#### ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:	A MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP SCHISMS	
	Michelle Dugas, Doctor of Philosophy, 2017	
Dissertation directed by:	Distinguished University Professor, Arie W. Kruglanski, Department of Psychology	

Splinter groups are frequently recognized to be more violent and extreme in ideology than their parent groups, suggesting a need to understand how such schisms arise. Despite their practical significance, however, group schisms are relatively neglected as a topic of interest in social psychological research. Drawing from the literatures of motivation and group processes, the present research sought to further social psychological perspectives on group schisms with an emphasis on explaining the phenomenon of extreme splinter groups. A motivational model of group schisms exploring the roles of goal commitment, group commitment, and expectancy beliefs was developed and tested across six studies using varied designs and samples. Pilot Studies 1-3 supported the central tenet that commitment to a focal goal is associated with increased support for a schism from a moderate group to join an extreme splinter group. Studies 1-3 extended these findings by exploring the effects of social identity and expectancy beliefs. Study 1 found that commitment to a focal goal increased the desire to split from a group to pursue more extreme means to a goal, but social

identification with the parent group worked independently to reduce desire for a schism. Study 2 revealed that the relationship between goal commitment and support for a schism could be attenuated when the parent group was perceived as open to compromise. Finally, Study 3 yielded evidence of a three-way interaction effect of commitment, identification with a parent group, and perceptions of a potential splinter group's efficacy on support for a schism. Implications of these findings for understanding group processes in general and extremist splinter groups in particular are discussed.

#### A MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP SCHISMS

by

Michelle Dugas

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2017

Advisory Committee: Professor Arie W. Kruglanski, Chair Professor Michele J. Gelfand Professor James A. Grand Professor Jeff W. Lucas Professor Rebecca K. Ratner © Copyright by Michelle Dugas 2017

# Acknowledgements

This dissertation culminates what has been an exciting, intensive, and inspiring academic journey. I would like to take this opportunity to reflect on those who have offered invaluable mentorship and support throughout my work on this dissertation and my studies more generally.

I would first like to thank my Chair and primary advisor, Dr. Arie W. Kruglanski. Arie's passion for research (and life) is infectious, and his breadth of knowledge continues to amaze me even after all these years. With his singular mastery of theory construction and innumerable scholarly contributions, I am lucky to have learned from one of the greatest minds in psychology.

I would also like to give special thanks to Dr. Michele J. Gelfand who served as an important advisor throughout my studies, and whose brilliance and tireless energy inspire admiration (and awe) among everyone in the program. Michele's curiosity, drive, and commitment to fostering a cooperative intellectual culture serve as a model I hope to continue in my own career.

It has been a sincere pleasure working with both Drs. Kruglanski and Gelfand, and I am forever grateful for having had the opportunity. I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. Jeff Lucas, Dr. Rebecca Ratner, and Dr. James Grand for having served on my dissertation committee. I profoundly valued the opportunity to exchange ideas with great scholars I would otherwise not have the chance to work with. Their time and service is very much appreciated.

I would also like to acknowledge my fellow graduate students in SDOS who gave me more guidance, support, and encouragement than I could have ever hoped for. Senior students were always quick to offer a helping hand, and I learned as much from them as any formal class. Perhaps more importantly, I have formed enduring bonds of friendship with other students, postdocs, and staff that have been a source of great personal growth. There are too many wonderful memories to count, from karaoke to road trips, but I cherish them all. My experience would not have been the same without all the love and laughter we shared, and I can't wait to see what success the future holds for us all.

Finally, I'd like to thank my family and partner, Jeff, for their love and support. My parents were my first mentors, fueling my intellectual curiosity and shaping my moral compass, and I could not have accomplished this without them. Thanks to everyone for your unfailing understanding when I inevitably needed to work through a weekend or holiday visit. You were all an incredible source of comfort, encouragement, and motivation. Your significance in this journey cannot be overstated and I love you all dearly.

# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	ii
Table of Contents	. iii
List of Tables	. vi
List of Figures	vii
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 What are Group Schisms and Why Study Them?	2
Chapter 2: A Motivational Analysis of Group Schisms	4
2.1 Theoretical Framework	5
2.1.1 Appeal of Splinter Groups	5
2.1.2 Commitment to the Parent Group	10
2.1.3 Summary of Theoretical Framework	14
2.2 Empirical Evidence	16
2.2.1 Goal Commitment and Schism	17
2.2.2 Social Identity and Group Schisms	20
2.2.3 Expectancy Beliefs	23
2.3 The Present Research	27
Chapter 3: Overview of Studies	29
Chapter 4: Pilot Study 1: Personal Commitment and Schism	31
4.1 Overview	31
4.2 Method	31
4.2.1 Participants	31
4.2.2 Procedure	32
4.2.3 Measures	33
4.3 Results	33
4.3.1 Perceptions of Group Means	33
4.3.2 Support for Schism	34
4.4 Discussion	34
Chapter 5: Pilot Study 2: Manipulating Personal Commitment	36
5.1 Overview	36
5.2 Method	36
5.2.1 Participants	36
5.2.2 Procedure	37
5.2.3 Measures	38
5.3 Results	38
5.3.1 Manipulation Check	38
5.3.2 Internal Analysis	39
5.4 Discussion	40
Chapter 6: Pilot Study 3: Manipulating Faction Means	42
6.1 Overview	42
6.2 Method	44
6.2.1 Participants	44
6.2.2 Procedure	44
6.2.3 Measures	45

6.3 Results	. 46
6.3.1 Perceptions of Extremeness	. 46
6.3.2 Mediated Moderation Model	. 46
6.4 Discussion	. 50
Chapter 7: Study 1: Social Identity as a Binding Force	. 52
7.1 Overview	. 52
7.2 Method	. 53
7.2.1 Sample Size Considerations and Participants	. 53
7.2.2 Procedure	. 54
7.2.3 Measures	. 58
7.3 Results	. 59
7.3.1 Manipulation Checks	. 59
7.3.2 Desire to Form a Schism Group	. 63
7.4 Discussion	. 65
Chapter 8: Study 2: The Role of Parent Group Openness	. 68
8.1 Overview	. 68
8.2 Method	. 70
8.2.1 Sample Size Considerations and Participants	. 70
8.2.2 Procedure	. 72
8.2.3 Measures	. 74
8.3 Results	. 76
8.3.1 Manipulation Checks and Means Perceptions	. 76
8.3.2 Support for a Schism	. 78
8.3.3 Voice	. 82
8.4 Discussion	. 84
Chapter 9: Study 3: The Role of Splinter Group Efficacy	. 88
9.1 Overview	. 88
9.2 Method	. 91
9.2.1 Sample Size Considerations and Participants	. 91
9.2.2 Procedure	. 92
9.2.3 Measures	. 93
9.3 Results	. 95
9.3.1 Means Perceptions	. 95
9.3.2 Commitment to Reducing Inequality and Support for a Schism	. 96
Chapter 10: General Discussion	113
10.1 Summary of Findings	113
10.2 Integration with the Literature	113
10.2.1 Focal Goal Commitment	113
10.2.2 Social Identity	115
10.2.3 Expectancy Beliefs	116
10.2.5 Summary of Contributions	119
10.3 Limitations and Future Directions	123
10.3.1 Group Schisms vs. Individual Group Exit	123
10.3.2 A Static Snapshot	123
10.3.3 Clarifying the Role of Goals vs. Means	125
10.3.4 Generalizability to Other Group Types	126

10.4 Conclusion	
Appendices	
Bibliography	

# List of Tables

Table 1. Pilot Study 1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations	
Table 2. Pilot Study 2 Descriptive Statistics by Condition	39
Table 3. Pilot Study 3 Descriptive Statistics by Condition	
Table 4. Study 1 Donation Preferences by Commitment	
Table 5. Study 2 Bivariate Correlations	76
Table 6. Study 2 Descriptive Statistics by Condition	77
Table 7. Study 2 Regression Models Predicting Support for a Schism	79
Table 8. Study 2 Final Model Predicting Support for a Schism	81
Table 9. Study 2 Regression Models Predicting Voice	83
Table 10. Study 3 Bivariate Correlations	
Table 11. Study 3 Regression Models Predicting Support for a Schism	
Table 12. Study 3 Alternative Regression Models Predicting Schism	101
Table 13. Study 3 Schism Model Selection Statistics	105
Table 14. Study 3 Regression Models Predicting Voice	107

# List of Figures

Figure 1. Example of Counterfinality Means Structure	6
Figure 2. Example of Multifinal Means Structure	
Figure 3. Summary of Theoretical Framework	
Figure 4. Pilot Study 3 Interaction Effect	
Figure 5. Pilot Study 3 Mediated Moderation Model	
Figure 6. Study 1 Schism Results by Condition	
Figure 7. Study 2 Hypothesized Three-Way Interaction	
Figure 8. Study 2 Observed Interaction Effect	
Figure 9. Study 3 Hypothesized Three-Way Interaction	
Figure 10. Study 3 Distribution of Support for Clinton and Sanders	
Figure 11. Study 3 Observed Interaction Effect	

## Chapter 1: Introduction

From the saintly and single-minded idealist to the fanatic is often but a step.

-- F.A. Hayek (1944)

Fed up with the Democratic party's platform that encroached on states' liberty to maintain segregation, a majority of southern delegates defected from the Democratic party to form the States' Rights Democratic Party during the 1948 presidential elections. This party would go on to support a third-party ticket for president and issue its own platform that endorsed "home-rule, local self-government, and a minimum interference with individual rights" (Peters & Woolley, 2017). While short-lived, the 1948 Dixiecrat party nonetheless instigated a drastic shift in American politics and exemplifies a fascinating phenomenon that has occurred in political organizations across the world—groups schism.

Considering the costs inherent in leaving an existing group to form a new one, the members of such movements must be highly motivated to achieve their cause; however, much remains to be understood about the motivation of individuals who pursue schisms. It is therefore the aim of the present research to develop a general motivational framework to understand the motivation underlying group schisms, particularly in relation to groups centered around explicit pursuit of some goal or goals, as in opinion-based groups like political organizations and social movements. To this end, I review the importance of understanding group schisms, propose a motivational framework for understanding group schisms with a focus on

understanding splits of extreme factions from moderate groups, and report on six studies that provide initial evidence largely consistent with the outlined framework.

#### 1.1 What are Group Schisms and Why Study Them?

Group schisms occur when several members break from an original group (the parent group) to join another existing group or form their own group (Sani & Reicher, 1998; Hart & Van Vugt, 2006). Schisms occur frequently in real life among a wide variety of groups including religions (Lewis & Lewis, 2009), activist organizations, (Ghaziani & Baldassarri, 2011), and ethno-nationalist groups (Asal, Brown, & Dalton, 2012; Jenne, Saideman, & Lowe, 2007; Llera, Mata, & Irvin, 1993).

The study of group schisms is important for both practical and theoretical reasons. As group schisms typically involve the exit of multiple group members, they pose the chance of greater consequences for the parent group compared to other forms of individual group exit (Hart & Van Vugt, 2006). In line with this, group schisms are often studied as a precipitating factor of a parent group's decline and eventual end (Perkoski, 2015). With graver consequences than individual group exit, understanding the conditions that precipitate schisms could be of great interest to large organizations.

Particularly relevant to the present research, splinter groups have also been implicated in extremist activity, with some research finding that they tend to be more violent than their parent groups (Dugan & Gibbs, 2009; Cronin, 2006; Mesquite, 2008). If this is indeed the case, an understanding of the psychological processes underlying schisms could help identify situations that could lead to the formation of dangerous splinter groups. With regard to the potential theoretical gains from the study of group schisms, it is perhaps surprising that much of the literature on group schisms has been conducted by researchers outside of the field of psychology. Moreover, a considerable portion of psychological literature on group schisms has come from the perspective of organizational psychology (e.g., Dyck & Starke, 1999; Li & Hambrick, 2005) whereas social psychology has shown less interest in the phenomenon of breakaway groups despite the central role of group processes in the field. The relatively small literature on group schisms in social psychology coupled with their practical implications suggest that furthering social psychological theories of group schisms would offer an important contribution.

## Chapter 2: A Motivational Analysis of Group Schisms

In simple terms, the desire to split from a parent group to form a new group suggests that the appeal of a splinter group outweighed the appeal of the original group. What underlying factors shape the appeal of each group? To answer this question, it is helpful to consider the broader literature on group attachment. Many theories of group attachment and social identity have been offered to understand what attracts and keeps individuals committed to groups, but their common theme is that groups serve as means to the advancement of members' individual or collective goals (Yzerbet & Demoulin, 2010). Functional analyses of group membership suggest that different types of groups often fulfill primarily different types of goals (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995; Johnson et al., 2006), but groups are nonetheless multifinal in the sense that they are instrumental to achieving multiple goals (Riketta, 2008; Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). In line with this, goal fulfillment should be central to understanding schisms in which people leave a parent group to form a new group.

The present research builds on the notion that groups serve various goals, suggesting that conflict often arises from groups' efforts to satisfy the different priorities of their members at the expense of fully committing to any given goal. As a result, I argue that group schisms are often motivated by a desire to more vigorously pursue a particular focal goal, which could account for the observation that splinter groups are typically more extreme than their parent groups. In this sense, schisms can be said to represent a tradeoff between one's commitment to a particular focal group

goal, which shapes the appeal of a potential splinter group, and commitment to the parent group more generally. Below, I elaborate on this framework, drawing from literature of motivation and group processes relevant to my postulations.

#### 2.1 Theoretical Framework

#### 2.1.1 Appeal of Splinter Groups

Balancing Member Priorities. Even when guided by an overarching ideology shared among members, groups are faced with the challenge of managing the different goals and priorities of their constituents. In order to meet this challenge, groups must find means that balance the multiple goals of their members. For example, the Democratic party's 2016 platform outlines many party goals including those related to the economy, the environment, and civil rights (Democratic National Committee, 2016). These varied goals suggests that the party must balance the demands of environmentalists who place greatest importance on halting global warming and the demands of those who prioritize economic justice. With limited resources available and the reality that means to address one issue could harm progress on the other, the party is confronted with the dilemma of trying satisfy everyone. I argue that one strategy groups often adopt to harmonize pursuit of various goals is to pursue means that do not conflict with alternative goals. Goal systems theory, which defines goals as mentally represented cognitive structures associated with their corresponding means as well as with other goals (Kruglanski et al., 2002), provides insight into the types of strategies that can be adopted to deal with such dilemmas.

In goal systemic terms, means that are instrumental to one goal and detrimental to another can be called *counterfinal* (Kruglanski, Chernikova, Babush, Dugas, & Schumpe, 2015). These means are distinct from unifinal means in which a means is instrumental to a focal goal but unrelated to other goals. Continuing the example of environmentalists in the Democratic party, Figure 1 illustrates a basic counterfinal structure in which a potential means to an environmental goal is detrimental to another Democratic party goal of creating jobs. Given that counterfinal means conflict with -alternative goals, why would someone pursue such means?



*Figure 1.* Depiction of a counterfinal relationship in which fracking bans serve the goal of clean energy but are detrimental to a second goal of creating jobs.

Counterfinal means may be attractive because, while being detrimental to an alternative goal, they are often perceived as particularly effective for achieving their focal goal compared to unifinal or multifinal means, in which a means is instrumental to multiple goals (Bélanger et al., 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2015; Schumpe et al., 2017). In essence, counterfinal means offer instrumentality toward a focal goal at the expense of other goals and concerns. In the example from Figure 1, this suggests that fracking bans might be considered particularly useful for the environmental goal of

clean energy though they are perceived as hurtful to job creation. Counterfinal means such as this are expected to be non-normative with relatively few people willing to incur costs to alternative goals in an effort to pursue a focal goal (Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, & Webber, 2017). As a consequence, counterfinal means are generally expected to be perceived as extreme: they require sacrificing progress on a (potentially important) alternative goal and are pursued by few people.

In line with this, I assume that groups will generally avoid counterfinal means to any given goal because they conflict with alternative goals prioritized by some group members. For instance, the Democratic party should be less likely to endorse the implementation of a counterfinal means like a ban on fracking to achieve clean energy goals in an effort to balance the priorities of environmentalists and those who place greater priority on economic concerns. While groups might avoid counterfinal means to accommodate the pursuit of multiple goals, I expect counterfinality to be particularly appealing to individual members highly committed to a focal group goal.

Single-Minded Pursuit of a Focal Goal. Consistent with the notion that personal commitment is associated with preference for counterfinal means, Kruglanski et al. (2017) make the argument that *motivational imbalance*, or the degree to which a given need dominates over others, represents an important determinant of extreme behaviors--behaviors that deviate from a norm. Whereas balance among motivations compels most individuals to pursue means that do not interfere with alternative goals, the single-minded idealist does not experience the same constraints. Indeed, high commitment to a given goal might naturally elicit this

type of imbalance through suppression of alternative goals, a phenomenon called goal shielding (Shah et al., 2002).

Consistent with this, I propose that groups' avoidance of counterfinal means, often elicited in an effort to balance the priorities of various members, leads to the alienation of group members who are highly committed to a particular group goal. Specifically, personal commitment to a focal group goal is expected to increase the desire to split from a moderate parent group to form a splinter group willing to pursue more extreme, counterfinal means to their goal. However, splitting from a parent group is costly in itself, and a new group may face challenges to the successful pursuit of their goal outside of their means choice. In such cases, would an individual highly committed to a particular focal goal still want to form a new group?

**Splinter Group Efficacy**. I argue that individuals are motivated to split from groups to pursue a goal more single-mindedly than is possible in their parent group. However, if goal fulfillment underlies the desire to split from the parent group, alignment in preference for extreme means may not be sufficient to form a new group. That is, broader expectancy beliefs related to the efficacy of the splinter group should also be an important factor in shaping the appeal of a schism. Here, expectancy beliefs can be defined as the perceived or subjective likelihood that a desired outcome can be achieved. Many seminal frameworks of motivation consider expectancy beliefs to be fundamental determinants of motivation (Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, 1985). Indeed, a vast literature has supported the importance of expectancy beliefs in various domains of behavior (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Feather, 1990; Shah & Higgins, 1997) confirming that people will only work towards a goal if

they believe achievement is possible, regardless of how much they want a particular outcome.

The concept of collective efficacy, which refers to perceptions that a group can organize and implement actions that will have an impact on a desired outcome (Van Zomeren, Postemes, & Spears, 2008), is particularly relevant to the question of decisions to splinter from a parent group. While the appeal of counterfinal means is, in part, related to the perception that they are more instrumental to the focal goal (Schumpe et al., 2017), a group's efficacy is determined by a wide range of factors including individual-level and group-level characteristics (Bandura, 2000; Chen & Bliese, 2002; Watson, Chemers, & Preiser, 2001). Accordingly, the present research will explore how perceptions of a potential splinter group's efficacy will shape the motivation to split from a moderate parent group to form a more extreme group. Specifically, I expect the hypothesized relationship between commitment to a focal goal and the desire to form a more extreme schism group will be attenuated when the perceived efficacy of the potential splinter group is low.

**Summary.** In this section, I postulate that two factors are key in determining the appeal of a splinter group: commitment to a focal group goal and perceptions of a splinter group's efficacy. In an effort to balance the priorities of different group members, groups are motivated to avoid the use of counterfinal means, which appeal to individuals highly committed to a focal goal but require sacrificing progress on alternative goals that might be valued by other group members. Attracted to the possibility of pursuing a focal goal by any means necessary, individuals who are highly committed to a particular goal should be drawn to the possibility of splitting

from a moderate parent group, with many concerns, to form a more extreme splinter group. However, a potentially ineffective splinter group would not be particularly helpful in achieving one's desired goals. Therefore, a splinter group should only be appealing when it is also perceived as capable of achieving the focal goal.

Of course, the appeal of a splinter group is only one side of the decision to schism. Equally important are the factors that shape commitment to the parent group, which increase retention of group members. Next, I address this with an overview of the factors I expect to influence commitment to the parent group.

#### 2.1.2 Commitment to the Parent Group

**Groups as Multifinal Means.** I have argued that people are attracted to splitting from a moderate group to form a more extreme splinter group out of a commitment to a particular focal goal. As alluded to earlier, however, groups are typically *multifinal* for members in the sense that groups are means to fulfill multiple goals for any given member (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Even in the context of political and cause-oriented groups, in which particular focal goals are explicitly shared and pursued, research suggests that people are attracted to groups for multiple goals and needs. For instance, in a model describing motivations to participate in social movements, Klandermans (1997) includes social and reward motives as complements to collective goals of movements. Sageman (2004) goes as far as to suggest that social networks are more important than ideology in driving people to extremist groups. Similarly, other theoretical approaches have underscored the roles of the need for significance and meaning in attraction to extremist groups (Kruglanski et al., 2014; Lyons, Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq, & van Egmond, 2015). With this in mind,

a motivational analysis of group schisms should take into account the full constellation of goals fulfilled by group membership. Fulfillment of alternative goals, such as social rewards, likely increase commitment to the parent group and reduce the likelihood of a schism.

**Social Identification and Schism.** Functional approaches to understanding groups point to a comprehensive way of capturing groups' satisfaction of multiple goals, arguing that social identification is an outcome of a group's instrumentality to various goals. For example, the centrality of social identifies to the self has been associated with satisfaction of self-esteem, distinctiveness, and meaning motives (Vignoles et al., 2006). Similarly, other studies have indicated that social identification increases as groups fulfill important individual motivations (Riketta, 2008; Thomas et al., 2017). Together, this research suggests that social identification captures the value of a group as it relates to the fulfillment of a variety of goals. If this is a case, then social identification should be a key indicator of overall commitment to a parent group. That is, members should be more willing to stick with a group to the extent that it fulfills other goals, as there will be a trade-off in the overall value of the group and a group member's commitment to a particular focal group goal.



Figure 2. A depiction of a multifinal cognitive structure in which the Democratic Party serves multiple goals.

Even in the face of disagreement with a group's approach to a particular goal, the other forms of value offered by the group, captured by social identification, might serve to keep members together. Continuing the example offered earlier, Democrats who are highly committed to addressing climate change might disagree with moderate, gradual approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions endorsed by the political party. However, if the Democratic Party serves as a multifinal means that also fulfills goals like belongingness and self-esteem (see Figure 2), some members who are highly committed to addressing climate change might nonetheless strongly identify with the party. Instead of leaving to join a political party willing to pursue more extreme means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, these members might remain Democrats if commitment to the group, a consequence of alternative goal fulfillment, outweighs commitment to the focal goal of addressing climate change. Accordingly, I expect social identification with the parent group to attenuate the effect of focal goal commitment on support for a schism.

The phenomena of goal shielding (Shah et al., 2002) and the centrality of a shared cause in opinion-based groups (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009) suggest that the explicit goals of a political group might hold greater importance in evaluation of these groups than the fulfillment of other types of goals like belongingness and self-esteem. This raises the question of possible boundary conditions on the binding power of social identity.

**Parent Group Openness.** One possible boundary condition lies in expectancy beliefs related to the openness of the parent group. Target openness refers to perceptions about the approachability, interest in input, and fairness of a potential message recipient (Detert & Burris, 2007). In the context of my motivational analysis of group schisms, openness would reflect the expectation that the group can be persuaded to pursue the focal goal with more extreme, counterfinal means. Therefore, social identification with the group might attenuate the relationship between focal goal commitment and schism when parent group openness is high. Under these conditions, individuals highly committed to the focal goal might prefer instead to exercise voice, defined as speaking up to suggest ideas and bring about change to an existing objectionable state (Morrison, 2014) in lieu of splitting from the group. Similar to expectations that splinter group efficacy will be central to shaping the appeal of the splinter group, I expect parent group openness to be an important expectancy belief that serves to increase commitment to the parent group.

Alternative Sources of Commitment. Thus far, I have focused on mainly social identity and parent group openness as sources of group commitment. Of course, there are a multitude of factors that contribute to group attachment and commitment. While I have focused on the positive, rewarding aspects of a group that can increase commitment, individuals may also remain in groups simply because the costs of leaving are too great. Splitting from a group can pose social and economic costs in addition to time and effort. Indeed, some research shows that leaving a religious group is associated with lower well-being than those who remained in a religious group or were never part of a religious group in the first place (Fenelon &

Danielsen, 2016; Scheitle & Adamczyk, 2010). The threat of these losses may keep members from splitting from their groups even if they do not like or identify with their group, presenting an alternative way for groups to keep their members committed.

