

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: HAS HOPE DIED? THE SUCCESSES OF
SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ADVOCACY
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE POST-CIVIL
RIGHTS ERA

Margaret Mitchell Brown, Doctor of Philosophy,
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Directed By: Professor Eric Uslaner, Department of
Government and Politics
Professor Mark Lichbach, Department of
Government and Politics

This study examines the work of social movement and interest group organizations on behalf of women, African Americans and the homeless between 1975 and 2000. Four major questions are pursued. How have marginalized communities attempted to empower themselves at the national level during the last quarter of the 20th century? What success did they achieve? What contributed to that success? And are there differences between types of marginalized communities with respect to activities, success and contributions to success? To answer these questions, I collected data on forty-five national level organizations (15 from each category of women, African American and homeless groups). Three measures of success are constructed. The first, outcome success, measures whether and to what degree movements and their organizations have made a difference for their constituency. The second, legislative success, measures whether and to what degree movements and their organizations have pushed through supportive legislation in Congress. Finally, perceived success measures the range of success leaders

feel their organizations have met. I find that the success of social movement and advocacy organizations is the result of internal and external factors and differs by group. Internally, success is a function of what groups are asking for and how they are asking for it. Externally, success is a function of who is helping an organization and how receptive the broader environment is to its needs. I find that outcome success is dependent upon an organization's age, structure, and local crises and how radical its demands are: less radical demands produce increased outcome successes; older organizations and those with federated structures produce greater collective benefits; and local crises enhance outcome success. Legislative success is largely dependent upon public opinion but none of the other factors. Finally, I find that perceived success has more to do with internal issues, relationships and openness than with strategies and tactics.

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ORGANIZATIONS IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA

by

Margaret Mitchell Brown

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Advisory Committee:

Eric Uslander, Chair
Mark Lichbach, Chair
Karen Kaufmann, Professor
Geoffrey Layman, Professor
Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz, Professor

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Fifty years ago a young woman named “Marilyn”¹ grew up in a poor black section of Memphis, Tennessee in a time of tremendous change in the American landscape. During the 1960s she participated weekly in “Black Monday” protests, where kids of color were encouraged to be “too sick” to go to school on Mondays, or if they had to attend classes (Marilyn’s parents insisted that she go each week) they were to wear only the color black. One of her older brothers was part of a radical black-nationalist organization which advocated violent means to achieve civil rights goals and was deeply involved in that counter culture (her parents didn’t approve). Her brothers snuck out of the house to attend all of the local civil rights marches, and the whole family, whether they advocated for more radical change or for change through non-violent means, was galvanized by the activities of the civil rights movement. They were motivated by its energy and felt they had an important personal role to play in creating change.

Eventually Marilyn went to college on a full scholarship and later went on to graduate school, the first woman in her family to graduate from college much less obtain a graduate degree. She was very successful, was a Dean at one of the top universities in the country, and was later recruited for a political appointee position with the Clinton administration. She had a daughter to whom she taught the principles of the civil rights and women’s movements, but her daughter largely rejected this: “don’t talk to me about all that black stuff, mom.” Today Marilyn’s daughter is a physician in private practice and has never paid much attention to these issues. At thirty-two, she is a successful black

¹ “Marilyn” is an assumed name used to conceal her real identity. This information was gathered over a series of three conversations I had with her about the history, efficacy and future of these movements.

woman whose income will likely be in the top 10 percent of the country in just a few years.

Marilyn is not typical, but she and her daughter are an excellent example of the type of individual level successes anticipated by the civil and women's rights movements. Between 1960 and 1998 the number of African Americans who completed college rose from 3.1% to 15.4%, and for African American females this change was even greater, rising from 3.3% to 16.4%, a growth rate higher than for white women. The increase in black and women professionals has not grown as fast, but has been increasing nonetheless. Between 1983 and 1999 the number of blacks as physicians grew from 3.2% to 5.7% and as lawyers grew from 2.7% to 5.2%. For women these increases have been 15.8% to 24.5% and 15.8% to 28.9% respectively.² But Marilyn and her daughter are also an excellent example of why these movements aren't as successful today. They feel disconnected and have less time and impetus to be involved.

Despite these successes, racism, sexism and poverty are still important issues. The problems of systematic inequality in America have not been solved. Many people of color still feel politically marginalized (see for example the problems in the 2000 Presidential elections in Florida). The political and business leaders of the country are still predominantly white males though the composition of the country of course is not. The gap between the rich and the poor is widening and homelessness is at an all time high. How are marginalized communities attempting to empower themselves today? What successes are they achieving? What contributes to that success? Are there differences between the experiences and success rates for the different types of

² Data come from the U.S. Census Bureau. *Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 2000*.

marginalized groups? These questions can also be thought of in terms of problems, puzzles and questions. The problem is that the environment in which these groups operate and the factors that contribute to their success are multi-faceted and complex. The puzzle is how these things work in concert to produce ends. And the question is what factor, or combination of factors, produces success?

This study analyzes the work and success of social movement and advocacy organizations over the past 25 years with a focus on the work of African American civil rights organizations, women's organizations, and homeless organizations. These groups represent the major fights waged on the national landscape during this period: fights for power by race, class and gender. The combination of these three groups helps elucidate the range of problems, possibilities and experiences faced by marginalized communities in America. African Americans achieved significant legal successes at the beginning of the period of study, but the practical effects of these legal challenges were less impressive, and in some cases are currently being reversed. Their organizations focused on both court and protest tactics at the start of the period, and over time turned more to traditional institutional work. At the same time, women's groups received a mixed reaction to their demands in legislatures and the courts, with the notable failure of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), but simultaneously realized tremendous collective benefits in the *de facto* aspects of their struggles. Homeless organizations mostly formed during this period, in part as a spin-off from earlier efforts that focused on welfare and welfare rights and in part because of the growing social problem of homelessness spurred by the closure of major mental health hospitals across the country and returning veterans from Vietnam with significant mental and physical health problems and few resources.

I find that the success of social movement and advocacy organizations is the result of internal and external factors and differs by group. Internally, success is a function of what groups are asking for and how they are asking for it. Externally, success is a function of who is helping an organization and how receptive the broader environment is to its needs. In this study I measure the benefits that members of a group receive as a result of the collective efforts of advocacy organizations and movements. I find that this form of success is dependent upon how radical an organization's demands are, age, structure and crises: less radical demands produce increased outcome successes; older organizations and those with federated structures produce greater collective benefits; and local crises enhance outcome success. I also measure the legislative successes groups achieve and find that this form of success is largely dependent upon public opinion. To the extent that the organizations studied are able to impact public opinion, they can affect legislative success. However, their repeated efforts to impact this form of success through public opinion and indirect lobbying tactics do not appear to be fruitful as measured here. Finally, I examine perceived success, a measure of whether and to what degree organization leaders feel their organizations have been successful. This type of success has more to do with internal issues, relationships and openness than with strategies and tactics, but it is important because it sheds light on disconnects between what leaders think are important activities and what actually works.

The universe of this study is social movement and advocacy organizations, and though the three groups I focus on do not represent *all* of the social challenges and issues over the last 25 years, together they comprise a large portion of national debate and struggles for power. There is tremendous variance in the goals, strategies and tactics, and

outcomes among them, and these differences are worth significant exploration. I treat social movement organizations, advocacy groups, and interest groups as essentially the same thing, or at least as similar organizations that exist on a continuum from loosely organized groups of collective interest to highly organized and incorporated organizations. I define social movements as collective activity to achieve change at structural, societal or institutional levels (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The groups I study have also been characterized as “new social movements,” a type of social movement formed around narrow issues like women’s rights or homelessness. A social movement or advocacy organization is more narrowly defined as a formal structure that develops out of these movements to direct resources and activities to support the movement. To study these organizations, I gathered data on 45 of the largest national organizations (15 from each category), collected through interviews with organization leaders, archival research and other secondary sources.

I have four objectives for this study. My first objective is to examine how these organizations behave and what types of differences exist in the activities, functioning and results among them. Homeless organizations developed on average later than the African American civil rights and women’s organizations, and so I expect that they will behave differently than the African American and women’s organizations. My second objective is to analyze statistically what impacts success and to determine which internal and external factors matter most and how. I expect that they both matter, though differently. There is a wealth of studies that examine these factors alone or look at them all but for a specific case or couple of cases. The contribution of this study is how I add to these other findings through a quantitative analysis. This leads to my third objective, to use my

findings to develop an overarching causal model that takes into account the endogenous relationship between the internal and external determinants of success to be used in future studies. Finally, my fourth objective is to use these findings to develop practical lessons for the leaders of social movement and advocacy organizations today. What can they take away from these findings to enhance their work?

This study represents a shift in the social movement and interest group literature in two ways. With a few notable exceptions (see primarily Gamson 1991), social movement studies are frequently case studies of one or a couple of movements or their organizations. Because of small sample sizes and no standard measures of success for the field, they are unable to statistically analyze the effects of different strategies and tactics, organizational structures, or political opportunity structure, or the context in which groups operate, on success. I pull these literatures together, draw upon their debates and findings and construct a causal theory of social movement and advocacy group dynamics. Following Giugni (1998 and elsewhere),³ such a theory should include an examination of strategies and tactics, organizational factors, and political opportunity structure together.

To measure success, I construct three separate scales. The first, outcome success, measures whether and to what degree movements and their organizations have made a

³ Giugni's review of the social movement literature includes the impact of organization; the effectiveness of disruptive and violent protest; public opinion; political opportunity structures; and success, failure, outcomes and consequences. He proposes "an agenda for future research [that] should focus on the comparative study of the outcomes and consequences of social movements. Comparisons between different political contexts, different movements, and different periods will shed light over the causal dynamics involved in processes of social and political change" (Giugni 1998, 388-389). He also feels that these analyses must be able to model the interactions between these different components of social movement success and failure.

difference for their constituency. The second, legislative success, measures whether and to what degree movements and their organizations have pushed through supportive legislation in Congress. Finally, perceived success measures the range of success leaders feel their organizations have met.

This study tackles two major debates in the social movement and interest group literatures. First, do movement factors like strategies, tactics and organizations matter⁴ or is success a function of the political opportunity structure?⁵ The central argument of this study is that they both matter. Understanding political opportunity structure is critical to understanding why certain strategies, tactics and organizational characteristics matter in some circumstances but not in others. The second debate is about how these internal and external factors matter. Are inside or outside tactics more important to success?⁶ Do movement organizations hamper or forward success? What impact do patrons, public opinion and crises have?

How radical an organization's demands are in part determines the path the organization will take to achieve its goals (Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000). Because of the nature of our political system, a reformist agenda will be easier to achieve than a radical agenda, and so moderate organizations should have greater success rates. The political science and sociology fields are split about whether traditional interest group tactics like lobbying and litigation are more effective (Walker 1991), or whether unusual or violent tactics like protests and public disruptions are more effective (Gamson 1990). I test these

⁴ These are referred to as internal factors throughout the study.

⁵ These are referred to as external factors throughout the study.

⁶ Inside tactics are appeals to decision-makers and include things like lobbying and litigation. Outside tactics are appeals to the people and tend to be made through grassroots organizing, public education, and so on.

relationships and expect that inside tactics will produce greater legislative success by increasing the exposure and connections these organizations have with decision-makers, and outside tactics will produce greater outcome success. Organizational factors should also impact success. Older organizations originally developed federated structures with individual members (Crowley and Skocpol, 2001), increasing their reach and influence. They tend to have more resources (Minkoff 1993) and are larger (Kreisi in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1998). I test whether these organizational factors impact success.

The effectiveness of tactics will vary depending upon the context, or political opportunity structure, in which these organizations operate (Costain in Petracca 1992; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Tarrow 2003). Patrons provide access and resources to challenging and interest groups (Berry 1997; Imig and Berry 1996; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Rosenberg 1991; Walker 1991). I test whether success increases for organizations with more patrons as well as for the different types of patrons. The role and force of the media in these struggles are contested. Some research suggests that many successful interest group strategies are the result of media coverage (Berry 1997), while others have documented that media often do not help and provide biased and uneven coverage (McCarthy and McPhail 1996; Molotch 1979; Oliver and Myers 1999; Smith and McCarthy 2001). I test this and expect to find that as media exposure increases so do all forms of success. I also expect that public opinion will impact success, increasing as public opinion shifts in favor of movements and vice versa (Gilens 1999; Epstein 2000; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). I test this and expect it to be particularly true for legislative success (Costain and Majstorovic 1994; Ericson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Stimson 1999). Finally, I test whether crises increase success for

these organizations by putting issues on the public agenda that would otherwise have remained dormant (Frey, Dietz and Kalof 1992; Gamson 1975; Goldstone 1980; Kingdon 1977).

I find that the most important determinants of success for these organizations are moderate demands; age; having a federated structure with affiliates across the country; a supportive public opinion; and crises that spur people into action to support issues and organizations. The early strategic choice of how radical goals and demands are going to be impacts success. Groups with more radical agendas meet with fewer outcome successes and perceive this to be the case. Groups with the least radical demands meet with the greatest legislative success. Federated structures are positively related to outcome success, but organizations founded after 1975 have dampened outcome success. Groups with an individual membership base have dampened legislative success, and matrix organizations and federated organizations have dampened perceived success. A supportive public, measured through positive public opinion, and crises (in particular local crises) also positively and significantly impact success.

These analyses add new evidence to the debate about which matters more, specific strategies and tactics, organizational factors, or political opportunity structure. I conclude that they all matter, and the next step for the study of social movement organizations is to understand how these factors work together. This study also sheds light on several disconnects between the actual work and successes of these organizations and the perception of organization leaders about what leads to success. Finally, I provide some practical suggestions for social movement and advocacy organization leaders and discuss broader implications about power and social change.

Overview of Chapters

In the chapters that follow I discuss theories and findings from other studies about the determinants of success, provide an overview of the study design and analysis, and discuss what these organizations do and with what effects. In Chapter Two I describe an overall theory of change for social movement organizations. I summarize the contributions and problems of other studies of challenging groups, and advocate for a theory of social movement and advocacy group dynamics that includes an examination of strategies and tactics, organizational factors, institutional interactions and context together for understanding success.

In Chapter Three I describe the process by which the organizations in the study were selected and I give an overview of the organizations that are included in the study. The process by which the 45 organizations were contacted, interviews conducted, and outside data collected are detailed, and data and analysis methods are discussed. The chapter also includes an overview of the different measures of success used to examine the work of social movement organizations to date, and critiques the utility and problems associated with some of these measures. I analyze how the groups studied vary on these scales, and show that there is minimal correlation among the scales, suggesting that the three gauges measure different types of success.

In Chapter Four I explore the tactics and strategies used by organizations to move outcomes and policies in favor of constituent needs. This includes a discussion of the utility of Walker's inside/outside typology for understanding which tactics marginalized groups use, an overview of tactic and strategy use by groups, and an examination of which strategies and tactics impact success. Variables analyzed include: radicalness of

demands; level of work (national, state or local); collaborative and coalition work; and twenty-two different types of tactics. The findings show that overall none of the tactics produce either outcome or legislative success, though there are some slight differences by group. The analysis also shows that organizations with more radical agendas meet with fewer outcome successes and organizations with the least radical demands meet with the greatest legislative success.

In Chapter Five I present an analysis of differences in the organizational structures of the organizations included in the study and the impact of these factors on success. Variables analyzed include: size of organizations (number of local affiliates, staff size and budget); structure of organizations (membership type, federated versus unified, and decision making); and age of organizations. I find that federated structures are positively related to outcome success, but organizations established after 1975 have dampened outcome success. In addition, organizations with an individual membership base have dampened legislative success, and leaders of matrix organizations and federated organizations have dampened perceived success.

In Chapter Six I examine the impact of institutional patrons, interactions with them and broader contextual factors on success. This includes analyses of the interactions organizations have with different national, state and local institutions; the impact of partisan control changes; the provision of Congressional testimony; appeals to the federal courts; media exposure; the impact of crises (national, international and local) and the recent economic downturn; the impact of public opinion; and interactions with opposition groups. I then examine the impact of these factors on success. The analyses

show that crises impact all three measures of success, particularly local crises, and that a supportive public opinion produces increases in legislative success.

Finally, I conclude with a discussion of five issues that emerge from these findings and their implications. First, I discuss whether internal or external factors are more important for predicting success and argue that they are both equally important. Second, I discuss why tactics do not seem to matter in the analyses, and suggest three possibilities: the effectiveness of certain tactics wane over time; these tactics may actually be quite effective at protecting past successes from retrenchment, but I do not measure this; and that the changes made during the period of this study may be pushed by other factors, like business decisions, and not movements and their organizations. Third, I explore the differences in the activities and successes of the groups studied. Fourth, I discuss where power is vested in the American political system today and show that there is a chasm between the findings of this study and the feelings of the organization leaders I interviewed. And finally, I present lessons and implications for the leaders of social movement and advocacy organizations about modifying current tactics.

The work of social movement and advocacy organizations matters. Understanding why and how comprises a growing body of knowledge by political scientists and sociologists. In this study I attempt to augment this body of knowledge by creating scales of success that can be analyzed using quantitative techniques and interpreting these findings with qualitative data. In the next chapter, I lay out the findings from many of these studies and use them to build my success scales as well as to develop a set of testable hypotheses about the determinants of success.

Chapter 2: The Determinants of Success

Social movement organizations represent relatively powerless constituents who have few resources and little power.⁷ They work to attract resources and realize gains for “members,” though meet with different amounts of success. But all social movement and advocacy organizations are not created equal. How does the work of these groups vary? What is success and how does it vary? What contributes to the different types and levels of success? And are there differences between types of groups with respect to activities, success and contributions to success? All of these questions point to two unifying questions: Do social movement and advocacy organizations have power to create change, and how important are forces outside of the control of these organizations for determining their effect?

To answer these questions, I examine three measures of success, which I refer to as outcome success, legislative success and perceived success. Outcome success is a measure of the benefits that members of a group receive as a result of the collective efforts of advocacy organizations and movements. Legislative success is a measure of whether and to what degree the goals of social movement and advocacy organizations are realized in congress through policy change and the development and funding of programs. And perceived success measures whether and to what degree organization leaders feel their organizations have been successful.

The success of social movement and advocacy organizations is the result of internal and external factors and differs by group. Neither of these is more important than the other, as social movement development is path dependent and constrained by

⁷ This is no longer as true for women, but women’s rights groups continue to classify themselves and their constituents as marginalized.

structural conditions, but at the same time can and must be pushed by collective action (Oliver and Myers 2003). To understand success we have to look at the internal factors, things such as strategy and tactics and organization characteristics, and the external factors like patrons, media and context, and group/issue characteristics. I find that in the long run what matters the most is a combination of internal and external factors: strategic choices; organizational structure; time; public opinion; and crises.

Internally, success is a function of what groups are asking for and how they are asking for it. For example, most of the civil rights organizations and even a few of the women's organizations in this study have the elimination of racism as a central focus of their mission. Aside from the interpersonal approach to undoing racism, all other analyses require significant institutional and structural changes (Guinier and Torres 2002). This is a radical undertaking and is unlikely to meet with much success, particularly in the short run. More modest goals, like that of the National Student Campaign Against Hunger and Homelessness to "educate students about hunger and homelessness and increase activism," are much more attainable.

Success is also a function of internal operations (how much money an organization has, when they developed, whether they have an affiliate structure or not, and so on), and how groups ask for change, that is, what tactics they employ. Gamson's (1975) finding that the use of protest tactics increases success for challenging groups has received much anecdotal support. When asked about why he funded the homeless organization Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), former Washington, DC mayor Marion Barry stated "nobody wants Mitch [Schneider] running around the city protesting and throwing fake blood on everybody..." (from an interview with Kojo

Nnamdi, repeated on his December 14, 2004 show on WAMU). Protest and unusual tactics help, but are not everything. Poor administrative oversight and functioning led the same organization to lose over half a million dollars in disallowed expenditures and the termination of a federal grant years later, severely hampering their future fundraising and organizational viability (December 17, 1996 memo to CCNV from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development).

Externally, success is a function of who is helping an organization and how receptive the broader environment is to its needs. Organizations like the National Network for Youth have received ongoing support in the media and realized strong relationships with federal policy makers from the White House, to related agencies, to members of Congress. They regularly testify in front of congressional committees, and have helped to craft reauthorization bills. And they excel on every measure of success. A supportive environment is also critical to realizing goals. The environment can help, as in the case of the National Network for Youth, or can hinder progress, despite strong organizations and the use of proven tactics. Many women's organizations note the backlash building over the past 20 years against feminism as a significant force hampering their ability to create change.

In this chapter, I lay out what success is, what contribute to it, and how this differs by group. I begin with a discussion of how success has been measured in previous studies and the limitations of those measures, and present the three success measures used in this study and discuss how they relate to one another. I then lay out the different factors that potentially impact success for social movement organizations and advocacy groups and argue how they operate, both alone and together. Finally, I discuss the

differences between the experiences and outcomes of the three groups studied and discuss why there is variation among them.

Success

The meaning of success for social movement and advocacy organizations is contested in both the political science and sociology literatures. A myriad of outcomes may be counted as successful, from the mundane to the substantial. Success measures can be direct or indirect; they can refer to *de jure* or *de facto* change;⁸ they can focus on organizations, movement goals, or constituents and beneficiary groups (Cress and Snow 2000).

Most studies of success to date have focused on three types of measures: organizational, policy and collective benefits. Organizational measures of success focus primarily on the acceptance of organizations by the power elite, and long term sustainability and growth of organizations (Gamson 1975; Minkoff 1993; Rucht 1995). Though useful for organizational studies, this relates only theoretically to broader movement goals of group empowerment, as I demonstrate in Chapter Five. Organizational measures are incomplete and do not necessarily reflect legislative or collective change. In this study I measure success in three other ways: collective benefits for group members as a whole (outcome success); the passage of legislation aimed to assist the group in some way (legislative success); and the sense of success the organization feels about its work (perceived success).

Measuring actual changes, or outcomes, for group members is the ultimate measure of success. This has been referred to as collective goods standards (for more

⁸ *De jure* changes refer to legal changes; *de facto* changes refer to actual changes in practice,

discussion, see Amenta and Young in Guigni, McAdam and Tilly 1999 and Amenta, Dunleavy and Bernstein 1994). This is also the most difficult way to measure success. The incorporation literature (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984; Eisinger 1983; Gilliam 1996; McClain 1993; Smith 1994) hints that collective benefits may be obtained through the inclusion, or incorporation, of challenging group members into positions of power. However, this type of measure obscures the results of group empowerment efforts by focusing on individual empowerment (which is frequently easier to attain) and using it as a proxy for group empowerment. Incorporation may be an important step in the process of group empowerment, but it is not the same thing as group empowerment. Though in some cases minority group incorporation into leadership positions benefits group members, in other instances it may not. To avoid this pitfall, collective benefits measures need to capture aggregated change for group members. This type of change is more important than having a seat at the table.

Amenta and Young (1999) write that measuring collective benefits helps avoid problems with other measures because it

“make[s] it easier to keep separate the success of organizations that emerge within a challenge, and the impact of the challenge. Benefits or symbolic victories limited to activists and activist organizations do not constitute collective benefits in themselves, and should not be counted as a social movement impact unless they lead to collective benefits” (Amenta and Young in Guigni, McAdam and Tilly 1999, 27).

I echo these sentiments, and believe that the ultimate measure of success for social movement and advocacy organizations is whether and to what degree conditions have changed for group members. This is outcome success.

Outcome success is a measure of the benefits that members of a group receive as a result of the collective efforts of advocacy organizations and movements. It is dependent upon the combination of the context in which organizations operate, what groups are asking for, and the tactics groups use to achieve their goals. Outcome success may be but is not necessarily dependent on legislative changes. It is dependent on exogenous factors beyond the control of organizations and the influence of the national government.

America is a complex, market-oriented democracy where large-scale change is hard to come by. This type of change depends largely on the context in which a group is working and the type of problem being addressed. It is often dependent on the extent to which organizational goals to solve problems are attainable and acceptable to public opinion and mood. It goes without saying that the more modest a group's goals, the more likely they are to succeed.

For example, the decreasing pay gap (also known as equal pay for equal work) is a positive (though not yet complete) outcome success achieved by the efforts of women's rights organizations. It is the result of a combination of strategy and tactic choices, policy changes, a context characterized by a changing economy that could accommodate (and perhaps required) a larger workforce, and a changing public opinion sympathetic to issues of equality. Women's organizations were the central force pushing these changes through the 1970s, but once the major national changes were put in place their role shifted and these organizations are no longer able to push the national agenda, and

instead are able to steward the issue and fight backlash. Though the original shepherds of change, these organizations are now the rear-guard.

The determinants of outcome success have been challenging for social scientists to establish because of the difficulty attributing causality and teasing out the direct and indirect effects of the various factors important to significant social changes. Protest and violent tactics may increase outcome success, though indirectly (Gamson 1990).

Advocating for radical changes at the societal level is likely to meet with dampened outcome success, but again this is an indirect relationship (Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000). The strongest evidence suggests public opinion and policy changes, combined with time, enhance outcome success (Epstein 2000; Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson 2002; Gilens 1999; Kreisi in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1999x; Minkoff 1993; Mundo 1992; Page and Shapiro 1983; Rosenberg 1991; Tarrow 2003).

Legislative (or policy) success is typically measured in terms of policy gains through changes in laws and allocations of money (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan 1992; Burstein and Linton 2002; Barker 1994; Gamson 1975, 1990; Kitschelt 1986; Rucht 1999; and others). It is a measure of whether and to what degree the goals of social movement and advocacy organizations are realized in congress through policy change and the development and funding of programs. Policy success measures *de jure* change, not necessarily *de facto* change, as the implementation of new programs and allocations of funding does not necessarily solve a group's problems. Measures of policy success are benchmarks on the road to real change, and they may produce real change, but they also may not.

There is a wealth of research on how groups achieve legislative success. The efforts of social movement and advocacy organizations can impact legislative success (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2002; Goldfield 1989; Walker 1990; Williams and Matheny 1989), particularly if the issue at hand is largely uncontested (Neustadtl 1990). But often legislative success is determined more by personal factors like party, power and policy liberalism (Martin and Wolbrecht 2000; Monroe and Garand 1991; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Sullivan et al 1993), and sometimes issue salience and public opinion (Burgin 1994; Sullivan et al 1993). Again turning to the example of equal pay for equal work, increasing Congressional support and a shifting public opinion in support of the issue are the most critical factors explaining success (Burstein and MacLeod 1980; Burstein and Bricher 1997). The role of women's organizations in directly producing these changes, if they exist, is largely unsubstantiated to date. However, their efforts are attributed to having some effect, particularly with respect to public opinion. The lesson of these efforts is that to the extent that we are able to show that an advocacy organization or group of organizations is able to impact legislative success even in a minor way, that success is a real coup and show of their strength.

Perceived Success measures whether and to what degree organization leaders feel their organizations have been successful. It reflects a rationalization for the presence of the organization and is almost always fairly positive: organization leaders have to feel that they are successful or else the very existence of their organizations is questionable. But there are variations across the groups. Perceived success is the result of how well leaders are able to gauge and reflect back on their work, and the degree to which they are self-critical (and honest) in doing this. It has more to do with internal issues,

relationships and openness than with strategies and tactics. The variations across the groups are in part the result of how receptive the political climate is and the tractability of their problem.

The cognitive psychology literature provides two important insights about perception of success and differences between among group leaders. First, there is some evidence that suggests that when people take context into account they are less likely to see themselves (and by extension the organizations they lead) as a failure (Mendoza-Denton et al 2001). But not all people are able to see beyond themselves and understand the impact of contextual impediments. This means that when events like a major crisis occurs that diverts resources and attention *and* the organization leader is able to understand the importance of the event to their work, the leader will be more likely to report that the organization has been quite successful and any failures are the result of outside factors and irrelevant to measuring organizational success. This occurred over and over again in the interviews I conducted. Second, cognitive psychologists have found differences between racial groups, particularly “low status minorities,” in perception of self and the ability to situate the self as part of a collective, both in perception and behavior. This “decrease[s] their chances of bringing about social change through collective action” (Simon 1998), and suggests that of the groups in this study, African Americans should have lower ratings of perceived success as compared to the other groups, which they do (see Chapter 3).

There is only a minimal relationship between outcome and legislative success (pairwise correlation = .027, see Chapter 3 for more discussion), and the relationship between both of these types of success and perceived success to be even lower (pairwise

correlations are .159 and -.033 respectively, see Chapter 3 for more discussion). In a simple and ideal world, legislative changes would lead to outcome successes, and this would be reflected in how organization leaders perceive that success. But success is multi-faceted and there is not a single, underlying process that generates success or failure.

So why don't these types of success directly relate to each other? Legislative success is largely unrelated to outcome success because legislation is not a mandate. People can exert political and social pressure outside the legislative arena that produces outcome success. The legislative arena is not always the best place for creating change because it is so slow and cumbersome. Even when legislative and outcome success goals are related, legislative success does not guarantee outcome success. Policy changes do not exist in a vacuum, and their effects can be mitigated or strengthened by other factors. The passage of legislation can be symbolic only, or it can create new programs or policies, but the results may be so small that they only affect a few people. Or the changes may simply be wrong and the intended solution to a social problem will not work. Outcome success is a measure of changes for group members, like an increase in black wealth levels. Legislative success is a measure of the passage of legislation, for instance the passage of policy for Down Payment Accounts for first-time homebuyers, which has the purpose of increasing black wealth over time (Shapiro 2004). The latter is sometimes important to the former, but not necessarily, and certainly not sufficiently.

There is also a disconnect between the work of groups and their leaders' perception of that work. Organization leaders must champion their causes, so it follows that these leaders will perceive themselves to be more successful than they actually are,

or that they will put on the most positive public face possible. As a result, there is minimal relationship between perceived and outcome and legislative success.

How success varies by group tells an interesting story about shifts in attention in the American landscape. Why these variations exist shed light on changing power relationships in American politics and has valuable lessons about the role and importance of different strategies and tactics, organizational structures, patrons, the media and the broader economic and political context. The next section takes up each of these topics, laying out the major controversies in the literature and hypotheses about their relationships to the different forms of success.

Internal and External Determinants of Success

A combination of internal and external factors affect the type and level of success groups achieve. Figure 2.1 lays out this system of relationships. Movements spawn organizations, which over time tend to develop into and act more like traditional interest groups. The structure and function of these groups impact their ability to achieve their goals, at least in part. These organizations make certain strategic choices about how they will approach their work, and these choices influence which tactics they will employ to further their struggles. These strategy and tactic selections also determine, in part, their ability to achieve goals. The media pick up on and report these efforts (or don't), and frame them for the general public and agents of change. The mood and opinion of the general public may or may not shift in support of these issues. Agents of change, government and political patrons, provide or deny access and resources to group members and organizations, which in turn enhances or inhibits their success. All of this

takes place within a political and economic climate that helps determine how much or how little resistance groups face.

Taken together these are the key variables that impact success and drive the seven hypotheses discussed below that I explore in this study. How they impact success differs by the type of success. What is important to achieving collective benefits is not necessarily important, or as important, for achieving legislative success and vice versa. The same is true for perceived success.

Internal Factors: Strategies, Tactics & Organizational Attributes

The most important predictor of success should be a key strategic choice made early on in an organization's existence: whether to embrace pluralism and an incremental theory of change, or to decide on a more radical agenda and theory of change. How radical an organization's demands are determines to a large extent the path the organization will take to achieve its goals (Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000). And because of the nature of our political system, a reformist agenda will be easier to achieve than a radical agenda. Choosing the goal of eradicating all forms of racism, which requires literally changing the fabric of American society and culture, is going to be a whole lot harder to realize than choosing to educate and motivate students to engage in anti-hunger programs. The first hypothesis I test is that the more radical goals are, the lower the levels of success ought to be. This should be true for all types of success.

The main dispute over tactics is which work best: traditional interest group tactics like lobbying and litigation (Walker 1991), or unusual or violent tactics like protests and public disruptions (Gamson 1990). Institutional tactics should produce greater amounts of success *if* these organizations actually have any influence, though much of the interest

group literature suggests they do not, or do not have as much as other types of interest groups (Walker 1991). If this is the case, institutional tactics will have no impact on legislative success, and may even dampen perceived success, as result of constant efforts to effect change with no positive results. Outsider tactics, particularly protests and public disruptions, may positively impact outcome success as suggested by the example of CCNV and Mitch Schneider, though such tactics are unlikely to effect legislative outcomes, and may even dampen them as the public, and in turn lawmakers, is turned off of these in-your-face tactics. We know that the more radical a group's agenda, the more likely they will be to utilize radical tactics like protests and public disruption (pair wise correlation is .252, significant at $p < .10$). This provides more support for the notion that using outsider tactics will not increase outcome or legislative success, and will likely dampen perceived success in turn. Another hypothesis I test in Chapter Four is that neither insider nor outsider tactics should increase outcome success, nor will they increase legislative success and the use of outsider tactics may in fact decrease legislative success.

