Gray, and Breonna Taylor. Extant literature largely focuses on police killings of African Americans, and while this is of great importance, less attention has been paid to police-involved homicides of Latinos. The current study seeks to understand city level variation in police killings of Latinos, paying particular attention to a "dynamic" measure of racial threat -- change in the Latino population, and the presence of open political opportunity structures. I draw on an original dataset of 233 cities, with data curated from Fatal Encounters, Decennial Census, the American Community Survey, the Uniform Crime Report, the National Immigration Law Center, and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials. Regarding racial threat, I find that static Latino threat operates in a nonlinear fashion

as it relates to police killings, and moreover that cities that experience more pronounced change in the Latino population over time (i.e., dynamic threat) translates to higher city-level rates of police killings of Latinos. Additionally, I find that sanctuary jurisdictions and gateway cities serve as a protective buffer for Latinos against lethal police violence. Implications for this complex and nuanced issue, including police-community relationships, the functionality of the police, and extralegal consequences for minority populations are also discussed.

# LATINO THREAT: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL THREAT ON CITY CAPACITY FOR SOCIAL CONTROL

by

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

In recent years, police killings of minority individuals have come to the forefront of scholars and the minds of the general public, with the highly publicized murders of George Floyd, Freddie Gray, and Breonna Taylor (Haines, 2020; Hill et al., 2020; Stolberg & Nixon, 2015). Subsequent social movements have spurred and demanded investigations into the systemic origins of policing, seeking widespread, institutional change. For example, the Black Lives Matter and Defund the Police movements have prompted discussions about police injustices and violence, particularly against African Americans (Cobbina-Dungy & Jones-Brown, 2023; Skoy, 2021).

Such outcries among the general public have generated interest among criminological researchers, particularly with the advent of crowd-sourced data collection on fatal police-resident encounters (Cesario et al., 2019; Schwartz & Jahn, 2020; Tregle et al., 2019). However, much of this scholarship focuses on police killings of African Americans (Gray & Parker, 2020; Smith, 2004). While this is of great importance, less attention has been paid to police-involved homicides of Latinos (Holmes et al., 2019; Weitzer, 2014). Such a dearth of research exists despite Latinos representing the largest and fastest growing racial minority group in the United States, through both increased immigration from countries of origin, as well as increases in second generation immigrant birth rates (Bersani, 2014; Cabral & Cuevas, 2020; Massey, 2020).

The primary theoretical tradition to understand how race and formal social control (e.g., police killings) are related is conflict theory, and particularly racial threat theory (Blalock, 1967; Stults & Swagar, 2018; Vélez & Peguero, 2023). At the core is the expectation that as a minority population increases relative to whites, this growing population is perceived as a threat to the political and economic hegemony held by whites. As such, state actors increase reliance on formal social control measures in order to maintain their dominance in society. For example, upticks in the African American and Latino population are associated with increases in police expenditures (Jackson, 1989; Vargas & McHarris, 2017), size of the police force (Carmichael & Kent, 2014; D'Alessio et al., 2005), as well as non-lethal use of force (Holmes, 2000; Smith & Holmes, 2014), and lethal use of force against such groups (Holmes et al., 2019; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998). Furthermore, Blalock (1967) anticipated that when, for example, minority individuals hold political power (e.g., mayor) or a policy is instituted that empowers the political, economic, or social status of minorities, the relationship would be nonlinear, and it would accelerate formal social control. As the political threat of the minority group grows stronger, formal social control measures geared toward preserving political dominance will increase at an accelerating rate, given that the hegemonic group may criminalize the minority population. In that vein, extant literature indicates support for the idea that an increased minority political threat, as can happen with Black voting, is associated with an escalated intensity of crime control measures (Wang & Mears, 2010a).

Work by others however anticipates another nonlinear possibility – a counterthreat to formal social control. Some scholars argue that a growing minority

population is the ingredient that allows for mobilization against formal social control (Vélez et al., 2015). Therefore, political and bureaucratic ascension by minority groups may translate to decreased levels of formal social control (Horowitz, 1985; Turk, 1969). That is, if a minority group becomes large enough and achieves some political and bureaucratic integration in society, this may result in a greater ability for collective action, as well as the concession of hegemonic power by whites, thereby quelling existing formal social control mechanisms (Horowitz, 1985; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Turk, 1969). To make sense of this possibility, I draw upon the concept of political opportunity structures, which if open facilitate minority empowerment and if closed limit it. The idea is that places with minority political power will use city channels to redirect efforts away from formal social control to policies that reduce tensions between law enforcement and minority communities, as well as foster social investments that benefit such communities (Vélez et al., 2015). For example, prior literature documents that cities with Black mayors, an indicator of Black political opportunity, have fewer police killings of Black individuals, and that bureaucratic incorporation of minorities into police departments can lead to improved police-community relationships, thus supporting arguments of redirecting resources and community investment (Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Marrow, 2009; Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009). This thesis takes seriously the idea that the implementation of formal social control measures by law enforcement are nested within political environments of cities across the United States.

The current study anticipates racial threat to be both demographic and political, seeking to understand whether changes in racial composition (i.e., the

Latino population from 2000 to 2010), as well as variation in closed versus open political opportunity structures are associated with city level variation in police killings of Latinos. As such, this project utilizes crowd sourced data exclusively from Fatal Encounters, the Decennial Census, the American Community Survey, the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey, the Uniform Crime Report, the National Immigration Law Center, and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials. Finally, I leverage a poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimate regression technique in order to investigate the relationship between Latino threat and rates of police killings of Latinos.

Current literature suggests one of two ways in which racial threat may play out. On the one hand, criminological and sociological literature, such as Blalock's political threat hypothesis, would anticipate that cities with increases in the Latino population and with relatively receptive and open political structures will have more police killings of Latinos. On the other hand, political science literature, including frameworks of bureaucratic representation, would anticipate that open political opportunity structures result in fewer police killings. The former grounds the argument of the current study. As such, this study fills a critical gap in the extant literature by examining Latino threat through the lens of population change and structural markers of political threat, and how these dynamics impact the most extreme dimension of formal social control, police killings.

Studying police killings represent "the tip of the iceberg", so to speak, as they represent the most extreme dimension of formal social control. Certainly, the most consequential result of police killings, in contrast to other dimensions of formal social

control such as non-lethal use of force, is their contribution to increased risks of mortality, particularly among communities of color. Police killings represent a leading cause of death for young men, behind accidents, suicides, other homicides, heart disease, and cancer (Edwards et al., 2019). In this sense, police violence represents a leading cause of death that is inflicted by another individual, as opposed to natural processes or self-inflicted death. While African Americans hold the highest lifetime risk of mortality vis-à-vis the police, Latinos face a higher likelihood than both whites and the total population, more broadly, to be killed by police. In particular, Latinos are approximately 1.4 times more likely than whites to be killed by the police, and additionally that lethal use of force by law enforcement is responsible for 1.2% of Latino deaths among those aged 20-24 years old, compared to just 0.5% of whites within this same age bracket (Edwards et al., 2019). Examining police killings, then, highlights a process of formal social control that holds profound impacts on one's life chances, particularly for racial minorities.

Apart from the immediate impact that is suffered through one's death at the hands of law enforcement, police killings may hold consequential implications for police-community relationships. Police killings may sever relationships with minority communities and foster a sense of distrust and perceived unfairness among this population. For example, procedural justice scholars contend that the public makes judgments on how police employ discretion and exercise authority, as well as their decision-making process (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006). As such, citizens who perceive their encounters with law enforcement as fair and just are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward police, which is crucial to cooperative police-

community relationships (Bolger & Walters, 2019; Donner et al., 2015). In the wake of police killings, such violence may amplify negative community attitudes toward law enforcement. These incidents, as opposed to non-fatal police violence, may activate the greatest rise in distrust and delegitimization of the police. Such ideas of *legal cynicism* convey an attitude among the public that views law enforcement as illegitimate, ineffective, and unresponsive (Kirk & Matsuda, 2011; Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). In turn, the breakdown in procedural justice, and a subsequent rise in legal cynicism, hold considerable implications for communities in which the police routinely serve.

In particular, unjust behavior by the police may engender considerable consequences for the functionality of the police to solve and prevent crime (Cheng & Long, 2022; Roberts & Roberts Jr., 2022). Specifically, incidents of police brutality and police killings may decrease citizen reporting to the police as a result of increased legal cynicism. Observing that police employ unjust tactics, residents may resort to self-help strategies in which they take matters into their own hands, thus only calling police when the situation is dire (Anderson, 1999; Bell, 2016; Brunson & Wade, 2019). For example, scholars found that the non-fatal police beating of an African American man in Milwaukee was associated with decreased reporting of crimes to law enforcement, particularly among residents of Black neighborhoods (Desmond et al., 2016, 2020, but see Zoorob (2020) for a critique). Related to *fatal* incidents of police violence, Ang and colleagues (2021) find that 911 calls fell precipitously after the murder of George Floyd. Further, there is empirical evidence suggesting that police killings may negatively influence extralegal outcomes, such as school

performance, mental health outcomes, and civic engagement, particularly for minority individuals (Ang, 2021; Bor et al., 2018; Markarian, 2023). Given that "the police are to the state as the edge is to a knife" (Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998: 859), studying police killings is meaningful in both its short term impacts on one's life chances, as well as its long-term consequences for communities more broadly.

# Chapter 2: Conceptual Arguments

*Latino Growth and Perceived Threat*

Since the 1960s, Latinos have comprised a substantial proportion of new immigrants to the United States. Approximately half of the post-1965 wave of immigrants either hold familial origins in Mexico, or other countries in Latin America, predominantly from Central America and the Caribbean (Hirschman, 2014). For Latinos in particular, immigration surged after the termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 (Massey et al., 2002). Increases in Latino immigration can also be attributed to legislation that included provisions regarding family reunification and scant occupational abilities (Keely, 1979). In addition to immigration, the second-generation Latino population increased twofold from 2000 to 2020 (Bersani, 2014). As such, the Latino population represents the largest and fastest growing minority population in the United States, currently comprising 19% of the United States population, and may grow to approximately 30% of the population by 2060 (Díaz McConnell, 2019; Krogstad et al., 2022).

These increases in the size of the Latino population have led to an increased criminalization of this group in the present day, with stereotypes being placed on Latinos, and immigrants in particular, fueled by claims that "illegals" cause crime, steal "American" jobs, and engage in acts that otherwise endanger or threaten the status of native-born Americans (Flores & Schachter, 2018; Light & Miller, 2018; Ousey & Kubrin, 2018). This perceived criminal element of Latinos has led to both federal and state level policy changes (e.g., 287(g), AZ SB1070, etc.) seeking to quell the growing perceived influence of the Latino population, in both the political and

economic spheres (Armenta, 2017; Flores, 2017; Stumpf, 2006). Moreover, non-state actors such as the Minuteman Project, rooted in nativism and vigilantism, seek to police undocumented immigrants traveling across the southern border, further stigmatizing and criminalizing the Latino population as a threat to society (Stewart et al., 2015). These increased perceptions of Latino threat, particularly among whites, has fueled increased support for aggressive policing tactics of this population (Pickett, 2016).

## *Racial Threat*

### Conflict Theory

The conflict perspective argues that the state does not represent societal interests, but rather represents the interests of those in power. Therefore, less powerful people in society, including minorities, are more likely to be defined by the state as criminals when pursuing their own self-interests. In contrast, hegemonic societal groups hold greater autonomy to pursue their own interests, and in turn wield greater power to designate particular populations as threatening. Thus, in areas where the minority population is growing, conflict theorists would argue that this group poses an escalating threat to the status quo, and formal social control, including police violence, is warranted to curb the growing influence of this group (Blalock, 1967; Stults & Swagar, 2018).

### Blalock's Racial Threat Theory

One such conflict theory is Blalock's theory of racial threat. This framework posits that the hegemonic group in society utilizes the structures of the state in order

to control "subordinate" groups who threaten the interests of the dominant group (Blalock, 1967: 145). Thus, as a minority group's population increases, formal social control measures are implemented in an attempt to quell the growing influence of this group. One particular dimension of Blalock's theory is political threat, which follows that as racial and ethnic minorities increase their political representation and power, whites feel as if their political power and interests are threatened. As the political threat of the minority group grows stronger, formal social control measures will increase at an *accelerating* rate in order to mitigate the attempted upward political mobilization by minority populations.

Empirical studies largely apply a linear functional form in their measurement of threat. For example, studies find that greater levels of social control are instituted in places defined by larger minority populations. For Latinos in particular, this positive relationship is observed with various markers of social control, including police expenditures (Vargas & McHarris, 2017), size of the police force (D'Alessio et al., 2005), arrests (Kane et al., 2013), and non-lethal use of force (Holmes, 2000; Smith & Holmes, 2014). However, this assumption among racial threat scholars also produces a negative linear relationship. For example, areas with larger Latino populations may experience less social control, primarily in the context of police force size (McCarty et al., 2012; Sever, 2001; Zhao et al., 2012). Moreover, scholars have found no relation between percent Latino and total police killings when threat is operationalized through a linear functional form (Smith, 2003, 2004; Willits & Nowacki, 2014). In sum, linear interpretations of racial threat theory have produced mixed findings, no matter the type of formal social control under scrutiny.

While a large sum of literature centers theoretical arguments around a linear interpretation of racial threat, Blalock (1967) and other scholars contend that racial threat operates in a nonlinear fashion, though such conceptualizations of this relationship vary. On the one hand, Blalock's political threat hypothesis proposes that as the percentage of the relative minority population increases, so does the intensity of formal social control measures. In response to this growing population, formal social control measures will increase at an *accelerating* rate. On the other hand, some scholars argue that once the minority population becomes a plurality or majority of the population, such formal social control measures begin to decrease in magnitude (Horowitz, 1985; Turk, 1969). Specific to political threat, the magnitude of formal social control aimed at a particular minority population may *decelerate* as this group, both in numbers as well as its political influence, grows relative to whites (Jackson & Carroll, 1981; Jacobs et al., 2005). Traditional curvilinear relationships between Latino threat and formal social control have been observed in the context of police expenditures (Holmes et al., 2008; Jackson, 1985; Sever, 2001), size of the police force (Katz et al., 2002; Stucky, 2005), and police homicides (Holmes et al., 2019). Conversely, other studies find an inverse curvilinear relationship, where the magnitude of formal social control decreases during the initial Latino population increase, but these measures then increase in influence after the population reaches a particular threshold, for outcomes such as police deployment (Kane, 2003) and size of the police force (Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Kent & Carmichael, 2014). Thus, prior studies of Latino threat, as illustrated above, find support for the nonlinear hypothesis of the theory. However, the exact functional form of these relationships varies, and are

conditional on the temporal dimensions of the data, unit of analysis, and type of formal social control measured.