Concepts like embeddedness and investment (Rusbult & Farrell, 1983; Zhang, Fried, & Griffieth, 2012) help to capture some of the costs associated with leaving a group, and related research suggest that they help keep people tied to organizations. While these concepts are without a doubt relevant to the parent group commitment, and offer a complementary perspective to social identity, the present research focuses on social identity for several reasons. First, social identity is a core concept of social psychological research related to group concepts. As such, it offers an ideal starting point to understand how commitment to the parent group can prevent group schisms. Secondly, social identity has already been studied in the context of group schisms. Given its importance in social psychological research more broadly and its relevance to group schism, I considered it the most important determinant of parent group commitment to explore. In light of these considerations, it should be noted that there are other important factors related to parent group commitment that are unexplored in the present research, but I expect that they would exert a restraining force similar to social identification.

#### 2.1.3 Summary of Theoretical Framework

The concepts introduced in Kruglanski and colleagues' (2012) force field analysis of goal-directed behavior can be used to summarize the proposed theoretical framework for understanding group schisms. In their model, *the driving force* is

derived from the many influences that increase the effort an individual is willing to invest in an activity. In contrast, the *restraining force* is derived from factors that reducing a willingness to invest effort in an activity. Mapping these constructs on to my motivational analysis of group schisms, personal commitment to a focal goal and splinter group efficacy, which increase the appeal of the splinter group, might be considered components of the *driving force* to form a schism. In contrast, social identification and parent group openness are associated with commitment to the parent group, and therefore represent the *restraining force* shaping one's motivation to form a schism (see Figure 3).

In line with this, group schism should be more likely when commitment to a given focal goal and the belief that a splinter group represents an effective means to achieve that goal outweigh the value provided by one's membership to a group (i.e., social identification) and the expectancy that the group can become more committed to pursuing this goal. Next, I review existing empirical evidence relevant to these postulates.



**Driving Force** 

*Figure 3*. Summary of theoretical framework in terms of driving and restraining forces.

### 2.2 Empirical Evidence

In this section, I review existing empirical evidence relevant to my theoretical postulations. First, I review evidence that magnitude of goal commitment is associated with preference for counterfinal means, and argue that this finding can further our understanding of some findings in the group schism literature. Second, I review the literature on social identity as it relates to group exit and group schism. Finally, I highlight discrepancies in findings from the social identity literature and

review evidence related to parent group openness and splinter group efficacy that could help account for these discrepancies.

#### 2.2.1 Goal Commitment and Schism

**Preferences for Counterfinal Means.** One assumption in my model is that goal commitment is associated with a preference for extreme, or counterfinal, means. Evidence consistent with this argument is found in recent literature on self-sacrifice, which involves giving up benefits to the self for a cause. Bélanger, Caouette, Sharvit, and Dugas (2014) reported correlational evidence that goal commitment, harmonious passion, and obsessive passion were all positively associated with self-sacrifice, supporting the argument that personal commitment to a focal goal increases one's willingness to pursue means that are detrimental to other goals. Furthermore, Dugas et al. (2016) found experimental evidence that increasing the need for significance also increased the willingness to self-sacrifice. In other words, individuals reported a willingness to forego other basic needs in order to achieve status in the eyes of others.

Iannacone (1992, 1994) invoked similar reasoning in his investigation into the prominence of religious sects that impose seemingly unproductive costs on members through restrictions on behaviors like diet, alcohol consumption, and premarital sex. Iannacone makes the argument that imposing costs to alternative activities filters out members who would lack commitment to the group and thereby increases rewards of membership for those who take on these costs. In an illustration of the greater commitment of those drawn to restrictive sects, Iannacone (1992) reported that, compared to mainstream church members, sect members attended more services, contributed more money to their religious institution, and chose more of their close

friends from among their congregation. Iannocone's (1992) work suggests that the relationship between personal commitment and preference for extreme means extends beyond self-reported attitudes to patterns of real-world behavior.

**Evidence from Group Subversion.** Indirect evidence of the role of goal commitment in group schisms can be drawn from the work of Sani and colleagues (2002, 2005, 2008) who are responsible for much of the social psychological literature on group schisms. In a summary of this research, Sani (2008) proposes a model in which group schisms are motivated by changes in group norms that produce a sense of *group subversion*, or perceptions that the essence of a group's identity is being changed. Perceptions of subversion are associated with distancing oneself from the group, lowered perceptions of group entitativity, and negative emotions. These processes, in turn, are postulated to lead to greater desire to separate from the group.

What might explain when certain norms are essential to a group's identity? In my model, the norms that form a group's 'essence' might simply be goals that are highly important to members, meaning that they view the goals as a defining purpose of the group and are therefore unwilling to compromise on their pursuit. This can be illustrated in the case of the Alleanza Nazionale (AN), which suffered a schism after the leader of the party went to Israel and condemned fascist ideologies while apologizing for the persecution of Jewish people. Shortly after the formation of this new party was proposed, Sani and Pugliese (2008) distributed questionnaires during local meetings of the AN to test their model of group schisms. As expected, they found results consistent with the notion of group subversion. The denunciation of fascism was associated with decreased perceptions of group entitativity and

identification with the party, in turn leading to greater intentions to form a schism. Reinterpreting these findings in the framework of goal commitment, one could argue that a strong commitment to a 'conservative revolution' (Griffin, 1996), drove a preference for extreme, fascist policies among some members, and finally intentions to split from the AN when it strongly denounced fascism.

Sani and Todman (2002) reported similar evidence that members of the Anglican Church had greater schismatic intentions after women were allowed to be ordained because they viewed the change as subverting the church's identity. This could also be interpreted as consistent with a goal commitment framework. Specifically, some members of the Church might have been so strongly committed to living according to God's Word that they had a preference for traditional means to do so, even if those means (like not ordaining women) were counterfinal to more modern values and beliefs. In turn, these individuals sought to split from the group to join alternative religions that were still highly traditional in their interpretation of God's Word. Interestingly, Sani and Todman (2002) reported that these relationships were especially strong for those who felt like they had no "voice" in the group, something that I will revisit when discussing perceptions of a parent group's openness to influence.

**Summary.** In light of evidence that personal goal commitment is associated with a preference for counterfinal (and hence extreme) means, I propose that this relationship extends to a preference for extreme groups and, therefore, desire to split from a moderate group. Notably, however, many groups have members that share

varying degrees of commitment to their goals. What makes these groups stick together?

#### 2.2.2 Social Identity and Group Schisms

Together, this research is consistent with the argument that groups are typically multifinal for group members, and suggest that that this additional value could play a role in binding groups together in the face of disagreement. Adopting the perspective that social identity captures the value of a group in its fulfillment of a wide range of goals, as evidence suggests (Vignoles et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2017), provides a helpful lens with which to review the social identity literature and draw connections to the motivation to form schisms.

**Group Exit.** Research on the role of social identity in group exit is consistent with the notion that identification works to maintain group cohesion. For example, individuals who strongly identify with a low-status group prefer to remain in their original group when presented with the opportunity to move to a high-status group despite the benefits in being higher status (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). Zdaniuk and Levine (2001) also reported that high identifiers were more likely than low identifiers to stay in a group when doing so only benefited the group, not themselves. Similarly, Van Vugt and Hart (2004) found that social identity encouraged *group loyalty*, or the willingness to stay in a group at a cost to oneself. These findings suggest that group exit is attenuated when the overall value of the group, captured by social identification, exceeds the motivation to achieve other benefits that would require leaving the group.

Within-Group Conflict. Particularly relevant to the proposed research is the literature examining how social identity plays a role in responding to disagreement with one's ingroup. In contrast to Sani and colleagues' work (e.g., Sani & Reicher, 1998; Sani & Pugliese, 2008), which focuses on how intragroup conflict about change can lead to weakened identity, Packer's (2008) normative conflict model focuses on how social identity can moderate responses to conflict with group norms. Packer's model aims to understand when group members will dissent with group norms and does not explicitly address when members will leave a group, but it is helpful in understanding how social identity shapes responses to conflict between personal beliefs and group pursuits.

The normative conflict model argues that highly identified members of a group will deviate from group norms in cases where they think a norm is harmful to the group. In other words, highly identified members will try to change a group from within if they believe that change will improve the group in the long-term. On the other hand, weakly identified members will simply allow the group to continue with its harmful norm, and not voice any concerns.

Packer's (2008) normative conflict model of dissent in groups has received growing empirical support. Packer (2009) found that students who were highly identified with their university publicly expressed concern about the harms of drinking alcohol even if they were led to believe that a majority of students did *not* consider drinking a problem. In contrast, students who were weakly identified were willing to publicly express their private concerns about drinking alcohol only when they believed that a majority of students shared their concern.

While most of the research on the normative conflict model has focused on what motivates highly identified individuals to effect change within a group rather than what motivates individuals to leave a group, Packer and Miners (2012) offers some insight into this more directly. The authors found that highly identified individuals react to normative conflict with dissent whereas weakly identified individuals are more likely to disengage with the group. These findings suggest that weak social identification might play an important role in decisions to disengage from and leave a group, as in the case of a group schism.

**Summary.** Evidence from the group exit and dissent literatures suggest that social identity acts as a powerful force that binds groups together. While social identity might be, in part, tied to successful achievement of explicit group goals, fulfillment of other motives might also enhance group attachment (Klandermans, 1997; Vignoles et al., 2006). This points to the possibility of bolstering identification through fulfillment of alternative goals (e.g., affiliation) as one plausible route to maintaining the cohesion of political groups even in the face of disagreements over how best to achieve their stated goals. However, Sani's (2008) work on group subversion in schisms also points to possible limits on the binding power of social identity. What factors might attenuate the power of social identity to prevent schisms? I propose that expectancies related to the parent group's openness and the splinter group's effectiveness moderate the interaction between personal commitment to a focal goal and social identification on support for a schism.

#### 2.2.3 Expectancy Beliefs

In my review of goal systems and counterfinality, I linked the appeal of counterfinal means to the highly committed as being related to their perceived instrumentality (Kruglanski et al., 2015; Schumpe et al., 2017). Here, I broaden the focus of expectancy beliefs to perceptions of both the parent group and the possible splinter group as important determinants of forming a splinter group. A review of discrepancies in findings of the social identity literature point to two particularly important expectancy-related belief sets: the openness of the parent group to compromise and the efficacy of the potential splinter group.

**Discrepancies in the Social Identity Literature.** The literature I have reviewed in relation to the role of social identity in group schisms presents two possibilities. First, Sani and colleagues' (Sani & Pugliese, 2008; Sani & Todman, 2002) work on subversion suggests that disagreement with an ingroup results in deidentification, and this lower sense of social identity motivates the desire to exit from the group. On the other hand, literature supporting the role of social identification as a "social glue" that maintains group cohesion even in the face of fractures suggests that social identification acts as a moderator. I propose that these discrepancies in the literature might be related to the impact of expectancy beliefs.

A closer look at the evidence reveals important differences in the paradigms used in the literature examining the two roles of social identity in schism and dissent. For example, Sani and Pugliese (2008) conducted their research on the schism of the Alleanza Nazionale after a ceremonial gesture in which fascism was officially denounced, suggesting that the party was decidedly closed to counterarguments on

the issue. Similarly, Sani and Todman (2002) found that the process of group subversion was stronger when Church of England members felt like they did not have a voice in debates about the introduction of women ministers. In contrast to these examples, the paradigms used in Packer (2009) and Packer and Miners (2012) where strong social identification yielded greater engagement and less disengagement in the face of norm conflict involved harmful but informal group norms like binge drinking.

One difference apparent in these paradigms is the extent to which the group could be seen as open to change. Instances of schism studied by Sani and colleagues involved situations in which the parent group was decided on a course of action (Sani & Pugliese, 2008) and opportunities for voice attenuated intentions to split from the group (Sani & Todman, 2002). The informal norms studied in the normative conflict model paradigms (e.g., Packer & Miners, 2012) could be perceived as comparatively more malleable, as binge drinking does not represent college doctrine. The perceived malleability of these norms might explain why highly identified group members who considered the norms harmful would choose dissent over disengagement. More generally, the choice to actively dissent instead of passively accepting the harmful norm suggests that these individuals believe their opinions could have some impact on the group's norms.

A second difference apparent in the group subversion and normative conflict paradigms is the potential effectiveness of a splinter group. The Italian parliamentary context is one in which members from many different parties are elected to hold office and (often unstable) coalitions are needed to govern (Curini, 2010; Verzichelli & Cotta, 2000). Thus, while a new political party might be considered low in efficacy

in other contexts with a smaller number of core parties, the effectiveness of a potential splinter political party might be viewed more favorably in Italy. Similarly, the schism explored in Sani and Todman (2002) largely represented individuals leaving the Anglican Church for already existing religious groups that could successfully meet individuals' religious needs. Finally, the normative conflict literature has largely focused on social category groups (e.g., Packer, 2009; Packer & Miners, 2012), like university affiliation, that would not be conducive to splintering. That is, the context represents one in which there are few viable alternative groups that could be formed or joined.

Given the important differences in how the group subversion and normative conflict models of schism and dissent were tested that yielded different empirical patterns, the present research will explore the role of two types of expectancy beliefs. The moderating role of a parent group's openness to influence and perceptions of a potential splinter group's effectiveness will be tested in conjunction with an individual's goal commitment and identification with the parent group.

**Parent Group Openness.** Organizational psychology has long recognized voice as an important determinant of work outcomes like satisfaction (Bashshur & Oc, 2015; Spencer, 1986), and research on voice might shed light on the factors that contribute to retention of group members. One way in which organizations create a sense of openness is with leaders who solicit and listen to suggestions from lower-level employees (Detert & Burris, 2007; Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2012). Not only can organizations cultivate a climate of openness, and perceptions of a group's climate for voice (i.e., it is safe to speak up and speaking up can effectively change

the group) have been shown to increase individual voice behavior (Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, & Kamdar, 2011). In turn, greater opportunities for employees to have their voice heard has been associated with greater retention (Spencer, 1986). This evidence supports my argument that opportunities to express dissent in a group, and the perception that the group's direction is open to influence, is an important determinant of group cohesion.

In sum, groups differ in their willingness to listen to members and change group norms. Perceptions of this openness have implications for retention of group members, and might explain some of the discrepancies in the literature examining the role of social identity in how people react to disagreements with their groups that was reviewed. Specifically, perceptions that the group is not open to change might prompt even the strongly identified to leave the group if highly committed to a focal goal for which their group is only pursuing moderate means. On the other hand, strongly identified individuals with high focal goal commitment might be more willing to stay in the group if they perceive it as being open to change or compromise.

**Splinter Group Efficacy.** In addition to expectancy beliefs related to the parent group, I expect that perceptions of the potential splinter group's efficacy will be an important determinant of a group schism. Research related to collective action offers evidence consistent with the importance of group's efficacy in motivating group-oriented behavior. Coming from the perspective of collective disadvantage, group efficacy in the collective action literature refers to perceptions that one's group can resolve its grievances through unified effort (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). Consistent with broader frameworks of motivation, perceptions of a
group's efficacy are associated with greater participation in collective action (Hornsey et al., 2006; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012).

I expect perceptions of a potential splinter group's efficacy to play a similarly important role in understanding group schisms. Individuals highly committed to a focal goal might be attracted to extreme means to pursue their goals, but other characteristics of a potential splinter group (e.g., available resources) or other external factors (e.g., the existence of powerful rival groups) could make it difficult for a splinter group to succeed. In such situations of low efficacy, I expect support for a schism to be low among everyone, as splitting the group would do little to improve chances in achieving one's focal goal. Instead, these individuals would likely choose to voice their disagreement within the parent group, in an attempt to change the course of the group. When a splinter group has the potential to be highly effective, however, I expect an interaction effect of personal goal commitment and identification with the parent group. Specifically, I expect commitment to be strongly associated with desire for schism when group members are weakly identified with the parent group. When strongly identified, however, I expect the relationship between commitment and desire for a schism to be somewhat weakened, as these individuals might want to remain in the group for fulfillment of other personal needs.

# 2.3 The Present Research

Heretofore, I have reviewed evidence related to a number of factors expected to increase or decrease the motivation to splinter from a moderate group to form a more extreme group. Drawing from both basic motivational science, like goal

systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2015) and value-expectancy theory (Atkinson, 1964), and theories of group dynamics, including constructive social identity models (Vignoles et al., 2006) and normative conflict theory (Packer, 2009), I have attempted to integrate different literatures and develop a framework for understanding the motivational forces underlying group schisms with a particular focus on explaining how extreme groups break away from more moderate parent groups.

In light of the reviewed evidence, I propose that support for schism from a moderate group is determined by three main factors: personal commitment to a group goal, social identification with the parent group, and expectancy beliefs. Based on postulations from goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2015), high personal commitment to a group goal is expected to increase the appeal of counterfinal, and hence extreme, means and thereby promote greater willingness to split from a moderate group to form an extreme group. Social identification, capturing the value of a group through fulfillment of multiple goals (Vignoles et al., 2006), is expected to attenuate the relationship between commitment to a focal goal and desire to split from a moderate group when the parent group is perceived as open to change or the potential splinter group is perceived as likely to be moderately effective. Correlational and experimental methods were employed to test these predictions in six studies using a mix of hypothetical scenarios and real groups.

# Chapter 3: Overview of Studies

Six studies were conducted to explore the roles of personal goal commitment, social identification with a parent group, and expectancy beliefs in determining support for group schisms. Three pilot studies served as an initial proof of concept using hypothetical scenarios. The scenarios used in the studies varied in context but all incorporated elements of a clear faultline, meaning there were two relatively homogenous subgroups (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). A scenario dividing subgroups along a faultline was used because of the literature supporting faultlines' roles in precipitating group schisms in the face of intragroup conflict (Hart & Van Vugt, 2006). Moreover, a key motivation of the present research is to gain insight into the pattern of breakaway groups being more extreme than their parent groups, and a faultline paradigm allows for a clear distinction between an extreme faction and the more moderate majority. Finally, a scenario with two identifiable groups also provides participants with a specific group they will be forming.

Pilot Study 1 used a correlational method to test the relationship between goal commitment and support for schism from a moderate group. Pilot Study 2 sought to clarify the causal direction of the model by manipulating personal commitment to a focal goal instead of measuring it. Pilot Study 3 sought to test whether this model held when the alternative group is pursuing an extreme means in particular, and not simply a different means from the majority using the context of defeating a terrorist group. Furthermore, Pilot Study 3 explored whether perceptions that an extreme group is more committed to the focal goal than a moderate group mediated the relationship between personal commitment to a goal and support for group schism.

The pilot studies provided initial evidence of a relationship between personal commitment to a goal and did not address the hypothesized roles of social identification and expectancies, which were the focus of Studies 1-3. Study 1 experimentally investigated the interaction between personal commitment and social identification on desire to form a schism in the context of novel but real groups. Study 2 tested the hypothesized three-way interaction of goal commitment, identification with the parent group, and expectations of the parent group's openness to influence in a sample of members of advocacy and volunteer groups. Finally, Study 3 tested the hypothesized model's utility in explaining the desire to split from a real-world political group while exploring the role of perceived effectiveness of a potential splinter group.

# Chapter 4: Pilot Study 1: Personal Commitment and Schism <u>4.1 Overview</u>

Pilot Study 1 sought to test the relationship between personal commitment to a political goal and the desire to split from a moderate group to form an extreme group. A hypothetical context in which a parent group prefers moderate means and a faction within that group prefers extreme means was used. I expected that individuals highly committed to a focal goal, environmentalism in the present study, would be associated with increased support for a schism. Environmentalism was selected as the focal goal because much of the previous research on group schisms has examined right-wing cause like fascism (Sani & Pugliese, 2008) and religion (Sani & Todman, 2002), and this has been raised as a critique of the psychology of group schisms (Sani, 2008). Therefore, I sought to explore a model in relation to a predominantly left-wing political concern (Dunlap, Xiao, McCright, 2001). Moreover, given the criticisms that political orientation could be driving schisms, I sought to test whether commitment to a specific focal goal is associated with support for schism

# <u>4.2 Method</u>

# 4.2.1 Participants

155 participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk and compensated with 20 cents. Twenty participants were excluded for failing either of two attention checks (Oppenheimer, Davis, & Davidenko, 2009) in which participants were asked to recall information from a scenario they read, leaving a final sample of 135 ( $M_{age} = 35.33$ ,  $SD_{age} = 11.30$ ; 48.9% men).

## 4.2.2 Procedure

Participants first completed a measure of their commitment to environmentalism along with filler items assessing their commitment to other issues like gender equality and racial diversity. Next, participants read a scenario that described a large international organization that has existed for many years and is composed of both developed and developing nations. The scenario then described that the majority of the group, including the UK and Sweden, favor methods of climate change reduction that have low anticipated impacts on economies of both developed and developing nations but will produce more gradual changes. In contrast, a second, smaller, faction including representatives from countries like the United States and Denmark, was described as favoring more extreme methods of reducing greenhouse gas emissions that would have low anticipated impacts on developing economies, but higher impact on developed nations as shifts in production methods will be higher in these countries.

After reading about the scenario, participants completed a series of measures relating to each group—the moderate majority and the extreme faction. In particular, they completed measures assessing the extent to which the means endorsed by the majority and the faction were extreme. Participants answered these measures in relation to the moderate majority before answering the same items in relation to the more extreme minority faction. Participants then completed a measure of their

support for a schism before providing information about their demographics, including political orientation, and receiving a debriefing.

#### 4.2.3 Measures

**Personal Commitment.** Personal commitment to environmentalism was measured with two items assessing the extent to which the participant was committed to the goal of protecting the environment and the importance of environmentalism as a cause. These items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*).

**Political Orientation.** Political orientation was measured with a single item asking participants to rate their political orientation on a scale ranging from 1 (*Far Left*) to 7 (*Far Right*).

**Support for Schism.** Support for schism was measured with a single item. Participants were instructed to imagine that they were one of the delegates representing the US and indicate the extent to which they would be supportive of a schism from the international climate change organization. Responses were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*Very Unsupportive*) to 7 (*Very Supportive*).

# 4.3 Results

#### 4.3.1 Perceptions of Group Means

A repeated paired-samples *t*-test was conducted to test whether the majority group described in the scenario was indeed perceived as endorsing more moderate environmental means than the faction. Consistent with expectations, the moderate

parent group was perceived as less extreme (M = 2.70, SD = 1.09) than the faction (M = 4.86, SD = 1.36), t(134) = -17.26, p < .001.

Table 1

*Pilot Study 1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations* (N = 155)

	М	SD	1	2	3	4
1. Personal Commitment	5.12	1.55				
2. Political Orientation	3.21	1.70	27**			
3. Majority Extremity	2.70	1.09	10	.11		
4. Faction Extremity	4.86	1.36	.01	.28**	.31***	
5.Schismatic Intentions	4.28	1.24	.24**	22**	12	05

*Note.* \* p < .05, \*\* p < .001, \*\*\* p < .001.

# 4.3.2 Support for Schism

Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are reported in Table 1. Regression analyses yielded a negative relationship between political orientation and support for schism,  $\beta = -.17$ , t(132) = -2.00, p < .05. That is, the more left-wing an individual's political orientation, the more likely they were to support schism. Most importantly, there was a significant positive relationship between personal commitment to environmentalism and support for schism,  $\beta = .19$ , t(132) = 2.21, p = .03.

# 4.4 Discussion

Results from Pilot Study 1 offer initial support for the notion that schisms are goal-driven endeavors. The greater the personal commitment to a cause, the more an individual was supportive of a schism from a moderate group to an extreme group. In addition, these results shed light on the processes underlying schisms among leftwing causes when much of schism research has focused on right-wing issues. These results were correlational, however, and the next study sought to test my hypothesis with an experimental manipulation of personal commitment.

# Chapter 5: Pilot Study 2: Manipulating Personal Commitment *5.1 Overview*

The main objective of Pilot Study 2 was to test the hypothesis that commitment to a focal goal drives schisms from moderate to more extreme groups in an experimental paradigm to assess causality more clearly. Pilot Study 2 was also designed to address a second limitation of the previous pilot study—the use of an ingroup in the description of the alternative group that was leading the schism. An ingroup was specified in Pilot Study 1 to increase engagement of the participants by making participants feel more tied to the decision even in a hypothetical situation. However, participants might also be more likely to show a preference for schism when the majority is composed of outgroup members and the subgroup interested in forming a schism includes an identifiable ingroup. Accordingly, Pilot 2 used a hypothetical scenario that did not elaborate on which members of the group fall into the moderate majority and those who prefer the extreme means.

# 5.2 Method

#### 5.2.1 Participants

Participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk, with 189 individuals beginning the study and 18 excluded for failing to complete all measures in the hypothesized model, leaving a final sample of 172 ( $M_{age} = 34.68$ ,  $SD_{age} = 11.70$ ; 44% male).

