ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: TO DRINK A CUP OF FIRE: MORALITY TALES AND MORAL EMOTIONS IN EGYPTIAN, ALGERIAN, AND FRENCH ANTI-COLONIAL ACTIVISM, 1945–1960

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In the 1940s and 1950s, newspapers in Egypt, Algeria, and France debated the behavior of activists who sacrificed themselves for a cause, calling them "hysterics," "radicals," "fanatics," and "terrorists." Underlying these debates was a core question: what "rational" person would choose to sacrifice himself for a cause?

To learn how activists answered their critics, and to explore transnational patterns of activist exchange, this study explores two revolutionary moments: the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and the Algerian Revolution of 1954–1962. Focusing on four Egyptian clubs (the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt, the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation, and the Workers' Vanguard); three Algerian organizations (the Front de Libération Nationale, the Mouvement National Algérien, and the Parti Communiste Algérien); and three French anti-colonial networks (the Jeanson network, the Curiel network, and the Mandouze network), the study analyzes data recovered from activist

journals, tracts, court cases, police confessions, and memoirs—data gathered through multi-archival research conducted at the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (Amsterdam), Dar al-Kutub (Cairo), The National Archives (London), and the Service Historique de la Défense (Paris).

The result is a cognitive and behavioral history of transnational activist movements. Setting aside the motive-based question of *why* activists made certain decisions, the study surveys *how* activists made decisions and narrativized behaviors. Three types of stories are examined: *stories of affiliation*, *stories of aggression*, and *stories about morality*. Each set of stories is linked to a research question. How did individuals decide to affiliate with certain clubs over others? How did activists decide to commit violent attacks? And what role did morality tales, moral rationalizations, and "moral emotions" (like disgust, shame, and anger) play in these processes?

As the study contends, activists drew on a common toolkit of cognitive and behavioral strategies to make decisions, negotiate behavior, and mobilize support for decolonization—crossing ideological, religious, and national boundaries in the process. Activist storytelling thus highlights the hybridity of Arab and French moral imaginaries, revealing how activists practiced emotions and produced movements. Their stories also foster awareness of how individuals negotiate concepts of right and wrong, both in public and in private.

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by

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Chapter 1

"Hysterics, Fanatics, and 'Irresponsibles': Reading Self-Sacrificial Choices in Anti-Colonial Activism, 1940–1960

"In the name of the ideal / Which made us fight /
And which pushes us still / To fight today."
Jean Ferrat, "Le Bilan"[1]

In June 1942, the Egyptian doctor Muḥammad Ḥusnī Wilāyah wrote an article for *Majallat al-Risālah*—Egypt's flagship journal on all things related to morality and comportment [*ādāb*]—reflecting on why men sacrificed themselves for causes. Taking a negative view of such behaviors, Dr. Wilāyah argued that self-sacrificers were often "hysterics," men driven by emotions. Volatile and radical [*mutaṭarrif*], hysterics were liable to seize on any passing ideology, commit to the cause, and cast themselves on the pyre of self-sacrifice. As Wilāyah wrote, "if we review historical events, we find that the first supporters [of a cause] and the most zealous fighters in reaching miraculous goals are they, the hysterics." But while hysterics touted their altruism, Wilāyah cautioned that such men were in fact intensely selfish, seeking public recognition for their "heroic" sacrifices. As Wilāyah phrased it, "in his struggle to gain public approval, one of the methods the hysteric resorts to is self-denial and self-sacrifice [*fidāʾīyyah*]—on the outside—while [on the inside] enjoying suffering [*istʿadhāb al-ʿadhāb*[2]] in the path to achieving lofty principles…. How the hysteric loves suffering, if only to gain special importance in the eyes of men."[3]

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[1] Epigraph in the memoir of Algerian activist Lucette Larribére Hadj Ali, *Itinéraire d'une militante algérienne, 1945-1962* (Algiers: Éditions du Tell, 2011).

[2] The verb *ʿadhuba* (I. to be sweet, pleasant, agreeable; II. [*ʿadhdhaba*] to torment, torture, inflict pain) communicates the idea that it is possible to have "too much of a good thing." Notably, the term *ʿabada* (I. to worship, to serve; II. [*ʿabbada*] to enslave, to subjugate) communicates a similar concept.

[3] Emphasis added. Muḥammad Ḥusnī Wilāyah, "al-Shakhṣīyyat al-histīrīyyah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 468, 22 June 1942, 639.

Dr. Wilāyah's profile sparked the interest of one of the magazine's readers, Muṣṭafā Jābir. In a letter to the editor published two weeks later, Jābir zeroed in on Dr. Wilāyah's comments about fighting for a cause. What was the doctor's opinion of the *fidāʾīyīn*—"self-sacrificers," those guerrillas, commandos, and bombers sent on deadly missions? Were they driven by "lofty principles"—and if so, what were these principles? "There have been many opinions, and conflicting accounts about these groups," Jābir acknowledged.[4]

A few weeks later, *al-Risālah* published Dr. Wilāyah's response: in his professional opinion, the guerrilla fighter was not motivated by lofty purposes at all—only selfish motives. "The tendency toward self-sacrifice is motivated by psychological complexes," Dr. Wilāyah added. Specifically, he explained, "self-sacrifice is the cousin of suicide," both being forms of masochism. As Dr. Wilāyah concluded, humans were selfish, and no one more so than the hysteric.[5]

Despite Wilāyah's answer, Jābir was unsatisfied. He wrote back one last time to *al-Risālah*, to argue that Wilāyah had not answered the question. As Jābir explained, he often heard comments like "this person is a *fidāʾī*" and "the army of *fidāʾīyīn* will (blah blah blah)…," but no one ever defined the principles of the *fidāʾī*. "To the good Doctor [Wilāyah], and to the broader group of researchers and writers, I hope one of them will write about the *fidāʾīyīn* as a group and their principles," Jābir concluded.[6]

[4] Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Majīd Jābir, "al-Fidāʾīyyah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 470, 6 July 1942, 691.
[5] Muḥammad Ḥusnī Wilāyah, "al-Fidāʾīyyah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 472, 20 July 1942, 731.
[6] Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Majīd Jābir, "al-Fidāʾīyyah ayḍan," *Majallat al-Risālah* 474, 3 August 1942, 771–772.

When I began sifting through records left by individuals who participated in anti-colonial movements at the time of British and French decolonization,[7] I came across a quote from Algerian activist Kateb Yacine. As a teenager, Yacine had participated in the 1945 nationalist demonstrations at Sétif, for which he had been arrested and sent to a French internment camp. Around 1946, the young man wrote: "We will drink a cup of fire / Because it is a pleasure."[8] The line was intriguing. What could possibly motivate someone to "drink a cup of fire," and how could such a "self-immolatory" act—something involving so much pain and sacrifice—be considered "a pleasure"?

Studying the lives of activists (men and women who campaigned to change social structures, norms, behaviors, or the beliefs of others), it became clear that I was not the only one with questions. In the 1940s and 1950s, newspapers in Egypt, Algeria, and France frequently debated the behavior of individuals who chose to sacrifice themselves for a cause. Dr. Wilāyah's 1942 "profile" of the *fidā'ī* as an extremist driven by emotion, self-interest, and psychological complexes was one example of these local conversations. And similar debates appeared in Algerian and French sources: for instance, in an article for *France-Observateur*, French journalist Gilles Martinet sketched his own characterization of French "suitcase carriers" (activists who joined underground networks supporting Algerian revolutionaries). In the article, Martinet characterized suitcase carriers as "radical" and "infantile," delusional adventurers who were "courageous but

[7] I will use here Charles Tilly's concept of a social movement as "a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities." Charles Tilly, *Regimes and Repertoires* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 53; Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 3.

[8] Kateb Yacine, *Soliloques* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1991 [1st Ed. Annaba: 1946]), 35.

irresponsible, well-intentioned but fully in aberration, and whose behavior could only arise from pure psychology."[9]

There thus existed an ongoing fascination with activist behavior, and a fundamental disagreement concerning their motives. What drove young men and women to sacrifice themselves "for the cause"—were they motivated by ideas or emotions, principles or "psychological complexes"? In each case, the underlying question was similar: what "rational" person would choose to "drink a cup of fire"?

Activism at the End of Empire and Records of High-Cost Commitments

Raymond Bouzar was a child of empire, born in North Africa to a French-Italian Catholic mother and an Algerian Muslim father. His father Abdelkader was a French citizen, and veteran of the Rif War (1924-1925); he had joined the French Army and helped put down a colonial revolt in Morocco, earning the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre for his loyal service. The family spoke only French at home, and Raymond had grown up considering himself fully French.[10]

When the Second World War erupted in 1939, Raymond was 22 years old and a student in university. Both he and his father were called up for service in the French Army. But while Raymond's friends from school were all made officers or placed in French units, Raymond was given one of lowest military ranks (*élève-caporal*), assigned

[9] "Entre la maladie infantile et la sénilité précoce," *Vérités Pour* 10, 6 July 1959, 3–4.

These attempts to "profile" activists were not new: with the advent of modern psychology, European anarchist activists in the 1910s similarly recorded attempts to "establish an ideal type of Anarchist, whose mentality is the aggregate of common psychic characteristics." See: Emma Goldman, "The Psychology of Political Violence," in *Anarchism and Other Essays* (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005 [First ed. 1910]), 88.

[10] Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance* (Algiers: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1989 [1st ed. Cairo: Comité de Libération du Maghreb Arabe, 1954]), 77–94.

to an "indigenous" infantry unit (the *tirailleurs*), and sent to train with other rank and file draftees—despite the fact he had already been admitted to reserve officer school (and thus merited the rank of *élève-officier*). Still, Raymond was "proud of the army, proud of the uniform." And after months of training, he was allowed to compete for the placement he should have initially been awarded. He outperformed other students, and gained entry into officer's school, departing for Saint-Maixent after a rushed marriage at city hall to his French Catholic girlfriend. But because of the additional training at Saint-Maixent, Raymond would not see battle until June 1940—as the German Army was invading France. Thus, Raymond's unit suffered a humiliating defeat its first time in combat; the Germans took Paris a few days later, and Raymond was demobilized. He thus returned to North Africa, and took a job teaching high-school Latin and French for the 1940–1941 school year.[11]

Back in France, another high-school Latin teacher had just had his own rushed wartime nuptials. A French Catholic from Bourdeaux, André Mandouze also married in early 1940, then departed for officer's training at Saint-Maixent. But due to his poor eyesight, André was assigned to answer mail. This was his position on 10 June 1940 (André's twenty-fourth birthday)—the day the French government deserted Paris; four days later, the Germans took the capital. Like Raymond, André was demobilized, and in autumn took a job teaching Latin in Bourg-en-Bresse (near Lyon).[12]

Meanwhile across the Mediterranean, Egypt was experiencing its own tumultuous summer, as British Commonwealth troops fought to hold the line against German and

[11] Ibid.

[12] André Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle, Tome 1: D'une résistance à l'autre* (Paris: Viviane Hamy, 1998), 76–83.

Italian forces at El Alamein. But a hundred and sixty miles away in Cairo, Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl (who had just turned sixteen) was celebrating: he had just graduated high school, and was scheduled to start classes at King Fuʾād University in the fall. He usually spent most nights that summer of 1942 at home: a private boy with only a few friends, Aḥmad loved to collect stamps and play chess with his parents. But this evening, a group of boys invited him to attend the theater. Aḥmad did not know them well, but he went anyway.[13]

Aḥmad remembered the trip vividly, because they never made it to the theater. While driving to the show, one of the young men heard a call to prayer coming from a house, and asked the group if they could stop and let him perform the *maghrib* prayer. Aḥmad and the other boys said yes—but waited for their friend outside. What was supposed to last minutes turned into a long and boring wait, however; their friend did not return. Eventually, a man came out and invited the boys inside. As it turned out, the site was a Muslim Brotherhood center, and their friend had been convinced to stay and hear a lecture. Annoyed, Aḥmad and the others were in a hurry to leave. They were late for the cinema, and suspicious that the Brotherhood wanted subscription money. The Brothers pressured them to stay, however, describing the club's beliefs and assuring the boys that money was not their aim. As the Brothers explained, they only wanted the boys to consider club membership. Spotting an escape, Aḥmad and the boys hurriedly signed the membership roster and left. But it was too late: they had missed the show. On the drive home, two of the boys joked and mocked the Brotherhood, trying to lighten the mood. And that was how the night ended.[14]

[13] Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, *al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-ḥurūf: al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-l-niẓām al-khāṣṣ* (Cairo: al-Zahrāʾ li-l-Iʿlām al-ʿArabī, Qism al-Nashr, 1989), 42–55.
[14] Ibid.

Across town in Cairo's wealthy European quarter, Diane Rossano, daughter of the director of the Egyptian National Bank, spent her time quite differently. Scion of Egyptian-Italian Jews, Diane spoke French and Italian at home. During the daytime, she would count bills at the bank, and most evenings she would return home and listen to her mother humming passages from *Rigoletto, Il Trovatore,* or *La Traviata* along with the voice of Enrico Caruso over the gramophone.[15] European politics were also a frequent topic of discussion: Diane's brother had been keeping news clippings since the start of the Spanish Civil War, and the family had been watching the Mussolini regime with concern. When Italy began passing anti-Semitic statues in 1938, Diane's father decided the family should apply for Egyptian nationality.[16]

The following year, Diane decided to get involved in politics herself: she joined a few relatives (including her cousin Henri Curiel) and some friends from the bank in the Democratic Union, an anti-fascist league with a Marxist orientation. By the summer of 1942, their concern transformed into fear. As the First Battle of El Alamein raged to the west, many of Diane's relatives and friends evacuated the Cairo for Israel or the Sudan. Diane's family met to discuss whether or not to leave, in a meeting that stretched late into the night. One of her Democratic Union friends argued they should flee: the Egyptian government had a list of Union members, and would round them up if the Germans broke through. But there was a new member of their circle who convinced the family to stay—Diane's latest boyfriend, Osman. She had met the handsome blonde Muslim officer at an evening ball (his father was Turkish-Circassian, and his mother English), and he had

[15] Didar Fawzy-Rossano, *Mémoires d'une militante communiste (1942–1990): du Caire à Alger, Paris et Genève, lettres aux miens* (Paris: Éditions l'Harmattan, 1997), 31, 39–53, 135; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart: The Life of Henri Curiel*, trans. Bob Cumming (London: Zed Books, 1987), 84, 133–135.
[16] Ibid.

started attending a reading circle with her. Now, Osman reassured the family that he could use his military contacts to evacuate them if the time came. As a result, Diane stayed in Cairo—and a month and a half before the Second Battle of El Alamein, she and Osman created a scandal in both their respective communities by wedding; Diane was 21 at the time.[17]

Four individuals from four different backgrounds, all of these young men and women would join anti-colonial activist clubs on the eve of decolonization and make huge personal sacrifices in the name of a cause. Raymond Bouzar would repudiate his French first name and flee to Cairo, joining Algerians fighting against French rule; André Mandouze would aid Algerian revolutionaries and be arrested for acts of treason against France; Aḥmad Kamāl would be arrested for plotting to overthrow the Egyptian regime as part of the Muslim Brotherhood; and Diane Rossano would change her Italian name to the Arabic name Didar, escaping imprisonment in Egypt before being arrested in France for aiding the Algerian National Liberation Front.

What inspired their high-cost commitments? To explore their decisions and stories (and the stories of other men and women who joined activist clubs on the eve of decolonization), I set out to compile documentary evidence on participation in anti-colonial protest movements before and during two "revolutionary moments": the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and the Algerian Revolution of 1954–1962.[18] These two

[17] Ibid.

[18] The term "Revolution" is an endonym (which was challenged by British and French observers).

For examples of Egyptian–Algerian linkages, see: Mohammed Benyahja, *La conjuration au pouvoir: récit d'un maquisard de l'ALN* (Paris: Éditions de l'Arcantère, 1988), 6–7, 10–27; Abderrezak Bouhara, *Les viviers de la libération: générations face au destin* (Algiers: Casbah, 2001), 17–75; Mohammed Harbi, *Une vie debout: mémoires politiques, Tome 1: 1945–1962* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2001), 55; Omar Boudaoud, *Du PPA au FLN: Mémoires d'un combatant. Cinq ans à la tête de la Fédération de France* (Algiers: Éditions Casbah, 2007), 9–18.

moments were chosen for the links between them: the success of the Egyptian coup of July 1952 influenced the Algerian decision to launch the insurrection of 1 November 1954. There were also human links: Algerian activists like Raymond Bouzar traveled to Egypt, where they solicited Egyptian support for the Algerian revolution, and after being expelled from Egypt, Egyptian activists like Henri Curiel and Diane Rossano traveled to France, where they formed transnational networks aiding Algerian revolutionaries.

As these two moments involved activist migrations and displacements, empires and transnational networks, collecting documents similarly involved a transnational, multi-archival search for records. The bulk of the research was thus conducted at Dār al-Kutub (Cairo), the Bibliotheca Alexandrina (Alexandria), the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis/IISG (Amsterdam), the Service Historique de la Défense/SHD (Paris-Vincennes), the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (Dijon), and the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (Paris).[19] The Arabic Press Archive (Tel Aviv University) and the Library of Congress (Washington, DC) also proved helpful for their Arabic and French periodical collections.

From these archives, the project worked to recover three types of stories individuals told about their activism: stories of affiliation (joining a group), stories about morality ("morality tales"), and stories of aggression (inflicting harm[20]). These three types of stories were then linked to a set of research questions. How did individuals describe their decision to affiliate with certain activist clubs over others? How did activists use stories

[19] Formerly the Service historique de l'armée de terre/SHAT.

[20] Goerges Steffgen and Jan Pfetsche, "Does Anger Treatment Reduce Aggressive Behavior?" in *Emotions and Aggressive Behavior*, eds. George Steffgen and Mario Gollwitzer (Göttingen: Hogrefe & Huber, 2007), 95; Dietmar Zinner and Brandon C. Wheeler, "Aggression in Humans and Other Primates– Biology, Psychology, Sociology," in *Aggression in Humans and Other Primates*, eds. Hans-Henning Kortüm and Jürgen Heinze (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013), 44.

to communicate and negotiate ideas about morality? And how did activists describe and narrativize their decision to commit an aggressive act?

To collect a diverse sample, the study sought records from individuals of different confessions, ethnic backgrounds, and political outlooks. The sample thus worked to include records from Muslims, Christians, Jews, and atheists; Arabs, Berbers, and Europeans; and communists, Islamists, socialists, and nationalists. To accomplish this, the search for Egyptian documents therefore focused on members of three conservative clubs—Young Egypt (Miṣr al-Fatāh), the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn), and the Society of Our Master Muḥammad's Youth (Jamāʿat Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad)—as well as members of two major communist groups, namely the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation/EMNL (al-Ḥarakah al-Miṣrīyyah l-al-Taḥarrur), and the Workers' Vanguard (Ṭalīʿat al-ʿUmmāl). In collecting Algerian documents, the study examined the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), and the Parti Communiste Algérien (PCA); and for France, the study surveyed members of Jeune Résistance, as well as members of the three major FLN support networks (the Jeanson network, the Curiel network, and the Mandouze network).

Collecting these stories posed a few methodological conundrums. For instance, should activist memoirs be included? Far from providing raw data on activists' ideas "at the time," memoirs were socially imitative, written decades after the events in question, and highly structured and mediated (having been revised by the author, edited by publishers, and subject to pressures of public expectations). The memoirs of most Egyptian and Algerian activists, for instance, adhered to the "political memoir" or "Great



Figure 1.1 – Items Recovered from Algerian Activists. A collection of items seized by French security forces. Top Left: An FLN news photo of Zeddour Belqacem, an Algerian activist arrested and killed by French police a few days after the start of the revolution for his ties to Cairo. Top Right: A notebook used to record FLN monthly membership fees (with Joan of Arc on the cover) (ca. 1957). Bottom: A blank FF-FLN membership card (ca. 1960).

(Source: SHD GR 1H 2589; SHD GR 1H 1715; SHD GR 1H 1623/D2)

Man" mode of autobiography,[21] a practice that limited what types of information memoirists shared. Egyptian and Algerian activists often recounted a few idealized

[21] George Egerton, "Politics and Autobiography: Political Memoir as Polygenre," *Biography* 15, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 221–242.

memories of village life, then recited formalized, professional testimonies of political events.[22]

Egyptian and Algerian intellectuals and French memoirists, on the other hand, were more likely to engage in artistic and affective reflections, self-critical "soul-bearing," and narrations of daily life.[23] But while these narratives supplied more information on emotions and inner worlds, they still produced a highly imitative mode for creating the narrative "self," being embedded in modernist or postmodernist narrative traditions.[24] Thus, despite being ostensibly more transparent, these memoirs remained constrained by conventions about "what should be said," and engaged in similar narrative performances of authenticity and individuation.

Memoirs were not the only problematic source encountered. Less well-studied (and thus particularly hazardous) was the fact that even activist accounts from "the heat of battle" were imitative. This was because after an individual joined a movement or group, he/she often underwent a process of "biographical reconstruction." Popularly known as conversion stories, these self-narratives were extremely important for social life, helping integrate the individual into the new community. As a process driven by both individual benefits and social pressures (push and pull factors), biographical reconstruction also

[22] See for example the memoirs of Muḥammad al-Najīb [Naguib], Yūsuf Qaraḍawī, Omar Boudaoud, Zohra Drif, etc.

[23] See for instance the autobiographies of Didar Fawzy-Rossano, Nawāl al-Saʿdāwī, Maurice Maschino, Anne Beaumanoir, etc.

[24] Thomas Philipp, "The Autobiography in Modern Arab Literature and Culture," *Poetics Today* 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 573-604; Debra Kelly, *Autobiography and Independence: Selfhood and Creativity in North African Postcolonial Writing in French* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005), 9–32; Paula S. Fass, "The Memoir Problem," *Reviews in American History* 34, no. 1 (2006): 107–123.

helped create personal transformation by narrativizing and performing change (see Chapter 6).[25]

The process often began with "biographical disintegration"—the disruption of a person's worldview or self-concept by new information, big events, or changes in primary attachments. This was followed by the construction of a new narrative, as individuals sorted and selected events from their lives, and emplotted those events into a new life story. In most cases, the new narrative posited a "grand rupture" between "the old life and the new,"[26] and described the transformation process as a "rebirth" (or in the words of Egyptian communist activist Henri Curiel, a "new birth").[27]

Understanding biographical reconstruction proved critical when reading stories of affiliation, searching for "motives," and tracing historical causality, because individuals tended to use collective "vocabularies of motives" to describe why they changed. Algerian activists, for instance, spoke of casting off of past humiliations in the name of personal dignity and patriotic duty. Muslim Brotherhood activists used a collective vocabulary that described leaving ignorance [jāhilīyyah] to renew the covenant of God (an Islamic modernist version of the Qurʾānic "Covenant–Betrayal–Redemption myth").[28] And communist activists spoke of an intellectual coming-to-consciousness of

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[25] Ines W. Jindra, *A New Model of Religious Conversion: Beyond Network Theory and Social Constructivism* (Brill, 2014), 87–122. Also see: Henri Gooren, *Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation: Tracing Patterns of Change in Faith Practices* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[26] David A. Snow and Richard Machalek, "The Convert as a Social Type," *Sociological Theory* 1 (1983), 259–289; David A. Snow, "The Sociology of Conversion, "*Annual Review of Psychology* 10 (1984): 167–190; Christy M. Ponticelli, "Crafting Stories of Sexual Identity Reconstruction," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 62, no. 2 (1999): 157–172; Sarah Hards, "Tales of Transformation: The Potential of a Narrative Approach to Pro-Environmental Practices," *Geoforurm* 43, no. 4 (June 2012): 760–771.

[27] Henri Curiel, *Pages autobiographiques: une contribution à l'histoire de la naissance du Parti Communiste Égyptien de 1940 à 1950* (Typescript, 1977), vi in IISH ARCH01722/Folder 402.

[28] R. Stephen Humphreys, "Qurʾanic Myth and Narrative Structure in Early Islamic Historiography," 217–290; Mansoor Moaddel, *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 215–220.

exploitative class structures—"presenting Communist propositions as though they arose spontaneously from independent reflection" (a narrative that effaced the social and affective features of communist affiliation decisions).[29]

Far from being stable, these biographical reconstructions shifted over time. Individuals could cycle through multiple biographical narratives in one lifetime; one also had to consider "generations" of self-narratives. For example, after the Egyptian and Algerian Revolutions, first generation memoirs echoed nationalist triumphalism, transposing the national myth into personal biographies. Then, as these revolutionary myths (and the regimes that championed them) came under scrutiny—or as individuals moved on to more salient group attachments and identities—second- and third-generation memoirs advanced revisionist and iconoclastic arguments. These counter-histories of assassinations, massacres, and other sordid "affairs" aided personal and collective biographical disintegrations; but rather than representing pure "truth-telling," these texts often constituted the competing claims of another group's counter-myth, or the start of another narrative cycle. Ali Guenoun and Tony Judt explored these processes for the Algerian revolutionary myth and French communist myth, respectively (as Judt warned, since the disintegration of the Stalinist myth, "almost every writer who was politically engaged on the [French] Left in the postwar years" claimed in retrospect to have been at odds with the Parti Communiste Français during the 1940s and 1950s—despite defending

[29] Raymond Aron, "Aventures et mésaventures de la dialectique," *Preuves* 59 (January 1956): 5, as quoted by Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 159.

the PCF at the time).[30] It was thus important to read iconoclastic autobiographies just as carefully as their predecessors.

There was also the chronic challenge of presentism in biographical accounts. For example, Egyptian activist Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn was involved in a post-revolutionary trial concerning his communist commitment; in his memoir, he thus emphasized his personal piety, and defended his loyalty to the regime. Egyptian activist and military officer Anwar al-Sādāt, meanwhile, wrote his memoir in 1978 during his presidency, and responded to the political exigencies of office by praising Ḥasan al-Bannā and carefully moderating his statements about the Muslim Brotherhood. Other Egyptian and Algerian activists looked back from periods in which Islamist groups were primary political competitors, and responded by minimizing the role of religion or describing religious sentiments as private and spiritualistic rather that political. Hamou Amirouche's autobiography was a good example of this trend: the book was written with an eye toward undercutting the claims of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and thus emphasized the secular character of the Algerian Revolution.[31]

Consequently, when dealing with activist stories, there was no such thing as "pure memory." There was a good chance that long before giving an interview or setting pen to paper, the activist had already reconstructed his story to fit the group narrative. Even activist accounts of their motives given *in flagrante* were imitative, performative, and tailored according to audience. Memory was similarly mediated by neurocognitive

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[30] Ali Guenoun, "Mémoire et guerre d'Algérie: quand des maquisards (ré)écrivent le(ur) passé," *L'Année du Maghreb* (2006): 519–531; Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect*, 5.

[31] Hamou Amirouche, *Memoirs of a Mujahed: Algeria's Struggle for Freedom, 1945–1962* (San Diego: Amirouche Publishing, 2014), xvii–xx.

For other discussions of the dangers of memoirs, see: Ali Guenoun, "Mémoire et guerre d'Algérie," 519–531; Gilbert Meynier, "Les Algériens vus par le pouvoir égyptien pendant la guerre d'Algérie d'après les mémoires de Fathi al Dib," *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 41, no. 1 (1990): 89–127.

factors, emotional salience, information-handling and storage strategies, and individual and group narratives about "who we are, where we're going, and where we fit in the world."[32] Recognizing how individuals told stories—and how those stories were socially embedded and cognitively stored—was thus the first step to avoiding a number of methodological pitfalls. But rather than render activist stories "historically flawed" or unusable, these practices made interviews, memoirs, and affiliation stories valuable for understanding storytelling practices.

A final methodological challenge concerned the quantity and representativeness of sources. The activist testimonies gathered were not socially representative of all activists, with written testimonies overrepresenting the educated elite. Interestingly, individuals who confidently stood by their decisions in retrospect were also overrepresented in activist testimonies. There were certainly "doubting generations" and revisionist historical movements; but apart from these movements, individuals who were ashamed of their decisions were altogether less likely to agree to be interviewed, and less likely to write memoirs about their activist careers. "Strong penitents"—activists who vocally repudiated their original decisions—were even rarer, and when encountered they could usually be categorized as "non-standard witnesses."[33] In general, the loudest (and most overrepresented) voices thus tended to be the strong rationalizers—those who continued to reason strongly in support of their original decisions.

[32] See for instance: Charles Stone and Lucas Bietti, eds., *Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

[33] This is a term coined by Jean-Charles Jauffret and Gilbert Meynier in "*La guerre d'Algérie: histoire officielle, histoire idéologique, histoire des historiens*," *Esprit* 37 (August–September 2004): 224–229.

There were also disproportionalities in the quantity and quality of sources recovered. Members of French support networks (often intellectuals, artists, journalists, film producers and actors) left many detailed records of their experiences. Both French and Algerian activists also benefitted from the large push to gather interviews that occurred from 1990–2010. At that time, Jacques Charby, Martin Evans, Andrée Dore-Audibert, and Djamila Amrane (Danièle Minne) collected and published interview collections on the eve of the deaths of this generation of actors.[34] Importantly for the historical record (and this present study), all interviewers asked the question of how the activist came to join the network.

It proved more challenging to access the stories of members of Egyptian clubs like the Muslim Brotherhood and Muḥammad's Youth. While leaders saved documents, these were in various states of preservation, and rank-and-file members of these clubs were less likely to write and save personal papers (due to security concerns and fewer resources). In addition, the mode of testimony for these groups remained firmly entrenched in the political memoir narrative mode—with less emphasis on affectivity, attachments, and day-to-day experiences and decisions. This mode of self-presentation would shift with the next generation of Brotherhood activists (who came of age in the 1960s–1970s)—but this later generation was beyond the scope of the present study. Nevertheless, there were a handful of Brothers who shared their affective experiences, and I have tried to make their voices heard.

[34] Each study was unique in its own right: Charby and Evans focused on the ideological and political outlook of suitcase-carriers, Dore-Audibert and Amrane on the experience of women, and Evans on historical memory. See: Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir: Les réseaux de soutien au FLN pendant la guerre d'Algérie, les acteurs parlent* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004); Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War, 1954–1962* (Oxford: Berg, 1997); Andrée Dore-Audibert, *Des françaises d'Algérie dans la guerre de libération: des oubliées de l'histoire* (Paris: Karthala, 1995); Djamila Amrane, *Des femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie, entretiens* (Paris: Karthala, 1994).

A Historical Methodology for the Study of Cognition and Behavior

Having collected the stories Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists told about affiliation, morality, and aggression, the study turned to analyzing the information. The results were incredibly complex. There were narrative and performative aspects to the stories; but the narratives also communicated information about how individuals made decisions and ordered information—and in these accounts, small changes in initial conditions produced large divergences and nonlinear outcomes. Thus, despite the retrospective illusion of historical linearity (and despite activist myths concerning teleological movement toward an assured future), at the time activists made decisions, outcomes were by no means a given.

Other historians similarly noted this dynamism: after studying Algerian commitment decisions, for instance, Ouanassa Siari Tengour cautioned historians not to reduce activist commitments to Manichean positions "for or against" a cause. Instead, she recommended historians pay attention to the "temporalities of commitment," or the "tension that surrounds every act of commitment."[35] And in fact, these temporalities revealed unexpected entanglements and (sometimes counterintuitive) choices. Two girls set out to murder French citizens as part of the Algerian revolution—why did one follow through, and the other turn back? What made a devout Islamic theology student join the Egyptian communist movement? What inspired a Catholic priest to help Algerian militants smuggle weapons?

[35] Ouanassa Siari Tengour, "Dits et non dits dans les mémoires de quelques acteurs de la guerre d'Algérie," in *Savoirs historiques au Maghreb: constructions et usages,* eds. Sami Bargaoui and Hassan Remaoun (Oran: Éditions CRASC, 2006), 167.

To conceptualize how storytelling intersected with individual ecologies, temporalities, and tensions, I thus looked for a hybrid approach, with the capacity to handle a) broad environmental and historical patterns, b) the effects of minute environmental changes, and c) diversity in how individuals negotiated cues, handled information, and structured this information into narratives. The result is an interdisciplinary methodology, which draws on the cognitive and behavioral sciences in explaining the "temporalities of commitment," narrative construction, and aggression.

There are precedents for approaching historical sources from this direction. A number of other historians have opened a historical discourse with fields like cognitive neuroscience, psycholinguistics, sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology.[36] Among these volumes, this study has been particularly influenced by William Reddy's *The Navigation of Feeling*, which fruitfully combines cognitive science and anthropology to explore emotions in the French Revolution.[37] Reddy's volume is also exemplary for engaging with the behavioral sciences in a way that is limited, cautious, and concrete—an approach that stands in stark contrast to sweeping statements by other historians calling for "a new historical theory and method enlightened by cognitive science."[38] Such statements must be tempered; and to this end, Carla Hesse's healthy skepticism about historical ventures into the hard sciences is worth remembering. As Hesse argues, "the fundamental aim of these disciplines—to discover immutable laws of human behavior—

[36] See for instance John Carter Wood, "A Change of Perspective: Integrating Evolutionary Psychology into the Historiography of Violence," *British Journal of Criminology* 51 (2011): 479–498; Luther H. Martin and Jesper Sørensen, eds., *Past Minds: Studies in Cognitive Historiography* (London: Equinox, 2011); David Dunér and Christer Ahlberger, eds., *Cognitive History: Mind, Space, and Time* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019).

[37] William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[38] David Dunér, "Human Mind in Space and Time: Prolegomena to a Cognitive History," in *Cognitive History: Mind, Space, and Time*, 3–4.

is essentially at cross purposes with what historians want to know about 'meaning,' 'identity,' 'needs,' 'desires,' 'discourse,' and 'narrative.'"[39]

Hesse's reservations are important to keep in mind; fields like neuroscience entail a "discourse of facticity" and immutability that can be both misleading and epistemically disempowering. But this does not have to be the case. A number of scholars (including Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby) have productively combined Critical Theory and neuroscience, alerting us to the fact that there are political interests and social structures involved in the biosciences that affect the production of "fact."[40] And while new technologies generate new claims regarding "objective fact," these technologies also complicate what we think we know about historical causality, scientific fact, and human cognition. For instance, as neuroscientist Nikos K. Logothetis warns, "the beautiful graphics MRI and fMRI produce, and the excitement about what they imply, often mask the immense complexity of the physical, biophysical and engineering procedures generating them. The actual details of MRI can only be correctly described via quantum mechanics."[41] Like other disciplines, cognitive science thus has its own methodological pitfalls, which must be taken seriously.

Through a historiographical engagement with cognitive and behavioral science, this study thus does not set out to "discover immutable laws of human behavior," impose

[39] Carla Hesse, "The New Empiricism," *Cultural and Social History* 1, no. 2 (2004): 201–207.

[40] See for instance: Steven Rose, "The Need for a Critical Neuroscience," Martin Hartmann, "Against First Nature: Critical Theory and Neuroscience," and Shaun Gallagher, "Scanning the Lifeworld: Toward a Critical Neuroscience of Action and Interaction," in *Critical Neuroscience*, eds. Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby (Oxford: John Wiley and Sons, 2016), 53–109.

[41] See: Nikos K. Logothetis, "What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI," *Nature* 452 (June 2008): 869–878; Edward Vul, "Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition," *Perspectives in Psychological Science* 4, no. 3 (May 2009): 274–290; Anders Eklund, Thomas E. Nichols, and Hans Knutsson, "Cluster Failure: Why fMRI Inferences for Spatial Extent have Inflated False-Positive Rates," *PNAS* 113, no. 28 (July 2016): 7900–7905.

modern science on the past, create a new "profile" to explain activist behavior, or advance an authoritative and complete analysis of what caused an individual to make a particular decision. Rather, this study argues that inventing "ideal types" to "profile" political activists is reductive, and misleading in terms of understanding how individuals make decisions and construct narratives. Similarly, trying to ascertain "why" an activist made a decision based on his/her testimony is an unproductive endeavor, because activists drew from collective vocabularies of motives and imitated others in providing causal explanations for their behavior. Activists also had incomplete information (and withheld information) concerning internal mental states, motivational systems, and cues. Finally, as cognitive science reveals, there were too many variables—most of them unknown, most of them in motion—to fully "know" an individual's motives or cognitive processes in any "objective" sense.

Thus, *a guiding question for this study is not why an activist made a decision*, *but how activists remembered making decisions*. Congruent with this goal, this study notes patterns in historical experiences and decision-making ecologies; it highlights which heuristics and affective cues individuals used; and it describes how activists ordered information into narratives. And based on these observations, this study contends that understanding how humans process information and negotiate stimuli is indispensable for the study of social activism. Furthermore, expanding our knowledge of cognition can contribute to (rather than limit) "what historians want to know about "'meaning,' 'identity,' 'needs,' 'desires,' 'discourse,' and 'narrative.'"[42]

[42] Carla Hesse, "The New Empiricism," 201–207.

Part I: The Activist's Affiliations

To begin the exploration of how activists made affiliation decisions, the study opens in Cairo in the 1930s. Here, Chapter 2 ("Allahu Akhbar, Long Live the Workers!") traces how Egyptian activists selected club affiliations when presented with diverse options like the Muslim Brotherhood, Miṣr al-Fatāh, Iskra, Ṭalīʿat al-ʿUmmāl, and the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation (EMNL). Chapter 3 ("Between the 'Mystique of the Maquis' and a 'Gang of Highwaymen'") then recounts Algerian memories concerning how social learning, attachments, and social pressures influenced their decisions to join nationalist associations Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), and later the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Chapter 4 ("The Suitcase Carriers") then follows French and Egyptian activists who chose to cross geographic borders and social boundaries to help the Algerian revolutionary movement.

Each of these chapters explores how historical events, social processes, and cognitive factors intersected to shaped decisions, and how individual decisions in turn transformed cognitive, social, and historical processes.[43] But by cognition, this study does not mean "rational" thought as opposed to "irrational" thought, "thinking" as opposed to "feeling," or self-awareness and conscious reflexivity. Rather, this study defines *cognition* in a sociobiological sense, as the *neural information-handling strategies* that dynamically

[43] This approach is a synthesis of both Fernand Braudel's tripartite division of historical time in the Mediterranean into the *longue durée*, *conjoncture*, and *événementielle*, and Albert Bandura's social cognitive theory, which approaches learning as the outcome of reciprocal causality between environmental influences, behavior, and cognition. See: Albert Bandura, "Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action," in *Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development, Vol. 1: Theory*, eds. William M. Kurtines and Jacob L. Gewirtz (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991), 45–103.

couple to allow humans to perceive stimuli, mentally represent things in their environment, inhibit unwanted action, and produce action.[44]

While "information-handling strategies" perhaps sounds dull and abstract, these cognitive strategies were in fact vital for social movements—because when deciding "what to do," individuals described 1) processing information in many different ways, and 2) facing real limits in processing capacity, energy, and time. For instance, with large amounts of information circulating, activists had to choose which information to pay attention to and which information to ignore. French Priest Robert Davezies, for instance, said he read many newspaper articles about the problems in Algeria prior to 1956—but he explained that the news never registered, because he was finishing his dissertation at the time. As a result, he paid little *attention* to the information (and thus did not act on it) until after he graduated.[45]

Choosing which information to trust was also not a straightforward task. Activists described facing constraints in the reliability and availability of information: censorship limited their access to information, and they heard contradictory information from different sources. As a result, activists described using a variety of information-handling strategies. They prioritized information from family, friends, and in-group members, and discounted information from outside sources (with Egyptian communists labeling mainstream papers "false news," Egyptian Islamists labeling these the "dirty" and

[44] Toni Gomila and Paco Calvo, "Directions for an Embodied Cognitive Science: Toward an Integrated Approach," in *Handbook of Cognitive Science: An Embodied Approach* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2008), 1–19; Joseph Ledoux, "Cognitive-Emotional Interactions," in *Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion*, eds. Richard Lane and Lynn Nadel (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 129; George A. Miller and Michael S. Gazzaniga, "The Cognitive Sciences," in *Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience*, ed. Michael S. Gazzaniga (New York: Springer Science, 1984), 3–11.

[45] Robert Davezies, *Le temps de la justice* (Lausanne: La Cité, 1961), 52–64, 70–71; *Les frères des Frères*, directed by Richard Copans (Paris: Les films d'ici, 1992).

"depraved newspapers," and French communists dismissing mainstream newspapers as "the putrid press").[46] Activists also imitated the examples of others, considered affective cues, remembered past experiences, and followed behavioral scripts. These *heuristics*, or rule-based information processing strategies, helped speed up decision-making time, conserve resources, and span informational gaps.[47]

Heuristics were also important because activists faced time constraints in decision-making. When deciding whether or not to shoot a French soldier, for example, Louisette Ighilahriz described having a matter of seconds to make her choice.[48] Similarly, in deciding to defect from the French army to join the FLN, Noël Favrelière recalled having ten minutes to make a decision that would certainly result in his exclusion from French society, and possibly also end in his death.[49] As a result, both Louisette and Noël described using heuristics to make their decisions. (The choices they made are covered in Chapter 9 "What Would You Do If You Were Invisible?" and Chapter 12 "The Jump").

Interest-based calculations were also more complex than traditional rational choice theory would suggest. For instance, as Chapter 11 ("The Activist Immolated") explores, activists considered not only the material costs and benefits of their decisions, but non-material outcomes as well: how they would feel, and whether decisions would meet certain psycho-social goals (i.e., belonging, certainty, control, meaning, security, and

[46] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire: La Résistance, le communism, et l'Algérie, 1940–1976*, preface by Mohammed Harbi (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2009), 63–100; "Safālah… Ākhir Sāʿah," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 211, 20 Shawwāl 1368/15 August 1949, 7 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5; "al-Ṣuḥuf al-khalīʿah," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 229, 21 Ramaḍān 1369/7 July 1950, 11 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5; "Bayna al-ṣuḥuf wa al-kutub wa-l-ḥayāh," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 1, 16 May 1945, 20 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97.

[47] Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, eds., *Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[48] Louisette Ighilahriz, *Algérienne* (Paris: Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 2001), 73–74.

[49] Noël Favrelière, *Le désert à l'aube* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2000 [First Ed. 1960]), 74.

stimulation). Individuals also weighed both their own interests and the interests of others (family members, friends, and in-group members). Methodologically, these findings about activist decision-making best match theories of bounded rationality and satisficing behaviors.[50] As Graham Mallard has summarized:

> "… decision-makers search for satisfactory outcomes by applying 'rules of thumb, or heuristics, to determine what paths should be traced and what ones can be ignored' and the 'search halts when a satisfactory solution has been found, almost always long before all alternatives have been examined' (Simon *et al.*, 1992:4). The first part of this, that decision-makers do not always possess cognitive capacities equal to the complexity of decisions they face (what Heiner, 1983, has termed the 'C-D gap' [competence-difficulty gap]) and so are unable to make decisions optimally, is the principle of *bounded rationality*. The second aspect (that they consequently search for a satisfactory outcome when making decisions) is the concept of *satisficing*."[51]

If the first concept to consider when studying activist behavior is how humans process and negotiate information (cognition), a second consideration is how humans actually act (behavior). And as activists were well aware, cognitions *favoring* a certain course of action did not mean an individual had the resources, motivation, or volition to act out those cognitions: sympathizing did not lead to activism any more than loving football made someone a football player. So what separated an armchair supporter from an active participant? How did sympathizing lead to affiliation, moral disapproval transform into moral policing, and violent thoughts become violent behavior?

Other studies have found that crossing the cognition–behavior gap (or "thought–action divide") involved a variety of considerations: entrenched habits, the costs of acting (or not acting), and internal and external stimuli. In some cases, moving from thought to

[50] See for instance: Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten, *Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolkit* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001); Daniel Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," *The American Economic Review* 93, no. 5 (December 2003): 1449–1475.

[51] Graham Mallard, *Bounded Rationality and Behavioral Economics* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 5.

action also involved overcoming inhibitions.[52] Building on these studies, the chapters that follow explore how activists actively worked to move men to action by disrupting habits, overriding inhibitions, negotiating stimuli, and ordering information into narratives.

In this process, emotions proved to be an important bridge across the cognition–behavior gap. Consequently, this study intersects with current historiographical debates regarding the "history of emotions." Dubbed "history from the inside out," this historiographical school explores how emotional taxonomies vary across time, from culture to culture, and among subcultures. The "history of emotions" approach also challenges scholars to consider how societies try to "discipline" emotions through affective regimes—assigning emotions to appropriate spaces, roles, classes, genders, and modes of expression.[53] Medieval historian Barbara H. Rosenwein has further studied the formation of "emotional communities," or groups in which "people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value."[54]

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[52] Here, a good starting place is Chapter 2 (Wolfgang Prinz et al., "Cognition and Action"), Chapter 3 (Clayton E. Curtis and Mark D'Esposito, "The Inhibition of Unwanted Action"), and Chapter 14 (Deidre L. Reis and Jeremy R. Gray, "Affect and Affect Control") in Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh, and Peter M. Gollwitzer, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Human Action* (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2009).

Also see: Paschal Sheeran and Thomas L. Webb, "The Intention-Behavior Gap," *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 10, no. 9 (2016): 503–518; Peter M. Gollwitzer and John A. Bargh, eds., *The Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to Behavior* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1996); Herbert Gintis et al., eds., *Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005).

[53] Pioneers of this approach include scholars like Susan J. Matt, Peter Stearns, and William Reddy, as well as organizations like the Australian Research Council's Center for Excellence for the History of Emotions (focused on emotions in European history) and the Max Planck Institute for Human Development (which spearheads a History of Emotions Research Center).

See: Susan J. Matt, "Current Emotion Research in History: Or, Doing History from the Inside Out," *Emotion Review* 3, no. 1 (January 2011) 117–124; Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns, eds., *Doing Emotions History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Pres, 2014); Carol Zisowitz Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, *Emotion and Social Change: Toward a New Psychohistory* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988); Geoffrey Cocks and Travis L. Crosby, *Psycho/History: Readings in the Method of Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

[54] Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 2.

Building on these studies of the historicity of emotions (and on Reddy's work on emotional regimes),[55] this study places the history of emotions in conversation with studies of human cognition and behavior. This is an important step, because if histories of human emotion seek to understand how emotions move from internal concepts to expressed states, it is equally important to interrogate how individuals process affective cues from others. In other words, this present work represents not just "history from the inside-out" but history "inside-out and outside-in," seeking to understand how individuals inhibit, negotiate, or act on affective cues.

Emotions—defined here as "multicomponent phenomena" or "complex full-body responses" coordinating "changes across physiology, subjective experience, and behavior"—were vital to many social processes.[56] At a young age, individuals learned to regulate emotions, using attentional control and self-teaching to ignore some emotional cues and heed others; individuals also learned different emotional styles and affective norms (when to be angry, when to feel proud, when to display these feelings, and when to conceal them) from caregivers and peers.[57] Emotions were further involved in learning, decision-making, risk-assessment, moral judgement, and remembering.[58]

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[55] William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[56] David Sander, "Models of Emotion: The Affective Neuroscience Approach," in *The Cambridge Handbook of Human Affective Neuroscience*, eds. Jorge Armony and Patrik Vuilleumier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 16–17; Scott E. Jacobs and James J. Gross, "Emotion Regulation in Education," in *International Handbook of Emotions in Education*, eds. Reinhard Pekrun and Lisa Linnenbrink-Garcia (New York: Routledge, 2014), 184–185; Jorge Armony and Patrik Vuilleumier, eds., *The Cambridge Handbook of Human Affective Neuroscience*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[57] Ibid.; Maria von Salisch, "Children's Emotional Development: Challenges in Their Relationships to Parents, Peers, and Friends," *International Journal of Behavioral Development* 25, no. 4 (July 2001): 310–319; Amanda Barrett Cox, "Correcting Behaviors and Policing Emotions: How Behavioral Infractions Become Feeling- Rule Violations," *Symbolic Interaction* 39, no. 3 (August 2016): 484–503.

[58] Ibid.; Ross A. Thompson, "Emotional Regulation and Emotional Development," *Educational Psychology Review* 3, no. 4 (December 1991): 269–307.

As activist accounts reflected, individuals were both limited by and empowered by emotions. For instance, while studies show how emotional socialization "hard wires" certain emotional cues (causing real activation in pain and pleasure centers of the brain),[59] studies also demonstrate that these processes can be "rewired."[60] And in line with these findings, activists reported flexibly ignoring and rewriting their emotions through re-teaching: what was fearful could thus become pleasurable, and what was disgusting could become stimulating. Activists also worked to re-teach emotions to others, by modeling emotional responses. (As one article in the Egyptian communist paper *al-Taṭawwur* enjoined readers, "we must establish a school to teach people how to be angry and what to be angry about."[61])

Activists used emotions in other ways as well. By violating emotional regimes through "outbursts" and emotional performances, activists attracted attention.[62] Activists were also strategic about how they used emotions in discourse. Arabic speakers, for instance, used formal, affect-free language to assert the facticity of information—then switched to familiar, affective language when trying to connect with an audience,

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[59] Katja Wiech and Irene Tracey, "The Influence of Negative Emotions on Pain: Behavioral Effects and Neural Mechanisms," *NeuroImage* 47 (2009): 987–994; Arthur Aron et al., "Reward, Motivation, and Emotion Systems Associated With Early-Stage Intense Romantic Love," *Journal of Neurophysiology* 94, no. 1 (July 2005): 327–337; Mina Cikara, "Intergroup Schadenfreude: Motivating Participation in Collective Violence," *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences* 3 (June 2015): 12–17; Mina Cikara and Jay J. Van Bavel, "The Neuroscience of Intergroup Relations: An Integrative Review," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 9, no. 3 (2014): 245–274.

[60] Kevin N. Ochsner and James J. Gross, "The Cognitive Control of Emotions," *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 9, no. 5 (May 2005): 242–249; Kevin N. Ochsner et al., "Functional Imaging Studies of Emotion Regulation: A Synthetic Review and Evolving Model of the Cognitive Control of Emotion," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1251, no. 1 (March 2012): E1–E24; Olga M. Klimecki et al., "Functional Neural Plasticity and Associated Changes in Positive Affect After Compassion Training," *Cerebral Cortex* 23, no. 7 (July 2013): 1552–1561.

[61] "Madrasah al-sukhuṭ," *al-Taṭawwur* 2, 1 February 1940, 7.

[62] Jayne Morgan and Kathleen Krone, "Bending the Rules of 'Professional' Display: Emotional Improvisation in Caregiver Performances," *Journal of Applied Communication Research* 29, no .4 (2001): 317–340; Keelah E.G. Williams and Art Hinshaw, "Outbursts: An Evolutionary Approach to Emotions in the Mediation Context," *Negotiation Journal* 34, no. 2 (April 2018): 165–186.

encourage social bonding, or communicate moral judgments.[63] And perhaps most importantly, activists used emotional appeals to try and mobilize supporters, by linking emotions to physiological responses and action tendencies (for more on this, see Chapter 6, "Shaykh in a Dance Club!").[64] Thus, like many other behavioral and cognitive processes, emotions were highly plastic, contested, and "in motion."

Part II: Morality Tales and Moral Emotions

While Part I of the study lays the foundation for understanding how individuals made affiliation decisions, Part II explores how activists used storytelling to negotiate *morality* (normative principles and practices, and concepts of right and wrong) and participate in *moral production*.[65] Moral production was particularly important for social activism,

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[63] Susanne Stadlbauer, "Language Ideologies in the Arabic Diglossia of Egypt," *Colorado Research in Linguistics* 22 (June 2010).

[64] The mobilizing function of emotions is notably present in the etymology of the French term *émotion* (which carries the meaning of "movement, agitation… excitation"). One of the Arabic terms for emotion, *ʿāṭifah* ("feeling," from a root meaning "bias" or "inclination"), has an etymology that relates to the heuristic/decision-making function of emotions; another term *iḥsās* ("feeling, sensation"), carries a meaning related to the role of emotions in perception or sensation, like the French term *sentiment*.

See for instance the entries for "Émotion" and "Émouvoir," in *Grand Larousse de la langue française en sept volumes, Tome deuxième, Cir-Ery*, eds. Louis Guilbert et al. (Paris: Larousse, 1989), 1530–1531; Marek M. Dziekan, "The Categorisation of Emotions in the Classical Arabic Language. A Preliminary Lexicographical Study," in *Codes and Rituals of Emotions in Asian and African Cultures*, ed. Nina Pawlak (Warsaw: ELIPSA, 2009), 63–81.

[65] Émile Durkheim's definition of morality as a "system of rules of conduct"—which belongs to a collectivity, is invested with authority and sacrality, is enforced by sanctions, is interpreted differently by "each individual moral conscience," helps determine conduct, and changes according to historical and social setting—is also useful here. Émile Durkheim, "The Determination of Moral Facts," in *Sociology and Philosophy*, trans. D.F. Pocock (New York: The Free Press, 1974), 35–62; Emilé Durkheim, *Moral Education*, trans. E. K. Wilson and H. Schnurer (New York: Free Press, 1973), 24.

As activists rarely distinguished between concepts like "ethics" and "morals," I have followed the sources—and the example of other scholars—in including under the heading of "morality" concepts about rights and duties (deontological ethics) and concepts of virtuous thought and conduct (aretaic ethics). On different meanings of the term "morality," see: Steven Hitlin and Stephen Vaisey, eds., *Handbook of the Sociology of Morality* (New York: Springer, 2010), 5–11; Jarrett Zigon, *Morality: An Anthropological Perspective* (New York: Berg, 2008), 3.

Similarly, because individuals described a) using multiple types of moral reasoning at once, and b) adapting moral rationalizations based on their audience, I have found Lawrence Kohlberg's distinct "stages of moral development" thesis to be untenable. Instead, Albert Bandura's social cognitive theory (SCT) of moral development has proven more descriptively useful, as a dynamic model that allows for hybrid moral

because it involved multiple steps—each of which could be challenged. For instance, as a part of moral socialization,[66] individuals learned norms and value systems, and when deciding how to act, individuals inhibited behavior by remembering learned norms and value systems.[67] Moreover, as children and adults, individuals participated in systems of moral production and policing (producing norms in spaces like the home, schools, religious institutions, marketplaces, workplaces, and media spaces; and policing norm violations with sanctions ranging from gossip and ostracization to fines and imprisonment). Activists could thus contest moral production at each of these stages and sites: through courtroom, mosque, and media performances, activists presented alternate ideas about right behavior; through vigilante policing, activists attempted to change regulatory regimes; and through reteaching, activists tried to bypass the self-inhibition of behavior.[68]

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reasoning strategies. See: Albert Bandura, "Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action," in *Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development, Vol. 1: Theory*, eds. William M. Kurtines and Jacob L. Gewirtz (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991), 45–103.

[66] Socialization is "the process by which people learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system;" moral socialization refers to the teaching of moral norms, values, and attitudes. See: Emilé Durkheim, *Moral Education*, trans. E. K. Wilson and H.Schnurer (New York: Free Press, 1973); Peter Robert Sawyer, *Socialization to Civil Society* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 38–39.

For an overview of definitions of socialization, as well as debates and different approaches to the topic, see the entries for: "Socialization," "Agents of Socialization," and "Primary Socialization" in *The Concise Encyclopedia of Sociology*, eds. George Ritzer and J. Michael Ryan (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 588–592.

[67] John Voiklis and Bertram F. Malle, "Moral Cognition and Its Basis in Social Cognition and Social Regulation," in *Atlas of Moral Psychology*, eds. Kurt Gray and Jesse Graham (New York: The Guilford Press, 2018), 109–112.

Also see: Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, and Roland Zahn, "Neuroscience and Morality: Moral Judgments, Sentiments, and Values," in *Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology*, eds. Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K. Lapsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 108.

[68] Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1986); Melike M. Fourie et al., "Guilt and Pride are Heartfelt, but Not Equally So," *Psychophysiology* 48 (2011): 888–899; Monica Pivetti et al., "Shame, Guilt, and Anger: Their Cognitive, Physiological, and Behavioral Correlates," *Current Psychology* 35, no. 4 (December 2016): 690–699.

One technology that activists used to contest norms was the *morality tale*—a tool that takes center stage in Part II. Broadly speaking, a morality tale is any didactic narrative used to transmit norms and values, guide behavior, or impart social wisdom. For example, morality tales can communicate information about social boundaries, rights and duties, and divisions of space and time. Morality tales can also communicate prescriptive and proscriptive counsel (do this/don't do that), or normative information about cause and effect (such as how certain behaviors lead to punishment or reward).[69]

Studying activist morality tales is an important exercise, because studies suggest stories have a power that "cold facts" simply lack. Narrative has a "privileged status in the cognitive system" when it comes to processing and recall,[70] with individuals processing information twice as quickly and retaining information twice as well (at minimum) when that information is told in story form (findings echoed by activist accounts).[71] Stories are attention-grabbing, and can thus be used to "seduce people to finally pay attention" (as Jean de La Fontaine's "The Power of a Fable" argued).[72] Stories further trigger responses in many different areas of the brain: as the brain models

[69] Elaine M. Bennett, "Storytelling and the Moral Tradition: An Examination of the Pedagogy of Storytelling for Moral Enculturation," in *The Many Facets of Storytelling: Global Reflections on Narrative Complexity*, eds. Melanie Rohse et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 13–21; Robert Reich, "Four Morality Tales," in *Popular Culture: An Introductory Text*, eds. Jack Nachbar and Kevin Lause (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 111.

[70] This privileged status likely stems from the fact that stories mimic the brain's own architecture, which uses environmental cues to determine causality and predict outcomes (providing an evolutionary advantage). Elaine M. Bennett, "Storytelling and the Moral Tradition: An Examination of the Pedagogy of Storytelling for Moral Enculturation," in *The Many Facets of Storytelling: Global Reflections on Narrative Complexity*, eds. Melanie Rohse et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 13–21; Robert Reich, "Four Morality Tales," in *Popular Culture: An Introductory Text*, eds. Jack Nachbar and Kevin Lause (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 111.

[71] Arthur C. Graesser and Victor Ottati, "Why Stories? Some Evidence, Questions, and Challenges," in *Knowledge and Memory*, Advances in Social Cognition Vol. 8, ed**.** Robert S. Wyer, Jr. (New York: Psychology Press, 1995), 124.

[72] Marlène Lebrun, "Le didactisme en trompe-l'oeil des *Fables de La Fontaine*," *Pratiques* 91 (1996): 94.

narrative information, it produces emotional responses to character emotions, theory-of-mind representations of character thoughts, and motor cortex responses to descriptions of action—an effect that occurs cross-culturally, regardless of language.[73] Stories can also motivate and facilitate action (an important finding for historians of social activism).[74] And finally, stories can convince: in contexts ranging from hate group recruitment to environmental activism, stories have been found to a) be more persuasive and b) generate less cognitive resistance from dissenting individuals as compared to facts and data.[75]

Because stories are attention-grabbing, memorable, and useful in promoting emotional and motor responses, Egyptian, Algerian, and French activist campaigns were full of morality tales. These narratives came in many forms: in terms of content, morality tales could be based on real or imagined events; in terms of structure, they could be long and intricate (like a novel) or short anecdotes. And just as moral discourses were not always easy to recognize, morality tales were often hidden. In activist conversations, for instance, morality tales were often implicit and analogical: an activist might say "remember Zéralda…?"—inviting listeners to draw an experiential morality tale from a

[73] Raymond A. Mar, "The Neural Bases of Social Cognition and Story Comprehension, *Annual Review of Psychology* 62 (2011):103–134; Raymond A. Mar, "The Neuropsychology of Narrative: Story Comprehension, Story Production and Their Interrelation," *Neuropsychologia* 42 (2004): 1414–1434; Christopher J. Honey et al., "Not Lost in Translation: Neural Responses Shared Across Languages," *Journal of Neuroscience* 32, no. 44 (October 2012): 15277–15283.

[74] For instance, stories can promote neural coupling, or the synchronization of speaker-listener hemodynamic responses. Also, after listening to a story, those who either experience physiological arousal or adopt the point of view of a character are more likely to undertake a costly behavior (like donating to a cause). See: Giti Zahedzadeh, Jorge A. Barraza, and Paul J. Zak, "Persuasive Narratives and Costly Actions," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29, no. 1 (2017): 160–172; Greg J. Stephens, Lauren J. Silbert, and Uri Hasson, "Speaker–Listener Neural Coupling Underlies Successful Communication," *PNAS* 107, no. 32 (August 2010): 14425–14430; Lauren J. Silbert et al., "Coupled Neural Systems Underlie the Production and Comprehension of Naturalistic Narrative Speech," *PNAS* 111, no. 43 (October 2014): 4687–4696.

[75] Elissa Lee and Laura Leets, "Persuasive Storytelling by Hate Groups Online: Examining Its Effects on Adolescents," *American Behavioral Scientist* 45, no. 6 (2002): 927–957; Brandi S. Morris et al., "Stories vs. Facts: Triggering Emotion and Action-Taking on Climate Change," *Climate Change* 154, nos. 1–2 (May 2019): 19–36.

commonly known event. Certain words and phrases (like "Pharisee," "Nazi," "feet of clay," and "cut his tail") could also reference morality tales drawn from religious canon, historical events, and well-known fables. As a result, for group outsiders, recognizing morality tales could be a challenge.

I have chosen the morality tale as an object of analysis, because it is a category broad enough to encompass multiple types of narrativized moral discourse. This is strategic, because activist moral imaginaries borrowed from many genres and discursive forms. Take for instance Arabophone moral modes. In addition to religious scripture, ḥadīth, and religious law, there was *adab* (manners, etiquette, and comportment literature), *adab al-ḥikmah* (wisdom literature),[76] fables and allegorical stories (*ḥikāyāt ramziyyah*), tales of heroes and legends (*usṭūra,* pl. *asāṭīr*), didactic proverbs (*mathal*, pl. *amthāl*), advice and admonishment (*ʿibrah,* pl. *ʿibar*), and other types of behavioral counsel (*mawʿiẓah*, pl. *mawāʿiẓ*). These genres often overlapped, and could be blended with other discursive modes (i.e., news articles, films, novels, linear three-act plays, short stories, etc.). Francophone moral modes were similarly diverse, and ranged from religious canon to *fables*, *épopées*, *légendes*, and *chansons de geste*.[77] By taking morality and morality tales as objects of analysis, this study thus tries to maintain the fluidity of moralistic discourses as it was actually expressed and performed by activists. In searching activist writings, I have therefore first looked for moral discourses, including ideas about morality (Ar. *akhlāq*; Fr. *mœurs*), and then explored how these ideas were organized into narratives—

[76] See for instance: Hikmet Yaman, "The Concept of *Ḥikmah* in Early Islamic Thought" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2008).

[77] For a discussion of this fluidity between Francophone modes like fables, epics, and allegories, see for instance: Archimede Marni, *Allegory in the French Heroic Poem of the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Haskel House, 1971), 47–60.

be those narratives *adab al-ḥikmah*, *ḥikāyāt ramziyyah*, *fables*, personal biographies, or news stories.

Studying activist morality tales in this way had the effect of highlighting the hybridity of activist moral imaginaries. For instance, to make the case for independence, Algerian activists used morality tales that drew from different cultural traditions and domains of authority. This included stories from Islamic tradition (e.g., stories about the Battle of Badr and the Caliph ʿAlī); maraboutic and millenarian traditions (stories about the *moul-es-sâa*/*mûl al-saʿa*); North African and Berber myths (e.g., stories of Jugurtha, Mokrani, Kahina, and the Emir Abdelkader); Jewish and Christian stories (e.g., "Samson and Delilah," "David and Goliath"); African fables (e.g., "The Mason-Wasp and the Toad," "The Scorpion and the Frog"); Mediterranean myths and legends (e.g., the "bandits of honor"); and French fables (e.g., "The Rat and the Oyster"). Algerians also invented original morality tales and myths (e.g., "The Tale of Ben Daoud").

When reading activist morality tales, scholars often focus on religious and political mythmaking—and these modes of moral storytelling were vitally important in social activism. But as the study of Egyptian, Algerian, and French morality tales revealed, these types of narratives were only one part of activist storytelling. No Egyptian sat down in the 1940s, opened up the pages of *al-Daʿwah* or *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* and read only stories from the Qurʾān and tales of Saʿd Zaghlūl and Aḥmed ʿUrābī; no Algerian opened up the pages of *El Moudjahid* or *Révolution* and read only about the Battle of Badr and the Emir Abdelkader; and no French activist opened up *Témoignage Chrétien* and *Jeune Résistance* and read only morality tales about Christ, Saint George, and Joan of Arc. As a

result, to get a complete picture of how groups used narrative in activist campaigns, it is important to consider the whole "collective treasury of legends."[78]

To understand how activists negotiated this treasury to try and bring supporters across the cognition-behavior gap, the chapters in Part II thus explore the types of morality tales activists told. Chapter 5 ("Shaykh in a Dance Club!") examines how Egyptian activists in the 1940s used parochial fables (perhaps the most recognizable type of morality tale) in their campaigns, and inferred "experiential morality tales"[79] from everyday happenings and world events. Chapter 6 ("The Lowly Toad, the Foolish French, and the Moral Maquisard") continues this reading of morality tales in Algeria, investigating how the FLN created a shared morality tale (a collective myth explaining "who we are" and "where we're going")[80] to meet member needs. Chapter 7 ("On Trial with Antigone and Christ Crucified") then describes how French activists adapted and contested collective myths through counter-hegemonic readings of French morality tales, using these stories to mobilize supporters, authorize border-crossings, and challenge the French state.

As a preface to Part II's study of morality tales, two final concepts require definition: scripts and action scripts. In *L'invention du quotidien* (published in English as *The Practice of Everyday Life*), Michel de Certeau argued in passing that legends and myths

[78] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 89.

[79] Here, I believe "experiential" is a more apt description than "empirical," because rather than being a product of empirical learning, these morality tales mediated observed fact by narrativizing it, interpreting it, and adding value judgments to it. The "experiences" in question were also not always the product of empirical observation, but often the outcome of collective memory and mythmaking. A good example is the morality tale French communists created from the French World War II experience (see Chapter 7).

[80] I borrow here Claude Lévi-Strauss' understanding of myth as a narrative based on real or imaginary events that "explains the present and the past as well as the future." Myths, like other morality tales, often go through multiple permutations, and can be reinterpreted and appropriated. Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," *The Journal of American Folklore* 68, no. 270 (October-December 1955): 430–435, 443.

"offer their audience a repertory of tactics for future use," or phrased differently, "repertories of schemas of action."[81] Having investigated this claim, this study agrees with de Certeau—and adds some observations on how precisely myths accomplished this. As Chapters 5–7 describe, one way activists tried to move men to action was by embedding scripts and action scripts in narratives.

Scripts, or cognitive knowledge structures that guide behavior, were a type of behavioral heuristic: learned "rules of procedure" for how one should behave in certain spaces and situations, which helped create social order by providing role-based behavioral guidelines.[82] For example, most readers will be familiar with the scripts for eating at a restaurant or attending a university lecture. Each script features established roles (waiter/customer, professor/student) and typical actions (ordering/eating/paying; sitting at a desk/listening/asking questions). Moreover, these scripts are socially enforced: students who speak out of turn will be rebuked by the professor, or will receive meaningful glances from other students.

Scripts were important in the discussion of activist behavior for a few reasons. Since scripts were not static, activists worked to negotiate and contest scripts; activists also purposefully violated social scripts to attract attention and generate certain emotional responses. Scripts also proved an especially fluid and adaptable mode of transnational behavioral exchange, with activists imitating and adapting scripts from other cultures.[83]

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[81] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 23–24.

[82] Robert G. Lord and Mary C. Kernan, "Scripts as Determinants of Purposeful Behavior in Organizations," *The Academy of Management Review* 12, no. 2 (1987): 265–277.

[83] See for instance *Scripting Revolution*, on interpretations and innovations on the revolutionary script that emerged from the French Revolution. The text is also interesting as a *Begriffsgeschichte* (conceptual history), a field that strongly intersects with cognitive history. Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein, eds., *Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 3–4.

Finally, activists used well-known scripts to construct morality tales,[84] and embedded *action scripts*—scripts prescribing or proscribing specific behaviors—in their stories. Here then, were de Certeau's "repertories of schemas of action": actionable guides for behavior that could be embedded in (or inferred from) everyday narratives.

Part III: The Activist's Aggression

The final part of the study, *The Activist's Aggression*, builds on concepts from *Part I* (understanding how individuals made affiliation decisions) and *Part II* (understanding morality tales and moral discourses) to investigate how activists negotiated a specific kind of behavior: aggression. Theoretically, the study of aggression ought to be no different than the study of mating behavior, courtship displays, consumption patterns, market behaviors, or any other form of social activity. Yet because aggression is tied up in many political interests and social processes, aggression (and its cousin "violence") tends to be ill-defined, over-determined, and greatly misunderstood as an object of analysis.[85] Studies of terrorism have been particularly problematic for the study of aggression in Middle Eastern history; as Laleh Khalili has pointed out, studies of terrorism often contain the normative presumption that violence by nonstate actors is "a policy problem to be resolved, and thus particular, exceptional, and unmoored from sociohistorical contexts and explanations." To break away from this frame, she suggests focusing on the "political and sociological processes and relations that produce

[84] See here David Herman's synthesis of cognitive science and narratology. David Herman, "Scripts, Sequences, and Stories: Elements of a Postclassical Narratology," *PMLA* 112, no. 5 (October 1997): 1046–1059.

[85] For an introduction to this topic, see Craig A. Anderson and Brad J. Bushman, "Human Aggression," *Annual Review of Psychology* 53 (2002): 27–51.

Ira M. Leonard also critiques this trend in "The Historiography of American Violence," *Homicide Studies* 7, no. 2 (May 2003): 99–153.

violence"[86] in all its forms, and pay attention to how aggression is socially negotiated and contested.

The chapters in *Part III* thus examine the social production of aggression (defined in this study as the intentional inflicting of harm[87]), and the moral discourses surrounding it. Chapter 8 ("Murder as a Moral Imperative") shows how Egyptian activists used myths and morality tales to justify vigilante violence against the state in the tumultuous lead-up to the 1952 Revolution. Chapter 9 ("What Would You Do If You Were Invisible? Ideating Violence/Actuating Violence") highlights how activists decided to cross the cognition-behavior gap between aggressive thoughts and aggressive behavior. Chapter 10 ("Acts of Faith and Worthy Deeds") then describes how French and Algerian activists used morality tales to justify anti-colonial aggression.

Just as historical engagement with the cognitive and behavioral sciences can extend our understanding of decision-making and storytelling, these chapters contend that such disciplines can challenge our understanding of aggressive behavior. It is often assumed, for example, that individuals participating in violent attacks were emotionally-driven or socialized to be violent. Laboratory studies, field studies, and activist testimonies, however, all suggest that individuals use cognitive strategies to *bypass* socialization practices and learned inhibitions and give attention to certain emotions (for more on this, see Chapters 8–10). As Chapter 9 explores, the cognition–behavior gap is also important

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[86] Laleh Khalili, "Thinking about Violence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45 (2013): 791-792.

[87] More fully, "behavior directed toward the goal of harming or injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment." Robert A. Baron, *Human Aggression* (New York: Springer, 1977), 7–13.

Also see: Dietmar Zinner and Brandon C. Wheeler, "Aggression in Humans and Other Primates–Biology, Psychology, Sociology," in *Aggression in Humans and Other Primates*, eds. Hans-Henning Kortüm and Jürgen Heinze (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013), 44.

when discussing aggression, because violent fantasies, violent words, and violent deeds were different animals—fantasizing and verbal threats served different functions (and involved different social and cognitive processes) than acting out a violent attack.

Because of this complexity, individuals tend to boil down threat assessments (determinations of whether a person is likely to be aggressive) to fast and frugal heuristics. Yet history suggests we must look past learned heuristics, and expand the questions we ask about aggression. For instance, since threat heuristics play such a large role in determining aggressive behavior, how are these heuristics produced and negotiated, and how do they change over time? How do humans attempt to inhibit aggression, and how are these inhibitions bypassed? How are roles, action scripts, and divisions of space and gender used to produce "authorized" aggression?[88] How are the resulting aggression norms authorized, performed, and commemorated—as well as negotiated and transgressed?[89] How do individuals construct their own aggression vis-à-vis the aggression of others? Why is there a social fascination with certain types of aggression (e.g., minority, immigrant, and out-group aggression; terrorism; violent atrocities; serial murder; and "honor crimes"[90])?

These questions are important, and help problematize threat heuristics that reduce violence to a matter of religious orientation or race. As Part III explores, for instance,

[88] J. Carter Wood "Locating Violence: The Spatial Production and Construction of Physical Aggression," in *Assaulting the Past: Violence and Civilization in Historical Context*, ed. Katherine D. Watson (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 20–37.

[89] See for instance Kirk W. Fuoss, "Lynching Performances, Theatres of Violence," *Text and Performance Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (January 1999): 1-37.

[90] On this topic, Lila Abu-Lughod has made an excellent contribution exploring the fascination with honor crimes. See: Lila Abu-Lughod, "Seductions of the 'Honor Crime,'" *Differences* 22, no. 1 (May 2011): 17–63.

appeals to religious texts were certainly one strategy activists used to produce violence,[91] but there were other strategies activists used as well: rituals and performances, reteaching, norm-based rationalizations, and "secular" prooftexts were also crucial for authorizing aggression.

The stories activists told about their lives also yielded interesting insights about aggression. Somewhat counter to stereotypes of Arabs or Muslims as violent, for instance, there was evidence of strong biases against violent attacks, with Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists finding it stressful to openly discuss their participation in violence. Even forty and fifty years later, activists expressed being uncomfortable or hesitant to discuss the specifics of attacks. For instance, Andrée Dore-Audibert found that her female interviewees repressed memories of violence when discussing the war, and others worried that sharing stories of violence would displease or attract the judgment of family members. Participating in attacks was thus broadly viewed as both personally and social undesirable.[92]

The same patterns were visible in written testimonies, with some interesting addendums. Activists rarely shared memories of harming members of their own communities (e.g., FLN activists were reserved discussing violence against MNA members, and French activists hesitant to discuss violence against other Frenchmen)—but activists were altogether more at ease discussing violence against foreigners. And by far the most talkative when it came to sharing memories of violence were members of the Yacef Saadi network, a high-commitment cell of "violent specialists" formed by the

[91] Nouri Gana and Heike Härting, "Introduction: Narrative Violence: Africa and the Middle East," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 28, no. 1 (2008): 2.
[92] Andrée Dore-Audibert, *Des Françaises d'Algérie dans la guerre de liberation*, 14.

FLN,[93] whose surviving members were hailed as heroes by their community in posterity. Saadi network members proved to be "strong rationalizers," repeating almost verbatim the same rationalizations from interview to interview and from decade to decade. Supported both by positive feedback from their community and a strong social environment (group members who mutually reinforced one another's behavior), Saadi network members were frank and unapologetic about their aggression, and well-accustomed to responding to inquiries and reciting their justifications (for an analysis of this, see Chapter 10 "Acts of Faith and Worth Deeds"). Still, they preferred to discuss and justify their violence against Frenchmen—violence against other Algerians was less discussed.

Before ending this introduction to Part III's study of aggression, it is worth acknowledging a few reservations raised by James McDougall, a distinguished scholar of Algerian history. McDougall has rightly pointed out that the history of the Algerian Revolution tends to obfuscate other narratives and fruitful paths of inquiry concerning Algerian culture and history. He further adds that there is a need to deconstruct Algeria as a "violent object" and meet Algerians on their own terms, instead of positioning them as symbols of trauma, violence, and radicalism. I could not agree more—although admittedly, in some ways this study feeds into that conception, by once again involving Algerians in a study of activism and violence. In fact, merely by juxtaposing Muslim case studies and the question of aggression, this study risks contributing to the construction of Muslims as "violent subjects."

[93] I have borrowed this term from Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Despite this danger, I would argue that it is futile to ignore the question of aggression in Muslim societies—especially considering that Muslims are already "fanatical," violent subjects in many a moral imagination (in much the same way that immigrants and black men are often constructed as violent subjects). Ignoring these heuristics will not make them disappear. One can point out, however, how and why such heuristics operate. Moreover, it is important to consider why revolutionary histories and "violent subjects" continue to fascinate (because they help reinforce our own aggression norms and sense of self; because they are important to modern-day morality tales, guardianship claims, and social hierarchies; and because transgression is intriguing, generates certain affects, and is important for social learning). It is also useful to note that such discourses are not unilateral: for instance, Algerian activists described FLN violence as lawful and reluctant, while characterizing French violence as fanatical, hateful, sadistic, and irrational (see Chapter 10). Hence, by tackling the question of aggression head-on, this study attempts to foster an awareness about how groups constructed and negotiated ideas about "virtuous violence."

As a preface to this study of aggression, however, an important word of warning follows: Part III ("The Activist's Aggression") is *not* intended as a comparison of the *scale* or *shape* of Egyptian, Algerian, and French aggression. For this, one would need to examine French responses to territorial occupation in World War II, or the bombings and lynching rituals of French ultra-conservative groups ("ultras") like the Mouvement populaire du 13-Mai (MP-13) and Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS).[94]

[94] For an introduction to comparative French decolonizations, see for instance: Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

Instead of comparing aggressions of a similar scale and mode, this study has rather included the experiences of French activists in order to maintain the focus on anti-colonial activism. Even with the difference in scale, however, I have included some brief notes in Chapter 10 regarding French rationalizations for violence, to illustrate that the cognitive and social processes involved in the production of aggressive behavior—and the violence-authorizing myths and morality tales activists tell—remain strikingly similar.

Toward a History of Hopes, Disappointments, and "Tomorrows that Sing"

In sum, this study approaches data differently than would a political history or intellectual history. Other scholars have already written excellent intellectual and political histories of some of the clubs discussed;[95] but as this study argues, there is something missing from these accounts. First, there is missing a comparison of anti-colonial activism in Egypt, Algeria, and France, which can cast light on the similar discourses and different trajectories these movements took. Second, the field lacks an investigation into the affective lives and day-to-day choices of individual activists, which can break apart the teleological narrative of decolonization and capture its contingencies.

Eleanor Davey, for instance, admits in *Idealism beyond Borders* (her intellectual history of French *tiers-mondisme*) that she "does not dwell on the personal lives" of individuals, although she was once advised to "seek out the 'blood on the carpet'… By

[95] See for instance: Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2011); Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988); Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Brynjar Lia, T*he Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998); Mohammed Harbi, *Aux origines du Front de libération nationale: la scission du PPA-MTLD* (Paris: C. Bourgois, 1975); Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War, 1954-1962* (Oxford: Berg, 1997).

this was meant the personal stories: the loves, hopes, disappointments, friendships, and fallings-out that accompany and often help to drive the evolution of activist engagement."[96] While socio-affective events were thus outside the scope of Davey's analysis, this study looks to fill that gap, by exploring how activists participated in local emotional and moral "economies" by *marketing, negotiating, and "buying in" to emotional and moral regimes*. To help readers conceptualize these practices, I will thus occasionally use the metaphors "emotional economy" and "moral economy" to describe the market-like manner in which activists negotiated emotions and moral values.[97] But the guiding goal is to trace exchanges, rediscover the "loves, hopes, disappointments, friendships, and fallings-out" of activism, and understand how activists negotiated these experiences in public and in private.

Recovering this history is important, because it was this *histoire événementielle* of day-to-day decisions, internal cognitive battles, and affective negotiations that myths about the "Rise of Communism," the "Rise of Islamism," and the "Rise of Third-Worldism" later effaced. It was this history of contingent choices that theories about "revolutionary waves" and "waves of decolonization" too often bury. And it was this history of affective and moral battles that later helped the Muslim Brotherhood become

[96] Eleanor Davey, *Idealism beyond Borders: The French Revolutionary Left and the Rise of Humanitarianism, 1954-1988* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 16.

[97] I use the terms sparingly, because while I define "emotional economy" and "moral economy" as *the metaphorical market for emotions and values,* the term "moral economy" (as coined by E.P. Thompson and used by social historians) more frequently means *an economy that is moral*—that is, the normative beliefs that various societies hold about moral buying and selling behavior, and how economic markets can be operated in a way that does not harm others. See: E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Pantheon, 1964), 66-67. Similarly, the term "emotional economy" is most often used to mean the role of emotions in economics, or the investment of commodities with emotional importance. See: Hazel Christie et al., "The Emotional Economy of Housing," *Environment and Planning A* 40 (2008): 2296-2312.

one of the most powerful extra-parliamentary clubs in Egypt, which brought the FLN its victory in the struggle for independence, and which established *tiers-mondisme* as the driving myth for revolutionary movements in the 1960s and 1970s.

Thus, this study is a book about cognitive transfers and behavioral movements: a study of how men and women promoted norms, expressed emotions, and told stories that crossed ideological, ethnic, religious, and geographic boundaries. And the argumentative thread that connects each chapter to the next is this: regardless of confession or political alignment, activists negotiated the end of colonial regimes using a common repertoire of cognitive and behavioral strategies. This toolbox included affective displays, positive and negative feedback gestures, heuristics, learning strategies, normative discourses, and narratives—tools which activists used to contest norms, connect with others, and move men and women to action.

Using these tools, each organization challenged old myths and advanced new ones. Muslim Brotherhood activists worked to make the unification of religion and state seem like the only legitimate expression of Islamic piety; FLN activists labored to make Algerian independence seem the only possible policy outcome; and French suitcase-carriers struggled to make aiding the FLN appear the most reasonable response to the French Resistance experience. Yet as shall be seen, at the time, such positions were bizarre, unthinkable. In Egypt, Muslim piety meant prayer at the corner mosque, membership in a Sufi lodge, a visit to the tomb of a local saint, celebrating the Prophet's Birthday, or a career at al-Azhar—not running in parliamentary elections and protesting the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty negotiations. In Algeria, meanwhile, most Muslims felt they were either "becoming French" or moving toward greater autonomy—it was hard to

imagine that France would ever agree to grant Algeria her independence. And in mainland France, it was absurd to think that French Europeans in Algeria were somehow like the Nazis who occupied France—because *Algeria was France* (how could France "invade" her own territory?).

These were some of the fronts on which activists would wage their narrative battles. In the name of their respective causes, Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists thus set out across cultural and geographic boundaries. In the name of the cause, they left parents and spouses, endured torture, risked death, violated social norms, and engaged in violent behaviors, knowing full well they might never see the fruits of their action or reap material rewards from their efforts. But still they moved, and worked to convince others to move. They moved toward what they believed were lofty goals, brighter futures, and "tomorrows that sing;"[98] and slowly, one gesture, one emotion, and one story at a time, they constituted a behavioral migration—an anti-colonial exodus whose movements echoed the words of philosopher Eric Hoffer: "Every mass movement is in some ways a migration—a movement toward a promised land."[99]

[98] "Ahmed Akkache," *Liberté: Organe Central du Parti Communiste* 33, 25 July 1960 in SHD GR 1H 3092 bis.

[99] Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 20. While the text has some fundamental flaws, Hoffer is a talented rhetorician who raises provocative questions.

Part I: The Activist's Affiliations

Chapter 2

"Allahu Akhbar, Long Live the Workers!": Affiliation, Switching, and Competition among Egyptian Clubs, 1935–1950

In 1947, H.A.R. Gibb advanced a conjecture that would gain great purchase among British Arabists: the Muslim Brotherhood, he wrote, was an example of how "Mahdism[1] has linked up with extreme nationalism to produce the swelling tides of popular discontent and revolutionary ardor… In contrast to the modernists and the rationalists… [Mahdism] is a popular movement… the true product of primitive Islamic romanticism, with an emotional reason of its own. It is not a rational assertion that one type of political organization is more desirable than another, but a revolt."[2] Echoes of Gibb's description of "swelling tides" of emotion appeared in other British descriptions of events in Egypt: a cable to London after the Cairo fire-setting of 26 January 1952 described "destruction by howling incendiary mobs." But Ralph Stevenson, the British Ambassador to Cairo, saw other processes at work. As he argued a few days after the 26 January cable, "It would be idle to pretend that these riots were the spontaneous manifestation of popular emotion.

[1] The *mahdī* is an eschatological figure in Islam, whose return is expected to usher in a rule of righteousness. The *mahdī* is vaguely defined in Islamic *ḥadīth*: he could be a Prophet or a political leader. Because of this ambiguity, and because the *mahdī*'s arrival will bring about the upending of the ruling order, the *mahdī* is frequently invoked by revolutionary movements. That said, the Muslim Brotherhood did not appeal to *mahdīst* traditions to legitimize its program.

[2] H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* [1947] (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 113, 120, 136. The 1947 edition was a print of Gibb's Haskell Lecture, delivered at the University of Chicago in 1945.

For other Arabists commenting on the Brotherhood as an example of emotionalism, and more on the intellectual history of these debates, see: Israel Gershoni, "The Theory of Crisis and the Crisis in a Theory: Intellectual History in Twentieth-Century Middle Eastern Studies," in *Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century*, eds. Israel Gershoni, Amy Singer, and Y. Hakan Erdem (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 138-150

The organization of the many different gangs, their discipline and their very carefully concerted action could only have been the result of plans laid long before-hand."[3]

Such different interpretations beg the question: what were the affective styles and organizational strategies of Egyptian nationalist clubs on the eve of the 1952 Revolution? Were there "swelling tides of discontent" and "howling incendiary mobs," disciplined and coordinated groups, or some combination thereof? And what was the role of religion, morality, and emotion in these clubs? The chapters that follow will begin to answer these questions: this present chapter will explore the market for extra-parliamentary activist clubs in Egypt in the 1940s; later, Chapter 5 will recount the stories Egyptian clubs told about morality and the use of emotions in club discourse, and Chapter 8 will describe how these factors came together to produce violent events like the assassinations of Prime Minister Maḥmūd al-Nuqrāshī and the Cairo Fire.

To open this discussion, this chapter provides an introduction to anti-colonial clubs in 1940s Egypt, focusing on the activities of Young Egypt (Miṣr al-Fatāh), the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn), the Society of Our Master Muḥammad's Youth (Jamāʿat Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad), the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation/EMNL (al-Ḥarakah al-Miṣriyyah l-al-Taḥarrur), and the Workers' Vanguard (Ṭalīʿat al-ʿUmmāl). As channels for extra-parliamentary political participation, these associations commanded the attention and loyalty of many Egyptians. The Muslim

[3] Telegram from John Rathbone Hayes Jones, Cairo to Winston Churchill, London, 31 January 1952, Ref. No. D 13966, Code JE 1481/4 in *Claims against Egypt for Compensation for Injury and Damage Suffered as a Result of the Cairo Riots*, FO 371/97024; Telegram No. 318 from Ambassador Ralph Stevenson, Cairo, to the Foreign Office, London, 5 February 1952, Code JE 1018/52 in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'Ét at of General Neguib*, FO 371/96872.

Brotherhood's Islamic program has received excellent coverage in historical literature,[4] and so has the development of Miṣr al-Fatāh[5] and the Egyptian communist movement.[6] In addition, there are excellent scholarly studies of how ideological trends like liberalism and Islamic modernism informed these movements.[7]

This chapter does not seek to replicate these studies. Instead, by juxtaposing clubs like the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt, the EMNL, and the Workers' Vanguard, this chapter undertakes an unconventional comparison. In setting contemporaneous competitors side by side, this chapter explores patterns of differentiation and points of conjuncture between activist clubs and expressions of morality. To accomplish this, the first half of the chapter historically locates these clubs, and traces how individuals selected and switched between clubs (with a comparative look at the choices of Muslim, Copt, and Jewish activists). The second half of the chapter then explores how clubs competed to attract and retain members, and how movement leaders crafted competitive ideological products that grappled with questions of religion and morality.

What can such a comparison tell historians about Egyptian activism in the 1940s? As activists accounts suggest, despite post-hoc stories of ideological "awakening," individuals tended to first attend clubs as a result of relational networking—a pattern that

[4] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Brynjar Lia, T*he Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998).

[5] James P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels: Young Egypt, 1933-1952* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975).

[6] Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988); Joel Beinin, *Was the Red Flag Flying There?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt: Communists and Citizens* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004); Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2011); Tareq Y. Ismael and Rifaʿat el-Saʿid, *The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990).

[7] Roel Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity: Secular Liberal and Left-Wing Political Thought in Egypt, 1945*-1958 (New York: Routledge, 2002).

would later prove equally true for Algerian and French activists. However, affiliation decisions in Egypt were not always clear cut: by attending a club, Egyptians did not always throw their full support behind the club or take a firm stance "for or against" a cause. Instead, activists pursued multiple affiliations at once, and frequently engaged in club switching, moving between clubs as diverse as the Muslim Brotherhood and the EMNL. Egyptians also affiliated with clubs without agreeing with the group's entire platform, and maintained heterodox beliefs within their respective clubs.

As this chapter explores, the Egyptian activist environment of the 1940s was thus dynamic and competitive. Clubs like Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood engaged in fierce competition with political parties and other clubs for control of public spaces; they worked to differentiate their clubs from competitors; they adapted different epistemologies and texts and to construct ideological products; they competed for members; and they poached members from other clubs. Imitation between clubs was also common—even between religious associations and communist groups.

Thus, movements like the Muslim Brotherhood were not "Islamic romanticism" born aloft by a wave of emotion any more than Egyptian communism represented a "rising tide" of class consciousness. Instead, activists invested countless hours building associational products and constructing "awakenings," by drawing attention to certain information, interpreting events, and repeating ideas about the social order. Thus, rather than Islamic or class consciousness being born ex nihilo, identities and ideologies were carefully constructed, differentiated, and circulated by energetic activists working to advance specific social platforms and meet member needs.

The Changing Geography of Egyptian Political Space, 1920–1940

For the group of activists who came of age in the 1940s, norms in Egypt had changed dramatically from the world their fathers had known. Religious culture was changing: since the late 19th century, Islamic modernists like Muḥammad ʿAbduh had made arguments for Islamic rationalism and an religious engagement with Western science and technology, while the development of a community of lay intellectuals had challenged the "monopoly of religious knowledge" held by Muslim ʿulamāʾ and Coptic priests. By the early 20th century, these trends were calling for "the unmediated reading of the holy text and the mass dissemination of its principles to the public."[8] In the Coptic Church, for instance, a growing lay movement worked to compete with British Protestant, American Presbyterian, and Franciscan missionaries and prevent the "Frankification" (Westernization) of the Coptic Church by promoting spiritual renaissance [*nahḍah*], charitable societies, and the Sunday School Movement.[9]

Political culture was also shifting. The Great War and Allied statements on self-determination, such as Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, helped empower an Egyptian national movement. Together, the Egyptian industrial bourgeoisie, large landholders, and a growing middle class came together under the leadership of the Egyptian lawyer Saʿd Zaghlūl to organize the Wafd Party. And when the party was refused a place at the Paris Peace Conference, Egyptians circulated tracts, held nationalist meetings in mosques and churches, and turned new spaces like cafés into "revolutionary hubs."[10] Ultimately, the

[8] Meir Hatina, *ʿUlamāʾ, Politics, and the Public Sphere: An Egyptian Perspective* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), 96.

[9] Vivian Ibrahim, *The Copts of Egypt: The Challenges of Modernisation and Identity* (London: IB Tauris, 2011), 86; S.S. Hasan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 59–60, 72–76.

[10] The term is Ziad Fahmy's.

1919 Revolution that grew out of this movement achieved Egyptian independence in 1922, universal suffrage for men, and the establishment of a parliamentary monarchy with organized political parties. And along with these new political spaces, Egyptians could speak of a national founding myth, which posited a grand rupture: the nation had passed from the "shame" and "dishonor" of the 1906 Dinshawāy massacre to the pride of the 1919 Revolution.[11]

There was also a revolution underway in "human geography." From 1920–1950, the expansion of higher education remade space, time, gender norms, and epistemologies in Egypt, with the 1945/46 school year marking the first year that enrollment at secular universities outpaced enrollment at al-Azhar (see Figure 2.1). As a new form of knowledge, these new universities competed with al-Azhar. The existence of a growing student community also demanded new norms and demographic categories: thus, instead of speaking only of children and adults, Egyptian magazines now debated the phenomena of "youth" [*shabāb*] and the adolescent [*al-murāhiq*] (with scientific debates over youth appearing in the first decades of the century, and the popularization of these concepts by the mid-1930s).[12]

[11] Wilson even featured in the nationalist poetry of the era: "Oh Wilson, we have gathered together…total independence is our goal!" See: Mounah Abdallah Khouri, *Poetry and the Making of Modern Egypt: 1882-1922* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 77–90; Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2011), 92–95, 134, 145–149, 161–164; Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 63–74; Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882–1954* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1998), 7–13, 26–27.

[12] Omnia El Shakry, "Youth as Peril and Promise: the Emergence of Adolescent Psychology in Postwar Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43 (2011): 591–610; Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, "The Discovery of Adolescence in the Middle East," and Peter Wien, "'Watan' and 'Rujula': The Emergence of a New Model of Youth in Interwar Iraq," in *Youth and Youth Culture in the Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Jørgen Bæk Simonsen (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2005), 10–34.

Secondary and university schooling also enlarged the Egyptian middle class, united as a community of readership around colloquial newspapers and journals.[13] It was this new middle class of students and professionals that would became the "activist core for all of the political trends" of the 1930s and 1940s.[14] Studying the phenomenon, Donald Reid summarized the political birth of this new community of interest: "it made a big difference to a minister of interior whether he was dealing with the [protests of] 2,000 university students of 1925, or the 30,000 at the three universities in 1950."[15]

Figure 2.1 – Enrollment in Egyptian Higher Education, 1925–1952

	Universities*	al-Azhar**
1925/1926	3,368	---
1930/1931	2,266	9,116
1936/1937	8,312	12,274
1939/1940	8,803	13,666
1942/1943	9,513	13,200
1945/1946	15,360	14,748
1948/1949	20,088	18,694
1950/1951	31,744	---
1951/1952	53,338	19,227

* Combined figures for Egyptian University/King Fuʾād University, ʿAyn Shams University, and Alexandria University. Data for Dār al-ʿUlūm, the teacher's training college, is unavailable.
** Al-Azhar had three internal colleges, but was not designated a university until 1961.

Sources: James Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels*, 2; Kirk J. Beattie, *Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics and Civil Society* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 22.

[13] Over 163 new periodicals were established in the 1890s, 278 in the 1900s, and 442 new periodicals established in the 1920s. See: Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians*, 74–77; Donald Malcolm Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 106–113; Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 12.

[14] Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 396.

[15] Donald Malcolm Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 126–129.

Women's roles and spaces were also changing. Industrialization and the Great War had pulled women into the factories to replace men drafted into labor corps; the growth of textile factories in 1930s further pulled women into the Egyptian workplace. In 1923, the Egyptian Feminist Union was established as part of a conversation with imperial networks like the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA)/International Alliance of Women (IAW). And after attending the 1923 IAW conference in Rome, a few Egyptian activists including Hudá Shaʿrāwī and Sayzā Nabarāwī would seek to change gender norms by uncovering their faces in public. Over the next decade, Egyptian women's clubs published articles demanding suffrage, describing how other Muslim women were unveiling in Turkey and Lebanon, and engaging in exegesis of Islamic scripture to show that veiling was not a requirement in Islam.[16] Universities were part of these changing gender norms, becoming the first educational spaces where men and women mixed.[17]

Finally, Cairo was undergoing spatial and cultural transformations. A "demographic revolution" of urbanization was bringing more Egyptians to the city, with Cairo's population topping 1 million in 1927.[18] In the first two decades of the 20th century, affluence and commerce also brought European-style restaurants, clothing and department stores to downtown Cairo—spaces which further added to the visibility of

[16] Beth Baron, *Egypt as Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 109–112; Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and the Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 47, 160, 172, 190–191.

[17] In 1930, females represented 0.4% of enrollment at Cairo University, ʿAyn Shams University, and Alexandria University; by 1950 this had climbed to 7% of enrollment. Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and the Nation*, 47, 172; Donald Malcolm Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 91–113.

[18] André Raymond, *Cairo*, trans. Willard Wood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 317–321.

Western culture and the visibility of women.[19] By the 1930s, unveiling had become "widespread among both middle- and upper-class women" in the city, and elite women were driving and mixing with men in new entertainment spaces.[20] Overall, the generation that came of age in the 1930s and 1940s had thus witnessed an unprecedented expansion of the space for political activism, as well as large shifts in Egyptian culture and politics—shifts that were still underway, still new, and still unfamiliar (especially to young village men freshly arriving in Cairo or Alexandria for university or to find work).

Building Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood

Whereas the 1920s had been years of change, economic growth, and promise, the 1930s brought economic and political hardship. Although Egypt had gained independence, British troops were still stationed in the Canal Zone, and the British Residency continued to direct Egyptian politics with a not-so-invisible hand. Moreover, the expansion in the student population came just as wages and the market for jobs contracted with the worldwide economic depression (with the value of Egyptian exports dropping by a third from 1928–1933). When the parliament failed to solve the economic crisis, the result was growing anti-parliamentarianism.[21]

Consequently, the next six years saw the radicalization and militarization of Egyptian politics, as well as a boom in extra-parliamentary political clubs. Faced with economic depression and unemployment, many Egyptians called for strong government, economic

[19] Nancy Y. Reynolds, *A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, the Cairo Fire, and the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

[20] Beth Baron, *Egypt as Woman,* 109–112; Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and the Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 47, 160, 172, 190–191.

[21] Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930–1945,* 1–31.

autarky, the Egyptianization of labor and capital, and boycotts of foreign goods. The result was a "Palace-oriented dictatorship" under Ismāʿīl Ṣidqī Pasha, who was appointed Prime Minister in 1930; he proceeded to abrogate the constitution and fix Egyptian elections. The political climate also shifted to an "intense nativism," characterized by the valorization of Arab, Islamic, and Egyptian heritage. The powerful Wafd party, now in the opposition, cultivated discontent, appealing to students with political speeches.[22]

One of the first clubs that responded to these changes was Young Egypt (Miṣr al-Fatāh). The club was the creation of its energetic founders Aḥmad Ḥusayn and Fatḥī Raḍwān, childhood friends and law students at Egyptian University. Ḥusayn and Raḍwān first tried to start a patriotic club on campus in 1929; it failed. Then in 1932, Ḥusayn launched a university campaign called the "Piaster Plan." The plan collected money during the depression to build a factory that would locally produce red tarbushes [fezzes] as a marker of distinct Egyptian national identity and economic independence. The 1932 campaign brought so much income and publicity, Ḥusayn and the campaign staff decided to expand by founding a nationalist club in 1933, which they named Young Egypt. Its first slogan was "God–Fatherland–King."[23]

Young Egypt took a conservative approach to nationalism, adapting different modernist trends including scouting, Pharaonicism, Social Darwinism, fascism, and populism. Pharaonicism was particularly prominent in the club's 1930s-era messages. Coming on the heels of the 1919 Revolution, the discovery of Tutankhamun's tomb in 1922 sparked a fashion for ancient Egyptian archaeology; seizing on this "mood,"

[22] Ibid.

[23] James P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels*, 9–41; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 234–265.

Egyptian leaders talked of restoring the greatness of Pharaonic Egypt, made "pilgrimages" to Upper Egypt to experience the ancient ruins, and read in the stones a patriotic morality tale concerning the eternal greatness of Egyptian civilization (with Pharaonic nationalists re-writing Tutankhamun's reforms as the "Al-Amarna Revolution").[24]

In this climate, Young Egypt leader Aḥmad Ḥusayn adapted Pharaonicism into a club narrative of national and personal rebirth. In one of Young Egypt's early manifestos, entitled *Īmānī* [My Faith] (and subtitled "Glory to Egypt"), Ḥusayn developed this myth, describing his own "rebirth" while on a scouting trip to Luxor in December 1928. In a day "chiseled in my memory," Ḥusayn said he stood at attention with his fellow scouts as the Egyptian flag was lowered for the evening. In a majestically worded passage that echoed a sermon or ode, Ḥusayn described the moment: as the bugle called and dusk rolled across the desert ruins, he suddenly saw the fluttering flag as "the source of life, strength, and happiness," a companion in times of loneliness, and the link between man, his loved ones, and his homeland. "For the first time in my life, I stood in front of the flag, as if I were in prayer." And seeing his fellow scouts, "their eyes shining with this holy flame that eyes reflect when men are in spiritual ecstasy," Ḥusayn felt his spirit soar over Egypt, in a moment that seemed to last a lifetime. That evening, he said, "I felt rebirth growing in my soul and in my mind… it was the beginning of my development, my entrance into a new world." Later at Karnak, he asked the heavens what would bring life to the ruins—but he received no answer. Instead, drawing his finger through the sand, he found himself tracing out a word in the earth: faith. Thus, Ḥusayn said he left Karnak

[24] Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 164–190.

convinced of "the need for faith in our greatness, in order to resurrect the glory of ancient Egypt."[25] Ḥusayn added that he tried to perform this rebirth by changing his name (and asking club members to follow suit): "Since that night [at Karnak], I devoted my life to the revival of the glory of Pharaonic Egypt… and did even too much in this regard through appealing to people to take Pharaonic names—starting with myself. I took the name Aḥmas… a shortening of my name, Aḥmad Ḥusayn."[26]

Young Egypt's program thus worked to provide members with a myth describing a personal and collective transformation to greatness. This myth creatively combined Pharaonicism and Egyptian Romantic nationalism, as well as ideas from the scouting movements that had become popular among the Egyptian middle class in the 1920s. The club also promoted spiritualism, masculinity, and an active "martial spirit," borrowing from European fascist movements. That said, while Miṣr al-Fatāh adapted the organizational modes, patriotic displays, and nativism of fascist movements, it vocally condemned Nazi racism—along with capitalism, communism, and imperialism.[27]

For the first few years of its life, the club remained small. Meanwhile, the Waṭanī Party, in touch with the Italian legation, created a paramilitary group it called the Blue Shirts in 1933; the precedent would quickly inspire Young Egypt to launch its own paramilitary corps, the Green Shirts, in 1934. The following year, Benito Mussolini launched an invasion of Ethiopia, and Britain increased its troop strength in Egypt. In response, Egyptian political parties began a fierce battle of patriotic one-upmanship,

[25] Aḥmad Ḥusayn, *Īmānī* (Cairo: n.p., 1936), 19–33.

[26] Aḥmad Ḥusayn, *Niṣf qarn maʿa al-ʿUrūbah wa-qadīyyat Filasṭīn* [1972], as translated by and quoted in Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski*, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs,* 175.

[27] *Miṣr al-Fatāh* 33, 12 September 1945; *Miṣr al-Fatāh* 135, 24 November 1947; *Miṣr al-Fatāh* 222, 2 January 1950; James P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels*, 9–41.

denouncing the British and appealing to students in speeches. In January 1936, the Wafd established its own Blue Shirts (not to be confused with the Waṭanī Blue Shirts). That same month, palace politician ʿAlī Māhir Pasha became Prime Minister, and gave Young Egypt a huge boon: he cultivated ties with the club in order to use it in street battles against the Wafd Blue Shirts. With this patronage, Miṣr al-Fatāh and their Green Shirts experienced a membership boom in 1935-1936 that would position them as a major political player for the rest of the decade.[28]

Besides Young Egypt, another popular extra-parliamentary club was the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, or the Ikhwān). The Brotherhood was the initiative of Ḥasan al-Bannā, the eldest son of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Bannā (a low-level al-Azhar shaykh who made money repairing watches). Ḥasan grew up in the Delta; he started formal education at a village *madrasah* at age nine, but since he had started school late, he did not memorize the Qurʾān in time to meet the entrance requirements for al-Azhar's school system. As a result, he entered the government-run secondary schools. There, Ḥasan became involved in lay activism, joining an association of teachers and classmates called the Society for Morality and Ethics [Jamāʿat al-Akhlāq al-Adabīyyah]. In his mid-teens, Ḥasan, his younger brother ʿAbd al-Raḥīm, and some friends further established their own religious club, called the Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden [Jamāʿat Manaʿ al-Muḥarramāt]. Around the same time, Ḥasan became a member of the Ḥaṣṣāfiyyah Sufi order. There, Ḥasan and his best friend from the order, Aḥmad al-Sukkarī, established the Ḥaṣṣāfiyyah Society for Charity (with Sukkarī as

[28] Haggai Erlich, *Students and University in Twentieth Century Egyptian Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 108–125.

president and Bannā as secretary). The Society's goal was simple: combat the activities of the American Presbyterian mission, which had arrived in town that year (1923).[29]

After Ḥasan completed his secondary studies, the Bannā family relocated to Cairo so Ḥasan could attend the teacher's training college Dār al-ʿUlūm. The transition to the city was extremely difficult: the family moved almost twenty times between August 1924 and January 1926 (moves that continued into the early 1930s). During the day Ḥasan studied topics like Islamic modernism and Western literature at the college, and in his spare time he worked with his father and brother repairing watches and taking odd jobs.[30]

Upon graduation in 1927, Ḥasan took a teaching job in Ismāʿīlīyyah along the Suez Canal, and continued associating with different clubs. He joined the Association for the Prevention of Narcotics and an unidentified "worker's club" associated with one of the Canal Zone cooperative societies. Meanwhile, a Syrian journalist (in political exile from French mandate Syria) named Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb decided to found a club of his own. Khaṭīb had been attending meetings of an Egyptian publisher's circle held at the Cairo YMCA, and decided to establish a Muslim version of the club: the Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA). With the backing of politicians from the National Party [al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī], the YMMA thus opened in Cairo in fall 1927 as a sports club, society to counter Christian missionary efforts, and socialization space for upper class, Western-educated Egyptians. The YMMA fostered both nationalism and pan-Islamic internationalism (its president was educated in Paris, its vice president at al-Azhar and

[29] Ḥasan al-Bannā, *Mudhakkirāt al-daʿwah wa-l-dāʿīyyah* (Kuwait: Maktabat Āfāq, 2012 [First ed. 1950]), 8–26; Gudrun Krämer, *Hasan al-Banna* (London: Oneworld, 2013).

[30] Ḥasan al-Bannā, *Mudhakkirāt al-daʿwah wa al-dāʿīyyah*, 43–85; Jamāl al-Bannā, *Khiṭābāt Ḥasan al-Bannā al-shābb ilá abīhi* (Cairo: Dār al-fikr al-Islāmī, 1990), 43–44; Brynjar Lia, "Autobiography or Fiction? Ḥasan al-Bannā's Memoirs Revisited," *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies* 15 (2015): 199–226.

Oxford). Since Ḥasan knew some of the YMMA's founders from his time at Dār al-ʿUlūm, he sent in his subscription, and became a member of the association. Within a year, he was writing articles for the YMMA paper, *al-Fatḥ*.[31]

In late spring 1929, Ḥasan al-Bannā, Aḥmad al-Sukkarī (his friend from the Ḥaṣṣāfiyyah Society for Charity), and Ḥāmid ʿAskariyyah decided to begin holding their own meetings in Ismāʿīlīyyah; they named the club the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's first pamphlet (released in June 1929) was nineteen pages, and printed in response to two events that had transpired in May: the release of a new draft law on Egyptian compulsory education, and a speech by Benito Mussolini on the Lateran Accords with the Vatican. Responding to these events, the pamphlet wrote "the Italian Parliament decided to make obligatory the teaching of catechism in secondary schools." The pamphlet praised the Italians for expanding religious education; it then asked the government to follow the Western example, citing Friederich Fröbel and Victor Hugo. (The pamphlet cited no Islamic scriptures or traditions.)[32]

The society started modestly, with members painting advertisements on walls in the middle of the night, recruiting through kinship and friendship networks, and inviting men from local mosques. Initially, the club focused on Sufi piety, charitable work, and education, working to respond to the proliferation of English Protestant schools of the Egypt General Mission (EGM) in Ismāʿīlīyyah. In its first few years, the Ikhwān fundraised to establish new schools that could compete with the missionary schools, opening the Islamic Freedom Institute (est. 1931) and the School for Mothers of the

[31] Ibid.; Mehdi Sajid, "A Reappraisal of the Role of Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb and the YMMA in the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 29: no. 2 (2018): 195–200.

[32] Johannes J.G. Jansen, "Ḥasan al-Bannā's Earliest Pamphlet," *Die Welt des Islams* 32, no. 2 (1992): 254–258.

Believers (est. 1932). Borrowing from the YMMA, the club took an Islamic internationalist position; but unlike the elite-oriented YMMA, the Ikhwān worked to recruit working-class and lower middle-class Egyptians from towns and cities. The Ikhwān also maintained ties with the YMMA as a source of legitimacy and political connections.[33]

Two developments were important for the club's takeoff. The first came in summer 1933, when Egypt was rocked by the Turkiyya Ḥasan affair, a public scandal concerning Christian missionaries accused of trying to convert a Muslim orphan girl. The scandal represented a public contest of jurisdiction between European missionary schools, the Egyptian government (working to abolish the Capitulations), and Muslim lay societies (challenging the hegemony of al-Azhar and government inaction on the missionary problem). A coalition of the YMMA, National Party, and Ikhwān thus established a League for the Defense of Islam in response to the Turkiyya Ḥasan scandal; in an effort to catch up, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and al-Azhar established their own initiatives. But the campaign and the political competitions it inspired were a turning point for the Ikhwān: the Brothers circulated petitions, and convinced Khaṭīb to help them underwrite a weekly journal (*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*, est. June 1933). By the end of the year, the Brotherhood had doubled its branches.[34]

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[33] Israel Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39," *Middle Eastern Studies* 22, no. 3 (July 1986): 381–382; Beth Baron, *The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 85–150.

[34] Notably, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*'s first issue listed al-Khaṭīb as the journal's director, Shaykh Ṭanṭāwī Jawharī as the editor, and al-Bannā as the "editor of the religious section." Mehdi Sajid, "A Reappraisal of the Role of Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb," 203.

Also see: Beth Baron, *The Orphan Scandal,* 85–150; Heather J. Sharkey, *American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in an Age of Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 106–130; Maḥmūd ʿAssāf, *Maʿa al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Cairo: Maktabat ʿAyn Shams, 1993), 32–34; Richard P. Mitchell*, The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 185–188.

The Arab Revolt in Palestine gave the Brotherhood another boost. The Ikhwān and YMMA ran outspoken campaigns promoting a pan-Islamic front against British imperialism in Palestine, and the Brotherhood's 1936–1939 fundraising drive was a huge success, and gave the organization a windfall of capital. By fall 1937, an independent surveyor estimated Brotherhood membership to be about 20,000, and in 1938, the club founded its first weekly publication, *al-Nadhīr*. By 1940, the Brothers were offering regular Tuesday lectures, scouting activities, public speaking classes, study groups, and small libraries. And although membership numbers for the organization remain unreliable, branch numbers provide insight into the club's expansion (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 – Number of Muslim Brotherhood Branches, 1929–1944

Year	Branches
1929	4
1930	5
1931	10
1932	15 (9 branches in the Delta, 5 in the Canal Zone, and 1 in Cairo)
1933	---
1934	---
1935	31
1936 (Spring)	45
(Autumn)	74
1937	---
1938	100 (Gershoni)/300 (Mitchell)*
1939	120 (Gershoni)
1940	500 (Mitchell)

* Mitchell's numbers are based on branch numbers as reported in Ikhwān newspapers; Gershoni's numbers are based on lists of actual branches.

Sources: Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 328; Israel Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39," 367–397; Beth Baron, *The Orphan Scandal,* 128.

By 1938 the club was not only competitive—it had become a leader in extra-parliamentary politics, and was approached by Palace politicians to foster a working relationship.[35] And notably, 1941 marked the first year Ḥasan al-Bannā's parents (who were being supported by their eldest son) considered themselves economically prosperous and free from poverty: as Ḥasan's younger brother Jamāl recorded, that year for first time—and for each year thereafter—their father Shaykh Aḥmad recorded "I have paid alms [zakat], thanks be to God for this success."[36]

Although the Brotherhood had many competitors by the 1940s, one immediate rival was the Society of Our Master Muḥammad's Youth (Jamāʿat Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad). The Muḥammad's Youth faction split from the Brotherhood in autumn 1939. The original cause of the schism had been threefold. First, there was a disagreement over money (Bannā being accused of using funds gathered for the Palestine War for internal administrative purposes). Second, there was a leadership dispute over the role of Brotherhood deputy Aḥmad al-Sukkarī, who had accepted Prime Minister ʿAlī Māhir Pasha's offer of patronage. This placed the Brotherhood in the orbit of the palace (like Young Egypt), and generated dispute over whether the Ikhwān should associate itself with political parties. Third, there was a quarrel over praxis: Muḥammad's Youth activists demanded armed resistance against the British and argued the Brothers should go fight in Palestine, while the Ikhwān (wanting to keep its members out of prison) preached gradualism and reformism.[37]

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[35] ʿAbd al-Fattah Muhammad el-Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question* 1928–1947 (London: Tauris, 1998); Israel Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39," 367–397.

[36] Jamāl al-Bannā, *Khiṭābāt Ḥasan al-Bannā al-shābb ilá abīhi*, 49; ʿAbd al-Fattah Muhammad el-Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question* 1928–1947 (London: Tauris, 1998), 29–67.

[37] Richard P. Mitchell*, The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 17–19.

Overall, the faction that broke with the Brotherhood to create Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad did not command the same numbers as the Ikhwān. However, the club remained vibrant on account of its high-commitment cells, strict approach to membership, and the high level of tension and distinction it maintained between its community of members and Egyptian society at large.[38] The organization also boasted the support of a number of ex-Young Egypt and ex-Brotherhood leaders, including youth leader Ḥusayn Yūsuf (who became the editor of the club's eponymous journal *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad,* est. 1940) and Maḥmūd Abū Zayd, (editor of the Brotherhood magazine *al-Nadhīr*, who left to join Muḥammad's Youth in 1940, taking the Brotherhood's publishing license with him).[39]

The Workers' Vanguard and the EMNL in a Competitive Market

For individuals not interested in joining clubs like Young Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, or Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad, Egyptian communist clubs represented an important alternative. Communist clubs were active and tenacious, if difficult to track and map: communist groups existed underground, and frequently underwent name changes and reinventions linked to schisms, mergers, government bans, arrests, and the use of organizational fronts. Figure 2.3 below sketches the main communist clubs between 1939–1951 (including club names and aliases, founders, dates of activity, and the periodicals associated with various organizations).

[38] For a discussion of this, see Laurence R. Iannaccone, "Why Strict Churches Are Strong," *American Journal of Sociology* 99, no. 5 (March 1994): 1180–1211.

[39] Al-Azhar graduate Ḥāfiẓ Salāmah, a shaykh with a following in the Canal Zone, would also become a member of the society. Richard P. Mitchell*, The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 17–19.

Figure 2.3 – Egyptian Communist Clubs, 1939–1951



Sources: The IISH Ṭalīʿat al-ʿUmmāl and Egyptian Communists in Exile Collections; Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 33–113; Tareq Y. Ismael and Rifaʿat el-Saʿid, *The Communist Movement in Egypt,* 32–81.

A few things are worth noting about the chart. Prior to 1946, major communist clubs and trends included the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation/EMNL (est. 1943 by Henri Curiel), the New Dawn group (est. 1945 by Yūsuf Darwīsh, Raymond Duwayk [alt. Douek], Aḥmad Ṣādiq Saʿd, and Aḥmad Rushdī Ṣāliḥ), People's Liberation (Taḥrīr al-Shaʿb, est. 1939 by Marcel Israel), and Iskra (est. 1942 by Hillel Schwartz). Besides Ṣāliḥ, the founders of all these clubs were Jewish. Among these groups, it is also worth noting two major poles of communist activity: the relatively stable New Dawn/Workers' Vanguard bloc (on the left side of the chart) and the mercurial EMNL-DMNL (on the right side of the chart). The Workers' Vanguard [Ṭalīʿat al-ʿUmmāl] was anchored by its journal *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, its publishing interests, and its four founders (Darwīsh, Duwayk, Saʿd, and Ṣāliḥ), while the EMNL underwent many mergers and divisions.

The Workers' Vanguard had its roots in the Union of Peace Partisans, an interwar anti-fascist league established in 1934. The Union attracted a mélange of highly educated elite Egyptians and Europeans, who gathered to discuss world events such as the Spanish Civil War, the Abyssinia Crisis, the appointment of Adolf Hitler as German Chancellor, and the beginning of the Ioannis Metaxas regime in Greece. Darwīsh, Duwayk, and Saʿd all joined the Union; all three had studied at French lycées. Darwīsh was freshly returned from France when he joined the league—he had studied law at the University of Toulouse, where he gained an interest in anti-fascism. Duwayk, meanwhile, had been introduced to Marxism by Greek communists. Saʿd, on the other hand, spoke both French and Arabic, having learned Arabic from an al-Azhar scholar. Together, the three friends decided to establish *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* in 1945 (thanks to the addition of Ṣāliḥ, whose familial connections to the government allowed them to secure a publishing license). The

journal gave them a platform, and from there the four founded an underground communist association, the Popular Vanguard for Liberation, which by 1950 had changed its name to the Workers' Vanguard (to reflect the club's focus on workers and union organizing in Shubrā al-Khaymah).[40]

A second major center for communist activism was the EMNL, a club founded by Henri Curiel. The son of a Jewish banker and a Turkish Jewish mother (who had converted to Catholicism), Henri's family held Italian citizenship and lived in a mansion in the wealthy Cairo neighborhood of Zamalek; he grew up speaking French and attending Jesuit school. In 1930, however, he suffered a blow when his father decided Henri would not depart for university in France like his eldest brother Raoul (studying Sanskrit at the Sorbonne)—Henri would finish his law degree in Cairo, and go to work at the bank. As Henri put it, "It was for me an event that plunged me into the deepest despair. Never had I considered anything but leaving for France: it was not a dream, it was the fate of all my cousins, all my classmates. …it was difficult to find a real place of attachment… the only homeland to which I had felt attached was France—[now] become suddenly inaccessible." Henri grudgingly went to work at the bank; he found release with an illness in 1937 that sent him to convalesce in Savoy for a year. But when his father finally capitulated and agreed to let him stay in France, Germany's annexation of the Sudentenland in September 1938 made the patriarch change his mind again. Henri

[40] Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 6–12; Tareq Y. Ismael and Rifaʿat el-Saʿid, *The Communist Movement in Egypt,* 33–45; *Irmgard Schrand, Jews in Egypt,* 147–150.

returned to Cairo; in 1939 he presented himself at the French Consulate to volunteer to join the French Army—to no avail.[41]

Since Henri's brother Raoul was back in Cairo and working to establish the Democratic Union (an anti-fascist league more Marxist in orientation than its competitor, the Union of Peace Partisans), Henri joined the club along with his cousin Diane Rossano (introduced in Chapter 1); Diane became the club librarian. In was in this milieu that Curiel became a communist; he said he could not remember how it happened, only that it had been like a "new birth." (His wife later said it was Henri's brother Raoul who had introduced him to Marxism). In 1941, Henri opened a bookshop (which an American attaché described as stocking French communist newspapers, books on the Soviet Union in English, French, and Arabic,[42] and pictures of Stalin).[43]

Because of these activities, Henri was arrested in June 1942, as part of a general roundup of political dissidents as General Erwin Rommel was making his push across Libya toward the Egyptian border.[44] More determined following his prison stay and the 1943 dissolution of the Democratic Union, Henri decided to establish his own communist club. It was just after the Battle of Stalingrad, and Stalin's victory over Hitler had made him the hero of the anti-fascist movement. Inspired, Henri and some ex-Unionists thus decided to establish the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation; Henri's cousin Diane Rossano was among the first recruits (and in turn, she said her husband Osman

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[41] Henri Curiel, *Pages autobiographiques: une contribution à l'histoire de la naissance du Parti Communiste Égyptien de 1940 à 1950* (Typescript, 1977), vi–viii, 12–14, 27 in IISH ARCH01722/Folder 402; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 36–37, 49–51.

[42] The Arabic books were likely part of the EMNL's "Green Book" series; as part of this series, EMNL members had translated Stalin, Lenin, and Marx into Arabic.

[43] Henri Curiel, *Pages autobiographiques,* vi–viii, 12–14, 27; Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 38; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 74–75, 84.

[44] Ibid.

would be "my first recruit").[45] In October 1943, the friends launched the club with a cadet training course at "the Palace," the Curiel's country home. There, some six instructors and two dozen trainees (including Egyptian workers, students, and one student from al-Azhar) gathered to read the texts of Stalin, learn about dialectical materialism, discuss Egyptian social problems, and sing "La Marseillaise" and "The International."[46]

As Henri later explained, the name "Egyptian Movement for National Liberation" communicated specific alignments: they chose the word "Egyptian" to distinguish themselves from Iskra (whose name was Russian and membership largely foreigners).[47] They wanted to include the term "communist," but decided against it—communism was illegal in Egypt and surrounded by "incredible prejudices" thanks to British propaganda (as Curiel put it, in the Egyptian imagination communism was associated with "the most extravagant vices"). Instead, they chose the words "National Liberation," to emphasize the club's anti-fascist and anti-imperialist orientation.[48] A phrase linked to Lenin's 1916 "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," the "national liberation" vocabulary had become popular among European communists in the interwar period as an alternative to fascist "nationalism"[49]—it was a vocabulary that movements in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia would adopt for the next three decades.

In terms of membership, illegal communist groups like the Workers' Vanguard, the EMNL, and Iskra organized themselves as small, covert cells of 5-10 members each, with cell leaders reporting to a central committee. And although figures are sparse and

[45] Didar Fawzy-Rossano, *Mémoires d'une militante communiste (1942–1990): du Caire à Alger, Paris et Genève, lettres aux miens* (Paris: Éditions l'Harmattan, 1997), 48-49, 62.
[46] Henri Curiel, *Pages autobiographiques,* 34-37; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 95.
[47] Iskra, or "Spark" in Russian, had been the name of Lenin's newspaper.
[48] Henri Curiel, *Pages autobiographiques,* 34-37; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 95.
[49] Nigel Harris, *National Liberation* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990).

unreliable, at peak membership, the EMNL likely counted 600-700 members (ca. 1947).[50] When the EMNL, Iskra, al-Qalʿah, and People's Liberation combined to form the DMNL in 1947, the new merger gave the DMNL approximately 1600 members (ca. 1947). Buoyed by student and worker demonstrations, the DMNL then reportedly grew to some 4000-5000 members before breaking into more than twenty splinter groups (a fragmentation precipitated by the 1948 Palestine War). But these figures were still small compared to the Brotherhood—which by the late 1940s claimed to command some 250,000 members.[51]

In addition to underground cells, communist clubs recruited through organizational fronts. These fronts were varied, and included: unions, workers' literacy courses, university study groups, women's clubs, English courses, bookstores, publishing enterprises, and cultural clubs (based around the reading of French literature, English literature, and Russian literature in French translation).[52] Through these venues, communist underground associations could publicly engage in marketing, networking, and recruitment.

[50] Al-Qalʿah counted around 150 members (ca. 1945–1946). Smaller breakaway groups such as the Marxist League (al-ʿUsbah al-Mārksīyyah; est. 1946, founder Fawzī Jurjis) counted only around 60 members.

[51] Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Tārīkh al-ḥarakah al-shuyūʿīyyah al-Miṣrīyyah*, al-Mujallad 3 (Cairo: 2007), 503–504; Tareq Y. Ismael and Rifaʿat el-Saʿid, *The Communist Movement in Egypt,* 53–64; Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism*, 231–234; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart,* 143.

[52] For instance, the EMNL had al-Midan bookstore and the Social Cultural Center (al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī wa-l-Ijtimāʿī) as fronts; Iskra had the House of Scientific Research publishing company (Dār al-Abḥāth al-ʿIlmīyyah); People's Liberation had the club Bread and Freedom (al-Kubz wa-l-Ḥurrīyyah); and the Workers' Vanguard had Le Groupe d'Études, the Office of Union Services (Maktab al-Khadmāt al-Naqibīyyah), the Workers' Committee for National Liberation (Lajnat al-ʿUmmāl li-l-Taḥrīr al-Qawmī), and Twentieth Century House publishing company (Dār al-Qarn al-ʿAshrīn).

"You Only had to Strike a Match…": Affiliation in the Postwar World

World War II brought to Egypt an influx of foreign troops—a mix of English, Polish, Australian, New Zealander, South African, Indian, Canadian, French, and Greek servicemen. By November 1941, the Commonwealth garrison in Cairo alone had swelled to 140,000 men. The large influx of men was a great disruption to the city's social life: drunk soldiers caroused through the downtown, robbing and assaulting passersby, harassing women, commandeering Egyptian cars and taxis, and engaging in the "tarbush game" (competing to see who could knock the most red hats off Egyptian pedestrians). Egyptian General Muḥammad al-Najīb [Naguib] recalled getting in a fight on a bus with an intoxicated British soldier, and being assaulted by three drunken South Africans, who hit him over the head with a beer bottle and stole his wallet.[53] As late as 1954, Diane Rossano said she was "still furious at the memory of these colossal drunks" assaulting girls (she had been caught, then rescued by her brother).[54] Muslim Brotherhood member Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl and communist activist Mubārak ʿAbdu Faḍl similarly listed the disturbances caused by soldiers "rampaging" through the downtown as motivating activism.[55] As Najīb reasoned, by the end of the war, the average Egyptian would cheer any ideology that promised an end to British occupation.[56]

[53] Artemis Cooper, *Cairo in the War, 1939-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 112–119; Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *Historical Dictionary of Egypt, 4th Ed.* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 442; Mohammed Neguib, *Egypt's Destiny* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1955), 84-85. [English version predates the Arabic.]

[54] Didar Fawzy-Rossano, *Mémoires d'une militante communiste*, 52, 101.

[55] Mubārak ʻAbdu Faḍl, "Mudhakkirāt," in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʻīyūn: maḥāḍir niqāsh, taqārīr, mudhakkirāt, rasāʾil, taḥqīqāt qaḍāʿīyyah, bayānāt intikhābīyyah* (Cairo: Sharikat al-Amal li-l-Ṭibāʿah wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1989), 125–126; Aḥmad ʻĀdil Kamāl, *al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-ḥurūf: al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-l-niẓām al-khāṣṣ* (Cairo: al-Zahrāʾ li-l-Iʿlām al-ʿArabī, Qism al-Nashr, 1989), 123–179.

[56] Mohammed Neguib, *Egypt's Destiny*, 84-85.

Wartime events also affected the Egyptian political system. The war cut Egypt off from foreign imports, and factories began producing goods locally. High employment and the government's desire to avoid strikes gave workers bargaining power,[57] and when the industrial bubble collapsed at the end of the war, communist clubs like the Workers' Vanguard and the EMNL worked to convert discontent to action.[58] The war also inspired Egyptian plots to use the Germans to unseat the British, and triggered a political crisis that would later be remembered as the "4 February incident." The crisis was caused by the resignation of the Egyptian Prime Minister in January 1942; but with German forces advancing in the Western Desert and a pro-Axis politician (ʿAlī Māhir Pasha) organizing street demonstrations and vying for the vacant Prime Minister's office, British Ambassador Miles Lampson intervened. The Ambassador gave King Fārūq an ultimatum: appoint Muṣṭafā Naḥḥās (head of the Wafd Party), to form a government by 4 February, or accept the consequences. But King Fārūq balked: Naḥḥās in office would weaken the Palace's position, while Māhir would strengthen it. When the deadline lapsed on 4 February, Lampson ordered the British military to surrounded ʿĀbdīn Palace with tanks and armored trucks. Then, he stormed inside and presented the king with an abdication proclamation. The move inspired Fārūq's cooperation: he agreed to appoint a Wafdist cabinet, and Naḥḥās assumed office.[59]

But Lampson's show of arms had unintended consequences. Naḥḥās' opponents used the incident to demolish the Wafd's credentials as the symbol of the Egyptian nationalist

[57] Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile,* 306.
[58] Henri Curiel, *Pages autobiographiques,* 38 in IISH ARCH01722/Folder 402.
[59] Charles D. Smith, "4 February 1942: Its Causes and Its Influence on Egyptian Politics and on the Future of Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1937-1945," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10 (1979): 453–479.

struggle—that very trait the British had been hoping to use to restore order. Naḥḥās was publicly condemned as a traitor and British agent, and the Wafd, once the symbol of Egyptian nationalism, was accused of being a British pawn.[60] This weakness inspired political challengers: in spring 1943, politician Makram ʿUbayd (called Egypt's human "political barometer" by the British residency[61]) capitalized on the moment by publishing a scathing exposé of Wafd corruption. His book, called *The Black Book in the Black Era* [*al-Kitāb al-Aswad fī al-ʿAhd al-Aswad*] was a lurid and detailed catalogue of graft, election-fixing, nepotism, bribery, war profiteering, price-fixing, contracting schemes, and other misdeeds perpetrated by Naḥḥās and the Wafd.[62]

As Rifʿat Saʿīd has pointed out, the popularity of Muṣṭafā al-Naḥḥās and the Wafd had been a barrier limiting the influence of clubs like the Muslim Brotherhood and Miṣr al-Fatāh in the 1930s.[63] However, the two scandals—4 February and *The Black Book*—created a rush of disaffiliations from the Wafd, as a political exodus sent activists in search of new outlets for political participation, swelling club membership rosters. Activists remembered the sea change well: Muṣṭafá Haykal related that 4 February destroyed any thoughts he had of joining the Wafd, and gave him the final push he needed to become a Marxist, and military officer ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿAbd al-Raʾūf decided to join the Muslim Brotherhood that year.[64] Wafd supporter and university student Laṭīfa al-Zayāt similarly explained that in 1943 (her second year of university), she faced a

[60] Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 18–20.
[61] "Report to the Empire Communist Parties Conference in London," 26 February to 3 March 1947, in *Communism*, FO 141/1158 [1947].
[62] Makram ʿUbayd, *al-Kitāb al-aswad fī al-ʿahd al-aswad* (Cairo: al-Markaz al-ʿArabī li-l-Baḥth wa-l-Nashr, 1984 [First ed. 1943]).
[63] Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Tārīkh al-munaẓẓamāt al-yasārīyyah al-Miṣrīyyah, 1940–1950* (Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfah al-Jadīdah, 1976), 89.
[64] Interview with Mustafa Haykal, in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 212.

decision of affiliation—and the only two remaining options seemed to be the communists or the Brotherhood. As she recalled, "Any real nationalist[65] had to make a choice, a decision, to become a communist or a member of the Muslim Brotherhood…. This was especially true after the failure of the established parties."[66]

Activist clubs worked to capitalize on the Wafd's troubles. The Brotherhood took the crisis as an opportunity to expand into politics. As part of this drive, Ḥasan al-Bannā announced his candidature for the Ismāʿīlīyyah House of Representatives seat in March 1942. Concerned, Naḥḥās pressured Bannā to withdraw in exchange for a government license to resume printing *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*. Bannā agreed, and withdrew his candidature—but the decision angered club members and produced a bout of disaffiliations.[67] Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad, meanwhile, capitalized on the moment by poaching members and denouncing the Ikhwān's "ignominious capitulation."[68]

Communist clubs also expanded after 1942. A first wave of growth from 1942–1945 saw the founding of Iskra and al-Qalʿah (est. 1942), the EMNL (est. 1943), and the journal *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* (est. 1945, which expanded into the Workers' Vanguard in 1946). The Ismāʿīl Ṣidqī government gave more wind to the communist movement. Some 50,000 workers had been laid off at the end of the war, and the end of censorship had

[65] Al-Zayāt's statement highlights the predominantly nationalist character of Egyptian communist doctrine: while some European members of Egyptian communist clubs like Iskra and the EMNL maintained the internationalist focus of European communism, their rejection of nationalism was highly unpopular with Egyptian members, and generated tension and debate. See: Tareq Ismael, *The Communist Movement in Egypt*, 154.

[66] Laṭīfa al-Zayāt interview with Selma Botman, 9 February 1980, Cairo. As quoted in Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 51–52;

[67] "Report: Abdul Kader Mukhtar," Dispatch from the Cairo City Police to the British Embassy, 28 April 1944, in *Young Egypt Party*, FO 141/951 [1944]; Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt* (Washington, D.C., 1950), 40–41; Muḥammad Ṣābir ʿArab, *Ḥādith 4 Fibrāyir 1942 wa-l-ḥayāh al-siyāsīyyah al-Miṣrīyyah* (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1985), 284–285.

[68] Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, 249.

opened up the press; as a result, a broad coalition of Wafdist, communists, and Brotherhood students organized demonstrations. When police opened fire on protesters in February, the movement ballooned. Consequently, on 8 March the British government announced it would evacuate Egypt, leaving military personnel only in the Canal Zone. Worried the success would inspire more demonstrations and the reinstatement of the Wafd, the Ṣidqī government offered the Muslim Brotherhood paper and a publishing license to make *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* into a daily if it would help break up strikes and demonstrations. The Ikhwān complied, providing lists of names and addresses of activists on strike; the Brothers also deployed teams to urge workers to return to their posts (and when that failed, intimidated workers with sticks and pistols). As a result, the Ṣidqī government was able to close down leftist magazines and arrest hundreds of activists in "The Great Communist Plot" that summer.[69]

The Brotherhood's deal with Ṣidqī caused an appreciable loss of members, however. And while arrests temporarily disrupted communist clubs, in the long-run the arrests proved counterproductive. The Ṣidqī government was forced to release most of the activists for lack of evidence, and the communists emerged looking like the standard-bearers of the national cause. As EMNL recruiter Yusuf Hazan described it, "Recruit? The word doesn't fit. You only had to strike a match and everything went up in flames… Everybody wanted to join us!"[70]

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[69] Ahmed Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt,* 68–77; Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 369–372. For more details on the vicissitudes of the Brotherhood-Ṣidqī alliance, see Malak Badrawi, *Isma'il Sidqi (1875–1950): Pragmatism and Vision in Twentieth Century Egypt* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996), 148–160.

[70] Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism*, 214; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 119–130; Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 341–355

Overall then, wartime blows to two major Egyptian political players (the British and the Wafd), as well the Brotherhood–Ṣidqī alliance of 1946, opened up the field for social activists. The result was a competitive political field for activist clubs, as the EMNL, the Workers' Vanguard, the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt, Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad, and other clubs contended for the loyalties of young Egyptians. By the 1940s, activist Abū Sayf Yūsuf thus estimated at least 20 communist factions,[71] and the British Arabist James Heyworth-Dunne noted a highly competitive environment of some 135 Muslim religious societies (most of which were charitable, but some of which engaged in politics).[72] Young Egyptians therefore had a variety of options from which to choose when deciding on routes for political engagement.

Choosing a Club: Ping-Pong, Football, and Reading Groups

Considering this competitive market for extra-parliamentary activism, how did Egyptians choose which club to join? In fact, while activists often had a vague knowledge about the platforms of the Ikhwān, Young Egypt, and communist clubs prior to joining, interviews and memoirs emphasized that it was club amenities, relationships, and contingency that sparked most affiliation decisions. Friendships or repeated contact with clubs then led to a more sustained consumption of club literature. Thus, decisions to affiliate were often not a sudden ideological awakening as much as they were a process.

Jābir Qumayḥah, for instance, remembered that as a boy he had loved ping-pong. In his early teens, he was on the school ping-pong team, which was overseen by a teacher

[71] Abū Sayf Yūsuf, "Muqadima," in *Wathā'iq wa mawāqif min tārīkh al-Yasār al-Miṣrī, 1941–1957* (Cairo: Sharikat al-Amal li-l-Ṭibāʿah wa-l-Nashr, 2000). [Henceforth, *Wathā'iq*.]

[72] He provides a partial list of these organizations on pages 90–91 of the book. See J. Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt*, 30.

who was a Muslim Brotherhood member. "The thing that drew me to the Brotherhood branch was the presence of a ping-pong table," he explained; he would go after school to play.[73] Maḥmūd ʿAssāf joined the Muslim Brotherhood around the same time. In 1941, while on summer break from university, ʿAssāf joined a sports scrimmage in his hometown of al-Qaṭāwiyyah (Abu Ḥammād). Their club had no place to practice, and frequently played in the yards of members' families. One day, the group asked the local school headmaster, Shaykh Muḥammad Salīm al-Bakrī, if they could use Bakrī's yard for practices. The shaykh agreed—but since he was a local division head for the Ikhwān, he agreed on the condition they attend Ikhwān lectures and name their sports club after the Society. That same summer, ʿAssāf's cousin gave him some of the *rasāʾil* [Bannā's messages], which ʿAssāf read and found moving. When ʿAssāf returned to Cairo after summer break, these positive experiences prompted him to get in touch with Brotherhood members on campus.[74]

Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, on the other hand, (mentioned in the introduction) joined the Ikhwān in mid-1942, due in part to the Brothers' persistence. Sixteen at the time, Aḥmad had been headed to cinema, when one of his friends noticed a conveniently located prayer hall on the street and asked if he could stop to pray. The boys said yes—but waited for their friend outside. After a long and boring wait, however, an Ikhwān member came and invited them inside. Eager to hurry the process along, the boys signed the club's membership roster and left; Aḥmad never planned to go back. However, he was later visited at home by a Brotherhood member, whose job was to follow up with absentee

[73] Jābir Qumayḥah, *Dhikrayātī maʿa daʿwah al-ikhwān fī al-munzilah daqahlīyyah* (Giza: Markaz al-Iʿlām al-ʿArabī, 2009).

[74] Maḥmūd ʿAssāf, *Maʿa al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Cairo: Maktabat ʿAyn Shams, 1993), 226–227.

members. Through this *iftiqād* or follow-up visit,[75] the Brotherhood convinced Aḥmad to attend a second lecture. This time, the lecture was about hope. Aḥmad found it stirring, and continued coming back to hear the engaging speaker, Muḥammad al-Khudarī.[76]

Like Brotherhood activists, communists often recounted being introduced to communist clubs through social networks and club services. In fact, even more than the Brotherhood, communists recruited only close friends and relatives (to guard against denunciation and arrest). There were a few exceptions: Sharīf Ḥatāta described falling in with communist circles as the result of contingency and person-to-person networking. He was looking for a route to nationalist political activism, and Iskra provided the opportunity. "I didn't really choose Iskra," Ḥatāta explained, "I became interested in the national movement.... I was contacted by people from the organization and went to the cultural club called Dār al-Abḥāth… but it could have been anybody else. They were the people who were there at the moment."[77]

There were a few clubs like the Egyptian Communist Organization that broke this protocol, and tried cold-contact recruiting at factories. The policy ended in disaster: the police rounded up the activists, and the ECO's membership dropped from 500 members (January 1949) to 250 members (March–April 1949)—and by the start of 1950, only ten members remained. Leader Muḥammad Sid Aḥmad explained the plummet in membership frankly: "The party required people to try to recruit among workers. You can just imagine young Jewish girls from the center of Cairo going to Shubrā al-Khaymah

[75] The *iftiqād* [inspection, check], was a popular technology of organization in the 1930s and 1940s. The Muslim Brotherhood used it in their recruiting; Coptic youth organizers also used it as a strategy. See: S.S. Hasan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 79.

[76] Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, *al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-ḥurūf*, 42–55.

[77] Sharīf Ḥatāta interview with Selma Botman, 28 February 1980, Cairo. As quoted in Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 50–51. Also see the interview with Sulaymān al-Rifāʿī, 12 January 1976, Cairo, in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 110–112.

under martial law and without any experience. People ended up being arrested. In practical terms, it was a kind of suicidal line."[78]

Multiple Affiliations and Switching: From the Muslim Brotherhood to the EMNL

As the Egyptian market for clubs was competitive, one interesting feature of Egyptian activism was that individuals often held multiple affiliations, cross-recruited from other organizations, and engaged in "switching" between organizations.[79] Some activists concurrently affiliated with and/or switched between conservative clubs: ʿAbd al-Qādir Mukhtār, for instance, was simultaneously on the council of the YMMA and a member of Young Egypt. Other activists similarly described being part of the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt, and/or the YMMA, and switching between these organizations.[80]

Ḥasan Dawḥ, for instance, had grown up in the village of Ṭafnīs in Upper Egypt, and had first encountered the Muslim Brotherhood when two of their guest speakers, Aḥmad Rifʿat Effendi and Shaykh Jundī (an al-Azhar student), visited his village. The young Dawḥ was particularly inspired by Rifʿat Effendi, who took a modern approach to Islamic scripture. As Dawḥ explained, "our admiration for the *effendi* that preached religion was more than our admiration for the shaykh" with his traditional clothes. However, Dawḥ's excitement soon turned sour, when the village received a letter claiming Rifʿat had "received a revelation and become a prophet." Whether the claim was true or just an

[78] Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 95–100.
[79] See for instance FO 371/63033 and FO 371/69250.
[80] Cairo City Police Report on Abdul Kader Mukhtar, 26 April 1944, Ref. 231/9/44 in *Young Egypt Party*, FO 141/951 [1944]; Maḥmūd Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn: Aḥdath ṣanaʿat al-tārīkh, ruʾyah min al-dākhil, Juzʾ 1* (Alexandria: Dār al-Daʿwah, 1994), 34–40.

attempt to discredit Rifʿat, the mockery Dawḥ endured for having supported the Brotherhood preacher left him disenchanted.[81]

Despite this rocky start, as a high school student in 1940 Ḥasan Dawḥ joined a Sufi order (the *tariqat al-khlūtīyyah*), led by the respected ʿ*ālim* Shaykh ʿAbd al-Jawwād al-Dūmī. Dawḥ said he found the order helpful for introducing him to Azhari networks; he also explained the order helped him through his difficult transition from village to city, and three years of health issues (including five surgeries). However, Dawḥ ultimately found the order itself too esoteric, and its older members seemed uninterested in current events and political activism. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, stood out for its younger membership, which like Dawḥ was energetic and interested in engaging with political issues. As a result, Dawḥ renewed his ties with the Ikhwān in 1944, during his first year in the Faculty of Law at the University of Cairo.[82]

While individuals commonly held multiple affiliations and switched between similar clubs (be it religious clubs like the Ikhwān and YMMA, or communist clubs like Iskra and the EMNL), individuals also held overlapping memberships and switched between religious and communist clubs. Aḥmad al-Gibālī was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, then left for a communist club after the 1946 strikebreaking incident. Ṭaha Saʿd ʿUthmān, for his part, was a longtime member of the Ikhwān (1935–1946), joined a Workers' Vanguard group in Shubrā al-Khaymah around 1942, and then left the Brotherhood in 1946.[83]

[81] He further notes that he found the speaking style of Mustafa Mumin and Said Ramadan particularly engaging. Ḥasan Dawḥ, *25 ʿāman fī jamāʿah: murūran bi-al-ghābah* (Cairo: Dār al-Iʿtiṣām, 1983), 12-20.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 237-239.

Despite stiff competition, relations between clubs were not always confrontational or hostile: Muṣṭafā Haykal described how he and his Marxist friends in al-Qalʿah had a good relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood activists in their neighborhood (near the Citadel), and sometimes attended meetings at the Ikhwān. Jewish EMNL member Raymond Stambouli, meanwhile, remembered how their cell was initially afraid of the Brotherhood, but while in prison in 1948, Curiel encouraged them to forge relationships with them, "man to man." As a result, the communists were invited to a *hashish* party thrown by the Brothers (not orthopraxis in the Brotherhood, but also not uncommon among Brothers in prison). The relationships also led to exchange: that summer, the imprisoned communists and Brothers discussed topics like Islam and revolution, and the origins of Egyptian property rights in French law.[84]

Cavalry officer Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn, meanwhile, joined the Muslim Brotherhood, Iskra, and the DMNL, all thanks to personal contacts. He had been raised in a Naqshabandī *takīyyah* (Sufi lodge), but around 1945, another military officer (Maḥmūd Labīb) approached him and a group of officers and invited them to the Muslim Brotherhood. After attending, Muḥyī al-Dīn and some of the other officers joined the Ikhwān. But even as members, the men held differing opinions about the Society: officer Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir [Gamal Abdel Nasser] remained suspicious that the Brothers were trying to use the officers to extend their networks in the army; Ṣalāḥ Khalīfah and Ḥusayn Ḥammūdah committed "body and soul" to the Brotherhood; other officers were "just seeking a direction," according to Muḥyī al-Dīn. Around the same time, another of Muḥyī al-Dīn's officer friends, ʿUthmān Fawzī, invited him to a discussion and reading

[84] Interview with Muṣṭafā Haykal, in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 211–223; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 157–158.

group (a Marxist front), where Muḥyī al-Dīn was introduced to communist literature, including *L'économie: moteur de l'histoire,* published in Algiers in 1943 by the French communist Roger Garaudy.[85]

For Muḥyī al-Dīn, these overlapping affiliations went on until 1946. That year, Muḥyī al-Dīn became one of the Brotherhood members who left in response to the Brotherhood–Ṣidqī alliance: as he wrote, he felt the Ikhwān had "revealed its political face, behaved as a political group, and abandoned pretensions of religious purity…. We started to feel that they were just like other politicians: they preferred their own interests over what they claim are principles."[86] The following year, a friend (Aḥmad Fuʾād) invited Muḥyī al-Dīn to join a different "study group" than the one Muḥyī al-Dīn was already attending. The young officer thus went to an Iskra meeting—but he did not return. As he explained, none of the club members were in the military, and he did not like the leader of the club: "Marxism was jumbled in his head in a very abnormal way… in his mind, it was confused with many other things, like atheism, for instance." In 1950, Fuʾād invited him to yet another meeting (this time hosted by the DMNL). After verifying that the group was respectful of religious faith, Muḥyī al-Dīn joined.[87]

Other communists reported being members of both communist clubs and the Wafd (before 1942), and/or al-Kutlah (after 1943). Ḥilmī Yasin, for example, was a member of the Wafd until it signed the 1936 Treaty; he then moved to Miṣr al-Fatāh. When he discovered the organization was in league with the Palace, however, he left Miṣr al-Fatāh

[85] After being expelled from the French Communist Party in 1970, Garaudy himself would ultimately "switch" from communism to Islamism in the 1980s, while maintaining his Marxist positions.