Region may also impact the nonlinear relationship between racial threat and formal social control. In particular, the Southwest region may present a situation in which Latinos are particularly numerous and powerful, through both population size and political influence. Such a dynamic may reduce or amplify formal social control. This assertion is supported by Hawkins (1987), who notes that "a revised conflict perspective must predict the direction of regional differences… and provide plausible explanations for them" (732). While Hawkins and other scholars have primarily examined this idea in the context of the Black experience in the South, it is important to evaluate how Latino threat varies on a regional basis. Latinos are primarily concentrated, contemporarily and historically in the Southwest.[1] Thus, geographic region may act as a proxy for political opportunities, for example, where the sizable Latino population enjoys political representation in the Southwest, with the election of Latino council members, mayors, and other officials (Garcia, 1986; Garcia & Sanchez, 2021; Holmes et al., 2019; Holmes & Painter, 2023).[2]

On the one hand, region can provide a moderating effect through the reduction of formal social control, as elected Latino officials, who are aligned with the concerns of their group, may enforce laws that benefit other Latino citizens. This would result in less formal social control once Latinos are at a majority. Such a nonlinear

[1] While the Latino population is still largely concentrated in the Southwest, this dynamic is currently changing. Recent demographic trends identify that the Latino population's rate of growth from 2010 to 2020 took place in states that have not historically had large Latino populations (Passel et al., 2022).
[2] Also see https://naleo.org/at-a-glance/. The states with the largest number of Latino elected officials are in the Southwest: Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas.

relationship is illustrated by Figure 1. On the other hand, concerns among whites, the hegemonic group, may recognize larger populations of Latinos in the Southwest as a growing threat to their political status. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the increased visibility of this group, both demographically and politically, creates a greater risk for the implementation of formal social control measures. This idea, consistent with Blalock's accelerating political threat hypothesis, is indicated by Figure 2.

Extant literature indicates that the substantial Latino population in the Southwest represents a double-edged sword to the implementation of formal social control measures, as increased political and bureaucratic opportunities in this locale may translate to increased *or* decreased levels of formal social control against Latinos. For example, both Holmes (2000) and Smith and Holmes (2003) find that as percent Latino increased in the Southwest, the number of civil rights complaints against law enforcement also increased. This supports prior research suggesting that Southwestern Latinos are perceived as threatening (Jackson, 1985; Wang, 2012), wherein region serves to moderate formal social control in an accelerating fashion. Moreover, a recent study finds that police-caused homicides of Latinos are largely clustered in the Southwest, suggesting that region may serve to *amplify* the most extreme form of social control (Holmes et al., 2019). Such a relationship is not suggestive of a moderating effect, however, given that the authors did not test an interaction between percent Latino and the Southwest, unlike the prior studies (Holmes, 2000; Smith & Holmes, 2003).

However, at the heart of Blalock's theory is *dynamic* threat, or the *change* over time in the minority population, that is the main driver of formal social control.

Blalock (1967) explains, for example, that "the change in [the minority] population… might affect prejudice levels and discriminatory behavior" (176). Similarly, Liska (1992) notes that a change in minority threat "may be perceived as more threatening than a stable high level [of threat]" (189). As the hegemonic societal group, whites may perceive an increased influx of Latinos as possessing characteristics that are threatening or undesirable, and thus may employ various social control measures in response to this change. For example, areas with increasing immigrant populations are more likely to experience hostile reactions among current residents to these individuals (Hopkins, 2010). Such reactions are often translated into exclusionary immigration policies such as 287(g), which are more likely to be enacted in locales with growing, rather than established, foreign-born populations, thereby lending theoretical weight to a dynamic threat mechanism (Walker & Leitner, 2011).

Within the context of policing, few studies have conceptualized racial threat dynamically. For example, Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) find that cities with increasing Black populations experience relatively more police killings of African Americans. Moreover, Holmes and Painter (2023) examine the connection between police strength and changes in both the native-born and foreign-born Latino population, to which they find little evidence of a relationship.

Other scholarship, meanwhile, has applied the dynamic threat hypothesis to contexts outside of policing, though this literature is relatively sparse (Caravelis et al., 2011; Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Golden, 2012; Green et al., 1998; King & Wheelock, 2007; Updegrove et al., 2020; Wang & Mears, 2010b). Such literature examining racial threat as a change measure, in a similar vein as the traditional, static marker of

threat, are unable to discern a consistent effect on formal social control. My project informs these prior works by applying Latino threat as the change in this population as it relates to city level rates of police killings, a crucial gap in the extant literature. Leveraging a dynamic threat perspective therefore addresses prior concerns that the sole reliance on a "static" marker of threat may create uncertainty concerning the empirical status of racial threat theory (Chamlin, 1989).

*Latino Political Opportunity Structures*

The "political opportunity structure" framework posits that the political and economic success of minorities are shaped through elections and the institution of policies that benefit such groups (Eisinger 1973). "Closed" political opportunity structures, for example, are those where the government is unresponsive, wherein people are unable to attain certain goals or seek political action. However, Eisinger (1973) argues that in relatively "open" political opportunity structures, the local government is more responsive to its members by providing "opportunities of formal representation for distinct segments of the population" (12), for example, through the election of Black mayors and council members (Vélez et al., 2015). While Eisinger (1973) primarily frames political opportunity structures in the context of Black representation, such examples can also be applied to the Latino population. For example, the presence of a Latino mayor is associated with increased employment of Latino law enforcement officers, thus expanding opportunities for this group for representation in the police force (Zhao et al., 2005). As a result, open political opportunity structures may create substantive benefits for minorities, including Latinos, such as decreased experiences of formal social control (Lyons et al., 2013;

Vélez et al., 2015). In turn, these substantive benefits may marshal policy changes that benefit the political, economic, and social positions of minorities, such as greater citizen control over the police force, reallocating funds to neighborhoods to combat crime, and the improvement of relations between minority citizens and public officials, including law enforcement. In that vein, the current study explores how various measures of Latino political opportunity structures, including mayors, councilmember representation, bureaucratic incorporation into the police force, sanctuary policies, and gateway status impact the city-level rate of Latinos killed by police.

**Mayoral Effect**

City mayors represent political empowerment, as their legislative authority may wield considerable influence over the implementation of salient policies for minority communities. However, no studies in the realm of racial threat to date have incorporated the influence of a Latino mayor as it relates to formal social control mechanisms, in particular, the use of force by police. Several studies have analyzed the effect of a Black mayor, for which findings are mixed, conditional on the type of formal social control being measured. With respect to police brutality, Parker et al. (2005a) find that the presence of a Black mayor increases the incidence of nonlethal police use of force on civilians. However, Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) find a negative relationship between a Black mayor and the number of police shootings of Black individuals. Conversely, Legewie and Fagan (2016) find no relationship between the presence of a Black mayor and the killing of African Americans by police officers. Moreover, studies looking at arrests, ranging from violent to drug to order

maintenance arrests, largely find no effect of a Black mayor on Black arrest rates for the aforementioned crime categories (Eitle & Monahan 2009; Ousey & Lee, 2008; Parker et al., 2005b; Sharp, 2014; Stucky, 2012). Thus, the mixed results of these studies suggest uncertainty as to whether the presence of a Latino mayor, as an open political opportunity structure, would either increase or decrease the incidence of police killings of Latinos.

**Presence of Other Minority Elected Officials**

Similarly, the extant literature documents the relationship between formal social control and other elected minority officials (e.g., council members), primarily in the context of Black political figures. With the exception of Legewie and Fagan (2016), who find no relationship between the proportion of Black council members and police shootings of African Americans, much of this scholarship lends support to the political science thesis that greater opportunities for minority figures within the political sphere reduces various forms of formal social control. For example, Ochs (2011) finds that Black political opportunities, measured through the combination of a Black mayor and the percentage of Black members on the city council, decreases the incidence of police lethal force toward African Americans. A similar relationship holds for arrests, where both total arrests among African Americans, as well as the racial disparities in Black-white arrests decline when more Black and nonwhite officials, more broadly, serve on the city council (Eckhouse, forthcoming; Sharp, 2014). Finally, Christiani and colleagues (2022) find that Black drivers hold a lower likelihood of being searched in cities composed of majority-Black city councils. Such findings counter Blalock's hypothesis of political threat and instead support

frameworks of political and bureaucratic representation, which contend that increased minority representation leads to decreased formal social control (Horowitz, 1985; Turk, 1969).

**Incorporation into the Police Force**

A core framework within policing is bureaucratic incorporation, which advocates for increased representation of police officers, including minority and female officers. Proponents of bureaucratic incorporation argue that greater opportunities for minority individuals to join the police force lead to policies that benefit similarly situated societal groups, and lead to better relationships with the public (Marrow, 2009; Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009). Moreover, minority officers are better educated about minority communities and the underlying culture of these communities and may therefore express greater empathy to the concerns of these groups (Legewie & Fagan, 2016; Smith, 2003; Sun & Payne, 2004). Thus, increased diversity within police departments can reduce tensions with minority groups, as non-white officers may better relate to such groups and enhance perceptions of police legitimacy. Reducing such tensions may result in decreased use of force among police officers (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).

Existing scholarship indicates mixed results for the benefits of bureaucratic incorporation of Latinos into the police force for formal social control outcomes. Smith and Holmes (2003) find that in cities where the proportion of Latino police officers closely matches the proportion of Latino citizens, the incidence of citizen complaints against police is lower. However, a subsequent study by the two authors finds that in the Southwest, when the proportion of Latino police officers is more

representative of Latino citizens, excessive force complaints among the latter are higher (Smith & Holmes, 2014). The authors attribute this finding to the historical tensions between law enforcement and those of Mexican origin in the Southwest (Bender, 2003). This dynamic, combined with recent tensions related to immigration, may exacerbate the perceived threat of Latino immigrants among Latino police officers. As it relates to lethal force, existing studies that include Latino police incorporation find no relation to police homicides of Latinos (Holmes et al., 2019).

**Sanctuary Cities**

Extant literature notes that historically, sanctuary policies are implemented largely in response to federal action, or inaction, as it relates to immigration enforcement (Bau, 1994; Ridgley, 2008). As it relates to the framework of political opportunity structures, such policies seek to more adequately incorporate immigrant residents into the political, economic, and social infrastructures of the community, as well as to indicate that local politicians and institutions are attuned and sympathetic to the needs of immigrants (Lyons et al., 2013; Martínez-Schuldt & Martínez, 2021). As such, the adoption of immigrant-friendly policies is indicative of jurisdictions that contain favorable political opportunity structures for immigrants.

There is considerable variation in immigrant-related policies in major metropolitan areas across the United States. On the one hand, some cities have sought to encourage cooperation between local police and immigration enforcement, through the implementation of "devolution" measures, such as 287(g) and Secure Communities. Such policies may hinder the ability of Latinos to attain political, economic, and social goals. On the other hand, other jurisdictions have espoused a

pro-immigrant position through the adoption of sanctuary policies, which seek to limit cooperation with local officials as well as the federal government in enforcing immigration statutes (Armenta, 2017). Proponents of such policies argue that sanctuary policies foster greater trust in law enforcement, thereby quelling the development of legal cynicism in immigrant communities (Kittrie, 2005; Lyons et al., 2013; Martínez et al., 2018; Martínez-Schuldt & Martínez, 2019; Martínez-Schuldt & Martínez, 2021; Sullivan, 2009). As such, sanctuary cities represent an open political opportunity structure for Latinos, who are less constrained by structural barriers for political, economic, and social advancement in these communities compared to non-sanctuary jurisdictions. In contrast, opponents argue that sanctuary laws create a public safety threat by allowing unauthorized immigrants into cities and prohibiting police from enforcing strict immigration laws (Garcia, 2009; Vaughan, 2017). This perspective aligns with the political threat hypothesis stipulated by Blalock (1967), that the adoption of sanctuary policies increases the levels of formal social control placed on Latinos, as legislation in favor of this group threatens the political hegemony of whites.

The scant research on sanctuary cities as it relates to formal social control responses generates a pressing need to operationalize this variable in the context of racial threat, given how it represents an "open" political opportunity structure, particularly for Latino immigrants. As a result, it is possible that studies that include traditional measures of Latino threat (e.g., percent Latino) may have attenuated the impact of this variable on social control through the omission of a sanctuary variable (Carmichael & Kent, 2014; Stults & Baumer, 2007). However, the only known study

intersecting these issues finds no effect of sanctuary cities on city police spending (Vargas & McHarris, 2017). Although not explicitly connected to policing, other studies have elucidated the effect of sanctuary cities related to crime and victimization. For example, Lyons and colleagues (2013) find that the inverse relationship between immigration and crime is strengthened in communities with sanctuary policies, a salient indicator of immigrant political opportunities. At the city level, Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez (2019) partially support the prior study, with a negative association between the presence of a sanctuary policy and robbery, however the authors find no relationship between sanctuary policies and homicide rates. Moreover, a prior study observed no effect between sanctuary cities and three different crime types: violent, property, and rape (O'Brien et al., 2019). Finally, a recent study found that Latinos are more likely to report violent crime victimization to law enforcement in cities that adopt a sanctuary policy (Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez, 2021). Thus, the aforementioned studies largely convey a protective element of sanctuary jurisdictions that may buffer residents' experience of formal social control by law enforcement.

In sum, the empirical findings as it relates to Latino threat are often conditional on the researcher's application of Blalock's theory, including the functional form (linear vs. nonlinear), how threat is measured (static vs. change/dynamic), inclusion of moderating factors (e.g., political opportunity structures, region, etc.), as well as the type of formal social control being measured. Given these various factors, support for Latino threat is mixed in the existing literature. Prior scholarship, for example, finds both positive and negative linear

relationships, as well as nonlinear and null relationships between Latino threat and various forms of formal social control. In the context of Latino threat however, few studies have considered the possibility that political opportunity structures, in a similar vein to region, may either reduce or amplify the implementation of formal social control measures on this population. In doing so, the inclusion of political opportunity structures in the current study may serve to explain the previously mixed empirical findings between Latino threat and formal social control.

# Chapter 3: Data

*Sample*

This study analyzes cities with populations of 100,000 or more. The city is a relevant unit of analysis theoretically, given its wide usage in the broader racial threat literature (Carmichael & Kent, 2014; Holmes et al., 2008; Kent & Jacobs, 2005). Moreover, large urban cities are frequently the subject of quantitative and qualitative literature illustrating coercive crime control strategies by police, and subsequent contention between police and minority communities (Brunson, 2007; Rojek et al., 2012; Weitzer et al., 2008). The city-level is also preferred given its ability to uncover heterogeneity, a limitation which is prevalent in state-level analyses (Gray & Parker, 2020; Klinger et al., 2016; Nix et al., 2017).

