

## ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: COLLECTIVE RACIAL EMOTION  
AND WHITES' REACTIONS TO DEMANDS  
FOR RACIAL EQUITY

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Research has shown that white people in the United States support the principle of racial equity, but oppose most practical efforts to advance it. Less is known about how whites respond to social actors who push for these efforts. Building on theories of racial policy attitudes, this research addresses the following questions: How do whites respond emotionally to actors who push for (and against) racial equity? Does the race of the actor matter? And what influence, if any, do these reactions have on subsequent policy evaluations?

To begin answering these questions, I conducted three experiments ( $n = 1255$ ) with self-identified white respondents recruited from Prolific Inc. In each of the studies, respondents reported their emotional reactions to an article designed to look like an online opinion piece. In the first and second studies, I varied the author's race and whether or not the author supported or opposed race-targeted

COVID-19 related economic stimulus. In the third experiment, I examined whites' emotional reactions to Black and white advocates pushing for (or against) a presumably race-neutral policy—carbon taxing.

My findings show that the author's race does influence reactions, particularly when the policy has racial implications. Whites tended to direct more anger toward a Black advocate of the economic relief than they did when a comparable white advocate made the same claim. But whites showed more warmth toward the Black author when he argued against the relief. In both cases, the Black advocate promoted greater opposition to the policy by way of the emotional response. However, when the policy was race-neutral, the advocate's race did not much influence emotional responses, suggesting that the response is, in part, related to the presumed effect the policy would have on reducing the social gap between Blacks and whites.

The results of this research shed light on how white people react to demands for racial equity, and if the race of the messenger has any influence. It extends on previous research by focusing on emotional responses to these demands—both positive and negative—and the influence they have on policy opinions.

COLLECTIVE RACIAL EMOTION AND WHITES' REACTIONS  
TO DEMANDS FOR RACIAL EQUITY

by

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# Dedication

For Jess and Char.

# Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my committee for their guidance and support: Rashawn Ray, Jeff Lucas, Long Daon, Alan Neustadt, Jennifer Wessel, and Antoine Banks. I especially want to thank Rashawn, who has been my advisor for nearly my entire time at UMD sociology. Although I did not apply to the sociology program at UMD because of Rashawn, I very likely came to the program because of him and the students who belonged to the Critical Race Initiative. When I visited as a prospective student, I was planning to go to the University of Illinois, Chicago, but I figured I might as well check out the program at UMD before deciding. They were offering to pay for (some) of the trip, after all. While visiting, we had the option to go to some talk, or to sit in on a writing workshop session with the Critical Race Initiative. Why anyone would ever choose the talk is a mystery to me. Anyway, my experience with the writing workshop was as thrilling as an academic experience can be. I remember my hands were shaking. I remember going back to the hotel room that night and saying to my wife (fiancee at the time), Jessica, "they're making it really difficult for me to choose UIC."

After arriving at UMD I had a chance to talk with Rashawn about some research ideas. I ended up asking him to be my advisor because he exudes enthusiasm for his students' early stage ideas. I think he does this because he recognizes that the early stages of an idea are fragile. They represent curiosity more than anything, and enthusiasm can nurture curiosity. The two things together provide much of the motivation needed to be successful in a graduate program.

When curiosity is nurtured with enthusiasm, eventually curious students will make strides in their work and become enthusiastic on their own. That was true for me anyway. So, thanks Rashawn.

My other committee members also provided crucial support and insight. Before meeting Jeff, I didn't have an inkling of what theory is or how to use it. This, despite already having earned a BA and an MA in sociology. As it stands, I still struggle with what it means to make a theoretical contribution and how to do so, but it is at least something I now consider routinely in my work, thanks to Jeff.

When I visited UMD as a prospective student, I asked the graduate studies director at the time, Liana Sayer, if members of the department were supportive of qualitative work. Her answer was important to me because, at the time, I didn't think I was capable of doing quantitative work. Then I took a class with Alan. And then another (and another). And then I was his teaching assistant for introductory statistics. Halfway through my second (or was it the third?) semester as his lab instructor, I overheard the economics lab instructor next door talking to his students about interaction terms. We never get that far in undergraduate statistics in sociology, and I remember feelings envious for a moment. Who would have thought that I'd transition from terror at the thought of a spreadsheet to feeling envious about teaching "advanced" material? I'm very grateful to Alan for playing such an important role in that one-eighty.

In a way, Long Doan is like a composite of all of the things I have found helpful in the others: He knows experimental methods, he's good at theory, and he's good

at stats. And he answers email immediately. Sometimes I thought he might actually be on call. I once emailed him a question on a Saturday and was surprised to see his name come through on my phone moments later. When struggling through a statistical problem, there's no better salve than an immediate answer, and Long always had one. He is also encouraging, but not too quick to endorse an idea. I always felt like if I had Long's seal of approval, I must be on the right track.

I'd also like to thank Jennifer Wessel and Antoine Banks. Both agreed to serve on my committee without really knowing me beforehand. Nevertheless, they gave excellent advice and feedback that has helped to improve this dissertation and has given me inspiration for future projects. Rashawn always pointed out the importance of building a team, and I feel like I triangulated the best one for me.

Although I've never met him, I'd also like to thank Lawrence Bobo. His work has been enormously influential in my thinking and the way I approach racial attitudes research. There's no other author I rely on more for a foothold and direction in my work. I sometimes joke that I sleep with his research papers under my pillow. Though without question he has had a significant impact on the study of racial attitudes and ideology, I do think his efforts to combine symbolic racism and group conflict theories has been underappreciated. I have secretly hoped that if he were to read my dissertation that he would think I've carried forward his work and this effort is some small way.

I also need to acknowledge funding sources for this research. The BSOS Dean's Research Initiative provided partial funding. And Rashawn once again went above

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Just as important in this process are my personal relationships. I especially want to thank Justin Maietta and Danielle Koonce for being friends. And my family for their unwavering support: Mom, Tim and my brother Mitch, my Dad and Shannon, my Grandma Elaine. I'm sending out a special nod to my Grandma Jan, who passed just before I began my journey at UMD, and to my Grandpa Charlie, who passed just before I finished (though I was able to tell him I had scheduled a defense date). They moved mountains to make sure I had the chance to pursue my goals, even if it meant making many (many) mistakes along the way. Perhaps I achieved this goal in part because of those mistakes. Well, cheers Grandma and Grandpa.

Finally, and above all really, I want to thank Jessica and Charlie. We had talked about wanting to climb mountains together. This was certainly one of them, but it turns out to have been one of many, and I'm so grateful that we're climbing them together. I could not do it without you.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Race-equity policies, or what are sometimes referred to as “racial” or “race-targeted” policies, are designed to mitigate inequities between racial groups. By and large, white people oppose these policies. Affirmative action provides an example. In one study examining 14 years of data from the General Social Survey (1994-2008), around 90% of whites opposed this measure, year after year (Bobo et al. 2012). There is of course a large body of work attempting to explain this and similar trends regarding whites’ racial policy attitudes. However, little is known about how whites react to social actors who push for these kinds of policies.

An early debate focusing on Black political activists gave two answers that provide some direction. From one perspective, whites oppose their efforts because they are seen as taking advantage of a fair system that would otherwise reward them if only they would put forth the effort (Sears and Kinder 1985). From another perspective, whites oppose the efforts of Black political activists because they are seen as threatening whites’ group interests (Bobo 1983, 1988a). There is evidence that both of these beliefs could lead whites to be resentful of such demands (Banks

and Valentino 2012; Outten et al. 2012), and further evidence that anger powerfully shapes policy opinions (Outten et al. 2012; Valentino et al. 2008, 2011). Thus far, however, research has not pieced together this evidence in a systematic test of whites' emotional and policy reactions to Blacks' demands for racial equity. As a result, the question remains open.

What little research there has been on the topic has focused its attention on *Black* political activists. But white people promote policies for racial equity too. There are at least a few examples in the popular culture of well-known white “anti-racist” activists and authors who have captivated much public attention, as well as success on the *New York Times* best seller list. Anecdotally, whites who push for racial equity may face less resistance. As evidence of this possibility, consider this white student's attempt, alongside his Black friend, to have the confederate flag removed from use by their school's mascot:

As word of the petition spread, articles began to appear in the school and local papers. Many people regarded me [a white student] as deserving praise. Few said the same about my friend [a Black student]. I, it seems, was treated as an individual, as a particular person engaging in specific acts meant to help others. My friend was regarded more as another underprivileged [B]lack kid spending more time rebelling against authority than taking care of his grades, getting a job, and so on (Hyttén and Warren 2003: 87).

Within the broader context of American race relations, this reaction may not be entirely surprising. Whites continue to enjoy advantages in most if not all domains of social life, and anti-Black discrimination persists. Yet, to my knowledge, the best evidence that whites who advocate for racial equity get a pass is anecdotal.

Research has also been limited to perceptions of efforts to implement or expand race-equity policies (perceptions of “Civil Rights leaders” in particular). However, the situation described above might be turned on its head if these same actors were to push *against* them. For example, there are clues that the same anger directed at Blacks who push for racial equity might be converted to feelings of warmth if they were to instead push against it. Notice how “conservative” people of color are pushed into the public spotlight when they hold anti-affirmative action views or other policy opinions that might be considered racially problematic (López 2014). Such a strategy may deflect criticism (López 2014) and lead to an especially warm reception as a result. Whites who publicly espouse these same views, on the other hand, may invite rather than deflect criticism. If so, the broader audience they enjoyed when advocating for racial equity may diminish when advocating against it. Though these claims are plausible, research has yet to test them.

To be clear, these are not merely academic issues. The public is perennially concerned with race-equity policy on issue after issue, from the use of the confederate flag to affirmative action, police reform, and reparations. The economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic recently renewed this conversation regarding how best to approach economic stimulus in a racially stratified society. In this debate, activists and other claims-makers understand that there are real material consequences at stake and hope to influence public opinion to shape how these resources are used. Are they effective in doing so? This dissertation is an effort to begin answering this question. To that end, I refine the question with



reference to the research gaps I outlined above to ask: *How do whites respond emotionally to social actors who push for (or against) racial equity? Does the race of the actor matter? And what influence, if any, do these reactions have for subsequent policy evaluations?*

In attempting to answer these questions, I draw on collective racial resentment theory (Bobo 1999; Bobo et al. 2012; Bobo and Tuan 2006). Using this framework, I argue that whites do indeed resist Black calls for racial equity more vigorously, and that they do so in part because the demand fuels a feeling of resentment. Resentment, in turn, results from a belief that the demand violates whites' values (especially the work ethic) and poses a threat to their privileged group status. These expectations echo the familiar arguments Bobo (1983) and Sears and Kinder (1985) made, outlined above, but the collective racial resentment framework provides a theoretical and empirical basis to synthesize both alternatives into a simplified model. Such an approach is useful to escape the common practice of casting these explanations in adversarial terms and, in my view, has been underappreciated.

At the same time, collective racial resentment theory emphasizes intergroup hostility manifested in anger. To broaden its utility, I propose the concept of “collective racial emotion” to capture contexts where these beliefs may manifest in either racial resentment or paternalistic warmth. Black advocates who reject race-equity policy may provide such a context. I argue that that whites feel greater warmth toward these actors in part because they appear to be compliant with white norms and dominance, and in part because they deflect criticism that could impugn

a racially innocent sense of self.

I conducted three experiments to test these hypotheses. In each of these studies, I compared participant emotional and opinion reactions to an article designed to look like an online opinion piece. In study 1, I focused on white reactions to the race of the author and the author's argument. To compare reactions to the author's race, I varied the race of the person depicted in the article's by-line photograph. To compare reactions to the author's argument, both the Black and white author were presented as arguing either for or against race-targeted COVID-19 related economic stimulus. Study 2 focused on white racial innocence. In this study, I continued to vary the author's race, but presented only the argument against the economic stimulus. To test if whites feel greater warmth because they believe Blacks who oppose race-equity policy deflect criticism, I included a condition to threaten white racial innocence by making the prevalence of "white privilege" more salient (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007). Study 3 is a partial test of a presumptive scope condition of this research. I assume these expectations are generalizable to any social identity in the context of unequal group relations (e.g., gender, sexuality, immigrant status), but only when their advocacy has consequences for his or her group's position. To test this possibility, study 3 takes the same approach as study 1 by varying the authors' race and argument, but the policy (carbon taxing) is ostensibly race-neutral.

In general, I find that the author's race does matter, particularly when advocating for or against racial equity. Whites with stronger feelings of collective

racial emotion direct more anger at Blacks who push for racial equity than they do toward white advocates. This increased anger, in turn, increases opposition to the advocate's goals. At the same time, white advocates apparently do not get a "pass," but they do escape the hottest feelings of anger. On the other hand, Blacks who advocate against racial equity are received with greater warmth than their white counterpart, although this effect appears to hold across all levels of collective racial emotion. A racially innocent self-concept does not appear to play a meaningful role in generating this warmth though, at least not in the way it was operationalized here. Nevertheless, the warmth that Blacks evoke when pushing against race-equity policy leads whites to more openly reject it.

When the policy is race-neutral, the race of the advocate appears to matter less. In the case of carbon taxing, both the Black and white author elicited similar reactions from white respondents. The policy itself still matters though. White respondents who oppose government taxation more generally feel greater anger toward an advocate taking a pro-tax position and less anger toward an advocate taking an anti-tax position. Likewise, respondents more supportive of government taxation feel greater anger toward an advocate taking an anti-tax position. In both cases, increased anger has a subsequent effect on policy opinions.

In the next chapter, I begin by discussing the debate I mentioned at the outset of this chapter that focused on white reactions to Black political activists. I discuss the theoretical foundations of the debate and scholarly efforts to synthesize these perspectives within the collective racial resentment model. In Chapter 3, I introduce

the concept of collective racial emotion and outline the theory underpinning the hypotheses for study 1. I then describe its design, the results of the study, and present a discussion of its findings. In Chapter 4, I turn my attention to study 2 and present its design, the results of the study, and a discussion of its findings. Chapter 5 presents the design for study 3, the results of the study, and a discussion of its findings. Chapter 6 is a general discussion and conclusion of this research, including its findings, limitations, and future directions.

## Chapter 2

# Understanding Whites' Reactions to Demands for Racial Equity

Realistic conflict is like a note on an organ. It sets all prejudices that are attuned to it into simultaneous vibration. The listener can scarcely distinguish the pure note from the surrounding jangle (Allport 1954: 233).

In the 1980s, a common item used in “symbolic politics” research sparked a debate in the racial policy attitudes literature. In two papers, Sears and colleagues (1980) argued that various policy attitudes, including attitudes about busing, unemployment, and national health insurance, were determined by what they referred to as “symbolic attitudes.” According to the theory, people acquire predispositions early in life that later influence their adult perceptions and attitudes. In adulthood, they respond in a highly affective way to symbols that evoke those predispositions. Symbols such as “welfare queens” and “inner city crime” are therefore important not because they evoke self- or group-interested behavior, as earlier scholars had argued, but because they evoke an underlying, early learned predisposition toward racial prejudice.

In both studies, Sears and colleagues used multiple measures of racial prejudice

to index symbolic attitudes, including an item asking survey respondents whether or not Civil Rights leaders were pushing too fast. They then collapsed these items into a single index ranging from “tolerant” to “intolerant.” Using this measure, the authors found strong evidence that racial intolerance motivated attitudes about the policies they examined. Its effect, in turn, presumably resulted from the symbolic content of policy issues such as “forced busing” that harnessed early learned racial prejudice. Importantly, the authors concluded that symbolic attitudes, and not self-interest or group conflict motives, animated attitudes about these issues.

Bobo (1983) later criticized this approach, arguing that whites’ opposition to busing did in fact have a basis in group conflict. To support the claim, Bobo (1983) focused on the Civil Rights item Sears and colleagues incorporated into their composite of racial prejudice. According to Bobo (1983), attitudes towards Civil Rights leaders are not merely a product of their symbolism and the symbol’s ability to evoke early learned prejudice. Questions about the Civil Rights movement also address efforts to reduce inequality between Blacks and whites (Bobo 1988a). For this reason, attitudes about the Black political movement—particularly those involving appraisals of Black Civil Rights leaders, activists, or the pace of social change—likely tap concerns about perceived challenges to the racial status quo (Bobo 1988a). Therefore, if whites believe Civil Rights leaders are pushing too fast, it is because they feel the Civil Rights movement is threatening to whites’ group interests (Bobo 1983). As a result, incorporating this item into a unidimensional scale overlooks the multidimensional features of racial attitudes and leads to an

underestimation of group conflict motives. Bobo (1983) then separated this item to create a multidimensional measure of racial attitudes and reanalyzed the data from Sears and colleagues' papers. Perceived threat, operationalized using this controversial question, emerged as the strongest correlate of whites' attitudes toward busing. With these results, Bobo (1983) concluded that whites' attitudes towards busing resulted from group conflict motives rather than a simple underlying racial prejudice.

Of course, Sears was not convinced by this rebuttal. Sears and Kinder (1985) wrote a reply arguing that Bobo (1983) neither provided an adequate definition of group conflict nor a satisfactory operational definition of it. At the level of measurement, the Civil Rights question did not align with the definition of group conflict Bobo did offer, which included the objective conditions of intergroup competition as well as subjective assessments of out-group threat. The Civil Rights question, however, did not refer to relational arrangements between whites and Blacks, nor did it refer to any resources over which groups might be in competition. As such, it could not address perceived levels of intergroup conflict or subjective appraisals of threat and was an inadequate measure of such perceptions. In short, attitudes towards Civil Rights leaders did not unambiguously index group conflict motives, as Bobo (1983) had argued. Instead, according to Sears and Kinder (1985), whites might be hostile toward symbols such as Black activists for many reasons other than group conflict. For example, they may dislike Black activists "because of their aggressive championing of Blackness," which many whites dislike "for its own

sake” (Sears and Kinder 1985:1145). To be sure, Sears and Kinder (1985) argued that it would be speculative to say these scale items are unambiguously symbolic, but pointed to what they believed to be the weight of evidence that they are not strong indicators of group conflict motives.

## 2.1 Theoretical Foundations

Despite subsequent support for both perspectives, the Sears and Bobo debate foreshadowed an apparent obstacle to racial policy attitudes research: white reactions to Black political activists—and white racial policy attitudes more generally—could only be a matter of either racial prejudice or group conflict motives (Sears 1988). This false dichotomy entangled the Sears and Bobo debate and soon came to preoccupy more attention than it perhaps deserved in the field.

The debate, and to a large extent the disagreement, reflected assumptions about the sources of racial policy attitudes that derive from more general sociocultural and group conflict theories of intergroup attitudes. Understanding these differences is useful for understanding subsequent research on racial policy attitudes and later efforts to synthesize the basic frameworks Bobo and Sears outlined above. Both the sociocultural and group conflict frameworks were developed, at least in part, as a critique of personality theories, the most famous of which was articulated by (Adorno et al. 1950). These authors adopted a Freudian framework to argue that disciplinarian and emotionally manipulative childrearing



practices led children to develop an obsession with status and authority that manifested in ethnocentric attitudes and hostility toward others (Hogg 2003). Both the sociocultural and group conflict theories share a skepticism of this perspective, but there are important differences as well.

Researchers taking a sociocultural approach tend to define prejudice, following Allport (1954), as “an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization” (9). This conceptualization defines prejudice in emotional and cognitive terms, involving feelings of dislike on the one hand and stereotypes about the character of outgroup members on the other. It is assumed to be learned during childhood through a culture of bigotry and intergroup hostility, and is resistant to change in adulthood (Glaser and Gilens 1997; Kinder and Sears 1981). Pettigrew (1958) gave one of the earliest statements using this approach. In a critique of personality theories, he compared racial attitudes between northern and southern Americans. He found expected differences in anti-Black sentiment, with southerners expressing stronger hostility than northerners, despite similar overall personality profiles between the two regions. The difference, therefore, could not be attributable to personality differences between regions, but rather was a function of the culture of the Jim Crow south.

Whereas sociocultural theories assume individuals are socialized into holding attitudes consistent with cultural norms, values, and beliefs, group conflict theorists argue that group membership and the nature of the relationships between groups are the source intergroup attitudes. Sherif’s (1956, 1958, 1966) field experiments in

“realistic group conflict” provided extensive evidence that goal relations between groups set the stage for intergroup prejudice. In these studies, Sherif and colleagues placed groups of boys in competition with one another to achieve a “zero-sum” goal. In this competitive environment, where only one group could win at the expense of the other, boys who had been congenial toward one another prior to being placed in opposite groups became hostile, and group solidarity coalesced around ingroup membership. Surprisingly, the same conflicting groups were later able to minimize these group boundaries when asked to work cooperatively to accomplish a goal for mutual gain.

Related research in social identity theory found evidence that group identification itself, even in the absence of competition, is sufficient to trigger in-group favoritism and out-group prejudice (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987). According to the theory, individuals who identify with a group experience their group identity as a meaningful aspect of their self identity, and thus become psychologically invested in the distinctiveness of their group. Efforts to achieve group distinctiveness become competitive because, fundamentally, “the aim of differentiation is to maintain or achieve superiority” (Tajfel and Turner 1979: 41). In a series of studies, Tajfel (1970) and Tajfel, M. G. Billing, and Bundy (1971) found that this process could take hold even when group membership was defined in superficial or “minimal” ways, so long as people are aware of the existence of an out-group.

## **2.2 Symbolic Racism and Group Conflict Theories of Racial Policy Attitudes**

### **2.2.1 Symbolic Racism**

Sears and Bobo built on these theoretical foundations to better understand the sources of white Americans' racial policy attitudes. Again, these theoretical foundations led to fundamental differences in their approaches, but it is important to understand that both theories have strong empirical support in their own right. Next, I will review some of this work before moving on to discuss research that has attempted to synthesize their approaches.

The symbolic politics approach, rooted in the sociocultural tradition, soon developed into symbolic racism theory. In this theory, the definition of racial prejudice was refined to refer to “a blend of antiblack affect and the kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic” (Kinder and Sears 1981: 416). “Symbolic racism,” as it is called, involves a resistance to change in the racial status quo based on the belief that discrimination is no longer a major barrier to Black achievement, and as such any continuing disadvantages Blacks experience are largely due to their own unwillingness to work hard (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1988; Sears and Henry 2003; Tarman and Sears 2005).

The social effect of symbolic racism is broad opposition among whites to policies that could advance racial equity. There is extensive evidence supporting the theory. The earliest research focused on anti-busing attitudes (e.g., Kinder and

Sears 1981). Later work incorporated a broader set of racial policy attitudes and found evidence that symbolic racism was a strong predictor of attitudes toward policies dealing with equal opportunity, federal assistance, and affirmative action (Sears et al. 1997). More recently, Tuch and Hughes (2011) revisited these findings and showed evidence of the continuing significance of symbolic racism well into president Obama’s first term, an era widely believed to have ushered in a post-racial future (Hutchings 2009). Other work has found that symbolic racism even fuels opposition to ostensibly race-neutral issues, such as welfare, when they have strong and negative associations with Black people in the media (1995, 1996, 1999). More recently, Tesler (2012, 2016) extended on this finding with evidence that these associations have “spilled over” to a much wider set of political attitudes, health care in particular, following the election of president Obama.

Additional research has tested a central claim of symbolic racism theory—that racial symbols evoke or “prime” these early learned prejudices. One of the claims of symbolic racism theory is that people who are socialized from an early age in a culture that promotes anti-Black affect and the Protestant work ethic will respond viscerally later in life to symbols that evoke these predispositions. Theories of racial priming build on this claim and argue that racial appeals in political messaging activate racial considerations by making them more accessible in memory and thus influential in political decisions (Hutchings and Jardina 2009; Mendelberg 2001). Importantly, however, implicit racial appeals (e.g., oblique references to “inner city crime”) are assumed to be the most effective messages because they are ambiguous

and plausibly about something other than race (Hutchings and Jardina 2009). Overt racial appeals (e.g., “Blacks are criminals”) are less effective because they blatantly violate American norms of racial equality, a principle that many white Americans support even as many continue to hold negative views about Blacks (Hutchings and Jardina 2009). For example, Mendelberg (1997), showed that including a “mug shot” of a Black face alongside a political advertisement featuring an anti-crime message increased the influence of symbolic racism on race-related policy attitudes compared to a message without the image. Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002) later corroborated the theory with evidence that racial cues are in part effective because they make symbolic racism more accessible in memory. However, the norms surrounding political rhetoric have changed in recent years such that overtly bigoted language has become much more prominent and accepted (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2018). There is evidence that, in this new context, the effect of racial attitudes such as symbolic racism has remained powerful regardless of how explicitly racial the issue frame is (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2018; Wetts and Willer 2019).