Studies of social movement organizations show that organizational differences are important to their success. Older organizations originally developed federated structures with individual members (Crowley and Skocpol, 2001), increasing their reach across the country and ability to influence outcomes. Age is correlated with increased resources (Minkoff 1993) and increased size (Kreisi in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1998), impacts type of membership (Mundo 1992) and structure (Crowley and Skocpol 2001). As such, older organizations ought to have greater access to resources and more prestige,

and in turn be better at positively influencing legislative success and will have greater perceived success. These are the major hypotheses I test in Chapter Five.

These internal factors play an important role in determining the results of movements, both positively and negatively. Organizations with greater demands will meet with lowered success levels. Institutional tactics, if they have an impact at all, will produce higher levels of legislative success. Protest and other outside tactics will lower legislative and perceived success. Older organizations, with greater wealth and influence, should meet with increased success in all its forms. But the combined effects of these factors do not tell the whole story. External factors beyond the control of social movement and advocacy organizations are also important, and some would argue more important.

External Factors: Institutions and Patrons, Media and Context

Alternative explanations based on the importance of opportunity structure suggest that strategies and tactics and movement resources are not as important predictors of success than previously thought. Most notably, Tarrow (2003 and elsewhere) posits that the decline of the effectiveness of some tactics, in this instance the use of protest tactics, is the result of a constricted opportunity structure beginning in the 1970s and lasting through the 1990s. The success of protest tactics is the result of “political process and timing,” not organizational factors or leadership (Tarrow 2003). Analyses of the work of women’s organizations during the second wave of feminism also suggest that success was in large part a function of general changes in government and public opinion on issues of fairness as opposed to movement resources and tactic use (Costain in Petracca

1992). In these analyses, success is a function of broader contextual factors and has much less to do with actual strategy and tactic choices. I test this in Chapter Six.

Which contextual factors impact success? Anecdotally, organization leaders told me that their patrons matter, as do public opinion and the media and crises. Patrons provide access and resources to challenging and interest groups (Berry 1997; Imig and Berry 1996; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Rosenberg 1991; Walker 1991). Congress and the Executive are able to not only make beneficial policy changes, but are also able to provide financial assistance to movement organizations, bolstering their work through tax benefits, grants, government contracts, and so on. When Congressional and Executive actions on behalf of a group are further undergirded by a supportive Supreme Court, movements are particularly successful, as seen by the civil rights movement (Rosenberg 1991). The first hypothesis I test in Chapter Six is that patronage produces increased success for all forms of success.

The role and force of the media in these struggles are contested. Some research suggests that many successful interest group strategies are the result of media coverage (Berry 1997), while others have documented that media often do not help and provide biased and uneven coverage (McCarthy and McPhail 1996; Molotch 1979; Oliver and Myers 1999; Smith and McCarthy 2001). Media coverage should be highest for groups with affiliate structures because of their ability to connect national stories with local faces and have easier access to local networks (Berry 1993), and for larger organizations because of their increased resources, activities, and media savvy and contacts (Oliver and Myers 1999). In theory this coverage should produce increased success, and this is the second theory I test in Chapter Six.

Where the media are also important is in driving public opinion (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Because public opinion influences public policy (Burstein 1998), or is a “proximate cause” of policy changes (Page and Shapiro 1983), success should increase as public opinion shifts in favor of movements and vice versa (Gilens 1999; Epstein 2000; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). This will be particularly true for legislative success (Costain and Majstorovic 1994; Ericson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Stimson 1999). The third hypothesis I test in Chapter Six is that as public opinion in favor of an issue increases, so will success, particularly legislative success.

Crises will produce increased success for these organizations by putting issues on the public agenda that would otherwise have remained dormant (Frey, Dietz and Kalof 1992; Gamson 1975; Goldstone 1980; Kingdon 1977). In the last hypothesis I test in Chapter Six, I expect that crises that impact people directly (ie, local crises) will have a positive and greater influence on outcome and legislative success than crises that only indirectly impact people (national and international crises).

External factors are equally important in helping us understand the effects of movements and their organizations. But just as with the internal factors, they do not tell the whole story. The movement itself is an important piece of the equation, further complicating the impact of each of the internal and external factors.

Groups

One of the central questions I seek to answer is how the groups studied differ with respect to success and the factors that contribute to success. African American civil rights organizations, women’s organizations, and homeless organizations are similar in that they, or at least their constituents, are or have been considered marginalized in one way or another. But their agendas, strategies and tactics, resources and outcomes have

been very different. This means that what contributes to and explains success also varies across the groups. All of the groups have in common the need to change public policy, but the type of policy changes needed differs. African American and women's groups need to change public opinion, whereas homeless organizations need to change government spending more to solve their issues.

The struggle of African Americans during the twentieth century bears out the utility of using certain tactics over others. The organizations representing African Americans during the first half of the twentieth century began with significant use of litigation. The use of this tactic produced positive outcomes, resulting in tremendous strides for group members beginning in the 1950s. These changes were further undergirded as public opinion shifted in favor of the movement and coincided with an increased use of protest and violence. The result was additional successes for African Americans overall through national law and policy changes (Colby 1985; Kingslow, Horton & View, 2000; Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1982; Rosenberg 1991).

The story of this period suggests that for African American organizations the use of certain tactics matters, particularly litigation, legislation and public opinion appeals (Colby 1985; Kingslow, Horton & View, 2000; Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1982; Rosenberg 1991). This is also true for women's and homeless organizations in different periods as well. The core tactics of women's groups have included lobbying, litigation, and work with their grassroots membership base (Gelb and Hart in Giugni, McAdam & Tilly 1999). Homeless groups frequently rely more on direct service tactics than on other types of tactics, and are also frequently portrayed as relying on protests and public disruption (Cress and Snow 2000; Lipsky 1968). Central to the success of all of these

groups is the importance of public opinion and policy shifts for affecting change (Rosenberg 1991).

The older organizations, primarily those with a women's or an African American focus, originally developed federated structures with individual members (Crowley and Skocpol, 2001). Homeless organizations are different, having developed more recently and boasting fewer members and unified as opposed to federated structures (Cress and Snow 1996). These organizations are also more likely to provide direct services in addition to their advocacy work, and because of changes in social service provision and funding over the past 20 years, are more likely to have larger staffs and greater funding than the other types of organizations (Lipsky and Smith, 1989-1990).

The support of patrons during the period of study also differs by groups. Institutional positions on civil rights ran the gamut from active pursuit of affirmative action ideals to active opposition of them. The Nixon administration pursued an active affirmative action agenda in the 1970s, recruiting prominent African Americans to federal service while simultaneously befriending more conservative groups. The Carter administration was unable to attend to many of these issues because of more pressing economic and foreign policy problems. This was followed by the Reagan and Bush administrations, which pushed through many roll backs in affirmative action policies that continued through the 1990s. Simultaneously, support for homelessness increased, culminating in the passage of the McKinney Act, and institutional support for women's rights shifted to acceptance of the role of women in most parts of the American workforce.

But where specifically are the most fruitful places for groups to focus their efforts? For homeless organizations, this was agencies (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Lipskey and Smith 1989-1990; Walker 1991), and for African American and women's organizations the Congress (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2002; Kilson 1976). Homeless groups have a lower number of national level partners on average and interact with Congress less (as measured through the provision of Congressional testimony), despite the fact that during this period homeless groups realized greater changes and successes in Congress than the other groups.

Through the period of this study the role of the media expanded with the increased importance of television and changed with the advent of new technology and consolidation of many media outlets. Media coverage was lowest for homeless groups, but gradually trended up. African American organizations received the greatest amount of media attention, which tended to peak in years where incidents involving prominent or infamous African Americans made the national news. The attention given to women's organizations during this period gradually trended down, with the highest peak in 1980 and subsequent peaks in years during which national elections were held.

During the same period, the country experienced "stagflation," recession, economic recovery, and then the beginnings of another recession, impacting all Americans but most significantly the poor and people of color. Opposition to women's and civil rights gained momentum, with a backlash starting in the 1980s and growing through the 1990s against the women's and civil rights agendas. The beginning of this period was also marked by a series of crises impacting the focus and ability of the organizations and groups in this study to operate. Returning veterans from Vietnam, the

closure of many mental hospitals, and later decreasing support for indigent families swelled the numbers and needs of homeless people across the country. Black leadership was also in decline beginning with the 1968 murder of Martin Luther King, Jr. and continued through the period of this study with the marked exception of Jesse Jackson's run for president in 1988. Representation of women and minorities increased significantly in state and national offices, though not reaching parity with their population size, and enrollment of women and minorities in higher education rose significantly as well (Carson 2003). All of these factors combined to create a context in which the needs of the homeless became paramount over the needs of women and minority groups. Though the power of individual women and minorities rose during this period, as leaders they were unable to leverage enough resources to meet the combined demands of their constituents.

The theme that runs through all of this is that African American civil rights and women's organizations are largely similar in functioning, relationships, and experiences over the period of study. Homeless organizations are different in several important areas: goals and needs; operation and functioning of organizations; public opinion; patronage; and success. During the period of study homeless organizations achieved a great deal more with fewer resources than the other two groups, all of which suggests that the impact of the political opportunity structure in determining success is, if not paramount, at least equally important to other factors.

Success can be measured in different ways, helping us understand the nuances of social change and power. Outcome success is the most important but difficult way to

measure the impact of social movement and advocacy organizations. It is important because it gets at the heart of the purpose of the movements and their organizations: realizing positive changes for constituents. It is difficult because social processes are multifaceted and complex, raising challenges for establishing causality. Understanding legislative success is important because policy changes may lead to real changes for constituents, and at the least signal symbolic shifts. The determinants of legislative success are also easier to ascertain. Perceived is an important gauge of differences among groups. The success of social movement and advocacy organizations is the result of internal and external factors and differs by group. Internally, success is a function of what groups are asking for and how they are asking for it. Externally, success is a function of who is helping an organization and how receptive the broader environment is to its needs.

In the chapters that follow I explore each of these areas. In Chapter Four I examine the impact of strategies and tactics on success, and I find strategies, particularly how the extremity of groups demands, to be one of the key determinants of success. In Chapter Five I explore the impact of organizational factors on success, and organization age and structure are the most important explanations of success. And in Chapter Six I explore external factors of patrons, media attention and context, and find public opinion and crises to be particularly important factor impacting success. I find that in the long run what matters the most is what groups ask for more than how they ask for it; time; a broad reach to achieve goals; public opinion; and crises to spur action along. In Chapter Seven I conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for

understanding power and democratic functioning, and practical implications for social movement and advocacy organizations for approaching their work.

Chapter 3: Methods

This study examines the work of social movement and interest group organizations on behalf of women, African Americans and the homeless between 1975 and 2000. Four major questions are pursued: 1) How have marginalized communities attempted to empower themselves at the national level during the last quarter of the 20th century? 2) What success did they achieve? 3) What factors contributed to that success? 4) Are there differences between the groups? In this chapter I describe the cases and organizations used in this study and how they were selected; provide an overview of the data collection process; lay out how success is measured; present and describe the factors that explain success; and discuss the analysis methods used to answer these questions.

Groups and Organizations

The focus of this study is on national advocacy groups that worked to promote the empowerment of African Americans, women, and the homeless during the last 25 years of the 20th century. These groups represent major fights waged on the national landscape during this period: fights for power by race, class and gender. The combination of these three groups helps elucidate the range of problems, possibilities and experiences faced by marginalized communities in America. African Americans achieved significant legal successes at the beginning of the period of study, but the practical effects of these legal challenges were less impressive, and in some cases are currently being reversed. Black activists and their organizations focused on court and protest tactics at the start of the period, and over time turned to more traditional institutional work. At the same time, women's groups received a mixed reaction to their demands in legislatures and the courts, with the notable failure of the ERA, but simultaneously realized tremendous

collective benefits in the *de facto* aspects of their struggles. Homeless organizations formed during this period, in part as a spin-off from earlier efforts that focused on welfare and welfare rights. The issue of homelessness also received tremendous support from the national government through the development of new programs and funding streams with the passage of the 1988 McKinney Act. Though these three groups do not represent all of the challenging groups and issues over the last 25 years, together they comprise a large portion of national debate and struggles for power. These groups have had different experiences and successes, and the forces and reasons behind these different experiences are worth exploration.

Forty-five organizations were selected for this study, fifteen from each issue area. The organizations were drawn from the *Encyclopedia of Associations 2002 Edition*.⁹ Four criteria were used for organizations to be considered for inclusion in the study. First, only national-level organizations operating in America are included.¹⁰ Second, the work of the organizations has to focus in one of the three areas of the study: women's rights,¹¹

⁹ This source has been frequently used for similar studies because it is comprehensive, regularly updated, and focuses on national membership organizations. Through the course of this study, I discovered several other significant problems with this source. First, not all of the organizations in existence in the three substantive issue areas studied were included. Second and related, some of the categorizations were incorrect or could have been more accurately made. Third, and most importantly, much of the factual information was incorrect, including contact information (in some cases even the cities and states were inaccurate); staff size; budget information; year established; local affiliates; and activity descriptions. However, I do not believe that these inaccuracies adversely impact the choice of organizations for the study or my ability to generalize from the findings. These inaccuracies are likely the result of the inclusion of outdated information. Regardless, my findings cast suspicions on the results of findings that rely on the factual information contained in the *Encyclopedia of Associations*.

¹⁰ Organizations that operate both nationally and internationally were considered.

¹¹ No organization was considered whose work centers on reproductive rights only, though organizations with reproductive rights as one of several focus areas were included. In addition, no organization was considered whose work centers on domestic

African American civil rights, or homelessness. Third, advocacy has to be a component of the work of the organization, but with no restrictions placed on how much of the organization's work comprises advocacy activities. And fourth, the organizations must have a proactive position for the issue. This means that organizations that work against an issue area were not considered. For example, though the national organization of the Ku Klux Klan came up in the search for organizations that focus on African Americans, they were excluded from the study. However, groups that take opposing approaches were allowed. For example, in the search for women's organizations, both the National Organization for Women and Concerned Women for America are included. Though they appear to be opposition forces, they both want the same thing (to support women throughout the country), but from very different perspectives (feminist principles and Christian fundamentalist values respectively).

After culling the organizations based on the above four criteria, a list of several hundred organizations was generated. The organizations that comprised this list were then ranked by size of membership, organizational budget, and scope of influence (all self-report). Not all organizations reported information in each of these categories. The largest forty-five organizations, 15 from each group, were then selected for the study. (See Table 3.1 for a list of organizations.) Of these organizations, nine organizations were either unwilling or unable to participate in the interview portion of the study. Six of these are African American organizations and three are women's organizations. All of the homeless organizations fully participated.

violence only. Again, organizations with domestic violence issues as one of several focus areas were included.

The organizations in the study are located around the country, but most of the national offices are located in Washington, DC (22 organizations). Other areas include: New York (8 organizations); Illinois (5 organizations); New Jersey (2 organizations); Virginia (2 organizations); Alabama (1 organization); California (1 organization); Georgia (1 organization); Massachusetts (1 organization); Pennsylvania (1 organization); and one unknown (last known address in Louisiana).¹²

Data Collection

Secondary source and historical data were collected for all of the organizations and were used for the development of two of the outcome and legislative success measures and several of the explanatory factors. Elite interviews were used to collect additional qualitative and quantitative information and for the development of the perceived success measure and other explanatory factors.

For the elite interviews, a semi-structured interview protocol was developed with questions focusing on success; strategies and tactics used; interactions with government institutions; contextual factors that impact success (including crises, the economy and opposition groups); and power (see Appendix A for a copy of the protocol). Interviews began with a clarification question on organization mission, followed by a “grand tour question” (Leech 2002) on organization success used to engage the respondent, establish comfort and rapport, and gauge perception of success.

Each organization was contacted first by letter and then with follow-up phone calls to arrange interviews. The number of calls made to arrange interviews ranged from two to upwards of 30. When possible, interviews were conducted in person, and when not

¹² Organization location was not a significant indicator of success in any of the multivariate analyses, and is therefore not included in the chapters that follow.

they were conducted by phone. The interviews took approximately one hour, but ranged from 30 minutes to 2 hours. Most interviews were with the organization's Executive Director, but in some cases others were substituted (including members of the organization's Board of Directors or other senior level employees). The interviews were not taped, though notes were taken during the interviews. Respondents were told at the beginning of the interviews that the entire interview would be conducted on a 'not for attribution' basis. After each interview was conducted, the items were coded and qualitative responses were pulled out for pattern matching and content analysis (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Miles and Humberman 1983).

Data from Lexis/Nexis, the *New York Times* and the General Social Survey were collected on organization history and background; exposure in the national media; exposure in Congress; participation in the federal court system; and public opinion on issues concerning public subsidies and support for the poor, affirmative action, racism, sexism, and so on. Organization history and background data were collected from websites, published articles and books on the organizations, and organizational documents. Information on the national media, federal court cases, and congressional testimony was collected from Lexis/Nexis, and the public opinion information come from the General Social Survey.

Measuring Success

Success is not a fixed target; it has many nuances and measures of success are contested in both the political science and sociology literatures. Success measures can be direct or indirect; they can refer to *de jure*, *de facto*, or policy ends; they can focus on organizations, movement goals, or constituents and beneficiary groups (Cress and Snow

2000). In this study, I measure success in three ways: collective benefits, the passage of legislation, and the perception of success.

Outcome Success

The most compelling but difficult way to gauge success is to examine whether and to what degree the conditions of a group's constituents have improved. In this study I refer to this as outcome success. To develop a measure of outcome success, I translated organization goals into one key area for each group. I did this by selecting the substantive area that the organization focuses on the most based on the organization's mission, and then I narrowed this down to a specific item based on information I received from organization leaders about what topic they have focused their energies the most.

I then took a measure of the group's demographic for that goal area for the year the organization began or for 1975, whichever is later, and for the year 2000, and compared the measures and placed the results on a 7-point scale. This allows me to standardize outcomes and gives a measure of the amount and direction of change over the period of study. With the exception of the groups that note that they seek parity in certain goal areas (for example, parity in executive positions for women as compared to men), none of the organizations had specific quantitative goals. In these cases, I used doubling the value at the start of the period for the highest level of change.

The possible scores for the scale include:

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| 3 | 67-100% of possible positive change |
| 2 | 34-66% of possible positive change |
| 1 | 1-33% of possible positive change |
| 0 | no change |

- 1 1-33% of possible negative change
- 2 34-66% of possible negative change
- 3 67-100% of possible negative change

To explicate this and the other success measures discussed below, I provide the example of one of the women's organizations in the study. The mission of this organization is "to protect and secure equal rights and economic opportunities for women and girls through litigation and advocacy." Based on information gathered through interviews about how they narrowed this to focus their work and the activities they engage to achieve their mission, I selected *increases in non-traditional employment for women* as the outcome measure and took a proxy of women in the construction field to quantify success. Using Department of Labor documents, I find that the percentage of women in the construction field in 1975 was 1.8, and in 2000 was 2.5. I then developed thresholds for the scale based in an increase¹³ in women's labor participation on construction:

- 3 > 3.0%
- 2 2.41% - 3.0%
- 1 1.81% - 2.4%
- 0 1.8%
- 1 1.79% -1.2%
- 2 1.19% - 0.6%
- 3 <0.6%

¹³ Because the stated goal of the organization is an increase, not parity, I used 1.8% as a baseline to construct the scale. Had the stated goal been parity, the scale would have changed and the final score for outcome success for this organization would have been 1.

Since the percentage of women in this type of position was 1.8% in 1975, I divided it in 3 equal parts of .6 to create the thresholds in each direction.¹⁴ The increase in 2000 was to 2.5% of women in the construction field, giving the organization a score of “2” for outcome success.

The actual range of the scale for the organizations in the study is from -3 to 3 (see Table 3.2), and the overall average score for outcome success is .7 (see Table 3.3). By group, African American and women’s organizations most frequently had scores of “1”, while homeless organizations scored “3” the most, followed closely with scores of “-3”. During the period of study African American and women’s groups met with low to moderate success rates, the averages .9 for each, and homeless organizations met with both great successes and great failures, averaging .3. For detailed information about each of the scores, see Appendix B.

Legislative Success

To measure policy success, I focus on national changes in Congress and again took organization goals and translated the goals into key policy areas. I then collected data on national laws that have been passed by Congress for each area, and placed the policy changes on a 9-point scale to indicate the amount and direction of change over the period of study. The potential range of this scale includes:

- 4 policy change that meets group needs/goals
- 3 significant policy change in direction of group interests (several policy changes that mirror group’s demands and include program funding)

¹⁴ Threshold 1= $1.8 + .6 = 1.81-2.4$; Threshold 2= $2.4 + .6 = 2.41 - 3.0$; Threshold 3= > 3.0 ; Threshold -1 = $1.8 - .6 = 1.2- 1.79$; Threshold -2 = $1.2 - .6 = 0.6 - 1.19$; Threshold -3 = $0.6 - 0.6 = 0 - 0.6$.

- 2 some policy change in direction of group interests (greater than 2 pieces of legislation with partial or no funding)
- 1 minimal/symbolic policy change in direction of group interests (1-2 legislative efforts with no program funding)
- 0 no change OR both positive and negative policy change
- 1 minimal/symbolic policy change in opposition to group interests (1-2 legislative efforts with no program funding)
- 2 some policy change in opposition to group interests (greater than 2 pieces of legislation with partial or no funding)
- 3 significant change in opposition to group interests (several policy changes that directly oppose a group's demands and include program funding)
- 4 complete policy change in opposition to group interests

Turning again to the example of the women's organization, for legislative success I focused on the enactment of policies to *increase non-traditional employment for women*. During the time period, I found three key pieces of legislation enacted to promote this goal. The first is the "Nontraditional Employment Act" passed in 1991 that amended the Job Training Partnership Act to encourage a broader range of training and job placement for women. The second is the "Women in Apprenticeship and Nontraditional Occupations Act" passed in 1992 that assists businesses in providing women with opportunities in apprenticeship and non-traditional occupations. The third piece of legislation is the "Commission on the Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science, Engineering and Technology Development Act" passed in 1998 that established a commission to examine and promote women and minorities in these fields. Based on

this, I chose a rating of “2” for legislative success. This rating reflects the passage of some policies to increase non-traditional employment for women, but the policies and programs established were not strong. The funding associated with the first two pieces of legislation is minimal (1% of the employment training budget) and the third piece is largely symbolic.

The actual range of the scale for the organizations in the study is from 0 to 4 (see Table 3.2), and the average is 1.8 (see Table 3.3). By group, African American organizations have the lowest success levels (average is 1.0) and homeless groups have the highest success levels (average 2.3), with women’s organizations falling in between (average 2.1). These relationships are significant (see Table 3.4) and drive many of the legislative success findings in the chapters that follow. For detailed information about each of the scores, see Appendix C.

Perceived Success

The last measure of success I use is perceived success. Perceived success captures how the leaders of the organizations see the effects and success of their work. The information used to develop this measure was captured through the interviews. I then developed a 5-point scale that captures the direction and level of success achieved by the group. The potential range for this scale is:

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------------------|
| 4 | full success |
| 3 | some success but with struggles and/or incomplete |
| 2 | mix of success and failures |
| 1 | some failures but not complete |
| 0 | complete failure |

Turning to the example of the women's organization used earlier, for perceived success the organization representative answered that

“We have been very successful. If you measure this by the amount of money collected on behalf of our clients, this is in the hundreds of millions... We helped to integrate certain professions, including fire fighting and police, which opened up jobs and career paths for women. And the publicity that was generated around these issues and the public education efforts show this success. When our name is in the paper, there is a spike in individual contacts about these issues... And for every call we receive, there are hundreds of people with the same issues. They call because they want verification and validation, not to bring a law suit. They want information they can use.”

Based on this response, I rated the organization's perceived success as “4”, the highest success rating, because the organization discussed their successes exclusively and did not discuss any struggles or failures.

The actual range of the scale for the organizations is from 1 to 4 (see Table 3.2), and the average is 3.7 (see Table 3.3). The results are largely similar across the groups. The African American perceived success average is 3.6 and the women's average score is 3.8. While homeless organizations were more likely to focus on their struggles and failures, their average score was still equivalent to the others at 3.6.

Relationship between Success Measures

There is little relationship between these three success measures. The strongest of these is between outcome and perceived success (pairwise correlation= 0.159) but this relationship is not significant. The relationship between the other measures is equally

low (pairwise correlation =0.027 between legislative and outcome success and -0.033 between legislative and perceived success). When the scales used are standardized, the greatest type of success achieved by groups is perceived success. Legislative success is greater than outcome success. As difficult as it is to get a bill passed in Congress, it is more difficult to produce large scale, collective benefits for group members across the country.

Why are the relationships between these variables so weak? The first reason, discussed in several of the chapters to follow, is that there is a serious disconnect between the work groups do and their perception of that work. In this case, groups see their success more favorably than it is both for legislative and outcome success. Organization leaders must champion their causes, so it follows that these leaders will perceive themselves to be more successful than they actually are, or that they will put on the most positive public face possible.

The second reason for these weak relationships is also intuitive. Legislative success is greater than and largely unrelated to outcome success. As difficult as it is to get a bill passed in Congress, it is more difficult to produce large scale, collective benefits for group members across the country. When these policy changes are passed, they do not necessarily translate into collective changes for group members. The passage of legislation can be symbolic only, or if it creates new programs or policies, the results may be so small that they only affect a few people, or the intended solution to a social problem may not work. In the best cases, legislation is thoughtful, with fully funded and staffed programs resulting from it. But in reality there are limitations to this, so it is not surprising that there is a low correlation between outcome and legislative success.

Because of the incremental nature of national legislative changes we will not be able to see major collective benefits from it in such a short period of time.

The Determinants of Success

I collected data from interviews and secondary and archival sources to examine what contributes to success. The following section describes each of these factors. For more specific information about coding, see Appendix D.

Strategies and Tactics

Strategies and tactics comprise the cornerstone of the work of challenging groups. Though frequently discussed interchangeably in the political science and sociology literatures, in military and other more formal language there is a difference between the meaning of strategies and tactics. Strategies refer to overall plans of action by countries, militaries, or other groups (in this case, advocacy and movement organizations) to accomplish the goals of the group. Tactics refer to the specific maneuvers (in military terms) or activities (in organizational terms) used to reach goals. For example, the decision to take a radical as opposed to a moderate approach to achieving goals by an organization is a strategy; the use of lobbying, protest, public education work, etc. are different types of tactics. The aspects or dimensions of an organization's strategy I explore in this study include radicalness of demands, collaborations and level of work.

Radicalness of demands measures the type of changes organizations are trying to make, gathered from each organization's mission. The types of demands coded are structural change (the most radical type of change, for example, changes to the economic system), institutional change (for example, advocating for changes to policies about including excluded groups in voting), or changes that do not disturb the status quo/current

frame (for example, more money for a current program). Over half of the organizations have status quo goals, slightly less than a quarter have institutional change goals, and the remainder have structural change goals or are unknown. Level of work refers to the level (national, state, local or some combination) that organization leaders feel is most important to work in to forward their organization's agenda. This information comes from the interviews, and the results are evenly split among the different levels.

Collaborations are the joint efforts organizations enter to forward their work. To develop this variable, I took a count of the number of collaborations leaders said their organizations are involved in during the interviews. The range of collaborations reported is 0 to 40 and the average is six. I also collected information on leader perception of collaborative success, and used latent coding to develop a scale that ranges from complete success to failures. The majority of respondents feel their collaborative efforts are highly successful and none mentioned failures.

A series of twenty-two dummy variables captures the types of tactics the organizations use to advance their goals. These include community organizing; conferences and seminars; grants or scholarships; leadership development; litigation; lobbying; networking; organization formation; petitions; policy analysis and forums; protests; public education; publicity; publications; research and evaluation; direct services; technical assistance or training; volunteer coordination; and voter drives or voter education. They are coded 1 if the organizations use the tactic and 0 if they do not. I also constructed a tactic count variable, an aggregate of the number of different types of tactics an organization uses. The range is 1-19 and the average is 13 different tactics per organization. I also include a series of three variables capturing the most used tactics by

organizations; and another series of three variables capturing the most successful tactics from the perspective of the organization leaders. These variables were constructed from the interview process. The three most frequently used tactics are public education, training and technical assistance provision, and networking with other organizations.

Organizational Structure

To examine whether and how organizational structure impacts success, Chapter Five focuses on the characteristics and functioning of challenging group organizations. I examine organization age captured through the year the organization was established and also use a dummy variable for organizations created before and after 1970 in Chapter Five. The range of years organizations were established is 1851 to 1991, and the average is 1964 (median 1970). Organizational structure is captured through a dummy variable measuring whether the organization has a federated or a unified structure. Federated organizations have a national office with a formal structure of local affiliates around the country, and unified organizations have a single national office with no formal affiliate structure. A majority of the organizations have a unified structure. I also include a series of dummy variables capturing decision making by board, staff, a mix or other types of decision making. Most of the organizations in the study use a mix for decision making. I measure size in three ways, including a count of local affiliates; budget; and staff. The range of affiliates is 0 to 1,802. The average number of affiliates is 87 and the mean is 0. The budget figure is for fiscal year 2000 or the most recent fiscal year budget available prior to 2000. The range is \$80,000 to \$69,000,000, the average is approximately \$5,900,000, and the mean is \$1,000,000. Staff sizes range from 1.5 full time equivalent (FTE) to 15,000 FTEs. The average is approximately 480 FTEs, and the mean is 10

FTEs. Finally, I examine membership type through a series of dummy variables that capture whether the organization has individual members, organizational members, a mix of individual and organizational members, or no members at all. Most of the organizations have no members and the second most common category has individuals.

Institutions, Media and Context

The receptiveness of institutions and the media, as well as the context in which a group operates, form the environment, or the political opportunity structure, that supports or mitigates the effectiveness of challenging groups. These factors help in part to explain the differential success rates of the groups and organizations in this study. Chapter Six examines these factors, breaking them into three sections: institutional contacts (also known as patrons), media and context.

I collected two types of data to examine institutional contacts, one from Lexis/Nexis and the other from the organizational interviews. In the first, count data of organizations providing Congressional testimony (1989 to 2000) and being involved in federal court cases for Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and District Court cases (1975 to 2000) were collected annually and averaged over the period of study. The range for Congressional testimony provision is none to 533, the average is 35, and the median is 6.5. The range for the court cases are 0 – 3,796, 0 – 2086, and 0 – 349, the averages are 190, 199 and 13, and the medians are 2, 1.5 and 0 for district court, appellate court, and the Supreme court respectively.

In the second, I asked respondents about their contacts with government institutions, including which they worked with at all, which they worked with the most, whether one institution has been more important to them, and if partisan changes in

control of the national government affects their work. The first is a series of dummy variables for institutional contacts indicating whether or not the organizations had contact with different institutions. This includes the cabinet or agencies, Congress, courts, local governments, parties, state government, or the White House. The top three (in order) include the Congress, the White House and the federal agencies. I created an institutional partner count variable that is a count of the total number of institution types with which each of the organization works. The range is 2 to 7 institutions and the average is 5. The second captures the institution with which the organization has the most contact through a series of dummy variables. The top three (in order) include the federal agencies, Congress and the courts. The third examines which institutions organization leaders feel is most important to forwarding their agendas, including the Congress, White House, a mix or neither. Finally, I include a variable for organization perception of the impact of partisan changes that captures whether or not the organization leader feels that partisan changes in control of the national government affects their work. This includes whether they are more successful with one party or another and whether they change tactics depending upon which party is in control.

Two types of data were collected for the media. In the first, count data on the number of times an organization is listed in the New York Times (1975-2000) is taken for both the front page of the *Times* and for front-page articles for each of the sections. The range for *Times* articles generally is none to 2,936, the average is 161 and the median is 7. The range for front page articles is none to 153, the average is 14 and the median is 1. In the second, I developed a series of dummy variables capturing which types of media outlets the organizations work with, including TV, print (newspaper and magazines),

radio, and web-based media. The range for the number of media outlets used is 1 to 6 and the average is 3. The most frequently used media source is newspapers.

I also examine four contextual measures. The first looks at whether or not organizations are impacted by crises. I asked respondents whether their work has been affected (either positively or negatively) by national, international and local crises (each of these questions was asked and coded separately). Most leaders reported being affected by national level crises. The second captures whether opposition groups have had significant impact on the work and success for organizations. Again, this impact can be positive or negative, and the measure only captures the perspective of the respondent. The responses were evenly split. The third measure captures whether organizations have been impacted by the recent economic downturn. There was no variance in the responses. Almost 90% of respondents noted that they have been negatively affected by the economic changes.

Finally, I developed a measure of the strength of public opinion for or against the organization's work from the General Social Survey (GSS). For this variable, I selected a question from the GSS that reflects the goals and/or work of each organization and collapsed the response categories into those that support the issue and those that oppose it (the neutral responses were omitted) and use the proportion in favor of an issue as a proxy for public opinion. The range for the variable is .04 to .44 in favor of the work of the organizations. For example, for the public opinion measure in favor of Community for Creative Non-violence I selected the question, "Do you agree or disagree with 'The government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed'?" The standardized score of people in favor of this position is .072, or 7.2% of respondents.