I begin with the full sample of cities that contain a population greater than 100,000 people – 274 cities, as designated by the 2010 United States Census Bureau. I then eliminate those with less than 5000 Latinos, a criterion which mitigates the risk of generating large killing rates from a small number of incidents (Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998). Doing so reduced the initial sample size to 259 cities.[3] Moreover, additional cities were dropped due to missing data from the Census,[4] Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey (LEMAS),[5] and Uniform Crime

[3] After imposing this criteria, the following cities were dropped: Fargo, ND; Springfield, IL:; Sterling Heights, MI; Jackson, MS; Warren, MI; Evansville, IN; Charleston, SC; Columbia, MO; Flint, MI; Cedar Rapids, IA; Dayton, OH. Akron, OH; Lafayette, LA; Mobile, AL; Ann Arbor, MI.

[4] Centennial, CO (formed in 2001 from parts of unincorporated Arapahoe County), and Miami Gardens, FL (incorporated in 2003 after previously being a part of unincorporated areas within Miami-Dade County) were not yet designated by the Census as cities in 2000, which represents the initial measurement point of the primary racial threat variable. They are thus dropped from the study.

[5] The following cities did not appear in either the 2007 or the 2013 LEMAS survey and were thus dropped: Augusta, GA; Lancaster, CA; Moreno Valley, CA; Norwalk, CA; Palmdale, CA; Rancho Cucamonga, CA; Santa Clarita, CA; Temecula, CA; Thousand Oaks, CA; Victorville, CA; Visalia,

Report (UCR).[6] The resulting analytic sample size, as a consequence of these missing data, is 233.[7] While smaller than the original pool of cities, the current sample represents 43 states, plus the District of Columbia, thus generating results that can be attributed to an array of large urban places across the United States.[8]

*Dependent Variables*

Three primary outcome variables comprise this study. They are the total counts of police killings of 1) Latinos, 2) whites, and 3) total residents in each city across the years 2012-2016. Following prior literature utilizing Fatal Encounters, this analysis excludes incidents classified as suicides, accidents (including drug overdoses and other medical emergencies, falling from a height, or drowning), or were the result of a vehicular collision or pursuit (Edwards et al., 2018; Edwards et al., 2019; Schwartz & Jahn, 2020). This allows for the study to focus on a small range of fatal police use of force tactics most prominently discussed in the social control literature (e.g., asphyxiation/restrained; beaten/bludgeoned with an instrument, chemical

CA. With one exception, all of these cities contract with county sheriff departments for law enforcement services in their communities, so these locales do not have a city-specific police department represented in LEMAS. The lone exception is Visalia, CA, whose police department does not appear until the 2016 edition of LEMAS. Moreover, the following cities do not appear in any of the LEMAS surveys conducted between 1997 and 2003: Antioch, CA; Murrieta, CA; Roseville, CA; West Jordan, UT. Further, McKinney, TX and Provo, UT are only represented by their county sheriff's office as opposed to a city-specific law enforcement agency. Because data are not available to measure change in bureaucratic incorporation for these cities, they are dropped from the study.

[6] North Las Vegas, NV was missing in the 2010 and 2011 editions of the UCR and was dropped from the study. However, this city appears in editions of the UCR outside of this two-year period. Furthermore, the following cities do not appear in the 1999-2001 editions of the UCR, and are therefore dropped from the sample: Elk Grove, CA; Elgin, IL; Kansas City, KS; Olathe, KS; Overland Park; KS; Chesapeake, VA.

[7] See Appendix A for the list of included cities and associated law enforcement agencies.

[8] The following states have no cities included in this analysis: Delaware, Maine, Mississippi, North Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Such states do not contain highly urbanized cities with large police departments, as most are classified as geographically rural.

agent/pepper spray, shootings, and taser incidents). Population data were obtained from the Decennial Census. The Latino population is characterized by those who responded on the Census that they are Latino of any race. Moreover, the white population is characterized by those who responded that they were white, non-Latino, and the total population represents a count of all residents (of any race) in the city.

The data for police killings are drawn from Fatal Encounters (FE), a database of all deaths resulting from police interactions since 2000. Fatal Encounters is compiled primarily using information from media sources and police records. Case coding is triple checked by paid researchers who validate information across various sources (Burghart, 2019). Notably, Fatal Encounters has been lauded as being more comprehensive than other commonly used data sources such as the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR), the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Arrest-Related Deaths survey, and official vital statistics data, which are scrutinized on grounds that they underestimate the incidence of police-involved fatalities (Gray & Parker, 2020; Loftin et al., 2017). In fact, Fatal Encounters has been endorsed by BJS as opposed to other crowdsourced data, including *The Guardian's* "The Counted", and the "National Police Shootings Database", maintained by *The Washington Post*, for example (Banks et al., 2016). Moreover, Fatal Encounters has been analyzed empirically in several studies on fatal police killings (Comer & Ingram, 2022; Edwards et al., 2018; Edwards et al., 2019; Mitchell & Chihaya, 2022; Schwartz & Jahn, 2020).

However, Fatal Encounters contain limitations that hold potential weight over the outcome of the current study. For one, the data are missing the decedent's race in

approximately 34% of cases, which is higher than that of the SHR, as well as other crowdsourced data on police killings (Holmes, 2022). Fortunately, Edwards et al. (2019) note that such missingness is more problematic in years prior to 2012. I utilize a period beginning in 2012, and thus the data I employ should be less susceptible to this complication. Relatedly, Fatal Encounters is partly compiled from publicly available records, including police reports, which may not correctly include the race of the decedent as police officers may misclassify Latinos as white when constructing police reports, leading to an undercounting of Latinos (Luh, 2022). Finally, the indictments that make up Fatal Encounters are largely drawn from media reports, thereby creating concerns of selection. It may be that only the police killings that generate considerable public attention and public demonstrations will be captured, and omit incidents that are less "popular", which are likely to be from relatively smaller cities in the analytic sample (McCarthy et al., 1996; Oliver & Maney, 2000). The nature of these limitations should negatively bias the magnitude of the key variables in the current study, thus any significant relationships that are found should be understood as conservative estimates of police killings. These issues notwithstanding, Fatal Encounters is an optimal data source to examine police killings given the breadth of incidents it captures, particularly compared to official data sources like the SHR.

*Independent Variables*

**Racial Threat**

The underlying argument of Blalock (1967) is that the change in the minority population over time represents the driving force behind formal social control mechanisms. As such, the current study employs the primary measure of racial threat as the *rate of change* of the Latino population from 2000 to 2010, as measured by the Census. To obtain this, both the Latino and total population are obtained from the Census for each sample city in 2000 and 2010. The Latino population and total population are then divided to obtain the proportion of Latino citizens in each city for the two time points. Finally, the proportion of Latinos in a particular city in 2010 is then subtracted by the proportion of Latinos in that same city in 2000 to obtain the rate of change in the Latino population. While few racial threat studies utilize such a measurement of threat in the context of policing, it is theoretically relevant given substantial increases in the Latino population since 2000 (Holmes & Painter, 2023; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998). Notwithstanding, in the spirit of prior racial threat literature, this study also includes a static measure of the proportion of Latino individuals in a given city as of the 2010 Census, and its quadratic term to test for nonlinearity.

**Political Opportunity Structures**

The following study includes measures of current levels (2010) and changes (2010 minus 2000 values) in five different Latino political opportunity structures, which correspond to the political threat dimension of Blalock's theory, positing that

increased political representation by Latinos represent a threat to whites, which in turn increases formal social control (e.g., police killings). To capture minority political opportunity structures, I create a ratio of Latino council members to Latino residents by taking the number of elected Latino council members and dividing by the number of Latino residents in a given city in 2000 and 2010, according to the Census (for an example of this strategy, see Lyons et al., 2013). This accounts for the possibility that cities with a larger Latino population may elect a greater number of Latino council members. Moreover, I include a binary measure of whether or not the city is represented by a Latino mayor (1=yes). Both measures are captured through the 2000 and 2010 databases from the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO).

Prior literature indicates that increased diversity in police departments may result in better relations with residents, and thus decrease incidence of police violence in these communities (Smith, 2003). Thus, to measure minority bureaucratic incorporation in policing, I construct a ratio of the percentage of Latino officers in a given city's police department to the percentage of Latino individuals currently residing in that city (for an example of this strategy, see Lyons et al., 2013). For the current period (approximately 2010),[9] this is measured primarily through the 2007 LEMAS survey; however, if data were not available for a particular city, the 2013 LEMAS survey was employed to eliminate potential missing data.[10] For the earlier

[9] There was no LEMAS survey conducted in 2010. Therefore, I rely on temporally similar estimates from 2007 and 2013.

[10] Bridgeport, CT, Corona, CA, and McAllen, TX appear in the 2007 LEMAS survey, however the data on the number of Latino police officers for their respective local police departments are missing. I therefore use data from the 2013 LEMAS survey for these cities. Moreover, Erie, PA, Green Bay, WI, and Jersey City, NJ, appear in the 2007 LEMAS survey, but they are only represented by their county

period (approximately 2000), I primarily utilize the 2000 LEMAS survey, however I also employ data from the 2003 LEMAS survey for a small group of cities that do not appear in the 2000 edition.[11]

Another important dimension of Latino political opportunity structures is favorable immigrant legislation, which in this study is measured through whether or not the city has a sanctuary policy in both 2000 and 2010.[12] These data are drawn from the National Immigration Law Center (NILC), which identifies a list of sanctuary jurisdictions as of 2008 (Lyons et al., 2013; Martínez-Schuldt & Martínez, 2021). Supplemental sources were consulted to see if any additional jurisdictions had been added between 2008 and 2010.[13]

Finally, I include a dichotomous variable to indicate whether a city is classified as a "gateway city" as of approximately 2000 and 2010. Gateway cities are communities[14] that have experienced a rapid influx and growth of immigrant populations, and thus may have important implications for Latino political opportunity structures and the subsequent enforcement of social control (Singer, 2015).[15] For gateway status in 2000, I use the original six classifications as outlined

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sheriff's office. I therefore use the 2013 LEMAS survey for these cities, in which their respective local police departments are represented. The following cities do not at all appear in the 2007 LEMAS survey: Frisco, TX; Hialeah, FL; New Haven, CT; and Tempe, AZ. Again, I use the 2013 LEMAS survey for these cities in order to minimize missing data.

[11] The following cities do not appear in the 2000 LEMAS survey but are present in the 2003 LEMAS survey: Cary, NC; Costa Mesa, CA; Frisco, TX; Gilbert, AZ; Peoria, AZ; Paterson, NJ.

[12] See Appendix B for the list of sanctuary cities included in this study.

[13] See, for example, https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-State. Jackson, MS was the only city that was added as a sanctuary jurisdiction during the initial coding process. As stated earlier, however, this city was dropped.

[14] Singer (2004, 2015) classifies gateway communities by Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs). As such, all cities that fall within a specified MSA or PMSA are coded as "1".

[15] See Appendix C for the list of gateway cities included in this study.

by Singer (2004), including (1) former; (2) continuous; (3) post-World War II; (4) emerging; (5) re-emerging; and (6) pre-emerging. For gateway status in 2010, I utilize an updated report which indicates seven classifications in which gateways are defined (Singer, 2015). As such, I include all gateway statuses: (1) former; (2) major-continuous; (3) minor-continuous; (4) post-World War II; (5) re-emerging; (6) major-emerging; and (7) minor-emerging.[16] Low immigration metro areas are excluded, given that the percentage of the foreign-born population in these cities are below the national average.

*Control Variables*

**Demographic Controls**

I control for current levels (2010) and changes (2010 minus 2000 values) for two relevant measures of economic threat at the city level: the Gini Index (a measure of income inequality) and the Latino-white dissimilarity index (a measure of residential segregation). I measure the Gini Index in 2010 through 1-year estimates provided by the American Community Survey (ACS) (Holmes et al., 2019; Jacobs & Britt, 1979; Sorensen et al., 1993).[17] Data for the 2000 Gini index are employed through estimates constructed from the Census.[18] Finally, data for the Latino-white

[16] Lakeland, FL is the only gateway city excluded from this analysis, given that it had a population less than 100,000 as of the 2010 Decennial Census.

[17] The Census website states that one-year estimates are best used with "data for areas with populations of 65,000+." Given the sample, it is used here, as opposed to five-year estimates. See: https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/guidance/estimates.html

[18] While the ACS was used to measure the 2010 Gini Index, the ACS itself was not created until 2005. Thus, I estimate the 2000 iteration of this variable through the strategy employed by the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS).

dissimilarity index are captured for both 2000 and 2010 from the "Diversity and Disparities Project" website (Holmes et al., 2019).[19]

Additionally, I control for current levels (2010) and changes (2010 minus 2000 values) for three demographic groups: the proportion of African Americans, the proportion of young males (ages 15 to 34), and the proportion of foreign-born individuals. For African Americans and young males, I obtain data from the 2000 and 2010 editions of the U.S. Census. Doing so accounts for two populations that are among the most vulnerable to fatal police violence (Durán, 2016; Gray & Parker, 2020; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998). Finally, I utilize data from the 2000 U.S. Census[20] and 1-year estimates from the 2010 ACS to measure the proportion of foreign-born individuals. This helps purge the core Latino threat variable from immigration threat (Lyons et al., 2013; Vélez et al., 2015).

**Violent Crime**

Prior studies indicate that cities with higher violent crime rates have greater rates of deadly force by police (Holmes et al., 2019; Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998; Smith, 2004). To account for this, the current study controls for current levels (2010) and changes (2010 minus 2000 values) in the violent crime rate per 100,000 people, primarily utilizing the 2010[21] and 2000[22] iterations of the UCR. Given complex

[19] See, https://s4.ad.brown.edu/projects/diversity/Data/data.htm
[20] The 2000 foreign-born variable faces a similar challenge to the 2000 Gini Index, as the data source (ACS) used to measure this value did not exist until 2005.
[21] Baton Rouge, LA; Birmingham, AL; Indianapolis, IN; and Naperville, IL are missing in the 2010 UCR report but do appear in the 2011 version. To minimize missing data, I employ this iteration of the UCR.
[22] Westminster, CO and Alexandria, VA are missing in the 2000 UCR report but do appear in the 1999 version. Similarly, the following cities are missing in the 2000 UCR report but appear in the 2001 version: Waterbury, CT; Joliet, IL; Baton Rouge, LA; Billings, MT; Hampton, VA. To minimize missing data, I employ these other editions of the UCR.

definitional and reporting issues by some cities to the UCR, the violent crime variable includes only robberies and homicides.[23]

**Region**

Region is included in this study, given that various racial tensions may influence the magnitude of social control measures, including police violence (Holmes et al., 2019; Smith & Holmes, 2003, 2014). Predictions about regional effects vary, so no claims about such effects are made (Hawkins, 1987). Region is measured by a set of dummy variables (Southwest, South, Midwest, Northwest, Northeast [omitted category]).[24]

[23] Numerous cities did not comply with the data collection methodology for forcible rape as defined by the Uniform Crime Reporting Program guidelines. Other cities did not follow the guidelines with respect to reporting aggravated assault. Consequently, the violent crime rate in this study includes just homicide and robbery.