To summarize, there is extensive evidence that whites oppose race-equity policy because of an early learned belief that Blacks could succeed on their own, if only they would try. Contemporary political discourse, in turn, amplifies the effect of this belief when deploying racialized symbols that evoke it.

### 2.2.2 Group Conflict

According to many group conflict scholars, both racial prejudice and negative racial policy attitudes are a matter of group membership and develop from the perception that racial outgroups threaten the ingroup's status, interests, and position. Systems of racial inequality by definition stratify the relative position of racial groups. Such inequality produces group-based perceptions concerning the character of group members and beliefs about what group members are "rightly" entitled to (Blumer 1958). In the current context, whites receive greater material and psychological advantages resulting from their racial group membership, and as such tend to justify and defend the racial inequalities from which they benefit [Bobo1988chapter; Bonilla-Silva (1997), Bonilla-Silva (2003); Jackman (1994)]. This effort results, at least in part, from the perception that outgroup members are challenging (or preparing to challenge) some aspect of whites' dominant group position, whether politically, economically, or culturally (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999).

Using this perspective, Bobo, Kluegal, and Smith (1997) highlight the distinction between the symbolic racism and group conflict perspectives of racial policy attitudes. These authors agree that the concept of symbolic racism basically captures the *content* of contemporary racial prejudice, but they refer to contemporary prejudice as "laissez-faire racism" for historical reasons. Like symbolic racism, laissez-faire racism is characterized by a dismissal of ongoing discrimination paired with persistent anti-Black stereotyping. Unlike symbolic

racism, however, they believe contemporary racial prejudice developed from a process of intergroup struggle rather than through continuing socialization. For Bobo, Kluegal, and Smith (1997), the decline of “Jim Crow racism” and the emergence of contemporary racial prejudice can be traced to the political and economic gains among Blacks and the dismantling of Jim Crow institutions in the 1950s and 1960s. Jim Crow racism, which involved beliefs about white biological differentiation and superiority, was a historically appropriate belief system to justify strict racial segregation and formalized white supremacy. However, as the structures of the Jim Crow south were challenged, weakened, and ultimately collapsed, a new context emerged based on free economic exchange and labor (relatively speaking) (Bobo, Kluegal, and Smith 1997; Wilson 1980). Despite these changes, racial inequalities persist, but in this new context claims to white biological superiority make little sense to justify them. Laissez-faire racism, however, matches the realities of the new racial system by asserting Black *cultural* inferiority to explain continued Black disadvantage in an economic environment of “equal opportunity.” Again, the content of laissez-faire racism is described in an essentially identical way as symbolic racism, but its emergence is located in history rather than ongoing socialization. And while laissez-faire racism serves as a justification for many whites to oppose racial policies, it is only one aspect of racial prejudice, which should also include perceptions of threat, entitlement, and conflict (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1983, 1988a, 1988b; Bobo 1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996).

Bobo, Kluegal, and Smith (1997) illustrate the importance of group interests,

conflict, and threat in shaping white racial attitudes with historical evidence. There is also research using survey and experimental methods to support this theoretical approach. Early research focused on racial policies much as symbolic racism researchers did. Echoing those findings, but using a conflict model, researchers found that group identification and interests influenced policy outlooks toward affirmative action (Bobo 2000), residential integration (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996), and various equal opportunity measures (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; see Jardina 2019 for a more recent example). Other studies at this time focused the role of perceived threat in shaping white racial attitudes. Some of this work focused on the “group threat” hypothesis that the size of a minority population relative to the white population is threatening to whites and heightens racial prejudice as a result. Early work to test this hypothesis typically used demographic data to determine different group sizes and then compared variation in prejudice obtained in survey data across geographic spaces. With this method, Quillian (1995) found that white Europeans living near large racial or immigrant populations, particularly those who were struggling economically, expressed greater prejudice toward these groups. Quillian (1996) supported this finding, adding that group threat is partially responsible for the difference in expressed racial prejudice between northern and southern regions in the United States as well as changes in racial prejudice over time. Taylor (1998) added that group threat also increases opposition to race-equity policy. Dixon (2006) also supported these findings, but noted that the group threat effect is moderated by the extent of meaningful contact with racial outgroup members.



Later group threat work using experimental methods has been especially compelling. Rather than using demographic data to calculate actual group sizes, researchers have used information about population trends to experimentally manipulate *perceptions* of group size. Many of these studies have examined white reactions to the common narrative that group demographics are shifting from majority white to “majority-minority” (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). When whites are told their group is declining numerically, there is evidence that they are more likely to express political conservatism (Craig and Richeson 2014), support restrictive immigration policies (Craig, Rucker, and Richeson 2018; Outten et al. 2012) and conservative political candidates [Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich (2018)], and to oppose welfare programs (Wetts and Willer 2018). Mutz (2018) echoed these results with a time-series probability sample. This study showed that status threat resulting from racial demographic changes influenced presidential voting patterns in 2016—a cycle that offered a candidate who openly campaigned to restore white racial hegemony.

Although the research outlined above supports the group threat hypothesis, whites may feel threatened by racial outgroups for a variety of reasons other than the relative size of nearby minority populations (Blumer 1958). Other research has examined whites’ reactions to perceived political and economic competition as well. Bobo and Hutchings (1996) argued that feelings of “racial alienation” underpin perceptions of intergroup threat. The concept extends on Vanneman and Pettigrew’s (1972) examination of “fraternal deprivation” and refers to the feeling

that one's racial group is at a comparative disadvantage. Using a sample of Los Angeles residents, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) found that people from all racial groups with strong feelings of racial alienation perceive greater political, economic, and housing competition with racial outgroups. Hutchings et al. (2011) later replicated this finding with a nationally representative sample.

Mirroring the experimental work on group threat, there is also experimental work that has examined white reactions to perceived political and economic threat. Willer, Feinberg, and Wetts (2016) found that white study participants were more likely to express favorable opinions toward the Tea Party—a social movement that romanticized the Jim Crow era social context—when they were primed to think about various sources of political and economic competition with racial outgroups. Wilkins and colleagues found that white respondents who were primed to think about “racial progress” were significantly more likely to feel threatened, and to claim that whites are the victims of racial discrimination as a result (Wilkins et al. 2017; Wilkins and Kaiser 2014). Conversely, contemplating anti-white discrimination led many whites to feel threatened (Wilkins et al. 2015).

To summarize, there is broad evidence that racial prejudice and negative racial policy attitudes are a matter of group membership and develop from the perception that racial outgroups threaten the ingroup's status, interests, and position. The perception of threat, in turn, can result from group size (or the perception of group size), political and economic competition, and—as Bobo (1983) argued—activist demands for racial equity.

## 2.3 Reconciling the Debate

The wide empirical support for both theories has not, in itself, bridged the gap between them. Even though much of the research outlined above can be read as support for either symbolic racism or group conflict theories, at least some of it was aimed at discrediting the value of the other. Bobo (1983) and Sears and Kinder (1985) were early examples, but the nature of the arguments remained the same in subsequent work and always led to the same conundrum. The dilemma is perhaps most evident in Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo (2000). This edited volume featured contributions from both paradigms (and others) and was an apparent attempt to reconcile their differences. In the end, though, it reads like an inescapable entrenchment of positions.

Despite the apparent deadlock, some work advanced in the background to reconcile these competing perspectives. Most notably, Bobo and colleagues used group position theory to draw the simple conclusion that white racial policy opinions can involve *both* racial prejudice as traditionally defined and the perception of threat (Bobo 1999; Bobo and Tuan 2006). Lamont (2000) gives a clear example of this in an interview showing how whites draw on both traditional values and perceived threat when describing their views about Blacks:

Vincent is a workhorse. He considers himself “top gun” at his job and makes a very decent living. His comments on blacks suggests that he associates them with laziness and with welfare and with claims to receiving special treatment at work through programs such as affirmative action. He says: “Blacks have a tendency to...try to get off doing less, the least possible...to keep the job where whites will put in that extra oomph. I know this is a generality and it does not go for all,

it goes for a portion. It's this whole unemployment and welfare gig. A lot of the blacks on welfare have no desire to get off it. Why should they? It's free money. I can't stand to see my hard-earned money [said with emphasis] going to pay for someone who wants to sit on his ass all day and get free money (as cited in Bobo et al. 2012).

The anger expressed in this comment is unmistakable, and there are clear references to the value of hard work, just as symbolic racism theory would predict. But these sentiments are also very clearly combined with group comparisons and perceptions of threat (i.e., "I can't stand to see my hard earned money go to pay for someone..."), as group conflict models would predict.

In their own work, Bobo and Tuan (2006) asked survey participants to write in reactions to questions commonly used to tap symbolic racism. Comments included "repeated references to ambition, hard work (or lack thereof), freeloading, self-sufficiency, and playing by the rules" (148-149). In short, clear statements of outgroup disdain filtered through references to traditional moral values. But as in Lamont's research, comments were frequently paired with perceptions of threat. As one respondent commented, "if they want to live on a reservation, then they shouldn't get paid by white man's taxes" (Bobo and Tuan 2006: 146).

To capture the multi-dimensional nature of measures used to tap symbolic racism, Bobo et al. (2012) refer to them as measures of "collective racial resentment." This term highlights both the importance of affect to the sociocultural model and group membership to the conflict model. In the next chapter, I describe the collective racial resentment argument in greater detail and how it is used to synthesize symbolic racism and group conflict theories of racial policy attitudes. I

then propose the concept of “collective racial emotion” as a more general concept to account for contexts where white reactions to demands regarding racial equity may result in either feelings of resentment or warmth.

## Chapter 3

### Study 1: Does an Advocates' Race Influence How Whites React to Demands for Racial Equity?

Race-equity policies such as race-targeted affirmative action, economic stimulus, and anti-bias police trainings are common sources of debate in public discourse. How do white people react to demands for these kinds of race-equity policies? Does it matter if the person making the demand is Black or white? Anecdotally, white advocates for racial equity face less resistance than their Black counterpart. Consider the following statement from Tim Wise, a well-known white anti-racist activist and author:

I am not standing in front of you, and you are not listening to me, because I am the most informed person in the country on racism or white privilege...it is instead because I, and I know this, fit the aesthetic that is needed on too many campuses and too many communities in order to come in and give this talk.

With this statement, Wise claims he has a platform to discuss racism—and an audience who will listen—because of his race, not because of his expertise. The claim is plausible. Research has shown that white people who confront racist

behavior are more positively evaluated (Czopp and Monteith 2003) and face less backlash than their Black counterpart (Schultz and Maddox 2013). Others have shown that white male management leaders are rewarded for promoting diversity, while their non-white, female colleagues are penalized (Hekman et al. 2017). More generally, anti-Black prejudice and discrimination is a persistent feature of American society. Evidence of racial discrimination in labor markets is well documented (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Pager 2003; Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009). Racist policing is widespread (Eberhardt et al. 2004; Ray 2015) and has contributed to racially disproportionate incarceration rates (Alexander 2012) and police killings (Edwards, Lee, and Michael Esposito 2019). Protests involving African Americans are seen as more likely to end in violence (Manekin and Mitts 2021; Valentino and Nicholson 2019) and are more heavily policed, even when other factors are held constant (Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 2011).

The prevalence of anti-Black prejudice and discrimination provides a general basis to believe whites who advocate racial equity will have a broader platform and face less resistance, as Tim Wise claims. Drawing on collective racial resentment theory (Bobo 1999; Bobo et al. 2012; Bobo and Tuan 2006), I develop the concept of “collective racial emotion” and argue that whites do indeed resist Black calls for racial equity more vigorously, and that they do so in part because the demand incites a feeling of anger. This is especially so among whites who already believe Black Americans threaten white status and values—that is, among whites who feel a sense of collective racial emotion. I use an experimental design to test this

hypothesis. Using a fictitious blog post presented as being written by either a Black or white author, I tested for race effects in emotional and policy opinion reactions to the author's demand for race-targeted economic stimulus. I further tested for moderating effects of baseline racial attitudes, measured two weeks prior to the experiment.

One might argue, however, that Black people may evoke more anger because they are seen as being more angry, not because of the argument they are making. There is evidence that whites attribute more anger to Black faces (Hugenberg and Bodenhausen 2003, 2004; Hutchings and Haddock 2008), and that people mirror the emotions they see in others (Bastiaansen, Thioux, and Keysers 2009). My contention, however, is that anger is an emotional reaction to the author's race *and* the nature of the demand. If white resentment is merely a result of attributions of anger to race, then the Black author would evoke more anger regardless of the demand. I do not anticipate this to be the case. Instead, I expect a Black advocate's demand *against* race-equity policy to evoke more *warmth* than a white advocate's demand would muster. To test this hypothesis, I included two additional conditions in the experiment, likewise varying the race of the author, but featuring an argument against race-targeted economic stimulus. I again tested for race effects in emotional and policy opinion reactions as well as for moderating effects of baseline racial attitudes.

In a political landscape where figures from Tim Wise and Ibram X. Kendi to Ben Shapiro and Candace Owens are publicly urging Americans to support or



oppose a range of race-equity policies, the results of this research shed light on how white people might react to these policy demands, and if the race of the messenger has any influence. It also extends on previous research by focusing on emotional responses to these demands—both positive and negative—and the influence they have on policy opinions.

### **3.1 Collective Racial Resentment**

Symbolic racism and group conflict theories provide reasons to believe Black advocates for racial equity will be more strongly resented than their white counterparts. Below, I briefly outline these theories and then discuss how their insights can be integrated into a more simplified collective racial emotions framework.

Many scholars that study symbolic racism have taken an interest in what is sometimes referred to as the principle-implementation paradox—the apparent contradiction between whites’ increased support for the principle of racial equity on the one hand and their steadfast opposition to policies designed to mitigate racial inequity on the other (Bobo et al. 2012; Krysan 2000; Schuman et al. 1997). According to the theory, resistance to racial policies persists because racism persists, albeit in a “new” form (Sears 1988). In its new form, post-Civil Rights racism—referred to as “symbolic racism”—is more covert and difficult to detect, often appealing to beliefs about cultural inferiority rather than blatant biological

claims. The basis of symbolic racism is thus “a blend of anti-Black affect and traditional moral values” such as individualism and the Protestant work ethic (Kinder and Sears 1981). The belief that Black people violate these values in pursuit of an unfair advantage animates white opposition to further demands (Sears 1988; Tarman and Sears 2005).

Early researchers assumed anger and resentment underpinned symbolic racism (Kinder and Sanders 1996), but recent research has empirically validated this claim (Banks 2014; Banks and Bell 2013; Banks and Valentino 2012). For example, Banks and Valentino (2012) found that simply asking people to think about an occasion when they felt angry is sufficient to increase the influence of symbolic racism on political decision making. According to the study, symbolic racism and anger are tightly connected in memory, setting the groundwork to activate one by activating the other. Each of these points support a hypothesis that Black advocates for racial equity will be seen as violating important values and resented because of it.

According to conflict models, white people seek to protect their group’s status and interests, and are especially motivated to take action when they feel their assumed entitlements are threatened. A series of classic studies illustrate this point, showing that large minority populations are threatening to many white people, leading to heightened expressions of prejudice (Quillian 1995, 1996; Taylor 1998; Taylor 2000). Recent research has established empirical and theoretical links between perceived threat and resentment, finding that many whites will feel angered when threatened (Smith 1993; Willer, Feinberg, and Wetts 2016). For example,

Outten et al. (2012) found that presenting white respondents with demographic projections showing a “majority-minority” future elicited greater feelings of threat, and increased anger because of it. According to other research, many white people believe Black demands for racial equity are threatening (Bobo 1983, 1988a). Taken together, these points support a hypothesis that Black demands for racial equity will be seen as threatening to whites’ status and interests, resulting in increased anger.

The collective racial resentment perspective (Bobo 1999; Bobo and Tuan 2006) uses group position theory to integrate the insights from both perspectives. Blumer (1958) originally advanced group position theory to shift the scholarly emphasis from prejudice conceptualized as the property of individuals to an appreciation “that race prejudice is fundamentally a matter of relationship between racial groups” (3). According to Blumer (1958), prejudice becomes a social force when four “feelings” develop among whites. These feelings encompass beliefs about the proper position of racial groups in relation to each other. The first is a feeling of superiority; the second is a feeling that racial outgroups are different and alien; the third is a feeling of entitlement to certain areas of advantage and privilege; and the fourth is a suspicion that racial outgroups are challenging (or preparing to challenge) whites’ group position (Blumer 1958). Blumer was clear that these feelings refer to positional arrangements. The feeling of superiority places racial outgroups below, the feeling of difference sets them apart, the feeling of entitlement excludes others, and perceived threat is “an emotional recoil from the endangerment of group position” (Blumer 1958: 4).

These four dimensions of the sense of group position make it possible to integrate symbolic racism and group conflict theories (Bobo 1999; Bobo and Tuan 2006). To begin with, even though group position theory is distinct from the cognitive and sociocultural statements from Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1958), it still incorporates, and in fact requires, these elements found in their works. For instance, the feeling that racial outgroups are inherently different and inferior reflects the emphasis psychological and sociocultural theories place on racial animus and stereotyping as the basis of racial prejudice (Bobo 1999; Bobo and Tuan 2006). Symbolic racism theory is a direct descendant of the psychological and sociocultural paradigm (Kinder and Sears 1981) and thus fits squarely into this essential dimension of the sense of group position.

Elements of conflict theories are also present in group position theory. All of the feelings Blumer (1958) identified require group members to distinguish themselves from others, a core insight of the social identity approach to intergroup attitudes (e.g., Hogg 2003; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987). Blumer's view that feelings of entitlement and threat are crucial aspects of racial prejudice clearly involves conflict motives as well. Scholars who argue that group interests influence racial attitudes invoke Blumer's concept of entitlement (e.g., Jackman 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Others pioneered the concept of intergroup threat, the crucial ingredient in group position theory. For example, Sherif and colleagues (1956, 1958, 1966), in what are perhaps the paradigm establishing studies in intergroup conflict, found that groups placed in

competition readily develop ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativism when the outgroup is believed to threaten ingroup goal attainment.

From a collective racial resentment perspective, the melding of anti-Black affect, commitment to traditional moral values, and perceived threat are all aspects of the sense of group position. Using this framework, I hypothesize that whites will resist Black calls for racial equity more vigorously, and that they will do so in part because the demand incites a feeling of anger. The emotional response, in turn, results from a belief that Black people violate values *and* threaten whites' group status and interests. Anger then influences political decisions (Banks and Valentino 2012; Outten et al. 2012; Valentino et al. 2008, 2011).

Traditionally, such an argument has been untenable because these frameworks have been treated as incompatible, if not antagonistic (Hoschild 2000; *cf* Bobo 1999). The foregoing review, based on Bobo and colleagues' work, shows that they are in fact complimentary when viewed from a group position framework. Furthermore, items used to index symbolic racism tap both its own underlying concepts as well as threat perceptions. Bobo and Tuan (2006) make this case forcefully. In their study of a public battle over Native American treaty rights in Wisconsin, Bobo and Tuan (2006) gathered public attitudes using a survey that included a symbolic racism battery. They also included an open-ended question immediately following one of the items to elicit qualitative feedback about participant responses to the question. Responses often included complaints about welfare dependency and lack of ambition and self-sufficiency. The authors conclude: "It would be hard to imagine how to tap

into a clearer fusion of traditional moral values and anti-Indian affect than is revealed by these open-ended responses” (Bobo and Tuan 2006: 149). In other words, the item they tested clearly tapped “symbolic racism.” At the same time, they also noted frequent group comparisons and references to group conflict and threat. According to the authors, “These are ideas, precisely as the theory of group position predicts, about who is *rightly entitled* to what” (Bobo and Tuan 2006: 151, emphasis in the original). In other words, the item they tested clearly tapped “conflict motives.” Thus, symbolic racism items tap feelings traditionally associated with symbolic racism as well as threat perceptions. In short, *a measure of symbolic racism is a measure of collective racial resentment*. As I show below, the emotional content of this belief system may manifest in resentment or paternalistic warmth, depending on the context. Therefore, I will refer to the items traditionally used to tap symbolic racism as “collective racial emotion.”

Using this logic, the above hypothesis can be clarified: I expect whites with a strong feeling of collective racial emotion to resent demands for racial equity because they perceive the demand as a violation of their values *and* as a threat to whites’ group status and interests. I also expect these respondents to be most angered by Black people making these demands since they are viewed through the lens of collective racial emotion and white people are not. Figure 3.1 summarizes these hypothesized relationships.




Figure 3.1: Theoretical Diagram

## 3.2 Collective Racial Paternalism

The theory outlined so far describes how white people may respond to demands for racial equity and associated policies. But how do they respond when advocates reject these policies?

Jackman and colleagues give some insight. Their work has been critical of symbolic racism and conflict models for assuming that “parochial negativism” and conflict are the baseline conditions of unequal intergroup relations (Jackman 1994). Jackman argues that dominant group members attempt to secure stability through ideological persuasion by promoting a consensus view that the prevailing system is reasonable and fair (Jackman 1994; Jackman and Crane 1986; Jackman and Muha 1984). Dominant group members (i.e., white Americans) then feel affection toward subordinate group members (i.e., Black Americans) who appear to have internalized the consensus view and who are thus disinclined to harm the in-group (Jackman 1994). With this in mind, I expect advocates who oppose policy disruptive of the status quo to evoke greater warmth, especially when Black advocates are the face of the opposition.

Even though warmth might be described as a positive emotion, in this context it involves a paternalistic disposition that encompasses pity (which can involve warmth) on the one hand and disrespect on the other (Fiske et al. 2002). This response may be described as “collective racial paternalism.” It is the flip side of collective racial resentment and is likewise rooted in the sense of group position. As such, I expect emotional reactions to arguments against race-equity policy to be motivated by anti-Black affect, a commitment to traditional moral values, and perceived threat. In other words, collective racial emotion. Respondents who feel a strong sense of collective racial emotion believe that Black people are unwilling to work hard and are likely to expect most Black people to conform to this expectation. For these whites, a Black advocate who opposes a racial policy agenda counters this stereotype. Such unexpected behavior may engender warmth because it implies compliance to and acceptance of white norms. Likewise, white respondents who typically feel threatened by Blacks may be especially appreciative since a Black face opposing these policies signals compliance to and acceptance of white dominance. Furthermore, Black advocates who oppose race-equity policy may serve as evidence to whites that prejudice, discrimination, and structural racism are not responsible for social differences between Blacks and whites (Pettigrew 1979). Such “proof” could be reassuring to whites that the system is open and fair and, thus, that any advantages they have are the result of a fair process. This belief could protect whites’ sense of self as morally superior and “racially innocent” (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007; DiAngelo 2018), and is likely a warming thought.



I want to emphasize that the presence of warm feelings does not necessarily reflect a desire for equal status or a commitment to racial equity. Rather, to echo Jackman and colleagues, dominant group members strive for an amicable inequality and such warmth and gratitude contributes to system stability. So, ironically, expressed warmth may lead whites to more freely embrace dominance attitudes such as opposition to race-equity policy. Therefore, in addition to feeling greater warmth, I expect whites to show greater resistance to the policy because of it. Again, Figure 3.1 summarizes these hypothesized relationships.

### **3.3 Collective Racial Emotion?**

Examining whites' reactions to arguments against racial equity also provides a test case to evaluate the usefulness of "collective racial emotion" as a more general concept than "collective racial resentment." The concept of collective racial resentment implies that the belief system invariantly manifests in anger. So even though I expect an argument against racial equity to bring about more warmth, if warmth were simply accompanied by a similar level of anger, then the concept of collective racial resentment would continue to accurately signal the invariant relationship between anger and the belief system. However, if anger were to subside as warmth increases, then collective racial emotion would be a useful extension of the concept since in some contexts the belief system may manifest in warmth in the absence of anger.

A priori, I expect anger to decrease as warmth increases. Motive-inconsistency sets the groundwork for negative emotions (Smith 1993), but there is likely motive *alignment* between many white Americans and those who oppose race-equity policies. A broad segment of white Americans already oppose these policies (Bobo et al. 2012; Hutchings 2009), and of course measures of collective racial emotion are strong predictors of opposition to them. As a result, I expect stronger feelings of collective racial emotion to result in less anger towards an advocate of any race who opposes these measures. And as described above, I also expect stronger feelings of collective racial emotion to result in greater warmth.