Data Analysis

In this study I seek to answer four questions: 1) How have marginalized communities attempted to empower themselves at the national level during the last quarter of the 20th century? 2) What success did they achieve? 3) What contributed to that success? 4) Are there differences between the groups? To answer these questions, I parse out the different contributors to success in Chapters Four through Six and analyze how they vary by group and their relationships to success, both combined and separated.

I begin each of the following chapters with a description of the data and discuss how they vary by group; the bi-variate relationships between the variables and success for all of the groups combined and for each group separately; and a causal analysis of the determinants of success through multivariate models¹⁵. In discussion, the findings are supplemented with qualitative evidence collected through the interview process. Descriptive statistics are used to answer questions about what the organizations are doing and whether and how their work differs by group.

Various other statistical methods are used to examine how the different variables interact. For example, in Chapter Four I perform a factor analysis on the tactics to see whether and how they group, and in Chapter Five I perform a series of regression and logit analyses to look at the impact of age on other organizational factors. For some of the topics, I utilize pattern matching to lay out trends and commonalities among the experiences of the groups. For example, I do this in Chapter Six to parse out common experiences the organizations have with the media. All three dependent variables examined (outcome, legislative and perceived success) are ordinal. For this reason, I

¹⁵ I am unable to pull the models from Chapters Four through Six together for one large multivariate analysis because of problems with statistical power and multicollinearity.

utilize ordered probit analyses in Chapters Four through Six in the causal analyses. For each of the models presented, I also ran regression analyses and compared their results to the ordered probit results. They are largely similar, so for simplicity I only present the ordered probit results.

Success can mean many things, and in this study it is explored in terms of outcomes or collective benefits for group members, legislative and policy changes that favor group or organizational goals, and the perception of success of organizational leaders. How success varies by group tells an interesting story about shifts in attention to the needs of members of different marginalized groups in the American landscape. Why these variations exist shed light on changing power relationships. The next three chapters take up these topics to answer how marginalized communities have attempted to empower themselves at the national level during the last quarter of the 20th century, which successes they have achieved, what contributed to that success, and whether and what differences exist between the groups.

Table 3.1
Organizations by Group

African American/ Civil Rights Organizations	A. Philip Randolph Institute Black Veterans for Social Justice Congress of National Black Churches Congress of Racial Equality Nation of Islam National Association for the Advancement of Colored People National Black Leadership Roundtable National Black United Fund National Coalition on Black Civic Participation National Council of Negro Women National Rainbow Coalition/PUSH National Rainbow Coalition/PUSH National Urban League Poverty and Race Research Action Council Southern Christian Leadership Conference Southern Poverty Law Center
Women's Organizations	American Women's Economic Foundation Concerned Women for America Equal Rights Advocates Feminist Majority Foundation League of Women Voters Ms. Foundation for Women National Council for Research on Women National Organization for Women National Partnership for Women and Families National Women's Political Caucus Rural American Women Wider Opportunities for Women Women Work! Women's Law Project YWCA of the U.S.A.
Homeless Organizations	ABA Commission on Homelessness Community for Creative Non-Violence Covenant House National Alliance to End Homelessness National Coalition for the Homeless National Coalition for Homeless Veterans National Interfaith Hospitality Network National Law Center on Homelessness National Network for Youth National Resource Center on Homelessness and Mental Health National Runaway Switchboard National Coalition for the Homeless National Student Center Against Hunger and Homelessness Orphan Foundation of America Second Harvest Travelers Aid International

Table 3.2
Cross Tabulations between Success Measures and Groups

A. Outcome Success

	African American	Women	Homeless	Total
-3	1	1	5	7
-2	0	0	0	0
-1	1	1	1	3
0	0	0	1	1
1	7	9	1	17
2	1	1	1	3
3	2	2	6	10
Total	12	14	15	41

Chi-square= 14.795*

B. Legislative Success

	African American	Women	Homeless	Total
0	4	1	1	6
1	6	1	0	7
2	2	8	7	17
3	1	4	7	12
4	0	0	0	0
Total	13	14	15	42

Chi-square= 20.454***

C. Perceived Success

	African American	Women	Homeless	Total
0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	3	3
2	4	6	2	12
3	3	2	7	12
4	1	4	3	8
Total	8	12	15	35

Chi-square= 10.148*

Table 3.3
Between Group Success (mean success score)

	Outcome Success	Legislative Success	Perceived Success
Overall	0.707 (n=41)	1.833 (n=42)	3.714 (n=35)
African American	0.917 (n=12)	1.000 (n=13)	3.625 (n=8)
Women	0.929 (n=14)	2.071 (n=14)	3.833 (n=12)
Homeless	0.333 (n=15)	2.333 (n=15)	3.667 (n=15)

Table 3.4
Relationship between Success Measures and Groups (Regression)

	Outcome	Legislative	Perceived
African American	0.583 (0.469)	-1.333*** (0.000)	-0.042 (0.021)
Women	0.595 (.0442)	-0.262 (0.413)	0.167 (0.654)
Constant (homeless)	0.333 (0.535)	2.333*** (0.000)	2.667*** (0.245)
R-squared n	0.020 41	0.324 42	0.009 35

Table 3.5
Correlational Analysis of Relationship between Success Measures by Group

	Outcome Success	Legislative Success
African American Groups		
Legislative Success	-.647**	.696**
Perceived Success	-.812***	
Women’s Groups		
Legislative Success	.378*	-.628**
Perceived Success	-.309	
Homeless Groups		
Legislative Success	.483**	.114
Perceived Success	.569**	

Chapter 4: Strategies and Tactics

The work of interest and advocacy groups at the national level centers around forwarding the agenda and goals of the group's constituents. These groups are burdened by their development out of marginalized communities, communities that frequently have few resources and minimal access to the seats of power. Yet these groups persevere, and if we gauge success merely in terms of their ability to adequately garner resources in order to function as national organizations over time, they are successful. Examples of this abound and include the YWCA, the League of Women Voters, the NAACP, CORE, and many others. But real success comes in the form of changes in the laws of the country and the *de facto* changes for constituents, and this success is commonly assumed to be predicated upon the appropriate selection and use of key tactics and strategies¹⁶ for moving national level agendas forward.

The struggle of African Americans during the twentieth century bears out the utility of using certain tactics over others. The organizations representing African Americans during the first half of the twentieth century began with significant use of litigation. The use of this tactic produced positive outcomes, resulting in tremendous strides for group members beginning in the 1950s. As public opinion shifted in favor of the movement and coincided with an increased use of protest and violence, additional

¹⁶ Though frequently discussed interchangeably in the political science and sociology literatures, in military and other more formal language there is a difference between the meaning of strategies and tactics. Strategies refer to overall plans of action by countries, militaries, or other groups (in this case, advocacy and movement organizations) to accomplish the goals of the group. Tactics refer to the specific maneuvers (in military terms) or activities (in organizational terms) used to reach the goals of the group. For example, the decision to take a radical as opposed to a moderate approach to achieving goals by an organization is a strategy; whereas the use of lobbying, protest, public education work, etc. are different types of tactics. The distinction between the two is made throughout this study.

successes were achieved for African Americans overall through national law and policy changes (Colby 1985; Kingslow, Horton & View, 2000; Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1982; Rosenberg 1991). In recent years, however, these tactics, particularly protest tactics, have been less successful (Berry 1997).

The story of this period suggests that for African American organizations the use of certain tactics matters, and this is also true for women's and homeless organizations in different periods as well. The core tactics of women's groups have included lobbying, litigation, and work with their grassroots membership base (Gelb and Hart in Giugni, McAdam & Tilly 1999). Homeless groups frequently rely more on direct service tactics than on other types of tactics, and are also frequently portrayed as relying on protests and public disruption (Cress and Snow 2000; Lipsky 1968). However, there have been few studies conducted to date and there is little evidence available testing the success of these tactics for homeless organizations.

Alternative explanations based on the importance of opportunity structure suggest the opposite is true. Most notably, Tarrow (2003 and elsewhere) posits that the decline of the effectiveness of some tactics, in this instance the use of protest tactics, is the result of a constricted opportunity structure beginning in the 1970s and lasting through the 1990s. The success of protest tactics is the result of "political process and timing," not organizational factors or leadership (Earl et al 2003; Tarrow 2003). Analyses of the work of women's organizations during the second wave of feminism also suggest that success was in large part a function of general changes in government and public opinion on issues of fairness as opposed to movement resources and tactic use (Costain in Petracca

1992). In these analyses, success is a function of broader contextual factors and has much less to do with actual strategy and tactic choices.

Do strategies and tactics matter? The answer to this puzzle lies in a middle ground between those that extol the utility of certain strategies and tactics over others and those that focus on the opportunity structure that may allow for success. Internal factors ought to play an important role in determining the results of movements, particularly radical demands, protests, public education and lobbying. Increased radicalness should produce decreased success (Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000). The organizations in this study will not have enough power and clout to impact changes in Washington, despite the fact that many use insider tactics. Thus lobbying and other inside tactics will not produce outcome or legislative success, though perception of success may be dampened by the use of insider tactics. As outsiders, engaging a system that requires tremendous resources often is not fruitful, and it is likely that the leaders of these organizations will be more cognizant of and willing to admit their failures in this arena, an area where they are generally not expected to succeed. And outsider tactics, at least in the context of the last quarter of the 20th century, will largely have no effect and in some cases actually depress success (Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003). Public education, the most frequently used tactic, designed to change norms in the hopes of increasing outcome success for group members and to engage the public in an informal (and legal) lobbying campaign ought to produce greater outcome success but likely will not. Norms change is hard, long term work, unlikely to produce the long-term change measured in outcome success. It is also unlikely to help produce legislative success. Though we hear anecdotally about the importance of constituent opinions in Congress, there is little evidence to support this,

particularly for groups that tend to have lower levels of voter turnout and few resources for campaign contributions.

This begs forth four hypotheses. First, strategy matters. The more radical a group's demands are the less likely they are to achieve their goals. Our political system is based on incremental change. Radical demands run contrary to this system and are therefore less likely to be attained. Second, inside tactics will not produce success. Inside tactics can only impact legislative success, and will do so only if these groups are considered power brokers at the national level. Given the outsider nature of the groups, this is unlikely and thus I do not expect the use of inside tactics to produce success. Third, outsider tactics are unlikely to increase success and may actually depress all types of success rates. They either turn off the public and decision makers to a particular cause, and/or their cumulative effects are inadequate to impact real or lasting change. And finally, the determinants of success will differ by group, particularly for tactics. Certain tactics will lend themselves to success for one group but not for another. I find that the strategic choice of how radical your demands are and not tactics is the most important determinant of success in the current climate. I also show that the experiences of these groups are different, and what produces success for one group does not produce success for others.

We live in a moderate state characterized by incremental change. Even the more startling successes of the civil rights movement have roots in efforts that began almost a century before. Change takes time, and moderate change is easier to attain than radical change. The practical implications of the relative importance (or unimportance) of strategy and tactic selection are potentially tremendous. What groups do and the utility

of their work are intricately tied up in strategy and tactic choice selection. Strategies and tactics *are* the meat of advocacy groups, and they require tremendous energy for planning and comprise the majority of efforts and expenditures of organizations. In the long run what matters is *what* groups ask for more so than *how* they ask for it. The more groups ask the more difficult it is to get those demands met. In terms of strategies and tactics, the answer to what contributes to success is a combination of what a group is asking for and what is reasonably possible at a given time.

Strategy and Tactic Use

Which strategies and tactics are used by social movement and advocacy organizations? Which most often? Are there differences by organization focus (African American, women and homeless issues)? Do these match Walker's inside versus outside tactics? To answer these questions, I surveyed these organizations about their strategies, including radicalness of demands and level of work (that is, a focus on national, state or local level work and change), and tactics (ie, lobbying, public education, and so on). I find that homeless organizations are more likely to engage service and community organizing activities than the other groups. I also find that contrary to the expectations of much of the literature, these groups do not engage protest, unusual or violent tactics. Strategy and tactic use by African American and women's organizations are largely similar, with a strong emphasis on public education work. I also look at whether the most frequently used tactics of these organizations reflect Walker's inside/outside typology and find that they do.

Strategies

National social movement and advocacy organizations face two significant strategy choices. First, what level will the organization work on (national, state, local or some mix), and second, how radical will the organization's goals be? I examine whether these groups will be more likely to focus on local or state level work as a result of devolution as opposed to national work, and whether there are differences in radicalness of demands by substantive focus. I find that though these organizations now talk about the importance of focusing at the state and local levels because of devolution, their work is situated primarily at the national level. I also find that women's organizations have significantly more radical demands than African American and homeless organizations.

Broader Strategy Considerations: Level

Based on the study interviews, I expected to find that level of work would be highly important to outcomes, as a preponderance of respondents discussed devolution and the subsequent shifts produced for their work. For example, when asked about level of work one respondent noted "the answer depends on the climate you are working in. With the recent devolution, [our] sites have had to become increasingly more equipped to work at the estate level. Most of the energy is at the local level, and then the state level." To follow up, Table 4.3 presents the results of a cross-tabulation between the types of groups and the level of organizational focus. Homeless groups seem to focus more at the national level, women's groups at the local level, and the African American groups are equally spread. The operative word in reading this table is 'seems.' These findings do not so much reflect where the groups actually focus their work, but where the groups perceive that they ought to be focusing. These findings are largely incongruous with the findings from the most frequently used and successful tactics. For example, the work of

homeless organizations centers around direct service, work that is by definition done at the local level. On the other hand, the women's organizations said they tend to work most at the local level, though a majority of their tactics revolve around national level activities like policy analysis, litigation, and large public education campaigns. Though groups may actually work on one level, their perception of where they *ought* to focus in order to be successful is different.

[insert Table 4.1]

These findings point out an important disconnect between thinking about strategies and acting on strategies. There are several reasons for this. Most important is that in the aftermath of devolution, there is a real sense on the part of these organizations that their work should be at the state and local levels, as those are the levels where much of the resources for their population's needs are being redistributed. Many of these organizations, even the youngest of them, have developed and entrenched national level strategies and tactics that are difficult to shift to the state and local levels. This is a function of history, knowledge, experience, and organizational structure, and appears to be particularly true for the African American and women's groups. One group noted that "with the recent devolution, sites have had to become increasingly more equipped to work at the state [and local] level," though their actual work does not reflect this sense of shift in importance of the different levels.

Another explanation for this disconnect concerns membership and time. One women's organization noted that they focus locally because women today "have limited time, [and] therefore it is important to work locally and be close to [their constituency]." Another large women's organization with significant grassroots membership base but

whose tactics focus mainly on national, institutional level work argued that “without having grassroots support behind them they would not be effective in lobbying.” Thus there is a sense of the importance of local work but at the same time their activities reflect the reality of their national level goals.

Homeless groups face the opposite problem. Many of these organizations have traditionally worked on the local level, and now sense a need to shift their work to the national level in order to create broad-sweeping policy changes that will positively impact their constituency. Several of the groups noted that though they have been working on the local level since their inception, it is becoming increasingly important to expand this to the national level as they feel that national level consciousness raising is critical to developing the future of the movement. Their responses tend to reflect this sense of the importance of the national level while their activities reflect their past and the realities of the needs of their target population. At the same time, a few of the homeless organizations in this study formed essentially as technical assistance and national level service delivery systems. These are national organizations with no membership base and close ties to federal agencies. They work nationally but deliver service locally. This contradiction between location and mission also helps explain the unexpected response from homeless organizations about level of work.

Broader Strategy Considerations: Radicalness of Demands

The radicalness of a group’s demands is also an important strategy decision likely to impact success. At the nascent stage of issue development advocacy organizations tend to have much more radical demands and then moderate as they become institutionalized (Rozell and Wilcox 1999). The importance of radicalness of demands is

in the relationship between radicalness and the ability to achieve goals. Among the three groups in this study, women's organizations over time should have more radical agendas, a reflection of the institutionalization of their earlier radical values into their organizational structures, structures which have endured over time (Kingslow, Horton and View 2000). Given the incremental nature of the American political system, radical organizations ought to be less likely to achieve their goals.

To test radicalness, I created a 3-point scale that captures the types of changes organizations seek (as stated in the organization's mission) as a proxy for radicalness of demands. The types of demands coded include structural change as the most radical type of change (for examples, changes to the economic system), institutional change (for example, advocating for changes to policies about including excluded groups in voting), or changes that do not disturb the status quo/current frame (for example, more money for a current program).

Women's organizations have the most radical demands of the three. These organizations based their organizational structures on their ideals, institutionalizing these ideals and making the organizations more resistant to moderation and change. The homeless organizations, on the other hand, are in a fight for resources for their constituency. A fight for resources necessarily implies a fight for program and policy changes, the least radical of the possible goals and requests. Though the homeless themselves may have little to lose personally, as a movement their organizations have some to lose and much to gain with respect to resources. This may help to explain the increased legislative success of homeless organizations as compared to the other groups.

Tactic Use

In the organization leader interviews, respondents were asked which tactics their organizations ever use. Three of the tactics are used by all or almost all of the organizations studied: conferences; public education; and networking. Conferences represent a benign tactic that serves a myriad of functions, from setting agendas and policies for the organizations to membership (and sometimes broader) public education. Public education is a critical function of public interest groups and is one of the most frequently used tactics, both outright and as a way for organizations to “lobby” Congress without violating tax law for 501(c)(3)’s. Networking with other organizations is also frequently used, and represents a tactical adaptation to the effects of the explosion of interest groups over the past 30 years (Berry 1997; Goldstein 1999; Mundo 1992; Peterson in Petracca 1992; Rozell and Wilcox 1999). This explosion rendered more competition for scarce resources as well as for attention from policy makers, but there is little evidence to suggest that the interest group explosion was followed by an increase in their influence (Peterson in Petracca 1992). The groups in this study use networking in particular to bolster potential attention from Congress. Though the organizations feel that these networks increase their capacity to do their work and to gain access to decision-makers, there is only anecdotal evidence that suggests that this tactic produces actual successes for the organizations.

Which tactics are used least often? Protest tactics are among the least frequently used, despite evidence that suggests that protest and/or violent tactics can produce successes for outsider organizations (Gamson 1990). Petition drives and direct services are also infrequently utilized tactics. These activities are time intensive and yield

uncertain outcomes, particularly given the national level agendas that many of the organizations in the study hold.

Are African American organizations today more likely to use protest and litigation strategies as their past suggests? Do women's organizations tend to focus on lobbying, litigation, and direct grassroots work as their past suggests? Will homeless groups rely more on direct service and protest strategies? Are there differences among the various types of marginalized groups concerning the types of tactics they are likely to use? There are few tactic use differences among the groups. Exceptions to this are grants (utilized more by African American groups); protests (utilized the least by homeless groups); direct services (used more by homeless groups); and voter education and voter drives (used more by African American groups).

Why do homeless organizations use protest strategies the least, particularly given their outsider status and the sense that their members really have nothing to lose? The answer to this puzzle lies in part in the timing of the formation of these organizations. The older organizations, the same ones that have received most of the media attention, developed out of civil rights struggles and adopted the tactics of these organizations, but as these organizations have changed, their strategies and tactics have adapted. The homeless organizations that developed later (primarily during the 1980s) were formed in a time of increasing public and congressional attention to the issue of homelessness. Several of these groups were founded by people close to the seats of national power. It follows that these groups would adopt more mainstream and less radical tactics.

Protests are infrequently utilized by these groups and do not produce success for the groups. Many respondents, however, *believe* that these strategies can be quite

successful, but also have negative unintended consequences. Several of the homeless organizations in the study provide direct services in addition to their advocacy work (or put more accurately, do advocacy work in addition to providing direct services). And a couple of these organizations are well known for their protest tactics. One organization in particular has utilized protest tactics, including holding rallies, interrupting public meetings, and engaging hunger strikes frequently since its inception in the 1970s. When asked about their use of these tactics, the response was surprising. The organization's sense was that though these tactics had been quite successful in garnering public attention for their issues (and in some cases leveraging resources for their work), they also have a down side, particularly fasting activities. "The problem is that fasting for public consciousness raising is OK, but it is not OK for blackmailing officials to get what you want," which is essentially what the tool had come to be used for. "Blackmailing" techniques such as this one are seen as effective, albeit extreme, ways to garner attention for immediate relief. However, solving the problem of homelessness requires what this leader referred to as "accommodating" the problem: addressing affordable housing, a living wage, and on-demand drug treatment. The problem of homelessness cannot be solved using protest techniques. According to the respondent, success requires that the issue become a priority, both locally and nationally. These tactics will give the issue immediate attention, but this attention is fleeting and ultimately the tactic does not help in achieving long-term success.

Most Frequently Used Tactics

Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of the most used tactics with percentages of use by group. Respondents were asked what the organization's three most frequently used

strategies are, providing information not just about the types of tactics used, but also about the tactics to which organizations devote most of their resources.

[insert Table 4.2 here]

The most popular strategy used by all organizations is public education. Other popular tactics used include networking, training and technical assistance, and policy analysis. This differs by group. For African American organizations, the most used tactics include networking, voter education and drives, and public education. For women's organizations, the most frequently adopted tactics include public education, policy analysis, litigation, leadership development and networking. For homeless organizations, the most frequently adopted strategies include public education, direct service provision, policy analysis, and training and technical assistance.

Given the issues and goals of the organizations surveyed, it should and does follow that public education is the most frequently used tactic. All of the organizations have a sense of the importance of grassroots support for their work, used to both support and push their national level agendas. This is true whether or not the organizations have a grassroots or other type of membership base. Even groups without a membership base will frequently employ public education for this purpose.

Networking is at least *perceived* by many of these organizations to be critical to achieving their goals, though does not directly translate into success. The use of collaborations and coalitions to achieve goals is a frequently used tactic, and is also cited by organizations as highly successful. Given the proliferation of interest and advocacy groups across the nation, working through collaborations and coalitions became increasingly popular in the 1980s and continues today (Berry 1997; Hula 1999; Rozell

and Wilcox 1999). Many foundations now require collaborative activity as a requisite for certain grants, a fact pointed out by many respondents. But these coalitions also serve functions other than merely meeting a grant requirement. They allow greater access and leverage, particularly in congressional lobbying and in public education around specific areas. Other activities the coalitions are used for include publications; conferences; information exchange; and coordinating work (including decreasing competition between similar organizations). Despite the sense of the utility of collaboratives and coalitions, this tactic does not correlate with outcome success. The most frequently cited positive result is greater access to and impact on legislators on the Hill. However, this also does not produce any tangible legislative success, nor does it correlate with overall perceived success (analysis not shown). Why is this?

The downsides and struggles of networking and collaborative building at the national level are considerable. Negative aspects of collaborative work mentioned by respondents include the increased time involved; varying levels of commitments of other organizations with no enforcement mechanism; increased expenses; and little ability to control the message of collaborative partners. In response to these problems, several organizations have developed processes to restrict the type of coalitions they join as well as the types of activities in which they will take part. Developing Memoranda of Understanding at the start of collaborative relationships is an increasingly used enforcement mechanism. These organizations frequently work in this manner and hope that the work will be successful and rewarding. This was put most eloquently by one respondent who stated that “being in a collaborative is like playing in an orchestra—each member has a different instrument, but together you make beautiful music.”

The third most used tactic differs by group. African American groups focused more on voter education and drives, women's organizations focused more on formal institutional interactions (policy work and litigation), and homeless groups focused more on direct service provision and training and technical assistance (an extension of direct service provision). This finding supports the expectation that marginalized groups use different tactics, with the exception of protest tactic use. These differences reflect target population needs. Whereas homeless groups must provide services, women's and African American groups tend to be focused more on pushing the national agenda to benefit group members as a whole.

Organization leaders perceive that their most successful tactics are those to which they dedicate the most resources (findings not presented). This result is intuitive: organizations actively pursue and devote large proportions of their resources to tactics that they *at least think* are effective. From the perspective of organization leaders, the most successful tactics include public education, networking, policy analysis and direct service provision.

Tactic use is driven by many factors, but key among them are resources and staff expertise. One organization staffed primarily by attorneys described an attempt to expand their repertoire of tactics by engaging in community organizing in addition to their more traditional litigation work. They stopped this expansion because they found the learning curve for the work too high, driving costs up and benefits down, and diverting them from their original mission. The same group also expanded into policy analysis and research, but stopped this work as "policy analysis and research is costly, time consuming and diverts us from the work we are trained to do." Many of the groups

interviewed mentioned retrenching the number and type of tactics they have employed in recent years. This was particularly true for the women's organizations. In times of limited resources, organizations "focus on the skills where they are best suited."

Walker's Inside/Outside Tactics¹⁷

Walker's (1991) notable study of interest groups differentiates between types of tactics, that is, inside and outside tactics. Though his inside tactics, or "close consultation with political and administrative leaders," are primarily afforded only to those with close connections to the seats of power and thus seldom to members of marginalized communities, outside tactics, or "appeals to the public through the mass media and efforts at the broad-scale mobilization of citizens at the grassroots," are the work of more formalized interest groups and less formalized social movements alike (Walker 1991, 9). Outside tactics affect both public opinion and actions made by elected and appointed officials at the same time. The success of these types of advocacy and interest groups depends upon these appeals and their ability to engage active membership and participation from marginalized communities. This process, however, is often hampered by the effects of being marginalized (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001), as well as by the amount of resources groups are able to garner to continue their work (Walker 1983). Walker suggests "groups seeking to further a cause thrive on controversy and must gain the attention of the mass media in order to convince their patrons of the organization's potency, and also to communicate effectively with their far-flung constituents" (Walker 1991, 12). These types of groups are more likely to use outside tactics.

¹⁷ Walker refers to inside versus outside "strategies"—here I call them tactics.

How do the organizations in this study fall out in terms of inside versus outside tactics? The organizations in this study are considered to be ‘outsiders’ in most of the literature on interest groups, predicted to be less likely to use mainstream pressure tactics and power plays. To see if this holds true, I test Walker’s (1991) typology in two ways. In the first test, I compare his typology with the tactics used generally and most frequently by the organizations in this study. In the second test, I perform a factor analysis on the tactics considered in this study and compare the results to Walker’s factors. His typology holds in both cases.

In the first test, I compare Walker’s typology with the tactics used generally by the organizations in this study as well as the most frequently used tactics. Almost sixty-three percent of the organizations studied use inside tactics, as opposed to a use of 82.9% of Walker’s outside tactics, for a difference of approximately 20%. This is also true by group, with a difference favoring outside tactics of 23.9% for homeless groups, 20.8% for women’s groups, and 11.5% for African American groups.

Turning to the most frequently used tactics from table 4.2, the differences between inside and outside strategy use are less remarkable. Overall, groups rated inside tactics in their top three used tactics 12.4% of the time, whereas outside tactics were rated in their top three used tactics 20% of the time, for a differences of 8%. African American groups rated inside and outside tactics closely, for a difference of only 3% favoring outside tactics. The difference was highest for women’s groups at 11%, and 7% for homeless organizations.

Outside tactics are used more frequently by these organizations than inside tactics because of resources (scarce for most of these groups) and access. Access is particularly

important, as most of these groups discuss this as a struggle that they have attempted to overcome through the use of coalitions and collaboratives. Related to the issue of access are rules about lobbying. Most of these organizations have 501(c)(3) ratings, meaning that they have limited allowances for lobbying, and indeed many feel that they are in fact not allowed to lobby (see Berry 2003). Few of them have 501(c)(4) ratings to lobby, and even fewer have PACs that would allow them to make campaign contributions. Though most of the organizations noted that they do some form of lobbying (80% overall), they do not mean lobbying in the traditional sense. When pressed, these organizations noted that their ‘lobbying’ efforts come in the form of public education directed at members of Congress and the executive branch. In reality, the organizations are engaged in focused public education work (still an outside tactic), as opposed to more formal, traditional lobbying (an inside tactic). This lends even more credence to the assertion that these types of groups are more likely to employ outside tactics.

Homeless groups engage fewer institutional tactics but more individual change tactics. This finding accurately reflects the focus, work and influence of these organizations. Even national level homeless organizations work, for the most part, with individuals in their population. Individual change tactics are the bedrock of homeless organizations, as the population has immediate needs that must be met in order to ensure survival. Focusing on the national level, institutional tactics that traditionally require more resources and access must come last. On the other hand, individual change tactics are used less on whole by African American groups. This finding also reflects the traditional focus and work of these organizations. Though many have local branches that work with community members (see Chapter 5 for more discussion), these organizations

have been a part of the American political scene for the better part of a century, have made impressive in-roads into our institutions (see Chapter 6 for more discussion), and have developed tactics that focus on national level politics and institutions.

In my second test of Walker's typology, I perform a factor analysis of the tactics considered in this study and compared the results to Walker's factors. His original factors hold with a minor modification/expansion of the typology. Table 4.3 displays the results of the factor analysis and lays out four factors. The first grouping is characterized by institutional tactics and includes litigation; lobbying; petitions; protest; and public education. The second underlying tactic centers around individual change and includes individual advocacy, direct service provision and volunteer work, with policy analysis and public education showing a negative impact. The third grouping focuses on outreach tactics and includes grants and networking. The fourth concerns civic education and includes leadership development, organization formation and training and technical assistance.

[insert Table 4.3 here]

Do these four groupings mirror Walker's inside/outside groupings? In general, the answer is yes. The institutional tactics closely mirror Walker's inside tactics. The other three tactic groupings reflect extensions of Walker's outside tactics. Though individual change strategies, outreach strategies and civic education strategies were not an explicit part of Walker's factor analysis, the tactics subsumed under these categories represent an extension of the possible grassroots strategies considered by Walker. This presents an interesting way to expand Walker's typology for the types of organizations that rely more on outsider tactics. I believe this expanded typology has emerged from my

study for two reasons. First, my interview protocol includes several more and different types of outsider tactics than Walker's does, providing richer information about the different factors of tactics that emerge from analysis. Second, my sample was limited to outsider groups, whereas Walker's included both insider and outsider groups. Again, it makes sense that more information would emerge from this study about the different forms and clusters of outside tactics.

Do these factors impact success? In bivariate analyses (analyses not shown), the answer is mostly no. Using a one-tailed test, none of these factors impact outcome or legislative success in the hypothesized directions, though the use of civic education tactics is a significant predictor of lowered perceived success as is the institutional tactics factor. The tactics in the civic education factor represent local level activities, and the experience of community organizers shows that sustained change at the community level takes a long time and is difficult to achieve. Because it is difficult, long-term work with fewer tangible wins along the way, it makes sense that engaging in this type of work produces a decreased perception of success. It is natural that the use of institutional tactics subsumed under the institutional tactic produce decreased perceptions of success. These tactics are costly and tend to work best for organizations with resources, power and contacts, of which the organizations in my study have little.

The individual tactic factor increases legislative success in one-tailed tests, and I imagine that this factor actually serves as a proxy for the homeless organization who engage many of these tactics (notably direct service, volunteer work and individual advocacy) and have significantly greater legislative outcomes.

In multivariate models, there is too much multicollinearity among the factors to use, particularly when combined with radicalness of demands. For that reason, in the following section on the impact of different strategies and tactics on success, only the individual tactics are included in the analyses and not the factors.

Impact of Strategies and Tactics on Success

The most important question for social movement and advocacy organizations to answer is whether and how their tactic and strategy choices produce success. Chapter 3 lays out three measures of success: outcome (success for the group members as a whole), legislative (success in Congress), and perceived success (success from the perspective of the organization leaders). In the following sections, I test whether and how the use of different strategies and tactics impact success through bi-variate analyses of the entire sample (Table 4.4), multivariate analyses of the entire sample (Table 4.6), and bi-variate analyses by group (Table 4.5).

[insert Table 4.4 here]

[insert Table 4.5 here]

[insert Table 4.6 here]

The first part of the internal success equation is that success is a function of what groups are asking for and how they are asking for it. Radical undertakings are unlikely to meet with much success, particularly in the short run. More modest goals are much more attainable. How radical an organization's demands are determines to a large extent the path the organization will take to achieve their goals (Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000). And because of the nature of our political system, a reformist agenda will be easier to achieve than a radical agenda, as will tactics aimed at incremental change. The more

radical goals are, the lower the levels of success will be. This should be true for all types of success.

The debate that has received more attention in the political science and sociology literatures than strategy choices is about which tactics work best: traditional interest group tactics like lobbying and litigation (Walker 1990), or unusual or violent tactics like protests and public disruptions (Gamson 1990). Insider, more institutional tactics, should produce greater amounts of success *only if* these organizations actually have any influence. Much of the interest group literature suggests they do not, or do not have as much as other types of interest groups (Walker 1990). As outsiders, it is unlikely that these groups will have significant amounts of power and influence. I do not expect the use of inside tactics will influence any type of success, with the possible exception of perceived success. Perceived success may be dampened by the use of insider tactics. As outsiders, engaging a system that requires tremendous resources often is not fruitful, and it is likely that the leaders of these organizations will be more cognizant of and willing to admit their failures in this arena, an area where they are generally not expected to succeed. The only exception to this should be for the African American organizations. Litigations has traditionally been a major tactic employed by this group, and has been shown to have been tremendously effective, both at changing law, but also at changing public opinion over time, both directly and indirectly (Rosenberg 1991). Litigation tactics have been a catalyst for major civil rights changes, and the fruits of this should show up in the group level analyses.

