ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:	***SUPERORDINATE IDENTITIES: NATIONAL IDENTITY, EMOTIONS, AND WARTIME PUBLIC OPINION***
	Autumn Perkey, Doctor of Philosophy, 2025
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Although wartime public opinion has explored the various ways casualties influence wartime attitudes, international relations scholars have not yet paid sufficient attention to the influence of national identity and the effect of emotions on influencing and changing political attitudes. Understanding the relationship between identity saliency and emotions furthers the field by expanding influence and information studies and the of framing effects that may otherwise be ignored. I propose a theory focused on the relationship between identity saliency and emotional states in determining public attitudes in conflict situations. I argue that individual-level attitudes are informed by the identity held salient at that point in time which is influenced by the situational context as well as an individual's emotional state. However, while I am speaking of individually primed emotional states, the focus is on collective emotions as related to their collective identities and how in general a member of the same group would react. I propose a model of wartime attitude

formation expanding behind the logic that attitudes are informed by generalized values that determine specific foreign policy preferences (Peffley & Hurwitz 1993 and Hurwitz & Peffley 1987), these specific policy preferences are informed in addition by the situational and strategic context at hand (Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser 1999) and that specific values are previously informed by our social identity categorizations (Trepte & Loy 2017, Billig & Tajfel 1973, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy 1971, Hornsey 2008). I extend this conversation by focusing on the impact of emotions on foreign policy attitudes across a spectrum of emotions, and the impact emotions have on national identity saliency.

SUPERORDINATE IDENTITIES: NATIONAL IDENTITY, EMOTIONS, AND WARTIME PUBLIC OPINION

by

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to my friends, family, and mentors who have guided me throughout its construction. To my minions, Aria and Aiden, who inspire me to achieve insurmountable odds in the face of adversity and offer hugs along the way. To my husband, Erik, who has been a constant supporter and friend, who willingly has followed me across the country to achieve my dreams. To my father, Thomas Perkey, who inspired much of this work. His dedication as a father and veteran taught me that hard work will pay off, even when you feel like you are failing. To my mother, Kathy Perkey, who has dealt with all my failures and successes throughout the years, but will always find a way to brighten the darkest of days. Lastly, to my advisor, Sarah Croco. She has put up with all my tears, frustrations and has always had my back in every endeavor. I could not have wished for a more perfect mentor.

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Table of Contents

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List of Abbreviations

AIT	Affective Intelligence Theory
E.U.	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States

Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

During war and conflict, public attitudes towards events are informed by various heuristics. Often this includes partisan and elite cue taking, casualty aversion, casualty phobia, and victory-centrism. Existing scholarship discounts the impacts of superordinate identities and emotions in informing wartime attitudes and often focuses on partisan differences rather than similarities. However, these studies have overlooked the conceptualization and impact of national identity and emotions, assuming a partisan lens is the most important aspect. Although wartime public opinion has explored the various ways in which casualties influence wartime attitudes, international relations scholars have not yet paid sufficient attention to the influence of national identity and the effect of emotions on influencing and changing political attitudes. Understanding the relationship between identity saliency and emotions furthers the field by expanding influence and information studies and the study of framing effects that may otherwise be ignored.

My dissertation, "Superordinate Identities: National Identity, Emotions, and Wartime Public Opinion," explores the impact of national identity and emotions across various contexts and countries. Specifically, I examine variation in national identity strength as related to emotions in wartime opinions. I examine this in the cases of the United States, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. I focus on examining the impacts of guilt, anger, and anxiety in wartime public opinion. The dissertation proceeds as follows.

In Part I, "American Social Identity and Emotions: Responses to Military Intervention and Civilian Casualties," I develop a theoretical framework that examines American Social

Identity (ASI) and the effect of guilt on opinions toward United States interventions with civilian casualty predictions. Existing studies that seek to explain wartime public opinion tend to limit their explanation in terms of elite cue taking, partisan cue taking, and casualty sensitivity, which often leads to a conclusion that domestic audiences' attitudes are driven by elites and a cost/benefit analysis. This is a generalization that is drawn from truncated examinations of framing effects that inform attitudes, neglecting other intersecting and opposing hypotheses. I argue that the key drivers for wartime attitudes are national identity and an individual's emotional state. I find that overall, individuals, regardless of political party, are likely to support actions that risk civilian casualties. This finding, while stronger for Republicans, was still significant for Democrats, where an individual's level of ASI was a significant predictor of support for military actions that risk civilian lives.

In Part II, "Defining Being American Through Intersecting Identities," I continue to explore the findings from Part I, examining how individuals stack ASI across different aspects of national identity. Previous work lacks a consistent definition of what it means to be an American. I examine how different subgroups of Americans define what it means to be "American". In general, previous work has defined being American through engaged citizenship, American ideals and values, national attachment/chauvinism, and patriotism. Not all Americans, however, are the same. Americans vary on standard demographic characteristics such as race, ethnicity, age, gender, socio-economic status, religion, and education. However, because America is significantly bigger than most European states, location-based variation exists, and this does not account for partisan differences. Using a survey experiment and an exploratory analysis of what being an American means, I find that there is variation in how individuals of different genders, races, and partisan groups define being American and how they define being patriotic.

In Part III, “War in Ukraine: National Identity and Anxiety”, I examine the role of national identity and anxiety in external actor evaluation (the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, and United Nations). Specifically, I argue that states closer to the conflict in Ukraine will likely have higher anxiety over the war and their attitudes towards external actors will be informed by national over European identity. Therefore, I anticipated that national identity would be more substantive and significantly impactful than European identity in external actor evaluation. Using existing data and coding additional variables to create a novel dataset, I find that national identity was more impactful in almost all cases, with the exceptions of Slovakia and Hungary. Some variation did exist between evaluations of the external actors, specifically the United Nations and European Union, but overall, national identity was significant and more impactful than European identity in informing attitudes toward external actors.

Additionally, I tested how anxiety impacts external actor evaluation. While I argued that those closer to the conflict were more likely to be more worried/anxious, this was not the case. While being close to the conflict in general led to increases in the evaluation of external actors, being near a non-continuous Russian border was more likely to increase anxiety over the war.

The set of papers in this dissertation collectively improves our understanding of the impact of national identity and emotions in wartime public opinion. The arguments and findings in this dissertation draw upon and build on the theories from framing effects, including elite cue taking, partisan sorting, national identity conception, and cognitive models of wartime public opinion. No one theoretical framework can single-handedly explain wartime public opinion. However, this dissertation improves our understanding by focusing on the complexities in attitudes due to superordinate identity and emotional states. This is the first study to

systematically examine the relationship between national identity and emotions in informing attitudinal responses. This research is relevant in areas of policy concerned with psychological and cyberwarfare. The findings suggest that attitudes in conflict may be influenced by contexts on the ground that prime national identity beyond a state's control. Designing impactful messaging during conflict may be being mindful not just of partisan differences, but the way national identity may be altered by the situational and emotional contexts.

Theoretical Approach: An Identity and Emotion Model of Wartime Public Opinion

In this dissertation, I propose a theory to understand wartime preferences and attitudes and describe how emotional framing can influence identity saliency, focusing primarily on national identity. I argue that national identity and emotions, such as threat, influence public perceptions in ways that can lead to support for more aggressive action. Aggressive actions can include events such as risking civilians in the name of national security, being more supportive of military allies, evaluating external actors based on proximity to ongoing conflicts, or demonstrating remorse after violating the expectations of international norms, such as through apologies or language demonstrating such. Support for aggressive actions is determined by which identity an individual holds salient and which identity has the most to lose if that action is not taken. Throughout this dissertation, I focus on addressing the following questions:

- How does national identity influence public attitudes during conflict?
- How do emotions affect public attitudes in conflict settings?
- What is the relationship between national identity and emotions?
- How do Americans define what it means to "be American"?

I propose a theory focused on the relationship between identity saliency and emotional states in determining public attitudes in conflict situations. I argue that individual-level attitudes

are informed by the identity held salient at that point in time which is influenced by the situational context as well as an individual's emotional state. However, while I am speaking of individually primed emotional states, the focus is on collective emotions as related to their collective identities and how in general, a member of the same group would react. I propose a model of wartime attitude formation expanding behind the logic that attitudes are informed by generalized values that determine specific foreign policy preferences (Peffley & Hurwitz 1993 and Hurwitz & Peffley 1987), these specific policy preferences are informed in addition by the situational and strategic context at hand (Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser 1999) and that specific values are previously informed by our social identity categorizations (Trepte & Loy 2017, Billig & Tajfel 1973, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy 1971, Hornsey 2008). I extend this conversation by focusing on the impact of emotions on foreign policy attitudes across a spectrum of emotions, and the impact emotions have on national identity saliency.

Seminal work in public attitudes toward foreign policy preferences has argued that, in general, the public operates with low levels of information (Campbell et al 1960, Almond 1950, Lippman 1931, Converse 1964). Often, public attitudes are unstructured and appear random in nature (Campbell et al 1960, Almond 1950, Lippman 1931, Converse 1964). In the past, this was referred toas "Mood Theory", treating attitudes toward foreign policy as entirely random and shifting just as often as the ocean tides (Almond 1950). Others have proposed that to address the lack of information the public uses heuristics, such as elite cues (Campbell et al 1960, Kim 2014, Berinsky 2007, Berinsky 2009), rational evaluation—evaluating the costs and benefits (Mueller 1971, Mueller 1972, Mueller 2005, Gelpi & Mueller 2006, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler 2009, Gelpi 2010), through generalized values that inform specific responses (Herrmann et al 1999, Peffley & Hurwitz 1993, Hurwitz & Peffley 1987), or through emotions (Maracus, Neuman, &

MacKuen 2000, Banks 2014, Banks, Hicks, Merolla 2022). Though these early works tell us a lot about how public attitudes are driven by specific heuristics or pieces of information, they neglect to inform us of the emotional impact of the heuristic in question or the relationship between emotions and identity saliency. My work examines the role of national identity, examining the United States, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. While I will limit my evaluation to specific cases, the theoretical implications should hold for other contexts when examining the relationship between national identity and emotional effects as related to public attitudes.

In this dissertation, I present three papers examining national identity in three distinct ways. The first paper examines the impact of emotions on the United States' national identity during military actions that risk the lives of foreign civilians. This paper will include an emotional priming survey experiment that tests the effect of guilt on foreign policy attitudes. This helps demonstrate the tension between emotions and identity saliency. Paper 1 shows that the strength of ASI drives response to casualties, yet research on political polarization shows increasing divergence among Americans. To how do different groups of Americans define "being American"? In the second paper, I examine how different subgroups of Americans create and perceive American identity and what it means to be an American looking at different types of patriotism. The third paper tests my theory more broadly, applied to the cases of Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. In it, I examine the impact national identity has on external actor evaluation—specifically the United States (U.S.), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (U.N.), and the European (E.U.) -- and the effects of anxiety.

Chapter 2: American Social Identity and Emotions: Responses to Military Intervention and Civilian Casualties

Abstract:
Why do civilian casualties upset some individuals more than others? There are international norms that establish the acceptable level of harm to civilians during combat, however, these are not always maintained or enforced. I examine how individuals internalize international norms against killing civilians differently based on the strength of their attachment to their national identity and emotional frames, specifically examining the effects of collective guilt and threat perception. I hypothesized that people with a strong sense of American national identity would avoid internalizing the norm. The threat to their national identity makes them prioritize that part of their identity more than respect for international law. By contrast, those with a weaker attachment to their national identity will be more susceptible to feelings of guilt because they can internalize the international norm more strongly. Additionally, I anticipated that women would be averse to military actions that risked foreign civilian lives and Republicans would be more strike acceptant than Democrats. To test my hypotheses, I used a survey experiment to examine how guilt, threat, and American identity affected foreign policy attitudes toward American military intervention abroad during a hypothetical action. The study was conducted in the Fall of 2021 on a student sample of roughly 600. Individuals with a strong sense of American social identity were more supportive of military intervention that risked foreign civilian lives regardless of the treatment (guilt prime). Republicans were supportive of all elements of the strikes regardless of risks to foreign civilians at statistically significant levels. Men, more so than women, were supportive of military intervention that risked foreign civilian lives and threat perceptions were significant in all outcome questions. Overall, this research contributes to cognitive models of opinion formation with the incorporation of identity complexity and American social identity.

Keywords:
Public Opinion, Guilt, Social Identity, Experiment, American Identity

Introduction

While the likelihood of dying from an armed conflict has decreased in recent years with 80,000 dying globally due to conflict in 2019. In 2022, the three countries with over 10,000 conflict deaths (including deaths of combatants and civilians) were Mexico, Ethiopia, and Ukraine (Herre, Rodes-Guirao, Roser, Hasell, & Macdonald 2023 and Davies, Pettersson & Öberg 2023). In 2021, the only countries to have over 10,000 conflict deaths were Yemen, Afghanistan, Mexico, and Ethiopia, with Ukraine not being a factor before the Russian invasion in 2022. While the media has blasted images from Ukraine and Israel, the war on drugs in Mexico and the Ethiopian civil conflict remains neglected. In 2022, the war in Ethiopia was the deadliest conflict active in the world accounting for over 100,000 fatalities (Obermeier, Strand, & Berry 2023). While cumulative conflict losses denote variation in civilian deaths around the world, this shows how individual-level factors have affected reactions to civilian casualties globally with often limited conversation. For example, Roman Sheremeta, an economics Professor at Case Western examined Twitter data from a post by Allasko (@Allasko21), who said: "And the death of Navalny alone is more painful to me than the deaths of all these Ukraine children".

Why do civilian casualties upset some individuals more than others? Thousands are dying regularly, but we are only sometimes upset. There are international norms that establish acceptable levels of harm to civilians during combat, however, these are not always maintained or enforced. These norms are founded on international law to not deliberately target civilians in wartime and expectations are that states try to reduce and minimize collateral civilian losses. However, an unacceptable level of harm toward civilians has sometimes occurred during military interventions in the name of national security. During the war on terror, between 2002 to 2005, it

is estimated that 112 detainees died while in U.S. custody, of those 112, it is suspected that 43 were murdered (Allen, Rich, Bux, Farbenblum, Berns, and Rubenstein 2006).

Scholarship on wartime public opinion has long confirmed that citizens' perceptions and opinions are sensitive to changes in casualties; however, studies have largely focused on the effect of home-country military fatalities rather than the victims of war—foreign civilian casualties. Foreign civilian casualties are one way in which the norms of war are violated. Of central concern in this article is how American national identity influences public opinion towards foreign civilian casualties during United States military interventions abroad.

In this article, I argue that foreign policy attitudes are formed by an active dominant identity that is triggered by various emotional states. This activation occurs through framing effects in how the information is presented, in this case, I focus on the emotion of guilt and threat. Identities are activated through emotions, and under environments of threat, such as war, specific identities inform the attitudinal response. In the context of threat or military intervention, I argue that national identity is the dominant identity responsible for determining foreign policy attitudes toward military intervention. Kruglanksi et al (2014) have shown that in situations in which individuals experience a loss of self-esteem, there is a strengthened association with the social groups we belong to. In the case of war, unacceptable levels of civilian collateral losses that are caused by the American military should result in a similar level of loss of self-esteem. While a loss of self-esteem is not directly measured or tested within this paper, the assumption can be made that it behaves similarly to what research has already shown. While I specifically focus on the implications of American military intervention abroad, this theory holds promise to be used in the contexts of other states and in other conflict settings where violations of international norms of warfare may occur.

To test this hypothesis, I used an emotion induction and survey experiment manipulating causality risk and subject priming. Respondents were given either a guilt prime or a control. Attitudinal outcome questions measured respondents' perceptions of the benefits, success, ethics, and agreement with the military intervention. The outcome questions probed what civilian costs the participants were willing to accept for national security objectives. Additional measures included a threat perception measure as well as traditional covariates for partisanship and gender.

My findings support several general conclusions in public opinion research. First, women tend to be against aggressive military action. Republicans, compared to Democrats, are more hawkish. Individuals with high threat perception are likely to support aggressive military action regardless of actual risk. We can prime individuals to feel guilty, however, the effectiveness of guilt is insignificant compared to our survival emotions driven by threat perception. Lastly, I test the implication of American social identity and identity dominance which demonstrates that on the international scene, while partisanship matters, so does our level of national identity, which warrants further exploration.

Elite Cue Taking and Casualty Tolerance

Seminal work in public attitudes toward foreign policy has argued that the public has a low level of information about foreign events, is unstructured, and appears random (Campbell et al 1960, Almond 1950, Lippman 1931, Converse 1964). To address the lack of information, the public has utilized heuristics such as elite cues (Campbell et al 1960, Kim 2014, Berinsky 2007, Berinsky 2009), weighing the cost and benefits (Mueller 1971, Mueller 1972, Mueller 2005, Gelpi & Mueller 2005, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler 2009, Gelpi 2010), relied on generalized values (Herrmann et al 1999, Peffley & Hurwitz 1993, Hurwitz & Peffley 1987), or emotions (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen 2000, Banks 2014, Banks, Hicks, Merolla 2022). Most of this work is

dependent on public attitudes being driven by a single piece of information: elite cues or casualty numbers. Though these early works tell us a lot about how public attitudes are driven by specific heuristics or pieces of information, they neglect to inform us of the emotional impact of the heuristic in question or the relationship they hold to identity salience beyond a partisan focus.

Evaluating the elite-cued school of thought regarding understanding opinion formation towards foreign civilian death, it argues that due to low levels of political knowledge, the public depends upon elite cues to form opinions about foreign events (Campbell et al 1960, Kim 2014). In this case, individuals use elite cues as heuristics to form their foreign policy attitudes (Campbell et al 1960, Kim 2014). However, elites feel will inform the public on how to respond, regardless of individual characteristics or values. In this realm, partisan identity serves as the most important indicator of opinion formation and the evaluation of elite messages (Page & Shapiro 1982, Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock 1991, Berinsky 2007). Most of this literature has focused on how partisan cues are used to inform individual attitudes (Zaller 1992, Bartels 2002, Berinsky 2007, Achen & Bartels 2006). Elite cues tell individuals to "follow the leader" due to their attachments to a leader and partisan affiliations (Zaller 1992, Lenz 2013). These attachments can be driven by superficial things such as whether a leader is perceived as being "smart" or "ambitious" (Campbell et al 1980) or political affiliation alone (Lenz 2013). Whether individuals will accept elite messages is dependent upon whether the individual feels they have common interests with the elite/leader or whether there are external pressures that motivate the elite/leader to be truthful (Lupia & McCubbins 1998). In general, this school of thought is limited to the idea that party identity matters but fails to explain how our partisan identity will inform our responses when there is a conflict between elite messaging and our normative values, such as "though shall not kill" or the international norms against harm to civilians in conflict.

However, when it comes to foreign policy attitudes, individuals are often unaware of the positions their leaders hold (Guisinger 2009). This implies that individuals' foreign policy preferences may not be driven by partisan differences or elite cues. Focusing on partisanship as a driver requires individual respondents to have general knowledge of what their partisan positions ought to be, which goes against the common understanding that in general, the public tends to have low levels of political knowledge (Campbell et al 1960). In general, voters are not well informed about the foreign policy positions of political elites. While the counterclaim could be made that the public is relying on the typical beliefs of their party, like Republicans being more hawkish in foreign policy and Democrats being more dovish, an examination of the effects of party ideology on the President's foreign policy stances brings into question the significance of this impact. For example, during the Clinton administration, Democrats defended and ran on a platform of interventionism while Republicans argued for less (Schlesinger 1995). By 2002, just a few years after the Clinton administration, positions changed—more Republicans than Democrats favored interventionism (Lewis 2007). Rather than being driven by partisanship alone, the overall finding on elite interventionism is driven by who is in control of the presidency (Lewis 2007). Opposition parties tend to be less interventionist than parties in long-term control of the presidency (Lewis 2007). Therefore, the elite-cued position is an insufficient mechanism to explain the tension between norms around foreign policy and public opinion formation, absent a broader incorporation of framing effects.

In contrast to the elite-cue school of thought, those who focus on the human costs of war have long confirmed that citizens' attitudes are sensitive to changes in casualties (Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler 2009, Mueller 2005, Mueller 1971, Mueller 1973, Larson 2000, Gartner 2008, Gartner & Segura 1998). This debate has centered around support for war shifting either due to casualty

phobia (Mueller 2005, Mueller 1971) or casualty sensitivity and victory-centricism (Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler 2009). There are various schools of thought on the effects of casualties on public attitudes toward war, and the focus has shifted from the general effect of mounting casualties to more specific elements of conflict, such as mission objectives, participation of allied states, or success on the battlefield.

In his examination of the Korean and Vietnam war, Mueller (1971, 1973) demonstrated that at the beginning of the war, most Americans experienced an initial surge in support (rally around the flag effect), especially as troops headed off to battle, regardless of the risk to foreign civilians. However, this effect is short-lived as the Korean and Vietnam wars dragged on, support for the war began to decline as America was experiencing mounting military fatalities (Mueller 1971, 1973). While foundational, Mueller's work has been critiqued due to his focus on war support declining in relation to the proportion of the log of casualties arguing for a fixed decline in support as casualties mount (Mueller 1973, p 62). Mueller's view of public attitudes towards war is dependent upon the news media framing growing casualty losses while ignoring all other potential situational contexts that could alter opinion such as the situation on the ground or how elites are framing the war.

Growing out of Mueller's initial work, further casualty tolerance work has focused on the public engaging in a cost-benefit analysis where the public weighs the expected costs with the benefits of continuing to fight (Larson 2000, Gartner 2008, Segura & Gartner 1998). This model of wartime public opinion is referred to as the rational cost-benefit where the public applies an "economic rational calculation about war" (Gelpi, Feaver & Reifler 2005, p. 13) to evaluate the human costs of war. Gelpi (2010) examines the tension between the surprising events model (a media framing model that focuses on the rational calculations of war) and partisan cue-taking

looking at the Iraq War. Gelpi (2010) shows that positive and negative framing of an event has important implications that are distinct from elite rhetoric or partisan cue-taking. Gelpi (2010) argues that these findings are consistent with the "surprising events model" suggesting that individuals seek information that conflicts with their preexisting positions. Later work by Paolino et al (2015) demonstrated that once you control for attitude strength and a measure of source credibility support for the surprising events model falls away and the overall results were driven by the influence of partisan cue-taking.

Others have investigated casualty tolerance by including other factors. Jentleson (1992) examined the effects when the military mission was framed as either "humanitarian intervention" or "internal political change". Jentleson (1992) argues that military missions with humanitarian intervention as the objective are likely to only receive support when costs are low, while missions focused on internal political change are likely to struggle even more with obtaining support. Like elite cue-taking, Larson (2000) argues that casualty tolerance is dependent upon elite cohesion. When elites are divided on the issues and casualties are mounting, public support for the war will likely experience a decrease in support (Larson 2000). Another element of casualty tolerance is whether other nations support the military mission in question. Kull (1997) found that support for a mission increased, and the human costs of war were more acceptable when there was multilateral support. Kull (1997) argues that multilateral support for a mission serves as an elite cue that justifies the costs of the mission in question.

These studies, (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2009, Mueller 1971, Mueller 1973), however, focus on the human costs of war focusing on the effect of home-country military fatalities rather than the victims of war—foreign civilian casualties. One study, by Johns and Davies (2017) examined public support for military action focusing on civilian casualties found support for

foreign civilian casualty aversion as death tolls increased, similar to that of the work of Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler on military fatalities (2009).

While the seminal work in public attitudes toward wartime foreign policy has offered up two plausible explanations for opinions towards foreign civilian death, they have nonetheless come up short. These arguments are limited as they infer individuals either focus on following the cues of elites or respond to the costs and benefits of the proposed action. As has already been discussed, this previous research cannot fully explain foreign policy preferences, as often individuals do not know the position of elites on foreign policy matters, and there are limitations for when individuals focus on casualty losses as the issue may not always be framed that way from the media. Considering these implications, I argue other explanatory factors for how individuals form opinions during war namely the cognitive processes that inform individuals' value judgments and the emotions that affect them.

In contrast to the literature on elite cues and the rational approach to foreign policy opinion formation, cognitive models argue that foreign policy beliefs are formed from broadly derived postures that are constrained by values (Hurwiz & Peffley 1987). Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) go a step further and show that our belief systems have dispositional cleavages that interact with situational factors, such as the conflict they are occurring within. Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) argued that both the dispositional factors or hierarchical values that individuals have and the situational factors (e.g. the identity of an attacker) matter for how individuals form foreign policy preferences. However, while these studies denote the importance of the interaction that occurs between individual values and situational factors, additional

individual-level characteristics, such as salient identities and emotional states, were not examined by this research. [1]

We already know that people's emotions greatly matter for their cognitive interpretations of the world. For example, "the troubles" is a loaded word if used in Northern Ireland that carries with it various identities of suffering as well as anger and grievance. In addition to the cognitive models, other models have focused on the impact of emotions. Emotions guide how we interpret our world and how the world makes us feel. Research applying affective intelligence theory, as introduced by Marcus and MacKuen (2006), shows that public responses to terrorism are often emotionally driven by individual's coping through anger by distancing themselves from terrorism (Banks, Hicks, Merolla 2020). Because emotions are attached to our cognitive functions, some emotions have the potential to affect our perceptions and attitudes in wartime. In this vein, the application of affective intelligence theory to understanding opinions of military interventions that result in civilian casualties is missing from current research and can help political science understand how emotions affect people's cognitive process of violent events.