[86] Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam* [And Now I Speak] (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahrām li-l-Tarjamah wa-l-Nashr, Muʾassasat al-Ahrām, 1992), 47.

[87] Garaudy and other French communists had taken a leading role in the French resistance to the Vichy regime in Algeria; his book had thus gained some purchase in North Africa. Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 51.

and fell in with the communists around 1940. Muṣṭafā Ṭaybah also tried most of these groups. "I started as usual as a Wafdist, and then I went in the direction of Miṣr al-Fatāh. But also I joined the Muslim Brotherhood—for three or four days only." In 1946, he joined the EMNL.[88] Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir was similarly a member of Young Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the DMNL, and Muḥammad Anwar al-Sādāt summarized his history of varying commitments by writing that "I had joined every single political party in Egypt, either out of curiosity or in the hope that it might provide a way out of our predicament."[89]

Such experiences of switching suggest that for many Egyptians, communist clubs, Miṣr al-Fatāh, the Muslim Brotherhood (and to some extent the Wafd, Kutlah, and other political affiliations) could in fact serve as substitutes. Moreover, organizational recruitment policies tended to encourage affiliation *without* ideological commitment, in the hopes affiliation would lead to gradual conversion. Fawzy-Rossano remembered club leader Henri Curiel as being strict with cadres but adopting an "irritating flexibility with sympathizers."[90] Muslim Brotherhood membership protocols were especially pragmatic: no immediate conversion to a life of piety was required to be an associate of the group. Instead, there were four levels of membership—assistant/helper [musāʿid], member/affiliate [muntasib], worker [ʿāmil], and fighter [mujāhid]—and only those in more advanced ranks of the organization (e.g. workers and fighters) were required to commit to study the Qurʾān.[91]

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[88] Interview with Ḥilmī Yasin, 12 February 1978, Cairo, and Interview with Muṣṭafā Ṭaybah, 8 October 1978, Cairo in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 270–275, 342.

[89] Anwar El Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 59.

[90] Didar Fawzy-Rossano, *Mémoires d'une militante communiste*, 110.

[91] Brynjar Lia, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 103–108; Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 31.

Because public perception of communism was so negative, and because security demanded it, Marxist clubs introduced communist ideology even more gradually. Iskra and the EMNL, for instance, recruited through fronts like English classes, women's clubs, and student discussion groups, and only introduced ideology once they could ensure loyalty. Ḥilmī Yasin, for instance, reported that he attended an English club that was a communist front for six years, and never once heard the word "Marxist" or "communist." Sīdārūs likewise joined a league for female students, and only later realized (to her dismay, since she was a devout Copt) that the group was Marxist.[92]

Demographic Targeting and Barriers to Entry

Despite the fact that Egyptians often switched, clubs were not perfect substitutes: income level, religious and ethnic background, and educational upbringing all played a large role in determining which organizations activists selected. The Muslim Brotherhood's emphasis on Islamic piety, for instance, was most accessible to individuals who had grown up in villages and/or received a primary education at a Qurʾānic school/*kuttāb*. As Brotherhood ideologue Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī remembered of growing up in the village of Ṣafṭ Turāb in the 1930s, traditional Egyptian village life was structured around the religious field. Most young boys, if they received an education at all, studied at the local *kuttāb* (which was often attached to the home of the local shaykh). "Religion in our village—as it was in villages in Egypt generally speaking—was the primary

[92] Interview with Ḥilmī Yasin, 12 February 1978, Cairo, in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 270–275.

influence in people's lives. It was the first guide for people's thinking, the first source of their education… and the first influence of their behaviors."[93]

Dawḥ had studied in a village *kuttāb* before his family moved to Cairo. He described the move as a profound dislocation: in Cairo, he was shocked by the public visibility of urban women, who wore knee-length skirts and no veil. He found this new environment terrifying, frustrating, and incompatible with "my habits and my traditions." Calling the visibility of women the "most serious problem" that confused him as a new émigré to the city, he was appalled by beauty contests, images of women in magazines, pictures of actresses on cinema façades, and prostitutes. Explaining his outlook, Dawḥ wrote that even as an adult the "village still governs me today in much of my behavior… there are [certain] ethics imposed upon Ṭafnīs society, and I remain a prisoner to this morality."[94]

Communist clubs, meanwhile, appealed more to individuals who had studied at missionary schools and/or French-speaking secondary schools [*lycées*]. One reason for this was the communist emphasis on a Western reading curriculum (much of which was in French and English). These texts, and the epistemologies they emphasized, were most accessible to urban elites educated in *lycées*. Communist activists like Diane Fawzy-Rossano, Hillel Schwartz, Injī Aflāṭūn, Rifʿat al-Saʿīd, Marcel Israel, Muḥammad Sīd Aḥmad, Aḥmad Ṣādiq Saʿd, and Anwar ʿAbd al-Malik, for instance, had all received their educations in French *lycées*. (Fawzy-Rossano, for her part, remembered being sent off to school every morning wearing a French beret and a crisp white pinafore).[95]

[93] Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *Ibn al-qaryah wa-l-kuttāb: malāmiḥ sīrah wa-masīrah* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2002), 20.
[94] Ḥasan Dawḥ, *25 ʿāman fī jamāʿah*, 5–7.
[95] Didar Fawzy-Rossano, *Mémoires d'une militante communiste*, 37–38.

Because of the curriculum and the underground nature of recruitment, communist clubs targeted specific demographics instead of basing their platforms on mass appeal. Iskra, for instance, (in)famously catered to foreign elites and university students. There was a candidacy period of six months to a year for entry, and candidates were asked to read twenty-eight books and take an exam as a precondition for membership. This limited membership to privileged circles and those willing to sacrifice to be in the club.[96] The Egyptian Communist Party, meanwhile, was run by Jewish and Egyptian intellectuals who had traveled to Paris to study at the Sorbonne; the organization prided itself on its progressive ideas and contacts with the French Communist Party (PCF). The Workers' Vanguard, on the other hand, took an Egyptian approach, and addressed itself to Egyptian intellectuals and workers. The EMNL-DMNL appealed to the broadest audience—a feat it achieved by founding special sections based on "natural social units," including a section for al-Azhar students and a section for Cairo University students; workers' sections; a women's section; a section for Jews, one for Italians, and one for Nubians; military sections; and sections for bankers and merchants. Different communist clubs also appealed to different religious outlooks. People's Liberation was distinctly anti-religious, while the Union of the Peoples of the Nile Valley was avowedly religious. Notably, these positions matched the dispositions of their target demographics: People's Liberation members included foreign intelligentsia, while the Union was a small club comprised of Egyptian bureaucrats (specifically, a group of friends from the tax office).[97]

[96] Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism*, 241–242.

[97] Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 40–71; Tareq Y. Ismael and Rifaʿat el-Saʿid, *The Communist Movement in Egypt*, 54.

Activists attested to the fact that class, confession, ethnicity, and education thus created barriers to entry for certain clubs, and frequently guided affiliation decisions. Sharif Hatata, for instance, said Iskra appealed to him because it stressed studying and reading. Thurayā Shākir had a different experience. Introduced to Iskra through her husband, Shākir struggled to understand the required reading, and complained to Injī Aflāṭūn that "'They talk to me as if they are condescending to me'… Everybody was talking in French, all of them, there was nobody *not* speaking French. …Because Arabic was the language they used for talking to servants only."[98] Sulaymān al-Rifāʿī, who had attended an industrial school in Manṣūrah, similarly struggled. Despite being an avid reader, he went away from his second meeting with the communist group Bread and Freedom feeling depressed. Hearing Anwār Kāmil speak, Rifāʿī recalled he had not understood a word the activist had said. Even so, in 1943 Rifāʿī tried another communist club (the EMNL), and found Curiel's way of speaking more comprehensible. As a result, Rifāʿī stayed, and with perseverance managed to pass their course.[99]

Especially when describing communist clubs (whose membership costs were high for the average Egyptian), activists described at length the barriers to entry and costs of affiliation. Egyptians raised in the provinces, for instance, found the Western sartorial norms and elite, urban habits of communist clubs to be an obstacle. For instance, Shākir (a Muslim whose mother had converted to Catholicism), was "shocked" by the behavior and dress habits of the girls in Iskra. While rural Jewish, Christian, and Muslim women traditionally wore long gowns (*jilbāb*) and headscarves, the girls in Iskra were elite and

[98] Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 212–213; Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 51.
[99] Interview with Sulaymān al-Rifāʿī, 12 January 1976, Cairo, in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 109–122.

Europeanized. As Shākir related, "[Injī Aflāṭūn] took me to clubs… Most of them were Jews, speaking French all the time and very westernized… wearing shorts and wearing I don't know what… I felt that I was a stranger…. And we come from Upper Egypt, very closed off, and I couldn't."[100]

Activists raised in elite households also described themselves as unwilling to make the sacrifices required to join the Muslim Brotherhood. As Laṭīfa al-Zayāt recalled, "Being a woman and having a temperament—that is, being a rebel and not a conformist—I could not join the Ikhwān."[101] Sharīf Ḥatāta, moreover, pointed out that his social and ethnic position (as half-English/half-Egyptian) excluded him from entertaining the idea of Brotherhood membership. "Belonging to a modern [living situation], it was difficult for me to join traditional political movements." As he described, for him a political club "had to be something progressive, open, that wasn't traditional or fanatical. And it had to be something rational."[102] In Ḥatāta's terminology, then, his educational upbringing made him seek an organization based in Western, post-Enlightenment epistemology (i.e. something "progressive" and "rational," not "traditional").

Individuals from ethnic and religious minorities were especially attracted to the communist movement, which stressed equality. These included activists such as Yūsuf Darwīsh (a Karaite Jew), Anwār ʿAbd al-Malik and Geneviève Sīdārūs (Copts), and Mubārak ʿAbduh Faḍl[103] (a half-blind Nubian enrolled at al-Azhar). For minority communities, word- of-mouth and recruitment by fellow community members were

[100] Irmgard Schrand interviews with Thurayā Shākir, in Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 212–213. Also Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism*, 282.
[101] Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 52.
[102] Sharīf Ḥatāta in interview with Selma Botman, 28 February 1980, Cairo. As quoted in Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 50–51.
[103] Alt: Moubarak Abdo Fadl

important: Fransīs Kīrilus, Fauzī Ḥabbashī, and Widād Mitrī ʿAdlī Barsūm, for instance, were all introduced to communism through other Copts.[104] Al-Azhar student Mubārak ʿAbduh Faḍl, meanwhile, expressed his early indifference to ideology, but emphasized the importance of Nubian networks in shaping his decision to join the communists in 1945. ʿAbduh Faḍl said he had sought opportunities for nationalist engagement, and when another Nubian student at al-Azhar invited him to the EMNL, he joined.[105]

That said, ʿAbduh Faḍl's membership costs were steep. Concerned that communist activities would endanger his son's ability to generate income for the family, ʿAbduh Faḍl's father tearfully confronted ʿAbduh Faḍl about his communist activism. "What you believe is to the benefit of the poor," his father admitted, "but whoever joins this kind of work must be rich!" ʿAbduh Faḍl refused to quit the club, however, and was banished from the house as a result. In addition, his father's concerns concerning the cost of communist activism ultimately proved correct: ʿAbduh Faḍl was arrested multiple times, and in 1948 was expelled from al-Azhar for his political activism.[106]

Communists reported other costs to communist affiliation. British and Ikhwān propaganda painted communist groups as atheistic, morally depraved, and Western; as a result, the Coptic activist Geneviève Sīdārūs initially refused to join the communist clubs on campus. EMNL members worked to convince her that Marxist groups were morally respectable, and not hostile toward religion. Even so, when Sīdārūs eventually joined, the decision cost her dearly. She was arrested at a Western-style, co-ed gathering at a private

[104] Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 210.

[105] Mubārak ʿAbduh Faḍl, "Mudhakkirāt," in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 125–126.

[106] Ibid.; "44 inculpés de communisme devant la cour martiale," *Affaire des "44"*, (1954), p. 5 in IISH ARCH01722/Folder 149.

apartment. When her fellow students learned of the arrest, Sīdārūs was harassed and shamed. To salvage her reputation, she was forced to take out a newspaper notice to defend her honor, claiming the arrest had occurred during the daytime rather than at night.[107]

In the end, because of the especially high costs of communist membership, communist clubs struggled to recruit Egyptians from non-elite backgrounds. Fakhrī Labīb, for instance, said he resorted to putting on old clothes, sitting in cafes in working class neighborhoods (like Shubrā and Imbaba), and pretending to be unemployed to strike up conversations with workers. The Copt communist Geneviève Sīdārūs was similarly asked to stand in front of factories to try and attract workers (she refused out of consideration for her reputation, as such behavior was unbecoming for a respectable Copt, Muslim, or Jewish woman of the time).[108]

Such accounts of affiliation suggest an important pattern: Egyptian activists in the 1940s tended to invest in clubs a way that maximized (or at least conserved) existing social capital. Thus, individuals tended to choose clubs that utilized existing knowledge of languages, reading curricula (learned in *kuttāb* or *lycée*), and rituals (e.g. Western or Egyptian etiquette, Qurʾānic recitation). Individuals also selected clubs that maintained investments in particular social networks and cultural modes of distinction. As a result, communism appealed more to Western-educated minorities (Copts and Jews) and Muslims on the margins of the community (such as French-speaking Muslim elites, individuals in mixed marriages, and ethnically marginalized Nubians). The Brotherhood, on the other hand, appealed to Egypt's middle and working classes—Arabic-speakers,

[107] Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 206–212.
[108] Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 210–212.

who had studied at *kuttāb* (and who in many cases had gone on to receive a Western higher education). Affiliation decisions and switching were thus somewhat bounded by the social circles and forms of capital in which activists were already invested.

Club Competition: Battles over Religious Spaces and Moral Reputations

If one consideration in Egyptian club life was how individuals selected clubs, another consideration was how clubs themselves competed to attract and retain members. And in Cairo's competitive club environment, organizations vied for hegemony in many different spaces: factories, secondary schools, universities, media spaces, and even in prisons and detention camps.[109] Religious spaces were one important site where political interest groups engaged in struggles for public support. For instance, both the Muslim Brotherhood and Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad worked to recruit students at al-Azhar, and competed with the established ʿulamāʾ for religious leadership, sometimes denouncing—and at other times working to win over—al-Azhar shaykhs.[110] This competition was reflected in organizational publications: *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* denounced members of the ʿulamāʾ for worldliness, corruption, attending cocktail parties, and a host of other misdeeds.[111] Similarly, a Ṣāliḥ ʿAshmāwī article in the Brotherhood's

[109] See for instance, accounts of a military preacher trying to convince Muslim Brotherhood members at al-Ṭūr detention facility to disaffiliate, Muslim Brotherhood members attacking communists at a prison camp, and news about the Ikhwān proselytizing in prisons. "Akhbār lā tunsharu fī ẓill al-irhāb," *Kifāḥ al-Ummah*, 1 June 1948, 4 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 106; Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Aḥmad, "Kalimāt wa ārāʾ," *al-Daʿwah* no. 26, 27 Shawwāl 1370/31 July 1951, 4; *al-Daʿwah* no. 28, 11 Dhū al-Qaʿdah 1370/14 August 1951, 1, both in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1.

[110] Letter from Ronald Campbell to Ernest Bevin, 25 April 1948, Dispatch No. 215 (501/50/48), in *Development of Communism in Egypt*, FO 371/69250 [1948]; "al-Īmān qaydu al-fatki," *al-Asās bi Tārīkh,* 2 January 1949, as reprinted in *Jamharat maqālāt al-ʿallāmah al-Shaykh Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir* (Riyadh: Dār al-Riyāḍ, 2005), 472–475; Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir, *Taqrīr ʿan shuʾūn al-taʿlīm wa-l-qaḍāʾ: taqrīr muqaddam li-jalālat al-Malik ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Saʿūd, sanat 1949*, ed. Ashraf Ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm (Cairo: Maktabat al-Imām al-Bukhārī, 2009), 47–50.

[111] Bayyūmī Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Khāliq, "Ilá ḥaḍarāt aṣḥāb al-faḍīlah al-ʿulamāʾ," *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* 212, 8 Dhū al-Qaʿdah 1368/1 September 1949, 11; "Mā fāʾidah wujūdukum ayyuhā al-sādah

Majallat al-Mabāḥith held the ʿulamāʾ responsible for the spread of vice and corruption, and another article in *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* criticized the ʿulamāʾ for having contributed to the decline of Islamic education by focusing on boring philosophical theories rather than action. (Islamic education should be practical and interesting, the article explained).[112] Third parties noted this competition: as a DMNL memo explained, "The Brotherhood enjoy certain sympathy, mingled with hate, in al-Azhar. This is because the Brotherhood are ambitious for religious control and spiritual leadership, which the Azharites feel is their prerogative." (Commenting on the seized note, a British official confirmed the analysis, adding it would be more accurate to say that al-Azhar viewed the Brotherhood with "sympathy, mixed with a certain amount of jealousy.")[113]

While this competition for religious hegemony among religious interest groups is perhaps expected, it is significant to note that religious spaces were also sites where "secular" political groups competed for support. EMNL recruiter Aḥmad Khiḍr went to the YMCA and YMMA to meet and poach potential members. In the same way, Muṣṭafā Haykal's small Marxist group Tanẓīm al-Qalʿah attended Ikhwān lectures and called Brothers in his neighborhood to invite them to meetings (a practice that eventually got them banned from the Brotherhood's offices).[114] Ḥilmī Yassin (an activist with *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*/the Workers' Vanguard) further recalled that he would stand by the mosque after

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al-ʿulamāʾ?," *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* no. 227, 10 Shaʿbān 1369/28 May 1950, 9; Muḥammad ʿAṭīyah Khamīs, "ʿUlamāʾ fī ḥaflat kūktīl!!," *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* no. 229, 21 Ramaḍān 1369/7 July 1950, 4; all in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5.

[112] Muḥammad Abū Bakir Ibrāhīm, "Al-akhlāq al-dīnīyah fī al-madāris," *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* no. 8, 26 Dhū al-Qaʿdah 1361/5 December 1942, 11 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 3.5; Ṣāliḥ ʿAshmāwī, "Hal ān al-awān li-ḥimāyat al-ādāb wa-l-taqālīd," *Majallat al-Mabāḥith* no. 29, 27 Shaʿbān 1936 [sic, 1369]/13 June 1950, 1 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1.

[113] Letter from Ronald Campbell to Ernest Bevin, 25 April 1948, Dispatch No. 215 (501/50/48), in *Development of Communism in Egypt*, FO 371/69250 [1948].

[114] Interview with Muṣṭafā Haykal, in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 211–223; Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 241.

Friday prayers and invite attendees to literacy classes at their "youth group" (a communist front).[115]

A confrontation at al-ʿAdawī Mosque in summer 1951 further reflected these struggles over religious space. At the time of Friday prayers that summer, an Ikhwān member tried to hijack the service by preaching his own sermon to the assembled crowd. However, as the Brother was not authorized to speak (and the mosque was a site for Wafdist support), the mosque preacher [*khaṭīb*] stopped the Ikhwān member from teaching. In response, the Brother accused the *khaṭīb* of being a Jew. This caused an altercation, in which service attendees delivered some potent negative feedback to the Muslim Brotherhood member: they beat the would-be-preacher with slippers and drove him out of the mosque. Afterward, youth from the Wafd helped reclaim territory in the spaces around the mosque, by effacing Ikhwān slogans and replacing them with new graffiti about the Ikhwān being a corrupt "Brotherhood of Satan."[116] Overall then, the fact that religious groups tried to expand into "secular" spaces was not unusual; "secular" clubs and parties also fought for influence in religious spaces.

"The Devil when Ill": The Adaptations of Miṣr al-Fatāh

Besides competing for support in various public spaces, clubs worked to create competitive ideological platforms that would to appeal to constituents. Miṣr al-Fatāh was the example par excellence of how organizations often rebranded themselves in response to changing social trends and the claims of competitors. In the first years after its

[115] Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism,* 10.

[116] "al-Hujūm ʿalá al-salām," *al-Muqāwamah al-Shaʿbīyyah* no. 7, 27 August 1951, in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 111.

founding in 1933, Young Egypt had focused on promoting Pharaonicism and family values, and abolishing "immorality, alcoholic beverages, and effeminacy" from Egyptian society.[117] By the end of the 1930s, however, financial troubles and dwindling numbers inspired club leader Aḥmad Ḥusayn to shift the club's platform in an attempt to revive the ailing organization. Shortly on the heels of the religiously-charged elections of March 1938 and the Muslim Brotherhood's decision in February 1939 to declare itself a political organization, Young Egypt therefore rebranded itself with religious colors. In January 1940, Ḥusayn performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, and in March he officially changed the party name to the Islamic National Party. However, as Egyptian historian ʿAlī Shalabī has argued, the change was not motivated by any sudden piety on Ḥusayn's part, but rather reflected the need to compete with the more popular Muslim Brotherhood. Young Egypt also hoped to bolster flagging membership by tapping in to Sudanese support (an important student demographic that tended to be less Westernized and more religious than their Egyptian counterparts). As part of this effort, Ḥusayn went on pilgrimage again in January 1941, and drafted a new party program that included a call for the foundation of an Islamic University.[118] Shalabī's argument that the shift in orientation was superficial is borne out by Miṣr al-Fatāh's subsequent publications: despite the name change, the discourse concerning religion remained largely consistent with earlier runs of the journal, focusing on vague overtures to Egyptian and Islamic identity (with little or no interest in theological discussion or Islamic rituals).[119]

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[117] James P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels*, 9–41; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Confronting Fascism in Egypt*, 234–265.

[118] ʿAlī Shalabī, *Miṣr al-Fatāh wa dawruhā fī al-siyāsah al-Miṣrīyyah, 1933–1941* (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jāmiʿī, 1982), 93–103.

[119] Compare this with the abstract Islamic theological discussions in *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* (which resumed printing in August 1942).

At the same time Young Egypt became suddenly religious, Ḥusayn also approached the British Residency with professions of friendship. In spring 1940, the British decided to provide Young Egypt with modest funding, in an attempt to keep the club in line. The agreement only lasted six weeks before falling apart, however. An unknown agent leaked news of the deal, and Miṣr al-Fatāh was so discredited by charges of British collaboration it almost collapsed. As a result, over the next year the organization swung back to the other extreme, desperately trying to regain credibility through increasingly radical anti-British statements and religious rhetoric. The campaign ended in disaster, however, with a government order for Ḥusayn's arrest and the suppression of Miṣr al-Fatāh.[120]

By 1943, Young Egypt was back on the streets, partnering with the Palace against political competitors. And in 1944, the club changed allies again. In spring, the ailing Wafd (weakened by the Black Book scandal) tried to reinforce its ranks by releasing additional Young Egypt members from jail, offering them government posts, and providing the party with financial assistance and facilities (in exchange for support in the upcoming election cycle). As part of the Wafd–Young Egypt alliance, between June and August 1944 Aḥmad Ḥusayn and his deputy Muḥammad Ṣubīḥ again approached the British to make a deal. Their overtures prompted the British official overseeing the agreement to wryly remark that Ṣubīḥ "reminded me of the Devil, who when ill was ready to be a saint."[121] But the British agreed to another entente: this time, they would

[120] "The Young Egypt Party," Memorandum from Colonel G.J. Jenkins of 18 May 1944, Ref. 231/15/144, in *Young Egypt Party*, FO 141/951 [1944].
[121] Ibid.; "Minutes," 20 June 1944, in *Young Egypt Party* FO/141/951 [1944].

supply Young Egypt with paper for printing tracts at the reduced military rate of 55 pounds per ton (as opposed to the black market price of 450 pounds per ton).[122]

Miṣr al-Fatāh took the paper. As Aḥmad Ḥusayn put it, "Necessity knows no law."[123] Less than two months later, however, Young Egypt was facing another self-made membership crisis, with members accusing Ḥusayn of becoming a propagandist for the Wafd, colluding with the British and Americans to import paper, and selling that paper on the black market for personal profit. Overall, the controversy led to a number of high-level defections, with Young Egypt members switching to other clubs. Similar to what had occurred in 1940, the defections also prompted a spate of radical activities on the part of Young Egypt members, with activists attacking bars and participating in grenade assaults to prove the club's mettle as an honest broker, serious about British evacuation.[124]

By the end of the 1940s, Young Egypt was again rebuilding its membership base. However, the political situation was again changing: in December 1948 the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved by the Egyptian government, and communist clubs were on the rise. As a result, in 1949 Miṣr al-Fatāh rebranded itself again, this time changing its name from the Islamic National Party to the Socialist Party. However, as had been the case before, the change was "little more than emotional sloganeering," as James Jankowski has pointed out. While Miṣr al-Fatāh's 1940 Islamic program had been limited

[122] "Memorandum" from Sir Walter Smart, 9 June 1944, Ref. 231/16/44 and Correspondence from Sir Walter Smart to Lieutenant General R.G.W.H. Stone, 9 August 1944, in *Young Egypt Party*, FO 141/951 [1944].

[123] In Arabic: "al-Ḍarūrāt tubīḥu al-maḥẓūrāt" (necessity allows the forbidden). Dispatch from Colonel Jenkins, 9 June 1944, in *Young Egypt Party*, FO 141/951 [1944].

[124] "Intelligence Report No. 449," 4 November 1944, Ref. 231/28/44, in *Young Egypt Party*, FO 141/951 [1944].

to superficial reforms, now almost a decade later, the club's "socialism" was equally shallow, echoing communist calls for land reform, egalitarianism, and workers' rights.[125]

Overall, Young Egypt's flexible approach (which sometimes appeared schizophrenic, due to the organization's attempts to play all sides) was visible in the party's statements before the elections of January 1950. The party paper called for an Islamic–socialist synthesis, declaring that their socialism was "distinguished from Western socialism in that we believe in God, religion, and morals." Meanwhile, other articles in the issue appealed to Copt voters one the one hand (praising Christ's message of peace and love, and describing a joint Muslim–Christian struggle against European atheism and immorality), and on the other hand courted members of the dissolved Muslim Brotherhood (praising the Ikhwān for its values, and calling for it to be reconstituted as an organization).[126] A day later, Young Egypt managed to score its first major electoral victory: the organization's Vice President Ibrāhīm Shukrī was elected to the Chamber of Deputies.

Despite the victory, Young Egypt's changing strategies were ultimately costly, hurting the organization's reputation, triggering multiple waves of membership flight, and prompting increasingly costly (and radical) credibility-enhancing displays. The "devil when ill" could very well put on the trappings of sainthood—and self-professed saints could make deals with the devil—but too much ideological switching and too many interest-based violations of principle were bad for business. "Necessity" might "know no law," but members could (and did) leave if they felt the organization was out for its own benefit. As the Brotherhood learned with the 1946 strikebreaking incident,

[125] James P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels*, 93–94, 109–119.
[126] *Miṣr al-Fatāh* no. 222, 2 January 1950.

clubs thus had to balance interest-based compromises with the need to maintain their image as honest brokers. After all, Egyptians had a name for men whose disingenuously professed virtue: those who put on piety like a turban (*ḥāmil ʿimāmat al-taqī wa-l-wara ʿ*).[127]

"Our Islam": The Muslim Brotherhood in a Competitive Field

Like Young Egypt, the Ikhwān also adapted its platform in response to challengers, and worked to synthesize the trends and issues of the era. In its early years, the Brotherhood worked to compete with and adapt Western models, preaching sermons in cafés like American and British missionaries. The Brothers also launched summer camps in response to the American Presbyterian Mission's Vacation Bible Schools.[128] This competitive focus (and the effects of the 1933 Turkiyya Hasan controversy), was reflected in the Ikhwān's first conference in May 1933, which discussed the Christian missionary problem.

Tracts from the mid- and late-1930s, meanwhile, increasingly focused on competing with Young Egypt and addressing the perceived crisis of the Egyptian party system. A 1934 tract entitled "Preparing Men" reflected the interwar passion for scouting and masculinity, describing how the nation must impress its "sons with a proper masculine disposition…. The strength or weakness of nations is measured by their capacity to

[127] Lit: "Bearer of the Turban of the Devout and Pious." The phrase was most famously applied to Wafdist politician Makram ʿUbayd, who infamously fluctuated between liberal declarations and attempts to court the Muslim Brotherhood. ʿArafah ʿAbduh ʿAlī, "ʿIndamā yaʿlū sulṭān al-kalimah fawq kalimah al-sulṭān: Muḥammad al-Tābiʿī, Birins al-ṣiḥāfah al-ʿArabīyyah," *al-Ahrām al-ʿArabī*, 21 March 2017, http://arabi.ahram.org.eg/News/107310.aspx.

[128] Johannes J.G. Jansen, "Ḥasan al-Bannā's Earliest Pamphlet," 254–258; Heather J. Sharkey, *American Evangelicals in Egypt,* 107.

produce men."[129] The Ikhwān's third conference (March 1935) transformed its athletic groups into a scouting troop called the "Rovers." In 1937, responding to Young Egypt's Green Shirts and the Wafd's Blue Shirts, the Brothers added their own group, the "Battalions" [katāʾib].[130] Overall, the platform of the Fifth Conference (January 1939) summarized the organization's hybrid approach, describing the Society as "1) a Salafi message… 2) a Sunni way… 3) a Sufi truth… 4) a political body… 5) an athletic group… 6) a cultural-educational league… 7) an economic enterprise… [and] 8) a social idea."[131]

The national question and competition with Young Egypt also shaped the Ikhwān's ideology in the 1930s. Bannā's tracts "To What Do We Summon the People?" (1936), "Towards the Light" (1936), and "Our Call" (1937) all worked to define the Brotherhood's position vis-à-vis the national question, rejecting Pharaonicism and other nationalisms based on geography and race. A 1938 speech on the heels of the Munich crisis further denounced imperialism, "racist nationalism," and "fanaticism of race and color" as the causes of world strife, pointing to events in Germany, the Italian invasion of Libya, and Zionism in Palestine as examples of how European imperialism and racism were causing warfare. Finally, the Ikhwān's Fifth Conference (1939) and a variety of articles addressed the question of Young Egypt directly, rejecting a proposed unity project between the two groups, denouncing the club as an example of narrow chauvinistic nationalism, describing the club as not understanding "the true significance

[129] Wilson Chacko Jacob, *Working Out Egypt*, 109–110, 312.
[130] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 13–14, 275–291.
[131] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Risālah al-muʾtamar al-khāmis," in Ḥasan al-Bannā, *Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Dār al-ḥaḍārah al-Islāmīyyah, 1980), 122–123.

of Islam" and "pure Islamic principles," and rejecting the club's violent approach and bar-sacking as radical and premature.[132]

In the late 1930s and throughout the 1940s, Ikhwān publications turned toward topics such as "Islam and capitalism," "Islam and liberal democracy," and "Islam and communism." Particularly as the Cold War developed and communist clubs proliferated, the Brotherhood shifted its energies toward competing with communism and capitalism as ideological systems.[133] An anti-communist article printed in 1945 in *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, for instance, critiqued communist materialism and communist clubs, arguing that spirit would win over body. The article also alluded to popular rumors that communist organizations were recruiting through libertine parties, in which men and women comingled.[134]

The Brotherhood particularly worked to position its vision of an Islamic system as a "third way" between capitalism and communism. Already in the late 1930s, Ḥasan al-Bannā's official *rasāʾil* [messages] were criticizing communism and capitalism for only addressing material needs (while explaining that Islam addressed all men's needs).[135] The organization's 1937 statement of principles, *"*Our Call," for instance, denounced the "tyranny of materialism," explaining that Muslim Brotherhood members represented "a new spirit… a new light dawning and scattering the darkness of materialism through the knowledge of God." Bannā's message "The Economic System," meanwhile, described

[132] For an extended discussion of this, see: Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 210–233.

[133] John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 130–131.

[134] Saʿādat Muḥammad al-ʿAshmāwī Bik, "Hal natataḷaʾ ilá fajr jadīd fī al-iṣlāḥ," *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, 31 January 1945, 3–5.

[135] Unless otherwise noted, page numbers henceforth refer to the *rasāʾil* as printed in the edition Ḥasan al-Bannā, *Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Dār al-ḥaḍārah al-Islāmīyyah, 1980).

capitalism, socialism, and communism as all having both flaws and benefits, but Islam as containing all the benefits of the three systems (but avoiding their faults). The article further took cues from communist platforms, by describing how an Islamic system would broaden the middle class and equalize the gap between classes.[136]

Following the war, these attempts to synthesize other systems were made more explicit and extended to an official "third bloc" doctrine. In 1947, one of the Brotherhood's founding members, Bahī al-Khūlī, authored a book entitled *Islam, not Communism nor Capitalism*. The Ikhwān periodical *al-Shihāb* further ran a 1948 article that argued Islam was an ideal synthesis of modern systems, merging capitalism and communism into a spiritual, "reasonable socialism."[137] These positions were expanded in February 1951, when Sayyid Quṭb published *The Battle of Islam and Capitalism*, along with multiple articles on Islam as a "third bloc." As he argued in an article on January 1952, the "Islamic bloc" as a third power would help achieve the independence of colonial peoples and keep the world from a Third World War. Quṭb also tried to convince readers that unlike the communist and capitalist blocs (which pulled states into their orbit based on similar social systems), an Islamic bloc already existed and had a "natural" internal unity—it was already "a historical fact, a geographical fact, an economic fact, and an intellectual and emotional fact."[138]

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[136] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Daʿwatunā" and "al-Niẓām al-iqtiṣādī," in *Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Dār al-ḥaḍārah al-Islāmīyah, 1980), 13–30, 337–352.

Also see "Bayna al-ams wa-l-yawm" and "Tabiʿa al-Rāʿī" for similar statements.

[137] Al-Bahī al-Khūlī, *Islām, lā shuyūʿīyyah wa lā raʾsmālīyyah* (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1951 [First ed. 1947]).

[138] Sayyid Quṭb, "al-Kutlah al-Islāmīyyah fī al-mīzān al-dawlī," *Majallat al-Risālah* 949, 10 September 1951, 1021–1023; Sayyid Quṭb, "al-ʿĀlam al-islāmī ḥaqīqah wāqiʿah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 966, 7 January 1952, 10–12; Sayyid Quṭb, "al-Ṭarīq ilá al-kutlah al-thālithah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 976, 17 March 1952, 293–295; Sayyid Quṭb, "Ghubār ḥawla al-Kutlah al-Islāmīyyah!" *Majallat al-Risālah* 981, 12 April 1952, 433–434.

Also see: Sayyid Quṭb, *Maʿrakat al-Islām wa al-raʾsmālīyyah* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1951).

As had been true in its encounters with Christian missionaries, the YMMA, and Young Egypt, the Ikhwān also selectively adapted and worked to improve on communist discourses and ideas. The Brotherhood learned from communist organizational strategies (sending Brotherhood members to observe communist cells, in order to copy their cell organizational strategies).[139] The Brothers also called for social security measures, an end to "oppression by monopolistic companies," land redistribution/reducing the number of large estates (while still respecting private property), and the nationalization of Egyptian industries.[140] And as the Ikhwān had opened schools in the 1930s to compete with missionary schools, by the 1940s, the Ikhwān was operating medical clinics, legal services, and insurance providers, and had established commercial startups that included a factory, a mine, and shipping interests.[141]

What was distinct about the Ikhwān's program, and what differentiated it from other organizational platforms, was how Ḥasan al-Bannā leveraged his skills and social capital to create a uniquely modern Islamic reform package. Bannā had studied at Dār al-ʿUlūm, a teacher training institute which combined Arabic studies with instruction in the Western sciences, and this hybrid epistemological framework informed Bannā's thinking.[142] He frequently displayed his proficiency as a modern scholar, quoting Western authors like George Bernard Shaw, Isaac Newton, and Herbert Spencer (although by late 1940s, this was increasingly replaced with denunciations of the West as "evil"—a reflection of the

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[139] Sir Ronald Campbell to Michael R. Wright, Dispatch 88/4/49G, in Communism in Egypt, FO 371/73476 [1949].

[140] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "al-Niẓām al-iqtiṣādī," 338–350; Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Ilá ay shayʾ nadʿū al-nās?" 48; Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Naḥwa al-nūr," 291–294.

[141] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 13–14, 275–291.

[142] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 328–329; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation*, 16; Zakarīyā Bayyūmī, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-l-Jamāʿāt al-Islāmīyyah fī al-ḥayāt al-siyāsīyyah al-Miṣrīyyah, 1928–1948* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1979), 85–87.

onset of the Cold War and the increasingly anti-foreign tenor of Egyptian politics). Even the Western suit and nationalist fez Bannā wore were visual markers of distinction, signaling his status as a middle-class lay pedagogue, rather than a traditional Islamic scholar [ʿ*ālim*], who wore the turban and robe [ʿ*imma* and *kākūlā*]. These sartorial habits distinguished Bannā as a hybrid and thoroughly modern authority—a "fezzed shaykh" from the ranks of the modern middle class [*effendiyya*] who combined Western modernity (the suit) with an Egyptian nationalist symbol (the fez). Bannā's sartorial signaling of what Gudrun Krämer calls the "Islamic modern" thus stood in sharp contrast to both al-Azhar shaykhs and the dress of communist activists, who wore European shorts, suits, and hats.[143]

To this, Bannā added personal affects and impressive interpersonal abilities. Followers and detractors alike recognized him as charismatic, describing his skill in making interpersonal connections and his ability to produce emotions in listeners. For example, Aḥmad Kamāl recalled that Bannā's use of rhetoric and inflection generated feelings in audiences; he was also skilled in connecting with individuals even in throngs of people, pausing during speeches to greet visitors from the provinces by name and ask about their families.[144] Jābir Qumayḥah, who saw Bannā speak at a tent meeting in Upper Egypt in the late 1930s, said the sermon was like nothing he had heard before in mosque. The speech was colorful, simple, and living: Bannā used concrete analogies (comparing the nation to a sailing ship) that Qumayḥah understood as a boy and remembered years later. "But even more importantly than this, I had the powerful feeling… that he was

[143] See Gudrun Krämer, *Hasan al-Banna***,** [n.p.].

[144] Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl*, al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-ḥurūf*, 85–87, 90.

Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn similarly wrote "Honestly, Ḥasan al-Bannā possessed the unique ability to persuade and infiltrate the souls of his listeners." Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 44.

directing his gaze and his words to me, and no one else." More than just eloquence, Qumayḥah said he felt Bannā could stir and awaken "invisible 'connections' in listeners."[145] Even outsiders were impressed by Bannā's relational abilities: as American visitor Robert Jackson described after meeting the leader in 1946, Bannā "didn't depend on sermons, and didn't incite or stir up sentiment through shouting and agitation." As Jackson explained, Bannā was not a demagogue, but a relational networker. He made everyone feel they had a special friendship with him; in this way, he could convince individual after individual, and link them together with an unbreakable bond.[146]

With these talents and resources, the Muslim Brotherhood constructed and promoted an Islamic ethic for the *effendiyya*. Citing a part of Qurʾān 13:11 ("Indeed, God will not change the condition of a people until they change themselves"), the Brothers argued that Egypt's social and political conditions would only improve through industrious self-improvement and turning to Islam.[147] The program was straightforward: Egypt's problems had been caused by turning away from Islam and blindly imitating foreign systems; thus solution was thus Islam, an endogenous system that "guarantees to supply the rising nation with its needs" both "practically and spiritually. This is the characteristic that distinguishes Islam."[148] As Bannā wrote, "I read and experimented a lot, and had contact with many circles… I emerged… with a fixed and unshakeable doctrine: The

[145] Jābir Qumayḥah, *Dhikrayātī maʿa daʿwah al-ikhwān fī al-munzilah daqahlīyyah* (Giza: Markaz al-Iʿlām al-ʿArabī, 2009).

[146] Anwar al-Jundī, "Ḥasan al-Bannā, al-rajul al-qurʾānī," *Majallat al-Risālah* 982, 28 April 1952, 462–463.

[147] The verse in its entirety: "For each one is successive before and behind him who protect him by the decree of God. Indeed, God will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves. And when God intends for a people ill, there is no repelling it. And there is not for them besides him any patron." (Surāt al-Raʿd 13:11) See: Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Ilá ay shayʾ nadʿū al-nās?" 45; Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Naḥwa al-nūr," 282; Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Risālah al-muʾtamar al-khāmis," 116.

[148] Emphasis added. Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Bayna al-ams wa-l-yawm," 103–104; Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Naḥwa al-nūr," 275–276.

happiness that all men seek… does not come from outside the heart—never!" Instead, happiness must be produced from within, through the pursuit of Islamic devotion.[149]

Bannā was careful to define what he meant by "Islam," however. The Islam that would bring happiness and social wellbeing was not Islam "confined to conscience and temple."[150] Instead, in an idea he referred to as "our Islam," Bannā explained that their Islamic system was a universal and comprehensive ideology for structuring every aspect of social life.[151] Such a comprehensive order, Bannā argued, could only be achieved by refusing the distinction between religion and state. In Bannā's words, "If you are asked: 'On what do you base your call?' Say: 'We call for Islam—the Islam that Muḥammad brought, and governance is a part of it.' Say: 'This is Islam, and we do not recognize these divisions."[152] Calling the separation between religion and state a colonial artifice, Bannā argued that it was only by unifying the religious and political fields that the nation could regain peace, security, hope, strength, and a sense of national greatness.[153]

Commensurate with this goal, the Society called for a sweeping revision of the existing social divisions of labor, and the expansion of the religious field into education, governance, security, and economy,[154] including the annexation of state elementary

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[149] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Risālah al-muʾtamar al-khāmis," 116.

[150] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Niẓarāt thalāth," in *Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Dār al-Andalus, 1965). For a similar argument, see Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Min hunā naʿlam…!* (Cairo: Nahḍat Miṣr, 2005), 8.

[151] Ibid., 18. For other examples, see Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Niẓarāt thalāth," "a religion and a society, mosque and state, this world and the next." Also see Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Risālah al-muʾtamar al-khāmis," 119, which describes "the Muslim Brotherhood's Islam" as comprehensive, "doctrine and worship, nation and citizenship, religion and state, spirituality and action, Quran and sword."

[152] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Bayna al-ams wa-l-yawm," 110. For similar statements and a full explanation of the Ikhwānid position toward religion and politics under al-Bannā, see Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Fī muʾtamar ṭalaba al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn," 158–168.

[153] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Naḥwa al-nūr," 276–281.

[154] "Naḥwa al-nūr" contains the most comprehensive statement of the Ikhwān's political program. The tract was compiled from earlier Brotherhood tracts, and sent to King Fārūq, Prime Minister Naḥḥās Pasha, and other Egyptian leaders in summer 1936. It was also reprinted as an open letter around the same time. The letter was at once self-promotion, a condemnation of the Egyptian political system, and an open bid for

schools to the mosques, "the employment of Azharites in military and administrative posts," "the surveillance of [government] employees' personal behavior,"[155] and an "Islamic government whose members are *practicing* Muslims."[156] The Society also demanded clerical control over social policing, and campaigned against popular religious customs, including those related to weddings, funerals, births, holidays, and the *zār* (exorcism, generally performed by a female medium).[157]

Finally, Bannā fashioned an internationalist, expansionist reading of Qurʾānic scripture, interpreting part of Qurʾān 8:39 ("And fight them until there is no *fitnah*, and the religion is all for God")[158] as an injunction to expand the Islamic nation until it encompassed the entire world, thereby creating a common nationality. He supported this interpretation by linking it to a fragment of Qurʾān 49:13 ("O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another"), interpreting the verse as a call for the creation of a common nationality.[159] These interpretive labors located a synthesis of modern nationalist and internationalist

power. It began "We submit [this message], and place ourselves, our talents, and all we have at the disposal of any organization or government that wants to make strides toward progress and advancement with an Islamic nation." Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Naḥwa al-nūr," 294.

[155] Ibid., 291–294. For similar statements concerning revision of Egyptian laws, see Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Ilá ay shay' nadʿū al-nās?," 48.

[156] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Risālah al-taʿālīm," 360.

[157] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Naḥwa al-nūr," 291–293.

[158] The entirety of the verse reads "Fight them until there is no *fitnah* and the religion is all for God. But if they cease, then indeed God is Seeing." The antecedent of the pronoun "them" is "those who have disbelieved" [*ladhīna kafarū*], from āyah 38. This scripture is often compared to Qur'ān 2:193 (Sūrat al-Baqarah) "Fight them until there is no *fitnah* and the religion is for God. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression except against the oppressors." The antecedent of the pronoun "them" in this verse is "those who fight you" [*alladhīna yuqatilūnakum*], from āyah 190 of the same sūrah.

[159] Again, the verse as a whole reads "O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted." Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Naḥwa al-nūr," 278–279.

ideas in religious scripture. As Bannā explained, "the Brotherhood has *found* the correct program in God's Book, the Sunnah of His Messenger, and the precepts of Islam."[160]

A few features of this program are worth highlighting, as they directly speak to the question of religion and club competition. First, many of the proposed reforms would have enlarged the number of positions available to men of religion. These reforms thus aimed to reverse Egyptian political and economic trends of the late 19th century, which had seen the state's expansion into the fields of education and law, and a decline in the number of jobs available to men trained in religious schools.[161] The program as a whole also aimed to invest the Brotherhood with religious and moral hegemony. By proposing a ban on popular spiritual practices like the *zār* and *mawlid* celebrations, the Brotherhood hoped to eliminate competing Islamic theologies and practices. The Society's call for moral policing and "Islamic government whose members are *practicing* Muslims"[162] would have similarly given the group religious hegemony. In "Hal naḥnu qawm ʿamaliyūn," for example, Bannā argued that two types of Muslims existed: the vast majority, who "perform prayer in a mechanical way inherited from their parents," and the select few who understood "the secrets of prayer" (secrets understood and taught by the Society).[163] Thus, the Brotherhood sought broad powers over religious boundary creation and maintenance, including the ability to define who constituted a true Muslim.

Notably, the Muslim Brotherhood performed the new order the Society hoped to create. And this social performance of cooperation and selflessness was a pivotal part of

[160] "al-Minhāj al-ṣaḥīḥ: wa qad *wajadahu* al-Ikhwān fī kitāb allāh…" Emphasis added. Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Daʿwatunā," 30.
[161] Ṭaha Ḥusayn, *Mustaqbal al-thaqāfah fī Miṣr* [1938] (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1996), 212–215.
[162] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Risālah al-taʿālīm*,"* 360.
[163] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Hal naḥnu qawm ʿamaliyūn?" 75.

what made the Brotherhood's message compelling. Brothers were to maintain good physical health and be literate and educated, avoid coffee, tea, and other stimulants, refrain from smoking, drinking, and gambling, and keep a clean house (for "religion is built on cleanliness").[164] Personally, Brothers were taught to model outstanding moral character: honesty, faithfulness, forgiveness, bravery, humility, fairness, and service to others. Ikhwān members were also taught to be industrious, excel at their jobs, and wear and eat locally-produced goods. In social life, the group further used a distinctive "language of commitment" (speaking in Islamic greetings and idioms) and kept Islamic food practices.[165]

These practices of communal distinction, in the context of high-commitment cells with extensive social contact and kinship-like structures, had a profound effect: Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl described how once he was placed in a Brotherhood cell (called a "family"), Brothers saw one another frequently, grew to know everything about one another, and grew to love one another more than themselves.[166] As Ṭaha Saʿd ʿUthmān remembered, "We would go on Thursdays at night, pray, and then enter our room. Everybody from the family would take all his money out of his pocket and put it together on a handkerchief. Some had a lot, some had a little, some did not have anything." The money was then split equally between the family members.[167]

Overall, the Society well understood that members could expect to "find that some members of the official religious establishment [*al-ʿulamāʾ al-rasmiyīn*] will deem your

[164] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Risālah al-Taʿālīm," 368–369.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, *al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-ḥurūf*, 73–74.
[167] Ṭaha Saʿd ʿUthmān interview with Irmgard Schrand, Shubrā al-Khaymah, November 19999, in Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 238.

understanding of Islam preposterous!"[168] And indeed, a series of articles and interviews by al-Azhar Shaykh Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir in 1949 described the Muslim Brothers as Kharijites and apostates, while a 1950 report by the al-Azhar notable lumped the Brothers together with other dangerous and contaminative social groups.[169] Nonetheless, the Brotherhood continued to act out an order that would comprehensively encompass "doctrine and worship, nation and citizenship, religion and state, spirituality and action, Qurʾān and sword."[170]

"Allāhu Akhbar, Long Live the Workers!": Religion and Morality in Communist Clubs

In contrast to the Brotherhood's well-developed framework for a comprehensive social order based around the primacy of the religious field, communist clubs were divided in their approach to questions of religion and morality. For one, communist clubs faced a number of challenges when it came to signaling their good faith and moral probity. Marx's comments on religion, communism's reputation as an atheistic doctrine, Iskra's reputation for co-ed parties and other elite practices, and a popular perception of the communism as foreign (due to the overrepresentation of foreigners and ethnic minorities in its ranks, and communism's reliance on a foreign reading curriculum), were all factors that negatively affected communism's moral standing in the Egyptian public eye. Communist activists were thus often on the moral defensive.

[168] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Bayna al-ams wa-l-yawm," 108–109.

[169] "al-Īmān qaydu al-fatki," *al-Asās bi Tārīkh,* 2 January 1949, as reprinted in *Jamharat maqālāt al-ʿallāmah al-Shaykh Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir* (Riyadh: Dār al-Riyāḍ, 2005), 472–475; Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir, *Taqrīr ʿan shuʾūn al-taʿlīm wa-al-qaḍāʾ*, 47–50.

[170] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Risālah al-muʾtamar al-khāmis," 119.

Marx's dictum "Religion… is the opium of the people" was one phrase that proved problematic in the battle for recruitment. Opponents quoted the dictum to demonstrate that communism was atheistic and disrespectful of religious tradition; thus, Egyptian communists worked to reinterpret and contextualize Marx's phrase.[171] Lenin was one author that proved useful for rebutting charges that communism was anti-religious. As communist activist ʿAbd al-Mughnī Saʿīd pointed out, Lenin stated that "each member [of the communist party] believes what he wants… communism does not interfere in his religious faith." Thus, "socialism does not attack religion in and of itself, but rather attacks the capitalist *exploitation* of the idea of religion."[172] In his 1940 course on Marxism, Jewish communist Marcel Israel similarly cited Lenin's stance on religion, to demonstrate that communism was not hostile to religious faith.[173]

While arguing that they respected religion, Ṭalīʿah, Iskra, and DMNL authors denounced the fact that "reactionaries" were exploiting faith.[174] *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* ran stories describing how religion was being used to oppress workers and peasants. One story described how a factory owner had fired a worker on the pretext that the worker ate during Ramadan; thus, the paper moralized, the factory owners "dishonestly feign religious devotion to satisfy their special interests." The paper also described how

[171] See for instance Anwār Kāmil's anti-Stalinist pamphlet "Opium of the People" (1948).

[172] This may have been a borrowing from Maurice Thorez's influential 1936 speech and 1938 pamphlet *Communistes et catholiques, la main tendue* (Paris: Éditions du Comité populaire de propagande, 1938), which made the same argument. However, Egyptian communists often refrained from openly citing European sources.

Emphasis added. ʿAbd al-Mughnī Saʿīd, *Asrār al-siyāsah al-Miṣrīyyah fī rubʿ qarn* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥurrīyyah, 1985), 58–59; Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades: Poland, France, and "Revolution," 1891–1956* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 52–53.

[173] Mārsīl Shīrīzī [Mārsīl Isrāʾīl] *Awrāq munāḍil Īṭālī fī Miṣr* (Cairo: Dār al-ʿĀlam al-Thālith, 2002), 145–146.

[174] See for instance the DMNL tract quoted in Letter from Ronald Campbell to Ernest Bevin, 25 April 1948, Dispatch No. 215 (501/50/48), in *Development of Communism in Egypt*, FO 371/69250 [1948].

shaykhs in the provinces were helping the Ministry of Interior, by collecting personal information and compiling reports on political activists in their area.[175] *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* further denounced "reactionary religious bodies" like the conservative Coptic Union, and decried the fact that "capitalists among the Jews and Copts (like Ḥaim Dura) support the Muslim Brotherhood."[176] An Iskra platform condemned religious fanaticism and the use of religion by reactionaries to sow discord,[177] and another communist article took aim at both the Ikhwān and the Central Christian Union [al-Ittiḥād al-Masīḥī al-Markazī], describing these as fascist groups formed by the "ruling classes" in order to prevent the people from rising up. Such fascist religious associations "present themselves to the people as their savior from their weariness and dissatisfaction," the writer argued, asking rhetorically "[but] is the purpose of this call [*daʿwah*] only religion?"[178]

Communists were thus careful to attack groups like the Ikhwān for *exploiting* religion—not for being religious. *Al-Fajr al-Jadīd* described the Ikhwān's platform as a racist theory encouraging world conquest and calling for "a spiritual and intellectual return to the Middle Ages."[179] Other articles accused the Brothers of advocating Islamic imperialism and fascism, and engaging in disingenuous, grasping, selfish politicking.[180] Many such critiques were grounded in the fact that the Brotherhood had agreed to serve

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[175] "Akhbār ʿummālīyyah," *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* 42, 15 July 1949, 2–3 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 104.

[176] "Limādhā yaslaḥūna al-Ikhwān?" *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* 26, 8 March 1948, 2 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 102.

[177] Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Maʿbūd Jubaylī and Shuhudī ʿAṭīyya al-Shāfiʿī, Ahdāfunā al-waṭanīyah [1945] (Cairo: Dār Miṣr al-Maḥrūsah, 2004), 40–45.

Also see: FO 141/1272; "Al-hujūm al-muḍādd al-rajʿīyya wa al-istiʿmār," *Kifāḥ al-Ummah*, 10 May 1948, in *Wathāʾiq*, 223; Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Maʿbūd Jubaylī and Shuhudī ʿAṭīyya al-Shāfiʿī, *Ahdāfunā al-waṭanīyah* [1945], 40–45.

[178] "al-Ittiḥād al-Masīḥī al-Markazī baʿd al-Ikhwān" [1948] in *Wathāʾiq*, 211–212.

[179] Abū Sayf Yūsuf, "Ṣadd al-hujūm al-rajʿī al-istiʿmārī yataṭallaba taghyīr usus munāhaḍa al-istiʿmār," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 27, 27 March 1946, in *Wathāʾiq*, 81.

[180] "Turāthunā" in *Wathāʾiq,* 146; "Taḥāluf lā yanqaṭiʿ bayna al-rajʿīyyah wa al-istiʿmār," [1948] in *Wathāʾiq*, 211–213.

as "muscle" for the government's attempt to quash student and worker protests.[181] A statement from an EMNL-led trade union around 1946, for instance, accused the Brotherhood of using fascist methods and serving imperialism, arguing "Today the naked intentions of this Society have been exposed to the people: from calling for [religious] sectarianism aimed at splitting the ranks of the people for the benefit of imperialism, to fighting the Students' General Executive Committee with fascist methods… A worker who joins any of [the Muslim Brothers'] committees represents no one but himself."[182]

Perhaps the most extensive moral critique of the Ikhwān was a joint EMNL–Wafd tract released in 1946 (around the time of the Brotherhood–Ṣidqī strikebreaking incident), entitled *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Balance*. Ostensibly authored by one "Muḥammad Ḥasan Aḥmad," the name was a pseudonym for multiple contributors, including Marxist al-Azhar shaykh ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Buṣaila and Wafdist-communist professor ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Nāṣir. The recurrent theme of the tract was to show the Brotherhood as a fascist organization, which exploited religion and had forsaken all morals and allied itself with capitalism and colonialism (as evidenced by the Brotherhood alliance with Ismāʿīl Ṣidqī Pasha). The pamphlet criticized an Ikhwān article in *al-Daʿwah* entitled "National Conquest [Waṭanīyyah al-Fatḥ]," which had called the process of Islamic expansion a beneficent colonization. But most importantly, the tract tried to reassure Brothers thinking of leaving the Ikhwān that resigning from the Muslim Brotherhood did not mean that one had left the religion.[183] This last comment was

[181] *Al-Muqāwamah al-Shaʿbīyyah,* for instance, reported in 1951 that the government was encouraging the Brotherhood to form armed brigades to fight workers and farmers. "Muʾāmarah khabīthah li-ḍarb al-ʿummāl wa-l-fallāḥīn," *al-Muqāwamah al-Shaʿbīyyah* no. 11, 24 October 1951, 2 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 111.

[182] As quoted in Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 369–370.

[183] Muḥammad Ḥasan Aḥmad (pseud. for ʿAbd al-Raḥman ʿAbd al-Nāṣir), *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī al-mīzān* (Cairo: n.p., 1946), 13-21, 43.

significant: the Brotherhood, it seemed, had convinced at least some members that Ikhwān membership was commensurate with being a "true Muslim"—thus conflating club membership with membership in the Muslim community— and salvation itself. This strategy created a powerful barrier to exit, which *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Balance* attempted to address.

While Egyptian communists agreed that the manipulation of religion was contributing to Egypt's problems, they were divided as to whether religion could also be part of the solution. The Jewish founder of People's Liberation argued in a 1940 curriculum that religious sentiment could be useful. Specifically, the fact that the British were Christian and the Egyptians Muslim could be exploited: "religion in a colonized country takes on a progressive nationalist content—especially if the colonizer belongs to another religion."[184] Police-seized meeting notes from Workers' Vanguard leader Yūsuf Darwīsh, however, suggested that their activists disagreed with this strategy: "The Resistance should not do religious propaganda… It's not our role to provoke religious sentiment."[185]

Curiel defined the EMNL's position as "religious neutrality." He acknowledged that reactionaries often used religion against communism, but argued that "the most stupid reply to such an attack would be to struggle not against reaction, but against religion." He added that fighting religion in Egypt would be a "truly suicidal enterprise." Moreover, he continued, it was wrong-headed, since many believers and religious leaders had joined the struggle for economic and social liberation. At a time when the EMNL had been restricted to urban spaces, for instance, al-Azhar students who were members of the

[184] Mārsīl Shīrīzī [Mārsīl Isrāʾīl] *Awrāq munāḍil Īṭālī fī Miṣr*, 145–146.

[185] Meeting notes of 22 May 1950, in *Maḥkamat jināyah miṣr: Raqm al-Qaḍīyyah 2021 al-Juzʾ al-thānī* (Miṣr al-Qadīmah, 1951), 154–155, in IISH ARCH02693/Folder 2.

EMNL had helped link the club with the countryside. (He concluded "Long live the revolutionaries of al-Azhar!")[186]

The club thus established student sections at the Islamic institution of al-Azhar and circulated tracts on campus.[187] As a DMNL report outlining the organization's program for al-Azhar argued:

> "Men of religion in this country have always played an important part against Imperialism… At present Zahra [al-Azhar] is standing at the crossroads, between the people and the bourgeoisie. The importance of [al-Azhar]is as follows: they are the religious body which assists reactionaries; their men represent the working classes; they enjoy spiritual confidence among the people; their roots go deep among many classes of Egyptians—teachers, preachers, Imams, etc.
>
> As they are so important, we must win them away from reactionarism and the Palace…. Reactionarism pretends to support religion, but the men of al-Azhar are the best people to understand religion truly."[188]

The religious question was not just debated between communist clubs; activists within clubs disagreed. The activists of *al-Taṭawwur* provide one glimpse into these disputes. In 1940, the paper ran an article entitled "The Development of the Idea of God and Its Evolution," a critique of religion that was painstakingly-worded. Despite its provocative title, the article denounced only idolatry, without directly arguing against the existence of God. Maintaining careful ambiguity through and through, it concluded that with the Bolshevik Revolution, mankind had turned to unbelief. However, the author declined to explain whether this represented a culmination of historical development or a

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[186] Henri Curiel, *Pages autobiographiques,* 23–25, 29–30.

[187] See for instance: "Barnāmaj al-lajnah al-waṭanīyyah bi-ḥayy al-Azhar," January 1952 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 50; Mubārak ʿAbduh Faḍl, "Mudhakkirāt," in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 125–126.

[188] Letter from Ronald Campbell to Ernest Bevin, 25 April 1948, Dispatch No. 215 (501/50/48), in *Development of Communism in Egypt*, FO 371/69250 [1948].

setback. Overall, the article was open-ended enough to allow its author legal cover, while still implying that the idea of God was a manmade invention.[189]

Behind the scenes, however, members of *al-Taṭawwur* became embroiled in a bitter dispute over the religious question. In a meeting, ʿAbd al-Mughnī Saʿīd defended religion by arguing that individuals who advocated materialist views were "tools of Zionism and promoters of immorality," expressing their own private opinions rather than those of the group. His statements sparked a conflict with other members of the staff (particularly with Italian member Marcelle Biagini, who accused him of being a fanatic and a fascist). As a result, Saʿīd left the club to advocate for a synthesis of Islam and communism he called Islamic socialism. Saʿīd was not the only one: Curiel's refusal to construct an Islamic–communist synthesis similarly led to the 1945 departure of ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sharqāwi from the EMNL.[190]

Whether or not they agreed on the place of religion in politics and society, many Egyptian communists still cited religious and/or ethical values as playing a role in their activism. Coptic communist Fransīs Kīrilus, for instance, recalled that his Christian education had instilled in him a compassion for the poor, which carried through into his communist activism. Ṭaha Saʿd ʿUthmān, meanwhile, was a devout Muslim; he found no contradiction between communism and Islam, explaining that Islam was a religion of the poor, which proclaimed equal rights and measured men by their devotion rather than their class position.[191] Muṣṭafá Haykal was also a pious Muslim, liberal, and supportive of the separation between religion and state. His father was a member of the High Council of

[189] Zakī Salāma (pseud.), "Nushūʾ fikrah Allāh wa taṭawwuruhā," *al-Taṭawwur*, February 1940, 27–29.
[190] ʿAbd al-Mughnī Saʿīd, *Asrār al-siyāsah al-Miṣrīyyah fī rubʿ qarn*, 58–59; Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 113.
[191] Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 210, 237–238.

ʿUlamāʾ, and a supporter of Shaykh ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq; Muṣṭafá had thus been brought up according to ʿAbd al-Rāziq's dictum that Islam was "a message, not a government—a religion, not a state." (These religious credentials helped Haykal's communist club al-Qalʿah attract devout Muslims and recruit students from al-Azhar.)[192] And religious or not, communists could be strongly moralistic, with a clear vision of how a just society ought to operate. Moral critique in communist articles thus denounced social cheating, exploitation, inequality, and racism; but communists also wrote articles on the negative effects of hashish smoking[193] and gambling (condemned as a form of wasteful luxury spending).[194]

In general, however, most communist clubs understood themselves to be on the moral defensive. The overrepresentation of foreigners in the movement, as well as communism's origins as a European doctrine, opened the communist movement to accusations that it was "foreign." Compounding the problem, many communists spoke French and English rather than Arabic. To attempt to remedy the problem, communists like Injī Aflāṭūn and Muḥammad Sīd Aḥmad (an elite Muslim who had grown up speaking only French) worked to improve their Arabic. To assert the Egyptian character of the movement, some non-Muslim communist activists also requested name changes or used pseudonyms: Hillel Schwartz became Hilāl Adham, Henri Curiel called himself Yūnis, and Diane Rossano took the name Didar Fawzy. The men of Ṭalīʿah went a step

[192] Muṣṭafā Haykal, in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 211; ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq, *al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm: baḥth fī al-Khilāfah wa-l-ḥukūmah fī al-Islām* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Miṣr Shirkah Musāhamah Miṣrīyyah, 1925), 64.

[193] *Maḥkamat jināyah miṣr: Raqm al-Qaḍīyyah 2021 al-Juzʾ al-thānī* (Miṣr al-Qadīmah, 1951), in IISH ARCH02693/Folder 2.

[194] *al-Hubz wa-l-Hurrīyyah* 1, February 1949, in "Communism in Egypt" FO 371/374/76 [1949].

further: Aḥmad Ṣādiq Saʿd, Raymond Duwayk, and Yūsuf Darwīsh converted to Islam (and Curiel considered it).

Communist clubs also struggled to counter the charge that communists were depraved and licentious, following foreign and urban habits. French-speaking members of Iskra (as well as some members of the EMNL) were elite and thoroughly Westernized: they wore European clothing (including shorts and, when swimming, bathing suits), mixed men and women, danced, drank alcohol, and mingled in late night soirées. These parties gave Iskrans a reputation for sexual licentiousness, which opponents worked to project onto the communist movement as a whole. In order to appear virtuous per Egyptian social norms, other communist clubs thus worked to ensure members adhered to ideas of propriety appropriate to Egyptian life in the 1940s. Both the EMNL and Ṭalīʿat al-ʿUmmāl divided men and women in to separate sections.[195] When the EMNL and Iskra merged in 1947, Curiel also successfully lobbied for women and foreigners to be secluded in their own units—the foreigners (largely Iskra members) being segregated on the grounds that they did not have the "proletarian" character the movement was trying to cultivate. The DMNL bylaws further tried to ensure the organization remained respectable, listing as a membership duty that "members must by their behavior set a good example. They must avoid everything which may touch their honor or reputation, [and] must be careful about the feelings of others and their opinions."[196]

[195] As Khālid Ḥamza explained, Ṭalīʿat al-ʿUmmāl later had to remix the sections, as it had the effect of isolating the group's female members.

[196] Report from Colonel G.J. Jenkins, Head of Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) in Cairo, to F.H. Tomlyn, Cairo Embassy, Ref. No. DS(E) 200/128, in *Arab Societies: Democratic Movement for National Liberation*, FO 141/1272 [1948].

Communists took other steps to assert their honorable character. Curiel fasted Ramadan, justifying the decision by arguing that "When you're a communist, you must behave in an exemplary manner, and this conduct is a better way of serving our cause that longest speeches." He added that "we must respect the social customs of the environment."[197] Ḥilmī Yassin, meanwhile, reported that "Membership in [the Workers' Vanguard] resembled priesthood; moral stature was stressed… The member had to be responsible in his private life, and the organization had the right to interfere in a member's private life." To ensure propriety, the club also established a "corridor" separating Greek and Francophone members from the main membership (Egyptians and workers)—and only those who mastered Arabic were admitted as full members."[198]

As part of these demonstrations of moral probity and "Egyptianness," Egyptian communists used light religious discourse in speeches and tracts, such as Arabic idioms referring to God and terms like *shahīd* and *jihād*.[199] (This was not unusual: Christians, Jews, and Muslims, religious and secular activists alike in Egypt had been using the term *jihād* to describe the national struggle for independence since before the 1919 Revolution.) Notably, communists also used piety displays to counter Brotherhood campaigns and signal propriety. In one notable incident (echoing the 1951 shoe incident in the al-ʿAdawī Mosque), Muslim Brotherhood members tried to derail the election campaign of communist candidate Yūsuf al-Mudarrik in Shubrā al-Khaymah, by publicly accusing al-Mudarrik of being an infidel. To counter the charges, Mudarrik rallied the

[197] Henri Curiel, *Pages autobiographiques,* 23–25, 29–30.

[198] Tareq Y. Ismael and Rifaʿat el-Saʿid, *The Communist Movement in Egypt,* 45; Joel Beinin, "Exile and Political Activism: The Egyptian-Jewish Communists in Paris, 1950–59," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 73–94.

[199] See for instance: *Wathā'iq,* 88, 201, 218, 220, 616; Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 246.

workers in a piety display, with chants of "God is Great, Long Live the Workers!" [*Allāhu akhbar, wa yaḥyā al-ʿummāl!*].[200]

Overall, while the Egyptian communist movement was thus on the moral defensive, activists found creative ways to signal moral probity, and synthesize French and Russian communist ideas into a distinctly Egyptian form of communism. Moreover, by establishing cells at al-Azhar and leading chants of "*Allāhu Akhbar,* Long Live the Workers!", Mudarrik and other communist activists sent an important message: they would not let the Brotherhood claim hegemony over Islamic devotion, piety, or factory space.

Conclusion: Rethinking the "Rise of Islam" and the "Rise of Communism" in Egypt

In exploring affiliation, switching behaviors, and competition in the market for political clubs, the preceding discussion has highlighted a few features of Egyptian activism in the 1940s. First, Egyptians often chose clubs relationally rather than as a result of a sudden "awakening." In deciding which club to join, activists emphasized the influence of personal networks, follow-up visits, recruitment through events and activities, and happenstance. After prolonged contact with a group, some activists then described a gradual paradigm shift. Clubs further encouraged affiliation without ideological commitment, in hopes of convincing individuals over time.

Egyptian accounts also suggested that individuals in the 1940s primarily invested time and energy in activities that maximized their social capital, choosing clubs that utilized discourses, behaviors, curricula, and epistemologies learned in *kuttāb* or *lycée*.

[200] "al-ʿUmmāl fī kifāḥihum al-jamāhīrī al-siyāsī," in *Wathāʾiq*, 638.

As a result of these social investment patterns, communism tended to attract Western-educated minorities (Copts and Jews) and Muslims on the margins of the community. For poor minorities, communist clubs particularly provided access to elite circles and opportunities for advancement otherwise unavailable. (The Nubian communist and al-Azhar student Mubārak ʿAbduh Faḍl, for instance, justified his communist commitment by recalling his lack of enthusiasm for his studies at al-Azhar, explaining that he did not want to spend his life reading Qurʾān at funerals—the expected fate for a low-level ʿ*alīm*).[201] The Brotherhood, on the other hand, appealed to workers and the *effendi:* the growing middle-class of Arabic-speaking Muslims, who had studied at a *kuttāb* (and in some cases, gone on to receive a Western higher education).

Switching practices further suggested that for many Egyptians, nationalist associations (the Wafd, Kutlah, Miṣr al-Fatāh, the Muslim Brotherhood, and to a lesser extent, communist clubs) could serve as substitutes, meeting various social needs and the demand for political involvement. Activist organizations were not perfect substitutes, however. For the average Egyptian, membership in a communist club involved a much higher cost than Brotherhood membership. Egyptians coming from villages, whether Muslim or Copt, also tended to express strong preferences for clubs that respected traditional values—the "values of the village." This profound disparity in moralities tended to fall between these traditional village ethics on the one hand, and the values of foreigners and urban Westernized elites on the other hand.

Club leaders and ideologues considered these sensibilities, and used diverse interpersonal, rhetorical, and interpretive skills to try and build competitive

[201] Mubārak ʿAbduh Faḍl, "Mudhakkirāt," in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 123–179.

organizational products. In this process, the Muslim Brotherhood combined religious resources (texts, rituals, and symbols) with eclectic organizational strategies adapted from other clubs, converting these resources into distinct interpretation of Islam: "our Islam." Communist activists, meanwhile, relied heavily on European texts (Marx, Tolstoy, Lenin), which they tempered with references to local thinkers (Salāmah Mūsá, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq). For both movements, such texts served as raw materials for interpretive labors: it was not always what a text said that mattered, so much as what it could be *made* to say. Thus, Lenin could be used to endorse private piety, and nationalism and internationalism located in the Qurʾān. As Pierre Bourdieu put it, "particularly elastic authors transfer so well. All great prophecies are polysemic.… Such elastic thinkers are manna from heaven when it comes to serving expansionist strategic uses."[202]

The ideological systems that resulted from these productive processes held much in common. However, of the two systems, the Brotherhood's program was better adapted to the Egyptian market. Relying on more accessible sources of cultural capital (Qurʾānic scripture and Islamic tradition), the Brotherhood met a variety of material and non-material needs and differentiated itself from its competitors. The Brotherhood also advanced a simple, coherent, and comprehensive reform program, and embedded this program in a strong social environment (featuring "families," a fatherly figurehead, a dynamic leadership, a clear hierarchy, and practices that encouraged strong reciprocity between members). The Ikhwān advertised, and employed diverse strategies for meeting members' material and non-material needs (helping members find employment, offering devotional activities and counseling, providing opportunities to participate in service

[202] Pierre Bourdieu, **"**The Social Conditions of the International Circulation of Ideas," in *Bourdieu: A Critical Reader*, ed. Richard Shusterman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 224.

projects, and constructing an organizational myth with meaningful roles and clear scripts). Finally, the Brotherhood established strong barriers to exit by conflating club membership with being a "real Muslim." In the end then, the best-developed (and most competitive) organizational product among Egyptian clubs proved to be that offered by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Egyptian communists, on the other hand, tried to position their ideology as minimally counterintuitive to its Egyptian audience, but struggled against a public perception that communists were dissimilar from the average Egyptian, and unable to speak the same language. To stay competitive, communist activists tried to bridge the gap—whether that meant putting on old clothes like Fakhrī Labīb, trying to learn Arabic like Injī Aflāṭūn and Muḥammad Sīd Aḥmad, requesting name changes and using pseudonyms like Hillel Schwartz and Henri Curiel, converting to Islam like Aḥmad Ṣādiq Saʿd, Raymond Duwayk, and Yūsuf Darwīsh, or encouraging EMNL activists to write articles "of interest to people," "connected with the lives of the masses" (rather than "dry and theoretical" articles using "words which the least educated of people cannot understand").[203] But the gap remained. Activist Fauzī Ḥabbashī later explained the problem in stark terms when justifying why he had dismissed Coptic communist Abū Sayf Yūsuf's bid for leadership of the Egyptian Communist Party. As Ḥabbashī reasoned, as much as Yūsuf might argue that "religion was something personal, and that politics was something public," Ḥabbashī felt it was about appealing to "the man in the street." And despite being very much a

[203] Internal EMNL [Hameto-Shar] memo regarding the newspaper *al-Jamāḥīr*, "The Newspaper: Its Task… Its Possibilities… Its Duties," Ref. No. DS(E) 330/6 and 20/2/24, July 1947, p. 5, in *Communism*, FO 141/1158 [1947].

mythical figure, in the Egyptian imagination the "man on the street" was Arabic-speaking, male, and Muslim.[204]

Communists thus struggled to gain a mass following, and fought a losing battle against accusations that communism was foreign and immoral. And in the end, this propaganda was so successful, communist activists working in Arabic-speaking communities ended up avoided the term "communism" altogether, preferring to speak of their platform as "socialism" instead. Advertising strategies reflected this: when police caught Jewish communist Bakhūr Mināḥim Munshāf painting slogans on walls in the ʿĀbdīn district, the messaging was divided by linguistic audience. In French, he had been painting "Long Live Communism!"; but in Arabic, his graffiti read "Socialism Will Lead the World" and "Socialism Against Imperialism."[205]

Overall, both communist clubs and the Brotherhood worked to perform the worlds they hoped to create. The EMNL, for instance, decreed that all members must work to increase their knowledge, and establish democracy "by promotion being from the bottom to top."[206] The Brotherhood likewise performed its vision of a comprehensive Islamic order that would meet the material and non-material needs of Egyptians, creating "families" and sponsoring sports activities, schools, cooperative societies, and health clinics. Through such activities, clubs tried to create new realities as much they interpreted things as they "really were"—after all, despite what Quṭb claimed, Muslim countries did not already represent a united "historical fact, geographical fact, economic

[204] Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 152–153.
[205] Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 105.
[206] Report from Colonel G.J. Jenkins, Head of Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) in Cairo, to F.H. Tomlyn, Cairo Embassy, Ref. No. DS(E) 200/128, in *Arab Societies: Democratic Movement for National Liberation*, FO 141/1272 [1948].

fact, and intellectual and emotional fact."[207] But by speaking of "world Islam" and describing British-occupied Palestine and Italian-occupied Libya as part of one "Islamic homeland" united against European imperialism, the Brothers endeavored to make this transnational community a fact.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and communist clubs also worked to creatively negotiate the twin engines of cultural learning: imitation and innovation.[208] But while groups like the Muslim Brotherhood worked to imitate competitors and synthesize capitalism and communism into a spiritualist "third way," I would hesitate to apply Zeev Sternhell's "neither right nor left [ni droit ni gauche]" formula (used to describe interwar fascism as a capitalist–communist synthesis) to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt. Certainly, Egyptian clubs shared certain aesthetic, organizational, and even ideological similarities with European fascist movements (emphasizing anti-materialist spiritualism, masculine virility, youth organizing, patriotism, and industriousness). And their ideologies certainly responded to similar material circumstances (industrialization, economic depression) and defied easy categorization as right/left or modern/traditional. However, the Brotherhood and Young Egypt's ideology and social demographic makeup was different from that of European fascist parties (whose base was demobilized soldiers), and the movements arose from different historical antecedents.

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[207] Sayyid Quṭb, "al-Kutlah al-Islāmīyyah fī al-mīzān al-dawlī," *Majallat al-Risālah* 949, 10 September 1951, 1021–1023; Sayyid Quṭb, "al-ʿĀlam al-islāmī ḥaqīqah wāqiʿah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 966, 7 January 1952, 10–12; Sayyid Quṭb, "al-Ṭarīq ilá al-kutlah al-thālithah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 976, 17 March 1952, 293–295; Sayyid Quṭb, "Ghubār ḥawla al-Kutlah al-Islāmīyyah!" *Majallat al-Risālah* 981, 12 April 1952, 433–434.

Also see: Sayyid Quṭb, *Maʿrakat al-Islām wa al-raʾsmālīyyah* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1951).

[208] Cristine H. Legare and Mark Nielsen, "Imitation and Innovation: The Dual Engines of Cultural Learning," *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 19, no. 11 (November 2015): 688–699.

It would thus be a mistake to view either the Brotherhood or the communists as engaging in "high fidelity imitation"[209] of any single tradition—be it Islamic modernism, Wahhabism, or Sufism on the one hand, or European fascism, communism, or liberalism on the other hand. Clubs like the Muslim Brotherhood borrowed from fascism, but they also borrowed from Christian missionary societies and communist clubs; this high degree of imitative flexibility and innovation was necessary for club survival. At the same time, clubs had to maintain enough behavioral and ideological consistency to be viewed as honest brokers. While the "ni droite, ni gauche" description is thus tempting to apply, it risks perpetuating old misconceptions about the link between Egyptian interwar clubs and fascism (suggesting Egyptians imitated Europeans and shared the same antiliberal and antidemocratic mentality as European fascists).[210]

Rather than categorize the Muslim Brotherhood as "neither right nor left," I would thus argue it can be better described as "à la fois traditionnel et moderne"—both traditional and modern, capitalist and Marxist, democratic and authoritarian-statist, nationalist and internationalist. Similarly, I am inclined to agree with Israel Gershoni that the shift to Islamic discourses in the 1930s was not representative of a rejection of liberalism or "crisis of orientation" (as Nadav Safran and P. J. Vatikiotis described),[211] but rather a result of the deft organizing skills and creative energies of Brotherhood leaders, the particularities of British presence in Egypt, and the political competitions and

[209] Cristine H. Legare and Mark Nielsen, "Imitation and Innovation," 688–699.

[210] Zeev Sternhell, *Neither Right Nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France*, trans. David Maisel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), xvi–xviii, 294–296.

[211] Israel Gershoni, "Egyptian Liberalism in an Age of 'Crisis of Orientation': *Al-Risāla*'s Reaction to Fascism and Nazism, 1933–39," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31 (1999): 551–576.

colliding interests within and between Egyptian political parties, the Palace, al-Azhar, religious societies, foreign missionaries, communist clubs, and other political clubs.

Overall then, the struggles clubs waged—struggles to control space, build networks, signal moral sincerity, connect with other Egyptians, create attractive platforms, and model new worlds—suggested that communism and Ikhwānid Islamism were not popular in pre-revolutionary Egypt because a "wave of frustration" or emotion overtook Egyptian society (as Gibb suggested). Nor was Islam or a faceless proletariat suddenly "awakened," as Brothers and communists prophesied—because the term "awakening" suggests an impersonal, dormant force awaiting an inevitable dawn. Neither was the term "rise" appropriate: as Michael Walzer has pointed out, "the annoying word 'rise,' which seems to denote some collective and impersonal ascent, actually conceals a vast amount of painful human endeavor requiring willfulness, calculation, nerve, and perhaps above all an anxious, introspective discipline and self-control."[212] Even terms like "revolt" and "rebellion" seem insufficient, as they imply a negative and reactionary impulse. On the contrary, Ikhwānid Islamism and Egyptian communism gained traction in the 1940s because enterprising individuals expended a great deal of energy creating, adapting, and promoting ideological products. Bannā reflected on this labor-intensive process of ideological production in December 1948, in one of his final interviews before his assassination. "We have spent 20 years *making people understand* that Islam is a religion and a state: not a religion of worship and reclusion, but a religion of *jihād* and *niḍāl* [struggle]."[213]

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[212] Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints* (New York: Harvard University Press, 1968), 20.

[213] Emphasis added. Interview with Ḥassan al-Bannā, "Hal al-shaykh Ḥassan al-Bannā zaʿīm qawī wa māhir?" *Rūz al-Yūsuf* 1070, 15 December 1948. He further describes both Muslim and non-Muslim

Despite their efforts, however, the world-building performances of the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt, the Workers' Vanguard, and the DMNL would not succeed in overturning the ruling order. Instead, a cadre of officers—including Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn (who had attended the Muslim Brotherhood and Iskra before committing to the DMNL), Gamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir (who had been affiliated with Young Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the DMNL), ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿAbd al-Raʾūf (Muslim Brotherhood), Ḥusayn Ḥammūdah (Muslim Brotherhood), and Muḥammad Anwar al-Sādāt (who said he had "joined every single political party in Egypt")—would form their own underground club around 1949. Building on established discourses and networks, the officers borrowed a roneo machine from the DMNL, and began printing anti-government tracts to circulate in the mess hall. Calling themselves the "Free Officers," it was ultimately their resources, adaptive imitation, and initiative—as well as their ability to unite members of different clubs around a vague populist program—that would allow them to topple the monarchy in July 1952.[214]

opposition to the Ikhwānid combination of religion and politics in Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Fī muʾtamar ṭalaba al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn," 158–168.

[214] Anwar El Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 59; "Ahdāf al-ḍubbāṭ al-aḥrār," [Autumn 1951] in Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 94–95; Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 44–50.

Chapter 3

Between the "Mystique of the Maquis" and a "Gang of Highwaymen": Relational Networking and the Making of the 1 November Movement

"[Lakhdar, wounded]: …[H]ere is our street. For the first time I can feel it throbbing like a single flooded artery, where I can offer up my soul without losing it. I am no longer a body, but a street. As of now, it will require a field gun to kill me."[1]

These are the lines that open the 1954 play *Le cadavre encirclé* [*The Encircled Corpse*], by Algerian author Kateb Yacine. The setting is the aftermath of nationalist demonstration: a young Algerian activist named Lakhdar lays dying, having been gravely wounded by French soldiers dispersing the protest. Meanwhile, his best friends (Mustapha and Hassan) and the woman in love with him (Nedjma) anxiously wait to discover whether Lakhdar is alive or dead. Describing the scene as the aftermath of any anti-colonial protest, Yacine writes "It is a street in Algiers or Constantine, Sétif or Guelma, Tunis or Casablanca."[2]

Written to stir memories of the Sétif and Guelma demonstrations of 8 May 1945, the opening scene of *Le cadavre encirclé* was inspired by Yacine's own experiences. Yacine had himself participated in the 1945 demonstrations, and at that time been in love with a girl he called Nedjma. He had been fifteen years old at the time, and a student in Sétif. As he remembered, he had been in class that Tuesday. But oddly, about ten o'clock that morning the school bell had sounded, dismissing them from class. He joined his fellow students as they poured into the street. As he remembered, since Tuesday was market

[1] Kateb Yacine, "Le cadavre encerclé" [Part 1, December 1954], in *Le cercle des représailles: théâtre* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1959), 17–23.

[2] Sétif and Guelma had been the site of anti-colonial demonstrations in May 1945, Tunis in February-March 1952, and Casablanca in April 1947, November 1951, and December 1952. Ibid.

day, there were many shoppers out and about, and peasants leading their cows. And "suddenly," he says, "I saw a huge procession arrive in the center of the city." Leading the demonstration, he saw scouts and some friends from school. They "signaled me, and I joined them, without knowing what I was doing. Immediately, there were gunshots, followed by an extraordinary crush of people, the crowd surging and looking for safety in flight. A little girl was crushed in the panic."[3]

Yacine tried to take shelter in a bookshop, but was horror-struck to find the proprietor lying in a pool of blood. He ran back outside, and next tried ducking inside a hotel. There, he found his French art teacher and a group of soldiers. The soldiers showered him with racist epithets, and his art teacher shouted at him "here is your revolution, now are you happy?" (She was "a very nice old lady," he writes, but he had once heckled her in class about the Algerians following in the path of the French Revolution, and she still remembered, it seemed.) So, he fled Sétif to the countryside, returning to his family's village, Bougie. The next few nights were uneasy, as they lay awake listening to the sound of gunshots. Then, "May 13, in the morning, I was arrested by the police detectives who took me to the prison. … A few days later, we were transferred to Sétif prison, then to the concentration camp… where I remained several months."[4]

Through his *Soliloques,* started the year before Sétif and finished the following year, and *Le cadavre encircle* (authored in the first year of the Algerian Revolution), Yacine communicates his experience and his truths about life in the Maghreb during decolonization. But despite being written with an eye to the Sétif and Guelma

[3] Kateb Yacine, *Soliloques* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1991 [First Ed. Annaba: 1946]), 9–12.
[4] Ibid., 9–12.

demonstrations of 1945, *Le cadavre encirclé*'s main message is not about diplomacy, economic deprivation, political developments, or organizational strategies. Instead, a striking feature of the play is the intimacy with which Yacine describes the experience of resistance to French colonization. This is visible in the play's opening lines, where Lakhdar (the "encircled corpse" of the play's title) reveals an unusual sentiment: in dying he no longer feels like an isolated individual, but a whole street. And as part of this community, he says "I can offer up my soul without losing it. I am no longer a body, but a street"—a street it "will require a field gun" to beat.

So how did the "encircled" activists of French Algeria build an anti-colonial revolt? The first chapter of this study investigated Egyptian decisions to join anti-colonial clubs in the leadup to the 1952 Revolution; and while no single club in Egypt was able to enact regime change, they did contribute materials, personnel, and ideas to the Free Officers movement that seized power in July 1952. Meanwhile, Algerians were paying close attention to regional events—particularly the Tunisian and Moroccan uprisings of 1952, the Egyptian Revolution of July 1952, and the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 (marking the success of Ho Chi Minh's August Revolution). When explaining such serial revolutionary events, other scholars have called these phenomena "revolutionary waves," discussing "how revolutionary waves rise and fall." Mark Katz, for instance, argued that waves spread through sponsorship of "aspiring revolutions" by a "central revolution," and identified the period 1952–1967 as constituting a distinct "Arab

nationalist" revolutionary wave fueled in part by Egyptian patronage. Other scholars have pointed to the role of economic and demographic patterns in triggering such "waves."[5]

There is some truth to these explanations: the 1 November movement in Algeria, for instance, drew inspiration and material support from Egyptian leaders. Algerians smuggled weapons from Egypt, took noms de guerre like "Nasser [Nāṣir]" and "Neguib [Nājib]," and one FLN dissident group even named themselves "the Free Officers."[6] And while much of this history was later silenced (to repudiate French claims that the Algerian insurrection was part of an Egyptian, Arab League, or Soviet plot to destroy the French Empire), the two movements participated in knowledge transfer and material exchanges.

Even with this aid, however, most Algerians opposed the 1 November movement when it began—contrary to the FLN's myth of "linear certainties" and the collective march toward independence,[7] and contrary to the inevitable sense the term "revolutionary waves" lent these movements in retrospect. Moreover, as James McDougall has pointed out, the FLN's revolutionary myth wrote out "the long and impassioned search of Algerians for a workable reform of the colonial system," as well as the "divisions and

[5] Mark N. Katz, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 13–14; Mark N. Katz , "Cycles, Waves, and Diffusion," in *The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions*, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (*The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 126–127.

[6] "Annexe IV: 2° interrogatoire de Masser [sic]," *Documents récupérés sur les rebelles dans le corps d'armée d'Oran* (September–November 1957) in SHD GR 1H 1623/D2; ALN-FLN, "Réunion des officiers libres," Wilaya III (14 September 1959) in Annex II, Mohammed Benyahja, *La conjuration au pouvoir: récit d'un maquisard de l'ALN* (Paris: Éditions de l'Arcantère, 1988); Mohamed Fathi Al Dib, *Abdel Nasser et la révolution algérienne* (Paris: Éditions l'Harmattan, 1985).

[7] James McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.

conflicts of the revolution," and "the means by which an activist fringe" of the nationalist movement managed to inspire, persuade, and coerce the rest of Algerians to join them.[8]

So how did certain French Muslims of Algeria (and a number of French Europeans) decide to invest large amounts of capital in a high-risk activity like anti-colonial activism, and convince others to do likewise? I would argue that the answer is not to be found in any mystical (and mythic) account of national awakening—although as Chapter 6 will explore, myths and stories did play a significant role. Before storytelling could make any meaningful contribution, however, Algerian activists assessed historical events and material opportunities, built networks, and persuaded peers. And it was in these early moments of historical contingency, when insurrectionists were still seen by other Algerians as fools and criminals, that the mechanisms for the spread of revolutions can be found—and as this chapter argues, those mechanisms were above all relational.

As the following pages thus explore, kin and peer relationships were foundational to individual decision-making in Algeria in the 1950s: when deciding what to do, Algerians learned from family and friends, and were often swayed by conformity pressure and coercion. Kinship and peer networks thus formed the basis for activist recruitment strategies, determining the direction of network growth and underpinning activists' moral justifications for "why we fight." But while kinship and friendship, coercion, and conformity pressure contributed to activist decisions, none of these factors were fully determinative in shaping individual choices. Instead, conflict within and between socializing institutions (e.g. disagreements within families, and differences of opinion between one's parents and one's friends) allowed the FLN to create clusters of outspoken

[8] James McDougall, "Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s–1990s," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 123–124.

"minority voices," who persuaded peers and created behavioral change through positive and negative reinforcement and confident, consistent argument.[9] Consequently, like their Egyptian counterparts (and Yacine's character Lakhdar), Algerian activists were indeed socially "encircled"—but exercised a remarkable amount of agency in choosing affiliations and courses of action.

Revolution, Interrupted: From the Second World War to Sétif

World War II had been traumatic for France's Algerian departments, which unlike the British protectorate in Egypt or the French protectorates of Tonkin and Annam, had been considered part of France since 1848. When the Second World War erupted in 1939, some 176,000 Algerian Muslims were called to serve in the French Army, including Raymond Bouzar and his father Abdelkader. Raymond, as mentioned in Chapter 1, would marry hastily before leaving for training at Saint-Maixent in 1940. Ahmad Ben Bella and two of his brothers also went to serve; one brother would die in the barracks of tuberculosis, the other in the war. Thousands more Algerians were conscripted into the colonial labor service (Main-d'œuvre indigène, or MOI).[10]

Raymond and Ahmad would not see battle, however, until June 1940—as the German Army was invading France. In Marseilles, Ahmad reported the aerial bombardment was "rapid and terrible," and many of the young men in his unit abandoned their posts and fled. Raymond's unit also suffered a humiliating defeat; the Germans took Paris a few

[9] Damon Centola, *How Behavior Spreads* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 96–108; Charlan J. Nemeth and Jack A. Goncalo, "Rogues and Heroes: Finding Value in Dissent," in *Rebels in Groups: Dissent, Deviance, Difference, and Defiance*, eds. Jolanda Jetten and Matthew J. Hornsey (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 18–24;.

[10] Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance* (Algiers: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1989 [First Ed. Cairo: Comité de Libération du Maghreb Arabe, 1954]), 77–94; Robert Merle and Ahmad Ben Bella, *Ben Bella*, trans. Camilla Sykes (London: Michael Joseph, 1967), 39–49.

days later, and the French Army was demobilized. Raymond and Ahmad thus returned to North Africa with a wave of demobilized soldiers, soon to be joined by 10,000 Algerian workers expelled from mainland France as part of new Vichy regulations. Another 8,000 Algerian workers were expelled in January 1942, and emigration was suspended altogether from November 1942 until the end of the war.[11]

At home, conditions were dire. The war had interrupted both North African and trans-Mediterranean trade, triggering an unprecedented economic crisis in Algeria, worse than that of the 1930s: with merchant traffic in Algiers down 83% between 1938 and 1941, the region saw severe shortages of butter, milk, sugar, meat, gasoline, shoes, fertilizer, and seeds for agriculture.[12] Structural and environmental factors exacerbated hardship. French colonization had converted Algerian grazing lands to the production of non-food cash crops (such as tobacco and wine), and established an import-export economy based on trade with the metropole (with 80% of Algerian exports going to France). As a result, the interruption of trade, a season of drought, and the particularly harsh winter of 1942-1943 combined to create human catastrophe. From 1939-1945 cereal production in Algeria plummeted from 16.9 million quintals to 3.8 million quintals; heads of sheep similarly dropped from 6.4 million to 2.8 million from 1939-1946. But despite the spreading starvation, Vichy administrators continued to seize Algerian grain stores to meet the demands of the mainland, exporting 1.8 million quintals in 1941 for transit to France and

[11] Jacques Frémeaux, "Les contingents impériaux au cœur de la guerre," *Histoire, économie & société* 23, no. 2 (2004): 215–233; Benjamin Stora, *Ils venaient d'Algérie: L'immigration algérienne en France* (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 75–80; Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Aux origines de la guerre d'Algérie 1940–1945*, 30; Roger Vétillard, *Sétif, mai 1945: massacres en Algérie* (Versailles: Éditions de Paris, 2008), 245–261.

[12] Omar Boudaoud, *Du PPA au FLN: Mémoires d'un combatant. Cinq ans à la tête de la Fédération de France* (Algiers: Éditions Casbah, 2007), 19–20; Abderrahmane Farès, *La cruelle vérité: L'Algérie de 1945 à l'Indépendance* (Algiers: Casbah, 2006), 19–24; Roger Vétillard, *Sétif, mai 1945: massacres en Algérie* (Versailles: Éditions de Paris, 2008), 245–261.

Germany. The result was a devastating famine, as well as cholera, typhus, and typhoid epidemics (with typhus causing 112,000 deaths in France's North African colonies in 1939, 154,000 deaths in 1941, and 235,000 deaths in 1943).[13]

In these conditions, Raymond was lucky, and found a job teaching high-school Latin and French in Morocco. But back in Algeria, his father Abdelkader watched in devastation as tens of thousands of tomatoes he had invested in rotted on the docks, bankrupting him. Ahmad, meanwhile, returned to Algeria with his sergeant's stripes and a Croix de Guerre—but "they did not get me a job. The situation at home was appalling." His brother Kouider [Abdelkader] and his best friend Abdelkrim died of typhus.[14]

While the war brought suffering and risk, it also created opportunities. The French defeat in 1940 and Anglo-American landing in Algiers in November 1942 were both experienced by French leaders as profound humiliations to French prestige—but interpreted by Algerian activists as a sign of French weakness and an opportunity to press national claims. The Atlantic Charter (1941) encouraged Algerian nationalists, by promising self-determination in an attempt to win over colonial populations to the Allied cause. The Americans distributed over one million copies of the Charter in Algeria in March 1944, and the British distributed another million leaflets advertising the Charter on 7 May 1945 (the day before the Sétif and Guelma demonstrations).[15]

For some Algerian nationalists, the war thus contributed to the decision to press for independence. Vichy rule in the colonies had empowered a brand of nationalism that

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[13] For charts of Algerian imports and exports, as well as agricultural production of wine, legumes, wheat, olives, etc., see: Roger Vétillard, *Sétif, mai 1945*, 245–261.

Also see: Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Aux origines de la guerre d'Algérie 1940–1945: de Mers-el-Kébir aux massacres du Nord-Constantinois* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006), 17–30, 61–64, 159.

[14] Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance*, 77–94; Robert Merle and Ahmad Ben Bella, *Ben Bella*, 39–49.

[15] Dominique Lormier, *C'est nous les Africains: L'epopée de l'armée française d'Afrique 1940–1945* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2006).

emphasized family values, tradition, and an exclusivist vision of French citizenship based on race and religion.[16] Building on experiences of wartime racism, Algerian nationalists thus worked to impress on Algerian Muslims that any hopes for French citizenship were in vain, and that even if Muslims were granted citizenship rights, these would always be precarious—as illustrated by the Vichy Regime's decision to revoke Algerian Jews' citizenship rights during the war. As Ferhat Abbas asked in June 1942, "How can we [Algerian Muslims] believe that we will not one day be rejected from the French community under some pretext that it pleases you to imagine?"[17]

Still, when the Allies began the push to liberate France in 1944, a quarter (134,000) of the soldiers who fought in the French Army campaign were Algerian; Ahmad Ben Bella, for his part, returned to service to help the French Army liberate Italy.[18] Moreover, in an attempt to secure the loyalty of Algerian leaders and prove the stability of the French empire, Charles de Gaulle granted Algerians a series of political concessions, including a repeal of the Code de l'indigénat, the granting of full French citizenship to an additional 65,000 Algerian elites and military personnel (albeit out of a population of 8.5 million), and an increase in the proportion of Algerian representation in local assemblies (from 1/3 to 2/5—although this was still not equal representation, as the Algerian population outnumbered Europeans 8/1).[19]

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[16] There was a brief window of time between autumn 1940 and mid-1941 when some Algerian Muslim officials like Ferhat Abbas tried to appeal to Pétain based on Napoleon III's idea of creating an "Arab Kingdom," but this was quickly abandoned. See: Jeremy F. Lane, "Ferhat Abbas, Vichy's National Revolution, and the Memory of the *Royaume arabe," L'Esprit Créatur* 47, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 19–31; Eric T. Jennings, V*ichy in the Tropics: Petain's National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940–1944* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 9–11.

[17] Roger Vétillard, *Sétif, mai 1945*, 233–234, 405.

[18] Dominique Lormier, *C'est nous les Africains*.

[19] Phillip C. Naylor, *Historical Dictionary of Algeria, 4th Ed.* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 368; Roger Vétillard, *Sétif, mai 1945*, 233–234, 345–346, 405; Mouloud Feraoun, *The Poor Man's Son*, trans. Lucy R. McNair (University of Virginia Press, 2005), xxiv.

In March 1944, Algerian politicians Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj merged their movements into the Amis du manifeste et de la liberté (AML). The nationalist club grew so quickly it alarmed French administrators, and prompted activists Lamine Debaghine and Hocine Asselah to visit Messali Hadj in the third week of April 1945 to discuss plans to declare an independent Algerian government, to be backed by armed struggle if necessary. The war had provided material resources, in the form of weapons acquired through French Army service, the black market, and/or bought from American, British, and German servicemen. The AML thus asked cadres to make preparations and arm themselves.[20] Revolutionary plans were interrupted, however, by the French interrogation and deportation of Messali to Brazzaville (in the French Congo) at the end of April 1945.

Despite the setback, activists continued to organized demonstrations through word of mouth, tracts, and graffiti on walls. In the first days of May, activists went through Algerian neighborhoods in Sétif, announcing demonstration plans and telling Algerians that the hour of struggle had arrived and those absent would be noted. The demonstrations themselves were scheduled for the successive market days of 1 and 8 May 1945, and aimed to attract the attention of local Algerians, the French administration, and world powers meeting at the San Francisco Conference. On 1 May (Labor Day), scout troops and AML-Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) activists marched in Oran, Blida, Bougie, Bône, Sétif, and other towns and cities in Algeria. In Algiers, some 2,000 people chanted slogans including "Long Live an Independent Algeria," "Free Messali Hadj," and "Down with Colonialism."[21]

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[20] Mohammed Harbi, *Aux origines du Front de Libération Nationale: la scission du PPA-MTLD* (Paris: C. Bourgois, 1975), 20–23; Mouloud Feraoun, *The Poor Man's Son*, xxiv; Roger Vétillard, *Sétif, mai 1945*, 233–234, 345–346, 405; Phillip C. Naylor, *Historical Dictionary of Algeria, 4th Ed.*, 368.

[21] Roger Vétillard, *Sétif, mai 1945*, 51.

Activists used the momentum from 1 May to arrange larger nationalist demonstrations the following week: 8 May 1945, or VE Day. The march was organized and led by some 250 scouts of the Kechafat el-Hayat troop, and members of the local AML section in Sétif. They assembled at 8:30am some 4,000-8,000 strong, carrying banners in French (and a few in English) reading "Long Live the Atlantic Charter," "Long Live the United Nations," and "Long Live Algeria, Free and Independent," in addition to messages such as "Free Messali," "Down with France," "Death to Colonization," and "We Want to Be Your Equals."[22]

At 9:15am, the French commissioner, a group of police officers, and other French officials approached the head of the Sétif procession. Blocking the path of the Algerian protestors, the French officials pronounced the demonstration in violation of their assembly permit, which had included a prohibition on banners and nationalist flags. This created an argument, a scuffle (purportedly when a French official tried to wrest the flag away from an Algerian flag-bearer), a shot (likely the commissioner shooting in the air to disperse and intimidate the crowd), and then chaos. In the subsequent riot, Algerian protestors sacked nearby shops, attacked the police station, and lynched Europeans in their path. By the end of the day, 23 Europeans and 4 protestors were dead, and many more wounded.[23]

These events repeated themselves in Guelma later that evening, where a crowd of 2,000-3,000 scouts, AML, and PPA activists gathered in violation of French regulations against indigenous assembly (as the previous day nervous French officials had revoked

[22] Ibid., 47–68; Jean-Jacques Gauthé, "Les Scouts musulmans algériens vus par les services de renseignements français (1945–1962)," in *De l'Indochine à l'Algérie: la jeunesse en mouvements des deux côtés du miroir colonial, 1940–1962*, eds. Nicolas Bancel et al. (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), 88–89.
[23] Ibid.

their assembly permit). The Guelma demonstration moved anyway, with banners reading "Long Live Independent Algeria," "Down with Colonialism," and "Long Live the Atlantic Charter." The procession converged on Saint Augustine Square around 6:30pm, where they were met by the French commissioner and police, who demanded the group disperse. And similar to events in Sétif, a shove, a thrown punch, and a gunshot triggered panic and confusion as the crowd scattered. Some individuals fled back to their homes, others formed groups and armed themselves with sticks, razorblades, and guns.

By evening, the unrest in Sétif and Guelma had spread to the countryside. Tribesmen in Kabylia armed themselves, French civilians formed militias, and in the next few days the armed bands attacked one another, with Algerians lynching French Europeans and French Europeans lynching Muslims. In all, 102-113 Europeans were killed in the violence, along with an unknown number of Muslims. And to put down the uprising and restore control, the French administration declared martial law and undertook a show of force. By the end of May, some 6,000-8,000 Algerians (45,000 by Algerian accounts) had been killed in the repression, and over 4,000 individuals arrested or detained. Thousands more were wounded, or simply disappeared.[24]

The Gun in the Garden: Relational Recruitment and the Construction of Activist Networks

On 11 May 1945, French soldiers and Moroccan Tabor reinforcements marched into the Kabyle town of Tazmalt. It was a few days after the 8 May 1945 demonstrations in Sétif and Guelma, and the French administration was hoping a show of force in Tazmalt would keep Algerians in the town from imitating their compatriots in the east. Hamou

[24] Roger Vétillard, *Sétif, mai 1945*, 189, 206–207.

Amirouche was seven years old at the time, and remembered the day well. His father Ahitous was the village blacksmith, and a longtime member of the PPA. The afternoon of 11 May, Hamou was playing in the house, when the door burst open and soldiers stormed inside. Shouting and pointing rifles, they asked if the family had any weapons. Hamou's elderly midwife told them there were no weapons; so the soldiers rounded up the midwife, Hamou's mother, Hamou, and his siblings, and locked them in a room with a window facing the garden. Two Moroccans then seized Hamou's father and handcuffed him. They dragged the blacksmith straight to the grapevine out back, and began digging.

It only took a minute for the soldiers to dig up a French MAS-36 rifle. Rather than turn over his prized possession, Hamou's father had buried the gun in the garden. But another Algerian had informed the French it was there. Towering over the blacksmith, the soldiers demanded to know where Ahitous had hidden other weapons. When Ahitous swore he had no other weapons, the soldiers began beating him. Hamou and his family watched from the window in terror; Hamous was numb, beside him, his mother sobbed and screamed. Once the soldiers had finished beating his father, the Tabors ransacked the house, taking food, coins, and his mother's jewelry. When they were done, they took his father to prison in Bejaia, where the blacksmith was interrogated and tortured.[25]

To understand the effects of 8 May, it is important to understand that French repression was first and foremost experienced on a household level. PPA and Radio Cairo estimates of 38,000–55,000 dead were exaggerated, but each of the 6,000–8,000 Algerians (and 102–113 Europeans) killed was connected to a family who mourned his or

[25] Hamou Amirouche, *Memoirs of a Mujahed: Algeria's Struggle for Freedom, 1945–1962* (San Diego: Amirouche Publishing, 2014), 24–38.

her death, and thousands more families were affected by the some 4,000 arrests and incarcerations that followed the demonstrations.[26] The repression that followed the Sétif and Guelma demonstrations thus had an immediate impact on demand for membership in nationalist clubs: PPA membership doubled, and in some places quadrupled, by mid-May. North Constantine, Oran, and Kabylia saw the largest increases. In Skikda, for instance, PPA membership increased from 50 to 200 in the week or so after 8 May, and in Oran the numbers jumped from 446 to 1,000.[27]

This hints at a broader point: the importance of kinship ties for understanding why activists chose to join certain clubs and associations. In his historical monograph *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, Harbi notes in passing that Algerians joined clubs in family groups and in groups of friends (such as neighbors living on the same street); he calls this a "personalization of political life."[28] Activist stories confirm this observation: in decisions to engage in anti-colonial activism, the largest single motivating factor they cited, both distal and proximate, material and moral, was family (with friends a close second). Loyalty to other family members involved in activism, desire to avenge a killed or imprisoned family member, kinship networks, and social pressure from one's family all counted among the top reasons activists gave for joining nationalist associations.

The case of Hamou Amirouche was one example of this trend. As Amirouche explained, seeing his father beaten instilled in him a deep hatred for colonialism. Multiple times in his narrative, he stated that he joined the nationalist movement to avenge the

[26] The majority of arrests, some 3,696 people, were in the department of Constantine. Another 505 arrests are made in Oran, and 309 in the department of Alger. Mohammed Harbi, *Aux origines du Front de Libération Nationale: la scission du PPA-MTLD* (Paris: C. Bourgois, 1975), 21–23; James McDougall, *A History of Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 180.

[27] Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 29.

[28] Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 80.

wrong inflicted on his father. At one point, he added that without his father's torture and arrest, he would likely not have joined the armed resistance.[29] Harbi similarly remembered Guelma as a family event. During the unrest some of his relatives were killed; others disappeared or were arrested. Harbi recalled that this misfortune reinforced feelings of family solidarity. "Thus, the 8th of May 1945 did not represent for me a founding myth of the armed struggle, *but a family event whose memory would never cease to resurface*," he explained.[30]

Other activists also shared memories of 8 May and its aftermath. Benyahia recalled that after the demonstrations, the Foreign Legion surrounded his town and set houses on fire, and Europeans in town formed a civilian militia that roamed the streets. Around this time, Mohammed Benyahia's brother Smaïl brought home an Algerian flag, a first for the family. Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, remembered that in May, soldiers came to search their home, and his father was arrested in the general roundup of known political activists. His father was then incarcerated in Algiers. Around this time, Taleb-Ibrahimi began affiliating with the AML.[31]

Mohamed Méchati, a soldier in the French Army, was still in France with his unit of Algerian Tirailleurs on 8 May 1945. His unit had served in the recent campaigns to liberate Toulon, Marseille, and Alsace from the Germans. Hearing about events through word-of-mouth, he and his fellow Algerian servicemen felt "shock, fear, incomprehension," as Sétif had been their home base. Their general commander gave a

[29] Hamou Amirouche, *Memoirs of a Mujahed*, xv, 24–38.

[30] Emphasis added. Mohammed Harbi, *Une vie debout: mémoires politiques, Tome 1: 1945–1962* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2001), 46–47.

[31] Mohammed Benyahja, *La conjuration au pouvoir*, 6–7; Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, *Mémoires d'un Algérien, Tome 1*, 30–39.

speech in which he brushed off 8 May as exaggerations and distortions; it was not until Méchati was back home in Constantine that he heard a different story from his cousin Rachid Kérouaz. Angered, Méchati asked to be retired from the army (in which he had served faithfully for seven years); he and two friends then joined his cousin's PPA cell.[32]

A second reason Algerians gave for their activism—almost equal in prevalence and importance to kinship—was friendship. Moreover, activists frequently joined clubs in dyads, triads, or groups of friends. For example, Mohamed Méchati joined the PPA with his close friends Abderrahmane Gherras and Abdesselam Habachi.[33] Ouarda D. joined the MNA in Algiers because Messali Hadj was their neighbor and a friend of the family; she played with his daughter Djanina. She explained that "before loyalty to a party, there was loyalty to a man," their friendly and charismatic neighbor Messali Hadj.[34]

Salah Louanchi was another example; one of his friends (Ahcène Allouche) introduced him to the local SMA troop. Through scouting, Louanchi found a way to "surmount his personal difficulties" and the shame of having to complete his father's mandatory community service (weeding the cemetery and sweeping the market because his father could not afford to pay taxes). In scouting, Louanchi found a sense of pride; he advanced through the ranks, and became the leader of a troop. He and his scouting friends also began meeting in the local café after work to discuss books and politics. This group of confederates called themselves the "Friends of the Round Table" (after the

[32] Mohamed Méchati, *Militant de l'indépendance algérienne* (Brussels: Éditions Tribord, 2012), 30–38.

[33] Ibid., 36–38.

[34] Marc André, *Femmes dévoilées: des algériennes en France à l'heure de la décolonisation* (Lyon: ENS Éditions, 2016), 231–233.

Knights of the Round Table of Arthurian legend). As a group, the band of friends joined the PPA together in 1942.[35]

Omar Boudaoud explained how this mobilization worked. He had attended a PPA meeting, in which the leader explained the organization's recruitment strategy: each young man would recruit five of his friends and become a cell head. This plan struck Boudaoud as simple and practical, so he went back to his village and contacted his friends. As he explained, this process was facilitated by the fact that the boys were already a part of a distinct community: they shared similar social positions, ran in the same social networks, and had similar hobbies and interests. "We knew one another well, a mutual trust was between us," Boudaoud related. "We had the same preoccupations, the same hobbies. We formed a sort of community apart. Bonds of friendship united us, even before our political baptism."[36]

That said, while close relationships could and did pull individuals into activism, the process was often long and fraught, and frequently ended in refusal. Individuals also ran up against family resistance to activism. For instance, when Mohammed Harbi was fourteen, his friends convinced him to throw his support behind the PPA-MTLD candidate in the 1948 election—even though Harbi's grand-uncle was also a candidate. Concerning this peer pressure, Harbi reflected that "in this environment one could not ask questions, one needed to prove oneself [to one's peers]." And prove himself he did: Harbi, his cousin, and his friend Majid Djaballah broke into Harbi's grandfather's office (where the election ballots were being stored), stole the ballots, threw them in a stream,

[35] Anne-Marie [Chaulet] Louanchi, *Salah Louanchi: parcours d'un militant algérien* (Algiers: Éditions Dahlab, 1999), 16–37.

[36] Omar Boudaoud, *Du PPA au FLN*, 21–23.

and went barhopping in Skikda. Unfortunately for the would-be militant, Harbi's father and grandfather were waiting for him when he arrived home. Harbi received a "memorable" beating for underage drinking and turning his back on his family. His father also pressured him to stop his political activities: "You can do politics, but not like that, and not now. For the moment, occupy yourself with your studies. Don't forget and don't count on [your] inheritance." Even attending high school away from home in a *lycée* where many students were politically active, Harbi recalled he had to wait until 1954 to become engaged in politics, because strong social networks in the city reported his behavior back to his family in the village. And as Harbi confessed, "It is not easy for a high school student to face his parents."[37]

Algerians who later joined nationalist clubs particularly remembered older generations opposing their activism. Harbi's grandfather, for instance, thought the nationalist movement might upset order and security in the region. "When my grandfather learned about my membership in the nationalist movement, he shook me and grabbed me by the ear—I was often grabbed by the ear when I was young to better make me hear reason—and scolded: 'Donkey, aren't you afraid that we'll revert to the Turkish system? In those days, neither you nor anyone could go to Medjez-Edchiche (Robertville) without being accompanied by a *mehalla* (expeditionary force). Today, a brat like you can take the horse to go to the farm without being harassed.'"[38]

Boudaoud similarly described encountering generational opposition to his PPA activism. He and some friends managed to convince the village elders to meet at the local mosque, where they tried to convince the men to support the PPA. To convince their

[37] Mohammed Harbi, *Une vie debout, Tome 1*, 55–60.
[38] Ibid., 34–35, 48–50.

elders, the young men brought a figure of authority to speak: PPA leader Si Mohamed Zerouali. Zerouali spoke impressive classical Arabic (an important form of social capital in Algerian society). Despite Zerouali's impressive speech, however, the older men expressed concern about the risks involved in political activism. One man reminded the boys of the bloodshed and defeat of the 1871 revolt, and warned the boys: "I am not against your project, but be very careful. This is not a game."[39]

Overall then, most Algerians did not revolt in 1945, nor did they revolt in 1954. Some individuals and families joined nationalist associations, but Algerians were by and large pressured by their elders to accept an assimilationist or gradualist position. Frantz Fanon noted this trend, writing that at first, the older generation strongly pressured children to accept the status quo. As Fanon explained, in Algeria "parents frequently react in a uniform way," by appealing to prudence and making remarks such as "Stay calm and don't move; the French are too strong; you'll never succeed.'" In response, sons would often "evade the conversation, avoid responding… Sometimes the father demands that the son stay silent, abandon the struggle, return to the family... To singles, we talk about marriage, and to married men we remind them of their duties."[40]

Such evidence supports Wadi Bouzar's argument that "Contrary to any overbearing, demagogic and mystifying vision, in the early 1950s, genuine activists ran neither the streets nor the *djebels* [mountains, i.e., countryside]. They were *in the minority*. As for those who, above all, lived encased in their family traditions, they certainly showed a certain kind of passive resistance, sometimes unconscious in any case, but they did not

[39] Omar Boudaoud, *Du PPA au FLN,* 21–23.
[40] Frantz Fanon, *L'an V de la révolution algérienne* (Paris: François Maspero, 1959), 89–90.

make the revolution. Or, at most, they rallied in the last quarter of an hour."[41] Instead, in the 1940s and into the mid 1950s, the movement that would become the Algerian Revolution was still the initiative of a passionate, forceful minority of friends and family—social entrepreneurs leveraging kinship networks, peer networks, socialization practices, symbolic canons, and other forms of social capital to recruit members for nationalist clubs.

"Knock on Every Door": The Inglorious Work of a Glorious Revolution

Despite increasing recruitment to nationalist clubs after 8 May 1945, there was thus no direct line from 8 May 1945 to 1 November 1954, but a nine year gap of hard work. The insurrectionist attempt organized by the PPA in April-May 1945 was a failure, and the organization recovered slowly. In October 1946, Messali reconstituted the PPA legally, under the new name Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD). In February 1947, the MTLD leadership decided to create a paramilitary section, the Organisation Spéciale (OS), in hopes of resuming the independence project by force. After the French election-fixing of April 1948, which saw MTLD candidates defeated, the paramilitary project gained steam: the MTLD asked Hocine Aït Ahmed to investigate armed options.[42] But the report that Aït Ahmed returned was blunt: he recognized that "sentimental" calls for a repeat of Mokrani's 1871 revolt and a second French Revolution were circulating. But liberation would not come through a mass

[41] Wadi Bouzar, "Préface," in Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance*, 7.

[42] Matthew Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 2 (May, 2001): 221–245.

uprising or mythmaking alone: villages that had experienced French repression after May 1945 had only regrets, Aït Ahmed reported.[43]

Instead, the twenty-two-year-old Aït Ahmed promoted a revolutionary realism. Quoting Carl von Clausewitz at length, he explained that that France would prevent Algerian independence by every means at her disposal. Thus, Algeria should learn from other examples of anti-imperial struggles, like 1916 Easter Rising of the Irish Republicans against the British (a common example used in Marxist anti-imperialist tracts), the career of Mao Zedong, the anti-fascist Yugoslav National Liberation Army (which had fought German occupation in World War II), and the League for the Independence of Viêt Nam (the Việt Minh, who were fighting the French in Indochina at the time). And based on these lessons, Algerians should focus on a strategy of guerrilla warfare.[44] He conceded that May 1945 could provide a rallying point for the community: the Algerian "fixation" on this "traumatizing" historical episode could be useful, he noted, for just as "[the French] do not forget 1940, we do not forget 1945." Moreover, he argued that "There are traditions of anti-colonial struggle that memories of Nazi oppression can revive and reinvigorate in the organizations on the [French] left." But first, they needed weapons and money. "Knock on every door. Go to Rabat, Tunis, Cairo."[45]

[43] Hocine Aït Ahmed, "Report to the Central Committee of the PPA," December 1948, in *Les archives de la révolution algérienne*, ed. Mohammed Harbi (Paris: Les Éditions Jeune Afrique, 1981), 15–49.

[44] He recommended looking to the 1916 Easter Rising of the Irish Republicans against the British (a common example used in Marxist anti-imperialist tracts), the career of Mao Zedong, the anti-fascist Yugoslav National Liberation Army (which had fought German occupation in World War II), and the League for the Independence of Viêt Nam/Việt Minh (who were fighting the French in Indochina at the time).

[45] Hocine Aït Ahmed, "Report to the Central Committee of the PPA," 15–49.

A few months later, Aït Ahmed put in motion a plan to solve the money problem. With the help of Mohammed Khider and Ahmed Ben Bella (who had left the army, and joined the OS after a property dispute put him on the wrong side of the law), Aït Ahmed concocted a plan. The plan went into action around eight in the morning on 4 April 1949. Six men dressed in smart-looking suits and hats, and crowded into a borrowed Citroen. They pulled up in front of the Oran Post Office, piled out of the car, and entered the building brandishing two pistols and a machine gun. One of the men then shouted, "Hands up!"[46]

Aït Ahmed later admitted that "to justify the operation" he had to "ennoble the objectives. It is not easy to accept forms of struggle that resemble banditry." So, he told the men that the money they were stealing had been made off the "sweat and misery of [Algerians]"—and it was in the banks and post offices where the money made from colonial oppression was being transferred. Whether or not the men found Aït Ahmed's speech convincing, they went along with the plan. In the post office, the aspiring revolutionaries grabbed stacks of bills, and frantically stuffed them in sacks, pockets, and down their shirts, before fleeing the scene. Overall, the take tallied around 3 million old francs (about 100,000 American dollars).[47]

The victory was short-lived. Following a botched kidnapping attempt by OS militants in spring 1950 (the intended victim—an Algerian—put up a struggle that caused the kidnappers' car to crash into a tree), French security services apprehended the kidnappers. The resulting interrogations produced enough information for a subsequent

[46] Hocine Aït Ahmed, *Mémoires d'un combattant*: *l'esprit d'indépendance 1942–1952* (Paris: Éditions Sylvie Messinger, 1983), 168–175.
[47] Ibid.

roundup. Around a quarter of OS militants were arrested, including Ben Bella; Khider was forced to flee to Cairo to evade trial. It was a calamity for the insurrectionist movement. Concerned the OS would give the French pretext to outlaw the MTLD altogether, the MTLD dissolved the paramilitary branch in 1951 (a move which alienated a passionate cadre of activists).[48]

As the Arab League had been founded in Cairo in March 1945, sparking hopes of pan-Arab cooperation, some of the scattered members of the OS—including Aït Ahmed and Ben Bella—looked east. Cairo had become a refuge for North African nationalists: Tunisian activists (including Habib Bourguiba, Habib Thameur, Taipei Slim, and Rachid Driss) had arrived in exile in Cairo in 1945-1946, followed by the Moroccan nationalists Mohamed Ahmed Ben Abboud, Abdelkhalek Torres, and Mohamed Allal El Fassi. They had formed the Comité de Libération du Maghreb Arabe (CMA) in 1948. Thus, Mohammed Khider and Hocine Aït Ahmed departed for Cairo, to be followed in 1952 by Ben Bella (recently escaped from prison).

In Cairo, the Algerians hoped the Arab League would aid the struggle against France; but the League provided only a "few vague sentences" of encouragement and advised caution. Forging ahead, the CMA created a National Liberation Army under exiled Moroccan leader Mohamed ben Abdelkrim el-Khattabi (hero of the failed Rif War) and began advertising the Army. The Free Officers coup of July 1952 again raised Algerian hopes of substantial Egyptian-North African collaboration against France—and the

[48] Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 117–118; Mohammed Harbi, *Aux origines du Front de Libération Nationale,* 75–77*;* Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 107–111.

Officers did agree to train fifteen Algerians at the Alexandria War College in 1953. However, the new government declined to cut ties with France.[49]

Meanwhile, the Algerians in Cairo continued gathering additions to their ranks: a small but dedicated group of Algerians-in-exile interested in revolution. Among them was Raymond Bouzar. The half French-Italian World War II veteran and Latin teacher arrived in Cairo in 1953, having fled North Africa after the collapse of his marriage, changing his name from Raymond to Nadir (see Chapter 6 for his full story). Another Cairo exile was an Algerian student who had studied at the Ben Badis Institute and was now studying at al-Azhar. His name was Mohammed Boukarouba—but he was better known by his nom de guerre, Houari Boumédiène (the name he would keep when he became President of Algeria in 1976).[50]

Also in 1953, a young deserter from the French military, an Algerian named Mohammed Benyahia, sailed for Cairo. Benyahia had been hiding in Paris, spending time with a group of other young Algerian labor migrants who regularly gathered at a local hotel. The hotel walls were covered in photos of General Neguib and other Egyptian military leaders, and the Algerians always met to discuss the recent coup in Egypt, hoping the Egyptians would help liberate Algeria. As a result of these conversations, Benyahia sailed for Egypt in 1953, with plans of joining Abdelkrim's National Liberation Army.[51]

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[49] Samya El Mechat, "L'improbable «Nation arabe»: La Ligue des États arabes et l'indépendance du Maghreb (1945–1956)," *Vingtième Siècle* 82 (2004/2): 57–68; Charles-Robert Ageron, "Les forces internationales et la décolonisation de l'Afrique du Nord," *Publications de l'École Française de Rome* 95 (1987): 195–218.

[50] Benjamin Stora and Akram Ellyas, "Boumediene Houari: 1932–1978, deuxième président de la République," *Les 100 portes du Maghreb* (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 1999), 101–102.

[51] Mohammed Benyahja, *La conjuration au pouvoir*, 10–27.

Benyahia arrived in Cairo in September 1953, and went straight to al-Azhar Mosque (which provided shelter for indigents). There, he found a childhood friend from Algeria, who had also deserted from the French Army and was now studying at al-Azhar. His friend connected him to both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Bureau du Maghreb Arabe. But while Benyahia went to both organizations, the Bureau proved to be the more significant contact: it was fast becoming a center for Algerians who had either fled Algeria after 1945 to avoid detention for political activism, or who had deserted the French Army to avoid fighting in Indochina. While most of these uprooted Algerian men could be found in the lobby of the Bureau yelling and arguing with Mohammed Khider, Hocine Aït Ahmed, or Ahmed Ben Bella for having failed to help them find work or provide them financial assistance, Aït Ahmed welcomed Benyahia at the Bureau for a simple reason: they were both from Kabylia and spoke Kabyle.[52]

Meanwhile back at home, the MTLD was floundering in the wake of three major crises: the 1949 "Berber Crisis," the 1950-1951 police roundups and dissolution of the OS, and Messali's 1952 deportation and house arrest. Messali's arrest had particularly upset the organization, triggering a drawn-out leadership dispute between "Messalists" and "Centralists."[53] By summer 1954, the Messalist-Centralist debates had become an

[52] Ibid.

[53] The conflict was at once a leadership dispute, the result of clan politics and regional loyalties, a reflection of differences in opinion over strategy, and a generational struggle between Messali's older generation of activists and a new generation of up-and-coming leaders. The Central Committee and their supporters (Centralists) supported shifting authority away from the charismatic person of Messali Hadj and to the Committee. This trend appealed to a younger generation of PPA activists, who hailed from the "new middle class" of professionals (*effendiyya*). Messalists emphasized Arab-Islamic identity, Centralists (usually educated in the French system) were respectful of religion—but hostile to the mixing of religion and politics. At the height of the leadership crisis, the Centralists accused Messali of running a personality cult, and Messalists accused the Centralists of being grasping "pashas" leading a push toward the gentrification [*embourgeoisement*] of the MTLD's leadership. For further information on the trends and the social and geographic backgrounds of specific members, see: Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 110–117; Mohammed Harbi, *Aux origines du Front de Libération Nationale,* 290–314.

open schism, leading to repeated armed clashes between the factions in May-June, August, and October of 1954. Meanwhile, a third faction looked to end the leadership disputes by creating facts on the ground through insurrection. This third force—which would become the FLN—was a diverse collection of activists disenchanted with the leadership struggles. Geographically, the faction drew its strength from Kabylia and the Aurès, and demographically it was largely Berbers (alienated from the MTLD since 1949) and ex-OS members (alienated since the dissolution of the OS in 1951). In terms of social background, adherents to the insurrectionist position tended to be from rural or *villageois* origins. They generally had primary or secondary educations, and many were *déclassés* (the sons of large clans whose status had fallen as a result of colonization, and who thus had a stake in French evacuation). But these insurrectionists were a minority within the party: of some 7,000 MTLD activists in North Constantine, the FLN faction counted only 50 men. To this, the FLN could add another 50 from the Algérois, and 60 in Oran. Its base of support was among the families of the Aurès and Kabylia, where they counted 350 and 450 men, respectively.[54]

Over the summer of 1954, the faction stockpiled arms (primarily old service weapons from World War II and black market arms from the Allied landing) and contacted the

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Also see: Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War*, 107–111; Ramdane Abbane, "Directive du FLN à ses militants," June 1955 in Mabrouk Belhocine, *Le courrier Alger-le Caire, 1954-1956: le Congrès de la Soummam dans la révolution* (Algiers: Casbah Éditions, 2000), 88; Omar Carlier, *Entre Nation et Jihad: Histoire sociale des radicalismes algériens* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1995), 234–236; Mohammed Harbi, *Une vie debout, Tome 1*, 98–117; Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 92–129, 169.

[54] Harbi classifies the insurrection leaders as follows: sons of large clans whose status had fallen (Zamoum Guemraoui, Aït Ahmed, Boudiaf, Ben M'Hidi), proletariats who found social advancement through politics (Khider, Bitat), employees/clerks (Bouadjadj, Merzougui), notables or sons of rural notables (Ben Boulaïd, Krim), craftsmen (Zighoud), peasants and sons of merchants (Didouche, Ben Bella, Bentobbal, Belouizdad). Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 92–129; Hocine Aït Ahmed, *Mémoires d 'un combattant*, 140.

OS-MTLD members in exile in Cairo: Mohamed Khider, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Hocine Aït Ahmed.[55] In October, this insurrectionist faction met and took the name Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Then in the predawn hours of Monday, 1 November 1954, the FLN sent out small paramilitary groups to strike a blow against the French. Some groups set to work cutting telephone wires and sawing down telegraph posts in Oran; another group destroyed a transformer in Ouillis, and the Monsonego and Janson farms were attacked. Meanwhile in Algiers, cadres set charges at the gas and electricity plant, the offices of Radio-Alger, the telephone company, and the Mory company fuel tanks. Most of these attacks were unsuccessful: bombs failed to detonate, and those that did explode were not powerful enough to set the fuel tanks alight.

Attacks in Kabylia and the Aurès proved more effective. In Kabylia, cork and tobacco warehouses were set ablaze, and commandos shot up the front of multiple barracks and police stations. The highest losses were in the Aurès. In Batna, a group of 26 commandos attacked the central military outpost, killing two French soldiers. At the Khenchela military outpost, European lieutenant Gérard Darnault was shot, and rebels opened fire on the Saint-Germain barracks and police station in Biskra, wounding four. An ambush on the Biskra-Arris road ended with the deaths of a European teacher and Muslim caïd working with the French administration. Meanwhile, planned attacks at Arris and Aïn M'Lila failed to materialize: the groups of armed cadres responsible decided to defect at the last minute rather than risk it.[56]

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[55] Nordine Boulhaïs, *Des harkis berbères de l'Aurès au nord de la France* (Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2002), 60; Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 92–129;

[56] Mohammed Harbi, *1954, la guerre commence en Algérie* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1998), 21–24; Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie, Tome 1: Le fils de la Toussaint* (Paris: Fayard, 1976), 388–454; Nordine Boulhaïs, *Des harkis berbères de l'Aurès*, 63–81.

These were the types of actions that characterized the first phase of the uprising (1954-1955): scattered cells took sporadic action against French targets of opportunity. And one year after the start of the insurrection, Algerian intellectual Mouloud Feraoun could report that there were occasional "incidents" around Tizi Ouzou, and "from time to time, the telephone poles were cut, but nothing else."[57]

Thus, following 1 November, many MTLD activists remained firmly set against insurrection, on the grounds that the organization was ill-equipped to face the French. Mahmoud Abdoun, for instance, described feeling "certain that the insurrection would not last long and the repression would be terrible." Ferhat Abbas assessed the new organization's insurrectionary attempt as an act of "despair, disorder and adventure."[58] A French report on the situation noted the population at large had a similarly measured attitude: "Among the French Muslims, almost the entire population has kept its cool and has not let itself be carried away by rebel actions or the propaganda from Cairo. But the *attentisme* [wait-and-see strategy] to which this testifies is often built more from prudence than sympathy towards us." The report went on to note that despite their hesitancy to act, Algerians were generally sympathetic to the rebels' actions, commenting favorably on the Cairo broadcasts and comparing events in Algeria to the Tunisian independence movement.[59]

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[57] "9 November 1955," in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 13–14. Also note the testimonies of Zerrouk [dit "Kalala"] and Mohammed Kadid in the appendix of Mohammed Harbi, *Aux origines du Front de Libération Nationale,* 268–274.

[58] Mahmoud Abdoun, *Témoignage d'un militant du Mouvement nationaliste*, 90–92; Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 132.

[59] "Rapport du Préfet de Constantine au Gouverneur Général," Constantine (14 February 1955), SHAT 1H1944 in *Harbi and Meynier Collection*, 167.

So how did the FLN move from sporadic attacks to rallying Algerians to a revolutionary movement? In part, the transition involved the arduous work of diplomatic networking, and the collection of material support from Egypt, Syria, and Yugoslavia in the form of military training, weapons shipments, and false documents. And while the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April 1955 proved disappointing,[60] from 1954-1956 (a critical period for the FLN's takeoff) the Algerians in Cairo convinced the Nāṣir government to launch arms shipments across the Mediterranean. Raymond Nadir Bouzar thus set off on the *Dina* in spring 1955, with a Yugoslav captain and crates of Egyptian-supplied weapons; Yugoslav arms shipments would follow in 1956 and 1957. A number of Algerian al-Azhar students (including Boumédiène) also helped in the weapons smuggling operations.[61]

Like their Egyptian counterparts, FLN activists also engaged in the arduous work of relational recruitment, leveraging kinship networks to rally support. For instance, in the Aurès, adherence to the FLN followed the lines of existing clan rivalries between the Ben Boulaïd family and followers of the *agha* Sebti Merchi, a French client. The Ben Boulaïd family thus first worked to rally to rebellion their sub-clan Aït Bellil, as well as most the clans of Aït Ouza, Aït Aïcha, and Iheddaden, half the families of Aït Takhribt, and a few families from the Izzehafen and Aït Smaïl clans. The rally was only partially successful:

[60] The conference produced a moderate statement that reaffirmed Algerian rights of self-determination and independence, but called on the French government to reach a mediated solution—there was no expressed supporting the Algerian revolutionary movement or demanding a cutting of ties with France.

[61] Nadir Bouzar, *L'odyssée du 'Dina'* (Algiers: Éditions ENAL 1993); Guy Pervillé, "L'insertion internationale du FLN algérien (1954–1962)," *Relations internationals* no. 31 (1982): 373–386; 62; Guy Pervillé, "La révolution algérienne et la « guerre froide » (1954–1962)," *Études Internationales* 16, no. 1 (1985): 62–63; Benjamin Stora and Akram Ellyas, "Boumediene Houari," 101–102; Daho Djerbal, "L'organisation spéciale de la Féderation de France du FLN (Algiers: Éditions Chihab, 2012), 371.

the Aït Fars and most of the Izeehafen and Aït Smaïl clans remained loyal to the French.[62]

In addition to relational recruitment through kinship networks, existing MTLD networks, and peer networks, the FLN encouraged *ralliement* through negotiations and pressure tactics. In summer 1955, this combination of negotiations and coercion brought some PCA members and a number of Algerian bourgeois families[63] into the fold; the MTLD Centralists rallied in mid and late 1955. French tampering in the elections of April 1955 further inspired the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) and its leader Ferhat Abbas to open discussions with the FLN in May 1955. But they did not shift support to the FLN until after November and December 1955, when the FLN launched a campaign demanding Algerian political officials resign their posts in the French administration or face execution. Public pressure and concern about losing votes finally proved decisive: by January-February 1956, UDMA leaders were estimating that some 90% of their supporters in the countryside supported the FLN. As a result, in spring 1956, the UDMA officially joined the Front.[64]

Enforcing Collective Action through Coercion

As the *ralliement* process suggests, until late in the war, Algerians remained measured when deciding whether or not to join the insurrectionist movement. Moreover, FLN activists succeeded in launching revolutionary action through a combination of relational networking and coercion (community policing, threats, and violence). In

[62] For more exact figures, see Nordine Boulhaïs, *Des harkis berbères de l'Aurès*, 79–81.
[63] Including the Bengana, Boutaleb, Bensiam, Hadj Hamou, Bouderba, Bashir, Ali Khodja, Abbas Turqui, and Benouenniche families.
[64] Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 132–160.

Algiers, for instance, the FLN organized a police force, complete with "police officers," which it tasked with "returning to reason recalcitrant elements through physical force." These officers were tasked with rallying MNA members, collecting clothes for the needy, and enforcing strike orders.[65] During the election boycott of January 1956, the school strike of autumn 1956, and the eight-day strike of January 1957, the FLN published notices demanding cooperation on pain of death. For instance, a tract calling for an election boycott in January 1956 demanded that elected officials resign, and asked FLN supporters to "procure a weapon and take direct action. Each patriot will make it his duty to shoot traitors."[66]

Feraoun remembered these tracts; in December 1955 just ahead of the French National Assembly elections, he recorded that they had received leaflets threatening to execute candidates and slash the throats of all electoral agents participating. As one tract declared, "Any official… who refuses to resign will be considered a traitor to the homeland and will be executed without trial…. Each patriot will make it his duty to execute a traitor." A few weeks later in January 1956, he recorded that Moorish cafes had been ordered to prohibit gambling (including dominoes, cards, and games of chance) to signal their solidarity with the insurrection. A regular smoker who enjoyed his apéritifs,

[65] Police Commissioner Marc Prione, Police Judiciaire d'Alger, 4° Brigade Mobile, "Procès-verbal de Benhamida, Abderrahmane," Algiers (1957), 9–10, in SHD GR 1H 1245; for information on assassinations of MNA members, see for instance SHD GR 1H 1718.

[66] ALN-FLN, "Élections pour le renouvellement de l'Assemblée Nationale Française," (n.d., ca. January 1956) in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.

For other examples of threatening tracts and letters, see: ALN-FLN, "À monsieur... C'est un ultime appel que nous vous adressons...!" Douar d'Amlouline (November 1957), Tract No. 137; ALN-FLN, "Monsieur…" Sétif (December 1956), Tract No. 69; and ALN-FLN, "Frères Algériens…" Constantine (12 January 1957), Tract No. 63, all in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.

Feraoun grumbled, "Alcohol is bad, tobacco is bad, and gambling is bad. Bad! Bad! It is time to return to austerity. It is an absolute duty to blindly obey the Decalogue."[67]

Those who violated FLN commands were punished with social sanctions, beatings, mutilation, or death. FLN revolutionary courts were responsible for authorizing such punishments, with activists drawing up guidelines for standardized penalties. Corporal punishments focused on shaming non-cooperative individuals and their families, by targeting symbols of honor and masculinity, such as the mustache, head, nose, and sexual organs. Low-level sanctions included shaving the mustache and head; more severe punishments involved mutilating the victim's nose and ears.[68] Mahmoud Abdoun, for instance, recalled that traitors and those who failed to rally to the FLN were punished through execution or mutilation, having their lips or noses cut off.[69] This policy of making examples of non-cooperative individuals met with some measure of success: for instance, after the FLN murdered an uncooperative man who was refusing to obey the tobacco boycott in summer 1956, officials in Constantine noted that the murder had inspired the rest of the community to fall in line. By September 1956, French officials

[67] 10° Region Militaire, Division d'Alger, 9éme DI et Zone d'Orleansville, "Synthèse mensuelle de Renseignements pour le mois de Septembre 1956: Annexe No. 7," (28 September 1956), Ref. No. 1632/D9/2S in SHD GR 1H 1447; "November–December 1955" and "5 January 1956" in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962*, 46–48, 51–52.

[68] ALN "Circulaire adressée par le Comité de la Wilaya 1 aux Comités de Zones-régions-secteurs et assemblées de l'ordre judiciaire," Montcalm (August 1957), in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4; Report of the Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques et de la Fonction Publique, Ministère de l'Algérie, "Recherches sur l'organisation judiciaire rebelle en Algérie," Algiers (2 March 1958), 12–14 in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4.

[69] Mahmoud Abdoun, *Témoignage d'un militant du Mouvement nationaliste*, 93.

For archival records of this, see for instance: Commandement Régional de la Gendarmerie de la X° Region Militaire, Compagnie de Mostaganem, Section de Cassaigne "Rapport du Lieutenant Daoudi, Commandant La Section de Gendarmerie de Cassaigne, sur des faits relatif à la sécurité publique," (4 January 1958), in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4.

further noted that in some districts, communities were now observing a complete boycott of alcohol, tobacco, and European clothing.[70]

A 1957 FLN execution list from Wilaya III is a good example of how such practices operated (see Figure 3.1 below). Most of those executed tended to be males aged 35–60; to ensure familial compliance, non-cooperative individuals were often executed in pairs (two from same family). Reasons for execution were usually listed as: refusing to hand over weapons, failing to comply with strike orders, informing and working with the enemy, defeatism (i.e., dissuading others from supporting the independence movement), treason, and denouncing or working against the FLN. One man was listed as executed for being a "Francophile," others for being "harmful" or "suspect;" there were also a few executed for adultery, and one man executed for blasphemy (for more on these latter cases, see Chapter 6, "The Lowly Toad, the Foolish French, and the Moral Maquisard").[71]

Activists remembered participating in these coercive measures. Hamou Amirouche, for instance, was an ALN-FLN secretary whose job included drafting letters inviting Algerians to join the revolutionary movement—and threatening them if they did not. He described how he drafted a letter to an Algerian doctor demanding he join the FLN. When the doctor refused, Amirouche drafted his execution order. Amirouche further

[70] Letter from the Commissaire Principal des Renseignements Généraux to the Inspecteur Général de l'Administration in Constantine, "Objet: Boycottage du tabac à CONSTANTINE," (August 1956), Ref. No. 14.523/RGG/MR, in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1; 10° Region Militaire, Division d'Alger, 9éme DI et Zone d'Orleansville, "Synthèse mensuelle de Renseignements pour le mois de Septembre 1956: Annexe No. 7," (28 September 1956), Ref. No. 1632/D9/2S in SHD GR 1H 1447.

[71] ALN-FLN, "Liste demandée par le Comité de la Wilaya avant le 25/9/1957: Liste des traîtres abattus par l'ALN," Wilaya 3, Zone 2, Region 5, Kabylia (November 1957), in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4.

Also see: ALN-FLN, "Tribunal militaire de la Wilaya No. 1 de la frontière," Djebel Bou Taleb (November 1957), in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4; 10° Région Militaire, Corps d'Armée d'Oran, "Bulletin de renseignements: Exécution de traîtres par le FLN," Oran (August 1957), Ref. No. 2874/CAO/2S/ENI, in SHD GR 1H 1623/D1.



- 3 -

NOMS	PRENOM	AGE	SEXE	VILLAGE	COMMUNE	DATE, MOTIF D'EXECUTION	NOM DU CHEF DE SECTEUR
BOUDAOUD	Rabah	60	"	AIT AILA	[illegible]	Fév. 56, grand souteneur de la France	SI Id TAHAR
BETTIOUI	Zaina	47	Féminin	"	"	Dénonciation	"
AIT OUARES	Chabane	37	Masculin	TAKA	"	Fév.57,se procure argent	BELAID CHIKHOUNE
AIT ALI	Mouloud	60	"	TAKA	"	Avril 57,dénonce A.L.N.	"
AIT ALI	Achour	22	"	"	"	Avril 57, ------	"
AIT [illegible]	Mahmoud	25	"	"	"	Juil.57,fou insultant Dieu	KEDDECI SALAH
[illegible]NIOU	Madi	32	"	"	"	1955,Traitre bien connu	SI Id TAHAR
[illegible]NIOU	Said	45	"	"	"	1957,Traitre dénonciateur	BELAID CHIKHOUNE
[illegible]HIOU	Baya	50	Féminin	"	"	1957, Traitre	"
OULD ALI	Ramdane	62	Masculin	"	"	Soulard.Avril 57	"
AIT ALI	Braham	50	"	"	"	Juil.57,dénoncia-teur	BELAID Kandeci
	Salem						
HAMOUT	Tounsia	40	Féminin	TIFIGHOUT	"	25-7-57, Adultère	"
BEN ADI	Bélaid	25	Masculin	TAGOUNITH	"	15-7-57,voulait se rallier	"
OUAZOU	Azouaou	45	"	AIT HICHEM	"	Fév.57,délégation S...S.	SI Id TAHAR
OULD BRAHIM	Larbi	42	"	"	"	"	BEN CHIKHOUNE
B.DOUDJEMAA	Ali	55	"	"	"	"	"
AIT SAAD	Arab	57	"	"	"	"	"
AIT ALI	Belkacem	53	"	"	"	"	"
BEN [illegible]AIEN	Larbi	60	"	"	"	"	"
TIMSILINE	Said	63	Masculin	AIT ZIRI	"	Fév.57,a réparé la route	"
BEN GOUGUA	Id Arezki	60	"	"	"	Janv.57,ordre de grève non respecté	"
GOUGUA	Salem	30	"	"	"	Mars 57, fréquente les militaires	"
AIT ALI	Slimane	60	"	AIT MELLAL	"	"	"
AIT ALI	Ijousa	30	Féminin	"	"	Adultère, Mars 57	"
BEN GOUGUA	Abderah.	20	Masculin	AIT	"	Nov.56,refus de remettre son fusil	SI Moh.TAHAR
AIT KACI	Arab Améziane	45	"	AIT AMEUR	"	Sept.56,refus cotiser	"
AIT KACI	Said	26	"	"	"	Juin 57,indicateur	CHIKHOUNE B.
BEN SLIMANE	Tahar	50	"	KOUKOU	"	Août 57,indicateur	SI Id TAHAR
BEN CHIKHOUNE	Salem	30	"	"	"	Fév.57,indicateur	CHIKHOUNE B.
AIT OUYAHIA	Ahmed	35	"	"	"	Juillet 57, adultère	KEDDECI B.