### **3.4 Limited Government Attitudes**

There is another perspective of racial policy attitudes. From this perspective, white opposition to race-targeted policies is unrelated to race and best understood as the result of principled objections to excessive government overreach. Furthermore, because political liberals and conservatives differ sharply in their commitment to a limited government, political ideology is supposed to be the central consideration guiding attitudes toward race-targeted policies (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Conservatives, therefore, oppose race-equity policies because they believe the government should have a limited role in private affairs, not because they respond negatively to Blacks. This pattern is particularly prevalent among highly educated conservatives since they are the most likely to have developed a deep understanding of these ideological principles (Sniderman et al. 1991). To the extent that racial

prejudice continues to exert an influence in racial politics—and Sniderman and colleagues acknowledge that it occasionally does—it is primarily so among less educated whites and, perhaps paradoxically, among the most liberal whites (Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). This is because, for reasons of politics, strong liberals should be inclined to support government solutions to social problems; when they refuse to extend those same programs to Black people, it is often because the force of prejudice overwhelms their liberal principles (Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000). On the other hand, conservatives—prejudiced or otherwise—have a principled basis for opposing racial policies, so prejudice plays a minor role in their decision making.

Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell (2000) illustrate this point in a study of attitudes toward Black leaders. Using a “list experiment,” researchers presented respondents with a list of things that might be upsetting, such as “increased taxes on gasoline” or “athletes getting million-dollar salaries” and asked respondents to report how many make them angry. In one group, respondents were asked to only report the number of things that were upsetting (a “covert” response), and in the other group they were asked to specifically identify which things (an “overt” response). In the study, half of these respondents were shown a list that included “black leaders asking for affirmative action.” When respondents were required to say which things made them angry, conservatives were much more likely to include Black leaders among them. However, when respondents were able to report their anger covertly, anger among liberals increased to match conservative anger.

According to Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell (2000), this response pattern supports their argument that conservatives are angered by Black leaders because they are making demands that result in excessive government spending and taxation. Liberal anger, on the other hand, is motivated by prejudice, since they do not have an ideological justification for objecting to race-targeted policies.

In short, a politics centered model assumes collective racial emotion will have little influence over how whites with strong limited government attitudes respond to demands for or against race-equity policy. As a result, the advocate's race should also have no influence over emotional responses or policy opinions. For reasons of motive-inconsistency and alignment (Smith 1993), I still hypothesize stronger limited government attitudes to be associated with greater anger when the argument promotes race-equity policy and more warmth when the argument opposes it. Because of this, I anticipate a straightforward direct effect, where limited government attitudes (but not the author's race) influences emotional reactions and policy opinions.

The meaning of "conservative" and "liberal" is constantly in flux. and may or may not reflect attitudes about the size of government. More recent efforts to study this perspective have used measures of "limited government attitudes" as a baseline indicator of principled objections (e.g., Banks and Valentino 2012). I follow this approach because these measures directly tap attitudes about government tax-and-spend issues.

### 3.5 Methods

Participants were recruited via Prolific, an online crowdsourcing platform where researchers post studies and pay respondents to participate. Although Prolific users are self-selected, crowdsourced experiments have been shown to produce similar results as experiments using a nationally representative sample (Mullinix et al. 2015). Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan (2014) found this to be the case for over 20 experiments conducted both on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and nationally representative samples, including studies about race relations. Increasingly, there have been some concerns about inattentive participants and bot activity on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Dreyfus 2018). However, data gathered using Prolific has been shown to be comparably higher quality (Peer et al. 2017, 2021; *cf* Litman et al. 2021). The surveys themselves were designed using Qualtrics, an online application for creating and distributing web surveys.

The research took place over two waves, with an initial pre-test to gather standard demographic information and measure political and racial attitudes. Four hundred seventy-five self-identifying white participants completed the pre-test and were paid \$1.20 for doing so. Collective racial emotion was measured with the standard symbolic racism battery in use by the American National Elections Study and other scholars (e.g., Henry and Sears 2002). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with each of the four items on a 7-point scale (e.g., “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks

would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”). For analysis, items were coded such that higher scores represent greater endorsement of collective racial emotion. They were then averaged to form a composite ranging from 1 to 7 (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.93$ ). I included measures of “racial alienation” as well since they have been shown to be linked to perceptions of threat (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hutchings et al. 2011). Racial alienation was measured using questions designed to tap how people feel their racial group has been treated by American society (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hutchings et al. 2011). Using a 7-point scale, respondents were asked to report their level of agreement with questions such as “American society owes people from my racial group a better chance in life than we currently have.” Items were coded such that higher scores indicate a greater feeling of alienation. They were then averaged to form a composite ranging from 1 to 7 (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.62$ ). Limited government attitudes were measured with two items. Following (Banks and Valentino 2012) these questions are designed to tap respondent attitudes toward government tax-and-spend issues. Question wording follows the American National Elections Study convention and is available in Appendix C. Again, the items were coded so that higher scores represent a stronger commitment to limited government and then averaged to form a composite (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.93$ ).

Attitude scales were set off on their own blocks. Each block was randomly rotated within the survey and each item was randomly rotated within its block. A standard demographic questionnaire appeared at the end of the pre-test survey. Full wording for each question is available in Appendix C.

Two weeks after the pre-test, I invited pre-test respondents to participate in a follow-up study. Such a time lag is intended to mitigate order and priming effects that may result from measuring moderator variables either directly before or after the experimental stimulus (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018). A two-week intervening period is typical (e.g., Banks and Valentino 2012; Wetts and Willer 2019). Four hundred eight respondents completed the follow-up in exchange for \$1.50, and there are 408 in the final sample. Table 3.1 summarizes respondent characteristics and attitudes for the final sample.

Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Study 1 Variables

Variable	n	Mean/Proportion	SD	Min	Max
Anger	408	2.85	1.84	1	7
Warmth	408	3.96	1.63	1	7
Policy Opinion	408	4.21	1.89	1	7
Collective Racial Emotion	408	2.90	1.63	1	7
Racial Alienation	408	2.43	1.08	1	7
Limited Government	408	2.84	1.60	1	7
Political Ideology	408	2.37	1.13	1	5
Income	408	4.02	1.44	1	6
Education	408	4.29	1.37	1	6
Age	408	36.65	13.44	18	82
Male	194	0.48	0.03	-	-
Female	208	0.51	0.03	-	-
Other	6	0.01	0.00	-	-

Participants were randomly assigned to read an article designed to look like an opinion article or blog post written by either a white or Black author and featuring an argument either for or against race-targeted COVID-19 pandemic related economic stimulus. The articles are the same length and contain much the same content. They begin with an overview of the economic impact of the pandemic and

early efforts by Congress to alleviate hardship. Both articles discuss racial disparities in the effects of the economic fallout. The blog post in favor of the stimulus, however, uses a race-equity framing to argue for the policy. This framing focuses on historic and ongoing racism to justify support for race-targeting (Bunyasi 2015). The blog post against the stimulus draws on a colorblind framing to argue against it. This framing diminishes the extent of ongoing racism and calls for individual responsibility in the face of economic difficulty (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Full wording is available in Appendix B. The race of the author is communicated by manipulating the by-line photograph that appears on the blog post. I attempted to match these photos as closely as possible on various socially important characteristics such as gender, age, class, and attractiveness. The results of a photo comparison test, reported in Appendix A, show that the photos are well matched and vary by perceived race and skin tone, as intended.

Next, I measured respondent agreement with the author's policy opinion with two items, both using a 7-point agreement scale: 1) Do you agree or disagree with this person's policy position?; and 2) Do you agree or disagree with the reasons this person gives for his policy position? Responses were then averaged to form a composite index (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.92$ ). It is important to note that in these analyses, respondent "policy opinions" are measured as agreement with the author's policy opinion and argument. In the race-equity condition, the author is arguing in favor of race-equity policy. Therefore, agreement with the author indicates support for race-equity policy. In other words, it is a favorable "policy opinion." In the



colorblind condition, the author is arguing against race-equity policy. Therefore, agreement with the author indicates opposition to race-equity policy and is an unfavorable “policy opinion.”

Respondents were then asked a series of questions to tap emotional responses to the author. Using a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all [emotion]; 7 = Very [emotion]), I included three questions to measure respondent anger: 1) Does this person make you angry?; 2) Is this person irritating?; and 3) Is this person frustrating? I averaged responses to create a composite (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.95$ ). Following the same procedure as the anger items, I included other emotional responses unrelated to this study. Respondents were then asked to report how warm or cold they felt toward the author with a standard feeling thermometer item (1 = Very cold; 7 = Very warm).

The anger items were asked separately in their own block and were randomly rotated within the block. The feeling thermometer question was also set off on its own block. I avoided including it in a block with the other emotions because the feeling thermometer response options are on a bi-polar scale and it is usually recommended to group questions with similar response types (Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2014). For this same reason, the feeling thermometer always appeared after other emotional response questions, which were otherwise randomly rotated. Full wording for each question is available in Appendix C.

## 3.6 Results

There are 408 respondents in the analytic sample. Forty-four participants failed the manipulation check (“Does the person who wrote the article at the beginning of this survey support or oppose providing extra resources for blacks?”). Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres (2018) argue that removing cases based on responses to posttreatment questions may bias the sample. This can happen when the types of people who fail a manipulation are different across conditions, even if the rates of failure are the same. Whether or not this is the case is unknown, so their responses were retained for analysis. Furthermore, including or excluding these cases does not affect the results, so there is little justification to remove them.

Before formally testing my hypotheses, I examined the response distributions for anger and warmth by experimental condition in Figure 3.2. For some readers, this distribution might run counter to expectations. In this sample, whether the author is white or Black, there is notably more anger directed at the colorblind author and warmth toward the race-equity author. In the broader population, however, there is much broader acceptance of colorblind ideology among whites (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Bunyasi 2015). One interpretation of this result is that the sample skews liberal, a common feature of crowdsourced samples (Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). The bottom half of Figure 3.2 disaggregates the sample by political ideology. It is clear that anger toward the colorblind author is driven by ideological liberals, as is warmth in the race-equity condition. With this

information alone, it seems that political ideology may explain this unexpected distribution. However, further analyses below that include collective racial emotion and limited government attitudes complicate this initial interpretation.

In addition to these notable differences in emotional reactions depending on the argument, there also appears to be a race effect in the colorblind condition. Respondents were more angry about the white colorblind author and reported more warmth toward the Black colorblind author, as expected. However, this pattern also appears to be driven by ideological liberals. Notably, there is no apparent race effect in the race-equity condition, which also runs counter to my hypotheses, but as I show below, this initial interpretation overlooks the moderating effect of collective racial emotion.




Figure 3.2: Mean self-reported feelings of anger (left) and warmth (right), by the race of the author, the author's argument, and respondent political ideology. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.

Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of policy opinions across conditions. The distribution of policy opinions similarly runs counter to expectations, with stronger support for the race-equity argument compared to the colorblind argument against the policy. In the general population, there is little support for racial policies such as affirmative action (Bobo et al. 2012). Again, the liberal skew of the sample might

explain this unexpected pattern. The bottom half of Figure 3.3 disaggregates the sample by political ideology. Political liberals clearly hold stronger support for the race-equity policy and political conservatives for the colorblind argument against the policy. The fact that there is overall more support for the race-equity policy may therefore be attributable to the liberal skew of the sample. As with the emotional reactions, further analyses below that include collective racial emotion and limited government attitudes complicate this initial interpretation.

Below, I examine these distributions more closely by testing the hypotheses outlined in the theory section above. I organize the remainder of the results section to mirror the structure of the hypotheses, focusing first on reactions to the argument in favor of race-equity policy and then shifting attention to the colorblind argument against it. All models reported below use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict respondent emotions and policy opinions.




Figure 3.3: Agreement with the author’s policy position, by the race of the author, the author’s argument, and respondent political ideology. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.

### 3.6.1 Race-equity Argument

I first examined the effects of respondent demographics, racial and limited government attitudes, and the author’s race on self-reported anger. Table 3.2 shows the results of these tests. There is no race effect in any of the models, which is not

surprising given the similar bar height for the white and Black author in the race-equity condition shown in Figure 3.2. Model 1 includes only demographic variables. In Model 1, political ideology is statistically significant such that increased conservatism results in increased anger toward the race-equity argument ( $b = 0.56, p < .001$ ). Models 2, 3, and 4 introduce the racial attitudes and limited government attitudes indexes. Each of these belief systems are statistically significant when included with only the demographic controls. Increased collective racial emotion increases anger ( $b = 0.44, p < .001$ ), as does racial alienation ( $b = 0.17, p = 0.038$ ) and limited government attitudes ( $b = 0.31, p < .001$ ). To directly compare the effect of each belief system, Model 5 includes terms for the race of the author, demographics, and all of the belief systems. In this model, only collective racial emotion ( $b = 0.37, p < .001$ ) and limited government ( $b = 0.19, p = 0.02$ ) are significant.

Table 3.2: Effect of Belief Systems and the Author's Race on Anger (Race-equity Condition)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Black author	−0.06 (0.18)	−0.03 (0.17)	−0.07 (0.18)	−0.03 (0.17)	−0.02 (0.16)
Coll. racial emotion		0.44*** (0.07)			0.37*** (0.08)
Racial alienation			0.17* (0.08)		0.05 (0.08)
Limited government				0.31*** (0.08)	0.19* (0.08)
Political ideology	0.56*** (0.08)	0.13 (0.10)	0.52*** (0.08)	0.26* (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)
Income	0.07 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)
Education	0.04 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)
Age	0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Female	0.01 (0.18)	0.00 (0.17)	0.04 (0.18)	−0.01 (0.18)	0.00 (0.17)
Other (gender)	−0.24 (0.93)	−0.07 (0.86)	−0.08 (0.93)	−0.23 (0.90)	−0.04 (0.86)
Constant	0.24 (0.44)	0.02 (0.40)	−0.14 (0.47)	0.19 (0.42)	−0.09 (0.43)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.24	0.36	0.26	0.30	0.38
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.33	0.23	0.27	0.35
Num. obs.	204	204	204	204	204

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

To test whether the Black author increases the influence of each belief system on anger, I introduced interaction terms in Table 3.3. Models 1-3 show the interaction of the author's race and belief system on anger for each index. Taken on their own, with only demographic characteristics as controls, racial alienation is non-significant, but collective racial emotion ( $b = 0.32$ ,  $p = 0.002$ ) and limited



government attitudes ( $b = 0.27$ ,  $p = 0.012$ ) are statistically significant. Model 4 compares each of these terms in the same model. In Model 4, the interaction of race and collective racial emotion is statistically significant ( $b = 0.38$ ,  $p = 0.012$ ). There is also a main effect of limited government attitudes on anger ( $b = 0.2$ ,  $p = 0.041$ ).

Table 3.3: Interaction of Belief Systems and the Author's Race on Anger (Race-equity Condition)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Black author	−0.92** (0.33)	−0.20 (0.43)	−0.81* (0.35)	−0.57 (0.45)
Coll. racial emotion	0.25** (0.09)			0.14 (0.11)
Racial alienation		0.14 (0.12)		0.16 (0.12)
Limited government			0.19* (0.09)	0.20* (0.09)
Political ideology	0.16 (0.10)	0.53*** (0.08)	0.24* (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)
Income	0.07 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Education	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)
Age	−0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Female	−0.02 (0.16)	0.04 (0.18)	−0.03 (0.17)	−0.04 (0.16)
Other (gender)	−0.40 (0.85)	−0.11 (0.94)	−0.45 (0.89)	−0.30 (0.85)
Black author x CRE	0.32** (0.10)			0.38* (0.15)
Black author x RA		0.05 (0.16)		−0.18 (0.16)
Black author x LG			0.27* (0.11)	−0.03 (0.14)
Constant	0.57 (0.43)	−0.06 (0.53)	0.61 (0.45)	0.26 (0.49)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.26	0.32	0.41
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.36	0.23	0.29	0.37
Num. obs.	204	204	204	204

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

Figure 3.4 visualizes these results to aid interpretation. These findings provide evidence to support the hypothesis that Black demands for race-equity policy

heighten the effect of collective racial emotion to generate greater resentment relative to a white counterpart. There is also evidence that limited government attitudes increase resentment, regardless of the author's race.




Figure 3.4: Predicted effect of the author's race on anger, moderated by collective racial emotion (left) and the direct effect of limited government attitudes on anger (right). Race-equity condition, adjusting for model covariates. Shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval for the predicted means.

Next, with an analysis of moderated mediation (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007), I tested the hypothesis that the effect of the author's race on policy opinions via anger differs for those with strong feelings of collective racial emotion compared to those with less intense feelings. To do so, I first estimated a series of models, reported in Table 3.4. In Models 1-3, I examined predictors of respondent policy opinions. The first model in the series tests the effect of the author's race on policy opinions, the second model includes respondent demographic characteristics, and

the third includes the interaction terms for belief system by the author's race. The results show there are no direct effects of the author's race on policy opinions. Then, I estimated the models under the "Mediation Models" heading in Table 3.4 for use in the moderated mediation analysis. The first of these two models uses anger as the dependent variable and is simply a restatement of Model 4 in table 3.3. The second mediation model uses policy opinions as the dependent variable and includes anger as a predictor. Notably, the association between anger and policy opinion is statistically significant such that as anger toward the author increases, support for race-equity policy decreases ( $b = -0.43, p < .001$ ). The results of the fourth model, as I have already shown, indicate that the Black author increases the influence of collective racial emotion to generate increased anger.

Table 3.4: Factors Predicting Agreement the with Author's Policy Position

	Policy	Policy	Policy	Mediation Models	
				Anger	Policy
Black author	-0.04 (0.24)	0.05 (0.19)	-0.29 (0.44)	-0.57 (0.45)	-0.53 (0.40)
Anger					-0.43*** (0.06)
Coll. racial emotion			-0.46*** (0.11)	0.14 (0.11)	-0.40*** (0.10)
Racial alienation			-0.08 (0.12)	0.16 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.11)
Limited government			-0.37*** (0.09)	0.20* (0.09)	-0.29*** (0.08)
Political ideology		-0.88*** (0.09)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.10)
Income		-0.05 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)
Education		0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)
Age		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Female		0.06 (0.19)	0.10 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.16)	0.08 (0.14)
Other (gender)		0.53 (0.99)	0.27 (0.82)	-0.30 (0.85)	0.14 (0.74)
Black author x CRE			-0.16 (0.14)	0.38* (0.15)	0.00 (0.13)
Black author x RA			0.13 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.16)	0.05 (0.14)
Black author x LG			0.14 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.14)	0.13 (0.12)
Constant	4.73*** (0.17)	7.25*** (0.46)	7.72*** (0.48)	0.26 (0.49)	7.83*** (0.43)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.42	0.62	0.41	0.70
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	-0.00	0.40	0.60	0.37	0.68
Num. obs.	204	204	204	204	204

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ 

An analysis of moderated mediation involves two steps. In the first step, the

mediation models are used to conduct a mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986). The results of the mediation analysis are then used to test for moderated mediation in the second step. To conduct the test, I use the R `mediation` package and follow guidelines outlined by its developers, Tingley et al. (2014). The first step uses quasi-Bayesian confidence intervals to test whether anger mediates the effect of the author’s race on policy opinions (Imai et al. 2010).<sup>1</sup> Following Tingley et al. (2014), the first step uses two simulation draws since the test of uncertainty is conducted in the second step of the analysis. The second step calculates the difference in the effect of the author’s race on policy attitudes, by way of anger, at “high” and “low” levels of collective racial emotion. I used one standard deviation from the mean to define high and low. In the second step, I used 1,000 simulations.

Table 3.5: Effect of the Author’s Race on Policy Opinions By Way of Anger, Moderated by Collective Racial Emotion

	Estimate	Lower CI	Upper CI	p
ACME(low CRE) - ACME(high CRE)	0.525	0.207	0.895	0.000

As shown in Table 3.5, the 95% confidence intervals do not contain zero, indicating a statistically significant effect. The difference in the effect (ACME) of the author’s race on policy attitudes via anger for respondents high and low in collective racial emotion is 0.52 ( $p < .001$ ). Figure 3.5 is a conceptual diagram of

<sup>1</sup>Bootstrapping is also a common method of calculating confidence intervals (Hayes 2009; Preacher and Hayes 2008). The bootstrap method involves taking repeated random samples using the actual data rather than simulations of the data, as is the case with the quasi-Bayesian method. Because the “sex” variable has an “other” category with very few respondents, this repeated sampling procedure causes the test of moderated mediation to fail. Both methods are appropriate for parametric statistics (Imai et al. 2010), so I have opted to use the quasi-Bayesian confidence intervals. In any case, I conducted a bootstrap analysis after removing the “other” cases and the results are the same.

the test. The results could be interpreted as showing that the Black author evokes more anger than his white counterpart among respondents with a strong feeling of collective racial emotion, and that the resulting anger fuels opposition to race-equity policy.




Figure 3.5: Conceptual diagram of moderated mediation analysis.

### 3.6.2 Colorblind Argument

To examine respondent reactions to an advocate making an argument against race-equity policy, I first examined the effects of respondent demographics, racial and limited government attitudes, and the author's race on self-reported warmth. Models 1-5 in Table 3.6 show the results of these tests. In each of the models, the Black author elicits more warmth. Model 1 includes demographic characteristics, and here political ideology is statistically significant such that increased conservatism is associated with an increase in warmth toward the author ( $b = 0.6, p < .001$ ). Models 2, 3, and 4 introduce the racial attitudes and limited government

attitudes indexes. When included with only demographic controls, collective racial emotion ( $b = 0.47, p < .001$ ) and limited government attitudes ( $b = 0.26, p = 0.005$ ) are statistically significant, but racial alienation is not. To directly compare the effect of each belief system, Model 5 includes terms for the race of the author, demographics, and all of the belief systems. In this model, only collective racial emotion ( $b = 0.43, p < .001$ ) and the author's race ( $b = 0.83, p < .001$ ) are significant.



Table 3.6: Effect of Belief Systems and the Author's Race on Warmth (Colorblind Condition)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Black author	0.80*** (0.20)	0.81*** (0.18)	0.81*** (0.20)	0.83*** (0.20)	0.83*** (0.18)	2.14*** (0.52)
Coll. racial emotion		0.47*** (0.08)			0.43*** (0.09)	0.55*** (0.12)
Racial alienation			0.19 (0.10)		0.07 (0.09)	0.21 (0.13)
Limited government				0.26** (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.07 (0.12)
Political ideology	0.60*** (0.10)	0.10 (0.12)	0.55*** (0.10)	0.33* (0.13)	0.04 (0.14)	0.05 (0.13)
Income	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)
Education	0.00 (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)
Age	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Female	-0.12 (0.20)	0.03 (0.19)	-0.07 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.20)	0.05 (0.19)	0.08 (0.18)
Other (gender)	-0.78 (0.73)	-0.53 (0.67)	-0.75 (0.72)	-0.72 (0.71)	-0.52 (0.67)	-0.57 (0.66)
Black author x CRE						-0.21 (0.16)
Black author x RA						-0.24 (0.19)
Black author x LG						-0.04 (0.16)
Constant	1.71*** (0.50)	1.21* (0.47)	1.27* (0.55)	1.73*** (0.49)	1.10* (0.51)	0.47 (0.55)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.24	0.36	0.25	0.27	0.37	0.39
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.21	0.34	0.22	0.24	0.33	0.35
Num. obs.	204	204	204	204	204	204

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

To test whether the Black author increases the influence of each belief system on warmth, I introduced interaction terms in Model 6. According to these tests,

there is no interaction effect. Because there is no interaction effect, subsequent mediation analyses focus on Model 5. Here, feelings of warmth increase as collective racial emotion increases, and the author's race has an additive effect on feelings of warmth. There is a visualization of these results in Figure 3.6.



Figure 3.6: Predicted effect of the author's race on warmth (left). Predicted additive effect of the author's race on warmth as collective racial emotion increases (right). Colorblind condition, adjusting for model covariates. Error bars (left) and shaded area (right) indicate the 95% confidence interval for the predicted means.

Because there are no interaction effects, there is no reason to expect a moderated mediation. There is a condition effect on warmth, however, so the possibility remains that warmth mediates the effect of the author's race on policy attitudes. To conduct the mediation analysis, I first estimated a series of models, shown in table 3.7. In Models 1-3, I examined predictors of respondent policy opinions. The first model in the series tests the effect of the author's race on policy

opinions, the second model includes respondent demographic characteristics, and the third includes each of the belief systems. In the third policy model there is a main effect of the author's race and collective racial emotion on policy opinions. The Black author promotes stronger agreement with the author's position (i.e., against racial policy: ( $b = 0.57, p = 0.008$ ) as does collective racial emotion ( $b = 0.58, p < .001$ )

Next, I estimated the models under the "Mediation Models" heading in Table 3.7. The first of these two models uses warmth as the dependent variable and is simply a restatement of Model 5 in Table 3.6. The second mediation model uses policy opinion as the dependent variable and includes warmth as a predictor. Notably, the association between warmth and policy opinions is statistically significant such that warmth toward the author increases opposition to race-equity policy ( $b = 0.71, p < .001$ ). Including warmth in the model also removes the effect of condition on policy attitudes ( $b = -0.02, p = 0.925$ ).