[24] The Northeast and Midwest categories include those states as defined in their respective categories by the U.S. Census. The "South" category also includes all such states in that respective category as defined by the Census, with the exception of Texas. The Northwest category includes all such states defined in the "West" as designated by the Census, with the exception of Arizona, California, and New Mexico. The "Southwest" category includes Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, states in which the majority of the Latino population currently live (see Holmes, 2000).

# Chapter 4: Analytic Strategy

Prior studies examining deadly use of force by police have frequently employed count models as their primary analytic strategy (Gray & Parker, 2020; Holmes et al., 2019; Smith, 2004). Specifically, these include poisson and negative binomial models, which are useful when analyzing relatively rare occurrences such as police killings. On the one hand, scholars have recommended the use of negative binomial models as an alternative to the poisson model under the key assumption that the former corrects for issues of overdispersion, the idea that the expected variance exceeds the expected mean, suffered in the traditional poisson model (Osgood, 2000; Paternoster & Brame, 1997). In particular, the negative binomial model includes an extra parameter whose estimated value inflates the poisson dispersion as necessary, thus addressing overdispersion. As such, the aforementioned studies analyzing police-involved killings primarily utilize negative binomial models as an alternative to the poisson model under this logic.

On the other hand, however, scholars have argued that there are few known cases in which the negative binomial helps to correct for overdispersion (Berk & MacDonald, 2008; Blackburn, 2015). For example, if overdispersion results from the systematic structure (i.e., parameters and independent variables) of the poisson regression model being misspecified, the negative binomial is not a useful remedy. Only misspecification in the stochastic component (i.e., the error term) of the poisson model would result in the appropriate application of the negative binomial model. In sum, overdispersion does not arise from any and all excess variation in the data, but rather from the stochastic component of the model.

In that vein, the current study employs a poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimate (QMLE) regression to correct for overdispersion in the model (Gardner et al., 1995). Prior studies have used a similar technique when confronting specification issues with count models (Chalfin et al., 2023; Kubrin et al., 2018; MacDonald & Braga, 2019). Moreover, an "offset term" is added, which allows for the use of a count model to examine the expected rates of an event when the count is divided by the offset, or "exposure" term (MacDonald & Lattimore, 2010). Thus, we can transform the original count outcome into a per capita measure, which can then measure the police killing *rates* of Latinos, whites, and the total population. Similar studies have used this technique in the context of fatal police shootings (Gray & Parker, 2020; Legewie & Fagan, 2016).

The current study estimates a series of models to assess the impact of Latino threat and political opportunity structures on the city-level rate of police killings. Tables 2, 4, and 6 utilize a static measure of Latino threat (proportion Latino, 2010), as well as its quadratic term to test for nonlinearity in the model. The dependent variable for these three models is the police killing rates of Latinos, whites, and the total population, to parse out whether or not Latino threat and levels of political opportunity structure differentially affect Latinos, whites, and the city-wide population in its entirety (i.e., "targeted effects" versus "diffuse effects"; see Zane (2018) for a discussion). As mentioned above, the independent variables are the proportion of Latino individuals in a particular city in 2010, along with the measures of political opportunity structures for Latinos (Latino mayor, ratio of Latino council members to Latino residents, ratio of Latino police officers to Latino individuals, the

presence of a sanctuary policy, and gateway status). Each measure of political opportunity is tested separately, to discern whether or not it independently impacts city level rates of police killings.[25] Moreover, measures of economic threat, including the Gini Index, as well as the Latino-white dissimilarity index, are also employed. Lastly, I control for region, violent crime, and other salient demographic variables (proportion Black, proportion foreign born, and proportion of young males, defined as 15-34 years old). All variables in these models are measured exclusively at their current level (2010).

Tables 3, 5, and 7 assess *change* in the Latino population, as opposed to the static measure described above. Similar to above, the dependent variable for these three models are the police killing rates of Latinos, whites, and the total population, to make sense of whether or not Latino threat and levels of political opportunity structures differentially affect Latinos, whites, and the city-wide population in its entirety (i.e., "targeted effects" versus "diffuse effects"; see Zane (2018) for a discussion). The independent variables are the rate of Latino population change in a given city, from 2000 to 2010, along with the measures of political opportunity for Latinos (i.e., Latino mayor, ratio of Latino council members to Latino residents, ratio of Latino officers to Latino individuals, the presence of a sanctuary policy, and gateway status). Each measure of political opportunity is tested separately, to discern whether or not it independently impacts city level rates of police killings.[26] Moreover, measures of economic threat, including the Gini Index, as well as the Latino-white

[25] These measures are also tested together in one model for each of the three groups (see Table 8).
[26] These measures are also tested together in one model for each of the three groups (see Table 9).

dissimilarity index, are also employed. Lastly, I control for region, violent crime, and other salient demographic variables (proportion Black, proportion foreign born, and proportion of young males, defined as 15-34 years old). All variables in these models, with the exception of region, are measured as change (2010 minus 2000 value).

# Chapter 5: Results

*Descriptive Analyses*

Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the sample cities. Approximately half of the cities in the sample, 47%, did not have any police killings of Latinos across the study period, 2012-2016. Just 5% of cities did not have any deaths during this time, inclusive of all races. The average city in the sample had 2.21 Latino police killings, 3.18 white police killings, and 10.43 total police killings. Across the five-year study period, Los Angeles had the highest count of Latino police killings (46), while Phoenix and Houston had the highest counts of white (34) and total killings (112), respectively. These maximum values translate to 9.2 (Los Angeles), 6.8 (Phoenix), and 22.4 (Houston) deaths per year of these respective groups.

Significant variability exists among these cities as it relates to the size of the Latino population. In 2010, sample cities range from just 2.3% of the population comprised of Latinos (Pittsburgh, PA) to 95.6% (Laredo, TX). Nonetheless, Latinos comprise 24.7% of the population on average for a given city, reflecting the racial diversity of the analytic sample of cities; this figure is higher compared to the percentage of Latinos nationwide (Krogstad et al., 2022). On average, cities in the sample experienced a 4.9% increase in the Latino population from 2000 to 2010, including five cities that experienced a decrease in the Latino population.[27] Interestingly, the city that experienced the most Latino growth was Allentown, PA,

[27] These cities include Surprise, AZ; El Monte, CA; Glendale, CA; Jersey City, NJ; and Burbank, CA. All of these cities contained relatively large percentages of Latino residents when initially measured in 2000.

which grew from 24.4% to 42.8% Latino in one decade, an increase of approximately 18%. While cities that experienced high levels of change in the Latino population were frequently situated in the Southwest, other regions, particularly the Midwest and Northeast saw upticks in this group as well.

In 2010, cities generally exhibited low levels of Latino political opportunity structures, as indicated by Table 1. For instance, just 6% of cities had a Latino mayor and 16% had at least one sanctuary policy. Moreover, cities on average had less than 1 Latino council member, as well as less than 1 Latino police officer per every 100,000 Latino citizens, respectively. However, Singer's (2015) expanded classification designates approximately two-thirds of the sample cities as gateway cities. As far as changes in these conditions, cities were marginally more likely to have a Latino mayor, have a police force that is more representative of the Latino population, and be classified as a sanctuary city in 2010 compared to 2000. However, cities in the sample experienced a decrease in the representativeness of their city councils compared to the prior decade. Finally, Singer's (2015) updated list of gateway cities added additional cities that were not classified in the original report. In other words, more cities are defined as gateway cities in 2010 compared to 2000.

Cities also varied in the prevalence of economic threat in these communities. The average city in 2010 had a Latino-white Dissimilarity Index score of 36.55, indicating low to moderate levels of residential segregation for Latinos. However, these indices ranged from 8.6 (in Killeen, TX – indicating a low level of residential segregation) to 66.9 (in Oakland, CA – signifying a high level of residential segregation). On average, cities experienced a decrease in Latino-white residential

segregation between 2000 and 2010. Further, the average city in 2010 had a Gini coefficient of 0.46, illustrating moderate levels of income inequality. Again, variability existed between cities, with a low of 0.345 in Ontario, CA, and a high of 0.57 in Atlanta, GA. In contrast to residential segregation, sample cities saw an increase in general income inequality, albeit marginally.

African Americans and the foreign-born account for approximately 17% and 19% of the population across these cities on average in 2010, respectively, which is slightly higher for both groups when compared to the national average, again indicating that this sample of cities is more diverse compared to all cities across the United States (Budiman, 2020; Tamir et al., 2021). Furthermore, young males (aged 15-34) comprise 16% of the population in these cities on average. In terms of changing demographics, cities experienced a modest 3% increase in the foreign-born population. Lastly, the proportion of Black individuals as well as young males across the cities experienced little change during the ten-year period.

In 2010, the violent crime rate per 100,000 for these cities, on average, was 216.29, with a minimum value of 18.27 in Naperville, IL, a city with zero total police-involved killings and a maximum value of 765.65 in Cleveland, OH, which interestingly had a relatively low count of total police killings, including zero Latino deaths. Nonetheless, cities with high counts of Latino police killings, such as Houston, Miami, and Los Angeles, tended to have above-average violent crime rates. In parallel with crime trends during this period, cities experienced a moderate decrease in the violent crime rate from 2000 to 2010. Concerning region, a plurality of cities, approximately forty percent, are concentrated in the Southwest, with about a

quarter of the cities located in the South. Smaller percentages of cities are situated in the Northwest, Midwest, and Northeast.

*Latino Threat and Police Killings of Latinos*

Table 2 assesses the influence of demographic and political threat on Latino police killings with static measures. Findings indicate a quadratic relationship between the proportion of Latinos in a given city and the police killing rate of this population. As such, the linear Latino coefficient is positive and statistically significant ($p<.01$), while the quadratic Latino coefficient is negative and statistically significant ($p<.01$), illustrating a traditional curvilinear relationship. This result remains despite including the five Latino political opportunity structures. Figure 3 provides a visual depiction of this curvilinear relationship, and illuminates that the police killing rate of Latinos increases until Latinos comprise approximately 54% of the population in a given city, at which point the killing rate begins to decrease. Further, when considering political opportunity structures, Table 2 suggests that the five related measures have little independent influence on police killing rates of Latinos, as none reach statistical significance. However, the coefficients for Latino mayor (model 1), Latino police representation (model 3), sanctuary city (model 4), and gateway city (model 5), while not statistically significant, possess a negative direction, which align with the political science hypothesis of political empowerment. Only the coefficient for the ratio of Latino elected officials (model 2) is positive, which parallels Blalock's hypothesis of increased formal social control in the presence of political threat. When all political opportunity structures are considered in

one comprehensive static model (Table 8, Model 1), cities with both sanctuary and gateway status observe a lower rate of police killings of Latinos.

Table 3 indicates how changes in the Latino population and political opportunity variables predict police homicides of Latinos. Regardless of the political opportunity structure measured in the separate models, the Latino change variable is positive and significant, such that cities that experience increases in the Latino population between 2000 and 2010 observe increased police killing rates of Latinos.[28] In a similar vein to the static models, however, there are no independent effects of the five Latino political opportunity structures on police killing rates of Latinos. While not statistically significant, the change in Latino mayor (model 1) and the change in Latino police representation (model 3) possess a negative coefficient, which align with the political empowerment hypothesis. On the other hand, the change in elected officials (model 2), sanctuary status (model 4), and gateway status (model 5) possess a positive coefficient estimate and therefore align with the political threat hypothesis as specified by Blalock. Nonetheless, a dynamic threat as represented by Latino change appears to be a significant predictor of police killings of Latinos.

In Table 2, static measures of economic threat such as the Gini Index and Latino-white dissimilarity index do not significantly predict police killing rates of Latinos. The static models additionally indicate that the proportion of African

[28] It is important to consider that the dynamic threat variable treats cities that changed, for example, from 10% to 20% Latino the same as cities that changed from 80% to 90% Latino. In that vein, I ran additional analyses that include initials levels (2000) along with change levels in proportion Latino from 2000 to 2010. I find the change measure to be a positive and statistically significant predictor of Latino police killings (as well as whites and the total population); the initial level is not significant (see Supplemental Table 1). Thus, change in the Latino population seems to matter, while the absolute/initial level of the Latino population does not.

Americans and foreign-born individuals are negatively related to police-involved killings of Latinos, and that a larger proportion of young males predicts higher death rates among Latinos. Moreover, the violent crime rate in 2010 is significant and positively related to increased killings of Latinos. In the change model, Table 3 indicates that cities that experience increases in the Latino-white dissimilarity index observe an increased rate of police homicides of Latinos. Changes in the Gini Index were not predictive of police killing rates. Further, cities with more pronounced changes in the foreign-born population experience smaller rates of police killings of Latinos. No effect of Black change exists in the models, and the change in young males is an inconsistent predictor of increased Latino deaths. Unlike its static measure, the change in the violent crime rate from 2000 to 2010 was not statistically significant. Lastly, all region variables were positive and significant, indicating that the Northeast had lower death rates of Latinos.

*Latino Threat and Police Killings of Whites*

It is important to parse out whether or not Latino threat and levels of political opportunity structures differentially affect the police killing rates of whites and the total population from Latinos, thereby providing a key robustness check of this relationship. As indicated by Table 4, there is no support for a quadratic relationship between the Latino population as it relates to the white death rate. Interestingly, the coefficients for Latino police incorporation, sanctuary status, and gateway status are negative and statistically significant when considering police killing rates of whites. Thus, when the police force in a particular city is more representative of the Latino population, police killing rates of whites decrease. Likewise, when a city is

designated as a sanctuary city or a gateway city, police killing rates of whites also decrease. Thus, it appears that cities become less deadly when there are Latino political opportunities.

Table 5 suggests that the change measure of Latino threat is statistically significant for white police-involved death rates. This indicates that a greater influx of Latinos in a particular city between 2000 and 2010 is associated with an increase in police killing rates of whites. Such results are robust across the five political opportunity structures. Further, when the police force is more representative of Latinos in 2010 compared to 2000, police killing rates of whites decrease. No other political opportunity structures, measured independently as change, influence police killings of whites.