Cognition, Emotion, and Identity

Traditionally, political science has focused on "approach-based emotions", such as anger and enthusiasm, however, this does not handle the rise in research being done on "self-conscious emotions, such as guilt, shame, surprise, distress, fear, and disgust".[2] Self-conscious emotions, such as guilt, shame, and embarrassment, serve a function in self-regulating behavior (Tracy, Robins, Tangney 2007). Guilt results in avoidance of the action that causes individuals to feel

[1]Canetti, Rubin, and Wayne (2019) on Framing and Fighting does get closer to the aspects of identity, but the point of their article is to look at the situational factors—through conflict frames.

[2] For more on approach based emotions see: Harmon-Jones, Eddie, Cindy Harmon-Jones, and Tom F. Price. "What is approach motivation?" *Emotion Review* 5, no. 3 (2013): 291-295. For more on self-conscious emotions see: Tracy, Jessica L., Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney, eds. *The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research*. Guilford Press, 2007.

guilty and causes the individual to seek reparative action (Tracy, Robins, and Tangney 2007). Guilt has been shown to result in individuals preemptively avoiding actions that make them feel guilty (Tracy, Robins & Tangney 2007). While there is some debate within psychology about what emotions are considered primary versus secondary emotions, shame and guilt are often denoted as different subsets of anger, but they operate differently than anger. Anger can be both constructive and destructive. Shame acts destructively, often resulting in the externalization of blame and scapegoating behavior (Tracy, Robins, Tangney 2007). In contrast, guilt is associated with a "disinclination towards aggression" (Tracy, Robins, Tangney 2007, 27). This means that subjects want to avoid actions that make them feel guilty. Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) unintentionally found that when individuals were informed of an in-group's mass killing of an out-group, it increased infrahumanization for the victims and this occurred concurrently with collective guilt, infrahumanization being the concept that we grant human characteristics to groups that may have been previously dehumanized.

Self-conscious emotions like guilt, which enable self-regulating behavior are housed predominantly in the amygdala and insula, denoting that the frontal, temporal, and limbic areas of the brain play important roles in the regulation of moral emotions (Michl, Meindl, Meister, Born, Engel, Reiser, Hennig-Fast 2014). In contrast, approach-based emotions, like anger, are housed predominantly in the amygdala alone. This area is also responsible for our ability to process threats and fear often argued as the part of our brains responsible primarily for survival and instinct-based behavior. Whether or not individuals are likely to internalize guilt for violating international norms, may be moderated by the level of external threat they are interpreting from their environment.

Along with emotions, identity is an important understudied concept in understanding foreign policy opinions. Identity is multifaceted, what this implies is that the different identities that an individual has will be activated at different points in time whose salience varies over time. For example, a woman may be a mother, a teacher, a Muslim, and an American. Yet, she will not always equally weigh the various parts of her identity, but rather which identities are salient at what point in time may vary. Because identity is multifaceted, we have different identities that affect our perceptions at different points in time. In the previous example, national identity may supersede religious or gendered identity at some points, but the inverse can also be true. There are multiple ways individuals can handle their multiple social identities. Individuals either compartmentalize by using social identities that are "context-specific" or "situation-specific" (Roccas & Brewer 2002) to the individual context at hand or it can result in identity dominance.

Depending upon the frame an individual is given, a different social identity will be activated, rather than framing effects alone, frames interact with social identities resulting in a dominant or compartmentalized social identity forming the preference. Which social identity is salient is conditional on the frame being presented. Since foreign policy preferences often involve an element of perceived threat, for example in the case of terrorism, social identity dominance is key. When a threat is introduced one social identity dominating the others enables individuals to form preferences based on their dominant group attachments.

While emotions can certainly affect cognition directly, they can serve as an important relationship moderator. Certain emotions can influence an individual's level of social identity complexity and how they sort the various identities that define them. Stressors, such as fear of loss of personal significance, can cause individuals to reduce their complex identities into a

single entity (dominance) (Roccas & Brewer 2022). When there is the perception of threat, stress, or strong emotions, individuals tend to have low social identity complexity and one identity dominates the other. Therefore, strong emotions, such as threat or guilt, in foreign policy will result in a low social identity complexity. How individuals reconcile these various identities will be dependent upon the context of the event at hand.

I argue that social identities matter for attitudes toward conflict. Social identities are an individual's representation of self as related to their membership in various groups. These can be an individual's shared religious, ethnic, racial, partisan, national, gender, age, or cultural groups. It can also refer to shared experiences that result in a shared identity, such as being a parent, a soldier, or a survivor of domestic violence. What social identities are relevant under different contexts depends on which social identities are experiencing threat or stress under these different contexts. Threats do not need to be direct but can be the threat of humiliation for one's group resulting in a reduction in the group's social worth which will then result in a reduction in an individual's sense of self-worth. When forming attitudes towards conflict, the frame (i.e., the context or scenario) and the direction of the threat, will determine what social identity is dominant. The dominant social identity will then inform the response, here I am examining how American Social Identity responds to American Military intervention abroad that results in the death of foreign civilians violating expectations of international norms of conduct in war. Supporting the cognitive interaction model by Herrmann et al (1999), I go a step further examining in which situational and dispositional factors certain social identities are activated. In this context a social norm is being violated by harming civilians, whether intentionally or unintentionally, creating collective guilt. I do not touch upon this directly in this paper, but related work supports this assumption, elaborated on below. Ideally, I should have tested this, but

because I did not the plausibility is supported by research from Merolla and Zechmeister (2019) and Kruglankski et al's (2014) work on the psychology of motivation and the significance quest. Most likely what we are seeing is a response of anger resulting in further dehumanization and distancing from terrorism (suspected or not), but that is not the point of this paper.

The focus here will be on national identity and utilizing cognitive states, specifically emotional, to cause aversion to the casualties. Theoretically, we should expect that if an action is taken in the name of national security individuals will support that action However, given that causing civilian casualties should be seen as a negative behavior, by priming individuals to feel (collectively) guilty, in this case collectively guilty, should result in aversion towards actions that risk civilians. The implications of this are that American military actions on the world stage can lead to feelings of collective guilt for the actions in question, such as seen with the exposure to the use of torture in Abu Ghraib or actions during the Mia Lia Massacre. A wrongful action violating international norms attributed to Americans should result in a reduction in the worth of the American Social identity. Individuals should be avoidant of actions that reduce their significance. Leading to avoidance of those actions in the future.

Thus, priming guilt should result in an aversion to civilian casualties regardless of national or partisan identity. My intuition is that priming individuals to feel guilty for past national collateral damage beyond acceptable levels should make individuals averse to pursuing actions that violate international norms that could lead to civilian victimization.

Because public opinion depends on an individual's identity, I am focusing on the effect of collective emotions (guilt and threat) in response to military interventions and the relationship to national identity. Due to an activation that occurs between national identity (as the one responsible for military actions abroad) and emotion, I hypothesize the following:

H1: Guilt will cause an aversion to actions that risk foreign civilian lives and lead to a negative approval for military action that possesses these risks.
H1a: Individuals with a strong national identity will be less affected by the guilt prime.
H1b: Individuals with a strong national identity will approve of military actions regardless of risk to foreign civilians.

Emotional impact is not limited to approach-based emotions such as guilt, which can result in a reduction of the negative action/behavior that caused the feelings, but also other approach-based emotions, such as anger and threat. While I do not directly measure anger within this paper, threat was measured with multiple questions and a presumption can be made that threat is a response from anger and anxiety resulting in further dehumanization and distancing from the violence. This distancing, while not directly tested here, has been previously tested in the emotional distancing from terrorism by Banks, Hicks, and Merrolla (2022).

How individuals respond to negative group perceptions and the relationship it has to the individual self are best understood through the quest for personal significance. The quest for personal significance is a theoretical concept of individual motivation for violent extremism introduced by Kruglanski et al (2014). This form of radicalization occurs as individuals are socialized in violent behaviors that align with group norms while often against societal expectations. This occurs as part of motivational psychology and how individuals process the path to a goal they are pursuing—including individual factors driven by a human motivation to gain self-esteem, personal achievement, appear competent, and gain control, as well as other factors that make individuals feel desired and respected. Degrees of radicalization vary according to the balance between the goal of the extreme behavior and traditional common ends individuals have. According to Kruglanski et al (2014, p 73) "[k]illing members of an out-group may seem justifiable to the radicalized person in light of her or his cause's subjective importance, but it may hardly seem so to members of the victimized group". Accepting that human motivation is

driven by a need for acceptance, self-worth, and validation, attacks or threats to our significant social groups can be assumed to result in similar behavior—the acceptance of otherwise socially unacceptable behavior towards foreign civilians internationally.

H2: A high level of threat perception will lead to approval for aggressive military action regardless of civilian lives lost.
H2a: A high level of threat perception and high American Social Identity will lead to approval of aggressive military action.

Here, I focus on national identity, however other cross-cutting identities, such as gender and ethnicity tend to react differently to foreign policy attitudes (Zaller 1991, Iyengar and Simon 1993, & Crawford, Lawrence, Lebovic 2017). Past research has shown that women tend to be casualty averse (Crawford, Lawrence, Lebovic 2017), and in general Republicans tend to seek more Hawkish policies (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), though as previously stated this has not always been the case. Therefore, the alternative hypotheses in these cases are:

H3: On average Republicans will be more strike acceptant than Democrats.
H4: Women will be more averse to interventions that risk civilians' lives leading to negative attitudes.
H4a: Women will have a greater aversion to actions if they receive the guilt prime.

H1 is an examination of the treatment effects on individuals primed to feel guilty and should result in individuals being averse to interventions that risk civilian lives. H1a examines the interactions between guilt and American Social Identity. H1b is an examination of the impact of American social identity alone, while national embarrassment may lead to individuals being more averse to future national atrocities, the inverse is plausible given a means to preserve self-esteem gained from national identity. This is driven by the reality that individuals with a strong national identity will not internalize the norm against harm to civilians as a threat to their national identity makes them prioritize their national identity more than international norms. H2a examines the interaction between American Social Identity and Threat. H3 and H4 account for

known effects of gender and partisanship. H4a examines the effect of guilt on women given the existing knowledge that women tend to be casualty averse.

Method

I conducted a survey experiment in the Fall of 2021 the subject pool was 621 undergraduate students from the University of Maryland. Students received partial course credit for participating in three different experiments including this one. Subjects who failed to complete 50% or more of the survey were excluded from the analysis. Due to this, a subject total of 560 were included in the final analysis. Following standards of between-subject experimental design, 50% of the sample received the treatment and 50% were placed in the control group receiving no treatment. Given this was initially a test of the success of priming guilt on a student population, pre-registration did not occur. Part of this was driven by the necessity of investigating the effect of guilt with the understanding that guilt is generally difficult to manipulate as has been found in work by Tracy, Robins, and Tangney (2007) and Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006). Deception was used as it was necessary to keep respondents from knowing the true purpose of completing the experiment. Post-survey debriefing was given to respondents explaining the use of deception and the true nature of the survey. Given that there was minimal risk in the process, IRB approval met the standards necessary for the use of deception.

The subject pool demonstrated expected demographic variations and limitations due to being an undergraduate population. 43% of subjects self-identified as male and 55% as female. While respondents reported ages ranging from 17 to 100, the mean age of respondents was 19.65.[3] The majority of subjects reported being U.S. citizens (95%) with while only 5% were

[3] With 30% of respondents self-reporting being 18 years of age, 30% 19 years of age, and 21% 20 years of age. Any respondents below the age of 17 were not included in this this study and were screened out in the pre-experiment phase.

not. The sample contained 9% (51) Independents, 70% (394), Democrats, and 20% (114) Republicans. Of the 20% Republicans in the sample, 3.51% identified as female and non-white, 25.4% identified as female and white, 8.77% identified as male and non-white, and 50% identified as male and white. Subsequently, Independents who leaned were placed within partisan groups. [4]Racially, 57% of subjects identified as white, 11% as African American, 11% as Asian, 3% as Latino, and 20% identified as 2 or more races. While student populations represent a limitation to their generalizability (Sears, 1986), other studies conducting similar research have shown that these samples tend to produce similar trends as found in the general public (Altemeyer 1996, Druckman 2004, Druckman & Kam 2011, and Mullinix et al. 2015, Canetti et al 2019).

The survey experiment included an emotion prime to measure respondents' attitudes toward U.S. military intervention abroad. Since this is a randomized experiment, the claim to internal validity is strong because of the experimental treatment. This allows for a strong position to make casual statements about the outcomes. Binary and rating-based models (scale of 1-7 Likert) were used throughout the survey questionnaire, as well as feeling thermometers where appropriate. The full survey questionnaire is available in the appendix.

Subjects were first asked for their consent to take part in the survey. Those who did not consent were immediately taken to the survey end. Following the standards of between-subject design mentioned above, subjects were either assigned to the control or treatment group. Subjects assigned to the treatment group received an emotional prime priming them to feel guilty, while the control group received no prime and moved straight on to the news story

[4] Alvarez 1990, Dennis 1998, and Greene 2004 have demonstrated that while an individual may self-identify as an independent, the person may still behave in a partisan fashion. After using a multi-dimensional measure of partisanship, self-identifying leaners that behaved in a partisan social identification fashion were placed within their partisan categories.

depicting future military action in Yemen, which both the control group and treatment group read. The experimental manipulation utilized an emotional prime describing the events of a fictitious massacre occurring in the recent past by the American military during an intervention abroad. Following the emotional prime, subjects in the treatment group were asked a series of questions measuring the amount they felt guilty. These questions were adapted from Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) measures described in further detail below.

Treatment	Control
Guilt Prime	----------
Fictitious New Story Depicting Future Action	Fictitious News Story Depicting Future Action

Then, both subjects in the treatment and control group read an investigator-generated news story describing a fictitious potential future Predator drone strike in Yemen that would potentially result in numerous civilian deaths "many of whom [would be] women and children" prior to the outcome questions. The news story states that so far 1,400 civilian deaths have occurred in Yemen with at least 200 of those being children due to U.S. actions. Because the news story describes future action using a drone strike, it also mentions that the risk of military fatalities is 0. This removes the risk of loss of American lives, which research has shown Americans are generally sensitive to (Mueller 1973 &, Gartner & Segura 1998 and Gelpi, Feaver, & Reifler 2009) allowing for isolating the effects of foreign civilian deaths. Because my test removes the focus on American loss of lives it is a precise test of the hypotheses focused on the effect of national identity and emotion as related to foreign civilian loss of loss. Due to the necessary use of deception, subjects were debriefed after the study.

After reading the investigator-generated news story subjects were then asked outcomes questions relevant to approval of the proposed strike in Yemen, including a sliding scale question

on the acceptable number of foreign civilian deaths they were willing to incur to achieve the objective. The six outcome questions are listed below along with response measurement in parentheses:

1. Do you agree with the decision to launch the strike? (Yes or No – Binary)
2. How much would you agree with the following statement: The benefits of the proposed strike outweigh the risks to civilians. (Highly disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Highly Agree – 5-point Scale)
3. How much would you agree with the following statement: The risk the strike entails is worth the success for Americans. (Highly disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Highly Agree – 5-point Scale)
4. How much would you agree with the following statement: The risk the strike entails is worth the success for civilian populations. (Highly disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Highly Agree – 5-point Scale)
5. How ethical or unethical would it be for the U.S. to conduct the strike? (Highly unethical, Unethical, Neutral, Ethical, Highly Ethical – 5-point scale)
6. What is the maximum number of civilians that will be killed as a result of this strike that you would be willing to accept? (Please mark this number using the slider or enter the number in the box on the right. If any number of civilian deaths is acceptable, please check the box for "Any number is fine" – slider scale 0-1000 with check box)

Manipulation Check

A manipulation check was conducted to determine if the guilt prime operated as expected. The manipulation check was adapted from the GASP measures introduced by Cohen, Wolf, Panter, and Insko (2011) to suit the scenario in the prime being read by the treatment group. GASP measures are traditional measures used in psychology to measure the "propensity to experience guilt and shame across a range of personal transgressions" (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, Insko 2011, 947). The GASP measures were created to understand and assess reparative tendencies following publicly exposed transgressions due to the moral emotions of guilt and shame (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, Insko 2011). Initial findings from Wolf, Cohen, Panter, and Insko (2010), demonstrate that guilt-proneness can be measured by the responses to transgressions, meaning negative self-evaluation, and avoidant responses. Guilt proneness is one way in which

individuals differ in their cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to perceived transgressions both individually and at the group level (Tangney & Dearing 2002). Guilt differs from shame as it involves a violation of personal standards that results in harm to others (Keltner & Buswell 1997). Because guilt is associated with psychologically pro-social and healthy behaviors linked to demonstrations of empathy, the GASP measures offer a way to see how effective the emotional prime is at triggering the expected prosocial behaviors and cognitive state associated with guilt.

Only respondents in the treatment group were asked GASP measures to prevent potential priming due to the nature of the questions themselves. Given that the questions are a measurement of guilt-proneness, the control group was not presented with these questions as there was a potential that asking these questions would unintentionally prime the control group to feel guilty if asked. When asked "What is the likelihood that you feel terrible about what Americans did?", 94% of respondents responded with somewhat likely or higher, and only 4% of respondents responded with somewhat unlikely. When asked "What is the likelihood that you feel the way Americans acted was pathetic?", 88% of respondents responded with somewhat likely or higher, and 10% with somewhat unlikely or unlikely. When asked "What is the likelihood that you feel remorse for what the Americans did?", 86% of respondents were somewhat likely or higher to feel remorseful for what Americans did. As expected, subjects who read the news story depicting the past massacre denoted significant collective guilt for the events described. These results indicate that the emotional prime performed as intended. The slight under-performance (by 12%) of the prime is not surprising given how emotions occur in real life as it is not anticipated that all individuals will feel equally collectively guilty for situations at the same thresholds.

Constructed Variables and Scales

Two items were constructed to measure an individual's strength of American Social identity and external Threat Perception. To measure American Social Identity, I used two items from the four-item battery from Huddy and Khatib's measures (2007). The American Social Identity variable was created by adding together the questions: "How important is being an American to you?" and "How well does the term American describe you?". The American social identity scale was folded into a dichotomous two-point measure from the original four-item measure. Each item of the two-question scores was rescaled to range in value from 0-1. The final index for American Social Identity was a continuous scale that ranged from 0 to 2 (0 = none, 1 = moderate, 2 = strong). Respondents who received a 2 demonstrated a stronger sense of American Social Identity, while those who received a 0 scored "none" on American social identity. Higher ranges on the scale are related to a stronger sense of American social identity, while lower ranges are related to low or no American social identity levels. Figure 1 shows the percentage of the total sample by partisan group and the level of American social identity. As the bar graph demonstrates, those with high levels of American social identity tended to be predominantly Republican, with Democrats scoring mostly from 1-1.5.

Figure 1:



To measure external threat perception, I created a variable by adding together the questions "Do you perceive ISIS to be a major threat to U.S. national security?" (Poushter & Manevich 2017) and "Are you concerned about you or a loved one dying as a result of a terrorist attack?".[5] Overall, 54% of respondents believed ISIS was a significant threat to U.S. national security. While only 26% of respondents were concerned with loved ones or themselves dying in a terrorist attack. Variables were rescaled to a binary, and the two questions were added together and then divided by two. This measure of threat perception allows accounting for the extreme

[5] The question "Are you concerned about you or a loved one dying as a result of a terrorist attack?" follows trends in public opinion research following 9/11. As denoted by John Mueller and Mark Stewart (2020) there have been general trends from 1995 to 2019 demonstrating concern over individuals or themselves being victims of terrorism with upticks associated with major events and attacks.

measure accounted for by the threat of ISIS, while also allowing for the perception of threat due to individual harm to oneself and potential threat to their family. The created continuous variable ranged from 0-1, 1 corresponding to a strong sense of external threat. After creating the scaled variable, 23% of respondents strongly agreed with the terrorist threat, 41% were neutral, and 35% disagreed. Figures 2 and 3 show the responses to the questions on external threat perception and the scale created. Figure 2 shows the range of the combined scale from 0-1, with most respondents sitting in the middle. Figure 3 shows the different levels of the threat scale by partisanship, which is equally divided.

Figure 2 and Figure 3:



In the analyses that follow, I examine the roughly 500 respondents from the student sample. The only manipulation within the experiment was the treatment group reading the vignette about the prior attack in Yemen.

Results

To begin, I examined how the outcome questions were shaped by the guilt prime, threat perception, and identity measures of interest (i.e., American social identity, gender, and

Republican). I conducted a series of regression models for each question on the guilt prime (treatment), threat measure, and American Social identity. Given that the sample was a student population with limited variation in demographic characteristics such as age and military service, I did not include these demographic characteristics as covariates in the following models. Overall, I found that Threat, American Social Identity, gender, and partisan identification were powerful predictors of support for aggressive military action regardless of the risk to foreign civilians. These findings fit within my general argument suggesting that identity is informed by our emotional response to various frames and informs our position on aggressive military intervention that risks civilians.

I used an ordered logistic regression model where the dependent variable takes on a value from 0 to 5, except for the question on civilians (0-100 where respondents could select any number acceptable) and the outcome question of whether the individual agreed with the decision to launch the strike, which was measured as a binary and analyzed using linear regression.[6] Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 present my findings. For the questions of Agree, Success, Benefit, and Ethics, positive numbers represent increased support for aggressive military action regardless of the risk to civilians, and lower and negative numbers represent a desire to avoid that action. For the questions of Success, Benefits, and Ethical, positive numbers represent increased support for aggressive military action regardless of the risk to civilians, and lower and negative numbers represent a desire to avoid that action. I found support for hypotheses H1b, H2, H3, and H4. The findings for Republicans, women, and general response to threat are concurrent with existing literature. There was no significant support for H1, H1a, or H3a. While in the expected direction, the guilt prime had no statistically significant effect.

[6] Linear regression was run on all outcome variables and the results of this are in the appendix.

Given that the treatment was not statistically significant, it is not surprising that I did not find support for H1, H1a, or H3a. Those high in American Social identity were not more likely to be affected by the guilt prime, but it did result in a non-significant response against launching the strike, while in all other outcome questions a positive response in favor of the strike regardless of the risk to civilians. While women in the treatment group were against aggressive military actions, it was not significantly different compared to men in the treatment group.

	Agree			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Female	-0.1***	-0.1***	-0.1**	-0.1***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Threat	0.1**	0.1**	0.1**	0.2
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.1)
Republican	0.2***	0.2***	0.2***	0.2***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ASI	0.1**	0.1	0.1**	0.1*
	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.1)
ASI*Treatment		-0.004		
		(0.1)		
Female*Treatment			-0.01	
			(0.1)	
ASI*Threat				-0.1
				(0.1)
Constant	1.0***	1.0***	1.0***	1.0***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	549	549	549	549
R^2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Adjusted R^2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Residual Std. Error	0.4 (df = 543)	0.4 (df = 542)	0.4 (df = 542)	0.4 (df = 542)
F Statistic	17.5*** (df = 5; 543)	14.5*** (df = 6; 542)	14.5*** (df = 6; 542)	14.6*** (df = 6; 542)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 1: Do you agree with the decision to launch the strike?

Looking at the first column in Table 1, we can see that gender, threat, partisanship, and American Social Identity had a significant effect on overall opinion on the decision to launch the strike. Females were averse to the strike compared to males. Respondents with high threat perception, Republicans, and those with high American Social Identity were more likely to

support launching the strike. The guilt prime does not have a significant effect on support for the strike, suggesting that while emotions do shape civilians' judgments about military intervention aboard which are most impactful may need further evaluation as moral emotions, like guilt, operate in different parts of the brain than primitive emotions such as fear and anger predominate in threat perception.

Examining the substantial effects of the Agree outcome question, any variable that the confidence interval overlaps the 0 line is non-significant. Republican was a significant predictor of the outcome variable across all four models. Female was also significant, but were in the opposite direction of Republicans. This demonstrates the effects are consistent across models.

	Benefits			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.1	-0.8	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Female	-0.4**	-0.4**	-0.4**	-0.4**
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Threat	0.6***	0.6***	0.6***	1.2*
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.7)
Republican	1.1***	1.1***	1.1***	1.1***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
ASI	0.9***	0.7**	0.9***	1.1***
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
ASI*Treatment		0.6		
		(0.4)		
Female*Treatment			0.1	
			(0.3)	
ASI*Threat				-0.4
				(0.5)
Observations	549	549	549	549
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: How much would you agree with the following statement: The benefits of the proposed strike outweigh the risks to civilians

Comparable to the results of the decision to launch the strike, Table 2 shows how respondents respond to weighing the benefits versus risks to civilians. Overall, we can see that gender, threat, Republican, and American Social Identity were significant factors in opinions on the benefits of the strike over the risks. Females remained averse compared to males. While, Republicans, higher threat perception, and higher American Social Identity resulted in general support for the benefits of the strike regardless of the risks to civilians. In general, this points to specific identities that are more likely to support aggressive military action. While concurrent with existing literature, threat went across partisan groupings and was a significant determining factor in all outcome questions.