Table 3.7: Factors Predicting Agreement with the Author’s Policy Position

	Policy	Policy	Policy	Mediation Models	
				Warmth	Policy
Black author	0.43 (0.27)	0.54* (0.24)	0.57** (0.21)	0.83*** (0.18)	−0.02 (0.18)
Warmth					0.71*** (0.07)
Coll. racial emotion			0.58*** (0.10)	0.43*** (0.09)	0.28** (0.08)
Racial alienation			0.07 (0.11)	0.07 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)
Limited government			0.05 (0.11)	0.09 (0.09)	−0.01 (0.08)
Political ideology		0.89*** (0.11)	0.20 (0.16)	0.04 (0.14)	0.17 (0.13)
Income		−0.08 (0.09)	−0.08 (0.08)	−0.04 (0.07)	−0.05 (0.06)
Education		−0.12 (0.09)	−0.10 (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	−0.11 (0.06)
Age		−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)
Female		−0.43 (0.24)	−0.21 (0.22)	0.05 (0.19)	−0.25 (0.17)
Other (gender)		−1.32 (0.86)	−0.98 (0.78)	−0.52 (0.67)	−0.62 (0.62)
Constant	3.50*** (0.19)	2.61*** (0.59)	1.84** (0.60)	1.10* (0.51)	1.06* (0.48)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.29	0.43	0.37	0.64
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.26	0.40	0.33	0.62
Num. obs.	204	204	204	204	204

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ 

To test whether warmth mediated the effect of the author’s race on agreement with the author’s position, I conducted a mediation analysis. Figure @ref(fig:warmth\_diagram) presents a conceptual model of the analysis and shows the coefficients from the “Mediation Models.” Results of the test are displayed in

Table 3.8. The 95% confidence interval does not contain zero, indicating a statistically significant mediation. This provides evidence to support the claim that the Black author engendered greater opposition to race-equity policy in part by promoting greater feelings of warmth.




Figure 3.7: Conceptual diagram of mediation analysis.

Table 3.8: Estimated Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) of Warmth on Policy Opinions (Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals)

	Estimate	Lower CI	Upper CI	p
ACME	0.581	0.31	0.852	0.000

I then examined the extent to which collective racial emotion is a useful conceptual extension of collective racial resentment by testing the hypothesis that there would be less anger directed toward either author in the colorblind condition relative to the race-equity condition as collective racial emotion increases. Table 3.9 shows the results of two models comparing emotional responses between the colorblind and race-equity arguments. Both include interaction terms for the author's argument by collective racial emotion, racial alienation, and limited government attitudes. Model 1 shows a statistically significant relationship between anger and the interaction of the author's argument by collective racial emotion

( $b = -0.98$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and limited government attitudes ( $b = -0.3$ ,  $p = 0.012$ ).

Table 3.9: Emotional Reactions to the Race-equity and Colorblind Arguments

	Anger	Warmth
Colorblind argument	5.22*** (0.40)	-4.97*** (0.35)
Coll. racial emotion	0.42*** (0.09)	-0.32*** (0.09)
Racial alienation	0.06 (0.10)	-0.17* (0.09)
Limited government	0.23* (0.09)	-0.27** (0.08)
Political ideology	-0.10 (0.10)	0.01 (0.09)
Income	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Education	0.05 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Female	0.24 (0.14)	0.15 (0.13)
Other (gender)	0.10 (0.59)	-0.20 (0.53)
Colorblind x CRE	-0.98*** (0.13)	0.77*** (0.11)
Colorblind x RA	-0.02 (0.14)	0.23 (0.13)
Colorblind x LG	-0.30* (0.12)	0.34** (0.11)
Constant	0.19 (0.41)	6.53*** (0.37)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.44
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.43	0.42
Num. obs.	408	408

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

Figure 3.8 is a visualization of these results, focusing on the interaction of collective racial emotion by the argument. Notably, the plot for the anger model

shows decreased anger relative to the race-equity argument as collective racial emotion increases. At the same time, warmth increases relative to the race-equity argument as collective racial emotion increases. These results provide some evidence that warmth does not simply accompany a similar level of resentment, but instead replaces it.




Figure 3.8: Predicted effect of the author's argument on anger (left) and warmth (right), adjusting for model covariates. Shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval for the predicted means.

Finally, Figure 3.9 provides additional evidence that warmth does not necessarily accompany anger. In what is nearly a mirror image of Figure 3.6, Figure 3.9 shows that not only does anger decrease as collective racial emotion increases, but there is also less anger directed toward the Black author relative to the white author.




Figure 3.9: Predicted effect of the author's race on anger (left). Predicted additive effect of the author's race on anger as collective racial emotion increases (right). Colorblind condition, adjusting for model covariates. Error bars (left) and shaded area (right) indicate the 95% confidence interval for the predicted means.

### 3.7 Discussion

I began this research by asking if an advocate's race influences whites' emotional reactions to demands for race-equity policy, and if these reactions in turn shape policy opinions. Using a "collective racial emotion" framework, I argued that whites with a strong feeling of collective racial emotion will resent the demand because they perceive it to be a violation of their values and as a threat to their group's status and interests. However, whites will especially resent a Black advocate because they are viewed through the lens of collective racial emotion, whereas whites are not. I expected this increased anger to fuel greater opposition to the



policy. The results of an experiment comparing white emotional reactions to Black and white authors making these demands support this hypothesis. White respondents with a stronger feeling of collective racial emotion did indeed feel more angry about the Black author. To be sure, the white author did not get a full pass, but he evoked substantially less anger than his Black counterpart. Furthermore, an analysis of moderated mediation indicated that the author's race influenced policy attitudes by way of anger at different levels of collective racial emotion, providing support for the theoretical framework outlined in Figure 3.1.

The results also provide some evidence in support of the limited government perspective. This theory holds that attitudes about government tax-and-spend issues—and not racial considerations—motivate white opinions about race-equity policy. The finding that anger toward race-equity policy increases as a preference for limited government increases supports this view. This is so regardless of the race of the author, as the theory predicts. However, the combined findings regarding collective racial emotion and limited government attitudes offer important qualifications to both theories: both racial considerations and limited government attitudes remain impactful even after accounting for one another. Although it is tempting to place these theories in competition with each other in search of a singular explanation, it is possible for both to be true (Hoschild 2000; Schuman 2000). The results here are evidence of that.

In this research, I also asked if reactions would differ if an advocate argues against these policies. I have argued that whites' reactions to demands for

race-equity policy are a function of the race of the advocate making the demand, the nature of the demand, and baseline racial attitudes. I examined arguments against the policy to foreclose an alternative explanation—that reactions to the policy are based solely on reactions to the race of the advocate. I still expected white reactions to be moderated by collective racial emotion, but in this case I expected it to increase warmth toward the Black advocate. I offered two possible explanations for this outcome. First, I expected whites with greater feelings of collective racial emotion to feel more warmth toward Black advocates because they are seen as compliant with white values and social dominance. Second, they stand as “proof” that racism is not responsible for Black-white social differences (Pettigrew 1979), offering comfort to whites who hope to preserve a sense of white moral superiority and “innocence.” The results of the experiment comparing emotional reactions to a Black and white author offer qualified support for this hypothesis. Surprisingly, the Black author produced an additive rather than interactive effect, resulting in greater warmth at all levels of collective racial emotion. I also expected feelings of warmth to increase opposition to the policy. Because there was no interaction effect, there was no basis to test for moderated mediation. However, a mediation analysis supports the conclusion that the Black author increased opposition to race-equity policy in part by promoting greater feelings of warmth.

This unexpected finding merits further discussion. Why would a Black advocate who argues against race-equity policy evoke more warmth among respondents with lower levels of collective racial emotion? I originally hypothesized the effect to be

strongest among whites with stronger feelings of collective racial emotion because I assumed: 1) they would be the most pleased by an apparently compliant outgroup member, and 2) they would be most open to any suggestion that racism is no longer a major social problem. The finding here suggests that all whites seek compliance and are grateful for Blacks who seem to provide evidence that the problems of race are behind us. This interpretation seems plausible. However, another possibility is that different aspects of collective racial emotion are operating and high and low ends, but generate similar levels of warmth nonetheless. This would be the case if some whites seek compliance (at the high end) and some are anxious about ongoing racism (at the low end). Whites at the high end of collective racial emotion feel Blacks threaten white values and status and thus may be comforted by apparent compliance. Since they deny the existence of racism, however, they may not feel particularly guilty about Black-white social differences. Whites at the low end, on the other hand, do not feel Blacks threaten their status or values and therefore may not seek compliance. They may, however, feel greater warmth because they acknowledge ongoing racism and possibly feel guilty because of it. If so, they may feel comparatively more relieved when it seems like the burden has somehow been lifted. In any event, the Black advocate would evoke more warmth at all levels of collective racial emotion, though for different reasons at different levels.

There are yet other possibilities. Respondents low in collective racial emotion did not feel particularly warm toward either the white or Black author. These respondents found both of the authors' policy stances disagreeable, but may have

felt even colder toward the white author because he was seen as having racist motives, whereas the Black author would likely escape that label (López 2014). Another possibility is that whites low in collective racial emotion may believe the Black advocate is expressing views resulting from “internalized oppression” (Hall 1986; Pyke 2010). If so, these respondents might feel pity, which as discussed above may be accompanied by paternalistic warmth. In any case, examining these possibilities is well beyond the scope of this study, but I would welcome further research to develop and study them.

Finally, I examined my proposition that the concept of collective racial emotion adds value to the already available concept of collective racial resentment. Collective racial resentment implies that anger is an invariant feature of the belief system. However, I found evidence that increased warmth is not necessarily accompanied by similar levels of anger. Instead, in some contexts, warmth appears to replace it. Given that in some contexts this belief system can manifest in warmth in the absence of anger, collective racial emotion seems to be a useful conceptual extension of collective racial resentment.

### **3.8 Conclusion**

This research provides evidence that whites who have strong feelings of collective racial emotion are more resentful of demands for race-equity policy when the advocate is Black. The resulting anger, in turn, fuels greater opposition to the

policy. This finding corroborates anecdotal claims that Black advocates face greater resistance than their white counterparts. On the other hand, Blacks who advocate against these policies elicit greater warmth at all levels of collective racial emotion. Such warmth is not evidence of a commitment to racial equity, however, since increased warmth likewise heightens opposition to the policy. In both cases, this research highlights an emotional mechanism that promotes greater resistance while pointing to the need to better understand why white people feel warmer towards Black advocates who oppose these efforts.

## Chapter 4

### Study 2: Does White “Racial Innocence” Influence Reactions?

The *New York Post* recently posted an article titled “Video of dad, daughter speaking out against critical race theory goes viral”(Lungariello 2021). A video just below the title featured a Black father with his daughter arguing that critical race theory is harmful to children and should be banned from schools. Surely, the politics of the video align with the *New York Post*, a conservative media outlet. But would showcasing this particular video—with Black faces “speaking out”—bolster their politics? Study 1 provided some evidence that it might. When comparing emotional reactions to a Black and white author arguing against race-equity policy, the Black author promoted more warmth, and greater resistance to race-equity policy as a result. The mechanisms that produced this result, however, are unclear.

In study 1, I had suggested three possible explanations for this result and echo them here: Black people who advocate against race-equity may be seen 1) as compliant with white American norms and values, 2) as defending the system of white racial dominance, and 3) as protecting a racially innocence sense of self

among whites. In this study, I attempt to evaluate this third possibility. I tested this hypothesis with an experimental research design consisting of four conditions. In an adaptation of the approach employed by Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer (2007), white study participants were randomly assigned to either a “racial innocence threat” group and asked to generate a list of advantages they have received because of their race, or to a control group where respondents were asked to make a list of words describing their life experiences. Then respondents read a fictitious blog post featuring an argument against race-equity policy presented as being written by either a Black or white author. I then tested for differences in emotional and policy reactions across conditions. I further tested for moderating effects of baseline racial attitudes, measured two weeks prior to the experiment.

Black opponents of race-equity policy are routinely thrust into the spotlight by whites who hope to erode support for these kinds of policies (López 2014). Study 1 provided experimental evidence that the strategy may be effective. This study focuses on white racial innocence as one possible mechanism to explain why this strategy is effective.

## **4.1 Emotional and Policy Reactions to Racial Innocence Threat**

“Racial innocence” is the belief that whites neither benefit from nor perpetuate racism (DiAngelo 2018). Racial innocence may be threatened through an implicit or explicit claim that whites in fact do. Popular and academic observers have argued

that “hiding behind a minority” is a common defense against attacks on white racial innocence (López 2014). Such a strategy is evident on conservative news programs, talk shows, and political rallies, where nonwhite spokespeople are pushed to the fore to advance and legitimize policies that are often considered racially problematic (Blow 2010; Fulwood III 2017; López 2014). But there is little evidence to support the claim that Black people who oppose racial policies are in fact received more warmly. To my knowledge, there is also no research specifically testing the hypothesis that they are held closely because they defend white innocence.

The hypothesis that whites need to protect a racially innocent identity is based on an assumption that such an identity is both worth defending and vulnerable to attack. There is theoretical and empirical evidence to support both of these assumptions. First, social identity theory argues that group identification is an important source of self-definition, leading group members to seek a positive group image, including on moral dimensions (Branscombe et al. 1999; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Some research following this theoretical model finds that an attack on racial innocence is in part perceived as an attack on whites’ moral superiority. That is, because a challenge to racial innocence may carry with it a claim that whites are advantaged—and blacks disadvantaged—by an illegitimate system, it may be difficult for whites to maintain a moral self-definition given the unfairness of their group’s favorable position (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007). Furthermore, such a challenge may also be seen as threatening whites’ privileged group position, since many whites think they will lose out if the system were to



become more fair (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007; Hutchings et al. 2011).

Second, scholars and other social observers have noted that white Americans are highly sensitive to anything that might challenge their racial innocence. Baldwin (1998) argued that the mere presence of a Black face is sufficient to lead whites to feel their innocence is on trial. In a rather dramatic display of this “fragility,” DiAngelo (2018) has remarked that whites participating in her anti-racism workshop sometimes even feel physically ill when told their words or actions, despite intentions, may have a racist impact. Given this sensitivity, many whites attempt to avoid (Baldwin 1998) or neutralize any perceived challenge to their innocence (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007).

These observations indicate that racial innocence may be threatened through an implicit or explicit claim that whites do in fact benefit from and perpetuate racism. Given white sensitivity and aversion to perceived accusations of white guilt, opposing race-equity policy may implicitly threaten racial innocence. That is, many whites are aware that rejecting racial policy may be seen as a racially motivated attitude (Hoschild 2016; López 2014), thus casting doubt on their racial innocence. Under normal circumstances, many white people may be ambivalent about race-equity policy for this reason. However, Black opponents of race-equity policy may neutralize this concern by providing “proof” that prejudice and discrimination are not responsible for social differences between Blacks and whites (Pettigrew 1979). Such reassurance that the system is open and fair may protect whites’ sense

of self as morally superior and racially innocent, and is likely a warming thought. It may also allow whites to more freely embrace their opposition to these policies. These hypotheses echo those from study 1.

Although merely opposing racial policy may implicitly threaten a racially innocent identity, I would expect a Black opponent of race-equity to elicit even more warmth from white respondents whose racial innocence is more overtly called into question. Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer (2007) found that asking white respondents to make a list of the advantages they've received because of their race—that is, to ponder “white privilege”—threatens white racial innocence. I adapt this methodology here. If Black opponents of race-equity policy shield white racial innocence, I would expect whites whose innocence has been threatened to feel the most warmth. Furthermore, these reactions may be strongest among those who believe the current system is fair and legitimate, since the threat may call this worldview into question. The reaction may also be strongest among whites who believe their group will lose ground if the system became more fair. Both of these beliefs—the denial of ongoing discrimination and the belief that Blacks threaten whites' status and interests—are encapsulated in collective racial emotion (study 1).

These hypotheses are summarized in Figure 4.1. In short, I assume that a Black advocate will evoke more warmth than his white counterpart, and that this reaction will be strongest among threatened whites with strong feelings of collective racial emotion. In turn, increased warmth is expected to increase opposition to race-equity policy.




Figure 4.1: Theoretical Diagram

## 4.2 Methods

Most of the methods used in study 1 were also used in study 2. I will summarize them here and highlight the differences. As with study 1, participants were recruited via Prolific, an online crowdsourcing platform where researchers post studies and pay respondents to participate. There is a discussion of the suitability of using this kind of respondent pool for experimental research in study 1. In short, replication studies using crowdsourced samples have produced similar results as nationally representative samples Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan (2014). These findings provide some confidence in crowdsourced platforms as a data source. Again, as with study 1, the surveys themselves were designed using Qualtrics, an online application for creating and distributing web surveys.

The research for study 2 also took place over two waves, with an initial pre-test to gather standard demographic information and measure political and racial attitudes. Five hundred self-identifying white participants completed the pre-test and were paid \$1.20 for doing so. The questionnaire items used in study 1 were also

used in study 2. Collective racial emotion was measured with the standard symbolic racism battery in use by the American National Elections Study and other scholars (e.g., Henry and Sears 2002). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with each of the four items on a 7-point scale (e.g., “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”). For analysis, items were coded such that higher scores represent greater endorsement of collective racial emotion. They were then averaged to form a composite ranging from 1 to 7 (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.93$ ). I included measures of “racial alienation” as well since they have been shown to be linked to perceptions of threat (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hutchings et al. 2011). Racial alienation was measured using questions designed to tap how people feel their racial group has been treated by American society (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hutchings et al. 2011). Using a 7-point scale, respondents were asked to report their level of agreement with questions such as “American society owes people from my racial group a better chance in life than we currently have.” Items were coded such that higher scores indicate a greater feeling of alienation. They were then averaged to form a composite ranging from 1 to 7 (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.7$ ). Limited government attitudes were measured with two items. Following (Banks and Valentino 2012) these questions are designed to tap respondent attitudes toward government tax-and-spend issues. Question wording follows the American National Elections Study convention and is available in Appendix C. Again, the items were coded so that higher scores represent a stronger commitment to limited government and then averaged to form a composite (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.9$ ).

The structure of the survey was also the same as study 1. Attitude scales were set off on their own blocks. Each block was randomly rotated within the survey and each item was randomly rotated within its block. A standard demographic questionnaire appeared at the end of the pre-test survey. Full wording for each question is available in Appendix C.

Two weeks after the pre-test, I invited pre-test respondents to participate in a follow-up study. This time lag helps to mitigate order and priming effects that may result from measuring moderator variables either directly before or after the experimental stimulus (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018). Four hundred eighteen respondents completed the follow-up in exchange for \$1.50, and there are 418 in the final sample. Table 4.1 summarizes respondent characteristics and attitudes for the final sample.

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Study 2 Variables

Variable	n	Mean/Proportion	SD	Min	Max
Warmth	418	3.66	1.57	1	7
Policy Opinion	418	3.71	1.95	1	7
Collective Racial Emotion	418	2.94	1.71	1	7
Racial Alienation	418	2.45	1.20	1	7
Limited Government	418	3.00	1.48	1	7
Political Ideology	418	2.39	1.14	1	5
Income	418	4.18	1.51	1	6
Education	418	4.43	1.29	2	6
Age	418	38.37	13.67	18	77
Male	192	0.46	0.02	-	-
Female	219	0.52	0.02	-	-
Other	7	0.02	0.01	-	-

Participants in the follow-up survey were first randomly assigned to either a

“racial innocence threat” condition or a control condition. I adapted these conditions from (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007). In the threat condition, respondents were asked to write a list of advantages they have received because of their race. In the control condition, respondents were asked to generate a list of words to describe their life experiences. After completing this task, they were then randomly assigned to read an article *against* race-targeted COVID-19 pandemic related economic stimulus written by either a Black or white author. These combinations result in four conditions total. The article is the same as the “colorblind” version used in study 1. It begins with an overview of the economic impact of the pandemic and early efforts by Congress to alleviate hardship. The article then discusses racial disparities in the effects of the economic fallout and uses a colorblind argument to argue against race-targeted economic relief. This framing diminishes the extent of ongoing racism and calls for individual responsibility in response to economic difficulty (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Full wording is available in Appendix B. The race of the author is communicated by manipulating the by-line photograph that appears on the blog post. Again, the photos are the same as study 1 and were matched as closely as possible on various socially important characteristics such as gender, age, class, and attractiveness. The results of a photo comparison test, reported in Appendix A, show that the photos are well matched and vary by perceived race and skin tone, as intended.

I then asked respondents to evaluate the article and author on various dimensions. I measured respondent agreement with the author’s policy opinion with

two items, both using a 7-point agreement scale: 1) Do you agree or disagree with this person's policy position?; and 2) Do you agree or disagree with the reasons this person gives for his policy position? Responses were then averaged to form a composite index (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.93$ ). It is important to note that in these analyses, respondent "policy opinions" are measured as agreement with the author's policy opinion and argument. In this study, the author is arguing against the policy. Therefore, agreement with the author indicates opposition to race-equity policy and is an unfavorable "policy opinion."

Respondents were then asked to report how warm or cold they felt toward the author with a standard feeling thermometer item (1 = Very cold; 7 = Very warm). Because I used the same questionnaire for all of the studies, I also included other emotional responses unrelated to this particular study. Each of these items were asked separately in their own block and were randomly rotated within the block. The feeling thermometer question was also set off on its own block. I avoided including it in a block with the other emotions because the feeling thermometer response options are on a bi-polar scale and it is usually recommended to group questions with similar response types (Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2014). For this same reason, the feeling thermometer always appeared before other emotional response questions, which were otherwise randomly rotated. Full wording for each question is available in Appendix C.

## 4.3 Results

There are 418 respondents in the analytic sample. Seventy-two participants failed the manipulation check (“Does the person who wrote the article at the beginning of this survey support or oppose providing extra resources for blacks?”). However, as with study 1, I did not remove these cases. Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres (2018) argue that removing cases based on responses to posttreatment questions may bias the sample. This can happen when the types of people who fail a manipulation check are different across conditions, even if the rates of failure are the same. Whether or not this is the case is unknown, so their responses were retained for analysis. In most cases including or excluding these cases does not affect the results. Below, I clearly note when removing them would lead to a different conclusion.

Before formally testing my hypotheses, I examined the response distribution of warmth by experimental condition in Figure 4.2. At first glance, there do not appear to be any discernible effects of the racial innocence threat, counter to my expectations. There does, however, appear to be a difference in warmth by the race of the author, echoing the results of study 1. The bottom half of Figure 4.2 disaggregates the sample by political ideology. This visual raises the possibility that political liberals are driving the difference in warmth by race. I examine this possibility further below.






Figure 4.2: Mean reported feelings of warmth, by the race of the author, threat condition, and political ideology. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.

Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of policy opinions across conditions. Again, there appears to be no differences between the threat and control conditions. While the means in the Black author condition appear somewhat higher, the confidence intervals of the means clearly overlap, suggesting no differences by the race of the author. The bottom half of Figure 4.3 disaggregates the sample by political ideology,

and unsurprisingly warmth toward the author increases as conservatism increases. However, further analyses that include collective racial emotion complicate this initial interpretation. Below, I examine these distributions more closely by testing the hypotheses outlined in the theory section above. All models reported below use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict respondent emotions and policy opinions.




Figure 4.3: Agreement with the author’s policy position, by race of the author, threat condition, and political ideology. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.

I first tested the hypothesis that the Black author generated more warmth among white respondents. This hypothesis is an effort to replicate findings from the colorblind component of the results section of study 1. I began testing this hypothesis with a series of models, reported in Table 4.2, using warmth as the dependent variable and the race of the author as the primary independent variable.

In each model, the Black author elicits greater warmth, echoing findings from study 1. Model 1 includes demographic variables as controls. In Model 1, political ideology is statistically significant ( $b = 0.58, p < .001$ ) such that increased conservatism is associated with an increase in warmth toward the author. Models 2-3 include each of the belief systems on their own with the demographic controls. In Model 2, collective racial emotion is positively associated with warmth ( $b = 0.5, p < .001$ ), as is racial alienation in Model 3 ( $b = 0.18, p = 0.002$ ), and limited government attitudes in Model 4 ( $b = 0.22, p < .001$ ). In Model 5, which includes all of the belief systems together along with the demographic controls, collective racial emotion ( $b = 0.48, p < .001$ ), education ( $b = -0.12, p = 0.023$ ), and the race of the author ( $b = 0.68, p < .001$ ) are statistically significant. These results indicate both a condition effect of the race of the author and an additive effect of collective racial emotion. They also suggest that the findings from study 1 are reliable. These relationships are depicted in Figure 4.4.