# 5.2.2 Procedure

Participants read about a scenario in which a federal organization composed of delegates from different states was planning wildlife conservation strategies. In both conditions, participants read about how the organization preferred an approach that would protect about 5% of the forested area inhabited by an endangered species, and a faction within the organization preferred a strategy that would protect about 25% of the inhabited area, meaning that less area would be available for commercial development.

To manipulate commitment, participants were assigned to read about protecting different endangered species that were expected to be considered of greater or lesser importance to people based on findings from the biodiversity community. Several studies have found that individuals are more willing to support and take action for "cute" rather than "ugly" animals, independent of their biological importance (Gunnthorsdotir, 2000; Huddy & Gunnthorsdotir, 2000; Knight, 2008; Small, 2011). Drawing from this research, participants assigned to the low commitment condition read about debates surrounding the protection of the spruce-fir moss spider. The scenario presented to participants in the high commitment condition instead focused on the red-cockaded woodpecker. It was expected that a bird species is considered "cuter" and more likeable than a spider, and thereby would elicit greater commitment to their conservation.

After reading the scenario, participants completed a measure assessing their own personal commitment to protecting the target species as a manipulation check.

Participants then rated their level of support for a schism from the environmental group and completed demographic information.

# 5.2.3 Measures

**Personal Commitment**. Personal commitment was measured with three items assessing the extent to which protecting the target endangered species was a cause that was important, that they were committed to the cause, and that they were dedicated to the cause ( $\alpha = .97$ ).

**Support for Schism.** Participants were asked to imagine themselves as a participant in these discussions while rating their support for a schism in which the extreme faction would form a new organization to pursue their protection efforts. Response categories for the scale ranged from 1 (*Very unsupportive*) to 7 (*Very supportive*).

# 5.3 Results

### 5.3.1 Manipulation Check

An independent samples *t*-test was conducted with commitment condition as the independent variable and measured personal commitment as the dependent variable. Results confirmed that participants assigned to the high commitment condition (M = 4.89, SD = 1.57) indeed reported greater commitment to the cause than those assigned to the low commitment condition (M = 5.35, SD = 1.39), t(170) =2.01, p < .05.

# 5.3.2 Internal Analysis

**Overview.** While there was a significant difference in personal commitment between conditions, the manipulation was not strong enough to result in differences in schism directly (see Table 2). Therefore, I proceeded to conduct an internal analysis using the manipulation check measure of personal commitment as a mediator of an indirect effect of the experimental manipulation on support for schism.

# Table 2

ž ž ž	Low Commitment		High Commitment	
	М	SD	М	SD
Personal Commitment	4.89	1.57	5.35	1.39
Schismatic Intentions	4.00	1.64	3.99	1.55

A mediation model was tested using Hayes' (2013) PROCESS macro. The *total effect* of the independent variable was decomposed into direct and indirect effects (Mackinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). The *direct effect* represents the association of an independent variable with a dependent variable whereas the *indirect effect* corresponds to the effect of a mediating variable in that relationship. This macro uses bootstrapping, a non-parametric resampling procedure, to assess the significance of indirect effects. Specifically, the indirect effect was tested with bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals using 5000 random samples generated by the macro. An indirect effect was considered significant when zero was not within the range of its confidence interval.

**Analyses.** Regression analyses revealed a non-significant total effect whereby experimental condition did not predict support for schism,  $\beta = -.004$ , t(170) = -.05, p = .96. However, analyses revealed a significantly positive relationship between experimental condition and self-reported levels of personal commitment to the cause,  $\beta = .15$ , t(170) = 2.00, p < .05. That is, individuals assigned to the high commitment condition reported significantly greater personal commitment to the cause. In turn, personal commitment was positively associated with support for schism,  $\beta = .22$ , t(169) = 2.92, p < .01. When controlling for self-reported personal commitment, the experimental manipulation had no direct effect on schism,  $\beta = .04$ , t(169) = -.50, p = .62. Finally, results of the bootstrapping yielded a significant indirect effect of the experimental condition on schism through self-reported personal commitment to the cause,  $\beta = .04$ , 95% CI[.003, .09].

# 5.4 Discussion

The main objective of Pilot Study 2 was to address questions of causality, but the strength of the manipulation yielded non-significant effects on the dependent variable. Nonetheless, differences in the manipulation check allowed for an internal analysis using a measure of personal commitment. Results of the internal analysis were consistent with the results of Pilot Study 1. Specifically, personal commitment to a focal goal was associated with increased support for a schism to form a more extreme organization. In addition, these findings replicate the findings of Pilot Study 1 while ensuring that the faction group did not consist of an identifiable ingroup with a moderate majority composed of outgroups. While it would have been preferred to support these relationships using the experimental conditions as a predictor, the

differences in reported levels of personal commitment suggest that the manipulation could be further strengthened to have the desired downstream effects on perceptions of commitment and support for schism.

The results of Pilot Studies 1 and 2 are consistent with the notion that personal commitment to a focal goal is associated with a desire to form an extreme group, but they did not assess the potential appeal of groups that differed in ways other than extremity. This raises the question of whether only subgroups adopting extreme means will motivate highly committed individuals to split from a majority group, or whether these individuals simply want to exit the group. To address this question, I conducted a third pilot study that manipulated a faction's choice of means to be either moderate or extreme.

# Chapter 6: Pilot Study 3: Manipulating Faction Means <u>6.1 Overview</u>

The objective of Pilot Study 3 was to illustrate that high commitment to a focal goal is related to support for schism only when the alternative group pursues extreme means. That is, commitment should increase the attraction to counterfinal means, or the willingness to pursue means to a focal goal at the cost of other goals, but it should not be systematically related to preference for different types of moderate means. Thus, when the alternative faction is equally moderate as the parent group, higher commitment to the focal goal should not show any relationship with schismatic intentions.

Another aim of Pilot Study 3 was to investigate a possible mediating mechanism of the relationship between personal goal commitment and support for schism from a moderate group. Specifically, I was interested in inferences individuals might make about the moderate and extreme groups based on their (un)willingness to pursue extreme means. One literature that could shed light on such processes is the political science literature on "outbidding," which suggests that political organizations become more extreme to signal greater commitment to their causes (Bloom, 2004; Horowitz, 1985). This literature would suggest that more extreme groups should be perceived as more committed to their goals than their moderate counterparts.

Literature from the perspective of sacred values also suggests that preference for moderation might be interpreted differently depending on an individual's level of goal commitment. For example, Ginges, Atran, Medin, and Shikaki (2007) found that

those who held sacred values were offended by a willingness to compromise in sacred domains. In other words, individuals with sacred values perceive moderate choices (i.e., compromising between different goals) negatively. In relation to my motivational analysis of group schisms, this offers indirect evidence that high goal commitment will be associated with negative perceptions of an attempt to compromise on a goal. In light of this, I hypothesized that personal commitment would be associated with the perception that an extreme group (which is willing to forego alternative goals) is more committed to the focal goal than a moderate group. However, no difference in perceptions of commitment should occur in the case of a disagreement between two moderate groups.

In sum, I sought to test a model of mediated moderation. The positive relationship between personal commitment and support for schism was predicted to be moderated by the alternative group's means. When the alternative group adopts extreme (i.e., counterfinal) means, personal commitment was expected to be associated with support for schism, and mediated by perceptions that the extreme subgroup is more committed to the focal goal than moderate group. When the alternative group adopts moderate (but different) means, I predicted that there would be no relationship between personal goal commitment and support for schism and no indirect effect through perceptions of the groups' commitment to the focal goal. To test this mediated moderation hypothesis, a scenario method was used and the means endorsed by the alternative faction was experimentally manipulated between-subjects to be either moderate or extreme.

# 6.2 Method

#### 6.2.1 Participants

A total of 193 participants began the study, but 28 dropped out after coming across the question requiring an open-ended response, leaving a final sample of 165 participants ( $M_{age} = 34.18$ ,  $SD_{age} = 11.18$ ; 55.2% men). Participants were recruited from MTurk and compensated with 20 cents for their participation.

# 6.2.2 Procedure

Pilot Study 3 followed a procedure similar to the previous pilot studies. First, participants completed a measure of their commitment to a focal goal—defeating the terrorist group ISIS. Participants also indicated their commitment to unrelated goals as filler items. Next, participants read a scenario in which different factions of an international organization were disagreeing over how to defeat ISIS. Participants were randomly assigned to read about either a disagreement between a moderate majority of the international group and a faction pursuing other moderate means (moderate condition) or a moderate majority of the international group and an extreme faction (extreme condition).

In the moderate condition, a majority group faction (including the UK and the Netherlands) was described as favoring the use of air strikes but with a focus on training local military forces to confront ISIS themselves. In contrast, another faction (including the US and Belgium) was said to endorse the use of air strikes as well, but wanted to focus on diplomatic strategies instead of training local military forces. In the extreme condition, the description of the majority group remained the same, but

the second faction was described as favoring ground forces in addition to air strikes, a more resource-intensive and thereby counterfinal intervention.

After reading the descriptions, participants rated the extent to which each faction was committed to defeating ISIS, how extreme each faction was, and whether they would support the US splitting from the majority group to form their own organization. As an attention check, participants were then presented with an openended question asking them to report one of the methods used by the US as described in the scenario.

## 6.2.3 Measures

**Goal Commitment.** Commitment to defeating ISIS was measured with two items (*'I am committed to the defeat of ISIS'*; *'Defeating ISIS is an important cause to me'*) that were highly correlated, r(163) = .87, p < .001.

**Perceptions of Group Commitment.** Perceptions of each faction's commitment was measured with two items assessing the extent to which each group was committed to defeating ISIS and dedicated to defeating ISIS. These items were highly correlated for both the majority group (r(163) = .84, p < .001) and alternative faction (r(163) = .83 p < .001).

**Perceptions of Extremeness.** Two items were used to assess perceptions of the extremeness of the faction within the international group. These items were not highly correlated in this sample (r < .20, p > .05) and were therefore treated separately as an assessment of extremism and radicalism.

**Support for Schism.** Participants were asked to imagine themselves as a delegate participating in discussions about how to defeat ISIS and to rate their support

for the US splitting with the other countries in their faction to form a new group. Response categories for the item ranged from 1 (*Very Unsupportive*) to 7 (*Very Supportive*).

# 6.3 Results

#### 6.3.1 Perceptions of Extremeness

Patterns for both the measure of extremeness and radicalism were very similar and, therefore, only the results related to the extremism item are reported here. As a manipulation check, an independent samples *t*-test with perceptions of extremeness as the DV and faction means condition as the IV was performed. Results revealed that the moderate faction (M = 3.87, SD = 1.91) was perceived to be significantly less extreme than the extreme faction (M = 4.64, SD = 1.85), t(163) = -3.84, p < .001.

# 6.3.2 Mediated Moderation Model

A mediated moderation model was tested using Hayes' (2013) PROCESS macro. The model specified that the interaction between the experimental condition and personal commitment occurred at the pathways leading to the proposed mediator, the difference in perceptions of the majority group and faction's commitment to the focal goal. Specifically, personal commitment to the cause was expected to be unrelated to differences in perceptions of group commitment in the moderate means condition. In contrast, personal commitment was predicted to be associated with perceptions that the faction was more committed to the cause than the majority group (represented by positive difference scores) in the extreme means condition. In turn, the difference score of perceptions of commitment were expected to predict support for a group schism. The mediated moderation model also estimates conditional indirect effects, which are specific indirect effects of the independent variable through a mediator at each level of the moderator. As such, the model tested two specific indirect effects, and I expected a significant indirect effect only in the case of the extreme means condition. Descriptive statistics by condition are summarized in Table 3.

## Table 3

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Moderate Means		Extreme Means	
	М	SD	М	SD
Personal Commitment	5.29	1.46	5.33	1.32
Difference in Group Commitment	5.32	1.32	4.90	1.37
Schismatic Intentions	3.61	1.43	3.72	1.45

Pilot Study 3 Descriptive Statistics by Condition (N - 165)

**Regression Analyses.** First, support for schism was regressed on personal commitment to defeating ISIS, extremeness of means (effects coded), and their interaction term. There was a significant main effect of personal commitment on schismatic intentions,  $\beta = .17$ , t(161) = 2.09, p = .04. There was no main effect of extremeness of means,  $\beta = .04$ , t(161) = 0.48, p = .63. Inconsistent with predictions, there was no interaction effect of extremeness of means and personal commitment on schismatic intentions,  $\beta = .06$ , t(161) = 0.76, p = .45.

Next, a difference score of perceptions of group commitment was regressed on the same predictors. First, there was a significant association between personal

commitment and differences in perceptions of group commitment,  $\beta = .17$ , t(162) = 2.24, p = .03. There was also a significant relationship between means condition and differences scores of group commitment,  $\beta = .27$ , t(162) = 3.73, p < .01. Most importantly, these relationships were qualified by a significant interaction effect of personal commitment and means condition,  $\beta = .19$ , t(162) = 2.51, p = .01.

To decompose the interaction, I examined the simple slopes of personal commitment at each level of the moderator. When the faction was described as preferring moderate means, there was a non-significant relationship between personal commitment and differences in perceptions of group commitment,  $\beta = -.02$ , t(161) = -.20 p = .84. However, in the extreme condition, personal commitment was associated with perceptions that the faction was more committed than the majority group,  $\beta = .36$ , t(161) = 3.12 p < .01. These simple slopes are illustrated in Figure 4.



*Figure 4*. Simple slopes of the relationship between personal commitment and difference in perception of majority and faction commitment. Positive scores indicate perception that faction is more committed to the focal goal than the majority group.

Next, the full moderated mediation model was tested. Consistent with my hypothesis, perceptions that the faction was more committed to the cause than the majority were associated with greater support for a schism,  $\beta = .27$ , t(160) = 3.28, p < .01. Controlling for the mediator, there was no significant relationship between personal commitment to the cause and support for schism,  $\beta = .12$ , t(160) = 1.55, p = .12. Nor was there a relationship between means condition and support for schism,  $\beta = -.04$ , t(160) = -0.45, p = .65. Finally, there was no direct effect of an interaction of personal commitment and means condition,  $\beta = .01$ , t(160) = 0.13, p = .90. The full regression model explained a significant amount of variance in the support for schism, F(4, 160) = 3.98, p < .01,  $R^2 = .30$ . These relationships are summarized in Figure 5.



*Figure 5*. Mediated moderation in which the extremeness of means interacts with personal commitment to a focal goal and leads to support for schism through differences in perception of group commitment.

**Indirect Effects.** Specific indirect effects of the interaction term on support for schism through the mediator was tested with bootstrapping. Results revealed a

significant indirect effect of the interaction through difference in group commitment in the moderate means condition  $\beta = .10$ , 95% CI [.02, .23]. To decompose the mediated moderation, we examined the conditional indirect effects within each level of the moderator. When the faction was described in moderate terms, personal commitment had a non-significant indirect effect on support for schism through perceptions of commitment,  $\beta = -.001$ , 95% CI [-.06, .04]. However, there was a significant indirect effect when the faction was described as extreme,  $\beta = .10$ , 95% CI [.02, .20]. These results support my hypothesis of mediated moderation whereby perceptions of group commitment would only mediate a relationship between personal commitment and support for schism when the alternative group was extreme.

# 6.4 Discussion

Results from this study suggest that the extremeness of the means being pursued by the faction moderates the relationship between goal commitment and support for schism seen in Pilot Studies 1 and 2. Specifically, high commitment to a focal goal motivates separation from a moderate majority group when an alternative group is advocating for means that are perceived as extreme but not when the alternative group is moderate themselves. Furthermore, this was explained by perceptions of the alternative, extreme group, being more committed to the focal goal than the moderate majority. These findings underscore the role of extreme means in prompting the highly committed to split from a majority group. Thus far, however, my pilot studies have yet to examine the roles of social identity and perceptions of a group's openness to change.

# Chapter 7: Study 1: Social Identity as a Binding Force 7.1 Overview

The purpose of Study 1 was to test moderation of social identification with the parent group on the relationship between personal commitment to a cause and desire for schism. Consistent with research on group loyalty (Hart & Van Vugt, 2006), social identification is expected to serve as a "social glue" that binds individuals to their groups even with disagreement over the means selected by one's group to pursue a personally important goal. This study will more closely test the assumption that the decision between remaining in a moderate group or forming a more extreme schisms represents a tradeoff between one's commitment to the group and one's commitment to the focal goal.

Individuals who are weakly identified with the group but highly committed to the focal goal should be less committed to keeping the group together at the cost of doing whatever it takes to achieve the focal goal. In contrast, individuals who are strongly identified with the group, regardless of commitment to the focal goal, should prioritize maintaining the group's cohesion. Even those who are strongly identified with the group *and* highly committed to the focal goal are expected to prefer maintaining the group over forming a schism in the right situation. Similar to how highly identified individuals prefer to voice dissent than disengage from a group (Packer & Miners, 2012), these individuals would likely prefer an alternative approach to changing the means preferences of the group than forming a schism.

Furthermore, Study 1 examined the proposed model for group schism in a context where participants are expecting to interact with one another as a real group.

Study 1 built on the pilot studies by implicating real group behavior rather than a hypothetical scenario approach. One critique of using hypothetical scenarios is that they do not involve real costs whereas schisms from real groups might involve risking interpersonal relationships, pursuing means that are detrimental to alternative goals, and other costs. Accordingly, individuals may be more willing to *say* they support a schism to pursue more extreme means rather than they are willing to actually split from the group. Study 1 allowed me to investigate whether my hypothesized model addresses real behavior beyond "cheap talk".

# 7.2 Method

#### 7.2.1 Sample Size Considerations and Participants

Study 1 employed a 2 (personal commitment: high or low) x 2 (social identity: high or low) factorial design. I used G\*Power 3.1 to estimate the sample size needed to achieve .75 power to detect a medium-sized interaction effect (f = .25, equivalent to  $\eta_p^2 = .06^1$ ) in a typical 2 x 2 factorial design in ANOVA, yielding a required sample size of 101. Accordingly, I aimed to recruit over 100 participants for the study.

One-hundred seventeen UMD affiliated participants were recruited through a subject pool and advertising on campus. Eight participants were excluded from analyses for being confident that some or all of their fellow group members were not real participants, yielding a final sample size of 109 ( $M_{age} = 20.91$ ,  $SD_{age} = 2.16$ ; 64.5% women). Participants were compensated with \$8 for their participation.

# 7.2.2 Procedure

Participants were recruited to participate in a study about how people make decisions in groups and deal with differences in opinion. Participants were recruited in groups to make the deception of their group interactions more realistic. At the start of the study, each participant was brought to an individual room to complete their consent form and wait for the other participants to be ready to begin. When a group of under six participants completed the study at a given time, researchers led participants to believe that more people had arrived for the study by making additional noises in adjacent lab rooms after the real participants had completed their consent form.

To begin the study, a researcher read a description of the study from a script stating that the study was interested in how virtual groups reached decisions, and that participants would be interacting with a group of other people via Google Hangouts. At this time, the researcher pointed out the two chat boxes on the screen: one for the group chat and one for contacting the researcher directly if they had any questions or concerns once the study began. Participants were informed that the researcher would send the first message to the group chat to begin the study shortly.

Participants were informed they would be interacting with other participants via the chat, but they were instead interacting with the researcher and confederates who followed a script. Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition based on their study session. In other words, all participants completing the study at the same time experienced the same experimental condition. This was mainly to help researchers follow the same script for multiple people during a given session.

Social Identity Manipulation. Social identity was manipulated with two features of the study. First, individuation was emphasized in low identification sessions by referring to chat participants as "Participant 1", "Participant 2",etc. In addition, participants in low identity sessions began the group decision-making procedure as soon as the chat begins without any opportunity to interact with their purported group members. In contrast, group membership was made salient in high identification sessions by referring to chat participants as "Group Member 1," "Group Member 2", and so on. In addition, participants in high identification sessions were given the opportunity to interact with their group members before completing the decision-making task. Specifically, the real participant was asked to share their favorite movie genre with the group as an icebreaker. After the participant shared their favorite type of movie, the confederate group members gave positive feedback about their choice, indicating that they also liked the same type of movies.

The labeling feature of the manipulation serves to highlight group identity for those in the high identity condition and is similar to deindividuation procedures that have been used frequently in past research to manipulate a sense of social identity successfully (e.g., Lea, Spears, de Groot, 2001; Reicher & Levine, 1994). In addition, the interaction manipulation is intended to increase a sense of similarity and positive affect, which can be used to inductively generate a sense of social identity in a group (Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005).

Next, participants were informed in the chat that the study involved deciding, as a group, on an amount of their compensation that would be donated to a particular cause. At this point, participants were sent a link via the chat that opened a Qualtrics

survey. This survey first asked them to complete a scale assessing social identification with their group as a manipulation check. Participants also answered questions about whether they had seen any of their group members before starting the study and if they recognized or already had a relationship with them outside of the study. Next, participants were presented with the commitment manipulation.

**Commitment Manipulation.** The commitment manipulation consisted of manipulating the fund that participants were ostensibly going to have to donate a portion of their compensation toward. In the high commitment condition, participants were informed that their group would have to decide to donate \$1 or \$4 to the UMD Student Crisis Fund, which helps members of the University of Maryland community deal with financial emergencies. In the low commitment condition, participants were presented with the same dilemma except in relation to a crisis fund purported to help Duke University students. In this context, choosing to donate \$4 is considered the counterfinal means because it requires greater sacrifice than donating \$1, hence greater commitment should be associated with greater willingness to donate \$4.

Individual Preferences. After reading about the fund they had to donate to, participants completed a manipulation check of commitment to raising money for the particular fund. Then, participants indicated how much money they wanted to donate to the fund and how strongly they preferred their selected option. After responding to these questions, participants returned to the chat. At this point, the researcher asked each participant to state, in the group chat, which option they selected. To minimize concerns about social desirability, each real participant was always asked to provide their response third. Moreover, the first confederate always indicated that they

selected the \$1 option and the second confederate always selected \$4 to make the participant comfortable with providing their own preference. Regardless of what the real participant chose, three confederates always preferred \$1 and two confederates always preferred \$4 to set up the scenario for a potential schism<sup>1</sup>. After all group members had stated their preferences, participants were asked to complete another brief survey in which they rated their intentions to try and convince their group members to choose their preferred donation amount.

Schism Decision. After participants responded to these questions, the researcher contacted each participant directly to present them with the schism scenario. The researcher told the participant that two of the group members asked about splitting into a new group. To minimize participants' concerns about pleasing the researcher, the message also mentioned that the researcher didn't have any preferences for the participants' decision since it was still early in the study. After the participant responded to the question about forming a new group, the researcher told the participant that the study was over.

**Debriefing.** Participants were then sent a third link in the chat, which directed them to answer questions about any suspicions they had about the study, the fund to which they were supposedly donating, and their interactions with group members over chat. Participants were then presented with an explanation of the study and given

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Previous piloting suggested that a 7-person group in which four individuals always selected \$1 and three individuals always selected \$4 would yield little variance in support for schism, with essentially everyone who preferred to donate \$4 deciding to leave the group as a decision would simply be easier, and leaving little opportunity for the social identity manipulation to affect responses. As such, a 6-person group format was chosen. However, additional piloting suggested that participants who selected \$1 were highly skeptical of the paradigm when asked about splitting groups if there were already three other group members (i.e., confederates) who preferred \$4. Therefore, I kept the number of confederates who preferred \$4 to two people regardless of the participants' own preferences.

the chance to ask the researchers any questions in person before being given their compensation.

#### 7.2.3 Measures

Response categories ranged from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) unless otherwise specified. Full measures and other materials can be found in Appendix A.

**Social Identity.** To assess the effectiveness of the social identity manipulation, participants completed the subscales of group solidarity (e.g., '*I feel a bond with my group'*, *I feel committed to my group'*) and satisfaction (e.g., '*I am glad that I am part of my group'*) from Leach et al. (2008). One item from the satisfaction subscale ('*My group has a lot to be proud of'*) was replaced with another item ('*I like my group members'*) because pride was not expected to be relevant in the context of a new group. The items showed adequate internal reliability ( $\alpha = .90$ ), and the scale items were averaged to form a single index of social identity.

**Personal Commitment.** To assess the effectiveness of the commitment manipulation, personal commitment was assessed with the average of four items (e.g., '*I am committed to raising money for this fund*';  $\alpha = .85$ ).

**Personal Donation Preference.** In addition to reporting their personal preference for a donation amount in the group chat, participants were also asked to report their preference in a Qualtrics survey. Participants indicated their preference by responding to a dichotomous question indicating that they would prefer to donate \$1 or \$4.