Regarding the question of the benefits of the proposed strike. Any variable that crosses the 0 line is non-significant, this applies to Threat and the interaction between Threat and ASI in Model 4. In Model 2, the interaction between the Treatment and ASI was also non-significant, along with the interaction in Model 3 with Treatment and Females. However, this also demonstrates consistency between models with the effect of Female, ASI, Republican, and Threat.

	Success			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.2	-0.7	-0.01	-0.2
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Female	-0.5***	-0.5***	-0.4*	-0.5***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Threat	1.2***	1.2***	1.2***	1.2*
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.7)
Republican	1.3***	1.3***	1.3***	1.3***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
ASI	0.9***	0.7***	0.9***	0.9***
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
ASI*Treatment		0.4		
		(0.4)		
Female*Treatment			-0.3	
			(0.3)	
ASI*Threat				-0.02
				(0.5)
Observations	549	549	549	549
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 3: How much would you agree with the following statement: The risk the strike entails is worth the success for Americans.

These results are mirrored in the question of whether the strike is worth the success for Americans displayed in Table 3. Females compared to males were against the risk regardless of the success, while Republicans, those with high threat perception, and those high in American Social Identity believed the risk to be worth the goal of success. This is concurrent with existing literature but extends upon the idea of wartime phobia and victory centrism by showing that success may be further tied to identity-reinforcing self-esteem mechanisms, such as those that strengthen the sense of worth an individual gets by being a member of that nation.

	Civilians			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.1	-0.6	-0.01	-0.1
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Female	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Threat	0.9***	0.9***	0.9***	1.3**
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.7)
Republican	1.1***	1.1***	1.1***	1.1***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
ASI	0.9***	0.7***	0.9***	1.0***
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
ASI*Treatment		0.4		
		(0.4)		
Female*Treatment			-0.1	
			(0.3)	
ASI*Threat				-0.3
				(0.5)
Observations	549	549	549	549
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 4: How much would you agree with the following statement: The risk the strike entails is worth the success for civilian populations.

In considering the civilian costs associated with military action, respondents were able to decide if the risk the strike entailed was worth the success for the civilian populations in question. Given the frame here changed from the success of the American strike to the risk to civilians, the differences between women and men were not significant. However, threat perception, Republican, and higher American social identity remained significant factors for positive responses to the strike. The difference here between women and men can be explained by how women respond to success when framed around protecting civilian populations, rather than in the name of the nation.



The question of whether the proposed strike was worth the risk to civilians was a bit varied compared to the previous effects on the agreeableness of the strike and the benefits. The non-significant effect of the treatment remains, as well as the effect of the interaction models. In this question compared to the rest in the one situation in which the effect for females falls away and non-significant significant.

	Ethical			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.002	-0.8	0.3	-0.002
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Female	-0.4**	-0.4**	-0.1	-0.4**
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
Threat	0.8***	0.8***	0.8***	0.9
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.7)
Republican	1.0***	1.0***	1.0***	1.0***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
ASI	1.1***	0.8***	1.1***	1.1***
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
ASI*Treatment		0.6		
		(0.4)		
Female*Treatment			-0.5	
			(0.3)	
ASI*Threat				-0.1
				(0.5)
Observations	549	549	549	549
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 5: How ethical or unethical would it be for the U.S. to conduct the strike?

Results remained consistent on the significant effect of American Social Identity, threat perception, and partisanship on the questions of ethics of the strike. Emotionally when processing the terrorist actors, threat is the predominant emotion that drives the response and identity activation. It is questionable why the effect of females compared to males was not as significant on the question of ethics compared to other outcomes questions. This may be driven in part by bias in question-wording, as whether something is ethical or unethical is purely subjective and may be tied to other underlying value structures.



As denoted, the question wording with the outcome variable on whether the strike was ethical may be problematic. As we can see here, the non-significance of the treatment and interaction models holds and demonstrates model consistency throughout the outcome variables. Variation occurs here as only Model 4 does Threat become non-significant; however, this may be accounted for by Model 4 being the interaction model between Threat and ASI. The same effect occurred in Model 3 with the Female and Treatment interaction model.

To better understand the effects of the interaction terms across the 5 attitudinal outcome variables, I examined the marginal effects for each utilizing a linear model (a full table for the linear model is available in the appendix). Each question, agree, benefits, success, civilians, and ethical, were examined across each of the four models in linear terms and marginal effects plots were created for each. Before this, I compared the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) across the 4 outcome variables on each of the four models. The lowest AICs for each are bolded below.

Outcome Question	Model	AIC
Agree	**1**	**444.890896663915**
Agree	2	446.888637832024
Agree	3	446.840075362626
Agree	4	446.521294192549
Benefits	1	1339.18917959718
Benefits	**2**	**1338.9549304773**
Benefits	3	1341.14202560513
Benefits	4	1340.42015077875

Success	**1**	**1396.22915487375**
Success	2	1397.12379602029
Success	3	1398.16966497394
Success	4	1397.73138654115
Civilians	**1**	**1313.2485975429**
Civilians	2	1314.07878534386
Civilians	3	1314.40917233644
Civilians	4	1315.24711370063
Ethical	1	1202.91890384534
Ethical	**2**	**1202.6051442461**
Ethical	3	1202.66311853393
Ethical	4	1204.87596868919

Given that AIC penalizes based on the number of parameters, the slight difference in the models (2,3,4 for each outcome question) that include an interaction had slightly lower as they required less information. In the models for the outcome questions on the Benefits and Ethics of the proposed strike, the second model which contained an interaction between gender and the treatment had lower AIC scores. Model fit can only tell me how much of the data is best explained by the model. However, given the difference between the models is 2.19 at most, I know that there is a moderate difference between certain models. All models above in yellow are less than 2 units lower than the best-fit models, implying there may not be a significant difference in the models.

Agree Marginal Effects



On examining the interaction between Treatment and ASI on whether or not an individual agreed with the proposed strike, there is not a significant effect of ASI on Treatment effects.



When examining the marginal effect of treatment on females on the agree outcome question, the effect of females does not significantly interact with the treatment.



Examining the marginal effects of the interaction between Threat and ASI on the question of the agreeableness of the strike demonstrates that as the effect of Threat increases the relative effect of ASI decreases slightly, but this decrease is not significant across the range of effects. The interactive effect only exists when ASI is 1.0-1.5.

Benefits Marginal Effects



Regarding the outcome question of the benefits of the strike, the interaction between Treatment and ASI, there is non-significant effect.



On examining the interaction between Treatment and Female, there is non-significant effect of Female on Treatment effects.



The effect of threat differs by ASI score when ASI is between 0.5 to 1.5 on the question of the benefits of the strike.

Success Marginal Effects



On regarding the outcome question of the success of the strike, the interaction between Treatment and ASI, there is non-significant effect.



On regarding the outcome question of the benefits of the strike, the interaction between Treatment and ASI, there is non-significant effect.



On regarding the outcome question of the success of the strike, the interaction between Treatment and female is non-significant. As we have seen within all of the models. The interactions for Treatment and ASI and Treatment and Female for the question on civilians and ethics can be found below, they also demonstrate that there is a non-significant interaction. However, the effects remain consistent for the interaction between Threat and ASI in the question of civilians and ethics as demonstrated below.

Civilians Marginal Effects





Ethical Marginal Effects







Discussion and Conclusion

There are several important takeaways from my paper on the understanding of wartime public opinion. First, women while generally more casually averse than men, and this was supported by my findings are not more likely to be affected by moral emotions. Often the literature has pointed to a socialization reasoning for this result, but further research needs to examine the potential for differences in underlying value structures tied to salient and dominant identities as this may be what is driving the difference between women and men.

Second, my findings demonstrate that while we can prime individuals to feel guilty, in situations where there is a perceived active terrorist threat, even if not directly aimed at the nation, Americans' capacity to cognitively process civilian victimization through moral emotions, such as guilt, is limited. Survival instincts tend to dominate our cognitive processes in situations where there is a perceived threat. Which provides a rather bleak outlook for the future U.S. engagement abroad. However, part of this may be driven by the strength of the prime or the uniqueness of using a student sample. Given that guilt is difficult to prime, the prime may not have been strong enough to impact perceptions of collective guilt. While collective guilt has been effective in post-Holocaust Germany (Branscombe & Doosje 2004), the same reaction may not occur while reading a fictitious news story. Further research should explore different ways to prime guilt such as through the use of music, through media depicting the situations that would activate collective guilt, or possibly through a list experiment. The uniqueness of the sample also leads to the necessity of further investigation. Using a student sample that is predominately in the early 20s creates further limitations as they are still growing cognitively as well as learning about the United States' participation in the world and sometimes lack thereof (such a with Rwanda and Somalia). Further research needs to be done to examine the impact of other emotions when

contrasted with threat perception to determine if any emotions are correlated with this. While some have examined different types of terrorist threats (Merolla & Zechmeister 2019), this has been limited to the effects on the public without the engagement of other emotions or the impact of national identity. Antoine Banks, Heather Hicks, and Jennifer Merrolla (2023) have extended this research and found that individuals emotionally cope with terrorism through anger to distance themselves from it, however, this has more to do with how we respond to exposure to the information about a terrorist attack rather than how individuals respond to pursuing perceived aggressors. Anger may also be a driver in the response that limits the effectiveness of guilt in military intervention that risks civilians if there is a perceived threat.

Third, my findings demonstrate that on the international stage American social identity may matter in a different way than partisanship alone. While there was a slight, though not a direct correlation between partisanship and American social identity, the impact of American social identity was still different than partisanship alone and those who had higher American social identity were more likely to support aggressive military action regardless of the risk to civilians. Further investigation on the importance of American Social Identity will need to be undertaken as one flaw in my study was not measuring the level of American Social Identity before the experimental manipulation and after. Matthew Levendusky (2018) found similar results when examining the impact of national identity on reducing affective polarization in the U.S. between partisan groups by utilizing the holiday of July 4th and participation in the 2008 Summer Olympics. Further research on this should explore the potential of utilizing national holidays and sporting events to foster support during U.S. military interventions abroad.

In conclusion, there are potential policy ramifications for the initial findings of my research. While my sample was limited due to being from a student pool, traditionally we would

expect a less aggressive response, which was not my findings. Even with a Democratic President, the results demonstrate that the hawkish tendencies may be driven by desires to protect the nation, rather than partisanship alone. These results may be different if the experiment focused on another country with different civilian victims. As demonstrated by Ku and Knuppe (2016), victims of violence identified as Christian were more likely to receive support for American military invention. Implying that shared characteristics, such as religion, race, and ethnicity, as well as shared cultural values, like support for democracy, are important factors for whether individuals support protecting victims of war. In contrast, however, the rational models of public opinion have shown that when framing is focused on the number of losses, regardless of individual-level factors, "where death tolls were higher, support for force was invariably and significantly lower" (Johns & Davies 2017 p 251). From the research I conducted, this rationality may not be entirely the case when the threat is significant there is a higher acceptance of higher losses with the use of military force. Given these previous findings, further investigation is necessary into countries where results may be different, such as the current affairs in both Ukraine and Israel.

Chapter 3: Defining Being American Through Intersecting Identities

Abstract
What does it mean to be an American? Current literature points to a diverse set of qualities. Some say that it is about engaged citizenship (Pocok 1965, Bailyn 1967, Wood 1969, Schildkraut 2005), others say it is about national attachment and/or patriotism/nationalism (Schildkraut 2005, Schildkraut 2011, Schildkraut 2013, Huddy & Khatib 2007, Herrmann et al 2009). Still others focus on "typical American values" (Banning 1986, Smith 1993, Mills 1997, Streich 2009). Regardless of the numerous definitions and qualities, what is clear is that the field lacks a comprehensive definition of what it means to be American. I argue that by looking across basic demographic groups, we see that the differences between these groups drive how people in them conceptualize "being American". Specifically, I look at race, gender, and partisanship. I argue that whites will prioritize ethnocentric conceptualizations of being American compared to non-whites, women are more supportive of constructive patriotism than the other forms, and that Democrats take a view of patriotism driven by accountability, while Republicans focus on unwavering loyalty. To examine how individuals define being an American, I conducted a survey experiment in the Spring of 2025 with a national sample examining differing aspects of how individuals may define "being American". Concurrent with my expectations, I found that men and Republicans displayed favorability towards ethnocentric measures of American identity, while women and Democrats showed shame for national wrongdoing. Additionally, Republicans favored uncritical patriotism, while Democrats favored constructive patriotism. Lastly, women favored constructive patriotism over uncritical patriotism, but not symbolic patriotism. My research contributes to the field in two ways: understanding how the various measures of patriotism relate to one another in terms of who prioritizes what types and understanding how different groups of Americans define being American.

Keywords: American identity, national attachment, survey, emotions

Introduction

One of the first things you often hear at the start of a baseball game is the national anthem, The Star-Spangled Banner. In a stadium filled with hundreds, the only sound that can be heard is the sound of a nation. While you may still get goosebumps when you hear those lines, this brings to mind a question: what does it mean to be an American?

At present, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there is no uniform definition of what it means to be an American. Current literature points to a diverse set of qualities. Some say that it is about engaged citizenship (Pocok 1965, Bailyn 1967, Wood 1969, Schildkraut 2005), others say it is about national attachment and/or patriotism/nationalism (Schildkraut 2005, Schildkraut 2011, Schildkraut 2013, Huddy & Khatib 2007, Herrmann et al 2009). Still others focus on "typical American values" (Banning 1986, Smith 1993, Mills 1997, Streich 2009). Regardless of the numerous definitions and qualities, what is clear is that the field lacks a comprehensive definition of what it means to be American. Currently, there is no definition that everyone agrees on or that seems to generate the same reactions for all people.

I argue that the reason for this disagreement is that people in different subgroups define being American in different ways. Across broad demographic groups, there are big differences in how people think about how they define being American. Three groups that warrant further examination are whites/non-whites, women/men, and Republicans/Democrats. Within these groups, we see variation because of their different life experiences and perspectives.

Women, for instance, are going to prioritize keeping families secure due to socialization factors, namely how women are raised to think about their role in the family and society. We see this, for instance, in trade policy opinions; women have been found to prefer protectionist trade policies over free trade (Mayda & Rodrik 2005). This is due to the perception that free trade

policies would risk losing jobs at home (Mayda & Rodrik 2005), thus creating insecurity for the family. Generally, women are believed to be socialized into specific attitudes that are tied to their role as caregivers (Liao & Cai 1995). These ties are often reflected through egalitarian and altruistic values, as well as displaying greater empathy (Andreoni & Vesterlund 2001 and Eisenberg & Lennon 1983). Given these known, gender based differences, it is likely that women view "being American" through a different lens than men.

Similar to gender, we also get differences when we break groups down by race. Whites, for instance, tend to have views to show support for social dominance and ethnocentric policies (Holt & Sweitzer 2018). I argue that this result is likely to carry over to whites showing increased support for ethnocentric views of patriotism and how politics should work. Ethnocentric views of America likely lead to a reduction in support for policies of cooperation in international politics. Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti (2009) demonstrated that chauvinistic views of American identity lead to a decrease in international cooperation and a desire to do what we will in the name of American national interests. Similarly to women as discussed above, non-whites are going to have differing positions on what "being American" means as related to patriotism due to the historical realities they have faced. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 demonstrate how deeply rooted in prior American culture was to discriminating against portions of the population. These historic realities led to a reality that history matters, and how parts of the population were treated in the past, likely reflect the way they define "being American" as part of their identity.

Lastly, just as with gender and race, belonging to different political parties will not only lead to differences in policy preferences, but also different definitions of what is in America's best interest. After 9/11, for instance, Republicans tended to be more supportive of aggressive

military actions compared to Democrats (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav 2005). Similarly, findings on the role of right-wing versus left-wing leaders has shown that right-wing candidates are more prone to state aggression in international conflict (Bertoli, Dafoe, & Trager 2018). Differences in preferences over using aggression between parties has continued with divisive issues, like the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Israel/Palestine conflict. For example, 62% of Republicans say that the United States does not have a responsibility to help Ukraine (PEW Research Center 2024). By contrast, a sizable majority of Democrats (71%) favor continued economic aid and the use of American-made military weapons (65%). The only issue Republicans and Democrats overlap on how to address the conflict is by continuing the use of economic sanctions on Russia (PEW Research Center 2024). When looking at divisions in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, partisan differences emerge again. Republicans tend to show strong support for Israel, while Democrats show support and sympathy for Palestinian (Smeltz, El Baz, Rasool-Ayub, Rondeaux, & Shell 2024).

The differences between groups (e,g, men and women, whites and nonwhites, etc.) discussed above are important, as people often think a person's sense of national identity is just about partisan identity. But this is not the case. Assuming American policy preferences are driven primarily by party policies ignores important implications for how individuals define being American, and how this defining process affects policy preferences. Policy preferences, both domestic and international, likely vary due to other factors such as how an individual defines being an American and believes what policies are best pursued to protect the national interest. In order to understand how different groups prioritize different aspects of "being American", a first place to start is to investigate the differences between these binary groups (Republicans/Democrats, women/men, whites/non-whites).

My research contributes to two areas of the field. First, I help understand how different groups of Americans define being American. This helps resolve the lack of consensus in the field about how we ought to define being an American for different groups of people. Second, my work looks at the roles of national chauvinism and patriotism across different groups. I help detangle how different demographic aspects of the individual relate to levels of national chauvinism and patriotism. While many scholars have explored patriotism and the way patriotism affects attitudes towards specific policies (Byrne 2011, Citrin & Sears 2014, Huddy & Khatib 2007), most have not sought to understand how different subgroups stack differently across the multitude of measurements used. Currently, the field has more measures for patriotism and national attachment than it does consensus. My research contributes to understanding how the various measures of patriotism relate to one another in terms of who prioritizes what types. Additionally, while many scholars have looked at the role of ethnocentrism (Hammond & Axelrod 2006, Bizumic & Duckitt 2012, Neuliep & McCroskey 1997) and chauvinism (Lukin 2014, Gustavsson & Stendahl 2020, Huddy & Del Ponte 2019), they mostly focus on how they relate to U.S. domestic policies or relationships with other nations abroad, rather than compared to each other.

The rest of this paper will proceed as follows. First, I will review the literatures on engaged citizenship, patriotism, and American ideals; I will also discuss my theory of intersectionality in defining "being American". Second, I will provide an overview of the study design and the created indices. Following this, I will go through the results of my research. Lastly, I will discuss the implications of my findings, policy implications, and avenues for future research.

Literature Review

The literature on American identity is vast, but falls into three main categories: engaged citizenship, patriotism, and holding a specific set of American ideals.

The first category through which American identity is usually understood is by looking at engaged citizenship. Engaged citizenship has been a focus of many scholars since the 1960s giving rise to a vibrant research agenda (e.g., Pocok 1965, Bailyn 1967, and Wood 1969). Focusing on civic engagement amongst new Americans, Chen (2005, 10), for instance, argues that "American-ness" is viewed as a sense of belonging, rather than identity alone. Chen (2005, 25) found that participation increased as individuals reported feeling connected to the United States, with 69% of their sample reporting "at least one form of political participation" besides voting. Chen's work implies that different forms of civic participation and values are important for different groups of people, and that understanding how Americans value different forms of participation is one form of identity. Similarly, Schildkraut (2005) focused on how civic engagement is related to preferences on policy. She argued that there are four distinct categories of types of Americans: those that have a liberal identity, a civic republican identity, an ethnocultural (ethnocentric) identity, and incorporation identity. Schildkraut (2005) found that these four different definitions of what it means to be an American result in different types of policy opposition and support. In general, individuals tended to use one form of identity to inform preferences on abstract issues, like English as the official language, and multiple forms of identity to understand complex issues, like bilingual teaching in public schools (Schildkraut 2005). Schildkraut showed that individuals with ethnocultural types of American identity were more likely to support restrictive language policies, while those with liberal and civic republican identities supported more open policies. Schildkraut found that people stack similarly on these

categories of American identities, but how they informed policy positions occurred in different ways depending on whether the policy being evaluated was seen as complex or abstract. This finding suggests the American identity can be defined by the same people but different aspects of being American are salient at different points in time. An abstract issue that is easily processed is English as an official language, while having bilingual classrooms in public schools is viewed as a complex problem, both requiring differing aspects of American identity according to Schildkraut (2005).

The second category that American identity is understood through is patriotism and national attachment. Many scholars have written about how patriotism is a part of American national identity and a form of national attachment (Schildkraut 2005, Schildkraut 2011, Schildkraut 2013, Shelton 2010, Byrne 2011, Huddy & Khatib 2007, and Herrmann, Isernia, & Segatti 2009). Huddy and Khatib (2007), for instance, argue that previous measures of patriotism (symbolic, constructive, and uncritical) exhibit ideological basis and new measures based on our understanding of social identity theory of national attachment are needed. Using a student sample conducted in 2002 and 2004 and a 1996 General Social Survey Sample, they found that ideology was not an important predictor of how individuals stacked on national identity, national pride, or nationalism. Instead age, time of life in the United States, immigration generation, and race served as important predictors(Huddy & Khatib 2007). Additionally they found that attention to politics was driven by national identity strength and an individual's level of uncritical patriotism (Huddy & Khatib 2007). From these results, they concluded that their new measure for American identity did not demonstrate the same ideological basis as the previous measures (Huddy & Khatib 2007). Their work shows that how individuals define being American breaks down in different ways beyond ideological divides.

Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti (2009) took a similar approach to examining national identity through the lens of social identity theory, focusing on how people define themselves in terms of their national identity. Specifically, they measured national attachment through an individual's level of patriotism and national chauvinism, examining how national attachment and national chauvinism predict affect towards other nations (Herrmann, Isernia, & Segatti 2009). They found that an individual's level of national attachment led to increased affect to England, Israel, Mexico, and South Africa, but the higher levels of national chauvinism led to increased negative affect towards England, Israel, Mexico, South Africa, and Iran (Herrmann, Isernia, & Segatti 200). National attachment, by comparison, led to higher evaluation of countries perceived as allies. The finding that negative affect was linked to national chauvinism were argued by Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti (2009) to be due related to perceptions of power from others. While Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti did not examine how different subgroups of Americans stack on their measures of national attachment and national chauvinism, their work showed that how attached or chauvinist an individual is can cause inverse policy positions demonstrating group differences that are triggered through an us versus them mentality. However, how this us versus them mentality is depicted at the individual level up to the international level is not clear. Understanding how individual differences lead to national chauvinism will help us understand if it is a typical American trait or unique depending upon the context it is being examined in.

The final category by which American identity is typically understood is through American ideals. Some researchers argue that one way to understand American identity is through specific ideals that are associated with American values and culture (Banning 1986, Smith 1993, Mills 1997, Streich, Citrin et al 1990, and Byrne 2011). Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990), for instance, explore how individuals define civic identity and the relationship to

particular American ideals to explore American identity. They focus on the difference between a liberal conception of America (political participation, economic individualism, and egalitarian values of equality) contrasted with the ethnocentric conception (belief in God, speaking English, and defending the country vocally). They found that liberals believed speaking English was an important part of being an American, and that conservatives and liberals were equally likely to endorse equality as a principle (Citrin et al 1990). Overall, their results indicate that regardless of ideology, most Americans incorporate liberal and ethnocentric conceptions of American society. These conceptions come along with general beliefs across ideological lines that to be American is to speak English, believe in God, be economically self-reliant, participate in politics, and values of social equality (Citrin et al 1990).

Similarly to Citrin, Reingold, and Green's work, Byrne (2011) investigates the relationship between ethnocentric, civic, and liberal conceptions of American identity. Byrne (2011) argues that balance between these three concepts is important in shaping individual attitudes towards immigration. She finds that unequal balance between the three conceptions of what it means to be American, leads to extremely positive and negative evaluations of immigrations. Overall, Byrne (2011) showed that we need to focus on policy positions in relation to one another as informed by different forms of American identity. Citrin et al (1990) and Byrne (2011) both demonstrate how being American can stack across both ethnocentric and liberal conceptions of American identity, showing how these concepts are important to understand policy preferences on a diversity of issues.

As we can see, there is no common take away from the existing literature. The definitions in the literature don't all point to the same thing. My theory offers a way to reconcile the lack of consensus. By looking across basic demographic groups, we see that the differences between

these groups drive how people in them conceptualize "being American". In the next section, I will unpack each of these main demographic groups.

Theory

Whites/Non-Whites

I argue that whites will prioritize ethnocentric conceptualizations of being American compared to non-whites. When compared to African Americans, white Americans will look for ways to maintain group dominance and cohesion in positions of power. Finally, non-whites will have differing positions on what "being American" means as related to patriotism due to the historical realities they have faced.

Social dominance orientation tells us how ingroups will hold preferences for maintaining superordinate in-group status over the outgroup (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo 1994). This often is demonstrated through socially constructed hierarchies between groups (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo 1994). Given this, SDO is directly associated with national chauvinism, as national chauvinism is a measure of preference for your nation over others and putting your nation's interests first. SDO attitudes tend to present as xenophobia and ethnocentrism (Hodson & Dhont 2015 and Kauff et al 2016). In examining support for the Black Lives Matters (BLM) movement, for instance, Holt and Sweitzer (2018) found SDO was a significant predictor for white Americans attitudes toward BLM. While social dominance orientation was an important predictor for white attitudes toward BLM, for African Americans, attitudes toward BLM were driven by ethnic identity (2018).