SECRET

SECRET

Figure 3.1 – FLN Execution List from 1957. Third page of a seized FLN roster of individuals executed, showing their name, age, gender, village, date and reason for execution, and name of the leader of the sector in which the execution occurred.

(Source: ALN-FLN, “Liste des traîtres abattus par l'ALN,” Wilaya III, Zone II, Region V, Kabylia [November 1957], p. 3, in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4.)

related how in summer 1956, the FLN came to the village of Ihitoussen. As in other villages, the fighters gathered the villagers and told them it was their sacred duty to support the *mujahideen*. The village assembly discussed whether or not to lend their support, but one of the village elders argued it was out of the question to give money to a "gang of highwaymen." A few days later, the dissenting elder was found in ravine with his throat slit. After that, the village began supporting the FLN.[72]

Word-of-mouth worked to extend the reach of FLN sanctions on recalcitrant individuals. Mouloud Feraoun, for instance, described hearing gossip and rumors that FLN guerrillas were strangling and hanging victims from trees, cutting throats, and mutilating victims near Palestro. He further recounted how in late 1955, the village council in "A.K." received FLN leaders in the mosque at night. The fighters demanded the village provide them with supplies and shelter throughout the winter. Similarly, at Tizi-Hibel, the FLN started by sending letters demanding money from town elders. Then, an FLN liaison officer pressured the elders to arrange a rendezvous in the mosque. During the meeting, the FLN relied on religious coercion, telling the townsmen that they "deserve to be burned alive. You are nonbelievers. You have neither faith nor law. You are all drunkards. In your midst, there are people who are not true Algerians and people who believe in another God. You have never done anything for the cause." Feraoun recorded that the people of Tizi-Hibel agreed they were guilty and would repent. "Now, since that day, there are new leaders at Tizi-Hibel as well as in all the other villages… now, here we are following these brave men. They are determined to die for the good

[72] Hamou Amirouche, *Memoirs of a Mujahed*, 82–88, 95–110, 140.
For a sample FLN death warrant, see: ALN-FLN, "Tribunal de la Révolution: Condamnation à mort," Oran (24 December 1957), in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4.

cause and to drag you along with them. And this happens after they have made your houses burn and perhaps raped your women." As Feraoun added, threats and violence were jolting Algerians out of complacency.[73]

The FLN's combined use of religious capital, kinship networks, coercion, and other forms of social capital (such as the creation of myths of revolutionary justice and morality, covered in Chapter 6) was vividly illustrated in a conversation between Feraoun and one of his friends from Tizi-Hibel named Amar. As Amar explained to Feraoun, the maquis were executing informers. But Amar insisted they are "good Muslims. When they gathered us at the press-house, *the village elders were scared*, but their leader was wonderful. He began by reciting from the Qurʾān. A *fatiha* entirely done in Arabic. You should have heard his pronunciation, his tone, and his zeal. *You did not need to understand*, it was that impressive. Really, you have to respect these people. …They want a union in every village, as well as peace and brotherhood. You, as well educated as you are, if you ever listened and talked to them, you would be won over…."[74]

In his journal, Feraoun summarized the meeting, writing "And so, the people of Tizi-Hibel, once the most villainous on the surface of the earth, have found their faith again; they are now paying the salary of a muezzin and frequent the mosque assiduously." The FLN—now styling itself the "maquis" (a term for underbrush, used to describe the

[73] "November-December 1955," in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962*, 40–48.

For more information on these types of racketeering strategies, see: Alan Collins and Colin Jennings, "A Club Good Perspective on Gangsters and Revolutionaries," *University of Portsmouth Department of Economics Discussion Paper* No. 88 (December 1996); Ian Wilson, "Morality Racketeering: Vigilantism and Populist Islamic Militancy in Indonesia," in *Between Dissent and Power: The Transformation of Islamic Politics in the Middle East and Asia*, eds. K. B. Teik et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 248–274.

[74] Emphasis added. "2 February 1956," in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962*, 68–69.

French Resistance during World War II) and calling its fighters maquisards[75]—was also appealing to French sources of capital. Moreover, Feraoun suggested they were delivering emotional benefits: "we have our dignity back. That is why the locals willingly submit themselves to the mystique of the maquis… why they are honestly beginning to rediscover exceptional virtues in the holy book of Islam." The force of coercion and desire to protect one's family was also fueling decisions to fall in line. As Feraoun sardonically concluded, "I have no doubt that I would be won over if I lived in Tizi-Hibel. I would have given them my total support, my admiration without any reservation. After all, I am a family man… I am not unaware of my heavy responsibilities."[76]

On 3 April 1955, the Governor General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, passed Law No. 55–385 declaring a state of emergency. The law gave the military broad powers to censor the press, ban public assemblies, search and seize property, and detain and interrogate individuals without trial.[77] Over the next few years, the French Army began relocating Algerian civilians to regroupment camps, and French troop strength increased from 100,000 men (June 1955) to 390,000 (August 1956), peaking at some 612,000 personnel in July 1959. French Army "peacemaking" operations leveled entire villages, and beatings, arrests, internments, rape, and torture made it increasingly dangerous for young Algerian men and women to remain in their villages. By 1960, some 2 million Algerians had been forcibly relocated into camps, and tens of thousands more civilians were interned in detainment centers and prisons.[78]

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[75] "Tout pour la victoire," *El Moudjahid* 1, June 1956, 14 [Tome 1]; "Les maquis algériens," *El Moudjahid* 16, 15 January 1958, 270–271 [Tome 1].

[76] Emphasis added. "2 February 1956," in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962*, 68–69.

[77] Sylvie Thénault, "L'état d'urgence (1955–2005), de l'Algérie coloniale à la France contemporaine: destin d'une loi," *Le Mouvement Social* 218 (2007): 63–78.

[78] Camps included CHs (centres d'hébergement), CTTs (centres de triage et de transit), and CMIs (centres militaires d'internés). See: Emmanuel Blanchard, "Interner, enfermer, regrouper," *Vacarme* 30,

French repression thus added to the push factors inspiring activists to join the FLN. Hamou Amirouche related that in spring 1955, French Senegalese soldiers raided and occupied his town. During the raid, he was taken at gunpoint along with everyone else coming out of the mosque. The group was herded to the pens at the cattle market, and made to sit in dung while soldiers performed identity checks and searched the town. He remembered other encounters with soldiers as well, including being kicked by a soldier at a checkpoint. As he recalled, the memory of the kick made him "shake with a fury that I still feel today, more than 50 years later." As he described it, these humiliations made the idea of the joining the guerrillas harden in his mind. "Looking back at my motivations at that age, I can say that retribution and hatred, rather than the lofty ideal of freeing my country, were my primary reason for taking up arms."[79]

As a whole, both French and FLN coercion and violence were thus high-risk strategies that were not always successful. One FLN activist described a failed campaign to prevent women in Algiers from complying with French picture ID regulations. The FLN tried sending teams of women to people's homes in the Casbah, to convince them to boycott the IDs. When that was unsuccessful, the FLN placed activists in the lines of people queuing for photographs. Then, they tried harassing and beating up people in line. When this still did not dissuade Muslim residents, an FLN commando burned two photography shops. In the end, nothing worked, and the women were photographed for the French IDs.[80]

(Winter 2005): 86–87; Sylvie Thénault, "Personnel et internés dans les camps français de la guerre d'Algérie: Entre stéréotypes coloniaux et combat pour l'indépendance," *Politix* 69, (2005): 63–81; Alban Mahieu, "Les Effectifs de l'armée française en Algérie (1954–1962)," *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d'Algérie*, eds. Jean-Charles Jauffret and Maurice Vaïsse (Brussels: Complexe, 2001), 39–47.

[79] Hamou Amirouche, *Memoirs of a Mujahed*, 84–95.

[80] Police Commissioner Marc Prione, Police Judiciaire d'Alger, 4° Brigade Mobile, "Procès-verbal de Benhamida, Abderrahmane," Algiers (1957), 9–10, in SHD GR 1H 1245.

For the people of Tizi-Hibel (who had supposedly "found their faith again" according to Feraoun), coercion had mixed effects. Although they initially rallied to the FLN after the meeting in the mosque, they later changed their minds. Exhausted from FLN extortion and executions, Tizi-Hibel defected to side with the French in June 1959. Similarly, after the FLN killed families of non-cooperative villagers, burned homes, and slaughtered herds in summer 1955 near Khanagat-Zidane, the French captain reported that within six months, 1200 Algerians from the area had volunteered to serve in the French auxiliary forces. And after the Melouza massacre, there were reports that two hundred Algerians from the area had joined the French army, seeking revenge.[81]

Shared Certainties: Conformity Pressure in Algerian Communities

Despite many Algerians having publicly rallied to the FLN (joining the organization or offering verbal endorsements), the number of FLN activists remained modest as late as summer 1956. In August 1956, FLN reports and internal assessments estimated the organization commanded 7,469 active fighters [*djounoud*] and 15,570 partisans and active supporters [*moussebiline*] in Algeria proper (although these numbers did not include Aurès-Nementchas and Souk-Ahras). However, even if one (generously) estimates some 30,000 fighters and active supporters total, these figures are low. Considering an opposing force of some 500,000 French troops, and an overall population of 8.5 million Muslims, the FLN's troop strength was not more than 1% of the Algerian Muslim population (and was probably closer to 0.35–0.5% of the population). These

[81] "Rien n'excuse la trahison," *Voix du Peuple: organe clandestin du Mouvement National Algérien,* July 1957, 3, in BNF MICR D-1263; "12 July 1959," in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962*, 268.

numbers considered, how could Harbi thus argue that the student strike of summer 1956 marked the FLN's influence over the whole of Algerian society?[82]

Scholarly studies, activist testimonies, and archival data advance some potential answers to these questions. Whereas at the beginning of hostilities, activists described feeling pressured by parents and community members *not* to participate in the uprising, by 1955-1956 this attitude was shifting. Indeed, Mohammed Harbi's overview of the *ralliement* process,[83] Matthew Connelly's data on FLN force strength (which shows a sudden increase from January-May 1956),[84] and Charles-Robert Ageron's study of Algerian Muslim desertions from the French army (which reached a peak in 1956)[85] all show a swift demographic shift in mid-1956. So what happened?

First, this *ralliement* was being facilitated by French pacification measures. In March 1956, the French government passed the Special Powers law, giving the military broad emergency powers. As a result, in April and May, French civilians were called up for military service, and that summer, hundreds of thousands of new French troops arrived in Algeria. Second, as a highly cohesive group, the FLN was making a strong, confident, and consistent case for armed struggle through network-building, coercion, and mythmaking. Collective action and group rituals—including strikes, tobacco boycotts, and ululations in the Casbah for executed Algerians—were also providing prescriptive signaling that encouraged Algerians to work in concert to support the FLN.

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[82] Jean Despois, "La population algérienne au 31 octobre 1954," *Annales de Géographie* 65, no. 347 (1956): 55–56; Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 169–177.

[83] Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 169–177.

[84] Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 290.

[85] Charles-Robert Ageron, "Les supplétifs algériens dans l'armée française pendant la guerre d'Algérie," *Vingtième Siècle, revue d'histoire* 48 (October–December 1995): 14–17.

Testimonies indicate that this kind of group pressure was already being felt by the time of the FLN boycott campaigns in late 1955. For instance, Feraoun reported in November he was feeling increasingly pressured by his Algerian students to choose a side, "take a position, show some kind of commitment to an ideal." Moreover, since the tobacco and alcohol strike had started, he was now having to hide to smoke cigarettes in Algiers, and at Fort National he reported that Algerians were no longer drinking in public.[86] Meanwhile, FLN tracts tried to raise the perceived costs of smoking, by shaming non-compliant individuals, threatening them with death, pointing to bad health effects of smoking and drinking, invoking the cultural norm not to rejoice while others were suffering, and arguing that funds from tobacco and alcohol sales were being used to buy bullets, tanks, and bombs: "In exchange for your money, you will receive from French soldiers a stab of the knife or a machine gun burst in the back."[87]

The FLN also exerted social pressure on non-cooperators. Some of this pressure was implicit, asking individuals to emulate FLN members and peers who had left to join the maquis. Tracts targeting Algerians in the French military, for instance, showed pictures of Algerians who had already deserted to join the ALN, and asking "Why HIM and not YOU?" (see Figure 3.2 below)[88] To students, the FLN released fliers announcing "The

[86] "9 November 1955" and "12 November 1955," in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962,* 13–15.

[87] "Boycott du tabac, des débits de boissons, alcoolisées et des salles de spectacles," Algiers (March 1956); FLN, "Tu as été reconnu tes amis et toi-même te donner à la boisson…" Koléa (21 October 1956), Tract No. 49; FLN, "Peuple algérien, tout le monde sait…" Algiers (31 May 1957), Tract No. 82; "Peuple algérien, comme tu le sais depuis quelques mois…" (n.d.); FLN, "Alcool et tabac," Aït Lahcène (8 August 1957); all in SHD GR 1H 2588/1.

[88] "Pourquoi LUI et pas TOI?" Arba (16 November 1960), in SHD GR 1H 1715.



Figure 3.2 – FLN Tract, "Why HIM and not YOU?" A tract inviting Algerians in the French military to emulate their peers.

(Source: "Pourquoi LUI et pas TOI?" Arba [16 November 1960], in SHD GR 1H 1715.)

greatest among you can join the ranks of the ALN, where many of their brothers have proceeded them already."[89] In a message to Algerian women, meanwhile, the FLN attempted to arouse guilt, telling women their sisters were out in the cold fighting, while they were safe at home "untroubled, laughing, satisfied." It then asked women to help the cause by exerting pressure on "your brothers, your husband, your children, push them, encourage them to fight." Moreover, "To those who lack faith, unmask them, attack them, punish them… If any member of your family wants to become a traitor, mistreat

[89] ALN-FLN, "Elèves fréquentant les écoles francaises, étudiantes," Philippeville (December 1957), Tract No. 138, in SHD GR 1H 2588/1.

him... Don't work on strike days, prevent your men from working." The message added a warning: "The wives of those men and traitors who have been shot by the Commandos will be singled out and stigmatized [lit. pointed out]."[90]

Ultimately, all of these factors seem to have produced a reputational cascade by 1956–1957, with the FLN having garnered the support of a sufficient number of individuals to prompt other community members to follow suit. Understanding that their attempt to create an independent paramilitary wing was floundering, PCA cadres thus negotiated and integrated their units into the FLN in spring and summer 1956. The student strike starting in May 1956 added more recruits to the ranks of the FLN, as university students on strike found themselves with an excess of free time, and experienced pressure from their peers to take action. Djamel-Eddine Bensalem, for example, described returning to university in Montpellier after summer break 1956, only to find that most other Algerian students in the department of medicine were still on strike and had not returned. As a result, at the end of the term (December 1956) Bensalem took a boat to Tunisia, to join relatives and friends who were there helping the FLN.[91]

Zohra Drif also joined the FLN around this time. Her best friend Samia Lakhdari had joined an FLN cell near the University of Algiers, so Zohra worked to return to campus, despite the student strike. Her mother tried to prevent her from leaving, arguing with her, rebuking her, and expressing disgust for the FLN, who she termed "those people who want to hide behind woman to bring down France." The tension caused Zohra to lock herself in her room. Even so, Zohra's brother Kader supported her nationalist activism,

[90] ALN-FLN, "Musulmanes, vos soeurs sont dans les montagnes…" Constantine (27 January 1957), Tract No. 66, in SHD GR 1H 2588/1.

[91] Djamel-Eddine Bensalem, *Voyez nos armes, voyez nos médecins: chronique de la Zone I, Wilaya III* (Algiers: ENAG, 2009), 7–24.

and undermined their mother's will by inventing lies to help Zohra conceal her activism from their parents. When Zohra finally left for Algiers to join the FLN, her mother sobbed and tried to prevent her from leaving. Her father, silent through these exchanges, accompanied Zohra back to the city, and helped her resettle in the university dormitories, aware that the students were on strike and Zohra was not there to study. Looking his daughter straight in the eyes, he finally broke his long silence: "I hope you are aware of the significance of your decision—that you've thought about its gravity and all its implications. You're not committing only yourself [to this cause]. Sooner or later, the whole family will suffer for it… Hear me well—this is not novels and poetry. It is a war of liberation, where the rule is 'win or die.'" He then asked her to reconsider. He would stay overnight in a hotel, he told her, and she could come meet him in the morning if she changed her mind. Zohra never went. Concerning this decision, Zohra wrote that she felt guilty not for her militancy, but "for having grieved and upended my family, and for having so badly hurt my mother."[92]

Fanon also noted the sea change, explaining that as the war intensified, disagreements between children and parents were becoming overt, with some young men and women rejecting their parents' prudence and joining the FLN. At that point "The militant replaces the son and undertakes the indoctrination of the father. But it is not the son's words that will convince. Above all, it is the dimensions of popular engagement, the information received about repression. The father's previous assurance, already chipped, finally collapses."[93] In a July 1956 report, the French administration made a similar

[92] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN,* 134–136.

[93] Frantz Fanon, "La famille algérienne," in *L'an V de la révolution algérienne*, 90. Notably, Fanon's analysis of the Algerian family was also printed in *El Moudjahid* as "La famille algérienne dans la révolution," *El Moudjahid* nos. 53–54, 1 November 1959, 544–545 [Tome 2].

observation. As the report explained, while populations might fear the FLN or think revolution imprudent, it was not easy for a population to "denounce their [own] children" once they had joined the FLN.[94]

Feraoun documented this social shift as well: "people change opinions overnight to become patriots, conspirators in Moorish cafes. They like to think of themselves as part of the action, as serving the cause. It is a duty that they can fulfill without any real compromise, and simply through dispassionate affiliation." By the time he visited home (Tizi-Hibel) in August and September 1956, this pressure was complete, having grown in response to French pacification measures. Speaking with family and neighbors, Feraoun felt compelled to exaggerate his grievances against the French, "if only to emphasize that I was being persecuted *just like everybody else*." Dissatisfied with his accounts of suffering, Feraoun said the villagers

> "told me everything, *as if they were trying to convert me, to make me share their anger, their hopes, their certainties—all of their feelings. And those feelings were shared by everyone without exception—by my parents, my friends, my enemies; there was a consensus and I had to think, act, and speak like everybody else*."[95]

In this environment, choosing *not* to join the community was socially and emotionally costly. Feraoun's journal was a prime example of the internal dissonance caused by non-conformity: he recorded feelings of guilt, shame, selfishness, and irresponsibility for speaking against the FLN, not joining the fighting, and not suffering as much as his

[94] Commandement Civil et Militaire de Kabylie, "Synthèse de renseignements," Kabylie (July 1956), in SHAT 1H 1447/D3.

[95] Emphasis added. "November–December 1955" and "9 September 1956," in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962*, 49–50, 132–133.

community. At one point, he wrote "I am ashamed that I have peace of mind [in the safety of Fort National]."[96]

Other individuals similarly described feeling pressured to act. As one activist testified to a French court, he had been working in his family's Moorish café in Algiers. Despite the fact the café was a site for political conversations, he stayed out of politics (he had suffered a terrible experience, having been expelled from the PCA some ten years prior). But "in 1955, I was told on multiple occasions that Muslims did not understand why I remained inactive while 'everyone was moving.'" The comments, he said, pushed him to start publishing a bi-monthly newsletter.[97] One woman pushed her husband to return to the maquis by invoking honor, reputation, and the duty to keep one's word. "What will you say to the people of the village when they ask you questions," she prodded him. "You promised to return once Algeria gained independence; you swore to bring back freedom. How can you even imagine returning to normal life, when all the other men are up there [in the maquis] or in prison?"[98]

A final example illustrates how strongly individuals could feel pressured to prove themselves brave members of the community. This pressure could be implicit or even imagined, as was the case for a suicidal 22-year-old Algerian male, whom Fanon included in his case notes. The case was this: during adolescence, the young man had been a leader in a scout troop. However, around age nineteen he decided to devote himself entirely to his career and cease involvement in political activism. 1 November

[96] "2 November 1956" and "17 August 1961," in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962*, 146–147, 294–295.

[97] Service Régional de Police Judiciaire d'Alger "Procès-verbal de Ouzegane, Amar," Algiers (28 January 1958), PV No. 65, in SHD GR 1H 1245/D2.

[98] Frantz Fanon, *L'an V de la révolution algérienne*, 102.

1954 came and went, and the young man showed no interest in politics. “He was no longer hanging out with his long-time friends,” Fanon recorded. “He describes himself in this period as ‘dedicated to improving his technical skills,’” dreaming of being a leader in his profession.[99]

The young man’s troubles started in mid-1955, when he attended a family gathering. By that time, the war was heating up, and many Algerians were feeling pressure to prove their patriotism. As a result, at the family meeting, the young man “suddenly got the impression his parents considered him a traitor.” He felt anxious and uneasy, and isolated himself in his room, away from his family. One day, the young man was walking down the street, when he “distinctly heard a voice call him a coward. He turned around, but saw nobody.” That night, he stayed in his room and did not eat dinner. “For three hours, he heard all kinds of insults, voices in his head and in the darkness crying: ‘Traitor... coward... all your brothers are dying... traitor... traitor.’" These auditory hallucinations gave the young man a panic attack. From then on, the young man barricaded himself in his room, refusing to eat or see his parents.

On the fourth day he snapped. Unshaven and unkempt, the young man rushed out of the house half-dressed “like a madman.” He had no aim or destination in mind—he just walked. After a time, he found himself in the European neighborhood. The police were stopping and frisking Algerians and demanding papers, but the police ignored the young man, assuming he was French. Passing for French while a group of his fellow Algerians were being searched “confirmed [the young man’s] delusion: ‘everyone knows he's on

[99] “Série B, Cas N° 2: Délire d’accusation et conduite-suicide déguisée en ‘acte terroriste’ chez un jeune algérien de 22 ans,” in Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre (Cahiers libres Nos. 27–28)* (Paris: Françoi Maspero, 1966 [1st ed. 1961]), 207–209.

the side of the French. Even the soldiers were given orders to leave him alone.'" Agitated, and thinking the Algerians being searched were staring at him in contempt, the young man rushed away. He next found himself in front of French staff headquarters. Several soldiers stood guard at the gate. So, he walked up to one of the soldiers, grabbed the man's machine gun, and shouted: "I'm an Algerian!" He was quickly subdued and taken to the police station. There, he was violently interrogated, but when it was established that he had no FLN contacts, the police sent him to the hospital as a mental case. "All I wanted," the young man told the doctors, "was to die. Even at the police station I believed and hoped that after they tortured me, they would kill me. *I was happy to be beaten, because it proved they considered me their enemy.* I couldn't go on hearing these accusations without responding. I'm not a coward. I'm not a sissy [*femme*]. I'm not a traitor.'"[100]

Conclusion: The Activist Encircled?

> *"[Lakhdar, wounded]: …[H]ere is our street. For the first time I can feel it throbbing like a single flooded artery, where I can offer up my soul without losing it. I am no longer a body, but a street. As of now it will require a field gun to kill me. And if the field gun strikes me down, I will still be there, a shining star glorifying the ruins, and no shell will reach my home without a child, mature before his time, leaving earth's gravity to dissolve with me into a perfumed star, in an intimate procession…*
> ….
> *[Mustapha to Tahar]: … As for the corpses, the old street has seen others… it will see your hearse pass through. It is not the number of deaths that weighs on our street, it's the lonely death of the coward…"*[101]

Published one month after the events of 1 November 1954, Kateb Yacine's *Le cadavre encirclé* is not a typical triumphalist work of nationalist theater. One unusual

[100] Emphasis added. Ibid.
[101] Kateb Yacine, "Le cadavre encerclé" [Part 1, December 1954], 17–23, 56–60.

feature of the play is that the story's momentum does not come from the activities of the main protagonist (the activist Lakhdar), but from what goes on *around* the main character. The martyr-hero himself is stationary, ever-dying and statuesque in the unfolding tragedy. Instead of focusing on the symbol of the martyr, then, the play emphasizes the circle of individuals involved in the drama of the death—those individuals moving around the "corpse" Lakhdar.[102] But their movements are not a circumambulation, because Lakhdar's death is not yet ritualized or commemorated. The actors in the tale move in different directions, responding to the "corpse" in different ways. In this way, the play highlights how activists were embedded in intimate networks of friends and family—and how each act of violence, whether undertaken by the FLN or French forces, rippled through these interconnected networks, leading to different results.

As *Le cadavre encirclé* thus suggests, anti-colonial activism was not simply a political act born in a vacuum, or a natural response to a "revolutionary wave," but a complex choice tied up in social bonds, personal preferences, and individual needs—an "intimate procession," as Yacine described it. These findings are broadly consistent with studies concerning the importance of peer networks in decision-making, as well as studies that have found parental political attitudes to be predictive of adult children's political attitudes.[103] And as this chapter has explored, these social ties became even more important in decision-making as Algerians increasingly voiced their support for the FLN and conformity pressure went to work.

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[102] Ibid., 17–23, 56–60; Said Khadraoui and Amel Boussad, "La poétique théâtrale dans *Le cadavre encerclé* de Kateb Yacine," *Synergies Algérie* 14 (2011): 77–87.

[103] Interestingly, as children age this influence tends to reverse, with the adult child's political attitudes affecting his or her parents. See: Jennifer Glass, Vern L. Bengtson and Charlotte Chorn Dunham, "Attitude Similarity in Three-Generation Families: Socialization, Status Inheritance, or Reciprocal Influence?" *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 5 (October 1986): 685–698.

Instead of describing the FLN's revolutionary program as part of a "revolutionary wave," the 1 November movement can thus be better understood as part of a "modular political phenomenon": Algerian activists launched informed, learned "action based in significant part on the emulation of the prior successful example of others,"[104] and then attempted to influence the behavior of others by leveraging social networks and social learning practices. FLN activists thus learned from events in Egypt, Tunisia, and Indochina, called on Algerians to emulate them in revolting against the French, and sanctioned those who refused through a range of negative feedback strategies (gossip and rumors, threats, beatings, and assassinations). In this way, FLN activists tried to make "coercion and capital" converge, in order to move men to action.[105] Understanding events in this way—as the contested outcome of emulative learning (a highly personal, creative, and uneven process)—helps explain why revolutions followed other revolutions in some countries, but not others.

Considering the importance of networks, conformity pressure, and social feedback gestures, were activists therefore "encircled" by the demands of their social circles? It is true that most activists expressed the need to conserve capital and maintain relationships with family or peers. Moreover, the cost of dissent could be high: as Mustapha warns Tahar in *Le cadavre encirclé*, the man who went against the community risked "the lonely death of the coward," and would be remembered only as a traitor.[106]

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[104] Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 2 (2007): 259–276.

[105] Laleh Khalili, "Thinking about Violence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45 (2013), 793.

[106] Kateb Yacine, "Le cadavre encerclé," 17–23, 56–60.

In contrast, the man who joined a community of commitment would die surrounded by brothers. For example, despite being estranged from his nuclear family, Lakhdar states near the end of the play that he will die "encircled" by the maquis. This comment helps interpret the play's opening lines: in death Lakhdar no longer represents an individual but a community—and that community is not his estranged family, but the maquisards he has chosen to join. This is the community that encircles him and courses through his veins by the end of the play, such that only a field gun can cut him down. And it is an encirclement he experiences as meaningful and comforting, not limiting. It is therefore to this community that Lakhdar says he feels "I can offer up my soul without losing it"—because "if the field gun strikes me down, I will still be there, a shining star glorifying the ruins, and no shell will reach my home without a child, mature before his time, leaving earth's gravity to dissolve with me." His death would thus inspire others, pulling at the strings of kinship and friendship, to create an "intimate procession."[107]

In the end, the social encirclement(s) of the activist was thus somewhat paradoxical. Social ties could constrain choice, encourage activists to adopt the same opinion as their peers, and pressure individuals to follow a crowd. However, social encirclement could also provide a sense of community, certainty, and meaning. Similarly, while conformity pressure could encircle the activist and limit an individual's choices, it could also be used by a passionate minority of activists to amplify acts of protest, giving individuals a reach far beyond their immediate circles of influence.[108] Thus, the FLN imagined a reality

[107] Ibid.

[108] For more on these social processes, see for instance: John Levine and Hoon-Seok Choi, "Minority Influence in Interacting Groups: The Impact of Newcomers," and Charlan J. Nemeth and Jack A. Goncalo, "Rogues and Heroes: Finding Value in Dissent," in *Rebels in Groups: Dissent, Deviance, Difference, and Defiance*, eds. Jolanda Jetten and Matthew J. Hornsey (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 17–35, 73–92; Robert C. Ellickson, "The Market for Social Norms," *American Law and Economics Review* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 26.

separate from France, undertook the inglorious work of inscribing this reality "into real life, into people's minds, bodies, behaviors and perceptions, and the laws governing them,"[109] and one person at a time, through capital and coercion, drew together a movement that even a field gun could not beat.

[109] James McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria*, 11.

Chapter 4

The Suitcase Carriers: "Pain-in-the-Ass Militants" and the World of French and Egyptian Border Crossings, 1954–1960

In Spring 1957, Hélène Cuénat and her two close friends, Étienne and Paule Bolo, set out from Paris on a road trip in Hélène's tiny Renault 4CV. The group was headed for a holiday in Italy, with Étienne and Paule's 4-year-old son Laurent along for the ride. The friends looked forward to time away from the Sorbonne, where Étienne was a philosophy professor, Paule a philosophy student, and Hélène a literature student. Soon after the road trip was underway, Étienne turned to Hélène to ask a favor. Would she mind if they made a stop in Switzerland, so he could deliver an important letter? Hélène said it was fine—"it was just a letter in the pocket of a jacket." She thought nothing of it. They dropped off the letter, and continued to Italy.

But on the drive back, Étienne and Paule had another request, this time much larger. They wanted to pick up a half-cubic meter of the underground newspaper *Résistance Algérienne*, which was being printed in Switzerland. This task was riskier: it involved smuggling a banned newspaper across the border into France. Trusting her friends, Hélène agreed. So, the group stopped again in Switzerland, loaded up the newspaper, and continued toward home. However, when they reached the border, customs officers waved the car to a stop. Worried the young adults might be smuggling cigarettes, the officials demanded to search the car.

The group tried to look relaxed and unconcerned as the officers peered into the vehicle. Suddenly, one of the officers spotted 4-year-old Laurent, sound asleep in the back. Rather than disturb the child, they waved the group through the checkpoint without

searching further. Little did they know, the child was sleeping over the stack of newspapers. Thus, Hélène Cuénat participated in her first illegal act.[1]

Writing about her experience in the Jeanson network, Cuénat later wrote that being in a resistance movement takes two types of courage: the courage to face death, and the courage to violate social norms. As she reflected, "To cross into the Resistance was to cross a line. It was one thing to become a mobilized soldier, it is another to become a *maquisard* by transgressing the established order."[2]

Cuénat was not alone in transgressing. During the Algerian war, a small minority of French activists decided to support the Algerian independence movement, crossing ethnic and communal lines, and in some cases traveling across geographic borders to participate in the movement. Called "suitcase-carriers"—a term borrowed from the French Resistance and later used to describe European activists who joined FLN-support networks—these French activists sacrificed large amounts of capital to aid the FLN. It was a decision that seemed counterintuitive, contradicting the "conservation of capital" principle explored in Chapter 2. Anti-colonial activism also ran against French norms and habits—what one anonymous activist in *Vérités Pour* called the "collective unconsciousness."[3] As the activist acknowledged, "What disorients a lot of French is that the terms INSUBORDINATION, DESERTION, and AID TO THE FLN call into question habits, conceptions deeply rooted in their conscience."[4]

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[1] Hélène Cuénat, *La porte verte* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2001), 21–23.

[2] Ibid., 16.

[3] "La jeunesse française et la guerre d'Algérie," *El Moudjahid* 49, 31 August 1959, 428–430 [Tome 2]. Also see the same article, reprinted or printed in extracts, in: "La jeunesse française et la guerre d'Algérie," *Vérités Pour* 11, 12 October 1959**,** 5–7; "Jeunesse française et guerre d'Algérie," *Coexistence* (September–October 1959); "Ils acceptent puis collaborent," *Vérité Liberté* 2, June 1960, 4.

[4] Emphasis in original. A. Limousin, "Rappel des principes," *Vérités Pour* 18, 26 September 1960, 16.

An activist in *Vérité Liberté* explained that because of these habits, his decision to become an *insoumi* had involved overcoming many social pressures. French norms pushed young men to "do their duty," serve in the army, and respect the advice of elders. But aiding the FLN flew in the face of these norms; it also went against the prevailing notion that Algeria was a part of France, and a collective sense of French national pride: "[Raymond] Kopa [the famous footballer], the Tancarville Bridge [a lauded French technical feat]… the atomic bomb and the Champs-Elysées [symbols of French Great Power status]. Youth do not escape from this collective un-consciousness."[5]

So how did a diverse group of individuals—French Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, intellectuals and workers, communists and anarchists, Europeans from the metropole, Europeans in Algeria, and a handful of Egyptians—decide to support the cause of Algerian independence? Like Egyptian and Algerian activists before them, socialization and information certainly played a role: for instance, the overwhelming majority of French activists who joined support networks hailed from specific intellectual communities. On the one hand, there were activists from self-described "progressive Christian"[6] circles: worker-priests from the Mission de France, and activists from the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne (JOC) and the Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne (JEC). A second bloc of activists came from the fragmented French left, a mix of socialists, communists, syndicalists, Trotskyists, and anarchists.

Although diverse, these blocs were unified by what they read: all counted themselves readers of magazines and journals like *Esprit*, *Les Temps Modernes,* and *L'Express,* and

[5] "La jeunesse française et la guerre d'Algérie," *El Moudjahid* 49, 31 August 1959, 428–430 [Tome 2].
[6] See for instance: André Mandouze, "Prendre la main tendue," in *Les Chrétiens et la Politique*, eds. Henri Guillemin et al. (Paris: Editions du Temps Présent, 1948).

newspapers such as the left-leaning *France-Observateur* and the communist papers *L'Humanité* and *Alger Républicain.* These papers helped inform decision-making by providing information on the behavior of others and drawing attention to certain issues. Such publications were also important for communal cohesion and distinction, helping create and coalesce political trends into communities of readership. In both mainland France and North Africa, for instance, individuals classified and made judgments about one another according to the types of dailies and journals they consumed.[7] Hervé Bourges (a journalist who joined the FLN support networks), for instance, described his political shift from right to left in terms of a change of information source: a move from *Le Figaro* (read by his parents) to his encounter with *France-Observateur*, *L'Express*, *Libération*, *Les Temps Modernes*, and *Esprit* at the library.[8] French teacher Maurice Maschino remembered being "marked" by French settlers in North Africa as untrustworthy because he read left-leaning publications like *France-Observateur* and *L'Express*, (As he vividly recalled, the French owner of the local newsstand agreed to sell him the papers, but would hand them to Maschino with a disgusted "Take them, here are your dailies," holding the newspapers "with her fingertips, as if they were shit.")[9] In the same vein, Anne Beaumanoir recalled that as a communist, she was dissuaded from reading mainstream capitalist papers, dubbed *la presse pourrie* ["the putrid press"] (a name that invoked decay and contamination).[10]

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[7] See for instance Pierre Chaulet and Claudine Chaulet, *Le choix de l'Algérie: Deux voix, une mémoire* (Algiers: Éditions Barzakh, 2012), 150; Noël Favrelière, *Le désert à l'aube*, (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2000 [First Ed. 1960]), 43.

[8] Rosa Moussaoui, "Hervé Bourges: 'C'est par le combat anticolonialiste que je suis devenu l'homme que je suis,'" *l'Humanité*, 2 August 2016, https://www.humanite.fr/herve-bourges-cest-par-le-combat-anticolonialiste-que-je-suis-devenu-lhomme-que-je-suis-612941

[9] Maurice Maschino, *Le refus* (Paris: François Maspero, 1960), 145.

[10] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire: La Résistance, le communism, et l'Algérie, 1940–1976*, preface by Mohammed Harbi (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2009), 63–100.

Information sources were thus vital to the decisions of suitcase-carriers, but insufficient. The majority of the readers of *Les Temps Modernes* and *Esprit* certainly did not aid the FLN; in fact, most vocally opposed the organization. So how did a small group of French activists decide to defy social convention and majority trends (including trends within their own intellectual communities), and support Algerian revolutionaries? What made them decide to pursue an action that was, as *Vérités Pour* put it, "difficult, costly, dangerous," and without glory?[11]

Chapter 1 provided a glimpse of how some observers in the French press answered this question: French journalist Gilles Martinet (editor of *France-Observateur*) profiled suitcase carriers as delusional adventurers, "courageous but irresponsible, well-intentioned but fully in aberration, and whose behavior could only arise from pure psychology."[12] This chapter neither blithely dismisses nor wholly agrees with Martinet's comments; instead, it puts his profile to the test. Were there certain causal factors (like aberrant psychological traits or common demographic patterns) behind the demographic disproportionalities found in the suitcase carrier movement? For instance, why were Jews and communists overrepresented? And why did certain social characteristics, like social marginalization, co-occur with suitcase-carrying?

To answer these questions, this chapter examines how activists described themselves: what they wrote about their personality traits, their preferences, their social locations, and their historical experiences. The first part of the chapter explores the historical factors activists recalled influencing their activism, and the habits formed as a result of these events. The second part of the chapter then traces the border-crossings of French

[11] Martini, "Vous qui recevez," *Vérités Pour* 17, 26 July 1960, 16.
[12] "Entre la maladie infantile et la sénilité précoce," *Vérités Pour* 10, 6 July 1959, 3–4.

activists. And finally, the third part describes the personality traits that may have contributed to activist decisions. And based on these testimonies, this chapter notes that there did seem to be certain traits overrepresented in the FLN support networks—at least in retrospect. But personal preferences were often projected backward, and only a handful of French individuals with these traits aided Algerian revolutionaries.[13] So-called "predisposing traits" were thus deterministically indeterminate.

Instead of being the result of certain psychological traits, this chapter thus argues that activist decisions to "cross the line" to aid Algerian revolutionaries in the late 1950s was more informed by complex conjuncture: a convergence of individual factors (risk preferences, information sources, and investments), social processes (like the social marginalization of certain groups), and historical events (including the Spanish Civil War, World War II, and debates in the Catholic and communist communities during the early Cold War)—not to mention a great deal of work by French activists, who mobilized peer networks, modeled emotions and behaviors, and created myths to encourage border-crossing. Chapter 7 "On Trial with Antigone and Christ Crucified," will explore how French activists used moral emotions and myths to help build a movement of "border-crossers." But first, this chapter lays a foundation, exploring some of the social and historical factors that contributed to French decisions to "cross the line."

[13] Laurent Schwartz interview with Hartmut Elsenhans, 8 June 1970, in Hartmut Elsenhans, *Les carnets de Hartmut Elsenhans: la guerre d'Algérie par ses acteurs français* (Algiers: Casbah Éditions, 2009), 63–71.

The Specialists: From the International Brigades to the Algerian Resistance

In a seminal 2004 history on the FLN support networks, Jacques Charby provided a demographic analysis of the men and women who became "suitcase carriers" in the 1950s. Charby was not only an authority on the history of the suitcase carriers, he was intimately familiar with the movement: he was a recruiter for the Jeanson network, who was arrested near the Spanish border in February 1960, and put on trial in September 1960 with other members of the Jeanson network (see Chapter 7). As Charby described, there had been three generations involved in the movement. The oldest group (and smallest numerically) was a generation of 45-50 year olds, usually lifelong communist or anarchist militants continuing their struggle. Next, there was a group of 35-40 year olds; these were individuals who had fought in World War II, and counted themselves members of established organizations like the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) and the Peace Movement. Finally, there was the youngest generation (and the largest bloc of recruits): activists 20-30 years old.[14]

Starting with the older generation of activists, it is worth unpacking and expanding on Charby's overview of the suitcase carriers. His analysis was accurate—but it is important to explore *why* activists often fell into such distinct demographic categories. What was it about older French communist and anarchist militants, Catholics and communists of the World War II generation, and postwar youth that made a minority among them decide to aid the FLN?

[14] Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir: Les réseaux de soutien au FLN pendant la guerre d'Algérie, les acteurs parlent* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004), 24.

Diasporas and Dislocations of the 1930s and 1940s

The July 1936 military coup in Spain was violent, and intentionally so: the Nationalists used "violence as the end of the argument over constitutional reform," and overthrew the Popular Front government. First a coup and then a "crusade" aimed at purifying the nation of urban cosmopolitan culture, the Nationalist militias spoke of "blood sacrifice" and turning back secularizing reforms (like civil marriage and mixed male-female classrooms). Bands of Nationalist activists roamed the countryside, lynching farmers and unionists and massacring "Republican" villages. Women were especially targeted: schoolteachers, intellectuals, progressives, and other "red" women were raped, executed, or shamed through head-shaving. The response was more violence: Republican militias massacred nationalists, razed churches, disinterred bodies, and castrated and murdered priests—in part, a response to the ruling entente between the Church and the Restoration monarchy that had seen religious personnel staffing prisons and helping break up workers' rights movements.[15] Every violence had a history.

In the personal histories of older-generation suitcase carriers, the Spanish Civil War was a formative moment. In autumn 1936, the Communist International began mobilizing volunteers to aid Spanish Republicans in the war with the Nationalists (among whom was General Francisco Franco). In Europe, North Africa, and North America, young communists volunteered to fight in Spain. In France, members of the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) formed units like the 6 February, Paris Commune, and "La Marsellaise" Brigades; they joined other foreign fighters in Spain, including American volunteers in the Abraham Lincoln and George Washington Brigades, Canadians in the Mackenzie-

[15] Helen Graham, *The War and Its Shadow: Spain's Civil War in Europe's Long Twentieth Century* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 27–42.

Papineu Battalion, Germans in the Thälmann Battalion, and British volunteers in the British Battalion.[16] In Egypt, anti-fascist leagues collected donations to send the Spanish Republicans; in Algeria, pieds-noirs (particularly French, Spanish, and Italians) hung Republican or Nationalist flags in shops, collected money for aid, and boarded boats to go fight. Among those who departed for Spain were some 200 French Algerian communists, including PCA members Maurice Laban, Lisette Vincent, and Georges Raffini (later, they would go on to join the FLN's struggle as well). In metropolitan France, meanwhile, 9,000 French communist and anarchist volunteers traveled to Spain.[17]

In a Chapter on the Spanish Civil War entitled "Border Crossings," Helen Graham notes that the young volunteers who left to fight in Spain had certain demographic characteristics. The Great War (and the political unrest that followed in its wake) had created a lot of diasporas, displacements, and "unfinished business"—and thus many of the volunteers who headed for Spain were Jews and communists in exile. Among these activists were Finnish refugees displaced during the Finnish Civil War of 1918 (fought between the Whites and the Reds—the former backed by Germany, the latter by Soviet Russia). One volunteer for Spain, a Finnish communist exiled to Canada, explained that by fighting Spanish nationalists, he was avenging his sister (who had been killed by Finnish nationalists). Others who left to join the International Brigades had similar

[16] See: Michael Alpert, *A New International History of the Spanish Civil War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Peter N. Carroll, *The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Michael Petrou, *Renegades: Canadians in the Spanish Civil War* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008).

[17] Anne Dulphy, "L'Algérie entre la France et l'Espagne de 1936 à 1939: les répercussions de la guerre civile," *Matériaux pour l'Histoire de Notre Temps* 99 (2010/3): 51–59; Jean-Luc Einaudi, *Un Algérien: Maurice Laban* (Paris: Le Cherche midi éditeur, 1999), 28; Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 942; Henri Curiel, *Pages autobiographiques: une contribution à l'histoire de la naissance du Parti Communiste Égyptien de 1940 à 1950* (Typescript, 1977), 8 in IISH ARCH01722/Folder 402.

stories: there were communists and Jews who had fled the White Terror and the Miklós Horthy dictatorship in Hungary; communists in exile as a result of the single-party state created by the fascist Fatherland Front in Austria; Italian communists fleeing the Benito Mussolini regime; and members of the German Communist Party, in exile following the takeover of Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP, or the Nazi Party). Jews and ethnic minorities were particularly overrepresented among the volunteers: Jewish communists arrived in Spain from Egypt, Palestine, Poland, France, and Germany, and the Abraham Lincoln Brigade counted among its members a number of Jewish and black American volunteers (alienated by nationalist doctrines, and attracted to communism's egalitarian, anti-racist precepts). Most of the volunteers were young: between 21-35 years old.[18]

Six months after Franco's forces defeated the Republicans, World War II began. The start of the war upended politics in France and her Algerian departments. After the Soviet Union signed a pact with Germany in August 1939, French and Algerian communists were denounced as traitors; and when France declared war on Germany, the PCF and PCA were banned. Many communists quickly disaffiliated: the PCA, which had claimed some 5,000 members in 1937, was decimated by departures and police roundups, with over half of its members leaving from 1938–1939. Other activists went underground, and following the fall of France in 1940, communist activists would endure arrests, torture, and internment in Drancy and Barberousse.[19]

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[18] Helen Graham, *The War and Its Shadow,* 75–83; Michael Alpert, *The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 219–224.

[19] Charles-Robert Ageron, "Le parti communiste algérien de 1939 à 1943," *Vingtième Siècle* 12 (1986): 39–50; Stéphane Courtois, *Le PCF dans la guerre: De Gaulle, la Résistance, Staline* (Paris: Ramsay, 1980); Allison Drew, *We Are No Longer in France: Communists in Colonial Algeria* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 113–116.

Between autumn 1939 and spring 1940, France mobilized four and a half million young men for war—almost a quarter of the male population. But while young men mobilized, most did not begin fighting immediately. Instead, they sat in an eight-month "Phoney War," waiting for movement on the Western Front. In the gap, Raymond Bouzar and André Mandouze (both mentioned in the introduction) got married and departed for officer's training at Saint-Maixent.

When the war did come, it came swiftly: seven days after launching their offensive, the Germans were already forty miles into the French department of Ardennes. The date was 16 May 1940; the French government began burning documents and preparing to evacuate Paris—but news of the German advance was censored, and Prime Minister Paul Reynaud assured the French population in a radio address that the government was not leaving Paris. A wave of Belgian refugees into northern France, however, portended that German forces were drawing closer. A week after Reynaud's radio address, the Belgians were joined on the roads by panicked residents of France's northern departments, and in the first week of June, waves of families evacuating the Seine and Loire regions joined them.[20]

The wave of evacuees quickly became an avalanche: in the course of a month, an estimated 8–10 million French citizens frantically packed suitcases and fled, in what was later called "the exodus." Claudine Guillot (who would go on to join an FLN support network in Algiers) remembered it well: because her father had been mobilized and her mother gone to work to fill in for mobilized men, her parents had sent Claudine to live with her grandparents for the summer. For weeks they had been scanning the newspapers,

[20] Richard Carswell, *The Fall of France in the Second World War: History and Memory* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 49–52.

following what they thought was the progress of the war. Then one day out of the blue, they saw a flood of refugees with suitcases coming down the road. A few days later, Claudine's mother pulled up in their Citroën. The family packed the bikes and their grandmother's embroidered sheets, tied the mattresses to the top of the car, and headed south. On the road, it was "panic"—a chaos of civilians in wagons and on foot, cars abandoned after running out of gasoline, destroyed bridges, and abandoned farm animals.[21] Paris fell on 14 June.

Other dislocations followed. After Marshal Philippe Pétain formed a new government at Vichy, the government targeted French Jews. The Law of 3 October 1940 on the Status of the Jews prohibited French Jews from holding government, military, teaching, journalism, film, entertainment and broadcasting positions, and limited the number of Jews allowed in law and medicine to a fixed percentage. On 7 October, another statute revoked en masse the French citizenship of Algerian Jews, giving them the status of "natives" [*indigènes*] and making them equal in status to Algerian Muslims. A 1941 law further limited Jewish enrollment in schools to 14% of students, dropping that to 7% in 1942; as a result, some 12,000 Jewish students were expelled from their classrooms in Algeria. And finally, some 75,000 Jews were deported from France to concentration camps; only 3% survived.[22]

While most of the French Army rallied to the new Vichy government under the popular Marshal Pétain, General Charles de Gaulle tried to rally an army under the name

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[21] Richard Carswell, *The Fall of France in the Second World War*, 83–87; Pierre et Claudine Chaulet, *Le choix de l'Algérie*, 113–116.

[22] Jacques Bernard Sadon, "Les juifs d'Algérie sous Vichy" (PhD diss., Paris-Sorbonne, 2015); Henri Msellati, *Les juifs d'Algérie sous le régime de Vichy: 10 juillet 1940–3 novembre 1943* (Paris: Harmattan, 1999); Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 343–344; Renée Poznanski, *Jews in France During World War II* (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1997), 287–288.

the "Free French." Over the next few years, other resistance networks formed inside France, including Libération, Combat, the communist-led Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP), and the rightist Ceux de la Libération. But while de Gaulle's postwar Resistance myth imagined these forces to be French, male, and representing the vast majority of French citizens, in reality these networks were small, diverse, and often divided. Their activities ranged from the creation of false papers and fugitive transport to lynching French collaborators and German targets of opportunity. And most Resistance fighters were men and women on the margins: Polish, Hungarian, and Russian Jews in exile, French Jews, French communists, trade unionists, Spanish Republican exiles, German and Italian anti-fascists in hiding, French Catholic progressives, and Armenians—individuals who had little or no role in the new order fascism looked to create. Others were far-right veterans of the Great War, who rejected the Vichy collaboration with Germany,[23] and still others were pulled in by family, friends, or other circumstances.[24]

The Heretical Vocation: From Resistance to Resistance

As had been true with the International Brigades and French Resistance, it was often these men and women on the margins who agreed to support the FLN. Adolfo Kaminsky was one of these young men. From a family of Russian Jews exiled after the 1917 Revolution, his parents had met in Paris, fled to Argentina during the Great War, then returned to France after the Armistice. Adolfo thus grew up in the town of Vire (near the English Channel). As a child, he dreamed of being a painter—but his parents had more

[23] Members of Croix de Feu and Action Française were particularly well-represented.

[24] Richard Carswell, *The Fall of France in the Second World War,* 245; Robert Gildea, *Fighters in the Shadows: A New History of the French Resistance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 2–5, 360–371; Olivier Wieviorka, *The French Resistance* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2016).

practical designs. So at age thirteen, Adolfo went to work in an aviation factory. There, he met Jean. Jean was everything the quiet Adolfo was not: confident and charismatic, Jean sang revolutionary songs and had already been in prison once for hitting his alcoholic father over the head with a hammer. Jean introduced Adolfo to communism, and the boys became best friends.[25]

Two years later, France fell to the Germans. As a Jew, Adolfo was expelled from the factory, and found a new job as an apprentice dyer, where he learned soap-making, chemistry, and stain removal. Weeks came and went; his mother traveled to Paris to visit his uncle. When she was long in returning, his father explained she was in the hospital recovering from an illness.

One winter day, Adolfo was making bike deliveries, pedaling across the plain of Normandy through the miserable cold and rain. He stopped at a friend's home to deliver some soap; but his friend looked distraught. "You haven't heard?" she asked him. "Jean Bayer, from the factory…"

Adolfo left the house, pedaling "like mad, not going anywhere in particular." Biking into the wind and rain, his mind raced. Jean had been executed by firing squad. Jean was "the first person dear to me the war had torn away," Adolfo later wrote. And suddenly, in the tumult of his thoughts, he had a sudden realization: his mother, who had been "traveling" now for weeks, was also dead. "I realized just like that."

Back home, Adolfo confronted his father, and for the first time heard the truth. "She was on her way back from Paris…" Adolfo's brother Paul had gone with his father to identify her body, which was found dismembered on the railway line. They suspected the

[25] Sarah Kaminsky, *Adolfo Kaminsky: A Forger's Life* (Los Angeles: DoppelHouse Press, 2016), 42–66.

Germans had pushed her from the moving train, since her brother had been a wanted man. But as Adolfo wrote, "Paul had been so traumatized at seeing 'her head separated from her body and the bits of brain,' that he'd preferred to say nothing to us."

In the following weeks, Adolfo tried to bury himself in work. "I threw myself body and soul into chemistry; it was my only reason for living." One day he was visiting the local chemist. And there over coffee, the man threw the drowning Adolfo a lifeline: "If I showed you how, would you be willing to make some things for me that are a little more dangerous than bars of soap?" Those things: bomb detonators and corrosive chemicals.

As Adolfo later recalled, the work gave him a sense of purpose, pride, and empowerment. "Being involved in the sabotage meant that for the first time I didn't feel entirely impotent following the death of my mother and my friend Jean. At least I had the feeling I was avenging them. And I was proud; I was in the Resistance."[26]

In 1943, Adolfo and his family were interned in Drancy, then released due to a clerical error. A Jew in occupied Paris, however, Adolfo had no place to go—until a Jewish resistance cell recruited him. The group of young men and women had been in a Jewish scouting troop together (the Éclaireuses et Éclaireurs Israélites de France/EEIF), and they were now making false papers for Jewish fugitives; they wanted Kaminsky for his chemistry background and ability to remove stains (particularly, the ink on official documents and passports). As Adolfo wrote, "I remembered my first forgery. At that time there was no question that my activity was morally justified. We had to break the law."[27]

After the war ended, Adolfo had trouble reintegrating. But his special skills, social contacts, and record in the Resistance soon earned him another invitation: the Stern

[26] Ibid., 42–66.
[27] Ibid., 26–36, 68–73, 117–118.

Gang. He joined, and as part of the group helped Jewish DPs and members of the Hungarian resistance immigrate to Palestine. As the only atheist in the group, however, he still felt on the periphery. As his cell members made plans to go to Palestine and departed one by one, Adolfo remained in France. The war had split up his family, and in 1951 he and his wife divorced. Describing himself as lonely, he said he was "twenty-three, alone, without papers, with no fixed income or an 'official' past. I took on little jobs… but they never matched my abilities or my hopes… I wasn't interested in routine work. What I enjoyed was solving technical problems, learning new processes." As a result, he said he was "unsettled." "I often changed my address, my job and my partner as well. In reality, my reintegration into 'normal' life proved difficult."[28]

Eventually, Adolfo made friends in the Parisian artistic community, becoming a regular in in the cafés of Montparnasse and Saint-Germain. There in 1957, he met the actress Marceline Loridan (who was part of an FLN support network); she introduced him to her beautiful blonde friend Anne Beaumanoir [pseud. Annette Roger] (also in the network). As Adolfo was preparing for a photography exhibit and models were expensive, Anne agreed to model for free. As she proudly described it, she would talk while he photographed her, "indoctrinating" the photographer. And after many sessions, the girls convinced Adolfo to help the FLN support network.[29]

From these beginnings, Kaminsky would go on to forge passports for Basque revolutionaries, anti-government groups in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, revolutionaries in Guinea, Angola, Venezuela, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay, Americans looking to avoid the Vietnam War, 1968 protestors, French

[28] Ibid., 106–128, 149–152.
[29] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire,* 122; Sarah Kaminsky, *Adolfo Kaminsky*, 153–157, 169.

leftists wanting to participate in the revolution in Guatemala, Czechoslovakian dissidents, and more. "Fear, euphoria, days too full and nights too short, you get used to living at a hundred miles an hour," Adolfo later explained. But as he reflected, "I was outside the law, and I wondered whether, from the day I'd done my first forgery, I hadn't been caught up in a spiral I'd have difficulty getting out of my whole life."[30]

Adolfo and other older-generation suitcase-carriers described their decisions to engage in the Algerian cause in different ways. For instance, Adolfo said he had wanted to continue using the skills he had learned; his recruiter, Anne Beaumanoir, had fought in the French Resistance, and described her decision to join the FLN as comfortable, a slipping back into old habits. "Recidivism," as she called it.[31] But beneath such statements was a fundamental pattern: after working outside the law or in the borderlands, activists tended to continue in these behaviors.

André Mandouze (introduced in Chapter 1), for instance, had moved "from one resistance to another," as his autobiography phrased it. Brought up in the traditional milieu of Bourdeaux in the 1920s, he had been introduced to politics by two men: a teacher Pierre Henri Chamaillard (a Popular Front supporter), and a Jesuit priest named Antoine Dieuzayde (a social Catholic). He met Chamaillard ("Cham") in high school, where the English teacher's conflicts with the school administration made him beloved by students. On Sunday afternoons, students (including Mandouze) would gather at Cham's home to have political discussions. It was through Cham that the boys would

[30] Sarah Kaminsky, *Adolfo Kaminsky*, 117–118, 140–141, 208–209, 217–218.
[31] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire*, 12–23, 119–121, 130–131.

attend their first Popular Front demonstration (Mandouze did not remember the speeches years later, but remembered the feeling of hearing "The International" sung in unison).[32]

Around the same time, a friend from school invited Mandouze to attend the Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne (JEC). Mandouze's mother disapproved of the Catholic club, because it met in a bad neighborhood. But Mandouze said he was "seduced" by the club's billiard and ping-pong tables. While he came for the billiards, Mandouze stayed out of admiration for the club's charismatic firebrand of a leader, Father Antoine Dieuzayde, nicknamed the "Red Jesuit." Through Dieuzayde, Mandouze learned about social Catholicism, a small movement within the Church critical of capitalism and fascism. Emphasizing social justice and social service projects, social Catholicism sought to bring about revolutionary social transformation through lay activism, engaging with workers and the urban poor. The movement vigorously opposed Action Française (a league advocating "integral nationalism," or the combining of Catholicism and exclusionist nationalism). Through Dieuzayde, Mandouze thus developed a hatred for racism and the conviction that the religious beliefs of the bourgeoisie were nothing but "poor prejudices stewed in holy water."[33]

In 1939 the war started, and Mandouze went to train at Saint-Maixent; but his bad eyesight landed him answering mail in the French Army. Following the German occupation, the young Catholic took a job teaching Latin in Bourg-en-Bresse. There with his coworker and friend (high-school philosophy teacher Charles Devivaise), Mandouze began painting over anti-Semitic posters and distributing the underground *Temps*

[32] André Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle, Tome 1: D'une résistance à l'autre* (Paris: Viviane Hamy, 1998), 20–33; Interview with André Mandouze, 7 September 1989, Paris, in Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War, 1954-1962* (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 44–47.
[33] Ibid.; Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades,* 15–36.

Nouveau to Catholics arriving for Mass. As a result, in autumn 1940, Mandouze experienced his first night in jail. The arrest cost him: later that week while he was teaching, the school headmaster appeared in his classroom and showed him the door.[34]

Mandouze took another teaching position in Toulon, then accepted a position at the University of Lyon in 1942; there, he joined Father Pierre Chaillet at the underground journal *Courriers du Témoignage Chrétien*, where Mandouze championed a "spiritual front" against Nazism that would bring together Catholic and communist *résistants*. Within the year, Mandouze and his wife sent the children to live with their grandparents, so their home come become a crossroads for the Resistance: the couple hosted fugitives (often entire families of Jews), and secured false papers for their charges. At the university, the dean kindly gave Mandouze a ground-floor classroom: he anticipated the Latin teacher's political activities might someday require him to make a quick exit through the window.[35]

After the war, it would take time for French Resistance myths to form (and it is important to speak of Resistance myths in the plural, as the de Gaulle government, the PCF, the FLN, French pied-noir ultras, and French suitcase carriers all had their myths of the French Resistance).[36] Activists were affected by these myths in important ways, as Chapter 7 will explore. But historical developments like the Spanish Civil War and World War II also affected French activists in concrete and immediate ways. Particularly among the older group of French activists who decided to join FLN support networks

[34] André Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle, Tome 1*, 92–114.

[35] Ibid.; Étienne Fouilloux, "Les cinq étapes de Témoignage Chrétien," *Vingtième Siècle* 125 (2015): 3–15; Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 67–70.

[36] See for instance: Robert Gildea, *Fighters in the Shadows: A New History of the French Resistance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); Pieter Lagrou, "The Politics of Memory: Resistance as a Collective Myth in Post-War France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1945–1965," *European Review* 11, no. 4 (October 2003): 530–554.

(those in what Charby called the 35-40 year-old and 45-50 year-old generational blocs), there were many individuals who had fought in conflicts like the Spanish Civil War and World War II. PCA members Maurice Laban, Lisette Vincent, and Georges Raffini were veterans of Spain; André Mandouze, Francis Jeanson, Anne Beaumanoir, and many others[37] had engaged in the French Resistance.

These older-generation activists, who moved from resistance to resistance, were thus what one could call "specialists" in clandestine activities. Such individuals were not choosing to transgress social boundaries for the first time: they had already developed skills and accumulated resources appropriate to border-crossing. To echo Mohammed Harbi's fond characterization of his friend Anne Beaumanoir, they had taken up the "vocation of heretic"[38] (or at least the vocation of border-crossing). And recognizing that such individuals had important skills, FLN support networks purposely worked to enlist them: as Jeanson network activist Aline Charby later explained, "when recruiting for the Jeanson network," she "always looked for people who had been linked to the Resistance."[39]

The "Frontaliers" of France and French Algeria: Life in the Borderlands

Despite old habits dying hard, working in one resistance did not automatically lead to investment in another. In fact, Mandouze's record of illegalities might have ended with the German surrender—but an unexpected shift in itinerary sent the Latin professor

[37] See also Madeline Baudoin, Jacques Mecker, Jean Berthet, Jean-Marie Boeglin, Dominique Darbois, Claude Vinci, and Jobic Kerlan.

[38] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire*, 8, 11–14.

[39] Interview with Aline Charby, 13 November 1989, Paris, in Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 55–56.

toward a new resistance. After the war, Mandouze had been hoping to take a lecture position in Caen. But the professor would not end up enjoying weekends on the coast of Normandy that year. The position fell through, and instead, Mandouze traveled across the Mediterranean in 1946 to take a job at the University of Algiers. As Mandouze described, it was a risk, a huge leap to take: "We didn't know anything about Algeria." His wife Jeannette was pregnant, they had never visited, and had no friends or relatives there. But they agreed to embark on the adventure.[40]

By his second day in Algeria, however, Mandouze remembered feeling a sense of cognitive dissonance. He arrived on Saturday, 19 January 1946, and attended Mass the following day. After service, he asked the student chaplain his thoughts on recent political events (the May 1945 demonstrations and the pacification efforts). In response, the chaplain answered with a gospel of the machine gun: "Things are in fact very simple to resolve. All we have to do is agree to use the machine gun, when necessary." The answer shocked Mandouze; he thought he had misunderstood.[41]

This shock might not have developed further, except in the following days Mandouze made friends in a different social circle: members of the local JEC branch, who introduced the Mandouzes to two ethnically mixed clubs: the Association Générale des Étudiants and the Parti Communiste Algérien (PCA). A few months later, Mandouze was also introduced to Father Jean Scotto, the "Red Priest" of an ethnically diverse working-

[40] André Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle Tome 1*, 159–180.
[41] Ibid.

class neighborhood.[42] The priest being both a World War II veteran and a social Catholic, he and Mandouze became fast friends.[43]

As Mandouze quickly learned, French Algeria was a highly stratified and segregated society. At the bottom of the social hierarchy were Muslims. Moving up, there were Jews, then "little whites" [*petits blancs*] (Europeans whose families had immigrated to France from Spain, Italy, and other European countries). Above them were French pieds-noirs (Frenchmen born in Algeria). Finally, at the top of the social hierarchy sat the "French from [mainland] France," who lived in a bourgeois community near the city center.[44] Raymond Bouzar, half French-Italian, half Arab, succinctly summarized this hierarchy: "In everyday life in North Africa, Martinez mistreats Mohamed. But, on the other hand, Dupont despises Martinez."[45] These borders were strictly maintained. As Alice Cherki remembered, as a Jew she was not allowed past the threshold of European homes,[46] and Raymond Bouzar was almost beaten for inviting a Spanish girl to dance. Even Claudine Guillot (whose family arrived in Algiers a few months after the Mandouzes), soon found that her family considered her relationship with one of the local JEC members, Pierre Chaulet, a "mixed" relationship "between a Frenchwoman from France… and a European from Algeria."[47]

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[42] A *petit blanc* from the Algiers neighborhood of Hussein-Dey, Scotto had encountered social Catholicism in seminary in the late 1920s (through his teacher Jules Declercq). After being ordained in 1936, Scotto founded a JEC branch at his parish of Saint-Charles—a highly controversial decision at the time.

[43] André Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle Tome 1*, 178–180; Darcie Fontaine, *Decolonizing Christianity Religion and the End of Empire in France and Algeria* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 35–45.

[44] Lucette Larribére Hadj Ali, *Itinéraire d'une militante algérienne, 1945–1962* (Algiers: Editions du Tell, 2011).

[45] Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance*, 170.

[46] Interview with "A.C." [Alice Cherki], in Andrée Dore-Audibert, *Des françaises d'Algérie dans la guerre de libération*: *des oubliées de l'histoire* (Paris: Karthala, 1995), 193–207.

[47] Emphasis in original. Pierre Chaulet and Claudine Chaulet, *Le choix de l'Algérie*, 126–127, 153.

By joining the mixed group of PCA members and social Catholics, Mandouze thus began to work in the "borderlands" between different communities. And by the start of 1947, he noticed this behavior was scandalizing work colleagues. One day, when he offhandedly mentioned looking forward to visiting the Casbah, his French coworkers expressed an "incredible anxiety," telling him "Do nothing of the sort! Or let us know you will be accompanied by a police officer." A few months later, he further published a twenty-page article in *Esprit* that raised a fracas. In the piece, Mandouze rejected the "myth of the three departments" (the idea that Algeria was part of France), arguing that the reality on the ground showed Algeria was in fact two segregated communities.[48]

These social transgressions were spatially marked a few months later with a physical relocation: in September, Mandouze and his family moved to an apartment next to Scotto's chapel in Hydra. A red neighborhood on the periphery of Algiers, Mandouze described Hydra as the end of the bus line. That fall, he also intensified his social activism: he got involved in the October 1947 municipal elections, and in 1948 joined the steering committee of the communist-aligned *Algiers Républicain*. The behaviors made him the target of social sanctions for violating both the accepted ethnic hierarchies of French Algeria and the standard comportment for academics. Colleagues on campus condemned his behavior, and pied-noir students came to his classes at the University of Algiers to heckle him. As Mandouze explained, his colleagues saw him as "break[ing] with the sacrosanct false neutrality of intellectuals." But as he wrote, he "took a mischievous pleasure in having, when necessary, somewhat less-than-professional behavior." (And rather than shy from the criticism, Mandouze published an article

[48] André Mandouze, "Prévenons la guerre d'Afrique du Nord: Impossibilités algériennes ou le mythe des trois départements," *Esprit* 135, no. 7 (July 1947): 10–30.

defending academic engagement in politics, in an article entitled "Address to the Intellectual Puritans.")[49]

By the end of 1948, Mandouze had grown outspoken in calling for a "progressive Christian" engagement, arguing that Catholics should work "hand-in-hand" with communists.[50] At the same time, he warned French citizens that they were complicit in the 1945 massacres and "this crime called *racism*." As he argued, "The Arab is a man, the same as the European… The time is now or never to be logical: one can obviously admit that Hitler was right to eliminate the Jews… that the Ku Klux Klan has the right to lynch the Negroes—but then one admits at the same time that the massacres of Sétif in May 1945 were perfectly natural."[51] Mandouze also worked to model a different vision of French-Algerian relations. In 1950, he founded a mixed-staff journal, *Consciences Algériennes*; its board included JEC member Pierre Chaulet and SMA member Salah Louanchi. The first issue of the journal called for the liquidation of the colonial system, and noted that the magazine would be modeling a scandalous kind of social relations: "our team was formed without taking into account the fact of being Muslim, Jew, or Christian, Arab, Berber, or European. For us, that doesn't matter. We exist together, we live together, we work together, we value one another."[52]

Also in 1950, Scotto managed to introduce to Algeria two teams of worker-priests from the Mission de France. Established in 1941 (during the Occupation, which had

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[49] André Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle: D'une résistance à l'autre*, 176–180.

[50] Mandouze envisioned a partnership that would remain in the borderlands: in light of Christian theology and events like the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and the Tito-Stalin Split that year, he emphasized that Christians should not try to create a "communist Christianity or a Christian communism." André Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle: D'une résistance à l'autre*, 176–180; André Mandouze, "Prendre la main tendue;" Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 168–170.

[51] André Mandouze, "Le dilemme algérien: suicide ou salut public," *Esprit* 149, no. 10 (October 1948): 535–566.

[52] André Mandouze, "Manifeste," *Consciences Algériennes* 1 (December 1950).

paradoxically given Catholic initiatives leeway for experimentation), the Mission de France was a small avant-garde institution in the Catholic Church.[53] With one team in Hussein-Dey and another in Souk-Ahras, the priests went to work in factories and missionized European and Muslim workers—unheard of at the time, as the Church in Algeria "had essentially turned their backs on the project of converting the Muslims."[54]

This dedicated group of mixed Muslim and Christian activists, which included Mandouze, Scotto, and the worker-priests; Muslim scouts Salah Louanchi and Mahfoud Kaddache; and JEC students Pierre Chaulet, Claudine Guillot (who would marry Pierre), and Anne-Marie Chaulet (Pierre's sister, who would marry Louanchi), was the community that would form the core of the "Mandouze network." Most of the members of group would go on to aid the FLN, but the circle and its levels of engagement were diverse. Louanchi would become the head of the FF-FLN in France. Chaulet would help edit the FLN's paper, *El Moudjahid*. Mandouze would never reveal the extent of his engagement (although he would be arrested for it); and Scotto would provide sanctuary to FLN fighters.

Interestingly, the worker-priests (including Father Jobic Kerlan and Father Pierre Mamet), both in Algeria and in France, would also join the FLN support networks. Their levels of engagement also varied: some refused to participate, others distributed tracts or gave sanctuary to FLN fighters, while others transported fugitives, helped procure false documents, smuggled money, or transported weapons. Priest Robert Davezies, for

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[53] Darcie Fontaine, *Decolonizing Christianity*, 36–47; Jean Scotto, *Curé pied-noir, évêque algérien* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1991), 5–10, 60–72; Piotr Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 191; Tangi Cavalin and Nathalie Viet-Depaule, *Une histoire de la Mission de France: la riposte missionnaire, 1941–2002* (Paris: Karthala, 2007), 64–78.

[54] The one exception was the White Fathers and the White Sisters, another small minority of "border-walkers." See Darcie Fontaine, *Decolonizing Christianity*, 36–47; Sybille Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie: l'action de la Mission de France* (Paris: Atelier, 2004), 19.

instance, was a member of the FLN support networks in Paris; he described himself as between many worlds, but not fitting in to any. He had joined the Mission de France in 1953;[55] but Rome banned the worker-priest vocation in March 1954, shortly before the start of the Algerian war. The ban caused a great crisis in the movement; the priests were forced to leave their work or face disciplinary action, and only about half complied with the new orders.[56]

What unified this odd assortment of activists? Ideology, certainly, and a commitment to Algerian friends. But social location and extended work in a "site of contact" between the French and Algerian communities was also a common denominator. First, social marginalization or location in the "borderlands" increased the likelihood that a person would "cross the line" that divided communities. Pierre Chaulet alluded to this in an interview years later: when asked by an interviewer why he broke out of his "colonial bubble," Chaulet replied simply "We were already on the fringes of this bubble."[57] Second, there were specific sites of contact where inter-communal mixing occurred: the university, the PCA, primary and secondary school classrooms,[58] student clubs, social service organizations (such as the Service des Centres Sociaux), and "red neighborhoods" (working-class neighborhoods). And like Chaulet and Mandouze, most Europeans who later joined the FLN or FLN support networks related that they had first sympathized

[55] Robert Davezies, *Le temps de la justice*, 9–12.

[56] Charles Suaud and Nathalie Viet-Depaule, *Prêtres et ouvriers: une double fidélité mise à l'épreuve, 1944–1969* (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2004), 233–234, 362; Piotr Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 279–280.

[57] Rachid Mokhtari, "Pierre Chaulet: "L'humiliation dans laquelle étaient tenus les Algériens nous a fait rejoindre le camp de l'Histoire," *Le Matin d'Algérie*, 21 July 2012, http://www.lematindz.net/news/8426-pierre-chaulet-lhumiliation-dans-laquelle-etaient-tenus-les-algeriens-nous-a-fait-rejoindre-le-camp-de-lhistoire.html; Anne-Marie [Chaulet] Louanchi, *Salah Louanchi: parcours d'un militant algérien* (Algiers: Éditions Dahlab, 1999), 47–51.

[58] For examples of teachers-turned-activists, for instance, see the testimonies of Maurice Maschino, Myriam Ben, Lisette Vincent, and Jacqueline Guerroudj.

with Algerian independence after repeated contact with Algerian Muslims at one of these sites.[59]

But what made life in the borderlands such a potentially transgressive location? Maurice Maschino offered one answer to this question. A French teacher from the metropole, Maurice described himself as socially marginalized on multiple fronts: raised by a single mother, the son of White Russians who had fled the 1917 Revolution, he had never fit in to Parisian society. So after graduating in 1950, he took a teaching position in Morocco, to escape his family. This move, he explained, was not difficult: he had very few friends in France, and "was not a part of a band, a club—no, no group." Once in Morocco, he and his wife (also an unsociable sort) continued their habit of isolation. But Maurice's pied-noir neighbors and work colleagues found his unwillingness to "be seen"—to attend church and make social calls—flatly unacceptable. As Maurice wrote, "we did not seek to please them, and we offended them, we did not sacrifice according to the rites, and they judged us sacrilegious." Maurice's decision to work on a philosophy degree exacerbated this divide: he increasingly found his fellow teachers uncultured and banal—people who "read little more than children." (In exchange, Maurice admitted the other teachers found him pretentious).[60]

Ultimately, Maurice's failure to socialize had an interesting consequence: it meant that Maurice and his wife bypassed the acculturation process that new European transplants to North Africa underwent. As Maurice noted, usually the new arrival to

[59] See for instance the testimonies of Hélène Ratel-Gautron, Annie Steiner, Myriam Ben, and Maurice Maschino. Jacqueline Guerroudj, *Des douars et des prisons* (Algiers: Bouchene, 1993); Myriam Ben, *Quand les cartes sont truquées: Mémoires* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999), 182–205; Maurice Maschino, *Le refus*, 87–99, 158–159, 173–178; Interview with Roger Rey, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir:* 49–50; Andrée Dore-Audibert, *Des françaises d'Algérie dans la guerre de libération*, 29–30, 67–68.

[60] Maurice Maschino, *Le refus*, 14–15, 23–24, 46–54, 59, 65, 72–78, 94–99.

North Africa felt "out of place, helpless, hesitant, he needs landmarks, a code to decipher this strange world, to tame it… [so he] adopts the formulas, the passwords, the reflexes of his peers." The new arrival was then taught the "articles of faith" of the colonial "catechism": that the "indigenous" races are barbaric and lazy, a homogenous mass. But Maurice's self-described social "savagery" insulated him from this acculturation process. Instead, Maurice became attached to his Muslim students, who were curious and hard-working. They looked up to Maurice, and were interested in discussing philosophy. As a result, Maurice admitted "I loved them… they were my kids, my friends." He wrote that they also "sensitized" him to colonial realities—more than this, they made these realities "alive, concrete, in the flesh." The administration did not approve: Maschino was reprimanded for getting too friendly with his students.[61]

Studying Catholic activists in the 1930s involved in anti-racism campaigns, John Connelly concluded that the activists shared one basic trait: they were *frontaliers,* who lived along borders. Early European anti-colonial activists of the 1940s—men like Mandouze—would share this demographic characteristic with their predecessors (and borrow doctrines and arguments from them as well). "Rooted in diverse communities," these men and women did not just cross geographic borders—they crossed the boundaries that separated groups.[62]

The fact that suitcase-carriers also shared this trait of border-crossing suggests that borderlands and sites of contact were a significant part of activist development. These spaces placed individuals of different classes, confessions, ethnicities, and political

[61] Ibid.

[62] John Connelly, *From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the Jews, 1933–1965* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 61–63.

identifications in close proximity to one another, giving individuals opportunities to build empathy, attachment, and trust. As Maschino phrased it, such spaces incarnated abstract politics and policies—they made them "alive, concrete, in the flesh."[63] Pierre Chaulet also explained that meeting young Algerians his age in their student association allowed similarity attraction to work: "In talking with them, I realized that we shared many things in common, and we faced the same problems."[64] Simply stated, sites of contact were important for building new relationships—and relationships increased the chance that an individual would empathize with Algerians, and later agree to favors for Algerian friends.

Intercommunal interactions also revealed that in French Algeria, boundaries were performed and policed emotionally, discursively, and corporally. Prominent in memories was the use of emotional feedback (anger, fear, contempt, or disgust) to maintain social boundaries. Policing strategies also revealed that not everyone experienced boundaries in the same way: as Europeans from the metropole, Mandouze and Maschino avoided most of the physical boundary enforcement that Algerian Jews and Muslims endured. Muslim and Jewish activists reported more corporal sanctions (being spat upon and beaten for boundary crossings), while Frenchmen recounted more ostracization, affective enforcement, and in extreme cases, organized protests and shouted verbal feedback. These experiences were a reminder that "borders never exist[ed] in the same way for

[63] Ibid., 14–15, 23–24, 46–54, 59, 65, 72–78, 94–97.

[64] Pierre Chaulet and Claudine Chaulet, *Le choix de l'Algérie*, 93–94; Rachid Mokhtari, "Pierre Chaulet: L'Humiliation dans laquelle étaient tenus les Algériens nous a fait rejoindre le camp de l'Histoire," *Le Matin d'Algérie*, 21 July 2012, http://www.lematindz.net/news/8426-pierre-chaulet-lhumiliation-dans-laquelle-etaient-tenus-les-algeriens-nous-a-fait-rejoindre-le-camp-de-lhistoire.html

individuals belonging to different social groups"[65]—there were significant differences in "how, and on whose body" a border was performed.[66]

The individuals who crossed ethnic boundaries further suggested there were certain roles (teachers, priests, union representatives, and aid workers) in French Algeria in the 1940s tasked with spreading French Republican, French Catholic, or communist values who were authorized to work in the borderlands. But individuals brought their own philosophies to these roles: Mandouze became politically and socially engaged as a professor, and Maschino became friends with his students as a teacher. Both men were reproached for these behaviors—but they persisted in adapting and contesting the scripts set out for them.[67] Moreover, although roles (like teacher-student interactions) were unequal, ideas still flowed in both directions. As Connelly observed of *frontaliers* in the 1930s, "Because it is impossible to walk, let alone live on a border, these people in fact were border-crossers who took ideas in both directions," and "that made the acts of border-crossers subversive and destabilizing."[68] Thus, while worker-priests, social Catholics, metropolitan teachers, and social service workers brought new ideas to Algerian communities, they also came into contact with Algerian nationalism, and helped transport ideas about Algerian rights and colonial injustices back to the metropole.

As a final word about borders, it should be noted that boundary-crossing was not always voluntary. While some *frontaliers* like André Mandouze and Maurice Maschino

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[65] Etienne Balibar, as quoted in Corey Johnson et al., "Interventions on Rethinking 'the Border' in Border Studies," *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 67.

[66] Nancy A. Wonders, "Global Flows, Semi-Permeable Borders and New Channels of Inequality: Border Crossers and Border Performativity," in *Borders, Mobility, and Technologies of Control*, eds. Sharon Pickering and Leanne Weber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 66; Anssi Paasi, "Borders and Border-Crossings," *Environment and Planning A* 44 (2012): 2303–2309.

[67] André Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle: D'une résistance à l'autre*, 176–180; Maurice Maschino, Le refus, 96.

[68] John Connelly, *From Enemy to Brother*, 61–63.

chose to work in the borderlands, individuals living in the borderlands often found that in wartime, choices were made for them. With the start of the Algerian war, there was a sharp constriction of communal ties among the European and Muslim communities. Mixed couples and Europeans who worked in Muslim communities (such as social workers) immediately found their loyalties suspect, and often discovered that decisions of allegiance were made for them. Jewish medical student Alice Cherki experienced this constriction firsthand. She was part of the mixed Association de la jeunesse algérienne pour l'action sociale/AJAAS and sympathetic to the Algerians, but at the time, being part of the MTLD or FLN was "unthinkable." With the 1955 student strike, however, the university became polarized. As she recalled, "things happened very quickly;" there was an immediate rupture between the students, between those who supported the Algerian student strike and those who "wanted to punch those supporting them in the mouth." When Cherki was assaulted and the tires of her car slashed, she felt her side had been chosen for her.[69]

Priest Alfred Bérenguer similarly found himself pushed out of the French Algerian community. Bérenguer had written an article ("Regards chrétiens sur l'Algérie"), which predicted the collapse of the colonial system and explained Algerian nationalism. The first printing of the article had gone relatively unnoticed; but when the essay was unexpectedly reprinted in February 1956 it created a firestorm, and the French administration expelled Bérenguer from Algeria. This expulsion was lifted in summer 1956, but by the time Bérenguer returned to his parish in Montagnac (near Tlemcen), he

[69] Adam Shatz and Alice Cherki, "An Interview with Alice Cherki," *Historical Reflections* 28, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 293–300; Interview with "A.C." [Alice Cherki], in Andrée Dore-Audibert, *Des françaises d'Algérie dans la guerre de libération*, 193-207.

had made a decision. Having been expelled once already, he decided to join the FLN support networks. As he reasoned, "I am treated like a *fellagha* without having made direct contact with the *maquis*, or even with the clandestine nationalists of the village. So from now on, I will do more. If they expel me [again], at least I will have deserved it."[70]

Borderlands in the French Metropole: The PCF and Its Discontents

Between 1950 and 1954 an unusual group of activists began gathering in Paris: Egyptian members of the EMNL–DMNL. They arrived on the heels of the 1948 Palestine War and creation of Israel, which in Egypt had resulted in the declaration of martial law. The Egyptian government rounded up some 1,300 political dissidents, including Jews, communists, and Zionists (often collapsed as one and the same in Egyptian political discourse). DMNL members Henri Curiel, Raymond Stambouli, and Yusuf Hazan were among those arrested and sent to the Huckstep internment camp. The arrests fueled leadership struggles in the DMNL and widened political fissures, causing the movement to splinter into dozens of factions.[71]

Egypt's war with Israel also struck at the heart of the Egyptian Jewish community, which suffered anti-Semitic attacks (see Chapter 8) and property seizures (as the Egyptian government had passed a decree authorizing state seizure of properties owned by individuals under investigation for security violations and political activities). Over 16,500 Egyptian Jews left for Israel, and some 6,000 Jews departed for Europe and the Americas between 1948 and 1951. Stambouli called it "the end of a dream that had been

[70] Alfred Bérenguer, *En toute liberté: Entretiens avec Geneviève Dermenjian* (Paris: Éditions du Centurion, 1994), 136–159.

[71] Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a Modern Diaspora* (Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 2005), 67–70.

coming true. We had thought of ourselves as Egyptians, even while admitting that Egyptians saw us as foreigners. It was all over. Now we weren't just foreigners, but Jews, [and] therefore the enemy."[72]

In the midst of crisis, the DMNL internees held a meeting. Like many wealthy Egyptians of the time, Hazan's family had gained French citizenship. The DMNL thus decided Hazan should accept release and expulsion, and travel to Paris to make arrangements in case the situation in Egyptian worsened. Consequently, in summer 1949, Hazan arrived in France. Curiel was released in early 1950—but he was quickly rearrested in July 1950. This time, the court ordered his deportation. His Egyptian citizenship declared void by the court, in August 1950 Curiel found himself in a locked cabin on a boat bound for Italy. After landing, Curiel joined Hazan in Paris, and other DMNL members trickled in over the next few years, including Egyptian-Italian communist Diane Fawzy-Rossano (now called Didar). This laid the foundation for a new network of Egyptian communists-in-exile. The group grew to around a dozen members in Paris (and another thirty members in Switzerland and Italy), and called themselves the "Paris Group."[73]

Rather than abandon their activism, once in Paris the Egyptians joined the French Communist Party and continued working long-distance with their DMNL colleagues in Cairo. But the PCF was experiencing its own crisis. After the war, the Communist Party

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[72] Ibid.; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 149.

[73] Called the Rome Group by some scholars, the group called itself the Paris Group. The group included Raymond Biriotti, Joyce Blau, Alfred Cohen, Ralph Costi, Jacques Hassoun, Yusuf Hazan, Didar Fawzy- Rossano, Armand Setton, and Raymond Stambouli, among others.

Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry*, 148–149; Interview with Joseph Hazan, by Michèle Krivine and Marie-Paule Valentini, "HAZAN, Joseph," in *Le Maitron: Le dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français* (online), August 2010, at http://maitron-en-ligne.univ-paris1.fr/spip.php?article88930; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 126–128, 160–161.

had joined a tripartite ruling entente with de Gaulle's Mouvement Républicain Populaire/MRP and the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière/SFIO. This postwar rapprochement crumbled in 1947, however, as a result of disagreement over French policy in Indochina and a wave of labor strikes. As a result, the PCF was ejected from the government. The ejection came hand-in-hand with the developing Cold War and declining Party membership: between 1948–1952, PCF membership fell 60% (with 40,000 members leaving in 1947, and 450,000 members disaffiliating between 1948–1952).[74]

As a result, just as the Egyptians were arriving in Paris, the PCF swung toward a more radical politics. Trying to shore up its patriotic credentials, the PCF quoted the communist role in the French Resistance, created a martyrology based on the 75,000 communist *résistants* shot during the war, and argued that the Party was under siege from a fascist police force commanded by a bourgeois state. This rhetoric peaked with a series of demonstrations protesting the Korean War in May 1952. The protests ended with two dead and some 718 PCF activists arrested in Paris (and hundreds more arrested in other parts of France). The demonstrations marked a peak in PCF radicalism: to avoid further government sanctions and membership flight, the PCF took a sharp turn, moderating its stance, closing ranks, and cracking down on party discipline just as the Algerian war was beginning. Whereas PCF members arrested for confronting the police had been lauded as heroes in 1951-1952, activists who drew police attention were now denigrated as being "assholes," because their behavior was putting the Party at risk.[75]

[74] Vanessa Codaccioni, "Expériences répressives et (dé)radicalisation militante: La variation des effets de la répression sur les jeunes membres du Parti Communiste Français (1947–1962)," *Cultures & Conflits* 89 (Spring 2013): 29–52; Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 100–102.
[75] Ibid.

Because of this growing Party insularity and a series of historical conjunctures, in Paris the Egyptians were treated as outsiders. First, the Free Officers coup of July 1952 in Egypt drove a wedge between the Paris Group and the PCF: the Egyptians wanted to stay in contact with the Free Officers (since fellow DMNL members like Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn were part of the Officers movement)—while the PCF condemned the Officers as "fascists" in bed with American intelligence agents.[76] The Marty Affair, which started in autumn 1952, further distanced the Paris Group from the PCF. During the crisis, the Party accused prominent PCF leader André Marty of being a police informer, sowing factionalism, and maintaining contacts with a "dubious Egyptian couple" (the Curiels)—called "dubious" because one of the Curiel's relatives stood accused of being a "Trotskyist" and British "informer" during World War II. (In fact, Marty had only met the Curiels once, when he visited them in 1943. This wartime stopover had given the newly-formed EMNL much prestige in Egyptian communist circles.) Now, Curiel and the Paris Group were declared personæ non gratæ in the PCF because of their link to Marty. As Hazan remembered, because of the Marty Affair, one of his cousins (a fellow PCF member) crossed the street to avoid being seen with him.[77]

In addition to this growing estrangement from French communist circles, the Paris Group found itself growing apart from friends back home. Communism was already denigrated in Egypt as a foreign, Jewish doctrine—and with the Suez Crisis of October 1956 (which saw Britain, France, and Israel invade Egypt and seize control of the Suez

[76] This was part of a developing rhetoric in the PCF in the 1950s, in which the PCF would increasingly focus on the United States as the main threat to peace. See: Danièle Joly, *The French Communist Party and the Algerian War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 1991), 39–44.

[77] Gilles Perrault, *A Man Apart*, 177–180; Joel Beinin, "Exile and Political Activism: The Egyptian-Jewish Communists in Paris, 1950–59," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 79–94; Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry*, 151–153.

Canal), links with Jews in France were even more of a political liability. Thus in 1957, the remains of the DMNL in Egypt (now going by the name of the United Egyptian Communist Party) informed Curiel that his cell of communists-in-exile was now officially dissolved from its Egyptian parent organization.[78] Socially marginalized on multiple fronts, the Paris Group thus became its own community, increasingly functioning as a family (and in some ways resembling the hometown societies or *landsmanshaften* that Jewish immigrants had formed in Paris in the 1930s after arriving from Eastern Europe).[79]

The PCF's retreat from the active stance it had taken from 1949-1952 also alienated a number of Party members, unhappy with the shift toward a more moderate orthopraxy. International developments, including the 1953 death of Stalin, the Doctors' Plot, the 1956 Khrushchev report ("On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences"), and the invasion of Hungary only deepened this dissatisfaction. Some activists remembered spring 1956, when the PCF voted in favor of giving the government Special Powers in Algeria, as the final straw. A minority of PCF activists denounced the move as "narrow electoralism," hypocrisy, selling out to the pied-noir lobby, and betrayal of the Party's principles. (After its painful losses in the 1958 legislative elections, the PCF would

[78] The exclusion of the Paris Group was embedded in internal politics: the Unified Egyptian Communist Party/UECP (comprised of the remnants of the DMNL) had sought a merger with the Egyptian Communist Party/ECP—a group with ties to the PCF. The ECP's members had studied at the Sorbonne, before being sent back to Egypt to found an "official" communist party. As a condition of the merger, the ECP demanded the exclusion of the Paris Group and any other Jewish communists, arguing they had been responsible for the "sexual dissolution, [and] moral dissolution" of the communist movement in Egypt, as well as responsible for the DMNL's breakup. The UECP readily agreed to this condition, as it was already eager to distance itself from Curiel and the Paris Group. See: Joel Beinin, "Exile and Political Activism," 76–88.

[79] Joel Beinin, "Exile and Political Activism," 85–89; Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry*, 150–157.

continue its move toward the middle, and in 1959 forbade its members from joining the newly created Jeune Résistance).[80]

A growing minority of communist activists thus felt themselves on the margins of the Party, even as the pacification operations in Algeria intensified. Hélène Cuénat, Anne Beaumanoir, and Paule and Étienne Bolo expressed feeling disgusted and distanced from the PCF, as did many other PCF members that would go on to become suitcase carriers.[81] The Bolos, for instance, tore up their party cards after the voting of the Special Powers, and Robert Bonnaud decided to let his membership lapse.[82]

"Just a Letter in the Pocket of a Jacket": Small Favors and Escalatory Commitment

Despite all of these historical developments and social processes, sympathy was still not action. Working with Algerians at sites of contact, or being socially and politically marginalized, was still a far cry from supporting the FLN. So how did individuals cross from sympathy to action? In fact, there were many ways activists worked to bring individuals across the cognition-behavior gap; but one of the most common ways suitcase carriers described joining FLN support networks was through a leveraging of reciprocity norms—or in colloquial terms, through the power of the favor. In other words, when

[80] Vanessa Codaccioni, "Expériences répressives et (dé)radicalisation militante: La variation des effets de la répression sur les jeunes membres du Parti Communiste Français (1947–1962)," *Cultures & Conflits* 89 (Spring 2013): 29–52; Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 65, 92, 107, 115.

[81] Others that expressed this sentiment included Gérard Spitzer, Gérard Chaliand, Bernard Boudouresque, Gérard Lorne, Denis Berger, and Simon Blumenthal.

See: Gérard Lorne's semi-autobiographical historical novel, *Du rouge au noir: mémoire vive d'un porteur de valise* (Paris: Éditions du Monde Libertaire, 1998), and Michel and Hélène Bracco, "Interview with Gérard Lorne, one of the co-founders of the newspaper 'La Voie communiste,'" D2452, No. inventaire 2302, Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l'homme, http://phonotheque.mmsh.huma-num.fr/dyn/portal/index.seam? page=alo&aloId=8326

[82] Robert Bonnaud interview with Hartmut Elsenhans, September 1970, in Hartmut Elsenhans, *Les carnets de Hartmut Elsenhans*, 40–44; Interview with Paule Bolo, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 45; Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 73–83.

crossing from legal to illegal activism, most French activists described arriving at transgression not through one decisive leap off a precipice, but through a small step down a path—a gradual intensification of activity rather than a seismic shift in behavior.

As Anne Beaumanoir remembered, this was how she had ended up in the French Resistance. At age seventeen, her school teacher (a communist) asked her to make a few deliveries for him. Thus, she explained, "without thinking, I was put on the path of engagement." From making deliveries on her bike, her involvement evolved to painting slogans on walls and putting up posters. And eventually, she graduated to more dangerous tasks, such giving short speeches in cinemas with a megaphone. By 1942, Beaumanoir was a full-time underground operative for the Jeunesses Communistes. "Terrorist" not being a term with much negative connotation for her, she jokingly dubbed this progression the "hierarchy of tasks for the apprentice terrorist."[83]

Much like the men and women of the Resistance, suitcase carriers also often entered activism through the power of the favor. Francis Jeanson crossed from sympathy to action in 1956. He and his wife Colette had honeymooned in Algeria in 1948, and had fallen in with Algerian communists, teachers, and journalists—that same mixed community of European and Muslim *frontaliers* that had attracted Mandouze. But the couple had returned to France and life as usual; every other year, Francis would write an article on the Algerian issue, denouncing colonialism and French racism, but "the

[83] Over a decade later (in Spring 1956) Beaumanoir would start into the Algerian cause through a similar series of favors. See: Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire*, 12–23, 119–121.

Also cited: "Anne Beaumanoir, La leçon d'une 'Juste,'" *Le Télégramme*, 30 January 2014, https://www.letelegramme.fr/cotes-darmor/dinan/anne-beaumanoir-la-lecon-d-une-juste-30-01-2014-10011817.php

Algerian situation did not obsess him."[84] Politically, he adhered only to existentialist networks and the short-lived Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire[85]—he was thus in the communist orbit but not a PCF member, being critical of Stalinism. After the start of the Algerian uprising, however, the couple decided their experience in Algeria and the contacts they had made placed them in a good position to write a book on the situation. But since Francis was ill, Colette return to Algiers alone, making three trips in February, May, and September 1955. She was hosted by the activists of *Consciences Maghribines* (André Mandouze, Pierre Chaulet, and Salah Louanchi), who helped her gather information for the book, *L'Algérie hors la loi*.[86]

A few months later, Louanchi and his fiancée Anne-Marie Chaulet (Pierre's younger sister) relocated to Paris. Louanchi had been appointed head of the Fédération de France du FLN (FF-FLN)—an appointment the FLN hoped to use to "ensure the support of a [certain] part of French opinion."[87] Now in Paris, Salah Louanchi and Anne-Marie Chaulet began recruiting progressive Catholic and communist activists to help the Algerian independence struggle.[88] The couple began spending time at the Jeanson home, and after a few weeks, Louanchi asked Francis for a favor: he needed transportation. So Francis agreed to drive him to a meeting.

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[84] See for instance: Francis Jeanson, "Cette Algérie, conquise et pacifiée..." *Esprit* 166, no. 4 (April 1950): 615–621; Marie-Pierre Ulloa, *Francis Jeanson: A Dissident Intellectual from the French Resistance to the Algerian War*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007),142.

[85] The party, established in 1948 and dissolved within the year, was a mix of ex-Trotskyists, disaffected communists, and socialists.

[86] Marie-Pierre Ulloa, *Francis Jeanson,*142.

[87] Daho Djerbal, *L'organisation spéciale de la fédération de France du FLN: histoire de la lutte armée du FLN en France, 1956–1962* (Algiers: Éditions Chihab, 2012), 30.

[88] Anne-Marie [Chaulet] Louanchi, *Salah Louanchi*, 68–69; Darcie Fontaine, *Decolonizing Christianity*, 126.

As Francis later described it, over the next few weeks he chauffeured his Algerian friend around, and gradually became aware that Louanchi needed other things, including safe accommodations and places to hold clandestine meetings. As a result, Francis' involvement increased. Later, Francis was asked if there was a "turning point" in his decision to aid the FLN. He replied that looking back, he could identify a few turning points, like going from "an intellectual position to… a practical position (receiving Algerians at our home), then when we moved to concrete actions [like transport]." But he explained that this was in retrospect—at that time, he had not felt any shift. "My problem was simply: 'How can I respond to this request?'"[89]

The Jeanson network spread outward from there. While working with the Louanchis, Francis asked Paule Bolo (a friend of his on the editorial readings committee at Éditions du Seuil) for a favor: picking up copies of *Résistance Algérienne* in Switzerland. She accepted, thereby drawing in her husband Étienne Bolo. But Paule and Étienne needed a car. So, they asked their best friend Hélène Cuénat if she could drive—and if they could stop on their way to deliver an important letter. This is how Cuénat's story of crossing the Alps (from the opening of the chapter) started. Cuénat said that at the time, she did not understand that this small detour "was going to project me away from my bases, putting me completely in orbit. [But] for the moment, it was just a letter in the pocket of a jacket."[90]

Within the year, the Egyptian communists-in-exile joined the network. Hazan had been running a startup paper company, when one of his clients approached him in 1957.

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[89] Francis Jeanson and Christiane Philip, *Entre-deux: conversations privées, 1974-1999* (Latresne: Bord de l'Eau, 2000), 66–67; Interview with Francis Jeanson, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 32–34.

[90] Hélène Cuénat, *La porte verte*, 21–23.

The client was Catholic activist and FTP veteran Jacques Dupont.[91] Dupont had started clandestinely printing abridged versions of *El Moudjahid* and press releases for the FF-FLN, and he convinced Hazan to help with the illegal enterprise. Around the same time, Paris Group member Joyce Blau met the veteran *résistant* and Catholic journalist Robert Barrat.[92] After hearing her story, Barrat introduced Blau and Curiel to Francis Jeanson. As a result of this contact, Jeanson would soon ask the Paris Group to start running deliveries. And in 1958, with Hazan's paper, Dupont's printing materials, and Jeanson's editing experience, the two groups begin producing the underground *Vérités pour*. As Henri Curiel's wife Rosette described it, "We were mad with joy… because we were useful again."[93]

From there, Fawzy-Rossano described the growth of the Curiel network. As she put it, Curiel was already a "professional revolutionary" when the Paris Group began working with the Jeanson network in late 1957, so Curiel was "like a fish in water" aiding the FLN. They were first entrusted with making FLN deliveries and duplicating tracts. Soon, the group was counting and transporting money, and making deposits into Swiss bank accounts. As Fawzy-Rossano remembered, they handled over 500 million Francs a month: she would dress in Dior, and if asked, claim the cash belonged to French, English, and Jewish families in Egypt, whose property had been sequestered as a result of the Suez Crisis. The Paris Group also smuggled fugitives across borders. Overall, Fawzy-

[91] Like Mandouze, Dupont had helped produce and distribute *Témoignage Chrétien* during World War II; he had left the PCF in 1948 because of the Tito-Stalin Split, and stayed estranged in part because of his marriage in 1952 to a Hungarian Jewish communist.

[92] Blau had been incarcerated in Egypt, and had come to know Barrat during his investigation into Egyptian political prisoners.

[93] René Gallissot, "DUPONT Jacques," in *Le Maitron: Le dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier français* (online), February 2014, at http://maitron-en-ligne.univ-paris1.fr/spip.php?article156934; Interviews with Joyce Blau and Didar Fawzy-Rossano, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 100–102, 156–157; Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry*, 160.

Rossano explained that the networks were thus "not just an Algerian–French affair": as she described, in addition to their band of Egyptian activists, they worked with activists from Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. "The phenomenon," she argued, "was no different from the 1930s, which had pushed European anti-fascists to defend Republican Spain."[94]

In spring 1960 while in prison awaiting trial for helping the FLN, English teacher Micheline Pouteau described her own progression (the trial would open a few months later in September 1960, and is covered in Chapter 7). As Pouteau explained, "I did not start with underground action." As she explained, it had started with "conversations with my colleagues (I am a teacher)," in which "we were, they and I, in agreement on a certain number of points. First of all, revolted by methods of war that were dishonorable and unbearable to our consciences." They then tried various forms of action: petitions, committees, and meetings, to start. But these were ineffective, and attracted police harassment and censorship. As a result, Pouteau turned to clandestine action. "I would have very much liked to use only legal means of struggle… [But] When citizens are deprived of their legal means of expression, or when these means are emptied of their practical efficacy, action is no longer possible except in the underground. …One does not save a man struggling in a torrential flood by praying the torrent leaves him in peace." So, she started folding FLN pamphlets and stuffing them in envelopes. This evolved to counting and transferring money being routed to the FLN, then hosting fugitives.[95]

[94] Didar Fawzy-Rossano, *Mémoires d'une militante communiste (1942–1990): du Caire à Alger, Paris et Genève, lettres aux miens* (Paris: Éditions l'Harmattan, 1997*)*, 119–120, 122–123, 128–129; Interview with Didar Fawzy-Rossano, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 100–102.

[95] Micheline Pouteau, "Nous qui sommes en prison," *Vérité Liberté* 2, June 1960, 1, 3.

Once committed to an organization, individuals could be entrusted with increasingly high-risk activities: money transfers, recruitment, fugitive transport, and smuggling. Jean-Marie Boeglin described this escalation of commitment with a biological metaphor: "You start with the little finger, and then comes the hand, and so on!"[96] Leadership tasks, internal enforcement and disciplinary actions, weapons handling, and violence (assaults, assassinations, and bombings) were among the last tasks entrusted to activists—most never reached this point. Instead, individuals with military backgrounds or special skills were generally assigned high-risk tasks, and only when willing. Roger Rey a CGT activist who had had fought in Germany and Indochina (earning a Legion of Honor before being expelled from the military in 1952 for his communist connections), was one of these men entrusted with weapons handling for the FLN support networks: "Certainly it's not harder to carry a suitcase of machine guns than one full of money. But that's how it was." Sylvain Laboureur, an editor by trade who joined the Curiel network, was less comfortable with the work. Laboureur had started folding and stapling FLN brochures in Paris in early 1959; this evolved to smuggling Algerian activists across borders, then storing and transporting weapons and plastic explosives. For this last task, he worked with an anonymous priest out in the *banlieues rouges*, and remembered being "extremely worried" about the explosives, which would ooze nitroglycerin.[97]

Other French activists similarly recounted experiences of escalating involvement, beginning with favors. Paul-Louis Thirard was pulled in to the Jeanson network by his

[96] Jean Scotto, *Curé pied-noir, évêque algérien* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1991), 119–122; Sybille Chapeu, *Des chretiens dans la guerre d'Algérie: l'action de la Mission de France* (Paris: Les Éditions de l'Atelier, 2004), 189; Interview with Jean-Marie Boeglin, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 78.

[97] Interviews with Roger Rey and Sylvain Laboureur, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 51, 137–138.

Jewish friend from *Positif*, Michèle Firk, after Firk asked to borrow his car—cars were valuable resources in the 1950s. This initial favor expanded to repeat conversations with network leader Francis Jeanson, and cross-border trips to Brussels. Thirard then started helping Kaminsky make forged documents, and helping Le Masson and Jacques Audoir smuggle suitcases of weapons.[98]

In this way, support for the FLN traveled through particular social networks (in Paris, Trotskyist, communist, and social Catholic circles), with French activists introduced to transgressive activism through family or friends. Close relationships provided the mutual trust, commitment, and obligation needed for crossing boundaries and undertaking high-risk activities. Catholic priest Robert Davezies, for instance, recruited his brother Jean and sister Geneviève to help him in his FLN support activities (for which the two were arrested); priest Alfred Bérenguer similarly used his sister and brother-in-law for illegal deliveries. In the FLN support networks, such examples of husband-wife, brother-sister, and other familial dyads abounded.[99] Egyptian Joyce Blau, a member of the Paris Group, was particularly transparent about the power of the favor between close friends: "I'm asked why I helped the Algerians in their struggle. To be totally frank, I reply 'Because Henri [Curiel] asked me to do it.'"[100]

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[98] Interviews with Paul-Louis Thirard in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 40–42, 156–157.

[99] These include husband-and-wife pairs Jacques and Aline Charby, Étienne and Paule Bolo, André and Annick Pailler-Castel**,** René and Jocelyne Chatain, Denise and Robert Barrat, and Anne Beaumanoir and Joseph Roger. There was also brothers Gerold and Jehan De Wangen, the Larribère family, Germaine Rousset and her son Jean-Jacques Rousset, Laurence Bataille and her cousin Diego Masson, and many more. Jean-Marie Boeglin also said he recruited friends. Interview with Jean-Marie Boeglin, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 78; Marc André, "Des algériennes à Lyon, 1947–1974, Vol. II" (PhD diss., Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2014), 380–388.

[100] Interviews with Paul-Louis Thirard and Joyce Blau in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 40–42, 156–157.

Because human relationships were diverse and contingent, the "logic of the favor" meant that given the right circumstances, even individuals with discordant beliefs and political positions could be convinced to aid the FLN. For instance, Adolfo Kaminsky recounted convincing a Jewish friend named Philippe to hide an FLN fugitive in his home. Philippe and his family had recently fled Algeria to escape the fighting, so Philippe was strongly outspoken in his hatred of the FLN. But Philippe owed Adolfo a great personal debt (most likely, Adolfo had helped provide the Jewish family with false papers). So, Adolfo approached Philippe about hosting the FLN operative.

The request enraged Philippe. As Kaminsky recalled vividly, "No sooner [had] I mentioned the word FLN than Philippe gets up out of his chair, red with fury, shouting at me, 'That's a lousy thing to ask of me because you know very well that I can't refuse.'" Adolfo reassured his friend that he could refuse, but Philippe grumbled, "After everything you've done for me? You saved my life. You saved my father, my mother and my sister. I can't say no!" So ultimately, Philippe agreed to host, "once, but not twice."[101]

It was a good example of how human relationships—trust, patterns of attachment, reciprocity and debts of gratitude—could override ideology, given the right circumstances. And indeed, after being pushed into a situation of proximity and (forced) trust with the Algerian fugitive he was hosting, Philippe changed his mind. Out of the blue one day, he asked Adolfo to come visit. The forger rushed to Philippe's home, thinking something had gone terribly wrong. To his surprise, however, Philippe offered to continue hosting fugitives. As Philippe explained, "Oh, Adolphe! Your Algerian, he was a very cultured man. Basically, what he's doing is resistance, as we were [during

[101] Sarah Kaminsky, *Adolfo Kaminsky*, 178–183.

World War II]. If you have any more like that, you can send them to me." Philippe had been won over. Interestingly, it was the Algerian's ability to communicate and behave according to French social graces ("he was a very cultured man") and similarity attraction that helped win the day. As Phillipe put it, "what he's doing is resistance, as we were."[102]

In the end, suitcase carriers frequently described their route to illegal activism as starting with a minor commitment: making a delivery or attending a meeting, for instance. And over time, the presence of encouraging peers, repetition, and escalatory investment could turn these small favors into larger commitments. In other words, "once a particular path gets established… self-reinforcing processes" produced routinization (or habituation).[103] Sociologist Matthew Kearney notes that this process could also be encouraged by a sense of "escalating moral obligation": a growing feeling of duty to one's peers who were also making sacrifices for the shared project.[104] And while in retrospect activists often remembered the initial move to action as a turning point or moment of rupture, at the time, it was "just a letter in the pocket of a jacket."

[102] Ibid.

[103] Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 51–52.

[104] Matthew Kearney, "Escalating Moral Obligation in the Wisconsin Uprising of 2011," *Social Forces* Vol. 96, no. 4 (June 2018): 1570–1572.

Crossing the Line: "Pain-in-the-Ass Militants," Rebels, and Risk-Takers

"I salute you, workers at the limits /
Ephemeral rebels [*frondeurs*[105]] hurling the idea
/… / I salute you, explorers of darkness / … /
Those condemned for life—to bring life / … /
I salute you, rebels forever / against decay, against submission."[106]

There was one final group that was overrepresented in FLN support networks: the 20-30 year olds. Charby described this group as diverse—and it was. There were young soldiers, recently returned from the war in Algeria and disgusted by what they had seen. Network recruiters worked to contact these men quickly, approaching French soldiers in the first week after they returned to France when the experience (and emotions) were still fresh.[107] Network activists also used mobilizing myths and emotional and behavioral modeling to bring these young men across the cognition-behavior gap—processes that will be explored more in Chapter 7.

What made "young" activists more willing to support the FLN than their elders? One answer points to French divisions of time and labor: as Anne Beaumanoir explained of her decision to join the French Resistance, "If you do not have strong convictions at sixteen years old, you are doomed to let yourself be carried along on a long tranquil river. *At this age*, not to be revolted, romantic, revolutionary, and one must say, ignorant, is the symptom of an emotional handicap. We ignore (or want to ignore) that successful revolutions secrete bureaucracy and terror—we hope, and we leap."[108]

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[105] Lit. "slingshotters," a historical term for rebel-protesters who participated in the Fronde (a series of 17th-century revolts in France). More generally speaking, the term denotes political dissidents and rebels—i.e., those with slingshots, or in a modern sense, throwers of rocks and bottles.

[106] Henri Kréa, "Le champ de manœuvres," in Denise Barrat, *Espoir et parole: poèmes algériens* (Paris: Seghers, 1963), 59–60.

[107] Général de Corps d'Armée de Pouilly, "Note d'information: Activités du 'réseau Jeanson' en Métropole," Ref. No. 24/RT/CAO/BDL/PH (Oran, 25 February 1961) in SHD GR 1H 1718/D2.

[108] Emphasis added. Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire*, 16–17.

Beaumanoir was not the only one to express this sentiment: many activists explained that their age or "youth" contributed to their decisions to become involved in activism. In fact, concepts of "adolescence" and "youth" were fairly new, invented in the late 19th century and popularized among the French middle classes in the 1940s and 1950s. Understood to be a liminal period between childhood and adulthood, the invention of concepts like *adolescence* and *jeunesse* was a reflection of rising affluence and a postwar boom in higher education. In postwar France, late adolescence thus became a period when youth asserted autonomy from parental influence, left the home to pursue work or educational opportunities in urban centers, and experimented with new behaviors and ideas.[109]

In short, by the 1950s, there was now a new division of time between childhood and child-rearing, marked by its own social patterns, behavioral expectations, and affective regimes—a period understood to be more "volatile" than that of childhood and adulthood. In this special period of liminality, French activists described themselves as experimenting and crossing borders (be they ideological, geographical, or communal). They also described having been on the move geographically, migrating to urban centers. After high school, for instance, Noël Favrelière moved to Paris to join the art community, Paul-Louis Thirard to work in theater and film, Diego Masson to join the Parisian music scene, Aline Charby to be an artist and writer, and Claude Vinci to sing (and study chemistry).[110]

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[109] Sarah Fishman, *From Vichy to the Sexual Revolution: Gender and Family Life in Postwar France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 85–93; Chapter 2 in Olivier Galland, *Sociologie de la jeunesse, 6e éd.* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2017); Chapters 6 and 10 in Peter N. Stearns, *Childhood in World History* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[110] Interview with Aline Charby, 13 November 1989, Paris, in Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 55–56.

Being "uninvested"—or less established in careers and families—youth had enough freedom (and as Beaumanoir put it, ignorance) to hope and leap. Charby explained it differently: because these activists were not yet heavily invested in the Communist Party, they were still willing to disobey. As a recruiter, he added that these were the easiest individuals to recruit to the networks, as they were "without party constraint, generous and open-handed, disgusted by the games of politicians, openly supportive of Algerian independence, available for support, and—why not say it—excited by the forbidden. I had… to draw their attention to the risks; they did not care... wrongly so."[111]

Interestingly, the end of Charby's comments echoed Martinet's profile. Did this mean there was truth to the idea that the suitcase carriers were "irresponsible" adventurers?[112] It is true that in addition to "youth," individuals who expressed preferences for rebellious behaviors, risky investments, and deviant lifestyles were prominent among individuals who joined the FLN support networks. These self-described risk-takers were a ragtag band of colorful characters who enjoyed testing the limits. Twice-married Anne Beaumanoir, for instance, had wanted to be a trapeze artist. She was characterized by her friend Mohammed Harbi as a woman unafraid of disobedience and insubordination, a passionate individual whose "vocation is that of a 'heretic.'" As she described, her hero since the age of fourteen or fifteen had been Tchen from Malraux's *La condition humaine*, a communist revolutionary-turned-suicide bomber.[113] Parachutist and artist

[111] Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 24.

[112] "Entre la maladie infantile et la sénilité précoce," *Vérités Pour* 10, 6 July 1959, 3–4.

[113] Notably, Malraux's *La condition humaine* was also a favorite of Zohra Drif and Samia Lakhdari. See: Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN* (Algiers: Éditions Chihab, 2013), 114, 154, 172; Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire: la Résistance, le communism, et l'Algérie, 1940–1976*, preface by Mohammed Harbi (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2009), 8, 11–14; "Anne Beaumanoir, La leçon d'une 'Juste,'" *Le Télégramme*, 30 January 2014, https://www.letelegramme .fr/cotes-darmor/dinan/anne-beaumanoir-la-lecon-d-une-juste-30-01-2014-10011817.php

Noël Favrelière described himself as an adrenaline-seeker: the type who would do the optional airplane jumps "for the pleasure of being afraid."[114] Diego Masson similarly explained that he had felt comfortable with the risks and dangers of the clandestine networks. "Certainly, there were dangers, but that pleased me. I've always loved doing forbidden things."[115]

Then there was fiery redhead Marceline Loridan, nicknamed "the tornado." A divorced Polish-Jewish actress, Loridan was an eternal provocatrice who took great pride in her social transgressions. A self-professed kleptomaniac, she had started out stealing soup in Bergen-Belsen; after the war, she continued practicing her "talent" in department stores. "Allergic to groups," Loridan dropped out of the PCF after six months, and left the Mouvement de Libération des Femmes (MLF) because, as she put it, she "loved men." She started hosting a Jeanson network-linked FLN support cell in her apartment in the Latin Quarter (and would go on to sign the "Manifesto of the 343 Sluts).[116] Jean-Marie Boeglin was just as unconventional. "There was that tendency of mine always to be mutinous—I'm something of an anarchist," Boeglin explained. "I've always been against no end of things: against society, against anything discreditable." He described himself as kindling waiting to ignite, but drenched by a "respectable left"[117] swimming in shit. By

[114] Noël Favrelière, *Le désert à l'aube* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2000 [First Ed. 1960]), 18–19.

[115] Monique Burke is another example that could be included in this list. See: Interview with Madeleine Baudoin, 7, 12 February and 14 March 1989, in Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 64–66; Interview with Diego Masson, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 143–144.

[116] The "Manifeste des 343" was a famous petition advocating the legalization of abortion. In signing the Manifeste, each of the 343 prominent French women who participated declared that they themselves had had an abortion. Isabelle Regnier, "Marceline la tornade," *Le Monde*, 25 July 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/shoah-les-derniers-temoins-racontent/article/2005/07/25/marceline-la-tornade_674520_641295.html

[117] "Gauche respectueuse," was a term with a double entendre: it meant respectful and respectable, but it was used as an allusion to Sartre's 1946 play (and 1952 film adaptation) "La putain respectueuse" [The Respectable Whore].

the 1950s, Boeglin already had a long record of provocations: these included blowing up a prison gate to free inmates, being expelled from both the Young Communists and the Anarchist Federation, and climbing to the top of a church spire to urinate on church attendees below.[118]

Paratrooper and filmmaker-turned-weapons-smuggler Yann Le Masson was unique in describing himself as a "pain-in-the-ass militant." In first adhering to communism, Le Masson rebelled against both his Jesuit teachers and his father (a far-right military man who had been active in the Parti Nationaliste Breton). As Le Masson remembered, his decision to embrace the teachings of Marx "drove my father crazy, may have even killed him. For him, it was as if the devil had taken hold of me." Le Masson continued this spirit of revolt when called up to serve in the Algerian war in 1955; instead of answering the military draft notice, he fled to Italy with his girlfriend. Still, he was not immune to social pressure (provided that pressure came from the right place). As a result, when his communist cell pressured him to reconsider, "in the end I let myself be convinced by them and left for Algeria," placed in a unit of paratroopers. After returning with a number of disciplinary incidents marring his record, Le Masson was recruited to traffic weapons for the FLN by another rebel-at-heart, Michèle Firk.[119]

These individuals who specialized in pushing the limits could be found in all walks of life. Priest Alfred Bérenguer, for instance, was a devout Catholic who specialized in questioning boundaries. (Although he aided the FLN, the nature of his involvement

[118] Interview with Aline Charby, 13 November 1989, and Interview with Jean-Marie Boeglin, 17 August 1989, Dinard, in Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 42–43, 55–56, 66–69; Interview with Jean-Marie Boeglin, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 77.

[119] Yann Le Masson interview with Paul Douglas Grant, Avignon, France, 13 April 2010, "Kharon at his oar: An Interview with Yann Le Masson," *La Furia Umana* 19, http://www.lafuriaumana.it/index.php/47-archive/lfu-19/136-paul-douglas-grant-kharon-at-his-oar-an-interview-with-yann-le-masson

remains cloaked in secrecy.) As the priest remembered, the bishops at his seminary in Oran had called him the *enfant terrible* because of his disciplinary issues (like smoking on the seminary grounds). Once ordained, he accumulated a record of conflicts with parishioners, local government officials, and fellow priests. Ultimately, he ended up specializing in his pursuit of freedom. "*Enfant terrible*, I consent to be it. I have been one, and I will stay one… because I've placed freedom above all." He even developed his own theology of freedom: "Christ has shown us the way to freedom. He has taught us to be free in regard to all prohibitions: do not touch a leper, do not speak to a Samaritan. He has freed us from all law."[120] Not afraid of conflict and challenging the norm, as Bérenguer described himself, "I'm not the one who always says amen, who lives on his knees."[121]

While rebels and non-conformists were certainly prominent in the French support networks, in many cases it is unclear whether these rebellious preferences *caused* individuals to join the support networks, or whether rebellious preferences were developed *as a result of* life in the support networks, then projected backward in time (a reading that seems likely, considering many activists described being introduced to risky behaviors through gradual escalation). Moreover, it would be a mistake to characterize all French suitcase carriers as radicals or "rebels-at-heart." Different clubs, networks, and leaders appealed to different interests and preferences. For example, Robert Bonnaud remembered that despite being similar in many ways, the Jeanson and Curiel networks appealed to different types. Francis Jeanson was known for whiskey, cigars, and women. He reached out to the *insoumis* (insubordinates, military deserters), and created Jeune

[120] Ibid., 62–65, 70–71, 93–96, 102–104.
[121] Alfred Bérenguer, *En toute liberté*, 39–40, 47, 57–59.

Résistance to encourage desertion and help the FLN. Curiel, on the other hand, had a more elite affect, with a refined and distinguished personal manner. His lifestyle tended toward the "puritanical" and serious. As a result, Curiel's network attracted more intellectuals and activists from the South of France.[122] Whether the suitcase carriers were truly "born rebels" is thus unclear. The most likely conclusion, however, is that even if the networks attracted a slightly larger proportion of risk-takers than other clubs, rebelliousness as a personal preference was insufficient on its own for explaining support for the Algerian cause.

Conclusion: The Anatomy of a Suitcase Carrier (and the Shape of His Skull)

Weighing in on the illegal activities of Hélène Cuénat, Francis Jeanson, Didar Fawzy-Rossano, and other suitcase carriers, French journalists described their decisions as the result of personality flaw, mental unbalance, and certain criminal "types."[123] With his characteristic wry humor, Maschino mocked these attempts at profiles and typologies: "If nobody… has sketched yet a morphology of the deserter—nor claimed that the shape of his skull, his nose ("Ah, these Jews"), blood type, or size predisposes him to this type of behavior, many on the other hand have tried [to sketch] his psychology." According to these profiles, the "deserter-type," Maschino wrote, was "made on the left," a "youth," selfish, unbalanced, and impulsive. He was emotionally troubled, not to mention "criminal"—but mainly, he "does not perform his act cool-headedly. He does not

[122] Robert Bonnaud interview with Hartmut Elsenhans, June 1970, in Hartmut Elsenhans, *Les carnets de Hartmut Elsenhans*, 48–50.

[123] See for instance: Francis Jeanson, "Lettre de Francis Jeanson à J.M Domenach en réponse de son article paru dans la Revue *Esprit*," *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 19–22; Francis Jeanson, "Lettre de Francis Jeanson à Claude Bourdet en réponse de son article 'Pourquoi aident-ils le FLN?' paru dans *France-Observateur*," *Vérités Pour* 15, 13 June 1960, 4; "Entre la maladie infantile et la sénilité précoce," *Vérités Pour* 10, 6 July 1959, 2–3.

reflect… he decides in a panic, without weighing the premises [upon which he builds his action] or consequences of his action."[124]

Echoing these debates (and the conversation between Dr. Wilāyah and Muṣṭafā Jābir in the introduction), historian Robert Gildea asked similar questions of the small minority of French men and women who became resistors in World War II. "Were they oddballs and eccentrics or idealists who had undergone a political apprenticeship and were moved by principles? Were they in some way conditioned by their families and background, or did contingency and chance play a part?"[125] As I would argue, the answer to all of these questions was often "yes"—and more. If there were suitcase carrier "types" (like the overrepresentation of rebels), statistical patterns were not determinative: even "well-behaved," risk-averse, and ideologically antagonistic individuals (like Adolfo Kaminsky's pied-noir friend Philippe) could be swayed by historical conjuncture and social pressure.

There were also social processes at work, as evidenced by the distinct demographic categories overrepresented in the suitcase carrier movement. One of these demographic categories were individuals living and working in the borderlands. Thus, if "to cross into the [Algerian] Resistance was to cross a line…. by transgressing the established order,"[126] *frontaliers* who worked near those line were the ones who most frequently crossed them. Individuals uprooted through diaspora and socially marginalized in their new exilic homes were particularly prominent among the border-walkers. Thus, like the Baltic communists who joined the International Brigades and the Eastern European Jews who

[124] Maurice Maschino, *L'engagement: le dossier des réfractaires* (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), 33–35.
[125] Robert Gildea, *Fighters in the Shadows*, 15.
[126] Hélène Cuénat, *La porte verte*, 16.

fought in the French Resistance, one found among suitcase carriers many Jews of French, Egyptian, Algerian, Russian, and Eastern European origin.[127] European wars of the first half of the 20th century thus proved centrifugal: even as governments worked to homogenize populations and reinforce communal boundaries, they generated boundary-crossing by individuals excluded from the community. Fascist projects of racial purification and national greatness thus struck a blow to both social hierarchies based on race and colonial empires.

Since there were many different communities and institutions in France and French Algeria, however, one could arrive at the social periphery through many routes. In the 1950s, a Frenchman could be marginalized as a result of social awkwardness, ethnicity, ideology, or simply for having made life choices contrary to group norms (such as interracial relationships, factory work for priests, etc.). Individuals could reach the margins through institutional developments, as had occurred in the PCF and Mission de France in the 1940s and 1950s. As Helen Graham noted of International Brigade members, there were thus many "forms of cultural and existential displacement and 'exile.'"[128] And as activists discovered, being in the margins could make social transgressions less costly. Describing why she had disobeyed the PCF, for instance, Anne Beaumanoir frankly explained "I was not high enough for the fall to hurt me."[129]

Finally, specialists with a "competitive advantage in transgression" were prominent among the suitcase carriers. In France in the 1950s, these veteran *résistants* were usually

[127] See for instance Henri Curiel, Didar Fawzy-Rossano, Gaby Jimenez, Lucie Coscas, Alice Cherki, Gérard Spitzer, Michèle Firk, Daniel Timsit, Georges Arbib, Myrian Ben-Haïm Adolfo Kaminsky, France Binard, André Castel, Jacqueline Netter-Gerroudj, Diego Masson, Janine Cahen.
[128] Helen Graham, *The War and Its Shadow*, 76.
[129] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire*, 72.

men and women who had fought in the Spanish Civil War and the French Resistance. In a study of individual and organizational decision-making, behavioral scientist Paul Pierson explains why this might have been the case. As he argues, as behaviors become routine, there is a tendency for individuals and organizations to become more set in their ways; as a result, decision-making tends to be more "open" and unpredictable (or hypercontingent) early on, growing more "closed" (or as Gottlieb puts it, "canalized") as time goes on and thought processes become entrenched.[130]

To a certain extent, this pattern was reflected in the decisions of Egyptian and French activists. Francis Jeanson, for instance, noted how difficult it was to convince French youth to spurn the status quo and abscond from military service. Social structures, norms, and habits had a powerful gravitational pull. As he wrote, "Everybody knows that we end up no longer seeing, for lack of sufficient distance, the situation in which we find ourselves immersed. Our daily activity, that which shapes us and makes us who we are, most of the time demands we remain at the level of spontaneous attitude, that we 'stick' to our actions…. this gesture calls for another, the great mechanism absorbs us, and here we are trapped in a Duty that we no longer know where it leads…. then we speak of our role, our 'mission,' our responsibilities, and our sacrifices..."[131]

But while scripts, roles, and duties constituted a powerful "collective unconsciousness," they were never fully deterministic. Individuals could and did change habits and abandon investments—especially when new conditions (or even a simple

[130] Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 51–52; Gilbert Gottlieb, *Synthesizing Nature-Nurture,* 57–59.
[131] Francis Jeanson, "Cette Algérie, conquise et pacifiée..." *Esprit* 166, no. 4 (April 1950): 617.

favor) disrupted the feedback loops and "mechanisms of reproduction" that guided habitual behavior.[132]

In the end, individual decision-making ecologies were thus complex. Personal, social, and environmental factors proved coactive and reciprocally determinative: a preference for risk could contribute to border-crossing, or border-crossing could habituate individuals to risk and create a preference that activists "remembered" and projected backward. There were, admittedly, certain traits overrepresented in the FLN support networks. But despite these demographic trends, only a handful of French activists with these traits sympathized with Algerian revolutionaries, and even fewer crossed from sympathy to action.[133] In other words, being of a certain demographic type (or having an individual economy favorable to anti-colonial activism) was not enough to make someone a suitcase carrier. It took a great amount of conjuncture, as well as a great deal of work by activists themselves in the field of behavioral modeling and mythmaking (see Chapter 8), to move individuals from sympathy to action.

Specific traits were thus not deterministic—instead, there was a great deal of indeterminacy and conjuncture in decision-making. No single factor was sufficient to explain a human choice, and each choice was made in a complex decision-making ecology unique to the individual. As a result, the FLN support networks were a diverse amalgamation of priests and die-hard atheists, communists and Gaullists, soldiers and artists, workers and aristocrats. And to answer the question of whether French and Egyptian border crossings were acts of passion or premeditation, impulse or reason,

[132] Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time*, 51–52; Gilbert Gottlieb, *Synthesizing Nature-nurture,* 57–59.
[133] Laurent Schwartz interview with Hartmut Elsenhans, 8 June 1970, in Hartmut Elsenhans, *Les carnets de Hartmut Elsenhans*, 63–71.

socialization or individuation, history or psychology, the answer was all of these factors—working at odds and in concert.

Part II: Morality Tales and Moral Emotions

Chapter 5

"Shaykh in a Dance Club!" and Other Shocking Tales from the Egyptian Moral Imaginary

In summer 1946, Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī wrote to the Egyptian journal *Majallat al-Risālah* with a story to share. Recently, Ṭanṭāwī had gone the mosque to pray; but upon entering, he was surprised to find a young man—a well-known sinner—praying fervently. Once respectable, the young man had wandered astray after becoming infatuated with a cabaret dancer. Thinking it was love "like he'd read about in novels," the young man pursued the woman, but the dancer took advantage of his foolishness and bled him dry. The young man was thus left to "himself, the dancer, and the Devil—and then to sickness, poverty, and hell." What had caused the repentance of this sinner? Ṭanṭāwī was curious and asked the young man, and this was the story he told:

> One day, a local shaykh named Ṣalaḥ al-Dīn saw that only the elderly were attending mosque. Concerned, the shaykh asked his followers "Where are the youth?" and they replied "The youth are in cinemas, casinos, and dance clubs." The shaykh was distraught; but he insisted on changing the situation. So the shaykh did the unthinkable: he approached the owner of a local dance club, and asked to speak at intermission.
>
> The club owner thought the shaykh was insane—he must have escaped from a mental hospital! But the shaykh offered good money to rent the theater for a short time. Plus, the owner reasoned, a shaykh preaching at a dance club would make a big story for the nightclub. So, the theater owner began advertising about a special "surprise."
>
> The night the shaykh was scheduled to preach, people came from far and wide, wondering what new dance or tantalizing performance they would see. And indeed, the first act was a dancer so good, men would have given up their honor for her. But when the curtain rose the second time, the dancer had disappeared, and there stood the shaykh with his beard and robes.
>
> There was utter silence. Then, the audience became angry. They whistled, mocked, and cursed the shaykh; they offered him wine, and asked him to take off his clothes and show them his "talent." But eventually the audience grew tired of shouting and started listening. So the shaykh started to preach. He preached in a way that moved hearts: he described how their love for the dancer

> was a low love, and preached a higher love. He explained how illicit sexual desire was fleeting and unfulfilling, and called them back to love for their wives. He also reproached them for lusting after the dancer. "Don't you have sisters? Don't you have daughters?" the shaykh asked, and beseeched the crowd to consider how they would feel if one of their daughters were forced into such work.
>
> At those words, the club patrons shed tears of mercy for the dancer, and "had compassion for her, and resolved to look at her as one looks at one's daughter, seeking to protect [*yastur-ha*, lit: cover her] and shelter her." So they rescued the dancer from "this mud," she married a pious man, "and now she is a housewife and mother of children." Even the club owner has started visiting the shaykh and might soon close his club and find honorable work!

Thus Ṭanṭāwī ended his morality tale with this wish: "If only a shaykh would enter every dance club! If only a shaykh would enter the Ministry of Education!"[1]

Previously, Chapter 2 ("Allahu Akhbar, Long Live the Workers!"), followed the lives of Egyptians who joined anti-colonial clubs in the 1930s and 1940s, exploring how societies like the Muslim Brotherhood and Workers' Vanguard competed to recruit and retain members. Subsequent chapters in Part I further traced how individual preferences, social factors, and historical circumstances shaped Algerian and French affiliation decisions. Having thus considered the stories activists told about affiliation, this section shifts to a related practice: the stories activists told about morality.

So how did activists communicate ideas about morality, and embed these ideas into narratives? What types of morality tales did activists tell, and how did activists use stories to try and convince others to change their beliefs and behaviors? As Phil Hopkins has warned, one challenge in answering these questions is that "moralistic narratives need not, and usually will not explicitly refer to 'morality' or 'ethics' in terms we would

[1] Abridged version. ʿAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī, "Shaykh fī marqaṣ!" [part 1], *Majallat al-Risālah* 673, 27 May 1946, 574–575; ʿAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī, "Shaykh fī marqaṣ!" [part 2], *Majallat al-Risālah* 674, 3 June 1946, 599–601.

readily recognize as such."[2] Instead, moral signaling takes many different forms, with value judgements and moral messages being communicated through strategies ranging from naturalistic metaphors[3] to gestures and signals (like crossing one's arms, shaking the head, or tilting back the head and lifting the eyebrows).[4]

As this chapter will outline, a close reading of Egyptian morality tales (c. 1945-1952) suggests there were four fundamental communication strategies that undergird morality tales like "Shaykh in a Dance Club," which storytellers used regardless of whether they hailed from the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt, or the Workers' Vanguard. First, activists used *normative discourses* in storytelling— valuative language which often explained abstract concepts by metaphorically linking them to material experiences and physiological responses. Second, activists used *affective cues* to communicate ideas about the social environment, sending emotional signals (like anger, shock, shame, and disgust) that provided cues for thought and action. Third, activists built *moral maps* into their stories, which sketched a vision of the social order and helped transmit ideas about social roles, hierarchies, and divisions of space. And fourth, activists embedded *action scripts* in their morality tales, which served as guides for thought and behavior.

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[2] Phil Hopkins, *Mass Moralizing: Marketing and Moral Storytelling* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 11–16.

[3] Ahmed Abdul-Raheem, "Moral Metaphor and Gender in Arab Visual Culture: Debunking Western Myths," *Social Semiotics* (2019), DOI: 10.1080/10350330.2019.1604991; Fawwaz Al-Abed Al-Haq and Ahmad KhairAllah Al Sharif, "A Comparative Study of Some Metaphorical Conceptualizations of Happiness and Anger in English and Arabic" (Master's Thesis, Yarmouk University, 2007); Shahrzad Pirzad Mashak et al., "A Comparative Study on Basic Emotion Conceptual Metaphors in English and Persian Literary Texts," *International Education Studies* 5, no. 1 (February 2012): 200–2017; Fabienne Baider and Georgeta Cislaru, eds., *Cartographie des émotions* (Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2013); Ad Foolen, "The Expressive Function of Language: Towards a Cognitive Semantic Approach," in *The Language of Emotions*, eds. Susanne Niemeier and René Dirven (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1997), 15–32.

[4] Marie Virolle, *Gestes d'Algérie* (Paris: Karthala, 2007); Geneviève Calbris, "Geste et parole," *Langue français* 68 (1985): 66–84; Robert A. Barakat, "Arabic Gestures," *Folklore* 6, no. 4 (Spring 1973): 749–793.

With these four strategies in their narrative toolkit, Egyptian activists told stories as part of the competition for social influence in the leadup to the 1952 Revolution. These tales (including stories like "Wings of Wax" and "Shaykh in a Dance Club") outlined very different visions of the ideal social order. But by juxtaposing communist stories with morality tales from the Muslim Brotherhood and Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad, the chapter underscores an important point. While activists made disparate claims, they used surprisingly similar techniques to mobilize audiences and make arguments for change.

The Language of Virtue and Vice: Normative Discourses in 1940s Egypt

> "The dawn approaches /
> We are the light that drives out the darkness."[5]
> — Arab communist poet Waṣfī al-Bunnī, 1945

Concomitant with the growth of Egyptian print journalism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Egyptians began using the new communication medium and public space to debate virtue and vice. Various historians have examined the shape of these debates: there were conversations about sartorial habits[6] and economic behaviors,[7] as well as debates over the morality of different leisure activities (alcohol and drug use, films and magazines, music and dance shows, erotic novels and prostitution).[8] There were also

[5] Waṣfī al-Bunnī, "Ṣidq al-shiʿr," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 3, 16 June 1945, 14 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97.

[6] Beth Baron, *Egypt as Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805–1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and the Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[7] Mona L. Russell, *Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education, and National Identity, 1863–1922* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); Nancy Y. Reynolds, *A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, The Cairo Fire, and the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 2012.

[8] Liat Kozma, "White Drugs in Interwar Egypt: Decadent Pleasures, Emaciated Fellahin, and the Campaign against Drugs," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 33, no. 1 (2013): 89–101; Khaled Fahmy, "Prostitution in Egypt in the Nineteenth Century," in *Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*, ed. Eugene Rogan (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 77–103. ʿImād Hilāl, *al-*

ongoing moral debates related to the prevention of social cheating (adultery, corruption, crime), and arguments about the proper roles and comportments for specific groups: negotiations over gender roles;[9] debates about the place of minorities; discussions concerning the behavior of politicians, merchants, and religious leaders; arguments about the unique moral failings of the rich and the poor; and discussions about the behaviors of urban versus rural denizens.[10] Thus, already in the 1940s, these issues had been active sites of social debate in Egypt for three decades or more.

The growth of political clubs after World War II, however, highlighted the extent to which Egyptians waged these debates with the help of a shared language of virtue and vice—vocabularies that Egyptians used to deem things beneficial or harmful, valuable or worthless, desirable or undesirable. A glimpse at this language of morality (and immorality) in 1940s publications sheds light on the shape of these debates, as well as the Egyptian Arabophone moral imaginary of the time. Terms frequently appearing in moral debates included words like *akhlāq* (pl., morals, morality; from a triliteral root meaning to be "created, shaped, molded, fit, or suitable") and *ṣāliḥ* (pious, righteous; from the root "to be good, in order; to be useful, fitted, suitable"). Other vocabularies of virtue included

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Baghāyā fī Miṣr: dirāsah tārīkhīyyah ijtimāʿīyyah, 1834–1949 (Cairo: al-ʿArabī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2001); Shaun T. Lopez, "The Dangers of Dancing: The Media and Morality in 1930s Egypt," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 24, no. 1 (2004): 97–105; Viola Shafik, "Prostitute for a Good Reason: Stars and Morality in Egypt," *Women's Studies International Forum* 24, no. 6 (2001): 711–725.

[9] Lisa Pollard, "From Husbands and Housewives to Suckers and Whores: Marital-Political Anxieties in the 'House of Egypt', 1919–48," *Gender and History* 21, no. 3 (November 2009): 647–669; Hanan Kholoussy, *For Better, for Worse: The Marriage Crisis that Made Modern Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

[10] Indira Falk Gesink, *Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution of Modern Sunni Islam* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014); B.L. Carter, *The Copts in Egyptian Politics, 1918–1952* (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1988); Eve M. Troutt-Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Iman Farag, "Private Lives, Public Affairs: The Uses of Adab," in *Muslim Traditions and Modern Techniques of Power*, ed. Armando Salvatore (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001), 93–120.

terms of restraint like *ʿiffah* (upright, pure; from the root "to abstain or refrain"), and terms of purity like *ṭāhir* (clean, pure, virtuous) and *ikhlāṣ* (purity, fidelity; from the root "to be unmixed"). Finally, Egyptians used terms of increase and elevation to express moral uprightness: words like *faḍīl* (good, virtuous; from the root "to be in surplus, overflow"), *zakiy* (pure, blameless; from the root "to grow or increase, to be fit or suitable"), and *sharīf* (honorable; from the root "to be well-bred, noble, raised or exalted").

One of the most frequently used words for morality, *ādāb*, was polysemous. In its plural form (*ādāb*), the term meant "morals" or "morality." However, in its singular form (*adab*), the term denoted etiquette, decorum, and good manners. This singular form also denoted a mode of Arabic literature that combined literary style with the promotion of cultural values. As a genre of Arabic literature, *adab* frequently quoted religious traditions and proverbs; but material in the genre did not have to invoke religious scripture or Islamic theology. The term *adab* (pl. *ādāb*) was thus important, because it reflected the fact that in the Arab moral imagination, language and morality were linked: as an Arabic proverb explained, "he who knows the language finds his morals refined."[11] The Egyptian cultural and literary journal *Majallat al-Risālah* (*al-Risālah*) described the link between morality and language in the following terms: a man upright in morality (*ādāb*) was a man who was filling himself with the correct literature (*adab*).[12]

[11] Iman Farag, "Private Lives, Public Affairs: The Uses of Adab," in *Muslim Traditions and Modern Techniques of Power*, ed. Armando Salvatore (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001), 93–120.

[12] See for instance Zakī Mubārak, "al-Ḥadīth dhū shujūn," *Majallat al-Risālah* 465, 1 June 1942, 578; ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Maghrabī, "al-Taṭawwur al-ijtimāʿī baʿda al-ḥarb," *Majallat al-Risālah* 617, 30 April 1945, 443–445; Sayyid Quṭb, "al-Lughah al-ʿArabīyyah fī al-ʿālam al-islāmī," *Majallat al-Risālah* 965, 31 December 1951, 1469–1470.

Notably, most of these concepts of virtue were in fact moral metaphors: man was a container who needed to be filled with *adab*; an upright life was like language (everything in its proper place); virtue was a direction on a path (up, ahead); virtue was like cleanliness. While there has been little exploration of how these moral metaphors operated in Arabophone contexts, a few scholars have noted similar uses of metaphor in Islamic *ḥadīth* collections and Arabic emotional idioms,[13] and have sought to explain these patterns by drawing on Conceptual Metaphor Theory (as grounded in the work of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Zoltán Kövecses). According to this hypothesis, humans take "clearly delineated and concrete experiences" (like the experience of being sick), and through ontological metaphor use concrete experience to conceptualize "highly abstract and elaborate concepts" (like emotional experiences or normative concepts of right and wrong).[14] Paul Ricœur similarly describes how metaphor both "depicts the abstract in concrete terms,"[15] and serves a "picturing function," allowing men to "set before the eyes" the thing described.[16] The Arabic terms for metaphor—*majāz* [metaphor; lit. "a passage, corridor"] and *istiʾārah* [metaphor; lit. "a borrowing"]—further allude to the idea that metaphors make ideas more accessible, and borrow meaning by transferring ideas from a source domain to a target domain.[17]

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[13] Fawwaz Al-Abed Al-Haq and Ahmad Khair Allah Al Sharif, "A Comparative Study of Some Metaphorical Conceptualizations of Happiness and Anger in English and Arabic" (Master's Thesis, Yarmouk University, 2007); Ahmad El-Sharif, "The Muslim Prophetic Tradition: Spatial Source Domains for Metaphorical Expressions," in *Religion Language and the Human Mind*, eds. Paul Chilton and Monika Kopytowska (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 263–293.

[14] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 105; Zoltán Kövecses, *Emotion Concepts* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990).

[15] Paul Ricœur, *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Czerny et al. (London: Routledge: 2004), 38.

[16] Here, Ricœur quotes Aristotle. Paul Ricœur, "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling," *Critical Inquiry* 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1978): 144.

[17] Ahmad Elsharif, "The Muslim Prophetic Tradition: Spatial Source Domains for Metaphorical Expressions," in *Religion, Language, and the Human Mind*, eds. Paul Chilton and Monika Kopytowska (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 265.

In Egyptian moral debates of the 1940s, this use of concrete metaphors to illustrate normative concepts was strongly visible in both vocabularies of virtue and vice. Figure 5.1, for instance, outlines Arabic words used in *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, *al-Risālah*, *Ākhir Sāʿah*, and *al-Daʿwah* to make negative moral valuations in the 1940s. The depraved man, for instance, was described as *munḥarif* (having veered off a path), and the corrupt politician described as *fāsid* (decayed and rotten). In fact, Arabic terms of negative moral valuation could be broadly grouped into five categories: "Cluster I: Terms of Contamination and Decay," "Cluster II: Terms of Deviation, Excess, and Breaking," "Cluster III: Terms of Exposure," "Cluster IV: Terms of Lowness and Decrease," and "Cluster V: Terms of Aversion." Such clusters were not hard-and-fast categories: some terms, like *mukhill* [shameful], expressed many concepts at once, and could be placed in multiple categories. Clusters also overlapped: for instance, terms of contamination often invoked aversion as well.