**Perceptions of Group Openness.** After seeing the preferences of their supposed group members, participants responded to two items assessing the extent to which they thought the group was still open to being influenced (*'There is still opportunity to influence the decision of the group'*; *'With the breakdown in individual preferences for donations, the outcome of the group discussion is more or less already decided'*). After revere-scoring the second item, the two items assessing openness were significantly correlated with each other, r(108) = .31, p < .01, suggesting they could be averaged into a single index.

**Desire for a Schism.** Desire for a schism was measured by a single question. Participants were asked to indicate whether they were interested in Definitely staying in their current group, leaning toward current group, leaning toward the new group, or definitely interested in leaving for the new group. These responses were coded as 1 (Definitely staying) to 4 (Definitely Leaving) for the purposes of statistical analysis.

# 7.3 Results

# 7.3.1 Manipulation Checks

**Social Identification.** A one-way ANOVA was performed to assess the effectiveness of the social identity manipulation. Consistent with expectations, participants assigned to the strong social identity conditions (M = 4.54, SD = 0.93) reported significantly stronger identification with their group than participants in the weak identity conditions (M = 4.17, SD = 0.80), F(1, 107) = 4.96, p = .03.

**Commitment.** Next, the effectiveness of the commitment manipulation was assessed by testing for differences in the self-reported Likert-type items assessing

commitment. Participants assigned to the high commitment level (donating to a UMD student fund) were expected to report greater commitment to helping the fund raise money than those assigned to the low commitment level (donating to a Duke University fund). One concern was that the social identity manipulation could also affect commitment to helping the fund raise money by instantiating a collective mindset or increasing the saliency of social monitoring, which may motivate prosocial attitudes and behavior (Batson, Ahmad, & Stocks, 2011). Therefore, a 2 (commitment: high or low) x 2 (social identity: weak or strong) between-subject ANOVA was conducted to assess the potential impact of both the commitment and social identity manipulations.

Results of the ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of the commitment manipulation, F(1, 105) = 28.67, p < .001,  $\eta_p^2 = .22$ . Participants assigned to the high commitment conditions (M = 5.34, SD = 0.92) reported significantly greater commitment to raising money for their fund than those in the low commitment conditions (M = 4.41, SD = 0.95). In addition, there was a non-significant effect of identification on self-reported commitment, F(1, 105) = 0.51, p = .48,  $\eta_p^2 = .01$ . However, the main effect of commitment was qualified by a significant interaction with social identity, F(1, 105) = 4.18, p = .04,  $\eta_p^2 = .04$ .

To decompose the interaction, I performed a series of pairwise comparisons to compare the effect of commitment within each level of identification, weak and strong. At weak levels of identification, the commitment manipulation yielded an especially strong difference in self-reported commitment between the high commitment (M = 5.61, SD = 0.63) and low commitment conditions (M = 4.29, SD =

0.97), F(1, 105) = 27.23, p < .001. At strong levels of identification, the difference in self-reported commitment between the high (M = 5.12, SD = 1.07) and low (M = 4.53, SD = 0.93) commitment conditions was somewhat attenuated, F(1, 105) = 5.51, p = .02. Despite this interaction, the overall main effect of the commitment manipulation was evident in higher scores in the high (vs. low) commitment condition at both levels of the social identity manipulation, suggesting that the commitment manipulation had the desired effect.

**Donation Preference.** Given that the self-reported commitment measure yielded an unexpected interaction pattern, I also examined differences in donation preference (\$1 or \$4) as an indicator of commitment to the assigned cause. The more committed an individual to a cause, the more money they should be willing to donate from their compensation. I tested a logistic regression model in which dummy coded commitment, social identity, and their interaction effect predicted preferred donation amount.

Results of the logistic regression model yielded a significant main effect of the commitment manipulation, B = 1.58, Exp(B) = 4.85,  $\chi^2(1) = 6.37$ , p = .01. The odds ratio associated with the commitment effect indicated that individuals assigned to the high commitment condition (UMD fund) were 4.85 times as likely to select the \$4 option as those who were assigned to the low commitment condition (Duke fund). Table 4 shows the distribution in donation preferences in low and high levels of commitment. The distribution suggests that individuals assigned to the high commitment conditions were particularly willing to donate \$4 whereas participants

assigned to the low commitment conditions exhibited more variability in their preferences.

Table 4

Study 1 Frequency of Donation Preferences by Commitment Level

	\$1	\$4	Total
Low Commitment	31	22	53
High Commitment	12	44	56

Furthermore, there was a non-significant effect of identification on donation preference, B = -0.43, Exp(B) = 0.65,  $\chi^2(1) = 0.59$ , p = .44. Finally, unlike the pattern found in self-reported commitment, there was no interaction effect of commitment and identification on donation preference, B = 0.19, Exp(B) = 1.21,  $\chi^2(1) = 0.14$ , p =.71. Given that this more objective behavioral measure of commitment showed only a main effect of the commitment manipulation, as desired, these analyses provided additional support for the effectiveness of the commitment manipulation.

**Perceptions of Openness.** One concern regarding the design was that the manipulation would result in different perceptions of openness at low and high commitment levels because participants who preferred to donate \$1 would share their preference with a majority of their group members whereas those who preferred to donate \$4 would be in a group equally split in preferences. If this were the case, the manipulation would cause not only differences in commitment to raising funds for the cause but also perceptions of the group's openness. In addition, participants assigned to the strong social identity condition might feel like their group members would be
more receptive to persuasion than those in the low social identity condition.

Therefore, a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was employed to test the impact of the manipulations on the perceptions of the group's openness.

Results of the ANOVA revealed a marginally significant effect of the commitment manipulation on perceptions of the group's openness, F(1, 105) = 3.04, p = .08,  $\eta_p^2 = .03$ . A comparison of marginal means suggests that participants assigned to the low commitment (M = 4.92, SD = 1.15) conditions were trending towards perceptions that the group was less open than those assigned to the high commitment conditions (M = 5.29, SD = 1.06). However, no main effect of identification was detected, F(1, 105) = 0.05, p = .83,  $\eta_p^2 = .00$ . Finally, no interaction of commitment and identification was found, F(1, 105) = 1.82, p = .18,  $\eta_p^2 = .02$ . Although the effect of the commitment manipulation was marginal, these findings suggest that it is important to control for perceptions of openness when testing the effect of commitment on schism to ensure that detected effects are not an artifact of differences in perceived openness of the group.

#### 7.3.2 Desire to Form a Schism Group

Next, I proceeded to test the central predictions of Study 1: an interaction effect of commitment and identification on desire to form a schism. When participants were weakly identified with the group, I expected commitment to significantly increase the desire to schism. When strongly identified, however, I expected the effect of the commitment manipulation to be attenuated, as group members would instead prefer to convince their other group members to donate more money. I also sought to control for perceptions of a group's openness in light of the marginally significant differences across commitment conditions. Therefore, a 2 (commitment: high or low) x 2 (social identity: weak or strong) ANCOVA with a group's openness as a covariate performed with desire to form a schism as the outcome variable.

Results of the ANCOVA yielded a non-significant main effect of the covariant, openness, F(1, 104) = 2.41, p = .12,  $\eta_p^2 = .02$ . A main effect of the commitment manipulation was detected, however, F(1, 104) = 4.18, p = .04,  $\eta_p^2 =$ .04. That is, the individuals in the low commitment conditions (M = 2.02, SD = 0.91) reported lower desire to form a schism than those in the high commitment conditions (M = 2.41, SD = 1.04). In addition, there was a significant main effect of social identification, F(1, 104) = 7.93, p < .01,  $\eta_p^2 = .07$ . Participants assigned to the weak social identity conditions (M = 2.46, SD = 1.04) reported greater desire to form a schism than those in the strong social identity conditions (M = 1.98, SD = 0.89). Inconsistent with expectations, however, there was no interaction effect of commitment and social identification, F(1, 104) = 0.09, p = .77,  $\eta_p^2 = .001$ . The pattern of main effects is illustrated in Figure 6. Notably, removing perceptions of openness from the model did not change the pattern of effects, as the commitment manipulation still increased desire for a schism and a stronger social identity still decreased desire for a schism.



*Figure 6.* Estimated means by experimental condition, controlling for perceptions of openness.

## 7.4 Discussion

Results from Study 1 were consistent with findings from Pilot Studies 1-3 but failed to detect the hypothesized interaction effect of focal goal commitment and social identification with the parent group. Consistent with findings from Pilot Studies 1-3, participants assigned to the high commitment conditions (vs. low commitment) were particularly attracted to a counterfinal, but highly effective means to their focal goal. That is, the participants in the high commitment level were willing to sacrifice more of their compensation to help raise money for the target fund. Also consistent with Pilot Studies 1-3, higher commitment was associated with greater desire to form a splinter group. Study 1 represented an important extension of Pilot Studies 1-3, however, by investigating the relationship between focal goal commitment and splinter groups in the context of behavior with ostensibly real consequences where my previous studies employed hypothetical scenarios. The major contribution of Study 1, however was introducing the effect of social identification with the parent group. Identification with the parent group was hypothesized to serve as a moderator attenuating the effect of focal goal commitment on the desire to break away from the parent group. Instead, however, a second main effect of social identity in which stronger identification decreased desire to form a splinter group independent of focal goal commitment. These findings were somewhat more consistent with Sani's (2008) model of group subversion in which social identification with the parent group decreases schismatic intentions. Notably, Sani and colleagues' (Sani & Pugliese, 2008; Sani & Todman, 2002, 2009) research has been limited to correlational designs in order to sample real groups that have undergone instances of schism. The present research offers an interesting extension of their findings by employing an experimental paradigm in which commitment to the group's focal goal and social identification were manipulated.

The effect of social identification with the parent group was consistent with the literature on the group subversion model, but it is somewhat unclear how social identity exerted its effect in Study 1. While a significant difference was found in the manipulation check testing the effectiveness of the social identity manipulation, it was clear that those in the "strong" social identity conditions were only slightly positive about their group whereas those in the "weak" social identity conditions were completely neutral about their group. Perhaps more importantly for the interpretation of these findings, the manipulation check measure of social identity was unrelated (p= .45) to desire to form a schism group in a simple correlation test. This could suggest that the social identification manipulation did not exert its impact on desire to form a

schism by fulfilling alternative motives like the need for affiliation (captured by items like 'I feel a bond with my group') but instead through some alternative mechanism. For example, participants in the high (vs. low) social identity conditions might have reacted more negatively to their group members' request to split up the group because earlier interactions with their group members led to expectations of greater cohesiveness.

Although Study 1 did not offer insight into why social identity was associated with a weaker desire to form a splinter group, it nonetheless offered initial evidence of a role independent of focal goal commitment. The experimental method of Study 1 was a strength in that it built on correlational findings from previous research (e.g., Sani & Pugliese, 2008), but it might have led to generally weak-to-moderate levels of social identification as participants did not feel truly strong attachment in a novel group context. Study 2, therefore, sought to test the role of parent group openness in the context of groups to which members would feel more strongly attached.

# Chapter 8: Study 2: The Role of Parent Group Openness <u>8.1 Overview</u>

Results of Study 1 found that commitment to a focal group goal could increase the desire for schism while social identification with the parent group could decrease the desire for schism. While Study 1 did not find evidence of an interaction effect of goal commitment and social identification, this might have been related to the strength of the social identity manipulation in the context of a completely new group. That is, social identification with the parent group was fairly moderate for everyone. With this in mind, Study 2 still sought to explore a potential interaction effect of goal commitment and social identification at different levels of parent group openness. The major objective of Study 2 was to test the moderating role of parent group openness, a form of expectancy, in group schisms among a sample of participants who considered themselves members of real advocacy or volunteer groups.

Consistent with research in the dissent literature (e.g., Packer, 2009; Packer & Miners, 2012), I expected that highly identified group members may disagree with their group, and even recognize the strengths of another group (the extreme faction in this case), but respond to those disagreements in ways that also maintain the cohesiveness of the group. However, discrepancies between the findings from the normative conflict (e.g., Packer & Miners, 2012) and the group subversion (Sani, 2008) approaches to understanding intragroup conflict underscore the need to consider additional contextual factors. In my review of the discrepancies in these literatures, I identified perceptions of the group's openness to influence as a

potentially important moderator in my model of group schisms. If individuals, even those strongly identified with the group, view the parent group as unwilling to compromise, will they still choose to remain in the group? Study 2 sought to answer this question.

Based on my review of the normative conflict model and group subversion literatures, I hypothesized that there would be a three-way interaction effect of personal commitment to a focal goal, social identification with a parent group, and expectancy of the parent group's openness to influence on support for schism. Specifically, I proposed that expectations of the group's openness to influence will further moderate the interaction of commitment to a focal goal and social identification on support for schism. Specifically, I expected no second-order interaction when there are perceptions of the parent group being low in openness. In this case, I expect high levels of commitment to positively predict support for schism and social identification with the parent group to negatively predict support for schism in parallel.

In contrast, I predicted a second-order interaction of personal commitment and social identity when the parent group is open to influence. When social identification is low, personal commitment to the focal goal is expected to increase support for schism. Unattached to the parent group, individuals who are more committed to the organization's focal goal are expected to be drawn to the idea of a more extreme group, and exhibit greater support for a schism. However, when social identification is high, the relationship between goal commitment and schism is expected to be attenuated, as these individuals will be motivated to stick with the and influence the

group to achieve their goals. Patterns of predictions for the three-way interaction are reported in



Figure 7. Hypothesized pattern of three-way interaction.

Implicit in my predictions about how highly goal committed, strongly group identified members' attitudes is the assumption that these individuals will turn to constructive, group-oriented responses when they would prefer to pursue more extreme means than advocated by their group. To address this, a secondary aim of Study 2 was to explore the relationship between voice and support for a schism.

## 8.2 Method

## 8.2.1 Sample Size Considerations and Participants

A power analysis was conducted with G\*Power 3.1 to estimate the sample size needed to achieve an 80% likelihood of detecting effects assuming a small-tomedium effect size for the three-way interaction (f = .20, equivalent to  $\eta_p^2 = .04$ )<sup>2</sup>, in a model with three factors and eight groups (estimates for linear regression with the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Cohen (1988) provides the following equation to represent the relationship between the two effect size measures:  $\eta_p^2 = f^2/(1+f^2)$ .

appropriate number of predictors yielded similar results). The power analyses yielded an estimate of 200 total participants, therefore I sought to recruit this number.

Participants were self-identified members of an advocacy or volunteer group who were recruited through publicly available contact information for advocacy/volunteer groups (e.g., Meetup groups, university student groups, Facebook groups). Participants were also encouraged to share the survey with anyone who was a member of an advocacy/volunteer group and might be interested in completing the study. The study was described as seeking to understand how advocacy groups achieve their goals and how members deal with differences in opinion in such groups. Participants had the chance to enter a raffle to win one of four \$50 gift certificates for participating.

In total, 307 people began the study and 218 (71%) completed it. Of those 218, a further 24 observations were dropped from analyses for failing to follow instructions for the manipulation. Finally, one participant with an outlier score on identification (score of 1) who indicated she struggled with social anxiety in her responses to the alternative health goal mental contrasting paradigm was also excluded, yielding a final sample of 192. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 75 (M = 29.26, SD = 11.04, 51% women), and represented organizations supporting a variety of causes (e.g., environmentalism, animal welfare, mental health awareness, etc.). Participants reported their level of involvement with their organization with 25.1% considering themselves passive supporters, 65.4% considering themselves active members, and 9.4% considering themselves leaders of their group.

### 8.2.2 Procedure

Participants completed the study online, beginning with answering questions about the organization to which they belonged. Participants completed scales assessing their identification with and embeddedness in the organization, then listed the cause targeted by their organization. After listing their cause, participants were randomly assigned to the high or low commitment manipulation.

**Commitment Manipulation.** An adapted mental contrasting paradigm was used to manipulate participants' commitment to their cause. Mental contrasting consists of writing about both positive aspects of a future in which your goal is achieved and negative aspects of reality that could impede progress on the same goal, and has been shown to energize goal pursuit and increase commitment (Oettingen et al., 2009, 2010). Following Oettingen, Pak, and Schnetter's (2001) procedure, participants in the high commitment condition listed four positive future and four negative reality aspects related to progress on their organizations' cause, then elaborated on two of the positive aspects and two of the negative aspects. Those assigned to the low commitment condition were asked to think about a personal health goal and completed the mental contrasting paradigm for this goal to make alternative goals more salient and thereby reduce commitment to the organization's cause. Participants then completed a manipulation check assessing their commitment to the organization's cause.

Scenario. Participants were then presented with a hypothetical scenario in which they were asked to imagine that their organization was experiencing a disagreement on participation requirements. Participation requirements were selected

because mandating active participation was something that could be applied to any organization regardless of their cause and was easily quantifiable. Specifically, the scenario asked participants to imagine that their organization was debating how often members should be required to attend meetings and penalties for failing to meet those requirements. The majority of the organization was said to be in support of monthly meetings with no penalties for failing to attend the meetings if members gave advance notice. In contrast, about a third of the organization was described as advocating weekly meetings to ensure that everyone was engaged and could get more work done. Moreover, this faction was described as favoring stricter penalties for missing meetings, including demotions or expulsions from the group. As such, the majority of the group could be construed as favoring more moderate means whereas the minority was favoring more counterfinal (in terms of requiring greater effort) and hence more extreme means to achieving the organization's goal.

**Openness Manipulation.** Perceptions of the group's openness were manipulated at the end of the scenario text. Participants randomly assigned to the low openness condition read that the organization's leaders scheduled the vote on the participation issue to take place in one week with the stipulation that they would not be open to revisiting the situation after the decision has been made. Participants assigned to the high openness condition read that the leaders schedule the vote to take place in a month and that they indicated they were open to revisiting the participation requirements if things didn't go as well as expected.

**Outcomes.** After reading the scenario participants completed manipulation checks regarding their perceptions of the counterfinality of requiring monthly

meetings and weekly meetings and the extent to which they perceived the group as open to compromising on the issue. Finally, participants indicated the extent to which they would support the minority faction splitting from the organization and the extent to which they would voice their opinions on the disagreement in such a scenario.

#### 8.2.3 Measures

Response categories ranged from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) for all scales unless otherwise noted. Full measures and other materials can be found in Appendix B.

**Social Identification.** Social identification was measured with an index of the solidarity (e.g., '*I feel a bond with my organization*') and satisfaction (e.g., '*I am glad to be a member of my organization*') subscales of group identification (Leach et al., 2008;  $\alpha = .94$ ).

**Group Embeddedness.** Group embeddedness was assessed with 9 items ('*It would be difficult for me to leave the group*';  $\alpha = .90$ ) from a global job embeddedness scale (Crossley et al., 2007). One item assessing attachment to the organization was excluded from the scale due to overlap with the social identification items.

**Personal Commitment.** Participant's personal commitment to their organization's cause was measured with four items ('*I am committed to this cause*', '*This cause is not important to me*';  $\alpha = .71$ ) to assess the effectiveness of the commitment manipulation.

**Means Counterfinality.** Perceptions of the counterfinality of monthly and weekly meetings were assessed with three items each (e.g., *'[Monthly/Weekly]* 

meetings would require a lot of effort from members'; 'Group members would have to sacrifice other parts of their life to attend [monthly/weekly] meetings'). Estimates indicated that the three items exhibited poor internal reliability for perceptions of both the monthly ( $\alpha = .56$ ) and weekly meetings ( $\alpha = .64$ ). Eliminating the third item of the scale ('Meeting once a [week/month] would interfere with other personal goals I have') yielded improved reliability estimates for counterfinality perceptions of monthly ( $\alpha = .65$ ) and weekly ( $\alpha = .84$ ) meetings. Therefore, counterfinality was operationalized as the mean of the two remaining items of the scale.

**Means Extremeness.** Extremeness of requiring monthly and weekly meetings was assessed with one item each (*'Meeting [monthly/weekly] is an extreme requirement for an organization'*).

**Openness.** The majority's perceived openness was measured with two items ['*The group's leaders seem open to compromising on participation requirements'; 'It is unlikely that the group is willing to consider changing participation requirements in the future' (reverse scored)] to assess the effectiveness of the expectancy manipulation. The items were modestly correlated with one another before reverse scoring the items, r(190) = .24, p < .01, and it looked as though many participants failed to notice that the second item was reversed in framing. Therefore, only the first item was used in the manipulation check analysis.* 

Schism and Voice. Support for schism ('*I would want to join the faction leaving the organization*';  $\alpha = .88$ ) and voice ('*I would express my opinions in a meeting about the issue*';  $\alpha = .86$ ) were each assessed with four items adapted from existing organizational exit and voice scales (Naus, van Iterson, & Roe, 2007).

## <u>8.3 Results</u>

Results with group identification and group embeddedness were very similar, therefore only the results for group identification are reported here. Bivariate correlations are reported in Table 5 and descriptive statistics by condition are reported in Table 6.

Table 5

Study 2 Bivariate Correlations ( $N = 192$ )								
	1	2	3					
1. Social Identification								
2. Group Embeddedness	.66***							
3. Support for Schism	28***	.36***						
4. Voice	.47***	22**	22**					
<i>Note</i> . * $p < .05$ , ** $p < .001$ , *** $p < .001$ .								

#### 8.3.1 Manipulation Checks and Means Perceptions

**Commitment.** An independent samples *t*-test was conducted to test the effectiveness of the commitment manipulation. As expected, participants in the high commitment condition reported greater levels of commitment (M = 6.03, SD = 0.97) to their organizational goal than those in the low commitment condition (M = 5.60, SD = 0.96), t(190) = 3.03, p < .01, d = .45. Although there was a significant difference in commitment according to condition, it should be noted that participants in the 'low' commitment condition still reported moderately high levels of commitment to their organization's cause.

## Table 6

		Identification		Embeddedness		Schism		Voice	
	Ν	М	SD	М	SD	М	SD	М	SD
Low Openness									
Low Commitment	42	5.76	1.05	5.09	1.13	2.99	1.30	5.45	1.10
High Commitment	49	5.84	0.90	5.02	1.23	3.62	1.12	5.33	1.15
High Openness									
Low Commitment	57	5.70	0.93	5.08	1.00	3.36	1.33	5.44	0.84
High Commitment	44	5.81	0.90	5.02	1.19	3.20	1.56	5.23	1.33

Study 2 Descriptive Statistics by Condition (N = 192)

*Note.* \* p < .05, \*\* p < .001, \*\*\* p < .001.

**Openness.** Results of an independent samples *t*-test also suggested that the manipulation of openness was successful. Participants assigned to read the high openness (M = 4.81, SD = 1.42) scenario reported that the organization was significantly more open than those assigned to the low openness scenario (M = 3.96, SD = 1.58), t(191) = 3.95, p < .001, d = 0.57.

**Counterfinality.** A paired samples *t*-test was conducted to compare perceptions of the counterfinality of monthly and weekly meetings. As expected, participants perceived the plan for weekly meetings (M = 5.44, SD = 1.46) to be significantly more counterfinal than monthly meetings (M = 4.19, SD = 1.42), *t*(191) = 10.89, *p* < .001, *d* = 0.79.

**Extremeness.** A paired samples *t*-test was conducted to compare perceptions of the extremeness of monthly and weekly meetings. Consistent with expectations,

participants perceived the plan for weekly meetings (M = 4.82, SD = 1.76) to be significantly more counterfinal than monthly meetings (M = 3.16, SD = 1.77), t(190) = 10.71, p < .001, d = 0.84.

#### 8.3.2 Support for a Schism

A hierarchical regression approach was employed in which regression models of increasing complexity were tested. Step One tested a model with main effects of focal goal commitment, social identification with the advocacy organization, and parent group openness predicting support for a schism. Next, Step Two included second-order interactions of these predictors in the model. Finally, a model including the hypothesized three-way interaction was tested. Effects coding was used for the manipulated commitment and openness (low = -1, high = 1) variables in all models, allowing for interpretation of true main effects and interactions. In addition, identification was standardized for inclusion in the regression model.

**Step One.** Overall, the Step One model explained a significant amount of variance in support for a schism, F(3, 188) = 5.94, p < .001,  $\mathbb{R}^2 = .09$ . Results of multiple regression analyses revealed that social identification with the organization was negatively associated with support for a schism,  $\beta = -.28$ , t(188) = -4.05, p < .001. However, there was no main effect of commitment on support for a schism,  $\beta = .10$ , t(188) = 1.38, p = .17. In addition, there was no main effect of openness on support for a schism,  $\beta = -.01$ , t(188) = -.016, p = .87.