In examining differences in how individuals across different races defined typical American values, Citrin et al (1990) found that the majority of whites viewed important aspects of being American as related to voting (77%), speaking English (77%), trying to get ahead

(77%), treating all equally (88%), and speaking up for the country (52%). African Americans feel similarly on many of the issues, but were higher in believing a typical American had a strong belief in God (63%), speaking English (83%), treating all equally (94%), and speaking up for the country (52%). Both racial groups showed favorability to most aspects of being American, however, African Americans showed a comparable different in believing in God as an important aspect of being American. On all of the issues whites and African Americans placed as a important aspects, the percentage of African Americans who placed higher those aspects was more than the percentage of white respondents.

In Huddy and Khatib's (2007) original study of symbolic, constructive, and uncritical patriotism, they found that African Americans were significantly less in favor of constructive (-.031 at the .05 level), symbolic (-.158 at the .001 level), and uncritical patriotism (-.075 at the .05 level) compared to whites. However, given that this study was completed on a student sample, further investigation is needed to see if these effects hold on a nationally representative sample. Given historic injustices experienced by minority populations throughout American history, I anticipate that these experiences will lead to non-whites being in favor of constructive patriotism, that is, viewing the right to protest and speak out as a means to change society in positive ways.

Given the discussion above, I hypothesize that:

H1: Whites will have higher levels of national chauvinism than non-whites.
H2: Whites will be more in favor of uncritical patriotism than non-whites.
H3: Non-whites will be more in favor of constructive patriotism.

Gender

As noted above, I argue that women tend to prefer policies that are more protective of the home. This is due to their defined roles in society and the socialization that flows from that. Multiple studies support this notion. Liao and Cai (1995), for instance, look at how socialization

through social learning versus situational dispositions inform expectations towards gender roles in society. They found that gender roles in the family division of labor follow traditional expectations compared to that of the relationship between gender roles and how best to raise children (Liao & Cai 1995). Theoretically, their work points to a relationship between the socialization of gender roles for women, as well as the importance of situational contexts for gender role attitudes. For the purposes of this study, their work helps explain that women will prefer protective policies and support traditional norms regarding women's role in the home.

Similarly, other research has shown that women tend to display greater empathy and egalitarian values compared to men (Andreoni & Vesterlund 2001 and Eisenberg & Lennon 1983). But this is not always the case. In examining how gender shapes attitudes about immigration, for instance, research has shown that gendered differences can vary. Sometimes women are different from men, and other times there is no difference between the genders. On some issues, for instance, women have viewed immigrants as social burdens compared to men (Pichler 2010 and Markaki & Longhi 2013). Similarly, Kobayashi and Tanaka (2024) found that women tend to hold more negative attitudes towards immigration based on economic and fiscal reasons. They argued that the differences they found may be driven by how women evaluate immigration by different metrics compared to men, namely women focused on economic implications of immigration (Kobayashi & Tanaka 2024). In 40% of the models they tested, women held more negative views of immigration compared to men . They argue this because women traditionally have certain gender roles in society and have values associated with those expected roles. Therefore, when issues such as immigration arise that relate to economic stability and potential job losses, women will hold harsher perceptions of immigration compared to men.

These findings point to tensions between how women and men view economic conflict from immigration that likely relates as well to differences in conflict perceptions.

By contrast, men tend to be more power hungry and ethnocentric. Multiple studies support this position. Returning to social dominance orientation, research has shown that men are more social dominance-oriented (SDO) than women (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle 1994). This general finding points back to the fact that women tend to display empathy and egalitarian values (Andreoni & Vesterlund 2001 and Eisenberg & Lennon 1983), while having high levels of SDO is negatively correlated with empathy and altruism (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle 1994). When Pratto et al investigated social dominance orientation in individuals they found that, concurrent with their past studies (Pratto, Sidanius, & Stallworth 1999 and Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo 1994), men were more oriented towards social dominance than women. As has been seen throughout the research on social dominance orientation, there is a direct link between social dominance orientation and ethnocentrism (Olonisakin 2023). This link implies that individuals who display higher levels of chauvinism would also have higher levels of social dominance orientation as ethnocentrism is a part of social dominance orientation. This supports the idea that men compared to men will display more ethnocentric/chauvinistic views of patriotism compared to women, given higher levels of social dominance orientation.

Focusing on this relationship as to how women versus men will define patriotism, in Huddy and Khatib's (2007) original study, women scored less highly on constructive and symbolic patriotism compared to men. They did not, however, see differences on feelings toward uncritical patriotism between men and women. However, this test is limited as it was conducted on a student sample, rather than a nationally representative sample. Constructive patriotism relates to loving one's country through criticizing it, In contrast, uncritical patriotism

is unwavering loyalty, and symbolic patriotism relates to love of the flag and national anthem. Given that women have a disposition to show greater empathy and egalitarian values, I argue that women are likely to be more supportive of constructive patriotism than the other forms. This is because being empathetic should be linked to constructive measures of patriotism, as empathy is the ability to understand another's feelings and experiences which should then lead to a desire to speak out against the suffering of others. While this goes against Huddy and Khatib's (2007) original study, I believe that their original study missed socialization that occurs throughout the lives of women and might be missed in an undergraduate sample.

Given the research discussed above and its implications, I hypothesize the following differences based on gender:

H4: Women will be more supportive of constructive patriotism than uncritical or symbolic.
H5: Men will have higher responses to national chav. compared to women.

Political Party

Partisan differences in attitudes have been well researched (Gerber & Green 1998, Converse 1962, and Levendusky 2013). Based on these earlier findings, I argue that the Republican party will be more focused on loyalty-based views of the country compared to Democrats and demonstrate higher levels of national chauvinism. Democrats, I argue, will see criticism of one's country as a part of being a patriot. Partisanship will also affect how people in these parties view what it means to be patriotic. I will now briefly review three studies that support this position.

In Huddy and Khatib's (2007) original study of constructive, symbolic, and uncritical patriotism they found that Republicans were significantly more likely to embrace uncritical patriotism compared to Democrats (.13 at the .001 level). Associating with the republican party was only significant in an individual's level of uncritical patriotism, resulting in a .13 change

(Huddy & Khatib 2007). They did find a reduction with strong conservatives on their agreement with the statements for constructive patriotism (-0.6 at the .001 level), but this effect did not carry over for Republicans compared to Democrats.

When examining how individuals define "being American" through a partisan lens, it is important to note research has shown that differences between Democrats and Republicans can be reduced when they focus on each other as *fellow* Americans (Levendusky 2018). Levendusky's work focused on applying a common ingroup identity model to show how Americans from different political groups come together on opinion during events like the Olympics and July 4th towards out party political candidates. This demonstrates that there are no partisan differences when examined in these specific contexts. However, while this rationale works to understand how Americans can band together against a common enemy (or for a common cause), it does not explain how different definitions occur. Instead, it suggests that in general, members of all partisan groups are patriotic. Given this, I should not expect differences in my general measure or patriotism as well as symbolic patriotism, but instead differences should be tied to constructive and uncritical patriotism as they tie to party value differences.

Americans exhibit similarities on general measurements of patriotism (Byrne 2011) and national attachment (Herrmann et al 2019), but how these similarities are operationalized towards matters of policy, such as immigration, demonstrate divisions (Byrne 2011). Byrne (2011) found that when Americans hold similar levels of ethnocentric, civic, and liberal conceptions of American identity that attitudes towards immigration were neutral. However, this effect changed when the balance between these three concepts were unequal, often leading to negative depictions of the effects of immigration (Byrne 2011). Byrne (2011) also showed that symbolic racism was a significant contributor to negative attitudes towards immigration, which

resulted in a 60% probability of respondents reporting negative views of immigration. Connecting Byrne's (2011) work back to divisions between political parties, we know that symbolic racism is often tied to the conservative party (McConahay & Hough 1976). This helps demonstrate that while there may be similarities in how partisan groups respond to measures of American identity, the effect of these attachments differ due to underlying political values tied to party concepts. Put differently, while there may be similarities on how partisan groups view patriotism, this does not necessarily consistently translate to similar policy preferences.

Given this, I anticipate that Democrats take a view of patriotism driven by accountability through political participation and Republicans focus on support of the status quo through unwavering loyalty. Given that research has shown instances when Democrats and Republicans have shown similar measures on areas like support for out party candidates during July 4th and the Olympics (Levendusky 2018), and similar levels of support in general measures of patriotism (Byrne 2011), differences between the party should be tied to differences in how the party believes the American government should operate as well as American values.

Based on what I have discussed above, I hypothesize the following regarding how partisanship will affect definitions of "being American":

H6: Members of the Republican party will be more supportive of national chauvinism than Democrats.

H7: Democrats will be more supportive of constructive patriotism compared to Republicans.

Research Design

To examine how individuals define being an American, I conducted a survey experiment in the Spring of 2025 with a national sample. The total sample for this survey was 952 respondents. Prior to the exclusion of those who failed the attention check or did not consent to participate, the original sample was 2245, demonstrating the importance of incorporating

attention check questions into survey work. Subjects were measured on a variety of demographic characteristics, including partisanship, American social identity, threat perception, patriotism, national attachment, and national chauvinism. Subjects were recruited through CINT Theorem following CINT Theorem's standard recruitment process.[7] Participants were able to skip most of the questions if they so chose, except for the consent and attention check.

Following the demographic questions, participants were asked different questions on patriotism. I utilized different survey questions from previous research to examine how different groups of Americans stacked on these different measures of patriotism. Utilizing existing measures illustrates the diversity of measurements in the field and the lack of a consensus on how best to measure many of these concepts. These questions include Huddy & Khatib's (2007) patriotism measures, which included: symbolic patriotism, constructive patriotism, and uncritical patriotism. Along with Huddy and Khatib's patriotism measures, additional measures of patriotism were included for national attachment, national chauvinism (Herrmann et al 2009), and a general measure for national pride pulled from multiple sources. I will now break down each of these measures in turn and explain how they were measured.

Huddy and Khatib's (2007) measures consisted of questions that pertained to symbolic patriotism, constructive patriotism, and uncritical patriotism. Their measures pulled from previous research from the American National Election Survey (ANES) and from Robert Schatz, Ervin Staub, and Howard Lavine (Schatz & Staub 1997 and Schatz, Staub, & Lavine 1999). The ANES measures used here to examine symbolic patriotism examine national pride when hearing the national anthem or seeing the American flag. Past research on symbolic patriotism has been

[7] CINT Theorem allows for the collection of data from participants and avoids duplicate screening. Participants are recruited through Lucid Markplace and they partner with suppliers to avoid data collection from bots, duplicates, and offer several prescreening metrics for evaluation.

shown to be linked to conservatism (Hurwitz & Peffley 1999 and Conover & Feldman 1987) and act as a measure of national pride. By contrast, constructive patriotism examines love of country and political involvement for positive change that came from the work of Schatz and Staub (1997). Past criticism of these measures noted that it is difficult to detangle constructive criticism from blind patriotism (Spry & Hornsey 2007, Schatz & Staub 1997). Schatz and Staub (1997) believed this form of patriotism would be more appealing to liberals because it is defined by a desire to question the government for positive change. Lastly, the fourth measure previously tested by Huddy and Khatib (2007), was uncritical patriotism. Uncritical patriotism is best understood as blind loyalty or a desire to support one's country without criticism. Past research has linked uncritical criticism with authoritarianism, as well as conservatism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine 1999). Traditionally, we see that conservatives tend to be authoritarians due to a general disposition to respect positions of authority (Feldman 2003).

The distinctions between these three types of patriotism are important because they demonstrate ideological differences in how individuals process different types of patriotism. While conservatives tend to favor symbolic (Hurwitz & Peffley 1999 and Conover & Feldman 1987) and uncritical patriotism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine 1999), Huddy and Khatib's (2007) research showed that constructive patriotism has only been weakly correlated with national identity. These past findings suggest that how individuals conceptualize patriotism varies by different groups and has important implications for how we understand national identity in the United States.

The second set of measurements included in my research come from Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti (2009). These measures were previously used to understand the role of national attachment for international policy preference in the United States and Italy (Herrmann, Isernia,

& Segatti 2009). While Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti's (2009) measures focused on the difference between international cooperation (liberal internationalism) and national ethnocentrism, they offered distinct measures for national attachment. They sought to remove some of the ideological differences seen in other measures of national attachment and examined national attachment in terms of "feelings of belonging", status, and boundary setting (Herrmann, Isernia, & Segatti 2009, 727). The measure included here for examining how individuals define "being American" is national chauvinism. National chauvinism is a feeling of ingroup superiority and ingroup preference. Ingroup preference is important as social identity theory suggests it often follows with aversion to outgroups, creating a us versus them mentality. This measurement allows us to better understand which Americans have feelings of superiority compared to other countries that can be impactful for policy preferences especially in the foreign policy arena.

The created measure for general patriotism came from several previous measurements (Byrne 2011, Tafoya, Corral, & Leal 2022, and Citrin & Sears 2014). These measures of patriotism focused on national pride for different aspects of America. They ranged from being proud of democracy, economics, science, history, to specific issues such as equality and social security.

Based on my hypotheses, my main dependent variables are feelings toward symbolic patriotism, constructive patriotism, uncritical patriotism, and national chauvinism. Next, I will discuss each of these dependent variables and how I coded them.

When asked the question from Huddy and Khatib (2007) on symbolic patriotism regarding how it "feel[s] when you see the American flag flying?", 46% of respondents reported "very good", 23% "good", and 18% "somewhat good", only 12% reported "somewhat bad" to

"very bad". The second question on symbolic patriotism asked "[h]ow does it feel when you hear the national anthem?". Similar to the previous questions, most respondents responded positively with 47% saying "very good", 22% "good", 19% "somewhat good", and only 13% responding between "somewhat bad" to "very bad". I created an additive average measure for symbolic patriotism by adding together these two questions and dividing by 2. Most respondents scored the maximum on the symbolic patriotism scale of 6 (42% of the sample), indicating a strong sense of symbolic patriotism. A full breakdown of the respondents' divisions on symbolic patriotism may be found in the appendix.

To examine Huddy and Khatib's (2007, p. 64) constructive patriotism measure, which sought to measure a mix of "love of country with political efforts directed at a change in the status quo", a matrix table question was asked on how much respondents agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

1. People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.
2. If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my country.
3. I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.
4. I express my love for America by supporting efforts for positive change.

Responses ranged from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" for each measure of constructive patriotism. Most respondents responded that they either "strongly agree" or "agree", with 50% of respondents saying that "people should work hard to move this country in a positive direction".

Similarly to the additive measure created for symbolic patriotism, I made an additive measure for constructive patriotism that ranged from 1 to 6. The measure was calculated by adding together the results from the 4 statements and dividing by 4. To get a 6, respondents would have had to choose "strongly agree" on all four constructive patriotism measures, so the divisions are unsurprising. Most respondents received a 5 (43% of the sample), with those

receiving in the range from 4-6 accounting for 89% of all respondents. By contrast, less than 1% of respondents report a constructive patriotism score of a 1, and combined responses ranging from 1-3 was less than 12% of all respondents.

The final patriotism measure I included from Huddy and Khatib (2007) was for uncritical patriotism. Similarly to other measurements of patriotism, uncritical patriotism had several items to measure it. Respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the 7 statements shown below.

1. I support my country's leaders even if I disagree with their actions.
2. People who do not wholeheartedly support America should live elsewhere.
3. For the most part, people who protest and demonstrate against U.S. policy are good, upstanding, intelligent people.
4. The United States is almost always right.
5. I support U.S. policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.
6. There is too much criticism of the U.S. in the world, and we, as its citizens, should not criticize it.
7. I believe that U.S. policies are almost always the morally correct ones.

Similar to the findings from symbolic patriotism and constructive patriotism, I created a new variable by folding together responses from the 7 statements for uncritical patriotism by adding together the 7 statements and dividing by 7. The newly indexed variable ranged from 1-6. The majority of respondents fell into categories 3 and 4, which correlate to "somewhat agree and "somewhat disagree". There was more tension between respondents on questions under the vein of uncritical patriotism compared to the other measures.

The next variables came from work done by Herrmann et al (2009) and examined an individual's level of national attachment and national chauvinism. Herrmann et al's (2009) measures for national attachment and national chauvinism were examined in this survey. I used two measures to examine the strength of national attachment. One question asked "if something bad happens to America, it is like it is happening to you", and the other is "how being an

American is also a part of how you define yourself". Respondents reported they were likely to define themselves as being an American, however, the same was not true when asked the question if something happened to America, treating it as if something bad happened to themselves. 33% of respondents reported that something bad happening to America was not like something bad happening to themselves, and did not feel strongly that this statement was true.

Lastly, I made an index variable by combining the nine measures asked for general patriotism. These 9 measures asked respondents to say how important they were for "being truly American". The nine items include:

1. I am proud of the way democracy works in America.
2. I am proud of America's economic achievements.
3. I am proud of America's science and technology achievements.
4. I am proud of America's history.
5. I am proud of America's fair and equal treatment of all groups in society.
6. I am proud of America's achievements in art and literature.
7. I am proud of America's social security system.
8. America is a better country than others.
9. The world would be better if more people from other countries were like Americans.

Respondents were asked to say how much they agreed or disagreed with the above statements, scored from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". Similarly to both sympathetic patriotism and constructive patriotism, respondents tended to respond favorably, with some exceptions being responses to "[t]he world would be better if more people from other countries were like Americans" and "I am proud of the way democracy works in America". 15% of respondents somewhat disagreed with being proud of how democracy works in America, and ~17% of respondents somewhat disagreed with the world being a better place if "more people from other countries were like Americans".

The additive measure for general patriotism ranged from 1-6. This was calculated by adding together the results from the 9 statements evaluated above and dividing by 8. The justification for this was to make sure this measure had an identical range to symbolic, constructive, and uncritical patriotism. The majority of respondents fell between 4-6 (70%), with only 30% responding with 3.99 or below. Overall, these points point to a generally strong sense of patriotism within the sample.

Findings

Now, I will go through each of my hypotheses and describe what the evidence shows. Examining the hypotheses on national chauvinism (ethnocentrism and shame), I find support for H5: Men will have higher responses to national chauvinism compared to women. Men, compared to women, had a 0.4 point increase on a 5-point scale, significant at the .01 level, when asked "How superior or inferior is the United States compared to other nations?"(National Chauvinism 1). National Chauvinism measures one measures subjects sense of national superiority compared to other states. However, when asked, "How many things about America make you ashamed?" (National Chauvinism 2), men slightly decreased in evaluation compared to women (-0.1**). Herrmann et al (2009, p. 727) suggested that ethnocentrism is a "deep attachment to the nation [that] leads to discriminatory biases that favor the home nation". Herrmann et al (2009) further suggested that the measure used as National Chauvinism 1 is a function of citizens of one country feeling that their nation is vastly superior to another nation. This difference suggests that men tend to hold more ethnocentric views, but do not have as strong an internalization of shame or blame related to American actions. These findings are not surprising given that women tend to avoid situations of competition as it causes shame-aversion if there is failure (Ludwig, Fellner-Röhling, & Thoma, 2017). When faced with the National

Chauvinism 1 question, which primes subjects to consider national superiority as a collective form of superiority, women would avoid ethnocentric responses due to their greater capacity for empathy. Past research has shown that women tend to hold greater empathy and altruistic/egalitarian values (Eisenberg & Lennon 1983 and Andreoni & Vesterlund 2001). In addition, men tend to avoid feelings of shame (Lewis 1971) and instead refocus shame into blaming others (Nathanson 1992). Hence why men are more likely to answer in the affirmative on the first question and in the negative on the second.

Table 1: Evaluating National Chauvinism

	National Chauvinism 1 (Ethnocentric)	National Chauvinism 2 (Shame)
Male	0.4***	−0.1**
	(0.1)	(0.1)
Republican	0.7***	−0.6***
	(0.1)	(0.1)
White	0.04	−0.003
	(0.1)	(0.1)
Constant	3.1***	2.8***
	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	952	952
R^2	0.1	0.1
Adjusted R^2	0.1	0.1
Residual Std. Error (df = 948)	1.0	0.8
F Statistic (df = 3; 948)	52.1***	44.3***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

In examining whites versus non-whites on both measures of national chauvinism, there were no significant results to suggest that race was an important factor in how individuals evaluated the questions. I did not, therefore, find support for H1: Whites will have higher levels of national chauvinism than non-whites. While this is a null result, it shows that important determinants of ethnocentrism and shame due to nationality are not driven by race compared to

other factors. More work should be done to examine when race matters in other factors of national identity, such as engaged citizenship (Pocok 1965, Bailyn 1967, Wood 1969, Schildkraut 2005), American ideals (Banning 1986, Smith 1993, Mills 1997, Streich 2009), national attachment (Herrmann et al 2009, Huddy & Khatib 2007), and normative aspects what it means to be American(Citrin et al 1990, Theiss-Morse 2009, Shelton 2010, Wong 2010, Byrne 2011, Taylor et al 2012, Jacobs & Theiss-Morse 2013).

The final hypothesis on national chauvinism argued that Republicans would have higher responses to national chauvinism depicted as ethnocentrism than Democrats. I did find support for this hypothesis with the first measure, as Republicans responded 0.7 percentage points higher, significant at the .01 level, on the national chauvinism measure that pertained to ethnocentrism compared to Democrats. However, when given the version of the question that asked if they felt ashamed if their country did something bad, Republicans demonstrated a decrease in support by -0.6 percentage points, significant at the .01 level. This finding suggests that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to hold ethnocentric views of America, while Democrats are more likely to internalize shame for America's wrongdoing. Implications for this finding suggest that Republicans are likely to prefer actions that maintain American dominance and significance over accountability. Indeed, we have seen this dynamic play out in recent elections. According to Cindy Kam (Peterson 2016), for instance, ethnocentric rhetoric was one of the important factors during Trump's 2016 election.

Now, I will go through each of my hypotheses related to the four different types of patriotism. I found support for H7: Democrats will be more supportive of constructive patriotism compared to Republicans, as is evidenced by the negative coefficient on the Republican coefficient in the second column of Table 3. This supports the idea that Democrats favor holding

the government accountable through protest and other measures than Republicans. For measures of symbolic (0.9***), general (0.6***), and uncritical patriotism (0.9***), on the other hand, Republicans experienced increases in these patriotism measures compared to Democrats, all significant at the .01 level.

Table 2: Evaluation of Different Types of Patriotism

	Symbolic	Constructive	General Patriotism	Uncritical Patriotism
Male	0.2**	0.1	0.3***	0.2***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Republican	0.9***	−0.1**	0.6***	0.9***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
White	0.4***	0.4***	0.2**	−0.2***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Constant	4.2***	4.6***	3.9***	3.2***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	949	952	951	951
R^2	0.2	0.03	0.1	0.2
Adjusted R^2	0.2	0.03	0.1	0.2
Residual Std. Error	1.1 (df = 945)	0.8 (df = 948)	1.0 (df = 947)	1.1 (df = 947)
F Statistic	64.6*** (df = 3; 945)	11.2*** (df = 3; 948)	37.2*** (df = 3; 947)	61.1*** (df = 3; 947)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This finding points towards an intense loyalty from Republicans that holds implications for whether or when Republicans will hold America or the president accountable. The measures for uncritical patriotism allude to supporting a country's leaders even if an individual disagrees with the actions, and encouraging others if they don't like America, they can leave. Support under uncritical patriotism comes from supporting U.S. policies regardless of alternative possibilities. By contrast, symbolic patriotism keys into feeling good because of associations with things that are American, such as the flag and national anthem. Because Republicans place importance on *how* being American makes them feel and a desire to support American policies, not criticize them, it is unlikely that accountability would be an important metric. Detangling Republican loyalty and Democrat criticism warrants further research in the future. This finding

further supports the need to look at variation across groups in how people define being American.

I do not find support for H3: Non-whites will be more in favor of constructive patriotism. Instead, we see that whites, compared to non-whites, favor all forms of patriotism except uncritical patriotism. However, while not formally specified as a hypothesis, I found that white respondents do not have decreased evaluations (-0.2) of uncritical patriotism, demonstrating a different and distinct effect from partisanship. Here, being white results in a decrease in support of unwavering loyalty (supporting American policies just because they are American). This points to tensions within individuals who identify as white compared to those who are Republican. Namely, those who identified as Republicans experienced an increase in loyalty, while whites in general experienced a decrease. This points to tensions between race and partisanship that being uncritical of governmental policies may not be as related to race as might be believed. Exploring the role of race in understanding the perception of patriotism would be useful in the future, as here, race operated differently in the case of uncritical patriotism than in partisanship.

When examining the differences between women in responses to measures of patriotism (H4), I found that women were more supportive of constructive patriotism compared to uncritical patriotism but not compared to symbolic patriotism. The median response for constructive patriotism was a 5 for women, while uncritical patriotism was a 3.5, and symbolic a 5. The maximum response for all three types of patriotism was a 6, with the minimum for uncritical being a 1 and symbolic a 1. Constructive patriotism is the only type of patriotism in which women received a 3 to 6 score, with anything below 3 being an outlier. The median response for uncritical patriotism was only slightly higher (3.5) than the minimum observation for

constructive patriotism (3). While I did find support that women were more supportive of constructive compared to uncritical patriotism, I did not find support for H4, that women were more supportive of constructive patriotism than uncritical or symbolic (Figure 1). Running Kruskal-Wallis tests, I found that women were significantly more supportive of constructive patriotism compared to uncritical patriotism significant at the .01 level.