Outsider tactics, particularly protests and public disruptions, have been found to positively impact outcome success. Gamson's (1975) work suggests that unusual tactics

and/or violence should be an excellent predictor of success. His argument holds that the willingness to use violence and the ability of a group to avoid arrest produces success (Gamson 1975), or is at least more effective than other tactics (Morris 1993). This is supported by other work that shows disruption tactics more than institutional tactics produce success for marginalized groups (Piven 2003; Piven and Cloward 1977). However, more recent work has shown that the success of these tactics is context specific. Most recently, it has been shown that these tactics have no impact or depress success if the context is not sympathetic to the contested issues (Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003). This has been particularly true for the past 30 years, which covers the time period of this study. I expect to find that the use of protest and public disruptions during the period of this study will either produce no effect or actually have a dampening impact on all forms of success.

In addition to the use of the outside tactic of protests, I also think it is important to look specifically at public education tactics. The majority of the organizations included in this study use public education tactics to change norms in the hopes of increasing outcome success for group members and to engage the public in an informal (and legal) lobbying campaign. Public education work is used to inform the public about issues and possibly change unfavorable perceptions, but more importantly, this tactic is undertaken to build movements, placing both direct and indirect pressure on decision makers to produce change. In theory, the use of this tactic should produce greater outcome success. But norms change is hard, long-term work, unlikely to produce the long-term change measured in outcome success. It is also unlikely to help produce legislative success. Though we hear anecdotally about the importance of constituent opinions in Congress,

there is little evidence to support this, particularly for groups that tend to have lower levels of voter turnout and few resources for campaign contributions.

Overall, these internal factors play an important role in determining the results of movements, particularly radical demands, protests, public education and lobbying. Increased radicalness should produce decreased success. The organizations in this study will not have enough power and clout to impact changes in Washington, despite the fact that many use insider tactics. And outsider tactics, at least in the context of the last quarter of the 20th century, mostly have no effect and in some cases actually depress success.

The determinants of success should also differ by group. For African American organizations, certain tactics should increase success, particularly litigation, legislation, protests, and public opinion appeals (Colby 1985; Kingslow, Horton & View, 2000; Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1982; Rosenberg 1991). In particular, I expect this to produce changes in outcome success as opposed to legislative success. The combination of these tactics produced success in Congress and the courts 40 years ago, and because of these successes, these organizations continue to use them. Though they no longer seem to work in the legislative arena for the new demands of these groups, the cumulative impact of the past successes over time should produce enhanced collective benefits for groups today. I also expect that the core tactics of women's organizations should continue to be successful, in particular lobbying, litigation, and work with their grassroots membership base (Gelb and Hart in Giugni, McAdam & Tilly 1999). Finally, I expect homeless groups to be more successful when they use direct service tactics, producing support for

arguments to further their cause for status quo program, and to have dampened success when they use protests and public disruption (Cress and Snow 2000; Lipsky 1968).

Four hypotheses follow from the set of expectations discussed above. First, strategy matters. The more radical a group's demands are the less likely they are to achieve their goals. Second, inside tactics will not produce success. Inside tactics can only impact legislative success, and will do so only if these groups are considered power brokers at the national level. Given the outsider nature of the groups, this is unlikely and thus I do not expect the use of inside tactics to produce success. Third, outsider tactics are unlikely to increase success and may actually depress all types of success rates. They either turn off the public and decision makers to a particular cause, and/or their cumulative effects are inadequate to impact real or lasting change. And finally, the determinants of success will differ by group, particularly for tactics. Certain tactics will lend themselves to success for one group but not for another. In each of the sections that follow, I discuss the results of the correlation and multivariate analyses by type of success and then draw conclusions about the importance of strategies and tactics for marginalized groups working today.

Outcome Success

Outcome success is a measure of the benefits that members of a group receive as a result of the collective efforts of advocacy organizations and movements. In terms of internal factors, it is most dependent upon what groups are asking for, though this will differ by group. The determinants of outcome success have been challenging for social scientists to establish because of the difficulty attributing causality and teasing out the direct and indirect effects of the various factors important to significant social changes.

Advocating for radical changes at the societal level is likely to meet with dampened outcome success, but this is an indirect relationship (Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000). Protest and violent tactics have been found to increase outcome success in the past (Gamson 1990), but are not likely to have this effect in the current context (Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003), nor will other outsider tactics. Inside tactics are not developed for change at this level and therefore will not impact outcome success.

Table 4.4 displays the correlations between each of the strategies and tactics and success. This table shows that, not controlling for other factors, two tactics are related to increased outcome success: providing technical assistance and leadership development work. Both of these activities help to support the long term efforts of a movement by ensuring its future (leadership development) and increasing the competency of the advocates (training and technical assistance). However, neither of these tactics are significant in multivariate models (analyses not shown). The correlations also show that radicalness of demands dampens outcome success as predicted, as does the provision of grants and publications. These results tell two possible stories. First, some activities, no matter how well intended, detract from efforts to create change. Activities like publishing journals and providing research grants may appear on the surface to forward agendas, but instead they divert resources and attention away from the things that really work. Though there is no evidence to support this claim, it does provide an interesting direction for future research. The other is that these findings are only marginally statistically significant, and when other activities are controlled for, they actually have no impact on success.

The multivariate model displayed in Table 4.6¹⁸ shows that only the strategic choice of radical demands has a significant impact on outcome success. As radicalness increases, outcome success decreases. The converse is particularly true: the organizations with less radical goals have increased success rates. And as predicted, neither the inside nor the outside tactics impact outcome success. If public education produces norms change, it does not do so in a way that enhances the collective benefits for group members. And for the time period of this study, protests and public disruptions also do not have an impact on this form of success. Why do the overall findings not correspond with those of other studies examining tactic choice and success? Do these findings lend credence to arguments about the importance of opportunity structure? The answer is both yes and no. Individual tactics in isolation cannot explain outcome success, though the early and continued choice to make highly radical demands does. This issue is examined further in Chapter Six.

The correlations with success by group tell a different story. For the African American organizations, outcome success is enhanced by the use of protest strategies, litigation, and lobbying. This reflects the common wisdom and understanding of the factors that produced the success of the civil rights movement for civil rights, litigation and protest worked, and over time produced collective benefits for group members. In addition, organization formation, training and technical assistance, community organization and leadership development are significantly related to success. This

¹⁸ Because of multicollinearity problems with the multivariate models, I have pared the models down to the few key variables critical to resolve the two key debates addressed in this chapter: does radicalness impact success, and which works best, inside or outside tactics (lobbying versus protests). The public education variable is included because this is the most frequently cited tactic used by the organization and crosses outsider goals (norms change) with insider goals (grassroots lobbying).

reflects the work to expand the civil rights movement at the local level around the country, and as Chapter Five will show, working through an affiliate structure supported by activities like organizational and leadership development is correlated with increased success. We also see that what works for some groups does not work for others. Though voter education is not important for the other groups, it appears to actually dampen the success of homeless groups, as does the use of litigation and lobbying tactics. In fact, none of the tactics explored here produce increased outcome success for women's and homeless organizations. At least for the homeless organizations, this is because change takes time, and these groups have had less time to improve the collective benefits for their constituents.

Legislative Success

Legislative (or policy) success is rarely impacted by the efforts of social movement and advocacy organizations, though this can happen (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2002; Goldfield 1989; Walker 1990; Williams and Matheny 1989), particularly if the issue at hand is largely uncontested (Neustadtl 1990). The issues that these organizations represent are highly contested. The lesson from anecdotal studies of efforts to effect legislative success by social movement and advocacy organizations is that to the extent that we are able to show that an advocacy organization can to impact legislative success even in a minor way, that success is a real coup and show of their strength. However, given the low levels of influence of these organizations and the highly contested nature of their issues, I do not expect insider or institutional tactics to produce legislative success. In addition, like for outcome success, increased radicalness of

demands ought to dampen legislative success, as these demands fly in the face of the slow and incremental change characterized by the US Congress.

In the overall correlations, the only tactic that increases success is direct service provision. Because this tactic is used the most by homeless organizations and because of the increased legislative success of these groups (see Chapter Three, Tables 1 through 4), I believe that this is an artifact of their success in this arena. Several tactics dampen legislative success, including research and surprisingly, lobbying and voter education work. What is going on here? Just as direct service serves as a proxy for the homeless groups, I also believe that lobbying and voter registration may serve as proxies for the African American groups, groups who have dampened legislative success for the period of this study (again, see Chapter Three, tables 1 through 4).

In the multivariate analyses, none of the inside tactics nor the outside tactics used by the organizations have a significant impact on legislative success. Though these organizations engage inside tactics, their use of lobbying, litigation and policy work does not produce positive effects for them. Why doesn't lobbying work? First, this finding is in part an artifact of the dampened legislative success of the African American organizations. Second, and more importantly, what does not show up in these analyses is the effective rear guard efforts engaged by many lobbyists to protect changes that have already been made from retrenchment. In fact, it is possible (though I certainly cannot conclude this from my findings) that these organizations have been quite successful in their lobby efforts evidenced by the fact they there have been so few rollbacks in past legislative changes, rollbacks strongly advocated by opposition groups.

Contrary to my expectations, radicalness of demands also has no impact on legislative success. The Congress is a moderate body, and it is reasonable to expect that the more radical a group's demands, the less likely the group will be to meet with success in that arena. Instead, these findings suggest that radicalness of demands has no impact on legislative success. In parsing out the distribution of radicalness by legislative success, I find that the groups with the greatest legislative success do have the least radical demands. However, what throws this finding off is that for the groups that achieve some forward progress in Congress, their radicalness levels are bi-modal¹⁹. The results are not significant because the relationship between level of radicalness and legislative success only holds in the case where legislative success is at its highest level and level of radicalness is at its lowest. In short, the relationship is not linear and as such is not significant in these analyses.

The correlations by group laid out in Table 4.5 also shows that the only tactics that increases legislative success are providing direct services and organization formation, both for the homeless organizations. The direct service organizations are primarily the homeless organizations, and the goals of these organizations closely mirror and are supported by the legislation of the McKinney Act and its subsequent revisions, thus producing this success. The finding about organization formation is more difficult to explain. It is possible that this is about the success of the larger, nationwide homeless organizations with expanding local affiliates and their strong connections to the resources provided by McKinney and its revisions.

¹⁹ I attempted several transformations to model this but none produced significantly different results.

Legislative success is dampened for African American organizations that are involved in community organizing. This tactic is used most often by organizations that are less concerned with national or group level change and instead are focused on individual outcomes and local community building efforts. These organizations are not likely to push their agenda at the national level, and therefore it makes some sense that focusing on these types of activities will mean that the organization has little or no influence on national policy. What is most surprising in these models is that none of these strategies or tactics are related to the success of women's organizations in Congress. The implications of this finding are twofold. Women's organizations have not been successful in advancing their agenda in Congress. However, the inside tactics used by these organizations have been largely successful in blocking attempts to erode the past efforts these groups have made by opposition groups. The current women's organizations now serve as the rear guard of the successes of the past.

Perceived Success

I expect that organizations with radical agendas will perceive themselves to be less successful, cognizant of the incremental nature of American politics and the difficulty they face in realizing their goals. I also expect to find that the use of insider tactics, an area where these groups have little power, will result in decreased perceived success, particularly when used by civil rights and homeless groups that have a larger population of "low status minorities" (Simon 1998).

In the correlations (Table 4.4), increased radicalness does dampen the sense of success. Because protests are strongly correlated with increasingly radical demands, I also expected that the use of protests would dampen perception of success, but it has no

effect. The use of lobbying dampens perception of success as I anticipated. Lobbying is difficult and these groups have little real power and to date have shown few significant victories in this arena. Their leaders recognize this fact. Related to this is the difficulty with networks designed to increase influence, both in Congress and with public opinion. As discussed earlier, this is time-consuming work with elusive rewards. Several other tactics also dampen the perception of success, particularly organization formation and community organizing. These are all local level tactics, and the experience of community organizers shows that sustained change at the community level takes a long time and is difficult to achieve. Because it is such difficult, long-term work with fewer tangible wins along the way, it makes sense that engaging in this type of work produces a decreased perception of success. None of the tactics increase perceived success, and none of these strategies and tactics were significant in the multivariate models. Perception of success has to do with something other than strategies and tactics.

The results of the correlation analyses by group are equally mysterious. None of the strategies and tactics related to an increase or decrease of perception of success for leaders of the women's organizations. However, the use of several of the tactics dampens the perception of success for the African American and homeless groups. For African American organizations, dampened perception of success is related to lobbying, leadership development, and community organizing. These are the organizations trying to build the next wave of the civil rights movement as well as protect the gains from the last, and in Congress and in public opinion, have met fewer and fewer successes. Their rear-guard efforts to shore up past achievements have also not been successful. And the

leaders of these organizations have been consistently under attack, both personally and professionally.

For the homeless groups, the most significant of the negative strategies and tactics include radicalness, lobbying and protests. This makes sense. The use of these tactics *ought* to dampen perception of success. If you don't have resources and you are trying to compete in the lobby world against well-funded corporations and interests, it must feel like you are butting your head against a wall, decreasing your sense of success by the comparison. And if you are using protests and violent tactics it means that by definition your group is on the outside and is battling against an adversarial system. This ought to dampen your sense of success, particularly in the current political climate in which the use of these tactics are no longer in vogue and met with hostility (see for example all of the regulations meant to dampen organized protest during the most recent Presidential Inauguration celebration).

These findings have an important implication for these types of organizations. Though organization leaders perceive certain tactics to be successful (see discussion of Table 4.2) and perceive their work to be successful (see Chapter Three, tables 1 through 4), in fact there is little direct relationship between the use of these "successful" tactics and the actual and perceived success. This has tremendous practical implications for these organizations. The most immediate of these is the need to develop a system that accurately reflects actual organization work and accomplishments as opposed to imagined ones.

Conclusions

Advocacy groups are the vehicles that marginalized communities use to advance their concerns and well-being at the national level. The strategies and tactics used by these organizations are the means by which they try to advance their constituents' goals. The analyses presented in Tables 4.4 through 4.6 discussed above support the four hypotheses of this chapter. First, strategy matters. The analyses presented here indicate that a critical early strategy choice does impact success. The choice to pursue a highly radical agenda, and the institutionalization of that agenda into organizational structures that preclude its co-optation and moderation over time, dampen outcome success. In addition, groups with the most moderate agendas tend to meet with greater legislative success. Second, taken together these organizations are unable to effectively engage inside tactics to produce change. The only exception to this is for African American groups. The combined use of litigation and protests over time have produced increased outcome success. Third, they are also unable to effectively engage outside tactics to produce change. Strategy and tactic use alone does not predict outcome or legislative success. The findings of this chapter both support and represent a shift in the social movement and interest group literatures concerning the use and importance of different types of strategies and tactics. And finally, the experiences of the different groups are just that, different. What works for one does not work for the others.

Why is there a difference between some of the extant literature on strategies and tactics and these findings, particularly findings about the efficacy of protests and unusual strategies? First, the work of Gamson and others is not applicable to contemporary groups because the context in which they now operate is so different. Research on

outcomes and tactics suggests that tactic choices and success are context dependent (Barker 1994; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003; Tarrow 2003). For example, in some instances violence and protest strategies work, and in other instances they are not always a viable or the best option (Lipsky 1968). The answer is that these groups have employed tactical innovations, changing as the context in which they operate changes. Second, the purpose of protest and public disruption tactics is to get attention, period. To effectively engage this tactic, it is more important to catch the public's eye than to give the public a message that yours is the good cause and the right side, because there is no guarantee that the attention groups receive will be positive. Third, history lays out that producing change from these tactics is difficult, and is dependent upon the demonstration of a credible threat to stability. Though this has recently worked in some parts of the world (see for example the 1994 uprising in Chiapas, Mexico), in western society creating such a threat seems less and less likely (for more discussion, see della Porta in Guigni, McAdam & Tilly 1999).

The findings from this chapter also represent a series of disconnects for advocacy organizations. First, there is a disconnect between the thinking of leaders about tactics and their organization's actual use of tactics. This is made clear in the differences between the levels the leaders think are most important to work at and the level their work actually represents. Second, there is a disconnect in leader thinking about the strategies and tactics organizations use and their reflections on the utility of those strategies and tactics. Given the broad ranging organizational goals, the tactics that organizations use do not seem to help them in achieving their ends directly, despite the fact that the leaders of the organizations see at least some of these tactics as producing

success. These groups take their ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ tactics too seriously. And on the whole perception of success does not match actual success as measured in this study.

In the long run, what matters for groups is what they ask for and the context in which they are asking, and how they ask for it is a function of their demands. The more radical a group’s demands, the more difficult it is for the group to have their demands met. Success is a function of what is possible and what a group is demanding. The findings presented here suggest that with the exception of radicalness of demands, examining strategies and tactics in isolation is unlikely to shed light on what produces change. Tactics and strategies alone do not tell the entire story. Characteristics of the organizations themselves have a great deal to do with outcomes and interact with the strategies and tactics in ways that alter our understanding of what produces success. The next chapter takes up these issues, examining the range of ways these organizations differ and the impact of these characteristics on success.

Table 4.1
Cross-Tabulation between the Strategy of Level of Work and Group

	African American	Women	Homeless	Total
National	25% (2)	8.3% (1)	60% (9)	34.3% (12)
Local	37.5% (3)	50% (6)	20% (3)	34.3% (12)
Mix	37.5% (3)	41.7% (5)	20% (3)	31.4% (11)
Total	8	12	15	35

Chi-square= 8.350*

Table 4.2
Most Frequently Used Tactics

	Afri American	Women	Homeless	Total
Lobbying	0% (0)	2.8% (1)	8.9% (4)	4.8% (5)
Litigation	0% (0)	8.3% (3)	2.2% (1)	3.8% (4)
Policy Analysis	0% (0)	11.1% (4)	11.1% (5)	8.6% (9)
Training/ Technical Assistance	8.3% (2)	8.3% (3)	11.1% (5)	9.5% (10)
Grants	0% (0)	2.8% (1)	0% (0)	.09% (1)
Protests	4.2% (1)	2.8% (1)	0% (0)	1.9% (2)
Organization Formation	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)
Individual Advocacy	4.2% (1)	0% (0)	4.4% (2)	2.9% (3)
Petition Drives	0% (0)	2.8% (1)	0% (0)	.09% (1)
Community Organizing	8.3% (2)	2.8% (1)	6.6% (3)	5.7% (6)
Research or Evaluation	4.2% (1)	2.8% (1)	2.2% (1)	2.9% (3)
Public Education	12.5% (3)	25.7% (9)	20% (9)	20% (21)
Conferences	0% (0)	2.8% (1)	4.4% (2)	2.9% (3)
Publications	4.2% (1)	2.8% (1)	0% (0)	1.9% (2)
Leadership Development	4.2% (1)	8.3% (3)	0% (0)	3.8% (4)
Direct Services	8.3% (2)	2.8% (1)	13.3% (6)	8.6% (9)
Voter Education/ Drives	12.5% (3)	2.8% (1)	0% (0)	3.8% (4)
Networking	16.7% (4)	8.3% (1)	6.6% (3)	9.5% (10)
Volunteer Coordination	4.2% (1)	2.8% (1)	6.6% (3)	4.8% (5)
n	24	36	45	105

Table 4.3
Factor Analysis of Tactics

	Factor 1: Institutional Tactics	Factor 2: Individual Change Tactics	Factor 3: Outreach Tactics	Factor 4: Civic Education Tactics
Litigation	.718	.019	-.142	-.017
Lobbying	.513	-.011	-.223	.382
Petitions	.560	-.044	-.294	-.101
Voter Drives/ Education	-.743	.010	.211	.169
Policy analysis	.237	-.412	-.407	.159
Research or Evaluation	.399	-.179	.189	-.381
Publications	.337	-.276	.204	-.166
Protest	.636	-.044	.048	.141
Community organizing	.611	.136	-.095	-.058
Direct Service	.111	.722	.081	-.127
Public Education	.502	-.617	.122	-.071
Volunteer work	.454	.582	.161	-.066
Individual advocacy	.596	.399	.019	-.282
Networking	.238	-.299	.755	-.144
Grants	-.212	-.147	.471	.212
Organization formation	.013	.193	.439	.625
Leadership development	.278	-.191	-.151	.551
Training/Technical Assistance	.073	.324	.075	.389

Scale Reliability Coefficient: .766

Table 4.4
Summary of Correlation Analysis between Success and Strategies and Tactics

	Outcome Success	Legislative Success	Perceived Success
Radicalness of Demands	-.249*	-.095	-.226*
Collaborative Partners	.030	.138	-.106
Lobbying	-.169	-.319**	-.235*
Litigation	-.143	-.394***	-.179
Policy Analysis	.183	-.138	.058
Training/TA	.228*	-.009	-.096
Grants	-.303**	-.149	-.192
Protest	.023	-.277*	-.216
Org Formation	.034	.061	-.233*
Ind Advocacy	-.062	.214	-.116
Petitions	.028	.025	-.128
Comm Organizing	-.203	-.149	-.271*
Research/Evaluation	-.158	-.297**	.183
Public Education	-.166	-.138	-.077
Publications	-.255*	.099	-.096
Leader Develop	.226*	-.186	-.217
Direct Service	.169	.333**	.116
Voter Reg/Educat	-.203	-.210	-.398***
Networking	-.166	-.008	-.077
Volunteering	-.158	-.019	.079

***= positive impact, significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test

**= positive impact, significant at $p < .05$ using a one-tailed test

*= positive impact, significant at $p < .10$ using a one-tailed test

Table 4.5
Summary of Correlations between Strategies and Tactics and Success by Group

	Outcome Success			Legislative Success			Perceived Success		
	AA	W	H	AA	W	H	AA	W	H
Radicalness of Demands	-.185	.152	-.526**	-.202	-.273	-.014	.183	.131	-.682***
Collaborative Partners	.342	-.294	.223	-.097	-.018	.256	.000	-.307	.032
Lobbying	.798***	-.279	-.381*	-.293	-.614	-.143	-.747**	.322	-.495**
Litigation	.522*	.189	-.651***	-.149	-.137	-.599***	-.311	.066	-.397*
Policy Analysis	--	-.016	.339	--	-.321	.092	--	-.056	.176
Training/TA	.706**	--	--	-.600*	--	--	-.417	--	--
Grants	-.114	-.608**	-.207	.098	.114	-.247	.339	-.219	-.269
Protest	.522*	.064	-.254	-.149	-.311	.043	-.311	.031	-.495**
Org Formation	.522*	-.031	-.099	-.149	-.167	.389*	-.311	-.107	-.323
Ind Advocacy	.000	.376	--	.258	.290	--	.179	.000	--
Petitions	.000	.064	-.064	.258	-.114	.259	-.179	-.157	-.165
Comm Organizing	.870***	-.054	-.594***	-.745**	.097	.150	-.726**	.000	-.308
Research/Evaluation	--	-.016	-.254	--	-.321	-.259	--	.279	.165
Public Education	--	-.016	-.272	--	-.321	.092	--	-.056	-.088
Publications	-.569*	--	-.249	.098	--	.136	.339	--	-.323
Leader Develop	.798***	-.024	.199	-.293	-.456*	.136	-.747**	.166	-.323
Direct Service	-.078	.154	.311	.067	.311	.459	.046	.157	.135
Voter Reg/Educat	.174	.390	-.628*	-.149	-.311	.023	-.311	.031	-.449***
Networking	--	.016	-.272	--	.029	.092	--	-.056	-.088
Volunteering	.078	.189	-.445**	-.067	.068	.023	-.046	.066	-.449***

***= positive impact, significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test
 **= positive impact, significant at $p < .05$ using a one-tailed test
 *= positive impact, significant at $p < .10$ using a one-tailed test

Table 4.6
Ordered Probit Analysis of Strategies and Tactics on Success

	Outcome Success	Legislative Success	Perceived Success
Radicalness of Demands (scale)	-.365* (.238)	-.115 (.239)	-.248 (.238)
Protest (dummy)	.338 (.403)	-.333 (.412)	-.278 (.398)
Public education (dummy)	-.535 (.862)	-.307 (.920)	.165 (.801)
Lobbying (dummy)	-.453 (.507)	-.827 (.534)	-.520 (.498)
Cut Point 1	-2.236 (.895)	-2.638 (1.017)	-2.287 (.895)
Cut Point 2	-1.946 (.884)	-2.128 (.994)	-.993 (.819)
Cut Point 3	-1.860 (.881)	-.769 (.954)	-.024 (.814)
Cut Point 4	-.842 (.854)		
Cut Point 5	-.654 (.851)		
R-squared	.35	.35	
n	.043	.065	

*=significant at p<.10; **=significant at p<.05; ***=significant at p<.01 using 1-tailed tests

Chapter 5: Organization Structure

Piven and Cloward (1979) challenged students of social movements with their assertion that developing movement organizations mitigates the impact of movement forces because leaders are co-opted through the formalizing process. This assertion sparked 25 years of debate about the role and importance of formal organizing (see for example the series of articles in the December 2003 issue of *PS*). At the other end of the spectrum are those that purport that movement organizations forward, not hamper, agendas and help create success by serving as vehicles for organizing and increasing influence (Kling 2003; Skocpol, Ganz and Munson 2000; Skocpol et al 1993). The previous chapter demonstrated that, contrary to the findings of Piven and Cloward and others, marginalized groups during the last quarter of the 20th century did not necessarily produce success through disruption and protest tactics, and that success is in part a function of the decisions made in the organizing process through the choice of how radical organization agendas are going to be. How a group organizes impacts what it does and how it does it: structure, strategies and tactics, and context in combination are all important in producing success generally. But does how groups structure their organizations impact outcome, legislative or perceived success? In this chapter I explore differences in organizing and examine what impact, if any, these differences have on success.

Studies of social movement organizations indicate that organizational differences are important, particularly differences in focus, constituency base, and age. Older organizations, primarily those with a women or an African American focus, originally developed federated structures with individual members (Crowley and Skocpol, 2001).

Federated organizations have a national office with a formal structure of local affiliates around the country. For example, the YWCA developed in 1858 with a federated structure, and today boasts almost 450 local affiliates around the country. This is contrasted to unified organizations, which have a single national office with no formal affiliate structure. The Women's Law Project is a good example of this structure. It is a feminist law firm located in Philadelphia, PA, developed in 1974 and does not have local affiliates, working only out of the Philadelphia office. The importance of the federated structure is that it theoretically generates more access to the community and a stronger grassroots base that has been shown to produce real changes for members (Skocpol, Ganz and Munson 2000; Skocpol et al 1993).

Homeless organizations are different than the women's and African American organizations, having developed more recently and boasting fewer members and unified as opposed to federated structures (Cress and Snow 1996). These organizations are also more likely to provide direct services in addition to their advocacy work, and because of changes in social service provision and funding over the past 20 years, are more likely to have larger staffs and greater funding than the other types of organizations (Lipsky and Smith, 1989-1990). Age is important for all of the organizations. It is correlated with increased resources (Minkoff 1993) and increased size (Kreisi in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1998), impacts type of membership (Mundo 1992) and structure (Crowley and Skocpol 2001).

The design of social movement and advocacy organizations varies, but does this differentially impact success? In this chapter I test two hypotheses about the impact of the design of these organizations on success. First, organizations with federated

structures should have greater outcome and legislative success than organizations with unified structures. The affiliates that are a part of this structure will enable the organizations to draw on a grassroots base that when mobilized can exert pressure and draw attention to issues. Second, as organizations get older, developing more resources and a greater reputation, success should increase. Formalizing and sustaining focus and organization over time will increase influence, leading to greater outcome success in particular.

I find that organizations formed after 1975 have dampened outcome success, and that federated structures produce increased outcome success. Neither age nor structure impacts legislative success; perceived success is dampened only when organizations have a matrix membership base. Finally, though there are differences in organizational structure by group, no meaningful patterns emerge from the analyses, with the exception of the effects of age. I conclude with a discussion of the practical implications of these findings for social movement and advocacy organizations.

Organizational Factors

How do these organizations differ with respect to affiliates, membership types, federated versus unified structures, decision making, and age? I find that the homeless organizations do differ from the others, with fewer affiliates, larger staff sizes, different membership patterns, and more organizations with unified structures. In addition, their average median age is roughly 10 years younger than the African American and women's organizations. I also examine the impact of age on the other organizational factors, and find that on average older organizations have a greater number of affiliates and individual members, and younger organizations are more likely to have no members. In regression

and probit analyses, age has no impact on staff size, budget, and matrix and mixed memberships.

Affiliates

Movements are made of people, and many of the respondents in this study argue that the success of movements is dependent upon having an active and engaged grassroots membership base. One large women's organizations traced back many of their successes to this base, noting specifically that

“the confirmation of John Ashcroft as Attorney General was seen as a done deal at first, and he had support from all Senators. We then mobilized the grassroots, and this changed to several no votes. Senator Feinstein was going to vote yes, but her office got 35,000 calls about this, so she changed her vote the next day.”

This same organizations used their membership to make organizational decision making through their annual meeting, and the membership supports the organizations, providing 90% of their funding. Many of these organizations have found that this type of structure is best supported through an affiliate structure. How many of these organizations have affiliates, and are there differences by group?

The history of the early women's organizations indicates that they developed federated organizations with local affiliates, chosen as the best way to forward their agendas (Crowley and Skocpol 2001; Skocpol et al 1993). Many of the early African American organizations also followed this pattern. I expect to see this trend played out in the organizations in this study, with greater numbers of affiliates for women's and African American organizations than for homeless organizations (Cress and Snow 1996; Crowley & Skocpol 2001). Table 5.1 displays the range and average number of local

affiliates by group. Most of the organizations do not have local affiliates, and of those that do, African American organizations have the most number of affiliates, while homeless organizations have the least number of affiliates.

[insert Table 5.1 here]

Having local affiliates means that groups have a potentially more widespread and entrenched grassroots base. This base can be important in voicing concerns and needs, thus pushing national agendas forward and increasing success. This is tested in the section on success.

Size

A second aspect of organization structure is size. Size can be measured in a number of ways, including staff size, budget, and membership size. Membership size is not included in this study because of two measurement problems. First, there are different types of memberships among the organizations studied, including those with individual members, those with organization members (referred to as matrix organizations by the respondents), groups with no members, and groups with a mix of individual and organization members.

The presence of four possible types of memberships makes equating one with another difficult. For example, the National Black Leadership Roundtable (NBLR) is a matrix organization, and its membership base is comprised of approximately 250 other civil rights organizations. Included in the membership of this organization are groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which boasts literally thousands of individual members. On the surface it appears that the NBLR is a much smaller organization than the NAACP. But if we add all of the

individual members of all of the organization members of the NBLR, the NBLR is a much larger organization than the NAACP. Neither of these options is practical as what membership means and how it is used by the organizations is different in each case. Second, though these organizations were selected because they are membership organizations listed in the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, the estimates and figures in this source are largely incorrect, as established through the interview process (see discussion in Chapter 3). For these reasons, membership size is not included in this study and staff size and budget are used as proxies.

Research on movement, advocacy and interest organizations suggests that when a group's needs are highest and their constituents most at risk, their size increases (Hansen 1985). In recent years, the needs of the homeless have been seen as more pressing and critical than those of women and African Americans. For this reason, and because of the type of work that homeless organizations do marrying both advocacy and direct service, I expect to find that homeless groups will have greater staff sizes. Table 5.1 displays the range and average staff size for the organizations. Most organizations have relatively small staffs, but a few are quite large. As expected, the homeless organizations have the largest staffs, followed by African American organizations and then women's organizations.

This finding has potential implications for the analyses of success that follow. The success measures examine national level change for group members and in Congress, but the work done by several of the homeless organizations, in particular the larger ones, is focused on individual service provision first and national advocacy second. This makes the meaning of staff size comparatively different for the homeless groups

than for the African American and women's organizations (though some of those groups provide direct services as well). In fact, the average staff size for organizations that provide direct services is over 1,000 full time equivalents (FTEs), whereas for groups that do not provide direct service work the average staff size is 13.5 FTEs. To account for this, the success models are run both with and without a control for direct service provision.

Wealth, measured in terms of budget, is also an important measure of size, as funding allows a group to hire staff, organize members, and develop and implement tactics. I expect homeless organizations to have the largest budgets, as they perform both advocacy and direct service work and have "benefited" from shifts in funding for social programs to non-profits from the government (Lipsky and Smith, 1989-1990). Ten years ago, a relatively wealthy advocacy organization was thought to have an annual budget in the low millions (Berry 1997). The organizations in this study run the gamut in terms of budget, with the smallest budget at \$700,000 and the largest of \$69 million. Table 5.1 shows that homeless organizations have the largest budgets, then African American and women's organizations. Using a median measure of budget size to take the outlier organizations into account (results not shown), women's organizations have the largest budgets, then African American organizations, and then homeless organizations. All of the outlier homeless organizations at the high end are direct service providers. If wealth buys influence in Congress, women's organizations ought to have greater legislative success than the other organizations, but they do not. This suggests that wealth for these types of organizations does not buy influence, or at least enough influence to make a difference.