Despite this overlap, placing these terms in conceptual clusters highlights an important pattern: normative expressions in Egypt in the 1940s often related back to a few foundational metaphors. For one, concepts of virtue and vice were concretely conceptualized in terms of disease prevention: objects and behaviors considered safe and clean (*ṭāhir*) and things considered contaminative, dirty, and dangerous (as reflected in the use of words like *qadhir, danas, rajis*, and other Cluster I terms). Immoral behaviors were further understood to be things which incurred harm, and which broke, burst out of, transgressed, or strayed from their "container" or "place" (as conveyed through Cluster II terms like *fājir, fāsiq, mukhill* and *munḥarif*). In other words, the immoral person was

Figure 5.1 - The Arabophone Moral Imaginary: Terms of Negative Valuation*

Cluster I – Terms of Contamination and Decay			
Arabic	*Transliteration*	*Definition*	*Root*
فاسد	*fāsid (n. fasād)*	bad, rotten, corrupt, immoral	"to decay or rot"
قبيح	*qabīḥ*	disgusting, repugnant, ugly, shameful, foul	"I. to be repulsive, disgusting, shameful; (II) to disfigure"
قذر	*qadhir*	dirty, filthy	"to become dirty, unclean"
دنس	*danis*	unclean, dirty, soiled, polluted	"to be soiled, defiled, dirty"
مريض	*marīḍ*	sick, ill	"to be ill"
رجس	*rajis (n. rijs)*	filthy, dirty	"to be dirty; to commit a shameful act"
خبيث	*khabīth*	evil, wicked, harmful, malignant, nauseating disgusting	"to be wicked" (related to *khabath*: slag/waste from metal refining, refuse)
Cluster II – Terms of Deviation, Excess, and Breaking (Going Beyond the Limits)			
فاجر	*fājir (n. fujūr)*	licentious, obscene, shameless	"to break apart or burst out"
انحلال	*--- (n. inḥilāl)*	dissolution, decay	"to decompose or break apart"
فاسق	*fāsiq (n. fisq)*	sinful, godless, immoral	"to stray or deviate"
فاحش	*fāḥish*	disgusting, immoderate, dirty, obscene	"to be monstrous, excessive, exorbitant"
مضل/مضلل	*muḍil/muḍallil*	deceptive, misleading	"to stray, lose one's way, go astray"
منحرف	*munḥarif (n. inḥirāf)*	depraved, perverted, deviant	"to veer off or depart from [a path or line]"
مخل	*mukhill (n. ikhlāl)*	disgraceful, shameful, immoral	"(IV) to pierce [a veil], transgress, or violate"
Cluster III – Terms of Exposure			
اباحة	*ibāḥī*	licentious, over-permissive	"to reveal, become known, open"
فاضح	*fāḍiḥ (n. faḍīḥah)*	shameful, disgraceful, scandalous	"to expose faults"
خليع	*khalīʿ*	morally depraved, dissolute	"to take off [i.e., a hat, clothes], remove, throw off"
متهتك	*mutahattik*	insolent, shameless, dishonorable	"to expose, tear off, dishonor, rape"
Cluster IV – Terms of Lowness and Decrease			
خسيس	*khasīs*	despicable, vile	"to become less, diminish"
سافل	*sāfil*	low, base, despicable	"to be low, base"
نذل	*nadhil*	low, vile, debased	"to be low, base, depraved"
Cluster V – Terms of Aversion			
مكروه/كاره	*makrūh/karīh*	hated, odious, repulsive	"to hate, to be disgusted"
مقرف	*muqrif*	disgusting, loathsome, repulsive, nauseating	"to peel back [a rind, bark, skin, crust, scab], to feel disgusted"
مخجل	*mukhjil (n. khajal)*	shameful, shocking, disgraceful	"to be ashamed, embarrassed"
مخزي	*mukhzī*	shameful, disgraceful, vile	"to be vile, base, despicable"
شنيع	*shanīʿ*	atrocious, hideous, heinous	"to be hideously ugly, repugnant"

* Unless otherwise noted, all terms listed are in adjective (*ṣifah)* form. Terms commonly used as nouns are included in parentheses.

someone who wandered from an established path, transgressed a role or boundary, or posed a contamination threat (be that threat physical, ideological, or behavioral).[18] As this chapter (and the next few chapters) will explore, in addition to helping "set before the eyes" abstract concepts, these moral and emotional metaphors served another important function. Activists used metaphors to filter information (highlight similarities and suppress non-consonant details), communicate emotional cues (infusing "the feelings attached to the symbolizing situation into the heart of the situation that is symbolized"),[19] and shape physical experiences and worldviews.[20] Activists also used moral and emotional metaphors to encourage action. By using a term like "dirty," for instance, activists could advocate transferring certain roles and action scripts from the source domain to the target domain (arguing that a "dirty" society must be "cleaned"). Metaphors were thus an important strategy that activists used to build social movements and encourage action.

One final metaphor must be mentioned, based on the list of terms activists used to describe virtue and vice. The Egyptian moral field of the 1940s indicated a moral universe built around role socialization and divisions of labor—concretely conceptualized as being "in place," "molded," or "fit for" certain tasks and roles. That unusual Arabic term *adab/ādāb* particularly illustrated how morality (and language) were seen as role

[18] For non-Arabophone examples of this, see T.O. Beidelman, *Moral Imagination in Kaguru Modes of Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Pres, 1986).

For a sociological explanation, see: William E. Thompson and Jennifer C. Gibbs, eds. *Deviance and Deviants: A Sociological Approach* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2017); Clifton D. Bryant ed., *Deviant Behavior: Readings in the Sociology of Norm Violation* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1990).

[19] Paul Ricœur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, 101, 224.

[20] These debates have a long history; thinkers like Wilhelm von Humboldt, for instance, hypothesized that language influenced worldview, and that this process was reciprocally determinative, or "a two-way process in which language penetrates man and man penetrates language." See: James W. Underhill, *Humboldt, Worldview and Language* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 99.

and place-dependent. As Arab moral philosophers explained, language and morality were linked because *being able to order and understand the proper place of words* embodied an understanding of *the proper place of humans* in society, and the proper times and places for different behaviors.[21] In an 1883 text used as an Egyptian school manual, for instance, Muḥammad ʿUmar al-Bājūrī [al-Bagouri], argued that each room of the house had its own *adab*, with living space divided and assigned different functions and behaviors. (For instance, a well-mannered man would never eat in the bathroom!) Similarly, a landmark morality manual by Sayyid Muḥammad (which activist Sayyid Quṭb counted among his cherished possessions) included rules for proper conduct according to one's social status and role. The manual distinguished, for example, between the morals and manners of children, students, men, and women. An oft-cited Muḥammad Masʿūd text from 1913 similarly delineated an *adab* for different situations, such as walking, sleeping, and eating.[22] Such descriptions of morality were common, reflecting that Egyptian moral socialization involved an understanding that different roles, spaces, and situations called for distinct comportments.

A review of 1940s-era Egyptian magazines and activist newspapers suggests that these moral vocabularies and conceptual metaphors were broadly shared by Muslims and Christians, communists and Islamists alike, albeit with differences in emphasis. Cluster I terms of contamination proved popular among all activists—including communists, the Muslim Brotherhood, Miṣr al-Fatāh, and Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad. There were

[21] For a brief explanation about the tradition of *adab* in Arab literature, see: Juan Eduardo Campo, "Adab," in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 11–12. Also see: Hoda Yousef, *Composing Egypt: Reading, Writing, and the Emergence of a Modern Nation, 1870–1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 60; Richard Jacquemond, *Conscience of the Nation: Writers, State, and Society in Modern Egypt,* trans. David Tresilian (Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 2008) [covering the period from the 1952 coup forward].

[22] Iman Farag, "Private Lives, Public Affairs," 93–120.

quantitative differences, however. Social conservatives (like Muslim Brotherhood and Miṣr al-Fatāh members) used moralistic terms far more frequently than did the communists. Conservative clubs also tended to express normative judgments using a broader vocabulary, making abundant use of terms from Clusters I–V. Egyptian communists, on the other hand, tended to favor terms of breaking (Cluster II) and high/low terms (Cluster IV). Studying communist tracts also revealed two other valuative lexicons at work, which a review of Arabic moral vocabulary missed: communists often shunned vocabulary like "depraved" [munḥarif] and "licentious" [fājir] (terms whose naturalistic metaphors were grounded in their Arabic triliteral roots), and more frequently expressed normative judgments using terms of flaw (e.g., ignorant, deaf, blind, ill) and naturalistic terms (e.g., light, darkness, dawn, night, growing, withering, living, dying). Thus, one could add to the Arabic moral lexicon a "Cluster VI: Terms of Flaw" and a "Cluster VII: Naturalistic Terms."

The morality tale "Shaykh in a Dance Club" was a good example of how activists maneuvered this language of virtue and vice to make claims. Most common in the story were Cluster I terms of contamination and decay (like evil/*khabīth*, dirt/*rijs*, filth/*danas*, mud/*ḥamʾah*, repulsive/*qabīḥ*, and poison/samm)—terms the narrator used to describe everything from the behavior of the club patrons to the dancer and the club space itself. Meanwhile, the story used terms of purity and cleanliness to describe good behaviors (such as clean/*ṭāhir*/*ṭāhūr*, sincerity/*ikhlāṣ*, and purest/*anqá*).

The story further described bad behaviors using Cluster II terms of deviation and breaking. For instance, the story discussed straying/*ḍalāl*, immorality/*fujūr*, sin/*ithm*, and error/*khaṭīʾah*, and described behaviors as licentious/*fājirah* and sinful/*fāsiq*. Other

clusters appeared in the story as well. There were many terms of lowness and decrease (abyss/*hāwīyyah*, lower/*suflī*, more shameful/*akhzá*, we despised/*naḥquru*). Their antipodes—terms of highness and enlargement—also appeared: words like honorable/*sharīf*, lofty/*ʿalawī*, higher/*aʿlá*, ascend/*tartafiʿu*, and made great/*ʿaẓumat*. Expressions of aversion were deployed (they hate/*yakrahūna*, odious/*baghīḍ*), as were terms of flaw (sickness/*maraḍ*, poverty/*faqr*). And finally, naturalistic metaphors appeared in the story, with the shaykh's voice coming to the audience "as the full moon rises through the dark clouds on a gloomy night."[23]

Why is it important to identify and categorize these vocabularies? For one, it helps us understand how activists created and propagated morality tales and other moral discourses. Moreover, while the sample clusters are not meant to serve as hard classifications, they help illustrate the creative and concrete ways activists conceptualized and expressed ideas about integrity. Lastly, being able to recognize moral discourses highlights how activist groups were similar in their expressions of right and wrong, and where there were elements of distinction (see Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 below).

[23] ʿAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī, "Shaykh fī marqaṣ!" [part 1], *Majallat al-Risālah* 673, 27 May 1946, 574–575; ʿAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī, "Shaykh fī marqaṣ!" [part 2], *Majallat al-Risālah* 674, 3 June 1946, 599–601.



Figure 5.2 – Contamination Discourses in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Workers' Vanguard.

Left: An Ikhwān cartoon, entitled "The Sun which Terrifies the Insects." In the illustration, the British flee before the rising sun, which bears the Muslim Brotherhood crest. Right: The Egyptian communist publication *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* [*The New Dawn*], showing reactionaries fleeing the light of a torch.

(Sources: "al-Shams allatī tafzaʿu al-ḥasharāt," *al-Daʿwah* 39, 13 Ṣafar 1371/13 November 1951, in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1; *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 18, 23 January 1946, in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97)



Figure 5.3 – Contamination Discourses in Algeria: The FLN

A Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) cartoon, showing Charles de Gaulle and a group of French pieds noirs (labeled "[Alain] de Sérigny and Co.") fleeing a cloud of bug spray.

(Source: FLN-ALN, *Avenir* 34, n.d. [c. 1958], in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1)

The Four Affective Gatekeepers of the Moral Order

In February 1942, Zakī Mubārak (a writer frequently in literary spats with other Egyptian thinkers) published an article entitled "The Worst of Enemies." The title was inspired by a Prophetic saying: "The worst enemy of your enemies is yourself—that which is between your sides."[24] Taking liberty with the proverb, Mubārak argued that "The importance of this *ḥadīth* is that it is alerting [us] to a danger that threatens our moral strength: the danger that comes to us from wives and children." Railing against the "tyranny of the feminist movement," Mubārak warned that wives and children were out of control. Children were using their status as university students as an excuse to remain dependent upon their parents until the age of 30. Girls were walking in the streets without *niqāb*, and young men were also wandering the streets with heads uncovered! (This was problematic, he explained, because humans covering their heads distinguished them from animals.) The solution, he argued, was for a division of labor in which men wielded complete primacy. "Man will not taste happiness or honor unless he is the first and last master at home," he wrote. Mubārak then declared that women could not live without a master—because they had a "canine nature." From this, he pleaded "Dear People… Do not allow women to govern the house—for what is so governed is only ruled by the weak, and [this] is the most repulsive kind of tyranny. And do not let any of your children enjoy your patronage after twenty."[25]

As was often the case with his articles, Mubārak's writing inspired controversy. A few weeks later, *al-Risālah* decided to publish one reply to Mubārak written by a woman from Suhāj (in Upper Egypt). In a letter to the editor, a Muslim woman named Buthayna

[24] Paraphrased in English, "You are your own worst enemy." أعدى أعدائك نفسك التي بين جنبيك
[25] Zakī Mubārak, "Aʿdā al-aʿdāʾ!" *Majallat al-Risālah* 448, 2 February 1942, 115–116.

expressed moral outrage at Mubārak's comments. "Dr. Zakī Mubārak, in what century do we even direct these shameful words to women, who gave birth to genius and helped establish civilization?"[26] The exchange between Zakī Mubārak and Buthayna was revealing: Mubārak had expressed anger at changing roles and divisions of household labor. However, his comparison of women and dogs had triggered moral outrage from Buthayna, who confronted his devaluation of women and understanding of their roles. (No one seemed to express much anger at his comments about freeloading college students.)

As the conversation between Mubārak and Buthayna suggested, the use of emotional signals to communicate ideas about morality and behavior was an important part of social activism in Egypt. Whether in articles or morality tales, emotional cues were used to communicate value judgments, maintain boundaries, signal others as to the problematic nature of certain behaviors, and encourage action. And some of the most prominently expressed emotions in Egyptian activism were the "four affective gatekeepers" of the moral order: anger, shock, shame, and disgust. Often dubbed "moral emotions" because of their role in the regulation of behavior, these emotions acted as a kind of "emotional moral barometer, providing immediate and salient feedback on… social and moral acceptability."[27]

Anger, such as that expressed by Buthayna toward Mubārak, was one such "moral emotion."[28] Anger, as an emotion with strong action tendencies, was a favorite of

[26] "al-Barīd al-adabī," *Majallat al-Risālah* 451, 23 February 1942, 251.

[27] June Price Tangney, Jeff Stuewig, and Debra J. Mashek, "Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior," *Annual Review of Psychology* 58 (2007): 347.

[28] Jonathan Haidt, "The Moral Emotions," in *Handbook of Affective Sciences*, eds. R.J. Davidson et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 852–870.

activists, who used expressions of anger to make agonistic displays, send negative feedback, urge confrontation, and prescribe punitive action. Buthayna used anger to signal her condemnation of Mubārak's comments; two months before the Egyptian Revolution, another editorialist in *al-Risālah* used anger to urge confrontation of the British. In the article, the author lauded anger as a "latent force" that when expressed, protected the community against threat. He then urged Egyptians to use anger to confront Britain for colonial aggression and social cheating. The anger of Egyptians, the author explained, would also serve as a model for other nations. "The Arab country [Egypt]—which leads the Arab world, guides it intellectually, culturally, and politically, and enjoys an honored position, regarded place, and noteworthy influence in it—must become angry, until the way is paved for this anger to reach all the countries of the Arab world."[29]

A second affective cue that Egyptian activists frequently utilized was disgust. Zakī Mubārak, for instance, expressed disgust at wives "contaminated" by feminism, and Ḥamid Badr similarly described female immodesty as "disgusting" [*qabīḥ*].[30] Sayyid Quṭb went even further, arguing that bikini-clad beachgoers were nothing but stray animals, and "disgusting, cheap meat"—filthy "cockroaches."[31] Such expressions of disgust were important because they encouraged action, either implicitly or explicitly. For Egyptians in the 1940s, most expressions of disgust were accompanied by scripts encouraging distancing oneself from or "cleaning" the disgusting element. One anonymous religious scholar, for instance, used a string of similes to condemn ʿulamāʾ

[29] Abī al-Ḥassan ʿAlī al-Ḥasanī al-Nadwī, "al-Sharq al-Thāʾir," *Majallat al-Risālah* 985, 19 May 1952, 551–554.

[30] Ḥamid Badr, "Hunā mawḍiʿ al-gharābah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 923, 12 March 1951, 312.

[31] Sayyid Quṭb, "Min laghw al-ṣayf: Ṣarāṣīr…!" [part 2], *Majallat al-Risālah* 683, 6 August 1946, 856–858.

linked to the government: "Like dung beetles they fear perfume, like bats they flee the light, like bacteria, they die from purity, like demons, they fear goodness," the anonymous scholar explained, adding that al-Azhar should be cleaned of these men as one sweeps away "mud on the road."[32] The article was typical of Egyptian disgust appeals, in that it explicitly called for cleaning al-Azhar.

While emotional expressions were often paired with explicit action scripts, they also communicated implicit action scripts. For instance, while one might read the above description of ʿulamāʾ as "bats" and "dung beetles" as dehumanizing (just as Quṭb's description of beachgoers as "cockroaches" was dehumanizing), there was more to these moral discourses. Dehumanizing discourses did more than just *devalue* or revoke the humanity of humans—after all, if devaluation was the only function of human/animal comparisons in activist rhetoric, most any animal would serve the purpose. Instead, these comparisons were *actionable metaphors*, which both normatively evaluated the target object, and suggested potential action scripts. Thus, the Workers' Vanguard calling Ismāʿīl Ṣidqī Pasha a wolf (see Figure 5.4) was a call to guard against him, just as Quṭb calling bikini-wearing women stray animals and cockroaches implied possible paths of action: the stray animal should be brought back to its place, the cockroach exterminated. Similarly, emotional expressions of disgust (such as calling women "disgusting, cheap meat") could be used to bridge abstract moral concepts to physiological functions (gagging, vomiting, or spitting something out).[33]

[32] Ḥasan [pseud.], "ʿUlamāʾ!" *Majallat al-Risālah* 994, 21 July 1952, 797.

[33] See for instance Sayyid Quṭb "Min laghw al-ṣayf: Hāʾulāʾ al-aristuqrāṭ," [part 4], *Majallat al-Risālah* 687, 2 September 1946, 961–963.



Figure 5.4 – Moral Metaphors in Egypt: Cover illustration from *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* printed around the time of the 1946 demonstrations, showing Prime Minister Ismāʿīl Ṣidqī Pasha as a wolf. He stands atop a copy of the unpopular Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, holding a stick to "maintain security… and extreme nationalism" (a jab at the Muslim Brotherhood's partnership with the Ṣidqī Adminstration).

(Source: *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 24, 6 March 1946 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97)

Pride and shame signals were another important affective strategy that activists used to police and contest the social order and mobilize supporters. Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad, for instance, proved itself well-versed in "affective policing," attempting to shame individuals who refused to behave according to its vision and interpretation of Islamic law. In one article, for instance, the club condemned an al-Azhar shaykh for declaring "without the least bit of shame or abashment [*khajal aw ḥayāʾ*]" that he was a fan of Umm Kulthūm's voice and films, adding that the shaykh had "in insolence and impudence [*jurʾah wa waqāḥah*]" called for a recording of her reciting the Qurʾān.

Similarly, the club denounced a Muslim official "drinking wine publicly and without any shame," adding that such behavior was shameless insolence.[34]

A communist parable printed by *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* shortly after the end of World War II illustrated how activists further used affective displays to communicate ideas about right and wrong. According to the parable, one night, a suffering peasant was released from the hospital, and forced to walk back to his hut through the bitter cold. As he walked in misery, the happy sounds of a great feast echoed in the air. The next morning, the peasant's dead body was found on the roadside. Other peasants of the village organized a funeral procession for the man—but as the funeral passed down the road, the procession encountered a rich man in his luxury car. The rich man's driver stopped to let the procession pass; but the rich man became angry and shouted at the peasants for the inconvenience. But while the wealthy man raged, the driver of the car was overcome with emotion. A man of humble origins, the driver's father was also a peasant. And so the driver shed tears for the dead man, while the rich man cursed and raged.[35]

The communist parable was interesting, in that it operated by juxtaposing the emotional displays of rich and poor. In the story, the poor were shown upright by their appropriate affective displays: the peasants held a funeral out of respect for the dead man, and the driver of the car modeled proper grieving behavior, shedding tears as the procession passed. Meanwhile, the improper affects of the wealthy illustrated their depravity: the partygoers celebrated while the poor man suffered, and the rich passenger

[34] Muḥammad ʿAṭīyah Khamīs, "ʿUlamāʾ fī ḥaflat kūktīl!!," *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* 229, 21 Ramaḍān 1369/7 July 1950, 4; "Mūwaẓẓafū al-dawlah yashrabūna al-khumūr ʿalānīyah," *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* 211, 20 Shawwāl 1368/15 August 1949, 4, both in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5.

[35] Dīmitrī Jurjus, "Talaqqāhu al-ṭarīq," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 10, 1 October 1945, 22–23 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97.

violated Egyptian display rules, by showing anger rather than grief in the face of the funeral procession. The storyteller thus communicated his condemnation of the rich through emotional signaling.

"Shaykh in a Dance Club" further demonstrated how emotional displays could be used to challenge the social order. The 1946 morality tale was portentous, appearing a few years before the famous debate between al-Azhar shaykhs Muḥammad Farīd Wajdī (an Islamic modernist), Khālid Muḥammad Khālid (a Marxist), and Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (a Muslim Brotherhood associate) over the proper division of labor between religion and state.[36] "Shaykh in a Dance Club," prefigured these debates; it appeared in *al-Risālah* as a morality tale supporting an expansionist role for Muslim religious institutions.

The parable was also notable for putting center stage the revolutionary potential of violating emotional display rules and social norms. The story described the eponymous shaykh transgressing Egyptian divisions of space by entering a dance club. But as the shaykh's disciples warned in the tale, this attempt at social pioneering was risky—if they entered the dance club, the patrons would surely "jeer at us and harm us." And indeed, when the shaykh appeared on stage, the crowd demonstrated how entertainment space was policed: they provided immediate negative feedback concerning the transgression, by becoming angry and mocking the shaykh. The shaykh's trip to the dance club thus

[36] Khālid Muḥammad Khālid, *Min huna nabdaʾ* [From Here We Start] (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1974 [First ed. Cairo, 1950]); Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Min hunā naʿlam…!* (Cairo: Nahḍat Miṣr, 2005 [First ed. Cairo, November 1950]); Muḥammad Farīd Wajdī, "Laysa min huna nabdaʾ," *Majallat al-Azhar* 22, no. 1 (1950/1370), 17–22; Muḥammad Farīd Wajdī, "Laysa min huna nabdaʾ," *Majallat al-Azhar* 22, no. 4 (1950/1370), 390–395; Muḥammad Farīd Wajdī, "Laysa min huna nabdaʾ," *Majallat al-Azhar* 22, no. 5 (1951/1370), 481–485.

constituted a kind of breaching experiment: by transgressing divisions of space, the shaykh revealed important information about how the social order was maintained.

In the story, the club patrons also provided specific feedback about what they felt was appropriate behavior for club space: they offered the shaykh wine, and told him to strip, dance, and arouse them. In other words, the clubgoers demanded that the shaykh adhere to the proper scripts for a nightclub, by performing the behaviors suitable for the space and his (appropriated) on-stage role. After all, in the eyes of the club patrons, religion was for the mosque, and dancing and drinking for the club. Despite this feedback, the shaykh refused to follow the display rules for Egyptian norm violations: he refused to shame (and thus refused to admit fault). Instead, the shaykh in the tale worked to transform the space by preaching a sermon, aimed at convincing club patrons that *their* behavior—not his—was shameful. And the story described him succeeding in this endeavor: ashamed, the audience changed their ways.

The story communicated other messages through emotional cues. For instance, the surprise of the shaykh's disciples, the club owner, and the club audience at "the shaykh in the dance club" communicated the unusual and transgressive nature of the shaykh's behavior—as the story explained, the club manager initially thought the shaykh must have escaped from a mental hospital. There was also the shock of the narrator (Ṭanṭāwī) upon encountering the sinner praying at the mosque. Rather than signal a positive or negative value judgment, Egyptians used these expressions of shock to a) focus attention and b) express that a behavior was unusual, unexpected, or "out of place."

Other emotions played important roles in the story as well. The anger of the club patrons reinforced the fact that in the Egyptian social imagination of the 1940s, it was not

the club patrons but the shaykh who was out of place. Characters in the tale also used grief to signal their conviction that certain behaviors were problematic. The story opened with the shaykh expressing grief that Egyptian youth no longer attend mosque, but could be found in clubs and bars. There was also the grief and shame of the club patrons after hearing the shaykh's sermon. Finally, the shaykh modeled disgust and shame in his sermon, to signal his conviction that the dancer's exhibition of her body (and the club patrons' ogling of the dancer) were unacceptable; he also used these affective cues to encourage club-goers to distance themselves from such activities.

Emotions—and proper emotional signaling behaviors—were thus vital for social activism. Activists used emotional cues to negotiate social norms, attract attention, encourage action, and communicate normative claims about what should be valued and devalued. Thus, both in morality tales and public debates, Egyptians harnessed the revolutionary potential of breaking display rules: *refusing to shame* and participating in *pride displays* for behaviors others found transgressive, and *refusing to show pride* for things they found undeserving of respect.

The Dance Club, the Shaykh, and the Sinner Repentant: Moral Maps, Roles, and Action Scripts in Egyptian Morality Tales

In addition to using normative discourses, moral metaphors, and affective cues in storytelling, Egyptians made arguments about morality by drawing moral maps. These maps communicated ideas about hierarchies, social roles, divisions of space, and the proper behavior for different roles and spaces.[37] We have just seen how "Shaykh in a

[37] These "moral maps" have also been called moral cartographies, moral geographies, and normative geographies. The salient point, however, is the linking of certain "expectations about place and behavior." Timothy Cresswell, *In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 48–49.

Dance Club" used emotions to communicate important messages about what behaviors Egyptians found appropriate (and inappropriate) for a dance club in the 1940s. As "Shaykh in a Dance Club" also suggested, the Egyptian morality of nakedness (or uncovering) was situational, and assigned to appropriate spaces. As an *al-Risālah* article from 1950 explained, nakedness was for specific spaces (the bathroom and the bedroom) and appropriate social relations (for oneself, for husband and wife, for doctor and patient).[38] Such divisions made for an orderly society (and kept nakedness out of spaces like parks and restaurants).

"Shaykh in a Dance Club" also demonstrated how activists not only described socio-behavioral maps in their morality tales—they also contested and encouraged transgressions of these maps. In the story, the shaykh challenged the map that allowed for erotic entertainment space. Moreover, as the shaykh astutely argued in his sermon, behavior could remake space: consequently, when worshippers at the mosque were lustful, the mosque became like a club, and when nightclub patrons prayed and turned their hearts to God, the club could become like a mosque. The tale also revealed what the narrator considered an appropriate space and set of relationships for the female (and her nakedness); by the end of story, the dancer was relocated to the home and given a new role (that of wife).[39]

So which spaces did different clubs find problematic? In fact, socially conservative publications like *al-Risālah* and *Miṣr al-Fatāh*, and religious publications like *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad, al-Daʿwah*, and *Majallat al-Azhar* considered similar spaces dangerous. And topping the list of dangerous places were media, leisure, and

[38] Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt, "Adab al-mujūn," [part 3], *Majallat al-Risālah* 885, 19 June 1950, 680.
[39] ʿAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī, "Shaykh fī marqaṣ!" [part 2], *Majallat al-Risālah* 674, 3 June 1946, 599–601.

entertainment spaces. One passionate attack on media spaces, for instance, appeared in a 1945 article written by Sayyid Quṭb (who had not yet taken up Islamic activism). After relating various tales of iniquity and vice (such as an unaccompanied girl in a restaurant with a male suitor, and a woman leaving the house to cheat on her husband), Quṭb ended by asking "What pushed this generation into the abyss?" His answer: brothels, magazines, films, and popular songs.[40] In another article published just over a year later, Quṭb expanded his argument, adding that actors, journalists, and singers were successful "because their profession is prostitution and pimping. Because they advocate brothels" by selling erotic images and stories. He then asked rhetorically if there was any difference between a journalist who published pictures of women on the beach, and a pimp in a bar who showed men nudes to attract them to a whorehouse.[41]

Miṣr al-Fatāh, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad shared similar concerns, often attacking popular magazines like *Ākhir Sāʿah* and *al-Muṣawwar*. For instance, after the magazine *Ākhir Sāʿah* published a photo of a woman sitting naked among the trees (with the caption "Waiting for Adam"), *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* denounced the baseness [*safālah*] of the magazine, asking "how long will these filthy [*danisah*] newspapers continue to corrupt the nation's morals and spread debauchery and immorality [*daʿārah wa fujūr*] on their pages?... This organized prostitution is more dangerous than other kinds."[42]

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[40] Sayyid Quṭb, "Ṣuwar min al-jīl al-jadīd," *Majallat al-Risālah* 622, 4 June 1945.

[41] Sayyid Quṭb, "Min laghw al-ṣayf: Mufāraqāt…!" [part 5], *Majallat al-Risālah* 689, 16 September 1946, 1017–1019.

[42] "Safālah… Ākhir Sāʿah," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 211, 20 Shawwāl 1368/15 August 1949, 7 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5.

Also see: "Mujūn wa istihtār," *Miṣr al-Fatāh* 135, 24 November 1947; Ṣāliḥ ʿAshmāwī, "Ilḥād fī al-ʿaqīdah wa ibāḥīyah fī al-aʿmāl," *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* 6, 28 Shawwāl 1361/7 November 1942, 3–4 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 3.5.

In addition to theaters, bars, and nightclubs, there was another den of iniquity that attracted the attention of Egyptian moralists. This den was a "paradise of Satan"—a place where Egyptian pleasure-seekers frolicked in filth and depravity. This paradise of evil was the beach. "This beach is Satan's Paradise, which gathers together a thousand Adams and a thousand Eves," wrote Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb in 1950. "The beach in summer is a playground of immorality and theater of moral depravity, melting away virtue and replacing it with vice, immodesty, and lack of shame."[43] Similarly, Brotherhood leader Ṣāliḥ ʿAshmāwī included the beach—alongside pictures in magazines, and parties where men and women mingled, danced, and drank—in a list of symptoms of a "deadly diseases" decaying the nation, Egyptian homes, and Egyptian families.[44]

Sayyid Quṭb, meanwhile, found the beach so odious he was inspired to include it in a five-part series on moral collapse in Egyptian society, which ran in *al-Risālah* in 1949. In the series, he described the beach as representative of all the symptoms of social depravity: there was a private beach for corrupt aristocrats who did not speak Arabic; Egyptian celebrities visiting the beach (for Quṭb, cause for reflection on the decrepitude of popular music); men and women sitting at a shoreside casino (a symbol of elite depravity and the squandering of wealth); scandalous bathing suits and a photographer taking pictures of half-dressed women for a lewd magazine; and signs of government

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For similar complaints about cinemas, see: Raḍwān Maḥmūd Naṣr, "al-Sīnimā," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 284, 19 Rajab 1371/14 April 1952, 11 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.6; Sayyid Quṭb, "Min laghw al-ṣayf: Sūq al-Raqīq," [part 3], *Majallat al-Risālah* 685, 19 August 1946, 911–912; Nafīsah al-Shaykh, "al-Barīd al-adabī: Risālat al-sīnimā fī tarbīyyat al-shuʿūb," *Majallat al-Risālah* 992, 7 July 1952, 765–766; Maḥmūd Sāmī Aḥmad, "al-Masraḥ al-Miṣrī," *Majallat al-Risālah* 867, 13 February 1950, 186–187.

[43] Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb, "Ṣuwar min al-ḥayāh: Jannat al-shayṭān!" *Majallat al-Risālah* 846, 19 September 1949, 1362–1363; Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb, "Ṣuwar min al-ḥayāh: ʿAlá al-shāṭiʾ," *Majallat al-Risālah* 892, 7 August 1950, 880–881.

[44] Ṣāliḥ ʿAshmāwī, "Ilḥād fī al-ʿaqīdah wa ibāḥīyah fī al-aʿmāl," *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* 6, 28 Shawwāl 1361/7 November 1942, 4 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 3.5.

corruption (police patrolling the beach to preserve public morality, but allowing men and women to flounce about in bathing suits).[45] Even the popular "femme fatale" of Egyptian morality tales—the dancer—was to be found at the beach, leading men astray.[46]

But what social harm made beaches, cinemas, and dance clubs the target of so much moral anxiety in the 1940s and 1950s? This question was echoed in one 1949 anti-beach morality tale, "Goddess of the Beach," in which the narrator began by posing a similar question: "What possible harm could it do to throw off one's shackles for an hour, so as to enjoy the breeze of life… there on the seashore, where the world ripples with beauty and fun, and the earth undulates with youth and movement?" As the story continued, feeling bound by "chains of manhood and family," a husband went to the lay on the ocean sands. There, he saw a beautiful girl, and was instantly enchanted with this "Goddess of the Beach." She occupied his thoughts like a fever, until one night, he went with his friend to the casino. But when the dancer came on stage to perform, the young man was dismayed. It was "my girl," the narrator exclaimed, "She—the Goddess of the Beach!... a dancer from among the 'fancy girls,'[47] who breathes poison into the hearts of men, so to steal from man his masculinity and money, and strip the husband from his wife and children. She—the servant of Satan, who wants to destroy the home and break up the family."[48]

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[45] Sayyid Quṭb, "Min laghw al-ṣayf: ilá al-Iskandarīyyah" [part 1], *Majallat al-Risālah* 681, 22 July 1946, 796–798; Sayyid Quṭb, "Min laghw al-ṣayf: Ṣarāṣīr…!" [part 2], *Majallat al-Risālah* 683, 6 August 1946, 856–858; Sayyid Quṭb, "Min laghw al-ṣayf: Sūq al-raqīq," [part 3], *Majallat al-Risālah* 685, 19 August 1946, 911–912; Sayyid Quṭb "Min laghw al-ṣayf: Hāʾulāʾ al-aristuqrāṭ," [part 4], *Majallat al-Risālah* 687, 2 September 1946, 961–963; Sayyid Quṭb, "Min laghw al-ṣayf: Mufāraqāt…!" [part 5], *Majallat al-Risālah* 689, 16 September 1946, 1017–1019.

[46] Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb, "Ṣuwar min al-ḥayāh: Rabbat al-shāṭiʾ," *Majallat al-Risālah* 847, 26 September 1949, 1395–1396.

[47] Archaic term for a high-end prostitute or escort.

[48] Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb, "Ṣuwar min al-ḥayāh: Rabbat al-shāṭiʾ," *Majallat al-Risālah* 847, 26 September 1949, 1395–1396.

As a morality tale, "Goddess of the Beach" was thus part of that familiar pattern in Egyptian moralizing that linked entertainment and leisure practices with perceived harms to the household. As a central unit for social organization and (re)production, the household was a space where fundamental social roles and divisions of labor were defined: where marital dyads produced new members of society, where kinship-based role assignments (like father, husband, mother, wife, son, and daughter) were taught, and where children were socialized into gender norms and moral codes. Egyptian moralists in the 1940s thus spent much time evaluating spaces based on perceived disruptions to family norms. The usually sober and dry *Majallat al-Azhar*, for instance, published an article in 1941 in which Shaykh Muṣṭafá al-Ṣāwī lamented that restaurants, cafes and clubs had caused women to abandon the household, such that "the 'Queen of Cooking' has died in the brains of women and girls." From this, he concluded that "I think that the house is on the road to destruction, family building on the path to wreckage, and morals descending to the depths of depravity."[49]

There was also a recurrent theme that harmful leisure practices and the desires they produced would turn men and women into animals (the human–animal divide being an important part of the Egyptian moral imaginary), and inspire them to cheating and bad faith in marriage.[50] Finally, articles argued that erotic and romantic stories threatened to

[49] Muṣṭafá al-Ṣāwī, "Fī ikhtilāṭ al-jinsayn," *Majallat al-Azhar* 12, no. 8 (1941/1360), 503–505.
Aslo see: Abū al-Wafā al-Marāghī, "Nadhīr min al-gharb," *Majallat al-Azhar* 21, no. 2 (1949/1359), 144–146.

[50] See for instance: Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb, "Ṣuwar min al-ḥayāh: Zawj yaḍallu [A Husband Astray]," *Majallat al-Risālah* 850, 17 October 1949, 1478–1479; Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb, "Ṣuwar min al-ḥayāh: Khiyānah imraʾah [A Woman's Unfaithfulness]," *Majallat al-Risālah* 865, 30 January 1950, 124–125.

erase social divisions and boundaries, until "there will be no difference between permissible and forbidden [*ḥalāl wa ḥarām*], order and chaos, man and animal."[51]

Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad's morality tales took such concerns a step further: they explained that the only way to ensure the safety of the home and sustain the mutual obligations of martial dyads was to keep women in the home. Describing in May 1952 that the home as the only appropriate space for women, the club warned that dance parties, beaches, clubs, and other spaces of gender mixing would lead to adultery, prostitution, murder, rape, and disease.[52] What was fascinating about Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad's moral imaginary was the types of morality tales they told to reinforce this moral map. In its columns, the club printed two unique kinds of morality tales: what can only be described as "cautionary rape tales," and "tales of mixing and murder."

In the first category ("cautionary rape tales"), for instance, came one 1949 morality tale about a shaykh and his daughter. The shaykh was in the habit of letting his daughter serve guests who came to visit their home. However, there was a wolf among the flock: Muṣṭafá ʿAbd Allāh, who went every day to the shaykh's home not to worship, but to enjoy the beauty of the shaykh's daughter. That was, until one day, when ʿAbd Allāh dragged the shaykh's daughter away. Thus, the writer moralized, "the shaykh paid the price of his daughter's honor, his own honor, and his dignity for neglecting God's moral

[51] Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt, "Adab al-mujūn," [part 1]*, Majallat al-Risālah* 883, 5 June 1950, 624. Also see: Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt, "Adab al-mujūn," [part 2], *Majallat al-Risālah* 884, 12 June 1950, 652; Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt, "Adab al-mujūn," [part 3], *Majallat al-Risālah* 885, 19 June 1950, 680; Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt, "Adab al-ladhdhah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 882, 29 May 1950, 596.

Also see: Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb, "Ṣuwar min al-ḥayāh: Wafāʾ…!" *Majallat al-Risālah* 848, 3 October 1949, 1422–1423; Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb, "Ṣuwar min al-ḥayāh: Jannat al-shayṭān!" *Majallat al-Risālah* 846, 19 September 1949, 1362–1363; Kāmil Maḥmūd Ḥabīb, "Ṣuwar min al-ḥayāh: ʿAlá al-shāṭiʾ," *Majallat al-Risālah* 892, 7 August 1950, 880–881.

[52] "Mādhā fī ʿāṣimat al-islām!" *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 287, 8 Shaʿbān 1371/3 May 1952, 7 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.6.

precepts."[53] Another cautionary tale described how a mother abandoned her children at home to enjoy nights out at entertainment halls. As a result, the servant molested the woman's six-year-old daughter. Other stories described a pregnant woman raped by her obstetrician; a girl raped after her parents let her leave the house without a veil; a wife raped after deciding to leave the house because her husband was neglecting her; and many other such stories.[54]

Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad's paper also published many tales of "mixing and murder," which described how gender mixing and the exhibition of women would lead to social chaos, crime, and bloodshed. For instance, in a series entitled "scandals [*faḍāʾiḥ*] of [gender] mixing and unveiling"—the journal related sordid tales of lust and betrayal brought on men and women mingling. From the series, two "honor killing" stories from 1952 are worth noting. One related the story of a Christian man who stabbed his sister Maryam to death (because she fell in love with a Muslim man, left her husband and three children, and converted to Islam to marry her lover). Another story concerned a young Muslim man, who beat and stabbed his sister to death, because she would not stop flirting with young men in their father's shop. The moral of these tales, notably, was not to affirm honor killing as a practice (no comment was made concerning the acceptability or unacceptability of such behavior). Instead, the point was that regardless of confession,

[53] "al-Shayṭān yaghrī," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 211, 20 Shawwāl 1368/15 August 1949, 4 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5.

[54] Muḥammad Fahmī ʿAbd al-Wahāb, "Fasād fī al-niẓām wa al-tafrīṭ fī al-ḥuqūq wa tadahwur fī al-akhlāq: anṣār al-marʾah fī fujūrihā… hum adhnāb al-mustaʿmirīn," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 215, 2 Muḥarram 1369/25 October 1949, 1, 5 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5; Ḥusayn Yūsuf, "Naʿlinuhā mudawwīyyah ʿālīyyah: hādhihi al-ḥafalāt mā hiya illā fāḥishah munaẓẓamah wa shuyūʿīyyah ṣārikhah," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 226, 24 Rajab 1369/12 May 1950, 2, 11 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5.

gender mixing (and miscegenation) broke up families, produced crimes of passion, and led to social chaos.[55]

Other short morality tales in the paper illustrated the same principle. In one story, a woman's jealous husband murdered her and her (also married) lover at a bar; as *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* moralized, the newspapers had not mentioned the real reason for the murders, which was "mixing and unveiling."[56] Another story (about the killing of a Saudi, the dancer accompanying him, and her male friend in a club) explained "this is the natural result of what happens in dance clubs and cabarets," which "threaten morality, honor, and peoples' souls."[57] The moral of these stories, which often appeared preceding or following open letters to government ministers, was twofold: 1) members of the opposite sex should not mix (not even with relatives), and 2) the government was failing in its duty to protect both Egyptian homes and the metaphorical "house of Egypt"—for in the Egyptian moral imagination, the health of the Egyptian home was intimately attached to imagined health of the nation. Thus, as the open letters of Muḥammad's Youth suggested, the home in disarray was a symptom of a government in disarray.[58]

Since Muḥammad's Youth activists positioned themselves as being more upright and socially active than other religious groups (including the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Azhar shaykhs), they argued not only against clubs and bars, but against mixing in universities. Universities, according to the club, were dangerous spaces for women. As

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[55] "Min faḍāʾiḥ al-sufūr wa-l-ikhtilāṭ," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 282, 2 Rajab 1371/28 March 1952, in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.6.

[56] Ḥusayn Yūsuf, "Naʿlinuhā mudawwīyyah ʿālīyyah: hādhihi al-ḥafalāt mā hiya illā fāḥishah munaẓẓamah wa shuyūʿīyyah ṣārikhah," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 226, 24 Rajab 1369/12 May 1950, 2, 11 and "al-Sufūr wa al-ikhtilāṭ," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 266, 23 Ṣafar 1371/23 November 1951, 4, both in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.6.

[57] ʿAlá hāmish al-akhbār," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 289, 28 Shaʿbān 1371/23 May 1952, 5 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.6.

[58] Lisa Pollard, "From Husbands and Housewives to Suckers and Whores," 648-649.

evidence, the paper printed stories about one girl impregnated by her professor, and another girl seduced by her tutor.[59] Muḥammad's Youth activists also frequently wrote to the Ministry of Education, complaining that male and female students were sitting next to one another in class and mixing in the courtyards at Cairo University. In a 1949 letter demanding university doors be closed to women and strict dress codes be imposed on female workers (including banning lipstick "and other manifestations of malice and pornography"), the paper explained that "Equality between boys and girls in the type of education [they receive] was a big mistake… and this mistake has led to the decline of education and morality, as well as distanced girls from their natural place, which is the home."[60] Reinforcing the point, a similar article warned that in seeking higher education and careers, women deviated from "her nature, traditional norms [*sunnah*], moral excellence, and her duty in life." The paper reinforced these opinions with short news items concerning the futility of females seeking jobs: tales of government ministries refusing to hire females (and female graduates crying in response to the news), and stories of women who sought careers only to end up unhappy, poor, tired, and humiliated.[61]

[59] Ḥusayn Yūsuf, "Naʿlinuhā mudawwīyyah ʿālīyyah: hādhihi al-ḥafalāt mā hiya illā fāḥishah munaẓẓamah wa shuyūʿīyyah ṣārikhah," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 226, 24 Rajab 1369/12 May 1950, 2, 11 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5; Saʿūd Muṣṭafá al-Ḥafīf, "Iḥdharū al-taraddī fī al-hawīyyah," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 289, 28 Shaʿbān 1371/23 May 1952, 11 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.6.

[60] "Min Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad ilá maʿālī wazīr al-maʿārif," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 211, 20 Shawwāl 1368/15 August 1949, 6 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5.

[61] "Ilá rajul al-sāʿah: maʿālī Aḥmad Mursī Badr Bik, wazīr al-maʿārif," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 215, 2 Muḥarram 1369/25 August 1949, 9 and "Khirījāt al-zirāʿah yabkīna!" *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* 211, 20 Shawwāl 1368/15 August 1949, 5, both in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5; Saʿūd Muṣṭafá al-Ḥafīf, "Iḥdharū al-taraddī fī al-hawīyyah," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 289, 28 Shaʿbān 1371/23 May 1952, 11 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.6.

The Moral Geography of Egyptian Communist Morality Tales

These concerns about the home and entertainment spaces, which filled the pages of *al-Risālah*, *al-Daʿwah*, and *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad*, were occasionally echoed by Egyptian communist activists (albeit on the grounds that these spaces were sites for the reproduction of repressive gender relations and capitalist values). However, Egyptian communists generally advanced guardianship claims over entirely different spaces: primarily, rural and factory spaces. Communist papers thus focused on printing stories about the bad behaviors occurring daily on farms and in factories and shops.[62] As communist articles explained, for instance, it was the countryside where peasants lived in ignorance, poverty, and disease, while "feudal exploiters" took advantage of their labor; it was the countryside where tenant farmers paid for machinery and worked the ground, but ceded the profits to landlords.[63]

While the characters in conservative morality tales were usually husbands, wives, mothers, and daughters, (and while conservative tales problematized the roles of entertainers and dancers), communist stories featured different characters. The protagonists of communist tales were usually workers and farmers, and many stories involved children (to inspire sympathy in readers). The deviant roles in these tales, meanwhile, were wealthy employers, landowners, factory owners, the bourgeoisie, and men of religion.[64]

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[62] "Aṣḥāb al-ʿummāl yuḥāwilūna inqāṣ al-ujūr bi-shattá al-ṭuruq," and "al-Kifāḥ al-yawmī fī al-maṣāniʿ," *Kifāḥ al-Ummah*, 20 September 1948, 4–5 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 106; "Akhbār ʿummālīyyah," *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* 42, 15 July 1949, 2–3 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 104.

[63] Henri Curiel, "Lettre à mes compatriotes," (1951), 1–3 in IISH ARCH01722/Folder 329; "Fī dawāʾir āl Sirāj al-Dīn," *Kifāḥ al-Ummah*, 15 July 1948, 5 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 106.

[64] See for instance "Akhbār ʿummālīyyah," *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* 42, 15 July 1949, 2–3 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 104; "Muʾāmarah khabīthah li-ḍarb al-ʿummāl wa-l-fallāḥīn," *al-Muqāwamah al-Shaʿbīyyah* 11, 24 October 1951, 2 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 111.

The content of communist morality tales was also different from stories told by Egyptian social conservatives. While *al-Risālah* focused on stories of familial ruin, and *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* printed sensational tales of mixing and murder, communist publications printed tragic sagas of economic exploitation and suffering. For instance, one story followed the journey of a poor father and son in a slum. In the tale, the father slaved away in a shoe workshop, only to die of tuberculosis. After the father's death, the young son took his father's place in the factory. He too slaved away, until the tale ended with the son dying of tuberculosis just like his father. Another tale followed a man returning to his natal village (only to find it in abject poverty), and yet another short story described the suffering of a poor girl working in a cotton field.[65]

These tales worked to contrast the behavior of Egypt's rich and poor classes. The story about the poor man who died on the road home has already been mentioned above (in the analysis of emotional cues).[66] *Al-Fajr al-Jadīd* also printed a story comparing the lives of two girls (one rich, one poor) born on the same day. The tale described the rich girl being nursed by the mother of the poor girl, while the poor girl suffered from lack of milk. This pattern of injustices continued, ending with a final juxtaposition: the rich girl rides the train, the poor girl is found dead beside it.[67]

What was unusual about these tales (especially considering the typical communist emphasis on revolutionary activism) was the action scripts they communicated. Articles declared that peasants and the working class had an elect role to play, but morality tales

[65] Laṭīfah al-Zayāt, "Qiṣṣah: Mawkib al-ḥayāh," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 9, 16 September 1945, 22–23; "Ibn al-Fallāh," [pseud. "Son of the Peasant"], "Ḥaṣād," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 2, 1 June 1945, 17, 19; Laṭīfah al-Zayāt, "Allāh yurīdu," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 1, 16 May 1945, 16; all in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97.

[66] Dīmitrī Jurjus, "Talaqqāhu al-ṭarīq," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 10, 1 October 1945, 22–23 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97.

[67] "Anwar al-Mashrī, "Muʾminah," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 13, November 1945, 20–21, all in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97.

tended to end tragically, with the death of the protagonist (see Figure 5.5). Moreover, the peasants and workers in *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*'s morality tales did not rebel, revolt, or resist—they slaved and died. This was overwhelmingly true of the journal's stories: action scripts



Figure 5.5 – Ambiguous Action Scripts. Cover illustration from the Egyptian communist publication *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, showing Egypt (front) and Sudan (back) jointly destroying the edifice of colonization (*al-istiʿmār*). Like the tale of Samson, which the drawing echoes, the act of destruction seems likely to end in self-sacrifice, as the building collapses on the mens' heads.

(Source: *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 30, 17 April 1946, in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97).

eschewed resistance and offered no calls to arms; instead, they worked to inspire pity for the poor and aversion for the rich (commenting proscriptively on the bad behavior of the powerful). This was likely both a function of the journal's intellectual readership, and the tradeoff that *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* made for its publishing license and the continued freedom of its authors: the journal's editor Yūsuf Darwīsh was a lawyer, and understood that to avoid prosecution according to §§ 171 and 174 of the Egyptian Penal Code, the journal could not print any incitement to crime or anything promoting the "overthrow of the

ruling order."[68] But despite *al-Fajr al-Jadīd's* quietism, the activists linked to it were heavily engaged in trade union activism, and signs of resistance appeared in smaller underground papers. In these circulars, short news stories appeared about factories exploiting workers—and workers fighting back through strikes or union organizing. Still, these stories were more often "tragedies" than "triumphal epics": resistance overwhelmingly ended with firings and arrests.

One exception to this corpus of passive and tragic action scripts was the communist tale "Wings of Wax." The story concerned three friends (a young man, a beautiful young lady, and their intellectual but argumentative colleague). One day, the story ran, the three friends visited an artist's studio to view a famous painting. At the studio, the first work of art they viewed was a painting of a female, bound and beaten, and imprisoned atop a high hill. But surveying the work, neither the artist nor the young men found any hope in the piece: as the artist explained, like the bound woman in the painting, people in this world were self-imprisoned—if they managed to break their chains, their only exit was a leap into the void. As the demoralized painter lamented, "People who live on high occupy every surface… they want freedom, but as soon as they reach the door, they return to their prison—confused and disconcerted about whether it was wise [to go back to captivity] or leap into the abyss."

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[68] See for instance Yūsuf Darwīsh's court records following his 1950 arrest for communist activism. The case is both dull and legally astute: the lawyer spends most of the file refusing to answer questions, denying any involvement in the production of communist propaganda, denying the chain of custody of documents found in his residence, and stating for the record that he has been mistreated in police custody. *Maḥkamat jināyah miṣr: Raqm al-Qaḍīyyah 2021 al-Juzʾ al-thānī* (Miṣr al-Qadīmah, 1951), in IISH ARCH02693/Folder 2.

Also see §§171, 174 of the Egyptian Penal Code of 1937. Al-Saʿīd Muṣṭafā al-Saʿīd, *Qānūn al-ʿuqūbāt al-Miṣrī: al-ṣādir bi-l-qānūn raqm 58 li-sanat 1937* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Fatḥ Allāh al-Yās Nūrī wa-Awlādihi, 1937), 140–141, 143–147.

The young woman, however, saw hope beneath the paint. As she argued back, the woman was fighting her chains and looking toward freedom. The young lady also expressed grief for the woman in the painting; with tears in her eyes, she asked "How did I not notice the suffering of the miserable woman?" The surly young intellectual, however, perhaps shaken by the painting, became inexplicably angry and stormed off; thus, his two friends were left alone to view the final painting, "Wings of Wax."

The painter led the young man and woman over to a dark corner, and a curtain rose, revealing a massive canvas. There in dark impassioned strokes, the painter had retold the tale of Icarus, who made wings of wax to flee from his prison. In the artist's version of the Greek tale, Icarus "desired the sun, he went to her… but his wings melted, and Icarus, lover of the sun, enemy of slavery, plunged down and died, shrouded in the remnants of his wings of wax." The painter interpreted these wings as "civilization," which men tried to use to gain freedom. But instead of freeing men, "civilization covered people's bodies and covered their souls," the artist explained. Unwilling to accept the painter's bleak outlook, the young lady asked if the glimmer on the horizon of the canvas was hope; but the painter replied in the negative, asking rhetorically from whom, and from what, would such a light come?

By now, the sun was setting, so the friends left the painter in his gloom and headed home. But on their way back, they came to a crossroads: on one side, a calm and quiet road leading off into the distance, on the other side, a busy road, where a group of provincial [ṣaʿāyidah] workers were returning from a hard day's labor, happily singing songs as they walked. As they traveled down the street, one of the workers bumped into the young lady, but she remained unperturbed. "Are you going on this road?" the young

woman's companion asked, pointing to the calmer route. But with a laugh of beautiful youthfulness, the girl said no. "I will take this street"—the road with the workers.[69]

Of all the tales studied, "Wings of Wax" was notable as one of the few stories involving a female protagonist in a positive, agentic role. The story was also rare among Egyptian communist tales, in that it involved both an affective action script (grief for the suffering of others) and a concrete action script (take the path of the workers). There were also implied scripts like "break your chains" and "take a leap." Even so, these implied scripts were described ambivalently, as such behaviors were clearly dangerous, difficult, and even deadly.

"Wings of Wax" was also an interesting study in how older morality tales were adapted to new purposes. In its oldest extant form (as told by the Roman poet Ovid) the story of Icarus was a "listen to your parents" tale involving a young boy and his father; and the boy was not escaping imprisonment through flight, but learning a lesson from his father. Moreover, in Ovid's version of the tale, Icarus' downfall was caused by filial disobedience and failing to stay between the limits.[70] *Al-Fajr al-Jadīd*'s story of the ill-fated flyer, however, departed from this moral, making Icarus a symbol of the communist activist (a "lover of the sun, enemy of slavery"), and a symbol of society broadly speaking, whose demise was ironically caused by the same technologies that enabled his flight.

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[69] A.R.Ṣ. [probably Aḥmad Rushdī Ṣāliḥ], "Ajniḥah min al-shamaʿ," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 2, 1 June 1945, 18–19 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97.

[70] In Ovid's version of the tale, Icarus is a young boy, not a man. According to the story, Icarus' father "Instruit et natum 'Medio' que, 'ut limite curras, Icare…'" (Lines 203-204) and "hortaturque sequi…" (Line 215), but Icarus "deseruitque ducem" (Line 224). For the entire passage, see: Lines 183–235 of Ovid, *Metamorphoses Book VIII,* ed. A.S. Hollis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 7–9, 59.

Similarly, the woman bound and beaten by her lover atop a mountain could be understood as symbolizing elites ("people who live on high" and "occupy every surface" but who lack true freedom), or a symbol of British-occupied Egypt (often portrayed as a maltreated or bound woman in Egyptian art). Whatever the case, there was something of an elite bias to the tale, reflecting the journal's authors and readership. The workers were a background feature, while the depressed painter, the hopeful young lady, her male friend, and the argumentative intellectual (clinging to his books) were all central to the tale. Each character provided a behavioral example for what one should or shouldn't do in response to the risk, danger, and discomfort inherent to social activism—and the female provided the positive behavioral example. The male characters, meanwhile, were portrayed as depressed and squabbling intellectuals (and were likely a veiled condemnation of the Workers' Vanguard's rivals in Iskra and the EMNL).

Overall, Egyptian morality tales of the late 1940s communicated many different action scripts. Communist scripts tended to be more reflexive (asking readers to change their mind about something) or affective (working to inspire pity for the poor and hatred for the rich). At the other end of the political spectrum, action scripts were less esoteric and more concrete. Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad's cautionary rape tales and stories of "mixing and murder" encouraged women not to remove the veil and not to leave the house. They further called on men to protect their female family members (by not allowing them to unveil or leave the home unaccompanied). For both genders, the club's newspaper also communicated a proscriptive message: do not mix.

The action scripts of "Shaykh in a Dance Club" were also notable, for containing not one but many overlapping scripts. First, the shaykh asked the crowd to cognitively

reposition the dancer, having the men imagine the dancer in familial roles (stating "Don't you have sisters? Don't you have daughters?") The men then physically relocate the dancer, with the story describing how the men "rescued" the dancer, she married a pious man, "and now she is a housewife and mother of children."[71] Thus, one action script in the story made a case for moving women out of erotic entertainment space and back into the family, where they would no longer pose a threat to marital dyadism.

Second, the story used moral metaphors to encourage readers to take further action regarding the club as an entertainment space. The story described both the club and the dancer as "filth," and described club patrons as "flies swarming around." The story thus appealed to a contamination metaphor; and if Ricœur, quoting Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* writes that metaphor "makes one see things because it 'represents things as in a state of activity,'"[72] the story invited readers to see the club as a place of decay and contamination attracting insects. This *istiʾārah* [metaphor] thus not only borrowed meaning, it imported emotions and action scripts specific to the source domain: feel disgust, distance yourself, clean the dirt, and shoo away or exterminate the flies.

There were other action scripts as well. For instance, the script for repentance strongly permeated the story: as the tale narrates, the club patrons heard the shaykh's words, shed tears of mercy for the dancer, and repented. The opening act of the story (in which Ṭanṭāwī encountered one of the club patrons in the mosque praying) served to reinforce this repentance script. The morality tale was thus two nested tales: a *mise en*

[71] ʿAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī, "Shaykh fī marqaṣ!" [part 1], *Majallat al-Risālah* 673, 27 May 1946, 574–575; ʿAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī, "Shaykh fī marqaṣ!" [part 2], *Majallat al-Risālah* 674, 3 June 1946, 599–601.

[72] Paul Ricœur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, 48.

abyme of a shaykh in a mosque and a shaykh in a dance club—one shaykh "in place" and another "out of place."[73]

In the end, "Shaykh in Dance Club!" was therefore above all a story of action. Structured to model movement, the story described change in multiple registers, using many different narrative strategies. But perhaps the most important action script of the story was saved for last. As the final line of the morality tale exclaimed, "If only a shaykh would enter every dance club! If only a shaykh would enter the Ministry of Education!"[74] Here then was the moral of the story: an action script encouraging the entry of religious functionaries into entertainment and government spaces—in short, a wholesale re-mapping of Egyptian public space to solve the problem of dangerous entertainment.

Conclusion: The Dog's Birthday Party (and Other Moral Totems in 1940s Egypt)

Overall, many large Egyptian literary and cultural journals of the 1940s and 1950s, (including *al-Risālah, al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, and *Ākhir Sāʿah*) printed well-developed morality tales and parables in their pages. Meanwhile, faced with smaller operating budgets and constraints on page space, smaller club newsletters and publications like *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb, al-Muqāwamah al-Shaʿbīyyah, Kifāḥ al-Ummah*, and *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad*, focused on publishing short news items and (purportedly) true stories that could be imbued with moral lessons. The "mixing and murder" stories that appeared in *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* were a good example of these practices, validating Hayden White's observation that whether recounting history or contemporary events,

[73] Mieke Bal, *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 52–58.

[74] ʿAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī, "Shaykh fī marqaṣ!" [part 2], 599–601.

"narrativizing discourse serves the purpose of moralizing judgments," and constitutes a process of imposing meaning on events.[75]

But activists did more than just locate meaning or a "moral of the story" in events; activists also embedded emotions and action scripts in their stories, and used narrative as an important tool for negotiating norms, advancing guardianship claims, and shaping behavior. "Shaykh in a Dance Club," from the pages of *al-Risālah*, was in many ways representative of how activists accomplished this. First, ideas about morality in the tale were communicated through terms of negative and positive moral valuation—especially Cluster I terms of contamination, and high/low contrasts. Second, the story used affective signaling (such as shock, shame, anger, and disgust) to evaluate behavior and encourage action. Shock, for instance, signaled the shaykh was out of place in the club; the anger of club patrons was an alert and agonistic signal that the shaykh was transgressing social roles and divisions of space. Meanwhile, the shaykh's struggle with club patrons over who should shame represented a battle for who was at fault. Ultimately, the shaykh won: he refused to shame (and successfully shamed club patrons), thus producing a revolutionary shift in behavior.

Third, the story demonstrated how activists used narratives to a) reveal information about existing moral maps, and b) challenge these maps. The story challenged erotic entertainment space and prescribed the expansion of religious space into government. The tale also communicated important messages about gender roles (and gendered spaces), relocating the woman out of entertainment and back into familial roles and domestic spaces. Fourth and finally, "Shaykh in a Dance Club" communicated a number

[75] Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," in *On Narrative*, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 19–23.

of ideal action scripts for listeners to follow: for religious activists, expansion into entertainment spaces; and for club patrons, repentance and mosque attendance.

Such stories suggest that readers should be attuned to certain questions when reading activist stories. For instance, how was normative language used (who and what was described as contaminated, low, deviant, or flawed, and what was described as high and honorable)? Which emotions were expressed, and what did these emotions signal? Were there any transgressions of affective norms (anger when there should be sadness, pride where there should be shame)? What social maps (roles and divisions of space) were described, and what parts of the social map did the tale look to legitimize, contest, transgress, or redraw? And finally, what action scripts (prescriptive and proscriptive, cognitive-affective and behavioral) were embedded in the narrative?

Overall, studying morality tales in this way yields several comparative insights about moral claims in Egyptian social activist campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s. First, a comparative reading reveals that publications like *al-Daʿwah*, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad*, and *al-Risālah* usually featured stories about dangers to the home. In line with this focus, characters were usually defined by their household roles: husbands and wives, fathers and mothers, sons and daughters astray in new entertainment spaces. Action scripts were diverse: there were proscriptive messages warning against emulating Western gender and sartorial practices, and prescriptive messages about removing women from public spaces, maintaining traditional gender norms, and protecting the home. But prominent in these tales was a linkage between the Egyptian home and the "house of Egypt"—that politicization of the home previously

noted by Lisa Pollard.[76] As the Egyptian saying went, "the nation is the family repeated, and the homeland is the house magnified."[77] Thus, concerns about the family were not just idle moralizing: they were political grievances.

Meanwhile, Egyptian communists tended to write stories about the marketplace and the workplace, in which the characters were usually workers and bosses. In this imaginary, bosses and landowners usually played negative roles, while workers and farmers occupied more sympathetic roles. However, the limited political power of Egyptian communist clubs, and vigorous government repression against communist activists, meant that most of these stories had ambiguous or tragic endings: farmers and workers slaved and died, labor organizing resulted in mass firings, activists were arrested and tortured, a woman enchained on a mountaintop considered a hopeless leap, and Icarus' flight led to immolation. Surprisingly, Egyptian communists also avoided telling morality tales about radically upending the social hierarchy, equalizing class relations, or eliminating poverty and eradicating disease. Most of the tales contained action scripts focused on achieving more modest goals: generating guilt, pity, or compassion in middle and upper-class readers toward the poor, and condemning elite behaviors.

Because authors were often anonymous and papers read surreptitiously, there is little information on how these stories were received. But one glimpse at reception suggests

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[76] Lisa Pollard, "From Husbands and Housewives to Suckers and Whores," 649.

Lisa Pollard and Beth Baron have both authored a number of excellent studies that expand on this theme, examining how ideas about family, home, and motherhood played in to Egyptian nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries. See: Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805-1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Beth Baron, "Mothers, Morality, and Nationalism in Pre-1919 Egypt," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, eds. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih and Reeva S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 271-288; Beth Baron, *Egypt as Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

[77] Aḥmad Ḥassan al-Zayyāt, "Mithl al-Miṣrīyyah al-ḥadīthah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 468, 22 June 1942.

the affective focus of communist stories and recruitment strategies met with mixed results. For instance, Nawāl al-Saʿdāwī remembered that in 1946 when she about fifteen, she became friends with a girl named Sāmiyah at their boarding school (the Helwan Secondary School for Girls). Sāmiyah was in Iskra, and secretly passed Nawāl copies of *al-Jamāhīr* to read. Nawāl would furtively read the paper in the restroom, but was frustrated at being "barely able to decipher… or to understand" the paper's opaque style—which she said was "more difficult than that of *al-Akkad*, or my uncle Shaykh Muhammad, or [the 8th century Arab scholar] Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ." The paper frustrated her so much, Nawāl said she would tear it into pieces and angrily flush it down the toilet. But Sāmiyah "continued to thrust this newspaper on me," and use words Nawāl could not understand: "The word dialectics made me feel depressed." She further related that Sāmiyah "always made me feel guilty, as though we were responsible for the British occupation of Egypt… or for the widespread poverty, ignorance and disease… So all the girls in the dormitory insisted on calling her Bo'o Bo'o Effendi."[78]

Nawāl's first real engagement with political activism came later, in her third year of medical school at Cairo University. It was autumn 1951, and all the clubs were on campus making speeches. She remembered little of these speeches—except for a Muslim Brotherhood speaker, who told the story of how God sent a spider to weave a web over the mouth of a cave, to hide the Prophet Muḥammad while he was fleeing Mecca. She also remembered that she and her female colleagues kept a safe distance from the communist in their class, Yūsuf Idrīs. They believed communism was a "combination of atheism, heresy, corruption and immorality." But one day, she met another medical

[78] Nawal El Saadawi, *A Daughter of Isis: The Autobiography of Nawal El Saadawi*, trans. Sherif Hetata (London: Zed Books, 1999), 209–224.

student Aḥmad Ḥilmī, a communist activist who edited a small student paper named *Shuʿlat al-Taḥrīr*. Ḥilmī had written a short story for the paper called "The Boy and the Dog," and he gave Nawāl a copy to read. Like many other communist morality tales, the story highlighted the suffering of the poor, and focused on the story of a child in order to inspire pity. Whereas "Boo Boo Effendi's" newspaper had not inspired the intended guilt, pity, or grief, however, Ḥilmī's story had the desired effect: "Fifty years have gone by since then," Nawāl later wrote, "but I still carry a vivid picture in my memory, that of a small crippled boy and a small crippled dog sitting side by side as they eat out of a dustbin." Later, sitting with Ḥilmī in a seminar, she further remembered Idrīs approaching them, to tell Ḥilmī "You know I read your short story 'The Boy and the Dog.' When I go to sleep at night I see the crippled dog and the crippled boy… I felt it was more effective than a hundred political articles dealing with poverty."[79] Whether one was in the Muslim Brotherhood or Iskra, then, stories were a powerful tool for capturing attention and making political positions memorable.

Even with their different political outlooks, it is also notable that different clubs shared certain moral concerns in common. There was a shared condemnation of elite spaces and behaviors: the communists agreed with Ikhwān and Miṣr al-Fatāh members that casinos were problematic spaces, as a leisure space where wasteful luxury spending occurred. (One communist tract, for instance, decried the fact that "While we find the King sending thousands of our troops to fight against Jewish workers and peasants in

[79] Nawal El Saadawi, *A Daughter of Isis*, 273–278; Nawal El Saadawi, *Walking through Fire: The Later Years of Nawal El Saadawi*, trans. Sherif Hetata (London: Zed Books, 2009), 250–251.

Palestine, we also find him gambling and drinking at the Automobile Club every evening with Jewish capitalists."[80])

There were also types of morality tales that clubs shared in common. *Al-Fajr al-Jadīd* shared a fictional story about a servant girl raped by her master—although unlike Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad's tales, the action script in the communist version of the tale involved protecting the poor, not confining women to the home.[81] Some of the Muslim Brotherhood's stories, moreover, were strikingly similar to stories found in communist publications. News items in *al-Daʿwah* and *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* described employees mistreated by bosses, and contrasted the fate of rich and poor in Egypt; one such story, for instance, described the firing and starvation of workers from a textile factory, and contrasted their plight with Egyptian leaders from different political parties, who the paper described as building ivory palaces, buying up large tracts of agricultural land, partying in clubs, and relaxing in European resorts.[82] The Brotherhood also printed fictional stories that were strikingly similar to communist tales. One such story in *al-Daʿwah*, for instance, related the tragic tale of a tenet farmer (named Mujāhid), exploited by a crooked landowner. The story ended with the farmer leaving his land in tears, then dying.[83]

Muḥammad's Youth condemned elites for their wasteful spending and disregard for the poor as well—albeit not with the same regularity and focus as Ikhwān publications. Moreover, these critiques were stylistically characteristic of the club's brand of "outrage

[80] *Al Hubz wa al-Hurrīyyah* 1, February 1949, in *Communism in Egypt*, FO 371/374/76 [1949].
[81] Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Laythī, "al-Sayyid al-ṣaghīr," *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* 27, 27 March 1946, 19–20, in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 97.
[82] M.F., "Faṣl 1200 ʿāmil," *al-Daʿwah* 26, 27 Shawwāl 1370/31 July 1951, 14; "Ismaʿū li-haʾulā," *al-Daʿwah* 39, 13 Ṣafar 1371/13 November 1951, both in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1.
[83] "Nihāyat ʿābid al-arḍ," *al-Daʿwah* 2, 29 Rabīʿa al-Thānī 1370/6 February 1951, 15 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1.

journalism" (complete with liberal use of multiple exclamation points and question marks). One example was a short news item about ʿAfāf Luṭfī al-Sayyid [Marsot], a history student at the American University of Cairo at the time. In a story meant to provide readers with a "real idea of the kind of education" being offered by American University, an institution that "works to destroy every virtue," *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* wrote in scandalous tones that "this university throws a birthday party—not for any great man—but for the dog of Luṭfī al-Sayyid Pasha's daughter!!" Describing professors and students enjoying the dog's birthday cake (with candles) while "the vast majority of the nation writhes in starvation," the paper asked rhetorically "is there any greater scorn and wanton negligence than this?"[84]

The article was a good example of how clubs chose certain behaviors, spaces, and imaginary types (be it the intellectual, the landowner, the religious reactionary, the feminist, the liberal, or the dancer) as "moral totems": symbols of social harms and dangers. As part of this process of moral claims-making, activists embedded objects, spaces, behaviors, and individuals into stories, making these things representative of a certain deviant type, a "whole spectrum of problems and aberrations."[85] Thus, the beach or the dancer could be read as representing the decay of public morality and collapse of the family; the landowner could become a symbol of economic exploitation and underdevelopment; and the dog's birthday imagined as a symbol of elite waste and depravity. By weaving these moral totems into disturbing narratives, activists worked to elicit certain emotions and produce "moral panic" or outrage. These stories sometimes

[84] "ʿĪd mīlād!!" *Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad* 224, 15 Jumādá al-ākhirah 1369/4 April 1950, 5 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5.

[85] Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 51–55.

developed into moral myths, which outlined what would happen if deviance were left unpunished. Examples of such myths included: the male or female with an uncovered head would cause the breakdown of social order and the free reign of passions, erasing the distinction between man and animal; the dancer would tempt men to forsake their marital dyads, leading to social cheating and the breakdown of the family.

Such myths and symbols were an important part of political claims-making. By laying claim to the problematic nature of certain activities, activists positioned themselves as social guardians over certain activities, spaces, and groups.[86] Thus, the Brotherhood and Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad positioned themselves as guardians of the family by telling stories about the home and entertainment spaces, and communists positioned themselves as the guardians of the workplace by telling stories about bosses and employees.

But most contested behaviors, roles, and spaces continued to be tolerated in Egyptian society—because a) no consensus could be reached on the extent of the social harm caused by the behavior, b) the deviant practice was tied up in a social bargaining process (e.g. political interests, market practices, etc.), or c) those who opposed the behavior proved unable to muster the resources to force others to alter their behavior. And while activists could seize the power to punish violators through vigilante policing (a behavior that will be explored in Chapter 8 "Murder as a Moral Imperative"), community policing was a risky and costly endeavor that required resources. Thus, the vast majority of Egyptian activists dedicated their energies to less coercive methods of persuasion: they

[86] Sean P. Hier, "Thinking beyond Moral Panic: Risk, Responsibility, and the Politics of Moralization," *Theoretical Criminology* 12, no. 2 (2008): 176, 180–181; Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (London: Routledge, 2002).

told stories, "performed emotions" by participating in affective displays, and sent negative feedback about behavior through dirty looks, gestures, and gossip. And of course, Egyptians continued participating in public debates about appropriate behavior, writing passionate articles in *al-Risālah*, *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, *Miṣr al-Fatāh,* and *al-Daʿwah*.

Chapter 6

The Lowly Toad, the Foolish French, and the Moral Maquisard: Algerian Tales of Transformation, Revival, and Rebellion

Just after dawn on All Saints Day, 1 November 1954, the Biskra–Arris bus slowly wound its way up the Tighanimine Gorge, hugging the wall of the rocky mountain pass. It was around 7 o'clock in the morning, and the bus was crowded with some fifty Berber and Arab locals, mainly women in black haïks and men in gandouras. Two French Europeans, Guy Monnerot and his wife Jeanine, were also on board. Aged 23 and 21 years old respectively, Guy and Jeanine had recently arrived in Algeria, where Guy had taken a job as a teacher. Today, they were on their way to lunch with friends in Arris.

As the bus neared kilometer marker 79, the driver slammed his breaks. There were screams and shouts as passengers flew forward, and a cloud of dust enveloped the gravely road. Then, the door of the bus jerked opened, and Bachir Chihani climbed aboard, brandishing a rifle. Peering out the bus windows, passengers could now see the situation. A pile of rocks blocked the road, setting up an ambush point for a group of 10-15 FLN guerrillas. The would-be revolutionaries had chosen the bus for a number of reasons: the strategic geography of the gorge worked well for an ambush—but the bus company had also recently dropped the business of FLN commander Mostefa Ben Boulaïd, who operated a bus line of his own. It was Boulaïd's deputy, Chihani, who now stood on the bus. Examining the passengers, he spotted the notable Hadj Ben Saddock, the Muslim *caïd* of M'Chounèche, and ordered him off the bus. Then, Chihani saw the Monnerots. He waved them off the bus as well.

Standing outside with the *caïd* and her husband, Jeanine later recounted what happened next. The commandos stood in the roadway, grasping their rifles. They were wearing khaki, and scarves obscured their faces. The passengers on the bus cowered; the silence in the gorge was complete. "Then everything happened so fast," she relates. Chihani exchanged words in Arabic with the Muslim *caïd*. Suddenly, they changed to French, and the notable shouted "I am the *caïd* Saddock, captain in the French Army, what is happening?" The *caïd* made a motion—perhaps reached into his pocket—and from the side, the commando Mohammed Sbaïhi squeezed the trigger of his Sten gun. There was a loud noise, and a burst of bullets. Guy shouted "But we are teachers…" Then, bullets tore into *caïd* Saddock, then Guy, then Jeanine. The three fell to the ground.

Chihani's unit would later claim the *caïd* was reaching for his pistol. Whatever the case, the militants proceeded to rob the passengers on the bus. Then, the bus was allowed to pass, and the guerrillas scattered back into the rocky hills. By the time a vehicle found them, it was too late for Guy, who had been shot in the chest. Remembering that day, Jeanine remembered "Until my death, I will hear his heartbreaking cry."[1]

While in retrospect 1 November 1954 became the start date for a glorious revolution,[2] the events of All Saints Day 1954 were initially neither glorious nor revolutionary. With bombs failing to detonate, armed groups unable to capture military posts, and some cadres defecting the night of the action, even the "sons of All Saints" were at first

[1] Jeanine Monnerot interview with *Le Figaro*, 29–30 October 1994, in Nordine Boulhaïs, *Des harkis berbères de l'Aurès au nord de la France*, 70–81.

[2] "Hommage aux condamnés à mort de la glorieuse Révolution du 1er novembre 1954," *Algérie Presse Service*, 25 July 2017, Online at: http://www.aps.dz/algerie/60962-hommage-aux-condamnes-a-mort-de-la-glorieuse-revolution-du-1er-novembre-1954

disheartened. As described in Chapter 3, Algerians described feeling the movement would fail, and frightened locals in the Aurès closed schools for two days afterwards in mourning. Moreover, of all the deaths that day, the murder of Guy Monnerot dominated the news—a disaster for the militants who looked to convince the public of the justice of their cause.[3] Also strange about the attacks was the choice of date: the occasion of a Catholic holiday (All Saints Day) seemed to contradict the secular democratic narrative the FLN later emphasized in its public mythmaking.

Moreover, the most prominent symbol invoked on All Saints Day 1954 was somewhat unusual: an internal FLN letter on 29 October referred to the planned uprising by the code name "the circumcision." The name invoked a cleansing process, a symbol of masculinity, and a cultural rite of belonging.[4] But who or what was being cleansed? It is possible the FLN was suggesting removing the French from Algeria would be a purifying process. However, a close reading of the FLN's first documentary exchanges suggests "the circumcision" was a reference to cleansing the Algerian Muslim community, by stamping out collaborators, assimilationists, and gradualists. As FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella read on the radio station *Ṣawt al-ʿArab* in Cairo that day, the new organization's goal was to achieve national independence and restore a sovereign Algerian state, and to achieve the "internal objective" of "*political cleansing* by returning the revolutionary

[3] Mohammed Harbi, *1954, la guerre commence en Algérie* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1998), 21–24; Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie, Tome 1: le fils de la Toussaint* (Paris: Fayard, 1976), 388–454; Nordine Boulhaïs, *Des harkis berbères de l'Aurès*, 63–81.

[4] Letter from Mohamed Boudiaf ["Tebbib"] to the External Delegation in Cairo [Mohamed Khider, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Hocine Aït Ahmed], Berne, Switzerland, 29 October 1954, in Mabrouk Belhocine, *Le courrier Alger-le Caire*, 77–82, 223–228.

Linguistically, the idea of circumcision can also indicate a process of fixing, repairing, or "making well." See: Salem Chaker and Andrzej Zaborski, *Etudes berbères et chamito-sémitiques: mélanges offerts à Karl-G. Prasse* (Paris: Éditions Peeters, 2000), 298; Chorfi Mohamed Séghir, "Analyse des représentations de la circoncision en Algérie" (PhD diss., Université Louis Pasteur, 1987).

national movement to its true path, *through the destruction of all vestiges of corruption and reformism*, [the] causes of our present regression."[5] The selection of Muslim administrative targets like *caïd* Saddock supports this reading.

Besides these statements on cleansing, the first few FLN documents provided other hints at the meaning of the movement. For example, the FLN's first communiqué described its militants as taking action to advance the cause of independence, in the name of "the majority of elements still holy [*saints*] and resolved"[6]—perhaps an allusion to All Saints Day [*La Toussaint*] and the internal cleansing process. Retrospectives further suggested that 1 November was chosen to mark a beginning, with militants striking on the first hour of the first of the month. Other activists referred to 1 November as "le jour J" [D-Day], symbolically linking their movement to the struggle to liberate France from German occupation.[7] But as of November 1954, there were few other indications as to the movement's symbolic worldview.

Studying the FLN's 1970s-era government statements, James McDougall noted that the FLN's "official history of the revolution is that of a glorious epic in which only extremes of purity or corruption are possible, in which 'men were snatched from their mediocrity to become the 'sublime heroes' or the 'absolute traitors' of the unfolding tragedy.'… The constitution of 1976 asserted in its opening paragraphs that the war of

[5] Emphasis added. First Communiqué of the Secretariat of the ALN-FLN, "Proclamation au peuple algérien aux militants de la cause nationale," adopted 23 October 1954, published 1 November 1954, in Mabrouk Belhocine, *Le courrier Alger-le Caire*, 77–82, 223–228.

[6] Ibid.

[7] According to Courrière's (often fanciful) account, Didouche Mourad recommended the date as a beginning, as opposed to 15 October (too early for them to pull together plans) and the 25 October, which was symbolically uninspirational. Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie, Tome 1*, 276–277.

national liberation 'will remain in history as one of the great epics marking the resurrection of the peoples of the Third World.'"[8]

Here then was the myth, fully-formed. But as this chapter will explore, it took work to move from the vague and imprecise beginnings of 1 November 1954 to the developed collective myth of "sublime heroes" fighting a "glorious epic." Thus, after 1 November (and concomitant with the *ralliement* process described in Chapter 3), the FLN worked to craft a coherent organizational narrative, and engaged in multiple battles to convince Algerians, French citizens, and international audiences of the justice and morality of its cause. And by the time of Algerian independence in 1962, some of the FLN's greatest battles had been won in the field of mythmaking. So how did the organization use myths and morality tales to attract support and mobilize followers? And specifically, how did the organization craft a *mythomoteur,* or "constitutive political myth,"[9] that both provided direction to the movement and mobilized individuals?

To better understand this process of mythmaking, this chapter will thus explore the FLN's use of morality tales. First, the chapter will provide a brief overview of the stories Algerian activists told to justify separation from France. Then, the chapter will examine in detail how the FLN used a *mythomoteur*—a myth that "makes things go," or a driving narrative that "'makes sense' of [the group's] experiences" and "guide[s] collective action"[10]—to make claims, mobilize audiences, and integrate members into the organization. As the chapter argues, this collective morality tale did more than instill

[8] James McDougall, "Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s–1990s," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 124.

[9] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1988), 58.

[10] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 102; Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* 24–25.

events with order and meaning: the narrative also provided significant benefits to FLN supporters. It gave individuals a clear role in a heroic story, and with this role a sense of meaning, power, and agency in their own lives. But above all, the myth, as shall be seen, made men move.

The Algerian Moral Imaginary: From ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib to the French Revolution

Surveying the moral appeals and narrative practices found in FLN tracts and memoirs, one quickly discovers the diversity and hybridity of the Algerian moral imaginary. *Échos Militaires de la Wilaya d'Oran*, to take one example, regularly quoted as wisdom everything from African proverbs and Pope Pius XII to Clausewitz and Faulkner.[11] As had been the case in Egypt, Algerian activists also searched Islamic history and traditions about the heroes of early Islam, finding stories supportive of revolution and Algerian nationalism. The Battle of Badr, for instance, was used as positive example for auspiciously beginning a struggle for a righteous cause.[12]

Activists also found morality tales for social change in messianic, apocalyptic, and millenarian traditions. For instance, in the 1940s Algerians exchanged rumors about the coming of the *mahdī*, and some said the Caliph ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib had been spotted riding a white horse and brandishing his sword on Mount Toumiet. In maraboutic circles, there were allusions to cultural scripts concerning the "master of the hour" [*moul-es-sâa*, *mûl al-saʿa*], who would appear to usher in an era of justice. And in Orléansville in 1954, during their weekly visits to the tomb of local saint Sidi Bentrama, local women could be

[11] "Ils ont dit…" *Échos Militaires de la Wilaya d'Oran* 3, ca. June 1958, 38–39 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1.

[12] Note on "Pages immortelles de Islam: de Badr (624) au 1er novembre 1954," *Résistance Algérienne* 2, 15 November 1956 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

heard exchanging rumors about an old man with a white beard who had appeared to warn the *umma* to prepare for future change.[13]

In a study of the "moral economy of peasant rebellion," Julia Clancy-Smith analyzed this messianic and millenarian corpus in detail, exploring how Algerians mobilized their cultural canons of "saints, rebels, and mahdis" (and used sacred spaces) to produce anti-colonial revolt in the decades following the 1830 conquest. As she noted, Algerian leaders collapsed multiple traditions (warrior tales, stories about the *mahdī* and the "master of the hour," etc.) in crafting their moral claims to leadership. Based on her studies of rumor exchange, Clancy-Smith also argued that more than just idle chatter or positive/negative feedback, Algerian rumors represented an active attempt to mobilize listeners. Rumors worked to transform the supply of information available to individuals facing decisions; gossip about millenarian expectations also communicated to others "individual and collective hopes and aspirations," constituting veiled information about what to expect and which action scripts should be retrieved from the collective repertoire.[14]

Many of these trends persisted into the 1940s and 1950s—the FLN, for instance, would similarly combine diverse genres, and collapse various rebel roles and scripts in crafting their program of revolt. But while Islamic (and especially Sufi or maraboutic) myths and scripts for envisaging change had been the primary mode of collective

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[13] Mouloud Haddad, "Les maîtres de l'heure: soufisme et eschatologie en Algérie coloniale (1845–1901)," *Revue d'Histoire du XIXe siècle* 41 (2010): 49–61.

Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 38–40; Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN* (Algiers: Éditions Chihab, 2013), 46; Mohammed Harbi, *Une vie debout: mémoires politiques* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2001), 55–66.

[14] Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 100–101, 120–121, 262–264.

organizing in Algeria in the 19th century, changing educational regimes and the increased circulation of information meant that by the 1940s and 1950s, the source materials Algerian activists were adapting had shifted. For instance, anti-colonial activists now mobilized Biblical tales not found in the Qurʾān, such as the story of Samson and Delilah. Mohammed Ould Cheikh and Mahieddine Bachetarzi's *Le Samson algérien*, for instance, dramatized the Algerian rejection of French rule as a mixed marriage between an Algerian nationalist "Samson" (a fictionalized version of the Emir Khalid, grandson of Abdelkader) and a French "Delilah." Staged in 1946, the performance sparked nationalist demonstrations in Oran, causing the play to be banned by the French administration.[15]

In addition to Biblical source material, some of the actors involved in the 19th century rebellions that Clancy-Smith studied had themselves been added to the collective treasury of legends. FLN, MNA, and PCA publications appealed to rebellious role-models like Masinissa and Jugurtha (2nd century BCE) and the heroines Kahina (7th century CE) and Lalla Fatma (19th century CE). The 19th century rebels Shaykh Muhammad Al-Mokrani and the Emir Abdelkader were also figures whose heroic exploits were frequently recited as examples of nationalist revolt and resistance.[16]

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[15] See: Khalid Amine and Marvin Carlson, *The Theatres of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia: Performance Traditions of the Maghreb* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 117.

[16] See for instance: CDL-PCA, "Paysans Algériens!" Blida (n.d., ca. April 1956) in SHD GR 1H 1447; PCA, "Tout pour la lutte unie de libération," Algiers (25 October 1957) in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3; "L'Algérie ne sera jamais française," *Liberté* 24, June 1958 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1; Mohamed Aït Amrane's Kabyle adaptation of "L'international," "Debout, fils d'Amazigh" (1945); Kateb Yacine, *Abdelkader et l'indépendance algérienne* (Algiers: En-Nahdha, 1948); Algérie: l'heure de l'Indépendance," *Résistance Algérienne* 11, Edition B, November 1956, 7 in SHD GR 1H 2589; "Quelques points d'histoire," *El Moudjahid* 51, 29 September 1959, 483 [Tome 2]; "La résistance algérienne ne date pas d'aujourd'hui," *La Voix du Peuple: Organe Clandestin du Mouvement National Algérien* 4, 16 January 1955, 1, 3, in BNF MICR D-1263; "Le peuple algérien n'a jamais désarme," *La Voix du Peuple: Organe Clandestin du Mouvement National Algérien* 23, December 1956, in BNF MICR D-1263; "5 juillet 1830–5 juillet 1958: 128ème anniversaire de la conquete coloniale," *Mouvement National Algérien: Bulletin d'Information du MNA* 21, 3 July 1958, 5 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1.

Algerian anti-colonial activists also drew from Mediterranean legends. For instance, Algerians recited stories about folkloric figures called "bandits of honor." Like Robin Hood legends in Europe, these stories provided scripts that could be used to selectively legitimize "honorable transgressions" of law and order. In this mode, "honorable outlaws" like the popular 1940s heroes Oumeri [Ahmed Belaïdi] and Hadj Ali Arezki came from among the people and fought tyranny.[17]

Counterhegemonic readings of French myths, stories, and historic episodes were also prevalent in Algerian activism. Algerians compared the French occupation of Algeria to the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, for instance, even rewriting the lyrics of "Vous n'aurez pas l'Alsace et la Lorraine" into a new song: "Vous n'aurez pas notre terre algérienne."[18] However, for Algerian activists who had attended French schools, the French revolutionary script (in which a group of patriots casts off a tyrant), stood out as a particularly salient paradigm for anti-colonial mythmaking. As a result, the French Revolution was one of the most frequently referenced myths, with activists talking about 1789 and describing the "colonial Bastilles" France had erected in Algeria.[19]

As was the case with Islamic and Berber canons, these borrowings were highly selective. As Zohra Drif explained, "Trained in French school, it was only natural that we extracted references from French texts on rights, duties, universal values, and humanist

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[17] Ali Zamoum, *Le pays des homes libres: Tamurt Imazighen, mémoires d'un combattant algérien, 1940–1962* (Éditions La Pensée Sauvage, 1998), 33; J. Dejeux, "Bandit d'honneur (Kabylie, Aurès)," *Encyclopédie Berbère 9* (Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1991), 1328–1331; Settar Ouatmani, "Arezki L'Bachir, un 'bandit d'honneur' en Kabylie au xixe siècle," *Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 136 (November 2014), http://journals. openedition.org/remmm/8514.

[18] PCA, "Sur l'air: vous n'aurez pas l'Alsace et la Lorraine," Oran (May 1960), Ref. No. 2401/AMM/CAO in SHD GR 1H 3092 bis.

[19] "Communiqué du MNA du 13 juillet 1958," *La Voix du Peuple* 38, August 1958, and "Une lettre de Messali-Hadj à Nehru," *La Voix du Peuple* 7, 16 March 1955 in BNF MICR D-1263; Colonel Ouamrane, "Ordre du jour," *Révolution: Organe les Combattants de la Wilaya IV* no. 3, 1957, 2 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3.

principles." Between the different versions of the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, for instance, Algerian anti-colonial activists "extracted" a prooftext from the 1793 *Déclaration* (shunning the earlier, more famous 1789 version of the document)—because the 1793 version contained the important Article 35. Zohra recalled that by 1956, she and her friend Samia had memorized Article 35: "When the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is for the people and for each portion of the people the most sacred of rights and the most indispensable of duties." She also described devouring Jules Michelet's *History of the French Revolution*, as well as the speeches of Georges Danton, Maximilien Robespierre, and Louis Antoine de Saint-Just.[20]

Besides the French Revolution, the most frequently transposed myth was that of World War II and the French Resistance. As part of a highly elaborated morality tale concerning the legitimacy of Algerian resistance to the French army, FLN activists referenced the poems of René Char, watched films on the French Resistance, and sang "Le chant des partisans."[21] Communiqués, meanwhile, accused the French government of fascism, dubbed French parachutists the "French Gestapo" and "SS [Schutzstaffel]," and compared the French razing of Algerian villages to the Nazi massacre of French civilians at Oradour-sur-Glane (with FLN tracts calling massacres in Algerian villages "Algerian Oradours").[22] The historical experience of the Resistance also provided an important

[20] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 170; "Rapport d'Aït Ahmed, membre du Bureau Politique du PPA, au Comité Central Élargi," (December 1948) in *Les archives de la révolution algérienne*, ed. Mohamed Harbi (Paris: Éditions Jeune Afrique, 1981), 18–22; "L'armée française et ses complexes," *El Moudjahid* 38, 17 March 1959, 190 [Tome 1]; Hocine Aït Ahmed, *Mémoires d 'un combattant: l'esprit d'indépendance 1942–1952* (Paris: Éditions Sylvie Messinger, 1983), 93, 186.

[21] "Poèmes d'hier et d'aujourd'hui," *Échos Militaires de la Wilaya d'Oran* 3, n.d., 40 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1; "Serkadji: quartier des femmes," *Liberté: Organe Central du Parti Communiste Algérien* 38, 18 February 1961, 5 in SHD GR 1H 3092 bis.

[22] See the testimonies of Haddad Hamada and Slimane Ould Younès, in *Le procès du réseau jeanson*, eds. Francis Jeanson and Marcel Péju (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), 49–50, 227; Arslane, "Ben M'Hidi est mort!" *Révolution: Organe les Combattants de la Wilaya IV* no. 3, 1957, 1 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3;

vocabulary of resistance for Algerian activists. While the ALN-FLN started its career (1954-1955) referring to its activists as patriots, soldiers, activists [*militants*], nationalists, jihadists [*moudjahidines*], and fighters [*combattants*], by 1956 the organization was consistently calling ALN fighters *maquisards*.[23] Because this myth was held in common with French activists, this particular morality tale will be covered more thoroughly in Chapter 7. However, it is important to note that the idea of Algerians as *maquisards* developed concurrently with, and perhaps even informed, this myth as understood by French activists in FLN support networks.

Algerians borrowed other morality tales from the French cultural corpus. For instance, activists frequently retold Jean de La Fontaine fables, such as "Le corbeau et le renard" [The Fox and the Crow], "Le villageois et le serpent" [The Villager and the Snake], and "Le rat et l'huître" [The Rat and the Oyster]. (For an explanation of Algerian uses of "Le rat et l'huître," for instance, see Chapter 10 "Acts of Faith and Worthy Deeds").[24] FLN activists also adapted African fables into anti-colonial parables like "The

"Les 'Oradour' algériens," *Résistance Algérienne* 6, Edition C, 13 May 1957, 8 in SHD GR 1H 2589; "Déclaration de Hamel El Mansour, rédigée à l'intention de ses juges," Versailles (n.d.) in Patrick Kessel and Giovanni Pirelli, *Le peuple algérien et la guerre: lettres et témoignages d'algériens,* 347; "Déclaration d'Amar Ouzegane devant le Tribunal Militaire d'Alger," 12 January 1959, in Patrick Kessel and Giovanni Pirelli, *Le peuple algérien et la guerre: lettres et témoignages d'algériens,* 328.

[23] "Tout pour la victoire," *El Moudjahid* 1, June 1956, 14 [Tome 1]; "Les maquis algériens," *El Moudjahid* 16, 15 January 1958, 270–271 [Tome 1]; ALN-FLN, "Pourquoi les Algériens combattent," Wilaya I (1961) in SHAT 1H1642/D1, in *Harbi and Meynier Collection*, 579–581, Letter from Ramdane Abane in Algiers to the FLN External Delegation in Cairo, 20 January 1956, in Mabrouk Belhocine, *Le courrier Alger-le Caire*, 127–129; Letter from Djamila Bouhired to her brother Nourredine, Algiers (16 March 1957), in Patrick Kessel and Giovanni Pirelli, *Le peuple algérien et la guerre: lettres et témoignages d'algériens,* 141–152.

[24] "Rions…" *El-Erg: Publication Hebdomadaire de la Zone VIII* no. 10, n.d., 5 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1; "De te fabula narratur," *Résistance Algérienne* 10, Edition B, 10 October 1956, 3 in SHD GR 1H 2589; "La bouteille," *Révolution: Organe les Combattants de la Wilaya IV* no. 1, 1957, 15 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3; "Tel est pris qui croyait prendre…" *Résistance Algérienne* 11, Edition B, November 1956, 7 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

Mason-Wasp and the Toad" and the "Scorpion and the Frog," and crafted original Algerian morality tales like the "Tale of Ben Daoud" and "Muhammed and His Mine."[25]

A survey of morality tales used in Algerian anti-colonial activism thus reveals an active moral imaginary characterized by creativity and hybridity. And in this diverse field, a few patterns emerge. First, there were differences in the frequency with which Algerian activists cited material from different genres. Stories of resistance from the Algerian nationalist canon (i.e., material about Abdelkader, Mokrani, and Lalla Fatma) and the French culture canon (i.e., myths about the French Revolution and the Resistance, and tales of Jean de La Fontaine) were the most frequently cited—stories from Islamic tradition were more sparsely distributed through FLN and MNA publications. And while it is difficult to gauge the prevalence of morality tales of the genres *timucuha*, *tiqsiḍin* and *tidyanin* (Kabyle fairy tales, legends of the heroes of Islam and antiquity, and fables about animals, respectively)—since these were primarily oral traditions—one can observe that at least in written material, *tiqsiḍin* and *tidyanin* were popular genres for anti-colonial protest, while *timucuha* (as a gender and age-specific genre, told by women to children) were virtually non-existent.[26]

Different types of sources also favored different genres of morality tales. Established newspapers like *El Moudjahid*, *Résistance Algérienne*, *Alger Républicain*, and *La Voix du Peuple* tended to communicate organizational metanarratives (metalevel morality tales), as carefully constructed by FLN and MNA leaders. Meanwhile, local wilaya publications (like *Révolution, El-Erg*, and *Combat*) published humorous stories and short didactic

[25] Kateb Yacine, "La mouche-maçonne et le crapaud,**"** *Afrique-Action*, 6 March 1961, 28, and Kateb Yacine, "Dialogue de sourds," *Afrique-Action,* 19 August 1961, n.p.

[26] D. Merolla, "Le conte kabyle," in *Encyclopédie Berbère XIV: Conseil–Danse*, ed. Gabriel Camps (Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1994), 2084.

morality tales. Islamic and millenarian material, on the other hand, circulated more in gossip and rumors, on special occasions (like holidays), in internal memoranda, and in targeted propaganda (aimed at persuading pilgrims on *hajj* and uncooperative *imams* and soldiers working with the French administration to support the FLN). These nuances within source bases are thus important to keep in mind when studying morality tales in social activism.

Metalevel Morality Tales: The Myth of the Moral Revolutionary

Considering Algerians drew from such a broad corpus, what narratives about morality did the FLN teach its cadres, and what did it communicate to constituents? In fact, looking at moral argumentation in FLN publications, it becomes immediately clear that both in internal memoranda and in outwardly-directed statements (to Algerians, French citizens, and international audiences), the organization worried about maintaining moral order.

FLN rulebooks, training manuals, and internal communiqués were one place where leaders emphasized the importance of socially upright behavior. A training manual, for instance, encouraged FLN leaders to "BE AN EXAMPLE: in everything and for everyone. [A leader] must have all the Moral Qualities."[27] A Wilaya III document further explained that "The *mujahid* is the model that one tries to imitate, and because of this, he must leave his 'imprint' wherever he passes, through his goodness, his loyalty, his patience, his spirit of sacrifice, his generosity, and his courage. He must crush the enemy

[27] Irregular capitalization in the original. Note that many copies of this document exist in the SHD archives, suggesting the document was well-circulated. ALN-FLN, "Notice ôrganisation et notice 'guérilla' de la Wilaya d'Oran, Zone Sud-Oranais (8°)," *Documents récupérés sur les rebelles dans le corps d'armée d'Oran* (September–November 1957), in SHD GR 1H 1623/D2.

by his high morality, which barely exists among our adversaries, and abstain from any act that might damage the honor and dignity of our people."[28]

Exemplary behavior was not only important, it was seen as an integral part of the struggle for recruitment, and an integral part of the fight against France. As a training document explained, FLN cadres should avoid favoritism, nepotism, and non-merit-based advancement. Leaders "must by their conduct, their disinterestedness, their impartiality, their honesty, their spirit of justice, make everyone feel that our administration is really working for the benefit and for the exclusive good of the People. Our leaders must not forget that they are taken as examples by everyone, and therefore [must] have an irreproachable personal conduct."[29]

Such guidelines for behavior served multiple purposes. High-risk collective action required strict rules concerning order, hierarchy, loyalty, and self-sacrifice for the group. Thus, disorderly behavior could put the organization and its members at risk. These goals were reflected in organizational rules of procedure: murder, desertion, disclosing secrets, defeatism, dissidence, disobedience, dereliction of duty, and rape were listed as meriting the death penalty. Lesser behavioral violations—including uniform violations, lack of hygiene, lack of respect for fellow soldiers, bickering, and general misbehavior—warranted guard duty or manual labor.[30]

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[28] ALN-FLN, "Éloge de l'ALN," Wilaya III (September–October 1957) in SHD GR 1H 2583 in *Harbi and Meynier Collection*, 638.

[29] ALN-FLN, "Le modèle du bon cadre de l'ALN," Note from Wilaya II, Zone 1 to the Officials of Zone 1 (4 August 1958) in *Harbi and Meynier Collection*, 639.

[30] Irregular capitalization in the original. ALN-FLN, "Règlement intérieur de la Wilaya d'Oran, Zone Sud (8°)," and "Notice ôrganisation et notice 'guérilla' de la Wilaya d'Oran, Zone Sud-Oranais (8°)," *Documents récupérés sur les rebelles dans le corps d'armée d'Oran* (September-November 1957), in SHD GR 1H 1623/D2.

Attracting public support also required convincing multiple audiences that the FLN and its cause were virtuous. As an internal FLN document on leadership and cadre training explained, to gain support for the revolution the FLN must make Algerians believe their world was being transformed. "The people must feel that everything is changing, and that they are resolutely marching toward an era of happiness and prosperity." Thus, leaders "must never give pretexts for critique." The excesses and vices of colonialism had caused the war of liberation, so FLN fighters should avoid replicating these vices at all costs. The FLN's role in Algerian society was the "purification of mores, [and] destruction of the habits of the colonial administration."[31]

Borrowing a page from Judeo-Christian symbolism, the FLN's "Ten Commandments" reflected these organizational imperatives. The highest rules on the list (the first and second commandments) were practical: the first commandment was to "continue the liberation struggle until full independence," and the second to destroy the enemy's forces and acquire his military equipment. The third commandment was to develop the FLN's "material, moral, and technical potential." Other commandments emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering (no. 6) and building the FLN's influence and support network among local populations (no. 7). The eight and ninth commandments were things necessary for any army or group: "discipline" and "the spirit of brotherhood, sacrifice, and teamwork." And finally, the tenth commandment reflected the need to adhere to social norms concerning warfare, in order to convince internal and

[31] ALN-FLN, "Le modèle du bon cadre de l'ALN," Note from Wilaya II, Zone 1 to the Officials of Zone 1 (4 August 1958) in *Harbi and Meynier Collection*, 639.

external audiences of the justice of the FLN's cause: "Comply with the principles of Islam[32] and international law in the destruction of enemy forces."[33]

Fighting a war, using coercion to rally support, and asserting moral respectability to multiple demographics was no easy task, however. So what did being a "moral revolutionary" mean for the Algerian cultural context of the 1950s? First and foremost, this meant emphasizing social conservatism, including traditional gender roles and prohibitions against extramarital sex. At the same time, the organization emphasized that it was modern as opposed to backward, and pointed to its treatment of women as proof. Decrying false interpretations of the Qurʾān that understood women as "mere objects," the organization asserted that Algerian women should be examples of modern femininity, receiving educations and taking part in the liberation struggle (as nurses, and sometimes as fighters).[34] The organization also lauded historical examples for Algerian women to follow, such as Chadjaratou Eddouri (who helped defend Egypt from Crusader invasion), and Fakhr Anissa (who taught literature and history in the mosque of Baghdad). More modern paradigms of femininity, meanwhile, were praised for exhibiting revolutionary values, with FLN publications applauding a woman who refused to marry any man not in the maquis, and a patriotic wife who turned in her collaborating husband to be executed.[35]

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[32] Likely a reference to Islamic guidelines for *jihād*, which prescribe honorable treatment for prisoners of war, prohibit the destruction of crops, and forbid the killing of women, children, and priests. See: Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī Vol. X: The Conquest of Arabia*, trans. Fred. M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press), 16.

[33] "Les dix commandements de l'ALN," *El Moudjahid* 1, June 1956, 16 [Tome 1].

[34] ALN-FLN, "Instructions générales, circulaire no. 2 de la Wilaya d'Oran, Zone du Sud-oranais," (September–November 1957), 15–16 in SHD GR 1H 1623.

[35] "La page de la moudjahida: une véritable patriote," *El-Erg: Publication Hebdomadaire de la Zone VIII, Wilaya V* no. 10, n.d., 14 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1; "La page de la moudjahida: héroïnes d'hier et d'aujourd'hui," *El-Erg: Publication Hebdomadaire de la Zone VIII, Wilaya V* no. 9, n.d. (ca. December 1958–January 1959), 11 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1; "Extraits de la plate-forme pour assurer le triomphe de la révolution algérienne dans la lutte pour l'indépendance nationale," *El Moudjahid* 4, Numéro spécial, 20 August 1956, 70 [Tome 1].

Despite this modern outlook, the FLN's concept of a modern woman was a modern woman of the 1950s—that is to say, a woman who kept her house orderly, sanitary, and taught her children to be model citizens. In line with this concept of modernity, the FLN emphasized traditional gender roles. As a document from Wilaya V explained, the women's part in the struggle should be squarely "within the framework of her natural prerogatives as wife, mother, homemaker and citizen." Moreover, the male leader of each ALN unit stood in as the male guardian for any females in his unit, and had the right to give his charges away in marriage or refuse a union, if necessary. The FLN also tried to maintain separation of the sexes in its cadres, and put in place bans on adultery and pederasty (homosexuality), enforcing these with the death penalty.[36]

The FLN also emphasized the value of levity when communicating with Algerian audiences. To this end, an FLN political officer in Wilaya III instructed: "Responsible, you must be an example, do not joke, do not use mean or nasty words."[37] FLN leaders also leveraged this value when trying to convince Algerians to comply with boycott orders: a tract found near Wilaya IV calling for a tobacco and alcohol boycott, for instance, argued that "In a time when the blood of your best sons flows, in a time when widows and orphans weep for their husbands and fathers, no Algerian worthy of the name has the right to spend his time rejoicing in theaters, forgetting the unequal struggle that is being waged before his eyes by the brave fighters of the National Cause."[38] As Bachir Hadj Ali writes, because of this norm many Algerians did not celebrate during

[36] Ibid.; FLN-ALN, "Notes aux militants au FLN," Wilaya d'Oran, Zone VIII (n.d., ca. June 1958), 5 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1.

[37] ALN-FLN, "No. 3, Document 8: Note de service du responsable politique AMAR du Secteur I aux responsables des Nahia," Wilaya V, Zone 3 (September–November 1957), in SHAT 1H1623/D2.

[38] ALN-FLN, "Boycott du tabac, des débits de boissons alcoolisées et des salles de spectacle," (April 1956) in SHAT 1H1447/D2.

moussems or family gatherings during the war. (A song written in the late 1950s echoed these prohibitions, criticizing the Algerian *zazou* [hep cat, hipster] for using too much hair gel and dancing rumba and swing in times of mourning.)[39]

In proclamations to French and international audiences, meanwhile, the FLN stressed that it was a paragon of humanist and enlightenment values. For example, in *El Moudjahid*, whose audience was mainly educated Algerians and expatriates, French intellectuals, and international readers, the FLN described the Algerian revolution as "channeling the essential values of modern humanism," and the Algerian people as "simultaneously the most nationalist and the most open… the most attached to the Muslim faith and the most penetrated by the spirit of the modern West."[40] It further touted its fighters as examples of enlightened and modern men. As the paper explained, ALN members were living repositories of the moral and spiritual patrimony of the Algerian people, embodying Algerian values. They were "mature," followed the laws of war, and rebelled not for the sake of rebelling, but for the community's good. As *El Moudjahid* wrote,

> "The *moudjahidine* belong to this race of men who think and conceive the highest and most bold ideals…. His indomitable energy and aggression in combat remain within the limits of the laws of war and of respect for human persons, plants, crops, and livestock."[41]

Another article described the FLN's *fidayine* as soldiers not terrorists, ascetics who lived in "solitude, austerity, and deprivation" rather than fanatics. As the paper explained, "The

[39] Abdelwehab Abjaoui, "Bu teɛmamt d uqendur [L'homme au turban et tunique]," in Mehenna Mahfoufi, *Chants kabyles de là guerre d'indépendance*, 162–163.
[40] "Une révolution démocratique," *El Moudjahid* 12, 15 November 1957, 163 [Tome 1].
[41] "Les forces morales de l'ALN," *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, 105–107 [Tome 1].

fanaticism so often attributed to our *fidayines* is absurd. The *fidaï* is an enlightened hero."[42]

Besides verbal pronouncements and attempts at modeling good behavior, the FLN created a well-developed and far-reaching parajudiciary to enforce model revolutionary behavior in Algerian communities. Judicial and penal system combined, FLN courts heard cases involving everything from marital quarrels and property disputes to death penalty cases. Some of these tribunals were kangaroo courts, in which individual FLN leaders settled scores and asserted authority. However, other FLN courts involved local councils of notables, French-trained judges, and law enforcement officials. For instance, documents seized from an FLN court in Philippeville reported a military tribunal composed of a president, two assessors, a prosecutor, a court clerk, a lawyer, a police commissioner, and three police officers. Other formal and well-developed courts were reported in Constantine, El-Milia, Mila, Chateaudun-du-Rhumel, and Aïn M'Lila, for instance, with the most developed of these being in Constantine, where the FLN also had on its payroll an itinerant magistrate and court clerk.[43]

Just as FLN moral pronouncements tried to walk the line between local Algerian and Western moral standards, FLN courts applied a hybrid legal code. Court legal proceedings applied a combination of Berber, French, Islamic, and ad hoc revolutionary procedures and legal codes. Following French colonial judicial divisions, Islamic law applied more to personal status cases, while cases of criminal, commercial, and property law drew from French legal codes, with the addition of some traditional Berber practices

[42] "Le fidaï: sentinelle avancée de la révolution" *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, 106–107 [Tome 1]; "20 août 56–20 août 57," *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, 101 [Tome 1].

[43] Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques et de la Fonction Publique, "Recherches sur l'organisation judiciaire rebelle en Algérie," Algiers (2 March 1958) in SHD GR 1H 1691.

(for example, in FLN courts, the familial oath, sworn on the tomb of marabout, was recognized as valid testimony).

Through the creation of a judicial system, the FLN enacted the division between the French and Algerian communities, laid claim to the authority to judge and punish, and (as a French report phrased it) worked to break "Muslims of the habit of relying on French authority, and thus respecting it." The FLN also took concrete steps to encourage and enforce the use of these courts, calling for a boycott of the French judiciary and punishing individuals who took cases before French judges. The effect of this campaign was striking: there was an 86.72% decrease in Algerian Muslim cases before French justices of the peace between 1954 and 1957 in the Algiers region, an 81.39% decrease in Blida, a 93.27% decrease in Orleansville, a 96.62% decrease in Tizi-Ouzou, a 93.95% decrease in Tlemcen, a 98% decrease in Philipeville, and a 88.73% decrease in Constantine.[44] Thus, by 1957 the FLN was claiming not only broad moral authority, but the authority to police, judge, and punish social violators.

The Tenth Commandment: Religion in Revolutionary Mythmaking

In terms of the invention of the moral revolutionary, the question of religion presented a conundrum for FLN leaders. The FLN defined its movement not in religious terms, but in national terms—members were Algerians first and foremost. But the group's relationship with religious identity, theology, and practice was conflicted: they proclaimed themselves moral role models representing "the people"—and most Algerians were Muslim. Moreover, many Algerian Muslims were demanding independence in no

[44] See "Annexe I: Statistique des affaires musulmanes enrôlées dans justices de paix," in Ibid.

small part because French citizenship rights had been defined ethnically and confessionally.[45]

Despite this strong incentive to use religious rhetoric, there were very few religious appeals in FLN literature. For instance, tracts announcing alcohol, tobacco, and theater boycotts in Kabylia, Algiers and Oran (Wilayas III, IV, and V) contained no mention of Islam (even in an FLN tract posted at a Qurʾānic school). Instead, the boycotts were justified with appeals to levity ("don't spend your time rejoicing" while others are suffering), health and morality (tobacco is "harmful" to one's health, boycotting it "is to clean up our society and our behavior"), economic warfare ("Why [boycott]? Because in boycotting tobacco and alcoholic beverages, you deal a serious blow to the colonial economy"), and patriotism ("This measure will not only be an act of faith—faith in the liberation of the Homeland from the colonialist yoke—but it will also help deal a major blow to the imperialist economy"). Tracts also argued that money from tobacco and alcohol sales were going towards French weapons purchases. Notably, one of the few tracts containing a religious appeal linked religion to the weapons argument—not to Islamic prohibitions on drinking alcohol. As the tract explained, to buy tobacco was to contribute to the French war budget: "to buy tobacco is to put a bullet in the gun barrel directed at you… to buy tobacco is suicide, and suicide is a crime punished by God."[46]

[45] See for instance: Patrick Weil, "Le statut des musulmans en Algérie coloniale," *Histoire de la Justice* 16 (2005): 93–109.

[46] FLN, "Alcool et tabac," Aït Lahcène-Fort National (8 August 1957) in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1; ALN-FLN, "Boycott du tabac, des débits de boissons alcoolisées et des salles de spectacle," Orleansville (April 1956) in SHD 1H1447/D2; FLN, "Peuple algérien, comme tu le sais depuis quelques mois…" (1955) in SHD GR 1H 1715; FLN, "Peuple algérien, tout le monde sait…" Algiers (31 May 1957), Tract No. 82 in in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1; "Boycott du tabac, des débits de boissons, alcoolisées et des salles de spectacles," Algiers (March 1956), in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1; "Extrait du tract: boycottage du tabac et des alcools," in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1; ALN-FLN, "À la nation algérienne, les forces répressives…" Constantine (August 1956) in SHD GR 1H 2590/D4.

On the other hand, there were also internal reports of some FLN leaders prescribing group prayer or using religion appeals to convince recalcitrant populations. Wilaya I (the Aurès), for instance, instructed combatants not to neglect prayers.[47] Another example of religiosity suddenly appeared after the MNA called for demonstrations on the Prophet's birthday (*mawlid al-nabī)*. In response, the FLN fought for holiday hegemony, by calling on Algerians to observe a day of mourning by wearing dark colors, closing shops, staying home, and embracing the "piety of silence." It asked believers to go to mosque to pray for Algerian fighters, and called for a rejection of any traditions (like animal sacrifice, henna, and candle-lighting) representing "the corruption of our religion and our traditions" that "have nothing to do with the laws of the Prophet."[48]

Regional variations and situationally-driven statements on the question of religion allowed the organization to meet a variety of imperatives. On the one hand, religious appeals allowed the FLN to better compete with the MNA and the charismatic personality of Messali Hadj and compete with (and later coopt) an older generation of religious nationalist leaders (from organizations like the Association of ʿUlamāʾ and centers like El Kettania Institute and Dar el-Hadith). The FLN also used religious statements when appealing to the Mozabites, an ethnic minority belonging to the Ibadi sect of Islam. Unlike the MNA, which used religious scripture to condemn the Mozabites as a heretical deviance, the FLN used religious appeals to bring the Mozabite minority into its tent, appealing to a common Muslim identity.[49]

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[47] ALN-FLN, "Régime des punitions en *mintaqa* 11," Wilaya I (17 November 1957), in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4 in *Harbi and Meynier Collection*, 622–626.

[48] FLN, "Patriotes algériens!" (November 1955), Tract No. 5 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.

[49] See for instance: FLN, "Lettre dactylographiée et ronéotypée adressée à un commerçant Mozabite," (1959) in *Harbi and Meynier Collection*, 160.

By appealing to religious symbols, the FLN could furthermore extend its reach with marabouts and religious brotherhoods (i.e., the Rahmaniya, Qadiriya, Chadiliya, Derqawa) and discredit Muslim leaders producing pro-French religious propaganda. For instance, the FLN used religious discourses to denounce Sheikh Ben Tekkouk, head of the Senoussia brotherhood in Wilaya V, who was preaching that good Muslims would support France.[50] The FLN also used religious symbols and discourses as social capital for convincing Algerians (particularly in rural areas) of the FLN's moral probity as selfless revolutionaries and model Algerians. To this end, Islam provided a powerful canon of shared symbols, stories, and spaces to help facilitate communication. Mosques often served as community meeting places, and the use of classical Arabic and Qurʾānic recitation could be used to impress elders.[51]

Religious discourses were also important for meeting internal organizational needs. For instance, religious rituals provided moral support to fighters, in the form of stress management and emotional regulation techniques. To this end, FLN commanders frequently used light religious discourses in military speeches, such as invoking the favor of God. A speech by Colonel Amirouche to his troops, for example, reassured soldiers that "They possess modern aircraft, but we have faith in God, and God is on the side of just causes."[52] Islam also served to emphasize the distinctiveness of Algerian identity (as

[50] "Commentaire de Radio Tunis sur l'assassinat du Chaykh Ben Tekkouk," (26 May 1957) in SHD GR 1H 2517/D1 in *Harbi and Meynier Collection*, 577; Abou Djamal-Eddein, "Persécution de l'Islam par le colonialisme en Algérie," *Renaissance Algérienne* no. 4, 1958, 28–30 in *Harbi and Meynier Collection*, 587–588.

[51] Mohammed Benyahja, *La conjuration au pouvoir: récit d'un maquisard de l'ALN* (Paris: Éditions de l'Arcantère, 1988), 96–98; Hamou Amirouche, *Memoirs of a Mujahed: Algeria's Struggle for Freedom, 1945–1962* (San Diego: Amirouche Publishing, 2014), 126.

[52] Ibid.

separate from the French), while asserting internal unity (as Muslim identity was a common ground between the country's Arab and Berber populations).[53]

On the other hand, FLN publications also worked to minimize the movement's relationship to religion, in order to counter French propaganda that dismissed Algerian nationalism as religious fanaticism. To this end, the Platform of Soummam insisted that the FLN movement was "a national struggle to destroy the anarchic regime of colonization, and not a religious war." The Platform also denounced Georges Bidault, Robert Lacoste, Jacques Soustelle and Cardinal Maurice Feltin for trying to deceive the world by defining the revolution as a "fanatical movement in the service of pan-Islamism."[54] Moreover, the use of secular discourses helped the FLN gain support from international allies, such as French intellectuals and Egyptian leaders. In France, for instance, the FF-FLN worked to underscore the democratic, secular, and humanist nature of the Algerian revolution, and reassured French activists that after independence, the Algerian state would not discriminate based on religion.[55]

These often-contradictory imperatives were visible in the FLN debate over whether or not to use the terms *jihād* [djihad] and *mujāhid* [moudjahid] in FLN proclamations. As Ramdane Abane argued, the use of these terms would "be exploited by the colonialists… They will accuse us of religious fanaticism." But he and Benyoussef Benkhedda agreed the terms were powerful and evocative. So, they decided to solve the problem by using the words, but clarifying and circumscribing the terms in an editorial, which appeared in

[53] Mohammed Harbi, *Une vie debout, Tome 1*, 37–38.
[54] Le Plate-forme de la Soummam," 20 August 1956 in Rémy Madoui, *J'ai été fellagha, officier français et déserteur: du FLN à l'OAS* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2004), 343, 369.
[55] Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 187.

the first issue of *El Moudjahid*.[56] According to the editorial, "Jihad, reduced to the essentials, is simply a dynamic manifestation of self-defense." Moreover, "the word jihad has necessarily evolved with time and has become clearer—adapting itself to the modern world… [Jihad] contains no religious or racial hatred, no exclusivism or conformism, except that of unity, which is necessary for total liberation; *jihad so understood is the quintessence of liberal and open patriotism*."[57] So defined, the FLN hoped to harness the symbolic power of the term *jihād*, while circumscribing it as a patriotic term rather than a specifically religious one.

Monique Gadant, who published a thorough study of religious language in *El Moudjahid*, emerged with similar conclusions. Overall, Gadant found that the FLN laïcized the idea of jihād in *El Moudjahid*. In these discourses, jihād was "reduced by [FLN] ideologues to a moral effort." But while the FLN maintained a secular discourse in official documents, in practice the FLN enforced some religious tenets, demanding that its members (and communities under its purview) pray, fast Ramadan, and abstain from sexual relations outside marriage. Gadant explained this dual policy as a form of solidarity signaling: "when the interest of the community demands it, conformism can be even more important than conviction, in that through [conformism] one expresses belonging to this community."[58] She also noted that Islam served as a symbolic referent in *El Moudjahid*—but one stripped of any theological or doctrinal elaboration. In this way, Arabo-Islamic content could be used to assert "specificity" or distinction: "such language permits one to impose oneself on others as different," Gadant wrote. She further

[56] Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie, Tome 2: Le temps des léopards* (Verviers: Marabout, 1985), 352–353.
[57] Emphasis added. "Bulletin de naissance," *El Moudjahid* 1, June 1956, 8–9 [Tome 1].
[58] Monique Gadant, *Islam et nationalisme en Algérie*, 22, 31.

pointed out that the FLN used a vague, stripped-down version of Marxism in much the same way: the organization borrowed Marxism's revolutionary language and symbols, but presented a "Marxism stripped of any reference to the class struggle, stripped of its philosophy of history."[59]

A review of local wilaya publications and FLN tracts only reinforces Gadant's original assessment. The FLN overwhelmingly ignored Islamic theology, scripture, and even discourses (aside from vague mentions of jihad and martyrdom). In its place was a valorization of the "Islamic tradition" as a pure, universal, and spiritual force, balanced with appeals to humanism and the "universal conscience." Moreover, Islam was not important on its own for piety and practice, but for the way in which it merged with Algerian culture, modern society, and revolutionary forces to create a distinct Algerian citizen. The center of this process was the ALN-FLN, which was described as a crucible in which "the great moral forces of the past and the hopes of the future merge."[60]

The few times the FLN did refer to scripture or hadith, the references were vague and unelaborated. Such was the case in a *Résistance Algérienne* article, for instance, which used Islamic tradition to support the principle of equality: "As a hadith of the Prophet emphasizes: 'Men are equal to one another, like the teeth of a weaver's comb; there is no distinction between black and white, Arab and non-Arab, except in the degree they fear God.'"[61] Other uses of Islam were transparently functional (aimed at producing cooperation, for instance). An internal memorandum exhorted fighters to selflessly

[59] Monique Gadant, *Islam et nationalisme en Algérie: d'après "El Moudjahid" organe central du FLN de 1956 à 1962* (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1988), 11–12, 19–24.

[60] "Les forces morales de l'ALN," *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, 105–107 [Tome 1].

[61] *Résistance Algérienne*, Edition B, 1 October 1956, in *La révolution algérienne par les textes: documents du FLN*, André Mandouze, ed. (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), 135.

sacrifice themselves for the nation, for instance, quoting Qurʾān 3:169.[62] An appeal to pilgrims in Mecca asked for financial support, citing bonds of religious fraternity, and somewhat disingenuously arguing the FLN movement was launched on the occasion of the Prophet's Birthday (1 November was a week before the holiday, and the organization had never mentioned any connection before). And a letter to a pious Muslim soldier in the French military asked him to spy on the French and send them arms and battle plans, citing Qurʾān 5:2 and Qurʾān 16:91. Pointing out that King Saud of Mecca was supporting the FLN as well, the letter told the man that if he wanted to attain paradise, he should "return to Islam" and join the FLN in holy war against the polytheists [the French, who worshipped God, Jesus, and Mary].[63] Such appeals should not be overdetermined, however, as the rhetorical situation involved a devout Muslim audience; the FLN equally invoked Jesus Christ when appealing to French settlers and attempting to gain the support of Kenyan Christians.[64]

In sum, while "the circumcision" (1 November 1954) may have been a salient symbol of the insurrectionist movement within FLN circles, activists quickly discovered that the struggle for Algeria would be fought in multiple arenas: in Algeria, in France, and on the international stage. Thus, despite the early forays of the 1 November movement into symbolism and mythmaking, by 1956 the FLN was increasingly disseminating targeted

[62] ALN-FLN, "Petit plan des règles de conduite du militant *moussebel* et *moudjahide*," Wilaya III (n.d. ca. November 1957), 20, in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3.

[63] "L'algérie combattante aux pèlerins de la Mecque," (July 1957), p. 6, Ref. No. 888/AMM in SHD GR 1H 1715; Letter from Si Mahfoudh to Moussa Ben Ali Haouat, "Louanges à Dieu seul, Dieu est le plus grand," (January 1958), Tract No. 1 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3.

[64] Boualem Taibi, "Lettres du maquis: frère du Kenya," *Révolution: Organe les Combattants de la Wilaya IV* no. 1, 1957, 26–29 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3; "Français, jamais la tyrannie aussi bien organisée…" Constantine (February 1957), Tract No. 67 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.

messages to internal and external audiences. In these proclamations, the group argued that it commanded a model army, which was following the laws of war and fighting for the sake of the community rather than its own self-interests. The FLN also asserted its moral merits, according to Islamic and secular, Algerian, French, and international standards.

The result of these interpretive labors was the myth of the moral revolutionary. This "moral revolutionary" was both *mujāhid* and *maquisard*, pious and secular, traditional and modern. A combination of Algerian and French moral worldviews, he was an ideal fighter, a model soldier, and a future citizen. And most importantly, he was forging a new era of social justice in Algeria. Feraoun noted on 11 January 1956 how this idea of the FLN was quickly becoming myth. As he explained, stories about how the FLN was maintaining social order were circulating by word of mouth: "T— relates with convincing fervor that [the FLN] intervened in favor of a woman who was left in a sad state after her husband had repudiated her… They threatened the fellow… There are several stories like this one that are making the rounds," he explained. "In the future they will be worthy of becoming folk stories. This is how people create History."[65]

The Goatherd, the Toad, and the Postage Stamp: Everyday Morality Tales

While FLN tracts and papers like *El Moudjahid* and *Résistance Algérienne* focused on communicated organizational myths about morality, local wilaya publications like *Révolution, Combat*, and *El-Erg* published more parochial parables. These stories, like "Mahmoud and His Mine" and "An Example of Abnegation," were often short, practical,

[65] Ibid.; "11 January 1956" in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 56.

and focused on the conflict. Written by FLN rank-and-file soldiers or local officers (rather than official spokespeople), the stories could also be crass and off-color. One common trope of these morality tales was reciprocity: "The Bottle," for instance, described a French officer violently receiving his "just deserts" (for a full description of this tale, see Chapter 10 ("Acts of Faith and Worthy Deeds").[66] Another common trope was to show the French as foolish or cowardly, and Algerians as virtuous (courageous, self-sacrificing, and clever).

A good example of this latter trope—the foolish French and the clever Algerian—appeared in *El-Erg* No. 10. As the story went, one day an indigenous man "imposing in his burnous" went to the post office. Despite the long looks the Europeans gave him, the man stood proud and tall "without appearing the least bit embarrassed in his national costume." When the Algerian's turn came in line, he stepped up to the counter. However, the postal employee, "wanting undoubtedly to give a taste of his knowledge and culture" and embarrass the man, asked the Algerian in florid French "What doth his Majesty desire?"

The ruse was quickly returned, however. To the employee's shock, shame, and confusion, the *indigène* "adopting the pose of a perfect monarch" replied swiftly and in perfect French: "His Majesty desires that his humble servant cede unto him a 15 franc stamp." The short story then ended borrowing a line from the Jean de La Fontaine fable "The Fox and the Crow." Taking the original line ("The crow, ashamed and confused, swore a little too late not to be fooled again"[67]), the Algerian author adapted it with

[66] "La bouteille," *Révolution: Organe les Combattants de la Wilaya IV* no. 1, 1957, 15 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3.

[67] "Le corbeau et le renard," in Jean de La Fontaine, *Fables de La Fontaine* (Paris: Lecointe, 1829), 5.

modern commentary: "ashamed and confused, the crow… excuse me, the employee, swore a little too late not to be fooled again."[68]

The tale of the *indigène* and the postal employee was interesting in a number of regards. First, it offered a critique of the French-colonial social hierarchy, by depicting a Frenchman foolishly underestimating an Algerian man—a common trope in FLN publications. Second, it portrayed the man in the burnous outwitting the postal employee and asserting his dominion through both a mastery of French culture and a display of Algerian culture. Thus, like the FLN's myth of the moral maquisard, the *indigène* was an ideal example: he was both traditional and modern, true to his origins and Western-educated, master of his own culture and that of the other. Third, the story turned on its head French efforts to dictate the social standing of the Algerian by shaming him. When the French tried to humiliate the man and "put him in his place," the man in the burnous refused to cow to French glances. In a prescriptive aside, the narrator explained that the man instead stood tall and proud, "without appearing the least bit embarrassed." Here, then, was the story's main action script: Algerians should stand tall and display pride in their national heritage. The man in the burnous was thus a vehicle for emblematic action; he served as the grand *actant* in the tale, significant because of *how he acted*.[69]

Although in posterity these tales might not be read as traditionally funny, many such morality tales appeared on humor pages. For instance, *El-Erg* No. 9 carried in its humor section an anecdote about an Algerian soldier unhappy after winning a battle, because while he singlehandedly faced and killed three French soldiers in combat, in his mind it

[68] "Rions un peu…" *El-Erg: Publication Hebdomadaire de la Zone VIII, Wilaya V* no. 10, n.d., 5 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1.

[69] For a discussion of this, see: Roland Barthes, "Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits," *Communications* 8 (1966): 15–17.

took him too long (fifteen minutes) to beat them. Directly underneath, a second anecdote described a French soldier who wanted to demonstrate his courage—so he asked his captain if he could execute an Arab prisoner.[70] Another humor page carried one story about a patrol of FLN maquisards capturing a French patrol, and a story about a goatherd shot in the shoulder by a French soldier. (The herder, indignant at being shot, responds by mocking the soldier's aim: "Was that a serious shot, [you] son of a bitch?"[71])



Figure 6.1 – The Foolish French. An illustration accompanying a short tale about a French soldier who shoots an Algerian goatherd in the shoulder. In response, the goatherd mocks the soldier's aim.

(Source: "Humour," *Combat: Organe bimensuel de la Zone I, Wilaya V* no. 7, n.d., 12 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1.

Many of these stories fit morphologically with particular modes of storytelling in Arab, African, and French cultures. For instance, the story of the FLN soldiers who capture a French patrol, the story of the man in the burnous who deals a clever riposte to the postal employee, and the tale of the goatherd who tenders a smart rejoinder to the

[70] "Rions un peu…" *El-Erg: Publication Hebdomadaire de la Zone 8, Wilaya 5* no. 9, n.d., 10 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1.

For other examples, see: "Mahmoud et sa mine," and "Humour," in *Combat: Organe Bimensuel de la Zone I, Wilaya V* no. 7, n.d., 6, 11–12 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1, and copies of *Révolution: Organe les Combattants de la Wilaya IV* in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3.

[71] "Humour," *Combat: Organe Bimensuel de la Zone I, Wilaya V* no. 7, n.d., 12 in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1.

French soldier—all are *dhakaʾ* (cleverness or wit) tales. A common narrative mode in Arabic literature, these types of comic short stories are called *akhbar al-adhkiyaʾ* by Ibn al-Jawzī. But in these narratives, the element of humor is typically delivered through quick-witted verbal rejoinders or through ironic juxtaposition. Algerian *dhakaʾ* tales in particular often echoed—and in some cases deliberately intersected with—African trickster tales and French *voleur/volé* tales (stories in which the robber becomes the robbed).[72] The French *voleur/volé* mode was particularly present in the story of the FLN unit that captured a French patrol: the moral of the tale was verbatim the *voleur/volé* moral from Jean de La Fontaine's "The Rat and the Oyster": "he is caught who thought to catch" [alt: "he is taken who thought to take"].[73]

Despite their entertainment value, very few of these morality tales gained traction—at least in writing. Many tales, like the story of the goatherd and the soldier, were localized. A source of amusement (and catharsis), such stories were rarely printed, and usually circulated by word-of-mouth. As a result, their appearance in local Wilaya newsletters is notable, and makes these papers a rare and valuable resource for studying Algerian jokes [nikāt] and anecdote culture during the war.

There were also many failed morality tales and false starts. In 1961, for instance, Kateb Yacine tried to adapt a Sudanese morality tale for an anti-colonial context, with confusing results. The morality tale was "The Mason-Wasp and the Toad." Yacine opened the tale by relating a formula that Sudanese storytellers repeated before fables: "I

[72] Fedwa Malti-Douglas, "Classical Arabic Crime Narratives: Thieves and Thievery in *Adab* Literature," *Journal of Arabic Literature* 19, no. 2 (1988): 108–127; Henri Bergson, *Le rire: Essai sur la signification du comique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972).

[73] "Le rat et l'huître," in Jean de La Fontaine, *Fables de La Fontaine, Tome 2* (Paris: Lecointe, 1829), 44–45; "Tel est pris qui croyait prendre…" *Résistance Algérienne* no.11, Edition B, November 1956, 7 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

am going to tell a fable… it's a lie… but not everything is false." He then told the tale as follows:

> Along the edge of the stream live many small animals. "They go about their business in isolation, avoiding as much as possible contact with one another," because when they do meet, it is often for tests of strength or shows of force. There by the stream, the mason-wasp and the toad often passed by one another. Although she was well armed with her stinger, the mason-wasp feared the toad.
>
> One day, the mason-wasp decided to mock the toad, so she sent him a dinner invitation. "Having a sociable nature, and feeling flattered, the toad accepted." So at sunset, the toad set out for the mason-wasp's house—hop, hop, hop. When he arrived at the house, however, the mason-wasp seemed disappointed. "Oh, my dear, I can't eat with you. How dirty you are! Go and wash your hands."
>
> Without suspecting mischief, the poor toad went back to the stream, washed vigorously, and—hop, hop, hop… he naively returned to his perfidious friend. But by the time he reached the house a second time, his feet were muddy again! So the mason-wasp sent him away again. This happened many times: the toad went back and forth, back and forth, but each time the mason-wasp turned him away. And the wasp laughed, laughed, laughed, and rubbed his wings together! Finally, the toad understood that he had been duped. So, he politely left, thanking the wasp. "Imbecile," the wasp thought.
>
> A few days later, the toad sent the mason-wasp an invitation for dinner. Oh the vanity of wasps! She accepted the invitation without any suspicion. When the mason-wasp arrived, she saw the toad had beautifully arranged a table with wonderful treats. But over the table, the toad had placed an old jar. As a result, when the mason-wasp came close, the sound of her wings echoed loudly in the jar—buzz, buzz, buzz! So the toad showed her the door: "Stop there, dear friend, it's absolutely impossible for me to eat with music playing! Leave your tom-tom and xylophone outside the door, please." The mason-wasp flew back outside, and tried to quiet the sound of her wings, but when she came back in—buzz, buzz, buzz! She went in and out, in and out, but could not silence the sound of her wings. Meanwhile, the toad laughed, laughed, laughed, and ate his food.
>
> "'Buzz, buzz, buzz,' said the wasp, furious and hungry. 'Hop, hop, hop,' said the good toad, happy with his vengeance. And relations between the two friends never went any further."[74]

The archetext for Yacine's tale was the African fable "The Grasshopper and the Toad." A trickster tale, the moral of the original fable was twofold. First, the tale

[74] "La mouche-maçonne et le crapaud," *Afrique-Action*, 6 March 1961, 28.

communicated a lesson about reciprocity: duplicity is met with duplicity, and the trickster should beware, lest he find himself tricked by a more clever foe. Second, the tale contained the moral that "a leopard cannot change his spots": the grasshopper and the toad both saw the unique qualities of the other as flaws, but neither could change who they were by nature. Thus, their relationship never progressed.

As told by Yacine, however, the agents and meaning of the story shifted. The grasshopper became a wasp, and the lesson focused on reciprocity and the innate deceptiveness of the colonial system. To Yacine, the French were like the wasp, holding out a hand of friendship to Algerians, never allowing Algerians to eat at the same table. Instead, the French demanded Algerians first "make themselves clean." The Algerians, like the toad, would thus respond in-kind, out-maneuvering the perfidious wasp until the good toad was "happy with his vengeance." Yacine's adapted morality tale was thus solidly in the mode of showing the French as foolish and Algerians as clever. The problem was, the wasp and toad analogy was ill-fitting: the fact that the toad and wasp were implied to have never changed was unflattering to Algerians (whose essential characteristic was described to be dirtiness).[75]

While Yacine's "The Mason-Wasp and the Toad" never caught on, one anti-colonial morality tale that did achieve traction was the story of Colonel Ben Daoud. The Tale of Ben Daoud was based on the real story of an Algerian colonel in the French army, who

[75] Ibid. Yacine tried his hand with morality tales again a few months later in the same magazine, publishing an adapted version of the fable "The Scorpion and the Frog." Per the original tale, a frog agrees to help a scorpion cross a river, giving the scorpion a ride on his back. Halfway across the river, however, the scorpion stings the frog, and they both drown. Yacine used the fable as an analogy for decolonization: as Yacine argued, the Algerians (the frog) should not negotiate with the French (the scorpion) to help them cross the river (of decolonization), because the French could not be trusted. However, as with "The Mason-Wasp and the Toad," Yacine's morality tale was not particularly effective as an analogy. See: Kateb Yacine, "Dialogue de sourds," *Afrique-Action,* 19 August 1961.

had died of suicide in 1912 (although the exact circumstances were unclear). According to legend, Ben Daoud had worked hard, loyally served in the French military, and undergone the difficult process to become a naturalized French citizen. As a result, he had won the hard-fought honor of becoming one of the few Algerians to attain the rank of colonel. With this prestigious rank, Colonel Ben Daoud seemed to have become "truly French."

One day, however, a French general visiting from the mainland did a review of the ranks. The officers and NCOs lined up, and the French general came down the line. The general saluted and shook hands with each European officer and sub-officer—but skipped Ben Daoud. Then, the general returned down the line, and shook hands with all the Algerian officers (including Ben Daoud, who outranked the French officers). Ben Daoud remained calm and collected, "disciplined until the end." But the next morning, they found him lying in bed, his revolver at his side. He had put a bullet through his head. Next to him was a suicide note, which read only this: "My brothers, remember this well: even when you're Colonel Ben Daoud, you're still a nigger [*bicot*]."[76]

As was often true for morality tales, the Tale of Ben Daoud was not fixed, and had many variations and room for elaboration. For instance, one version of the tale involved a French woman refusing to let the colonel kiss her hand. Another version described how Ben Daoud was denied entry into a party. What remained fixed was the outcome (suicide) and the moral of the story: "An Arab remains an Arab, even if he is Colonel Ben Daoud."[77]

[76] Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance* (Algiers: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1989 [First ed. Cairo: Comité de Libération du Maghreb Arabe, 1954]), 63–64.

[77] "Un Arabe est [alt: reste] un Arabe, même si c'est le colonel Bendaoud."

This proverb was popular among Algerians. Reflecting in prison on the conditions that had inspired him to join the OS, Mustapha Bekkouche (OS-MTLD, FLN) recalled the morality tale multiple times. In March 1955, he reflected that "Racism oppresses all feelings. Everywhere, in the high schools, the barracks, the administrations, the hospitals, and the same in prison, *an Arab is an Arab*. It is to be repulsive, inferior… Racism has made Arabs the repressed, and God alone knows what he is capable of, he whom despair drives to action. Because it is a desperate situation to have no place. In this search, hatred grows, and from disappointment to disappointment, the heart ends up bursting." In another passage, Bekkouche referenced the story again, reflecting on the unequal treatment of Algerians in the French court system: "An Arab is always an Arab, even if he is the greatest of men."[78] Raymond Bouzar also recalled the morality tale in his 1954 memoir describing his experience in the French military; as he explained, Ben Daoud had been a "great martyr of French betrayal."[79] Thus, the Tale of Ben Daoud epitomized the depths of French racism, and the impossibility of Algerians ever being fully accepted as French.

For other iterations and examples of this morality tale, see: Hamid Lourari and Saïd Bouterfa, *Ammi Kaci, ou, les mémoires de Kaci Tizi Ouzou* (Rouïba: Éditions ANEP, 2006); Djilali Bencheikh, *Mon frère ennemi* (Séguier, 1999); Toufik Benkartaba, *Les senteurs de mon pays: Rihet Bladi 1945–1962* (Oran: Éditions Dar el Gharb, 2006); Abdelkader Bessedik, *Le basané de Nemours: autobiographie* (Paris: Société des Écrivains, 2007); Amar Belkhodja, *Colonialisme: les crimes impunis* (Algiers: Éditions Alpha, 2006).

[78] Emphasis added. Mustapha Bekkouche, *Journal d'un oublie* (Algiers: Éditions ANEP, 2002), 28, 51.

[79] Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance*, 63–64.

"The Blade Fell Three Times": The Intersection of Organizational Myth and Individual Biography

"I learn to read /
A is for ALN / B is for bars / C is for cell /

I learn to count /
One dozen deaths in my family / One hundred of our houses burned /
One million suspects arrested / One century of servitude.

I learn to read /
G is for guillotine / H is for the executioner's axe / I is for immortal./....

I learn to write the history of insults…"[80]

In activist memoirs, many Algerians described their life before the FLN as a series of humiliations similar to Ben Daoud's. This "history of insults" was often condensed into a few incidents from childhood or adolescence, which came to symbolize an individual's grievances with the injustices of the French system. For instance, Malika Zerrouki, who joined the FLN when she was 15 years old, remembered feeling humiliated that when there was a check for head lice, school administrators only checked the indigenous children, "even though we were as clean as everyone else."[81] Zina Haraigue recalled having to move off the sidewalk in Sétif for French settlers. Louisette Ighilahriz, meanwhile, remembered suffering ostracization at school, and being called "rat" and *bougnoule.*[82] But the "drop that overflowed the vase," she explained, was the day her teacher publicly humiliated her by throwing her CAP diploma on the ground. She joined the FLN that year.[83]

[80] "L'école," in Boualem Khalfa, *Certitudes* (Paris: Club des amis du livre progressiste, 1961), 51-53.
[81] Interview with Malika Zerrouki, in Danièle Djamila Amrane-Minne, *Des femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 87.
[82] An ethnic slur, meaning negro, or half-breed.
[83] Louisette Ighilahriz, *Algérienne*, 40–43.

Zohra Drif remembered a different wound: the year she passed her exams, but her best friend Roselyne failed. When Zohra tried to comfort Roselyne, the distraught girl shot back, "You don't understand anything. How am I going to explain to my mother that you passed and I didn't? She will never understand that Zohra, the Arab, passed and I failed." Zohra described this as the end of her innocence, and the end of their friendship; that day, she realized that neither her elite status as the daughter of a judge nor her academic excellence would ever change the fact that she was an Arab. "With one simple sentence, she had put me in my place as the 'native,'" Zohra recalled.[84]

Other activists described discrimination encountered when seeking work or trying to get equal treatment at government offices. During his trial in France, for instance, FLN member Slimane Madadi was asked why he joined the FLN. In response, he recited a history of humiliations: he had been unable to find work in France, as multiple companies had told him they did not hire Algerians. Then, back in Algeria his 76-year-old father had been interned in a detention camp. This "made me angry," Madadi said. "Our people served France; they have been badly rewarded. It is with bitterness that I think about how my father went to Syria, under French orders, to fight against our Arab brothers. And now he's in a camp."[85]

While such tales figured prominently in activist narratives, a word of caution is necessary. When individuals join a group or club with a distinct identity and strong worldview, they often re-narrativize their life stories. In this process of biographical

[84] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 52–55.

[85] "Procès-verbal d'interrogatoire de Slimane Madadi," Juge d'instruction de Cusset, Court of Appeals, Riom (30 August 1959), in Patrick Kessel and Giovanni Pirelli, *Le peuple algérien et la guerre: lettres et témoignages d'algériens,* 340–341.

For other examples, see: Mohamed Méchati, *Militant de l'indépendance algérienne* (Brussels: Éditions Tribord, 2012), 36–38; Mohammed Benyahja, *La conjuration au pouvoir*, 17–18.

reconstruction, individuals rearranged events in their life around a significant life transformation. This involves making pivotal a particular moment representative of the transformation, positing a grand rupture between a shameful past and a more honorable future, and selecting anecdotes from one's life story compatible with the new narrative. This process of biographical reconstruction tends to be highly structured and performative. It reinforces solidarity, helps integrate new members into the group, and lends order and meaning to events. Finally, biographical reconstruction signals personal transformation, and helps produce that change by acting it out.[86] Thus, it is a way of retraining the self, or as Boualem Khalfa described, a process of learning the group narrative: *"I learn to read / A is for ALN / B is for bars / C is for cell /... / I learn to count / One dozen deaths in my family / One hundred of our houses burned / One million suspects arrested / One century of servitude.*"[87]

There are strong indications that activist memoirs should be read in this way—as a collective recitation of a "history of insults." For instance, Feraoun mentions how on arriving in his hometown of Tizi-Hibel in summer 1956, he experienced strong social pressure to emphasize his personal history of complaints.[88] The experience of Raymond (later Nadir) Bouzar is also informative. Born to a French-Italian mother and Algerian-Arab father, Raymond grew up believing he was French. However, in 1939 he and his friends from university were all called up for military service. Raymond's friends were placed in French units or became officers. Raymond, however, was given one of lowest

[86] See for instance: Hetty Zock, "Paradigms in Psychological Conversion Research: Between Social Science and Literary Analysis," in *Paradigms, Poetics, and Politics of Conversion*, eds. Jan N. Bremmer et al. (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 41–48; *Ulrike Popp-Baier, "*Narrating Embodied Aims: Self-Transformation in Conversion Narratives: A Psychological Analysis," *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung* 2, no. 3 (September 2001).