When considering economic threat in the static models, the Latino-white dissimilarity index produces null effects as it relates to police-involved deaths of whites, while the Gini index inconsistently predicts higher death rates among this group, conditional on whether political opportunity variables are independently considered in a given model, including Latino mayor, Latino police representation, and sanctuary status. Other static control variables produce similar results in the white models as those in the Latino models, with the violent crime rate predicting higher police killing rates of whites, and both the proportion of Black and foreign-born individuals predicting lower police killing rates of whites. Unlike the static Latino models, however, the proportion of young males is not statistically significant in any of the five models. Additionally, the region variables are statistically significant, again indicating that the Northeast region has fewer police-involved deaths of whites.

Controls in the change models for white deaths follow a similar pattern as Latinos, as an increase in the Latino-white dissimilarity index between 2000 and 2010 predicts higher rates of white deaths, and a larger rate of change in the foreign-born population during this period is associated with lower police killing rates of whites. The sole difference in controls concerns the change in young males, which is positive and statistically significant in some of the Latino models, but not at all in the white models. In sum, change in the Latino population appears to increase lethal police use of force against whites.

*Latino Threat and Police Killings of the Total Population*

Table 6 conveys little evidence of a robust curvilinear relationship between the Latino population and the total rate of police killings. As such, the linear term is statistically significant in all models, however the quadratic term is only significant when gateway status is considered in model 5.[29] The static model also conveys that cities with both sanctuary and gateway status predict lower rates of total police killings. Furthermore, Table 7 suggests that the dynamic measure of Latino threat is statistically significant for total police-involved death rates, which is robust across the five political opportunity structures. Referring to Table 7, the point estimate for Latino change and total police killings is the largest when there is a shift in sanctuary policy (Model 4), whereas this point estimate is smallest when considering a city level change in the election of a Latino mayor (Model 1). Overall, these results

[29] Table 8, which includes all political opportunity variables in one model, does predict a curvilinear relationship between the Latino population and the rate of total police killings. However, such coefficient estimates of static threat remain the largest in magnitude when considering police-involved deaths among the Latino population.

indicate that a greater influx of Latinos in a particular city between 2000 and 2010 is associated with an increase in total police killings.

The results of the static control variables for total killings are similar to those of whites. As such, the violent crime rate in a given city is highly significant and positively associated with increased total deaths, while the proportion of Black individuals as well as the proportion of foreign-born individuals in a given city are negatively related to rates of total killings by police. Furthermore, the region variables are statistically significant, again indicating that the Northeast region has fewer deaths of all residents. The controls in the change models for total police deaths parallel those of Latino deaths, as cities with increases in the Latino-white dissimilarity index from 2000 to 2010 predict a higher rate of total police killings, while areas with higher rates of foreign-born change produce a lower rate of total police killings. However, the change in the proportion of young males is a more robust predictor of increased total deaths than in the models for Latinos or whites.

# Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion

## *The Current Study*

Lethal police violence represents a considerable social and public health issue in the United States (Rich et al., 2023). A majority of this burden falls on Black communities, who disproportionately confront the highest risk of being killed by police (Edwards et al., 2018; Edwards et al., 2019). Not surprisingly, then, most scholarship centering police violence has focused on African Americans. However, the aforementioned studies also note that Latino individuals face a higher risk of police violence compared to whites, as well as the overall population. Given the scant scholarship in this realm, it is important to consider how Latino demographic and political threat contribute to the most extreme dimension of formal social control – fatal police use of force. The current study advances prior literature in its consideration of how city-level Latino political opportunity structures, as well as change over time in the Latino population and other relevant variables, contribute to fatal police use of force.

The findings of the current study indicate that racial threat is an important contributor to rates of police killings for Latinos. For example, the static measure of Latino threat takes on a curvilinear relationship with police killings of Latinos, where the rate of police killings increases until Latinos comprise a majority of the population, at which point killings subsequently decrease. Such a finding is consistent with recent studies on racial threat and Latino police homicides, and lends supports to theoretical arguments contending that growing minority populations serve to moderate levels of social control (Holmes et al., 2019, Horowitz, 1985; Turk, 1969).

Further, while most models suggest that political opportunity structures do not impact the rate of Latino police killings; when considered in one comprehensive model (see Table 8), living in both sanctuary and gateway cities are associated with a decrease in the police killing rate of Latinos. While this finding may be spurious given that its statistical significance is not robust across different model specifications, it nonetheless suggests a potentially protective element of immigrant-friendly environments that may buffer residents' experiences of formal social control by law enforcement (Lyons et al., 2013; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez, 2021). More broadly, these findings as it relates to political opportunity structures are at odds with the hypotheses of the current study, which expected police killing rates of Latinos to increase in the presence of open political opportunity structures, as delineated by Blalock. Rather, it supports the political empowerment hypothesis (Vélez et al., 2015), whereby bureaucratic ascension by Latinos may quell existing formal social control mechanisms, such as fatal police use of force.

The Latino *change* measure is also a robust predictor of higher police killing rates of Latinos across the five political opportunity structures. However, there is no evidence to suggest that change over time in Latino political opportunity structures are associated with Latino deaths. Interestingly, the Latino change measure is also associated with increased death rates among whites and the total population, which are robust across all five political opportunity structures. Such a phenomenon may reflect "diffuse effects", where rather than specifically impacting minority groups (i.e., targeted effects), dynamics of racial threat may impact the population writ large

(Zane, 2018). Future research should investigate why such diffusion takes places by mapping out possible mechanisms.

*Implications*

Beyond the immediate impact that is suffered through the death of one at the hands of law enforcement, police killings may hold consequential implications for police-community relationships. For example, Desmond and colleagues (2016, 2020) found that Black residents in Milwaukee neighborhoods were less likely to report crime to the police after the non-fatal beating of Frank Jude, an unarmed African American man (but see Zoorob (2020) for a critique). Other studies, which examine the impact of *fatal* police incidents on citizen reporting and interaction with law enforcement, have conveyed mixed evidence of such a phenomenon. For example, Ang and colleagues (2021) find a considerable decrease in 911 calls following the murder of George Floyd. However, other scholarship has found little changes of citizen's attitudes towards procedural justice and police legitimacy in the wake of Freddie Gray's death, as well as no considerable change in the rate at which Baltimore residents call the police for both criminal and non-criminal matters (Moyer, 2021; White et al., 2018), and the impact of fatal officer involved shootings on 911 (emergency) and 311 (non-emergency) calls in Los Angeles (Cohen et al., 2019). This taps into the theoretical notion that killings of community members by the police may result in a breakdown of procedural justice, or the perceived fairness of interactions that inform police legitimacy among the public, and thus spur a subsequent rise in legal cynicism (Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). In turn, community members may feel uncomfortable calling the police and

may resort to self-help strategies, only contacting the police when the situation is especially dire. Further, there are theoretical reasons to suggest that legal cynicism, a cultural frame in which law enforcement is perceived as illegitimate and unresponsive to the needs of the public, is linked to community adaptations that are conducive to criminal activity. For example, Anderson (1999) suggests that communities develop a street code, in which the use of violence is considered appropriate or even necessary for community members to defend themselves, their families, and their reputations against potential victimization in the absence of adequate police protection. In any case, the empirical evidence at the intersection of legal cynicism and police violence, as noted above, is mixed and not definitive across place.

Nonetheless, law enforcement itself, through their own consequential actions, may inhibit their ability to solve and prevent crime. For example, Roberts and Roberts Jr (2022) offer some evidence that lethal use of force against African Americans is associated with declining clearance rates for crimes in which there is a Black victim. Such a finding suggests a potential decline in cooperation and disengagement among African Americans with the police as a result of police killings, thereby providing a potential mechanism elucidating the historically low clearance rates in the United States. In a similar vein, some suggest evidence of de-policing, where in the aftermath of high-profile police killings, law enforcement withdraw from their policing duties, including arrests and other enforcement activities (Cheng & Long, 2022). Such impacts may be consequential as it relates to the prevalence of crime, given the fairly robust inverse police-crime relationship (Chalfin et al., 2022; Mello, 2019; Weisburd, 2021). Mechanically, then, the crime-reducing

ability of law enforcement may be diminished as a result of violence exerted on community members. Relatedly, other scholars go a step further, arguing that reduced police activity, as a result of decreased community trust and perceived legitimacy of the police, *causes* violent crime in a given area to increase. However, empirical evidence for this phenomenon, also known as the "Ferguson Effect", has been quite mixed (Nix et al., 2023; Piza & Connealy, 2022; Pyrooz et al., 2016; Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019; Shjarback et al., 2017). And while the institution of policing and its primary functions may be impacted as a result of actions taken by their own officers, implications exist for the general public as well.

Research indicates that communities experience long term consequences from police violence. For example, Gershenon and Hayes (2018) find that in the wake of Michael Brown's death and subsequent protests, student achievement in school declines, particularly in majority Black schools. This finding was reaffirmed in a more recent study illustrating that exposure to police violence results in lower completion rates of high school as well as college enrollment, chronic declines in GPA, and an increased prevalence of emotional disturbance among youth, effects which were most pronounced among African American and Latino students (Ang, 2021). Related to health outcomes, Bor and colleagues (2018) find that worsening mental symptoms appeared among African Americans, specifically in response to police killings of unarmed Black Americans, as opposed to unarmed whites or armed Black Americans. Finally, there is mixed evidence surrounding the impact of police killings on civic engagement. Markarian (2023) finds that police killings reduce voter turnout among African Americans who live within one mile of the killing radius,

however they do not find an effect on turnout outside of this area. They further find that white and Latino turnout is not affected regardless of proximity to killings. Moreover, Branton and colleagues (2021) find that areas with high levels of police killings translate to feelings of political inefficacy, particularly among African Americans, though a smaller effect is also found for whites and Latinos. However, two other studies find that police killings, and violence more broadly, results in increased voting registration and participation, illuminating a mechanism of mobilization as a result of fatal police incidents (Ang & Tebes, 2023; Morris & Shoub, 2023). In sum, lethal incidents of police violence may have deleterious impacts on minority communities, particularly for youth outcomes, public health, and civic engagement.

Lastly, the findings presented here are consequential for understanding how city policies may shape how formal social control operates. For example, when all political opportunity structures are considered as a block, the current study finds sanctuary cities – in other words, jurisdictions that "[limit] enforcement of immigration laws by state and local authorities" (NILC, 2008: 2) – have fewer police killings of Latinos than their less receptive counterparts. In other words, environments that are more receptive to Latinos appear to be less deadly contexts for Latinos vis-à-vis the police. By implication, cities that are considered more repressive should have heightened levels of formal social control. A small body of work finds this to be the case. For example, Coon (2017) notes that the implementation of 287(g), a measure which enhances localized immigration enforcement, led to a higher count of Latino arrests than would have transpired in the absence of this policy.

Moreover, in jurisdictions that implement 287(g) as well as other restrictive policies like Secure Communities, Latinos were less likely to report crimes to law enforcement (Theodore & Habans, 2016). Localities can therefore take policy stances that make contexts more or less receptive, and it appears that more receptive policies attenuate the "tip of the iceberg" – police killings – as well as other salient crime and victimization outcomes (e.g., Lyons et al., 2013; Martínez-Schuldt & Martínez, 2021). My findings signal the potential for such receptive policies to help mitigate the deleterious effects of formal social control on Latino wellbeing. The results presented in the current study thus encourages future work to evaluate this potential.

*Limitations and Future Research*

The current study employs data on police killings from Fatal Encounters, a crowdsourced dataset that is primarily comprised from media sources, as well as police reports. While such sources are often lauded as being a more representative account of police killings in the United States compared to official sources, underlying biases that favor the police may still exist in these data. For example, media reports suffer from selection bias, given that not all events, such as police killings, are reported on (Althaus et al., 2022; Earl et al., 2004; Oliver & Myers, 1999). Therefore, certain locales may be more or less represented in media reporting of police killings. In large cities, for example, the sheer volume of police killings may result in selective media reporting based on community demonstrations and exposure, compared to other incidents in which there is little mobilization (Oliver & Maney, 2000). In smaller locales, media may be less likely to report on police killings, particularly if their agency is farther away from the incident (McCarthy et al., 1996).

Thus, the Fatal Encounters data are only representing the incidents that media sources *choose* to report on. In a similar vein, given that Fatal Encounters also relies on information from police reports, it is important to highlight that law enforcement may incorrectly characterize the race of the victim, where someone who is Latino may be misclassified as white, leading to an undercounting of Latinos (Luh, 2022). Such an issue extends to an emerging literature concerning underlying biases in how police record data administratively, specifically for race, with consequential implications for statistical analyses (Knox et al., 2020). Taken together, the estimates in this study should therefore be understood as conservative, as selection bias in both media and police reporting may still underestimate the prevalence of police violence, though likely in a less severe fashion compared to official data sources such as the SHR.

Given that the current study exclusively examines large cities,[30] a notable limitation is the omission of smaller locales. Prior research has noted that most fatal police incidents occur in smaller cities, as opposed to larger cities (Sherman, 2018). Relatedly, recent research indicates that police killings are increasing in rural areas, particularly for non-white individuals (Mapping Police Violence, 2023). Most studies have examined police killings in larger cities, perhaps due to greater media and political attention paid to such contexts. Future research should more carefully consider these smaller locales, and in doing so, theoretically incorporate racial threat as well as political opportunity structures in order to geographically and contextually differentiate the implementation of formal social control.

[30] As of 2010, the average total population size of cities in the analytic sample is 336,874.

The focus on city as a geographic unit of analysis presents concerns for heterogeneity in findings. It is possible that within-city variation may be more salient than between-city variation. For example, large cities are often segregated, both racially and socioeconomically, and thus a city-level analysis may mask heterogeneity in important neighborhood-level variation in police killings. Apart from Fyfe's (1980) microanalysis of police shootings by grouped precincts or "zones", only recently has scholarship begun to analyze police killings at more granular units of analysis, specifically at the neighborhood level (Arnio, 2021; Klinger et al., 2016). Both studies indicate that racial and socioeconomic characteristics appear to play a crucial role in police violence. Thus, future research should continue to investigate the relationship between neighborhood-level characteristics and police killings, particularly at a more national level, given that the two aforementioned studies look specifically at Houston and St. Louis, respectively. Given that the Fatal Encounters data captures specific neighborhood geographic indicators, these data are feasible in investigating killings at this unit of analysis (see Mitchell & Chihaya, 2022).