Figure 1: Women's responses to Constructive, Uncritical, and Symbolic Patriotism



Conclusion

My research represents an important contribution to the field by reconciling the tension in measuring what it means to be an American. In general, I have shown that people across different demographic groups think differently about what it means to be an American. These results help resolve the lack of consensus that has existed in the literature to this point. I focused on patriotism and national chauvinism, but these findings demonstrate a need to reevaluate all variables we use to understand American identity and how individuals define being an American.

Secondly, my research has important policy implications. My findings demonstrate how Americans might respond to policies differently based on their definition of American identity. For example, we can examine how people have responded to controversial policies. Two policies worth discussing are the U.S. policies on Gaza and immigration. Generally, findings have shown that Republicans tend to be more supportive of U.S. backing for Israel, with Democrats condemning Israel's military actions (Smeltz & El Baz 2025). However, research has also shown that when reading or hearing about the conflict, 40% of women feel afraid, compared to only 24% of men (Silver, Alper, Keeter, Lippert, & Mohamed 2024a). There are also substantial differences in how whites and African Americans view the ongoing conflict. African Americans largely believe that restricting military aid is favored (54% from Smeltz, El Baz, Rasool-Ayub, Rondeaux, & Shell 2024a) and show sympathy to the Palestinians, favoring a ceasefire (Shell 2023). Whereas whites have demonstrated differences throughout the conflict. Only 8% of white protestants have argued that the attacks by Hamas were justified (Silver, Alper, Keeter, Lippert, & Mohamed 2024b). Similarly, white respondents are equally divided on whether Israel has gone too far (32%)) in the war or whether Israel is defending its interests (33%) Smeltz, El Baz, Rasool-Ayub, Rondeaux, & Shell 2024b). While the divisions demonstrated by women and African Americans fall similarly to Democratic preferences, these identities nonetheless have important differences in how they inform attitudes towards the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. Given these differences, policy preferences examining how American identity affects attitude preference on foreign policy is needed.

The second policy dimension is immigration. Immigration policy preferences have routinely varied by political party, gender, and race. Between 2001 and 2007, research has shown that concern over illegal immigrants has continued to increase from 28% of the population

surveyed in 2001, increasing each year until 2007, where 45% of respondents were greatly concerned about illegal immigration (Segovia & Defever 2010). Rising concerns over immigration demonstrate the importance of examining how different people define "being American" and how this relates to attitudes on immigration. In a recent study by Pew Research Center, for instance, they found that 49% of Republicans surveyed believed it was a "very" important goal to deport immigrants who were here illegally; by contrast, only 12% of Democrats surveyed responded this way (Oliphant & Cerda 2022). By comparison, past research has shown that women tend to rate the economic effects of immigration more negatively than men (Mayda 2006 and Kobayashi & Tanaka 2024), demonstrating implications for how gender and gender roles affect policy perceptions that likely relate to how women and men define "being American". Lastly, research has shown differences in attitudes towards immigration due to race. 43% of African Americans surveyed believe that undocumented immigrants should be eligible for social services, compared to 20% of whites (Rosentiel & Doherty 2006). Similarly, 79% of African Americans believed that illegal immigrants should be allowed to attend public school, compared to 677% of white respondents (Rosentiel & Doherty 2006). However, Blacks and whites are both equally concerned that rising immigration threatens American values (Rosentiel & Doherty 2006). While there are known partisan, gendered, and racial differences in how individuals view immigration policy, that does not necessarily mean how individuals define "being American" stacks the same way.

The findings from my research have opened up several other avenues for future research. One important identity that I did not investigate here would be religious identity. Research has often shown how Americans evaluate attitudes towards policies through "protestant work ethic" (Sniderman & Piazza 1991). Protestant work ethic has been viewed as what is needed to achieve

the American dream–work hard and you will prosper. Given that Americans are diverse and this includes religiously, it would be useful to examine how religion affects how individuals define being American. I would suspect that these traditional protestant values would play out differently for individuals who were Catholic, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist, or Hindu . While the United States tends to favor Western-based religions, it is worth examining the differences between religious groups on how they define being American.

A second avenue of future research would be to explore differences in how individuals define being American based on regionality. Regionality offers several potential options, such as the traditional regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), by U.S. postal codes, geopolitical areas, such as the Rust belt, or just by states. It is likely that different regions, and different groups of people living in them, define being American in different ways, which is worth investigating.

The final avenue for future research would be to expand the study of being American and the relation to emotions. Affective intelligence theory tells us that cognition is determined by affect through two monitoring systems (Marcus et al 2000). These two systems monitor for threat and justify habitual behavior through emotional dispositions (Marcus et al 2000). There has been a significant amount of work in how cognitive appraisal theories explain political behavior, often demonstrating that anger results in a desire to address problems and hold the one responsible to account (Mackie et al 2000). By contrast, fear has been shown to cause individuals to avoid addressing the issue (Frijda et al. 1989). Other discrete emotions, such as shame and guilt, have had similar effects. Those who feel guilty are likely to alter their behavior following a transgression, while those who feel shame are likely to avoid responsibility for the action and retrench (Tangey & Dearborn 2003). Because emotions are important predictors for

political behavior and engagement, future research should examine how emotions impact policy preferences in relation to their national identity definition.

My research explored how Republicans/Democrats, women/men, and whites/African Americans defined "being American" by examining different types of patriotism and national chauvinism. Patriotism and national chauvinism are just two parts of what it means to be an American. More work needs to be done to examine how Americans define "being American" in the realms discussed above and through other measures, such as what it means to be an engaged citizen, what American ideals are relevant for understanding differences today, and how national attachment helps form different types of American social identities.

Chapter 4: War in Ukraine: National Identity and Anxiety

Abstract
Why do some European countries support 3rd party engagement in Ukraine while others are indifferent or opposed? Existing scholarship typically only looks at European identity or at national identity, but not at how they interact with one another. Scholars also typically ignore the role of emotion. I argue that, in a situation where national security is an issue, national identity will trump regional identity, in this case, European identity. I argue that in the context of threat, anxiety holds an important role for third-party actor evaluation. To test this, I examine data from the Flash Eurobarometer 506 European Commission 2022) responses fielded in April 2022 focusing on Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. I created variables to measure and examine national and European identity in response to the effectiveness of the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations, and European Union in addressing the war in Ukraine. I found that in most states national identity was an important indicator for attitudes towards international actors, and only occasionally was European identity more substantive than national identity. Worry about the war alone was not as important an indicator of international actor attitudes as national or European identity. Lastly, I found that in some situations there was an interaction effect between national identity and anxiety in attitudes towards international actors. My research contributes to the field in three ways: examining national and European identity together, focusing on the role of emotion in conflict, and by examining two different proxies for anxiety (self-reported level of worry and the proximity of military threat).

Keywords: National Identity, Ukraine War, Threat, Public Opinion, International Actors

Introduction

Since February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has dominated international relations. Multiple international actors are involved, whether for good or bad, in the situation that has been unfolding in Ukraine. This leads me to the question: why do some European countries support 3rd party engagement in Ukraine while others are indifferent or opposed?

Existing scholarship typically only looks at European identity or at national identity, but not at how they interact with one another. Scholars also typically ignore the role of emotion. I argue that, in a situation where national security is an issue, national identity will trump regional identity, in this case, European identity. Conflict situations like these often lead to emotional responses that we need to consider. The most relevant to this is the perception of threat, which manifests as anxiety. When we feel anxious, we trigger both the fight and flight responses. The fight response should make us approve of people who can help us deter the threat. The flight response should make us like groups that make us feel safe, or that help us remove the anxiety. In this paper, I look at survey data that contains information on how worried Europeans were about the conflict. I also investigate how the potential for spillover effects (measured by distance from the Ukrainian border) compares to the effect of anxiety and how this affects people's assessments of 3rd parties (e.g., the US, NATO, etc.)We need a better understanding of how these constructed identities work together. These are often how people define themselves and think about how policies affect them. We also need to understand the role that emotion plays in determining opinions of 3rd party involvement in conflict.

My research contributes to the field in three ways. First, I examine European and national identity together. Often, research has examined one or the other and not addressed the way that identity saliency plays out with conflicting constructed identities. Second, I focus on the role of

emotion in conflict. Most of the time, the role of anxiety is neglected in international relations research and left to American politics.[8] Lastly, my research contributes to the field by examining two different proxies for anxiety (self-reported level of worry and the proximity of military threat) to see if they produce similar effects.

The rest of this paper will proceed as follows. First, in the next section, I will briefly review the literatures on national and European identity; l discuss why we need to reevaluate our understanding of how these constructed identities influence attitudes; and present my theory on identity dominance during conflict and the role of anxiety. Second, I will provide an overview of the study design and the created indices. Following this, I will go through the results of my research. Lastly, I will discuss the implications of my research and the policy implications.

Theory

Identity has been the focus of much research. For my purposes here, I will focus on three categories related to identity and how they matter: national identity, European identity, and the relationship between identity and emotions. While many scholars have focused on national and European identity, very few have focused on the differences between the two in conflict settings. Moreover, there is also a lack of literature that examines the relationship between national identity and emotions outside of the United States.

Many scholars have discussed national identity in Europe and its importance in international relations and their relevance to the evaluation of the European Union (Laitin 2002, Haller & Ressler 2006, Arts & Halman 2014, Aichholzer, Kritzinger, & Pelscia 2021). Haller and Ressler (2006) examined what national identity meant in Europe post World War II (WWII).

[8] The exception to this has been work on ontological security, looking at "anxiety and subjectivity" in "self-constitution" (Kinnvall, C., & Mitzen, J. 2020).

They argued that nationalistic sentiments experienced a decline after the end of WWII, and with the rise of economic interdependence and European integration, nationalism took a different form than what was associated with fascism (Haller & Ressler 2006). They focused on examining nationalism through three different concepts relevant to the post WWII nations: formative nationalism (early nationalism immediately after WWII prevalent in Eastern Europe), prestige nationalism (seen through European unification), and expansive nationalism (such as a peacefully represented by the European Union) (Haller & Ressler 2006). They found that Europeans construct their national identity through both association with the nation state (state of birth, ancestry), as well as through an ethno-cultural (respect for institutions and laws and mastery of that country's formal language) association (Haller & Ressler 2006). Additionally, they found that conservative/traditional individuals did not lean towards ethnocultural nationalism compared to others (Haller & Ressler 2006). Haller and Ressler's (2006) findings show that in European countries, similarly to the United States, the concept of national identity is strongly tied to the nation state itself, as well as ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Because of Haller and Ressler's (2006) research, national identity in Europe has been shown not to be on the decline since WWII, as previously speculated, but is intrinsically tied to state boundaries, ethnic majorities, and traditional values of that country. Given this, the development of the European Union, tensions with national and European unification, such as Brexit, the role of national and European identity is likely to be different in the current world contexts.

In their study that examines the differences between the effects of national identity versus European identity in attitudes toward the E.U., Arts and Halman (2014) investigated the differences in national identification, European attachment, and attitudes toward European unification. They found that when examining responses from the European Values Study

Eurobarometer that respondents listed local affiliation first, followed by national, and then European affiliation. Very few of the respondents reported that being European was a primary affiliation (3.3%). In fact, it was about twice as likely that respondents reported having the world as primary affiliation (6.6%)(Arts & Halman 2014). In Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania, respondents reported a high sense of national identity; by contrast, those with the weakest national identity were Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Estonia, and Hungary (Arts & Halman 2014). Their research shows that there is no clear pattern to understand when national identity is the primary affiliation (Arts & Halman 2014). Additionally, their research shows that there is a low sense of shared European identity along with a lack of concern for fellow Europeans (Arts & Halman 2014). Their work points to the complexity of understanding the roles of national and European identity, given the historical contexts in Europe undergoing multiple wars, along with desires for European Unification.

Similarly, Aichholzer, Kritzinger, and Plescia (2021) explored how different configurations of national identity relate to support, ambivalence, or objection to the European Union. The four configurations of national identity they explored were: patriotism, chauvinism, ethnic, and lastly, civic conceptualizations of national identity (Aichholzer, Kritzinger, & Plescia 2021). Using the four configurations of national identity, they (Aichholzer, Kritzinger, & Plescia 2021, 304) derived five distinct categories to think about support for the E.U.:

1.Anti-nationalist supporters; those who had average support for the E.U. and not stressing in particular configuration of national identity;

2.Nationalists; those who demonstrated a low level of support for the E.U., but had all positive evaluations of the configurations of national identity;

3.Patriotic supporters; who had the highest level of support for the EU along with high levels of constructive patriotism

4.Civic citizenship; moderate supporters, with low emphasis on national identity and slightly positive views of the E.U.

5. “[P]rideless opponents”, who had the lowest support for the E.U. and low levels of patriotism and chauvinism.

With these five configurations of national identity, they found that individuals stacked differently across Western and Eastern Europe, showing that different configurations of national identity alter support for the E.U. (Aichholzer, Kritzinger, & Plescia 2021). Both of these articles show that national identity is an important factor in attitudes towards the E.U.; however, how national identity has affected support has varied depending on how national identity is defined. Underlying this dynamic are the historical complications that make studying national identity in NATO and the EU complicated.

With increased economic interdependence, the creation of the European Union, and general European integration after WWII, many scholars have discussed the role/conception of European identity (Gehring 2021, Góra & Zielińska 2019, Todorov & Bracher 2008, Rohde-Liebenau 2020, and Mitchell 2015). Todorov and Bracher (2008), for instance, explore the role of the development of European identity across time. They argue that European identity “lacks coherence”, due in part to the plurality of nations and cultures it is attempting to represent (Todorov & Bracher 2008). Their work explored why European identity has become solidified, even given the post-war events of WWII (Todorov & Bracher 2008). Their work helps explain why there may be differences in how nations have internalized European integration and led to the creation, or lack thereof, of European identity (Todorov & Bracher 2008).

As much of the literature has argued, European identity was not an important factor until after WWII, when the rise of European integration occurred. An additional major impact was the formation of new states after this large-scale conflict, such as Slovakia. Because of these

realities, Góra & Zielińska (2019) argued that the prospect of joining the E.U. served as a threat to newly established states in part because of a clash between a national "us" versus the collective European "them". The authors examined, for instance, how the speeches of the Polish members of the European Parliament looked at how they constructed national and European identity through specific sets of discursive key words: civilization, identity, nation, and sovereignty (Góra & Zielińska 2019). For national identity, they found that MEPs discussed it in terms related to the nation state, focusing primarily on threats to national sovereignty from the E.U., ethnicity, and the role of national culture (Góra & Zielińska 2019). By contrast, MEPs who focused on European identity discussed it much less abstractly, predominantly referring to the "common basis of European identity" from traditions of republicanism, rationalism, and a Christian heritage (Góra & Zielińska 2019, 345). Overall, their findings point to a complementary relationship between national and European identity that is problematic when national identity feels threatened by the process of integration.

Understanding that the relationship between national and European identity is complex, it is worth examining how European identity was affected by the Russian invasion of Crimea. Gehring (2021), for instance, did so by focusing on the relationship between threat and European identity strength, arguing that external threat is one means to strengthen European identity (Gehring 2021). He found that the level of perceived threat was highest for Estonia and Latvia, which share a border with Russia (Gehring 2021). Overall, he found that the higher perceived threat led to an increase in European identity across three quarters of E.U. member states (Gehring 2021). While his research showed that European identity could be strengthened during threats from conflict, he did not see this effect as related to national identity. Given that we know national and European sometimes operate concurrently (and sometimes operate distinctly) it is

important to understand how these identities inform attitudes during conflict in relation to each other.

While other people have examined national and European identity, these studies have not incorporated the role of emotion. This oversight is unfortunate as emotion has been found to have important effects on how states respond to external threats relevant during conflict (Marcus & Mackuen 1993, Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav 2005, and Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings 2011). Marcus and MacKuen (1993), for instance, developed a framework for understanding positive and negative emotions, and how they relate to political action. Affective intelligence theory (AIT) tells us that there are two systems individuals use to process the political environment (Marcus & MacKuen 1993): the surveillance system and the disposition system. Affective intelligence theory helps us understand how threat and anxiety may interact with an individual's emotional systems to inform attitudes during conflict. Of importance here is the way anxiety is processed through the surveillance system, which is different from the system responsible for positive emotions, like enthusiasm. The first system, the surveillance system, monitors for environmental threat, which "motivates citizens to learn about politics", and is associated with the emotions of anxiety, stress, and fear (Marcus & Mackuen 1993, 672). The second system, the disposition system, is associated with "excitement, elation, and enthusiasm" (Marcus & MacKuen 1993, 673). The authors examined how anxiety and enthusiasm affected presidential preferences, finding that prior anxiety leads individuals to seek more information about presidential candidates (Marcus & MacKuen 1993). Their findings suggest that emotions affect how individuals react to political processes (Marcus & MacKuen 1993).

Marcus and MacKuen's (1993) early work set the stage for more work in the realm of the role of anxiety in politics. Following their work, Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav (2005)

extended our understanding of the role of anxiety and processing threat by examining attitudes on military policy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. They looked at how perceived threat and anxiety informed attitudes towards aggressive military action in response to terrorism (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, Lahav 2005). They found that a high perception of the threat of terrorism led to increased support of aggressive military action (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, Lahva 2005). By contrast, anxiety did not lead to increased support for aggressive antiterrorist policies as they predicted because it led to an avoidance of the danger and was perceived as a "risky action" (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, Lahav 2005, 605). Overall, their research points to *threat* being a driver for supporting aggressive military action, but not anxiety. The outcome variable in this study was support for the military actions being taken, but as the work of Marcus and MacKuen (2005) demonstrated, anxiety leads to increased information seeking, which is in understanding ongoing conflicts and the role of actors, such as the United States.

Along the same lines, Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings (2011) examined the role of anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm as related to mobilization. Examining implications of cognitive appraisal theory, which argues "that individuals take deliberate actions in order to cope with their emotions", they conducted a survey experiment and examination of the 2008 election (Valentino et al 2011, 159). They argued that, while anxiety and anger are similar, anger leads to risk-seeking behavior and problem solving while anxiety leads to risk avoidance and emotional coping (Valentino et al 2011). Overall, they found that anger motivates individuals to participate in costly political action, such as protesting, and anxiety increases less costly participation, such as voting. Anxiety, as has been seen across studies, has both positive, negative, and null effects on participation (Valentino et al 2011).

These findings point to the complicated effect anxiety has; increasing participation some of the time, but not consistently.

Anxiety is an important emotion to understand when examining conflict. The reality of the situation is stressful for those impacted by an ongoing conflict, but also those nearby witnessing the aftermath from potential spillover effects, as well as increased immigration from the conflict zones. While previous research has covered national and European identity separately, we need to look at both of these constructed identities at the same time. Along with this, identity does not act in isolation, and we need to appreciate the role of emotion in cognitive decision-making. This is especially the case when we are trying to understand what the best policies are to be pursued by third-party actors in states with active conflicts. We must know what matters to the people living in states proximate to the conflict, who, in all likelihood, will be experiencing a great deal of anxiety and threat.

I argue that in the context of threat, anxiety holds an important role for third-party actor evaluation. Anxiety is processed within the amygdala, which triggers a fight or flight response. Most previous research has focused on anxiety as related to risk-aversion, the flight response, rather than the alternative. When anxiety is active in a situation where the threat is unavoidable, the fight response should be triggered, leading to support for actors who could address the threat. Focusing on Affective Intelligence Theory and cognitive appraisal theories of emotions should help us further situate the role of anxiety and threat in conflict. AIT tells us that anxiety operates within the surveillance systems of processing, arguing that it will lead to increased political engagement (Marcus & MacKuen 1993). This engagement should, in turn, lead to seeking increased knowledge of the role these various international actors play in the conflict in Ukraine. By contrast, cognitive appraisal theories tell us individuals will pursue specific actions to cope

with the emotions they are experiencing, such as avoiding the cause of the issue or focusing on other things that are not related to the cause of the emotional experience (Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, & Delongis 1986 and Lazarus 1991).

Given that we know anxiety operates within the fight or flight response system, and that it leads to increased political participation, but avoidance in other situations, the role of anxiety in conflict is still not fully understood. I argue that in a situation where threat is unavoidable, and spillover effects are possible, anxiety and threat are both relevant emotions. Because emotion-based coping occurs at the individual level, anxiety should interact with an individual to inform attitudes in conflict.

Extending the role of threat and anxiety, I argue that an individual's level of anxiety will interact with their identities, informing attitudinal responses. Roccas and Brewer (2002) argued that in situations where there is a perceived threat, identity dominance should occur and result in one salient identity. However, they did not quantitatively test this argument. I argue that during conflict situations, the prevalence of threat triggers identity dominance. In this case, should result in a dominant national identity over European identity on attitudes towards international actors. While some research has shown that European and national identity can be complementary, other work has demonstrated that when national identity feels threatened, it results in a focus on the *nation* state rather than integration into international institutions (Gora & Zielinska 2018). Previous research examined how European identity strength increased during the invasion of Crimea, for instance, but ignored the role of national identity (Gora &Zielinska 2018). Understanding how identity dominance works for European *and* national identity is important because under different lenses it is likely that attitudinal responses will differ. More specifically, we need to understand how anxiety interacts with different types of identity. When you are

anxious, you are likely to be informed by one dominant identity. In a conflict like the one in Ukraine, this should be *national* identity since that is the one that is most at risk. Because the threat is not equal across all the states, simply being European and having that shared identity should not matter as much.

To examine the role of anxiety and threat as related to European and national identity, I hypothesize the following:

H1: People living in states sharing borders with Ukraine will have higher anxiety over the conflict than people in non-bordering states.

H2: People living in states sharing a non-contiguous border with Russia will have higher anxiety over the conflict than people in non-bordering states.

H3: People who have both high anxiety and high national identity will have higher positive assessments of external actors than those who do not have high values of both.

H4: For people living in states that are proximate to the conflict, national identity will have a larger effect than European identity when determining attitudes toward external actors.

Research Design

The data for this study comes from the Flash Eurobarometer 506 (European Commission 2022) responses fielded in April 2022. This Flash Eurobarometer 506 focused on the European Union's response to the war in Ukraine. In this study, I focused on Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. My particular interest was in NATO countries that were proximate to the conflict in Ukraine. This includes the states of Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. France and Germany served as counterexamples to the sample of Eastern European states proximate to the ongoing conflict.

Next, I will discuss my main dependent variables. Based on my hypotheses, my main DV's are: anxiety about the war, evaluation of U.S.' effectiveness in the war in Ukraine,

evaluation of NATO's effectiveness in the war in Ukraine, evaluation of the European Union's effectiveness in the war in Ukraine, and the evaluation of the United Nations' effectiveness in the war in Ukraine.

The first dependent variable captures a subject's anxiety about the conflict. In the Flash Eurobarometer 506 , respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "I am personally worried about the war in Ukraine." This question was coded on a 4-point scale from "Totally Disagree" to "Totally Agree". In my design, anxiety acts as both a DV and an IV across different models. I test how proximate to the conflict, national identity, and European identity influence an individual's level of anxiety about the war. Additionally, I use anxiety as a DV to test the effect of anxiety on the evaluation of external actors and the interaction between anxiety and national identity. While one could argue that being worried is not the equivalent of being anxious, the similarities in psychological effects on attitudes is similar given the reality of an active, deadly war. The majority of respondents either agreed or totally agreed. The three cases with the highest disagreement were France (23%), Hungary (22%), and Slovakia (27%).

The second dependent variable captures how individuals viewed the perceived effectiveness of different external actors. Respondents were asked, "How satisfied or dissatisfied [they] were with how the following had reacted to the war in Ukraine?". The scale was a 4-point Likert scale with responses ranging from "Not at all satisfied" to "very satisfied". The dependent question of focus here is "How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way the following have reacted to the war in Ukraine?" Respondents were able to report how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and the United States. Values ranged from 0-3, with 0 being "Not at all satisfied" and 3 being "Very satisfied".

IV Coding

Now, I will discuss my independent variables: shared borders with Ukraine, shared borders with Russia, U.S. troop presence, percent of the population being ethnically Russian, percent of the population Russian speaking, Russian resource dependency, national identity, and European identity.

Shared Borders

The conflict in Ukraine carries a risk of spillover effects into nearby states. Tensions are accentuated by leftover sympathies from some states being previously aligned with the Soviet Bloc and others that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Given this, I coded variables to account for states having a shared border with Ukraine or a shared border with Russia.

Given the nature of the ongoing conflict, there have been rising concerns over potential spillover effects leading to a bigger international crisis. States that share a border with Ukraine are Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. To account for the threat of spillover effects and proximity to the ongoing conflict, I created a binary variable states with a shared border with Ukraine were coded as a 1, and non-bordering states were coded as 0.

States that share a border with Russia (including non-contiguous or indirect borders) are Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland also share a border with Belarus, a known Russian sympathizer, and Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad is an Oblast of Russia that shares a border with Lithuania and Poland. Kaliningrad is a result of land that was previously captured by the Soviet Union Red Army from the Germans in 1945. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad remained a part of Russia. Kaliningrad is armed with cruise missiles, submarines, and nuclear weapons.