Table 4.2: Effect of Belief Systems and the Author's Race on Warmth

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Black Author	0.59*** (0.14)	0.68*** (0.12)	0.60*** (0.13)	0.57*** (0.13)	0.68*** (0.12)
Coll. Racial Emotion		0.50*** (0.05)			0.48*** (0.05)
Racial alienation			0.18** (0.06)		0.04 (0.05)
Limited government				0.22*** (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Political ideology	0.58*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.53*** (0.06)	0.38*** (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)
Income	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)
Education	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)
Age	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Female	0.15 (0.14)	0.23 (0.12)	0.17 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)	0.23 (0.12)
Other (gender)	-1.25* (0.54)	-0.90 (0.48)	-1.12* (0.54)	-1.27* (0.53)	-0.89 (0.49)
Constant	2.31*** (0.35)	1.88*** (0.32)	1.82*** (0.38)	2.21*** (0.35)	1.78*** (0.35)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.25	0.40	0.26	0.27	0.40
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.39	0.25	0.26	0.39
Num. obs.	418	418	418	418	418

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$




Figure 4.4: Predicted effect of the author's race on warmth (left). Predicted additive effect of the author's race on warmth as collective racial emotion increases (right). Error bars (left) and shaded area (right) indicate the 95% confidence interval for the estimate, controlling for model covariates.

To test the hypothesis that reactions to the race of the author would differ at different levels of collective racial emotion, racial alienation, and limited government attitudes, I included interaction terms for each of these belief systems in Table 4.3. The interaction term for collective racial emotion by the race of the author is significant in Model 1 ( $b = -0.16$ ,  $p = 0.023$ ). The remaining models have non-significant interaction terms. The interaction term for collective racial emotion in Model 4 is technically non-significant because it falls short of the .05 cutoff, but is close ( $b = -0.19$ ,  $p = 0.056$ ). It is also difficult to ignore that the confidence intervals nearly overlap the means at the highest levels of collective racial emotion in Figure 4.4. This near overlap along with the near significant interaction term in

Model 4 both suggest that the coefficient is leaning toward an interaction.

Table 4.3: Interaction of Belief Systems and Activist's Race on Warmth

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Black Author	1.15*** (0.24)	0.86** (0.30)	0.68* (0.30)	1.08** (0.35)
Coll. Racial Emotion	0.58*** (0.06)			0.58*** (0.07)
Racial alienation		0.22** (0.08)		0.04 (0.07)
Limited government			0.24** (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)
Political ideology	0.08 (0.07)	0.53*** (0.06)	0.38*** (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)
Income	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)
Education	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.11* (0.05)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Female	0.23 (0.12)	0.17 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)	0.23 (0.12)
Other (gender)	-0.94 (0.48)	-1.12* (0.54)	-1.27* (0.53)	-0.93 (0.48)
Black author x CRE	-0.16* (0.07)			-0.19 (0.10)
Black author x RA		-0.11 (0.11)		-0.01 (0.11)
Black author x LG			-0.04 (0.09)	0.07 (0.11)
Constant	1.58*** (0.34)	1.70*** (0.41)	2.15*** (0.38)	1.54*** (0.38)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.27	0.27	0.41
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.25	0.25	0.39
Num. obs.	418	418	418	418

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

A plot of the (not quite significant) interaction in Figure 4.5 gives the strong impression that the race effect is not evenly distributed across different levels of

collective racial emotion. Notably, the effect is in the opposite direction than predicted. However, these near significant coefficients are non-significant when removing respondents who failed the manipulation check. I discuss possible interpretations of this difference in the discussion section.




Figure 4.5: Predicted effect of the author's race on warmth, moderated by collective racial emotion. Adjusting for model covariates. Shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval for the predicted means.

Next, I tested the hypothesis that a Black advocate would generate even more warmth when white racial innocence has been threatened. Table 4.4 presents the results of four models. Model 1 is a comparison of warmth across all of the experimental conditions. Both of the Black authors generate greater warmth compared to the white author in the control group. However, the difference between the threat and control groups among respondents in the white author condition is non-significant ( $b = 0.04$ ,  $p = 0.848$ ). And the difference in the coefficients between the threat ( $b = 0.63$ ,  $p = 0.003$ ) and control group ( $b = 0.58$ ,  $p = 0.008$ ) among



respondents in the Black author condition is quite small. Models 2 and 3 test again for possible differences between the control and threat conditions by comparing warmth in the threat and control conditions within the author groups. Both models show no difference by threat condition. Taken together, Models 1-3 offer little evidence that racial innocence threat influences white reactions to these authors. Given the distributions presented in Figure 4.2, these findings are not surprising. Model 4 then compares mean warmth by the race of the author and is significant ( $b = 0.58, p < .001$ ). This finding echoes the analyses above and suggests that the differences in Model 1 of Table 4.4 are driven by the race of the author rather than the threat manipulation.

Table 4.4: Effect of All Conditions (Model 1), Threat Within the Author's Race (Models 2 and 3), and the Author's Race (Model 4), on Warmth

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Threat, white Author	0.04 (0.22)	0.04 (0.21)		
Threat, Black Author	0.63** (0.21)		0.05 (0.22)	
Control, Black Author	0.58** (0.22)			
Black Author				0.58*** (0.15)
Constant	3.34*** (0.15)	3.34*** (0.15)	3.92*** (0.16)	3.36*** (0.11)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	−0.00	−0.00	0.03
Num. obs.	418	206	212	418

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

I then examined if warmth mediated policy attitudes. Because the racial

innocence threat had no clear effect, I returned to the models focusing on the race-effect of warmth. To conduct the mediation analysis, I first estimated a series of models, shown in table 4.5. Models 1-3, focus on the predictors of respondent policy opinions. The first model in the series tests the effect of the author's race on policy opinions, the second model includes respondent demographic characteristics, and the third includes each of the belief systems. In the third policy model, there is a main effect of the author's race and collective racial emotion on policy opinions. The Black author promotes stronger agreement with the author's position against racial policy ( $b = 0.37, p = 0.007$ ) as does collective racial emotion ( $b = 0.68, p < .001$ ). These findings mostly replicate the results presented in the colorblind section of study 1, but in this model education is also significant ( $b = -0.16, p = 0.005$ ).

Next, I estimated the models under the "Mediation Models" heading in Table 4.5 following the Baron and Kenny (1986) method. The first of these two models uses warmth as the dependent variable and is simply a restatement of Model 5 in Table 4.2. The second mediation model uses policy opinion as the dependent variable and includes warmth as a predictor. Notably, the association between warmth and policy opinions is statistically significant such that warmth toward the author increases opposition to race-equity policy ( $b = 0.77, p < .001$ ). Including warmth in the model also removes the effect of condition on policy attitudes ( $b = -0.15, p = 0.129$ ). In summary, the effect of the author's race on warmth is significant, and the effect of warmth on policy attitudes is significant, justifying a test of mediation.

Table 4.5: Factors Predicting Agreement with the Author’s Policy Position

	Policy	Policy	Policy	Mediation Models	
				Warmth	Policy
Black Author	0.21 (0.19)	0.24 (0.16)	0.37** (0.13)	0.68*** (0.12)	−0.15 (0.10)
Warmth					0.77*** (0.04)
Coll. Racial Emotion			0.68*** (0.06)	0.48*** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.05)
Racial alienation			0.09 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)
Limited government			0.09 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)
Political ideology		0.86*** (0.07)	0.09 (0.09)	0.07 (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)
Income		0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Education		−0.23*** (0.07)	−0.16** (0.06)	−0.12* (0.05)	−0.07 (0.04)
Age		0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Female		−0.07 (0.16)	0.04 (0.14)	0.23 (0.12)	−0.13 (0.10)
Other (gender)		−1.45* (0.64)	−0.92 (0.54)	−0.89 (0.49)	−0.23 (0.39)
Constant	3.60*** (0.14)	2.06*** (0.42)	1.19** (0.38)	1.78*** (0.35)	−0.18 (0.28)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.30	0.52	0.40	0.75
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.29	0.51	0.39	0.75
Num. obs.	418	418	418	418	418

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ 

To test if warmth mediated the effect of the author’s race on policy opinions, I conducted a mediation analysis using quasi-Bayesian confidence intervals (Imai et al. 2010). Figure @ref(fig:warmth\_diagram2) presents a conceptual model of the analysis and shows the coefficients from the “Mediation Models.” Results of the test

are displayed in Table 4.6. The 95% confidence interval does not contain zero, indicating a statistically significant mediation. This provides evidence to support the claim that the Black author elicited greater opposition to race-equity policy in part by promoting greater feelings of warmth.




Figure 4.6: Conceptual diagram of mediation analysis.

Table 4.6: Estimated Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) of Warmth on Policy Opinions (Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals)

	Estimate	Lower CI	Upper CI	p
ACME	0.528	0.334	0.722	0.000

As I discussed above, Model 4 of Table 4.3 shows a near interaction of collective racial emotion by the race of the author on warmth. Although the coefficient is technically non-significant, it approaches significance ( $b = -0.19, p = 0.056$ ), opening the possibility of a moderated mediation. Such an analysis would show if the author's race influences policy opinions differently by way of warmth at high and low levels of collective racial emotion (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007). A moderated mediation analysis takes place in two steps (Tingley et al. 2014). The first step is a mediation analysis. Table 4.7 shows the models used for this. The warmth model is a restatement of Model 4 in Table 4.3. The policy model is similar

to the policy model in Table 4.5, but here it includes interaction terms to match the warmth model. The results of the mediation analysis are then used to test for moderated mediation in the second step. To conduct the test, I use the R `mediation` package and follow guidelines outlined by its developers, Tingley et al. (2014). The mediation analysis uses quasi-Bayesian confidence intervals to test whether anger mediates the effect of the author’s race on policy opinions. Following Tingley et al. (2014), this first step uses two simulation draws since the test of uncertainty is conducted in the second step of the analysis. The second step calculates the difference in the effect of the author’s race on policy attitudes, by way of anger, at “high” and “low” levels of collective racial emotion. I used one standard deviation from the mean to define high and low. In the second step, I used 1,000 simulations.

Table 4.7: Models Used in Moderated Mediation Analysis

	Warmth	Policy
Black Author	1.08** (0.35)	−0.41 (0.28)
Warmth		0.77*** (0.04)
Coll. Racial Emotion	0.58*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.06)
Racial alienation	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)
Limited government	−0.02 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)
Political ideology	0.07 (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)
Income	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Education	−0.11* (0.05)	−0.07 (0.04)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Female	0.23 (0.12)	−0.14 (0.10)
Other (gender)	−0.93 (0.48)	−0.23 (0.39)
Black author x CRE	−0.19 (0.10)	0.02 (0.08)
Black author x RA	−0.01 (0.11)	0.05 (0.09)
Black author x LG	0.07 (0.11)	0.03 (0.09)
Constant	1.54*** (0.38)	−0.06 (0.31)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.75
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.75
Num. obs.	418	418

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ 

As shown in Table 4.8, the 95% confidence intervals do not contain zero, indicating a statistically significant effect. The difference in the effect (ACME) of

the author’s race on policy attitudes via anger for respondents high and low in collective racial emotion is 0.5 ( $p = 0.026$ ). Figure 4.7 is a conceptual diagram of the test. The results could be interpreted as showing that the Black author evokes more warmth than his white counterpart among respondents with comparatively low feeling of collective racial emotion, and that the resulting warmth increases opposition to race-equity policy. However, as I discuss below, this finding is sensitive to the manipulation check. When removing respondents who failed, the interaction term—and therefore the moderated mediation—is no longer significant.




Figure 4.7: Conceptual diagram of moderated mediation analysis.

Table 4.8: Effect of the Author’s Race on Policy Opinions By Way of Anger, Moderated by Collective Racial Emotion

	Estimate	Lower CI	Upper CI	p
ACME(low CRE) - ACME(high CRE)	0.5	0.056	0.973	0.026

## 4.4 Discussion

I began this research by replicating the results of study 1, asking if whites feel more warmth toward a Black opponent of race-equity policy compared to a white opponent. To extend on this finding, I then asked if this reaction is linked to a racially innocent identity. Following study 1, I argued that a Black advocate would evoke more warmth because they provide “assurance” that the system is open and fair, a belief that could protect whites’ sense of self as morally superior and innocent. For this same reason, I expected a Black advocate to evoke even more warmth when white innocence has been more overtly threatened, and to generate greater opposition to race-targeted policy because of it. In any case, I anticipated these reactions would be moderated by collective racial emotion such that increased collective racial emotion would increase warmth toward the Black advocate. To test these hypotheses, I compared white reactions to a Black and white author arguing against race-equity policy among respondents who had been assigned to either a racial innocence threat group or a control group.

The results of the experiment provide little evidence that racial innocence threat, as conceptualized here, moves white emotions or policy attitudes. I had originally hypothesized that the Black author would elicit the most warmth among whites high in collective racial emotion in the innocence threat group. This was not the case. In retrospect, it seems obvious that these respondents may believe strongly enough that whites do not contribute to or benefit from racism that they



only double-down on this belief when it is challenged (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007), and thus the feeling of white racial innocence remains in tact.

There are, however, two sets of findings that remain. One largely replicates study 1 and shows that the race of the author moves these reactions evenly at different levels of collective racial emotion. In the discussion section of study 1, I argued that different aspects of collective racial emotion may be operating at high and low ends, but generate similar levels of warmth nonetheless. This would be the case if some whites seek compliance (at the high end) and some are anxious about ongoing racism (at the low end). Whites at the high end of collective racial emotion feel Blacks threaten white values and status and thus may be comforted by apparent compliance. Since they deny the existence of racism, however, they may not feel particularly anxious about Black-white social differences. Whites at the low end, on the other hand, do not feel Blacks threaten their status or values and therefore may not seek compliance. They may, however, feel greater warmth because they acknowledge ongoing racism and possibly feel some responsibility because of it. If so, they may feel comparatively relieved when they have reason to feel this burden has been lifted. In any event, the Black advocate would evoke more warmth at all levels of collective racial emotion, though for different reasons at different levels.

The second set of findings, though more tenuous, complicate this conclusion. This set of results shows that collective racial emotion moderates reactions to the race of the advocate after all, but the race effect appears to be driven by respondents with comparatively low levels of collective racial emotion. This helps to make sense

of Figure 4.2. Although political ideology and racial ideology are not the same thing, there is a great deal of overlap (Sears et al. 1997), and in this figure political liberals appear to be the only group to react to the race of the author. After controlling for collective racial emotion and other factors, those low in collective racial emotion may be the group driving the race difference. To reiterate my point above, this might be because they acknowledge racism and therefore feel greater relief in the face of implicit evidence to the contrary. Those high in collective racial emotion, however, may not be particularly convinced by one or another person making the argument since they were going to oppose the policy anyway. Importantly, this set of findings provide less evidence that white people high in collective racial emotion react to compliance, as I had guessed based on Jackman's (1994) work.

The interaction may not be reliable though since it is sensitive to the attention check question. All respondents were asked at the end of the survey if they could remember if the author was arguing for or against extra economic resources for Blacks. The interaction effect was already just short of statistically significant, and is even further when removing cases who failed the attention check. As Table 4.9 shows, respondents in the Black author condition were twice as likely to fail the attention check. These respondents either did not pay attention, or they did pay attention but the stereotype of Black people pushing for "special favors" overwhelmed their ability to accurately recall what they had read. Either way, these respondents incorrectly remembered what the author had argued for, which may have shaped their subsequent evaluations of the author. If respondents high in

collective racial emotion believed the author was arguing in favor of race-equity policy, I would expect them to respond more coldly. Enough people answering this way could artificially suppress mean warmth among respondents high in collective racial emotion, creating the impression of an interaction effect where there is none. I had initially interpreted the near significant interaction as worth exploring because its coefficient was nearly significant. This is reflected in the “fanning out” of the confidence intervals in Figure 4.4 (and Figure 3.6 in study 1). Of course these confidence intervals may become wider because there is an actual effect. However, they may also become wider because there are fewer cases at the high end, resulting in poorer estimates and wider confidence intervals as a result.

Table 4.9: Percent Who Passed/Failed Manipulation Check, by Condition

	White Author	Black Author
Pass	52.6% (182)	47.4% (164)
Fail	33.3% (24)	66.7% (48)
Total	49.3% (206)	50.7% (212)

On balance, there seems to be more support for the first set of findings, that the race effect is additive across different levels of collective racial emotion. But whether or not the interaction is reliable, or the first set of results is more compelling, the explanation for either finding I have offered is difficult to reconcile with the null findings from the racial innocence threat manipulation. If ongoing racism causes anxiety among white people, particularly among white people at the low end of collective racial emotion (as I have argued), then a reminder of the systems’ unfairness should make their anxiety more salient. This does not seem to

have been the case, and yet respondents reported more warmth toward the Black author. Perhaps a different explanation is in order, or different evidence is required to use this explanation. In any case, why whites responded more warmly to the Black author remains an open question. I would welcome additional research to better understand these processes.

## 4.5 Conclusion

Study 2 provides supporting evidence to study 1 that Black opponents of race-equity policy evoke more warmth from white people than a white opponent would. In this study, I tested one possible mechanism to explain this difference—white racial innocence. The results of an experiment in which respondents were randomly assigned to an “innocence threat” condition or a control group uncovered no evidence that the threat motivates white reactions. The strongest evidence is that the advocate’s race produced the greatest difference in emotional and policy responses, regardless of threat condition. Whites felt greater warmth when reading an article written by a Black opponent of race-equity policy, and were more likely to oppose the policy because of it. This was true at all levels of collective racial emotion, though there is some evidence that the effect may be strongest among those at the low end. Because this study did not find an effect of racial innocence, it is difficult to support my initial argument that a Black advocate would evoke more warmth because they provide “assurance” that the system is open and fair, thus protecting whites’ racially innocent sense of self. However, the null

threat effect should not categorically foreclose this explanation. This is only one study, after all. A better conceptualization of innocence threat, and a better understanding of who is most likely to respond to such a threat, could lead to different findings. Of course, a different explanation altogether may in fact be appropriate. In any case, further research is needed to better understand the processes involved in white warmth toward Black opponents of race-equity.

## Chapter 5

### Study 3: How Do Whites React to Policy Arguments Not Directly Related to Racial Equity?

My basic argument has been that white people will resent Black advocates who push for racial-equity, but will respond with warmth when they advocate against it. Study 3 is a partial test of a presumptive scope condition. I assume these expectations are generalizable to any social identity in the context of unequal group relations, such as gender, sexuality, or immigration status, but only when their advocacy has consequences for his or her group's position.

According to the collective racial emotions framework, many whites resent Blacks who push for racial equity because they are seen as threatening to whites' values and interests (i.e., their group's position). The results of studies 1 and 2 show that this framework is well suited for studying reactions to people who make demands relevant to racial stratification. However, the framework may be less well-suited for studying white reactions to non-racial policy claims, even though the race of the advocate may influence them. For example, student activists against gun

violence gained wide support following a mass shooting in Parkland, Florida. These students attributed their success, in part, to their whiteness and affluence (Alter 2018). In other words, even though the policy issue was not directly related to race, the students felt their race mattered, and that they were taken more seriously because of it. The claim is plausible, and is consistent with status characteristics theory, but has yet to be tested. I outline briefly the theory below.

## **5.1 Perceived Status and Whites' Reactions to Non-Racial Policy Arguments**

According to status characteristics theory, socially significant categorical distinctions, such as race, may become the basis of status differences when widely held cultural “status beliefs” accord greater competence, respect, and worthiness to one category of the distinction (i.e., Black or white) over the other (Berger et al. 1977). In interaction, these distinctions then become the basis for evaluating others, where members of the advantaged category are evaluated in favorable terms relative to the disadvantaged category.

Race is assumed to be a status characteristic, and there is extensive evidence that whiteness confers status advantages (Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980). For example, racial discrimination in labor markets is attributable, in part, to differences in status beliefs regarding the competence, suitability, and deservingness of racialized applicants. As a result, white job applicants are regularly favored for employment over their equally qualified Black and Latino counterparts (Bertrand

and Mullainathan 2003; Pager 2003; Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009). Fiske et al. (2002) showed that perceptions of competence follow from perceived group status, so I would expect greater competence to be attributed to a white advocate in the context of race-neutral advocacy. This should be the case regardless of the position they take (i.e., for or against a policy) since in both cases the white advocate belongs to an advantaged category. Furthermore, according to the theory, status beliefs (such as perceived competence) are culturally defined and are assumed to be consensual. As such, there is little reason to expect a moderating influence of other belief systems such as collective racial emotion or limited government attitudes on perceived competence.

To the extent that advantaged group members are assumed to be more competent, their ideas may “sound better” than the same idea voiced by a disadvantaged group member (Correll and Ridgeway 2003; Ridgeway 2014). This perception may increase influence (Correll and Ridgeway 2003; Ridgeway 2014) such that white advocates—by way of attributions of competence—may have greater influence on others’ opinions. If so, then a white advocate might increase agreement with their policy position regardless of the specific position they take. Figure 5.1 shows a conceptual model of these hypothesized relationships.




Figure 5.1: Theoretical Diagram A

Status characteristics theory has broad empirical support (Kalkhoff and



Barnum 2000), but theorists caution that its predictions are limited to a very specific set of scope conditions. In particular, the predictions of the theory are limited to goal-oriented task groups where there is a clear distinction between success and failure, and a sense that group members' contributions may influence the likelihood of achieving a goal (Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980). Although some studies have found that status characteristics sometimes guide behavior outside of these scope conditions (e.g., Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; Harkness 2016), they may not. Nevertheless, the broad applicability of SCT outside of these scope conditions provides some basis to use the theory here.

## **5.2 Limited Government Attitudes and Whites' Reactions to Non-Racial Policy Arguments**

Status characteristics theory might be helpful for examining possible differences in reactions to the race of the advocate. There may also be an emotional response to the argument itself. In the previous two studies, I hypothesized that collective racial emotion would moderate emotional responses to the race of the advocate, depending on their argument. When dealing with non-racial policies, however, I do not expect collective racial emotion to play such a prominent role since the policy does not have an obvious impact on whites' group position. Still, political ideologies might influence how whites respond to the argument itself. And the relevant moderating political ideologies might vary from issue to issue, depending of the kinds of concerns raised in the policy proposal. In this study, I compare arguments for and against the implementation of a carbon tax, which is likely to prime tax-and-spend

considerations. Limited government attitudes tap exactly this consideration, so I would expect attitudes toward government taxation and spending to moderate reactions to the advocates' claims. Sniderman and colleagues (2000) provided evidence that activist demands to increase government taxing and spending leads whites who oppose these actions to become angry. Therefore, I expect whites with strong limited government attitudes to feel more anger toward an advocate pushing for a carbon tax than they would toward an advocate arguing against it. As I have described in earlier chapters, anger has a strong political effect, so it is likely to increase opposition to the policy among these respondents.

It is important to note that Sniderman and colleagues are quite insistent that racial considerations do not factor into white policy opinions, even when the policies have a direct impact on racial equity. So even though limited government attitudes should be associated with greater anger toward an advocate pushing for a carbon tax, the race of the advocate should not matter, and in fact racial considerations like collective racial emotion should play no role. Figure 5.2 shows a conceptual model of these hypothesized relationships.




Figure 5.2: Theoretical Diagram B

## 5.3 Methods

The methods used in study 3 mirror study 1, except for the content of the articles respondents were presented with. Participants were again recruited via Prolific, an online crowdsourcing platform where researchers post studies and pay respondents to participate. See study 1 for a discussion of the suitability of crowdsourced participant pools for experimental research. In short, replication studies with these samples have produced similar results as nationally representative samples (Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan (2014)). The surveys themselves were designed using Qualtrics, an online application for creating and distributing web surveys.

Data collection for study 3 took place over two waves, with an initial pre-test to gather standard demographic information and measure political and racial attitudes. Five hundred self-identifying white participants completed the pre-test and were paid \$1.00 for doing so. The same questionnaire items used in studies 1 and 3 were also used here. Collective racial emotion was measured with the standard symbolic racism battery in use by the American National Elections Study and other scholars (e.g., Henry and Sears 2002). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with each of the four items on a 7-point scale (e.g., “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”). For analysis, items were coded such that higher scores represent greater endorsement of collective racial emotion. They were then averaged to form a composite ranging from 1 to 7 (Cronbach’s

$\alpha = 0.92$ ). I included measures of “racial alienation” as well since they have been shown to be linked to perceptions of threat (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hutchings et al. 2011). Racial alienation was measured using questions designed to tap how people feel their racial group has been treated by American society (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hutchings et al. 2011). Using a 7-point scale, respondents were asked to report their level of agreement with questions such as “American society owes people from my racial group a better chance in life than we currently have.” Items were coded such that higher scores indicate a greater feeling of alienation. They were then averaged to form a composite ranging from 1 to 7 (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.58$ ). Limited government attitudes were measured with two items. Following (Banks and Valentino 2012) these questions are designed to tap respondent attitudes toward government tax-and-spend issues. Question wording follows the American National Elections Study convention and is available in Appendix C. Again, the items were coded so that higher scores represent a stronger commitment to limited government and then averaged to form a composite (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.93$ ).