A couple of additional future directions are worth mentioning. For one, while the current study examines political opportunity structures such as Latino mayor and council members, it may also be important to consider political partisanship as a determinant of formal social control. For example, Hawley (2011) notes that "In areas where immigration levels are low, partisanship is a weak predictor of immigration views. As the foreign-born population increases, however, the views of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents increasingly diverge" (404). In support of this, Stupi and colleagues (2016) find that those with a politically conservative orientation are

more likely to view undocumented immigrants as criminally threatening, through their support for increased border controls. Likewise, other scholars find empirical evidence suggesting that conservatives are more likely to support crime control policies, as well as increased police powers against Latinos (Pickett, 2016; Welch et al., 2011). Therefore, it may not just be the presence of political opportunity structures, but also the ideology of those who occupy them, in addition to those of the general public, that may drive formal social control. Thus, future studies should consider the effect of partisanship, defined as both the ideology of prominent political figures (e.g., Republican or Democrat mayor), as well as the political leanings of the general community (e.g., % of votes for Republicans or Democrats; see Lyons et al., 2013; Vélez et al., 2015) on an area's propensity for police killings of minorities. Lastly, while the current study examines, in part, the relationship between political opportunity structures as a predictor of police killings, it is possible that the relationship may be tautological or circular in nature, such that the presence of police killings may *impact* political opportunity structures. Prior work has shown that exposure to police killings impact voting behavior and trust in civic processes more broadly (Ang & Tebes, 2023; Branton et al., 2021; Markarian, 2023; Morris & Shoub, 2023). In the wake of police violence toward minority individuals, citizens may be more apt to elect a mayor or councilmember that is a minority, thereby opening up political opportunities in the hopes that such an individual would bring change to how formal social control is implemented within the community. In addressing these questions, we can continue to investigate and unearth salient predictors that contribute

to formal social control, which may inform policies and reforms that reduce the disproportionate police killings of minority individuals in the United States.

# Appendices

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for All Cities**

| | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Dependent Variables** | | | | |
| Latino Killing Counts (2012-2016) | 2.21 | 5.04 | 0 | 46 |
| White Killing Counts (2012-2016) | 3.18 | 4.52 | 0 | 34 |
| Total Killing Counts (2012-2016) | 10.43 | 15.15 | 0 | 112 |
| **Threat Conditions (2010)** | | | | |
| Proportion Latino | 0.25 | 0.2 | 0.02 | 0.96 |
| Latino Mayor | 0.06 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 |
| Latino Elected Officials | 0.79 | 1.95 | 0 | 11.75 |
| Latino Police Representation | 0.48 | 0.27 | 0 | 1.77 |
| Sanctuary City | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Gateway City | 0.67 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| **Change Threat Conditions (2010-2000)** | | | | |
| Change in Proportion Latino | 0.05 | 0.03 | -0.05 | 0.18 |
| Change in Latino Mayor | 0.004 | 0.27 | -1 | 1 |
| Change in Latino Elected Officials | -0.26 | 2.22 | -16.02 | 10.84 |
| Change in Latino Police Representation | 0.12 | 0.21 | -0.51 | 0.98 |
| Change in Sanctuary City | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |
| Change in Gateway City | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| **Control Conditions (2010)** | | | | |
| Latino-White Dissimilarity | 36.55 | 12.3 | 8.55 | 66.87 |
| Gini Index | 0.46 | 0.04 | 0.35 | 0.57 |
| Proportion Black | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.004 | 0.83 |
| Proportion Young Males | 0.16 | 0.03 | 0.11 | 0.27 |
| Proportion Foreign Born | 0.19 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.76 |
| Violent Crime Rate | 216.29 | 156.39 | 18.27 | 765.65 |
| **Change Control Conditions (2010-2000)** | | | | |
| Change in Latino-White Dissimilarity | -0.94 | 5.96 | -41.56 | 23.7 |
| Change in Gini Index | 0.01 | 0.03 | -0.08 | 0.12 |
| Change in Proportion Black | 0.004 | 0.03 | -0.1 | 0.09 |
| Change in Proportion Young Males | -0.002 | 0.01 | -0.06 | 0.03 |
| Change in Proportion Foreign Born | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.05 | 0.1 |
| Change in Violent Crime Rate | -46.35 | 107.88 | -634.92 | 245.72 |
| **Regional Controls** | | | | |
| Southwest | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| South | 0.24 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 |
| Northwest | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |
| Midwest | 0.14 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Northeast (referent) | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| *N* | | | | 233 |

**Table 2. Poisson Model of Latino Police-Involved Deaths with Static Threat Measure**

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
| Proportion Latino | 3.74** | 1.20 | 3.64** | 1.18 | 3.65** | 1.22 | 3.49** | 1.25 | 4.03*** | 1.16 |
| Proportion Latino^2 | -3.16** | 1.15 | -3.35** | 1.10 | -3.24** | 1.16 | -3.40** | 1.15 | -3.74*** | 1.07 |
| Latino Mayor | -0.23 | 0.13 | | | | | | | | |
| Latino Elected Officials | | | 0.04 | 0.04 | | | | | | |
| Latino Police Representation | | | | | -0.15 | 0.23 | | | | |
| Sanctuary City | | | | | | | -0.30 | 0.17 | | |
| Gateway City | | | | | | | | | -0.26 | 0.15 |
| Latino -White Dissimilarity | 0.001 | 0.006 | -0.0003 | 0.006 | -0.001 | 0.006 | -0.0002 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.006 |
| Gini Index | 0.46 | 1.57 | 0.13 | 1.51 | 0.55 | 1.69 | 1.23 | 1.61 | -0.33 | 1.47 |
| Proportion Black | -5.56*** | 0.87 | -5.23*** | 0.88 | -5.34*** | 0.85 | -5.31*** | 0.80 | -4.93*** | 0.89 |
| Proportion Young Males | 7.42* | 3.41 | 7.19* | 3.21 | 7.34* | 3.36 | 7.93** | 2.91 | 7.51* | 3.30 |
| Proportion Foreign Born | -1.70*** | 0.46 | -1.79*** | 0.53 | -1.82*** | 0.52 | -1.48* | 0.59 | -1.45* | 0.59 |
| Violent Crime Rate | 0.003*** | 0.0005 | 0.003*** | 0.0005 | 0.003*** | 0.0005 | 0.003*** | 0.0005 | 0.003*** | 0.0005 |
| Southwest [a] | 0.75*** | 0.21 | 0.81*** | 0.22 | 0.75*** | 0.21 | 0.78*** | 0.20 | 0.80*** | 0.22 |
| South [a] | 1.66*** | 0.26 | 1.67*** | 0.26 | 1.58*** | 0.26 | 1.47*** | 0.26 | 1.59*** | 0.26 |
| Northwest [a] | 1.16*** | 0.26 | 1.16*** | 0.26 | 1.12*** | 0.27 | 1.10*** | 0.25 | 1.21** | 0.27 |
| Midwest [a] | 0.36 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 0.24 | 0.34 | 0.24 | 0.40 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 0.24 |

Note: SE refers to robust standard error

[a] Referent = Northeast

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 3. Poisson Model of Latino Police-Involved Deaths with Change Threat Measure**

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
| Latino Change | 4.91* | 2.04 | 5.40** | 1.97 | 5.17* | 2.11 | 5.50** | 2.03 | 5.44** | 1.92 |
| Mayor Change | -0.08 | 0.13 | | | | | | | | |
| Elected Officials Change | | | 0.04 | 0.04 | | | | | | |
| Police Representation Change | | | | | -0.17 | 0.47 | | | | |
| Sanctuary Change | | | | | | | 0.07 | 0.19 | | |
| Gateway Change | | | | | | | | | 0.15 | 0.18 |
| Dissimilarity Change | 0.03** | 0.01 | 0.03** | 0.01 | 0.03** | 0.01 | 0.03** | 0.01 | 0.03** | 0.01 |
| Gini Change | -1.95 | 2.97 | -0.92 | 2.99 | -1.55 | 2.91 | -1.57 | 2.99 | -1.48 | 2.91 |
| Black Change | -0.32 | 3.08 | -0.63 | 3.03 | -0.63 | 3.07 | -0.29 | 3.00 | -0.94 | 3.03 |
| Young Males Change | 13.03* | 6.65 | 13.75* | 6.64 | 13.37* | 6.53 | 12.91 | 6.63 | 10.55 | 6.51 |
| Foreign Born Change | -7.21** | 2.79 | -7.31** | 2.73 | -7.56** | 2.81 | -7.65** | 2.79 | -7.43** | 2.83 |
| Violent Crime Rate Change | -0.0003 | 0.001 | -0.0003 | 0.001 | -0.0003 | 0.001 | -0.0003 | 0.001 | -0.0004 | 0.001 |
| Southwest [a] | 1.27*** | 0.22 | 1.29*** | 0.22 | 1.26*** | 0.22 | 1.29*** | 0.24 | 1.22*** | 0.22 |
| South [a] | 1.03*** | 0.31 | 1.07*** | 0.30 | 1.04*** | 0.30 | 1.09*** | 0.33 | 1.03*** | 0.30 |
| Northwest [a] | 1.56*** | 0.32 | 1.56*** | 0.31 | 1.55*** | 0.32 | 1.59*** | 0.32 | 1.54*** | 0.32 |
| Midwest [a] | 0.36 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 0.23 | 0.34 | 0.23 | 0.39 | 0.25 | 0.34 | 0.23 |

Note: SE refers to robust standard error

[a] Referent = Northeast

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 4. Poisson Model of White Police-Involved Deaths with Static Threat Measure**

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
| Proportion Latino | 2.35 | 1.53 | 2.66 | 1.57 | 2.60 | 1.53 | 2.42 | 1.55 | 2.83 | 1.55 |
| Proportion Latino^2 | -0.93 | 1.87 | -1.62 | 1.90 | -1.34 | 1.86 | -1.59 | 1.82 | -1.94 | 1.85 |
| Latino Mayor | -0.30 | 0.16 | | | | | | | | |
| Latino Elected Officials | | | 0.01 | 0.03 | | | | | | |
| Latino Police Representation | | | | | -0.56* | 0.24 | | | | |
| Sanctuary City | | | | | | | -0.39* | 0.18 | | |
| Gateway City | | | | | | | | | -0.32* | 0.14 |
| Latino -White Dissimilarity | -0.005 | 0.006 | -0.006 | 0.006 | -0.008 | 0.006 | -0.004 | 0.006 | -0.005 | 0.006 |
| Gini Index | 3.15* | 1.60 | 2.95 | 1.65 | 3.95** | 1.54 | 3.61* | 1.44 | 2.35 | 1.69 |
| Proportion Black | -1.98* | 0.79 | -1.93* | 0.80 | -1.71* | 0.71 | -2.01** | 0.75 | -1.72* | 0.75 |
| Proportion Young Males | -2.72 | 2.39 | -2.56 | 2.36 | -2.58 | 2.49 | -1.58 | 2.29 | -2.83 | 2.55 |
| Proportion Foreign Born | -3.23*** | 0.69 | -3.37*** | 0.70 | -3.09*** | 0.67 | -2.77*** | 0.74 | -2.60*** | 0.72 |
| Violent Crime Rate | 0.002** | 0.001 | 0.002** | 0.001 | 0.002*** | 0.001 | 0.002*** | 0.001 | 0.002*** | 0.001 |
| Southwest [a] | 1.38*** | 0.23 | 1.37*** | 0.23 | 1.39*** | 0.21 | 1.32*** | 0.21 | 1.42*** | 0.24 |
| South [a] | 1.39*** | 0.26 | 1.37*** | 0.25 | 1.27*** | 0.25 | 1.23*** | 0.25 | 1.31*** | 0.27 |
| Northwest [a] | 1.40*** | 0.27 | 1.36*** | 0.27 | 1.32*** | 0.25 | 1.32*** | 0.25 | 1.41*** | 0.28 |
| Midwest [a] | 0.92** | 0.35 | 0.90** | 0.33 | 0.84** | 0.32 | 0.83** | 0.32 | 0.87* | 0.34 |

Note: SE refers to robust standard error

[a] Referent = Northeast

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 5. Poisson Model of White Police-Involved Deaths with Change Threat Measure**

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
| Latino Change | 8.01*** | 1.98 | 8.47*** | 2.00 | 7.60*** | 2.17 | 8.15*** | 2.04 | 8.46*** | 2.03 |
| Mayor Change | -0.29 | 0.18 | | | | | | | | |
| Elected Officials Change | | | 0.03 | 0.02 | | | | | | |
| Police Representation Change | | | | | -0.76* | 0.36 | | | | |
| Sanctuary Change | | | | | | | -0.14 | 0.16 | | |
| Gateway Change | | | | | | | | | 0.01 | 0.13 |
| Dissimilarity Change | 0.03*** | 0.008 | 0.02** | 0.008 | 0.02** | 0.008 | 0.02** | 0.008 | 0.03** | 0.008 |
| Gini Change | -5.21 | 2.87 | -4.12 | 2.94 | -4.06 | 2.77 | -4.11 | 3.04 | -4.46 | 2.93 |
| Black Change | 4.07 | 2.73 | 3.90 | 2.75 | 2.88 | 2.61 | 3.91 | 2.76 | 3.93 | 2.74 |
| Young Males Change | 7.22 | 5.95 | 7.24 | 6.02 | 8.85 | 6.16 | 7.96 | 6.16 | 7.17 | 6.11 |
| Foreign Born Change | -10.13** | 3.29 | -9.94** | 3.29 | -9.64** | 3.25 | -9.58** | 3.27 | -9.81** | 3.28 |
| Violent Crime Rate Change | 0.0002 | 0.0007 | 0.0002 | 0.0007 | -0.00004 | 0.0007 | 0.0001 | 0.0007 | 0.0002 | 0.0007 |
| Southwest [a] | 1.31*** | 0.25 | 1.31*** | 0.25 | 1.35*** | 0.25 | 1.23*** | 0.25 | 1.29*** | 0.25 |
| South [a] | 1.13*** | 0.24 | 1.15*** | 0.24 | 1.11*** | 0.23 | 1.06*** | 0.25 | 1.14*** | 0.24 |
| Northwest [a] | 1.40*** | 0.28 | 1.38*** | 0.28 | 1.36*** | 0.27 | 1.33*** | 0.28 | 1.38*** | 0.28 |
| Midwest [a] | 0.98*** | 0.30 | 0.99*** | 0.29 | 0.89** | 0.29 | 0.92*** | 0.28 | 0.98*** | 0.30 |

Note: SE refers to robust standard error

[a] Referent = Northeast

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 6. Poisson Model of Total Police-Involved Deaths with Static Threat Measure**