**Step Two.** Next, second order interaction terms were included in the model. Once again, Step Two explained a significant amount of variance in support for schism, F(6, 185) = 3.96, p < .001,  $R^2 = .11$ . Results of this model are presented in

Table 7, where two significant effects are evident. After including the second order interaction terms, a main effect of social identification was still detected,  $\beta = -.27$ , t(185) = -3.89, p < .001. In addition to this main effect, a significant interaction of commitment and openness was detected,  $\beta = -.14$ , t(185) = -2.04, p < .05. Although a significant interaction effect was detected, the Step Two model did not significantly improve the amount of variance explained in support for a schism over Step One, which did not include interaction terms, F(1, 185) = 1.89, p = .13,  $\Delta R^2 = .03$ .

Table 7

	Step Two			Ste	Step Three			
	β	t	р	β	t	р		
Commitment	.10	1.48	.14	.10	1.47	.14		
Social Identification	27	-3.89	< .001	27	-3.90	< .001		
Openness	02	-0.21	.83	01	-0.15	.85		
Commitment x Identity	.08	1.17	.24	.08	1.13	.25		
Identity x Openness	01	-0.08	.90	01	-0.13	.90		
Commitment x Openness	14	2.04	< .05	14	-1.99	< .05		
Comm. x Open x Ident.				03	-0.36	.72		

Study 2 Step Two and Step Three Models Predicting Support for a Schism

**Step Three.** Lastly, the third order interaction effect of commitment, social identification, and openness was included in the model. Results of this full model are also reported in Table 7. After including the third order interaction term in the model, the main effect of social identification remained significant,  $\beta = -.27$ , t(184) = -3.89,

p < .001. The interaction effect of commitment and openness remained significant as well,  $\beta = -.14$ , t(184) = -1.99, p < .05. However, the hypothesized three-way interaction effect was non-significant,  $\beta = -.03$ , t(184) = -.03, p = .72. Accordingly, Step 3 did not significantly improve the amount of variance explained in support for a schism when compared to Step 2, F(1, 184) = 1.89, p = .13,  $\Delta R^2 = .03$ .

**Final Model.** Results of the Step Two and Step Three models detected a significant interaction effect of commitment and openness on support for schism, but these models did not represent a significant improvement in explained variance from the Step One model of main effects. One reason for this, however, could be that the inclusion of non-significant interaction effects yields a sub-optimal model. Therefore, I proceeded to test a model in which main effects and only one interaction effect – commitment x openness – were included in the model.

This model explained a significant amount of variance in support for a schism,  $F(4, 187) = 5.61, p < .001, R^2 = .11$ , with full results of the model reported in Table 8. Once again, social identification with one's organization was negatively associated with support for a schism,  $\beta = -.28, t(187) = -4.07, p < .001$ . In addition, the interaction effect of openness and commitment remained significant,  $\beta = -.14, t(187)$  = -2.07, p < .05. Most importantly, this model represented a significant improvement over a model that only included main effects,  $F(1, 187) = 4.29, p = .04, \Delta R^2 = .02$ . This suggests that the Step Two model in which all interaction effects were included was unnecessarily complex compared to a model that only includes the significant interaction effect of commitment and openness in addition to main effects.

#### Table 8

	β	t	р
Commitment	.10	1.49	.14
Social Identification	28	-4.07	< .001
Openness	01	-0.21	.84
Commitment x Openness	14	-2.08	< .04

Study 2: Final Model Predicting Support for Schism

Satisfied with this model, I proceeded to decompose the interaction effect of commitment and openness on support for a schism, examining the simple effect of commitment within each level of openness while controlling for participants' social identification with their organization. Results of the pairwise comparisons revealed that high commitment (M = 3.62, SD = 1.12) increased support for a schism (M =2.99, SD = 1.30) relative to low commitment when the group was described as being low in openness, F(1, 187) = 6.06, p = .02. When the group was described as being high in openness, however, there was no difference in support for schism between those assigned to the high commitment (M = 3.20, SD = 1.56) and low commitment conditions (M = 3.36, SD = 1.33), F(1, 187) = 0.18, p = .68. This pattern of effects (see Figure 8) is somewhat consistent with expectations that parent group openness can motivate members to remain in the group even if they want to pursue alternative, more extreme means to a group goal. One reason that high parent group openness might attenuate the effect of commitment on support for a schism is that group members prefer to voice their opinions to the group, which they view as receptive to

input, rather than leave the group. To investigate this possibility, I next turned to exploring predictors of voice behavior.



*Figure 8.* Estimated mean differences of support for schism as a function of commitment to orgnizational cause and perceptions of group openness when controlling for social identification.

## 8.3.3 Voice

As with predicting schism, a hierarchical regression approach was adopted in which main effects were modeled in Step One, second-order interactions were included in Step Two, and a third-order interaction effect of goal commitment, social identification, and parent group openness was modeled in Step Three.

**Step One.** Overall, the Step One model including main effects of goal commitment, parent group social identification, and parent group openness explained a significant amount of variance in voice behavior, F(3, 188) = 19.30, p < .001,  $\mathbb{R}^2 = .22$ . More specifically, social identification with the organization was positively associated with voice behavior,  $\beta = .48$ , t(188) = 7.49, p < .001. There was no main

effect of commitment  $\beta = -.11$ , t(188) = -1.68, p = .10. In addition, there was no main effect of openness,  $\beta = -.02$ , t(188) = -0.32, p = .75.

Step Two. The second-order interaction terms were added in the Step Two model. The model explained a significant amount of variance in voice F(6, 185) =9.92, p < .001,  $R^2 = .22$ . Results are summarized in Table 9, revealing that only the positive association between social identification and voice was detected,  $\beta = .48$ , t(185) = 7.49, p < .001. Given that all interaction effects were non-significant, Step Two did not yield an improved model over Step One, F(3, 185) = 0.65, p = .59,  $\Delta R^2 = .01$ .

Table 9

	Step Two			St	Step Three			
	β	t	Р	β	t	р		
Commitment	11	-1.66	.10	11	-1.16	.25		
Social Identification	.48	7.49	<.001	.48	7.48	<.001		
Openness	02	-0.32	.75	02	-0.33	.74		
Commitment x Identity	.04	0.66	.51	.04	0.66	.51		
Identity x Openness	07	-1.16	.25	07	-1.12	.26		
Commitment x Openness	01	-0.21	.84	01	-0.21	.84		
Comm. x Open x Ident.				.02	0.24	.81		

Study 2: Step Two and Step Three Models Predicting Voice

**Step Three.** Lastly, a three-way interaction effect of the predictor variables was entered in the Step Three model. Once again, the model explained a significant

amount of variance in voice F(7, 184) = 8.47, p < .001,  $\mathbb{R}^2 = .22$ , but the only significant predictor of voice was a main effect of social identification,  $\beta = .48$ , t(185)= 7.48, p < .001 (see Table 9). This model did not yield any improvements over Step Two, F(1, 184) = 0.06, p = .81,  $\Delta \mathbb{R}^2 = .00$ . In light of the findings from the three models results suggested that only social identification with the parent organization was a reliable predictor of voice. This finding is somewhat inconsistent with the expectation that individuals highly committed to a focal goal would also be motivated to exercise voice when in an open parent group.

## 8.4 Discussion

Results of Study 2 differed somewhat from expectations. In my predictions, I hypothesized a three-way interaction effect of commitment to the organization's cause, identification with one's group, and perceptions of a group's openness on schism and voice. Instead, a significant negative effect of social identification on schism was found, consistent with Sani's (2008) model of subversion. However, a significant two-way interaction effect of commitment and openness was detected. Specifically, commitment to the organizational cause at high, but not low, levels openness increased support for a schism when controlling for social identification.

These results suggest that commitment to a particular focal goal can increase the desire to split from a group pursuing more harmonious, moderate means (e.g., with less demanding effort requirements) to form a new group that will pursue the goal more single-mindedly (e.g., with more stringent effort requirements for members). Furthermore, the interaction with openness suggests that a moderate group's willingness to compromise with a more extreme faction can attenuate support for a split among the highly committed in the group. This finding is consistent with Sani and Todman (2002) where lack of voice was found to exacerbate intentions to leave the Anglican Church for another religious denomination. However, whereas Sani and Todman (2002) measured disagreement with a norm directly, my finding points to an antecedent of such disagreement—strong commitment to a particular focal goal that increases the appeal of more extreme means.

Study 2 is also consistent with evidence from mental contrasting research that thinking about both positive and negative aspects of a goal can increase commitment (Oettingen et al., 2001, 2009, 2010). Notably, in order to maximize the impact of the manipulation, my low commitment condition increased the saliency of an alternative goal. This may have worked to decrease commitment to the focal group goal through inhibition, as has been found in goal shielding research (Shah et al., 2002). One implication of this finding, therefore, is that increasing the saliency of alternative goals could help keep group members on the path of moderation.

Another objective of Study 2 was to investigate the relationship between support for schism and use of voice. I expected voice to be the response of group members who were highly committed to the group goal and more attracted to the counterfinal means, but wanted to maintain group cohesion. Importantly, results regarding voice differed from simply being a mirror image of schism. Instead, identification with the group was the only predictor of motivation to speak up about the disagreement.

This finding was, in some ways, discrepant from Packer's normative conflict model (Packer, 2009; Packer & Chasteen, 2010) in which disagreement with a norm

and high social identity increase the likelihood that someone will voice their concerns in a group. However, this could reflect methodological differences reflecting an emphasis on measuring *dissent* in normative conflict model research whereas my measure of voice more broadly captured a willingness to express *any* opinion to find a solution. In line with this, strong group identification might motivate individuals who preferred either means to speak up and fulfill their duty as 'good' group members.

This is consistent with evidence from the organizational psychology literature that has support the importance of work-group and organizational identification in predicting voice (Liu, Zhu, & Yang, 2010; Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008). More generally, this pattern could reflect the voice is considered an other-oriented behavior aimed at improving the group (Morrison, 2014). Interestingly, commitment to the organization's cause was trending towards a negative relationship with voice. It is somewhat unclear what could underlie this trending relationship. On the one hand, individuals who are highly committed to the organizational cause could be holding back their opinions in order to minimize the possibility of disagreement interrupting progress on the group goal. However, the relationship between commitment and schism at low levels of openness, and the negative correlation between schism and voice suggests the need to further investigate implications of my model on voice in Study 3.

It should also be noted that, although Study 2 detected greater support for schism among participants assigned to the high (vs. low) commitment condition when the group was portrayed as less open to influence, scores for voice were higher than support for schism in all conditions. In other words, participants greatly preferred to

express their opinions about ways to deal with the conflict over means selection over the possibility of splitting from the group. While the factors of commitment to the organization's goal and perceptions of the group's openness could explain relative differences in support for schism, it would be misleading to suggest that individuals highly committed to their organization's goal preferred forming a splinter group.

One reason for this could be the hypothetical nature of the scenario and moderate levels of conflict over the preferred group means (i.e., extent of participation requirements). Support for schism may only rise above other methods of dealing with conflict over moderate and extreme means when the issues are seen as highly consequential. Indeed, examples from the literature on schisms typically revolve around highly charged issues in religion and politics (Sani & Pugliese, 2008; Sani & Todman, 2002). With this in mind, Study 3 sought to test my motivational model of schisms in a real-world, highly consequential context: the Democratic party.

# Chapter 9: Study 3: The Role of Splinter Group Efficacy <u>9.1 Overview</u>

The objective of Study 3 was two-fold. First, Study 3 introduced another form of expectancy in the model. Whereas Study 2 explored beliefs related to the openness of the parent group, an expectancy related to the parent group, Study 3 examined the role of expectancy related to the perceived effectiveness of a splinter group. Thus far, the reported studies have involved scenarios in which a splinter group likely would have been at least moderately effective. In particular, Pilot Studies 1 and 3 involved the US, a powerful nation capable of acting on its own, leaving an international organization. Furthermore, Pilot Study 2 involved states leaving a national organization to form environmental policy, something that could be enacted successfully at state levels. Moreover, participants in Study 1 were asked about splitting to form a group that would be highly effective at achieving the focal goal of raising money for a cause, as the splinter group members were known to advocate donating more. Given that previous studies tested my model in the context of moderately effective splinter groups, the role of splinter group efficacy remained to be explored.

A second objective of Study 3 was to explore the utility of the model in understanding support for splitting from a long-standing political group that would have important real-world consequences. As exemplified by the turmoil of the 2016 elections, schisms from existing political groups are a contemporary threat, representing a fascinating real-world context to test my model of group schisms. Political parties are a particularly interesting context to examine the question of group

schism because the goals they serve are explicit and manifold—economic, environmental, and social—while also being an important source of social categorization in society (Huddy, 2001). As a result, there are many different opportunities to disagree with the group on a given issue while still maintaining allegiance with the party.

The relatively high level of support for third party candidates among Millennials in the 2016 presidential election (Cohen, Luttig, & Rogowski, 2016) and the prevalence of anti-establishment beliefs (Oliver & Rahn, 2016) suggest that many individuals are unsatisfied with both the Democratic and Republican parties, and are willing to consider splitting. Despite this surge in interest, there are many institutional barriers to the success of a third party, including exclusion from debates and restrictive ballet access regulations (Amy, 1993; Gillespie, 2012). As a result, perceptions that third parties are unlikely to be effective in the American electoral system likely limit their appeal. The saliency of concerns about the feasibility of third parties makes for an especially appropriate context to study the role of splinter group efficacy on schisms.

In light of the above, Study 3 tested the hypothesized roles of personal commitment, social identity, and perceptions of a potential splinter group's efficacy in the context of a concern that was a central focus of disagreement in the Democratic presidential primaries—how to reduce inequality. Drawing from motivational frameworks that deem expectancy to be a necessary precursor to action (Atkinson, 1964), I predicted that support for a schism will be low for everyone when perceptions of a potential splinter political party's effectiveness are low. In such

cases, even individuals highly committed to reducing inequality with weak Democrat identities would not want to leave the party because the splinter group would not help them achieve their goal.

When perceptions of a potential splinter party's efficacy are high, however, I expected an interaction effect of commitment to reducing inequality and identification with the Democratic Party. When Democratic Party identification is low, I expected commitment to reducing inequality to be strongly related to support for a schism. When Democratic Party identification is high, however, I expected the relationship between commitment to reducing inequality and support for a schism to be weakened, as these individuals might be inclined to stick with the Democratic Party for other needs (e.g., affiliation). The hypothesized interaction effect of splinter group efficacy, commitment to reducing inequality, and identification with the Democratic party are illustrated in Figure 6.



Figure 9. Hypothesized three-way interaction pattern.

#### 9.2 Method

#### 9.2.1 Sample Size Considerations and Participants

Similar to Study 2, Study 3 aimed to test a three-way interaction, therefore I aimed to recruit over 200 participants. Specifically, American adults who identified as Democrat or leaning Democrat were recruited online through posts on various discussion forums frequented by Democrats and by posting on comment threads for articles related to the Democratic party. 356 participants began the survey, but only 277 continued to its end. Of those, 24 failed an attention check, yielding a final sample of 253. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 73 (M = 38.37, SD = 14.41) and 52.4% were men. To minimize incentives for non-Democrats to misrepresent their political leanings to take the survey, no compensation was offered for the study.

A greater percentage of participants reported supporting Sanders (65.5%) than Clinton (29.3%) with a minority having no preference (5.2%). There were not only a greater number of Sanders supporters, but Sanders supporters were more enthusiastic than the Clinton supporters, as illustrated in Figure 7. While not representative of Democrats' attitudes during the primary, when Clinton was favored by more supporters than Sanders (Pew, 2016a), a large number of strong Sanders supporters presented an excellent opportunity to test my hypotheses regarding desires to schism from the Democratic party.



Figure 10. Figure depicting distribution of support for each candidate.

### 9.2.2 Procedure

Participants completed a series of scales online. First, participants completed measures of their social identification with and embeddedness in the Democratic party. Participants then rated the extent to which they were committed to reducing economic inequality in particular on a Likert-type scale because it was the focal goal related to our questions about schism.

After completing these items, participants read a brief summary of the disagreements over how to reduce economic inequality that were manifest in the Democrat party's presidential primaries. Consistent with results of the primaries, the majority of Democrats were be described as favoring relatively moderate methods of reducing economic inequality that were reflected in Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton's campaign including increasing the minimum wage to \$12/hr, increasing taxes on capital gains, introducing a tax credit for families with high medical expenses, and limiting tuition fees to 10% of a family's income. Modeled after Bernie Sanders' platform, a faction of Democrats will be described as wanting to reduce

economic inequality by more extreme methods including increasing the federal minimum wage to \$15/hr, increasing several taxes on the wealthy, introducing single-payer universal health care, and making tuition free at public institutions of higher education.

After reading the descriptions of different policies to reduce inequality, participants them on their approach to reducing inequality on their counterfinality. Finally, participants indicated their willingness to split from the Democratic party to form a new party to pursue Sanders-like policies for reducing inequality and the extent to which they desired to voice their opinions about the issues to other Democratic Party members.

## 9.2.3 Measures

All scales will use response categories ranging from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) unless otherwise noted. Full measures and other materials can be found in Appendix C.

**Social Identification and Group Embeddedness.** Social identification (M = 4.44, SD = 1.53;  $\alpha = .96$ ) and group embeddedness (M = 4.18, SD = 1.49;  $\alpha = .94$ ) were measured with the same scales as Study 2, but adapted for the Democratic party (e.g., '*It would be difficult for me to leave the Democratic party*'; '*I feel a bond with the Democratic Party*').

**Personal Commitment.** Personal commitment to reducing economic inequality in the US was assessed with the same four Likert-type items used in Study 2, but adapted for the goal of reducing inequality (e.g., '*Reducing economic inequality is an important cause to me*'; M = 5.68, SD = 1.16;  $\alpha = .82$ ). Participants

were also asked to rank the importance of five policy issues including economic inequality, accessible health care, environmentalism, providing foreign aid, and countering terrorism in case variability in the Likert-type measure was low.

**Support for Sanders.** Support for Sanders was assessed with a single 7-point bipolar item ranging from 1 (*Strongly Preferred Sanders*) to 7 (*Strongly Preferred Clinton*). This item was reverse-scored such that greater scores reflected greater support of Sanders (M = 5.02, SD = 2.16).

**Means Counterfinality.** Counterfinality of each approach was assessed with three items similar to Study 2 (e.g., '*The types of policies advocated for by [Bernie Sanders/Hillary Clinton] would require a lot of sacrifice from Americans*') rated on 5-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 5 (*Strongly Agree*). Counterfinality perceptions for Sanders ( $\alpha = .70$ ) and Clinton ( $\alpha = .78$ ) policies showed adequate reliability.

**Means Extremeness.** Extremeness of Sanders' and Clinton's policies regarding the reduction of inequality was assessed with a single item (*'The types of policies advocated for by [Bernie Sanders/Hillary Clinton] are extreme'*) with response categories ranging from scales ranging from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 5 (*Strongly Agree*).

**Splinter Group Efficacy.** Perceptions of the potential effectiveness of a splinter political party was assessed with four items (*'If the Democratic party split, the faction would be able to form a successful new political party'; 'The new political party would be the best option to reduce inequality in the long term'; M = 3.66, SD = 1.49; \alpha = .88). Two items explicitly mentioned long-term effectiveness to address* 

possible restrictions in range relating to short-term effectiveness. In the end, however, all items loaded adequately on a single dimension and an overall effectiveness index was computed.

**Support for Schism.** Participants were instructed to respond to items measure the support for schism while thinking about the possibility of splitting up the Democratic party over approaches to reducing inequality. Four items adapted from Naus et al. (2007) were employed but adapted for the Democratic party context (e.g., '*I want to leave the Democratic party for another party;* '*I want to actively explore how we could successfully split the Democratic party*'; M = 3.61, SD = 1.66;  $\alpha = .91$ ).

**Voice.** In assessing voice, participants were asked to think about how they have reacted to disagreements within the Democratic party over approaches to reducing inequality. Four items ('*I want to express my opinions in discussions about the issue with other Democratic party members*'; '*I want to discuss the problem with local Democratic party leaders and try to work out a solution together*'; M = 4.67, *SD* = 1.22;  $\alpha = .81$ ) adapted from Naus et al. (2007) were employed to create an index of voice.

## 9.3 Results

#### 9.3.1 Means Perceptions

An assumption of my motivational model of group schisms is that individuals highly committed to a focal goal are more attracted to counterfinal, or extreme, means and groups. Thus, my model's application to the context of the Democratic Party would only be reasonable if Bernie Sanders' policies were in fact considered more

counterfinal and extreme than those of Hillary Clinton. Accordingly, I first tested whether this assumption was true before testing the model to predict schism.

**Counterfinality.** Five participants who completed the other survey items failed to complete the measures of counterfinality, yielding a final sample size of 248 for comparisons of mean perceptions. A paired samples *t*-test was performed to compare perceptions of the counterfinality of the policies to reduce inequality advocated by Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton. As expected, Sanders' policies (M = 2.95, SD = 1.03) were perceived as significantly more counterfinal than those of Clinton (M = 2.76, SD = 0.82), t(247) = 2.86, p < .01, d = 0.18.

**Extremeness.** Ten participants who completed the other survey items failed to complete the measures of extremeness, yielding a final sample size of 243 for comparisons of mean perceptions. A paired samples *t*-test was also performed to compare perceptions of the extremeness of policies to reduce inequality advocated by Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton. Also consistent with expectations, Sanders' policies (M = 2.88, SD = 1.35) were perceived as significantly more extreme than those of Clinton (M = 2.18, SD = 0.99), t(242) = 7.14, p < .001, d = 0.47.

#### 9.3.2 Commitment to Reducing Inequality and Support for a Schism

Similar to analyses in Study 2, a hierarchical regression approach was employed in which regression models of increasing complexity were tested. Step One tested a model with main effects of commitment to economic inequality, identification with the Democratic party, and perceptions of a potential splinter group's effectiveness. Next, Step Two included second-order interactions of these predictors in the model. Finally, a model including the hypothesized three-way

interaction was tested. All predictors were standardized for analysis. Bivariate correlations of are reported in Table 10. Results related to embeddedness were again very similar to social identification, therefore only the results for identification are described here.

#### Table 10

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Democratic Party Identification						
2. Party Embeddedness	.76***					
3. Commitment to Reducing Ineq.	.02	.08				
4. Support for Sanders	31***	30***	.08			
5. Effectiveness of Splinter Group	26***	22***	03	.40***		
6. Support for Schism	44***	39***	01	.45***	.81***	
7. Voice	.33***	.43***	.33***	14*	22**	21***

 $C_{1} = 1 + 2 D^{1} + C_{2} + C_{2} + 1 + C_{2} + (M - 252)$ 

*Note*. \* p < .05, \*\* p < .001, \*\*\* p < .001

Step One. Overall, the Step One model of main effects explained a significant amount of variance in support for splitting from the Democratic party, F(3, $(249) = 201.35, p < .001, R^2 = .70$ . Specifically, there was no main effect of commitment on support for a schism,  $\beta = .02$ , t(249) = 0.47, p = .64. However, there was a significant negative relationship between Democratic party social identification and support for a schism,  $\beta = -.25$ , t(249) = -7.09, p < .001. Finally, there was a strong relationship between perceptions of the effectiveness of a potential splinter party and support for a schism,  $\beta = .74$ , t(185) = 20.93, p < .001.

Step Two. With second order interactions now included in the model, Step Two explained a significant amount of variance in support for schism from the Democratic party, F(6, 246) = 103.08, p < .001,  $\mathbb{R}^2 = .71$ . Full results are presented in Table 11. As in Step One, social identification with the Democratic party was negatively associated with support for a schism,  $\beta = .26$ , t(246) = -7.17, p < .001. In addition, perceptions of splinter group effectiveness were positively associated with support for a schism,  $\beta = .26$ , t(246) = -7.17, p < .001. In addition, perceptions of splinter group effectiveness were positively associated with support for a schism,  $\beta = .75$ , t(246) = 20.76, p < .001. Finally, there was a marginal interaction effect of commitment to reducing economic inequality and party identification,  $\beta = -.06$ , t(246) = -1.79, p = .08. However, since this interaction did not reach significance, I did not probe it here. In light of only a marginal second-order interaction effect, Step Two did not significantly improve on Step One in explaining support for a split from the Democratic party, F(3, 246) = 2.11, p = .10,  $\Delta R^2 = .01$ .