Attitude scales were set off on their own blocks. Each block was randomly rotated within the survey, and each item was randomly rotated within its block. A standard demographic questionnaire appeared at the end of the pre-test survey. Full wording for each question is available in Appendix C.

Two weeks after the pre-test, I invited pre-test respondents to participate in a follow-up study. This time lag helps to mitigate order and priming effects that may result from measuring moderator variables either directly before or after the

experimental stimulus (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018). Four hundred thirty-one respondents completed the follow-up in exchange for \$1.40. Two respondents were dropped from analyses due to item missingness on important measures, resulting in 429 cases in the final sample.

Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for Study 3 Variables

Variable	n	Mean/Proportion	SD	Min	Max
Perceived Competence	429	5.20	1.10	1	7
Anger	429	2.11	1.48	1	7
Policy Opinion	429	4.75	1.80	1	7
Collective Racial Emotion	429	3.08	1.73	1	7
Racial Alienation	429	2.40	1.08	1	7
Limited Government	429	3.00	1.59	1	7
Political Ideology	429	2.41	1.07	1	5
Income	429	3.89	1.42	1	6
Education	429	4.16	1.38	1	6
Age	429	36.60	13.21	18	85
Male	177	0.41	0.02	-	-
Female	248	0.58	0.02	-	-
Other	4	0.01	0.00	-	-

Participants were randomly assigned to read an article designed to look like an opinion article or blog post written by either a white or Black author and featuring an argument either for or against implementing a carbon tax. The articles are the same length and contain much the same content. They begin with an overview of what a carbon tax is before presenting an argument for or against it. The argument in favor of the carbon tax follows a familiar “liberal” reasoning that emphasizes the environmental impacts of global warming, the effectiveness of a carbon tax to mitigate global warming, and ancillary benefits of increased tax revenue. To provide some assurance that the argument closely followed arguments in use by actual

political liberals, this particular argument was edited from an opinion piece written by Senator Bernie Sanders, a well known Democratic-Socialist and climate change activist. The argument against the carbon tax follows a standard “conservative” logic that is critical of taxing and the effect it would have to slow global warming. The argument used in this research is an edited version of an opinion piece found on the Heritage Foundation website, a well-known “conservative” think tank. Of course the actual source of the opinion piece was not revealed to the respondent. Full wording is available in Appendix B,

The race of the author is communicated by manipulating the by-line photograph that appears on the blog post. I attempted to match these photos as closely as possible on various socially important characteristics such as gender, age, class, and attractiveness. The results of a photo comparison test, reported in Appendix A, show that the photos are well matched and vary by perceived race and skin tone, as intended.

Next, I measured respondent agreement with the author’s policy opinion with two items, both using a 7-point agreement scale: 1) Do you agree or disagree with this person’s policy position?; and 2) Do you agree or disagree with the reasons this person gives for his policy position? Responses were then averaged to form a composite index (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = 0.95$ ). It is important to note that in these analyses, respondent “policy opinions” are measured as agreement with the author’s policy opinion and argument. In one condition, agreement with the author indicates support for carbon-taxing and is a favorable “policy opinion.” In the anti-tax

condition, agreement with the author indicates opposition to race-equity policy and is an unfavorable policy opinion.

Respondents were then asked a series of questions to tap emotional responses to the author. Using a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all [emotion]; 7 = Very [emotion]), I included three questions to measure respondent anger: 1) Does this person make you angry?; 2) Is this person irritating?; and 3) Is this person frustrating? I averaged responses to create a composite (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.93$ ). They were then asked a series of four questions, adapted from Fiske et al. (2002), relating to the perceived competence of the author (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.87$ ). Full wording for all of these questions is available in Appendix C.

## 5.4 Results

Before testing my hypotheses, I examined the response distributions for anger and perceived competence following the approach from studies 1 and 3, I then disaggregated these distributions by political ideology. Figure 5.3 shows these distributions. Counter to my expectations, the race of the author does not appear to affect attributions of competence. There are, however, apparent differences in attributions of competence and feelings of anger between the different arguments. Because liberals and conservatives differ in their opinions toward taxing, the bottom half of Figure 5.3 also shows these distributions by political ideology. From this view, it would appear that self-identified liberals are driving the difference in

perceived competence since, on average, they seem to think the pro-tax author is more competent than the anti-tax author. Moderates and conservatives, on the other hand, do not seem to attribute a different degree of competence to one author or the other. The author's argument seems to influence anger reactions both for liberals and conservatives, although liberals report greater anger toward the anti-tax author than conservatives do toward the pro-tax author. In the analyses below, I examine these patterns in greater detail with a focus on limited government attitudes since they more directly tap attitudes toward tax-and-spend issues.






Figure 5.3: Mean perceived competence of the author (left) and self-reported feelings of anger (right), by the race of the author, the author's argument, and respondent political ideology. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.

Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of policy opinions across conditions. In this sample, there is comparatively more agreement with the pro-tax author's position. Once again, this difference may be driven in part by the liberal skew of the sample, so I compared respondent opinions across political ideology in the bottom half of Figure 5.4. Not surprisingly, there is far greater agreement with the pro-tax policy

stance among liberals and greater agreement with the anti-tax policy stance among conservatives. Notably, however, the difference in opinion between the pro- and anti-tax authors among conservatives is much smaller. Indeed, conservatives in the pro-tax, Black author condition reported statistically similar levels of agreement as conservatives in the anti-tax conditions.

Below, I examine these distributions more closely by testing the hypotheses outlined above. Following the organization of my hypotheses, I will first focus on perceived status, then turn my attention to self-reported feelings of anger. All models reported below use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict perceived competence, respondent emotions, and policy opinions.




Figure 5.4: Agreement with the author’s policy position, by the race of the author, the author’s argument, and respondent political ideology. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.

### 5.4.1 Perceived Competence of the Author

I first tested the hypothesis that the white author benefits from a status advantage by comparing average perceived competence between the Black and white author.

Table 5.2 shows the results of four tests. In all of the models, both the Black and

white author are perceived to be similarly competent. The first two models show these comparisons without any controls. The first model compares perceived competence between the Black and white author among respondents in the pro-tax condition and the second is the same comparison among respondents in the anti-tax condition. Again, both authors are rated as similarly competent, which is not surprising given the graphical representation of these means shown in Figure 5.3. The second and third models introduce statistical controls in case accounting for these measures would reveal an otherwise overlooked difference. Still, both authors are rated as similarly competent. I also included interaction terms for each of the belief systems. There is no evidence that they moderate perceptions of competence. Above, I had hypothesized that differences in perceived competence would mediate policy opinions. Since there is no statistical difference in perceived competence (the hypothesized mediator), there is no justification to further explore mediation effects.

Table 5.2: Tests of Differences in Perceived Competence Between the Black and White Author

	Pro-tax	Anti-tax	Pro-tax	Anti-tax
Black author	0.14 (0.15)	0.08 (0.14)	0.27 (0.41)	0.59 (0.39)
Coll. racial emotion			0.04 (0.10)	0.06 (0.08)
Racial alienation			−0.17 (0.11)	−0.06 (0.09)
Limited government			−0.33*** (0.09)	−0.00 (0.09)
Political ideology			0.05 (0.11)	0.23* (0.10)
Income			0.02 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)
Education			0.03 (0.06)	−0.06 (0.06)
Age			−0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Female			0.04 (0.15)	0.20 (0.14)
Other (gender)			0.68 (1.05)	−1.16* (0.57)
Black author x CRE			−0.14 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)
Black author x RA			−0.03 (0.14)	−0.19 (0.13)
Black author x LG			0.13 (0.12)	−0.08 (0.11)
Constant	5.38*** (0.11)	4.92*** (0.10)	6.59*** (0.42)	4.43*** (0.41)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.17
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	−0.00	−0.00	0.19	0.12
Num. obs.	214	215	213	215

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

### 5.4.2 Anger Toward the Policy Proposal

I have hypothesized that the findings from studies 1 and 2 are limited to situations where the policy proposal may shift the contours of racial stratification. When policies are non-racial, I still expected the race of the author to elicit different reactions, but I assumed these differences would be linked to status attributions (i.e., perceived competence) rather than feelings of collective racial emotion. The above tests do not provide much evidence that the white author enjoys a status advantage, or that the Black author experiences a status disadvantage. At least this seems to be the case in this particular context and with these particular measures. However, if the findings from studies 1 and 2 are limited to race-equity policy, it is still important to rule out the possibility that the race of the author increases or decreases the influence of collective racial emotion on anger in a non-racial policy context. The results presented in Table 5.3 explore whether or not this is the case. The first model focuses on the pro-tax condition and includes the race of the author as an independent variable along with controls for income, education, age, and gender. To test if the race of the author changes the influence of collective racial emotion on anger, I also included an interaction term. The interaction of collective racial emotion by the race of the author has no apparent affect on anger. The second model focuses on the anti-tax condition, and the same is true here. In both models, political ideology is a significant covariate of anger (pro-tax:  $b = 0.24$ ,  $p = 0.041$ ; anti-tax:  $b = -0.37$ ,  $p = 0.02$ ). Limited government attitudes are also significant in the second model ( $b = -0.29$ ,  $p = 0.035$ ). These results provide some

evidence that the race of an advocate is less important in shaping reactions to non-racial policy issues, and that political ideology and limited government attitudes take a more central role.

Table 5.3: Tests of Differences in Self-Reported Anger Between the Black and White Author

	Pro-tax	Anti-tax
Black author	0.02 (0.42)	-1.08 (0.62)
Coll. racial emotion	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.13)
Racial alienation	0.15 (0.11)	0.06 (0.15)
Limited government	0.18 (0.10)	-0.29* (0.14)
Political ideology	0.24* (0.12)	-0.37* (0.16)
Income	0.01 (0.06)	0.10 (0.08)
Education	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.09)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Female	0.23 (0.15)	-0.43 (0.22)
Other (gender)	1.23 (1.08)	1.92* (0.92)
Black author x CRE	0.06 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.18)
Black author x RA	0.01 (0.15)	0.14 (0.21)
Black author x LG	-0.13 (0.12)	0.21 (0.17)
Constant	0.40 (0.43)	3.94*** (0.66)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.21
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.16
Num. obs.	213	215

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

I had also hypothesized that limited government attitudes would moderate how whites respond to the argument itself, and that whites with strong limited government attitudes would feel more anger toward an advocate pushing for a carbon tax. Table 5.4 shows the results of this test. As expected, the interaction term indicates increased anger toward the pro-tax argument as limited government attitudes increase, and decreased anger toward the anti-tax argument as these attitudes decrease ( $b = -0.4, p < .001$ ). Unexpectedly, racial considerations are also present, as evidenced by the significant interaction of collective racial emotion and the argument ( $b = -0.25, p = 0.013$ ).



Table 5.4: Tests of Differences in Self-Reported Anger Between the Pro-tax and Anti-tax Arguments

	Anger
Anti-tax	2.64*** (0.38)
Coll. racial emotion	0.15 (0.08)
Racial alienation	0.12 (0.09)
Limited government	0.16* (0.08)
Political ideology	−0.10 (0.10)
Income	0.07 (0.05)
Education	−0.00 (0.05)
Age	−0.00 (0.01)
Female	−0.12 (0.13)
Other (gender)	1.94** (0.68)
Anti-tax x CRE	−0.25* (0.10)
Anti-tax x RA	0.03 (0.13)
Anti-tax x LG	−0.40*** (0.10)
Constant	0.58 (0.40)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.22
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.19
Num. obs.	428

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

Figure 5.5 presents a visual depiction of these relationships. Interestingly, the figure shows that respondents who do not believe the government should limit

taxing and spending were more angry when encountering an anti-tax argument than respondents who hold limited government views were when encountering a pro-tax argument. The same is true, and even somewhat more pronounced, when focusing on collective racial emotion.




Figure 5.5: Predicted effect of pro- and anti-tax arguments anger, moderated by limited government attitudes (left) and collective racial emotion (right). Adjusting for model covariates. Shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval for the predicted means.

Next, using an analysis of moderated mediation, I tested the hypothesis that the author's argument influences policy attitudes by way of anger at different levels of limited government attitudes. An analysis of moderated mediation involves two steps (Tingley et al. 2014). The first step is a mediation analysis. In the second step, the results of the mediation analysis are then used to test for moderated mediation.

To conduct the first step, I began by estimating the three models shown in

Table 5.5. The first model tests the effect of the author’s argument on policy opinions while controlling for demographic characteristics, and racial and limited government attitudes.

There is a main effect of the argument, collective racial emotion, and limited government attitudes, but I would caution against attempting to interpret these coefficients. Recall that the dependent variable is a measure of agreement with the author’s policy position. In the anti-tax condition, agreement indicates opposition to a carbon tax, and in the pro-tax condition agreement indicates support for the carbon tax. In both cases, 1 = Strongly disagree and 7 = Strongly agree, but the meaning behind these responses are opposite depending on the experimental condition. It is sensible to compare the difference in agreement by the author’s argument, where there is more agreement with the pro-tax argument ( $b = -5.07$ ,  $p < .001$ ). It is more difficult to interpret the negative coefficients for limited government attitudes ( $b = -0.41$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and collective racial emotion ( $b = -0.31$ ,  $p < .001$ ). In both cases, the coefficient is negative such that an increase in either is associated with a decrease in agreement with the author’s policy position. But since agreement with the author could indicate either a pro- or anti-tax opinion, it is unclear what the coefficients really mean.

Table 5.5: Models Used in Moderated Mediation Analysis

	Policy	Mediation Models	
		Anger	Policy
Anti-tax	−5.07*** (0.40)	2.64*** (0.38)	−3.46*** (0.34)
Anger			−0.61*** (0.04)
Coll. racial emotion	−0.31*** (0.08)	0.15 (0.08)	−0.22** (0.07)
Racial alienation	−0.06 (0.10)	0.12 (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)
Limited government	−0.41*** (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)	−0.31*** (0.07)
Political ideology	0.09 (0.10)	−0.10 (0.10)	0.03 (0.09)
Income	−0.01 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
Education	0.02 (0.06)	−0.00 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Age	0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Female	0.09 (0.14)	−0.12 (0.13)	0.02 (0.12)
Other (gender)	−0.96 (0.72)	1.94** (0.68)	0.22 (0.59)
Anti-tax x CRE	0.58*** (0.11)	−0.25* (0.10)	0.42*** (0.09)
Anti-tax x RA	0.02 (0.14)	0.03 (0.13)	0.03 (0.11)
Anti-tax x LG	0.64*** (0.11)	−0.40*** (0.10)	0.40*** (0.09)
Constant	7.41*** (0.42)	0.58 (0.40)	7.76*** (0.34)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.22	0.61
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.19	0.60
Num. obs.	428	428	428

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ 

The interaction terms help to solve this problem of interpretation. When

focusing on the interaction terms, it is clearer that agreement with the anti-tax position increases with increasing limited government attitudes, and agreement with the pro-tax condition diminishes with increasing limited government attitudes ( $b = 0.64, p < .001$ ). The same relationship is true of collective racial emotion and policy opinions ( $b = 0.58, p < .001$ ).

Returning to the description of the analysis, I then estimated the two models under the “Mediation Models” heading in Table 5.5. The first of these uses anger as the dependent variable and is a restatement of the model from Table 5.4. The second mediation model uses policy opinions as the dependent variable and includes anger as a predictor. I then used these two models to conduct the mediation analysis using the R `mediation` package. In fact, all three models are used in the analysis, but it is only necessary to supply the second and third models. The mediation analysis uses quasi-Bayesian confidence intervals to test whether anger mediates the effect of the author’s argument on policy opinions (Imai et al. 2010). See the results section in Chapter 3 for a discussion of on the use of bootstrapping versus quasi-Bayesian confidence intervals. Following Tingley et al. (2014), the package developers, this first step uses two simulation draws since the test of uncertainty is conducted in the second step of the analysis. The second step then calculates the difference in the effect of the author’s argument on policy attitudes, by way of anger, at “high” and “low” levels of limited government attitudes. I used one standard deviation from the mean to define high and low. In the second step, I used 1,000 simulations.

Table 5.6: Effect of the Author’s Argument on Policy Opinions By Way of Anger, Moderated by Limited Government Attitudes

	Estimate	Lower CI	Upper CI	p
ACME(low LG) - ACME(high LG)	-0.775	-1.163	-0.417	0.000

As shown in Table 5.6, the 95% confidence intervals do not contain zero, indicating a statistically significant effect. The difference in the effect (ACME) of the author’s argument on policy attitudes via anger for respondents with high and low commitment to limited government is -0.78 ( $p < .001$ ). Figure 5.6 is a conceptual diagram of the test. The results could be interpreted as showing that limited government attitudes condition anger responses to the pro-tax and anti-tax arguments, resulting in different policy evaluations for people who strongly hold limited government views compared to those who do not.




Figure 5.6: Conceptual diagram of moderated mediation analysis of limited government attitudes.

The interaction term for collective racial emotion is also significant in the first mediation model reported in Table 5.5, implying that it may also moderate the

effect of anger on policy opinions. To test this possibility, I repeated the above steps for collective racial emotion.

Table 5.7: Effect of the Author’s Argument on Policy Opinions By Way of Anger, Moderated by Collective Racial Emotion

	Estimate	Lower CI	Upper CI	p
ACME(low CRE) - ACME(high CRE)	-0.551	-0.929	-0.179	0.004

Table 5.7 shows the results of this test. The 95% confidence intervals do not contain zero, indicating a statistically significant effect. The difference in the effect (ACME) of the author’s argument on policy attitudes via anger for respondents with high and low levels of collective racial emotion is -0.55 ( $p = 0.004$ ). Figure 5.7 is a conceptual diagram of the test. The results could be interpreted as showing that collective racial emotion conditions anger responses to the pro-tax and anti-tax arguments, resulting in different policy evaluations for people who have strong feelings of collective racial emotion compared to those who do not.

## 5.5 Discussion

In studies 1 and 2, I argued that whites’ react to the race of an advocate pushing for (or against) racial equity because their actions are seen as having consequences for whites’ group position, either because the advocate is pushing for racial equity, in which case they are seen as challenging the system, or because the advocate is taking a stand against it, in which case they may be seen as protecting the system. Whites who have strong feelings of collective racial emotion view Blacks as




Figure 5.7: Conceptual diagram of moderated mediation analysis of collective racial emotion.

especially threatening to whites' group position and are thus most resentful of their demands when they push for racial equity. They are also most welcoming of Blacks who push against it. But what happens when the policy does not have apparent consequences for white's group position? Does the advocate's race still matter in some way? In this study, I assumed that the race of the advocate would still matter, but that whites would attribute different levels of competence to Blacks and whites rather than react emotionally. The results reported above show that whites did not respond viscerally to the race of the activist, as expected, but they also did not attribute different levels of competence to either advocate. It would seem that the race of the advocate matters little when the policy proposal is race-neutral.

On the other hand, the advocate's policy position is related to anger reactions, but these reactions are unrelated to the race of the advocate. As expected, anger toward the pro-tax policy position increases as respondent commitment to a limited



government increases, and anger toward the anti-tax policy increases as respondent commitment to a limited government decreases. Unexpectedly, however, collective racial emotion had a similar effect on emotional responses. There are at least two ways to interpret this result. One interpretation is that policies that seem race-neutral in fact are not. As noted in Chapter 2, there are many studies showing that apparently non-racial policy issues actually have a racialized component (e.g., Gilens 1999; Tesler 2016). This interpretation is also consistent with the view that society is fundamentally structured by race and therefore any struggle is infused with consequences for the racial system (e.g., Bonilla-Silva 1997). If so, then the effect of collective racial emotion on carbon tax opinions may reflect the true underlying racialized nature of all policy debates. Another interpretation is that the items used to measure collective racial emotion extend beyond racial consideration to include attitudes toward government more abstractly. This is a long standing criticism of symbolic racism scales, which of course I am using to index collective racial emotion. According to the critique, these measures unwittingly tap attitudes about the size of government and therefore emphasize non-racial considerations too much. In so doing, they conceal the significant role of principled objections to government overreach (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). If so, then the association between collective racial emotion and carbon tax attitudes I have documented here is an artifact of limited government attitudes, not racial considerations.

I also examined whether or not the advocate's policy position influenced policy opinions by way of anger at different levels of commitment to limited government.

In other words, I tested for a moderated mediation. The test provided evidence to support the hypothesis. Limited government attitudes do seem to moderate anger responses, which in turn shapes policy opinions. Once again unexpectedly, the same was true of collective racial emotion.

Given the significance of race in many aspects of social life, it is somewhat puzzling that perceptions of the author do not appear to vary by his race. It might be the case that the race of an advocate does not influence whites' perceptions of policy advocates when the policy itself is race-neutral. If so, this is a somewhat encouraging finding since it represents at least one instance where an individual is not evaluated based on his or her race. The experiment here is of course a rather limited test case, so it may be premature to draw such a conclusion. Further research to examine situations where an advocate's may or may not influence whites' perceptions of the person would be useful. Of course there are a wide range of policy issues people might advocate for that might be more or less overtly attached to race and which might evoke different responses. There may also be other ways to measure responses to an advocate's race other than competence attributions that might reveal (or not) different reactions. It might also be the case that there is a relevant set of moderating attitudes that could uncover different reactions to the advocate's race. Status characteristics theory does not stipulate an important role for moderating attitudes, but it may be that another theory could be more useful for research in this context. Finally, if the results from studies 1 and 2 are indeed generalizable to other social identities in the context of unequal group

relations, then a more thorough test of this claim would need to include research involving group-equity policies relating to other social identities in addition to race-neutral policies.

## **5.6 Conclusion**

This study provides some evidence that the race of an advocate does not elicit a strong emotional reaction among whites when the policy issue is race-neutral.

Unexpectedly, the advocate's race does not seem to elicit different evaluations at all.

At the same time, the policy itself continues to evoke a meaningful emotional response that influences policy opinions. In either case, further research would be useful to understand under what conditions, if any, an advocate's race would lead to a different evaluation of the advocate. Test cases outside of environmental policy that emphasize tax-and-spend issues could be useful in that pursuit, as well as identifying relevant attitudes that might moderate such reactions.

# Chapter 6

## Conclusion

Three basic findings come from this research. First, white people feel greater resentment toward Black advocates of racial equity than they do toward white advocates. They do so, in part, because of what I have referred to here as “collective racial emotion.” Collective racial emotion is the belief that Blacks could make it on their own if only they would try, and so they have no business asking for and taking what rightfully belongs to white people. This belief encompasses aspects of symbolic racism and group conflict motives and reflects a concern with maintaining whites’ racial group position. For white people who hold this belief strongly, Blacks pushing for racial equity are seen as unnecessarily attempting to alter the racial status quo. The attempt is perceived as a threat to whites’ group position and generates anger as a result. Anger, in turn, promotes greater opposition to the demand itself, in this case race-targeted economic stimulus. White advocates mostly escape this response, however, possibly because they are not subjected to collective racial emotion.

Second, there is evidence that whites respond with greater warmth toward Blacks who argue against racial equity. However, collective racial emotion does not

appear to moderate the relationship between the advocate's race and emotional responses. Instead, whites at all levels of collective racial emotion responded this way. This result was unexpected because I assumed whites high in collective racial emotion would be 1) the most pleased by an apparently compliant outgroup member and 2) most open to any suggestion that racism is no longer a major social problem. Furthermore, "white racial innocence" does not appear to influence reactions to the advocate, contrary to my expectations.

Third, I provided additional evidence that these emotional responses are linked to the presumed effect a policy would have on whites' group position. When the policy has no apparent effect, such as in the case of a carbon tax, whites do not feel more or less anger toward an activist of one race or another. The advocate's policy position still has an effect on anger, but the effect is related to conflicting political ideologies rather than a concern about the policy's effect on the racial status quo. Unexpectedly, however, the advocate's race does not appear to shape white perceptions of the advocate at all. That is, even though I expected the advocate's race to have little effect on respondent emotional reactions, I still expected the advocates' race to elicit different status attributions (in this case, differences in perceived competence). This appears to have not been the case.