Staff size and budget are highly correlated at .946 (pairwise correlation significant at $p < .000$, results not shown). Though staff size and budget are not necessarily the best measure of an organization's size or strength, and cannot replace a count of actual members, these measures nonetheless are important predictors of an organization's presence on the national advocacy scene. Because the correlation between these two measures is so close, and because there are more observations for staff size than budget, staff size is used as the proxy variable for general size in the analyses that follow.

Membership

Membership type has implications for the kinds of work a group will do as well as the tactics an organization will utilize to attempt to realize its' goals. In cross-tabulations and correlations, the organizations overall are more likely to be involved in litigation and lobbying work if they have an individual membership base (cross-tabulation probability .038 and .076 respectively, analysis not shown). This differs when the analysis is conducted by group, most notably for the women's organizations. Women's organizations are significantly more likely to use litigation and petition tactics if they have an individual membership base (cross-tabulation probability .058 and .030 respectively, analysis not shown). These relationships were not significant for the other groups.

Early organizations tended focus on individual members, but other types of structures have emerged, including matrix organizations, mixes of the two, and organizations with no members. Homeless groups should be the least likely of all of the groups to have individual members because of problems mobilizing their constituency (Cress and Snow 1996), whereas African American and women's organizations will be

more likely to have individual memberships because of their earlier development (Crowley and Skocpol 2001). Table 5.2A shows that overall most of the organizations have no members, and this is followed closely by organizations with individual members. African American organizations are the most likely to have individual memberships, followed closely by women's organizations. Few of the homeless organizations have an individual membership base. Of the homeless organizations with individual members, "membership" is not comprised of the homeless themselves, but of organization supporters who are classified as members because they provide contributions to the organizations. Groups like Covenant House have been particularly adept over the years in building a significant support base, most notably through churches (Covenant House is a Catholic organization and receives significant support from the Church and its members). In the case of the homeless, membership means non-constituents; for African American and women's organizations, membership is made up primarily of constituents. Few of the organizations have a matrix or mixed individual and matrix base.

[insert Table 5.2 here]

Federated versus Unified Structure

The original American voluntary and social movement organizations developed federated structures, with a central, national level organization and local affiliates. But over time this structure has been replaced with unified structures for the younger organizations (Crowley and Skocpol 2001). How do the organizations in this study fall out in terms of structure? Table 5.2B shows that most of the organizations have unitary as opposed to federated structures. The only exception to this is African American organizations, which have more federated structures. The African American

organizations also have more affiliates and a larger individual membership base. This produces more access to the community, and potentially a stronger and louder grassroots base. How does this relate to membership type? Membership type and organization structure are significantly related (cross-tabulation significance is .04, analysis not shown), and unified organizations are far more likely to have either no members or a matrix membership base.

Does a federated structure necessarily translate into a stronger and more visible movement? Anecdotal evidence suggests yes and. Events like the Million Man March and the 2004 Pro-Choice rally attracted hundreds of thousands of people from all over the country to Washington, DC, yet marches for the homeless have been significantly smaller. Federated organizations are able to mobilize their members from across the country when needed as a show of strength. But many of the later organizations decided on unitary structures because these structures are generally easier to develop. They are less expensive, take less time to set up and require less oversight. Whether and how this impacts success is taken up in the success section.

Decision-Making

Organizational structure has significant implications for internal decision making. Federated organizations and organizations with an individual membership base allow for more input from their membership. Table 5.2 C shows how decision-making falls out by group. Decision making for organizations is primarily done by a combination of the organization's board of directors with input from the staff. This holds by group except for the African American organizations, in which decision-making is equally split between those organizations in which it was a mix of board/staff input and those that are

based just on the board of directors, suggesting that African American organizations tend to be less hierarchal. In a few cases, the organizations employ other decision-making structures, primarily through members voting on organization direction and activities. Decision making is significantly related to organizational structure and membership type (cross-tabulation significance is .022 and .082 respectively, analysis not shown). Organizations with no members tend to use staff for major decision making, whereas organizations with individual memberships tend to use alternative decision making structures, most notably using the membership itself through annual meetings to make major organizational decisions. Federated organizations are much more likely to use their board of directors for major decision making.

Why is decision making important? Board decision-making is seen as a more inclusive and membership based approach to running organizations, as opposed to more “top down” staff driven structures. But board decision making is not without problems. An executive director of one of the homeless organizations stated that “board members don’t take their ... roles very seriously and this inhibits our progress at times. The board is made up of member organizations spread all over the United States. A lot come on the Board for what they can get, not what they can give. I [the Executive Director] report to them regularly and try to hold them accountable.” Though this was not a common sentiment among organizational leaders, problems such as this one pose significant barriers for organization and movement advancement.

The “other” structures are held primarily the women’s organizations, in which there is an interplay between direct input from the membership, staff and board in making

decisions and directing the work of the organization. In the case of one large women's organizations,

“decisions are made by two processes. First, public policy issues are structured by a grassroots oriented approach that takes 2 years with feedback between the national and local levels and with a vote at the national convention. This is a structured process and culminates in a vote at the biennial convention. Second, all other decisions are set by a combination of the Executive Director, staff and board together.”

Membership input helps keep these organizations tied to the wishes and needs of the grassroots. Grassroots decision making helps ensure that a movement, when formalized through the development of an organization, is not co-opted, mitigating the concerns raised by Piven and Cloward.

Age of Organizations

Age plays an important role in the structure, reputation, activities and survival of organizations. Age should produce increased resources (Minkokff 1993); increased size (Kreisi in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 19x); impact type of membership with older organizations more likely to have individual members (Mundo 1992) and federated versus unified structures; and increased number of local affiliates (Crowley and Skocpol 2001). Table 5.3 shows the spread of organizational age by group. Women's organizations developed first, followed by African American organizations and then homeless organizations, though on average African American organizations are the oldest. A preponderance of these organizations developed in the early 1970s, reflecting the success of the civil rights movement and in part fueling the interest group explosion in the 1970s and 1980s.

[insert Table 5.3 here]

How does age affect the other organizational factors? Table 5.4 displays the results of a series of regression and probit analyses of the impact of age on structure, size and membership. These analyses show that age has no impact on staff size or budget, but does impact local affiliate count and type of membership. Older organizations have more affiliates: as year established increases (i.e., the younger the organization is) the number of local affiliates decreases. Younger organizations tend to not develop and work through affiliates. Age also impacts the type of membership organizations are likely to have. Newer organizations are more likely to have no members, whereas older organizations are more likely to have individual members. Age has no significant impact on the choice to have organizational members or a mix of organizational and individual members.

[insert Table 5.4 here]

Impact of Organizations on Success

The central debate about organizations is whether or not and how they impact the results of social change efforts. The section above shows that organizational differences vary by group *and* impact what groups do and how they do it. Does this in turn impact success? The findings of this section will show that movement organizations forward agendas and help create success by serving as vehicles for organizing and increasing influence ala Kling (2003), but in subtle, and perhaps unintentional, ways.

Age should be the most important organizational attribute impacting success, particularly outcome and legislative success. Change takes time and the lesson from this study for social movement and advocacy organizations is patience. Younger

organizations ought to have less outcome success than older organizations because they have not had as much time to produce the large scale improvements the groups are looking for as measured in this success variable. To test this, I have generated a dummy variable differentiating between those organizations created before 1975 and those created after.²⁰ I selected this year because it roughly marks the turning point in the formalization and professionalization of social movement organizations that coincided with the interest group explosion. It also marks that start of a national focus on homelessness, fueled in part by the problems returning veterans from Vietnam faced, the closure of major mental hospitals around the country, and the vociferous attention drawn to class issues by homeless advocates like Mitch Snyder of CCNV. I also expect that older organizations will have greater legislative success because they will have had more time to establish relationships in Congress and have developed more prestigious reputations, relatively speaking. These factors should increase access to decision makers in Congress, and by extension increase their levels of legislative success. The effects of age on perceived success are more difficult to untangle. Age seems to work both for and against these organizations: it can bolster their sense of success by the mere fact that they have survived in an often hostile environment, but it also brings challenges with public perception. Many of the leaders of the older organizations interviewed indicated that their organization's age posed a significant barrier in terms of public perception, particularly the women's organizations whose leaders complained of their organizations being seen as "old hat." Because of the split sentiments among the older organizations

²⁰ Testing the actual year organizations were created showed no significance in the analyses, nor did other splits, both before and after 1975.

about the importance of their age, I do not expect age to be a statistically significant predictor of perceived success.

The second organizational factor that ought to impact success is organizational structure. Federated structures generate more access to the community, and potentially a stronger and louder grassroots base (Skocpol, Ganz and Munson 2000; Skocpol et al 1993). This base over time should produce movement and change for these organizations, particularly for outcome success but also for legislative success. Representatives from organizations with federated structures should have more clout because standing behind them are the voices, opinions, and potential votes of hundreds, thousands, and even hundreds of thousands of organization members. They also have greater ability to engage in tactics like GOTV campaigns, petition drives, and so forth, potentially increasing their ability to produce legislative success. Like with age, the impact of structure on perceived success is more difficult to predict. The cognitive psychology literature suggests that low status minorities will have lower perceptions of success, and given that the majority of African American organizations in this study have federated structures, it is possible that perceived success may be dampened when organizational structure is factored into the equation.

Related to organizational structure is type of membership. Forms of membership are significant because they bring different types of resources and pressure. Individual membership organizations are less hierarchal, carrying the word of the “people” with the organization’s agenda, along with their support and voice. On the other hand, matrix organizations are backed by other organizations, in effect serving as a formal collaborative or affinity group, bringing with them leadership, access, and potentially the

power of the individual membership organizations. I anticipate that organizations with an individual membership base will be able to garner grassroots attention to their cause and over time produce greater outcome success. But because these organizations largely represent the African American group, I expect them to have dampened legislative success because of the failures of this group in Congress during the period of study. Finally, again because this category is largely made up of African American organizations and because of the expectation in the cognitive psychology literature of minorities having dampened perceived success, I expect an individual membership base to have either dampened or no impact on perceived success.

The effects of matrix organizations on success should behave differently. These organizations are convened to produce a national presence and pressure to affect movement needs in Washington and across the nation. I expect all three of the success ratings to be positively impacted by matrix organizations because of the explicit purpose of organizations to pressure the national agenda to produce collective benefits. A good example of this is the National Black Leadership Roundtable (NBLR). Their express purpose is to “develop and implement collective initiatives that support the public policy agenda of the CBC and that enhance the political, economic and spiritual development of [Black] people.” The organization is comprised of representatives from all of the major Black organizations, fraternities and sororities. At the national level, they are charged with overseeing the Black Leadership Family Plan, an agenda for supporting and forwarding the status of Blacks in America through the Black Development Fund, which directs giving from the Black community back into Black organizations. Because of the explicit purpose of matrix organizations like this one to put pressure on the national

agenda to produce collective benefits, I expect to find that this type of work will produce increased outcome success. These organizations also have a greater lobbying potential because of the status positions held by their members, frequently the leaders of other notable national organizations. This should be the potential for legislative success through access to members of Congress. These organizations should also have a greater sense of success because their leaders frequently alluded to their “insider” status in national politics in interviews and boasted more of the importance of this than the other organization leaders. This ought to translate into higher levels of perceived success.

The final piece of the puzzle of how organizations impact success is organizational size. On the face, size should positively impact success. As size and resources increase, organizations *ought* to be able to have greater impacts, expanding their reach across the country and influencing change in Congress, and their leaders should be able to reflect this back with increased perceived success ratings. However, research on social movement and interest organizations suggests that when a group’s needs are highest and their constituents most at risk, their size increases (Hansen 1985). This suggests that in fact larger organizations will have decreased success because their problems are greater. In addition, the larger organizations tend to focus most on direct service provision, leaving fewer resources and less time for broad-based, movement work. This should hold for both money and staff size. For these reasons, I expect to find that larger organizations, measured in terms of staff size²¹, will have dampened outcome

²¹ For all of these models, staff size is used as a proxy for size generally. The pairwise correlation between staff size and budget is .946, significant at $p < .000$. Because the correlation between these two measures is so close and there are more observations for staff size than budget, staff size is used as the proxy variable.

success, as the needs of their constituents will be greater and largely unmet, the demands on the organizations for constituent services more, and the time to effect broad based change for members less.

With respect to group focus, the effects of organizational differences should primarily be driven by the effects of age. Because homeless organizations formed on average later than the African American and women's organizations they will naturally be structured and will behave differently and have lower outcome success, but beyond that, I do not expect organizational factors to differentially impact success in any meaningful way by group.

Two major hypotheses emerge from this. First, organizations with federated structures should have greater outcome and legislative success than organizations with unified structures. Organizational factors can make some positive difference for success: organizations matter, though subtly. Contrary to the findings of Piven and Cloward, organizations should provide a vehicle through which groups can focus energy, attention and resources to positively effect change for group members. Second, as organizations get older, developing more resources and a greater reputation, success should increase. Success for these organizations will likely be enhanced most by time. Formalizing and sustaining focus and organization over time will increase influence, leading to greater outcome success in particular.

In the sections that follow, I test the impact of size of organizations, age, membership type and structure on outcome, legislative and perceived success.²² I find

²² Initial analyses suffered from problems with multicollinearity between age and federated versus unified structure. For this reason, two separate models are presented for

that organizations formed after 1975 have dampened outcome success, and that federated structures produce increased outcome success. Neither age nor structure impacts legislative success, and perceived success is dampened by having a matrix membership base. Finally, though there are differences in organizational structure by group, no meaningful patterns emerge from the analyses, with the exception of the effects of age.

Outcome Success

Outcome success is a measure of whether and to what degree movements and their organizations have made a difference for their constituents, improving outcomes and living conditions. Kling (2003) posits that social movement organizations forward movement agendas by serving as vehicles for organizing and increasing influence. But does how social movements formalize into organizations differentially impact that success, particularly outcome success? I anticipate that younger organizations will have less outcome success than older organizations because they have not had as much time to produce the large scale improvements the groups are looking for as measured in this success variable. Change takes time, and as such I expect that older organizations will have greater outcome success than younger ones. Related, organizations with a federated structure will have greater outcome success than those with a unified structure because of their access to the community and potentially stronger and louder grassroots base that over time should produce movement and change for these organizations. I expect membership type to influence outcome success only for matrix organizations, convened to produce a national presence and produce pressure to affect movement needs in Washington. Finally, I expect the larger organizations to have dampened outcome

each of the success variables, one with organization age and the other with federated versus unified structure.

success because of their focus on service provision, leaving fewer resources and less time for broad-based, movement work.

Column 1 of Table 5.5 displays correlations between outcome success and these organizational factors. Age is a significant predictor of outcome success. As the year an organization was founded increases (ie, as the organizations get younger) outcome success decreases. This finding is even more profound when age is parsed out by organizations developed before and after 1975. Achieving outcome success takes time. Federated structures are also significantly related to increased outcome success, and this makes sense. Federated structures generate more access to the community, and potentially a stronger and louder grassroots base to enhance collective benefits for group members. Membership type and size are not significantly related to outcome success.

Table 5.7 displays the results from two ordered probit analyses of the impact organizational factors have on success, the first with an age variable included and the second with a structure variable included. The analysis shows that, as predicted, those organizations created after 1975 have significantly dampened outcome success as compared with those created before 1975. Change takes time, and in a political environment driven by incrementalism, older organizations have a better chance of realizing their goals. It is tempting to also argue that the older organizations are more successful because they, and their goals, have moderated over time. However, in examining the age and radicalness of demands, there is no relationship between the two

(correlation -.115 and not significant). There is also no relationship between age and this strategic choice.²³

The only other significant variable in these analyses is structure²⁴, with organizations that have federated structures showing greater outcome success than those with unified structures. This is in part an extension of the age finding, as those organizations with federated structures also tend to be older. But this is also due in part to the potential power organizations like this have to forward their agendas because of their simultaneous presence at the local, state and national levels and their grassroots base. Implicit in this finding are significant practical implications for groups in the nascent organizing stage and those facing decisions about how to organize and approach their work.

Table 5.6 displays the correlations between success and these variables by group. African American organizations have lower outcome success when they have no members. All of the African American organizations without members are newer organizations (developed sometime between 1970 and 1980), adding more weight to the assertion that outcome success is enhanced by time. Membership type is positively related to outcome success for the women's organizations, particularly for matrix organizations. This finding is largely driven by the organizations that focus on increasing

²³ Though there is no relationship between age and specific tactics, there is a significant relationship between age and three of the factored tactics. Older organizations are more likely to utilize civic education and individual level change tactics (pairwise correlations .3490 significant at $p < .000$ and -.4164 significant at $p < .000$ respectively), and younger organizations are more likely to utilize the factored outreach tactics (most notably grantmaking and networking) (pairwise correlation .3002 significant at $p < .000$). Age was not significantly related to the institutional tactic factor.

²⁴ Additional models were run with a direct service variable included as a control for the size of organizations who provide direct services in addition to their advocacy work. This variable was not significant in any of these models.

women's employment, organizations whose outcome success ratings are higher than those that focus on other issues. Finally, none of these factors impact outcome success, either positively or negatively, for the homeless organizations, except for those created after 1975 that also have dampened outcome success.

[insert Table 5.6 here]

Legislative Success

How do these organizational factors impact legislative success? I expect to find that older organizations will have greater legislative success because they will have had more time to establish relationships in Congress and have developed more prestigious reputations, relatively speaking. These factors should increase access to decision makers in Congress, and by extension increase their legislative success. I expect that organizations with federated structures will have greater legislative success than organizations with unified structures. Representatives from organizations with federated structures should have more clout because standing behind them are the voices, opinions, and potential votes of hundreds of thousands of organization members. I also expect that organizations with both an individual membership base and a matrix membership base to have greater legislative success, in both cases because of whom they represent.

Individuals equal voters, increasing their importance to legislators and by extension the legislative success for these organizations. Similarly, matrix organizations are made up of other organizations and consequently have even more individual members, which equals even more voters. These organizations also have a greater lobbying potential because of the status positions held by their members. Finally, I expect that as size increases, so will legislative success. Larger organizations have greater resources,

increasing their potential to lobby, gain access to law makers, and engage in public relations and voter campaigns.

The message in the correlations displayed in column 2 of Table 5.5 is that homeless organizations have increased legislative success and that African American organizations have decreased legislative success, as we saw in Chapter 3. The table shows that younger organizations have increased legislative success, but there are no differences when the organizations are parsed out by those created before and after 1975. I suspect that this is a proxy measuring the success of the homeless organizations in Congress during the period of study. Table 5.4 showed us that younger organizations are more likely to have no members, and organizations with no members are also significantly related to increased legislative success in Table 5.5. Again, I believe this is another proxy for the homeless organizations. Finally, we see that as affiliates increase, legislative success decreases, and this is also true for the organizations with an individual membership base. The African American organizations have the lowest legislative success and the greatest number of affiliates and individual member organizations.

Table 5.8 displays the results of two sets of analyses of these organizational factors on legislative success. In these multivariate analyses, none of these variables are significant predictors of success.²⁵ Differences in organization structures do not impact access, decision-making, or voting in the legislature on these issue; therefore, these

²⁵ Using a one-tailed test, an individual membership base is significant, but not in the direction predicted. As discussed above, this is likely a proxy for the African American organizations.

factors are unimportant for understanding this type of success.²⁶ If access is important for getting legislation passed and obtaining funding for programs, it is safe to assume that the groups in this study have not been able to obtain access. The age, reputation, clout and membership of these organizations have not been significant enough to help these organizations meet their goals in Congress.

[insert Table 5.8 here]

Table 5.6 shows that there are differences in the importance of organizational structures by group. The African American organizations actually have increased legislative success when they have no membership base, and decreased when they work through an affiliate structure. All of the African American organizations that do not have a membership base were formed later (between 1970 and 1980) and focus on poverty issues specifically, and for some of the organizations prioritize poverty over race. These organizations, or at least the issues they represent, seem to have more salience in Congress than focusing on race alone. These results suggest something further: the idea that age equals status and access is not true for these organizations. These tables also show that women's organizations without members also have increased legislative success. The organizations in this category also developed later. Two of them focus solely on litigation and policy change, and the others focus on combating poverty and increasing the economic viability of women. Again, overcoming poverty through employment has more salience in Congress than focusing on gender alone. Finally, the homeless organizations with an individual membership base had dampened legislative

²⁶ When I include a direct service control variable there is no change to the sign or significance of the other coefficients in the model, but the direct service control variable is significant in both models at $p < .05$ using a one-tailed test.

success. None of the organizations that fit into this category provide direct services—the area in homelessness legislation and policy change that has realized the greatest benefits in Congress. The differences in legislative success by group seem to have the most to do with the specific focus of the work of the organizations than with any of the structural factors.

Chapter Six will show that favorable public opinion is important for producing legislative success. The findings here, together with those from Chapter Four, imply that these organizations are unable to effect public opinion in any measurable way, nor are they able to effect the actions of Congress. Anecdotally, organization leaders bemoan the difficulty they have gaining access and moving the opinion of legislators. These findings and their own feelings illuminate an important practical question: why do they bother? The answer is simple: hope. Social movement organizations are formed out of hope for a better future and struggle against sometimes insurmountable odds. Hope fuels them, and in this case blinds them. This theme will be taken up again in Chapters Seven.

Perceived Success

I expect perceived success to be affected only by those factors that relate to type of group, in particular organizations that primarily have an individual membership base. This serves as a proxy for low status minorities and the expectation that they will have dampened perceived success. I do not expect age to have any impact on perceived success because age works both for and against these organizations: it can bolster their sense of success by the mere fact that they have survived in an often hostile environment, but it also brings challenges with public perception. Many of the leaders of the older organizations interviewed indicated that their organization's age posed a significant

barrier in terms of public perception, particularly the women's organizations whose leaders complained of their organizations being seen as "old hat." Because of the split sentiments among the older organizations about the importance of their age, I do not expect age to be a statistically significant predictor of perceived success. I also do not expect type of membership to significantly impact perceived success, with the exception of matrix organizations who boasted in interviews of their clout and who therefore should have increased perceived success.

The results in column 3 of Table 5.5 show that the only organizational structure variable significantly related to perceived success is matrix organizations, which have a lower probability of perceived success. The expectation that lower status minorities (here tested through organizations with an individual membership base) will have dampened perceived success does not play out. Table 5.8 also shows that the only variable in the multivariate analysis to impact perceived success is for those organizations with a matrix structure.²⁷

[insert Table 5.9 here]

The leaders from matrix organizations showed a dampened sense of success, opposite of the prediction that they will have a greater sense of success. Why might this be? It is possible that this is a function of their largely collaborative structure, a structure that is hard to maintain (see Chapter Four for more discussion), and the difficulty in convening and working with a group of leaders from many organizations that have demands elsewhere. The two other characteristics these organizations have in common are age and structure. The average year established is 1976, and ranges from 1968 to

²⁷ As with the outcome success models, there is no significant relationship between the direct service control and perceived success.

1990. They also all have unified structures and are located in Washington, DC with aggressive national agendas that focus largely on change in Congress, an area where they all have had little success of late. The other explanation for this finding is that the leaders of these organizations recognize their failures but are simultaneously unable to place them within the context of the difficulty of pushing national level change forward, particularly given their scarce resources in a political climate that is not likely to support their causes. By group, Table 5.9 shows that for the African American and women's organizations, younger organizations have lower levels of perceived success, but age has no effect on perceived success for homeless organizations. This finding is interesting in that it suggests that the leaders of the younger organizations African American and women's organizations are reflecting back their legislative success but not necessarily their failures with outcome success.

Conclusions

Today's premiere social movement and advocacy organizations vary with respect to longevity, structure, membership and decision-making, and these differences impact success in four ways. First, organizational factors make a positive difference in producing success: organizations matter, though subtly. Contrary to the findings of Piven and Cloward, organizations provide a vehicle through which groups can focus energy, attention and resources to positively effect change for group members. Second, success for these organizations is enhanced most by time. Formalizing and sustaining focus and organization over time increases influence, leading to greater outcome success in particular. Third, in addition to time, outcome success is enhanced by the spread of organizational influence through affiliates. Finally, there are few meaningful differences

in organizational by group, except to the extent that the organizations of the different groups developed at different times which impacted how they organized and the receptiveness of the broader political environment to their causes.

What do these findings mean? It is possible that had the time, money and energy that has gone into developing, sustaining and governing these organizations been used to foment protest and disruption ala Piven and Cloward, these groups *may* have seen more successes. However, this is impossible to measure. The more realistic implications of these findings are twofold. First, organizations that take the time to develop a mass membership base, facilitated through the sometimes more cumbersome and bureaucratic federated structure, will realize greater collective benefits over time. Patience, persistence and reach trump specific tactics. Second, organizations that succumb to the temptation of working only at an elite level, either through developing a matrix organization structure or by having no membership base, will find it more difficult to achieve their goals. Despite the lure and appeal of an “inside-the-beltway” approach to advocating for marginalized groups, *for these groups* outcome success depends on mass appeal and support, not insider contacts and power plays. The road to change is through the concerted efforts of the many spread across the country, not through that of a few elites in Washington. This has practical implications for organizations in the process of development or those considering significant structural changes. Putting in the effort to establish and maintain a national network of constituents actively pursuing common goals yields more for group members over time. Finally, legislative success appears to be a function of appeals made at the right time. During the period of this study, homeless groups saw impressive legislative victories as did African American and women’s

organizations that shifted focus away from purely civil rights arguments and to more individualized approaches to creating change (i.e., employment and wealth).

Organizations matter, and how they matter depends on the types of ends a group is trying to achieve. For collective benefits in particular, organizations provide vehicles to sustain energy and focus over time. But just like with strategy and tactics selection (see Chapter 4), organizations are not the only or most critical factor impacting success. Patrons, institutions and context differentially impact success and shape the ability of organizations to forward their agendas. Chapter 6 takes up these issues, examining differences by group in contact with institutions, use of the media, and the role of contextual factors in producing success.

Table 5.1
Size of Organizations

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
<i>Number of Local Affiliates</i>				
Mean of local affiliates	243	68	11	87
Median local affiliates	11.5	0	9	0
Range of local affiliates	0-1802	0-600	0-88	0-1802
n for local affiliates	8	9	14	31
<i>Staff Size</i>				
Mean staff size	45.4	23.7	1,085	479.3
Median staff size	5.75	16	0	10
Range of local affiliates	2-132	2-50	1.5-15,000	1.5-15,000
n of local affiliates	8	11	14	33
<i>Budget</i>				
Mean budget	\$6,766,667	\$3,866,667	\$7,513,182	\$5,988,913
Median budget	\$700,000	\$2,300,000	\$600,000	\$1,000,000
Range of budgets	\$700,000-\$18,900,000 3	\$700,000-\$14,000,000 9	\$80,000-\$69,000,000 11	\$80,000-\$69,000,000 23

Table 5.2
Organization Structures

A. Membership Type

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
None Chi-square=8.691**	21.4% (3)	33.3% (4)	73.3% (11)	43.9% (18)
Individuals Chi-square=6.699**	57.1% (8)	50% (6)	13.3% (2)	39% (16)
Organizations Chi-square=.517	14.3% (2)	8.3% (1)	6.7% (1)	9.8% (4)
Mix Chi-square=.028	7.1% (1)	8.3% (1)	6.7% (1)	7.3% (3)
n	14	12	15	41

B. Federated and Unified Organizations

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
Unitary	40% (4)	58.3% (7)	73.3% (11)	59.5% (22)
Federated	60% (6)	41.7% (5)	26.7% (4)	40.5% (15)
n	10	12	15	37

Chi-square= 2.775

C. Decision Making

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
Staff Chi-square=.279	25% (2)	25% (3)	13.3% (2)	20% (7)
Board Chi-square=1.103	37.5% (3)	16.7% (2)	26.7% (4)	25.7% (9)
Mix Chi-square=.648	37.5% (3)	41.7% (5)	53.3% (8)	45.7% (16)
Other Chi-square=1.823	0% (0)	16.7% (2)	6.7% (1)	8.6% (3)
n	8	12	15	35

Table 5.3
Age of Organizations

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
Mean	1957	1961	1973	1964
Median	1971	1971/1972	1982	1972/1973
Mode	1971	--	1971	1971
Range	1909-1990	1858-1987	1851-1991	1851-1991
n	15	14	15	44

Table 5.4
Impact of Age of Organization on Other Organizational Factors

	Impact of Age (from regression)	Impact of Age (from probit)
Local affiliate count		--
Year established	-4.862***	
Constant	9663.725***	
R-squared	.173	
n	31	
Staff size		--
Year established	1.680	
Constant	-2826.213	
R-squared	.000	
n	33	
Budget		--
Year established	-22751.14	
Constant	.000	
R-squared	.003	
n	23	
Membership: None	--	
Year established		.019*
Constant		-19.406*
Pseudo R-squared		.042
n		41
Membership: Individuals	--	
Year established		-.015**
Constant		29.172**
Pseudo R-squared		.103
n		41
Membership: Organizations	--	
Year established		.107
Constant		-35.192
Pseudo R-squared		.050
n		41
Membership: Mix	--	
Year established		.009
Constant		-18.301
Pseudo R-squared		.020
n		41

Table 5.5
Correlations between Organizational Factors and Success

	Outcome	Legislative	Perceived
Local affiliates (count)	-.059	-.352**	-.074
Organizational structure (dummy)	.337**	-.189	-.192
Budget (count)	.245	.102	.098
Staff size (count)	.199	.186	.044
Membership: none (dummy)	-.187	.470***	.072
Membership: individuals (dummy)	.119	-.434***	.077
Membership: matrix (dummy)	.184	-.051	-.352***
Membership: mix (dummy)	-.051	-.139	.096
Year established	-.252*	.225*	.128
Created after 1975 (dummy)	-.470***	.160	.225*

***= positive impact, significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test
 **= positive impact, significant at $p < .05$ using a one-tailed test
 *= positive impact, significant at $p < .10$ using a one-tailed test

Table 5.6
Correlations between Organizational Factors and Success by Group

	Outcome Success			Legislative Success			Perceived Success		
	AA	W	H	AA	W	H	AA	W	H
Local affiliates (count)	.128	.032	-.097	-.501	-.035	-.056	-.336	.354	-.091
Organizational structure(dummy)	.631	.263	.268	-.563*	.114	.182	-.417	-.408*	.049
Budget (count)	-.500	.059	.316	-.500	-.476*	.262	.500	.193	.077
Staff size (count)	-.020	-.232	.265	-.051	-.237	.251	-.027	.121	.066
Membership: none (dummy)	-.465*	.152	-.153	.633**	.547**	.013	.417	-.066	.099
Membership: individuals (dummy)	.390	.054	-.125	-.370	-.290	-.389*	.046	--	.129
Membership: matrix (dummy)	.016	.405*	.169	--	-.029	.254	-.339	-.379	-.441*
Membership: mix (dummy)	.017	-.761***	.272	-.330	-.379	.254	-.339	.392	.088
Year established	-.431*	.076	-.323	.615	-.010	-.006	.305	.423*	-.118
Created after 1975 (dummy)	-.713***	-.408*	-.395*	.823***	-.423*	-.305	.788***	.536**	-.093

AA= African American

W= Women

H= Homeless

***= positive impact, significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test

**= positive impact, significant at $p < .05$ using a one-tailed test

*= positive impact, significant at $p < .10$ using a one-tailed test

Table 5.7
Ordered Probit Analysis of Impact of Organizational Factors on Outcome Success

	Model with Age	Model with Federated versus Unified
<i>Organizational Factors:</i> Organizations created after 1975 (dummy)	-1.236*** (.421)	--
Federated versus Unified Organizations (dummy)	--	.819** (.438)
Individual membership (dummy)	-.226 (.434)	-.307 (.458)
Matrix membership (dummy)	.702 (.706)	.857 (.712)
Staff size (count)	.000 (.001)	.000 (.006)
Cut point 1	-1.728 (.453)	-.680 (.333)
Cut point 2	-1.339 (.431)	-.358 (.330)
Cut point 3	-1.221 (.424)	-.259 (.329)
Cut point 4	.008 (.359)	.832 (.342)
Cut point 5	.217 (.359)	1.041 (.348)
Pseudo R-square	.130	.078
n	33	33

Table 5.8
Ordered Probit Analysis of Impact of Organizational Factors on Legislative Success

	Model with Age	Model with Federated versus Unified
<i>Organizational Factors:</i> Organizations created after 1975 (dummy)	.015 (.404)	--
Federated versus Unified Organizations (dummy)	--	-.368 (.425)
Individual membership (dummy)	-.724 (.459)	-.621 (.474)
Matrix membership (dummy)	-.178 (.689)	-.155 (.681)
Staff size (count)	.000 (.006)	.001 (.006)
Cut point 1	-1.438 (.449)	-1.552 (.399)
Cut point 2	-.922 (.407)	-1.037 (.349)
Cut point 3	.291 (.392)	.199 (.312)
Pseudo R-square	.284	.071
n	33	33

Table 5.9
Ordered Probit Analysis of Impact of Organizational Factors on Perceived Success

	Model with Age	Model with Federated versus Unified
<i>Organizational Factors:</i> Organizations created after 1975 (dummy)	.277 (.398)	--
Federated versus Unified Organizations (dummy)	--	-.680 (.430)
Individual membership (dummy)	.063 (.430)	.237 (.449)
Matrix membership (dummy)	-1.675** (.761)	-1.739** .755
Staff size (count)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Cut point 1	-1.795 (.508)	-2.188 (.486)
Cut point 2	-.251 (.357)	.618 (.321)
Cut point 3	.814 (.383)	.505 (.308)
Pseudo R-square	.079	.104
n	33	33

Chapter 6: Institutions as Patrons, Media and Context

External factors, the receptiveness of institutions, the media and the context in which a group operates, form the environment, or the political opportunity structure (Tarrow 2003 and elsewhere), that support or mitigate the effectiveness of challenging groups. These factors help to explain the differential success rates of the groups and organizations in this study. They combine to create a context in which the needs of some groups became paramount over the needs of others. The power of individual women and minorities rose during the period of this study, but this increase was not adequate to significantly help their organizations meet the combined demands of their constituents. In contrast, the younger homeless organizations made significant strides during the period of study. To what extent were the failures of some groups and the successes of others facilitated by factors external to their organizations and members?