Table 11

Study 3: Step Two and Step Three Models Predicting Support for a Schism

	Step Two			St	Step Three			
	В	Т	Р	В	Т	Р		
Commitment	.02	0.51	.61	.03	0.80	.42		
Social Identification	26	-7.17	< .001	26	-7.22	< .001		
Splinter Group Efficacy	.75	20.86	< .001	.76	20.86	< .001		
Commitment x Identity	06	-1.79	.08	07	-1.83	.07		
Identity x Efficacy	.05	1.37	.17	.04	0.99	.32		
Commitment x Efficacy	06	-1.51	.13	06	-1.60	.11		
Comm. x Eff. x Ident.				.04	1.16	.25		
**Step Three**. A three-way interaction effect of commitment to reducing inequality, party identification, and splinter group efficacy was included in the Step Three model, which explained a significant amount of variance in support for a schism from the Democratic party, F(7, 245) = 88.67, p < .001,  $R^2 = .72$ . Results from Table 10 revealed similar effects as in Step Two. Most importantly, the hypothesized three-way interaction effect was non-significant,  $\beta = .04$ , t(245) = 1.16, p = .25. Accordingly, the Step Three model did not significantly increase the amount of variance explained in support for a split from the Democratic party, F(1, 245) =1.34, p = .25,  $\Delta R^2 = .00$ .

Results for the effect of commitment to reducing inequality were inconsistent with expectations; however, this may be attributable to the finding that commitment to reducing inequality was unrelated to support for Sanders during the primaries.<sup>3</sup> As demonstrated in the results comparing perceptions of Clinton's and Sanders' policies, Sanders was considered the more extreme candidate. Accordingly, I expected a positive association between commitment to reducing inequality and support for Sanders, but this was not the case. In light of this, I sought to test an interaction effect with a more proximal indicator of support for more extreme left-wing policies support for Sanders during the primaries, which might perform superior to a model with commitment more broadly.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Likert-type measure of commitment to reducing inequality was unrelated to support for Sanders, but a ranking measure yielded results more consistent with expectations. Participants who ranked reducing economic inequality higher as a priority exhibited greater support for Bernie Sanders (r = .14, p = .03) whereas ranking counterterrorism higher as a priority was associated with less Sanders support (r = .24, p < .001). Ranking of the other issues (environmentalism, health care, and foreign aid) was unrelated to candidate preference.

#### 9.3.3 Sanders Support and Support for a Schism

Step One. The main effects of Sanders support, party identification, and splinter group efficacy were included in Step One, explaining a significant amount of variance in support for a schism, F(3, 249) = 207.97, p < .001,  $R^2 = .71$ . Support for Sanders was positively associated with desire to split from the Democratic party,  $\beta =$ .09, t(249) = 2.45, p = .02. In addition, identification with the Democratic party was negatively associated with support for a schism,  $\beta = .23$ , t(249) = -6.39, p < .001. Finally, splinter group efficacy was also positively associated with desire to split from the Democratic party,  $\beta = .71$ , t(249) = 19.04, p < .001. While support for Sanders was a better predictor than commitment to inequality, which was initially tested, its relationship with support for schism was relatively independent of party identification and perceptions of splinter group efficacy, as the pattern of their relationships with schism were similar to what was seen in the model with commitment.

Step Two. Second order interaction effects were then included in Step Two,  $F(6, 246) = 100.75, p < .001, R^2 = .71$ . Full results of the Step Two model are reported in Table 12. Once again, all of the main effects were significantly associated with desire to split from the Democratic party. However, there were no significant second-order interaction effects. As a result, Step Two did not yield an improved model over Step One,  $F(3, 246) = 0.55, p = .65, \Delta R^2 = .00$ .

#### Table 12

	Step Two			Ste	Step Three		
	В	t	р	β	t	р	
Sanders Support	.10	2.36	.02	.09	2.23	.03	
Social Identification	24	-6.43	< .001	27	-7.01	<.001	
Splinter Group Efficacy	.71	18.72	<.001	.76	18.18	<.001	
Support x Identity	01	15	.88	.01	0.36	.72	
Identity x Efficacy	.05	1.25	.21	.02	0.34	.73	
Support x Efficacy	.03	0.63	.53	01	-0.24	.81	
Supp. x Eff. x Ident.				.12	2.62	.01	

Study 3: Alternative Step Two and Three Models Predicting Support for a Schism

Step Three. The third-order interaction effect was entered, F(6, 246) = 100.75, p < .001,  $\mathbb{R}^2 = .71$ . Full results of the Step Two model are reported in Table 12. Once again, all of the main effects were significantly associated with desire to split from the Democratic party. In addition, the hypothesized three-way interaction was significant,  $\beta = .12$ , t(245) = 2.62, p = .01. Accordingly, Step Three yielded a significant increase in the variance explained in support for a schism, F(1, 245) = 6.88, p = .01,  $\Delta \mathbb{R}^2 = .01$ . In light of the significant three-way interaction in an improved model of Step Three, I proceeded to probe the interaction.

To probe the three-way interaction, I examined the two-way interaction effect of Sanders support and Party identification at low (-1 SD) and high levels (+1 SD) of perceived effectiveness of a splinter party. At low levels of perceived effectiveness, there was a marginally significant interaction effect,  $\beta = -.08$ , t(245) = -1.72, p = .09. The interaction effect of Sanders support and Party identification on support for schism at high levels of perceived effectiveness was also marginal,  $\beta = .11$ , t(245) = 1.90, p = .06. Given these marginal effects, I conducted further analyses employing the Johnson-Neyman technique (Johnson & Neyman, 1936), which identifies the values of a moderator at which an effect is significant. This technique identified significant interaction effects at -1.24 and +1.11 standard deviations from the mean of perceived effectiveness. These values were equivalent to scores of 1.55 and 5.67 on the Likert scale, with 14.62% and 14.23% of observations falling below and above these values, respectively. With a reasonable amount of data falling within the ranges identified by the Johnson-Neyman technique, I defined low and high levels of perceived splinter group effectiveness at these levels to probe the detected three-way interaction.



*Figure 11*. Interaction of Sanders support and identification with the Democratic party at low and high levels of perceived effectiveness of a splinter group.

At low levels of perceived effectiveness, a significant negative interaction between Sanders support and Party identification was found,  $\beta = -.12$ , t(245) = -2.07, p = .04. In order to probe this two-way interaction, I examined the effect of support for Sanders at weak (-1 SD) and strong (+1 SD) levels of party identification. Simple slopes analyses yielded a significant positive relationship between Sanders support and support for a schism at weak levels of identification,  $\beta = .18$ , t(245) = -2.35, p = .02. In contrast, support for Sanders was unrelated to support for a schism at strong levels of identification,  $\beta = .02$ , t(245) = 0.35, p = .73.

As illustrated in Figure 11, however, support for a schism was very low regardless of identification with the Democratic party or primary support when a possible splinter party was viewed as likely to be ineffective. Indeed, the interaction pattern might reflect a broader disengagement from the Democratic Party if not a motivated split to pursue issues like societal inequality more vigorously.

At high levels of perceived effectiveness, there was a significant positive interaction between Sanders support and Party identification,  $\beta = .13$ , t(245) = 2.04, p = .04. Once again, I proceeded to examine the relationship between Sanders support and support for a schism at weak (-1 SD) and strong (+1 SD) levels of party identification. Results yielded a non-significant relationship between Sanders support and support for a schism at weak levels of identification,  $\beta = -.03$ , t(245) = -0.28, p =.78. In contrast, support for Sanders was positively related to support for a schism at strong levels of identification,  $\beta = .19$ , t(245) = 2.51, p = .01.

Examining these patterns in Figure 11, one can see that support for a schism is relatively high for everyone when effectiveness of a potential splinter group is perceived to be high. However, strong identification was particularly helpful in mitigating the appeal of a schism among Clinton supporters. Sanders supporters, on the other hand, were still drawn to the idea of supporting a schism when strongly identified with the Democratic Party when the splinter group was viewed as likely to be effective.

**Comparisons of Model Complexity.** A significant 3-way interaction was detected, but the strength of the main effect of perceived efficacy might raise questions about the necessity of such a complex model. To address questions about parsimony, I conducted a series of model comparisons with a more conservative analysis that penalizes for model complexity to strike a balance between the number of predictors in my model and the amount of variance explained in support for a schism. I computed Akaike Information Criterion corrected for sample size (AIC<sub>c</sub>) values for models of differing complexity: the full model with the 3-way interaction, a less complex model with 2-way interactions but no 3-way interaction, and a model with only main effects of Sanders support, identification with the democratic party, and perceived efficacy of a potential splinter group.

The AIC<sub>c</sub> can be used to select the model that best approximates truth relative to a set of candidate models given the data, as indicated by the lowest AIC<sub>c</sub> value among the specified models (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). These AIC<sub>c</sub> values can then be transformed into AIC<sub>c</sub> weights that represent conditional probabilities describing the evidence in favor of a model given the observed data and the alternative models to which they are being compared. In other words, the AIC<sub>c</sub> weight values are subject to change across different samples from the same population, and should be interpreted as evidence in favor of a model compared to other candidate models given a sample of observed data, but not as evidence that a given model is "true" (Burnham & Anderson, 2002; Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004).

A summary of the AIC<sub>c</sub> model comparisons is presented in Table 13. Results of model comparisons found that the best fit for the data was the most complex model with a three-way interaction effect of support for Sanders, party identification, and perceived efficacy of a potential splinter group. Specifically, the AIC<sub>c</sub> weights indicated an 83% chance that the 3-way interaction model was the best model out of the three candidate models, given the observed data. These results suggest that interpreting the 3-way interaction pattern is important even in light of the very strong main effect of perceived efficacy of the potential splinter group.

Table 13

Model selection results with models ranked according to AIC<sub>c</sub>

Model	AIC <sub>c</sub>	$\Delta \operatorname{AIC}_{c}$	$AIC_c$ wt
1. 3-way Interaction Model	-306.01	0	.83
2. Main effects Model	-301.65	4.36	.09
3. 2-way Interaction Model	-301.19	4.82	.07

*Note*: AIC<sub>c</sub> = AIC corrected for sample size,  $\Delta$  AIC<sub>c</sub> = difference between model AIC<sub>c</sub> and AIC<sub>c</sub> value of the best model, AIC<sub>c</sub> wt = relative likelihood that a model is the best given the data.

#### 9.3.4 Voice

#### Voice

A similar hierarchical regression procedure was used to test the role of commitment to reducing inequality, social identification with the Democratic party, and perceptions of a splinter group's efficacy in predicting voice. Step One. Overall, the Step One model of main effects explained a

significant amount of variance in voice, F(3, 249) = 24.77, p < .001,  $\mathbb{R}^2 = .23$ . Specifically, there was a main effect of commitment on support for a schism,  $\beta = .32$ , t(249) = 5.78, p < .001. In addition, there was a significant positive relationship between Democratic party social identification and support for a schism,  $\beta = .28$ , t(249) = 4.93, p < .001. Finally, there was a significant relationship between perceptions of the effectiveness of a potential splinter party and support for a schism,  $\beta = .14$ , t(249) = -2.44, p = .02.

**Step Two.** Next, second order interactions were entered into the Step Two model, F(6, 246) = 12.99, p < .001,  $R^2 = .24$ . Full results are reported in Table #. The same main effects emerged as in Step One, but there were no significant interaction effects. In line with this, Step Two did not significantly improve the amount of variance explained in voice from Step One, F(3, 246) = 1.17, p = .32,  $\Delta R^2 = .01$ .

**Step Three.** Next, the third-order interaction was entered into the Step Three model, F(7, 245) = 11.54, p < .001,  $\mathbb{R}^2 = .25$ . Full results of Step Three are also reported in Table #. The same main effects emerged as in Step One and Two, but the third-order interaction effect was non-significant,  $\beta = .09$ , t(245) = 1.54, p = .12. Accordingly, Step Three did not significantly improve the amount of variance explained in voice, F(1, 245) = 2.38, p = .12,  $\Delta \mathbb{R}^2 = .01$ . Based on these results, the Step One model in which only main effects of commitment to reducing inequality, identification with the Democratic party, and perceptions of a splinter group's efficacy predict voice.

#### Table 14

	Step Two			St	Step Three		
	β	t	р	В	t	р	
Commitment	.32	5.74	<. 001	.34	5.96	<.001	
Social Identification	.28	4.84	< .001	.28	4.78	< .001	
Splinter Group Efficacy	15	-2.50	.01	-014	-2.30	.02	
Commitment x Identity	08	-1.44	.15	09	-1.49	.14	
Identity x Efficacy	.06	1.05	.29	.04	0.99	.32	
Commitment x Efficacy	.02	0.40	.69	.02	.29	.78	
Comm. x Eff. x Ident.				.09	1.54	.13	

Study 3: Step Two and Step Three Models Predicting Voice

Since support for Sanders was a better predictor of desire to split from the Democratic party, I also tested a model with Sanders support to explain schism. Support for Sanders was not a significant predictor of voice behavior ( $\beta = .02, p = .65$ ) and including it in the model instead of commitment to reducing inequality did not change the relationships of social identification or splinter group efficacy with voice. Thus, I focused on the model including commitment to reducing inequality in my discussion instead.

# 9.4 Discussion

Results from Study 3 provide insight into processes underlying the desire to form a splinter group in a real-world setting with potentially serious consequences. While results were not entirely consistent with predictions, they largely supported hypotheses regarding social identification with the parent group and perceptions of the potential splinter group's efficacy. Specifically, social identification with the Democratic party was generally associated with weaker desire to form a new group. This finding echoes results from Study and 2, which found main effects of social identification. In contrast, perceptions of the potential splinter group's efficacy were associated with greater desire to form a new political group. While, a three-way interaction qualified these main effects to an extent, but the interaction seemed driven by surprising effects of candidate preference. Finally, Study 3 also provided additional insight into factors that motivate group members to voice their concerns and opinions.

Unexpectedly, magnitude of commitment to reducing inequality was unrelated to support for Sanders, the more extreme option in the primaries. The mean level of commitment to reducing inequality was very high in the sample, and this could be indicative of a ceiling effect. Alternatively, this finding might reflect the fact that the defining difference between Sanders and Clinton supporters was not in their commitment to reducing inequality, despite the centrality of inequality in Sanders' campaign rhetoric (Sanders, 2016), but in their commitment to competing goals. For example, a Pew survey (2016b) suggested that Sanders and Clinton supporters differ most extensively in their attitudes regarding the right role for the US in the world. In this case, considerations about splitting up the Democratic party may not have overlapped perfectly with concerns over reducing inequality, leaving support for Sanders as the better predictor.

Aside from the inclusion of support for Sanders in the model instead of the originally intended commitment to reducing inequality, results from Study 3 yielded findings somewhat consistent with expectations for the effects of splinter group efficacy and social identification with the parent group. Overall, the strongest predictor of support for a schism was the potential splinter group's perceived efficacy. Participants who had perceptions of low efficacy exhibited very low levels of desire for a schism, even among Sanders supporters. In contrast, those who viewed a potential splinter group as highly effective endorsed a schism much more strongly. This is consistent with basic motivation science that considers expectancy an important determinant of attitudes and behavior (Atkinson, 1964; Kruglanski et al., 2014). However, this finding also differs from collective action research suggesting that efficacy is a weaker predictor of group behavior than other factors (van Zomeren et al., 2008), raising questions about when value or expectancy beliefs are more important in shaping behavior.

As noted, Study 3 yielded a three-way interaction that qualified the strong main effect of splinter group efficacy. Decomposing this 3-way interaction revealed different patterns of 2-way interactions between Sanders support and Democratic Party identification at low and high levels of splinter group efficacy. At low levels of splinter group efficacy, party identification exerted its effect mainly by keeping strongly identified Sanders supporters from showing any desire to support a schism. Interestingly, support for Sanders was associated with relatively greater support for a schism (although still low overall) when weakly identified, perhaps suggesting a general dissatisfaction with the group.

At high levels of splinter group efficacy, however, strong party identification was especially strong in reducing support for a schism among Clinton supporters. That is, strongly identified Sanders supporters were more likely to endorse a split than strongly identified Clinton supporters. Moreover, the difference in support for a schism between Sanders supporters with weak and strong Democratic party identification was smaller than the difference between weakly and strongly identified Clinton supporters. Nonetheless, strong party identification still helped to weaken support for a schism among Sanders supporters who believed that the potential splinter party could be highly effective. Thus, while perceptions of efficacy were of greater importance in determining support for schism, these findings are consistent with the notion that cultivating a sense of identity is another pathway groups can pursue to further reduce group exit. In this sense, results from Study 3 were fairly consistent with findings in Study 1 and 2 with regard to social identification.

Somewhat unexpectedly, among those weakly identified with the Democratic party, Clinton and Sanders supporters both endorsed a group schism to an equally high degree when the potential splinter group was highly effective. Why would a Clinton supporter endorse a split from the party to pursue ideals initially supported by Sanders, the candidate they did *not* support in the primaries? One explanation of this finding could be that the patterns reflect differences in affective and cognitive drivers of political behavior. Party identification is often considered reflective of "affective attachment" to a party (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Burden & Kolfstad, 2005), and anecdotal evidence suggests that Clinton supporters were generally less passionate than Sanders supporters (Healy & Alcindor, 2016). It is

plausible then, that Clinton supporters weakly identified with the Democratic party might represent a group of voters who were more pragmatic than zealous. Accordingly, it would be reasonable for these voters to support a potential splinter party perceived to be highly effective, even if they previously thought a different approach would have been more effective during the primaries.

Study 3 also explored implications of the model for voice behavior. Consistent with Study 2, social identification with the parent group was a significant positive predictor of voice behavior. The more attached one felt to the group, the more one intended to express their opinions about how it should pursue goals surrounding inequality. Again, this is consistent with conceptualizations of voice as group-oriented behavior (Morrison, 2014).

Commitment to reducing inequality was also associated with greater intention to engage in voice behavior, suggesting that people who care more about an issue are more willing to speak up about it. This differed from Study 2 where commitment to a group's focal goal was trending toward a negative relationship with voice, but is more in line with research showing that people who care about an issue are more likely to voice their opinions on the issue, regardless of whether their opinions are consistent with a norm or not (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014).

Finally, perceptions of a potential splinter group's efficacy were negatively associated with voice. Given the strong relationship between splinter group efficacy and support for a schism, this could imply that these individuals would prefer to invest their effort in the new splinter group they perceive to be effective than engage in voice behavior to improve the existing parent group. However, the relationship

might also exist in the opposite direction, with experiences of expressing voice shaping perceptions about the efficacy of the splinter group (vs. parent group). If Democratic party members have given up on trying to voice their opinion due to a lack of receptiveness, then those individuals might begin to perceive a potential splinter group more positively.

# Chapter 10: General Discussion

### 10.1 Summary of Findings

Results from six studies using a mix of hypothetical scenarios and real groups supported a conceptualization of group schisms as a goal-oriented behavior motivated by the desire to achieve a focal group goal. Furthermore, evidence revealed that social identification (Studies 1-3) and expectancy beliefs about both the parent (Study 2) and splinter groups (Study 3) are important contextual factors in driving and restraining the motivation to split from a group. These findings offer important extensions to existing theories of schism and group dissent while focusing on a context of considerable practical significance: understanding how extreme factions break away from more moderate groups. Overall, the present research suggests that studying group processes through the lens of basic motivation science can yield novel insights and provide directions for future research.

#### <u>10.2 Integration with the Literature</u>

#### 10.2.1 Focal Goal Commitment

Consistent with postulations of goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2015; Schumpe et al., 2017) and theories of deviance (Kruglanski et al., 2017), Pilot Studies 1-3 and findings from Study 1 supported the argument that strong commitment to a focal goal increased attraction to counterfinal means, and thereby the desire to splinter into a more extreme group willing to pursue those counterfinal means. In addition, Pilot Study 3 demonstrated that the relationship between goal commitment and the desire to break away into a more extreme group was mediated by perceptions that the group pursuing counterfinal means was more committed to the goal. While previous research from the goal systems perspective has investigated implications of counterfinality for means evaluation in the context of individual goal pursuits (Bélanger et al., 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2015; Schumpe et al., 2017), the present research extended these findings by exploring implications for group processes.

These findings also extend previous work on both group schisms and normative conflict. Sani's (2008) model of group subversion and Packer's (2008) model of normative conflict both begin with some assessment of disagreement with a group's norms. In contrast, my motivational analysis of group schisms identifies an antecedent of such disagreement. That is, my model suggests that individuals who are highly committed to a particular group goal are likely to disagree with choosing moderate means when more extreme (i.e., counterfinal) means are available. Other sources of disagreement might arise in different contexts, but my findings are particularly relevant to explaining the finding that splinter groups are typically more extreme than their parent groups (Dugan & Gibbs, 2009).

The present research focused on the explicit goals of political and social groups, but it is not inconsistent with approaches to extremism that instead focus on implicit motives unrelated to radicals' purported goals. For example, McGregor's (2006) model of compensatory zeal argues that experiences of self-threat increase endorsements of one's cultural worldview to extremes, suggesting that self-threat might increase personal commitment to a group's goal in my model, serving as a catalyst for the preference of extreme means and groups. Similar evidence that significance loss increases extreme worldviews (Webber et al., 2017) points to

additional opportunities to integrate my motivational analysis of group schisms and existing theories explaining extremism.

#### 10.2.2 Social Identity

Evidence from Studies 1-3 suggested that social identification with a parent group reduces the desire for a schism, as individuals want to stick with groups to which they feel attached. This general pattern showed some similarity to the group subversion model of schism (Sani, 2008). Research on group subversion in the context of Italian politics and the Anglican church has demonstrated that lowered identification with the parent group is associated with greater desire to form a schism (Sani & Pugliese, 2008; Sani & Todman, 2002). While my studies were less focused on understanding how social identification with the group might decrease as a result of conflict, they showed similar relationships between social identification and support for a schism.

My findings were less consistent with the normative conflict model approach to understanding disagreements with group norms. The normative conflict model argues that a strong social identity can buffer against disengagement when group members disagree with a norm, steering them towards other responses (Dupuis et al., 2016; Packer & Miners, 2012). Evidence from my studies suggest that social identification with a parent group does not consistently attenuate the attraction of extreme groups to individuals highly committed to a focal goal. Instead, social identification was found to exert a mostly independent, negative effect.

#### 10.2.3 Expectancy Beliefs

Study 2 and 3 revealed that expectancy beliefs are important contextual factors moderating the link between focal goal commitment and support for a schism from a moderate group. In particular, Study 2 found that perceptions of greater openness in a parent group attenuated the relationship between commitment and the desire to split from a moderate group to form a more extreme group. These findings were similar to those of Sani and Todman (2002) in which intentions to split from the Anglican Church were exacerbated when members felt like they did not have the opportunity for their voices to be heard on the central contentious issue at hand, the ordaining of women.

These findings suggest that individuals highly committed to a focal goal might have stronger preferences for counterfinal means than individuals less committed to a focal goal, but these preferences will not translate to leaving the group if they have the opportunity to influence the parent group's direction. Given the potential costs associated with leaving a group (Hart & Van Vugt, 2006), staying in a more moderate group open to change might indeed be the best option to eventually make progress on a focal group goal.

Study 3 tested the role of a different set of expectancy beliefs than those explored in Study 2, finding that perceptions a potential splinter group's efficacy constituted a very strong predictor of support for a schism. As noted above, Sani and Todman (2002) had previously explored some elements of a parent group's openness to voice in relation to schism, but no quantitative research had yet examined the importance of a potential splinter group's efficacy in shaping attitudes about splinter

groups. As such, Study 3 represented an important contribution to the literature on group schisms by exploring a practical limit to the appeal of splinter groups.

Although perceived efficacy of the splinter group moderated the effects of social identification and support for Bernie Sanders on the desire to split from the Democratic Party, it had a striking main effect on support for a schism. Perceptions that the potential splinter party would be effective in achieving its goals, particularly goals related to reducing inequality, were strongly associated with increased support for a splinter group. Interestingly, this finding differs from those in the collective action literature in which group efficacy tends to be less consistent and less important than other factors like perceptions of injustice and social identification (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Hornsey et al., 2006; van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Notably, our study sampled from a population of politically involved Democrats whereas collective action research often concerns attempts to motivate initial political involvement (Becker & Wright, 2011; Duncan, 1999; Postmes & Brunsting, 2002). In other words, our sample already recognized the value in political participation, and the main question at the heart of Study 3 concerned where individuals would invest their resources to achieve their highly-valued goal, which might explain the ultimate importance of effectiveness. These differences highlight a need for additional research to understand when concerns about value or expectancy take precedence in group-oriented behavior.