[87] "L'école," in Boualem Khalfa, *Certitudes*, 51-53.

[88] Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962*, 132–133.

ranks of French recruits (*élèves-caporal*), assigned to an indigenous infantry (*tirailleurs*) unit, and made to suffer basic training. This was despite the fact that Raymond had already been admitted to reserve officer school (and thus merited at least the rank of *élève officier*). His father saw Raymond's placement as racial discrimination; but at the time, Raymond dismissed his father's concerns as evidence of "hypersensitivity and a bad spirit." As Raymond explained, "I did not want to admit the evidence of prejudices."[89]

Taken together, these testimonies are important for understanding how individual experiences were reinterpreted in light of revolutionary myths. Raymond Bouzar's experience was interesting, in that it showed how unjust or racist incidents could initially be dismissed as a mistake (or as the action of a biased individual), then later reinterpreted as evidence of a systemic problem. Such reinterpretations could occur in response to the collection of additional information; they could also occur in response to an individual encountering a narrative framework or myth that was helpful in explaining, organizing, and giving meaning to discriminatory events.

The FLN, meanwhile, actively promoted the idea that by joining the organization, activists could cast off past humiliations and enter a new world of dignity and honor. This theme appeared in countless tracts (see Figure 6.2 below), which proclaimed messages such as "Algerian brothers, leave the path of degradation and dishonor, come to that of duty, dignity, and honor," and "Algerian brothers, you suffer from humiliation, misery, and illness. The enemy sends you first to a meaningless death, without dignity and without honor. The ALN wants to return to you this dignity and honor."[90]

[89] Ibid., 83–98.

[90] ALN-FLN, "Frère algérien, ceux qui vivent sont ceux qui luttent…" Benni Hamou (February 1957), Tract No. 100 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1; ALN-FLN, "Frères algériens, la Patrie vous appelle…," "Frères



Figure 6.2 – Casting off Humiliation. ALN-FLN tract showing (on the right) an Algerian being used as a beast of burden. Whipped by a French soldier, he pulls a plow through a field. On the left, a group of ALN soldiers waits near the mountains beneath a rising sun, standing tall and holding an Algerian flag.

In French, the tract makes an appeal to emulation ("as they [have done]..."). In Arabic, the tract appeals to kinship ("come to your brothers") and to nature ("as water returns to its channel"). Both languages implore Algerians to cast off or be done with humiliation.

(Source: ALN-FLN, "*Barkākā man al-dhall*… Comme eux débarrassez-vous de l'humiliation…" Aflou (June 1958), Tract No. 34 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3.)

An article in *Résistance Algérienne* further described how "Fatmas" (a colonial term for low-status female laborers) had joined the ALN and become heroines: these women had lived "an 'inferior' life full of humiliations," but now they had taken their "primordial place at the side of their brothers," and were fighting for a better future, "a definitive role in a better society." The same issue carried another article that similarly described how "Yesterday humiliated and despised by an arrogant master, today you

algériens, vous souffrez de l'humiliation…," and "Frères algériens, quittez la voie de l'avilissement…," all from Wilaya IV, Zone IV (October 1960), in SHD GR 1H 1715.

have self-respect; you have retrieved your National Dignity: it is the first conquest of the Algerian Revolution."[91]

In addition to promoting this narrative through tracts and declarations, the FLN provided stories of heroism and sacrifice. Perhaps the most well-circulated of these was the tale of ALN militant Ahmad Zabana (called Hamida). Zabana had participated in the uprising of 1 November 1954, at which time his unit had killed a forest ranger. One week later on 8 November, Zabana's unit ran into a French patrol. As the story went, Zabana was shot in the arm and leg, then shot himself in the head so that his own men would leave him behind and save themselves. However, Zabana survived. He was captured, imprisoned in Barberousse, and sentenced to be executed on 19 June 1956. The morning of his execution, Zabana wrote a letter to his parents. It read:

> "Dearest parents, dear mother,
> I write you this letter; I don't know if it is the last… If anything should happen to me, do not believe that it is finished, because to die for the cause of God is [to gain] eternal life. And to die for one's country is but a duty. And your duty is to have sacrificed him who is most dear to you. Don't cry, but, on the contrary, be proud of me."[92]

The letter was picked up and printed in the first issue of *El Moudjahid* and the seventh issue of *Consciences Maghrébines*. Alongside the letter, *Consciences Maghrébines* also printed an anonymous report describing Zabana's march to the scaffold. According to the report, Zabana (crippled from his war wounds) had refused the help of the guards, and had "mounted the scaffold a hero." Then, standing there on the platform, he undertook a series of final statements. He first shouted to the prison bloc:

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[91] "L'algérienne au maquis," and "Premier novembre 1956," *Résistance Algérienne* 11, Edition B, November 1956, 3, 5 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

[92] "Dans une lettre à ses parents Zabana se dit heureux de mourir pour Dieu et la patrie," *El Moudjahid* 1, June 1956, 20 [Tome 1].

"What does my personal fate matter—Algeria will live free." He then asked to say a final prayer. The executioners refused this request, but his lawyer intervened and secured permission from the colonel. After praying, Zabana then turned back to the prison block and "according to the ritual tradition," asking the prisoners to forgive him for any wrongs. He then cried "I am proud to be the first to climb the scaffold. With us or without us, Algeria will live!" The prisoners in the block asked Zabana's forgiveness in reply, and shouted "We will follow you onto the scaffold, but what matters is—with us or without us— Algeria will live free!" At that, Zabana asked them to tell his mother he was not dying in vain, and thus he was not really dying. Then, he "climbed up to the guillotine, and the blade fell three times before beheading him.[93]

This account of Zabana's execution (more hagiographical than factual) was published and re-published by the FLN in order to highlight Zabana's heroism, piety, and self-sacrifice, and contrast these virtues with the depravity of the French. For instance, a few months after the execution, *Résistance Algérienne* printed a poem to Zabana entitled "The Martyr," along with an article describing the execution. The article elaborated on the original account of the beheading: as it explained, Zabana had been arrested on 8 November after being shot in the leg, arm, and face (with the bullet entering the cheek and exiting out the left eye). And while no fewer than four moral authorities—the Catholic Archbishop of Algiers, the Jewish President of the Consistoire Israélite, the Muslim mufti of Algiers, and the Protestant pastor of the Reform Church—had appealed the government to halt the execution, Zabana had begun his march to the scaffold on 19

[93] "Rapport anonyme sur l'exécution de Hamida Zabana," in *Consciences Maghrébines* no. 7, n.d. (Summer 1956) in Patrick Kessel and Giovanni Pirelli, eds., *Le peuple algérien et la guerre: lettres et témoignages d'algériens, 1954–1962* (Paris: François Maspero, 1962), 46–48.

June 1956. Embellishing the original account, the story explained that as Zabana walked from the cell block to the yard, he had sung "with a voice like thunder" the hymn of Barberousse, "Wind, blow ever stronger," and three thousand prisoner-fighters had joined him in the hymn. Moreover, despite facing the ultimate symbol of social effacement (execution), Zabana had signaled only pride: as the article explained, Zabana walked "holding his head high and a smile on his lips." His opening words were more aggressive as well: "Kill me, but Algeria will live!" Other elements of the story were the same: Zabana's refusal of help from the guards, his request to pray, his exchanges with the prisoners, his final words to his mother, and the blade, which "fell three times before his head was completely severed from his body."[94] Subsequent articles repeated similar ideas. "Zabana was very sick and disabled. In complete contempt for the laws of war, the French sent him to the scaffold," one article declared.[95] Another noted that Zabana was in poor health, and that the four religious authorities had intervened on his behalf.[96]

In addition to its hagiographic qualities, "The Tale of Zabana" was notable for the way in which FLN activists remembered it, recited it, and used it as a model of self-sacrifice. Yacef Saadi, for instance, rehearsed the execution of Ahmed Zabana as a kind of passion play, writing as though he were watching the execution himself. He described Zabana walking through the cell block past the other prisoners, "haloed in a messianic

[94] Note from the Embassy of France in Tunisia to the Bureau Régional d'Action Psychologique, "*La Résistance Algérienne, Organe du Front et de l'Armée de Liberation Nationale* no. 2 du 12 Novembre 1956," Tunis (19 November 1956), p. 3, Ref. No. 7074 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

[95] "Nos souffrances et les vôtres," *Résistance Algérienne* 10, Edition B, 10 October 1956, 2 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

[96] "Le message de Zahana," *Résistance Algérienne* 6, Edition C, 13 May 1957, 6–7 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

splendor," turning from side to side to tell the others "I am proud to go up to the scaffold first—with us or without us, Algeria will live free."[97]

Zohra Drif also threaded the story of Zabana throughout her life story. She described the march through the prison block, Zabana and the prisoners singing "Min Djibalina" [sic], his last words to his mother, and that the blade of the guillotine "jammed" twice before falling the third time. Furthermore, she recited that Zabana's death had sparked triumphant ululations in the Casbah and inspired thousands of young men and women to join the FLN. Drif also took the moral of Zabana's story and applied it to her own situation. In summer 1956, she said she told her friend that even the dead could live on through their inspiration of others. "Zabana was beheaded, but he is still fighting! What I'm trying to say is that what gave his life meaning now gives meaning to millions of other lives—so he's not dead! He was completely right to say to his mother, "I am not dying in vain, and so I'm not truly dying!"[98]

In addition to reciting this triumphal narrative of Zabana's death, Drif claimed that the text which had galvanized her the most was Zabana's letter to his mother, which the FLN "duplicated and distributed everywhere." Most remarkably, Drif said she used this letter as a focusing exercise, ritually reciting it to herself before her Milk Bar mission to keep calm and prevent herself from crying. She also came up with a phrase based on Zabana's story, which she repeated to herself in times of stress: she called it her "profession of faith." The phrase was an enjoinder to self-sacrifice: "my life is not worth more than Zabana's." As Drif explained, she repeated this phrase to steel her resolve

[97] Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger, Tome 1* (Paris: Publisud, 2002), 233.
[98] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d 'une combattante de l'ALN*, 142–152.

when leaving her family to join the FLN in Algiers, to manage stress while in prison, and at many other times during her activist career.[99]

Tales of self-sacrifice and heroism thus served many purposes in activist circles. They were a way for activists to memorialize the dead and give them a legacy; such stories also provided positive behavioral models lauding self-sacrifice, resolve in the face of death, and dedication to the cause. More than this, however, such tales gave activists a chance to rewrite their own stories. Without a doubt, Algerians suffered racism at the hands of the French. But by joining the FLN, activists could invest discrimination and suffering with meaning; they could re-interpret suffering as part of a grand story—a revolutionary myth, in which they could play a meaningful role. In describing how he organized the Casino bombing, for instance, Yacef Saadi said that in choosing Casino-worker Lounès Imekhlef as the bomber, Imekhlef had been "now rewarded [alt: gratified] with a role that would completely change his life. As a simple drudge just tolerated by his employers, he had every chance of becoming a hero."[100] Stories like "The Tale of Zabana" supported this process, providing clear action scripts that encouraged activists to take up the mantle of heroism and self-sacrifice, and "write their names next to those of Abdelkader and Mokrani" (as one FLN tract proclaimed).[101] This was a chance to be enshrined in the hall of heroes of the Algerian community—a chance at a legacy. Even Boualem Khalfa's poem about learning the revolutionary catechism included this lesson: "*I learn to read / G is for guillotine / H is for the executioner's axe / I is for immortal….*"[102]

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[99] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d 'une combattante de l'ALN*, 134–135, 142–147, 150–152, 170–171, 184, 530–351.

Also see: Zohra Drif, *La mort des mes frères* (Paris: François Maspero, 1960), 9, 14.

[100] Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger, Tome 2, 344–345.*

[101] ALN-FLN, "1° novembre 1954–1° novembre 1957, Peuple algérien," (November 1957), Tract No. 128 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.

[102] "L'école," in Boualem Khalfa, *Certitudes* (Paris: Club des amis du livre progressiste, 1961), 51-53.

Unsurprisingly, it was those most embedded in the organization—activists in high-commitment *fidaï* units like Zohra Drif and Yacef Saadi—who most conformed their autobiographical reconstructions to this myth. And as their stories demonstrated, the FLN's organizational myth was successful in part because it could operate on both a collective and personal level. Individuals who bought in to the FLN were not just joining a club: they also bought in to the association's *mythomoteur*—a driving myth that helped drive an intensely personal movement that claimed to be ushering men out of humiliation and into honor. This collective narrative brought order from chaos and made meaning out of suffering. And in this way, the myth met men's needs, providing activists with feelings of belonging, certainty, pride, and agency, as well as a sense of personal significance and direction—benefits that came from having a clear role in a collective story.

On the Edge of Biographical Reconstruction: The Story of Raymond Bouzar

By way of conclusion, it is worth taking a closer look at the story of Raymond Bouzar. While most activists narrated their activist careers using the vocabulary of motives provided by the FLN myth, occasionally one stumbled across what Jean-Charles Jauffret and Gilbert Meynier have called a "non-standard witness."[103] Raymond Bouzar was one such unusual witness, whose testimony was so naked, reading it approached voyeurism. The book he produced was also historically informative, as the chronicle was an example of what the sociologist Wadi Bouzar aptly described as a "hot testimony," having been written immediately after events by a "disgusted, wounded, traumatized,

[103] Jean-Charles Jauffret and Gilbert Meynier, "La guerre d'Algérie: histoire officielle, histoire idéologique, histoire des historiens," *Esprit* 37 (August-September 2004): 224–229.

revolted, 'outlawed' man" struggling through his first few months of self-described "misery" in exile in Cairo.

There was little time for Bouzar to re-narrativize or distance himself from events, and it was still a month before the FLN would launch its movement, so its guiding myth had no opportunity to intervene. Thus, Bouzar wrote an impassioned account, writing at the start of his book that "I have written episodes, piling up page after page in the fever of retrospective, and I have not significantly changed anything from the initial form," to the extent of ignoring the "classical rules of composition."[104] Historically speaking, this gives the memoir significant evidentiary value, as the testimony had less time to build up rationalizations, anachronisms, organizational schemas, and other retrospective accretions.

Raymond Bouzar's memoir was really the story of two men, Raymond and his father Abdelkader. Abdelkader Bouzar was the son of a *qadi*, who had sent his children to madrasa and taught them Arabic and Islam. Despite this, Abdelkader had forged a different path for himself, marrying an Italian Catholic woman and becoming an interpreter for the French administration. Abdelkader, his wife, and his children spoke only French at home, and kept the company of other men and women on the margins: other mixed couples, Muslim civil servants in the French administration, and marginalized whites (*petits blancs*, usually Spanish and Italian immigrants).

In this marginalized position, Raymond's father had struggled his entire life to be considered fully French. Passed over for promotions, Abdelkader Bouzar took a dangerous post as an interpreter for the French military during the Rif War (1921-1926),

[104] Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance* (Algiers: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1989 [First ed. Cairo: Comité de Libération du Maghreb Arabe, 1954]), 5–6, 25–27.

being promised a *Croix de Chevalier* in the Legion of Honor and a post in Rabat at the end of his service. He also undertook the difficult and controversial step of becoming a naturalized French citizen (at the time, citizenship was only available through military or government service, and involved renouncing one's personal status as a Muslim, thus effectively renouncing Islam).[105] But even after his military service and citizenship, Abdelkader was assigned a minor post in Salé, rather than the promised post in Rabat. When he registered a complaint, the French administrator told him he should feel lucky to have even attained the Salé post, as it was reserved for the "French"—they had only made an exception for Abdelkader out of consideration for his European wife. Abdelkader was then put on copying duty for his effrontery.

This was but one of many indignities Abdelkader suffered. When he received his *Croix de Guerre*, despite having become a French national, the *Croix* read "indigenous Algerian" rather than French citizen. As a result, Raymond wrote that over time "Disgust began to grow within my parents, and grand disillusionment was born." His father began to lose faith in French "Republicans, Democrats, and other so-called atheists, liberal thinkers, and defenders of human rights," who were often just as racist as their conservative counterparts.[106]

The last straw for Abdelkader Bouzar was around 1934, when he ran as an independent for the Miliana district seat on the Conseil général. The French administration preferred a "yes-man" on the Council, and resorted to religion-baiting to undermine Abdelkader's candidature, flooding the countryside with tracts reading "Don't

[105] Guy Pervillé, "La politique algérienne de la France, 1830–1962," in *Juger en Algérie, 1944–1962, actes du colloque tenu à Bordeaux le 1er décembre 1995* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1997), 27–37.
[106] Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance*, 29–52, 70.

vote for a candidate who served France against Islam during the Rif War." The French sub-prefect further circulated copies of administrative records related to Abdelkader's service in the war. As Raymond recalled, his father was "disgusted, revolted, frustrated, in a state of defeat… His idealism was lost in sad reality. Finished was 'France generous and enlightened,' finished was 'the good French,' finished was 'the true Christians that include us' and 'the great humane Republicans.'"[107]

But as Raymond's father grew more alienated, Raymond felt increasingly French. As his mother was Italian, Raymond was half-Algerian, half-European. This enabled him to join a French scouting group (Fédération des éclaireurs de France) as opposed to the Scouts musulmans algériens (SMA); Raymond also gained a love for French philosophy. Still, he was caught between two worlds. French boys at his school taunted him, saying "Is it true your father is Arab? Is it true, say, that you are a *bicot* [nigger]?" Another year, Raymond was almost beaten for inviting a Spanish girl to dance. At the same time, Raymond's father's clan in Miliana also viewed him as an outsider. Raymond remembered his father having a heated argument with the *muqaddam* of their ancestral shrine. The *muqaddam* insisted that Raymond's time spent in Morocco and "doubtful education" [i.e., French education] meant he should not be included on the list of clan members who traditionally received a portion of meat sacrificed in honor of the local saint.[108]

Despite this uneasy existence between two worlds, Raymond grew and thrived. He studied law and was elected president of the Association générale des étudiants in Rabat. The start of the Second World War in 1939 could have been a moment of rupture: all of

[107] Ibid., 74–77.
[108] Ibid., 66–80.

his friends from university went into French units, while Raymond was given a low rank in an indigenous infantry unit. His father said it was racial discrimination; but Raymond ignored him. And eventually, Raymond managed to work his way into a French unit, and then into the reserve officers' school in France. He was "proud of the army, proud of the uniform."[109]

Years passed following the Second World War. Raymond and his French Catholic wife, Andrée, had four children. Raymond followed in his father's footsteps, working his way up through the French military and civil service: he earned his stripes, became a judiciary police officer, civil status officer, and later civil controller in Morocco. His family, meanwhile, moved in different directions: Raymond's younger sister studied at the Sorbonne, while his father Abdelkader gave up smoking and started talking about independence.[110]

The breaking point for Raymond was his marriage. Like his father, Raymond married a European woman. Andrée was an uneducated, working-class French Catholic; Raymond was well-educated, loved collecting books, and kept the company of socialists and intelligentsia. But for ten years, they made it work, despite challenges (she racked up debts and occasionally made racist remarks; his work often took him away from home or saw them stationed in outlying provinces). Around their tenth anniversary, however, things began to deteriorate. They argued about money, as Andrée began accruing debts. Andrée's parents went through a messy divorce, and her father committed suicide. Andrée also began running in a different circle of friends. One friend, Anna Paolantonacci, began lodging with them; Andrée also began spending more time with

[109] Ibid., 83–98.
[110] Ibid., 103–138.

Jewish converts to Catholicism who were part of the conservative Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne (JAC).

On 5 July 1951, Raymond embraced Andrée and left for work. She seemed attentive and affectionate, he wrote, and "I did not notice anything abnormal." When he came home, however, the house was empty except for a note: "You are an idiot for believing that one could live more than eleven years with an Arab."[111]

The divorce case that followed was bitter and contested. Trained in law and having worked most his life in the French court system, Raymond documented the case's procedural irregularities with a detail that only a civil servant could (dedicating some fifty pages in his memoire to the divorce and custody cases). From the initial mediation hearings to the official inquiry, social worker visits, divorce proceedings, and custody hearings, the case devolved into suits and countersuits. Raymond filed official complaints about judicial irregularities, Andrée's team found an old housekeeper to file criminal complaints against Raymond's father, and her friend Anna sued Raymond for a joint business they had started when Anna had lived with them.

Perhaps most damaging, his wife's friends and legal team made the case about race and religion. The social worker's report called Raymond "misaligned between two civilizations, two heredities," and his wife complained he had imposed "Arab mores" at home. Andrée also took the "Bouzar affair" into the streets, with Catholic activists declaring "We must annihilate the *bicot*," "protect the poor European from the mixed marriage," "once and for all, let us make an example by the Bouzar case," and "Help us save the Bouzar children. There are four souls to bring back to God."[112]

[111] Ibid., 86, 183, 200–216.
[112] Ibid., 200–225.

During the case, Raymond was denied visitation; for eight months, he could not see his children. When he was eventually granted visitation, it was a slap in the face: he could only see them for a few hours, after Mass on Sundays. These visits were an ordeal, as the children repeated terrible things they had been told by their mother. The children themselves were separated to give their mother more freedom: the two eldest girls were sent to a Catholic boarding school in Fez, the seven-year-old son to a school in Tiflet, the youngest son to nursery school in Rabat. Raymond faithfully compiled legal documents, filed appeals, and registered complaints with the legal system he trusted and loved. He filed appeals to custody rulings, a defamation case against the social worker, a neglect case against Andrée, complaints about violations of the custody agreement, complaints against the court, and more. Raymond's mother (a Catholic) also filed a complaint with the bishop. But from the start, Raymond's appeals to the civil code were dismissed: as the court told him, it was not a question of civil code, it was just "like this, and that's all." In other words, as Raymond understood it, "The French civil code was not applicable to an Arab." He felt they were trying to punish him for having "married a 'white,'" and for not having raised his children Catholic.

Meanwhile, friends and family worried Raymond would commit suicide. For months, French and Arab friends took turns staying with him. As Raymond wrote, "Think what it is like, for a man to be so violated and ridiculed, tortured in his soul, his flesh, and his blood." One of his hardest days was Christmas Eve. Financially, physically, and emotionally drained, he sat alone with the toys he had bought on credit for his children, whom he could not see. Alone in the apartment that night, he remembered accidentally bumping into a fluffy musical teddy bear—the jolt caused the music box inside the bear

to start playing. The childlike tune broke him. Raymond said he burst into tears, and cried until morning.[113]

The divorce and custody case dragged on for two years. But the final blow was the lawsuit against Raymond's father, Abdelkader. Abdelkader Bouzar was in poor health and demoralized; when the children visited over the school holidays, they did not want to hug or kiss their grandfather. The old man cried. The lawsuit was more than he could bear. Within the year, he passed away in Algeria. As a result, in June 1953 Raymond traveled to his boyhood village of Miliana to attend his father's funeral. Exhausted, heavy with grief, and surrounded by family, for the first time he wrote that he felt a sense of peace:

> My father smelled good. He smelled of musk. His head was slightly bent to the right side. He was smiling. He was smiling with a radiant air. He was all rose. His features, extraordinarily relaxed, gave his face a peace I had never seen …Yes, my father had won. He had won salvation. Islam. That was it. Victory, salvation, Islam.
>
> *And I too, at last I found the solution, salvation, Islam.*
>
> We buried him near the bones of his grandfather, barely a meter from his ancestor."[114]

Raymond returned home with a sense of calm. When he met a friend, she was perplexed, and said, "You, something has happened to you, an upheaval. You worry me. You are very calm…" Later, his friend said "I knew, that day, you had a deep faith in what you decided, and nothing would shake it. You were too calm."

On 1 August 1953, Raymond went to pick up his children for his regular visit. On 2 August, he took them to the train station. There, he hugged his youngest daughter and youngest son, and promised he would see them again next week. Then, he boarded the train with his two eldest children. Together, they traveled to the airport, and boarded a

[113] Ibid.
[114] Emphasis in the original. Ibid., 248.

flight to Paris. From Paris, they bought tickets to Amsterdam, and from Amsterdam, they flew to Cairo. In Cairo, they were welcomed as exiles by the Arab Maghreb Bureau. Raymond was no more—his name was now Nadir. And Nadir Bouzar would go on to join the FLN leadership in exile, helping smuggle Egyptian weapons across the Mediterranean to Algeria. As he explained looking back on the experience, he no longer believed he was French, and no longer felt the need to hide that he was half-Arab. "*The racial complex had left me*. From now on, my friends would be Muslims, Moroccans and Algerians, and I would only associate with Europeans in my administrative obligations."[115]

Overall, non-standard "hot" testimonies like that of Raymond Nadir Bouzar were unusual but important, revealing how political activism intimately intertwined with individual needs and personal circumstances (e.g. a crisis that produces situational availability or limits resources[116]). In Nadir's case, devastating personal circumstances and emotional stress (divorce, his father's death, bankruptcy), inspired him to first seek emotional management strategies and communal support in religious practice and kinship networks. Then, dislocation (living in destitution in Cairo with no work) and separation from family contributed to his decision to join the FLN. And from involvement in this all-consuming external crusade with a group of kin-like comrades, Nadir gained certainty, hope, meaning, and support. Nadir would also subsequently use his identity reconstruction and worldview change to legitimize his decision to kidnap two of his

[115] Ibid., 226–254.
[116] Ines W. Jindra, *A New Model of Religious Conversion: Beyond Network Theory and Social Constructivism* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 110–114.

children and become a weapons smuggler. In short, Nadir would have gained many benefits (both material and non-material) from his decision to join an anti-colonial movement.[117]

Also striking was how Nadir's testimony provided a glimpse into the early stages of mythmaking. Compared with other memoirs studied, Nadir's testimony was emotional, disorganized, and highly personal. When he wrote the book (in early/mid 1954), the FLN movement was not yet underway. As a result, the recurrent theme in the story was betrayal, injustice, and racism—not revolution or nationalism triumphant.

In Cairo, Allal El Fassi (leader in exile of the Moroccan Istiqlāl Party) encouraged Bouzar to write down his experience around spring or summer 1954. Upon reading the finished volume, the men at the Arab Maghreb Bureau described having strong emotional reactions to the text: El Fassi admitted he cried reading the book. In his preface (dated 16 October 1954), El Fassi argued the moral of Bouzar's story related back to the parable of Colonel Ben Daoud. The book was evidence that attempts at assimilation could "only lead to failure and disappointment," because even if North Africans accepted the wholesale "abandonment of Maghrebi religious personality, national character, or even human character, by dissolving it into the French entity, [this] would still not satisfy the French" because of their racism. The French would never fully accept Muslims, Jews, and "men of color," he explained. He then encouraged readers to join him in a particular affective response: as he declared, the only remaining reaction to the French, and "the only word that expresses the impression left by the French on their Muslim and Jewish subjects" was disgust—a disgust both Colonel Ben Daoud and Mohamed Attabou (Ben

[117] See for instance Nadir Bouzar, *L'odyssée du Dina: récit du premier transport d'armes de la Révolution Maghrébine* (Algiers: Bouchene-ENAL, 1993).

Daoud's Moroccan counterpart) had committed suicide to escape.[118] Nadir, for his part, added in his own preface that "Westerners, if they have even a little heart left, a tiny bit of remorse for the crimes perpetrated against human dignity, some shame for the offense against God and North Africa," they would let the people of the Maghreb be free.[119] Here then was the moral of the story, prefacing the story itself and intimately linked to the tale of Ben Daoud (and pan-Maghrebian identity).

In a postface (also dated 16 October 1954), however, FLN leader Mohamed Khider relocated Bouzar's story into a nationalist narrative. In words that proved prescient, he urged a more positive, agentic action script. As he argued "More than putting the colonialist mentality on trial, more than reflecting on the misery of Africans, *this book is a stirring plea in favor of Maghrebian nationalism*."[120]

Conclusion: "Régner, c'est faire croire"[121]

Méchati opened his memoir with a quote: "It is obvious that nothing comes from nothing. Every action, every decision has a beginning and an end. And for better or worse, every end is but a logical consequence of its beginning."[122] However, the war that reached its peak between 1956–1960 was not a "logical consequence" of a beginning that was tumultuous, hasty, disorganized, and lacking in supplies and support. Moreover, the death of Guy Monnerot and symbols like circumcision and All Saints Day sent unclear messages concerning the aims and symbolic world of the FLN.

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[118] Ibid., 20–23.
[119] Ibid. 27.
[120] Emphasis in original. Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance*, 20–22, 256.
[121] A maxim quoted by Mabrouk Belhocine (and attributed to Machiavelli). Mabrouk Belhocine, *Le courrier Alger-le Caire, 1954–1956: le Congrès de la Soummam dans la révolution* (Algiers: Casbah Éditions, 2000), 7.
[122] Mohamed Méchati, *Militant de l'indépendance algérienne* (Brussels: Éditions Tribord, 2012), 15.

Instead of its end proceeding naturally from its start, then, the Algerian Revolution involved a protracted struggle to make the FLN's actions *seem* the only logical consequence of colonial policy—a battle fought in the field of mythmaking. This involved a pitched struggle to convince French citizens, international audiences, and individual Algerians to accept particular morality tales concerning the violence. On one side, the FLN endeavored to convince audiences that ALN-FLN fighters were heroic and selfless maquisards, fighting a French occupation whose criminal policies and moral bankruptcy necessitated resistance. On the other side, the French administration tried to convince the world that the FLN was a criminal band of fanatics, bent on undermining the unity and security of the state.

These battles, as we have seen, involved a number of failures, false starts, and forced silences. The circumcision analogy was cast aside, "The Mason-Wasp and the Toad" ignored. Other locally-crafted nationalist morality tales were told in the moment, and later forgotten. Notably, in these FLN "working tales," the stock characters commonly found in *timucuha* (e.g., stepmother, ogre, ghost, djinn) were replaced with a cast of foolish French villains and Algerian "everyman" characters: merchant, farmer, herder, soldier. Cleverness remained a prominent trope; and like the traditional stories, the action of the protagonist "is always exemplary." But there were no introductory or concluding ritual formulas, no magic, and no need to transition the reader into "a narrative space-time different from the daily space-time;" these were stories for the here and now.[123]

The prevalence of the "Tale of Ben Daoud" in individual narratives—and the silence concerning Ben Daoud in FLN publications—was another anomaly. This spoke to the

[123] Émile Dermenghem, *Contes kabyles* (Algiers: Charlot, 1945), 216; D. Merolla, "Le conte kabyle," 2084.

story the FLN sought to tell. Fatally flawed, Ben Daoud trusted the French, and his trust led to his demise (not to a nationalist awakening). The action script was thus negative or proscriptive: don't trust the French. Instead, the FLN marketed the "Tale of Zabana." With Zabana's story, the trope of French perfidy and depravity stayed constant, as did the protagonist's tragic end. However, the action script for the "Tale of Zabana" was anti-colonial struggle and self-sacrifice, helping communicate the idea that struggle was an act of dignity—valuable in its own right, independent of outcome.

Ultimately, the FLN's myth of the "moral revolutionary" who sacrificed himself for his community was not necessarily a myth unique to the FLN: other organizations told tales in which they, the righteous few, heroically faced foolish or malicious opponents. Moreover, many activist groups printed hagiographies of fallen members in their newspapers.[124] But these stories were not for the dead: their audience was the living. They sought to inspire adherents with concepts about pride, legacy, meaning, and duty, providing scripts and role models to follow.[125]

Parochial morality tales were also notable for the spaces of contact and social exchange they described (and failed to describe). Many of the tales were set along country roads or in the street, where Algerian peasants and fighters encountered French soldiers, roadblocks, and patrols; other stories featured Algerian interactions with French officials in post offices, at tax desks, in the barracks, in the classroom, and in other

[124] PCA, "L'exemple d'Henri Maillot," *La Voix des Soldats* 4, June 1956, 4 in in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3; "Gloire aux martyrs du MNA!" *La Voix du Peuple: Organe Clandestin du Mouvement National Algérien, Numéro spécial*, 11 March 1958, 6, in BNF MICR D-1263; "Ali Khodja n'est plus," and "Quelques jours avec le commando 'Ali Khodja,'" *Révolution: Organe les Combattants de la Wilaya IV* no. 1, 1957, 2, 10 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3; "Les membres du CNRA tombés au champ d'honneur fidèles à leur engagement, ils ont donné leur vie pour l'indépendance nationale," *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, 102–104 [Tome 1].

[125] *Ulrike Popp-Baier, "*Narrating Embodied Aims. Self-transformation in Conversion Narratives: A Psychological Analysis," *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung* 2, no. 3 (September 2001).

"official" settings characterized by unequal power relations. Thus, when the protagonist of the FLN imagination met his or her antagonist, that antagonist was French, male, and occupying a space or role that gave him a disproportional social status vis-à-vis the Algerian. For as Yacine's "The Mason-Wasp and the Toad" suggested, even the fictional Algerian was not allowed to sit at the same table as the Frenchman.

But these morality tales silenced many sites of French-Algerian interaction that would have disrupted the narrative of the "moral maquisard" driven to inevitable separation by the perfidious Frenchman. Missing from FLN morality tales were descriptions of companionate social settings and egalitarian interactions. Records of intermarriage and were quieted. And FLN activists denied responsibility for the Melouza massacre and were silent about Guy Monnerot's death on the "heroic day" of 1 November. Such events did not fit with the myth's division of time, the FLN's self-fashioning, or the "moral of the story" the FLN wanted to tell.

Mohammed Harbi argued that the FLN won its struggle for multiple reasons. The MNA was late to the game creating its own armed movement; the FLN proved better at coalition-building and rallying diverse demographics (including bourgeois families in Algiers; UGEMA members; Egyptian, Moroccan, and Tunisian leaders; European intellectuals, etc.). Moreover, the FLN was better at spreading its message (using organs like *El Moudjahid* and Voice of the Arabs in Cairo), and outperformed the MNA through targeted messaging and branding. It competed with the MNA by emphasizing Islamic piety and social conservatism, but still attracted Algerian urban bourgeoisie and European intellectuals by emphasizing secular humanism, Resistance heritage, and democratic

liberalism. Meanwhile, the FLN gained support in North Africa by emphasizing Arabism to Egyptian leaders, and Islam and North African solidarity to Tunisian allies.[126]

To this list, it is important to add that the FLN won important battles in the field of mythmaking. Michel de Certeau wrote that it is "the will to 'make people believe' ('faire-croire') that gives life to institutions."[127] And for a time, France had made Algerians believe they were being made French, "a quarter, then a half, then finally in whole."[128] For men like Raymond Bouzar, this had guided their sense of who they were and where they were headed. But as the original title of Bouzar's autobiography (*I Believed in France*) suggested, that myth was collapsing. Finished was 'France generous and enlightened"—now, *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité* represented the "three great deceptive words on the front of buildings."[129] And in place of the old myth, the FLN undertook an intimate battle to win hearts with a new narrative.

However, if Yacine described fables as "lies where not everything was false," one might similarly describe the FLN's myth as "truths where not everything was true." But the myth did not need to be completely true—for as the FLN well understood, "To reign is to make believe."[130] And in addition to making men believe, the FLN made men move. By giving individuals *a path for action*, the organization made believers into actors. Thus, the FLN fulfilled de Certeau's prediction that "The credibility of a discourse is

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[126] Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: mirage et réalité*, 159–162.

[127] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 149, 179.

[128] "Palestro," in Boualem Khalfa, *Certitudes*, 30–32.

[129] Ibid., 29.

[130] Mabrouk Belhocine, *Le courrier Alger-le Caire, 1954–1956*, 7.

This French maxim is popularly, albeit incorrectly, attributed to Machiavelli. Machiavelli did write, however, that "the nature of the people is fickle; it is easy to persuade them of a thing, but difficult to keep them in that persuasion. Thus it should be ordered that when men no longer believe, they can be made to believe by force." [Author's translation]. See: Niccolò Machiavelli, *Scritti politici scelti: Il principe, e scritti minori*, ed. Vittorio Osimo (Milan: F. Vallardi, 1910), 53.

what first makes believers act in accord with it. It produces practitioners. To make people believe is to make them act."[131]

This movement, I have argued, was accomplished through twin engines: the collective myth on one side, and individual acts of biographical reconstruction on the other side. Through biographical reconstruction, activists emplotted their life stories according to the group myth. And as Paul Ricœur noted, "What Aristotle calls plot is not a static structure but an operation, an integrating process."[132] In other words, life stories with a plot were not static: they moved *toward* something. Thus, the myth and its biographical reconstructions became integral to the success of the 1 November movement, helping create both *movement* (as an action) and *the movement* (as a group of people heading somewhere).

Studying social movements, Gary Alan Fine noted that some groups make "narrative occasions into ritual," and that through such rituals, "one throws one's body into to the breach, embodying one's commitment." Moreover, when "performed" or retold in interviews or in print, these stories draw out "a set of emotions" that allow both the storyteller and the audience to "share the affective state."[133] His comments held true for how FLN activists ritually retold their stories of "awakening." And at their core, the affective state the stories communicated was a personal relocation out of humiliation and impotence, and into hope and empowerment. The boy who watched his father beaten, the girl whose friend called her a "rat," the man whose wife left him, the woman whose

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[131] Ibid.

[132] Paul Ricoeur, "Life in Quest of Narrative," in *On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation*, ed. David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1991), 20–33.

[133] Gary Alan Fine, "Public Narration and Group Culture: Discerning Discourse in Social Movements," in *Social Movements and Culture*, eds. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 131, 135.

diploma was thrown on the ground—they no longer had to see these memories as evidence of personal weakness, failure, or victimhood. Through the FLN, humiliations could be transformed into war wounds suffered on the path to a better future; the moral of the story could be rewritten. And while not all of this myth was true, it was powerful.

Chapter 7

On Trial with Antigone and Christ Crucified: Building a French Community of Revolt during the Algerian War, 1954-1960

On 5 September 1960 in a cramped hall in Cherche-Midi Prison, reporters, spectators, military and government officials, lawyers and witnesses gathered for the trial of six Algerians and eighteen French activists. Arraigned before the Tribunal permanent des forces armées (TPFA), the twenty-four defendants faced the grave charge of having undermined state security by aiding the FLN, a violation of Article 88 of the French Penal Code. President Curvelier[1] presided over the military tribunal, with Lieutenant Schuppé and Captain Estève serving alongside him on the bench; Major Lequime served as the prosecuting Government Commissioner.

Before these somber military men stood the twenty-four accused and their twenty-six defense lawyers. On the Algerian side stood the defendants Hamada Haddad, Allaoua Daksi, Aliane Hamimi, Saïd Hannoun, Ould Younès, and Lounis Brahimi. Haddad was the head of the FF-FLN for Wilaya II in France (the Paris suburbs); Daksi was the youngest Algerian in the box at 22-years-old.[2] Next to these Algerian activists stood eighteen French European activists. This group included artists and intellectuals, such as France Binard (pottery artist), Jean-Claude Paupert (bookseller), and journalist Denise Barrat (Catholic activist with *Témoignage Chrétien*; wife of the paper's editor and *résistant* Robert Barrat). Actors and teachers were overrepresented in the dock: these included actors Paul Crauchet, André Thorent, Georges Berger, and Jacques Rispal, and the teachers Hélène Cuénat, Micheline Pouteau, Yvonne Rispal, and Janine Cahen. There

[1] Alt: Curbelier
[2] Allaoua Daksi, *Daksi à cœur ouvert* (Bouzaréah: Scolie Editions, 2017).

were also a few workers, notably Jacqueline Carré (CGT activist, worker in an electronics factory) and Gérard Meïer (surveyor and army deserter). Finally, nurse Odette Huttelier stood in the box, alongside two husband-wife activist pairs: Jacques and Lise Trébouta (he an actor, she a medical student), and Jacques and Aline Charby [Charbit] (he an actor, she an AJAAS member and former student of André Mandouze). Four other French activists were tried in absentia: Francis Jeanson (philosopher), Danielle Sabret, Cécile Regagnon, and Jacques Vignes.[3]

Although the trial was officially centered on FF-FLN head Hamada Haddad, the crowd that crammed itself into the courtroom was not there to see the Algerians. A sizeable part of the audience was vocal and hostile, holding printed signs or jeering at the accused (such that the crowd had to be brought to order by the President of the Tribunal). Meanwhile, crowds outside shouted their disgust and anger toward the French defendants, gathering to yell "Death to the traitors!" and "Shoot them!"[4] Press coverage also focused on the French defendants, with *Le Monde, Le Soir*, *La Cité*, *Le Figaro,* and even *Vérité Liberté* referring to the spectacle as the "Jeanson network trial," the "Jeanson trial," or on occasion, the "FLN support network trial."[5]

So, in a hot, crowded, and uncomfortable chamber just larger than a classroom, the military tribunal of 5 September 1960 began. Or rather, it tried to begin. No sooner had

[3] "Accusation," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, ed. Marcel Péju (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), 13–14.

[4] Jeannine Cahen [sic], "Le procès vu du box," *Vérité Liberté* 5, November 1960, 9; Jean-Marc Théolleyre, "Violences verbales et confusion au procès du 'réseau Jeanson,'" *Le Monde*, 10 September 1960; *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, ed. Marcel Péju (Paris: François Maspero, 1961).

[5] Jean-Marc Théolleyre, "Le procès du 'réseau Jeanson' s'achève," *Le Monde*, 3 October 1960, "Nouvel incident au procès des membres du 'réseau Francis Jeanson,'" *Le Figaro*, 7 September 1960; "Le procès du 'réseau Jeanson,'" *Le Soir*, 7 September 1960; "Vifs incidents au procès Jeanson," *La Cité*, 7 September 1960; "Le procès du réseau de soutien au FLN," *Vérité Liberté* 5, November 1960; "Trente et un accusés au procès du réseau de soutien au FLN," *Le Soir*, 6 September 1960.

the proceedings started, FLN defense lawyers Mourad Oussedik and Jacques Vergès orchestrated a disruption. The two complained their client Aliane Hamimi was not being given due process. The reason they cited: Hamimi could not speak French (the language of the court), and he could not speak dialectical Arabic (the language of the court interpreter)—Hamimi could only speak *literary* Arabic. Flabbergasted, the court debated the language issue, questioned the lawyers, then took a recess to investigate the claim. Forty-five minutes later, having discovered "all Arabophones speaking literary Arabic understand dialectical Arabic," the judges angrily resumed proceedings. But Vergès and Oussedik continued to press the point. The ongoing debate caused a stir in the court and snickering from the dock. Exasperated, the President of the Tribunal finally growled "There is too much laughter in this debate, which is grave… This is not a public market!"[6]

Already, the tribunal was struggling to assert its authority in the face of a concerted effort by the defense to delegitimize the proceedings. And the disturbances continued. Oussedik and Vergès continued arguing with the bench, forcing a second forty-five minute recess. Finally, after the second break, President Curvelier attempted to question Hamimi through the interpreter. But this only compounded the court's frustration. Hamimi, who had attended Qurʾānic school, put his education to use and responded in a florid literary Arabic, which the hapless interpreter was unable to translate. Furthermore, when the translator posed questions in Algerian dialectical Arabic to Hamimi, the uncooperative defendant simply replied, "I don't understand." And so instead of

[6] "Lundi 5 Septembre," and "Mardi 6 Septembre," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson,* 15–21; Jean-Marc Théolleyre, "La défense des inculpés musulmans a entamé une querelle procédurière," *Le Monde*, 7 September 1960.

witnessing any grand performance of French justice, the angry audience sat through an entire day of linguistic debates.

When the tribunal resumed the next day, the state had attempted to preempt further disorder by fetching two additional interpreters: one for literary Arabic, and another for Kabyle Berber (just in case). This solved the problem. Unfortunately, as the defense lawyers pointed out, before the tribunal could get underway Hamimi needed to be informed of the proceedings and the charges against him. The reporter from *Le Monde*, Jean-Marc Théolleyre, described what happened next. Before a "dumbfounded" audience, the group of "satisfied or alternately amused" defense lawyers launched an absurd "war of attrition:" they made the new Arabic interpreter verbally translate court procedural documents for Hamimi into classical Arabic—for the next four hours.[7]

This was the start of a trial that would contain many morality tales. Other claims from the trial will be explored later; but for now, it is enough to cite Vergès' account of what the defense team hoped to accomplish in these opening two days of the trial. As Vergès put it, the state had "dreamed" of staging a morality tale: "French traitors amalgamated with the assassins of the FLN. A beautiful *image d'Épinal*[8] on a yellowed page, navy blue, red and black, uniforms and dresses! Saint Georges de Reuilly slaying the dragon of treason."[9]

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[7] Jean-Marc Théolleyre, "La défense demande la récusation du président au tribunal militaire, qui la déclare irrecevable," *Le Monde*, 8 September 1960.

[8] An *image d'Épinal* is traditional French caricature art of the 19th century, similar to what one might see in old children's books. Colorful and simple, the subject matter is often fairy tales and fables, aristocratic women in gardens, imperial themes, men on horseback and soldiers with cannons, and important political events (i.e., men in uniforms and women in dresses). Figuratively, an *image d'Épinal* is something traditional, over-simplistic, and stereotyped.

[9] Jacques Vergès, "La leçon d'un procès," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 233–237.



Figure 7.1 – *Image d'Épinal* of the War in Africa. On the top left, an Arab lifts high a severed head. On the bottom left, Arabs ambush a French soldier. (Source: "Scènes de la guerre d'Afrique N°1," [Print, 41 x 33 cm] (Épinal: Pellerin et Cie, 1853) in BNF FOL-LI-59 4, ID ark:/12148/btv1b6938128k).

But as Vergès explained, this fantasy would not endure. In reality, "The truth also betrays the Prince's dreams. She [the truth] is also a *fellagha* [bandit, outlaw]."[10] In mounting their opening disruption, the defense thus hoped to shatter the court's picturesque and oversimplified performance of justice, and present their truth insurgent. Yes, the linguistic debate had been an opening jab aimed at upsetting the proceedings. Yes, it hoped to undermine the court's control and legitimacy. And yes, Vergès—son of a French father and Vietnamese mother, frequent target of racist epithets, communist activist and staunch anti-colonialist, a self-described "brilliant bastard" and specialist in

[10] Ibid.

transgression—would later become infamous for this tactic (which he dubbed the rupture defense).

But illegitimacy was not the only message the defense hoped to send. The confusion over what language Hamimi spoke, the four hours of literary Arabic, the refusal to recognize the French interpreter as a valid interlocutor—these bits of comedic theater were a serious attempt to prove that *Algerians were not French* and not *known* by the French. The imperial vision of Algeria, the *image d'Épinal* was a lie. As Vergès put it, "When Alaine Hamimi demanded an interpreter of literary Arabic, he was proving with a laugh that from the moment [it's revealed nobody] knows exactly what language a French Muslim speaks, it's a good bet this Muslim is not really French."[11]

What role would the French defendants choose to play in this grand performance of morality and justice? And what morality tales would they tell, both on the stand and in public statements? Teachers, artists, students, good Catholics, devoted husbands and wives, a nurse—what business had they (presumably respectable members of French society) with an organization the state considered "assassins," "terrorists," and "dangerous criminals"?

The pages that follow will explore how French activists answered these questions, both in print and in court. The first section explores how activists chipped away at the French colonial myth through affective modeling, expressing revulsion at French behavior in Algeria. From this revulsion, the chapter then follows how activists tried to bring others across the cognition-behavior gap by converting revulsion to revolt—illegal action in support of Algerian separatists—through morality tales. Particularly, chapter

[11] Ibid., 237; Jacques Vergès, *Le salaud lumineux* (Neuilly-sur-Seine: Éditions Michel Lafon, 1990), 124–125.

argues that French activists worked to demythologize the French colonial myth through a dual process of mobilizing emotions and mobilizing narrative.

Thus, while Paul Ricœur noted that "At first glance demythologization is a purely negative enterprise," the tearing down of a collective myth was not only a process of rejection. It involved drawing others' attention to, or "becoming conscious of the mythic clothing," and returning to cultural texts and shared pasts in order to build from them counter-myths.[12] Overall then, the process of constructing and marketing collective narratives was a competitive and uneven process.

Constructing a Community of Sentiment

The struggle for Algerian independence included many battles in the field of mythmaking. Chapter 6 examined the FLN's struggle to present themselves as moral revolutionaries—a battle included a fight to engage everyday Algerians in a liberationist myth that was both intensely personal and steeped in the idea of the sacrifice of the individual to the cause. But the Algerian war also involved a debate over the French colonial myth—the idea that that Algeria was three departments of France, that Algerian Muslims were participating in a process of assimilation into the French body politic, and that French colonization been a benevolent attempt to civilize indigenous peoples and deliver benefits (like safety and social order, infrastructure, European education, Western medical science, hygiene, and culture).

Since the late 1940s, activists including André Mandouze and Francis Jeanson had denounced this myth, attempting to show how France was at fault for its behavior in

[12] Paul Ricœur, "Preface to Bultmann's *Jesus, mythologie et demythologization*," in *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Lewis Seymour Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 35–37.

Algeria. In 1947, for instance, Mandouze deconstructed the "myth of the three departments," and in a 1950 article declared the colonial system a "crime against humanity" and called for its liquidation.[13] In December 1955, Francis and Colette Jeanson further released a book on the Algerian national question entitled *Algérie hors la loi*. Informed by Colette's trip to Algeria (and her meetings there with André Mandouze, Pierre Chaulet, Salah Louanchi, Father Jean Scotto, the UDMA, and the MTLD, among others), the book gave an alternate, Algerian nationalist history of French-Algerian relations: it challenged the colonial myth that Algeria had been a land without a people, empty and waiting for French cultivation, and provided extensive information on Algerian poverty, inequality, and repression under the French administration.[14]

However, this attempt to convince French citizens of the harm colonialism had wrought was met with a "wall of silence" from French readers.[15] Algerian Jewish journalist Jean Daniel denounced the book in *L'Express* as "masochistic," with "gratuitous denunciations and infantile resentment," adding the volume ultimately elicited only sadness or a shrug of the shoulders. And in *Esprit*, French Algerian Clémence Sugier noted the French should indeed "be ashamed if the facts recounted are the only true ones," and for the last one-hundred and twenty years Algeria had in fact been only "mud and tears." But, she argued, France had brought many benefits to

[13] André Mandouze, "Prévenons la guerre d'Afrique du Nord: Impossibilités algériennes ou le mythe des trois départements," *Esprit* 135, no. 7 (July 1947): 10–30; André Mandouze, "Manifeste," *Consciences Algériennes* 1 (December 1950).

Also see: Francis Jeanson, "Cette Algérie, conquise et pacifiée..." *Esprit* 166, no. 4 (April 1950): 615–621; André Mandouze, "Déclaration algérienne au congrès mondial des intellectuels pour la paix à Wrocław, août 1948," *Consciences Algériennes,* 1, December 1950.

[14] Colette and Francis Jeanson, *L'Algérie hors la loi* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1955).

[15] Anne Simonin, "Éditions de Minuit et les Éditions du Seuil: Deux stratégies éditoriales face à la guerre d'Algérie," in *La Geurre d'Algérie et les intellectuels français,* eds. Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1991), 225; Francis Jeanson, *Notre guerre* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1960), 46–47.

Algeria. “Jeanson only admits the colonial fact from a perspective of sin,” and thus “the face of France is disfigured in this book.” France, Sugier argued, had no reason to shame.[16]

By 1956, however, the myth of French Algeria was beginning to crack. Following the Special Powers vote in March 1956, the French government began a personnel increase in Algeria that by the end of the year would see a doubling of French military strength in Algeria. For some 200,000 French youth, this meant the extension of mandatory military service (from 18 to 27 months), or being called up for active duty.[17] The escalation of hostilities, increased exposure to wartime atrocities, and the testimonies sent home by respected young men in uniform thus allowed the question of French behavior in Algeria to receive a broader hearing.

French singer and communist activist Claude Vinci was among the first soldiers to receive a military recall notice. He had finished his mandatory service in 1954; but in April 1956 he received a recall notice summoning him to report again in May. Like Yann Le Masson, he discussed it with his communist cell; they took a vote, and decided Vinci should depart for Algeria despite his reservations. A few months later in Algeria, twenty-four year-old Vinci experienced one of two days in his life he would never forget. It was August 1956, and Claude was stationed in Kabylia. His company was tasked with serving as reinforcements for a pacification operation, led by the Red Berets (paratroopers) and Green Berets (Commandos Marine/French Special Forces). Claude’s unit was positioned

[16] Jean Daniel, “Entre le chagrin et le haussement d'épaules,” *L'Express*, 13 January 1956, 11; Clémence Sugier, “Colette et Francis Jeanson: *L'Algérie hors la loi* (Ed. du Seuil)” (Review article), *Esprit* 237, no. 4 (April 1956): 631.

[17] Guy Perville, “L'armée française au combat, de 1956 à 1962,” in *La France en guerre d'Algérie: novembre 1954–juillet 1962*, Laurent Gervereau, Jean-Pierre Rioux and Benjamin Stora eds. (Paris: Edition Contemporary International Documentation Library, 1992), 46–47; Charles-Robert Ageron, “L'opinion française devant la guerre d'Algérie,” *Revue française d’histoire d’Outre-Mer* (1976): 256–285.

on a hill, overlooking the target: a cluster of Algerian mud huts. The engagement started with bursts of machine-gun fire. For a moment, Claude thought Algerians had opened fire on them. Then, he came to the horrible realization that there were no Algerian fighters. The French units were firing on the huts and the villagers. He watched as women and children below ran for cover. Then, the French soldiers lit flamethrowers. As Claude recalled, "our elite troops started using flamethrowers at the women and children, who became living torches one after the other, all while fleeing and falling."[18]

He says he panicked, "disgusted, ashamed." He shouted to the sub-lieutenant to do something, "We can't let it happen. Our elite troops are nothing more or less than our own SS. These criminals, they must be shot…. it's Oradour!"[19] Standing surreally beside his silent peers, Claude fumbled with his gun, tried to open fire on the French troops below, but his gun jammed, or the safety was on—in the flush of emotions he did not know. His sub-lieutenant and the other soldiers were oddly quiet. Finally, one man rebuked him for trying to open fire without orders. Meanwhile, the name Oradour kept racing through Claude's mind. He felt paralyzed, ashamed of having agreed to Lenin's injunctive that communists should join the military. "Piles of monstrosities emerged from my memory." He says he had visions of the Nazis and the SS, Oradour, deportation camps and the Vel d'Hiv roundup, an eleven-year-old friend of his who had been tortured by the Gestapo. "This is what we are doing in Algeria."[20]

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[18] Interview with Claude Vinci in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir: Les réseaux de soutien au FLN pendant la guerre d'Algérie: les acteurs parlent* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004), 55–60; Claude Vinci, *Les portes de fer: "ma" guerre d'Algérie et "ma" désertion* (Pantin: Temps des cerises, 2002), 40–44, 51–70.

[19] Oradour-sur-Glen, a French village whose inhabitants were massacred by German troops in June 1944.

[20] Claude Vinci, *Les portes de fer,* 40–44, 51–70.

As soon as he got back to camp, Claude packed his clothes, having decided to get the hell out. As he later explained, it was "absolutely an individualistic reaction, not thought out, and not 'revolutionary.'" He had witnessed an intolerable atrocity which every part of his being rejected, and that carnage "was the 'drop of water' that made me, as one might say, overflow my role as soldier." He deserted his post and fled to Algiers, where some friends from the PCA took him in.[21]

Claude Vinci was disgusted through direct experience; others came to disgust through the reports of friends. For instance, one *insoumi* interviewed by *Jeune Résistance* explained that he had come to believe the Algerian war was "odious" after some of his friends returned from Algeria and shared their experience with him. "One even had photos," he recalled. "In one of them (I will always remember it) there was a French soldier (a Private Second Class) who was holding in each hand the severed head of an Algerian; and he was smiling. In another, there was a non-commissioned officer raping a woman, on the ground, while her husband watched, tied up. It's sentimentalism, I'm aware. But since that day, I've been revolted by this war, permanently. I had cold sweats at night, thinking to myself that I might be pushed to do this too." He considered conscientious objection, an act that would have landed him in prison. "I had such disgust for this war that I would have given five years of my youth to not participate."[22]

From individual experience to sharing stories with friends, the next step was formalizing testimonies of disgust in print. One of the most impactful of these came from the Catholic soldier Jean Muller. Called up in spring 1956, Muller was killed in October,

[21] Ibid.

[22] "Yves," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 1: Des Résistants a la guerre d'Algérie témoignent* [also printed as *Documents Jeune Résistance* No. 1], January 1960, 7–9.

prompting his family and friends to gather the letters he had sent home. His scouting friend, Paul Rendu, then delivered the file to Catholic activists at *Témoignage Chrétien* (a journal founded in 1941 to rally Catholics and Protestants in resistance to Nazism). After debating long and hard whether or not to print the material, the paper published a preview in *Témoignage Chrétien* No. 37 in late 1956, and then the entire collection in *Témoignage Chrétien* No. 38 in February 1957. The documents, entitled the Jean Muller Dossier, were a "media bomb," selling 34,000 copies in a few weeks, being covered by *L'Humanité*, *Le Monde*, and *France-Observateur*, and forcing *Témoignage Chrétien* to reprint the issue four times to meet demand.[23] This testimony also inspired others, including Father Jean Urvoas. A priest of the Mission de France who had become friends with MTLD activists while working in the *banlieues rouges* of Paris, Urvoas had been hosting FLN activists and providing them with false papers since spring 1955. Now in March 1957, he assembled letters from priests and young soldiers about abuses in Algeria. This dossier was printed as "Des rappelés témoignent…".[24]

The disturbing content and success of the Jean Muller Dossier and "Des rappelés témoignent…" inspired self-declared "vanguard" publishers to take up the cause—publishing houses like Éditions Maspero (est. 1959) and Éditions de Minuit (est. 1941). For instance, the small publishing house Éditions de Minuit specialized in controversial

[23] See "Un premier dossier sur la repression en Algérie," *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien* 37: *L'Algérie c'est d'abord l'Algérie* (n.d., 1956) and *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien* 38: *De la pacification à la repression, Le Dossier Jean Muller* (February 1957), Fonds Patrick Kessel Ref. No. 03PK0561, 03PK0562.

Malika Korso, *Algerie, 1954–1962, la torture en question: Le Dossier Jean Muller* (Algiers: Dahlab, 2013); "Débate par René Rémond, Jacques Julliard, Gaston Bordet, Paul Rendu, Jean-François Théry, Pierre Chaulet, Michel Branciard, André Mandouze," in *Cahiers de l'Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent No. 9: La Guerre d'Algérie et les chrétiens*, eds. François Bédarida and Étienne Fouilloux (October 1988), 142–144.

[24] Sybille Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie: L'action de la Mission de France* (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 2004), 70–71.

literature: established during German occupation to circulate Resistance literature like the writings of Vercors, it cultivated a "subversive, avant-garde image," moved books to print quickly, and printed material by individuals in exile, on the run, imprisoned, or in the midst of court battles (such as Jacques Vergés, Georges Arnaud, Francis Jeanson, Henri Alleg, Robert Bonnaud, Jacques Charby, and Robert Davezies).[25]

From 1957-1961, these publishers facilitated a boom in moral vanguard literature, publishing books like Pierre-Henri Simon's *Contre la torture* (March 1957), Georges Arnaud and Jacques Vergés torture reveal concerning their client, *Pour Djamila Bouhired* (autumn 1957), Henri Alleg's *La question* (February 1958), *L'affaire Audin* (1958), *La gangrène* (1959), Robert Davezies' *Le front* (1959), Frantz Fanon's *L'an V de la Révolution algérienne* (1959), Francis Jeanson's *Notre guerre* (1960), and many others. There was also a boom in clandestine or semi-clandestine publications, including *Témoignages et Documents* (est. 1957, eds. Robert Barrat, Maurice Pagat), *Vérités Pour* (est. 1958, ed. Francis Jeanson), *Vérité-Liberté* (est. 1960, eds. Robert Barrat, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Paul Thibaut), *Jeune Résistance* (est. 1960, eds. Louis Ohrent [Orhant], Jean-Louis Hurst, Jacques Berthelet),[26] and *Partisans* (est. 1961, eds. ca. 1961-1962 included François Maspero, Gérard Chaliand, Nils Andersson, Maurice Maschino, Jean-Louis Hurst, and Georges Mattéi).[27]

Together, this alternate information helped create a community of individuals disgusted by French behavior in Algeria. Visceral, wrenching, and overwhelming in its

[25] Anne Simonin, "Éditions de Minuit et les Éditions du Seuil," 219–245.
[26] Nils Andersson, "Les résistances à la guerre d'Algérie," *Savoir/Agir* 21 (2012–3): 97–105.
[27] For a full list of members of the editorial board of *Partisans* and the years of their activity, see: "Appendix," in Christoph Kalter, *The Discovery of the Third World: Decolonization and the Rise of the New Left in France, c. 1950–1976*, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 435.

sheer volume, this literature described shocking mutilations of the human body. In 1955, Claude Bordet had described how French interrogators were submerging prisoners in bathtubs to simulate drowning, forcing "impalement" on a bottle or baton, using electricity to shock and burn the mucous membranes, armpits and spine, and "pumping water into the anus" to painfully inflate the colon, small intestine, and stomach.[28] Now, from 1957-1959, there was a flood of similar testimonies from soldiers, priests, and victims. These explicitly described:

- making prisoners drink urine;
- napalming villages and burning women and children alive;
- the torture of French citizens (Christians, Jews, and Muslims, including women and young children), at torture sites both in Algeria and on the French mainland;
- torture by pumping electricity through the ears, nose, tongue, and genitals;
- crushing hands in doors;
- using makeshift torches to burn the tongue and genitals (and the dousing of the penis in 90 proof alcohol to facilitate burning);
- live burial and suffocation;
- burning away the skin with boiling water;
- rape (vaginal or anal) with glass champagne, beer, or wine bottles, by setting the bottle on the ground and forcing the victim to sit;
- mutilation by pushing sticks into the eyes and ears;
- and the taking of pictures as souvenirs.[29]

Activists encouraged a disgust response by graphically describing bodily mutilations in print, by expressing disgust themselves for others to see and model, and by providing suggestions for how one should respond to information. For instance, in 1958 *Témoignages et Documents* released a special issue containing torture testimonies from Henri Alleg's *La question*. By way of conclusion to the text, the editors included one

[28] Claude Bourdet, "Votre Gestapo d'Algérie," *France Observateur*, 13 January 1955.

[29] See for instance: *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien* 38: *De la pacification à la repression, Le Dossier Jean Muller* (February 1957), 11–39; "Nous accusons…" *Témoignages et Documents,* Numéro spécial No. 8 (October 1958), 4–7; Anonymous [Jérôme Lindon], *La gangrène* (Paris; Éditions de Minuit, 1959); "Texte intégral du livre *La question* par Henri Alleg, paru aux Éditions de Minuit," *Centre d'information et de coordination de "Défense des libertés et de la paix"* (1958), 6, Fonds Patrick Kessel, Ref. No. 01PK073; "Le Rapport Farrugia," *Témoignages et Documents* 17 (October 1959), 9.

brief reader letter taken from *L'Express*—a kind of model response. "I read *La question*," the letter explained. "I feel we dishonor ourselves by keeping silent in the presence of these horrors. Differences of political opinions vanish, they no longer have any importance in this issue. There is only those who approve or accept, and those who condemn, who vomit from disgust."[30]

Many expressions of disgust accompanied appeals to contamination, with activists comparing French behaviors to disease and rot. Jérôme Lindon's book *La Gangrène* (1959), for instance, compared torture to the blackening and festering of dying human body tissue—a behavior decaying the French body politic, that must be amputated to prevent it from spreading. Articles in *Vérités Pour*, *Vérité Liberté*, and *Jeune Résistance* echoed this terminology, comparing the war to rot or virus defiling French citizens, French values, French workers, democracy as an institution, the press, French-Algerian relations, and both Christianity and Islam as institutions.[31]

Alongside disgust, French anti-colonial activists were vocal about their shame concerning French behavior in Algeria. For instance, *Vérité Liberté* and *Partisans* both printed Benoist Rey's poem "Chant du deshonneur," written after his return from his tour of duty in Algeria. The poem expressed shame for French atrocities, and condemned the French community for failing to take the proper affective posture in response to

[30] "Lettre de Gabriel Marcel," *Centre d'information et de coordination de "Défense des libertés et de la paix"* (1958), 3, Fonds Patrick Kessel, Ref. No. 01PK073.

[31] Jérôme Lindon, *La gangrène* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1959); Maurice Laverdure, "Il n'est pas aberrant de renforcer 'le adversaire,'" *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 6; C.G. Saintes letter to the Editor, "Les Lecteurs nous écrivent," *Vérité Liberté* 2, June 1960, 3; "Le Seule politique possible," *Jeune Résistance* 1, December 1960, 8; Claude Ollivier, "Quand la parole n'y suffit plus," *Vérités Pour* 5, 26 January 1959, 2–4; *Jeune Résistance,* Cahier No. 2: Jeune Résisitance s'explique, 7–9; M. Rungis, "Guerre a déja couté le prix d'un million de logements," *Vérité Liberté* 2, June 1960, 3; André Mandouze, "Déclaration commune des 21 organisations algériennes représentées à Pleyel," Congrès mondial des partisans de la Paix, Paris, Pâques 1949, published in *Consciences Algériennes* 1, December 1950.

atrocities. As the poem read, "I will never forget the Algerian dismemberment… Nor the children, in the ruins, searching for whom to mourn. Nor the men, shot at dawn, butchered at night, between the walls of shame. Nor the violated women, nor the hideous smile of the rapist, my comrade. …Nor their laughter at the torture, the beatings, the mutilation."[32]

One of the most outspoken expressions of disgust and shame, however, came from a manifesto simultaneously printed in *Vérité Liberté* and in the first issue of *Partisans* (a François Maspero publication). Signed only "Partisans" for reasons that will quickly become clear, the writer of the article (Jean-Philippe Talbo of Éditions Maspero) praised those who had helped the FLN and were standing trial before military tribunals, while condemning the majority of French citizens for standing idly by while Algerians suffered. In a passage full of contempt and disgust, the article declared:

> "We simply want to mark the date. We are the generation who has witnessed the collapse of the humanist values of our nation. We know today that our country can make us into murderers and torturers, that colonialist alienation can cause the same deviations as Nazism… that the process of the fascization of the regime is underway, that the last nails are planted in the internment camps for 'French niggers'…
>
> This Republic, of which all that remains to us is the obscene '14 July' [Bastille Day], this Republic whose army descended from 'Free France' [the French Resistance] oppresses peoples in the name of Cartesian humanism, this army of praetorians angry because someone is threatening to take away their toy: 'the Algerian war,' this army that has compromised and degraded our generation by making us share its crimes… It's not about becoming angry, as others have done before us and will continue to do.
>
> It's a matter of seeing France with new eyes: our country is not grand, it is not good, it is not generous, because an imperialist nation cannot be good, great, and generous. France has no 'special mission,' we are the inhabitants of a megalomaniacal and sterile nation that disgusts the world. We must not be thin-lipped snobs, the 'petite bourgeois' cancer, incarnated in all its splendor by a vanquishing general of old, today a lecherous old man, [who] has invaded this country of old men excited by their paras [paratroopers].

[32] Benoist Rey, "Chant du deshonneur," *Vérité Liberté* 12, October 1961**,** 5; Benoist Rey, "Chant du deshonneur," *Partisans* 1, September–October 1961, 123.

> …We have behind us a 'France dressed in lace,' hypocritical and criminal.... [and today] a system of colonial violence, organizing a veritable genocide in Algeria [and] a police state in the metropole. …We let the gangrene take root in our body, until we became that carrion of which Jean-Paul Sartre speaks: a decaying flesh, not even bothered by its own stench."[33]

It was truly a passage thick with moral appeals and metaphors. And although it is impossible to fully do analytical justice to such a passage in such a short space, it will suffice to mention the following points. The article presented a strong moral argument using analogies (communicating behavioral deviance by comparing the military to a spoiled child, the bourgeoisie to a lewd old man), and affective appeals (invoking disgust and contamination through terms like "obscene," "degraded," "gangrene," "carrion," "decaying," and "stench"). The author also used discourses that invoked specific philosophies and value sets (i.e., Marxism and humanism). The World War II metaphor was prominent (a point that will be discussed later in this chapter): the article mentioned fascism, internment camps, genocide, Nazism, Nuremberg, and the French Resistance. And the article communicated a sense of French dishonor and fault by describing the national holiday, an occasion of pride, as "obscene," and describing a high-status concept (the French nation) in low-status terms (not grand, not good, not generous, sterile, criminal). The article was thus a good example of how many complex moral arguments could be communicate in a short passage. Combined, these elements made a fervent argument that feelings about French behavior should shift from pride to shame and disgust.

Overall, shame and disgust were thus important affective cues that activists used to create a community of sentiment against the war in Algeria. Through expressions of

[33] Partisans [Jean-Philippe Talbo-Bernigaud], "A propos de la génération algérienne," *Partisans* 1 (September–October 1961), 146–148; "La génération algérienne," *Vérité Liberté* 12, October 1961**,** 5.

shame and disgust, French activists sent negative feedback concerning colonial behaviors, and signaled their rejection of French norms and myths. But more than just signaling rejection, activists hoped these affective cues would inspire imitation. In short, activists hoped to become what one *Vérité-Liberté* activist dubbed "the concentrate of disgust, the vanguard of shame… witnesses heard, followed, defended, exalted."[34]

From Revulsion to Revolt: Creating a New Resistance

Distancing oneself from the colonial system through expressions of disgust, using expressions of shame to assert French culpability, or expressing other moral emotions (like anger and shock) were all well and good. But it took more than emotions to bring individuals across the cognition–behavior gap, and move men from revulsion to revolt. As Maurice Maschino put it, "a young person learns, for example, that torture exists. It is a shock: his faith in 'the traditional virtues of France' wavers. But if there is nothing except this shock, if other factors did not then intervene… it would be insufficient, in any case, to incite him to desert. How many people, under the blow of an emotion… declare they will 'do something'—and do nothing."[35]

Besides using social strategies like networking and peer pressure, morality tales were an important strategy that activists used to move individuals from revulsion to revolt. For French activists in particular, one was a historical morality tale, constructed from the World War II experience. Martin Evans first recognized the importance of this myth after an oral history study in the late 1980s, in which he collected interviews from members of FLN support networks. At that time, he noted that in retrospect, activists held resistance

[34] Bernard Randon [Robert Bonnaud], "Le grand refus," *Vérité-Liberté* 1*,* May 1960, 4, 6.
[35] Maurice Maschino, *L'engagement* (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), 34–35.

to Nazism and the German occupation as a unifying common experience. Jeanson trial defendant Aline Charby, for instance, explained to Evans that the Algeria problem to her had been "logical and uncomplicated: the FLN was like the French Resistance." Madeleine Baudoin, who had helped supply the FLN with weapons, similarly told Evans that "Algeria was occupied just as France was occupied by the Germans after June 1940."[36]

From such statements, Evans concluded that activists had built a community of resistance based on a common "set of values from anti-Nazi Resistance"—values that included opposition to the danger of fascism, racism, and totalitarianism. As Evans wrote, activists "held up [the Resistance] as a moral example to follow… a set of values through which to make sense of the Algerian war. It was a prism which helped them make choices and judgments." He further explained that to activists, the Resistance tradition was a "stimulus to illegal opposition," "a compelling narrative," "a code of ideas, a statement of belief, a way of being," which allowed activists "to situate their actions within the revolutionary patriotic tradition." Finally, he noted that the Resistance provided a lexicon, symbols, and categories for understanding the world: "comrades or enemies; for or against."[37]

As it turns out, this was not only true for activists in retrospect. In the 1950s and early 1960s, activists worked to transform the World War II experience into a living morality tale—and a founding myth of necessary transgression. This myth helped bridge the gap between disapproval of French behavior in Algeria and support for the FLN. It

[36] Interview with Aline Charby [Charbit], 13 November 1989, Paris, and Interview with Madeleine Baudoin, 7, 12 February and 14 March 1989, Paris, in Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954–1962)* (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 55–56, 64–66.
[37] Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 31–41.

encouraged revulsion-by-association (linking French torture to Nazi atrocities), but most importantly, it offered an action script for what to do in response to that disgust. Evans rightly described this myth as including a set of values, a compelling narrative, a prism for making choices (i.e., a set of decision-making heuristics), and categories for understanding the world. I would add that the morality tale was notable for how it provided not just categories, but established roles (i.e., the Nazis/SS/Gestapo and French collaborators vs. the French Resistance), linked to clear action scripts and behaviors (occupation and torture vs. underground resistance).

André Mandouze and Claude Bourdet were two veterans of the French Resistance who early on applied this morality tale to the Algerian situation. In his speech to the World Congress of Intellectuals in Defense of Peace in 1948, for instance, Mandouze drew a connection between the crematoria of Auschwitz and "the colonial furnaces," declaring that "colonialism springs from racism, to the point it can be said that Hitlerism was born in the colonies, centuries before Hitler was born in Europe."[38] The following year at the World Committee of Partisans for Peace, he further declared "men of Europe and America… you have extinguished the cremation furnaces of Auschwitz, but you let millions of other humans burn slowly in the deadly fire of colonialism," and added "humanity has on its conscience the crime of colonialism."[39] To a French audience a few years later, Claude Bourdet warned that French security services were practicing torture in the colonies, in an article suggestively entitled "Is there a Gestapo in Algeria?" In

[38] André Mandouze, "Déclaration algérienne au congrès mondial des intellectuels pour la paix à Wrocław, août 1948," *Consciences Algériennes* 1, December 1950.

[39] André Mandouze, "Déclaration commune des 21 organisations algériennes représentées à Pleyel," Congrès mondial des partisans de la Paix, Paris (Pâques 1949), in *Consciences Algériennes* 1, December 1950; Piotr H. Kosicki, *Catholics on the Barricades*, 153–185.

January 1955 (shortly after the start of the Algerian uprising), he repeated this warning again, in a more aggressively phrased article entitled "Your Gestapo in Algeria."[40]

Maurice Maschino described the effect of hearing this analogy in his activist trajectory. As he explained, he had lived through the Occupation, his stepfather had told him about his aunt's internment in Ravensbrück, and he had "heard about 'German savagery,' the Nazi horrors, the death camps, the Gestapo's tortures." The sum of these stories and experiences had formed in his mind categories of good and evil: "the idea of an absolute evil that was German, [and] of a good in itself, whose name was France." In this imaginary, "German" was synonymous with "executioner," while the French fought for justice. "Then, the excitement waned, forgetfulness fell like a shroud, and as such, I did not revisit the lessons I learned from the era; nothing incited me to do so. Nothing—until the day at Roger's house, where I learned the French, in turn, were behaving like the Germans; that they tortured like them… [that] in 1945, they massacred the populations of Sétif and Guelma, that already in 1830 there were hundreds of Oradours in Algeria."[41]

Roger's description of both his own mistreatment at the hands of colonial police and the mistreatment of Algerians planted in Maurice a feeling of shame and disgust. As Maurice wrote, "In the following days, I experienced an intense, almost 'physical' shame in the presence of the Moroccans. As if I too were *marked*, dishonored; but in a sense, wasn't I? If someone other than [my best friend] Roger had told us about it, we would not have believed it—this exceeded all we could understand, think, imagine: the 'misery', the 'exploitation', the 'ill-treatment', the 'colonial fact' that we knew (Roger had sufficiently

[40] Claude Bourdet, "Y a-t-il une Gestapo algérienne?" *France-Observateur*, 6 December 1951; Claude Bourdet, "Votre Gestapo d'Algérie," *France-Observateur*, 15 January 1955.
[41] Maurice Maschino, *Le refus* (Paris: François Maspero, 1960), 120–121.

explained to us), became that evening brutally, odiously *concrete*: the 'fancy words,' the 'ideas' were condensed (came rushing down) into a few horrible images, they took a human form, they touched us directly, full force like a *whip*: it was Roger humiliated, fighting with a cop, it was this cop whipping Moroccans, it was this kid who died from torture… The *torture*: French—ours—we practiced it."[42]

In turn, this prompted Maschino to seek additional information. He says "I bought *France-Observateur* that Roger, a subscriber, recommended to me. I remember an article by Bourdet (I don't remember the date any more), which denounced torture; I believe it was entitled 'Votre Gestapo d'Algérie,' and it confirmed to me, if it were necessary, Roger's revelations."[43] Anne Beaumanoir related an analogous tale. In spring 1957, she read Pierre-Henri Simon's *Contre la torture*. The pamphlet argued that "by shutting our eyes to the disproportionate abuses of the army in Algeria we became the 'vanquished of Hitler.' This thought," she said, "bored into me for several days." As she had served in the Resistance, the analogy made her resolve to act. "Discussions could no longer be sufficient." This resolution might have floundered, except that soon after, one of worker-priests from Peace Movement asked her to help an Algerian family, pulling her in to an activist circle.[44]

Activists built on the World War II analogy in different ways. A *Jeune Résistance* activist put France in the role of invader and occupier, describing how "In 1939-45, if I were old enough, I would have defended my country against the invader. But now the

[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid., 122–123.
[44] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire: la Résistance, le communism, et l'Algérie, 1940–1976* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2009), 120.

invaders (the Nazis) are us."[45] A letter to the editor of *Vérité Liberté* similarly argued that "with the war in Algeria, France is at the moment (relatively speaking) like Germany under Hitler, with the concentration camps and SS divisions."[46] And *Jeune Résistance* obliquely compared French youth to the Hitler Youth. Describing French behavior in Algeria as a "disgusting policy," the article decried the fact that French youth automatically joined an army that was torturing, executing, and raping civilians. The decision to respond to military summons "has passed into [French] mores, has become a routine. French youth have become, without noticing it, mannequins, like young Germans under Hitler. …If we risk looking our condition in the face, it makes us want to scream. It calls for revolt. The discussions between friends from the Youth Hostel movement at the vigil are no longer effective enough… we must act; *it's our role,* leftist youth. Because we find this war odious, the first thing is to REFUSE to do it. …One has no right to require that a whole generation prostitutes itself so easily."[47] Activists also used the German massacre of French civilians at Oradour-sur-Glane as an analogy for French behavior in Algeria.[48]

By using the French Resistance as a positive model for clandestinity and lawbreaking, activists justified both FLN fighters and French underground support networks. For example, a *Vérités Pour* article explained that most French citizens had not wanted to collaborate with the German Occupation, but they did. And the French would have

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[45] "Robert," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 1: Des Résistants a la guerre d'Algérie témoignent* [also printed as *Documents Jeune Résistance* No. 1], January 1960, 12–13.

[46] C.G. Saintes letter to the Editor, "Les Lecteurs nous écrivent," *Vérité Liberté* 2, June 1960, 3.

[47] Emphasis added. "Albert," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 1: Des Résistants a la guerre d'Algérie témoignent*, January 1960, 20.

[48] Claude Bourdet, "Treize questions et réponses sur la paix en algerie," *Vérité Liberté*, *Des Français parlent aux français,* (October 1961)**,** 4; Richard, "Je ne puis me contenter d'une simple protestation…" *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 7–8; Maurice Maschino, *Le refus*, 122–123; Claude Vinci, *Les portes de fer,* 42.

remained collaborators, "if a few thousand men hadn't decided to create, from one end of the country to the other, a climate of resistance."[49] Claude Ollivier similarly compared those who resisted the Algerian war to the French Resistance, and in an article in support of the FLN, Maurice Maschino explained that "Like the French *maquisard* in the Resistance, the Algerian fights against an oppressor."[50]

In *Vérités Pour,* French Resistance veteran Jacques Dupont was one activist who drew on his experience in justifying the Resistance connection. Now a member of the Jeanson and Curiel networks, Dupont explained how "The fight that I continue today in *VP* is the one I started in the FTP [Francs-tireurs et partisans]."[51] Another veteran, "Richard," described how this Resistance myth affected him. A veteran of the Forces françaises combattantes (FFC), Richard had been tortured and interrogated by the Gestapo during the war. In listing his reasons for supporting the FLN, he described feeling repulsed by French behavior. "I am aware—and this is the second reason for my action— that the crimes committed 'in the name of France' by the forces of repression (the DST, Paras, etc ...) equal in horror, in ignominy, to those committed by Hitler's forces of repression (the Gestapo, SS, etc.). The Algerian people today, like our own people yesterday… continues to have its torture chambers, its shootings of hostages, its rapes, its Oradour." Continuing, he described the Algerian struggle as analogous to the French Resistance. "I am aware that the cause for which the Algerian *Combattants* have engaged in armed struggle is not only a just cause, but that it identifies itself with the one for which I fought myself…. Indeed, like yesterday's resistance fighters, the Algerian

[49] Emphasis in original. Claude Ollivier, "Quand la parole n'y suffit plus," *Vérités Pour* 5, 26 January 1959, 2.
[50] Ibid.; Maurice Maschino, *Le refus*, 156.
[51] Martini [pseud. Jacques Dupont], "Lettre à une camarade," *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 10.

fighters have taken up arms…. to defend their right to dignity, their right to liberty, their right to justice, their right to independence."[52]

By linking French behavior to that of a particularly repugnant and harmful example (the Nazis), activists thus appealed to powerful negative experiences, and for some, direct memories of horror and disgust. The comparisons also provided categories and roles to help order and make sense of the Algerian conflict, and provided an action script for necessary transgression. But although activists used adjectives like "natural," "obvious," "logical" and "self-evident" to describe the German occupation/colonial occupation morality tale, it must be emphasized that the analogy was revolutionary at the time. To adapt France's World War II experience into a morality tale for military refusal and/or FLN support was unthinkable, because many were convinced *Algeria was France*. Thus, assigning France the role of occupier (of its own territory) was absurd. On the contrary, in the eyes of many Frenchmen, if someone was playing the part of Nazis, it was the FLN. The government prosecutor Major Lequime made this claim in his indictment of the Jeanson network members, declaring:

> "Not a day passes without some new crime, some monstrous act of violence to show exactly that in all areas, the FLN follows the totalitarian methods of Nazism. Yes! If there is an identification to be made, this is it! Nazism painfully extended its empire over the German people and became the scourge of all humanity. And who would pretend now that Nazism represented the German people? Who would pretend the FLN represents the Algerian people?"[53]

Such analogizing was not limited to the public prosecutor's office. During the trial, a representative of the Gaullist party (the Union pour la nouvelle République/UNR) compared the Jeanson defendants to French citizens who had collaborated with the

[52] Richard, "Je ne puis me contenter d'une simple protestation…" *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 7–8.
[53] "Réquisitoire: Mardi 27 Septembre," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 174.

Nazis.[54] Meanwhile, the French ultras of the OAS advanced a competing claim with the FLN to be the true maquis, forming a paramilitary group called the "Maquis Bonaparte" and launching a clandestine publication entitled *La Voix du Maquis*. Taking the analogy even further, the OAS claimed the French government was persecuting them as Hitler had persecuted the Jews; they additionally accused the government of planning to evacuate the French pied-noir population into concentration camps, in order to perpetrate a genocide of French residents of Algeria.[55]

Such examples serve to emphasize an important point: it was not a given that the partisans of the French Resistance (or their children) would transfer the lessons of the German occupation of France to France's behavior in Algeria. It was true World War II could provide powerful affective cues, action scripts, roles, and categories for French activists constructing tales of resistance and rebellion. However, it took interpretive and persuasive work to make readers aware of potential similarities between the French and Algerian experiences. And even then, readers needed to buy in to the comparison for the morality tale to gain any ground. First and foremost, French readers had to be able to imagine the French government in the role of the Nazis, and the FLN in the role of the maquis—and in the end, that was a comparison only a small minority of French citizens were willing to accept.

[54] Le groupe UNR entend dénoncer 'la carence coupable d'une certaine administration,'" *Le Monde*, 27 September 1960.

[55] See: "Lettre d'un patriote, nouveau venu au Maquis Bonaparte," 15 January 1962, "Chanson Officielle 'Maquis Bonaparte,'" n.d., and OAS, "Pour réduire l'OAS, 'les démocrates' proposent une solution: le génocide...," n.d. (c. May 1962), in Pierre Meallier, *OAS: la guerre d'Algérie vue de Bône à travers les tracts OAS* (Nice: France Europe Éditions Livres, 2004), 155–159, 312–313.

"Antigone is Not Far": Transgressive Tales and Rebellious Role Models

Arrested on 9 November 1956 and incarcerated in La Santé for crimes against national security, André Mandouze began keeping a prison journal. In good humor, he wrote on 17 November that he was in high spirits, since he had just been brought "the opium of the intellectual"—a stack of books. "Man does not live by bread alone," he joked. In another entry, he found another bright side to his situation: "I told myself many times… 'If I go to prison some day, it will be a good way to finish my thesis': no classes to teach." And after being handed a notice that he was being charged with treason, Mandouze wryly replied "I had no trouble comforting myself by thinking of the thousands and tens of thousands of Free French—starting with General de Gaulle—who were charged with treason."[56]

More than an offhanded jest, Mandouze was using a moral rationalization many support network members employed to justify illegal activism. After de Gaulle established the Fifth Republic and assumed the premiership in 1958, the French Resistance morality tale activists had been using took a more specific—and ironic—turn. As an authority figure, the President's behavior during World War II fit usefully with a morality tale for revolt. As one *insoumi* in the Jeune Résistance network reasoned, "Isn't it General de Gaulle who gave us the example of revolt when he judged that the honor of his homeland was being trampled?"[57] Similarly, in a congratulatory tone, a writer in

[56] Entries for 15 November, 16 November, and 17 November 1956, "Solitude pour l'Algérie: Journal de cellule," Maison d'arrêt de la Santé (Paris), in André Mandouze, *Un chrétien dans son siècle*, 177, 186, 189.

[57] "Yves," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 1: Des résistants a la guerre d'Algérie témoignent* [also printed as *Documents Jeune Résistance* No. 1], January 1960, 10.

Vérités Pour exclaimed that "The very example of disobedience given in 1940 with brilliance by the current head of state [de Gaulle] has now become popularized."[58]

De Gaulle as an example of necessary transgression continued to be a theme in retrospective interviews. Jeanson trial defendant Aline Charby, when later asked whether she considered herself a traitor, replied: "No, not at all… because as I see it, the morality of France is not the official morality.… De Gaulle was sentenced to death by Marshal Pétain, by the French government. That didn't stop him saving France." Her co-defendant Micheline Pouteau similarly explained that the Resistance "was important because it legitimized the refusal to obey… at the time we used the texts of de Gaulle against him, as well as other texts which said, in essence, that you always have the right to rebel against an unjust order." Paule Bolo also appealed to de Gaulle: "When the law seems to me to be wrong, it's my duty not to abide by the law. … De Gaulle, though, was the champion of disobedience. …One's duty was to disobey Vichy…. This duty to break bad laws is something I carry out all the time."[59]

What were these "other texts which said… you always have the right to rebel against an unjust order" mentioned by Pouteau? Like in the Algerian case, material from the French Revolution was popular. But one less obvious morality tale French activists adopted came from Greek literature: Sophocles' *Antigone*. As with the French Resistance morality tale, the decision to adapt *Antigone* to the Algerian situation was not necessarily an obvious choice. Originally, the ambiguous play sets two tragically flawed characters

[58] A. Lepelletier, "LA GRANDE ILLUSION: Un officier qui revient du Constantinois…" *Vérités Pour* 18, 26 September 1960, 7.

[59] Interview with Paule Bolo, 2 June 1989, Paris; Interview with Aline Charby [Charbit], 13 November 1989, Paris; and Interview with Micheline Pouteau, 12 April 1989, Paris, all in Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 50, 56–57, 62–64.

head-to-head: Creon, King of Thebes, and Antigone, daughter of Oedipus. The play opens after the death of Antigone's brother Polynices, (killed in battle after leading an army against Thebes, in a dispute over succession and inheritance). Creon prohibits the administration of funerary rites to Polynices. But citing fraternal love and honor for the dead, Antigone scatters dirt over her brother's corpse, dubbing the act a "holy crime." Thus, Antigone breaks the law of King and city-state [*polis*] in the name of a higher law—"the laws of the gods that are unwritten and unfailing." In the play, this brings Antigone into conflict with Creon. The two stubborn characters clash, but neither yields. As a result, Antigone is sealed in a cave and left to die for her defiance of the king. In turn, for Creon's refusal to grant Polynices proper burial and for sending Antigone to her death, the Furies drive Creon's wife and son to commit suicide.[60] In this original iteration, *Antigone* thus has a strong proscriptive moral, with both Creon and Antigone's behaviors leading to their ruin.

In an interesting inversion of the play's proscriptive messages, French activists adapted *Antigone* into a tale prescribing anti-colonial protest and insubordination in response to the Algerian war. *Antigone* was attractive because the story was recursively linked back to the French Resistance: Jean Anouilh had adapted the play in February 1944, famously casting the Vichy administration in the role of Creon and the Free French Forces in the role of Antigone. For the Algerian situation, activists once more assigned the French State to the role of Creon, but cast French activists as Antigone and Algerians as the fallen rebel Polynices. This took some interpretive creativity. No longer fatally flawed (or even morally ambiguous, as Anouilh's Creon and Antigone had been),

[60] Sophocles, *Antigone*, trans. Reginald Gibbons and Charles Segal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 56, 73–76, 100–104, 139–140.

Antigone became a heroic example of fraternity, standing proud in the face of state despotism. Similarly, the ill-fated Polynices was transformed into a symbol of Algeria, tortured and martyred, his body left exposed in an affront to human dignity. In this way, *Antigone* was transformed into a myth of necessary transgression, asserting the legitimacy of breaking the laws of the state in the name of a higher law: fraternal love and respect for the human body.

This Antigone myth does not seem to have sprung fully grown from the imagination of French activists. André Mandouze provided one interpretation of the myth in *Témoignage Chrétien* in March 1958, in an article reporting on the trial of Lutheran pastor Étienne Mathiot (accused of helping smuggle an FLN militant across the French-Swiss border) and Francine Rapiné (Catholic university student and FF-FLN secretary in Besançon). In his report, Mandouze compared the trial to a living morality tale for the claim of Antigone over Creon. As he explained, "And then [at the trial] we saw this extraordinary thing: that the men who succeeded each other at the bar, professors of philosophy, letters, or law; advocates of the right, center, or left; agnostics, Catholics, Protestants, or Jews; all invoked in their way the supremacy of the unwritten laws over the written laws, of Antigone over Creon, of truth over opportunism."[61]

The first page of the first issue of *Vérités Pour* opened with a reference to the Antigone myth as well. The paper adapted the play in a different way, however. Instead of the moral of the story being necessary transgression, the "unwritten laws over the written laws," for *Vérités Pour* the moral was the importance of collective action. As the underground declared in its inaugural issue, "in the end, it is not true that we are doomed

[61] André Mandouze, "Coupable de christianisme," *Témoignage Chrétien,* 14 March 1958.

to witness—eyes wide open, but mouth closed and hands limp—our own enslavement, our own descent into the tomb…. Antigone was alone, and had no choice except apostasy against her conscience or the horror of being buried alive; for a little while, we still have a third solution." This third way, the paper explained, was to refuse the solitude that would mean suicide, join together, and fight.[62]

By spring and summer of 1960, the clandestine networks were making waves in the press, due to a series of high-profile arrests that were heading to trial. In this context, the Antigone myth reappeared with a vengeance. Thus, Maurice Duverger tried to address the Antigone question in *Le Monde* in April 1960, in an article provocatively titled "Les deux trahisons" ["The Two Treasons"]. In the article, Duverger acknowledged the moral dilemma posed by *Antigone*, and agreed that when "injustice is glaring, indisputable, the individual cannot escape the conflict of Antigone between the written laws and those '*unwritten laws that Justice has established among men'*: he has a duty to disobey." But, Duverger argued, the war was complex, and France was fighting not just to maintain colonial domination, but to prevent the expulsion of one million French pieds-noirs from the only home they had ever known. As a result, Duverger rejected *Antigone* as a morality tale applicable to the Algeria situation. The call of Antigone could not be used to justify breaking "the collective solidarities of the group," or to justify desertion, he argued. Citizens had a duty to criticize injustice—but since the war was not unjust, citizens had a "duty to comply" and serve in the military. Moreover, "a French citizen has neither the duty nor the right to organize support networks for the FLN or promote the desertion of our soldiers: these are acts of treason." Thus, Duverger concluded, just as the

[62] "V.P. numéro 1," *Vérités Pour* 1, 20 September 1958, 1.

Algiers officers' putsch of May 1958 (which had sought to preserve the French presence in Algeria) had been a crime, "to aid or endorse Francis Jeanson and his friends is a crime." He ended with a warning: "Take good care on the extreme right as on the extreme left: there are two limits not to cross if one wants to remain in the French community."[63]

The article generated impassioned and diverse responses, with many activists including Maurice Maschino, Gérard Spitzer, Jérôme Lindon, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Robert Davezies writing to the paper to refute Duverger's conclusions.[64] Davezies, in exile in Switzerland after being sentenced *in absentia* to ten years imprisonment for aiding the FLN, was one of the activists who read Duverger's article. Shocked, the priest immediately wrote a letter back to the editor of *Le Monde*. When *Le Monde* published only an excerpt, *Vérités Pour* printed the letter in full in June. As Davezies explained, the statement that the war was not unjust had shocked him: he had almost dropped the newspaper in astonishment. To the contrary, he argued, the war was indeed unjust and unfair. Moreover, the French *were* facing the problem of Antigone. Since the Algerians were "claiming their independence as a condition of their existence," the French were positioned before an inevitable fact, before "one of the very laws of life, and it is unjust and aberrant to oppose these laws."[65]

Through the debates over the behavior of French activists on trial for helping the FLN or refusing military draft notices, Antigone thus became shorthand for an appeal to

[63] Emphasis in original. Maurice Duverger, "Les deux trahisons," *Le Monde,* 27 April 1960. Also see his follow-up article, Maurice Duverger, "Les deux trahisons," *Le Monde,* 14 May 1960.

[64] "Parmi les lettres reçues," *Le Monde*, 14 May 1960.

[65] Letter from Robert Davezies to Mr. Hubert Beuve-Méry, Editor of *Le Monde*, 27 April 1960, printed as "Les deux trahisons," *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 14.

higher, unwritten laws ("the laws of life," love, fraternity, conscience, or God) over the laws of men. In line with this meaning of the tale, in July *Antigone* made another appearance in the arguments of the defense at the trial of Mission de France priest Christien Corre. Accused of aiding the FLN and encouraging desertion through activism with Jeune Résistance, Corre appeared before the Tribunal permanent des forces armées in Lyon in July 1960. There, his defense lawyer appealed to the Antigone principle. As the attorney argued, Corre "has taken us back to the days of Antigone by reminding us that above the written laws there are unwritten laws, even more imperative, which are the laws of conscience."[66]

French activists thus chose moral role models (both positive and negative) that highlighted the duty to disobey injustice. Antigone in particular served as a model for refusing to shame in the face of power, and the imperative of honoring the dignity of man and a "higher law" over the laws of the State. More than a dead letter, *Antigone* was thus a call to transgression and trespass. As one of the Jeanson trial defendants, Jacques Charby [Charbit], later inscribed, "rebellion against an unjust order is a duty—Antigone is not far!"[67] And for activists, she was indeed close at hand, her example living and active in each transgression against the State.

"To Arms, Citizens!": Mobilizing Myths, from Marx to Christ Crucified

Even with morality tales to enjoin action (i.e., the French Resistance) and justify lawbreaking (i.e., de Gaulle and *Antigone*), convincing French citizens to act against the majority (and their immediate interests) was no small task. Thus, activists appealed to

[66] Plaidoirie de Maître Claude Bernardin, avocat à la Cour de Lyon, in Sybille Chapeau, *Des Chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 185.
[67] Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 27.

many other tales of resistance and rebellion embedded in the French cultural canon. As with Algerian activists, the French Revolution was a common referent. Other morality tales received occasional mentions. *Vérités Pour*, for instance, used the 16th century François Rabelais tale of Panurge's flock as a warning against blindly following the herd and joining the French military.[68]

In some cases, activists mixed morality tales: in 1959, for instance, *Vérités Pour* published an interview with the respected World War II resistor Vercors [Jean Bruller]. A symbol of the French Resistance and a legitimizing authority figure, Vercors' decision to endorse the movement in *Vérités Pour* was a boon for the underground. And, in the interview he compared the French political situation to the 17th century Jean de La Fontaine fable "Les Grenouilles qui demandent un roi"—a tale about frogs who grow tired of a democratic state, and ask the god Jupiter for a king. First sent a floating log for a "king," the frogs are unhappy and demand a king that moves. Their wish is horrifically granted: Jupiter sends them a crane, who gobbles up the frogs.[69] In the article, Vercors used the story as a metaphor for the French political situation: the political immobilism of the "cacophony of parties, groups, and factions" of the left was dangerous, because the French people would demand movement—and the crane, or the forces of fascism (as exemplified by Mouvement Populaire du 13-Mai)[70] was waiting in the wings. Thus, the French people could no longer wait for the "unification of the groups and parties of the

[68] "Pourquoi ne désertent-ils pas?" *Vérité Pour* 4, Série spéciale, August 1960, 18–19; François Rabelais, *Le quart livre*, ed. Robert Marichal (Geneva: Droz, 1947), 60–63.

[69] "Les grenouilles qui demandent un roi." in Jean de La Fontaine, *Fables de La Fontaine* (Tours: Alfred Mame et Fils, 1875), 81–82.

[70] A militant right-wing party formed by pied noir ultras, who advocated keeping Algeria French. The party formed in support of the 13 May 1958 coup of French pied noir officials and military officers (including General Raoul Salan and General Jacques Massu), who seized power in Algiers. The coup resulted in the collapse of the Fourth Republic, and the return of de Gaulle to office.

left"—they must create an "underground current" that would unite the left in common action.[71] It was an somewhat ill-fitting metaphor: the roles were hard to transpose (how could the divided French left constitute a single "log," and how could such a log ever be active?) and an unclear action script (should the frogs create this "current" to move the log?). But the dangerous frog-eating crane was at least a suitable metaphor for the forces of fascism.

Morality tales were not always so easy to spot, however—and in fact, this was one important function morality tales served. Morality tales allowed activists to avoid censorship (and even legal prosecution), by making their opinions known through oblique literary references (like *Antigone*). In line with the discussion of *Antigone* as a call to defy state power, activist Hervé Bourges proudly related using the play as a subversive statement while performing his military service in Algeria. Bourges, a journalist and activist with *Témoignage Chrétien*, had been assigned to Sétif-Aïn-Arnat with Colonel Marceau Crespin. Crespin had entrusted Bourges with staging theatre productions to entertain the troops. So, Bourges recommended they stage *Antigone* by Sophocles. Crespin was unfamiliar with the Greek tragedy, so he agreed to the suggestion. As Bourges fondly recalled, they thus performed *Antigone* in the Roman ruins of Djémila, in front of 3,000 soldiers, Colonel Crespin, and General Raoul Salan. Bourges played Creon, and at the end of the performance, they added a scripted explanation of the meaning of the tragedy (now lost). But afterward, Bourges said that Crespin stormed

[71] "L'interview de Vercors," *Vérités Pour* 8, 2 May 1959, 8–10.

backstage to confront him: "This is a subversive play!" As Bourges remembered, "It is one of the greatest memories of my military service in Algeria."[72]

With the help of another veiled morality tale, in summer 1955 the staff of *Alger Républicain* executed their own subversive feat. A leftist newspaper edited by Henri Alleg, the *Alger Républicain* staff was primarily Marxist in orientation, and many were aligned with the PCA. The paper was also a frequent target of government censorship, and on occasion ran with the slogan "*Alger Républicain* tells the truth, it tells nothing but the truth… but it cannot tell the whole truth."[73] So, in July 1955 as the first French national day since the start of the Algerian insurrection approached, Lucette Larribére recounted how she and the editorial staff had a "brilliant idea" for how to skirt the censors. 14 July was Bastille Day—the French national holiday. So, the staff decided they would take the occasion to print the lyrics of the French national anthem. Who could protest the national anthem? They ran the text with a single line of explanation: "Today, the 14 of July: What better day to publish the text of the 'Marseillaise'!"[74]

In peacetime, the revolutionary hymn might not have raised eyebrows. But as the *Alger Républicain* staff well understood, in the context of the Algerian uprising, the lyrics of "La Marseillaise" could be read many ways. And so the newspaper printed: "Arise children of the Fatherland! / The day of glory has arrived. / Against us, tyranny's bloody banner is raised." This rallying call, of course, was originally a call to arms against

[72] Interview with Hervé Bourges, in Claude Baudry, "Hervé Bourges, témoin privilégié," *L'Humanité*, 27 June 2003, https://www.humanite.fr/node/287361; Interview with Hervé Bourges, in Rosa Moussaoui, "Hervé Bourges: 'C'est par le combat anticolonialiste que je suis devenu l'homme que je suis,'" *L'Humanité*, 2 August 2016, https://www.humanite.fr/ herve-bourges-cest-par-le-combat-anticolonialiste-que-je-suis-devenu-lhomme-que-je-suis-612941

[73] See for instance *Alger Républicain* 3729, 16 July 1955, 1.

[74] "La Marseillaise," *Alger Républicain* 3727, 14 July 1955, 1, 6; Pierre Laffont, "Vive le 14 Juillet," *Alger Républicain* 3727, 14 July 1955, 1.

invading Prussian and Austrian forces in 1792. But in the Algerian political climate of 1955, it did not take a stretch of the imagination for Algerian subscribers to envisage the French as the invading army. Verse III as printed in the paper opened with "What! Foreign cohorts / would make the law in our homes?!" and Verse IV warned "Tremble, tyrants! And you, traitors! / The dishonor of all parties / … / Everyone is a soldier to fight you / If our young heroes fall / New ones will spring from the Earth / All ready to fight against you." Verse VI continued with a patriotic prayer for victory and liberty, intoning "Sacred love of the Fatherland / Lead [us], sustain our avenging arms! / Liberty! Precious Liberty! / Fight alongside your defenders." And finally, the hymn ended with the Children's Verse: "We will enter into the pursuit / When our elders are no more / … / We shall have the sublime pride / Of avenging them or joining them."[75]

Overall, *Alger Républicain*'s choice of verses was very conservative. The paper was careful not to omit any verses traditionally included—and thus the staff printed a verse calling the French "magnanimous warriors." The paper also did not print any supplementary verses not traditionally sung, no matter how applicable the verses were to the Algerian situation (for instance, the paper did not include a verse which talked about destroying slavery and foreign legions "trampling on the Rights of Man"). The editorial staff confined itself to printing the core text of the national anthem. However, they did include a brief note on the same page, entitled "Vive le 14 juillet." This note explained Bastille Day as commemorating the fall of an important symbol of arbitrary monarchial power, and more generally, a holiday symbolizing the Revolution of 1789 and the Rights of Man. Suggestively, the note also explained one modern moral of the holiday: today,

[75] Ibid.

other “peoples of the world” had taken up “the immortal message of fraternity, dignity, and peace,” and “many Bastilles are still standing,” The message ended with a (possibly invented) Saint-Just quote: “"Of what import are the colonies, if we must compromise the principles of ’89." The only other provocative printing choice was the typesetting: the newspaper indented the text of the verses to the right, but typeset the first and third lines of the refrain (“To arms, citizens! Form your battalions!” and “March, Let impure blood water our furrows”) protruding to the left (see Figure 7.2).

Between the lyrics and the textual description, the message was vague enough to be interpreted as a celebration of the French state. But as Larribére knew, it could also be interpreted as a call to arms in defense of Algerian rights, and a denunciation of French tyranny and enslavement. As a result, Larribére remembered feeling proud of having used the 14 July issue to send a subversive message.[76] Two months later, the newspaper was banned. But the incident was a good example of how, through interpretive labors, cultural texts could be used to send many messages—often veiled, and often visible only to those for whom they were intended.

If the national anthem could be used to encourage rebellion, this begs the question: what role did Christian and Marxist morality tales play in French activism? There are also already many excellent monographs on wartime debates within the Christian[77] and Marxist communities[78] over the use of torture in the French military and question of

[76] Lucette Larribére Hadj Ali, *Itinéraire d'une militante algérienne, 1945–1962* (Algiers: Editions du Tell, 2011).

[77] See: André Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre* (Paris: Cana, 2001); Sybille Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie: L'action de la Mission de France* (Paris: Atelier, 2004); Darcie Fontaine, *Decolonizing Christianity: Religion and the End of Empire in France and Algeria* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Elizabeth Foster, *African Catholic: Decolonization and the Transformation of the Church* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019)

[78] See: Sylvain Pattieu, *Les camarades des frères: Trotskistes et libertaires dans la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Éditions Syllepse, 2002); Danièle Joly, *The French Communist Party and the Algerian War* (New



LA MARSEILLAISE

(paroles et musique de **Rouget de Lisle**)

(Suite de la première page)

III

Quoi ! Des cohortes étrangères
Feraient la loi dans nos foyers !
Quoi ! Ces phalanges mercenaires
Terrasseraient nos fiers guerriers ! (bis)
Grand Dieu !... Par des mains enchaînées
Nos fronts sous le joug se ploieraient !
De vils despotes deviendraient
Les maîtres de nos destinées !...
Aux armes, Citoyens ! Formez vos bataillons !
Marchons (bis), qu'un sang impur abreuve nos sillons.

IV

Tremblez, tyrans ! et vous, perfides,
L'opprobre de tous les partis,
Tremblez !... vos projets parricides
Vont enfin recevoir leurs prix. (bis)
Tout est soldat pour vous combattre.
S'ils tombent, nos jeunes héros,
La terre en produit de nouveaux
Contre vous, tout prêts à se battre.
Aux armes, Citoyens ! Formez vos bataillons !
Marchons (bis), qu'un sang impur abreuve nos sillons.

V

Français ! En guerriers magnanimes
Portez ou retenez vos coups.
Epargnez ces tristes victimes
A regret s'armant contre nous. (bis)
Mais le despote sanguinaire !
Mais les complices de Bouillé !
Tous' ces tigres qui, sans pitié,
Déchirent le sein de leur mère...
Aux armes, Citoyens ! Formez vos bataillons !
Marchons (bis), qu'un sang impur abreuve nos sillons.

VI

Amour sacré de la patrie
Conduis, soutiens nos bras vengeurs !
Liberté ! Liberté chérie !
Combats avec tes défenseurs. (bis)
Sous nos drapeaux, que la victoire
Accoure à tes mâles accents ;
Que tes ennemis expirants
Voient ton triomphe et notre gloire !...
Aux armes, Citoyens ! Formez vos bataillons !
Marchons (bis), qu'un sang impur abreuve nos sillons.

(Couplet des enfants)

Nous entrerons dans la carrière
Quand nos aînés n'y seront plus.
Nous y trouverons leur poussière
Et l'exemple de leurs vertus. (bis)
Bien moins jaloux de leur survivre
Que de partager leur cercueil,
Nous aurons le sublime orgueil
De les venger ou de les suivre.
Aux armes, Citoyens ! Formez vos bataillons !
Marchons (bis), qu'un sang impur abreuve nos sillons.

Figure 7.2 – Lyrics to the French National Anthem "La Marseillaise," as Printed in *Alger Républicain*, 14 July 1955. The first line ("To arms, citizens!…") and third line ("March…") of the refrain are attached to each verse and aligned left, emphasizing the lines. (In typesetting "La Marseillaise," this is atypical, albeit not without precedent.)

whether Algeria should have independence from France or whether it was a "nation in formation" that should remain within the French community. But it is important to add a few comments about how Christian and Marxist texts (and worldviews) intersected with the question of morality tales in French anti-colonial activism. And from this perspective,

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991); René Dazy, *La partie et le tout: le PCF et la guerre franco-algérienne* (Paris: Éditions Syllepse, 1990).

one can make the following observations. First, the role of these texts was ambiguous. Marxist and Christian activists could cite passages encouraging peace or war, demanding obedience to authorities or authorizing rebellion. These traditions referenced many values and imperatives: equality, justice, purity, charity, fraternity, freedom, family, defense against threat, mission, revolution, and advancing the Church or Party. The texts also involved different categories and roles. For Marxists, this included categories like bourgeoisie/proletariat, capitalist/workers, exploiter/exploited, and reactionary/communist/deviationist. And for Christians, there were categories and roles like good/evil, rich/poor, servants/masters, disciples/Pharisees, Israelites/Canaanites, City of God/Earthly City, which could be selectively engaged (or disengaged) according to one's policy outlook.

Marxism, for instance, came with its own morality tales, roles, action scripts, and prooftexts. Through interpretive labors, Marxist texts could thus be used to promote one type of behavior—or its exact opposite. Members of the support networks and *insoumi* networks, for instance, frequently referenced Lenin's *What is to be Done* and "The Twenty-One Conditions of Admission into the Communist International," as prooftexts, since these texts contained prescriptive guidelines for how communists should behave. Activists also referenced Lenin's *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (1914), "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (1915), and "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of the Nations to Self-Determination" (1916) as texts specifically dealing with the colonial question.

These texts were used as sources of authority, but they were also plumbed for action scripts. To encourage support for the FLN, for instance, *Vérités Pour* activists printed a

quote from "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of the Nations to Self-Determination": "Not only must socialists demand the immediate, unconditional release of the colonies—and this claim in its political expression signifies nothing besides the recognition of the right to self-determination—but they must support in these countries, in a most decided fashion, the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois-democratic movements of national liberation, *helping them in their insurrection and, if the case arises, in their revolutionary war against the imperialist powers who oppress them*."[79]

While this quote as a guide for action seems like it would have made the question of whether or not to support the FLN an open-and-shut case for communist activists, this was far from the reality. By and large, PCF members argued *against* support for the FLN or participation in *insoumi* networks, drawing selectively from Marxist texts and categories to support these arguments. For instance, PCF members opposed support for the FLN by arguing that such behavior would result in imperialist encroachment (American or German) into Algeria. Other arguments included: the Party should wait to commit itself to action until the masses (Algerian and/or French) mobilized; neither the FLN or the support/*insoumi* networks were truly movements of the people; the FLN did not represent a revolutionary movement; the FLN was divided and going nowhere; the FLN was an insurrection not a national liberation movement; the Party should be sensitive to French public opinion, so as not to be politically isolated; aiding the FLN and promoting desertion would harm the Party's place in French society and in the French National Assembly (and the Party was a higher imperative than aid to colonial

[79] Empasis added. The journal wrongly attributed the quote to Lenin's 1915 article "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination"; it in fact came from Lenin's similarly-titled 1916 article, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of the Nations to Self-Determination." See: *Vérités Pour* 9, 2 June 1959, 17.

insurrections); the FLN was a nationalist deviation (or led by reactionaries); the French support networks were a Trotskyist deviation; "The Twenty-One Conditions" instructed communists to serve in the military; and being in the "avant-garde does not mean being kilometers ahead."[80]

Claude Vinci for instance, remembered that when he received his summons to report for duty, his PCF cell became embroiled in a debate over whether or not he should comply. In a marathon meeting that ran until five in the morning, the group of twenty-three activists debated the question. Since there was no consensus, the group turned to a source of authority to help them—"The Twenty-One Conditions." They found "two [conditions] that address[ed] this subject more or less, but in contradiction to one another." These were conditions four and eight. Number four declared that communists had a duty to carry out a revolutionary struggle within the imperialist army, while number eight proclaimed the duty to support liberation movements in the colonies. One of the activists also brought up a phrase from Lenin's *What is to be Done*,[81] which further supported condition four (joining the military, so as to carry out propaganda work). As Vinci related with some bitterness, he and two friends were alone in making the argument for insubordination, and their arguments were dismissed as "too personal, anarchist, completely pacifistic… [and] a bit Trotskyist—the big insult at the time." Thus, when it came time to vote, there were nineteen votes in favor of Vinci complying with his

[80] See: Jeannine Verdès-Leroux, "La guerre d'Algérie dans la trajectoire des intellectuels communistes," in *La geurre d'Algérie et les intellectuels français,* eds. Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1991), 311–322; Jeannine Verdès-Leroux, *Le réveil des somnambules: Le parti communiste, les intellectuels, et la culture*, *1956–1985* (Paris: Fayard, 1987), 174–190.

[81] "…as soon as our forces permit, we must pay serious attention to propaganda and agitation among soldiers and officers…" V.I. Lénine, *Que faire?* (Éditions Sociales, 1947), 129, as cited in the appendix of Claude Vinci, *Les ports de fer*, 84.

military summons, and three votes against (Vinci and his two friends). Since he was obliged to comply with the Party, he thus departed for Algeria.[82]

Meanwhile, FLN support networks and *insoumis* argued back using the revolutionary vanguard doctrine (a theory for how to use a minority, or vanguard, to elicit revolutionary action from the proletariat) and Lenin's texts on self-determination. There were also attempts to disengage condition four (the injunctive to join the military) and the "movement of the masses" idea. For instance, in an appeal to potential network members, *Vérités Pour* argued that the use of Lenin's texts to encourage young men to fulfill their military service in Algeria was taking phrases out of context, a "vulgar distortion of the thought of Lenin" and a "falsification of revolutionary thought." In support of this, the article cited Lenin's 1920 "Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions," which stated "It is necessary that all the Communist Parties lend direct assistance to revolutionary movements in dependent nations… and in the colonies."[83]

In addition to marshaling authorizing texts in support of their positions, activists could quickly situate their activism (and the Algerian war more generally) within a communist worldview by transposing modern groups into the roles and categories of the organizational myth. This had the effect of simplifying and organizing an immensely complex and messy war into familiar roles and action scripts. Some activists, for instance, described the Algerian insurrectional movement as a struggle against French big business and capitalism. Others described their friendship with Algerians in terms of class solidarity or solidarity of the proletariat (despite neither Algerians nor most of their

[82] Overall, Vinci's experience was not unique (see for instance the testimony of Yann Le Masson). Claude Vinci, *Les ports de fer*, 14–15.

[83] A. Limousin, "Rappel des principes," *Vérités Pour* 18, 26 September 1960, 15–16.

French supporters fitting the Marxist definition of a proletariat).[84] To make these comparisons work, a Union de la Gauche Socialiste/UGS activist in *Vérités Pour*, for instance, explained the French working class was actually the middle class vis-à-vis Algerians, while colonized peoples were "the true proletariat."[85] The first issue of *Jeune Résistance* likewise claimed that the Algerian nationalist movement was a revolutionary movement opposing the capitalist Gaullist regime.[86] Other *Jeune Résistance* activists adapted the Marxist myth in a similar fashion: the French were the exploitative capitalists, making the Algerians *ipso facto* the revolutionary proletariat (or in some PCA readings, the peasant class).[87]

This process of locating Algerian events in the Marxist myth, however, was hotly contested. Many PCF members put the FLN firmly in the category of a reactionary movement. And the MNA appealed to French communists, by arguing the FLN did not represent the masses, but a group of "bourgeois and feudal politicians" camped out in the palaces of Cairo.[88] *France Observateur* editor Jean Daniel, meanwhile, critiqued all those trying to superimpose the Marxist myth on the Algeria situation. As he wrote, after the Spanish Civil War and the death of Stalin, Algeria had become "the site of transfer for all the disappointed revolutionary hopes… So it was an overflow of transfers: all the

[84] See for instance: "Aujourd'hui plus que jamais, c'est a nous de jouer," and "Les polices contre la jeunesse," in *Jeune Résistance* 2–3, February–March 1961, 2–3; Pourquoi ne désertent-ils pas?" *Vérité Pour* 4, Série spéciale, August 1960, 19; J.G., "J'ai travaillé en Algérie … Pourquoi j'aide le FLN?" *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 10–11.

[85] "Libres propos," *Vérité Pour* 1, Numéro special, March 1960, n.p.

[86] "Le seule politique possible," *Jeune Résistance* 1, December 1960, 7–8.

[87] "Albert," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 1: Des Résistants a la guerre d'Algérie témoignent* [also printed as *Documents Jeune Résistance* No. 1], January 1960, 20; Comité Central du Parti Communiste Algérien, *Réalités algériennes et marxisme: Revue théorique et politique* No. 5 (March 1960), 19–21, in SHD GR 1H 3092 bis.

[88] Jeannine Verdès-Leroux, "La guerre d'Algérie dans la trajectoire des intellectuels communistes," 311–322; Jeannine Verdès-Leroux, *Le Réveil des somnambules,* 174–190; "Messali Hadj au deuxième congrès de l'USTA," *La Voix du Peuple*, 11 March 1960, 4.

colonial affairs—and especially the Algerian civil war—were analyzed with Stalinist jargon. The Algerian insurrection? A revolt against capitalist exploitation. The insurgents' ideal? An Algeria that was socialist, egalitarian, and so on." Communists, he added, were just "compensating" for the "failure of their old Marxist faith… the working class, immutable and sacrosanct… Marx, the One God; Stalin, his prophet; and the Soviet Union, our holy mother-Church."[89]

As the FLN support networks included not just Marxists and Trotskyists, but individuals with anarchist and Christian worldviews as well, there were also interesting examples of the Algerian conflict transferred into anarchist and Christian myths and morality tales. As one young anarchist explained in *Jeune Résistance*, for instance, "the violence of the French 'peacemaking' operations in Algeria proceeds from the following fact: the Algerian war marks a weakening of the French centralization, a sort of attempt at secessionist federalism. This centralizing empire, the most centralizing of European empires, vigorously reacts against a war which, since it is decentralizing, strikes at the deepest core of its essence." The young man continued to explain that the Algerian Revolution was a "revolution made from below, which arose from the breakup of various political parties. It presently continues to be a revolution that springs from the bottom up."[90]

While Marxists and anarchists usually worked to transpose their metanarratives and worldviews onto the Algerian situation, Catholic and Protestant activists had a more diverse repertoire available: from the Bible alone, Christian activists could select from

[89] Entry for 12 February 1957, in Jean Daniel, "Journal d'un journaliste," *Esprit* 251, no. 6 (June 1957), 988–989.

[90] "André," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 1: Des Résistants a la guerre d'Algérie témoignent* [also printed as *Documents Jeune Résistance* No. 1], January 1960, 17–18.

hundreds of stories, thousands of characters, and countless proverbs. Most Christian activists who aided the FLN focused on scriptures popular in progressive Christian circles: verses enjoining equality and solidarity (such as Galatians 3:28, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus"), and scriptures about fighting injustice, loving one's brother, and caring for the poor and enslaved. For example, a Christian activist in *Vérités Pour* described his Algerian commitment in the following terms: Algerians were discriminated against in wages and hiring, avoided in the subway, and packed into slums. But he explained, "Being a Christian, I learned in the Gospel that the poor are our masters and we must serve them. For the Frenchman of 1960, who are the poor, if not those who are everywhere rejected, those who nobody wants, those who are despised and who, by the same token, are much closer to God than us."[91]

Davezies further described how his understanding of Christian ethics was guided by a few passages, which he read and re-read. These included Matthew 23:23,[92] Amos 5:24,[93] 1 John 4:20,[94] and Psalm 72, passages enjoining equity, justice, aiding the poor against oppressors, and loving one's brother. He also cited Isaiah 58 as a favorite: "Is not this the fast that I have chosen? To loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke? Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry…"[95] Davezies also frequently cited Psalm 72, explaining it was like a "fifth Gospel" to him. He could recite it by heart; he mentioned the Psalm in interviews and

[91] Anonymous, "Le Colonialisme n'est qu'un aspect du capitalisme," *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 8.
[92] "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you pay tithe of mint and anise and cumin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith..." Matthew 23:23, KJV.
[93] "But let judgment run down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream." Amos 5:24, KJV.
[94] "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar…" 1 John 4:20, KJV.
[95] Robert Davezies, *Le temps de la justice* (Lausanne: La Cité, 1961), 16–17.

placed it on the back cover of his book *Un Temps pour la guerre* [*A Time for War*, itself a reference to Ecclesiastes 3:8].[96] Specifically, he took from Psalm 72 verse 4: "He [the Messiah] will save the sons of the poor, / he will crush to pieces their executioners." Davezies explained he "dialectically reread" the psalm as describing class struggle, and the coming victory of the poor over their oppressors. For him, the Psalm was thus a call to join the struggle of Christ against injustice and the oppressor, and rank himself among the exploited.[97]

When Urvoas asked Davezies to join the FLN support network, Davezies said it was thus Psalm 72 that came to mind. In a letter to TPFA in Paris (which at the time was trying him *in absentia* for undermining state security by aiding the FLN), Davezies explained what the psalm meant to him in light of the Algerian situation. "Am I the representative of Christ if I leave [Algerians] alone in their struggle, when the presence of Christ in the world is, according to a famous messianic psalm [Psalm 72], revealed through the struggle against the Unjust and the Oppressor?"[98]

Of course, like Islamic and Marxist morality tales and texts, Christian scripture could be flexibly interpreted to reach contradictory conclusions. For instance, to justify military service in Algeria, the Assemblée des Cardinaux et Archevêques (ACA), cited the scriptural duty to obey governmental authorities.[99] To further authorize warfare, Christians also turned to Old Testament scriptures invoking God as the "God of Hosts

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[96] "To everything there is a season… A time to kill, and a time to heal… A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace." Ecclesiastes 3:1–8, KJV.

[97] Robert Davezies, *Un temps pour la guerre*, 64, 112–113, 116; Interview with Robert Davezies, in *Les frères des Frères*, directed by Richard Copans (Paris: Les Films d'ici, 1992); Robert Davezies, *Le temps de la justice*, 16–17.

[98] Lettre de Robert Davezies au Président du Tribunal militaire, October 1958–February 1959, in Robert Davezies, *Le temps de la justice*, 97–101.

[99] André Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 121–151; Darcie Fontaine, *Decolonizing Christianity*, 111, 119–120.

[Armies]," and passages commanding the destruction of the Canaanites (Deuteronomy 20:17) and the Amalekites (1 Samuel 15:3)—categories that were often transposed onto modern ethnic groups. But interpretive labors could turn even pacifistic passages to warlike ends. The Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Maurice Feltin proved this in a 1959 tour of Algeria. During one of his liturgies, the Cardinal managed to transform a sermon on the Beatitudes into a celebration of the French military. Referencing Matthew 5:4 ("Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted") and Matthew 5:9 ("Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God"), the Cardinal enjoined the French armed forces to "Sow peace. ... You are here for a work of pacification." Angry at what he viewed as a scandalous interpretive mutilation of the passage, André Mandouze wrote an open letter calling Feltin's comments on the second and seventh Beatitudes "foolish," adding that the liturgy could be considered "flatly political propaganda" and "cruelly fanciful exegesis."[100] Priest Robert Davezies, meanwhile, wrote impassioned rejoinders to Cardinal Feltin and Abbé Louis for sermons enjoining young Frenchmen to serve in the war,[101] and *Témoignage Chrétien* confronted a military chaplain of the 10th Parachutists Division, after he delivered a report to General Massu on how torture was legitimate means for Christians, because it saved lives.[102]

[100] André Mandouze, "Lettre ouverte au cardinal Feltin, arche vêque de Paris, vicaire aux armées," *France-Observateur*, 12 November 1959.

[101] Robert Davezies, *Le temps de la justice*, 129; "L'ARMÉE, bouclier de le Chrétienté?" *Vérités Pour* 18, 26 September 1960, 11–12.

[102] For information and scholarly discussions on this debate, see: "Un prêtre justifie la torture," *Témoignage Chrétien*, 21 June 1957, 1; P. Delarue, "Réflexions d'un prêtre sur le terrorisme urbain," in *Note de service du général Massu* (29 March 1957), SHD IR 339-3 as cited in Raphaëlle Branche, "La lutte contre le terrorisme urbain," in *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d'Algérie*, eds. Jean-Charles Jauffret et Maurice Vaïsse (Brussels: Complexe, 2001), 469–487; Darcie Fontaine, *Decolonizing Christianity*, 121; André Nozière, *Algérie: Les chrétiens dans la guerre*, 131–150.

As had been true in the Egyptian case, court trials were one space where religious morality, value hierarchies, and divisions of labor were publicly debated. Such was the case in the trial of Lutheran pastor Étienne Mathiot and Catholic university student Francine Rapiné. The facts of the case surrounded the activism of Francine Rapiné, JEC activist and student in the Faculty of Letters at the University of Besançon. After high school, Rapiné had tried to enter a Catholic religious order, but when her father refused, she instead took a year-long position as a teacher in Morocco, before returning to Besançon to enter the university. There, she joined the Maghrebian student associations (the Association Générale des Étudiants de Besançon/AGEB, and later the Union Générale des Étudiants Musulmans d'Algérie/UGEMA). Through these meetings, Rapiné became friends with UGEMA-head and medical student Mouhoub Si Ameur. Si Ameur was leading the FF-FLN section in Franche-Comté, and looking for a secretary to help in the organization's clandestine activities. Rapiné agreed to help, and began typing FF-FLN communiques, distributing copies of *El Moudjahid*, and delivering messages. Gradually, her involvement expanded to money transfers, smuggling fugitives across international borders, and storing weapons.

In October 1957, Rapiné was asked to help smuggle FLN leader Salah Laouedj to Switzerland. Needing help, she turned to her friends from high school, Monique and Françoise Mathiot. She knew their family sympathized with the Algerians: the girls' father, pastor Étienne Mathiot of the Lutheran Church of Montbéliard, had participated in demonstrations and had helped distribute copies of *Des Rappelés témoignent.* So, Rapiné approached the mother, Élisabeth Mathiot, who in turn spoke with her husband, Pastor Étienne. He agreed to hide Laouedj in the presbytery for three days. Then he drove

Laouedj and Rapiné in his car to Switzerland, intending to hand Laouedj off to Mathiot's brother-in-law, pastor Jacques Lochard (who himself had been engaged in Algerian support networks for some time). Francine Rapiné and Étienne Mathiot were subsequently arrested in December 1957; at the time of her arrest, Rapiné was found with weapons and ammunition.[103]

The controversial trial opened 7 March 1958 in Besançon. Mathiot's defense team focused on the Christian right to sanctuary. Citing the Biblical injunction to "love your enemies" (Matthew 5:44), the defense argued that without distinction Mathiot had provided shelter to French Resistance fighters, alcoholics, criminals just released from prison, FLN members, and MNA members hunted by the FLN. While Mathiot minimized his involvement to avoid a harsh sentence, other witness vocally defended his actions and put the state on trial. Philosopher Paul Ricœur asserted that defending the values of French heritage in current circumstances meant crossing into illegality, as the state was guilty of violating French values. And André Mandouze compared what Rapiné and Mathiot had done to the work of smuggling Jews out of France during the Second World War. This analogy was reinforced by Mathiot's defense lawyer, who read a letter of support sent from a man Mathiot had hidden during World War II.[104]

The prosecution's case, meanwhile, denied that Christian charity included weapons smuggling, money laundering to a criminal organization, and transporting criminals across international borders. It characterized Francine Rapiné as a hardened criminal and soldier of the FLN. It was harder to make this argument for the Pastor, however. The

[103] Pierre Croissant, "L'affaire Mathiot, épisode montbéliardais de la guerre d'Algérie," *Bulletin de la Société d'Émulation de Montbéliard* (2010): 5–12, 21–22 [367–374, 383–384].
[104] Ibid., 12–20 [374–382].

prosecution was ultimately forced to concede that Mathiot was within his Christian right to offer sanctuary to Laouedj. However, it argued Mathiot had transgressed both legal and symbolic boundaries in conveying Laouedj to Switzerland, "And on 11 November [Armistice Day, i.e., Veteran's Day] no less!" In an affective appeal to patriotic loyalty, fidelity to fallen soldiers, and the memory of the war, the prosecutor told Mathiot "I don't know, it seems to me that I would have chosen another day. Weren't you afraid of disturbing the dead? Of Verdun, la Marne?" The comment prompted murmuring from the courtroom, and the prosecutor pressed on. "Since we are talking about a case of conscience and condemning violence, the pastor might have considered if, in aiding the flight of Laouedj, he had not allowed the FLN to commit new crimes!" To this, he added that he could have called his own witnesses against Mathiot: widows and mothers whose sons had been killed in Algeria.[105]

In addition to this struggle to claim patriotic capital and define the meaning of fidelity to nation and religion, there was a dispute over a Christian's responsibility to follow the laws of the state. Pastor Maurice Sweeting, who served as a witness for the defense, raised the point that Jesus had taught that it was better to obey God over men in certain circumstances. This caused the prosecutor to retort with a scripture enjoining obedience to authority, saying "It is also written... that one must render unto Caesar what is Caesar's" (Matthew 22:21). This agitated the audience, with some observers shouting "And then [what does it say]?" Others called out the rest of the verse: "… and to God

[105] These court testimonies were published in a special issue of a Protestant journal, "Étienne Mathiot, signe et témoin," *Cahiers de la Réconciliation*, *Bulletin du Mouvement International de la Réconciliation (MIR)* (July 1958). Pierre Croissant, "L'affaire Mathiot, épisode montbéliardais de la guerre d'Algérie," 18 [381].

what is God's!"[106] Here again, Christian scripture was flexible enough to provided support for both legality and illegality. The debate ultimately came down to ambiguities in 1) what belonged to the state [Caesar] and what belonged to God, 2) the definition of Christian charity, and 3) value hierarchies (what was more important, obedience to the governing authority or love for one's brother? Peace or justice?). Creatively, in an article on the trial published in *Témoignage Chrétien* the following week, André Mandouze returned to these points of contention, and argued that in helping the Algerians, Mathiot and Rapiné had in fact completely fulfilled Matthew 22:21 by serving both God *and* Caesar at the same time, because by extending Christian charity to the Algerians, they had helped France as well.[107]

One morality tale French activists selected to support their activism was the Biblical tale of Pontius Pilate. However, of the four versions of the morality tale (Matthew 27, Mark 15, Luke 23, and John 18-19), activists only used Matthew 27—the version of the story in which Pilate washes his hands before turning Jesus over to die. Broken down into its constituent parts, the morality tale (as told in the Book of Matthew) provided a colorful cast, including Christ, Pilate, Pilate's wife, the chief priests and the elders, a crowd, and the prisoner Barabbas. In the story, Pilate presents Jesus to the crowd along with Barabbas, and asks the people to choose one man for release. When the crowd selects Barabbas for pardon and demands the execution of Christ, Pilate complies, but not before washing his hands and declaring "I am innocent of this man's blood."[108]

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[106] Ibid., 14 [376].

[107] André Mandouze, "Coupable de christianisme," *Témoignage Chrétien,* 14 March 1958.

[108] "[Ἀ]θῷός εἰμι ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος τούτου..." Barbara and Kurt Aland, eds., *Nestle-Aland Novum Testamentum Graece*, 28th Ed. (Stuttgart : Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2012), 95–96; Matthew 27:11–26 in Michael D. Coogan, ed., *The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version with the Apocrypha, 4th Ed.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1788.

In the hands of French activists, this Biblical tale was simplified and adapted. The multiple actions that comprise the tale (i.e., Pilate's exchange with Jesus, Pilate's conversation with his wife, Pilate presenting Jesus and Barabbas to the crowd, the crowd demanding the death of Christ, Pilate washing his hands, and Pilate handing Christ over for execution) were collapsed into a single behavioral script (Pilate washing his hands) and a clear proscriptive message (don't behave as Pilate). French activists then assigned the roles in the tale to modern actors: they placed French citizens in the role of Pilate, and Algerians in the role of the suffering Christ.

With this simplified tale, French activists suggested that like Pilate, French citizens were in the judgment seat facing a decision that would determine Algeria's fate. In some cases, activists elaborated on this morality tale: such was the case of a *Vérités Pour* article entitled "Will we wash our hands…?" As the author declared, Algerians were being murdered in Algeria, and French citizens must take action rather than standing idly by like Pilate. Appealing to Pilate's behavior as a negative example, the author then implored readers to follow a proscriptive action script: "Let us not commit today the crime of washing our hands."[109] In other cases (like Robert Bonnaud's "La Paix des Nementchas"), references to the morality tale went unelaborated, however, and relied on readers to transpose the roles themselves.[110]

It is also important to note that other versions of the tale would have imparted different messages and action scripts: while activists used Matthew 27 to communicate a proscriptive message regarding Pilate's behavior, such a reading would have been difficult with Luke 23 (which describes Pilate as working hard to secure Jesus' release).

[109] Emphasis in original. "Nous en laverons-nous les mains...?" *Vérités Pour* 9, 2 June 1959, 8–9.
[110] Robert Bonnaud, "La paix des Nementchas," *Esprit* 249, no. 4 (April 1957): 592.

Similarly, John 18–19 (focusing on conversations between Pilate and Jesus) would have foregrounded exchanges between French citizens and Algerians, and Mark 15 (in which Pilate has Jesus flogged) would have highlighted the direct responsibility of the French for Algerian suffering.

As a many Christian idioms and analogies were embedded in the French language and moral imaginary, non-religious and atheist activists alike referenced Pilate. Immediately after the close of the Jeanson trial, for example, one could find an appeal from Jacques Vergès, condemning the fact that some Frenchmen were content in the face of horror to "fold their hands like Pontius Pilate."[111] Notably, Vergès showed himself unfamiliar with the morality tale (saying "fold their hands" rather than "wash their hands"); but his use of the phrase still preserved French activists' reading of the tale as proscriptive lesson against non-involvement or a "hands off" approach.

Activists also used Christian morality tales to express the act of suffering for a righteous cause, with activists comparing Algerian and French activists to the crucified Christ. Priest Robert Davezies, for instance, likened Algerians to Christ, unjustly insulted, stripped, tortured, and humiliated. And in the first issue of *Partisans*, a Benoist Rey poem described "the agony of their men / these christs that are hung / … / these christs who sing without respite / under the blow or the wound."[112]

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[111] Jacques Vergès, "La leçon d'un procès," in *Le Procès du réseau Jeanson*, 242.

[112] Robert Davezies, *Le temps de la justice*, 64, 99; Benoist Rey, "Rompre le silence," *Partisans* 1, September–October 1961, 122.

Meanwhile, for passages comparing the Algerians and support network activists to martyrs, see: Testimony of André Mandouze for the Defense, "Mardi 20 Septembre," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 120, 122; "Jeune Résistance fait le point," *Résolution finale du premier congrès de "Jeune Résistance,"* 1960; "André," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 1: Des Résistants a la guerre d'Algérie témoignent* [also printed as *Documents Jeune Résistance* No. 1], January 1960, 17–19.

Besides a model of suffering for a cause, the stories of Jesus also offered morality tales that could be adapted to authorize Christian legal transgressions. Mandouze took Christ's driving away of the merchants and moneychangers at the Temple as a morality tale for creating scandal. As he argued in his journal, his decision to betray of the French state's "politics of treason" was, in his words, "to reestablish a healthy order of things (a bit like Christ condemning scandal but not being afraid to made scandal against the scandalous: see the episode of the merchants at the Temple)."[113] Notable here, then, was how Mandouze adapted the Biblical morality based on its prescriptive action script, which encouraged the confrontation of transgressors.

Father Alfred Bérenguer also saw Christ as a positive role model for freedom from the law, citing the tales of the Samaritan at the well (John 4) and the healing of the leper (Matthew 8, Luke 5, Mark 1). As Bérenguer wrote, "Christ has shown us the way to freedom. He has taught us to be free in regard to all prohibitions: do not touch a leper, do not speak to a Samaritan. He has freed us from all law." The priest further developed the story of Easter into a revolutionary morality tale. In his liberationist reading, Christ was the embodiment of revolutionary dignity: "Christ is the one who wanted us to stand up. This is the meaning of the resurrection, we must not forget it." Easter, he explained, was thus an action script for rising up against injustice, with Christ as the prescriptive role model *par excellence*. "It is said that Christ has risen, that he was lying like the dead. 'Resurrection,' *anastasis* in Greek, is to get up when one is on the ground. Christ wanted us to stand up…. [God] has made us free and standing. It is the slave who is prostrate, lying on the ground." Finally, when the French administration expelled Bérenguer from

[113] Entry for 9 November 1956, "Solitude pour l'Algérie: Journal de cellule," Maison d'arrêt de la Santé (Paris), in André Mandouze, *Un Chrétien dans son siècle*, 174.

Algeria, the priest said he thought of Christ and his expulsion from Nazareth. "The Christian life is an imitation of Jesus Christ. Christ, who attacked those in power, who was persecuted by his own people and by the two powers, religious and civil. Is it forbidden to imitate him up to this point?"[114]

The Judgment: The Jeanson Network versus the *Image d'Épinal*

Both on the stand and in their writings, French activists looked to communicate a number of lessons. For one, activists asserted the right of Antigone. In part, this was a value hierarchy: the precedence of higher "unwritten laws" (like fraternity and human dignity) over the laws of men. These higher laws that French defendants claimed to be upholding were diverse: some defendants grounded their claims in French humanism or Republican values, others appealed to progressive Christian ethics, and others cited Marxist ethics. Hélène Cuénat, for instance, cited justice, humanity, and fraternity; Gérard Meïer cited Christian love; Jean-Claude Paupert cited liberty; and Micheline Pouteau cited respect for man and the right to self-determination. Defendant Michele Pouteau made these implicit value hierarchies explicit in a letter to *Vérité Liberté* elucidating her motives: "Our desire for justice surpasses our desire for peace."[115]

A fundamental conviction that unified the defendants, however, was the necessity of illegal action against a state steeped in illegality—the right of Antigone over Creon. To this end, de Gaulle's resistance activities-turned-morality tale made multiple appearances in the trial proceedings. In his testimony for the defense, for instance, historian Pierre

[114] Alfred Bérenguer, *En toute liberté: Entretiens avec Geneviève Dermenjian* (Paris: Éditions du Centurion, 1994), 39–40, 62–65, 70–72.

[115] "Nous qui sommes en prison," *Vérité Liberté* 2, June 1960, 1; Marcel Péju ed., *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 55–64, 82–83, 221.

Vidal-Naquet favorably compared Jeanson network activists to de Gaulle. "I grew up, Mr. President, under occupation. At that time, many illegalities were committed, and, if I remember correctly, General de Gaulle was condemned to death, not only for having deserted, but also for incitement to desertion." To this, the historian added that in the current situation, "there is no other solution besides illegality." Defendant and deserter Gérard Meïer, meanwhile, testified that insubordination of superior officers had been decisive in his decision to desert. Supporting him, Jacques Vèrges rhetorically asked "Did Mr. Meïer, at the time of desertion, not think of an illustrious example, in the month of June 1940, when a French general refused to serve the enemy? … I joined General de Gaulle [at that time], and I believe his act in June 1940 was perfectly legitimate, and should serve as an example today."[116]

In closing arguments, defense lawyer Maurice Gautherat made another appeal to de Gaulle on behalf of his client Micheline Pouteau. The France that had collaborated with the Nazis, the lawyer argued, was neither legal nor legitimate. As a result, in London, de Gaulle had forged a new notion of legitimacy. "[I]n order to discard the law that was no longer legitimate, he created precedents," Gautherat declared, just as the French Revolution had done in 1789. At certain points in history, people "washed away great historical impurities," and colonialism was one of those impurities. The France that was waging a colonial war was in need of purification, "it is not a legitimate France," the lawyer declared. The prosecutor, for his part, rejected the defense's use of de Gaulle as a morality tale for revolt, retorting angrily that the French Resistance brought men together rather than imposing itself by terrorism. "Must General de Gaulle… suffer today the

[116] "Interrogatoires: Mardi 13 Septembre" and "Témoignage de Pierre Vidal-Naquet," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 63–64, 123–124.

insult of being compared with those who, under the auspices of Jeanson, promote hatred, criminal complicity, and disorder in our military through desertion?"[117]

The defense also thoroughly elaborated the World War II experience as myth of necessary transgression. French behavior was like Nazi behavior, and the Algerian Resistance and French support networks like the French Resistance. In his statements to the court, for instance, Hamada Haddad compared the French government to the Nazi regime; Gérard Meïer described the war in Algeria as genocide, and compared his desertion to French Resistance fighters who opposed the Vichy regime. France Binard condemned French torture and government-run concentration camps, and declared she had been defending France from fascism. Sociologist Andrée Michel acted as an expert witness for the defense, testifying to the suffering in Algeria and the fact that French youth who had been children during the war now idolized the Resistance, and "have identified the Algerian Resistance with the French Resistance." And testifying for Jacques Charby [Charbit], Hadj Ali compared Charby's loss of his mother (tortured and shot under the Vichy regime) to Algerian teens whose parents were being "immolated on the altar of pacification." Finally, Jacques Vergès, provocative as ever, drew a comparison between the FLN and the French Resistance by calling Minister of Cultural Affairs André Malraux a "former terrorist." (The judge rebuked him for the comparison, and for using the term "terrorist" to describe a respected veteran and government official).[118]

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[117] "Plaidoirie de M. Gautherat," and "Réquisitoire: Mardi 27 Septembre," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 212–213.

[118] "Interrogatoires: Lundi 12 Septembre," "Interrogatoires: Mardi 13 Septembre," "Mardi 20 Septembre," and "Témoins défaillants: Jeudi 22 Septembre," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 49–50, 55–56, 60–64, 111, 144–149.

The most important morality tale contested throughout the trial, however, was the colonial morality tale (and the performance of French justice that accompanied it). The Government Commissioner Major Lequime maintained that "the French have a right to be proud" of their nation. They had taken Algeria—a land of "Barbary pirates," a backward country with a non-existent economy, a population decimated by "infighting, disease, and misery"—and achieved many economic and developmental feats. And these had been accomplished not out of a spirit of profit or desire for conquest, Lequime declared, but out of a spirit of patriotism.[119]



Figure 7.3 – *Image d'Épinal* of the "Song of Barbenzingue." The lyrics on the left read "Indeed, if Barbenzingue / Were to depart from legality / He would swiftly return, one hopes / to the law…." In the middle panel, in hopes of furthering his diplomatic career, Barbenzingue departs to serve in a war in the colonies. In the image on the right, he becomes a model emperor. The bottom row (not pictured) include a stanza on Barbenzingue's gallantry and goodness, and the last verse shows the hero's story being enshrined in a history book "to preserve his glory."

(Source: "La Chanson de Barbenzingue," Série aux armes d'Épinal. N° 25 [Print, 43 x 32 cm] (Épinal: Pellerin et Cie, 1889) in BNF FOL-LI-59 10, ID ark:/12148/btv1b6938667d).

[119] "Témoins défaillants: Jeudi 22 Septembre" and "Réquisitoire: Mardi 27 Septembre," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 147, 169–170.

The defense team, for their part, fought to tell a different story: one of colonial crimes, Algerian suffering, and a fraternal French-Algerian struggle to make amends. Defense counsel Jeanine Courrégé explained this message as the trial drew to a close:

> "You've made, Monsieur Commissioner, a caricature of the situation: on one side, there is France, good, great, generous and civilized, on the other, Barbary pirates, cruel pillagers and their descendants, those men of the FLN who kill, plunder, torture and destroy all we have built. … This description of the situation you created, I saw it with an *Épinal* print, framed by an oil lamp, with the Declaration of the Rights of the Citizen, perhaps even a Celtic cross. It held a song of epic deeds [*chanson de geste*] and the story of the Crusades. But I have a duty to the truth—and I have a duty to the Tribunal I respect—to try to discern more closely a reality that is, to the contrary, serious and tragic."[120]

She then explained the second morality tale and its meaning. "For several months, everyone has been asking one and only one question: 'Why are French people sitting beside Algerians in that box?' And this single question already shows the distinction that is made between the French and the Algerians." The question was in itself unequal: nobody had bothered to ask the reverse, why Algerians would sit next to French people. Continuing, Courrégé elaborated on how the presence of French activists was challenging French norms:

> "This trial, gentlemen, is a scandal. Scandal because, for the first time in the six years of the pacification in Algeria, for the first time in the heart of Paris, Algerians and French people are sitting side by side on the benches of your Tribunal. Scandal because the French and Algerians, far from being ashamed of this indecent proximity on the bench of infamy, radiate joy and pride to be side by side and facing you in this way. Scandal because they are proud to fight you, scandal because their witnesses, professors, actors, talented journalists, famous writers, prestigious philosophers, tell you their esteem for the accused, declaring them right and declaring the Government wrong."[121]

[120] "Plaidoirie de M.Courrégé: Vendredi 30 Septembre," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 208–209.
[121] Ibid., 206–209.

In short, by standing side-by-side, by refusing to shame—in short, by staging a performance of equality and fraternity—the French activists had attempted to model a different kind of relations between French and Algerians. And in this morality play, the guilty party was not the rebels and *insoumis*, but the State itself.