(Economist 2024)

Thinking geopolitically, it is important to understand that Kaliningrad creates multiple forms of Russian threat. Strategically, Kaliningrad is located on the coast and near the Suwalki Gap. The Suwalki Gap serves as a critical land route between the Baltic states, the rest of NATO, and the European Union. Kaliningrad is also home to the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet and Kaliningrad Chkalovsk Air Base. To account for the potential Russian threat from a shared border with Russian land, including Kaliningrad, I created a binary variable with states with shared borders with Russia given a 1, and those that did not were given a 0.

NATO/US Troop Presence

Given the importance of NATO membership for these states, I estimated U.S. troop presence using open-source information (e.g., News Articles, Department of Defense Public Statements, Department of State Public Statements). Open-source intelligence research is a common practice within the security community and provides reasonable estimates for U.S. troop presence in NATO states.

According to the CIA Factbook, the United States has more than 200,000 forces deployed, with about 50% being located in Europe. As of 2023, it was estimated that there were roughly 600 US military troops stationed in Estonia (ERR News 2023). In Latvia, there are "roughly 600 troops" stationed with a NATO force (Garamone 2022). In Poland, 10,000 U.S. troops are stationed there as part of a rotational presence at Camp Kościuszko (Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Poland). The United States maintains troops in Lithuania at Pabrade, Lielvārde Air Base (Rembate Parish in the Ogre Municipality). Similar to Poland, in Lithuania, the U.S. has maintained a rotational U.S. force (Amran 2024). In 2023, the U.S. sent 700 soldiers to participate in a Lithuanian military exercise with Poland, Portugal, and Norway (Shkolnikova 2023). By contrast, the U.S. currently maintains roughly 3,000 military personnel throughout Romania (Department of State 2023). It is estimated that Slovakia still has 200 remaining American troops operating the patriot missile systems in central Slovakia (Hegedus 2023). This is a 33% decrease from the previous troops before relocating one of the Patriot missile defense systems to Germany for maintenance (Hegedus 2023). However, data from the U.S. European Command estimates that roughly 1,500 U.S. troops remain stationed in Slovakia (Basu 2022).

Given that Germany and France serve as the Western European cases, it is important to note that Germany has served as a base for decades for the United States. France, by contrast, removed U.S. troops in 1969. In Germany, there are over 40 United States military installations, with the biggest base being the Ramstein Air Base. It is currently estimated that roughly 35,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed in Germany (USA Facts Team 2024). Given the history of concerns regarding respect to sovereignty and military pullout from the 27 U.S. military installations in 1967 (Nicastro 2022), there is currently no US Army Garrison support in France (French Land Command 3rd Division 2022). U.S. troop presence is one way to deter threat perceptions and demonstrate security/alliance commitments. It is also likely that U.S. troop presence affects how worried individuals are about the war, as an increase in troops will likely lead to an increase in feelings of insecurity either domestically or for potential aggressors.

Figure 1:



As part of NATO's continued deployment as of 2024, forward presence has been maintained in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2024). This forward deployment included headquartering "a rotational Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in Romania" (U.S. Department of State 2023). At the NATO Summit in 2022, President Biden reinforced the U.S. presence within Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, calling for "a persistent heel-to-toe rotational presence in all three Baltic countries"

(Garamone 2022). At the NATO 2022 summit, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced the deployment of a larger number of battle groups to Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia to increase NATO force deployment from 40,000 troops to 300,000 (Bluth 2022). For a percentage breakdown of U.S. troops across this country please see Figure 1.

Because the numbers for U.S. troops are appropriations, I created a coding scheme that allows for some variation. To account for U.S. forces in the state, I included a coding scheme from 0 to 3, where states with 0 troops received a 0, 1-999 a 1, 1,000 to 9,999 a 2, and 10,000+ a 3.

Ties to Russia

The majority of the countries being examined were members of the Eastern Bloc. While Germany was divided between West and East Germany at the end of World War II, all but the state of France were members of the Eastern Bloc. The case of Slovakia is complicated due to the history of Czechoslovakia and the end of communist rule in 1989. Because of this history, attitudes towards the external actors, including the perception of threat, may be driven by whether individuals perceive themselves to have shared culture, identity, or ethnic ties to Russia.

I examined the percentage of the population in each country who speaks Russian. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have portions of their population that both speak Russian and have ethnic ties. 29% of Estonia's population speaks Russian, and 24% are ethnically Russian. In Latvia, 2% of the population speaks Russian, and 25% are ethnically Russian. 7% of Lithuanians speak Russian, and 5% are ethnically Russian. Other states that have a percentage of the population that speaks Russian are Hungary (2%) and Slovakia (>1.8%). To account for Russian identity ties, two variables were coded: one for language and one for ethnicity. Russian language and Russian ethnicity were coded 0 for zero percentage of the population speaking or being

Russian, 1 for less than 10%, 2 for 11-24%, and 3 for 25% and above. While raw percents could have been used, creating an index for influence allows for examining how the states hang together on similar levels of resource dependency.

Another way states may be tied to Russia is through dependency on resource imports. While a ban coal, crude oil, and petroleum was placed in 2023 by the European Union, member states in the European Union were still importing natural resources at the time this survey was fielded. Between 2022 and 2023, the European Union reduced fossil fuel imports from Russia by 94 percent (Hockenos 2025).

Before the ban, in the European theater, important fossil fuels from Russia were oil and natural gas. Before the European Union ban in 2023, states were importing anywhere from 13% to 78% of their oil from Russia (Statista Research Department 2024). Similarly, the share of gas supplied by Russia ranged from 12% to 92% (Statista Research Department 2024). Except for Lithuania (69% oil imports from Russia) and Latvia (92% gas imports from Russia), countries with shared borders (Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) had higher dependencies, ranging from 33% to 78% for oil and 24% to 68% for natural gas. To account for resource dependency, I created an additive variable that was the average of the dependency on natural gas and oil. States that received less than 25% of the resource from Russia received a 1, 25%-49% a 2, and 50%+ a 3.

National and European Identity

Two variables were created for identity: one for national identity and another for European identity. To create a measure of national identity, I added together three questions from the Flash Eurobarometer 506 ; “How satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the way citizens in their own country have reacted to the war in Ukraine”, “How satisfied or dissatisfied they were

with the way national authorities in their own countries have reacted to the war in Ukraine", and "Generally speaking, how much do you trust the national authority's information regarding the war in Ukraine". The national social identity scale was folded into a four-point continuous measure from these three items, with values ranging from 0-3. A coding of 0 represented no or little sense of national identity, and 3 represented a stronger sense of national identity. The scale was created by adding together answers, resulting in cutoffs of 0, 0.33, 0.67, 1, 1.33, 1.67, 2, 2.33, 2.67, and 3. As demonstrated in the figure below (Figure 1), the majority of countries demonstrated a strong (2) to very strong (3) sense of national identity. This represented roughly 25% of each state's sample, and looking at responses under level 0 on Figure 2, less than 10% of each state's respondents reported little to no national attachment at level 0.

Looking at Figure 1, we can see that states with a non-continuous shared border with Russia (Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, except for Latvia) had the highest percentages of responses in the strong category, between 2.33-3. Looking at Figure 1 below, only 10% of Slovakians reported a response between 2.33-3. Slovakia's results demonstrate a possible consequence of the complex history of the Slovak nation. Before 1918, Slovakia was ruled by Hungary, creating intense desires for a unique Slovak identity separate from Hungarian rule and the process of Magyarization (Kusá 2009). Along with the previous rule under Hungary, after World War I, Slovakia was a part of the new state of Czechoslovakia. Slovakia became an independent nation after Czechoslovakia was dissolved in 1993. Slovakia's history and state birth likely contribute to Slovakians being less nationalistic compared to other states with a longer duration in which to form a strong national identity.

Figure 2:



To measure European identity, I added together two questions from the Flash Eurobarometer 506: “Generally speaking, how much do you trust the European authorities' information regarding the war in Ukraine?”, and how much they agreed with feeling more European since the start of the war in Ukraine. The European identity scale was folded into a three-point measure from these two items. The value of the European social identity scale created ranged from 0-3, with 3 representing a stronger sense of European identity and 0 representing no or little attachment.[9] Figure 3 below shows that across all states, having a very strong sense of European identity was less than 20%. In Romania, 20% of individuals reported a

[9] I checked for the correlation between National and European identity, the correlation coefficient was 0.6251563 with a p-value of < 2.2e-16. While the two variables are correlated, they are not significantly correlated which should be expected given that their national Identity is also one of a European State-based identity.

strong sense of European identity. By contrast, Slovakians were most likely to report no sense of European identity (25%) depicted at responses at level 0.

Respondents responded similarly to European Identity as they did to national identity as can been seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Looking at responses at level 2 in Figure 3, a large portion (roughly 50% for each population as described above) fell into category two, which represents tending to feel attached to being European. When examining the European identity scale I created, all other cases have a higher percentage of the population with no sense of European identity. This difference is most notable for Slovakia, where previously the national identity scale only 6% received a 0 (Figure 1), with European identity, 14% of the Slovak population reported no to all items asked to create the European identity measure (Figure 3). There were similar divisions in European Identity as with national identity. A large portion (roughly 50% for each population) fell into category two (Figure 3), which represented tending to feel attached rather than the 0 category, which is no attachment or sense of European Identity.

Figure 3:



Findings

Below are my findings for H1, H2, H3, and H4. I will discuss each finding and the results for each external actor individually. I will first discuss my findings on the determinants of anxiety towards the war. Then I will discuss the results for national identity, European identity, and anxiety for the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union. Now, I will go through each of my hypotheses and describe what the evidence shows.

Table 1:

Worry over the War

	Worry
Shared Border with Ukraine	−0.1***
	(0.02)
Shared Border with Russia	0.1***
	(0.03)
National Identity	0.2***
	(0.02)
European Identity	0.4***
	(0.01)
US Troops	0.1***
	(0.01)
Ethnically Russian	0.01
	(0.03)
Russian Speaking	0.1***
	(0.02)
Russian Resource Dependency	
Constant	1.1***
	(0.03)
Observations	7,008
R^2	0.2
Adjusted R^2	0.2
Residual Std. Error	0.7 (df = 7000)
F Statistic	324.9*** (df = 7; 7000)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Turning to my first two hypotheses on shared borders and anxiety, I find support for H2 (H2: People living in states sharing a non-contiguous border with Russia will have higher anxiety over the conflict than people in non-bordering states), but not H1 (H1: People living in states sharing borders with Ukraine will have higher anxiety over the conflict than people in non-bordering states). As demonstrated by the first coefficient in Table 1, in states that share a border with Ukraine (Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), there was a 0.1 point **decrease (p = .01)** in anxiety compared to states that did not share a border with Ukraine. This result is

significant at the .01 level and demonstrates the opposite relationship than what I predicted. The inverse of what I predicted may have happened due to anxiety not being as high near shared borders with Ukraine due to protection being provided from NATO forces. To avoid an international crisis, beyond what had already occurred, it is not in Russia's interests to have the war spill over. The reason for this is the moment the war spills over into a NATO state, that state is bound to call for a vote on invoking Article V. Because of the reality of an attack on one being an attack on all, anxiety over the conflict spilling over may have been reduced.[10] Overall, this points to the fact that states that share a border with Ukraine have slightly less anxiety than those who do not.

Examining H2, People living in states sharing any type of border with Russia will have higher anxiety over the conflict in Ukraine than people in non-bordering states, I found that in states with shared borders with Russia, including non-contiguous borders with Kaliningrad, worry over the war increased by 0.1 points compared to those who did not share a border with Russia. This result was significant at the .01 level and demonstrates a strong relationship for my hypothesis that those who share a border with Russia will have more anxiety over the conflict than those who do not. However, this result was not as substantive as the change in worry due to European identity (0.4) or national identity (0.2).

The results for examining H1 and H2 imply that sharing a border with the primary combatants does matter, but the effect was not as substantive in causing a change for external actor evaluations compared to European or national identity. Interestingly enough, while I did not have a hypothesis for national and European identity as related to an individual's level of

[10] This may not be in the case in other regions of the world where a large, powerful collective security organization does not exist.

anxiety, there were significant results for an individual's level of national identity and European identity. For each step of European identity an individual had, it led to a 0.4 increase in worry over the war, significant at the .01 level. By comparison, national identity was also significant at the .01 level, but increased worry over the war by 0.2 for each step of national identity strength. Historically, there are many reasons that European identity strength relates to increased worry over the war, more so than national identity, given that both world wars occurred across Europe and many of the same states involved were analyzed here the past record of historical trauma, conflict engagement, and historical memory likely hold important implications for why European identity matters more to an individual's level of worry over the war.

Next, I will discuss my findings on how individuals evaluated the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union. Overall, I find that national identity was the most important factor in evaluating the United States, NATO, and the European Union, except for Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania. Results for this can be found in Figure 4.

Hungary's evaluations of the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and the E.U. seem to be driven primarily by European identity. In Hungarian attitudes, national identity resulted in a decrease in the evaluation of all external actors. This is the only state where, as an individual's level of national identity increased, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the external actor decreased. Hungary's results may point to tension with trust in the government, as part of the national identity measure asks about trust in national authorities. It may also be related to the history of Hungary and implications from historical trauma. After World War I, the Treaty of Trianon caused Hungary to lose a significant amount of territory as well as roughly 3.5 million citizens (Schöpflin 2020). Citizens were not given a choice of which state they could be a

citizen of, the combined incidents of loss of territory and fragmentation of citizens left a traumatic mark on Hungarian national identity.

In Poland, European identity had more of an effect than national identity on attitudes towards the U.N. and E.U., and both European and national identity were equally important to evaluations of NATO. In Lithuania, European (0.3 point increase) and national identity (0.3 point increase) were equally significant in attitudes towards NATO and the E.U.; European identity was only more impactful than national identity on evaluating the United Nations. This having been said, I found support for H3: For people living in states that are proximate to the conflict (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), national identity will have a larger effect than European identity when determining attitudes toward external actors. However, this effect only occurred for the cases of Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia. Although not all non-conflict proximate states have this relationship, Germany and France also experienced a relationship between national identity strength and attitudes toward external actors.

Figure 4:



United States

Focusing first on evaluations of the United States and the effect of national and European identity, I find that in Estonia (0.6), France (0.5), Germany (0.5), Latvia (0.6), Lithuania (0.6), Poland (0.5), Romania (0.5), and Slovakia (0.6) the stronger an individual's national identity the greater evaluation of the United States. This effect was significant at the .01 level across all states. In these states the change in the evaluation of the United States was larger than the change due to European identity. [11] Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia all share a border with either Ukraine (Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) or a border with Kaliningrad/Russia (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland) or with Belarus (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland). European identity has had difficulties in constructing a salient identity group as its

[11] Tables can be found in the appendix.

making was largely driven by European integration, national identity, however, has been a salient factor through each of the world wars. Given that national identity in most of these countries was either under threat during the world wars or formed as a result of (Slovakia), and the creation of NATO, has likely created a stronger effect on the evaluation of the United States. This is not to say that European identity does not matter, but in this case it is not as substantive as national identity.

Hungary was an outlier case of states proximate to the conflict, where an individual's strong national identity led to a decrease in evaluation of the United States. For each step increase in an individual's national identity, the evaluation of the United States decreased by -0.1, and this effect was significant at the .01 level. By contrast, in Hungary, European identity strength resulted in a 0.7 increase in evaluation of the United States. This effect is likely due to the complicated history and rulership of Hungary. Hungary has been under rule through different empires: Ottoman, Hadsburg, Soviet.

Overall, I find support for H3 (H3: People who have both high anxiety and high national identity will have higher positive assessments of external actors than those who do not have high values of both) in most cases with the exception of Hungary. That is, for states that are proximate to the war, there are higher effects on the evaluation of the United States stemming from a sense of national identity. However, I also find this effect from national identity for the cases included that are not close to the war: France (0.6) and Germany (0.5), showing a general trend that the stronger an individual's national identity is, the higher the evaluation of the United States.

NATO

In examining the effect of national and European identity on attitudes towards NATO's effectiveness, I find that in Estonia (0.3), France (0.6), Germany (0.7), Latvia (0.6), Romania

(0.6), and Slovakia (0.6) national identity was more important than European identity in percentage point change in the evaluation of NATO. In Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia, national and European identity were significant at the .01 level. The effect of national identity on the evaluation of NATO was similar to the effect from national identity on the evaluation of the United States. Effects were similar for how evaluation of the U.S. and NATO changed due to national identity for Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia. There were decreases in the effect of national identity on the evaluation of NATO compared to the U.S. for Estonia, Poland, and Lithuania. Increases occurred in the effect of national identity on NATO compared to the United States in Hungary, though national identity was still not as substantive as European identity for changes in the evaluation of NATO.

In evaluating NATO, the states where national identity was not as important as European identity were: Poland (0.3), Hungary (0.2), and Lithuania (0.3). National identity was still significant ($p = .01$) for Poland and Lithuania, but as was seen with the evaluation of the United States cases, national and European identity resulted in the same percentage point change (0.3) in evaluation of NATO for each step increase in identity. The relationship found in Estonia, Poland, and Lithuania points to a larger impact from European identity than national identity on evaluating NATO. This is an important difference as previous research has shown that Poland is a case where establishing a collective European identity was often placed at odds with Polish nationalism (Gora & Zielinska 2019). This finding points to a change within Poland from 2007 on how European identity affects external preferences. Additionally, the findings that European identity is more important for Estonia, Poland, and Lithuania demonstrates support for Putin's argument that NATO is a western aggressor, given that European identity is an important factor in positive evaluations of NATO.

United Nations

Turning to the evaluation of the United Nations, I find that national identity resulted in the most substantive change to the evaluation of the U.N. in France (0.5), Germany (0.6), Latvia (0.4), Romania (0.6), and Slovakia (0.6). This finding was significant at the .01 level. In Estonia, when evaluating the U.N., an individual's level of European identity led to a 0.3-point increase in evaluation compared to national identity (0.2), the effect from national and European identity were both significant at the .01 level. The difference in evaluation of the U.N. in Poland was minimal between national and European identity, with European identity level changing evaluation of the U.N. by 0.1 steps more compared to national identity. When evaluating the U.N., Lithuanian's European identity strength led to an increase in the evaluation by 0.4 significant at the .01 level, Lithuania is the only case where national identity was not significant at all. The results for evaluations of the United Nations are interesting as they point to a more complicated relationship between national and European identity when the international institution is a diplomatic one rather than a military one.

National identity was significant in all cases except for Lithuania, even in Hungary, this is a case where national identity was significant at the .01 level and resulted in an increased evaluation of the U.N., however, it was not as substantive as the change due to European identity. In Hungary, European identity led to an increase in evaluation of the U.N. by 0.6 points. Of all the states, Hungary's change in evaluation of the U.N. was the most substantive. By comparison, the biggest changes due to national identity were in France (0.5), Germany (0.6), Romania (0.6), and Slovakia (0.6). Slovakia suffered many of the same issues from the Treaty of Trianon, where it was a newly created state of Czechoslovakia. However, as seen here from the results displayed in figure 1, how Slovakia and Hungary have internationalized national and

European identity has different effects on the evaluation of other international actors. Hungary has increased effects from European identity that lead to higher evaluations of the U.N., by comparison, Slovakia's evaluation of the U.N. is more affected by national identity. These results point to a need for future research to further detangle the historical contexts which helped or hindered the development of European and national identity across these cases and under which circumstances one may be more important than the other.

European Union

When evaluating the European Union's effectiveness in Ukraine, Estonia (0.4), France (0.7), Germany (0.7), Latvia (0.7), Romania (0.7), and Slovakia (0.7) experienced a more substantive change in evaluation due to national identity compared to European identity. This effect was only slightly stronger in Estonia, where national identity resulted in a 0.4 change, while European identity resulted in a 0.3 point change. In Hungary, national identity was not a significant factor in the evaluation of the E.U., but European identity resulted in a 0.7 increase. Lithuania continues to demonstrate ambiguity between national and European identity being equally impactful in evaluating the European Union. European identity was more substantively impactful for the cases of Poland (0.6) and Hungary (0.7), again these outliers likely point to complications in the role of national and European identity given historic contexts and traumas.

Overall, I find support for H3 that states proximate to the conflict, national identity had a larger effect than European identity when determining attitudes toward external actors. However, this was not true for all cases. This finding was true for Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and most of the time, Estonia (with the exception being in evaluating the United Nations). For Lithuania and Poland, the effects of national and European identity were equivalent for the evaluation of NATO. For evaluating the European Union, Lithuania's effect for national and European identity

was equivalent (0.3). In Poland, European identity was only more important for evaluating the United Nations and European Union.

Hungary was a general outlier case, as in all evaluations, European identity was more impactful than national identity significantly at the .01 level. In Hungarian evaluations of the United States, national identity resulted in a 0.1 decrease in evaluation of the United States. By comparison, European identity leads to an increase in evaluation of the United States by 0.7 in Hungary. While national identity was significant for Hungary in evaluating NATO and the U.N., it was not as substantially impactful as European identity. This finding points to conflict within the Hungarian people that may be driven by mistrust of the government. The variables used to create the national identity measure depended partially on trust in the government as well as trust in national authorities. Part of Hungary's result may be driven by the injuries and trauma to Hungarian national identity. In 1920, the Treaty of Trianon sparked what is now known as "Trianon Syndrome". Following the end of World War I, the Treaty of Trianon removed 3/5 of Hungary's territory. This has led to a narrative that Hungary may have been better off before the war, and created collective resentment that has been utilized to further fractionalize the state.

The Table 2 below outlines my findings on who shared what borders with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine and on what external actor evaluations national and European identity were most substantive in for each state.

Table 2: Summary of Results

State	**Borders**	**National ID**	**European ID**
Estonia	Russia	Yes for: U.S., NATO, E.U.	Yes for : U.N.
France	No	Yes for: U.S., NATO, U.N., E.U.	No

Germany	No	Yes for: U.S., NATO, U.N., E.U.	No
Hungary	Ukraine	No	Yes for: U.S., NATO, U.N., E.U.
Lativa	Russia, Belarus	Yes for: U.S., NATO, U.N., E.U.	No
Lithuania	Russia, Belarus	Yes for: U.S.,	Yes for: U.N.
Poland	Russia, Belarus, Ukraine	Yes for: U.S.,	Yes for: U.N., E.U.
Romania	Ukraine	Yes for: U.S., NATO, U.N., E.U.	No
Slovakia	Ukraine	Yes for: U.S., NATO, U.N., E.U.	No

Worry and National Identity

Turning towards H4: People who have both high anxiety and high national identity will have higher positive assessments of external actors than those who do not have high values of both, I ran multivariate interaction models examining the interaction between anxiety ("Worry") and an individual's level of national identity. I did not find support for H4, with an exception for the evaluation of the United States. In Romania and Slovakia, the more worried an individual was and the stronger their sense of national identity, the higher their evaluation of the United States. By contrast, in evaluating the United Nations, having a higher anxiety score and having a stronger sense of national identity resulted in a decreased evaluation of the United Nations, compared to individuals who just had a strong sense of national identity. However, the effect for the interaction between national identity and anxiety in evaluating the United Nations resulted in a decreased evaluation of the United Nations for Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. These results are further broken down below.

Examining the interactive effect between national identity and worry over the war for evaluation of the United States, I found that there was a statistically significant effect at the .01 level for Estonia (0.1) and Poland (0.2), at the .05 level in France (-0.1), and at the 0.1 level in Lithuania (0.1) and Slovakia (0.1). The more worried an individual was and the stronger their sense of national identity, resulted in an increased positive evaluation of the United States. By contrast, only in France (-0.1) did this effect result in a slight decrease in the evaluation of the United States.

Examining the interactive effect in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, the marginal effects plots below show that, as national identity increases, so does the evaluation of the United States. In Romania and Slovakia, national identity and "totally agreeing" with the statement that "I am personally worried about the war in Ukraine" lead to a higher evaluation of the United States. However, this effect does not occur until National Identity is 1.5 or higher. Substantially, the difference in evaluation is an increase of roughly .25 points on a 3-point scale, correlating to an 8% increase. n Romania, this effect happened at around 1.5 on the national identity scale, where the more worried you were and the higher your national identity the higher your evaluation of the U.S. (Figure 5). In Slovakia, this effect occurred at 1.25, where once national identity was at least 1.25 there was an interaction between an individual's level of worry and national identity that led to a higher evaluation of the U.S. (Figure 5, second plot). Lastly, in Poland, when national identity reached 2.25 (Figure 5, third plot) and individuals were more worried about the war, there was a decrease in evaluation of the U.S., while those who were not worried about the war at all had more positive views by comparison. Figure 5 shows that in Romania and Slovakia, being more worried about the war and having a higher national identity would lead to increased evaluations of the United States.

Figure 5: National Identity * Worry in Evaluating the U.S.