These unexpected findings deserve further discussion. I was surprised to find that respondents at all levels of collective racial emotion reported more warmth toward the Black advocate when he argued against racial equity. I had initially anticipated this response among those with the strongest feelings of collective racial

emotion. I assumed they would be the most pleased by an apparently compliant outgroup member, and I assumed they would be most open to any suggestion that racism is no longer a major social problem. One interpretation of this finding is that *all* white people seek compliance on the one hand and evidence of the end of racial problems on the other. This is a reasonable interpretation, but another possibility is that different aspects of collective racial emotion are operating at high and low levels. At high ends, whites feel Blacks threaten their group's position and may be comforted by apparent compliance. At the low ends, whites are not concerned that Blacks threaten their group's position and therefore do not seek compliance. They do, however, acknowledge ongoing racism and possibly feel guilty because of it. If so, they may feel comparatively more relieved since a Black opponent of racial equity may provide "evidence" that racism is no longer a serious problem. In both cases, the Black opponent would evoke more warmth, though for different reasons at different levels.

There are at least two other possibilities that could help explain this finding. Respondents low in collective racial emotion did not feel particularly warm toward either the white or Black author. These respondents found both of the authors' policy stances disagreeable, but may have felt even colder toward the white author because he was seen as having racist motives, whereas the Black author would likely escape that label (López 2014). That I failed to collect a measure of the extent to which the advocate was seen as racist is an unfortunate oversight that could have shed some light on this issue. Another possibility is that whites low in collective

racial emotion may believe the Black advocate has internalized his oppression (Hall 1986; Pyke 2010). If so, these respondents might feel pity, which may be accompanied by feelings of warmth.

There was also little evidence that “white racial innocence” has much to do with feelings of warmth. I had initially hypothesized that a Black advocate would evoke more warmth because they provide “assurance” that the system is open and fair. I argued this belief could in turn protect whites’ sense of self as morally superior and innocent. If this were the case, then a Black advocate against racial equity would evoke even more warmth when white innocence is overtly threatened. The results of the experiment provided little evidence that this is the case. One possible explanation is that respondents with strong feelings of collective racial emotion believe strongly enough that whites do not contribute to or benefit from racism that they only double-down on this belief when it is challenged (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer 2007). If so, the feeling of white racial innocence would remain in tact even in the face of some threat. But respondents at the low end of collective racial emotion *do* believe in ongoing racism. If this causes some anxiety, then a reminder of the systems’ unfairness should make their anxiety more salient. And if the Black advocate alleviates this anxiety, I would have expected greater feelings of warmth when white innocence has been threatened. This does not seem to have been the case either, and yet respondents at all levels of collective racial emotion reported more warmth toward the Black author. Thus, while this research has provided evidence that whites report more warmth toward Blacks when they

oppose race-equity policy, the reasons they do so remains an open question.

Next, it was surprising to find that an advocate's race appears not to shape perceptions at all when the policy is race-neutral. If this finding is reliable, it is somewhat encouraging since it represents at least one instance where an individual is not evaluated based on their race. Such a conclusion may be premature since I only measured perceptions of competence. Other measures might reveal (or not) different reactions by the race of the advocate. Or maybe including moderating attitudes would be necessary to uncover differences. Status characteristics theory does not stipulate an important role for moderating attitudes, so it provides little direction in this regard. Perhaps some other theory would provide more relevant insight. Given the significance of race in most aspects of social life, understanding the extent to which it does or does not matter here would be useful.

These unexpected findings hint at some of the limitations of this research. There are others worth noting. While there is a wide range of policies that could be considered race-equity policies, this research only examined one—race-targeted COVID-19 related economic stimulus. Using this as a test case was advantages in my view because the issue was likely known to most Americans and was an immediately relevant concern to many at the time this research was conducted. However, the uncertainty and fear surrounding the pandemic might have underpinned a special kind of emotional response that would otherwise be absent in a test of a more common policy proposal such as affirmative action or reparations. Economic stimulus is also a concretely material issue. Other race-equity policies



with less overtly material consequences, such as the use of the confederate flag or public displays of confederate statues, might also lead to different reactions. In both cases I think the findings of this research provide a basis to expect similar results regardless of the policy, but further research would be necessary to draw such a conclusion with any confidence.

In addition to studying different race-equity policies, it would also be useful to examine group-equity policies relating to other social identities. This research provided some evidence that white reactions are linked to the perceived effect of the policy on their group's position by showing that reactions differ when the policy is race-neutral. A more thorough test of the generalizability of the hypothesis would examine group-equity policies related to other social identities as well. One of the main findings of this research is that whites react with anger toward Blacks who push for race-equity policy. But race relations is a particular case of intergroup relations that involves dominant and subordinate groups. To the extent that white reactions in the particular case of race relations are an instance of dominant group member behavior more generally, I would expect dominant group members from any social identity to react with anger when subordinate group members push for intergroup equity. Evidence of whether or not this is so would of course require research involving other social identities.

It is also difficult to use a convenience sample without addressing its limitations. Crowdsourced samples are common in academic research because they offer a fast and inexpensive method of data collection. Given my own cost and time constraints,

this research would not have been possible using any other source. There is evidence (noted in Chapter 3) that experiments using these kinds of samples produce similar results as nationally representative samples. This is true of research involving political and racial attitudes similar to the studies I have presented here. These findings lend some legitimacy to the use of crowdsourced samples, but it is difficult to deny that they are often inconsistent with nationally representative samples. In each of the studies presented in this dissertation, I began the results section by showing the unadjusted distributions for the dependent variables. In each case the distributions were the opposite of what one would expect from a nationally representative sample. Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3 (study 1) is an example. Although white opinion varies from policy to policy, there is typically much less support for race-equity policies in a nationally representative sample than what is reported here.

Controlling for theoretically relevant moderators is one way to correct for this problem (Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan (2014)). To the extent that I expected collective racial emotion or limited government attitudes to influence whites' reactions to policy demands, it is less important to have perfect representation of the United States population than it is to have representation across the continuum of these ideologies. In this case, I do have representation across the continuum, but there is admittedly much more representation at the low ends of these measures than there would be in a nationally representative sample. It could be that a more fair test of the moderating effect of collective racial emotion would involve a sample that is evenly distributed across these measures, in which case a nationally

representative sample would be undesirable since they produce a distribution with greater representation at the high ends (see E.1 in Appendix E.3).

It is also worth noting that my goal is not necessarily to generalize to the United States population anyway. Instead, my aim is to provide insight about attitudes that may apply to any intergroup context where a disadvantaged group member is advocating an issue that has consequences for their group's position. According to Lucas (2003), sampling procedures "do nothing to increase generalization across settings and populations" (Lucas 2003: 244). With this in mind, research involving other groups in a dominant and subordinate relationship would provide a better test of generalizability than a nationally representative sample.

The sample was also unrepresentative by design because I only recruited white respondents. Whites and non-whites occupy different positions in the racial structure and often have different attitudes toward race-equity policy because of it (Bobo 2000). A more diverse sample, or at least a sample that included Black respondents, might have bolstered the argument that one's group position is a factor shaping reactions to demands for racial equity. Recruiting a more diverse sample would still require a non-representative sample, however, since a sample size roughly equivalent to my white sample would be necessary to draw conclusions with a similar level of confidence. There is also a longstanding bias in the racial attitudes literature of focusing on white attitudes (Krysan 2000; Sigelman and Welch 1994). My research reproduces this trend and in doing so it reproduces a white-centric sociology.

Each of these limitations are important and worth considering, but they point to opportunities for further research rather than seriously call into question the value of the dissertation. What I have been able to is provide sound evidence that whites with strong feelings of collective racial emotion feel greater anger toward Blacks who advocate for racial equity. On the other hand, white people feel greater warmth toward Blacks who oppose it. In both cases, the elevated emotion promotes opposition to efforts designed to achieve racial equity. These findings contribute to the sociological literature both empirically and theoretically. Of course it contributes empirically by providing evidence of a series of relationships that heretofore have not been demonstrated. Extending the concept of collective racial resentment to encompass warmth and its political effects is my way of giving back to the theory.

# Appendix A

## Photo Comparison Results

Studies 1-3 use the same pair of photographs to depict the race of the authors.



Figure A.1: Photographs Used to Portray the Author's Race

The author's race is the central independent variable throughout this research, so it is important to have reasonable assurance that most people would agree about the person's race. Since my goal is to isolate the effects of race on perceptions of the author and his policy proposal, I also attempted to match the photographs on other important social characteristics.

Experiments using racially matched pairs are not unusual in sociological research. Using matched pairs, researchers have documented discrimination in the

labor market by sending men with different racial backgrounds, but who otherwise dress and act the same, to apply in person for entry level jobs (Pager 2003; Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009). Matching pairs, however, can be difficult. Even when individuals are carefully selected to appear the same, race powerfully shapes how group members are perceived. For example, it is well known that Black men are more likely than white men to be associated with criminality (Eberhardt et al. 2004; Ray 2015), to be seen as less intelligent (Allport 1954; Steele 1997), and Black boys are assumed to be older than they actually are (Goff et al. 2014). White-centric beauty ideals might also lead many people to rate white people as more attractive (Frevert and Walker 2014), although the empirical findings are somewhat mixed, with some research finding that Black men are rated as more attractive (e.g., Lewis 2011) while other research finds the opposite (e.g., Wade, Irvine, and Cooper 2004). Displays of emotion are perceived differently too. Protest onlookers believe a protest is more likely to result in violence if there are Black participants who show signs of anger (Valentino and Nicholson 2019), and Black professionals report being punished for displaying the same kind of anger as their white colleagues (Wingfield 2010).

Attributions on these and other dimensions could be important if a favorable rating increases the chances that the Black or white author will be given the benefit of the doubt. With these challenges in mind, I conducted a short survey to test and compare reactions to the photographs in figure A.1. In addition to race, I asked respondents to rate the person's skintone (1 = lightest, 11 = darkest), gender (male, female, or other), and attractiveness, professionalism, seriousness, happiness, and

anger (1 = not at all; 7 = very[attribute]).

I collected data to make these comparisons from 50 respondents using a short survey distributed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. After examining responses to several questions designed to detect insincere responses, I excluded 8 respondents from the analysis. The resulting analytic sample for the analyses below is  $n = 42$ . Comment about whether including these respondents changes response patterns.

Figure A.2 shows the response distributions for the perceived race, skintone, and age of both photographs. Although there is not complete agreement, over 90% of respondents said the faces in the “white” and “Black” photographs represented white and Black people, respectively. Perceived skintone is somewhat more varied, but in the expected directions. Responses for the white photograph cluster near the lighter end of the spectrum and responses for the Black photograph cluster near the darker end. Both photographs were also perceived as depicting people who are about 25-34, with about 75% of respondents choosing this range. There is 100% agreement about the individuals’ gender.

Figure A.3 shows comparisons of the mean ratings for skintone, attractiveness, happiness, anger, professionalism, and seriousness for both photographs. There are apparent differences between the white and Black photograph on all of these traits, except for seriousness. I chose these photographs because they seemed to depict men with different racial backgrounds and skintones. The mean difference in perceived skintone indicates my effort was successful on this dimension. A difference of means paired t-test provides evidence that this difference is not likely due to



Figure A.2: Distributions of Perceived Race, Skintone, and Age, by Photograph



chance ( $t = 20.53$ ,  $p < .001$ ). However, I had hoped to match the photos on each of the other traits as well. The apparent differences in trait attributions suggests I may not have been entirely successful. Indeed, difference of means paired t-tests for these other traits shows statistically significant differences between the two photos on attributions of attractiveness ( $t = -2.15$ ,  $p = 0.038$ ), happiness ( $t = -2.85$ ,  $p = 0.007$ ), anger ( $t = 2.5$ ,  $p = 0.016$ ), and professionalism ( $t = -3.89$ ,  $p < .001$ ).




Figure A.3: Comparison of Perceived Attributions, by Photo

Perceived differences in skintone are always significantly different, regardless of other controls. But once accounting for the display order of the photographs, and the respondent's race and gender, the differences on each of the other traits become statistically non-significant. To examine how these factors influence respondent perceptions of these traits, I created a new variable for each trait by calculating the difference between each respondent's rating of the white and black photo on that trait. Subtracting the trait rating of the Black photo from the white photo results in a positive rating if the Black photograph is rated lower on that trait and a negative rating if he is rated higher on that trait. By this measure, the negative rating on anger in figure A.3 indicates the Black person was perceived as being more angry. The positive values on the other attributes indicates the white person was seen as more attractive, happy, and professional.

Using this difference variable allowed me to control for factors that might contribute to differences in respondent ratings. Table A.1 shows reduced regression models for each of the rating difference variables. Note that the estimated differences (i.e., each model's constant) are the same as the visual depictions in figure A.3. Likewise, the test statistics and p-values produced by these models are the same as those produced by the t-tests I reported above.

The survey was designed to randomly present either the white or Black photo first. The display order seems to have influenced perceptions of how angry and attractive the person in the photograph is. As reported above, the Black photograph was rated as being more angry and less attractive on average. However,

Table A.1: Reduced Models of the Mean Differences in Perceived Traits

Attribute	Estimated Difference	SE	t	p
Angry	-0.5476190	0.2187558	-2.5033350	0.016
Attractive	0.4761905	0.2214882	2.1499587	0.038
Happy	0.6904762	0.2421547	2.8513845	0.007
Professional	0.7380952	0.1899310	3.8861234	0.000
Serious	0.0714286	0.1783681	0.4004561	0.691
Skintone	-5.2142857	0.2539713	-20.5310055	0.000

this difference may have been driven by respondents rating the Black person as angrier and less attractive if they saw the white person first. As reported in table A.2, the difference in perceived anger and attractiveness (the model constant) is no longer statistically significant once accounting for display order, although display order itself is non-significant.

Table A.2: Differences in Attribution Ratings, by Display Order

	Attribute			
	Angry	Attractive	Happy	Professional
white photo first	-0.333 (0.440)	-0.286 (0.446)	-0.619 (0.480)	-0.524 (0.376)
Constant	-0.381 (0.311)	0.619 (0.316)	1.000** (0.340)	1.000*** (0.266)
Observations	42	42	42	42
R <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.010	0.040	0.046

*Note:* \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Controlling for display order alone does not affect mean attributions of happiness or professionalism, but controlling for the respondent's race and sex removes these differences. The regression output displayed in table A.3 shows these

results. Once accounting for the respondent's sex and race, the difference in ratings for the Black and white photo on each of these attributes (i.e., the constant term) is not statistically different from zero. Respondent sex and race themselves, however, are not statistically significant. The respondent's race is collapsed into a two category variable since there were very few non-white respondents altogether (n = 8).

Table A.3: Differences in Attribution Ratings by Display Order, Controlling for Respondent Race and Gender

	Attribute			
	Angry	Attractive	Happy	Professional
white photo first	−0.314 (0.447)	−0.278 (0.443)	−0.622 (0.493)	−0.525 (0.373)
white (non-white comparison)	−0.378 (0.599)	0.834 (0.595)	0.109 (0.662)	0.769 (0.501)
Female (male comparison)	0.407 (0.473)	0.157 (0.470)	−0.069 (0.523)	−0.029 (0.396)
Constant	−0.269 (0.562)	−0.130 (0.558)	0.945 (0.621)	0.391 (0.470)
Observations	42	42	42	42
R <sup>2</sup>	0.036	0.075	0.041	0.106

*Note:*

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

The results of this pre-test indicate that most respondents agree about the race and skintone of the people depicted in the photographs. Initially, there appear to be differences in how the photographs are rated on each of the other attributes (except seriousness), but these differences are statistically non-significant after accounting for display order and the demographic characteristics of respondents. Taken

together, these results provide some assurance that any differences in reactions to the arguments the authors make in their blog posts are attributable to the interaction of the race of the person depicted in the photograph and the claims they are making.

## Appendix B

### Opinion Articles

## Racial Policy

# The Coronavirus Shutdown Has Created an Economic Disaster

*Congress Needs to Act*



October 24, 2020

In mid-March 2020, many states issued stay-at-home orders to slow the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This move resulted in unprecedented unemployment as economic activity halted across the country. By many estimates, a staggering 22 million jobs were lost in March and April.

Businesses suffered too, many shuttering their doors entirely, uncertain if they would ever be able to open again.

**“As a result of these racial disparities, some have urged Congress to set aside extra economic stimulus for Blacks and Black communities. We should support these calls.”**

In response, Congress swiftly moved to pass the CARES Act, an economic stimulus package widely lauded as a necessary and bold move. The Act put money—\$1200 for most—directly into American pockets within weeks. Businesses faced with the tough decision to either lay off workers or go bankrupt were given the resources they

needed to keep employees on board, at least in the short term, with the Payroll Protection Program (also known as PPP).

But even as businesses carefully reopen and workers slowly get back to work, the economic fallout has had lasting effects, and Congress needs to act again. As the pandemic has worn on through the summer and into the fall, many Americans are feeling the pinch. According to a recent study from the Pew Research Center, 33% of all respondents reported needing to dip into their savings and retirement to pay bills. To deal with the ongoing economic crisis, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve has pressed Congress to take

additional action to ensure economic stability.

**“We need to remember that historic and ongoing racism has caused black communities to lag behind others.”**

So far, there have been various proposals in Congress, but none have succeeded.

As part of the debate, there has been growing attention to how the economic fallout has affected racial groups differently. For example, the same Pew Research Center

study found that while 18% of Whites have had trouble paying their bills since the beginning of the pandemic, 43% of Blacks reported having trouble.

As a result of these racial disparities, some have urged Congress to set aside extra economic stimulus for Blacks and Black communities. We should support these calls.

In America, not everyone has the same opportunities to be successful. We need to remember that historic and ongoing racism—often government sponsored—has caused black communities to lag behind others. But instead of taking responsibility, the government has looked the other way. Congress needs to act, and soon, to remedy this inequality or it is going to get much worse.

Figure B.1: Race-equity condition, Black author

## Racial Policy

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Figure B.2: Race-equity condition, white author



## Racial Policy

# The Coronavirus Shutdown Has Created an Economic Disaster

*Congress Needs to Act*



October 24, 2020

In mid-March 2020, many states issued stay-at-home orders to slow the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This move resulted in unprecedented unemployment as economic activity halted across the country. By many estimates, a staggering 22 million jobs were lost in March and April.

Businesses suffered too, many shuttering their doors entirely, uncertain if they would ever be able to open again.

**“As a result of these racial disparities, some have urged Congress to set aside extra economic stimulus for Blacks and Black communities. We should reject these calls.”**

In response, Congress swiftly moved to pass the CARES Act, an economic stimulus package widely lauded as a necessary and bold move. The Act put money—\$1200 for most—directly into American pockets within weeks. Businesses faced with the tough decision to either lay off workers or go bankrupt were given the resources they

needed to keep employees on board, at least in the short term, with the Payroll Protection Program (also known as PPP).

But even as businesses carefully reopen and workers slowly get back to work, the economic fallout has had lasting effects, and Congress needs to act again. As the pandemic has worn on through the summer and into the fall, many Americans are feeling the pinch. According to a recent study from the Pew Research Center, 33% of all respondents reported needing to dip into their savings and retirement to pay bills. To deal with the ongoing economic crisis, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve has pressed Congress to take

additional action to ensure economic stability.

So far, there have been various proposals in Congress, but none have succeeded.

**“We need to remember that everyone has some responsibility for lagging behind others.”**

As part of the debate, there has been growing attention to how the economic fallout has affected racial groups differently. For example, the same Pew Research Center

study found that while 18% of Whites have had trouble paying their bills since the beginning of the pandemic, 43% of Blacks reported having trouble.

As a result of these racial disparities, some have urged Congress to set aside extra economic stimulus for Blacks and Black communities. We should reject these calls.

In America, everyone, including Black people, has the same opportunities to be successful. We need to remember that everyone has some responsibility for lagging behind others. But instead of taking responsibility, some members of the Black community have been demanding special treatment from the government. Congress needs to act, and soon, but it needs to act on behalf of everyone, without regard to skin color.

Figure B.3: Colorblind condition, Black author

## Racial Policy

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Figure B.4: Colorblind condition, white author

## Environmental Policy

### What Is a Carbon Tax and Do We Need One?



June 6, 2021

When a hydrocarbon fuel such as coal, petroleum, or natural gas is burnt, its carbon is converted to CO<sub>2</sub> and other carbon compounds and released into the atmosphere. A carbon tax is a tax levied on the carbon emissions involved in producing many goods and services. In theory, a carbon tax puts a price on

carbon dioxide to pay for the “hidden” social and environmental costs of burning fossil fuels that otherwise aren’t accounted for.

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**“Recently, there have been many calls to implement a carbon tax, and we should support them.”**

Recently, there have been many calls to implement a carbon tax, and we should support them.

Those who oppose such a tax because they are concerned about the economic cost of transitioning to a clean energy system seem willing to overlook the enormous cost of not making this transition as quickly as possible. Climate change is already causing devastating problems in terms of droughts, heat waves, floods, forest fires, disease, and rising sea levels. And it is already imposing enormous costs on consumers and our economy, and those costs will continue to escalate as the impacts of global warming worsen.

Opponents argue that the economic cost is too great, but there are economic benefits that would result from additional revenue. This revenue could be returned directly to American taxpayers to offset any rising prices and to support large investments in renewable energy...

Figure B.5: Pro-carbon tax condition, Black author

## Environmental Policy

### What Is a Carbon Tax and Do We Need One?



June 6, 2021

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Figure B.6: Pro-carbon tax condition, white author

## Environmental Policy

### What Is a Carbon Tax and Do We Need One?



June 6, 2021

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**“Recently, there have been many calls to implement a carbon tax, and we should oppose them.”**

Recently, there have been many calls to implement a carbon tax, and we should oppose them.

Those who support such a tax propose to address this “market failure” with a policy that could well lead to economic failure. Families would pay more at the meter and the pump. Approximately 80% of America’s energy needs are met by natural gas, oil, and coal, which means the costs would be economy-wide. It would cost more to manufacture, which would drive up the price of manufactured goods. And it would cost more to farm, which would drive up the costs of food.

Supporters argue a carbon tax is worth it despite the costs, but it’s not clear it would do much to benefit the climate. No doubt, carbon dioxide emissions would decline—if you tax something, you’ll get less of it. But the impact on global temperatures would be negligible by the end of the century...

Figure B.7: Anti-carbon tax condition, Black author



## Environmental Policy

### What Is a Carbon Tax and Do We Need One?



June 6, 2021

When a hydrocarbon fuel such as coal, petroleum, or natural gas is burnt, its carbon is converted to CO<sub>2</sub> and other carbon compounds and released into the atmosphere. A carbon tax is a tax levied on the carbon emissions involved in producing many goods and services. In theory, a carbon tax puts a price on

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Figure B.8: Anti-carbon tax condition, white author

# Appendix C

## Questionnaires

### C.1 Photo Comparison Questionnaire

(New block)

- 1) In this study, you will be asked to pretest materials to be used in a future study. We will ask you to look at photographs of people's faces and to tell us what characteristics you think describe them. Participation should take about 5-10 minutes and you will be paid \$1.00 for completing this HIT. We will provide you with a validation code at the end of the survey.

Your participation is voluntary and your responses will be kept confidential. When we summarize the data, no personally identifiable information will be associated with your responses. You must be at least 18 to participate.

If you have any questions or comments about the survey, please feel free to contact the PIs, Shaun Genter (sgenter@umd.edu) or Rashawn Ray (rjray@umd.edu). If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact: University of Maryland College Park, Institutional Review Board Office, 1204 Marie Mount Hall, College Park, MD 20742, E-mail: irb@umd.edu, Phone: (301) 405-0678. This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.

Please click [here](#) if you would like a copy of this consent form.

Do you agree to participate in this study?

Yes

No

(New block)

- 2) In this research, we are trying to test materials that we intend on using in a future study. To do this successfully, it is important to have your accurate and

honest responses to the questions. Please take your time and think carefully before answering.

Are you willing to take your time and think carefully before answering?

Yes

No

(New block)

3) Are you...?

Male

Female

Other (please specify)

4) How would you describe your race or ethnic background? You can choose more than one.

American Indian or Alaska Native

Asian

Black or African American

Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin

Middle Eastern or North African

Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander

White

Other (please specify)

5) What is your age in years?

Text entry

6) When you were growing up, what was the big city nearest where you lived?

Text entry

7) In the last 30 days, about how often have you completed HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks) on Mechanical Turk? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Multiple times a day

About once a day

More than once a week, but not every day

About once a week

Less than once a week

Only this one

(New block)

8) Next, we would like your impressions about some profile pictures that we would like to use in future research. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions that we are asking about these pictures. We just want to have a measure of how people perceive each picture before we use them in future



research. We would like to see how similar or different the people in the following pair of photographs seem on some social and physical characteristics.

(New block)

(The following block of questions are asked as a set for both the white and Black photo. Randomize which set is shown first)

(Photo here)

- 9) If you had to guess the race of this person, what would you say their race is?

American Indian or Alaska Native

Asian

Black or African American

Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin

Middle Eastern or North African

Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander

White

Other (please specify)

(Page break)

(Photo here)

- 10) What would you say is this person's skin color?



(Page break)

(Photo here)

- 11) What would you say this person's gender is?