If the Jeanson trial seemed to *Le Figaro*, *L'Aurore*, and *Rivarol* like "a masquerade, a circus, a bazaar, a pandemonium,"[122] it was a chaos that had been shrewdly designed. By frustrating the court (and the audience) in a debate over whether an Algerian could speak and comprehend only literary Arabic, the defense team had hoped to disrupt the pageantry of justice, challenge the authority of the court, and highlight that Algerians were not, in fact, French. Beyond farce, the first two days of the proceedings were thus a carefully-scripted morality play. And if by mocking the State's right to judge the defense made the court a circus, it was a circus of the utmost gravity.

When it had opened on 5 September, the expectation was that the trial would be brief. Instead, it dragged on almost a month, pitting a state that had already reached a verdict against a box of defendants whose audience was not the military tribunal itself, but a wider French audience they hoped to reach through the spectacle.[123] And they certainly succeeded in attracting attention. A day after the trial opened, *Vérité Liberté* published the "Manifeste des 121," which called the war a "degrading" enterprise "perverting the nation," a "criminal and absurd combat" fought by leaders "acting openly and violently outside any legality." The manifesto then announced the right to resistance: "we respect

[122] Jacques Vergès, "La leçon d'un procès," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 233–234.

[123] See for instance, the testimony of Hélène Cuénat, who characterized the trial as a grand performance. Hélène Cuénat, *La porte verte* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2001), 102–117.

and judge justified the refusal to take up arms against the Algerian people. We respect and judge justified the behavior of French citizens who estimate it their duty to bring aid and protection to the oppressed Algerians in the name of the French people." This language (and the long list of signatories that accompanied the document) was important: it worked to communicate to the French public that a large number of authority figures sanctioned and had "judged justified" behavior the court considered transgressive.[124] It was a message that would not remain unchallenged: a counter-manifesto of over three hundred academics in turn condemned Jeanson and other "teachers of treason." Moreover, veterans associations organized a protest around the Arc de Triomphe and Champs-Élysées, to pay tribute to soldiers killed by the FLN, respond to the "Manifeste des 121," and show their opposition to statements made at the Jeanson trial.[125]

Thus, at least in terms of publicity, Paupert was not wrong in declaring in his last appearance on the stand that "This trial is a bomb, which is continuously exploding under the feet of our princely lords, as is reflected in the manifesto on insubordination."[126] Jeanson (in exile abroad), similarly explained that through the trial, the network had achieved some of its goals. "Our real concern has been to use this tribunal, before which my friends are appearing, as the best platform we have ever been offered to announce to

[124] "Déclaration sur le droit à l'insoumission dans la guerre d'Algérie," *Vérité-Liberté* 4 (September–October 1960), 12.
[125] "Un Manifeste d'intellectuels français s'élève contre 'un certain nombre de déclarations scandaleuses,'" and "Un Manifeste condamne 'les professeurs de trahison,'" *Le Monde*, 7 October 1960; "Six associations d'anciens combattants manifesteront lundi place de l'Étoile pour protester contre les '121,'" *Le Monde*, 1 October 1960; "Manifestations et prises de position sur 'le droit à l'insoumission,' *Le Monde*, 4 October 1960; M.L., "Deux à trois mille manifestants ont tenté de se rendre devant l'Élysée," *Le Monde*, 5 October 1960.
[126] "Plaidoiries: Samedi 1 Octobre," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 222.

all of France that a new Resistance is born in this country, and to explain its motives and provide proof we are not alone."[127]

Indeed, the trial (along with the "Manifeste des 121" on the right to insubordination) marked a shift. There was a growing movement convinced that that illegality was both a right and a duty. In fact, this decision came late in the Algeria war. The FLN support networks did not gain steam until 1958-1960, and it took many developments—the 1956 Special Powers vote and the escalation of hostilities in Algeria, the coup of 13 May 1958 (and the collapse of the Fourth Republic), the creation of a "community of revolt" against torture in the French military, and mythmaking labors grounded in the French Resistance—before any movement of French activists willing to "cross the line" into illegality could be formed. However, it was a shift that would continue into the 1960s, growing after the 1961 Algiers putsch by French generals, and evolving into May 1968. But immediately, the sea-change was marked in Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir's *Les Temps Modernes* (est. 1945): the journal started carrying articles on anti-colonialism and independence movements from 1954-1956, then focused on torture in the French military from 1956-1957, and voiced support for illegal behaviors (like refusing to report for military service) from 1958-1962.[128]

The Tribunal judging the FLN members and their French supporters went into deliberation on the evening of 1 October 1960. The military judges spent two hours *in camera*. Then, just before midnight, they returned with a verdict. For the Algerian

[127] "'Le tribunal devant lequel mes amis comparaissent est la meilleure tribune qui nous ait jamais été offerte' déclare M. Francis Jeanson," *Le Monde*, 30 September 1960.
[128] Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 73–83.

defendants Hamada Haddad, Allaoua Daksi, Aliane Hamimi, Saïd Hannoun, and Ould Younès (all except Lounis Brahimi), the verdict was guilty, with the maximum sentence of ten years in prison. For five of the French activists—Hélène Cuénat, France Binard, Micheline Pouteau, Jean-Claude Paupert, and Gérard Meïer—the verdict was guilty, with the maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Jacqueline Carré and Jacques Rispal were found guilty, and respectively handed sentences of five and three years. Denise Barrat, Paul Crauchet, André Thorent, Georges Berger, Yvonne Rispal, Jacques and Lise Trébouta, and Odette Huttelier were acquitted.[129]

This chapter has examined a few of the morality tales and myths French activists used to justify transgressive activism. This included: an exploration of how activists used the common World War II experience as a morality tale to move activists from revulsion to revolt; a study of how figures like Antigone and de Gaulle were used as behavioral models, and their stories transformed into morality tales for necessary transgression; the use of veiled morality tales to skirt censorship; and the location of communist and Christian traditions supporting disobedience.

Like Egyptian and Algerian activists, French activists thus referenced a flexible and dynamic moral imaginary. This included morality tales from Greek mythology, Marxist materialist myth, Christian scripture, and stories constructed from communal experiences. These broad references helped organizations appeal to individuals with diverse worldviews. Moreover, as was true for Egyptians and Algerians, the French case shows how social norms were actively contested within institutions (like the Church), and how

[129] The case against Jacques and Aline Charby had been dismissed earlier in the trial. "Verdict," in *Le procès du réseau Jeanson*, 231.

the same cultural canons could be mobilized to support opposing policy positions. It is also notable how trials were a space for modeling value sets; this bears out the observation that trials were themselves a type of "morality play in which offenders, jury members, and spectators are invited to see offending behavior as violating the standards of the community"[130] and narrate this "transgression" as stemming from ideological deviation, psychological illness, etc. But courts were also spaces where defendants could present their own morality tales by refusing to shame for law-breaking, performing of patriotic professionalism (in the FLN's case), or refusing to respect the authority of the justice system by laughing and smiling on the stand. By sitting side-by-side with Algerian activists, French activists thus modeled a revised vision of French-Algerian social relations, a different value hierarchy, and new definitions of community. And in this way, they worked to "shatter the false scandal constituted by the absurdity of the mythological representation."[131]

In the end, French activists by and large found their transgressions to be a great source of pride. After being sentenced to ten years in prison by the TPFA, Father Robert Davezies wrote an open letter to the editor of *Le Monde*, chastising them for failing to publish news of his sentencing. Refusing to be shamed or silenced, Davezies wrote, "I have been hit [with a punishment] by the Justice System of my country for participating in the work of Algerian militants in France. And, it is an honor for me. …France is fortunate that Francis Jeanson and his friends exist. Among the countries of Bandoeng [the Asian and African nations], more than half of the world, he saves our honor. …And

[130] Paul Zak, *Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 177.

[131] Paul Ricœur, "Preface to Bultmann's *Jesus, mythologie et demythologization*," in *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Lewis Seymour Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 35–36.

if we are still permitted—above all, if our youth are still able— to be proud of being French, we probably owe it in no small part to Francis Jeanson and his 'crimes.'"[132]

[132] Letter from Robert Davezies to Mr. Hubert Beuve-Méry, Editor of *Le Monde*, 27 April 1960, printed as "Les deux trahisons," *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 14–16.

Part III: The Activist's Aggression

Chapter 8

Murder as a Moral Imperative: Egyptian Vigilantism, from the Courtroom to the Cairo Fire

> "Murder, although considered a crime in civil cases,
> is nevertheless often warranted in cases of faith or patriotism.
> In this case, murder loses its criminal character, and becomes
> for men a duty."[1]
>
> – Muslim Brotherhood memorandum, presented at the
> Nuqrāshī assassination trial, 5 September 1949

Muslim Brotherhood leader Ḥasan al-Bannā had experimented with vigilante policing early in life. In the 1920s, the aspiring social reformer and his friends formed a *ḥisbah* society called the Society for Morality and Ethics [akhlāq wa adabīyyah]. As the teens quickly discovered, however, trying to police the behavior of others could be risky. First, Bannā's group of young activists called a congregational prayer in a mosque—without the permission of the mosque imam. The imam let the boys finish their prayer, then rebuked them. Outraged, Bannā swung the *ḥisbah* society into action, writing a reproach to the imam and fining him one *qirsh* for violating "Islamic ethics." The imam was not impressed; he angrily contacted Bannā's father to ensure the boy would be chastised for his effrontery.

Undeterred, the young Ḥasan and his *ḥisbah* group carried on. For the next six months, the boys penned threatening letters to people they considered lax in religious morals. They sent letters to those seen breaking the Ramadan fast, wearing gold, or engaging in tribal funerary practices. However, their campaign came to an inauspicious end one day, when one of the boys delivered a threatening letter to a local café owner

[1] Luṭfī ʿUthmān, *Qaḍīyyat maqtal al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Tawakkul, 1950), 103.

who had invited a dancer to perform. The coffee shop proprietor caught the student delivering the letter, and delivered some very clear negative feedback about the boy's behavior: in full view of the café patrons, he gave the boy a thorough beating.

As a result, Bannā's *ḥisbah* society was forced to suspend its activities. Both traditional Islamic authorities (like the local imam) and members of the lay community refused to recognize the organization's right to police and punish behavior. Moreover, the adults exerted strong social (and physical) pressure on the boys, forcing them to change their behavior. Consequently, the young Ḥasan al-Bannā gave up attempting to police public morality—for a few years, at least.[2]

The Rise of the "Irresponsibles": Vigilantism and Community Policing

In the 1920s, Ḥasan al-Bannā's community policing campaign had styled itself as a *ḥisbah* society. *Ḥisbah*, a term meaning "calculation" or "accounting," is an Islamic concept based on Qurʾān 3:104, a scripture that vaguely calls on believers to promote accountability by "enjoining right and forbidding wrong."[3] At various historical junctures, groups have used the passage to justify the formation of *ḥisbah* societies: independent clubs, government-sanctioned police, or vigilante gangs which make claims over the right to patrol communal behavior.[4] Such communal policing strategies were not unique to Muslim societies, however: vice squads and vigilante brigades are a common behavioral practice in human communities. They appear as part of both religious and

[2] Ḥasan al-Bannā, *Mudhakkirāt al-daʿwah wa-l-dāʿīyyah* (Kuwait: Maktabat Āfāq, 2011), 8–13.

[3] Qurʾān 3:104 (Sūrat Āl ʿImrān) – "And let there be among you a people [ummah] calling for the good, and enjoining right and forbidding wrong, and those, they are the successful."

[4] See for instance: Ian Wilson, "Morality Racketeering: Vigilantism and Populist Islamic Militancy in Indonesia," in *Between Dissent and Power: The Transformation of Islamic Politics in the Middle East and Asia*, eds. Khoo Boo Teik et al. (London: Palgrave-Macmillan 2014), 248–274; Fatima L. Adamu, "Gender, Hisba and the Enforcement of Morality in Northern Nigeria," *Africa* 78, no. 1 (2008): 136–152.

non-religious movements, on the right and left of the political spectrum, and in issues ranging from prostitution and public drunkenness to animal rights.[5]

These patrols, as shall be seen, played a large role in the social production of violence in Egypt in the leadup to the Cairo Fire of January 1952, alongside two other modes of violence: political assassination and bombings. So which moral rationalizations and narratives did Egyptian activists mobilize to legitimize these behaviors in the late 1940s and early 1950s, what was the moral and emotional economy in which activists negotiated violent acts? Chapter 2 ("Allahu Akhbar, Long Live the Workers!") and Chapter 5 ("Shaykh in a Dance Club!") already explored how Egyptian activist groups—including Young Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the EMNL–DMNL—advanced social reform programs and competed for influence in postwar Egypt, expressing their ideas in public and underground journals.

From 1945 to 1952, however, Egyptian social activists increasingly took to the streets to employ more active methods of persuasion, engaging in community policing and using aggressive attacks to bring about change. Noting the social instability, the British Residency grumbled that "the real influence, where Anglo-Egyptian relations are

[5] Kiyohiro Matsudo, "Obshchestvennost' in the Struggle Against Crimes: The Case of the People's Vigilante Brigades in the Late 1950s and 1960s," in *Obshchestvennost' and Civic Agency in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia*, ed. Yasuhiro Matsui (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015); "Voluntary Militia and Courts," *Soviet Studies* 11, no. 2 (October 1959): 214–217; Stefan H. Leader and Peter Probst, "The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, no. 4 (2003): 37–58; Gerry Nagtzaam, "Vigilantes on the High Seas?: The Sea Shepherds and Political Violence," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 1 (2007): 110–133; Ivan D. Steen, "Cleansing the Puritan City: The Reverend Henry Morgan's Antivice Crusade in Boston," *The New England Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (September 1981): 385–411; M.J.D. Roberts, "The Society for the Suppression of Vice and Its Early Critics, 1802–1812," *The Historical Journal* 26, No. 1 (1983): 159–176; Lucy Bland, "'Purifying' the Public World: Feminist Vigilantes in Late Victorian England," *Women's History Review* 1, no. 3 (1992): 397–412; Lars Buur and Steffen Jensen, "Introduction: Vigilantism and the Policing of Everyday Life in South Africa," *African Studies* 62, no. 2 (December 2004):139–152; Daniel M. Goldstein, "'In Our Own Hands': Lynching, Justice, and the Law in Bolivia," *American Ethnologist* 30, no. 1 (February 2003): 22–43; Juli L. Gittinger, "The Rhetoric of Violence, Religion, and Purity in India's Cow Protection Movement," *Journal of Religion and Violence* 5, no. 2 (May 2017): 131–149.

concerned, is exercised by the irresponsibles—the journalists, the poorly-off political lawyers, the would-be politicians and the rabble-rousers, whose ultimate source of power is not the Pound Egyptian but the bottle of petrol and the pistol."[6] The memo was sent on 18 June 1952—and just over a month later, on 23 July 1952, a group of military officers overthrew the Egyptian monarchy. But the official's statement raised more questions than it answered. Journalists and lawyers were not the "usual suspects" for petrol-throwing and pistol-wielding. Nor was the official wrong about the demographic makeup of activists taking to the streets: as shall be seen, those perpetrating attacks were largely urban, middle-class men; many had received modern university educations, and there were many lawyers, police and military personnel, journalists, and engineers among them. What reason, then, did these "responsible" students and professionals cite for taking up "petrol and the pistol"?

To answer this question, the following pages will examine vigilante attacks in the leadup to the 23 July Revolution. The first section of the chapter provides background on the material and structural factors that informed aggressive activism in these years. The central portion of the chapter then explores two landmark assassination cases: the assassination of Amīn ʿUthmān, and the assassination of Maḥmūd al-Nuqrāshī. Finally, the last portion of the chapter investigates the moral rationalizations that surrounded the Cairo Fire of 1952.

As the chapter argues, from 1945 onward, Egyptian activists began to seize the right to police and punish social behavior. In the courtroom and during the Cairo Fire, these

[6] Minute No. 29 by J.W. Wall on "How to Convince the Egyptians it Would Not Pay 'To Have a Row with Britain,'" 18 June 1952, in *Situation in Egypt*, FO 141/1462 [1952], in *BDEEP* Series B, Vol. 4, Part II, 432.

behaviors became the focus of vigorous debates about the meaning of virtuous violence—debates where activists argued that murder was a moral imperative. But while Egyptians quoted many motives for attacks, they often appealed to a common narrative: a three part "myth of necessary transgression." In this myth, an imagined boundary violation threatened society; the government failed in its duty to punish transgression; and it therefore fell to ordinary citizens to mete out altruistic punishment to offenders. Through this narrative, Egyptian activists would thus make the case for murder as a moral imperative—arguing that in certain cases, "murder loses its criminal character, and becomes for men a duty."[7]

Vigilante Aggression: Contributing Structural and Historical Factors

Like most aggressions, the Egyptian street violence of the late 1940s and 1950s was a highly complex behavior, involving a combination of cognitive, behavioral, structural, and historical factors. But a few historical and structural conditions were vital to the production of Egyptian vigilante attacks in the 1940s: resource availability (i.e., weapons and paramilitary training, as a legacy of the interwar years, World War II, and the Palestine War); the operation of the Egyptian law enforcement, judicial, and penal systems; the practice of political bargaining with activist groups (so as to use clubs against political opponents); and activist negotiations of threat identification heuristics.

The first of these contributing factors was training and resource availability. Egyptian clubs and political parties had trained for organized action early in their careers: Miṣr al-Fatāh had formed a paramilitary group called the Green Shirts in 1935, the Muslim Brotherhood created its own Excursion Groups the same year (communism being illegal,

[7] Luṭfī ʿUthmān, *Qaḍīyyat maqtal al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā*, 103.

the EMNL and Iskra did not dare to organize public scout troops or paramilitary groups). Also, from 1936-1937 the Egyptian government introduced military drills at Fūʾād I and al-Azhar University. And while the paramilitary clubs were all officially dissolved in March 1938 following a spate of partisan street violence, the organizational experiences and frameworks for action remained.

Armed conflict in the region, including the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936-1939) World War II (1939-1945) and the Palestine War (1948), further contributed to military and paramilitary mobilization in Egypt. Brynjar Lia, who studied the policy shifts of the Brotherhood in the 1930s in depth (ending his study in the year 1942), for instance, noted that prior to the Arab Revolt, the Ikhwān relied on non-aggressive strategies to convince listeners and change behavior, using emotional appeals, social programs, marketing techniques, and social pressure.[8]

With the start of the Arab Revolt in 1936, this policy began to shift. The Ikhwān used fiery rhetoric to fundraise, describing the British and the Jews as a territorial, economic, and cultural threat to Egypt—while expressly denying they represented a racial threat.[9] As Gudrun Krämer concluded in a study of anti-Semitism during the period, the Brotherhood's rhetoric during the campaign was therefore "a complex blend of arguments and images" that included a selective mélange of Islamic traditions and European anti-Semitic propaganda. This propaganda attacked Egyptian Jews a Zionist

[8] Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), 85, 250–251.

[9] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Ṣināʿat al-mawt," *al-Nadhīr* 18, 26 September 1938; "Radd ḥaḍrah Raʾīs al-Lajnah al-Markazīyyah li-l-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ʿalá khiṭāb min ʿAwnī Bik ʿAbd al-Hādī," *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn al-Usbūʿīyyah* 18, 11 August 1936; ʿAbd al-Fattah Muhammad el-Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928–1947* (London: Tauris, 1998), 16–18.

fifth column, repeated stereotypes about their political and economic machinations, and demanded Jews leave Egypt—but nonetheless repudiated racism.[10]

At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood was experiencing internal and external pressure to act. The organization suffered public controversy and internal schism after it decided not to send volunteers to fight in Palestine; opponents accused Bannā of using the Palestine donations for internal purposes, and around 1937, Miṣr al-Fatāh's Green Shirts started mocking the Muslim Brotherhood Rovers for "not being real paramilitary units, and for being "quietists and not revolutionaries."[11] As a result of the disputes, from 1938–1939 a group of Ikhwān "radicals" took to the streets, engaging in skirmishes with police and shaming unveiled women by throwing mud or ink on their clothes. Bannā responded by expelling them from the club and denouncing their "irresponsible rashness and emotional zealotry." But the move only compounded the organization's troubles; within the year, the Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad faction also seceded from the club.[12]

This competition continued to intensify. In January 1940 (and in January 1941), Aḥmad Ḥusayn went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and in March 1940 he officially changed Young Egypt's name to the Islamic National Party and began advocating pan-Islamic identity. Muslim Brotherhood activist Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm reported that around this time, Young Egypt also began a wave of bar-sacking initiatives, and broadly publicized these activities on campus at Cairo University (where he was a student), denouncing the Brotherhood for its inaction.[13]

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[10] Gudrun Krämer, *The Jews in Modern Egypt, 1914–1952* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), 145–151.

[11] Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, 252.

[12] See Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Fī ṣamīm al-daʿwah," *al-Nadhīr* 34, 1938, 11, as quoted in Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, 85, 250–251.

[13] Maḥmūd Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, Aḥdath ṣanaʿat al-tārīkh: ruʾyah min al-dākhil, Juzʾ 1* (Alexandria: Dār al-Daʿwah, 1994), 124–128.

Understanding that Young Egypt sought to "surpass [the Brotherhood] in the field of action, and action will draw attention to them," and understanding that "this action and this challenge was directed to the Ikhwān in general, and to Brothers at the Faculty of Agriculture specifically," ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm immediately wrote an article for the Brotherhood's magazine *al-Nadhīr* denouncing the bar sackings as foolish and futile (since the perpetrators had ended up in jail, and the government would just rebuild the bars). To prove his point, he cited the story of the Prophet Muḥammad, who had lived in Mecca for over a decade, praying at the Kaʿbah despite the fact it housed idols. It was not until much later that the Prophet took Mecca peacefully, brought everyone to Islam "without war nor blood," and only then smashed the idols, he argued.[14] But as Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad was expanding in the provinces, attracting both disaffected Muslim Brothers and Young Egypt members, "formidable pressure for revolutionary action was building up inside" the Brotherhood (and likely in Young Egypt as well). Thus, in 1940 Bannā moved the organization toward a greater emphasis on "struggle and action," by approving the establishment of a militant "Special Section" [al-ṇizām al-khāṣṣ].[15]

World War II further fueled paramilitary mobilization. As the North Africa Campaign progressed and Egyptians came to expect an Axis invasion, young men trained for war. In 1940, the Egyptian government began mobilizing university students to fight: it redoubled the university military drill program, and required all students to buy khaki uniforms and participate in military training.[16] To keep Young Egypt in line and put a lid

[14] Ibid.
[15] Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, 255–256.
[16] Maḥmūd Ṣabbāgh, *Ḥaqīqat al-tanẓīm al-khāṣṣ wa-dawruhu fī daʿwat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* (Cairo: Dār al-Iʿtiṣām, 1989); Abd al-Fattah Muhammad el-Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question*, 106–109; ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Ramaḍān, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-al-tanẓīm al-sirrī* (Cairo: Maktabat Rūz al-Yūsuf, 1982), 37–53.

on the bar-sacking, the British Residency further agreed to provide financial support to the club. But the move backfired: the deal was exposed in the press, and Young Egypt came close to disintegrating. To "dispel the doubts of his followers," from autumn 1940 to spring 1941, Ḥusayn thus undertook a vehement anti-British campaign (describing the British as "a Jewish people" and declaring that God had sent Hitler and Mussolini to destroy them). As a result, Ḥusayn and other club members were arrested.[17]

In 1943, the Egyptian government also debated whether to expand military drills to secondary schools. The British Residency warned that military training for high school students would endanger public security, but found it difficult to object further to the plan, since Britain had a similar wartime program for its own secondary students. Consequently, by spring 1944, military training drills had become compulsory for Egyptian high school students. Concomitant with these mobilizations, in 1944 King Fārūq formed his own paramilitary group, the Iron Guard, to use against the Wafd.[18]

Institutional failures also stimulated vigilante activism. The police and judiciary were highly politicized and faith in the institutions low, and activists worked to further delegitimize the criminal justice system. Articles in both Muslim Brotherhood and communist journals complained that police officers were in the employ of political parties, and reported mass police roundups and political arrests for "thought crimes." Activists further reported that the police fabricated evidence and obtained confessions by torture (see Figure 8.1).[19]

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[17] "The Young Egypt Party," Memorandum from Colonel G.J. Jenkins of 18 May 1944, Ref. 231/15/144, in *Young Egypt Party*, FO 141/951 [1944].

[18] Dispatch from Giles Bey, 16 January 1944, and "Note: On the Military Training," Letter from Mahmoud Ghazzali, Egyptian Ministry of Interior to Sir Walter Smart, British Embassy, 26 January 1944, in *Students Egyptian: Military Training of*, FO 141/961 [1944].

[19] Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, "al-Būlīs al-siyāsī… marrah ukhrá," *al-Daʿwah* no. 39, 13 Ṣafar 1371, 13 November 1951, 12 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1; "Akhbār," *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* no. 40, 9 July 1949, 2 in



Figure 8.1 – The Passion of the Ikhwān. Illustration from a 1951 Muslim Brotherhood testimony of police torture. The article described a Brother beaten, whipped, and crucified.

(Source: GH. M. A., "Ṣafḥah dāmīyah min al-taʿdhīb al-waḥshī li-l-ikhwān fī ʿahd ḥukūmat al-irhāb," *al-Daʿwah* 2, 29 Rabīʿa al-Thānī 1370/6 February 1951, 16 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1)

But even with such tactics, convictions were never assured. As a British report from 1948 noted, "Various arrests [of communist activists] have been made by the police without any case being successfully prosecuted… with such feeble and ineffective backing from the law, all police activity against communists is stillborn. Not even the communist paper *al-Jamaheer*, which maintains a continuous flood of propaganda, can be closed down."[20] Government attempts to maintain order were further hindered by an ineffective and politicized court and prison system. Court dockets were extremely slow—as the Residency put it, the maintenance of public safety was "thwarted by a cumbrous

IISH ARCH02315/Folder 104; "Akhbār munawwaʿah," *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* no. 42, 15 July 1949, 3 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 104; "Akhbār," *Kifāḥ al-Ummah*, 15 July 1948, 6 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 106.

[20] Dispatch No. 134 from Campbell, DS(E) 20/2/24, in *Development of Communism in Egypt*, FO 371/69250 [1948].

judiciary which, like the mills of God, grinds very slowly but without the proverbially compensating feature of grinding exceedingly small."[21]

Moreover, cases were frequently postponed, and dismissed once a new government came to power and cut a political bargain with the activist group in question. The prison history of Young Egypt activists was a case in point. The club suffered multiple mass roundups and group amnesties: there were mass arrests in 1936 after street battles with the Wafd; a mass prison release of Young Egypt activists in 1938 (by the Saʿdists, in exchange for help in the elections against the Wafd); mass arrests in 1941 (for anti-British agitation); arrests in 1943 and 1944 (for pro-Palace, anti-Wafd demonstrations); a group release in 1944 (by the Wafd, in exchange for help in the elections against the Saʿdists); and so on. Such "revolving door" arrest patterns, as shall be seen, both disenchanted activists with law enforcement and the penal system, and enabled activists like Anwar al-Sādāt to be imprisoned in 1941 for conspiring to provide military aid to the Germans, released, imprisoned again in 1943 for the same crime, escape, be re-arrested in 1946 and tried for murder, be released again in 1948 and allowed to rejoin the army, and ultimately be involved in the underground military organization which overthrew the monarchy in 1952.

Overall, these historical and material changes thus created the conditions in which activists would increasingly choose aggressive tactics to press their claims. In this process, competition between the Muslim Brotherhood, Muḥammad's Youth, and Young Egypt, particularly contributed to the street battles that would rock Egypt in the late 1940s and 1950s. But the clientelistic nature of the Egyptian political system also created

[21] Ibid.

a bargain–scandal–signal–arrest cycle, in which clubs made bargains with Egyptian political parties for favors, were publicly denounced by competitors for these bargains, undertook costly signaling initiatives to prove their moral sincerity and assert moral hegemony, and were arrested for their aggressive behavior—only to be released as part of a political bargain, beginning the process anew. Thus, the moral economy of Egyptian political space was increasingly characterized by competition, costly signals, and moral bargaining.

Patrolling for Hats in Postwar Cairo: Mobilizing Heuristics and Moral Rationalizations

With the end of the war in 1945 came a lifting of wartime press censorship and assembly regulations. The result was a surge of new clubs, vigorous competitions over public space, and a push for British evacuation. In this environment, clubs attempted to bring their platforms to fruition and prove their moral worth through community policing. The communists were perhaps the least successful in these endeavors. While the Workers' Vanguard and the EMNL did instigate factory strikes, picket banks, and call for the sabotaging of production lines,[22] they ran up against fierce opposition and government repression. *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb*, *Majallat al-Ḍamīr*, *Kifāḥ al-Ummah*, and many other publications reported that strikes and union formation attempts were meeting with little success, because striking workers were fired or arrested, and had no savings to feed their families. Moreover, factory owners called on police to break up strikes and arrest unionists, and used larger clubs (like the Muslim Brotherhood) as muscle to intimidate workers and strikebreak.[23] Nevertheless, communist activists continued trying to exert

[22] See for instance *Majallat al-Hadaf*, 6 September 1948 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 110.

[23] "al-Taḍlīl bi-ism al-waḥdah," (anti-Muslim Brotherhood leaflet) (1946), in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 56; "Hujūm al-raʾsmālīyīn ʿalá ujūr ʿummāl," *Majallat al-Ḍamīr* no. 274, 17 October

pressure on social violators, by printing the names of companies that mistreated workers (like the Upper Egypt Textile Company and the Bilah Textile Factory in Sharābīyyah), and publishing the names of individuals working against unions or acting as police informants.[24]

It was therefore the Muslim Brotherhood and Miṣr al-Fatāh who ultimately engaged in the fiercest struggle to seize the right to police and punish. Like communist clubs, some of these community policing efforts involved boycott drives and blacklists, picketing, and public shaming campaigns. For instance, Young Egypt activists undertook a campaign in which they recorded and published the license plate numbers of Egyptian visitors to the British embassy, and printed the names of Egyptians suspected of being British agents. (The campaign resulted in the named collaborators being publicly beaten with shoes).[25]

But the major public policing trends that came to characterize the postwar club scene were vigilante attacks, lynchings, and assassinations. There had already been bombings of Jewish homes and synagogues during the Arab Revolt in Palestine.[26] The first major postwar bout of street violence echoed this earlier escalation over the Palestine issue. It came in a year when communist clubs were booming (as wartime demobilization had

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1945, 4 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 98; "Ḥawla al-intikhābāt," *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* 41, 18 July 1949, 3 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 104; "Mawjat al-faṣl lā tazālu mustamirrah bi-l-Iskandarīyah," *al-Muqāwamah al-Shaʿbīyyah* 8, 9 September 1951, 2; "Muʾāmarah khabīthah li-ḍarb al-ʿummāl wa-l-fallāḥīn," *al-Muqāwamah al-Shaʿbīyyah* 11, 24 October 1951, 2 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 111.

[24] "Akhbār ʿummālīyyah," *Kifāḥ al-Shaʿb* 42, 15 July 1949, 3 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 104; "Fī al-ṣuḥuf," *Kifāḥ al-Ummah*, 6 September 1948, 5 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 106; "Iḥdharū al-khawanah wa al-jawāsīs fa-innahum sūs yankhuru fī al-ṣufūfukum," *Kifāḥ al-Ummah*, 14 September 1948, 4 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 106.

[25] For examples of these campaigns, see: Murtaḍá al-Marāghī, *Gharāʾib min ʿahd Fārūq wa bidāyat al-thawrah al-Miṣrīyyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1976), 116–117; James P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels: Young Egypt, 1933-1952* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), 91–99, 145–146; Anne-Claire Kerbœuf, "The Cairo Fire of 26 January 1952 and the Interpretations of History," in *Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919–1952*, eds. Arthur Goldschmidt et al. (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press), 194–216.

[26] Gudrun Krämer, *The Jews in Modern Egypt,* 147.

seen mass layoffs of workers); in the face of the new competition, the Ikhwān turned its rhetorical efforts toward discrediting the communist trend and reinforcing the cognitive link between Jews, Zionists, and communists. Thus on 2 November 1945 (the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration), the Brotherhood organized a nationalist demonstration denouncing Zionism and linking it to British colonization. Following the demonstration, a group of activists then diverted to the Jewish Quarter, where they attacked shops, synagogues, and Jewish passers-by, killing five. The following day, the attacks spread to European establishments in Cairo and Alexandria, where activists attacked British, French, Greek, and Jewish shops. Some of the worst damage was sustained by the Ashkenazi synagogue in Cairo, which protestors set ablaze.[27] Summarizing the attack, Joel Beinin wrote that "if we believe that there is a logic to the collective action of crowds, the selection of [an Ashkenazi, or European Jewish synagogue] target suggests that the most vulnerable Jews were those most closely identified with Europe."[28]

The next wave of attacks came on the heels of the infamous strikebreaking incident of spring 1946, in which the Brotherhood partnered with Ismāʿīl Ṣidqī Pasha to break up the student demonstrations of February–March 1946. With a wave of disaffiliations from the Brotherhood, the EMNL teaming up with the Wafd to circulate tracts denouncing the

[27] In Cairo, the Jewish-owned department store ʿAdès, two Greek grocery stores, and two cafés were damaged in attacks. In Alexandria, vigilantes further damaged St. Andrew's Church of Scotland and multiple Greek groceries. Note that the list supplied by the British embassy only included damage done to British-owned establishments; more Greek Christian and Egyptian Jewish properties were damaged in both the November 1945 and February–March 1946 rioting. See: Letter No. 903 from British Embassy, Cairo to Foreign Office, London, 29 July 1946, in *Egypt*, FO 950/24 [1946]; Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a Modern Diaspora* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998), 64–65.

[28] Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry*, 64-65.

Brotherhood,[29] in May there was a series of attacks. Bombs detonated in Cairo at the Miami Cinema and the YMCA/YWCA, and damaged the British Ministry of Information, the British Ministry of Works, the All Saints Anglican [Church of England] Cathedral in Cairo, a club for British servicemen in the basement of Saint Joseph's Roman Catholic Church, and a variety of foreign-owned shops. In Alexandria, rioters additionally attacked the Hotel Cecil and Greek shops. The Muslim Brothers were suspected, but they were allied with the government; no arrests were made.[30] In response, Copts called for the establishment of a club called the Christian Brethren with a youth group ("Jesus's Youth"), to take up arms and fight the Muslim Brotherhood and Muḥammad's Youth; in Upper Egypt, a group called "Soldiers of the Christian Army" was formed.[31]

Over the next few months, the attacks intensified. Internal developments in the Brotherhood offer one clue as to why. Still suffering fallout from the Ṣidqī Pasha alliance, the Brotherhood had entered into what it later called a *fitnah* (internal civil war). "The most serious crisis in the movement since its foundation," the *fitnah* resulted in mass disaffiliations, as well as the expulsion of Bannā's brother-in-law ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm ʿAbidīn from the club, and the expulsion of Bannā's best friend and club co-founder Aḥmad al-Sukkarī. (Sukkarī had been advocating an alliance with the Wafd, and seems to have challenged Bannā's leadership). Whatever the nature of the dispute, Sukkarī

[29] See for instance: Muḥammad Ḥasan Aḥmad (pseud. for ʿAbd al-Raḥman ʿAbd al-Nāṣir), *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī al-mīzān* (Cairo: n.p., 1946); "al-Taḍlīl bi-ism al-waḥdah," [1946] in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 56; Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt: Communists and Citizens* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004), 237–239.

[30] Letter No. 903 from the British Embassy, Cairo to the Foreign Office, London, 29 July 1946, in *Egypt*, FO 950/24 [1946]; Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, *al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-ḥurūf*, 184–191.

[31] Vivian Ibrahim, *The Copts of Egypt*: *The Challenges of Modernisation and Identity* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 90–91.

promptly joined the Wafd after his expulsion, and began writing articles against the Brotherhood.[32]

In the midst of crisis, the Ikhwān's credibility and status-enhancing displays grew. On 25 November, the Muslim-Brotherhood further sponsored a "Day of Fire" for burning English language material (a powerful performance of ritual cleansing). December further witnessed a series of violent assaults against British soldiers and suspected Egyptian collaborators, with Muslim Brothers attacking bar patrons and hurling hand grenades at a British club in Zamālik and Egyptian police stations. According to Brotherhood activist Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, they targeted Egyptian police stations for their corruption, periodic roundups of activists, and collaboration with the British.[33] As a result of the December attacks, the Egyptian government declared a state of emergency, deposed Ṣidqī, and brought in a Saʿdist government under a new Prime Minister, Maḥmūd Nuqrāshī Pasha.

Another cluster of attacks came in summer 1947; the Metro Cinema, Cosmo Cinema, and Cinema Metropole were targeted; a group called Rābiṭat al-Shabāb (a combination of Wafdists and Brotherhood activists, perhaps on Sukkarī's initiative) was indicted. Other attacks targeted the Brazilian Embassy in Cairo and King George Hotel in Ismāʿīliyyah. The start of the Palestine War in late 1947 poured fuel on an already tense and competitive situation. In March 1948, Judge Aḥmad al-Khāzindār was assassinated by a Muslim Brother, and Miṣr al-Fatāh continued its targeting of cinemas, Jewish merchants, and department stores. A deadly 20 June bombing of the Karaite neighborhood killed 22

[32] Brynjar Lia, "Autobiography or Fiction? Ḥasan al-Bannā's Memoirs Revisited," *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies* 15 (2015): 202–203.

[33] Letter No. 903 from the British Embassy, Cairo to the Foreign Office, London, 29 July 1946, in *Egypt*, FO 950/24 [1946]; Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, *al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-ḥurūf*, 184–191.

Jewish civilians, and after the Israeli air force bombed a Cairo neighborhood on 15 July (killing Egyptian civilians), activists bombed the Jewish-owned department stores Cicurel and Oreco on Fuʾād Street on 19 July. On 28 July, the ʿAdès department store was bombed, and within weeks other explosions hit Gattegno and Benzion (two other Jewish-owned department stores). A bomb in the Rabbanite Jewish neighborhood on 22 September further resulted in 19 deaths.[34] Finally, state security tracked various threats and assassination attempts made against the King, members of the Court of Appeals, and other Egyptian politicians.[35]

The list of attacks was thus long; but reviewing those institutions and individuals targeted exposed a few patterns. For instance, attacks on entertainment spaces were consistent with the guardianship claims of the Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt; banks and factories (sites where communists claimed guardianship), were far less represented on the list. In line with this observation, when arrests were made, attackers almost always hailed from the Brotherhood or Young Egypt. Moreover, foreigners, ethno-religious minorities (Jews, Greeks, and Copts), and Egyptian "traitors" accused of collaborating with the British represented the most common targets of aggression.

While a full exploration of anti-foreign, anti-Semitic, and anti-Christian aggression in 1940s Egypt is beyond the scope of this study, it important to make a few comments

[34] "From Cairo to the Foreign Office," Dispatch No. 1584 from Sir Ronald Campbell, 18 July 1947, and Dispatch No. 69/7/47 from Sir Ronald Campbell, 24 March 1947 in *Compensation for Damage to British Property during Anti-Jewish Riots*, FO 950/171 [1947]; B.L. Carter, *The Copts in Egyptian Politics, 1918–1952* (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1988), 277; Nancy Reynolds, *A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, The Cairo Fire, and the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 149–151; Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry*, 66–70.

[35] "Themes, Methods and Successes of Hostile Propaganda and Chief Rumors Current," Code J 7299, in *Ikhwan al Hurriya: Monthly return for August 1949*, FO 371/73469 [1949]; Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 60; ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Ramaḍān, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-al-tanẓīm al-sirrī.*

about the behavioral processes and moral discourses that surrounded these attacks. First, attacks on Jews and foreigners were tied up in a series of complex historical conjunctures: the Arab Revolt (and the club campaigns and schisms that surrounded it); World War II and the Holocaust; the Palestine War; and the onset of the Cold War. Cold War tensions, for instance, caused the British to circulate anti-communist propaganda—which the Brotherhood and Young Egypt happily echoed, adding anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist appeals. Defending themselves (and echoing Soviet propaganda), the DMNL then circulated anti-British and anti-American tracts accusing the Brotherhood and Young Egypt of being in the pay of the imperialists (as Aḥmad Ḥusayn had recently visited the United States). Thus, in their own way, communist clubs stoked anti-foreign sentiment.[36] But the result of these conjunctures was that the Brotherhood and Young Egypt both began promoting identity constriction and consolidation: they narrowed who was considered "Egyptian," and consolidated (or heuristically collapsed) ingroup and outgroup networks (conflating categories such as Egyptian–Arab–Muslim, Jewish–communist–Zionist, and European–Christian–white–foreign).

As a behavioral strategy, constriction and consolidation can be used to gain strategic advantages and protect against outside threat: these strategies reduce the permeability of group boundaries, improve group cohesion, and decrease the probability of outside contamination and internal subversion. By increasing group homogeneity, such behaviors also seek to facilitate communication, coordination, and norm compliance.[37] But as

[36] Memorandum from Colonel G.J. Jenkins Cairo, to F.H. Tomlyn, British Embassy, Ref. 176/10/48, of 1 April 1948, in *Arab Societies: Democratic Movement for National Liberation*, FO 141/1272 [1948].

[37] Damon Centola, "The Social Origins of Networks and Diffusion," *American Journal of Sociology* 120, no. 5 (March 2015): 1295–1338; Barry M. Staw et al., "Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (December 1981): 501–524; Linda Plotnick and Murray Turoff, "Mitigating Maladaptive Threat Rigidity in Response to Crisis," in *Information Systems for Emergency Management*, eds. Bartel Van De Walle et al. (New York: Routledge,

reflected by the list of attacks, constriction and consolidation behaviors could also have terrible consequences for minorities.

Egyptian articles published during the Palestine War (1947-1949) and the Canal Struggle (1951) strongly reflected constriction and consolidation strategies, although it is impossible to know whether authors were collapsing categories intentionally (to improve their claims to hegemony) or unintentionally (in response to perceived threat). What was notable about these appeals was that denunciations of foreigners and Jews were printed side-by-side pledges that campaigns were not anti-foreign, racist, or religiously intolerant. An article in *Miṣr al-Fatāh* in November 1947, for instance, responded to the United Nation's Resolution 181 (on the partition of Palestine) by claiming that no one had shown more "abhorrence of religious intolerance" than organization head Aḥmad Ḥusayn, quoting a Qurʾānic verse on universal brotherhood (Qurʾān 49:13). But as the article went on, "We will not fight the Jews on the basis of religion… no! And we will not fight them on the basis of race or bloodline." But, the article explained, Egyptians could not let the Zionists (together with the British, the Russians, and the Americans) turn Jews in Egypt into a "fifth column." The article then called on Egyptian Jews to prove their loyalties or face expulsion. "The issue we have is not an issue of religion or race, but rather the interests of Egypt, which we put above everything— *above Zionism and Judaism and communism*—and all the associations in this world."[38]

In a 1948 article, Christian Marxist Nicholas Ḥaddād similarly praised a letter to the editor of *al-Risālah*, written by a Muslim man in Manṣūra. The Muslim writer had

2015), 65–94; Peter M. Blau and Joseph E. Schwartz, *Crosscutting Social Circles: Testing a Macrostructural Theory of Intergroup Relations* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997).

[38] Emphasis added. "Marrah ukhrá, naḥnu wa yahūd miṣr," *Miṣr al-Fatāh*, 24 November 1947, 7.

defended Jews as the same as Christians and Muslims. As Ḥaddād wrote, he agreed with the man in principle—but he warned that Jews represented a threat to Egyptian companies and capital, and the Zionist state would be used as a base to invade and "devour" Egypt. In another article, Ḥaddād exclaimed "we do not condemn the Jews… we condemn the Zionists"—but this distinction vanished within a matter of paragraphs.[39] Another Ḥaddād piece that appeared on the front page of *al-Risālah* in August 1948 collapsed Zionists and Jews within the first three lines of the article, then further lumped Jews together with the English and Americans (although not without approvingly noting that even some American hotels banned Jews from entering). The article further argued that "This species of living creature [Jews] is not part of the human race… but it is devoid of conscience and emotion, without a heart and feelings, and without honor—a disgusting biological species." As the article concluded, the Arab proverb "Do good to those who harm you" should therefore not be applied to Jews.[40]

In 1949, *al-Risālah* similarly printed an article by ʿAdnān al-Kayyālī, who praised Muslim and Christian universalism and love for all mankind—then proceeded to argue that the Jews were intolerant and "spread ideas and beliefs which poison men's minds, so they become like a network of deadly weapons." This Jewish threat, Kayyālī continued, could only be solved through one of two options: 1) casting out the Jews, cutting them off from urban centers, and confining them to remote areas so they would be unable to "spread their poison to the people," or 2) "taking the young generations away from them"

[39] Niqūla Ḥaddād, "al-Maqāṣid al-ṣihyūnīyyah [The Aims of Zionism]," *Majallat al-Risālah* 772, 19 April 1948, 440–442.

This article was part of a series of Ḥaddād's articles on the Palestine Question which ran from *Majallat al-Risālah* 769 (29 March 1948) to *Majallat al-Risālah* 774 (3 May 1948).

[40] Niqūla Ḥaddād, "Faṣīlah al-makhlūqāt al-khabīthah [The Species of Repulsive Creatures]," *Majallat al-Risālah* 791, 30 August 1948, 971–972.

and raising them in a different religion, "such as Islam, Christianity, Confucianism, Buddhism, or any other faith" until they "are completely absorbed into the [other] nations."[41]

Muslim Brotherhood articles echoed these statements, denouncing "the West and the Jews" and "the Jews and the Zionists" on the one hand, and calling for Christian–Muslim unity and tolerance on the other hand. For instance, an Ikhwān article entitled "My Brother George" in April 1951 (a reprint of an earlier article that had been aimed at rallying Coptic votes for the elections) denounced bigotry as a disease, called for religious tolerance, and quoted scriptures on love and brotherhood from the Qurʾān, sunnah, and Bible—including the scriptures that the closest in affection to Muslims are Christians (Qurʾān 5:83), "do not nurse malice against one another… be fellow-brothers and servants of God" (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Book 45, Hadith 37), "love your enemy" (Matthew 5:44), and "turn the other cheek" (Matthew 5:39).[42] And in the middle of the Canal Struggle later that year, the Ikhwān denounced Britain for being intolerant toward Islam, and added that in contrast, "the Muslim Brotherhood are the people farthest from religious bigotry."[43]

Overall, activists thus juxtaposed appeals to love and religious tolerance with attacks (verbal and physical) against foreigners and Jews. This could be read as evidence of duplicity or hypocrisy. However, it is unlikely that activists self-conceptualized as

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[41] ʿAdnān al-Kayyālī, "al-Mushkilah al-Yahūdīyyah wa al-ʿālam [The Jewish Problem and the World]," *Majallat al-Risālah* 860, 26 December 1949, 1765–1767.

[42] "Akhī Jirjis!" *al-Daʿwah* 10, 26 Jumādá al-Ākhirah 1370/3 April 1951, 12; Ṣāliḥ ʿAshmāwī, "al-Andalus… Filasṭīn… Bākistān," *al-Daʿwah* 26, 27 Shawwāl 1370/31 July 1951, 1; ʿAbd al-Salām al-Rifāʿī, "al-Rishwah," *al-Daʿwah* 26, 27 Shawwāl 1370/31 July 1951, 2; all in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1.

[43] "Miṣrīyūn waṭaniyūn lā aqbāṭ wa muslimūn," *al-Daʿwah* 39, 13 Ṣafar 1371/13 November 1951, 1 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1.

intolerant or hypocritical. On the contrary, activists praised Egyptian tolerance, but insisted they would not tolerate British and Jewish behaviors, ideas, and bigotry (in other words, Egyptians were intolerant of intolerance—*not* intolerant of Jewish and English people). Activists further rationalized attacks by recourse to a hierarchy of moral imperatives. Religious tolerance and brotherhood were indeed important values, but protecting the community was the highest priority. Consequently, tolerance could be shuffled lower down the value hierarchy in the name of self-defense. As Aḥmad Ḥusayn stated in his article on tolerance, "the interests of Egypt… we put above everything."[44]

Notably, such invectives and rationalizations came from the pens of Muslim and Christian, conservative and liberal Egyptians alike. And in making the case for exclusion, authors selectively appealed to a variety of prooftexts: historical events, scientific theories, and Muslim and Christian scripture. Kayyālī, for instance, explicitly acknowledged that Islamic ḥadīth encouraged "a spirit of kindness" toward Jews, but discounted such religious sayings as "fabricated." Ḥaddād, a Christian, similarly recognized that "our Messiah [Christ] said 'Love your enemies'…. and your Noble Qurʾān" commanded Muslims to repay evil with good, so as to make your enemy a devoted friend (Qurʾān 41:34). But, Ḥaddād argued, it was impossible to apply these scriptures to Zionists, who were claiming the right to seize "all that Gentiles possess—Christians, Muslims, and pagans alike."[45] Anti-Semitic articles by other Egyptian authors, such as Sayyid Quṭb and ʿUmar Ḥalīq, demonstrated similar discursive patterns.[46]

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[44] "Marrah ukhrá naḥnu wa yahūd miṣr," *Miṣr al-Fatāh,* 24 November 1947, 7.

[45] ʿAdnān al-Kayyālī, "al-Mushkilah al-Yahūdīyyah wa-l-ʿālam [The Jewish Problem and the World]," *Majallat al-Risālah* no. 860, 26 December 1949, 1765–1767; Niqūla Ḥaddād, "al-Maqāṣid al-ṣihyūnīyyah [The Aims of Zionism]," *Majallat al-Risālah* 772, 19 April 1948, 440–442.

[46] For more examples of these discourses at work, see Sayyid Quṭb, *Maʿrakatunā maʿa al-Yahūd* [*Our Battle with the Jews*] (Cairo: n.p., 1950); Niqūla Ḥaddād, "al-Siyāsah al-Ṣihyūnīyyah al-mālīyyah wa nadhāltuhum," *Majallat al-Risālah* 773, 26 April 1948, 467–470; ʿUmar Ḥalīq, "al-ṣihyūnīyyah hiya al-

Finally, it is important to note that this collapsing of race, religion, and nationality also took a visual form: to identify Jews and other "foreign threats," Egyptians relied on visual heuristics. This was vividly demonstrated by one Muslim author, who found himself suddenly on the wrong end of the social exclusion process. The Muslim man, named Adham, wrote a letter to the editor of *Ākhir Sāʿah* in summer 1948. "It would seem that most people in Egypt are unaware of the fact that among Egyptian Muslims there are some who have white skin," wrote the man. "Every time I board a tram, I see people pointing at me and saying 'Jew, Jew.' I have been beaten more than once because of this. For that reason, I humbly beg that my picture (enclosed) be published with an explanation that I am not Jewish, and that my name is Adham Muṣṭafá Ghālib."[47] Adham's complaint—that he was being misidentified as Jewish, and therefore "other," because of his light skin—was telling. As it suggested, Egyptians were identifying targets based on skin color (with "white" serving as a heuristic for identifying outsiders), and collapsing identificatory schema (like "white," "Jewish," and "foreign").

Hats and headgear were another visual marker used to distinguish Egyptians from non-Egyptians in the midst of the violence. As *Le Monde* warned, following the Israeli air force bombardment of Cairo, Egyptians had started ransacking Jewish and foreign shops and attacking "porteurs de chapeau" (hat-wearers).[48] In line with this, activist campaigns from 1948–1951 called on Egyptians not to wear hats: the Muslim Brotherhood and

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khaṭar al-awwal [Zionism is the First Danger]," *Majallat al-Risālah* 806, 13 December 1948, 1394–1396; and a reprint of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in Muḥammad Khalīfah al-Tūnisī, "al-Khaṭar al-Yahūdī [The Jewish Danger]," [Part 1] *Majallat al-Risālah* 858, 12 December 1949, 1705–1707; [Part 2] *Majallat al-Risālah* 859, 19 December 1949, 1742, and [Part 3] *Majallat al-Risālah* 862, 9 January 1950, 55.

[47] Yaʿakov Meron, "The Expulsion of the Jews from the Arab Countries: The Palestinians' Attitude Toward It and Their Claims," in *The Forgotten Millions: The Modern Jewish Exodus from Arab Lands*, ed. Malka Hillel Shuleqitz (London: Continuum, 2000), 92.

[48] Maurice Ferro, "L'Égypte glissé vers un dangereux fanatisme," *Le Monde*, 13 August 1948.

Young Egypt both ran anti-hat campaigns, and *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* told readers hats were a "distinguishing mark of a non-Muslim," calling it heresy to wear the hat rather than the tarbouche.[49]

Overall then, one of the foremost social patterns that characterized Egyptian attacks of the late 1940s was that even while activists swore adherence to values like confessional unity and tolerance, they engaged in what Tony Judt called "moral bifocalism" or "double-entry moral bookkeeping,"[50] applying a double standard which was justified though appeals to a higher moral imperative. Thus, while repudiating racism and religious prejudice, Egyptians continued to assert that Jews were a homogenous "other"—to the extent of discounting information that contradicted this view. For instance, as evidence of Jewish "betrayal," Miṣr al-Fatāh claimed that "not one Jew in Egypt" was actively opposing Zionism, that Jews had not been participating in the struggle for national independence, and that Jews were selling foreign imports (and thus not participating in the foreign goods boycott). At the same time, Miṣr al-Fatāh acknowledged that Jewish anti-Zionist tracts were circulating—but it disregarded these as fabricated.[51]

Young Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood activists thus did not self-identify as racist, and expressly rejected the charge that their attacks were motivated by xenophobia or bigotry. As a result, a tension remained between the types of attacks groups committed and their concepts of self—between their stated values, their behavior, and their

[49] "Mā yabnī al-ʿulamāʾ fī sanawāt, yahdimuhu al-naʿmāʾ fī Laḥaẓāt," *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* no. 213, 26 Dhū al-Qaʿdah 1368/19 September 1949; "al-Malābis al-ifranjīyah," *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* 227, 10 Shaʿbān 1369/28 May 1950, 11, both in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5.

[50] Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 142–145.

[51] "Marrah ukhrá, naḥnu wa yahūd miṣr," *Miṣr al-Fatāh*, 24 November 1947, 7.

rationalizations for that behavior. As Ḥasan al-Bannā himself acknowledged, some Egyptians were afraid that if the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood were allowed to spread, and if the organization gained power, it would lead "to aggression against foreigners, pillaging of their property, assassinating them, and damaging their interests." But as Bannā reassured listeners, this would not happen, because "true Islam forbids Muslims from aggression and injustice, even in the most extreme cases of anger and hatred."[52]

"For the Sake of the Homeland": The Activist as Judge, Jury, and Executioner

Having located attacks in the historical and discursive environment of Cairo in the late 1940s, it is now worth turning to activist accounts of participation in these attacks. And one trend that emerges reading activist accounts of the period leading up to the Egyptian Revolution is the sheer number of activists who described being involved in assassination attempts and vigilante attacks prior to the 1952 coup. Multiple members of the Free Officers (the military club that would ultimately carry out the coup), for instance, described having considered, attempted, or perpetrated vigilante attacks. For instance, Free Officer ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī remembered paying a visit to palace advisor Aḥmad Muḥammad Ḥassanayn soon after the 1942 February incident, to discuss Prime Minister Naḥḥās. In the conversation, Baghdādī told Ḥassanayn that Naḥḥās was guilty of treason and collusion with the British. Thinking the palace would be amenable to the idea of removing the Prime Minister, Baghdādī then suggested to Ḥassanayn that he and the army officers could assassinate Naḥḥās as a traitor. Ḥasanayn was disturbed

[52] "Kalimah al-faḍīlah al-murshid al-ʿāmm," *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* 73, 7 Dhū al-Qaʿdah 1364/13 October 1945, 5 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 3.5.

by the discussion, and managed to convince Baghdādī that his desire for revenge was best directed toward the British—not the Prime Minister. As a result of the negative feedback, Baghdādī said he backed down from the plan.[53]

Baghdādī was not alone in his desire to purge the community of "traitors" working with the British. Another Free Officer, DMNL member Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn, described his decision to help in a 1946 assassination plot. At the time, Muḥyī al-Dīn was involved with both a communist cell and a Muslim Brotherhood cell—but neither club drove his decision to undertake the assassination attempt. Instead, as Muḥyī al-Dīn explained, his friend, Ḥasan ʿIzzat, pressured him to help with the plot. The target was the senatorial candidate from Būlāq. The young men considered the politician a traitor, because he had negotiated with the British to gain a place for himself in the government. As ʿIzzat told Muḥyī al-Dīn, they had a duty to "get rid of [the collaborator] *as an example* to all traitors." In other words, they hoped the assassination would send a message to others thinking about cooperating with the British. Remembering the assassination plan, Muḥyī al-Dīn said he was torn between conflicting emotions and overlapping moral imperatives: he remembered feeling angry at the man's treachery against the community, but said he hesitated at the idea of assassination, due to religious prohibitions against killing. As he wrote, religious scruples [wāziʿ al-dīnī] repelled him from the idea of murder.[54]

Another interesting account came from Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir himself. In a revolutionary apologetic written a year after the revolution (entitled *The Philosophy of the Revolution*), Nāṣir described the period of the Second World War as inflaming

[53] ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī, *Mudhakkirāt ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī, al-juzʾ al-awwal* (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Miṣrī al-Ḥadīth, 1977), 18–21.

[54] Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam [And Now I Speak]* (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahrām li-l-Tarjamah wa-l-Nashr, Muʾassasat al-Ahrām, 1992), 65–66.

passions, as "we, the whole generation, began to move towards violence… [P]olitical assassinations blazed in my enflamed mind during the period…. I thought of assassinating many whom I regarded as obstacles… I began to expose their crimes and set myself as a judge of their actions…. When I sat with others, our thoughts passed from thinking to planning."[55]

Nāṣir also described feeling a thrill from the planning (it was "like an exciting detective story," he wrote), plus a mix of complex emotions: "patriotism, religion, compassion, faith, suspicion, knowledge and ignorance." Nāṣir thus described a variety of causal factors at work: an impression that "an entire generation" was on his side and behaving similarly, the feelings of excitement and stimulation he received from activism, and a belief he was in a position to expose crimes, judge actions, and punish violators. There was also a social element: the encouragement of peers—or as Nāṣir described, "when I sat with others."[56]

In January 1952, planning moved to action; Nāṣir and a group of his fellow officers decided to assassinate General Ḥusayn Sirrī ʿAmir. Like Baghdādī and Muḥyī al-Dīn, Nāṣir's group targeted the general because they felt he was a traitor. General Sirrī was also known for corruption, having been involved in arms racketeering during the Palestine War. But there were immediate interests involved as well that Nāṣir did not mention in his memoir: only days earlier, the Palace had tried to elect Sirrī head of the Officer's Club. Sirrī had been defeated by the Free Officer's favored candidate, General Muḥammad Najīb, but Sirrī remained a threat.

[55] Gamal Abdel-Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Cairo: Mondiale Press, 1953), 32–33.
[56] Ibid.

As a result, on 8 January 1952, Nāṣir and friends Ḥasan Ibrāḥīm, Ḥasan al-Tuhāmī, and Kamāl al-Dīn Rifaʿt put in motion their assassination plot. Approaching General Sirrī in Cairo, the young men sprayed a hail of bullets in his direction. One round struck a female bystander, and the young men fled in the getaway car.[57] After the shooting, Nāṣir described initially feeling "steeped in my rebellious set of emotions as my car rushed me around." But then, he recalled feeling progressively disconcerted remembering the cries of the injured bystander. That night, he said he felt restless, with "my heart and conscience incessantly boiling, the cries, moans, and wails and the appeals for help still ringing in my ears." He stayed awake all night smoking cigarettes, asking himself "Was I right?... My motives were patriotic." When he discovered the general had survived, he said he felt relieved.[58]

Contamination on Trial: Assassinating Amīn ʿUthmān

Another Free Officer (who like Nāṣir, would later go on to become President of Egypt), succeeded where Nāṣir had failed. In 1941, Anwar al-Sādāt had joined a confederacy of friends, who had formed a club around the charismatic Ḥusayn Tawfīq. Tawfīq was a wealthy and educated young man, with a Turkish mother and a father in the halls of government. Most of the friends were students, studying engineering and other sciences. Ideologically, Sādāt recalled that the group had debated which organization to follow: the Waṭanī Party, the communists, Miṣr al-Fatāh, the Muslim Brotherhood, or the

[57] Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 50.
[58] Gamal Abdel-Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* 34–35.

Wafd. Ultimately, they decided to be ideologically nationalist, without subscribing to any particular party or philosophy.[59]

In terms of moral reasoning, the young men felt they were at war with the British, and that a different ethical code therefore applied than in peacetime. Soon after the start of World War II, the boys thus decided to fight for Egyptian independence and force British evacuation: they began sabotaging and stealing military equipment from British stations in Maʿādī, and sniping at English soldiers. This culminated in the young men compiling a list of targets for assassination: the list included King Fārūq's aides-de-camp, two suspected spies in the Egyptian police barracks, and members of the Wafd government (whom the British had brought to power on 4 February 1942). On 6 December 1945, a section of the group (including Sādāt, Ḥusayn Tawfīq and Wasīm Khālid) thus set out to assassinate Wafd head Muṣṭafá al-Naḥḥās. They waited for Naḥḥās outside the Saʿdī Club, and when he appeared, they threw a grenade at his car. The grenade exploded too late, however, and Naḥḥās survived.[60]

Fatefully, a month after this failed attempt on Naḥḥās, the young men selected a new target from their list: Amīn ʿUthmān, who had been the liaison between Naḥḥās and the British on 4 February. The boys plotted a way to corner ʿUthmān, and on 5 January 1946 they succeeded: a pistol tucked into his jacket, Tawfīq followed ʿUthmān and his aids up the staircase of an office building. Tawfīq then drew the gun, called out "Pasha! Pasha!" to catch ʿUthmān's attention, and fired three shots into ʿUthmān's chest, killing him.

[59] Anwar Sādāt, *al-Baḥth ʿan al-dhāt: qiṣṣat ḥayātī* (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Miṣrī al-Ḥadīth, 1978), 69–75; Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 57–61.
[60] Ibid.

The police rounded up and arrested the members of Tawfīq's club shortly thereafter. And after a long investigation and multiple hearings that stretched through 1946 and 1947, the members of the club were brought to trial in December 1947. Their trial swiftly became a national event. The state brought charges against a long list of 26 co-conspirators: Sādāt was the oldest at 28 years old; the average age of the defendants was 21 years old; and the youngest was 17 years old (and was tried for activities he committed at the age of 15).[61]



Figure 8.2 – "The Biggest Political Trial in Egyptian History." Right center: The stairs where the victim was shot, and a photo of Amīn ʿUthmān. Top left: Pictures of witnesses called to testify, including Muṣṭafá al-Naḥḥās Pasha, ʿAlī Māhir Pasha, and Ḥusayn Sirrī Pasha. Left column: The defendants, including Ḥusayn Tawfīq and Anwar al-Sādāt (top two photographs). Bottom center: A recovered arms cache, including a pistol and a box of grenades.

(Source: Muḥammad Ḥasanayn Haykal, "Akbar qaḍīyyah siyāsīyyah fī tārīkh Miṣr," *Ākhir Sāʿah* 717, 12 July 1948, 12–13.)

[61] Markaz Wathāʾiq wa-Tārīkh Miṣr al-Muʿāṣir, *Ightiyāl Amīn ʿUthmān*, eds. Nabīl ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Sayyid Aḥmad and Yuwāqīm Rizq Murquṣ (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Miṣrīyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1992).

The trial of the group is informative, illustrating how decisions to participate in violent acts intersected with concepts of morality and mythmaking. The trial was also a study in how norms were contested in Egyptian society. Almost the entire group stated in interrogations and in court testimonies that the 4 February incident had been a motive for the assassination. As they claimed, the club's goal had been to punish Egyptian traitors. For instance, Tawfīq alleged that ʿUthmān was guilty of treason, but since the government had been unable to prosecute him, the boys had elected to come to the aid of the nation. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Khamīs similarly said he had been motivated by the 4 February incident; and Midḥat Ḥusayn Fakhrī and Muṣṭafá Kamāl Ḥabīshah both described wanting to rid the country of traitors.[62]

Interrogations and memoirs also revealed that the young men had convinced themselves that the assassination was altruistic, just, and honorable. Sādāt, for example, related that Tawfīq had yelled out "Pasha! Pasha!" to get ʿUthmān to turn around, so that he could shoot the politician in the chest—thereby observing the "rule that forbade the shooting of a man in the back."[63] Different interpretations of Islamic ethics were also raised in the investigation and trial process. Tawfīq told investigators that he believed killing ʿUthmān had been right. However, investigators disagreed, asking "how is murder right, when God has forbidden it?" Tawfīq replied, "God does not forbid killing everyone—there are some souls it is permissible [mubāḥ] to kill, like Amīn ʿUthmān and his kind, who wreak havoc and corruption on earth [fasād fī al-arḍ]. God permitted killing them for the sake of the people [fī sabīl al-shaʿb]." The interrogator then asked Tawfīq what gave him the authority to "indict a person, try him, judge him, and execute the

[62] Markaz Wathāʾiq, *Ightiyāl Amīn ʿUthmān*, 249–254.
[63] Anwar Sādāt, *al-Baḥth ʿan al-dhāt*, 69–75; Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 57–61.

judgment upon him, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself?" Tawfīq only replied that he had heard ʿUthmān's statements, and knew what the politician thought.[64]

The exchange was instructive: investigators appealed to due process and Islamic laws inhibiting murder, while Tawfīq bypassed these inhibitors by insisting his murder was altruistic (for the sake of the people). By stating that it was permissible to kill those who spread "fasād fī al-arḍ," Tawfīq also referenced a scripture fragment from Qurʾān 5:32: "Because of that [Cain's murder of Abel], We decreed upon the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul—unless for a soul or for corruption on earth [fasād fī al-arḍ]—it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one [life]—it is as if he had saved mankind entirely." Of course, the scripture was vague (and involved commandments given to the Israelites); its applicability was thus contested by the interrogating officer. The interrogator also challenged Tawfīq's authority to act as act as judge, jury, and executioner.

When the case went to court, however, it was not only the boys and their behaviors that were put on trial—the case also put the deceased victim, Amīn ʿUthmān, on trial. The defense argued that ʿUthmān had not been truly Egyptian, but in every regard English, having married an English woman, received his education in England, and aided the British. The defense's most damning evidence against ʿUthmān was his comments of 7 February 1940, which were raised repeatedly throughout the proceedings. In a speech to Victoria College graduates in the United Kingdom, ʿUthmān had compared the British-Egyptian alliance to three types of marriages: first a forced marriage (by British invasion), which had grown into a marriage of mind (as Egyptians received English

[64] Markaz Wathāʾiq, *Ightiyāl Amīn ʿUthmān*, 155–159.

educations), and eventually a marriage of love. Catching himself, ʿUthmān had reflected in the speech:

> "Perhaps some of us will be angered because I compared Egypt to a woman and England to a man, but I like this metaphor, because the women always takes from the man the best he has. And we are the broker of love. We say to the man [England], 'Tell the [woman Egypt] that you love her,' and we say to the English, we are your allies…. But I will go even further than this, and say that… our marriage with them is a Catholic marriage—which has no divorce! …And true, you [the British] have made mistakes. But only God doesn't make mistakes."[65]

When ʿUthmān's statements were reported in *al-Ahrām* the following day, there were charges of treachery and moral outrage on multiple levels. Through his analogy, ʿUthmān had implied there would be no Egyptian independence or "divorce" from Britain; this flew in the face of the growing expulsionist movement. The religious intermarriage analogy also raised the ire of Egyptians. Intermarriage challenged long-standing miscegenation rules, which kept Egypt's Copt, Muslim, and Jewish communities distinct from one another. Viewed from an Egyptian perspective, ʿUthmān's intermarriage analogy thus challenge the established order, and expressed support for continued British political dominance and cultural mastery.

Activist responses to the Catholic marriage speech reflected these judgments. Marxist activist Aḥmad Ṣādiq Saʿd denounced the comments, and rejected the idea that Egypt (as the wife in the analogy) should have to sacrifice its sovereignty to England.[66] Sādāt went a step further, later arguing that "[ʿUthmān's] declaration was tantamount to a self-imposed death sentence…[and] on 6 January 1946, the sentence was carried out."[67] In describing the assassination, Sādāt thus fully transferred blame for the murder on to

[65] *al-Ahrām*, 8 February 1940, as quoted in Markaz Wathāʾiq, *Ightiyāl Amīn ʿUthmān*, 107–110.
[66] Aḥmad Ṣādiq Saʿd, "Wa ayna qaḍiyyah istiqlālna?" *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* no. 14, 6 December 1945.
[67] Anwar Sādāt, *al-Baḥth ʿan al-dhāt*, 69–75; Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 57–61.

ʿUthmān (and used passive voice to efface the agents of the murder: the killing "had been carried out"). From Sādāt's perspective, the boys had not judged him—ʿUthmān had imposed a death sentence upon himself. Put differently, the assassins (and the defense team) suggested that through his words and actions ʿUthmān had expelled himself from Egyptian society, making the vigilante execution merely a physical consummation of the social excommunication process.

The prosecution made a different moral argument. Prosecutor Ḥasan Anwar Ḥabīb opened by acknowledging the abuse of 4 February and barbarity of the English (an indication the prosecution was already on the defensive). However, he pointed out that the struggle against the British required unity rather than factionalism, and appealed to the Qurʾān as a "heavenly constitution" in which God had forbade killing and commanded obedience to the ruler. With disgust, the prosecution argued the vigilantes were simply a "gang of arrogant men: their intentions were wicked, their eyes were blinded, and Satan seduced them."[68] This moral deviance had led them to commit a twofold crime: they had committed murder, and perpetrated a crime against freedom of opinion. In this way, the prosecution argued that the killers had deviated from the religion, transgressed acceptable social behavior, and should themselves be removed from society.

To a large extent, the young men prevailed in the debate, convincing the public that the killing had been just. Witnesses gave extensive testimony on the activities of ʿUthmān, and much of the trial became about the events of 4 February rather than the conspiracy to commit murder. It was also clear that some of witnesses called to testify

[68] Markaz Wathāʾiq, *Ightiyāl Amīn ʿUthmān*, 206–209.

were themselves on trial: many prominent Egyptian politicians took the stand, including ʿAlī Māhir, Ḥusayn Sirrī, and Muṣṭafá al-Naḥḥās himself; these were asked to explain or justify the events of 4 February. The trial was thus highly politicized; Fatḥī Raḍwān—ex-Young Egypt leader and now a leader of the opposition in parliament—served as a lawyer for defense, and ex-Wafd leader and Coptic politician Makram ʿUbayd testified for the defense (despite the fact he had been on the group's list of assassination targets). The trial was thus used as a platform for denouncing the Wafd. Cecil Campbell, head of the British Chamber of Commerce in Cairo, was so disgusted with the proceedings, he wrote to his attorney that the so-called "Amin Osman Murder 'Trial'… [represents] abusive proceedings much resented by [the] British Community."[69]

Later, Tawfīq admitted that 4 February was not the main reason for the attack: as he explained, they had used the memory of the collective trauma as social capital in their defense case, to gain sympathy from the court. Tawfīq said that in truth, the group had a long list of grievances against the Wafd, including Amin ʿUthmān's role in negotiations with the British, and the fact he had collected money from Egyptians to rebuild English villages after the 1942 Battle of El Alamein. The defense, however, turned the case into a referendum on the Wafd and Egyptian nationalism: as defense lawyer Basṭā Shukrī dramatically declared in court, "jihād in our country is a considered a crime, and killing for the sake of the homeland [fī sabīl al-waṭan] is put on the same level as murder."[70] Defense attorney Aḥmad Rushdī similarly pleaded with the court not to kill the spirit of the national independence struggle.

[69] Sir Cecil Cambell to Anthony Dove, 3 May 1948 in *British Community Council*, FO 141/1278 [1948].

[70] Markaz Wathāʾiq, *Ightiyāl Amīn ʿUthmān*, 235–239.

In the end, the verdict handed down by the judge evidenced their success in the battle to shape a narrative of events. On 24 July 1948, the court handed down reduced sentences for the young men. Most received fines or prison terms ranging from one month to three years; Sādāt and a number of other members of the group were acquitted. As mitigating circumstances (clemency conditions), the verdict mentioned the events of 4 February, ʿUthmān's speech comparing the 1936 Treaty to a Catholic marriage, and ʿUthmān's relationship with the British. Only Tawfīq himself was handed a ten-year sentence—in absentia, since a month earlier, he had escaped his armed guard during a doctor's visit and fled the country.[71]

The Muslim Brotherhood on Trial: Assassinating Prime Minister Maḥmūd al-Nuqrāshī

Even as the ʿUthmān assassination trial was winding to a close, events were underway that would soon produce another major scandal. As seen, the summer of 1948 was chaotic in Cairo, where tensions were running high as a result of the Palestine War. The government imposed martial law in May 1948, but from June to September the city was the site of demonstrations, vigilante attacks, and bombings, including the 20 June bombing of the Karaite neighborhood, the 15 July air strike by the Israeli military, the 19 July bombing of the Jewish-owned department stores Cicurel and Oreco, and the 28 July bombing of the department store ʿAdès.[72]

Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, suspected in many of the attacks, had already started paramilitary training and arms acquisitions. Concerned, the government of

[71] Ibid., 253–259.

[72] "From Cairo to the Foreign Office," Dispatch No. 1584 from Sir Ronald Campbell, 18 July 1947, and Dispatch No. 69/7/47 from Sir Ronald Campbell, 24 March 1947 in *Compensation for Damage to British Property during Anti-Jewish Riots*, FO 950/171 [1947]; B.L. Carter, *The Copts in Egyptian Politics*, 277; Nancy Reynolds, *A City Consumed*, 149–151; Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry*, 66–70.

Saʿdist Prime Minister Maḥmūd al-Nuqrāshī attempted to block the Muslim Brotherhood's paramilitary mobilization, uncovering and seizing a Brotherhood arms cache in the Muqaṭṭam hills in January 1948, and confiscating another arms store at the estate of Brotherhood paramilitary commander Shaykh Muḥammad Farghalī in October. In November 1948, the police further arrested a group of Ikhwān members, who were found with incriminating documents concerning paramilitary activities and bombings in Cairo; their subsequent trial would be known as the "Jeep Case."

When Cairo police commander Salīm Zakī was killed by a bomb on 4 December while trying to put down university demonstrations, the Nuqrāshī government decided to take more drastic measures. Suspecting the Brotherhood, the Prime Minister issued an order dissolving the Ikhwān, seizing its assets, suspending its activities, and ordering that any Brotherhood members violating the order be expelled from government offices and public universities. Summarizing the reasons for the order, Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Interior ʿAbd al-Raḥman ʿAmmār justified the dissolution on the grounds that the Brotherhood's stated aims were "religious and social," when in fact "it had a definite political tendency." The statement went on to say that the Society "provoked disorder," was set on "gaining power and overthrowing the established regime," held "aspirations contrary to the constitution…. [and] aimed at revolutionizing political and social principles by force and terrorism." He concluded that the organization was therefore a "danger to public security."[73] The order thus defined the social threat posed by the Brotherhood in the following terms: upsetting public order, endangering public security,

[73] "Summary of a Report Submitted by Abdel Rahman Ammar Bey, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of the Interior, to the Prime Minister, which Led to the Publication of Military Proclamation No. 63 Dissolving the Ikhwan al Muslimin," in *Arab Societies: Ikhwan el Muslimin*, FO 141/1271 [1948].

and transgressing the division of labor between the political and religious fields. (The Brotherhood, for their part, sent a lawyer to the British, to complain that the dissolution order was unjust, because it was the Saʿdist government which had given them the weapons in the first place. On the memorandum about the lawyer's visit, a British official scribbled "I'm not actually surprised… This is almost certainly why 'Shaykh Ḥasan' [al-Bannā] has not been arrested").[74]

The dissolution would not be the final word in the showdown between the Brotherhood and the state, however. Twenty days after the ruling, on 28 December 1948, 21-year-old Brotherhood member and veterinary student ʿAbd al-Majīd Ḥasan entered the Ministry of Interior dressed in an officer's uniform. As Prime Minister Nuqrāshī headed for the elevator, Ḥasan approached him from behind. Pulling out a pistol, he then shot the Prime Minister in the back. Just over two months later, an unknown assailant (suspected to have been hired by the Saʿdists) responded: a little past 8 o'clock on the evening of 12 February 1949, two men approached Muslim Brotherhood guide Ḥasan al-Bannā on the street and shot him. Bannā made it to the hospital, where he died of his wounds.[75]

By now, the structural factors and moral imaginaries that made this series of events possible should be evident. As Nuqrāshī's killer (ʿAbd al-Majīd Ḥasan) openly stated in his confession to the police, "Yes, I killed him… because he is a traitor to the homeland." Expanding on his motives, the young man added that Nuqrāshī had betrayed Egypt

[74] Memorandum from T.C. Ravensdale (Assistant Oriental Secretary) to Tomlinson (SIS Officer) at the British Embassy, Cairo, 22 December 1948 [Marginalia dated 23 December 1948], Ref. No. 172/77/49 in *Arab Societies: Ikhwan el Muslimin*, FO 141/1271 [1948].

[75] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 63–67; Luṭfī ʿUthmān, *Qaḍīyyat maqtal al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā*, 15–16.

through his Sudan policy, his behavior during the Palestine War, and his attack on Islam in dissolving the Brotherhood. Ḥasan added that he was also upset because he had been expelled from the veterinary faculty, since Nuqrāshī had ordered universities to dismiss Brotherhood members from their programs of study.[76]

Ḥasan al-Bannā's killers were not tried until after the 1952 Revolution. The hearings for the Nuqrāshī assassination, however, commenced in August 1949. Prosecutors charged some fifteen Muslim Brothers for the crime, including the shooter, ʿAbd al-Majīd Ḥasan (age 20), four co-conspirators involved in planning the murder (all aged 25-26 years old), a Brotherhood shaykh accused of sanctioning the crime (age 35), and other Ikhwān associates. But unlike the ʿUthmān assassination, this time it was not the victim on trial—it was the Muslim Brotherhood itself.

In building their case against the Brotherhood, government prosecutors relied heavily on appeals to religion and morality. Attorney General Muḥammad ʿAzmī's opening statement approached the form of a sermon: his opening line began "In this holy *miḥrāb* [prayer niche] is the *miḥrāb* of justice and punishment, which God granted life to his servants, as revealed in His Perfect Book. We stand, our heads humbly lowered in homage to the memory of a man [Prime Minister Nuqrāshī] who lived a *mujāhid* [jihadist] and died a *shahīd* [martyr] in the path of his country [fī sabīl bialādihi] and in the path of every ideal among the supreme ideals—for courage, sacrifice, and selflessness." ʿAzmī continued: "God and his Messenger scorn taking His religion as an excuse for perpetrating grave sins, shedding blood, and spreading corruption on Earth [fasād fī al-arḍ]."[77]

[76] Luṭfī ʿUthmān, *Qaḍīyyat maqtal al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā*, 15–16.
[77] Ibid., 87–89.

To support the case of the prosecution, ʿAzmī cited passages from the Qurʾān and ḥadīth. For instance, the Attorney General quoted Qurʾān 4:93, declaring that hell awaits he who intentionally kills a believer, and Qurʾān 6:123-124, concerning criminals who deceive themselves and commit crimes before God.[78] He further condemned the Brothers for twisting scripture: "They distort the word from its contexts, and invent lies against God to justify their crimes." Then addressing the defendants, he told them "You are not Egypt's judges, you are her misery." As he proclaimed, "I cherish the values of religion, and they [the Brotherhood] are its greatest enemies."[79]

As the trial progressed, the prosecution frequently returned to the claim that the Brotherhood was a depraved terrorist organization, spreading corruption, plotting the overthrow of the established order, and using religion to deceive its followers. Purity and contamination threats were also a recurring theme. The Attorney General, for example, contrasted the "pure spirit" of Nuqrāshī with the "evil men" of the Brotherhood. Disgust was also expressed in many of the prosecution's statements. Throughout the proceedings, for instance, the prosecutors accused the Ikhwān of contaminating the faith by "mixing religion and crime." The Attorney General further called the Brotherhood a society "seduced by Satan," and a "league of sacrilege" [ʿaṣbah min al-fijār] guilty of hypocrisy, and guilty of slandering God and His Messenger.[80]

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[78] Qurʾān 6:123–124 (Sūrat al-anʿām) – "And thus We have placed within every city the greatest of its criminals to conspire therein. But they conspire not except against themselves, and they perceive [it] not. And when a sign comes to them, they say, 'Never will we believe until we are given like that which was given to the messengers of God.' God is most knowing of where He places His message. There will afflict those who committed crimes debasement before God and severe punishment for what they used to conspire." (Sahih International)

[79] Luṭfī ʿUthmān, *Qaḍīyyat maqtal al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā*, 87–89.

[80] Ibid., 78–89.

ʿAzmī further accused the Brotherhood of deviance, overstepping social and religious boundaries, and spreading disorder, calling the organization a danger not only to Egypt, but to the entire East. "Muslims have been afflicted by the likes of those who used God's religion as a cover to disguise their schemes and deceive their victims. They teach an evil example to the religion and her people, and sow seeds of *fitnah* [discord, civil strife] and error on earth, from which Muslims do not cease suffering its evil." As deviant teachers, Shaykh Sayyid Sābiq and other Brotherhood leaders were further condemned for legitimizing the assassination with sermons, newspaper articles, and religious opinions. One prosecution attorney, for instance, argued that Shaykh Sābiq had taught that "crime and chaos are jihād in the path of God"—but as the attorney pointed out, "assassination is *not* one of the types of jihād."[81]

In responding to these accusations, the defense attorneys took a variety of approaches. Shaykh Sābiq's lawyer denied his client's involvement entirely, and argued that Ḥasan's decision to assassinate the Prime Minister was inspired by Ḥasan al-Bannā's infamous article "The Art of Death," not by Shaykh Sābiq's comments. Other attorneys described their clients as mentally ill; still others repudiated those who had plotted the assassination as having gone astray from the Brotherhood's message, which they claimed was a purely religious calling with no political designs. Notably, Aḥmad Ḥusayn (leader of Miṣr al-Fatāh) served as defense counsel for ten of the fifteen defendants. He maintained that the Brotherhood (and Miṣr al-Fatāh as well) hated chaos. The Ikhwān, he said, was not a secret society; this violence had been perpetrated by extremists who deviated from the organization's values. Ḥusayn further portrayed most of his clients as victims who had

[81] Ibid., 87–89, 117–119.

been inflamed by the "corrupt conditions" of the British occupation. Ḥusayn also appealed to religion in his statements, asking the court to rise above hatred and anger, and forego calls for revenge and the death penalty, as the "Egyptian judiciary… represents heavenly justice."[82]

As the focus of the proceedings, the shooter Ḥasan was the center of a debate concerning culpability, authority, and religious deviance. The prosecution described Ḥasan as a depraved and evil man, who had deviated from and corrupted the faith. Ḥasan's defense lawyer (Aḥmad al-Sādah), on the other hand, described his client as a victim. On the stand, Ḥasan gave extensive testimony on how, as a high school student, he had been recruited into the Brotherhood by members of his local mosque. Ḥasan then described how he had joined the family system, and how the family members came to know everything about one another. He further explained how a boy from school had invited him to join the elite and militant "Special Section;" as Ḥasan related, "its system is exactly like the family system." In the Special Section, Ḥasan said he was introduced to leaders of the Ikhwān in contact with Bannā: "This had a great effect on me. I firmly believed it impossible that these individuals—people of great status—who are working for Islam, will order me at some point to do something incompatible with Islam."[83]

In closing statements, Ḥasan's lawyer continued to paint a picture of a sincere and deeply religious boy, who had struggled with mental illness following the death of his father. Drafted into the Brotherhood at the age of 15, Ḥasan had been led astray by teachers he thought were respectable, Sādah argued. The Ikhwān had exploited Ḥasan's

[82] Ḥusayn also somewhat duplicitously argued that resistance by the tongue was activists' responsibility—direct action (such as attacks on bars) was only for rulers, lest society devolve into chaos. Luṭfī ʿUthmān, *Qaḍīyyat maqtal al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā*, 121–139.

[83] Ibid., 26–37.

moral traits—his piety, respect for authority figures, and inclination toward obedience—and guided him to religious fanaticism and blind obedience. (Ḥasan had been the youngest of the co-conspirators, and in interrogations had described feeling social pressure not to fail in his mission.) In short, Ḥasan's attorney argued the 20-year-old had merely been a patriot following orders, who had fallen victim to "demagoguery" and coercion, until he was deprived of any willpower. Sādah then closed with a series of appeasement signals: he pleaded for the court's leniency, and explained that his client had repented, and felt remorse for his crime.

In October 1949, the verdicts were finally handed down—and the result could not have been more dissimilar from the ʿUthmān case. Some ten defendants were acquitted for lack of evidence (including Shaykh Sayyid Sābiq al-Tuhāmī); however, four of Ḥasan's co-conspirators were sentenced to life in prison. The court also censured the dissolved Muslim Brotherhood for undertaking secret activities with the aim of establishing a "*régime totalitaire*." Nuqrāshī's murder had not been an isolated incident perpetrated by rogue elements, the court declared, but part of a concerted program of terror with political designs.

As for the shooter, ʿAbd al-Majīd Ḥasan, the state did not accept his story of moral manipulation, nor did it accept his appeals to authority and agentic state. In an opinion handed down with the judge's ruling, the court commented that Ḥasan was a young man of majority, who had been fully aware of his actions and knew murder was forbidden by Islam. To reinforce its verdict, the court followed the customary practice from Ottoman *kanun* of "sending Ḥasan's papers to the Mufti."[84] In turn, the Egyptian Grand Mufti,

[84] Having one's papers "sent to the Mufti" is a euphemism in Egypt for prescribing the death penalty. It was a customary part of Ottoman *kanun* law, which involved declaring the perpetrator a *sai bil' fesad*

Ḥasanayn Muḥammad Makhlūf, reviewed the papers, and provided a fatwa [legal opinion] stating that Prime Minister Nuqrāshī's killing had been a violation of Islamic law. Back in the courtroom, the judge pronounced the court's verdict: in murdering Nuqrāshī, Ḥasan had claimed a right that belonged solely to the law; he had committed an act forbidden by God. Then, the judge sentenced Ḥasan to death.[85]

A few points of comparison between the Nuqrāshī assassination case and the ʿUthmān case are worth highlighting. First, throughout most of the proceedings, Nuqrāshī's character remained unimpeachable. This was a departure from the ʿUthmān case, in which both the morality and communal loyalties of the victim had been questioned. Second, moral and religious appeals played a prominent role in both trials, being used by both prosecutors and defenders in building their cases. The Nuqrāshī assassination trial was particularly notable for the state's efforts to repudiate the Brotherhood's claims to religious authority by quoting the Qurʾān, citing stories from Islamic history, and using religious idioms and discourses in building its case. The state's assertion of religious authority was also seen in the Attorney General's attempt to sanctify (or collapse) judicial and religious space, describing the court as a holy *miḥrāb* pointing the way to justice and punishment. At the same time, the court tipped its hat to traditional sources of religious authority, following the customary practice of asking the Mufti to supply a religious opinion sanctioning the death penalty. This also challenged

[fomenter of evil/corruption]. The Mufti would sign off on the execution with a fatwa [fetva]; a clause in the fatwa stipulated that the authority for the order was in the hands of the sovereign. This was an acknowledgement that sovereignty continued to reside with sultan, not the Mufti himself. See: Haim Gerber, *State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 97–100. For other instances of this practice in Egypt, see Malak Badrawi, *Political Violence in Egypt 1910–1925* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

[85] Luṭfī ʿUthmān, *Qaḍīyyat maqtal al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā*, 208–227.

the Brotherhood's claim to religious authority, and represented a performance of the division of labor and cooperative relationship between religious institutions and the state. As a whole, these performances asserted a simple argument: the right to judge and punish belonged solely to the state (with its religious functionary, the Grand Mufti, providing a ceremonial opinion in the process).

Despite the state's victory in the case, there was an epilogue to the Nuqrāshī assassination trial. Starting after the end of the Nuqrāshī case, the Jeep Case proceedings against the Muslim Brotherhood stretched from December 1950 to February 1951, and involved a list of thirty-two defendants charged with murder, bombings, plotting to overthrow the established order, criminal endangerment, theft and extortion, radio operating without a license, sabotage to public utilities, attacks on police and government facilities, and a host of other crimes. Among the defendants was a familiar face: Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, the shy teenager whose waylaid trip to the cinema had by chance placed him in the orbit of the Brotherhood. Finding close friends in his family group, Kamāl had remained with the club, risen through the ranks of the organization, and received an elite invitation to join the Ikhwān's militant "Special Section."[86]

Now Aḥmad and his brothers from the Special Section stood accused of membership in a secret terrorist organization and plotting to rob the National Bank. Like the Nuqrāshī trial, the case involved a debate over whether the Brothers were attempting to overthrow the regime, or legitimately defending the nation from British occupation and Zionist

[86] Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, *al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-ḥurūf: al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-al-niẓām al-khāṣṣ* (Cairo: al-Zahrā' lil-I'lām al-'Arabī, Qism al-Nashr, 1989).

attack. Religious deviance also returned as a trope in the proceedings, with the Ikhwān being accused of preaching that murder was a duty.[87]

This time, however, politics derailed the government's attempt to assert dominion over the right to judge and punish. With the start of election campaigning in summer 1949, the Wafd saw disenfranchised Brotherhood members as a route back to power. As a result, the Wafd began advocating that the Saʿdist government be investigated for its involvement in Bannā's assassination. Moreover, when the Wafd emerged victorious in elections and returned to power in January 1950, the Wafd's lawyers joined the defense team for the Muslim Brothers charged in the Jeep Case.[88]

As a result of these political maneuvers, the Jeep Case judgment in March 1951 represented an enormous departure from the Nuqrāshī assassination ruling. The court dismissed the charges of attempting to overthrow the regime, and instead convicted most of the Brotherhood members (including Aḥmad) on lesser charges, such as public endangerment. In addition, the court registered a note of clemency conditions and handed down a reduced sentence, noting that the defendants deserved consideration "since they had lofty purposes, which aimed first to achieve national goals." The clemency note added that the Muslim Brotherhood had done a service to Egyptian society by "raising morale," teaching the ideals of Islam, designing a program to purify souls, and stirring emotions and souls from the submissiveness of an occupied people. True, the ruling

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[87] Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Fattāh and ʿAbd al-Karīm Manṣūr eds., *Qaḍīyyat sayyārat al-Jīb, al-ḥaythīyyāt wa naṣṣ al-ḥukm* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1951), 13–23, 46–77; Luṭfī ʿUthmān, *Qaḍīyat maqtal al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Tawakkul, 1950), 103.

Although other charges were brought against the co-conspirators, the main charge was the violation of § 87 of the Egyptian Penal Code, "conspir[ing] to overturn by force the state's constitution, form of government, or system of monarchial succession." Al-Saʿīd Muṣṭafā al-Saʿīd, *Qānūn al-ʿuqūbāt al-Miṣrī,* 98.

[88] Barbara Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 18–19.

explained, the Brothers arrested had "deviated from the right path" in pursuing violence. But it was the court's duty to teach the men a lesson, and set them again on the right path.[89] In short, the ruling argued this was not a case for excommunication, but rehabilitation. Thus, with the help of the Wafd, the "revolving door" of the Egyptian court system turned once more.

"Fire… Blood": From the Canal Struggle to the Cairo Fire

> "They desecrated and defiled the prayer niches /
> And the sanctity of justice in the men of the judiciary /
> And they seized funds, robbing and plundering….
> These bastards betrayed the charters.
> In a world of crime, there is no sin."[90]
> — ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Nashshār, "The Guerrilla," 10 December 1951

The Jeep Case judgment was handed down in spring 1951. By that fall, an activist-driven armed struggle to expel the British from the Suez Canal Zone had commenced. Called "the Liberation Struggle" by the Egyptians and the "Battle of the Canal Zone" and "Suez Emergency" by the British, the popular guerrilla movement lasted from October 1951 to January 1952. Participants hailed from a variety of organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafdist Vanguard, Miṣr al-Fatāh, and the DMNL. The volunteers further came from different professional backgrounds: some were students, others lawyers, tradesmen, auxiliary policemen, army officers, and workers. Together, these *fidāʾiyīn* [commandos, lit: self-sacrificers] launched anti-British paramilitary attacks, with the aim of forcing the British evacuation of the Canal Zone.

[89] Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Fattāh and ʿAbd al-Karīm Manṣūr eds., *Qaḍīyyat sayyārat al-Jīb*, 91–93.
[90] ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Nashshār "al-Fidāʾī," *Majallat al-Risālah* 962, 10 December 1951, 1402.

The crisis had been in the making since 1946, when British Prime Minister Clement Attlee had responded to Cairo demonstrations by promising the evacuation of Suez by September 1949. However, the Canal proved difficult to quit. At the time, the Suez Canal Zone was the largest military base in the world, hosting some 50,000–90,000 troops on any given year.[91] But world events suggested Britain was on her way out: she relinquished her Transjordan mandate in 1946, India and Pakistan in 1947, and Palestine in 1948. The event that rocked Egypt, however, came in March 1951: the Iranian parliament passed legislation nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and after an extended diplomatic crisis, on 3 October 1951 the British evacuated the oil complex at Abadan—a retreat the Associated Press billed as the "1951 Dunkerque" the following day.[92]

In the days after the Abadan evacuation, the Egyptian press buzzed with calls for the evacuation of Suez, suggesting that "Egypt must draw a lesson from Iran's firm stand, since it had been proved that the British could not stand up to force."[93] Looking to turn the Abadan incident into political momentum, on 8 October, Prime Minister Naḥḥās announced Egypt's unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in a speech to the nation.

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[91] The British reported their garrison strength as follows:
Spring 1947 – 90,000
Fall 1948 – 47,000
Fall 1951 – 64,000
Spring 1952 – 80,000
Michael T. Thornhill, *Road to Suez: The Battle of the Canal Zone* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2006), 5, 17, 46, 70.

[92] "British Retreat from Abadan is 1951 Dunkerque," *Chicago Tribune*, 4 October 1951, 9.

[93] Dispatch No. 347 from Sir R. Stevenson to Mr. Morrison, 16 October 1951, in *Events Leading up to the Egyptian Government's Abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and 1899 Condominium Agreement*, FO 371/90144 [1951], in *BDEEP* Series B, Volume 4, Part II, 230–234.

The treaty abrogation of 8 October had a colossal effect on nationalist activism. Around 11 October, the Muslim Brotherhood circulated a declaration announcing a "state of war" with the English, and an independent group of al-Azhar shaykhs circulated a religious opinion that "The Muslim religion forbids collaboration with the British in any form whatsoever…. the person who knowingly undertakes such an action is a renegade and a traitor to his homeland, and is therefore liable to the death penalty." The statement was broadly circulated—although the rector of al-Azhar declined to endorse it.[94]

The first major demonstration coalesced on the morning of 16 October. Cairo area university students took trains, busses, and cars, and poured in to Ismāʿīlīyyah. Converging in the square near the train station, at 8 o'clock the students began demonstrating, throwing rocks, and setting military cars and busses ablaze. Next, the students surrounded the base commissary (NAAFI), and set it on fire. By 12 o'clock noon, the British military had restored control, but one Egyptian policeman had been killed, and a handful of Egyptians wounded.[95] British officials, assessing the events, warned that such incidents were likely to continue. "We must certainly expect acts of terrorism. Even [Egyptian] Cabinet Ministers are inciting the people to murder."[96]

By the end of October, activists had arranged mass strikes and walkouts of Egyptian workers in the Canal Zone; workers who did not join the strike were encouraged to reconsider by groups of volunteers enforcing social cooperation—including Muslim

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[94] Anne-Claire de Gayffier-Bonneville, "La guerre du canal 1951–1952," *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 70 (June 2005), 111–136.

[95] Inward Telegram No. 202 from Lieutenant-General G. Erskine (Ismailia) to Sir R Stevenson, No. 2/8, 16 October 1951, in *Disorder in Ismailia*, FO 141/1439 [1951], in *BDEEP* Series B, Volume 4, Part II, 234–235.

[96] Inward Telegram No. 32602 from General Sir B. Robertson to Field Marshal Sir W. Slim on Measures to Maintain Britain's Position in Egypt through Co-operation with King Farouk and the Egyptian Army, No. 368, 23 October 1951, in *Situation in the Canal Zone*, FO 371/90144 [1951], in *BDEEP* Series B, Volume 4, Part II, 238–240.

Brotherhood teams (who reportedly turned back labors heading to work at gunpoint). According to Egyptian estimates, some 70,000 workers walked out over the next month; a British estimate in December was much lower, but nonetheless put the number of Egyptian workers on hand down from 58,000 to 2,306.[97]

Around the same time, "liberation battalions" began paramilitary training on university campuses, including Fuʾād University, Ibrahim Pasha University, and al-Azhar University. The first organized paramilitary units headed to the Canal Zone on 9 November, with the goal of sabotaging equipment and launching attacks on British personnel. Miṣr al-Fatāh and the Ikhwān opened recruiting centers for volunteers; the journal *Rūz al-Yūsuf* and Wafd paper *al-Miṣrī* also opened their offices as recruitment centers for guerrillas. Soon, Ikhwān and Young Egypt battalions, as well as at least one DMNL battalion, headed off to the Canal Zone to fight.[98]

Meanwhile, club papers called on Egyptian youth to arm themselves "by any means" and join their brothers in the Canal Zone. *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* told readers "Do not worry about laws which restrict weapons—because there is no place for the law in these exceptional circumstances. It is better for us to risk legal culpability than be slaughtered like sheep."[99] Sayyid Quṭb, in a special editorial for *al-Daʿwah*, encouraged students to join the liberation battalions rather than the military. As he argued, colonialism had corrupted the military, which treated recruits like slaves and killed their sense of pride. But "the liberation battalions will cleanse the valley from traitors and

[97] Aḥmad Ḥusayn, *Mudhakkirāt Aḥmad Ḥusayn, raʾīs Miṣr al-Fatāh* (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Miṣrīyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Kitāb, 2007), 184–187; John Kent, "The Egyptian Base and the Defense of the Middle East, 1945–54," 51.

[98] Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels*, 100.

[99] "Tasallaḥū… bi-kull wasīlah," *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* 266: 23 Ṣafar 1371/23 November 1951, 1 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.6.

spies," Quṭb declared. "Every young man that joins a battalion… he is a young man who has earned his manhood," and cleansed himself of luxury, vice, filth, darkness, and selfishness. Moreover, after the battle, he would be a "man of whom the nation is proud."[100]

Estimates varied to how many volunteers actually went: Miṣr al-Fatāh announced it had 10,000 volunteers (the British estimated the club's recruitment figures were closer to one-tenth that figure). At the same time, the Wafd government dispatched 1,000–1,500 auxiliary police to the Canal to keep the peace. However, many of these were reported to be participating in nighttime paramilitary raids, along with residents of Ismāʿīlīyyah unhappy about their homes being ransacked by British soldiers searching for guerrilla fighters.[101]

The liberation battalions put the Egyptian government in an awkward position. In asserting the right to armed struggle against a foreign occupier, the paramilitary groups challenged the government's monopoly on force and jeopardized British-Egyptian relations. But the clubs' mobilization made it difficult for the parties like the Wafd to repudiate the movement without ceding its nationalist credentials to other political parties and clubs like Miṣr al-Fatāh and the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, the Wafd tried to coopt the paramilitary movement. The Minister of Interior Fuʾād Sirāj al-Dīn Pasha, organized a government committee to bring the paramilitary groups under the aegis of the state.[102] When that initiative failed, the Wafd opted to crack down on the movement

[100] Sayyid Quṭb, "Sibāq ilá al-taḍḥiyyah wa al-fidāʾ," *al-Daʿwah* 39, 13 Ṣafar 1371/13 November 1951, 3 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1.

[101] Letter No. 1012/9/52 from the British Embassy, Cairo to the Foreign Office, London, 24 January 1952, in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib*, FO 371/96871 [1952]; Ahmed Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt*, 78; Michael T. Thornhill, *Road to Suez*, 47; Anne-Claire de Gayffier-Bonneville, "La guerre du canal 1951–1952," 111–136.

[102] Aḥmad Ḥusayn, *Mudhakkirāt Aḥmad Ḥusayn*, 184–187.

instead. In December, the government rounded up Miṣr al-Fatāh activists, banned political meetings, confiscated journals, and worked to disarm the guerrillas and close down training camps.[103]

Overall, an estimated 117 Egyptian civilians were killed and 440 injured between 16 October and 3 December, and by the close of the year the number of British troops in the Canal Zone had swelled to some 64,000 men. Moreover, British military maneuvers like "Operation Flatten" (which involved the razing of the village of Kafr ʿAbduh) were further fueling Egyptian anti-British sentiment.[104] Such was the climate in the months and weeks leading up to the Cairo Fire.

"Those Who Jest in a Time of Gravity": Moral Appeals and the Cairo Fire

The relationship between events in the Canal Zone and the infamous fire-setting in the capital—as well as the motives and identities of the perpetrators—have long remained a historical mystery. Censorship and the imposition of martial law after the fire limited the expression of opinions on the events, and the Egyptian government used the fire as an opportunity to round up political dissidents en masse. Thus, what is known about the events of 26 January come mainly from the British Residency's official inquiry. Scholarly studies have since helped fill in some of the blanks: in 2012, for instance, Nancy Reynolds added to our understanding of events, by publishing a study which examined the fire as an act of protest against foreign goods and elite consumer culture.[105]

[103] James P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels*, 101

[104] John Kent, "The Egyptian Base and the Defense of the Middle East, 1945–54," 51; Michael T. Thornhill, *Road to Suez*, 47–52.

[105] Nancy Y. Reynolds, *A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, The Cairo Fire, and the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

There are still many aspects of the fire-setting which remain unexplored, however, including the moral claims that surrounded the well-orchestrated acts of vigilantism. For instance, one thing that stands out in Egyptian articles preceding the fire was the surprising scarcity of contamination claims and appeals to purification—appeals which often accompany book-burning and other acts of ritual immolation. It is possible these purification discourses circulated by word of mouth and in back rooms. But at least in the press, calls to purify Cairo were not central to the narrative of the city's sins. So what types of rationalizations and moral discourses surrounded the Cairo Fire?

As it turned out, instead of purification appeals, a different kind of moral narrative was prominent: the idea of punishing Cairo's elites for transgressing affective norms and failing to do their fair share, while the nation's patriots fought in the Canal Zone. As Aḥmad Ḥusayn declared in a December article, "Will you continue, O you ministers, will you continue, O you Muṣṭafá al-Naḥḥās, to live in scandal, wealth, joy, and illuminations? Will our cinemas and theaters and our cabarets stay open?... The anger that stirs up now the people…looks for an exit to express itself…. If the government continues [in its actions]... the explosion will be directed against the government itself and will overthrow it."[106] In a 15 December proclamation to the government, Muslim Brotherhood leader Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī further appealed to reciprocity, arguing "It is *unfair* that supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood should fight and sacrifice their lives for the sake of their country, while others spend their time in places of amusement."[107]

[106] Emphasis added. Anne-Claire Kerbœuf, "The Cairo Fire of 26 January 1952 and the Interpretations of History," in *Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919–1952*, eds. Arthur Goldschmidt et al. (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press), 194–216.

[107] Ibid.

Condemnations of Cairo were repeated in the two weeks leading up to the fire, with activists denouncing those who engaged in selfish behaviors while their brothers fought. Twelve days before the fire, Bahījah al-Minshāwī, Secretary of the Muslim Women's Society in Cairo wrote that "Spoiled, drunk Cairo has not yet woken up. Deafened by the entertainment and hubbub, she has not heard the sound of bullets in the Suez Canal; in her frivolities and her pleasures, her shamelessness and her clamor, [Cairo] continues, as if nothing had happened…. Hasn't this dangerous and stormy period been enough to make Cairo limit her evils—for entertainment halls, theaters, bars, and nightclubs to curb their extravagances?"[108]

The idea of happy Cairo violating affective display rules by celebrating while others suffered was particularly well-articulated in an article entitled "Those Who Jest in a Time of Gravity," by Anwar al-Maʿaddāwī. In the editorial, Maʿaddāwī wrote "On Saturday night, 5 January 1952… wretched Suez cried out in pain, listening to the sound of bullets, [while] happy Cairo overflowed with pleasure, listening to the sound of Umm Kulthūm! There was a funeral, and there was a wedding—there was blood, and there was singing. …. [And] what do people say about this happy, cheerful capital that knows no shame?" As Maʿaddāwī explained, he had expected that Egyptian cities would rally to the aid of Suez, that Egyptian souls would be united in the cry of the homeland. "I was waiting for all this and more—but insolent Cairo moved me from the world of beautiful fantasy to the world of ugly reality... My blood boils in my veins, and I search for the man that owns an executioner's whip, but I do not find him."[109]

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[108] "al-Barīd al-Adabī," *Majallat al-Risālah* 963, 17 December 1951, 1438–1439.

[109] [Lit: "The Jesters in a Time of Gravity!"]. Anwar al-Maʿaddāwī, "al-Hāzilūn fī waqt al-jidd!" *Majallat al-Risālah* 967, 14 January 1952, 41–42.

Five days before the fire, Sayyid Quṭb lent his voice to the chorus of condemnations, publishing an article provocatively entitled "Fire… Blood." Denouncing the behavior of the idle rich in the face of the bloodshed in the Canal Zone, Quṭb wrote "The people do not demand that those affluent, bloated, impudent men, in their pleasures, render a blood tax to this valley… [the people] do not demand they sacrifice their precious blood! Not to die as the martyrs die! … [The people] demand only a *fair* portion of that which is spent at wine tables and evening shows!"[110]

Meanwhile, fighting in the Canal Zone continued to inflame tensions. Cairo activists rallied on 14 January for demonstrations as part of the funeral procession of ʿUmar Shāhīn, a Muslim Brotherhood member and student killed in the Canal Struggle. A few days later, a group of young Egyptians (aged 18 and 19 years old) tried to break into a convent overlooking a bridge in the Canal Zone, in hopes of bombing the bridge. In the struggle to take the building, they shot to death a 52-year-old American nun, causing moral outrage both at home and abroad. As the female charity worker was a non-combatant per Islamic, Christian, and international legal codes (not to mention according to general Egyptian moral standards), the killing was problematic in both moral terms and in terms of the Egyptian narrative of the Canal Zone struggle. As a result, the response was a mix of moral denunciations, cognitive dissonance, and apologetics. The head of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī) and Coptic politician Makram ʿUbayd both paid a joint visit to the Coptic Patriarchate, where Huḍaybī denounced the perpetrators of the crime. However, within days, the Wafd Minster of the Interior Sirāj al-Dīn announced

[110] Emphasis added. The term *nār* can mean "fire" or "gunfire." Quṭb's other uses of the term in the article (i.e. "the fire of holy hatred," "they turn blood to water, and fire to cold"; "just try to extinguish the burning fire between us and them") suggest it should be translated "fire." Sayyid Quṭb, "Nār… Dam," *Majallat al-Risālah* 968, 21 January 1952, 69–70.

that their investigation had "proved beyond any doubt" that the British had killed Sister Anthony. A few weeks later, *al-Risālah* repeated the idea that the British had shot the nun and blamed the Egyptians. At the same time, the article defensively appealed to relative privation, asking why the American conscience was agitated over one dead nun, but not the scores of dead Egyptians.[111]

In the days leading up to 26 January, the British were being thoroughly excoriated in the press and in the streets. There were more student demonstrations on 20 January, followed by a British sweep of a cemetery in Ismāʿīlīyyah on 21 January. The British justified the cemetery sweep in terms of military necessity: they had been chasing guerrillas and had opened tombs in search of an ammunition cache. The Egyptians cried desecration.[112] Quṭb described the colonizers as extreme deviants and role-violators, calling them criminal, barbaric, heinous, savages, betrayers, and enemies of humanity. "No treaty after today with the liars, no treaty of alliance after today with the enemies—nothing but blood-stained struggle, blood and fire, between us and the wretches," he declared. "Everything has a limit."[113]

On 22 January, an illustrated brochure circulated, entitled "British Atrocities in the Canal Zone." And on 23 January, the Minister of Interior gave a speech, calling the acts of British troops in the Canal Zone "barbarous." "Things have gone beyond the point where mere protests are of avail," Sirāj al-Dīn declared. "Women were turned into the streets half-clothed and taken to camps where their fate is still unknown. Mosques were

[111] *Al-Ahrām* 23812, 19 January 1952, 2; "Britain Orders Army Probe in Slaying of Nun," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 January 1952, 7; Abū al-Futūḥ ʿAṭīfah, "Thawrat al-sharq," *Majallat al-Risālah* 971, 11 February 1952, 162.
[112] Anne-Claire de Gayffier-Bonneville, "La guerre du canal 1951–1952," 111–136.
[113] "Sayyid Quṭb, "Nār… Dam," *Majallat al-Risālah* 968, 21 January 1952, 69–70.

desecrated, cemeteries profaned and great numbers of Egyptians killed or wounded and crucified on trees."[114]

The stories that circulated—stories of a shaykh killed while praying, women violated, mosques and cemeteries profaned, and bodies desecrated—sent a clear message: the British had violated all boundaries. They had crossed the lines of sacred space, gender, religion, justice, and humanity itself. Two days later, another transgression was added to the list. On 25 January, British soldiers attempted to disarm the auxiliary police in Ismāʿīlīyyah. When the police refused to surrender their weapons, the situation erupted into a firefight. By the end of the battle, four British soldiers and 50 Egyptian policemen were dead. The news shocked and outraged Egyptians. That evening, the cabinet discussed expelling the entire British community from Egypt and appropriating all British assets.[115]

The next morning, the 26 January, the auxiliary police (Bulūk al-Niẓām) amassed for a demonstration in front of ʿĀbdīn Palace around 10 in the morning. They were quickly joined by local university students from Fuʾād University and al-Azhar University. The spark came around noon. As the morning protesters began to disperse, part of the crowd passed through Opera Square, where some Egyptian officers were sitting on the balcony of Casino Badīʿah. Members of the crowd began shouting at the officers for "not being in the front ranks in Ismāʿīlīyyah."[116] As the fight continued, some demonstrators broke off

[114] "Report of the British Committee of Inquiry into the Riots in Cairo on the 26 January 1952," in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib*, FO 371/96872 [1952].
[115] Ibid.
[116] "The Rioting and Organized Fire Raising in Cairo on 26 January," Chancery (Cairo) to African Department, 31 January 1952, in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib*, FO 371/96871 [1952].

from the crowd and stormed through the front doors of the casino. Inside, they overturned chairs and tables, threw the furniture off the terrace, and then set the furniture ablaze.

Over the next few hours, gangs of activists stormed other parts of the city center. Between noon and six o'clock, four to five areas of Cairo's modern downtown were attacked simultaneously. However, this was not a mass movement or popular uprising. Instead, it was a campaign undertaken by gangs of well-organized, well-dressed young effendis in suits. The gangs were familiar with the security measures of the shops they attacked, and came prepared with specific equipment: an oxyacetylene torch, paraffin, and trucks carrying hay and petrol. These groups of young men targeted stores based on pre-compiled lists: when confronted by employees of the establishments they attacked, multiple witnesses mentioned seeing lists, or recalled that the vigilantes told them they had "orders" to attack the location. Moving methodically from site to site, the young men broke doors and windows, entered shops, spread petrol across the premises, and set the establishments ablaze. Then, they moved on to the next location. Thus, as the British Embassy reported, the riots were far from "spontaneous manifestation of popular emotion. The organization of the many different gangs, their discipline and their very carefully concerted action could only have been the result of plans laid long beforehand."[117]

The arsonists targeted bars and clubs offering alcoholic beverages, shops selling luxury goods, and places where Western entertainment was available. Although most of

[117] Telegram No. 318 from Cairo to Foreign Office, 5 February 1952, in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib,* FO 371/96872 [1952]; "Minutes," 1 March 1952, in *Egypt and Sudan*, FO 371/96873 [1952].

the institutions targeted were not British-owned, most traded in British goods.[118] As the Committee of Inquiry stated, "Although British interests suffered heavily, British establishments were not the only targets in the planned destruction. The plan appears to have been drawn up to satisfy xenophobia and anti-Jew and anti-Christian as well as extreme Islamic feelings; there was also a strong element of anti-capitalism which manifested itself in attacks on establishments catering for the rich."[119] Another report mentioned "the cinemas, the Pasha's clubs, the bars and cabarets, frequented by the idle rich were attacked more as part of the morality drive begun by the Muslim Brotherhood, and the big stores from a general feeling that their prices make them establishments only for [the rich]."[120]

Overall, estimates put the number of protesters involved in the Cairo Fire at about 500 individuals. This number included the vigilante gangs, plus a secondary wave of spectators and looters that followed in their wake. This secondary group opportunistically rushed in to break and smash stores and wares. Interestingly, the fire-setting gangs tried to control these hangers-on; for instance, when some looters attempted to steal silverware, the gangs took the objects from the looters and smashed them. In another

[118] "Report of the British Committee of Inquiry into the Riots in Cairo on the 26 January 1952," in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib*, FO 371/96872 [1952]; "The Rioting and Organized Fire Raising in Cairo on 26 January," Chancery (Cairo) to African Department, 31 January 1952, in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib*, FO 371/96871 [1952].

[119] "Her Majesty's Ambassador's Investigation Committee's Report on the Egyptian Rioting of 26 January," Sir Ralph Stevenson to Mr. Anthony Eden, 29 February 1952, in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib*, FO 371/96872 [1952].

[120] "The Rioting and Organized Fire Raising in Cairo on 26 January," Chancery (Cairo) to African Department, 31 January 1952, in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib*, FO 371/96871 [1952].

instance, a gang took materials from looters and threw the illicit wares on a bonfire. There were also reports that one looter had himself been thrown on a bonfire.[121]

The most violent attack of the day occurred at the Turf Club just after 1 o'clock in the afternoon. A gang entered the club, hunted down those left inside, beat anyone they encountered, then set fire to the establishment. Ten British subjects were killed in the attack. Five died inside club: two men from blows to head, one man from a wound to the lower groin, one woman from asphyxiation while hiding in a bedroom (the cause of death for the fifth was undetermined). Five more men were found dead outside the club. One man jumped from a window and fell into the fire; a second man jumped and fell on a shed, breaking his back. Others jumped from balconies and were beaten to death with iron bars and rocks by the gangs below. At least two of the bodies in the courtyard were further mutilated after death: the bodies were beaten, stripped, dragged across the road, dismembered, covered in trash, and set on fire. As the British Investigating Committee noted in its report, as this was going on, a Muslim doorman working near the Turf Club confronted the crowd that was mutilating the dead Englishmen. The doorman argued that it was "useless and barbarous to burn the dead (this is very much against the Muslim religion), but after some time the rioters told him that if he did not stop arguing they would burn him too, and so he ran away."[122]

It is difficult to speak of morality in the face of such wanton violence. Nevertheless, it is important to make a few remarks concerning how historical processes and social

[121] "Report of the British Committee of Inquiry into the riots in Cairo on the 26 January 1952," in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib*, FO 371/96872 [1952].

[122] "Her Majesty's Ambassador's Investigation Committee's Report on the Egyptian Rioting of 26 January," Sir Ralph Stevenson to Mr. Anthony Eden, 29 February 1952, p. 32 in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib*, FO 371/96872 [1952].

processes came together in the making of the events of January 1952. First, one must recognize that corpse mutilation was considered taboo to Egyptians who followed Islamic law;[123] the dead body was afforded a modicum of respect, even if the living man had not warranted it. And yet, mutilation of the dead still occurred sporadically in Egypt (as in most human societies) as part of lynching rituals. As a form of aggression, these rituals were performative and highly narrativized. The event was often staged to be unforgettable (didactic and mnemonic): the idea was to draw attention, make others take note. And rather than a single action, lynching was a series of acts: there were affective invocations of the "crime" or unpunished transgression (i.e. group rallies, incendiary tracts); the (re)construction of the "criminal" as subhuman; the choosing of a scapegoat; the execution; post-mortem mutilation; the exposure/display of the body; and in some cases, the taking of souvenirs. Lynching thus acted out punishment, hierarchy, and boundary maintenance on the bodies of those seen as violating the social order: miscegenators, overthrown leaders, minorities behaving "outside" or "above" their station, and those viewed as having violated gender and sexual norms.[124]

Despite their horrific nature, then, acts like post-mortem mutilation did not necessarily evidence mental unbalance, represent an "unfortunate excess" or loss of control, or reflect a cultural norm. Instead, the violation of social taboos was integral to the process of lynching.[125] Following a study of 20th century American lynching

[123] See for instance Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, The Book of Jihād and Expeditions* Book 32, 1731; Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī Vol. X: The Conquest of Arabia*, trans. Fred. M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press), 16.

[124] Kirk W. Fuoss, "Lynching Performances, Theatres of Violence," *Text and Performance Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (1999): 1–37; Christine Harold and Kevin M. DeLuca, "Behold the Corpse: Violent Images and the Case of Emmett Till," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* Vol. 8, no. 2 (2005): 263–286; Lee Ann Fujii, "The Puzzle of Extra-Lethal Violence," *Perspectives on Politics* Vol. 11, no. 2 (June 2013): 410–426.

[125] Studying court cases for pubic decency violations, Hanan Hammad also records taboo violations on a smaller scale in altercations between men and women in Cairo in the 1930s–1940s. As Hammad notes, in

behaviors, for instance, David Garland described the behavior as a "self-consciously uncivilized penal conduct." As he argued, lynching performances "took the form that they did precisely because their stagers *chose to transgress against the norms* of civilized punishment, to make themselves an exception to the rule… [as part of] an 'economy of suspended rights.'"[126] In other words, lynchers intentionally violated taboos, laws of war, religious precepts, norms of decency, and protocols of respect for the human corpse, in order to draw attention and actuate debasement and disrespect. It was a display of overwhelming force—a show of transgression to end transgression. Lynching was thus transgression-as-desecration: the violent revocation of the body's status as a respected object through intentional violation.

Records suggest that the Turf Club mutilations should be read in this way: as communicative, didactic, and intentionally transgressive. Similar to other lynching events, (including Egyptian lynchings of Jews in 1938–1939), there were circulating stories of boundary violations: tales of the British violating women, profaning mosques and cemeteries, and desecrating bodies. the Turf Club mutilations were highly performative, involving beating, undressing, dragging, the covering of the bodies with trash, and then immolation. The mutilations violated Egyptian taboos, raising protest about the transgression of Islamic law. And such extreme signaling had an effect on the European community in Cairo: a few days after the attacks, Michael Creswell at the

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conflicts Egyptians seemed to violate "sexual taboos [by exposing or grabbing their genitals, beating opponents on the genitals] for the sake of humiliating" their opponents. Taboo violation could thus be understood as a dominance display or form of status signaling. See: Hanan Hammad, "Gendered Obscenity: Women's Tongues, Men's Phalluses and the State's Fist in the Making of Urban Norm in Interwar Egypt," in *Urban Violence in the Middle East: Changing Cityscapes in the Transition from Empire to Nation State*, eds. Ulrike Freitag et al. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 76.

[126] Emphasis added. David Garland, "Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in Twentieth-Century America," *Law and Society Review* 39, no. 4 (2005): 829.

British Embassy advised that all non-essential British subjects should be "actively encouraged to leave and settle elsewhere," and the Australian Legation quickly wrote to request a loan of arms and ammunition from British army stocks to protect their families.[127]

At the same time, there were other social processes and moral performances at work on 26 January. Attacks on English bookstores and British clubs attempted to excommunicate the British from the heart of Cairene society. The argument with the soldiers on the terrace of the Casino Badīʿah and the targeting of theaters, bars, and nightclubs suggests that the gangs were also passing judgment against "spoiled, drunk Cairo," the bloated elite who had failed to rally behind their brothers fighting in the Canal Zone. And notably, while afterward the Egyptian military would be applauded for stopping the conflagration, it was also undutiful soldiers—out of role, out of place, and taking the wrong affective posture—who had been the original target of aggression on the casino terrace.

The well-organized nature of the gangs was in keeping with Brotherhood and Miṣr al-Fatāh policing displays. The destruction of luxury shops selling men's and women's fashions was a sentence against both foreigners and Egyptian elites (wearers-of-hats), those internal "traitors" who imitated British dress and manners. The seizure and destruction of valuable looted property was also interesting: this could have been a high-cost signal that the gangs could enforce discipline and "lawful" behavior; this behavior could have also reflected a belief that such materials were contaminated, a symbol of

[127] Minutes from Michael Creswell, Ref. 10111/3/526, 30 January 1952 in *Riots: Cairo*, FO 141/1474 [1952]; Dispatch No. S.256/6/6 from Mr. Claude Massey, Australian Legion, Cairo, to Sir R. Stevenson, British Embassy, Cairo, Ref. 10111/4/526, 5 March 1952 in *Riots: Cairo*, FO 141/1474 [1952].

British culture and influence. But like many acts of vigilante aggression, the initiative had belonged to groups of young men who carefully planned their actions and seized the right to judge and punish. In other words, in many ways the Cairo Fire was the physical actualization of the moral claims and narratives that had been circulating for months.

Morality and religion were also tied up in other types of responses to the fire-setting. A number of Egyptians worked to protect foreigners during the Cairo Fire, vouching for foreign friends and colleagues, and hiding them from gangs and rioters. The Assistant Trade Commissioner of Canada reported that after he was attacked outside the Turf Club, a random young Egyptian man helped him beat off attackers, then dragged him into a nearby building to hide him. An Egyptian manager at Barclay's Bank lied to an angry crowd, telling them his British coworkers were in fact Italians. As the official British report of inquiry explained, Egyptian doormen had particularly behaved with "loyalty and courage." A Muslim shaykh employed as a doorman for a Giza clinic also lied to an armed gang, and "appealed to the crowd as Muslims to believe him when he falsely said his employer was not at home." The Miami Cinema doorman helped carry hoses to the burning theater. And at W.H. Smith, the doorman tried to convince a gang of arsonists that the establishment was an Arabic bookshop, not an English bookshop. (They ignored him, and set the shop on fire anyway.) Such incidents suggest that for some Egyptians, loyalty to friends and colleagues, and the importance of saving human life, could trump moral injunctions against dishonesty, political interests, and even group solidarities.

There were also reports that women and elderly had been generally excluded from the violence. One gang of arsonists protected a British woman escaping from her apartment, and told the crowd not to bother her. An elderly British man was also given safe passage

by the gangs. Other witnesses reported Egyptians helping women away from the fires.[128] These behaviors and narratives would have served multiple purposes. For instance, they could have been used to communicate that the arsonists were adhering to popular ethics and Islamic prohibitions against harming women and the elderly in times of warfare.[129] Internally, the retelling of such stories could have also served to reinforced a narrative that the vigilantism was a rightful course of action, having been taken against legitimate combatants (foreign male invaders). Like Ḥusayn Tawfīq's decision to shoot Amīn ʿUthmān in the chest rather than in the back, there were certain standards of behavior for war that vigilantes followed (however selectively), to signal their claim to moral righteousness.

So who was responsible for the fire? Many blamed the Egyptian government—specifically, the Wafd and its Minister of Interior, Sirāj al-Dīn Pasha. The British, for instance, held Sirāj al-Dīn and the Wafd responsible for having been "indifferent to the maintenance of public order and security in the country. [The government's] overt and covert encouragement of criminal elements, the inflammatory speeches… its encouragement of attacks on the British forces… 26 January [was] a logical outcome of its policy." Popular gossip (most apocryphal) also denigrated Egyptian leaders for their behavior the day of the fire: Naḥḥās had purportedly been receiving a pedicure, Sirāj al-Dīn involved in a private land deal, and King Fārūq at a banquet, dining while Cairo burned.[130]

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[128] "The Rioting and Organized Fire Raising in Cairo on 26 January," Chancery (Cairo) to African Department, 31 January 1952, in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'Ét*at *of General Neguib*, FO 371/96871 [1952].

[129] Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī Vol. X: The Conquest of Arabia*, trans. Fred. M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press), 16.

[130] Dispatch 1012/15/52 from the British Embassy in Cairo to the Foreign Office, 18 February 1952, and "Report of the British Committee of Inquiry into the riots in Cairo on the 26 January 1952," both in

Many Egyptian activists (including the Wafd, the Free Officers, and the communists) also claimed the British bore a share of responsibility for the fire—either directly (by having orchestrated the revolt as pretense for declaring martial law) or indirectly (by fomenting public unrest with the Ismāʿīlīyyah massacre the day before the fire). The Free Officers, for instance, circulated a tract calling the fire an imperialist "coup" and conspiracy aimed at quenching the nationalist movement.[131] A *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* article, meanwhile, referred back to the idea of Cairo singing while fighters in the Canal died: "The blood of the martyrs was running in rivers, villages utterly annihilated, and at the same time, singing spread over the horizons, and bars and dance clubs were packed with thousands."[132]

Direct responsibility, of course, belonged to the smartly-dressed gangs of middle-class Egyptian vigilantes. Officially, authorities rounded up some 181 auxiliary policemen, suspected rioters and looters, as well as hundreds of Egyptian activists representing a variety of political views (including communists, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Nationalist Party, Miṣr al-Fatāh, and others). In the weeks and months after the fire, however, British investigators concluded that the fire-raisers had mostly been members of Miṣr al-Fatāh; communist activists supported this reading in *al-Muqāwamah al-Shaʿbiyyah*, charging Aḥmad Ḥusayn with being "at the head of the reactionary forces that burned the city of Cairo."[133]

Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'État of General Neguib, FO 371/96872 [1952]; Michael T. Thornhill, *Road to Suez*, 62.

[131] Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 120.

[132] "Waqaʿat al-waqʿah… falā yāʾis, wa lā qunūṭ, wa lā khunūʿ, wa lā istislām," *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* no. 283, 9 Rajab 1371/4 April 1952, 7 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.6.

[133] "Aḥmad Ḥusayn wa ʿiṣābah majallah al-malāyīn," *al-Muqāwamah al-Shaʿbiyyah,* July 1952, 8 in IISH ARCH02315/Folder 111.

A confidant of Ikhwān Guide Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī also reported to the British Residency that the Brotherhood was involved: members had formed gangs, which attacked the "bars and cafes, but not the cinemas." While admitting that these "individual members" of the Brotherhood had been involved, the Brotherhood liaison reported that most of the gangs had been Miṣr al-Fatāh members, who had been equipped and given police protection by the Minister of Interior, Sirāj al-Dīn. The Minister had been expecting Aḥmad Ḥusayn's men to execute a "normal riot"—not set the city on fire. The British found this a plausible explanation of events, and added that there was "no reasonable doubt" that Aḥmad Ḥusayn and Miṣr al-Fatāh (The Socialist Party) were "the principle designers and executors of the main destruction." But, they added, "there is no actual proof."[134]

"Cleanse the Country": The Advent of the Blessed Movement

If Egyptians had been convinced the nation was in a state of chaos before the fire-raising of "Black Saturday," the Cairo Fire of 26 January cemented this claim. As Egyptians saw peers engaging in unlawful behavior, it became increasingly difficult to maintain social conformity pressure for lawful behavior. Moreover, when the state itself resorts to sponsoring vigilantism, it "destroys the moral certainties of ordinary citizens, who are no longer sure who stands for what, and what the ends of revolution or resistance

[134] Dispatch No. 1012/15/52 from the British Embassy, Cairo, to the African Department, Foreign Office, London, 18 February 1952, Ref., Code JE 1018/78 in *Egyptian Political Events Leading to the Military Coup d'Ét*at *of General Neguib*, FO 371/96872 [1952].

are."[135] As ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Nashshār had written, "In a world of crime, there is no sin."[136]

The fire-raising of 26 January thus further delegitimized the Wafd, the monarchy, and Egyptian elites. For its failures in preventing and responding to the rioting of 26 January, the Wafd government was dismissed on 27 January. This led to a series of minority-party "salvation ministries" in the first half of 1952: the governments of ʿAli Māhir (27 January-1 March), Aḥmad al-Hilālī (2 March-29 June), Ḥusayn Sirrī (2 July-20 July 1952), and Aḥmad al-Hilālī (22 July-23 July). These governments tried to save Egyptian society from disorder, corruption, and factionalism. However, with the Wafd in the opposition, a lack of public confidence in the regime, and the Palace working to increase its own power over the premiership, no government was able to enact substantial reforms. As a result, in the last six months before the Free Officer's coup of 23 July, the Prime Minister's office changed hands four times (making for a total of over a dozen government turnovers in ten years).

The fire had another effect. The deployment of the army to quell the chaos emboldened young activists in the officer corps, who had already been organizing underground cells. "The army seemed to step up as a defender of the nation… the one force capable of imposing order," Marxist officer Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn wrote. Deploying the army to quell the riots of 26 January "was perhaps the largest mistake the King

[135] "Nandini Sundar, "Vigilantism, Culpability and Moral Dilemmas," *Critique of Anthropology* 30, no. 1 (March 2010): 116; Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, "The Economics of Strong Reciprocity," in *Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life*, ed. Herbert Gintis et al. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 167.

[136] ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Nashshār, "al-Fidāʾī," *Majallat al-Risālah* 962, 10 December 1951, 1402.

made…. [the officers] had saved the country, and if the army had moved the night of the Cairo Fire on 26 January for the king's benefit—why not move for their own benefit?"[137]

The Free Officers cell that ultimately seized power on 23 July 1952 shared many similarities with the young activists that undertook vigilante campaigns in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Most of the Free Officers had been involved in vigilante activism before the coup: Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn had tried to kill the parliamentary representative from Būlāq, Anwar al-Sādāt had participated in the Amīn ʿUthmān assassination, and Nāṣir had attempted to assassinate General Ḥusayn Sirrī ʿAmir just weeks before the Cairo Fire. Similar to their civilian peers, the Free Officers felt that this vigilantism was altruistic—necessary to save Egyptian society from the threats that afflicted it. Moreover, like their civilian peers, in justifying the coup the Free Officers pointed to the events of 4 February 1942, and the duty of cleansing the country from colonialism and its collaborators.[138]

There were other similarities as well. Many Free Officers held multiple affiliations (either serial or overlapping) with other nationalist activist groups.[139] Like Ḥusayn Tawfīq's club, the Officers kept their ideological program intentionally vague, despite Marxist members pressing them for ideological elaboration and Brotherhood members pushing for greater Islamic content. By mentioning only vague goals, such as liberating Egypt and eliminating traitors, the Free Officers attracted a broad membership. And as a group, the Free Officers cooperated with other cells and activist organizations, working

[137] Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 118–119.

[138] See for instance Nasser's interview with *al-Ahram* on the First Anniversary of the Revolution, 22 July 1952, Archived at http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=47

[139] Muṣṭafá ʿAbd al-Majīd Naṣīr et al., *Thawrat Yūliyū wa-l-ḥaqīqah al-ghāʾibah* (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Miṣrīyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1997), 136–160.

with the Brotherhood in paramilitary training, and with the communists (who had access to Roneo machines) in printing anti-government materials.[140]

Interestingly, where contamination and purification appeals were lacking in the Cairo Fire, they were in abundance in tracts released by the Free Officers. Tracts labeled opponents criminals and traitors, appealed to contamination and purification, and called for the army to take up the duty of enforcing justice where the government had failed. In autumn 1951, a joint DMNL-Free Officers statement of goals mentioned the problem of "traitors" four times, listing as its first objective "The extermination of foreign colonialism and its servants—the traitors—from the Nile Valley." The document went on to name as traitors the men of the palace, the various parties, and the corrupt press defending imperialism. As the tract argued, "These traitors must be rooted out in order to cleanse the country."[141] A pamphlet of 22 March 1952 similarly called for cleansing, warning "We will never advance, and the army will not walk on the right path, until it purifies itself of colonial henchmen."[142]

Already in late January, the Foreign Office was nervous. A few days before Māhir's resignation, it wrote a dispatch to the British Embassy in Cairo asking "Will there be a

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[140] Chapter 6 of ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿAbd al-Raʾūf, *Arghamtu "Fārūq" ʿalá al-tanāzul ʿan al-ʿArsh: mudhakkirāt* (Cairo: al-Zahrāʾ li-l-Iʿlām al-ʿArabī, 1988); Ḥusayn Ḥammūdah, *Asrār ḥarakat al-ḍubbāṭ al-aḥrār wa-l-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* (Cairo: al-Zahrāʾ li-l-Iʿlām al-ʿArabī, 1985), 73–75; Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 84–86.

[141] "Ahdāf al-ḍubbāṭ al-aḥrār," in Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 94–95.

For similar tracts and discourses, see the Free Officer tracts from January 1952 and March 1952: "Qāwamū al-ṭughyān… wa dāfaʿū ʿan al-shaʿb," [1952] in Appendix 8, Muṣṭafá ʿAbd al-Majīd Naṣīr et al., *Thawrat Yūliyū wa-l-ḥaqīqah al-ghāʾibah,* 171–173; Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 91–92.

[142] *Ṣawt al-Ḍubbāṭ al-Aḥrār* 7, 22 March 1952, in Appendix 8, Muṣṭafá ʿAbd al-Majīd Naṣīr et al., *Thawrat Yūliyū wa-l-ḥaqīqah al-ghāʾibah,* 176–178.

Also see: "Yā rijāl al-jaysh, yā abnāʾ al-shaʿb," in Appendix 8, Muṣṭafá ʿAbd al-Majīd Naṣīr et al., *Thawrat Yūliyū wa-l-ḥaqīqah al-ghāʾibah,* 223–225.

revolution in Egypt?"[143] A week later, the British Embassy replied back that the British government should expect a coup, rather than a revolution: "[S]ince the fall of the Wafd Government [on 27 January], it has become likely that the immediate effect of a failure [in negotiations securing British evacuation]… will be a military dictatorship rather than an immediate outbreak of revolution."[144]

Over the summer, the British expressed concern that neither the Palace nor Egyptian elites seemed overly concerned about the political situation, however. They discussed how to give the pasha class a "jolt" towards reality. They dubbed the information campaign "Operation Jolt," and tried to drive home a number of points: that the British "were not prepared in the last resort to rescue the King and to keep him on his Throne," and that "if the Egyptian *jacquerie* and urban riffraff started cutting the throats of their landlords, pashas and middle classes, much though we might regret it on humanitarian grounds, we would certainly not feel that our vital interests were being jeopardized and we would not intervene."[145]

The precipitating event for the coup came on 16 July: King Fārūq dissolved the board of the Officers' Club. In the army, there was fear the king's next move would be to arrest officers suspected of disloyalty. The following evening, the Free Officers met and

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[143] Letter from R. Allen to M. J. Creswell on the Prospects of an Agreement, No. 365, 26 February 1952, in *Agreement with the Egyptians*, FO 371/96931 [1952], in *BDEEP* Series B, Vol. 4, Part II, 348–349.

[144] Letter (reply) from M. J. Creswell to R. Allen on the Implications of a Failure to Reach an Agreement, No. 365, 4 March 1952, in *Future Developments in Egypt*, FO 371/96931 [1952], in *BDEEP* Series B, Vol. 4, Part II, 349–351.

[145] Memorandum by R. Allen on the Measures Needed to Resume Negotiations, No. 315, 1 May 1952, in *Negotiations with Egypt*, FO 371/96929 [1952] in *BDEEP* Series B, Vol. 4, Part II, 387; Letter from M. J. Creswell to R. Allen, *Annex:* Memorandum by Creswell, "Operation Jolt", No. 12, 12 May 1952, in *Policy towards Egypt*, FO 141/1462 [1952], in *BDEEP* Series B, Vol. 4, Part II, 391–394; Letter (Reply) from R. Allen to M. J. Creswell on "Operation Jolt" and the Possibility of an Agreement with Egypt, No. 350, 23 May 1952, in *Policy towards Egypt,* FO 371/96930 [1952], in *BDEEP* Series B, Vol. 4, Part II, 395–396.

decided to launch an assassination plot. However, after another night's rest, this idea was abandoned as too risky: an assassination campaign would only lead to a reciprocal "campaign of terrorism" by the government.[146] By 19 July, the group of conspirators decided they had the resources to move straight to the second phase of the plan: a coup d'état. They set a date in early August.

Events were moving quickly, however. The next day (20 July), Prime Minister Sirrī resigned, and the Free Officers learned that Hilālī would be returning to power in a few days. They expected Hilālī would appoint Major General Ḥusayn Sirrī ʿĀmir ("the archenemy of our movement") as Minister of War. Concerned that the general would purge the ranks of the army, the officers moved swiftly. They informed the two best-organized blocs of anti-government nationalist activism, the DMNL and Muslim Brotherhood, that they were making their move.

As the Hilālī government came to power on 22 July, however, the British Embassy reported that the Palace was "now far more confident of the future than he had been at any time in the last six months." Continuing, the Embassy explained: "[The King's advisor] Ḥāfiẓ ʿAfīfī had heard rumors of impending trouble in the country and of agitation by the partisans of Aḥmad Ḥusayn, but did not set much store by them…. [I]f the new Government… is successful in dealing with the trouble in the army, there is a reasonable chance that the next few months will be uneventful. Ḥāfiẓ ʿAfīfī himself is planning to go away for a holiday in Europe in mid-August."[147]

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[146] Nasser Interview with *al-Ahram* on the First Anniversary of the Revolution, 22 July 1952, Archived at http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=47; Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 124–125.

[147] Inward Telegram No. 1059, from M.J. Creswell to the Foreign Office, on a Meeting with Hafez Afifi, No. 72, 22 July 1952, in *Outcome of the Latest Crisis in Egypt,* FO 141/1453 [1952], in *BDEEP* Series B, Vol. 4, Part II, 437–438.

That evening, the Free Officers moved. They arrested their commanding officers, rallied the units at their command, and marched through Cairo. They seized control of bridges and roads, took over military barracks and headquarters, and commandeered the radio station. Within thirty-six hours, calls and messages of support poured in from other army units, university staff and students, nationalist clubs, and trade unions. Trapped in Rās al-Tīn palace in Alexandria, King Fārūq had little choice but to acknowledge the new regime. Three days later, he was presented with an abdication proclamation, allowed to board his yacht, and sailed off into exile.[148] In his wake, he left a government charged with purifying the nation of factionalism and corruption. As the order investing the new head-of-state declared:

> "Today, our dearest homeland urgently needs to establish its structure on a firm and sound foundation.... The Blessed Movement, whose standard you carry, is but an expression of the hopes held in the hearts of a noble people. And it has become a sign for a new era… Therefore, we have seen fit to invest you [General Muḥammad Najīb] with the charge of governance, and entrust the premiership to you… so the country can soon enjoy parliamentary life, free from stain and flaw."[149]

Conclusion: Altruistic Punishment and Punitive Rights

> "And when it is said to them, 'Do not cause corruption on the earth,' [lā yufsidū fī al-arḍ] they say, 'We are but reformers.'" (Qurʾān 2:11)

Overall, extra-judicial killings and other vigilante acts undertaken by activists and would-be revolutionaries in the 1940s and 1950s reflected a complex conjuncture of historical events, political disfunction, social signaling, and moral rationalizing. But the results would have lasting effects. If Brynjar Lia rightly argued that "the Muslim

[148] Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam*, 131–162.

[149] "Amr malakī raqm 10, li-sanat 1952," Wizārat al-liwāʾ Muḥammad Najīb, 7 Sibtambir 1952–18 Yūniyū 1953, Bibliotheca Alexandrina. Available at: http://naguib.bibalex.org/DocumentForm.aspx

Brotherhood–Muhammad's Youth divide has become the historical antecedent for today's schism between moderate Islamists and radical Islamic militants"[150] (by pushing the Ikhwān toward more aggressive forms of activism), I would add that political parties allying with extra-parliamentary clubs, along with inter-club competition between Young Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad, and the EMNL, also contributed to the street violence of the era. The events of 1946–1952 also created precedents for the use of violence by extra-parliamentary clubs, and had lasting effects on the Brotherhood's ideology.

But the violence had not been spontaneous, nor did it reflect any "violent personality" on the part of any of the actors involved. The violence had been produced. And as part of this production process, vigilantes invoked a tripartite narrative. This narrative posited 1) a boundary violation (real or imagined), 2) an argument that state institutions had failed to punish the offender, and 3) a claim over punitive rights. Each of these three steps—imagined boundary violation, the myth of unpunished transgression, and appropriation of the right to police and punish—were important in the moral imaginings that led to violence.

Imagined boundary violation. Among Egyptian activist clubs, there were many claims concerning imagined boundary violations. What drove vigilante activists was the additional claim that a boundary violator represented a case of extreme deviance: that the violator was a threat to the social order, who must be punished and removed from the community. As part of this "creation of the extreme deviant" or invention of the social excommunicant, the transgressive behavior in question was not seen as an isolated

[150] Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, 250–251.

incident. Instead, the transgressive behavior was understood to represent a "whole spectrum of problems and aberrations," and the transgressor seen as representing a certain deviant "type."[151] Thus, patrons of the Turf club could become a symbol of British military occupation, European cultural hegemony, and atrocities in the Canal Zone; and an Egyptian politician like Amīn ʿUthmān could symbolize the treachery of Egyptian elites and British occupation.

Myth of unpunished transgression. Such moral totems were additionally woven into narratives of social threat: the "myth of unpunished transgression." There were usually examples of wrongdoing specific to the target: ʿUthmān's Catholic marriage comment, for instance. Sometimes, these individual transgressions further overlapped with communal myths of injustice (the 4 February humiliation, the Palestine arms scandal, and the Ismāʿīliyyah massacre, for instance). Whatever the case, the victim's "sin" was not seen as an isolated incident—it was mythologized, woven into disturbing narratives about how the behavior typified a particular social threat.

Appropriation of Punitive Rights. The invention of such "myths of unpunished transgression" was a potent way to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling regime. By claiming that the existing government had failed to punish violators, activists and revolutionaries could claim that it was now the community (and its appointed guardians) who now had the duty to police and punish. The threat posed by the excommunicant made punishment a moral obligation.

Egyptians who engaged in vigilantism advanced other claims as well. In targeting cinemas, cabarets, and other places of amusement, activists claimed social guardianship

[151] Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (London: Routledge, 2002), 51–55.

over these spaces. Interestingly, vigilantes also asserted their right to violate moral norms. (As one *al-Risālah* author wrote, British crimes in the Canal Zone had made "sound and legitimate methods" irrelevant.[152]) Thus, everything from assassination to lynching could enter into the realm of thinkable action—in the name of protecting the community. These claims were placed front and center in the courtroom, where activists accused the state of having failed in its duties, and asserted their right to punish.

In this process, religion could inhibit aggression (through the recall of scriptures prohibiting murder; scriptures enjoining obedience to rulers), or it could be used to justify aggression (through scriptures denouncing treachery; scriptures enjoining fighting and protecting the community; and scriptures describing historical conflicts with other communities). Religious authorities could similarly be called upon to buttress the ruling order's right to punish, or to challenge it. But the presence or absence of religious appeals did not change the fact that in Egyptian vigilantism, the primary line for determining communal boundaries passed between the endogenous community (constricted and consolidated) on one side, and exogenous groups (and anyone contaminated by them) on the other side.

Despite the debates over moral and religious probity, however, neither religion nor morality constituted the primary cause of the 1952 Free Officer's coup. The moral imaginary did play an important contributing role, however. Myths like 4 February, the Canal Zone atrocities, and King Fārūq's banqueting while Cairo burned were used in activist campaigns to undermine the legitimacy of the *ancien régime*. And the Free Officers took their mandate from these myths.

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[152] Muḥammad Maḥmūd Zaytūn, "Jalāʾ…wa Jalāʾ," *Majallat al-Risālah* 970, 4 February 1952, 133–136.