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
| Proportion Latino | 2.55** | 0.93 | 2.61** | 0.93 | 2.59** | 0.91 | 2.49** | 0.91 | 2.90** | 0.95 |
| Proportion Latino^2 | -1.48 | 0.95 | -1.67 | 0.93 | -1.57 | 0.92 | -1.70 | 0.91 | -2.07* | 0.93 |
| Latino Mayor | -0.10 | 0.13 | | | | | | | | |
| Latino Elected Officials | | | 0.01 | 0.02 | | | | | | |
| Latino Police Representation | | | | | -0.19 | 0.14 | | | | |
| Sanctuary City | | | | | | | -0.23* | 0.11 | | |
| Gateway City | | | | | | | | | -0.29** | 0.10 |
| Latino -White Dissimilarity | -0.006 | 0.005 | -0.006 | 0.005 | -0.007 | 0.005 | -0.005 | 0.005 | -0.006 | 0.005 |
| Gini Index | 1.47 | 1.05 | 1.42 | 1.05 | 1.74 | 1.05 | 1.80 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.04 |
| Proportion Black | -1.00* | 0.43 | -0.97* | 0.43 | -0.89* | 0.41 | -0.95* | 0.41 | -0.84* | 0.38 |
| Proportion Young Males | 1.23 | 1.70 | 1.27 | 1.68 | 1.26 | 1.72 | 1.85 | 1.57 | 1.26 | 1.69 |
| Proportion Foreign Born | -2.33*** | 0.51 | -2.36*** | 0.53 | -2.29*** | 0.53 | -2.06*** | 0.56 | -1.85*** | 0.57 |
| Violent Crime Rate | 0.002*** | 0.0004 | 0.002*** | 0.0004 | 0.002*** | 0.0004 | 0.002*** | 0.0004 | 0.002*** | 0.0004 |
| Southwest [a] | 0.79*** | 0.15 | 0.80*** | 0.16 | 0.79*** | 0.15 | 0.77*** | 0.16 | 0.81*** | 0.16 |
| South [a] | 1.08*** | 0.21 | 1.08*** | 0.21 | 1.04*** | 0.21 | 0.98*** | 0.20 | 1.02*** | 0.21 |
| Northwest [a] | 0.95*** | 0.19 | 0.94*** | 0.19 | 0.92*** | 0.19 | 0.92*** | 0.18 | 0.98*** | 0.20 |
| Midwest [a] | 0.58* | 0.25 | 0.59* | 0.25 | 0.55* | 0.24 | 0.56* | 0.24 | 0.57* | 0.25 |

Note: SE refers to robust standard error

[a] Referent = Northeast

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 7. Poisson Model of Total Police-Involved Deaths with Change Threat Measure**

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
| Latino Change | 6.24*** | 1.52 | 6.52*** | 1.55 | 6.25*** | 1.63 | 6.55*** | 1.56 | 6.49*** | 1.55 |
| Mayor Change | -0.11 | 0.13 | | | | | | | | |
| Elected Officials Change | | | 0.02 | 0.02 | | | | | | |
| Police Representation Change | | | | | -0.24 | 0.19 | | | | |
| Sanctuary Change | | | | | | | 0.01 | 0.12 | | |
| Gateway Change | | | | | | | | | 0.05 | 0.12 |
| Dissimilarity Change | 0.03*** | 0.006 | 0.03*** | 0.006 | 0.02*** | 0.006 | 0.03*** | 0.007 | 0.03*** | 0.006 |
| Gini Change | -2.03 | 2.02 | -1.50 | 2.07 | -1.58 | 2.05 | -1.70 | 2.14 | -1.65 | 2.06 |
| Black Change | -1.04 | 1.72 | -1.11 | 1.73 | -1.36 | 1.69 | -1.11 | 1.71 | -1.17 | 1.73 |
| Young Males Change | 20.11*** | 4.15 | 20.29*** | 4.15 | 21.04*** | 4.28 | 20.17*** | 4.10 | 19.87*** | 4.23 |
| Foreign Born Change | -6.47** | 2.31 | -6.45** | 2.28 | -6.47** | 2.28 | -6.44** | 2.24 | -6.54** | 2.31 |
| Violent Crime Rate Change | -0.0002 | 0.0004 | -0.0003 | 0.0004 | -0.0004 | 0.0004 | -0.0002 | 0.0004 | -0.0003 | 0.0004 |
| Southwest [a] | 0.77*** | 0.17 | 0.77*** | 0.16 | 0.79*** | 0.16 | 0.76*** | 0.17 | 0.75*** | 0.16 |
| South [a] | 0.79*** | 0.15 | 0.81*** | 0.15 | 0.80*** | 0.14 | 0.80*** | 0.16 | 0.80*** | 0.15 |
| Northwest [a] | 0.84*** | 0.20 | 0.84*** | 0.20 | 0.84*** | 0.19 | 0.84*** | 0.20 | 0.84*** | 0.20 |
| Midwest [a] | 0.72*** | 0.20 | 0.73*** | 0.20 | 0.70*** | 0.19 | 0.73*** | 0.19 | 0.72*** | 0.19 |

Note: SE refers to robust standard error

[a] Referent = Northeast

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 8. Poisson Model of All Political Opportunity Structures with Static Measure**

| | Model 1 (Latino) | | Model 2 (White) | | Model 3 (Total) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
| Proportion Latino | 4.03*** | 1.14 | 2.34 | 1.45 | 2.72** | 0.93 |
| Proportion Latino^2 | -4.00*** | 1.08 | -1.24 | 1.73 | -1.93* | 0.95 |
| Latino Mayor | -0.24 | 0.14 | -0.26 | 0.18 | -0.12 | 0.13 |
| Latino Elected Officials | 0.001 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.03 | -0.01 | 0.02 |
| Latino Police Representation | 0.34 | 0.28 | -0.31 | 0.26 | 0.03 | 0.19 |
| Sanctuary City | -0.39* | 0.18 | -0.32 | 0.16 | -0.23 | 0.13 |
| Gateway City | -0.34* | 0.16 | -0.36* | 0.14 | -0.30** | 0.11 |
| Latino -White Dissimilarity | 0.004 | 0.006 | -0.004 | 0.006 | -0.003 | 0.005 |
| Gini Index | 0.49 | 1.55 | 3.56* | 1.48 | 1.43 | 1.03 |
| Proportion Black | -5.03*** | 0.80 | -1.70** | 0.65 | -0.86* | 0.38 |
| Proportion Young Males | 8.23** | 2.85 | -2.17 | 2.56 | 1.77 | 1.59 |
| Proportion Foreign Born | -0.75 | 0.55 | -1.73* | 0.73 | -1.49** | 0.56 |
| Violent Crime Rate | 0.003*** | 0.0005 | 0.002*** | 0.0006 | 0.003*** | 0.0004 |
| Southwest [a] | 0.87*** | 0.21 | 1.41*** | 0.22 | 0.80*** | 0.17 |
| South [a] | 1.53*** | 0.26 | 1.15*** | 0.28 | 0.94*** | 0.21 |
| Northwest [a] | 1.24*** | 0.25 | 1.39*** | 0.26 | 0.98*** | 0.19 |
| Midwest [a] | 0.48* | 0.24 | 0.80* | 0.33 | 0.55* | 0.25 |

Note: SE refers to robust standard error

[a] Referent = Northeast

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 9. Poisson Model of All Political Opportunity Structures with Change Measure**

| | Model 1 (Latino) | | Model 2 (White) | | Model 3 (Total) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
| Latino Change | 4.97* | 2.25 | 6.79** | 2.20 | 5.97*** | 1.60 |
| Mayor Change | -0.06 | 0.14 | -0.29 | 0.18 | -0.10 | 0.13 |
| Elected Officials Change | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Police Representation Change | -0.17 | 0.46 | -0.71 | 0.36 | -0.23 | 0.20 |
| Sanctuary Change | 0.06 | 0.19 | -0.15 | 0.15 | 0.01 | 0.12 |
| Gateway Change | 0.14 | 0.19 | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0.05 | 0.13 |
| Dissimilarity Change | 0.03** | 0.01 | 0.02** | 0.01 | 0.02*** | 0.006 |
| Gini Change | -1.51 | 3.03 | -4.05 | 2.77 | -1.74 | 2.09 |
| Black Change | -1.16 | 3.03 | 3.01 | 2.61 | -1.37 | 1.66 |
| Young Males Change | 11.70 | 6.31 | 9.29 | 6.22 | 20.58*** | 4.20 |
| Foreign Born Change | -7.19* | 2.85 | -9.89** | 3.22 | -6.63** | 2.30 |
| Violent Crime Rate Change | -0.0004 | 0.001 | -0.0001 | 0.001 | -0.0004 | 0.0004 |
| Southwest [a] | 1.29*** | 0.23 | 1.31*** | 0.24 | 0.80*** | 0.17 |
| South [a] | 1.07*** | 0.33 | 1.04*** | 0.24 | 0.80*** | 0.16 |
| Northwest [a] | 1.57*** | 0.32 | 1.33*** | 0.25 | 0.84*** | 0.20 |
| Midwest [a] | 0.37 | 0.26 | 0.85*** | 0.27 | 0.71*** | 0.19 |

Note: SE refers to robust standard error

[a] Referent = Northeast

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

**Supplemental Table 1. Poisson Model of Initial and Change in the Latino Population**

| | Model 1 (Latino) | | Model 2 (White) | | Model 3 (Total) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
| Proportion Latino (2000) | -0.11 | 0.38 | 0.26 | 0.52 | -0.001 | 0.32 |
| Latino Change | 5.02* | 2.26 | 6.35** | 2.34 | 5.98*** | 1.66 |
| Mayor Change | -0.06 | 0.13 | -0.29 | 0.17 | -0.10 | 0.13 |
| Elected Officials Change | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Police Representation Change | -0.13 | 0.48 | -0.75* | 0.37 | -0.23 | 0.19 |
| Sanctuary Change | 0.05 | 0.19 | -0.15 | 0.15 | 0.01 | 0.12 |
| Gateway Change | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.01 | 0.14 | 0.05 | 0.13 |
| Dissimilarity Change | 0.03** | 0.01 | 0.02* | 0.01 | 0.02*** | 0.01 |
| Gini Change | -1.74 | 3.02 | -3.86 | 2.80 | -1.74 | 2.05 |
| Black Change | -1.17 | 3.02 | 3.09 | 2.61 | -1.37 | 1.66 |
| Young Males Change | 11.30 | 6.76 | 9.62 | 6.28 | 20.58*** | 4.32 |
| Foreign Born Change | -7.42* | 2.89 | -9.30** | 3.35 | -6.64** | 2.31 |
| Violent Crime Rate Change | -0.0004 | 0.001 | -0.00002 | 0.001 | -0.0004 | 0.0004 |
| Southwest [a] | 1.29*** | 0.23 | 1.31*** | 0.25 | 0.80*** | 0.17 |
| South [a] | 1.06*** | 0.33 | 1.08*** | 0.26 | 0.80*** | 0.17 |
| Northwest [a] | 1.55*** | 0.34 | 1.35*** | 0.26 | 0.84*** | 0.21 |
| Midwest [a] | 0.35 | 0.26 | 0.88** | 0.28 | 0.71*** | 0.20 |