Male

Female

Other (please specify)

- 12) What would you say this person's age is?

Under 18

18–24

25–34

35–50

Over 50

- 13) How attractive would you say this person is? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all attractive

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very attractive

(Page break)

(Photo here)

- 14) How professional would you say this person is? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all professional

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very professional

- 15) How serious would you say this person is? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all serious

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very serious

(Page break)

(Photo here)

- 16) How angry would you say this person is? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all angry

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very angry

- 17) How happy would you say this person is? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- 1 - Not at all happy
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5
  - 6
  - 7 - Very happy
- (New block)
- 18) Which of the following is a synonym of “car?” (Randomize response options)
- Automobile
  - Airplane
  - Boat
  - Bicycle
  - Motorcycle
  - Roller skates
  - Skateboard
- 19) What is your age in years?
- Text entry
- 20) What is the first word of the first question on this page?
- Text entry
- (Nww block)
- 21) If you would like a copy of this study’s consent form for your records, click [here](#).
- (End of survey)

## C.2 Pre-test Questionnaire

(New block)

- 1) In this study, you will be asked to tell us some of your attitudes and opinions about political and social issues. Participation should take about 6-10 minutes and you will be paid \$1.20 for completing this survey. We will provide you with a completion code for payment. You may take this survey only once, and we only offer payment for one completion.

Your participation is voluntary and your responses will be kept confidential. When we summarize the data, no personally identifiable information will be

associated with your responses. You must be at least 18 to participate. We may also contact you for a follow-up study. Your decision to participate in any follow-up research is voluntary.

If you have any questions or comments about the survey, please feel free to contact the PIs, Shaun Genter (sgenter@umd.edu) or Rashawn Ray (rjray@umd.edu). If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact: University of Maryland College Park, Institutional Review Board Office, 1204 Marie Mount Hall, College Park, MD 20742, E-mail: irb@umd.edu, Phone: (301) 405-0678. This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.

Please click here if you would like a copy of this consent form.

Do you agree to participate in this study?

Yes

No

- 2) Please enter your Prolific ID here: (Display if consent == “Yes”)

Text entry (autopopulated)

(New block)

- 3) In this research, we would like to learn your opinion about various topics. To do this successfully, it is important to have your accurate and honest responses to the questions. Please take your time and think carefully before answering.

Are you willing to take your time and think carefully before answering?

Yes

No

(New Block)

- 4) With which political party do you most closely identify? (Randomize Democrat/Republican)

Democrat

Independent

Republican

Other (please specify)

- 5) How would you describe your political views? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Very liberal

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

Very conservative

(Page break)

- 6) How warm or cold are your feelings toward the following people or groups?  
(Matrix, randomize order of Whites, Blacks/African Americans, Hispanic Immigrants)

(1 - Extremely cold, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 - Extremely warm)

Joe Biden

Donald Trump

Democrats

Republicans

Whites

Blacks/African Americans

Hispanic Immigrants

(New block, limited government attitudes)

(Randomize Q order)

- 7) Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.

Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services **even if it means an increase in spending**. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.

And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1 - Government should provide many fewer services

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Government should provide many more services

- 8) Some people think the government should provide fewer services in order to reduce spending. These people are at point 1 of the scale.

Other people feel it is important for the government to provide more services **even if it means an increase in taxes**. These people are at point 7 of the scale.

And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1 - Government should provide many fewer services

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Government should provide many more services

(Randomize each of the following blocks: symbolic racism/collective racial emotion, racial alienation, zero-sum beliefs, discrimination, group consciousness)

(New block, symbolic racism/collective racial emotion)

(Randomize Q order)

- 9) Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same. (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

- 10) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

- 11) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

- 12) It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree

Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
(New block, racial alienation)  
(Randomize Q order)

- 13) American society owes people from my racial group a better chance in life than we currently have. (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree

- 14) American society has provided people from my racial group a fair opportunity to get ahead in life. (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree

(New block, zero-sum beliefs)  
(Randomize Q order)

- 15) More good jobs for blacks means fewer good jobs for my racial group. (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree

- 16) The more influence blacks have in politics, the less influence my racial group has in politics. (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
(New block, discrimination)  
(Randomize Q order)

- 17) How much discrimination is there in the United States today against whites?  
(Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - None at all  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 - A great deal

- 18) How much discrimination is there in the United States today against blacks?  
(Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - None at all  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 - A great deal

- 19) How much discrimination is there in the United States today against recent Hispanic immigrants? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - None at all  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 - A great deal

(New block, group consciousness)  
(Randomize Q order)



- 20) How important is being a member of your racial group to your identity?  
(Random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- Not at all important
  - A little important
  - Moderately important
  - Very important
  - Extremely important
- 21) How important is it that people from your racial group work together to change laws that are unfair to your group? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- Not at all important
  - A little important
  - Moderately important
  - Very important
  - Extremely important
- 22) How likely is it that many people from your racial group are unable to find a job because employers are hiring people from other racial groups instead?  
(Random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- Not at all likely
  - Somewhat likely
  - Moderately likely
  - Very likely
  - Extremely likely
- (New block)
- 23) On January 6, 2021, protesters stormed the U.S. Capitol building in Washington, DC to contest Congress's certification of the 2020 election results. Are you familiar with this event?
- Yes
  - No
  - Not sure
- 24) How warm or cold do you feel toward the protesters who stormed the Capitol?  
(Display if familiar == "Yes," random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- 1 - Extremely cold
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5
  - 6
  - 7 - Extremely warm

(New block)

- 25) Please select “Neither agree nor disagree” (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree

- 26) Please select “Neither agree nor disagree” (If select != “Neither agree nor disagree.” Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree

- 27) Which of the following is a synonym of “car?” (Randomize response options)

Automobile  
Airplane  
Boat  
Bicycle  
Motorcycle  
Roller skates  
Skateboard

(New block)

- 28) Finally, we have a few background questions to help us know if we’re hearing from all different types of people.

- 29) Are you...?

Male  
Female  
Other

- 30) Do you consider yourself to be...? (feel free to select more than one)

American Indian or Alaska Native  
Asian  
Black or African American  
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin

Middle Eastern or North African  
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  
White  
Other (please specify)

31) What is your highest level of education?

Less than 12th grade  
High school graduate (includes GED)  
Some college, no degree  
2-year college degree (Associate, Technical, etc.)  
4-year degree (Bachelor's)  
Graduate or professional degree (Master's, Ph.D., M.B.A., etc.)

32) What is your employment status?

Employed full-time  
Employed part-time  
Unemployed but looking for work  
Unemployed and not looking for work  
Retired  
Student

33) What is your age in years?

Text entry

34) When you were growing up, what was the big city nearest where you lived?

Text entry

35) Which of the following categories best describes your household's total income from all sources in 2020, before taxes?

Less than \$10,000  
\$10,000 to under \$25,000  
\$25,000 to under \$50,000  
\$50,000 to under \$75,000  
\$75,000 to under \$100,000  
\$100,000 or more

36) In the last 30 days, about how often have you completed surveys on Prolific?  
(Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Multiple times a day  
About once a day  
More than once a week, but not every day  
About once a week  
Less than once a week  
Only this one

- 37) Do you ever complete HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks) on Amazon's Mechanical Turk?
- Yes  
No  
I have not heard of Amazon's Mechanical Turk
- 38) In the last 30 days, about how often have you completed HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks) on Mechanical Turk? (Display if mturk == "Yes."  
Random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- Multiple times a day  
About once a day  
More than once a week, but not every day  
About once a week  
Less than once a week  
Only this one
- 39) What is the first word on this page? Please type your response below:
- Text entry
- 40) If you would like a copy of this study's consent form for your records, click here.
- (End of survey)

## C.3 Experiment and Post-test Questionnaire

(New block)

- 1) In this study, you will be asked to evaluate an article and its author and to give us your impressions about them. Participation should take about 8-12 minutes and you will be paid \$1.50 for completing this survey. We will provide you with a completion code for payment. You may take this survey only once, and we only offer payment for one completion.

Your participation is voluntary and your responses will be kept confidential. When we summarize the data, no personally identifiable information will be associated with your responses. You must be at least 18 to participate.

If you have any questions or comments about the survey, please feel free to contact the PIs, Shaun Genter (sgenter@umd.edu) or Rashawn Ray (rjray@umd.edu). If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact: University of Maryland College Park, Institutional Review Board Office, 1204 Marie Mount Hall, College Park, MD 20742, E-mail: irb@umd.edu, Phone: (301) 405-0678. This research has been

reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.

Please click here if you would like a copy of this consent form.

Do you agree to participate in this study?

Yes

No

- 2) Please enter your Prolific ID here: (Display if consent == “Yes”)

Text entry (autopopulated)

(New block)

- 3) In this survey, we would like you to evaluate an article and its author. To do this successfully, it is important to have your accurate and honest responses to the questions. Please take your time and think carefully before answering.

Are you willing to take your time and think carefully before answering?

Yes

No

(Page break)

- 4) Please read the following article carefully. Afterward, we will ask you to evaluate the author and article and to give your impressions about them.

(New block)

- 5) Experimental manipulation here. For studies 1 and 3 randomize Black/white; for/against. For study 2, randomize racial innocence threat/control, then Black/white against.

(New block)

- 6) Do you agree or disagree with this person’s policy position? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

- 7) Do you agree or disagree with the reasons this person gives for his policy position? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

(Randomize each of the following blocks: anger/irritation/frustration, threat and fear, gratitude and appreciation, hope and respect)

(New block, anger/irritation/frustration)

(Randomize Qs)

- 8) Does this person make you angry? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all angry

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very angry

- 9) Is this person irritating? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all irritating

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very irritating

- 10) Is this person frustrating? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all frustrating

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very frustrating

(New block, threat and fear)

(Randomize Qs)

- 11) Do you feel afraid of this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

- 1 - Not at all afraid
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Very afraid

12) Do you feel threatened by this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

- 1 - Not at all threatened
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Very threatened

(New block, gratitude and appreciation)

(Randomize Qs)

13) Do you feel grateful for this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

- 1 - Not at all grateful
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Very grateful

14) Do you feel appreciation for this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

- 1 - Not appreciation at all
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Very much appreciation

(New block, hope and respect)

(Randomize Qs)

15) Does this person give you hope? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

- 1 - No hope at all
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Very much hope

16) Do you respect this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

- 1 - Not at all
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5
  - 6
  - 7 - Very much
- (New block)

17) How warm or cold are your feelings toward this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

- 1 - Very cold
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 - Very warm

18) Do you have any feelings toward the author that we have not asked about? Please list as many as you like.

Text entry

(Randomize each of the following blocks: stereotype competence, stereotype warmth, credibility)

(New block, stereotype competence)

(Randomize Qs)

19) How competent is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

- 1 - Not at all competent
- 2
- 3
- 4



5  
6  
7 - Very competent

- 20) How confident is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all confident  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 - Very confident

- 21) How independent is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all independent  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 - Very independent

- 22) How intelligent is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all intelligent  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 - Very intelligent

(New block, stereotype warmth)  
(Randomize Qs)

- 23) How tolerant is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all tolerant  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6

7 - Very tolerant

- 24) How good natured is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all good natured

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very good natured

- 25) How warm is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all warm

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very warm

- 26) How sincere is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all sincere

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very sincere

(New block, credibility)

(Randomize Qs)

- 27) How convincing is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

1 - Not at all convincing

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very convincing

- 28) How credible is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- 1 - Not at all credible
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5
  - 6
  - 7 - Very credible
- 29) How honest is this person? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- 1 - Not at all honest
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5
  - 6
  - 7 - Very honest
- 30) Does the person care more about himself or others? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- 1 - Cares more about himself
  - 2
  - 3
  - 4
  - 5
  - 6
  - 7 - Cares more about others
- (New block, for studies 1 and 2 only)
- 31) In general, do you support or oppose providing extra economic resources to Blacks due to hardship resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)
- Strongly oppose
  - Oppose
  - Somewhat oppose
  - Neither support nor oppose
  - Somewhat support
  - Support
  - Strongly support
- 32) Do you support or oppose providing extra economic resources to Blacks who became unemployed due to the COVID-19 pandemic? (Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly oppose  
Oppose  
Somewhat oppose  
Neither support nor oppose  
Somewhat support  
Support  
Strongly support

- 33) Do you support or oppose providing extra economic resources to Black owned businesses that have struggled economically due to the COVID-19 pandemic?  
(Random reverse response options, consistent with others)

Strongly oppose  
Oppose  
Somewhat oppose  
Neither support nor oppose  
Somewhat support  
Support  
Strongly support

(New block, studies 1 and 2 only)

- 34) Providing extra economic resources to Blacks in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: (Matrix)

(Strongly disagree, disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree, Strongly agree)

Is unfair to Whites

Gives an opportunity to qualified Blacks who might not have had a chance without it.

May help out unqualified people

Helps make sure that the American workforce and economy remain competitive.

(Page break)

- 35) Did the person who wrote the article lead you to more strongly support or oppose providing extra economic resources to Blacks, or did he not influence your view? (Randomize support/oppose)

More strongly support

More strongly oppose

No influence

(Page break)

- 36) If you could respond to the person who wrote the article, what would you say?

Text entry

(New block)

- 37) Does the person who wrote the article at the beginning of this survey support or oppose providing extra resources for blacks?

He supports extra economic resources for blacks

He opposes extra economic resources for blacks

He did not give an opinion on this issue

I don't remember

- 38) Thank you for participating in our study. We are interested in understanding how people respond to different policy arguments, and if the race of the person making the argument influences those reactions. To do this successfully, we needed to keep the content of the article constant, while varying the race of the person depicted in the by-line photograph. In doing so, this study's researchers wrote the articles themselves, placed photographs of models in the article's by-line to indicate the race of the author, and then presented them to you as if the person in the photograph was the author. We apologize for this deception. If you wish to have your data removed from this study, please contact us using the information below.

To the best of our knowledge, any information presented as factual in these articles is accurate. Likewise, the opinions voiced in these articles are commonly found in mainstream newspaper opinion columns.

If you have any questions or comments about the survey, please feel free to contact the PIs, Shaun Genter (sgenter@umd.edu) or Rashawn Ray (rjray@umd.edu). If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact: University of Maryland College Park, Institutional Review Board Office, 1204 Marie Mount Hall, College Park, MD 20742, E-mail: irb@umd.edu, Phone: (301) 405-0678. This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.

Please click [here](#) if you would like a copy of this statement.

If you would like a copy of this study's consent form for your records, click [here](#).

Please click the arrow button to receive your payment code.

(End of survey)

# Appendix D

## R Packages Used in This Research

base R  
bookdown  
tinytex  
tidyverse  
haven  
scales  
janitor  
sjPlot  
kableExtra  
labelled  
stargazer  
tidycomm  
rstatix  
mediation  
gridExtra  
broom  
prediction  
texreg  
patchwork  
corx  
MESS  
glue  
viridis  
performance  
here

# Appendix E

## Supplemental Analyses

### E.1 Political Ideology vs. Party Identification

In early versions of modeling for study 1, I included both party identification and political ideology in the list of covariates. Both measures are aspects of political commitment. In an effort to simplify the model, I investigated if both were needed. A regression analysis using party identification as the independent variable and political ideology as the dependent variable (Table E.1) shows that they are significantly associated, and in the expected direction with Republicans expressing more conservatism than Democrats. The  $R^2$  of .59 also indicates substantial overlap between the two measures.

Table E.1: Correlation of Political Ideology and Party Identification

	Political Ideology
Independent	1.00*** (0.09)
Republican	2.28*** (0.10)
Other (party)	0.68*** (0.20)
Constant	1.68*** (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.59
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.59
Num. obs.	408

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ 

Given this overlap, I examined if excluding one or the other measures is merited. To do so, I estimated four models (shown in Table E.2) with anger as the dependent variable and demographics as control variables. Model 1 shows estimates with only the demographic controls. The second includes party identification but not political ideology, and the third shows political ideology without party identification. The fourth compares both in the same model. Both political ideology and party identification are significantly associated with anger when each is included on its own. They both also substantially improve the  $R^2$ . However, when included together in the same model, only political ideology is significant with little improvement to the  $R^2$  compared to the model with only political ideology. Separate analyses showed that using party identification, political ideology, or both does not substantively affect the results of any of the analyses in study 1. For these reasons, I have excluded party identification from analyses in favor of the measure of



political ideology.

Table E.2: Comparing the Effects of Political Ideology and Party Identification on Anger (Race-equity condition)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Political ideology		0.56*** (0.08)		0.41** (0.12)
Independent			0.33 (0.22)	−0.10 (0.25)
Republican			1.67*** (0.26)	0.72 (0.38)
Other (party)			0.71 (0.60)	0.43 (0.59)
Income	0.12 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	0.11 (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)
Education	0.01 (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)
Age	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Female	−0.13 (0.20)	0.01 (0.18)	−0.08 (0.18)	−0.02 (0.18)
Other (gender)	−0.88 (1.03)	−0.24 (0.93)	−0.64 (0.95)	−0.35 (0.93)
Constant	0.97* (0.47)	0.24 (0.44)	0.94* (0.44)	0.47 (0.45)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.24	0.23	0.27
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.22	0.19	0.23
Num. obs.	204	204	204	204

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

## E.2 Correlation Matrices

Below are three correlation matrices for the remaining quantitative variables used in study 1. The first combines responses from all of the conditions, but the correlation coefficients for policy opinions are nonsensical when including all conditions. As

noted elsewhere, the policy opinion variable is a measure of agreement with the author's policy argument. In the race-equity condition, greater agreement indicates more support for race-equity policy whereas greater agreement in the colorblind condition indicates opposition to the policy. In both cases, 1 = Strongly disagree and 7 = Strongly agree, but the underlying meaning is opposite depending on the condition. As an example, many readers might expect collective racial emotion, political ideology, and limited government attitudes to be strongly associated with policy opinions. In this table they appear not to be, but this is only because the race-equity and colorblind conditions have been combined, so agreement with the author could indicate either support for or opposition to race-equity policy.

I have included correlation tables for the race-equity and colorblind conditions below to clarify these relationships. These tables clarify the association between policy opinions and the key belief systems I have examined in this research. For example, Table E.4 shows a negative correlation between policy opinions and collective racial emotion, and Table E.5 shows a positive association, as expected.

Table E.3: Correlation Matrix of Study 1 Variables, All Conditions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Anger	-								
2. Warmth	-.79*	-							
3. Policy Opinion	-.77*	.76*	-						
4. CRE	-.04	-.04	-.05	-					
5. RA	.00	-.05	.00	.38*	-				
6. LG	-.02	-.05	-.08	.68*	.16*	-			
7. Political Ideology	-.03	-.06	-.07	.71*	.25*	.72*	-		
8. Income	.02	.01	-.04	.10	-.03	.20*	.15*	-	
9. Education	.05	-.02	-.06	-.02	-.08	.05	.02	.30*	-
10. Age	.03	-.09	-.15*	.16*	.08	.17*	.22*	.08	.10*

Table E.4: Correlation Matrix of Study 1 Variables, Race-equity Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Anger	-								
2. Warmth	-.70*	-							
3. Policy Opinion	-.69*	.73*	-						
4. CRE	.58*	-.60*	-.75*	-					
5. RA	.24*	-.32*	-.27*	.40*	-				
6. LG	.52*	-.54*	-.68*	.68*	.16*	-			
7. Political Ideology	.48*	-.51*	-.64*	.73*	.25*	.72*	-		
8. Income	.14*	-.04	-.11	.06	-.03	.18*	.11	-	
9. Education	.08	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.09	.05	.02	.35*	-
10. Age	.18*	-.18*	-.28*	.29*	.14*	.20*	.32*	.03	.04

Table E.5: Correlation Matrix of Study 1 Variables, Colorblind Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Anger	-								
2. Warmth	-.80*	-							
3. Policy Opinion	-.80*	.74*	-						
4. CRE	-.55*	.54*	.62*	-					
5. RA	-.18*	.21*	.26*	.35*	-				
6. LG	-.43*	.41*	.46*	.68*	.17*	-			
7. Political Ideology	-.46*	.41*	.49*	.69*	.26*	.73*	-		
8. Income	-.09	.07	.03	.13	-.03	.23*	.19*	-	
9. Education	.01	.03	-.07	.00	-.07	.05	.02	.24*	-
10. Age	-.13	.04	.00	.02	.02	.14*	.12	.12	.16*

There is no need to separate the correlation tables for study 2 because all of the conditions involved the colorblind argument. Therefore, agreement with the author indicates opposition to race-equity policy in all of the conditions, so the correlations coefficients for the policy measures are meaningful.

Table E.6: Correlation Matrix of Study 2 Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Warmth	-							
2. Policy Opinion	.81*	-						
3. CRE	.57*	.70*	-					
4. RA	.22*	.29*	.35*	-				
5. LG	.40*	.50*	.65*	.14*	-			
6. Political Ideology	.42*	.52*	.68*	.23*	.67*	-		
7. Income	.04	.04	.03	-.13*	.08	.07	-	
8. Education	-.09	-.09	-.02	-.07	.07	.06	.33*	-
9. Age	.11*	.14*	.20*	.00	.16*	.19*	.05	.18*

I have also displayed the correlation matrices for study 3 in three tables because once again the correlation coefficients for the policy opinion measures are non-sensical when combining all conditions. Again, the policy opinion variable is a measure of agreement with the author's policy argument. In the pro-tax condition, greater agreement indicates more support for a carbon tax whereas greater agreement in the anti-tax condition indicates greater opposition to the policy. By disaggregating the tables, it is clear that limited government attitudes are negatively associated with the pro-tax position (as shown in Table E.8) and positively associated with the anti-tax position (as shown in Table E.9)

Table E.7: Correlation Matrix of Study 3 Variables, All Conditions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Competence	-								
2. Anger	-.61*	-							
3. Policy Opinion	.62*	-.67*	-						
4. CRE	-.06	-.03	-.04	-					
5. RA	-.19*	.09	-.07	.36*	-				
6. LG	-.12*	-.07	-.04	.62*	.17*	-			
7. Political Ideology	.00	-.10*	.01	.72*	.18*	.70*	-		
8. Income	-.02	.05	-.02	-.03	-.14*	.15*	.04	-	
9. Education	-.01	-.01	.04	-.12*	-.03	.05	-.07	.39*	-
10. Age	-.03	-.04	.03	.25*	.13*	.15*	.18*	-.02	.12*

Table E.8: Correlation Matrix of Study 3 Variables, Pro-tax Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Competence	-								
2. Anger	-.62*	-							
3. Policy Opinion	.65*	-.64*	-						
4. CRE	-.35*	.34*	-.56*	-					
5. RA	-.29*	.22*	-.24*	.36*	-				
6. LG	-.42*	.34*	-.58*	.62*	.23*	-			
7. Political Ideology	-.30*	.37*	-.54*	.75*	.18*	.69*	-		
8. Income	-.02	.04	.03	-.04	-.08	.17*	.10	-	
9. Education	.05	-.05	.13	-.20*	-.08	.03	-.11	.40*	-
10. Age	-.15*	.02	-.12	.21*	.12	.10	.15*	.01	.08

Table E.9: Correlation Matrix of Study 3 Variables, Anti-tax Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Competence	-								
2. Anger	-.59*	-							
3. Policy Opinion	.55*	-.66*	-						
4. CRE	.24*	-.28*	.44*	-					
5. RA	-.07	-.01	.11	.36*	-				
6. LG	.18*	-.33*	.42*	.62*	.12	-			
7. Political Ideology	.30*	-.38*	.45*	.69*	.19*	.71*	-		
8. Income	.00	.04	-.04	-.01	-.20*	.14*	-.01	-	
9. Education	-.08	.01	-.03	-.03	.03	.08	-.03	.37*	-
10. Age	.10	-.09	.19*	.29*	.14*	.20*	.22*	-.06	.16*

### E.3 Distribution of Collective Racial Emotion

In the conclusion chapter I discussed some of the advantages and disadvantages of a convenience sample. Figure E.1 shows a comparison of one of the items I used to index collective racial emotion that is also available in the General Social Survey, a nationally representative sample. This question asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: “Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same.” Aside from the different samples, the scales are also different, with the General Social Survey using a 5-point scale and my own using a 7-point scale. Nevertheless, it is notable that the distributions are almost the inverse of one another. In the General Social Survey, the distribution is somewhat left skewed, and in my own data is somewhat right skewed. In either case, a theoretically important moderator is skewed when perhaps a more even distribution across the scale would be preferable.

If so, then a nationally representative sample would offer few advantages. What is probably more important than national representation is that there is representation across the entire scale. As shown in Figure E.1, there is.

**Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same.**




Figure E.1: Comparison of the distribution of one of the items used to measure collective racial emotion between the General Social Survey (left) and my own data source (right).

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