It is said that when institutions fail the test of justice, "morality acquires new flag-bearers."[153] The Muslim Brotherhood, Miṣr al-Fatāh, the EMNL, the Wafd, and many other groups attempted to seize the standard of social order and moral reform. Among these groups, the Muslim Brotherhood made a particularly convincing case for their ability to guard the social order, encourage strong reciprocity, promote social cooperation, and enforce conformity in times of trouble. They accomplished this by providing social services, policing and punishing social violators, and performing their unique vision of morality and order. However, after 23 July 1952, the right to bear the flag of public morality was not seized by the Muslim Brotherhood, Miṣr al-Fatāh, or any of the communist clubs, but by a vigilante cadre from the ranks of the state, with a better claim over the right to defend and punish: the "Blessed Army Movement."

[153] Nandini Sundar, "Vigilantism, Culpability, and Moral Dilemmas," *Critique of Anthropology* 30, no. 1 (April 2010): 116–117.

Chapter 9

What Would You Do If You Were Invisible?
Ideating Violence/Actuating Violence

On a sunny Mediterranean afternoon, an educated and urbane young law student crossed through the Place Bugeaud, a block from the beach in the chic, Europeanized city-center of Algiers. The young woman wore a fashionable blue- and white-striped summer dress; it swished around her ankles as she entered the popular Milk Bar on the Rue d'Isly. The café was buzzing with life. It was the last day of the summer holiday before school resumed, so college students, mothers, and children returning from the beach happily stopped to cool down with a shake or ice cream. Along with the other students, the young lady took a stool at the bar, set her beach bag on the ground, and ordered a Peach Melba ice cream.

The day was Sunday, 30 September 1956, and the young woman was twenty-two year-old law student Zohra Drif. She ate her sweet treat slowly. Then, she paid her bill and exited the café, back through the sparkling glass doors—without her beach bag. The clocked ticked. One minute, then two, and three, and four: Zohra lost count. She was down the street.

The explosion ripped through the ice cream shop. Nicole Guiraud, who was ten years old at the time, remembered the day, albeit in pieces. She and her father had just come from watching the boats on the harbor. The shop was busy and overcrowded, so rather than sit, her father paid for her cornetto at the counter. They turned to leave. They were at the threshold of the café when there was a deafening noise, fog, debris, smoke—and the world went silent. Chaos. Panic. Dust, the force of feet trampling her underfoot. In one

moment, she screamed for her father. In another, she was suddenly in the street outside, in a silent world of glass and debris—she was temporarily deaf from the explosion. Suddenly, her father was there, lifting her, holding her tightly to his chest. Another moment, a stranger jerked her away. Her father loosened his tie, grabbed her shoulder, and wrapped the tie near her upper arm. Her beautiful plaid dress was wet with blood. And where her left arm had been, there was now just a dangling sleeve.[1]

That same year, in the same city, another young Algerian girl of about the same age contemplated a violent act of her own. The young woman, Louisette Ighilahriz, was twenty-one years old, and not as educated or well-to-do as Zohra Drif. Louisette had studied for a professional aptitude certificate in home economics (sewing, cooking, and household management), and worked at her father's bakery. Her father was already in prison for political activism, and Louisette had also started working with the FLN. She regularly transported money, documents, and weapons for the organization, baking the contraband into bread made at the family bakery. As she recalled, her French classmates at school did not know "I was already a 'terrorist,'" although some of her schoolmates might have "nonetheless suspected that I was going to become one. Because everyone was aware of the arrest of my father."[2]

One day in her neighborhood, Louisette saw some French soldiers kicking, insulting, and beating a pregnant Algerian woman lying on the sidewalk. Infuriated, Louisette ran back to the bakery. She grabbed a pistol, hid it in her jacket, and set out. Near the bakery

[1] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN* (Algiers: Éditions Chihab, 2013), 161–191; Nicole Guiraud testimony before the Congrès Veritas, Nice, 20 September 2008, in La Lettre de Veritas no. 126 (October 2008).

[2] Louisette Ighilahriz, *Algérienne* (Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 2001), 73–74.

was a French military barracks, where a French soldier always stood guard by the gate. Louisette remembered vividly how she felt. She says she went there with "ideas of murder," having decided to kill the sentry. There at the gate, she prepared to draw the pistol. And the soldier turned around. "I saw that he was a kid… He was handsome. He was about the same age as me…. Naïve, he had no suspicions about anything." Her hand loosened on the pistol. And in an instant, she turned around and left.[3]

These two girls, both members of the FLN who participated in the Battle of Algiers, came from different backgrounds. Louisette was uneducated, working-class, and had almost no friends at school. She had one parent who was already in jail for his FLN activities (her father), and a mother, sister, and uncle who were heavily invested in FLN activism. In terms of propensity for violence, her peers assumed she was high-risk. Zohra, on the other hand, was a well-educated young woman hailing from the Algerian elite; she had close friends, and a father who was a *qadi* [judge] in the French administration, and a mother who was strongly opposed to political activism. Louisette had opportunity to attack a French combatant (a young male soldier), but she felt sympathy for him and aborted the attack. Meanwhile, Zohra had the opportunity to attack a group of French non-combatants (including women and children), and did. In other words, both young women made somewhat counter-intuitive decisions concerning whether or not to perpetrate violent attacks.

Such decision-making begs the question: what social factors, cognitive strategies, and moral rationales informed Algerian decisions to commit violent acts during the Battle of

[3] Louisette Ighilahriz went through the remainder of the war (and as far as it is known, her life), without having killed anyone. See: Ibid.

Algiers? I have already described why many activists crossed the line from legal to illegal action: in addition to historical shifts and carefully-crafted morality tales, social factors like escalatory investment, habituation, and social pressure played a role. Why did a minority of Algerians and French activists, however, take the additional step of disregarding social taboos concerning the use of violence, particularly violence against noncombatants?

This question is important, as colonial stereotypes at the time characterized Algerians as "criminal types," savage killers driven by animal impulse and religious fanaticism, prone to commit senseless crimes without motive.[4] Yet neither Zohra or Louisette were religious devotees; both described themselves as secular. Moreover, some of the FLN's French supporters (Catholic, Jewish, and atheist) participated in violent acts as well. With religious status thus neither necessary nor sufficient cause for violence, what moral cognitions and rationalizations affected the decision to choose violence?

As an entrance into this question, the following pages will explore four moments in which aggression was imagined and/or actuated: the Casbah essays, Fanon's case of two Algerian boys who killed their French playmate, and two moments in the lives of FLN members Louisette Ighilahriz and Zohra Drif. Each incident highlights how Algerian activists in a particular historical moment—the Battle of Algiers—negotiated heuristics and environmental cues when considering a violent act. Each story also highlights some of the analytical snares one encounters when studying human aggression—snares such as the cognition-behavior gap and the unpredictability of multivariate decision-making.

[4] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 150, 222–228; Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* [*L'an cinq, de la révolution algérienne*], 41; Monique Gadant, *Islam et nationalisme en Algérie: d'après "El Moudjahid" organe central du FLN de 1956 à 1962* (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1988), 23.

These stories of how a few Algerian activists arrived at the decision to commit a violent act should not be read as evidence the "ubiquity of violence" in Algerian history and society, however. Nor were these incidents evidence of the pathology of certain individuals. Instead, these events from the Battle of Algiers were an example of what James McDougall (in a study of Algerian violence in 1990s) once described as "distinct moments [in] the social production and cultural encoding of the various forms of violence."[5] And as this chapter explores, even during the Battle of Algiers—arguably one of the most recognizable and distinct moments in the social production of violence during the Algerian war—violent fantasies and violent deeds were far from alike, and outcomes far from determined. This was because decisions to participate in violence were at once informed by *longue durée* historical and biological structures, individual life-cycle and community *conjonctures*, and minute social and cognitive *événementielle*—which changed even as actors considered a decision.[6] And while the previous chapter focused on historical and social conjunctures, this chapter will explore how cognitive events contributed to the production of violent fantasies and violent deeds.

Violent Fantasies, Violent Words in the Casbah Student Essays

In 1957 (sometime between July and August), the eminent French ethnologist Germaine Tillion visited one of the *Service des Centres Sociaux* (SCS) in Algiers. The center was one of those "sites of contact" in French Algeria, where French social workers interacted with Algerian Muslims from the Casbah, or old city, of Algiers. Tillion later

[5] James McDougall, "Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s–1990s," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 117–118.

[6] J.H. Hexter, "Fernand Braudel and the *Monde Braudellien*…," in *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, ed. Stuart Clark (London: Routledge, 1999), 49–52.

wrote that she had "wanted to collect documents to put an end to the repression." As a result, psychologist Bernard Durey introduced Tillion to a Muslim teacher from the Casbah. The teacher had become interested in psychoanalysis after a trip to Paris, and upon returning to Algiers, on 22 June 1957 he gave his students (ages 10–14) an essay prompt that asked "What would you do if you were invisible?" Upon collecting and reading the essays, however, the teacher said he had been "completely distraught" and panicked. Now a month or so after, he agreed to give Tillion the stack of 32 essays (minus one, which was sent to Jean-Paul Sartre at *Les Temps Modernes*).[7]

Indeed, the essays were hair-raising enough that upon returning to France, Germaine Tillion showed them to editor Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and staff journalist Jean Daniel at *L'Express*. They begged her to let them publish the essays, repeating over and over "We must end the war in Algeria," but she vigorously opposed them, worried that the teacher who had given her the essays would be tortured if the essays leaked. She did, however, show them to Prime Minister Guy Mollet. The essays then sat with Tillion for over a year and a half, before being published by the Comité pour la Paix en Algérie and *Les Temps Modernes* as part of an argument for ending the war in Algeria.[8]

Since then, the only scholar (besides Tillion) who has studied the essays in any length has been Alexis Artaud de La Ferrière. And as he rightly pointed out, the documents

[7] Germaine Tillion, *Combats de guerre et de paix* (Paris: Seuil, 2007), 651.

[8] "Que feriez-vous si vous étiez invisible?" 22 June 1957, in Comité pour la Paix en Algérie, *Et ils pacifièrent Alger* (Brussels, 1959). The Brussels version includes photocopies of the assignments of Students 1, 4, 10, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, and the first half of 20. For the version in *Les Temps Modernes*, see "A quoi rêvent les enfants d'Algérie?" *Les Temps Modernes* 164 (October 1959): 720-724. There is also a version reproduced in Patrick Kessel and Giovanni Pirelli, eds., *Le peuple algérien et la guerre: lettres et témoignages d'Algériens, 1954-1962* (Paris: François Maspero, 1962), 109-111, although at least two entries are confused, and other entries are truncated. Finally, Germaine Tillion herself reprinted 23 of the 32 essays in Germaine Tillion, *Combats de guerre et de paix*, 651-659. I have numbered these (Students 1–23), and this is the version I will reference.

should be approached with caution, rather than treated as "pure" examples of children's testimony. There are reasons to doubt the veracity of the documents: a few essays demonstrated handwriting and linguistic similarities; the documents had an unclear chain of custody, and Algerian children did not usually express political positions to teachers because of the dangers involved. There were also accusations the SCS had been "infiltrated" by the FLN, raising questions of whether the essays were intended to sway French opinion against the war. He added that in general, historians should be careful treating children's writings as "pure" or "innocent" voices.[9] To these astute observations, I would add that the essays could have been influenced by adult and/or student intervention in the form of classroom discussion, discussions with parents and siblings at home, transcription of oral responses by the teacher, and/or editorial selection by the teacher. At the very least, a few responses seem to have been rewritten (probably by the teacher for readability).

But all caveats considered, there are compelling reasons to consider the documents. Foremost among these is the interest of not withholding historically pertinent data. The Casbah essays have also become an infamous example of violence in the context of the 1956–1957 Battle of Algiers—a legacy that should be addressed. In addition, based on the content of the essays, an excellent case can be made that 1) the documents are of Algerian origin and written during the Battle of Algiers, and 2) that children were involved in their production, with most of the entries being dissimilar enough in handwriting, linguistic form, content, length, spelling, and grammar[10] to warrant analysis.

[9] Alexis Artaud de La Ferrière, "The Voice of the Innocent: Propaganda and Childhood Testimonies of War," *History of Education* 43, no. 1 (2014): 105–123.

[10] For instance, the essays contain many grammatical errors (such as homophone confusion between *c'est*/*ces*/*ses*/*sais*) and irregular usage of French tenses and moods. More rudimentary essays reply to the

The teacher, moreover, redacted the students' names, but included their birthdates. Tillion, for her part, did not doubt the authenticity of the documents.[11]

All things considered, how did the students respond to the question "What would you do if you were invisible?" In fact, students answered the essay prompt in many ways. Many students said if they were invisible, they would release prisoners (one boy said he would release his three brothers from prison), hunt rabbits, steal the class pennant, steal money and give it to the poor, go to restaurants, visit the circus, become King, get drunk, steal vehicles (bikes, scooters, cars, boats, and taxis), and steal livestock (sheep, horses, and goats). Many other students imagined stealing fruit (apples, oranges, figs, loquats, apricots), shoes, clothes, food, sugar, and lemonade. However, there were darker responses. A number or students described harassing, robbing, or killing the school principal. But by far the most popular responses were 1) wanting to kill or bomb French soldiers (20 of 23 essays; and from the three remaining essays, two mentioned wanting to battle soldiers), followed by 2) wanting to rob the bank (16 of 23 essays; and two additional essays mentioned stealing money). Over half of the essays described wanting to plant or throw bombs (15 of 23 essays; of those, 6 mentioned bombing civilian targets) and over half of the essays described wanting to kill civilians (14 of 23).[12]

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prompt using present/future constructs instead of the conditional, while more advanced essays use imperfect or pluperfect/conditional. Other essays shift irregularly between tenses and moods. Discursively, a few essays appeal to Islamic themes or use Arabic terms, other essays use secular discourses. There are also many spelling errors. "Indépendance" is variously spelled indépandanse, indeponsedanse, and independanse, and "bombes" becomes in some essays bonbe and bobes. "Mitraillette" or "mitrailleuse" [machine-gun] seems to have been a problem word for many students, being spelled: mitralleses, mitrayetes, mitrailette, mitralletes, mitrallettes, and métraeillette.

[11] Alexis Artaud de La Ferrière, "The Voice of the Innocent: Propaganda and Childhood Testimonies of War," 111.

[12] Of those wanting to kill civilians, the targets mentioned were: Student 1 (bomb the French neighborhood, kill Guy Mollet and Robert Lacoste), Student 2 (bomb barracks, police stations, and churches), Student 4 (kill all French big and small), Student 5 (kill all women and men, bomb "all the city"), Student 6 (kill the French), Student 7 (bomb a French house), Student 8 (kill all the French all the Jews, kill all the French), Student 10 (kill Muslim snitches), Student 11 (kill the French, bomb "rich

Student 4 (11 years old) was one example of this content. As the student wrote,

> "I would strangle the parachutists… Put a bomb in the police station and rescue the prisoners. And then I would steal the jewelry. And I would rescue my three brothers who are prisoners of the French soldiers. And I will massacre all the French, big and small, on the way. … And then I would go up to the Aurès Mountains to give the rifles, [and] the machine guns to win Algerian independence."[13]

Student 16 similarly described how he would bomb the military barracks and police stations, and kill members of the security services (CRS). He added "I would go to where the parachutists are and I would kill them like dogs… then I would go to the Aurès, I would kill all who… attack the rebels. LONG LIVE the Arabs and long live the FLN."[14] Student 20 wrote "I would bomb the commissary… If I had a pistol, I would kill the 'bouchénachas' [informers]… If I had a rifle, I would be a fellagha."[15] And Student 22 wrote "I would kill the paras who torture men. Like the Indians[16] I would plant bombs in the bars, in the casinos, in the barracks. I would kill all Massu's paras.[17] I would attack the arms convoys, and give [the weapons] to the men in [the detention camp at]

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cities"), Student 13 (kill the school principle), Student 15 (bomb the Hotel Touring), Student 20 (kill Muslim informers), Student 22 (bomb bars, the casino), Student 23 (bomb the Milk Bar and the Cafeteria, kill Muslim traitors, kill Ali Chekal, Robert Lacoste, and Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury.)

[13] Student born 26 July 1946, 11 years old, "Samedi 22 juin 1957, Que feriez-vous si vous étiez invisible?," 653.

[14] Student born 25 November 1942, 14 years old, 7 months, "Samedi 22 juin 1957, Que feriez-vous si vous étiez invisible?," 657.

[15] Student born 14 January 1946, 11 years old, 5 months, "Samedi 22 juin 1957, Que feriez-vous si vous étiez invisible?," 657.

[16] As the FLN had been printing information about Indian support for the Algerian cause and framing the Algerian struggle as part of the broader struggle for decolonization in Asia and Africa, the student was likely referencing the Nationalist bombings of the 1900s–1920s in India, or the Quit India Movement of the 1940s (which like the FLN's 1954 uprising had included bombings, attacks on post offices and administrative buildings, and the sabotage of communications lines), See for instance FLN, "La lutte du peuple algérien s'inscrit dans la lutte des peuples d'Afrique et d'Asie" in SHD GR 1H 1715.

[17] General Jacques Massu, leader of the 10th Parachute Division of the French Army, was the commander charged with "pacifying" the Casbah during the Battle of Algiers. He was infamous for instituting patrols, raids, stop-and-searches, arrests, and tortures, and checkpoints in the neighborhood where the children were located.



Figure 9.1 – Student #20 in the Series "What Would You Do if You Were Invisible?" The student writes about stealing sugar from his mother, killing informers, and bombing the commissary.

(Source: Student born 14 January 1944, 11 years old, 5 months, in Comité pour la Paix en Algérie, *Et ils pacifièrent Alger* [Brussels, 1959], 33.)

Paul Cazelles. I would steal the jewelry from French women, just as Massu's paras do; they take pictures of [Algerian] women to show to men."[18]

[18] Student born 11 February 1944, 13 years old, 4 months, "Samedi 22 juin 1957, Que feriez-vous si vous étiez invisible?," 658.

Translation Note: As the students responding to these questions were young, their essays show many grammatical errors and irregular usage of French tenses and moods. More rudimentary essays reply to the prompt using present/future constructs (implying actions are possible or even likely to occur), while more advanced essays use imperfect or pluperfect/conditional; that said, many students shift irregularly between tenses and moods. As a result, rather than over-interpret the shifts as intentional (e.g. as an indication that the students really intended to become invisible or rob a bank), I have translated the entries as fully hypothetical.

Finally, Student 23 described how "If I were invisible, I would rob the bank, I would kill men, I would steal bread, apples, figs, and taxis [sic]. I would also kill police officers. I would free the prisoners. … I would steal machine guns, revolvers, bombs, and I would deposit them at the Milk Bar, [and] the Cafeteria, and I would also kill Robert Lacoste, [Maurice] Bourgès-Maunoury, and it would be me who killed Ali Chekkal[19] as he was leaving the stadium…. Who told me to kill the soldiers? It's in my head, and I would kill, I would kill the *mounafiqines* [Muslim traitors and hypocrites]. I would attack Massu's paras [paratroopers], those wretches, those thieves, those imbeciles, those idiots, those cretins. DOWN WITH THE PARAS OF MASSU. Long live the Front."[20]

Before making any suggestions on what the essays might say about violent behavior, it is important to explain what the essays *do not say* about violent behavior. First, although the scientific study of homicidal ideations is still nascent, those studies that do exist suggest that homicidal ideation is common. In wartime, homicidal fantasies are prevalent in children over the age of seven,[21] and various French activists in the present study described fantasizing about killing the Germans as children, with Anne Beaumanoir as a fourteen-year-old wanting to follow the example of the fictional Chinese suicide-bomber Tchen. (The current author similarly read a 1990s-era class assignment from an

[19] Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury served as French Defense Minister from February 1956–June 1957, and Prime Minister from June–November 1957, and advocated a military response to events in Algiers. Robert Lacoste was the French Resident Minister of Algeria, who invested General Jacques Massu with police powers over the city of Algiers in January 1957. Ali Chekkal was an Algerian politician, famous for his advocacy of a French Algeria. Condemned to death as a traitor by the FLN, he was assassinated at a soccer match on 26 May 1957.

[20] Student born 18 February 1944, 13 years old, 4 months, "Samedi 22 juin 1957, Que feriez-vous si vous étiez invisible?," 658.

[21] Raija-Leena Punamäki and Taina Puhakka, "Determinants and Effectiveness of Children's Coping with Political Violence," *International Journal of Behavioral Development* 21, no. 2 (1997): 349–370.

American class of 11–12 year-olds, in which students were asked to write stories about their classmates and read them aloud. Many essays involved homicidal fantasies about killing classmates and teachers; none were ever actuated.)

Homicidal ideations are also common among adults, with some 75–90% of adult males in peacetime studies admitting to the practice.[22] Francis Jeanson reported that he and other suitcase carriers wanted to participate in FF-FLN bomb attacks (but were not given the opportunity), and European PCA activist Gilberte Chemouilli described to an interviewer how being surrounded by French soldiers, she imagined wanting "to be a bomb, in order to explode."[23] Thus, particularly in light of the wartime context, the Casbah essays *do not necessarily indicate any abnormal cognitions on the part of the children.*

Second, the Casbah essays *do not indicate intent to commit violent attacks* by the students. Studies of violent and threatening notes (including reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, FBI-NCAVC) have found that written threats to kill (whether phrased in hypothetical or actual terms) were *inversely* related to whether or not the note-writer followed through on

[22] A study of adult Texans found a rate of 91% for homicidal ideations; a study of Finnish male college students self-reported a rate of 80%, two studies of American college students similarly found rates of 75% and 79%, respectively. The locations and cultural differences of study subjects notwithstanding, the Texas percentage was likely higher in part because it included a broader range of socio-economic groups, older individuals, and individuals of low cognitive ability. (Low cognitive ability has so far proven to be the one of the most contributive factors to aggression, far outpacing socioeconomic differences.)

See: Joshua David Duntley, "Homicidal Ideations," (PhD dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 2005), 54; Douglas T. Kenrick and Virgil Sheets, "Homicidal Fantasies," *Evolution and Human Behavior* 14, no. 4 (July 1993): 231–246; Laura Auvinen-Lintunen et al., "Sex Differences in Homicidal Fantasies among Finnish University Students," *Psychology* 6, (2015): 39–47.

[23] Francis Jeanson interview with Richard Copans, in *Les frères des Frères*, directed by Richard Copans (Paris: Les Films d'ici, 1992); Gilberte Chemouilli interview with Pierre-Jean Le Foll-Luciani, 22 June 2012, in "'J'aurais aimé être une bombe pour exploser': les militantes communistes algériennes entre assignations sexuées et subversions des rôles de genre (1944-1962)," *Le Mouvement Social* 255 (April–June 2016): 51.

the threat, with death threats being "the least likely threat to be carried out." Although this finding might seem counter-intuitive, it is because writing or verbalizing threats serves a purpose different from planning an attack. Sometimes threats serve as an agonistic display (they are meant to unsettle or intimidate), sometimes verbal and written threats serve a cathartic function (a release for energy and feelings that cannot or should not be directed at the target), and at other times threats are used as virtue-signaling or to send a message to peers (e.g., communicating one's willingness to attack a collective enemy or defend one's group; or signaling one's distress concerning shared traumas).

Individuals planning to perpetrate attacks, on the other hand, generally demonstrate more predatory behavior, preferring not to give their victim advance warning (and only confiding their intent to accomplices, close family members, or close friends). Zohra Drif and Samia Lakhdari, for instance, intentionally made no public political statements and joined no student or political organizations before joining the Yacef Saadi network and carrying out the Milk Bar and Cafeteria bombings. Their decision to abstain from activism prior to the attacks was controversial within their community: it generated rumors and negative feedback from other Algerian students, who saw their refusal to participate in nationalist activism as anti-social and pro-French. But Drif and Lakhdari took on that cost, to increase their chances of being recruited into the FLN. They did, however, confide to one family member, of whose support they were sure. This family member (Mama Zhor) then helped them carry out the attack. Other family members were kept in the dark. *Jeune Résistance*, although having a different goal, similarly advised its

sympathizers "Before joining a JR team for clandestine action, avoid drawing attention [*signaler*] to yourself through inappropriate public opinions."[24]

Third, the Casbah essays *do not necessary suggest a high probability that the children would go on to commit violent acts.* The actuation rate for violent fantasies is typically quite low. Even violent communications, which require putting thoughts to action, rarely lead to violent attacks.[25] Why are actuation rates so low? Ultimately, violent ideations and moralistic impulses are far insufficient on their own to overcome 1) individual regulatory processes (inhibitions and impulse control), 2) limited access to resources and opportunities that would facilitate action, 3) social inhibitors and regulatory processes (norms, taboos, group pressures, etc.), and 4) the steep probable costs one could expect to incur from actuation.[26] Thus, similar to how many individuals expressed moralistic sentiments (like anger and disgust) but few joined activist groups working to change the situation that had generated the feelings, most individuals with violent ideations never crossed from sympathy to action (see Chapters 2, 3, and 7, for instance).

Fourth, the Casbah essays *do not indicate what the students might have done in different circumstances* (i.e., if they had the means and if they knew there would be no

[24] Sharon S. Smith, "From Violent Words to Violent Deeds? Assessing Risk from Threatening Communications," (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2006), 22–78; Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 74–77; "Jeune Résistance s'adresse d'abord aux jeunes," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 2: Jeune Résisitance" s'explique* (1960), 13.

[25] See footnote 22, (Duntley, Kenrick, etc.), as well as: Sharon S. Smith, "From Violent Words to Violent Deeds? Assessing Risk from Threatening Communications," (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2006); *Zohra Drif, Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 74-77.

[26] For instance, ideation involves the activation of the posterior cerebellum (important in the inhibition of movement) and fronto-temporal regions (involved in the regulation of emotions and motor functions), whereas the execution of movement engages, among other regions of the brain, the anterior cingulate cortex and the cerebellum (which coordinates motor movements). Simona Gardini, "Brain Activation Patterns Characterizing Different Phases of Motor Action: Execution, Choice and Ideation," *Brain Topography* 29 (2016):679–692; Martin Lotze et al., "Activation of Cortical and Cerebellar Motor Areas during Executed and Imagined Hand Movements: An fMRI Study," *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 11, no. 5 (September 1999): 491–501.

consequences to killing). A peacetime study, for instance, asked adult males in the United States if they had ever had a homicidal fantasy (91% said "yes"), and then asked whether they would have carried out their homicidal fantasy "if they knew the [murder] would not be discovered." Nearly a third (27.7%) of the men responded "yes"—in the absence of legal and social consequences, they would have actuated their murderous fantasy.[27] This tells us very little, however, about what the men would have done—it only tells us what they *think* they would have done. This is an important distinction, because when asked hypothetical questions, individuals tend to overestimate their abilities and underestimate the power of individual and social inhibitors and other social pressures.[28] In other words, imagining or predicting what one would do and actually doing it are two very separate things.

Fifth, the Casbah essays *do not tell scholars what cognitive function the essays served for the authors*. Much like mythmaking, fantasizing serves multiple complex functions for humans. Fantasizing can be used for: cathartically releasing stress, anger, frustration, and other emotions one does not want to publicly release; coping with difficult or frustrating situations; managing unfulfilled needs and wants; entertainment and enjoying the (imaginary) fruits of an action one knows to be impossible; and auto-production of emotions (anger, arousal, happiness, hope, fear, sadness, etc.). Fantasizing also serves auto-didactic functions, being used to correct oneself after mistakes; imagine paths to goal attainment; predict possible outcomes of behavioral paths; rehearse for upcoming

[27] Joshua David Duntley, "Homicidal Ideations," 54-61.

[28] A famous study by Richard LaPiere, for instance, surveyed small restaurants during a period of anti-Chinese racial tension in the United States, asking restaurant managers whether they would refuse service to Chinese customers. 90 percent of managers said "yes," they would refuse service to Chinese clients. However, when the study followed up by taking Chinese customers to these same restaurants, of 250 visited restaurants, no restaurant refused to serve the Chinese diners. See: Richard T. LaPiere, "Attitudes vs. Actions," *Social Forces* 13 (1934): 230–237.

situations (or re-rehearse after the fact, to train oneself for future encounters); and construct one's sense of self (through stories one tells oneself about who one wants to be). For instance, for children in wartime, violent ideations have been shown to serve an important coping function, with children using cognitive restructuring to fantasize that they are heroes killing the enemy and freeing prisoners (when in fact they are impotently trapped with their family at home during curfew).[29]

Sixth, it is important to note that *the hybrid modality of the essays (violent fantasizing, written down in the form of a hypothetical essay) makes it even more challenging to interpret the intent behind the essays*. Homicidal ideations and homicidal signaling (speech-acts and written threats) serve separate and complex functions in agonistic behavior. Internal processes like fantasizing usually serve more cathartic and auto-didactic functions. Spoken and written ideas, on the other hand, tend to serve signaling functions as well (ex: signaling one's patriotism to peers, signaling disgust and anger at certain behaviors, trying to instill fear in an opponent, etc.).

Thus, it is important to determine what audience(s) the children were signaling in putting thoughts to paper. Were the children expressing their ideas principally to their adult (Algerian) teacher, or were they also expressing themselves to their peers? Did family members at home read the essays prior to submission? Were the essays turned in anonymously? What was the political outlook of the teacher, and had he expressed this outlook to the students? These are questions that are important to know before jumping to conclusions about whether the children were headed toward violent behavior. The

[29] Raija-Leena Punamäki and Taina Puhakka, "Determinants and Effectiveness of Children's Coping with Political Violence," *International Journal of Behavioral Development* 21, no. 2 (1997): 349–370. Also see the testimonies of Noël Favrelière and Anne Beaumanoir.

observation of peers and/or an authority figure (such as a parent or teacher) radically changes behavior. Moreover, in times of war, communal solidarity and virtue signaling tend to focus on vocally opposing the enemy and declaring one's dedication to the community. Especially considering the similarities between many of the student essays (mentions of attacking paratroopers, punishing traitors within the Algerian community, references to recent bombings, and the Algerian flag), it is important to consider what social imitation and signaling processes were at work. Considering the date of the essays (22 June 1957), the students may have also been responding to commemorations of the one-year anniversary of the Zabana and Ferradj executions (on 19 June). The anonymity of the Casbah essay authors and teacher, and the lack of information about the production process behind the essays, thus makes it difficult (if not impossible) to determine *why* the essays were written in the way they were, and their relationship (if any) to actuated violence.

Caveats aside, what can one learn from the Casbah essays? One, I would argue that *it is important to note one's own emotions and moral impulses reading the essays.* Those passages arousing emotions (surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, sympathy or hostility) in the reader are important signals as to the engagement of one's own "moral immune system." For instance, the mention of bombs in public places or harming non-combatants might arouse antipathy, as aggression against noncombatants is taboo in most societies. For readers to whom fruit and footwear are readily available, the mention of stealing fruit and shoes might arouse sympathy or sadness. On the other hand, depending on one's religious affiliation and political outlook, terms like "jihadists" and "Allah" might trigger feelings of threat or alarm, hostility, embarrassment, or defensiveness. In other words, the

Casbah essays can speak to our own social norms, moral impulses, beliefs, and heuristics. That said, it is important to recognize that our emotional responses *do not* tell us how Algerian and French readers understood the essays in 1957 (when the essays were first read) and in 1959 (when the essays were published). According to Tillion, the Algerian Muslim teacher was panicked and distressed [*affolé*], while Tillion and French journalists she met described feeling they had read something that would help end the war (perhaps by inspiring shock and sympathy).

Next, from the behavioral history perspective, a few things stand out in the essays. One clear trend was that much of the aggression in the essays was imitative, referring to attacks that actually occurred: the essays mention the assassination of Ali Chekkal, the attacks at the Milk Bar and Cafeteria, and the Casino bombing (which occurred just two weeks before the essays were written), for instance. Another common trope was the direction of animosity and blame toward Algerian "snitches" and "traitors" like Ali Chekkal, French leaders (including Prime Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Governor-General of Algeria Robert Lacoste, and General Jacques Massu), and of course the ubiquitous paratroopers (who had cordoned off the neighborhood in which the students lived, and were conducting raids and searches at the time the essays were written).

While very few essays explained why students imagined killing these figures, *those essays that did provide a reason for aggression cited reciprocity or wanting to punish past crimes and misbehavior*. Student 1, for instance, wrote he would "take revenge on the paras who have made so much misery for my brothers," and Student 22 wrote "I would kill the paras who are torturing men" and "I would steal jewelry from French

women like Massu's paras do." Student 17 similarly wrote "I would strike all who cause harm [hurt people], I would kill all the paras because they cause harm." The negative reciprocity principle held true for violence directed against others as well: Student 11 said he would "hit the men who beat children" and Student 3 mentioned punishing the bad behavior of other children, writing "I would hit the kids who are mean."

Regarding the relationship between violence and religion in the essays, there was little connection. In some form or another, all of the essays mentioned violence. (This was likely the result of selection bias; originally, there had been 31–32 essays, but the teacher only gave Tillion two dozen essays he found alarming). Almost all of the essays (20/23) mentioned wanting to *kill* soldiers or "paras," and of the three that did not, two mentioned wanting to *fight* soldiers. Moreover, 14 of 23 essays explicitly mentioned wanting to kill civilians (including politicians). However, only 6 of 23 essays contained any religious discourse. Student 22 once mentioned "mujahidin"—a term technically religious in origin, but vague in meaning and secularized to point by the FLN it should probably be discounted as "religious discourse" altogether (as it was the only religious reference in the essay). Finally, Student 23 once used the term "mounafikin" (Arabic *munāfiqīn*), a Qurʾānic term meaning "hypocrites" that describes those who falsely claim to be believers, feign devotion, or profess faith while continuing to sin.[30] Religious in origin and usage, the term was often used in Egyptian and Algerian discourse to refer to traitors within the Muslim community.

[30] See for instance Qurʾān 4:143, and Surah 63 (*Al-Munāfiqūn*).

Students 1 and 13 used the most religious language. The only essay that 1) used religious discourse, 2) cited religion as motivation for violence, and 3) directed that discourse toward French targets was Student 1. Even so, Student 1 repeatedly cited reciprocity motives as well:

> "If I were invisible, the first job I would do would be *to take revenge on the paras who have made so much misery for my brothers*. I would take a rope and strangle the last of the paras who were patrolling the tunnel in our neighborhood, and I would take his weapons, then I would run behind the other paras and kill them. *And if they dared do everything they were in the habit of doing [i.e., torture], I would double-torture them* before killing them. And I'm not done—I would sabotage all their plans; I would plant bombs in the French neighborhoods, I would go up to Guy Mollet and Robert Lacoste, I would kill them, I would go to the Aurès Mountains, I would give courage to our brothers the ji GORIOUS JIHADISTS [*moudjahidines*] that I would find there, I would throw grenades at the paras who would come there, to that holy place, and when we bring independence, I will raise the flag myself. Then, if I died, it wouldn't matter. I would have finished the mission that Allah entrusted to me."[31]

Ironically, the most "religiously violent" of the essays, Student 13, was an outlier: unlike all of the other students in the group, he wrote nothing about violence against French soldiers or paratroopers, and wrote nothing about the war. Instead, he described wanting to go to the school principal's house, steal his notebooks, books, pencils, pens, etc., and strangle him "if he does not love the Muslim religion."

Finally, two other essays mentioned violence against religious-communal targets. Student 2 wrote that besides stealing oranges and apricots, "I would bomb the gendarmerie, all the French [military] barracks, the churches… I would kill all the French and the soldiers." Student 8, meanwhile, mentioned wanting to kill "all the French and all the Jews." Despite this, the only ideological discourses in his essay were Arab nationalist: "Long live the arabs, long live the fellagua, long live nassere, long live bourguiba and

[31] Student born 10 October 1946, 10 years, 8 months, "Samedi 22 juin 1957, Que feriez-vous si vous étiez invisible?," 652–653.

long live ferhate Abase. indeponsedanse to the arabs, long live Algerian independanse [sic]."

Overall then, a generous estimate would put the number of violent essays with a religious outlook or discourse at only six out of twenty-three. Moreover, if one considers Students 2 and 8 to have been more concerned with punishing specific ethno-religious communities, the number drops to 4 of 23. In reality, however, religious content was absent from most of the "violent" essays, and only Students 1 and 13 had any statements that implied any religious motivation for violence. Children expressed the desire to perpetrate violence in mostly secular idioms, and if moral justifications were offered, they overwhelmingly had to do with negative reciprocity.

What factors in violent ideations and communications should scholars therefore consider significant? For one, studies have suggested that there is an important distinction between limited and repetitive fantasizing. Repetitive fantasizing carries a higher positive correlation to actuated aggression, as repetition is habituating and didactic. Violent fantasizing, if performed repeatedly, can become cognitive "rehearsing" and contribute to violent behavior. Moreover, repeat threats, spending weeks or months developing a plan and rehearsing, journaling, revenge-seeking (reciprocity), interest-based grievances, idolization of previous attackers (social emulation), the presence of recent attacks to emulate, and obliquely mentioning the coming of "something big," are all factors that positively correlate to violent attacks.[32] In addition, violent words (especially by authority figures or high-status peers) are significant, in that they can prompt others to revise their

[32] L. Rowell Huesrnann and Leonard D. Eron, "Cognitive Processes and the Persistence of Aggressive Behavior," *Aggressive Behavior* 10, no. 3 (1984): 243–251; Sharon S. Smith, "From Violent Words to Violent Deeds?," 22–28.

estimations of social support for violence. But overall, while violent fantasizing and violent words could contribute to violence, like many other factors, they were not sufficient on their own. In other words, violent ideations and threats should neither be ignored nor over-determined. These were just two factors among many that could play a role in aggressive behavior, but which on their own were causally insufficient.

In the "Heat of the Moment": Choosing Violence

Having distinguished between violent fantasies, violent words, and violent acts, what can Algerian activist experiences tell us about the decision to actuate violence in the context of the Battle of Algiers? And what moral rationales did activists invoke when justifying violent acts during the Algerian war? One interesting place to start is with a "hot testimony,"[33] in the form of statements given during the court-ordered psychiatric evaluations of two Algerian boys accused of murdering their European playmate. As an example of an actuated homicidal attack by Algerian children, the case provides a good point of comparison to the Casbah essays.

One of Frantz Fanon's psychiatric case studies, the evaluation involved two Algerian boys, a thirteen-year-old and a fourteen-year old, who murdered their European playmate around 1958. While being questioned by court-appointed psychiatrists, the boys freely admitted their crime, and expressed no remorse or guilt concerning the murder. Moreover, both children insisted their European playmate had done nothing wrong. The thirteen-year old boy described the crime in the following terms:

> "We were not angry with him. Every Thursday we used to go hunting with slingshots together on the hill overlooking the village. He was our good friend. …One day we

[33] Wadi Bouzar, "Préface," to Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance* (Algiers: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1989 [First ed. Cairo: Comité de Libération du Maghreb Arabe, 1954]), 5.

decided to kill him, because the Europeans want to kill all the Arabs. We can't kill the 'grown-ups.' But someone like him, someone our own age, we can. …So, we took a knife from home and we killed him."[34]

As a follow-up question, one of the evaluating physicians asked the boy why he would kill a friend (someone with whom they presumably shared a sense of loyalty and camaraderie). The thirteen-year-old answered that they had killed him because he was an opportune victim.

Doctor: "But why did you choose him?"
Thirteen-year-old: "Because he played with us. Any other [French boy] would not have come up the hill with us."
Doctor: "But wasn't he a friend?"
Thirteen-year-old: "But *just the same*, *why do they want to kill us*? [The French boy's] father, *he's in the militia*,[35] and says our throats must be slit."
Pressing the boy, the doctor asked: "Does it bother you to have killed someone?" To this, the thirteen-year-old replied again: "No, *because they want to kill us*, so…"[36]

The thirteen-year-old boy's responses were therefore rudimentary. The boy morally justified the crime by citing the imperative of self-defense (the boy's father "says our throats must be slit," "they want to kill us, so…"), as well as negative reciprocity and communal defense ("we decided to kill him, because the Europeans want to kill all the Arabs"). Finally, the boy cited having had a) the opportunity and b) the resources to kill (the boy would go up the hill with them; they could not kill adults, but they could kill someone their own age; they had a knife).

Meanwhile, the fourteen-year-old boy gave far more elaborate, mature, and personal explanation, which included references to negative reciprocity, kinship, and a vigilante meting out of justice. He also actively attempted to persuade the doctor of the justice of

[34] "Série B, Cas N° 1: Assassinat par deux jeunes Algériens de 13 et 14 ans de leur camarade de jeux européen," in Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 205–207.
[35] Paramilitary bands of French civilians, who patrolled Algerian towns and lynched Algerian civilians during the war.
[36] Emphasis added. Ibid.

his cause. He began by asking if the doctor if he had ever seen a European in prison, or if a European had ever been arrested for the murder of an Algerian.

> Fourteen-year-old: "… Algerians are killed every day, no?"
> Doctor: "Yes."
> Fourteen-year-old: "So then why does one only find Algerians in prison? Can you explain to me?"
> Doctor: "No, but tell me why you killed this boy who was your friend."
> Fourteen-year-old: "I'll explain to you… Did you hear about the Rivet affair?[37]…Two of my family members were killed that day. *At home, they say the French have sworn to kill us all,* one after the other. Has there been a single Frenchman arrested for all these Algerians who were killed? … *nobody has been arrested*. Me, I wanted to go up to the mountains [to join the ALN], but I'm too small. So the other boy and I said we must kill a European. … [and] *they kill children too*."

The doctor also asked the fourteen-year-old if his playmate had done anything to warrant them killing the boy, but the teen replied "No, he didn't do anything to me."[38] Like the thirteen-year-old, then, the fourteen-year-old cited the necessity of self-defense. He also viewed the Rivet affair, in which two of his relatives had been killed, as an "unpunished transgression," and suggested he had learned these things at home ("At home, they say…").

Overall then, negative reciprocity both generally ("they want to kill us"), and specifically ("Two of my family members were killed") was a primary justification both boys gave for their actions. It was also notable that this concept of reciprocity was stretched both temporally and in terms of object. Temporally, the boys extracted reciprocity for wrongs both in the past (the Rivet affair) and in the future (explaining that had acted preemptively). In addition, they stretched the object of threat to include not just

[37] Rivet was a village raided by the French in 1956; during the raid, forty Algerian men were taken from their homes and shot.

[38] "Série B, Cas N° 1: Assassinat par deux jeunes Algériens de 13 et 14 ans de leur camarade de jeux européen," in Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 205–207.

French military personnel, decision-makers, or the boy's father (part of a local French paramilitary gang), but all Europeans, including children. As the boys admitted, their playmate had personally done nothing wrong. However, the fact that the boy had been part of a group they felt was trying to kill them was enough for them to see the murder as an act of negative reciprocity and even preemptive self-defense.

While the boys gave a rudimentary account of their motives and behaviors, both Zohra and Louisette, introduced at the beginning of the chapter, gave more extended descriptions of how they decided to use violence—and their stories illustrated just how complex the processes of decision-making and actuation could be. At first glance, Louisette might have seemed the more likely candidate for violent behavior: she lived in a poor area of the Casbah infamous for crime and prostitution, and was less educated than Zohra. She had also struggled to find a place in her mostly French and Jewish school. She felt humiliated by her teacher, and was ostracized and insulted by her peers. Because everyone knew about the arrest of her father, her schoolmates further "suspected that I was going to become [a terrorist]." In private, she wrote that she cried and badly wanted to "wring their necks." She wrote that by 1957, when she started helping the FLN, she hardly had any friends left.[39]

Louisette also had compelling family reasons to participate in violence. For one, she had already criminally facilitated a violent crime. Her maternal uncle Khali was part of the Yacef Saadi network, and in June 1956, the network chose Khali to carry out an assassination in retaliation for the executions of Zabana and Ferradj. At that time,

[39] Louisette Ighilahriz, *Algérienne*, 49–54, 73–74.

Louisette agreed to a favor: helping her uncle smuggle a gun through a French checkpoint. Louisette also had FLN contacts through her father, who had started working with the FLN in their neighborhood in 1954. Finally, Louisette had motive and means to commit a violent crime. Her father had been arrested for the first time January 1955, released, and then arrested a second time following the 1957 student strike. Louisette strongly remembered visiting him in prison. Her father had been missing for weeks; now she saw a ghost of a man, pale and covered in bruises. She barely recognized him. As Louisette explained, after the visit, she fully committed to the FLN. Along with her mother and her sister Malika, the family continued their father's activism in his absence, transforming the bakery into FLN delivery and transit center. There, they received money, medicine, documents, and weapons, which they hid in bread for deliveries.[40]

Despite these factors, being active in the FLN did not necessarily translate to committing a violent act. The only time Louisette ever described coming close to killing someone was during the Battle of Algiers. That day, she saw some soldiers beating a pregnant woman lying on the sidewalk. Enraged and wanting to punish the men, Louisette rushed back to the bakery and grabbed a pistol, hid it in her jacket, and set out for the first target that came to mind: the military barracks near the bakery. But when the sentry turned around and she saw his face, she changed her mind. In her words:

> "I saw that he was a kid, and I left. When going up to the barracks, *my goal had been [finding] easy prey* against whom I could've taken action after seeing the unacceptable spectacle of a pregnant woman beaten on a public road. *I wanted to avenge her*, but the soldier's youth made me retreat. He was handsome. He was about the same age as me. If he'd been older, or if he'd seemed to me less sympathetic, I don't know what I would have done. If he'd spoken to me, telling me to get lost [*foutre le camp*], I would've certainly committed the act. Naïve, he had no suspicions about anything."[41]

[40] Ibid., 35–72.
[41] Ibid., 73–74.

Although short, Louisette's account compressed many decision-making considerations into a few seconds. Like many of the activists studied, she cited reciprocity as motive ("I wanted to avenge her [the pregnant woman]") and extended reciprocity beyond the perpetrator to all members of the perpetrator's group. But in her initial, at-a-glance assessment of the soldier, other cognitive processes went to work. Specifically, Louisette described using and rejecting multiple decision-making heuristics. She rejected standard hostile attribution heuristics: despite her target being 1) adult, 2) male, 3) in military uniform, and 4) a different race (four traits frequently implicated in evaluations of hostility), she saw him as non-threatening. The soldier's young appearance ("he was a kid"; "the soldier's youth made me retreat") particularly seemed to inform this evaluation. She further made an theory of mind evaluation of the soldier's intent, and decided he seemed naïve, with "no suspicions." The fact the soldier gave no hostile signals or agonistic displays (like scowling, raising his weapon, looking at her suspiciously, shouting, or telling her to "get lost") reinforced her assessment of him as non-hostile. Despite him being a French male, she also saw him as similar to herself ("he was about the same age as me"). Even Louisette's description of the young soldier as "handsome" could have been significant in her decision-making process: it could indicate an attractiveness bias, as attractive individuals are typically viewed as less hostile, less aggressive, and more trustworthy than their unattractive counterparts, and their social transgressions evaluated less negatively.[42] (Accounts from the Battle of Algiers suggest

[42] See for example: Daniel Alcock et al., "How Individuals' Responses and Attractiveness Influence Aggression," *Psychological Reports* 82 (1998): 1435–1438; Andrew R. Nesdale et al., "Moral Judgments of Aggression: Personal and Situational Determinants," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 5, no. 3 (July-September 1975): 339–349; Leslie A Zebrowitz and Robert G. Franklin, Jr., "The Attractiveness Halo Effect and the Babyface Stereotype in Older and Younger Adults: Similarities, Own-Age Accentuation, and

the Yacef Saadi network was intuitively aware of this fact, as they used attractive young women to smuggle bombs and weapons through checkpoints.)

So if Louisette decided to back away from her attack, what made Zohra decide to follow through? On the surface, Zohra might have seemed the less likely candidate for violent aggression. She was highly educated and faced higher personal costs from her involvement in activism. Unlike Louisette's family, Zohra's father and mother both gave Zohra negative feedback on her interest in the FLN (Zohra's father worked for the French administration, and her mother expressed hostility toward the FLN). Suspecting her daughter was returning to Algiers to join the FLN, Zohra's mother also shouted, fought with her daughter, and sobbed. She reminded Zohra of the sacrifices they had made so she could attend law school, and called her daughter ungrateful.[43]

To overcome parental pressures, Zohra physically separated herself from her family (barricading herself in her room to avoid her mother, and ultimately traveling to Algiers). The most important factor in overcoming maternal opposition, however, was Zohra's close friendship with Samia Lakhdari. Zohra spent most of her time with Samia, choosing to stay with Samia's family while at university. And while the two girls received negative feedback on activism from Samia's father, Samia's mother (Mama Zhor) gave them her outspoken support.

This close "social proximity to appreciative observers"[44] was vital in forming Zohra's approach to anti-colonial violence. After being contacted by the FLN and asked to make

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OA Positivity Effects," *Experimental Aging Research* 40, no. 3 (2014): 375–393; Karen K. Dion, "Physical Attractiveness and Evaluation of Children's Transgressions," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 24, no. 2 (1972): 207–213.

[43] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 134.

[44] Robert C. Ellickson, "The Market for Social Norms," *American Law and Economics Review* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 27.

deliveries, for instance, Zohra related that she felt anxious about the decision. Samia, however encouraged her to talk to Mama Zhor. As Zohra later admitted, "In truth, we felt an irrepressible need to be reassured." Mama Zhor gave them the encouragement they sought, and celebrated their entry into the FLN with joyful ululations. When Zohra and Samia were later accepted into the FLN's armed section, Mama Zhor similarly told the girls that being chosen was a great honor. And once embedded in the Saadi network, Zohra only received positive feedback from peers concerning anti-colonial violence.[45]

Unlike Louisette, then, Zohra was embedded in a high-commitment activist cell, engaged alongside her best friend. Her violent attack was embedded in this high-pressure social context, and took place at the same time as Samia's parallel attack on the Cafeteria. In addition, by the time Zohra approached the Milk Bar with the bomb in her beach bag, she had invested countless hours preparing for the attack. She and Samia, along with other cell members, extensively rehearsed the attacks. To the very last detail, they planned their affects and hand motions, the type of ice cream Zohra would order, and how much she would pay, with tip. Notably, this seems to have produced a kind of "going through the motions" during the stress of the attack itself. As Zohra mentioned multiple times in her narrative, the day of the attack, she felt a sense of surrealism or unreality, as though she were an actor in a film.[46]

Zohra also noted having strongly felt that her job in the FLN was socially desirable. This is significant. In joining the FLN armed section, Zohra and Samia said they had been accepted into an elite circle. As Zohra described, when they were welcomed into the armed group, Samia came back from the meeting ecstatic, exultant, radiating joy as

[45] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 101-102, 174.
[46] Ibid., 179, 183, 192.

though she had been "struck by a divine revelation or the appearance [of the Angel Gabriel] on Laylat al-Qadr." As Samia explained to Zohra, she had been welcomed into a lavish, marble-columned home with inlaid mother-of-pearl furniture, like something out of the "One Thousand and One Nights." Those who welcomed her were "modern," warm, vivacious, beautiful, attractive, and smiling—a "refined" and well-bred family, who laughed and told jokes, and had a "natural and deliciously contagious urbanity." The leader of this well-bred and urbane family was Yacef Saadi (called El Kho, or "the Brother"). His presence almost made Samia "weep with gratitude and acknowledgment." As Zohra explained, "Samia felt herself in a family who opened its arms wide." Upon returning from the induction meeting, Samia imparted to Zohra her "exaltation," and "we cried from happiness and gratitude for the brothers and the sister who had opened their arms and trusted us, but above all for El Kho for choosing us." As Zohra stated, their induction into the armed group was an "immense honor that 'the brothers' bestowed on us." Mama Zhor similarly called it an honor and a privilege that they had been chosen.[47]

Overall then, by the time violence became a choice for Zohra, she was already highly invested in the organization. Thus, the choice of violence was no longer a question of right and wrong, but a question of strategy and election (one's special role in the group). The FLN encouraged this behavior, by framing acceptance into the ALN (and particularly into *fidaï* units) as a mark of honor, a badge of trust, a solemn responsibility awarded to only to an elite minority. By using simple social technologies (treating violence as an honor for the select few, framing it as a special role and important

[47] Ibid., 162-166, 174.

responsibility, consecrating it in organizational authority), the FLN thus worked to bypass inhibitions against violence, and encourage participation in deadly missions.[48]

The theme of kinship also ran strongly throughout Zohra's account of her activities. Upon departing from the group to take the bomb to the Milk Bar, she noted the group exchanged standard parting goodbyes and good luck wishes in Arabic and French, including "Bon courage!" "God be with you," "Inshallah," "See you later," etc. It was a kinship term, however, which Zohra said she found most significant: the "magic word" of "khtou" (sister). "This word brimming with such human solidarity, such tender fraternity, it excited me, reinvigorated and galvanized me all at once." She said she felt the term bore her aloft and carried her forward, "I felt I had wings, invested by all the brothers and sisters of the earth." In another passage, she wrote that "In August 1956, Samia and I, in full responsibility, chose to become 'volunteers for death' to recover and liberate our mother (Algeria), taken by force, violated, and held hostage for 126 years, or die trying. In August 1956, we were thus facing a choice between our mother and our life, and like Camus, we chose our mother."[49]

What was perhaps most surprising was that Louisette's fast, heuristic-driven cognitions were not what ultimately produced a violent attack—it was Zohra's slower, reflective cognitions and self-teaching strategies. For instance, Zohra used Zabana's letter to his mother as a focusing device, repeating as a calming exercise and self-teaching strategy the phrase "my life is not worth more than Zabana's." The phrase also served as

[48] Notably, Bandura found a similar finding with prison execution squads—it is usually considered an honor awarded only to top guards who are well-respected. The same holds true in military organization, with units tasked with close combat, targeted killings and assassinations, interrogation, and other "special operations" being considered the most elite (e.g. French paratroopers, U.S. Navy Seals, Russian Spetsnaz, Israeli Shayetet 13). See: Albert Bandura, *Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm and Live with Themselves* (New York: Worth, 2016).

[49] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 168–169, 184.

a reminder of a particular set of values: putting community over self.[50] And while Louisette described embracing the same pro-social value, she did not describe using any focusing exercises or ritualistic self-teaching strategies to override her inhibitions against violence.

There was also a marked difference in how Zohra and Louisette saw their targets. Zohra saw the Milk Bar customers as a hostile group, describing the patrons as a "compact, noisy crowd." She also worked to bypass inhibitions against attacking civilians, writing that "What these newspapers call a 'civilian population' is a settlement of Europeans brought by boat by army to colonize our country." She added that French "civilians" had also voted for the Special Powers, to "exterminate us, we the real innocent civilians."[51] Louisette, on the other hand, saw the soldier as an individual—a difference that was likely significant, as individuals tend to be less aggressive toward individuals than groups.[52]

The similarities and divergences between the lives of Zohra Drif and Louisette Ighilahriz were thus a prime example of how social circumstances and cognitive processes could profoundly alter decision-making. Louisette's actions were more impulsive, and thus relied more on heuristic strategies—and in the end, this was not enough to override her inhibitions. Zohra, on the other hand, was part of a group that used kinship cuing to promote a sense of strong reciprocity and solidarity; she had a strong dyad within that group (Samia) who provided positive feedback on aggressive

[50] Ibid., 152, 170–171, 531.
[51] Ibid., 185, 200–201.
[52] Brian P. Meier and Verlin B. Hinsz, "A Comparison of Human Aggression Committed by Groups and Individuals: An Interindividual–Intergroup Discontinuity," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 40, no. 4 (July 2004): 551–559; Albert Bandura et al., "Disinhibition of Aggression through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims," *Journal of Research in Psychology* 9, no. 4 (December 1975): 253–269.

behavior; she rehearsed and routinized her plan; she had more means at her disposal (including bomb materials, a support network, and knowledge and training); she felt social pressure to follow through with her mission; she was heavily invested in the project; and she actively used auto-didactic strategies to disengage learned inhibitions, and to manage stress and guilt. Chapter 10 will further explore one additional factor: namely, Zohra learned from her cell members how to bypass taboos on aggression, by recreating her behavior as in compliance with Algerian norms for aggressive behavior. She did this 1) by expanding the definition of reciprocity to cover irregular attacks like bombings, and 2) by moving civilians into a combatant role and appealing to the action scripts appropriate for her role as a special operations soldier. Ultimately then, the attack did not spontaneously arise from emotions or psychology: it was produced by Zohra and her FLN cell, who used multiple social and cognitive strategies to create a violent end.

Conclusion: From "Lightning Strikes of Consciousness" to Actuated Aggression

In the *Les damnés de la terre*, Fanon correctly observed that "Racism, hatred, resentment, 'the legitimate desire for revenge' cannot sustain a war of liberation. These lightning strikes of consciousness which toss the body into stormy paths… where the face of the other makes my head spin, where my blood calls for the blood of the other, where by the simple laws of motion my death calls for the death of the other—this great passion of the first few hours disintegrates if left alone to feed only on itself."[53] The differences in outcome between Louisette and Zohra were a good example of this principle. One girl, flung "into stormy paths," had the motive, means, and opportunity to actuate a violent

[53] Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 104.

plan, but backed down. The other girl—buttressed by social support and pressure, a strong relational dyad, kinship recognition cues, didactic strategies, training, and an elect role in a tight-knit group—followed through.

Overall, the Casbah essays, the Algerian boys who murdered their playmate, and the examples of Louisette and Zohra also underscored an important principle: when it came to predicting which individuals would transform violent thoughts into violent deeds, the process could be highly complex and unpredictable. Fantasizing (imagining what one *wishes* one could do), moral cognition (determining what one *should* do), decision-making (deciding what one *will* do), and action (doing something) were all very different processes—and in these processes, every little thing counted. For instance, aggressive behavior could be influenced by: incidental affects (how one felt that day); affective cues (how one felt about a particular situation); the presence or absence of peers and authority figures; whether the individual was acting alone or in a group (groups meting out more aggression than individuals); whether violence was being directed toward an individual or a group (groups and crowds attracting more aggression than individuals); the amount of time available for making the choice (the less time, the more heuristically-driven the decision tended to be); and learned heuristics for determining threat (with many cultures having threat heuristics for low-status, adult, foreign, and male individuals, as well as individuals with their faces covered, fists clenched, etc.). Actors could also be influenced by physiological factors (blood pressure, amount of sleep, loud noises, uncomfortable sound frequencies, unpleasant smells, alcohol, caffeine, physical exercise, arousal, testosterone, estrogen, oxytocin, cortisol, adrenaline, etc.). Factors like resource availability, experiential learning (past experiences and outcomes), in-group attachments

and out-group classifications, personal preferences (risk preference or risk aversion, pro-social or pro-self preferences), gender (males tending to be more aggressive), and age (young adults choosing violence more than elderly individuals) could also play a role. In fact, even the weather could make a difference (with revolts, riots, and protests more often occurring in hot, dry weather than in rainy or snowy conditions).[54]

Moreover, not all aggressions were alike. Aggression toward high-status public figures (celebrities and politicians) historically correlated to mental illness, while sexual aggression correlated to childhood abuse.[55] Terrorism, meanwhile, has historically correlated to pro-social rather than pro-self preferences (but has bore no correlation to mental illness).[56] Finally, because of framing effects and emotional priming, even the order in which events occurred and the language used could have an effect on outcome

[54] Multiple psychopharmacological studies have further shown that administering blood pressure medication to block adrenaline and lower heart rate reduces both racial bias and aggressive behavior. See: Brian P. Meier and Verlin B. Hinsz, "A Comparison of Human Aggression Committed by Groups and Individuals: An Interindividual—Intergroup Discontinuity," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 40 (2004): 551–559; Mina Cikara and Jay J. Van Bavel, "The Neuroscience of Intergroup Relations: An Integrative Review," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 9, no. 3 (2014): 245–274; Craig A. Anderson, "Temperature and Aggression: Ubiquitous Effects of Heat on Occurrence of Human Violence," *Psychological Bulletin* 106, no. 1 (July 1989), 74–96; Craig A. Anderson and L. Rowell Huesmann, "Human Aggression: A Social-Cognitive View," in *The SAGE Handbook of Social Psychology*, eds. Michael A. Hogg and Joel Cooper (London: Sage, 2003), 296–326; Thomas Haspel, "Beta-blockers and the Treatment of Aggression," *Harvard Review of Psychiatry* 2, no. 5 (1995): 274–281; Craig A. Anderson and Brad J. Bushman, "Human Aggression," *Annual Review of Psychology* 53 (2002): 27–51; Mina Cikara and Jay J. Van Bavel, "The Neuroscience of Intergroup Relations: An Integrative Review," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 9, no. 3 (2014): 245–274; Sylvia Terbeck et al., "Propranolol reduces implicit negative racial bias," *Psychopharmacology* 222, no. 3 (2012): 419–424.

[55] Theoharis K. Seghorn et al., "Childhood Sexual Abuse in the Lives of Sexually Aggressive Offenders," *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry* 26, no. 2 (March 1987): 262–267; Eileen Zurbriggen et al., "Childhood Emotional Abuse Predicts Late Adolescent Sexual Aggression Perpetration and Victimization," *Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment and Trauma* 19, no. 2 (2010): 204–223; J. Reid Meloy et al., "A Research Review of Public Figure Threats, Approaches, Attacks, and Assassinations in the United States," *Journal of Forensic Science* 49, no. 5 (September 2004): 1–8; Jerrold M. Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

[56] The mental illness assumption persists, despite having been repeatedly debunked. See for instance: Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 3–42.

(as Louisette explained, if the soldier had told her to "get lost," the situation might have ended differently).[57]

In the end then, human behavioral choices (be it club affiliation or violent attacks) were complex, multivariate phenomena. Large historical processes and social structures collided with individual cognitive events, such as responses to cues and heuristic-based information processing. And as the next chapter will explore, these processes were bidirectional: while cognitive cues (like scripts and roles) could affect decision-making, activists also actively adapted, re-negotiated, and in some cases bypassed these cues. As a result, "the activist's aggression" was one distinct moment in "the social production and cultural encoding"[58] of violence—but it was also part of an indeterminate negotiation between the individual and her environment. Thus, Zohra could look at a group of civilians eating ice cream in a café and see enemy combatants, while Louisette encountered a male soldier at war with her community, and saw a person—a naïve kid in a uniform.

[57] J.F. Christensen and A. Gomila, "Moral Dilemmas in Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Decision-Making: A Principled Review," *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews* 36 (2012): 1249–1264.

[58] James McDougall, "Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s-1990s," 117–118.

Chapter 10

"Acts of Faith and Worthy Deeds": The Creation of Virtuous Violence in French and Algerian Discourse

> One day, an Algerian was strolling through the streets of old Algiers; but as he wandered along, he encountered a patrol of French parachutists. The paras stopped him, and began searching "the young patriot." However, the Algerian had nothing of value on him, except a bottle labeled "cologne." So the leader of the patrol confiscated the bottle, and let the Algerian go.
>
> Once the Algerian had departed, the leader of the patrol examined his prize. Then, "laughing loudly," the para took the bottle and poured a generous draft on his scalp. But no sooner had the liquid touched his head, the soldier let out a terrible scream. The liquid in the bottle was not cologne, but nitric acid. And so ended our tale with this moral: "The little para was taken who thought to take."[1]

This unusual tale, entitled "The Bottle," appeared in the underground *Révolution* in 1957. It bore many similarities with the morality tales explored in Chapter 6; for instance, like "The Mason-Wasp and the Toad," "The Bottle" fit firmly in the mode of Algerians dealing cleverly with foolish Frenchmen. Interestingly, however, the tale also communicated an important lesson about violence. So what did "The Bottle" have to say about Algerian aggression norms (and what other stories did activists tell about violence)? How did Algerian justifications for violence compare with French rationalizations for violence, and was there a particular moral or emotional economy underlying activist aggression?

To answer these questions, this chapter explores how activists lay claim to the use of force, negotiating violence in the courtroom, in tracts and organizational statements, and in memoirs. First, the chapter examines the most commonly cited justifications for aggression used by activists. Then, the chapter explores the FLN's organizational

[1] Abridged. "La bouteille," *Révolution: Organe les Combattants de la Wilaya IV* no. 1, 1957, 15 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3.

narrative concerning "virtuous violence," (investigating how the work of Frantz Fanon intersected with this organizational argument for the use of force). Then, the chapter surveys how aggression was justified by the FLN's French supporters. And based on these accounts, the chapter contends that the FLN's production of violence during the Algerian war was not the result of some innate flaw in Islam or the Algerian race (as the French argued). Nor was the violence a "natural response"—the only possible response—to 132 years of continuous colonial violence, as Fanon and the FLN claimed. Instead, the FLN *produced* violence by renegotiating well-established and widely shared "violence values" and violence-authorizing roles. And in doing so, the FLN took a violence that was "'foreign' to most ordinary Algerians, to their self-conceptions, world-view and morality"[2] (as James McDougall has argued), and made that violence seem natural, necessary, inevitable, and above all, moral.

"The Rat and the Oyster" and Other Tales of Negative Reciprocity

"The little para was taken who thought to take." This phrase ended "The Bottle;" but in beginning to unravel the tale, the phrase was of great significance. The sentence deliberately echoed Jean de La Fontaine's moral from "Le rat et l'huître"—a story of an uneducated rat who spotted a savory oyster on the beach. Yet when the rat stretched out his neck to eat the oyster, the bivalve violently snapped shut on the rat's head. The La Fontaine tale consequently ended with a lesson in negative reciprocity: "such is taken he who thought to take" (or alternately, "he is caught who thought to catch").[3] The story of

[2] James McDougall, "Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s–1990s," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 118-119, 124.

[3] "Le rat et l'huître," in Jean de La Fontaine, *Fables de La Fontaine, Tome 2* (Paris: Lecointe, 1829), 44-45.

the paratrooper and the bottle similarly ended violently for the transgressor: the soldier took the bottle, and in return received a violent reward.

"The Bottle" was an important story on a number of levels. The tale represented a certain mode of folk stories in which bad behavior was terribly punished. Such tales of "just desserts" were proscriptive ("don't behave in this way") and rooted in the principle of reciprocity: to each action, its reward. Of all the Jean de La Fontaine tales referenced by Algerians, "Le rat et l'huître" was by far the most frequently cited and adapted, a trend reflected by "The Bottle." Algerian references to and stories based on "Le rat et l'huître" followed a standard model: the French behaved badly, and the French were badly rewarded. Sometimes this punishment occurred indirectly, through twists of fate and mishaps; and at other times, punishment was directly inflicted by the FLN. For instance, after capturing a French military patrol, the FLN printed a series of photos about the ambush. The series ended with a picture of an ashamed-looking Frenchman, captioned with the moral from the "Le rat et l'huître": "he is caught who thought to catch."[4]

The popularity of "Le rat et l'huître" in the Algerian imagination hinted at a larger pattern: whether in newspapers, tracts, or memoirs, by far the most common justification for violence among Algerians was negative reciprocity. For instance, following the Rue de Thèbes bombing by French ultras, which killed 73 and wounded 300 Algerian civilians, the FLN released a tract promising retaliation. "[The Algerian] people shout: Vengeance! ….This crime that you committed will not remain unpunished. The grief that

[4] "Tel est pris qui croyait prendre…" *Résistance Algérienne* 11, Edition B, November 1956, 7 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

strikes us will only sharpen the weapon of vengeance…. Crime calls for crime / Blood calls for blood. / The dead of the Casbah will be avenged."[5]

In fact, in almost every Algerian justification for violence, a reference to the reciprocity norm could be found. A *Résistance Algérienne* article about the Milk-Bar and Cafeteria bombings, for instance, dubbed the attacks a "return of the pendulum," pointing to the bombings, tortures, collective massacres, and general "war of extermination" Algerians had been suffering.[6] And in *Les damnés de la terre,* Fanon argued that colonialism "is violence of the jungle, and bows only when confronted with greater violence." To this, he added that "the violence of the colonial regime and the counter-violence of the colonized balance one another and respond to one another in an extraordinary reciprocal homogeneity… The development of violence among the colonized will be in proportion to the violence exercised by the contested colonial regime."[7]

Such appeals were ubiquitous in FLN pronouncements concerning violence, and often promised not only direct reciprocity, but escalatory reciprocity. In the wake of the Ahmed Zabana and Abdelkader Ferradj execution, the FLN released a tract declaring that since the French only understood force, "We will respond to crime with crime and to violence with violence. The blood of Zabana, Ferradj, and all the Algerians who have died for Algeria will be avenged." The tract explained the organization would start by

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[5] FLN, "Les morts de la Casba seront vengés," (September 1956), Tract No. 33 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.

[6] Notably, another article in the same issue called the attacks "fate," describing Algerian suffering, then noting that with the Milk-Bar and Cafeteria attacks "fate has struck the other side of the ditch." "La côte d'alerte" and "Nos souffrances et les vôtres," *Résistance Algérienne* 10, Edition B, 10 October 1956, 1 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

[7] Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre (Cahiers libres Nos. 27-28)* (Paris: François Maspero, 1966 [First ed. 1961]), 47, 66.

executing two captured soldiers (direct reciprocity); the tract then threatened escalatory counter-aggression as a deterrent: "For each Algerian prisoner guillotined, the ALN will execute 100 French civilians."[8] After the executions of another two FLN men, the organization similarly announced it had executed some of its French prisoners of war; it added that FLN attacks over the weekend had been "reprisals" to "avenge the guillotined brothers." And through these reprisals, the tract explained, the French would know that Algerians would answer Lacoste "blow for blow."[9]

Activists similarly cited reciprocity in justifying aggressive behavior. FLN activist Baya Hocine justified the El Biar and Belcourt stadium bombings as retaliatory: "each attack was *a response* to the [French] executions."[10] Louisette Ighilahriz in considering her attack on a French soldier, and Zohra Drif and Samia Lakhdari in carrying out the Milk-Bar and Cafeteria attacks, all mentioned reciprocity as well. Yacef Saadi likewise rationalized that the FLN bombing campaign had been a "reply" to French executions, citing Robert Lacoste's famous words: "blood calls out for blood." He also framed the campaign as a response to "European terrorism" (torture, lynchings, and executions) which had remained unpunished. Furthermore, he related that in his meeting with the young ladies who would carry the bombs for the network (Samia Lakhdari, Zohra Drif,

[8] "Zabana et Ferradj seront vengés," Algiers (June 1956) in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.

[9] FLN, "Exécution de deux patriotes condamnés à mort," Algiers (March 1957), Tract No. 60 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.

For similar tracts warning about reciprocal attacks and authorizing reprisals against civilians in response to French Army massacres, see FLN, "Avertissement solennel," (June 1956) in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1; FLN, "Population française, des représailles s'abattront sur vous." Algiers (n.d.), Ref No. 2716 in SHD GR 1H 1612.

[10] Emphasis added. Interview with Baya Hocine, in Danièle Djamila Amrane-Minne, *Des femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie*, *entretiens* (Paris: Karthala, 1994), 146.

and Djamila Bouhired), he tried to convince the girls to participate by invoking the French bombing on the Rue de Thèbes and the 8 May 1945 massacres.[11]

Saadi's appeal to May 1945 was notable. While the Milk-Bar bomb was justified as being a direct response to the Rue de Thèbes attack, it is notable that FLN aggression during the war was more broadly justified by pointing to colonial aggression over a longer period of time. For instance, *El Moudjahid* No. 1 described the FLN as fighting a war against the colonial regime, which it said was responsible for starting hostilities with a "cowardly aggression in 1830." This aggression, the paper explained, had continued for 125 years, during which time the French had tried to "exterminate the Algerian people."[12] Other articles repeated this idea. *El Moudjahid* No. 4 described how "for 127 years, our people have resisted this aggression,"[13] while *Liberté* explained that the Algerian people had to "resort to violence to end the violence it has suffered for 130 years."[14]

Frantz Fanon, in his duties as an official spokesman for the GPRA-FLN, also framed Algerian violence as negative reciprocity in this expanded sense. At a speech in Ghana in April 1960, Fanon declared "The colonial regime is a regime founded on violence," and a regime that survives through violence. This violence was "a violence of the daily behavior of the colonizer toward the colonized: apartheid in South Africa, forced labor in Angola, racism in Algeria. Contempt, hate politics—such are the manifestations of a violence that is very concrete, very painful." Fanon also worked to naturalize violence as

[11] Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger* (Paris: Publisud, 2002), 229-236, 264-268 277, 282-284 [Tome 1].
[12] "Bulletin de naissance," *El Moudjahid* 1, June 1956, 8-9 [Tome 1].
[13] "Mémoire de la délégation FLN à New-York en réponse à M. Guy Mollet," *El Moudjahid* 4, Numéro spécial, 20 August 1956, 79 [Tome 1].
[14] "Pour en finir avec la violence," *Liberté: Organe Central du Parti Communiste Algérien* 44, 20 October 1961, 3 in SHD GR 1H 3092 bis.

natural and inevitable, writing that colonial violence "irremediably provokes the birth of an internal violence within the colonized people."[15]

What was notable in these appeals was that activists did not treat reciprocity as a static norm. In some cases, they stretched reciprocity temporally, justifying violence as a response to events weeks, years, or even decades old. There were also efforts to stretch reciprocity in terms of legitimate target (exacting damages not from the immediate perpetrator, but from any available member of the perpetrator's family, racial cohort, religion, or social group otherwise defined). Reciprocity was also stretched in terms of who could rightfully mete out justice: instead of the original victim (person struck) claiming the right to strike back, activists claimed rights of reciprocity *on behalf of* a particular social group. Finally, activists creatively stretched reciprocity in terms of the reciprocal act itself—such that torture or execution could be reciprocated with a bombing, and colonial injustices and "contempt" reciprocated with armed insurrection. Thus, through persuasion, activists attempted to negotiate and adapt reciprocity norms to fit situations that might otherwise not be accepted as legitimate examples of negative reciprocity.

Signaling: The Art of Being Heard

"Reduced to nothing more than a living explosion…
Our blood must be lit, and we must catch fire
So that the spectators are moved."[16]

[15] Frantz Fanon speech at the Conférence des Etats et des peuples africains pour une Action positive pour la Paix et la Sécurité en Afrique, in Accra [Ghana], 7–10 April 1960, printed as "Pourquoi nous employons la violence," *Vérité Liberté* 1, May 1960, 4, 9.

[16] Kateb Yacine, "La bombe et le temps," in *Espoir et parole: poèmes algériens,* ed. Denise Barrat (Paris: Seghers, 1963), 94.

A second reason activists commonly cited for violence was signaling—or as activists put it, "sending a message," "being heard," "showing them," "making them see," and "making them realize." In other words, activists used aggression to communicate. These aggressive signals typically had multiple audiences: for the FLN, this included potential supporters in the Algerian community, political competitors like the MNA, French civilians, French leaders, the United Nations, and the international community. Baya Hocine, for instance, said of her participation in the stadium bombings that "The bombing of the [El Biar and Belcourt] stadiums was to prove to the United Nations that we existed, it was the only way to be heard."[17] Habib Redha, a member of the Algiers bomb network involved in the street-lamp attacks in June 1957, similarly explained "we had no other choice for making ourselves heard."[18] Yacef Saadi himself gave a similar explanation in his first interview with Germaine Tillion on 4 July 1957. When Tillion asked him to stop the bombing campaign, he replied "It's our only way of expressing ourselves," and he repeated the phrase several times during the meeting.[19]

In fact, this signaling function, when combined with the escalatory patterns mentioned above, matches studies that find negative reciprocity in particular tends to elicit responses asymmetrical to the original act, in order to both inflict sanctions and send a message detering further aggression.[20] The FLN mentioned this function in its

[17] Interview with Baya Hocine, in Danièle Djamila Amrane-Minne, *Des femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 146; Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie, Tome 2: le temps des léopards* (Verviers: Marabout, 1985), 484–485.

[18] Interview with Yacef Saadi, Zohra Drif, and Habib Redha, in Florence Beaugé, "50 ans après: les survivants du 'nettoyage d'Alger,'" *Le Monde*, 29 January 2007, https://www.lemonde.fr/a-la-une/article/2007/01/29/50-ans-apres-les-survivants-du-nettoyage-d-alger_860986_3208.html

[19] Germaine Tillion, *France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 35–39, 42–48.

[20] Boaz Keysar et al., "Reciprocity is Not Give and Take: Asymmetric Reciprocity to Positive and Negative Acts," *Psychological Science* 19, no. 2 (2008): 1280–1286.

declarations promising retaliation. In the tract issued after the Casbah bombing, for instance, the FLN promised it would avenge the bombing, writing that "This crime you committed will not remain *unpunished*."[21] Similarly, after the Zabana and Ferradj executions, the FLN declared "*we witness to all mankind watching us* that terrible *consequences will result* from this crime;" the organization then promised to kill 100 people for each executed prisoner.[22] Negative reciprocity thus often served both a punitive function and acted as a signal concerning the unacceptability of the behavior.

Algerian activists used attacks to send other signals as well. In discussing the Milk Bar attack, for instance, Zohra Drif mentioned being angry about the violation of a specific cultural norm: proper grieving behavior. Just as Egyptians had denounced happy Cairo for celebrating during the Canal Struggle, and just as the FLN chastised Arabs for drinking in cafes while their brothers suffered, Drif chastised Europeans for taking the wrong affective and behavioral posture while Algerians grieved. Writing from prison in 1960, she explained that while Algerians were being tortured and killed, "the European population, in their peaceful neighborhoods, for the benefit of whom all this repression was conducted, was living in peace, going to the beach, to the cinema, dancing, preparing for vacation."[23] She repeated this point multiple times in her memoir, describing this behavior as disgusting, insulting, and obscene. "The European cities and neighborhoods bathed in a *revolting* tranquility compared to the terrible repression that was beating down on the indigenous civilian population," she wrote. In another passage, she added the patrons were "drunk from sun, well-being, and peace, while our people were being

[21] FLN, "Les morts de la Casba seront vengés," (September 1956), Tract No. 33 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.
[22] Emphasis added. "Zabana et Ferradj seront vengés," Algiers (June 1956) in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.
[23] Zohra Drif, *La mort de mes frères* (Paris: François Maspero, 1960), 9.

searched and slaughtered." In casing the Milk-Bar, she further explained the café symbolized the Europeans' "*insulting* carefree insouciance, their *guilty* indifference to our misfortunes." She repeated this again after the attack, explaining they had achieved their objective of jarring the Europeans from "their *indecent* tranquility and peace." And finally, she explained that through the bombings, the FLN had wanted to send a message to Europeans, happy and content. "'Well! Algeria is at war, so let them taste the bitter reality!' *That was our message,* to force [Europeans] to *open their eyes* and realize that every day, thousands of 'natives' were bombed, besieged, arrested, tortured, executed."[24]

Other messages embedded in aggressive behavior were status-driven, territorial, and agonistic. In 1962, Yacef Saadi wrote, for instance, that "It was necessary for us to *show the people we had at [our] disposal equipment* as terrible as that of the enemy," and that the FLN was *capable* of responding (and maintaining a war against France).[25] Zohra further explained that the FLN wanted "*to show our people* that it [the FLN] was able to protect them, and above all *to keep its word* by striking blow for blow, by striking the heart of the European city."[26] In the military dossier on the arrests and interrogations of the Saadi network members, French officials similarly noted that an attack in March 1957 "according to Yacef Saadi and [Mohamed] Hattab, mainly had a psychological goal in *marking the presence* of the FLN."[27] And in his statement to police, Saadi said the bombs

[24] Emphasis added. Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN* (Algiers: Éditions Chihab, 2013), 202.

[25] Yacef Saadi, *Souvenirs de la bataille d'Alger, décembre 1956–septembre 1957* (Paris: Renê Julliard, 1962), 17–19.

[26] Emphasis added. Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 202.

[27] Gendarmerie du Secteur Alger-Sahel, "Étude sur l'affaire des bombes," Algiers (n.d.), 6, in SHD GR 1H 1245/D1.

were "psychological, *to show the presence of* the FLN."[28] Such costly signals thus communicated vital claims about the FLN's competitive ability and resource endowment.[29]

Aggressive behavior was also stimulative, aiming to elicit certain behaviors and feelings from others. Drif described wanting to fulfill her mission "so that my people would not despair"[30] about the futility of the war. In his interrogation record, Saadi also mentioned wanting to use the bombings to "raise the morale" of the Algerian community (important for maintaining the FLN's support base).[31] In his memoir he expanded on this, explaining that they hoped to communicate to the Algerian population that they should not be apathetic or discouraged: something could be done, and something was being done. He added that they had also wanted to spread "psychosis" among the French population, and thus destabilize the colonial order.[32]

Such statements highlight the importance of considering which audiences were being targeted and what messages being sent through aggressive behavior—because acts of aggression communicated multiple messages to multiple audiences. For instance, just in the Algiers bombings, the FLN sent messages to the French (that French aggression would be punished, and that French behavior was causing Algerian suffering). The FLN also hoped to instill fear, and signal that the French no longer had the capacity to guarantee the safety of its citizens in a colonial context. Next, they sent messages to

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[28] "Copie de la confession de Yacef, Saadi Ben Mohamed, écrite librement," transcribed by Officer Nogueira, Officier de Police Judiciaire Auxiliaire [OPJA] (25 September 1957), Ref. No. 2733, Document No. 01730 in SHD GR 1H 1612.

[29] Eric A. Smith and Rebecca Bliege Bird, "Costly Signaling and Cooperative Behavior" in *Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundation of Cooperation in Economic Life*, eds. Herbert Gintis et al. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005), 116.

[30] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 185.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger,* 229–236 [Tome 1].

Algerians that the FLN was an honest broker (it would "keep its word"), and an effective broker that could respond to French aggression "blow for blow." The bombings also sought to position the FLN as the defenders of the community ("show our people that it was able to protect them"), signal the FLN's competitive ability and resource endowment ("show the people we had equipment"), and make a territorial claim ("mark the presence of the FLN").

The cost of sending these messages was steep. An attack meant creating casualties, bearing repugnancy costs, and attracting sanctions (e.g. French counterattacks, repression, arrests, torture, executions). The Saadi network's bombing campaign, for instance, elicited a fierce military crackdown and *ratonnades* ("'coon hunts," or lynchings of Algerian civilians by French ultras). The organization also lost some support (mainly from French leftists) as a result of the campaign. Individual activists further took on psychological costs (stress, guilt), social costs (negative feedback, sanctions), and steep material costs (imprisonment, reprisals against family members, torture, and death). However, activists chose to risk these costs, because attacks that transgress social norms and violate taboos achieve more broadcast efficacy.[33] As Baya Hocine put it, "it was the only way to be heard."[34]

The Finger on the Trigger: Role Conformity as a Rationalization for Aggression

"Your mother is dead, says the letter
Pick up your heart and march / … /

[33] Eric A. Smith and Rebecca Bliege Bird, "Costly Signaling and Cooperative Behavior," in *Moral Sentiments and Material Interests*, Herbert Gintis et al., eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 115-125.

[34] Interview with Baya Hocine, in Danièle Djamila Amrane-Minne, *Des femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 146; Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie, Tome 2: le temps des léopards* (Verviers: Marabout, 1985), 484-485.

Neither too fast nor too slow
The good step of a good marcher / … /

Let go of your memory
Let go of your pain
You are no longer a child born
By a mother who is born and who dies
You are nothing but a rifle
A finger on the trigger
An eye on the sight
You are the war."[35]

If reciprocity and signaling were two of the most commonly cited reasons for violence, a close third and often unnoticed justification was role conformity. In other words, in justifying aggression, activists often argued they were merely acting per the duties, action scripts, and affects suitable to their role as a good soldier, a good patriot, a good brother, a good son, etc. Because such statements were unelaborated (relying on implicit social roles and scripts), they were often overlooked. However, role appeals were incredibly important.

In rationalizing violence, most activists appealed to the role of soldier. Jewish bombmakers Georges Arbib and Daniel Timsit, for instance, rationalized their production of explosives for the FLN by pointing to their duties as soldiers. Timsit, a medical student and PCA member, had wanted to join the FLN as a doctor; as a result, he experienced a great deal of negative self-feedback (guilt) about his fabrication of bombs. After an attack that killed a civilian woman, Timsit came to Arbib completely shaken, and said "We are guilty, we have killed a woman." The two men discussed abandoning the explosives lab; but Arbib drew Timsit's attention to their role as soldiers and the scripts appropriate for

[35] "La lettre," (March 1959) in Boualem Khalfa, *Certitudes* (Paris: Club des amis du livre progressiste, 1961), 43.

that role. “This is war…. There are bombs. When a pilot bombs a village, he does not know if the bomb will fall on children or on a military target. We are in a similar case, a little bit.”[36]

Looking back on the decision in his memoir, Timsit morally justified his actions in a similar manner. As he explained, he had made explosives for soldiers fighting a war. “For me, the explosives, they were for the armed forces, they were for the maquis.” Later in the text, he returned to question of explosives manufacturing, shuddering at the thought of the detached limbs and mutilations. These, he said, were “an atrocity.” But he immediately added “when I think that I was manufacturing explosives, it was for the maquis, it was for the war.”[37]

Abderrahmane Skali, brought before a tribunal in Lille in 1960 for manufacturing bombs for the FF-FLN, gave a similar testimony. *“*I admit that *I am a soldier*. I admit that I have *done my duty* by making bombs…. We are *at war* with France and we have the right to war prisoner status.”[38] After assassinating a Muslim senator the same year, Slimane Madadi declared in his testimony to the TPFA in Lyon that “*I am a fidaï… I was part of a unit of my country's army* fighting on French soil. I didn’t want to hurt anyone but the traitor. *It was my mission*. I shot [him] in the head. Yes, I really wanted to kill him because *it was my mission*.”[39] And before the TPFA in August 1955, Babouche Saïd similarly declared “I am neither a ‘rebel’ nor an ‘outlaw,’ I am an Algerian who has taken

[36] Daniel Timsit, *Algérie, récit anachronique* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 1998), 9–28; Jean-Luc Einaudi, *Pour l'exemple: l'affaire Fernand Iveton* (Algiers: El Kalima, 2015), 138–140.

[37] Daniel Timsit, *Algérie, récit anachronique*, 32, 42–45.

[38] Emphasis added. “Déclaration d’Abderrahmane Skali devant le Tribunal militaire de Lille,” (1 April 1960) in *Le peuple algérien et la guerre: lettres et témoignages d'Algériens, 1954–1962*, eds. Patrick Kessel and Giovanni Pirelli (Paris: François Maspero, 1962), 448.

[39] “Déclaration de Slimane Madadi devant le Tribunal militaire de Lyon,” (23 April 1960) in Ibid., 341.

up arms to liberate his country... *Soldier of the ALN*, I consciously struggled for the liberation and independence of my country."[40]

Notably, French courts and French citizens vehemently denied Algerian claims to certain roles, especially that of soldier. In the 1959 trial of Mouloud Ouraghi for the attempted assassination of Jacques Soustelle, for instance, Ouraghi testified to the court that "*I am a soldier of the National Liberation Army. I obeyed an order from my officers.* The order was to execute a war criminal, responsible for the death and torture of several thousand of my compatriots. I regret nothing." Later in the proceedings, Ouraghi again declared "No one forced me. *Soldier of the ALN, I obeyed my officers without coercion*. …I am a prisoner of war. … I was thinking about the independence of my country, that is all."[41]

The French audience at Ouraghi's trial met these statements with whistles, boos, and laughter. The state also rejected Ouraghi's self-declared role of soldier, accusing him and his co-defendant (Abdelhafid Cherouk) of being mercenaries motivated by money. The prosecutor pointed out that the men had been paid 50,000 francs a month. But the defendants claimed this was the regular salary of a soldier serving in the military. And in closing remarks, both Ouraghi and Cherouk reiterated that "We are soldiers of the ALN and we are proud of it." Both were condemned to death.[42]

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[40] "Morts pour que l'Algérie vive!" *Résistance Algérienne* 6, Edition C, 13 May 1957, 7 in SHD GR 1H 2589, 151.

For an example of similar statements by MNA fighters, see: "Un procès plein d'enseignements," *La Voix du Peuple: Organe Clandestin du Mouvement National Algérien* 30, February 1958, 2 in BNF MICR D-1263.

[41] Emphasis added. "Déclaration de Mouloud Ouraghi devant le Tribunal militaire de Paris," (4 February 1959) in Ibid., 338; Notes on the Trial of Mouloud Ouraghi and Abdelhafid Cherouk before the Tribunal militaire de Paris, 2–7 February 1959, "Le journal d'un procès," *Vérités Pour* 6, 14 February 1959, 2.

[42] Ibid.

A few notes are worth inserting here about the intersection of role conformity and rationalizations for violence. Activists expressed feeling both internal and external pressure to live up to their roles. Tillion said in her interview with Yacef Saadi in summer 1957, for instance, that the leader indicated he felt a great deal of pressure, being responsible for the military operations of the FLN in Algiers but having no material means. As Tillion gathered from the conversation, "in cases of capital punishment, the pressure of Muslim public opinion is so strong on the clandestine organizations that they are *obliged* to take action (in order to manifest their presence, and their community of feeling with the mass of the people)."[43]

Zohra Drif, who attended the meeting with Saadi and Tillion, also remembered expressing to the French anthropologist that she had duties she felt she needed to fulfill as a fighter. As Zohra saw it, the FLN was waging an unfair fight against a more powerful enemy, and they had a duty to "respond" to French violence. In Zohra's recollection, Tillion tried to lecture them on how "Bombs are bad" during the meeting. This made Zohra angry and "annoyed to the highest degree." As Zohra explained, "we lived hunted, with the *responsibility* to respond to the [French] executions [of Algerians], when we didn't have the means. And [Germaine]… came to moralize to us: bombs are bad. Exasperated, I interjected: 'Shut up, you big baby.'"[44] In her memoir, Zohra further described feeling intense pressure to live up to her special role as a *fidaï*. As she described, in the days leading up to the attacks, she and Samia had only two fears. One

[43] Germaine Tillion, *France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies*, 35–39, 42–48.

[44] Emphasis added. For their parts, neither Saadi nor Tillion mention the outburst, although Saadi mentions silencing Drif with a wink during the meeting, after Tillion called them "assassins." Interview with Zohra Drif, in Danièle Djamila Amrane-Minne, *Des femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 141–142; Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger,* 395 [Tome 2].

fear was they would die. But above that, she said her main fear in undertaking the mission "was the fear of not being able to handle our new role, or worse, of failing."[45]

That said, while activists did experience internal and external pressure to live up to certain roles, role-based norms were not always externally-imposed or coercive. To the contrary, choosing one's own role (or embracing a role considered socially deviant or taboo) could be an act of protest, agency, and self-empowerment. As we have seen, many FLN activists declared themselves soldiers, and worked to live up to their stated role. Zohra Drif, meanwhile, provided an example of role selection as protest. She remembered that after the Milk-Bar attack, she had come to question her role in society. As she mulled over the idea, she realized that in terms of social roles, the French were in control—it was the French who externally imposed roles on Algerians. And as a result, Algerians had limited options: an Algerian could submit and be a *bicot* [nigger]—or he could rebel and be scorned as a *fellagha* [bandit, outlaw]. As Drif wrote, she thus rhetorically asked Samia, "What do you prefer? [Being a] cotton-picker,[46] 'coon, or *fellagha*?" To this, Samia enthusiastically replied "*Fellagha*, and proud to be it! Twice over."[47]

These role-based justifications for violence worked on multiple levels. As we have seen, activists could use role-based appeals to lay claim to violence-authorizing roles like soldier. But activists could also relocate civilians into aggressive categories, in order to make an argument that such individuals were valid combatants (and thus socially acceptable targets of aggression). Zohra Drif, for instance, described being angry at

[45] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 170–171.
[46] In French, *melon*, a pejorative term for Arabs who worked as seasonal migrant laborers picking melons in the south of France.
[47] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 200–201.

French reportage on the Milk Bar bombing, because "What these newspapers call a 'civilian population' is that settlement of Europeans brought by boat by army to colonize our country."[48] Taking the argument a step further, a controversial *El Moudjahid* article squarely defined French civilians as "enemy soldiers." As the article stated, "The French in Algeria cannot be neutral or innocent. Every Frenchman in Algeria oppresses, despises, dominates…. All French currently in Algeria are enemy soldiers." (Notably, French supporters of the FLN raised an outcry over the article, causing the newspaper to moderate these statements a few weeks later.)[49]

Role-based rationalizations also shifted depending on audience. Activists gave very different role appeals on the witness stand and in police confessions than they did in memoirs and interviews. For instance, in his 1957 confession to police, Yacef Saadi appealed to his role as a subordinate soldier in a military network, arguing that he had only been following orders.[50] In two memoirs written in 1962 and 2002, however, Saadi depicted himself as a military strategist and commander. Invoking the imagery of chess, he described himself carefully considering his moves. He also wrote of himself as a keeper of order and purity (preventing Algerians from forming a lynch mob after the bombing of the Rue de Thèbes, and cleaning up the Casbah from drugs, crime, and prostitution), as well as a commander on high, looking out over the city with his binoculars and keeping watch over the citizens of Algiers.[51] In other words, when facing

[48] Ibid.

[49] "Les intellectuels et les démocrates français devant la révolution algérienne," *El Moudjahid* 14, 15 December 1957, 230–231 [Tome 1].

[50] "Copie de la confession de Yacef, Saadi Ben Mohamed, écrite librement," transcribed by Officer Nogueira, Officier de Police Judiciaire Auxiliaire [OPJA] (25 September 1957), Ref. No. 2733, Document No. 01730 in SHD GR 1H 1612.

[51] Yacef Saadi, *Souvenirs de la bataille d'Alger*, 37, 82–86; Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger*, [Tome 1] 133–172, 264–265 and [Tome 2] 70–71.

social sanctions, Saadi chose a role justification that served to minimize his responsibility, shift blame, and reduce punishment. When socially valorized for his behavior, however, Saadi took full responsibility for his actions, and emphasized his agency and control. He then justified his behavior by referencing different roles: those of a military commander, watchman, and guardian.

The affective dimension of roles was also notable. While in front of military tribunals, FLN fighters delivered role appeals in a professional and straightforward fashion—that is, in a manner *befitting* the role of a soldier. In other words, activists did not only appeal to the action scripts suitable for a given role, they also strived to adopt the *affects* of the role. To this end, FLN tracts, training manuals, and official newspapers emphasized professionalism, adhering to the laws of war, and being free from racism and hatred toward the enemy. The first issue of *El Moudjahid*, for instance, described its *fidayines* [Arabic *fidāʾiyīn*] as special operatives, soldiers executing orders with efficiency, discipline, calm, and maturity.[52] This was the environment Yacef Saadi and Zohra Drif describe in the bombs network. Saadi, for instance, described bombings and attacks emotionlessly: business-as-usual, part of his job and professional responsibilities.[53] The link between affect and properly fulfilling one's self-perceived role was thus important, and might help explain an odd finding in criminological studies of threatening communications: politeness—not anger, disgust, or contempt—has so far

[52] "'El Moudjahid' vous présente le fidaï," *El Moudjahid* 1, June 1956, 15–16 [Tome 1]; "Le fidaï: sentinelle avancée de la revolution," *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, 106–107 [Tome 1].

[53] Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger,* 379–389 [Tome 1].

been one of the only linguistic markers found to be positively correlated to the actuation of violent threats.[54]

While activists strove to behave professionally when "on duty," this did not mean that role-based justifications were always a dry, emotionless process. Once roles were internalized as part of an individual's value system, emotional cues helped regulate and maintain role-based norms. Activists could thus be deeply attached to their roles, and find a sense of pride, purpose, and satisfaction in being a good soldier, good patriot, good son, or good brother. Moreover, certain roles (such as kinship-based roles) did include emotionally-charged scripts and affects. For instance, if close friends ("brothers and sisters") were fighting, some activists felt a strong sense of guilt *not* to be involved, as this was failing in one's duties as a friend and brother. PCA activist Maurice Laban, for instance, fled to Paris in November 1955 to join his wife and son. But while there, he remained obsessed with the war, and plagued with guilt for having left his friends. As a result, when he received a message at the end of November 1955 from the clandestine wing of the PCA asking if he would return to Algiers to fight, he did not hesitate. He went back to Algiers, and joined his PCA cellmates in the underground. He died alongside them in the field some six months later.[55]

Thus, while activists could (and did) contrive and adapt role justifications based on their audience, that is not to say that all role appeals were coldly calculated. Activists generally embraced multiple social roles at once, and could emphasize different roles to

[54] J. Reid Meloy et al., "A Research Review of Public Figure Threats, Approaches, Attacks, and Assassinations in the United States," *Journal of Forensic Sciences* 49, no. 5 (September 2004): 1–8; Park Elliott Dietz et al., "Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate Letters to Members of the United States Congress," *Journal of Forensic Sciences* 36, no. 5 (September 1991): 1454, 1463; Sharon S. Smith, "From Violent Words to Violent Deeds? Assessing Risk from Threatening Communications," (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2006), 82–111.

[55] Jean-Luc Einaudi, *Un algérien: Maurice Laban* (Paris: Le cherche midi éditeur, 1999), 155–156.

different audiences in an effort to better communicate and convince. Activists who justified aggression by appealing to certain roles could also be responding to genuine and deeply-held beliefs about who they were and what their role was in society. Role conformity could thus be a very powerful impetus to aggression, with activists acting to avoid (or alleviate) the guilt, shame, and loss of self-worth that could result from failing to live up to one's role.

An example of kinship-based reciprocal aggression illustrated the power roles (and attachment) could have, as well as how activists endeavored to "live up to" and negotiate the responsibilities of various roles. As part of his psychiatry practice, Fanon treated a young man named "Dj—," a 19-year-old student who had dropped out of school to join the ALN. However, after joining the underground movement, Dj— was discharged and admitted to the hospital for a major depressive disorder. The 19-year-old was suffering from insomnia, and had attempted suicide twice.

In counseling, Dj— told doctors the reason for his pain and turmoil. He had been fighting in the ALN, but "After several months I received news from home. I learned that my mother had been killed at point-blank range by a French soldier." The French soldiers had then taken his two sisters to the barracks to rape and torture them. The teenager still had no idea where his sisters were, or what had become of them.

Because his father had died years earlier, Dj— was the only man in the family: it had thus been his responsibility to protect his mother and sisters. As a result, the young man experienced a crushing guilt about what had happened. "I was terribly shaken by my mother's death… My sole ambition had always been to do something to improve the lives of my mother and sisters," he explained. But there was nothing he could do; he was a

soldier who had committed to the ALN. (In the words of Boualem Khalfa, "Your mother is dead, says the letter / Pick up your heart and march / … / Neither too fast nor too slow / The good step of a good marcher."[56]) Moreover, ALN soldiers were forbidden from acting without direct orders. Dj— thus found himself caught between his duties as a son, and his role as a soldier.

One day after receiving word of his mother's murder, Dj—'s ALN unit attacked a large estate. The estate was owned by a white settler family, and managed by a man accused of killing two Algerian civilians. Dj—'s ALN unit arrived at the plantation at night, intending to execute the manager for the Algerian deaths. But the man was not there: only his wife was home. As a result, Dj—'s ALN unit settled in, and waited for the husband to return.

While they waited at the house, however, the colon's wife crumbled. She began begging and sobbing. "I know you've come for my husband," she told them, "but he isn't here ... How many times have I told him not to get mixed up in politics?" As she cried and wailed, pleading with them to spare her life, Dj— just stared at the woman. He was supposed to remain calm and collected, and his orders were to wait. But all he could think about was his dead mother. "I was wondering to myself why didn't we kill [the settler's wife]. And then suddenly, she noticed I was looking at her. She threw herself on me, crying: 'I beg you... don't kill me... I have children.'" The next instant she was dead, and he was covered in her blood. He had stabbed her multiple times in the stomach, eviscerating her. "I'd killed her with my knife."[57]

[56] "La lettre," (March 1959) in Boualem Khalfa, *Certitudes*, 43.

[57] "Série A, Cas N° 3: Psychose anxieuse grave à type de dépersonnalisation après le meurtre forcené d*J*une femme," in Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 198–200.

This was not the end of it, however. As he had disobeyed orders and murdered a civilian, Dj— was put on trial by his superior officers. The young man said he hoped they would execute him. But to his dismay, the FLN instead sent him to a psychiatric hospital. There, Dj—could not eat; he would vomit up any food he choked down. He also had trouble sleeping; each night, he had nightmares about the settler's wife. As soon as he tried to sleep, the dead woman would appear: gaunt and bloodless, with a gaping hole in her stomach. And each night, she would demand that Dj— give her back her blood; she would not let him rest. Some nights, he dreamed his own blood was gushing out onto the floor of the room. Then he would wake up soaked in sweat. The 19-year-old was so distressed, he attempted suicide twice. But this was not the worst he suffered. As Dj— reported to doctors, he could no longer remember his mother's face. He had tried to avenge her, by killing the settler's wife. But now, he couldn't remember her face. Because each time he tried to picture his mother, all he saw was the face of the French woman, staring back at him.[58]

Overall, the fact that activists leaned most heavily on reciprocity and role appeals in justifying violence is a finding with important implications for understanding the Algerian moral imaginary. For one, appeals to reciprocity suggest that for Algerians, the highest point of return (or social approval) for aggressive behavior tended to be reciprocal aggression—that is, striking someone who hit you first. Consistent with this finding, reciprocity as a guiding norm is indeed prevalent in both Kabyle and Arabic traditions. Algerian Kabyle proverbs, for instance, encourage positive and negative

[58] Ibid.

reciprocity ("Whoever strikes you a little, strike him the same, whoever loves you a little, love him the same"[59]), preemptive aggression in the face of imminent threat ("He who raises his hand, it is as though he struck"[60]), and escalatory counter-aggression ("Whoever strikes you on the feet, strike him in the head"[61]).[62] The concept of aggression as a transgressive behavior is also semantically built in to the Arabic language. The Arabic root *ʿadā*, for instance, means both "to cross a boundary, to transgress" and "to engage in aggressive, hostile action," and the term imparts this dual meaning to its derivatives. For example, Qurʾān 2:190 enjoins reciprocal aggression but forbids initiated aggression, telling Muslims to fight "those who fight against you, but do not transgress/aggress, for God loves not the transgressors/aggressors."[63] Such traditions, as well as the sheer number of reciprocity appeals in activist statements, thus suggest that aggression norms in Algerian society were much like aggression norms in other human societies, where the best return potential[64] for violence was for violence based on negative reciprocity.

The frequent appeals to the role of soldier were also significant. Of course, on the stand, many of these appeals were part of a concerted defense strategy scripted by FLN lawyers. By instructing its activists to appeal to their role as soldiers, the FLN hoped to gain international recognition as an army, secure protection for its fighters under the

[59] French: *Celui qui te frappe un peu, bats-le de meme, celui qui t'aime un peu, aime-le de meme.*
[60] French: *Celui qui a levé la main, c'est comme s'il avait frappé*.
[61] French: *Celui qui te frappe aux pieds, frappe-le a la tete.*
[62] See: Ouahmi Ould-Braham, "Locutions et proverbes kabyles: d'après un recueil manuscrit de 1928–1932," *Etudes et Documents Berbères* 5 (1989): 58-84; Youssef Nacib, *Proverbes et dictons kabyles: oralité sapientiale* (Algiers: Éditions Maison des Livres, 2012), 91, 278.
[63] Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, *Third Ed.,* ed. J. Milton Cown (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, 1976), 598–599.
[64] David B. Henry et al., "A Return Potential Measure of Setting Norms for Aggression," *American Journal of Community Psychology* 33, nos. 3/4 (June 2004): 131–149.

Geneva Conventions, and assert its legitimacy as a national entity. Even so, appeals to the role of soldier were prevalent outside the courtroom as well. This was because by claiming to be a soldier, one claimed the right, duties, and action scripts appropriate for this role—and these action scripts included the use of force. The violence of the soldier was within limits: professional and orderly, overseen by an executive authority and commanding officers, and performed in the defense of the nation and the nation's values. It was violence—but legitimate, socially-sanctioned violence, performed by a group of commissioned specialists. As a result, when an individual said that he made or carried bombs as soldier, as part of his duties for the military, he argued to himself and others that *no transgression of social boundaries concerning violence had occurred*.

In sum, there were good reasons that reciprocity and role-based appeals were by far the most common rationalizations for violence. By appealing to reciprocity and one's roles (as a soldier and brother, son or daughter), activists invoked recognized and well-established social norms. They claimed precedent for their behavior. And they attempted to prevent sanctions and minimize negative feedback—both from themselves, and from others. After all, what brother would not avenge his murdered family? What soldier would refuse the call to take up arms to protect his people against a foreign invader?

Fanon, the FLN, and Organizational Arguments for Virtuous Violence

Having seen how both the FLN and individual activists used reciprocity and role-based appeals to justify violence, it is worth turning now to the question of how the FLN combined such appeals with a broader argument authorizing the use of force. In fact, FLN publications made a specific case that certain types of violence were acceptable, and

other types of violence unacceptable. In these arguments, the French were above all the archetype for transgressive aggression. French violence was firstly denounced for violating the laws of war and humanity. FLN articles, for instance, condemned French practices like genocide, torture, burning villages, interning civilians in concentration camps, raping women, using explosive bullets and napalm, and killing categories of people considered off-limits (i.e., civilians, women, children, the elderly, and the disabled).[65] *Résistance Algérienne*, for example, ran an article describing the French army killing infirm, blind, and crippled individuals, as well as a WWI veteran and hero of Verdun. Denouncing the murder of a blind man, the article exclaimed "The HUNS, the MONGOLS, the NAZIS would have spared him. French troops, would you say? I repeat it to you as an eyewitness: he was shot!"[66]

French violence was also denounced for its affective qualities—namely, for being emotionally uncontrolled and irrational. *El Moudjahid* described how "homicidal fury arouses a France enraged by the colonial virus,"[67] and *Résistance Algérienne*, portrayed the French as driven by "hysteric and criminal rage" and "primitive aggression." One article explained that although reason was commanding the French to stop the war, they were being driven onward by emotions, including spite, hatred, selfishness, and the "rage of impotence."[68] As *Résistance Algérienne* described it, "The French of Algeria behave like fools, like people who have lost their reason. They hate the whole universe. First of all, they hate the Arabs, obviously; they hate the Americans… they hate the Spaniards…

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[65] Boualem Taibi, "Lettres du Maquis: Lettre à Guy Mollet, bourreau du peuple algérien," *Révolution: Organe les combattants de la Wilaya IV*, no. 3 (1957), 12, in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3;

[66] Sinistres souvenirs," *Résistance Algérienne* 6, Edition C, 13 May 1957, 9–10 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

[67] "Le village martyr," *El Moudjahid* 18, 15 February 1958, 320 [Tome 1].

[68] "La guerre d'Algérie menace pour la paix," *Résistance Algérienne* 12, Edition C (22 July 1957), 2 and "Lacoste n'a rien inventé," *Résistance Algérienne* 11, Edition B, 13 May 1957, 2 and "Génocide," *Résistance Algérienne* 6, Edition C (13 May 1957) 2, all in SHD GR 1H 2589.

they hate the English… they hate the Russians… finally, they hate themselves because they have neither the will nor the desire to fight."[69]

The French were also denounced for taking pleasure in violence, and for failing to properly shame for aggressive behavior. Many tracts and articles described the French as sadistic; an FLN tract, for example, described how colonialist hordes behaved with hysteria and sadism, burning and pillaging villages and attacking the elderly and disabled. Another tract explained that the French military was "mercenaries without faith or law, who take sadistic pride and joy in the burning, pillaging, massacres, and rapes that they commit daily."[70] The French were also characterized as lacking remorse: "They are all sick, all infected by the virus of racism… colonialism enters into their life and their mores, darkening, shrinking their consciences…. far from having any guilt complex, any troubled conscience, do they not instead legitimize their exploitation and murder of colonized peoples?"[71]

Surprisingly, however, it was not just the French who were described as aggressive: the FLN also described the Algerian masses as potentially violent. Most famously, Frantz Fanon argued that by forcibly oppressing men and attempting to reduce them to the level of beasts, colonialism had made Algerians behave in ways criminal, violent, impulsive, and savage. At a conference in Ghana, where he was serving as an FLN representative,

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[69] "Je reviens d'Algérie," *Résistance Algérienne* 9, Edition B, 1 October 1956, 1–2 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

For statements about the French as a whole being filled with hatred, see for instance: "De Gaulle intensifie la répression," *République Algérienne: Bulletin Politique* 18, 20 August 1959, 7 in SHD GR 1H 1715; "De Suez à l'Algérie," *El Moudjahid* 2, July 1956, 31 [Tome 1]; "L'assassinat légalisé," *Résistance Algérienne* 6, Edition C, 13 May 1957, 6, 9–10 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

[70] ALN-FLN, *Premier Novembre 1954–Premier Novembre 1958* (1958), 4, and FLN, "Soldats Français! N'avez-vous pas encore compris," (June 1957), both in SHD GR 1H 2588 D3.

[71] Boualem Taibi, "Lettres du Maquis: Frère du Kenya," *Révolution: Organe les combattants de la Wilaya IV*, no. 1 (1957), 26–29 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3.

for instance, Fanon argued that colonization provoked animalistic "defense reactions" in the colonized. The violence of the colonized could thus be understood as "the last gesture made by a hunted man" in defense of his life.[72] In *Les damnés de la terre* Fanon expanded on these statements. In a society where Algerians were unemployed, evicted from their homes, wallowing in famine and illness, interned in concentration camps, reduced to fighting with fellow men over resources like loaves of bread and a single sheep—in a society where stealing a man's bread was tantamount to attempted murder—the colonized had been made violent, Fanon said. "The criminality of the Algerian, his impulsiveness, the violence of his murders are thus not the consequence of how his nervous system is organized or something unique to [the Algerian] character, but the direct product of the colonial situation."[73]

Fanon chose case studies for *Les damnés de la terre* to illustrate this outlook. For instance, Fanon saw the Algerian children who murdered their playmate as responding to the systemic violence of colonization; similarly, the young man who stabbed the colon's wife was responding to colonial violence against his mother. The violence of the colonized subject, then, was instinctive and ferocious: the masses were beset by "reactionary psychoses," Fanon explained, these were men whose "muscles… are always tensed," men waiting to "vomit up" white Western values and the raw violence enforcing them. As he wrote, "it is very dangerous to deprive the masses of their leader. Because then, no longer restrained, the people hurl themselves headlong into jacqueries [popular revolts], mutinies and 'bestial murders.' The masses give free rein to their 'bloodthirsty

[72] Frantz Fanon speech at the Conférence des Etats et des peuples africains pour une Action positive pour la Paix et la Sécurité en Afrique, in Accra [Ghana], 7–10 April 1960, printed as "Pourquoi nous employons la violence," *Vérité Liberté* 1, May 1960, 4, 9.

[73] Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 233–235.

instincts,' and demand the liberation of their leaders, to whom falls the difficult task of restoring calm."[74]

What is notable is that Fanon contrasted the violence of the colonized (a cathartic overflow of passions, a reciprocal reaction to the colonial system) and the violence of colonizer (barbaric, racist, and exploitative) with the FLN's violence, which was circumscribed and ordered. "Because we want a democratic and a renovated Algeria… we condemn, with pain in our hearts, those brothers who have flung themselves into revolutionary action with the almost physiological brutality that centuries of oppression give rise to and feed," Fanon wrote. He further explained that FLN chiefs were responsible for restraining and directing communal violence, and judging those who let their passions reign. As he explained, the FLN "must take disciplinary action against a patriot guilty, for example, of having killed a notorious traitor—or worse, a woman or child—without having received orders to do so." Such unrestrained aggression was understandable—but brothers acting without orders "must be judged" and placed "before the revolutionary court."[75] In describing's Dj—'s evisceration of the settler woman, Fanon highlighted that this was indeed the practice: an FLN revolutionary court put Dj—on trial for murder and acting without orders, but ultimately sent the young man to a mental facility.[76]

FLN leaders likewise argued they were restraining the violence of the masses. An article on the Sétif and Guelma massacres of 1945 in *El Moudjahid*, for instance,

[74] Ibid., 34–35, 41, 54–55, 190–192.

[75] Frantz Fanon, "Preface," (July 1959) in *A Dying Colonialism* [*L'an V de la révolution algérienne*], trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1965 [First Ed. François Maspero, 1959]), 25–26.

[76] "Série A, Cas N° 3: Psychose anxieuse grave à type de dépersonnalisation après le meurtre forcené d'une femme," in Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 198–200.

described how "provocateurs" had cried *jihād* and raised the call to kill the French, but nationalist leaders had urged the Muslim population to remain calm, and not give in to provocation.[77] A similar narrative appeared in Saadi's 1962 book on the Battle of Algiers. As he described it, after the Rue de Thèbes bomb, Algerians in the Casbah called for revenge, and were set to launch an angry and "out of control" mob into the European neighborhoods. Saadi explained that "It was necessary to keep this popular emotion from degenerating into an anarchic explosion." So, he patrolled the streets of the Casbah and talked to residents, "to channel this immense wave by announcing a disciplined counter-offensive." Saadi also claimed they helped maintain law and order by setting up a "system of surveillance and self-defense," and rolling back the French-set curfew (midnight) to an earlier time (11 o'clock). In the 2002 book, he added that he went through the neighborhoods shouting "It is the FLN who will avenge you… We have a more effective weapon that they do. It is the Front who represents you. You must obey it and return to your homes."[78]

In addition to restraining the uncontrolled violence of the masses, the FLN asserted its right to exercise a different kind of violence on behalf of the Algerian people: a violence that was acceptable, if not virtuous. This violence, according to FLN statements, was professional, orderly, solemn, and sanctioned by the community. Above all, this violence fit within designated social roles and action scripts for acceptable violence.

[77] "Il y a 13 ans la 'France libre' croyait venir à bout du peuple algérien," *El Moudjahid* 23, 5 May 1958, 447–449 [Tome 1].

[78] Yacef Saadi, *Souvenirs de la bataille d'Alger,* 17–18; Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger*, 264–265 [Tome 1].



Figure 10.1 – A Modern, Regular Army. FLN photos for press distribution, confiscated by the French. The photos characterize the ALN as being a professional, orderly, and modern army, while the French note on the file describes the photos as pictures of "fellaghas" or bandits.

(Source: "Photos de fellaghas," (n.d.) in SHD GR 1H 2590/D3.)

For instance, FLN violence adhered to Islamic[79] and international laws of war, sparing women, children, the elderly, infirm, and other noncombatants.[80] FLN violence was also assigned to a professional soldierly, and under the aegis of a specialized body, the Armée

[79] Islamic guidelines for *jihād*, for instance, include prohibitions on destroying crops and killing women, children, the elderly, and priests, prescribed honorable treatment for prisoners of war, forbade corpse mutilation, etc. See: Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī Vol. X: The Conquest of Arabia*, trans. Fred. M. Donner (Albany: State University of New York Press), 16.

[80] "Les dix commandements de l'ALN," *El Moudjahid* 1, June 1956, 16 [Tome 1].

de Libération Nationale (ALN)—"a regular and organized army," the "national army" of Algeria, and "a modern regular army," as tracts and articles declared.[81]

Certain types of irregular violence, meanwhile, were relegated to the duties of a specially commissioned soldier: the *fidaï*. Placed immediately after an article on the morality of the ALN, an article in *El Moudjahid* explained the role of the *fidaï*. The *fidaï* was a plainclothes officer, who carried out special missions behind enemy lines. But although he lacked a uniform, the *fidaï* was a "revolutionary engaged in liberating combat. The *fidaï* is a soldier. … He is not a terrorist." His duties included meting out justice to traitors and policemen who tortured patriots. Charged with executing justice on behalf of the people, the *fidaï* kept dossiers on the "enemies of the people," and when the FLN pronounced the death sentence, the *fidaï* carried out the conviction. "The *fidaï* keeps watch."[82]

In terms of activist imaginations, the *fidaï* was important because it was a violence-authorizing role, framed as a high-status position. By circumscribing violence as a special responsibility, assigning it to an elite and trusted minority, and having authority figures sanction it, the FLN helped activists bypass inhibitions against violent behavior. As Zohra Drif explained from prison in 1960, for instance, her bombing of the Milk Bar had been part of her job as a *fidaï*, which she defined as a plainclothes soldier selected for elite missions. And like soldiers in special units, she explained, the *fidaï* in the FLN had a rank, a special role in the army, and "the problems posed to him are those of any soldier

[81] "L'ALN, tout un peuple en armes," *El Moudjahid* 11, 1 November 1957; *Résistance Algérienne*, Numéro spécial, Edition B, February 1957, 2 in SHD GR 1H 2589; "Combattants de l'ALN, à l'exercice," *El Moudjahid* 8, 5 August 1957, 4 in SHD GR 1H 2589.

[82] "Le fidaï: sentinelle avancée de la revolution," *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, 106–107 [Tome 1].

required to fire on a human target."[83] Overall, this finding is similar to what has been found in studies of prison execution squads and elite military combat units: overcoming inhibitions on aggression is facilitated by framing deadly tasks as an important responsibility, awarded only to the select few.[84]

Along with these specific violence-authorizing roles, the FLN emphasized that its legitimate violence was characterized by specific affects. As the FLN stressed, while French violence was hateful and fanatical, the FLN's violence was professional and solemn. Many articles, for instance, contrasted French racial and religious hatred, hysteria, and sadism with the FLN's hatred-free approach to the war.[85] Further recognizing that religious aggression was seen as an illegitimate form of aggression, *El Moudjahid* redefined *jihād* as the most legitimate form of aggression: "self-defense," a patriotic aggression "without religious or racial hatred."[86]

One of the appropriate affects for violence, according to the FLN, was a reticence and regret for violent behavior. As opposed to the pleasure the French sadistically took in their murders, Fanon emphasized that FLN leaders were appropriately hesitant to carry out civilian attacks. "Nobody takes lightly the decision to kill a civilian in the street. Nobody stops to place a bomb in a public place without a battle of conscience. …Many times, [FLN] leaders canceled plans or even in the last minute recalled the *fidaï* charged with placing a bomb."[87] Similarly, the Wilaya IV paper *Révolution* memorialized one of

[83] Zohra Drif, *La mort de mes frères*, 10–11.

[84] Albert Bandura, *Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm and Live with Themselves* (New York: Worth, 2016).

[85] See for instance: "De Gaulle intensifie la répression," *République Algérienne*: *Bulletin Politique* 18, 20 August 1959, 7 in SHD GR 1H 1715; "De Suez à l'Algérie," *El Moudjahid* 2, July 1956, 31 [Tome 1].

[86] "Bulletin de naissance," *El Moudjahid* no. 1, June 1956, 8–9 [Tome 1].

[87] Frantz Fanon, "L'Algérie se dévoile," in *L'an V de la révolution algérienne (Cahiers libres No. 3)* (Paris: François Maspero, 1959), 36–38.

its ALN soldiers by describing how "he felt a profound regret about burning their [the colons'] farms or ransacking their vineyards. However, he did it because he understood the absolute necessity."[88]

In addition to authorizing violence through specific social roles, the FLN also authorized its violence through mythmaking and ritual performances of justice. Chapter 6 already looked at FLN tribunals, showing how the organization created its own judiciary, held trials (complete with judges, lawyers, court clerks, and police officers), and passed down sentences.[89] In addition to these parajudicial institutions, the FLN authorized violence by embedding aggression in its revolutionary myth. And per this myth, violence was part of the transformative process, helping move individuals from humiliation to dignity. This argument was most strongly visible in the writings of Fanon, who argued that violence was helping transform the individual from a slave into a man of dignity. As Fanon wrote, "At the individual level, violence is a disinfectant. It rids the colonized of his inferiority complex, of his detached and despairing attitude. It renders him fearless, and restores his self-confidence… Violence hoists the people up to the height of the leader."[90]

In an important passage, Fanon also explained that violence also served as a collective ritual of self-excommunication from the French system, and a cost of entry for

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[88] Colonel Sadek, "Nous, militants du FLN…" *Révolution: Organe les combattants de la Wilaya IV*, no. 1 (1957), 25 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D3.

Notably, this "reticent violence" appeal had an echo in French discourse as well: Jean-Paul Sartre and other French progressives argued that the difference between communist concentration camps and colonial concentration camps was that the West "wanted" concentration camps, these being "essential to its nature," whereas the Soviets were acting out of necessity. See: Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 170.

[89] See for instance Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques et de la Fonction Publique, "Recherches sur l'organisation judiciaire rebelle en Algérie," Algiers (2 March 1958) in SHD GR 1H 1691.

[90] Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 70.

"strayed" members of the community wanting to enter back into communion with the group. As Fanon phrased it,

> "A new militant could be relied upon when he could no longer return to the colonial system. This strategy, it seems, existed in Kenya among the Mau-Mau, who required that each member of the group strike the victim. Everyone was therefore personally responsible for the death of the victim. To work means to work towards the death of the colon. Participating in violence allowed members of the group who had strayed or been excommunicated to return, to retake their place and reintegrate. Violence is thus understood as a supreme form of mediation. The colonized man liberates himself in and through violence."[91]

Here, Fanon was not wrong: as the penalty for FLN activists caught by the French was prison or execution, violence was indeed a kind of self-excommunication from the colonial system—and separating oneself from colonial society could be seen as liberating. To this, the FLN added that violence not only formed a new man, it helped form a new national community. As *El Moudjahid* wrote, "The armed struggle, the ambushes, the clashes, the man-to-man combat with the enemy are for the Algerian Citizen the first modality of the national experience. And this successful and historic [national] rediscovery is expressed perfectly through the intensification of our combat, the elevation of our aggression, and the always heroic violence of our assaults."[92]

For Fanon and the FLN, then, violence was a necessary social practice or "praxis," which was revolutionary insofar as it was helping create a new man, a new collective consciousness, and a new nation. Violence was thus constructive (building a new community) inasmuch as it was destructive (destroying the colonial order). In Fanon's terminology, for the colonized violence was "positive, formative."[93] And per this

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[91] Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 64.

[92] "L'ALN, tout un peuple en armes," *El Moudjahid* no. 11, 1 November 1957, 145 [Tome 1].

[93] Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 69.

For more on violence as revolutionary praxis in Fanon, see Cécile Lavergne, "La violence comme *praxis* révolutionnaire chez Frantz Fanon: la fabrique subjective d'un homme nouveau?" in *Violences:*

revolutionary myth, in rising up, by collectively striking the victim, through aggressive self-assertion, the colonized would be transformed into a man of dignity.

As a final word on FLN mythmaking, it is important to point out that neither Fanon nor FLN publications should be read as a blank check for violence. Even though Fanon endeavored to explain why anti-colonial violence was "natural" and understandable, his writings were not an apologia for unconstrained aggression. Instead, he highlighted that the FLN was needed to control and discipline that aggression, and channel it toward the creation of a new community. In the same way, the FLN did not suggest a radical revision of the norms of just and unjust aggression. Instead, the organization claimed for itself the role of military tribunal and national defense force, and with these roles the right to use violence to punish and defend.

What the FLN sought, then, was not to overturn the social order, but to seize certain duties and powers from the French administration. And the FLN supported this prerogative with a specific set of claims concerning violence. These included an argument that the FLN's violence was professional and ethical, per the action scripts for a national army; a claim that the FLN was working to restrain the unchecked violence of both the degenerate French and the beleaguered Algerian masses; and an argument for anti-colonial violence as a collective ritual, appropriate for a liminal and transitional moment—violence as a rite of passage, helping separate Algerians from France, and helping birth a new Algerian nation and a new Algerian man. All these arguments served to authorize violence as appropriate—for the FLN.

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anthropologie, politique, philosophie, ed. Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc (Toulouse: Europhilosophie Éditions, 2017).

"They Can Only Make It Explode": Rationalizations for Violence among the FLN's French Supporters

By way of comparison, it is worth adding a few brief comments about how French support network members justified aggression. And as was standard, when it came to justifying violence, reciprocity topped the list of rationalizations. This was the argument Jean-Claude Paupert made at his trial, for instance. Paupert had served in the French Army before joining the Jeanson network; he said that when deciding whether to offer the Algerians aid, he had considered the question of Algerian violence and concluded "there was violence in Algeria, which was colonial violence. When a spring is forcefully pressed and then this spring is released, it strikes what was oppressing it. …Algerians live in violence, it is their memory and their destiny. They cannot break out. They can only make it explode." In a second statement before the court, he expanded on the idea of French violence. "There is but one blood, just as there is but one violence—and that is colonial violence. …Since torture is a system, we are all torturers. I was a torturer, and I do not come before you as a veteran, but as a fallen soldier, like a policeman of the worst kind. …I did not choose to help the Algerian militants in spite of [their] terrorism, but because terrorism is their destiny. …My path is clear: from the French army in Algeria to the Algerians, from the colonizer to the colonized, from the system to hope. I was a torturer; freed, I am a terrorist."[94]

Other activists gave explanations that invoked compensation and fairness. As Jeanson wrote, young men and women in France "have chosen to provide the Algerians with practical aid, to compensate to some extent for the atrocious repression of which they are

[94] "Les accusés: premières déclarations" and "Les accusés: deuxièmes déclarations," *Vérité Liberté* 5, November 1960, 3–4, 8.

daily the victims."[95] Yann Le Masson, who served in the French Army before deciding to help with FLN arms-smuggling and weapons training, gave a similar explanation for his aid. "What I had learned myself in the army, weapons handling and street fighting, I was able to transfer this knowledge through military courses given to Algerian militants in the *bidonville* [slum] of Nanterre. It was a fair exchange." There was also an element of compartmentalization concerning how the weapons would be used: as Le Masson said, what the Algerians did with the weapons was "none of my business."[96]

Interestingly, before the start of the Algerian conflict, Jeanson had previously addressed the question of whether or not violence was an acceptable way to bring about a revolution of the proletariat. In a 1948 article in *Esprit*, he answered the question by appealing to negative reciprocity (but negotiating the concept by stretching the idea of violence): "Violence in itself is neither more nor less justifiable than any other behavior, and its outright rejection would only be complicity with *bourgeois violence, solidly established in an order and a legality* that serve as its justification."[97] In *Notre guerre*, Jeanson took a different tack, appealing to fairness and the scripts appropriate for wartime. As he explained, there was no "clean war" or "absolutely pure causes." The war in Algeria, he added, was an unfair war, "1 against 20," fought according to laws of war established by the colonial power.[98]

Jeanson then turned to the question of French support for the FLN. "Yes, we have helped, we currently help, and we will continue to help the Algerians *on all planes*. Their

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[95] Francis Jeanson, "Lettre adressée à Claude Bourdet à la suite de la publication par France-Observateur d'un article intitulé 'Pourquoi aident-ils le FLN?" *Vérités Pour* 15, 24 March 1960, 3–4.

[96] Interview with Yann Le Masson, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir: Les réseaux de soutien au FLN pendant la guerre d'Algérie, les acteurs parlent* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004), 161–163.

[97] Emphasis added. Francis Jeanson, "La morale de l'histoire," *Esprit* 145, no. 5/6 (May–June 1948): 914.

[98] Emphasis in original. Francis Jeanson, *Notre guerre* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1960), 40–46.

struggle is indivisible. This man you help evade the police one night, maybe the next morning he will shoot an enemy of the revolution or blow up one of those marvelous dams French grandeur prides itself on, and then you will be an accomplice in his act… Sometimes, money from Algerian collections is used to buy weapons, and it happens that these weapons are directed against certain Frenchmen." But, Jeanson explained, supporting the Algerian cause was to recognize from the start that "Whether you like it or not, *tout se tient.*"[99] The statement was likely a reference to French linguist Antoine Meillet's grammatical adage "*tout se tient"*—meaning everything is connected or interlinked. As Jeanson continued, yes, the Jeanson network was linked to FLN violence. But as Frenchmen, they were also already supporting the French military by paying taxes, he argued. Thus, as Jeanson saw it, they could continue being "an accomplice to *genocide*," or they could be complicit in FLN violence.[100]A *Vérités Pour* interview with Jeanson later pushed the philosopher to the conclusion of his statements, asking him point-blank: "*Tout se tient*, you say in *Notre guerre*: would you accept [to carry out] a 'terrorist mission'?" The philosopher replied, "Yes, *tout se tient.*"[101]

Claude Bourdet had similar justifications for violence. When asked about the FLN's attacks on Muslim collaborators, Bourdet replied "These are certainly cruel acts, *but they are acts of war*: the Resistance did the same in France." Of indiscriminate attacks against civilians, like grenades in cinemas and cafes, Bourdet appealed to reciprocity. These acts, he said, were "unacceptable and inexcusable, but two things must be understood. First, i*t's the Europeans who started it.* The first indiscriminate attack that was committed in

[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.
[101] "Une interview de Francis Jeanson: les réseaux sont en France le seul exemple permanent d'unité d'action…" *Vérités Pour* 18, 26 September 1960, 2–3.

Algiers, the Rue de Thèbes [bombing], in the summer of 1956, killed several dozen people… The indiscriminate attacks by Algerians only started later, following the example of the attacks committed by the Europeans, and in response to the executions of Algerian prisoners."[102]

Mandouze was one activist who did not excuse or support violence. However, he did explain that he found purity and righteousness claims by one side or the other to be hypocritical. Since both the French and Algerians were using and justifying violence, and as "a general climate of terrorism is accepted by both parties," he wrote, there was no point in clutching one's pearls at the Jeanson network's support of FLN militants who would likely go on to commit violent acts. The French were supporting their own military, which was doing the same. "Since… we all accept in practice the law of the jungle, why from time to time, when it suits us, feign indignation? … Come on! A truce of hypocrisy. Admit that the world has made a philosophy of violence, a philosophy born from the practice of this violence. Let us admit that Christendom has made a theology of violence and war. And let us admit that the evangelism of the Beatitudes has been set aside, as valid for the Kingdom [of God, or the Kingdom of Heaven], and not for the City of Earth."[103]

Other Christian activists justified violence by citing a quote attributed to Protestant theologian Karl Barth: "There is the violence that oppresses and violence that liberates." For instance, testifying on behalf of Father Davezies (*in camera*, as the government argued the testimonies presented a danger to public order), Georges Casalis, chair of

[102] Claude Bourdet, "Treize questions et réponses sur la paix en algerie," *Vérité Liberté*, *des Français parlent aux Français,* October 1961, 1, 4.
[103] André Mandouze, "Supplément à deposition," *Témoignage Chrétien*, 30 September 1960.

practical theology at the Faculty of Protestant theology of Paris, echoed the phrase, saying of Davezies that "He chose the violence that liberates against violence that oppresses."[104] And Annie Preiss, who worked with the FLN in Lyon, mentioned she had heard this quote from Georges Casalis at church, and it had inspired her decision to help the Algerians.[105]

An article entitled "What is to be done?" (a nod to Lenin's tract of the same name) in *Jeune Résistance* further appealed to reciprocity. As it advised its members, in response to OAS attacks and the 1961 putsch in Algiers, it was time to "harden demonstrations to overwhelm the forces of the traditional order. Wear a helmet and jacket. …Study and organize street fighting tactics: [climb to the top of the trolley and] pick up trolley poles [disconnecting them from the electricity], [spread] upholstery nails within a radius of one kilometer for cars, appoint a person who can (in extremis) be in charge of bringing beach bags filled with bolts [to use as projectiles] or batons. Make it last. Refuse orders to disperse. The political objective is to push for illegal actions, to drive to revolutionary violence those whom the left has put to sleep here, before delivering them over to the [French] army in Algeria…. It must be admitted that *violence is already imposed on us by the bombings, assassinations, theft of weapons, etc; and that we must* riposter *[strike back, respond] without delay*."[106]

Overall then, besides more appeals to Marxist revolutionary myths, and more comments dismissing violence as unfortunate but standard practice in wartime, French justifications for violence were not so dissimilar from Algerian appeals. Particularly, the

[104] Sybille Chapeu, *Des chrétiens dans la guerre d'Algérie: L'action de la Mission de France* (Paris: Atelier, 2004), 214–215.
[105] Interview with Annie Preiss, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 82–83.
[106] Emphasis added. "Que faire?" *Jeune Résistance* nos. 7–8, January 1962, 3.

emphasis on reciprocity—and the attempt to expand it— was still prominent. In 1960, *Vérité Pour*, for instance, printed an article containing responses to common objections it received for aiding the FLN. Number one on the list of objections was "But don't you see that this action, with which you are in solidarity, is essentially a violent action whose violence is directed against the French?" In response, the clandestine journal wrote: "We know it. But those who have taken up arms did so to respond to 130 years of violence. Did they, moreover, have a choice as to means? Do they have it now? And what is opposing them, under the name of 'pacification,' if not the worst forms of violence?"[107]

Remembering Violence: Rationalizations Before and After the Fact

"… the book of the dead /
Opens like a novel on a blank page /
To remember blood is to risk remorse."[108]

On a Sunday afternoon in February 1957, sixteen-year-old high school student Baya Hocine accompanied some friends to El Biar stadium in Algiers to watch a soccer match. As she watched the game from the stands, Baya leaned in close to Mohand Belhamine. He wrapped an arm around her, and as they embraced, she passed him one of two bombs she had smuggled into the stadium. Mohand folded his jacket over the package. Then, he discreetly set his jacket on the stadium bleachers, and the two headed for the exit. A few minutes later, the bomb detonated in the stadium, killing eight people. When asked about

[107] "Réponse à quelques objections," *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 12.
[108] "Palestro," in Boualem Khalfa, *Certitudes*, 28.

it decades later, Baya (a retired Member of Parliament with three children) replied simply, "The bombs… Oh, I don't like to talk about that!"[109]

As social norms and taboos concerning violence exist in both Algerian and French society, most activists who participated in violent attacks—especially attacks on civilians—were silent concerning their role. Those who did describe their participation were often distant, vague, and unforthcoming about events. In part, this reticence likely stemmed from a strong social desirability bias. But discussing past violence was also avoided because it was problematic in terms of the activist's personal coping methods. Activists like Baya Hocine, for instance, described coping with distressing thoughts like guilt, sadness, and cognitive dissonance by repressing memories of difficult events.

The suppression was discernable in interviews and memoirs. For instance, in his autobiography, Jewish activist and medical student Daniel Timsit (PCA, FLN) began to write about his production of bombs for the Yacef Saadi network, then stopped mid-sentence. He could not talk about it, he explained, the memory was too painful.[110] Female ALN-FLN activist Kheira Bousafi recalled using a similar strategy when someone died in her section of the maquis. "We did not need to think about this brother who is dead, ask ourselves why he's dead. We acted like he hadn't existed, so as not to shake our morale…. He's dead—God rest his soul. He's dead for independence, and that is all."[111] They would simply not discuss it—"turn the page" and move on.

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[109] Interview with Baya Hocine, in Danièle Djamila Amrane-Minne, *Des femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 143–146; Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie, Tome 2: le temps des léopards* (Verviers: Marabout, 1985), 484–485.

[110] Daniel Timsit, *Algérie, récit anachronique* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 1998), 32.

[111] Interview with Keira Bousafi, in Danièle Djamila Amrane-Minne, *Des femmes dans la guerre d'Algérie*, 49–50.

This unwillingness to discuss past violence was particularly strong when it came to discussing violence against other Algerians. Occasionally, an individual would break the silence: Messaouda Benchaa, for instance, described cleaning up after her husband killed MNA members. She justified her role by appealing to agentic state (as she explained, she had been following her husband's orders), and by appealing to necessity and duress. As she remembered, her husband would cut the heads off political opponents and throw them in the Rhone. One night, she said her husband brought home two men in a sack. One was still alive, and cried out to her "Please, Madame, open the sack." She explained, "Me, I said no. [If] I open the sack, it will be me that he kills."[112]

But Benchaa's testimony was unusual. By and large, the willingness to share memories of violence followed social norms concerning acceptable aggression. Descriptions of aggression against foreign combatants were thus prevalent in activist memoirs; there were far fewer accounts of attacks against foreign civilians and MNA members. Yet statistically, both in France and in Algeria proper, most FLN violence was directed not against Europeans, but against other Muslims—particularly MNA members, uncooperative civilians, and individuals with ties to the French administration. For instance, a French-compiled list of FLN bombings in Algiers listed attacks on French government buildings, military posts, transportation hubs, the US consulate, churches, and a Jewish school—alongside many bomb attacks on Muslim tobacco shops, cinemas, cafes, and Muslim families in residential buildings.[113] Statistical briefings accounting for

[112] Marc André, *Femmes dévoilées: des algériennes en France à l'heure de la décolonisation* (Lyon: ENS Éditions, 2016*)*, 233-235.

[113] Commissioner Perriod, "État des actes terroristes commis par bombes dans le secteur Alger-Sahel depuis le 1er Janvier 1956," Algiers (12 October 1957) in SHD GR 1H 1245.

Many items on the list do not specify whether the target of the attack was European or Muslim, making a statistical breakdown of the attacks impossible.

all attacks (not just bomb attacks) gave an even starker picture of where most aggression was directed: in mainland France in December 1960, November 1961, and December 1961, for instance, 91%, 97%, and 96% of attacks were against Muslims, and in Algeria reports for Orleansville and Algiers for autumn 1956 showed similar trends.[114] Finally, FLN execution orders and execution lists often listed exclusively Muslim targets.[115]

Among the few activists who did discuss violence, there was a very strong choice-supportive trend in how individuals rationalized aggression after events. This was likely the effect of source bias: the most likely to testify about violence were those who still strongly supported their original decision (individuals ashamed of their behavior tended not to broadcast their shame). For instance, in 2013 Zohra Drif wrote that while "revisionism" and regret might be fashionable in French circles, "I will not adopt this posture." As she explained, their bombings were acts of self-defense, and they had a right and a duty to take up arms to protect the country from settlers, who were not simply passive civilians. She repeated this sentiment more forcefully in the English version of the text. "Perhaps the reader of today expects me to regret having placed bombs in public places frequented by European civilians. I do not…. Samia and I did not regret our actions in 1956 or 1957, nor do we today, nor will we ever."[116]

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[114] See: Ministère des Armées, Direction de la Sécurité Militaire, "Extraits de la synthèse mensuelle du SCINA," Ref. No. 3177 DSM/213/SC, Paris (24 January 1962) in SHD GR 1H 1718. For sample figures for Algeria proper, see the reports for from the X° Région militaire, Division d'Alger, Zone d'Orleansville, 9° Division d'Infanterie for September and November 1956 (Ref. Nos. 3032/D9/2/S and 1632/D9/2/S), and the reports from the X° Région militaire, Division d'Alger, Subdivision d'Aumale for September and October 1956, Ref. Nos. 5930/2 and 7235/2, in SHD GR 1H 1447.

[115] See for instance: ALN-FLN, "Liste des traîtres abattus par l'ALN," Wilaya 3, Zone 2, Region 5, Kabylia (November 1957), 3, in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4; ALN-FLN, "Tribunal de la Révolution: Condamnation à mort," Oran (24 December 1957), in SHD GR 1H 1691/D4; "Interrogatoire de Chouaib," (September-November 1957), in SHD GR 1H 1623/D2.

[116] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 168–169; Zohra Drif, *Inside the Battle of Algiers*, 105–127.

As Drif's testimony indicated, this lack of guilt likely came from her use of autodidactic strategies before and after the bombing. After her bombing of the Milk Bar, for instance, Zohra Drif related experiencing many emotions. On the one hand, she felt proud of having accomplished her task, and relief that both she and Samia had survived their missions. This pride and relief, however, was mixed with deep-seated unease, fear, and disbelief. Especially when she read the newspapers, saw pictures of the wounded, read stories of the victims, and heard the terrible things others were saying about the bombers, Drif said she felt angry. But she kept repeating to herself she would not feel guilty: she had a duty to her nation, Zohra told herself, and she had "agreed to pay the price of blood" as Algerians had been paying since 1830, in 1945, and nonstop since 1 November 1954.

Returning back to Samia's home after the explosion, she continued to write that she kept repeating to herself that she was engaged in a total war, and "Your bomb didn't do a millionth of the damage they caused, did not commit a thousandth of the crimes they commit each day…" As Drif wrote, "I refused to let myself feel guilty. I set about repeating to myself that Samia and I had chosen to participate in the national liberation struggle by joining the armed groups to fulfill our sacred duty to our country." Overall, in one short passage she wrote that she "kept saying" or repeated something to herself more than seven times: "I repeated to myself… I repeated to myself… I repeated to myself…" This repetition was likely a self-persuasion strategy, to ingrain a particular interpretation of events and suppress cognitive dissonance and anxiety.[117]

[117] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 189, 199–201.

Interestingly, activists who discussed violence also tended to maintain the same justification strategies over time. Rationalizations did, however, shift strongly according to the audience and social situation. Yacef Saadi provided an interesting and valuable example of this phenomenon, as he left rationalizations from immediately after the bombing campaign (September 1957), a few years after (1962), and long after (2002). With Saadi's arrest in September 1957 came an early example of rationalizing. In a confession taken at the gendarmerie, Saadi cited negative reciprocity, pointing to the Rue de Thèbes bomb detonated by French ultras. He also repeatedly invoked the communicative purpose of the attacks. As he explained, "for the CCE [Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution du FLN], it was a way of expressing things…. vengeance was necessary to raise the morale of the Muslim population." Repeating these points, he added that "[Our] First objective: We did not realize the power, nor the effect of these devices. A spectacular attack was needed to reassure the Muslim population and make them forget what they had just suffered [the Rue de Thèbes bomb]."[118]

Alongside reciprocity and sending a message, Saadi emphasized social pressure and obedience to authority in his confession statement. As he claimed, he had been acting per the commands of superior officers. He had "received an order" to begin making the bombs, he told interrogators. "I received the blame that day," he explained, but it was the CCE who had told him "to be cold and insensitive [*être plus sec*]," as the time was ripe for the Europeans to recognize Algerian rights. As a result of this pressure, Saadi said his group had started using bombs on non-human targets. However, "I was harassed again by

[118] "Copie de la confession de Yacef, Saadi Ben Mohamed, écrite librement," transcribed by Officer Nogueira, Officier de Police Judiciaire Auxiliaire [OPJA] (25 September 1957), Ref. No. 2733, Document No. 01730 in SHD GR 1H 1612.

the CCE (Benkhedda)," Saadi said, and as a result he created the bombs network. Moreover, in the first weeks of the operation, Ben M'hidi joined them in the Casbah to "better control our actions and ensure their execution. … I therefore received orders directly from Ben M'hidi." As Saadi declared, "I have always been against [it], but alas, it was necessary to follow orders."[119]

As always, such interrogation records must be treated critically. Many Algerians were tortured or otherwise coerced into providing information, and prisoners often lied to interrogators to protect themselves and their cell members. Despite these considerations, the rationalizations Saadi gave to his interrogators were not substantially different from the testimonies FLN fighters delivered before French military tribunals. Moreover, in front of authorities, agentic state appeals (i.e., "I was only following orders") were incredibly common, helping shift culpability away from the accused and minimize sanctions. Thus, from the point of view of moral rationalizations, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the answers Saadi gave (the veracity of his answers is another matter). What is notable for this present study is that rationalizations given to French interrogators were largely uniform compared with those given before military tribunals. Moreover, Saadi's interrogation responses shared much in common with FLN tracts (which cited reciprocity, and sending a message to the Muslim population) and his later writings. The one unique response in the interrogation record was Saadi's claim he had not realized the "power, nor the effect of these devices"—a comment specifically aimed at reducing sanctions.

[119] Ibid.