#### 10.2.4 Voice Behavior

Finally, the present research also revealed that many of the factors involved in motivating group schisms also have implications for voice, but typically by exerting

influence in opposite directions. Both Studies 2 and 3 yielded negative correlations between support for schism and voice behavior, suggesting that voice behavior is often motivated to maintain group cohesion or improve the status of the group (Morrison, 2014). While consistent with the organizational psychology literature more broadly, these findings differ somewhat from the process identified in Dyck and Starke's (1999) stage model of schisms. In their model, resistance, some of which takes the form of voice behavior, leads to eventual group exit, suggesting that voice and intentions to split the group could be positively correlated. One reason for this departure from Dyck and Starke's model could be our measure of voice (Naus et al., 2007), which was based on a scale that did not solely capture the airing of grievances, but also included a slant towards compromise-based conflict resolution. In this context, it would be reasonable to expect compromising conflict resolution strategies to be negatively correlated with support for breaking up an organization.

Consistent with organizational research (Liu et al., 2010), social identification with the parent group was significantly associated with voice in Studies 2 and 3. This finding is again consistent with the notion that the behavior is largely motivated by group-based concerns. These findings are also in line with evidence from the normative conflict in which highly identified group members are more likely to voice concerns about a harmful group norm (Dupuis, Wohl, Packer, & Tabri, 2016; Packer & Chasteen, 2010; Packer & Miners, 2012). However, in contrast to normative conflict research, results from Studies 2 and 3 suggested that disagreement with the group norm was not necessary to motivate high identifiers to engage in voice behavior. Finally, findings from Study 2 diverged somewhat from other

organizational literature suggesting that climates of openness increase voice behavior (Morrison et al., 2011). This could be because my operationalization of openness in Study 2 was mainly rooted in manipulating solicitation of advice and the likelihood that expressing voice would change the course of the organization, whereas openness in the context of organizational psychology often relates to the riskiness of voicing an opinion, which could have more serious implications for behavior (Detert & Burris, 2007).

These findings may not contribute a great deal to the extensive voice literature in organizational psychology, but they build on existing approaches to schism. Social psychological research on schism has tended to focus on schism in isolation as a response to conflict over group norms (Hart & Van Vugt, 2006; Sani, 2008). Examining intentions to engage in voice behavior as an outcome variable, the present research began to explore how group members who did not support schisms would deal with the conflict.

#### 10.2.5 Summary of Contributions

The present research aimed to understand how motivational and group processes shape both the appeal of splinter groups and commitment to parent groups. The conclusions to be drawn from my findings are nuanced, but the gist of my results can be summarized using the framework of driving and restraining forces. My motivational analysis of the phenomenon argued that the schisms often reflect the desire to single-mindedly pursue a focal group goal at the cost of alternative goals that may be valued by other group members. From this perspective, two key factors forming the appeal of extreme splinter groups were explored: personal commitment

to a focal group goal and perceptions of the potential splinter group's efficacy. Using terminology from models of motivation (Kruglanski et al., 2012), these factors were hypothesized- to constitute the *driving force* that motivates group schisms. While observed relationships among focal goal commitment, splinter group efficacy, and support for a schism were not entirely consistent with hypotheses, results generally showed that both contributed to the driving force, increasing support for a schism.

In contrast, social identification with the parent group, an important component of commitment to the group, and the parent group's openness were expected to constitute the *restraining force* against splitting. Findings from the present research was consistent with this, with social identification exhibiting a main effect in reducing desire to split from a group and openness attenuating the driving force of focal goal commitment. Identifying factors that shape both the driving and restraining forces underlying schisms, the present research offers both theoretical contributions and practical implications.

Theoretical Contributions. As reviewed above, the present research offered several theoretical contributions to understanding group schism. First, my findings identified an antecedent of group conflict that can arise over disagreements about appropriate means to a goal. Specifically, my model suggests that high focal goal commitment can lead to a preference for counterfinal means, which are less popular among individuals lower in focal goal commitment. This not only extends existing research on group schisms, but also contributes to the goal systems literature, where there is still much to learn about the implications of counterfinality.

My findings with regard to social identity were fairly consistent with Sani's (2008) group subversion approach to schism, but I was able to extend this model by also examining voice as an alternative response to dealing with group conflict. These findings revealed that social identity not only reduces the desire to join a schism from a parent group, but also motivates active engagement in resolving disagreements that could lead to a schism.

Finally, my model expounded the role of expectancy belief sets related to parent group openness and splinter group efficacy. Previously, the role of expectancy beliefs had not been carefully examined in social psychology theories of schism and dissent, particularly as they related to beliefs about a potential splinter group's efficacy. As such, evidence from my research supporting the importance of including expectancy beliefs in models of schism offer an important extension of existing models of group schisms. In sum, my motivational analysis of group schisms represents a significant development in the social psychological understanding of group schisms, even though results were not always consistent with predictions.

**Practical Contributions.** The proposed research offered insight into how to successfully maintain group cohesiveness when balancing demands of multiple constituents. In an effort to balance the different priorities of its members, groups may find themselves avoiding means to a focal goal that could be detrimental to alternative goals. My model of group schisms suggests that a group's pursuit of moderate means can lead members highly committed to a focal goal to split from the group in order to pursue more extreme, counterfinal means that are viewed as representing greater commitment to a goal. However, my model also suggests that

groups might be able to stem threats of schism by cultivating a strong sense of social identity, creating a group climate of openness to influence, and portraying a splinter group as unlikely to succeed.

To a large extent, the present research was motivated by observations in political science that groups are often more violent than their parent groups (Dugan & Gibbs, 2009; Cronin, 2006). Accordingly, the implications of my results for understanding this phenomenon are an important consideration, and I think my theoretical framework provides novel insight into this issue. First, the present research suggests that group members who are very highly committed to a narrow set of goals find counterfinal means more appealing, and are therefore drawn to forming splinter groups more extreme than their parent groups. My studies examined comparatively mild counterfinal means but, theoretically, these findings should extend to other types of counterfinal means including aggressive acts.

Furthermore, my findings suggest that the parent group's openness to compromise could moderate the appeal of extreme means and groups, but groups might be unwilling to signal an openness to consider certain counterfinal means that are detrimental to closely held cultural values, including violent means. Thus, schisms might be especially likely when factions endorse violence if parent groups do not try to counteract. Findings from Study 3 identify one plausible route to reducing likelihood of schism in this case, however. Specifically, these findings suggest that portraying a potential splinter group as ineffective could help minimize the appeal of a group schism. Preventing a group schism in this case might allow other, less

extreme group members the opportunity to temper some of the more extreme attitudes of others.

#### 10.3 Limitations and Future Directions

#### 10.3.1 Group Schisms vs. Individual Group Exit

The present research offers important advancements in the social psychology of group schisms, but suffers from several limitations worth discussing. The present research examined the use of voice as an alternative to splitting from a parent group, offering insight into one alternative response to group conflict, but did not address potential differences in the processes underlying individual group exit and those involved in group schisms. Research on the roles of social identity (Ellemers et al., 1997) and goal importance (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008) in individual group exit suggest that there may be some overlap in the forces that shape the two, but there are likely important distinctions. For example, the additional component of group schisms involving the exit of multiple group members suggests that factors like identification with a subgroup could play a role. In addition, individual group exit could be precipitated by declining motivation and a desire to disengage from an issue whereas a group schism implies continued mobilization to achieve some goal. Future research would do well to clarify distinct processes underlying group exit and group schism, which tend to be studied in isolation.

#### 10.3.2 A Static Snapshot

The present research offered a fairly static snapshot of group schisms, leaving out dynamic dimensions of motivation and group processes that could shape the

formation of splinter groups. In particular, the present research did not explore temporal dynamics of how group schisms evolve over time. The paradigms used in the present research involved contexts or scenarios in which clear faultlines between a subgroup and the rest of the group were already present. An extension of my model to incorporate temporal dynamics would have to address the initial crystallization of faultlines and possible subgroup identities. Similarly, my studies did not address the role of prolonged group conflict, which is often characteristic of disagreements resulting in group schisms (Dyck & Starke, 1999). While prolonged conflict might affect group schisms through mechanisms already identified in my model (i.e., identification with the parent group, perceptions of the parent group's openness), these possibilities should be tested empirically in future research.

Another limitation in my research was related to the assumption that group schisms arise because groups are tasked with balancing the different priorities of their constituencies. Further, I assumed that groups typically try to balance the various goals of their members concurrently by avoiding counterfinal means that conflict with alternative goals. However, multiple goals can be pursued sequentially instead of concurrently (Orehek & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, 2013), and such goal shifting could have implications for satisfaction among group members. On the one hand, group members could be frustrated if they believe their personal priorities are secondary to other group goals, prompting greater disengagement from the group. On the other hand, group leaders could use this approach to corral group members around a narrow set of goals at a given time, yielding fewer disagreements among group members that could lead to a schism. Incorporating the dynamic aspects of motivation, like goal

shifting, into the model could generate additional insight into motivations underlying group schisms.

#### 10.3.3 Clarifying the Role of Goals vs. Means

My model of group schisms primarily explored the impact of disagreement with a group's chosen means to pursue a goal rather than differences in goals themselves. To the extent that strong commitment to a given goal increases the appeal of counterfinal means through the inhibition of alternative goals (Kruglanski et al., 2015), then it is likely that these individuals differ from their fellow group members not only in their preference for counterfinal means but also in their commitment to alternative goals. These differences in broader goal systems could introduce additional obstacles to group cohesion that were not fully explored in the present research.

More fundamentally, some group schisms may occur as groups' focal goals change over time. In other words, some group members might decide to form a new splinter group if they perceive the group to be pursuing goals they do not care about as individual members. Indeed, my findings from Study 3 suggested that differences between Hillary Clinton supporters and Bernie Sanders supporters may have reflected disagreements over other goals in addition to differences in the strength of their commitment to reducing inequality. Similarly, Pew (2016b) reported thatBernie Sanders supporters did not share the opinion with Clinton supporters that the U.S should take on a leadership role in foreign affairs, which may be considered an important difference in policy goals (not just means), and may have contributed to the desire to split from the Democratic party. As such, a future focus on commitment not

only to a specific focal goal, but also commitment to alternative goals that might be impacted by counterfinal means, might yield a more comprehensive understanding of group schisms.

In addition, findings from Pilot Study 3 that revealed the importance of a group's perceived goal commitment might shed light on how concerns about overlap in both goal and means preferences could lead to similar motives to split from a group. Pilot Study 3 found that individuals highly committed to a focal goal wanted to join a more extreme splinter group because they perceived that group to be more committed to their focal goal than the parent group who avoided counterfinal means. Of course, groups can signal commitment to goals in many different ways, including outright rejection of some goals. Regardless of how a group's commitment to a particular focal goal is signaled, I would expect to find a similar pattern of results. Individuals highly committed to a focal goal should be driven to leave a group they perceive as less committed to their goal for a new group they perceive as more committed regardless of whether that commitment is signaled by rejection of a goal or by the rejection of counterfinal means to a goal. If a group's perceived goal commitment functions similarly in cases of disagreements over goals and disagreements over means to a goal, then I should be able to integrate both drivers of schism into future formulations of my theoretical framework.

#### 10.3.4 Generalizability to Other Group Types

The present research largely focused on membership in politicized and opinion-based groups in which there are clear group goals. Moreover, the observation that splinter groups tend to be more extreme than their parent groups played a role in

motivating the present research, and these findings also typically concern politicallyoriented groups. This might raise questions about the applicability of my model to other types of groups that serve primarily different types of goals (Johnson et al., 2006). It is readily apparent that different types of conflicts can drive different types of groups apart. For example, secession movements around the world, such as those in Quebec and Catalonia, are typically explained as conflicts stemming from perceptions of an identity distinct from the parent group based on unique cultural or historical backgrounds (Guibearneau, 2006). The example of secession movements serves to highlight a central challenge in applying my model to different group contexts. While I think my model of group schisms addresses concepts relevant to most group schisms, including factors related to identity, these factors might hold different levels of importance depending on the context. For example, (lack of) social identification with a parent group might play a central role in national secessionist movements, and concerns about efficacy of an eventually sovereign nation may dominate attitudes to a weaker extent than was seen in my study with Democratic party members. My approach to understanding group schisms will need further theoretical development to understand which motivational and group-based dimensions of my model are most important in different group contexts.

### 10.4 Conclusion

The formation of splinter groups represents an underexamined topic of study in social psychology despite raising questions of practical significance. The present research integrated an understanding of motivation science and group processes to generate novel insights into group schisms with a focus on trying to understand

factors that push more extreme members of a parent group to form splinter groups. Findings underscore the difficulty faced by groups in maintaining satisfaction among a diverse group of members, some who may be more single-minded than others, but also provide guidance on how to maintain group cohesion. Striving to create a strong sense of group identity and encouraging a culture of openness requires sustained and deliberate effort, but they represent pathways to group loyalty. While these findings offered support for several important postulates of my motivational approach to understanding groups schisms, there were several limitations to the reported studies that offer opportunities for future research on group schisms, including the exploration of temporal dynamics and the application of the model to different types of groups. Still, the present research represents a step forward in understanding the fascinating but understudied phenomenon of group schisms.

# Appendices

# Appendix A

### Social Identity Manipulation [Chat script excerpt]

#### Researcher

Before we get started with the main decision making task, we are going to do a bit of an icebreaker for you to get to know your group members better. I'm going to have a couple people talk about their favorite movie genre just to get people more comfortable talking to each other

### Researcher

No volunteers? How about you, Group member 3? What's your favorite kind of movie?

Researcher

Thanks for the answers, everyone! Haha, it's nice that everyone can agree...I think it's good to end things on this positive note and, we'll get on with the study.

# Task Introduction [Chat excerpt]

### Researcher

Okay, let's get started with the study. We are interested in how virtual groups make decisions, so today you will be given a task in which you have to decide on an amount of money to give to a cause (\$1 or \$4 each), and everyone in your group will have to agree on the amount of money to give.

#### Researcher

Please follow this link to answer a few questions (a baseline assessment) and read about the fund you will be donating to: [Study link]

# First Survey

# Social Identity Manipulation Check (adapted from Leach et al., 2008)

*Instructions*: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements in relation to the advocacy group you belong to.

- 1. I feel a bond with the group.
- 2. I feel solidarity with the group.
- 3. I feel committed to the group.
- 4. I am glad to be part of the group.
- 5. I think the group has a lot to be proud of.
- 6. It is pleasant to be in the group.
- 7. Being in the group gives me a good feeling.
- 8. I like my group members.

# State Self-Esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1992)

- 1. I feel confident about my abilities.
- 2. I feel good about myself.

Not at all	A little bit	Somewhat	Very much	Extremely
------------	--------------	----------	-----------	-----------

# **Commitment Manipulation**

Now, we are going to present you with information about the fund that you and your group will have to make your decision about.

[University of Maryland's/Duke University's] Division of Student Affairs established the [UMD Student Crisis Fund/Duke Emergency Aid Fund] in 2001 to keep students on the path to academic success during a personal and unexpected crisis. The Fund helps any currently enrolled student who faces an unanticipated emergency that requires immediate financial need.

Since its creation, the [Student Crisis Fund/Emergency Aid Fund] has replaced textbooks and clothes lost in an off-campus fire, helped a student who was unable to pay for a medical prescription, and even helped pay medical expenses for another student's emergency surgery.

Today, the Fund is a source for financial support for [our own UMD/Duke University's] student community. Any student, a member of the [UMD/Duke] community, or any person concerned about a student can apply for support. Funding is provided by private donations - students who receive money are not required to repay it, but will hopefully make a donation in the future when they are financially stable.

The [UMD Student Crisis Fund/Duke Emergency Aid Fund] enables students experiencing trauma to look to the [University of Maryland/Duke University] community for comfort and a helping hand. You can help keep someone's life on track by donating today.

# **Commitment Manipulation Check**

*Instructions*: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements in relation to the fund described above.

- 1. I am committed to helping raise money for this fund.
- 2. I care about helping this fund raise money.
- 3. Raising money for this fund is not important to me.
- 4. I would feel disappointed if little progress is made in raising money for this fund.

# **Donation Preference**

In this study, you and your group will have to decide to give a certain amount of your compensation to this Fund. You have the option of donating \$1 or \$4 each to the fund.

Before talking to your group members, we would like you to provide your preference. How much would you like to give to the fund at this point?

□ \$1 □ \$4

- .

How strongly do you feel about your preference for the amount you chose?

Weakly Prefer Slig	ghtly Prefer	Moderately Prefer	Strongly Prefer	Very Strongly Prefer
--------------------	--------------	----------------------	-----------------	-------------------------

# **Continuing Chat**

Researcher

Okay, if nobody has questions about what they read then I will continue with the study

Researcher

Alright, to start I am going to ask everyone to state whether they chose the \$1 or \$4 option. Starting with [Participant/Group Member] 1, can you tell everyone what you chose? Then, [Participant/Group Member] 2 can state their preference, then [Participant/Group Member] 3, and so on

•••

# Researcher

Okay, thanks everyone, now I'm going to ask you to complete these other brief questions in this survey and we'll then continue with the discussion: [Second survey link]

# Second Survey

# **Attention Check**

*Instructions:* To make sure you were able to follow your group members' preferences, we'd like you to indicate the number of group members who preferred each option (*not* including your own preference in the count).

- 1. How many group members reported preferring \$1?
- 2. How many group members reported preferring \$4?

# **Group Openness**

*Instructions*: Now that you and your group have shared your preferences with each other, we'd like to ask you a few more questions. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

- 1. There is still opportunity to influence the decision of the group.
- 2. With the breakdown in individual preferences for donations, the outcome of the group discussion is more or less already decided.

### **Filler Questions**

*Instructions:* Thinking about how you plan to interact with your group when you go back to the chat, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

- 1. I will trust the decision-making process of the group without my interference.
- 2. I am confident that any disagreements will be taken care of, without me actively contributing to the decision-making process.
- 3. I assume that, in the end, everything will work out fine.
- 4. I trust the group to solve any problems without my help.
- 5. I don't plan on being active in the decision because I don't care what the group decides.
- 6. I will let my group decide whatever they want because I am not motivated to participate.

### **Schism Chat Procedure**

#### Researcher in direct chat message

Hi [Participant/Group Member 3], your group members [Participants] 2 and 6 asked if they could split into another group. It actually dosen't make a difference to me or the study since it's still early in the procedure. It would take a couple of extra minutes to set up, but that's about it. So I just wanted to check with others, would you want to join them if they split up?

Researcher

I think they're asking because they want to contribute \$4?

#### Researcher

I'm asking everyone, so there is no pressure either way! I guess, if you had to choose between Definitely stay in current group/Leaning toward staying/Leaning toward new group/Definitely want new group, what would you say?

Appendix B							
All scales were rated on the following response categories unless otherwise noted:							

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
----------------------	----------	----------------------	----------------------------------	-------------------	-------	-------------------

# **General Instructions**

Thank you for participating in our study! We are recruiting people who belong to various advocacy groups to better understand how people deal with disagreements in these types of groups. If you consider yourself a member of multiple groups like this, please think of only one when answering questions related to an advocacy group and its cause.

And please remember there are no right or wrong answers to these questions--just answer as honestly and accurately as you can. Your answers will remain completely confidential.

# Social Identification (adapted from Leach et al., 2008)

*Instructions*: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements in relation to the advocacy group you belong to.

- 1. I feel a bond with the group.
- 2. I feel solidarity with the group.
- 3. I feel committed to the group.
- 4. I am glad to be part of the group.
- 5. I think the group has a lot to be proud of.
- 6. It is pleasant to be in the group.
- 7. Being in the group gives me a good feeling.

#### **Embeddedness in the Group** (adapted from Crossley et al., 2007)

*Instructions*: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements in relation to the advocacy group you belong to.

- 1. It would be difficult for me to leave the group.
- 2. I'm too caught up in the group to leave.
- 3. I feel tied to the group.
- 4. I simply could not leave the group.
- 5. It would be easy for me to leave the group. (Reverse scored)
- 6. I am tightly connected to the group
- 7. I often interact with other group members.
- 8. I would sacrifice a lot by leaving the group.
- 9. I have invested a lot in the group.

# Cause

In this study, we are going to ask you some questions about the advocacy group you belong to and the main cause it is pursuing. What cause is the main cause your advocacy group is pursuing? [Free text response]

# Likelihood

How likely is it that significant progress will be made towards this cause in the next year?

Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Somewhat Unlikely	Likely nor Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Likely	Very Likely
------------------	----------	----------------------	---------------------------	--------------------	--------	----------------

# Mental Contrasting Paradigm (adapted from Oettingen et al., 2001)

# Low Commitment

Now, we'd like to ask you about an important health goal you have, something that might sometimes get in the way of dedicating time to the cause you listed earlier. Please list your health goal below.

# Listing Portion

Please list **four positive aspects** associated with achieving the [group cause/health goal] you listed in **the future**.

- 1. [Free text response]
- 2. [Free text response]
- 3. [Free text response]
- 4. [Free text response]

Now, please list **four negative aspects of reality** that could stand in the way of making progress on [the cause/health goal].

- 1. [Free text response]
- 2. [Free text response]
- 3. [Free text response]
- 4. [Free text response]

# Elaboration Section

Now, we would like you to describe a few of the aspects that you mentioned in a bit more detail.

Here is the [first/second] [positive future/negative reality] aspect you mentioned:

Think about this aspect and depict the respective events or experiences in your thoughts as intensively as possible! Take as much time and space as you need to describe the scenario.
## Commitment

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements in relation to the cause you listed earlier: **[piped text]**.

- 1. I am committed to this cause.
- 2. This cause is a priority for me.
- 3. This cause is not important to me.
- 4. I would feel disappointed if little progress were made for this cause. (Reverse Scored)

## Scenario

# Now, you are going to be presented with a hypothetical scenario. Try to read the scenario carefully and really put yourself in the mindset of this situation occurring.

Imagine that the group you are part of is in the process of restructuring some of its guiding principles.

One of the issues being debated relates to the expectations for participation levels among members. Most of the group members are advocating for a requirement to participate in a group meeting once a month with no penalties for missing meetings if members give advanced notice. However, about a third of the group wants to require participation in weekly meetings with penalties for missing meetings, including expulsion from the group, as they think this will help make sure that everyone is engaged in group activities and progress will be made on the organization's main goal.

## High openness

The decision about participation requirements was set to be made in a month, and leaders of your organization say that they are open to revisit the decision after it is made—the policy could be revised based on its results.

## Low openness

The decision about participation requirements was set to be made in a week, and the leaders of the group says that they will not revisit the decision after it is made—it will be group policy for at least a few years.

The disagreements between the group and the minority that wants to strengthen participation requirements have become strong enough that the faction is considering splitting from the group to form their own organization that would pursue the same cause.

## **Means Perceptions**

*Instructions:* Thinking about the scenario described to you here, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

- 1. It would take a lot of effort from members to attend monthly meetings.
- 2. It would take a lot of effort from members to attend weekly meetings.
- 3. Group members would have to sacrifice other parts of their life to attend monthly meetings.
- 4. Group members would have to sacrifice other parts of their life to attend weekly meetings.
- 5. Meeting monthly is an extreme requirement for an organization.
- 6. Meeting weekly is an extreme requirement for an organization.

# **Openness Manipulation Check**

*Instructions*: Thinking about the scenario described to you here, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

- 1. The group's leaders seem open to compromising on participation requirements.
- 2. It is unlikely that the group is willing to consider changing participation requirements in the future.

Support for a Schism (adapted from Naus et al., 2007)

*Instructions*: Thinking about the scenario described to you here, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

- 1. I would support the faction leaving the organization.
- 2. I would want to join the faction in leaving the organization.
- 3. I would want to actively explore how we could successfully split organization.
- 4. I would want to leave the organization for another group.

## Voice

*Instructions*: Thinking about the scenario described to you here, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

- 1. I would express my opinions in a meeting about the issue.
- 2. I would come up with suggestions of how to deal with the disagreements.
- 3. I would try to work out a solution to the benefit of everyone.
- 4. I would discuss the problem with group leaders and try to work out a solution together.

# Bibliography

- Amy, D. J. (2002). Real choices, new voices: How proportional representation elections could revitalize American democracy (2<sup>nd</sup> ed). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Asal, V., Brown, M., & Dalton, A. (2012). Why split? Organizational splits among ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56, 94-117. doi: 10.1177/0022002711429680
- Atkinson, J. W. (1964). *An introduction to achievement motivation*. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.
- Bandura, A. (2000). Exercise of human agency through collective efficacy. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *9*, 75-78.
- Bashshur, M. R., & Oc, B. (2015). When voice matters: A multilevel review of the impact of voice in organizations. *Journal of Management*, 41, 1530-1554. doi: 10.1177/0149206314558302
- Batson, C. D., Ahmad, N., & Stocks, E. L. (2011). Four forms of prosocial motivation: Egoism, altruism, collectivism, and principlism. In D. Dunning (Ed.), *Social Motivation* (pp. 103-126). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Becker, J. C., & Wright, S. C. (2011). Yet another dark side of chivalry: Benevolent sexism undermines and hostile sexism motivates collective action for social change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101, 62-77.