When examining the interactive effect between national identity and anxiety in evaluating the United Nations in France, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, the more worried you were about the war, the less positive your evaluation. The more worried people were about the war led to increased evaluations of the U.N., regardless of increases in national identity. By comparison, in Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, once national identity reached around .5 and above, there was an interaction where the higher your national identity and the more worried you were about the war, the less positive your evaluation of the U.N. (Figure 6) compared to not being worried at all. In Lithuania, this effect happened when national identity was 1. There was a slight increase in the evaluation of the U.N. for those who were most worried, but this did not lead to as high an evaluation as those who were not worried with a high level of national identity. This difference led to a substantive change as those who were not worried and had a high level of national identity evaluated the U.N. by almost .5 points higher on a 3-point scale (Figure 6, first plot). In Hungary, this effect happened when national identity was 2, where national identity of 2 or higher and not being worried about the war at all lead to increases in the evaluations of the

U.N., however, this was not a substantive change. This result points to a lack of faith in the U.N.'s abilities for states where national identity and worry about the war is high. This points to a potential reality that states with high national identity saliency and worry about the war decrease their perception of diplomatic entities and ideas of international cooperation.

Figure 6: National Identity * Worry in Evaluating the U.N.



The interaction model between national identity and worry in evaluating NATO was only significant for Slovakia (.05). However, when examining the marginal effects, the interaction change in evaluation of NATO is irrelevant. The only case that was significant when evaluating the E.U. for the interaction between national identity and worry over the war was Slovakia. However, this interaction was not substantive, and the significance was minimal at the $p<0.1$ level.

Implications and Conclusions

I have shown that people living in states that border Ukraine have a decreased level of anxiety over the war than those who do not. By contrast, I showed that states that share a border with Russia have higher anxiety than those who did not. Second, emotions and national identity interact, but only in some situations, and mainly in evaluating the United States. Third, worrying about the war alone was sometimes significant, but was not as substantive a factor as national or European identity. Lastly, I have shown that national identity matters for the evaluation of external actors more so than European identity.

Out of this work, there are several policy implications. First, how populations view external actors. Understanding what affects how populations view actors like the United States, NATO, the E.U., and the U.N. will help us understand when states are more likely to support intervention from third parties. In this case, third parties that are known as military forces (the United States and NATO), saw an increase in support as national identity increased. This finding points to implications for how we understand the rally-around-the-flag effect and its relationship to alliance assistance. Secondly, this work speaks to the future of NATO. It brings forward the question of do European member states see NATO as an effective institution in a conflict-fueled Europe?

The results of this research have opened up several avenues for future research. The first avenue is that more research is needed to understand how attitudes about external actor effectiveness have changed given changing world situations and contexts. With the election of President Trump in 2024, Trump has enacted a major shift in U.S. policy towards both Ukraine and NATO. President Trump asserted most confidently that he would be able to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of being in office. That has yet to be the case. Instead, President Trump has voiced pro-Russian sentiments, along with biased proposals and deals that place benefits to Russia while not offering Ukraine much beyond the end of the war (Miklos 2025). This policy mistake likely holds important differences for how other states' citizens perceive the United States as being effective in the war, and will likely hold long-term consequences if not rectified.

Along with President Trump's changing stances and policies on Ukraine, the fate of NATO has been called into question. President Trump has suggested that the United States would not defend any NATO ally that is not meeting the minimum GDP expenditure on defense. This would be a drastic change from expectations of membership, where an attack on one is an attack on all. States that already demonstrated some areas of concern were Slovakia and Hungary. The United States needs policies focused on maintaining allies, but the current administration may risk further alienation of already delicate friendships.

Second, more work should be done to explore the case of Slovakia. Included with understanding pro-Russian sentiment, further research on Slovakia needs to be completed to understand Slovakia's lean towards Russia. Figure 7 below shows that of all states, Slovakia (25%) had the largest percentage of its population favoring Russia over NATO. -2 to 0 represents support of NATO, and 0 to +2 represents support of Russia. Given the previously discussed

implications of changes within NATO, Slovakia further leaning towards Russia may risk U.S. strategic relationships in another way: strengthening Russia at the cost of the United States.

Figure 7:



Third, further work needs to be done in Eastern Europe, looking at potential pivot points for either the United States or Russia. Specific cases that are important would be Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova. Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova are known Russian allies. However, Moldova has shown increasing cynicism of Russia and provides a potential flex point for U.S. influence in the region. Gaining a better understanding of Georgia and Belarus on the role of national versus Russian identity would expand our understanding of the region and offer insights into how best to conduct influence campaigns in these states.

Fourth, my research showed that in Hungary that national identity resulted in negative effects compared to the other cases. This finding warrants further investigation to better understand how Hungary has constructed national identity since the Treaty of Trianon. The trauma caused by the Treaty of Trianon has left generational effects on the construction of national identity that current understandings of national identity can not capture. The differences in Hungary are likely related to other causes, such as the treaty, and further analysis ought to include examining the historical relationships between Hungary and the outside actors, as well as understanding Hungarian national identity construction.

Lastly, Hungary's result points to a need to understand the role of national trauma more comprehensively. After World War II, findings have shown that transgenerational effects from the Holocaust on families with Jewish survivors continued to future generations (Volkan 2001). Given the cost that Hungary incurred at the end of World War I, there are likely similar effects that need further investigation to understand the role, function, and limitations of trauma.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

While partisanship is still an important factor in attitude formation in the United States contexts, other forms of identity are also important. This dissertation builds upon existing literature and opens new avenues for future analysis. Individuals have multiple heuristics they can use to determine wartime attitudes; this study specifically examined important aspects from national identity and emotions. If framing effects matter during international crises, what identities are most important for messaging during this time? This question leads to an important conclusion that if the goal is to change behavior during conflict, messaging framing may need to be more focused on national identities. I demonstrate that national identity and emotions impact the way individuals form attitudes during conflict. These variations are important as they demonstrate how the potential messaging effect may be perceived depending upon the framing.

In Part I, I have argued that national identity and guilt are important lenses to understand aversion to support of military actions that risk civilian lives. I examined how guilt and national identity inform attitudes toward actions that would directly result in the loss of civilian lives if pursued in the name of national security. My findings provided evidence that at times when there is a perceived threat from actors such as a terrorist, democrats and republicans responded similarly. While democrats had less national attachment than republicans, they were overall still supportive of aggressive military action.

In Part II, I explored how national identity was defined, examining different types of patriotism. I found that gender, race, and partisanship were significant factors in which types of patriotism individuals favored. Republicans were more supportive of uncritical patriotism while Democrats and women favored constructive. This finding suggests that how Americans define

being American varies and that determining a collective definition will be based on how individuals in part define themselves.

In Part III, I extended my theory of national identity and emotions to the cases of Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, examining responses to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. I found that national identity was, in most cases, more impactful than European identity when evaluating external actors' performance in the war. Additionally, I found that there were two cases with different responses that warrant further investigation: Hungary and Slovakia. This finding points to some potential ramifications for U.S. foreign policy and negotiations going forward if countries like Slovakia have a population that favors Russia. This suggests that a better understanding is needed on how national identity relates to policy expectations for the citizens affected around the world, rather than just assumptions about framing effects.

The formal empirical findings from Part I, Part II, and Part III demonstrate a need to find a better conceptualization for national identity broadly and the impact emotions have on identity saliency. A full exploration of national identity in all these contexts is beyond a single dissertation, but this dissertation has allowed a glimpse into how national identity may be conceptualized under different contexts and how it informs foreign policy attitudes.

One of the primary goals of psychological and cyberwarfare is to understand populations on the ground. Often political science has focused on the politics of warfare through political groups, but this negates important framing effects that are needed during conflict—what matters and when. This dissertation opens a research avenue into understanding framing during conflict. What identities are most important for framing during what types of international crises? When is anger more important than emotions like empathy, sympathy, and guilt? How do states

connect with foreign populations successful to reduce battle deaths? These questions point to a need to understand how identity framing is used, needed, and executed during military intervention to achieve strategic goals.

Appendices

Chapter 1
Guilt Prime

U.S. Ground Strike in Yemen Against Houthi Rebels Leaves 40 Civilians Dead And At least 65 Injured

September 25, 2021

The Associated Press

Mohammed al-Naqib, a citizen of Lahj, told The Associated Press about a recent US attack against Houthi rebels in Yemen, saying that "We heard a loud crashing. Then we saw American troops approaching. I heard gun shots being fired and my wife fell to the ground beside me with blood coming out of her chest." The American troops were on a counterinsurgency mission in Yemen chasing down Houthi rebels in the province of Lahj attempting to target a suspected hideout. Mohammed's wife was one of several casualties that day along with numerous others in the village.

The number of Yemeni civilians wounded is known to be at least 65 with 40 total deaths. Among those deaths include several children from a nearby elementary school that was in session during the attack. It is estimated that as many as 20 children died during the attack as a Hellfire missile was launched via Predator drone prior to US force entering the scene. The target was meant to be a nearby farm supposedly housing Houthi rebels. Graphic footage from the seen showed several bodies littering the ground with sirens from ambulances blaring in the background.

Most of the wounded were taken to a nearby hospital in Aden. Officials in Yemen blame the American troops for the deaths of the Yemeni civilians.

General Jake Smith, who was in charge during the attack, has commented that he is aware that "Americans could have done better. Americans should and could have been better informed". President Biden has commented that "This is our fault, and this is a result of not thoroughly verifing on the ground information and here our failure as Americans has led to the deaths of many women and children who should not be soon forgotten".

Almutawakel:
"My baby wasn't breathing, and he was bloodied from debris. My baby was taken from me by the Americans. Americans killed my baby"

Bassma Emani Almutawakel, a Yemeni woman and mother, described to us the horrific experience of finding her 5 year-old son Boushra's body, "He wasn't moving, I couldn't see him breathing. My baby wasn't breathing and he was bloodied from debris. He was taken from me by the Americans. Americans killed my baby". Bassma was not the only mother to lose a child that day as countless bodies were scattered around the area with body bags beginning to pile up.

The strike in Lahj is one of several U.S. drone strikes and counterinsurgency missions in Yemen. Overall U.S. actions in Yemen have resulted in the killing of hundreds of innocent civilians. Since 2019 this has resulted in over 1,400 civilian deaths and at least 200 children dead. Villagers are left to wonder if they will be next in the U.S. crusade against terrorism.

Fake News Story Yemen

American Troops Prepare to Target Houthi Rebels, Civilian Casualties are Expected

October 12, 2021

The Associated Press

Following recent events from September in Lahj, Yemen, American troops are preparing additional attacks against the Houthi Rebels. Recent events have led to questions of American behavior in Yemen resulting in numerous civilian deaths.

Decisions have been made to avoid on the ground confrontation with the Houthi Rebels and instead utilize Predator drones in the place of on the ground American troops. This decision eliminates the risk to American soldiers by utilizing drone warfare for counterinsurgency purposes.

However, recent events have shown that lack of proper on the ground information and due caution have led to incorrect targeting resulting in numerous civilian deaths.

The American drone campaign in Yemen will likely lead to countless deaths of civilians, many of whom are women and children.

So far U.S. actions in Yemen have resulted in in over 1,400 civilian deaths and with at least 200 of those being children

The Biden Administration has yet to comment on the potential outcomes of these proposed strikes. No estimations have been provided for the potential civilian causalities that will occur.

Survey Questionnaire

Q1: What is your gender?
1. Female
2. Male
3. Other
4. Prefer not to answer

Q2: What is your current age?
[Dropdown.]

Q3: Are you a U.S. citizen?
1. U.S. citizen
2. Not a citizen

Q4: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Independent
4. Other

Q4a (If Republican): Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a weak Republican?
1. Strong
2. Weak

Q4b (If Democrat): Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a weak Democrat?
1. Strong
2. Weak

Q4c (In Independent or Other): Do you think you are closer to the Republican or Democratic party?
1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Neither

Q5: How important is being an American to you?
1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Not very important
4. Not at all

Q6: How well does the term "American" describe you?
1. Extremely well
2. Very well
3. Not very well
4. Not at all

Q7: Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be (Mark all that apply)
1. White
2. Black or African American
3. American Indian or Alaska Native
4. Asian
5. Native Hawaiian, or other Pacific Islander

Q8: Are you a U.S. veteran

1.Yes

2. No

<u>Block II – Pre-survey (Randomized block)</u>

Q9: How would you rate your favorability towards the following countries: (100 represents the most favorable and 0 represents the least favorable) [Feeling Thermometer]?

1. United States
2. Iraq
3. China
4. Germany
5. Yemen
6. Sweden

Q10: How threatened do you feel by the following groups? (100 represents the most threat and 0 represents the least) [Feeling Thermometer] (order randomized)

1. Boko Haram
2. ISIS
3. Proud Boys
4. Antifa
5. Black Lives Matter

Q11: How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?

1. Extremely Likely
2. Very Likely
3. Somewhat Likely
4. A little Likely
5. Not at all Likely

Q12: How would you rate your favorability toward the following groups of people: (100 represents the most favorable and 0 represents the least favorable) [Feeling Thermometer]?

6. African Americans
7. Muslims
8. Muslim Americans
9. Americans

Q13: Do you think ISIS to be a major threat to U.S. national security?

10. Strongly Agree
11. Agree
12. Neutral
13. Disagree
14. Strongly Disagree

Q14: Are you concerned about you or a loved one dying as the result of a terrorist attack?

1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

Q15: What is the most important consideration when evaluating the success of US intervention? (Please rank your considerations from most important to least important) (Ranked Choice)
1. Establishing peace
2. Civilian casualties
3. Military fatalities
4. Spreading democracy
5. Protecting American civilians
6. Protecting Another country's civilians from human rights abuses

Q16: How much do you agree with the following statement: The use of torture by our government is justified against people suspected of terrorism.
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

Q17: How much do you agree with the following statement: The use of excessive force by the police is justified against people suspected of a violent crime, such as rape or murder.
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

Q18: How much do you agree with the following statement: The excessive use of force in the name of national security is justified.
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

Q19: How much do you agree with the following statement: The use of excessive force in the name of maintaining law and order domestically is justified.
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

Q20: How important is the value of security (national security, family security, social order, cleanliness, reciprocation of favors) to you?
1. Extremely Important
2. Somewhat Important
3. Slightly Important
4. Not Important at all
5. Opposed to my principles

Q21: How important is the value of universalism (broadmindedness, beauty of nature and arts, social justice, a world at peace, equality, wisdom, unity with nature, environmental protection) to you?
1. Extremely Important
2. Somewhat Important
3. Slightly Important
4. Not Important at all
5. Opposed to my principles

Block III – Induction Treatment

Instructions
(only for those in the treatment group):
On the following screen you will be asked to read a short news article from The Associated Press about a recent U.S. mission in Yemen. There will be a 90 second pause on the news article to allow you time to read it then you may proceed to the following section. After reading the news article you will be asked a few questions about your response to the new article.
(only for those in the control group):
There will be a 90 second pause and then you will be able to proceed to the following section and continue the survey.

Q22. Guilt prime
News story about US intervention in Yemen.

Q23. Control
Control – No information – goes straight to Block IV

Manipulation Check questions (only attached to the treatment)[12]
Q24: What is the likelihood that you feel terrible about what Americans did? (5 point)
1. Highly likely
2. Likely
3. Somewhat Likely
4. Somewhat Unlikely
5. Unlikely

Q25: What is the likelihood that you feel that the way Americans acted was pathetic? (5 point)
1. Highly likely
2. Likely
3. Somewhat Likely
4. Somewhat Unlikely
5. Unlikely

Q26: What is the likelihood that you feel remorse for what the Americans did? (5 Point)
1. Highly likely
2. Likely
3. Somewhat Likely
4. Somewhat Unlikely
5. Unlikely

Block IV – News Story

[Directions]

On the following screens, you will be asked to read through a news story. A 90-second pause will occur before you will be able to move on. Following reading the news story, you will be asked a serious of questions regarding your preferences.

[News Story]

Q27: Do you agree with the decision to launch the strike?
1. Yes
2. No

[12] #1-3 are adaptations from the GASP scale measuring the evaluation of negative guilt due to behaviors.

Q28: How much would you agree with the following statement: The benefits of the proposed strike outweigh the risks to civilians.
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly Agree

Q29: How much would you agree with the following statement: The risk the strike entails is worth the success for Americans.
1. Highly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Highly Agree

Q30: How much would you agree with the following statement: The risk the strike entails is worth the success for civilian populations.
1. Highly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Highly Agree

Q31: How ethical or unethical would it be for the U.S. to conduct the strike?
1. Highly Unethical
2. Unethical
3. Neutral
4. Ethical
5. Highly Ethical

Q32: What is the maximum number of civilians that will be killed as a result of this strike that you would be willing to accept?
[Feeling Thermometer, and/or check box for any number is fine]

Additional Analysis

Linear Models:

	Dependent variable:																			
	agree				Scores				Benefits				Civilians				Ethical			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Treatment	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.1	-0.1	0.01	-0.1	-0.02	-0.2	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.2	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.2	0.1	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Female	-0.1***	-0.1**	-0.1*	-0.1**	-0.3**	-0.3**	-0.2*	-0.3**	-0.2**	-0.2**	-0.2*	-0.2**	-0.1	-0.1	-0.04	-0.1	-0.2**	-0.2**	-0.1	-0.2**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Threat	0.1*	0.1**	0.1*	0.2	0.3**	0.3**	0.3*	0.2**	0.3*	0.2*	0.4	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.3**	0.3**	0.3**	0.3**	0.3
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Republican	0.2***	0.2**	0.2**	0.2**	0.6**	0.6**	0.6**	0.6**	0.5**	0.5**	0.5**	0.5**	0.5**	0.5**	0.5**	0.5**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
ASI	0.1**	0.1	0.1*	0.1*	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.5**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.5**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**	0.4**
	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
ASI*Treatment		-0.004				0.1				0.1				0.1				0.2		
		(0.1)				(0.2)				(0.2)				(0.2)				(0.2)		
Female*Treatment			-0.01				-0.1				0.03				-0.1				-0.2	
			(0.1)				(0.1)				(0.1)				(0.2)				(0.1)	
ASI*Threat				-0.1				-0.01				-0.2				-0.2				0.01
				(0.1)				(0.2)				(0.2)				(0.2)				(0.2)
Constant	1.0***	1.0***	1.0***	1.0***	1.6***	1.5***	1.4***	1.4***	1.5***	1.6***	1.5***	1.4***	1.5***	1.5***	1.4***	1.4***	1.4***	1.5***	1.5***	1.4***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)
Observations	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549	549
R^2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Adjusted R^2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Residual Std. Error	0.4 (df = 543)	0.4 (df = 542)	0.4 (df = 542)	0.4 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 543)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 543)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 543)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)	0.6 (df = 542)
F Statistic	17.5*** (df = 5; 543)	14.5*** (df = 6; 542)	14.5*** (df = 6; 542)	14.4*** (df = 6; 542)	30.4*** (df = 5; 543)	28.0*** (df = 6; 542)	28.2*** (df = 6; 542)	28.0*** (df = 6; 542)	24.6*** (df = 5; 543)	17.2*** (df = 6; 542)	17.1*** (df = 6; 542)	17.1*** (df = 6; 542)	22.4*** (df = 5; 543)	18.7*** (df = 6; 542)	18.7*** (df = 6; 542)	18.6*** (df = 6; 542)	21.9*** (df = 5; 543)	18.9*** (df = 6; 542)	18.7*** (df = 6; 542)	18.2*** (df = 6; 542)
Note:																				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Support for the Use of Force

Chapter 3 Appendix
Evaluating American Social Identity

Survey Tool

Block I Consent [Make sure this is the full IRB consent form]
[Insert IRB consent form – package number will be added on later]
Do you agree to participate in the study?

a. Yes
b. No

Block II Demographics [randomize]

Q1: Are you a U.S. citizen? [Citizenship]

a. Yes, born in the United States
b. Yes, born in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or Northern Marianas
c. Yes, born abroad to U.S. citizen parent of parents
d. Yes, U.S citizen by naturalization
e. No, not a U.S. citizen

Q2: What is your current age? [Age]

[dropdown choices 17-110]

Q3: What is your gender? [Gender]

a. Male
b. Female
c. Other [text box]
d. Prefer not to answer

Q4: Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? [Ethnicity]

a. No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish Origin
b. Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano
c. Yes, Puerto Rican
d. Yes, Cuban
e. Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish Origin

Q5: What is your race? (Please select all that apply) [race]

a. White
b. Black or African American
c. Latino
d. American Indian or Alaska Native
e. Asian
f. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
g. Other [text box entry]

Q6: What is your total Household income?

a. $0-$19,999
b. $20,000-$49,999
c. $50,000-$89,999
d. $90,000-$129,999
e. $130,000-$149,999
f. $150,000+
g. Prefer not to respond

Q8: What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?

a. Some high school
b. High school graduate (GED or Diploma)
c. Trade/Technical/Vocational Training
d. Some College
e. Associate's degree
f. Bachelor's Degree
g. Some Postgraduate Work
h. Master's Degree
i. Professional Degree
j. Doctorate Degree

Q9: What is the zip code of your primary residence? Please enter a 5-digit zip code:
[Text box entry zip code]

Q10: Have you ever served on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces, Reserves, or National Guard?

a. Never served in the military
b. Only on active duty for training in the Reserves or National Guard
c. Now on active duty
d. On active duty in the past, but not now
e. Retired/Veteran

Q11: What is your present religion if any? [Religion]

a. Protestant
b. Roman Catholic
c. Orthodox Christian (such as Greek or Russian Orthodox)
d. Latter-Day Saints (LDS)
e. Jewish
f. Muslim
g. Buddhist
h. Hindu
i. Atheist
j. Agnostic
k. Something else
l. Nothing in particular

Q12: What is your favorite flavor of ice cream from the below list? [This question is to check for your attention, please select only Rum Raisin]

a. Vanilla
b. Chocolate
c. Rocky Road
d. Rum Raisin
e. Strawberry
f. Mint Chocolate Chip

Block III Partisanship

Q13: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

a. Republican
b. Democrat

c. Independent
d. Other

Q13a (If Republican): Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a weak Republican?
a. Strong
b. Weak

Q13b (If Democrat): Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a weak Democrat?
a. Strong
b. Weak

Q13c (In Independent or Other): Do you think you are closer to the Republican or Democratic party?
a. Republican
b. Democrat
c. Neither

Block IV ASI [Randomize order questions are asked in]

Q14: How important is being an American to you, where 0 is not at all important and 10 is the most important thing in your life? [social identity measure]
[sliding scale 0-10]

Q15: How well does the term "American" describe you? [social identity measure]
a. Extremely well
b. Very well
c. Not very well
d. Not at all

Q16: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I see myself as a typical American? [social identity measure]

a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Somewhat Disagree
d. Somewhat Agree
e. Agree
f. Strongly Agree

Q17: When talking about Americans, how often do you say "we" instead of "they"? [social identity measure]

a. All of the time
b. Most of the time
c. Some of the Time
d. Not at all

Block VI Treatment [½ of treatment group receives it here, ½ control group]

Q18 Emotion Prime Anger [treatment group]

For the next 5 minutes, please write down an experience you had recently that made you feel very angry and livid.
[text box]

Q18 Control group:

For the next 5 minutes, please write down your experience while grocery shopping.