In 1962, Saadi released a book containing justifications produced under less coercive circumstances. These responses dropped the agentic state rationale, and focused on signaling and reciprocity. As Saadi described, the attacks were "legitimate vengeance," and the network had felt they needed respond to the Muslim population's pain. He also noted the desire to send a message to Algerians: "It was necessary for us to show the people we had at [our] disposal equipment as terrible as that of the enemy."[120]

This terse explanation can be compared with the two-volume, expansive description that Saadi gave in 2002. This book was a study in many of the rationales already examined. Saadi mainly described the bomb attacks as reciprocity, calling them a reply, a response, and retaliatory measures—"blood calls for blood." The attacks were justified by pointing to the Zabana and Ferradj executions, the Rue de Thèbes bombing, the 1945 massacres, and French Army violence in general. Saadi also characterized the attacks as sending messages to the French community: the attacks were a "punitive action," an attempt to get the French to wake up and pay attention, and an attempt to spread psychosis. The attacks were also meant to signal Algerians: as Saadi wrote, they wanted to improve community morale and mitigate fallout from the Zabana execution, and "prove to our people that we are able to respond effectively to provocations."[121]

Strong in the narrative was an assertion of moral probity. Saadi readily admitted that bombs were "barbaric," but appealed to the scripts for wartime, arguing that this was the "logic of war," and the attacks were nothing compared to the murders the French army and police committed on a daily basis. As in the 1962 book, he further depicted the FLN as helping restrain the violence of the masses, and organize disciplined offensives on

[120] Yacef Saadi, *Souvenirs de la bataille d'Alger*, 17–19.
[121] Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger,* 229–268, 283–284, 321 [Tome 1].

behalf of the community. Saadi described himself, meanwhile, as feeling reticent to use bombs because of the damage they would cause. And he insisted they initially tried their best to not inflict civilian casualties, at times refraining from attacks because of the civilian deaths they would cause. Moreover, he argued that many of the clubs and cafes they bombed were not purely civilian targets: they were known hangouts of French military officers and French ultra gangs.[122]

In something of a departure from other narratives, Saadi also recorded the network's campaign of violence in the Casbah against MNA members and Muslim civilians. He characterized this project as a cleanup campaign against drug dealers, gangsters, pimps, informers, and casino owners. Here there were traces of cognitive dissonance, however. In one organized assassination of a police collaborator (who according to Saadi was also a known drug addict), Saadi admitted that a member of their FLN cell had a personal score to settle with the target. But, Saadi insisted the group had refused to let the FLN member kill the man outright. Instead, they obtained a death warrant from the FLN and carried out the assassination as a group, leaving witnesses alive so they could "testify and spread the news" about what they had seen. Besides appealing to the "sanitization of the city," however, Saadi gave no apologies and little explanation for the Casbah killings. As he phrased it, concerning what to do with the Messalistes, "precise orders had been given."[123]

Overall then, besides being more forthcoming and providing additional details about events, Saadi's rationalizations for his behavior did not change significantly between his 1962 and 2002 manuscripts, or even between his police confession and his later books. In

[122] Ibid., 147, 152, 229–235, 277–279, 400.
[123] Ibid., 151–172.

all the documents, Saadi described his behavior as strategic and professional, and appealed to reciprocity, signaling, and his role in the organization. In fact, Saadi's responses were so similar, key phrases and terms consistently reappeared in the documents. By 1962, Saadi's justifications were thus already well-rehearsed, for as he himself attested, he had been using these same justifications for a long time to convince others to join the network. Instead, the rationalizations shifted when discussing violence directed toward Algerians, or when addressing French interrogators. Then, facing a higher probability of disapproval and/or sanctions, Saadi shifted toward agentic state rationalizations: he was doing his job, "but alas, it was necessary to follow orders."

Conclusion: "Acts of Faith and Worthy Deeds"

Whether investigating stories like "The Bottle" or Algerian tracts and testimonies, it is clear that by and large, Algerian activists were *not* socialized with the idea that violence was an acceptable behavior for everyday citizens. Nor were they raised thinking it acceptable to strike an innocent bystander; nor did they lack respect for human life; nor did they grow up seeing women and children as valid combatants. Instead, Algerians had specific violence-authorizing roles, and other norms for just and unjust aggression. In line with these norms, the FLN activists frequently cited prohibitions against harming civilians, appealed to their roles as soldiers, and Saadi himself described how one of the girls in the network had objected to the bombing plan based on the fact it would generate civilian casualties, and specifically the deaths of women and children.[124] Thus, norms regulating violence were in place.

[124] Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger,* 283–284 [Tome 1].

But individuals actively worked to negotiate and adapt these norms—while still holding them to be generally true. And through this process of moral negotiation, activists found ways to justify the use of force by broadening reciprocity norms, remaking citizens into combatants, and commandeering violence-authorizing roles and scripts. In response to the girl who objected to the bomb plot, for instance, Saadi devalued the inhibitor (told the girl she was "still prisoner to the morality that one teaches to schoolchildren") and appealed to the norm of negative reciprocity.[125] Thus, Bandura's observation held true: "selective activation and disengagement of internal control permits different types of conduct *with the same moral standards*."[126]

Moreover, beyond constituting just a social strategy or rhetorical appeal, these were proactive, creative, and constitutive processes, in that they attempted to remake the self as moral, the act as justified, and the victim into a legitimate target of aggression.[127] In other words, activists dynamically worked to construct violence as a "worthy deed." One way they accomplished this was by stretching the definition of reciprocity as far as it could go, extending it across time, expanding it from the individual at fault to the entire group, etc. Another way they achieved this was through rituals, institutions, and myths: the ALN and the FLN's parajudiciary, for instance, were part of its argument that FLN violence was legitimate. Similarly, the FLN created an elaborate revolutionary myth, in which ethical revolutionaries 1) restrained the violence of the masses, 2) used violence to facilitate separation from France, and 3) created a new Algerian man.

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[125] Yacef Saadi, *La bataille d'Alger,* 283–284 [Tome 1].

[126] Emphasis added. Albert Bandura et al., "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, no. 2 (1996): 364.

[127] Michael J. Osofsky, Albert Bandura, and Philip G. Zimbardo, "The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution Process," *Law and Human Behavior* 29, no. 4 (August 2005): 374.

This process of moral reconstruction served a variety of purposes. By adapting well-established norms, activists helped minimize internal costs (like guilt and negative self-feedback), worked to convince others of the moral acceptability of their behavior, and tried to minimize external sanctions.[128] This strategy also prevented Algerian society from devolving into chaos, by maintaining violence as restricted for authorized specialists, circumstances *in extremis*, and self-defense.

Many authors have noted how demonization, dehumanization, and other devaluative discourses enabled violence in other conflicts. But as this chapter has demonstrated, there were also important discourses of "virtuous violence" or "just aggression" that authorized injurious behaviors. In modern contexts, actors particularly argued that their violence was measured, restrained, rational, professional, and humane. Algerians were not unique in this regard. For instance, as one anonymous French officer testified in 1959, at the DOP (Détachement opérationnel de protection) intelligence training center in Philippeville, the military hierarchy had been complicit in torture practices because they had been taught at the center they were engaged in "humane torture."[129] Here then was not just a myth of "torture lite,"[130] but a full-fledged myth of "moral torture." Sustaining this myth were arguments about Algerians being irrationally-driven, unpredictable, and dangerous—claims which served to reclassify them as legitimate targets of violence. And such discourses, far from being relics of the past, continue still.[131]

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[128] Glenn D. Reeder et al., "Inferences about the Morality of an Aggressor: The Role of Perceived Motive," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83, no. 4 (2002): 789–803.

[129] Robert Barrat, "Quatre officiers parlent," *Témoignage Chrétien*, 18 December 1959, reprinted in Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Les crimes de l'armée française*: *Algérie 1954-1962* (Paris: La Découverte, 2001 [First ed. François Maspero, 1975]), 115–118.

[130] Also see: Jessica Wolfendale, "The Myth of 'Torture Lite,'" *Ethics and International Affaires* 23, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 47–61.

[131] Alexandra Holomar, "Rebels without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in US Security Policy," *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 4 (December 2011): 705–727.

In addition to these myths, French activists testified as to the power of role conformity, or the everyday "power of a hat," in ensuring complicity in violence. Jeanson network member Georges-Mathieu Mattéi wrote of his service in the French Army that "Young men became soldiers because they thought 'that's what was expected of them.' So they stepped into a role, 'played the little soldier,' thinking of what their father had advised them: 'Do your duty.'"[132] Claude Vinci described his military service even more sardonically: as he put it, upon receiving their uniforms in Marseille, "many of us begin to enjoy the idea of being taken for a legionnaire; as for the 'cherry on the cake,' it is a beige-colored canvas bush hat that everyone wears in his own way: the two brims, or just one side of the hat folded up; placed forward on the head; or on the contrary, tilted back very casually…. almost forgotten are the seven days of travel and demonstrations against the war… the protesters of these past days are becoming warriors; a hat, I must say, is the psychological strategy of the army, which transforms rebellious adults into children who will play cowboy, legionnaires who will play war."[133] In other words, with the right "hat" or role, the right affects, an orderly and professional system, and an authority figure supervising, typically unacceptable behaviors could be made acceptable.

For both the Algerians and the French, aggression was thus legitimized and sustained not based on fanatic emotionalism or religious fervor—but by negotiating everyday social norms. When needed, religion was certainly marshaled to appeal to certain demographics, and emotional cues used to encourage certain action scripts. But the FLN (and the French, for that matter) mainly asserted their right to force based on their professionalism and claim to well-established norms: namely, negative reciprocity, and

[132] Georges-Mathieu Mattéi, "La generation algérienne," *Esprit* 261, no. 5 (May 1958): 820–821.
[133] Claude Vinci, *Les portes de fer,* 24.

the roles and action scripts appropriate for a national army, police force, and judiciary. Claiming necessity, both the FLN and the French extended their definition of legitimate combatant to include civilians (those suspected of supporting and sustaining the enemy). Both asserted the other was fanatical, violent, and emotionally-driven. And ironically, the FLN itself promulgated the myth of the Algerian masses as "violent subjects," to assert its hegemony as guardians of the social order.

Despite the rhetoric and rituals and myths, however, aggression was an instrumental and communicative behavior. Organizations used aggression to coerce, signal competitors and potential followers, assert dominance, make territorial claims, and create communal divisions. And all that was needed in order to claim this coercive force was the disengagement of a few inhibitions—a well-placed "hat," a reciprocity appeal, and perhaps a legitimizing value hierarchy. As Bandura wrote in 1996, self-sanctions could thus be selectively disengaged, and detrimental conduct made acceptable by "converting harmful acts to moral ones through linkage to worthy purposes."[134] But in March 1956, Feraoun had already noticed the trend: "on either side, one legitimizes the crime and justifies it. Thus, crimes are rendered necessary, like acts of faith or worthy deeds."[135]

[134] Albert Badura et al., "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," 364.
Also see: Albert Bandura, "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 3, no. 3 (1999): 194.
[135] Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955-1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000*)*, 90.

Chapter 11

The Activist Immolated:
The Costs and Benefits of "Drinking a Cup of Fire"

"And now we will sing love
because there is no Revolution without Love."[1]
— Algerian activist-poet Jean Sénac

In 1942, Dr. Wilāyah's expressed his outspoken opinion on guerrillas, commandos, bombers, and activists sent on deadly missions: such "self-sacrificers" [fidāʾīyīn] were only inspired by emotional "hysteria" and a masochistic love of suffering. As Wilāyah argued, "The tendency toward self-sacrifice is motivated by psychological complexes." Humans were selfish, Wilāyah noted, and no one more so than self-sacrificing hysterics.[2]

As we have seen, these types of criticisms were frequently leveled at activists by their critics. In 1957, for instance, the FLN complained that French propaganda was trying to diminish the "proven courage of the ALN… by detaching it from any rational context."[3] Two years later, *Vérités Pour* found it necessary to rebut similar criticisms, when Gilles Martinet characterized suitcase-carriers as delusional adventurers "whose behavior could only arise from pure psychology."[4] In 1960, Francis Jeanson likewise rebuked *Esprit* editor and French Resistance veteran Jean-Marie Domenach for describing support network members as driven by passion. As Jeanson complained, Domenach found the network's "motivations to be 'reasons of the heart'—which obviously contradict your

[1] Jean Sénac, "Citoyens de beauté," *Espoir et parole: poèmes algériens*, ed. Denise Barrat (Paris, Seghers, 1963), 212.
[2] Muḥammad Ḥusnī Wilāyah, "al-Shakhṣīyyat al-histīrīyyah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 468, 22 June 1942, 639; Muḥammad Ḥusnī Wilāyah, "al-Fidāʾīyyah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 472, 20 July 1942, 731.
[3] "Les forces morales de l'ALN," *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, Tome 1, 105–106.
[4] "Entre la maladie infantile et la sénilité précoce," *Vérités Pour* 10, 6 July 1959, 3–4.

own reasons, which are reasons of 'the mind.' … So we are decidedly in your eyes only a handful of rebels, fools and bleeding hearts who have blindly thrown themselves into adventure, driven by purely sentimental motives."[5]

As such statements reflect, irrationality and emotionalism were common accusations used to devalue Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists in the 1940s and 1950s. Fueled by advances in psychology and common notions about the "control" of emotions as foundational to "rationality," such articles used a shared normative vocabulary to devalue activists: such men were driven by "hysteria," "madness," uncontrolled emotions, "imbalance," "insanity," and "maladjustment." Activists thus spent a great deal of time making the case that their motives and behaviors were "rational." As Maurice Maschino argued, one must "sweep away all these illusions" of imbalance, emotionalism, and maladjustment, and recognize the "truth": the choice to desert or revolt was "very thoughtful, very calm, and this choice, which is in no way 'dramatic,' comes following a lucid and rigorous analysis."[6]

While such self-defenses are understandable in the face of the charges levied against them, there is a disjunct between such explanations of cold rationality and the affective appeals found in activist tracts. As seen in Chapter 6, for instance, the FLN explicitly advertised that joining the maquis would bring emotional benefits, giving one a sense of dignity and self-worth. And the Jeanson network advertised that those who joined the resistors would gain a sense of action and efficacy (being "no longer resigned and passive").[7] Maschino's description of decisions being made with a "tête froide" also run

[5] "Lettre de Francis Jeanson à J.M. Domenach en réponse de son article paru dans la Revue *Esprit*," *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 19-22.
[6] Maurice Maschino, *L'engagement: le dossier des réfractaires* (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), 34.
[7] A. Limousin, "Rappel des principes," *Vérités Pour* 18, 26 September 1960, 16.

contrary to the emotional expressions found both in his own account of refusal (*Le Refus*, 1960), as well as in activist journals, poetry, and memoirs broadly speaking.

This disjunct begs the question: was what was the emotional economy behind anti-colonial activism? Previous chapters have studied activist decision-making, activist morality tales, and activist aggression; and in surveying these behaviors, the question of emotions was a recurrent theme. Now, the pages that follow will look to answer the emotions question head-on, unraveling the debates over activist emotions. In doing so, the chapter seeks to fill a gap in the historical literature, by examining the affective environment of activism in the 1940s and 1950s. And in doing so, the chapter both tests the criticisms of Wilāyah, Domenach, and others, and evaluates a recent theory advanced by Katarzyna Jasko: that "instead of being driven solely by grievances and a state of deprivation… activists also engage[d] in actions for a cause because of what they psychologically gain[ed] from such engagement."[8]

To accomplish these tasks, this chapter thus explores the most frequently-cited non-material costs and benefits of activist commitments, taking a combined look at Egyptian, Algerian, and French accounts. And despite activist claims that their commitments were purely "rational," activists spoke at length about how clubs met their needs for belonging, security, and esteem.[9] They also described how clubs advertised affective goods. To better understand the "affective economy" of 1940s and 1950s-era Egypt, Algeria, and France, the first half of the chapter surveys how clubs worked to produce (and influence

[8] Katarzyna Jasko et al., "Rebel with a Cause: Personal Significance from Political Activism Predicts Willingness to Self-Sacrifice," *Journal of Social Issues* 75, no. 1 (2019): 316–317, 341–342.

[9] Douglas T. Kenrick et al., "Renovating the Pyramid of Needs: Contemporary Extensions Built Upon Ancient Foundations," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 5, no. 3 (2010): 293, 305; Joshua M. Ackerman and John A. Bargh, "The Purpose-Driven Life: Commentary on Kenrick et al. (2010)," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 5, no. 3 (2010): 323–326.

demand for) belonging, security, and esteem, by creatively adapting kinship recognition cues, crafting organizational narratives, drawing attention to death, and constructing group rituals that made use of repetitious synchrony (the collective repetition of thoughts, movements, and vocalizations).[10] The second part of the chapter then briefly explores the "disavowed benefits" of activism (those benefits activists were hesitant to acknowledge), as well as the costs of activism. And based on this assessment of costs and benefits, the chapter argues that the resulting "affective economy" had important implications for social activism. Specifically, because many club "payouts" were non-material, clubs were able to retain a hard core of dedicated members, even while members absorbed high costs of participation. As a result, activists continue "drinking a cup of fire,"[11] even though the behavior was painful—and in some cases, deadly.

To "Know People So Profoundly": Life in a Community of Conviction

A year before writing about how his decision to refuse his military summons and join an FLN support network had been "very thoughtful, very calm, and… [made] following a lucid and rigorous analysis,"[12] French teacher Maurice Maschino provided a somewhat different description of how his decision had evolved. As Maurice explained, he had taken a job in Morocco, but his lack of social graces and communist sympathies had resulted in his ostracization from "polite" French society—the French community in Morocco, it turned out, was still staunchly Pétainist. So Maurice started spending time

[10] Dario Páez et al., "Psychosocial Effects of Perceived Emotional Synchrony in Collective Gatherings," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 108, no. 5 (2015): 711–729; Arie Kruglanski, *The Motivated Mind: The Selected Works of Arie W. Kruglanski* (New York: Routledge, 2018). Christian Von Scheve and Mikko Salmela, eds., *Collective Emotions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[11] Kateb Yacine, *Soliloques* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1991 [First Ed. Annaba: 1946], 35.

[12] Maurice Maschino, *L'engagement: le dossier des réfractaires* (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), 34.

with a mixed group of French, English, Algerian, and Moroccan men on the social margins, who met to discuss politics. As Maurice wrote, "We became friends very quickly, speaking more frequently and more freely, finding ourselves together more often."[13]

As Maurice became friends with the men, he learned more about them. There was Péréa, a Spanish Republican; Jacques, a *résistant* from Brittany; Peter, an English teacher; Driss, an Algerian FLN member who collected dues for the organization in Morocco; and Salah, who had fought with the FLN in Oran for over a year before fleeing to Morocco to escape arrest. As the group spent time together, they grew closer. They would stay chatting over coffee at Maurice's house until one in the morning, talking loudly and making farting noises at the downstairs neighbor, who would bang on the ceiling to shut them up. Slowly, the men also began to conspire: they entertained plans to kidnap a cop and steal weapons, but decided it was too risky, even for them. But "there, in the midst of brothers," Maurice wrote, "there was no self-regard, no false humility, but a feeling—so alive—of participating in a collective work, of 'becoming one body with,' of being part of a body —a part neither essential nor insignificant, but significant… Communists, members of the Resistance, all those who 'militate' know this feeling. …for me, it was a '*new birth'* thanks to the Algerians." As a result, when Maurice received his military recall notice summoning him to report for duty in May 1957, he says "I had already chosen." He would go to Tunisia to join the FLN.[14]

As Maurice and countless other activists testified, some of the primary benefits gained from activism were psycho-social: a sense of belonging, security, esteem, and

[13] Maurice Maschino, *Le refus* (Paris: François Maspero, 1960), 158–194.
[14] Ibid.

significance. Describing the Yacef Saadi network, for instance, Zohra Drif explained that when she and Samia Lakhdari had first been welcomed into the network, they had felt themselves

> "in a family who opened its arms wide. And from this family emanated an atmosphere of immense solidarity, grand cooperation, ironclad fraternity, which filled the whole room, and penetrated every pore of Samia… these five individuals [the Saadi network] radiated this feeling of solidarity, cooperation, and fraternity, which enveloped you and rendered life so much more beautiful, more light, and more promising. …these persons were themselves life and its promises. And because they were life, they fought and made war to merit [life]. Made war so that this life has meaning."

As Zohra continued, in this "family" they knew everything about one another; they also described one other using kinship terms: Saadi was called El Kho ("the Brother"), and members of the network called one another sister and brother.[15]

So how did groups manage to provide activists with these feelings of belonging? Maurice and Zohra's descriptions provided a clue: both described extended, repeated contact with a group of familiar individuals, and described the sense of attachment they experienced using kinship terms (like "brother," "sister," and "family") and organic metaphors (like "rebirth"). These metaphors could be used to explain attachments; but they also facilitated them, by concretely conceptualizing group membership as being part of a family—the most intimate, affective social unit conceivable.

While a sense of "belonging" and affection could happen organically as individuals spent time together, clubs could also attempt to facilitate and even manufacture these sentiments using cognitive and behavioral strategies. Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, EMNL, and FLN, for instance, encouraged bonding by using kinship

[15] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN* (Algiers: Éditions Chihab, 2013), 122, 145, 162–166, 174.

metaphors, developing a shared language of commitment, and scheduling regular social events. Some groups used more costly and coercive strategies, such as encouraging (or requiring) members to share personal information, limiting contact with kin, targeting individuals separated from kin, and requiring group members to wear similar sartorial markers.[16] But whichever strategies a club used, the goal was similar: encouraging recognition, familiarity, and attachment through social proximity, kinship cuing, and visual and auditory phenotype matching (i.e., similar affects and gestures, dress habits, and discursive or linguistic cues).[17]

Activist descriptions of feeling a sense of belonging in clubs were thus frequently accompanied by accounts of how the group mimicked family life. As Anne Beaumanoir summarized, "Clandestine life is a microcosm where… life is organized to imitate the society that one has deliberately left. There were many marriages, divorces, and remarriages."[18] And activists described working to impart this sense of "family" to new recruits. As "Robert," a member of Jeune Résistance explained, he "tried to make other friends who arrived feel that they were really at home and that we all formed one big family."[19]

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[16] For examples of this, see: 10° Region Militaire, Division d'Alger, 9éme DI et Zone d'Orleansville, "Synthèse mensuelle de Renseignements pour le mois de Septembre 1956: Annexe No. 7," (28 September 1956), Ref. No. 1632/D9/2S in SHD GR 1H 1447; "5 January 1956" in Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955-1962*, 51-52; *Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad* Vol. 8 (1949) in IISH COLL00329/Folder 2.5.

[17] Hector Qirko, "Altruistic Celibacy, Kin-Cue Manipulation, and the Development of Religious Institutions," *Zygon* 39, no. 3 (September 2004): 681-706.

[18] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire: la Résistance, le communism, et l'Algérie, 1940–1976* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2009), 24.

[19] "Robert," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 1: Des Résistants a la guerre d'Algérie témoignent*, January 1960, 12–13.

Also see: Noël Favrelière, *Le désert à l'aube* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2000 [First Ed. 1960]), 77, 109–115, 123.

Reflecting on his time in the MTLD, Mohammed Harbi (himself a historian) highlighted the importance of this type of affective environment. As he explained, the MTLD was more than a political party—it was a "community of conviction" with a strong "socio-affective" dimension. As Harbi poignantly wrote:

> "Parties of this type offer, independent from their objective, a place of emotional security and identity by inscribing the adherent in a strong collective space. So it was with the workers parties of the 19th century who responded—*and not only politically*—to all dispossessions, all solitudes, all wanderings, and which offered at the same time the warmth of a place and the hatred of the inhuman embodied in the social Other. This socio-affective dimension, with all it implies for the psychology of the activist, I obviously came to know, since [once I joined] I *could no longer distinguish private life and political action.*
>
> My daily life became inseparable from the organizational structure of which I was a member. For me, the organization was not an instrument. *It was like a symbolic father*…"[20]

In the passage, Harbi thus outlined the MTLD's major strategies for meeting member needs, as well as the ways he felt inscribed in this "collective space." He felt the party responded to deprivations, loneliness, and lack of social "place" ("wanderings") by offering "warmth of place." The group also fostered an aversion for outsiders, or "hatred of the… social Other." Harbi also felt the group collapsed his private life into the "organizational structure," which he described in familial terms. And while these processes likely involve a measure of coercion, the feeling of social belonging ultimately gave him a feeling of "emotional security and identity."

As Harbi's account suggested, in addition to a sense of belonging, clubs worked to provided members with security and significance. And one powerful way that that organizations accomplished this was through narratives. Shared stories provided order, by emplotting events into a comprehensible story, defining roles and duties, giving the group

[20] Emphasis added. Mohammed Harbi, *Une vie debout, Tome 1: mémoires politiques* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2001), 69–74.

a shared goal, and establishing categories for interpreting and filtering information. Chapter 6 already explored how the FLN's organizational morality tale helped activists take on a heroic role that gave meaning and order to their lives. But activists of all stripes described how having a well-defined role and set of goals in a collective narrative gave them a sense of purpose and agency. After studying Iskra founder Hillel Schwartz, for instance, Rami Ginat concluded that Schwartz's "charm was his message to youngsters that their lives had value and meaning. He offered a solution for their identity problems by becoming the world's saviors, people who could change others."[21]

Activists also explained that having a well-defined role or "place" in the organization (and in society) further gave them a sense of esteem. Dawḥ recalled that one of the reasons he liked the Ikhwān was that the group made him feel part of an elite group who respected and appreciated him. As a rural émigré to the city, Dawḥ initially felt out of place, as other city-dwellers mocked his simple speaking style and Ṣaʿīdī accent. The Brotherhood, however, valued his plainspoken affects and humble comportment, and gave him an important role traveling out to the villages to preach.[22]

Activists also suggested that the knowledge systems and moral claims they learned in clubs gave them a sense of esteem and strength. Aḥmad Khiḍr, for instance, found that Marxist ideas imparted a sense of knowledge and empowerment. As he explained however, in some cases this could be a double-edged sword: Iskra, for one, found that after teaching workers dialectical materialism, the trainees lorded it over the other

[21] Avraham Farhi in interviews with Rami Ginat, 4 January and 3 February 2005, Israel. As quoted in Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 241–242, 247.

For an EMNL statement about how the club provided meaning to members, see: Letter from the Comité du Groupe du MDLN à l'étranger to Egypt, "Sur la situation intérieure de notre mouvement," (1951), p. 1 in IISH ARCH01722/Folder 326.

[22] Ḥasan Dawḥ, *25 ʿāman fī jamāʿah*, 21–23.

workers and "bragged about their newly acquired insights," creating problems for the organization.[23] This was not a problem unique to activist groups: knowledge, morality, and spirituality in any form could become a form of capital to laud over the ignorant.[24]

Muḥammad Anwar al-Sādāt, for instance, realized the esteem-enhancing potential of spirituality after his family moved to Cairo in 1925. Feeling intensely self-conscious about his poverty in the midst of the city, he took solace in a sense of moral superiority. "The set of values on which I was brought up in the village, and which city life so lacked, supported me," Sādāt wrote. "It deepened my feeling of inner superiority, a feeling which has never left me and which, I came to realize in time, is an inner power independent of all material resources. Indeed, that feeling perhaps gains strength as material resources diminish."[25]

Groups also recognized the esteem and power-enhancing potential of ideological, moral, and spiritual capital. In "Ilá ay shay' nadʿū al-nās?," for instance, Ḥasan al-Bannā explained that "Many people think the East lacks material power [that comes] from money and equipment and war machines and struggle, [which would allow it] to rise up and compete with the nations that stole its rights and oppressed its family. This is true and important; but even more important and necessary is spiritual power."[26] Sayyid Quṭb took the argument a step further, arguing that Egyptians' morality set them above the materialistic West, and Egyptians should value this spiritual capital. "Shouldn't spiritual

[23] Irmgard Schrand, *Jews in Egypt*, 243.

[24] Allon Vishkin, Yochanan Bigman, and Maya Tamir, "Religion, Emotion Regulation, and Well-Being," in *Religion and Spirituality across Cultures*, ed. Chu Kim-Prieto (New York: Springer, 2014).

[25] Quotations are from the English version, which adheres closely enough to the Arabic to make a retranslation redundant. Nonetheless, the Arabic will be cited for reference. Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 8–9; Anwar Sādāt, *al-Baḥthʿan al-dhāt: qiṣṣat ḥayātī* (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Miṣrī al-Ḥadīth, 1978), 16–17.

[26] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Ilá ay shayʾ nadʿū al-nās?," in *Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Dār al-ḥaḍārah al-Islāmīyyah, 1980), 46.

capital [*raṣīd al-rūḥ*, spiritual balance/credit], intellectual resources, and the heritage of heart and soul be treated the same as goods and money in human life?" he reasoned.[27]

Finally, it is important to recognize that organizations actively advertised these non-material benefits of membership. *El Moudjahid*, for instance, announced that those who joined the ALN would be joining a rare elite that was socially admired: as the paper emphasized, young people vied to serve the ALN's ranks, old men wished to meet the maquisards before they died, and women saw ALN members as good mating partners. It added that those "who have entirely dedicated their lives to an Ideal" (had a goal) experienced a permanent "elevation of spirit."[28] Other FLN tracts explained that joining would give members a sense of self-worth, dignity, meaning, and empowerment. One tract, for instance, warned that the French were sending Algerian Muslim soldiers to a meaningless death, and followed this with a call to join the FLN and fight for a noble goal: Algerian independence. Another tract described how a traitor and French collaborator had died in regret, humiliation, and shame. To avoid such a death, the tract laid out an altruistic action script: "join our ranks to work for the interest of your fatherland."[29]

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[27] Here I have quoted the translation by William Shepard; however, to avoid superimposing a particular understanding of "capital" over Quṭb's original phrasing, I have provided terms from the original Arabic as well. William Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 1, and Sayyid Quṭb, *al-ʿAdālah al-ijtimāʿīyyah fī al-Islām* (Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1995), 7.

[28] "Les forces morales de l'ALN," *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, 105–107 [Tome 1]; "Extraits de la plate-forme pour assurer le triomphe de la révolution algérienne dans la lutte pour l'indépendance nationale," *El Moudjahid* 4, Numéro spécial, 20 August 1956, 70 [Tome 1].

[29] ALN-FLN, "Oh! Frères musulmans…" Wilaya 4 (23–24 September 1960); ALN-FLN, "Frères algériens, ne servez pas…" and ALN-FLN, "Frères algériens, vous souffrez de l'humiliation…" Wilaya 4, Zone 4 (8 October 1960), all in SHD GR 1H 1715; FLN, "Appel à la population au village Ouled Ali Ben Athmane," (26 July 1958), Tract No. 34 in SHD GR 1H 2588/D1.

Notably, all of these tracts appealed to death. In other words, in addition to advertising the affective benefits of membership, FLN tracts worked to increase *mortality salience*, or awareness of the prospect of demise, by drawing attention to mortality. This behavior was significant, as studies suggest drawing attention to death can be used to increase anxiety in individuals about whether their lives have "meaning" and stimulate pro-social and legacy-enhancing activities.[30] A Sayyid Quṭb article in *al-Daʿwah*, for instance, juxtaposed the idea of death alongside a pro-social appeal to selflessness, a role-based appeal to duty, a bandwagon appeal, and promises of social esteem. As he argued, young men were rushing to sign up to fight in the Canal Zone. "They compete with one another for death," working to give everything—life, money, and future—for the nation because "duty calls." And in return for their sacrifice, he pledged, these young men would cleanse their souls from luxury, vice, and selfishness, and earn the esteem of the nation.[31]

This conceptual juxtaposition of death, pro-social appeals, and legacy and esteem-enhancement appeared both in organizational tracts and activist writings, where individuals often mentioned the importance of "legacy" and "meaning" alongside reflections on death. For instance, after being arrested for the first time in 1945, 22-year-old Salah Louanchi wrote a letter agonizing over the difficult choice he faced about whether or not to return to activism. Salah's family desperately needed him: his sister had died while he was in prison, leaving behind a one-year-old son, and there were six other

[30] See for instance Clay Routledge and Jacob Juhl, "When Death Thoughts Lead to Death Fears: Mortality Salience Increases Death Anxiety for Individuals Who Lack Meaning in Life," *Cognition and Emotion* 24, no. 5 (2010): 849–852; Eva Jonas, Daniel Sullivan, and Jeff Greenberg, "Generosity, Greed, Norms, and Death–Differential Effects of Mortality Salience on Charitable Behavior," *Journal of Economic Psychology* 35 (2013): 47–57.

[31] Sayyid Quṭb, "Sibāq ilá al-taḍḥīyyah wa al-fidāʾ," *al-Daʿwah* 39, 13 Ṣafar 1371/13 November 1951, 3 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.1.

underage children in the house needing care. Thus, as Salah wrote to a friend, "I am now going through a troubled period…. [My father] is currently exerting, directly or through the intervention of a lot of people, a lot of pressure on me. Fear compels him to do everything that is in his power to prevent me from pursuing my [political] activity." The following month, however, Salah resolved to put politics ahead of family. He justified his decision by appealing to legacy: "The man matters little. What matters is what he does…. To die is the destiny of all men—but not every man is given [the chance] to leave behind an idea, a memory that will make him live on after his death."[32]

Ritual and the Production of Affective Goods

Besides using kinship cues and encouraging phenotype matching to build family-like attachments, an important strategy individuals and clubs used to meet non-material needs were rituals and meditative exercises (what Clancy-Smith has called "sociospiritual services"[33]). Members of the Brotherhood, for instance, participated in group prayer and devotional activities; as Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl described, they learned to recite Qurʾān and memorize scriptures. He added that the faith he developed in the Brotherhood gave him a boundless hope and confidence that he could accomplish anything. He particularly held on to a phrase Ḥasan al-Bannā would often say about hope: "The dreams of yesterday are realities today—and the dreams of today are tomorrow's realities."[34]

[32] Letter from Salah Louanchi, 15 April 1945, in Anne-Marie [Chaulet] Louanchi, *Salah Louanchi: parcours d'un militant algérien* (Algiers: Éditions Dahlab, 1999), 28–29.

[33] Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800–1904)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 216.

[34] Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, *al-Nuqaṭ fawqa al-ḥurūf: al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-l-niẓām al-khāṣṣ* (Cairo: al-Zahrāʾ lil-Iʿlām al-ʿArabī, Qism al-Nashr, 1989), 51–52, 59–61.

Such memories of reciting scriptures and phrases are significant, because repetition and positive feedback aid in both learning and appetitive conditioning.[35] In other words, by teaching scriptural memorization and having club members repeat positive slogans, the Brotherhood taught its members appetitive motivational strategies and techniques for generating positive emotions. That said, while the Brotherhood put more emphasis on and offered specific training in meditative strategies, such methods were also available to and frequently used by activists outside the aegis of religious clubs. Muḥammad Najīb, for instance, described using his devotions to help generate feelings of hope and confidence, among other things. As Najīb phrased it,

> "[The Qurʾān] has never failed to give me strength in my hours of need. The Qurʾān affects different people in different ways. Its chief effect on me has usually been to convert my pessimism in to optimism… In Palestine [during the 1948 war], I read the Qurʾān for half an hour every day. As a boy I used to read it in preparation for my examinations. It helped me to obtain high marks, if only because it filled me with self-confidence. Unlike some people, I have never read the Qurʾān merely in the hope that it would bring me luck. I have read it, instead, in order to increase my command of the Arabic language and also to exalt my spirit."[36]

Zohra Drif, on the other hand, described using a secular recitation strategy that focused on mortality: when she was stressed or felt like crying, she said she would repeat to herself parts of Ahmed Zabana's letter to his mother, and her self-described "profession of faith," the sacrificial phrase "our lives are not worth more than Zabana's." As Zohra explained, she used Zabana's letter as a focusing exercise, reciting the phrase before her Milk Bar mission to redirect her attention away from anxiety and back onto

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[35] Appetitive conditioning is facilitated by positive verbal feedback. Thus, reciting affirming scriptures and mantras, repeating to oneself positive autodidactic self-talk, and hearing encouraging comments from others (friends, authority figures, or divine sources) can be used to motivate and generate hope and positive expectations. For information on recent research on the role of positive verbal feedback in appetitive conditioning, see: C. Martin-Soelch et al., "Appetitive Conditioning: Neural Bases and Implications for Psychopathology," *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews* 31, no. 3 (2007): 426–440.

[36] Mohammed Neguib, *Egypt's Destiny* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1955), 44. [English version predates the Arabic.]

her mission. She also described repeating her Zabana slogan when leaving her family to join the FLN, when feeling stressed in prison, and at many other times during her activist career.[37]

Zohra also tried religious devotions a few times. After the Milk Bar attack, she mentioned that Samia's mother (Mama Zhor) prayed, but Zohra did not join her. However, a month after the bombing (on 1 October), she had a vivid nightmare, in which her old Latin teacher and a crowd of Europeans surrounded her. The accusers yelled and pulled at her, until Zohra woke up screaming. Mama Zhor thus instructed Zohra to try a recitation exercise: repeat eleven times Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ (Qurʾān 112, a commonly used devotional passage that declares the Oneness of God and whose repetition is said to give the believer merit). "You'll see, you will feel better after," Mama Zhor encouraged her. Zohra recited the passage, but never mentioned if the exercise helped her feel better.[38]

The second time Zohra mentioned participating in religious devotions was after she and Samia were forced to go into hiding. The two relocated to the Casbah, a more traditional neighborhood. There, Zohra recounted that her host Lalla pressured her to pray. However, when Zohra agreed to join Lalla in the ritual, other members of Zohra's FLN cell (Samia Lakhdari and Djamila Bouhired) ruthlessly mocked her. The two girls both claimed to be menstruating to avoid praying, then laughed at Zohra while she performed the ritual. After Zohra completed the prayer, "My friends gratified us with an *Allah yaqbal* ("May Allah accept your prayer"), with the intent of ridiculing me and driving me crazy." When Zohra continued praying with Lalla, she was further mocked.

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[37] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 134–135, 142–147, 150–152, 170–171, 184, 530–351.

Also see: Zohra Drif, *La mort des mes frères* (Paris: François Maspero, 1960), 9, 14.

[38] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 206–207.

As Zohra wrote, "I ultimately found the comedy I was playing by washing myself five times a day very tedious. There was nothing enjoyable about the dawn prayer, especially because my two friends, whose heads were buried under pillows and sheets, were smothering hysterical laughter." As a result of the negative feedback, Zohra discontinued the practice. However, she mentioned praying once last time: when she was imprisoned and interrogated, and thought she was going to die. At that time, she repeated her Zabana phrase, asked her mother's forgiveness, and recited the *shahādah* and al-Ikhlāṣ.[39]

Many other activists similarly described turning to devotional strategies to manage stress—a trend that was true for Christian, Muslim, Jewish and non-practicing activists alike.[40] For instance, after making the bombs used in the Milk Bar and Cafeteria attacks, Daniel Timsit expressed his feelings of guilt to his partner in the explosives lab, Georges [Giorgio] Arbib. Despite being Jewish, Timsit then decided to go to Father Jean-Claude Barthez for confession and to seek advice.[41] Similarly, Paule Bolo remarked that the presence of Father Robert Davezies in the FLN support network was reassuring. "I believe that his presence, [even] for me who did not have his religious faith at all, was nevertheless a comfort, to a certain extent, a moral guarantee."[42]

The Brotherhood, for its part, advertised these non-material benefits of religious observance in its paper. In a special edition of *al-Daʿwah* dedicated to the Egyptian military (which aimed to prove the club's worth and ingratiate it to the new Free

[39] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 217–220, 532–535.

[40] Aḥmad Ḥusayn, *Mudhakkirāt Aḥmad Ḥusayn, raʾīs Miṣr al-Fatāh* (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Miṣrīyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Kitāb, 2007), 288–379; Daniel Timsit, *Algérie, récit anachronique* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 1998), 42–45; "Solitude pour l'Algérie: Journal de cellule," Maison d'arrêt de la Santé (Paris), in André Mandouze, *Un chrétien dans son siècle*, 171-261; Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 206–207; Hamou Amirouche, *Memoirs of a Mujahed*, 100–110, 141.

[41] Jean-Luc Einaudi, *Pour l'exemple: L'affaire Fernand Iveton* (Algiers: El Kalima, 2015), 138–140.

[42] Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir: Les réseaux de soutien au FLN pendant la guerre d'Algérie, les acteurs parlent* (Paris: Le Découverte, 2004), 4.

Officer's regime), Ikhwān division leader Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh al-Sammān explained that the Qurʾān should be the stalwart companion of the army. The Qurʾān was a moral guarantee for fighters that they were fighting on the side of right; and as Sammān explained, "The Qurʾān strengthens confidence in victory in the souls of the *mujāhidīn*, because they [know they] struggle on the right path." He added that the Qurʾān could also strengthen soldiers' *rūḥ al-maʿnawīyyah* [morale; lit. the "spirit of meaning" or the "spirit of the ideal"], as well as their certainty and endurance—two traits he explained "are among the most important components of strong *rūḥ al-maʿnawīyyah.*"[43]

Overall then, both within the context of club activism and individually, activists described using devotional strategies to try and manage anxiety, generate positive affects, assuage negative self-feedback (guilt) for their behavior, and self-teach. As some activists attested, these strategies could be powerful and effective. Others, like self-described agnostic activist Mustapha Bekkouche, described struggling, torn between the need for certainty and the doubts they harbored. In a section of his prison journal entitled "Solidarity," the agnostic recorded his thoughts on saying Friday prayers and singing religious hymns with the other Muslim prisoners in April 1955. The title of the passage suggests he experienced the ritual as a collective act, and a performance of solidarity and community. But as he recorded, during the experience the recitation of the Qurʾānic sūrah *al-Raḥmān* moved him to tears. In a candid paragraph, he then described struggling with mortality, wanting to believe in God, and hoping faith could fulfill his need for comfort and strength in a time of uncertainty, fear, powerlessness, and loneliness. As Bekkouche wrote:

[43] Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh al-Sammān, "al-Qurʾān wa al-rūḥ al-maʿnawīyyah fī al-jaysh," *al-Daʿwah* 86, 17 Muḥarram 1372/7 October 1952, 23 in IISH COLL00329/Folder 7.2.

> "One feels his solitude and his impotence in the face of what awaits us… What awaits us: nothingness or something else? It is as terrifying as it is terrible. After having lived, we disappear… forever!... God of men and worlds, God who I fear to deny resolutely, God who I still doubt exists, God help me and open my eyes! God show me the way! Deign to lower Your eyes to me… that I [might] believe! Because I need to believe. To believe… it is to have support, a support that I very much lack."[44]

Benefits: Disavowed and Overlooked

When describing life in their respective organizations, activists repeatedly referenced how activism met needs for social intimacy, meaning, and security. However, activist testimonies also revealed the extent to which political activism was driven by diverse needs—some of which were stated plainly, others of which activists vigorously denied. Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, for instance, admitted he joined the Algerian struggle for "entertainment" as much as anything. As he reflected, without the experience he would have lived a life of "frightening banality." But once committed, he said the cause gave him "a reason to live."[45] Jābir Qumayḥah similarly described his initial years in the Muslim Brotherhood as fun, remembering matches at the club ping-pong table, going on hikes, and competing in soccer matches with other Brotherhood branches. "These sports trips—in addition to their direct benefits—had missionary and moral benefits, including strengthening the bonds of love and brotherhood," he explained.[46] PhD candidate in philosophy Maurice Maschino, meanwhile, reported that involvement in anticolonial politics provided him with intellectual stimulation (something that was essential for him). Political activism also connected him to others, pulled him out of his own head, and put

[44] Mustapha Bekkouche, *Journal d'un oublie* (Algiers: ANEP, 2002), 57.
[45] Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, *Mémoires d'un Algérien,* 8 [Tome 1].
[46] Jābir Qumayḥah, *Dhikrayātī maʿa daʿwah al-ikhwān fī al-munzilah daqahlīyyah* (Giza: Markaz al-Iʿlām al-ʿArabī, 2009).

him in the field of action—important things for an academic who spent most of his time reading and pondering. He also emphasized that activism reconnected him to his estranged wife, by giving them a shared passion that brought them closer together.[47]

Hélène Cuénat was another example of how personal needs could influence the decision to engage in political activism. As Hélène explained, when she decided to join the PCF, she had just given birth to her daughter Michèle, and was feeling isolated in the house and suffocated by her mother. As she phrased it, "There was in this decision [to join] the desire not to remain excluded, to exist socially…. As if motherhood risked closing in on me. It was not easy to find housing at this time just after the war. We were living, [my husband] André, [my new daughter] Michèle and I, for many months in my parents' home, the conflict with my mother was latent, I felt stifled, so I took this first step."[48]

Hélène similarly described her decision to join the Jeanson network as personal and relational. Her friend Étienne Bolo had asked her to join the network early on, but she had turned him down. However in 1956, following the Special Powers vote, the torture scandals, and her estrangement from her husband, Hélène began to frequent the home of Étienne and Paule, who had a two-year-old son and were members of her PCF cell at the Sorbonne.[49] Hélène became intensely attached to both Paule and Étienne: Paule was animated and charming, a "magician of speech;" Étienne, meanwhile, was a man of passion and vigor, a philosophy professor whose intelligence "seduced her." Hélène

[47] Maurice Maschino, *Le refus*, 135–136.

[48] She chose the PCF because her husband was affiliated with the party, and her parents (both teachers) were themselves leftists affiliated with the PCF and PSF. Hélène Cuénat, *La porte verte* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2001), 17.

[49] Interview with Paule Bolo, 2 June 1989, Paris, in Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War, 1954-1962* (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 50; Sybille Chapeu, *Des chretiens dans la guerre d'Algérie: L'action de la Mission de France* (Paris: Atelier, 2004), 99.

began an affair with Étienne, and Paule noted that Hélène was attached to him "like a mussel to its rock." Hélène readily admitted these motives were not politically correct, but as she described it, she was adrift and empty. She was attracted to Étienne's Bohemian spirit, as "he helped me transgress, to say no… he respected me, he wanted me free—that was his seduction." In helping her transgress, Étienne and Paule also introduced Hélène to the FLN support networks.[50]

Club benefits were also historically contingent, and specific to certain circumstances and communities. The FLN support networks, for instance, were formed at a time when French communist activists were growing disillusioned with the Communist Party, which had been weakened and discredited by the Show Trials, the death of Stalin, the Khrushchev report, the 1956 Hungarian invasion, and the 1956 Special Powers vote in French parliament. There was also a disgust among some activists at the PCF's "double-entry moral bookkeeping," the double standard that condemned capitalist atrocities while apologizing for Soviet atrocities.[51] At this time, many communists expressed feeling disgusted and distanced from the Party. The Bolos, for instance, tore up their party cards after the voting of the Special Powers.[52] In this climate, FLN support networks fulfilled a particular need: it provided a way to assuage guilt, new commitments, a concrete way to signal rejection of the war and dissatisfaction with the Party, and a feeling of potency and action.

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[50] Hélène Cuénat, *La porte verte*, 17–23.

[51] Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 167–168.

[52] Similar sentiments were expressed by Gérard Spitzer, Gérard Chaliand, Hélène Cuénat, Bernard Boudouresque, Gérard Lorne, Denis Berger, Simon Blumenthal, Anne Beaumanoir, and Paule and Étienne Bolo. Robert Bonnaud interview with Hartmut Elsenhans, September 1970, in Hartmut Elsenhans, *Les carnets de Hartmut Elsenhans: la guerre d'Algérie par ses acteurs français* (Algiers: Casbah Éditions, 2009), 40–44; Interview with Paule Bolo, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 45; Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance*, 73–83.

There was another important group of French youth for whom the FLN support networks provided an important affective benefit: French veterans of the Algeria campaigns. Yann Le Masson, for instance, explained in an interview that helping the FLN had been for him a "making of amends." In 1955, his communist cell had convinced him to stop being "individualistic" and work for the good of the masses by complying with his summons for military service in Algeria. So, from summer 1955 to spring 1958, Le Masson served as squad leader for a paratrooper unit in Algeria. But the pacification efforts left him wracked with guilt. As a squad leader, Le Masson had trouble convincing himself he had "only been following orders" (the agentic state rationalization, a common moral rationalization for committing atrocities). As Le Masson explained, "I thus experienced the Algerian war in the worst possible conditions: I wasn't the one who fired, I gave the order to fire."[53]

After finishing his military tour, Le Masson began working with a fellow communist and filmmaker René Vautier; Vautier was collecting stories of Algerian children traumatized by the war. This job, collecting victim testimonies, exacerbated Le Masson's sense of guilt. By the time Le Masson returned to France, he admitted "I was really sick, in my head. For instance, I couldn't tolerate someone looking at me. I could be at a restaurant and someone very innocently could look at me and I would go crazy, jump on whoever was looking at me and start hitting him or her." Le Masson was arrested multiple times for altercations, but was always released because he was a troubled

[53] Yann Le Masson interview with Paul Douglas Grant, Avignon, France, 13 April 2010, published as Paul Douglas Grant, "Kharon at His Oar: An Interview with Yann Le Masson," *La Furia Umana* 19, http://www.lafuriaumana.it/index.php/47-archive/lfu-19/136-paul-douglas-grant-kharon-at-his-oar-an-interview-with-yann-le-masson; Interview with Yann Le Masson, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 160–161.

veteran. A communist friend pulled him out of this cycle. "During that period I had a good friend named Michèle Firk. Michèle was very involved with the underground networks and she was the one who told me that the only way to cure myself was to be of service to those against whom I had ordered soldiers to fire." So, Le Masson joined filmmaker Jacques Audoir and *Postif* journalist Paul-Louis Thirard in smuggling suitcases of weapons for the FLN support networks. Looking back on Firk's advice on how to soothe his conscience, Le Masson concluded, "She was absolutely right."[54]

Communist activists in Egypt, meanwhile, expressed receiving other benefits. The mixed-race Egyptian activist Sharīf Ḥatāta noted that communism for him was a way to connect with the Egyptian masses and assuage his sense of estrangement from Egyptian society. "Belonging to an upper-class family with an English mother… I had a need not to feel alienated."[55] Jewish-Egyptian communist Avraham Farḥi similarly explained that as a minority, communism gave him both a sense of community and a sense of reach beyond that small community. "We were a group of young *lycée* students... we were very similar: we spoke French and shared common ideals and perspectives…. Marxism gave us the identity that we were lacking. Belonging to Marxism meant to belong to the international proletariat…we felt as an integral part of the big world, not as members of a small community."[56]

Egyptian communists also cited enjoying the educational benefits and feeling of self-betterment that came from club membership. Muṣṭafā Ṭība described joining the EMNL

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[54] Ibid.

[55] Sharīf Ḥatāta in interview with Selma Botman, 28 February 1980, Cairo. As quoted in Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939–1970* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 50–51.

[56] Avraham Farhi interview with Rami Ginat, 4 January and 3 February 2005, Israel. As quoted in Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism*, 247.

in part because he was interested in furthering his education.[57] And military officer and Egyptian communist Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn said that in Iskra, he benefited from being part of a group of intellectuals who held engaging book discussions; as he explained, Iskra members were voracious readers who taught him "methodological reading" and analytical reasoning. He also learned important skills like recruitment techniques and argumentation—skills he later used to recruit men to the Free Officers.[58]

While activists spoke at length about how they had benefitted from club membership—and while clubs advertised the benefits of belonging—they also expressly rejected any suggestion that self-interest played a role in club life. The Ikhwān, for instance, solemnly pledged that "the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood is a pure and unblemished one. It has aspired to such heights of purity that it has transcended the limits of merely personal ambition: it has held material gain in contempt, abandoned all selfish impulses and goals."[59] The question of motives also preoccupied contributors to *Vérités Pour*, who published numerous articles responding to critics who charged activists with adventurism and other psychological motives. One article proclaimed "those who give this support are not adventurers, but a courageous elite who provide an example of significant revolutionary action."[60]

An article by Francis Jeanson tackled the problem more thoroughly in response to a Claude Bourdet article in *France-Observateur* entitled "Why do they help the FLN?" In

[57] Interview with Muṣṭafá Ṭībah in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn: maḥāḍir niqāsh, taqārīr, mudhakkirāt, rasāʾil, taḥqīqāt qaḍāʿīyyah, bayānāt intikhābīyyah* (Cairo: Sharikat al-Amal li-l-Ṭibāʿah wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1989), 342–347.

[58] Khālid Muḥyī al-Dīn, *Wa-l-ān atakallam* (Cairo: Markaz al-Ahrām li-l-Tarjamah wa-l-Nashr, Muʾassasat al-Ahrām, 1992), 49–60.

[59] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Daʿwatunā," in *Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Dār al-ḥaḍārah al-Islāmīyyah, 1980), 13.

[60] A. Limousin, "Des Principes à l'action," *Vérités Pour* 18, 26 September 1960, 15–16.

the article, Jeanson refuted Bourdet's suggestion that they were supporting the FLN out of despair, bitterness, escapism, or romanticism. As he wrote,

> "[Y]ou don't understand at all. Our attitude is a political position, I've explained it many times, and recently again in responding to an article in which Giles Martinet thought he could find psychological motives—and therefore excuses—for our action… but I reject, for myself and for all my comrades, the excuses that you and he have invented for us. We are not excusable… We have one faith, dear Claude Bourdet. We are fighting for a cause. You know this, and you know that desperation has nothing to do with business like this. … [So] If you want to 'emphatically blame us,' dear Claude Bourdet, start by taking into account our actual positions."[61]

I include these statements for two reasons. First, such debates underscore the fact that activists felt acknowledging the material or non-material benefits of activism would detract from their political positions (and empower critics). And based on the fact that critics attacked activists by claiming groups were self-interested—as well as psychologically or materially motivated—these concerns were well-founded. Second, such debates highlight the fact that a club's value (and the value of the goods it provided) hinged in part on whether it could maintain member belief that the group was pursuing pro-social goals and acting in a selfless manner. Thus, while individuals received multiple benefits from club membership, they strongly asserted their primary motive was the cause.

"Drinking a Cup of Fire": The Costs of Activism

While activists described experiencing amazing highs from activism (highs that some individuals described as the best of their life), the large returns of high-commitment

[61] Francis Jeanson, "Lettre adressée à Claude Bourdet à la suite de la publication par France-Observateur d'un article intitulé 'Pourquoi aident-ils le FLN?" *Vérités Pour* 15, 24 March 1960, 3–4.

For similar statements, see: "Entre la maladie infantile et la sénilité précoce," *Vérités Pour* 10, 6 July 1959, 3–4; "Lettre de Francis Jeanson à J.M. Domenach en réponse de son article paru dans la Revue *Esprit*," *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 19–22; "Action clandestine et action de masse: Lettre à un militant de gauche," *Vérités Pour* 16, 13 June 1960, 16.

activism came with a steep and risky investment. Many activists spent years of their life in prison: such was the fate of Muslim Brotherhood activists like Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, Ḥasan al-Jamal, and Muṣṭafā Mashhūr, and Egyptian communist activists including Sharīf Ḥatātah, Injī Aflāṭūn, and Clément Leibovitch. Communist professor Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Badrī and textile worker Muḥammad ʿAlī ʿAmr spent years in concentration camps. Mubārak Abduh Faḍl was expelled from al-Azhar, kicked out of his house by his father, and by age 26, he had spent more than 4 years in Egyptian prisons and concentration camps.[62] Other activists paid the ultimate price: Brotherhood member ʿAbd al-Majīd Ḥasan was executed, and brothers Muḥammad and ʿAbd al-Wakīl al-ʿAnānī went with other Ikhwān members to volunteer for the Palestine War; they died at Kfar Darom.

French activists who supported Algerian independence tended to suffer more threats, ostracization, and exclusion (formal or informal), as their activism meant going against their community, their party (if they were communists), and their religious community (if they were Catholic or Protestant). While teaching at the University of Algiers, for example, Andre Mandouze was attacked by students, who brought a noose to campus and disrupted his lectures. As a result of the attacks, Mandouze's classes were suspended. Meanwhile, walls around his neighborhood were graffitied with "MANDOUZE THE TRAITOR," and fliers were passed around reading: "*Fellagha Mandouze* / While our men are dying / as Heroes on African soil / *The traitors stab them in the back!*"[63] Mandouze's family also came under attack. His children were threatened, and French

[62] "44 inculpés de communisme devant la cour martiale," *Affaire des "44"*, (1954), 5 in IISH ARCH01722/Folder 149; Mubārak ʿAbduh Faḍl, "Mudhakkirāt," in Rifʿat Saʿīd, *Hākadhā takallama al-Shuyūʿīyūn*, 125–179.

[63] Emphasis in original. André Mandouze, *Mémoires d'outre-siècle*, 248, 254–255 [Tome 1].

ultras ransacked the family's apartment; his 15-year-old daughter tried to save the family car, which the vigilantes pelted with rocks (they also filled the gas tank with mud, which destroyed the engine).

The family also found themselves ostracized from their church community: when they tried to attend Mass on 11 March 1956, a crowd blocked them from entering the church, shouting "Since you love the Arabs, go to the mosque, not to the church!" The priest and vicar, embarrassed, escorted the Mandouzes in through the sacristy. But they sat alone in the front pew during service, the rest of the congregation refusing to sit next to them. Even the questor (who passed the offering plate) refused to collect their alms. The congregation's *de facto* social exclusion of the family succeeded in distancing Mandouze: after this treatment, he stopped attending church in Hydra, concluding that "our brothers could not be… these Catholics of Hydra… this so-called Christian community," but the Muslims who made them feel welcomed and loved.[64] Ultimately, Mandouze was forced to return to France, and a few weeks after his arrival his social exclusion was made *de jure*: he was arrested, imprisoned in La Santé, and charged with treason per Article 76 of the Penal Code—having conspired with a foreign power to wage war against France.[65]

PCA members Henri Maillot and Maurice Laban paid a higher price. While fighting in the CDL in June 1956, Maillot and Laban were killed by the French Army. Notably, when the military tried to bury Maillot and Laban in the municipal cemetery in Lamartine, the townspeople gathered to block the entry of the coffins, forcing the two

[64] Ibid., 245–251.

[65] Entry for 15 November 1956, "Solitude pour l'Algérie: Journal de cellule," Maison d'arrêt de la Santé (Paris), in André Mandouze, *Un chrétien dans son siècle*, 177.

men to be interred outside the cemetery wall.[66] This act bore a symbolic significance: even in death, the two men would be excluded from the French community.

In addition to imprisonment, torture, death, job terminations, and financial costs, there were also less-discussed relational costs. Many activists (e.g., Didar Fawzy-Rossano, Henri Curiel, Adolfo Kaminsky, Anne Beaumanoir, Joséphine Carmona, and Lucette Laribère) reported marriages that terminated because of their activism, while countless others reported losing spouses and friends killed in the struggle. An activist interviewed in *Jeune Résistance* recalled that he had thought long and hard about his decision, because "it was necessary for me to leave everything, my parents, my friends, my habits, my job (I had a good position), and I did not know what awaited me after."[67] And Egyptian communist activist Nawal El Saadawi described how her first love, a fellow medical student in her biochemistry lab at Cairo University, left to fight in the Canal Zone in autumn 1951. Before he departed, he slipped her a note promising that while he was away, "Your image will always be before my eyes." He was killed a few weeks later.[68]

Maurice Maschino described the toll his activism took on his family. "I could measure, during the summer holidays we spent in France, the increasing gap that estranged me from my family, and to what extent their mentality had become foreign to me." Visiting them, he realized "I was no longer theirs, I had become a stranger in my family, in my country." His wife's mother cried, telling them "I don't recognize my

[66] Serge Kastell, *Le maquis rouge: L'aspirant Maillot et la guerre d'Algérie, 1956* (Paris: Harmattan, 1997), 7.

[67] "Robert," *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 1: Des Résistants a la guerre d'Algérie témoignent*, January 1960, 12–13.

[68] Nawal El Saadawi, *Walking through Fire* (London: Zed Books, 2009), 34.

daughter anymore." On Maurice's side of the family, there was also anger and tears. His mother threatened him with expulsion from the family: "'If you join the Front," she told him, "I'll curse you, you'll never see us again."[69] This was Jean-Louis Hurst's experience as well: after deserting from the military to join the FLN support networks, Hurst's father refused to speak to him, and the two men remained estranged until his father's death.[70]

Women had unique costs to bear, as their activism often flew in the face of gender norms. As a result, women who took part in activism were frequently characterized as sexual deviants: prostitutes, lesbians, "mistresses" of male activists, and whores involved in "mixed" (interracial and/or interreligious) relationships. After her arrest in France, Egyptian communist Didar Fawzy-Rossano, for instance, recalled that police officers, interrogators, and the press accused her of bringing shame on her daughters through her loose behavior. She was also the target of rumors that she was a lesbian, a slut, and an adulteress.[71] Such slurs against Anne Leduc were more intimate. She had two brothers in the French military; looking back, she said "I can still hear my younger brother, screaming and throwing me out of his house: 'Sluts like you deserve twelve bullets in the chest."[72]

There were also additional risks and costs if children were involved. Some activists worked around children: Sylvain and Fabienne Laboureur and Étienne and Paule Bolo used their children to deflect suspicion during police searches and checkpoints, for instance. Other activists sent their children to live with relatives. Didar Fawzy-Rossano

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[69] Maurice Maschino, *Le refus*, 128–135, 158–174, 191, 194.

[70] Didier Monciaud, "La Contribution d'un anticolonialiste français: repères sur la trajectoire de Jean-Louis Hurst (1935–2014)," *Cahiers d'histoire* 125 (2014): 161–171.

[71] Didar Fawzy-Rossano, *Mémoires d'une militante communiste (1942–1990): du Caire à Alger, Paris et Genève, lettres aux miens* (Paris: Éditions l'Harmattan, 1997), 134.

[72] I.e., to be shot by a firing squad. Interview with Anne Leduc, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 203.

sent her children to live with their father; Hélène Cuénat left her daughter with her parents. Lucette Laribère also left her four-year-old son with her parents—the boy grew up thinking she was dead.[73]

Finally, there were many psychological and emotional costs that could accompany activist commitments. After his decision to help the FLN, Noël Favrelière felt a great deal of anxiety and stress: he reported that he repeatedly bit his fingernails down to the bed.[74] Monique Burke described how she went from sleeping soundly to always being hyperalert, explaining she never recovered the ability to sleep without being jolted awake by "the sneeze of a fly."[75] Zohra Drif mentioned she woke up screaming from night terrors after taking part in the Milk Bar bombing, and Habib Redha similarly said he had trouble sleeping.[76]

In the end, then, high-cost and high-risk investments indeed yielded some of the highest returns of an activist's life. In the words of Anne Beaumanoir, in the French Resistance she had experienced "strong emotions, discoveries, exceptional encounters, enriching companionships, new friendships" and "love capable of sweeping away all morose feelings." Over time, however, the euphoria wore off, and the costs of clandestine activism became heavier. Anne said she felt exhausted and destabilized. Whenever she was outside the group, she felt "Alone in the world, in a hostile world… *Enthusiasm, the*

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[73] For additional examples, see the testimony of Christiane Jeanson.
Hélène Cuénat, *La porte verte*, 21–23; Interview with Paule Bolo, Interview with Didar Fawzy-Rossano, and Interview with Silvain Laboureur, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 45, 101–107, 137–138; Sarah Kaminsky, *Adolfo Kaminsky: A Forger's Life* (Los Angeles: DoppelHouse Press, 2016), 10–11.

[74] Noël Favrelière, *Le désert à l'aube*, 170–171.

[75] Interview with Monique Burke, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 195.

[76] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN*, 206–207; Interview with Yacef Saadi, Zohra Drif, and Habib Redha, in Florence Beaugé, "50 ans après: les survivants du 'nettoyage d'Alger,'" *Le Monde*, 29 January 2007, https://www.lemonde.fr/a-la-une/article/2007/01/29/50-ans-apres-les-survivants-du-nettoyage-d-alger_860986_3208.html

certainty of being on the right path, the satisfaction and pride of commitment helps overcome this abandonment of oneself, which nevertheless is a kind of amputation of your consciousness."[77]

When the war ended in 1945, Anne felt thrown. The Communist Party's decision to dissolve the Liberation Committees rather than press for revolution made her feel "cheated," and she said it put "water in my wine." But it was difficult to leave, because as she put it, "My only friends were Party members. My only joys were 'militant.' So although the faith was becoming insidiously more and more shaky, I clung to the remaining tatters of my devotion to the Party." She admitted she probably would have abandoned her communist activism, especially after the roundup of doctors that followed Stalin's death in 1953 (which as a doctor disturbed her deeply). However, she had fallen in love with another party member. Moreover, the highs of activism, the strong feelings and relationships it engendered, could be addictive. So eventually, Anne found a new cause to pour herself into—the Algerian revolution—and the process started again.[78]

Kaminsky called this the "depression of the ex-combatant"—a profound malaise he would feel when he tried to reintegrate into society. As he explained, "When you've learned to live with fear, risked your life, your freedom, experienced dangerous and romantic adventures, always under pressure and dedicating your life to a cause you've decided is pure, becoming reintegrated in society can be a painful ordeal."[79] Consequently, despite the high costs of club membership, the exit costs—the shift in worldview, the shift in one's sense of self, the shift in behaviors and habits, the lost

[77] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire*, 56–65.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Sarah Kaminsky, *Adolfo Kaminsky*, 140, 208–209.

friendships, the lost feelings of intense highs and lows, the lost investments, and the cost of learning new skills, making new friends, and finding new anchor points—were often too painful to bear.

In the end, however, Anne was one activist who discovered that the costs of activism were higher than she could have possibly predicted. For her, her worst moment would be the day she decided to end her pregnancy to continue her activism. The baby was the child of her first love, a fellow Resistance fighter shot and killed by Vichy forces in the forests of France. As she wrote, on that day she decided to terminate the pregnancy—one of the longest days of her life—she would "hold to my heart the urn containing the ashes of my child. …I had not kept the child: for the Cause."[80]

Conclusion: "Why Should I Care about the Return?"

> "I was content with her… / I lived for her /
> Her protection sheltered me / I found happiness with her…"
> — Muslim Brotherhood activist Jamāl Fawzī, "My Idea"[81]

In Paris facing news of the retraction of his Egyptian nationality, Henri Curiel took stock of his activist career. He had been arrested five times. "I have been persecuted, illegally arrested, unjustly detained, threatened with death… They exiled me, distanced me from my family, from my mother, from my wife, from my possessions and my friends, from everything dear to me in the world. But of these persecutions and this exile, I am proud." These losses, he explained, were for the cause: a suffering to end suffering.[82] Anne Leduc similarly remembered how her activism had driven a wedge

[80] Anne Beaumanoir, *Le feu de la mémoire*, 74, 115.
[81] "Fikratī," in Jamāl Fawzī, *al-Ṣabr wa-l-thabāt: nafathāt mujāhid fī sabīl Allāh: dīwān shiʿr* (Cairo: Dār al-Anṣār, 1980), 142–143.
[82] Henri Curiel, "Lettre à mes compatriotes," (1951), 1–3 in IISH ARCH01722/Folder 329.

between her and her brother; but she added "I also think of the friendship, the solidarity, and the warmth that I encountered, and that makes me forget the hardships."[83] And Roger Rey described his experience briefly, but eloquently: "It was the most beautiful period of my youth."[84]

Despite the glowing words, many activists also struggled with loss and reported experiencing survivor's guilt. Zhor Zerari, a member of the Saadi network who had helped plant a bomb at a French radio station during the Battle of Algiers. Nineteen years old at the time, she was arrested and imprisoned in August 1957. While incarcerated, she sketched drawings and wrote poems reflecting on the experience that contributed to her decision to join the network: her father's arrest by the French Foreign Legion. She had watched the arrest from the doorstep, and could not get the image of him smiling out of her mind: "I still remember / Your roughed-up smile / Because / You were still smiling / … / I still remember / And I will always remember / Your roughed-up smile / When the green dogs[85] / Took you away / Mouth smeared with blood / You were still smiling at me…"[86] They had never recovered his body.

In March 1962, she received word that negotiations were underway at Évian for an agreement that would end the war and provide for the release of Algerian prisoners. But in the midst of the celebrations, Zerari jotted down a four-line summary of her feelings about the prospect of returning home. "Why should I care about the return / If my father / Is not on the platform / Of the station?"[87]

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[83] Interview with Anne Leduc, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 203.
[84] Interview with Roger Rey, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir,* 51.
[85] I.e., The green berets, parachutists in the French Foreign Legion.
[86] Zhor Zerari, "A mon père," in *Poèmes de prison* (Algiers: Éditions Bouchène, 1988), 60.
[87] Zhor Zerari, "Prison Centrale de Rennes, 14 mars 1962," in *Poèmes de prison* (Algiers: Éditions Bouchène, 1988), 65.

Jewish activist and Combattants de la Libération (CDL) member Myriam Ben described her feelings in stark terms. "I only have one regret, a very large regret: not to have died in '62. It's a feeling so deep, so deep. … Because if by some misfortune you return, for the living, for others you are a stranger, you no longer have a common language to speak with them." Ben had tried to connect with the grandmother of Henri Maillot, her friend from childhood who had died in the CDL. But visiting the home, she experienced an overwhelming guilt at the fact she had survived while Maillot was dead. "That day," she said, "I understood that you must not come back alive…. when you make a war like this one, when you make a Revolution, you have to know to die there."[88]

Organizations that demanded a totalizing commitment thus proved difficult to quit. The closeness of relationships, the intensity of feelings, the reciprocal support and cooperation, the amount of time and resources invested, the isolation from outside networks and information, the internal monitoring and punishment regimes, and the morality tales and roles one adopted in the organization all created high exit costs. And if one did leave the group, the loss of close attachments, sense of purposelessness, and reintegration into a society of strangers was difficult. Thus, many activists chose to go bankrupt on their investment rather than deal with the loss of abandoning it.

Wilāyah's hypothesis that self-sacrificial behavior was motivated by masochistic urges was thus not supported. While Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists did enjoy their activism, it was the social environment, the sense of significance and accomplishment, and in a few cases the enjoyment of meting out just punishment that they most often described enjoying—not the pain and suffering. As Francis Jeanson put

[88] Interview with Myriam Ben (Ben-Haim), in Andrée Dore-Audibert, *Des Françaises d'Algérie dans la guerre de liberation: Des oubliées de l'histoire* (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1995), 177–178.

it, "One day, or rather night, Robert Davezies asked me, 'Why did you do it?' I replied to him: 'Because it makes me happy!' [*ça me fait plaisir*, lit. "it gives me pleasure"]. I think these aren't just idle words, because my response corresponds to something very real. Naturally, that was not my only motivation. But it made me happy, it made sense to me. Rarely can one to devote oneself whole-heartedly to something of which you can say to yourself, 'That makes sense.' It was not always easy. It was sometimes distressing, agonizing. We were all anxious... It's true that when it was over, I breathed a sigh relief. So, it was not *that* fun… but it was fun."[89]

The fact that activists benefitted from activism should not be taken as evidence that altruistic claims were disingenuous, however. Many studies have demonstrated that individuals who participate in high-cost signaling behaviors like self-sacrifice do so out of a sincere belief that their behaviors will benefit their kin group, party, or community. In fact, self-interest and pro-self preferences tend to be *negatively* correlated to high-cost aggressive behaviors like rebellion and armed insurgency.[90] In line with these findings, Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists indicated time and time again that they considered not only how they would benefit, but whether their group would benefit.

In sum, the "emotional economy" and "moral economy" of activism was complex. Historical circumstances could create "relative deprivation, humiliation, rejection, and unfair treatment,"[91] thus raising demand for certain non-material goods and affecting the

[89] Interview with Francis Jeanson, in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir*, 38.

[90] Nichole Argo, "Why Fight?: Examining Self-Interested Versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in Palestinian Resistance and Rebellion," *Security Studies* 18, no. 4 (2009): 651–680; Rachel L. Einwohner, "Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943," *American Journal of Sociology* 109, no. 3 (2003), 650–675; Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran, "War as a Moral Imperative (Not Just Practical Politics by Other Means)," *Proceedings of the Royal Society B* 278 (2011): 2930–2938.

[91] Katarzyna Jasko et al., "Rebel with a Cause: Personal Significance from Political Activism Predicts Willingness to Self-Sacrifice," *Journal of Social Issues* 75, no. 1 (2019): 316.

overall "moral economy." The 1956 Special Powers vote, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the show trials in Eastern Europe, the French anti-torture campaign, and years of stalled negotiations and sterile political debates, for instance, certainly explained why the Jeanson network advertised freedom from guilt, "cleaning your conscience," and turning to action and efficacy.[92]

But while historical circumstances could concretely affect what psycho-social goods clubs advertised and individuals sought, clubs also *drew attention to* specific emotions and desires, in order to increase demand for feelings like dignity, security, and meaning. In other words, clubs responded to needs, met needs, and created needs. Like other historical and social processes, causality was reciprocal.

The fact that the benefits of club membership were largely psycho-social also had interesting implications for how organizations operated. First, activists could continue receiving benefits whether or not the cause succeeded. This model of payouts allowed clubs to retain a hard core of dedicated members, even in cases where members were absorbing high costs of participation. (That said, these emotional payouts should not be overstated: activists did disaffiliate from clubs when affiliation costs rose.) Second, because activist feelings of pride and satisfaction hinged in part on the club's altruistic claims, when the organization operated in a manner that was self-serving or went against its stated principles, it devalued the sense of pride and accomplishment the group claimed to be offering—and this led to membership flight (as Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood discovered at various junctures).

[92] A. Limousin, "Rappel des principes," *Vérités Pour* 18, 26 September 1960, 16.

Here is where the "emotional economy" metaphor should end, however. Emotions were commodity-like and emotional exchanges economy-like. But while clubs tried to produce and promote certain affects, and while individuals could "buy in" to these sentiments, emotions were far more dynamic than any commodity. They were private and public, individual and collective, excludable and non-excludable, rivalrous and non-rivalrous, conceptual and concrete—as well as broadly similar across societies, culturally specific, and historically situated.

For future historical studies of activist movements, what is important to remember is that groups worked to leverage both aversive and appetitive stimuli. Previous chapters explored how clubs worked to produce feelings like anger, disgust, and guilt, for instance. But while these might motivate in the short run, in the long it was positive emotions that helped prevent activist burnout and maintain engagement.[93] As the FLN explained it, without love for his people, the fighter's "capacity for endurance and abnegation, and his incalculable sacrifices, would never have reached the height of a devouring flame, the flame of this love we know."[94]

Love, conceptualized as an "uncontrollable" consuming fire, was thus understood by many activists to be the heart of their commitment. Bannā taught members of the Brotherhood "Love one another, and jealously guard your bond, as it is the key to your strength and the pillar of your success."[95] And such teachings of love and light were experienced by Ikhwān activists as elevating: as seventeen-year-old Jābir Qumayḥah

[93] Katarzyna Jasko et al., "Rebel with a Cause: Personal Significance from Political Activism Predicts Willingness to Self-Sacrifice," 316–317, 341–342.

[94] "Les forces morales de l'ALN," *El Moudjahid* 9, 20 August 1957, 105–106 [Tome 1].

[95] Ḥasan al-Bannā, "Bayna al-ams wa-l-yawm," in *Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Dār al-ḥaḍārah al-Islāmīyyah, 1980), 111.

eulogized in a 1951 poem on Bannā's legacy, "And when I heard him say / Oh friends, God is the be-all, end-all / I saw light dawn on the horizon / … / And all eyes swim in light / And the Earth—oh Earth!—becomes a sky."[96]

So in the end, who was correct: activists who claimed they were acting selflessly, or critics who claimed activists were pursuing self-interest? Activists who told tales of love, or critics who saw only hatred? In fact, there was truth to both claims. Clubs worked to generate both positive and negative emotions, and drove commitment with both a shared altruistic goal and attempts to meet member needs. And while there were broad patterns to which needs clubs advertised and individuals pursued, in the end, each individual had a distinct utility for political activism and approached his/her commitment in unique ways. For individuals like Aḥmad ʿĀdil Kamāl, Zhor Zerari, Hélène Cuénat, and Yann Le Masson, historical and personal circumstances intersected to inspire involvement in an all-consuming crusade with a group of tight-knit, kin-like comrades. But an individual's utility for any given behavior—and the costs and benefits it produced—could only be understood on an individual level. For in the words of Kateb Yacine, "We will drink a cup of fire… Because it is a pleasure / Known / Only to me."[97]

[96] Jābir Qumayḥah, *Dhikrayātī maʿa daʿwah al-ikhwān fī al-munzilah daqahlīyyah* (Giza: Markaz al-Iʿlām al-ʿArabī, 2009).

[97] Kateb Yacine, *Soliloques* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1991 [1st Ed. Annaba: 1946], 35.

Chapter 12

Conclusion: "The Jump"

Sergeant parachutist Noël Favrelière wrote about two jumps that helped define his life. The first was out of an airplane.

Noël had grown up on the coast of France during World War II. When he was ten, French and Spanish volunteers with the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP) fought to take back his town from the Germans—and Noël snuck out to see the fighting. From that day forward, Noël dreamed only of war wounds and heroic exploits. So, when the time came in 1954 for Noël to do his mandatory military service, he chose to join the paratroopers. He thought paratroopers would undertake difficult missions and fight as isolated commandos—and that was the kind of soldier he wanted to be. There was just one problem: the jump.[1]

In order to make the mandatory airplane jump, his regiment practiced jumping countless times from different platforms. First, the parachutists jumped off a springboard. Then, they moved to a short platform. Each time, when the jumpmaster shouted "Go!" they jumped. They practiced jumping off a short tower, then a tall tower, and then an airplane, parked on the ground. The jumpmaster shouted "Go!" and they jumped.

Still, the day of his first airplane jump, Noël was deathly afraid. He experienced physiological fear responses: his stomach was upset, he felt the intense need to urinate (which he called "the pee of fear"), and he felt his heart was going to stop. But standing with his fellow parachutists in the airplane, Noël put on a brave face. "We were all

[1] Noël Favrelière, *Le désert à l'aube*, 7–31, 61, 165–166.

agglutinated in the same fear and pride," he explained; nobody wanted to be the man to back down.

Noël was number fourteen in the jump order. Part of his brain was convinced the others would not jump: they were smarter than that, surely they would refuse. But when number one jumped, then numbers two, three, four— Noël knew he had no choice, he would have to jump too. His rationalizations shifted. He told himself it must not be so terrifying if others had done it. So he hugged the pack of the guy in front of him, and kept his eyes firmly fixed on the ground to avoid looking at the open door and the blue sky beyond.

Once the soldier in front of Noël stepped up to the void, he had no choice but to watch. The jumpmaster yelled "Go!" and the young man leapt out. Instead of falling down, he was swept away sideways: as Noël put it, he disappeared like a wad of paper tossed from a train window. Noël stepped up to the blue rectangle—the door of the plane and the empty sky. But there was no time to reflect. The jumpmaster shouted "Go!" and Noël threw himself forward, eyes closed, "almost without realizing it." In the days prior, he had jumped so many times, maybe hundreds of times. Now, at the word "Go!" his muscles reacted on their own. So he jumped (and landed safely).

Following the jump, Noël was deployed to Algeria. It was October 1954, just before the uprising. The deployment was not how Noël had imagined, however. Instead of glorious exploits, he was assigned to an enlistment desk, helping screen potential Muslim recruits. He witnessed how deprivation drove many Algerian men to seek employment in the French Army, and how they were poorly treated with racist epithets and beatings once enlisted. Then a week after Noël arrived, the November insurrection started. Everyone

was on edge, and everything worsened. He spent almost two years in Algeria, and when he returned to France he was disenchanted. He could imagine what he would do if he were in an Algerian's shoes. As he commented to friends, "If I were Algerian, I would be a fellagha."[2]

Noël moved to Paris to paint. But the Special Powers vote had just been passed, and he was almost immediately recalled for a second tour of duty, to start in summer 1956. This caused a struggle of conscience. He sympathized with the Algerian independence movement, and he knew the military imposed a social order that was hard to resist: as he told himself, "you will walk in step, you will obey, you will salute." But he also experienced social pressure to obey the recall order. There was the added risk that refusal would limit his job prospects in the future (conscientious objectors spent time in jail, and had trouble finding work). As he wrote, "I thought it might cause me trouble for a very long time. I was also foolishly afraid that my refusal would be taken for fear." So he went.[3]

One of the first things the parachutists did was renew jump credentials. About half of the men agreed to jump. As Noël wrote,

> "Among those who refused [to jump], many were married and sometimes fathers. Others were just very afraid, but few would admit it… As for those who wanted to jump, at least half were interested in the jump bonus [financial gain]; the others for pleasure. I was one of them… for me, it was for the pleasure of being afraid."[4]

[2] Ibid., 12–14.
[3] Ibid., 10–14, 16.
[4] Ibid., 7–23.

For Noël, jumping was by now a habit: this would be his 36th jump. As a result, once the plane reached jump altitude, he stepped up to the door, "all anxiety disappeared, and I jumped, light and casual."[5]

After these physical jumps, Noël described one figurative leap he would make the night of 26 August 1956. A few months in to his second tour, he now saw Algerians as individuals, rather than a monolithic and hostile group ("They are all fellaghas," another soldier commented). Noël was also becoming more outspoken in his opposition to the war. One day, a fellow soldier shot and killed a seven-year-old Algerian girl. When there was no disciplinary action, Noël went around the mess hall trying to convince others to protest. "Shut up, you'll get in trouble," one friend told him; another said "we'll be thrown in prison, and the others won't follow us." When Noël suggested desertion, a friend brought up the risk and lack of resources: "To go where?" They were French soldiers in the middle of Algeria—as the soldier argued, the FLN might catch and kill them. But in the following days Noël obsessed over the girl's death. Even though he had not been present, he felt personally responsible. Distressed, Noël appealed to a friend to shoot him in the leg, so he could get a medical discharge. The friend refused, and told him to "stop thinking so much, the keel [end of your military service] will come on its own."[6]

At the end of August, two FLN soldiers were captured and brought to camp. One prisoner was soon led away and disappeared (executed, Noël assumed). Noël analyzed the remaining prisoner for signs of hostility, but determined the man had a sympathetic, pleasant face. He started bringing the prisoner cigarettes and bread; but he was told not to

[5] Ibid., 22–23.
[6] Ibid., 25–26, 41–50, 65.

bother: the Algerian would be taken out for the "chore of wood." A euphemism, this meant the prisoner would be led into the forest to collect firewood, then shot in the back on the pretense he had tried to escape.

Noël was shocked. His second thought was that the *goumiers* (indigenous soldiers) would be assigned to execute the prisoner, so there was no need to feel morally responsible.[7] But Noël's conscience tugged at him, so he asked friends for advice. One friend, a sergeant, told him not to worry about it: an Arab resident had told him the FLN fighters were "bastards who were extorting civilians and stealing livestock." Noël rejected this information, however, and retorted the Arab had lied, because he was afraid of the French soldiers. (This had happened before, at the Gesta farm earlier in the campaign.)[8]

After returning to his cot, Noël continued to worry about the "chore of wood." Finally, he gave himself "ten minutes" to make a decision. He was considering something drastic—a "jump." As he recorded, in those ten minutes he roughly reasoned the following:

> "If you don't do anything, this man will die... Is this certain? Maybe… if he's killed, you'll have your whole life to remind you that you could have saved him… Here it is, the opportunity you've been waiting for! Fuck it—isn't this the best way to tell everyone that you're disgusted with their pacification? If only friends were here, maybe they would come with me? But no, they would not come, and you know it well. Remember [your friend] the Alsatian who told you 'I consider it suicide.' No, it's not suicide, since there's a chance to succeed…. Only two things you're sure about: one, you want to save the prisoner; two, you're fed up with this so-called pacification. Well, then, don't think about it anymore."[9]

He had made his decision.

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[7] Ibid., 67–69.
[8] Ibid., 71–73.
[9] Ibid., 74.

Just after ten o'clock on the night of 26 August 1956, twenty-two-year-old Noël Favrelière stole a machine gun from a duty guard, untied a prisoner of war, and defected from the French military. He and the prisoner set off across the desert to the Algerian-Tunisian border, where they joined an FLN combat unit. Back at camp, Noël left behind only a hastily composed two-line postcard to his parents. It read: "Dear parents, please don't hold against me the pain I am about to cause you; I couldn't act in any other way. I love you and hug you. Your son, Noël."[10]

"The Jump": The Ecologies and Etiologies of High-Cost Decisions

Chapter 1 of this study opened with a 1942 debate between Egyptian doctor Muḥammad Ḥusnī Wilāyah and Muṣṭafā Jābir about the motives driving individuals who sacrificed themselves for a cause. In the debate, Dr. Wilāyah characterized self-sacrificers as "hysterics" driven by emotions. Volatile and radical, these men seized on ideologies, distorted reality, and built elaborate fantasies in which they played the role of either hero or victim. Such men, Wilāyah argued, touted their altruism, but were in fact selfish and self-aggrandizing, seeking public recognition for their "heroic" sacrifices. Moreover, they masochistically enjoyed the suffering that came from self-sacrifice.[11]

In order to interrogate profiles like Dr. Wilāyah's, this study set aside the motive-based question of *why* activists made high-cost decisions, and engaged with the process-based question of *how* activists made decisions in Egypt, Algeria, and France in the 1940s and 1950s. Chapter 2 followed Egyptian activists as they decided to affiliate with

[10] Ibid., 75–77.

[11] Muḥammad Ḥusnī Wilāyah, "al-Shakhṣīyyat al-histīrīyyah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 468, 22 June 1942, 639; Muḥammad Ḥusnī Wilāyah, "al-Fidāʾīyyah," *Majallat al-Risālah* 472, 20 July 1942, 731.

or disaffiliate from clubs; Chapter 3 explored how Algerian activists leveraged social networks and social pressure to construct an insurrectionist movement; Chapter 4 then traced how Egyptian and French activists navigated the borderlands of postwar France and French Algeria, deciding to undertake illegal action in support of Algerian revolutionaries.

The two "jumps" that Noël Favrelière described in *Le désert à l'aube* summarized some of the paths activists took in making decisions. Noël recorded that watching FTP fighters in World War II led him to create a particular image (or *theory of mind construct*) about who he wanted to be; his engagement in the Parisian artistic community drew his *attention* to *information* about colonial injustices. There were also personal *preferences* involved (with Noël expressing a strong risk preference). But these preferences were not enough: whether jumping from a plane or undertaking another high-risk behavior, there were strong psychological and physiological *inhibitors* to overcome. To increase the chance the parachutists would make their first jumps, the young men trained themselves to make large jumps through gradual *escalation*. By the time Noël was in the plane, facing the *pressure of peers and authorities*, he felt the need to put on a brave face. And finally, when it was Noël's turn and the jumpmaster shouted "Go!," his muscles acted from *conditioning*.

Noël's decision to desert was another example of how individuals arrived at costly decisions. This figurative jump took place in a torrent of contradictory social forces, cognitions, and emotions, bounded by limited information and limited time. Noël said he considered *emotional feedback*, *experiential learning*, and *heuristics*. He also considered *signaling*, and engaged in *forecasting* about probable outcomes and costs. Noël also

weighed whether he had the *resources and abilities* to succeed—and as a sergeant, he could (and did) use his authority to reposition the guards on duty, assign friends to important guard posts, convince a guard to give him his weapon to "borrow," and secure permission to take the prisoner for a walk.[12]

In hindsight, Noël (and many of the other activists studied) remembered their commitments as a jump. But as activist stories demonstrated, even if a decision was made in a fraction of a second, it was the product of a tremendous amount of development. While activists thus often arrived at the similar decision-making outcomes (affiliating with a club; participating in violence), the paths and cognitive approaches they took to get there were as diverse as the individual. In other words, each decision was made in a unique historical moment, socially embedded, and informed by personal factors specific to the decision-making ecology of the individual. As Maschino summarized, "One does not rebel just like that, on a whim…. this act comes at the end of an evolution, which for me was quite long.… [And] Like any choice, it is situated—it has a history, and this history is singular."[13]

While decisions were singular, there were statistical patterns to who made which decisions. For instance, certain groups were overrepresented and underrepresented in clubs: Jews and Copts were overrepresented in Egyptian communist clubs, for instance, and individuals who studied at *kuttāb* overrepresented in the Muslim Brotherhood. Young Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood members were also overrepresented in the individuals who engaged in aggressive social policing, and French Jews, social Catholics, and

[12] Ibid., 75.
[13] Maurice Maschino, *Le refus* (Paris: François Maspero, 1960), 8–9.

communists overrepresented in the suitcase carrier networks. Such disproportionalities can be helpful in pointing the way toward potential contributory causes.

However, *it is a grave error to mistake demographic disproportionality for causality*. As we saw, Egyptian, Algerian, and French observers all built "profiles" and based their biases on demographic disproportionalities: Egyptians collapsed "Jewish" and "communist" because Jews were overrepresented in communist clubs, and some French observers collapsed "Jewish" and "suitcase carriers." However, disproportionalities were often the result of co-occurring factors: historical developments, the social marginalization of certain groups, the disruption of social life as a result of conflict, patterns of resource distribution, or strategic choices adopted vis-à-vis other political players, for instance.

One should thus not overdetermine the effect of ethnicity, genetics, risk preferences, religion (or any other single factor) on behavioral outcomes. Such factors might be statistically predictive in a given historical moment—but nonetheless unrelated to causality. To adapt Maschino's comments regarding attempts to "profile" the *insoumis*, it was not "the shape of his skull, his nose ('Ah, these Jews'), blood type, or size [that] predisposes him to this type of behavior."[14] As *Vérités Pour* wrote in response to a profiling attempt by Gilles Martinet, "No, things are not that simple! There is not on one side sensible, reasonable, thoughtful men, operating according to exclusively political motives," and on the other side men whose behavior was in aberration, based on "pure psychology." There were only "face to face, two different political attitudes, and on both

[14] Maurice Maschino, *L'engagement: le dossier des réfractaires* (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), 33–35.

sides the inevitable and very diverse psychological colorations that always accompany any political attitude whatsoever."[15]

Studying how historical processes intersect with human decision-making thus demands we complicate our understanding of causality. As Christophe Heintz (a historian of science and cognition) writes, often "historians attempt to reconstruct Social Cognitive Causal Chains by using simple assumptions… [that] people have beliefs, desires, and interests, and these account for their decisions and behavior"—and these assumptions about cognition guide historical debates about causality. However, there is a need to better understand our own cognitive situatedness, and the vast contingency of how humans negotiate behavior.[16] Environments were multivariate, causal processes entangled, and single variables insufficient for explaining outcomes.

While actors thus could start from similar positions (or possess demographic characteristics statistically predictive of certain behaviors), outcomes were deterministically indeterminate. Activists revised their emotions and heuristics—they even revised their own personal preferences and life stories. In other words, personality traits and emotions did not just act on the individual, they were acted upon. Decision-making outcomes were thus the consequence of bidirectional, coactional processes from the person's genetic, cognitive, social-environmental, and historical milieus. In short, causality was nonlinear: mutual and relational causality was at work.[17]

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[15] "Entre la maladie infantile et la sénilité précoce," *Vérités Pour* 10, 6 July 1959, 3–4.

[16] Christophe Heintz, "Cognitive History and Cultural Epidemiology," in *Past Minds: Studies in Cognitive Historiography*, eds. Luther H. Martin and Jesper Sørensen (London: Equinox, 2011), 13.

[17] This could also be termed probabilistic epigenesis, a developmental model that understands development as bidirectional: genetic, neural, behavioral, and social processes reciprocally interact and adapt to one another. Thus, structures act upon behavior, and behavior acts upon structures. See: Gilbert Gottlieb and Carolyn Tucker Halpern, "A Relational View of Causality in Normal and Abnormal Development," Development and Psychopathology 14 (2002): 421; Gilbert Gottlieb, *Synthesizing Nature-nurture: Prenatal Roots of Instinctive Behavior* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1997), 14–15, 126.

The Activist's Emotions

So how can one describe the affective environment of movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, the EMNL, the FLN, and suitcase-carrier networks? Were the members of these clubs "hysterics" or "fanatics" driven by emotions, as Dr. Wilāyah (and many other journalists and pundits) suggested? In most cases, the answer was no. In the 1940s and 1950s, Egyptian, Algerian, and French clubs all promoted emotional restraint and rationality, and used charges of emotional fanaticism and the lack of emotional self-control to devalue their competitors. The Muslim Brotherhood and Muḥammad's Youth both argued that Westernized Egyptian elites were letting their passions run wild, while the EMNL and Workers' Vanguard described the Muslim Brotherhood as fanatics stoking the passions of the masses. The FLN similarly argued that the French Army, French ultras, the MNA, and the Algerian masses lacked emotional restraint—just as French writers denounced the FLN and suitcase carriers for being emotionally-driven.

The emotional economy of self-sacrificial behavior was therefore not quite what Dr. Wilāyah had suggested. Rather than being tossed to and fro by the gales of emotion, activists were strategic in how they put emotions to work. Activists used emotional appeals to communicate moral judgments and encourage action; they used shock to draw attention to campaigns, and used pride and shame signaling to negotiate norms. Activists also worked to teach and model emotional responses. And activists labored to enforce (or contest) affective regimes, assigning emotions to appropriate spaces and genders.

As part of these negotiations, Egyptian communists worked to inspire pity for the poor. Young Egypt, the Muslim Brothers, and Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad members, meanwhile, argued that men and women should be angered and disgusted by Western

sartorial habits and leisure practices. The FLN called on Algerian Muslims to participate in pride displays, and suitcase carriers modeled love for Algerians and disgust for French colonial norms. Thus, moral emotions constituted a shared language and social technology for negotiating norms—even if the conclusions were worlds apart.[18]

While emotions were thus a vital part of social activism, emotions were not always sufficient to bring individuals across the cognition-behavior gap. As Maschino argued, "If we insist on the insufficiency of the moral jolt, it is because too many 'psychologists' see it as the sole spring of refusal… but a) this jolt does not always exist; b) when it exists, it does not necessarily lead to refusal… and c) when it does end in refusal, the reflexivity that [has occurred] between the original emotion and the final decision has played a very important role."[19] Maschino was of course working to refute claims that the suitcase carriers were emotionally-driven, and thus perhaps overemphasized the level of reflexivity involved. But he was not wrong in insisting that moral shock and other emotions were often insufficient for producing (and sustaining) action. The FLN recognized this problem as well, noting that to retain recruits, the passion "of the first day must be transformed into a lucid resolve and determination that nothing will discourage."[20]

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[18] French anti-torture campaigns also call into question studies that argue disgust is a moral emotion related to social conservativism. In fact, such studies have either primed for disgust, or centered on expressions of sexual disgust. Disgust in other contexts (human rights, animal rights, environmental, and vegan/vegetarianism campaigns, for instance) is often overlooked.

See: John A. Terrizzi Jr. et al., "Disgust: A Predictor of Social Conservatism and Prejudicial Attitudes toward Homosexuals," *Personality and Individual Differences* 49, no. 6 (October 2010): 587–592; John A. Terrizzi Jr., et al., "The Behavioral Immune System and Social Conservatism: A Meta-Analysis," *Evolution and Human Behavior* 34, no. 2 (March 2013): 99–108; Joshua M. Tybur et al., "Is the Relationship between Pathogen Avoidance and Ideological Conservatism Explained by Sexual Strategies?" *Evolution and Human Behavior* 36, no. 6 (November 2015): 489–497.

[19] Maurice Maschino, *L'engagement*, 36.

[20] "Le psychologue aux armées," *Échos Militaires de la Wilaya d'Oran* 3 (n.d.), 4, in SHD GR 1H 2590/D1.

What of Wilāyah's argument that those who sacrificed themselves to causes enjoyed suffering? In fact, while Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists did enjoy their activism, it was the social environment, the sense of significance and accomplishment, and in some cases the enjoyment of meting out just punishment that they described enjoying—not the pain and suffering. And while negative emotions (like anger and disgust) were certainly important in affiliation and aggression behaviors, positive emotions (like love and pride) also played a guiding role. Resistance was thus not all negative: as French Catholic activist André Mandouze rightly observed,

> "[T]here is nothing more resistant, more active, more devouring than love. Resignation is the opposite of resistance, action, and flame. Resignation is all negative…. The resigned man bitterly flattens his ears [like a horse or dog], mutters inwardly or behind the scenes, but he will never risk that act of courage which consists of shaking off the yoke, in saying out loud what he thinks, in feeling the effect of the sound of his voice, even if he dies."[21]

Wilāyah's hypothesis that self-sacrificial behavior was motivated by masochistic urges was thus not supported. Instead of considering pain a benefit, pain was a cost that activists counted and accepted in order to achieve a specific goal. And in most cases, the stated goal of self-sacrifice was costly signaling (sending a message) and/or behavioral modeling. As Robert Bonnaud reflected,

> "First of all and at the very least, refusers want to testify…. Otherwise, if they did not want to be witnesses, and *witnesses heard, followed,* defended, exalted, *if they did not offer to be the living examples, the high symbols erected to the refusal of the war, why would these young men immolate their youth* before the automatic judgment of the military tribunals, why would they sacrifice their liberty? There are other ways not to go to war.
>
> They sacrifice… so that we have names, faces, heroes, so that we have slogans, so that we have no excuses."[22]

[21] André Mandouze, "Résignés?" *Cahiers de Notre Jeunesse* 18 (June 1943).

[22] Emphasis added. Bernard Randon [Robert Bonnaud], "Le grand refus," *Vérité-Liberté* 1, May 1960, 4, 6.

ALN fighter Messaour Boulanouar also described the sense of purpose and empowerment he hoped to gain from high-cost signaling, and explained what message he hoped to send to the Algerian community through his sacrifice. As he declared,

> "I want my life to burn and give off an intense heat / … / fire as a signal of peace / as a signal of joy / as a signal of love / a fire, an ardent promise, that one day / we will forget the shame… / I want my life to burn and show the way / to the poor lost in the thick fog… / I want my life to burn and be useful and have meaning / because I must testify… / Witness, I am a witness—it's my way of loving."[23]

Aggression, Activism, and the "Smell of Reasonable Crime"

Having outlined conclusions on activist decision-making and activist emotions, what can we therefore conclude about the activist's aggression? An anecdote from French suitcase carrier Jean-Marie Boeglin offered an entrance to the question. After learning that French security services had succeeded in the "arrest of five dangerous terrorists" (one of whom was FLN activist Mostefa Lacheraf), Boeglin remembered feeling a sense of cognitive dissonance. "I had the opportunity to meet [Lacheraf] with my friends from *Les Temps Modernes*. I remembered a quiet man, a historian, for which the adjective 'terrorist' seemed very odd," he reflected.[24] Boeglin's impressions of Lacheraf's normality were not unusual. Except for a few outlying cases, the vast majority of individuals studied who participated in violent acts showed no signs of psychosis.

This statement is not a normative evaluation, or an endorsement of their behavior. Rather, it underlines an important point: it is dangerous and misleading to perpetuate the misconception that "radicals" or certain "types" of activists were psychologically ill or

[23] Messaour Boulanouar, *La meilleure force: 1956-1960* (Paris: Editions du Scorpion, 1963*),* 128.
[24] Interview with Jean-Marie Boeglin in Jacques Charby, *Les porteurs d'espoir: Les réseaux de soutien au FLN pendant la guerre d'Algérie, les acteurs parlent* (Paris: Le Découverte, 2004), 77.

deranged. In fact, there is a tendency to see one's own violence as a result of one's situation, while denouncing the violence of others as indicating an inherently violent temperament, an inherently violent race, or an inherently violent religion. Such assumptions are *attribution errors*—attributing the misbehavior of another to disposition rather than circumstantial factors (while explaining one's own misbehavior as conditional).[25]

Wadi Bouzar warned against this error when introducing the autobiography of Raymond Nadir Bouzar (the man whose divorce prompted his flight to Egypt with two of his children, where he became a weapons trafficker for the FLN). As Bouzar wrote,

> "Certainly, people are no more born *violent* than they are *revolutionary* from the cradle. The philosopher Alain recommended: '*Do not say that man is evil. Look for the pin* [the cause].' One could paraphrase this famous saying: '*Do not say that man is inherently violent. Look for the thing that started it.*' It is a terrible violence to make men believe that they have the same rights, and then to humiliate, condemn or reject them because of their ethnic origin or their confessional affiliation. Often, then they are made *violent* in turn. Some of those who are *violent* and in *revolt* become *revolutionaries*—and some do not."[26]

Bouzar was correct in stating that men were not revolutionary or violent from the cradle. And when activists "looked for the pin" that had prompted their behavior, they found not one pin but many—countless causes, many mundane or minor, all embedded in the complex ecosystem of daily life. Socialization, for example, played an important role in violent behavior—although perhaps not in the ways one might expect. Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists in the 1950s were not socialized to behave violently, hold

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[25] Donald C. Pennington, *Social Cognition* (London: Routledge, 2000), 38–39.

[26] Emphasis in original. Wadi Bouzar, "Préface," in Nadir Bouzar, *Abus de confiance* (Algiers: Entreprise nationale du livre, 1989 [1st ed. Cairo: Comité de Libération du Maghreb Arabe, 1954]), 6.

For the original context of Alain's aphorism, see: "Bucéphale, 8 décembre 1922," in Alain [Émile Chartier], *Propos sur le bonheur* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1928), 11–12.

violent beliefs, or disregard human life (such behavior would have been socially counterproductive). Instead, individuals learned to rely on certain roles, scripts, heuristics, authority figures, and authorizing texts—and then negotiated them to produce violence.

It was thus the interpretive labors of activists and their re-socialization practices that proved critical. Violence was not inborn, it was made. To produce violent attacks, activists located authorizing texts and authorities. They modeled affective cues like anger and disgust toward outgroups, and used heuristics to encourage the collapsing of religious, ethnic, and political identifications. They introduced activists to difficult tasks slowly and escalated commitment over time, to encourage affiliation and facilitate cognitive and behavioral modification. They used social pressure and coercion to facilitate compliance, and used auto-didactic repetition (self-teaching) and appeals to role conformity to bypass inhibitions and suppress feelings of guilt. And they created elite groups of "violent specialists," rehearsed plans, and habituated specialists to overcome physiological responses like fear and anxiety.

The work did not end there. Activists created myths, rituals, and structures to authorize and even sanctify aggression. They made claims to violent hero-roles (*mujāhid*, *fidāʾī*, crusader, guerrilla, soldier, maquisard, partisan), and promoted sacrificial scripts and martyrologies. Activists adapted kinship roles and used kinship cuing to encourage self-sacrifice and strong reciprocity. They negotiated the rules concerning the appropriate spaces, targets, and agents for violence; and activists argued violence was reciprocal, stretching reciprocity to include distant attacks, indirect actors, asymmetrical means, and

entire groups. And through these labors, activists re-made aggression as acceptable, rational, and necessary.

Neuroscientist Jo-Ann Tsang and psychologist John M. Darley both note that overall, such rationalization strategies worked to lower the cognitive costs of violence. For instance, habituation (routinization) bypassed active decision-making processes and reduced self-questioning. Having authority figures authorize behavior reduced the sense of individual responsibility. Working in anonymity (hiding one's face, operating in the dark, wearing sunglasses, or perpetrating anonymous attacks) also lowered the sense of individual culpability, as did diffusing the task across multiple individuals (a strategy that could be used to creates a disjunct between task and outcome and reduce feelings of direct responsibility). Dehumanizing victims, compartmentalizing, and using euphemistic language and moralizing analogies (i.e., describing massacres as "cleaning house" or removing a disease) could further reduce the cognitive burden of violating taboos against harming others.[27] In other words, because there was a great deal of subjectivity to costs and benefits, individuals actively tried to re-write the costs of bad behavior through rationalization. In the 1950s, activists specifically appealed to modern notions of virtuous violence, remaking violence as "rational," "professional," and "necessary." Thus, as Albert Bandura famously observed, what was culpable could be "made honorable through cognitive restructuring."[28]

[27] Jo-Ann Tsang, "Moral Rationalization and the Integration of Situational Factors and Psychological Processes in Immoral Behavior," *Review of General Psychology* 6, no. 1 (2002): 25–50; John M. Darley, "Social Organization for the Production of Evil," *Psychological Inquiry* 3, no. 2 (1992): 199–218.

[28] Albert Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1986), 376; Albert Badura et al., "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, no. 2 (1996): 364–374.

These observations provide a response to Martin Evan's query about what type of "emotional economy" undergird Algerian violence during the war.[29] As I would argue, wartime violence was characterized by overlapping emotional regimes and role-contingent concepts of which emotions were appropriate when undertaking aggressive acts. For instance, the FLN appealed to the modern role of soldier; and per this mode of just aggression, the FLN justified violence on the grounds that it was orderly, self-reflective, emotionally restrained, restricted to trained military professionals, and accompanied by performances of justice (i.e., trials, juries, judges, and judgments).

This emotional regime intertwined with another aggressive mode: the performances of terror that characterized the Battle of Algiers. These performances were restricted to an elite shock force and a special role: the *fidāʾī*. The *fidāʾī* was authorized to carry out organizational justice and advance the cause through assassinations and bombings. As part of their role, *fidāʾī* could also attack "taboo" targets, in order to amplify the "propaganda of the deed." These agonistic displays were performed with the goal of intimidating competitors, advancing a guardianship claim within the Algerian community, and driving a wedge between the European and Muslim communities.

Among FLN activists there were also more personal emotional scripts for violence. One of these was tied to the organization's founding myth, which styled violence as the heroic act of casting off past humiliations, reclaiming manhood, and recreating oneself as a dignified human person. This was the mode of violence that played such a prominent role in Fanon's apologias. But there was also the intimate tenor of violence justified

[29] Martin Evans, "Reprisal Violence and the *Harkis* in French Algeria, 1962," *The International History Review* 39, no. 1 (2017): 102.

according to familial roles. This proved one of the most commonly-cited moral reason given for participating in violence: obligations to family and friends.

The primacy of kinship and its prominent role in "violence values" was vividly illustrated by a controversial statement given by Albert Camus at the Maison des Étudiants at Uppsala University, following his acceptance of the Nobel Prize in Stockholm in December 1957. During the question and answer session, the Algeria question was raised, and Algerian and Swedish students in the audience began shouting and arguing. Fighting to make himself heard over the din, Camus (himself from a pied noir family) denounced hatred on both sides and called for justice in Algeria. However, he then stated: "I have always condemned terror. I must also condemn [Algerian] terrorism, which is exercised indiscriminately (in the streets of Algiers for example), and which one day could strike my mother or my family. I believe in justice [for the Algerians], but I will defend my mother before justice."[30] (Another journalist recorded Camus as saying "At this moment, bombs are being thrown in the street trollies in Algiers. My mother could be in one of these trollies. If this is justice, I prefer my mother."[31])

While Camus was widely vilified for the comment, it likely represented a moment of honesty in the tumult of political debates. As Camus recognized, everyone had their value hierarchy—and kinship and friendship often came first. Organizations understood this, and endeavored to expand this strong reciprocity and kin attachment to more abstract groups and objects in producing violence. Thus, Zohra Drif could in all seriousness

[30] Dominique Birmann, "Albert Camus a exposé aux étudiants suédois son attitude devant le problème algérien," *Le Monde*, 14 December 1957.

[31] Olivier Todd, *Albert Camus: A Life*, trans. Benjamin Ivry (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 378–379.

describe her activist commitment to the FLN by echoing Camus' comment: "we were… facing a choice between our mother and our life, and like Camus, we chose our mother."[32]

Finally, the last register of aggression—present at Melouza and during the wholesale massacres of "traitors" that the FLN carried out in 1962—was the purification mode of violence. This was "cleansing" violence, which ruthlessly effaced "contaminated" parts of the communal body. As Evans pointed out in his study of the 1962 massacres, this was a particularly "intimate violence… aimed at personal humiliation through bodily mutilation, in particular sexual humiliation through emasculation of men and the head-shaving of women."[33]

To Evans' assessment, I would add that cleansing violence also performed new boundaries, roles, and hierarchies. As Nancy Wonders writes, it is important to ask "how, and on whose body" social borders and hierarchies were performed.[34] As described in Chapter 4, events like the Spanish Civil War and the Liberation of France were each notable for the bodies they targeted (during the Spanish Civil War, for instance, the Republicans lynched priests, while the Nationalists raped women and lynched farmers, workers, and intellectuals). Egypt, Algeria, and France each had their own boundary performances. In 1948, Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to run the border of Egyptian citizenship through the bodies of Egyptian Jews, through lynchings and bombings—and in January 1952, the same groups tried to expel British and European

[32] Zohra Drif, *Mémoires d'une combattante de l'ALN* (Algiers: Éditions Chihab, 2013), 168–169, 184.
[33] Martin Evans, "Reprisal Violence and the *Harkis* in French Algeria, 1962," *The International History Review* 39, no. 1 (2017): 101.
[34] Nancy A. Wonders, "Global Flows, Semi-Permeable Borders and New Channels of Inequality: Border Crossers and Border Performativity," in *Borders, Mobility, and Technologies of Control*, eds. Sharon Pickering and Leanne Weber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 66; Anssi Paasi, "Borders and Border-Crossings," *Environment and Planning A* 44 (2012): 2303–2309.

citizens from the heart of Cairo through fire-raising and lynching.[35] In Algeria in the 1940s and 1950s, French ultras would similarly attempt to preserve the hierarchies and boundaries of French Algeria by lynching Muslims (performances that would be repeated in the metropole).

Mouloud Feraoun, the Algerian writer who tried to stand in the widening gap between the French and Algerian communities, would be one casualty of these boundary performances—assassinated by the OAS in 1962. The FLN would cement its own boundaries that same year, by massacring *harkis* and other Muslims accused of French collaboration. Those "boundary straddlers"—men and women whose flesh challenged certain political myths of Algerian and French identity—were thus targeted for "coordinated destruction."[36]

Overall, violence was thus performed and justified in multiple acts and registers—to the extent it would be more accurate to speak of "violences" in the plural. Each act of aggression served a different function, and each violence was carefully crafted to advance certain claims and achieve certain goals. Thus, in most cases political violence was not psychosis—it was something more insidious: it was the adaptation and redeployment of shared norms, attachments, social organization strategies, and emotional cues for violent ends. The end result was the naturalization of horrific behavior. The FLN had their myth of moral bombings, and the French had their myth of moral torture—a series of rationalizations performed to convince officers that interrogation sessions were being

[35] Robert Wuthnow, *Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 115–140.

[36] Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 110, 229.

carried out professionally and humanely. I am therefore inclined to agree with Tilly when he concludes that "Terror is a strategy, not a creed."[37]

But not everyone remained convinced that violence was virtuous. In a stream-of-consciousness poem started in 1956 and completed in 1960, ALN fighter Messaour Boulanouar recorded a "poetic journal of [my] various paths, the sum of attitudes generated by the war."[38] He began by expressing Manichean certainties similar to those of the Saadi network members: Boulanouar described emerging from slavery and shame into pride and freedom, expressed his "green[39] certainties" in the face of rotten men, and wrote that "everything must be reborn." Regarding his choice between France and Algeria, early parts of the journal described the decision as an easy one, just as it is easy "to choose between beast and man / to choose between day and night / the dead leaf and the living flower / the tomb and the sun." Relating his feelings about being in the FLN, Boulanouar sang "Love is at work / … / we have had the joy of feeling ourselves better humans / we have had the joy of feeling ourselves among brothers / … / leading the fight of the men of my time." As he exalted, "love burns stronger in me;" and even with the cold of the campaign, "it still remains, this fire in the heart of all / it still remains, the joy of understanding one another/ acting in trust / going out together and fighting together/ the joy of useful hands / … / I am happy."[40]

Within a year and a half, however, the tone shifted. The Manichean certainties and heroic luster of the cause had faded. As Boulanouar wrote, "For centuries we dreamed of

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[37] Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence*, 237.

[38] Letter from Messaour Boulanouar to the Editors of the *Diwan algérien*, excerpt in Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi and Jamel-Eddine Bencheikh, eds., *Diwan algérien, la poésie algérienne d'expression française de 1945 à 1965: Étude critique et choix de textes* (Centre pédagogique maghribin, 1967), 58.

[39] The color green was used in Algerian poetry as a synonym for Algeria and Algerian nationalism (see Kateb Yacine's work, for instance). This is how Boulanouar uses the color in his journal as well.

[40] Messaour Boulanouar, *La meilleure force*, 9–10, 14, 17, 23–24.

the good of mankind / but we marched in the direction of horror / but we fed hatred and vermin / … / Eye for an eye, heart for heart / We took the sword to break the sword / We have done evil to put an end to evil / Each believed himself just and judged all the others." In a passage that directly addressed the question of violence, Boulanouar then recorded:

> "Murder is still murder / We are fooled by our own machines, by our own lies / … / We talk, we struggle, we want to prove to men / By shame and blood, death and vermin / By the hose and the bathtub[41] / We kill, we multiply the crime / because we are in the great century… / I know the full horror / The house on fire, the rape, the carnage / Shame is an old acquaintance / I know the full horror / Jews burned like old clothes / Negroes skinned / I know the full horror / the smell of daily murder / the smell of reasonable crime."[42]

The Activist's Myths: Heroes, Victims, and Villains

There was one part of Dr. Wilāyah's analysis that contained a grain of truth, even if it was embedded in a heavy helping of normativity. As Wilāyah argued (citing German psychologist Emil Kraepelin), hysterics built elaborate fantasies in which they played the role of hero or victim. And as part of this process, the hysteric "distorts facts to make them fit his personal desires."[43] These comments, which described building fantasies and conforming reality to fit them, as well as the use of hero and victim roles, sounded strikingly similar to the organizational metanarratives that activists recited. So how did these myths and roles figure in to activism?

As it turned out, activists did structure, filter, and interpret information through the lens of specific metanarratives. Wilāyah also correctly noted that these organizational

[41] The hose and bathtub were torture devices used by the French Army (the hose used to pump water through the mouth or anus, to painfully inflate the stomach and colon)—see Chapter 7.
[42] Messaour Boulanouar, *La meilleure force,* 94-96, 105, 132, 138.
[43] Muḥammad Ḥusnī Wilāyah, "al-Shakhṣīyyat al-histīrīyyah," 639.

myths allowed members to take on meaningful roles: an activist could become a defender of society, punisher of wrongs, bringer of light, maquisard, or mujāhid (just as participants in the colonial myth had been pioneers, explorers, and missionaries of modern civilization). Such roles were individually and organizationally important, providing multiple benefits to club members—including a location or place in the world, a sense of significance, and a schema for making sense of life. But while organizations certainly had their guiding myths and roles, the use of such epistemological, narratological, and/or ideological filters was hardly unique to activist clubs.

There was another consideration to how narratives (or "fantasies" as Wilāyah phrased it) contributed to activist behavior. In a study of Coptic activism in Egypt, Sana Hasan argued that "the function of myths is not just to interpret the past in a way that strengthens group solidarity but to alter behavior. In other words, myths lead to action."[44] Similarly, Christoph Kalter noted that through the French Resistance myth, the "New Left" in France tried to "create a mobilization for its policy" in the 1960s and 1970s.[45] And Michel de Certeau argued that the story "opens a legitimate theater for practical actions. It creates a field that authorizes dangerous and contingent social actions."[46]

This study expanded on such observations, by pinpointing *how* myths promoted mobilization and encouraged individuals to cross the sympathy-action gap. And one way that activists mobilized men was through action scripts and temporal scripts. Action scripts laid out behavioral paths, while divisions of time helped create change by

[44] S.S. Hasan, *Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 61.

[45] Christoph Kalter, *The Discovery of the Third World: Decolonization and the Rise of the New Left in France, c. 1950-1976*, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 136, 166.

[46] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 125–127.

interrupting habits, emplotting life around mythologized grand ruptures (like February 1942 and the 1945 Sétif and Guelma massacres), then encouraging individuals to live and model these ruptures. Thus, if the morality tale described moral crisis, activists performed crisis by reciting injustice, modeling shock and disgust, and convincing others that there was in fact *crisis* (not just life-as-usual).

The degree to which these historical disjuncts and crises actually existed varied, however. Fanon and the FLN, for instance, argued that the collapse of the colonial system was "the collapse of an entire moral and material universe"[47]—but as we have seen, the FLN's program was in fact a blend of many moral universes. Similarly, while the Brotherhood argued their program was an authentic return to 7th century Islamic values, and while Nāṣir claimed the 1952 "revolution" represented an upending of the monarchial system of privileges, these claims were not entirely true. All of these movements responded to local markets and diverse competitors by creatively synthesizing multiple systems, ideological products, and value sets.

A final way that morality tales moved men was through the use of roles. Roles offered guidelines for how to act, and predictions about what behavior to expect from others. As individuals like Zohra Drif and Noël Favrelière demonstrated, roles also guided theory of mind constructs ("mentalizing") about the intentions and desires of oneself and others (answering "who am I/what do I want" and "who are they/what do they want"). And when individuals made decisions about what to do based on these mentalizations, role-taking and role-playing became productive process that contributed to the active reconstruction of oneself and one's world. In this way, heroic "fantasies"

[47] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth,* trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 6–7.

could reshape reality in small but significant ways.[48] PCA activist Anna Gréki was thus not far from the truth when she wrote in 1952: "I order objects by virtue of a word / I see, I say, and the future will be what I command."[49]

The Transnational Afterlives of Myths and Morality Tales

In posterity, the efforts of anti-colonial activist clubs produced ambiguous results. The Muslim Brotherhood and Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad hoped to make sure their version of Islamic norms and Islamic identities prevailed in Egyptian society. This strategy leveraged majority affiliations—but it also relegated Egyptian Copts and Jews to a peripheral place in the social hierarchy. The marginalization of Egyptian Jews was only deepened by interclub competition between the Ikhwān, Young Egypt, and communist clubs, events like the 1936 Revolt and 1948 War in Palestine, and British anti-communist propaganda. Egyptian Jewish communists thus struggled against strong rhetoric that placed them outside a tightening circle of Egyptian identity. And in participating in the exclusion of Egyptian Jews from the communist movement in the name of self-preservation, communist clubs like Workers' Vanguard contributed to the constriction of Egyptian identity.

But it was not under the Ikhwān, Young Egypt, or the Workers' Vanguard that the largest constriction occurred—it was under the Free Officers regime and the Presidency of Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir. The 1956 invasion of Suez by Britain, Israel, and France, the

[48] Jean Addington and Mariapaola Barbato, "Social Cognition in Those at High Risk for Psychosis," in *Social Neuroscience: Brain, Mind, and Society*, eds. Russell K. Schutt et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 192–194; Amanda R. Burkholder et al., "Intergroup Relationships, Context, and Prejudice in Childhood," in *Handbook of Children and Prejudice*, eds. Hiram E. Fitzgerald et al. (Cham: Springer, 2019), 123.

[49] Untitled poem by Anna Gréki, ca. 1952, in Yvonne Llavador, *La poésie algérienne de langue française et la guerre d'Algérie* (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1980), 86.

anti-Semitic attacks that followed, and Egyptian sequestration of Jewish property led to the flight of Jews from Egypt. And Nāṣir's promotion of pan-Arab identifications, while helping position Egypt as a regional leader, further marginalized Jews by collapsing Arab ethnicity and Egyptianness. (Ironically, in the long-run such policies also made the Egyptian community more homogenous, empowering the religious identity claims of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.)

Starting in November 1952, Nāṣir also worked to mythologize the Free Officers movement as the culmination of the national "revolution." With the decree dissolving Egyptian political parties in January 1953, this concept was expanded into a revolutionary myth. As the myth described, Egypt was being brought from darkness to light, from slavery to freedom, and from humiliation to dignity.[50] And in the first year after the coup, this revolutionary myth included "men of religion"—but not communist activists. Despite the fact that two DMNL members were in the leadership of the Free Officers (and the DMNL had supplied the materials for printing the Officer's tracts), after coming to power the Officers began arresting DMNL and ECP members, in order to signal to the British and the Americans that the military junta was fully in control of the state, and not in the Soviet camp.[51]

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[50] "Kalimat al-bikbāshī Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir fī jāmiʿat Fuʾād al-awwal bi-munāsabat yawm al-shuhadāʾ," Cairo, 15 November 1952, Bibliotheca Alexandrina and the Gamal Abdel Nasser Foundation Archive: http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=2; "Kalimat al-bikbāshī Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir fī hayʾat al-taḥrīr fī Shibīn al-Kum Munūfīyyah," 23 February 1953, Bibliotheca Alexandrina and the Gamal Abdel Nasser Foundation Archive: http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=4; "Taṣrīḥ al-bikbāshī Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir ilá mudīr wakālat anbāʾ Miṣr bi-l-Qāhirah," 1 March 1953, Bibliotheca Alexandrina and the Gamal Abdel Nasser Foundation Archive: http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=7; Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 77–81.

[51] Malika Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31, no. 3 (August 1999): 371–399; Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution*, 94–108.

To maintain power, the Officers also did what so many Egyptian governments before them had done: they coopted the Brotherhood, by pardoning Brothers still in jail for their involvement in the Amīn ʿUthmān, Judge Aḥmad al-Khāzindār, and Nuqrāshī murder cases. The Officers also went a step further, and distributed seats in the cabinet and on the constitutional council to Ikhwān leaders. Like the monarchy before it, the new regime thus relied on clientelism to keep religious leaders and clubs in line.[52]

This honeymoon did not last long. Once the new regime had been consolidated, the Officers dissolved the Brotherhood in January 1954 and arrested some 450 of its leaders. Ever pragmatic, the Egyptian Communist Party made multiple overtures to the Brotherhood to form an Islamist-Communist front against Nāṣir's "fascist dictatorship," but the attempts never met with success. Instead, police surveillance and successive crackdowns drove communists and Brotherhood members either underground or into exile (with Saudi Arabia offering asylum to Brotherhood members).[53]

Nāṣir would also look to export the Free Officer's revolutionary myth, supporting Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian nationalists in exile in Cairo. The developing myth emphasized pan-Arabism, and positioned Egypt as the leader of the "rising forces of nationalism" in the Middle East, in opposition to "reactionary" monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan. It disseminated this myth over the Voice of the Arabs (est. 1953), with Saudi Arabia launching its own station, Radio Mecca, soon after.[54]

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 88–127, 140–141; Jakob Skovgaard-Peterson, *Defining Islam for the Nation* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 182.

[54] Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 76.

Nāṣir also expanded the third way doctrines that the Brotherhood and other clubs had worked to promote. As Nāṣir argued, Egypt's Islam represented a middle way between the atheistic communism of Iraq and the false Islam of "corruption, reaction, exploitation, and tyranny," of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen. Egypt, Nāṣir declared, supported an Islam "against social tyranny, against exploitation," for "[t]he Islamic religion was the first revolution which established the principles of socialism."[55] In a 1962 speech, he further justified the regime's economic policies by declaring that socialism is "the law of God… [and] the nation that Muhammad established was the first socialist nation. He was the first to implement the policy of nationalization." And a 1964 speech he added that "our religion is a socialist religion," arguing that Islam in the Middle Ages had fulfilled the first socialist experiment in the world."[56]

Overall, the 1952 coup and the Nāṣir presidency would therefore have an ambivalent legacy. The regime continued monarchial policies of religious clientelism and returned to al-Azhar its monopoly on public religion by suppressing the Brotherhood. But in doing so, Nāṣir tied the regime's version of social Islam to state authoritarianism, and expanded the diaspora of Ikhwānid border-crossers. The one-party state similarly brought an imposed peace to Egyptian political life, but at the cost of violently suppressing extra-parliamentary groups and empowering Islamist critiques of "secular" politics. And

[55] P.J. Vatikiotis, "Islam and the Foreign Policy of Egypt (1965)," in *Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 32–34, 38; Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Cause the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 33–35, 185, 255–257.

[56] Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, *Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 366–369.

finally, pan-Arabism positioned Egypt as a regional leader, but narrowed concepts of Egyptian identity.[57]

The FLN's entrance into the halls of government would similarly have an ambivalent legacy. Similar to how the postwar PCF had tried to anchor its political legitimacy in the myth of the heroic maquisard and the "75,000 shot," the FLN established its regime on the heroic *mujāhid* and "1,500,000 martyrs" killed by France. Like Nāṣir, the FLN government also looked to export its myth, becoming a supporter of revolutionary movements abroad. Fataḥ (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement), for instance, would partner with the new government for training and material aid, and Che Guevara and Eldridge Cleaver would pay visits to Algiers, a growing revolutionary hub.[58]

These groups would directly be influenced by Algerian mythmaking—but as this study has suggested, while transnational contacts existed and were important in the exchange of ideas, *direct contact was not necessary for the exchange of information*. Neither was a shared language a precondition. Instead, social learning meant that activists and authors could and did commandeer foreign behavioral examples to justify their actions (as the FLN's use of the Vietnamese example indicated). In this process, proximity, language, and similarity were good predictors of which examples activists considered the most salient (Algerians, for instance, most frequently cited the Tunisian, Moroccan, and Egyptian cases).

The FLN's revolutionary myth would also become its own source of cultural capital, which Algerians would appropriate and reinvent as time went along. In an article entitled

[57] Malika Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31, no. 3 (August 1999): 371–399.

[58] See Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

"Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria," for instance, James McDougall traces how the Islamic Salvation Front/FIS in the 1990s justified its violent politics with both appeals to the Islamic past (the coming of the *mahdi* and the "Islamic state") and appropriations of the FLN's War of Independence myth. As the FIS argued, their assassinations of political functionaries, intellectuals, and police officers were "patriotic" and "just like in the war of independence." As McDougall concludes, the FIS thus did not just represent "the instinctive reiteration of culturally entrenched patterns of political behavior"—rather, such discourses and practices constituted "a continuous, deliberate reinvention, and struggle for the appropriation, of the strongly valorized and widely diffused inheritance of the war of independence… in a situation of political implosion where the symbolic order has been fragmented, and where symbolic goods are up for repossession."[59] The cycle of creative reinventions thus continued.

Finally, the myth the suitcase carriers had forged through the Jeanson trial and publications like *Vérités Pour* and *Partisans* also expanded following the end of the war. In August 1952, demographer Alfred Sauvy had warned about the "third world" as a possible threat to peace. As Sauvy wrote, "the pressure is constantly rising in the human boiler"—as proven by the 1952 Egyptian coup and Tunisian independence movement. This "Third World, ignored, exploited, despised like the Third Estate" which had revolted during the French Revolution, would produce the "catastrophes of tomorrow."[60]

But with the FLN's advances in Algeria and Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution in Cuba, French activists reinterpreted Sauvy's concept of a revolutionary "Third Estate" into a

[59] James McDougall, "Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s-1990s," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 128.
[60] Alfred Sauvy, "Trois mondes, une planète," *L'Observateur* 118, 14 August 1952, 14.

myth of Third World revolution. In 1961, the journal *Partisans* printed its first issue with a picture of Cuban revolutionaries on the cover. The issue argued the Algerian war had permanently changed French politics, by giving the "Algerian generation" a new political consciousness and rising awareness "of the contribution of the third world to the Socialist Revolution." As the article declared, the war had reminded French communists of the "revolutionary meaning of violence in the liberation struggle of a colonized people," and impressed upon a certain vanguard of the need for underground "partisan" action. The following year, Curiel network member Victor Leduc published *La coexistence pacifique*, which further argued that the anti-colonial struggle should be "at the heart… of our revolutionary struggle," and French activists should extend material support to Third World revolutionary movements.[61]

It was the start of a sea change. While the Algerian revolution had struck too close to home, French communists could support revolutions in Latin America, Asia, and Africa with fewer reservations about the use of violence—and the suitcase carriers with their clandestine networks, publishing skills, and criminal experience were well-placed to lead the charge. Suitcase carriers including Henri Curiel, Didar Fawzy-Rossano, Joseph Hazan, Victor Leduc, and Jehan de Wangen thus threw their energies into internationalism and the support of third-world revolutionaries around the globe, transforming *Vérités Pour* into *Vérités Anticolonialiste* (est. 1961) and founding the Mouvement Anticolonialiste Français (est. 1960) and Solidarité (est. 1962). Throughout the 1960s, this *tiers-mondiste* movement would grow, attracting French activists who

[61] "A propos de la génération algérienne," *Partisans* 1, September–October 1961, 146–147 (concurrently printed as "La génération algérienne," *Vérité Liberté* 12, October 1961, 5); "Coexistence pacifique et peuples coloniaux," *Vérité Liberté* 18–19, April–May 1962, 7.

looked to "the 'third world' as the motor for world-wide revolution." Notably, the movement's driving myth would incorporate familiar refrains: the French Revolution, the International Brigades, and the French Resistance.[62]

In the end, the "partisans" (communist maquisards of the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans/FTP during World War II) would thus take their place alongside maquisards and guerrillas as the violent role models for European activists of the 1960s and 1970s. And the work suitcase carriers had dedicated to developing the French Resistance myth was transformed into the bedrock for the Third World revolutionary myth—a myth leaders like Nāṣir, Ben Bella, and Castro endorsed, as it positioned them as revolutionaries and "disguised the deep differences that divided these societies from one another."[63]

The myths developed by the FLN and French suitcase carriers would have another lasting effect: they contributed the gradual and contested collapse of France's colonial myth—the beautiful *image d'Épinal* in which the French state had championed its *mission civilisatrice*, claimed guardianship over Algerians, and performed their own hero roles. In an article aptly entitled "Game Over," for instance, activist and soldier Jean-Philippe Talbo-Bernigaud pronounced the death of this myth. The article, which appeared in the first issue of *Partisans*, drew attention to the ways the Algerian War had shattered the French colonial myth. Then, Talbo-Bernigaud described in stark terms the process of demythologization. As he wrote, since the French had been unwilling to admit the facts of what was happening in Algeria, "we for six years wage a colonial war that we try to

[62] Eleanor Davey, *Idealism beyond Borders: The French Revolutionary Left and the Rise of Humanitarianism, 1954–1988* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015), 2, 64, 71–75.

[63] Arif Dirlik, "Spectres of the Third World: Global Modernity and the End of the Three Worlds," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004): 136.

conceal under pretty fables: 'pacification,' 'defense of the free world,' 'integration of souls,' 'internal affair,' 'last quarter of an hour.' …[But] There comes a time when the flight reflex that drives the leap [deeper] into the lie no longer provides escape from the real and fundamental contradictions, particularly when it is obviously clear that the enterprise is no longer covering the costs." The result was "the fall of Icarus… the collapse of a presumptuous system of values."[64] The enterprise no longer covering the costs, the colonial myth—that truth, not all of which was true, and that lie where not everything was a lie—had gone bankrupt.

Historiographical Interventions: A Critical Look at Myths, Past and Present

In comparatively examining the moral imaginaries of Egyptian and Algerian activists, and in juxtaposing groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt, and the EMNL, this study has problematized three trends: the search for motives and profiling of activists, the historical imagining of movements as "rising" or "awakening," and the reification of Islam in the study of Middle Eastern protest politics. Regarding this last historiographical habit, for instance, this study has tried to decenter Islam in the study of Arab moral imaginaries, as topics such as "Muslim revolt" and "Why Muslims Rebel"[65] silence Jewish, Christian, Marxist, and progressive Arab activists, and obfuscates the exchanges and interactions between them. And while studies of "Islamic activism"[66] can

[64] Jean-Philippe Talbo-Bernigaud, "Fin de partie," *Partisans* 1, September–October 1961, 145.

[65] See for instance: Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Roger Hardy, *The Muslim Revolt: A Journey Through Political Islam* (London: Hurst, 2010); Ferran Izquierdo Brichs, John Etherington, Laura Feliu, eds. *Political Islam in a Time of Revolt* (Cham: Springer International, 2017).

[66] Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

be valuable, focusing exclusively on Islamic protest is unhelpful, as it frames modern Middle Eastern history as a problem, where the central question to be explained is the "rise of Islamism."

The periodization embedded in these studies has also been problematic for the field as a whole. Focusing on "Islamic activism" emphasizes three eras: Muslim Brotherhood activism of the 1930s, the "Islamic Awakening" of the 1970s, and contemporary Islamist organizations (i.e., FIS, al-Qaeda, and ISIS). But organizing history in this way overlooks the evolution of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, and leaves the 1940s–1960s as a silent period in the study of morality and protest politics. And because this silent period encompasses the era of decolonization, the "Rise of Islamism" framework has left scholars struggling to explain the moral content of anti-colonial movements (except by recourse to debating how much Islamic theology and Muslim identity informed Arab nationalism).

This study has thus demonstrated that reducing moral production to the question of "religion and state" is a grave error. Religious values were major inspirations for the anti-colonial movements studied, and religious spaces were important sites of moral production (and competition). But it is unhelpful to reify Islam as the sole basis of the Arab moral imaginary, especially in the modern period. Focusing on Islam misses the rich hybridity of Arab moral production, as well as a world of shared moral discourses and moral rationalization strategies held in common between Muslims, Copts, Jews, and atheists. Focusing on religion also obfuscates the many sites of moral production (e.g., churches, mosques, homes, schools, political institutions, worksites, marketplaces, and activist clubs), and ignores negotiations within and between these sites.

Reifying the religious field further silences religious-secular exchanges, and the important ways secular clubs competed in religious spaces and participated in debates over religious norms. French Catholics learned from and adapted Marxist ideas, the encounter with communism greatly influenced the doctrinal positions of the Muslim Brotherhood, and competition with the Muslim Brotherhood affected the shape of Egyptian communism. There was thus a rich world of behavioral interaction and exchange across confessional, ethnic, and geographic lines, as activists shared stories, learned behaviors, and adapted rationalization strategies from one another.

This study has also revealed the many similarities between movements in their use of religious canons. Among Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists alike, the use of scriptures and religious traditions was often selective, eisegetic, and prone to proof-texting as a persuasive practice. Young Egypt, the FLN, and the French military were most guilty of this; social Catholics and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, although not immune from the practice, made more effort to consider the context of their respective scriptural traditions.

The history of Egyptian, Algerian, and French anti-colonial debates also suggests that learned religious tenets and other corpora of social mores (such as legal codes, morality tales, and proverbs) served an ambivalent role in decision-making. This was visible in debates about the permissibility of violence: both sides in Egyptian courtroom debates, for instance appealed to religious values (and rearranged these into value hierarchies), and both sides appealed to religious scripture and stories (with all their scripts and roles). Religious and cultural canons were flexible enough to support these multi-vocal readings—in fact, this vagueness was part of what preserved human agency within

systems of religious practice. Ambiguity also allowed texts to be adaptive in changing circumstances (such that in 1942, writers like Zakī Mubārak could use 7th century traditions to suggest that final exams were a form of *jihād*).[67]

Religion could also be creatively engaged to alter cost-benefit assessments, promising divine reward to the faithful and punishment to the perverse. However, religious attempts to alter cost-benefit assessments should not be overstated, since as we have seen, a) moral rationalizations could similarly help rewrite cost-benefit assessments, and b) both sides of an issue inevitably tried to use threats of divine punishment and promises of divine reward to influence decision-making. Such was the case in the Nuqrāshī assassination trial, in which the Egyptian government suggested the assassin would receive divine punishment, and the assassin remained convinced of his waiting reward.

Another historiographical habit this study problematized was the use of terms like "awakening" and "rise" to discuss protest movements. Admittedly, this terminology is inherited from the sources: the opponents of activist movements used terms like "rise" and "awakening" to warn against lurking threats and dormant powers. Moreover, activists themselves used concepts like the "rise of Islam" or the "rise of Algerian nationalism" to assert the natural, inevitable, and irresistible nature of their movements. Many activists also *experienced* these movements as sudden, natural, and inevitable—either because activists were performing biographical reconstructions, or because they had undergone attentional shifts (suddenly paying attention to information they had previously ignored).

Even so, such language is misleading. By describing the thing rising (be it Islam, nationalism, the proletariat, communism, etc.) as an impersonal force, such language

[67] Zakī Mubārak, "al-Ḥadīth dhū shujūn," *Majallat al-Risālah* 467, 15 June 1942, 616–618.

denies human agency. Discussions about the "rise of Islam" or "the rise of the New Left" also obfuscate the tremendous amount of planning, training, and performance poured into anti-colonial movements. To rally followings, activists had to make Ikhwānid Islamism seem the only legitimate form of Islamic piety, Algerian independence the only possible policy outcome, and aiding the FLN the most reasonable form of protest to French military atrocities. Thus, activist movements did not "rise" so much as they were constructed, brick by brick, from available resources, just as ideological "-isms" (Islamism, communism, and Arab nationalism) were carefully and painstakingly crafted, revised, and marketed to specific demographics.

This strikes at a larger point: metaphors about "rising" movements and "revolutionary waves" must be interrogated, along with emotional and moral metaphors. Metaphors helped conceptualize and concretize experience, by linking abstract concepts to concrete objects and physiological responses.[68] Metaphors also contained important information about how actors constructed their world. Egyptian, Algerian, and French activists alike, for instance, described love, anger, and activism as burning "fires"—a consuming and powerful force that was both dangerous (when uncontrolled) and splendid to behold. But while metaphors were useful, they also imported hazardous assumptions, and were particularly powerful because they operated implicitly. Thus, when activists and politicians claim that choices and emotional responses are "obvious," "natural," and "inevitable," it bears remembering that these are often the most important decisions to interrogate.

[68] Paul Ricœur, "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling," *Critical Inquiry* 5, no. 1, (Autumn, 1978): 159.

Conclusion: In Search of "Tomorrows that Sing"

In certain respects, readers might feel this study has slaughtered not one "sacred cow" but all of them at once, in asserting that social movements were sustained in part by certain social strategies and payouts. However, my purpose in making this argument has not been iconoclastic. Instead, this study has sought to peer beyond the veil of myth and sacrality that so often surrounds "the cause," to explore how social movements operate. And based on this study, one must conclude that slaughtering all sacred cows is neither possible nor advisable: myths, morality tales, and other types of "moral talk" are important in social life.

However, it may be important to put "a bit of water in one's wine" (to borrow Anne Beaumanoir's phrase). Being able to recognize when our own "moral immune systems" are operating (with disgust, pride, shame, and anger responses)—and how other actors attempt to engage these systems through affective cuing—is an important skill to hone. Learning to identify moral discourses will also help us interrogate scholarly expressions of moral valuation, and recognize how we as scholars and students participate in the negotiation of norms. For instance, terms like "violent," "radical," and "fanatical" constitute important moral discourses, being linked to processes of norm creation, boundary policing, and social exclusion. Such discourses are also tied up in power relations and guardianship claims, and provide a sense of communal distinction (rhetorically separating "us" from "them"). By describing things as "radical," "violent," and "fanatical," we thus distinguish acceptable protest, legitimate aggression, and reasonable forms of religious behavior from practices deemed transgressive, deviant, and problematic.

Moreover, because such conversations serve important social functions, no study can close the book on "radicalism" as behavior "beyond the acceptable limits." Nor can "radical" behaviors ever be fully banished from society—because testing and debating boundaries is a normal part of social ecosystems (even if the process is often contested, and in some cases, violent). But while such practices are "normal," they must still be interrogated, to understand how and why groups come to define certain behaviors as radical—and how activists challenge and negotiate these norms. (After all, there were many failed, counterhegemonic concepts of radicalism that never caught on, such as Shabāb Sayyidinā Muḥammad's attempt to classify cinemas and universities as radical spaces).

There are a few conclusions we can make about anti-colonial activism at the end of empire, however. To start, a great irony was that the same social technologies that enabled heroic sacrifice for a cause could also enable wartime atrocities. It was the same cognitive and behavioral toolkit—divisions of labor and kinship structures, emotional cues and heuristics, escalation of commitment, habituation, strategies of purity and disease prevention, reciprocity norms and violence authorizing roles—that enabled both the preservation of society and the destruction of life.

In observing such behaviors, many contemporary observers tried to sort out whether activists were emotional or rational, idealistic "true believers" or interest-driven opportunists. But such categories crumbled upon closer investigation. Emotions were an important part of cognition, neither fully rational nor fully irrational. Similarly, ideologies were often closely linked to interest (it was unlikely a minority Jew would support an ideology grounded in the religious hegemony of the Muslim majority, just as a Muslim

was less likely to support an ideology based on French reading curricula taught in schools he could not afford). In other words, reason and passion, ideology and interest, selfishness and selflessness lifted the banner of the cause hand-in-hand.

I would end with a final "moral" or two for this story (since historians are so often themselves "tellers of morality tales"). First, whereas Anne Beaumanoir noted that young activists were prone to "hope and then leap," I am reminded of the proverb "look before you leap"—because in the original English adage, the proverbial "leap" was not a leap off a cliff, but a leap into flowers. The 19th century maxim used a naturalistic moral metaphor to encourage readers to look for hidden dangers, even in seemingly beautiful endeavors: as the proverb went, "look before you leap, for snakes among sweet flowers do creep."[69] Second, while a French proverb encouraged readers to "think before acting,"[70] I would add that it is nevertheless important to also consider *how* we think—because limitations on information, cognitive capacity, time, and energy mean we often fall back on emotional cues, heuristics, roles, scripts, authority figures, and social mirroring; and these mental shortcuts are easily manipulated. For as an Arabic proverb warned (predicting the effects of cognitive overload, cortisol, and blood sugar on cognition), "don't ask advice from the busy, hungry, afraid, and overwhelmed."

Finally, when analyzing patterns of social activism, it is important to remember Didar Fawzy-Rossano's comment that "militants are not machines."[71] Activism was personal and relational. For instance, after meeting some of the arrested FLN leaders in La Santé,

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[69] See: William Carew Hazlitt, *English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases, 2nd ed.* (London: Reeves and Turner, 1882), 279.

[70] "Réfléchir avant d'agir." G. Bruno [Augustine Fouillée], *Francinet, livre de lecture courante: principes élémentaires de morale et d'instruction civique, d'économie politique, de droit usuel, d'agriculture, d'hygiène et de sciences usuelles* (Paris: Belin Frères, 1891), 44.

[71] Didar Fawzy-Rossano, *Mémoires d'une militante communiste*, 19.

André Mandouze recorded in his prison journal "In this smile of [Mohamed] Boudiaf, this re-acquaintance with [Mostefa] Lacheraf, the handshake of [Hocine] Aït Ahmed… in these thank-you's I have found Algeria, the real one… *who has always been for me a person*."[72] Similarly, while on the run from French security forces, CDL militant Abdelkader Guerroudj expressed surprise when he saw a priest sitting behind the wheel of the car that had arrived to smuggle him to safety. Guerroudj asked the priest "You've agreed to take me in your car... I am surprised a priest does this for a communist! I'm wanted, and if I'm arrested, I will be condemned to death. And you… you'll go to prison. You would do this for a communist?" The priest (Alfred Bérenguer) said he replied: "*I'm doing it for a man.* You were in need, that's good enough for me."[73]

In relating activist stories, I tried to capture this very human side of activist commitments—including both the negative and positive affects that made individuals willing to put their lives on the line for an ideal, a friendship, or a group. That said, while I faithfully tried to convey some of the affective weight of decisions, activist testimonies can only capture fragments of emotional experiences. It is difficult, if not impossible, to recapture in writing the full affective force of attachment, which comprehensively engages cognitive, chemical, and physiological processes in the body. One can describe in so many words, for instance, the embrace of a mother, the tears of a father, the chills of a song sung in unison, the exhausted smile of a brother-in-arms before a battle. But these only transmit a hint, a seed of what that event might have meant to the individual.

[72] Entry for 21 November 1956, "Solitude pour l'Algérie: Journal de cellule," Maison d'arrêt de la Santé (Paris), in André Mandouze, *Un chrétien dans son siècle*, 199.
[73] Alfred Bérenguer, *En toute liberté*, 168.

I therefore tried to let activists "speak for themselves" concerning the emotions they experienced and how they navigated these experiences. And as most activists described, their experiences were ones of warmth and camaraderie; they found a role, a purpose, and a voice in a world of noise, but above all, they joined a new family or a new community. For as an activist in *Jeune Résistance* explained, they had decided "to lucidly perform one of the gravest acts a man can commit… risking death *to recover this community as we wanted it to be*."[74]

Without exception, their detractors saw their behavior as anti-social and transgressive, radical and emotional. But activists themselves emphasized pro-social motives: defending the community from threat, group loyalty and attachment, high-cost signaling, and altruistic punishment. Without exception, their detractors saw them as destroyers, tearing apart the established social order. But activists saw themselves as creators—although many admitted the act of creating a new world meant destroying the old one. The morality tales they constructed supported this worldview: passion plays where heroic young men and women restored covenants or fought the forces of darkness to usher in a new dawn. And rather than seeing themselves as fanatics, they saw themselves as soldiers: as one Algerian communist declared, "The ones you call assassins are the best soldiers of the tomorrows who sing."[75]

Even so, the morality of such behaviors was inherently ambiguous. Reshaping community, changing norms, and mobilizing men often involved boundary-crossing, destruction, and coercion. Albert Camus captured some of this tension underlying the

[74] Emphasis added. Reply to Françoise Giroud's letter in *l'Expres*s of 10 March 1960, in *Jeune Résistance, Cahier No. 3: Réponses à divers hommes de gauche* (1960), 2.
[75] *Liberté* 33, 25 July 1960, 2 in SHD GR 3092 bis.

rebel's commitment two decades after the end of the Algerian conflict, when he revisited the story of *Antigone*. And surveying that favorite morality tale of rebels and revolutionaries, he ultimately drew his own moral from the tale: "Antigone is right—Creon is not wrong."[76]

[76] Albert Camus, "Conférence d'Athènes sur l'avenir de la tragédie," in *Essais* (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1981), 1705.

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