This chapter examines the role of institutions, media and contextual factors in producing success for African Americans, women and the homeless. We know that patrons are important for the success of challenging and interest groups (Imig and Berry 1996; Walker 1991), and institutions as patrons are particularly important (Berry 1997; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Rosenberg 1991), as evidenced by the success of homeless organizers during this period. Congress and the Executive are able to not only make beneficial policy changes, but are also able to provide financial assistance to movement organizations, bolstering their work through tax benefits, grants, government contracts, and so on. When Congressional and Executive actions on behalf of a group are further undergirded by a supportive Supreme Court, movements are particularly successful, as seen by the civil rights movement (Rosenberg 1991). Success for marginalized groups

increases by joining the policy process as opposed to fighting it (Berry 1993; Cress and Snow 2000; Rochon and Mamanian 1993). Where specifically are the most fruitful places for groups to focus their efforts that improve success? For homeless organizations, this should be agencies (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Lipskey and Smith 1989-1990; Walker 1991), and for African American and women's organization this should be the Congress (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2002; Kilson 1976).

The role and force of the media in these struggles are contested. Many successful interest group strategies are the result of media coverage (Berry 1997), while others have documented that media often do not help and provide biased and uneven coverage (McCarthy and McPhail 1996; Molotch 1979; Oliver and Myers 1999; Smith and McCarthy 2001). Media coverage should be highest for groups with affiliate structures (Berry 1993) and for larger organizations (Oliver and Myers 1999), and this coverage should in turn produce increased success. Where the media is clearly important is in driving public opinion (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Because public opinion influences public policy (Burstein 1998), or is a "proximate cause" of policy changes (Page and Shapiro 1983), organizations should have greater success as public opinion shifts in their favor (Gilens 1999; Epstein 2000; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). This should be particularly true for legislative success (Costain and Majstorovic 1994; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Stimson 1999). Finally, crises should also increase success for these types of organizations (Frey, Dietz and Kalof 1992; Gamson 1975; Goldstone 1980), though opposition groups should depress success (Walker 1991), drawing attention and resources away from the organization's progressive messages and activities.

Taken together, institutions, media and contextual factors are outside forces that organizations attempt to control in their quests for power, but over which they have minimal influence. In the sections that follow I lay out how these different factors vary by group, how they interact, and test their impact on success. I expect to find that a supportive political opportunity structure increases success, and particularly that as the number of patrons an organization has increases and as public opinion in favor an issue increases, so will an organization's success. In addition, crises, particularly local crises that galvanize the grassroots, should increase success. Second, expect to find that these factors will differ by group, particularly that when public opinion is favorable to a group, their need for patrons will decrease, though crises will bring added public attention and support to their efforts.

I find that none of these variables significantly dampen success, though favorable public opinion and local crises increase outcome and legislative success. The impacts of external factors also differ by group. Public opinion has been particularly important for homeless organizations more so than for the other organizations and the leaders of these organizations recognize this. Crises have been important for increasing the success of both the women's and the homeless organizations, and success for the African American organizations is enhanced by media attention and shifting focus from the national to the state and local levels.

Institutions as Patrons

Examining the relationship between social movement and advocacy organizations and national level political institutions, also known as patrons, helps us understand the success of advocacy and social movement organizations. As they have progressed,

challenging group organizations realized that they could exert more influence with conventional interest group strategies and attracting institutional patrons than with protest strategies (Berry 1993). Which of these institutions do these organizations interact with the most? Are there differences by group? To answer these questions, I asked study respondents a series of questions about their institutional partners. First, which of the major political institutions do they engage? Second, what kind of activities do they do? Third, which institution do they work with the most? Fourth, do they feel the White House or the Congress is most important for forwarding their work? And finally, do shifts in partisan control of the national government impact how the organizations operate and their success? In addition, I collected data on congressional testimony provided by the organizations and organizational involvement in federal court cases (district, appellate and Supreme Court) annually between 1975 and 2000.

Overall, the organizations in this study tend to work the most with the Congress and the least with state governments. At the same time, they feel that an ally in the White House is more important in forwarding their work than allies in Congress. The experiences of homeless groups are different than that of African American and women's groups. Homeless groups have a lower number of national level partners on average and interact with Congress less (measured through the provision of Congressional testimony), despite the fact that during this period homeless groups realized greater changes and successes in Congress than the other groups. Each of these points is explicated below.

Contacts with Institutions

Joining the policy process is theorized to produce greater successes for advocacy organizations (Rochon and Mamanian 1993) by increasing their legitimacy (Cress and

Snow 2000). But where should groups put their energies? Congress? The courts? The White House or bureaucracy? Generally, I expect these organizations to have the most contact with Congress, as there are more points of access in Congress than in the other institutions.²⁸ These organizations should have fewer interactions with the parties than with the other institutions (Imig in Costain and MacFarland 1998; Peterson in Petracca 1992). This is for two reasons. First, all of the leaders I interviewed were very careful about not appearing to be partisan, and because of this many stay away from the parties. The second reason is that a particular party is only helpful when it can bring an organization influence over the decision-making process and program support, and when a party can do this it is because the party is in power. In this case, members in office or appointees are the people to go to, not the parties.

The institutional patrons with which the groups studied partner should significantly differ in four ways. First, as new issues emerge, the government creates a new program, agency and/or a budget line item to deal with the issue, out of which non-profit and for-profit programs and professionals emerge (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Because of the prominence of homeless issues during the study period, I expect to find that the homeless groups will have the greatest interactions with the agencies, as funding for their work will come through this venue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Lipsky and Smith 1989-1990; Walker 1991). Second, Kilson (1976) predicted that because of the strides made during the civil rights movements, African American organizations should have high political savvy by the 1990s and therefore be able to successfully move their

²⁸ The obvious exception is for state and local politics, but because the focus of these organizations is national Congress rank higher than state and local government institutions.

agendas forward in Congress (Kilson in Kilson and Rotberg 1976). If he is correct, the African American organizations should have greater contact with Congress than the other organizations, having spent the past 30 years developing organizations with the capacity to engage this type of work and strong relationships, particularly through the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). Third, because of past successes in the courts, I expect the women's and African American groups to have higher interactions with this institution than the homeless organizations (Berry 1997; Walker 1991). The homeless organizations have not experienced many wins in this arena and are therefore less likely to see the need to engage). Finally, I expect to find that women's organizations and African American organizations will have a greater number of institutional contacts than the homeless organizations, a result of the time they have had to establish relationships and learn to work with the different institutions (Kilson 1976).

Table 6.1 displays the percentage of organizations by group that indicated that they work with the various institutions *in any capacity*. As expected, homeless organizations work with fewer institutional partners than African American and women's organizations. Overall the highest interactions are with the Congress, and the lowest are with the Courts. By group, African American organizations tend to work most with the White House and least with the political parties. Women's organizations work the most with Congress and the least with the courts and parties. Finally, homeless organizations work most with the White House (and through them the agencies and the Interagency Council on Homelessness, see discussion below), and the least with the courts.

[insert Table 6.1 here]

Table 6.2 displays the percentage of institutions with which organizations have the *most* contact. Overall the high is Congress and the low is state government. By group, African American organizations have the most contact with Congress, and the least with state governments; women's organizations have the most contact with Congress, and the least is a mix of agencies and state governments; and homeless organizations have the most interactions with agencies and the least with state governments.

[insert Table 6.2 here]

Most Important Institutions

Respondents were asked whether they felt that the Congress or the White House is more important for moving their agendas forward. Overall groups felt that the White House is most important. By group, African American and women's organizations rated the White House highest, and homeless organizations rated the Congress highest. This does not correspond with the institutions with which the organizations have the most contact. The implication of this is that these groups do not see where they are actually working as particularly effective. They have a "grass is greener" problem when deciding which institutions are critical for moving their agendas forward.

The finding about the homeless organizations is also provocative given the history of homelessness policy in the United States. Though much of the current work being done to combat homelessness was spurred by the 1988 McKinney Act, Congress' role since that time has focused primarily on appropriations. Advocacy organizations for the homeless have worked more through the agencies (primarily receiving money to run programs) and the White House (primarily through the Inter-Agency Council on

Homelessness (ICH)). The politics surrounding the ICH in recent years represents a fascinating contradiction between generally accepted expectations of partisan behavior and actual behavior, with Democrats seemingly ignoring a problem one would expect them to champion during the Clinton administration and Republicans embracing an issue one would assume they would want to ignore under the Bush administration. To tease out the answers to this puzzle, I questioned the homeless program leaders about the ICH and its' politics. Their responses suggest that the answer to this puzzle is about how homelessness is defined and the competing theories about how to end it.

The ICH was established after the passage of the McKinney Act to bring weight to and coordination around homeless issues. The purpose of the ICH is “the development of a comprehensive federal approach to end homelessness.” It is made up of the heads of all the agencies, and is supposed to provide a coordinated federal response to the problems of homelessness. The ICH is currently led by Phil Mangano, former Executive Director of the Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance. The ICH was dormant under the Clinton administration because Congress eliminated appropriations for the Council in 1993. Then Assistant Secretary Cuomo asked the Congress not to fund it, in part because he wanted to take the lead on the issue according to several of the respondents. After Cuomo left office, advocacy groups pressured to have it reinstated, creating the momentum needed to get the Council operating again. Its' current focus is on chronic homelessness, and the ICH has been the locus of over 100 cities across the country to develop “10-year” plans to end chronic homelessness. The ICH's current federal, state and local partners include 20 federal agencies; the 50 governors; and 177 mayors and county executives. Even as other federal social service funds are cut,

homelessness continues to receive increases. The 2006 proposed budget has an 8.5% increase for what the administration calls their “Samaritan Initiative” (Philip Mangano on the Kojo Nnamdi Show, WAMU, March 1, 2005). The Bush approach to homelessness focuses on chronic homelessness, whereas the Clinton approach also included the problems of homeless families and housing concerns. The Clinton administration also supported significant demonstration and research on different ways to reduce homelessness (see for example the work on wrap around²⁹ services provided through supportive housing, Rog 2004), as the topic was particularly important to Tipper Gore.

The lessons of the ICH demonstrate that a universal issue, ending homelessness, can be political, and the definition of homelessness and the populations targeted for services differ depending upon the perspective of those in power. This example highlights the importance and power of the executive branch in bringing attention and resources to the issues of social movement groups. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, this attention was given to homeless groups more than to other groups. The result is increased successes and capacity for the field. It implies that if homeless organizations follow the model of African American and women’s groups, over the next 25 years the institutional contact patterns of homeless organizations will begin to mirror those of the other organizations, and that perhaps their success will wane as well.

Congress and the Courts

²⁹ Wrap around services are individualized, a la carte support services provided to clients at their home. This type of service provision given in a home rather than institutional environment was tested to see if it increases effectiveness and decreases stability. Studies of these demonstrations found this an effective way to provide support for certain types of people with serious and persistent mental illness (SPMI) (Rog 2004).

In Chapter 4 I examined the tactics that organizations use and whether the use of certain tactics produces success. The tactic variables in that chapter captured whether or not organizations ever use certain tactics, not how much they use them. To gauge this, I was able to gather more in depth data on a three of the tactics: providing congressional testimony; using the federal court system; and using the media. I collected data on actual congressional testimony provided by organization leaders and court cases in which the organizations were involved. Research suggests that “where social movement organizations develop in great numbers, so too does congressional attention rise” (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2002, 15). I expect that the African American and women’s organizations will provide more congressional testimony than homeless organizations, a reflection of their greater movement size, history, and greater capacity to engage in this type of work. At the same time, I expect that exposure for homeless groups will increase over the period studied but will not for the other organizations. I also expect that federal court usage will be greater for the African American and women’s organizations than for the homeless organizations. These organizations have had greater success with this tactic particularly, again a result of their greater capacity for this type of work. Because homeless organizations are nascent but growing, these organizations should have an increasing presence in the courts over time as their capacity for this type of work grows.

Table 6.3 lays out the range and average congressional testimony provided by the organizations in this study, as well as the range and average number of federal court cases (divided out by district courts, appellate courts and the Supreme Court) in which these organizations are involved. Most organizations do not provide any Congressional

testimony, but those that do receive a lot of exposure in congress.³⁰ African American organizations provide more congressional testimony than the other organizations, and this is driven largely by the NAACP, which averaged over 500 appearances annually during the period of study. The other two leading African American organizations that drive this finding are the National Urban League and the Southern Poverty Law Center. The amount of testimony provided by women's organizations fell in the middle of the groups, and is led by the YWCA, CWA and the League of Women Voters. These organizations averaged slightly over 100 appearances before Congress annually. The least amount of testimony was given by the homeless organizations. The leaders for these organizations are Second Harvest, the National Coalition for the Homeless and the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, though the annual averages for these organizations is less than one hundred.

The amount of congressional testimony provided increases as the number of patrons an organization works with increases (pairwise correlation is .519, significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test), with greater number of affiliates (pairwise correlation is .269, significant at $p < .10$ using a one-tailed test), and as the age of organizations increases (pairwise correlation is .391, significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test). The rate at which groups provide congressional testimony is not significantly related to radicalness of demands.

For all types of court cases, again, most organizations do not get involved. For those that do, most work is done at the district level, then in appellate courts, and lastly at the Supreme Court. At the Supreme Court level, African American organizations are

³⁰ The range of testimony provided by these organizations is none to 533. The averages are 35 (mean), 6.5 (median) and 0 (mode).

involved in overwhelmingly more cases than women's and homeless organizations, reflecting their greater historical use of and success with this tactic. In pairwise correlations, involvement in Supreme Court cases is positively and significantly related to providing congressional testimony (.891 significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test), the number of affiliates an organization has (.966 significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test), and age (.276 significant at $p < .05$ using a one-tailed test). These relationships suggest that there is a grouping of social movement and advocacy organizations that tend to be older, have similar structure and use similar tactics for achieving their goals. These are the major organizations of the movements, the NAACP, Urban League, YWCA, the League of Women Voters, and so on. They formed and operate in largely similar ways, and Chapter Five showed that these organizations have been the shepherds of collective benefit changes for their members but are losing influence on the national political scene.

[insert Table 6.3 here]

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 display the average congressional testimony provided by organizations and the average number of Supreme Court cases organizations are involved with over time (data available for 1989 – 2000 for Congressional testimony, and 1975-2000 for the federal court cases). Congressional testimony for African American organizations peaked in the mid-1990s and trends down, as does testimony for women's organizations. This is a result of changing control of Congress. For homeless organizations, this testimony has been steadily increasing. Supreme Court cases also trend down for African American and women's organizations during the period of study, though is highest for the African American organizations. With the exception of the few organizations whose sole purpose is litigation, most of the organization leaders with

whom I spoke talked about the high cost of litigation tactics and the uncertain outcomes, forcing them to focus in other areas. The homeless organizations were involved in the least amount of Supreme Court cases, though their involvement in this realm is slowly trending up. The trends for the homeless groups demonstrate their growing capacity to engage more sophisticated and expensive work at a time of increased national attention to their plight. The exposure of African American and women's groups is decreasing, perhaps displaying decreased public and institutional sympathy for the needs of these types of groups.

[Insert figure 6.1 here]

[Insert figure 6.2 here]

These graphs show that though the African American and women's organizations continue to engage institutional tactics at a higher rate than homeless organizations, their use is declining while it is increasing for the homeless groups. The cumulative impact of these relationships and tactics on success are explored in the second half of this chapter.

Partisan Impact

Participants were asked whether changing partisan control of the national government impacts their ability to move agendas forward (analysis not shown). All of the groups except one feel it makes a difference, and that one exception noted that "this was important in the past when we had close connection to people in Congress, but when those connections went away it stopped mattering."

Changes in partisan control of the national government affect these groups differently depending upon whether the change is in congressional leadership or in the White House. When there are changes in Congress, the groups alter their behavior with

respect to education, lobbying and election activities, and this also affects their sense of success getting legislation passed and in receiving funding. One of the major African American organizations noted that partisan changes in control of Congress impact where they “prioritize voter participation drives, giving particular priorities to where constituent participation in the election may impact the outcome, though we maintain a non-partisan stance.” To combat these changes while maintaining their non-partisan stance, organizations advocate for political representation that is “sympathetic to their agenda.” This is code for a shift to election strategies when Republicans are in control of Congress to attempt to remove them, and a shift to lobbying strategies when Democrats are in control of Congress to try to pass sympathetic policies and programs. Many of the organizations studied echoed this approach, though in carefully veiled terms.

Homeless advocacy groups have different perspectives about the importance of partisan changes in Congress. Many stated that Democrats were more amenable to their agenda than Republicans, and that they have different success rates with lobbying depending on who is in control. Another noted that they have to engage in “re-education and re-establishing relationships. But there is no financial difference in funding under Republicans and Democrats.” Similarly, a third stated that

“the odd thing is that neither Democrats or Republicans are universally better on these kinds of issues. Republicans are more interested in [prisoner] re-entry [into the community after incarceration] than Democrats. The champion of chronic homelessness is Senator Bond (R, MO). On the other hand, Democrats deal more with housing issues. Senator Dodd (D, CT, Chair of the Housing Committee) did

a lot of work on this. Poverty is higher on this agenda. So this work changes as political control changes, but not necessarily for the better or worse.”

On the other end of the spectrum, one organization leader told me that, “unexpectedly, our organization is the darling of the Republican party. We take no government money, and help young people who are trying to help themselves, so the organization is attractive to Republicans.”

When there are partisan changes in control of the White House, groups tend to shift their tactics. Several of the women’s organizations echoed this, one stating that they “moved away from litigation 15 years ago as the result of the Republican revolution and the appointment of more conservative judges. We are currently re-thinking this, but this was the original motivation. When the administration doesn’t share our view on discrimination, it is harder.”

A homeless organization noted that “under Reagan and Bush the First (sic), the administrations were not amenable [to this issue], so we did more litigation work. Under Clinton and Bush the Second (sic) the administrations have been more amenable, so we have been doing less litigation work.”

In sum, institutions are important to national advocacy organizations, but they are differently important depending on the focus of the organizations. The organizations in this study tend to work the most with the Congress and the least with state governments, but they feel that an ally in the White House is more important in forwarding their work than allies in Congress. The experiences of homeless groups are different than that of African American and women’s groups. Homeless groups have a lower number of national level partners on average and interact with Congress less (as measured through

the provision of Congressional testimony), despite the fact that during this period homeless groups realized greater changes and successes in Congress than the other groups. Finally, I find that almost all of the groups feel that their work is impacted by changes in partisan control of the White House and Congress, which directs them to shift tactics.

Media

Another key to the success of advocacy and social movement organizations is the amount of media time organizations receive and the slant on them taken by the media. In order to examine the relationship between these groups and the media, respondents were asked about the number of types of media outlets (newspaper, magazines, television, radio, web-based) they attempt to engage and about their relationship with the media. In addition, I collected data on the number of stories in which each of the organizations were discussed in *The New York Times*, both overall and on the front page of the different sections (organizations had to be named in the article title or first paragraph to be counted).

Newspaper coverage will be higher for events organized by larger organizations than by smaller organizations (Oliver and Myers 1999), and that movements need the media for “mobilization, validation, and scope enlargement” (Gamson and Wolsfeld 1993). It has also been established that membership organizations receive more coverage than organizations without a membership base (Berry 1993). Are there differences in media experiences by group? Using the number of local affiliates as a proxy for membership and a size variable, I expect that greatest media coverage will be given to the

African American organizations because they have the greatest number of local affiliates and as a result more opportunities to engage the media.

Table 6.4 displays the findings on media work and exposure in *The New York Times*. Most organizations receive little to no media exposure. African American organizations receive the most exposure, and homeless organizations receive the least exposure. Respondents work to attain media exposure (measured in terms of the number of outlets they approach) corresponds with the national exposure they actually receive: working with a greater number of media outlets significantly correlates with greater media exposure (pairwise correlation .371, significant at $p < .01$).

[Insert Table 6.4 here]

The data also support the expectation that size and affiliate structures increase media exposure (pairwise correlation .392, significant at $p < .01$ and .560, significant at $p < .01$ respectively). Affiliated organizations receive greater media attention than unified organizations (significant at $p < .01$) because they have more opportunities to engage the media. They can work with local media outlets and often have real faces that can be used by the media to tell stories. However, staff size is not significantly related to media attention, which suggests that organization size measured in terms of staff capacity and resources does not necessarily bring with it greater ability to garner attention from the media.

How does media exposure correlate with institutional interactions for these groups? Media exposure increases as the types of cases in which organizations are involved reaches higher levels of the federal court systems (pairwise correlation is .923, significant at $p < .000$). As levels of providing congressional testimony increases, media

exposure also (pairwise correlation is .868, significant at $p < .000$). This is intuitive. The media like to cover national politics, particularly when they can put a “real” face on their stories. The organizations that tend to be involved in federal court cases and provide Congressional testimony also have local affiliates. A great example of this is the NAACP. The NAACP is a large and significant player in national politics, and the media coverage they receive accounts for the majority of that received by all of the African American organizations combined. They can bring out the heavy hitters and also provide examples to undergird their position through their affiliates. This seems to be a great recipe for garnering attention.

Figure 6.3 displays annual averages of *New York Times* articles from 1975-2000. For African American organizations this coverage peaks in 1994 and slowly trends up. Women’s organization exposure peaks in 1980 and trends down. For the African American and women’s organizations, exposure tends to have peaks on election years, reflecting both the increased “news worthiness” of their issues during elections and their increased output utilizing election and campaign tactics during these years. Homeless organizations receive minimal exposure, peaking in 1990 but very gradually trending up over time.

[Insert Figure 6.3 here]

The organization leaders interviewed were asked about their experiences with the media and whether the media have helped or hurt their work. Overall the response was mixed. Three themes emerged from the interviews. First, organization leaders stated that they do not have the money or influence to effectively engage in a media campaign that changes opinions or advances their positions. One women’s organization noted that they

had tried several media campaigns, but the results were minimal and as a result the organization does less of this type of work now. Second, those organizations that have had bad experiences with the media noted that bad coverage facilitates a downward spiral for the organizations, and this has been especially true for the homeless organizations.

One organization stated that

“using them is like opening pandora’s box, so we avoid the media. [They] want mileage out of you, whether positive or negative.”

Two of the largest homeless provider organizations mentioned the positive effects of good media coverage (increased revenue) and the devastating effects of negative coverage (no revenue). And third, several organizations mentioned that there are so few real media outlets that the messages that get out there are controlled to the point that the organizations do not feel that going this route will get them far. One homeless organization that received mostly positive national media attention noted that despite this attention the stories are mostly “surface” and do not do much for educating the public about the importance of their issues.

The organizations in this study recognize the importance of the media for getting their messages out, and do try to engage the media, but have had negative experiences and doubt their effectiveness in shaping public opinion given their limited resources. Media attention is lowest for homeless organization and highest for African American organizations, and decreases significantly over time for women’s organizations. How important are these differences in cumulative exposure for explaining success? This issue is addressed in the last part of this chapter.

Context

The social movement literature has been greatly influenced by Gamson's (1975) findings on crises and context as well as by the findings of his challengers (Frey, Dietz and Kalof 1992; Goldstone 1980). The context is the environment in which these organizations operate and includes crises, the economy, and opposition groups. In this section, I examine these factors and whether there are differences by group. I find that the organizations feel most affected by national crises and opposition forces, though the presence of opposition provides both negative and positive impacts. There are minimal differences by the type of group.

Crises

Goldstone (1980) found that challenging groups fare better during times of crisis, particularly a military crisis. To examine the role of crises on the organizations I studied, I asked respondents about the impact of national, international and local crises on their work. I expect to find that crises will impact the organizations, mostly for the better (Frey, Dietz and Kalof 1992; Gamson 1975; Goldstone 1980). Table 6.5 displays how groups perceive the impact of national, international and local crises. Overall the leaders of the organizations feel affected most by national crises, though African American organizations are more affected by local crises, likely due to higher number of local affiliates these organizations have and their stronger ties to the local context.

[insert Table 6.5 here]

Two large women's organizations discussed how crises, particularly local crises, impact their focus, work and success at the national level. One noted that

“local crises have a temporary impact on the organization. For example, tornados, floods, airplane crashes and other types of big local tragedies tend to bring out people to give more support to our state level affiliates.”

Another stated that “whenever there is any crises we hear from our grassroots members,” whether or not the national organization can impact the situation at all. One large African American organization stated that “local crises have helped us by providing media attention to [our] issue and thus increasing public interest in us.”

Almost all of the organizations mentioned “9-11” (the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001) impacting their work, mostly diverting attention and resources away from their issues. This was especially true for the organizations located in New York city. They also mentioned the current military actions, particularly what is going on in Iraq, as international crises that impact their work in the same way, diverting attention and resources away from their issues. Homeless organizations stated that these events have placed a double burden on their organizations by increasing the numbers of people they need to serve. This was particularly true for the homeless organizations that focus their efforts on veterans.

Economy

I asked respondents about how the recent economic downturn has affected their work and their ability to bring about changes for constituents. All of the organization leaders stated that their organizations were negatively impacted by the economic downturn, and there were minimal differences by group. This is also tied to crises. Internationally, the organizations felt that the war efforts detract from attention paid to their issues. Among the homeless organizations there was a consensus that any crisis that

has an impact on the economy impacts the organization because it drives up the need for their work. This hurts these organizations across the board.

Opposition

Opposition also produces an important contextual impact on success.

Respondents were asked about the presence and impact of opposition groups on their work (results not shown). Homeless organizations ought to feel less impact from opposition groups because their cause is so difficult to come out against publicly (Walker 1991), and women's organizations should be the most impacted by opposition because of the controversial nature of their agendas. I find that the women's organizations do feel more impact from opposition than the other organizations.³¹ One of these women's organizations stated that

“sometimes the interesting technique [of opposition groups] is getting involved in litigation—this can be overwhelming and tax our resources. Years ago the Christian Coalition did this—it was more time consuming than anything else. We do not have one specific nemesis, but some are very well financed.”

However, being impacted by opposition groups does not mean being negatively impacted by them. One of the largest women's organizations stated that opposition groups help because “criticism means that we are doing our job because [the opposition group's] work is diametrically opposed to ours.”

Though many of the homeless organizations answered that they do not have opposition forces (one noted that “it is hard to be opposed to a homeless organization”),

³¹ The African American organizations noted less specific examples of opposition groups, most frequently referring generally to the “Klan.”

three specifically named the Veterans Administration (VA) as an opposition group. One stated that

“one of our greatest opposition groups is the VA. The VA blocks resources, public accolades, etc. If we had more resources, all veterans would be with us and not with the VA. Historically we have had a contentious relationship with the VA. Our outgrowth is because of the inefficiency and the poor attitudes of staff at the VA.”

These responses suggest that there are system tensions within the politics of homelessness, explained in part by differences in philosophy and approach to the problem, and also explained by emerging turf wars for scarce resources.

Public Opinion

A majority of the respondents stated that though their organizations would like to be able to impact public opinion, they did not believe that they actually have been able to do this *or* they did not know how to measure their impact. Despite this, they all feel that a supportive public opinion is critical to advancing their work. Public opinion influences public policy (Burstein 1998), or is a “proximate cause” of policy changes (Page and Shapiro 1983). The success of organizations should increase as public opinion shifts in their favor (Gilens 1999; Epstein 2000; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002), and this should be particularly true for legislative success (Costain and Majstororic 1994; Ericson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Stimson 1999).

To gauge public opinion in support of these organizations, I developed a measure of the strength of public opinion for or against the organization’s work from the General Social Survey (GSS). I selected a question from the GSS that reflects the goals and/or

work of each organization and collapsed the response categories into those that support the issue and those that oppose it. The neutral responses were omitted. This allows me to standardize the support response across questions that use different scales. I then took the proportion in favor of an issue as a proxy for public opinion. The range for the variable is .04 to .44 in favor of the work of the organizations. The average is .230, though this differs by group. The average is lowest for the African American organizations (.189), then .239 for the homeless organizations and at the high end .259 for the women's organizations.

Taken together, crises, the economy the presence of opposition forces, and public opinion are critical aspects of the political opportunity structure in which organizations operate. The organizations studied vary to the degree to which they feel affected by these forces, with women's organization faring worse overall. In the next section, I examine how these factors, together with media attention and institutional interactions, combine to effect the success rates of these organizations.

Impact of Institutions and Context on Success

Both outcome and legislative success are functions of internal and external factors. Chapters Four and Five showed that success is particularly affected by strategic choices, age and structure, but what about the impact of the political opportunity structure on success? Taken together, how do institutional patrons, media exposure, and contextual factors impact success? In this section, I present correlations between success and the external factors overall and by group, and then multivariate models testing these effects.

Externally, success is a function of who is helping an organization and how receptive the broader environment is to its needs. Organizations like the National Network for Youth have received ongoing support in the media and realized strong relationships with federal policy makers from the White House, to related agencies, to members of Congress. They regularly testify in front of congressional committees, and have helped to craft reauthorization bills. And they excel on every measure of success. A supportive environment is critical to realizing goals. The environment can help, as in the case of the National Network for Youth, or can hinder progress, despite strong organizations and the use of proven tactics. Many women's organizations note the backlash building over the past 20 years against feminism has been a significant force hampering their ability to create change.

Explanations based on the importance of the political opportunity structure suggest that strategies and tactics and movement resources are not as important predictors of success than previously thought. Most notably, Tarrow (2003 and elsewhere) posits that the decline of the effectiveness of some tactics, for instance the use of protests, is the result of a constricted opportunity structure beginning in the 1970s and lasting through the 1990s. The past success of protest tactics was the result of "political process and timing," not organizational factors or leadership (Tarrow 2003). Analyses of the work of women's organizations during the second wave of feminism also suggest that success was in large part a function of general changes in government and public opinion on issues of fairness as opposed to movement resources and tactic use (Costain in Petracca 1992). In these analyses, success is a function of broader contextual factors and has much less to do with actual strategy and tactic choices.

Is this true? If so, which contextual factors impact success most? Anecdotally, organization leaders tell us that their patrons matter, as do public opinion, the media and crises. Patrons provide access and resources for challenging and interest groups (Berry 1997; Imig and Berry 1996; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Rosenberg 1991; Walker 1991). Congress and the Executive are able to not only make beneficial policy changes, but are also able to provide financial assistance to movement organizations, bolstering their work through tax benefits, grants, government contracts, and so on. When Congressional and Executive actions on behalf of a group are further undergirded by a supportive Supreme Court, movements are particularly successful (Rosenberg 1991).

The impact of the media in these struggles is less clear. Some research suggests that many successful interest group tactics are the result of media coverage (Berry 1997), while others have documented that the media often do not help and provide biased and uneven coverage (McCarthy and McPhail 1996; Molotch 1979; Oliver and Myers 1999; Smith and McCarthy 2001). Some studies have shown that in the case of the media, strategy and tactics matter, and the best way to get positive attention is by leveraging sympathetic allies within the media (Rohlinger 2002), though this seems to rarely happen effectively. Contrary to Berry (1997), I do not expect to find media coverage to significantly impact success. Though these organizations frequently employ media tactics, their use and experiences are so uneven that I do not expect to detect any impact in the models that follow.

I expect supportive public opinion to be an important predictor of all types of success. Because public opinion influences public policy (Burstein 1998), or is a “proximate cause” of policy changes (Page and Shapiro 1983), success should increase as

public opinion shifts in favor of movements as well as decrease when public opinion wanes (Gilens 1999; Epstein 2000; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). This should be particularly true for legislative success (Costain and Majstorovic 1994; Ericson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Stimson 1999), but will still be important for outcome and perceived success.