[textbox]

BLOCK V Patriotism [Randomized question order]

Q19: How good does it make you feel when you see the American flag flying? [Huddy & Khatib-symbolic patriotism]

a. Very good
b. Good
c. Somewhat Good
d. Somewhat Bad
e. Bad
f. Very Bad

Q20: How good does it make you feel when you hear the national anthem? [Huddy & Khatib-symbolic patriotism]

a. Very good
b. Good
c. Somewhat Good
d. Somewhat Bad
e. Bad
f. Very Bad

Q21: How much do you agree with the following statements [constructive patriotism]:

a. People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.
b. If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my country.
c. I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.
d. I express my love for America by supporting efforts for positive change.

ii. Strongly disagree
iii. Disagree
iv. Somewhat Disagree
v. Somewhat Agree
vi. Agree
vii. Strongly Agree

Q22: Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: [patriotism]

g. I am proud of the way democracy works in America. [national pride]
h. I am proud of America's economic achievements. [national pride]
i. I am proud of America's science and technology achievements. [national pride]
j. I am proud of America's history. [national pride]
k. I am proud of America's fair and equal treatment of all groups in society. [national pride]
l. I am proud of America's achievements in art and literature. [national pride]
m. I am proud of America's social security system. [national pride]
n. America is a better country than most others. [nationalism]
o. The world would be better if more people from other countries were like Americans. [nationalism]

i. Strongly disagree
ii. Disagree
iii. Somewhat Disagree
iv. Somewhat Agree
v. Agree
vi. Strongly Agree

Q23: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements [Uncritical patriotism Huddy et al]:

a. I support my country's leaders even if I disagree with their actions.
b. People who do not wholeheartedly support America should live elsewhere.
c. For the most part, people who protest and demonstrate against U.S. policy are good, upstanding, intelligent people.
d. The United States is almost always right.
e. I support U.S. policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.
f. There is too much criticism of the U.S. in the world, and we as its citizens should not criticize it.
g. I believe that U.S. policies are almost always the morally correct ones.

i. Strongly disagree
ii. Disagree
iii. Somewhat Disagree
iv. Somewhat Agree
v. Agree
vi. Strongly Agree

Q24 When someone says something bad about American people, how strongly do you feel as if they say something bad about you? [Herrmann et al national attachment]

a. Extremely strongly
b. Very strongly
c. Strongly
d. Not too strongly
e. Not strongly at all

Q25 How much does being an American have to do with how you feel about yourself? [Herrmann et al national attachment]

a. A tremendous amount
b. A lot
c. Somewhat
d. Not too much
e. None at all

Q26 How much do you feel that what happens to America in general will be your fate as well? [Herrmann et al national attachment]

a. A tremendous amount
b. A lot
c. Somewhat
d. Not too much
e. None at all

Q18: Jenkins measure [national pride]

Q27: What activities did your family participate in this past July 4th? Please select all that apply:

b. Attended or Held a BBQ/Potluck/Picnic.
c. Watched fireworks.
d. Wore holiday clothing (Red, White, and Blue).
e. Set off fireworks.
f. Said "Happy Fourth" to at least 1 person.
g. Went to a parade.

h. None of the above

Q28 How superior or inferior is the United States compared to other nations? [Herrmann et al National Chauvinism]

a. Vastly superior
b. Somewhat superior
c. Neither superior or inferior
d. Somewhat inferior
e. Vastly inferior

Q29 How many things about America make you ashamed? [Herrmann et al National Chauvinism]

a. Very many
b. Many
c. Not Many
d. None

BLOCK VI Typical American Ideals

Q32: Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is: [Byrne American identity]

f. Being born in America
g. Having American citizenship
h. Living in America most of one's life
i. Respecting America's political institutions and laws
j. Feeling American
k. Being able to speak English
l. Being Christian
m. Being Protestant [taken from Citrin et al 1990]
n. Believing in God [taken from Citrin et al 1990]
o. Voting in elections [taken from Citrin et al 1990]
p. Trying to get ahead on one's own efforts [taken from Citrin et al 1990]
q. Treating people of all races and backgrounds equally [taken from Citrin et al 1990]
r. Defending American when it is criticized [taken from Citrin et al 1990]
s. To adopt basic American culture and values as your own [taken from Herrmann et al]

Scaling: Very important to not important at all

Q33: Some people feel that the nation is held together by a common allegiance to its political ideals like democracy and freedom, other people believe that the county is held together by a common language and cultural heritage. Which do you agree with? Please pick the most important one that you believe holds a nation together. [Herrmann et al weigh the difference between culture and allegiance]

a. Common Allegiance
b. Cultural Heritage

Block VII Premeasures

Q35: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: China is a major threat to U.S. national security?
1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

Q36: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Russia is a major threat to U.S. national security?

6. Strongly Agree
7. Agree
8. Neutral
9. Disagree
10. Strongly Disagree

Block VI Treatment [½ of treatment group receives it here, ½ control group here]

Q37 Emotion Prime Anger

For the next 5 minutes, please write down an experience you had recently that made you feel very angry and livid. [text box]

Q37 Control group:

For the next 5 minutes, please write down your experience while grocery shopping.

[textbox]

Block VII Scenario Outcome Questions

Q42 Here is a list of possible results from an increase in the number of immigrants living in the United States. For each of these items, please tell me how likely it is to happen [adapted from Citrin et al] Immigration

c. Higher economic growth
d. Lower quality of education in public schools
e. The place of English as our common language is endangered.
f. Our culture is being enriched by providing new ideas.
g. An increase in crime.
h. Providing needed labor for new jobs.
i. Higher taxes due to more demands for public services.
j. Increasing the number of people anxious to work hard.
k. Increasing the amount of unemployment in the country.
    i. Very Likely
    ii. Somewhat Likely
    iii. Not too likely
    iv. Not at all Likely
    v. Don't Know

Q43: Do you support or oppose the following policies [Citrin]:

a. Letting citizens who cannot read English vote.
b. Affirmative action both in hiring and promoting and in university admissions.
    i. Support
    ii. Oppose
    iii. Don't know

Q44 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: American interests are usually best served by cooperating with our allies and with international institutions even if it means we cannot do the things we want to. [Herrmann et al – international cooperation]

a. Strongly Disagree
b. Disagree
c. Agree
d. Strongly Agree

Q45 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Pursuing American interests often means we need to act on our own and not worry too much about what other countries think. [Herrmann et al – international cooperation]

e. Strongly Disagree
f. Disagree
g. Agree
h. Strongly Agree

Block VIV ASI Remeasures

Q47: How important is being an American to you, where 0 is not at all important and 10 is the most important thing in your life? [social identity measure]

Q48: How well does the term "American" describe you? [social identity measure]

e. Extremely well
f. Very well
g. Not very well
h. Not at all

Q49: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I see myself as a typical American? [social identity measure]

g. Strongly disagree
h. Disagree
i. Somewhat Disagree
j. Somewhat Agree
k. Agree
l. Strongly Agree

Q50: When talking about Americans, how often do you say "we" instead of "they"? [social identity measure]

b. All of the time
c. Most of the time
d. Some of the Time
e. Not at all

Q51: Who did you vote for in the 2020 Presidential Election?

a. Joseph Biden
b. Donald Trump
c. Jo Jorgensen
d. Someone else
e. Did not vote

Q52: Who did you vote for in the 2024 Presidential Election?

a. Kamala Harris
b. Donald Trump
c. Chase Oliver
d. Someone else
e. Did not vote

Block VIV Debriefing

Thank you for participating in this survey. As part of this project, we examined how American values are stacked differently within various identity groups and the role emotions play in informing your responses toward American interests and immigration. Additionally, we examined how the

strength of American Social Identity changed due to whether you were primed to feel angry. If you have any questions please contact the principal investigator, Autumn Perkey, at perkey@umd.edu.

Chapter 4 Appendix

Full graphs for national identity and European identity on a 0-1 scale.





State	EE	FR	DE	HU	LV	LT	PL	RO	SK
Sample Population	1018	1018	1003	1001	1005	1018	1002	1023	1004
Male v. Female	44% 56%	48% 52%	45% 55%	47% 53%	44% 56%	45% 55%	48% 52%	48% 52%	45% 55%

	Distance from Ukraine	Shared Border Length
Estonia (EE)	1371 KM	NA
France (FR)	2366 KM	NA
Germany (DE)	1348 KM	NA
Hungary (HU)	0	128KM
Latvia (LV)	1,065 KM	NA
Lithuania (LT)	863 KM	NA
Poland (PL)	0	498 KM
Romania (RO)	0	601KM
Slovakia (SK)	0	97 KM

State	Approximation of U.S. Troops
Estonia (EE)	**600**
France (FR)	**0**
Germany (DE)	**35,000**
Hungary (HU)	**1,500**
Latvia (LV)	**600**
Lithuania (LT)	**700**
Poland (PL)	**10,000**
Romania (RO)	**3,000**
Slovakia (SK)	**1,500**

State	Western/Eastern Bloc
Estonia (EE)	**Eastern**
France (FR)	**Western**
Germany (DE)	**Western*/Eastern (*West Germany)**
Hungary (HU)	**Eastern**
Latvia (LV)	**Eastern**
Lithuania (LT)	**Eastern**
Poland (PL)	**Eastern**
Romania (RO)	**Eastern**

Slovakia (SK)	**Eastern (*Czechoslovakia)**

State	% of Population Russian Speaking	% of population Ethnically Russian
Estonia (EE)	**29%**	**24%**
France (FR)	**0%**	**NA**
Germany (DE)	**0%**	**NA**
Hungary (HU)	**2%**	**NA**
Latvia (LV)	**34%**	**25%**
Lithuania (LT)	**7%**	**5%**
Poland (PL)	**NA**	**NA**
Romania (RO)	**NA**	**NA**
Slovakia (SK)	**>1.8%**	**NA**



State	Share of Russian products in total oil import by state (2020)	Share of gas supply from Russia products (2021)
Estonia (EE)	**32%**	**12%**
France (FR)	**13%**	**15%**

Germany (DE)	**30%**	**49%**
Hungary (HU)*	**45%**	**61%**
Latvia (LV)	**20%**	**92%**
Lithuania (LT)	**69%**	**27%**
Poland (PL)*	**68%**	**50%**
Romania (RO)*	**33%**	**24%**
Slovakia (SK)*	**78%**	**68%**



State	0	0.33-1	1.33-2	2.33-3
Estonia (EE)	**4%**	**6%**	**48%**	**48%**
France (FR)	**4%**	**16%**	**63%**	**18%**
Germany (DE)	**5%**	**15%**	**57%**	**23%**
Hungary (HU)*	**4%**	**26%**	**45%**	**25%**
Latvia (LV)	**2%**	**13%**	**58%**	**26%**
Lithuania (LT)	**3%**	**9%**	**46%**	**42%**
Poland (PL)*	**2%**	**16%**	**48%**	**34%**
Romania (RO)*	**2%**	**13%**	**52%**	**33%**
Slovakia (SK)*	**6%**	**38%**	**47%**	**10%**

State	0	.5	1	1.5	2	2.5	3
Estonia (EE)	**3%**	**4%**	**12%**	**19%**	**34%**	**19%**	**9%**
France (FR)	**10%**	**10%**	**16%**	**23%**	**28%**	**10%**	**3%**
Germany (DE)	**8%**	**9%**	**16%**	**22%**	**28%**	**12%**	**6%**
Hungary (HU)	**9%**	**12%**	**19%**	**23%**	**24%**	**10%**	**3%**

Latvia (LV)	**6%**	**5%**	**10%**	**13%**	**37%**	**23%**	**7%**
Lithuania (LT)	**5%**	**4%**	**8%**	**12%**	**38%**	**24%**	**10%**
Poland (PL)	**5%**	**6%**	**13%**	**17%**	**36%**	**17%**	**6%**
Romania (RO)	**7%**	**7%**	**14%**	**21%**	**25%**	**16%**	**10%**
Slovakia (SK)	**14%**	**12%**	**15%**	**17%**	**26%**	**11%**	**5%**

State	Not At All Satisfied	Rather Not Satisfied	Rather Satisfied	Very Satisfied
Estonia (EE)	**11%**	**26%**	**50%**	**12%**
France (FR)	**20%**	**32%**	**42%**	**6%**
Germany (DE)	**18%**	**21%**	**49%**	**13%**
Hungary (HU)	**27%**	**31%**	**35%**	**7%**
Latvia (LV)	**15%**	**22%**	**47%**	**16%**
Lithuania (LT)	**11%**	**21%**	**51%**	**17%**
Poland (PL)	**7%**	**17%**	**51%**	**26%**	
Romania (RO)	**15%**	**20%**	**46%**	**19%**
Slovakia (SK)	**40%**	**26%**	**28%**	**7%**
Overall	**18%**	**24%**	**45%**	**14%**

Perception of United States Effectiveness in Ukraine

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.6***	0.5***	0.5***	−0.1**	0.7***	0.6***	0.5***	0.5***	0.6***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
European Identity	0.2***	0.3***	0.3***	0.7***	0.2**	0.3***	0.3***	0.4***	0.5***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	0.1***	−0.1**	−0.03	−0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2***	0.1	0.1**
	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.05)
Age	0.004***	−0.000	0.002	−0.001	0.000	0.002*	0.01***	0.002	−0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	−0.2**	0.2*	0.1	0.5***	−0.1	−0.1	0.1	−0.1	−0.2**
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	775	703	732	714	733	789	750	817	720
R^2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

State	Not At All Satisfied	Rather Not Satisfied	Rather Satisfied	Very Satisfied

Estonia (EE)	**14%**	**36%**	**44%**	**6%**
France (FR)	**17%**	**30%**	**49%**	**5%**
Germany (DE)	**16%**	**21%**	**48%**	**14%**
Hungary (HU)	**10%**	**25%**	**53%**	**12%**
Latvia (LV)	**14%**	**30%**	**44%**	**11%**
Lithuania (LT)	**11%**	**33%**	**45%**	**11%**
Poland (PL)	**9%**	**27%**	**51%**	**13%**
Romania (RO)	**12%**	**21%**	**47%**	**20%**
Slovakia (SK)	**29%**	**26%**	**35%**	**9%**
Overall	**15%**	**28%**	**46%**	**11%**

Perception of NATO's Effectiveness in Ukraine

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.3***	0.6***	0.7***	0.2***	0.6***	0.3***	0.3***	0.6***	0.6***
	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
European Identity	0.2***	0.2***	0.2***	0.5***	0.1**	0.3***	0.5***	0.3***	0.4***
	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	0.1*	−0.1	−0.03	0.03	0.03	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1**
	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.05)
Age	0.001	0.001	−0.000	0.01***	−0.002	−0.002	0.01***	−0.000	−0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	0.2	0.04	0.2*	0.4***	0.3**	0.5***	0.2*	0.1	0.1
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	790	781	743	724	735	790	765	851	755
R^2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

State	Not At All Satisfied	Rather Not Satisfied	Rather Satisfied	Very Satisfied
Estonia (EE)	**25%**	**36%**	**35%**	**3%**
France (FR)	**19%**	**37%**	**40%**	**4%**
Germany (DE)	**19%**	**28%**	**43%**	**10%**
Hungary (HU)*	**15%**	**32%**	**46%**	**7%**
Latvia (LV)	**24%**	**37%**	**33%**	**6%**
Lithuania (LT)	**21%**	**37%**	**36%**	**6%**
Poland (PL)*	**16%**	**32%**	**44%**	**9%**
Romania (RO)*	**16%**	**24%**	**46%**	**14%**
Slovakia (SK)*	**31%**	**33%**	**30%**	**5%**
Overall	**21%**	**33%**	**39%**	**7%**

Perception of U.N. Effectiveness in Ukraine

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.2***	0.5***	0.6***	0.1***	0.4***	0.1	0.2***	0.6***	0.6***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)
European Identity	0.3***	0.2***	0.2***	0.6***	0.1	0.4***	0.4***	0.2***	0.3***
	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	−0.2***	−0.2***	−0.1*	−0.1**	−0.1**	−0.2***	−0.2***	−0.1**	−0.1**
	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Age	−0.01***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.010	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.004**	−0.005***	−0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.6***	0.3***	0.3**	0.6***	1.1***	0.9***	0.5***	0.2**	0.3***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	742	761	729	695	695	761	731	810	702
R^2	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5
Adjusted R^2	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

State	Not At All Satisfied	Rather Not Satisfied	Rather Satisfied	Very Satisfied
Estonia (EE)	12%	39%	44%	4%
France (FR)	14%	25%	54%	7%
Germany (DE)	17%	26%	47%	11%
Hungary (HU)*	14%	29%	47%	10%
Latvia (LV)	12%	31%	48%	10%
Lithuania (LT)	11%	37%	46%	7%
Poland (PL)*	13%	37%	43%	7%
Romania (RO)*	11%	23%	50%	16%
Slovakia (SK)*	27%	28%	37%	8%
Overall	14%	31%	46%	9%

Perception of E.U. Effectiveness in Ukraine

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.4***	0.7***	0.7***	−0.03	0.7***	0.3***	0.1*	0.7***	0.7***
	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
European Identity	0.3***	0.5***	0.5***	0.7***	0.1***	0.3***	0.6***	0.3***	0.4***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	0.04	−0.04	0.003	−0.1	−0.02	−0.02	0.01	−0.01	0.1*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.003**	−0.002	−0.01***	−0.005***	−0.004**	−0.003**	−0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.2**	0.05	0.1	0.5***	0.4***	0.5***	0.4***	0.2**	−0.03
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	801	817	753	731	742	769	770	828	750
R^2	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
"I am personally worried about the war in Ukraine"



Perception of United States Effectiveness in Ukraine Incorporating Worry

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.6***	0.5***	0.5***	−0.1**	0.7***	0.5***	0.5***	0.5***	0.6***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.1)
European Identity	0.2***	0.3***	0.3***	0.7***	0.3***	0.3***	0.3***	0.4***	0.5***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Worry	0.01	0.01	0.1**	−0.000	0.02	0.02	0.1**	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Male	0.1***	−0.1**	−0.02	−0.1	0.1	0.1*	0.2***	0.1	0.1*
	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Age	0.004**	−0.000	0.001	−0.001	0.000	0.002*	0.01***	0.002	−0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	−0.2*	0.2*	−0.01	0.5***	−0.1	−0.1	0.03	−0.1	−0.2*
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	773	782	725	708	730	786	750	807	704
R^2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Perception of United States Effectiveness in Ukraine and Worry Interaction

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.7***	0.6***	0.5***	0.03	0.6***	0.5***	0.7***	0.4***	0.4***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
European Identity	0.2***	0.3***	0.3***	0.7***	0.2***	0.3***	0.3***	0.4***	0.5***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Worry	0.1	0.1	0.04	0.1	−0.03	0.02	0.2***	−0.1*	−0.1***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
NatID * Worry	0.1***	−0.1**	−0.01	−0.1	0.1	0.1*	0.2***	0.1	0.1*
	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Male	0.004***	−0.000	0.001	−0.001	0.000	0.002*	0.01***	0.002	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Age	−0.1	−0.1*	0.03	−0.1	0.04	0.001	−0.1***	0.1**	0.1***
	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	−0.4*	0.03	0.1	0.3**	0.03	−0.1	−0.3**	0.2	0.02
	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Observations	773	782	725	708	730	786	750	807	704
R^2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Perception of NATO's Effectiveness in Ukraine and Worry

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.4***	0.6***	0.7***	0.3***	0.6***	0.3***	0.3***	0.5***	0.6***
	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
European Identity	0.3***	0.2***	0.1***	0.5***	0.2***	0.3***	0.3***	0.3***	0.4***
	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Worry	−0.1***	−0.03	0.1**	−0.002	−0.1***	−0.1	−0.005	−0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Male	0.1	−0.1	−0.02	0.001	0.01	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1**
	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.05)
Age	0.002	0.001	−0.001	0.01***	−0.001	−0.002	0.01***	−0.000	−0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	0.3**	0.1	0.1	0.4***	0.4***	0.5***	0.2*	0.1	0.05
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	786	772	785	718	732	786	756	812	737
R^2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Perception of NATO's Effectiveness in Ukraine and Worry Interaction

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.7***	0.7***	0.6***	0.4***	0.8***	0.4***	0.5***	0.5***	0.6***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
European Identity	0.3***	0.2***	0.1***	0.5***	0.2***	0.3***	0.3***	0.3***	0.4***
	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Worry	0.1	−0.005	0.02	0.2**	−0.01	0.03	0.1	−0.03	0.01
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
National Identity * Worry	0.1	−0.1	−0.02	−0.01	0.01	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1**
	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.05)
Male	0.002	0.001	−0.001	0.01***	−0.001	−0.002	0.01***	−0.000	−0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Age	−0.1**	−0.02	0.04	−0.1***	−0.1	−0.1	−0.1*	0.01	−0.001
	(0.1)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	−0.1	0.04	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3**	−0.03	0.2	0.04
	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Observations	780	772	785	718	732	780	750	812	737
R^2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Perception of U.N. Effectiveness in Ukraine and Worry

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.2***	0.5***	0.5***	0.1***	0.4***	0.1**	0.2***	0.0***	0.0***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)
European Identity	0.3***	0.2***	0.2***	0.5***	0.2**	0.4***	0.5***	0.2***	0.3***
	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Worry	−0.2***	0.04	0.05	0.04	−0.1***	−0.2*	−0.1**	−0.01	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Male	−0.3***	−0.2***	−0.1	−0.1**	−0.2**	−0.2***	−0.2***	−0.1**	−0.1**
	(0.1)	(0.06)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Age	−0.003**	−0.002*	−0.002	−0.000	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.003*	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.9***	0.3***	0.2*	0.5***	1.2***	1.0***	0.6***	0.4***	0.4***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	738	754	721	689	694	760	723	799	689
R^2	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5
Adjusted R^2	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Perception of U.N. Effectiveness in Ukraine and Worry Interaction

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.5***	0.5***	0.5***	0.2***	0.6***	0.1***	0.3**	0.5***	0.6***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
European Identity	0.3***	0.2***	0.2***	0.5***	0.2***	0.4***	0.5***	0.2***	0.3***
	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Worry	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.1**	−0.05	0.1	−0.1	−0.1	0.02
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
National Identity * Worry	−0.3***	−0.2***	−0.1	−0.1**	−0.2**	−0.2***	−0.2***	−0.1**	−0.1**
	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Male	−0.004**	−0.002*	−0.003	−0.000	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.003*	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	−0.1**	−0.01	0.02	−0.1*	−0.1	−0.1**	−0.02	0.04	−0.02
	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.4	0.3***	0.3*	0.3**	1.0***	0.7***	0.6***	0.5***	0.4***
	(0.3)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Observations	738	754	721	689	694	760	723	799	689
R^2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5
Adjusted R^2	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


National Identity * Worry Effect in Poland
National Identity * Worry Effect in Estonia
National Identity * Worry Effect in Latvia
National Identity * Worry Effect in France
National Identity * Worry Effect in Lithuania
National Identity * Worry Effect in Hungary
National Identity * Worry Effect in Romania
National Identity * Worry Effect in Slovakia
Evaluation of U.N.
National Identity
worry

Perception of E.U. Effectiveness in Ukraine and Worry

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.5***	0.7***	0.8***	−0.04	0.7***	0.3***	0.1*	0.7***	0.7***
	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
European Identity	0.3***	0.2***	0.2***	0.7***	0.2***	0.4***	0.6***	0.3***	0.4***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Worry	−0.1*	−0.04	−0.01	0.02	−0.1***	−0.1***	−0.04	−0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Male	0.03	−0.04	−0.01	−0.1	−0.03	−0.02	0.01	−0.01	0.1*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.01***	−0.005***	−0.004**	−0.003**	−0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.3***	0.1	0.1	0.7***	0.5***	0.6***	0.5***	0.2**	−0.1
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	796	805	745	727	739	796	761	817	732
R^2	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Perception of E.U. Effectiveness in Ukraine Worry Interaction

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.6***	0.8***	0.8***	0.02	0.8***	0.5***	0.2**	0.7***	0.7***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
European Identity	0.5***	0.2***	0.2***	0.7***	0.2***	0.4***	0.6***	0.3***	0.4***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Worry	0.04	0.02	−0.01	0.1	−0.02	−0.03	0.1	−0.01	0.01
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)
National Identity * Worry	0.03	−0.04	−0.01	−0.1	−0.03	−0.02	0.005	−0.02	0.1*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.01***	−0.004***	−0.004**	−0.003*	−0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	−0.1	−0.04	−0.002	−0.03	−0.1	−0.1*	−0.1**	−0.01	0.003
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.1	0.002	0.1	0.6***	0.4***	0.4***	0.2	0.2	−0.1
	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	796	805	745	727	739	796	761	817	732
R^2	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Perception of External Actor Effectiveness in Ukraine

	U.S.	NATO	U.N.	E.U.
National Identity	0.4***	0.4***	0.3***	0.3***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
European Identity	0.4***	0.4***	0.5***	0.4***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Worry	0.03***	−0.02	−0.03***	−0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	0.1***	0.04**	0.002	−0.2***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.001**	0.001	−0.003***	−0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Shared Border	0.1***	0.2***	0.1***	0.1***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
US Troops	0.1***	0.03**	−0.03***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic Russian	0.2***	−0.003	−0.01	−0.1***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Russian Speaking	−0.2***	−0.1**	−0.1***	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Resource Dependency	−0.001	−0.02	−0.1***	−0.1***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	−0.2***	0.2***	0.6***	0.7***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)
Observations	6,765	6,834	6,918	6,567
R^2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.2
Adjusted R^2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.2
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Perception of E.U. Effectiveness in Ukraine Worry Interaction

	(EE)	(FR)	(DE)	(HU)	(LV)	(LT)	(PL)	(RO)	(SK)
National Identity	0.6***	0.8***	0.8***	0.02	0.8***	0.5***	0.2**	0.7***	0.7***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
European Identity	0.3***	0.2***	0.2***	0.7***	0.2***	0.4***	0.6***	0.3***	0.4***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Worry	0.04	0.02	−0.01	0.1	−0.02	−0.03	0.1	−0.01	0.01
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.04)
National Identity * Worry	0.03	−0.04	−0.01	−0.1	−0.03	−0.02	0.003	−0.02	0.1*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.1)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	−0.004***	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.01***	−0.004***	−0.004**	−0.003*	−0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	−0.1	−0.04	−0.002	−0.03	−0.1	−0.1*	−0.1**	−0.01	0.003
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.1	0.002	0.1	0.6***	0.4***	0.4***	0.2	0.2	−0.1
	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Observations	796	805	745	727	739	796	761	817	732
R^2	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6
Adjusted R^2	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Perception of External Actor Effectiveness in Ukraine

	U.S.	NATO	U.N.	E.U.
National Identity	0.4***	0.4***	0.3***	0.3***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
European Identity	0.4***	0.4***	0.5***	0.4***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Worry	0.03***	−0.02	−0.03***	−0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	0.1***	0.04**	0.002	−0.2***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.001**	0.001	−0.003***	−0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Shared Border	0.1***	0.2***	0.1***	0.1***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
US Troops	0.1***	0.03**	−0.03***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic Russian	0.2***	−0.003	−0.01	−0.1***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Russian Speaking	−0.2***	−0.1**	−0.1***	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Resource Dependency	−0.001	−0.02	−0.1***	−0.1***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	−0.2***	0.2***	0.6***	0.7***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.1)
Observations	6,765	6,834	6,918	6,567
R^2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.2
Adjusted R^2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.2
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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