Note: SE refers to robust standard error

[a] Referent= Northeast

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

## Appendix A. List of Eligible Cities and Associated Police Departments

| City | State | Police Department |
|---|---|---|
| Abilene | Texas | Abilene Police Department |
| Albuquerque | New Mexico | Albuquerque Police Department |
| Alexandria | Virginia | Alexandria Police Department |
| Allentown | Pennsylvania | Allentown Police Department |
| Amarillo | Texas | Amarillo Police Department |
| Anaheim | California | Anaheim Police Department |
| Anchorage | Alaska | Anchorage Police Department |
| Arlington | Texas | Arlington Police Department |
| Arvada | Colorado | Arvada Police Department |
| Athens | Georgia | Athens-Clarke County Police Department |
| Atlanta | Georgia | Atlanta Police Department |
| Aurora | Colorado | Aurora Police Department |
| Aurora | Illinois | Aurora Police Department |
| Austin | Texas | Austin Police Department |
| Bakersfield | California | Bakersfield Police Department |
| Baltimore | Maryland | Baltimore Police Department |
| Baton Rouge | Louisiana | Baton Rouge Police Department |
| Beaumont | Texas | Beaumont Police Department |
| Bellevue | Washington | Bellevue Police Department |
| Berkeley | California | Berkeley Police Department |
| Billings | Montana | Billings Police Department |
| Birmingham | Alabama | Birmingham Police Department |
| Boise | Idaho | Boise Police Department |
| Boston | Massachusetts | Boston Police Department |
| Bridgeport | Connecticut | Bridgeport Police Department |
| Brownsville | Texas | Brownsville Police Department |
| Buffalo | New York | Buffalo Police Department |
| Burbank | California | Burbank Police Department |
| Cambridge | Massachusetts | Cambridge Police Department |
| Cape Coral | Florida | Cape Coral Police Department |
| Carlsbad | California | Carlsbad Police Department |
| Carrollton | Texas | Carrolton Police Department |
| Cary | North Carolina | Cary Police Department |
| Chandler | Arizona | Chandler Police Department |
| Charlotte | North Carolina | Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department |
| Chattanooga | Tennessee | Chattanooga Police Department |
| Chicago | Illinois | Chicago Police Department |
| Chula Vista | California | Chula Vista Police Department |
| Cincinnati | Ohio | Cincinnati Police Department |
| Clarksville | Tennessee | Clarksville Police Department |
| Clearwater | Florida | Clearwater Police Department |
| Cleveland | Ohio | Cleveland Division of Police |
| Colorado Springs | Colorado | Colorado Springs Police Department |
| Columbia | South Carolina | Columbia Police Department |
| Columbus | Georgia | Columbus Police Department |
| Columbus | Ohio | Columbus Division of Police |
| Concord | California | Concord Police Department |
| Coral Springs | Florida | Coral Springs Police Department |
| Corona | California | Corona Police Department |
| Corpus Christi | Texas | Corpus Christi Police Department |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Costa Mesa | California | Costa Mesa Police Department |
| Dallas | Texas | Dallas Police Department |
| Daly City | California | Daly City Police Department |
| Denton | Texas | Denton Police Department |
| Denver | Colorado | Denver Police Department |
| Des Moines | Iowa | Des Moines Police Department |
| Detroit | Michigan | Detroit Police Department |
| Downey | California | Downey Police Department |
| Durham | North Carolina | Durham Police Department |
| El Monte | California | El Monte Police Department |
| El Paso | Texas | El Paso Police Department |
| Elizabeth | New Jersey | Elizabeth Police Department |
| Erie | Pennsylvania | Erie Bureau of Police |
| Escondido | California | Escondido Police Department |
| Eugene | Oregon | Eugene Police Department |
| Everett | Washington | Everett Police Department |
| Fairfield | California | Fairfield Police Department |
| Fayetteville | North Carolina | Fayetteville Police Department |
| Fontana | California | Fontana Police Department |
| Fort Collins | Colorado | Fort Collins Police Services |
| Fort Lauderdale | Florida | Fort Lauderdale Police Department |
| Fort Wayne | Indiana | Fort Wayne Police Department |
| Fort Worth | Texas | Fort Worth Police Department |
| Fremont | California | Fremont Police Department |
| Fresno | California | Fresno Police Department |
| Frisco | Texas | Frisco Police Department |
| Fullerton | California | Fullerton Police Department |
| Gainesville | Florida | Gainesville Police Department |
| Garden Grove | California | Garden Grove Police Department |
| Garland | Texas | Garland Police Department |
| Gilbert | Arizona | Gilbert Police Department |
| Glendale | Arizona | Glendale Police Department |
| Glendale | California | Glendale Police Department |
| Grand Prairie | Texas | Grand Prairie Police Department |
| Grand Rapids | Michigan | Grand Rapids Police Department |
| Green Bay | Wisconsin | Green Bay Police Department |
| Greensboro | North Carolina | Greensboro Police Department |
| Gresham | Oregon | Gresham Police Department |
| Hampton | Virginia | Hampton Police Division |
| Hartford | Connecticut | Hartford Police Department |
| Hayward | California | Hayward Police Department |
| Henderson | Nevada | Henderson Police Department |
| Hialeah | Florida | Hialeah Police Department |
| High Point | North Carolina | High Point Police Department |
| Hollywood | Florida | Hollywood Police Department |
| Honolulu | Hawaii | Honolulu Police Department |
| Houston | Texas | Houston Police Department |
| Huntington Beach | California | Huntington Beach Police Department |
| Huntsville | Alabama | Huntsville Police Department |
| Independence | Missouri | Independence Police Department |
| Indianapolis | Indiana | Indianapolis Metropolitan Police |
| Inglewood | California | Inglewood Police Department |
| Irvine | California | Irvine Police Department |
| Irving | Texas | Irving Police Department |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Jacksonville | Florida | Jacksonville Sheriff's Office |
| Jersey City | New Jersey | Jersey City Police Department |
| Joliet | Illinois | Joliet Police Department |
| Kansas City | Missouri | Kansas City Police Department |
| Killeen | Texas | Killeen Police Department |
| Knoxville | Tennessee | Knoxville Police Department |
| Lakewood | Colorado | Lakewood Police Department |
| Lansing | Michigan | Lansing Police Department |
| Laredo | Texas | Laredo Police Department |
| Las Vegas | Nevada | Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department |
| Lexington | Kentucky | Lexington Division of Police |
| Lincoln | Nebraska | Lincoln Police Department |
| Little Rock | Arkansas | Little Rock Police Department |
| Long Beach | California | Long Beach Police Department |
| Los Angeles | California | Los Angeles Police Department |
| Louisville | Kentucky | Louisville Metropolitan Police Department |
| Lowell | Massachusetts | Lowell Police Department |
| Lubbock | Texas | Lubbock Police Department |
| Madison | Wisconsin | Madison Police Department |
| Manchester | New Hampshire | Manchester Police Department |
| McAllen | Texas | McAllen Police Department |
| Memphis | Tennessee | Memphis Police Department |
| Mesa | Arizona | Mesa Police Department |
| Mesquite | Texas | Mesquite Police Department |
| Miami | Florida | Miami Police Department |
| Midland | Texas | Midland Police Department |
| Milwaukee | Wisconsin | Milwaukee Police Department |
| Minneapolis | Minnesota | Minneapolis Police Department |
| Miramar | Florida | Miramar Police Department |
| Modesto | California | Modesto Police Department |
| Montgomery | Alabama | Montgomery Police Department |
| Murfreesboro | Tennessee | Murfreesboro Police Department |
| Naperville | Illinois | Naperville Police Department |
| Nashville | Tennessee | Metropolitan Nashville Police Department |
| New Haven | Connecticut | New Haven Police Department |
| New Orleans | Louisiana | New Orleans Police Department |
| New York | New York | New York City Police Department |
| Newark | New Jersey | Newark Police Department |
| Newport News | Virginia | Newport News Police Department |
| Norfolk | Virginia | Norfolk Police Department |
| Norman | Oklahoma | Norman Police Department |
| Oakland | California | Oakland Police Department |
| Oceanside | California | Oceanside Police Department |
| Oklahoma City | Oklahoma | Oklahoma City Police Department |
| Omaha | Nebraska | Omaha Police Department |
| Ontario | California | Ontario Police Department |
| Orange | California | Orange Police Department |
| Orlando | Florida | Orlando Police Department |
| Oxnard | California | Oxnard Police Department |
| Palm Bay | Florida | Palm Bay Police Department |
| Pasadena | California | Pasadena Police Department |
| Pasadena | Texas | Pasadena Police Department |
| Paterson | New Jersey | Paterson Police Department |
| Pembroke Pines | Florida | Pembroke Pines Police Department |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Peoria | Arizona | Peoria Police Department |
| Peoria | Illinois | Peoria Police Department |
| Philadelphia | Pennsylvania | Philadelphia Police Department |
| Phoenix | Arizona | Phoenix Police Department |
| Pittsburgh | Pennsylvania | Pittsburgh Bureau of Police |
| Plano | Texas | Plano Police Department |
| Pomona | California | Pomona Police Department |
| Port St. Lucie | Florida | Port St. Lucie Police Department |
| Portland | Oregon | Portland Police Bureau |
| Providence | Rhode Island | Providence Police Department |
| Pueblo | Colorado | Pueblo Police Department |
| Raleigh | North Carolina | Raleigh Police Department |
| Reno | Nevada | Reno Police Department |
| Richmond | California | Richmond Police Department |
| Richmond | Virginia | Richmond Police Department |
| Riverside | California | Riverside Police Department |
| Rochester | Minnesota | Rochester Police Department |
| Rochester | New York | Rochester Police Department |
| Rockford | Illinois | Rockford Police Department |
| Sacramento | California | Sacramento Police Department |
| Salem | Oregon | Salem Police Department |
| Salinas | California | Salinas Police Department |
| Salt Lake City | Utah | Salt Lake City Police Department |
| San Antonio | Texas | San Antonio Police Department |
| San Bernadino | California | San Bernadino Police Department |
| San Diego | California | San Diego Police Department |
| San Francisco | California | San Francisco Police Department |
| San Jose | California | San Jose Police Department |
| Santa Ana | California | Santa Ana Police Department |
| Santa Clara | California | Santa Clara Police Department |
| Santa Rosa | California | Santa Rosa Police Department |
| Savannah | Georgia | Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department |
| Scottsdale | Arizona | Scottsdale Police Department |
| Seattle | Washington | Seattle Police Department |
| Shreveport | Louisiana | Shreveport Police Department |
| Simi Valley | California | Simi Valley Police Department |
| Sioux Falls | South Dakota | Sioux Falls Police Department |
| South Bend | Indiana | South Bend Police Department |
| Spokane | Washington | Spokane Police Department |
| Springfield | Massachusetts | Springfield Police Department |
| Springfield | Missouri | Springfield Police Department |
| St. Louis | Missouri | St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department |
| St. Paul | Minnesota | St. Paul Police Department |
| St. Petersburg | Florida | St. Petersburg Police Department |
| Stamford | Connecticut | Stamford Police Department |
| Stockton | California | Stockton Police Department |
| Sunnyvale | California | Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety |
| Surprise | Arizona | Surprise Police Department |
| Syracuse | New York | Syracuse Police Department |
| Tacoma | Washington | Tacoma Police Department |
| Tallahassee | Florida | Tallahassee Police Department |
| Tampa | Florida | Tampa Police Department |
| Tempe | Arizona | Tempe Police Department |
| Thornton | Colorado | Thornton Police Department |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Toledo | Ohio | Toledo Police Department |
| Topeka | Kansas | Topeka Police Department |
| Torrance | California | Torrance Police Department |
| Tucson | Arizona | Tucson Police Department |
| Tulsa | Oklahoma | Tulsa Police Department |
| Vallejo | California | Vallejo Police Department |
| Vancouver | Washington | Vancouver Police Department |
| Ventura | California | Ventura Police Department |
| Virginia Beach | Virginia | Virginia Beach Police Department |
| Waco | Texas | Waco Police Department |
| Washington | District of Columbia | Washington Metropolitan Police Department |
| Waterbury | Connecticut | Waterbury Police Department |
| West Corvina | California | West Covina Police Department |
| West Valley City | Utah | West Valley City Police Department |
| Westminster | Colorado | Westminster Police Department |
| Wichita | Kansas | Wichita Police Department |
| Wichita Falls | Texas | Wichita Falls Police Department |
| Wilmington | North Carolina | Wilmington Police Department |
| Winston-Salem | North Carolina | Winston-Salem Police Department |
| Worcester | Massachusetts | Worcester Police Department |
| Yonkers | New York | Yonkers Police Department |

## Appendix B. List of Sanctuary Cities

| City | State |
|---|---|
| Albuquerque | New Mexico |
| Anchorage | Alaska |
| Austin | Texas |
| Baltimore | Maryland |
| Berkeley | California |
| Boston | Massachusetts |
| Cambridge | Massachusetts |
| Chandler | Arizona |
| Chicago | Illinois |
| Detroit | Michigan |
| Durham | North Carolina |
| Fresno | California |
| Garden Grove | California |
| Hartford | Connecticut |
| Houston | Texas |
| Lansing | Michigan |
| Los Angeles | California |
| Madison | Wisconsin |
| Milwaukee | Wisconsin |
| Minneapolis | Minnesota |
| New Haven | Connecticut |
| New York | New York |
| Newark | New Jersey |
| Oakland | California |
| Philadelphia | Pennsylvania |
| Pittsburgh | Pennsylvania |
| Portland | Oregon |
| Richmond | California |
| Salem | Oregon |
| San Diego | California |
| San Francisco | California |
| San Jose | California |
| Seattle | Washington |
| St. Louis | Missouri |
| St. Paul | Minnesota |
| Syracuse | New York |
| Washington | District of Columbia |

## Appendix C. List of Gateway Cities

| City | State |
|---|---|
| Atlanta | Georgia |
| Alexandria | Virginia |
| Anaheim | California |
| Arlington | Texas |
| Arvada | Colorado |
| Athens | Georgia |
| Atlanta | Georgia |
| Aurora | Colorado |
| Aurora | Illinois |
| Austin | Texas |
| Bakersfield | California |
| Baltimore | Maryland |
| Bellevue | Washington |
| Berkeley | California |
| Boston | Massachusetts |
| Bridgeport | Connecticut |
| Buffalo | New York |
| Burbank | California |
| Cambridge | Massachusetts |
| Cape Coral | Florida |
| Carlsbad | California |
| Carrollton | Texas |
| Cary | North Carolina |
| Chandler | Arizona |
| Charlotte | North Carolina |
| Chicago | Illinois |
| Chula Vista | California |
| Clearwater | Florida |
| Cleveland | Ohio |
| Columbus | Ohio |
| Concord | California |
| Coral Springs | Florida |
| Corona | California |
| Costa Mesa | California |
| Dallas | Texas |
| Daly City | California |
| Denton | Texas |
| Denver | Colorado |
| Detroit | Michigan |
| Downey | California |
| Durham | North Carolina |
| El Monte | California |
| El Paso | Texas |
| Elizabeth | New Jersey |
| Escondido | California |
| Everett | Washington |
| Fairfield | California |
| Fontana | California |
| Fort Lauderdale | Florida |
| Fort Worth | Texas |

| | |
|---|---|
| Fremont | California |
| Fresno | California |
| Frisco | Texas |
| Fullerton | California |
| Garden Grove | California |
| Garland | Texas |
| Gilbert | Arizona |
| Glendale | Arizona |
| Glendale | California |
| Grand Prairie | Texas |
| Greensboro | North Carolina |
| Gresham | Oregon |
| Hartford | Connecticut |
| Hayward | California |
| Henderson | Nevada |
| Hialeah | Florida |
| High Point | North Carolina |
| Hollywood | Florida |
| Honolulu | Hawaii |
| Houston | Texas |
| Huntington Beach | California |
| Indianapolis | Indiana |
| Inglewood | California |
| Irvine | California |
| Irving | Texas |
| Jersey City | New Jersey |
| Joliet | Illinois |
| Lakewood | Colorado |
| Las Vegas | Nevada |
| Long Beach | California |
| Los Angeles | California |
| Lowell | Massachusetts |
| Manchester | New Hampshire |
| McAllen | Texas |
| Mesa | Arizona |
| Mesquite | Texas |
| Miami | Florida |
| Milwaukee | Wisconsin |
| Minneapolis | Minnesota |
| Miramar | Florida |
| Modesto | California |
| Murfreesboro | Tennessee |
| Naperville | Illinois |
| Nashville | Tennessee |
| New Haven | Connecticut |
| New York | New York |
| Newark | New Jersey |
| Oakland | California |
| Oceanside | California |
| Ontario | California |
| Orange | California |
| Orlando | Florida |
| Oxnard | California |
| Pasadena | California |

| | |
|---|---|
| Pasadena | Texas |
| Paterson | New Jersey |
| Pembroke Pines | Florida |
| Peoria | Arizona |
| Philadelphia | Pennsylvania |
| Phoenix | Arizona |
| Pittsburgh | Pennsylvania |
| Plano | Texas |
| Pomona | California |
| Portland | Oregon |
| Providence | Rhode Island |
| Raleigh | North Carolina |
| Richmond | California |
| Riverside | California |
| Rochester | New York |
| Sacramento | California |
| Salt Lake City | Utah |
| San Antonio | Texas |
| San Bernadino | California |
| San Diego | California |
| San Francisco | California |
| San Jose | California |
| Santa Ana | California |
| Santa Clara | California |
| Santa Rosa | California |
| Scottsdale | Arizona |
| Seattle | Washington |
| Simi Valley | California |
| St. Louis | Missouri |
| St. Paul | Minnesota |
| St. Petersburg | Florida |
| Stamford | Connecticut |
| Stockton | California |
| Sunnyvale | California |
| Surprise | Arizona |
| Tacoma | Washington |
| Tampa | Florida |
| Tempe | Arizona |
| Thornton | Colorado |
| Torrance | California |
| Tucson | Arizona |
| Vallejo | California |
| Vancouver | Washington |
| Ventura | California |
| Washington | District of Columbia |
| Waterbury | Connecticut |
| West Covina | California |
| West Valley City | Utah |
| Westminster | Colorado |
| Winston-Salem | North Carolina |
| Worcester | Massachusetts |
| Yonkers | New York |

**Figure 1: Moderating Influence of Minority Population on Formal Social Control**




**Figure 2. Acceleration of Formal Social Control in Response to Political Threat**



**Figure 3. Relationship between Proportion Latino and Latino Police Killings**




**Supplemental Figure 1. Predictive Margins for Static Latino Threat Measure**



**Supplemental Figure 2. Predictive Margins for Dynamic Latino Threat Measure**



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