Past research has shown that crises produce increased success for challenging groups, putting issues on the public agenda that would otherwise have remained dormant (Frey, Dietz and Kalof 1992; Gamson 1975; Goldstone 1980; Kingdon 1983). The respondents in this study differed in their assessment of the impact of national crises, some indicating that national crises divert attention from their causes. But respondents consistently noted that local crises increase attention given to an issue and swell local support for national programs. I expect that crises that impact people directly (ie, local crises) will ultimately have a greater influence on outcome and legislative success than crises that only indirectly impact people (national and international crises). Direct crises galvanize the public around issues and the organizations that forward the solutions to the crises through increased resources and public support will. The presence of opposition groups should depress success (Walker 1991), taking attention and resources away from organizations, limiting an organization's ability to proactively push a cause and instead force organizations to defend themselves from detractors and protect past successes from rollbacks.

The determinants of success differ only slightly by type of success. Outcome success is largely dependent on exogenous factors beyond the control of organizations. It should be dependent upon public opinion and mood, combined with time to create change

(see Chapter Five) (Epstein 2000; Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson 2002; Gilens 1999; Kreisi in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1999x; Minkoff 1993; Mundo 1992; Page and Shapiro 1983; Rosenberg 1991; Tarrow 2003). The most important external factors that should impact legislative success are having institutional partners that increase proximity to decision makers and public opinion in favor of a group's issues (Burgin 1994; Sullivan et al 1993). Finally, perceived success is unlikely to be affected by many of the external factors, but may be affected by how receptive the political climate is, measured here through public opinion. As general public opinion increases in favor of a group's issues, the leaders of the organizations promoting those issues will feel more successful.

In sum, I expect to find that a supportive political opportunity structure will enhance success. In particular, as the number of patrons an organization has increases and as public opinion in favor of an issue increases, so will success. Crises, particularly local crises that galvanize the grassroots, will increase success. I also expect to find that how these factors matter will differ by group. When public opinion is particularly favorable to a group, their need for patrons and the effects of crises will differ. I find that none of these variables significantly dampen success, and public opinion increases success as do local crises, both of which produce greater outcome and legislative success. The impact of external factors also differs by group. Public opinion has been particularly important for homeless organizations more so than for the other organizations and the leaders of these organizations recognize this. Crises have been important for increasing the success of both the women's and the homeless organizations, and success for the African American organizations is enhanced by media attention and shifting focus from the national to the state and local levels.

Outcome Success

Organizations pursue institutional tactics because these types of patrons are commonly thought to help in producing support for legislation and allocations on behalf of the members of the group. I expect to find that as the number of national institutions with which an organization interacts increases so will outcome success. I do not expect to find that greater levels of media attention given to an issue will produce greater outcomes for group members, contrary to expectations in the literature (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). Media attention means public attention to an issue, but as I learned from the interviews conducted, this attention can both help and hurt these groups. The effects of media attention are cancelled out and are unlikely to affect success. A favorable public opinion, however, should positively impact outcome success (Gilens 1999; Epstein 2000; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). Finally, I expect that crises, or the sense of being impacted by crises, will produce a positive impact on outcome success (Frey, Dietz and Kalof 1992; Gamson 1975; and Goldstone 1980).

Table 6.6 column 2 displays the correlations between external pressures and outcome success. Four of these positively impact outcome success: local crises, a favorable public opinion, work with state governments and work with political parties. The findings about the impact of crises largely reflects the stories I heard during the interviews: local crises bring attention and money to these organizations, particularly if they work through an affiliate structure, whereas international crises, most notably the war in Iraq, take resources away from these organizations and increase the burden placed particularly on the homeless organizations. The finding about public opinion also reflects what I heard during the interviews: public support is critical to advancing the goals of

these organizations. The meaning behind the findings about work with the different institutional patrons is less clear. I believe these variables are actually serving as proxies for the different groups: African American organizations had greater outcome success and work more with the state governments and parties, whereas the homeless groups work more with the White House and have had less outcome success.

[Insert Table 6.6 here]

Table 6.7 displays the correlations between these factors and outcome success by group. The message of this table is similar to that in Chapters Four and Five: the determinants of success differ to some degree by group. For the African American organizations, outcome success is enhanced by media attention and work with state and local governments, which occurs through their affiliate structure. Their success is dampened by work with the agencies and public opinion. For the women's organizations, outcome success is only enhanced by work with the state governments, likely through their affiliate structures, and their outcome success is not dampened by any of these factors. Finally, for the homeless organizations outcome success is enhanced by local crises, positive public opinion and work with the state governments. Their outcome success is dampened when they work through the courts and the White House.

[Insert Table 6.7 here]

Table 6.8 displays the results of a series of ordered probit analyses on the impact of institutional contacts, media exposure, the provision of Congressional testimony, public opinion, and crises on success.³² Column 2 displays the results of the outcome

³² I was unable to model the impact of providing Congressional testimony, involvement in federal court cases, and media exposure together because of the high collinearity between these measures. For this reason, I selected one for each of the models.

success model. The only significant predictor of success in this model is local crises, which positively impacts outcome success. Respondents repeatedly mentioned the increased attention and resources brought to their organization's causes by local crises. This was particularly true for organizations with affiliate structures. Having affiliates enables organizations to mobilize at the state and local levels, increasing their standing in communities. This positively impacts outcomes success in two ways. First, it brings attention to the issue and often to the particular organizations working on behalf of the issue (for example, the problem of homelessness locally resulting from the death of homeless person in a high profile area—this “example” has happened repeatedly around the country, most notably in front of the Department of Health and Human Services building in Southwest Washington, DC). Second, this attention draws added resources (financial, in-kind, and volunteer) to the organizations, over time increasing outcome success. These factors in combination facilitate movement and change. A good example of this is the devastating floods in Princeville, NC a few years ago. Princeville is primarily an African American community, and the town was literally under water, forcing the permanent evacuation of its inhabitants. The results of this local crisis brought national attention from the black community to this area, resources were donated and volunteers generated, all in an effort to help these people. This had the side effect of improving outcomes, and is an excellent example of how potentially devastating how local crises can enhance success in the long run.

[insert Table 6.8 here]

National crises do not impact outcome success. This is likely due to the dual and conflicting nature such crises have. The attention drawn from national crisis events are

often so large in scope that they draw attention and resources away from these organizations. A clear example of this is what happens with homeless organizations for veterans. The war in Iraq has had a dual negative impact on these organizations, despite the increased attention given to the needs of homeless veterans in the media. First, organizers feel that financial resources have been diverted from domestic causes in order to fund the international war effort. Second, returning vets have increased the number of people these organizations advocate on behalf of and serve. Though some national attention is given to this issue, it has not generated the resources needed to offset the increased burden placed on providers. In this way, national crises both help and hurt, canceling out the effects of each.

Why aren't institutional contacts and media coverage significant in these analyses? I suspect that institutional contacts have an indirect effect on this type of change, not a direct one. The null effects of media attention are the result of a non-linear relationship between media coverage and outcome success. Most of the organizations studied receive little to no media attention as measured in this study. Who does receive attention? Primarily, it is the larger African American and women's organizations. Figure 6.4 presents a bar graph of media attention averaged by group and outcome. This graph shows that for African American and women's groups, those with the highest media coverage have the lowest outcome success, but outcome success is not at its highest for those organizations that receive the least amount of media attention. I suspect that this has to do with the type of coverage these organizations receive. Women's coverage increases in national election years, and African American coverage seems to peak when there is a controversy about a leader or an infamous incident. This type of

coverage is more about ratings than it is about supporting an organization or an issue. For homeless organizations, as media attention increases so do outcome success. The inverse is true for women's organizations, where outcome success decreases as media attention rises. For African American organizations the relationship is u-shaped—media attention is highest at the low and high ends of success, and lowest for moderate success. There is no direct or linear relationship between media attention and outcome success for these organizations for their organizations combined.

Legislative Success

In a perfect world, legislative success would solely be a function of the importance of an issue. But sometimes success in Congress has more to do with relationships than with the issue itself. To account for this, many organizations intentionally build relationships and work to develop their politically savvy and connections (Kilson 1976). Using congressional testimony as a proxy for political contacts and exposure, I expect to find that as the amount of testimony provided by an organization increases so will that organization's legislative success. I also expect that the greater number of legislative interactions an organization has, the greater legislative success that organization will have (Rochon and Mariant 1993).³³ In addition, legislative success should be rise when public opinion supports the work and goals of the social movement and advocacy organizations (Costain and Majstororic 1994; Ericson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Stimson 1999). I do not expect crises to impact legislative success for these organizations.

³³ A second critical factor potentially impacting legislative success is the media attention given to the issue. However, because the *New York Times* variable and the congressional testimony variables are so highly correlated, I was unable to include them both in the same analysis. In separate analyses, these variables were not significant.

Table 6.6 Column 2 displays the results of the correlations between these factors and legislative success. The only factor that positively affects legislative success is a supportive public opinion. When the public supports a marginalized group, the Congress supports that marginalized group. Having institutional patrons does not increase legislative success. This reflects the pattern we have seen in Chapters Four and Five: the African American and women's organizations have used the last 25 years to build relationships in Washington, but in terms of legislative success, these relationships have not helped them. Grassroots relationships that help foment supportive public opinion mean more than institutional patrons. The significant determinants of legislative success differ by group (see Table 6.7). None of these factors increase legislative success for the African American organizations. Though increased media attention was important for outcome success for these organizations, it does not appear to support legislative success. For the women's organizations, local crises actually help their legislative success, though institutional patrons do not. Finally, for the homeless organizations, legislative success is enhanced by local crises and work with the media.

Column 3 of Table 6.8 displays the results of the analysis of institutional interactions and crises on legislative success. Legislative success is impacted by local crises and a favorable public opinion. Providing congressional testimony and having greater number of institutional partners does not impact success.³⁴ Few of the organizations in the study provide congressional testimony, and the testimony that was provided by respondent organizations in the study has only recently reached sizeable

³⁴ A separate analysis (not shown) was run with a dummy variable included for those organizations that ranked Congress as the institutional partner with which they do the most work. This variable was also not significant.

levels (see Figure 6.1). Homeless organizations provided the least amount of testimony, but simultaneously made the most significant legislative strides during this period. As predicted, a supportive public opinion increases outcome success. This suggests that when a preponderance of people support an issue, the Congress will respond to this support through the passage of legislation.

The provision of congressional testimony has no impact on legislative success. Being invited to speak in front of Congress does not translate into Congressional support for your work. Why are local crises a significant predictor of success and not national crises? The answer again has to do with the attention drawn to an organization's cause by these events and the successful mobilization of affiliate structures to bring constituent pressure to an issue. These organizations are not able to mobilize around national crises, but are able to mobilize around local crises. Turning again to the example of Princeville, the crisis increased public sympathy to the homeless inhabitants, and this in turn aided in the procurement of long-sought after support for local programs, policy changes around zoning and funding for reconstruction.

Perceived Success

How do institutional relationships, media attention and crises impact leader's perception of success? I expect to find that the more institutions an organization has contact with and the greater the media exposure a group receives the more they will perceive themselves as successful. Interest and challenging group leaders alike like to feel that their connections and the attention paid to them in the media yield them something. In addition, a supportive public opinion should increase perceived success.

Based on the interviews conducted, I also expect to find that perception of success will be negatively affected by national crises and positively affected by local crises.

Table 6.6 column 4 displays the correlations between these factors and perceived success. There is a positive and significant correlation between public opinion and legislative success: the leaders of these organizations know when the public supports their cause and it increases their sense of success. Only international crises dampened success in these correlations. This appears to reflect the burden placed on all of these organizations when resources are diverted away from their organizations to support government actions abroad. As in the other analyses, the determinants of perceived success differ by group (see Table 6.7). For the African American organizations, local crises actually dampen perceived success. This is not true for the other organizations. Perceived success for the women's organizations was dampened by international crises but heightened by work with the White House. And for homeless organizations, their perception of success was dampened for the groups that work with the courts, but increased when public opinion increases and for those organizations that work with state governments.

Table 6.8 column 4 displays the results of the analysis of these factors on perceived success. None of these variables are significant predictors of perceived success. Having greater numbers of institutional partners does not increase a group's perception of its success. Exposure in the media also does not impact perception of success, because media exposure is not always positive, and the leaders interviewed seem to know that negative attention can be a detriment to organizational functioning if negative.

Despite respondent discussion of the sometimes positive and sometimes negative impact of crises, this also does not translate into either increases or decreases in perception of success. In a separate analysis (not shown), I use an additive scale of crisis impact to examine the effects on perceived success. This variable is not a significant predictor of outcome or legislative success, but does negatively dampen perceived success (significant at $p < .005$). This means that the cumulative effect of feeling impacted by crises dampens an organization's perception of their overall success. Stresses over which organizations have no control can dampen an organization's sense of its ability to affect change on behalf of group members when there are multiple stresses.

Conclusions

The receptiveness of institutions and the media, as well as the context in which groups operate, form the environment, or the political opportunity structure (Tarrow 2003 and elsewhere), that can either support or mitigate the effectiveness of a challenging group's work. In both qualitative and quantitative analyses, these factors help in part to explain the differential success rates of the groups and organizations in this study. During the period of this study, the needs of the homeless were paramount over the needs of women and African Americans, and this is reflected by their support in Congress.

Homelessness is a "hot" issue and in the recent past has received more attention at the federal level than women's and civil rights issues, producing greater legislative success for the homeless organizations. But this success will likely not last, as evidenced by the decline in legislative success experienced by civil rights organizations. At the same time, national leaders have been playing politics with homeless policy over the past 20 years, mitigating the real changes, or outcome success, met by these organizations and

their constituents. Women's organizations have met with more opposition than the other groups, and have also received steadily diminishing media attention. This opposition and dearth of attention, at least anecdotally, has diminished the effectiveness of advocates for women's issues over time. African American organizations continue to receive attention from institutions and the media and meet with little direct opposition to their efforts, but their ability to realize legislative successes have been minimal.

The results of the quantitative causal analyses are provocative, particularly in comparison with the results of chapters 4 and 5. *With respect to the issues of marginalized groups*, Congress responds to public opinion, not to lobbying. Though the pressure of lobbyists is felt when made by other, more monied interests, in the realm of public interests, Congress reacts to public pressure. I have also demonstrated significant relationships between crises (particularly local crises) and outcome and legislative success. This relationship has more to do with how groups organize and how their organizations operate than with the crises themselves. A positive political opportunity structure is a necessary part of success, but not a sufficient condition for determining that success. Perceptions of success are not impacted by these factors, but do dampen as the negative effects of the context in which groups operate increase.

The implications of both the qualitative and quantitative findings are important for understanding the broader picture of what contributes to a group's success. Strategies and tactics account for part of a group's success, organizational choices and factors account for part, and the relationships, attention and context in which groups operate account for part of their success. None of these factors act in isolation; in order to understand the myriad of factors that contribute to the success and failure of these

organizations, we have to examine them all together. In the next and final chapter, I discuss this theme in more detail.

Table 6.1
Institutional Interactions

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
Courts	62.5% (5)	66.7% (8)	33.5% (5)	51.4% (18)
Congress	100% (8)	91.7% (11)	93.3% (14)	94.3% (33)
White House	100% (8)	83.3% (10)	86.7% (13)	88.6% (31)
Bureaucracy	87.5% (7)	75% (9)	93.3% (14)	85.7% (30)
State government*	75% (6)	91.7% (11)	53.3% (8)	71.4% (25)
Local government	75% (6)	83.3% (10)	53.3% (8)	68.6% (24)
Political parties	62.5% (5)	66.7% (8)	40% (6)	54.3% (19)
Mean institution contacts	5.5	5.58	4.5	5.1
Range of contacts	3-7	2-7	2-7	2-7
n	8	12	15	35

*=significant at $p < .10$; **=significant at $p < .05$; ***=significant at $p < .01$

Table 6.2
Institutions with which Organizations Have the Most Contact by Group

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
Congress	50% (4)	50% (6)	26.7% (4)	40% (14)
White House	12.5% (1)	16.7% (2)	0% (0)	8.6% (3)
Agencies	12.5% (1)	8.3% (1)	60% (9)	31.4% (11)
Courts	25% (2)	16.7% (2)	6.7% (1)	14.3% (5)
State government	0% (0)	8.3% (1)	0% (0)	2.9% (1)
Mix	0% (0)	0% (0)	6.7% (1)	2.9% (1)
n	8	12	15	35

Table 6.3
Testimony and Federal Court Cases by Group

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
Congressional Testimony				
Mean	46.867	35.5	23.2	35.182
Median	4	8	8	6.5
Mode	0	8	0	0
Range	0-533	0-150	0-112	0-533
Appeals Court				
Mean	281.467	45.5	24.067	118.636
Median	1	16.5	0	1.5
Mode	1	2	0	0
Range	0-2086	0-213	0-345	0-2086
District Courts				
Mean	469.2	55.643	36.333	190.046
Median	6	7.5	0	2
Mode	0	2	0	0
Range	0-3796	0-423	0-482	0-3796
Supreme Court				
Mean	27.933	7	3.733	13.023
Median	1	2	0	0
Mode	0	0	0	0
Range	0-349	0-42	0-46	0-349
n	15	14	15	44

Table 6.4
Media Exposure by Group

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
<u>New York Times</u> Mean Range	320.067 0-2936	139.786 0-932	22.8 0-215	161.364 0-2936
<i>NYT</i> Front Page Mean Range	19.214 0-157	19.071 0-133	3.933 0-36	13.837 0-157
Outlet Count Mean Range	1.826 1-6	3.167 1-6	2.533 1-5	2.853 1-6
n <i>NYT</i> n Outlet Count	15 7	14 12	15 15	44 34

Table 6.5
Impact of Crises by Group

	African American	Women	Homeless	Overall
International Crisis Impact n	50% (3) 6	33.3% (4) 12	50% (7) 14	43.8% (14) 32
National Crisis Impact n	66.7% (4) 6	58.3% (7) 12	78.6% (11) 14	68.6% (22) 32
Local Crisis Impact n	66.7% (4) 6	50% (6) 12	42.9% (6) 14	50% (16) 32
Economic Impact n	83.3% (5) 6	91.7% (11) 12	86.7% (13) 15	87.9% (29) 33

Table 6.6
Correlations between Patrons, Media, Context and Success

	Outcome	Legislative	Perceived
Local crises	.357**	.229	-.200
National crises	-.094	.021	-.108
International crises	-.383**	-.058	-.639***
Congressional testimony	.017	-.285	-.145
Supreme Court cases	-.011	-.307	-.141
Court of Appeals cases	-.007	-.288	-.178
District Court cases	.002	-.284	-.164
Media outlets	.175	-.020	.153
<i>New York Times</i> articles	.067	-.334	-.083
<i>NYT</i> front page articles	.147	-.204	.112
Public opinion	.240*	.255	.289**
Institution partner count	.136	-.231*	.043
Work with White House	-.227*	-.230	-.014
Work with Congress	-.166	-.138	-.077
Work with Agencies	-.121	-.273	.141
Work with Courts	-.089	-.273	-.116
Work with state government	.470***	.048	.218
Work with local government	.154	-.086	.125
Work with political parties	.275*	-.089	-.162

***= significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test

**= significant at $p < .05$ using a one-tailed test

*= significant at $p < .10$ using a one-tailed test

Table 6.7
Correlations between Patrons, Media, Context and Success by Group

	Outcome Success			Legislative Success			Perceived Success		
	AA	W	H	AA	W	H	AA	W	H
Local crises	.500	.054	.506**	.000	.483*	.417*	-.585*	-.743	.497
National crises	.135	-.372	.019	.000	-.114	.101	-.172	.031	-.179
International crises	.000	.038	-.690	-.174	.137	-.289	-.243	-.657**	-.754
Congressional testimony	.040	-.133	.025	-.356	-.489	.291	-.323	.011	-.222
Supreme Court cases	.022	-.149	-.307	-.333	-.260	-.052	-.339	.374	-.433*
Court of Appeals cases	.025	-.225	-.351	-.240	.023	-.093	-.338	.038	-.446
District Court cases	.034	-.167	-.364*	-.219	-.038	-.092	-.337	.185	-.459**
Media outlets	.288	.140	.123	-.094	-.332	.387*	.242	.026	.185
<i>New York Times</i> articles	.123	-.162	.239	-.422*	.019	.287	-.307	.093	.071
<i>NYT</i> front page articles	.434*	-.139	.216	-.421	.016	.279	.146	.131	.040
Public opinion	-.420	.063	.525**	.283	.169	.124	.421	-.165	.454**
Institution partner count	.456	.213	-.048	-.098	-.326	-.069	-.204	.178	-.016
Work with White House	--	-.024	-.399*	--	-.476	-.119	--	.415*	-.323
Work with Congress	--	-.016	-.272	--	-.321	.092	--	-.056	-.088
Work with Agencies	-.569*	-.031	.034	.098	-.614	-.254	.339	.322	-.088
Work with Courts	.389	.189	-.467**	.200	-.137	-.612	-.046	.066	-.326
Work with state gov't.	.522*	.761***	.373*	-.149	.379	.150	-.311	-.392	.617***
Work with local gov't.	.522*	-.312	.169	-.149	-.216	.150	-.311	.166	.220
Work with parties	.389	.418*	.156	-.500	.068	.247	-.418	.066	-.269

***= significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test

**= significant at $p < .05$ using a one-tailed test

*= significant at $p < .10$ using a one-tailed test

Table 6.8
Ordered Probit Analysis of the Impact of Institutions and Contextual Events on Success

	Outcome Success	Legislative Success	Perceived Success
<i>Institutions:</i>			
Number of patrons (count)	.089 (.129)	-.215 (.146)	.043 (.127)
Congressional testimony (count)	--	-.0003 (.005)	--
<i>Media:</i>			
New York Times articles (count)	.0003 (.0009)	--	.0006 (.001)
<i>Context:</i>			
National crises (dummy)	-.338 (.435)	-.069 (.451)	.0006 (.001)
Local crises (dummy)	.794** (.408)	.568* (.428)	-.476 (.405)
Public opinion (proportion)	.812 (.812)	1.131* (.831)	.580 (.795)
Cut point 1	.203 (.938)	-2.063 (1.016)	-1.206 (.919)
Cut point 2	.424 (.937)	-1.488 (.984)	-.115 (.896)
Cut point 3	.525 (.938)	.153 (.958)	.854 (.911)
Cut point 4	1.526 (.966)	--	--
Cut point 5	1.720 (.969)	--	--
R-squared	.067	.121	.031
n	32	32	32

***= significant at $p < .01$ using a one-tailed test

**= significant at $p < .05$ using a one-tailed test

*= significant at $p < .10$ using a one-tailed test

Figure 6.1
Annual Average Congressional Testimony by Group, 1989-2000




Figure 6.2
Annual Average Supreme Court Cases by Group, 1975-2000




Figure 6.3
Annual Average of *New York Times* Articles by Group, 1975-2000





Figure 6.4
Bar Graph of Media Coverage by Outcome Success and Group



Legend

X Axis Outcome success scale
Group (1=African American; 2= women; 3=homeless)
Y Axis Mean number of *New York Times* articles

Command: `graph bar (mean) nt, over(outcome) over(group)`

Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this study, I've explored how relatively powerless people have attempted to empower themselves during the last quarter of the 20th century in America, what successes they've achieved and why. My findings largely support the expectations of the field: moderate demands meet with greater success; age improves outcomes; federated structures expand the reach of organizations and their ability to create change; a supportive public opinion increases legislative success; and crises increase success. But in some cases my conclusions depart from these expectations. The most important concerns the efficacy of protests and unusual strategies for affecting change. The work of Gamson and others does not appear to be applicable to contemporary groups as the context in which they now operate is so different. Tactical choices are context dependent (Barker 1994; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003; Tarrow 2003). At some points in America's history violence and protest strategies worked, and in other instances they have not been a viable or the best option (Lipsky 1968). These organizations have employed tactical innovations, changing as the context in which they operate changes, but these changes are not always for the best.

One of the major innovations I make in the study of social movement and advocacy organizations is in devising new ways to measure and model success. I do this in three ways. First, I measure the benefits that members of a group receive as a result of the collective efforts of advocacy organizations and movements. I find that this form of success is dependent upon the combination of the context in which organizations operate, what social movement and advocacy organizations are asking for, and time. Second, I've developed a scale for legislative success measuring whether and to what degree the goals

of social movement and advocacy organizations are realized in Congress through policy change and funding programs. Policy success measures *de jure* change, not necessarily *de facto* change, as the implementation of new programs and allocations of funding does not necessarily solve a group's problems. I find that this form of success is largely dependent upon public opinion. To the extent that the organizations studied are able to impact public opinion, they can affect legislative success. However, their repeated efforts to impact this form of success through public education and indirect lobbying tactics do not appear to be fruitful as measured here. Third, I also examine perceived success, a measure of whether and to what degree organization leaders feel their organizations have been successful. This type of success is important because it sheds light on disconnects between what leaders think are important activities and what actually works, but it is unable to tell us much about variations among the organizations and groups.

What Leads to Success

Outcome and legislative success are functions of internal and external factors. Strategies matter: the more radical a group's radicalness of demands, the lower their success will be. Advocacy organizations are the vehicles that marginalized communities use to advance their concerns and well-being at the national level. The tactics used by these organizations are the means by which they try to advance their constituents' goals. These tactics seem to matter less. Taken together, these organizations are unable to engage inside tactics effectively to produce change. These organizations are also unable to engage outside tactics effectively to produce change. The only exception to this is for

African American organizations. The combined use of litigation and protests over time has produced increased outcome success for this group.

Organizations matter, but subtly. They provide a vehicle through which groups can focus energy, attention and resources, and over time enhance outcome success.

Affiliate structures enable organizations to succeed because they spread influence broadly and mobilize the grassroots. Success is also enhanced by time. Formalizing and sustaining focus and organization over time increases influence, leading to greater outcome success. Organizations that take the time to develop a mass membership base, facilitated through the sometimes more cumbersome and bureaucratic federated structure, will realize greater collective benefits over time. Patience, persistence and reach trump specific tactics. Organizations that succumb to the temptation of working only at an elite level, either through developing a matrix organization structure or by having no membership base, will find it more difficult to achieve their goals. Despite the lure and appeal of an “inside-the-beltway” approach to advocating for marginalized groups, *for these groups* outcome success depends on mass appeal and support, not insider contacts and power plays. The road to change is through the concerted efforts of the many spread across the country, not through that of a few elites in Washington. This has practical implications for organizations in the process of development or those considering significant structural changes. Putting in the effort to establish and maintain a national network of constituents actively pursuing common goals yields more for group members over time.

Externally, success is impacted most by public opinion and crises. Congress responds to public opinion, not to the lobbying efforts of relatively powerless and

resource poor organizations. Though the pressure of lobbyists is felt when made by other, more monied interests, in the realm of public interest organizations, Congress reacts to public opinion and pressure. Crises, particularly local crises, also positively impact both outcome and legislative success. Local crises help organizations engage their grassroots around “real” issues that people care about. They put a face on problems which brings more attention and resources to their causes.

The types of success and their determinants differ by group, a reflection of the tractability of and public fatigue from their issues. During the period of this study, the needs of the homeless were paramount over the needs of women and African Americans. Their issue has received more attention at the federal level than women’s and civil rights issues, producing greater legislative success for the homeless organizations. But this success will likely not last, as evidenced by the decline in legislative success experienced by civil rights organizations. National leaders have been playing politics with homeless policy over the past 20 years, but have yet been able to impact real changes, or outcome success. Women’s organizations have met with more opposition than the other groups, and have also received steadily diminishing media attention. This opposition and dearth of attention, at least anecdotally, has diminished the effectiveness of advocates for women’s issues over time. African American organizations continue to receive attention from institutions and the media and meet with little direct opposition to their efforts, but their ability to realize legislative successes have been minimal. The only African American civil rights and women’s organizations for which this is not true are the organizations that have shifted focus away from purely civil rights arguments and to

more individualized approaches to creating change (i.e., employment and wealth). These goals seem to resonate better with the public and lawmakers today.

Towards A Causal Model of Social Movement and Advocacy Group Dynamics

The analyses discussed above show that strategies and sometimes tactics, organizational factors, and context are separately important for determining success, but how do they work together? In an overarching causal model, which of these, if any, is more important? I am unable to test such a model here because of the sample size of this study and problems with multicollinearity.³⁵ Instead I offer a causal explanation and model for future study. Based upon a combination of the extant literature on social movement and advocacy organizations and the findings from this study, I suggest the following causal explanation of success (see Figure 7.1).³⁶

Achieving collective benefits for group members is a function of moderate goals; the ability of organizations and movements to mobilize their grassroots; age; past legislative successes; and a supportive public opinion. This is an endogenous model where grassroots mobilization is a function of the types of tactics organizations use (most notably public education and community organizing); having a federated structure to mobilize the grassroots; a large individual membership base; and positive public opinion.

³⁵ I did attempt to run these and other similar models but they suffered from problems with multicollinearity. The only consistent finding among them is the negative and significant impact of radicalness of demands on outcome success ($p < .01$) and the positive and significant impact of local crises on legislative success ($p < .05$). There were no significant results in the simultaneous equation models I ran.

³⁶ Outcome success = $\beta_{10} + \beta_{11}\text{radicalness} + \beta_{12}\text{grassroots mobilization} + \beta_{13}\text{age of organization} + \beta_{14}\text{legislative success} + \beta_{15}\text{public opinion} + \mu_1$ (1), where Grassroots mobilization = $\beta_{20} + \beta_{21}\text{public education} + \beta_{22}\text{community organizing} + \beta_{23}\text{organizational structure} + \beta_{24}\text{membership size} + \beta_{25}\text{public opinion} + \mu_2$ (2), and Public opinion = $\beta_{30} + \beta_{31}\text{grassroots mobilization} + \beta_{32}\text{public education tactics} + \beta_{33}\text{positive media attention} + \mu_3$ (3). AND Legislative success = $\beta_{40} + \beta_{41}\text{radicalness} + \beta_{42}\text{public opinion} + \beta_{43}\text{grassroots mobilization} + \beta_{44}\text{crises} + \mu_4$

Grassroots mobilization reflects the agency of these organizations, and these organizations should also be able to impact public opinion. Public opinion should in turn be a function of grassroots mobilization efforts, public education, and a supportive media. Finally, legislative success is a function of moderate demands; a supportive public opinion; grassroots mobilization to help voice that public opinion to policy makers; and crises, particularly local crises that put a real face on problems and mobilize people to come out in support of the issue at hand. I have included a lagged legislative success variable in the outcome success model. Though I find only a minimal relationship between outcome success and legislative success in this study, I believe the relationship is at least theoretically important. In a perfect world, social change ought to be impacted over time by legislative mandates and programs. We live in an imperfect world where change is much more complex than a legislative victory, but historically we know that legislative changes can be critically important. The Civil and Voting Rights Acts are excellent examples of this. A comprehensive study of the impact of social movement and advocacy organizations ought to be able to model these relationships and their joint impacts on success. This represents an ambitious but important agenda for future work teasing out the determinants of social movement and advocacy organization success.

Discussion and Implications

The findings from this study lead me to five questions about the work of social movement and advocacy organizations today. First, how do we resolve the debate about whether internal or external factors are more important for predicting success for these groups? Second, do tactics matter? Third, why are there such significant differences between the activities and success of the groups studied? Fourth, where is power vested

in the American political system today? And finally, what are the lessons and implications for the leaders of social movement and advocacy organizations? Each of these questions is explored below.

Which Is More Important: Internal Or External Factors?

A major split in social movement theory is between those that feel that internal factors, explored through the study of strategies and tactics and resource mobilization theory are most important to success and those that extol the political opportunity structure and external factors as the key explanatory variable for success. The answer is that neither is more important than the other. Comparative studies of the effectiveness of tactics show that the same tactics used in different places have different results (Olzak and Uhrig 2001), but that must tactics matter because without them there would be no results. Strategies and tactics are differentially important as the political opportunity structure changes; they do not exist in isolation but interact to create change. What these movements and organizations are trying to do is multidimensional and complex, and the field needs to move to the point that it can model this dynamic process. Political opportunity structure can be affected by movements and vice versa: they have an interdependent relationship. Movements and their organizations have agency (Morris 1999) and can revitalize or mitigate the impacts of other movements and organizations (Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Rollins 1986). These processes are interdependent and complex: neither internal or external factors explain success in isolation.

Why Don't Tactics Seem To Matter?

The findings I present in Chapter Four suggest that tactics have only a minimal impact on success. Litigation and protests worked for African American organizations,

but not for the others, nor did they have a cumulative impact on the different forms of success. Why don't they seem to matter? I think there are three possibilities: first, the effectiveness of certain tactics will wane over time; second, these tactics may actually be quite effective at protecting past successes from retrenchment, but this is not measured in this study; or third, change may be pushed by other factors.

The first possibility is that there is a "movement playbook" (Cox 1951; Morris 1999; Olzak and Uhrig 2001) that developed over time and seems to work at the beginning of a movement but has a natural dying out affect. At the beginning of a movement, a combination of grassroots appeals and demonstrations combined with litigation and lobbying creates change. Over time this doesn't work as well because of greater emphasis on top down organizational structures, "grassroots" work that isn't very grassroots, and more use of inside tactics. This suggests that to some degree these organizations have wasted 30 years of resources (money, leadership, volunteers, public will) on tactics that just won't work. The civil rights movement provides a good example of this. Its ability to mobilize the grassroots began to wane in the 1970s, in part a result rising public opinion on the parts of whites about blacks and rising black socioeconomic status. These factors lessened the salience and importance of the civil rights movement making it more difficult to galvanize their grassroots (Thomas and Thomas 1984). Without real grassroots support, protest tactics lost their punch and lobbying tactics lost their saliency with the public and immediacy for lawmakers.