- Bélanger, J. J., Caouette, J., Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. (2014). The psychology of martyrdom: Making the ultimate sacrifice in the name of a cause. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 107, 494-515.
- Bélanger, J. J., Schumpe, B. M., Lafrenière, M. A. K., Giacomantonio, M., Brizi, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2016). Beyond goal commitment: How expectancy shapes means evaluation. *Motivation Science*, *2*, 67-84.
- Bliuc, A. M., McGarty, C., Reynolds, K., & Muntele, D. (2007). Opinion-based group membership as a predictor of commitment to political action. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 37(1), 19-32.
- Bloom, M. M. (2004). Palestinian suicide bombing: Public support, market share, and outbidding. *Political Science Quarterly*, 119, 61-88.
- Burden, B. C., & Klofstad, C. A. (2005). Affect and cognition in party identification. *Political Psychology*, 26, 869–886.
- Burnham, K. P., & Anderson, D. R. (2002). Model selection and multimodel inference: A practical information-theoretical approach. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American voter*. New York, NY: Wiley
- Chen, G., & Bliese, P. D. (2002). The role of different levels of leadership in predicting self-and collective efficacy: Evidence for discontinuity. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87, 549.
- Cohen, J. (1988). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

- Cohen, C. J., Luttig, M. D., Rogowski, J. C. (2016). Millenials speak out about the 2016 campaign: A summary of key findings from the first-of-it-kind monthly survey of racially and ethnically diverse young adults. http://genforwardsurvey.com/assets/uploads/2016/ 10/Genforward-Report-Final-3.pdf
- Cronin, A. K. (2006). How Al-Qaida ends: The decline and demise of terrorist groups. *International Security*, *31*, 7-48.
- Curini, L. (2011). Government survival the Italian way: The core and the advantages of policy immobilism during the First Republic. *European Journal of Political Research*, 50, 110-142.
- Deaux, K., Reid, A., Mizrahi, K., & Ethier, K. A. (1995). Parameters of social identity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68, 280-291.
- Della Porta, D. (2006). Social movements, political violence, and the state: A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Democratic National Party. (2016). *The 2016 Democratic platform*. Retrieved from https://www.democrats.org/party-platform.
- Detert, J. R., & Burris, E. R. (2007). Leadership behavior and employee voice: Is the door really open?. *Academy of Management Journal*, *50*, 869-884.
- Doosje, B., Ellemers, N., & Spears, R. (1999). Commitment and intergroup behavior.
  In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Social identity: Context, commitment, content* (pp. 84–106). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

- Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2005). Explaining enduring empowerment: A comparative study of collective action and psychological outcomes. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 35, 35-58.
- Dugan, L., & Gibbs, C. (2008). The role of organizational structure in the control of corporate crime and terrorism. In S. S. Simpson, & D. Weisburd (Eds.,) *The criminology of white-collar crime* (pp. 11-128). New York, NY: Springer
- Dugas, M., Bélanger, J. J., Moyano, M., Schumpe, B. M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., ... & Nociti, N. (2016). The quest for significance motivates self-sacrifice. *Motivation Science*, 2, 15-32. doi:10.1037/mot0000030
- Dunlap, R. E., Xiao, C., & McCright, A. M. (2001). Politics and environment in America: Partisan and ideological cleavages in public support for environmentalism. *Environmental Politics*, 10, 23-48.
- Dupuis, D. R., Wohl, M. J., Packer, D. J., & Tabri, N. (2016). To dissent and protect: Stronger collective identification increases willingness to dissent when group norms evoke collective angst. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 19, 694-710.
- Duncan, L. E. (1999). Motivation for collective action: Group consciousness as mediator of personality, life experiences, and women's rights activism. *Political Psychology*, 20, 611-635.
- Dyck, B., & Starke, F. A. (1999). The formation of breakaway organizations:
  Observations and a process model. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44, 792-822. doi: 10.2307/2667056

- Eccles, J. S., & Wigfield, A. (2002). Motivational beliefs, values, and goals. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *53*, 109-132.
- Ellemers, N., Pagliaro, S., Barreto, M., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Is it better to be moral than smart? The effects of morality and competence norms on the decision to work at group status improvement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95, 1397.
- Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1997). Sticking together or falling apart: Ingroup identification as a psychological determinant of group commitment versus individual mobility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72, 617–626. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.72.3.617.
- Feather, N. T. (1990). Bridging the gap between values and actions: Recent applications of the expectancy-value model. In E. Higgins, R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), *Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior, Vol. 2* (pp. 151-192). New York, NY US: Guilford Press.
- Fenelon, A., & Danielsen, S. (2016). Leaving my religion: Understanding the relationship between religious disaffiliation, health, and well-being. *Social Science Research*, 57, 49-62.
- Ghaziani, A., & Baldassarri, D. (2011). Cultural anchors and the organization of differences: A multi-method analysis of LGBT marches on Washington.
   *American Sociological Review*, 76, 179-206. doi:10.1177/0003122411401252
- Gillespie, J. D. (2012). *Challengers to duopoly: Why third parties matter in American two-party politics*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

- Ginges, J., Atran, S., Medin, D., & Shikaki, K. (2007). Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conflict. *Proceedings of the National Academy* of Sciences, 104(18), 7357-7360.
- Griffin, R. (1996). The 'post-Fascism' of the Alleanza Nazionale: A case study in ideological morphology. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, *1*, 123-145.
- Guiberneau, M. (2006). National identity, devolution, and secession in Canada, Britain, and Spain. *Nations and Nationalism*, *12*, 51-76.
- Gunnthorsdottir, A. H. (2001). Physical attractiveness of an animal species as a decision factor for its preservation. *Anthrozoos*, *14*, 204-215.
- Hart, C. M., & Van Vugt, M. (2006). From fault line to group fission: Understanding membership changes in small groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *32*, 392-404. doi:10.1177/0146167205282149
- Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Healey, P., & Alcindor, Y. (2016, January 12). Hillary Clinton races to close the enthusiasm gap with Bernie Sanders in Iowa. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <u>https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/us/politics/hillary-clinton-berniesanders-supporters.html</u>.
- Hogg, M. A., & Adelman, J. (2013). Uncertainty–identity theory: Extreme groups, radical behavior, and authoritarian leadership. *Journal of Social Issues*, 69, 436-454. doi: 10.1111/josi.12023
- Hornsey, M. J., Blackwood, L., Louis, W., Fielding, K., Mavor, K., Morton, T., ... & White, K. M. (2006). Why do people engage in collective action? Revisiting

the role of perceived effectiveness. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *36*), 1701-1722.

- Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.
- Huddy, L. (2001). From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory. *Political Psychology*, 22, 127-156.
- Huddy, L., & Gunnthorsdottir, A. H. (2000). The persuasive effects of emotive visual imagery: Superficial manipulation or a deepening conviction? *Political Psychology*, *21*, 745-771. doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00215
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1992). Sacrifice and stigma: Reducing free-riding in cults, communes, and other collectives. *Journal of Political Economy*, *100*, 271-291.
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1994). Why strict churches are strong. American Journal of Sociology, 99, 1180-1211.
- Jenne, E. K., Saideman, S. M., & Lowe, W. (2007). Separatism as a bargaining posture: The role of leverage in minority radicalization. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44, 539-558. doi:10.1177/0022343307080853
- Jetten, J., & Hornsey, M. J. (2014). Deviance and dissent in groups. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 65, 461-485.

Johnson, A. L., Crawford, M. T., Sherman, S. J., Rutchick, A. M., Hamilton, D. L., Ferreira, M. B., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2006). A functional perspective on group memberships: Differential need fulfillment in a group typology. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 42, 707-719. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.08.002

- Keating, M. (2001). Nations against the State: The new politics of nationalism in *Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). London, UK: Palgrave.
- Klandermans, B. (1997). *The social psychology of protest*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- Knight, A. J. (2008). "Bats, snakes and spiders, oh my!" How aesthetic and negativistic attitudes, and other concepts predict support for species protection. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 28, 94-103.
- Kruglanski, A. W., Bélanger, J. J., Chen, X., Köpetz, C., Pierro, A., & Mannetti, L.
  (2012). The energetics of motivated cognition: A force-field analysis. *Psychological Review*, 119, 1-20. doi: 10.1037/a0025488
- Kruglanski, A. W., Bélanger, J. J., Gelfand, M. J., Gunaratna, R., Hettiarrachchi, M.,
  ... & Sharvit, K. (2013). Terrorism, a (self) love-story: Redirecting the significance quest can end violence. *American Psychologist*, 68, 559-575.
- Kruglanski, A. W., Chernikova, M., Babush, M., Dugas, M., & Schumpe, B. M.
  (2015). The architecture of goal systems: Multifinality, equifinality, and counterfinality in means-end relations. *Advances in Motivation Science*, *2*, 69-98.
- Kruglanski, A. W., Chernikova, M., Rosenzweig, E., & Kopetz, C. (2014). On motivational readiness. *Psychological Review*, 121, 367-388. doi: 10.1037/a0037013
- Kruglanski, A. W., Jasko, K., Chernikova, M., Dugas, M., & Webber, D. (2017). To the fringe and back: Violent extremism and the psychology of deviance.*American Psychologist*, 72, 217-230.

Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Friedman, R., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W.
Y., & Sleeth-Keppler, D. (2002). A theory of goal systems. In M. Zanna
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 331– 378). San Diego: Academic Press.

- Lau, D. C., & Murnighan, J. K. (1998). Demographic diversity and faultlines: The compositional dynamics of organizational groups. *Academy of Management Review*, 23, 325-340.
- Lea, M., Spears, R., & de Groot, D. (2001). Knowing me, knowing you: Anonymity effects on social identity processes within groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27, 526–537.
- Leach, C. W., van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L. W., Pennekamp, S. F.,
  Doosje, B...Spears, R. (2008). Group-level self-definition and selfinvestment: A hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95, 144-155. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.144
- Lewis, J. R., & Lewis, S. M. (2009). *Sacred schisms: How religions divide*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Liu, W., Zhu, R., & Yang, Y. (2010). I warn you because I like you: Voice behavior, employee identifications, and transformational leadership. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 21, 189-202.
- Llera, F. J., Mata, J. M., & Irvin, C. L. (1993). ETA: From secret army to social movement-the post-Franco schism of the Basque nationalist

movement. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *5*, 106-134. doi:10.1080/09546559308427222

- Lyons-Padilla, S. Gelfand, M. J., Mirahmadi, H., Farooq, M., & van Egmond, M.
  (2015). Belonging nowhere: Marginalization & radicalization risk among Muslim immigrants. *Behavioral Science & Policy*, 1(2), 1-12.
- MacKinnon, D. P., Lockwood, C. M., Hoffman, J. M., West, S. G., & Sheets, V.
  (2002). A comparison of methods to test mediation and other intervening variable effects. *Psychological Methods*, *7*, 83-104. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.7.1.83
- McClelland, D. C. (1985). How motives, skills, and values determine what people do. *American Psychologist, 40*, 812-825.
- McGarty, C., Bliuc, A. M., Thomas, E. F., & Bongiorno, R. (2009). Collective action as the material expression of opinion-based group membership. *Journal of Social Issues*, 65, 839-857.
- McGregor, I. (2006). Offensive defensiveness: Toward an integrative neuroscience of compensatory zeal after mortality salience, personal uncertainty, and other poignant self-threats. *Psychological Inquiry*, *17*, 299-308.
- Morrison, E. W. (2014). Employee voice and silence. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, *1*, 173-197.
- Morrison, E. W., Wheeler-Smith, S. L., & Kamdar, D. (2011). Speaking up in groups:
   A cross-level study of group voice climate and change. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 96, 183-191. doi:10.1037/a0020744

- Mummendey, A., Kessler, T., Klink, A., & Mielke, R. (1999). Strategies to cope with negative social identity: Predictions by social identity theory and relative deprivation theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76, 229-245.
- Oettingen, G., Mayer, D., & Thorpe, J. (2010). Self-regulation of commitment to reduce cigarette consumption: Mental contrasting with reality. *Psychology & Health*, 25, 961-977.
- Oettingen, G., Mayer, D., Timur Sevincer, A., Stephens, E. J., Pak, H. J., & Hagenah,
   M. (2009). Mental contrasting and goal commitment: The mediating role of
   energization. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 35, 608-622.
- Oettingen, G., Pak, H. J., & Schnetter, K. (2001). Self-regulation of goal-setting: Turning free fantasies about the future into binding goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80, 736-753.
- Oliver, J. E. C., & Rahn, W. M. (2016). Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 election. *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 667,189-206.
- Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009) Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45, 867-872. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.009
- Orehek, E., & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, A. (2013). Sequential and concurrent strategies of multiple goal pursuit. *Review of General Psychology*, *17*, 339.

- Packer, D. J. (2008). On being both with us and against us: A normative conflict model of dissent in social groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 12, 50-72. doi: 0.1177/1088868307309606
- Packer, D. J. (2009). Avoiding groupthink: Whereas weakly identified members remain silent, strongly identified members dissent about collective problems. *Psychological Science*, 20, 546-548. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02333.x
- Packer, D. J., & Chasteen, A. L. (2010). Loyal deviance: Testing the normative conflict model of dissent in social groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36, 5-18.
- Packer, D. J., & Miners, C. T. (2012). At the first sign of trouble or through thick and thin? When nonconformity is and is not disengagement from a group. *Journal* of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 316-322.
- Park, C. H. (2001). Factional dynamics in Japan's LDP since Political Reform:
  Continuity and change. *Asian Survey*, *41*, 428-461. doi:
  10.1177/0022002711429680
- Perkoski, E. J. (2015). Organizational fragmentation and the trajectory of militant splinter groups (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1943

Peters, G., & Woolley, J. T. (2017). Minor/third party platforms: Platform of the States Rights Democratic Party, August 14, 1948. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25851

Pew Research Center. (2016a). In Clinton's march to nomination, many democrats changed their minds: 90% of 'consistent' Sanders supporters favor Clinton

over Trump. Retrieved from <u>http://www.people-press.org/2016/07/25/in-</u> clintons-march-to-nomination-many-democrats-changed-their-minds/

- Pew Research Center. (2016b). Clinton, Sanders supporters differ sharply on U.S. global role. Retrieved from <u>http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-</u> <u>tank/2016/05/17/clinton-sanders-supporters-differ-sharply-on-u-s-global-role/</u>
- Postmes, T., & Brunsting, S. (2002). Collective action in the age of the Internet mass communication and online mobilization. *Social Science Computer Review*, 20, 290-301.
- Reicher, S., & Levine, M. (1994). On the consequences of deindividuation manipulations for the strategic communication of self: Identifiability and the presentation of social identity. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 24, 511-524.
- Riketta, M. (2008). "Who identifies with which group?" The motive-feature match principle and its limitations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *38*, 715-735. Doi: 10.1002/ejsp.534
- Rusbult, C. E., & Farrell, D. (1983). A longitudinal test of the investment model: The impact on job satisfaction, job commitment, and turnover of variations in rewards, costs, alternatives, and investments. *Journal of applied psychology*, 68, 429-438.
- Sageman, M. (2003). *Understanding terror networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sanders, B. (2016). *Our revolution: A future to believe in*. New York, NY: Thomas Dunne.

- Sani, F. (2005). When subgroups secede: Extending and refining the social psychological model of schism in groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31*, 1074-1086. doi:10.1177/0146167204274092
- Sani, F. (2008). Schism in groups: A social psychological account. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 718-732.
- Sani, F., & Pugliese, A. C. (2008). In the name of Mussolini: Explaining the schism in an Italian right-wing political party. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 12*, 242-253. doi:10.1037/1089-2699.12.3.242
- Sani, F., & Reicher, S. (1998). When consensus fails: An analysis of the schism within the Italian Communist Party (1991). European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 623-645. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199807/08)28:4<623::AID-EJSP885>3.0.CO;2-G
- Sani, F., & Todman, J. (2002). Should we stay or should we go? A social psychological model of schisms in groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*, 1647-1655. doi:10.1177/014616702237646
- Scheitle, C. P., & Adamczyk, A. (2010). High-cost religion, religious switching, and health. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *51*, 325-342.
- Schumpe, B., Bélanger, J. J., Dugas, M., Erb, H.-P., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2017). Counterfinality: On the increased perceived instrumentality of a means to a goal. Unpublished manuscript.
- Serrano, I. (2013). Just a matter of identity? Support for independence in Catalonia. *Regional & Federal Studies, 23*, 523-545.

- Shah, J. Y., Friedman, R., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). Forgetting all else: On the antecedents and consequences of goal shielding. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83, 1261-1280. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1261
- Small, E. (2011). The new Noah's Ark: Beautiful and useful species only. Part 1.
  Biodiversity conservation issues and priorities. *Biodiversity*, *12*, 232-247. doi: 10.1080/14888386.2011.642663
- Spencer, D. G. (1986). Employee voice and employee retention. Academy of Management Journal, 29, 488-502.
- Tangirala, S., & Ramanujam, R. (2012). Ask and you shall hear (but not always):
  Examining the relationship between manager consultation and employee voice. *Personnel Psychology*, 65, 251-282.
- Tangirala, S., & Ramanujam, R. (2008). Exploring nonlinearity in employee voice:The effects of personal control and organizational identification. *Academy of Management Journal*, 51, 1189-1203.
- Tausch, N., Becker, J. C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R.
  N. (2011). Explaining radical group behavior: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and nonnormative collective action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*, 129-148.

Thomas, W. E., Brown, R., Easterbrook, M. J., Vignoles, V. L., Manzi, C., D'Angelo,
C., & Holt, J. J. (2017). Social Identification in Sports Teams: The Role of
Personal, Social, and Collective Identity Motives. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 43(4), 508-523.

- Van Vugt, M., & Hart, C. M. (2004). Social identity as social glue: The origins of group loyalty. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 86, 585-598. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.4.58
- van Zomeren, M., Leach, C. W., & Spears, R. (2012). Protesters as "passionate economists" a dynamic dual pathway model of approach coping with collective disadvantage. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 16, 180-199.
- van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: a quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. *Psychological bulletin*, *134*(4), 504-535.
- Verzichelli, L. & Cotta, M. (2000). Italy: From 'constrained' coalitions to alternative governments? In W.C. Muller & K. Strøm (eds), *Coalition governments in Western Europe* (pp. 433-497). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vignoles, V. L., Regalio, C., Manzi, C., Golledge, J., & Scabini, E. (2006). Beyond self-esteem: Influence of multiple motives on identity construction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90, 308-333. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.2.308
- Watson, C. B., Chemers, M. M., & Preiser, N. (2001). Collective efficacy: A multilevel analysis. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27, 1057-1068.
- Webber, D., Babush, M., Schori-Eyal, N., Moyano, M., Hettiarachchi, M., .... &
  Gelfand, M. J. (2017). *The road to extremism: how significance loss-based uncertainty fosters extremism*. Unpublished Manuscript.

- Wintrobe, R. (2006). Extremism, suicide terror, and authoritarianism. *Public Choice*, *128*, 169-195. doi:10.1007/s11127-006-9059-3
- Yzerbet, V., & Demoulin, S. (2010). Intergroup relations. In S. T. Fiske, D. T.
  Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (pp. 1024-1083). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Zdaniuk, B., & Levine, J. M. (2001). Group loyalty: Impact of members' identification and contributions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 37, 502-509. doi:10.1006/jesp.2000.1474
- Zhang, M., Fried, D. D., & Griffeth, R. W. (2012). A review of job embeddedness: Conceptual, measurement issues, and directions for future research. *Human Resource Management Review*, 22, 220-231.

# Appendix C

The sector were futed on the following response eutegories unless otherwise noted.							
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	

All scales were rated on the following response categories unless otherwise noted:

**Identification with the Democratic Party** (adapted from Leach et al., 2008) *Instructions*: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the provided scale.

- 1. I feel a bond with the Democratic party.
- 2. I feel solidarity with the Democratic party.
- 3. I feel committed to the Democratic party.
- 4. I am glad to be part of the Democratic party.
- 5. I think the Democratic party has a lot to be proud of.
- 6. It is pleasant to be in the Democratic party.
- 7. Being in the Democratic party gives me a good feeling.

**Embeddedness in the Democratic Party** (adapted from Crossley et al., 2007) *Instructions*: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the provided scale.

10. It would be difficult for me to leave the Democratic party.

- 1. I'm too caught up in the Democratic party to leave.
- 2. I feel tied to the Democratic party.
- 3. I simply could not leave the Democratic party.
- 4. It would be easy for me to leave the Democratic party.
- 5. I am tightly connected to the Democratic party
- 6. I often interact with other Democratic party supporters.
- 7. I would sacrifice a lot by leaving the Democratic party.
- 8. I have invested a lot in the Democratic party.

# **Commitment to Reducing Economic Inequality**

*Instructions*: Now, we'd like to ask you about your attitudes toward reducing economic inequality in particular. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

- 1. I am committed to reducing economic inequality in the US.
- 2. Reducing economic inequality is a priority for me.
- 1. Reducing economic inequality in the US is not important to me.
- 2. I would feel disappointed if little progress were made in reducing economic inequality.

# **Candidate Preference**

*Instructions*: During the Democratic primaries of 2016, who did you support more between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders? Even if you didn't vote in the primaries, please indicate the extent to which you felt like you supported one candidate or the other.

Strongly Preferred Sanders	Preferred Sanders	Slightly Preferred Sanders	Had no Preference	Slightly Preferred Clinton	Preferred Clinton	Strongly Preferred Clinton
----------------------------------	----------------------	----------------------------------	----------------------	----------------------------------	----------------------	----------------------------------

## **Position Summaries**

The recent presidential election shed light on what some people see as a major divide within the Democratic party concerning support for different policies to address inequality.

In the primaries for the Democratic party, Hillary Clinton received a majority of votes for a platform that included increasing the minimum wage to \$12/hr, increasing taxes on capital gains, introducing a tax credit for families with high medical expenses, and limiting tuition fees to 10% of a family's income.

A substantial minority of voters instead supported Bernie Sanders whose policies to address inequality included increasing the federal minimum wage to \$15/hr, increasing several taxes on the wealthy, introducing single-payer universal health care, and making tuition free at public institutions of higher education.

Now, there are rumors that some aides who worked for Sanders are interested in forming a new political party that would pursue similar solutions to inequality.

We're interested in understanding more about how people perceive such policies to inequality and their interest in the formation of a new political party like the one being explored by Sanders' aides.

## **Policy Perceptions**

*Instructions*: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the provided scale.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
----------------------	----------	-------------------------------	-------	----------------

The policies to address income inequality advocated by [Hillary Clinton/Bernie Sanders] and her supporters...

- 1. Would require a lot of sacrifice from Americans
- 2. Would cost the government a lot.
- 3. Are extreme
- 4. Would conflict with progress on other policy goals

## Support for a Schism (Adapted from Naus et al., 2007)

*Instructions*: As mentioned earlier, some supporters of Bernie Sanders have discussed the idea of forming a new political party. Now, we'd like to ask you about your own reactions to this possibility.

Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements in relation to the possibility of splitting up the Democratic party over approaches to reducing inequality.

- 5. I support the faction leaving the party.
- 6. I want to join the faction in leaving the organization.
- 7. I want to actively explore how we could successfully split the Democratic party.
- 8. I want to leave the Democratic party for another party.

# Splinter Group Efficacy

*Instructions*: Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements in relation to the possibility of splitting up the Democratic party over approaches to reducing inequality.

- 1. If the Democratic party split, the faction would be able to form a successful new political party.
- 2. The new political party would be effective in making progress on problems with inequality.
- 3. The new political party would be the best option to reduce inequality in the long term.
- 4. It would be impossible for the new political party to be effective, even in the long term. (Reverse scored)

Voice (adapted from Naus et al., 2007)

*Instructions*: Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements in relation to the disagreements within the Democratic party over approaches to reducing inequality.

- 5. I want to express my opinions in discussions about the issue with other Democratic party members.
- 6. I want to come up with suggestions of how to deal with the disagreements in the Democratic party.
- 7. I want to try to work out a solution to the benefit of supporters of both sides in the Democratic party.
- 8. I want to discuss the problem with local Democratic party leaders and try to work out a solution together.