Second, it is possible that these tactics are quite effective, but I am not able to capture this here because what the organizations are actually doing with these tactics is

shoring up past successes from retrenchment. Several of the organization leaders I interviewed hinted at this. One stated that opposition groups

“impact everything we do. Even though they [the opposition groups] are non-partisan, they are very political. These groups also push to get people elected to office that are supportive of their different priorities.”

And as I noted in Chapter Four, some of the groups mentioned opposition strategies taking up time and resources, diverting these organizations from fully pursuing their goals. This suggests that the field needs to develop a way to measure to what degree movements and their organizations are able to protect past successes from opposition threats.

Finally, change may be pushed by other factors. One example of this is business. Many businesses have found that it’s a good idea to hire women and minorities because it is good for their bottom line. Rob Handfield, Director of the North Carolina State University Supply Chain Resource Consortium believes that

“an increasing number of companies have focused on ... diversity simply because it is good business. Minorities now represent the largest sales growth markets, especially in consumer goods, and companies realize that increasing the amount of business with the minority businesses may mean increased sales for their own firm over the long term” (Handfield 2003).

This explanation suggests that at some critical point success becomes path dependent. Once the ball of change is rolling, social movement and advocacy organizations may no longer matter as much.

Why Are the Experiences and Successes of These Groups Different?

There are important differences between the activities and determinants of success for the groups I studied. In Chapter Four I showed that the homeless and women's organizations used public education tactics more than the African American organizations, that focused more on networking tactics, but past lobbying, litigation and protests worked for these organizations while they have not for the women and homeless organizations. Chapter Five shows that the homeless organizations are on the whole younger than the African American and women's organizations, which in turn impacts structure and outcomes. And in Chapter Six we see that the African American and women's organizations spend much more time with Congress and the courts and get more media attention than the homeless organizations, but this does not help them. Legislative success is significantly higher for the homeless organizations than for the others. Why have they been so much more successful in this arena?

There are two primary explanations for why the homeless organizations achieved greater legislative success during the period of this study than the other organizations. First, there is more to do at the beginning of a movement, so over time successes will diminish. The homeless movement is newer and has more to do; its ability to achieve goals is greater. Second, the nature of the appeals of these groups is different. African American and women's groups appealed to a basic human rights violation which lent itself well to public outcry in support of constitutional changes, but once this was achieved later appeals seem trivial. This may explain the waning legislative success of contemporary civil rights organizations. The "public" generally feels that the real problems of African Americans and women have been solved. White attitudes towards

blacks have increased, as has black socioeconomic status increasing, lessening the importance of calls from civil rights organizations to mobilize (Thomas and Thomas 1984). This also applies for the women's movement. The first wave of feminism was largely successful. But the second wave of the women's movement came from people who were not quite as excluded: they, at least, were allowed to vote, so they did not have to take to the streets in the same way. They did achieve some wins, particularly legal changes protecting women in education and the workplace. But today's fights seem less important.

Where Is Power?

Perhaps the most interesting question this study sheds light on is about power and where it lies in contemporary American society. Is there a powerful person, organization or group of people that has control over these organizations? The statistical analyses I present in Chapters Four through Six suggest that the power to effect change is held primarily in two places: in the hands of the social movement and advocacy organization founders as they grapple with questions of their demands and how their organizations will function, and in the hands of the "grassroots," the "people" whose opinions shape public will and when engaged or disengaged can differentially affect the fates of these organizations.

I asked the organization leaders who they felt the most important actors, groups or institutions are who can affect real change for their issue. Their responses largely do not reflect the quantitative findings. Overall, the organization leaders see Congress and donors/foundations as the two entities that can affect real change for them (29.4% and 17.6% of respondents respectively). But as measured in Chapters Five and Six, neither

strong relationships in Congress, testifying in Congress, nor budget or staff size are significant predictors of success. Broken out by group, African American organization leaders overwhelmingly noted donors and foundations as the most powerful group able to impact their success (42.9% of respondents). The women's organizations noted Congress first (41.7%) and their donors/foundations second (16.7%). The homeless organizations noted Congress first (29.4%) and were the only group to rate their target population and constituents in the top two response categories (20.0%). The response of Congress for the period of this study only makes sense for the homeless organizations.

Overall, only 2.9% of respondents noted “the people,” those who make up public will and opinion, as a powerful group that affects their chances of success. Why is there a disconnect between the quantitative findings and the feelings of the organization leaders? Perhaps these leaders are not looking at the good of the movement or thinking about the mechanisms that create success, but rather are thinking about notable public victories (and hence the response of Congress), or about what their organizations need to survive, money (and hence the response of donors and foundations). Either way, only the homeless organization leaders accurately reflected back who has been important for affecting the successes they've realized.

It is also possible that power lies together among all of these organizations in a way I do not measure here. Perhaps all of these organizations work together in concert, as an orchestra, some providing thunderous demands and others urging change with more melodic, softer demands. In this scenario, even unsuccessful organizations are critical to the success of social movements overall. The more radical and less “successful” organizations create room for the other organizations to achieve their goals by expanding

what is possible. If the only goals that are voiced are small, incremental changes, the opposition will fight against those. If, however, larger more radical goals are demanded by some organizations, opposition will focus on those and more room will be made for the organizations that pursue smaller wins, thus increasing their “successes” as measured here. Movements are organic, their organizations pieces of a larger whole that also includes the grassroots and patrons; together they all create change. In this conception power is diffuse, and we “see” it and its effects sporadically, here and there. But if we take a step back and look at the larger story, power is really held broadly by all of the players of the movement together. Though this would be very difficult to measure, it is nonetheless a compelling explanation.

What Can Advocacy Organizations Learn from This?

All studies of social movement and advocacy organizations should have important implications for the leaders of these organizations. This study has two. First, there is a disconnect between the perception of what works for organization leaders and what actually works. Second, some tactics that worked in the past aren’t working now, and organization leaders would be wise to revisit other tactics that have been abandoned.

As movements age, issues evolve, and context changes, organization leaders are faced with the need to alter tactics to compensate for these changes. In order to do this, these leaders must be able to accurately reflect on what is working and what is not. Through my interviews I discovered that in some important cases the leaders of these organizations are not able to do this, most notably in the area of strategies and tactics. This was made most clear to me in the differences between the levels the leaders think are most important to work at and the level their work actually represents. Where these

leaders say it is most important to work to effect change in the current political climate and where they are actually working do not match. There is also a disconnect in the thinking of leadership about the tactics organizations use and the utility of those tactics. The tactics that these organizations use do not seem to help them in achieving their ends directly, despite the fact that the leaders of the organizations see at least some of these tactics as producing success. The leaders of these organizations take their ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ tactics too seriously and need to develop a better way to measure and reflect back the impact of their work.

My findings also shed light on which approaches work best to advance movement goals. First, these organizations need to explore new and modified tactics to impact public opinion. Public opinion counts, and these organizations need to figure out how to tap into the tremendous power that it has. Second, newer and emerging organizations should resist the temptation to focus just on inside-the-beltway tactics. Third and related, these organizations should not forget their grassroots. If the civil and women’s rights movements have anything to learn from the current Christian fundamentalist movement, it is this one. (And ironically, the Christian fundamentalist movement learned this lesson from the civil and women’s rights movements.) As organizations become more sophisticated and are able to attract attorneys, lobbyists and public figures, they must not forget where their real power lies. Meaningful work at the grassroots level is indirect, slow and time consuming, but it makes a difference.


I end where I began, with the story of Marilyn. Today Marilyn is a professional, the leader of a national organization that advocates on behalf of marginalized people.

Her work crosses issues of powerlessness, violence, poverty, racism and sexism. She sees the experiences of her youth, participating in “Black Mondays,” watching the community improvements that resulted from the community empowerment projects of the local branches of national organizations, and listening to the rhetoric of her radical older brother as the critical influences that brought her to this place. The organizations that led these activities and that she saw as beacons of hope in her youth no longer resonate with her. She believes that groups like the NAACP and Urban League are “disconnected” from the people, unable to galvanize the support of the grassroots, and that these organizations do not see this. Their leaders are so blinded by past victories and the status that they have achieved that they no longer connect with their real power base, the people, in any meaningful way.

Marilyn may well be right. Most of the grassroots strategies that these organizations pursue today are web-based, focused on soulless activities like appeals for funds or to write letters to Congressional representatives and the White House or to sign petitions. It’s cheap, but this doesn’t really seem to work. Aldon Morris (2000) writes that the civil rights movement was successful because it capitalized on a combination of strong emotions and rational pursuits to galvanize the grassroots, and this is right. This was what Marilyn and her family felt, what they are missing today. Moderate goals, patience and time, a supportive public, and the ability to modify strategies and tactics to take advantage of the political context in which an organization is working is a formula for success. Real success happens for movements with a message that resonates with people: where problems are real and urgent; where their solutions are necessary for democratic functioning; where people are energized to do more than click their mouse

and then forget that they are actually fighting for something. Success for the organizations I studied will happen when they find a way to re-engage Marilyn and her family.

Figure 7.1
Causal Explanation of Social Movement and Advocacy Organization Success



Appendix A
Interview Protocol

Organization Name _____

Interviewee _____

Date _____

Location _____

General Questions: 1. I have identified the following goals from your organizational materials. Are these accurate? What else should be included? How have these changed over time? How? Why?

General Questions 2. In general, how successful have you been in meeting these goals? Explain what you mean.

Organization 1. First, I want to discuss the strategies you all have employed. What were the major strategies that you all have employed over the past 25 years?

- _____ a) lobbying
- _____ b) litigation
- _____ c) policy analysis, forums or advising policy makers
- _____ d) training, technical assistance or capacity building
- _____ e) grants or scholarships
- _____ f) protest or public disruption
- _____ g) organization formation
- _____ h) individual advocacy
- _____ i) petitions
- _____ j) community organizing
- _____ k) research or evaluation
- _____ l) public education or consciousness raising
- _____ m) conferences and seminars
- _____ n) publications
- _____ o) leadership development
- _____ p) direct services
- _____ q) voter drives or voter education
- _____ r) networking
- _____ s) volunteer coordination
- _____ t) other

[For each of these] How successful was it? Why?
Of these, which ones have you used most often?

Organization 2. With respect to the goals that you all have set, do you think that national, state, or local work is more important? Why? Has this changed over time? (If yes) How? Can you speculate as to why?

Organization 3. Now I want to ask a couple of questions about internal organizational dynamics. How do you make decision about goals and tactics? Once those have been set, how do you mobilize your constituency?

Organization 4. Does this organization collaborate with other organizations to meet goals?
(If yes) With whom? What do these arrangements look like? How long have you been doing this? How successful have they been? Will you continue this type of work in the future?

Organization 5. When your organization has not been successful in meeting its goals, what were the biggest barriers? Why? How?

Political Institutions 1. I have a list here of possible government institutions. For each, please answer whether your work engages this institution.

- _____ a) Congress (House, Senate)
- _____ b) Presidency
- _____ c) Cabinet
- _____ d) Courts (Supreme Court, Federal courts, State courts)
- _____ e) Political Parties (Republican, Democrat, Other)
- _____ f) State Politics
- _____ g) Local Politics

[For all of the yes answers] What did you do? How important do you see this work to meeting your goals? Has this has changed over the past 25 years?

Political Institutions 2. Has changing partisan representation shaped your strategy choices? How have strategies changed with control of the White House and Congress? What do you do under divided control?

Context 1. What role do you think public opinion plays in reaching your organizational goals? How? Why? Does your organization engage specific activities to try and influence public opinion? (If yes) What? Do you think it works? What makes you think that? (If no) Why not? Has this changed over time? (If yes) How? Why?

Context 2. What role do the media play? Do the media help or hurt? Can you differentiate among the effects of print media and other types? Which media outlets do you engage? How often? What do you do? Is it effective? How has this changed over time?

Context 3. What role do you think national crises play in your work? Do international crises affect your work? Local crises? How?

Context 4. Many nonprofits have cited the recent economic downturn as having a major negative impact on their work. Has this affected your organization? How? How does the economy generally affect your organization's ability to meet its goals?

Context 5. Does the work of other similar organization (aside from what we have already discussed) affect your organization's ability to meet its goals? (If yes) How? How important is this?

Context 6. Are there groups that are in opposition to your work? (If yes) Which ones? How does this affect your work? Do you think this opposition has been important in your ability to meet your goals? (If yes) How?

Power The final question I want to ask you is about power. With respect to what your organization is trying to achieve, who are the powerful actors? Why? How are they powerful? What does this mean for your organization and its ability to meet its goals? How has this changed over time?

Appendix B: Outcome Success

Legend:

Organization name	Description of group success measure	Year began or 1975 (later)	2000
		Measure	Measure
		Source	Source
		Score	

Organization	Group Success		
A. Philip Randolph Institute	Income parity between blacks and whites	1975	2000
		1:1.714	1:1.541
		US Statistical Abstract	
		1	
ABA Commission on Homelessness and Poverty	Legal representation for homeless persons (proxy of newspaper articles)	1991	2000
		20	15
		Lexis/Nexis	
		-1	
American Women’s Economic Development Corporation	Increase the number of women-owned businesses	1976 (87)	2000
		4114787	5417034
		H	US Stats
		1	
Black Veterans for Social Justice	Increase in available services and funding for veterans	1990	2000
		\$12 mil	\$9 mil
		US Statistical Abstract	
		-1	
Community for Creative Non-Violence	End homelessness	1975(87)	2000
		500-600k	500k-1.5m
		Y	k
		-3	
Concerned Women for America	Decrease rate/number of abortions	1979	1997
		28.8 (rate)	22.2(rate)
		US Statistical Abstract	
		1	
Congress on Racial Equity	Increase in black income (in 2000 constant dollars)	1975	2000
		21,418	30,436
		US Statistical Abstract	
		2	
Covenant House	Availability of youth services (proxy of articles)	1975	2000
		0	535
		Lexis/Nexis	
		3	
Equal Rights Advocates	Increase in non-traditional employ. for women (construction proxy)	1975	2000
		1.8%	2.5%
		DOL	US Stats
		2	
Feminist Majority Foundation	Use of mifepristone for abortion instead of surgical procedures (% gyn prescribing)	1987	2000
		0	6%
		NARAL	
		1	
League of Women Voters	Increase in voter turnout	1975	2000

Organization	Group Success	
		-1
Ms. Foundation for Women	Number of women-owned businesses	1975 (87)
		2000
		4114787
		5,417,034
		4
		US Stats
		1
Nation of Islam	Increase number of black-owned businesses	1978 (87)
		2000 (97)
		424165
		823000
		I
		US Stats
		3
National Alliance to End Homelessness	End (decrease) homelessness	1983
		2000
		500-600 k
		500k-1.5m
		Y
		K
		-3
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	Increase black voter turnout	1975
		2000
		1
National Black Leadership Roundtable	Black voter turnout	1982
		2000
		1
National Black United Fund	Number of black philanthropic institutions	1976
		2000
		1
		20+
		O
		3
National Coalition for Homeless Veterans	Decrease the number of homeless veterans	1990(96)
		2000
		529,000
		250,000
		Z
		N
		2
National Coalition for the Homeless	End/decrease the number of homeless persons	1982
		2000
		500-600 k
		500k-1.5m
		Y
		K
		-3
National Coalition on Black Civic Participation	Increase black voter turnout	1976
		2000
		1
National Coalition for Research on Women	Amount of research on women being conducted (pol sci journal proxy)	1981
		2000
		214
		21
		JSTOR
		-3
National Interfaith Hospitality network	Decrease number of homeless	1986(87)
		2000
		500-600 k
		500k-1.5m
		Y
		k
		-3
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty	Decrease number of homeless	1989
		2000
		500-600k
		500k-1.5m
		Y
		k
		-3
National Network for Youth	Increase number of youth services	1975
		2000
		1
		16

Organization	Group Success	
	(newspaper proxy)	Lexis/Nexis
		3
National Organization for Women	Parity in employment between women and men (unemployment rate proxy)	1975 (80)
		2000
		1:1.072
		1:1.051
		US Statistics Abstract
		1
National Partnership for Women and Families	Parity in employment between women and men (unemployment rate proxy)	1975 (80)
		2000
		1:1.072
		1:1.051
		US Statistics Abstract
		1
Rainbow/PUSH Coalition	Income parity between black and white people	1984
		2000
		1:1.681
		1:1.541
		US Statistics Abstract
		1
National Resource Center on Homelessness and Mental Health	Increase number of services for the homeless (newspaper proxy)	1988
		2000
		1
		81
		Lexis/Nexis
		3
National Runaway Switchboard	Increase in homeless youth services (newspaper proxy)	1975
		2000 (98)
		6
		535
		Lexis/Nexis
		3
National Student Campaign Against Hunger and Homelessness	Amount of student activism about hunger & homeless (newspaper proxy)	1985
		2000
		1
		1
		Lexis/Nexis
		0
National Urban League	Income parity for African Americans (in 2000 constant dollards)	1975
		2000
		1:1.714
		1:1.541
		US Statistics Abstract
		1
National Women's Political Caucus	Number of women in Congress (House is used)	1975
		2000
		13
		62
		Public Record
		3
Orphan Foundation of America	Education opps for foster children who have aged out (newspaper proxy)	1981
		2000
		0
		12
		Lexis/Nexis
		1
Poverty and Race Research Action Council	Availability of research on race and poverty (pol science articles)	1990
		2000
		44
		7
		JSTOR
		-3
Second Harvest	Amount of available food assistance (newspaper proxy)	1979
		2000
		4
		71
		Lexis/Nexis
		3
Southern Christian Leadership Conference	Employment parity for African Americans (median income in 2000 constant dollars)	1975
		2000
		1:1.714
		1:1.541
		US Statistics Abstract
		1

Organization	Group Success	
Traveler's Aid	Programs to support the homeless travel (newspaper proxy)	1975
		2000
		2
		100
		Lexis/Nexis
		3
Wider Opportunities for Women	Economic parity for women (in 2000 constant dollars)	1975
		2000
		1:2.547
		1:1.746
		US Statistics Abstract
		1
Women Work!	Women's employment (managerial position proxy used)	1978 (83)
		2000
		40.9%
		50.0%
		US Statistics Abstract
		3
Women's Law Project	Decrease in intimate partner violence (number of murders used)	1975
		2000
		1600
		1200
		D
		1
Young Women's Christian Association	Economic parity between men and women (in 2000 constant dollars)	1975
		2000
		1:2.547
		1:1.746
		US Statistics Abstract
		1

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Appendix C: Legislative Success

Legend:

Organization name	Description of policy success measure	Policy change references Score
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Organization	Policy Success	
A. Philip Randolph Institute	Policy to encourage income parity and living wages	0
ABA Commission on Homelessness and Poverty	Policy to encourage pro bono representation of homeless persons	0
American Women's Economic Development Corporation	Policy to encourage women owned small businesses	PL 100-533; PL 102-191; PL 106-17 3
Black Veterans for Social Justice	Policy to increase benefits and services for veterans, especially homeless veterans	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988; PL 102-86 1991; PL 105-368 1988 3
Community for Creative Non-Violence	Policy to increase number of homeless service programs	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988 2
Concerned Women for America	Promote policy to end legal abortion	PL 107-96 ; PL 104-107; PL 104-62; PL 103-259; PL 97-12 0
Congress on Racial Equity	Policy to continue and expand affirmative action	0
Covenant House	Policy to encourage increase youth homelessness programs	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988; PL 106-71 1999 3
Equal Rights Advocates	Policy to increase non-traditional employment for women	PL 102-530; PL 102-235 2
Feminist Majority Foundation	Legal use and funding for development of mifepristone	1987 banned 2000 allowed w/ funding 2
League of Women Voters	Election reform	PL 97-205; PL 98-435; PL 101-194; PL 93-443; PL 103-31; PL 102-344

Organization	Policy Success	
Ms. Foundation for Women	Policy to encourage women-owned businesses	PL 100-533 1998; PL 102-191 1996; PL 106-17 1999
Nation of Islam	Policy to encourage black owned businesses	0
National Alliance to End Homelessness	Policy to end/ decrease the number of homeless	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988 2
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	Policy to encourage affirmative action	0
National Black Leadership Roundtable	Symbolic acknowledgement of role of African Americans	PL 104-329; MLK Holiday 1
National Black United Fund	Change in the Combined Federal Campaign rules for the organization	PL 104-62 1
National Coalition for Homeless Veterans	Policy to increase programs for homeless veteran	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988; 102-86; 105-368 3
National Coalition for the Homeless	Policy to increase emergency services for the homeless	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988 2
National Coalition on Black Civic Participation	Policies to increase black voter turnout	PL 97-205; PL 98-435; PL 101-194; PL 93-443; PL 103-31; PL 102-344 2
National Coalition for Research on Women	Funding for research on women	PL 105-255 1998; PL 105-340 1998 1
National Interfaith Hospitality network	Policy to increase the number of homeless providers	PL 100-77; PL 101-645; PL 100-628; 2000 Presidential Order 3
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty	Increase the number of programs for the homeless	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988 2
National Network for Youth	Policy to support homeless youth	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628; PL 106-71 1999

Organization	Policy Success	
National Organization for Women	Policy to encourage economic parity between men and women	PL 102-530; PL 102-235; PL 105-255 1998 2
National Partnership for Women and Families	Policy to support women's employment	PL 102-530; PL 102-235; PL 105-255 1998 2
Rainbow/PUSH Coalition	Policy to encourage income parity	PL 105-255 1998 1
National Resource Center on Homelessness and Mental Health	Policy to support education and resources for the homeless	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988 2
National Runaway Switchboard	Policy to increase homeless youth services	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988; PL 106-71 1999 3
National Student Campaign Against Hunger and Homelessness	Policy to promote programs to end hunger and homelessness	PL 100-6; PL 100-435; PL 101-645; PL 103-448; PL 104-210 3
National Urban League	Policies that incorporate NUL language	From interview 1
National Women's Political Caucus	Women's cabinet appointments	3
Orphan Foundation of America	Policy to support foster children who have aged out of foster care	PL 106-169 2
Poverty and Race Research Action Council	Programs to ameliorate problems associated with race and poverty	PL 105-255 1998; PL 106-525 2000 2
Second Harvest	Policy to encourage food assistance	PL 100-6; PL 100-435; PL 101-645; PL 103-448; PL 104-210 3
Southern Christian Leadership Conference	Policy to encourage employment parity for African Americans	PL 105-255 1998 1
Southern Poverty Law Center	Laws to discourage extremist groups	0

Organization	Policy Success	
Traveler's Aid	Policy to support programs that support the homeless	PL 100-77 1987; PL 101-645; PL 100-628 1988 2
Wider Opportunities for Women	Policy to encourage women's employment	PL 102-530; PL 102-235; PL 105-255 1998; PL 105-255 1998 2
Women Work!	Policy to encourage women's employment	PL 102-530; PL 102-235; PL 105-255 1998 2
Women's Law Project	Policy to discourage violence against women	PL 103-322 1994; PL 106-385 2000 3
Young Women's Christian Association	Policy to encourage women's employment	PL 102-530; PL 102-235; PL 105-255 1998 2

Appendix D: Variable Codebook

Barriers (barriers1-6)

Barriers mentioned by organization (maximum 6), including:

- | | | | |
|----|-------------------------|-----|-------------------------|
| 1= | money | 10= | policy failures |
| 2= | staff limitations | 11= | opposition groups |
| 3= | program cuts | 12= | target population |
| 4= | competing issues | 13= | collaborative issues |
| 5= | service issues | 14= | organization reputation |
| 6= | lack of public interest | 15= | crises |
| 7= | public opinion | 16= | media |
| 8= | competing visions | 17= | other |
| 9= | internal problems | | |

Budget (budget)

Most recent available annual budget figure.

Collaborative Size (collabnum)

Number of collaborative partners organizations mentioned by name during interviews.

Collaborative Success (collabsuc)

Organization's sense of the success of their collaborative efforts, including:

- | | | | |
|----|------------------|----|---------|
| 1= | complete success | 3= | failure |
| 2= | mix | | |

Court of Appeals Cases (cat)

Total count of Court of Appeals cases over the time period.

Congressional Testimony (ct)

Count of times organization has provided testimony before Congress over the time period.

Crisis Impact- International (crisisi)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization feels that it has been impacted by international crises.

Crisis Impact- International (crisisil)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization feels that it has been impacted by local crises.

Crisis Impact- International (crisisn)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization feels that it has been impacted by national crises.

Decisions (decisions)

Source of decision making for organization, including:

- | | | | |
|----|-------|----|-------|
| 1= | staff | 3= | mix |
| 2= | board | 4= | other |

District Court Cases (dct)

Count of District Court cases over the time period.

Group (group, g1, g2, g3)

Categorization of organization into group, African American (g1), women (g2), or homeless (g3).

Economy (economy)

Dummy variable for whether organization has been impacted by recent economic downturn.

Institutional importance (iimp)

Organization's sense of whether the White House or Congress is most important in moving their work forward.

- | | | | |
|----|-------------|----|---------|
| 1= | White House | 3= | mix |
| 2= | Congress | 4= | neither |

Institutional Contact (imost)

Government institution with which the organization has the most contact, including:

- | | | | |
|----|-------------|----|-------|
| 1= | Congress | 6= | State |
| 2= | White House | 7= | Local |
| 3= | Agencies | 8= | mix |
| 4= | Courts | 9= | none |
| 5= | Parties | | |

Interaction with Agency/Cabinet (icabinet)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization works or interacts with a federal agency or cabinet member.

Interaction with Congress (icongres)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization works or interacts with Congress (individual members, testimony, committees, and so on).

Interaction with Courts (icourts)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization works with or interacts with the courts.

Interaction with Local Governments (ilocal)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization works or interacts with local governments.

Interaction with Parties (iparties)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization works with or interacts with the political parties.

Interaction with State Governments (istate)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization works with or interacts with state governments.

Interaction with White House (iwhitehs)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization works or interacts with the White House.

Interaction Total (icount)

Count of total number of institutional interactions (range is from 0-7).

Legislative Success (legislative)

Organization goals are translated into a key policy area. These policy areas are then explored to examine what types of national laws have been made by Congress in those areas. These policy changes are placed on a 9-point scale to indicate the amount and direction of change over the period.

- 4= policy change in direction of group interests and meets group needs
- 3= significant policy change in direction of group interests
- 2= some policy change in direction of group interests
- 1= minimal policy change in direction of group interests
- 0= no change OR both positive and negative policy change
- 1= minimal policy change in opposition to group interests
- 2= some policy change in opposition to group interests
- 3= significant change in opposition to group interests
- 4= complete policy change in opposition to group interests

Level of Work (levelwk)

Level that organization feels that it is most important to work at in order to achieve desired results, including:

- | | | | |
|----|----------|----|-------|
| 1= | national | 3= | local |
| 2= | state | 4= | mix |

Local Affiliates (localct)

Count of the number of affiliates of the national organization.

Media Outlet Count (medianum)

Count of number of media outlets used by organization (from interview question).

Media Outlets (media1-6)

Types of media outlets used by organization, including:

- | | | | |
|----|------------|----|------------|
| 1= | newspapers | 3= | television |
| 2= | magazines | 4= | radio |

5= other print

6= internet

Membership Type (memb, m1, m2, m3, m4)

Series of dummy variables indicating the type of memberships the organization has, including individual, organizations, combination, and none.

New York Times Articles (n1apct, n1pct, n1t, nt, nyc)

Series of variables of the count of times over the study period that the organization is mentioned on page 1 of the various sections of the New York Times (includes percentage, actual count, and percentage without 0 and 1 values). Also includes a dummy variable that captures whether or not the organization is located in New York City.

Name of Organization (name)

Name of organization.

Opposition Groups (oppose)

Dummy variable for whether the organization feels there is/are opposition groups that significantly impact their work.

Organization Structure (orgstruc)

Dummy variable that captures whether the organization has a federalized (1) or unitary (0) structure.

Outcome Success (outcome)

Organization goals are translated into a key area for group improvement. A measure of group demographic for that goal area is taken for the year the organization is created or for 1975 (whichever comes last), and is then compared to the same group measure for 2000. This is then placed on a 7-point scale to indicate the amount and direction of change over the period.

3= 67-100% of possible positive change

2= 34-66% of possible positive change

1= 1-33% of possible positive change

0= no change

-1= 1-33% of possible negative change

-2= 34-66% of possible negative change

-3= 67-100% of possible negative change

Partisan Control Impact (partisan)

Dummy variable for whether the organization feels that partisan leadership/control changes in Congress impact the organization's ability to achieve its goals.

Perceived Success (perceived)

Based on interview responses to a question about the overall general success of the organization in meeting its goals, a 5-point scale of subjective success is developed to capture reported success and direction.

- 4= complete success
- 3= some success but not complete
- 2= mix of success and failures
- 1= some failures but not complete
- 0= complete failure

Powerful Actors (power1-6)

Actors the organization feels has significant power for creating change in their issue area, including:

- | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1= Congress | 9= respondent organization |
| 2= President/White House | 10= another organization |
| 3= Agencies | 11= target population |
| 4= Courts | 12= the “people” |
| 5= government generally | 13= the electorate |
| 6= state officials/offices | 14= donors/foundations |
| 7= local officials/offices | 15= media |
| 8= corporations | 16= a specific person |
| | 17= other |

Public Opinion (pubop1)

Proportion of people who support the issue advocated by each organization, from the GSS.

Public Opinion Spread (pubopa, pubopb)

Standard error of proportions of people for and against the issue advocated by each organization, from the GSS.

Radicalness of Demands (raddemand)

The mission and goals of the organizations were examined for the degree of radicalness of demands, captured in terms of the types of changes for which the groups advocate. A 3-point scale is developed to capture how radical groups demands are.

- 3 advocate for changes in values and power structure
- 2 advocate for institutional changes
- 1 advocate for policy and program changes

Supreme Court Cases (st)

Count of number of Supreme Court cases organization is involved with during study period.

Staff (staff)

Count of total number of staff at time of interview.

Staff Volunteers (staffv)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not major staff positions are filled by volunteers.

Tactic: Community Organizing (tcommorg)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses community organizing as a tactic.

Tactic: Conferences (tconfer)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses conferences or seminars as a tactic.

Tactic: Count (tcount)

Total count of tactics used by the organization (range is 0-19).

Tactic: Grants (tgrants)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses grants or scholarships as a tactic.

Tactic: Individual Advocacy (tindadv)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses advocacy on behalf of individuals as a tactic.

Tactic: Leadership Development (tleaddev)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses leadership development as a tactic.

Tactic: Litigation (tlitigat)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses litigation as a tactic.

Tactic: Lobby (tlobby)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses lobbying as a tactic.

Tactic: Networking (tnetwork)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses networking with other organizations as a tactic.

Tactic: Organization Formation (torgform)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses formation of other organizations as a tactic.

Tactic: Petitions (tpetit)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses petitions as a tactic.

Tactic: Policy Analysis and Forums (tpolicy)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses policy analysis and education forums as a tactic.

Tactic: Protest and Public Disruption (tprotest)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses protest or public disruptions as a tactic.

Tactic: Public Education (tpubed)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses public education as a tactic.

Tactic: Publications (tpubs)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses publications as a tactic.

Tactic: Research and Evaluation (treseval)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization uses research or evaluation as a tactic.

Tactic: Services (tservice)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization provides direct services as a tactic.

Tactic: Success (tsuccess1, tsuccess2, tsuccess3)

A series of variables that captures the first, second and third most successful tactics used by the organizations, including:

1=	lobbying	10=	community organizing
2=	litigation	11=	research/evaluation
3=	policy analysis	12=	public education
4=	training, technical assistance	13=	conferences
5=	grants	14=	publications
6=	protest	15=	leadership development
7=	organization formation	16=	direct services
8=	individual advocacy	17=	voter education/drives
9=	petitions	18=	networking
		19=	volunteer coordination

Tactic: Technical Assistance or Training (tta)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization provides technical assistance or training as a tactic.

Tactic: Use (tuse1, tuse2, tuse3)

A series of variables that captures the first, second, and third most often used tactics by the organizations, including:

- 1= lobbying
- 2= litigation
- 3= policy analysis
- 4= training, technical assistance
- 5= grants
- 6= protest
- 7= organization formation
- 8= individual advocacy
- 9= petitions
- 10= community organizing
- 11= research/evaluation
- 12= public education
- 13= conferences
- 14= publications
- 15= leadership development
- 16= direct services
- 17= voter education/drives
- 18= networking
- 19= volunteer coordination

Tactic: Volunteer Coordination (tvolut)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization provides volunteer coordination as a tactic.

Tactic: Voter Drives and Education (tvoter)

Dummy variable indicating whether or not the organization provides voter drives or voter education as a tactic.

Year Established (yearest)

Year organization was established.

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